Losing a Model Democracy

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Title:
Losing a Model Democracy Salvador Allende and U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1945-1970
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english
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Hove, Mark
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University of Florida
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Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
History
Committee Chair:
Newman, Louise M.
Committee Members:
Thurner, Mark W.
Colburn, David R.
Williams, Philip J.
McMahon, Robert J.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
aid, alessandri, allende, authoritarianism, bowers, castro, chile, communism, copper, democracy, development, dictatorship, diplomacy, dungan, eisenhower, elections, embassy, frei, gonzalez, hove, ibanez, ideology, johnson, junta, kennedy, kissinger, korry, military, model, nixon, overthrow, pinochet, policy, politics, premise, president, reform, relations, revolution, rubottom, santiago, socialism, tacnazo, threat, truman, viaux, washington
History -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
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History thesis, Ph.D.
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )

Notes

Abstract:
LOSING A MODEL DEMOCRACY: SALVADOR ALLENDE AND U.S.-CHILEAN RELATIONS, 1945-1970 By Mark T. Hove August 2009 Chair: Louise M. Newman Major: History This dissertation breaks from the scholarly focus upon Allende?s presidency and from the 1975 Church Committee?s questions about U.S. actions towards Chile and Salvador Allende. It traces U.S.-Chilean relations from 1945 to 1970 and examines how U.S. perceptions of Chile as a model democracy intertwined with Allende's rise as the leader of the Chilean Left to create what U.S. officials deemed as one of the most dangerous threats of the Cold War. Drawing upon multiple U.S. and Chilean archives and primary sources, this study shows that at the start of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers defined Chile?s primary asset as an ally as the symbolic value that its model democracy offered the world. They constructed the model democracy premise, which asserted that Chile had a firmly rooted democracy, resembled a European nation, and was located outside the immediate U.S. sphere of influence. The premise guided U.S. policy towards Chile until 1970, defined the primary U.S. objective as preserving democracy, and enabled Chileans to extensively shape or impede U.S. efforts. Besides detailing the centrality of democracy in U.S. policy towards Chile, this study shows how U.S. perception of threats shifted from the Right to the Left during the Cold War. For U.S. officials, the initial postwar threat to Chilean democracy was rightist authoritarianism, embodied in General Carlos Ibáñez and Argentina?s Juan Pero acuten. During the 1954 U.S. intervention in Guatemala, Salvador Allende criticized and led protests against U.S. policy, and then travelled to Moscow, turning U.S. officials? focus from the Rightist to the Leftist threat. After Allende?s near-victory in Chile?s 1958 presidential election, U.S. policymakers considered him as dangerous to U.S. interests, if not more so, than Fidel Castro, because he could achieve socialism through democratic means and serve as a revolutionary prototype. Allende?s words and actions encouraged and rarely mitigated U.S. concerns about his Cold War allegiances and aims. Beginning under President Kennedy, the United States interfered in Chile?s domestic politics to keep Allende from power, but reduced its interference in the late 1960s. With Allende?s victory in 1970 and the Nixon administration?s efforts to subvert Chile?s constitutional processes to deny him the presidency, the United States lost a model democracy. Ironically, in the aftermath of Allende?s 1973 overthrow, critics of U.S. policy and subsequent U.S. policymakers drew upon the model democracy premise as they realigned U.S. policy towards promoting democracy and human rights and assisted Chile?s return to democracy.
General Note:
In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
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Includes vita.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
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Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
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This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
General Note:
Adviser: Newman, Louise M.
General Note:
RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2010-02-28
Statement of Responsibility:
by Mark Hove.

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Applicable rights reserved.
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lcc - LD1780 2009
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UFE0024361:00001


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LOSING A MODEL DEMOCRACY: SALVADOR ALLENDE AND U.S. -CHILEAN RELATIONS, 1945-1970 By MARK T. HOVE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2009 1

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2009 Mark T. Hove 2

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To David, whose love and support made this possible 3

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Completing any major academic effort like as a dissertation is not possible without the assistance of many people. I owe special th anks Dr. Robert McMa hon who took me under his wing, urged me to strive for my best narra tive and analysis, and continually provided good advice and encouragement. Dr. Louise Newman me rits special thanks for her constant support, encouragement, candor, and guidance. She c ontinually struck the perfect balance between mentor, colleague, and friend, and often transforme d that which seemed distant or unattainable into something within reach. During my studies at the Univers ity of Florida, I enjoyed the friendship, collegiality, and ideas of excellent co lleagues, such as Steve Ortiz, Jason Parker, James Thompson, Adam Howard, and Marixa Lasso. I thank the Society for Historians for Amer ican Foreign Relations (SHAFR) for granting me the Michael Hogan Fellowship to study Spanish and do research in Chile for several weeks. It was also through SHAFR that I met Jeff Taffet, Kyle Longley, Stephen Rabe, Alan McPherson, and Jim Siekmeier, who offered valu able ideas, critcism, and encouragement. I thank the John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines J ohnson, and Gerald R. Ford Presidential Libraries for generous research grants that enab led me to pursue the larger story of Allende and the United States. I thank the archivists at the many archives and libraries where I conducted research. They include Beth Lipford and Ed Ba rnes (National Archives, College Park), Dennis Bilger (Truman Library), Davi d Haight (Eisenhower Library) Stephen Plotkin and Jennifer Quan (Kennedy Library), Regina Greenwell (Joh nson Library), Geir Gunderson (Ford Library), Carmen D. Duhart (Archivo de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), Margarita Barraza C. (Fundacon Eduardo Frei), Jorge Salinas (Benso n Latin American Collection, University of Texas), Christopher Harter (Claude Bowers Pape rs, Lilly Library, Indiana University), Linda 4

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Long (Wayne Morse Papers, Knight Library, Univ ersity of Oregon), and Mary Carter (Frank Church Papers, Albertsons Librar y, Boise State University). During the course of this proj ect, I have gained many friends and colleagues who, in ways great and small, have assisted me in this project, as has my family. Herb and Mary Ann Bolton merit my gratitude many times over for their friendship and gracious hospitality during my extensive research at the National Archives and Li brary of Congress. I owe special gratitude to my friend Rick Marsden who encouraged me to take a chance and pursue a dream. I thank my parents, Lorin and Janet, and my sibling, Laurel Carrie, and Doug for their love and support. I offer profound thanks to my early mentors Ronald Schultz at the University of Wyoming and the late Kinley Brauer at the Univ ersity of Minnesota for sharin g their guidance, knowledge, and encouragement. Gwen Garrison, Linda Hodson, D oug Kraft, Sara Schoo, Patrick Barr-Melej, Judy Fai-Podlipnik, Nathaniel Smith, Tom Pearcy, Kristin Ahlberg, Rick Moss, Anand Toprani, Chris Tudda, Rick and Gloria Comstock, Ma deleine Matthew, Karrie Brain-Marsh and Jeff Marsh have helped me more than they realize. Finally, I offer my deep love and gratitude to my partner David Ma tthew who has been a constant source of strength, love, joy, and guidance since I firs t considered graduate study. David, without you, I would not have made it. 5

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...............................................................................................................4 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................9 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. .14 2 RISE OF A MODEL DEMOCRACY, 1945-1948.................................................................26 Periphery to Battleground...................................................................................................... .26 A Meeting of Two Democracies.............................................................................................29 Accepting a Popular Front President......................................................................................41 Copper, Coal, and Foreign Investment...................................................................................52 Collapse of Gonzlez Videlas Coalition...............................................................................57 A European Crisis.............................................................................................................. .....66 The Model Democracy Premise.............................................................................................73 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................82 3 FAVORING A MODEL DEMOCRACY, 1949-1952...........................................................84 The Premise Adopted............................................................................................................ .84 Mr. Y and Hemispheric Relations.......................................................................................87 Developing Threats Left and Right........................................................................................98 The Korea War and a Cold War Policy................................................................................107 Two Fronts and the 1952 Election........................................................................................112 Who Lost Chile?...................................................................................................................125 Conclusion............................................................................................................................131 4 A THREAT EMERGES, 1953-1954....................................................................................134 The Arbenz Factor.............................................................................................................. ..134 New Administration, Same Premise.....................................................................................136 The Friends of Guatemala....................................................................................................146 Shifting from Right to Left...................................................................................................158 A New Threat Arises............................................................................................................ 174 Conclusion............................................................................................................................182 5 A VERY CLOSE THING, 1955-1958.................................................................................185 Allende Precedes Castro.......................................................................................................1 85 Preventing Social Revolution...............................................................................................186 6

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Golpe with Tea and Marmalade...........................................................................................189 The Klein-Saks Mission.......................................................................................................19 6 The Pine Tree in a Flower Pot..............................................................................................208 The End of the Klein-Saks Program.....................................................................................211 Seeking the Presidency Again..............................................................................................220 Anxieties and Misse d Opportunities.....................................................................................227 A Very Close Thing..............................................................................................................240 Conclusion............................................................................................................................251 6 RUNNING SCARED, 1958-1964........................................................................................255 Supporting Frei, Stopping Allende.......................................................................................255 Insisting upon Reform..........................................................................................................257 A Road, But Not the Road....................................................................................................268 Creating a Showcase............................................................................................................ .271 Tampering with Democracy.................................................................................................289 The Panic Button............................................................................................................... ...303 Conclusion............................................................................................................................318 7 LOSING INFLUENCE, 1964-1967.....................................................................................320 Another Chance................................................................................................................. ...320 Getting Their Wish...............................................................................................................324 Allende and a Divided Left...................................................................................................33 3 Europes Model Democracy.................................................................................................339 A Short-Sighted Request......................................................................................................34 5 Balancing Democracy and Revolution.................................................................................350 Losing Influence...................................................................................................................357 The King of Spades..............................................................................................................363 Conclusion............................................................................................................................367 8 STEPPING BACK, 1967-1969............................................................................................369 A New Ambassador..............................................................................................................369 Stepping Back.......................................................................................................................372 Abandoning Democracy.......................................................................................................375 A Guayabera for Guevara.....................................................................................................383 Nixon and Latin America.....................................................................................................386 Political Skill and a Little Luck............................................................................................39 1 More Stepping Back.............................................................................................................402 Viauxs Earthquake..............................................................................................................405 Conclusion............................................................................................................................439 9 THE ANTI-MODEL, 1967-1969.........................................................................................443 Limits and Fears............................................................................................................... ....443 The 1970 Campaign..............................................................................................................446 Ten Days in September.........................................................................................................4 69 7

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Mucking Around...............................................................................................................481 Conclusion............................................................................................................................494 10 EPILOGUE.................................................................................................................... .......497 11 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. ...509 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................525 Manuscipt Collections.......................................................................................................... 525 Oral Histories........................................................................................................................528 Published Documents, Memoirs, and Historic Monographs................................................529 Newspapers and Periodicals.................................................................................................531 Books and Articles................................................................................................................532 Unpublished Materials..........................................................................................................559 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................560 8

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS In Text AID Agency for International Development AP Associated Press API Alianza Popular Independiente / Popular Independent Alliance ARA Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State CIA Central Intelligence Agency CUTCh Central nica de Trabajadores de Chile / United Union of Chilean Workers EXIM Export-Import Bank FECh Federacin de Estudiantes Chilena FRAP Frente de Accin Popul ar / Popular Action Front IADB Inter-American Development Bank IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IMF International Monetary Fund ITT International Telephone and Telegraph MAPU Movimiento de Accin Popular Unitaria / Movement of Unified Popular Action MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario / Movement of the Revolutionary Left NSC National Security Council OLAS Organizacin de Latinoamrica Solidaridad / Latin American Solidarity Organization PCCh Partido Communista de Ch ile / Communist Party of Chile PDC Partido Demcrata Cristiana / Christian Democrat Party PL Partido Liberal / Liberal Party 9

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PL 480 Public Law 480 (Food for Peace program) PN Partido Nacional / Nacional Party PR Partido Radical / Radical Party PS Partido Socialista / Socialist Party PSP Partido Socialista del Pueblo / Peoples Socialist Party UP Unidad Popular / Popular Unity USP Unin de Socialista Popular / Union of Popular Socialists In Source Citations AWF Ann Whitman File (Eisenhower Library) CGMR Records of Paul T. Carroll, A ndrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-1961 (Eisenhower Library) CFPF Central Foreign Policy File CIA Chile II Chile Declassification Project, CIA Files, Tranche 2 CIA Chile III Chile Declassification Project, CIA Files, Tranche 3 CO Country File DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library DEF Defense Files DF Decimal File DOD Chile III Chile Declassifi cation Project, Department of Defense Files, Tranche 3 FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States GRFL Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library HSTL Harry S. Truman Presidential Library JFKL John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 10

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LBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson Library NA National Archives and Records Administration NARA Chile II Chile Declassification Project, Department of State Files, Tranche 2 NARA Chile III Chile Declassification Project, Department of State Files, Tranche 3 NPMP Nixon Presidential Materials Project NSC National Security Council NSC Chile II Chile Declassification Project, National Security Council Files, Tranche 2 NSC Chile III Chile Declassification Project, National Security Council Files, Tranche 3 NSF National Security File POL Political Files RG59 Record Group 59 RG59 Lot Record Group 59, Lot Files USGPO United States G overnment Printing Office WHCF White House Central File WST Office of West Coast Affairs 11

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Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy LOSING A MODEL DEMOCRACY: SALVADOR ALLENDE AND U.S. -CHILEAN RELATIONS, 1945-1970 By Mark T. Hove August 2009 Chair: Louise M. Newman Major: History This dissertation breaks from the scholarly focus upon Allendes presidency and from the 1975 Church Committees questions about U.S. actio ns towards Chile and Salvador Allende. It traces U.S.-Chilean relations from 1945 to 1970 a nd examines how U.S. perceptions of Chile as a model democracy intertwined with Allende's rise as the leader of the Chilean Left to create what U.S. officials deemed as one of the most dangerous threats of the Cold War. Drawing upon multiple U.S. and Chilean archives and primary s ources, this study shows that at the start of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers defined Chiles primar y asset as an ally as the symbolic value that its model democracy offered the world. They constructed the model democracy premise, which asserted that Chile had a firmly rooted democr acy, resembled a European nation, and was located outside the immediate U.S. sphere of influence. The premise guided U.S. policy towards Chile until 1970, defined the primary U.S. objective as preserving democracy, and enabled Chileans to extensively shape or impede U.S. efforts. Besides detailing the centrality of democracy in U.S. policy towards Chile, this study shows how U.S. perception of threats shifted from the Right to the Left during the Cold War. For U.S. officials, the initial postwar threat to Chilean democracy was rightist authoritarianism, embodied in General Carlos Ibez and Argentinas Juan Pern. During the 1954 U.S. 12

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intervention in Guatemala, Salvador Allende cri ticized and led protests against U.S. policy, and then travelled to Moscow, turning U.S. officials focus from the Rightist to the Leftist threat. After Allendes near-victory in Chiles 1958 presidential election, U.S. policymakers considered him as dangerous to U.S. interests, if not more so, than Fidel Castro, because he could achieve socialism through democratic means and serve as a revolutionary prototype. Allendes words and actions encouraged and rarely mitigated U.S. concerns about his Cold War allegiances and aims. Beginning under Presid ent Kennedy, the United St ates interfered in Chiles domestic politics to keep Allende from power, but reduced its in terference in the late 1960s. With Allendes victory in 1970 and the Ni xon administrations effort s to subvert Chiles constitutional processes to deny him the presidency, the United States lost a model democracy. Ironically, in the aftermath of Allendes 1973 over throw, critics of U.S. policy and subsequent U.S. policymakers drew upon the model democracy premise as they realigned U.S. policy towards promoting democracy and human rights a nd assisted Chiles return to democracy. 13

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION We Chileanshad a long and solid democra tic tradition and we were proud of being different from other countries of the continent, which we scornfully re ferred to as banana republics, where every other day some caud illo took over the government by force. No, that would never happen to us, we proclaimed, because in Chile even the soldiers believed in democracy. Isabel Allende 1 The Model Democracy Premise. This dissertation began with a single question. While serving in the U.S. Coast Guard, I visited Chiles capital city, Santia go, and the gentleman who served as my tour guide for the day asked: Why did you Americans allow your government to overthrow our president? As a 21-year-old from a Minnesota farm travelling overseas for the first time, I could only confess my ignorance of Salvador Allende Gossens, Chilean history, and U.S. foreign policy. The mans question lingere d as I pursued my undergraduate and graduate studies after my military service. The contradi ction troubled me: the United States, the worlds premier democracy, whose leaders had long pr ofessed support for democracy, had acted to subvert another nations constitu tional procedures. Other ques tions arose as I studied the histories of U.S. foreign policy and Chile: Were U.S. leaders truly committed to democracy? How and why did U.S. policymakers reach a po int where they opted to compromise an ideological principle that U.S. citi zens hold as central to their exer cise of political rights? What influence did Chileans have in this process? During my readings and research of U.S. di plomatic and Chilean history, I was puzzled by the fact that Allende is generally cast in U.S. scholarship as a man without history, to borrow 1 Isabel Allende, My Invented Country: A Nostalgic Journey through Chile (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 155. 14

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Eric Wolfs phrase. 2 Little of his pre-1970 politic al career appears in English, 3 and unlike other prominent Chilean leaders like Carlos Ibez del Campo, Eduardo Frei Montalva, and Jorge Alessandri Rodrguez, Salvador Allende does not have a scholarly biography. 4 Even though diplomatic and Latin American scholars have no ted Allendes four pres idential candidacies and near-victory in 1958, they give scan t attention to his long political career or his relationship with U.S. diplomats prior to 1970. Given Chiles political system, 5 a prominent politician running four times for President would have merited c onsiderable attention by the U.S. Embassy in Santiago and the Department of State th roughout the post-World War II era. This dissertation examines U.S.-Chilean relations from 1945 to 1970, exploring how and why Allende arose as a Cold War threat among U.S. policymakers and how Allende as a man with history, as well as other Chilean leaders, influenced U.S. policy and diplomacy during the period. During the research and writing of th is study, the primary source documents shattered 2 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of Calif ornia Press, 1997 [1982]). 3 There are basically three English-language works that o ffer glimpses into Allendes pre-1970 political careers: interviews with Allende by Regis Debray, an article by Peter Winn, and a young readers biography sans citations by Hedda Garza. See Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Vintage Press, 1971); Winn, Salvador Allende: His Political Lifeand Afterlife, Socialism and Democracy 19/3 (November 2005): 129-159; and Garza, Salvador Allende World Leaders, Past and Present series, (New York: Chelsea House, 1989). Among Spanish-language works, edited collections of Allendes speeches by Alejandro Witker and Jos G. Martnez Fernndez offer short biographical e ssays on Allendes life. See Witker, ed., Salvador Allende, 19081973: Prcer de la liberacin nacional (Mxico: Universidad Nacional Aut noma de Mxico, 1980); and Martnez Fernndez, ed., Allende: Su vida, su pensamiento poltico (Santiago: Ediciones Palabra Escrita, 1988), 17-31. 4 Of biographies of prominent Chilean leaders, see Robert J. Alexander, Arturo Alessandri: A Biography 2 volumes (University Microfilms International for the Latin Ameri can Institute of Rutgers University, 1977). Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor 2 volumes (Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1952). Ernesto Wrth Rojas, Ibez: Caudillo enigmtico (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1958). Patricia Arancibia, Alvaro Gngora, and Gonzalo Vial, Jorge Alessandri, 1896-1986: Una biografa (Santiago: Editora Zig Zag, 1996). Cristin Gazmuri R., Eduardo Frei y su poca 2 volumes (Santiago: Aguilar, 2000). 5 Federico G. Gil details the Chiles political system as it existed prior to 1970. See Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966). See also Chiles 1925 constitution, which was in effect during the period under study. Constitucin Poltica de la Repblica de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, [1925] 1967). 15

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my preconceptions, resulting in a na rrative sharply at odds with th e one that I had expected to tell. I had anticipated writing about how and why U.S. foreign policymakers misperceived, misunderstood, and/or were uninformed about Chile, its politic dynamics, Salvador Allende, and the threat he posed in 1970. 6 I had also foreseen examining the ways in which U.S. officials described Chileans in orientalist terms and an alyzing how and why U.S. diplomats constructed Chileans as racially and culturally inferior. Inst ead, the primary source documents revealed that U.S. diplomats constantly detailed and discussed Chiles political system, the intricacies of its politics and party ideologies, as we ll as the countrys emerging social crisis. The documents also showed U.S. officials constantly praising the Chilean s for their talents, skills, industry, as well as their political and cultural sophistication. I fu rther discovered that U.S. officials knew Allende extremely well and had detailed his words, ac tions, and travels throughou t his career. The shock I experienced from the primary documents partly result ed from a secondary literature that remains trapped in the framew ork created by the 1975 Church Committee report. The product of a U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (D Idaho) that investigated U.S. intelligence ac tivities, the report traces what it describes as the increasing U.S. covert intervention in Chiles democracy from 1962, covert intervention that climaxed under President Richard M. Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger. The report details U.S. covert efforts to influen ce Chiles 1970 presidential election, to encourage a coup detat to prevent Allendes inauguration, as well as a few clandestine efforts against Allende during his presidency, until his overthrow on 11 September 1973. For a committee that 6 I had anticipated engaging in Robert Jerviss work on misperception and decision-making. See Jervis, Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Un iversity Press, 1976). 16

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held hearings in the wake of the 1973-1974 Watergate scandal, U.S. activities in Chile not only ran counter to U.S. foreign policy principles and U.S. values but al so were another indictment of the disgraced Nixons abuse of pr esidential power and his pursuit of a misguided foreign policy. 7 The scholarly debate and literature has rema ined caught up in the questions of the 1975 Church Committee: What were U.S. actions u nder Nixon and Kissinger towards Allende? To what degree were those actions illegal, unethical, and/or flaw ed? and How did those actions contribute to Allendes overthrow on 11 Septem ber 1973? Even today, scholars studying U.S.Chilean relations have generally approached U.S. policy and actions duri ng Allendes presidency (1970-1973) through those questions, creating a onesided story about what U.S. policymakers did to Allende and Chile. One group has inqui red into why Allende was overthrown and the degree to which the United States bears responsibility for his demise, 8 and the other has explored how the Nixon administration formulated and conducted U.S. foreign policy. 9 Furthermore, the focus on Allendes presidency has left the trajec tory of the U.S.-Chilean relationship during the early Cold War largely unexamined in English-langua ge historical literature, although Jeffrey F. 7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 94 th Congress, 1 st Session (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1975). 8 Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). Mark Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989). Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978 ). James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: The New Press for the National Security Archive, 2003) Jonathan Haslem, Allende and the Nixon Administration: A Case of Assisted Suicide (London: Routledge, 2004). 9 Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking Press, 1978); Seymour M. Hersch, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: BasicBooks, 1994); Robert Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger, Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia Univers ity Press, 1989); and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). 17

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Taffet has partially remedied this historiographi cal hole with an excellent, much-needed study of the Alliance for Progress in Chile during the 1960s. 10 The general literature on Chil ean history, while rich about Chiles politics, economy, copper industry, agrarian sector, and emerging social crisis, does not offer an adequate long-term perspective on Allende and his politi cal career. Works on Chilean po litics have tended to focus on Allendes presidency and the 1973 coup det at led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. Such accounts highlight three inte r-related questions: Why did Chiles democracy collapse and the military coup and subsequent brutal dictatorsh ip occur? Why did the Marxist revolution in Chile not succeed? and What achievements did A llendes Popular Unity (UP Unidad Popular) government attain? 11 Some scholars of Chilean history have examined the flaws and fragility of 10 The best, and really only English-language overview of the period remains William F. Saters survey of U.S.Chilean relations. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990). For essays addressing particular aspects of U.S.-Chilean relations during the early Cold War, see Andrew Barnard, Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947, Journal of Latin American Studies 13/2 (November 1981): 347-374. Barnard further developed this thesis in a later essay. See Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second Wo rld War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., 66-91. For the Klein-Saks mission of 1955-1958, see Jon V. Kofas, Stabilization and Class Conflict: The State Department, the IMF, and the IBRD in Chile, 1952-1958, International History Review 21/2 (June 1999): 366-385. Jeffrey F. Taffet, Alliance for What?: United States Development Assistance in Ch ile during the 1960s, Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2001. In moving from dissertation to book, Taffet focused upon the Alliance for Progress more broadly, using Chile as one of his case studies. See Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007). 11 Scholars have approached the three questions through a number of avenues. As examples, for the development and evolution of Marxism or socialism in Chile, see Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984); Ricardo Israel Z., Politics and Ideology in Allendes Chile (Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1989 ; and Benny Pollack and Hernan Rosenkranz, Revolutionary Social Democracy: The Chilean Socialist Party (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986) For the history of political parties, see the above works, and Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). For the developmen t of the Chilean Right, see Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford Univers ity Press, 1999); Marcelo Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 1973-1997 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999). Alt hough appearing more than a decade ear lier, Thomas C. Wri ghts work on the National Agricultural Society may be considered a pioneering study of the Right. See Wright, Landowners and 18

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Chilean democracy. 12 Other scholars have explored the weaknesses in Chiles economy, the composition of Chilean elites, the domination by multi-national corporations in Chiles two main export sectors (nitrates and copper), and the role that foreign economic missions had upon Chiles economy, development, and politics. 13 This dissertation breaks from the Church Committees framework and the scholarly focus upon Allendes presidency. Instea d of asking what the United Stat es did to President Allende, and how those actions contributed to his overthrow, this study poses another set of questions. If Allende ran for president four times and near ly won in 1958, why was he suddenly deemed a dangerous threat in 1970, as so of ten suggested in the literature? If he was not deemed a threat by previous U.S. presidential administrations, why did he evolve into a dangerous Communist threat for the Nixon administration? If he was d eemed a threat earlier, wh at initiatives did U.S. policymakers undertake to counter or reduce the A llende threat? How did the words and actions by Chileans, particularly Allende, facilitate or mitig ate U.S. perceptions of Allende as a threat? Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, 1919-1940 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). For the role and influence of specific groups such as the Catholic Church and landowners within Chiles political system, see Brian H. Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and Democracy in Chile and Peru (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); Brian Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); and Thomas C. Wright, Landowners and Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, 1919-1940 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). For Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and Toms Moulian, La forja de ilusiones: El sistema de partidos, 1932-1973 (Santiago: Universidad ARCIS and la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales [FLASCO], 1993). 12 For example, see Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and Toms Moulian, La forja de ilusiones: El sistema de partidos, 1932-1973 (Santiago: Universidad ARCIS and la Facultad Latinoameri cana de Ciencias Sociales [FLASCO], 1993). 13 See Markos J. Mamalakis, The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Barbara Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978); Stefan Van Wylder, The Political Economy of Unidad Popular (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 975); Maurice Zeitlin and Richard E. Ratcliff, Landlords and Capitalists: The Dominant Class in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile (or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were) (Princeton: Princeton Un iversity Press, 1984). 19

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Through these new questions, this dissertation tr aces three inter-related threads to explore how Allende evolved into what U.S. policymakers deemed as one of the most dangerous threats that the United States confronted in Latin America, and how they sought to diminish and end that threat. As one thread, this study examines how U.S. diplomats and policymakers perceived Chile and its role as a U.S. Cold War ally. U.S. officials constructed an image of Chile that became an icon that, while imperfect, distinguis hed Chile from the many nations and multiple crises that U.S. policymakers addressed on a daily basis. 14 Second, the work traces the development and evolution of U.S. policy towards Chile and describes how U.S. officials image of Chile shaped the actions and strategies that they employed to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. As U.S. government documents show, th e mental icon that U.S. officials constructed also gave Chilean leaders considerable access to and influence among U.S. policymakers. Third, the work explores Chiles political and economic dynamics to examine how Chileans, including Allende, shaped U.S. perceptions, policy, and actions. The study forages into Allendes political biography, as well as his speeches and writings, in order to study how his ideas and actions resembled, shaped, and contrasted with U.S. offi cials perceptions of him and the threat he posed. To go further and offer a fully resear ched biography of Alle nde or a study of the evolution of his political philos ophy would be to undertake one or two additional dissertations. U.S. policymakers ideas about Chile coales ced into what I have termed the model democracy premise and that premise shaped and guided U.S. policy toward Chile throughout the first half of the Cold War (1945-1970). Ac utely aware of the importance of symbols in 14 See Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 17-19. Cottams work effectively describes the importance of cognitive images in managing vast quantities of information; however it ineffectively uses it to examine U.S. interventionism. 20

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United States emerging ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers confessed that Chiles primary asset as a Cold War ally was the symbolic value that its democracy offered to the global community, not its copper, nor its control of the Straits of Magellan. 15 To the model democracy concept, U.S. o fficials added such ideas as Chile being a culturally sophisticated, Europeanized nation, a na tion with a long traditio n of constitutional rule and republican politics, and an i ndustrializing nation nearing devel oped status. By continually citing its exceptionalism, U.S. officials locate d Chile in a borderland between Europe and Latin America, and routinely compared Chile to Italy, France, and the United States. Although U.S. officials did not appear to not ice the contradiction of casting a nation as exceptionalist and a model, they did recognize that Chiles model democratic image was an effective but imperfect icon. It encapsulated the core issues and dynamics involved for U.S. policy and distinguished Chile from the many na tions with whom U.S. policymakers conducted relations. U.S. officials admitted that Chiles image as a sophisticated democracy accorded the Chileans favored treatment, respect, and measured equality. Also, Chileans effectively exploited their image as a European-like democratic mode l to attain their national and foreign policy objectives. In reports and memoranda, U.S. of ficials acknowledged that Chiles social and economic elites wielded a majority of the levers of power and enjoyed the benefits. Yet U.S. officials also noted that Chile had a comparativ ely large middle class and that Chiles middle, working, and lower classes had a larger voice in the political arena than was the case in other 15 For works that cite economics, copper, or strategic geographic sites as primar y objectives of U.S. Latin American policy, see David Green, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Petras and Morley, The United States and Chile ; and Lars Shoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton Univ ersity Press, 1987). 21

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Latin American nations. U.S. policymakers did not equate their constructed image of Chile as a full representation of the countr y, nor did they deem it as a mask, veneer, or mere rhetoric. 16 Salvador Allende also employe d the discourse of Chilean models and exceptionalism, and he openly cast himself as a revolutionary and a democrat. As a Socialist Party founder and leader, Allende admitted that he adhered to the pr inciples of Chiles bourgeois democracy and unwaveringly promoted his revolutionary vision of la va pacfica (the peaceful road) to marxist socialism. He said that la va pacfica would serve as a revolutionary prototype for other developing nations because they could look to Chile and say, an entire people succeeded in taking into their hands the contro l of their destiny in order to travel on the democratic road toward Socialism. Although defining himself as a revolutionary, Allende rejected the road of revolutionary violence the st rategy utilized and promoted by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara in Cuba as inapplicable to Chile. Castro deemed Allendes vision of democratic revolution as unworkable and dismi ssively told the Chilean that his guerrilla suit should be made by Christian Dior. Allende, however, st ressed that he could ach ieve Marxist socialist revolution via the ballot box in Ch ile, or as Guevara wrote, the same result by other means. 17 16 The idea that Chile received respect and measured equality from U.S. officials due to its democratic / republican image runs counter to Lars Schoultzs claim that Latin Amer ican inferiority is the essential core of U.S. policy. The subject of racism and U.S. policy is discussed more fully in the Conclusion. Historical geographer J. Valerie Fifer shows that U.S. diplomatic officials, entrepreneurs, and investors have long perceived the Southern Cone as distinct from the rest of Latin America. See Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard Univers ity Press, 1998); and Fifer, United States Perceptions of Latin America, 1850-1930: A New West South of Capricorn (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 1991). 17 For Allende adhering to democracy and reforming Chile an society within existing bourgeois institutions, see Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emisin, 1985), 83-84; and Sheldon B. Liss, Marxist Thought in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 100-102. Alejandro Cheln Rojas criticized Alle nde for adhering to bourgeois democracy. See Cheln, Trayectora del Socialismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Astral, 1966), 156. Salvador Allende Gossens, Speech in the National Stadium, 5 November 1970, in Allende: Su pensamiento poltico (Buenos Aires: Granica Editor, 1973), 19-26. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Memorandum Ch ilean Crisis, Chief of Chile Task Force and Deputy 22

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For U.S. officials working with in the bipolar, zero-sum Cold Wa r context, the threat that Allende posed to the United States was the model and precedent that he would offer as the first democratically elected Marxist leader of a nation a model and precedent that Allende also sought. For a generation of U.S. policymakers who had witnessed Germanys democracy elect Adolph Hitler and who had watched Communist members of a coal ition subvert a de mocratically elected government in Czechoslovakia, Allende stru ck at a core vulnerability of democracy and threatened to blur the binary of U.S. democracy versus Soviet totalitari anism. U.S. officials believed that the loss of Chile would cas t doubt on U.S. ideology and rhetoric about democracy, legitimate the Communists as an acceptable choice in electo ral politics, provide a model for Moscow and its allies, and signify U. S. weakness. For his part, Allende, through his words and actions, often fueled and rarely mitigated U.S. concerns about his objectives and allegiances. For U.S. officials, the Allende th reat was not a competing vision of democracy, one that would alter the rela tionship between the means of production and exercise of political rights; it was the precedent Allende would offer as the firs t democratically elected Marxist president. This dissertation tells the tragic and ironic story of how the United States struggled for two and one-half decades to preserve Chiles democr acy and prevent Salvador Allende being elected President of Chile, only to lose that struggle in 1970. The narrative consists of two parts, each divided into four chapters arranged in chronological order. The first part traces the rise of the model democracy premise and the rise of Allende as a preeminent threat to the United States. Chapter 1 details the rise of the model democracy premise during the onset of the Cold War, a Chief of Western Hemisphere Division to William V. Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, 29 September 1970, Tranche III, CIA Collection, Chile Declassification Project, http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CIA.asp. Rgis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Vintage Press, 1971), 74. 23

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rise that was facilitated by U.S. policymakers belief that events in Chile between 1945 and 1948 paralleled events in Europe, not Latin America. Chapter 2 tells how the Truman administration adopted the model democracy premise and best owed favored treatment to Chile between 1949 and 1952 in order to prevent the loss of Chile to rightist, authoritarian General (Ret.) Carlos Ibez del Campo. U.S. officials were convinced that Ibez would impose a dictatorship, ally with Argentinas Colonel Juan Pern, and pr esent a propaganda coup to the Communists. Chapter 3 relates how the U.S. hostility toward and the sponsor ed overthrow of Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, reverberat ed across Chilean politics and U.S.-Chilean relations. It describes how the Lefts response to Arbenzs demi se led in part by Allende shifted U.S. policymakers attention from Ibez and the authoritarian Right to Allende and the Marxist Left. Chapter 4 describes how the United States sought to streng then Chiles democracy by aiding the Ibez governments effort to enac t the Klein-Saks economic program. Allende, meanwhile, built the Popular Action Front coaliti on (FRAP Frente de Accin Popular), rose to be the foremost leader of the Left, and nearly won Chiles 1958 Pr esidential election. Part Two details U.S. policymakers struggle to preserve Chilean democracy and prevent Allendes election as president. Chapter 5 trac es the fallout of the 1958 election, from which the United States and Allende concluded that he could gain power through the ballot box. Deeming Allende a threat more dangerous than Fidel Ca stro, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations each tried to impose a reform program upon Presid ent Jorge Alessandri. Alessandri subverted both, prompting U.S. officials to embrace and extensively support Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. Chapter 6 relates how the Johnson administrati on, with Freis victory secured, lost sight of its primary objective: strengthe ning Chiles democracy. It fo cused upon how U.S. aid monies were spent, the mechanics of Freis reform pr ograms, and obtaining a special price on copper. 24

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Allende, meanwhile, recast himself as democrat and a revolutionary, and overtly aligned with Havana and Moscow. Chapter 7 discusses how U.S. Ambassador Edward M. Korry arrived in Santiago and found that the Johnson administrati ons strategy had alienated many Chileans, including the Frei government. Korry tried to recover U.S. influence by stepping back and pursuing a less intrusive, less vi sible strategy. Allende, meanwhile, rebuilt support for a fourth presidential candidacy among a divided Left, part of which had formally rejected his va pacfica and embraced the armed road to revolution. Chapter 8 traces how the Nixon administration initially adhered to the model democracy pr emise until Allende won the 1970 presidential election. Nixon and Kissinger then abandoned the premise to prevent Allendes inauguration, only to re-embrace and re-frame it for the anti -model that they deemed Allende to be. As a historian working for the Department of State, the ideas presented here are my own, and do not represent those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government. All sources are available to the public. All tr anslations of Spanish language sources were completed by the author, who bears sole responsib ility for their accuracy. 25

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CHAPTER 2 RISE OF A MODEL DEMOCRACY, 1945-1948 Periphery to Battleground Democracy, specifically Chiles democracy, was a central concern for U.S. foreign policymakers focusing upon Latin America during th e first years of the Cold War (1945-1948). This chapter traces the process by U.S. policymakers formulated the model democracy premise during the transition from Wo rld War II to the Cold War. 1 In tracing the rise of a premise that transformed Chile from a peripheral state to a Cold War battleground, this chapter challenges the existing scholarly literature in two ways. First, it asserts that U.S. po licy was not confused and inconsistent, nor did it focus on anti-communism. 2 Faced with threats from the Right and the Left, U.S. officials navigated a middle, anti-totalitarian course in order to preserve democracy 1 This gradual transition agrees with Bryce Woods dis mantling of the Good Neighbor Policy in U.S.-Argentine relations. See Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). Steven Schwartzberg posits a struggle between Cold War liberals and Cold War conservatives, with conservatives gaining the upper hand during Trumans second term. This chapter and Chapter 2 argue that consistency, not rivalry, characterized Truman admini stration policy. See Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), xviii, and Chapters 1 and 7. 2 For the inconsistent policy, see Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of AntiCommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 12. For the anti-Communist policy, see Barnard, Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947, Journal of Latin American Studies 13/2 (November 1981): 347-374, particularly 369. Barnard further developed this thesis in a later essay. See Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., 66-91. Barnards thesis serves as the foundation for many historical treatments of Chilean-U.S. relations during Gonzlez Videlas presidency. See Benjamin Keen and Kevin Haynes, A History of Latin America 6 th edition (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000); Leslie Bethell, ed., Chile Since Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990); Heraldo Muoz and Carlos Portales, Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), Orlando Garca Valverde, trans.; Bethell, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945-1948 Conjuncture, Journal of Latin American Studies 20 (May 1988): 167-189; Thomas Miller Klubock, Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), and Boris Yopo H., Los partidos Radical y Socialista y los Estados Unidos: 1947-1958 (Santiago: FLASCO, 1985). 26

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and political stability in Chile. U.S. officials tolerated the entrance of Communists into the Chilean cabinet in 1946 much as they had done in France. They did not impose a loan and credit embargo on Chile, nor did they pressure Chilean president Gabriel Gonzlez Videla to remove the Communists from his cabinet or outlaw th e Communist Party of Chile (PCCh Partido Comunista de Chile). 3 Concluding that the PCCh had few ties to Moscow, U.S. officials viewed the Party as strong but committed to the rule s of Chilean democracy. Although acknowledging that the Communists could create political instability in Chile, U.S. policymakers considered the authoritarian Right as more dange rous because it might take advant age of political instability and Communist actions in order to install an authoritarian regime in Chile. Second, this chapter contends that U.S. policymakers framed events and problems in Chile through a European lens, not a Latin American one. 4 As Cold War tensions escalated, European developments such as the Greek civil war, the Marshall Plan, and the fall of Czechoslovakia to Communism encouraged U.S. o fficials to cast Chilean events in European terms. Although Chile and Europe faced different threats, the central U.S. concern was political and economic instability that would allow totalitarians of either ex treme of the political spectrum 3 Andrew Barnard asserts that the United States imposed a credit and loan embargo against Chile and pressured Gonzlez Videla to move against the Communist Party. The documentary record does not support this claim. Barnard, Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947, 369. 4 See Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), particularly Chapter 2 Americas Quest for Peace and Prosperity : European Reconstruction and AntiCommunism. William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Pres s, 1998), particularly Chapter 1 Founding the Fourth Republic and the Conditions for French Recovery. James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). Miller, Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and Italian Elections of 1948, Diplomatic History 7/1 (Winter 1983): 35-55. Simon Serfaty, An International Anomaly: The United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947, Studies in Comparative Communism 8/1&2 (Spring/Summer 1975): 123-146. 27

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to gain power. 5 When Chile suffered coal shortages and Communist-led miners strike in October 1947, U.S. officials compared Chiles situation to postwar Eu ropean conditions, and rushed the much-needed coal to Chile in order to avert political and econ omic instability. The discovery of a right-wing plot to overthro w Gonzlez Videlas government in 1948 confirmed U.S. officials in their fears of the Right and political instability. The co mbined effect of the 1947 coal miners strike and the 1948 coup plot solidified the model democracy premise as the foundation of U.S. policy and relations with Chile during the Cold War. During construction of the model democracy pr emise, Salvador Allende Gossens merited little concern by U.S. officials, ev en as he built foundations for his later political success. U.S. officials knew the Socialist Party leader and ne wly elected senator, understood his policies, and perceived him as a friend of the United States, largely due to the Socialist Partys hostility to fascism and Communism. 6 Unlike many Socialists, Allende talked to, cooperated with, and defended the Communists, which did not trouble U.S. officials, and between 1945 and 1948, he remained committed to uniting the Left in to a broad, Popular Front coalition. 5 The U.S. focus on political and economic instability help s to explain why and how U. S. policymakers transitioned so quickly from defining the enemy as Nazism (far Righ t) to Communism (far Left. See also Thomas Paterson, Red Fascism: The American Image of Aggressive Totalitarianism, Meeting the Communist Threat 3-17; and H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Amer icans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 6 For Socialist-Communist hostilities, see Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 136-164, 242-266, 270-283; John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970 [1942]), 101-102, 107-109; Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 65-67. 28

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A Meeting of Two Democracies The post-World War II relationship between Ch ile and the United States began with an official visit by Chiles President Juan Antonio Ros Morales to the White House in mid-October 1945. Ros had long desired the st ate visit, and U.S. Presiden t Harry S Truman was hosting a foreign leader for the first time. Both men consid ered the visit a success, and years later, Truman would remember Ross visit with fond memories. 7 In public statements and internal documents U.S. officials emphasized that Chile was a democracy comparable to the United States. Truman consistently read documents describing Chile as a functioning democracy, even t he greatest functioning democracy in South America. His briefing papers characterized R os as a self-made man along American lines and a man who had grown up on a farm just as Truman had. The Department of State urged Truman to stress to Ros that U.S. officials realize and appreciate the strength of Chiles democracy, particularly given Chile's absolute freedom of the press, speech, and re ligion, and its absolute honesty of elections. 8 When introducing Ros, U.S. speaker s cited Chiles startling similarity to the United States, asserting that Chiles politica l parties engaged as here in the give and take 7 Letter, Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, 26 April 1945, enclosed with Truman to Bowers, 8 May 1945, Folder 429 (1945-1949), Box 1285, Official Files, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independen ce, Missouri. Hereafter, cited as HS TL. Weekly Political Report No. 72 for week ending January 6, 1945, encl osed in Despatch 11,439, Bowers to Secretary of State, 9 January 1945, 825.00/1-945, Folder 1, Box 5353, Decimal File 1945-1949, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafte r cited as DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Truman to Bowers, 19 November 1949, Folder Chile Folder 1, Box 172, Presidents Secretarys File Subject File, HSTL. Hereafter cited as PSF-Subject File, HSTL. 8 Memorandum for the President from Ambassador Bowers, James F. Byrnes, Se cretary of State, to the President, 11 October 1945, 825.001 Rios, Juan/10-1145, Folder 4, Box 5357, DF 1945-1949, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 26 April 1945. Memorandum, Bowers to the President, n.d. [October 1945], enclosed with Memorandum, Byrnes to Truman, 11 October 1945, Folder 1, Box 172, PSF Subject File, HSTL. Draft of Speech, n.d. [September 1945], enclosed with Bowers to James A. Farley, Chairman of the Board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation, 27 September 1945, Folder 1945, September October, Box 6, MSS II, Claude G. Bowers Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Hereafter cited as Bowers Papers. 29

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of political controversy, that politicians hammer ed each other as is the fashion with our own, and that the defeated accept the verdict of the people and do not sally forth with arms to launch a revolution.Chile, like ourse lves, had come to the democratic solution in government. 9 The repeated invocations of Chile as a stable U.S.-style democracy were aimed at U.S. ignorance. U.S. Ambassador to Ch ile Claude G. Bowers lamented the appalling ignorance that Americans had of its Latin American neighbor s: We have acted too long on the stupid assumption that all the Latin-American Republics were alike. He decried newspaper reporters who travelled to Chile to cover elections but wrote nothing because Chileans voted in a peaceful, orderly manner instead of engaging in coups and riots. Chile's foreign minister once asked Bowers, Is it impossible to persuade your people that Chile is not a dictator ship or totalitarian state but one of the only two bastions of democracy in South America? 10 Bowerss advocacy of Chile as a basti on of democracy likely resulted from his experience as U.S. Ambassador to Spain during th at countrys civil war (1936-39). A renowned historian, Bowers arrived in Spain during the last years of the Spanish Republic. 11 He was 9 Address at the Banquet given by the Pan American Soci ety in honor of His Excelle ncy, the President of the Republic of Chile, Seor Dr. Juan Antonio Ros, Farley, 15 October 1945, enclosed with Letter, Cecil B. Lyon, ARA, to Bowers, 4 March 1946, Folder 1946, January-April, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Farley, a friend of Bowers, asked the ambassador to write a few remarks to introduc e Ros. See Draft of Speech, n.d. [September 1945], enclosed with Bowers to Farley, 27 September 1945. 10 Chile as a firm democracy was the thesis of Bowerss memo irs on his time in Chile. In the introduction, he wrote, If I have not succeeded in making this [Chile as a democr acy] crystal clear, I have failed in my purpose. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows, 1939-1953 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), 30-31, 30, vi. 11 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 3-4. Bowerss most respected and influential works were Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925); The Tragic Era: The Revolution after Lincoln (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929); and Beveridge and the Progressive Era (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932). Jefferson and Hamilton and The Tragic Era were selected for the Pu litzer Prize in History in 1926 and 1930 respectively, but the Columbia University awards committee overruled the jurys decision both times. Peter J. Sehlinger and Holman Hamilton, Spokesman for Democracy: Claude G. Bowers, 1878-1958 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 2000), 114-126. 30

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shocked to find U.S. embassy personnel and U.S. citizens in Madrid against democracy and republicanism[,] and all seem monarchist[s] of the deepest dye. His predecessor, U.S. embassy officers, and consuls feared that the Republic governed by a Popular Front coalition led by Manuel Azaa, would lead to the rise of Bolshe vism. Bowers rejected this view and instead warned Washington about General Francisco Fran co, the Nationalists, and the support Franco received from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Department of State officers dismissed Bowers as a political appointee and an amateur diplomat and ignored his warnings. When Franco and his forces defeated the Republicans in 1939, Bowers was recalled to Washington. Upon his return, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull confessed to him that the United States had made a mistake in Spain and that he had been right all along. Bowers believed that the great democracies of the United States and Great Britain had erred by sacrificing the democracies of Spain and Czechoslovakia to the Fascists. 12 Appointed by Roosevelt as U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Bowers hoped to have a respite after the Spanish Civil War; instead, he found a nation that, for him, resembled Republican Spain. Like the Spanish Republic, Chile had a br oad range of political parties ranging from the National Socialist Movement (MNS Movimiento Nacional Social ista) to the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh Partido Communista de Chile). Chiles republic had been re-established in 1932, after the seven-year dictatorship of Ge neral Carlos Ibez del Campo, and former 12 Douglas Little, Claude Bowers and His Mission to Spain: The Diplomacy of a Jeffersonian Democrat, in U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1981), Kenn eth Paul Jones, ed., 127-146. Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Bowers, My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 411-422. Bowers, My Life: The Memoirs of Claude Bowers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 265-284. Quotes respectively appear in Little, Claude Bowers and His Mission to Spain, 129, 133; Bowers, My Life, 282; and Bowers, My Mission to Spain 416. 31

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president Arturo Alessandri Palma (1920-1924) was elected to a six-year term. Chileans closely followed the Spanish Civil War, and which side of the war one supported was an issue during the 1938 presidential campaign. The election resulted in a narrow, surprisi ng victory by Popular Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the Radi cal Party. Aguirre Cerdas victory was aided by a failed Naci putsch that Ibez (also a candidate in 1938) had supported but deemed ill-timed. 13 Bowers arrived in Chile the day before Nazi Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, invaded Poland in 1939, and the new U.S. ambassador viewed ev ents in Chile as another struggle against fascism. Many Chileans favored the Allies, due in part to Chiles long-standing economic and naval ties with Great Britain, but German sy mpathies were strong. A significant German immigrant population had settled in the southern Central Valley and Lakes district during the mid 19 th Century, and their descendants had gained wealth and married into Chiles political and economic elite. German cultural, economic, and educational ties flourished, and German military officers had trained Chiles army sin ce 1885. In some ways, the division of opinion within Chile in the early years of World War II might be compared to the division of opinion within the United States during th e initial years of World War I. 14 13 The Spanish word Naci is used to indicate local fascists and distinguish from German Nazis. Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970). Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front 30-93. Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 183190. Michael Monten, Chile and the Great Depression: Th e Politics of Underdevelopment, 1927-1948 (Tempe: Arizona State University Press for the Center Latin American Studies, 1998), 180-204, 218-238. Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia, Historia del siglo XX chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001), 96-135. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile 209-234. 14 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 3-4, 19-21, 30-42, 58-72. Graeme S. Mount, Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2002), 3-14. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile 95, 16566, 178-180. For U.S. opinion during World War I, see Ronald Schaffer, America and the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13-30. 32

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What was a clear decision for the United Stat es in 1941 declaring war against the Axis Powers was a muddled one for Chile. Elements with pro-German and neutralist sympathies, especially among elite circles, were encouraged by Hitlers early victories. According to Bowers, Nazi spies and agents were entering Ch ile and a fifth column was being organized by a German embassy officer. A significant amount of pro-Axis propaganda wa s printed and aired in Chile, and the Communists added their own anti-capitalist propaganda until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. In December 1941, the same month that the United States suffered the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Chilean President Aguirre Cerd a died. Aguirre Cerdas death and the subsequent 1942 presidential campaign postponed Chiles de cision to enter the war. Ibez, who was again a presidential candidate, received at least $100,000 of German support, and some of his most vocal supporters were Chilean Nacis. The other candidate, Juan Antonio Ros of the Radical Party, received support fr om Arturo Alessandri a nd a united Left, which included Salvador Allendes Socialist Party and the Communist Party. Ros won the 1942 election handily with 56 percent of the vote. German Nazis actively engaged in espionage in South America, and revelations of such espionage in Chile led Rios to break relations with the Axis powers in January 1943, and enter the war two years later. 15 Despite its delayed break with the Axis, Chile incurred no lingering anger or resentment from U.S. officials, and that may be a testam ent to Bowerss diplomacy. Bowers knew that Washington officials were frustrated with Chile, but he framed the situation as a basic issue of 15 Ricardo Cruz-Coke Madrid, Geografia Electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1952), 90-94. Mount, Chile and the Nazis 19-20, 30-99. Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1977), 126-129, 96-98. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile 243-246. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 64-66, 72-80. 33

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democracy versus dictatorship. Bowers asserted that those who had critic ized Chile but praised dictators who quickly broke relations with the Ax is ignored the very essential fact that as a democracy Chile could not make such an important decision by a dictator s scratch of a pen. 16 Bowers references to Chile as a democracy fell upon sympathetic ears. Throughout the first years of the Cold War, several leading Depa rtment of State policymakers had served at the U.S. Embassy in Chile. 17 Norman Armour, Bowers predecessor as U.S. Ambassador to Chile and scion of the meatpacking family, served as Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs in June 1947 to July 1948, a position which assu med the duties of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and the Assistan t Secretary for American Republic Affairs. 18 Robert F. Woodward, Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (ARA), was another 16 Historian Michael J. Francis asserts that Bowers avoided bring[ing] too many unpleasant realities to the government in Santiago. This seems to underestimate th e influence that Bowers experience in Spain exerted upon his approach toward Chile. The Nazis were active in Chile, and while Nazi Germany was militarily successful, proGerman and neutralist sympathies were strong, particularly in some elite circles and sections of the country. Bowers sought to avoid a replay of the Spanish Republic, and it is perhaps a testament to his skill as a translator of U.S. wartime demands to Santiago and Chilean political dynamics to Washington that U.S. officials showed no ill feelings toward Chile after the war. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony 22-23, 103-126, quote on 113; and Mount, Chile and the Nazis 17 Ellis O. Briggs, Proud Servant: Memoirs of a Career Ambassador (Kent OH: Kent State University Press, 1998), 145. Matthew Jacobs suggests that a loose assembla ge or network of academic s, government officials, businessmen, journalists, and members of the American educational and missionary communities who had an intimate knowledge of the Middle East and shaped U.S. po licy towards the region. This also applies to Chile. Several leading officials in the Department of States Division of American Republic Affairs (ARA) had served at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago and were ve ry familiar with Chile and its political system. They also knew or read several of leading scholarly works on Chilean politics by Ernest Halperin, S. Cole Blasier, Michael Francis, Paul Sigmund, among others. This led to a highly informed cohort of policymakers for Chile and its affairs. See Matthew F. Jacobs, Constructing the Middle East: Networks, Frameworks, and U.S.-Middle East Relations, 19451967, Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2002, p. 7. 18 Schwartzberg claims (mistakenly) that the position of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs remained vacant from Spruille Bradens departure in June 1947 until Edward G. Miller, Jr.s assumption of the office in 1949. Norman Armour was confirmed as Assistant Secretar y of State for European Affairs and American Republic Affairs on 10 June 1947, and he held the position until he resigned on 15 July 1948. See Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 193; Department of State Bulletin XVI/416 (22 June 1947): 1253; and Department of State Bulletin XIX/476 (15 August 1948): 213. 34

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former U.S. Ambassador to Santiago. Sheldon M ills had served as Chief Economic Officer at the Embassy in Santiago before becoming Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs in the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA ). Ellis Briggs had been as Bowers Deputy Chief of Mission before becoming an assistant to Armour, and Milton Mike Barall, the Chile Desk Officer and later Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affa irs, had earlier served as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Chile. 19 Besides a cohort of officials knowledgeable about Chile in prominent policy-making positions, Bowers regularly corresponded with senior policymakers, ensuring that Chiles affairs received a thorough, sympathetic hearing in the De partment of State and the White House. He wrote President Truman on a regular basis, sending him copies of his memoranda and letters to ARA. Truman read Bowers letters and memo randa, noting that he always appreciated hearing from Bowers. Perhaps indicating the influence of Bowers correspondence, Truman described Chileans as really interested in free government, and expressed a desire to visit Chile. Bowers letters to Spruille Braden bega n when Braden served as U.S. Ambassador to Argentina and continued after Braden became Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs in late 1945. Bowers initiated a similar correspondence with Edward G. Miller, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State for Inte r-American Affairs during Trumans second term. 20 19 Francis, The Limits of Hegemony 18-19. Briggs, Proud Servant 149-150, 152. Letter, Milton Barall, Chief of Division of North and West Coast Affairs, to Bowers, 15 May 1952, Folder -1952, May, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 20 Letter, Truman to Bowers, 19 November 1949, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF Subject File, HSTL. The President discussed a visit to Chile and South Ameri ca with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller. See Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with the President, Acheson, 20 October 1949, Folder Memoranda of Conversations October-November 1949, Box 65, Dean Acheson Papers, HSTL. For Truman reading Bowers memoranda, see Lett er, Truman to Bowers, 16 September 1946; and Letter, Truman to Bowers, 30 September 1946; both Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF Subject File, HSTL. 35

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Bowers also exerted an influential voice when Department of State officials determined postwar policy towards Latin America. Just befo re Nazi Germanys surrender to the Allies, and amid the departments post-war planning, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Spruille Braden strongly insisted that U.S. policy should overtly favor democracies over dictators. In a 5 April 1945 despatch titled Policy re: Dict atorships and Disreputable Govern ments, Braden asserted that not only was U.S. support for dictators and authorita rian regimes contrary to declared objectives and U.S. rhetoric, but it was also creating sympathy and converts for Communism. Braden urged that the United States demonstrate its pref erence for democracy by being tolerant, patient, and generous towards democracies. Meanwhile, U. S. officials should trea t dictators with an attitude of aloof formality, refuse to grant them material or moral aid, and demand that dictators fulfill their agreements and commitments to the letter. 21 Believing that Bradens recommendations meri ted broader discussion, Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent the B raden Memorandum to other U.S. ambassadors in Latin America for comment, including Bowers. In his response, Bowers declared his complete approval for Bradens recommendations, but he reminded the De partment that the recent defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy did not si gnify an end to the threat from the authoritarian Right. He noted that four groups remained instinctively hostile to democracy and the United States: Latin American followers of Franco, authorita rian military elements, large landholders, and German communities in South America. The postwa r era, Bowers said, gave the United States a 21 Less than two weeks after writing the memorandum, Braden was named U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 91. Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy 94-95. Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 5, 6. Quotes drawn from Schwartzberg. 36

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unique opportunity to take a clea r stand against dictatorships. The Latin American middle, working, and lower classes were craving democracy; moreover, the Good Neighbor policy and U.S. military achievements had fostered a bette r understanding and a greater appreciation of the United States. Not only are we in a position no w to take a strong stand against non-democratic regimes and elements, added Bowers, but milli ons in South America expect our leadership. 22 Bowers did not discount the threat of Comm unism; instead, he viewed Latin American support for Communism as less a matter of ideol ogy and more a matter of circumstances. He blamed overprivileged elites who were refusing to concede anything to the man below and as a result, poverty and misery fostered loca l support for Communism. A Communist in South America, he wrote, understands [Communism as] something extremely opposite to the system under which he suffers and he joins the communi sts as a protestconvinced that nothing could be worse than his present state. He asserted that the United States c ould best stem Communism by assisting Latin American nations in rais ing the masses living and working standards. 23 Bradens and Bowerss comments reveal that U.S. officials perceived two threats in the Southern Cone during the postwar transition: one threat from dictators and the anti-democratic Right, and the other from the Communists, and they deemed them equally dangerous. Under Secretary Grew praised Bowers comments duri ng a meeting of the Departments principal officers, saying that the comments fit precisely with my own thinking. Braden, Bowers, and Grew agreed upon the dangers of the Rightist and Le ftist threats, but, Bowers suggested that the 22 Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Truman Years 6-7. Memorandum Observations on Ambassador Bradens Memorandum, Bowers, 14 June 1945, Folder 1945, June-August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 23 Memorandum Observations on Ambassador Bradens Memorandum, Bowers, 14 June 1945. 37

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anti-democratic Right might be more dangerous, especially if the United States continued to support authoritarian regimes and show a Pickw ickian commitment to democracy in Latin America. The Department of State had not yet shifted its focus exclusively to Communism as the preeminent danger to the region, and for this reason, the democraci es versus dictators question came under intensive consideration. 24 U.S. concern for Rightist and Leftist threats in South America remained constant during 1946 and 1947. During late 1946, the Bureau of Am erican Republic Affairs (ARA) was drafting a new policy paper for Latin America, a final ve rsion of which George C. Marshall received when he became Secretary of State in January 1947. In the paper, ARA officials stressed that the United States should continue enforcing anti-A xis measures, and avoid strengthening cruel and corrupt dictatorships or permitting the United St ates to become identified with them. The paper also viewed Latin American Communism as a homegrown development, not a tool of Moscow, and that any general at tack against local Communist m ovements or their sources of inspiration was undesirable. However, the United States might act against the Communists if Communist activities endanger[ed] inte r-American solidarity or security. 25 24 Letter, Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State, to Bowers, 29 June 1945, Folder 1945, June August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 7. Memorandum Observations on Ambassador Bradens Memorandum, Bowers, 14 June 1945. 25 Letter, Braden to Bowers, 12 D ecember 1946, Folder 1946, November-December, Box 6, Bo wers Papers. Policy Paper (Draft) Current U.S. Policy Toward the Other American Republics, ARA, 16 December 1946, 711.20/12-1646, Folder 3, Box 3450, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Kyle Longley, In the Eagles Sh adow: The United States and Latin America (Wheeling IL: Harlan Davidson, 2002), 187-188. Memorandum Memorandum I: Important Policy Matters, January 1947, Folder Policy Position Papers, 1945-49, Box 6, Records for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State fo r Inter-American Affairs, 1945-56 -Su bject File, 1945-56, RG59 Lot Files, NA. Hereafter cited a RG59-Lot. Speech The Inter-Am erican System: A Solid Foun dation for the Challenge of the Future, Briggs, 14 April 1947, Department of State Bulletin XVI/408: 769. 38

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As U.S. policy towards Latin America shifted to anti-totalitarianism, the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Santiago disagr eed over the degree to which Argentinas populist leader Colonel Juan Pern could exert influen ce in Chile. For Department officials, Pern embodied much of the Rightist threat in South America, particularly his efforts to create an antiU.S. bloc. Bowers, however, considered Chilea n authoritarian groups more dangerous, and he discounted Perns ability to exer t political influence in Chile. The average Chilean, Bowers wrote, is not friendly to Argen tina and would prefer to play the United States against that country for the sole benefit of Chile. 26 In fact, Bowers noted, the Chileans were more interested in a military alliance with the United States. Chiles Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs had suggested the idea during the war, and a Chilean official had asked the U.S. military attach how the United States would respond should Chile be attacked by an Americ an nation like Argentina acting as an agent of Nazis. Bowers did not dissuade Washington, and during their briefing of the president, Department officials suggested th at should the topic of Pern and Argentina arise during Ros visit, Truman should express that we hope that Chile will not court Argentina. 27 When Ros met Truman in October 1945, the Chilean president invoked the Rightist and Leftist threats to obtain economic and military as sistance. Ros expressed concern that the 26 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 13 March 1946, Folder 1946, January April, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States 90-92. Glenn J. Dorn discusses well Per ns efforts to create an anti-U.S. bloc but overstates the possibility of Chile moving into Perns orbit. See Dorn, Perns Gambit: The United States and the Argentine Challenge to the Inter-American Order, 1946-1948, Diplomatic History 26/1 (Winter 2002): 1-20. Memorandum, Burr C. Brundage, Chile Desk Officer, to Hall and Wells, 12 July 1946, 825.00/7-1246, Folder 3, Box 5353, DF1945-49, RG59, NA, p. 3. 27 Bowers Diary, 16 January 1945, Volume 8: 260-261, Bowers Papers. Memorandum of Conversation, Donald R. Heath, Counselor of Embassy, 12 June 1942, enclosed with Despatch 3598 Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation between Chilean Under Se cretary of Foreign Affairs and Counselor of Embassy, Bowers to Department of State, 12 June 1942, Folder Chile, Box 14, John F. Melby Papers, HSTL. Memorandum Visit of President Ros, Byrnes to the President, 11 October 1945, 825.001 Ros, Juan/10-1145, Folder 4, Box 5357, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 39

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Communists might charge that the United States had taken advantage of Chile during the war: the United States had obtained Chiles copper and nitrates at pre-war pr ices and then allowed Chile to suffer unemployment and economic r ecession when U.S. postwar needs for those materials declined. The United States could stem this charge, said Ros, by providing Chile with machinery and equipment, and encouraging priv ate capital investment in Chile. Ros later invoked the Argentine threat to propose that Chile and the United States sign bilateral agreements to increase protection of the Straits of Magellan by placing ai rfields and anti-aircraft equipment in the area. U.S. officials were intere sted in the Straits of Magellan proposal and later assisted the Chileans with the airfields and equipment. 28 Ross pleas for development assistance di d not receive a sympathetic hearing in Washington, primarily because of Chiles foreign debt problems. Departme nt of State officials opposed new loans to Chile, asserting that Chile s nearly $62 billion of debt (approximately $2,160 pesos per Chilean) was as much or more th an Chile can be expected to service during the next few years. 29 Another impediment was a group of bonds on which Chile had defaulted in 1931, and Chilean officials had not yet negotiated a settlement. Nine months after Ross visit (June and July 1946), department officials cited dim forecasts for the postwar demand for copper and nitrates as another impediment. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago did not know if the 28 Airfields and anti-aircraft weapons were not covered by a Chilean-Argentine tr eaty that prevented fortification of the straits. Memorandum of Conversation between Ros, Truman, and Byrnes, Spruille Braden, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, 16 October 1945, 825.00B/10-1645, Folder 3, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Telegram 81, Bowers to Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Arneson, 9 September 1952, 725.00/9-952, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 29 Memorandum, Topics for Possible Discussion with President Ros of Chile, Byrnes to the President, 10 October 1945, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF Subject File, HSTL. Memorandum, D. M. Phelps to Collado, Thorp, and Clayton, 20 September 1945, 825.51/9-2045, Folder 5, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Ahora cada Chileno debe $2,160 en el extranjero, Ercilla 7 January 1947, p. 8. 40

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Chilean government had ever drawn up a carefully -constructed over-all credit program closely relating the countrys really essential needs with its ability to pay for them. 30 Ros and Truman considered the visit a succ ess, and the most successful aspect was the symbolic message that the visit signaled about U.S. postwar foreign policy. As Trumans first official White House guest since taking office six months earlier (April 1945) state visits were rare before 1950 Ros underlined the larger U.S. struggle against totalitarianism and postwar preference for democracies. By casting Ross vis it as a meeting between the presidents of two democracies, U.S. officials utilized and empha sized the symbolism offered by Chile and its political system. The visit also underscored th e democracies victory over fascist totalitarian regimes and the wartime cooperation of the Amer ican republics. Finally intra-administration discussions of development aid a nd the refusal to grant new loans indicate that U.S. officials recognized Chiles debt problems, and sought to assist Chile in resolving its financial problems and ensuring its economic stability. Accepting a Popular Front President U.S. expectations for postwar political stability and normalcy in Chile were dashed by an unanticipated presidential election. In January 1946, barely three months after his White House visit, Ros was diagnosed as having an advanced terminal form of cancer. He named Radical Party Senator Alfredo Duhalde Vsquez as Vice-P resident and transferred all presidential duties 30 The defaulted bonds portion of the debt amounted to $315 million. Chile reconquist su crdito mundial, Ercilla 19 March 1946, p. 3. Despatch 12,368 Possible Revision of Chiles External Debt, Bowers to Secretary of State, 2 July 1946, 825.51/7-245, Folder 5, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Braden, 16 October 1945, 825.00B/10-1645. Letter, Braden to Bowers, 24 June 1946, 825.51/5-2946, Folder 1; and Memorandum, A. S. Schnee, 20 June 1946, 825.51/6-1946, Folder 2; both Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 41

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to him. 31 As Ross health declined, Chilean politic al parties and leaders turned their attention away from the issues of debts, development a ssistance, and Chiles pos twar future, and began preparing their parties for the upcoming presid ential campaign. Upon Ros death on 27 June 1946, Duhalde scheduled the presidential election for 4 September 1946. 32 The election created a dilemma for Salvador Allende Gossens and the Socialist Party (PS Partido Socialista de Chile). Recently elected to his first term in the Senate, Allende sought to reconstruct the Popular Fr ont coalition of the 1938 and 1942 elections, whereby Socialists, Radicals, and Communists would jo in together to offer a single candidate for the 1946 election. Vice President Duhalde, however, had presidential ambitions. Even though the Radical Party, of which Duhalde was a member, had nominated Gabr iel Gonzlez Videla as its candidate, Duhalde announced in July 1946 that he would enter the presidential race. He soon gained support from many Socialists, which foreclosed a rebuilding of the Popular Front. Duhalde campaigned for a month but then withdrew in early August when the lack of popular support for his candidacy became apparent. Stung by Duhaldes withdrawal, the Socialist Party met in mid-August to 31 Between 1932 and 1973, Chile did not have a formal vice-pr esident. If the president n eeded to travel outside the country or take a medical leave, he na med a vice-president to assume presiden tial duties in his absence. Generally, this person was the Minister of the Interior. Frederico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 92-93. Vuelve a La Moneda, Zig-Zag XLI/2131 (24 January 1946): 5. Political Report No. 109, B. H. Garrison, 24 January 1946, att ached to Despatch 13,382, Bowers to Secretary of State, 24 January 1946, 825.00/1-2446, Folder 2, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 32 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 325-326. Memorandum President Ros Struggling with the Rightists, Chile, J. Edgar Hoover (Director of the FBI) to Frederick Lyon, Chief of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, Department of State, 26 December 1945, 825.00/12-2645, Folder 2, Box 5353; Letter, Bowers to Braden, 23 January 1946, 825.00/1-2345, Folder 2, Box 5353; and Memorandum President Juan Antonio Ros, Chile, Hoover to Cecil Lyon, 29 January 1946, 825.001 Rios, Juan A., Folder 5, Box 5357; all DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum, Garrison, 25 January 1945, attached to Despatch 11,548, Bowers to Secretary of State, 25 January 1945, 825.00/1-2545; and Weekly Political Report #72, Garrison, 9 January 1945, attached to Despatch 11,439, Bowers to Secretary of State, 9 January 1945, 825.00/1-945; both Folder 1, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Military Intelligence Division [MID Army], R ios Death Causes Increased Political Activity, Intelligence Review 21 (5 July 1946): 48-49, in Folder July, 1946 [Nos. 21-24], Box 18, Staff Member and Office Files -Naval Aide to the President Files, HSTL. 42

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determine which candidate they would support. As a leader of the gabrielista wing, Allende advocated supporting Gabriel Gonzl ez Videla, which in effect, would recreate the Popular Front because the Communists had already decide d to back Gonzlez Videlas candidacy. 33 As indicated by his efforts to rebuild the P opular Front, Allende had already emerged as a prominent Socialist Party leader, but his rise had begun two decades earlier. As a student, he had excelled in his studies and athletics, becoming a national yout h champion in the decathlon and swimming. In 1927, he was elected president of the Academy of Medical Students, and the following year, he led a group of students in opposition to the dictatorship of General Carlos Ibez del Campo, who had been in power sin ce 1924. Allende also co llaborated with the Communists to form the student political group Avance. In 1930, as president of the medical students union, Allende was elected Vice-President of th e umbrella student union, the Federation of Chilean Students. As such, he was a leader of the 1931 student protests that helped to bring down Ibezs dictatorship during the economic crisis that was the Great Depression. 34 After Ibezs fall, Allende became a rising st ar in the Socialist Party. He supported the twelve-day Socialist Republic in 1932 and was briefly jailed when it collapsed. During his arrest, Allendes father became seriously ill and died, and at the funeral, the son dedicated his life to the social struggle. In 1933, Allende helped found the Socialist Party and was Regional 33 Ercilla 20 August 1946, p. 8. El pleno nacional de Partido Socialista proclamo candidato a don Bernardo Ibez, La Nacin 19 August 1946, p. 16. Los socialistas movilizan todas sus seccionales, La Nacin 20 August 1946, p. 10. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 20 August 1946, Folder 1946, July August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 34 Jose G. Martnez Fernndez, Allende: Su vida, su pensamiento (Santiago: Ediciones Pa labra Escrita, 1988), 1719. Alejandro Witker, ed., Salvador Allende, 1908-1973: Prcer de la liberacin nacional (Mxico: Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico, 1980), 4-6. Rgis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), Peter Beglan et al., tr ans., 62-63. Peter Winn, Salvador Allende: His Political Lifeand Afterlife, Socialism and Democracy 19/3 (November 2005): 130-134. Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 106-107. For the 1931 fall of Ibezs dictatorship, see Ernesto Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Enigmtico Caudillo (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1958), 162-171; and Monten, Chile and the Great Depression 44-46. 43

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Secretary for Valparaso. He advocated collabora tion with other parties a nd worked to create the Popular Front with the Radical, Communist, and Radical-Democrat Pa rties. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from Valparaso in 19 37, and as a deputy, was i nvolved in one of the Socialists several clashes with the Nacis. In 1938, Allende directed in a magnificent manner the campaign for Popular Front presidential candi date Pedro Aguirre Cerda in Valparaso. Aguirre Cerda named him Minister of Health in 1939, a post that Allende held until he resigned in 1941, and during which he published his landmark study on public health, The Chilean Medical-Social Reality In 1943, party members elected Allende to be Secretary General of the Socialist Party. During the 1940s, Allende develope d ties with other popular socialist leaders in the region, including Perus Victor Ral Haya de la Torre and Ve nezuelas Rmulo Betancourt. Then in 1945, Allende won a Senate seat in the Ninth Agrupacin which included Chiles southernmost provinces of Osorno, Valdivia, Llanquihue, Chilo, Aysn, and Magallanes. 35 For the 1946 Presidential election, Allende a nd the gabrielistas did not succeed in persuading the Socialist Party to endorse Gonzlez Videla and thereby rebuild the Popular Front. Some Socialists favored Fernando Alessandri R odrguez, the Liberal Pa rty candidate; however, Allende and the gabrielistas opposed supporting a Rightist candidate. Several anti-communist members threatened to leave th e party if it backed Gonzlez Vi dela, who had made an alliance 35 Letter, Pedro Aguirre Cerda to Oscar Schnake Vergara, Rolando Merino Reyes, and Salvador Allende Gossens, [5 March?] 1941, Epistolario de Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941) (Santiago: Ediciones de la Direccin de Biblioteca Archivos y Museos and LOM Ediciones, 2001), Leonidas Aguirre Silva, ed., 134-135. Witker, Salvador Allende, 46. Martnez Fernndez, Allende 20-21. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, 61-71. Manuel Dinamarca, La Repblica Socialista Chilena: Orgenes Legtimos del Partido Socialista (Santiago: Ediciones Documentas, 1987), 235-236. Winn, Salvador Allende, Socialism and Democracy 19/3: 134-135. Arturo Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri: Polticas Memorias 2 volumes (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1962), I: 357. Cruz-Coke, Geografia electoral de Chile 84. For clashes with the Nazis, see Deutsch, Las Derechas 155-187. Allende, La realidad mdico-social chilena (Santiago: Editorial Cuarto Propio, 1999 [1939 ]). For the books influence on public health, see Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 159-183. 44

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with the Communists. The party compromise d by nominating Bernardo Ibez guila (no relation to General Ibez), who had succeeded A llende as Secretary General and was President of the Chilean Workers Federati on (Confederacin de Trabajadores de Chile). Entering the race about two weeks before election day, Bernardo Ibez had little hope of winning. Allende was named Jefe Regional of Ibezs campaign in the Los Lagos (The Lakes) region, which included the cities of Valdivia, Osorno, and Puerto Montt, as well as the island of Chilo, areas which comprised the northern half of his senatorial agrupacin. 36 Allendes and the gabrielistas inability to rebuild the Popul ar Front was symptomatic of the disintegration of the Right-Lef t framework that had emerged after Ibezs dictatorship. The broad coalitions of the Left and Right were frac turing, and the Rightist parties, like the Left, had failed to unite and offer a single candidate. Two candidates, Fernando Alessandri and Eduardo Cruz-Coke, vied for votes among the Chilean Righ t during the 1946 election. Alessandri was the son of former president Arturo Alessandri and candidate of the conser vative Liberal Party. 37 Bowers considered him a clean, decent, and fair ly able youngish man who could make a good President, but the general belief was that he would be dominated by his father. The U.S. Embassy deemed Dr. Cruz-Coke, candidate of th e Conservative Party and progressive Catholic 36 Ercilla 20 August 1946, p. 8. El pleno nacional de Partido Socialista proclamo candidato a don Bernardo Ibez, La Nacin 19 August 1946, p. 16. Los socialistas movilizan todas sus seccionales, La Nacin 20 August 1946, p. 10. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 20 August 1946, Folder 1946, July August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 37 The Liberal (right/conservative), Conservative (right/con servative/Catholic), and Radical (center-left/progressive) parties have their origins in 19 th Century political debates. The debates focused upon decentralized versus centralized government, the relationship between the State and Catholic Church, and promotion of industrialization and development. Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America Sixth edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 185-187, 207-211; Bethell, Chile Since Independence 2-11, 34; and Collier and Sater, A History of Chile See also Benjamin Vicua Mackenna, The Girondins of Chile: Remi niscences of an Eyewitness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Cristin Ga zmuri, ed., John H. R. Polt, trans. 45

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Falange, as unquestionably the best candidate. Bowers descri bed him as brilliant, able, progressive, and the only Conservative who talked with the Socialists and Communists. 38 Gabriel Gonzlez Videla was the most problema tic of the presidential aspirants for the United States, largely because he had cultivated Communist support. 39 From the northern coastal city of La Serena, Gon zlez Videla had served as President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ambassador to France and later Brazil, and head of Chiles dele gation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, which created the United Nations. 40 U.S. officials knew that Gonzlez Videla had been a militant democrat, strongly anti-Pern, a nd pro-United States in the past; however, his cooperation with the Communists ha d caused them to reconsider. He made campaign trips with PCCh Secretary General Carlos Contreras Labarc a, and adopted an anti-American imperialist theme for his campaign. Close friends of Gonzl ez Videla assured U.S. embassy officers that Gonzlez Videla would not allow himself to be dominated by the Communists if he was elected, but the assurances did not ease U.S. concerns. 41 38 Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 192-193. For short biographies of the candidates, see Biografas de los candidates, La Nacin 4 September 1946, p. 9. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 22 April 1946, Folder 1946, January April, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 29 August 1946, 825.00/8-2946, Folder 3; and Letter, Bowers to Braden, 23 January 1945, 825.00/1-2346, Folder 2; both Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 39 With many Chilean double last names -the paternal family name then the maternal family name -the maternal name is often dropped, e.g. Salvador Allende [Gossens]. In Gabriel Gonzlez Videlas cas e, this rarely occurs. 40 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 23 January 1946, 825.00/1-2346. Letter, Bowers to Nelson Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, 9 April 1945, Folder 1945, March May, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Weekly Political Report No. 83, 4 April 1945, attach ed to Despatch 11,896, Bowe rs (Garrison) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1945, 825.00/4-445, Folder 1, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 22 April 1946, Folder 2, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 41 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 5 August 1946, Folder 1946, July August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 10 May 1946, 825.00/5-1046; Letter, Bowers to Braden, 29 August 1946, 825.00/8-2946; Despatch 14,351 Political Report No. 128, Bowers (Garrison) to Secretar y of State, 22 August 1946, 825.00/8-2246; and Letter, Braden to Bowers, 9 September 1946, 825.00/8-2946; all Folder 3, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 46

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Despite reservations about Gonzlez Videla, U. S. officials did not view Communism as a serious threat in Chile. U.S. intelligence analys ts and Department of State officials considered the highly-disciplined PCCh as probably the strongest or at minimum, one of the three strongest Communist pa rties in Latin America (Brazil and Cuba were the others). U.S. officials admitted that the PCCh possessed the greatest potential for working against US interests and was the only Latin American Co mmunist party capable of paralyzing a nations economy. This potential, U.S. analysts and offici als agreed, was mitigated by the fact that the PCCh had few direct ties to Moscow, would ma ke no revolutionary bid for power in the near future, and would continue to work within the rules of Chiles de mocracy. Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy admitted that working and economic c onditions in Chile had warranted most labor strikes and that the Communist labor leaders had acted with relative restraint. 42 Embassy and ARA officers agreed it was essential that neither they nor U.S. companies involve themselves in the presidential election lest they create unnecessary trouble for themselves. Representatives from each of the f our campaigns had solicited money from the U.S. Embassy, embassy personnel, and U.S. busine sses operating in Chile. With Washingtons support, Bowers forcefully and successfully had directed all of our people to keep their 42 For quote, see Situation Report 9 Chile, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1 September 1947, Folder Situation Reports (9-10), Box 259, PSF -Intelligence F iles, HSTL. For State Department and US intelligence knowledge of the PCCh, see Attach ment D Communism in Latin Amer ica, enclosed with Memorandum Immediate Policy Matters, January 1947, Folder PolicyPosition Papers 1945-49, Box 6, Subject File 1945-1956, Records for the Deputy Assistant Secretar y of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1945-56, RG59-Lot, NA. ORE 16 Soviet Objectives in Latin America, Central Intellig ence Group (CIG), 10 April 1947; ORE 16/1 Soviet Objectives in Latin Ameri ca, CIA, 1 November 1947; and Enclosur e B Dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence of ORE 16/1; all located in Folder O.R.E. 1947 (15-17, 19-21), Box 25 4, PSF Intelligence Files, HSTL. Telegram, Hoover to Cecil Lyon, 29 December 1945 825.00/12-2945; and Letter, Bowers to Braden, 28 March 1946, 825.00/ 3-2846; and Report on Political Conditions in Chile, 31 October 1945, p. 2, enclosed with Despatch 13,005, Hugh Millard, Charg dAffaires, to Se cretary of State, 31 October 1945, 825.00/10-3145; all Folder 2, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 47

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hands, opinions, and pocketbooks out of the electi on. He threatened d rastic action against anyone who violated his instructions and told U.S. businessmen that if they take part or make contributionsthey will forfeit thei r right of protectionif they get in trouble. On the day of the election, the Department congratulated Bo wers and embassy staff for the completely disinterested posture they ha d maintained during the election. 43 Gonzlez Videla won a plurality by a margin of 48,000 votes, but not a majority. Since no candidate received a majority, the election went to Congress, whic h then voted between the first and second place candidates. Congresss vote wa s not in doubt because nearly all Chilean leaders, including Cardinal Jos Mara Caro, accepted and congrat ulated Gonzlez Videla on his victory. Congress ratified Gonzlez Videla as the winner by a vote of 136 to 46. The calm, grace, and orderliness by which the events transp ired prompted Assistant Secretary Braden to remark that the Chileans had impressed him with their political wisdom and their conduct of a close, hotly contested election. Bradens sentiments were representative of U.S. officials. 44 After the election, Gonzlez Videla assured U.S. officials of his pro-U. S. orientation. He pledged to remain a steadfast fr iend of the United States, and said that Chiles future relied upon increased investment from and closer economic ties with the United States. He also stressed that 43 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 12 August 1946, 825.00/8-1246; Letter, Bowers to Braden, 5 August 1946, 825.00/8546; Letter, Bowers to Braden, 29 August 1946, 825.00/8-2946; and Telegram 799, Bowers to Secretary of State, 5 September 1946, 825.00/9-546; all Folder 3, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Braden to Bowers, 9 September 1946, 825.00/8-2846. For the election, see Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 281-283. 44 For election results, see Lus Palma Zuiga, Historia del Partido Radical (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello, 1967), 240-241; Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile 281-283; and Gil, The Political System of Chile 213, 227. Letter, Braden to Bowers, 9 September 1946, 825.00/8-2946. Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, Memorias, 2 volumes (Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1975), I: 482-487, 498-503. hora y 10 minutos dur el Congreso pleno, Ercilla 29 October 1946, p. 3-7; Palma Zuiga, Historia del Partido Radical 241. Letter, Braden to Bowers, 9 September 1946, p. 2-3, 825.00/8-2946, Folder 3, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, NA. Letter, Braden to Bowers, 31 October 1946, Folder 1946, September October, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 48

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he would not allow the Communists to dominate him or his government. 45 Gonzlez Videla emphasized these points to his friend Admiral William Leahy, who headed the U.S. delegation for Gonzlez Videlas inauguration. He told Leahy that Chiles Communists were like French Communists: they were committed to democrac y, national union, and peaceful coexistence. Leahy informed Truman of Gonzlez Videlas assurances when he returned to Washington. 46 Gonzlez Videla further eased U.S. concerns about Chiles political stability by forming a national cabinet composed of parties from the Left and Right, not just parties of his electoral coalition. The tactic was not new; Ros had also used a national cabinet. Despite Communist opposition, Gonzlez Videla convinced the rightist Liberal Party the l aissez faire, big business boys as Bowers called th em to join his cabinet. The cabinet was an odd mix: three Liberals (right), four Radicals (center-left), th ree Communists (left) and one technocrat. 47 45 Bowers Diary, 20 September 1947, Volume 8: p. 363, Bowers Papers. Telegram, Bowers to Acheson and Braden, 13 September 1946, 825.001 Gonzalez Videla, Gabriel / 9-1346; and Letter, Bowers to Braden, 9 September 1946, p. 2, 825.001/9-946; both Folder 1, Box 5358, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 September 1946, p. 2, attached to Letter, Truman to Bowers, 30 September 1946, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject File, HSTL. Despatch 14,739 Bowers to Secretary of State, 20 December 1946, p. 2, 825.00/12-2046, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowe rs to Norman Armour, Assist ant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, 14 July 1947, enclosed with Bo wers to Truman, 21 July 1947, Folder Chile Folder 1, Box 172, PSF--Subject Files, HSTL. Assurances again were made six months later. Memorandum of Conversation, Braden with del Pedregal, 18 April 1947, 825.00/4-1847, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 46 Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 519-520. Admiral William Leahy and Gonzlez Videla became friends while serving as their countrys diplomat to Vichy France. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 2 October 1946, 825.001 Gonzlez Videla, Gabriel/10-246, Folder 1, Box 5358, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Notes on Chilean Visit, Leahy, 1-6 Nov 1946, attached to Translation of Parts of a Speech Made by President Gonzales of Chile at his Inaugural Banquet, n.d. [Nov 1946], Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject File, HSTL. 47 Despatch 12,105 Political Report No. 89, 17 May 1945, enclosed with Despatch 12,105, 17 May 1945, 825.00/5-1745, Folder 1, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Luis Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseca: Combatiente ejemplar (Santiago: Impresora Horizonte, 1971), 178. Liberales acordaron apoyar a Gonzlez Videla, La Nacin 22 October 1946, p. 1. Sehlinger and Holman, Spokesman for Democracy 229. Despatch 14,467, Bowers to Secretary of State, 27 September 1946, 825.00/9-2746, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 November 1946, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject File, HSTL. 49

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Salvador Allende unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Socialists to join Gonzlez Videlas national cabinet. The Socialis ts decision on whether to join th e cabinet was soon linked to the outcome of the partys election for a new Secretar y General. As a candi date, Allende urged his fellow Socialists to join with Gonzlez Vide la and become an active partner in the government. Ral Ampuero Daz, the other candida te, rejected Allendes position and asserted that the PS should support the president but stay out of the cabinet. When the votes were cast, Ampuero won by five votes. With Ampuero as Secretary General, the PS pledged its support to Gonzlez Videla, but refused to accept cabinet posts. 48 The fact that Communists would serve in Gonzlez Videlas cabinet bothered U.S. officials much less than one might anticipate give n the United States escalating postwar tensions with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials recogni zed that Gonzlez Videla owed his margin of victory to the Communists and that he would have to include them in his cabinet. They also expected the PCCh, under the leadership of Secret ary General Contreras La barca, to adhere to the Popular Front strategy. After the Communists complained about his talks with the Liberals, Gonzlez Videla bluntly told them that he would act on his own initiative and would make decisionswithout consulting the leaders of othe r parties including the Communists. Bowers concluded, The communist danger seems to me at this moment to be very much on the wane. 49 48 Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 492. Despatch 14,613, Bowers to Secretary of State, 14 November 1946, 825.00/11-1446, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile 282-283. 49 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 4 Decembe r 1946; and Letter, Bowers to Braden 18 December 1946; both Folder 1946, November December, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Bowers to Braden, 2 Oc tober 1946, 825.001 Gonzlez Videla, Gabriel / 10-246, Folder 1, Box 5358; and Bowers to Acheson, 14 October 1946, 825.00/10-1446, Folder 4, Box 5353; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 50

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Adopting a posture of watchful waiting, U.S. officials did not fully recognize the key changes in Communist leadership and strategy that occurred wh en the Communists entered the cabinet. Supportive of the victorious presid ential candidates in 1938 and 1942, the PCCh had refrained from requesting or accepting cabinet posts. Now, in 1946, cabinet posts created tensions between the two wings of the PCCh. The moderates, led by Contreras Labarca (who had been Secretary General since 1934), pres sed for acceptance of the posts; meanwhile, the militants, led by Ricardo Fonseca Aguayo, urged a more revolutionary course. After intense debate, the Central Committee agreed to accept the cabinet posts but forced Contreras Labarca to resign as Secretary General. The committee th en voted Fonseca as the partys new leader. 50 Fonsecas election as Secretary General signaled that the PCCh was shifting to a more confrontational, revolutionary strategy, and G onzalez Videla admitted that he believed Fonseca would bring difficulties. Contreras Labarca had followed the course promoted by Earl Browder, head of the U.S. Communist Party, who had urged collaboration with political parties within the existing political framework. Afte r the war and likely with Moscows approval, French Communist Party leader Jacques Duclos denounced Browderi sm as self-destructive to Communist efforts. Ducloss denunciation discredited Browder and those such as Contreras Labarca who favored his tactics. Ducloss crit icism and the shift to a more confrontational, revolutionary strategy after the war occurred just as the PCCh accepted cabinet posts. 51 50 Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseca, 182, 184. Letter, Bowers to Acheson, 14 October 1946; 825.00/10-1446. Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984), 39. 51 Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 525. Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism, 39-40. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 4 December 1946; and Letter, Bo wers to Braden, 18 December 1946; both Fo lder 1946, November December, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 51

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With Communists in the cabinet, several Chilean Rightists formed Chilean AntiCommunist Action (ACHA Acci n Chilena Anticomunista) in the belief that Communism now posed an eminent danger to Chile. ACHA fe d U.S. worries of political turmoil and rightwing threats, and the U.S. Embassy maintained careful observation of ACHA and its leaders. Bowers distrusted ACHAs leaders because he suspected that ACHA was more a fascist organization and less an anti-communist movement One of ACHAs leaders, Arturo Olavarra Bravo, admitted that some members had obtained arms and attacked the home of Communist Senator Elas Lafertte Gavio. Bowers late r learned that one member was an avowed totalitarian, and noted that du ring the war, Olavarra Bravo had been on the Black List of suspected Nazis or persons with ties to Nazi businesses. 52 Copper, Coal, and Foreign Investment During his first year in office, Gonzalez Videla faced potentially crippling crises in three sectors: copper, coal, and foreign investment, and the difficulties elevated U.S. fears of political turmoil in Chile. U.S. policymakers recognized th at if Chile was to be strong and independent and a model to be emulated, then it needed to enjoy economic development and prosperity. During the 1940s Chile relied upon copper for expor t (Chile accounted for 20 percent of the worlds production), coal for energy, and foreign investment for industrial development. During his difficulties in the three sectors, Gonzlez Vide la not only clashed with his Communists allies, 52 Memorandum, Translation of ACHA Paper handed to Bowers, n.d. [17? November 1946], enclosed with Letter, Bowers to Acheson, 20 November 1946, 825.00B/11-2046, Folder 5, Box 5356, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 20 November 1946, Folder 1946, November December, Box 6, Bowers Papers. A copy of this letter was sent to Acheson. Letter, Bowers to Brad en, 7 May 1947, Folder 1947, January-May, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Arturo Olavarra Bravo emphasizes ACHAs antic ommunism but downplays its extremism. See Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 41-53. For the purchase of arms and a ttack on Laferttes hom e, see pp. 49-51. 52

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but also pursued diplomatic alte rnatives and exerted pressure on Washington when U.S. officials seemed unresponsive. 53 One week after his inauguration, Gonzlez Vide la faced his first crisis: a strike at Kennecott Coppers Sewell mine. The U.S.-based companys negotiations with its copper miners had collapsed, and Kennecotts presiden t, E. T. Stannard, arrived in Santiago on 12 November 1946 to renew labor talks. The revived talks went poorly and st alled, in part because of Stannards attitude toward the Chileans. Bowers characterized Stannard as condescending and inflexible, and Chilean diplomats in Washington complained that Stannard had been very obdurate. 54 Gonzlez Videla offered to send th e matter to arbitration, where judges acceptable to Kennecott would de lete all of the miners illegal demands. Bowers considered this solution reasonable and advantageous to th e company, but Stannard re jected it. Gonzlez Videla then threatened to have the Chilean gov ernment take control of the mine through an interventor until the dispute was resolv ed, but Stannard hotly opposed this. 55 Without consulting the embassy, Assistant Secr etary Braden tried to strong-arm Gonzlez Videla into settling the strike in favor of Kennecott. Bowers had urged the Department of State to exercise caution in regards to the Sewell negotiations, and warned ag ainst doing anything such as blocking loans and credits, which he feared might push Gonzlez Videla and Chileans closer 53 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 261. 54 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 18 December 1946, 825.5045/121846, Folder 2, Box 5366, RG59, NA. Bowers Diary, 2 December 1946, Volume 8: p. 378, Bowers Papers. Memorandum of Conversation, Labor Strike at Braden Copper Mines, 24 October 1946, 825.5045/10-2446, Folder 1, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 55 Telegram 1024, Bowers to Secretary of State, 22 November 1946, 825.5045/11-2246; and Telegram 991, Bowers to Secretary of State, 12 November 1946, 825.5045/11-1246; both Folder 2, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, E. T. Stannard, President of Kennecott Copper, to Bowers, 29 November 1946, Folder 1946, November December, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 53

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to the Communists. Unbeknownst to Bowers, Braden had decided to hold up action on two loans to Chile. He claimed that the Department might have to explain to Congress and the public why it had given Chile $10 million to build a powe r plant and another $4 million in credits to buy ships when a $50,000,000 American enterprise is being placed in jeopardy and when Chiles government had not tried to bring about a fair and sa tisfactory solution. 56 Braden limited the hold to the power plant a nd merchant ship loans; he did not impose an across-the-board, informal embargo on all loans and credits to Chile. 57 Braden justified the hold on the threat of expropria tion or nationalization, not on anti-communism or the composition of Gonzlez Videlas cabinet. Braden strongly supported the role of private enterprise in encouraging economic development, asserting th at it would enlarge the middle classes and fortify popular resistance to those totalita rian ideologies of the Right and Left. 58 Bradens hold had little impact on the settlement and appears to have backfired. Stannard accepted Gonzlez Videlas proposal of arbitration. The Chilean judge reviewed the miners list 56 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 18 November 1946, 825.5045/11-1846; and Memorandum, Braden to Clayton, 6 November 1946, 825.51/11-646, Folder 2, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59 NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Braden with del Pedregal, 18 April 1947, 825.00/4-1847. 57 Andrew Barnard argues that Braden im posed an informal embargo on all loans and credits to Chile for more than a year to force Gonzlez Videla to break with the Communists. See Barnard, Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947, 369. 58 The embassy suggested nationalization was a possibility, and department officials expressed concern about it. See Despatch 14,561 Braden Copper Company Strike, Bowers (Crain) to Secretary of State, 25 October 1946, 825.5045/10-2546, Folder 1, Box 5366; and Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Request for Credit, 5 November 1946, 825.51/11-546, Folder 2, Box 5367; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum, Chilean Situation, Braden to Clayton, 6 November 1946, 825-51/11-646. Memorandum, Braden to Briggs and Trueblood, 2 December 1946, 825.5045/12-24 6, Folder 2, Box 5366; and Letter, Brad en to Bowers, 28 October 1946, 825.001 Gonzlez Videla, Gabriel/10-24 6, Folder 1, Box 5358; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Speech given to the Executives Club of Chicago, Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas, Braden, 13 September 1946, Department of State Bulletin XV/377 (22 September 1946): 539. Portions of the sp eech were reprinted in the Chilean government newspaper, La Nacin See Mr. Braden llam al co mercio Americano a hacer grandes inversiones en Latinoamrica, La Nacin 14 September 1946, p. 1. 54

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of grievances and demands, and struck out or revised all objectionable demands, resulting in an agreement between the miners union and the co mpany that was quite fa vorable to Kennecott. When Gonzlez Videla learned of Bradens hold, he was infuriated. In a meeting with Bowers, he snapped, Chile cannot be treated like a petty Central American country, and if this was to be [U.S.] policy he would have to change en tirely his foreign policy and look elsewhere for friends. Unaware of Bradens decision, Bowe rs admitted that Washington had not informed him of the action. Gonzlez Videla appeared to follow through with his pledge to look elsewhere for friends. On 13 December 1946, two weeks after he learned of Bradens hold, the Chilean president signed a trade and economic devel opment treaty with Juan Pern of Argentina. A key component of the treaty, said Gonzlez Videla, was $350 million dollars in economic development loans from Buenos Aires. 59 The treaty was received coolly by Chileans and U.S. officials. Many Chileans were troubled by loan terms that permitted Argentina to own one-half of the enterprises into which it invested monies. The Socialists, including Allende, were the first to express opposition to it. 60 The treaty disquieted Department of State official s, as well as financial experts in New York who advised the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Bowers observed that if the United States offered Chile such a treaty, every Chilean newspaper would scream 59 Bowers Diary, 26 November 1946, Volume 8: p. 376-377, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 4 December 1946, 825.5045/12-446, Folder 2, Box 5366, p. 2; Letter, Bowers to Braden, 2 January 1947, 825.00/1-247, Folder 4, Box 5353; both DF 1945-49 RG59, NA. Bowers Diary, 30 December 1946 and 31 December 1946, Volume 8: p. 382, 383, Bowers Papers. Despatch 14,925 Conversa tion between President of Chile and Mr. Turton of the Braden Copper Company, William E. Dunn (Earl T. Crain) to the Department of State, 12 February 1947, 825.5045/2-1247, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 524. 60 El Tratado Econmico Chileno-Argentino perjudicar a la Agricultura Nacional, Zig-Zag XLII/2182 (16 January 1947): 49. Notas Polticas: El Tratado Chileno-Argentino, Zig-Zag XLIII/2228 (5 D ecember 1947): 15. Autopsia del Comercio Chileno-Argentino Zig-Zag 27 February 1947, XLII/2188: 28. For widespread opposition to the treaty, see Letter, Bowers to Braden, 31 March 1947, Folder 1947, January May, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 55

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imperialism. Bowers recommended that the Unite d States remain absolutely silent until we know positivelywhat [the tr eatys] meaning may be. 61 Although claiming that the treaty was of no political importance, Gonzlez Videla likely was trying to play the United States and Argent ina off of one another, and this may have contributed to Braden releasing the hold on Chile s two loans. A month after Gonzlez Videla signed the treaty with Pern (January 1947), Braden indicated that the hold on the two loans was only a temporary measure, and that he had lifted it or was about to do so. By March 1947, Braden made clear that he was no longer holding up the two loans. 62 Meanwhile, Chile signed for and received other loans in February a nd April 1947, and another loan of $10 $15 million was possible from the World Bank that same April. 63 Eight months later, the Chilean charg daffaires told a senior Depart ment of State official that th e Chilean government had postponed action on the Argentine loan for months in hop es of getting additional loans and credits from the United States. A year after Gonzlez Videla and Pern signed the treaty, the hold had long 61 Letter, Braden to Carl Ulrich, Kennecott Copper Compan y, 13 December 1946, attach ed to Memorandum, Schnee to Wells, Trueblood, Briggs, Smith, and Braden, 10 D ecember 1946, 825.51/12-1046; an d Airgram A-106, Acheson (Atterberry) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 19 March 1947, 825-51/2-2047; both Folder 2, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 18 December 1946; and Letter, Bowers to Braden, 23 Decem ber 1946; both Folder 1946, November December, Box 6, Bowers Papers. 62 Memorandum, Braden to Briggs, Wright, Smith, and Schnee, 14 January 1947, FW 825.5045/12-2346, Folder 2, Box 5366; and Memorandum, Braden to Briggs, Wright, and Mann, 18 April 1947, 825.00/4-1847, Folder 4, Box 5353; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 63 Memorandum, Stenger to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 3 March 1947, 825.51/3-747, Folder 2; Memorandum, Stenger to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 9 April 1947, 825.51/5-947, Folder 3; Memorandum of Conversation, Schnee and Atterberry, 27 November 1 946, 825.51/11-27 46; Memorandum, Braden to Clay ton and Ness, 2 December 1946, 825.51/12-246, attached to Memorandum of Conversation, Schnee and Atterberry; Telegram 129, Bowers to Secretary of State, 20 February 1947, 825.51/2-2047, Folder 2; all Box 5367, RG59 DF 1945-49, NA. For the possible $10-15 million loan, see Memorandum, Robert F. Woodward, Deputy Director of Division of North and West Coast Affairs, to Brundage, Wells, Briggs, Wright, Schee, 4 April 1947, 825.52/4-447, attached to Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Credit Application with International Bank 825.51/3-2047, Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA 56

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been released, and the United States was providing aid to Chile. Gonzlez Videlas need for the treaty (and Argentinas development loans) had passed, and the treaty was not ratified. 64 Collapse of Gonzlez Videlas Coalition Gonzlez Videlas coalition cabinet of Liberals, Radi cals, and Communists proved contentious and unstable, and less than six months after his ina uguration, it fell apart, bringing the president into conflict with the Communists. All accounts agree on the three reasons why the cabinet collapsed: Communist efforts to union ize the peasants, the April municipal elections, and the Communists failure to work as a coalition partner. 65 The April 1947 municipal elections triggered the co llapse and Gonzlez Videlas first c onfrontation with the Communists. In the elections, the Radicals and Liberals suffered losses while Conservatives and Communists made gains. The Liberal and Radical Parties interpreted the results as criticism of their association with the Communists. The Liberals resigned from the cabinet, and the Radicals 64 Bowers Diary, 14 December 1946, Volume 8: page 380, Bowers Papers Memorandum of Conversation Chiles Difficult Economic Situation, Cecil Lyon, Acting Assistant Chief of Division of River Plate Affairs, 5 August 1947, 825.51/8-547, attached to Airgram A-303, Bowers to Secretary of State, 17 July 1947, 825.51/7-1747, Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Autopsia del Comercio Chileno-Argentino Zig-Zag 27 February 1947, XLI/2188: 28. 65 The unionization of the farm laborers was hotly debated, and many on the Right strongly opposed it. See El Mercurio January and February 1947, in passim Ercilla 17 December 1946, pp. 6-7; 25 March 1947, p. 4; and 8 April 1947, p. 4. Zig-Zag 5 December 1946, p.26; and 13 February 1947, p.25. For a schol arly work of the unionization effort, see Brian Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976). For a discussion of the 1947 Municipal elections and their result, see Drake, Populism and Socialism 287-288. For Gonzlez Videlas versi on of the cabinet collapse, see Gonzlez Videla, Defensa de la Democracia: Cartas cambiadas entre el Se rensimo Gran Maestro y S. E. el Presidente de la Repblica (Bogot: Litografia y Editorial Cahur, 1948), 30-34; and Acciones del Partido Comunista, Documento #2, Volumen 98, Coleccin Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, Archivo N acional, Santiago de Chile. The Communists acknowledged that they made little effort to coop erate with the other parties, and said that their only crime during this period was that they sought to achieve their own stated objectives as set forth in their 4 September 1946 platform. See Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseco 186-189. See also Letter, Bowers to Braden, 21 April 1947, 825.00/4-2147, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 57

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followed. The Communists, however, refused to resign. In a tense meeting with Contreras Labarca and the Communists, G onzlez Videla pressed them for their resignations, saying that he wished to start with a new cabinet. Cont reras Labarca refused, a nd the Communists charged that the crisis was directed by President Truma n, with the complicity of the reactionary and Trotskyite [Socialist] parties. 66 Gonzlez Videla then demanded their resignations, and Contreras Labarca angrily threw the resignations of every Communi st government official on the presidents desk. Rejecting th e set of mass resignations, Gonzl ez Videla said that he only wanted those of the three cabinet ministers, and he assured the Communists that their departure from the cabinet was only temporary. His assu rances apparently were perceived as genuine because the Communists remained supportive of Gonzlez Videla for several weeks. In a subsequent press interview, the president ca tegorically denied that his request for the Communists resignations was in any way due to North American influence or any such reasons. The cabinet changes, he insisted, w ere due to exclusively to internal political reasons. 67 The Communists departure from the cabinet cau sed U.S. officials and Gonzlez Videla to grow more worried about Chiles political stability, not less. The resignati ons occurred just four weeks after Truman requested aid for Greece and Turkey from the U.S. Congress in order to 66 Letter, Bowers to Braden, 21 April 1947, 825.00/4-2147, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 541. For the idea of U.S. pressure upon Gonzlez Videla and Chile, see Presin y Chantaje Imperialista, El Siglo 14 April 1947, p. 3. 67 Bowers diary and Department of State documents support Gonzlez Videlas denial of U.S. influence or pressure, offering no indication that Bowers or other U.S. official ever discussed the cabinet cris is or the composition of the cabinet with the Chil ean president at the time. Bowers Diary, 16 April 1947, Volume 8; p.388, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 21 April 1947, p. 2-3, 825.00/4-2147, Folder 4; and Airgram A-314, Bowers to Secretary of State, 29 July 1947, 825.00/7-2447, Folder 5; both Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Interview quotes from ltimas Noticias, 7 May 1947, in Despatch 15,257 Interview granted by the President Bowers (W. D. Robbins) to Secretary of State, 9 May 1947, 825.00/5-947, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 58

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prevent the two nations from falling to Communism (the Truman Doctrine). 68 Facing a strengthened Leftist threat in Chile, U.S. o fficials worried that the Communists might foment protests and strikes. They also knew that the PCCh was divided. Fonseca and the militants wanted to pursue a revolutionary agenda, withdr aw from government entirely, and aggressively oppose Gonzlez Videla. Contreras Labarca and the moderates, meanwhile, wanted to continue in government (sans the cabinet posts). Gonzlez Videla feared that the Communists, who led the coal miners union, would call a strike in the coal mines and paralyze the economy. He asked Bowers to request 20,000 tons of coal from Washington in order to prevent economic disaster, and the request was granted. Reviewing the situ ation, Bowers told the Department we now are fighting communism in South America must be prepared to support Gonzlez Videla. 69 For all of their concern about political stability, U.S. officials did not appreciate how Chiles financial difficulties, its inability to obtain new loans, and its energy (coal) shortages were fostering the instability U.S. officials wanted to forestall. The Chilean press had noted the shortage of coal reserves and the possibility of economic paralyzation. The Chilean government, however, could not pursue economic development or buy large quantities of coal to fuel that development because it could not obtain loans and credits. Gonzlez Videla sent Guillermo del Pedregal to the United States to negotiate wi th the EXIM Bank, World Bank, and other financial institutions, but Pedregal learned that Chile could not obtain new monies until it negotiated a 68 Speech before Joint Session of Congress, Truman, 12 March 1947, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office (USGPO), 1963), 176180. Hereafter cited as PPP Truman 1947 69 Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseca, 181-188. Bowers to Braden, 21 April 1947, 825.00/4-2147. Bradens comments were written in the margins of Bowers letter. Memorandum Coal for Chile, McGinnis to Brundage and Wells, 23 June 1947, 825.6362/6-2347, Folder 1, Box 5371, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 59

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payment plan for its current foreign debt, including the defaulted bonds left over from the Great Depression. Pedregal also learned that U.S. institutions wa nted Chile to address its severe shortage of foreign exchange. Chiles shortage of foreign exchange had become so acute that the Chilean government at one point had to ask U.S. copper companies to pay th eir quarterly taxes in advance, which the companies did. Yet Chile could not adhere to a revised payment plan, much less repay defaulted bonds, if its economy was weakened by energy shortages and labor strikes. 70 Bowers grew frustrated with the obstacles that Gonzlez Videla faced in obtaining loans from the United States, and he complained directly to President Truman. Arriving just weeks after Secretary of State Marsha ll proposed the Marshall Plan fo r European economic recovery, Bowers letter prompted Truman to intervene pe rsonally. In a memorandu m to the Secretary of the Treasury, Truman wrote: I hope you will take a personal interest into why Chile could not obtain loans, and he told the Trea sury secretary to make clear to the IBRD president and others that neither the Wall Street cr owd nor the copper interest should control the banks actions. 71 70 Otra huelga en el carbn arruinara la industria, Zig -Zag 20 March 1947, p. 28. Memorandum of Conversation, Braden with del Pedregal, 18 April 1947, 825.00/4-1847. Letter, Bowers to Braden, 2 June 1947, Folder 1947, June August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. For the foreign exchange shortage, see Memorandum, Woodward to Brundage, Wells, Briggs, Wright, and Schnee, 4 April 1947, 825.51/4-447, attached to Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Credit Application with Internatio nal Bank, 20 March 1947, 825-51/3-2047; and Letter, James Grafton Rogers, President of Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, to Frederick Livesey, Advisor of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, 12 June 19 47, 825.51/6-1247; both Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. A few private investors expressed concern about the safety of U.S. investment in Chile with the Communists in government, but the overwhelming issue was the defaulted bonds and the amount of Chiles current debt. For expressions of the safety of investment, see Despatch 15,273 Radical Pa rty, majority party in the Government, Bowers (Garrison) to Secretary of State, 13 May 1947, 825 .00/5-1347, attached to Despatch 15,257 Interview granted by the President, Bowers (R obbins) to Secretary of State, 9 May 1947, 825.00/5-947, Folder 4, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Bowers Diary, 7 September 1947, Volume 8, p. 401, Bowers Papers. 71 For the Marshall Plan, see Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Memorandum, Truman to Secretary of the Treasury, 5 August 1947, Folder Chile [1], Box 172, PSF -Subject File, HSTL. 60

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Trumans intervention prompted an eight-page, single-spaced memorandum from J. J. McCloy, the IBRDs president, and the memo offe red two important revelations regarding Chile and its financial troubles. Sent to Assistant Secretary of State for Am erican Republic Affairs Norman Armour, who had replaced Braden on 12 July 1947, the memorandum made clear that the IBRD was actually sympathetic towards Chile. McCloy pointed out that no Latin American country had received an IBRD loan and that Chiles application was the only one meriting consideration by the bank. Second, McCloy deta iled why the IBRD had not approved Chiles loan application, and the reasons were exclusivel y Chiles defaulted bonds, balance of payments problems, and budgetary deficits. Communists se rving in the cabinet had not been a factor. 72 With McCloys response, the Department of St ates Chile Desk Officer, Burr C. Brundage, now urged his superiors to rethink U.S. policy to wards Chile. If the United States wanted to continue future good relations with Chile, Brundage told his superiors, we [must] reverse our hands-off attitude [on Chiles debt problems], roll up our sleeves, wade in and get dirty. The department, Brundage asserted, needed to stop vi ewing foreign governments debt settlements as a private sector issue, and acknowledge that priv ate sector financial institutions such as the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, which he ld Chiles defaulted bonds, was an arm of our foreign policy and that they should be politely required to do what is considered just and 72 Memorandum Policy Recommendations on Chile, Brundage to Espy and Sheldon T. Mills, 28 August 1947, 711.25/8-2847, attached to Memorandum, Brundage to Wells, 9 June 1947, 711.25/6-947, Folder 4, Box 3450, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. For Armour replacing Braden, see Roger R. Trask, The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949, Diplomatic History 1/3 (Summer 1977), p. 276. Armour was confirmed as Assistant Secretary of St ate for European Affairs and American Republic Affairs on 10 June 1947. Department of State Bulletin XVI/416 (22 June 1947): 1253. Letter, Bowers to Armour, 14 July 1947, Folder 1947, JuneAugust, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Memorandum, J. J. McCloy, President of IBRD, to Secretary of the Treasury, 26 August 1947, p. 3-4, 7, attached to Memorandum, McCloy to Armour, 26 August 1947, 825.51/8-2647, Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 61

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proper to implement [that] policy. The depart ment, he stressed, must bring the Chileans and private sector representatives together and de mand concessions of equal magnitude from both sides. This applied to U.S. copper companies to o, said Brundage, because they were the biggest hindrance to excellent U.S.-Chilean relations due to their disregard of the sensibilities of the Chilean people. If the Department of State did not act, Brundage wa rned, Chiles democracy and those rights which we consider the highest expression of civiliz ation would be in jeopardy. Bowers was in hearty agreement with Brundages sentiments, noting that he had often been frustrated by individuals who have tried to create the impr ession that their organization determines the American policy toward Chile. 73 The remarkable aspect of Brundages A ugust 1947 memorandum is that he linked the success of Chiles democracy to the success of U.S. foreign polic y, considering it ideologically essential that [the United States] view Chiles problems in a sympathetic light. Bowers had long emphasized Chiles exceptionalism and presse d for U.S. support of Chile on the principle that democracies should assist each other. Br undage, however, was the first to assert that a successful U.S. foreign policy needed the ideologi cal symbolism that Chiles democracy offered. He urged his superiors to consid er the broad context, and remi nded them that there were few democracies in Latin America and Chile is one of these rarebirds. For Brundage, it was not the mere fact that Chile was a democracy, bu t rather Chiles democracy and constitutional history was in every sense the equal to ours. With the future of Chiles democracy now in 73 Memorandum Policy Recommendations on Chile, Brundage to Espy and Mills, 28 August 1947, 711.25/82847, attached to Memorandum Possi bility of Recall of Ambassador for Cons ultation, Brundage to Wells, 9 June 1947, 711.25/6-947, Folder 4, Box 3450; and Letter, Bowers to Armour, 9 September 1947, 825-51/9-947, Folder 3, Box 5367; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 62

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doubt due to its tremendous [financial] difficulties and the extreme temptation of authoritarianism, Brundage deemed it essentia l for the United States to assist Chile. 74 Brundages August 1947 memorandum posited the core premise that would guide U.S. policymakers in their decisions regarding Ch ile until 1970 a successful U.S. foreign policy required the symbolism offered by successful demo cracy in Chile. Brundage and Bowers were among several U.S. policymakers who interwove the concepts of excep tionalism, overseas territory, and European-ness to give that premise particular power and relevance, creating the model democracy premise. The Southern Cone context in which U.S. officials perceived right-wing authoritarianism as th e regional threat in contrast to Communism as the global threat highlighted the democratic qualities of Chiles political system. Bowers had long insisted that Chile was the staunchest, most inherent de mocracy in South America, and Braden had described Chile as a model for the region. Anal ysts at the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conceded that Chiles democratic tradition was of fairly recent origin, since Chiles 1925 Constitution. Yet certain republican practices, traditions, and institutions, despite their limitations, had existed since the 1830s, and Ch iles difference stuck in the minds of U.S. policymakers. Bowers further linked democracy and exceptionalism when he told Truman and the State Department that in the great interna tional battle of todaybetw een totalitarianism and democracyit would be rather remarkable if the United States made Chile our pet aversion. 74 Memorandum, Brundage to Espy and Mills, 28 August 194 7, 711.25/8-2847, Folder 4, Box 3450, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 21 July 1947, attached to Truman to Bowers, 30 April 1947, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject Files, HSTL. 63

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Even Truman seemed to note Chiles democratic exceptionalism, when he expressed his belief that Chileans were truly inte rested in free government. 75 The idea of Chile as overseas territory bol stered the importance of Chiles democracy and reinforced Chiles exceptionalism. Right-wi ng authoritarianism remained the primary threat, but the CIA was unequivocal: if the Communists assume a major role in Chile, the resultant eastern orientation of Chilean foreign pol icy would have implications far beyond those suggested by Chiles military and strategic value. CIA analysts divided Latin America into two zones, the circum-Caribbean and the Southern Cone, and Chile, in the Southern Cone, was outside the zone of immediate US predominance. Chiles remoteness from the centers of US power, analysts wrote, enabled it to exercise greate r independence, a fact recognized by nations within and outside Latin America. The CIA al so concluded that Chile, Argentina, and Brazil possessed a capacity to counterbalance U.S. strengt h, either by joining together (as in Perns anti-U.S. bloc) or by employing as strong ally from outside the hemisphere. 76 By interweaving the concepts of democracy, overseas territory, and exceptionalism, Armour, Brundage, Bowers, and the CIA admitted that significant disparities existed between Latin American nations, not a rough equality. Moreover, they acknowledged that the United 75 Letter, Bowers to Armour, 14 July 1947, Folder 1947, June August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. CIA Situation Report 9 Chile, 1 September 1947, Folder -Situation Reports (9-10), Box 259, Presidents Security Files Intelligence Files, HSTL, p. I-1. Memorandum, Brundage to Espy and Mills, 28 A ugust 1947, 711 .25/8-2847, Folder 4, Box 3450, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Armour, 9 September 1947, p. 4-5, 825.51/9-947, Folder 3, Box 5367, RG59 DF 1945-49, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 21 July 1947, attached to Truman to Bowers, 30 April 1947, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject Files, HSTL. Truman to Bowers, 19 November 1949, Folder -1949 October-December, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 76 CIA Situation Report 9 Chile, 1 September 1947, pp. V I-1VI-3, I-1, i-ii. The report for Chile is Number 9, with China Number 8 and Greece and Spai n Numbers 10 and 11 respectively. If the reports were completed by level of importance, degree of interest/concern to the United States, or perceived threat posed by Communism, then Chile generated a significant interest and concern am ong U.S. officials very early in the Cold War. 64

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States could not exert its power and influence to all parts of Latin America equally. U.S. relations with an overseas nation like Chile might more resemble U.S. relations with a European nation than with a nation such as Colombia in the circum-Caribbean. In fact, Armour, Brundage, and Bowers were framing Chiles predicament in European terms. Armour admitted that the Department was trying to provide assistance and cooperati on to Chile that would have a truly constructive result to resolve its financial difficulties. The search for a truly constructive result was in line with the Truman Doctrine, in which Truman declared that the status quo is not sacred and that the seed s of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. 77 Therefore, early in the Cold War, U.S. policym akers defined Chiles importance as an ally by intangibles and perception, not on tangible, balance-of-power factor s. U.S. officials determined that Chile was a necessary ally because of its political system and its role a regional leader, not its large copper rese rves. In fact, the CIA overtly downplayed geostrategic factors, saying that militarily, [e]conomically and strategical ly Chile is not a considerable factor in US security, and Chiles raw materialswere useful but not of vital necessity. This observation coincided with the view of Pa ul Nitze (who later wrote NSC-68) who said that U.S. copper reserves would last several decades. As a resu lt, Chile became a gauge by which to measure Soviet progress and an indi cator of Latin American s upport for the United States. 78 77 CIA Situation Report 9 Chile, 1 September 1947, p. VI-1. Letter, James H. Wright to Bowers, 13 August 1947, Folder 1947, June August, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Wright wrote the letter upon Armours instruction and said that these were points Armour wanted him to communicate to Bowers. Speech before Joint Session of Congress, Truman, 12 March 1947, PPP Truman 1947 176-180. 78 CIA Situation Report 9 Chile, 1 September 1947, p. i, ii, I-1. Paul Nitze, Natural Resources in a World of Conflict, Department of State Bulletin 21 November 1948, p. 625. 65

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A European Crisis The October 1947 coal strike marked the beginn ing of the Cold War in Chile and exposed the extent to which U.S. officials framed Chilean events in European terms. The strike led Department of State officials to question whet her they had misjudged th e Communist threat, and Chiles European-ness elevated the U.S. stakes in Chile and Chiles importance as a Cold War ally. The strike also introduced the Cold War into Chilean politics, because Gonzlez Videla clashed with his Communists alli es and subsequently pursued an anti-Communist campaign. The anti-Communist campaign broke down existing political party alignments, and forced the Radical president to look to the Right for political allies. 79 Gonzlez Videlas relations with the Comm unists soured between the April municipal elections and the October strike; meanwhile, th e Communists debated whet her to confront the president with a general strike or continue their cooperation w ith him. PCCh leader Galo Gonzlez warned those seeking confrontation th at a strike would only provoke a government crackdown on the workers and having the PCCh decl ared illegal. The June 1947 bus drivers strike in Santiago exacerbated tensions between the PCCh and the president. Gonzlez Videla publicly accused the PCCh of starting the strike and privately admitted that he had proof of it because he had ordered the Communists telephones to be tapped. 80 A series of strikes followed over the next several weeks in other sector s of the economy: Anaconda Coppers smelter 79 Chapters 2 and 4 will discuss more extensively the breakdown of political parties after the October 1947 strike. 80 Galo Gonzlez quoted in Mara Soledad Gmez, Factores nacionales e internacionales de la poltica interna del Partido Comunista de Chile, 1922-1952, El Partido Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario (Santiago: CESOC-FLASCO, 1988), Augusto Varas, ed., 113-114. Telegram 443, Bowers to Secretary of State, 7 June 1947, 825.5045/6-647; Telegram 453, Bowers to Secretary of State, 9 June 1947, 825.5045/6-947; Telegram 484, Bowers to Secretary of State, 15 June 1947, 825.5045/6-1547, all Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 66

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employees, blue and white collar workers at Br aden Copper, merchant marine officers, bus drivers in Valparaso and Via del Mar, coal miners, and postal a nd telegraph employees. During a meeting with E. T. Stannard of Kenn ecott Copper, Gonzlez Videla declared that he was disgusted with the Communists and expected a ge neral strike in September. If this occurred, he said, he would insist on a showdown. He then asked Stannard to help him obtain 50,000 tons of coal, and Stannard agreed. 81 Gonzlez Videlas final break with the Communists occurr ed during an early August 1947 meeting requested by PCCh Secretary General Ricar do Fonseca. The president had just returned from Brazil, where he had endorsed a U.S. propos al for a mutual defense pact (the proposal would become the 1947 Rio Pact). Gonzlez Vi dela and Fonseca may have viewed the meeting as a chance to create a working relationship, but the meeting devolved into a stormy affair. 82 Frustrated by the strikes, Gonzlez Videla as ked Fonseca for PCCh support of his government and for the party to take a low profile for a time, in other words, end the strikes. Fonseca refused and proclaimed the partys devotion to the worker s and improvement of their welfare. He then pressed Gonzlez Videla to align Chile with th e Soviet Union and reject the U.S.-proposed 81 Despatch 15,490, Dunn to Department of State, 15 July 1947, 825.5045/7-1547; Telegram 602, Bowers to Secretary of State, 23 July 1947, 825.5045/7-2347; Telegram 612, Bowers to Secretary of State, 24 July 1947, 825.5045/7-2447; Airgram 325, Bowers to Secretary of State, 5 August 1947, 825.5045/8-547; Airgram 315, Bowers to Secretary of State, 24 July 1947, 825.5045/7-2447; Despatch 15,567, Bowers to Secretary of State, 13 August 1947, 825.5045/8-13 47; and Telegram 667, Bowers to Secretary of State, 19 August 1 947, 825.5045/8-1947; all Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Observations of Mr. Stannard regarding the Chilean Situation, Brundage, 23 July 1947, 825.5043/7-2347, attached to Memorandum, Brundage to Wells, 23 July 1947, Folder 5, Box 5365, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 82 The absence of Contreras Labarca from the meeting indicates his loss of status in th e party. Gonzlez Videlas and Lus Corvalns accounts differ on who accompanied Fonseca. Gonzl ez Videla names Communist Deputy Cipriano Pontigo; meanwhile, Corvaln cites Volodia Te itelboim and Galo Gonzlez. Gonzlez Videla is likely correct. Corvaln seems to have conf used the April meeting when the presid ent asked for the cabinet resignations (Teitelboim and Galo Gonzlez accompanied Contreras Labarc a) and Fonsecas August mee ting. Also, the quotes that Corvaln attributes to Gonzlez Vi dela are out of context for the August meeting and more appropriate for the April meeting. Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 598-603. Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseca 195. 67

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defense pact, which would be discussed at th e upcoming inter-American conference in Rio de Janeiro (Latin American nations and the Unite d States signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, i.e. th e Rio Pact, three weeks later). 83 Gonzlez Videla dismissed Fonsecas suggestion. Aligning with the Soviets, he said, would leave Chile isolated in the hemisphere. Chile would support the West, the Chil ean president explained, and he said that he had instructed the Foreign Minist er to support the United States and the defense pact. Fonseca charged that Gonzalez Videla was making a mistak e and then threatened more strikes. Pounding his fist on the table, the president warned that if the Communists challenged his authority, the feathers will fly in the scuffle. The meeting ended. 84 Afterwards, the clash between Gonzlez Vide la and the Communists escalated. In midAugust 1947, the president publicly criticized the Communists, a nd the PCCh urged the masses to challenge Gonzlez Videlas gov ernment. The PCCh said that the nation confronted a choice between dictatorship and popular democracy, and to gain the latter, the party called on the masses to mobilize to the maximu m and give popular solutions to Chiles problems. Openly challenged by the Communists, Gonzlez Vide la removed the remaining Communists from government. He then requested and received Sta te of Emergency powers from Congress. Out 83 The treatys formal name is the In ter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assi stance, which was negotiated and signed between 15 August and 2 September 1947. For the treatys text, see Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Department of State Bulletin XVII/429 (21 September 1947): 565-572. For scholarly discussions of the Rio Pact, see Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 123-124; and Longley, In the Eagles Shadow 200-201. 84 Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 603-605. Corvaln, Ricardo Fonseca 195-197. 68

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of government and isolated, the PCCh now backtr acked, urging supporters to fight for rights and better conditions for workers but not to challe nge legitimate constitutional authority. 85 While Gonzlez Videla clashed with the Communists, Minister of Finance Jorge Alessandri Rodrguez and Corporacin de Fomento official Roberto Vergara 86 resolved the defaulted bonds impasse and improved Chiles finances. 87 In early September, Alessandri and Vergara developed a plan to repay the defaulted debt and had gained Department of State support for it. Over the next few weeks, Verg ara settled the defaulted bonds issue along the terms of the plan. By the end of October, the EXIM Bank told the Department of State that it was ready to authorize a loan to Chile. 88 85 Telegram 679, Bowers to Secretary of State, 21 August 1947, 825.5045/8-2047, Folder 3, Box 5366; and Despatch 15,694, Trueblood, Counselor for U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Secretary of State, 24 October 1947, 825.00B/10-2447, Folder 1, Box 5367; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 83-84. Sehlinger and Hamilton, Spokesman for Democracy 232. 86 Corporacin de Fomento (CORFO -Development Corporation) was the government entity that undertook much of industrial development in Chile. It was also the entity that received many of the development loans and credits from the EXIM Bank, IBRD, and other U.S. financial institutions. 87 Andrew Barnard asserts that loans and credits were p rinciple instrument the Department of State used to pressure Gonzlez Videla to break with the Communists. The Communist newspaper El Siglo first leveled this charge in April 1947 when Gonzlez Videla requested the Communists resignations from the cabinet. The documentary record does not support th is claim. The trajectories of the bo nds issue and Gonzlez Videlas clashes with the Communists had little influence on each other. As shown, no embargo on loans and credits existed, Chiles difficulties in obtaining new loans had arisen more than a year before Gonzlez Videla was elected, and Truman personally intervened to encourage loans to Ch ile. Except for Bradens brief hold on two loans in December 1946, Department offici als did not link Chiles ability to obtain loans and credits to the presen ce of the Communist Party in the cabinet. See Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 85; and Presin y Chantaje Imperialista [Imperialist Pressure and Blackmail], El Siglo 14 April 1947, p. 3. 88 Negotiations stalled later, with a final agreement achieved on 11 April 1948; however, the September plan and Vergaras negotiations removed a key obstacle. For the plan, Vergaras negotiations, and EXIM Bank approval, see Letter, Bowers to Armour, 9 September 1947, 825.51/9-947; Memorandum of Conversation Settlement of Chiles Debt Problem, 13 October 1947, 825.51/10-1347; and Memorandum of Conversation Encouraging Report on Progress toward Chilean Debt Settlement, 30 October 1947 825.51/10-3047; all Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. For the stalled talks and final agreement, s ee Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Negotiations for World Bank and Exim Loans, and Discussions concerning Exchange Control, 29 January 1948, 825.51/1-2948, attached to Memorandum of Conversation, 15 January 1948, 825.51/1-1548, both Folder 3, Box 5367, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Plan for New Chilean Bo nd Service, Department of State Bulletin XVIII/458 (11 April 1948): 480. 69

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Gonzlez Videlas clash with the Communists cu lminated in October during a coal miners strike. The president tried to avert the 4 Oct ober 1947 strike by offering the miners a 40% wage increase, a housing allowance, and other benefi ts, nearly matching the miners demands. The offer was rejected, and the strike went forw ard, although doubts exist about whether the miners learned of Gonzlez Videlas 40% wage increase o ffer before they called the strike. Gonzlez Videla then declared the coal mines to be emergency zones, and military units moved into the coal mining region just south of Concepcin to maintain order and ensure that coal mining continued. The president then had Communist labor leaders arrest ed and had all coal technicians and specialists conscripted into the army. Bowers considered the 40% wage increase so generous and without precedent that he believed that the Communists had declared the strike for notoriously political purposes. 89 The strike threatened to create a national energy shortage, and Gonzlez Videla pleaded with U.S. officials to send coal in order to ke ep Chiles economy operating at a minimal level. Initially, the Department of Stat e responded that the coal situati on was very tight (due in part to European coal shortages for the upcoming wint er), and that possibilities for obtaining coal were extremely remote. Exasperated by Wash ingtons parsimony and lack of action, Bowers scolded the Department, saying th at it was incredible that we should be indifferent to the Chileans in their time of crisis. Chile, he said, required the United States attention just as much 89 Telegram 776, Bowers to Secretary of State, 6 October 1947, 825.5045/10-647, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Despatch 15,694, Trueblood to Secretary of State, 24 October 1947, 825.00B/10-2447. Letter, Bowers to Armour, 24 October 1947, enclosed with Letter, Bowers to Truman, 24 October 1947, attached to Truman to Bowers, 30 October 1947, Folder -State Department, Correspondence, 1946-47 [5 of 5], Box 38, White House Central Files -Confidential File, HSTL. Joann Clements Pavilack, Black Gold in th e Red Zone: Repression and Contention in Chilean Coal Mining Communities from the Popular Front to the Advent of the Cold War, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2003, p. 399. 70

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as Greece had seven months earlier, and unless the United States made a better effort to help Gonzlez Videla, we may prepare ourselves for a grave Communist triumph in our backyard. 90 Bowers comparison of Chile to Greece, and imp licitly to the European situation at large, gained credibility, leading Department officials to question whether they had underestimated the Communist threat in Chile. Early in the strike, Gonzlez Vi dela announced that two Yugoslav diplomats had been arrested and expelled for in volvement in the strike. He claimed that documents taken from one of the mens bags proved the strike was instigated by a Soviet satellite (Yugoslavia) and that the Communists had chosen Chile as a test of st rength because of its extensive U.S. investments. He immediately br oke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and a week later severed rela tions with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 91 Caught off-guard by the coal strike and pressu red by Gonzlez Videla the Department of State moved quickly to aid Chile. One week after Bowers scolded the Department for its indifference, Gonzlez Videla and his cabinet im patiently told the U.S. Embassy that they needed to know positively if they could expect any help from the United States. Gonzlez Videla telephoned Chile's Ambassador to the Unit ed States, Felix Nieto del Ro, and asked him to contact the Department and request Washingtons full support. Th at support was 105,000 tons 90 Telegram 776, Bowers to Secretary of State, 6 October 1947, 825.5045/10-647; Telegram 453, Lovett, Department of State to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 7 October 1947, 825.5045/10-647; and Telegram 796, Bowers to Secretary of State, 13 October 1947, 825.5045/10-1347; all Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Fifteen years later, Bowers still believed that the coal strike was ordered from Moscow and was similar to Communist efforts in Eastern Europe and Greece. See Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 166-172. 91 The two Yugoslav diplomats were Dalibor Jakasa and Andrija Cunja. Cunja was Charg dAffaires at Santiago, and Jakasa was Secretary to the Yugoslav le gation in Buenos Aires. Hicieron Noticia Zig-Zag XLIII/2221 (18 October 1947): 9. Despatch 15,694, Trueblood to Secretary of State, 24 October 1947, 825.00B/10-2447. Telegram 776, Bowers to Secretary of State, 6 October 1947, 825.5045/10-647, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Bowers was not surprised by the break with the Soviet Un ion, but was with Czechoslovakia. Letter, Bowers to Armour, 24 October 1947. 71

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of coal in order to meet Chiles energy needs fo r October and November, as well as credit to buy it. Nieto del Ro telephoned Assistant Secret ary Armour, finding him at home. After the Chilean explained the situation, Armour asked the ambassador to see him promptly the next morning. 92 Nieto del Ro met with Armour and severa l other leading department officials early the next morning, and the ambassador learned that 72,000 tons of U.S. coal would promptly be made available, that 100,000 tons were possible. Moreover, Armour said that the United States would move heaven and earth to ensure that Chile got enough coal for not only October and November but also for December and January. Armour requested that Nieto del Ro move heaven and earth to find financing to purchase the coal and suggested that he try the EXIM Bank. After Nieto del Ro left, Armour and the other officials decided to approach the EXIM Bank and prepare the way for the Chilean amba ssador. They found the EXIM Bank sympathetic to Chiles request, and within twenty-four hours, the U.S. Gove rnment issued export licenses enabling the Chileans to buy the coal which was now at least 90,000 tons. 93 Department officials framed Chiles coal strike crisis as a European crisis rather than a Latin American one. The Truman administration r ecognized that it needed to provide more aid to Europe, offering the Marsha ll Plan. Had the United States not done so, the economic, political, and social deteriora tion would have enabled the alre ady-strong Communist parties to 92 Telegram 796, Bowers to Secretary of State, 13 October 1947, 825.5045/10/1347, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 194549, RG59, NA. Memorandum, Felix Nieto del Ro, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, to Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 18 November 1947, Documento #2378/121, Volumen 2566 (1947) Tomo II Seccin Confidencial Oficios Recibidos, Embajada en EE UU [Estados Unidos], Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago de Chile. Memorandum of Conversation Coal Situation in Chile, Armour, 13 October 1947, 852.6362/10-1347, Folder 1, Box 5371, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 93 Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Coal Problem, 14 October 1947, FW 825.5045/10-1447, Folder 3 Box 5366; Telegram 3283, Armour (Mills) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 14 Octobe r 1947, 825.5045/101347, Folder 3, Box 5366; and Telegram 3576, Lovett (Mills) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 15 October 1947, 825.6362/10-1547, Folder 1, Box 5371; all DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 72

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increase their power and subvert the United States ability to achi eve its postwar aims. Assistant Secretary Armour described the Ch ilean coal strike crisis to Secretary of State Marshall in precisely these terms. Bowers asserted that if the United States aided Chile, it would give the Italians proof of our moral support. Division chief Sheldon Mills asked if Chiles Communists were employing the same tactics against Gonzl ez Videla that French Communists might use against General Charles de Gaulle U.S. officials recognized that Chile, France, and Italy had similar political systems; in fact, while Communist s served in Gonzlez Videlas cabinet, French and Italian Communists also serv ed in their nations governments. Gonzlez Videla claimed the Communists were using the same st rategy in Chile as in France and Italy: they were using their support in labor unions to create economic chaos favorable to the interests of Russia. 94 The Model Democracy Premise For U.S. policymakers, three developments re sulted from the October 1947 coal strike. First, the ideas of European-ness, democracy, exceptionalism, and overseas territory fused into the model democracy premise. Second, U.S. offici als concluded that the United States needed to help Chile stabilize and develop its economy or th e country could face political turmoil. Finally, 94 For Europe, see Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: Americas Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997), 32, 40, 38. Memorandum Coal Strike in Chile Possibly a Communist Maneuver, Armour (Mills) to Secretary of State, 17 October 1947, 825.5045/10-1747, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. See also Memorandum Chiles Request for Coal in Fight Against Communist Penetration, Woodward (Mills) to Armour, 8 October 1947, 825.00B/10-847, Folder 1, Box 5357; and Armour to Bowers, 12 November 1947, 825.5045/102447, attached to Memorandum, Lyon to Mills, 29 October 1947, Folder 3, Box 5366; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Coal Problem, 14 October 1947, FW 825.5045/10-1447. Telegram 2653, Bowers to Secretary of State, 9 October 1947, 825.5045/10-947, Folder 3, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Mills to Bowers, 29 October 1947, Folder -1947, September October, Box 6, Bowers Papers. Despatch 15,796 Speech of the President of Chile, Bowers to Secretary of State, 10 December 1947, Folder 5, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA, p. 2. 73

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U.S. officials reverted to their concerns about political stability and the threat from the authoritarian Right. Department of State officials soon began to doubt that the Communists posed a threat to Chile. They considered the Chilean government s charges of Communist agitation against the two Yugoslav diplomats as dubious. The evidence that Chilean officials had presented did not demonstrate Moscow-directed agitation; instead, it showed a Yugoslav diplomat trying to build support for Yugoslav leader Marsha ll Tito, which likely resulted from Titos break with Stalin. 95 The U.S. Embassy in Belgrade reported that si milar activities were occurring in other nations that had relations with Yugoslavia. 96 The Department asked James Bell, Labor Attach in Santiago, to investigate the coal strike and labor conditions. Bell conc luded that the strike resulted from Communist tactic s, an opinion shared by Bowers and Gonzlez Videla. Yet his description of the poor pay, hazardous work ing conditions, poor housing, and bad health 95 For Titos break with Stalin, see Duncan Wilson, Titos Yugoslavia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 49-59; Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 115-130; Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 43-79; and David L. Larson, United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963 (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), 128-207. 96 Department of State Bulletin XVI/416 (22 June 1947): 1253. Letter, James H. Webb and Roberts to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 5 November 1947, 825.5045/11-847, Folder 4, Box 5366, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. U.S. officials talked with two Yugoslav exiles, one of whom had lived in Chile for some years. They learned that one of the expelled Yugoslav diplomats was considered an activ e communist agent; meanwhile the other was probably an innocent tool. Chilean docume nts suggest that the innocent tool was building support for Tito among Yugoslavs in Chile. Memorandum of Conversation Views of Yugoslavs in Exile on Communism, Webb, 16 October 1947, 825.00B/10-1647, Folder 1, Box 5357, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Synopsis de Franjo Pirc and Synopsis de General Ljubomic Ilic in Ruptura con Yugoeslavia, Volumen 2622 (labelled Ruptura con Rusia), Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago de Chile. Documents from Chiles Director General of Investigaciones suggest a network existed amon g the Czech, Yugoslav, and Russian diplomats in Chile. See Informes del Director General de Investigaciones, Lus Brun dAvoglio, 22 September 1947, 20 October 1947, and 27 October 1947, reprinted in Gonzlez Videla, Memorias II: 1406-1412. 74

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conditions conflicts with his conclusion, suggesting that the miners may have struck over traditional labor issues. 97 Gonzlez Videla spearheaded an anti-Communi st campaign that fueled U.S. concerns about political turmoil. Beginning in October 1 947, the president railed against the Communists in several speeches, admitting that he had erred in trusting them. He accused them of artificially aggravating the countrys economic problems with work slowdowns and strikes, of promoting disorder and anarchy, and giving their loyalty to the Soviet Union. Communist efforts in Chile, he charged, were similar to Comm unist disruptions in France, It aly, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He declared that if Communism does not stay within the law, he would make it disappear. 98 97 Report 404 Coal Strike October 1947, James D. Bell, 22 December 1947, attached to Despatch 15,823 Transmitting Report on Chilean Coal Mi nes, Bowers to Secretary of State, 23 December 1947, 825.5045/12-2347, Folder 4, Box 5366, DF 1045-49, RG59, NA. For Gonzlez Vi delas certainty of the politi cal nature of the strike, see Gonzlez Videla, Memorias I: 653-704; and Letter, Mi pensamiento frente a la actual posicin internacional, n.d., Volumen 2622 Ruptura con Rusia, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago de Chile. This letter appears to be dictated afte r the events and placed among the papers as a chronicle of the presidents ideas during events. The idea that the Communists called the strike for political purposes was what the Foreign Ministry told its diplomats. See Letter, German Vergara to All Diplomatic Missions, 21 October 1947, Volumen 2622 Ruptura con Rusia, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago de Chile. Joann Clements Pavilack concludes that the coal miners struck over pay, working conditions, and housing and is critical of Gonzlez Videla and Bowers. Gonzlez Videlas August m eeting with Fonseca and subsequent call by the PCCh to confront the president with strikes and other forms of resistance predisposed him to believe that the strike was political. A key question remains: What were Fonseca and the PCCh leadership doing an d saying just before and during the October strike? This author concludes that Pavilack is correct about the debate between Communist leaders and Chilean military and government leaders in th e mining communities. However, there was probably a divergence between what Communist l eaders were saying in Lota and Coronel and what the Communist Party leadership was saying in Santiago. It may be that Fo nseca and the PCCh national lead ership tried to use a local strike over pay and conditions to pressure Gonzlez Videla. If so, the move was serious miscalculation. Pavilack, Black Gold in the Red Zone: Repression and Contention in Chilean Coal Mining Communities from the Popular Front to the Advent of the Cold War, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2003, p. 399-407. 98 Gonzlez Videla, Discurso al Pueblo de Antofagasta, 20? August 1948, Documento #5; Discurso al Pueblo de Osorno, 3 November 1948, Documento #7; and Discurso en la Exposicin de Los Angeles, Documento #8, 19 November 1947; all Volumen 101, Coleccin Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, Archivo Nacional, Santiago de Chile. Acciones del Partido Comunista n.d. [after October 1947] Document #2, Vo lume 98, Coleccin Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, Archivo Nacional, Santiago de Chile. Despatch 15,796, Bowers to S ecretary of State, 10 December 1947, 825.00/12-1047; and Despatch 15,818, Bowers to Secretary of Stat e, 18 December 1947, 825.00/12-1847; both Folder 5, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Translation of Speech from La Nacin enclosed with Despatch 41, Bowers (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 19 January 1948, 825.00B/1-1948, Folder 2, Box 5357; and Despatch 81, Bowers (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 4 February 1948, 825.00/2-448, Folder 6, Box 5353; both DF 1945-49, 75

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The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communist s in February 1948 lent credibility to Gonzlez Videlas charges that Communists sou ght to subvert democracy and were loyal to Moscow. As part of the governing coaliti on, Czech Communists ove rthrew the elected government and installed a Soviet-oriented, Stalin ist, one-party regime. At Gonzlez Videlas direction, Chile petitioned the United Nations to investigate Czech events, citing Chiles own experience with Communist subversion during the October coal strike. 99 Just weeks after the fall of Czechoslovakia, and with Chiles politic al parties united behind him, Gonzlez Videla proposed the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy. The proposed law banned the Communist Party, removed Communists from voter rolls, and gave the president powers to censor the press. This was not a rash proposal; shortly before the bill was presented, Chiles Ministry of Foreign Relatio ns had asked its diplom ats to report on what restrictions other countrie s had imposed on the Communist s, with several diplomats responding. 100 Popularly called La Ley Maldit a (cursed or damned law), the bill generated significant debate in Congress, most notably from Sena tor Salvador Allende and Deputy Radomiro Tomic Romero. Both based their oppositio n on what they believed to be the fundamental principles of democracy. One could not defend liberty by re stricting liberty, Allende told his Senate RG59, NA. In an open letter to the President of the Ma sons, of which Gonzlez Videla was a member, the president detailed why he had turned on his former Communist allies. See Gonzlez Videla, Defensa de la Democracia. 99 Department of State Bulletin XVIII/456 (28 March 1948): 409-411. For the U.S. response to this petition, see Department of State Bulletin XVIII/457 (4 April 1948): 446-448. 100 Telegram 54, Foreign Minister (German Vergara) to the Ambassadors, 17 May 1948, Volumen 2631 Comunismo, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago de Chile. The many responses appear in the volume alter German Vergaras letter. 76

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colleagues, nor could one combat totalitarianism and adopt atti tudes similar to those held by totalitarians. Democracy, he said, was more than a series of dispositions ; it was a harvest of conscience that is constructed of principles, ideas, doctrines, not police measures. It was a spiritual attitude of constant overcoming that held out the possibility of a rebellion against injustice. For Allende, the proposed law was a misguided measure: it persecutes ideas, it excludes a political party, it restricts suffrage, it attacks the most basi c rights of the working class, and it makes the right of organizing groups of employees a myth. 101 In the Chamber of Deputies, Radomiro Tomic of the Falange Party looked to France and Italy as the examples that Chile should emulate. 102 Banning the PCCh, he charged, was an easy and cheap solution, it demonstrated a lack of confidence in every funda mental principlethat supports the institutions and methods of democracy. In Italy, he said, the Prime Minister gave the Communists every opportunity to remain within legal limits provid ed that they worked within the democratic framework and did not foster revolution. The French government, Tomic noted, did not outlaw the Communist Party when it initiated a strike that paralyzed six million workers. Instead, the French government passed laws that prohibited actions that impeded the freedom to work or harmed the nations econo my. The French broke the strike, he said, knocked down the Communists, and maintain[ ed] democratic norms and liberty. Banning 101 Speech in the Senate Defensa permanente de la democr acia. Proyecto que declara fu era de la ley al Partido Comunista, Salvador Allende, 18 June 1948, in Obras Escogidas, 1933-1948 Volume I (Santiago: Grafica Andes for el Instituto de Estudios Contemporneos, 1988), Patricio Quiroga, ed., 487-488. 102 The Falange are the predecessors of th e Christian Democrats. Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton Univer sity Press, 1985), 58. 77

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the Communist Party, Tomic declared, would en courage more sympathy towards Communism than everything that the communist propagandi sts and agitators coul d do in ten years. 103 Despite Allendes and Tomics opposition, th e Defense of Democracy bill passed both houses of Congress easily. Gonzlez Videla signed the bill into law on 3 September 1948. Quickly implemented, Law 8987 banned the Communist Party, removed approximately 26,000 Communists from voter rolls, and gave the presid ent considerable powers to censor the press. 104 U.S. officials disliked the Defense of Demo cracy Law because it gave Chiles executive branch a potentially dangerous weapon and the laws effectiveness or abuse relied solely upon the manner in which it was enforced. Under the new law, the Chilean government gained significant power to curtail dissent from any group, not just Communists. Government officials, if they wished, could silence investigative jour nalists who found corruption in high levels. The law could also be used to stifle labor union act ivism for better wages and conditions, as well as to sanction the breaking of labor unions. Even the anti-Communist provisions made the U.S. Embassy and ARA officers uneasy. As one AR A officer remarked, the law might reduce the number of Communist Party s upporters, but it would drive th e Communists underground where 103 Radomiro Tomic Romero, La Ley de Defensa de la Democracia victimiza a los Comunistas y favorece al Comunismo, Discurso in la Cmara de Diputados, 11 May 1948, in Tomic, Tomic: Testimonios (Santiago: Editorial Emisin, 1988), Jorge Donoso Pacheco, ed., pp. 188, 189, 185, 184, 187. 104 Despatch 265, Bowers to Secretary of State, 16 April 1948, 825.00/4-1648, Folder 6, Box 5353; Despatch 341, Bowers to Secretary of State, 13 May 1948, 825.00/5-1348, Folder 6, Box 5353; and Despatch 599 Defense of Democracy Law, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 14 September 1948, 825.00/9-1448, Folder 1, Box 5354; all DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. The names of those voters removed from the rolls were published in the governments Diario Oficial and copies of these were forwarde d to the States Department. See passim Folder 2, Box 5354; and Folder 1, Box 5355; both DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 78

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they will be more difficult to watch and possibly no less dangerous to the cause of democracy. 105 Six weeks after Gonzlez Videla had signe d La Ley Maldita, the discovery of a rightwing coup plot in Chile confirmed U.S. fears of th e authoritarian Right and led to the adoption of the model democracy premise. In October 1948, Chilean officials arrested several prominent civilians and military officers for plotting to overthrow the government, among them was General Carlos Ibez. Chilean o fficials discovered the conspirators early in their plans so the threat of a coup was minimal. State Department officials, however, re acted strongly, believing that Chiles democracy was imperiled. They insi sted that Chiles democracy must be preserved to serve as a model for other nations in the Cold War. Department offi cials then developed six proposals to strengthen Chiles democracy and President Gonzlez Videlas position. 106 The international context was crucial to the reaction by U.S. policymakers. The coup plot occurred after the fall of Czechoslovakia, during the U.S. airlift of supplies to Berlin after the Soviets closed access to the city, and afte r military coups in Venezuela and Peru. 107 U.S. 105 Despatch 599 Defense of Democracy Law, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 14 September 1948. Memorandum Defense of Democracy Law, Bainbridge C. Davis, Assistant Chief of Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 29 September 1948, 825.00/9-2948, Folder 1, Box 5354, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 106 Airgram A-486, Bowers to Secretary of State, 1 October 1948, 825.00/10-148; Telegram 708, Bowers to Secretary of State, 1 November 1948, 825.00/11-148; Memorandum, Davis to Paul C. Daniels, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, 5 November 1 948, attached to Telegram 708; and Memorandum, Miss Carlisle to Davis, 16 November 1948, FW 825.00/9-1248; all Folder 1, Box 5354, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum, Mills, Director of Division of North and West Coast Affair s, to Woodward, 17 December 1948, 825.00/12-1748, Folder 2, Box 5354, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 107 For the military coup in Venezuel a, see Steven Ellner, Venezuela, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 147-169; Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 125-167; and Charles Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Anti-dictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 19451959 (Coral Gables FL: University of Miami Pre ss, 1974). For the military coup in Peru, see Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 116-120; and Nigel Haworth, Peru, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 160-179. 79

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officials acknowledged that Gonzlez Videla had implemented several much-needed economic reforms, renegotiated Chiles de bt, and substantially improved Chiles credit standing. His efforts, U.S. officials admitted, had created w idespread public dissatisfaction among Chilean elites, who could not easily purchase imported goods, and among Chiles working classes and military personnel, who were not earning living wa ges. [T]here were many in Chile who would welcome a change, ARA division chief Sheldon Mills admitted, some of them any kind of change. Department officials now regretted their quick recognition of Perus military regime, and Truman admitted that the United States wa s a little fast in recognizing Venezuelas military government. Robert F. Woodward, deputy director of ARA, said the moment was a fine opportunity, if we are willi ng to seize it, to make our vi ews regarding dictatorships and democracy abundantly clear.[T]here are degrees of friendliness and democracies like Chile should and would be clearly fa vored over military dictators. 108 The U.S. response to the preempted right -wing coup in 1948 completed the Chiles transition from the periphery during Wo rld War II to a Cold War battleground. 109 The U.S. response fused the ideas of democracy, exception alism, European-ness, and overseas territory into the model democracy premise. Entrenching Chile between Europe and Latin America on their ideological map, U.S. policymakers conclude d that Chile was not the stereotypical Latin American country. Because its practice of de mocracy was deeply rooted and ought to be emulated, Chiles symbolic value as a model a nd ally outweighed other considerations, raising 108 Memorandum, Mills to Woodward, 17 December 1948, 82 5.00/12-1748. Truman to Bowers, 28 January 1949, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject Files, HSTL. Memorandum, Woodward to Mills, 17 December 1948, 825.00/12-1748, Folder 2, Box 5354, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 109 S. Cole Blasier used the term battleground in his 1950 article on Communism in Chile. See Blasier, Chile: A Communist Battleground, Political Science Quarterly 65/3 (September 1950): 353-375. 80

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the Cold War stakes in Chile to European-like levels and elevating Chile to a crucially important position in the Cold War. If Chile experienced a Communist ta keover or a right-wing dictatorship, then the blow to the U.S. pos ition would have implications far beyond those suggested by Chiles present military and strategic value. The demise of Chilean democracy would cast doubt upon Trumans claim that, Democ racy was the objective which gave strength to the brave men and women of the underground in the enslaved countries of Europe and Asia, and was the rallying cry today for free men ever ywhere in their strugg le for a better life. 110 The question remaining for State Department officials was how to support and strengthen Chiles democracy. Here, U.S. offi cials faced a dilemma: they wa nted to help, but they did not want to intervene or give the perception of inte rvening. This narrowed their six proposals. ARA decided that the proposals of sending an air squa dron or a cruiser would likely have a contrary effect. This left sending the Vi ce-President on a visit to Chile or inviting Gonzlez Videla to Washington for an official visit. The Department suggested the former but the latter occurred. 111 In April 1950, Gonzlez Videla arrived in Washington at Trumans invitation, and the visit was portrayed as meeting between the leaders of two democracies. In a rare gesture, Truman hosted the President of Chile fo r a second time, but the visit was to express U.S. support for Chile and demonstrate the deep bond between two democratic nations The two presidents held 110 Memorandum, Woodward to Mills, 17 December 1948, 825.00/12-1748. CIA Situation Report 9 Chile, 1 September 1947, p. i-ii, VI-2 VI-3. Truman, Address before the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, 15 April 1946, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1962), Warren R. Reid, ed., assisted by Mildred B. Berry, 201. For public statements of the importance of democracy, freedom, and economic development to US rela tions with and foreign policy towards Latin America, see Truman, Speech The Good Neighbor Policy -An Application of Democracy to International Affairs, 3 March 1947, given in Mexico City, printed in Department of State Bulletin XVI/404 (16 March 1947): 498-499; Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Economic Aid to Latin America, 8 April 1948, PPP: Truman, 1948 207-208. 111 Memorandum, Mills to Woodward, 17 December 1948 825.00/12-1748. Letter, Truman to Bowers, 19 November 1949, Folder Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF -Subject File, HSTL. 81

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substantive discussions on severa l issues; however, a lighter mome nt punctuated the visit and the bond between the two chief executives. As a surp rise, Truman played one of Gonzlez Videlas favorite songs on the piano, the waltz Mis Recuerdos and he urged the Chilean to join him. After playing several renditions t ogether, Truman pulled out sheet music for one of his favorites, The Missouri Waltz, and the two continued pl aying for some time. Gonzlez Videla long afterwards spoke of Trumans warmth, char m, enthusiasm, and constructive efforts. 112 Conclusion Between 1945 and 1948, U.S. officials constructed the model democracy premise that served as the foundation for U.S. policy towards Chile until 1970. At the end of World War II, several ideas democracy, exceptionalism, overs eas territory, and European-ness coalesced when U.S. officials discussed Ch ile. While tensions with the Soviet Union set the overall focus of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. policymakers view ed Chile as threatened more by right-wing authoritarianism and Argentinas Juan Pern. The 1947 coal miners strike and the 1948 rightwing coup plot surprised Department of State officials. The two events mark the period during which the ideas that coalesced around Chile were fused into the model democracy premise of Chile. The premise stressed the importance of preserving Chilean democracy and posited Chile as a model whose future success or failure could sw ay other nations in the emerging Cold War. 112 Gonzlez Videla, Memorias II: 858-859, 851-853, and 863-866. Their discussions focused on Chile obtaining a tanker and two naval cruisers, a tax on imported copper moving through the U.S. Congress, and creation of a corridor/port for Bolivia. Gonzlez Videla, Memorias, II: 863-866. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 295-297. Memorandum of Conversation Call upon the President of His Excellency Seor Felix Nieto del Ro, Ambassador of Chile, Woodward, 1 June 1950, Folder Chile [Folder 2], Box 172, PSF Subject File, HSTL. 82

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Allende, meanwhile, built his own foundations for future success. He adhered to Popular Front tactics and tried to align the Socialists with other Leftist parties, including the Communists. He won Communist friends for his opposition to the Defense of Democracy law. An influential Socialist, Allende was not yet a national leader of the Left, but he would soon emerge as one. 83

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CHAPTER 3 FAVORING A MODEL DEMOCRACY, 1949-1952 The Premise Adopted During President Harry S Trumans second term (1949-1953), his administration adopted the model democracy premise as the basis for U.S. policy and actions towards Chile. Formed between 1945 and 1948, the premise posited Chile as a model democracy for a world facing the Cold War, a democratic nation resembling a Eur opean state, and a nation beyond the immediate sphere of U.S. power and influence. The De partment of States Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) 1 admitted that Chile was favored over other Latin American nations, receiving greater assistance, loans, and pub lic gestures of support to ensure that its democracy was stable and prosperous. Senior policymakers lobbied Co ngress to prevent measures that would harm Chilean interests. Even when angry at the Ch ileans, the Truman administration preferred to maintain good relations, conceding to Chilean demands. As Truman acknowledged, he was particularly anxious that we should have the friendship of the Republic of Chile. 2 For U.S. officials, the unique context in the Southern Cone the United States facing a right-wing authoritarian threat in region, but confronting a Communist threat globally entrenched the model democracy premise. Be tween 1949 and 1953, Cold Wa r tensions with the 1 In 1949, the Department of State was reorganized, and the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) was renamed the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. ARA rema ined the bureaus acronym. Reorganization of Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State Bulletin XXII/555 (20 February 1950): 302-303. 2 Letter, Milton Barall, Chief of Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Department of State, to Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, 15 May 1952, Folder 1952 May; Letter, Barall to Bowers, 23 May 1952, Folder 1952 May; and Letter, President Harry S Truman to Bowers, 12 September 1952, Folder 1952 September; all Box 7, Claude G. Bowers MSS II, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Hereafter cited as Bowers Papers. 84

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Soviet Union progressively intruded upon U.S. po licy towards the region, transforming a hybrid Good Neighbor/anti-totalitarian policy into a thoroughly Cold War policy. The Southern Cone, however, followed a different trajectory because right-wing authoritarianism and Colonel Juan Pern of Argentina remained the primary threats. 3 In Chile, the preeminent threat to democracy was former dictator and Pe rn sympathizer General (Ret.) Carlos Ibez del Campo. 4 Ibez appealed to voter dissatisfac tion with high inflation using a populist message during his 1949 senatorial and 1952 presidential campaigns, and he w on both elections. U.S. officials feared that Ibez would subvert Chiles democracy, create a right-wing authoritarian, Peronist state, and ally with Pern in an anti-U.S. bloc. When Ibez won Chiles 1952 Presidential election, the Truman administration asked former first lady Elea nor Roosevelt to head the U.S. delegation to Ibezs inauguration. U.S. officials used her great popularity to demonstrate special support for Chiles democracy, build popular support for the United States, and trump any influence Pern might gain with Argentinas prestigious delegation. The effort succeeded. 3 Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: University of Texa s Press, 1985). For the Cold Wars gradual influence on U.S. Latin American policy, see Roger R. Trask, Impact of the Cold War on U.S. Latin American Relations, Diplomatic History 1/3 (Summer 1977): 282; and Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 24. 4 The persistence of U.S. concerns about totalitarianism a nd particularly the threat po sed by Argentinas Juan Pern and the authoritarian-minded Right challenges the interpretation that anti-Communism dominated U.S. policy. Glenn J. Dorn effectively demonstrates U.S. concerns a bout Pern. See Dorn, Pern s Gambit: The United States and the Argentine Challe nge to the Inter-American Order, 1946-1948, Diplomatic History 26/1 (Winter 2002): 120. For works that assert an anti-Communist focus of U.S. policy, see Steven Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 1. William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 120-124. Andrew Barnard, Chile; and Leslie Bethell and Ian Ro xborough, The Postwar Conjun cture in Latin America: Democracy, Labor, and the Left; both in Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 19441948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Bethell and Roxborough, eds., 79-80 and 8 respectively. Both essays are revisions of earlier works. See Barnard, Chilean Commun ists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947, Journal of Latin American Studies 13/2 (November 1981), 347-374; and Bethell and Roxborough, L atin America between the Second World Wa r and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945-48 Conjuncture, Journal of Latin American Studies 20/1 (May 1988): 167-189. 85

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Salvador Allende Gossens, meanwhile, built the foundations of his Leftist coalition. During the period, the political parties realigned and Chiles democracy expanded through the granting of womens suffrage, doubling the electorate. 5 Allende rejected the Socialists embrace of Ibez and ran for President in 1952. As the ca ndidate of the leftist Pe oples Front (Frente del Pueblo), Allende cultivated Communist and di ssident Socialist voters. He promised to nationalize the copper mines and repeal the Defens e of Democracy law. U.S. officials watched Allendes political maneuvers with intere st and approved his ca ndidacy, hoping it would undercut Ibezs campaign. Instead, Communist and Socialist vot ers largely voted for Ibez, and Allende finished a distant fourth. Despite sympathy for A llendes campaign, U.S. officials did not try to contact or nurture a relationship with the Socialist senator. 6 5 Chilean political developments from 1938 to 1952 challenge the postwar conjuncture thesis offered by Bethell and Roxborough, the thesis asserts that the postwar opport unity for significant political and social change was lost and democratic advances were contained or reversed duri ng the repression and illegalization of Communist Parties in Latin America from 1946 to 1948. See Bethell and R oxborough, The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America: Democracy, Labor, and the Left, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 2. In Chile, the political watershed was the 1938 election of Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the Popular Front. Gonzlez Videla was the third President of three Radical Partyled coalitions that won consecutive elec tions, and his election did not signify a political break from the past. Also, the Communists had dec lined earlier offerings of cabinet posts before 1946. Moreover, under Gonzlez Videla, Chilean democracy expanded, with the electorate doubling due to the granting of womens suffrage in 1949. See Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 237-243; Paul Drake, Chile, 1930-1958, Chile Since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 107-115; Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia, Historia del siglo XX chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001), 127, 129; and Patrick Barr-Melej, Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 200-201. For womens suffrage, see Corrine Antenaza-Perne t, Peace in the World and Democrac y at Home: The Chilean Womens Movement in the 1940s, Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 166-186. 6 Works focusing on Salvador Allende Gossens presidency (1970-1973) give little attention to his first candidacy in 1952. See Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Jame s Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); and Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allendes Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New York: Verso Press, 2005). 86

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Mr. Y and Hemispheric Relations As the Truman administration began its second term, it faced growing accusations that the United States had ignored or lost interest in Latin America since World War II. Ral Ampuero Daz, Secretary General of the So cialist Party of Chile (PS) complained that the United States was more interested in Europe than Latin Amer ica. Deputy Director of ARAs Office of North and West Coast Affairs Cecil B. Lyon admitted, We hear [that complaint] from all sides, adding that whether the accusation was true or not is really unimportant since [Latin Americans] have that impression, and it makes the situation as difficult as if it were true. 7 The Department of State tried to demonstrate that the United States still considered Latin America of primary importance. The new Assi stant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller, Jr., visited nearly every Latin American nation during his first year. 8 Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a key polic y speech before the Pan American Society, in which he defined U.S. regional objectives as he mispheric security, expa nsion of democracy, and economic cooperation and development. Three w eeks later, President Truman met with the ambassadors to the Organization of American St ates (OAS) and reiter ated Achesons points. 9 7 Carlos Santana, Raul Ampuero instiste: Los Soci alistas no quieren ni desean ir al Gobierno, Nuevo Zig-Zag XLIX/2246: 17, 61. Letter, Cecil B. Lyon, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Po litical Affairs, to Bowers, 3 February 1948, Folder 1948 January-February, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 8 Lyon to Bowers, 3 February 1948. Department of State, Briefing Material for Secretary (unsigned draft memorandum), 4 January 1950, printed in U.S. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume II, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1975), 590. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1950 II: 590. 9 Dean Acheson, Waging Peace in the Americas, Address be fore the Pan American Societ y of the United States in New York, NY, 19 September 1949, Department of State Bulletin XXI/534 (25 September 1949): 462-466. Truman, Remarks at a Meeting with th e Ambassadors to the Council of the Or ganization of American States, 12 October 1949, Public Papers of the President: Harry S. Truman, 1949 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1962), 507-508. Hereafter, cited as PPP: Truman 1949 87

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The Department used diplomatic gestures toward s Chile to demonstrate U.S. interest in the region. Assistant Secretary Mill er included Chile among the first group of nations he visited, and he emphasized that the trip should be publicized as a visit to Chile with stops in Peru and Ecuador. Department officials informed Secret ary Acheson that Latin Americans had received Miller with enthusiasm and that his visit to Chile generated 2500 column inches of newspaper coverage. The Department also promoted Chilean President Gabriel Gonzlez Videlas April 1950 state visit as a demonstration U.S. commitmen t to democratic regimes. Miller described Gonzlez Videlas government was t he most effective and serious of any of the major countries of South America, and U.S. officials were later pleased to report his visit was viewed as evidence of the U.S. commitmen t to democracy in the region. 10 Acheson urged Miller to write an essay on U.S. Latin American policy similar to [George F. Kennans] X article, and in July 1950, an article authored by Mr. Y appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs just as the X article had done three years earlier. In 1947, Kennan, writing as Mr. X, had clearly outlined the U.S. policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, and Acheson believed that ARA might do the same for U.S. policy towards Latin America. 10 Memorandum of Conversation Visit of President Gonzalez Videla to the United States, Sheldon T. Mills, Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 29 September 1949, 825.001 Videla, Gonzalez/9-2949, Folder 2, Box 5358, Central Decimal File 1945-1949, Department of State Records, Record Grou p 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter cited as DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA. Briefing Material for the Secretary, 4 January 1950, FRUS 1950 II: 590-591. Memorandum Suggested Visit of Ch ilean President to the United States, Miller to Under Secretary of State and S ecretary of State, 15 August 1949, Folder -Chile, 1949-1950, Box 3, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Edward G. Miller), 1949-1953 Subject File, RG59 Lot Files, NA. Hereafter cited as Miller Subject File, RG59-Lot, NA. 88

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Using the pseudonym Y, Louis J. Halle, AR As Policy Planning Advisor, wrote the 1950 essay, On a Certain Impatience with Latin America. 11 Halles Y article was significant in three re spects. It presented a policy and approach under which Chile received favored treatment. It responded to Kennans 1950 report on Latin America. Finally, it marked the transition from a Good Neighbor policy to a Cold War policy. 12 In the Y article, Halle summarized the pol icy that Acheson and Miller had advanced since late 1949. In September 1949, Acheson de fined U.S. objectives in Latin America as promoting democracy, encouraging economic deve lopment, and maintaining regional security (anti-Communism). Miller developed each objectiv e in three separate sp eeches between January and May 1950. 13 Regarding regional security, Miller said that through th e Rio Treaty and the OAS, the hemispheres nations agreed to main tain our common peace and security, which implicitly meant rejection of Communist intrusion. For economic development, Miller, and Halle in the Y article, asserted that extr eme social and economic misery and inadequate 11 Memorandum, Miller to Secretary of State, 7 August 1950, FRUS 1950 II: 624, 624 ff. For the X article, see X [George F. Kennan], The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs XXV/4 (July 1947): 566-582. Y [Louis J. Halle, Policy Planning Advisor to the Assistan t Secretary of State for Inte r-American Affairs], On a Certain Impatience with Latin America, Foreign Affairs 28/4 (July 1950): 565-579. 12 While several have cited the Y articles importance, this study differs on the reasons for its significance. See Kyle Longley, In the Eagles Shadow: The United States and Latin America (Wheeling IL: Harlan Davidson, 2002), 209; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 20; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 341-342; and Peter H. Smith, The Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125-126. 13 Miller told Acheson that the three speeches constitute hi s policy line. See Memorandum, Miller to Secretary of State, 7 August 1950. For the three speeches, see Miller, United States Leadership in the Americas, Address before the Rotary Club of Charleston, West Virginia, 13 January 1950, Folder Rotary Club, Charleston, West Virginia, January 13, 1950, Box 12, Miller Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA; Miller, Inter-American Relations in Perspective, Address before the Fourth Annual Bulletin Forum in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 22 March 1950, Department of State Bulletin XXII/561 (3 April 1950): 521-523; an d Miller The American Way and Standards of Democracy, Address before the Penn sylvania Federation of Labor, Philade lphia, Pennsylvania, 9 May 1950, Department of State Bulletin XXII/568 (22 May 1950): 797-799. 89

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educational opportunities hindered the expansion of democracy. Through technology exchanges, U.S.-funded development projects, and private inve stment, Miller said that the United States could assist Latin American nations in nati onal development, thereby advancing the U.S. national interest. By stre ngthening our friends, restoring stability, and creating a more prosperous world, said Miller the United States could help remove obstacles to democracy. 14 Miller and later Halle divided the United States considerable concerns about democracy in the hemisphere into two issues: an increase the number of democratic governments, and recognition of new regimes. Miller and Halle st ressed that one nation (i.e. the United States) could not impose [democracy] by force, creat e [it] by any simple campaign of mind or matter, or produce it out of a hat by exhortation. In order to expand democracy in the Americas, Miller and Halle insisted that the United States must set the example, although Miller confessed that the United States wa s by no means the only good example that the Hemisphere has to offer, which may have been a reference to Chile. 15 Miller stressed that diplomatic recognition di d not explicitly or implicitly signify U.S. approval of a regime. Recognition should not be used as a moral force to bring about internal reform, he said, because it constituted an interv ention in a nations internal affairs, which he admitted was a hotly debatable question. Besides, he added, nationalism distorts judgment and makes people stubborn, so that our expressions of disapproval of their government may make them cling all the more de sperately to it. Differences and disagreements required nations 14 Miller, Inter-American Relations in Perspective, 521. Miller, United States Leadership in the Americas, 13 January 1950, 7. Y (Halle), On a Cert ain Impatience with Latin America, 575. 15 Y (Halle), On a Certain Impatience with Latin America, 568, 569. Miller, United States Leadership in the Americas, 3, 4. Miller, The American Way and Standards of Democracy, 9 May 1950, 799. 90

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to maintain open channels of communication, an d Miller saw no need to lower another Iron Curtain if we are to work to ward international understanding. 16 The Y article is unusual in that Halle focu sed upon how the United States should relate with its hemispheric neighbors, not policy objectives. He asserted that Latin American nations merited respect, tolerance, and cautious optimism, and that the United States should treat them as equals, adults, and friends. Casting the existing debate between paternalists and fraternalists, Halle castigated the paternalists who exhibited impatience with Latin America and acted in the manner of a stern fatherafter his children have publ icly embarrassed him. True leadership, he said, was expressed as what we must do, not as what you must do. Besides, he noted, Latin Ameri can nations had made significant gains toward democratic government; it was a schoolboys misconception to claim that democracy was the absence of dictatorship or that it co uld be donned by a nation as one puts on an overcoat. 17 For Halle, the moral danger for U.S. policy and the United States national weakness was self-righteousness. Americans, he said, pr esumed that the United States exemplified the ideal; meanwhile, they expected Latin American nations to live up to that ideal or dismissed them as unworthy of us. Too often, he said, Americans claimed the United States was defending its rights while Latin Americans pursu ed their selfish interests; Americans waxed indignantly about corruption in Latin America as if corruption did not exist in the United States; and Americans complained about Latin Ameri can discriminatory trade and employment practices but ignored U.S. practices. When the United States had sought advice from its 16 Miller, The American Way and Standards of Democracy, 797, 799. 17 Y (Halle), On a Certain Impatience with Latin America, 565, 577-579. 91

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southern neighbors and had shown a disposition to be guide d by that advice, he wrote, Latin Americans had acted more statesmanlike. The challenge for the United States was to live up to its ideals and to act as a nation who respects itself and the rights of others. 18 Halles views diverged sharply from those of George Kennan, who had written a report on U.S. policy towards Latin America three months earlier (March 1950). A Russia specialist with negligible experience with the region, Kennan considered South America the reverse of North America. He could conceive of no place where humans had created a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life. He complained that Latin Americans had an exaggerated self-cen teredness and egotism, and had engaged in miscegenation. He believed that Latin Americans were unaware of Communisms reality. Kennan also claimed that the concepts and traditions of self-government were weak in Latin America, and as a result, the United States would have to work with regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure. 19 Halles ideas, not Kennans, ch aracterized ARAs views in 1950. 20 Assistant Secretary Miller considered Halles article an excellent restatement of U.S. policy; meanwhile, Millers staff assistant Norman Pearson described Kennan s report as not only exceedingly repulsive to [Latin Americans] butwould gag most thinking U.S. citizens. Pearson told Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Willard F. Barber that the United States could not afford to adopt Kennans 18 Y (Halle), On a Certain Impatience with Latin America, 565, 577-579. 19 Memorandum, George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department, to the Secretary of State, 29 March 1950, FRUS 1950 II: 600-603, 607. 20 For works citing Kennans report as demons trative of U.S. attit udes, see Gilderhus, The Second Century 134; and Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 68-72. 92

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holier-than-thou attitude When one U.S. official echoed Kennans attitude, saying that Latin Americans had experienced a lack of self-respect after World War II, Miller shot back, I do notbelieve there is any such concept whatever in our relations with Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, and a number of other countries. 21 Halle offered a transitional blend of Good Neighbor and Cold War ideas that emphasized democracy in the Y article, and it worked to Ch iles benefit. Rooted in the ideas of cultural anthropologists Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, a nd Ruth Benedict, the Good Neighbor policy had encouraged a more hands-off approach in part because the policy posited that uplift could not and should not be imposed. Halle adhered to this cultural pluralism by stressing that Latin American nations var[ied] widely and by reconciling U.S. regional policy with the individuality of each U.S. bilateral relationship. This conformed to the Truman administrations focus upon cooperation, responsibility, and self-help, and its discouragement of the idea that the United States was responsible for solving [La tin American] problems. Truman emphasized, We are not trying to sell them automobiles and televisi on sets. Our purpose is to help them to grow more food, to obtain better ed ucation, and to be more healt hy. That is the way they can gain the physical and moral strength to be free and to maintain their own governments. 22 21 Memorandum, Miller to Secretary of State, 7 August 1950, FRUS 1950 II: 624. Memorandum, Miller to Halle, 7 November 1950, FRUS 1950 II: 626. Memorandum Mr. Kennans Repo rt on his Latin American Visit, Norman Pearson, Staff Assistant to the Assist ant Secretary of State, to Willard F. Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 11 April 1950, Folder K, Box 4, Records of the Deputy Assi stant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1945-56 Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. See also Roger R. Trask, George F. Kennans Report on Latin America (1950), Diplomatic History 2/3 (Summer 1978): 311. 22 Y [Halle], On a Certain Im patience with Latin America, Foreign Affairs 28/4: 570. Pike, The United States and Latin America 262-266. Miller, Inter-American Relations in Perspective, 521; and The American Way and Standards of Democracy, 799. Truman, Making Democracy Work and Defending it from its Enemies, Address at the George Washington National Masonic Memorial at Alexandria, Virginia, 22 February 1950, Department of State Bulletin XXII/557 (6 March 1950): 349. 93

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With this Good Neighbor/pluralist basis, Hall e offered a progressive approach to U.S. bilateral relations. Halles insistence that the Un ited States could not offer moral leadership in hemispheric affairs until it first cultivate[d] these things in ourselves resembled Gunnar Myrdals contemporaneous insistence that Americans could not attain the American Creed of justice, equality, liberty, and opportu nity unless they cultivated thos e ideals in their attitudes and practices by ridding themselves of r acial prejudice. Halles insisten ce that the United States treat Latin Americans as adults and th at nothing is so stul tifying to development as to be treated like a child is not far from Thurgood Marshall arguing before the Supreme Court in the 1954 case Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka that racially segregated schools imposed a psychological badge of inferiority upon black children. 23 Despite Halles progressivism, Cold War c oncerns increasingly impacted U.S. Latin American policy and created a transitional blen d of Good Neighbor and Cold War ideas during the late 1940s. Victory in World War II had re newed the U.S. faith in democracy, capitalism, and the mission to uplift, 24 and this was reflected in Halle and Millers highlighting of democracy, encouraging its expansion and streng thening, as in the case of Chile. Through the Point IV program, they promoted economic development via private investment, sought to raise economic and social levels to strengthen allies, and kept open communications with undesirable 23 Y [Halle], On a Certain Im patience with Latin America, Foreign Affairs 577, 578. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 762-763. John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: American in War and Peace, 1941-1960 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 280-281. Memorandum Mr. Kennans Report on his Latin American Visit, Pearson to Barber, 11 April 1950. 24 Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myth s and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 301-305. Trask, Impact of th e Cold War on U.S. Latin American Relations, Diplomatic History 1/3: 282. Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years 196-204. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 24. Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy 209. 94

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regimes in order to maintain allies and preven t the expansion of Comm unism. U.S. officials tried to ensure the security of the hemisphere through the 1947 Ri o Pact and the 1948 creation of the OAS. The transitional blend permitted Mill er to assert, in a 25 April 1950 speech to the Pan-American Society (known as the Miller Doctrine), that non-intervention and the Monroe Doctrine were compatible concepts. He said th at the 1949 OAS charter dict ated that no state or group of states has the right to intervene but Miller then decl ared that the OAS could employ measures to maintain peace and security. Miller posited such measures as a collective undertaking by an organized community of equals but recognized that th e United States, as a superpower, would lead the community. 25 U.S. officials favored democratic Chile unde r the Truman administrations blend of Good Neighbor pluralism and Cold War imperatives. Miller remarked, the Ch ileans should realize more than anyone else the prefer ential position that we accord in our thoughts and in our actions to countries which are democratic. Miller encouraged the EXIM Bank and the International Bank for Recovery and Developmen t (IBRD) to offer substantial de velopment loan packages to Chile, and both institutions prep ared large long-term programs fo r the Southern Cone nation. When a Chilean official visited Washington, Miller ensured that he did not return to Santiago empty-handed by working with the Treas ury Department to have the IBRD and EXIM Bank grant Chile several targeted lo ans for industrial development. When a $25 million EXIM Bank loan for Chilean economic development stalled, M iller confessed that he had worked night and 25 For an introduction to the Point IV program, see Thomas G. Paterson, Beginning to Meet the Threat in the Third World: The Point IV Program, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 147-158. Miller, Non-Intervention and Collective Responsibility in the Americas, Address before the Pan American Society of New Engl and, Boston, Massachusetts 26 April 1950, Folder Speeches-Pan American Society-Boston Apr. 26/50, Box 12, Miller Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 95

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day to push the matter along. When delivery of a tanker that Chile had purchased for its navy was delayed, Truman twice intervened pe rsonally to ensure the tankers delivery. 26 The Truman administration tried to stop Congr ess from reinstating a suspended two-cent tax on imported copper because it placed U.S. domestic concerns and U.S. foreign policy priorities against each other. When the pric e of copper declined in 1949, several Congressmen from copper-producing states proposed a two-cent ta x on imported copper as a means of helping mining communities and their reelection chances in 1950. The Chilean government, meanwhile, relied heavily on copper exports (approximately 60 percent of revenues), and the price decline had created a severe budget shortf all. At Gonzlez Videlas instruction, Minister of Economy Alberto Baltra Corts and Ambassador Flix Niet o del Ro discussed Chiles economic plight and the two-cent tax with Truman. Miller assure d Baltra and Nieto that th e Department of State would make sure that Congress is thoroughly fa miliar with the taxs detrimental effects on Chile. Besides writing to Truman and Vice President Alben Barkley on the issue, Bowers warned ARA that the tax showed a complete di sregard for the vital eco nomic interests of a friendly country; moreover, he noted, Communist Senator Pablo Neruda had cited it as proof of the hypocrisy of our Good Neighbor Policy. 27 26 Miller to Bowers, 3 August 1949, Folder 1949 May August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. The Export-Import (EXIM) Bank program totaled approximately $100 billi on, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) program was of quite sizeable proportions. Miller to Bowers, 26 December 1950, 825.10/12-2650, FRUS, 1950 II: 798-800. Aide Memoire, Embassy of Chile, 20 June 1949, attached to Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Economy, Woodward, 20 June 1949, Folder -Chile [1], Box 172, PSFSubject Files, HSTL. Memorandum of Conversation, Mills, 13 September 1949, FRUS, 1949 II: 601-602. Miller to Bowers, 8 December 1949, Folder -Chile 1949-1950, Bo x 3, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Claude G. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958): 293-294. 27 Bowers to Davis, 28 June 1949; and Bowers to Truman, 8 July 1949; both Folder -1949 May-August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Bowers to Truman, 21 June 1950, attach ed to Truman to Bowers 29 June 1950, Folder -61 C (1950) [Folder 1], Box 354, Official Files, HSTL. Bowers to Barkley, 11 July 1949, Folder -1949 May-August, 96

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The White House and the Department of Stat e lobbied hard agains t the two-cent tax, urging Congress to extend its suspension. Trum an told Bowers, Ive been doing everything I possibly can to get the copper situation straightened out so there wont be a slap at our good friends in Chile. When one Department offi cer accused the Division of North and West Coast Affairs of selling the suspension to Assistant Se cretary Miller, division Director Sheldon Mills told the officer point blank that Miller know s Chile exceedingly well and is personally convinced of the necessity for permanently suspending the tax. Miller and ARA officials canvassed Congress to extend the taxs suspensi on, and Miller organized an interdepartmental effort with the Department of Commerce and th e Bureau of the Budget to pressure Congress during the 1950 session. When Bowers travelled to Washingt on in April 1950, he too visited Capital Hill and lobbied indivi dual Congressmen to extend the two-cent taxs suspension. 28 The Truman administration favored democratic Chile, but there were limits of the Executive branchs ability to influence and direct all parts of the U.S. Government. White House and State Department efforts defeated the c opper tax bill during the 1949 Congressional term, but Congress and election year politics prevailed in 1950, and the two-cent tax went into effect on 30 June 1950. Bowers assured Miller that G onzlez Videla understood that Truman and the Department had done all in their power to st op Congresss reimposition of the tax, but he later confided that some Chileans had difficulty rec onciling the Good Neighbor po licy with a tax that Bowers Papers. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 294-295. Miller to Bowers, 31 May 1950, 825.00/53150, FRUS, 1950 II: 786-787. 28 Truman to Bowers, 29 June 1950, Folder -1950 April-June, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Memorandum Excise Tax on Chilean Copper, Mills to Miller, 9 December 1949, Folder 5 Box 5370, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Farewell Call by Chilean Minister of Economy and Commerce, Davis, 24 June 1949, 825.6352/62449, FRUS, 1949 II: 597; Memorandum of Conversation Departmen ts position re restoration of copper excise tax H. M. Randall (NWC), 6 December 1949, Folder 5, Box 5370, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 97

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hurt Chile. Miller later pledged, one of my new years resolutions will be to proceed with all enthusiasm to work for constantly impr oved relations between our two countries. 29 Developing Threats Left and Right While the United States favored Chile, U.S. policymakers feared subversion of Chiles democracy from right-wing authorita rians, not the Communists. Ch ilean political developments encouraged U.S. fears and created important f oundations for Salvador Allendes future political success. Like U.S. Latin American policy, Ch ilean politics experienced a transition between 1948 and 1952. Suffrage in Chile expanded, Cold War dynamics increasingly impacted Chilean domestic politics, and the Right -Left axis that had dominated Chilean politics since the 1932 fall of General Carlos Ibezs di ctatorship was breaking down. Womens suffrage enhanced Chiles image of political maturity and democratic orientation; furthermore, Allende and the Le ft believed that giving women the vote (and doubling the electorate) would benefit the Left. President Gon zlez Videla signed legislation granting womens suffrage in January 1949, just weeks after signing the Defense of Democracy law. 30 Allende had long been an advocate of social programs fo r women and children, and he 29 Bowers mistakenly states that the tax was not imposed. See Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 295. Bowers to Miller, 12 June 1950; and Bowers to Jack K. Mc Fall, 12 June 1950; both Folder -1950 April-June, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Miller to Bowers, 31 May 1950, 825.10/12-2650, FRUS, 1950 II: 798. Miller to Bowers, 8 December 1949, Folder -Chile 1949 -1950, Box 3, Miller -Subject Files, RG59Lot Files, NA. 30 Womens suffrage casts grave doubt on whether the postw ar conjuncture thesis (democracy was contained or reversed in Latin America during th e early Cold War) applies to Chile. Enacted just a few weeks after the Defense of Democracy law was signed, womens suffrage added 475,000 voters to Chiles rolls; meanwhile, the Defense of Democracy law removed about 25,000 Communist s. By insisting Chilean democracy was contained in 1948, one risks asserting that womens suffrage is not important and that the votes of 25,000 Communist men matter more than the votes of 475,000 women. One also risks asserting that democracy only exists when the Communists participate but can exist regardless of whethe r or not women vote. Admittedly, Chilean women tended to vote more conservatively than Chilean men, but Michael Coppedge has cautioned against using the broad term 98

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supported womens suffrage, declaring that it was normal in the Socialist Party to believe that women shared the same rights as men. Leftis t women, notably Communist Elena Caffarena and Radical Amanda Labarca, were instrumental in urging Chiles Congress to pass womens suffrage legislations, and the suffr age movement cut across party and ideological lines, with First Lady Rosa Markmann de Gonzlez joining the cause The advantage that Allende and the Left anticipated would not materialize. Chilean wo men would vote more conservatively than men and would consistently prefer centris t and rightist candi dates to Allende. 31 The clash between the Communists and Gonzl ez Videla introduced Cold War dynamics into Chilean politics, which in turn, fostered a political realignment that abetted Allendes formation of a Leftist coaliti on. Anti-Communism and civil ri ghts issues radiated through and fractured nearly every political party, creating te n new political parties in addition to the eight democracy narrowly for only social de mocratic or progressive regimes. The dubious application of the postwar conjuncture thesis may also result from a tendency to f it every Latin American nation within one narrative, and overstressing the Latin American similarities at the expens e of the historical record. For the postwar conjuncture thesis, see Bethell and Roxborough, The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 2. Michael Coppedge, In Defense of Polyarchy, NACLA Report on the Americas 40/1 (January / February 2007): 36. 31 Corinne Antezana-Pernet, Peace in the World and Demo cracy at Home: The Chilean Womens Movement in the 1940s, Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), David Rock, ed., 166-186. Adolfo Pardo, Historia de la mujer en Chile: La conquista los derechos polticos en el siglo XX (1900-1952), Critica (1995), http://www.criti ca.cl/html/pardo_01.html. Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 212-214. Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 191-192. Womens conservative voting patterns in Chile raise thorny and difficult questions, questions which scholars have yet to devote adequate attention. Margaret Power offers a pioneering study, but scholars have not sufficiently accounted for women with in Chilean domestic movements and politics. A full incorporation an d consideration of women and their concerns suggests a strong strain of re formism in Chile, a centrist reformism that can both demand answers for disappeared children and family members and march with empty pots to demand better distribution and pricing of food. A full consideration of womens voting patterns and activism also questions how revolutionary Chilean society had turned in the late 196 0s, since women consistently preferred centrist and rightist candidates to Allende, and in 1970, nearly 70 percent voted for candidates other than Allende. For rightist women, see Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 20 02). For womens voting patterns, see Csar N. Caviedes, Elections in Chile: The Road toward Redemocratization (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 17-18. 99

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already in existence. 32 Gonzlez Videlas Radical Party sp lit twice; the Conservative Party divided; and the Socialist Party rent along anti-Communist lines. Within the PS, the faction led by Allende and Ampuero opposed the Defense of Democracy law and Gonzlez Videla; meanwhile, Bernardo Ibez Aguila (the party s 1946 presidential candidate) and his adherents supported the president and his an ti-Communist measures. Allende made an impassionate plea for party unity, but it failed. Bernardo Ib ezs group broke away, joined Gonzlez Videlas coalition, and accepted cabinet positions. The A llende-Ampuero Socialists formed the Popular Socialist Party (PSP Partido Socialista del Pueblo). 33 With party fracturing, the Left-Right dic hotomy broke down, and the parties began to realign in a three-way division the Right, the anti-Communist Left, and the Marxist Left opening the path to minority presidents. Initially the parties and factions congregated into two broad coalitions that supported or opposed Gon zlez Videla. Conservative s, centrists, and antiCommunist Left (Radicals, Liberals, Conservatives, and Be rnardo Ibez-led Socialists) comprised the Government coalition, and helped form the presidents Cabinet of National Unity (Concentracin Nacional). The an ti-Gonzlez Videla opposition was an unstable mix of rightist 32 Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 76. Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 89. Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952 (Urbana: University of Illin ois Press, 1978), 292, 293. 33 For Radical Party splits, see Florencio Durn Bernales, El Partido Radical (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1958), 411-412; and Germn Urza Valenzuela, La democracia prctica: Los gobiernos Radicales (Santiago: Editorial Melquades, 1987), 282, 310. Social Christians, led by presidential candidate Eduardo Cruz Coke, left the Conservative Party and formed the Social Democrats. Despatch 775 Present status of political parties and combinations, Bowers (E. T. Crain) to Secretary of State, 10 December 1948, 825-00/12-1048, Fo lder 2, Box 5354, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Cristin Gazmuri R., assisted by Patricia Arancibia and lvaro Gngora, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca 2 volumes. (Santiago: Aguilar Chilena de Ed iciones, 2000), I: 333-336. For the Socialists split, see Despatch 164 Socialist General Meeting, February 27-29, 1948, Bowers (E. T. Crain) to Secretary of State, 6 March 1948; and Despatch 332 S ocialist Party Splits, Bowers (E. T. Cr ain) to Secretary of State, 11 May 1948; both Folder 6, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile 2 vols. (Santiago: Editorial Prensa Latinoam rica, 1971), I: 210-213. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile 290-293. 100

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and leftist parties that became known the FRAS (drawn from the first letter of the four main parties: Falange, Radical-Democrat, Agrarian Labor, and Ampuero-Allende Socialists). The FRAS rejected Gonzlez Videlas pro-U.S. or ientation and sought to overturn the Defense of Democracy law. In an early version of non-alignment, the FRAS advocated national sovereignty and autonomy with the superpower s and an economically and politically unified Latin America on a democratic, antiimperialist, non-bellicose basis. 34 The imprisonment and treatment of Communists at Pisagua fueled political tensions and party divisions. Commun ists involved in the 1947 coal miners strike were arrested and taken to a penal colony in Pisagua, an isol ated, northern coastal town in the Atacama Desert. They joined Communists arrested by Ca ptain Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in the northern nitrate mines. As commander of the Army regiment at Pisagua, Pinochet admitted that the camp suffered problems but said the problems were soon resolved. The pr isoners could walk about the village and beach, and some apparently had their wives with them. 35 Accusations flew (largely from Communist sources) that the government ran a concentration camp at Pisagua. Gonzlez Videla denied this, insisting that the prisoners were well treated Allende rejected the accusations twice. He was a member of a Congressional delegation that inspected Pisagua and released a report 34 Airgram A-44, Bowers (Crain) to the Secretary of State, 24 January 1949, 825-00/1-2049, Folder 1, Box 5355; Despatch 116 Pre-election political activity, Trueblood (Cra in) to the Secretary of State, 16 February 1949, 82500/2-1649, Folder 1, Box 5355; Airgram 99, Bowers (Crain) to the Secretary of State, 8 March 1948, 825.00/3-448, Folder 6, Box 5353; and Despatch 775 Present status of political parties and combinations, Bowers (Crain) to the Secretary of State, 10 December 194 8, 825.00/12-1048, Folder 2, Box 53 54; all DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 35 Eduardo Labarca Goddard, Vida y lucha de Lus Corvaln (Mxico D.F.: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1976), 119. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Camino Recorrido: Memorias de un soldado Volume I (Santiago: Imprenta de Instituto Geogrfico Militar de Chile, 1990), 114-118. Jody (Joann) Pavilack, Regional Social History and the Advent of the Cold War in Chile: The Legal Revolutionary Coal Miners Strike of October 1947, Paper presented at the Latin American Labor History Conference, Duke University, 27-28 April 2001, http://www.duke.edu/web/las/Counc il/pavilack.html, p. 24. 101

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discrediting the concentration camp claims. 36 Bowers also issued a denial when U.S. citizens protested prisoner treatment at Pisagua. One such protest lette r came from a friend of former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Bowers assure d Mrs. Roosevelt that the concentration camp claims were based on thoroughly disreputable and utterly false pr opaganda put out by the Communists.there never was a concentra tion camp in the sense understood by us. 37 Pisagua, the Defense of Democracy law, and th e clash with Gonzlez Videla prompted the Communists to return to the Popul ar Front tactics and build stronge r relations with such Leftist parties as Allendes PSP. Outlawed, and with its Secretary Genera l Ricardo Fonseca Aguayo dying from cancer, the PCCh split. One faction led by Luis Reinoso wanted to mobilize the masses and engage in violence to overthro w the dictatorship of Gonzlez Videla. 38 The other faction, led by Galo Gonzlez and Volodia Teitelboim, rejected violence and urged a Popular Front strategy to achieve the peaceful road to socialism. The Gonzlez-Teitelboim faction sought reclamation of their full political rights and full bourgeois democracy in Chile as the first step to socialism. As internal debate raged, Fonseca died, but before his death, he 36 Allendes second denial occurred in Caracas when he led the Chilean delegation to the inauguration of Venezuelan President Rmulo Gallegos. Allende denied that any teachers were held in the camp; however, the Communist newspaper El Siglo produced a list of prisoner names and occ upations that included some teachers. See Newspaper Clipping El Nacional 22 February 1948, enclos ed with Despatch 181, U.S. Embassy Caracas to Department of State, 25 February 1948, 825.00/2-2548, Folder 6, Box 5353, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 37 Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, Memorias 2 volumes (Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1975), I: 694-695. Despatch 108, Bowers (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 4 February 1949, 825.00/2-449, Folder 1, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Eleanor Roosevelt, 20 June 1949, Folder -1949 May-August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Labarca, La vida y lucha de Lus Corvaln 119. PCCh leader Volodi a Teitelboim wrote a novel based on the Pisagua. See Teitelboim, Pisagua: La semilla en la arena (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2002 [1957]). 38 Some PCCh members accused Reinoso of committing robberi es at a time when the part y suffered its greatest difficulties, hurting public perceptio n of the party. See Labarca, Vida y lucha de Lus Corvaln 55. The terms dictatorship and legal dictatorship ar e often used by the far left to describe Gonzlez Videlas presidency. See Alejandro Chelen Rojas, Trayectoria del Socialismo (Apuntes para una historia critica de Socialismo chileno) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Astral, 1966), 121; Labarca, Vida y lucha de Lus Corvaln 19, 55. 102

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denounced Reinoso. After Fonsecas funeral procession, which included such prominent politicians as Allende, Ampuero, and General Carl os Ibez, PCCh leaders expelled Reinoso. The PCCh became resolutely committed to coalit ion politics and fearful of another military crackdown, even when outflanked by more revolutionary groups. 39 The Law for the Permanent Defense of Demo cracy was proving ineffective and opposition to it grew. The law officially removed about 26, 500 Communists from the re gistered voter rolls, but it did not eliminate most Communist voters. 40 Voters not registered as Communists or not known as party members were unaffected, and the embassy estimated this number at 55,000. Also, when the lists of Communists to be struck from the rolls were published in the newspaper, the names of several obvious non-Communists, incl uding the wife of Soci alist leader Bernardo Ibez, appeared. One could appeal their rem oval from the roll; however, Chilean newspapers published several letters from those who had b een wrongly listed, furthe r discrediting the law. 41 39 Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile 95-97. Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984), 43-54. Despatch 528 Death of Secretary General of Communist Party of Chile, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 26 July 1949, 825.00B/7-2649, Folder 3, Box 5357, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Labarca, La vida y lucha de Luis Corvaln, 55. 40 Important registration procedures prevent one from assuming that the number of Communists removed was more than 26,500. Joann Clements Pavilack asserts that the official 26,500 figure does not count more than 16,000 voters purged from the lists after Communist voters were removed. This brings the figure closer to 40,000 voters, and Allende used this 40,000 figure during a Senate debate in 1952. However, in the 1940s and 1950s, Chile did not have permanent voter registration. Voter registrations became invalid after ten years, and voters needed to reregister. The timing of expired registrations in 1948 coinci des with the registrations of literate men for the hotly contested 1938 Presidential election; therefore, many of the 16,000 are likely be expired registrations, not suspected Communists. Other reasons to purge a voters registration in clude change of address, death, failure to fulfill military service, mental incapacitation, etc. Moreover, if one is closely scanning voter rolls to remove Communists, then it is very likely that other items in the rolls such as expired registrations, death, and change of address would be noted. See Pavilack, Black Gold in the Red Zone: Repression and Contention in Chilean Coal Mining Communities from the Popular Front to the Advent of the Cold War, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2003, 454-455. For Chilean voter registration procedures, see Gil, The Political System of Chile 206-208. 41 Despatch 502 Defense of Democracy Law and present political situation, Bowe rs (Bell) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, 825.00/7-1949, Folder 2; and Despatch 44 Director of Electoral Register, Ramn Zaartu Crain (Bell) to Secretary of State, 13 January 1949, 825.00/1-1349, Folder 1, both Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 103

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Some minor government officials used the law to deny civil liberties to citizens who criticized Gonzlez Videla or to root out Communism from the coal, copper, and nitrate miners unions. Reporting the abuses to Washington, the U.S. La bor Attach called the la w a failure that was increasingly embarrassing for Chiles governme nt. Opposition to the law grew, even among the Center and Right, and Arturo Matte Larran, a lead ing Liberal party member and son-in-law of Arturo Alessandri, soon called for revisions to the law. Gonzlez Videla responded that since Matte was one whose friendship I respect, he would consider modifications to the law but remained opposed to repealing it. 42 La Ley Maldita, as the Defense of Democracy law was known, in several ways legitimized the Communists as accepted participants in Chile s democratic processes rather than stigmatizing them. With the PCCh committing firmly to popular front tactics, the other political parties competed for Communist votes in the 1949 Congressional elections helping to move political campaign rhetoric to the Left. The parties hope d to capitalize upon the no w-illegal PCCh being unable to defend its fifteen seats in th e Chamber and two seats in the Senate. 43 Communists unaffected by the law and their sympathizers form ed three new political parties that joined 42 Despatch 502, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, 825.00/7-1949, Folder 2, Box 5355, DF 194549, RG59, NA. Pavilack, Black Gold in the Red Zone, 460-462. Thomas Miller Klubock, Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chiles El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 273. Despatch 460 Rev ision of Law for the Defense of Democracy, Carlos C. Hall, Counselor of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 14 November 1950, 725.00/11-1450, Folder 1, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Address in Valdivia, Gonzlez Videla, 10 November 1949, quoted in Despatch 460, Hall to Secretary of State, 14 November 1950. 43 Three Communist Senate seats were not up for reelec tion in 1949. The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy did not remove Communist parliamentarians from office but rather made it impossible for them to seek reelection, allowing them to serve out their terms. 104

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together as the National Democratic Front (FND Frente Nacional Democrtico). A Communist-front group, the FND tried to join FRAS, but FRAS rejected them. 44 With the Communists not eliminated and th e opposition gaining strength, Gonzlez Videla asked the United States to assist his coalition during the 1949 Congression al elections, but U.S. officials adamantly opposed any U.S. involvement in Chiles domestic politics. During a meeting with Bowers, Gonzlez Videla said that the opposition received support from the Communists and financial backing from Pern; therefore, he wa nted contributions from the large U.S. companies operating in Chiles copper, nitrates and electricity industries. Bowers told him that Washington was rigid against any U.S. involvement, and he reminded Gonzlez Videla how much he had appreciated this policy during his election in 1946. The president waved this aside. The March elections were an international issue, he claimed, and if the Communists regained the power, U.S. interests would face seri ous trouble. Bowers insisted that he could not approach U.S. companies. When Bowers informed Washington of Gonzlez Videlas request, the Department of State instructed the embassy to continue to discourageany interference or partic ipation in Chiles political affairs. 45 The results of the 1949 Congre ssional elections deepened U. S. worries about a right-wing totalitarian threat. FND candida tes won four seats in the Chamber of Deputies; however, a majority of the Communists seats went to the Agrarian Labor Party (PAL Partido Agrario 44 Barnard, Chile, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War 89. Despatch 775, Bowers (Crain) to Secretary of State, 10 D ecember 1948, 825.00/12-1048. Despatch 502 Defense of Democracy Law and present political situation, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, 825.00/7-1949, Folder 2, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Despatch 89 Communist-front Frente Nacional Democrtico efforts to join the FRAS, Bowers (Crain) to Secretary of State, 3 February 1949, 825.00/2-349, Folder 1, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 45 Bowers Diary, 18 January 1949, Bowers Papers. Telegram, Acheson to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 25 February 1949, 725.00/2-3549, Folder 1, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 105

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Laborista), a rightist party composed of Ibais tas, southern land-owne rs, Nazi remnants, and leftist and rightist vo ters who favored a strongman. Particul arly worrisome for U.S. officials was the success of Senatorial candida te retired General Carlos Ib ez, an Agrarian Laborite who received the highest number of votes of any candidate in the electi ons. Bowers asserted that the far Right and far Left were quite willing to unite against Chilean democracy, as demonstrated by the fact that the fascists, Peronists, dissatisfied element[s] in the army, and Communists voted for Ibez. 46 He insisted that the threat to Chile was totalitarianism in general, and he told Secretary of State Acheson that in the current global struggle betw een totalitarianism and democracy, Chile is entitled to our most sympathetic consideration. 47 Ibezs authoritarianism and his ties to Pe rn troubled U.S. officials. Ibez, like the Argentine leader, based his movement on author itarianism, nationalism, and anti-oligarchical sentiment, and he called Argentin a as his second fatherland. He visited and talked with Pern multiple times, and in 1951, newsreel captured him and Eva Pern visiting social projects she had sponsored in Argentina. Gonzlez Videla and Conservative senator Eduardo Cruz Coke had charged that Pern had helped fina nce Ibezs senatorial campaign; 48 moreover, Ibez, 46 Despatch 167, Bowers to Secretary of State, 15 March 1949, 825.00/3.1549. Despatch 151 Congressional Elections held March 6, 1949, Bowers (Crain) to Secret ary of State, 8 March 1949, 825.00/3-849; and Despatch 254 Comment on Chilean Section of OIR Report No. 4780 (PV) Bowers (Crain) to Secretary of State, 11 April 1949, 825.00/4-1149, Folder 1, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. Despatch 17 Analysis of Voting in March 1949 Elections, Bowers (Bell) to Secretary of State, 9 January 1950, 725.00/1-950, Folder 1, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 47 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 22 August 1949, attached to Tr uman to Bowers, 27 August 1949, Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF-Subject Files, HSTL. Despatch 3 Chilean-Argentine Relations Bowers to Secretary of State, 3 January 1949, Folder -1949 January-April, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 48 Donald W. Bray, Peronism in Chile, Hispanic American Historical Review 47/1 (February 1967): 38-39. Despatch 3 Chilean-Argentine Relations, Bowers to th e Secretary of State, 3 Ja nuary 1949, Folder -1949 January-April, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Despatch 167 Some factors in the election of General Ibaez Bowers to Secretary of State, 15 March 1949, 825.00/3-1549, Folder 2, Box 5355, DF 1945-49, RG59, NA. 106

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fascists, and Pern agents had been implicated th e stifled 1948 coup. In a letter to Assistant Secretary Miller (with a copy to Truman) Bowers insisted that had G onzlez Videla not moved against the Communists, there woul d have been every reason to fear a military dictatorship like that in Argentina and Peru, and that the old Nazi element, represented by Carlos Ibez, the former dictator, would have gone into the street. 49 The Korea War and a Cold War Policy While Ibezs popular appeal re vived the rightist threat in Ch ile, the advent of the Korean War pushed U.S. Latin American policy into a Cold War framework. 50 Whereas the Y article had presented a policy comprised of a transitional blend of Good Neighbor and Cold War ideas; Miller, Halle, and other ARA o fficials determined in October 1950, after U.S. forces had withstood the initial Nort h Korean advance and then pushed across the 38 th parallel, that the Y article policy had been developed in response to a situation that no longer exists. Asserting that a reassessment of U. S. Latin American policy as overd ue, ARA officials invoked National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), a document pr imarily authored by Paul Nitze that served as the basic rationale for U.S. strategy during the Cold War. 51 In a series of memoranda likely 49 Ernesto Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, Caudillo Enigmtico (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1958), 218-219. Dorn, Perns Gambit, Diplomatic History 26/1: 19. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 22 August 1949, attached to Truman to Bowers, 27 August 1949, Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF-Subject Files, HSTL. 50 Historians of U.S.-Latin American relations generally have accorded little influence to Korea and NSC-68 upon U.S. policy towards Latin Am erica. See Gilderhus, The Second Century 137; Longley, In the Eagles Shadow ; Samuel L. Bailey, The United States and the Developme nt of South America, 1945-1975 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976); Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy ; and Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years Peter Smith hints that Korea and NSC-68 may have had an indirect influence. See Smith, Talons of the Eagle 126. 51 For the text and a discussion of NSC-68, see Ernest R. May, American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993). 107

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written by Halle, ARA officials asserted that th e world was divided into two camps, the United States, as the leader of the free world, agains t Soviet expansionism, and that the United States needed to build up the strength of the free worldto frustrate Soviet imperialism. 52 Viewing Latin America as central to the free world co alition, ARA policymakers considered the 1947 Rio Treaty was one of two alliance systems that constituted the core of the [free world] coalition: NATO was the front lines and the inter-Ameri can alliance was the inner defenses. In addition, Latin American nations had comprised th e bulk of U.S. support in the United Nations. ARA officials now wished that they had treated the Latin Amer icans more like the Europeans, confessing that in doing so we might have made [them] feel that they were honorably associated with us as our allies in an inspiring enterprise Too often, ARA admitted, the United States had told its southern neighbors that it was too busy to talk, had tended to overlook their needs and sensibilities and had expected them to follow rather than accompany us. 53 ARA offered a new policy focus and objectives in late 1950, revealing that the transitional Good Neighbor/Cold War policy blend had evolved into a predominantly Cold War framework. U.S. policymakers now sought to ensure the pos itive identification of Latin American nations with U.S. policy, to help secure the stabilit y and economic viability of their hemispheric neighbors, and encourage a more effective OAS. Moreover, ARA demanded better coordination 52 When comparing the drafts of a revised U.S. Latin Am erican policy with the Y Article, it seems that Halle likely wrote them. Notes for a Redefinition of US Inte r-American Policy, ARA [Halle?], 9 October 1950, pp. 2, 1, attached to Memorandum, Halle to Watts, 20 October 1950; and Draft Memorandum Development of US Latin American Policy in Terms of US Wo rld Objectives, 1950-1955, ARA [Halle?], 9 November 1950, pp. 1, 2, attached to Memorandum Latin Ameri can Policy Statement, Halle to Butler, 15 November 1950; both Folder -American Republics, 1947-1950, Box 25, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1957, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 53 Notes for a Redefinition of US Inter-American Policy, ARA [Halle?], 9 October 1950, p. 4-5. Development of US Latin American Policy in Terms of US World Objectives, 1950-1955, ARA [Halle?], 9 November 1950, p. 3. 108

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in the conduct of U.S. bilatera l relations in order to insure maximum consistency between what we do in Latin America and what we do in other parts of the world. Miller, Halle, and other ARA officials proposed no consultation, demanded greater defere nce to U.S. leadership, and cast Latin American nations as objects of persuasi on. Only the objective of encouraging a more effective OAS hinted at any remnant of the Good Neighbor. 54 The new Cold War framework placed greater emphasis upon Chilean democracy as an ideological symbol in the Cold War, and stress ed Chiles exceptionalism. ARA reassessed its policy for Chile in 1951, and that policy statemen t, like its 1947 predecessor, stressed that Chile constituted a crucial Cold War ally because of its functioning democracy. The 1951 policy statement acknowledged, The basic US objectiv e in Chileis to obtain Chiles full and effective cooperation in our quest for freedom and international security; however, Chiles contribution to that quest depended upon maint enance of reasonable governmental stability and the continuance of Chiles presen t strong adherence to democratic principles. Furthermore, Department of State officials invoked the two sphe res concept, which posited the Southern Cone as overseas territory rather than the U.S. bac kyard. It also emphasize d Chiles borderlands position between Latin America and Europe, in which Chiles practice of parliamentary government was uncommon in Latin America and s imilar to that of France. In short, Chile was different; it was a champion of democracy. 55 54 Notes for a Redefinition of US Inter-American Policy, ARA [Halle?], 9 October 1950, p. 9; Development of US Latin American Policy in Terms of US World Objectives, 1950-1955, ARA [Halle?], 9 November 1950, pp. 10, 11; and Draft Memorandum, 8 December 1950, Folder -Am erican Republics, 1947-1950, Box 25 Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 55 In the 1951 policy statement, copper appeared as a fourth priority, below th e necessity of Chiles military forces for hemispheric defense. Policy Statement Chile, Department of State, 27 February 1951, 611.25/2-2751, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA, p. 1, 10, 11-13. 109

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The 1951 policy statement firmly entrenched U.S. diplomacy in treating Chile as a respected, influential, regional ally for whom, lik e the European nations, th e next steps of U.S. policy would be to encourage pol itical stability, econom ic growth, and higher living standards. Chile obtained a laundry list of benefits a nd high-level personal attention from the United States. Assistant Secretary Miller personally attended to resolv ing Chiles difficulties with the IBRD, and the United States had sold Chile two crui sers at bargain prices, delivering them to the Chileans ahead of those bought by Brazil and Argentina. The United States offered to negotiate an agreement for grants of military aid that were entirely unconditional on any Chilean participation or assistance with the Korean War. U.S. officials increased Point IV aid efforts in Chile when Gonzlez Videla requested it. They also forged a copper agreement with Chile in which the United States paid Chile an additiona l three cents per pound more than U.S. domestic producers, the only commodity where this occurred. The Department of State successfully urged the EXIM Bank to make Chilean loans for the Huachipito steel mill and the construction of a petroleum refinery a priority. Finally, the Un ited States had supported Ch iles bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council and the Chil ean candidates election as president of the General Assemblys Committee on Human Rights. 56 U.S. officials oriented their diplomatic approach towards Chile on negotiation and compromise, and U.S.-Chilean negotiations on coppe r serve as an example. During the Korean War, the price of copper climbed sharply, rising as high as 55 cents per pound. In June 1950, the Office of Economic Mobilization, as a measure to control inflation, fro ze the price that the 56 Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin American during the Truman Years 219; Miller to Bowers, 7 January 1952, Folder -1952 January-February, Box 7, Bowers Papers. The term laundry list is found in Schwartzberg, 218. 110

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United States would pay for copper at 24.5 cents per pound. The lack of c oordination within the U.S. government and the lack of consultation w ith copper-exporting allies forced the Department of State to negotiate a copper ag reement with the Chileans. Afte r a year, the United States and Chile reached an agreement. Chile would sell 80 percent of its copper to the United States at the 24.5 cents price, and the United States agreed to pay the Chilean government an additional three cents per pound (making the price 27.5 cents). Chile could sell the remaining 20 percent of its production on the open market, but the Chileans agreed that such sales would not go to Communist bloc nati ons. The agreement easily passed by both houses of Chiles Congress, but newly elected Vice-President of the Senate Salv ador Allende publicly criticized it and tried unsuccessfully to amend it. 57 Department of State officials recognized that there were limits to U.S. power and Chilean tolerance. In September 1951, just a few weeks after Chile ratified the copper agreement, the United States, through the Internatio nal Materials Conference, attemp ted to allocate international sales of copper, and thereby dictate to whom copper could be sold and how much. The allocation scheme included the 20 percent that Ch ile sold on the open market. Furious, Chilean officials met with Miller and members of ARA and strongly opposed the allocation plan. They argued that copper comprised 65 percent of Chil es exports and was its principal source of revenue for international payments. Chiles Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Manuel Trucco reminded U.S. officials that Chile had lost tremendous revenue during World War II because 57 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 87. Despatch 103, H. Gerald Smith, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, to Department of State, 22 July 1951, 725.00 (W) / 7-2651; Despatch 11, Carlos C. Hall, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 6 July 1951, 725.00 (W) /7-651; and Despatch 233, Hall to Department of State, 22 August 1951, 725.00 (W) / 8-2251; all Folder 2, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 111

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of fixed prices and that Chile ha d already agreed to freeze 80 percent of its c opper at a low price. Miller assured the Chileans that the allocation was only tem porary and that it was necessary because copper was so important to mutual defense and security, but the Chileans were not persuaded. A few days later, the Chilea ns warned that if discussions shifted to fixing the price of copper, they would walk out. 58 After a week, Chile Desk Officer Milton Barall had informed Bowers that the United States was about to yield to the Chileans and accept exclusion of Chiles 20 percen t from allocation. The final allocation plan did so. 59 Two Fronts and the 1952 Election Although the Korean War and NSC-68 had pushed U.S. regional policy fully into a Cold War framework, U.S. officials remained more c oncerned about the far Right/authoritarian threat in Chile, particularly General Ibez. Party splintering and the emergence of four presidential candidates fostered U.S. worries about Chiles political stability and prompted Assistant Secretary Miller to lament, How many times we have seen the battle go by default because of the inability of the forces for good to concentr ate on the main enemy. Chile Desk Officer Milton Barall admitted that Chile has been keeping the pot boiling up here with its party splintering, presidential campaign jos tling, and copper allocation negotiations. 60 58 Memorandum of Conversation Chiles Position in the IMC -Copper, Lead, and Zinc Committee, Milton Barall, 7 September 1951; and Memorandum of Conversati on Chiles Position on Copper Allocation through the IMC, Barall, 11 September 1951; both Folder -Chile 1951 Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 59 Letter, Barall to Bowers, 14 September 1951; and Letter, Barall to Bowers, 25 September 1951; both Folder -1951 September-October, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 60 Policy Statement Chile, Department of State, 27 February 1951, 611.25/2-2751, p. 2. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 28 August 1951, Folder -1951 July-August; Letter, Bowers to Miller, 24 March 1952, Folder -1952 March-April; Miller to Bowers, 22 October 1951, Folder -1951 Septembe r-October; and Letter, Barall to Bowers, 14 September 1951, Folder -1951 September-October; all Box 7, Bowers Papers. 112

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Department officials were rather baffled by Ibezs popularity. Th e traditional ChileanArgentine rivalry and the general s close ties to Pern, Miller sai d, should have been a kiss of death for Ibezs candidacy. Ibez announced his presidential candidacy in Buenos Aires after appearing with Pern in two well-publici zed press conferences. Perns financial support of Ibezs campaign was well kno wn, and discovery that the Pern government had sent proIbez campaign propaganda to the Argentine emba ssy and consulates for distribution in Chile led to one Argentine consul being declared persona non grata. 61 Ibez lacked the support and resources of a major political party, and his Na tional Peoples Front (Frente Nacional del Pueblo) was a group of small political part ies that had few representative s in Congress. Furthermore, some prominent Ibez supporters were tied to a staged kidna pping case that involved former Nazis and was part of a plot to overthrow Gonzlez Videla. 62 U.S. officials recognized that Ibez had ga ined a significant following because of his stances on the central issues of the 1952 campaign: inflation, the high cost of living, and the need for strong political leadership. Ibezs strongman credentials could not be questioned, 61 Letter, Miller to Bowers, 15 July 1952, Folder -Chile 19 52, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 27 March 1951, attached to Letter, Bowers to Miller, 6 April 1951, 725.00/4-651, Folder 1, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 October 1951, Folder -1951 September-October; Memorandum of Conversation, Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, 5 March 1952, enclosed with Letter, Barall to Bowers, 18 March 1952, Folder -1952 March-April; Letter, Bowers to Miller, 14 July 1952, Folder, 1952 July-August; and Letter, Bowers to Miller, 28 July 1952, Folder -1952 July-August; all Box 7, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 7 July 1952, attached to Miller to Bowers, 15 July 1952. 62 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 Octo ber 1951. Fuerzas Parlamentarias Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2453 (29 March 1952): 26. Fuerzas Parlamentarias de los Candidatos, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2467 (4 July 1952): 28. Despatch 114 The Ibez Presidential Campaign, H. Gerald Smith, Counselor fo r Economic Affairs, to Department of State, 24 April 1952, 725.00/4-2452, Folder 2, Box 3313; and Telegram 113, Bowers to Secretary of State, 28 August 1951, 725.00/8-2851, Folder 3, Box 3315; both DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 27 August 1951, Folder -1951 July-August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Lette r, Bowers to Miller, 28 August 1951, enclosed with Bowers to Truman, 28 August 1951, Folder -Chile [Fol der 2], Box 172, PSF-Subject Fi les, HSTL. Despatch 272, Hall (C. A. Stewart) to Department of State, 29 August 1951, 725.00/8-2951, Folder 1, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 113

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and his ties to Pern and the adoption of th e broom as his campaign symbol (to clean out corruption) added to his appeal. With regards to inflation, a commonly s een placard at Ibez rallies showed two loaves of bread: the larger loaf represente d the amount of bread a consumer could buy in 1931 (the last year of Ibezs dictatorship), and the smaller loaf denoted the amount of bread one could buy in 1952 for the same amount of money. One U.S. Embassy officer remarked that given the large number of women at Ibezs rallies, one doesnt have to be too politically wise to understa nd what their complaints about the high cost of food at the market means. Moreover, the officer noted that many potential voters, besides enjoying the opportunity to meet with friends and neighbors, might find it hard to take a dim view of Ibez when the wine flows freely and there are plenty of empanadas to eat at his campaign rallies. 63 As much as the Department of State wo rried that Ibez might undermine Chiles democracy, Assistant Secretary Miller did not fault the Chileans; he believed that they were acting like U.S. voters. Miller compared the Ch ileans embrace of Ibez with the U.S. uproar over President Trumans firing of General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in Korea. When Americans rushed to the defense of an insubordinate general, Miller remarked, it must necessarily encourage tin-horn generals of the [Ibez] type. Citing the extensive public criticism of Truman and the ti cker tape parade given McArth ur upon his return to the United States, Miller told Bowers, We are making a very sad spectacle of ourselves indeed. 64 63 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 332-335. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 October 1952. Letter, R. M. de Lambert, U.S. Consul General, to Bowers, 31 August 1951, Folder -1951 July-August; and Letter, Miller to Bowers, 10 March 1952, Folder -19 52 March-April; both Box 7, Bowers Papers. Despatch 114, Smith to Department of State, 24 April 1952, 725.00/4-2452, p. 3, 1-2. 64 Letter, Miller to Bowers, 7 May 1951, Folder Ch ile, 1951, Box 4, Miller Papers, RG59-Lot, NA. 114

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The Popular Socialist Party was divided over whether or not to support Ibez, and the split led to Salvador Allendes first presidential candidacy. Led by Raul Ampuero, the PSP endorsed Ibez, but not all party members favore d this. When Popular Socialist Astolfo Tapia Moore, President of the Chambe r of Deputies, returned from an October 1951 trip to Buenos Aires, he declared in a press conference that Argentine fascism, whose candidate is Seor [Carlos] Ibez, dreams of placing Chile within its economic and political orbit, and this made Ibez the least Chilean of th e candidates. The PSP leadersh ip condemned Tapias comments and expelled him from the party. In protest, A llende resigned the Vice Presidency of the Senate, and the PSP leadership expelled him as well. 65 Taking several party members with them, Allende and Tapia joined the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh). Led by Bernardo Ibez, the PSCh nominated Allende as its presidential candi date amid an enthusiastic crowd of over 10,000 largely working class supporters. Gaining the Communist Partys endorsement as well, Allende formed the Peoples Front (Frente de l Pueblo), or Fourth Front as he called it. 66 The embassy and ARA respected Allende, but th ey did not know his political ambitions. In 1950, Allende divulged, I am going to be a candidate for Presiden t of this country. I do not 65 Despatch 449, Bowers (Hall) to Department of State, 10 October 1951, 725.00 (W) /10-1051, Folder 2, Box 3314; Despatch 556 New Realignment of Socialists of Chile Smith (Stewart) to Department of State, 6 November 1951, 725.00/11-651, Folder 1, Box 3313; Despatch 114 P opular Socialists Throw Support to Senator Ibez, Hall (Stewart) to Department of State, 27 July 1951, 725.00/7-2751, Folder 1, Box 3313; all DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 October 1951. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 5 November 1951. 66 Despatch 556, Smith (Stewart) to Department of State, 6 November 1951, 725.00/11-651. Despatch 642, Smith (Broderick) to Department of State, 29 November 1951, 725.00/11-2951, Folder 1, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 October 1951. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 5 November 1951. Don Salvador Allende ser proclamado hoy en el T[eatro]. Caupolicn, El Mercurio 27 November 1951, p. 27. Proclamacin del candidato seor Salvador Allende, El Mercurio 28 November 1951, p. 28. The weekly periodical Nuevo ZigZag listed those Socialists who left with Allende and Tapia. See Otro mas que se va, Nuevo Zig-Zag 47/2439 (22 December 1951): 25. Nuevo Zig-Zag earlier reported that the Popular Soci alist leadership had also expelled Jos Toh, president of the Chilean Student Federation (Federacin de Estudiantes de Chile -FECh) and other Socialist student leaders when they questioned the partys decision to endorse Ibez. See Expulsados del P.S.P., Nuevo Zig-Zag 47/2437 (8 December 1951): 25. 115

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want to be President by being Pres ident. I want to be President of this country, in order to change it. I want to be the President of Chile, andI want to convert this country into what it should have been, into a great c ountry. Aiding this ambition was the fact that Allende had good relations with and was popular among both Socialis t parties; and his stature outside of the Socialist circles was very high, especially am ong the Communists. As one conservative journalist noted and an Allende friend agreed, A llende was un pino plantado en un macetero (a pine tree planted in a flowerbox), a potentially powerful politician in a small political party. 67 Bowers and ARA officials welcomed Allendes candidacy largely because the Socialist senator was anti-Ibez, and partly because they considered him a friend. Bowers described Allende as an able and decent man, and an ab le man of character and intelligence, and considered him an uncompromising foe of communi sm. The fact that Communists were a part of Allendes support did not bother the U.S. Ambassador, although he admitted that Allende would probably go out on a limb in pursuit of the Communist vote. 68 Doubts existed as to whether the Communists w ould even vote for Allende because several sources indicated that many Comm unists would vote for General Ib ez. PSCh leader Bernardo Ibez remarked, no one knows how long the co mmunist support of Dr. Allendes candidacy 67 U.S. officials believed that Allende had maneuvered himself into a presidential bid, but they did not fully know his ambition. Despatch 449, Hall to Department of State, 10 October 1951, 725.00 (W) /10-1051. Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emision, 1985), 24, 98. 68 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 5 November 1951. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 5 November 1951, Folder -1951 November-December, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 39, 333. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 13 November 1951. Despatch 556 New Realignment of Socialists of Chile, 6 November 1951, 725.00/11-651. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 19 November 1 951. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 29 November 1951, Folder -Chile 1951, Box 4, Miller -Subj ect Files, RG59-Lo t Files, NA. 116

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will last. 69 Ibez, like Allende, promised to repeal of the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, and Communist Senator and poet Pablo Neruda had endorsed Ibez. Nerudas endorsement did not reflect the opinion of th e Communist leadership, and Central Committee member Volodia Teitelboim made clear that the party leadership had ple dged the partys support to Allende. Allende, said Teitelboim, was the only candidate who supported the partys aims of nationalizing Chiles natural resources and dividing the latifundios Teitelboim, however, strongly hinted that the Communist s votes could be obtained at the right po litical price (the repeal of the Defense of Democracy law), a nd he noted that Ibez was very popular among miners in the northern Communist strongholds of Tarapac and Antofagasta. Teitelboims remarks prompted the other politi cal parties to angle for Communi sts votes, and the Falange, led by Senator Eduardo Frei Montal va, approached the Communists about constructing a Popular Front coalition to defeat Ibez. The extensiv e maneuvering for Communist votes led Bowers to complain that no public man willutter a word of criticism of the Communists. 70 U.S. officials hopes for Allende to undermin e Ibezs candidacy were tied to their great distrust of Ibez, even as Ib ez tried to cultivate U.S. support. At one point, Bowers reported that Ibezs campaign was trying to arrange a dinner with U.S. Embassy officials. Bowers 69 Despatch 1469, U.S. Embassy Santiago (Hall) to Department of State, 25 June 1952, 725.00/6-2552, Folder 2, Box 3313; Despatch 195, U.S. Embassy Santiago (Hall) to Department of State, 20 August 1952, 725.00 (W) /82052, Folder 3, Box 3314; Despatch 841 Bernardo Ibez Hedges on Communist Support for His Partys Presidential Candidate, 15 January 1952, 725.00/1-1552, attached to Telegram 361, Bowers to Secretary of State, 15 January 1952, 725.00/1-1552, Folder 2, Box 3313; all DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 70 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 333. Translation of Teitelboim Interview in Las Noticias de ltima Hora C. Allen Stewart, 24 March 1952, attached to Despatch 1121 Communist Position on Presidential Campaign, Smith (Stewart) to Department of State, 24 March 1952, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 5 November 1951, attached to Letter, Miller to Bowers, 13 November 1951, Folder -Chile 1951, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 May 1952, attached to Letter, Truman to Bowers, 26 May 1952, Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF-Subject Files, HSTL. 117

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quashed this and any similar even ts, fearing that Ibez would ma nipulate it to suggest that the United States favored his candid acy (U.S. officials privately fa vored Pedro Enrique Alfonso, the Radical Party candidate, and Arturo Matte, the Liberal candidate ). Ibezs supporters, some Chilean officials, and even Ibez himself tried to assure U.S. officials that the former dictator was friendly to the United States, but U.S. officials doubted the a ssurances and their sincerity. U.S. officials remained convinced that Ibez wa s the preeminent threat to Chilean democracy. 71 Whether Allende would stay in the race until election day (4 September 1952) was another question. Allendes candidacy appeared to foll ow the path common for second tier presidential candidates: serving as a bargai ning chip for a small party to ac hieve cabinet posts or action on an issue. Often once an agreement had been negotiated, the smaller pa rtys candidate would throw his support to the coaliti on candidate. In April and Ma y 1952, rumors circulated that President Gonzlez Videla and Radical Party lead ers, as well as Eduar do Frei and the Falange, were negotiating with Allendes campaign in orde r to swing Socialist an d Communist votes to the Radical Partys candidate, Pe dro Enrique Alfonso. Alfonso a nd Allende reached a tentative deal in early May. Alfonso agreed to support a bill repealing the Defense of Democracy law and to assist Allendes 1953 Senate reelection campaign; in exchange, Allende would support to Alfonsos candidacy. Gonzlez Videla wrecked the agreement two weeks later when he declared that the country needed the Defense of Democr acy law now more than ever before. The 71 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 25 July 1951, Folder -1951 July-August; and Letter, Miller to Bowers, 2 February 1952, Folder -1952 January-February; both Box 7, Bowers Papers. Memorandum of Conversation, Barall, 16 June 1952, 725.00/6-1652, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 15 July 1952; and Letter, Bowers to Miller, 15 July 1952; both Folder 1952 July-August; Box 7, Bowers Papers. Telegram 58, Stewart to Secretary of State, 16 July 1952, 725.00/7-1652, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 118

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comment caused Allendes Peoples Front to doubt the sincerity of the Radicals promise to repeal the law, and Allende rema ined in the race to the end. 72 U.S. officials grew frustrated and resentful of how the pol itical parties and candidates used the United States as whipping boys, partic ularly over the copper is sue. Bowers reported that militants for Allende and Ibez, especially those of Allende, painted the catchphrase All the copper for Chile on walls everywhere, and M iller acknowledged that the political situation in Chile regarding copper was extremely touchy. Due to the Korean War and the Cold War military build-up, the United States was experienci ng an extremely critical shortage of copper, and Miller was very much afraid that Chile could maneuver the United States into [a] position where they [could] justify imposition [of a] substantially higher price. The Chileans already had objected to the existi ng situation, which they described as the richest country in the world, paying a low price for copper, whereas th e poorer countries had to pay a higher price. 73 With copper as the most explosive polit ical issue, a bill moved through Chiles Congress that proposed giving the president control ove r the entire production of U.S.-owned 72 Despatch 556 New Realignment of So cialists of Chile, 6 November 1951, 725.00/11-651. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 24 March 1952. Despatch 744, Hall to Depart ment of State, 19 January 1953, 725.001/1-1953. Nuevo ZigZag reported the details of the possible agreement between th e Radicals and Allendes Fourth Front in its 24 and 31 May issues; however, its 12 April issue indicates that talks between the two were already underway. See Definitivamente and Lo dijo un falangista, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2455 (12 April 1952): 24; tica Poltica, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2461 (24 May 1952): 25; Cooperacin?, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2462 (31 May 1952): 29. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 May 1952, attached to Letter, Truman to Bowers, 26 May 1952, Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF-Subject Files, HSTL. Despatch 1280, Smith to Department of State, 30 Apr il 1952, 725.00 (W) /4-3052, Folder 3, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Ser lo definitivo?, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2465 (21 June 1952): 29. 73 Telegram 349, Miller to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 25 Janua ry 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 24 March 1952, Folder -1952 March-April, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 May 1952, attached to Letter, Truman to Bowers, 26 May 1952, Folder -Chile [Folder 1], Box 172, PSF--Subject Files, HSTL. Te legram 496, Acheson (Miller) to Bowers, 9 April 1952, attached to Memorandum, Miller to Barall, 21 April 19 52; and Memorandum of Conversation Price of Chilean Copper, W. G. Brown, 13 February 1952; both Folder -Chile, 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 119

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copper mines. If the bill became law, Gonzlez Vi dela and his successors would have the power to determine the percentage of copper that Chil e could sell freely on the open market and the percentage that U.S. copper companies could take The bill received almost unanimous approval in the Chamber of Deputies, and was movi ng to the Senate. Bowers called the bill confiscatory, and warned Washington that pres idential campaign politics was encouraging the bills passage. In a meeting with Chilean diplom ats, Miller equated the bill with nationalization and charged that the bill woul d break the 1951 copper agreement. 74 Although partly a product of elect ion year politics, the copper bill might also have resulted from a large deficit in the Chilean government s budget, which prompted Gonzlez Videlas government to renounce the 1951 coppe r agreement. Government of ficials had sold Chiles 20 percent of copper production at high prices and then budgeted th e revenues, learning later that more than 90 percent of the sa les were destined to go behind th e Iron Curtain. Forced to cancel the sales, the Chilean government now faced a serious budget shortfall. Ambassador Nieto del Ro met with Miller on 2 May 1952 and info rmed him that Chile would renounce the 1951 copper agreement and take over control over th e copper production of the large U.S. copper companies. When La Moneda publicly announced the renunciation, Bowers wrote that, There was much flag waving over Chiles declaration of independence. 75 74 Telegram 496, Acheson (Miller) to Bowers, 9 April 1952. Memorandum of Conversation Price of Chilean Copper, W. G. Brown, 13 February 1952. Memorandum of Conversation, 4 January 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG 59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 24 March 1952. 75 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 10 April 1952, attached to Memorandum, Miller to Barall, 21 April 1952; and Memorandum of Conversation Chile Denounces Copper Agreement, Barall, 2 May 1952; both Folder -Chile, 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Despatch 1305, Smith to Department of State, 8 May 1952, 725.00 (W) /5-852, Folder 3, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, NA. Letter, Bowers to Truman, 12 May 1952. Walter Mller, the Economic Counselor for the Chilean Embassy in Washington, detailed the negotiations and implementation of the 1951 agreement an d its problems. See El problema de l cobre desde el Convenio de Abril 120

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Despite advance warnings, Chiles cancellation of the 1951 copper agreement came as a great surprise to U.S. officials. Miller was livid, telling Chilean Ambassador Nieto del Ro that this would affect every aspe ct of [U.S.] relations with Chil e. Miller further charged that any further discussions of the pr ice of copper would mean negotia ting with a gun to our head. Truman was shocked by Chiles can cellation, particularly when he considered Chile our best friend in L[atin] A[merica] and Gonzlez Videla hi s personal friend. He told Nieto de Ro that he saw no need for Chile to denounce [the] agreement, particularly when the U[nited]S[tates] was making great sacrifices [to] prevent [a] third World War at [t he] cost [of] many US lives in Korea. Truman added that he was willing [to instru ct] his assistants [to] work out [a] fair deal with Chile, but negotiations would not occur on the basis of [an] ultimatum. 76 Despite their initial re action, U.S. officials soon conclude d that Chiles renunciation of the 1951 copper agreement might be the best for all involved. If the United States conceded, it allowed the Department of State to remove itself from price negotiations for copper, and from being the arbiter between the U. S. copper companies and the Chilean government. On 20 May 1952, Miller informed Nieto del Ro that Pres ident Truman had decided, despite strong objections within the U.S. government, to allo w private U.S. companies to buy copper overseas at prices they (the companies) negotiated with th e sellers. The United States only request, said Miller, was that Chile not sell its copper to the Communist bloc nor allow third parties to do so. de 1951, El Diario Ilustrado 16 May 1952, enclosed with Letter, Bowers to Miller, 16 May 1952, attached to Letter, Miller to Bowers, 20 May 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 76 Memorandum of Conversation Chile Denounces Copper Agreement, Barall, 2 May 1952. Labelled NO DISTRIBUTION, Telegram 543 contains the account of Nieto del Ros meeting with Truman. Telegram 543, Miller to Bowers, 8 May 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 23 May 1952, Folder -19 52 May, Box 7, Bowe rs Papers. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 87. 121

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In disbelief that the United States had granted Ch ile all that it wanted 100 percent control of copper production, ending the two-price system [t he U.S. price and the price of Chiles 20 percent], selling all copper at market price, selling to all buyers at the same price the Chilean ambassador asked if this was a proposition or a negotiation. Miller said it was a unilateral decision. Two days later, Nieto del Ro met agai n with Miller and asked fo r clarifica tions; the Chileans still seemed uncertain about the U.S. decision. A month later, the United States was paying 35-1/2 cents per pound for Ch ilean copper, which was market price and eight cents above the price paid previously. 77 The model democracy premise influenced the outcome of the copper agreement dispute. Although Miller and other ARA officials were bitter, the assistant secretary said that they will try not to let this hurt our rela tions with Chile too much. Ch ief of West Coast Affairs Milton Barall indicated that U.S. offici als recognized that they needed to concede something to a fellow democracy. Truman showed little animosity, larg ely because Gonzlez Videla had written him a long letter, concerned th at a serious misunderstanding ha d arisen between them. Truman responded, I am sincerely sorry that I conveyed [that] impressi on in my conversation with your Ambassador.I knew very well that that coul d not happen.I hope everything will work 77 Memorandum of Conversation Chile Denounces Copper Agreement, Barall, 2 May 1 952. Telegram 557, Miller to Bowers, 13 May 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Mille r -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Letter, Miller to Bowers, 23 May 1952. Memorandum of Conversation Chile Informed of US Decision on Copper, Barall, 20 May 1952; Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Ambassador Seeks Clarification US Copper Position, Barall, 22 May 1952; and Letter, Miller to Bowers, 13 June 1952; a ll Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. 122

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outand that Chile and the United States will alwa ys be friends. A few weeks later, Truman admitted that he was particularly anxious to have Chiles friendship. 78 As the copper dispute revealed, U.S. officials favored Chile as a fellow democracy, but they were unprepared for all of the ramifications this entailed. Sensitive to anti-U.S. criticism, U.S. officials tried to minimize further critic ism by suggesting that Gonzlez Videla withdraw the Mutual Security Pact from Congressional ratification. Signe d by Chile and the United States during the previous year, the Mu tual Security Pact provided m ilitary training, assistance, and equipment to allies in the hemisphere. Amba ssador Nieto del Ro expressed doubts that Chiles Congress would ratify it. The pacts chances for ratification by the Chilean Congress, however, appeared mixed, because neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies had moved the agreement out of committee. Assistant Secretar y Miller was vitally interested in obtaining ratification of the pact; however, he would not do so at the cost of inflaming anti-US sentiment and allowing the politicians to use th is agreement as a political football. 79 The Gonzlez Videla administration and Chilean military leaders pressed Congress to ratify the pact, even though U.S. officials were unwilling to endure more anti-Yankee tirades. Bowers asked Chiles Foreign Minister to pull th e pact from consideration unless there was an absolute certainty of ratificati on. La Moneda (Chiles White House) sought ratification, and 78 Letter, Truman to Bowers, 19 Novemb er 1949, Folder -1949 October-December; and Letter, Miller to Bowers, 5 May 1952 Folder -1952 May; both Box 7, Bowers Papers. Letter, Gonzlez Videla to Truman, 14 May 1952; and Letter, Truman to Gonzlez Videla, 26 May 1952; both Fold er -Chile [Folder 2], Box 172, PSF -Subject Files, HSTL. Letter, Truman to Bowers, 12 September 1952. 79 Miller to Bowers, 5 May 1952; Bowers to Miller, 19 May 19 52, Folder -1952 May; and Bowers to Miller, 7 July 1952, Folder -1952 July-August; both Box 7, Bowers Papers. Memorandum of Conversation, Barall, 16 June 1952, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Barall to Bowers, 23 May 1952, Folder -1952 May, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 123

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Chilean military leaders approved the pact u nanimously and enthusiastically and lobbied Congress hard for passage. One retired Chile an military commander warned that Chiles military needed U.S. training and assistance to confront Argentinas armed forces and to replace military equipment that were true museum pieces Bowers earlier had noted that although the Chilean Navy was the best in South America, it had deteriorated during the Depression and World War II, and needed the equipment and training. 80 Critics of the pact, including Allende and Ibez, voiced thei r opposition. Allende, as well as Communists, Ibez supporters, and a few Radi cals, accused the United States of bullying Chile into the agreement, and of trying to send Chilean troops to die in Korea, even though U.S. officials had included a specific assurance that the ag reement would not send Chilean troops to Korea. To the surprise of military leaders, Ibez called the pact badly conceived and dangerous to our sovereignty a nd degrading to the armed forces. 81 Both houses of Chiles Congress ratified th e agreement by wide margins (24-6 in the Senate and 78-21 in the Chamber), but, U.S. offi cials focused on the anti-U.S. criticism, not the broad support for the pact. Assuming the attitu de of a scorned benefactor, U.S. policymakers momentarily forgot that Chiles political system, not benevolence, had led the Americans to favor Chile. Barall remarked, I am about ready to start trying to change our position to one where Chile would receive the same treatment as other Latin American countries. Admitting 80 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 13 May 1952. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 7 July 1952, Folder -1952 July-August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, Caudillo Enigmtico 222. Bowers to Truman, 18 July 1950, attached to Truman to Bowers, 25 July 1950, Folder -Chile [Folder 2], Box 172, PSF-Subject Files, HSTL. 81 Bowers to Miller, 13 May 1952, Folder -1952,May; Bo wers to Colonel Charles W. McCarthey, 14 April 1952, Folder -1952 March-April; and Bowers to Miller, 19 May 1952, Folder -1 952 May; all Box 7, Bowers Papers. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 309-312. Bowers to Miller, 14 Apr il 1952, Folder-1 952 March-April, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, Caudillo Enigmtico 222. 124

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that Miller and other senior officials were bitter, Barall confessed, From our point of view in the Department of State, we have gone all out to try to help Chile in every conceivable way.It does not seem fair that in exchange we s hould be faced with anti-US propaganda and the intensification of nationalistic fe eling at our expense in order to win votes in the next election. 82 Who Lost Chile? As Chiles 1952 presidential campaign drew to a close, U.S. officials remained distrustful of Ibez and feared the polic ies he might pursue if elec ted. Ibez had campaigned on nationalizing the copper mines, selling copper to all nations including the Communist bloc, revoking the Law for the Defense of Democrac y, canceling the Mutual Security Pact, and reestablishing relations with the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. Ibez unsuccessfully tried to assure U.S. officials that he did not have any anti-American feeling, that he was American-minded, and that he would not nationalize the copper mines. He insisted that unlike many Chileans who looked to Europe for foreign cap ital, he saw the United States as the primary source of investment for Ch iles economic development. 83 For Allende, the 1952 campaign earned him resp ect and name recognition, although not all publicity was necessarily the kind he desired. He gained respect for his earnest campaigning 82 Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, Caudillo Enigmtico 222. Despatch 744, Hall to Department of State, 19 January 1953, 725.001/1-1953, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Letter, Barall to Bowers, 15 May 1952. Letter, Barall to Bowers, 23 May 1952. 83 Translation of Ibezs Platform, n.d. [July 1952], enclosed with Despatch 133 Ibez Announces his Platform, Hall (Stewart) to Department of State, 7 August 1952, attached to Despatch 115, Hall to Department of State, 31 July 1952, 725.00/7-3152; and Memorandum of Interview with Ibez, Vebber to Hall, 15 July 1952, enclosed with Despatch 52 Senator Ibez Attitude Toward the U.S. as Deduced from Interview with Embassy Official, Hall (Stewart) to Department of State, 16 July 1952, 725.00/7-1652; both Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 125

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until the very end. Bowers observed: Allende has no illusions about his chances, but he hates Ibez andstays in in the hope of holding the commun ist vote away from the old dictator. Allende was also ai ded in part by monies that righ tist candidate Arturo Matte had funneled to Allendes campaign in the hope that Allende woul d draw votes from Ibez. Allende gained additional publicity, or rather notoriety, from his duel with Radical senator Ral Rettig. A month before election day, during a Sena te debate, Allende and Rettig traded insults, and the insults led to fisticuffs. Falange Se nators Eduardo Frei and Radomiro Tomic broke up the fight, but Rettig then challenged Allende to a duel. Gonzlez Videla ordered Investigaciones (Chiles FBI) to take the two se nators into custody for the evening, but both senators escaped from their homes when Investigaciones officers came knocking. Later, on the field of honor, Allende and Rettig fired shots into the air. No one was hurt, but Allende claimed that he heard a bullet whistle by his ear. Nuevo Zig-Zag called the affair medieval and an absurdity, opining that it might have been better if Frei and Tomi c had allowed the two men to let off steam. Bowers, however, reported that Chileans roar ed with laughter over the entire affair. 84 On 4 September, Mattes and the Department of States hopes that Allende would subvert Ibezs candidacy evaporated ; Ibez won easily, receiving 446,439 votes (47 percent). Matte, the Liberal Party candidate, received 265,357 (28 pe rcent), and Radical candidate, Pedro Enrique 84 Letter, Bowers to Miller, 28 July 1952. Despatch 811 Increasing Communist Activities in Chile, Hall (Flournoy et al) to Department of State, 3 February 1953, 725.001/2-353, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Un absurdo: El duelo, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2473 (16 August 1952): 27. Letter, Bowers to Miller, 11 August 1952, Folder -1952 July-August, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Bo wers relates the story in his memoirs but withholds the names. See Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 142. 126

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Alfonso, garnered 190,360 votes (20 percent). Allende finished a distant fourth with 51,975 votes (5.5 percent), indicating that many Communists and Social ists had voted for Ibez. 85 For Washington, an Ibez victory was the worst possible outcome. Miller lamented that Chiles election results have come as a severe bl ow to us.[and] the crowing that is emanating from Buenos Aires is sickening. Some U.S. newspapers expressed alarm at Ibezs victory, and the Washington Post charged that Ibezs electi on resulted from the Truman administrations neglect of Latin America. At this charge, Miller threw up his arms in frustration: [O]ur help to Chile was exemplary, and we went out of our way to give Chiles democracy a pat on the back.The only thing we did not do was force Matte and Alfonso to get together on a single candidacy, and I suppose some one with 20/20 hindsight will be telling us how we could have done that. Barall drew pa rallels to U.S. elections, When people ask me why Ibaez was elected in Chile, I can now avoid length[y] discussion by countering with the question why was [Senator Joseph] McCarthy elected in Wisconsin? 86 Underlying Millers and Barall s comments were the Departme nts fears that Ibez would prompt another Who lost China? debate in the United States or would emerge as another Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was then Prime Minister of Iran. Miller wo rried that if Ibez fulfilled his promises to nationalize the mines, the Truman administrations political opponents would charge that Department had followed the same kind of policy towards Chile as we allegedly have had towards China. The Republi can charge that the Department has lost 85 John Lee Pisciotta, Development Policy, Inflation, and Politic s in Chile, 1938-1958 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 113. Despatch 811, Hall (Flournoy) to Department of State, 3 February 1953, 725.001/2-353. 86 Miller to Bowers, 9 September 1952, Folder -Chile 1952 Box 4, Miller -Subject F ile, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Barall to Bowers, 16 September 1952, Folder -1952 September, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 127

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China to the Communists and the ensuing debate had severely damaged the Department of State and contributed to the belief that Communist spies had infiltrated the Department. Miller also drew parallels to the escalating situation in Ira n, where Mossadegh was th reatening to nationalize Irans oil industry. With Ibez promising natio nalization and opening tr ade with the Soviet bloc, Miller agreed with Bowers that Chile stands much more to lose than to gain in its relations with the United States, but as Miller rema rked, Ibez, like Mosadeq, may be unable to appreciate this. One year la ter, in 1953, the United States woul d facilitate a covert operation that removed Mossadegh from power. 87 U.S. officials began preparing for the worst from Ibez. Miller ordered Bowers not to visit the president-elect until Ib ez took the initiative and invited him. The assistant secretary also instructed Bowers to avoid anything that would seem like a threat or economic aggression and to educate Ibez sufficiently before he ta kes any drastic action. For his part, Bowers advised Washington that until Ibez intentions we re clear, the Department should go ahead with a loan for a pulp and paper mill, but hold up othe r loan applications and cease any preparations for sending military aid to Chile. Miller informed Bowers that if Ibez sold copper behind the Iron Curtain, the United States would likely termin ate its foreign assistance programs with Chile. Furthermore, Miller began preparations for an apparent propaganda campaign to influence Chileans to our way of seei ng things before the situat ion deteriorates too far. 88 87 Miller to Bowers, 9 September 1952. Miller to Bowers 11 September 1952, Folder 1952, September, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 88 Telegram 79, Miller to Bowers, 9 September 1952, 725. 00/9-652; and Telegram 93, Bowers to Department of State, 12 September 1952, 725.00/9-1252; both Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Miller to Bowers, 9 September 1952; and Miller to Bowers, 11 September 1952; bot h Folder 1952, September, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Memorandum Proposed Special Project for Chile, Miller to Compton, 18 September 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, 128

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Ibez began sending mixed signals in the days following his victory. Javier Lira, the Secretary General of Ibezs campaign, proclaimed that the Mutual Security Pact would be renounced, relations with the Co mmunist bloc would be reesta blished, and nationalization the copper mines would begin. Popular Socialist Part y leader Ral Ampuero echoed Liras claims. Ibez then undercut both men, announcing that Lira and Ampuero had merely offered their personal opinions, not his, and then asked his friends to discontinue making statements which I have not authorized and which onl y serve [to] confuse public opinion. 89 The general then assured U.S. officials that he would not nationa lize the copper mines, a nd instead, sought ways to increase foreign private investment in Chil es basic mining industrie s (copper, nitrates, and coal). Ibez also made clear that he would not reestablish relations w ith the Soviet Union, nor would he revoke the Defense of Democracy law. Bowers then learned that Ibez had become furious over the attempt of the extremists, Marxists Peronists, and extreme Nazis, to set forth in the press his program, and that he had ordered them to shut their mouths. 90 While Ibezs assurances began to ease U.S. o fficials worst fears, Bowers suggested that the United States might cultivate even greater sympathy with Ibez by asking former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to head the U.S. delegation to Ibezs inaugurati on. Pern had announced Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Barall to Bowers, 16 September 1952, Folder 1952, September, Box 7, Bowers Papers. 89 Bowers to Miller, 8 September 1952; 15 September 1952; Bowers to Miller, 16 September 1952; Bowers to Miller, 22 September 1952; and Bowers to Miller, 25 September 1952; all Folder 1952 September, Box 7, Bowers Papers. Telegram 81, Bowers to Miller and Arneson, 9 September 1952, 725.00/9-952, Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 90 Telegram 120, Bowers to Secretary of State, 27 September 1952; and Memorandum of Conversation The Policies of the New Regime in Chile, Barall, 17 October 1952; both Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Despatch 334, Hall to Department of State, 3 October 1952, 725.00 (W) /10-352, Folder 3, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA; Miller to Bowers, 23 September 1952, Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, Miller -Subject File, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Bowers to Miller, 22 September 1952. 129

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that Argentina would send its Vice-President and the Foreign Minister plus twenty other officials, a delegation which Bowers described as impressive in status and numbers. The U.S. ambassador proposed that Washington send former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and World War II General Omar Bradley to head the U.S. de legation, both of whom were well known and highly respected in Chile. Despite doubts, the Departme nt of State warmed to Bowers suggestion of Roosevelt (Bradley could not a ttend) and justified it to President Truman on Chiles unusual political importance as a model democracy. Tr uman agreed, and Roosevelt consented. The announcement that Roosevelt would head the U. S. delegation she was the first woman appointed by the United States as a special ambassador for an inauguration or coronation created a stir in official and diplomatic circle s in Santiago. When the Venezuelan Ambassador to Chile heard the news, he exclaimed to Bowers, My God, what a master stroke! 91 On the eve of Eleanor Roosevelts arrival in Santiago, Miller told Bo wers, I have no need to emphasize to you the importance of keeping Chile on our side in Lain America, but, Miller did not recognize that sending R oosevelt did exactly that. Washington soon learned that enormous crowds waited for hours and impeded tra ffic in order to see Mrs. Roosevelt. When she appeared in public, thundering cheers and roars of approval were heard as Chileans waved, scrambled to take her photograph, and gave her numerous rousing ovations. In addition to the usual diplomatic dinners, receptions, and ceremonies, Roosevelt visited schools, hospitals, and womens clinics. She spoke to womens groups a nd gave press conferences to reporters without 91 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 341-342; Telegram 112, Bowers to Miller, 25 September 1952, 725.00/9-2552; and Telegram 129, Bowers to Secretary of State, 2 October 1952, 725.00/10-252; both Folder 2, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA; Memorandum, David Bruce, Acting Secretary of State, to the President, 17 October 1952, Official Files, HSTL. 130

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questions screened in advance. She visited one of the poorest neighborhoods in Santiago, talking with the astonished women and children, a nd entering their homes upon invitation. Newly inaugurated President Ibez warmly greeted Roosevelt, and they spoke for an extended time. Outgoing President Gonzlez Videla made the u nusual gesture of hosting a dinner for Roosevelt in La Moneda on the eve of th e inauguration. With unrestraine d pride, Bowers reported, she stole the show. In a last diplomatic gest ure, the Truman admini stration once again had demonstrated its favoritism towards the model de mocracy that it held as a key Cold War ally. 92 Conclusion As the Cold War deepened during Trumans second term, U.S. officials entrenched the model democracy premise as the foundation of U.S. policy and actions towards Chile. The escalating Cold War transformed a U.S. Latin American policy from a Good Neighbor/Cold War blend into a predominantly Cold War policy. During the transformation, democratic Chiles importance as a Cold War ally and as an ideological symbol grew. Truman Administration policymakers favored Chile among Latin American nations in terms of assistance, loans, and advisors, and acceded to Chilean desires to cont rol the sales of their copper. Rather than allowing the renunciation of the 1951 copper agreement to sour U.S. -Chilean relations, President Truman and Department of State officials used it as an opportunity to deepen the friendship between the two nations and to ensure the adherence of a key ally to the U.S. side. 92 Miller to Bowers, 28 October 1952; and Bowers to Mille r, 5 November 1952, attached to Miller to Bowers, 12 November 1952; both Folder -Chile 1952, Box 4, M iller -Subject Files, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows 341-353. 131

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U.S. officials worried about the threats that the authoritarian Right, not the Communist Left, posed to Chiles democracy. Between 1949 and 1954, the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy weakened the Communists but did not eliminate them; meanwhile, former Nazi sympathizers, Peronists, authoritarians, and some Communists, coalesced around former dictator General Carlos Ibez. Ibezs election to the Chilean Senate in 1949 and then to Chiles Presidency in 1952 worried U.S. diplomats, who f eared that the former di ctator would overthrow Chilean democracy and join with Pern. During Chiles 1952 Presid ential election, U.S. officials cheered Salvador Alle ndes campaign from a distance, hoping that Socialist-Communist candidate would undermine Ibez s candidacy. They viewed th e Socialist senator as antiCommunist and did not see his Peoples Front as a threat. The key concern among U.S. policymakers between 1949 and 1952 was Chiles political stability. They recognized that Chiles political party framework had fractured, partly due to the introduction of Cold War tensions into Chil ean politics through Gonzlez Videlas anticommunist campaign. U.S. officials also recogni zed that the fracturing of political parties and the granting of suffrage to wome n created fluidity among the Chilean electorate, fluidity which fostered a sympathetic audience for populism, personalismo, and revolutionary intents. The senatorial and presidential campaigns of the former dictator General Carlos Ibez benefitted from this fluidity. Anxious U.S. officials acknowledged that Chileans were searching for a utopia in Ibezs mixture of Peronism, populism, and an idealized past, when food and the cost of living seemed cheaper during Ibez dictatorship. 93 93 Correa, Figueroa, JocelynHolt, Rolle, and Vicua, Historia del siglo XX chileno 192-193. For the search for a utopia, see Alan Angell, Chile de Alessandri a Pinochet: En busca de la utopa (Santiago: Editorial Andrs Bello, 132

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In the shadow of Ibezs allure, populism, and 1952 victory had emerged the outlines of the three voter blocs that woul d dominate Chilean politics duri ng the Cold War: the Right (Matte), the reformist Center-Left (A lfonso), and the radical Left (Allende). 94 Allende brought together a streamlined Leftist coalition based upon a working relationshi p between the Socialist and Communist Parties, a coaliti on made possible by La Ley Maldit a. Ibezs populism would fade, and his followers would disperse among the three blocs, but Ibez would prove to be the threat that U.S. officials feared. By then, how ever, the Eisenhower admi nistration had fostered an angry Chilean Left, which, in turn, genera ted new anxieties among U.S. policymakers that they could lose the Cold War symbolis m offered by Chiles model democracy. 1993). Angell does not apply the concept to Ibezs candidacy and presidency, although the documentary record does suggest it. 94 U.S. Embassy and ARA offici als would have agreed with Nuevo Zig-Zag which stated that the whole range of national politics was represented in the four 1952 presid ential candidates Ibez, Allende, Alfonso, and Matte. Menos de un mes, Nuevo Zig-Zag 48/2472 (9 August 1952): 25. 133

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CHAPTER 4 A THREAT EMERGES, 1953-1954 The Arbenz Factor The U.S. sponsored overthrow of Presiden t Jacobo Arbenz Guzmn of Guatemala on 27 June 1954 stunned and angered Latin Americans, a nd haunted U.S. relations with the region and the developing world long after Arbenz resigned and fled the Guatemalan capital. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland (1954-56) admitted that the United States had paid a price in terms of prestige and good-will for its opposition to Arbenz, whom it believed was a Communi st or Communist sympathizer. 1 In few places was that price higher than in Chile, where protests against U. S. intervention in Guatemala were described by the Christian Science Monitor and New York Times as the most violen t in the region. 2 Even so, Englishand Spanish-language scholarly wo rks on Chilean politics and the Left generally omit the protests of 1954 from their narratives. 3 1 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Fo reign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 6. Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889 (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 149. Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City NJ: Doubleday, 1982), 189. Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 54, 61. 2 Guatemala: Will Army Defect?Reaction Varies in Americas, Christian Science Monitor, 22 June 1954, p. 5. Latin Reds Find Fertile Ground, New York Times 21 June 1954, p. 3. Chile Reds Gains Stir Washington, New York Herald Tribune 19 July 1954, p. 2. 3 William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 126-131. Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 103-110, 116-126. Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984), 54-61. Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 251-258. Leslie Bethell, ed., Chile: Since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 122-128. Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia, Historia del siglo XX chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001 ), 197-205. Cristin Gazmuri R., with Patricia Arancibia and lvaro Gngora, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca, 2 volumes (Santiago: Aguilar, 2000), I: 361-363, 402-410. 134

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Chilean opposition to U.S. polic y towards Arbenz was more extensive and organized than scholars have previously recognized; moreover, it fundamentally transformed U.S. officials perception of the political th reats that it faced in Chile. 4 President Dwight D. Eisenhowers administration continued to adhere to the mode l democracy premise and to the idea that the United States needed the ideological symbolism that Chiles democracy projected for the Cold War struggle. Chilean denunciations of U.S. policy towards Arbenz, however, led Eisenhower administration officials to shift their threat conc erns from right-wing authoritarians and Peronist sympathizers to Communists and Marx ist-influenced Leftists. Furthermore, the shift, combined with the individual actions of Ch ileans, created a new threat: Socialist senator Salvador Allende Gossens. As the Eisenhower administrations policy grew more hostile towards Arbenz, the Chilean Left, led by Allende, Baltasar Castro Pa lma, and Eduardo Frei Montalva, grew more vocal, intense, and condemnatory of U.S. policy. Allendes prominent role in the opposition and his subsequent trip to the Soviet Union a nd Communist China grabbed U.S. policymakers attention. As Allende in creasingly asserted his l eadership over the Chilean Left, U.S. officials began to deem him a Communist threat and f eared that exemplary democratic Chile could become the next Guatemala. For the United States Allende emerged as a th reat not in the wake 4 Charles D. Ameringer is an exception, suggesting th at Arbenzs overthrow mini mally affected the exiled democratic Left of the circum-Caribbe an region. Evidence of growing Comm unist influence in Arbenzs regime, he asserts, created dilemmas for Cu bas Autnticos Party, Venezuelas Accin Democrtica, and the Dominican [Republic] Revolutionary Party, as well as leaders such as Rmulo Betancourt. While sympathetic to Arbenz, these parties and leaders shunned groups that aggressively criticized the United States for fear that they would alienate U.S. liberal and democratic groups whose support they needed. See Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-1959 (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1974), 199-200. 135

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of Fidel Castros revolution in C uba, as is often portrayed in schol arly literature, but in the wake of the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala. 5 New Administration, Same Premise During his 1952 presidential campaign, retired general Dwight D. Eise nhower criticized President Harry S Truman for neglecting La tin America. When the Republican Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, he addr essed U.S.-Latin American relations with urgency. Within one month, the National Secu rity Council (NSC) had drafted a new Latin American policy. During the NSCs first substantive discussion of the regions deteriorating situation, Eisenhower was deeply disturbed by what he had learned and asked the NSC to move ahead on the policy draft. The NSC expe dited the revisions, finishing them two weeks later. On 18 March, Eisenhower approved NSC paper #144 (NSC-144), United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, and the NSC promptly circulated it. NSC 144 detailed U.S. objectives in the region: devel oping greater support for U.S. policy among Latin Americans, furthering political and economic development, reducing the Communist menace, and obtaining greater access to and production of raw materials. 6 5 The argument that Allende emerged as a threat after Fidel Castro results primarily from scholars focus on Allendes presidency (1970-73). While offering background to Allendes 1970 victory, scholars have emphasized how the Alliance for Progress and Freis Revolution in Liberty failed to implement sufficient economic and social reforms to stem the appeal of Alle nde and Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), suggesting that Allende emerged and grew as a threat after Fidel Castros revolution in Cuba. See Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Pres s, 1977); James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); and Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allendes Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New York: Verso Press, 2005). Stephen Rabes study of John F. Kennedys policy toward Latin America implies this as well. See Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro lina Press, 1999), 101, 110-112. 6 Memorandum Discussion at the 132 nd Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, February 18, 1953, 19 February 1953, Folder -132 nd Meeting of NSC February 18,1953, Box 4, Ann Whitman File -National Security Council Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. Hereafter cited as AWF-136

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Despite Eisenhowers urgency and quick approval, NSC 144 continued to follow the outlines of the Truman administrations policy. Eisenhower administration drafters lifted the first sentence of NSC 144 from National Inte lligence Estimate 70 (NIE-70) Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security issued in December 1952. They also cut, pasted, and revised whole secti ons, including NSC 144s courses of action, from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) memorandum Latin America and U.S. Policy, written in late 1952. Several of NSC 144s objectives, such as access to and production of raw materials and the elimination of the Communi st menace, already had been put forth in NSC 56/2 United States Policy towards Inter-American Military Collaborati on, approved in 1950. 7 To further demonstrate his interest in im proving U.S. relations with Latin America, Eisenhower sent his brother Milt on, who was then president of Johns Hopkins University, on a fact-finding tour of the region. Upon his return, Milton Eisenhower said that it bothered him that in L[atin] A[merica] everybody throws impe diments in the way, in Iran we can find money, NSC, DDEL. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 31. Memorandum Discussion at the 137 th Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, Marc h 18, 1953, 19 March 1953, Folder -137 th Meeting of the NSC March 18, 1953, Box 4, AWF--NSC, DDEL. NSC 144 United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 4 March 1953, and Annex to NSC 144 NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 6 March 1953, both Folder -NSC 144 Latin America (2), Box 4, Office of the Special Assistan t for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, National Security Council Series, Policy Papers Subseries, DDEL. Her eafter cited as Sp Asst -Policy. 7 NSC 144 and Annex to NSC 144, 6 March 1953. Memorandum Latin America and U.S. Policy, Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs (ARA), n.d. [November? 1952], attached to Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, to Charles S. Mu rphy, Special Counsel to the President, 11 December 1952, Folder -Latin America, Box 182; and National Intelligence Estimate Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security (NIE-70), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 12 December 1952, Folder -National Intelligence Estimates (67, 69, 70, 72, 75), Box 254; both Presidents Secretar ys Files -Subject File, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 31-32. 137

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in Bolivia we cannot even get an answer. The one bright spot in Latin America for Dr. Eisenhower was Chile, where we are moving toward a solution. 8 Despite the U.S. Embassy in Santiagos claim that Dr. Eisenhowers visit was an outstanding personal success, Chil eans appeared to have viewed it as more ceremonial than substantive, if not somewhat disappointing. Chilean leaders conducted their substantive discussions in private with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot, who was travelling with Dr. Eisenhower. Dr. Eisenhower may have encouraged the ceremonial view when he told the Chileans that the purpose of his trip was to observe, learn and report, not to make decisions, solve problems, nor enter into negotiations. The Chilean Foreign Minister used the mome nt to burnish Chiles democratic image, telling the U.S. presidents brother that Chiles democracy was mo re firm than ever and that the Armed Forces were traditionally democratic and apolitical. Later, Luis Melo, the Director of the Diplomatic Section of Chiles Foreign Ministr y, met privately with Assistant Secretary Cabot and expressed concern about the weak copper market and growing stocks of copper in Chile. It would be very helpful, Melo said, if the Unite d States purchased Chiles copper (presumably for the U.S. stockpile). Cabot said this require[d] a general re-examination, but went no further. 9 8 Memorandum Telephone Conversation with Dr. M. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, 8 September 1953, Folder Telephone Memoranda (Except to and from White House) July Oct. 31, 1953 (2), Box 1, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Secretar y of State, 1951-1959, DDEL. For Dr. Eisenhowers trip, see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 28-29, 65-68. 9 Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Milton Eisenhower and Foreign Minister Fenner, Carlos C. Hall, 14 July 1953, Folder Chile, 1953-55, Box 2, Records for th e Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Henry F. Holland), 1953-56, Country File, 1953-56, Record Group 59 -Lot Files, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter cited as Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, John Moors Cabot, 15 July 1953, 725.00/7-1553 CS/S, Folder 3, Box 3313, Decimal File 1950-1954, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, NA. Hereaf ter cited as DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 138

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After accompanying Milton Eisenhower on his t our, Assistant Secretary Cabot noted that Chile was the first urgent item on my agenda, bu t that urgency was not related to the threat of Communism. While Guatemala under Communist sympathetic President Arbenz was a hot political problem, Chile merited concern becaus e its economic problems not only threatened its solvency but also the stability of its political institutions. Of the five most urgent economic problems in Latin America discerned by Cabot and the Department of States Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs (ARA) in 1953, three were Chilean : a rapidly rising infla tion rate ( per cent a month), a decline in Chiles market shar e and copper export income, and Chilean concern over the United States development of synthetic nitrates. 10 Chiles President Carlos Ibez del Campo (1952-1958) verged upon fueling inflati on and increasing the Chilean governments very substantial budget deficit by proposing ad ditional expenditures with no sound financing in sight. 11 With demand lagging, Chiles stockpiles of copper amassed. This in turn prompted U.S. and Chilean copper companies to reduce production and lay off workers. The Ibez administration soon requested the United States to buy 100,000 tons of c opper (then worth about $60 million) for the U.S. strategic stockpile in order to prevent disaster. 12 10 John Moors Cabot, First Line of Defense: Forty Years Experience of a Career Diplomat (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign Serv ice, 1979), 89, 85, 86. Willard L. Beaulac, Career Diplomat: A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 201, 27. 11 Despatch 1169 United States-Chilean Economic Relations, H. Gerald Smith to Department of State, 16 April 1953, 611.25/4-1653; and Despatch 1216 United States-Chilean Economic Relations, Smith to Department of State, 29 April 1953, 611.25/4-2953, both Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Arturo Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri: Memorias polticas 2 Volumes (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1962), II: 162-165. 12 Memorandum Creeping Nationalization of Copper Mines in Chile, Milton Barall to Thomas C. Mann, 9 February 1953, attached to Mann to Cabot and Matthews, 12 February 1953, Folder -Chile 1947-1953, Box 1, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secr etary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1945-1956 -Subject File, 19451956, RG59-Lot, NA. Hereafter cited as Deputy Assistant Secretary Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Bowers to Cabot, 28 July 1953, attached to Cabot to Bowers, 7 August 1953, Fold er 1, Box 1, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State 139

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The Eisenhower administration retained its pred ecessors preferential treatment of Chile, as well as its primary policy aim of preser ving and strongly supporting Chilean democracy. Willard L. Beaulac, Claude G. Bowers successor as U.S. Ambassador to Chile, articulated this aim most clearly: Our hope in the Embassy is that Chile can remain a practising [sic] democracy and that we can be helpful to her in this respect and in he r desireto improve her economy. 13 Milton Barall, Director of the Departme nt of States Office of South American Affairs, reiterated Chiles exceptionalism and fa vored status. He compared Chiles democracy and multiple parties to Frances political system, and he acknowledged that No country in Latin America has had more friendly cooperation or more economic assistance ( on a per capita basis) from the US than Chile. 14 Barall underscored Chiles favored status when he told Chiles Ambassador to the United States that the Department considered Chile just as good a friend as Brazil, the Latin American nation long seen as the United States closest ally in the region. 15 for Inter-American Affairs (John Moors Cabot), 1953-1954 -Country File, RG59-Lot, NA. Beaulac, Career Diplomat 201, 27. 13 As Claude Bowers successor, Beaulac arrived in Santiago to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Chile in Au gust 1953. Letter, Beaulac to Henry F. Holland, A ssistant Secretary of State for Inter-Ame rican Affairs, 14 May 1954, attached to Holland to Beaulac, 24 May 1954, Folder -Chile, 1953-1955, Box 2, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 14 Memorandum Chile, Barall, 1 April 1954, 725.00/4-154, attached to Despatch 772, William Sanders, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 1 April 1954, 72500/4-154; and Memorandum The Situation in Chile, Rollin S. Atwood (Barall) to Holland, 12 May 1954, attached to Despatch 878 Foreign Minister Discounts Rumors of Military Government, Beaulac to Department of State, 7 May 1954, 725.00/5-754; both Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 15 Milton Barall, Memorandum of Conversation United States Relations with Chile, 27 April 1953, 611.25/42753, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-1954, RG59, NA. For works that note Brazil as the United States closest Latin American ally, see Gerald K. Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 5; and W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups detat: Brazilian -American Relations, 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 8. E. Bradford Burns calls the U.S.-Brazilian relationship during the first half of the twentieth century as the unwritten alliance. See Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 140

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Despite Chiles favored status, U.S. policymakers considered President Ibez to be a major problem. They doubted Ibezs commitment to democracy, his leadership, and his ability to address Chiles economic problems. Ambassa dor Beaulac was the bluntest; he described Chiles government under Ibez as a ship with out a pilot and without a rudder. Heading a coalition of small parties and sp linter groups ranging from the socialist Left to th e authoritarian Right, Ibez had four cabinets with an almost continuous cycle of cabinet changes during his first eighteen months in office. He pushed the Po pular Socialists, his coa litions second largest party, out of the cabinet and into the opposition. 16 Attempting to garner greater labor union support, Ibez lunched with 3000 independent labor leaders, and two weeks later, two Ibaista labor unions formed. The thinly veiled effort to break the Communists and Socialists control of union leadership backfired. The Co mmunists and Socialists united their separate unions into the Central nica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh), creating a more unified and potent opposition to Ibez. 17 Calling Ibezs efforts a disaster, Foreign Mi nister Arturo Olavarra Bravo later cited two errors in particular that cast doubts on Ibezs abilities. The first was the presidents December 1952 request for special powers from Congress. Ibez and his cabinet decided to 16 Despatch 543 Possibility of Further Deterioration in Chiles Political and Economic Situation, Willard L. Beaulac to the Department of State, 7 January 1954, 725.00/1-754, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Memorandum The Situation in Chile, Atwood (Barall) to Holland, 12 May 1954, 725.00/5-1254. Despatch 1225 President Ibaez Versus Popular Socialists, Hall (Flournoy and Broderick) to Department of State, 4 May 1953, 725.00/5-453; and Despatch 379 Revision of Political No tebook, Chile, Hall (Broderick) to State Department, 29 October 1953, 725.00/10-2953; both Folder 3, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Although the Popular Socialist Party did not formally join the opposition until 1954, they generally opposed Ibezs efforts after their forced withdrawal from the cabinet in March 1953. See Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 199; and Fandez, Marxism and Demo cracy in Chile 119. Memorandum of Conversation Increasing Political Difficulty in Chile, Barall, 11 September 1953, 725.00/9-1153, Folder 3, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 17 John Lee Pisciotta, Development Policy, In flation, and Politics in Chile, 19 38-1958: An Essa y in Political Economy (New York: Garland, 1987), 120-121. 141

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ask Congress for the broadest possible powers to address Chiles economic difficulties, but Minister of Finance Juan Bautista Rossetti late r convinced the president to request a limited set of powers. The Chilean Congre ss granted the limited powers, but when few tangible results appeared, Ibez faced the double bind of receiving sp ecial powers and then achieving little with them. The second error his decision to raise bus fares broke a central campaign promises: to control inflation. An initiative of Minister of Interior Guillerm o del Pedregal, the fare increase angered the public and encouraged price increases in wheat, flour, bread, meat, gas, utilities, coffee, and other staples. As inflation climbed to 56 percent in 1953, 71 percent in 1954, and 84 percent in 1955, Beaulac noted th at disillusionment and dissa tisfaction rapidly set in among Chileans, who were now remembering that Ibezs dictatorship had been a failure. 18 U.S. officials grew increasingly concerned about Chiles political stability as public dissatisfaction rose and Congressi onal criticism of Ibez increased. That concern arose from two sources: U.S. fear of social revolution and Ibezs threats to impose authoritarian rule. Assistant Secretary Cabot had wa rned, Social reform is coming. It may come by evolution or by revolution, and he criticized Latin American elites who, in their conservatism and blindness, were willing to tie down the safety valve [of social reform] and to wait for the boiler to burst. 19 William Sanders, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, warned the Department that Chile was undergoing social revolution. He asserted th at Chiles insularity 18 Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, II: 159-165. Barall, The Situation in Chile, Atwood to Holland, 12 May 1954, 725.00/5-1254. Pisciotta, Development Policy, Infla tion, and Politics in Chile 168. Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile 104. Despatch 543 Possibility of Further Deterioration in Chiles Political and Economic Situation, Beaulac to Department of State, 7 January 1954, 725.00/1-754, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 19 Cabot, First Line of Defense 90, 87, 91, 85. 142

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and democratic traditions had long acted as a brake on social upheaval of the kind that other Latin American nations had endur ed, but, he warned, that brake was wearing down. Whereas in the past, factions of the economic and political elite had vied for power, Sanders observed that by the mid-20 th century an unacknowledged but very real struggle had arisen between the traditionally dominant minority and the previous ly economically and politically subordinate majority. In this struggle (scholar Fred erick Pike would later dub it the two Chiles), 20 political leaders such as Ibez, Gabriel Gonzl ez Videla, and Juan Antonio Ros Morales found themselves in a dilemma: they were popularly elected and had a mandate to change the old order of things, but they c ould not govern, much less undertak e reform, without support from the elite. Chile had resolved mo st political and social conflic ts by blending a strong leader tradition with the tradition of democracy and constitutional government, but Sanders doubted this would work for much longer. Implicitly but clearly, Sanders warned that soon the Chilean majority would demand reforms that the elite wo uld not accept, fosteri ng political instability, crisis, or even overthrow of Chiles democracy. 21 While social revolution posed dangers on the intermediate horizon, U.S. officials feared that in the short-term, President Ibez might re vert to past authorita rian form and impose a rightist, Pern-style dict atorship. Ibez struggled to main tain a stable cabinet and address Chiles economic problems. This prompted Salv ador Allende, who had been reelected to the 20 Sanders and other U.S. officials, in many ways, were a decade ahead of scholars in recognizing the potential impact of Chiles emerging social revolution. Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chiles Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), xxiv-xxv, 292-296, 299-301, xxvii. 21 Memorandum The Political Situation in Chile Today -Background and Trends, Sanders to Beaulac, 15 April 1954, enclosed with Despatch 814, Sanders to Department of State, 5 May 1954, 725.00/5-554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-1954, RG59, NA. 143

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Senate in 1953 from the northern provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapac, 22 to declare: If the President of the Republic does not consider himsel f capable of resolving [Chiles] problems and fulfilling the promises he made, he would do well to take the democratic course of calling the country to resolve the problem th rough new elections. Rumors of an impending coup circulated Santiago and worried U.S. officials. 23 Undersecretary of Defense Colonel Horacio Arce sounded out Ambassador Beaulac about how the United States would react to an Ib ez-led dictatorship; Beaulac responded that he preferre d that Chile stay democratic. 24 More troubling to U.S. officials was that Ibez, during meetings with Beaulac, twice declared that he was going to impose authoritarian rule. Beaulac reported that he took great carenot to say anything which could be interpreted as encouraging [the ] President to succumb [to] temptation. 25 22 Chiles constitution did not impose residency requirements upon Senators and Deputies; therefore, parliamentary representatives could switch provinces or senatorial regi ons when seeking reelection at the end of their term. Switching provinces or regions appears to have had the consequence of building not just a politicians national name recognition, but also his or her base of national popular support. First elected to the Senate in 1945, Allende switched senatorial regions during each of the three times he sought reelection. He represented Chiles Far South from 1945 to 1953, the Far North from 1953 to 1961, the Valparaso region from 1961 to 1969, and then the Far South again from 1969 to his election as President in 1970. 23 For Allendes quote, see Ernesto Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, Caudillo Enigmtico (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1958), 281. Bowers to Cabot, 28 July 1953. Memora ndum of Conversation Increasing Political Difficulty in Chile, Barall, 11 September 1953, 725.00/9-1153, Fold er 3, Box 3313; Despatch 543 Possibility of Further Deterioration in Chiles Political and Economic Situati on, Beaulac to Department of State, 7 January 1954, 725.00/1-754, Folder 1, Box 3314; Despatch 758 Joint Weeka No. 12, Beaulac to Department of State, 25 March 1954, 725-00(W)/3-2554, Folder 2, Box 3315; and Despatch 878 Foreign Minister Discounts Rumors of Military Government, Beaulac to Department of State, 7 May 1954, 725.00/5-754, Folder 1, Box 3314; all DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Memorandum The Situation in Chile, Atwood (Barall) to Holland, 12 May 1954, 725.00/5-1254. 24 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 June 1954, enclosed with Despatch 998, Beaulac to Department of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, attached to Telegram 419, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 25 Telegram 425, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654, attached to Telegram 416, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 31 Ju ly 1954, enclosed with Desp atch 90, Beaulac to Department of State, 6 August 1954, 725.00/8-654, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Wrth Rojas writes that Ibez was twice tempted to impose a dictatorship during his first 18 months. See Wrth Rojas, Ibaez, caudillo enigmtico 282-286, 305-310. 144

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With Chiles President Ibez expressing intent to impose dictatorial rule and Guatemalas President Arbenz apparently moving toward Communism, the contrast between Chile and Guatemala could not have been starker for the Eisenhower administrati on. Convinced that Communists wielded significant influence in Guatemala and that Jacobo Arbenz was a Communist dupe or worse, th e Eisenhower administration bega n moving aggressively against Arbenz and his government in 1953. President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Frank Wisner, and other CIA and White House officials initiated Operation PBSUCCESS. Through the CIA, the Eisenhower administration encouraged, funded, s upplied, and helped prepare exiled Guatemalan Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and his forces to invade Guatemala and overthrow Arbenz. The CIA-led operation also initiated a propaga nda campaign against Arbenzs government. 26 In contrast to Guatemala, U.S. officials did not perceive the Communists to be a threat in Chile. Although ARA acknowledged that Chile had one of the largest Communist organizations in Latin America (the others were Brazil a nd Cuba), the Chilean Congress, through the 1948 Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, had banned the Chilean Communist Party and removed all Communists from the voter rolls. U.S. officials recognized that some Communists had circumvented the law because they had not been registered or known as Communists, and therefore were able to be politically active through small leftist parties such as the Labor and 26 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 47. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 133-144. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 223-266. Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIAs Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 34-46. 145

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Democratic Parties. 27 Even so, the U.S. Embassy conc luded that Chiles Communists were carefully pursuing a policy of not flaunting the liberties they enjoy in spite of the illegality of their status as a political party. Adhering to the rules of Chilean democracy, the Communists appeared not to be a threat. Chile was not Guatemala. 28 The Friends of Guatemala The Eisenhower administration sought support fo r its policy towards Guatemala from other Latin American nations through the Organization of American States (OAS). For the OASs upcoming Tenth Inter-American Conference, to be held in Caracas, Venezuela, in March 1954, U.S. officials proposed adding an anti-Communist resolution to the mee tings agenda. They proposed resolution stated: That the domination or control of th e political institutions of any American state by the international Communist movementwould constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of th e American states, endangering the peace of America, and would call for appropriate acti on in accordance with ex isting treaties. The existing treaties portion referred to the 1947 Rio Treaty, which stat ed that if two-thirds of member nations agreed, the OAS could take action against the nation that posed a threat to the region. In essence, Secretary of State Dulles sou ght to expand the Monr oe Doctrine to include 27 Memorandum Communism in Latin America, 28 April 1953, Folder -Communism, 1946-1954, Box 2, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Files, RG59 -Lot, NA. Despatch 462, Sanders to Secretary of State, 4 December 1953, 725.00/12-453, attached to Despatch 429, Sanders to Secretary of State, 20 November 1953, 725.00/11-2053, Folder 3, Box 3313, DF 1950-54, NA. Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emisin, 1985), 38 ff. 28 ARA Memorandum Monthly Political Summary: Chile, Barall, 23 February 1954, 725.00/2-2354, Folder 1; Despatch 931, Sanders to Department of State, 28 May 1954, 725.00 (W)/5-2854, Folder 2; and Despatch 912, Sanders to Secretary of State, 20 May 1954, 725.00 (W)/5-2054, Folder 2; all Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 146

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outlawing foreign ideologies in the American Republics. Most Latin American delegates, however, considered economic matters a greater pr iority for the upcoming Caracas meeting than U.S. fears of Communism. 29 While the United States found tepid support for it s resolution in Caraca s, a broad swath of Chiles political Left and Center opposed the conference agenda and U.S. policy. Radical Party Senator Luis Bossay Leyva declared that Chile should not even attend th e conference, nor should any nation that respects the prin ciples of liberty, social justic e, andfree development of the human individual. The OAS, he sa id, should examine the internal affairs of dictatorships, not intervene in Guatemala. The National Executi ve Committee of Bossay s Radical Party opposed any measure that would be directed against Guatemala. It also suggested a change of venue for the OAS meeting a suggestion which overtly cal led attention to the irony and, by implication, the ineffectiveness of discussing Communist tot alitarianism in the capital of Venezuelas ruthless dictator, General Ma rcos Prez Jimnez, a contradi ction which was not lost U.S. officials. Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva of th e Falange Party declined an invitation to serve on Chiles delegation to Caracas. He then expressed sentiments similar to those of Bossay: I do not believe that the Department of State would be so bold as to suggest, least of all, an intervention into the internal affairs of [Guatemala] which is at liberty to determine freely its 29 Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954: Report of the Delegation of the United States of American with Related Documents (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1955), 8. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 49-50. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 26 February 1954, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., Assistant White House Staff Secretary, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV, The American Republics (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1983), 301. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1952-54 IV: page. 147

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own destiny. If [the Department of State] did, all democratic forces of America would rise up to repudiate the aggression and to make common cause with Guatemala. 30 On 18 February 1954, two weeks before the OAS conference, a group within Chiles Chamber of Deputies organized themselves as the Friends of Guatemala. Led by the Chambers president Baltasar Castro and Soci alist deputy Armando Mallet, the Friends of Guatemala pledged support for Arbenz and oppositi on to U.S. policy. While Chiles Friends of Guatemala may have begun like other Friends of Gu atemala societies in El Salvador, Cuba, and Mexico (where former President Lzaro Crdenas was a leader), the Chilean chapter appears to have had much broader parliamentary support. Ch iles parties of the democratic Left, such as the Radicals and Falange, did not labor under the proscriptions faced by the exiled Accin Democrtica of Venezuela and the Autnticos of Cuba of the circum-Caribbean region, both of which needed to cultivate U.S. support. 31 From a democratic nation in the more distant Southern Cone, Chiles Friends of Guatemala based thei r opposition on broad pol itical and diplomatic issues, such as self-determination, Arbenzs status as a democratically elected president, and the United States abusing its power to pressure its smaller neighbors. Moreover, Chiles Friends of Guatemala could do so without f ear of being labelled domestically as pro-Communist. When the OAS meeting began in Caracas, Chiles Chamber of Deputies, led by the Friends of Guatemala, sent a telegram to the conference expressi ng its unqualified support for Guatemala, and 67 30 Chile no debe asistir a conferencia de Caracas, El Siglo, 17 February 1954, p. 4. Bossays sentiments resembled those of Costa Rican President Jos Figueres who chose to boycott the conference. See Kyle Longely, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States during the Rise of Jos Figueres (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 136. El P. Radical no apoyar ningn medida en contra de Guatemala, El Siglo 26 February 1954, p. 4. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 144-145. Si el Departamento de Estado insina una intervencin en Guatemala, toda Am rica se levantar contra ella, El Siglo 26 February 1954, p. 4. 31 Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile 202. 148

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deputies just over one-third of the chamber signed it. Among the signers were Castro, Mallet, Julio Durn Neumann, and Salomn Corb aln, a close friend of Salvador Allende. 32 As a leader of the Friends of Guatemala, Baltasar Castro attracted the U.S. Embassys attention, but his background did not suggest that he was the Comm unist fellow traveler that U.S. officials considered him to be. From Ran cagua in the Central Valley, Castro had worked for Braden Copper Company, in the main office at the mine El Teniente When his first novel Sewell was published, Braden officials informed him that he could either stop setting his novels at the mine or leave his job. Castro left the job. In 1948, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a Socialist, but later left the Socialists to form the Labor Party. Later, as President of the Chamber of Deputies, Castro visited the Soviet Union in Ja nuary 1954 and travelled there a second time. He concluded that the Soviet syst em was not applicable to Chile and that the Communists were unalterably oppos ed to everything the United States did and stood for. Denying that he was anti-Yankee, Castro said th at one ought to recognize the good aspects of the United States, its culture, and its policies, but that one also ought to criticize those aspects with which he disagreed. For Castro, one disagreeable aspect was U.S. policy toward Arbenz. 33 32 Ayer se constituyo en la Cmara la asociacin de Amigos de Guatemala, El Siglo 18 February 1954, p. 4. diputados enviraron cab le ayer a Caracas, El Siglo 10 Marzo 1954, p. 1. For Corbaln, see Salvador Allende Gossens, Speech Salomn Corbaln: Era el mejor entre nosotros, March 1967, in Salvador Allende, 1908-1973: Prcer de la liberacin nacional (Mxico D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico, 1980), Alejandro Witker, ed., 67-89. For Durn, see Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 29-30; Sater, Chile and the United States 139-140; and Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 244. 33 ARA Memorandum Monthly Political Summary: Chile, Barall, 23 February 1954, 725.00/2-2354, Folder 1, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. For Castros trip to the Soviet Union, see Chile habl por Amrica asfixiada por el Imperialismo Yanqui, El Siglo, 6 January 1954, pp. 1, 8. Memorandum of Conversation Political Views and Affiliations of Important Chilean Political Leader, No rman M. Pearson, First Secretary of Embassy and Labor Attach, 7 June 1960, enclos ed with Despatch 18 Meeting with Baltasar Castro Palma, Pearson to Department of State, 8 July 1960, 725.00/7-860, Folder 725.00/2-1160, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 149

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While Baltasar Castro and other Chilean Friends of Guatemala criticized U.S. policy, the Latin American OAS delegates in Caracas had re servations about the U.S.-sponsored resolution. They forced a revision of it before they woul d pass the measure. Instead of the American republics taking appropriate action against a government deemed a threat, the revised resolution stated that the othe r republics would call for future consultations on additional measures. Chile and several other nations voted for the revised resolution with the understanding that it did not suppor t unilateral or collective inte rvention against Guatemala. Secretary of State Dulles claimed the resolution lacked vital ity. Within an hour of the resolutions passage, he boarded a plane and le ft the conference, leav ing regional economic concerns unresolved and Latin Americans bitter Louis Halle of the Department of States Policy Planning Staff drew a more ominous lesson: Latin Americans had concluded that they had more fear of U.S. interventioni sm than of Guatemalan communism. 34 Before the Caracas conference, Salvador Allende was an important leader of the Socialist Party leader and the far Left, but he had not yet emerged as a natio nal political leader. After his 1952 presidential bid, Allende continued to build support from the far Left, particularly the Communists. He won reelection to the Senate in 1953, running in the more heavily Communist, far northern provinces of Tarapac and Antofaga sta rather than the Socialist strongholds of Chilo, Aysn, and Magellanes in the far south. At a memorial service held for Stalin, shortly after the Soviet leaders deat h in March 1953, Allende appeared with Pablo Neruda and other Communist leaders and gave a l ong speech that, according to one U.S. embassy officer, played [the Communist] party line to the hilt. In January and February 1954, Allende, who was elected 34 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 52-53. Halle quoted on page 53. 150

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Vice-President of the Senate, publicized the deprivations of nitrate miners and their families. He toured the nitrate-mining areas of his senatorial district to dr amatize the fact that Ibezs government had not developed a policy to address the declining nitrat e industrys troubles. 35 U.S. policy towards Guatemala and the Ma rch 1954 OAS meeting in Caracas provided Allende with a new political issue, one that put him on the national stage. When the Latin American delegates in Caracas passed the U. S. resolution, Allende condemned it as nothing more than an instrument of the Cold War, decl aring that the resolution did not reflect any of the fundamental concerns of the peoples of this pa rt of the continent. He castigated Secretary of State Dulles for ignoring Latin Americas economic problems and for rudely leaving the Caracas meeting ten minutes after obtaining passage of the U.S. resolution. The latter act, Allende said, exposed the conference as merely vehicle f or approving the anti-Communist resolution of Mr. Dulles. U.S. propaganda, Allende charged, gave the impression that the mountains of [our] countries are infested with communists, that our coasts are fu ll of communist ships, that the small country of Guatemala threatens the existence of the largest of the bourgeois countries. Like David and Goliath. But Guatemala does not ha ve a sling. Its only sling is showing the road to follow for introducing progress and liberty into the nations of America. 36 This was harsh criticism from a political l eader whom U.S. officials respected, but Allendes comments were not mere rhetorical flourishes of the fa r Left. The Caracas resolution, 35 Despatch 1051, U.S. Embassy Santiago (Hall) to Dept of State, 18 March 1953, 725.001/3-1853, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Allende denuncio que otra riqueza chilena, el titanio, ha sido entregada a los Yanquis, El Siglo 24 January 1954, p. 8. Una poltica nacional para el salitre pidi Senador Allende, El Siglo 18 February 1954, p. 2. Ocu ltas los antecedentes del salitre, El Siglo 19 February 1954, p. 1. Solo la soluciones que plantea el Frente del Pueblo salvaran al Norte, El Siglo, 4 March 1954, p. 4. 36 Necesidad de enmendar rumbos no tifico S. Allende al Gobierno, El Siglo, 15 March 1954, p. 5. Allende denuncia el acuerdo de Caracas como contrario a nuestra independencia, El Siglo 18 March 1954, p. 4. 151

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Dulles rude departure, and Dulle s lack of consideration of La tin American economic concerns badly eroded what little Chilean sympathy ex isted for the U.S. position. By mid-May 1954, Milton Barall, Director of ARA s Office of South American Affa irs, reported that anti-US sentiment runs quite high in Chile and that U.S. embassy officers were striving to preserve such good-will as we still have. Six weeks later, Allende was still denouncing the Caracas meeting, the U.S. resolution, and Chiles affirma tive vote for the resolution before receptive audiences. It pains me, he said, that our country had not made common cause with this small and great nation [of Guatemala]. 37 U.S. embassy officials in Santiago grew frustrated at Chiles opposition to U.S. policy. They hoped President Ibez would initiate an anti-Communist public relations campaign to change the existing Chilean attitude that comm unism in Chile is a local phenomenon, but Ibez made no effort. During a 20 May dinner, Se nator Jaime Larran Garca-Moreno, leader of Ibezs Agrarian Labor Party, bluntly told Am bassador Beaulac that the United States was a poor propagandist. Beaulac re jected this: [T]he principa l burden of explaining things rested on the people of the country. The communists were Chileans, Beaulac said, and it was difficult for the United States to compete with Chileans in Chile. 38 In conversation with Undersecretary of Defense Arce, Beaulac reit erated his views and chastised Chiles noncommunists for withholding condemnation of th e Communists for electoral and demagogic 37 Memorandum The Situation in Chile, Atwood (Barall) to Holland, 12 May 1954, 725.00/5-1254. Bandera del anti-comunismo est siendo agitado para impeder la liberacin de los pueblos, El Siglo, 28 April 1954, p. 4. 38 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 20 May 1954, enclosed with Despatch 915 Need of Combatting Allegations United States Responsible, Beaulac to Depart ment of State, 20 May 1954, 611.25/5-2054, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. For background on Larran, see Thomas C. Wright, Landowners and Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, 1919-40 (Urbana: University of I llinois Press, 1982), 72-73. 152

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reasons. By doing this, Beaulac complained, the non-Communists had le ft the propaganda field to the Communists. The U.S. embassy also found it disconcerting that Eduardo Frei and his Falange Party seem[ed] blind to the natu re of communism which gripped Guatemala. 39 On 17 May 1954, news that the Swedish ship Alfhem was caught delivering Czechoslovakian arms to Guatemala provided U.S. offici als an opportunity to ex ploit the link between Arbenz and the Soviet bloc. The Alfhem revelation ignited a flurry of speeches and activity in the U.S. Congress and caused the new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, to postpone his trip to Chile and South America. The United States invoked the recently passed Caracas resolution and calle d for a meeting of the hemispheres foreign ministers to consult for additional measures agains t Guatemala. To be held in Montevideo, the proposed meeting received tepid support from Chile. U.S. offici als wanted greater support from Ibez and his administration, but Chiles cool re sponse indicated that Ibez could not support the United States without suffering serious domestic political repercussions. 40 Upon the U.S. call for consultations in Mont evideo, Chiles Friends of Guatemala openly rebelled against U.S. policy. Now including sena tors and deputies, the Friends of Guatemala issued a counter-call for a conferen ce of Latin American parliament arians to be held in Santiago on 1-4 July 1954. They proposed three agenda items: (1) the self-deter mination of peoples, (2) 39 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 June 1954, enclosed with Despatch 998, Beaulac to Department of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, attached to Telegram 419, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Despatch 2 Opinion in Chile Favorable to Communist Government of Guatemala: Efforts to Bring Opinion to Realities, 1 July 1954, 725.00/7-154, Folder 1, Box 3314; and Despatch 986 Joint Weeka No. 24, 18 June 1954, 725.00(W)/6-1854, Folder 2, Box 3315; both DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 40 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope 295-303, 313-316. Despatch 986 Joint Weeka No. 24, Beaulac to Department of State, 18 June 1954, 725.00(W)/6-1854. Letter, Holland to Beaulac, 24 May 1954; and Letter, Holland to Beaulac, 17 June 1954; both Folder 4 [Chile, 1953-55], Box 2, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 153

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the right of nations to dispose of their raw ma terials and autonomously conduct their diplomatic and commercial relations, and (3 ) the internal democracy of countries, the full exercise of human rights, and the inviolability of individual guarantees. Angere d, U.S. officials charged the Friends of Guatemala with trying to offset th e Montevideo meeting and create pro-Guatemala propaganda. Assistant Secret ary Holland accused the Chileans of having a pusillanimous attitude on Guatemala and declared : I sincerely hope something will shock the Chileans out of their present posture of co mplete irresponsibility. 41 Holland got a shock, but not the one he had hoped for. When Colonel Castillo Armas and his forces, with CIA support, invaded Guatemala on 17 June 1954, many Chileans were spurred into action. Protests denouncing the inva sion occurred in Santiago over successive days, often in front of the U.S. Embassy. On 20 June, in the Plaza de Armas, the central square of Santiago, a group of protesters burned a U.S. flag amid the cheers of thousands of students, with students shouting, [U]nite our forces and close our ranks to defeat the aggression against Guatemala. 42 A U.S. reporter for the Associated Pr ess wired a photograph of the flag-burning incident and an article to New York City. The protests continued the ne xt day, with students and workers condemning the U.S. intervention in Gu atemala and burning President Eisenhower in 41 Despatch 986 Joint Weeka No. 24, Beaulac to Department of State, 18 June 1954, 725.00(W)/6-1854. Holland to Beaulac, 21 June 1954; and Holland to Beaulac, 17 June 1954; both Folder 4 [Chile, 1953-1955], Box 2, Country File, 1953-1956, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 42 Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26, B eaulac (Flournoy, et al.) to Department of State, 1 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7154, Folder 2, Box 3315; and Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Action on Pro-Communist Demonstration, Barall, 24 June 1954, 611.25/6-2454, Folder 2, Box 2760; both DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Chiles Left Scores U.S. on Guatemala, New York Times, 21 June 1954, p. 2. Martial Law Ordered by Arbenz as Rebels Approach Key Points, Washington Evening Star 21 June 1954, p. A-8. The students shouts were quoted by an AP reporter whose story was printed the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times See Chilean Students Burn American Flag, Washington Post 21 June 1954, p. 3; and American Flag Burned by Chile Students, Los Angeles Times 21 June 1954, p. 7. 154

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effigy. 43 Undersecretary of Defense Arce told Be aulac that many university students believed that the United States is persecuting Guatemala. The embassy admitted that opposition to U.S. actions went well beyond students. Chilean public opinion continued to run high in favor of Guatemala and express[ed] accumulated pent up resentment against the United States. The embassys despatch containing this observat ion did not reach Washington before Holland, Department of State officials, and newspaper re aders in New York and Washington saw the flagburning photograph in the 24 June edition of the New York Herald-Tribune which was one of the leading newspapers of the time. ARA began fielding letters and telephone calls from U.S. congressmen and citizens asking about events in Chile. 44 On the heels of the 20 and 21 June protests Chiles Senate and Chamber of Deputies engaged in lengthy debates on the Guatemalan question, and the Cham ber passed a resolution opposing U.S. policy and expressing support for Arbe nz and Guatemala. In the Senate, Marcial Mora, former Ambassador to the United States, proposed sending a telegram of solidarity to the Guatemalan Congress. He and fellow senators Allende and Frei, among others, excoriated the United Fruit Company and the United States for intervening in Guatemala and, as Mora accused, supporting movements designed to overthrow a government which is not amenable to its interests. The U.S. Emba ssy reported that a few Liberal and Conservative senators had 43 Disturbios Promovieron Elementos Extremistas, El Mercurio 22 July 1954, p. 11. Latin American Students Back Arbenz; Governments Silent, Washington Evening Star 22 June 1954, p. A-3; Guatemala: Will Army Defect? Reaction Varies in Americas, Christian Science Monitor 22 June 1954, p. 5; and New York Times 22 June 1954, p. 3. 44 Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26, B eaulac (Flournoy, et al.) to Department of State, 1 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7154, p. 3-4. Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 June 1954. U.S. Flag Burned in Chile, New York HeraldTribune 24 June 1954, p. 3. Memorandum of Conversation Repercussions of Ambassador Beaulacs Speech of July 6, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 155

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argued valiantly against Mora, Allende, and Fr ei, prompting Mora to withdraw the Senate resolution. Nevertheless, the Ch amber had passed the resolution. 45 That evening, a few hours after the Chambers vote on 24 June, the Friends of Guatemala organized a march as a show of public support for Arbenz and opposition to U.S. intervention. Several thousand convened in the Plaza Vicua Mackenna, braving a cold and rainy winters night, and marched orderly through downtown Santiago. The U.S. Embassy admitted that the inclement weather had prevented a much larg er turnout. Salvador Allende, Eduardo Frei, Baltasar Castro, and poet Pablo Neruda led the march, and demonstrators included members of the Confederation of Chilean Workers (CTCh C onfederacin de Trabajadores de Chile), the Federation of Chilean Students (FECh Federa cin de Estudiantes Chilenos), the Social Christian Youth, and the Popular Socialist Party. The marche rs stopped in front of the Guatemalan Embassy and sang the Chilean national anthem to the Guatemalan diplomats who waved from the balcony. The protesters then moved to the Falange Partys headquarters. Taking places on the balconies, Allende, Frei, Ne ruda, and others speakers pledged support for Arbenzs legally constituted government a nd denounced United Fruit Company, U.S. policy, and the aggression of which Guatemala was victim. The protest earned front-page coverage in the government newspaper La Nacin and the Communist paper El Siglo and La Nacin ran a front-page photograph showing Allende, Frei, Castro, and Neruda leading the march. 46 45 Despatch 2 Opinion in Chile Favorable to Communist Government of Guatemala, 1 July 1954, 725.00/7-154. 46 Acto de adhesin a Guatemal a en las calles de Santiago, La Nacin 25 June 1954, pp. 1, 2. Telegram 419, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-255 4. Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26, Beaulac (Flournoy, et al.) to Department of State, 1 July 1954, 725.00 (W)/7-154. Cristin Gazmuri discusses Freis opposition to the Caracas resolution but omits Freis participation in the Friends of Guatemala march. See Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca I: 355-479, particularly 360-362. 156

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U.S. officials complained that Allende, Frei and Baltasar Castro were giving comfort to the communist cause, but the protests size a nd intensity and U.S. acknowledgement of the Chilean publics broad opposition revealed that th e United States had lost the public relations battle. The embassy told Washington that th e invasion of Guatemala provided the communists with an issue U.S. aggressi on against the integrity of a duly c onstituted government, around which many in Latin America are quick to unite Even Chilean conservatives and diplomats objected to U.S. actions against Guatemala. Horacio Surez, Chiles Charg dAffaires in Washington, bluntly told Milton Barall that the US course of action on Guatemala would be a fracaso [disaster], an opinion, Barall acknowle dged, that was in agreement with that of Chilean Ambassador Anibal Jara Letelier. In Santiago, Undersecretary Ar ce told Beaulac that the United States was simply not going about the Guatemalan thing properly. 47 Senator Larran had pointed to a crucial e rror by the Eisenhower administration: he charged the United States with being a poor pr opagandist and needing to do more to gain Chilean support than cite the danger of Communi sm. Convinced of the Arbenz threat, U.S. officials expected Chilean support, but little with in Department of State documents indicates that U.S. officials tried to cultivate support. U.S. policymakers badly underestimated the impact U.S. actions in Guatemala would have in other Latin American nations. When confronted with their misjudgment, U.S. officials blamed their critics. Ambassador Beaulac told Colonel Arce [T]he fault was not that of the United States, but Chile. 48 47 Despatch 2 Opinion in Chile Favorable to Communist Government of Guatemala, 1 July 1954, 725.00/7-154. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Action on Pro-Communist Demonstration, Barall, 24 June 1954, 61125/6-2454. Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 20 May 1954. 48 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 June 1954. 157

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Shifting from Right to Left With Chileans vocal opposition, signs emerged indicating that U.S. perceptions of Chile and the threats that existed there were rapidly changing. The same day that U.S. newspapers reported the flag-burning incide nt (24 June), unnamed Department of State officials told the New York Times that communism in Chile comes the nearest to being a menace now. The New York Herald-Tribune cited [r]ecent reports of growing Co mmunist strength in Chile. Also, when ARA officials informed Suarez about the ma ny letters and telephone calls the department had received about the flag-bur ning incident and protests, the implication was that ARA was reevaluating the danger that Communism posed to Chile. 49 The negative publicity in the United States ge nerated by the Friends of Guatemala, the protests, and the flag-burning incident alarmed some Chilean officials and elites, and they immediately tried to allay U.S. ire and concern for fear of the potential damage that [recent protests] could do to the good name of Chile. 50 The Ibez administration declared that it had enacted the strictest measures to control disturbances and prev ent property damage. Chiles Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs called the Asso ciated Press (AP) representative in Santiago and chided him for sending the flag-burning photograph to New Yor k. In Washington, the 49 Latin Reds Find Fertile Ground, New York Times 21 June 1954, p. 3. Restlessness in Chile, New York Herald-Tribune, 20 July 1954, p. 18. Memorandum of Conversation Repercussions to Ambassador Beaulacs Speech of July 6, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. 50 For U.S. coverage of the protests, see C hiles Left Scores U.S. on Guatemala, New York Times 21 June 1954, p. 2; American Flag Burn ed by Chile Students, Los Angeles Times 21 June 1954, p. 7; Chilean Students Burn American Flag, Washington Post 21 June 1954, p. 3; and Apologizes for Chile Burning of Flag of U.S., Chicago Daily Tribune 27 June 1954, p. 3. Holland to Beaulac, 21 June 1954. Poverty and Communism, Washington Post 24 June 1954, p. 12. Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26, Beaulac (Flournoy, et al.) to Department of State, 1 July 1954, 725.00 (W)/7-154, p. 4. 158

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Chilean Charg dAffaires met with Barall and, after noting the Washington Post s 24 June editorial on Latin Americans reaction to events in Guatemala, expressed his regrets that Chile had been cited as the government that apparently sides with Guatemala. 51 The Ibez administration, claiming that it did not want to blow up [the] flag-burning out [of] proportion, decided to wait two days before apologizing for what it termed offensive acts. 52 President Ibez also consented to an intervie w with George Nathanson of the U.S. media network NBC. During that interview, Ibez ad mitted that Communism was a real menace in Latin America but played down its danger in Ch ile. He pointed out that there were only 50,000 Communists among a population of 6.2 million Chileans. When Nathanson asked about the protests, Ibez said that Chileans would defen d inter-American principles and freely express their opinions but added, I can say, frankl y, that Chilean public opinion is in no way represented by the provocations of certain uncontrolled groups. Targeted at a U.S. audience, the interview would have gained little attenti on in Chile had not the U.S. Embassys Press Section suggested to the Chilean AP representative that he shoul d specifically request it. El Mercurio the only AP subscriber in Chile, promine ntly published the interview. Trying to 51 Chilean Order Restricts Guatemala Demonstrations, New York Herald-Tribune 23 June 1954, p. 3. Telegram 416, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Action on Pro-Communist Demonstration, Barall, 24 June 1954, 611.25/62454. 52 Telegram 433, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654, attached to Telegram 416, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554. Memorandum of Conversation Repercussions to Ambassador Beaulacs Speech of July 6, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. Chile Apologizes to U.S. for Burning of Flag, Washington Evening Star 27 June 1954, p. A1. 159

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build on this publicity, the Ibez administration handed out copies of the interview and printed it in the government newspaper, La Nacin. 53 Ibez apparently tried to furthe r demonstrate to the United States that he was in control by showing his anger at Chilean politicians and re questing constitutional reforms that would give him broader powers. In a meeting with Beaulac, the president roared, I dont know how much longer I am going [to] stand for this. I am going to do something but I dont know yet what it is. You can be sure of one thing, however, and that is that Chile will not go Communist. I will cut off their heads when the times come. Ib ez soon submitted proposals to Congress that would give him broader powers. He proposed repe aling the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy and replacing it with laws that gave him adequate power to maintain order and the nations security. He also called for sw eeping constitutional reforms and formed a [c]ommittee of 22 juridical experts to consider them. 54 Ibezs efforts backfired. He confirmed rath er than eased U.S. fears and doubts about his commitment to democracy, and his pronouncements and actions caused U.S. officials, the U.S. press, and Chileans to arrive at contradictory conclusions about the threat besetting Chile. Ibezs proposal to repeal the Defense of Demo cracy law prompted U.S. newspapers to splash headlines like Chile Chief Seeks End of Red Ban, giving the U.S. public the impression that Ibez was giving more freedom to the Communists not less. To U.S. officials and Chileans, 53 Declaraciones del Presidente Ibez a la National Broadcasting Company, El Mercurio 10 July 1954, pp. 1, 25. Peligro comunista en Amrica denuncia el Presidente Ibez, La Nacin p. 2. Despatch 32, Beaulac to Department of State, 15 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7-1554, Folder 2, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 54 Ibezs response resembles the strategies he employed in 1926-27. See Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 117-148. Telegram 425, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654, attached to Telegram 416, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 25 June 1954, 725.00/6-2554. 160

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Ibez validated their concerns that he might reve rt to his past dictatorial ways. Beaulac told Washington that he had taken gr eat care not [to] say anything which could be interpreted as encouraging the former dictator The conservative newspaper El Mercurio led the opposition against Ibezs request for powers to take direct action. The newspaper asserted that Ibezs constitutional reforms would only lead to improvisation and favoritism, the closure of Congress, and an end to freedom of the press. Dictatorship, said El Mercurio would be the final consequence of direct action. 55 While Ibez confirmed the Department of St ates worry that his au thoritarian tendencies threatened Chilean democracy, the Friends of Guatemala gave evidence that Communism constituted a serious threat in Chile. Seeking to organize opp onents to U.S. policy, the Friends of Guatemala hosted its Congress of Parliament arians and Personalities. The Congress opened on 8 July 1954 in the Chilean parliaments Sal on de Honor, with delegates from Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cost a Rica, El Salvador, and Paraguay attending. Leading members of Chiles Left attende d, including Allende, Frei, Castro, Popular Socialist Party leader Ral Ampuero, and Radomiro Tomic, the Falange Partys number two leader. The U.S. embassy wrote that the oratory was uniformly and usuall y vehemently critical of the United States and the OAS. Speakers condemned U.S.-allied dict ators Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic), 55 Chile Chief Seeks End of Red Ban, Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1954, p. 8. End of Chiles Red Ban Urged, New York Times 12 July 1954, p. 3. Chile Newspaper Warns Against Dictatorship Peril, Christian Science Monitor 12 July 1954, p. 13. Telegram 425, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654. El Presidente de la Repblica propone reformas fundamentales al rgimen constitucional y legal, El Mercurio 11 July 1954, pp. 19, 23. Despatch 58 Joint Weeka No. 30, Beaulac (Robert F. Corrigan, Chief Political Officer, et al.) to Department of State, 29 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7-2954, Folder 2, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 161

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Manuel Odra (Peru), Anastasio Somoza (Ni caragua), and Tiburcio Crias (Honduras). 56 Meanwhile, multinational corporations like United Fruit, Standard Oil, and Anaconda Copper were cast as the present-day counterparts of the pirate marauders of yore. Despite receiving a special invitation, former Guatemalan president Juan Jos Arvalo, who was in Santiago at the time of the overthrow, did not attend; however, he did send a letter supporting the congress and accusing the United States of the crime of Guatemala. 57 After two days of discussions, the Congre ss of Parliamentarians and Personalities unanimously approved five resolutions. It firs t rejected the Caracas resolution which give[s] the United States a presumed right of intervention in complicity with illegitimate Latin American governments [i.e., dictatorships] in the political and economic life of our peoples. Second, the Congress defended the inalienable right of na tions to determine their own government and conduct their own affairs. Thir d, the delegates declared that they would fight for the denunciation of the pact which created the OAS. Fourth, they pledged to fight against all forms of colonialism, especially on the Americ an continent. Lastl y, the Congress expressed sympathy for all underdeveloped nations fighting for self-determination and called on them for common action in defense of this right. Upon adjournmen t, many delegates remained in Santiago to participate in Pablo Nerudas 50 th birthday celebration. As Neruda was a known 56 The inclusion of Honduran dictator Tiburcio Crias in this group likely reflects the belief that Crias was the power behind then-Presi dent Juan Manuel Glvez, who was Crias hand-picked successor. For background on Crias, Glvez, and Honduran politics, see Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Honduras since 1930, Central America since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Leslie Bethell, ed., 194-208. 57 The documentary evidence do es not indicate that Arvalo participated or encouraged the protests, nor does it suggest that his presence in Santiago influenced Chileans opposition to U.S. policy toward Guatemala. American Flag Burned by Chile Students, Los Angeles Times 21 June 1954, p. 7. Inici su Funcionamiento Congreso de Personalidades Venidas de Latinoamrica, El Mercurio 9 July 1954, p. 15. Despatch 31 Congress of Parliamentarians and Personalities of Latin America, Beau lac (Corrigan) to Department of State, 15 July 1954, 725.001/7-1554, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 162

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Communist and a former Senator, the delegates participation in his birthday celebration gave further proof to U.S. officials of the Congress ties to Communism. 58 On the last day of the Congress (12 July 1954), Salvador Allende caught Department of State officials in Washington by surprise. Accepting an invitation from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, he departed for a six-month trip to th e Soviet Union, Communist China, and Europe. U.S. Embassy officers in Santiago were not taken aback by Allendes destination. Allendes rhetoric since the Caracas meeting and his leadership of the pr otests and opposition had already led embassy officers to disparage him as a Communist, commie-liner, and dupe, with the general consensus being that he was Communist fellow tr aveller like Baltasar Castro. 59 In Washington, ARA officials we re stunned and immediately wired the embassy, saying the Department was concerned about Allendes tr avel plans. Anticipat[ing] favorable proCommunist statements upon his return, they aske d if it was desirable [to] offer Allende [a] leader grant after [his] bloc vi sit in [the] hopes [of] counteracting Soviet propaganda. They also inquired whether Allende was su fficiently open-minded [to] make such [a] grant effective. The embassy apparently responded in the affirmative because Assistant Secretary Holland telephoned Beaulac two weeks later, sayi ng the leader grant had been approved. 60 58 Despatch 31 Congress of Parliamentarians and Personalitie s, Beaulac (Corrigan) to Department of State, 15 July 1954, 725.001/7-1554. For the program of Nerudas celebra tion, see http://www.uchile.cl/neruda/hitos/hitos47.htm. 59 Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26, B eaulac (Flournoy, et al.) to Department of State, 1 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7154. Ataque al senador Dr. Allende forman parte de la campaa contra el Parlamento, El Siglo 17 August 1954, p. 4. Telegram 425, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654. Despatch 31 Congress of Parliamentarians and Personalities of Latin America, Beaul ac (Corrigan) to Department of State, 15 July 1954, 725.001/7-1554. 60 Telegram 13, Dulles (Atwood and Barall) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 12 July 1954, 725.001/7-1254, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Holland and Beaulac, 30 July 1954, Folder 4 [Chile, 1953-1955], Box 2, Country F ile, 1953-1956, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 163

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The grant apparently was never offered to A llende, and U.S. officials may have missed an opportunity to cultivate the senato r and strengthen his ties to th e West. Allende spent one month in the Soviet Union, two months in Communist China, and three months in Western Europe, mostly in France, Italy, and England. When he re turned to Chile, he said he had not come back as a panegyrist of the Socialist world. He had a more measured view of the Soviet Union: [T]hose who think that the USSR is a paradise ar e mistaken, as well as those who affirm that it is a hell. Allende did note that the Soviets, in just twenty years, had built their nation into one of the worlds industrial powers. Yet the sena tor was most impressed with how Mao Zedong and the Communists had mobilized the Chinese people for national development and how the Chinese people seemed committed to the effort. 61 Whether bringing Allend e to the United States would have modified Allendes views is uncertai n. Yet, for all of the U.S. ire and complaint about the lack of Chilean support, the Eisenhower administration in 1953 a nd 1954 made little, if any, effort to cultivate Allende, basi cally giving up on him before trying. By early July 1954, Beaulac had grown frustrated with the rhetoric in Chile and decided to spur Chilean non-Communists into taking a more vocal role in pub lic dialogue. To do this, he took aim at Frei and the Falange who sought to use progressive Catholic social philosophy to reform Chile. 62 In a 6 July speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Santiago, Beaulac castigated those who ca ll themselves Christians but who are slow to talk against Russia and quick to talk against the United St ates, as though the United States and not Russia 61 Regreso Allende, El Siglo, 24 December 1954, p. 1. Allende: Posi bilidades concreta de comerciar con el mundo Socialista, El Siglo 28 December 1954, pp. 1, 3. 62 Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton Un iversity Press, 1985), 44, 227. For the influence of French philosopher Jacque s Maritain upon Freis political philosophy, see Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca, I: 114-131. 164

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menaced freedom everywhere. He split the Chr istians into two groups. The dupes were simple-minded people who know no better a nd who will never know any better, and the demagogues were ambitious men who lied to and betrayed the people whom they profess to respect, thereby advancing their own politi cal futures. The dupes and demagogues, along with the Communists, said Beaulac, pretend th at the problem of Guatemala was United Fruit, not communism. Guatemala, Beaulac declared, ha d demonstrated clearly that the real threat to our freedom occurs when thousands of Co mmunists and fellow travelerscoordinate and combine to spread their carefully devised lies. The time had come, he concluded, for decent men to work as hard to tell the truth.This, it seems to me, is the lesson of Guatemala. 63 In its despatch to Washington, the U.S. Embassy heralded Beaulacs speech for having clearly brought the problem of international comm unism out into the open and created salutary discussions of the problem in Chile. The sal utary discussions were actually a storm of protests that subsequently erupted over the speech. Frei personally objected to Beaulacs words. Chilean newspapers criticized the address, denouncing the ambassadors interference in Chilean domestic affairs, as well as his tactless attack upon Frei and the Falange. Even El Mercurio described Beaulacs words as imprudent and the Chilean Embassy in Washington formally expressed its displeasur e to the Department of State. 64 63 The Communist Effort in Guatemal a Address before the American Cham ber of Commerce in Santiago, Chile, Beaulac, 6 July 1954, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin XXXI/790 (16 August 1954), 235-237. Beaulac often cited demagoguery as an impediment to Latin American development. See Beaulac, A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ ersity Press, 1970), 140, 142; and The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-Up (Stanford CA: Hoover Ins titution Press, 1980), 179. 64 Despatch 47, Beaulac (Sanders) to State Department, 22 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7-2254, Folder 2, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Despatch 75 Falange Party Member s Explain Partys Philosophy, Beaulac to Department of State, 5 August 1954, 725.00/8-554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. For El Mercurio s assessment, 165

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Because U.S. officials now deemed Communism to be a greater threat to Chile than Ibez and dictatorship, Beaulacs speech was not the U. S. Embassys only effort to persuade Chileans of their misperception of Guatemala and the da ngers of Communism. Embassy officials also worked with El Mercurio s staff and placed strategic articles in the dailys pages. Ben Meyer of the Associated Press (AP) reported that responsible quarters in Washington were concerned that Communists are gaining power in Chile, and he quoted the staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who said, Coinciding as [events in Chile] have with occurrences in Guatemala, it is natural that signs of Comm unist infiltration and pe netration should cause alarm. The New York Herald Tribune editorialized, The well-bei ng of Chile is a matter of concern to all the nations of the Western Hemi sphere, and her successful surmounting of present difficulties will be eagerly awaited. 65 Meyers article and the Herald Tribune s editorial appeared in El Mercurio on successive days, as did a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs Thurston Morton, who ci ted the danger [of] communism in Latin America, particularly [in] Chile. 66 The embassy admitted that El Mercurio s printing of Mortons speech had resulted from prominent dissemination. In other words, like Ibezs NBC interview, the U.S. Embassy had encouraged El Mercurio print it. This was likely the case with Meyers article and the Herald Tribune editorial as well. The Eisenhower administration see Despatch 47, Beaulac (Sanders) to Department of State, 22 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7-2254. Memorandum of Conversation Repercussions to Ambassador Beaulacs Speech of July 6, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. 65 Ben Meyer, Chile Reds Gains Stir Washington, New York Herald Tribune 19 July 1954, p. 2. The Herald Tribune did not name Meyer as the author, but El Mercurio did. See El Mercurio 19 July 1954, pp. 1, 30. Memorandum of Conversation Repercussions to Ambassador Beaulacs Speech of July 6, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. Restlessness in Chile, New York Herald Tribune 20 July 1954, p. 18. 66 El Mercurio 19 July 1954, pp. 1, 30. The New York Herald Tribune habla sobre el Comunismo Chileno, El Mercurio 20 July 1954, p. 23. Despatch 47, Beaulac (Sanders) to Departme nt of State, 22 July 1954, 725.00(W)/72254. 166

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had made little effort to cultivate the Chileans support before the Caracas meeting or even before Castillo Armas invasion of Guatemala. Now in the aftermath, facing strong Chilean opposition, the administration was trying to c onvince Chileans through a propaganda campaign in the countrys leading newspaper that Ch ile faced a dangerous Communist threat. The articles in El Mercurio instead prompted Chiles Fore ign Minister to declare that reports concerning Communist inf iltration in Chile are greatly ex aggerated, and he instructed Charg dAffaires Suarez to rectify them. 67 On 20 July 1954, Suarez met with Department of State officials Milton Barall and Rollin S. Atwood, who was Director of the Office of South American Affairs. Reading the Foreign Ministrys complaint which drew upon Chiles image as a democracy, Suarez asserted that the protests, the Chambers reso lution, the Friends of Guatemala march, and the Congress of Parliamentar ians were acts by individuals or groups in a country which believed in democracy and believ ed in freedom of expression. The charg reminded Barall and Atwood that Chile did not have a Communist government, Communist candidates in the last election, nor Communists in th e executive or legislative branches. In fact, he said, the Communists had lo st relative strength in Chile. 68 No longer patient, Barall a nd Atwood made clear where the Department stood and, in doing so, exposed how frustrated and angry U.S. offi cials were with the Chileans. They agreed that Chile was a democracy and that these were acts of individuals. They also considered it normal for the American public, press, and Congr essional opinion to interpret many of these 67 Despatch 58 Joint Weeka No. 30, Beaulac (Corrigan, et al) to Department of State, 29 July 1954, 725.00(W)/72954. Telegram 28, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 22 July 1954, 725.001/7-2254, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 68 Memorandum of Conversation, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. 167

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acts as indicative of a strong proCommunist bias in Chile. Furt hermore, when Baltasar Castro, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, makesa pilgrimage to the Soviet Union, and then Senator Salvador Allende, the Se nates vice president, makes a si milar trip, they said, it was normal that each would be identified as a Communist or a sympathizer, even though the Department of State might understand otherwis e. Atwood and Barall pointed out that acts like burning of the American flag are bound to cause resentment in the American people, and while ARA had consistently replied that the Chilean government had not sponsored the acts, the [U.S.] public would draw its own conclu sions. When Suarez did not immediately reply, Atwood thanked the Chilean for hi s visit and showed him the door. 69 Atwood and Baralls curt dismissal of the Chile an charg and his objections revealed that ARAs views regarding affairs in Chile had ch anged significantly during 1954. During the first months of 1954, ARA had tolerate d a degree of criticism from the Chileans. By July, however, amidst Chiles opposition to U.S. policy, this toleration had evapor ated. The Eisenhower administration was disappointed by th e lack of Chilean support for U.S. efforts and angered that a favored nation would so openly challenge U.S. po licy. It must have b ecome clear to Suarez that Barall and Atwood agreed with Beaulac and Meyer, and this probably caught Suarez off guard. Suarez had voiced to Barall his own oppositi on to U.S. actions in Guatemala, and he may have wondered if he, like Castro and Allende, was deemed a Communist or sympathizer. Like Suarez, Frei learned first-hand of the Departments unhappiness with Chileans dissent regarding Guatemala; furt hermore, Beaulacs targeting of Frei and the Falange for sharp criticism was not accidental. Three weeks after Beau lacs speech (23 July), Frei sent two 69 Memorandum of Conversation, Barall, 20 July 1954, 611.25/7-2054. 168

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colleagues to smooth over differences with the U.S. ambassador. They told Beaulac that Frei regretted participating in the protests. 70 Beaulac found this unbelievable: [H]e had given detailed information about the Guatemalan situ ation, which he had received from the [U.S.] government, to Senator Frei and to Radomiro Tomic, and yet bot h had subsequently followed the communist line.The only conclusion he could reach therefore, was that they put greater faith in what the communists said about the Guatemalan situation than what the Government of the United States said about it. Four days later, Fr ei personally tried to make peace with Beaulac over lunch. Beaulac bluntly told him that Chileans should not try to make political capital at the expense of the United States and that Chile cannot gain the good will and the cooperation [from] the Government of the United States by attacking it. 71 Labeling Chiles protests as emotional, unr eflective anti-Americanism, U.S. officials overlooked a significant development. The anti-Americanism of Chiles 1954 protests departed from previous anti-Americanism in significant wa ys. As one element, the Chilean protests focused exclusively against the United States and its foreign policy towards another Latin American nation; there was not a direct domestic component. While large protests were not new in Chile, and although protests against U.S. foreign policy would be commonplace in both Chile and the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, su ch focused, large protests were unusual in 1954, as demonstrated by the extensive coverage of Ch ilean events by U.S. newspapers. The staged, 70 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 July 1954, enclosed with Despatch 75 Falange Party Members Explain Partys Philosophy, Beaulac to Department of State, 5 August 1954, 725.00/8-554, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 71 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 23 July 1954. Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 28 July 1954, enclosed with Despatch 59 Ambassa dor Discusses Chile-United States Relations with Falange Senator Eduardo Frei, Beaulac to Department of State, 29 July 1954, 611.25/7-2954, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 169

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provocative, symbolic act of burning the U.S. flag, particularly in the afterglow of World War II, amid the McCarthy hearings, and in a Cold War struggle that NSC-68 defined as good democracy versus evil Communism, was also uni que. The prominent coverage by major U.S. newspapers and the shock and anger expressed by Department of State officials, U.S. congressmen, and U.S. citizens indicates how novel the burning of a U.S. flag was in 1954. The novelty of the Chilean protests their size their exclusive focus, the intensity of the denunciations, their persistence over several days and the potent symbolism of burning the U.S. flag and Eisenhower in effigy likely explain why the Christian Science Monitor and New York Times labelled them as the most violent wh en, in truth, the Chilean protesters were orderly and non-violent. Chilean newspapers reported no violence, no large-scale arrests, and no extensive crowd control actions by the Carabineros Chiles national police force. Nor did the U.S. embassy report damage to its or other buildings in Santiago. El Mercurio which would have condemned violence had it occurred, reporte d that after burning Ei senhower in effigy, the protesters walked to the Alameda (the main avenue in Santiago) singing the party hymn. The sole instance of what might be called violen ce occurred when a few people threw stones at the windows of El Mercurio s building, a Chil ean-owned business. 72 Given that anti-Americanism is a historical phenomenon that changes in composition, expression, and strategy across time and space, then the protests and the critiques articulated by Allende and others indicate that the U.S.-engineered overthrow of Arbenz may have sparked a 72 Disturbios Promovieron Elementos Extremistas, El Mercurio 22 June 1954, p. 15; Guatemala: Will Army Defect? Reaction Varies in Americas, Christian Science Monitor 22 June 1954, p. 5; and Latin American Students Back Arbenz; Governments Silent, Washington Evening Star p. A-3. 170

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reconfiguration of anti-American critique in Chile. 73 Experiencing the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy, the international struggle against fascism, and U.S. leadership in creating the United Nations, Senator Allende had happily admitted in 1945 that the United States had changed, that the United States of today is not the Unit ed States of yesterday, that is, the 1910s and 1920s. Allende implied that the United Stat es had done much during the 1930s and 1940s to diminish anti-Americanism and build political goodwill. Older Chilean leaders, persuaded by the United States new direction, as well as young er leaders emerging in Chile, had come to believe that a sense of solidarity had grown between the two countries. 74 U.S. policy towards Arbenz shattered the Chilean s sense of solidarity and fostered an antiAmerican critique that stressed betrayal of democracy and neighborliness. Rhetorically, the United States had proclaimed that it promoted and defended democracy against a totalitarian Soviet Union; meanwhile, it actively undermined and overthrew a democratically elected Latin American president. Allende consistently stressed this contradiction between U.S. ideals and U.S. deeds. Admitting that he like[d] the peopl e of the United States, the senator oppose[d] the tendency of the Department of State to back dictators and put the screws to democracies like Chile. He cited U.S. support of General Pr ez Jimnez of Venezuela as an example. He disparaged U.S. support for Costa Rica during th at nations clash with Nicaraguan dictator 73 For anti-Americanism as a histori cal problem, see Alan McPherson, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 5. 74 Speech Poltica Internacional: Estatuto internacional de las Naciones Unidas, Allende, 12 September 1945, reprinted in Allende, Obras Escogidas, 1933-1948 p. 367. Steven Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years (Gainesville: University Pre ss of Florida, 2003), 215. 171

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Anastasio Somoza in 1955 as a cover-up for the shameful episode in Guatemala. 75 U.S. administrations that supposedly were so tolerant and respectful of the self-determination of peoples, Allende declared, did nothing against th e ignominious dictatorships of the Americas. For Allende, the overthrow of Arbenz was another le sson that we are not able to forget, and he challenged his Senate colleagues to stop minimizing the errors of norteamericano policy. 76 Allendes rebuke is sugg estive of what Joseph S. Nye, Jr., has defined as soft power: the attraction of U.S. political and social ideals, cultu re, and institutions to draw other nations to align with the United States without coercion. 77 In Chile, U.S. policy towards Guatemala, combined with U.S. support of circum-Caribbean dictatorships, destroyed the remnants of the Good Neighbor policy, turned attraction into repu lsion, and forfeited the soft power that had been gained during the Roosevel t and Truman administrations. 78 Long-time Chilean Socialist leader Oscar Waiss revealed how much accrued trus t had been destroyed when he declared that the United States has lost forever the friends hip of the peoples of Latin America and the 75 Report of Evening with Allende, Michael Lever, 2 November 1955, enclosed with Despatch 327 Transmittal of Report by an American Citizen of Evening Spent with Senator Salvador Allende, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 8 November 1955, 725.00/11-855, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. For U.S. policy towards Venezuelan dictator Prez Jimnez, see Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 117-138; and Judith Ewell, Venezuela and the United States: From Monroes Hemisphere to Petroleums Empire (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 154-167. For U.S. support of Costa Rica and Figueres, see Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk 139-149. 76 Speech Posicin del Partido Radical frente a otras colectivas polticas, Allende, 7 June 1955, MFN 1466, Folder Senado 1955 Enero-Junio S-7 D, Box S-7, Fundacin Eduardo Frei Montalva, Santiago, Chile. Speech Homenaje al Gobierno de Arbenz, in Guatemala, Allende, 4 December 1956, Salvador Allende: Obras Escogidas (Perodo 1939-1973) (Santiago: Editorial Antrtica, 1992), Gonzalo Martner G., comp., 182. 77 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5-11. Nye first introduced the idea of soft power ten years earlier. See Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 31, 188-195. 78 Bryce Wood, in his study of U.S.-Argentine relations, argues that the United States dismantled the Good Neighbor policy and describes the U.S. intervention in Guatem ala as destroying what rema ined of that policy. In case of Chile, it seems that much of the Good Neighbor pol icy still remained, and thus, the shock was sharper. See Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 190-209. 172

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possibility of being considereda good neighbor. For critics like Allende, the U.S. rhetoric of democracy, freedom, and self-determination was a veneer that, when peeled back, revealed baser U.S. interests like ensuring U.S. imperia lism over the region, protecting U.S. corporations, and maintaining a political and economic status quo that benefitted only a few. Moreover, each subsequent contradiction reinforced the criti que and forfeited any ne wly accrued soft power. 79 Public opinion surveys conducted in Chile in 195 5 reveal that Allende gave a much more powerful voice to Chilean opposition than U.S. officials acknowledged, which strongly suggests that the United States obtained a pyrrhic success with the overthrow of Arbenz. In surveys conducted in several Latin American count ries during 1955 and 1956, the United States Information Agency (USIA) learned that Chileans held the least favorab le impression of the United States and were more incli ned to say that U.S. words do not agree with U.S. actions. In fact, 73 percent of well-informed Chileans believ ed that the United States had intervened in Guatemala, and two-thirds of them disapproved of it. From the perspective of informed Chileans, it seems that U.S. policy towards Arbe nz had muddied the Cold War into a struggle between two domineering superpow ers rather than a struggle be tween the truth of democracy and the lies of Communism that Ambassador Beaulac had tried to character ize in his Lesson of 79 Oscar Waiss, Nacionalismo y socialismo en Amrica Latina (Santiago: Prensa Latinoamrica, 1954), 161. Boris Yopo H., Los partidos Radical y Socialista y los Estados Unidos, 1947-1958 (Santiago: FLACSO, 1985), 42-43. Norman M. Pearson, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, to Ralph W. Rich ardson, Office-in-Charge, Chilean Affairs, Department of State, 17 August 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, Records relating to Chile, Office of West Coast Affairs, Records of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, RG-Lot, NA. For the Chilean resp onse to the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, see Telegram 842, W. Averell Harriman, Ambassado r-at-Large, to the President and Secretary of State, 7 May 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68 Volume XXXI, South and Central America, Mexico (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 2005), pp. 609-611, 611 n 5; and Jeffrey F. Taffet, Alliance for What?: United States Development Assistance in Chile during the 1960s, Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2001, pp. 207, 209210. 173

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Guatemala speech. The USIA surveys bore this out showing that Chileans opted for neutralism over siding with the United States by a ratio of nearly three to one. 80 A New Threat Arises As the overthrow of Arbenz grew more distant with the pass ing weeks of 1954, the consequences of Arbenzs overthrow upon U.S. policy towards Chile, upon U.S. perceptions of the threats it faced in Chile, and upon the politica l trajectory of Allende became clearer. On 2 September 1954, the National Security Council ad opted revisions to NSC 144/1, which were approved by Eisenhower, and the new document was circulated as NSC 5432/1. The revised policy stated that the United States realiz[ed] the increasing importance of helping Latin America to reverse those trends which offer oppo rtunities for Communist pe netration, and that it should give greater emphasis to its Latin American programs in order to safeguard and strengthen the security of the Hemisphere. The NSC recommende d accelerating economic development in Latin America, giving more loan s to the region, increasing U.S.-Latin American trade, and pressing Latin Amer ican governments to create a climate more conducive to private investment. With Arbenz gone, howev er, the Eisenhower admi nistration treated the NSCs recommendations as less urgent. As Pr esident Eisenhower to ld his brother Milton, 80 Latin American Public Opinion Barometer Report #3 Chilean Attitudes Toward the United States and U.S. Economic Policies, United States Information Agency, 31 October 1955, Folder LA-3; and Latin American Public Opinion Barometer Report #4 Chilean Attitudes toward Communism and the East-West Conflict, USIA, 16 December 1955, Folder LA 4; both Box 2, Records of the United States Informati on Agency (USIA), Office of Research, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955-1962, Reco rd Group 306, NA, pp. ii, 1, 9. Hereafter cited as USIA Records, RG306, NA. Latin American Public Opinion Barometer Report #9 Mexican and Brazilian Attitudes Toward the East-West Conflict, USIA, 3 July 1956, Folder Latin Am erica (5), Box 5, National Security Council Staff Files Special Staff File, DDEL, p. 4. 174

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Countries like Burma, Thailand, and the remaini ng parts of Indochina are directly open to assault. This does not apply in South America. 81 Contrary to Eisenhowers comment, events had profoundly altered how Department of State and other Washington official s perceived threats in Chile. Instead of concern about Ibez and right-wing authoritarians ove rthrowing Chiles democracy, Department officials deemed Communism the preeminent political threat in Chile and that Chile might become the next Guatemala. In late August 1954, Herbert Matthews of the New York Times reported that Chile had been the major source of anxiety for many week s in the Department of State. The Chilean Communist movement, in proportion to Chiles population, was the largest and most alarming in Latin America. The New York Times editorialized that the strength of Communism in Chile exposed the folly of outlawing it. A House of Representatives subcommittee investigating Communist activities in Latin America announced that that Co mmunism in Chile had made considerable headway. 82 Then, on 20 November 1954, the Washington Evening Star reported that a well-placed American with much experience with Chile (probably a copper company executive) said Chile could be the next Guatemal a a view, he said, that was shared by United States officials. Chilean Ambassador Jara immediately filed a formal protest with the 81 Memorandum of Discussion at the 212 th Meeting of the NSC, Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of NSC Board Assistants, 3 September 1954, FRUS, 1952-54 IV: 70. NSC 5432/1 United St ates Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, FRUS, 1952-54 IV: 81-86. NSC 5432/1 Uni ted States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, FRUS, 1952-54 IV: 81-86. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 70, 72. 82 Herbert L. Matthews, Brazil Cris is Accents the Latins Problems, New York Times 29 August 1954, p. B4. Chile in Trouble, New York Times 22 September 1954, p. 28. House Unit Finds Latin Reds Active, New York Times, 14 November 1954, p. 9. 175

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Department of State, claiming the article woul d cause immense damage to Chiles prestige and grave injury to her pos ition among democratic nations. 83 Ambassador Jara, accompanied by Suarez, soon met with ARA officials and received an unsettling message. ARA officials dismissed the Chileans concerns They told Jara and Suarez that the reporter had not cons ulted a person with responsibili ty for United States-Chilean relations and that if the US Government undertook to deny all such articles it would have little time for anything else. Jara multiple times as ked ARA officials to gi ve him something to show that the [ Evening Star] article did not express the Departments view, but ARA officials refused. Jara and Suarez likely deduced that the article had expre ssed the Departments sentiments to some extent. If they did, they were correct. After vis iting Washington in early 1955, Ambassador Beaulac noted that a number of highly placed persons believed, Communism in Chile constitutes a serious threat to the stabi lity of the Chilean Government. 84 With Chile now threatened by Communism, U.S. fears of social revolution gained a new urgency. In late 1954, Chile faced shortages in wh eat, vegetable oil, cotton, and coal. Harold Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, which managed U.S. economic aid, strongly urged giving immediate aid to Chile: If Chile were near the USSR and facing a situation as serious as this, he declared, the risk would be too great and would be 83 Aide Memoire No. 1480-20, Anibal Jara Letelier, Ambassa dor to the United States, to Secretary of State, 22 November 1954, 725.001/11-2254, Folder 1, Box 3316, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Sparks to Jara, 6 December 1954, attached to Jara to Secretary of State, 22 November 1954. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Ambassador Objects to Article Appearing in Evening Star Belton, 22 November 1954, 725.00/11-2254, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 84 Letter, Sparks to Jara, 6 December 1954. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Ambassador Objects to Article Appearing in Evening Star Belton, 22 November 1954, 725.00/11-2254. Despatch 564 Strength of Communism in Chile, Beaulac (Beaulac, Sanders, Corrigan) to Department of State, 4 February 1955, 725.001/2-455, Folder 725.00 (W)/12-459, Box 3027, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 176

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unacceptable. Under Secretary of State Herber t Hoover, Jr., and Assistant Secretary Holland were sympathetic. U.S. officials offered PL480 assistance that sent surpluses of basic commodities (e.g., wheat, cooking oils, and cotton) to Chile at low prices, lest those problems offer fertile ground for the Commun ists to expand their support. 85 As the Chilean economy worsened and the U.S. focus turned to the Co mmunist threat, U.S. officials became less attentive to the growing threat posed by Ibez and his authoritarianminded supporters. Meeting with Beaulac, Ib ez said that he would request special powers from Congress, but if Congress refused, he would dissolve it and call new elections in eight to ten months under a new electoral code which he would promulgate. Ibez also would prohibit strikes for two years and replace the ineffectua l Law for the Defense of Democracy with a new Law for the Defense of the State, which he was preparing. Moreover, he was already sounding out the Armed Forces in the matter. Cautious about sayi ng anything that would encourage Ibez, Beaulac suggested that Chil e move more quickly th an it has beenin the direction of economic freedom. Ibez replied that one half of his Cabinet was for freedom and the other half against it. 86 Tensions between Ibez and Congress escalate d to almost a crisis stage with anxiety reigning in every quarter. Leaders of Ib ezs own Agrarian Labor Party expressed their concerns to Ibez directly about the rumors of the imminent overthrow of democracy in Chile. The U.S. Embassy reported that Presiden t of the Senate Ferna ndo Alessandri Rodrguez 85 Memorandum of Conversation Discussion of Chilean Problems, Holland, 2 Decem ber 1954, Folder Chile, 1953-1955, Box 2, Country File, 1953-56, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum, Bishop to Sparks, 23 December 1954, 72 5.00/12-2354, FRUS, 1952-1954 IV: 764. 86 Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 31 July 1954, enclosed with Despatch 90, Beaulac to Department of State, 6 August 1954, 725.00/8-654, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 177

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defused the crisis by meeting with Ibez, ne gotiating a working relationship between him and Congress, and convincing Ibez to stem his criticisms of Congress. 87 Six weeks later, the U.S. Embassy realized that the reprieve negotiated by Senator Alessandri was temporary and that Ibez was st ill angling for authoritarian rule. Beaulac hosted a lunch for several senators and cabinet members, and during it, Senator Eduardo Cruz Coke questioned Minister of Finance Jorge Prat Echaurren about Ibezs derogatory comments about Congress. Cruz Coke reminded Prat that Congress had passed every bill proffered by the president, but Ibez had mad e no effort to cultivate or get along with the Congress. Prat responded that the president was hemmed in by laws and institutions. He had made a democratic mistake by allowing the Agra rian Labor and Popular Socialist Parties to join him, and those parties had had nothing to do with [his 1952] victory. Afterwards, the Senate vetoed Ibezs state of si ege request, and the impasse continued. 88 Ibez and his administration did give more a ttention to the travels and activities of the Communists. In July 1954, renowned Soviet jo urnalist/writer Ilya Eh renberg and his wife arrived in Santiago to award Pablo Neruda the St alin Peace Prize for his strengthening of peace among peoples. At the airport, the Soviet couple and their lugga ge received intense scrutiny by Chilean security and were held for more than six hours before they were eventually released. 87 Despatch 140, Sanders to Department of State, 27 August 1954, 725.00/8-2754, Folder 1, Box 3314, DF 19501954, RG59, NA. 88 Despatch 207 Recent Political Developm ents in Chile, Sanders (Corrigan an d Sanders) to Department of State, 24 September 1954, 725.00/9-2454; Memorandum of Conversation, Beaulac, 4 November 1954, enclosed with Despatch 328 Finance Minist er Prat and Senators Discuss Conflict Be tween President and Congress, Beaulac to Department of State, 12 November 1954, 725.00/11-1254; Despatch 271 The Governments Case on the State of Siege and its Reception by the Political Parties and Congress, Sanders to Depa rtment of State, 25 October 1954, 725.00/10-2554; and Despatch 436 Political Developments, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 23 December 1954, 725.00/ 12-2354; all Fold er 1, Box 3314, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 178

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The couple went to stay with Ne ruda. Hearing of the incident, Allende wired a message from the Soviet Union lamenting the mean treatment gi ven the Ehrenbergs and c ontrasting it with the most hospitable reception he had received from his Soviet hosts. 89 Chilean and U.S. officials soon heard from Allende again, this time from the pages of the Soviet newspaper Pravda After a lengthy interview with the Soviet Unions Vice Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky, Alle nde penned an essay that appear ed in the 13 August 1954 edition of Pravda. Written for Soviet readers unfamiliar with Chile, Allende devoted the first half of his essay to a survey of Chile and its economy. After describing Ch ilean agriculture and the copper and nitrate industries, the Chilean senator advo cated agrarian reform and an end to foreign domination of Chiles mining indust ries. He then proclaimed that his anti-imperialist and antifeudal Peoples Front was leading a fight for a structural change of the economy. 90 The remainder of Allendes es say described the Peoples Fron t and its aims. The Peoples Front sought to repeal the reactionary De fense of Democracy law so Communists could exercise the same rights as those enjoyed by other parties. The Front also sought to reestablish relations with the Sovi et Union, Communist China, and the popular democracies, to develop trade with those nations, a nd to liberate [Chile] from those responsibilities that restrict us militarily and politically and limit our independence and sovereignty. In regards to the latter 89 Despatch 93 Joint Weeka No. 32, Beaulac (Corrigan, et al.) to Department of State, 12 August 1954, 725.00(W)/8-1254, Folder 2, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Posicin del Gobierno es Contraria A Postulados de Doctrina Comunista, El Mercurio 14 August 1954, p. 1. 90 Ada Figueroa de Insuza to Neruda, printed under Personalidades Chilenas gozan en Mosc de la cariosa hospitalidad Sovitica, El Siglo, 6 August 1954, p. 4. Allende, The Struggle of the People of Chile for National Independence, Pravda 13 August 1954, p. 3. I wish to offer special thanks to Artemy Kalinovsky for translating the Pravda essay for me. Allendes essay was printed in the Chilean Communist newspaper El Siglo There are no differences between the two essays. See Allende, La luch a de pueblo de Chile por su independencia nacional, El Siglo 24 August 1954, p. 4. 179

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responsibilities, Allende was a dvocating terminating Chiles 1952 Mutual Security pact with the United States, as well as its part icipation in the 1947 Ro Pact. 91 Allende declared that Chileans had learned the methods of th e reactionary forces from the experience of Guatemala. The Peoples Front had rallied Chilean masses t o give moral support to Guatemala and to condemn the [dictatorial] regimes of the Caribb ean that defend the United Fruit company, which enjoys the aid of the U.S. Department of Stat e. We [Chileans], Allende concluded, want peace and do not want war; we want respect of our sovereignty, not forced dependence; we want social justice, not exploitation.This is how the Peoples Front looks at the future. 92 Allendes Pravda essay was relatively tame compared to his recent denunciations of U.S. policy in Chile. Upon hearing of it, however, conservative Chil eans with an eye on Washington seemed more concerned with the U.S. reacti on and downplayed the importance of Allendes statement. News of Allendes essay and its c ontents reached Chile on 13 August, the same day Pravda ran the essay. Ibez and his cabinet discussed the essay and issued a statement saying that Allende did not represent Chile in any offici al capacity and was travelling solely as a private citizen. The conservative El Diario Ilustrado described Allendes comments as unfortunate declarations and expressed hope th at his words were not properly translated, a procedure very common in Russia where everything is altered an d distorted. Given Allendes birth and moral upbringing, wrote the editors, we have an obligation to believe[Allende] would not allow himself to be used for [the] despi cable intents of the Communists. El Mercurio minimized the 91 The latter item refers to the 1952 bilateral military pact between Chile and the United States which stipulated that Chile would not sell copper to the Soviet bloc. For the pacts concluded under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, see Rabe, Inter-American Military Cooperation, 1944-1951, World Affairs 137/2 (1974): 132-133, 141-142. For the U.S.-Chilean pact, see Yopo H., Los partidos Radical y Socialista y los Estados Unidos, 1947-1958 34-39. 92 Allende, The Fight of the People of Chile for National Independence, Pravda 13 August 1954, p. 3. 180

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essays importance: Chiles friends abroad can hardly be expected to recognize the irresponsibility of demagogic declarations by le gislative leaders, much less expect Chiles friends to distinguish between statements made purely for local political pu rposes and statements that honestly represent the feelings of the Ch ilean government and people, particularly when these statements are made by peopl e with important political positions. 93 Chilean efforts to downplay the Allende ar ticle had little effect upon U.S. Embassy officials, who were more ebullient about th e Chilean press comments. The embassy told Washington that the Allende st atement and the publicity it r eceived was the worst blunder made by communist propaganda in Chile since the flag-burning episode. It had aroused responsible opinion to the danger of communism in Chile and to the damage that this can do to relations with the United States. By responsible opinion U.S. officials undoubtedly meant pro-U.S. newspapers like El Mercurio and El Diario Ilustrado even La Nacin; however, none of those dailies claimed outrage at Allendes es say, nor did they characte rize it as a colossal blunder. In fact, La Nacin dismissed the essay, sa rcastically quipping that Allendes calls for agrarian reform were a truth th at no one has recognized before. 94 The discrepancy between what El Mercurio and other Chilean newspapers said and what the U.S. embassy claimed that they said reveal s that U.S. officials now considered Allende a communist threat. The U.S. Embassy, not r esponsible Chileans, co nsidered Allendes 93 Posicin del Gobierno es contraria a postulados de Doctrine Comunista, El Mercurio 14 August 1954, p. 1. El Consejo de Gabinete Estudio la vigencia de la Reforma tributara, El Siglo 14 August 1954, p. 8. Declaraciones Desgraciadas El Diario Ilustrado, 15 August 1954, p. 7. Desgraciada al so carries the sense of the words being unwise. Despatch 119 Joint Weeka No. 33, Beaulac (Cor rigan et al.) to Department of State, 19 August 1954, 725.00(W)/8-1954, Folder 2, Box 3315, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 94 Despatch 119 Joint Weeka No. 33, Beaulac (Corrigan et al.) to Department of State, 19 August 1954, 725.00(W)/8-1954. Visitas en Moscu under La Semana Internacional, La Nacin 14 August 1954, p. 4. 181

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Pravda interview as the worst blunder since the flag-burning incident. Their anxiety led them to view any criticism of Allende as confirma tion of their hopes that Chileans had finally recognized the danger of Communism. Allendes pr ominence in the Friends of Guatemala, his visible opposition to U.S. actions towards Arbenz and his trip to the Soviet Union led U.S. officials to view him a conduit for the Communist infiltration of Chile, in a similar vein that Arbenz had been such a conduit in Guatemala. For U.S. officials, Allende and Communism, not the Ibez and right-wing authoritari ans, became the primary political threat they faced in Chile. Conclusion In 1964, ten years after the fall of Arbenz, re tired ambassador Willard Beaulac asserted: Intervention is not leadership. It is capable of making it impossible for us to exercise the kind of leadership the world needs and that a prudent United States is in a position to give. 95 For U.S.-Chilean relations, the U.S.-sponsored ove rthrow of Arbenz proved profoundly damaging. As became apparent with the CIAs subsequent Operation PBHistory, the post-coup propaganda campaign to publicize Arbenzs ties to Moscow proved ineffective becaus e a new, smoldering resentment over U.S. intervention in Guatemala had emerged in Latin America. 96 Chilean Socialist leader Oscar Waiss made clear the depth of that resentment, It is certain that [the United States] has lost more than it gained. It ga ined a lot of kilometers of territory, it recovered a lot of hectares of bananas.B ut it has lost forever the frie ndship of the peoples of Latin 95 Beaulac, Career Diplomat 110. 96 Max Holland, Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17/2 (2004): 323. 182

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America and the possibility of being consider edas a good neighbor.Latin Americans will not forget Guatemala so easily. 97 With the overthrow of Arbenz, U.S. policymakers self inflicted a wound that hobbled U.S. policy and relations towards Chile. The Ei senhower administration created doubt in Chile about the United States adherence to the idea ls of protecting democracy and freedom. The overthrow of Arbenz ignited an explosion of opp osition and protest in Chile. It undercut Chilean public support for the United States, alienated pot ential allies, generated lingering distrust of U.S. intentions, and lent credibility to a re-formulated anti-American critique. Even as the Eisenhower administration sought to reduce the number of threats in Latin America, its intervention in Guatemala ironically fostered a new threat in Chile: Salvador Allende. While the overthrow of Arbenz p rofoundly radicalized th e young Ch Guevara and influenced a young Fidel Castro, 98 it provided Allende an opport unity to position himself as national leader on an issue that had broad support among the Chile an public. His leadership in Chiles opposition, his de nunciations of U.S. policy, his trip to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and his article in Pravda encouraged U.S. officials in th eir suspicions of the Socialist senators allegiances. In less th an two years, the U.S. perception of Allende had evolved from an able, anti-Communist politician in 1952 to a commie-liner who published anti-American views in Pravda by August 1954. 97 Waiss, Nacionalismo y socialismo en Amrica Latina 161. 98 Ernesto Ch Guevara, The Motorcycle Diaries: Note s on a Latin American Journey (New York: Ocean Press, 2004 [1952]), 5. For the influence of Arbenzs fall on Guevara, see Jorge G. Castaeda, Compaero: The Life and Death of Ch Guevara (New York: Vintage, 1998 [1997]), 63-77. Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America: An Historical An alysis of Inter-American Relations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 219. 183

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Allendes emergence, combined with Chil ean protests and opposition to U.S. policy, altered U.S. policymakers perception of Chile. The nation that had been viewed as a favored democratic ally threatened by a president with right wing, aut horitarian tendencies was, by the end of 1954, transformed into a democracy thre atened by a strong Communist presence. For Ch Guevara, the revolutionary struggle began with the fall of Arbenz. 99 For the United States, the Allende threat and the Cold War struggle for Chile began with its intervention in Guatemala. 99 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala 188. 184

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CHAPTER 5 A VERY CLOSE THING, 1955-1958 Allende Precedes Castro U.S. policymakers viewed Chilean Socialist Senator Salvador Allende Gossens as a threat years before Fidel Castro led the Cuban Revolution to power on 1 January 1959. Between 1955 and 1958, U.S. policymakers labored to prevent th e conditions that could bring Allende and his Communist-Socialist coalition, th e Popular Action Front (FRAP Frente de Accin Popular), to power in Chile. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland and his successor Roy R. Rubottom took special interest in Chile and aggressively worked to provide Chilean leaders with sufficient resources and s upport to stop rampant inflation and enact an economic reform program. Just like their pr edecessors, Holland, Rubottom, and other U.S. officials strove to preserve Chiles model demo cracy and the ideological symbolism it offered in the United States in its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Because U.S. officials perceived Chile as de mocratic, they relied on persuasion, advice, and aid to urge Chilean leaders to implement economic reforms; however, U.S. efforts suffered missteps, misjudgments, and obdurate local allies. Focused on the Communist threat, the U.S. Embassy ceased its vigilance of right-wing author itarians and their efforts to subvert Chilean democracy. As a result, the U.S. Embassy, and subsequently Washingt on, did not grasp how close President Carlos Ibez del Campo came to instigating an overthrow of Chiles democracy during the 1955 Linea Recta affair. The U.S. Embassy also stopped talking to Allende and his allies, and as a result, lost po ssible opportunities to bu ild ties with the Chil ean Left. Allendes near victory in Chiles 1958 pres idential election unnerved Depart ment of State officials, and occurred just as U.S. officials were confronting a revolution in Cuba. Four months before Fidel 185

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Castro took power in Cuba, U.S. policymakers concluded that Allende was not just a threat, but the predominant political threat to Chiles model democracy and U.S. interests in Chile. U.S. efforts were hampered by Chilean local elite allies who undermined the reforms that U.S. officials believed would foster economic stability and development. Confronted by high inflation, President Ibez hired the Klein-Saks consulting firm to devise an economic reform program for his government. Assistant Secretar y Holland ensured that the Ibez administration had the resources not only to enact the program but also to mitigate the programs harsher effects on the middle and lower classes. U.S. official s worried that if economic development did not benefit a broader portion of Chiles population, then Chile might face social revolution. After a year, the Klein-Saks team and U.S. officials cr iticized conservative Chilean elites and Ibez administration officials for placing the burden of reform upon the middle, working, and lower classes, and for refusing to impose sacrifices on themselves. The 2 and 3 April 1957 riots in Santiago ended the Klein-Saks program, forcin g the Eisenhower administration to salvage its remnants. As Chiles 1958 presidential campaign progressed, U.S. official s worried that Allende and the FRAP might win, but they feared that th ey would lose more if they tampered with Chilean democracy. Although Allende narrowly lost the election, he emerged as an influential national political leader, and he and the FRAP grew confident that they could bring socialism to Chile through democratic elections. When Cuba fell to Fidel Ca stro and his revolution, U.S. officials were acutely aware that unlike Cuba, they had a second chance in Chile. Preventing Social Revolution Prior to Chiles 1954 protests against U.S. policy towards Guatemala, U.S. policymakers perceived two threats to Chiles democracy: right -wing authoritarianism and social revolution. U.S. officials worried that President (and former dictator) Carlos Ibez and his intimates might 186

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impose dictatorial rule. However, U.S. officials were also con cerned that the Chilean publics growing dissatisfaction with Ib ezs handling of affairs might sp ark protests and unrest which could serve as the pretext that Ibez and his a llies sought to impose an authoritarian regime. Social revolution constituted the other intermedia te-term threat that U.S. policymakers perceived to Chiles democracy. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot criticized Latin American elites who were willing to ti e down the safety valve [of social reform] and to wait for the boiler to burst. William Sanders, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, gained the attention of the Department of States Bu reau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) in 1953 when he warned: [A]n unackno wledged but very real struggle had arisen between the traditionally domi nant minority and the previously economically and politically subordinate majority. Soon, Sa nders stressed, the Chilean majority would demand reforms that the elite would not accept, foster ing political instability, crisis, or an overthrow of democracy. 1 To preserve Chiles democracy, the Eise nhower administration embarked upon a twopronged strategy, one that was reco nfigured after the 1954 protests. Before the 1954 protests, the U.S. strategy focused on dissuading Ibez from moving outside democratic procedures and encouraging Chilean leaders to enact economic re forms and policies that would foster economic development and expand the distribution of economic benefits, thereby stemming political 1 John Moors Cabot, First Line of Defense: Forty Years Experience of a Career Diplomat (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign Service, 1979 ), 90, 87, 91, 85. Memorandum The Political Situation in Chile Today -Background and Trends, William Sanders, Counselor of Embassy, to Beaulac, 15 April 1954, enclosed with Despatch 814, Sanders to Department of State, 5 May 1954, 725.00/5-554, Folder 1, Box 3314, Central Decimal File, 1950-1954, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter cited as DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 187

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instability and social revolution. 2 After the 1954 protests, U.S. per ceptions of threat shifted from rightist authoritarianism to Communism, and th e Eisenhower administration reconfigured its strategy to encourage economic reform in order to prevent social re volution and political instability which could provide the Communists an opportunity to gain power. Some highly placed U.S. policymakers worried that Communism posed a serious threat in Chile, particularly since the 1948 Law for the Perman ent Defense of Democracy was not enforced. 3 In January 1955, and for the first time since before World War II, U.S. policy towards Chile resembled general U.S. policy towards La tin America, even as Chile remained a top priority. U.S. officials sought to prevent anot her Arbenz by urging Lati n American nations to adopt neo-liberal economic policie s. ARA officials drafted a po licy statement for each Latin American nation, detailing how each could stre ngthen its economy, and Assistant Secretary Holland personally sketched the policy statement for Chile. Chileans, he wrote, needed to reduce trade barriers, create a better climate for private inve stment, terminate uneconomic 2 Despatch 1216 United States-Chilean Economic Relations, H. Gerald Smith to State Department, 29 April 1953, 611.25/4-2953, Folder 2, Box 2760, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Barall, Memorandum of Conversation Free Enterprise Versus Government Ownership, 21 May 1954, Folder -Chile, 1953-1955, Box 2, Records of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American A ffairs, Henry F. Holland, RG59 Lot F iles, NA. Hereafter Holland Papers, RG59-Lot, NA. Barall, Memorandum of Conversation U nited States Relations with Chile, 27 April 1953, 611.25/4-2753, Folder 2, Box 2760; Beaulac, Memorandum of Conversation, 28 July 1954, enclosed with Despatch 59 Ambassador Discusses Chile-United States Relations with Falange Senator Eduardo Frei, Beaulac to State Department, 29 July 1954, 611-25/7-2954, Folder 2, Box 2760; and Barall, Memorandum Monthly Political Summary: Chile, 23 February 1954, 725.00/2-2354, Folder 1, Box 3314; all DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 3 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 70-73, 75-77, 92-96. James F. Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism, and InterAmerican Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States, 1945-1961 (Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 156, 253-291. Jon V. Kofas, Stabilization and Class Conflict: The State Department, the IMF, and the IBRD in Chile, 1952-1958, International History Review 21/2 (June 1999): 385. Memorandum Statement Regarding What is Needed for Each Latin American Country to Strengthen its Economy, Holland to Cale, 8 November 1954, Folder Chile, 1953-55, Box 2, Holland Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Despatch 564 Strength of Communism in Chile, Beaulac to Department of State, 4 February 1955, 725.001/2-455, Folder 725.00 (W)/12459, Box 3027, DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 99. 188

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social benefits, adopt labor laws that made labor more disciplined, and end uneconomic price controls. 4 Golpe with Tea and Marmalade For U.S. officials, President Ibez remained the main obstacle to achieving U.S. policy aims in Chile. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), which coordinated Eisenhowers foreign policy, placed Chile at the top of its list of Latin American countries of concern. The OCB wanted the Chileans to reduce inflation, but it had little faith in Ib ez to devise an antiinflationary program or implement one. Part of the problem was that even though Ibez needed Chiles Congress to approve his measures, he consta ntly criticized and refused to work with the legislature. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concluded that it is unlikely that well have anything except a bad situation in Chile for as long a President Ibez is around. 5 Despite U.S. officials frustration with Ib ez, the U.S. Embassy ceased its vigilance of Ibez, his allies, and their activities just as the authoritarian threat became most dangerous. Composed mostly of young Army a nd Air Force officers, the group Linea Recta (Straight Line) had authoritarian intenti ons, namely to close Congress and set up Ibez as head of an authoritarian government. 6 Maneuverings had begun weeks ea rlier, but the affair began on 25 4 NSC Progress Report on 5432/1 United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 3 February 1955, Folder NSC 5432/1 Policy Toward Latin America, Box 13, Policy Papers Subseries, NSC Series, Records of the Office of the Special Assi stant for National Security Affairs, 19521961, DDEL, p. 2. Hereafter, SpAsst--NSC Policy Papers. Memorandum Statement Regarding What is Needed for Each Latin American Country to Strengthen its Economy, Holland to Cale, 8 November 1954. 5 Memorandum Preliminary Notes on a [19 January] Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, Max W. Bishop, 20 January 1955, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 Volume VII (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1987), 776-777. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: page. 6 One of the Army officers was Major Ro bert Viaux Marambio who led the 1969 Tacnazo protest and a 1970 plot to kidnap General Ren Schneider Chernau. See H. E. Bich eno, Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 189

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February 1955 when President Ibez invite d several Linea Rectistas to his home for onces (afternoon tea). 7 Enjoying cups of tea and whiskey, Ibez and his guests discussed Chiles economic and political problems. After pled ging absolute loyalty to him, the officers condemned the violent parlia mentary opposition and presented Ibez with a manifesto and a plan of action that contained 49 recommendations The manifesto summarized Linea Rectas aims as A better Chile, forged by the best Ch ileans, so that all Chileans may live better. 8 Ibez claimed that he had calmed the young o fficers and that the revolt dispersed amid tea and marmalade, yet, his subsequent actions suggest otherwise. According to one cabinet minister, Ibez knew of Linea Rectas meetings and sought to control and direct the group. Claiming that nobody knows where [my] fight with Congress is going to stop, Ibez insisted, It will be necessary to do something with [C ongress], because it only serves to create problems. 9 Ibez then gave an impromptu speech in the city of Chilln, during which he expressed several ideas contained in Lin ea Rectas manifesto. He also denounced a New York 1920-1970, Allendes Chile (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1972), Kenneth Medhurst, ed., 130 n 142. For Linea Recta, see Telegram 319, Beaulac to Secretary of St ate, 26 March 1955, 725.00/ 3-2655; Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia,, Historia del siglo XX chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2 001), 200; Arturo Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri: Memorias polticas 2 volumes (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1962), II: 302-303; and Despatch 631 Indications of Political Crisis, 9 March 1955, 725. 00/3-955, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 7 Onces, literally elevens, is a Chilean term for afternoon tea. According to popular folklore, the term originates from the eleven letters of aguardie nte, an alcoholic beverage sometimes consumed during the break. See In Chile They Take Eleven, Washington Post 13 November 1955, p. L-5. 8 Olavarra Bravo reprints the manifest o in his memoirs. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 301, 307310. Ernesto Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtica (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1958), 313-315. Ibez said the officers got advice from a few politicians, indicating that a few rightist politicians were aware of events. Luis Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibez: La poltica y los polticos (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1962), 197-198. 9 Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibez, 198. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 300-302. Oscar Waiss characterizes Olavarra Bravo as the most disillusioned of the Ibaistas, yet, Olavarra Bravos memoirs are reliable when cross-referenced with other primary sources. Waiss, Chile Vivo: Memorias de un Socialista, 19281970 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Salvador Allende, 1986), 105. 190

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Times editorial that blamed him for Chiles economic crisis, and then charged that the crisis, if it exists, is attributable to excess profits. Many foreign countries w ould like us to surrender ourselves to free enterprise, he declared, but only the most powerful would benefit and the poor and the needy would rely on the largesse of the state. 10 Unaware of the onces meeting, the U.S. Embassy repor ted that the speech reflected Ibezs frustration and anger with Congress, but Foreign Minister Arturo Olavarra Bravo revealed two days later that this assessmen t was too generous. During an 8 March lunch, Olavarra Bravo asked Beaulac how the United States would react to a government of force in Chile. Beaulac said that he did not know the reasons for such a change. [T]he United States was a democracy, he continued, it believed in democracy; and that hist orically it had found its greatest and most dependable friends among the democracies. Beaulac asked if another political crisis was near, and Olavarra Bravo said yes. Beaulac then learned that Ibez had met with several cabinet members at his farm near Talca and had asked Jorg e Prat to resign. Prat complied but released an angry le tter of resignation to the press. 11 10 Inflation in Chile, New York Times 26 February 1955, p. 14. The Times gave similar views three weeks earlier, stating that Chile should be a prosperous, healthy, stable country, and that Chileans needed to act against inflation. See Crossroads in Chile, New York Times 6 February 1955, p. E-8. La Nacin 6 March 1955. Despatch 629 Chilln Plan Celebration, Sanders (Corrigan) to Depart ment of State, 8 March 1955, 725.00/3-855, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 307-310. 11 Despatch 633 Recent Political Developm ents in Chile, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 9 March 1955, 725.00/3-955; Telegram 292, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 9 March 1955, 725.00/3-955; and Despatch 673 Resignation of Jorge Prat as President of the Banco del Estado and Repercussions, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 22 March 1955, 725.00/3-2255; all Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. El Mercurio printed Prats letter of resignation. See Present su Renuncia el Presidente del Banco del Estado, Don Jorge Prat E., El Mercurio 11 March 1955, enclosed with Despatch 673. Prat was aiding Linea Recta, but, he also opposed closing Congress. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 301; Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtico 283-284; Despatch 673, Beaulac to Department of State, 22 March 1955, 725.00/3-2255; and Despatch 740 Events Within the Chilean Army, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 14 April 1955, 725.00/4-1455. 191

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Surprised by Prats firing, the U.S. Emba ssy still showed littl e concern, even though Ibezs actions actions resembled those of 1927 that enabled him to im pose a dictatorship. Ibez asked General Ramn Salinas to take cont rol and guide Linea Recta, which Salinas did. On 13 March, Ibez denounced Congress as antipatriotic, uncooperative, and obstructionist during a luncheon hosted by the commander of the Ar mys Valdivia garrison. Two days later, a special government broadcast interrupted radio pr ograms. It detailed Ibezs achievements, indicted opponents for seditious designs, and accused the landholding a nd financial oligarchy and international Communism of instigating a synchronized campaign of despicable and calumnious attacks, charges echoing t hose made in Linea Rectas manifesto. 12 The accusations made by Ibez and the government radio announcement sparked opposition, especially among senior military officers. Senator Fe rnando Alessandri assured the public that the government will not transgress constitutional and legal precepts; meanwhile, leaders from across the political spectrum (including Allende) united to defend constitutional order and public liberties. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces General Enrique Franco Hidalgo, his second in command, and two Air Force commanders confronted Ibez about his tea with Linea Recta, accused him of fomenting indiscipline in the ranks, and resigned in protest of Ibezs interference. Press coverage of the commanders resignations on 18 March exposed Linea Recta, the onces meeting, and a divided military. The Ibez administration 12 Telegram 295, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 11 March 1955, 725.00/3-1155. For Ibezs 1927 rise to power, see Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Hono rable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 117-133. Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtico 313. At the Linea Recta meeting when Salinas took control, Olavarra Bravo warned that foreign governments [the United States?] may not recognize their regime, suggestin g that Salinas took control after Olav arra Bravo talked with Beaulac. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 304-306. Telegram 297, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 16 March 1955, 725.00/3-1655; and Despatch 662 Charged Political Atmosphere, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 18 March 1955, 725.00/3-1855; both Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 192

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tried to turn the resignations to its advantage by decl aring that irresponsible elements in the military had engaged in seditious activities. It asked Congress to confer special powers on the president, but Congress chose to investigate the onces meeting and Linea Recta. 13 A week after Francos resignation on 26 March 1955, Beaulac bega n doubting Ibezs real intentions and urged the Department of St ate to express support for Chiles democracy. A persistent and evidently widespread campaign, he said, claimed that the United States wanted an authoritarian regime in Chile, and most memb ers of the Liberal, C onservative, and Radical Parties believed it. Beaulac implored ARA to have a high Department official immediately express their preference for democracy so that the Chilean press could use it as new evidence that our devotion to democratic ideals has not diminished. He cautioned against singling out Chile, fearing that it would prompt cries of U.S. intervention. The next day, Assistant Secretary Holland declared to the press, N one of us would claim to have attained perfection, but here, without diminishing our constant interest in personal freedoms and free democratic political institutions, we can devote gr eater energy to making the lives of our people more abundant. 14 Whether Hollands statement influenced Ib ez is uncertain, but 48 hours after Hollands words were publicized in Chile, Ibez was back -pedalling. The Chilean president proclaimed 13 Despatch 662, Sanders to Department of State, 18 March 1955, 725.00/3-1855. Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtico 315-318. Telegram 297, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 16 March 1955, 725-00/3-1655; and Telegram 306, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 18 March 1955, 725.00/3-1855; and Telegram 305, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 18 March 1955, 725.00/3-1855, Folder 725.00/1-355; all Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. El Gobierno Denuncia Actividades Sediciosas, La Segunda 18 March 1955, enclosed with Despatach 665, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 18 March 1955, 725.00/3.1855, attached to Telegram 297, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 16 March 1955, 725.00/3-1655. 14 Telegram 319, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 March 1955, 725.00/3-2655; Despatch 740 Events Within the Chilean Army, William Sanders (Corrigan) to the Department of State, 14 April 1955, 725.00/4-1455; and Telegram 259, Dulles (Edwin J. Sparks) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 28 March 1955, 725.00/3-2655; all Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 193

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that he had no intention of doing away with Congress or im posing a dictatorship, in any event, I have not the power to do so. Concurre ntly, Salinas divulged Lin ea Rectas plans to the top officers of Escuela Militar (Chi les West Point) and urged them to join. The officers rejected Salinass offer, then informed their commander, General Javier Daz Donoso, of Salinass offer and signed a statement detailing it. Daz met with the Commandant of the Army, the Minister of Defense, and President Ibez, presented the o fficers statement, and asked that Salinas be relieved of duty. Ibez relieved Daz of duty and appointed Salinas in his place. The Minister of Defense resigned in protest, several officers petitioned Ibez to reinstate Daz, and the Judge Advocate General initiated an inquiry into the matter. 15 The Chamber of Deputies investigated the matter and later censured Ibez for undermin ing military discipline. Salinas and three others were arrested, and in May 1955, Salinas was court-martialed. Linea Recta collapsed. 16 As a coup plot, Linea Recta was a fiasco, but its significance for U.S. policy and Chilean politics was considerable. For U.S. officials, the collapse of Linea R ecta ended the right-wing authoritarian threat and deepened their belief in the strength of Chilean democracy. The Embassy observed that Linea Recta had solidified the Chilean militarys apolitical role, as well as Ibezs adherence to democratic norms, although the latter observatio n indicated that the Embassy did not appreciate the exte nt of Ibezs involvement. The Linea Recta affair left the 15 Herbert Matthews, Ibez Di savows Dictatorship Aim, New York Times, 2 April 1955, p. 6. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 310-312. Telegram 389, Sanders to Secretary of State, 16 May 1955, 725.00/5-1655; Telegram 392, Sanders to Secretary of State, 18 May 1955, 725.00/5-1855, attached to Telegram 389; and Despatch 862 Linea Recta Developments, Sanders to Department of State, 23 May 1955, 725.00/5-2355; all Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 16 La Nocin de Ejrcito Involucra Obediencia, Subordinacin y Fiel Cumplimiento del Deber Militar, El Mercurio 27 May 1955, pp. 1, 23. Despatch 862, Sanders to Department of State, 23 May 1955, 725.00/5-2355. Telegram 412, Sanders to Secretary of State, 28 May 1955, 725.00/5-2855; and Despatch 892 More on the Linea Recta Sanders to Department of State, 1 June 1955, 725.00/6-155, both Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtico 319. 194

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far Right in disarray and curtailed coup plotting for fifteen years. Moreover, military officers, Linea Rectistas, and thos e of the far Right now distrusted Ibez, viewing him as disloyal or, at minimum, a timid, unenergetic leader. 17 Linea Recta also exposed the flaws and stre ngths in the Eisenhow er administrations policies. The affair revealed that U.S. official s had so shifted their focus to the Communists that they were slow to recognize a possi ble coup or that Ibez was involved. 18 The embassy had little intelligence about events and did not appr eciate the threat posed by Linea Recta until the details emerged during Salinass court-martial, indicating that the embassy had few contacts among the Chilean military or in the Ibez administration. More positively, the Eisenhower administration expressed support for democracy when confronted by anti-democratic threat from rightist authoritarians in the S outhern Cone, even as it accentuated the democratic trappings of Guatemalan dictators in Central America. The difference resulted, in part, because Ibez threatened to introduce instability and uncertain ty into the Southern Cone, much like General Juan Pern of Argentina was alre ady doing. It also resulted because U.S. officials approached the Southern Cone as a sub-region di stinct from the circum-Caribbean. 19 17 Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 313-314. Despatch 892, Sanders to Department of State, 1 June 1955, 725.00/6.155. 18 Despatch 892, Sanders to Department of State, 1 June 1955, 725.00/1-355. 19 U.S. actions towards Ibez contrast sharply with U. S. actions toward Generals Castillo Armas and Miguel Ydgoras Fuentes in Guatemala, where the United States sought a pro-U.S., an ti-Communist state. See Stephen M. Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). For Pern intr oducing instability and uncertainty in the sub-region, see Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1963), 64-66. Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 111-112. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 86. 195

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The Klein-Saks Mission After the Linea Recta fiasco, Ibezs politic al support, as well as the Chilean economy, rapidly deteriorated. Ibaismo collapsed as a political movement and in May 1955, the Agrarian Labor Party (PAL Partido Agrario Laborist a) withdrew its support for Ibez and his administration. Rejected by his own party, Ibez had to cultivate allies among the Congress he had so ardently and publicly criticized. Meanwhile, inflation spiraled, with the cost-of-living rising at an annual rate of 84 percent. Labor demanded pay incr eases to counter inflation and engaged in several strikes, which included hospi tal workers, communications workers, students, and a 24-hour general strike by Chil es largest confederation, Cent ral nica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh United Union of Chilean Workers) U.S. officials noted that most Chileans considered the strikes justified, with some strikes conducted in an almost holiday spirit. 20 Chiles political parties moved to solidify their base, expand their appeal, and acquire disillusioned Ibaista voters. Allendes People s Front (Frente del Pueblo) allied with Baltazar Castros Labor Party. Renamed the National Peoples Front (FRENAP Frente Nacional del Pueblo), the new coalition invited other Leftist parties to join them. Allende focused on the Popular Socialists and Peoples De mocrats, former Ibaista alli es now in the opposition, because 20 Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 107. Despatch 828 Political Activity, Sander s to Department of State, 12 May 1955, 725.00/5-1255, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. John Lee Pisciotta, Development Policy, Inflation, and Politics in Chile, 1938-1958: An Essay in Political Economy (New York: Garland, 1987), 124. Despatch 900 Cabinet Crisis, Sanders to Department of State, 2 June 1955, 725.00/6-255; Despatch 88 Recent Political Developments in Chile, Beaulac to Department of State, 1 August 1955, 725.00/8-155; and Despatch 227 Political Events and Trends in Chile, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 16 September 1955, 725.00/9-1655; all Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. William G. Tyler, An Evaluation of the Klein and Saks Stabilization Program in Chile, America Latina [Ro de Janeiro] 11/1 (January-March 1968): 51. 196

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he believed that a great mass of workers had been deceived by Ibez. 21 Social Christian Conservatives and the Falange al so discussed unification. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Cecil B. Lyon encour aged the latter discussions and urged the Falangists to develop ties with European, particul arly German, social Christian leaders. The Radicals, divided between Lus Bossay Leyva and Gabriel Gonzlez Videla, simultaneously appealed to the Left and Right. Bossay and his al lies turned to the Left, seeking to rebuild the Popular Front and present Bossa y as a presidential candidate in 1958. Meanwhile, Gonzlez Videla and his supporters also looked to the 1958 election, appealing to the Ri ght in hope that the former president could win by splitting the Ri ght and Left, thus repeating Ibezs 1952 tactics. 22 Lacking other alternatives, Ibez employed tw o initiatives to address Chiles declining economy: the Nuevo Trato (New Deal) for th e U.S. copper companies, and a mission of foreign experts to recommend an economic stabil ization program. When he entered office in 1952, Ibez raised the tax rate on U.S. copper companies from 50 percent to 60 percent. The Nuevo Trato, which Ibez signed in early 1955, re set the tax rate at 50 percent but added a surtax of 25 percent. While superficially a tax increase, An aconda and Kennecott could cut the 21 Composed of Socialist and Communist elements, the Labor Party officially did not have a marxist character, but it enabled Communists to circumvent the Defense of Demo cracy law and participate in politics. Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emision, 1985), 38, 38 n 36. Puccio was Secretary General of the Labor Party. Despatch 774 Expansion of the Frente del Pueblo Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 25 April 1955, 725.00/4-2555, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 828, Sanders to Department of State, 12 May 1955, 725.00/5-1255. 22 Despatch 828, Sanders to Department of State, 12 May 1955, 725.00/5-1255. Cristin Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca 2 vols. (Santiago: Aguilar Chilena de Ediciones, 2000), I: 418-421. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Political Matters, William Belton, 11 July 1955, 725.00/71155, attached to Despatch 900 Cabinet Crisis, Sanders to Department of State, 2 June 1955, 725.00/6-255, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 197

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surtax to zero if their production doubled the base rate. Doubling the base rate was relatively easy because the rate was derived from the low production levels of the years 1949-53, which were lower than WWII levels. The Nuevo Trat o also granted several items that the copper companies had sought: it eliminated many exch ange controls, accelerated depreciation on new investment, provided generous allowances for expenses, permitted free import of equipment, and granted control over the prici ng and marketing of copper. Wh ile U.S. newspapers downplayed Nuevo Tratos benefits, the Chileans offered the in centives in order to attract new investment. Kennecott and Anaconda fulfilled those hopes by announc ing that they would invest four million and one million dollars respectively in their Ch ilean operations. By late 1955, Anaconda sought to invest another $38 million and was considering an additional $12 million. 23 As a second policy initiative, Ibez and his cabinet decided to hire a group of foreign experts to advise on an economic stabilization program. In doi ng so, Ibez had turned to a familiar strategy. During the 1920s, Ibez the di ctator had hired E. W. Kemmerer for an economic mission, and the mission had been hail ed a success. In 1955, Ibez considered several possible consultants, but the two prim ary candidates for the mission were the U.S. consulting firm, Klein and Saks, and the Intern ational Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Ibez talked with the IBRD while Minister of Hacie nda Sergio Recabarren consulted with Chilean business leaders. A ugustn Edwards Budge, the owner of El Mercurio recommended Klein and Saks, and Ibez gave him the go-ahead sign to negotiate with Julian 23 Herbert Matthews, Chiles Congress Cuts Copper Tax, New York Times 7 February 1955, p.31. Chile Gives Copper Firms Better Deal, Washington Post 4 May 1955, p.34.. Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 89-118. For quotes, see 97, 96, 103. Despatch 241 Situation Affecting Prospects of Klein and Saks Mission, Beaulac to Department of State, 23 September 1955, 825.00/9-2355, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 198

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Saks. Deputy Assistant Secretary Lyon said that Edwards was perhaps more responsible than any other for hiring Klein and Saks. 24 The Ibez administration signed a contract with Klein and Sa ks at the end of July 1955, and the Chileans chose the firm for several reasons. Klein and Saks had extensive experience in Latin America and had devised a su ccessful stabilization plan fo r Peru in 1949. Given Klein and Saks esteemed reputation, Ibez administration officials also perceived that it wielded much influence with the Eisenhower administration and New York financial circles. Another factor in Ibezs decision may have been the size of the prospective missions: the IBRD, in cooperation with the Internati onal Monetary Fund (IMF), planne d to send one man to Chile; meanwhile, Klein and Saks would send a team of experts. Moreover, th e IBRD had initially suggested Klein and Saks to Ibez. 25 24 For Kemmerers mission, see Paul W. Drake, The Money Doctor in the Andes: The Kemmerer Missions, 19231933 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 76-124. Telegram 335, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 5 April 1955, 825.00/4-555; and Telegram 357, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 21 April 1955, 825.00/4-2155; both Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Albert O. Hirschman, Inflation in Chile, Journeys toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), 202203. Annex A: Supplementary Report on Chile to Special Report on Chile, OCB, 13 April 1955, FRUS, 19551957 VII: 790. Telegram 307, Hoover (Belton) to U.S. Em bassy in Santiago, 22 April 1955, 825.00/4-2255, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 202. Wrth Rojas, Ibez, Caudillo Enigmtico 336. Claude G. Bowers, My Life: The Memoirs of Claude Bowers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 328 [8 May 1955 entry]. Despatch 192 My Impressions of Chile After Thirteen Years Absence, Lyon to Department of State, 4 September 1956, 725.00/9-456, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 25 Telegram 35, Dulles (Belton) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 28 July 1955, 825.00/7-2855, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Tyler, An Evaluation of the Klein and Saks Stabilization Program in Chile, 52. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress 202-203. Telegram 372, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 5 May 1955, 825.00/5-455, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Telegram 307, Hoover (Belton) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 22 April 1955, 825.00/4-2255. Jon Kofas claims that Ibez selected Klein and Saks because it was backed by Anaconda Copper, and that he was in debted to the company for help in passing the Nuevo Trato. Department of State documents and other sources do not support this claim. They show that Ibez first consulted the IBRD for a mission, and that a decision to hire Klein and Saks was not made until June 1955. Kofas also claims Ibez was taking advice fr om Klein and Saks in July 1955, but this is not possible since the Ibez government did not sign a contract with Klein and Saks un til the end of July, and the mission did not arrive in Chile until September. Kofas, Stabilization and Class Conflict: The State Department, the IMF, and the IBRD in Chile, 1952-1958, 366-367. Telegram 372, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 5 May 1955, 825.00/5-455; Telegram 376, 199

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Ibezs decision to seek advice from econo mic experts encouraged U.S. policymakers who had a great deal of concern over the situation in Chile. The Department of State and OCB agreed that the U.S. Embassy should discreetly encourage the effort; however, given Chileans extreme sensitivityto anything they could interp ret as foreign intervention, ARA stressed that the embassy should not give the impression that the United States was sponsoring the mission. A New York Times editorial summarized the departments view: Chile is one of the few truly democratic countries of Latin America and it would be tragic if we allowed that democracy to weaken while waiting for Chile to put her house completely in order. 26 The Klein-Saks mission arrived in Santiago in September 1955 and soon determined that the only program with a chance of success was a broad attack on many fronts, with shared sacrifices by all income groups. In December, it proposed a program focused on six areas: government finances, government bureaucracy, mone tary policy, wages and salaries, prices and subsidies, and foreign exchange. For government finances, the advisors urged balancing the budget, controlling spending, rigorously enforci ng tax collection, and reforming the tax system which included increasing luxury taxes and avoidi ng taxes that harmed the lower classes. For government bureaucracy, the team urged comb ining overlapping agencies, stopping further expansion, and improving organizational efficienc y. It insisted the Central Bank should impose Holland to Beaulac, 17 June 1955, 825.00/6-1755; and Despatch 241 Situation Affecting Prospects of Klein and Saks Mission, Beaulac to Department of State, 23 September 1955, 825.00/9-2355; all Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 26 Memorandum Preliminary Notes on a [13 April] Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, Bishop, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 787. Annex A: Supplementary Report on Chile, 13 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 790. Telegram 297, Dulles (Belton) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 19 April 1955, 825.00/4-555, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. OCB Special Report on Chile, 13 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 790. Chile Faces a Choice, New York Times 10 April 1955, p. E-10. 200

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stronger credit controls and advocated ending au tomatic annual wage and salary adjustments, which were an important contributing factor to inflation. The mission also advised ending price controls and commodity subs idies. Lastly, it urged an over haul of the foreign exchange rate and establishing a single flexible excha nge rate for all merchandise transactions. 27 The Klein-Saks team provided very little tech nical advice and served more as political cover for Chilean politicians. Chilean leaders had proposed similar shared sacrifice plans earlier, but labor unrest and worsening econom ic conditions had made the proposals more acceptable in late 1955. Falange Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva and President of the Central Bank Jorge Prat each had proposed shared sacr ifice plans in 1954, and Central Bank officials had suggested many of the measures in July 1955, but the Ibez admini stration did not adopt them. Inflation spiraled toward 84 percent, and labor unrest increased and became more militant, with 62 legal and 212 illegal strikes in 1955 alone. Partly due to labor unre st and fears of further deterioration of the economy, Liberal, Cons ervative, and Agrarian Labor Congressmen cooperated with Ibez, but also the impartial experts of Klein and Saks enabled the three rightist parties to support the mission without join ing the cabinet or backing Ibez. Ibez accepted this: I will seek help wherever I can fi nd it.I am very grateful to the parties of the 27 Klein and Saks Mission, The Chilean Stabilization Program and the Work of the Klein and Saks Economic and Financial Mission to Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria [?] 1958), 6-12. This report contains copies of several documents passed between mission and Chilean officials. Francis H. Schott, Inflation and Stabilization Efforts in Chile, 1953-1958, Inter-American Economic Affairs 13/3 (Winter 1959): 12. Schott was a member of the KleinSaks mission. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress 205. Tyler, An Evaluation of the Klein and Saks Stabilization Program in Chile, 53. 201

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Right who are helping me carry forward plans ag ainst inflation. The U.S. embassy declared (and hoped) that the bottom has been reached and the climb will begin. 28 U.S. officials and Klein-Saks consultants belie ved that the stabilization program got off to an auspicious start. Congress ended the auto matic, annual wage and salary adjustments, and limited the 1956 adjustment to 50 percent of the previous years cost-of-living increase. To soften the impact, Congress established a minimum wa ge and raised family allowances. It raised taxes, primarily indirect taxes, and the Central Bank began a maj or tightening of its credit policies. The Ibez ad ministration cut its budget, instituted a single fluctuating rate for the Chilean peso, and reorganized several government agencies and offices. Finance Minister Oscar Herrera also prepared a bill to overhaul the ta x code. Inflation dropped to 38 percent in 1956, and U.S. investors, U.S. banks, and the IMF regained confidence in Chiles economy. 29 28 Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress 196-197, 206, 205, 204. Klein and Saks Mission, The Chile Stabilization Program 10. Despatch 975 Chilean Inflation Gathering Momentum; General Strike Threat, Sanders (Sanders/Silberstein/Fuess) to Department of State, 30 June 1955, 825.00/6-3055, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Kofas, Stabilization and Class Conflict, 367. Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism Second edition (New York: Oxford University Pr ess, 1988), 238. Despatch 241, Beaulac to Department of State, 23 September 1955, 825.00/9-2355. Despatch 227 Political Events and Trends in Chile, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 16 September 1955, 725.00/9-1655, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Donald William Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 19521958, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1961, p.114. 29 Schott, Inflation and Stabili zation Efforts in Chile, 14-16. Memorandum Comments on Mr. Locketts Letter of January 20, Joseph A. Silberstein, Office of South American Affairs, to Holland, 26 January 1956; and Despatch 875 Prospects of Completion of Anti-Inflationary Program, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 23 May 1956, 825.10/5-2356; both Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Informal Visit of Roberto Aldunate, Former Foreign Minister of Chile, Silberstein, 29 June 1956, Folder Chile, 1956, Box 2, Holland Papers, RG59-Lot, NA. Klein and Saks Mission, Chilean Stabilization Program 22, 33, 12-23. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Economic Stabilization Program, Silberstein, 6 June 1956, 825.00/6-656, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress 203-206. Memorandum Monthly Summary: Chile, Silberstein, 5 March 1956, 725.00/3-556, Folder 725.00/1-456; and Memorandum Monthly Summary: Chile, Silberstein, 5 July 1956, 725.00/7-556, Folder 725.00/7-356; both Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Exchange Problem, Silberstein, 1 March 1956, 825.10/3-156; and Memorandum of Conversation Current Status of the IBRDs Relations with Chile, Silberstein, 15 May 1 956, 825.10/5-1556; both Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 202

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In their optimism and enthusiasm, U.S. offici als largely ignored the fact that Ibez stifled public protest against the stabilization measures. When the CUTCh called a national strike to oppose what it termed the Klein-Sak s Hunger Measure, Ibez declared a state of siege. Using the Law for the Defense of Demo cracy, Carabineros and soldiers arrested CUTCh and other opposition leaders, and interned ma ny of them at the prison camp in Pisagua. 30 Assistant Secretary Holland s extensive support of the Klein-Saks mission not only sanctioned it, but also transformed its success into a key U.S. policy objective. One ARA official told his friend at th e U.S. Embassy in Santiago, Mr. Holland, as you have probably realized, has expressed great intere st (to put it mildly) in taking a ll the steps to clear the way for such aid to Chile as their progr ess on their anti-inflationary pr ogram merits. He has given us direct orders to get things rolling. Holland viewed the program as the best opportunity for stabilization in Chile in the foreseeable future, and at his request, a nd before Chiles Congress had passed any measures, ARA arranged a PL 480 pr ogram as a means of easing the austerity programs impact and ensuring that Chile had su fficient supplies of basic commodities, such as wheat, dried milk, and edible oils. 31 Holland had multiple telephone conversations with Finance Minister Herrera about the progr am, and he pressed the Federal Reserve Board to allow one of 30 Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Gove rnment, 116-117. Memorandum Monthly Summary: Chile, Silberstein, 5 March 1956, 725.00/3-556. For the experience at Pisagua, see Eduardo Labarca Goddard, Vida y lucha de Luis Corvaln (Mxico D.F.: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1976), 117-119; and Waiss, Chile vivo 115-117. 31 Letter, Silberstein to Corrigan, 1 February 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 801. Minutes of the 242nd Meeting of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 6 March 1956, FRUS 19551957 VII: 809. Telegram, Dulles (Belton) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 4 January 1956, 411.2541/1-456, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 799. Telegram, Sanders to Department of State, 5 January 1956, 411.2541/1-556; FRUS 19551957 VII: 800-801. 203

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its senior economists to serve on the mission. 32 He ensured that Chile received sufficient aid to complete its reforms, and ARA pressed the IMF to assist the Chileans with foreign exchange reforms. When doubts arose, Holland met with IMF, Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, and Treasury Department officials to assuage their doubts and to urge them to offer assistance to Chile. In addition, Holland, ARA, and the U.S. Embassy ma intained extensive c ontacts with Klein and Saks and its mission. Thomas Lockett, a mission member, passed copies of reports and letters that the mission gave to Chilean officials to th e embassy (the Chileans kn ew of his activities). 33 Already viewing Chile as a model of democrac y, Holland wanted Chile to serve also as a model of economic reform. [T]he outside worl d was watching very closely [Chiles] progress, he told Beaulac, and Chile couldserve as an ex ample to other countries in similar positions. If Chiles economy improve[s] substantially under Klein-Saks program, Holland continued, we are going to have an ex cellent anti-Communist weapon. 34 32 Telegram 315, Dulles (Ernest V. Siracusa, Director of We st Coast Affairs, and Belton) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 27 January 1956, 825.00/1-2756, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282; and Telegram 482, Sanders to Secretary of State, 24 February 1956, 825.10/2-2456, attached to Telegram 474, Sanders to Secretary of State, 21 February 1956, 825.10/2-2156, Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286; both DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Letter, Holland to Allen E. Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 16 August 1955, attached to Letter, Holland to William McChesney, Chairman of the Federal Reserves Board of Governors, 16 August 1955, 825.00/8-1655, Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 33 Memorandum, Silberstein to Holland, 26 January 1956, 825.10/1-2656; Telegram 319, Dulles (Siracusa) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 30 January 1956, 825.10/1-3056; Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Exchange Reform, Silberstein, 1 March 1956, 825.10/3-156; Memorandum of Conversation Stabilization Credits for Chile, Lyon, 6 March 1956, 825.10/3-656; and Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Exchange Reform Program, Silberstein, 6 March 1956, 825.10/3-656; all Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Courtesy Call [of Mr. Saks] and Comments on Activities of Klein and Saks Particularly in Chile, H. Dearborn, Office of South American Affairs, 1 November 1955, 825.00/11-155; and Lyon to Beaulac, 10 October 1955, 825.00/9-2955; both Folder 825.00/1-555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. For Locketts passing documents, see Letter, Beaulac to Holland, 29 September 1955, attached to Letter, Lyon to Beaulac 10 October 1955, 825.00/9-2955. Letter, Corrigan to Silberstein, 25 January 1956, 825.00/1-2556; Letter, Sanders to Holland, 11 June 1956, 825.00/6-1156; and Letter, Lyon to Holland, 22 June 1956, 825.00/6-2256; all three, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, NA. 34 Memorandum Documenting of Communists Attempt to Keep Chilean Economy from Improving, Holland to Spencer M. King, ARA Special Assistant, 10 February 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 803. 204

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Hollands desire to use Chile as an anti-com munist model likely resulted from a new Soviet policy to compete peacef ully with the United States for the hearts and minds of the peoples of Latin America and the Third World. Holland and many in the Department of State were already concerned that the United Stat es was not doing enough to check increasing Communist and Soviet subversi on in Latin America, but a 16 January 1956 announcement by Nicolai A. Bulganin, Chair of the Soviet Council of Ministers, create d a major problem. Bulganin declared that the Soviet Union w ould expand diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, as well as technical exchanges, with Latin American nations. At the Twentieth Party Congress (during which Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin), the Soviets revealed that their Latin American initiative was part of a larger strategy to temper Cold War tensions. 35 The new Soviet policy caused U.S. officials to focus on strengthening U.S. relations and economic cooperation with the ABC nations (Argen tina, Brazil, and Chile), which they viewed as the most advanced peoples of the Latin Am erican community and the most influential. Holland told Secretary of State J ohn Foster Dulles: If Argentina, Brazil, and Chile follow an anti-communist, pro-United States, pro-private enterprise road, thenthe balance of Latin America is assured. On the other hand, if any one of these three countries deviates from that path, then we may have calamitous problems in the area. U.S. policymakers now viewed the administrations Latin American policy (NSC5432/1) as inadequate and deemed Communist 35 Memorandum Draft Outline of Operations against Co mmunism in Latin America, OCB, 14 December 1955, Folder Latin America (8), Box 5, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-1961 Special Staff File, DDEL. Hereafter cited as NSCS Special Staff File. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 90. 205

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threats in Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador as s erious. They ordered a review of U.S. policy, which led to NSC 5613, a revised U.S. policy towards Latin America. 36 U.S. embassy officers worried that Chileans were underestimating th e Communist threat. New U.S. Ambassador to Chile Cecil B. Lyon (1956-58) found rather lukewarm opposition to Communism. Chile is really so remote from the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries, Lyon wrote, that the average Chilean tends to discount as exaggerated U.S. claims about Communism and the Soviet bloc. Moreover, he believed that many Chileans adhered to the very dangerous concept that the Communists in Chile are not re al Communists. When Lyon questioned the wisdom of allowing the Chinese Opera to perform in Chile, Chiles Foreign Minister rebuffed him. The Chinese company ha d visited the major capitals of Europe and had been greeted personally by the Queen of England, the minister said, why should not Chile be allowed this same cultural treat? 37 Adding to U.S. concerns, the Klein-Saks progr am began to falter. The mission had urged higher luxury and income taxes and a more progre ssive tax structure, but the Chilean Congress and the Ibez administration emphasized indirect ta xes, namely sales, ciga rette, gas, liquor, and other sin taxes, which placed the burden of stabilization on the middle, working, and lower 36 Memorandum, Importance of Present United States Rela tions with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Holland to Dulles, 11 July 1956, p. 416. Progress Report on U.S. Policy on Latin America, OCB, 28 March 1956, p. 9. For further discussions of the U.S. response to the Soviet initiative, see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 90-92; and Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhowers Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pres s, 1982), 59-73. 37 Lyon previously served as Deputy Assi stant Secretary of State for Inter-Ameri can Affairs, and his appointment to Santiago suggests the level of importance that Holland and ARA rated good relations with Chile. Despatch 192 My Impressions of Chile After Thirteen Years Absence, Lyon to Department of State, 4 September 1956, 725.00/9-456, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 74 Repeal of the Permanent Law for the Defense of Democracy, Sanders to Department of State, 27 July 1955, 725.00/7-2755, Folder 725.00/1-355, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 206

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classes. By August 1956, a few months afte r the stabilizat ion program began, it came under attack from many groups, with labor unions bit terly charging that th e working class had to sacrifice more than any other group. 38 Also, the price of copper declined, from 47 cents per pound in March 1956 to 25 cents in March 1958. Th e decline lowered government revenues for 1956, 1957, and 1958, and hampered stabilization efforts. Income and consumption among the wages and salaries sector dropped, unemployment rose, foreign i nvestment declined, and Chiles economy slid into recession. In August 1956, Ibez fired Finance Minister Herrera, whom the embassy described as the spark plug of the Kl ein-Saks program. Herreras dismissal angered the Conservative and Liberal parties, who sh arply criticized Ibez for several weeks. 39 In its first annual review of the stabilizati on program, the Klein-Saks team castigated the Ibez administration and Congress for placing the burden of stabilization on the wages and salaries sector. In November 1956, before a joint Congressional committee, the team urged Chilean legislators to correct the injustices and impose greater cr edit restrictions, higher luxury 38 Klein and Saks Mission, The Chilean Stabilization Program 13. Tyler, An Evaluation of the Klein and Saks Stabilization Program in Chile, 56. Memorandum Clouds over the Chil ean Economic Stabilization Program, Silberstein to Holland and Bernbaum, 22 August 1956, 825.10/8-2256, Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286; Memorandum Recent Developments Affecting Chile, S ilberstein to Bernbaum, 10 August 1956, Folder 825.00/1-956, box 4282; and Memorandum Status of Problems Chile, Silberstein to Bernbaum and Rubottom, 14 August 1956, 725.00/8-1456, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024; all DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 39 Schott, Inflation and Stabilization Ef forts in Chile, 16-17. Tyler, An Evaluation of the Klein and Saks Stabilization Program in Chile, 60. David Felix, Structural Imbalances, Social Conflict, and Inflation: An Appraisal of Chiles Recent Anti-Inflationary Effort, Economic Development and Cultural Change 8/2 (January 1960): 132. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress 210-211. Telegram 116, Lyon to Secretary of State, 28 August 1956, 725.00/8-2856, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. For spark plug comment, see Memorandum Monthly Summary, August 1956: Chile, Silberstein, 31 August 1956, 725.00/8-3156, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. For the Chilean Rights response, see Despatch 289 Prospects for Governments Economic Reform Program, Belton (Corrigan/Day) to Department of State, 28 September 1956, 825.00/9-2856, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282; Memorandum [October] Monthly Summary: Chile, Silberstein, 2 November 1956, 725.00/11-256, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024; and Despatch 382 Deterioration of Chilean Economic Reform Program, Robert Eakons, Economic Affairs Counselor, to Department of State, 19 October 1956, 825.00/10-1956, Folder 825-00/1-956, Box 4282; all DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 207

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taxes, a more progressive tax code, and better tax enforcement. Such measures would affect the highest income levels the most, but unless this occurred, the team warned, accumulated pressures would easily cause a social revolution. Congress i gnored the warning. The KleinSaks team reiterated their criticisms the fo llowing year, this time proposing a special investigation of the income tax claims of the 200 largest landowners, persons who bought property valued at more than 6 million pesos, and members of exclusive clubs. Congressmen decried the proposal as a demagogic breach of good taste, and passed what the U.S. Embassy described as the usual biannual waiver of pena lties for tax delinquency, the beneficiaries of which were largely the very gr oups the Klein-Saks team propos ed for special investigation. 40 The Pine Tree in a Flower Pot The Chilean Left gained strength as Ib ez and Congress implemented the Klein-Saks program. The Popular Socialist and Democratic Parties joined Allendes FRENAP coalition on 29 February 1956, and the expanded coalition renamed itself the Popular Action Front (FRAP -Frente de Accin Popular). The FRAP finished second among the political parties in the April 1956 municipal elections, garner ing 128,000 votes and 245 town c ouncil seats. Communist and Popular Socialist leaders admitted that their recent imprisonment at Pisagua by the Ibez 40 Exposicin ante la Comisin Mixta de Presupuestos del Congresso, 6 November 1956, pp. 3, 4, reprinted as Chapter 25, and Exposicin ante de la Comisin Mixta de Presupuestos, 7 November 1957, pp. 41-42, reprinted as Chapter 46, both in Klein and Saks, The Chilean Stabilization Program Felix, Structural Imbalances, Social Conflict, and Inflation, 146 ff 208

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administration encouraged closer cooperation be tween them. The Lefts growing strength led the U.S. Embassy to consider the Defense of Democracy law a dead letter. 41 On 25 October 1956, the FRAP, together with the CUTCh and the Radical and Falange Parties, staged a parade and protest rally in downtown Santiago, and the U.S. embassy admitted that the rally effectively demonstrated the wide spread discontent and frustration with Ibez and the stabilization program. Ibez initially denied the FRAPs request to hold the rally, but Allende threatened to hold the protest anywa y. Ibez declared Santiago an emergency zone and imposed a state of siege; however, Senator Fernando Alessandri negotiated a compromise, allowing the protest to occur. At the rally, A llende was, without any doubt, in his very best form, the U.S. embassy said, introducing an electric current in all hearts and spirits. During his speech, Allende recalled the achievements of Pres ident Pedro Aguirre Cerda and urged a revival of the Popular Front. With the rallys very decent showing, the embassy admitted that confidence of all sectors in anti-inf lationary program [had] reached a new low. 42 Salvador Allendes very best fo rm was indicative of his rise as a preeminent voice of the Left and a national political leader; in fact, one journalist described him, a pine tree set in a 41 Despatch 633 Leftist Unity, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 1 March 1956, 725.00/3-156, Folder 725.00/1-456, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984), 68-75. Despatch 175 April 1 Municipal Election Results Political Alignments, Corrigan to Department of State, 29 August 1956, 725.00/8-2956, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Labarca, Vida y lucha de Luis Corvaln 118-119. Waiss, Chile vivo 116. Despatch 74 Repeal of the Permanent Law for the Defense of Democracy, Sanders to De partment of State, 27 July 1955, 725.00/7-2755. Memorandum Latin American Communist Parties, S. M. King to Lyon, 3 January 1956, Folder Communism 1956, Box 2, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Subject File, RG59-Lot, NA. 42 Despatch 383 Political Developments, Corrigan to Department of State, 19 October 1956, 725.00/10-1956; Telegram 196, Belton to Secretary of State, 17 Octobe r 1956, 725.00/10-1756; and Despatch 410 Recent Political Developments, Corrigan to Department of State, 25 October 1956, 725.00/10-2556; and Despatch 423 Leftist Demonstration in Santiago October 25, Corrigan to Department of State, 29 October 1956, 725.00/10-2956; all Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Telegram 217, Belton to Secretary of State, 27 October 1956, 825.00/10-2756, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 209

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flower box. His secretary, Osval do Puccio, admitted that Allende was the inspiration, creator, and prime mover of FRAP, as well as its firs t president. At the Socialist Partys 16 th National Congress (November 1955), the delegates elected Allende as Secretary General, opting for his moderate course of building inte r-party alliances. A llende undertook much of the negotiations to create a working coalition among th e parties of the Left and had worked with Popular Socialist leader Senator Ral Ampuero to reunite the two Socialist parties, which occurred in July 1957. Moreover, it was Allendes expressed deci sion to include union forces and other organizations of independent masses, professionals, and technician s in the 1957 FRAP Conference. Despite Allendes efforts, the U. S. embassy reported and Ampuero admitted that the Popular Socialists had preven ted the Radicals from joining the FRAP. 43 Despite Allendes rising prominence, the U.S. Em bassy did not contact or talk with him. Embassy officers regarded as him a fellow trav eler and a devoted follower of the Commie 43 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 36-37, 98. Max Nolff, Salvador Allende: El poltico, el estadista (Santiago: Ediciones Documentas, 1993), 56, 58. Memorandum Report of Evening with Salvador Allende, Michael Lever, Public Relations Consultant for Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate Company, 2 November 1955, enclosed with Despatch 327 Transmittal of Report by an American C itizen, Sanders to Departme nt of State, 8 November 1955, 725.00/11-855, Folder 725.00/1-355; Despatch 484 Outstanding Congressional Figures in 1955, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 4 January 1956, 725.00/1-456, Folder 725.00/1-456; Despatch 74 Repeal of the Permanent Law for the Defense of Democracy, Sanders to Department of State, 27 July 1955, 725.00/7-2755, Folder 725.00/1-355; and Despatch 614 First National Conference of Popular Action Front (FRAP), Corrigan (Corrigan and Fuess) to Depa rtment of State, 18 December 1956, 725.00/ 12-1856, Folder 725.00/7-356; all Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 378 6 th National Congress of the Partido Socialista de Chile, Corrigan to Department of State, 29 November 1955, 725.003/11-2955, Folder 725.001/12-1956, Box 3027, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Letter, Ampuero to Allende, 7 D ecember 1956, portion reprinted in Ampuero, La Izquierda en punto muerto (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1969), 64-66. For the Po pular Socialists being the obstacle, see Despatch 633 Leftist Unity, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 1 March 1956, 725.00/3-156; Despatch 410 Recent Political Developments, Corrigan to Department of State, 25 October 1956, 725.00/10-2556; Despatch 614 First National Conference of Popular Action Fr ont, Corrigan (Corrigan and Fuess) to Department of State, 18 December 1956, 725.00/12-1856; and Despatch 820 Formal Launching of FRAP Candidates, February 10, Corrigan to Department of State, 12 February 1957, 725.00/2-1257; all Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Ampuero, La Izquierda en punto muerto 55-62. 210

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Party line. 44 The embassy did not send an officer to attend Socialist Party or FRAP events, nor did it build contacts among FRAP members, practices which were routine during the 1940s. When ARA and the OCB asked the embassy to brief Chileans travelling to the Soviet bloc, Robert F. Corrigan, the lead political officer, re sponded that they were not given timely notice of such travel and the travellers were unbr iefable due to their commitment to Communism. 45 Although Corrigan, Beaulac, and embassy o fficers shunned Allende, by many indications, he was approachable. He appreciated a good, fra nk exchange of views, once remarking during a sharp exchange: I like this guy; he talks back! One acquainta nce noted, Allende has reached the conclusion that sooner or la ter he must play ball with the United States, if for not other reason than that help can be found nowhere else. He also noted that Allende will do what he can to make the price as high a possible. 46 The End of the Klein-Saks Program At the start of 1957, U.S. embassy and ARA o fficials trumpeted the success of the KleinSaks program in Chile. Inflation dropped from 85 percent in 1955, to 38 percent in 1956, to 17 44 Despatch 383, Corrigan to Department of State, 19 October 1956, 725.00/10-1956. Memorandum Chilean Political Parties, n.d. [after May 1956], Folder 1956 Political, Box 3, Records of the Office of South American Affairs, Records Relating to Chile, Subject Files, 1956-1957, RG59-Lot, NA. For other Communist-related references to Allende, see Despatch 1 Joint Weeka No. 26 1 July 1954, 725.00(W)/7-154, Folder 1, Box 3316; Telegram 425, Beaulac to Secretary of State, 26 June 1954, 725.00/6-2654, Folder 1, Box 3314; and Despatch 31 Congress of Parliamentarians and Personalities of Latin America, 15 July 1954, 725.001/7-1554, Folder 1, Box 3316; all three DF 1950-54, RG59, NA. 45 Despatch 133 Action to Implement Outline Plan of Action Against Communism in Latin America, Belton (Corrigan) to Department of State, 16 August 1956, 725.001/8-1656, Folder 725.00(W)/12-459, Box 3027, RG1955-59, RG59, NA. See Item 15. 46 Report of Evening with Allende, Lever, 2 November 1 955. Speech in the Senate Posicin del Partido Radical frente a otras colectivas polticas, Allende, 7 June 1955, MFN 1466, Folder Senado 1955 Enero-Junio S-7 D, Box S-7, Fundacin Eduardo Frei Montalva, Santiago, Chile. Hereafter cited as Fundacin Frei. 211

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percent in 1957. U.S. investors, U.S. banks, and the IMF had confidence in Chiles economy. Ambassador Lyon said that the atmosphere in Chile is more optimistic, and the Embassy proclaimed that the Klein-Saks program had placed the countryin a far sounder condition. 47 Due to the programs success, Holland and Du lles agreed that Eisenhower should invite President Ibez to Washington for a state visit in 1957, one of two invitations the Department of State planned to extend to Latin American leaders. Lyon endorse d the invitation, saying it would show unqualified support for Chiles anti-inflation program, which can serve as [an] example [for] Latin America and [the] rest [of the] world. Furthermore, said Lyon, hosting Ibez would counter the frequent charges in Chile and Latin America that the United States was more sympathetic [to] hemisphere dict atorships than to democracies. 48 U.S. officials considered the March 1957 Congre ssional elections to be a sign of success in Chile; however, Allende and the FRAP reached the same conclusion. The Ibaista parties suffered heavy losses; meanwhile, the Radicals rega ined their position as the countrys largest party, the Liberals recuperated their losses to Ib aista parties, and the Falange surprised many with its growing strength under the leadership of Senator Eduardo Frei. Comparing Chilean 47 Klein and Saks Mission, The Chilean Stabilization Program 33. Schott, Inflation and Stabilization Efforts in Chile, 15. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Exchange Problem, Silberstein, 1 March 1956, 825.10/3-156. Memorandum of Conversation Current Status of the IBRDs Relations with Chile, Silberstein, 15 May 1956, 825.10/5-1556, Folder 825.10/1-1055, Box 4286, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Monthly Summary: Chile, Silberstein, 5 March 1956, 725.00/3-556. Memora ndum of Conversation Situation in Chile Today, Lyon with Enrique Bernstein, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1956, Folder 1956 Political, Box 3, Records of the Office of South American Affairs, Records relating to Chile, Subject File 1956-1957, RG59-Lot, NA. Telegram 346, Lyon to Secretary of State, 5 January 1957, 825.00/1-557; and Memorandum Accomplishments of the Chilean Governments Economic Stabilization Program, Arthur R. Day (?), n.d. (12 February 1957), enclosed with Despatch 822 Accomplishments of Chilean Government in Past Year, Day to Department of State, 825.00/21257; both Folder 825.00/1-557, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 48 Memorandum Recommendation that Presid ent Ibez of Chile be Invited to Visit the United States, Holland to Secretary of State, 20 August 1956, attached to Memorandum Official In vitations to Latin American Presidents, Folder Chile 1956, Box 2, Holland Papers, NA. Telegram 436, Lyon to Department of State, 21 February 1957, 725.11/2-2157, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 822. 212

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politics to those of France, U.S. Embassy officers subscribed to El Mercurio s post-election analysis: the elections had stabilized Chiles poli tical order, and the FRAP suffered an electoral and moral defeat. Allende challenged El Mercurio s analysis and asserted that the FRAP had made impressive gains; however, El Mercurio s editors refuted his claims. 49 Allende was closer to the mark than either El Mercurio s editors or the U.S. embassy. With Ibaismo dead, the 1957 elections essentia lly reverted Congress to the pre-Ibaista distribution of parties, that is prior to the 1953 Congressional elections. In the Chamber of Deputies, the FRAPs losses were exclusivel y among the Popular Socialists, who had gained seats as an Ibaista party. El Mercurio and the U.S. embassy, however, considered the Popular Socialists to be a FRAP party, not the Ibaista part y that it was in 1953. If one excludes the Popular Socialists, the FRAP actually had gained three Senate seats and won two by-elections in 1956. 50 Because the Chilean political system allo wed coalition candidates in individual races, one also needed to examine which candidates th e FRAP had supported in places where it did not run a candidate, with Radical and Falange vict ors as obvious possibilities. Allende likely included these factors his analysis but U.S. embassy officers and El Mercurio s editors did not. 49 Several scholars have noted that Chiles political system before the 1958 electoral reforms (the DHondt system) was quite complex and confusing. U.S. embassy political officers M. N. Lindgren and Robert F. Corrigan, in a 1957 despatch, offer what is probably the best, most easily comprehensible explanation of how this system operated. See Despatch 663, Corrigan (Lingren and Corrigan) to Department of State, 3 January 1957, 725.00/1-357, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, NA. For an example of scholars noting the complexity of the pre-1958 system, see Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 215. Despatch 922 Explaining the March 3 Electoral Results, Corrigan to Department of State, 11 March 1957, 725.00/3-1157, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Puccio, Un Cuarto del Siglo con Allende 31. 50 This analysis is drawn from the tables created by Bray drawn primarily from the Chilean periodical Zig-Zag See Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 30-35, 123-127. For FRAPs victories in two earlier by-elections, see Despatch 738, Corrigan to Department of State, 5 April 1956, 725.00/4-556, Folder 725.00/1-456, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Oddly, embassy officers chalked the by-elections up as two Radical victories; even though one was a Socialist and the other won due to FRAP support. 213

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Three weeks after the Congressional elections, the aura of optimism vanished amid two days of riots in downtown Santiago, effectively ending the Klein-Saks program. As an antiinflation measure, Ibez officials decided in late 1956 to raise mass transit fares, but delayed announcing the increase until after the March electi ons. Fares rose 111 percent for adults and 400 percent (1 to 5 pesos) for students, and coin cided with price increases averaging 25 percent on cigarettes, flour, bread, newspapers, and petroleum, as well as electric and telephone rates. Students and workers in Santiago, Valparaso, and Concepcin violently protested the fare increase, attacking and damaging public buses, which caused the government to assign guards to ride the buses. Students verbally abused and st oned Carabineros, and th e Carabineros beat and arrested several students. In Valparaso, local officials deployed naval forces to impose order. 51 In Santiago, Allende served as intermediary between the students union a nd the Ibez administration to avoid the viol ence occurring in other cities. In the morning of 31 March 1957, Allende met with Interior Minister Benjamn Vide la and told him that students would end their protests if the government reduced bus fares and released all students from prison. By afternoon, student leaders reached an agreement with Videla, but Ibez terminated the talks. 52 Ibezs refusal to negotiate led students a nd workers to stage mass protests the next day (1 April), and the protests escalated into violence. Protesters attacked buses and broke windows, and clashes between students and Carabineros ensued. That evening, with violence rising, Carabineros fired warning shots that ricocheted, killing a fema le nursing student and wounding a high school student. The young womans death motivated protesters to return en masse to 51 Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, II: 352-359. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca I: 431. 52 Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 128-130. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 354. 214

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central Santiago on 2 April, and a riot erupted. Amid the 2 April protests, skirmishes quickly broke out between protesters and Carabineros, and public officials pulle d public buses off the streets. Carabineros began s hooting at protesters, and verita ble caravans of ambulances took the injured to hospitals. With bystanders ch eering for the protestors, Ibez ordered the Carabineros off the streets and military troops entered the city. Due to a logistical error, a gap of three hours occurred between the Carabineros departure and the militarys arrival, during which vandals destroyed street lamps a nd looted several stores, includi ng the department store Almacn Paris. One group wrecked Horizonte Pre ss, which published the Communist dailies El Siglo and ltimas Noticias By nightfall, Army and Air Force troops had imposed order. 53 With more than 70 dead and several hundred injured, the riots had shocked Chileans and U.S. policymakers, and officials of both countries tried to reassure each other. Ibez told Eisenhower: we have had these troubles; they have passed, there will be no changes in my economic program, and Chilean elites offere d similar sentiments to U.S. officials. 54 During an NSC meeting, Secretary of State Du lles said that the riots were rather surprising because the Klein-Saks program had been thought to be going along fairly well, but he doubted that any 53 Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 352-359. Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 128-134. Despatch 1030 Serious Disorders in Santiago, Corrigan to Department of State, 5 April 1957, 725.00/4-557; Despatch 1060 B ackground and Analysis of Recent Dist urbances, Lyon to Department of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157; and Telegram 542, Lyon to Secretary of State, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457; all Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 54 Despatch 1060 Background and Analysis of Recent Disturbances, Lyon to Department of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157. Memorandum of Conversation Recent Disturbances in San tiago, Lyon, 6 April 1957, attached to Despatch 1039 Conversation with President Ibez on April 6, 1957, Lyon to Department of State, 8 April 1957, 725.00/4-857, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Personal Message from President Ibez of Chile, Dulles to the President, 18 Apri l 1957, Folder Chile (7), Box 7, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File) Inte rnational Series, DDEL. Hereafter cited as AWF International Series. Memorandum of Conversation C ourtesy Call of Recaredo Ossa Undurraga, President of Chiles National Agricultural Society, Devine, 15 May 1957, 825.00/5-1557, Folder 825.00/1-557, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 215

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long-range serious consequences would occur. Lyon and ARA assured Chilean officials that the United States was sympathetic, and the Departme nt of State expressed confidence that Chile would find a solution to its difficulties consistent with its democratic traditions. 55 U.S. and Chilean leaders immediately blamed the Communists of fomenting the riots, even though Deputy Chief of Mission William Belton confessed, Nobody has a good clear concept of what started the trouble. 56 U.S. officials soon conceded that the Communists and Socialists had little, if any, role in the riots. Communist labor leaders were arrested and jailed on 1 April (before the riots), and Corrigan re ported that the Communists did not favor large-scale demonstrations at this time because they feared repercussions. Ral Ampuero and the Popular Socialist Partys Central Committee held a meeti ng at their party headquarters on 2 April (the worst day of the riots), and refused to leave thei r building until almost midnight for fear of being 55 Memorandum Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the Nati onal Security Council on Thursday, April 4, 1957, S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary, 5 Apr 1957, Folder -318th Meeting of NSC -April 4, 1957, Box 8, AWF National Security Council Series, DDEL. Memorandum of Conversation Recent Disturbances in Santiago, Lyon, 6 April 1957. Telegram, Dulles (Silberst ein) to U.S. Embassy in Chile, 5 April 1957, 825.10/4557, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 824-825. Noon Briefing Statement, Silberstein, n.d. [10 April 1957], enclosed with Memorandum Proposed Statement on Chile, Rubottom to Berding, 10 April 1957, Folder 1957 Chile, Box 2, Records for the Assistant S ecretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs (Roy R. Rubottom), RG59-Lot, NA. Hereafter cited as Rubottom Files 56 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Riots in Chile, Maurice M. Bernbaum, Director of South American Affairs, with William Belton, 3 April 1957, 725.00/4-357; Te legram 536, Lyon to Secretary of State, 3 April 1957, 725.00/4-357; Memorandum of Conversation Chilean In terest in Financial Assistance Arising Out of Civil Disorders, Silberstein, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457; Memorandum Public Disorders in Chile, Rubottom (Devine) to Under Secretary of State, 3 April 1957, 725.00/4-357; and Memorandum Government Measures to Contain Public Disorders in Chile, Rubottom (Devine) to Under Secretary of State, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457; all Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversa tion Courtesy Call of Recardo [sic] Ossa Undurraga, Devine, 15 May 1957, 825.00/5-1557, Folder 825.00/1-557, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 216

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killed by military troops. Also, it was learned th at government security forces took advantage of the mayhem to destroy Horizonte Press and the main offices of the Communist Party. 57 The Klein-Saks team asserted that the ri ots were spontaneous, resulting from economic hardship under the anti-i nflation program, but the Department of State was reluctant to accept this explanation. The team told embassy, ARA, and the Klein-Saks offici als that three factors motivated the riots: 1) wage ceilings combined with price in creases, notably on foodstuffs, 2) accumulated irritation over the lack of sacrifices by the wealthy and Ibez government officials, and 3) government mishandling of public transportati on problems. ARA and embassy officials initially rejected this, with Co rrigan insisting that the stabilization program was not to blame for the conflagration. The so-ca lled wage-price squeeze is real and painful, he said, but the lot of the Chilean worker is better than it would have been had this program not been carried on. ARA requested the embassy to investigate the working classes economic conditions, and subsequent reports confirmed th e Klein-Saks teams explanation. Ambassador Lyon admitted that the lack [of] ability [of an] average family [to] feed itself properly under present economic stresses [is] be lieved to be [a] greater prob lem than generally realized. 58 57 Despatch 1062 Organized Labor and the April Riots, Corrigan (Fuess) to Department of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Alejandro Cheln Rojas, Trayectoria del Socialismo (Apuntes para una historia crtica de Socialismo chileno) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Astral, 1966), 150-151. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 360-361. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 38-39. Memorandum of Conversation Chiles Current Problems, Robert J. Dorr, First Secretary of Embassy, 4 April 1957, enclosed with Despatch 1054 American Consultative Group, Lyon to Department of State, 10 April 1957, 825.00/4-1057, Folder 825.00/1-557, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Telegram 536, Lyon to Secretary of State, 3 April 1957, 725.00/4-357; and Telegram 560, Lyon to Secretary of State, 8 April 1957, 725.00/4-857; both Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 58 Telegram 550, Lyon (Knox of Klein-Saks Mission) to Secretary of State (Klein and Saks), 5 April 1957, 725.00/4-557; and Despatch 1060 Back ground and Analysis of Recent Distur bances, Corrigan to Department of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157; both Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Olavarra Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri II: 358-359. Telegram 489, Dulles (Silberstein, Blodgett, Bernbaum) to U.S. Embassy in Chile, 5 April 1957, 825.10/4-557, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 825. Telegram 579, Lyon to Department of 217

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With the evidence exonerating the Communists, U.S. officials now blamed all major Chilean groups. They faulted the Ibez administ ration for failing to sell the anti-inflation program to the public and for cr eating the impression that Ibez was not serious about cutting government expenditures or even governing. Th e U.S. charged that the Leftist presss aggressive and sensationalist t one had played a prominent role in creating the climate for rebellion. The U.S. embassy particularly blam ed the Chilean elite for their selfishness and relative insensibilityto the lot of the lower cla sses. Rubottom pointedly told the President of the National Agricultural Society (SNA -Socied ad de Nacional Agricult ura), the bastion of Chiles landholding elite, that wealthy Chileans were not sufficiently shouldering the burden of economic reforms, a charge that the SNA pres ident strongly denied. Chilean Ambassador Mariano Puga Vega told Secretary Dulles that the anti-inflation program had sparked the riots. As Puga remarked to Rubottom, [W]hen the horse kicks, its often becaus e he is tired and overworked and does not necessarily mean that he is vicious. 59 U.S. policymakers now worried that the Klei n-Saks program might become a casualty of the April riots. Admitting that Chileans were among that most attractive people I have ever State, 12 April 1957, 825.10/4-1257, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 829. Rubottom contributed to the problem when he mistakenly said the increase of bus fares was 50 percent when it actually was 111 percent for adults and 400 percent for students. See Memorandum Proposed Statement on Chile, Rubottom to Berding, 10 April 1957. 59 Despatch 1060 Background and Analysis of Recent Disturbances, Lyon (Corrigan) to Depart ment of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157. Despatch 1063 The Role of the Leftist Press in Recent Chilean Riots, Corrigan (Lingren) to Department of State, 11 April 1957, 725.00/4-1157, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Courtesy Ca ll of Recaredo Ossa Undurr aga, Devine, 15 May 1957, 825.00/5-1557. Memorandum, Wiley T. Buchanan, Chief of Protocol, to Bernard M. Shanley, Secretary to the President, 12 March 1957, Folder Chile (7), Box 7, AWF International Series, DDEL. Memorandum of Conversation Call on the Secretary of State by the Chilean Ambassador, Wiley T. Buchanan, 3 April 1957, 611.25/4-357, FRUS 1955-57 VII: 823. Memorandum of Conversation Difficult Situation Occasioned by Civil Disorders in Chile, Devine, 5 April 1957, 725.00/4-557, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 218

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met, Rubottom acknowledged, The United States has a tremendous stake in the success of the Chilean program, and that if it failed, the Chilean economy may go down the drain but perhaps worse would be the effect on other countri esand the gains which the Communists would achieve at our expense. Lyon stressed the imp act upon Chilean domestic po litics, asserting that it was essential that the programs success be generally evident before the 1958 presidential elections.Otherwise [the] new government [is] more apt to be [the] wrong kind. 60 With the stabilization program in serious danger of fa ilure, U.S. policymakers increased PL-480 aid to keep foodstuffs readily available in Chile, and th ey gave serious consid eration to the Ibez governments request for a $50 million loan to cover its budget shortfall so that Chile would not dump the stabilization program. 61 As the weeks passed, the urgency created by the April riots faded, and U.S. officials reduced the loan fr om $50 million to $40 million, then to $25 million, even though Klein and Saks, Anaconda Copper, and probably Kennecott Copper were pressing ARA to grant it. Rubottom sent Harry Turkel Director of ARAs Regional Economic Affairs office, to Santiago to investigate Chiles fina ncial situation, and Turkel returned, urging a $25 million loan, as well as further belt-tightening measures. The Chileans obtained a $12.5 million 60 Rubottom to Lyon, 22 June 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 839. Memorandum Proposed Statement on Chile, Rubottom to Berding, 10 April 1957. Memorandum P olitical Importance of Increasing Loan Component from 80% to 85%, Rubottom, 20 May 1957, Folder 1957 Chile, Box 2, Records for the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Roy R. Rubottom), 1957-1959, RG59-Lot, NA. Hereafter cited as Rubottom Files. Telegram 579, Lyon to Department of State, 12 April 1957, 825.10/11-1257, FRUS, 1955-57 VII: 829. Lyon to Rubottom, 14 May 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 835. 61 Telegram 493, Dulles (Bernbaum, Silberstein, Devine) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 8 April 1957, 725.5-MSP/4657, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 826, 826 n Memorandum Chilean Stabilization Program, Rubottom to Kalijarvi, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 4 June 1957, 825.10/6-457, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 835-836. Memorandum Political Importance of Increasing Loan Component from 80 to 85% Under PL-480 Sales Agreement with Chile, Rubottom, 20 May 1957, Folder 957 Chile, Box 2, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum Proposed Statement on Chile, Rubottom to Berding, 10 April 1957. United States Supporting Chiles Stabilization Effort, Department of State Bulletin XXXVI/933 (13 May 1957): 773. Memorandum of Conversation Call on the Secretary of State, Buchanan, 3 April 1957. Te legram 546, Lyon to Secretary of State, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 219

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loan, but only after several months. By Nove mber 1957, U.S. officials continued to press the Ibez government to implement elements of the Klein-Saks program. 62 U.S. efforts to maintain the remnants of Chiles stabilization program reveal that the Eisenhower administration layered an economic reform model on top of the existing democratic model and elevated U.S. stakes in Chile. U.S. officials worried that a failed effort in Chile would severely impair any possibilities of im plementing similar programs in other countries. Moreover, they did not want th e United States to fail a friend and ally. As Lyon told Rubottom, this situation reminds me of when I was in Egypt [1944-45] and the Egyptians looked to us for guidance and assistance. Im afra id we failed them. The Chileans are turning to us just this way today. I do not want to fail them, and I know you dont either. 63 Seeking the Presidency Again While U.S. officials sought to avert a failure and save the Klein-Saks program, Chiles political parties turned their a ttention to the upcoming 1958 Presiden tial election. Four political 62 Memorandum of Conversation Klein-Saks Mission and Chilean Economic Program, Devine, 28 June 1957, 825.00/6-2857; Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Governments Need for Financial Assistance, 16 July 1957, 825.00/7-1657; and Memorandum Your 11:30 am Appointment with Mr. Paul Jessup [Secretary of Kennecott Copper Company] Devine to Rubottom, 23 July 1957, 825.00/7-2357; all Folder 825.00/1-557, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Report on Trip to Evaluate Chilean Economic Situation, Harry Turkel, Director of the Office of Inte r-American Regional Economic Affairs, to Secretary of State, 18 July 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 VII: 843-844. Current Economic Developments, Issue No. 527, Department of State, 3 September 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 850-851. Memorandum of Conversation Economic and Financial Developments in Chile, Devine, 6 November 1957, 825.131/11-657, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 852-854. 63 Memorandum Public Disorders in Chile, Rubottom (Dev ine) to the Under Secretary, 3 April 1957, 725.00/4357. Telegram 547, Lyon to Secretary of State, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Difficu lt Situation Occasioned by Civil Disorders in Chile, Devine, 5 April 1957, 725.00 /4-557. Memorandum of Conversation Recen t Disturbances in Santiago, Lyon, 6 April 1957. Telegram 550, Knox to Klein and Saks, 5 April 1957, 725.00/4-557. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Interest in Financial Assist ance, Silberstein, 4 April 1957, 725.00/4-457, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, NA. Memorandum Chilean Stabilization Program, Rubottom to Kalijarvi, 5 June 1957. Letter, Lyon to Rubottom, 11 July 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 841. 220

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blocs emerged, each with their own presidential candidate: the FRAP, the Radicals, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberal-Conservative coal ition. In July 1957, the Falange and Social Christian Conservatives merged into the Christian Democratic Party, creating a moderate Left party. The Christian Democrats selected Edua rdo Frei as their can didate, and the fading Agrarian Labor Party later endorsed his candidacy. As a test of hi s appeal, Frei ran for a Senate seat in the Metropolitan Distri ct (Santiago) during the March 1957 Congressional elections, and had received the highest number of votes of any senatorial candi date in the country. The U.S. Embassy described Frei as a winner, and Frei had broad support among the Liberals, who were ready to endorse him. Frei might have had the Liberals endorsement, but a Liberal senator had a heart attack and died during his speech opposin g the endorsement of Frei, and the senators funeral postponed the partys deci sion. When the Liberals r econvened, the Conservatives had nominated Liberal Senator Jorge Alessandri Rodr guez as their candidate, prompting the Liberals to support the son of the famous Arturo and th e younger brother of Sena te President Fernando. 64 The deeply divided Radical Party nominated Senator Luis Bossay Leyva but nearly split. Bossay and Left-leaning Radicals wa nted to revive the Popular Front and align with the FRAP; meanwhile, the Right faction, led by Julio Durn Neumann, sought an alliance with the Liberals. The Liberals opposed Bossay, and the FRAP distrust ed the Radicals, particularly after a Radical senator invoked the Law for the Defense of Demo cracy to disqualify four recently elected FRAP 64 Despatch 19 Socialist Unity Congress, July 5-7, 1957, Belton (R. W. Herbert) to Department of State, 725.003/7-1057, Folder 725.001/12-1956, Box 3027; and Despatch 143 Establishment of the Christian Democrat Party of Chile, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of Stat e, 9 August 1957, 725.00/8-957, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; both DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Chilean Presidential Candidates, Devine to Rubottom and Sanders, 25 September 1957, 725.00/9-2557. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca, I: 438-449. For the death of Senator Marn Balmaceda, see I: 446. Bray, C hilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 142144. Germn Gamonal, Jorge Alessandri: El Hombre, El Poltico (Santiago: Holanda Comunicaciones, 1987), 122-124. 221

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deputies (the Radicals gained two of the seats). Rejected by the Right and the Left, the Radicals feared isolation and certain defeat in 1958, and pressure intens ified within the party to drop Bossay. Bossay held on, but the party narrowl y averted a formal split in December 1957. 65 The FRAP faced internal divisions as well, with Allende and the Communists agreeing upon strategy. The former Popular Socialists had adopted a workers front strategy: espousing anti-oligarchic, anti-imperialist rhet oric, rejecting coopera tion with bourgeois parties, and advocating the crea tion of a socialist Democrati c Republic of Workers. The Communists urged a broad Nationa l Liberation electoral coalit ion that promoted cooperation among all progressive forces. Allende and mo derate Socialists fa vored the Communists popular front strategy as well; moreover, they gained control of the Social ist Partys leadership when the two Socialist parties reunited to form a single party in July 1957. 66 Allende gained the FRAPs presidential nomination with overw helming support, but he did so by departing from customary political practice. After the Socialis ts reunification, Allende met with his close friend Salomn Corbaln, president of the Socialist Party, and proposed that the FRAP have a large nominating convention, one which invited a broad range of Leftist 65 Despatch 1165 The Presidential Pict ure According to Julio Duran, Corrigan to Department of State, 6 May 1957, 725.00/5-657; Despatch 1185 The Radical Partys Problem, Corrigan to Department of State, 10 May 1957, 725.00/5-1057; Despatch 1214 Fissures Within Popular Action Front, Corrigan to Department of State, 17 May 1957, 725.00/5-1757; Memorandum Final Composition of Chiles New Congress Convening May 21 st Devine to Rubottom and Sanders, 22 May 1957; Despatch 456 Problems Currently Confronting Radical Party, Zook (Lindgren, Zook) to Department of State, 7 November 1957, 725.00/11-757; Despatch 586 New Analysis of Radical Party Campaign Outlook, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of State, 13 December 1957, 725.00/12-11357; all Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 66 Cheln, Trayectoria del Socialismo, 137, 142-44. Despatch 633 Leftist Unity: Political Alignments in Chile, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 1 March 1956, 725.00/3-156, Folder 725.00/1-456, Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 36. Despatch 378 16th Nacional Congreso of the Partido Socialista de Chile, Sanders (Corrigan) to Department of State, 29 November 1955, 725.003/11-2955; and Despatch 28 Socialist Unity Congress, July 5-7, 1957, William Belton, Counselor of Embassy (R. W. Herbert) to Department of State, 10 July 1957, 725.003/7-1057; both Folder 725.001/12-1956, Box 3027, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 222

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groups, including sports clubs, intellectuals, prof essionals, unions, and student organizations. Allendes idea appears to have broken from the usual political practice, in which nominees were determined by party executives and coalition candidates emerged from agreements negotiated between party leaders. Alle ndes popular convention circum vented party executives and played to his broad appeal among the rank-and-fi le. Allendes purpose wa s two-fold: to bring more people into the FRAP, but more importa ntly, to promote the image that the FRAP candidate represented the entirety of Chile: urbanites, campesinos miners, intellectuals, factory workers, professionals, Indians, and students. Corbaln recognized that a broad convention would also mitigate the divisions within the FR AP, and he rushed to make the arrangements. 67 The nominating convention did not go as Allende anticipated; in fact, it worked too well. Over 1800 delegates attended the convention, which was held from 15 to 17 September 1957, and more than 1600 could cast ballots. Allende e xpected to finish third in the initial balloting and then gradually emerge as the unity candidate; however, he easily gathered the highest number of votes on the first ballot, more than 120 over his nearest competitor. Allende was furious. He feared that the first ballot results would cast him as the candidate on arrival, split the FRAP, and undercut his drive for unity. Al lende threatened to w ithdraw his name from contention, but Corbaln and the other candidate s convinced Allende to remain a candidate. When the results of the first ballot were announced, the delegates overwhelmingly voted to nominate Allende as their candidate. 68 67 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 43-46. Jaime Surez Bastidas, Allende, Visin de un militante (Santiago: Editorial Jurdica ConoSur, 1992), 28-29. Nolff, Salvador Allende 59. 68 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 48-51. 223

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Allende may have underestimated his support, bu t his acceptance speech enlisted it for the campaign. Allende accepted the nomination not as personal res ponsibility but as a responsibility of the whole conve ntion, and he asked the delega tes to demonstr ate the shared responsibility by raising their hands and pledging their comple te support. [T]the campaign will not be easy, he continued, and the platform that we are going to carry out will not be achieved without sacrifices. We are the vanguard party of Chiles progress, Allende declared, We shall win, because we constitute a renewed movement that is committed to changing the political, economic, and social face of our na tion.We shall win, because we count on support that is the most representative that there is in our land.We sha ll win, because to our side will come all of those who sincerely desire progress and well-being for our people.We shall win, because with us goes the enthusiasm and desire for making a nation greater from justice, progress, and liberty. With rousing applause, Allendes campaign had begun. 69 Surveying the candidates, the U.S. embassy beli eved that Bossay had the least chance of success, which left the race between Frei, Ales sandri, and Allende, with a fifth candidate, Antonio Zamorano, serving as nuisance value. Embassy officers admitted that Frei was the outstanding exponentfor Christian Democratic philosophy, but th ey distrusted him and had long disliked his reluctance to take a strong an ti-Communist position. Still, they could not ignore that Frei was insisting th at a Chilean foreign policy not based on friendship and mutual understanding with the United States would lead [Chile] along the path of doom and failure. 70 69 Surez, Allende, visin de un militante 30-33. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 50. 70 Despatch 107 Eduardo Frei Accepts Presidential Nomination, Zook (Lindgren Dorr) to Department of State, 30 July 1957, 725.00/7-3057, attached to Despatch 94, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of State, 25 July 1957, 725.00/7-2557, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; Despat ch 643 Chilean Presidential Campaign, William Belton, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 2 January 1958, 725.00/1-258, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025; 224

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Embassy officers favored Alessandri but consider ed him a risky candidate. He possessed none of personality or popular appeal of his father (Arturo) and was too fa r to the Right to be acceptable to most Chileans. Even if Ale ssandri won, the Embassy doubted that he could govern Chile effectively with a minority coalition from the Right. 71 Embassy officers described Zamorano, a defrocked priest who entered the race but had no organized support, as colorful, demagogic, and unpredictable. Zamorano was elec ted to the Chamber of Deputies as a FRAP candidate in March 1957, and had gained renown by helping a FRAP candidate defeat a heavily favored Rightist candidate in a July 1957 by-election. 72 Allendes campaign staff soon no ticed that the 1958 campaign di ffered markedly from that of 1952, namely support for Allende was much gr eater and stronger. During the A Days Wages for Victory campaign, Osvaldo Puccio, head of Allendes presidential campaign, went to a winery, expecting no more than eight workers to donate to Allendes campaign, instead 60 contributed. Performers of San tiagos vaudeville theaters organized a benefit for Allende at the Despatch 834 Chilean Political Trends and Prospects, Corrigan to Department of State, 15 February 1957, 725.00/2-1557, Folder 725.00/7-356, Box 3024; Despatch 143 Establishment of the Christian-Democrat Party of Chile, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of State, 9 August 1957, 725.00/8-957, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; Despatch 1165 The Presidential Picture According to Julio Duran, Corrigan to Department of State, 6 May 1957, 725.00/5-657, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; and Despatch 1048 Special Powers for President Ibez, Corrigan to Department of State, 9 April 1957, 725.00/4-957, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; all DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 143 Establishment of the Christian Democrat Party of Chile, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of State, 9 August 1957, 725.00/8-957. 71 Despatch 643 Chilean Presidential Campaign, William Belton, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 2 January 1958, 725.00/1-258, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025; Memorandum Chilean Presidential Candidates, Devine to Rubottom and Sanders, 25 September 1957, 725.00/9-2557, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; Despatch 1146 Presidential Picture Subseq uent to Recent Events, Corrigan to Department of State, 3 May 1957, 725.00/5-357, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; all DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 72 Despatch 84 July 21 By-Elections, Zook (Zook and Lindgren) to Department of State, 23 July 1957, 725.00/72357, Folder 725.00/4-157; and Despatch 834 Chilean Political Trends and Prospects, Corrigan to Department of State, 15 February 1957, 725.00/2-2557, both Box 3024, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 145-146. Despatch 643 Chilean Presidential Campaign, Belton to Department of State, 2 January 1958, 725.00/1-258, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 225

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Caupolicn Theatre. The show lasted from 9pm to 3am and performed to a packed house. Then, two prostitutes came to Allendes campaign offices and asked that he meet with them and their colleagues so they could donate a days wages to his campaign. Fearing a scandal if Allende met with the women, Puccio and FRAP campaign leader Jos Toh went in his place. They were properly welcomed by more than 200 women and received as great quantity of money. 73 Many who supported Allendes candidacy, Pu ccio admitted, had only a vague notion of class struggle, and did not speak of a socialis t government. They instead expressed hope for a better future or a better life for the next ge neration. This hope was ensconced in the Allende campaigns theme song. Borrowing the melody of the theme song for the 1957 film, Bridge over the River Kwai supporters attached the words: P rontola reaccin sabrcuando termina su reinarcuandoel Doctor Allendea la Monedallegue a gobernar [Soon, the reaction will know when its rule has ended, when Doctor Allende arrives at La Moneda to govern]. 74 Even though Secretary of State Dulles d eclared, in November 1957, that we see no likelihood at the present time of communism gaining control of any Latin American government, ARA and embassy officials worried th at Allende and the FRAP might very well do so in Chile. Several Chileans, including some co nservatives, remarked that Allendes campaign was picking up surprising strength as the campaign progressed. The U.S. Consul in Antofagasta reported that Allende led in the pr ovince and was still gaining votes. Some leftleaning Radicals hinted that Bossay should drop out and support Allende. In February 1958, embassy officers heard that Freis campaign wa s lagging. They also discounted a public 73 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 64-68. 74 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 65, 66, 67-68, 70. 226

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opinion poll that showed Allende as a distan t third because they believed that the poll underestimated Allendes support. By March, six months before the election, the embassy expressed concern that Alle nde might win in September. 75 Anxieties and Missed Opportunities Allendes improving chances of victory likely contributed to ARAs conviction that more concerted action was needed against Communism in Latin America, a belief which led to Vice President Nixons ill-fated trip to Latin Am erica. Urging a stronger offensive against Communism, Special Assistant Henr y A. Hoyt told Rubottom that we must concede that the communists have made gains over the past year a nd that U.S. actions were largely ad hoc and not much more than a containment policy. Rubottom concurred and told Dulles that ARA was going to increase the intensity and improve the quality of its an ti-communist campaign. 76 By Christmas 1957, ARA grew more anxious, and Rubottom asked Dulles to travel to the Southern 75 Dulles quoted in Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 92. Despatch 586 New Analysis of Radical Party Campaign Outlook, Zook (Lindgren) to Department of State, 13 December 1957, 725.00/12-1357. Memorandum of Conversation Political and Economic Comments on Chile, Devine, 18 November 1957, 725.00/11-1857, Folder 725.00/4-157, Box 3024; Despatch 10 Political Activities in Antofagasta, Regulo Rivera, U.S. Consul, to Department of State, 26 February 1958, 725.00/2-2658, Folder 725.00/1-258; and Despatch 782 Chilean Presidential Campaign, William Belton, Charg dAffaires ad interim, to Department of State, 4 February 1958, 725.00/2-458, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025; all DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 898 Developments in Chilean Presidential Campaign, Zook to Department of State, 7 March 1958, 725.00/3-758, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. For the poll and the embassys analysis, see Despatch 851 Public Opinion Poll on Presidential Election, 24 February 1958, 725.00/2-2458, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025. Despatch 957 Embassy Views on Problems Resulting from an Increase in U.S. Copper Import Tax, Belton (Eakens, Zook, Richardson) to Department of State, 21 March 1958, 411-256/3-2158, in U.S. Department of State, FRUS 19581960 Volume V, microfiche supplement (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1991), Document CL-1, Frame 84-2635. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1958-60 V: Microfiche, document#, frame#. 76 Rubottom opens his memorandum to Du lles saying that Communism posed little or no immediate threat to U.S. security in the region, but the remainder reiterated Hoyts points and concern.. Memorandum Anti-Communist Campaign in Latin America, Hoyt to Rubottom and Snow Deputy Assistant Secretar y of State, 19 November 1957; and Memorandum Communist Ac tivities in Latin America, Rubottom to Secretary of State, 4 December 1957; both Folder 1957 Communism, Box 2, Subject Files, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 227

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Cone in February because the situ ation had changed substantially. Dulles had little interest in the region and no desire to travel south. He re quested Eisenhowers guidance on the request and called attention to the upcom ing NATO, SEATO, and Baghdad Pa ct meetings, as well as his own vacation plans, implying all were more im portant than a trip to Chile and Argentina. 77 Eisenhower agreed with Rubottom, I urgently believe something should be done, and he proposed sending Vice President Richard M. Nixon, w ith Dulles or himself travelling to South America shortly thereafter. A few weeks late r, Rubottom, Dulles, and Eisenhower were all pressing Nixon to make the trip. 78 Ambassador Lyon, meanwhile, called for a wholesale reorientation of U.S. policy towards Chile. He was categorical about the necessity of doing so: We have missed opportunities in the past. What government has not? But let us not repeat the mistake here, Lyon warned, We must demonstrate, even more strongly than we ha ve in the past, our sincere interest in Chile.If we do not, others will. In fact, others already have. Lyons re orientation would have elevated Chile to being a key U.S. partner in the Cold War. In a 25 February 1958 despatch, Lyon proposed that the United States should take Chile more into our confidence, and should promote an increased display of [Chiles] democratic traditions in the forums of international 77 Memorandum Your Trip to South America, Rubottom to Secretary of State, 26 December 1957, attached to Dulles to Eisenhower, 28 December 1957, Folder State Department November 1957 January 1958 (4), Box 2, Files of Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpastor, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-1961, Su bject Series, State Department Subser ies, DDEL. Hereafter cited as SSCGMR State. Dulles to Eisenhower, 28 December 1957. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Dulles with the President, 26 Feb 1953, Folder -White House Tele phone Conversations January to April, 1953, Box 10, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles Papers: Secretary of State: Papers,1951-1959, DDEL. 78 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 101. Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1962), 183-185. Dulles to Nixon, 6 March 1958, Folder [no name], Box Papers from State Department, Series 397, South America Trip 1958 Files, Nixo n Pre-Presidential Papers, National Arch ives-Pacific Region, Laguna Niguel, CA. Hereafter cited as Nixon Pre-Presidential Papers. 228

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affairs. He asserted that the United States could create one of the strongest possible bulwarks against Communism in the world in the West ern Hemisphere, so why should we not lay the foundations of this democratic bul wark here in Chile? He also urged Washington to treat the Chileans as the democratic partners that they were, and to stop constantly underlining the shortcomings of Chiles anti-inflation program and start lauding its succe sses. Chileans were politically sophisticated, L yon wrote, and Chile, with re ason, prides itself on being a democratic country, and it is justly democratic, with all that this implies. However, he warned, it was not beyond the realms of po ssibility that the Soviets could obtain a bridgehead in this m ost vulnerable third member of the ABC powers. 79 While Lyon sought to use Chiles democratic exceptionalism as a basis for a new U.S. policy, Donovan Q. Zook, the embassys new political officer, sought to institutionalize it in the Department of State. Zook sent ARA a speech by Conservative deputy Ral Yrarrazaval and suggested that ARA make Yrarrazavals speech part of the orientation materials for new Foreign Service officers preparing to work in Chile. In the speech titled Democracy in Chile and given at the U.S. Naval War College, Yrarrazaval cast Ch ileans as the English of Latin America or the Americans of the South. Yrarrazavals U.S. a udience would have recogn ized his descriptions of battling the Araucano Indians, settling th e land, opening mines, and overcoming great distances to reach other parts of the world. W ith echoes of Frederick Jackson Turners frontier thesis, Yrarrazaval asserted that such circumstances had fostered the development of democracy 79 Despatch 857 Communism in Chile, Lyon to Department of State, 25 February 1958, 611-25/2-2558, Folder 611.25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 229

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while other Latin American countries endured mili tary dictatorships and had encouraged the rise of an educated and numerous middle class who were committed to democratic institutions. 80 Lyons democratic partner proposal gained AR As attention, but three events President Ibezs swerve to the Left, a U.S. proposal to raise taxes on impor ted copper, and Vice President Nixons trip to Latin America closed the window of opportunity. Regarding Ibezs swerve to the Left, relations between President Ibez and the Right had broken down, and Ibezs appeal to the Left for support caused U.S. officials (and some Chileans) to worry that Ibez might throw his support to Allende. Th e president met with CU TCh union leaders in late 1957 and discussed their obj ections to the Klein-Saks program. He also offered FRAP leader Baltazar Castro the position of Minister of Interior, one of the most important positions in the cabinet, but Castro declined the offer. 81 With Ibezs flirting with the Left, U.S. offi cials subtly tried to dissuade him, but their efforts went awry. U.S. offici als had intended to use Ibezs state visit to the Washington in December 1957 for some straight talking with Ibez, but Eisenhower suffered a stroke on 25 November, forcing U.S. officials to cancel the vis it. Lyon believed that the visit had acted as a brake on Ibez from shifting fully to the Left so he asked ARA if Eisenhower would write Ibez a letter express[ed] regret for postponing th e visit but also of hi s (Eisenhowers) desire to talk about the need for all the free countriesto maintain a solid frontagainst 80 Speech Democracy in Chile, Ral Yrarrazaval L., 14 May 1958, enclosed with Despatch 1121 Democracy in Chile, Zook to Department of State, 14 May 1958, 725.00/5-1458, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 81 Memorandum Chilean Situation, Hoyt to Rubottom and Snow, 11 October 1957, 725.00/10-1157. Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ib ez Government, 147. Telegram 386, Lyon to Secretary of State, 27 November 1957, Folder Chile (6), Box 7, AWF International Series, DDEL. 230

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Communism. Eisenhower sent th e letter, and Ibez replied th at he opposed Communism as well. Ibez also assured Lyon th at he was not m oving to the Left. 82 A week later, Lyon asked Rubottom if the White House c ould publish the exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Ibez, as well as offer a new date for the state visit, preferably early to mid-1958. If we keep the invitation [to the White House] pending until April or May, said Lyon, it will give us about three months more of holding [Ibez] in check, and probably prevent him from turning Left for the remainder of his presidential term. Rubottom, Dulles, and Eisenhower agreed. The letters were published and Ibezs state visit was rescheduled for late April (Eisenhowers first after his stroke). The scheduled st ate visit likely was the reason w hy Chile was not placed on the itinerary of Vice President Nixons trip to Latin America. 83 Lyons new plan to hold Ibez in check st arted to unravel due to a by-election for a Chamber of Deputies seat. On 23 March 1958, voters in a Santiago district cast ballots, and the Rightist candidate won by severa l thousand votes. Fearing the election foreshadowed an Alessandri victory, the Center a nd Left parties united into a bloc called Everyone against Alessandri (TOCOA Todos contra Alessandri). With a majority in the Chamber and Senate, TOCOA ousted the Liberal/Conservative leader ship and announced a two-point program: passage of electoral reforms (e xpanding suffrage and introducing the secret ballot) and the repeal 82 Telegram 386, Lyon to Secretary of State, 27 November 1957. Nixon, Six Crises 170-181. Lyon to Rubottom, 20 December 1957, 611.25/12-2057, attach ed to Rubottom to Lyon, 15 January 1958, Folder 611. 25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 83 Lyon to Rubottom, 20 December 1957, 611.25/12-2057. Rubottom to Lyon, 15 January 1958. Memorandum Rescheduling of State Visit and Publi cation of Correspondence with President Carlos Ibez of Chile, Dulles to the President, 17 January 1958, Folder State Visits 1958-1959 (3), Box 5, SS-CGMR -State, DDEL. For the exchange, see Eisenhower to Ibez, 5 December 1957, an d Ibez to Eisenhower, 13 D ecember 1957, attached to Memorandum Rescheduling of State Visit, Dulles to the President, 17 January 1958. 231

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of the Defense of Democracy law. Supporting th e repeal, Radical candidate Bossay claimed that the strength of Chiles democratic traditions mitigated the threat posed by Communists; moreover, the European democracies of Great Br itain, France, and Italy had Communist parties, implying that Chiles democracy was equally capa ble of doing so. With TOCOA in control of Congress, Ibez faced a strong inducemen t to make alliances with the Left. 84 As the second event, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton unintentionally derailed Lyons plan to keep Ibez from turning to the Left. On 11 April, a few days after TOCOA took control of Chiles Congress, S eaton recommended that the U.S. Congress revoke the suspension of taxes on imported copper. Seatons recommen dation caught the Department of State, the White House, and Chileans entirely by surprise. Dulles confessed to President Eisenhower that Seaton had made a bad statement, and that a violent press and public reaction in Chile had resulted. 85 Rubottom exacerbated the controversy wh en he admitted to Chilean Ambassador Mariano Puga that the Department of State was caught between a foreign relations problem (its opposition to reimposition of import taxes) and a domestic problem (copper companies 84 Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 150-153. Despatch 1019 Developments During March in Chilean Presidential Campaign, Zook to Department of State, 725.00/4-1158; and Despatch 1129 Political Observations of Luis Bossay and Dario Ste. Mari e, Zook to Department of State, 16 May 1958, 725.00/51658; both Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 85 Press Release Secretary Seaton Urges Repeal of suspensi on of Copper Import Taxes, Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 11 April 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 V: microfiche, CL-2, 84-2639. Memorandum, Dulles to the President, 17 April 1958, Folder -Du lles, John Foster April 1958 (2), Box 10, AWF Dulles-Herter Series, DDEL. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Dulles with the President, 16 April 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, V: microfiche, Cl-3, 84-2641. Memorandum Suggested Reply to President Ibez, Dulles to the President, 17 April 1958, Folder Chile (5), Box 7, AWFInternational Series, DDEL. 232

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lobbying Congress for protection from foreign im ports). Rubottoms comment suggested that the department was indecisive even though it strongly opposed Seatons proposal. 86 Confusion over job titles fueled the uproar as much as Seatons proposal had. Embassy officers informed ARA that they suspected Ib ez (and perhaps many Chileans) assumed that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior was the top-ranki ng member of the Cabinet, which was the case in Chile. Chiles Minister of the Interior roughly approximated a combination of the U.S. Attorney General, Secretary for Homeland Security, domestic policy advisor, and Chief of Staff; meanwhile, the U.S. Minister of In terior is equivalent to a ble nd of Chiles Minister of Mines and Minister of Lands and Colonization. With the job title confusion, Seatons recommendation sounded like a formal change in U.S. policy. Although recognizing the problem, neither Charg dAffaires ad interim William Belton nor other embassy officers tried to clear up the confusion with Ibez and other Chilean cabinet member s. The embassy did report that Ibez was expecting Eisenhower or Dulles to clarify Seatons statement. When neither did, Ibez abruptly cancelled his state vis it to Washington, which was less than two weeks away a clear diplomatic snub to the United States. 87 86 Rubottom comments are discussed in Editorial Footnote #1 for Press Release Secretar y Seaton Urges Repeal of Suspension on Copper Import Taxes, Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 11 April 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, V: microfiche, Cl-2, 84-2640. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Dulles with Thomas Mann, 1 May 1958, Folder --Memoranda of Tel. Conv.--Gen. Apr 1, 1958 to May 29, 1958 (2), Box 8, Dulles Papers Telephone Calls Series, DDEL. For the Department of States opposition to Seatons recommendation, see Memorandum Economic Problems in Latin America, Rubottom (Maurice M. Bernbaum, Office of South American Affairs) to C. Douglas Dillon, 3 June 1958, enclosed with Memorandum Draft Recommendations on Economic and Political Policy in Latin America, Bernbaum to William Key, Office of the Vice President, 4 June 1958, Folder Latin America Programs, RN Recommendations, Box 10, Series 401 South American Trip 1958, Nixon PrePresidential Papers. 87 Telegram 692, Belton to Secretary of State, 17 April 1958, attached to Memorandum, Fisher Howe to General Goodpaster, 18 April 1958; and Translation of Telegram, Ibez to Eisenhower, 16 April 1958, attached to Eisenhower to Ibez, 18 April 1958; both Folder State Visits, 1958-1959 (3), Box 5, CGMRSubject Series, State Department Subseries, DDEL. 233

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Seatons proposal ballooned into a diplomatic fiasco and handed Allende a campaign issue. The embassy told ARA that Chileans almost universally applaud Ib ezs cancellation and deem it as upholding national dignity. On the campaign trail, Allende criticized the United States for adopting internally a policy diametrically opposed to that which it imposes on other nations. The nation of the North, Allende de clared, imposes tariffs on imported minerals in order to protect its mining industry, but demands th at Chile open its markets to U.S. products. Charg Belton, meanwhile, skewered Ibez: He long ago earned [the] local title of the horse: Stubborn animal, likely to run any direction, and inclined to kick out at those too near him. This time he kicked us and is momentarily reapi ng public acclaim for so doing. Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that they could do nothing but c all of the dinners, but Eisenhower blamed Seaton for the cancellation. The president as ked Dulles if Seaton had coordinated his announcement with the Department of State, an d Dulles said no. Irked, Eisenhower said he would have his assistant call Se aton and tell him by no means is he running foreign affairs of the US and if he is going to make statements he will coordinate them. Adding to Eisenhowers difficulties, the U.S. Congress re-imposed the taxes on imported copper. 88 Riding a wave of popularity, Ibez embr aced TOCOAs program, and the TOCOAcontrolled Congress and Ibez enact ed several election reforms. The new suffrage laws levied fines on persons failing to vote and severe penalties for the cohecho (vote buying), through 88 Speech by Allende, Por las calles de hoy desfilo mundo del maana, El Siglo 31 May 1958, p. 6. Telegram 692, Belton to Secretary of State, 17 April 1958. The telegram appears in FRUS 1958-1960 V: microfiche, but its last two paragraphs were declassified after publication. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Dulles to the President, 16 April 1958; and Memorandum of Telephone Co nversation, Eisenhower to Dulles, 16 April 1958; both FRUS 1958-1960 V, microfiche: Cl-3, 84-2641. For reimposition of imported copper taxes, see Memorandum Strategic Controls on Copper and U. S. Relations with Chile, Rubottom (Silb erstein) to C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 18 June 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 V: microfiche, Cl-6, 84-2654. 234

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which owners of fundos (landed estates) had l ong controlled the votes of rural workers and small landholders. With land and factory owners unable to control the vot es of workers, the Left and Center gained strength, and the Right shrank to a minority. Congress and Ibez also repealed the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy. Despite long viewing the law as bad legislation and a failure, U.S. offi cials considered repeal a distinct loss from the standpoint of U.S. policy objectives in Chile. One month before the election, the Co mmunist Party regained its legal standing and party memb ers regained the right to vote. 89 After Ibezs swerve to th e Left and Seatons call to impose taxes on imported copper, Vice President Nixons trip to Latin America was the third event that closed the window of opportunity for Lyons democratic partner pla n. U.S. officials had not placed Chile on the Vice Presidents itinerary (due to Ibezs scheduled state visit), but the Chileans angry reaction to Seatons statement and Ibezs cancellation of the state visit ensured that any representative of the United States would be badly received in Santiago. The Ibez state visit/Seaton statement fiasco foreshadowed the difficulties that Nixon faced on his May 1958 trip. Nixon debated U.S. policy with hostile students in Uruguay, and faced angry students in Peru, with a 89 The U.S. Information Service provided materials to newspapers, radio stations, and Congressional opposition in an effort to prevent repeal of the Law for the Permanen t Defense of Democracy. Since repeal occurred during the 1958 presidential campaign, claims of covert U.S. funding in the 1958 campaign may have been USIS efforts to stop repeal. Bray, Chilean Politics during the Second Ibez Government, 153-157. Gil, The Political System of Chile 216. Despatch 634 President Ibez Press Interview with St. Louis Post-Dispatch Correspondent, Corrigan to Department of State, 1 March 1956, 825.00/3-156, Folder 825.00/1-956, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Progress in Chile on OCB Programs and Courses of Action, Zook, n.d. [22 November 1958] enclosed with Despatch 517 Report of Progress Made in Implemen ting Operations Plan for Latin America, Krieg, Counselor of Embassy, to Department of State, 22 November 1958, 611.25/11-2258, Folder 611.25/1-3158, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 235

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stone thrown at him, striking his in the head. In Venezuela, Nixon was spit upon at the airport and a mob attacked his motorcad e on the streets of Caracas. 90 Nixons rough treatment in South America shocked Americans and Latin Americans alike, but many took it as a sign of the state of U.S.-L atin American relations. Senator Wayne Morse (D Oregon), chair of the Sena tes Subcommittee of American Re public Affairs, put it bluntly: In 1953, the Presidents brother, Milton Eisenh ower, made a successful good will tour of South America. Five years later our Vice Presid ent was met with stones and forced to return home. In those five years, we have obviously mi ssed the boat, so to speak, in South America. Horacio Surez, the Chilean Charg dAffaires in Washington, explained to the Foreign Minister in Santiago that Nixons trip had the virtue of demonstrating to th e [United States] the errors of the [U.S.] policy, togeth er with the urgent necessity of changing it. The Chilean press condemned the violence, but they did not view Nixon/United States as a blameless victim. The conservative El Diario Ilustrado editorialized that Latin Americans felt neglect and resentment as they witnessed torrents of (U.S.) money heading to Europe and Asia for economic development, but Latin America received little. 91 90 Marvin R. Zahniser and W. Michael Weis, A Diplomat ic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixons Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958, Diplomatic History 13/2 (Spring 1989): 163-190. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 100-116. Alan McPherson offers a good discussion of the anti-Americanism aspect of Nixons experience in Caracas. See McPherson, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 9-37. For Nixons perspective, see Nixon, Six Crises 183-234. 91 Radio Broadcast, Wayne Morse, 21 May 1958, Folder Nixon, Richard, Vice President, 1957-60, Box A96, Papers of Senator Wayne L. Morse, Special Collections, Un iversity of Oregon Library, Eugene, Oregon. Hereafter cited as Morse Papers. Horacio Surez, Charg dAffaires, to Minister of Foreign Relations, 16 May 1958, Documento 782/53, Volumen 4972, Tomo I 1958 Confidenciales: Oficios y Varios, Embajada de Chile en Washington, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Santiago, Chile. Hereafter cited as AMRE. Despatch 80 Impact of Nixons Visit on Chilean Public Opinion, USISSantiago (H. A. Ryan ) to USIAWashington, 19 May 1958, Folder Loose Material (3 of 3), Box 2, Series 390, South America Trip (1958) Files, Nixon PrePresidential Papers. 236

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Although ARA had favored Chile since 1954, U.S. embassy officers in Santiago agreed with the Chilean press and Senator Morse; in fact, Charg Belton implored Washington, Demonstrate that we do recognize the difference between a Dominican [Republic] dictatorship and a Chilean democracy. Although the embassy te mpered its criticism with comments such as Chileans are adept in se eing the mote in our eye and not th e beam in their own, Belton made clear that the Chileans wanted new ideas, not more explanation of old ones; they desired new systems and techniques, not more volume. He urged Washington to work to resolve commodity problems, adequately finance long-t erm development, build housing, increase PL480 assistance, support a regional free trade market, and better coordinate U.S. policy and public relations. Belton was advocating an early version of the Alliance for Progress; furthermore, he asserted that U.S. insistence that the Chileans no t have cultural and non-st rategic trade contacts with Soviet bloc nations gives the impression of blind fear. We have not lived down the harm McCarthyism did us here, and [we] will not until we relax and let the Chileans know we recognize they are as politically sophisticated as we are. 92 While Belton and the embassy pressed Washin gton to treat the Chileans as democrats, Vice President Nixon argued that democracy was the problem, not the solution. In a 22 May meeting of the NSC, Nixon asserted that the threat of Communism in Latin America was greaterthan ever before in history. He gran ted that South America was certainly evolving toward a democratic form of government, but we should realize that such a development may not always bethe best of all possible courses, particularly in those Latin American countries 92 Belton was referring to Manuel Trujillo, the long-time dict ator of the Dominican Republic. Despatch 1142 U.S. Policy Toward Chile, Belton to Department of State, 20 May 1958, 611.25/5-2058, Folder 611.25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. The document is also in FRUS, 1958-1960 V: microfiche, Cl-5, 84-2646-2653. 237

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which are completely lacking in political maturity He claimed that the new democratic leaders who had overthrown the dictators were from th e Marxist-influenced middle class and evolving intelligentsia. They were nave about the nature and threat of Communism, deeming the Communists as nothing more th an a duly-constituted political party. Nixon was unequivocal: [W]hile we are thus witnessing the development of democracy in Latin America, we are at the same time witnessing the development of a serious Communist threat. 93 By linking the expansion of democracy to th e spread of Communism, Nixon inverted the logic of U.S. post-WWII foreign policy. 94 Since World War II, U.S. policymakers had asserted that the spread of democracy and the free exchange of ideas would impede, even stop the spread of Communism. Nixon, however, argued that democracy posed a liability, not an asset, and that United States could not win in the public de bate and exchange of ideas. Moreover, Nixon suggested that U.S. officials might need to sacr ifice democracy in some countries in order to defeat the Communists. This outlook cast the bipolar Cold War not in ideological terms, but in terms of partisan politics and power, where one worked to retain and increase the number of partisans on ones side. Nixons vi ew was a far cry from that of the U.S. Embassy officers in Santiago, who pressed Washington to value Ch ilean democracy in and of itself. 93 Memorandum Discussion at the 366 th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 22, 1958, S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, 23 May 1958, Folder 366 th Meeting of the NSC, May 22, 1958, Box 10, AWF NSC, DDEL. This memorandum is reprinted in FRUS 1958-1960 V: 239-246. Several lines of text have been declassified since that volume of FRUS was published. 94 Contrary to assertions of continuity between Nixons reports after his return from South America, Nixon offered a much darker assessment and course of action to the 366 th meeting of the NSC than he had done a week earlier to the cabinet. For continuity between Nixons reports, see David F. Schmitz, Thank God Theyre on Our Side: The United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 211-213. 238

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After the NSC meeting, during a 2 July 1958 ne ws conference, Eisenhower initially sought to justify U.S. support for dictators because of Cold War tensions, but Senator Morse had little patience for it. The President couldnt be more wrong, Morse declared, To embrace dictators merely because they offer us an advantage in st rategic bases or materials is to risk losing the most important stake in this struggle: the allegiance and loyalty of their people. 95 A repressive dictator, he said, not only was an unreliable ally, but U.S. support for dictators also gave a propaganda weapon of tremendous value to the Co mmunists. Morse called committee hearings to review U.S. policy towards the region, pronounc ing: When our friendships deteriorate in South America, it is really time to take stock, and not only of them but of ourselves as well. Chilean Charg dAffaires Surez admitted that Morse was one of the harshest and most incessant critics of the Eisenhower administ ration, and Dulles and Nixon tried to dismiss Morses criticisms as efforts to discredit the presidents foreign policy. 96 Pressure within and without the Eisenhower administration mounted, and by August, the administration altered U.S. policy to favor the hemispheres democracies over its dictators. Senior ARA officials in the Depa rtment of State had pushed for th e changes in policy. It is high time that Americans in general discover Latin Am erica, Assistant Secretary Rubottom told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs com mittee, and one ARA official told Rubottom that 95 The Presidents News Conference, 2 July 1958, Public Papers of the President: Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1959), p. 515. Hereafter cited as PPP: Eisenhower Press Release Morse Raps New Eisenhower Doctrine on Totalitarian Allies, Office of Senator Wayne Morse, 5 July 1958, Folder Foreign Policy 1958-60, Box A44, Morse Papers. 96 Radio Broadcast, Senator Wayne Morse, 21 May 1958, Fo lder Nixon, Richard, Vice President, 1957-60, Box A96, Morse Papers. Surez to Minister of Foreign Relations, 20 May 1958, Documento #799/54, Volumen 4972, Tomo I 1958 Confidenciales: Oficios y Varios, Embaja da de Chile en Washington, AMRE. Transcript of Telephone Call, John Foster Dulles to Nixon, 16 May 1958 Folder Memoranda of Tel. Conv. Gen., April 1, 1958 to May 29, 1958 (1), Box 8, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. 239

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the moment presents us with an opportunity perhaps our last major one before serious deterioration in our relations se ts in. In a letter to Eisenhower, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed Operation Pan American. Basically a Marshall Plan for Latin America, Kubitscheks proposal called for th e United States to offer $40 billi on dollars in aid to the region. The Eisenhower administration rejected Kubitsch eks proposal and instead created the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) to finance regional development, although the IADB did not make its first loan until 1961. In August 1958, Eisenhower announced that authoritarianism and autocracy of whatever form are incompatible with ideals of our great leaders of the past. 97 A Very Close Thing Salvador Allendes candidacy continued to ga in strength during April, May, and June 1958 while Washington reeled from the fallout of Nixons trip. Embassy Political Officer Donovan Zook reported that [w]ithout any question Alle ndes prospects for victory had improved and that the general subjective feel of the count ry was pro-Allende. Alle ndes growing strength was evident at a 29 May 1958 rally called The Four Marches of Victory. Following instructions and a diagram printed in El Siglo the four columns of A llende supporters marched from four different locations in Santiago and converged at Plaza Bulnes. The columns were organized by occupation and enthusiastic adhere nts created banners and placards to demonstrate their support. A group of women florists decora ted placards in brightly colored flowers that 97 Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Latin America, Rubottom, 3 June 1958, Box 1, Series 397 South American Trip 1958, Nixon Pre-Presidential Papers. Memorandum Some Thoughts Derived from My Recent Trip to South America, Ben S. Stephansky Office of River Plate Af fairs, to Rubottom, 18 June 1958, Folder 1958 Policy, Box 8, Subject Files, Rubottom Files. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 109-115, 105. Exchange of Letters between the Presiden t and President Kubitschek of Brazil, 10 June 1958, PPP: Eisenhower pp. 463-465. 240

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spelled out Allendes name when they walked side-by-side. A sea of humanity, proclaimed El Siglo flowed into Plaza Bulnes from the four sectors of the city. U.S. embassy officers confessed that the rally was more than twice the size of a FRAP rally held several months earlier. Although the embassy doubted El Siglo s figures of 130,000 people in attendance and cited [m]ore objective estimates of 60-65,000, it admitte d that the lower estimate was still a large number for Santiago. 98 At the Four Marches for Vict ory rally, Allende gave what the U.S. officials termed a major address, during which, he harshly criticiz ed U.S. policy. Allende prefaced his criticisms by emphasizing that we have nothing against the North American people; however, he accused the Department of State of pur suing a policy that is odious and unpopular, and charged that U.S. leaders pursued domestic po licies that were diametrically opposed to what they impose on other countries. U.S. officials pressed other nations to reduce tariffs and open their markets, Allende said, but Seatons tari ff protected the U.S. mining industry. Allende decried the 1952 Mutual Security Pact, under which Chiles Armed Forces received U.S. military training and equipment, and in exchange, the Chilean governme nt promised not to se ll copper to Communist bloc nations. The bilateral agreement, Allende char ged, imposes on us a trea ty that is beneficial for the nation of the North but detrimental to us As Chileans, we reject the prohibition of placing our copper in any country and of accepting the best conditions of the market. He 98 Despatch 1136 Presidential Campaign Developments During April, Zook to Department of State, 19 May 1958, 725.00/5-1958, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Diagram for the Four Marches of Victory, El Siglo 29 May 1958, p. 1. 0,000, un mar de los humanos, El Siglo 30 May 1958, p. 1. Arrebataremos a la Derecha poder poltico y econmico, El Siglo 30 May 1958, p. 8. Despatch 1217 Major Address by Left-Wing Presidential Candidate Allende, Zook to Department of State, 9 June 1958, 725.00/6-958; and Despatch 1255 Presidential Campaign Developments during May, Zook to Department of State, 20 June 1958, 725.00/6.2059; both Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 241

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charged that U.S. PL-480 loans had undermined Chiles trade with its La tin American neighbors, particularly Argentina, and that the KleinSaks mission had damaged the Chilean economy. Why do the Right and its candidate [Alessandri] not face the country, to defend the action of the Klein-Saks Mission and the economic policy that they imposed from the Government, he said, Why are they not held responsible before th e unemployed worker, the impoverished employee, the bankrupt industrialist, the ru ined shopkeeper, and the indebted farmer, of the flaws of a policythat only benefitted m onopolistic capital and foreign bus inesses? We demand, he continued, the right to seek our own solutions and to follow the road that better accommodates our habits and traditions.I decl are publicly, that the only thi ng that we await and insist upon from the United States is the respect for our lib erty to determine and follow independently the policy that best suits Chile within and outside its borders. Today, Allende concluded, our triumph has been won on the streets. Today, it has been demonstrated that Chile is not for sale. Today the power of the dollar, th e threat, and the lie has been defeated. Today, the reaction has been notified of its demise.Today, we have founded a new Chile! 99 Just before the rally, Allende proposed a ne w copper law to replace the 1955 Nuevo Trato. During the campaign, Allende had promised copper miners in Rancagua (near the El Teniente mine) that the copper would be Chileno, that he would go to [their city] to sign the decree nationalizing it. 100 However, Allende proposed something less than nationa lization and more closely resembling the state monopoly that Gon zlez Videla had created for copper in 1952. 99 Por las calles de hoy desfilo mundo del maana, El Siglo pp. 6-7. 100 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 70. In 1971, Allende fulfilled his promise by travelling to Rancagua and signing the nationalization decree. See Allende, Discurso en el da de la nacionalizacin del cobre, 11 July 1971, in Discursos (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1975), pp. 123-153. 242

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Allende called for raising tax rates on copper companies to their pre-1955 levels and mandating a 100 percent return of all foreign exchange genera ted by the sale of [copper]. He justified the measures because Chiles very low cost of produc tion, which permits [the copper companies] to obtain excess profits (excess profits would be a key concep t in the 1971 Allende Doctrine). He also advocated creating a government entity to co ntrol copper sales and di stribute the income. Moreover, he said that the stat e should obtain exact knowledge of the elements that come into play in the production of copper, in order to defe nd the interests of the co untry, interests such as the human capital that lives on this industry. 101 Allendes critique was partly on the mark. De spite Eisenhower administration claims that private investment was the path to national de velopment, Chiles expe rience with the copper companies had proven the claim as true and fa lse. The Chileans had learned that the bad investment climate between 1951 and 1953 had disc ouraged foreign investment, but they hoped that the 1955 Nuevo Trato would encourage Anaconda and Kennecott Copper companies to increase investment in Chile. Both companie s did invest new capital in Chile, but Anaconda Copper also doubled its after-tax profits from its Chilean operations, and Kennecott nearly did so. Instead of using their greater profits for ne w investment in Chile, the copper companies used the profits to invest in other countries, in vertical integration, a nd other industries. Thus, Allende could credibly and effectively claim that Chile was an exporter rather than an importer of 101 Medidas Concretas del Gobierno Popular, Convencin Nacional de Profesionales y Tcnicos de la Candidatura de Salvador Allende, July 1958, Folder 2503, Box PPCO-04, Fundacin Eduardo Frei, Santiago, Chile, p. 53-55. Hereafter cited as Fundacin Frei. Memorando Allendes Remarks at Foreign Correspondents Dinner, Hewson A. Ryan, Press Attach, to the Ambassador and George N. Butler, 8 July 1958, en closed with Despatch 49 Off the Record Press Conference with Presidential Candidate Allende, Zook to Department of State, 15 July 1958, 725.00/7-1558, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025; and Memorandum of Conversation Roberto Vergaras Views on U.S. Relations with Chile, Silberstein, 3 June 1958, 611-25/6-358, Folder 611.25/1-3155, Box 2468; both DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 243

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capital. In fact, Charles Knox of Klein a nd Saks warned ARA that the copper companies enjoyed such a good deal under the Nuevo Trato th at it placed the companies in a vulnerable position for the presidentia l campaign, namely Allendes nationalization plan. 102 After the FRAPs Four Marches to Victory rally, U.S. official s grew anxious that Allende might win. They acknowledged that the most important trend of th e election was Allendes remarkable upswing and that he had succe eded in narrowing the gap between him and Alessandri to the point where anything can happen ARA officials, including Assistant Secretary Rubottom, believed that it would be be tter if any of the candida tes other than Allende won; however, they also concluded that even if Allende lost, he would still win because he and the Left would be a political force to be reckoned with for years to come. U.S. officials admitted that Alessandri would most likely advance U.S. objectives in Chile, but he would not undertake enough reforms to stem the growing appeal of Allende and the Le ft. Frei might do better in pushing reform, but the embassy beli eved that the Christian Democrat should have saved himself for the 1964 campaign. U.S. policymakers concluded that Bossay would probably never be President in any year, but they took consolat ion that he had kept Radical 102 Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence 108-109. Memorandum of Conversation Robert Vergaras Views on U.S. Relations with Chile, Silberstein, 3 June 1958, 611.25/6-358. Memorandum Allendes Remarks at Foreign Correspondents Dinner, Ryan, 8 July 1958. 244

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voters from Allende; otherwise, Alessandr i would have little chance of victory. 103 In fact, U.S. officials believed that Bossay, not Zamo rano, was keeping Allende from victory. 104 Despite their concerns, Eisenhower administra tion officials were ex tremely hesitant to tamper with Chiles presidential election, partly because they fear ed the consequences and partly because the Rights efforts precluded the need fo r U.S. action. The Department of State and the OCB recognized that any tampering with the election would backfire badly against the United States. As the OCB noted, Any reasonably substant ive charge of U.S. intervention in [Chiles] internal matters would not only alienate large segments of the populace for a considerable period 103 Emphasis in original; italics are used in place of the original quotation marks. Memorandum Outlook for the Chilean Presidential Election, R. Phillips to Rubottom and Bernbaum, 15 August 1958, 725.00/8-1558, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 138 Presidential Election Outlook, Zook to Department of State, 8 August 1958, 725.00/8.858, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum Strategic Controls on Copper and U.S. Rela tions with Chile, Rubottom (Silberstein) to Dillon, 18 June 1958, 460.259/6-1858, FRUS, 1958-1960 V: microfiche, Cl-6, 84-2656. 104 Many have claimed that Zamorano, the Cura of Catap ilco, cost Allende the election; however, it was likely Bossay who was the spoiler. The Zamo rano-as-spoiler claim assumes that every vote for Zamorano would have been a vote for Allende, which is unlik ely. The claim also overlooks the el ement of Catholicism, and Zamorano being a former priest. Perhaps the best evidence for the Bossay-as-spoiler assertion is a February 1958 public opinion poll, which suggested that Zamoranos votes probably would have gone to Frei rather than Allende. The poll questioned 3300 potential voters in cities from Antofagasta to Puerto Montt, and the North American polling firm concertedly tried to obtain not just a geographical distribution but also a representative cross-section by agegroups, occupations, and educational levels. Potential voters were asked to designate a second choice for President if they could not vote for their first option. Of those fa voring Zamorano, 36 percent selected Frei as their second choice, 32 percent picked Alessandri, while only 14 percent opted for Allende. The choice of Frei was logical, because Zamorano, as a former priest blended Catholicism with an extensive reform program; meanwhile, the FRAP was more anti-Church. During the campaign, U.S. officials consistently referred to Bossay as the spoiler for Allende. Five years later, ARA and the embassy determined that Bossay, not Zamorano, had denied Allende victory and that Radical votes were the key to an Allend e victory. See Despatch 271 Distribution of Votes in Presidential Election, Zook to Department of State, 15 September 1958, 725.00/9-1558. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Presidential Elections and Chiles N eed of Foreign Aid, R. M. Phillips, 15 September 1958, 725.00/9-1558. For others who assert that Zamorano took votes from Allende, see For U.S. official reviewing the 1958 election five years later, see Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Presidential Election 1964, and Implications for US Strategy and Policy, Ralph W. Richardson, Chile Desk Officer, 14 November 1963, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963 Volumes X/XI/XII American Republics/Cuba, 1961-62/Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Microfiche supplement (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1998), Document CHI-23/3. Airgram A-233 Observations on the Possible Ef fect Should Julio Durn Withdraw from the Presidential Race, Robert A. Stevenson, Counsel or for Embassy for Political Affair s, to Department of State, 6 December 1963, Fold er POL 15 Government Chile 2/1/63, Box 3866, Central Foreign Policy File 1963, RG59, NA. 245

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but would seriously damage our general position in Chile. Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain any U.S. actions as covert. USIS anal ysts observed that, In no other country, either in Latin America or Western Europe, [were] suspici ons of U.S. domination quite so extreme as in Chile, and any sudden infusion of resources would draw attention. 105 Also, Alessandri enjoyed generous financial support from Chiles commerc ial and agricultural elite. Alessandri posters, banners, portraits, and campaign ads were ubiqu itous in Santiago, and according to political officer Donovan Zook, Alessandri radio spots a nd roaming sound trucks had gone well beyond the point of diminishing returns. Furthermore, rumors swirled that Alessandris forces secretly financed Bossays campaign in order to keep Radi cals from voting for Allende. There were also rumors that the Right had paid Zamorano to continue his campaign, and Alessandri supporters were giving Zamorano access to southern agricultu ral workers so that th ey might be wooed away from Allende. One month before the election (August 1958), U.S. policymakers concluded that Alessandri would likely nos[e] out Allende by a very narrow margin. 106 Allende, meanwhile, in August 1958, took his camp aign south on the Train of Victory, a whistle-stop tour during which he gave 147 speeches in 11 days. He visited El Teniente copper miners near Rancagua, the coal miners of Lota and Coronel, the campesinos of the southern Central Valley, as well as the major cities of Osorno, Curic, Concepcin, Valdivia, and Puerto 105 Memorandum Preliminary Notes on a [13 April] Mee ting of the Operations Coordinating Board, Bishop, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 787. Annex A: Supplementary Report on Chile, 13 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 790. Telegram 297, Dulles (Belton) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 19 April 1955, 825.00/4-555, Folder 825.00/1555, Box 4282, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. OCB Special Report on Chile, 13 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 VII: 790. Latin American Public Opinion Barometer Report #14 Latin American Views on Political Relations with the United States, United States Information Agency, 23 September 1957, Folder LA-14, Box 2, RG 306, NA. 106 Despatch 138 Presidential Election Outlook, Zook to Department of State, 8 August 1958, 725.00/8-858, pp. 4, 9, 10. Documento #712/195, 2 June 1958, Volumen 4973, Tomo I 1958 Confidenciales: Oficios, Embajada de Chile en Washington, AMRE. 246

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Montt. Multitudes of supporters crowded around the train, and people ran alongside the train in order to touch Allendes hand, causing Allendes staff to fear that an accident might occur. In many places, the train had to stop unexpectedly, Puccio noted. [P]eople had lined themselves across the tracks, and at night, they made large bonfires on the tracks. Allende would get off the train and greet them. Unprepared for the larg e crowds or their fervor, Allendes campaign considered the Train to Victory to be a great success. At Curic, however, after Allendes speech, a woman approached the senator and kisse d the cuff of his pants. Furious, Allende scolded her. Returning to the tr ain, he told his staff: Compaeros, I am not a Messiah, nor do I want to be one. I want to appear before my people, before my public as a political possibility. I want to appear as a bridge toward Socialis m.We can not assume the government, we can not arrive at La Moneda with a people who hope for miracles.the construction of socialism is not an easy thing. And a woman who kisses pants or s eeks to kiss ones feet expects miracles that I am not able to make, because the people must make the miracle, not I. 107 Allende ended his 1958 campaign with a large ra lly in Santiago that emulated the success of the Four Marches to Victory, but the rally also sought to li nk Allendes campaign with past liberation efforts. It was larges t of the rallies that concluded the five campaigns. On 31 August, FRAP partisans formed four columns in separate parts of Santiago and came together in Plaza Bulnes. Three columns were named after past Chilean presidents: Bernardo OHiggins, Jos Manuel Balmaceda, and Pedro Aguirre Cerda; the fourth column was called Salvador Allende. Each column carried a banner with a portrait of th eir namesake and the four portraits were placed behind the podium where Allende spoke. Allende and his staff c hoose the three presidents in 107 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 70, 75, 74, 72. 247

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order to document Allendes cont inuity with the libe ration struggles of OHiggins, the father of the country; Balmaceda, the martyred presiden t of the 1891 civil war; and Aguirre Cerda, the Popular Front president, under whom Allende had served as Minister of Health. 108 On 4 September, Chileans cast their ballot s, and Alessandri edged Allende by 33,000 votes (389,909 to 356,493). Frei finished third (255,76 9), Bossay was fourth (102,077), and Zamorano trailed far behind (41,304 votes). Chiles Amba ssador to Washington, Jos Serrano Palma, said the results were magnificent, but confessed to Rubottom that Alessandris victory was a very close thing. The election re sults, he added, now made it all the more advisable for the United States to give sympathe tic consideration to Chiles need of economic assistance. 109 U.S. officials viewed Alessandris victory as a satisfactory outcome, but they also recognized that it a very close thing that th e United States was not confronting an elected Marxist government under Allende. Embassy political officer Donovan Zook told ARA that Alessandris alarmingly narrow margin of victor y can be construed as virtually a political accident, and that the United States would be seriously mistaken in taking a complacent attitude that everything is all right in Chile. He warned that unl ess Alessandri succeeds in making headway against the perplexing tangle of economic, social and political problems which 108 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 79. For a photograph of the rally and the four banners with Allende at the podium, see Federico Vogelius, ed., Salvador Allende Grandes Reportajes de Crisis series (Buenos Aires: Prensa Mdica Argentina, 1974), p. 67. The caption incorrectly dates the photograph. OHiggins was Chiles first president and helped lead the struggle for Chiles independ ence. President during Chile s civil war, Balmaceda was defeated by military and conservative elements, and committed suicide rather than surrender to them. Pedro Aguirre Cerda was the first Popular Front President, and he is viewed something as a mixture of Franklin Roosevelt (a populist program for all Chileans, not the elites) and John F. Kennedy (inspiration). 109 Despatch 921 Operations Plan fo r Latin America, Walter Howe, Ambassador to Chile (Zook and William L. Krieg, Counselor of Embassy) to Department of State, 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759, Folder 611-25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Presidential Elections and Chiles Need of Foreign Aid, R. M. Phillips, 15 September 1958, 725.00/9 -1558, Folder 1958 Chile, Box 5, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Gil, The Political System of Chile 227. 248

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confront Chile, the extremist left vote may well co me out on top next time. Zook explained that Allende had received seven times the number of votes he received in 1952, and had dominated the northern and southern thirds of the country. Even in the Central Va lley, long a stronghold of the Right, Zook remarked, Alessandri came danger ously close to losing out in some of the provinces which would traditionally be considered as securely in his camp. According to Zook, Alessandri owed his victory to his success in Santiago and Valparaso, and 30,000 of his 33,000vote margin of victory were from Santiago. 110 Assistant Secretary Rubottom and the new U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Walter Howe, shared Zooks alarm. The OCB viewed Alessa ndris victory a setback for the Communists, but Rubottom thought otherwise. Shortly after a meeting that considered Castros growing revolution in Cuba, Rubottom remarked: [O]ur po litical interests will not permit us to stand by and watch Chile go down the drain. 111 In Santiago, Ambassador Howe feared that Allende might achieve power legitimately, and stressed to ARA that Chile had entered a crucial testing period during which western-oriented democr acy must prove that it can resolve Chiles problems. Embassy officers called upon Washi ngton to help the new government stave off the economic and social pressures which might otherwis e lead to a disastrous collapse of the nations dependability as a strong ally of the western democracies. 112 110 Despatch 271 Distribution of Votes in Presidential Election, Zook to Depa rtment of State, 15 September 1958, 725.00/9-1558, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 921 Operations Plan for Latin America, Howe (Zook and Krieg) to Department of State, 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759. 111 Special Report on Latin America (N SC 5613/1), OCB to the NSC, 26 November 1958, Folder Latin America (2), Box 63, NSCS Disaster File, DDEL, p. 19, 4. Memorandum Chile Seeking Financial Assistance, Rubottom to Dillon, 23 December 1958, attached to Note, Rubottom to Dillon, 23 December 1958, Folder 1958 Chile, Box 5, Subject Files, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 112 Despatch 851 Public Opinion Poll on Presidential Electio n, Zook to Department of State, 24 February 1958, 725.00/2-2458. Despatch 271 Distribution of Votes in Presidential Election, Zook to Department of State, 15 249

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Socialist leader Alejandro Cheln Rojas claimed that, [t]he 1958 election was the first stumble, on the ascendant road of the FRAP; however, FRAP leaders took the opposite lesson from the election. They grew confident that the FRAP could gain power through democratic elections and that Allende was a legitimate presidential contender. Allende declared that, not only have we forged popular unity and given a distinct substance to the new left: We have formed a national conscience Popular Socialist leader Ral Ampuero wrote, Everyone came to believe that never were the people closer to power. He further admitted that the Allendes candidacy originally was considered without expectations but it had mushroomed into an impetuous offensive that menacingly challenged the control of the reactionaries. Max Nolff, a Socialist Party Central Committee member, asserted that the near-victory impelled the popular forces to more determined political action in or der to achieve better organization and broaden the social base with the end of facing the next pr esidential contest in more favorable conditions. 113 The electoral results initially divided the FRAP between those who wanted to protest election fraud and those who wanted to accept th e result. Some Allende partisans, believing Alessandris scant 30,000-vote victory signaled a stolen election, wanted to take to the streets to defend [Allendes] triumph. 114 The Central Committee debated whether or not to concede the election to Alessandri, but they we re unaware that Allende had alr eady done so. Cheln charged, It was not necessary for Allende to concede in the style of bourgeois candidates, validating September 1958, 725.00/9-1558. Despatch 921 Operations Plan for Latin America, Howe (Krieg, Zook, Eakens, Ryan) to Department of State, 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759. 113 Cheln, Trayectora del Socialismo 156. Emphasis in original. Surez, Allende: Visin de un militante 42. Ampuero, La izquierda en punto muerto 68. Nolff, Allende: El poltico, el estadista 64. 114 Surez, Allende: Visin de un militante 41. Puccio, Un cuarto del siglo con Allende 83-84. 250

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the fraud that the Right had pe rpetrated. Allende strongly disa greed: [T]hrowing people into the street, signified a civil war, which was a politi cal and historic irrespon sibility. The FRAP, he said, had committed itself to the road not armed, and since it had chosen the democratic bourgeois road, we must be consistent and accep t the defeat without re signation. He too believed that the Right had stolen the election, but these were th e risks of the st ruggle within the system of bourgeois democracy. 115 Allende sought to calm and r eassure his supporters during a 9 September radio speech, and it likely augmented his stature as a national lead er. If each Chilean would put their ear on the ground, he said, they would hear the message that today travel s the world: people want independence and not vassalage; economic coopera tion and not exploitati on; progress and not stagnation; broader horizons for living with dignity a nd happiness. This is what is embodied in our movement, he said, We have captured this message. I will reintegrate myself into the ranks as one more soldier, Allende concluded, bu t this time, he said, they will find me more principled, more determined, more enthusia stic, more combative, and more hopeful. 116 Conclusion Reviewing the 1950s, scholar Frederick Pike cl aimed, I am now convinced that Chileans fooled us thoroughly.Deceived by the undeniably attractive and appeal ing features of the nation and its political traditions, we have tended, at le ast until late 1961, to assume that all must 115 Cheln, Trayectora del Socialismo 156. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 83-84. 116 Surez, Allende: Visin de un militante 42-43. 251

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be well. 117 Pike was incorrect; the Chileans deceived no one. Eisenhower administration officials, like their predecessors, favored Chile because they perceived it to be a democracy and wanted it to serve as a model for Latin America and the devel oping world. The Eisenhower Administration recognized in late 1954 that all was not well in Chile, and it worked to stem social revolution and the grow ing strength of Allende and th e FRAP. Washington hoped to strengthen Chiles democracy th rough economic liberalism and fiscal conservatism. Holland and other ARA officials allowed the Chileans to pur sue their own initiatives (the Klein-Saks mission), encouraged them to implement reform and ensured that Chile received loans and assistance to soften the hardships of stabilization and reform. The Eisenhower administration made errors, and Ibez, his administration, the Chilean Right, and the copper companies undermined the U.S. strategy. Ibezs poor leadership and his refusal to cultivate allies in Congress undercut national economic policy. Congress placed the burden of stabilization on the middle, worki ng, and lower classes, and the Right rebuffed suggestions that they share the burden. U.S. of ficials did not pressure the Ibez administration or the Right to share the burde n of stabilization as the Klein-Saks team had recommended. Chileans expressed their frustration in the 2 Ap ril 1957 riots, ending the stabilization program. With the Nuevo Trato, Kennecott and Anaconda Copper companies gained greater profits from their Chilean operations but invested the profits in other places and othe r operations. Secretary of the Treasury Seatons proposal to re-impose the tax on impor ted copper exploded into a diplomatic fiasco, leading Ibez to cancel his state visit to the White House, and handing 117 Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chiles Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), xxiv-xxv, 292-296, 299-301, xxvii. 252

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Allende a campaign issue. The Nixon 1958 trip to South America revealed Latin Americans frustration with U.S. policies. Chileans told AR A directly that they d idnt understand what the policy of the United States was toward Latin Amer ica in general, nor Chil e in particular, and one of those puzzled, ARA learned, was newly-elected president Jorge Alessandri. 118 It was a very close thing that Allende was not elected President of Chile in 1958. He had challenged his fellow Senators to st op minimizing of the errors of norteamericano policy because the United States, supposedly so tolerant and respectful of the self-determination of peoples, he said, did nothing against the ignominious dictatorships of the Americas. 119 He had reunited the Socialists, constructed the FRAP, and broadened his appeal. In 1958, he proved that the Marxist Left could come to power through democracy and that he was a force to be reckoned with. Had Allende won in September 1958, one wonders if scholars, foreign policy analysts, and pundits now be talking about Allend e rather than Fidel Castro, who took power in Cuba four months later in Janua ry 1959. As it was, Rubottom and U.S. officials viewed Allende as a threat parallel to Castro: What Cast ro promised through violent revolution, Allende promised through democracy. While Allende and the FRAP nearly achieved democratic victory in Chile, Fidel Castro and Ernesto Ch Guevar a were successfully leading a revolution toward 118 Memorandum of Conversation, Charles F. Knox, Klein and Saks, to RLD, JMS, and JK, 2 June 1958, enclosed with Memorandum of Conversation Roberto Vergaras Views on U.S. Relations with Chile, Silberstein, 3 June 1958, 611.25/6-358, Folder 611.25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 119 Speech in the Senate Homenaje al Gobierno de Arbenz, in Guat emala, Allende, 4 December 1956, Salvador Allende: Obras Escogidas (Perodo 1939-1973) (Santiago: Editorial Antrtica for Centro de Estudios Polticos Latinoamericanos Simn Bolvar y Fundacin Presidente Allende [Espaa], 1992), Gonzalo Martner G., comp., 182. 253

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Cubas capital, Havana. In 1958, U.S. officials recognized that they had a second chance to stop Allende, which was more than what they had in Cuba. 120 120 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America p. 115, 113. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 177-178. Jorge G. Castaeda, Compaero: The Life and Death of Ch Guevara (New York: Vintage Books, 1998 [1997]), 119-121. 254

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CHAPTER 6 RUNNING SCARED, 1958-1964 Supporting Frei, Stopping Allende During Chiles 1964 presidential campaign, one Department of State policymaker wrote that we should continue to run scared in order to defeat Salvador Allende Gossens. In truth, U.S. officials had been running scared for six years. They had promoted Chile as a model democracy, but in 1958, Allende nearly won Chiles presidency and almost converted Chile into a model for the democratic road to Marxist socia lism. The U.S. Embassy in Santiago considered the 1958 victory of right-wing candidate Jorge Alessa ndri Rodrguez as a political accident. Unless Alessandri addressed Chiles economic and social problems, the embassy said, Allende and his coalition of Communists and Socialists known as the Popular Action Front (FRAP Frente de Accin Popular) may well come out on top next time. 1 What Allende nearly achieved democratically in 1958, Fidel Castro atta ined through revolution in Cuba. The parallel threats of Allende and Castro transformed Latin America into what President John F. Kennedy called, the most dangerous area in the world. As Kennedy late r noted, the United States may not win the Cold War in Latin America, but it certainly could lose it there. 2 1 Policy Paper Chile: Short Term Policy and Action from Present through Presidential Election, September 4, 1964, Office of West Coast Affairs, 10 July 1964, Fold er Political Chile General (Background Paper), Box 7, Records Relating to Chile, 1957-1964, Office of West Coas t Affairs, Records of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 Lot Files, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter cited WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Despatch 271 Distribution of Votes in Presidential Election, Donovan Q. Zook, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Department of State, 15 September 1958, 725.00/9-1558, Folder 725.00/1-258, Box 3025, Decimal File 1955-59, RG59, NA. Hereafter cited a DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Despatch 921 Operations Plan for Latin Ameri ca, Howe (Zook and Krieg) to Department of State, 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759, Folder 611-25/1-159, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, NA. 2 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 19. Richar d M. Nixon reiterated the idea of 255

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Between 1958 and 1964 U.S. officials sharply intensified their efforts to stop Allende and preserve Chiles democracy. The Eisenhower admi nistration imposed an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization program upon Chiles new president, Jorge Alessandri. Under Kennedy, the United States promoted the Alliance for Progress, which sought to foster economic development, higher living standards, land re form, and social progress. Kennedy pressed Alessandri to initiate reforms to prevent Chileans from turning to Allende. As one U.S. policymaker observed: In the last analysis our national inte rest [in Chile] does not demand a particular economic system, nor the preservation of the wealthy class here, but we do hope to maintain a democratic government with human lib erties preserved in larg e measure and oriented favorably toward the United States. 3 In their efforts to stop Allende, U.S. policymakers tampered with what the United States valued most about Chile: its democracy. One em bassy officer cautioned: If we really believe in the democratic process, as we want to conv ince others that we do, we must be especially careful in the extent to which we tamper with the process. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations agreed with their predecessors th at [a]ny reasonably substa ntive charge of U.S. intervention in [Chiles] internal matterswould seriously damage our general position in Chile, but U.S. fears of Allende overrode this restraint. Departing sharply from previous policy, U.S. officials funneled millions of dollars to Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalvas 1964 Allende and Castro as parallel threats in Latin America w ith his use of the metaphor red sandwich metaphor. See Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon Vol. I (New York: Warner Books, 1979 [1978]), p. 607. 3 Norman M. Pearson, Counselor for Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Santiago, to Ralph W. Richardson, Officerin-Charge of Chilean Affairs (Chile Desk officer), Department of State, n.d. [19? June 1962], Folder Chile 1962 16 Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Pearson sent a copy to Taylor G. Belcher, Director of the Office of West Coast Affairs. 256

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presidential campaign and steered millions in Allia nce for Progress funds to projects that might increase Chilean voter support for Frei. Frei won the 1964 election, but as one Chilean friend warned, the United States has put all [of its] eggs in one basket in backing Frei. 4 Insisting upon Reform Allendes near-victory in Chiles 1958 presidential el ection (losing by a scant 33,000 votes) stunned and alarmed U.S. officials. Alle ndes success, combined with Chiles financial difficulties, accentuated disagreements between Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) and the U.S. Embassy in Santiago. Six weeks after the election (28 October 1958), U.S. Ambassador to Chile Walter Howe informed Washington that the IMF had denied the Chileans the remaining portion of their loan. Unless Chile received the money, said Howe, the government would exhaust its foreign exchange reserves in less than two weeks. ARAs Office of West Coast Affairs, which oversaw U.S. relations with Ch ile, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, did not view the situation so imminent and bickered with the embassy over whether or not the Department of State should contact the IMF. Assistant Secretary of State fo r Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, meanwhile, had talked with IMF official s and expected them to relent on their denial 4 Pearson to Richardson, n.d. [19? June 1962]. OCB Special Report on Chile, 13 April 1955, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume VII (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1987), pp. 790. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1955-57 VII: page. Airgram A5, Views of Radical Senator Julio Duran, American Embassy Santiago (Dungan) to Department of State, 9 July 1966, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile -US 1/1/64, Box 2030, Central Foreign Policy Files 19641966, RG59, NA. Hereafter cited as CFPF 1964-66. 257

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of loans to Chile. He considered it doubtful political or economic wisdom to put the new Alessandri administration in a financial straight jacket in its first days. 5 After Alessandris inauguration, Washingtons and Santiagos differi ng expectations of U.S. aid sparked another dispute between ARA and the Embassy. Rubottom and ARA expected Alessandri to have a much more business-like administration than his predecessor; meanwhile, Alessandri and his advisers expect ed substantial U.S. aid. Howe reported that Chilean officials considered Chiles financial problems as [a] time bomb certain [to] explodeunless they obtain substantial outside assistance, and he pre ssed ARA to send an economic mission. Rubottom disagreed, saying that the Chileans did not need a mission because they had sufficient technical knowledge to work out their own programs if they want to. He instead worried that Alessandri would allow political pressure to prevent him fr om taking the strong medicine which will have to be downed if the Chilean economy is to be put back on th e stabilization road. 6 The collapse of Fulgencio Batistas regime in Cuba three months after Allendes nearvictory lent urgency to resolv ing Chiles financial crisis. During a 23 December 1958 National Security Council (NSC) meeting, CI A Director Allen Dulles warned that if Fidel Castro gained 5 Telegram 169, Walter Howe, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Secretary of State, 28 October 1958, 398.13/10-2858, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume V, microfiche, Document Cl-10, 84-2660. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1958-60 V: Microfiche, document#, frame#. Telegram 167, Dulles (Robert M. Phillips, Office of West Coast Affairs (WST); Telegram, Ernest V. Siracusa, Director of WST) to U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 31 October 1958, 398.13/10-2858; and Memorandum Chilean Financial Situation, Rubottom to Dillon, 3 November 1958, 398.13/11-358; all FRUS 1958-60 V: Microfiche, Documents Cl-12, 84-2663-2664; Cl-12 n 1, 84-2665; and Cl-11, 84-2662. 6 Memorandum Chilean Financial Situation, Rubottom to Dillon, 3 November 1958, 398.13/11-358, FRUS 195860 V: microfiche, Cl-11, 84-2662. Telegram 199, Howe to Secretary of State, 24 November 1958, 398.13/11-2458, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-13, 84-2666-2667. Telegram 199, Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State, to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 28 November 1958, 398.13/11-2858, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-13 n 1, 84-2668. Memorandum Chile Seeking Financial Assistance, Rubott om to Dillon, 23 December 1958, attached to Note, Rubottom to Dillon, 23 December 1958, Folder 1958 Chile, Box 5, Subject Files, Records for the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Roy R. Rubottom), 1957-59, RG59-Lot, NA. Hereafter cited as Rubottom Files. 258

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power, the Communists woul d join his government. 7 That same day, Rubottom, who attended the meeting, told Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon late r that U.S. interests would not permit us to stand by and watch Chile go down the drain. If Alessandri fails to achieve a good record on reform, the possibility of a sharp swing to the left in Chile will be enhanced. 8 Recognizing that they no l onger enjoyed the luxury of time, Rubottom and ARA imposed a stabilization program upon Alessa ndri, a program devised by the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Chileans received another economic mission not because they needed the techni cal advice, but to create a frame work to ensure that Alessandri would implement and adhere to an economic stab ilization program. Like his predecessor Henry F. Holland, Rubottom worked with the Export-Im port (EXIM) Bank to ensure that Alessandri obtained sufficient resources to implement the IMF-approved plan and received a development aid package large enough to have a fa vorable political impact in Chile. 9 The firmness with which Rubottom and ARA tr eated Alessandri contrasted sharply with the patience exhibited by Holland and ARA toward President Carlos Ibez del Campo, but, for Rubottom, an IMF-IBRD mission was the least unpalatable choice. From his view, the United States had three options: it could urge the IMF and IBRD to send anothe r mission; it could give Chile financial aid without a constructive econo mic program in place; or it could assume the 7 Memorandum Discussion at the 392 nd Meeting of the National Security Co uncil, Tuesday, December 23, 1958, n.d. [December 1958], Folder 392 nd Meeting of NSC, Dec. 23, 1958, Box 10, AWFNational Security Council Series, DDEL. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 219-220. 8 Memorandum Chile Seeking Financial Assistance, Rubottom to Douglas B. Dillon, U nder Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 23 December 1958, Folder 1958 Chile, Box 5, Subject Files, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 9 Memorandum Acceptance of Eximbank Loan Proposal to Chileans, Turkel and S ilberstein to Rubottom, 17 April 1959, Folder 1959 Chile, Box 11, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 259

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role of adviser on a program of harsh internal measures. Rubottom believed that offering aid without a stabilization program in place would undermine the incentive to enact reform and waste money. He also opposed the United States assuming the role of advisor for a harsh reform program because it would expose ourselves to distasteful political involvement in Chile. 10 Ambassador Howe and embassy officers in Sa ntiago disagreed with Rubottoms choice and pressed an alternative. They dissented primarily because they focused upon how the United States could encourage and assist development in Chile, not upon which reforms or measures the Chileans needed to undertake. In early 1959, the embassy urged the department to embark on a ten year basic development program that woul d lay the groundwork for a rapid upsurge in economic development for Chile and the region. E ssentially a Marshall Plan for Latin America, the embassys alternative echoe d Operation Pan Americana propos ed by Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek a y ear earlier but rejected by the Eisenhower admi nistration. The embassy insisted that Latin Americans should have m aximum participation and cooperationin the planning and execution of projects so that the effort is not simp ly a U.S. operation. Now a new stimulus is needed something that can capture the imaginations of the younger generation of Latin Americans, they argued, but if the plan was too ambiti ous, let us seek for some other way to achieve this result. 11 The Chileans chafed under the ARAs insisten ce upon a stabilization plan. When the director of Chiles Central Bank accused the United States of demanding specific fiscal policies before it would consider assistance to Chile, ARA pr omptly instructed that Howe to clarify the 10 Memorandum Chile Seeking Fi nancial Assistance, Rubottom to Dillon, 23 December 1958. 11 Annex B New Courses of Action, [Krieg, Zook], n.d. [17 March 1959], enclosed with Despatch 921 Operation Plan for Latin America, Howe (Krieg, Zook), 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759. 260

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situation. It is precisely to avoid direct involvement [in] heated political situations, ARA told the ambassador, that [the United States] consistently refrains from advising other governments on specific internal economic stabilization measures. 12 The embassy reported that Minister of Finance Roberto Vergara had asked several time s what would be the attitude in Washington if Chile would achieve two-thirds or even possibly 75 percent of the [IMF] program. Alessandri government officials even announced publicly that they needed $100 million in loans for the budget and Chiles balance of payments as a way to pressure the Department. 13 Alessandri directly appealed to Eisenhower, decl aring that it was imperative that Chile obtain a sizeable amount of foreign aid. He re quested the U.S. president to use his high and decisive influence with U.S. lending institutions so that the lenders would look more favorably upon Chiles applications. Orthodox economic po licies worked too slowly, Alessandri wrote, because by the time they produced results, Marxis t propaganda would create such an adverse atmospherethat the action of my Administ ration would possibly re ndered fruitless. Alessandri insisted that he c ould not sponsor exaggerated econo mic restrictions or call for measures that the Marxists could cast as attack s against the welfare of the people. Alessandri then linked his request to the larg er Cold War, saying that failure to provide aid to Chile would probably lead to a serious weak ening of the free enterprise system and would inflict critical damage to democracy and to the moral and political standardsthe West is defending. 12 Telegram 230, Herter (Siracusa) to U.S. Em bassy Santiago, 10 Decembe r 1958, 825.00/12-958, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-14, 84-2669. 13 Memorandum of Conversation Economic Program of the Alessandri Administration, U.S. Embassy in Santiago, 20 January 1959, 398.13/1-2359, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-15, 84-2673. Memorandum Anticipated Chilean Request for Financial Assistance Rubottom and Mann to Dillon, 13 February 1959, 825.10/2-1359, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-17, 84-2683 and 84-2686. 261

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Eisenhower praised the Chilean for facing up to his nations economic problems, but showed little interest in becoming involved and turned the matter over to the appropriate officials. 14 Alessandris ineffective appeal outlined reas ons why he could not enact reform, and it frustrated and angered U.S. officials. A week after Eisenhower received Alessandris letter, Rubottom and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann accused Alessandris administration of ha ving dragged its feet on working out a satisfactory stabilization arrangement with the IMF and devising economic measures that did not give promise of achieving stability. While it is in our in terests politically to support the Alessandri Government, Rubottom explained, and while it s application of a sound economic program will entail certain political risks, we believe that financial support in the ab sence of an effective stabilization program will serve neither Chilean nor U.S. intere sts in the long run. 15 Publicly the adopted stabilization program app eared to succeed; pr ivately, Alessandri and U.S. officials criticized each other. Infla tion dropped to 2.7 percent in 1960 and held at 4.2 percent in 1961. Chiles industrial production rose, unemployment decreased, and its Gross Domestic Product increased. AR A officials warned Rubottom th at Alessandris government had obtained these gains from an increase in the pric e of copper, not from st abilization measures, and that Alessandri may have exacerbated Chile s financial difficulties by taking on a very 14 Letter, Alessandri to Eisenhower (translation of original ), 30 January 1959, attached to Letter, Eisenhower to Alessandri, 28 February 1959, Folder Chile (3), Box 7, International Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. Hereafter cited as AWF-International Series, DDEL. 15 Memorandum Anticipated Chilean Request for Financial Assistance, Rubottom and Mann to Dillon, 13 February 1959, 825.10/2-1359, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-17, 84-2683. Letter, Rubottom to John Moors Cabot, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, 2 February 1959, Folder 1959-Policy, Box 15, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Eisenhower to Alessandri, 28 February 1959, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-18, 84-2688-2689. 262

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substantial load of new dollar debt. 16 Also, the IMF-Alessandri agreement was leaked to Chiles press, and critics condemned Alessa ndris government for permitting itself to be dictated to by the IMF. Publicly Alessandri de nied that the IMF had not imposed on us any economic or financial conditions, but he privately complained to Howe, Rubottom, and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter (who had replaced the terminally ill John Foster Dulles), saying that U.S. lending agencies demanded more of sound responsible governments [like Chile] than they did of irresponsible governme nts, objections which were made known to Eisenhower. Six months into the program, the EXIM Bank blocked part of Chiles stabilization funds, charging that Alessandris administ ration had not followed the IMF agreement. 17 While Rubottom and ARA criticized Alessandri, Howe and the U.S. Embassy criticized Washington. [T]too many Chilean s associate the United States with blind maintenance of the status quo and the USSR with social and econo mic progress, embassy officers warned. To stint in our support because Alessa ndris failure to achieve the ideal results, they continued, could result in less attractive consequences. The embassy again pressed for an extensive aid 16 Memorandum Evaluation of Chilean Stabilization Program, Turkel to Rubottom, 20 August 1959; both Folder 1959 Chile, Box 11, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. For Chiles economic improvement, see Alan Angell, Chile since 1958, Chile: Since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Leslie Bethell, ed., 143144. Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfrado Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia, Historia del siglo XX chileno (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001), 208-209. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Polticas Econmicas en Chile, 1952-1970 (Santiago: Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1973), 248. 17 Memorandum Chilean Leftist Attacks on the International Monetary Fund, E. V. Siracusa, Director of Office of West Coast Affairs, to Rubottom, 8 July 1959; and Memorandum Chilean President Reports to Nation on Economic Situation, Silberstein to Rubottom, 16 September 1959, Folder 1959 Chile, Box 11, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation between Alessandri, Herter, and Rubottom, 24 August 1959, attached to Letter, Rubottom to Howe, 9 September 1959, 611.25/8-2659, Folder 611.25/1-3155, Box 2468, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Briefing Paper Chilean Relations w ith International Financial Institutions, ARA (Phillips), 4 February 1960, Folder Subject File South America Econ omic (1), Box 17, Papers of Phillip E. Areeda, Assistant Special Counsel to the Pres ident, 1952-1962, DDEL. Memorandum E ximbank Refusal to Permit Chile to Draw $25 Million Balance of Payments Loan, Wymberley Coerr, Chief of Division of North and West Coast Affairs, to Rubottom, 17 December 1959, Fold er 1959 Chile, Box 11, Rubotto m Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 263

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program for Chile. If Alessandri could improve living standards in Chile, it wrote, his success will have a strong influence in strengthening demo cracy not only in Chile but in other countries of Latin America as well. Conversely, [Alessa ndris] failure would be a body blow to the principle of free enterprise and [a ] gain for anti-democratic forces. 18 ARA and the embassy did agree upon the importa nce of President Eise nhowers visit to Chile in 1960. Despite their frustration with Alessandri, U.S. policymakers still sought to ensure the success of the Alessandri Administrati on politically and economi cally in order that Chile could continued to serve as a model democracy. Just af ter New Years Day 1960, Howe proposed enhancing the pres tige of Alessandris governme nt by having Eisenhower and Alessandri exchange official visi ts. Unbeknownst to Howe, Secretary Herter had proposed such a visit two weeks earlie r. As part of a tour of South Amer ica, Eisenhower arrived in Chile from 28 February and stayed until 2 March 1960, being th e first sitting U.S. president to visit Chile. 19 While in Chile, Eisenhower received a letter from a group of univers ity students, and the letter and Eisenhowers response over-shadowed his discussions with Alessandri. In the letter, leaders of the Federation of Chilean Students (F ECh) rebuked U.S. policy in polite, respectful, but firm terms. They charged that U.S. diplomacy since World War II had turned good neighbors into associated nati ons who were expected to follo w the United States, not join together as equals. The students castigated the United States for supporting dictators and 18 Despatch 489 Objectives and Operations Plan for Chile, Howe (Krieg, Zook, et al.) to Depart ment of State, 8 January 1960, 611.25/1-860, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-27, 84-2710-2714. 19 Despatch 489 Objectives and Operations Plan for Chile, Howe to Department of State, 8 January 1960, 611.25/1-860. Memorandum Your Proposed Visit to South America, Herter to the President, 29 December 1959, enclosed with Memorandum, Thomas W. McElhiney to Anne Whitman, 30 December 1959, Folder Christian Herter, December 1959 (1), Box 12, AWF Dulles-Herter Series, DDEL. El hombre para un pueblo, Zig-Zag 56/2864 (26 February 1960): 3. 264

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maintaining the status quo. Citi ng malnutrition, poverty, illiteracy, a nd lack of civ il rights in the status quo, the students warned: If the injustices of today are all that Christianity or democracy can offer this continent, no one should be surpri sed if the best children of these nations turn toward Communism. There could never be a bette r time, they insisted, for the United States, if it so desired, to demonstrate to the worl d what humanity can expect from the nation of Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. 20 Privately Eisenhower was shaken by the stud ents letter; publicly he emphasized the Chilean students misunderstanding of U.S. policy. Speaking just hours after receiving the letter, the U.S. president mixed contrition with conde scension. He acknowledge d, The people of the United States do not have as deep a knowledge of our sister republics as they should, but he insisted the charge that the Un ited States supports dictators wa s ridiculous. He wished the students could have had better sources of inform ation, but then assert ed, Before individuals who do not carry great responsibilities in the wo rld make decisions and spread information, or what they call information, we should be sure of our facts, we should r ead history carefully. Lets dont read merely the sensational stories of the newspapers. We [the United States] are not saints, he admitted, we know we make mist akes, but our heart is in the right place. 21 20 For Eisenhower and Alessandris discussions, see Me moranda of Conversation, Krieg Counselor of Embassy, 29 February 1960, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-29, 84-2716-2719 (Disarmament), Cl-30, 84-2720-2722 (Economic Problems), and Cl-32, 84-2726-2728 (Cuba). Letter, The Federation of Students of Chile [FECH] (Eduardo Zuiga and Patricio Fernndez) to Eisenhower, 24 February 1960, attached to Memorandum Reply to Chilean Students Letter, Herter to th e President, 30 March 1960, Folder Chile (2), Box 7, AWFInternational Series, DDEL. This is an official translation. 21 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America 137. Remarks to the American-Chil ean Group, Embassy Staff, American Society of Chile, Association of American Women in Chile, and Chil ean-American Chamber of Commerce, Eisenhower, 1 March 1960, Folder DDE to South America, Chron (Chile), Feb. 29 Mar. 2, 1960 (2), Box 10, White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-1961, In ternational Trips and Meetings Series, DDEL. Hereafter cited CGMRInternational Trips Series. 265

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Upon returning to Washington, ARA prepared and Eisenhower personally edited a 26-page response to the students 4-page letter, signed it, and sent it to FECh leaders. 22 Contrary to Under Secretary Dillons belief that the respons e was effective, Eisenhowers 26-page rebuttal wounded and angered the stud ents. As indicated by the responses length, Eisenhower and White House officials focused upon educating the studen ts and rebutting their critique, not engaging in a dialogu e. By characterizing the studen ts as ill informed, Eisenhower implicitly suggested that the students might be unworthy to criticize the United States. Moreover, in citing the burdens of global leadership, Eisenhower im plied that the United States expected other nations to follow, not participat e in determining the c ourse of world affairs. 23 It was a very close thing that Eisenhower did not to leave office with Castro and Allende as heads of state in Latin America; even so, Alessandri subverted the Rubottom-imposed IMFIBRD reform plan. U.S. officials wanted m ore effective action by Alessandri to restore financial stability and effect basic improve ments in national economy and distribution of income, but Alessandri negotia ted and stalled for more than a year. By then, the U.S. presidential campaign of 1960 wa s underway and Eisenhowers presidency was drawing to a close, allowing Alessandri to stall and wait out another year while U.S. voters deliberated whether to vote for John F. Kennedy or Richar d M. Nixon. Meanwhile, Chileans attacked U.S.22 Eisenhower to Patricio Fernndez, President of FECH, n.d [30 March 1960]; and Howe to Fernandez, n.d. [30 March 1960], enclosed with Memorandum Reply to Chilean Students Letter, Herter to the President, 30 March 1960, Folder Chile (2), Box 7, AWFInternational Series, DDEL. Memorandum Discussion at the 441 st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 14, 1960, NSC, 14 April 1960, Folder 441 st Mtg of NSC, April 14, 1960, Box 12, AWF-NSC Series, DDEL. 23 Memorandum Discussion at the 441 st Meeting of the National Security Co uncil, Thursday, April 14, 1960, NSC, 14 April 1960. Fernndez and Ziga to Howe, n.d. [April 1960], enclosed with Memorandum Second Letter of Chilean Students Who Wrote to the President During His Latin American Trip, John A. Calhoun, Director of Executive Secretariat, to Goodpaster, 3 May 1960, Folder Chile (2) [Apr-May 1960], Box 2, CGMR International Series, DDEL. 266

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promoted reform policies, saying that such policie s achieved neither stability nor development. Chilean economist and former Ambassador to the United States Anbal Pinto Santa Cruz charged that reforms based upon economic orthodoxy were reducing demand indiscriminately accentuating a regression in the distribution of income, diminishing the volume of public and private investment, constraining the dynamic infl uence of the state, and limiting the protective barriers of the national productive system with re spect to foreign influences. Reviewing the situation, Ambassador Howe wrote, the United Stat es had lost the psyc hological ini tiative in Inter-American relations, and we cannot afford to ignore the serious ne ed for regaining [it]. 24 In May 1960, at the start of Chiles winter, the strongest earthquake recorded in human history heavily damaged the southern Central Va lley, and the emergency redirected Chilean and U.S. resources to humanitarian aid and recons truction, ending the IMF-IBRD reform program. In a region where one-third of Chiles popula tion resided, the earthquake was accompanied by tidal waves, volcanic eruptions, a nd strong aftershocks, inflicting ru in on the cities of Valdivia, Concepcin, Talca, Osorno, Puerto Montt, Ancu d, and Chilln, with Valdivia devastated by a tidal wave. Hundreds were dead or missing; tens of thousands we re injured and/or homeless. Within 96 hours, the U.S. government airlifte d two field hospitals (400 beds and 227 Army personnel), ten helicopters (71 pers onnel), and large quantities of tents, blankets, cots, field rations, and medicine to the affected regions. President Eisenhower personally appealed to the U.S. public to come to the aid of the Chileans, resulting in generous c ontributions to the Red 24 Memorandum Balance Sheet on Chile, Phillips to Rubottom, 2 May 1960, FRUS 1958-60, V: microfiche, Cl34, 84-2730. Anbal Pinto S.C. [Santa Cruz], Ni Estabilidad Ni Desarrollo: La poltica del Fondo Monetario (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1 960) 12. Despatch 921 Operations Plan for Latin America, Howe to Department of State, 17 March 1959, 611.25/3-1759. 267

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Cross. Former Chamber of Deputies president Ba ltasar Castro Palma said that U.S. government and private assistance was so spontaneous, rapid, and generous that it created a tremendously favorable impression among Chileans. Both houses of Chiles congress passed unanimous resolutions thanking their North American neighbor, a feat that Chiles ambassador admitted to Eisenhower was exceedingly rare fo r his very democratic country. 25 A Road, But Not the Road Allendes success in 1958 hearte ned the FRAP and ensured that he would be its candidate in 1964. Socialist Ral Ampuero remarked, the Le ft had to hold back its impatience and wait confidently. Allende himself confided to one FRAP leader, I will be President of Chile. 26 During the post-election lull, Allende investig ated the Cuban Revolution firsthand and met with Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara. Allendes friend Rmulo Betancourt had won Venezuelas December 1958 election, and Betancour t, who had lived across the street from Allende while in exile in Chile, had invited hi m and Senator Eduardo Frei to his inauguration 25 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 259. Memorandum Chilean Emergency, [State Department], 1 June 1960; and Memorandum Chilean Relief Operations, Department of Defense, n.d. [1 June 1960]; both Folder Chilean Disaster Relief, Box 1, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, DDEL. Hereafter cited as SpAsst OCB Series, Subject Subseries. Memorandum Latin Ameri can Progress, Dillon to the President, 1 August 1960, Folder State Department Latin America (3) [Apr il July 1960], Box 4, CGMRSubject Series, State Department Subseries, DDEL. Memorandum of Conversation United States Assistance to Chile, Coerr, 18 June 1960, FRUS 1958-60 V: microfiche, Cl-38, 84-2740-2741. Telegram 771, Howe to Secretary of State, 30 May 1960, Folder Chile (2) [April May 1960], Box 2, CGMRInternational Series, DDEL. Memorandum of Conversation Political View and Affiliations of Importa nt Chilean Political Leader, Norman M. Pearson, First Secretary of Embassy and Labor Attach, 7 June 1960, enclosed with Despatch 18 Meeting with Baltasar Castro Palma, Pearson, 8 July 1960, 725.00/7-860, Folder 725.00/2-1160, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 26 Ral Ampuero Daz, La izquierda en punto muerto (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1969), 70. Jaime Surez Bastidas, Allende, visin de un militante (Santiago: Editorial Jurdica ConoSur, 1992), 47. 268

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ceremonies. 27 Allende and Frei travelled together to Caracas, but before the ceremonies, Allende went to Cuba to see the revolution. He and his staff had not closely followed events in Cuba during Chiles presidential campaign, kn owing little more than what was presented in Life magazine, which had published an interview w ith Castro. Arriving in Havana on 20 January 1959, Allende watched a parade in which the mayor of Miami, Florida, and 200 of that citys policemen participated. The presence of Ameri cans led Allende to conc lude that there was no revolution, and he decided to leav e. A Cuban friend, Carlos Rafael Rodrguez, convinced him to stay and talk with the Cuban l eaders. Allende soon met Ch Guevara. When he started to introduce himself, Guevara br oke [him] off, saying Look, Allende, I know perfectly well who you are. I heard two of your speeches during th e presidential campaign: one very good and the other very bad. Allende later met Ral Castr o, Fidels brother, and then Fidel. The Chilean sat in on a cabinet meeting, dined with Fi del, and talked with him afterwards. 28 Castro, Guevara, and Cubas Revolution impr essed Allende. He wa s struck by Castros intelligence and candor, and considered Guevara one of the most important leaders of Latin America. As occurred during his 1954 visit to China and later vi sits to North Korea and North Vietnam, Allende was moved by how the Cuban people were mobilized materially and spiritually to build a socialist society, how they were a people organized, disciplined, 27 Judith Ewell, Venezuela and the United Status: From Monroes Hemisphere to Petroleums Empire (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 165-166. Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emisin, 1987 [1985]), 96. Rgis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 69. 28 Debray, The Chilean Revolution 72-73. Guevara likely he ard Allendes speech es while travelling with Alberto Granado across South America in 1952. He alludes to the 1952 campaign in his diary but does not mention Allende. See Ernesto Ch Guevara, The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes on a Latin American Journey (New York: Ocean Press, 2004 [1954], 79. For Guevara wan ting to meet Allende, see Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 95. 269

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absolutely conscious of the great task that they must fulfill. Allende said the revolutions in Mexico and Bolivia were stages toward libe ration, but the Cuban revolution marks with indelible characteristics a pro cess of overcoming, of taking firm steps towards full economic independence. Cuba, he said, i ndicated the road that Latin Am erican peoples must follow to consolidate and accelerate the poli tical, economic, and social evolut ion that leads them to being genuinely and definitively free. 29 For Allende, the Cuban Revol ution did not demonstrate the road for Latin Americans struggles, but a road. Upon returning from Cuba, he was more convinced than before that Chile must seek a peaceful road to socialism, and for two reasons. First, Cubas revolutionary leaders had put one over on imperialism, he said, but they also had closed to us the road of armed insurrection because existing government s would be more sensitive to controlling guerilla movements. He also asserted that Cuba s revolution signified not the means, but rather that the feat of overcoming dependency and imperi alism was possible: a Latin American people, if united, could initiate revolut ion, transform society, and build a socialist society. [E]ach country has its own particular circumstances, said Allende, a nd it is in the light of these circumstances that one must act. There is no set formula. He admitted that his views had led to fundamental and violent disagreements with Castro, and he acknowledged that in some countries, there is no alternat ive to armed struggle. Chile, however, was different; and circumstances had permitted the Chilean ma sses, through the vanguard Socialist and 29 Debray, The Chilean Revolution 73, 77. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 95. Allende: Posibilidades concreta de comerciar con el mundo Socialista, El Siglo 28 December 1954, p. 3. Allende, Cuba, un camino (Santiago: Prensa Latinoamrica, 1960), 7-9. This reprints a speech Allende gave in the Senate on 27 July 1960. 270

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Communist parties, to have a voi ce in politics. With the ballot box available as a route to revolution, Allende insist ed, we must redouble our efforts to find a way by the electoral road. 30 Allendes views about Cuba, revolution, socialism, and democracy explain his support for the Declaration of Caracas. As a democrat a nd Marxist-socialist, Allende insisted that the revolution must be democratic, in addition to anti-imperialist and anti-feudal.It must be profoundly human. The Declaration of Car acas, negotiated during and signed by many who attended Betancourts inaugurati on festivities, did not conflict with Allendes views. It repudiated every form of dictatorial or total itarian rule, and called for the exclusion of dictatorships from the Organization of American States (OAS). It encour aged greater integration and cooperation amongst Latin American nations, as well as equitable and fruitful relations between Latin America and the United States. He, as well as E duardo Frei, signed the declaration on 15 February 1959, two days after Betancourts inauguration. 31 Creating a Showcase For John F. Kennedy, the new U.S. president, [f]ighting and winning the Cold War in Latin America was [his] paramount concern. He warned that time was running out in Latin America and that while the Cold War may not be won in Latin America, it could well be lost there. During the 1960 campaign, Kennedy charge d that the Eisenhower administration had 30 Debray, The Chilean Revolution 127, 74, 82. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 96. Allende, Cuba, un camino 8. 31 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 96. Charles D. Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The AntiDictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-1959 (Coral Gables FL: University of Miami Press, 1974), 265, 330 n 24. 271

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allowed a Communist satellite ninety miles off the coast of Florida, and Ca stros Cuba could be a base from which to carry Communist infilt ration and subversion throughout the Americas. 32 Kennedy emphasized his desire to improve U. S.-Latin American relations by creating the Alliance for Progress. On 13 March 1961, in a White House ceremony attended by the Latin American diplomatic corps, Kennedy proposed a ten-year, vast cooperativ e effort that would encompass political, economic, and social reform s, as well as cultural exchanges. Quoting Mexican president Bento Jurez, Kennedy insisted that if democracy is the destiny of future humanity, then the nations of the hemisphere must broaden the opportunity for all of our people. Kennedys words spread a wave of e xpectation across Latin America, but Kennedy also put money behind his proposal. Congre ss provided $500 million for Latin American development in 1961, and in 1962, the Kennedy administration earmarked $1 billion for Latin America through various U.S. government pr ograms such as PL-480, EXIM Bank, and the Agency for International Developm ent (AID). At the August 1961 Inter-American conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, the U.S. delegation head ed by C. Douglas Dillon, now Secretary of the Treasury, ironed out the charter for the Alliance for Progress with the other Latin American delegations, and Dillon outlined a plan to make good on [U.S.] commitments. 33 32 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 19, 14, 15. 33 Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for th e Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, Kennedy, 13 March 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1962), 170-175. Jerome Levinson and Juan de Ons, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 36. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World 10. Rabe, Controlling Revolutions: La tin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism, Kennedys Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Thom as G. Paterson, ed., 107. Memorandum Immediate Steps in Furthering the Alliance for Progress, C. Douglas Dillon to the President, 25 August 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Volume XII (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1996), 61-63. For documents relating to discussions at the August 1961 Punte del Este meeting, see FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XII: 44-65 272

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Like their predecessors, Kennedy administrati on officials favored Chile because they perceived it as a model democracy, and as a showcase for the Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy White House emphasized Ch iles remarkable history of stable democratic political institutions and consider[ed] Ch ile to be both important and cri tical. Assistan t Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin M. Martin said that they were determined that Chile would show the way for the Alliance for Progre ss. U.S. officials described Chile as an outstanding symbol of traditionally stable democratic government, a nation painfully close to the take off stage of economic development, and a nation that sets the pace for all Latin America. Senator Wayne Morse (D Oregon), chair of the Senates subcommittee on U.S.Latin American relations, echoed the administrations emphasis on Chiles democratic qualities, The political atmosphere in Chile is one of true democracy. Basic human freedoms are deeply and traditionally respected. There is a powerful and growing middle class. 34 Kennedy took a special interest in Chile; in f act, no previous White House had taken such a strong interest in the countr y. Did you know in Chile the Am erican copper companies control about eighty percent of all th e foreign exchange? Kennedy to ld special assistant Richard Goodwin, We wouldnt stand for th at here. And theres no reason they should stand for it. 34 Briefing Paper Foreign Minister Ma rtnez Call on the Presiden t, n.d. [29? September 1961], enclosed with Memorandum, Brubeck to ODonnell, 29 September 1961, Folder 12 Chile Security, 1961-1962, Box 113C, Presidents Office Files Co untries File, JFKL. Hereafter cited as POF Countries. Edwin McCammon Martin, Kennedy and Latin America (Lanham MD: University Press of Ameri ca, 1994), 313. Subject Paper, Chile: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations, March 1962, enclosed with Memorandum, Charles E. Johnson to Ralph Dungan, 11 May 1962, Folder Chile, General, 5/1/62 5/21/62, Box 391, NSF Dungan, JFKL. Background Paper, The Alliance for Progress in Chile, en closed in Presidents Briefi ng Book, Visit of President Alessandri, December 11-15, 1962, Folder 725.11/8-162, Box 1566; and Letter, Chester Bowles, Presidents Special Representative, to Cole, 9 May 1962, Folder 725.00/1-1662, Box 1564; both DF 1960-63 RG59, NA. United States Senate, South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela: Report of Senator Wayne Morse on a Study Mission to the Committee on Foreign Relations 20 February 1960, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1960), 19. 273

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Kennedy requested information on school and housi ng construction in Chile, on agrarian reform, and Christian Democrat victorie s among university student groups. He also expressed a desire and agreed to visit Chile. The new U.S. Ambassa dor to Chile, Charles W. Cole, was dazzled that Kennedy knew all [Chiles] important peop le, all the important issues, the crucial recent happenings, how things were de veloping. Meetings with Ke nnedy on Chile, Cole said, were like going through a Ph.D. examinat ion. Cole, an economic histor ian, did not believe this was a president being well briefed by a staff member ; he knew that men like Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, or McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser, either were learning about Latin America (Dungan) or had little interest in the region (Bundy). 35 By positing Chile as a democratic model a nd as an Alliance showcase, the new Kennedy administration elevated the U.S. stakes in Chile, casting the loss of Chile as a major blow to U.S. policy. Chile, they said, could be a more dangerous and effective Cuba, and an Allende victory in 1964 would be so dangerous for U.S. in terests in Chile and in all Latin America that U.S. policy should be to strive to prevent it. Assistant Secretary Martin admitted that their expectations for Alliance programs in Chile woul d be considered unreasonable if applied to any other Latin American nation, and Walt W. Rostow admitted that Chile was probably the 35 Richard N. Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), 200. Memorandum Gains by Christian Democratic Party in Chile, n.d. [28-29 April 1962], enclosed with Memorandum Christian Democratic Gains among Chilean St udents, L. D. Battle, Execu tive Secretary of the NSC (Melvin L. Manfull), to Bundy, 30 March 1962, Folder Chile General 1/62 4/62, Box 391, NSF -Dungan, JFKL. Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Situation, Martin, 3 August 1962, Folder 725.11/8-162, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Ambassadors Call on Secretary Rusk, 6 March 1963, enclosed with Memorandum, William H. Brube ck to McGeorge Bundy, 12 March 1963, Folder Chile, General, 1/63 6/63, NSF-Countries, JFKL. Charles W. Cole Oral History Interview, 26 April 1969, Dennis OBrien, interviewer, JFKL, 33-34. 274

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first real test of the Alliance. 36 Cole perhaps best summarized the administrations view, We should keep it in mind that a real fracaso [failure] in Chile will cast a blight on the whole [Alliance] and strengthen anti-American forces all over Latin America. 37 As much as U.S. officials wanted Chile to serve as a model for democracy and the Alliance, they faced two obstacles: U.S. coppe r companies and the Chilean Right. U.S. policymakers believed that Anaconda and Kennecott Coppe r needed to adjust their basic relations with the Chilean government and the Chilean pu blic, but they also admitted that the two companies confronted eventual na tionalization of their operations in Chile. [T]he root of the companies problems, Assistant Secretary Mart in told Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator of the Alliance, was that Anaconda and Kennecott were subsidiaries of U.S. corporations with no Chilean equity participation and with few manage rial positions open to Chileans. In fact, ARA officials were surprised when the president of Anacondas sales division admitted that he never thought about hiring Chileans in its sa les operations. ARA did a study that compared U.S. and British copper companies in Chile and Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia) respectively, and it found that the British companies generally provided better housing, social 36 Guidelines Paper Chile: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Department of State, March 1962, attached to Memorandum, Charles E. Johnson to Dungan, 11 May 1962, Folder Chile General 5/1/625/21/62, Box 391, NSFDungan Series, JFKL. Richardson to Cole, 11 February 1963, Folder CHRON 3 Letters Chile Incoming Embassy 1963 [2 of 2], Box 5; Cole to Richardson, 22 June 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16 Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4; Memorandum, LAPC Meeting, January 10, Chile, Belcher to Martin, 8 January 1963, Folder CHRON 6 Memoranda Chile 1963 to June 1963 [2 of 2], Box 6; Memorandum, Belcher to Martin, 7 November 1963, Folder CHRON Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6; all WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 37 Underline in original. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 315. Memorandum, Our Alliance for Progress Strategy in Chile, Walter W. Rostow, 25 May 1962, Folder Chile, Box 213, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1962, RG59 Lot Files, NA. This idea of Chile being a test for the Alliance was reported in the New York Times See Juan de Ons, Chile to be Test of Kennedy Plan, New York Times 2 April 1961, p. 14. Letter, Cole to Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State (ARA), 15 January 1962, Folder Chile 1962 -130 Ambassadors, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 275

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facilities, and educational arrangements for African miners and their families. 38 Chile Desk officer, Ralph Richardson tried to convince Kenn ecott president Frank Milliken to change that companys relations with the Chileans, but Mil liken refused. Kennecott would continue its hard-nosed approach toward the Chilean Governme nt, Milliken replied, and he suggested that the U.S. Government get tougher on the Chileans. Martin admitted to Under Secretary of State George W. Ball that, unless some major changes are effectedit is only a matter of time until some form of nationalization overtakes the two companies, sentiments to which Cole agreed. 39 Alessandri and the Chilean Right were anot her obstacle to making Chile a showcase for U.S. foreign policy. Dominating Alessandris ad ministration, Chiles Liberal and Conservative Parties resented the revolutionary tone of th e Alliance for Progress and equated it with the rhetoric of the Chilean Left. According to th e U.S. embassy, many Cons ervatives and Liberals believed that they are being pushed toward making concessions which they would like to postpone or not make at all. Conservative Se nator Francisco Bulnes Correa accused the United States of pushing Chile too far a nd too fast along the road of agrarian reform. Long-time U.S. 38 Memorandum Terms of Reference of World Bank Review of Problems of US Copper Companies in Chile, Martin to Moscoso, 11 February 1963. Memorandum of Conversation Chileanization of US Copper Companies, Richardson, 23 May 1963, Folder Chron Chile Memoranda of Conversation 1963; and Belcher to Charles M. Brinckerhoff, President of the Anacond a Company, 19 December 1963, Folder Chron 5 Letters Chile 1963 Miscs 1963; both Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 39 Underlining in the original. Memorandum Randall Committee Consideration of Problems of American Copper Companies in Chile, Martin to George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, 21 October 1963, Folder Chron Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6; and Memorandum Terms of Reference of World Bank Review of Problems of US Copper Companies in Chile, Martin to Moscoso, 11 February 1963, Folder Chron 6 Memoranda Chile 1963, Box 5; both WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Kennecott View on Chile Problems, Richardson, 4 June 1963, enclosed with Memorandum, Brubeck to Bundy, 7 June 1963, Folder Chile, Box WH-3a, White House Files, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Papers, JFKL. Memorandum US Copper Companies in Chile, Martin to Dungan, 5 Decembe r 1963, Folder Chron Chile White House Memoranda 1963, Box 6, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Cole agreed with Martins assessmen t. See Cole to Richardson 19 December 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letter Chile Incoming Embassy 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 276

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friend Augustn Duny Edwards Budge, owner of the newspaper El Mercurio travelled to Washington and complained to ARA official s about the new direction in U.S. policy. 40 The Chilean Rights opposition to and its ultimate proposal for land reform frustrated, if not angered, U.S. officials. Chilean Foreign Minister Carlos Martnez Sotomayor diplomatically told President Kennedy that division of large estates must not lead to small, uneconomic holdings, but the Rights opposition was much deep er. Alessandri confided that he thought that the United States was demanding agrarian reforms of an absurd breadth, reforms which would cause chaos and for which there is no possi ble financing, and the president of Chiles Liberal Party baldly suggested that the United States should pay for land reform in Chile. 41 When the Right did put forth a land reform proposal the initiative concentr ated on settlement of new lands in Magallanes (far south), Arica (far north) and other public lands, as well as expropriating abandoned and poorly worked lands ; it made no effort to divide existing large 40 Memorandum A Program of Political Action in Chile, Pearson to Cole, 17 October 1962, enclosed with Airgram A-371 Summary of Political Situation in Chile, Co le to Department of State, 17 October 1962, Folder Chile General 1/63, Box 392, NSF Dungan, JFKL, p. 6, 7, and 15. Despatch 20 Mounting Tension in Chilean Politics, Pearson to Department of State, 11 July 1961, 725 .00/7-1161, attached to Telegram 14778, Rusk (Phillips) to Cole, 26 July 1961, 725.00/6-2261, Folder 725.00/6-261, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Briefing Paper Foreign Minister Martnez Call on the President, n.d. [September 1961], enclosed with Memorandum Brubeck to ODonnell, 29 September 1961, Folder 12 Chile Security 1961-1962, Box 113c, POF Countries, JFKL. Memorandum of Conversation, 18 July 1961, Robert Foster Corrigan, Counselor of U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, attached to Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to Corrigan, 26 July 1961, 725.00/7-2161, Folder 725.00/6-261, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. John Joseph Jova to Richardson, 12 June 1962, Unmarked Folder between Folders Chile 1962 925. Relations with Bolivia and Chile 1962 650. U.S. Credits, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 41 Memorandum of Conversation Interview President Kennedy and Chilean Foreign Minister Carlos Martnez Sotomayor, Richardson, 10 October 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Volumes X/XI/XII, American Republics/Cuba 19611962/Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Microfiche supplement (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1998), CHI-5/2. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1961-63 microfiche. Alessandri to Aldunate, 16 February 1962, Cartas del Presidente Jorge Alessandri con los embajadores en la Santa Sede (1959-1964) (Santiago: Pehun, 1994), Sergio Carrasco Delgado, ed., 72-76. Memorandum of Conversation Views of the Interim President of the Liberal Party, Pearson, 5 April 1961, enclosed with Despatch 703 Memorandum of Conversation, Pearson to Department of State, 24 April 1961, 725.00/4-2461, Folder 725.00/2-1160, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 277

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estates. The proposal also required a constituti onal amendment and created an appeals process which U.S. officials admitted could d efer expropriation for a long period. 42 Alessandris actions during the December 1961 financial crisis exacerbated U.S. officials frustration. In late 1961, a surge in imports drained Chiles fi nancial reserves, leading to a severe foreign exchange crisis. Alessandri blamed the crisis on the Chilean Congress and said he was not able to do anything other than suspen d foreign exchange operations, leading Assistant Secretary Martin to accuse him of taking a do-nothing pos ture. Although the Chilean economy enjoyed low inflation a nd a rise in GDP during 1960 a nd 1961, Alessandri obtained the improved economic conditions through U.S. loans, deficit spending, and an overvalued escudo pegged at 1.05 escudos to 1 U.S. dollar. Deficit spending broke Chiles agreement with the IMF, and the additional loans had raised the Chilean go vernments deficit to 5 percent of GDP. The Alessandri administration, with Congressional agreement, also raised taxes on U.S. copper companies, prompting Anaconda and Kenneco tt to cancel new investments in Chile. 43 Perhaps no action of Alessandris rankled U.S. officials more than his refusal to devalue the escudo. In early December 1961, Eduardo Figueroa, the head of Chiles Central Bank, 42 Despatch 455 Politico-Economic Assessment Chile Janu ary 1962, Thomas R. Favell, Counselor for Economic Affairs, to Department of State, 30 January 1962, 725.00/1-3062, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA, p. 7-8. Memorandum Agrarian Reform in Chile, Roger Hilsman (INR) to Moscoso, 28 February 1962, Folder Chile, Box WH-3a, White House Files, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Papers, JFKL. 43 Telegram 58, Martin to Cole, 20 July 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63 CHI-8/1. Letter, Alessandri to Fernando Aldunate, Ambassador to the Holy See, 16 February 1962, Cartas del Presidente Jorge Alessandri con los embajadores en la Santa Sede 72-76. Despatch 455 Politico-Economic Assessment Chile January 1962, Favell to Department of State, 30 January 1962, 725.00/1-3062, p. 9-10. Memorandum Policy Directive: Subject: Chile, Woodward, 8 March 1962, Folder Subjects, Policy Directiv es, ARA, Bureau of Latin American Affairs, 1961-1963, Box 288Department of State, NSFDepartments and Agencies, JFKL. Memorandum Your Luncheon Engagement with Mr. Charles Brinckerhoff, President of the Anaconda Copper Co., Belcher to Goodwin, 22 February 1962, Folder Chil e 1962 20. Briefing Papers, Box 4, WST Files, RG59Lot, NA. 278

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pushed Alessandri to devalue the escudo in order to help resolve the exchange crisis. U.S. Embassy officials also pressed devaluation when they met with the Minister of Finance Lus Mackenna at the end of December, but Mackenna and several cabinet members urged exchange controls instead. The U.S. Embassy called excha nge controls a political course, because many Chilean commercial banks and several Conservati ve, Liberal, and Radi cal Party members had internal dollar debts at the 1.05 escudo to 1 U.S. dollar rate. If Alessandri devalued the escudo, party members and banks would lose money; howev er, exchange controls allowed many of them to cover their debts before devaluation. Alessandri admitted that he opted for exchange controls because of political realities, even though he and Mackenna ad mitted privately that they know full well that the right thing was devaluation. 44 The Chilean Rights refusal to accept reform at the expense of what U.S. officials deemed prudent policy led the Kennedy ad ministration to grow exasperate d and hostile to Alessandri and his administration. U.S. offici als recognized that the exchange crisis confronted them with a stark choice: they could assist Alessandri in order to buy the time for him to obtain passage of land reform and a progressive income tax laws, or they could allow the Alessandri government to collapse, precipitating new Presidential electi ons, which could bring Allende and the FRAP to power. Some U.S. officials indicated that the United States should let Alessandri collapse. Deputy Chief of Mission John Joseph Jova remarked that all would not necessarily be lost even 44 Alessandri to Fernando Aldunate, Ambassador to the Holy See, 16 February 1962, Cartas del Presidente Jorge Alessandri con los embajadores en la Santa Sede 73-74. Despatch 455 Politico-Economic Assessment Chile January 1962, Favell to Department of State, 30 January 1962, 725.00/1-3062. For the connections between Chiles banks and the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Party leaders, see Attachment I Some Influential Members of Chilean Financial Community (as of Januar y 1962), U.S. Embassy in Santiago, Folder Chile, General, 1/63, Box 392, NSFDungan Series, JFKL. This a ttachment is for Airgram A-371, but it was not attached in the folder. 279

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should a really left wing government come to power in Chile, but he confessed that it would be unrealistic in the extreme to ignore the dangers, risks, and hindrances of doing so. 45 Admitting that the Allende threat left them no choice, the Kennedy administration decided to provide an aid package to Alessandris gov ernment, but meetings with the Chileans went poorly. Alessandri invited a U.S. mission head ed by Teodoro Moscoso and Richard Goodwin to Santiago, but Moscoso and Goodwin sought to negotiate an aid package predicated upon Alessandri implementing land reform and a progressive income tax. The Alessandri administration publicized the mission beforehand, placing additional pressu re upon U.S. officials who confessed that no agreement would be a gr eat disappointment to the Chilean public and would damage the United States position in Chile. When Moscoso and Goodwin met with Alessandri, the Chilean president launched into a two-hour monologue. He charged that Chile was misunderstood in Washington and misrepresented in the U.S. media; furthermore, the IMF was too theoretical. Regarding land refo rm, Alessandri claimed that Chile was not a land of big estates like Argentina and that land reform was not applicable in many areas. During the visit, Goodwin told Finance Minist er Mackenna that i f you dont do something 45 For Kennedy following the crisis, see Handwritten note on Telegram 13156, Rusk (B. R. Moser) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 30 December 1961, Folder Chile, General, 10/61-12/61, Box 20a, NSFCountries, JFKL. Memorandum Political Considerations in our Aid Commitment to Chile, Belcher (Richardson) to Martin, 19 April 1962, Folder Chile 1962 19. Policy & Background Papers; and Memorandum Your Luncheon Engagement with Mr. Charles Brinckerhoff, President of Anaconda Copper Co., Belcher to Goodwin, 22 February 1962, Folder Chile 1962 20. Briefing Papers; both Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Cole to Woodward, 15 January 1962, Folder Chile 1962 130. Ambassadors, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, John Joseph Jova, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Belcher, 10 July 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16 Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 280

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about these changes [land and tax reforms] soon, Allende will win the next election. Mackenna rebuffed Goodwin, The problem is that you just dont understand Chile. 46 Despite facing outright opposition to reform, th e question for Goodwin, Moscoso, and U.S. officials was not whether the Un ited States would aid Chile, but how much and what type. The resulting $120 million aid package provided $80 million in loans ($50 million from AID, $30 million from the EXIM Bank) for high priority economic and social development projects, and $40 million in PL-480 assistance. 47 One-half of the monies was immediately available but contingent upon the Alessandri administration reach ing an agreement with the IMF. The United States promised $350 million dollars for the first 5 years of Alessandris 10-year development plan, but it was subject to an annua l review by an OAS panel to ensure that necessary social and structural reforms were implemented. The U.S. aid package did not offe r monies for shortages in the governments budget; inst ead, it provided investment cap ital for economic and social development projects, so that the Chilean government could shift budget monies to other needs. 48 46 Letter, Jova to Richardson, 12 February 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16 Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Moscoso-Goodwin Meeting with President Alessandri and Ministers, Cole, 5 March 1962, enclosed with Despatch 590 MoscosoGoodwin Meeting with President Alessandri [sic] and Ministers, Jova to Department of State, 22 March 1962, 811.0025/3-2262, Folder 725.022/1-2160, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Goodwin, Remembering America, 215. 47 Although an exporter of foodstuffs in the 1930s, Chile by the 1960s was an importer of food, spending about 20 percent of its export earnings to impor t foodstuffs. Richard E. Feinberg, The Triumph of Allende: Chiles Legal Revolution (New York: Mentor Books, 1972), 59. 48 Martin, Kennedy and Latin America v-vii. Memorandum Instructions for the Moscoso-Goodwin Mission, J. R. Robinson, 3 March 1962, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-6/1. Telegram 746, Moscoso and Goodwin to Hamilton and Robert F. Woodward, 9 March 1962, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-7/1-7/3. Memorandum Our Alliance for Progress Strategy in Chile, Jerome Fried (S/P) to Rost ow, 22 May 1962, attached to Memorandum, Rostow to Dungan, 25 May 1962, Folder Chile, General, 5/22/62-5/31/62, Box 391, NSFRalph Dungan Series, JFKL. 281

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No one was happy with the Moscoso-Goodwin agreement. Alessandri and his cabinet wanted grants but received loan s that required reforms. Even though U.S. officials agreed that economic aid was our only real leverage, they concluded that the pros pects of Alessandri and the Right undertaking reform were doubtful at best. Moscoso questioned the Departments unwillingness to allow Alessandris government to collapse, and Cole acknowledged that some were convinced that a FRAP victory is the on ly way to get rapid and thorough-going economic and social reform Chile. 49 Goodwin followed his instructions, but apparently blundered by not clearing the loans with Depa rtment officials (likely AID) beforehand. The Deputy Chief of Mission John Joseph Jova summarized the United St ates exasperation with Alessandri and the Right: we must plow with the oxen we own, a nd Alessandri, with all his defectsis our ox. Old Chinese proverb say: Dont give away old ox until you have bought new tractor. And Washington was now looking for a new tractor. 50 Unhappy with the aid package, Alessandri be gan pressuring Washingt on for an invitation for an official state visit in order to gain al terations in the Moscoso-Goodwin agreement. ARA had decided in December 1961 that a state visit fo r Alessandri was not in the US interest until we had seen more determined leadership and progr ess in Chiles economic and social reforms. 49 Letter, Pearson to Richardson, 21 March 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Pearson to Richardson, 19? June 1962. Pearson to Richardson, 28 March 1962, Folder Unmarked [located between Folders Chile 1962 925. Relations with Bolivia and Chile 1962 650. U.S. Credits], Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Jova to Richardson, 12 February 1962. Letter, Jova to Belcher, 10 July 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16 Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4; and Memorandum LAPC Meeting, January 10, Chile, Belcher to Martin, 8 January 1963, Folder CHRON 6 Memoranda Chile 1963 to June 1963 [2 of 2], Box 6; both WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 50 Memorandum Instructions for the Moscoso-Goodwin Mission, Robinson, 3 March 1962. Telegram 746, Moscoso and Goodwin to Hamilton and Woodward, 9 March 1962. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World 180. For ARA and Embassy wrangling with AID, s ee Memorandum Political Considerations in our Aid Commitment to Chile, Belcher (Richardson) to Martin, 19 April 1962; and Jova to Belcher, 10 July 1962. Jova to Richardson, 12 February 1962. 282

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Alessandri first raised the invita tion in a 7 July 1962 meeting with Cole when he indicated four times that he wanted to visit Washington not to beg [for] money but to explain to President Kennedy, who understands politics, [the] political problems of Chile. A few days later, Alessandri again suggested a visit in order to ex plain political difficultie s and then bemoaned the continual restrictions and limitations on US loans and especially Mo scoso-Goodwin loans. Chile, he said, was an island of democracy and stability in a sea of political deterioration and confusion, and it was in Chiles interest and ours that [Chile] be kept stable. 51 Alessandris timing (July 1962) for his request of a White House visit was not accidental. The Moscoso-Goodwin accord stipulated that Alessandris administration needed to reach an agreement with the IMF by 10 September in order to receive the other half of the aid package; however, Alessandri did not invite IMF officials to come to Chile until 14 August, ensuring that agreement would not occur before the deadline. In addition, the presiden t soon needed to submit a budget to the Chilean Congress, and he told Co le that he had counted on 120 million this year from Moscoso-Goodwin agreement in order to balance the budget and re dress the balance of payments situation. The Moscoso-Goodwin agreement did not provide funds for either item, and Alessandri must have known this. Even so, if he did not hear (or get the funds) soon, he said that he would have to cut capital investment which he admitted would slow progress under the Alliance and cause unemployment and economic recession. 52 51 Memorandum Possible Invitation to President of Chile to Visit the US, Belcher to Woodward, 22 December 1961, 725.11/12-2261, Folder 725.022/1-2160, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Telegram 23, Cole to Secretary of State, 7 July 1962; and Te legram 66, Cole to Secretary of State, 19 July 1962; both Folder Chile, General, 7/62-10/62, Box 20a, NSF-Countries, JFKL. 52 Memorandum Policy Considerations Related to U.S. Assi stance to Chile, ARA, n.d. [15 August 1962], Folder Chile, General, 8/15/62-10/4/62, Box 391a, NSFDungan Series, JFKL. Telegram 746, Moscoso and Goodwin to 283

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Alessandris grumblings and bro ad hints infuriated Assistan t Secretary Martin. The U.S. Embassys political counselor, Norman Pearson, reported that many, particularly Conservatives and Liberals, believed that the United States ha d an obligation to aid Chile, and that Chile should be treated generously and without conditi ons because of their long democratic tradition and apolitical military. Martin recognized that Al essandri was using the visit as a stalling tactic, and as an effort to get Kennedy and the Alliance identified with his administration (and the Right). [I]t is not just a stubborn insistence upon carrying out the letter of the MoscosoGoodwin agreement, he fired back at Cole. There are too many demands on our funds and they are secured with too much political blood, sweat, and tears here for us to be able to make them available where there is a substantial risk that they will not contribute pr oportionately to [Alliance for Progress] shared objectives. Martin bluntly told Cole that if Alessandri came to Washington without undertaking reforms, devalui ng the escudo, or negotiating with the IMF, he would find no receptivity [to] his efforts [to] persuade Washington agencies [to] waive [the] conditions [of the] Moscoso-Goodwin understanding, and would receive a stiff lecture on [the] necessity [of] taking measures he so far has shunned. 53 Cole now split with Martin, sa ying that the latters response to Alessandris request for an official visit was no real help. In a letter to Martin, with copies sent to McGeorge Bundy, Walt Hamilton and Woodward, 9 March 1962. Telegram 23, Cole to Secretary of State, 7 July 1962, 725.11/7-762, Folder 725.022/1-2160, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 53 Airgram A-154 Misunderstandings Over Alliance Aid Sour U.S.-Chilean Relations, Pearson to Department of State, 14 August 1962, 611.25/8-1462, Folder Chile, Ge neral, 7/62-10/62, Box 20a, NSF-Countries, JFKL. For Alessandri sharing such ideas, see Memorandum Policy Cons iderations Related to U.S. Assistance to Chile, ARA, n.d. [15 August 1962]; and Memorandum Export-Import Banks $30 Million Commitment for Chile, Graham Martin, Acting U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and Edwin Martin, n.d. [13 August 1962], attached to Graham Martin to Dungan, 13 August 1962, Folder Chile, General, 6/1/62-8/14/82, Box 391a, NSFDungan Series, JFKL. Telegram 58, Martin to Cole, 20 July 1962, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-8/1-8/4. 284

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Rostow, and Theodore Moscoso, Cole asserted th at Alessandri and his administration have a good deal of justice on their side; furthermor e, he accused Washington of hiding behind the IMF. If IMF orthodoxy was the wrong prescription, Cole told Martin, You and I are going to feel a little odd if Chile lapses into economi c chaos and the FRAP takes over and makes another Cuba out of Chile. Lets stop worrying becau se the Chileans dont do things our way, Cole concluded, because they are short on the follo w-through, because they are too political, etc., etc., and look at the larger picture of the Hemisphere and the next decade. 54 By sending copies to Bundy, Rostow, and Moscos o, Cole circumvented Martin and pushed the decision for Alessandris visit into the White H ouse. Cole also requested that he return to Washington for consultations, which ARA granted. Cole arrived in Washington a week later, and he and Martin met with President Kenne dy. Before that meeting, ARA (Richardson, Belcher, Martin) and Moscoso sent Kennedy a memorandum that discouraged a visit by Alessandri until he obtained an agreement with the IMF and made progress on reforms. 55 Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) also sent a letter to Kennedy, urging him to invite Alessandri to Washington, but Mans fields letter revealed th at Alessandri was using the copper companies to pressure the White House. Mansfield wrote that he had talked with a friend who had extensive personal and financ ial interests in Chile (likely an Anaconda Copper executive, which had extensive interests in Montana). His friend was contacted by 54 Letter, Cole to Martin, 9 May 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Co le to Martin, with copies sent to Bundy, Rostow, and Moscoso, 23 July 1962, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-9/1-9/3. 55 Telegram, Cole to Secretary of State, 23 July 1962, Folder -Chile, General, 7/62-10/62 Box 20a, NSF -Countries, JFKL. Memorandum Question of Visit by Chilean President, Brubeck (written by Richardson, initialed by Belcher, Martin, and Moscoso) to Dungan, 1 August 1962, 725.11/8-162, Folder 725.11/8-162, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 285

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Chiles Minister of Mines, Alessandris brother, and a close friend of Al essandri, and all three Chileans urged Mansfields friend to press the U.S. government to invite Alessandri to see President Kennedy. [T]he Chilean man in the street believes, Mansfield wrote, that the U.S. government wants Alessandri to fa il, that the Moscoso-Goodwin mission gave promises of aid that have not materialized, and that U.S. insistence upon reform was a policy of intervention more insidious than Theodore Roosevelts policy of the Big Stick. 56 The decision for the Alessandri visit occurr ed on 3 August 1962 in an Oval Office meeting between Kennedy, Martin, Cole, and Kennedys sp ecial assistant Ralph Dungan. Kennedy asked Cole to summarize the situation in Chile, and the Ambassador desc ribed the Alessandri governments success in building schools and housi ng and that the agrarian reform was almost through the Chilean Congress. Cole then stre ssed the deep disappoint ment Alessandri had about the Moscoso-Goodwin agreement and Alessa ndris desire to discu ss the situation with Kennedy. Impressed by Alessandri s difficulties, Kennedy then rais ed the points that Mansfield had made in his letter, and Cole said some of those points were valid but some were derived from a misunderstanding. Kennedy decided Alessandri should visit Washington soon, and chose November, just three months away, even though it meant postponing the visit by Brazilian President Joo Goulart. Whether Martin was an gry with Cole for circumventing the Department is not clear, but he and ARA did believe that Cole seemed unwilling to pressure Alessandri and preferred to listen to [A lessandris] speeches blaming the U.S. for his short-comings. 57 56 Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) to the President, 28 July 1962, Folder Chile, General, 6/1/62-8/14/62, Box 391a, NSFDungan Series, JFKL. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 372 n 72. 57 Memorandum of Conversation Chilean Situation, Martin, 3 August 1962, 725.11/8-362, Folder 725.11/8-162, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 313-314. 286

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Martin and ARA anticipated that the White House invitation would decrease rather than strengthen Alessandris initiative for reform, a nd Alessandris actions proved them correct. By his 11-15 December 1962 visit, Alessandri had not reached an accord with the IMF nor had tax reform passed Congress. Congress had passe d a land reform law, but Alessandri had not implemented it. Alessandri did devalue the escudo. Martin believed that Alessandri was stalling on reforms and that he would try to persuade us to ease our conditions but he did deem Alessandris visit useful. It would allow the United States to recognize Chiles outstanding record as a political democracy and enab le ARA to present our candid views on the importance of Chiles own efforts to help itself. 58 Kennedys luncheon toast exemplified the recognize-Chilean-democracy-but-pleasereform approach that the Kennedy administratio n had adopted. In the toast, Kennedy invoked the memory of Alessandris father, Arturo Ale ssandri, saying that his fathers election as President of Chile in 1920 had ended oligarchical rule and had all the aspects of a social revolution, although a bloodless one. The elde r Alessandri, Kennedy said, had implemented New Deal-like laws that created Chiles social welfare system and its labor code, and the U.S. president added that he believed the senior Alessandri would have been enthusiastic about the Alliance for Progress. By invoking the fathers so cial reform achievements, the toast, perhaps unintentionally, seemed to call upon the son to live up to his fathers legacy. 59 58 Telegram 58, Martin to Cole, 20 July 1962. Memorandum Invitation to President Alessandri of Chile to Visit the United States, Richardson to Bundy, 9 November 1962, 725.11/11-962, Folder 725.11/8-162, Box 1566, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 314-315. 59 Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 316. 287

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Alessandri had insisted that he needed to explain his situation to Kennedy, yet the two presidents spent little time discussing Chilean politics, and when they did, Alessandri rebuffed Kennedys appeals for reform. The visit occurred just weeks after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Kennedy and Alessandri spent much of their time discussing Cuba. Alessandri offered Chiles embassy in Havana as a conduit for intelligence on Cuban internal politics and promised to replace the ambassador and several staff members. Kennedy used the discussion of Castro as an opening to urge reform: [T]he problem was not Castro, but rather difficult domestic problems which provide a breeding ground for the extreme le ft. Kennedy added that it would be a severe blow to see communism win an important election in a democratic country, when we have said that communism can remain in power only by building a wall (a reference to the recently constructed Berlin Wall). Alessandri deflected Kennedys hint, saying that democracy was at a disadvantage since its enemies take advantage of the right of free expression, and that one had turn the press from its defeatist approach on Chilean affairs. Kennedy changed the subject but grasped the Chileans message: For all Al essandris claims of wanting to explain his problems to Kennedy, he (and the Right) did not want reform. 60 During the months after the visit, Kennedy tw ice pressed the Alessandri administration to initiate reform but gave up. He even once told th e Chilean ambassador that it would be better to adopt reforms and weaken the Left from withi n, but in both instances when Kennedy pressed 60 Memorandum of Conversation Cuba, van Reigersberg (Translator) and Ri chardson, 12 Decem ber 1962, Folder Chile, General, 11/62-12/62; and Memorandum of Conversation Chile and Cuba, van Reigersberg and Richardson, 12 December 1962 attached to Memorandum, Brubeck to Bundy, 8 January 1963, Folder Chile, General, 1/63-6/63; both Box 20a, NS FCountries, JFKL. See also Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 318-319. Memorandum of Conversation The Cuban Problem, van Reigersberg and Richar dson, 11 December 1962, FRUS, 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-13/1-13/2. 288

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for reform, his urging s were turned aside. 61 With Alessandri and the Chilean Right, Kennedys administration found little allian ce and little progress, and it now turned to finding a reformoriented successor, who could prevent Allende and the FRAP from gaining strength. Tampering with Democracy For all of its frustration with Alessandri, the Kennedy administration first and foremost labored to preserve Chiles democracy and stop Allende. The U.S. Embassy in Santiago stressed that our national interest in Chile was to maintain a democratic government with human liberties preserved in large measure and oriented favorably toward the United States. Deputy Chief of Mission John Joseph Jova was unequivocal, Allende is the problem. By mid-1962, U.S. officials admitted that their overriding objective was to defeat Allende in Chiles 1964 presidential election and keep Chile from falling into the Communist camp. 62 Frustration and urgency drove the Kennedy admi nistration to consider and debate [t]he old question of the kinds of actions that we can take in the political field, both overt and covert. Embassy counselor Norman Pearson warned, If we really believe in the democratic process, as we want to convince others that we do, Pearson wrote, we must be especi ally careful in to the extent to which we tamper with the process. Th e Department of State insisted that the U.S. Government must not be left open to criticism of intervention in domestic politics, but the 61 Memorandum, Dungan to the President, 24 January 1963, Folder Chile, General, 1963, Box 113a, Presidents Office FilesCountries, JFKL. Memorandum of Conv ersation Farewell Call of Ambassador Muller on the President, Belcher, 24 January 1963, 725.00/1-2363, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-20/1-20/2. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 320. 62 Letter, Jova to Richardson, 20 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5; and Memorandum LAPC Meeting, January 10, Chile, Belc her to Martin, 8 January 1963, Folder Chron 6 Memoranda Chile 1963 to June 1963 [2 of 2], Box 6; both WST Files, RG59-Lot NA. Letter, Pearson to Richardson, n.d. [19? June 1962]. Letter, Cole to Cheste r Bowles, Presidents Special Representative, 18 May 1962, 725.00/5-1862, Folder 725.00/1-1662, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 289

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Department of Defense insisted that the United States must take all possi ble steps to isolate the Communists. When Chile Desk Officer Richardson worried th at the United States might expose itself by giving money to political parties, embassy officer Robert Stevenson dismissed the concern: Should money start becoming evid ent we dont think you need [to] worry overly about speculation or exposing ourselves there are many ways of doing it with which we need not concern ourselves. One of the most vocal advocates for intervening in Chilean politics was Ambassador Cole, who maintained that an Allende victory would be so dangerous for U.S. interests in Chile and in all La tin America that U.S. policy s houldstrive to prevent it. He asked the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) to provide him with a special fund of five million dollars per year for 1963 and 1964 so that he could finance housing, education, health, community development projects th at would produce rapidly visible results and thus prevent Chiles urban dwellers and rural workers from turning to Allende and the FRAP. 63 Advising ARA to exercise great caution, Pearson recommended that the United States act obliquely and indirectly, and offered a community-based assistance plan, a plan which Ralph Dungan and Arthur Schlesin ger, Special Assistant to the President, read and discussed with Pearson in January 1963. Pear son asserted that the United St ates should maintain contacts with a broad spectrum of political leaders. He al so suggested that the Unit ed States assist local organizations such as cooperatives and mutual ai d societies that helped the Chilean middle and 63 Letter, Pearson to Richardson, n.d. [19? June 1962]. Memorandum Department of State Draft Guidelines of U.S. Policy Toward Chile, Captain Paul B. Ryan, U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Officer-in-Charge, Chilean Desk, ARA, 18 October 1961, Folder Chile 1962 19. Policy and Background Papers, Box 4; and Letter, Robert A. Stevenson, Politcal Counselor, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Richardson, 6 December 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letter Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5; both WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum LAPC Meeting, January 10, Chile, Belcher to Martin, 8 January 1963, Folder Chron 6 Memoranda Chile 1963 to June 1963 [2 of 2], Box 6, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Cole to Chester Bowles, President s Special Representative, 18 May 1962, 725.00/5-1862, Folder 725.00/11662, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 290

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lower classes, Asociaciones de Pobladores (Settler Associations) that aided dwellers in Chiles urban slums, agricultural or ganizations that assisted campesinos, and local youth programs. Such programs, Pearson said, had always been set aside for the future, and this has precisely been our error in the past.A vigorous assault on these subjects beginning now will produce results more quickly than people might think. 64 In spite of the debate over whether the United States shoul d involve itself in Chiles domestic politics, U.S. officials were alrea dy doing so by rejecting Allendes overtures and actively seeking to divide the FRAP. Recognizi ng that Allendes appeal extended far beyond the boundaries of the FRAP parties, U.S. officials refused direct contact with Allende, his principal advisers, or his envoys in order to no t lend respectability to his candidacy. Later, when Allende sent Socialist journalist Augusto Olivares to Washingt on to meet with ARA officials, ARA kept Olivares at arms length. 65 U.S. policymakers also tried break apart the FRAP. Arthur Schlesinger remarked during a LA PC meeting, everywhere else in the world the Socialists had seen the light and left the d eathly embrace of the Communists, and the United States should do what we could to bring this ab out in Chile. 66 64 Letter, Pearson to Richardson, n.d. [19? June 1962]. Letter, Belcher to Cole, 30 January 1963, Folder Chron 4 Letters Chile 1963 Outgoing Embassy, Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 65 Memorandum, Stevenson, n.d. [July? 1963], enclosed with Fimbres to Richardson, 25 July 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5; and Cole to Richardson, 22 June 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Policy Paper Chile: Short Term Policy and Action from Present through Presidential El ection, Office of West Coast Affairs, 10 July 1964. Department of State Memorandum, n.d. [mid-late April 1964]. Memorandum Chilean Newsman Requests Meeting, on Behalf of Allende, Williams (Richardson) to Mann, 20 July 1964, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 66 Belcher to Cole, 30 January 1963, Folder Chron 4 Letters Chile 1963 Outgoing Embassy, Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 291

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For Kennedy administration officials, the centr al question of the debate became whom to favor. The debate centered upon two men: Radical Party Senator Julio Durn and Christian Democrat Party leader Eduardo Frei. While maintaining extensive contact with both men, the U.S. Embassy favored Durn. It was already wo rking with him and discreetly providing him with information to use in his speeches and publ ic comments. Durn was willing and able to use any such material because as he told one embassy official, he will lose all if the Communists come to power. 67 From the first months of Kennedys administ ration, ARAs Office of West Coast Affairs, and later the White House favored Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrat Party (PDC Partido Demcrata Cristiana). 68 Frei had been building relationships with Department of State officials and U.S. business leaders since the 1958 election. While travelling in the United States in 1959 with a group of Chilean senators on a le ader grant, Frei quietly lobbied American friends for monetary support for the PDC. 69 Frei returned again in 1961 and met with ARA officials, as well as copper i ndustry and other business leaders. Then in early 1962, Frei and Christian Democratic Senator Radomiro Tomic arrived on another leader grant and met with 67 Pearson to Richardson, 27 April 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 68 Memorandum Chilean Political Situation, Robert M. Phillip s, Chile Desk Officer, to Theodore C. Achilles, S/O, 2 June 1961, 725.00/6.261, Folder 725.00/6-261, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Memorandum Chile, Achilles to Adolf Berle, Jr., 13 April 1961, FRUS 1961-63 microfiche, CHI-2/2. 69 Memorandum Your Appointment with Chilean Senators on August 21 at 11:15 a.m., Phillips to Rubottom and Sircusa, 19 August 1959, Folder 1959 Chile, Box 11, Rubottom Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Complaint of Senator Eduardo Frei with Respect to AFL/CIO, Pearson, 20 October 1959, enclosed with Despatch 324 Memorandum of Conversation Concerning Financing Christian Democratic Party, Pearson to Department of State, 29 October 1959, 725.00/10-2959, attached to Despatch 213 Popular Action Front Elects New Leaders, William L. Krieg, Counselor of Embassy, to De partment of State, 11 September 1959, 725.00/9-1159, Folder 725.00/1-1259, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. 292

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officials of Kennecott Copper, including co mpany president Frank Milliken, even though Milliken believed that Frei and Tomic were enemies of the company. 70 Many in U.S. government and business circ les questioned the Christian Democrats working relationship with the Communists. In a 7 March 1961 editorial, the New York Times lumped the Christian Democrats together with th e FRAP and asserted that this opposition to Alessandri was seeking nationalization of mining companies and diplomatic and trade ties with the Soviet bloc. It also has a Fidelista slant. Frei read this editorial while travelling in the United States. He wrote a letter to the editor, challenging the Times characterization of his party and denying that his party belong[ed] to the Marx ist bloc. The PDC, he said, was openly and definitely anti-Communist, and it did not support nationalization of mining companies. 71 Freis letter to the New York Times editor sparked a pointed exch ange with Luis Corvaln Lpez, Secretary General of the Communist Party in Chile, who criticized Frei for dividing the opposition. Corvaln considered it dangerous for the PDC to claim it was anti-Communist and anti-Castro because they would be identified with the far Right and the worst enemies of the people. 72 Frei and Tomic confided to U.S. Embassy officers that they would put forth a 70 Letter, Pearson to Richardson, 28 March 1962. Memo randum Hostile Attitude of U.S. Businessmen in Chile toward Christian Democrats, Richardson to Martin, 24 August 1962, 725.00/8-2462, Folder 725.00/6-662, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Airgram A-6 American Busi ness Opposition to Christian Democrats, Pearson to Secretary of State, 3 July 1962, 725.00/7-362. The 1962 m eeting is remarkable for the fa ct that Frei and Tomic said that a colleague of theirs, Deputy Patricio Hurtado, had tr avelled to Cuba and spoke with Castro. While in Cuba, Hurtado asked Castro why he declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Castro responded that he feared a second invasion attempt by the United States and made the speec h hoping to force his way into the Warsaw Pact. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Alleged Reason Ca stro Declared Himself Marx ist-Leninist, Richardson, 3 April 1962, Folder Chile 1962 21. Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 71 The Chilean Elections, New York Times 7 March 1961, p. 34. Frei, Opposition Parties in Chile, New York Times, 24 March 1961, p. 30. 72 Despatch 719 Communists Seek to Embarrass Christia n Democrats, Pearson to De partment of State, 2 May 1961, 725.00/5-261, Folder 725.00/2-1160, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 293

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hard-hitting response, and it appeared in El Mercurio on 6 June 1961. In an open letter to Corvaln, Frei claimed that Christian Demo cracy offered an alternative to Communism because neither capitalism nor communism are e ffective solutions for the specific problems of the Chilean nation in the present historical realit y. The PDC, he said, supported the Alliance for Progress and the need for foreign investment in certain basic national industries in which scales of economy were necessary. Also, he noted that where Christian Democrats were in power, the Communists enjoyed freedoms of the press, religion, organization, a nd political participation, but the same could not be said of th e countries were Communists ruled. 73 Freis open letters asserting his partys anti-Communist credentials did little to dispel U.S. doubts. Embassy officials admitted that a PDC-led government would enact desirable structural reforms, but feared it would also create headaches for U.S. investment in Chile and new problems in U.S.-Chilean relations. The embassy hoped to temper the PDC zeal for profound reforms by encouraging the party to unite with the Radical, Liberal, and Conservative Parties. 74 U.S. businessmen were quite hosti le to Frei and the PDC. Braden Copper, Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate, a nd DuPont company officials told department officials that U.S. 73 Frei, El Partido Demcrat a Cristiano y el Comunismo, El Mercurio 6 June 1961, p. 15, enclosed with Despatch 788 Christian Democratic Reply to Communists, Pearson to Department of State, 5 June 1961 [sic], 725.00/6-561, attached to Memorandum Chilean Political Situation, Ph illips to Achilles, 2 June 1961, 725.00/6-261, Folder 725.00/6-261, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. 74 Airgram A-782 Comments on Experimental Policy Paper on Chile dated September 24, 1962, Jova (Stevenson) to Secretary of State, 26 February 1963, Folder POL Chile 2/1/63, Box 3864, Department of State Records, Central Foreign Policy Files, Subject-Numeric File 1963, RG59, NA. Hereafter cited as CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. In 1963, the Department replaced the Decimal F ile system with the Subject-Numeric File system for its central files. 294

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support for the PDC was dangerous to our natio nal interests, and Kennecott president Frank Milliken considered Frei and To mic enemies of the copper company. 75 Despite U.S. hostility, by mid-1962, leaders of Ch iles political parties, as well as the U.S. and Chilean business communities, were leveling charges of US favoritism against the Christian Democrats, and Julio Dur n complained of it more than once. 76 The charges of favoritism were true and false. President Kenne dy believed that the Ch ristian Democrats were the best hope for Chile; and that a PDC vict ory would be a good augury for the rest of the continent. Cole, the embassy, and ARA, meanwhile considered Durn our best bet and made support for him and his Democratic Front (Frente Democrtico) the basis of the embassys strategy for the upcoming presid ential election. In early 1962, the Kennedy administration created the Special Group, an inter-agency committee composed of White House, Department of State, and CIA officials, in order to follo w and influence Chiles 1964 presidential election. On 2 April 1962, the CIA presented two reports to the Special Group: one report advocated support for Frei and the Christia n Democrats, the other for Durn and the Radicals. The split between the White House and the Department of State likely prompted the Special Group to approve both courses. It gave $50,000 to st rengthen the PDC, and on 27 August 1962, the 75 Memorandum, Hostile Attitude of U.S. Businessmen in Chile toward Christian Democrats, Richardson to Martin, 24 August 1962, 725.00/8-2462. Airgram A-249 Tone of the Christian-Democratic Campaign for the September 2 By-Election in Santiagos First District, Rudy V. Fimbres, Second Secretary of Embassy, to Department of State, 13 September 1962, p. 3, attached to Telegram 255, Cole to Secretary of State, 12 September 1962, Folder 725.00/9-362, Box 1565, DF 1960-63, RG 59, NA. Airgram A-6 American Business Opposition to Christian Democrats, Pearson to Secretary of State, 3 July 1962, 725.00/7-362. 76 Airgram A-5 Strong Impressions that U.S. Government Supporting Christian Democratic Party, Pearson to Department of State, 4 July 1962, 725.00/7-462, attached to Airgram A-8, Edward P. Kardas, Political Officer, to Department of State, 3 July 1962, 725.00/7-362; and Memorandum of Conversation, Pearson, 1 July 1962, enclosed with Airgram A-6 American Business Opposition to Christia n Democrats, Pearson to Secretary of State, 3 July 1962, 725.00/7-362; both Folder 725.00/6-662, Box 1564, DF 1960-63, RG59, NA. Telegram 145, Cole to Martin, 8 August 1963, Folder POL 7 Visits. Meetings. Chile 2/1/63, box 3864, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 295

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Special Group authorized channeling $180,000 to the Christian Democrats through a third country (likely Italy) for fi scal year 1963 (October 1962-Sept ember 1963). In early 1963, the Special Group then approved $50,000 to Durans Ra dical Party. A committee was then set up at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago to assist in implementing the Speci al Groups decisions. 77 The Kennedy administration also enlisted the It alians to influence the Christian Democrats and other Chilean political parties not only becau se of the ties between Chilean and European political parties, but also becau se it considered Chile as a relatively advanced society among the Latin American countries both politically a nd economically. The United States had good contacts within the Italian Christian Democra tic Party and was well informed of Freis 1963 week-long stay in Italy, including his meetings with Italian Pr ime Minister Fanfani and the Secretary of the Christian Democrats Aldo Moro. 78 The Kennedy administration also worked with Italian Foreign Minister Gi useppe Saragat and the Italian So cialists to elicit encourage the Chilean Socialists to break them from the FRAP. Saragat visited Chile in late 1963 and met with 77 Cole, Oral History, 26 April 1969, 33. Memorandum Attached Report from Ambassador Cole, Richardson to Belcher and Thompson, 5 December 1963, Folder Chron Memoranda Chile July 1963, Box 6, WST Files, RG59Lot, NA. For supporting Durn and the Democratic Front as the embassys strategy, see Handwritten Note by Ralph Richardson on Letter, Jova to Richardson, 20 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 94 th Congress, 1 st Session (Washington DC: USGPO, 1975), 9, 14, 57. The 1975 report suggested that the Special Group may have been trying to hedge bets and support two candidates for President. Kennedy administration documents indicate that the split between the White House and the Department of State was the more likely reason. See Senate, Covert Action in Chile 15. 78 Memorandum Our Alliance for Progress Strategy in Chile, Jerome Fried to Rostow, 22 May 1962, Folder Chile, General 5/22/62-5/31/62, Box 391, NSF Dungan Series, JFKL. Airgram A-1714 Visit to Rome of Chilean DC Leader, Senator Eduardo Frei, J. P. Fromer to Department of State, 23 May 1963, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile-A, Box 3866, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Telegram Comments Made by Eduardo Frei Montalva CIA, 29 May 1963, attached to Telegr am Plans of the Christian Democratic Party for Chilean Presidential Election in 1964, CIA, 29 May 1963, Folder Chile, General, 1/63-6/63, Box 20a, NSF-Countries, JFKL. Airgram A-1181 POLAD Meeting April 23 Developments in Latin America, D. R. Norland to Depart ment of State, 25 April 1963, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Latin America, Box 3969, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 296

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Allende, later telling Secretary of State Dean Rusk that he would continue to do what he can within the limits of his influence to affect the attitude of the Chilean Socialist Party. 79 The White House also arranged for Frei to meet Kennedy in April 1963. Between 1959 and 1963, Frei had travelled to Washington and Ne w York four times, meeting with Department of State policymakers and copper industry offici als each time. During th e fourth trip (April 1963), Frei travelled to a conf erence at Notre Dame University, but spent three days in Washington to visit with Ralph Dungan, a friend whom he had known from years ago. When Frei arrived at Dungans White H ouse office, Dungan asked Frei if he wished to meet President Kennedy, and Frei expressed great interest in doing so. Frei was received immediately, and he and Kennedy had a 25-minute private conversation. 80 During that same trip, Frei also had met with Assistant Secretary Martin and th e presidents of Kennecott and Anaconda Copper before heading to Italy, where he was the guest of Italys Chri stian Democrat Party. 81 79 Memorandum Possible Visits of Italian Socialists to Chile, Belcher, 29 April 1963, Folder Political Affairs and Relations POL 7 Visits Meetings, Box 7, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum of Conversation Secretary of State Rusk and Italian Fore ign Minister Saragat on Chile, Francis E. Meloy, 15 January 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 1/1/64, Box 2027, CFPF 1964-66, RG 59, NA. Airgram A-887 Italian Ambassadors Views on Splitting Chilean Socialists from Co mmunists, Cole to Department of State, 29 March 1963, Folder CSM Communism 2/1/63 Chile, Box 3688, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 80 Memorandum, Respuestas para el Seor Edward Korry, n.d. [August? 1975], File Korry, Edward, Box Correspondencia Nacional, Personalidades A Z, CC. 1.2, Documents of President Eduardo Frei Montalva, Fundacin Eduardo Frei, Santiago, Chile. CIA Information Report Telegram Comments Made by Eduardo Frei Montalva, Leader of Christian Democratic Party in Chile Concerning His Recent Trav el Abroad and Presidential Election in 1964, 23 May 1963, attached to CIA Information Report Telegram Plans of the Christian Democratic Party for Chilean Presidential Election in 1964, 29 May 19 63. For Freis presentation at Notre Dame University, see Memorandum Notre Dame Conference on Religion and So cial Change in Latin America, Lois Carlisle to Mr. Plank, 29 April 1963, Folder Chron 6 Memoranda Chile 1963, Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 81 Letter, Robert A. Stevenson, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, to Richardson, 17 May 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST File s, RG59-Lot, NA. Memoran dum Kennecott Talk with Senator Frei, Richardson to Martin, 1 May 1963; and Memorandum Highlights of Telecon with Mr. Charles Brinckerhoff, President of Anaconda Copper, Richardson to Martin, 2 May 1963; both Folder Chron 6 Memoranda Chile 1963, Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Airgram A-1714 Visit to Rome of Chilean DC Leader, Senator Eduardo Frei, William N. Fraleigh, Counselor of Embassy (J. P. Fromer) to Department of State, 23 May 1963, Folder POL Political Affairs and Rela tions Chile A, Box 3866, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 297

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Freis description of his meeting with Kennedy permits several inferences. Given that Frei was immediately received, Dungan probably arra nged the meeting in advance. Frei, despite his modesty, could not have been unaware of the possibilities involved in visiting a long-time acquaintance at his White House office, and like ly knew of the scheduled meeting. Moreover, since Frei had known Dungan from years ago, th e White Houses support of Frei may have partly arisen from Dungans friendship with the Chilean senator. Surprisingly, Cole was unaware of the connection between Dungan and Frei, even years later. 82 The Department of State and the embassy continued to favor Durn and the Frente Democrtico (FD), a coalition forged between the Radical, Liberal, and Conservative Parties. The embassy asserted that Durn stood the best chance of defeating Allende, but they disliked the PDC and its adherents. 83 The embassy described the PDCs economic program as so shot through with contradictions as to be patently unworkable, and Robert Stevenson, the embassys Counselor for Political Affairs, considered some PDC leaders really very ignorant on economic issues. Cole even suggested that the PDC might expropriate the c opper companies. The embassy believed that Frei would undoubtedly make an able president, but it could not 82 82 Mr. Donahue in New York had arranged for Frei to meet with Dungan and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. See Stevenson to Richardson, 2 April 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile Incoming Embassy 1963 [2 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Cole, Oral History Interview, 26 April 1969, p. 33-34. Memorandum of Conversation White House Meeting with Representatives of Radical Party of Chile, Belcher, 16 May 1963, Folder POL 12 Politcal Parties Chile 2/1/63 Box 3865, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 83 Memorandum Attached Report from Ambassador Cole, Richardson to Belcher through Thompson, 5 December 1963, Folder Chron Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. For Assistant Secretary Martins support of Durn, see Briefing Memorandum Your Appointment, Friday, May 17, 12:00 noon, with Three Chilean Radical Party Leaders, 15 May 1963, enclosed with Memorandum, Richardson to Dungan, 15 May 1963, Folder Chile, Box 1, White House Staff Files Ralph A. Dungan Files, JFKL. Memorandum The Situation in Chile January 1963, enclosed with Airgram A-784 Improved Outlook for Chile as Compared with One Year Ago, Stevenson to Department of State, 28 February 1963, Folder POL 2-3 Politico-Economic Reports, Chile, 6/1/63, Box 3864; and Airgram A-1049 Christian Democrat Deputys Views on CD Tactics in Case of Probability of FRAP Victory, Jova to Department of State, 28 May 1963, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile 2/1/63, Box 3865; both CFPF 1963, RG59, NA.. 298

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overlook what it saw as the Christ ian Democrats tepid support for the Alliance for Progress, and their willingness to accept support from a nd overlook the shortcomings of the Marxists. 84 The U.S. Embassy admitted that the Frente Democrtico had a long way to go to build [Durn] into a national figure comparable to either Frei or Allende. To build his image as an international leader, Durn went on a tour of the Americas and Eur ope, including the United States, Italy, West Germany, Me xico, and Peru. Embassy offi cials twice recommended that Durn meet with President Kennedy, just as Frei had done a few months earlier. Durn did so, but Assistant Secretary Martin noted that Durn did not make a good impression. Durn criticized the Christian Democrats for campa igning on an allegedly strong Catholic position, while constantly justifying Castr o. He also claimed that in a close election, Congress would select the Radical candidate because the Radical s controlled 57 to 59 percent of the votes in Congress. Afterwards, Durn announced to the pr ess that he had met with Kennedy for three minutes, causing one Liberal deputy to lament that Durn had been too chronometric and that every time Durn opened his mouth he stuck his foot in it. 85 84 Airgram A-921 The Economic Policies Advocated by Chile s Christian Democratic Party A Critical Analysis, Madison M. Adams, Jr., Second Secretary, to Department of State, 11 April 1963, attached to Memorandum Attached Embassy Report on Chilean Christian Democrats, Martin to Dungan, 2 May 1963, Folder Chile, General 5/63-11/63, Box 392, NSF-Ralph Dungan Series, JFKL, p. 13. Letter, Stevenson to Richardson, 15 October 1963; and Letter, Stevenson to Richardson, 17 May 1963; both Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum Excerpts from Letters from Ambassador Cole, Richardson, n.d. [14 May 1963], attached to Memorandum Ame rican Copper Companies in Chile, Mar tin to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 15 May 1963, Folder Chron Chile White House Memoranda 1963, Box 6, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Airgram A-42 Comments on the Political Section of the Experimental Polic y Paper on Chile, Stevenson to Department of State, 15 July 1963, Folder Chile, General, 7/63-11/63, Box 21, NSF-Countries, JFKL. Airgram A-740 Joint Weeka No. 6, Kardas to Department of State, 8 February 1963, Folder POL 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile, 2/1/63, Box 3864, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 85 Biographic Sketch Senator Julio Durn Neumann, n.d. [August 1963], enclosed with Memorandum Call on Mr. Ralph Dungan by Chilean Senator Julio Durn, Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy, 16 August 1963, Folder Chile General 5/63-11/63, Box 392, NSF Ralph Dungan Series, JFKL. Airgram A-104 Observations on the Dur n Candidacy as the Campaign gets Underway, Stevenson to Department of State, 6 August 1963, Folder PO L 12 Political parties Chile 6/1/63, Box 3865, CFPF 1963, 299

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The unfavorable impression that Durn left with Kennedy and other Washington officials was one of several signs that his candidacy was in serious trouble. Chile an polls revealed that Durns name recognition lagged well behind Freis and Allendes. Durns campaign director complained bitterly that businessmen were not making sufficient cont ributions to Durns campaign fund. One Chilean senator told the em bassy that Durns Radical colleagues in the Senate were not working actively for him, in part, due to resentment from the many cases when Durn had stepped on their toes during his rise. 86 Durns lack of appeal became apparent when Deputy Chief of Mission Jova asked his elderly cook about the candidate. She responded, This man [Durn] does not have the dignity to be president of Chile, and furthermore, show me what he has done in Congress, or ou t of Congress, in support of the poor. 87 RG59, NA. Telegram 171, Cole to Secretary of State, 16 August 1963, Folder POL 7 Visits and Meetings Chile 2/1/63, Box 3864, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Martin, Kennedy and Latin America 321-322. Memorandum of Conversation Meeting between Senator Durn of Chile and the President, Fernando van Reigersberg, Department Interpreter, 19 August 1963, enclosed with Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy, 4 October 1963, Folder Chile General 7/63-11/63, Box 21, NSFCountries, JFKL. Memorandum of Conversation Meeting between the Vice President and Se nator Durn, van Reigersberg, 19 August 1963; Memorandum of Conversation Meeting between Acting Secretary Ball and Senator Durn of Chile, van Reigersberg, 19 August 1963; and Memorandum of Conversation Meeting between Senator Durn of Chile and Mr. Dungan, van Reigersberg, 19 August 1963; all Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile A, Box 3866, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Airgram A-152 Views of Deputies Correa and Alessandri on Du rns Candidacy, Jova to Department of State, 23 August 19 63, Folder POL 14 Election Chile 2/ 1/63, Box 3865, C FPF 1963, RG59, NA. 86 Memorandum of Conversation, Rudy V. Fimbres, 29 July 1963, enclosed with Airgram A-77 Durns Presidential Campaign, Fimbres to Department of State, 30 July 1963, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/63, Box 3865; Enclosure 3 Memorandum of Conversation with Jaime Tormo, Stevenson, 2 August 1963, enclosed with Airgram A-104 Observations on the Durn Candidacy as the Campaign Gets Underway, Stevenson to Department of State, 6 August 1963, Folder PO L 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/63; Box 3865; and Memorandum, n.d. [June 1963], enclosed with Airgram A1087 Conversation with Senators of Different Political Backgrounds on Current Situation, Jova to Department of State, 7 June 1963, Folder POL 2 Gen. Reports and Statistics Chile 2/1/63, Box 3864; all CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. 87 Memorandum of Conversation Chil ean Presidential Campaign; US Copper Companies, Lois Carlisle, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Plank, 7 October 1963, Fold er Chron Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6; and Jova to Richardson, 20 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5; both WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 300

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One of the most obvious signs of Durns flagging candidacy was opposition from the Right. Jorge Prat Echaurren, head of the Central Bank under President Ca rlos Ibez del Campo, entered the presidential race, asserting that Chile needed to be the prow of Latin America. Prat described Durn as a particular ly poor candidate and unprepared to deal with [Chiles] major problems. Also, a movement to reelect Alessandri developed among Liberals and Conservatives. Chiles cons titution did not permit reelection, but Liberal Deputy Enrique Edwards proposed a constitutional amendment to change this. Alessandri promptly denied any interest in another term, but th e issue did not die, in part be cause Edwards was very close to Alessandri. A proposal for a constitutional amendment circulated among Chilean political circles, advocating a reduction in the presidents term from six years to four years and to permit reelection. Only after a 2 Oc tober 1963 meeting between Durn and Alessandri, a meeting which lasted more two hours, did the matter finally rest. That ev ening, Alessandri issued a press statement in which he categorically denied any desire to be reel ected and unequivocally expressed his opposition to amending the constitution to permit reelection. 88 By late autumn 1963, after Prat s announcement and the Alessandri reelection affair, ARA and the embassy admitted that Durn probabl y could not win because many Liberals and Conservatives had turned to Frei. Deputy Chie f of Mission Jova said that Durns candidacy 88 Airgram A-268 Jorge Prat on his Best Behavior, Stevenson to Department of State, 1 October 1963, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/63; Telegram 1069, Cole to Secretary of State, 11 June 1963, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/63; and Airgram A-1062 Conversa tion with Presidential Pre-Candidate Jorge Prat, Jova to Department of State, 31 May 1963, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile 2/1/63; all Box 3865, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Airgram A-181 Joint Weeka No. 35, Stevenson to Department of State, 30 August 1963, Folder POL 2-1 Joint Weeka Chile 6/1/63, Box 3864, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. For Edwards being close to Alessandri, see Airgram A-1086 Joint Weeka No. 23, Jova (G.W.F. Clift) to Department of State, 7 June 1963, Folder POL 2-1 Joint Weeka Chile 6/1/63, Box 3864; and Airgram A-188 Conversation with Former President Gonzlez Videla on Political Scene, Jova to Department of State, 31 August 1963, Folder POL 15 Government Chile 2/1/63, Box 3866; both CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Airgram A-281 Joint Weeka No. 40, Jova (Ravndal) to Department of State, 4 October 1963, Folder POL 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile 6/1/63, Box 3864, RG59, NA. 301

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had reached rock-bottom and had no place to go except up (or out). When one ARA official proposed sending some cash to Durns flaggi ng campaign, Chile Desk Officer Richardson strongly objected, saying that if money began showing up, ma ny would start asking questions, knowing that none of them had changed their minds about Durn. 89 The November 1963 assassination of Kennedy ma gnified U.S. policymakers indecision over whether to support to Frei or Durn, and sh ifted support toward Durn. U.S. officials found Frei and the PDC a more agre eable and interesting lot, a nd Political Officer Stevenson admitted, All of us sense the appeal of the PDC the idealism, the emotion, the youthful enthusiasm and drive, which resembled Kennedy s own appeal in the United States. Yet Kennedys death removed the strongest voice for Frei and the PDC; furthermore, when President Lyndon Baines Johnson named Thomas Mann to be Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, replacing Edwin Martin, supp ort shifted strongly in favor of Durn. Mann, Cole, and other ARA officers believed that Durn would be more pliable in economic matters, and that a victory by Durns De mocratic Front would assist in making Chile the model for the Alliance and encourage U.S. companies to invest in Chile. Jova admitted that he had to do some fast talking to prevent Cole and ot her embassy officials from giving massive indiscriminate aid to Durn in late 1963. Jovas primary fear wa s that they might bring about a leveling between the PDC and the FD where neither could whip FRAP. Despite a swing toward Durn, the new Johnson leadership did not definitively decide between Frei and Durn 89 Memorandum Current Chilean Situation, Richardson to Boonstra, 26 September 1963, Folder Chron Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6; and Jova to Richardson, 20 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5; both WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. National Intelligence Estimate 94-63 The Chilean Situation and Prospects, CIA, 3 October 1963, Folder 94 Ch ile, Box 9, National Security Files National Intelligence Estimates, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presiden tial Library, Austin, Texas. Hereafter cited as LBJL. Letter, Richardson to Stevenson, 19 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 302

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for several reasons: the presidenti al transition, a desire to adhere to and fulfill Kennedys legacy, other pressing foreign policy issues such as Vietnam, and Johnsons own 1964 presidential campaign. As Chile Desk Officer Richardson co nfessed, I really had wonderedwhether we were going to get any definite decision from the front office on which group we should help. 90 The Panic Button The residents of Curic, an agricultural prov ince about 140 miles south of Santiago in the heart of the Central Valley, resolved the U.S. policymaker s dilemma during a March 1964 byelection, and the election result caused U.S. polic ymakers to panic. The death of Socialist deputy Oscar Naranjo Jara prompted the by-electi on, and Chilean and U.S. observers viewed the election as a yardstick of the re lative strength of the political pa rties. Allende, Frei, and Durn all campaigned in the province for their resp ective candidates. Durn and the Frente Democrtico, confident that their candidate, Ro dolfo Ramrez Valenzuela, would win, declared that the by-election was a national plebiscite, a comment which effectively staked the future of Durns candidacy on th e by-elections outcome. 91 Despite Durns prediction, embassy officers not ed that the FRAP candidate had several advantages. First, many Chileans had a sense of fair play about th e election, believing the 90 Letter, Stevenson to Richardson, 6 D ecember 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2]; and Stevenson to Richardson, 16 December 19 63, Folder Chro n 3 Letters Chile Incoming Embassy 1963 [1 of 2]; both Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum Conversatio n between Chief and Deputy Chief, WHD [Western Hemisphere Division] with Assistant Secretary Mann, 28 February 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 550. Jova to Richardson, n.d. [21? November 1963], Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Richardson to Jova, 3 April 1964, quoted in Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 552. 91 Airgram A-617 Background Paper Concerning the Forthcoming By-Election for a Congressional Seat Representing the Province of Curic, F. M. Ravndal to Department of State, 14 February 1964, Folder POL 18 Provincial, Municipal, State Government Chile 1/1/64, Box 2030; and Airgram A-644 The Curic Kaleidoscope, 4 March 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Memorandum, Richardson to Mann, 6 March 1964, quoted in FRUS 1964-66 XXXI: 551. 303

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Socialists had a right to fill the seat. Also, the FRAP candidate was the very popular and respected doctor Oscar Naranjo Arias, the s on of the recently deceased deputy. The FRAP promoted Naranjo, a pediatrician, as the Doctor of the People, a nd ran a radio ad that closed by saying, Honor the father, vote for the son, w ith a funeral march playing in the background. Embassy officials further noted th at Naranjo had endeared himsel f to many people in Curic in recent years by administrating to the poor for little or no fee a nd had vaccinated most of the kids in the area. In additi on, the embassy noted that the FRAP had 200 workers knocking on doors and canvassing voters in the province; meanwhile, the Frente Democrtico utilized the latifundio owners, whose influen ce over the campesinos and their votes had diminished. The FRAPs advantages were apparent in the size of the rallies for all three candidates. During his weekend visit to Curic, Politi cal Counselor Robert Stevenson estimated that 3500 people (2000 adults) attended the FRAPs rally, but the Frente Democrtico rally only drew about 1200. 92 While Durn staked his candidacy on the Curi c election, Cole and Stevenson staked U.S. policy on the by-election, de spite substantial data indicating a FRAP victory. Their error caused Washington to panic over a by-el ection, the outcome of which should have been anticipated by the embassy and Washington. Although the FD was running scared in Curic, Cole and Stevenson told the Department of State that th ey were confident that Ramrez would squeak through a winner. They based their flawed pr ediction on a single mislead ing statistic: During Curics 1963 municipal elections FD candidates received 49.5 pe rcent of the vote, the FRAP 92 Airgram A-664 The Curic Kaleidoscope, 4 March 196 4, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-617 Background Paper Concerning on the Forthcoming By-election, Ravndal to Department of State, 14 February 1964. Cole Oral History, JFKL, p. 23. Airgram A-644 By-election for Deputy in the Province of Curic, Fimbres to Department of State, 26 February 1964, Folder POL 18 Provincial, Municipal, State Government Chile 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 304

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received 29 percent, and the Ch ristian Democrats 21.5 percent. However, little carryover of voting strength occurred from lo cal elections to nati onal elections. Muni cipal elections had lower voter turnouts and tended to be shaped more by local issues and the candidates themselves, a point tha Jova had made at the time. 93 Cole and Stevenson acknowledged but discounted facts such as that in 1963, Dr. Naranjo had received th e highest individual vote total for any Curic city councilman, and that he had previously served as alcalde (mayor) the provincial capital. On 15 March 1964, Dr. Naranjo defeated Rodolfo Ramrez (40 percent to 33 percent), and the FRAP victory threw U.S. policymakers into turmoil. A post-electio n opinion poll found that 81 percent of respondents had voted for Naranjo as a person, not as a FRAP candidate, and the embassy noted that Naranjos su ccess among women resulted from his pediatric practice. The next day, Durn withdrew as a presidential candidate. The FD collapsed when the Liberal and Conservative Parties accepted Durns re signation and threw their support to Frei. 94 The Chief of the CIAs Western Hemisphere di vision told Assistant Secretary Mann that the most important thing is to keep people from panicking as a re sult of Curic; however, U.S. policymakers did panic. Chilean ambassador Sergio Gutirrez Olivos told Santiago that officials in Washington believed that a catastrophe had occu rred in Curic, and that some were saying, Allende is unstoppable, and Chile will be the first country in the world that will have a freely 93 Airgram A-644 The Curic Kaleidoscope, 4 March 196 4, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-617 Background Paper Concerning the Forthcoming By-election, Ravndal to Department of State, 14 February 1964. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 551. Federico G. Gil, The Political System in Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 241-242, 234. Jova to Richardson, 20 November 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 94 Telegram 758 Curic By-election, Jova to Secretary of State, 15 March 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029, DF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 1155, Jova to Secretary of State, 4 June 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64; and Telegram 763, Jova to Secretary of State, 16 March 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile; both Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-699 Joint Weeka No. 12, Jova (R avndal) to Department of State, 20 March 1964, Folder POL 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile [2 of 2], Bo x 2025, CFPF 1964-66 RG59, NA. 305

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elected Marxist regime. 95 In an 18 March White House st aff meeting, NSC Adviser McGeorge Bundy asked Dungan to comment on the FRAP victory in Curic. Dungan said that neither he nor Cole were really upset about the by-elections in Chile.There is a three to one chance that every thing will turn out all ri ght in the presidential electi on. [W]ith those odds, Bundy scoffed, we could lose five countries in Latin America. 96 The Johnson administration quickly approved an all-out, multi-million dollar effort to prevent another Curic result in Chiles presiden tial election. Before the by-March election, the United States spent $280,000 in Chile ($230,000 to Frei and $50,000 to Durn). Two weeks after Curic, the Special Group approved a $3 million plan to assist Frei a nd said that the United States should ensure that no suitable use of US resources is overlooked in working for the defeat of Allende and the FRAP. Under the cl ose monitoring of the NSC and the Department of State, the amount of money reflected the d eep US concern that Johnson and Mann had expressed to Cole regarding th e outcome of Chiles election, and Cole placed the embassy on emergency footing for the remainder of elec tion. As Bundy told Pr esident Johnson, the problem we face is that a very popular and attr active candidate named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the Communists, has more than a fighting chance to win. 97 95 Fitzgerald quoted in Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 551. Sergio Gutirrez Olivos to Gabriel Valds Subercaseaux, 1 May 1964, Volumen 17 S. G. O. 1964 S-Z, Fondo Sergio Gutirrez Olivos, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile. 96 Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 551. 97 Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 13 May 1964, Folder McGeorge Bundy 5/1/-5/27/64, Vol. 4 [1 of 2], Box 1, NSF-Memos to the President, LBJL. This memorandum was reprinted in FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 565 n 2. Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in Chile 57. For approval of the plan by the Special Group, see FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 558 n 5. Policy Paper Chile: Short Term Policy and Action from Present through Presidential Election, September 4, 1964, Office of West Coast Affairs, 10 July 1964. Telegram 902, Cole to Secretary of State, 11 April 1964, Folder AID (US) 15-11 Chile; and Telegram 1076, Jova to Secretary of State, 18 May 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 306

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The Special Groups $3 million assistance plan included several elements. One effort sought to pressure the Durns own Radical Part y to not endorse Allende or at least remain neutral. If the Radicals did endorse Allende, the United States woul d give financial assistance to Radical leaders who could swing Radi cal voters over to Frei. As a second element, U.S. officials would provide a substantial subsidy to Frei so that he could strengthen his electoral machine and campaign capabilities, and they would urge Frei to make some agreement with the Radicals. Whereas Freis campaign budget befo re Curic was about $100,000 (US) per month, his campaign managers presented to U.S. officials a $300,000 per month budget and suggested that U.S. officials to make up the difference. Third, the United States would urge the Liberal and Conservative Parties support Frei without damag [ing] his image as a reform candidate, and this included financial assistance to those parties. The United States would also pressure Jorge Prat to withdraw from the presidential race. Furthe rmore, the United States would provide financial assistance to youth, student, and womens groups, peasant and slum dwel ler associations, and labor unions to vote for Frei. U.S. officials would buy some votes outright if required and would also engage in black propaganda to de nigrate Allende. Much of this, Johnson administration officials planned to funnel through U.S. non-official sources in order to permit us plausible denial if necessary. 98 The cost of the Johnson administration effort went well beyond the initial $3 million; in fact, the total amount was more than $100 million if one factors in AID and PL-480 funds. Peter Jessup, executive secretary of the Special Group, which was renamed the 303 Committee in June, told McGeorge Bundy, We cant afford to lose this one, so I dont think there should be 98 Memorandum for the Special Group, 1 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68, XXXI: 554-558. 307

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any economy shaving in this inst ance. We assume the Commies are pouring in dough; [but] we have no proofsLets pour it on and in. The Special Group approved another $1,250,000 on 14 May 1964 and an additional $500,000 on 23 July 1964. 99 The Johnson administration provided $70 million in AID loans to keep Chiles economy as a whole active and unemployment low and approved a $20 million PL -480 program to provide wheat, beef, and other foodstuffs to Chile. Assistant Secretary Ma nn made clear that, Our objective is to have enough food in Chile during [the] pre-election period to prevent, to [the] maximum extent feasible, scarcity or excessive food prices, or ev en to bring prices down. Given that Chile had few storage facilities for frozen beef, Mann wa s willing to shuttle the monthly demand of 2700 tons from Uruguay if it meant dropping the price by more than 20 percent. 100 The Johnson administration also targeted e fforts towards specific groups in order to develop sympathy for Frei and U.S.-Chilean coop eration and temper the appeal of Allende and the FRAP. The United States helped to f und the Frei campaigns pobladores commando, a campaign effort that included 15 full-time docto rs, 30 part-time doctors, and a small group of social and legal workers, who provided medical a nd other services to the urban poor, particularly in Santiago. Using a special fund, Cole and th e Embassy provided small grants, such as a $250 scholarship or $5000 freezer plant for a co-op, wh ich could further draw votes away from 99 Memorandum, Peter Jessup, NSC and Executive Secretary of the 5412 Special Group, to Bundy, 23 July 1964, quoted in FRUS 1964-68, XXXI: 583. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 575-576. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 582-583. 100 Memorandum Presidential Election in Chile, Mann to Rusk, 1 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 565-567. Memorandum Current Situation in Four Problem Areas of Latin America, Mann to Rusk, 7 May 1964, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile, Box 2020, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 613, Mann to Jova, 27 April 1964, Folder AID AID 1/1/61, Box 1, Formerly Top Secret Files of the Central File, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Mann and John A. McCone, Director of the CIA, 28 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 563-564. Transcript of Telephone Conversation between McCone and George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, 7 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 572-573. 308

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Allende. Embassy staff travelled the length of the country, show ing 16-mm films that promoted the Alliance for Progress, and a nother 35-mm film played in San tiagos movie theaters. Two large U.S. Embassy-sponsored photograph exhib its -one on Kennedy, the other on Chile and the Alliance for Progress -toured Chiles nine ma jor cities. The USIS of ficials in Chile also made and all-out national driv e through means of all communi cations media to publicize the Alliance for Progress and U.S. economic coopera tion with Chile. The Johnson administration also devised propaganda efforts th at sought to build-up Frei and keep the band-wagon effect going for the Christian Democrat s; meanwhile, other propaganda efforts sought to denigrate and split the FRAP and denigrate Allende, hi s campaign manager Salomn Corbaln Gonzlez, even his wife, Hortensia Bussi de Allende. 101 The U.S. effort also included the Departments of Justice and Defense. The Department of Justices Anti-Trust Division notified the Department of State that it wished to investigate U.S. copper producers for collusion in trying to raise copper prices in the United States. The State Department asked the Justice Department to postpone its investigati on until after Chiles presidential election. Worki ng with Chiles armed forces and Carabineros, the Johnson administration sought to provide enough equipmen t and other services in order that Chiles police and military forces were ready and able to maintain order before, during, and after the elections and to ensure that the constitutiona l process was permitted to go forth. Although the Chilean Army considered itself well equipped, the other services required more hardware, and all 101 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Alliance for What? United States De velopment Assistance in Chile during the 1960s, Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2001, pp. 141-145. Department of State Memorandum, n.d. [mid-late April 1964], Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Ch ile 1/1/64, Box 11, Formerly Top Secret Files of the Central Files, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Hereafter cited as Formerly Top Secret Files. The first page of this document was withdrawn and re-classified in the months afte r the 11 September 2001 attacks. References place the date of the document around mid-late April 1964 and in dicate that the document or iginated within ARA. 309

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military branches were interested in improving interand intra-service communications. While the Defense Departments military attachs co ordinated with the armed forces, the State Department provided a civilian public safety officer that worked with the Carabineros. 102 The Department of State and CIA considered working with private business interests, and U.S. and Chilean businessmen were eager for such cooperation, but President Johnson opposed it. The Special Groups plan ca lled for a joint effort with th e Business Group for Latin America (headed by David Rockefeller) to provide information to U.S. business groups wishing to support Freis campaign. Working closely but disc reetly with Frei, Augustn Edwards offered the support of his newspapers El Mercurio and ltimas Noticias He also met with Assistant Secretary Mann, CIA Director John A. McCone, and Rockefellers group, and lobbied all for funds for Freis campaign. Mann complained ab out too much open talk in New York business circles and accused one busine ss leader of being a blabberm outh. CIA Director McCone refused to agree to U.S. businesses passing mone y to the U.S. Government to help Freis campaign because it raised so many questions of ethics, financial and inte rrelationships. Frei said publicized large-scale U.S. business support was the kiss of death for his candidacy. Acting independently, some U.S. companies, solicited by Frei cam paign officials, did contribute money to Freis election fund. 103 102 Memorandum of Conversation Proposed Justice Copper Investigation, David B. Ortman, International Business Practices Division, 8 Decembe r 1964, Folder INCO C opper 17, Box 1, Formerly Top Secret Files. Telegram 974 COG Request for Assistance on Internal Se curity and Attitude of Armed Forces on Election, Jova to Secretary of State, 1 May 1964, Folder POL 23 Inte rnal Security, Counter-Insurgency, Chile 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Me morandum, Bundy to the President, 13 May 1964. 103 Memorandum Presidential Election in Chile, Mann to Rusk, 1 May 1964, FRUS 1964-66 XXXI: 566. For Edwards efforts and meetings, see Telegram 821, Cole to Secretary of State, 27 March 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Memorandum Your Appointment with Mr. Agustn Edwards, Dentzer to Mann, 14 April 1964, Folder PO L Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 310

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Frei was fully aware the U.S. governments e fforts, and made clear that any linking of him to U.S. Government or U.S. business moni es would be fatal. He knew of U.S. aid directed toward keeping Chiles economy stable and holding down food prices, as well as the large sums the United States gave to his campai gn. He also received clippings of U.S. news coverage of Chiles presidential campaign from the U.S. Embassy, probably for use in Freis public statements and press releases. Constantly worried about publicity of his U.S. support, Frei admitted as early as 1959 that any exposure of his seeking or receiving U.S. assistance would be catastrophic. Amid the 1964 campaign, Frei expre ssed gravest concern to Jova about a U.S. official who twice had s poken indiscriminately about U.S. aid to his campaign. 104 Frei insisted that Durn should remain in th e race at any price, and Durn knew of his new role in the campaign and asked for U.S. funds. Even though Durn had withdrawn his candidacy, the Radical Party rejected it, and Durn reentered the presidential race on 5 April. In a 30 April meeting with Jova and Stevenson, Du rn emphasized that his only aim was the defeat of Communism, and he was prepared to act a Freis dupe so long as his candidacy helped keep the Radicals from going to Allende. Du rn suggested the United States give $2500 in 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Memora ndum Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 12 May 1964, Jessup, 12 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68, XXXI: 574-575, 575 n 2. Telegram 264, Cole (Jova ) to Secretary of State, 15 August 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/ 64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964 -66, RG59, NA. 104 Memorandum of Conversation between Frei, Carmona de Dios, Jova, and Robinson, 4 May 1964, enclosed with Airgram A-839 Conversation with Frei on Economic/Development Matters, Jova to Department of State, 8 May 1964, Folder POL 6 People, Biogra phic Data, Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram, Jova to Mann and William T. Dentzer, Jr., Director of the Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, 5 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 568-570. Memorandum, News Coverage The Presidential Election in Chile with attached U.S. news clippings, n.d. (September 1964), File 03, Box P 2, Fundacin Eduardo Frei Montalva, Santiago, Chile. Memorandum of Conversation Complaint of Senator Eduardo Frei with Respect to AFL/CIO, Pearson, 20 October 1959, attached to Despatch 213 Popular Action Front Elects New Officer s, Krieg to Department of State, 11 September 1959, 725.00/9-1159, Folder 725.00/1-1259, Box 3025, DF 1955-59, RG59, NA. Telegram, Jova to Mann and Dentzer, 5 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 568-570. 311

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installments to Radical deputies in order to help them in the March 1965 Congressional elections. He additionally asked for $3500 to he lp him prevent the Radicals from endorsing Allende and to cover his campaign expenses. Frei said that serious consideration should be given to subsidizing [Durn] e ither from PDC campaign funds or other sources. Durn did receive money from Freis campaign. Prominen t Radical Party leader German Pico Caas, Freis campaign finance manager Salvador P ubill, and Gabriel Gon zlez Videla, Durns campaign manager, met, and the U.S. Embassy concluded that Pubill was maintaining close contact with [the] Radi cals finance people. 105 U.S. concerns about Durn and the Radicals of supporting Allende were not unfounded. A few days after Curic, Durn and Salomon Corbaln met at Durns invitation. Durn offered to withdraw from the race and support Allende. Although Durn recanted after two days, he had conversations with Allende during the week of 3 May (four weeks later) at the home of former president and Radical Party member Alfredo Duha lde. During their conversations, Durn asked Allende three questions : would Allende break from the Communists, would the Communists withdraw from FRAP and give support from th e margins in exchange for a Radical-FRAP pact, and would Allende deny ministerial posts to the Communists. It was a steep price for Radical support, and Allende said no to all three ques tions. He did offer the Radicals the two most powerful ministries of his prospec tive cabinet (the Ministries of Defense and Interior), as well as 105 Telegram 981 Jova to Secretary of State, 2 May 1964, Folder POL 2 General Reports and Statistics, Box 2020, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 76320, Jova to Mann and Dentzer, 5 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 568569. Telegram 1013, Jova to Secretary of State, 8 May 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties, Chile, 5/1/64, Box 2027, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Memora ndum of Conversation, Fimbres an d Stevenson, 14 November 1963, enclosed with Airgram A-388 The Finances of the PDC, Stevenson to Department of State, 21 November 1963, Folder POL 12 Political Parties, Chile, 6/1/63, Box 3865, CFPF 1963, RG59, NA. Telegram 1137, Jova to Secretary of State, 1 June 1964, Folder POL 12 Politi cal Parties, Chile, 6/1/64, Bo x 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 312

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support for Radical candidates in the March 196 5 Congressional elections. Despite the tempting offer, the Radical-FRAP talks made little progress. Durn rece ived severe criticism from Radical leaders and had to apologi ze for his unauthorized convers ations. When news of the conversations broke, Frei met with Durn and asked him to stay in the race. Durn said he was only jawing with Allende but hinted that he needed financial support. Osvaldo Puccio and Salomon Corbaln believed that Durn had used them to obtain more money from the Right, but given that former Radical pres idential candidate Lus Bossay and former president Alfredo Duhalde supported Allende, U.S. officials worri ed that the Radicals might endorse Allende. 106 Despite the massive effort to a ssist Frei and defeat Allende, ARA officials worried that the United States was overidentified with Frei. 107 FRAP leaders charged that the United States was interfering in the electi on, and the Communist newspaper El Siglo accused Jova of meeting with Durn and preventing a FRAP-Radical agre ement. In the Senate, Corbaln, Allendes campaign manager, made the same accusations and called upon the Senate to declare Jova persona non grata The Senate did not act on Corbalns request, but Durn asked Jova to issue a public denial that he had met with him, fear ing that FRAPs accusations might embarrass or harm him. Jova did so, but also distanced himself from Frei for nearly two months. 108 106 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 128. El Triangulo Durn-Frei-Jova, El Siglo 17 May 1964, p. 5. Airgram A-851 Conversation between Popular Action Front Presidential Candidate and Radical Party Presidential Candidate, Fimbres to Department of State, 12 May 1964; Telegram 1034, Jova to Secretary of State, 12 May 1964; and Telegram 1044, Jova to Secretary of State, 12 May 1964; all Folder POL Political Parties Chile 5/1/64, Box 2027, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 1283, Cole to Secretary of State, 26 June 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 107 Memorandum Presidential Election in Chile, Mann to Rusk, 1 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 567. Memorandum U.S. Identification with Frei in the Chilean Election, Milton Barall, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to Mann, 20 August 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 587-88. 108 El Triangulo Durn-Frei-Jova, El Siglo 17 May 1964, p. 5. Telegram 1070, Jova to Secretary of State, 15 May 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 5/1/64, Box 2027; Telegram 1104, Cole to Secretary of State, 21 May 313

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Eight weeks before election day, the Frei campa ign tried to distance itself from the U.S. Embassy. Marfn, Freis campaign manager, hosted a private luncheon at his home for U.S. embassy officers, during which he suggested that they reduce contacts between top PDC leaders and embassy officials; meanwhile remaining contacts should be discreet and out of the public eye. Frei too wanted distance between him and the embassy. Embassy officers agreed, and Ambassador Cole admitted that he deliberately came home on leave to show [his] disengagement from the campaign. Shortly afte r Marfns suggestion, he and Freis economic advisors met with embassy officers at Freis urging to discuss PDCs economic program. Frei believed that the meetings would give U.S. offi cials some idea of how he saw his program and would help Frei and his advisors establish more realistic final goals, prompting the embassy to confess that Frei had practically taken the words out of Washington s mouth. Frei also proposed sending his advisors to Washington to meet with Department officials but later postponed this until after the elec tion. In addition, Frei asked for intelligence information on the FRAPs activities and asked U.S. officials to stress to the Liberal a nd Conservative Parties the importance of mainta ining the campaigns national and popular character. Frei and his campaign managers may have want ed distance from the U.S. Emba ssy, but they also would not reject assistance in achieving a Frei vi ctory and the partys reform program. 109 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 5/1/64, 2027; an d Telegram 158, Cole to Secretary of State, 29 July 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64, Box 2029; all CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 109 Telegram 49, Cole (Stevenson?) to Secretary of State, 9 July 1964; and Telegram 167 Freis Views on US Role in Final Days of Campaign, Cole (Jova?) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1964; both Folder POL 14 Chile, 5/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Cole, Oral History Interview, p. 38. Memorandum of Conversation Election Prospects and CD Views of Some U.S. Economic Policies, Thomas R. Favell, Economic Counselor, n.d., enclosed with Airgram A-41 Memorandum of Conversation with Some of Freis, Favell to Department of State, 14 July 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64, Box 2029 CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-30 Freis Desire Have Embassy Participate in Working Contacts with his Economic Staff, Jova to Department of State, 10 July 314

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Chileans on the Right and Left warned the Em bassy that the United States had misjudged Allende, and that it could work with the Socialis t senator, but U.S. officials dismissed them. President Alessandri was profoundly disturbed by th e short-sighted political stance that U.S. officials had taken against Allend e. He assured the Embassy that Allende did not want extreme solutions and warned that if the United States closed all doors on Allende, we would push him further left and on path similar to Cuba. Social ists in contact with the embassy insisted that Allende was a moderate Socialist and a hopele ss bourgeois. One supporter said, Basically Allende wants to get along with the USG[overnment] and is not taking over Chile just to end up under the control of the USSR. Such characterizations prompted Political Officer Rudy Fimbres to ask: Will the real Salvador Allende please step forward? 110 U.S. policymakers devised a contingency plan should Allende win. 111 If Allende won, the Embassy dismissed any attempt to precipitate a mili tary coup, asserting that such an effort would backfire, rallying the Chileans behind Allende and leaving the [Chilean] military left frozen in their tracks and our bridges burned. U.S. of ficials believed that Allende appreciated the 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64, Box 2029; Telegram 157, Cole (Jova?) to Secretary of State, 28 July 1964, Folder POL 7 Visits, Meetings Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026; and Telegram 207 Washington Visit Frei Advisers, Cole (Jova?) to Secretary of State, 5 August 1964, Folder POL 7 Visits, Meetings Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026; all CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Tele gram 162 Freis Views on FRAP Campaign, Cole (Jova?) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 110 Telegram 10, Cole to Secret ary of State, 2 July 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 580. Airgram A-823 Conversation with Socialist Leader and Intellectual [Julio Csar Jobet], Fimbres to Department of State, 4 May 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 5/1/64, Box 2027; and Airgram A-828 Socialist [Lus Quintero Yaez] Views on the Political Scene, Fimbres to Department of State, 5 May 1964, Folder POL 14 Elections Chile, Box 2029; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Fimbres quote appears in the latter document. 111 Memorandum, Stevenson, n.d. [July? 1963], enclosed with Fimbres to Richardson, 25 July 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile 1963 [1 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Memorandum Chilean Contingency Planning, Robert M. Sayre, NSC, to Bundy, 31 July 1964, Folder Chile, Memos Vol. I, 1/64-8/64, Box 12, National Security Files Country Files Latin Am erica, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Hereafter, cited as NSF-Country Files, LBJL. 315

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essential role of the U.S. in Chile a nd would quickly seek to establish a modus vivendi with the United States Government in order to play for time. The embassy advised that Washington should seek an early opportunity to make clear to Allende that th e US attitude in an important degree will depend upon what actions his administra tion takes. The United States, the Embassy recommended, should press Allende to refrain fr om any excessively antiU.S. actions and to break with the Communists, or at minimum limit Co mmunist participation in his government. In return, the United States would be prepared to adopt a flexible stance and to move rapidly as circumstances may dictate. However, if A llende and his administra tion pursued a hostile course, the Embassy made clear th at our policy should be to do all we can to prevent Allende from conducting a successful administration and to ensure that he does not obtain control over the police and military forces, favoring a coup if necessary. 112 On 4 September 1964, Chilean voters overwhelm ingly cast their ballots for Frei over Allende. Throughout election day, the Embassy tele graphed hourly updates to the Department of State, who then passed them to the White House. In the final tabulation of ballots, Frei received 1,409,012 votes (55.7 percent), and Allende had ga rnered 977,902 votes ( 38.6 percent). Durn finished a distant third with 125,233 (5.0 percent), with the remainder declared void or blank. 113 U.S. officials, including Pres ident Johnson, anticipated a Frei majority and congratulated themselves on the outcome. The CIA declared that U.S. aid to Frei, the black propaganda campaign against Allende, and Durns candidacy were indispensable ingredients of Freis success. NSC Adviser McGeorge Bundy sugge sted that the 303 Committee (formerly the 112 Memorandum Chile Pre-election Contingency Plan, Stevenson, 28 May 1964. 113 Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 591. For vote totals and percentages, see Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988 [1978]), 40. 316

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Special Group) commend the U.S. officials responsible for the successful outcome of the Chilean election; the committee agreed. On ly CIA Director McC one acknowledged that Chileans, not U.S. dollars, had cast the ballots saying that perhaps Ch ilean voters deserved some commendation for their hi gh turnout (86 percent). Bundy la ter wrote that the Chilean and Venezuelan elections had vindicated pol itical freedom against subversion and proCommunism, and progressive governments in Chile and Brazil had stopped the threat of Latin America crumbling toward Communism. 114 Bundy overlooked the price -about $100 million -that the United States spent to ensure a Frei win. A Senate committee later charge d that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration spent $2.6 million to aid Frei; some embassy officers claimed that $20 million was spent. Neither amount includes the $70 million in AID monies used to stabilize Chiles economy during the election, the multiple PL-480 aid packages to k eep Chilean food prices down (two packages totaled $28-35 million alone), or the funds for impact programs and other projects. If one adds all aid used to stop Allende and assist Fr ei, the United States spent over $100 million. 115 The $100 million was unnecessary because CIA Director McCone later confessed that Frei would have won anyway. Just as the United States started massive aid to Freis campaign, a CIA poll of Chilean voters, conducted in May 1964, showed that Frei already had a majority (52 114 For anticipation of a Frei majority, see Airgram A155 The Presidential Campaign with Two Weeks to Go, Stevenson to Department of State, 21 August 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 8/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA; and Memorandum The Most Recent Polls on the Forthcoming Chilean Elections, Peter Jessup to Bundy, 24 August 1964, enclosed with Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 25 August 1964, Folder Chile, Memos Vol. I, 1/64-8-64, Box 12, NSF Country Files, LBJL. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 592. Memorandum U.S. Foreign Policy since November 1963, Bundy to the President, 12 January 1965, Folder McGeorge Bundy 1/12/28/65 Vol. 8 [2 of 2], Box 2, NSFMemos to the President, LBJL. 115 Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 p. 9. Taffet, Alliance for What?, p. 145-146. For PL-480 loans, see Memorandum Chile, Chase to Bund y, 8 May 1964, Folder Chile, Memos Vol. I, 1/64-864, Box 12, NSFCountry Files, LBJL. Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 p. 34. 317

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percent). A subsequent CIA poll conducted in August revealed that Freis percentage had only increased by two points, and Freis final vote tally was a mere three and one-half percentage points higher than the March poll. 116 Such minimal increases could be explained by the margin of error or by undecided voters. In short, U. S. money and aid appears to have bought few votes in Chile; in fact, as the CIAs March poll indicate s, a majority of Chilean s had rejected Allendes Marxist-Socialist program four months before election day. Conclusion Between 1958 and 1964, U.S. policymakers were r unning scared in their efforts to stop Allende. Allendes near-victory and Fidel Castros revolution of Cuba pres ented parallel threats to the United States in Latin America. Whereas the Eisenhower ad ministration gradually evolved from uncertainty to hostility towards Castro, the administrations hostility toward Allende was immediate. As Castros revolu tion gathered momentum, Chile from September 1958 remained a primary focus for the United States in Latin American affairs. Gordon Chase of the NSC asserted that beyond Cuba, Chile should be United States top pr iority. Deeming an Allende electoral victory intolerable for national security a nd domestic political reasons, U.S. policymakers focused their efforts upon undercutting Chilean support for Allende and the FRAP. 117 Allende, meanwhile, had visited Cuba and talked with Castro and Guevara. His 116 Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 592. Memorandum Chilean Election Forecast, NSC, 1 September 1964, Folder Chile, Memos Vol. II, 9/64-11/64, Box 13, NSF-Country File, LBJL. 117 Memorandum Current Situation in Four Problem Areas of Latin America, Mann to the Secretary, 7 May 1964, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile, Box 2020 CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. The four areas in the order that they appeared in the memorandum are Chile, Br azil, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Memorandum Latin America Talk with John Plank, Gordon Chase, NSC, to Bundy, 30 April 1964, Folder Latin America Vol. I, 11/63-6/64, Box 1, NSFCountry File, LBJL. 318

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discussions and the revolutionary events in Cuba convinced Allende that the va pacfica was the proper path for Chiles exceptional political dynamics. After Allendes ne ar-victory in 1958, the Eise nhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations pursued three different strategies to stop Allende. As the Eisenhower administration wrestled with Ca stros revolution in Cuba, A ssistant Secretary Rubottom and ARA imposed an economic stabilization program upon the new Alessandri administration in order to encourage reforms that would undercut support for Allende and the FRAP. Alessandri accepted the loans, stalled on reform, and waited fo r Eisenhowers presidency to end. President Kennedy and his administration sought to make Ch ile a model for the Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy administration offered U.S. assistance for economic development, and coaxed and pressured Alessandri and his Liberal and Cons ervative allies to unde rtake land and social reforms. The Right rejected the Alliance for Progress, and Alessandri dissembled, resisted, and undercut U.S. pressures. Giving up on the Ri ght, the Kennedy White House embraced Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrats, who pledged reforms within a non-Communist framework. After Kennedys assassination, Department of State o fficials reasserted its preference for Radical candidate Julio Durn, but grew frustrated a nd worried as Durns candidacy lagged. The victory by the FRAP candidate in the Curic by-election in March 1964 caused the Johnson administration to panic. The United States pou red over $100 million dollars into Chile to assist Freis presidential campaign and ensure a non-Communist re former would govern in La Moneda. Johnson administration officials achieved their short-te rm goal of defeating Allende; however, with Freis full cooperation and knowledge U.S. officials abandoned a core tenet that had guided U.S. actions in Chile since World War II: non-interf erence in Chilean politics. 319

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CHAPTER 7 LOSING INFLUENCE, 1964-1967 Another Chance Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva, candidate of the Christian Democrat Party (PDC Partido Demcrata Cristiano), won Chiles 1964 presidentia l election. The Department of State lauded Freis victory, asserting that it had broad hemispheric significance be cause it confirmed the fears of the Communists and Fidel Castro devote es that the Christian Democrats advocacy of revolutionary changes with freedom might attract majority support. 1 Conversely, U.S. officials believed that if Salvador Allende Gossens had won (the candidate of the Communist-Socialist coalition Popular Action Front (FRAP Frente de Accin Popular), then his victory would have signified a defeat for US policy. One U.S. policymaker wrote that Allendes legitimacy as a democratic leader would be awfully tough to ha ndle from both the international and domestic standpoints, particularly in a country where we have invested the highes t rate of per capita assistance. Freis victory avoided that scenario and gave U.S. policymakers another chance to aid Chileans in achieving their socio-economic goals, blunt the appeal of Allende and the Marxists, and prove that the Alliance for Pr ogress did offer a non-Co mmunist alternative. 2 1 Intelligence Note Freis Victory in Chile has Broad He mispheric Significance, Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), to De an Rusk, Secretary of State, 5 September 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI South and Central America; Mexico (Washington DC: USGPO, 2004), 593-594. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: page. 2 Robert A. Hurwitch, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy Santiago, to McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, 19 June 1964, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 578-579. U.S. Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities 94 th Congress, 1 st Session, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1975), 9. 320

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Under the Alliance for Progress, this study ar gues that U.S.-Chilean relations followed a course that ran contrary to cu rrent historical interpretations. It finds that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were eager to have Chile succeed as a democratic model, an Alliance for Progress model, and an anti-Castro model; howev er, they confronted the distinct possibility that Allende might win Chiles upcoming 1964 presidential elect ion. Thus, U.S. policymakers generously supported Frei in order to defeat Allende in 1964, but th en readjusted U.S. aid efforts toward the Alliances lofty ideals of democratic expansion, economic development, and social reform. In contrast, scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations generally agree that the Alliance initially pursued its long-term goals; however, they argue that President Lyndon Baines Johnson and his administration, increasingly absorbed by the Vietnam War, abandoned the Alliance and preferred stability (e.g., support for Brazils 1964 military coup) or intervention (e.g. the 1965 Dominican crisis). 3 Moreover, scholars assert that the Johnson administration increasingly ignored Chile because it seemed stable and governed by a democratic reformer. 4 3 See Jerome Levinson and Juan de Ons, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 307; Stephen G. Rabe, Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism, in Kennedys Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Thomas G. Paterson, ed., p. 105-122; Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 196-199; W illiam O. Walker III, Mixing the Sweet with the Sour, in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Diane B. Kunz, ed., p. 42-79; Joseph S. Tulchin, The Promise of Progress: U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., p. 211-43; Tulchin, The United States and Latin America in the 1960s, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (Spring 1988): 1-36. Michael E. Latham examines the ideological underpinnings of the Alliance for Progress and modernization theory. See Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Albert L. Michaels argues that although the Alliance achieved many of its aims in Chile under Frei, it failed because Kennedy and Johnson a ttempted the impossible: promote refo rm and protect U.S. investments. Michaels, The Alliance for Progress and Ch iles Revolution in Liberty, 1964-1970 Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 18 (February 1976): 74-99, particularly 95-97. For U.S. policy and the overthrow of Joo Goulart, see Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969 (Kent OH: Kent State University Press, 1990 ); W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups detat: Brazilian-American Relations 1945321

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As this chapter traces, the United States lost influence in Chile during the first three years of Freis presidency (1965-1967) because it b ecame too involved in Chilean domestic politics, not because it ignored Chile. As Freis admini stration enacted long-needed reforms, the Left decried the reforms as insufficient, the Right de nounced them for being implemented at all, and both lambasted the United States for its support of Frei. Amid Chiles polarizing political dynamics of the midand late-1960s the decline of U.S. influence was, in part, a result of the unavoidable consequences of pursuing best, im perfect policy based upon Chiles image as a model democracy; however, U.S. missteps furthe r eroded U.S. influence. Unlike during the 1964 campaign, U.S. officials now questioned the de tails of Freis economic programs, imposed benchmarks and conditions upon the Chileans, and indicated that failure to meet benchmarks jeopardized future aid. Johnson al so asked Frei for a special, below-market price on copper to 1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); and Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Fo r the Dominican intervention, see Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1972]); and G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 133-142. H. W. Brands departs from this characterization, arguing that Johnson recognized th e limits of U.S. power. He asserts to the agreement of this author -that while the 1965 Dominican intervention did more harm to U.S. policy in the region, it was not a great deal more. See Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 258. 4 William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 155. Jeffrey F. Taffet, Alliance for What?: United Stat es Development Assistance in Chile during the 1960s, Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2001, pp. 448, 452. Leonard Gross, The Last, Best Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Democracy (New York: Random House, 1967). For works offering the standard interpretation, see Sater, Chile and the United States ; Taffet, Alliance for What?; Paul Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Pres s, 1977); James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 19-26; Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press for National Security Arch ive, 2003); Heraldo Muoz and Carlos Portales, Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 32-37. 322

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help offset the U.S.-borne costs of the Vietnam War. Benchmarks and requests alienated the Frei administration, and by 1967, Frei declined additiona l U.S. aid and criticized the Alliance. During the same period (1965-1967) Salvador A llende seemed to assume two personae. Chiles eminent political cartoonist Jorge Dla no, using the pseudonym Coke, caricatured Allendes dual personae in a por trait titled King of Spades. Drawing a playing card, Dlano sketched one bust of Allende as the noble demo crat and the opposite bus t as a revolutionary guerrilla with a gun and a Ch beret. 5 Allende had long cast himself as a democrat and was committed to the va pacfica (the democratic road to socialism), and his election as President of the Senate in 1965 embodied this image. Yet, during the 1960s, many younger members of the Left, particularly Socialists, rejected the democratic road and embraced the va armada (the armed road to revolution), espoused by Fidel Ca stro, Ernesto Ch Guevara, and Mao Zedong. Seeking to maintain his appeal a nd leadership of Leftis t forces, Allende tried to cast himself as a revolutionary as well. He advo cated the revolutionary path for nations where the peaceful road to socialism was not possible, and proposed creating an organization to support revolutionary efforts in Latin America. Not attempting to re solve the contradictions between his advocacy of democracy and revolution, Allende, by 1967, contempl ated a fourth run for the presidency and tried to unite an increasingly divided Left. 5 For Jorge Coke Dlanos King of Spades image, see Vi al and Cerda, Allende: Part 2, Los primeros renuncios a una tradicin impecable, Special supplement series, Le Segunda 8 August 2003, p. 20. 323

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Getting Their Wish On 5 September 1964, President Lyndon Johnson began his morning news conference by praising the Chileans and their c onduct of the previous days presidential elec tion, during which a majority of Chileans cast their ballots for Chri stian Democrat Eduardo Frei. Johnson said that Freis victory demonstrated the strength of democracy in Chile and throughout the Western Hemisphere. We look forward to cooperating with their newly selected leader, Johnson continued, and [w]e hope that the next 6 years will be a period of peace and prosperity and a period of continued progress in economic and social reform. 6 Johnsons comments drew upon Chiles image as a model democracy, but also hinted at the tendency by U.S. officials often to frame Chil ean events and developments in U.S. terms. Secretary of State Dean Rusk co mpared Freis Revolution in Li berty to Johnsons Great Society, and the U.S. Embassy in Santiago compared the Chilean Rights opposition to Freis Revolution in Liberty to the U.S. Republican Partys opposi tion to President Franklin D. Roosevelts New Deal. Secretary of State Dean Rusk likened Chile s role in the Americas to Frances role in Europe and described the Chileans as a capable and gifted people, who were recognized as such by other Latin Americans. Comments by U.S. policymakers such as Let us not forget how difficult it is for us to change our own tax sy stem further reveals th e constant framing of Chilean events in U.S. terms, but also U.S. officials basic sympathy, even favoritism, toward Chile. Expecting difference and simplicity, U.S. Foreign Service offi cers assigned to Chile found similarity and sophistication. A senior Pol itical Officer wrote a colleague: [L]et me say 6 Transcript The Presidents News Conference of September 5, 1964, 5 September 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 2 volumes (Washington DC: USGPO, 1965), II: 1040. Hereafter cited as PPP: Johnson, 1963-64 volume: page(s). 324

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that you did not mislead me in any way with re gard to the country, people, and climate Im enjoying all three.I find [Chilean politics] very interesting and considerably more complicated and sophisticated than I would have thought. 7 With Freis victory, the Johnson administrati on moved on four fronts to show U.S. support for the new Chilean president: foreign aid, de bt restructuring, the copper companies, and appointment of a new ambassador. As indicated by Johnsons pre ss, he and his administration harbored great expectations of Eduardo Frei and the PDC. Contrary to claims that the Alliance, as it was originally conceived, died with the assassinated John F. Kennedy, U.S. efforts towards Chile under Frei show that Johnson did attempt to fulfill his pledge to continue the Alliance. U.S. officials saw the Frei administration as t he last bastion against Communism, as the group of Latin American leaders who could he lp salvage the Alliance for Progress. 8 Given extensive U.S. aid during the campaign, PDC leaders anticipated extensive U.S. aid for Freis Revolution in Liberty reform program. A month after his election, Frei sent a special mission to Washington to meet with White House a nd Department of State officials. Radomiro Tomic, Gabriel Valds Subercaseaux, and Sergio Molina Silva formed the mission, and they 7 Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Tomic Chile-US Relations, William L. S. Williams, Deputy Director of the Office of BolivianChilean Affairs, 6 August 1965, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Airgra m A-489 Some Reflections on the Senate Rejection of President Fr eis Proposed Trip to the United States, Weintraub, 11 February 1967. Jova to Taylor G. Belcher, Director of the Office of West Coast Affairs, 10 July 1962, Folder Chile 1962 16. Letters from Embassy Santiago and Consulate Antofagasta, Box 4, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Letter, Stevenson to Lois Carlisle, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 8 January 1963, Folder Chron 3 Letters Chile Incoming Embassy 1963 [2 of 2], Box 5, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 8 Taffet details three fronts (aid, debt restructuring, an d copper companies), but this work contends that Dungans appointment was equally important. Taffet, Alliance fo r What?, 176-177, 155-156, 215, 151, 160. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, Latin America: The Search for a New International Role (New York: Halsted Press, 1975), Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum, eds., pp. 57, 71, 81. Edwin McCammon Martin, Kennedy and Latin America (Lanham MD: University Pre ss of America, 1994), 465. 325

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would be Freis Ambassador to th e United States, Minister of Fore ign Affairs, and Minister of the Economy respectively. The three sought $150 m illion in Alliance aid and U.S. assistance in rescheduling about $100 million in Chiles foreign debt. 9 The PDC $150 million request reflected the grave state of Chiles finances, of which Frei and his advisors were not fully aware until post-election meeting with outgoing President Jorge Alessandri Rodrguez. Frei noted that Alessa ndri became very emotional and gloomy during their conversations and said the country wa s out of money and way overdrawn. Chiles external debt was $2.4 billion (about $300 dollars pe r Chilean), and Alessandri said that he was seeking a loan from the United States so that his successor would not inherit a government in practically a state of financial paralysis. Frei suggested devaluing Chiles currency and raising artificially fixed pr ices, measures which U.S. official s had urged throughout Alessandris presidency, but Alessandri refuse d. Frei later remarked that hi s administrations first task was working out of the hole which Alessandri had left the government in. 10 U.S. officials acknowledged that the TomicValds-Molina mission meant a great deal to the new Frei administration, but the tepid U.S. re sponse disappointed the Chileans. Before the 9 Memorandum, Robert M. Sayre, Staff Member of the National Security Council (NSC) to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the Pres ident for National Security Affairs, 23 Oct ober 1964, Folder Chile, Memos Vol. II, 9/64-11/64, Box 13, National Security Files Country F ile Latin America, LBJL. Hereafter cited as NSFCountry-Latin America. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 176-7 7. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 176-177, 179. For Frei and the Christian Democrats program, see Eduardo Frei Montalva, Mi Programa de Gobierno, Poltica y Espiritu 18 (June-August 1964): 3-21. 10 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 177, 179, 176. Telegram 38 7 Frei Relations with Alessandri, John Joseph Jova, Deputy Chief of Mission, to Secretary of State, 8 September 1964, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/64, Box 2029; Memorandum of Conversation The Secretarys Meeting with the Mission of President Elect Frei of Chile [Part I of II], William T. Dentzer, Jr., Director of the Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, 30 November 1964, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Bo x 2030; and Memorandum of Conversation Informal Discussions with President Eduardo Frei, Dentzer, 30 November 1964, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030; all CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 326

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mission arrived, Assistant Secretar y of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann informed Secretary Rusk that the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA ) was concerned that Frei has overly optimistic view of the amount of aid the United States would offer and that the Chileans needed to accept various self-help conditions a nd a scaling-down of U.S. aid. U.S. officials said Alliance funds were limited and subject to considerable competition and told Frei that $150 million was simply not possible. ARA wa s prepared to offer $75-90 million and support restructuring of Chiles debt. As the missions vi sit drew to a close, Tomic admitted that they were satisfied with U.S. support ($90 million of aid plus debt restructuring) but not pleased. Frei, while appreciative, remarked that aid fell short by $40 million of his needs. 11 Freis and the Christian Demo crats disappointment over resu lted from several subtle but important changes in how U.S. officials handled foreign aid for the Chileans. While each change individually would have had little impact, collectively they hu rt the Revolution in Liberty, alienated the Chileans, and undercut the U.S. abil ity to exert influence. One change was that although Assistant Secretary Mann a nd other ARA officials favor reform, they now worried that Freis reforms might hurt U.S. allies on the Chilean Right and foster instability that the Communists could exploit. Mann also expressed concern that the PDC would use U.S. funds against the Radicals and the Right, and insisted that U.S. officials explain to Frei the difference 11 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 176, 179. Memorandum Y our Appointment with Advisors of Chilean Presidentelect Frei, Mann to Secretary of State, 13 October 1964, Folder POL 15-1 Chile [2 of 2] 10/1/64, Box 2028; and Memorandum of Conversation Meeting of Mr. Mann with the Mission of President-Elect Frei of Chile, Harry H. Lunn, Jr., Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, 12 October 1964, Folder POL 7 Visits, Meetings Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026; Memorandum Chile, Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chair of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, to Mann, 16 October 1964, Folder POL Politi cal Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030; Memorandum of Conversation between Radomiro Tomic Romero, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, and Mann, Mann, 14 October 1964, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile, Box 2020; CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 126, Anthony M. Solomon, Deputy As sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Economic Policy), to Mann and David E. Bell, Administra tor of the Agency for International Development (AID), 13 November 1964, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. XXXI: 604. 327

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between assistance for a presidential electi on against a Marxist candidate and assistance against other democratic groups. National S ecurity Adviser McGeorge Bundy admitted that Mann was a little insensitive to the Chilean need for reform, but Manns worries generated mixed signals and conflicting U.S. objectives. The Tomic-Valds-Molina mission therefore was puzzled when U.S. officials showed a lack of interest in the PDCs land reform program. 12 Another change was that U.S. policymakers in explicably gave little consideration to the political challenges confronting Fr ei and the PDC. The Department of State faulted the PDC not for their economic program but that their program was not fully developed Department officials seemed oblivious that the Christian Democrats we re in power for the first time, the PDC was a new party (since 1957), and that few new administ rations (including new U.S. administrations) entered office with fully developed economic pr ograms. U.S. officials also overlooked that Freis proposals still had to go through Chiles Congress where the PDC had little representation, the FRAP had a sizeable voting bloc, and the Right could oppose or water down PDC reforms. 13 Perhaps the most significant subtle but signifi cant change regarding foreign aid was that U.S. policymakers now based their decisions on the merits and technical aspects of Freis program, which led the United States to assume partial responsibility for the success or failure of Freis Revolution in Liberty. The shift becam e evident in a heavily attended meeting on the Agency for International Developments (AID) polic y towards Chile, held just days after Tomic, Valds, and Molina left Washi ngton. Chaired by AID chief David E. Bell and attended by 12 Memorandum Chile, Rostow to Mann, 16 October 1964. Memorandum Ralph Dungan and Chile, Bundy to the President, 20 September 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968 XXXI: 595. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-1968 XXXI: 598599. For the Curic by-election and supporting Frei, see Chapter 6. 13 Memorandum ARA-Agency Meeting September 30, 1964, Albert E. Carter, Deputy Director of Coordination for INR, to Hughes, 1 October 1964, FRUS 1964-1968 XXXI: 598. 328

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Assistant Secretary Mann, the attendees decided that while the PDCs long run development strategy is in the right direction, they still lacked an adequate programthat would ultimately lead to a revival of the private sector. Bell further added that even under appropriate policies, Chile would require at the least fi ve years to attain a self-sus taining growth position. As a result, meeting attendees decided to formulate a strategy that would tie the amount of aid to performance, which implicitly gave the U.S. gove rnment greater oversight over Chilean reform. Department officials stopped serving as mediat ors between the Chileans and financial entities like the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American De velopment Bank, and World Bank, and in doing so, made Freis task of reform and achieving economic benchmarks more difficult. Chilean Ambassador Tomic had warned Secretary Rusk, If you fail us, we fail, and we have no alternative. By attaching oversight and benchmar ks to aid, U.S. officials implicitly encouraged the Chileans to seek alternatives. 14 On a second front to show U.S. support for Frei, the Johnson administration strongly supported Freis efforts to restructure Chiles debt and expressed a willingness to take the initiative. Great Britain, Fr ance, West Germany, Italy, and th e International Monetary Fund (IMF) also had a great deal of interest in helping Frei succee d. Germany and Italy, which had large Christian Democrat constituencies, urged maximum accommodation for Chile, and the IMF viewed debt restructuring as a chance to ad dress the issue of burgeoning foreign debt held by developing nations. When the Chileans met w ith European and IMF representatives, U.S. officials reported that the Chileans were somew hat overconfident and di d not give details of 14 Memorandum Chile AID Policy Review, Jerome F. Fried (S/P) to Rostow, 21 October 1964, Folder Chile, Box 249, Records of the Policy Planning Council (S/PC), 1963-1964, RG59-Lot Files, NA. Hereafter, RG59-Lot. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 218. 329

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their fiscal program. Even so, 70 percent of Ch iles debt (principal only, not interest) was restructured, which in several ways was better than the agreement that the Brazilian military regime had recently obtained, involving 50 percent of its foreign debt. 15 As a third front, Johnson showed support for Frei by naming Ralph Dungan as U.S. Ambassador to Chile. Everyone agrees, Mc George Bundy told Johns on, that the job of Ambassador to Chile is now highly important and required a nominee who was fundamentally sympathetic to the cause of democratic reform. U.S. officials recognized that Frei and Chile would do many things that many Americans won t like; therefore, the new ambassador needed to be a person who could help us here in the US to roll with the punches. 16 Milton Eisenhower and David Rockefeller, who was President of Chase Manhattan Bank, Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and head of the Business Gro up for Latin America, were considered possible nominees, but Dungan had the inside track. As Special Assistant to the President, Dungan had helped develop and coordinate White House policy towards Chile for three years. He also sought the post, believing that it engages al l his own convictions. A liberal Catholic committed to progressive reform and a good friend of Frei, Dungan did not speak Spanish, but, as Bundy remarked, he would act as a good counte rweight to Mann. Johns on disliked the idea of losing Dungan, preferring instead to keep h im close where Johnson could benefit from his 15 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 180-183. Memorandum of Conversation Mr. Manns Second Meeting with the Mission of President-Elect Frei of Chile, Dentzer, 17 Oc tober 1964, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 16 Memorandum Ralph Dungan and Chile, Bundy to the President, 20 January 1964, FRUS 1964-1968 XXXI: 595-596, 596 n Special Report: Implications of the Recent Elections in Chile, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2 October 1964; and Memorandum Ambassador to Chile, Gordon Chase, Staff member of the NSC, to Bundy, 18 September 1964; both Folder Chile, Memos Vol. II, 9/64-11/64, Box 13, NSFCountryLatin America, LBJL. 330

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skills. The president soon relente d, telling Dungan that he wanted to give him the best. On 2 October 1964 the White House announced its no mination of Dungan as Ambassador to Chile. 17 On a fourth front to assist Frei, the Johns on administration stayed out of negotiations between the Frei administration and U.S. coppe r companies. By 1960, Department of State officials admitted that the question was not whet her Chile would nationalize its copper but how soon and to what degree. The Kennedy admini stration had pressed Anaconda and Kennecott to negotiate with the Chileans, and the J ohnson administration continued this policy. 18 After his election, Frei opened negotiations with the tw o companies for chileanization, that is, converting the companies to majority Chilean ownership (51%) over a period of 20-25 years. 19 Anaconda agreed to expand production and to perm it the Chileans one-third ownership of a new subsidiary that would explore a deposit near Chuquicamata, which would be the Exotica mine; however, Anaconda refused to grant the Chileans a greater voice in existing operations. 17 Memorandum Ralph Dungan and Chile, Bundy to the President, 20 January 1964, FRUS 1964-1968 XXXI: 595-596, 596 n Memorandum Ambassador to Chile, Chase to Bundy, 18 September 1964. Telephone Conversation 5581, Johnson and Bundy, 14 September 1964, 7:05pm, Tape WH6409.10, PNO 11; and Telephone Conversation 5621, Johnson and Dungan, 21 September 1964, 11:32am, Tape WH6409.12, PNO 12, both Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJL. 18 Richard N. Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), 200. Policy Directive Chile New Investment in Chilean Copper Resources by Anaconda and Kennecott, Department of State, 15 March 1962, Folder Chile Copper 1962-64; and Memorandum Chile: Review of United States Policy regarding 1964 Presidential Election, and Proposed Task Force on Problems of Amer ican Copper Companies, 7 January 1963, Folder Chile, General 1/63, p. 4; both Box 392, NSF-Ralph Dungan Files, JFKL. Memorandum Randall Committee Consideration of Problems of Ameri can Copper Companies in Chile, Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, to George W. Ball Under Secretary of State, 21 October 1963, Folder Chron Memorandum Chile July 1963, Box 6, Records relating to Chile, 1957-1964, Office of West Coast Affairs, Records of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, RG59-Lot, NA. Hereafter cited as WST Files. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 187-189. 19 Javier Lagarrigue admitted that he cr eated the term Chileanization and inse rted it into one of Freis speeches. He drew the idea from Mexicos example of nationalizing its oil resources. See Memorandum of Conversation Chileanization of US Copper Companie s, Ralph W. Richardson, Officer in Charge of Ch ilean Affairs, ARA, 23 May 1963, Folder Chron Chile Memoranda of Conversation 1963, Box 6, WST Files, RG59-Lot, NA. For Mexico nationalizing its oil resources, see Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico and the United States the Oil Controversy, 19171942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), Muriel Vasconcellos, trans. 331

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Kennecott, to Anacondas surprise, agreed to chileanize Braden Copper Company, which owned El Teniente, the worlds largest underground copper mine. Th at agreement was part of a strategy to protect its investment and broaden th e impact and consequences of nationalization so that nationalization of its Chilean investment s would affect investor s on three continents. 20 On 21 December 1964, Frei announced his governments agreements with Kennecott and Anaconda, proclaiming that he had fulfilled his campaign promise on copper. 21 The Department of State had encouraged the ne gotiations, but to ensure Freis success, it twice postponed antitrust investig ations against Anaconda and Kennecott. Department of Justice officials had evidence that the tw o copper companies had colluded to raise the price of copper in the United States. The Department of State postponed a March 1964 an titrust investigation, arguing such news might hand Allende and the FRAP a potent issue and thus affect the presidential election. Now, w ith Frei negotiating chileanizat ion, the Department of State obtained a second postponement, claiming that news of an antitrust i nvestigation would hurt Freis negotiations. Department o fficials also said that the news would give the FRAP an issue for the upcoming March 1965 Congressional elections and could swing the el ectorate toward the 20 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 190-193. Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Pr ess, 1974), 127-138. Norman Girvan, Copper in Chile: A Study in Conflict between Corporate and National Economy (Surrey UK: Unwin Brothers Limited for the University of the West Indies Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), 29-32. 21 Telegram 884 President Freis Speech on Copper, U.S. Embassy Santiago to Secret ary of State, 21 December 1964, Folder POL 15-1 Ch ile [1 of 2] 10/1/64, Box 2028, CFPF 1 964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-502 Frei Reports Results of Copper Negotiations, Martin Prochnik, S econd Secretary of Economic Affairs, to Department of State, 24 December 1964, Folder INCO Copper 17, Box 1, Formerly Top Secret Files, RG59-Lot, NA. 332

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FRAP at the expense of the PDC, which needed greater representation in Congress in order to enact Freis Revolution in Liberty. 22 Allende and a Divided Left For Allende, defeat in the 1964 election was difficult, personally and politically. Even though he polled a higher percentage of votes th an he did in 1958 (38.5 percent to 29 percent), many on the Left considered Allende finished as a politician. He recognized that he had faced a more determined opposition than he had in 1958, These people have shown us a new face of imperialism. Anticipating de feat during the last weeks of the campaign, Allende changed strategies: he worked to strengthen the FRAP and stressed consciousness -raising. I want that each person who votes from me to know why they are voting, Allende said. He did not want a million votes, recalls Osvaldo Puccio, Allendes secretary, but rather a million consciences. Campaign manager Salomn Corbaln viewed the stra tegy change as criticism of his efforts, but 22 Telegram 722, Solomon to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964; Telegram 804, Jova to Secretary of State, 4 December 1964; Telegram 832, Dungan to Secretary of State, 11 December 1964; and Telegram 83 6, Dungan to Secretary of State, 14 December 1964; all Folder INCO Copper 17, Box 1, Formerly Top Secret Files of the Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, RG59-Lot, NA. Her eafter cited as Formerly Top Secret Files. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 192-195. For State Departments postponement of the investigation, see Memorandum of Conversation Proposed Justice Copper Investigation, Ortman, 8 December 1964, Fo lder INCO 17, Box 1, Formerly Top Secret Files, RG59-Lot, NA. Mann believed that U.S. businesses overseas should make a concerted effort to be in the forefront of social progress by adop ting local customs and taking fair attitudes toward labor. See Memorandum Practices of Ameri can business Concern in Foreign Countries, Mann, Office of Economic Affairs, to Roy R. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of Stat e for Inter-American Affairs, 7 October 1957, Folder Chron File Oct.-Dec. 1957 (2), Box 1, Thomas C. Mann Papers, 1950-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. He reafter cited as DDEL. 333

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Allende assured him it was not. Allende told Puccio not to become bitter or discouraged by their defeat; they would win in 1970, but the st ruggle is now going to be much harder. 23 After the election, Allende criticized Frei for selling out and declared that Freis Revolution in Liberty reform progr ams would fall short. He char ged that Frei made many and secret compromises with the historic enemies of the people (i.e. the Right, the Church, and the United States). As evidence, Allende noted that Freis first act as President-elect was to send a mission to the United States. 24 Allende acknowledged that Frei confronted the difficult task of achieving a pilot program for Latin America first, and then for the rest of the underdeveloped countries. Claiming that Freis presidency will be a term of obstacles and six years of crisscrossing pressures, Allende asserted that the Left and Right would challenge Frei and his reforms, subtly implying that he intended to make Freis task as difficult as possible. Characteristically Allende dismissed Freis chance s for success: Freis government may make some small reforms, more of form than of substance. 25 Allendes criticism demonstrates that he was keenly aware of the Cold War stakes involved for Freis success or failure. His comments indicate that the idea of Chile as a model for economic development and the Alliance key policy objectives for the United States was 23 Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende:Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emision, 1985), 160, 135-136, 158-159. Airgram A-405 Observations on the Current Political Scene, Ravndal to Department of State, 24 November 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 24 Allendes interview with Lus Hernndez Parker of Ercilla (4 November 1964), reprinted in part in Max Nolff, Salvador Allende: El poltico, el estadista (Santiago: Ediciones Documentas, 1993), 72-75.. 25 Allendes interview with Lus Hernndez Parker of Ercilla (4 November 1964), 72-75. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 159. 334

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well known. Moreover, Allende admitted that Freis Revolution in Liberty was an anti-Marxist pilot program, a path which could threaten hi s own democratic road to socialism. Allendes long friendship with Frei was one of the first casualties of the 1964 presidential campaign. Years later, Frei attri buted their changed relationship to Allendes great shock at his 1964 defeat, hinting at a sor e loser interpretati on. Yet what most rankled Allende and FRAP leaders was the U.S. assistance that Frei had received, particularly campaign propaganda, or the Campaign of Terror as FRAP supporters called it. Ral Ampuero, the Socialist Partys Secretary General, accused Frei and his me rcenary activists of having degraded the presidential campaign to an ex treme unknown in Chilean civic pr actices, and Osvaldo Puccio charged that Frei could have reined in the Campaign of Terror if he had so desired it. 26 The depth of the FRAPs bitterness over the Campaign of Terror suggests that the Communists were not pouring in the dough as NSC officials had cl aimed and that Allende had received far less outside support than the millions Frei enjoyed. Perhaps more indicative of his bitterness, Allende refused to go to La Mone da during Freis presidency, and he shifted from the informal tu to the formal usted when conversing with his old friend Frei (i n English, it would be similar to changing from you to sir and doing so in every sentence). Frei objected to the 26 For the breaking of Allende and Freis friendship, see Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 162-163; and Patricia Politzer, Altamirano (Santiago: Ediciones Melquades, 1990 [1989]) 60. Interview w ith Former President Eduardo Frei, Santiago, Chile, March 28, 1980, in Mark Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 315. Surez, Allende, vision de un militante 78. Airgram A263 The Communist Party of Chile Outlines Policy for the Future, Ravndal, 2 October 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/64, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Ral Ampuero Daz, La hora de la simulacin, Arauco V/56 (September 1964): 2. For documents showing Freis knowledge of and ability to curb some campaign propaganda, see Telegram 162 Freis Views on FRAP Campaign, Cole (Jova[?]) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1964; and Telegram 167 Freis Views on US Role in Final Days of Campaign, Cole (Jova[?]) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1964; both Folder POL 14 Chile, 5/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 335

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shift and asked Allende why he switched. Allende insisted that he had too much respect for the Presidency and adamantly insisted upon using usted. 27 Following the 1964 electoral defeat, the FRAP fell into considerab le disarray amid bitterness and in-fighting, and the coalition and its political pa rties broke along two fault lines. 28 The first was along party lines. The Socialists charged that the Comm unists had sabotaged Allendes campaign and that the Soviet Union did not want a nother Cuba in South America because it would be prohibitively expensive. Th e charge suggests that the Socialists did want to create another Cuba and had expected greater Soviet support. The Communists, meanwhile, accused the Socialists of wanting to break up th e FRAP so they could align with the PDC. Baltasar Castro and his small National P opular Vanguard party bolted the coalition. 29 27 For U.S. officials assuming that the Communists were pouring in the dough, see Memorandum, Peter Jessup, NSC and Executive Secretary of the 5412 Special Group, to Bundy, 23 July 1964, quoted in FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 583. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 163. Nolff, Salvador Allende 73-75. While the Campaign of Terror embittered Allende towa rd Frei, Carlos Altamirano asserts that t he drop that overflowed the cup for Frei was the printing of Frei, the Chilean Kerensky Altamirano may have confused two books. Frei, el Kerensky Chileno is a far Right critique of Frei. The more likely work that might have angered Frei is Allendes essay Allende enjuicia a Frei where he charges that Christian Democracy is mere reformism and a defender of capitalism. See Politzer, Altamirano 60; Fabio Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, Frei, el Kerensky chileno (Buenos Aires: Cruzada, 1967); and Allende, Allende enjuicia a Frei (Santiago: Ediciones Punto Final, 1965), 5. The prologue of Allendes essay is some times printed as La democracia cr istiana no es revolucionaria [Christian Democracy is not revolutionary]. See Allende, La demo cracia cristiana no es revolucionaria, Discursos (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1975), 9-20. 28 For optimism and hope, see Jaime Surez Bastidas, Allende, vision de un militante (Santiago: Editorial Jurdica ConoSur, 1992), 78; Julio Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 167; and Airgram A-574 Views of Socialist Party Leaders Regarding the Political Situation in Chile, Rudy V. Fimbres, Second Secretary of Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Department of State, 4 Febr uary 1964, Folder POL 2 General Reports and Statistics Chile, Box 2020, CFPF 196466, RG59, NA. For the hard blow of defeat, see Alonso Daire T., La poltica del Partido Comunista desde la postguerra a la Unidad Popular, El Partido Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Sociales [CESOC] and Facultad Latinoamricana de Ciencias Sociales [FLASCO], 1988), Augusto Varas, ed., 201-203; Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984), 98; Alejandro Chelen Rojas, Trayectora del Socialismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Austral, 1967), 168. 29 Charles J. Parrish, Arpad J. von Lazar, and Jorge Tapia Videla, The Chilean Congressional Election of March 7, 1965: An Analysis (Washington DC: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967), 4-5, 24. Airgram A-497 The Future of the FRAPCommunist Party (PCCh), Frank M. Ravndal, Second Secretary of 336

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With the March 1965 Congressional elections looming, Allende intervened to stop the in-fighting and hold the FRAP together. He calle d FRAP leaders to his home one day and then threatened to leave politics entirely if th e FRAP collapsed. FRAP leaders negotiated a working relationship and inter-party criticism ceased. The FRAP held their bloc of seats in the March 1965 Congressional elections even made some slight gains; however, it was the Communists who made gain s, not the Socialists. 30 The second fault line that split the FRAP was the va pacfica / va armada divide. Fostered by the Cuban Revolution and Sino-S oviet split but subm erged during the 1964 campaign, factions of both Marxist parties abandoned Allendes elector al road to socialism. The pro-Soviet leadership of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh Partido Communista de Chile) proclaimed its steadfast adhe rence to the FRAP and the va pacfica but dissident Maoist elements of the PCCh rank-and-file claimed that Allendes defeat exposed the futility of the va pacfica and vindicated the va armada. According to U.S. intelligence, the dissidents numbered 30 to 40 percent of the PCChs memb ership. PCCh supporters of the va armada formed the group Spartacus, which held an anniversary cel ebration for the Chinese Revolution on 4 October 1964, and among the celebrations co-sponsors were Socialist Senators Salvador Allende and Salomn Corbaln. PCCh Secretary General Lus Corvaln Lpez accused the Maoist-Guevarist Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Department of State, 22 December 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/64, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), 209 n 2. Miles D. Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics (Lexington MA: D. C. Heath for Lexington Books, 1972), 141. 30 Parrish, von Lazar, and Tapia Videla, The Chilean Congressional Election of March 7, 1965 4-5, 24. Airgram A497 The Future of the FRAP Communist Party (PCCh), Ravndal to Department of State, 22 December 1964. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile 209 n 2. Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics 141. 337

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dissidents of being soda-fountain guerrillas and in December 1964, the Communist Party Central Committee expelled members of Spartacus for promoting the va armada 31 The impact of the Cuban Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split fractured the Socialist Party of Chile (PS Partido Socialista de Chile) as we ll, but also moved the pa rty to the left of the Communists. The 1964 defeat frustrated the So cialists, and the 1965 Congressional elections, where the Communists but not the Socialists made gains, intensified the PSs internal debate. During the June 1965 party congress, long-time PS leader Ral Ampuero resigned as Secretary General. He later interrupted Allende during th e latters speech, repro aching him for negotiating with Radical candidate Julio Durn during the presidential campaign, a reproach that received the overt approval of many in the audience. The congress voted Aniceto Rodrguez Arenas to be Secretary General, and the new PS leadership reasserted the partys commitment to the Workers Front, which was a more militant, cla ss-based strategy. Allende remained a leader of the PS and had several friends, including An iceto Rodrguez, Carlos Altamirano, Manuel Mandujo, and Salomn Corbaln on the new central committee, but the party blurred the lines between the democratic and armed roads. The PS asserted that positing the va pacfica and the va armada as an either/or option was a false choice; it defined the two roads as stages toward 31 Airgram A-497 The Future of the FRAP Communist Party (PCCh), Ravndal to Department of State, 22 December 1964. Airgram A-263 The Co mmunist Party of Chile Outlines Po licy for the Future, Ravndal to Department of State, 2 October 1964. Tab J The Incoming Administration of the Christian Democrats in Chile, p.8, Briefing Book for the United States Delegation to the Inauguration of His Excellency Eduardo Frei Montalva, Box 2028, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Da ire, La poltica del Partido Comunista desde la Post-Guerra a la Unidad Popular, El Partido Comunista en Chile 199-204. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile 223-224. Memorandum of Conversation, Jorge Barria with Benjamn Martin, Labor Information Officer, 3 November 1965, enclosed with Airgram A-434 Conversation with Jorge Barria on Developments in Socialist Party of Chile, Sam Moskowitz, Counselor for Political Affairs, to Department of State, 9 November 1965, Fo lder POL 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 338

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socialism where electoral victory signaled the star t of revolution. 32 The partys new position was still too moderate for some Soci alists, who broke away and formed the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolutionaria (MIR Revolutionary Leftist Movement). Supported primarily by university students and intellectuals, and led by Miguel Enrquez, MIR advocated armed insurrection as the only possible means of gaining power. MIRs voice was Punto Final and it urged supporters to abandon the democratic road by casting blank ba llots or abstaining. 33 Europes Model Democracy The Europeans embraced Chiles image as a m odel democracy, as became clear during the March 1965 Congressional elections a nd Freis trip to Europe. Th e March elections were crucial because even though Frei had won the presidency with broad support, the Christian Democrats held only a small number of seat s in Congress (28 of 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 4 of 45 seats in the Senate). O ccurring just six months after the presidential contest, the congressional elections put the Re volution in Liberty on hold as Frei, the Christian Democrats, and U.S. officials turned to increasing the PDCs re presentation. Assistan t Secretary Mann and Ambassador Dungan wanted to reduce U.S. fund ing to the PDC lest they use it against nonCommunist parties, but th e desire for Frei and the PDC to succeed outweighed that want. The 32 Fandez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile 169-170. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, 138-144. Surez, Allende, vision de un militante 90. Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile 2 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971), II: 106-108, 111-114. Chelen, Trayectoria de Socialismo 163-174. Memorandum of Conversation Views of Socialist Journalist [Augusto Olivares, political editor of ltima Hora ], Jova, 8 January 1965, enclosed with Airgram A-536 Views of Socialist Journalist, Jova to Department of State, 11 January 1965, Folder POL 15 -1 Chile 1/1/65, Box 2028, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 33 Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 258. Daire, La poltica del Partido Comunista desde la Post-Guerra a la Unidad Popular, El Partido Comunista en Chile 98-99. Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism, 98-99. Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics 152-153. 339

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303 Committee (formerly the Special Group on La tin America) approved a plan to direct $175,000 to select candidates and tasked Dungan with the coordination. Dungan and the CIA chose 29 candidates, 9 of whom were elected. 34 To the surprise of many, including Frei and U.S. officials, the Ch ristian Democrats won the 7 March Congressional elections in a landslide. They gain ed 82 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, attaining a majority, and won 12 of 21 Senate races. The PDC garnered so many votes in Santiago they could have elected 4 sena tors but had only put forward 3 candidates. 35 The Socialist and Communist Parties recorded slight gains; however the Liberal and Conservative Parties suffered heavy losses, dropping from 45 to 9 seats in the Chamber and 13 to 7 seats in the Senate. President Johnson sent Frei a message expressing his g ratification at the results. Dungan was pleased, but admitted that U.S. funding only modestly helped, suggesting that covert funding had little impact on the outcome and that CIA claims of helping to defeat as many as 13 FRAP candidates were exaggerated. 36 34 CIA Special Report Implications of the Recent Electio ns in Chile, Office of Current Intelligence, 2 October 1964. Memorandum Financial Support to Selected Candidates in the 7 March 1965 Congressional Elections in Chile, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to the 303 Committee, 25 January 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 606-608. Telegram 459 Freis Views on Politi cal Atmosphere, Cole to Secretary of State, 24 September 1964, Folder POL 1 Chile, Box 2020; and Telegram 523, Jova to Secretary of State, 3 October 1964, Folder POL 12 Political Parties Chile 6/1/64, Box 2026; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 598-599. U.S. Senate, Covert Action in Chile 17-18. 35 This allowed Socialist candidate Carlos Altamirano Orrego to gain a Senate seat. Parrish, von Lazar, and Tapia, The Chilean Congressional Election of March 7, 1965 23. 36 Airgram A-931 Elements in Chiles Rightist Parties Co nsider Formation of a New Political Party, Ravndal to Department of State, 22 April 1965, Folder POL 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ ersity Press, 1978), 37. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 50. Memorandum, CIA to 303 Committee, 11 March 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 608 n U.S. Senate, Covert Action in Chile 17-18. Gil, The Political System of Chile 235 and 309. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 198-200, 202-203. 340

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The Christian Democrats success led to a presid ential trip to Europe that showcased Frei as the vanguard Latin American democrat, and Chile as a mature, model democracy. Just after the March elections, the British government invited Fr ei for an official visit, and Frei said that the British were very anxious for him to accept because he woul d be the first Latin American president that the United Kingdom would host forma lly. Frei would also be first sitting Chilean president to travel to Europe in an official capac ity. The British invitation soon expanded into an three-week trip that included visits to Italy, the Vatican, France, West Germany. 37 Frei was enthusiastically rece ived in the four European cap itals of Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn. One French newspaper described the enthusiasm for Frei as extraordinary and profound, and French President Charles De Gaulle said that Freis visit was intended to convey that the French considered Frei [the] most important Latin American leader. The British emphasized Freis distinction as the first Latin Amer ican leader that they hosted for a state visit. They considered Frei the vanguard democratic leader for Latin America, and The Times of London called Frei the regions t he most significant figure. In Germany, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard cut short his vacation to meet with Frei; and at the Vatican, Frei discussed agrarian reform with Pope Paul VI. The governments in Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn offered Frei aid, equipment, and technical assistance, and Frei re turned to Chile to a heros welcome. He 37 Telegram 1485, Dungan to Secretary of State, 5 April 1965, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations ChileUS 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Cristin Gazmuri R., Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca, 2 volumes (Santiago: Aguilar, 2000) II: 602-603. Telegram 220, Charles Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State and W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 12 July 1965, POL 7 Visits, Meetings Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 341

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proclaimed that his warm reception in Europe wa s due to Chiles long democratic history, [the] political maturity of its people, and [the] admi rable example it [is] setting for Latin America. 38 Freis trip indicated how broadly Chiles de mocratic image had gained acceptance, but it also signified the European s elevated interest in Chile. Befo re his departure, Frei told Dungan that he was disinclined to go because a L[atin] A[merican] president in Europe is something of a curiosity; however, being a curiosity worked fu lly to Freis and Chiles advantage. Frei travelled as the Great Democrat, and he implicit ly cultivated Chiles democratic image, as well as a mental geography that situated Chile betwee n Europe and Latin America, a legacy that he bestowed to his successo r, Salvador Allende. 39 As Frei burnished and benefitted from Chiles democratic image, he travelled to Europe while the United States was intervening in th e Dominican Republic, and Chiles opposition to the U.S. intervention infuriated Johnson and Mann. The contrast between Chileans peacefully queuing at the polls in Santiago and U.S. Marine s patrolling the streets of Santo Domingo further highlighted Chiles exceptionalism for Europe. The Frei administration protested the 27 April 1965 landing of U.S. Marines in Santo Domingo, and opposed sending an OAS Inter-American Peace Force there. Mann complained that the Ch ileans are the ones that hurt us at the OAS, and U.S. officials charged that the Chileans nea rly sabotaged our efforts to achieve a political solution. Johnson said, [W]e should take a fe w siestason some their requests, and Mann 38 Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 602-608. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 203-207. Telegram 211 Frei Visit, Bohlen to Secretary of State, 11 July 1 965; and Telegram 230 Frei Visit, David Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, to Secretary of State, 16 July 1965, Folder POL 7 Visits, Meetings Chile 1/1/64, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 108, D ungan to Secretary of State, 26 July 1965, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/65, Box 2 028, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 39 Telegram 1485, Dungan to Secretary of State, 5 April 1965. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 607. 342

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agreed, but they did not go beyond talk. U.S. of ficials had some exceedingly frank discussions with Chilean officials, who th en toned down their rhetoric. 40 Much to U.S. officials chagrin, Frei also re opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He had promised to reestablish relations with the Soviet Union during the 1964 campaign, and when U.S. officials learned that reestablis hment was practically a certainty, they tried to dela y it. Mann enlisted U.S. Ambassa dor to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson and Belgian Prime Minister Theo Lefe vre, who was also President of the European Union of Christian Democratic Parties, to persuade Frei to postpone the reestablishment of relations with the Communist bloc. 41 Both spoke with Frei at his inauguration festivities, but he rebuffed their appeals. He told Stevenson that he had a long record on the issue; moreover, many countries including the United States had relations with the Soviet bloc and Chiles sovereignty was diminished by not having relations with the East as well as the West. Two weeks later, Chile and the Soviet Union reestablished relations. Chile then opened relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Shortly after the Soviet ambassador 40 Radio/Television Address, Gabriel Valds Subercaseaux, 21 October 1966, quoted in Airgram A-264, Dungan to Department of State, 26 October 1966, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 842, Harriman to the President a nd Secretary of State, 7 May 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 610 n 3, 611 n 4, 611 n 5, 609-611. Telegram 1980, Dungan to Secretary of State, 23 June 1965; and Memorandum, Presidents Meeting with Ambassador Dungan, Thompson (Sayre) to Bundy, 22 July 1965; both Folder POL Political Affairs an d Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66 RG59, NA. 41 Telegram 658, Jova, Charg dAffaires, to Adlai Stev enson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 28 October 1964; and Telegram 639, Jova to Secretary of State, 27 October 1964; both Folder Chile Cables Volume II, 9/6411/64, Box 13, NSF-Country File-Latin America, LBJL. Me morandum Chiles Relations with the Soviet Bloc, Mann to Stevenson, November 1964, Folder POL Politi cal Affairs and Relations Chile-Alg 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 343

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arrived in Santiago, Socialist Senators Salvador Allende, Ral Ampuero, and Carlos Altamirano, and Communist Senator Volodia Teitelboim met with him. 42 Just as with Guatemala eleven years earlier U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic sparked protests in Chile, a nd Allende again assumed a prom inent role. Demonstrations occurred in Santiago, and when Ambassador W. Av erill Harriman arrived in the city to urge Freis government to su pport the intervention, more protests occurred. Allende wrote President Johnson and demanded that he end the interventi on, charging that the United States cannot assume the right to control Latin America. Alle nde and four Leftist senators sent a letter to Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant, asserting that the intervention was typical of a great power that crushes by force a small country, and they asked the UN to restrain the United States. When Foreign Minister Valdes briefed Se nate leaders, Allende urged Valds to demand immediate withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Santo Domingo and carry that demand into the United Nations. Allende also suggested that the Chilean gov ernment bar U.S. Ambassador Ralph Dungan from attending the opening of Chile s Congress on 21 May 1965 in order to stress our moral repudiation of U.S. intervention. 43 42 Telegram 695, Jova to Secretary of State, 6 November 1964, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations ChileUSSR 1/1/64, Box 2031, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 764, Jova to Secretary of State, 24 November 1964, Folder Chile Cables Volume II 9/64-11/64, Box 13, NS F-Country File-Latin America, LBJL. Airgram A-1073 CERP Section C-2 Politico-Economic Relations with Communi st Countries, Prochnik to Department of State, 9 June 1965, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Ch ile-Alg 1/1/64; and Telegram 1587, Dungan to Secretary of State, 22 April 1965, Folder PO L 23 Internal Security, Counter-insurgency, Chile 1/1/64; both Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 43 Letter, Allende to Johnson, n.d. [April/May 1965]; and Letter, Salvador Allende, Ral Ampuero, Carlos Altamirano, Aniceto Rodrguez Arenas, and Rafael Tarud Siwady to U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, n.d. [April/May 1965]; both reprinted in Alfre do Vzquez Carrizosa, Salva dor Allende revolucionario, Salvador Allende en el umbral del siglo XXI (Mxico: Plaza y Jans, 1998), Frida Modak, ed., 269-270. Airgram A-987 Joint Weeka No. 18, Ravndal to Department of State, 7 May 1965, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/65, Box 2021; and Airgram A-984 Allende Mounts Personal Offensive against U.S. in Person of Ambassador, James F. 344

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Allendes invective against U.S. interventi on in the Dominican Republic led to a public sparring between him and Ambassador Dungan. In an open letter to Dungan, Allende charged that the United States had violated the most e ssential principles of international coexistence and that its use of troops si gnifies, simply, the predominance of force over all the moral, cultural, and spiritual values whichhave come to be considered part of civilization. The U.S. Embassy accused Allende of leading a personal offensive against the ambassador, but Allende denied this and declared that he had had no contact with th e U.S. Embassy since Ambassador Claude G. Bowers tenure, more than 15 years ea rlier. He added that the reasons for my isolation continue, namely U.S. interventions in the region. Embassy officers belittled Allende as a three-time presidential loser, but Dungan e ngaged him. In his response, Dungan insisted that the United States believe[d] deeply in the principles of se lf-determination and nonintervention, and that the Eisenhower administrati ons failure to act in time led to a loss of liberty for a noble people [the Cubans]. We ar e unwilling to sacrifice one principle for the other, Dungan concluded. He attended the ope ning of Congress at the invitation of President Frei, prompting Allende and FRAP C ongressmen to boycott the ceremonies. 44 A Short-Sighted Request President Johnson likely did not intend to alienate the Chilea ns, but the Vietnam War and its inflationary pressures on the U.S. economy led him to sacrifice U.S.-Chilean goodwill and the OConnor, First Secretary of Embassy to Department of State, 7 May 1965, Folder POL 1 General Policy Background Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 44 Airgram A-984 Allende Mounts Personal Offensive against U.S. in Person of Ambassador, OConnor to Department of State, 7 May 1965. Open letter, Dungan to Allende, 7 May 1965. Telegram 1815, Dungan to Secretary of State, 22 May 1965, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/65, Box 2028, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 345

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Alliance for Progress in Chile for a special pr ice on copper. Johnson administration officials admitted that the United States had a big stake in the success of the Frei experiment, and insisted, We can hardly do less for a strong de mocracy like Chile than we do for [a] shaky constitutional government in Colombia and a de facto [military] government in Brazil. The administration lauded its success in Chile, with one official writing, the Frei administrations record of achievement is impressive as many a vis itor of different ideologi cal stripe has noted. In the years 1965 and 1966, Freis Revolution in Liberty enjoyed growth rates of 6.1 and 10.5 percent respectively. The Frei administration dramatically cut inflation, substantially increased real wages for workers, raised crop prices, expanded credit opport unities for small farmers, and encouraged broad income distribution. The J ohnson administration also pointed to the Frei governments expansion in public housing construction, meaningful land reform program, increased private investment, tax code refo rms, increased tax revenues, and expanded enrollments and opportunities in higher educ ation. Although setbacks had occurred in 1967, U.S. officials attributed the setbacks to the too rapid social movement and Chiles economic expansion during the previous two years. 45 The economic pressures of the Vietnam War le d Johnson and his advisors to ask Frei to roll back the rising price of copper. Having esca lated U.S. involvement in Vietnam in August, the Johnson administration announced that the Pe ntagon would spend $3.2 billion per year for military hardware for the rest of the decade, a ne ar 100 percent increase over 1964 ($1.7 billion). 45 Underline in original. Memorandum Chilean Loan Progr am, William G. Bowdler, Staff Member of the NSC, to Bundy, 10 November 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 616. Airgram A-561, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper for Chile (CASP) 1968, Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Department of State, 1 May 1968, Folder POL 1 Chile-US, Box 1981, CFPF 1967-6 9, RG59, NA, pp. 16-18, 4. Ta ffet, Alliance for What?, 214. 346

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Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy grew worried when in response to pri ce increases on the London Me tals Exchange, Chile raised the price of copper from 36 cents to 38 cents on 20 October. Fearing that higher metal prices would increase military expenditures and fuel inflation, Johnson successfully pressured Alcoa and Reynolds, the two major U.S. aluminum co mpanies, to cut the price of aluminum. He then tried the same tactic on Frei. Bundy sent Dungan a telegram outlining Johnsons request that Frei cut the price of copper to 36 cents, as well as a list of sticks and carrots that U.S. officials could use to pressure Frei. For s ticks, Bundy listed holding up an $80 million loan, guarantees for Anaconda and Kennecotts new investments, and applications for $135 million in Export-Import Bank loans to companies operating in Chile. He added releasing copper from the U.S. stockpile (to drop the market price) and offering new incentives for companies to switch from copper to aluminum. The list of carrots was shorter. Bundy offered warm political support (which Frei had), a personal appeal from Johnson (the request was that), and a promise to consider sympathetically a deal to c over the loss incurred by the price rollback. 46 Bundys cable angered Dungan who, in response, called the request po litical suicide for the United States because the Frei administration was struggling to withstand the pressure to raise the price of copper to 40 cents. Dungan wa rned that Bundys imposing arsenal of sticks and a not so imposing supply of carrots may cause Frei to consider the U.S. request beyond the pale and may push the Chileans to nationalize its copper industry. He reminded Bundy that 46 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 225, 228-233. For Johnsons decision to escalate the Vietnam War, see Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Telegram 65695, Bundy to Dungan, Eyes Only, 12 November 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 617. 347

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Chile supplied only 13 percent of U.S. copper consumption, and that copper shipped from Antofagasta cost 14.5 cents per pound but was sold in the United States at 38 cents and 65 cents in London. Somebody makes a hell of a profit, Dungan quipped, and it was not the Chileans. 47 Johnson read Dungans response and sent W. Averill Harriman and Anthony Solomon to Santiago to negotiate the price rollback. Harrim an and Solomon presented the request to Frei, who reminded the Americans, For us, copper is not just one problem; it is the problem, and he made clear that his entire cabinet believed that co pper should be raised to at least 40 cents. Frei did say that because Johnson had personally sent them to Santiago, he would consider it. My disposition is to help, because the United States helps us, but he made clear that his entire cabinet believed that copper shoul d be raised to at least 40 cents. 48 The next day Frei agreed to help, but he preferred a one-year bilatera l agreement. If his government cut the price of all Chilean copper to 36 cents, he would confront a political crisis of the highest magnitude. He could, however, sell copper to the United St ates at 36 cents in a special agreement, but he stressed the importance of the United States continuing its assistance and cooperation in helping Chile enact economic and agricultural reforms. Harriman noted, [Frei] had real misgivings on how he would come out. Frei received the diplomatic version of the Johnson treatment, and he had little choi ce. The Johnson Administration had extensively helped Freis campaign and was funding the Revolution in Liberty. Now Johnson asked for a 47 Telegram, Eyes Only, Dungan to Bundy, 13 November 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 48 Telegram 629, Harriman to the President, 16 November 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 627-629. 348

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favor in return. As one historian observes it was a piece of ugl y business all the way around. 49 Despite acceding to the special price of copper, Frei did not receive the U.S. assistance cooperation that he had hoped. In fact, for the first time since World War II, U.S. officials intensely scrutinized U.S. support for Chilean programs, prompting Chilean Ambassador Tomic to object to Washingtons lack of sympathy and charge that the U.S.-Chilean relationship was a one-way street. Just after the Harriman/Solom on mission, U.S. and Chilean officials discussed Chiles 1966 program loan, and to the Frei admini strations surprise, U.S. officials took a hard line. They demanded changes to the Frei admi nistrations budget, e.g. removal of a 25 percent wage increase for public employees (largely cost of living increases), and reductions on less essential investment sectors such as housing (C hile suffered a housing sh ortage). The Chileans reworked their budget to meet many conditions, but Depart ment officials rejected it as insufficient. The price of copper then climbed to 42 cents in the United States and 70 cents in London, making the 36-cent ag reement fiscally even more painful for Chile, leading the Frei administration to plead for cooperation from Wa shington. In January 1966, just seven weeks after the agreement, Frei sent Javier Lagarrigue to Washington to resolve the 1966 program loan impasse and renegotiating the 36-cent agreement. Dungan and the U.S. Embassy urged the department to show more flexibility. U.S. of ficials refused to budge, and Lagarrigue returned 49 Telegram 642, Harriman to the President, 17 November 1965, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 629-632. Telegram 1168, Harriman to the President, 19 Novemb er 1965, Folder Political Affairs an d Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. For the Johnson treatment, see Brands, The Wages of Globalism 25-26. For the negotiations, see Taffet, Alliance for What?, 228-247. 349

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empty handed. Meeting with the Assistant Secretary of State, Dungan again urged Washington to ease its demands, and a loan agreement was finally achieved. 50 Johnson administration officials patted themse lves on the back for the copper agreement and the terms of program loan, but by Ambassa dor Dungans admission, the cost was the trust and friendly relations with Frei s administration. By April 1966, market and domestic pressures forced the Frei government to raise the price of copper to 62 cents, wi th copper under the U.S.Chilean agreement excluded. In May, new Assistant Secretary of St ate for Inter-American Affairs Lincoln Gordon asked for another copp er agreement for 1967, but the Chileans gave a polite, non-committal response. When Gordon aske d again in July 1966, Dungan fired back that another agreement was dangerous to [U.S.] po litical interests in the long and short run in Chile, and insisted upon discussing the matter personally with Johnson. As Dungan knew, the Chileans opposed another agreement. Frei allowed the first agreement to expire, but during a Christmas Eve 1966 radio address, he announced that he would not seek new loans from the U.S. Government or the IMF. 51 Balancing Democracy and Revolution Between 1965 and 1967, Allende faced what one So cialist Party leader called a difficult period of leadership. He confronted two dauntin g tasks: he had to re build a splintering Lefts faith in va pacfica and the Lefts faith in him. As FR AP leader and three-time presidential 50 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 252-269. 51 Letter, Dungan to A. Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 18 February 1966, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/65, Bo x 2028, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Ta ffet, Alliance for What?, 276, 281, 287-88, 299-300 350

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candidate, Allende was the preemin ent leader of the Chilean Left. His name, the U.S. Embassy admitted, was known in every Chilean household, and his appeal extended well beyond the Socialist and Communist party faithful. Howeve r, other political aspira nts sought to challenge Allende and establish themselves as leaders of the Left. Allende responded to the challenges by simulta neously presenting himself as a democrat and a revolutionary. Balancing th e two public personae required de licacy and political skill, for not everyone accepted the long-time Popular Front advocate as a revolutionary. Fidel Castro dismissed the idea that Allende was a revolutionary and reportedly told Allende to his face that his guerilla suit should be made by Christian Dior. Burnishi ng his democrat image, Allende arranged to meet with U.S. Senator Robert Kenne dy (brother of the former U.S. president), when Kenned visited Chile in December 1965, but so me PS central committee members opposed it. Allende and the central committee debated the issue for three hours, with Allende strongly insisting that they needed to meet with U.S. leaders. Allende met with Senator Kennedy, despite the opposition. 52 Two weeks after Robert Kennedys visit, Alle nde travelled to Havana and burnished his image as a revolutionary. At th e First Tricontinental Conference of Colonial Peoples, hosted by Fidel Castro, Allende pledged his devotion to de mocracy, but asserted that each country will 52 Surez, Allende, un visin de un militante 78. Airgram A-155 The Presidential Campaign with Two Weeks to Go, Robert A. Stevenson, Counselor for Political Affairs, to Department of State, 21 August 1964, Folder POL 14 Chile 8/1/64, Box 2029, CFPF 1964 -66, RG59, NA, p. 10. Fandez, Marxism and Demo cracy in Chile 170. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Memorandum Chilean Crisis, Chief of Chile Task Force and Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division to William V. Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, 29 September 1970, Tranche III, CIA Collection, Chile Declassification Project, http://foia.state.g ov/SearchColls/CIA.asp. Memorandum of Conversation, Jorge Barra with Benjamin Martin, USIS Labor Information Officer, n.d. [14? December 1965], enclosed with Airgram A-531 Trans mitting Memorandum of Conver sation, Moskowitz to Department of State, 14 December 1965, Folder PO L 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 351

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consider its own circumstances a nd its own tactics. He charged that Johnsons intervention in the Dominican Republic showed that the United States will prevent by arms the democratic and legal access to power by popular movements. Johnson indeed had declared, in the Johnson Doctrine, that The American nations cannot, mu st not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. 53 At the Tricontinental conference, Allende embraced Ch Guevaras call for revolution and proposed two organizations to promote revol utionary movements. In a message to the conference, Guevara declared that the choice was either a socialist revolu tion or a make-believe revolution, and that they must bring about the total destructi on ofthe imperialist domination of the United States. Guevara urged delegates to create two, three, or many Viet Nams, for We must carry the war as far as the enemy carries it: to his home, to his centers of entertainment, in a total war. After Gu evaras message, Allende proposed creating two umbrella organizations to suppor t to revolutionary movements in Latin America. Conference delegates formed the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OPSAAL) to aid revolutionary moveme nts in the developing world, an organization described as Cubas first stable front organization. 54 Allende proposed an organization 53 Salvador Allende: Cada pas considerar sus propias realidades y su s propias tcticas, El Siglo 7 January 1966, p. 7. Airgram A-609 Joint Weeka No. 1, Ravndal to Department of State, 7 January 1966, Folder POL 21 Chile 1/1/66 [2 of 2], Box 2021, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Johnson, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic, 2 May 1965, PPP: Johnson, 1965 2 volumes (Washington DC: USGPO, 1966), I: 221. Allende quoted in Alfredo Vzquez Carrizosa, Salvador Allende revolucionario, Salvador Allende en el umbral del siglo XXI 273. 54 Ernesto Ch Guevara, Message to th e Tricontinental, [January 1966], in Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary on Left and Nationalist Movements (New York: Random House, 1969), Irving Louis Horowitz, Josu de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., pp. 611-612, 619, 612, 620, 618, 616. For OPSAAL as a Cuban front organization, see Jorge I Domnguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cubas Foreign Policy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 270. For the reso lutions and the work of the conference, see Es deber de todos los pueblos borrar de la faz de la tierra al imperialismo, El Siglo 17 January 1966, p. 6. 352

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exclusively for Latin America, and the 27 Latin American delegations created the Organizacin Latinoamricana de Solidaridad (OLAS Latin American Solidarity Organization). Allende was the first director of the Chilean branch of OLAS. 55 When questioned, Allende assured listeners that OLAS was not a supranational revolutionary command, but the democratic road was not possible in every country. Some revolutionaries he said, did struggle with arms in hand, because in their countries they were denied th e opportunity to do it through legal channels. Chile, he assured his listeners, was different; the democratic road was still applicable. 56 Allende promoted the message revoluti on elsewhere but democratic Chile as an exception in Eastern Europe. In June 1966, Allende attended the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugosla via and met with President Josip Tito. The Chilean senator told the Yugoslav weekly Komunist that Latin Americans are awarethat imperialism is their enemy No. 1, and that U.S. actions were trying to suppress the struggle for the emancipation. Imperialism, he said, must be countered with an anti -imperialist strategy on a continental scale, i.e. revolu tion, but he did note that the va pacfica was still possible in Chile and Uruguay. Allende then travelled to East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 57 55 U.S. officials generally used the Chilean acronyms for parties and organizations; however, in the case of OLAS, they used the English-language acronym LASO. To maintain consistency, this work will use the Chilean acronym. 56 Speech to the Senate, Allende, 13 July 1967, quoted in Patricia Arancibia Clavel, ed., Los orgenes de la violenca poltica en Chile, 1960-1973 (Santiago: Universidad Finis Terrae for Libertad y Desarollo, 2001), 28. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 167. Gonzalo Vial and Mnica Cerda, Alle nde: Part 2, Los primeros renuncios a una tradicin impecable, Special supplement series, Le Segunda 8 August 2003, p. 14-15. This six-part series narrates Allendes life, career, an d presidency, and has many interviews with l eaders from across the political spectrum. Vial wrote the narrative, and Cerda conducted and transcribed the interviews. Martn de discursos contra el imperialismo en reunin cubana, La Nacin 8 January 1966, p. 12. 57 Airgram A-1033 Joint Weeka No. 22, Ravndal to Department of State, 3 June 1966, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/66 [1 of 2], Box 2020; Airgram A-1024 Allende Interviewed by Komunist C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia (W. Zimmerman), to Department of State, 28 June 1966, Folder POL 15 Chile 1966, Box 2027; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 353

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After Europe, Allende returned to Havana, wh ere his concurrence with comments by Fidel Castro led to accusations in Chile that he (A llende) was disloyal. On 26 July 1966, at the anniversary celebration of his raid on Moncada jail, Castro described Chile as a showcase of imperialism that is trying to introduce the contraband of Christian Democracy into Latin America. He called Frei a pampered child of Yankee imperialism, w ho represents the antirevolutionary, reformist trend in Latin America. Chileans might have dismissed Castros words as another choleric show, but Allende later said that he shared the ba sis of Fidel Castros critique and accused Frei of tak[ing] the banners of the Left not to achieve social change, but demagogically to create the idea that it has a revolutionary att itude. He urged Soviet bloc nations not to engage in techni cal or commercial exchanges with reformist governments such as Freis. When La Nacin, Chiles government newspaper, telephoned Allende and pressed him about his comments, Allende replied, I do not ha ve to give any explanation. I will determine when, how, and where I deem it conveni ent [to give an explanation]. La Nacin slanders me. 58 Allendes comments created a political firestorm and embarra ssed his Communist allies. Communist Deputy Orlando Millas, who was on the stage with Castro and Allende, rejected Castros charges, saying that they contained many errors, and abruptly left Havana. Dubbing Allende as the Senator from Havana, La Nacin editorialized that it was the hour of definitions, and the FRAP needed define toward who, whom, or what part of the Cuban Revolution it wishes to show solidarity. The conservative El Mercurio observed, For a 58 Discurso de Fidel Castro conmemor Revolucin, El Mercurio 27 July 1966, p. 37. Allende Comparte Injurias de Fidel Castro a Chile, La Nacin 29 July 1966, p. 1. La Semana Poltica, El Mercurio 31 July 1966, p. 23. Salvador Allende Bsicamente de acuerdo con el Ata que de Fidel Castro contra el Presidente Frei, El Mercurio p. 15.. 354

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democratic mentality, [Allendes] expression is highly reprehensible and leaves a terrible impression of one who on several occasions wanted to obtain majority s upport from the citizenry for his presidential nomination. Tying Allendes words to the Lefts larger debate over legal and violent paths to revolution, El Mercurio remarked, Evidently the cause of democracy does not merit anything in the discussion about what will be the best methods for destroying it. 59 Allende stayed in Cuba several weeks before re turning to Santiago, but while the furor over his comments had subsided, the bitterness rema ined. The U.S. Embassy reported that the walls in Santiago were liberally plastered w ith signs and posters ch arging: Traitor Allende because he wants to sell himself to CubaTraitor Allende because he said in Cuba They should not aid a nation like Chile. Allende was outra ged by the posters and acc used the Ministry of Interior of doing nothing about them. He then made the affair worse by submitting one such poster as evidence to accompany his speech in the Senate. El Mercurio which held the contract to print the Senates proceedings, reprinted the poster with Allendes remarks, giving the poster even greater circulation. 60 Allende now tried to distance hims elf from Castros remarks, saying that Castros criticism of socialist countries sending aid to Chile was correct from socialist 59 Airgram A-64 Joint Weeka No. 30, M. E. Sinn, Political Of ficer, to Department of State, 29 July 1966, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/66 [1 of 2], Box 2020, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. El FRAP en la Hora de las Definiciones, La Nacin 29 July 1966, p. 3. Los Frentes de la Poltica, La Nacin 31 July 1966, p. 15. La Semana Poltica: La actitud del Senador Allende, El Mercurio 31 July 1966, p. 23. 60 Diario del Senado, El Mercurio 19 September 1966, p. 29. Airgram A-184 Return of Salvador Allende, Dungan (Moskowitz and Norbury, Political Officer) to Depart ment of State, 24 September 1966, Folder POL 15-2 Chile, Box 2029; Telegram 2149, Robert W. Dean, Counselor of U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Secretary of State, 27 December 1966, Folder POL 12-6 Me mbership Leaders Chile, Box 2027; both CFPF 1964-66 RG59, NA. 355

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Cubas perspective but not from Ch iles, but was ineffective. Cast ro continued to browbeat Frei, which the U.S. embassy said, significan tly hurt the Cubans prestige in Chile. 61 Three months later, with Chilean politics focused back upon Frei and his reforms and away from Allende, the Senate elected Allende as its president on 27 D ecember. The key to Allendes election was the Radical Party, which held the bala nce of power in the Sena te. In their fourth attempt, the Radicals and the FRAP ousted the PD C leadership and elected Allende as President and Lus Fernando Luengo, an independent soci al democrat, as Vice-President. In his acceptance speech, Allende offered to set aside b lind opposition in order to serve the interests of the people and the nation, and he promised to uphold the Senates prestig e, the sovereignty of Congress [i.e. the separation of powers], and the rights of each Senator. 62 Reaction to Allendes election was positive but cautious. The U.S. Embassy believed that Allendes election might be a h ealthy thing for Chile, if fo r no other reason than it would demonstrate the incompatibility of the Marxist viewpoint with the democratic traditions. Senator Pedro Ibez Ojeda, a staunch conservati ve, asserted that the Al lendes election showed the United States that its shaping of Chilean po litics does not follow such a simple plan, a thinly veiled swipe at U.S. support for Frei. El Mercurio praised Allendes experience and his commitment to democratic principles, but caution ed him that he bore a responsibility to wield 61 Diario del Senado, El Mercurio 19 September 1966, 29. Airgram A-158 Joint Weeka No. 36, Moskowitz (Norbury) to Department of State, 10 September 1966, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/66, Box 2020, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 62 Telegram 2149, Dean to Secretary of State, 27 December 1966. Airgram A1119 Organization of the Senate, Ravndal to Department of State, 18 June 1965, Folder POL 15-2 Chile, Box 2029; and Airgram A-407 Joint Weeka No. 52, Moskowitz (Norbury) to Department of State, 30 December 1966, Folder 2-1 Chile 1/1/66 [1 of 2], Box 2020; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Presidente del Senado Elegido Salvador Allende, El Mercurio 28 December 1966, p. 1, 24. El Mercurio placed the news of Allendes election on its front page and printed his acceptance speech; mean while, Communist El Siglo put it on page 4 with a standard byline, omitting the speech. See Allende Presidente del Sena do; Luengo es Vicepresidente, El Siglo, 28 December 1966, p. 4. 356

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that power prudently and uphold the countrys polit ical traditions. It was not an opportunity, El Mercurio said, to pursue a partisan agenda or engage in conduct that would risk constitutional conflicts that in other eras had di sturbed the countrys political life. 63 Losing Influence As Allende became President of the Senate, U.S. officials were losing influence among many Rightists who had long been allies of the United States. The Right castigated the Johnson administration for its support for Frei, and the embassy admitted that Freis Revolution in Liberty had begun a definite redi stribution of income in favor of the poorer groups, both urban and rural. As a result, a sort of atmosphere of warfare, on the economic and social level had emerged between the PDC and the Right, with some Rightists saying that the FRAP couldnt do much worse than the PDC is promising to do. When Dungan praised land reform as socially necessary and economically beneficial in an interview with the weekly Ercilla, the Liberal Party accused him of intervening in Chilean politics, and several Liberals suggested that Dungan be declared persona non grata During a dinner, one conservative businessman pointed an accusing finger at Dungan and charged, Thi s country is being led to soci al chaos and you are to blame. 64 63 Presidente del Senado Elegido Salvador Allende, El Mercurio 28 December 1966, p. 24. Airgram A-435 Aftermath of Allendes Election to Senate Presidency, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 14 January 1967, Flder POL 15-2 Chile, Box 1980 CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Mesa del Senado y Realidad Poltica, El Mercurio 28 December 1966, p. 3. Funcin de la Presidencia del Senado, El Mercurio 29 December 1966, p. 3. 64 Airgram A-489 Some Reflections on the Senate Rejec tion of President Freis Proposed Trip to the United States, Sidney Weintraub, Economic Counselor of U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Department of State, 11 February 1967, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/ 67, Box 1779, CFPF 1967-69 and Airg ram A-398 Center-R ight Elements Consider Formation of a New Political Party, Moskowitz to Department of State, 26 October 1966, Folder POL 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66; both RG59, NA. Juan de Ons, A Way of Life Ends on Chilean Estate, New York Times 6 November 1966, p. 18; and Chile at Critical Point of Revolution, New York Times 7 November 1966, p. 16. Telegram 854, Dean to Secretary of State, 8 January 1966, Folder POL 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 357

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A former friend and ally, Radical Senator Julio Durn, told Dunga n that many Rightist political leaders resented U.S. favoritism toward the PDC. The Right objected to U.S. support of the PDCs land reform proposal because it threaten ed to decrease agricultural production and lose the campo to the communists. The Right was al so angered by U.S. efforts to exempt American mining companies from land reform b ecause, Durn said, such efforts promoted the idea that what was good enough for Chilean citizens was not good enough for U.S. companies. Duran said that out of spite that Right was wo rking with the Left and the PDC to defeat the exemption and that nationalization of copper was inevitable. From Du rans viewpoint, the United States has put all [its] e ggs in one basket in helping Fr ei, and it would be unprepared for the consequences in 1970 when that bask et is dropped. Dungan dismissed Durns criticisms, telling Washington that Durn had become increasingly embitt ered and irrational in his views, and suggesting that Durn was soft on Communism. Dungans dismissal of Durn was symptomatic of the U.S. attitude toward the Right. U.S. embassy officers equated the Rights criticism of Frei and the Revolution in Liberty with U.S. Republicans attacks on Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal. 65 Politically, the Right, which was in disarray since the 1965 congressional elections, began to rebuild itself as a political force, a force that more aggressi vely and independently pursued its values and interests, even if it meant opposition from U.S. officials. The Right collapsed in the 1965 Congressional elections, with the Liberal and Conservative parties losing one-half of their 65 Airgram A-5, Views of Radical Senator Julio Duran, Dungan to Department of State, 9 July 1966, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030, CFPF 1 964-66, RG59, NA. Airgram A-489 Some Reflections on Senate Rejection of President Freis Proposed Trip to the United States. Weintraub, 11 February 1967. For Republican and other critics of FDR and the New Deal, see George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1974 [1962]); and Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Vintage Press, 1983 [1982]). 358

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Senators and 80 percent of their Deputies. The remnants of the two parties formed the National Party (PN Partido Nacional), decl aring that they sought to restore the values of the Chilean people and to modernize the State. Rightist congre ssional leaders stressed to U.S. officials that they would no longer support Frei simply because he was the non-Communist alternative. They were now willing to follow any tactic that mi ght extort cooperation from Frei and his government. 66 The Rights anger against Frei, the PDC, a nd the United States lashed out when the Chilean Senate rejected Freis re quest to travel to Washington for a 1967 state visit to the White House. The Frei and Johnson administrations had been planning the February 1967 visit for nearly a year, and it intended to highlight Freis democratic credentials and his achievements in reform. Freis state visit tentatively included a speech to a joint sess ion of Congress and an appearance on the television show Meet the Press The invitation was announced publicly in December, 67 although Chiles constitution required Congres s to grant the president permission to 66 Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Objectivos nacionales, Creo en Chile (Santiago: Sociedad Impresora Chile, 1973), 71. Onofre Jarpa, Prlogo, to Juan Lus Ossa, Nacionalismo Hoy (Santiago: Printer Limitada for the Instituto de Estudios Generales, 1972), 5. Airgram A-398 Center-R ight Elements Consider Formation of a New Political Party, Moskowitz to Department of State, 26 October 196 6. Airgram A-931 Elements in Chiles Rightist Parties Consider Formation of a New Political Party, Ravndal to Department of State, 22 April 1965, Folder POL 12 Chile 1965, Box 2026, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. 67 For discussion of the trip, see Dungan to Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 5 January 1966, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/66, Box 2026; Memorandum of Conversation between President Frei and Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon, Dungan, 14 May 1966, enclosed with Dungan to Gordon, 17 May 1966, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US 1/1/64, Box 2030; and Telegram 102295, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State (S ayre) to Dean, 14 December 1966, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/66, Box 2026; all CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. For joint Congressional session speech and Meet the Press appearance, see Telegram 106898, Rusk (Dungan and Gord on) to Dean, 22 December 19 66, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/66, Box 2026, CFPF 19664-66, RG59, NA; and Memorandum Program for Frei Visit, Rostow to the President, 29 December 1966, Folder Chile President Frei Visit 12/66-1/67, Bo x 12, NSFCountriesLatin America, LBJL. For briefing papers, see Briefing Memorandum Scope Paper: Visit of President Eduardo Frei of Chile, February 1-3, 1967, Fimbres, ARA, 17 January 1967; Briefing Memorandum The Chileans: Knowing and Approaching them: Topics of Conversation, Fimbres [?], n.d. [17? January 1967]; and Background Sketches of Eduardo Frei Montalva, Gabriel Valds Subercaseaux, Ra l Saez Saez, Sergio Molina Silva, Carlos Massad Abol, 359

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travel abroad. U.S. officials expected both hous e of Congress to approve the trip, but in the Senate, the Nationals joined the Socialists and Ra dicals and denied Frei permission to travel. The U.S. embassy and Washington were shocked, even though the Nationals had informed the embassy well beforehand that they would deny Fr ei permission to travel in order to protest alleged US intervention in Chilean political a ffairs throughclose support of Frei. National Senator Pedro Ibez Ojeda was reported to be in a mood of almost childish glee that the Senate had hit [Frei] where it hurt, and hurt personally. Frei admitted to U.S. Charg dAffaires Robert W. Dean that the Senates denial was the hardes t jolt of his entire political career.He went to bed pained and furious and he got up pained and furious. 68 The Chilean Senates denial of permissi on was an embarrassment for Washington, but it also signaled a sharp decline in the U.S. ability to exert influence in Chile, a decline that was an unavoidable outcome of the best, imperfect policy. By its wholehearted support of Frei and his Revolution in Liberty program, U. S. officials confronted a shar ply divided Chilean polity. The Right opposed thoroughgoing reform, the Left viewed reform as too slow and too little, with the PDC/liberal center attacked from both sides for pursuing reform. Chile was experiencing its own version of the Turbulent Sixtie s, and U.S. officials, if a nything, may have minimized its decline of U.S. influence by supporting Frei and refo rm because the alternatives were worse. If the United states supported the Right, then the reformist cente r might have turned toward Eduardo Enrique Fornet Fernndez, and Patricio Silva Ec henique, U.S. Embassy Santiago, enclosed with Airgram A-408 Information on Freis Official Party Going to Washington, 31 December 1966; all Folder Chile President Frei Visit 12/66-1/67, Box 12, NSFCountriesLatin America, LBJL. 68 Telegram 2440, Dean to Secretary of State, 17 January 1967, Folder Chile Cables Vol. IV 10/65 7/67, Box 13; Telegram 1399 Frei Visit, Dean to Secretary of State, 13 January 1967, Folder Chile President Frei Visit 12/66 1/67, Box 12; and Telegram 2568, Dean to Secretary of State, 25 January 1967; Folder Chile Cables Vol. IV 10/65 7/67, Box 13; all NSFCountriesLatin America, LBJL. 360

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revolution; meanwhile, if the United States had supported the Left, the Johnson administration might have been accused at home of allowing another Cuba under Allende. The Johnson administration had compounded its difficulties with its own missteps. The copper deal and the terms of the 1966 program lo an angered and alienated PDC allies. Frei sharply criticized the Alliance in an April 1967 article for the pres tigious foreign policy journal, Foreign Affairs Just four months after he reject ed the U.S. program loan for 1967, Frei declared, the Alliance for Progress had lost its way, and that it had become another label for all forms of aid. He accused all participants of openly and covertly distort[ing] the Alliances objectives, principles, and achieve ments, and he harshly critic ized the reactionary Right and violent far Left for subverting the Alliance. He directed his frustration primarily toward the United States, which he charged with scarcely veiled paternalism because it offered aid to Latin America but then claimed the right to demandspecific t ypes of structural changes. With a tone of exasperation, Frei strongly hinted that he seemed to be the only leader who had played by the rules. He had implemented reform and structural change, but he had faced unfair demands and unwarranted criticism while others flouted the Alliances ideals. 69 Department of State officials did not apprecia te Frei airing his grie vances publicly, much less in a prestigious U.S. foreign policy journal. They dismissed Freis article as little more than a recipient blaming his benefactor for problem s that he had created, and proceeded to place 69 Frei, The Alliance that Lost its Way, Foreign Affairs 45/3 (April 1967): 443, 441, 438, 444-446, 442. 361

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Chilean developments in the best light. M eanwhile, Freis article became the foundational critique of the Alliance for Progress, even providing its epitaph. 70 As the Latin American leader who likely benefitted the most from the Alliance, Frei was correct and unfair in his criticis ms. The Alliance may have lost its way in many Latin American nations, but not in Chile, where it followed a course reverse of the commonly assumed narrative. In Chile, the Alliance first sought anti-Communist political ends, specifically to undercut the appeal of Allende and build support for Frei. After Freis victory, U.S. of ficials then reoriented the Alliance closer to its origin al ideals: a cooperative program of U.S. financial resources and Latin American initiative. 71 When U.S. officials set benchm arks for aid in 1966, Frei, benefiting from a rise in the price of copper, rejected additional U.S. loans for 1967 and spurned another bilateral copper agreement. One may ask if Frei had forgotten why the United States so generously supported him in 1964. Frei, however, was also correct; he and Chile had faced unrealistic demands. The Johnson administration had expanded Chiles role as a mode l: it had asked Chile to serve as a model for democracy, a model for economic development, a model for the Alliance for Progress, and a model of the anti-Castro path for Latin America and the Third World. The expanded model was to be all things to all nations, and Freis achievements in Chilean reform paled and were deemed marginal under the soaring expectat ions. In the Chilean context, given the obstacles and refusals 70 Letter, Covey T. Oliver, Assistant S ecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, to Korry, 8 May 1968, enclosed with Letter, Korry to Oliver, 14 May 1968, Folder POL 151 Chile 11/1/68, Box 1779; and Memorandum of Conversa tion, Fitting the President for Pants, 3 January 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-327 Enclosing Memorandum of Conversation, Korry to Department of State, 10 January 1968, Folder Political Affairs & Relations Chile-US, Box 1981; both CFPF 1967-1969, RG59, NA. For the Alliances epitaph, see Levinson and de Ons, The Alliance that Lost its Way 71 Taffet, Alliance for What?, 215. 362

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to initiate thoroughgoing reform under the previous two Chilean presidents, Carlos Ibez del Campo and Jorge Alessandri, Freis achieve ments were substantial, but the Johnson administration expected visible sign s of the progress immediately. The Johnson administration also erred by placing an additional burden on Chile. When Johnson asked Frei to give the Un ited States a special price on copper, he essentially requested that the Chileans accept a reduced income in order to ease th e pain of inflation on U.S. consumers namely to bear some of the cost of the Vietnam War. The Johnson administration then insisted that the Frei government meet speci fic conditions in order to obtain U.S. loans and while it enacted long-needed economic and so cial reforms. Whereas President Kennedy declared that the United States would bear any burden to turn U.S. obj ectives into realities; Johnson had inverted this vow. He expected Frei to bear some of U.S. burden for the Vietnam War, bear the burden of economic and social development, and bear the burden of repaying development loans with interest. Frei and hi s cabinet may not have recognized all of the multiple burdens, but they did recognize the conflict between U.S. demands and Chilean development, and responded by spurning a seco nd copper deal and the 1967 program loan. The King of Spades Allendes tenure as President of the Senate rebuilt his image as a democrat, and Frei assisted him. During the March 1967 municipa l elections, Frei aggressively campaigned for PDC candidates and leveled scathing attacks against what he said was an obstructionist Senate. Allende responded in a calm, low ke y approach and dismi ssed Freis charges by quoting Freis own words about political partie s and democracy. Allende appeared as the defender of Chiles democratic institutions. Hi s prestige rose, and, the embassy reported, some 363

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National Party members remarked, Allende no longer seems such a bete noire especially when matched against a Christian Democrat alternative. 72 Allende, however, continued to oscillate between adhering to democracy and promoting revolution. On 29 May 1967, Allende announced the formation of the Chilean branch of OLAS, and that he would be available to attend the first OLAS conference in Havana if the Socialist and Communist Parties as ked him to do so. El Mercurio and La Nacin accused Allende of leading a double life, and the Nationals charged that A llendes two roles Senate president and OLAS leader -were incompatible. Criticism of A llende lasted several days, and the U.S. Embassy observed that Allendes roles keep [him] in the limelight and we can be sure this is important to him. When the Chilean chapter of OLAS form ed on 16 June, Socialist Party Secretary General Aniceto Rodrguez became its chair. Allende was named to OLASs central committee but was not designated as a delegate to the OLAS conference in Havana. 73 The formation of OLAS and his promotion and leadership of it began to threaten Allendes Senate presidency. The Christian De mocrat and National Parties moved to try to censure Allende, and the success of either partys effort would have forced Allende to resign as Senate president. The Christian Democrats asse rted that Allende mishandled a bill to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba. The PDC said that the bill should have been declared 72 Airgram A-545 Joint Weeka No. 9, Dungan (Keith Wheelock, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Santiago) to Department of State, 4 March 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; and Telegram 3492, Dungan to Secretary of State, 6 April 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1777; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 73 Airgram A-727 Joint Weeka #22, Dungan to Department of State, 3 June 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; Airgram A-759 Allendes LASO Role Threatening His Senate Presidency?, Dean (Norbury), to Department of State, 10 June 1967, Folder POL 15-2 Chile, Box 1980; and Airgram A-799 Joint Weeka #25, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 24 June 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 364

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unconstitutional because it infringed on President Freis power to conduct foreign relations, but Allende sent the bill to committee, where it as defeated. The National Party moved to censure Allende for OLAS activities. Both moves faile d because the PDC and PN abstained from each others motion, despite Freis s trong pressure on PDC senators to vote for the PNs motion. 74 Allende did not attend the July 1967 OLAS conference in Havana, but the conference continued to focus attention on Allendes dual roles. 75 The delegates reiterated OLASs commitment to armed guerrilla struggle as the m eans of fostering revolution in Latin America, and it further criticized Frei and his Revolution in Liberty. Despite the Soviets threats and intense lobbying against it, OLAS delegates reaffirmed Castros criticism of Socialist countries who aided reformist governments such as Freis. 76 Frei denounced the Chilean OLAS delegates as insolent and treasonous, and he particular ly directed his comments at Senator Carlos Altamirano who, while in Havana, asserted that the struggle must be armed. Imperialism will 74 Airgram A-170 Renewal of Relation with Cuba Rejected, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 4 October 1967, Folder POL Political Affairs and Relations Chile A 1967, Box 1981; and Airgram A-760 Joint Weeka #23, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 10 June 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Airgram A-799 Joint Weeka #25, Dean to Department of State, 24 June 1967. Airgram A48 Joint Weeka #30, Dungan (Sinn) to Department of State, 29 July 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; and Airgram A-54 Frei on LASO and Relations with PDC, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 31 July 1967, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1779; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 75 Among the Chileans attending OLAS were: Senator Carlos Altamirano, Professor Clodomiro Almeyda, and Deputy Jorge Montes of the PS, and Senator Volodia Teitelboim of the PC. Eduardo Labarca Goddard, Chile al Rojo: Reportaje a una revolucin que nace (Santiago: La Sociedad Impresora Horizonte, 1971), 146. 76 Juan Carlos Gomez Leyton, La Rebelda Socialista: El Partido Socialista en la dcada de los sesenta, 1959-1970 Santiago: Facultad Latinoamrica de Ciencias Sociales, 1993), 64. Labarca Goddard, Chile al Rojo 348. Airgram A-85 Joint Weeka #32, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 12 August 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. El Partido Socialista en la Lucha Mundial y Continental por el Socialismo, Punto Final supplement to Number 42, 22 November 1967, p. l0. Jorge G. Castaeda, Compaero: The Life and Death of Ch Guevara (New York: Vintage Press, 1998 [1997]), 383 n 365

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not be defeated by the va pacfica 77 Allende tried to defend the delegates right to criticize the Frei government but his effort was ineffective. When asked by a reporter, Frei said that he considered OLAS a real danger. Although he did not name Alle nde outright, Frei condemned the duality of those in Chile who take refuge in the law but stimulate violence, who proclaim the democratic way but foster illegal methods, who opportunisti cally reject violence in Chile but advocate it in other countries. 78 Allende wanted to run again for the presidency in 1970, but OLAS was becoming increasingly problematic for him. Osvaldo Puccio asserts that A llende first expressed his desire to run again during the PSs part y congress at Chilln in November 1967, but, the U.S. Embassy reported five months earlier (June) that several reliable sources said that Allende believes the Presidency of Chile within his grasp. At the Socialist congress, Allende announced his desire to run for President for a fourth time, and two Ea st German representatives, Werner Kirchhoff and Friedel Trappen, were present when he did so. Allende told the East Germans that the FRAP needed assistance from socialist countries for the 1970 election, but Kirchhoff and Trappen did 77 Gomez, La Rebelda Socialista 66. During an 1989 interview with Patricia Politzer, Carlos Altamirano Orrego said, Neither I nor the leadership of my party wanted or sought violence. None of us were awaiting a disembarkation like that of Fidel in th e Sierra Maestra, for inciting armed st ruggle, that was not our strategy.The armed road was always understood as a form of defense of the process that we would bring forward to change the structures. Patricia Politzer, Altamirano (Santiago: Edicines Melquades, 1990 [1989]), 103. Altamirano is disingenuous. He actively promoted the va armada and perceived himself as part of the vanguard of the Chilean revolution. He believed that the revolution would occur neither with obsolescent par liaments that were paper tigers, nor thro ugh the ballot box, nor by popular demonstrati ons employing peaceful disobedience. Altamirano lionized Guevara, promoted replication of the Cuban Revolution in Chile, and called for striking mortally at the enemy of the people. One ca nnot promote and foster the va armada and then deny responsibility for the subsequent violence. To do so, as Altamirano does, is intellectually dishonest. See Altamirano, El Parlamento, Tigre de Papel, Punto Final supplement to Number 55, 21 May 1968, 1-8, particularly 2, 3, 8; and El Partido Socialista y la Revolucin Chilena, repr inted in Alejandro Cheln Rojas, ed., El proceso Chileno: Pensamiento terico y poltico del Partido Socialista de Chile (Buenos Aires: Editores Quatro, 1974), 73-85, particularly 84-85. 78 Airgram A-54 Frei on LASO and Relations with PDC, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 31 July 1967, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1779; and Airgram A-97 Joint Weeka #33, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 19 August 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 366

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not answer concretely on East German aid. Th e East Germans attendance at Chilln congress did enable the FRAP to consolidate their conn ections with the German Democratic Republic. 79 Conclusion In June 1967, just afte r Freis article in Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ralph Dungan resigned, 80 but during his tenure, the ability of the Un ited States to exert influence in Chile had markedly declined. The Johnson administrati on committed missteps that alienated allies among Christian Democrats. It dema nded that Freis government produce demonstrative results with Alliance for Progress aid, questioned the use of Alliance funds, and in sisted upon restrictive terms for U.S. loans. Against Dungans advice, Johnson pressed Frei to gi ve the United States a special, low price on copper to help curb inflat ionary pressures in the U.S. economy caused by the Vietnam War, but the one-year agreement eff ectively asked Chile to help shoulder the burden of the war. U.S. demands and favors soured Frei and his PDC colleagues on U.S. assistance, prompting Frei to refuse U.S. loans in 1967 and to publish a sharp critique of the Alliance. The Johnson administration, however, may have prevented a greater loss of U.S. influence in Chile through its adherence to the model democracy premise. The model democracy premise led U.S. policymakers to support Frei and his Revolution in Liberty. U.S. officials believed that Freis reforms would strengthen Chilean democracy, undercut support for Allende and the FRAP, and offer an anti-Castro non-Communist path to development. U.S. support of Frei and the PDC motivated both ends of the political spectrum to attack Frei. 79 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 167-168. Airgram A-759, Allendes LASO Role Threatening His Senate Presidency?, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 10 June 1967. 80 Dungan left to serve as New Jerseys Chancellor of Higher Education. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 348. 367

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Allende and the Left accused Frei of stealing the Left s ideas and offering inadequate reforms, the Right opposed Frei and the PDC for enacting reform at all, and both condemned the United States for helping him. Given the alternatives, support of Frei and reform was probably the best, imperfect policy for the Johnson admi nistration, but that policy reduced U.S. influence in Chile. Allende assumed two personae during the peri od, as he and the Chilean Left embraced democracy and revolution. He advocated the de mocratic road for Chile but drawing upon the example of Cuba, he encouraged revolution in other Latin American nations where the democratic road was not possible. The Commun ists and moderate Socialists continued to advocate the va pacfica but the Socialist Party and many young adherents of the Left favored the va armada. Elected as President of the Senate in 1965 and the originator of OLAS, Allende epitomized the King of Spades playing card image that cartoonist Coke had depicted of him. By 1967, Allende expressed his desire to run for President a fourth time. Promoting both the va pacfica and the va armada did bridge the division in the Chil ean Left, but it also made his task of uniting the Left into an electoral coalition mo re difficult. Furthermore, Allendes efforts to project a dual image cast doubt about his commitment to democracy among detractors on the Center and Right and in the United States. 368

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CHAPTER 8 STEPPING BACK, 1967-1969 A New Ambassador When the new U.S. Ambassador, Edward M. Korry, arrived in Santiago in August 1967, he concluded quickly and reluctantly that the over-exposure of U.S. direct intervention [in Chile]had boomeranged to the detriment of th e interests of both [the] Chilean and U.S. Governments. From Korrys perspective, U.S. influence was dwindling, U.S. policy was unraveling, and Chiles Marxist Left was gaining st rength. Korry believed that this predicament had resulted because the United States became too closely identified with President Eduardo Frei Montalva and his Revolution in Liberty reform program. That identification led to accusations of U.S. interference by Chileans Left and Right, eroding support for the United States. 1 Korry sought to rectify the U.S. predicament by stepping back, that is pursuing a limited, observant, behind-the-scenes role. He retreate d from the close ties to the Christian Democrat Party (PDC Partido Demcrata Cristiano) and pulled back from the active, pa rtisan role that the United States had adopted under his predecessor. Whereas Dungan and the administration of President Lyndon Baines Johnson had emphasized ec onomic and social reform so that Chile could serve as multiple models (democratic mode l, Alliance for Progress model, anti-Castro model), Korry concentrated on the model democracy premise and preserving Chiles democracy. In many ways, he reverted to the approach ta ken by Ambassador Claude G. Bowers during the 1 Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968, Folder POL 17 Chile US, Box 1981, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-69, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland, p. 3. Hereafter cited as CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 369

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early Cold War: he sought to neither endorse nor favor any political party or candidate, and he promoted Chile as a model democracy. Korry and U.S. officials, however, also grew anxious about the threat posed by Socialist senator Salvador Allende Gossens. U.S. officials expected Allende to be a presidential candidate in 1970, and believed that he possibly could win if he attained some unity of the Left. This was no easy task because the U.S. embassy recogni zed that the Left was splintering along the va pacfica (peaceful/electoral road to socialism) and va armada (armed road to revolution) divide. Allende, advocating the va pacfica was struggling to gain the pr esidential nomination of his own Socialist Party, which preferred the va armada. Moreover, he and his Communist allies worked to construct the coalition of Leftist parties, Popular Unity (UP -Unidad Popular). As 1970 approached, Allende overcame the obstacles, and his chances for victory improved. Between 1967 and 1969, U.S. officials still a dhered to the model democracy premise that had guided U.S. policy since 1947, but the structure supporting the premise deteriorated. Chiles far Left and far Right abandoned demo cracy and advocated revolution and guerrilla violence (Left) or authoritarianism (Right). Ne arly every political part y in Chile fractured, and the Chilean electorate split into three groups, with the Left and Right polarizing and the Center eroding. The administration of U.S. President Richard M. Nixon adopted a new Latin American policy, one that did not favor democracies, but accep ted governments as they are. The Tacnazo, a sit-in protest led by General Robe rt Viaux Marambio, shook and altered the political and diplomatic terrain on the ev e of the 1970 election, and severely damaged the structure supporting the model democracy premise. Although the Viaux-led group demonstrated for better pay, training, and equipment, the Frei administration mishandled the affair, falsely labelled it a coup detat, and trie d to manipulate it for political advantage. When the dust settled, 370

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the Tacnazo raised doubts about the militarys n on-political orientation, forced the replacement the militarys leadership, created a group of military plo tters, sharpened ideological divisions in the military, disgraced the civilian political lead ership among military officers, and cast Allende as a reasonable alternative for President. U.S. of ficials were bystanders to the affair but shared the opprobrium and blame because the Central Inte lligence Agency (CIA ) made an ill-advised press comment, leading Frei and ot hers to hint that the CIA had links to the Tacnazo. Korry and the Department of State rebuked Frei for the fa lse insinuations, but the unpleasant experience entrenched U.S. officials in Korrys stepping ba ck strategy and led the U.S. embassy to reduce its information-gathering activities and restrain fro m building contacts with the Chilean military. Scholars have given little attention to the three years between Freis 1967 Foreign Affairs article and the start of the 1970 presidential campaign. The lack of scholarly a ttention results from a general political and diplomatic narrativ e that telescopes even ts toward Allendes 1970 victory and presidency. In brief, the narrativ e relates that the Alliance for Progress did not succeed, Freis reforms were inadequate, and Chil eans turned to Allende and socialism in order to achieve social and economic reform. The narra tive also encourages a link between extensive U.S. aid for Frei and the Nixon ad ministrations covert efforts dur ing and after the 1970 election. As a result, the narrative promotes that idea that U.S. policy during the 1960s followed a trajectory of increasing involvement and interference in Chile. 2 2 The two examinations of the period are Jeffrey F. Taffe t, Ph.D. dissertation, Alliance for What?: United States Development Assistance in Chile during the 1960s, Georgetown University, 2001; and Paul Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). For other works, see William F. Sater, The United States and Chile: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990). James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), pp. 19-26. Heraldo Muoz and Carlos Portales, Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp. 32-37. 371

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A close examination of the 1967 to 1969 period finds that three developments challenge the standard narrative. First, the United States due to Korrys steppi ng back strategy reduced its overt role and was less involved in Chile than it had been for several years. Second, Chilean political developments, and Nixons policy for Latin America, damaged the structure upholding the model democracy premise, even as U.S. dipl omatic officials continued to adhere to it. Several Chilean groups abandoned or rejected democracy, and Nixons Latin American policy did not favor democracy. Third, the Tacnazo set the stage for the end and resurrection of the model democracy premise. Dismissing the Tacnazo as a coup attempt obscures the fact that many U.S. actions and Chilean events in 1970 have roots in or were shaped by the Tacnazo. Stepping Back During his first months in Chile, U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry quickly determined that the U.S.-Chilean relationship and the U.S. position in Chile were deteriorating, and he cited four interrelated reasons for the crisis. First, the Unit ed States had cultivated such a close relationship with Frei and his cabinet that th e U.S. Embassy had isolated its effective influence to[a] very small sliver of the political spec trum. Second, the close ties with Frei had led the United States to involuntarily assum[e] responsibility for Frei s reform programs, even if that the United States did not like, support, or control. Third, U.S. favoritism of Frei had produced a love-hate reaction in Chile, which had increased the an ti-U.S. decibel countto an almost intolerable pitch, reduced [U.S.] maneuverab ilityand reinforced a sentiment that somehow the U.S. would Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press for National Security Archive, 2003). 372

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bail out [Chile]. Lastly, the United States was contributing involuntarily to the erasure of that essential political line that separates those w ho believe in democracy from those ready to experiment with authoritarian socialism. Having so committed itself to Frei and his Revolution in Liberty, the United States, in Korrys view, had lost sight of its larger policy goals and encouraged exactly what they had so ught to prevent a stronger FRAP. 3 Korry was, in some ways, similar to Cla ude G. Bowers, who had served as U.S. Ambassador to Chile twenty years earlier. He was a maverick, a political appointee, a skilled writer, and vocal and influential in his opinions. Like Bowers, Korry praised Chiles democracy and compared Chile to the United States and France, not to Latin America. Amid the turbulence, violence, and terrorism of the late 1960s, Korry extolled that Chile is one of the calmer and more decent places on Earth and described the country as the most stable, tested, freest democracy in South America, a democracy of a tota lly different profile than any other country in all of Latin America. Eight-five percent of t hose [Chileans] eligible voted in elections, he pointed out, which is better than in this country [the Un ited States]. He viewed Chilean politics as a reflection of France, but ten years delayed. 4 3 Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968, Folder POL 17 Chile US, Box 1981, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA, p. 3-4. 4 Airgram A-10 When Klatch Means Country (Part I of two parts), Korry to Secretary of State, 2 January 1970; and Airgram A-54 When Klatch Means Country (Part II of two parts), Korry to Secretary of State, 7 January 1970, attached to Airgram A-10, Korry to Secretary of State, 2 January 1970; both Folder Chile Wrap-Up and PostMortem, March 1971, Box 128, National Security Files Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NA. Herefter cited as NSC Files HAK Offi ce Files. Interview of Korry by Williams F. Buckley, Transcript from Firing Line 29 September 1974, reprinted in Francisco Orrego Vicua, ed., Chile: The Balanced View: A Recompilation of Articles about the Allende Years and After (Santiago: Editora Gabriela Mistral, 1975), 292. Telegram 3823, Korry to Ru sk, 29 May 1968, Folder POL 13 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, 11 May 1968, p. 7. 373

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To preserve Chiles model democracy, Korry devised a strategy of stepping back. He sought to extricate the United Stat es from Chiles domestic politic s and take a more hands-off role than his predecessor. He reduced U.S. visi bility in order to help tone down the political rhetoric in Chile, and encouraged El Mercurio to change its tone and it s selection of news items. He urged Centrist and Rightist politicians (includi ng the PDC) to refrain from defining issues as via capitalista versus via no-capitalista, and instead discuss the via de eficiencia (efficient way), which Frei said never loses the electorate Korry also tried to disentangle the United States from its close identification with Frei and the Christian Demo crats, and expand its contacts with other political part ies, including the Marxists and even Allende. In addition, Korry pursued a harder line with Frei and the PD C, prodding them to produce results with their reforms, reawakening Frei to the dangers posed by Communists, and pressing Frei to not accede to Communist demands during strikes. 5 Korrys change of strategy for executing U.S. policy generated little or no opposition from Washington, in part due to the respect and in fluence according him within the Department of State, but also due to timing. In May 1968, th e Johnson administration wa s wrestling with the reverberations of the Tet Offe nsive, Johnson had decided not to seek reelection, and the 1968 U.S. presidential campaign was underway. Second, the U.S. Congress was reviewing U.S. foreign aid and making budget cuts. Combined with the fact that the Alliance for Progress had 5 Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968. 374

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run out of ideological steam, the circumstances made changes in implementing U.S. policy in Latin America acceptable. 6 Abandoning Democracy Salvador Allende, deemed a threat for over a de cade, continued to bolster U.S. officials convictions about his anti-US, pr o-Soviet sympathies. While Presidents Johnson and Frei talked during the 1967 Organization of Am erican States (OAS) meeting in the Uruguayan resort town of Punte del Este, Allende also travelled to Uruguay, where he participated in counter demonstrations and sharply criticized Johnson, th e Alliance for Progress, and the OAS summit. In October 1967, Allende attended the Soviet Unions 50 th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution. U.S. offi cials noted that while in Mosc ow, Allende and Socialist Party Secretary General Aniceto Rodrguez met with A. P. Kirilenko, a full member of the Soviet Communist Partys Presidium, a nd who held what the U.S. Embassy in Moscow considered one of the most powerful and high ranking Party offices in the Soviet Union. Kirilenko praised the flexible tactics of Chiles Communists and the peoples front of Communists and Socialists. 7 6 For the ideological steam comme nt, see Lawrence A. Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 229. Korry proposed revamping the administration of U.S. aid, and the proposal gained significant support in the Nixon administration. See Memorandum Major Feud within State including strong Rogers-Richardson Disagreement on Reform of Foreign Aid, C. Fred Bergsten to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser, 29 January 1970, Folder HAK/Richardson Meetings, Jan 70 Mar 70, Box 338, NSC Files Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NA. 7 Kirilenko published his report in Pravda on 23 November 1965. Airgram A-870 Kirilenkos Report on the Chilean Communist Party Congress, Alexander Akalovsky, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy Moscow (R. F. Rogers), to Department of State, 3 December 1965, Fold er POL 12-3 Meetings and Conferences Chile, Box 2027, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 3 492 Summit, Dungan to Secretary of State, 6 April 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1777; and Airgram A-458 Visit to Uruguay by Salvador Allende, Henry A. Hoyt, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay (H. R. Applebaum), to Department of State, 28 April 1967, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; both CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Alejandro Whitker, ed., Salvador Allende, 1908-1973: Prcer de la 375

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Allende struggled to obtain the nomination fo r his fourth bid for the presidency, but his difficulties with the Left were also becoming problems for the United States. A major source of his difficulties was his own Socialis t Party (PS -Partido Socialista de Chile). During the partys November 1967 congress in Chilln, Allende ur ged fellow Socialists to adhere to the va pacfica and moderate their criticism of the Radical Party, with whom he hoped to build an alliance. Allende was booed and jeered by younger Socialists sympathetic to the Cuban example and the va armada. The congress rejected Allendes proposals, and claimed that inclusion of the Radicals in the FRAP would extraordinarily debi litate the Left. The congress added that the Chilean revolution is indissolubly linked to the Latin American revolution (i.e. the Cuban Revolution), and that [r]e volutionary violence is in evitable and legitimate. 8 Allende and the PS disagreed on strategy ag ain during a Senate by-election in the provinces of Bo-Bo, Malleco, and Cautn. The PS voted to abst ain from the by-election rather than endorse Radical Party candi date Alberto Baltra Corts. Allende, however, sent a letter endorsing his friend Baltra and saying that he h oped that he and Baltra could march together in future campaigns. PS Secretary General Anic eto Rodrguez said that Allende was given a little tweak of the ears for his lack of party discipline, but polit ical observers were in almost liberacin nacional (Mxico: Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico, 1980), 437. Jos G. Martnez Fernndez, Allende: Su vida, su pensamiento poltico (Santiago: Ediciones Palabra Escrita, 1988), 25. 8 Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile II: 127-142. The quotes are on pp. 128, 135, and 130. Airgram A-292 Socialist Party Congress November 1967 Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 16 December 1967, Folder POL 12-1 Chile, Box; and Telegram 1598 Socialist Party Congress, Korry to Secretary of State, 28 November 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile, Box 1777; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 376

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unanimous agreement that Socialist voters went for Baltra, ensuring his victory. Allendes letter also indicated that the Socialist rank and file still supported the va pacfica 9 A split in the Socialist Party added to Allende s difficulties. A gr oup led by Senator Raul Ampuero staged a walkout during a June 1967 part y meeting. Ampuero charged that PS leaders denied freedom of expression to party members and served Allende s presidential appetites. Ampueros group formed the Unin Socialista P opular (USP Popular Socialist Union) and included Deputy Oscar Naranjo Arias, whose 1964 by-election victory had torpedoed Julio Durns candidacy and led the Johnson admini stration to support Frei so extensively. 10 The walkout frustrated Allende, who wrote in a letter to Ampuero, Never, over the years, have I succeeded in establishing with you a human bond which would permit me to form for myself a clear opinion on the mainsprings of your personality. Ampuero, however, charged that the PS has preferred to immerse itself into the Commu nist universe, and had fallen victim to the romance of Cubas Revolution, guerrilla fighters, and the va armada The party, he wrote, encouraged a false choice between electoral re formism and the dismissal of all legal forms of struggle, between guerrilla upr ising and complete capitulation. Simultaneous pursuit of the 9 Airgram A-308 Allende and the Socialists in the Baltra Victory Aftermath, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 30 December 1967, Folder POL 12-1 Chile, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 10 Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile II: 123. Jaime Surez Bastidas, Allende: Visin de un militante (Santiago: Editorial Jurdica ConoSur, 1992), 112-113. Airgram A-807 Joint Weeka #26, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 1 July 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For formation of the Unin Socialista Po pular (USP), see Airgram A-98 Ampue ro Forms a New Partido Socialista Popular, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 19 August 1967; and Airgram A-204 Popular Socialist Party Takes Shape, Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile (Norbury), to Department of State, 25 October 1967; both, Folder POL 12 Chile, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59 NA. The USP began as the Popular Socialist Party, but by the 1969 Congressional elections, it had altered its name to the Popular Socialist Union. See Airgram A-546 Popular Socialist Union (USP) Takes Legal Form, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 20 April 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 377

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va pacfica and the va armada, Ampuero warned, threatened to destroy both, as well as the party. 11 Ampuero was correct; some Socialist leader s were pushing a choice upon the PS and the Left, namely, to abandon democratic politics and commit to the revolutionary guerrilla struggle. One was Allendes protg, Senator Carlos Al tamirano Orrego. Upon Altamiranos return from the 1967 OLAS Conference in Havana, the Frei administration arrested him and charged him with advocating violence and insulting the Presid ent and the Armed Forces. During his several months in jail, Altamirano penned an essay in which he accused Congres of being a paper tiger, declared that electoral politics were bankrupt, and praised the insu rrectional struggle of the masses and the forthcoming revolution. He reiterated those points at a Socialist rally upon his release from prison, words which U.S. of ficials admitted courted another prison term. 12 Leftist groups like the Revolut ionary Left Movement (MIR -Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario) and the Revolu tionary Marxist Vanguard (VRM Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista) employed guerrilla violen ce ostensibly to bring forth revolution. MIR set up a weekend guerrilla training camp outside the city of Concepcin, and the VRM engaged in several robberies and claimed several attacks involving Molotov cocktails. Allende had particular 11 Airgram A-98 Ampuero Forms a New Partido Socialista Po pular, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 19 August 1967. Raul Ampuero Daz, La Izquierda en punto muerto (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1969), 183-188. 12 Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics, 34. Airgram A-143 Joint Weeka #37, Dean (Sinn) to Department of State, 16 September 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Altamirano, El Parliamento Tigre de Papel, Punto Final Supplement to Number 55, 21 May 1968, p. 1-8. Quotes appear on pp. 5, 8. In a 12 May speech, after a trip to Cuba, Altamirano said, conditions are right for carrying forward the armed struggle in Chile, but admitting that institutional and constitutional reasons make it more difficult here than in other countries. The speech started the case against Altamirano. See El Mercurio 13? May 1967; La Nacin 13? May 1967, p. xxx; and Airgram A-694 Socialist Senator Altamirano Speaks on Cuba and Revolution, Dungan (Norbury) to Department of State, 20 May 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Ai rgram A-620 Altamirano Defiant Again as He Leaves Prison, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 29 May 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 378

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affection for Miguel Enrquez Espinoza, MIR s leader, and they ta lked long and often. Allendes nephew Andres Gaston Allende (son of sister Laura) was a member of MIR. Gaston said that Allende would not participate in their ideology, but nor would he betray his nephew. 13 The abandonment of democracy and embrace of violence by MIR, VRM, Altamirano, and other PS leaders turned a largely theoretical debate over the va pacfica and va armada into a counterinsurgency/terrorism issue for the Unite d States. During an eight-week period in 1967, the U.S. Embassy chronicled 13 incidents against U.S. personnel: 8 inst ances involving Molotov cocktails, 1 bombing, and 1 unexploded bomb with a timer. Several Mol otov cocktail attacks against U.S. installations were linked to VRM, but harder to determine were the perpetrators of other incidents, such as a terror ist attack on the U.S. Army Attachs residence and the bombings of the U.S. Consulate in Santiago and the U.S. Binati onal Center in Rancagua. 14 As violence escalated, not only did the U.S. Embassy grow concerned about security, but also Chileans criticized the emer ging climate of violence. Emba ssy officers reported that the 13 Osvaldo Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende: Recuerdos de su secretario privado (Santiago: Editorial Emisin, 1985), 171-173. Vial and Cerda, Part 2: Allend e: Los primeros renuncios a una tradicin impecable, special supplement to La Segunda 8 August 2003, 17-18. Airgram A-59 Gover nment Reacts to Calls for Subversive Violence, Moskowitz[?] (Winder, Moskowitz) to Department of State, 2 August 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 14 For incident numbers, see Appendix Recent Incidents of Violence against American Personnel and Property in Chile, enclosed Airgram A-59 Gov ernment Reacts to Calls for Subversi ve Violence, Moskowitz[?] (Winder, Moskowitz) to Department of State, 2 August 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980; and Airgram A-143 Joint Weeka #37, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 16 September 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Telegram 2725 More Violence and Reactions, Korry to Secretary of State, 24 June 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For bombing of U.S. Consulate and Binational Center, see Telegram 39, Terrorism Act Against Army Attach Residence, Ralph A. Dungan, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, to Secretary of State, 5 July 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980; and Airgram A-473 The Bomb Explosion at the American Consulate in Santiago, Chile, Robert W. Dean, Deputy Chief of Mission (M. Martinez), to Department of State, 16 March 1968, POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG9, NA. 379

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Chilean press heavily played the climate of violence theme. When one Socialist leader rebuked cowards and pseudo-revoluti onaries of the Left for res ponding to the siren song of electoral opportunism instead of the calls to revolution, the PCCh daily El Siglo published a front-page denunciation of Leftists who elev ated bank robbers to popular heroes. El Siglo declared that the masses would never accept the id ea that the road to revolution will be opened by armed robbery. MIRs Concepcin training school and its links to the Socialist Party and the Cuban Cultural Institute worried Carabinero and government officials, who deemed the camps existence and rather dangerous degree [of] prepar ation as a matter of great seriousness for Chiles internal security. The fact that 111 Chileans had trave lled to Cuba between 1 January 1966 and 30 June 1967 did little to alleviate such c oncerns. The rise in violence led Frei and his National Security Council to cr eate a permanent committee to control and counter subversive movements, foreign agents, and inte rnal security threats. U.S. officials quickly concluded that any guerrilla movement would be noticed, reported, and quelled by Chiles security forces. 15 It was not just the far Left that abandoned democracy; the rightist National Party (PN -Partido Nacional) did so as well. On 15 August 1967, the PN issued a statement that accused the Frei administration of fost ering the Third Anarchy. 16 The PN alleged that Freis government 15 Telegram 3783 Socialist Invective Maintains Climate of Violence, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 2 September 1969; Telegram 2725, More Violence and Reactions, Korry to Secretary of State, 24 June 1969; and Airgram A-28 Internal Security Alertness to Potential Insurgency, Dungan (R. Bryant, A. Widemeyer, and Colonel Paul Wimert, U.S. Army Attach) to Department of State, 19 July 1967, p. 8-9; all Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG9, NA. 16 According to the PN, the First Anarchy occurred from 1823 to 1830 after Bernardo OHigginss rule, and the Second Anarchy occurred during Arturo Alessandris presidency (1920-1925). Regimes of authority supposedly restored order in both cases, Diego Portales in 1830 and General Carlos Ibez del Campo in 1927. For Portales, see Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46-69; Collier, From Independence to the War of the Pacific, Chile: Since Independence Leslie Bethell, ed., 2-7; and Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, El peso de la noche: Nuestra frgil fortaleza histrica (Santiago: Planta/Ariel, 1997). For Ib ez, see Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of 380

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had impose[d] precipitate reforms and negl ected its duty to maintain civil order, as demonstrated by the climate of violence. Only a regime of authority and an economic policy geared toward free markets and free enterprise said the PN, would r ectify Chiles socialeconomic crisis. Frei was highly incensed when Nationals contacted the military, made overtures for his ouster, and even once offere d money. The PN repeated its call for an authoritarian regime two weeks later in its 30 Au gust statement, which charged that Frei had neglected the military and defense of Chiles borders (references to Chilean-Argentine tensions over Palena and the Beagle Channel). The Frei government blew its stack, the U.S. embassy wrote, and jailed the PNs executive board for se dition. Embassy officers reported that Chileans (and the embassy, although it did not say so explicitly ) were still blinking in disbelief that Frei had jailed members of the upper class, but all f ound the spectacle of the blue-bloods behind bars amusing or even gratifying. 17 After the PN executive board was released from jail, the Right struck back, but split. A diatribe titled Frei, the Chilean Kerensky appeared. Written by Favio Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, a Brazilian lawyer with ties to Chilean ultra-ri ght elements, the work a ccused Frei of leading Chile into the hands of the Communists. The n, a few weeks later, in December 1967, the hardthe Armed Forces (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970); and Sofa Correa Sutil, Consuelo Figueroa Garavagno, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, Claudio Rolle Cruz, and Manuel Vicua Urrutia, Historia del siglo XX chileno: Balance paradojal (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2001), 89-107. 17 Translation of Political Declaration (Voto Poltico) of National Party, 15 August 1967; and Translation of Declaration of National Party, 30 August 1967; both enclosed with Airgram A-14 4 Arrest and Acquittal of National Party Leaders, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 16 September 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2 of 2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Telegram 683, Dean to Secretary of State, 2 September 1967, Folder POL 12-1 Chile, Box 1778, C FPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Airgram A144 Arrest and Acquittal of National Party Leaders, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 16 September 1967. Telegram 640 Jailing of National Party Leaders, Dean to Secretary of State, 1 September 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2 of 2], Box 1980; and Airgram A-126 Joint Weeka #35, Dean to Department of State, 2 September 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 381

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line, authoritarian faction le d by Jorge Prat broke from the National Party. One PN member told U.S. officials that Prat tried to insert a resolution calling for a corporate state in the 15 August declaration a reference to Getulio Vargas authoritarian Estado Novo in Brazil during World War II. PN leaders deci ded against it, leadi ng to the departure of Prat and his group. 18 The parallel abandonment of democracy by the So cialists and Nationals struck at the base of the U.S. model-democracy premise and Allendes va pacfica The Nationals and Socialists inverted the rhetorical and symbolic terrain. They rejected European comparisons and cast their visions for Chile as distinctly Latin Am erican. The U.S. model-democracy premise, Allendes va pacfica even Freis Revolution in Li berty, were premised on Chilean exceptionalism: that Chile was was inherently de mocratic, more European than Latin American, and had advanced beyond caudillos and totalitarians. However, the Socialists hailed Castros revolution and Guevaras va armada as organic Latin American developments, and the Nationals resurrected nostalgic images of caudillos and authoritarians. Both parties promoted their organic Latin American alternatives (Marxist socialism, and Chicago School neoliberalism respectively) overlooked that their alternatives were also imported. The Socialists decried foreign investment and North American imperialism; the Right decried the PDCs links to European Christian Democratic parties a nd the Lefts ties to Moscow and Havana. 19 18 Airgram A-226 Government Link Right Wing to Scurrilous Anti-Frei Book from Abroad, Korry (Wheelock) to Department of State, 8 N ovember 1967, Folder POL Chile, Box 1776 CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Favio Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, Frei: El Kerensky chileno (Santiago: 1967). A book resurrecting the same title and accusations appeared after the 1973 coup. See Gerardo Larran, Frei, el Kerensky chileno, frente a frente (Santiago: 1976). Airgram A-277 Dissension in the Natio nal Party, Korry (Norbury) to Depa rtment of State, 9 December 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/67, BOX 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Airg ram A-144 Arrest and Acquittal of National Party Leaders, 16 September 1967. 19 The Nationals vision may not have been the neo-liberalism articulated by Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys, but the Chicago School was already exerting an influence upon the economic thought of the Right. See Juan 382

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A Guayabera for Guevara The Bolivian Armys Second Ranger Battalion captured and executed Ernesto Ch Guevara de la Serna on 9 Oct ober 1967 in the southeast Bolivia n town of Higueras, and when Allende heard the news of Guevar as death, he suffered a severe blow. He contacted Bolivian President General Ren Barrien tos Ortuo and requested Guevar as body, but the request was denied. Guevara had clandestinely entered Bo livia under a false passport for the purpose of fostering a guerrilla movement in the Andean nation and later promoting it to neighboring Peru, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. 20 Guevara and Fidel Castro exempted Chile from their plans because, Castro told Altamirano, the c onditions in Chile were not ready for a guerrilla movement, yet, it may also have been that Ca stro and Guevara did not want to hinder Allendes va pacfica Allende was in Havana in July 1966 when Guevara returned from the Congo (during the uproar over Allendes agreement with Castros criticism of Frei), but whether Allende knew of Castro and Guevaras plans to e xport revolution is not clear. Guevara did note that not all national contexts required the revolutionary path, and he acknowledged that Gabriel Valds, Pinochets Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 162-217.For the Nationals linking the Christian Democrats and the Marxist Left to extra-continental movements, see Declaration of the National Party, 30 August 1967. 20 Memorandum Ch Guevara, Rostow to President Johnson, 14 October 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico (Washington: USGPO, 2004), p. 386. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: page. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 170. Memorandum Statement by Ernesto Ch Guevara Prior to his Executio n in Bolivia, Richard M. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence (William V. Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphe re Division, and [classified]) to Rusk, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Rostow, and Covey T. O liver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 13 October 1967, FRUS 1964-68 XXXI: 383-385. Castaeda, Compaero, 348-349. 383

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Allendes strategy was not his. In autographing a copy of hi s book for Allende, the guerrilla leader wrote, To Salvador Allende, who is trying to obtain the same result by other means. 21 Four months after Guevaras death (20 Februa ry 1968), the remnant of Guevaras band of guerrillas crossed the border from Bolivia into Chile, and Allende assisted them and burnished his revolutionary credentials. He sent journalist Elmo Cataln, head of the Chilean branch of the Cuban National Liberation Army, to find them, but an El Mercurio reporter found the three Cuban guerrillas first. Allende travelled to the northern port city of Iquique, met the guerrillas, and asked Freis government to bring them to Sa ntiago. The Carabineros brought the Cubans to Santiago on 22 February, and Alle nde visited them again. The Frei administration expelled them the next day and, on 24 February, placed them on a special early morning flight to Easter Island and Tahiti. From Tahiti, the Cuban guerrillas coul d board a French plane to Paris and then Cuba. Furious about the guerrillas expulsion, Allende took the next flight to Ea ster Island, caught up with them, and accompanied them to Tahiti. Allende said that the Cuban government had asked him to so, but Allende also expressed fears that the CIA might capture the guerrillas. When he deplaned in Tahiti, Allende wore a guayabera shirt to demonstrate his solidarity with the revolutionaries and Guevaras vision. 22 21 Vial and Cerda, Part 2: Allende: Los prim eros renuncios a una tradicin impecable, La Segunda supplement, 8 August 2003, 13-14. Airgram A-694 Socialist Senator Altamirano Speaks on Cuba and Revolution, Dungan (Norbury) to Department of State, 20 May 1967, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/67, Folder 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Ernesto Ch Guevara de la Serna, Guerrilla Warfare with Introduction and Case Studies by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [1960]), 48. Rgis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Vintage Press, 1971), 74. For Fidel Castros effort to export revolution to other countries, see Jorge Domnguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution (New York: Princeton University Press, 198xx). For Guevaras ef forts in the Congo, see Piero Gliejeses, Conflicting Missions: 22 Due to boycotts against Cuba, many Latin American countries did not have flights to Havana and might have arrested the guerrillas. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 170. Vial and Cerda, Par t 2: Allende: Los primeros renuncios a una tradicin imp ecable, special supplement to La Segunda 8 August 2003, 20-21. Telegram 2811, Dean to Secretary of State, 13 Marc h 1968, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; and Telegram 2699 Allende Visits 384

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Allende returned to a storm of protest in Chile. The Nationals and Christian Democrats castigated him for his dual roles as leader of a democratic body and leader of an organization that promoted revolution (OLAS). One PDC senator accu sed Allende of tropicalism and of being a parlor revolutionary who will not go near an ac tual guerrilla operation but solidarizes with [the] guerillas after [the] fighting is ove r. Allende defended himself sayi ng that he had acted only in his capacity as a senator, not as Senate presiden t. National Senator Fran cisco Bulnes Sanfuentes ridiculed that defense, saying that Allende co uld no more dissociate his activities from his office than President Frei could have if he had chosen to escort the guerrillas. 23 The Prague Spring gave Allende a chance to redeem himself as defender of democracy, but he used Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia to criticize the United States. In 1968, the Czechoslovak government under Alexander Dub ek enacted economic and legal reforms, ended censorship, curbed the secret poli ce, and removed Stalinists from power. Prague Spring, as the liberalization was dubbed, ended when Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev sent Warsaw Pact troops into Prague in August 1968 in order to exert Soviet control. 24 Chileans held turbulent protests at the Soviet embassy and damaged the building. Speaking in the Senate, Allende declared: we energetically condemn the armed intervention of the signa tories of the Warsaw Easter Island, Korry to Secretary of State, 4 March 19 68, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1779; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Assistant Director of Chiles Investigaciones Eduardo Zuiga Pacheco, also accompanied the guerrillas to Tahiti. See Airgram A-479 Sleuth Zuiga, or How I Learned to Love the Guerrillas, Dean (Norbury) to Department of State, 20 March 1968, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/2/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 23 Telegram 2811, Dean to Secretary of State, 13 March 1968. 24 Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 16-37. For the John son administrations response, see Thomas Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe : In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 213-220; and H. W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 118-119. 385

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Pact in Czechoslovakia. He accused his Sena te colleagues of harboring a double standard toward the Soviet Union: [T]hose who today rejoice at what is happening in the Socialist camp, shut up when the Bay of Pigs, Santo Domingo, and Guatemala occurred. When had his colleagues condemned the U.S. base at Guantna mo, he asked, which represents violation and shame, [and] where daily is sought the mean s of creating conflicts provoking, killing, and assassinating. Allende basica lly charged that U.S. actions were worse than the Soviets. 25 Nixon and Latin America Although Korry initially took a harder line with Frei, he soon revers ed course and lobbied on Chiles behalf. He did press th e Chileans to produce tangible results or, at least, adhere to the terms of grants and loans. The U.S. Congress, facing rising inflation in the United States, cut foreign aid. Inflation in Chile also rose sh arply in 1968, and Frei struggled to balance his governments budget. Korry urged the Department of State to give Chiles aid requests priority consideration. He warned that if more U.S. ai d did not materialize, Fr ei would nationalize the U.S.-owned copper mines. The loans did not app ear, and Frei renegotiated new agreements with the U.S. copper companies, essentiall y nationalizing the copper mines in 1969. 26 25 Speech in the Senate Checoslovaquia: libre determinacin y socialismo, Allende, 21 August 1968, in Salvador Allende en el umbral del siglo XXI (Mxico: Plaza y Jans, 1998), Frid a Modak, ed., 47-5 1. Airgram A-838 Czechoslovakia and Chilean Politics, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 7 September 1968, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 26 Letter, Korry to Frei, 20 February 1968; Letter, Korry to Frei, 1 August 1968; Letter, Frei to Korry, 20 August 1968; all File Korry, Edward, Box Correspondencia Nacional, Personalidades A Z, CC. 1.2, Fundacin Eduardo Frei Montalva, Santiago, Chile. Telegram 3004, Korry to Secretary of State, 27 March 1968, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 11/1/68, Box 1779, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Taffet, Alliance for What?, pp. 356-374, 379-415. 386

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Korry did achieve some success with his stepping back strategy. He reduced the U.S. public profile in Chile, as articles publicizing Alliance for Progress achievements faded from Chilean newspapers. With Department of Stat e support, Korry worked behind the scenes to press the Frei administration and U.S. companies to reduce sources of anti-U.S. sentiment. For example, when Frei renegotiated Chiles comp acts with U.S. copper companies in 1969, Korry pressed Anaconda and Kennecott to be amenable to Freis proposals. 27 Under Korry, embassy officers expanded their political contacts on the Left and Right. 28 The embassy continued to 27 On reducing the embassys public profile, see Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968, p. 2. On reducing ne wspaper coverage, see Taffet, Alliance for What? p. 341. For Korrys efforts, see Telegram 156642, Rusk (P. F. Mo rris, ARA, and Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,) to Korry, 1 May 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 19671969, RG59, NA. Taffet, Alliance for What?, p. 348. On Korry pressuring Anaconda, see Taffet, Alliance for What?, pp. 403-406. For Korry working with Frei, governme nt officials, and Chilean political leaders, see Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968, pp. 6-7, 9-13. Memorandum of Conversation, Fitting the President for Pants, 3 January 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-327 Enclosing Memorandum of Conversation Fitting the Presid ent for Pants, Korry to Department of State, 10 January 1968; and Telegram 6029 The President Wears Pa nts, Korry to Secretary of State, 9 November 1968; both Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US, Box 1981, CFPF 1967 -69, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation PN Public Relations, Norbury, 29 April 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-564 Ambassadors Meeting with National Party Leaders, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 4 May 1968, Folder POL 12-1 Chile, Box 1778; Memorandum of Conversation, Norbury, 21 February 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-435 Ambassador Korrys Meeting with Senator Pedro Ibez, Korry (Norbury) to Department of State, 24 February 1968, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US, Box 1981; and Memorandum of Conversation Turkey Talk, Townsend B. Friedman, 13 May 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-608 Memorandum of Conversation [with Rafael Tarud], Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 18 May 1968, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 28 Memorandum of Conversation The Rebeldes and the Communists, 29 March 1968, enclosed with Airgram A508 PDC Rebeldes and the Communists: Where There is Love Need There be Marriage?, Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 3 April 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777; Memorandum of Conversation Tarud for President, 24 October 1968, enclosed with Airgram A-959 Conversation with Senator Tarud, Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 6 November 1968, Folder POL 14 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1778; Telegram 5037 Politiquieria, Korry to Secr etary of State, 21 August 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777; and Memorandum of Conversation, PN Parliamentarians and PN Leaders, 31 March 1969, enclosed with Airgram A119 Memo of Conversation with PN Parliamentarians and PN Leaders, Korry (A. Fernandez) to Department of State, 17 April 1969, Folder Political Affairs and Rela tions Chile-US, Box 1981; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation PN Public Relations, Norbury, 29 April 1968. 387

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identify and develop relations with up and coming political leaders. Embassy political officers also travelled more extensively in Chile to gauge political developments in Chile. 29 The U.S. embassy began a dialogue with Allend e, the first such effort since Ambassador Claude Bowerss tenure nearly twenty years earlier Preparing for a trip to the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, Allende expressed reci procal interest in a dialogue. He told Joseph E. Karkashian, the embassys political counselor, We should not allow our doctrinaire convictions to get in the way of practical politics. I need to know [the] U[nited] S[tates] better, and you need to know me better. Regarding the 1970 presidential election, Allende said that he not going to salute [the] flag or make other gallant but losing gestures. He intended to win, and he would only run if there was a broad unity of popular forces: Socialists, Communists, Radicals, as we ll as some Christian Democrats. Allende asked whether the United States would change its poli cy toward Cuba, and Karkashian said no, not unless Castro stopped trying to export revoluti on. Allende replied th at this was not insurmountable. Cuba should be brought back into the hemispheric family, he said, and resolution of the problem would be [a] political coup for President Nixon, whom Allende believed to be genuinely interested in im proving US relations with L[atin] A[merica]. 30 29 Airgram A-279 Identifying and Building Influential Re lationships with Future Leaders, Harry W. Shlaudeman (Friedman) to Department of State, 28 August 1969, Folder POL 6 Chile, Box 1776; Airgram A-64 Pre-Election Field Trip: Magallanes Province, Karkashian to Department of State, 26 February 1969, Folder POL 18 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980; and Airgram A-62, Pre-Election Notes on Three Southern Provinces, Norbury to Department of State, 22 February 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 1/1/69, Box 1778; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 30 Telegram 8583, Dialogue with Senator Allende, Korry to Secretary of State, 16 April 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777; and Telegram 1449 PCCh Pressures PS, Korry to Secretary of State, 14 April 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69, Box 1 778; both CFPF 1967-196 9, RG59, NA. 388

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Allende misjudged Nixons foreign policy prio rities, in part, because Nixon sent mixed signals. Nixon initially indi cated that he gave Latin America priority status. On his first day in the White House (20 January 1969), Nixon asked Ne lson A. Rockefeller, the Governor of New York, to head a mission to Latin America. Ni xon essentially repeated Dwight D. Eisenhowers tactic of sending a special re presentative to the region on a mission to develop policy recommendations. Due to pressing matters, Ro ckefeller delayed the trip until after the New York state legislature had adjourne d. He also divided the trip into four smaller trips so that he could fulfill his duties as governor. 31 The Chileans tried to cultivate favor with the new U.S. president, but Nixon rebuffed their attempts. Just before Nixons inauguration, they proposed that Frei come to Washington for an official visit, and Frei said he was ready to go at any time at [the] convenience to President Nixon. The Chileans wanted Frei to be the first Latin American leader to visit the new president; moreover, such a visit would sym bolically reassert U.S. support and preference for democracy and reform, and substantiate the Nixon administrations claim that Latin America was a priority. During his first week in office, however, Nixon crossed Freis name off the visitors list, with the White House saying that Nixon did not like the PD C or Frei (they were viewed as Kennedy and Johnson favorites). As Ni xon set his foreign policy priorities elsewhere, 31 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 200. Letter, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, to Nixon, 30 August 1969, reprinted in Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americ as: The Official Report of a Un ited States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 5-6. Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association, Nixon, 31 October 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington: USGPO, 1971), 893-901. Hereafter cited as PPP: Nixon 1969 389

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notably Vietnam, Communist Ch ina, and the Soviet Union, 32 Chiles Ambassador to the United States, Domingo Santa Mar a Santa Cruz, lamented that Nixon p ractically has not defined his Latin American policy. Frei was dismayed, telling Korry that the days when Chile counted for something in Washington were gone. Frei also described National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger as percent European in his outlook, and given affairs in Europe, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Asia, Nixon did not have even a moment to think of a place such as Chile. 33 Nixons rebuff of Frei was repaid when Frei cancelled Rockefellers visit to Chile. Chilean officials made clear that they deemed Rockefellers mission as having little purpose. Anti-American sentiment was also very strong in Chile, and Frei told Korry that a visit by Rockefeller would generate possibly the larges t anti-US demonstrations in years and turn Santiago into an armed camp. As the U.S. embassy explained to Washington, the Frei administration basically said that not one dead Chilean is worth the visit. 34 32 Telegram 6571 Frei Visit to US, Korry to Secretary of State, 30 Decem ber 1968, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Joaqun Fermandois and Arturo Fontaine Talavera, El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP [Centro de Estudios Pblicos], Estudios Pblicos 72 (Spring 1998): 30, http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_1/autor_1073.html. See Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 145-181; Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 274-304; and Jeffrey Kimball, Nixons Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 33 Telegram 1208 Ambassador Santa Mara on US Latin Policy, Korry to Secretary of State, 27 March 1969, Folder POL 17 Chile-US, Box 1981; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Letter, Frei to Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, 12 March 1969, enclosed with Arnold Nachmanoff (NSC) to Kissinger, 7 April 1969, Folder [Ex] CO 1-9 South America, Beginning 9/11/69, Box 7, Country Files Latin America, White House Central Files Subject Files, NPMP. Hereafter, ctied as WHCF-Subject Files. Telegram 1160 Conversation with Frei (HQ Foreign Policy), Korry to Secretary of State, 25 March 1969, Folder POL 1 Chile-US, Box 1981, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 34 Telegram 2299 GOC Cancels Rockefeller Visit, Korry to Secretary of State, 4 June 1969, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1779; and Telegram 2200 Frei Commen ts on Politics, Korry to Secretary of State, 29 May 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Freis decision had wide support in the Chilean press, see Telegram 2337 Reaction to Cancellatio n Rockefeller Visit, Korry to Cannon, U.S. Mission at the United Nations, 5 June 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Foreign Minister Vldes met with Rockefeller fo r an hour and one-half when he travelled to New York in June 1969, and the according to Valdes, the governor was v ery understanding of why the Chileans cancelled his visit. See Telegram 390

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Political Skill and a Little Luck By 1969, Korry, embassy officers, and Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) officials worried that Allende might win Chiles 1970 presid ential election. U.S. officials anticipated a three-way race between Left, Right, and the Chris tian Democrats, with Salvador Allende, Jorge Alessandri Rodrguez, and Radomiro Tomic Romero as the respective candidates. Christian Democrats admitted that if they did not ally wi th other political parties, their candidate would eat dust. The U.S. embassy believed that if the Left could unify, Allende could win. Yet, whoever won the 1970 election would be a minority president, would face difficulties with Congress, and could not expect an easy or secure regime. One embassy officer predicted that Chile could face a constitutional cr isis of major proportions after the election, and that groups would engage in extra-constitutional moves that could alter Chiles democratic processes. 35 The March 1969 Congressional elec tions presented the United States with an opportunity to reduce Allendes chances of victory in 1970. Allende chose to run for reelection in the newly created Tenth Agrupacin (Chiles Congress had split the Ninth Agrupacin), a region which included the southern provinces of Aysn and Magallanes and th e island of Chilo. Some 094732 Valdes Visit, Rogers (Frederick L. Chapin, Count ry Director-Bolivia/Chile) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 11 June 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, C FPF 1967-69, RG59, NA; and Telegram 2299, Korry to Secretary of State, 4 June 1969. Despite the Chileans cancellation, Rockefeller still vi sited 20 countries in Latin America. See Rockefeller to Nixon, 31 August 1969, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas 8. 35 Airgram A-420 The Presidenciables : A Glimpse of 1970 Seen Through a Glass Darkly, Korry (Sinn and Dean) to Department of State, 17 February 1968, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 11/1/68; and Airgram A-280 The Presidential Election Procedure, Shlaudeman (Wheelock) to Department of State, 1 September 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/69; both Box 1779, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Telegram 10 When Klatch Means Country, Korry to Secretary of State, 2 January 1970, Folder Chile Wrap-Up and Post-Mortem, March 1971, Box 128, NSC Files Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, NPMP. Airgram A-283 The Chilean Situation: A Personal Assessment, Shlaudeman (Wheelock) to Department of State, 1 September 1969, Folder -POL 2 Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 196769, NA; and Telegram 3021 Presidential Sweepstakes: Handicappers Horror, Korry to Secretary of State, 15 July 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/69, Box 1779; both CFPF 1967-69, NA. 391

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Chileans deemed the decision audacious becaus e Allende would compete against Senator Ral Ampuero, leader of the Popular Socialist Unio n (USP Union Socialista Popular), who had promised to eliminate Allende as a political force. Allende wanted to teach Ampuero a lesson for splitting the party, but he also believed that a victory would consolidate the PSs position as the stronger of the two Socialist parties and would strengthen Allendes influence within the PS and the FRAP. A defeat, however, would torp edo Allendes hopes for a fourth nomination. Magallanes province had long b een a Socialist stronghold and A llende had the support of the mayor of Punta Arenas, but the citys two othe r aldermen supported Ampuero. Also, the island of Chilo was Ampueros home province. Furtherm ore, the PDC hoped to win a Senate seat in the new agrupacin with their candidate Juan Hamilton, who was consider ed the partys best, most attractive candidate in the elections. Pres ident Frei even campaigned in the far South for Hamilton as part of a trip to Antarctica. 36 To hurt Allendes reelection bid, Korry a nd CIA chief Henry Heckscher proposed a covert plan to influence severa l Congressional races. Since the Ch ilean Congress elected in 1969 would serve until 1972, the plan sought to assist enough non-FRAP candidates to create a a large non-FRAP bloc that would serve as a brake in Congress in case Allende won a plurality in the 36 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 177, 178. Ricardo Cruz-Coke Madrid, Geografa Electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacfico, 1952), 84. For Ampue ros comment, See Airgram A713 Leftists Squabble over Electoral Pact; Split Widens, Korry (Sinn) to Department of State, 10 July 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Telegram 249 President Frei Plans Trip to Southern Provinces and Antarctica, Korry to Secretar y of State, 21 January 1969. For Hamilton, see Telegram 249 President Frei Plans Trip to Southern Provinces and Antarctica, Korry to Secretary of State, 21 January 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777; and Telegram 976 Elections Again, Korry to Secretary of State, 13 March 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 3/1/69, Box 1778; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 392

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1970 election. The National Security Councils (NSCs) 303 Committee approved the plan in July 1968 and authorized $350,000 for it, but the embassy onl y spent about $200,000. 37 The covert plan consisted of two component s. The first component gave support to 12 select, moderate, anti-FRAP candidates. Of roughly $200,000 spent, approximately $50,000 was passed directly to candidates ( not through the political parties) although the candidates may not have known the actual source. The rema inder, approximately $150,000, was spent on propaganda that sought to create a more favorable climate for moderate candidates. Here too, many candidates may not have known that they were beneficiaries of U.S. support. The second component was support for USP candidates, which probably included Ampuero. As an effort to divide Socialist ranks further, the plan funded the USP, which would explain why Korry blew a hypothetical bubble to Frei that Allende might not receive the first majority in the Tenth Agrupacin, an idea that Fr ei dismissed out of hand. 38 Allende campaigned extensively, and likely through his efforts, the Communist and Socialist Parties joined in an electoral pact for the Ninth and Tenth Agrupacin races, even 37 Memorandum Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election, CIA, 14 March 1969, enclosed with Memorandum The Chilean Congressional El ection, CIA, 3 April 1969, Tranche III, NSC Collection, Chile Declassification Project, http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/NSC.asp. Hereafter cited Chile Declass NSC III. Memorandum Summary of Chilean Congressional Elec tion Operation, William V. Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, to Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans, 4 March 1969, Tranche III, CIA Collection, Chile Declassification Project, http://foia.stat e.gov/SearchColls/CIA.asp. Hereafter cited as Chile Declass CIA III. U.S. Congress, Se nate, Select Committee to Study Govern mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 94 th Congress, 1 st Session (Washington DC: USGPO, 1975), 18, 20. 38 Memorandum Summary of Chilean Congressional Election Operation, Broe to Karamessines, CIA Declass Chile III. Memorandum Progress Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election, CIA, 5 December 1968, Chile Declass III. Memorandum Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election, CIA, 14 March 1969. Korry, The USA-in-Chile and Chile-in-USA: A Full Retrospective Political and Economic View, Estudios Pblicos 72 (Spring 199): 7. U.S. Senate, Covert Action in Chile 18, 20. The Senate Select Committee report Covert Action in Chile notes the monies spent figure ($200,000), but consistently cites authorized amounts as monies spent figures, thus inflating the extent of U.S. covert action in Chile. See U.S. Senate, Covert Action in Chile 8-20 passim. 393

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though technically such pacts were illegal. The two part ies agreed to support each others candidates in the various contests for Chamber of Deputies seats (no two candidates were running against each other), and the Communists ag reed to support the Senate candidacies of Allende in the Tenth Agrupacin and Aniceto Rodrguez in the Ninth. Allende campaigned throughout the Tenth Agrupacin, and across the country in order to build support for the FRAP. Observers such as independent Senator Raf ael Tarud Siwady remarked that Allende was campaigning as much for the Presidency as for the Senate. 39 When voters of Magallanes, Aysn, and Ch ilo cast their ballots on 2 March, Allende obtained the first majority, and the U.S. Embassy admitted that Allende was the real victor of the elections. PDC candidate Juan Hamilton gain ed the other Senate seat; meanwhile, Ampuero fared poorly and faded as a political force. Across the country, the Christian Democrats polled just below 30 percent, losing 26 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but adding 9 seats in the Senate. The Nationals garnered 20 percent. U.S. officials conc luded that the 1970 presidential contest would be between Allende and Alessandri, and Korry warn ed that any bland assumption that Alessandri is going to win in 1970 is very dangerous. The National Party was weak, the embassy added, and had an inflated view of Al essandris real possibilities. Frei and the PDCbelieved and the U.S. embassy concurred that the FRAP had a hard 30 percent of the electorate and could gain as much as one-third of Radical Party vot ers if the presidential election 39 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 178-182, Telegram 4303 Communist/Socialist Electoral Pact, 1 July 1968; and Airgram A-713 Leftists Squabble Over Electoral Pact, Split Widens, Korry (Sinn) to Department of State, 10 July 1969; both Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Friedman with Rafael Tarud Siwady, 6 [?] February 1969, enclosed with Airgram A-45 Senator Tarud Analyzes His Candidacy, Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 12 February 1969; 394

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developed into a three way race between the Ri ght, Left, and PDC. The March Congressional elections revealed a Chilean elec torate roughly divided into thir ds, with the Center weakening. 40 U.S. officials deemed their covert efforts as highly successful, and Korry said that they had a maximum impact. Having used $200,000 for their covert efforts, U.S. officials were pleased when 10 of the 12 candida tes they supported won. The CIA determined that financial assistance to Ampueros USP totaling one-half of USP finances helped to deny Allendes Socialist Party 6 deputies and 1 senator. The CI A further noted that the Chilean press had not accused the United States with interference. 41 U.S. claims about the success of their cove rt action were highly dubious; the claims rested on an untested, unsubstantiated correl ation that had many un measured, unevaluated variables. U.S. officials declared success by linking the fact that the United States put money in certain races to the fact that 10 non-FRAP candidates had won and 7 FRAP candidates had not. In truth, U.S. officials did not know if U. S. propaganda actually had an effect, whether it properly targeted the local social -cultural context, or if voter reception of the propaganda was positive or negative. No one determined the comp arative influence of U.S. propaganda or funds 40 Telegram 866 FRAP Up PR Down, Korry to Secretary of State, 6 March 1969; and Telegram 976 Elections Again, Korry to Secretary of State, 13 March 1969; and Telegram 942 Election Hangover Including Freis Views, Korry to Secretary of State, 11 March 1969; all Folder POL 14 Chile 3/1/69, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For FRAPs 30 percent, see Telegram 976 Elections Again, 13 March 1969; Telegram 942 Election Hangover Including Freis Views, 11 March 1969; and Airgram A-580 Dialogue: Tomic-the Ambassador #1, 11 May 1968. For the Embassys view of the 1969 Congressi onal elections, see Telegram 779 Chilean Congressional Elections, Korry to Secretar y of State, 3 March 1969; and Airgram A-86 PDC Election Aftermath: Whiz Kids No More, Korry (Wheelock) to Department of State, 19 March 1969; both Folder POL 14 Chile 3/1/69, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For polarized electorate and weakening Center, see Telegram 942 Election Hangover Including Freis Views, 11 Ma rch 1969; Michael J. Francis, The Allende Victory: An Analysis of the 1970 Chilean Presidential Election (Tucson: University of Arizona Press for the Institute of Government Research, 1973), 46-47; Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and Politics in Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977), 74-75; and Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Chile 37-38. 41 Memorandum Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election, CIA, 14 March 1969. 395

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in relation to other factors, su ch as provincial polit ical dynamics, candidates personalities and histories, campaign strategies, non -U.S. propaganda, political party efforts, or other sources of political funding. U.S. officials wanted to claim success bureaucratically it was in their interest to do so and they did, but the claims lacked ha rd data and were little more than hopes. After the Congressional elections, the 303 Committee, chaired by Henry Kissinger, reviewed the prospects for Chiles 1970 election, but delayed action until Chiles political picture became clearer. During the 17 April meeting, Ki ssinger asked whether they should do anything for the upcoming election. The committee, which in cluded Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, CIA Director Richard Helms, and NS C staff member Colonel Alexander Haig, concluded that Alessandris chances were reasonably good, an assessment that sharply diverged from Korrys warning that any blan d assumption that Alessandri would win was dangerous. CIA Director Rich ard Helms, however, did advise the committee that a great deal of preliminary work is necessary to support a candidate and that an operation could not be effective unless an early enough start is made. The 303 Committee opted to wait until Chiles political parties had formally named their candi dates, a curious decisi on given that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago had been saying for more than a year who the th ree candidates would be. 42 In Chile, the March Congressional election results caused the Christian Democrat and Radical Parties to split, and this worried U.S. officials and aided the FR AP. The most notable split occurred among the PDC, where Tomic hur t his own candidacy. Two weeks after the elections, Tomic issued an ultimatum: either he would be a candidate of a popular unity of the 42 Memorandum Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Commit tee, 15 April 1969, Fran k M. Chapin, NSC Executive Secretary, 17 April 1969, attached to Memorandum Proposed Agenda for the Meeting of the 303 Committee, Tuesday, 15 April 1969, Chapin, 11 April 1969, Document 104, Chile Declass NSC III. 396

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entire Left or he would w ithdraw. The U.S. embassy, Fr ei, and the Communist daily El Siglo interpreted Tomics ulti matum as a withdrawal because the Communist and Socialist Parties had long made clear their refusals to support Tomic as a candidate. Three weeks later (early April), Tomic wrote multiple letters indicating his withdraw al and departed for Europe. In Europe, he apparently had second thoughts, and he soon hinted that he wanted to reenter the race. At its May convention, the PDC rejected alliances with other parties and insisted upon running its own candidate. Shortly after the convention, a group of PDC memb ers resigned from the party, formed the Movement of Unified Popular Ac tion (MAPU Movimiento de Accin Popular Unitaria), and aligned with the FRAP. 43 The Radical Party, which U. S. officials viewed as a key arbi trator in Chilean politics, also split after losing badly in the March elections. The partys executive board favored joining the FRAP, but dissidents, numb ering 1517 party members, pub lished an open letter opposing alignment with the FRAP. Am ong the signatories were Julio Durn Neumann (1964 Radical candidate), Pedro Enrique Alf onso (the 1952 candidate), and Al fredo Duhalde Vasquez (former President in 1946). During the June convention, the executive board and its supporters expelled Durn and several signatories, prompting many to resign from the party. The Radical Party 43 Telegram 1075 Tomic Issues All or Nothing Ultimatu m, Korry to Secretary of State, 19 March 1969; and Telegram 1100 Reaction to Tomic Electoral Ultimatum, Korr y to Secretary of State, 20 March 1969; both Folder POL 14 Chile 3/1/69, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA For Communist and Socialist rejection of Tomic candidacy, see Washington Post p. xx. For Tomics April letters of withdrawal, see Tele gram 1393 Tomic Withdraws: Again??, Korry to Secretary of State, 10 April 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69, Box 1778; Telegram 1409 Destructive Tomic, Korry to Secretary of State, 11 April 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69, Box 1778; and Telegram 1970 Tomic Again, and There Will Be More, Korry to Secretary of State, 15 May 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777 ; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For To mics second thoughts, see Telegram 1970 Tomic Again, and There Will be More, Korry to Secretary of State, 15 May 1969. For the May convention and creation of MAPU, see Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 110-111. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 78-80. 397

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aligned with the FRAP and nominated Senator Al berto Baltra as their presidential candidate. The dissidents formed the Democratic Radical Party and gave their support to Alessandri. 44 Splits in the Radical and Christian Democrat parties exposed the inviolability of Tomics popular unity strategy, but he refused to abandon it. In July, he travelled to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders, but the Soviets rebuffed him. Tomic accepted the PDC nomination in August but continued his appeal to the Left. 45 Korry admitted to Tomic that he favored him of the three candidates, but Tomic s pursuit of Leftist popular unity led Korry and the embassy to give up on him. The presidential race, they concluded, was between Allende and Alessandri. 46 Despite his resounding victory in March, Allende faced sizeable obstacles to getting his partys nomination, much less the FRAPs. Likely recognizing this, he pr oposed to Rafael Tarud 44 Arturo Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago: Editorial Nasciamento, 1969), V: 178187. Airgram A-84 Radical Party Debacle in Parliamentary Elections, Ko rry (Wheelock) to Department of State, 15 March 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 3/1/69; Airgram A-206 Radical Party: Are the Hustlers Being Hustled?, Korry (Wheelock) to Department of State, 26 June 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69; Telegram 2801 Radical Party: Some Expulsions and Leftward Ho, Korry to Secretary of State, 30 June 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69; and Airgram A-400 Constituent Assembly of Democratic Radical Party (PDR), Shlaudeman (Fernandez and Friedman) to Department of State, 30 November 1969, Folder POL 12-1 Chile; all Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For Baltras nomination and the PR to the FRAP, see Airgram A-586 The Radical Party: Not Yet Relaxed and Enjoying It, Korry (Wheelock) to Department of State, 11 May 1968, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777; and Telegram 3021 Presidential Sweepstakes: Handicappers Horror, Korry to Secretary of State, 15 July 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/69, Box 1779; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 45 For Tomics trip to Moscow, see Telegram 2746 USSR In tervenes Against Tomic, Korr y to Secretary of State, 25 June 1969; and Telegram 2861 Tomic in Moscow, Korry to Secretary of State, 2 July 1969; both Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For transcript of Tomics press interview in Moscow, see Transcript Entrevista concedida a la Agencia Reuters (Sr. Evans) por el Sr. Radomiro Tomic, 1 July 1969, enclosed with Airgram A-801 Tomic Visit to Moscow, Beam, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, (M. G. Wygant) to Department of State, 12 July 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 46 Airgram A-405 The Viaux Affair Further Reflections, Shlaudeman to Department of State, 3 December 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1 980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA Frederick L. Chapin of Office of BolivianChilean Affairs described Tomic as a fanatic in the margin of Shlaudemans airgram. Telegram 4322 Reflections on Humbuggery, Korry to Secretary of State, 14 October 1969, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For the race narro wing to Allende and Alesandri, see Airgram A-580 Dial ogue: Tomic-the Ambassador #1, Korry to Department of State, 11 May 1968, Folder POL 17 Chile US, Box 1981, CFPF 196769, RG59, NA. Telegram 807/1 Chilean Elections, Korry to Secretary of State, 3 March 1969. Telegram 976 Elections Again, Korry to Secretary of State, 13 March 1969. Telegram 3021 Presidential Sweepstakes, Korry to Secretary of State, 15 July 1969. 398

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that they should hold a Conventio n of the Left to nominate a ca ndidate. The proposal was a variation of the FRAP nominating congress that Allende had suggested in 1957, but the proposed convention would also bypass the PS central comm ittee, which did not favor Allende. Tarud, a presidential aspirant himself, rejected the idea because his candidacy would be submerged at the Convention by an Allendista boom. 47 In May 1969, Allende did not s eek reelection as President of the Senate when the new Congress convened; instead, he travelled abroad and strove to solidify his support among the Left. He visited the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba, and North Vietnam, and met with Ho Chi Minh before the latters death. Allende said th at his time with Ho Chi Minh taught him much, and he took pride in being one of the last foreign leader s to meet with him. While in Moscow, Allende met with two Central Committee members and the President of the Supreme Soviet. Allende received the red carpet treatment, wrote the U.S. emba ssy, and his reception contrasted sharply with that given Tomic, who only met the vice foreign minister. 48 U.S. officials did not fully appreciate the extent of the PS leaderships opposition to Allende because Allende was near ly denied his partys nominati on. Secretary General Aniceto Rodrguez and Senator Carlos Altamirano challenged Allende for the nomination. During 11-13 June party meeting, Altamirano advocated armed revolution, while Allende pressed for a broad electoral front. The party rej ected Allendes strategy and adopted the Revolutionary Front, 47 Memorandum of Conversation Senator Rafael Tarud s Campaign for Presidency, Fr iedman, 5 February 1969, enclosed with Airgram A-45 Senator Ta rud Analyzes his Candidacy, Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 12 February 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 1/1/ 69, Box 1778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 48 Telegram 1619 Trek to the East, Korry to Secretary of State, 24 April 1969; and Telegram 3286 Tomic and Moscow, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 31 July 1969, Folder POL 7 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1777, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Rgis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Vintage Press, 1971), 77-79. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 195-196. 399

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declaring that Chiles problems would not be resolved until a new popular revolutionary power replaced the capitalist system and initiated the construction of socialism. The division between the PS leadership, which favored Rodrguez, and the party base, which favored Allende, led the partys central committee to change its nomina tion procedure; the central committee would select the partys candidate, not the regional party committees as had been previous practice. Since Altamirano had withdrawn, the change favored Rodrguez and negated Allendes strength among the party base, among which nearly all of the regional committees had pledged their support for Allende. On 29 August, the central committee met and asked Allende and Rodrguez each to give a speech before the committee made its decision. Allende was slated first. He apparently was nervous, and his speech sounded rep etitive, monotone, insecu re, and disjointed. Never before had I heard, nor would I hear, a delivery so mediocre, wrote one attendee. Rodrguez followed. Reading a prepared statemen t, he renounced his candidacy, but did not say why. The surprise withdrawal disrupted the m eeting, and a shocked Alle nde soon recovered his composure and left. When the Central Comm ittee reconvened, it cast 13 votes for Allende, with 14 abstentions. A second vote gave Allende a majority (13 for, 12 abstentions) and the nomination. The ugly, acrimonious process, howeve r, was apparent to all: PS leaders would rather abstain than support Allende again. 49 49 Julio Csar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile 2 volumes (Santiago: Editorial Prensa Latinoamrica, 1971), II: 150-151. Jaime Surez Bastidas, Allende, vision de un militante (Santiago: Editorial Jurdica ConoSur, 1992), 146150. Arturo Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana: Quinto Ao (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1969), 201-202, 222. Labarca Goddard, Chile al Rojo 197198. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 196-198. Surez writes that Allendes speech occurred in circumstan ces which it was known that the vote was going to favor him, his account and the results indicate otherwise. Surez, Allende, vision de un militante 150-151. El Reves de la trama, La Nacin 1 September 1969, p. 13. Con dolor del Comit Central gan Allende, Las ltimas Noticias 30 August 1969. 400

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Undeterred, Allende moved to construct a broa d coalition of the Left. Two weeks after receiving the nomination, he gave the keynote sp eech at rally organized to pay homage to the recently deceased Ho Chi Minh (Rodrguez and Altamirano did not attend). After devoting much of his speech to a eulogy of the North Viet namese leader, Allende called upon Socialists to set aside partisanship and build a broad Leftist alli ance. Socialists cannot be masters of the Left, he said, and I do not accept that a Socialist can be an anti-Co mmunist. Supporters must exert patience and moderation, he cont inued, victory was within their gr asp if they remained united. [W]e do not want a left which functions within the [capitalist] regime, he said, and when confronted, we must respond to reactionary violence with revolutionary violence. 50 With Allende receiving the PS nomination, U.S. embassy officers were confident that he would be the Lefts candidate. Allendes name appears on more Chilean walls than any other legend except possibly Yankee go home, th e embassy told Washington. When the Communists, Socialists, Radicals, MAPU, Social Democrats, a nd Popular Independent Alliance (API Alianza Popular Indepe ndiente) formed Popular Unity on 9 October 1969, Allendes chances seemed certain. Even though each pa rty nominated a candidate Allende for the Socialists, Pablo Neruda for the Communists, Balt ra for the Radicals, Tarud for API, and Jacques Chonchol for MAPU Korry remarked that only a complete fracaso would cause the Communists to choose poetry (Neruda) over a chance at real power (Allende). 51 50 The North Vietnamese leader died on 4 September 1969. Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 279. Airgram A-317 Savvy Salvador Sallies Stoutly: Allende Seeks the Initiative, Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 18 September 1969, Folder POL 14 Chile 5/1/69, Box 1 778, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 51 Airgram A-356 A Political Round-Up, Shlaudeman (Karkashian) to Department of State, 19 October 1969. Telegram 807 Chilean Elections, Korry to Secretary of State, 3 March 19 69. Airgram A-317 Savvy Salvador 401

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More Stepping Back Governor Rockefeller completed his tour of Latin America and submitted his 144-page report to President Nixon on 30 August 1969, the da y after Allende received the PS nomination. Rockefeller recommended a policy that stepped b ack from the more aggressive policy pursued under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy. Congressi onal and public attention, however, largely focused on the eight and one-half pages relating to military-political affairs. Within the eight pages, three central points emerged. First, a new type of military man was assuming positions of leadership in Latin America. The new military men had poor or working class roots, had joined the military for education and advancemen t, and were willing to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress. Second, the rise of crime, urban terrorism, internal subversion, and guerrilla groups required that the United States work more cooperatively with Latin American police and military forces. Third, given the authoritarian and hierarchical tradition of Latin American cultures, and given that many nations had not built the advanced economic and social systems requir ed to support democracy, Rockefeller urged Nixon to accept Latin American governments as they were. Bilateral relations were merely practical conveniences and not measures of moral judgment. 52 Nixon gave Rockefellers report little atten tion until late September 1969 when he heard that a newspaper article had accused his administration of placing Latin America low on its agenda of priorities. Nixon ordered his National Security A dviser Henry Kissinger to make Sallies Stoutly, Korry (Friedman) to De partment of State, 18 September 1969. Telegram 4322 Reflections on Humbuggery, Korry to Secretary of State, 14 October 1969. 52 Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas 32-33, 60-64, 58-59. 402

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sure that the State Department knocks this story down. Then, during a 27 September meeting at Camp David, Nixon personally instructed Assi stant Secretary of St ate for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer on what the U.S. posture should be. 53 Drawing upon the Rockefellers findings, Nixo n outlined his Latin American policy in a 31 October 1969 speech to the Inter American Pre ss Association, a policy which stepped back from the more aggressive strategies of hi s Democratic predecessors Welcomed by IAPA president Augustn Edwards (owner of Chiles El Mercurio), Nixon called for a more balanced relationship between the United States and Latin America, and a more mature partnership in which all voices are heard and none is predom inant. He urged reducing trade barriers, increasing consultation on trade policies, encouraging trade fo rums, and fostering regional economic integration via entities like the Latin American Free Trade Area. He spoke of lifting restrictions on AID monies and asked financial organizations to develop remedies for nations facing heavy external debt payments. Nixon called upon nations to foster greater private investment and cited the successes of Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia as examples. He spoke little of political affairs, merely no ting that the United States had a preference for democratic procedures but adding that we must deal realistically wi th governmentsas they are. He stressed that his administrati on would oppose any nation that sponsors armed subversion, and named Cuba as one such sponsor. 54 53 James Nelson Goodsell, Latin America Sees Snub in Nixon Acts, Christian Science Monitor 20 September 1969, p.1. Memorandum Your Memo of September 25, Kissinger to Ken Cole, 30 September 1969, Folder [Ex] CO 1-9 9/12/69 11/30-69, Box 7 WHCF Country File, NPMP. Memorandum, Cole to Kissinger, 25 September 1969, attached to Memorandum, Kissinge r to Cole, 30 September 1969. 54 Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association, Nixon, 31 October 1969, PPP: Nixon 1969 893-901. Quoted portions appear on pages 894, 898, 900. The points were repeated in Nixons foreign policy 403

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Nixons policy departed sharply from his predecessors, at least when viewed through the lens of U.S.-Chilean relations, and offered what seemed a less Cold War-oriented policy towards Latin America. Previous administrations ha d focused upon the Cold War and viewed economics as means to fight it; Nixon focused upon economics in his speech and gave little mention to the Cold War. In some ways, Nixon put forth a policy that resembled what dependency theory proponents claimed U.S. policy was: promotion of U.S. economic interests and encouragement of raw materials exports that perpetuated dependency and did not bring economic development. Like Korry, Nixon would reverse course, reve rting to a more Cold War-oriented policy. 55 report to Congress; however, that report did mention th e two political elements. See First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Nixon, 18 February 1970, PPP: Nixon 1970 pp. 133-140. 55 For an example, see James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). Dependency theory arose from several historical insights about economic development. Ral Prebisch argued that the be nefits of technical progress did not distribute evenly over the ec onomic community, and that over time, pr ices of raw materials declined more than the prices of manufactured goods. Prebisch, The Economic Development of La tin America and its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950), 7 n 1, 10, and 13; and Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 49/2 (1959): 251-73, particularly 265. Celso Furtado called the phenomenon dependency, and showed how Brazil shifted its dependence from Portugal to Great Britain. Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965 [1959]) pp. v, 87-88, 101-04. Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto asserted that a coincidence of interests occurred between center and local elites, that is, an interrelationship between the international and domestic levels. Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Developmen t in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979 [1967]), pp. x, xv-xvi, xvii. In the late 1960s, dependency theory shifted its focus to capitalism, imperialism, and exploitation. Drawing upon Lenins theory of imperialism, Andre Gunder Frank argued that contemporary underdevelopment resulted from past and present economic relationships, and that the center imposes and maintains a monopolistic structure and an exploitative relationship for the ruling classes benefit. Underdevelopment, he said, was and is generated by the very same historical process that generates economic development, namely the development of capitalism. Frank, The Development of Under-development, Monthly Review 18, 4 (September 1966): 18, 20-21, 23; and Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), vii, ix. Theotonio Dos Santos added that dependence fosters local structures and institutions that deepen and aggravate national problems, reproducing dependence. Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 60, 2 (1970): 231, 235. Harry Magdoff asserted that the United States seeks to keep the world open for free trade and investment by U.S. multinational corporati ons. Seeing interdependence between the U.S. economy and the world capitalist system, he equated U.S. imperialism with capitalism. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 39, 62, 14, 20, 22, 26. 404

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Viauxs Earthquake An October 1969 sit-in protest by a group of Chil ean Army officers, led by General Robert Viaux Marambio, entrenched U.S. policymakers in Korrys stepping back strategy, and altered Chiles political terrain on the eve of the election. 56 The Chilean militarys discontent and frustration had been building for several years. Since the late 1950s, the Chiles Armed Forces had grown increasingly unhappy with their pa y, training, and equipment, and military expenditures had remained steady since 1957, and declined in 1968 and 1969. Inflation during the 1960s eroded the standard of living for m ilitary officers and enlisted men, and by 1967, the U.S. military attach reported that grim priva tion existed in the ranks. Officers and enlisted men moonlighted to make the extra income n eeded for family budgets, and many enlisted men were subsidized by their families during their tours of duty (military service was required of all men over 18 years of age). Perhaps more om inous, the embassy repor ted that the highly 56 For quote, see David J. Morris, We Must Make Haste Slowly: The Process of Revolution in Chile (New York: Vintage Press, 1973), 80. Despite little scholarly research on the topi c, most interpretations cast the Tacnazo as a military coup or as an anti-democratic/insubordinate milita ry effort. Scholars of U.S.-Chilean relations treat the Tacnazo as a domestic affair or overlo ok it. Arturo Olavarra Bravo, amateur historian and Foreign Minister for President Carlos Ibez del Campo, questions the Frei administrations handling of the affair. Only Mark Falcoff argues that the Tacnazo had important consequences but briefly discusses th em. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana V: xxx-xxx; and Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991 [1989], 270-271. For diplomatic history interpretations, see Sater, Chile and the United States ; and Petras and Morley, The United States and Chile Paul E. Sigmund asserts that the CIA knew of the supposed coup-plotting. See Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 87. For the coup detat interpretation, see Morris, We Must Make Haste Slowly 80-82; and Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 85-87. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile 326. For an anti-democr atic effort, see H. E. Bicheno, Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 1920-1970, in Allendes Chile (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1972), Kenneth Medhurst, ed., 132-133. Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes 38-39. Alain Rouqiu, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987 [1982]), Paul E. Sigmund, trans., 232-233. For interp retations casting the Tacnazo as military insubordination to civilian leaders, see Correa et al., Historia del siglo XX chileno 261; Frederick Nunn, The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810-1973 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), 260; and Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970-1989 270-271; Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism Second edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 290-291; and Alan Angell, Chile Since 1958, Chile Since Independence 156. Loveman suggests that the Tacnazo was a military warning to civil authorities about far Leftist subversion and violence. Angell notes the lack of cl arity about the events but agrees with Lovemans view. 405

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respected, professional na tional police force, the Carabineros were tired of battling strikers who are already receiving mo re pay than they did. 57 The Chilean militarys discontent entered a new phase when an active duty Army officer, Colonel N. N., submitted a letter to the editor of El Mercurio Chiles most prominent newspaper. Colonel N. N. (which likely sta nds for No Nombre [No Name]) had written to praise El Mercurio s critique of Communism, but his remark that poor pay had weakened the Armed Forces grabbed readers attention. He said that many men had resigned from military service for economic reasons, adding that the number of resignations averaged 10 men per month. Furthermore, almost all of the resi gnations were technical specialists, with the implication that the militarys most highly trai ned specialists and techni cians were leaving for higher paying jobs in the private sector. Quo ting a Latin American general, Colonel N. N. concluded, As military men, we do not have the right to deliberate politics, but we are not mentally retarded. 58 Colonel N. N.s letter created uproar and a debate ensued over military pay and the adequacy of resources devoted to Chiles ar med forces. The uproar was fueled by several factors, including external threats. Chilean military and civilian observers worried about 57 Gertrude E. Heare, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditure s, 1940-1970: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1971), 13, 25, 29, 35. Airgram A-48 Joint Weeka #30, Dungan (M. E. Sinn) to Department of State, 29 July 1967, Folder POL 2-1 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1776; Telegram 169 Golpe in the Air, Defense Attach, U.S. Embassy Santiago, to Defense Intelligence Agency and Department of State, 3 May 1968, Folder POL 23-9 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980; Telegram 4063 Armed Forces Arrests Reported, Korry to Secretary of State, 14 June 1968, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Alessandri claims that he had good relations with the Armed Forces because he did not meddle in military affairs. See Conversatio n with Jorge Alessandri in his Apartment in Santiago, 1 July 1971, conducted by Robert J. Alexander, in Alexander, ed., The ABC Presidents: Conversations and Correspondence with the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Westport CT: Praeger, 1992), 220. 58 Colonel N. N. Sueldos y FF. AA., El Mercurio 13 July 1967, p. 17. 406

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Argentinas military regime, which had overthrown the democratically elected president Arturo Illia the previous year (June 1966) Argentinas purchase of A4B aircraft from the United States, as well as other arms purchases, added to Chilean concerns. Some accused Frei of jeopardizing Chilean security by allowing Chiles military to fall behind that of Argentina. Chile and Argentina had already skirmished over the Palena region, and tensions we re rapidly rising over the Beagle Channel (the two nations nearly we nt to war over the Beagle Channel in the 1970s). 59 Internal security threats, specifically the terro rism, violence, and guerrilla warfare by MIR, VRM, and other far Left groups, also worried the Carabineros a nd the Armed Forces. Discovery of MIRs training camp/school outside the city of Concepcin, and its links to the Socialist Party and possibly the Cuban Cultural Institute alarmed the Carabineros. Carabinero leaders admitted to the U.S. embassy that the MIR traini ng camp and its rather dangerous degree [of] preparation was a matter of gr eat seriousness for Chiles intern al security. The fact that 111 Chileans had travelled to Cuba between 1 Janua ry 1966 and 30 June 1967 did little to alleviate concerns of Chilean law enforcement officials and the public about the climate of violence. 60 59 Heare, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures 29. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 258-259, 264-67. Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Request for F-5s, 19 July 1966; Memorandum of Conversation U.S. Military Assistance to Chile, Fimbres, 5 January 1966; Telegram 11334, Sayre to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 20 July 1966; and Telegram 275, Dungan to Secretary of State, 20 July 1966; all Folder DEF 19-8 US-Chile 7/1/66, Box 1725, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NA. Telegr am 1171 Military Postscript to Co nversation with Fr ei, Korry to Secretary of State, 25 March 1969, Folder POL 1 Ch ile-US, Box 1981; and Telegram 4219 Chilean Military, Korry to Secretary of State, 7 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For the overthrow of Illia in Argentina, see Leslie Bethell, ed., Argentina since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 290-299; David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsn Updated version (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 344-346. 60 Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 171-173. Vial and Cerda, Part 2: A llende: Los primeros renuncios a una tradicin impecable, sp ecial supplement to La Segunda 8 August 2003, 17-18. Airg ram A-59 Government Reacts to Calls for Subversive Violence, Moskowitz[?] (Winder, Moskowitz) to Department of State, 2 August 1967, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Te legram 2725 More Violence and Reactions, Korry to Secretary of State, 24 June 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 407

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U.S. military aid policies aggravated the situ ation. The U.S. Congress cut funding to the Military Assistance Program in 1967, with Chiles portion reduced to zero. Chiles Minister of Defense objected to the drastic and sudden redu ction, and the embassy lobbied the Department of State for reinstatement of the funds. Korry complained that the U.S. Government did not seem to realize that every dollar given to the Armed Forces for weapons and training meant one dollar more for the social and economic development of Chile. The Chilean military is keenly aware, he said, that every time a rifle is bought [with Chilean funds as opposed to U.S. military aid] three Chilean children are deprived of a school bench. The Chileans also pressed U.S. officials for F-5 jet aircraft, and Korry pointedly told ARA that Chiles armed forces are determined to have some arms modernization come hell, high water, or the U.S. Congress. 61 Stretched between external threats, internal violence, and low pay, Chiles military began expressing its discontent. In early May 1968, the U.S. military attach reported that several hundred cadets at Chiles military academy subm itted their resignations over poor pay, and another set of resignations occurred in the Air Force. 62 The resignations were rejected, but Frei 61 Telegram 2143, Korry to General Ca rroll, 16 January 1968; Telegram 2251 GOC Reaction to Prospective MAP Reductions, Korry to Secretary of State, 25 January 1968; and Telegram 115040, Rusk (A. J. Artwohl, Department of Defense/ISA) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 14 February 1968; all Folder DEF-Defense Affairs US-Chile 1/1/67, Box 1687, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Memorandum of Conversation, Chilean Request for F-5s, 19 July 1966; Memorandum of Conversation U.S. Milita ry Assistance to Chile, Fimbres, 5 January 1966; Telegram 11334, Sayre to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 20 July 1966; and Telegram 275, Dungan to Secretary of State, 20 July 1966; all Folder DEF 19-8 US-Chile 7/1/66, Box 1725, CFPF 1 964-66, RG59, NA. Telegram 1171 Military Postscript to Conversation with Frei, Korry to Secretary of State, 25 March 1969, Folder POL 1 Chile-US, Box 1981; and Telegram 4219 Chilean Military, Korry to Secretary of State, 7 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Taffet, Alliance for What?, 258-259, 264-67. 62 Some question exists about the number of resignations. The U.S. Defense attach reported 1000 resignations, but the Department of State reported 400. Cristi n Gazmuri cites 101 resignations. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei y su poca 2 volumes (Santiago: Aguilar, 2000), II: 709. Telegram 169 Golpe in the Air, Defense Attach to Defense Intelligence Agency and Department of State, 3 May 1968. Memorandum Chile: Military Serious, but Frei Administration Should Survive, George C. Denney, Jr., Of fice of Intelligence and Research to Secretary of State, 3 October 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 408

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replaced the military High Command, naming reti red General Tulio Marambio as Minister of Defense, and General Sergio Castillo as Comm ander-in-Chief. The Frei administration then fueled military discontent when it granted a small pay raise insignificant and insufficient the embassy described it and sacked the captain who led the academy protest. 63 The Frei administrations handling of the cadet resignations reflected of its management of the armed forces, at least that was Korrys view Frei, unlike Alessandr i [his predecessor], Korry told Washington, has politicized his army from the very first days of his regime. He chose to put politicians in key jobs and political generals in safe places. To seek to keep an apolitical institution out of politics by imposing po litics is a very questio nable tactic even in societies without the non-military history of Chile Korry described General Castillo as a pleasant bumbler and Defense Minister Marambio as a logrero (one who buys his way to the top), who, Korry added, knows less about army weaponsthan I do. 64 Military discontent appe ared anew during the dieciocho Chiles Independence Day (18 September 1969). During the national holida y, a battalion of the Yungay Regiment, led by Major Arturo Marshall, deliberately showed up late for the ceremonies to protest military pay. An inquiry was ordered, and the investigating of ficer found that the protest was not political but had indeed resulted from discontent over low wage s. Marshall and two captains were asked to 63 Telegram 169 Golpe in the Air, Defense Attach to Defense Intelligence Agency a nd Department of State, 3 May 1968. Telegram 4063 Armed Forces Arrests Reported, Korry to Secretary of State, 14 June 1968. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiano V: 241-242. Telegram 291, Korry to Secretary of State, 5 July 1968, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 64 Telegram 4196 Chilean S itrep, Korry to Secretary of State, 6 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; Telegram 4181 Military Unrest (Part II), Korry to Secret ary of State, 3 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; and Telegram 4197 Chilean Sitrep (Part II of II), Korry to Secretary of State, 6 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; all CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 409

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retire. As the commander of the Armys Second In fantry told a senior U.S. embassy official, the armed forces would not tarnish their reputation by becoming involved in [a] coup plot over [a] pay increase; however, he made clear that seri ous discontent existed w ithin the ranks and the military had a plan for impr oving their lot by other means. 65 Rumors of a coup had circulated for several weeks, and the U.S. embassy discounted them as exaggerated and alarmist. Frei and his advisors, however, reacted as though the military was seditious, and Frei placed extra Carabineros around his home. Korry dismi ssed Freis response as an overreaction: To take seriously the threat of a coup at this juncture is [to] manifest panic; to think of the Carabineros defending [Frei] against the army isa symptom of manic-depression. 66 The militarys discontent rapidly coalesced around General Roberto Viaux Marambio, Commander of the Armys First Division in Antofagasta. Promoted to general in February, Viaux lobbied General Sergio Castillo three times for improvements in troop welfare and military readiness. Viauxs first effort occurre d in February when Castillo met with the new 65 Telegram 4020 Government Denies Coup Rumors, Korry to Secretary of State, 23 September 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 708-709. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana V: 244-245. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile 326. Telegram 4063 Military Pay Problem, Korry to S ecretary of State, 25 September 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Telegram 4504 Military Reajuste, Harry W. Shlaudeman, Charg dAffaires, to Secr etary of State, 27 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Labores de Junta Calificadora del Ejrcito, El Mercurio 8 October 1969, p. 29. Fuerzas Armadas: A Retiro, El Mercurio 12 October 1969, p. 33. 66 For predieciocho rumors, see Telegram 1171 Military Postscript to Conversation with Frei, Korry to Secretary of State, 25 March 1969. Telegram 3165, Korry to Secretary of State, 24 July 1969; Telegram 3198 Frei on the Military, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 25 July 1969; and Telegram 3519 More on Import of Cabinet Changes, Korry to Secretary of State, 3 May 1968, all Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/68, Box 1779, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. For post-dieciocho rumors, see Categrico Desmentido a Supuesto Clima de Sedicin en el Ejrcito, La Nacin 23 September 1969, p.1; and El Partido Socialista Pretende Fundamentar las Golpista Rumores, La Nacin 25 September 1969, p. 5. Telegram 4197 Chilean Sitrep (Part II of II Parts), Ko rry to Secretary of State, 6 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776; and Telegram 4181 Military Unrest (Part II), Korry to Secretary of State, 3 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; both CFPF 19676-69, RG59, NA. 410

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generals. Frei travelled to An tofagasta twice, but Castillo in structed Viaux both times not to bother Frei, an odd order because presidential visits were usually opportunities for the local commander escort and talk with the president. By Septembe r 1969, Viauxs advocacy for better pay and conditions led Castillo to request a meet ing with him. Viaux said that during the 2 October meeting, Castillo treated him with tru ly exceptional respect and kindness and assured him that he was working on the economic issues. The meeting went too well, and Viaux left suspicious. Viaux then discovered that his house was under surveillance by Investigaciones agents. Viauxs qualms were correct; U.S. offici als knew several days prior to Viauxs meeting with Castillo that Defense Minister Marambio had decided to remove Viaux from command and force his retirement. 67 That night, after his meeting with Castillo, Viaux wrote a letter to Frei, respectfully requesting three things: urgent resolution to th e lack of equipment and material, resolution of economic issues, and replacement of the milita ry High Command. Viaux admitted that his decision to appeal directly to the President has not been easy, but he had not choice. The Army was no longer able to fulfill in an effective manner its Fundamental and Primary Mission: to be in a state of r eadiness to defend national sovereig nty and have the capability to form and instruct its ground reserves. The Army, he wrote, faced a criminal crisis of military equipment and was poorly dressed (aggravated by cuts in U.S. military aid). Viaux detailed how low pay forced conscripts to be subsidized by their families and how the highest paid miner 67 Florencia Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux (Santiago: Impresiones Eire, 1972), 88-90. General Roberto Viaux Marambio noted his presentations to General Castillo in his letter to Frei. See Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux p. 63. Memorandum Chile: Military Unrest Serious, But Fr ei Administration Should Survive, George C. Denney, Jr., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 3 October 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [2], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 411

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in Chuquicamata earned a salary equal to that of a lieutenant colonel having 25 years of service. The situation encouraged a constant and progre ssive flight of personnel, further undercutting the Armys readiness and morale. Viaux also cited how Generals Marambio and Castillo had promised to improve conditions but had done little increasing the bitterness and frustration in the ranks. Viaux essentially articulated the same concerns that Colonel N. N. had outlined two years earlier. 68 Viaux continued to meet with military and government officials, pressing for changes, but the High Command sought his ouster. Viaux met again with Castillo, but now requested three things: an opportunity to re port his concerns to the upcomin g annual convocation of army generals (known as the Junta Calificadora), an interview with General Marambio, and an interview with President Frei. Viaux met with Marambio, who seemed sympathetic, and Marambio acceded to Viauxs request to meet wi th Frei. The annual Junta Calificadora went forward, at a date earlier than normal due to discontent in the ranks. Near the end of the convocation, Castillo announced that the generals would meet again in a month to discuss the Armys problems. The announcement effectively forestalled any possibility for Viaux to present his concerns to the convocation. On the last day of the Junta Califica dora (Friday, 16 October), Castillo called Viaux into his office and asked fo r his resignation. Castillo even drafted a letter 68 General Roberto Viaux Marambio, Commander in Chief of the First Division of the Army, to President Eduardo Frei Montalva, 2 October 1969, reprinted in Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 54-67. Viauxs desire to meet with Frei and present his concerns about the military was soon public knowledge. See Cambio de Mando Militar en la Primera Divisin, El Mercurio 18 October 1969, p. 1. The daily Diario Ilustrado published the letter shortly after events. See Newspaper Clipping, Diario Ilustrado 27 November 1969, enclosed with Airgram A-407 General Viauxs Letter to President Frei, Harry W. Shlaudeman, Ch arg dAffaires (Freidman) to Department of State, 5 December 1969, Folder POL 15-1 Chile 1/1/ 68, Box 1779, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 412

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of resignation for Viaux to sign. Viaux objected that that it was completely irregular for a general to retire after a mere nine months in grade, and refused to sign the letter. 69 The Frei administration offered a pay increa se and requested retirements from several officers, but both actions raised military discontent to the flas hpoint. The governments pay increase was actually an advance from officers retirement pensions; moreover, it had to be repaid. Several officers in the military and the Carabineros rejected the pay loan. Castillo retired several Army officers besides Viaux, including 2 brig adier generals, 4 generals, 22 colonels, and 24 lieutenant colonels and majors. Retirements after the annual Junta Calificadora were normal because decisions for promotions were made at that time. This set of resignations, however, prompted the U.S. defense attach to re mark that Frei was getting rid of what he considers to be a core of army dissidents. 70 After his 16 October meeting with Castillo, Viau x returned to Antofagasta to relinquish his command. The next day (17 October), he called hi s officer corps together, explained events in Santiago, and turned over command. The text of Viauxs farewell was circulated among the 69 Military leaders acknowledged that the Junta Calificadora wa s meeting earlier than normal, but explained that this was done to provide sufficient time for officers to make preparations for moving to their new assignment. See Labores de Junta Calificadora del Ejrcito, El Mercurio 8 October 1969, p. 29. Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 90-94. The quote appears on p. 94. Telegram 4 219 Chilean Military, Korry to Secretary of State, 7 October 1969. Llamados a Retiro Tres Generales, El Mercurio 17 October 1969, pp. 1, 16. Telegram 4370 Retirement of Chilean Army Officers, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 17 October 1969, Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1 529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 70 Telegram 4267 Military Unrest, Korry to Secretary of State, 10 October 1969. Llamados a Retiro Tres Generales, El Mercurio 17 October 1969, pp. 1, 16. El Mercurio y el Partido Nacional Alientan Golpe de Estado, El Siglo 18 October 1969, p. 5. Fuerzas Armadas: A Retiro, El Mercurio 19 October 1969, p. 33. Telegram 4370 Retirement of Chilean Army Officers, Shlaudeman (Defense Attach) to Secretary of State, 17 October 1969. 413

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officers, and in it, Viaux lament ed his departure but asked his tr oops to remain devoted to the Army. Afterwards many officers visited Vi aux and offered their praise and loyalty. 71 Angered by Viauxs removal, 61 members of the Antofagasta divisions officer corps signed and sent a letter of prot est to President Frei, demanding th at Viaux be reinstated. The letter categorically denied that Viaux had organ ized any politically motiv ated meetings, a new element perhaps offered by the High Command to justify Viauxs removal (Viaux does not note it). 72 The Antofagasta newspapers La Estrella del Norte and El Mercurio (a subsidiary of the Santiago daily) printed the officers decl aration, as did the Santiago newspaper, La Segunda In Santiago, the Carabineros bega n confiscating copies of La Segunda from newsstands, and tried to hold up Santiagos El Mercurio The Carabineros arrested La Segundas editor, and the Ministry of Interior gave television stations strict instruct ions not to report the Antofagasta situation until instructed to do so. Ren Silva Espejo, El Mercurio s editor, gave the U.S. embassy a copy of Viauxs letter, and told Charg dAffaires Harry W. Shlaudeman that Frei had not received it and that Via ux was ordered to withdraw it. 73 71 Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 95-98. El Mercurio printed the text of Viauxs farewell speech under the heading Despidida del General Viaux. Cambio de Mando Militar en la Primera Divisin, El Mercurio 18 October 1969, p. 41. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana V: 266-272. 72 Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 95-98. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana V: 262-264. Olavarra Bravo reprints the letter/declaration of protes t. Cambio de Mando Militar en la Primera Divisin, El Mercurio 18 October 1969, pp. 1, 41, 42. El Mercurio y el Partido Nacional Alientan Golpe de Estado, El Siglo, 18 October 1969, pp. 1, 5. Absoluta Normalidad in el Cambio de Mando de la Divisin del Ejrcito en Antofagasta, La Nacion 18 October 1969, p. 12. General Castillo later charged that Viaux was trying to organize a subversive movement of a military character, indicatin g that he likely originated the charge. See Oportuna Informacin al Pas, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 2. Telegram 4385 First Division Demands Reinstatement General Viaux, Shlaudeman and Defense Attach to Secr etary of State, 17 October 1969; and Telegram 4386 More on First Army Divisions Demands, Shlaudeman an d Defense Attach to Secretary of State, 17 October 1969; both Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 73 Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 95-98. Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana V: 262-264. En Relacin con el Atraso de La Edicin de El Mercurio, El Mercurio 19 October 1969, p. 41. Detenido en Libre Pltica Mario Carneyro, El Mercurio 19 October 1969, pp. 41, 44. Detenido Director de La Segunda, El 414

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With publication of the Antofagasta officers le tter, the Frei government was confronting a rapidly developing civil-military relations crisis and then proceeded to make it worse. Minister of Defense Marambio and Minister of Interior Patricio Rojas told the Santiago press of the letter was a forgery and that a real letter did not exist. Rojas th en announced that Coronel Gustavo Kutzman, whose name headed the list of signatures, had issued a statem ent denying that he or anyone else of the First Division signed the letter; however, no ot her officer stepped forward to issue a denial. The Frei governme nt also brought charges against La Estrella La Segunda and El Mercurio before Chiles Supreme Court fo r printing the officers letter. 74 Ordered by Castillo to return to Santia go, Viaux arrived by plane about 22:00 on 20 October, and a protest was soon organized. Greeted by newspaper, radio, and television reporters, Viaux deemed it too late to meet with Castillo. Later that ni ght, officers from several regiments in Santiago met with Viaux at his house, and Viaux learned that Ca stillo had sent out a confidential circular about Via ux that offended many Army office rs. At 02:30 on 21 October, Viaux agreed to lead a confinement to barracks protest to obtain redress for their pay and equipment grievances. At 06:30, Viaux and his group arrived at the Tacna Regiment building, which fronted Cousio Park. They were joined by an armored battalion and a transport battalion, and received support from the War College, Sp ecial Forces school, Telecommunications school, Siglo 18 October 1969, p. 6. Chile Seizes Editions of Four Newspapers, Washington Post 19 October 1969, p. 26. Telegram 4386 More on First Army Divisions De mands, Shlaudeman and Defense Attach to Secretary of State, 17 October 1969. Director de L a Segunda Recibi Numerosas Adhesiones, El Mercurio 20 October 1969, p. 37. Ministro del Interior Da Respuesta a Periodistas, El Mercurio 20 October 1969, pp. 29, 34. 74 El Mercurio y el Partido Naci onal Alientan Golpe de Estado, El Siglo, 18 October 1969, pp. 5. Cambio de Mando Militar en la Primera Divisin, El Mercurio 18 October 1969, pp. 41, 42. No he Firmado Declaracin Alguna Dice Coronel Kutzman, La Nacion 18 October 1969, p.1. Comprobada Inexistencia de Presunto Documento Militar, La Nacin 18 October 1969, p. 5. Detenido en Libre Pltica Mario Carneyro, El Mercurio 19 October 1969, pp. 41, 44 Enrgica Protesta del Consejo Nacional de Periodistas, El Mercurio 19 October 1969, pp. 41, 44. 415

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Infantry school, as well as several Air Force a nd Carabinero officers. North of Santiago, in San Felipe, Major Arturo Marshall tried to take command of the Yungay Regiment and join the Tacna Regiment in protest, but he was soon arrested. The Tacnazo had begun. 75 From the start, Viaux stressed that his group was not initiating a coup. Viaux tried to call Frei and assure him that they were not challengi ng presidential authority. Viaux reached Enrique Krauss, Freis Minister of the Economy, and asked hi m to tell Frei that th eir action was entirely military-professional and was directed only at the High Command. Frei received the message but was infuriated by the call. 76 Viaux held press conferences with newspaper, radio, and television reporters at 10:30 and 12:00, insisting both times that th ey were not attempting a coup; their attitude was entirely military -professional, and their protest was directed strictly toward the High Command, not President Frei, his authority, nor the constitution. Senator Juan de Dos Carmona, who had met with Frei during the morning, went to the Tacna Regiment building just before noon. Afterwards, he told a reporter that Viaux had been a professional during his entire career, but he considered the present action as going against military duties. The senators comments made clear that Viauxs protest sought to resolve the Ar mys problems, not engage in 75 Llamado a Santiago el General Viaux, El Mercurio 20 October 1969, p. 37. Estado de Sitio en el Pas, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, p.26. Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 99-101. The sequence of events related by Viaux is confirmed by El Mercurio and the judge advocates report on Viauxs case. See Telegram 5149 Judge Advocate Recommends Viaux Exile, Korr y to Secretary of State, 16 December 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67 [1], Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. La Nacin claimed that Viaux arrive d in the afternoon / early evening, but was not able to establish the sp ecifics. Lleg a Santiago el General Viaux, La Nacin 21 October 1969, p. 5. El Siglo however, relates that Viaux arrived late on 20 October and faced a large gathering of reporters. See El Pueblo Notifica al Momiaje Golpista, El Siglo 21 October 1969, p. 1. John M. Goshko, Units Revolt in Chile, Washington Post 22 October 1969, pp. A1, A16. Chilean Regiments Rebel Over Pay; 14 Wounded in Exchange of Fire, New York Times 22 October 1969, pp. 1 and 10. 76 Varas, Convesaciones con Viaux 100. Krauss confirmed the call and the passage of Viauxs message to Frei in an interview with historian Cristin Gazmuri. See Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 711. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 187. 416

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a coup. In its 13:00 situation report, the U.S. embassy reported that government officials had informed them that this is not, repeat not, an a ttempted golpe but rather [an] airing of protest, information that was likely the product of Carm onas meeting with Viaux. At his 13:15 press conference, Viaux again told reporters that his groups actions were directed at the High Command, not at Frei. Hi s sole stated condition for resolving the protest was the removal of Marambio and Castillo. I am not a gorilla, he insisted, I am not sedi tious. When asked how the protesters would respond if attacked, Viaux said, We are prepared to defend ourselves. The U.S. embassy cabled an update to Washington at 18:00, saying that the Tacnazo was a sitin strike and that Viauxs group showed no signs of having aggr essive action in mind. 77 It soon became clear that the members of Chiles armed forces sympathized with Viaux and his group. Acknowledging that the protest wa s directed only at th e High Command, General Castillo called upon the troops to end the attitude of rebellion and repudiate Viaux who was one single man, taking advantage of his rank and in a clear attitude of spite and rebellion, is trying to tarnish the spotless presti ge of the army. None did. Frei ordered Army regiments to surround the Tacna Regiment building in order to pr essure the protesters to capitulate, but Viaux and the roughly 500-800 officers a nd troops who had joined him ha d enough supplies to hold out for several days. The U.S. embassy reported th at the encirclement of the Tacna Regiment 77 Expresamos Lealtad al Presidente, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, p. 25. Estado de Sitio en el Pas, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, pp. 1, 26. No es Procedimiento para Resolver Situacin, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, pp. 25, 27. El Pueblo Rechazo Unanimem ente el Intento de Sedicion Derechista, El Siglo 22 October 1969, p. 5. Los Hechos, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 1. Viaux: Niega lo que Afirma; Afirma lo que Niega, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 6. Segundo Comandante del Tacna Repudio Intento Sedicioso, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 6. Telegram 4412 Sitrep 1 P.M., Octo ber 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969; Telegram 4416 Sitrep 3 P.M., October 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969; and Telegram 4425 Sitrep 6:30 P.M., October 22 [sic], Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969; all Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Labarca, Chile al rojo 59. 417

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building was done in the loosest sort of fa shion with much coming and going, and with considerable fraternization between [the] two sides. Freis biogr apher admits that it was very doubtful that the military would have fought against their own. 78 Frei and his administration immediately accused the military and the political Right of seditious maneuvers and leveled such accusations we ll before Viaux agreed to lead the protest. The government daily La Nacin charged that since National Part y leader Sergio Onofre Jarpa was in the far north, near Antofagasta, he was f acilitating golpista maneuvers. Senator de Dios Carmona returned to Santiago by the afternoon of 19 October, spen t the evening conferring with Frei and his inner cabinet about the situation in Antofagasta a nd coup adventures by the Right, which may have been the Antofagasta officers lette r of protest. Just af ter Viauxs return and before he agreed to lead th e protest, Minister of Economy Enrique Krauss and PDC President Benjamin Prado met with Salvador Allende and to ld him that they feared a coup. They asked Allende how he and the Left would respond, and A llende assured them that the parties of the Left always were for defending Chiles democra tic system from an attack of the ultraright. 79 78 Masa del Ejrcito Est Unida Junto al Gobierno, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, p. 25. Cercados por Unidades leales los Amotinados, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 6. Telegram 4429 Sitrep 8 p.m., October 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 22 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776 CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca, II: 713. 79 Estado de Sitio en el Pas, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, p. 26; Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 185187. Dirigentes Nacionales Fomentan el Golpismo, La Nacin 18 October 1969, p. 5. Presidente del PN Confirma Origen Derechista de Rumores Golpistas, La Nacin 18 October 1969, p. 5. Sospechosas Andanzas del Presidente del PN, La Nacin 19 October 1969, p. 1. Unnime Repudio Poltico en contra de Maniobras Golpistas de Partido Nacional, La Nacin 19 October 1969, p. 5. Reflexiones Sobre los Hechos Recientes, La Nacin 19 October 1969, p. 4. Reunin en La Casa del Presidente, El Mercurio 20 October 1969, p. 36. Sorprendente Debilidad del Gobierno para Enfrentar Derecha Sediciosa, El Siglo 21 October 1969, p. 5. Telegram 4423 PS and PCCh Reaction, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 Octobe r 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. John M. Goshko, Chiles Coup Was a Sit-In, Washington Post p. B3. 418

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Even though Frei and his advisers knew that the Viaux-led action was a protest, and had privately told the U.S. embassy so, they publicly claimed that the Tacnazo was a coup. Despite receiving Viauxs assurances that his group was protesting against Marambio and Castillo, Frei closed Congress and declared a state of siege. The Frei administration then released government workers at noon so that they could attend a rally of mass support for Frei and democracy outside La Moneda (Chiles White Hous e), starting at 15:00. Interior Minister Rojas asked leaders of the other political parties to join Frei at the rally. P hotographs of Frei were handed out to people as they assembled at La Moneda. At 15:00, in a speech carried by radio a nd television networks, Frei charged that Viaux and his group had gath ered together in open rebellion against the High Command, the government, and the c ountrys legal and democratic regime. With Allende and other party leaders in attendance, Frei appe ared before the rally and declared, Nobody will move me from here! I trust that good sense will prevail, and those who lack it will submit themselves to discipline. Garbage trucks peoples tanks as La Nacin dubbed them encircled La Moneda, a photograph of which was on the front page of the New York Times 80 Despite the rally, Frei negotiated with Via ux and acceded to his demands. Negotiations between Freis government and Viaux moved quickly toward resolution afte r Undersecretary of Health Patricio Silva Garn (a former Military Health officer) showed Marambios letter of 80 For the state of siege order, see Estado de Sitio, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 1. For Freis radio and television speech, see No Habr Debilidades, Frei Says, El Mercurio 22 October 1969, pp. 1, 26, and No Puedo Aceptar Ningn Acto de Indisciplina en Resguardo del Pas y de las Propias AA.FF., La Nacin pp. 1, 5. Los Hechos, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 1. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 711-712. Puccio, Un cuarto de siglo con Allende 187-188. For rally attendees receiving photographs of Frei, see Estamos al Lado de Quien Nos Dignifico, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 12. Telegram 4412 Sitrep 1 p.m., Oct 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969. Telegram 4416 Sitrep 3 p.m., Oct 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969. Telegram 4425 Sitrep 6:30 p.m., Oct 22 [sic], Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 21 October 1969. Telegram 4429 Sitrep 8 p.m. Oct 21, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 22 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Chilean Regiments Rebel Over Pay, New York Times, 22 October 1969, pp. 1, 10. Tanques del Pueblo se Tomaron la Calle, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 2. 419

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resignation to Viaux. At 04:11, ju st before sunrise on 22 Octobe r, Viaux and Silva signed the Tacna Accord the key clauses of which were: Viaux would continue to comply with the authority of the President and constitutional powers, Marambios resignation would be made public, Frei would resolve the troops economic issues in an urgent manner, and the Frei government recognized that Viaux was facilitati ng the solution of the existent problem and would reaffirm its confidence in the Army. El Mercurio reported that Frei personally approved the accord, and Frei later admitted to Charg Shlaudeman, that the Armys unrest was no more than a reflection of much graver ills affecting all of Chilean society. Soldiers and everybody else want more money. 81 The Tacna Accord should have ended the affa ir, but three developmen ts propelled it far beyond its original bounds as a sitin protest. The Frei governme nt engaged in a disinformation campaign that labelled the Tacnazo as an at tempted coup and sought to link the right-wing National Party to it. A CIA press spokesman dra gged the United States into events. Finally, Viauxs fate became a new issue of contention be tween the military and the Frei government. La Nacin immediately charged the Nati onal Party (PN) with complicity in the protest. During the morning of 21 October, when Rojas invi ted party leaders to his office, he apparently did not invite PN leaders. Party founder Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Secretary General Engelberto Frias, and several PN leaders attended anyway and proffered their suppo rt to the government. 81 Dan Como Superado el Movimiento Militar, El Siglo, 23 October 1969, p. 1. El Siglo printed the agreement, El Mercurio printed it a week later, and La Nacin did not. See Texto del Documento Acta del Tacna, El Mercurio 29 October 1969, p. 25. Las Horas Cruciales, La Nacin 23 October 1969, pp. 1, 11. Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 104-108. The agreement is reprinted on p. 108. Telegram 4431 Sitrep 9 a.m. October 22, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 22 October 1969, Folder POL 2 Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su poca II: 712. Telegram 4593 Frei on the Chilean Scene, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 31 October 1969, Folder POL Chile, Box 1776, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 420

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During the Tacnazo, the PN issued a statement sayi ng that it supported the constitutional regime and did not favor extra-constitu tional solutions. The next day, La Nacin denounced the PN for not condemning the attempted coup, and it and El Siglo asserted that a consensus existed on the Left to apply [a] state of siege against the seditious Nazis of the Right. The PN rejected such assertions, charging that they unnecessa rily and dangerously prolonged the existing situation. 82 La Nacin accused the PN of trying to erase their seditious fingerprints from the Tacnazo, and printed photographs of four PN leaders, including Onofre Jarpa and Frias, under the caption Popular Punishment not Aggression. The U.S. embassy deemed the item a Wanted: Dead or Alive poster and government sanction of mob violence. 83 A CIA spokesperson then pulled th e United States into the affair Preparing a story on the events in Chile, a Washington Post reporter contacted the CIA for background information. The spokesman apparently used the moment to build rapport and a sense of openness with the press. He said that the agency had been aware of developments leading to this turn of events in Chile 82 Tarrazos y Puetes Recibieron Momios al Salir de La Moneda, El Siglo 22 October 1969, p. 7. La Nacin printed the PNs statement. See Partido Nacional: No Condena la Intentona, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 5. Todos los Partidos Contra la Sedicin, La Nacin 22 October 1969, p. 5. Dirigir Estado de Sitio en Contra de Los Momios, El Siglo 22 October 1969, p. 6. Telegram 4460 Press Reaction to AP Story, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 23 October 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980; Telegram 4445 National Party, GOC, and the Golpe, Shlaudeman to Se cretary of State, 22 October 1969, Folder POL 12 Chile 1/1/69, Box 1778; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. El Partido Nacional y Las Fuerzas Armadas, El Mercurio 23 October 1969, p. 23. 83 Procuran Borrar Huellas Sediciosas; La FECh: Sa nciones Contra La Derecha; and Damnificados: La Unidad Popular y La Derecha; all La Nacin 24 October 1969, p. 5. Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 102. Airgram A-403 Fuent ealba: He Floats, Shlaudeman (Friedman) to De partment of State, 3 December 1969, Folder Political Affairs and Relations Chile-US, Box 1981; and Telegram 4496 Aftermath of Military Mutiny: October 24 Roundup, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 24 October 1969, Fo lder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Box 1529; both CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 421

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for the last 6 months. He admitted that a comment was unusual, but the agency did wish to respond to queries when operationa l sources would not be affected. 84 Reading the Post s article on the morning of 22 October, Chile Desk Officer A. P. Shankle and Ambassador Korry, who was in Washington on leave, recognized immediately the explosive nature of the comment: implications of CIA / U.S. involvement when none existed. By midmorning, Department officers had wired news of the CIAs comment to the embassy and coordinated a statement with the Departments pr ess office to minimize impact. If asked (no reporter did), the Departments spokesman was prepar ed to say that military discontent has been a recurrent problem in Chile for some time, a nd a matter of public knowledge. Even so, the story went on the AP wire. Chiles afternoon newspaper ltimas Noticias picked up the CIA item for its 22 October edition, which appeared on newsstands a few hours after Viaux turned himself over to authorities and in time for Santiagos evening rush hour. 85 Two hours after ltimas Noticias hit the newsstands Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Patricio Silva Echeique called Charg Shlaudeman to his office to register sharp protest over the CIA comment, and the protest nearly led to a diplomatic row. Speaking officially and formally for Frei, Silva Echeique asked the Un ited States to prevent any further comments from U.S. agencies, but then he added that suspicions of CIA involvement existed among 84 Goshko, Units Revolt in Chile, Washington Post 22 October 1969, p. A16. Telegram 178765, Rogers (Arthur P. Shankle, Jr., Chile Desk Officer) to U.S. Em bassy Santiago, 22 October 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. There is no documentary evidence indicating that the CIA or the U.S. Embassy had any contact with Viaux or other officers of the Tacnazo. 85 Telegram 178765, Rogers (Shankle) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 22 October 1969. Telegram 4460 Siglo, Clarin and Ultimas Noticias Reported CIA Spokesmans Comments, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 23 October 1969; and Telegram 4449 Statement of CIA Spokesman, Shlaud eman to Secretary of Stat e, 23 October 1969; both Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 422

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high officials. Shlaudeman objected, insisting that the U.S. policy of friendship and support for Frei, his government, and Chile s democracy was too clearly es tablished over long years to allow responsible gov[ernmen]t officials [to] ente rtain such notions. Silva said that past experiences had led the Chilean government to observe that there [was] not always full coordination of action [among ] USG agencies. Shlaudeman retorted: We would not be surprised [to] find this sort of thing among th e hostile and uninformed, but the [Government of Chile] is another matter. The meeting soon ended. 86 Chilean newspapers now weaved the CIA co mment with the coup narrative and supposed PN ties. Wiring Washington, Shlaudeman lamented, I have to say that we made this particular trouble for ourselves. [The] CIA spokesmans rema rks were injudicious, inane, and completely uncalled for.[U]p to this time no one has atte mpted to connect [the] embassy or USG with General Viauxs adventure. The Communist El Siglo and leftist Clarin joined La Nacin in linking the PN and the CIA to the Tacnazo. El Siglo editor Eduardo Labar ca asserted that the comment brought to light a first fact of a possible role of the North American embassy and that countrys intelligence services in the triggering of the golpe. He also implied that Korrys absence may be tied to the CIA and the golpe Clarin asked in a headline, CIA Knew of Military Golpe for Six Weeks: Doesnt That Seem Strange to You? 87 86 Telegram 4449 Statement of CIA Spokesman, Shlaudem an to Secretary of State, 23 October 1969, Folder POL 23 Chile 1/1/67, Box 1980, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 87 Telegram 4449 Statement of CIA Spokesman, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 23 October 1969. Eduardo Labarca, En Washington conocan los planes sediciosos, El Siglo 23 October 1969, p. 3. Telegram 4460 Siglo, Clarin and Ultimas Noticias Reported CIA Spokesmans Co mments, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 23 October 1969. Labarcas claim that very few continued to calling the Tacnazo sedition or a frustrated golpe is not sustained by a review of the daily editions of his newspaper El Siglo or of La Nacin Labarca, Chile al rojo 62-63. 423

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The portrayal of the Tacnazo as a golpe cast Viaux as a golpista, and Mrs. Viaux spoke out in defense of her husband. Categorically denying that her husband was a golpista, she accused his detractors of being cowards who now want to show that they are men by subjecting to trial one of their companions who has given everything for the Army and the nation. She called for better pay and conditions for the armed forces, asking how we can maintain our homes, educate our children, and dress them on a hunger salary? When General Castillo resigned the next day he likely was asked to do so he bitterly at tacking Viaux for usurping the High Commands efforts to improve military pay. Mrs. Viaux qui ckly charged that Castillos attacks on her husband demonstrate the lack of manhood that has always characterized his actions. 88 Department of State officials were furious as well, and they directed their anger at the CIA and Frei. Recognizing that the CIA comment wa s the United States own blunder it was, as Silva Echeique said, a lack of coordination De partment officials were angry with the CIA for issuing a comment. The Department made vig orous representations to the CIA, and CIA Director Richard Helms apol ogized for the comment. Department officials were angered by Frei s suspicions comment. ARA instructed Shlaudeman at earliest opportunity and in most vigorous terms insist that Silva Echeique convey two points to Frei. First, the United States sincerely a pologized for the CIAs unauthorized statement, and second, the Un ited States was shocked, dismayed, and disappointed that any responsible Chilean o fficial would harbor any suspicions of U.S. 88 Olavarra Bravo, Chile bajo la Democrcia Cristiana V: 284. Olavarra Bravo reprints Seora Delia Igault de Viauxs letter. El General Sergio Castillo Arnguiz Hace Declaraciones Pblicas al Abandonar su Cargo, El Mercurio 25 October 1969, p. 20. Telegram 4496 Aftermath of Military Mutiny: Oct. 24 Roundup, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 24 October 1969. Telegram 4497 Military Shakeup, Shlaudeman to Secretary of State, 25 October 1969; and Telegram 4504 Military Reajuste, Sh laudeman to Secretary of State, 27 October 1969; both Folder DEF Defense Affairs Chile, Bo x 1529, CFPF 1967-69, RG59, NA. 424

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involvement in the Tacnazo. The record of US support for and cooperation with democracy and constitutionalism in Chile is well known and extend[s] in history well before the Frei administration, ARA rejoined; moreover, it was t he entire and sole basis of US policy toward Chile. Korry sent his own bliste ring letter to Frei. Declarin g that he was outraged by the suspicions comment, Korry wrote, our only efforts were directed to responding to the best of our abilities and capacities in ai ding Freis government in str engthening [Chiles] democratic structure. Any suggestion to the contrary by anyone is scurrilous, unfounded, and infantile. 89 The two communiqus were remarkable in two important ways. First, while the United States had been frustrated, even angry, with th e Chileans in the past, no Chilean president since at least Pedro Aguirre Cerda had received a U. S. diplomatic communiqu, much less two, that expressed the fury contained in the two missives that Frei rece ived on 24 October. Second, the Department and Korry, in their fury, articulate d what U.S. officials since 1945 had admitted to themselves but had never told the Chileans: supporting and strengthening Chiles democracy was the core tenet, indeed the entire and sole ba sis, of U.S. policy toward Chile. U.S. officials were willing to accept Freis anger over the CIA comment and apologized for it. Yet, to suggest that the United States was not committed to Chilean democracy, pa rticularly since it had been the polestar of U.S. policy since the start of the Cold War, and to hear it from the president who arguably had benefited the most from it, we nt beyond the pale for U.S. officials. 89 Telegram 180008, Rogers (Shankle) to U.S. Embassy Santiago, 23 October 1969; and Instruction Telegram 180007, Rogers (Korry) to Shlaudeman, 23 October 1