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The Connection Principle

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0024326/00001

Material Information

Title: The Connection Principle An Exegesis and Defense
Physical Description: 1 online resource (258 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Tostenson, David
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: connection, consciousness, intentionality
Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: In this study, I explicate and defend the view that there is a conceptual connection between the notion of intentionality, or representation, and phenomenal consciousness. Specifically, I argue that any intentional state is to be understood as either a conscious mental state or a disposition to have a conscious mental state, a view I call, after the work of John R. Searle, the Connection Principle. Intentionality and consciousness both present significant challenges to philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, but it is widely believed that they present different sorts of challenge. Specifically, intentionality is thought to be at least a tractable problem, something on which we already have a promising theoretical grasp. Meanwhile consciousness is often thought to present a vastly more difficult problem, perhaps more of a mystery. This view encourages the thought that we can pursue the study of intentionality independently of the study of consciousness. Meanwhile some researchers have attempted to show that the problems of consciousness are after all not intractable, but are reducible to the problems of intentionality, and are thereby readily resoluble within current research paradigms, though much remains to be worked out in detail. By establishing the Connection Principle, however, I make clear that the notion of intentionality ultimately presupposes the notion of consciousness, so both problems are equally tractable or intractable, and attempts to reduce consciousness to intentional notions get the order of explanatory priority backwards. Much recent work on both subjects will then need to be rethought in light of this fact.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by David Tostenson.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Ludwig, Kirk A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0024326:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0024326/00001

Material Information

Title: The Connection Principle An Exegesis and Defense
Physical Description: 1 online resource (258 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Tostenson, David
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: connection, consciousness, intentionality
Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: In this study, I explicate and defend the view that there is a conceptual connection between the notion of intentionality, or representation, and phenomenal consciousness. Specifically, I argue that any intentional state is to be understood as either a conscious mental state or a disposition to have a conscious mental state, a view I call, after the work of John R. Searle, the Connection Principle. Intentionality and consciousness both present significant challenges to philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, but it is widely believed that they present different sorts of challenge. Specifically, intentionality is thought to be at least a tractable problem, something on which we already have a promising theoretical grasp. Meanwhile consciousness is often thought to present a vastly more difficult problem, perhaps more of a mystery. This view encourages the thought that we can pursue the study of intentionality independently of the study of consciousness. Meanwhile some researchers have attempted to show that the problems of consciousness are after all not intractable, but are reducible to the problems of intentionality, and are thereby readily resoluble within current research paradigms, though much remains to be worked out in detail. By establishing the Connection Principle, however, I make clear that the notion of intentionality ultimately presupposes the notion of consciousness, so both problems are equally tractable or intractable, and attempts to reduce consciousness to intentional notions get the order of explanatory priority backwards. Much recent work on both subjects will then need to be rethought in light of this fact.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by David Tostenson.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Ludwig, Kirk A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0024326:00001


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PAGE 6

Explanandum

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8 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate S chool of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE CONNECTION PRINCIPLE: AN EXEGESIS AN D DEFENSE By David N. Tostenson August 2009 Chair: Kirk Ludwig Major: Philosophy In this study, I explicate and defend the view that there is a conceptual connection between the notion of intentionality, or representation, and phenomenal consciousness. Specifically, I argue that any intentional state is to be understood as either a conscious mental state or a disposition to have a conscious mental state, a view I call, after the work of John R. Searle, the Connection Principle. Intentionality and consci ousness both present significant challenges to philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, but it is widely believed that they present different sorts of challenge. Specifically, intentionality is thought to be at least a tractable problem, something on w hich we already have a promising theoretical grasp. Meanwhile consciousness is often thought to present a vastly more difficult problem, perhaps more of a mystery. This view encourages the thought that we can pursue the study of intentionality independentl y of the study of consciousness. Meanwhile some researchers have attempted to show that the problems of consciousness are after all not intractable, but are reducible to the problems of intentionality, and are thereby readily resoluble within current research paradigms, though much remains to be worked out in detail. By establishing the Connection Principle, however, I make clear that the notion of intentionality ultimately presupposes the notion of consciousness, so both problems are equally

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9 tractable or i ntractable, and attempts to reduce consciousness to intentional notions get the order of explanatory priority backwards. Much recent work on both subjects will then need to be rethought in light of this fact.

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Introduction

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sans sans

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An Overview

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Introduction Intentionality as C ontentfulness

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lo cus classicus

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Content and Mode

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Conditions of Satisfaction p

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reductio ad absurdum p p p p p p p p p

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Direction of F it

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Original Derived and As If Intentionality As if I ntentionality

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Natural M eaning

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s a

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t t t

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E C E C E

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Original and Derived Intentionality

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Defending the Distinction

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raison detre. s s s ersatz

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Conclusions

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Introduction Ambiguity

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Self -C onsciousness Creature C onsciousness Drosophilia

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Tra nsitive C onsciousness x

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P P Q P P Q P P P P

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Intransitive Consciousness/State C onsciousness incapable of being in conscious states

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AConsciousness

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Phenomenal Consciousne ss

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x prima facie

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Is Consciousness A mbiguous?

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Introduction Some Central Problems of C onsciousness

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Description

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C C S S prima facie

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prima facie

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Explanation

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The Why Q uestions could ad hoc

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prima facie

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ipso facto

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o f

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The Metaphysics of C onsciousness

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Introduction

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Informational Richness

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vast difference in dispositional complexity

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prima facie

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prima facie

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abstracta concreta concreta

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Consciousness as Non Conceptual C ontent

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Against Representationalism D D

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tout court. tout court

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Dretske

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a fortiori

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a fortiori

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when ad hoc ad hoc

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Tye x x

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prima facie

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ad hoc ad hoc Millikan your

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Fodor and f unctionalism

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asymmetrically be about

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only known

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if

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n n n n

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Can Original Intentionality B e a M atter of D egree? prima facie

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Against the vagueness of intentio nality

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Against original intentionalitys being a degree concept

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Conditions of satisfaction Vague contents

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The erosion of cognitive capacities compos mentis

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p p p prima facie p q p p q

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Partial c ompetence.

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The naturalists rejoinder

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representations no

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ersatz x y en masse

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fiat

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Introduction Higher Order Representation s s s Essay De Anima DA

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s s s s

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x x x prima facie What is the Explanandum ?

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have

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explanandum

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present

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prima facie CP HOR

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prima facie

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s s s s x x for me

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Introduction p p p

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p p p

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p q p -q

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p

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Auralization

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Introspective Reports p q p p p p sui generis

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difference the phenomenology of attitude type is

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is

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makes

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our

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Arguments against a Phenomenology of C ognition Georgalis

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p

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p q

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p p beliefs that

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pure feeling p p ceteris paribus p

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p Nelkin prima facie

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is that those that that p q r p p

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q p q

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p p p

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p p reductio ad absurdum p p p prima facie

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prima facie Some Theoretical Work

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Introduction The Dispositional and the Categorical

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Distinction S: o C M

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o ceteris paribus a posteriori a priori a pri ori ceteris paribus ceteris paribus

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d o o o o d Masking

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Mimicking o d Finkish Dispositions

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ceteris paribus o S2: M C B C B M C B

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a priori

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M C M C

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Relation d m d m d m Identity

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a fortiori

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Functionalism

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P P

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Explanatory R elevance m m

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) f

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a pri ori b d b d b d Conclusion prima facie

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Indirect A rguments Siewart

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seeing

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Horgan and Tienson epoche

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Brian Loar David Pitt

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p p p p p p

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p p p p p Direct A rguments prima facie Searle

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The Rediscovery of the Mind.

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Ludwig

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Huckleberry Finn Huckleberry Finn

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Taki ng S tock

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ad hoc

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Introduction Occams Razor ceteris paribus

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ceteris paribus

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psyche telos

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Metaphysics

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but complete

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sum unity unity

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x y y

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explanandum

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prima facie

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Is This Simply the P roblem o f Other Intentional A gents?

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Are the Representations Really U nconscious?

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prima facie explanans per mirabile

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prima facie ceteris paribus

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Introduction

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The Problem of Determinate Content Quine and Davidson

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Word and Object

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r r r

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mutatis mutandis

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Kripke

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a b

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a b Further Reflections

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x x x hoi polloi

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fleuves rivires Il y a un fleuve l Je ne regrette pas rien Je ne regrette pas rien

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a fortiori

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par excellence

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S s s s s

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a fortiori

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Summary

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Introduction

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A Purely Verbal D ispute

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False A ttributions Real Unconscious I ntentionality

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Conclusion

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Intention Vision and Mind Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Per ception Journal of Consciousness Studies On the soul The Complete Works of Aristotle Metaphysics. The Complete Works of Aristotle, A Materialist Theory of Mind The Nature of Consciousness The Nature of Mind and Other Essays Neural Computation A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness An inexpressibility account of the semantic paradox es Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Midwest Studies in Philosophy Behavioral and Brain Sciences Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Midwest Studies in Philosophy Philosophical Review Introducing Persons: An Introduction to the Philosophy of the Mind. Journal of Philosophy Phenomenal Consciousness HigherOrder Theories of Consciousness T he Conscious Mind Conceivability and Possibility Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Philosophical Topics Analysis The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception Psychologica Belgica Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson The Selfish Gene Brainstorms The Intentional Stance

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Modelling the Mind Consciousness Explained. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Naturalizing the Mind Th e History and Theory of Vitalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Psychosemantics is Philosophy and Phenomenological Research New Scientist Sinn Bedeutung The Frege Reader Consciousness and Self -Consciousness Canadian Journal of Philosophy HigherOrder Theories of Consciousness The Primacy of the Subjective Nous Behavioral and Brain Sciences Fact, Fiction and Forecast Paleobiology Philosophical Review

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The Nature of Consciousness Philosophical Perspectives The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Review From an Ontological Point of View Synthese Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Consciousness and the Computational Mind Philosophical Quarterly The Principles of Psychology Mind in a Physical World Physicalism and its discontents Philosophical Studies, Naming and Necessity Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Consciousness and Cognition Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly The Philosophical Quarterly Behavioral and Brain Sciences Perception Philosophical Perspectives Consciousness Consciousness and Experience Philosophical Perspectives HigherOrder Theories of Consciousness. Truth, Probability and Paradox Synthese The Philosophical Quarterly Synthese Midwest Studies in Philosophy Mind The Problems of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution A System of Logic The Varieties of Meaning Philosophical Studies Dispositions Philosophical Review

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Consciousness and the Origins of Thought Behavioral and Brain Science A Study of Concepts Nous The Language Instinct Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Plutarch's Lives and Writings: Essays and Miscellanies, American Philosophical Quarterly British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Ontological Relativity and Other Essays Word and Object Ontological Relativity and Other Essays British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness Consciousness and Mind Midwest Studies in Philosophy The Nature of Mind Philosophical Studies

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The Nature of Consciousness Co nsciousness The Nature of Consciousness Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays The Nature of Consciousness Philosophical Topics HigherOrder Theories of Consciousness Consciousness and Mind American Zoologist The Things We Me an Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind Minds, Brains and Science. The Journal of Philosophy Philosophical Topics Behavioral and Brain Sciences The Rediscovery of the Mind The Construction of Social Reality The Mystery o f Consciousness Psychological Review The Stream of Consciousness

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The Significance of Consciousness Visual Cognition Perception Inquiry Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophy of Language Science From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Ten Problems of Consciousness The S tanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Pacific Philosophical Q uarterly