<%BANNER%>

Effects of Narrative Refutational Text, Epistemological Beliefs, Empathy, Affect, and Systematic and Heuristic Processin...

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022429/00001

Material Information

Title: Effects of Narrative Refutational Text, Epistemological Beliefs, Empathy, Affect, and Systematic and Heuristic Processing on Conceptual Change in Preservice Teachers
Physical Description: 1 online resource (102 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Austin, Clayton
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: affect, change, conceptual, dual, empathy, narrative, processing, refutational
Educational Psychology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Educational Psychology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Preservice teachers enter teacher education programs with many strongly held beliefs that conflict with findings of educational research. In this study two interventions were compared that were designed to enable preservice teachers to recognize the conflicts between their entering beliefs and new research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will contribute to their effectiveness as teachers. Conceptual change theorists have identified refutational text that explicitly contrasts na?ve and accurate conceptions, as effective in facilitating conceptual change. The effectiveness of adding narrative elements of plot, character and setting to refutational text for effecting change in concepts of motivation in preservice teachers was investigated in this study. Weaknesses of previous conceptual change research, such as failing to investigate the personal characteristics of epistemological beliefs and verbal ability and affective and cognitive factors that could serve as resources for change were addressed. Pretreatment questionnaires on conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and epistemological beliefs were given to 190 students majoring in education. Then participants were randomly assigned to read an expository refutational or narrative refutational text and complete measures of empathy, affect, cognitive processing, and conceptions of motivation. Conceptions of motivation were measured again one month later. Structural equation modeling was used to test the fit of the proposed model of conceptual change and to analyze hypotheses regarding the relationships among the intervention and individual differences and conceptual change. The revised model included a significant direct effect of narrative refutational text compared to expository refutational text on changes in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and, indirectly via empathy, on conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Narrative refutational text was also causally related to positive and negative affect and heuristic processing, but none of the affective or cognitive factors served as a resource for conceptual change. Contrary to prediction, epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge did not affect conceptual change. However, the results show that empathy may influence conceptual change when reading narrative refutational text.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Clayton Austin.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Ashton, Patricia T.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022429:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022429/00001

Material Information

Title: Effects of Narrative Refutational Text, Epistemological Beliefs, Empathy, Affect, and Systematic and Heuristic Processing on Conceptual Change in Preservice Teachers
Physical Description: 1 online resource (102 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Austin, Clayton
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: affect, change, conceptual, dual, empathy, narrative, processing, refutational
Educational Psychology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Educational Psychology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Preservice teachers enter teacher education programs with many strongly held beliefs that conflict with findings of educational research. In this study two interventions were compared that were designed to enable preservice teachers to recognize the conflicts between their entering beliefs and new research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will contribute to their effectiveness as teachers. Conceptual change theorists have identified refutational text that explicitly contrasts na?ve and accurate conceptions, as effective in facilitating conceptual change. The effectiveness of adding narrative elements of plot, character and setting to refutational text for effecting change in concepts of motivation in preservice teachers was investigated in this study. Weaknesses of previous conceptual change research, such as failing to investigate the personal characteristics of epistemological beliefs and verbal ability and affective and cognitive factors that could serve as resources for change were addressed. Pretreatment questionnaires on conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and epistemological beliefs were given to 190 students majoring in education. Then participants were randomly assigned to read an expository refutational or narrative refutational text and complete measures of empathy, affect, cognitive processing, and conceptions of motivation. Conceptions of motivation were measured again one month later. Structural equation modeling was used to test the fit of the proposed model of conceptual change and to analyze hypotheses regarding the relationships among the intervention and individual differences and conceptual change. The revised model included a significant direct effect of narrative refutational text compared to expository refutational text on changes in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and, indirectly via empathy, on conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Narrative refutational text was also causally related to positive and negative affect and heuristic processing, but none of the affective or cognitive factors served as a resource for conceptual change. Contrary to prediction, epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge did not affect conceptual change. However, the results show that empathy may influence conceptual change when reading narrative refutational text.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Clayton Austin.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Ashton, Patricia T.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022429:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text





EFFECTS OF NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL
BELIEFS, EMPATHY, AFFECT, AND SYSTEMATIC AND HEURISTIC
PROCESSING ON CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN PRESERVICE TEACHERS



















By

CLAYTON D. AUSTIN


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2008



























2008 Clayton D. Austin


























To my wife, Wendy, who came into my life in a dark time, and continues to brighten and warm
each day with God's Light









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

How could one student have the two best mentors in the business? During my master's

studies at the University of North Florida, Paul Eggen was my Aristotle, a citizen of the "world

of ideas" but continually grounding me with the question, "What are the implications for

classroom teaching?" During my doctoral program, Patricia Ashton was my Socrates, whose

considered silence was as effective as her gentle but pointed questions in guiding and prodding

me. Both of my mentors extended themselves without limit for my benefit, blending excellence

in academics and character in a way that earns them the title to which I aspire, teacher. Along

with my other committee members Drs. Farrar, Linderholm, and Miller, they never stepped

down but always stooped down to lift me to a higher level of scholarship.

I want to thank the Board of Governors of St. John's Academy and Principal Wallis

Brooks for accommodating my every request regarding duties and schedule to allow me the

opportunity to pursue my studies. Dr. Matt McCrudden graciously allowed me to come into his

classes at UNF to gather data. Elaine Green never abandoned me even when I pushed every

deadline beyond the breaking point and convinced me to take a semester off when I was

determined to quit.

My personal network of support was second to none. My best friend, John Hays was

enrolled in seminary while I pursued this degree, always ready to step into my world and more

importantly, to allow me into his and share these burdens of joy. My children, Madeline and

Logan Austin and Amanda Cruz, have been a blessed distraction. Finally, my lovely wife Wendy

has always applied the swift kick or gentle touch to move me where God would have me.









TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A CK N O W LED G M EN T S ................................................................. ........... ............. .....

L IS T O F T A B L E S ................................................................................. 7

LIST OF FIGURES .................................. .. ..... ..... ................. .8

ABSTRAC T ..........................................................................................

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ............... ............................ ......................... ..... 11

Teacher Conceptions .................. ............................ .............................. .. 11
Conceptual Change ...................................................... ...... ....... ......... ..... 13
Interventions for Conceptual Change ........................................................ .............. 15
Expository R efutational Text ................................................ .............................. 15
N a rrativ e T ex t............................................................................................................ 1 7
A ugm ented A ctiv ation ........................................................................... ....................24
M editors of C conceptual C change ........................................ ............................................26
A ffe ct ................... ...................2...................6..........
E m p ath y ..................................................................................................................... 2 9
System atic and H euristic Processing....................................................... ................ 31
Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change.....................................................36
E pistem logical B eliefs............ ... .......................................................... ........... ...... 36
V e rb a l A b ility ...................................................................................................... 3 8
Purpose of the Study .................... ..... ......................... ...................... .. 39
Significance of the Study for Theory ................................................... .. ... .......... 41
Significance of the Study for Practice .................................... .......................... ......... 44

2 M A TER IA L S A N D M ETH O D S ........................................ .............................................46

Research Questions........... .......... .......... ... .. .... ...... .... .......... 46
P a rtic ip a n ts ....................................................................................................................... 4 6
E xperim mental T reatm ents............................................................................... ... ............47
Pretreatment Measures................................ .. ........... ..............48
C onceptual C hange................. .... ................................ ........... .. ............. 48
E pistem logical B eliefs............ ... .......................................................... ......... ........ 50
V e rb a l A b ility ...................................................................................................... 5 1
P o sttreatm ent M easu res ................................ .........................................................................52
A effect .................................................................................... .... ...............................52
Systematic and Heuristic Processing .. .......... ........ .......... .................... ....................52
Em pathy ............... ..............54
m at Procedures...... .................................... ........ ........................... 54

P h ase 1 .............. ..................................................................... 54









Phase 2.........................................54
P h a se 3 ................... ...................5...................5..........
A n a ly sis ...........................................................................5 5

3 R E SU L T S .............. ... ................................................................58

D descriptive Statistics ................................................................... 58
M manipulation C hecks ................................................................................ 59
A analysis of the C correlation M atrix .................................................................................... .... 59
M o d el F it .....................................................................6 1
Suggested M odel M modifications ............................................................................... 62
R e search Q u e stio n s........................................................................................................... 6 4

4 D IS C U S S IO N ........................................................................................................7 4

Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change ................................................75
E p istem olog ical B eliefs............................................................................................. 7 5
Verbal Ability ......................... ........... ........... .......................... 75
Interventions for Conceptual Change .......... ........ .............................76
Potential Mediators of Conceptual Change ....................................... ... ........ 78
Weaknesses of the Study and Need for Further Research ........................84
C on clu sion ......... ........... .. ..........................................................................86

APPENDIX

A NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT (NRT) ..................................................... 89

B CODING RUBRIC FOR THOUGHT LISTINGS ..................................... ...............91

LIST O F R EFEREN CE S ...............93................. ..........................

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ......................................................................... ......... ................... 102




















6









LIST OF TABLES


Table Page

2-1 Descriptive statistics for nominal variables ............................................... ............... 56

3-1 Means and standard deviations for pre- and posttreatment measures by treatment
co n d itio n .................................................................................6 9

3-2 Polychoric correlations for pre- and posttreatment measures for ERT condition ............70

3-3 Polychoric correlations for pre- and posttreatment measures for NRT condition............71

3-4 Total, direct, and indirect effects in the revised model.............. .... .................72









LIST OF FIGURES


Figure Page

1-1 Proposed m odel of conceptual change................................................................... ......45

3-1 Revised exploratory model of change of conceptions of motivation. ............................73









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

EFFECTS OF NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL
BELIEFS, EMPATHY, AFFECT, AND SYSTEMATIC AND HEURISTIC
PROCESSING ON CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN PRESERVICE TEACHERS
By

Clayton D. Austin

August 2008

Chair: Patricia T. Ashton
Major: Educational Psychology

Preservice teachers enter teacher education programs with many strongly held beliefs that

conflict with findings of educational research. In this study two interventions were compared that

were designed to enable preservice teachers to recognize the conflicts between their entering

beliefs and new research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will

contribute to their effectiveness as teachers. Conceptual change theorists have identified

refutational text that explicitly contrasts naive and accurate conceptions, as effective in

facilitating conceptual change. The effectiveness of adding narrative elements of plot, character

and setting to refutational text for effecting change in concepts of motivation in preservice

teachers was investigated in this study. Weaknesses of previous conceptual change research,

such as failing to investigate the personal characteristics of epistemological beliefs and verbal

ability and affective and cognitive factors that could serve as resources for change were

addressed.

Pretreatment questionnaires on conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and

epistemological beliefs were given to 190 students majoring in education. Then participants were

randomly assigned to read an expository refutational or narrative refutational text and complete

measures of empathy, affect, cognitive processing, and conceptions of motivation. Conceptions









of motivation were measured again one month later. Structural equation modeling was used to

test the fit of the proposed model of conceptual change and to analyze hypotheses regarding the

relationships among the intervention and individual differences and conceptual change.

The revised model included a significant direct effect of narrative refutational text

compared to expository refutational text on changes in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and,

indirectly via empathy, on conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Narrative refutational text was

also causally related to positive and negative affect and heuristic processing, but none of the

affective or cognitive factors served as a resource for conceptual change. Contrary to prediction,

epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge did not affect conceptual change.

However, the results show that empathy may influence conceptual change when reading

narrative refutational text.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Preservice teachers enter teacher education programs with many conceptions of teaching

and learning that conflict with findings of educational research (Holt-Reynolds, 1992; Woolfolk

Hoy & Murphy, 2001). Research in a variety of disciplines, including social and developmental

psychology as well as education, has shown that many of these concepts are very resistant to

change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Wideen, Mayer-Smith, & Moon, 1998). Research is needed to

enable preservice teachers to recognize the conflicts between their entering conceptions and new

research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will contribute to their

effectiveness as teachers. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation study was three-fold: first, to

compare two interventions designed to foster conceptual change in preservice teachers, second,

to explore pre-existing personal characteristics, specifically verbal ability and epistemological

beliefs, that may influence their conceptual change, and third, to identify cognitive and affective

processes that account for conceptual change.

Teacher Conceptions

As noted by Torff and Sternberg (2001), "Far from being blank slates with little knowledge

about education, prospective teachers' prior beliefs, expectations, and knowledge influence what

they come to understand, value, and use from courses in teacher education" (p. 21). Prospective

teachers come to their teacher education courses with prior conceptions about teaching and

learning. Some of these conceptions may have their origins in common human experience, as

described by evolutionary or cognitive-developmental psychologists, or in a more specific

cultural basis as described by anthropologists or cultural psychologists (Torff & Sternberg,

2001). Yet other conceptions may have their origins in prospective teachers' unique experiences

as students (Lortie, 1975). Although these prior conceptions can be useful frameworks for









effective practice, unfortunately preservice teachers have many conceptions regarding teaching

and learning that conflict with research findings (Holt-Reynolds, 1992; Woolfolk Hoy &

Murphy, 2001).

For example, one conception of learning that has received significant attention from

researchers is characterized as the transmission model of learning (Sternberg & Torff, 2001). In

the transmission model, the student's mind is "conceived as a vessel to be filled with knowledge

that only teachers and texts can provide" (Torff, 1999, p. 200). However, most teacher educators

maintain that the transmission model does not adequately capture the complexity of learning,

because knowledge is not merely imparted to students, it is actively constructed by students

(Torff, 1999; Woolfolk Hoy, 1996). The transmission model of learning is very resistant to

correction (Torff, 1999) and even when conceptions are correct, actions may not be. For

example, Strauss (2001) described how even professors who do not endorse the transmission

model still teach their classes as if they do.

In addition to these misconceptions about teaching and learning, many prospective

teachers' conceptions about motivation conflict with contemporary theoretical perspectives.

Patrick and Pintrich (2001) claimed that among prospective and novice teachers the most

common conception about motivation is that it is a stable trait-like characteristic of students (see

Calderhead, 1996; Holt-Reynolds, 1992); however, contemporary researchers characterize

motivation as the "ongoing dynamic process of interactions between the student and the context,

rather than as an object that students either have or do not have" (p. 129). A related conception

contrary to research but commonly held by prospective teachers is that only positive feedback

will increase motivation (Pajares & Bengston, 1995; Pajares & Graham, 1998).









Research on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation has led to findings that conflict with many

preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation. Extrinsic motivation refers to motivation for a

task that originates from outside the individual, typically in the forms of reinforcers such as

rewards and punishments. In contrast, intrinsic motivation refers to motivation for a task that

originates from within the learner, such as a desire to achieve mastery. Intrinsic motivation for a

learning task has been associated with deeper understanding and increased creativity (see Deci &

Ryan, 1980, 1985, 1991).

The finding that extrinsic rewards can decrease intrinsic motivation for a learning task

initiated a significant debate (see Ryan & Deci, 2000, for summary). However, according to

Lepper and Henderlong (2000), over 100 studies performed over three decades has resulted in a

consensus among researchers that initial intrinsic motivation for a learning task will likely be

diminished when students expect to receive a tangible arbitrary reward (e.g., stickers, prizes) for

completion of the task.

Two intervention studies (Kutza, 2000; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999) have focused

on fostering change in preservice teachers' conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In

these studies a text was used to refute the conception that extrinsic or reinforcement motivation

is the only or best motivation for learning and explain the concept of intrinsic motivation and its

positive effects on learning. I investigated the effect of adding narrative structures to the

expository refutational text used in these studies.

Conceptual Change

Researchers investigating changing teachers' prior conceptions to be more consistent with

research have looked to the literature on conceptual change as a theoretical framework (e.g., Gill,

2003; Patrick & Pintrich, 2001; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999). Important models of

conceptual change have emerged from research in developmental and social psychology and









science education (Vosniadou, 1999). Piaget (1975) explained how individuals confronted with a

new concept either assimilate it into existing mental schemes or restructure their schemes to

accommodate the new concept. This accommodation has been the focus of conceptual change

research in science education, a domain that often requires learners to change naive concepts or

theories in favor of scientific ones. Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) posited four

conditions for conceptual change: (a) dissatisfaction with existing concepts, (b) intelligibility of

new concepts, (c) plausibility of new concepts, and (d) fruitfulness of new concepts.

Posner et al. (1982) described the relationship between existing and new concepts, but

others criticized their model for its narrow conception of conceptual change. Pintrich, Marx, and

Boyle (1993), for example, criticized the model as overly "cold" and stressing cognition while

ignoring the influence of affect and motivation. Caravita and Hallden (1994) criticized a

foundational metaphor of conceptual change models, that of the student as scientist. They

claimed students learn more inductively, are more concerned with outcome than method, and

have more egocentric peer relations than scientists. Mayer (2002) claimed researchers of

conceptual change have yet to identify mechanisms of change or methodologies to effect change.

In response to these criticisms, researchers have looked to social psychological theories on

attitude change, particularly Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, and more recent

processing models (for reviews, see Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As a result,

researchers of conceptual change (e.g., Limon & Mason, 2002; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003) have

begun to identify the complex interplay of knowledge, affect, and motivation that contributes to

the process of change in knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes during learning.

From this important new scholarship, I identified key questions: What types of

interventions effect the greatest and longest lasting conceptual change? What learner









characteristics play a role in conceptual change? What cognitive and affective processes are used

in conceptual change? Then I proposed and tested a model based on these questions.

Specifically, I investigated narrative refutational text as a potentially effective and long lasting

intervention, verbal ability and epistemological beliefs as important learner characteristics, and

the influence of learners' empathy, affect, and systematic and heuristic processing in conceptual

change.

Interventions for Conceptual Change

Given that conceptual change is an important goal of teacher education programs, it is

important to identify the kinds of instructional interventions that can be used to effect conceptual

change. Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, and Gamas (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of the

interventions used in reading and science education to induce conceptual change. Examples of

interventions in their meta-analysis include discussion, demonstration, Socratic questioning,

concept mapping, summarizing, activating background knowledge, and reading expository,

refutational, and narrative texts. Interventions that made use of some kind of text were more

effective and longer-lasting than those that did not (effect size = .49), provided the text was

refutational or used with a strategy to induce cognitive conflict.

Expository Refutational Text

Plain expository text, typically used in school textbooks, simply explains concepts.

Expository refutational text, in contrast, explains a widely accepted concept and then refutes it by

describing a new and conflicting concept. On the basis of their meta-analysis, Guzzetti et al.

(1993) concluded that expository refutational text is one of the most effective approaches

researchers have used to achieve conceptual change. In eight studies, expository refutational text

had a greater effect on conceptual change than a typical expository nonrefutational text (average









effect size = .24). Guzzetti (2000) reported that conceptual change effected from expository

refutational text lasted a month or more, which is longer than other methods studied to date.

Expository refutational text has been more effective than plain expository text in inducing

conceptual change in preservice teachers. Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) investigated the

use of expository refutational text in changing prospective teachers' conceptions of motivation.

Participants read either a plain expository text that simply described intrinsic motivation or an

expository refutational text that criticized extrinsic motivation and then described intrinsic

motivation. After reading one of the texts, participants responded to 20 brief classroom scenarios

that endorsed either an intrinsic or extrinsic view of motivation. Participants who read the

expository refutational text demonstrated more evidence of conceptual change than those who

read the plain expository text on an immediate posttest (effect size = .71) and a posttest delayed 1

week (effect size = .54).

In her dissertation study, Kutza (2000) used the same text as Salisbury-Glennon and

Stevens (1999) but analyzed the 20 scenarios as two 10-item intrinsic and extrinsic subscales to

look for more precise and specific evidence of change. Furthermore, she used the texts in

conjunction with a contextual variable of reward structure. Kutza found that expository

refutational text facilitated conceptual change only with regard to the rejection of an extrinsic

theory and only when paired with an external controlling reward structure. This result was

observed on the immediate and delayed posttest.

Gill, Ashton, and Algina (2004) contrasted expository refutational and plain expository

text in a study of prospective teachers' epistemological beliefs about mathematics, described as

either constructivist or proceduralist. Those who hold constructivist beliefs endorse teaching for

deep understanding using authentic problems (Hiebert et al., 1996). In contrast, those who hold









proceduralist beliefs endorse using rote drill and practice. Both texts described the more

research-based constructivist epistemological beliefs, but the expository refutational text also

refuted the proceduralist beliefs.

After reading one of the two texts, participants completed outcome measures designed to

assess explicit and implicit epistemological beliefs of mathematics. Explicit beliefs were

measured by two subscales of the Cognitively Guided Instruction Belief Survey developed by

Peterson, Fennema, Carpenter, and Loef (1989). Implicit beliefs were measured by participants'

responses to eight short scenarios the first author constructed to represent either constructivist or

proceduralist teaching practices in mathematics. The expository refutational text was superior to

the plain expository text in changing explicit and implicit beliefs.

Narrative Text

Although expository refutational and plain expository text were used in the research

described above, some researchers have suggested that narrative text may have a stronger

positive effect on learning than either expository refutational text or plain expository text

(Lipson, 1986; Maria & Johnson, 1990; Valencia & Stallman, 1988). A narrative text is a

"symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matter and related by time"

(Scholes, 1981, p. 205). It may or may not involve human agents and intentions; for example, the

description of the formation of a tropical storm would be narrative without human agents.

However, a story is a type of narrative that consists of "events, characters, and settings arranged

in a temporal sequence implying both causality and significance" (Carter, 1993, p. 6) and

"encourages the projection of human values" (Scholes, 1981, p. 206). From this perspective I

investigated the use of stories, not merely narrative texts, in conceptual change; however,

conceptual change researchers have used the terms narrative text and narrative structures in

describing stories and their characteristics (Alvermann, Hynd, & Qian, 1995; Guzzetti et al.,









1993; Guzzetti, Williams, Skeels, & Wu, 1997). I have followed this convention and refer to

stories as narrative texts and their characteristics (characters, settings, and cause and effect

sequences) as narrative structures.

Researchers have advocated the use of stories, movies, or videotaped or written case

studies in teacher education programs (Putnam & Borko, 1997; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001).

The use of narrative texts and structures in teacher education programs may be warranted given

that preservice teachers' conceptions tend to be in the form of events and stories (Doyle &

Carter, 1996) that are often grounded in their experiences as students (Lortie, 1975). However,

researchers have also warned against the dangers of using narrative texts and structures for

research or communication. Phillips (1994, 1997) warned that narratives must be demonstrated

by analytical methods as true, not merely coherent or plausible, especially when they are

designed to influence public policy or classroom practice.

Doyle (1997) responded to the criticism of using narratives in teacher education arguing

that "story offers the only possibility for 'truth' in the study of teaching" (p. 95). Instead of

addressing epistemological questions about whether analytic or narrative text is most

representative of truth, Doyle outlined how those who are interested in understanding and

improving teaching, an "event and action with respect to a curriculum," can use narratives of

teaching as provisional models to capture the "floating value" of truth (p. 95).

Without endorsing Doyle's (1997) view, I believe the use of narrative refutational text in

my dissertation study avoids the criticisms of Phillips (1994, 1997). Narrative refutational text

consists of narrative structures that have been added to pre-existing expository refutational text

that was constructed based on results of the use of analytical methods. Therefore the meaning of

both narrative refutational text and expository refutational text, specifically the refutation of a









misconception and explaining a more accurate conception, remains open to analytical tests for

truth. Thus, the narrative refutational text is quite different from other narrative texts and

structures such as movies, books, or even case studies.

Some researchers have investigated the use of narrative text in effecting conceptual

change. Maria and Johnson (1990) noted that expository texts may present scientific conceptions

in an abstract or decontextualized manner, making it difficult for students to relate the

information to their pre-existing conceptions. To overcome this difficulty Maria and Johnson

suggested the use of narrative texts in science classes. Gordon and Rennie (1987) had fifth

graders read a short story about a boy and a lion to help them change their misconceptions that

wild animals are always ferocious. However, students who read the narrative text in addition to

an expository refutational text exhibited more evidence of conceptual change than students who

read only the narrative text, casting doubt about the effectiveness of straight narrative in

effecting conceptual change.

Other researchers have blended narrative and expository structures in a single text to effect

conceptual change. For example, results have been promising for soft expository text, a hybrid of

narrative and expository structures. Guzzetti et al. (1993) reported that the largest effect size

found in their meta-analysis was for considerate soft expository text. Considerate text exhibits

global coherence, such as an overall cause-and-effect or problem-and-solution structure, and

local coherence at the sentence level, such as clear references, substitutions, and connections

(Armbruster, 1984). Considerate soft expository text demonstrated strong effects when compared

with inconsiderate plain expository text (average effect size = -1.26, n = 4) and moderate effects

compared against expository refutational considerate text (average effect size = .59, n = 4).

These effect sizes were calculated from Maria and Johnson's (1990) study in which considerate









soft expository text was more effective than inconsiderate text in producing conceptual change as

measured on all immediate and delayed recognition and application tests in fifth- and seventh-

grade students who were learning about seasonal change in a gifted and talented program.

In contrast with the effectiveness of narrative structures in effecting conceptual change in

elementary school students, researchers have not found narrative structures to be more effective

than expository structures with secondary or undergraduate students. In their meta-analysis

Guzzetti et al. (1993) reported that narrative refutational text was inferior to expository

refutational text in producing conceptual change in high school students (average effect size = -

.25). This divergence from findings in elementary grades may indicate that students outgrow the

need for narrative structures (Guzzetti et al., 1993) or that these structures may distract learners

from important information (Guzzetti et al., 1997). For example, Alvermann et al. (1995)

investigated the effect of narrative refutational text and expository refutational text in promoting

conceptual change in ninth-grade physics students' conceptions of impetus theory and

Newtonian mechanics. Expository refutational text was superior to narrative refutational text on

two of the three posttests, an application task, and short-answer task. The application task

required students to use a diagram to draw the path a projectile would take and explain their

conclusions. The short-answer task was comprised of six items that either cued the subjects' free

recall of the text or asked them a high-order question about the concepts described in the text.

There were no significant differences on a 21-item true/false posttest. The authors suggested that,

by ninth grade, students may no longer read everything like a story and may find the story

elements distracting from the technical material in the passage, expecting expository text to be

tested one way and narrative text in another. Alvermann et al. recommended that future

researchers should try to clarify whether the superiority of expository text over narrative text









with high-school students is due to the increase in older students' ability to distinguish their

approach to learning depending on the type of text or whether the story grammar of narratives

interferes with the learning of technical material. To achieve this understanding, Alvermann et al.

(1995) suggested that researchers should include methods, such as talk-alouds or self-reports.

Guzzetti et al. (1997) used the narrative refutational text and expository refutational text

texts devised by Alvermann et al. (1995) and a cartoon in a qualitative study of conceptual

change in the physics domain. The study included three high school physics classes, a physics

honors class for advanced students, a physics class for college-bound juniors and seniors, and

basic physical science class for freshmen. Students were randomly assigned to the text

conditions. Students were interrupted several times while reading and asked if anything they had

read was surprising or new. Later, individual students were interviewed to find out how credible,

easy to understand, or helpful they considered the texts. Only 11% to 25% of the class members

reported using their textbook at all. Instead of using the textbook, the students in the honors and

junior and senior classes preferred hands-on activities and labs, whereas the freshman students

preferred studying notes and memorization. When asked how to improve the textbook, most of

the students suggested making it easier to understand. Though all types of texts were viewed as

credible, 53% of students in the basic classes and 80% of students in the honors classes preferred

expository refutational text to plain expository text. The majority of students in each class also

preferred expository refutational text to narrative refutational text or the refutational cartoon. To

typify this preference, the authors included the response of a student who reported that reading

the narrative refutational text was like mixing "pleasure reading with study reading" and made it

hard to "put your brain into the gear of learning" (p. 711).









In their meta-analysis of interventions to foster conceptual change, Guzzetti et al. (1993)

reported only one study that used narrative refutational text with preservice or inservice teachers.

In that study, Marshall (1990) contrasted expository and narrative refutational text in changing

preservice teachers' conceptions of seasonal change. Using immediate free recall and delayed

multiple-choice and application items to measure conceptual change, no significant differences

due to text type were found. The paucity of research on narrative refutational text with preservice

teachers reflects a need to further investigate if narrative structure in an expository refutational

text might be helpful to preservice or inservice teachers.

In sum, the empirical results demonstrating the benefits of narrative structures combined

with expository refutational text on conceptual change differ by grade level. The evidence to date

is that narrative structures may effect conceptual change with elementary students but not with

secondary students or undergraduates (Guzzetti et al., 1993). However, it is important to note

that in their meta-analysis Guzzetti et al. only included research using narrative structures with

concepts from the natural science domain.

The possibility that narrative refutational text may be more effective than expository

refutational text in producing conceptual change in the social science domain, as opposed to the

natural science domain, is intriguing. Concepts from natural science domains should be

distinguished from those in social science domains, like teacher education, that involve familiar

life experiences (Leean, 1979). Expository refutational text has been effective in the natural

science domain (e.g., physics) and the social science domain (e.g., psychology). In regard to

preservice teachers, expository refutational text has been effective in producing conceptual

change in the social science domain, specifically with theories of motivation (Kutza, 2000;

Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999) and mathematics instruction (Gill et al., 2004). Narrative









refutational text, however, though researched with various age groups including preservice

teachers, has only been researched in the natural science domain, where for high school and

college students expository refutational texts were more effective in inducing change than

narrative refutational texts. Narrative refutational text may be more effective than expository

refutational text in the social science domain, like teacher education, because teachers'

conceptions about teaching tend to be in the form of events and stories (Doyle & Carter, 1996)

that are often grounded in their experiences as students (Lortie, 1975). Like concepts in teacher

education, narrative text is "concerned with the explication of human intentions in the context of

action" (Bruner, 1985, p. 100). Because teachers' conceptions, concepts in teacher education,

and narrative text structures involve human agents in familiar life experiences, conceptual

change in the social science domain of teacher education might be more susceptible to influence

by narrative text structures. For example, Maria and Johnson's (1990) hypothesis that realistic

narrative may help students overcome tendencies to separate real-world knowledge from

information learned in texts may be more plausible for social science concepts, such as theories

of motivation or learning, than for natural science concepts, such as projectile motion. The

narrative structures common to teacher knowledge and narrative refutational text may facilitate

conceptual change.

In addition to the study of refutational text, the widespread use of case studies, contrived

scenarios, movie clips, and anecdotes in teacher education courses call for research on the

effectiveness of narrative structures in affecting conceptual change. Therefore, a major purpose

of my dissertation was to examine the question of whether narrative refutational text produces

greater and longer-lasting conceptual change than expository refutational text with preservice

teachers in the domain of social science, specifically on the topic of motivation.









Augmented Activation

In a conceptual change framework, augmented activation is a brief activity designed to

activate and then refute students' prior misconceptions. In contrast, an activation activity merely

activates the prior misconception without refuting it. In their meta-analysis, Guzetti et al. (1993)

reported small effects on conceptual change for activation (average effect size = .08) and large

effects for augmented activation (average effect size = .80). In a refutational text intervention,

augmented activation may take the form of a short paragraph read immediately before the

refutational text.

Gregoire (2002) used augmented activation in conjunction with expository refutational text

in her study of conceptual change of teaching mathematics in preservice teachers. She

administered her control group an activation activity and an expository text, neither of which

explicitly refuted the common misconception. As a check of the effects of augmented activation,

participants reported to what degree they felt the reading challenged their own beliefs. Consistent

with her hypothesis, participants who read the augmented activation and expository refutational

text rated the passage as significantly more challenging to their beliefs than did those who were

only exposed to the activation activity and the expository text.

The use of augmented activation may be especially salient for a study contrasting

expository refutational text and narrative refutational text. Qualitative and quantitative methods

have produced evidence that students process expository and narrative texts differently. For

example, Guzzetti et al. (1997) reported students' complaints that reading narrative refutational

text was like mixing "pleasure reading with study reading" and made it hard to "put your brain

into the gear for learning" (p. 711). To increase the likelihood that participants in both the

narrative and refutational text conditions in this study would adopt the goal of reading the text

for the purpose of study, I included augmented activation in both conditions.









Recent research has demonstrated that reading purpose, specifically reading for study

versus reading for entertainment, significantly affects processing of expository text. According to

the Landscape model of reading comprehension (van den Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm,

1999), reading purpose helps determine an individual's standard of coherence, specifically that

reading for study is associated with a higher standard of coherence than reading for

entertainment. Higher standards of coherence are hypothesized to be associated with more

complex processing. Researchers have used data from computer simulations based on the

Landscape model to suggest that reading for study is associated with the activation of sentence

information across reading cycles for the purpose of making referential, causal, logical, and

contrastive relations (Linderholm, Virtue, Tzeng, & van den Broek, 2004). The assertion that

those who read to study make more causal connections than those who read for entertainment

has also been supported in a related quantitative behavioral study (Linderholm & van den Broek,

2002).

This research on the effects of reading purpose on expository text processing is particularly

salient for this study of the processing of narrative refutational text. One could hypothesize that

the narrative structures in narrative refutational text may influence readers to adopt the purpose

of reading for entertainment. If so, one could expect less complex processing from those in the

narrative refutational text condition than from those in the expository text condition. However,

augmented activation, which has been shown to facilitate conceptual change, may also address

the concern that different text conditions may lead to different reading purposes. The use of an

augmented activation that explicitly states that the purpose of the text is to challenge and help

clarify readers' beliefs is designed, in part, to influence all readers, regardless of text condition,

to adopt the purpose of reading for study. To increase the likelihood that students in both the









narrative and refutational text conditions would adopt the goal of reading the text for study, I

included augmented activation in both text conditions in the design of my study.

Mediators of Conceptual Change

Affect

Several influential psychological theories converge on the idea that negative affect is

necessary to motivate conceptual change. Piaget's (1975) equilibration theory, the Posner et al.

(1982) theory of conceptual change, and Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all

explain cognitive change in terms of the human need to reduce negative affect, that is, the feeling

of discomfort or tension that results when two ideas conflict. Similarly, with regard to teacher

education, Feldman (2000) suggested that teachers need to be "discontent" in order to experience

conceptual change (p. 622).

In their meta-analysis of research on instructional interventions for producing conceptual

change, Guzzetti et al. (1993) concluded that all the approaches successful in inducing large or

moderate effects on conceptual change involved some type of cognitive conflict. In further

support of the role of the feeling of dissatisfaction in inducing conceptual change, Kitchener

(1992) contended that cognitive conflict is a negative affective state. Does this research mean

that "No pain, no gain" should be the motto of those teaching for conceptual change? Direct

support for the theorists' claim that negative affect motivates conceptual change is mixed.

Gregoire (2002) provided preliminary support for the idea that expository refutational text

is associated with negative affect. She found that students who read an expository text that did

not challenge their beliefs generated more favorable thoughts than those who read an expository

refutational text that challenged their beliefs, though the effect size (- .28) was relatively small.

However, she found no relationship between affect and explicit belief change as measured by

self-report, or between affect and implicit belief change as measured by response to teaching









scenarios. Furthermore, contrary to her hypothesis, negative affect was not associated with

systematic processing; in fact positive affect was marginally significantly related to systematic

processing, t= 1.94,p= .055.

In contrast to Gregoire's (2002) hypothesis, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) hypothesized

that positive affect would be associated with conceptual change from expository refutational text.

In their two studies, Linnenbrink and Pintrich used an expository refutational physics text

derived from Qian and Alvermann's (1995) study. In the first study positive affect was positively

related, (r = .22, p < .05), and negative affect was inversely related, (r = -.21, p < .05) to

knowledge of physics after reading an expository refutational text. In the replication study with

revised self-report scales to measure affect, positive affect was no longer significantly related,

but negative affect was still inversely related to physics knowledge after reading an expository

refutational physics test, (r = -.36, p < .001). These findings raise doubt about the contention that

expository refutational text leads to conceptual change through a negatively felt cognitive

conflict.

Specifically Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) hypothesized that those with mastery or

learning goals would have higher positive affect, lower negative affect, and greater use of

cognitive strategies resulting in greater conceptual change. They found partial support for this

hypothesis. They found evidence that those with mastery goals exhibited more conceptual

change mediated by lower negative affect and higher elaborative strategy use. Negative affect

was negatively related to conceptual change, suggesting negative affect may distract students

from the material to be learned.

As a theoretical basis for their hypothesis that positive affect would lead to increased

conceptual change, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) cited Bless's (2000) contention that those in









positive moods are less likely to feel threatened by information that contradicts their existing

conceptions and in turn are more likely to link that new knowledge with existing knowledge.

Given that researchers agree that negative affect is generally associated with accommodative

processing and positive affect is associated with assimilative processing (Bless, 2000; Fiedler,

2001), one might argue that the quality of conceptual change motivated by positive rather than

negative affect would be either comparatively weak, short-term, or both. However, Bless (2001)

explained that, though positive mood is associated with greater reliance on general knowledge

structures (i.e., schemas, heuristics) in an assimilative sense, reliance on those structures can

actually free cognitive resources for the accommodative processing of inconsistent information.

Therefore, in Bless's view, the assimilation associated with positive affect does not lead to a

decrease in the amount of processing as maintained by some theorists (Mackie & Worth, 1989),

but rather can lead to cognitive processing that is more efficiently allocated to assimilative and

accommodative processing. This view seems particularly salient for my study of narrative

refutational text in that I attempted to use it to increase the positive affect and assimilative or

heuristic processing associated with narrative structures, but also to encourage the

accommodative or systematic processing associated with the refutation of preexisting

misconceptions and acceptance of more accurate conceptions.

In sum, two rival hypotheses have been proposed to explain the role of affect in the process

of conceptual change. According to one hypothesis, conceptual change occurs because a new

idea conflicts with an individual's understanding and this cognitive conflict creates negative

affect that motivates the individual to resolve the conflict. According to the other hypothesis,

conceptual change is more likely to occur as a result of positive affect because individuals in a

positive emotional state are more likely to use general knowledge structures, such as heuristics,









to process consistent information, allowing cognitive resources to process inconsistent but non-

threatening information. To test these hypotheses, I investigated how the experience of affect is

related to the amount and quality of processing of narrative refutational and expository

refutational text.

Empathy

It seems likely that positive affect can be experienced empathically while reading narrative

refutational text. For example, reading a narrative in which a character displayed increased

competence could be an occasion for empathic positive affect. Furthermore, if this character's

increased competence was the result of conceptual change, in which a misconception is refuted

by experience and a more accurate conception is strengthened by experience, then readers might

be more likely to exhibit similar conceptual change. The empathic experience of positive affect

could increase processing and the resulting conceptual change.

Empathy has been described as experiencing someone else's emotional, physical, or

psychological state (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992). It is generally accepted that

empathy is a cognitive and affective process: (a) interpreting the emotional states of others and

(b) having an affective understanding or congruent affective response (Bourg, 1996; Eisenberg,

Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006). Empathy has been measured variously through self-report, facial

expressions, gestures, and picture story verbalizations.

Empathy has been related to comprehension of narratives in a number of studies. Empathic

ability of 8- and 9-year old female students has been found to predict reading ability at age 10

and 11 (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1987). Empathizing with a particular character affected how

ninth-grade students interpreted a text's theme (Golden & Guthrie, 1986). Sixth-grade students

who used an empathy strategy when reading narrative texts comprehended well (Phillips, 1988).

Bourg, Risden, Thompson and Davis (1993) found that, in sixth grade readers of all ability









levels, empathy led to greater comprehension of coherent narrative texts (texts with many

connected goal, action, outcome sequences, see Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984).

Reviewing these findings, Bourg (1996) suggested a possible causal chain from (a) text

coherence to (b) identification of goal-action-outcome (GAO) sequences to (c) inferencing of

character emotions to (d) development of empathy with characters to (e) creation of motivation

to (f) increased comprehension.

These studies have demonstrated that empathy is an important variable in the

comprehension of straight narrative texts, but is there any evidence empathy is associated with

the kind of conceptual change that is the goal of narrative refutational texts? Chebat, Vercollier,

and Gelinas-Chebat (2003) found empathy plays a key role in attitude change when reading

public service newspaper advertisements. They had participants read one of four advertisements,

ranging from 11 to 14 sentences in length and comparable in other measures of readability. The

advertisements were about a topic predetermined to be of high relevance (AIDS) or low

relevance (malaria) to the study participants. The advertisements were also manipulated by

message format, either lecture or drama format. The lecture format was a straight expository text,

and the drama format was a narrative about an individual who finds his friend has a disease

(AIDS or malaria) and becomes motivated to learn more and get involved in finding a cure. The

researchers used structural equation modeling to test hypotheses about the direction of the

relationship of information processing and empathy in attitude change.

The researchers measured empathy by self-report and information processing by thought-

listings. Results indicated that (a) empathy was significantly related to information processing in

both high and low self-relevant conditions and (b) the direction of influence between empathy

and information processing differed according to self-relevance. In high self-relevant conditions,









information processing increased empathy and subsequent attitude change regardless of message

format. However, in low self-relevant conditions, the drama format generated empathy that

increased information processing and attitude change.

Will similar results be obtained in a study of conceptual change in preservice teachers

using expository refutational text and narrative refutational text? To identify a specific condition,

such as text format, and describe how that condition influences the degree and direction of

empathy and cognitive processing in conceptual change deserves close attention. Therefore, in

this study I explored the role of empathy as a potential mediator of the relationship between

narrative refutational text and conceptual change.

In summary, those teaching for conceptual change have attempted to motivate conceptual

change by inducing a negatively felt cognitive conflict. Influencing conceptual change by the

process of cognitive conflict has met with mixed results, perhaps due to failure in making the

conflict salient to students (Limon, 2001). There is yet a further question as to whether cognitive

conflict is motivated or accompanied by negative affect. Alternatively, there is theoretical

support for the idea that change may be accompanied or motivated by positive affect, perhaps

empathically experienced by those reading narrative refutational texts; in this study I looked for

empirical support of these possibilities.

Systematic and Heuristic Processing

In the search for processes that account for conceptual change, researchers have looked to

the social psychological literature of persuasion and attitude change, specifically the research on

dual-process theories (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003). Dual-process theories were developed

to explain why people sometimes adopt attitudes after careful consideration of the evidence,

whereas other times they seem to bypass this process and make decisions based on heuristics, or

"rules of thumb." To address this inconsistency, researchers have proposed two independent, yet









interactive, processing systems, one for effortful rational processing and another for automatic

processing based on heuristics.

Researchers have proposed several dual-process theories, but the most heavily researched

is the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a review). Within the

HSM, systematic processing is described as rational, effortful, analytic, and verbal. Those

engaged in systematic processing "attend to, evaluate, elaborate, and integrate" information

(Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992, p. 318). In addition to thoughts representative of the

message, novel or self-generated thoughts related to the message are also indicative of systematic

processing (Chaiken, Duckworth, & Darke, 2000).

In contrast heuristic processing is dominated by rules that are stored in memory and

activated by cues (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 2000). These rules, heuristics, are used to

bypass the effort required for systematic processing. To operate, heuristics must be available

(learned, stored in memory), accessible, (retrieved from memory), and applicable (relevant to the

situation) (Higgins, 1996). Some examples of widely held and well-researched heuristics are

"experts can be trusted," "majority opinion is correct," and "long messages are valid messages"

(Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Stereotypes like "men are assertive" or "Asians are intelligent"

can also operate as heuristics (Chen et al., 2000). Heuristics provide expectancies or diagnostic

information for decision-making activities (Maheswaran et al., 1992).

Some researchers have hypothesized that systematic processing might serve as a process

that mediates the relationship between an instructional intervention and conceptual change (Dole

& Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003). To date, however, this hypothesis has not been supported by

empirical evidence. Gill et al. (2004) sought to identify systematic processing as the process

through which an instructional intervention using expository refutational text effected conceptual









change in preservice teachers' epistemological beliefs about mathematics. Participants completed

a measure of their general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs and read either a plain

expository or expository refutational text on the nature of mathematical knowledge. Gill et al.

measured systematic processing by thought-listings about the message of the text generated after

reading. The authors hypothesized that an expository refutational text would lead to belief

change, with systematic processing serving a mediational role, but the results did not support this

hypothesis, raising doubt about the importance of systematic processing in conceptual change.

The authors, however, speculated that their measure of systematic processing may not have been

sensitive enough to detect its mediating role in conceptual change and suggested investigating

alternative measures.

A third alternative is to look for evidence of the combined effects of systematic and

heuristic processing. As described in HSM, systematic processing does not occur in isolation, but

in conjunction with heuristic processing. This assumption is an implication of the sufficiency

principle of HSM. The sufficiency principle holds that thinkers are economy minded, but also

desire confidence in their decisions; they want to exert merely sufficient effort to reach the

desired confidence level. Systematic processing is used when heuristics alone cannot close the

gap between confidence in a decision and desired confidence. Therefore, low motivation leads to

only heuristic processing, but high motivation widens the gap and increases the likelihood of

systematic processing (Chen et al., 2000).

The sufficiency principle therefore allows for heuristics to operate alone or in conjunction

with systematic processing. When both systems operate in conjunction, researchers have

described three possible outcomes (Chen et al., 2000): (a) Heuristics may be attenuated; for

example, the heuristic "accidents never happen" can be attenuated by systematically processing









incongruent messages describing the danger of a product. (b) Heuristic and systematic

processing can be additive in their effects on attitude change. This additive outcome can occur

when the message and heuristic cue are congruent. For example, the "consensus implies

correctness" heuristic activated by favorable opinion poll results can have an additive effect on

endorsement of a product if that product is also logically superior. (c) Finally, heuristics can bias

systematic processing. For example, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) found that the "experts are

right" heuristic will bias systematic processing of a product description of ambiguous quality.

From this research, they described how the first two outcomes are likely when the message for

systematic processing is unambiguously strong or weak. Unambiguously strong or weak

messages should lead to attenuation when the heuristic cues are incongruent with the message

and additivity when the heuristic cues are congruent with the message. Messages that are of

ambiguous quality will more likely lead to the biasing of systematic processing by heuristic

processing.

To understand the processes of conceptual change in order to effect conceptual change, the

possibility of additive effects of heuristic and systematic processing is most promising. If the

effects of the processing systems are additive, then the likelihood of change, the strength of

change, and the duration of change should be greater. If refutational text effects conceptual

change by increasing systematic processing, as some have proposed (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill,

2003), then an implication of the sufficiency principle is that refutational text widens the gap

between confidence and desired confidence and motivates systematic processing.

If systematic processing is engaged while reading refutational text, another implication of

the sufficiency principle is that this systematic processing occurs only in relationship to the

default heuristic processing. Specifically, systematic processing is attenuating, adding to, or









being biased by heuristic processing. Theoretically, heuristics that are congruent with an

unambiguously strong message should lead to additive effects. For those using refutational text

for conceptual change, what text characteristics might serve as congruent cues for heuristic

processing, leading to additive effects with systematic processing and producing greater

conceptual change? Hynd (2003) claimed that cues such as style, length of argument, and

credibility are always heuristics even when experts use them consciously and systematically. She

suggested people use every means they can to construct meaning, so those teaching for

conceptual change should learn how to harness heuristics.

The possibility that systematic and heuristic processing can have an additive effect on

conceptual change is theoretically supported by another important dual-process model,

cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST; Epstein & Pacini, 1999). CEST includes a rational

conscious system that operates in a systematic manner and an experiential system that operates

by heuristics, specifically those grounded in narrative, metaphor, and affect. Therefore, the

heuristic processing described by Hynd (2003) and CEST may be an important process in

conceptual change.

Harnessing these heuristics grounded in experience, narrative, metaphor, and affect may

have an especially important place in teacher education. Doyle and Carter (1996) pointed to a

disturbing mismatch between teacher education programs and teacher knowledge, claiming that

teacher education courses are full of abstractions and principles, whereas teachers' knowledge is

in the form of concrete events and stories. They suggested the emphasis on abstract rationality

may miss the mark because teachers' understandings have a narrative structure.

Thus, it seems possible that, especially for preservice teachers learning social science

concepts, narrative refutational text might yield greater heuristic processing and, if congruent









with systematic processing, result in greater conceptual change. It also seems possible that this

processing could be motivated by positive affect, perhaps experienced empathically, and without

the negative affect assumed to be necessary for conceptual change in the theories of Piaget

(1975), Posner et al. (1982), and Festinger (1957). Therefore, I examined the relationship of

systematic and heuristic processing as well as empathy and affect as mediators of the relationship

between text type and conceptual change.

Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change

Epistemological Beliefs

Broadly speaking, epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature of knowledge and

knowing. Personal epistemology is the empirical study of individuals' beliefs about the

characteristics and sources of knowledge (Buehl & Alexander, 2001). Perry (1970) initiated

research on personal epistemology using semi-structured interviews and found that male

undergraduates construct their own theories about the nature of knowledge. Specifically, he

found that these personal epistemologies exist on a developmental continuum from dualism, that

is, the idea that knowledge is either true or false, to a more complex relativism that in contrast

accounts for differences in knowledge according to perspective and contexts.

A host of researchers followed Perry's (1970) lead with various emphases. King and

Kitchener (1994) expanded Perry's work by including females and more age groups but still

maintained a very general and stage-like conception of epistemological beliefs. Belenky,

Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) focused on the unique beliefs of women, suggesting

women's knowledge is not merely dualistic or relativistic but can be classified as subjective,

procedural, received, or constructed, for example. Baxter Magolda (1987, 1992) investigated

specific academic or subject-centered beliefs rather than general beliefs. In contrast to a unitary

and stage-like conceptualization of personal epistemology, Schommer (1990) proposed a









multidimensional approach by identifying five distinct epistemological beliefs: (The beliefs are

listed negatively so that strong belief suggests an immature personal epistemology.)

Simple knowledge: Knowledge is easily grasped.
Certain knowledge: Knowledge is unchanging.
SOmniscient authority: The source of knowledge is external to the knower.
Innate ability: The amount learning is determined by one's unchanging intelligence.
SQuick learning: Learning occurs over a short period.

Researchers have identified several problems with Schommer's (1990) five

epistemological beliefs. Schraw, Bendixen, and Dunkle (2002) criticized the factor analysis

techniques Schommer used in the validation of her 63-item Likert-scale measure of

epistemological beliefs. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) questioned if beliefs in innate ability and

quick learning are indeed epistemological beliefs, because they concern learning and not

knowledge.

Despite these problems, epistemological beliefs continue to have significant explanatory

power. For example, in her initial work, Schommer (1990) described how epistemological

beliefs are related to the way students process information and monitor comprehension.

Specifically, she found that the belief in simple knowledge was related to poorer comprehension,

the belief in quick learning was related to oversimplification and overestimation of learning, and

the belief in certain knowledge was related to more absolute and definitive conclusions. Kardash

and Scholes (1996) had college students read contradictory evidence about HIV/AIDS and found

that belief in certain knowledge was associated with a misinterpretation of contradictory

evidence, whereas a belief in uncertain knowledge was associated with a more valid inconclusive

interpretation of contradictory evidence.

Researchers have also looked to the explanatory power of epistemological beliefs as a

contributor to conceptual change. Pintrich (1999) suggested that more mature epistemological









beliefs may lead to more conceptual change, perhaps by fostering a mastery orientation that

encourages deeper cognitive processing. Some research has supported this possibility. For

example, in her study of the effect of expository and refutational text on conceptual change,

Gregoire (2002) used the 11 items identified in Qian and Alvermann's (1995) factor analysis to

measure beliefs in simple and certain knowledge and found that those epistemological beliefs

were related to conceptual change, as evidenced on measures of explicit and implicit beliefs

about teaching mathematics. The Cognitively Guided Instruction Belief Survey (CGI; Peterson et

al., 1989) is a self-report measure of explicit beliefs about mathematics. Those who had a belief

in simple and certain knowledge exhibited less conceptual change as measured by the CGI (t = -

2.97, p < .002). As a measure of implicit beliefs about mathematics, Gregoire devised eight

teaching scenarios that depicted either constructivist or procedural teaching practices. Belief in

simple and certain knowledge was not correlated with conceptual change as measured by

agreement with the constructivist scenarios (t = -1.08, p < .141), but was as measured by

disagreement with procedural scenarios (t = 2.22, p < .014). Consistent with this research I

investigated the effect of epistemological beliefs on change in conceptions of motivation.

Verbal Ability

In reading refutational texts, students with lower verbal ability might have difficulty

recognizing the conflict between theories and, as a consequence, might exhibit less conceptual

change than students with higher verbal ability. In her study of conceptual change, Gregoire

(2002) examined the relation of verbal ability, as measured by self-reported verbal scores on the

SAT, to conceptual change in beliefs about mathematics instruction. However, she found no

relationship between verbal ability and conceptual change on measures of either explicit or

implicit beliefs. To explore further the role of verbal ability in reading refutational text, I

investigated whether verbal ability influenced change in conceptions of motivation in this study.









Purpose of the Study

My purpose in this study was to increase our understanding of conceptual change in

preservice teachers by testing the model presented in Figure 1-1, which specifies that

instructional text (i.e., narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text), epistemological

beliefs, and verbal ability directly affect conceptual change and that type of text also directly

affects systematic and heuristic processing, which in turn directly affect change in conceptions of

motivation. Furthermore the model specifies that text directly affects positive and negative affect

which in turn affects processing, and conceptual change. Finally, the model specifies that the text

directly affects empathy, which in turn affects positive and negative affect, processing, and

conceptual change. This model addresses a number of weaknesses in current research. These

weaknesses include the need to further identify effective interventions to effect conceptual

change, the failure to identify individual characteristics that influence conceptual change, and the

lack of specification of cognitive and affective processes involved in conceptual change.

Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation study was three-fold: One purpose was to

compare two instructional interventions, expository refutational and narrative refutational text,

designed to foster conceptual change in preservice teachers. A second purpose was to explore

two personal characteristics, specifically epistemological beliefs and verbal ability that may

influence preservice teachers' conceptual change. A third purpose was to investigate whether the

affective and cognitive processes of positive and negative affect, empathy, and systematic and

heuristic processing mediate the relationship between the instructional intervention and

conceptual change in the preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation.

First, I compared instructional interventions designed to effect conceptual change.

Specifically I compared the extent of conceptual change in an experimental group that read a

narrative refutational text to a comparison group that read a comparable expository refutational









text. Both the narrative refutational and expository refutational text refute an extrinsic theory of

motivation and explain an intrinsic theory of motivation, but the narrative refutational text was

constructed by adding narrative structures such as setting, character, and plot to the expository

refutational text.

Second, I explored two personal characteristics hypothesized to affect the process of

conceptual change. Specifically, I investigated the role of general epistemological beliefs and

verbal ability in the process of conceptual change. Prior research has demonstrated that some

epistemological beliefs, such as the beliefs that knowledge is simple and certain, can influence

the relationship between specific instructional interventions and conceptual change (Kardash &

Scholes, 1996; Windschitl & Andre, 1998). To further explore this relationship, I tested the

hypothesis that individuals who hold epistemological beliefs that knowledge is simple or certain

demonstrate less evidence of conceptual change after reading a narrative refutational text.

Although Gregoire (2002) did not find a relationship between verbal ability and conceptual

change in her study of expository text versus refutational text, I examined whether verbal ability

influenced conceptual change in my study to determine whether it affected change in

conceptions of motivation when reading two types of refutational text.

The third purpose of my study was to explore cognitive and affective processes

hypothesized to account for conceptual change. To do this I investigated whether the positive or

negative affect experienced from reading narrative refutational and expository refutational text

was associated with conceptual change. Some researchers have hypothesized that, after reading

refutational text, an individual who experiences negative affect will allocate the cognitive

resources necessary for conceptual change to alleviate the negatively felt disequilibrium

(Gregoire, 2002), whereas other researchers have hypothesized that positive affect will increase









the processing for conceptual change (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002). In addition to these

affective processes, I explored the cognitive processes of systematic and heuristic processing in

conceptual change. Some researchers have claimed that systematic processing may serve an

important role in conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003), but others have also

looked to heuristic processing (Hynd, 2003). However, in light of work in social psychology

suggesting that systematic and heuristic processing have additive effects (Chen et al., 2000), I

looked for the additive effects of both systematic and heuristic processing on conceptual change

while reading narrative refutational text.

Significance of the Study for Theory

Mayer (2002) recently reviewed the state of the literature on conceptual change. He

concluded that researchers have reached consensus that conceptual change is a cognitive process

in which the learner actively constructs coherent and useful knowledge. Yet he also concluded

researchers do not agree on how change occurs, specifically regarding the mechanisms or

processes of conceptual change, and the methods teachers can use to effect conceptual change.

My dissertation study was designed to address these theoretical issues of conceptual change in

the context of teacher education.

First, this study has the potential to increase our understanding of methodologies used to

effect conceptual change in preservice teachers. Expository refutational text, designed to induce

a cognitive conflict in the reader, has been among the most effective methodologies to effect

conceptual change in the natural science domain among students from elementary school to the

university (Guzzetti et al., 1993). Furthermore, expository refutational text has been more

effective than plain expository text in effecting conceptual change in the social science domain

among preservice teachers (Gregoire, 2002; Kutza, 2000; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999).

However, research is needed that explores the effect of narrative refutational text in the social









science domain of teacher education on conceptual change in preservice teachers, even though

teacher conceptions of teacher education often take the form of narratives rather than general

principles (Doyle & Carter, 1996; Lortie, 1975). Given that methods of inducing cognitive

conflict may fail because they fail to make the conflict salient to the reader (Limon, 2001), it is

important to investigate the effectiveness of narrative refutational text in contrast to expository

refutational text in changing these preservice teachers' conceptions of teaching to be more

consistent with contemporary research.

Second, this study can help us understand personal learner characteristics that influence the

change process. Researchers have identified epistemological beliefs as a personal characteristic

that influences the effect of methods of intervention on conceptual change. Specifically

individuals with less mature epistemological beliefs, for example the belief that knowledge is

simple or certain, show less evidence of change than those with more mature epistemological

beliefs when reading an expository refutational text (Gregoire, 2002; Qian & Alvermann, 1995)

or when using instructional materials that require hypothesis formation and testing (Windschitl &

Andre, 1998). I investigated whether epistemological beliefs influence the effect of reading

narrative refutational text on conceptual change to help us further understand how personal

characteristics such as preexisting beliefs may influence conceptual change.

The third purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the cognitive and affective

processes of conceptual change. Prominent researchers have disagreed on whether positive or

negative affect motivates the cognitive processing necessary for conceptual change. Piaget's

(1975) equilibration theory, the Posner et al. (1982) theory of conceptual change, and Festinger's

(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all explain cognitive change in terms of the human need to

reduce the negative affect that is felt when individuals are confronted with conflicting









information. This negative affect theoretically motivates the cognitive processing necessary to

resolve the cognitive conflict and reduce the accompanying dissonance, or feeling of discomfort.

Bless (2000, 2001), in contrast, hypothesized that positive affect will ameliorate the threat

posed by conflicting information and lead to the use of general knowledge structures, such as

schemas or heuristics, freeing cognitive resources to process conflicting information and achieve

conceptual change. I hypothesized that a narrative refutational text about a teacher who increases

her competence by changing her conceptions about teaching to be more consistent with research

will lead to an increase of positive affect in the reader, either directly or indirectly through the

mediation of empathy. If reading a narrative refutational text increases positive affect, then

according to Bless's hypothesis, readers will activate their general knowledge structures,

specifically those schema or heuristics about teaching that exist in narrative from (Doyle &

Carter, 1996; Lortie, 1975), and allocate cognitive resources to the discrepant but non-

threatening information and achieve greater conceptual change than those who read expository

refutational text.

In addition to the divergent theories about the role of affect in conceptual change, a lack of

agreement exists regarding the cognitive processes that influence conceptual change (Mayer,

2002). To identify cognitive processes involved in conceptual change some researchers have

looked to dual process models of cognition, such as the heuristic-systematic model (HSM)

involving systematic processing and a more automatic or affect-driven type of processing, often

described as heuristic (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Within this dual process framework, some

researchers have suggested that systematic processing, that is, a logical, effortful type of

information processing, might be the primary cognitive process involved in conceptual change

(Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gregoire, 2003). Hynd (2003), in contrast, argued for the importance of









heuristic processing, such as thoughts about style, length of argument, and credibility, in

conceptual change. Evidence is needed that clarifies the role of these processing types; therefore

I investigated the additive effects of these dual processes (see Chen et al., 2000) in conceptual

change. The use of narrative refutational text designed to increase heuristic processing by the

inclusion of narrative structures and increase systematic processing by the inclusion of

refutational text will help us understand how systematic and heuristic processing influence

conceptual change.

Significance of the Study for Practice

Preservice teachers possess many conceptions about teaching that are incongruous with

findings of educational research (Holt-Reynolds, 1992; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001).

Research in a variety of disciplines, including social and developmental psychology as well as

education, has shown that such conceptions are very resistant to change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993;

Wideen et al., 1998). Specifically, preservice teachers have conceptions about motivation that are

not consistent with contemporary views (Patrick & Pintrich, 2001), creating a need to identify

effective interventions that promote such conceptual change. Expository refutational text has

been among the most effective interventions for conceptual change studied to date (Guzzetti et

al., 1993), yet important questions regarding text, domain, and reader characteristics remain. For

example, is narrative refutational text more effective in inducing conceptual change in the social

science domain than expository refutational text? Are these effects influenced by readers'

epistemological beliefs or verbal ability? By addressing these questions, this study's purpose was

to provide information to writers of texts used in teacher education programs, and those teacher

educators who use these texts, as to how different types of text influence conceptual change in

preservice teachers.






























Figure 1-1. Proposed model of conceptual change.









CHAPTER 2
MATERIALS AND METHODS

To investigate the effect of text type, epistemological beliefs and verbal ability on

conceptual change and the role of empathy, affect, and systematic and heuristic processing as

mediators of the effect of text type, I tested the model of conceptual change illustrated in Figure

1-1. Specific hypothesis implied by the model are presented below.

Research Questions

1. Do epistemological beliefs or verbal ability influence change in preservice teachers'
conceptions of motivation immediately after reading narrative refutational text and 4
weeks later?

2. Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect on conceptual change in
preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation than an expository refutational text
immediately after the reading and 4 weeks?

3. Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect on preservice teachers'
systematic and heuristic processing of information regarding conceptions of motivation
than reading an expository refutational text?

4. Does reading a narrative refutational text elicit more positive emotion in preservice
teachers than reading an expository refutational text?

5. Does reading a narrative refutational text elicit less negative emotion in preservice
teachers than reading an expository refutational text?

6. Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect on the empathy that
preservice teachers experience after reading than reading an expository refutational text?

7. Do empathy, positive affect, systematic, and heuristic processing mediate the relationship
between text type (narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text) and
conceptual change in preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation immediately after
the reading and 4 weeks later?
Participants

Two hundred sixteen undergraduate students enrolled in teacher education programs in the

2006-2007 school year participated in the pretest, intervention, and posttest phases of this study.

Ninety-five of these participants were enrolled in one of four sections of a required child

development course at a large, southern state university in the fall semester. One hundred









twenty-one of these participants were enrolled in one of three sections of a required educational

psychology course at a medium-sized, southern state university in the following spring semester.

All students recruited were volunteers who signed informed consent agreements to participate in

the study and were given course credit up to 1% of their final grade for their participation.

Twenty six students (6 from the large university and 20 from the medium-sized university)

did not complete all the measures and were deleted from the analyses. Of the remaining

participants (N= 190), 89 were from the large university, and 101 were from the medium-sized

university. Of the participants 93% were female, and 79% were juniors in their teacher education

program. Seventy-nine percent of the participants were Caucasian, 10% were Black, 5% were

Hispanic, 1% were Asian, and 3% identified themselves as "Other" or did not respond. Gender,

ethnicity, and year in school by university group are reported in Table 2-1.

Experimental Treatments

I compared the effect of an expository refutational text (ERT) and a narrative refutational

text (NRT) on conceptual change. The ERT is an expository text, that simply explains concepts

such as that typically used in textbooks, but it is also a refutational text in that it first explains a

commonly accepted concept and then refutes that concept by contrasting it with a different

concept that is better supported by research. I used the ERT devised by Salisbury-Glennon and

Stevens (1999). The ERT contrasts a commonly accepted extrinsic or reinforcement theory of

motivation to an intrinsic theory of motivation better supported by research. The NRT also

contrasts extrinsic and intrinsic theories of motivation, but in a narrative about a preservice

teacher who experienced the limitations of an extrinsic view of motivation and realized the

benefits of changing her conception of motivation to an intrinsic view.

I created the NRT (Appendix A) by adding narrative structures to the pre-existing ERT. In

the NRT, a novice teacher endorses and operates her classroom consistent with an endorsement









of extrinsic motivation. After she notices adverse effects in her classroom, she receives

information on how to operate her classroom to facilitate intrinsic motivation from an

experienced teacher. I placed as many phrases and whole sentences from the ERT into the NRT

as practicable. In previous studies the NRT has differed from the ERT in length or readability or

both. For example, in their study of conceptual change in high-school physics students,

Alvermann et al. reported a length of 606 words for their ERT and 782 words for their NRT

(NRT was 29% longer) and a Fry (1977) readability level of seventh grade for both. In their

study of conceptual change in fifth-grade science students, Maria and Johnson (1990) reported a

length of 1,075 words for their ERT and 1,533 words for their NRT (NRT was 42% longer), and

Raygor (1977) readability scores of sixth grade for the ERT and fourth grade for the NRT. The

difference in length, readability, or both may account for the differences in treatment effects

rather than differences in the content of the text; therefore, I designed the texts in my study to

have nearly identical lengths and levels of readability. The initial draft of the NRT was longer

and had a lower readability level than the ERT, so I excised selected monosyllabic words and

added polysyllabic words to reduce the word count and increase the readability level to be

consistent with the ERT. The ERT has a length of 573 words, and the NRT has a length of 569

words. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score, a function of average sentence and word length,

is 13.25 for the ERT and 13.17 for the NRT.

Pretreatment Measures

Conceptual Change

Conceptual change was measured by contrasting pre- and posttest scores on 20 items

regarding motivation theories developed by Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999). Each item on

the instrument is a short scenario that participants identified as true or false, by marking 0 for

true and 1 for false on their response sheet. See, for example, the following item:









Dr. White is pleased to see that his daughter is very motivated to read her biology
assignments. In fact, she often reads biology books from the library that are not assigned.
In order to encourage her to continue to learn about biology, Dr. White pays her $3 for
every chapter that she reads. This is a good way to motivate her to continue reading the
biology books.

For items, like this one, that endorse an extrinsic view of motivation, a response of 1 for

false was counted as correct and summed. However, for intrinsic motivation items a response of

1 for false would be incorrect, so I reversed the scores on these items before summing. Therefore

in my analysis, higher scores represent conceptions of motivation consistent with Deci's theory

of intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985); that is, high scores on the extrinsic pre- and

posttests indicated that the respondent did not endorse teacher strategies involving reinforcement

as good ways to motivate students for learning, and high scores on the intrinsic measure

indicated that the respondent endorsed teacher strategies that assisted students to learn for the

sake of learning.

Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) used this measure of conceptual change as a pretest,

posttest, and delayed posttest and reported internal consistency estimates of participants' scores

on the total scale of .68, .74, and .74, respectively. In her dissertation study, Kutza (2000)

reported a Cronbach's alpha reliability estimate of .70 for participants' scores on the 20-question

instrument. However, in her analysis she divided the instrument into two subscales of 10

questions each, using one scale to measure a preference for extrinsic motivation theory and the

other to measure a preference for intrinsic motivation theory. Kutza also changed the response

options from true or false to a 5-point Likert scale that participants used to rate their level of

agreement with each scenario. For the respondents' scores on the extrinsic and intrinsic subscales

scores, she reported internal consistency estimates of .81 and .77, respectively. Kutza analyzed

the two 10-item subscales rather than the total score in order to assess conceptual change as

rejection of an extrinsic theory, endorsement of an intrinsic theory, or both. For these reasons, I









also measured change using the two 10-item subscales, but I maintained the dichotomous

response options used by Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens.

For the scores on the protests of the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales, internal consistency

estimates were .58 and .61 for the participants' scores, respectively. For the participants' scores

on the posttests of the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales, internal consistency estimates were .59

and .77, respectively. For the delayed posttests administered 4 weeks after the posttest, I obtained

internal consistency estimates for the participants' scores on the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales

estimates of .63 and .74, respectively.

Epistemological Beliefs

Using Schommer's (1990) Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, a 63-item Likert-type

scale, researchers have conducted large quantitative studies of epistemological beliefs (e.g.,

Schommer & Dunnell, 1992; Schommer, Rhodes, & Crouse, 1992). However researchers have

identified some methodological and conceptual problems with that instrument (Hofer & Pintrich,

1997; Schraw et al., 2002). To address some methodological problems, Qian and Alvermann

(1995) conducted an exploratory factor analysis of Schommer's (Schommer & Dunnell, 1992)

Epistemological Belief Questionnaire that led to a three-factor model with factors named Quick

Learning, Innate Ability, and Simple-Certain Knowledge.

I used the 11-item Simple-Certain subscale devised by Qian and Alvermann (1995) as a

measure of epistemological beliefs in this study. Qian and Alvermann found that responses to

this subscale, with a reported alpha of .68, were inversely related to conceptual change in high-

school physics students. Subscale items include, for example, "Most words have one clear

meaning" and "If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost anything."

Response options for the items ranged from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Gregoire

(2002) used the same subscale in her dissertation study, similarly finding belief in simple-certain









knowledge was inversely related to change in preservice teachers' conceptions of mathematics

teaching. She reported a Cronbach's alpha of .73 for the preservice teachers' scores. The

Cronbach's alpha of .72 for participants' scores on this instrument in my dissertation sample was

consistent with these previous studies.

Verbal Ability

Participants were asked to report their scores on the verbal portion of the SAT or their

score on the reading portion of the ACT or both as an indicator of verbal ability. Sixty-six of the

216 participants reported SAT scores, though 4 were obviously incorrect because they were

single-digit numbers or exceeded the maximum possible score of 800. Forty-seven of the 216

participants reported their ACT reading scores, though 1 was obviously incorrect. In addition,

participants were asked to give their permission for me to request their scores from the registrar

to verify the accuracy of their scores or supply missing scores. One hundred twenty-five of the

216 participants gave permission to request their scores from the registrar. If the scores from the

registrar differed from the self-reported scores, I used the scores from the registrar. If I had only

ACT scores, I transformed them to a metric comparable to the SAT scores by using a

transformation based on z-scores1.




1 Transformed score = { [ACT score Mean (ACT)] [SD(SAT)/SD(ACT)] + Mean (SAT)}

The standard deviation (SAT) and the mean (SAT) for 2004-the year most participants took the exam-were
obtained from the College Board website at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod downloads/about/news_info/cbsenior/yr2004/2004_CBSNRtotal_group.pdf
For ACT scores, this information was obtained from www.act.org/news/data/04/data.html









Posttreatment Measures


Affect

To measure affect, I used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,

Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales. Participants rated their

positive and negative affect on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) very slightly or not at all

to (5) extremely. Examples of positive affect include interested, excited, and attentive; examples

of negative affect include distressed, guilty, and afraid. The PANAS can be used for various time

frames from the present moment, to the past few weeks, to generally. In an attempt to measure

affect induced by the reading I used the PANAS with the instruction, "Indicate how the selection

you read makes you feel right now at the present moment." In initial development and validation

studies of the PANAS using the present moment instruction, Watson et al. reported alpha

coefficients of .89 for respondents' scores on the positive affect scale and .85 for their scores on

the negative affect scale and a correlation of -.15 between the two scales. In my sample I

obtained an alpha coefficient of .90 for the participants' scores on the positive affect scale and

.82 for scores on the negative affect scale and a correlation of .22 between the two scales.

Systematic and Heuristic Processing

Processing type was measured by coding participants' thought listings (TLs) after reading

the text. Gregoire (2002) devised a rubric for coding TLs as either message-based or non-

message-based with message-based TLs reflecting systematic processing. I followed Gregoire's

coding procedure for systematic processing. An example of a TL that was coded as systematic

processing was "I knew about intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, but I never knew that giving

rewards would hinder students' motivation." Also like Gregoire, I coded TLs that were

fragmented, sweeping affective judgments, or cliches, as non-message- based processing.

However, her coding procedure for non-message-based TLs included what is described as









relevant heuristic processing (Hynd, 2003). For example, statements regarding text style, length,

difficulty, credibility, or audience reaction are relevant heuristics, but were coded by Gregoire as

non-message-based. In my study, I coded relevant heuristic processing in a separate category. An

example of a statement coded as relevant heuristic processing was "I think that this reading

needs more examples on not rewarding the children with prizes and stickers." Also, because of

the narrative aspects of heuristic processing (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), TLs regarding the story

elements (plot, character, and setting) of the NRT were coded as relevant heuristic processing.

An example of such a statement was "I understood the anxiousness Wendy had about wanting to

motivate her students to learn." In her dissertation study, Gregoire divided the number of

message-based TLs by the total number of TLs to obtain a score for systematic processing; my

coding procedures (Appendix B), however, resulted in scores for systematic and heuristic

processing.

An assistant transcribed the participants' TLs word-for-word, including spelling errors,

into a table labeled by their identification number, but not by their treatment condition, so the

raters were blind as to treatment condition. A second assistant and I coded each TL as an

example of systematic, heuristic, or irrelevant processing. As a measure of interrater reliability,

Cohen's kappa for the ratings was calculated at .63, indicating substantial agreement (Landis &

Koch, 1977). For each rater's codings, I divided the number of TLs coded as systematic by the

total number of TLs to get a systematic processing score in the form of a ratio that could range

from 0 to 1. I repeated the process for the TLs coded as heuristic processing. Cronbach's a was

.89 for participants' systematic processing scores and .94 for participants' heuristic processing

scores. I then averaged the two raters' systematic and heuristic processing scores to get one

systematic processing score and one heuristic processing score for each participant.









Empathy

I measured empathy using a 5-item, 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly

disagree i/ ith the ltuii'ie/1it) to 6 (strongly agree i/ ith the %uitIaemet) published by Coulson

(1989), but originally devised by Schlinger (1979) to assess empathic response to television

commercials. Chebat et al. (2003) revised the scale for use with public service newspaper

advertisements and obtained an internal consistency estimate of participants' scores of .84. I

revised the scale by replacing the word advertisement with the word reading, so that participants

indicated the extent to which they "liked the reading because it was personal and intimate,"

whether they felt they were "right there in the reading experiencing the same thing," whether

"the characters were expressing what they felt like at times," whether they were "involved in the

reading" and whether the reading represented, "their ideal--the life the reading showed."

Cronbach's alpha for participants' scores in this study was .81, slightly lower than that reported

by Chebat et al.

Procedures

Phase 1

On the first occasion that lasted approximately 10 minutes, participants completed the

informed consent form, the 11-item epistemological belief measure, and the 20-item conceptual

change measure as a pretest.

Phase 2

One week after Phase 1, participants were randomly assigned to read the expository

refutational text (ERT) or narrative refutational text (NRT) about motivation. After reading,

participants reported affect on the PANAS, completed the thought listing, and then completed

the 20-item conceptual change measure as an immediate posttest. This phase took approximately

20 minutes.









Phase 3

The final data collection of the study took place approximately 1 month after Phase 2 and

lasted approximately 5 minutes. On this third day, the participants completed the conceptual

change measure as a delayed posttest.

Analysis

My conceptual model (Figure 1-1) specifies that initial conceptions of motivation, the

experimental treatment, epistemological beliefs, and verbal ability directly affect subsequent

conceptions of motivation and that the treatment also directly affects systematic and heuristic

processing which in turn directly affects change in conceptions of motivation. Furthermore the

model specifies that the experimental treatment directly affects positive and negative affect,

which in turn affects processing and subsequent conceptions of motivation, and that the

treatment directly affects empathy, which in turn affects positive and negative affect, which in

turn affects processing, which affects subsequent conceptions of motivation. I used structural

equation modeling to estimate the effects. The model contains seven endogenous variables:

empathy, positive affect, negative affect, systematic processing, heuristic processing, subsequent

conceptions of intrinsic motivation and subsequent conceptions of extrinsic motivation. The

model contains five exogenous variables, initial conceptions of intrinsic motivation and initial

conceptions of extrinsic motivation, the experimental treatment, epistemological beliefs, and

verbal ability.

In a study of conceptual change that utilizes a pretest, the decision must be made whether

to use as the outcome variable the posttest scores or the change in scores from pretest to posttest.

Using change scores can create the misleading conclusion that protests scores were negatively

related to change. Therefore, similar to the analysis conducted by Gill et al. (2004), I used









posttest scores on the conceptions of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation measures rather than

change scores as the outcome variable.









Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics for nominal variables
Expository Refutational Text Narrative Refutational Text
Measure % N % N
Gender
Female 96% 89 91% 88
Male 4% 4 9% 9
Ethnicity
White 78% 73 80% 78
Black 9% 8 11% 11
Hispanic 4% 4 6% 6
Asian 2% 2 1% 1
Other 5% 5 0% 0
Year
Sophomore 3% 3 4% 4
Junior 74% 69 84% 81
Senior 15% 14 11% 11
Other 2% 2 0% 0
Note: Percentages may not total 100% because in each group one participant did not respond to
the ethnicity item, and five participants in the expository refutational text group and one in the
narrative refutational text group did not respond to the year-in-school item.









CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Demographic statistics for the participants were reported in Table 2-1. The sample,

consisting of predominantly white female participants, was fairly typical for the undergraduate

education programs at the two universities. Means and standard deviations by experimental

condition for all pre-treatment and post-treatment measures are reported in Table 3-1.

The mean SAT verbal score was 7.13 points higher for the narrative refutational text

(NRT) group than for the expository refutational text group (ERT), though the difference was not

significant, t(146) = -.53, p = .60. For the protests of conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic

motivation, scores could range from 0 to 10 with higher scores representing more accurate

conceptions. Participants in both conditions scored an average of 3 to 4 points higher on the

pretest of intrinsic motivation than on the pretest of extrinsic motivation. This difference

suggests that participants had more accurate initial conceptions of intrinsic than extrinsic

motivation. Participants' epistemological beliefs were on average more sophisticated than naive

with scores well below the mid-point on the 5-point Likert scale with lower scores representing

more sophisticated beliefs. Participants' epistemological beliefs were also more sophisticated

than the sample in Gregoire's (2002) dissertation study. Participants in my experimental and

control group averaged 1.40 and 1.53 respectively on the measure of epistemological beliefs,

whereas participants in Gregoire's groups averaged 2.41 and 2.27. Despite the random

assignment of participants to text condition, one pretreatment measure revealed significant

differences by text condition. Participants assigned to read the ERT scored significantly higher

on the pretest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation than participants assigned to read the NRT

with a mean difference of .51 questions correct, t(189) = 2.04, p = .04.









Manipulation Checks

I assessed the effectiveness of the treatment with a series of manipulation checks that

participants completed immediately after reading the assigned text. Specifically, I predicted that

participants who read the NRT would describe their text as more familiar, useful, interesting, and

more clearly making the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation than those who

read the expository text. Only one significant difference was found. Contrary to my hypothesis,

participants who read the ERT described their text as more clearly making the distinction

between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation than those who read the NRT (p < .05). In addition, on

the basis of Bless's (2000) contention that those in positive moods are less likely to feel

threatened by information that contradicts their existing conceptions and in turn are more likely

to link that new knowledge with existing knowledge, I hypothesized that those who read the

NRT would find it less challenging, requiring less effort, and would be more likely to agree with

conceptions in the text than those who read the ERT; however, again contrary to my hypotheses,

no differences by text type were reported on these manipulation checks.

Analysis of the Correlation Matrix

There were 43 participants, 22 in the NRT and 21 in the ERT condition for whom I was

unable to obtain SAT or ACT scores from the participants or the registrar. For these participants

I used pattern matching in LISREL to impute values to these missing scores.

As evident in the means presented in Table 3-1, despite random assignment to text

condition, those assigned to the NRT had significantly lower scores on the pretest of intrinsic

motivation, but there were no significant correlations with other pretreatment measures. For

posttreatment measures, reading the NRT was positively correlated with empathy, positive

affect, and negative affect. In regard to cognitive processing, the NRT was negatively correlated









with systematic processing and positively correlated with heuristic processing. The NRT had no

significant correlation with any posttest or delayed posttest of conceptions of motivation.

Tables 3-2 and 3-3 present the correlation matrices for all pre- and posttreatment measures

by treatment condition, ERT and NRT, respectively. A few correlations were significant across

both conditions. The tests of conceptions of extrinsic motivation were significantly correlated at

pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest, as were the tests of conceptions of intrinsic motivation.

For posttreatment measures, empathy and positive affect were positively correlated in both text

conditions. Systematic processing was negatively correlated with heuristic processing and

delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation for both text conditions.

However, several differences by text condition were found in pretreatment and

posttreatment measures. For the ERT condition, verbal SAT scores were significantly positively

correlated with conceptions of extrinsic motivation at pretest, posttest and delayed posttest. For

the NRT, verbal SAT scores were only significantly correlated with epistemological beliefs;

specifically, higher SAT verbal scores were negatively correlated with naive beliefs in certain

and simple knowledge. It should be noted that this correlation was close to significant for the

ERT condition. For the ERT condition, protests of conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic

motivation were significantly positively correlated with empathy. Naive beliefs in simple and

certain knowledge were only significantly correlated with other measures in the NRT condition.

Specifically these epistemological beliefs were significantly positively correlated with systematic

processing and negatively correlated with heuristic processing. Also for the NRT condition only,

naive beliefs in simple and certain knowledge were significantly correlated with lower scores on

the delayed posttest of intrinsic motivation.









Some notable differences in correlations of posttreatment measures by text condition were

found as well. For the ERT condition, empathy was significantly positively correlated with

conception of extrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest. In addition to the significant

positive correlation of empathy and positive affect in both conditions, empathy and positive

affect were correlated with negative affect for the NRT condition. For the ERT condition,

positive affect and heuristic processing were significantly correlated with conceptions of

extrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest.

In summary some patterns of correlations were distinct by text condition. For the ERT

condition, SAT verbal scores, empathy, positive affect, and heuristic processing were

significantly and positively correlated with posttest and delayed posttest of conceptions of

extrinsic motivation, though no nontest measure was significantly correlated with any posttest or

delayed posttest measure for the NRT condition. Also naive beliefs in simple and certain

knowledge were only significantly correlated with other variables in the NRT condition.

Model Fit

The hypothesized model in Figure 1-1 was estimated from the correlation matrix with

LISREL 8.80. Because I had only one measure of each variable I subtracted the internal

consistency estimates from 1.00 as the fixed error variance of the observed variables in order to

estimate the relationships among latent variables. The model was significantly different from the

saturated model at 2(44) = 221.71, p = 0.0, indicating an overall poor fit of the model to the

data. Other indices of fit include a comparative fit index (CFI) of .80, a non-normed fit index

(NNFI) of .58, a root mean square residual (RMR) of .09 and a root mean square error of

approximation (RMSEA) of .14. All of these indices are further evidence of the poor fit of the

hypothesized model to the data.









Suggested Model Modifications

An analysis of the residuals associated with the hypothesized model indicated several

relationships that could be significantly improved. The relationship between the indicators of

heuristic and systematic processing had the largest fitted residual (-.59) and standardized residual

(-9.08), with a modification index for the errors of these indicators of 67.97. Therefore, I allowed

the errors of these indicators to correlate. Also the modification index for the errors on observed

scores on the protests of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation was 25.64 and subsequent analyses

contained a modification index of 4.65 for the errors on observed scores on the posttests of

intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. These were the three sets of errors, all significant at the .05

level, I allowed to correlate in the revised model.

A number of relationships among the latent variables deserve attention and revision. Paths

with z-scores less than 1.96 I are not statistically significant at the .05 level and subject to

deletion, whereas paths not included with a modification index > 3.84 are significant at the .05

level and were candidates for inclusion in the revised model. For example, the model depicted

the exogenous variable for text type (narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text) as

having a direct effect on conceptions of motivation, but the path from text type to the posttest

and delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation was not significant with a parameter

ofy = .07, z = .79, and y = -.09, z = -1.32, respectively. Finally, the model depicted text type with

a direct effect on positive and negative affect, but the path from text type to positive affect was

not significant at y = .04, z = .56 so that path was deleted from the revised model.

The model also included the effect of epistemological beliefs on conceptions of intrinsic

and extrinsic motivation; however none of the paths from epistemological beliefs to change in

conceptions of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation were significant, y = .12, z = .98 and y = .04, z =

.34, respectively at posttest, and y = -.10, z = -.99 and y = -.02, z = -.34, respectively at delayed









posttest. None of the paths from epistemological beliefs were in the revised model because the

hypothesized parameters were not significant.

The relationship from affect to processing was also different than hypothesized. The

hypothesized model depicted direct effects for both negative and positive affect on heuristic and

systematic processing; however the paths from positive affect to heuristic and systematic

processing were not significant, 0 = -.12, z = -1.59 and 0 = .01, z = .09, respectively. The path

from negative affect to heuristic processing was not significant, 0 = -.14, z = -1.73, but the path

to systematic processing was significant, 0 = .19, z = 2.00. However, this path was found

nonsignificant in further analyses and was removed from the revised model. In summary, none of

the paths from affect to processing were included in the revised model. However, the

modification index of 4.81 for the direct effect of positive affect on posttest of intrinsic

motivation was significant so that path was included in the revised model. Also the direct effect

of empathy to posttest of extrinsic motivation had a significant modification index of 10.18 so

that path was included in the revised model.

In the analysis of the hypothesized model, heuristic and systematic processing were

differentially related to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation.

Specifically, heuristic processing was not significantly related to either posttest or delayed

posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation, P = -.08, z = -.98 and 0 = -.07, z = -1.10,

respectively. Systematic processing, in contrast, was not significantly related to either delayed

posttest of conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, P = -.11, z = -1.41 and P = -.09, z = -

1.12, respectively. These nonsignificant paths were not included in the revised model.

Only the path from SAT verbal to delayed posttest of extrinsic motivation was significant

(y = -.15, z = -2.10), whereas the paths to posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation (y = .03,









z = .30), extrinsic motivation (y = -.08, z = -.77) and delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic

motivation (y = .03, z = .41) were all nonsignificant and were not included in the revised model.

However, the modification index from SAT verbal scores to positive affect, 6.49, was significant

at the .05 level and was included in the revised model.

Finally the relationships among protests, posttests, and delayed posttests of conceptions of

intrinsic motivation were significant, as were those among conceptions of extrinsic motivation,

with the exception of the path from pretest to delayed posttest, y = .05, z = .17. There was one

significant relationship between tests of conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; the

pretest of intrinsic motivation was significantly related to the delayed posttest of extrinsic

motivation with a modification index of 5.80 and was in the revised model.

The revised model (Figure 3-1) was significantly different from the saturated model, X2(58)

= 75.05, p = .07, indicating an overall good fit of the model to the data. Other indices of fit

include a comparative fit index (CFI) of .98, a non-normed fit index (NNFI) of .97, a root mean

square residual (RMR) of .07, and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .04.

These indices indicated a good fit of the model to the data and allowed for interpretation of the

total, direct, and indirect effects of variables in the revised model (Table 3-4).

Research Questions

Research Question 1 was, "Do epistemological beliefs or verbal ability influence change in

preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation immediately after reading narrative refutational

text and 4 weeks later?" As described above, epistemological beliefs were hypothesized to be

causally related to change in conceptions of motivation; however, none of these paths were

significant and did not appear in the revised model and analysis. In regard to the relationship

between verbal ability and change in conceptions of motivation, only the effect of verbal ability

on conceptions of extrinsic motivation at delayed posttest was significant (y = -.13, z = -2.40).









Research Question 2 was, "Does reading a narrative refutational text (NRT) have a

stronger effect than reading an expository refutational text (ERT) on conceptual change in

preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation immediately after the reading and 4 weeks later?"

The revised model included a direct effect of NRT on conceptions of intrinsic motivation at

posttest (y = .49, z = 4.95) and delayed posttest (y = .30, z = 3.85), suggesting that reading an

NRT had a stronger effect than ERT on preservice teachers' conceptions of intrinsic motivation.

In contrast, the direct effects of NRT on conceptions of extrinsic motivation at posttest and

delayed posttest were not significant; however, the total effects were significant and were

addressed by research question 7 regarding mediation of the effects of NRT on conceptual

change.

Research Question 3 was, "Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect

than reading an expository refutational text on preservice teachers' systematic and heuristic

processing of information regarding conceptions of motivation?" The revised model included the

direct effects of NRT on both systematic and heuristic processing. Reading the NRT had a direct

positive effect on heuristic processing (y = .44, z = 5.73) but, contrary to prediction, a direct

negative effect on systematic processing (y = -.28, z = -3.38).

Research Question 4 was, "Does reading a narrative refutational text elicit more positive

emotion in preservice teachers than reading an expository refutational text?" A direct effect of

NRT on positive emotion was not included in the revised model. However, results showed that

the relationship was totally mediated by empathy. The total effect of NRT on positive affect was

significant, (y = .12, z = 2.06), and was fully mediated through empathy, given that the inclusion

of the paths from NRT to empathy (y = .18, z = 2.09) and empathy to positive affect (y = .68, z =









9.21) reduced the direct effect of NRT on positive affect to a nonsignificant level. Thus, in the

revised model empathy fully mediated the relationship between NRT and positive affect.

Research Question 5 was, "Does reading a narrative refutational text elicit less negative

emotion in preservice teachers than reading an expository refutational text?" The direct effect of

NRT on negative affect was significant (y = .25, z = 2.99), suggesting that, contrary to my

hypothesis, reading a NRT elicited greater negative emotion in preservice teachers than reading

an ERT. However, empathy was not a significant mediator of the effect of NRT on negative

affect, as it was for the relationship between the reading of NRT and positive emotion.

Research Question 6 was, "Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect

on the empathy that preservice teachers experience after reading it than reading an expository

refutational text?" As discussed in the preceding description of the mediation of NRT on

positive affect by empathy, the hypothesized direct effect of NRT to empathy was significant in

the revised model,(y = .18, z = 2.09), suggesting that reading an NRT had a stronger effect on

empathy in preservice teachers than reading an ERT.

Research Question 7 was, "Do empathy, positive affect, systematic, and heuristic

processing mediate the relationship between text type (narrative refutational text vs. expository

refutational text) and conceptual change in preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation

immediately after the reading and 4 weeks later?" Though the results provided evidence of

mediation of the relationship between reading NRT vs. ERT and conceptions of motivation, the

relationship differed by the type of motivation measured. For the intrinsic posttest, the direct

effect of NRT was significant (y = .49, z = 4.95), and the indirect effect was significant, yet

negative, (y = -.08, z = -2.84), suggesting a partial mediation of this relationship.









An analysis of this indirect effect revealed two paths of mediation: (a) from NRT to

heuristic processing to posttest of intrinsic motivation and (b) from NRT to empathy to positive

affect to the intrinsic motivation posttest. For the first path, the direct effect of NRT on heuristic

processing was estimated at .44, whereas the direct effect of heuristic processing on the intrinsic

motivation posttest was -.15. Multiplying these two parameters yielded an estimate of-.07 for

the indirect effect of NRT on the posttest of intrinsic motivation, as mediated by heuristic

processing. For the second path, the direct effect of NRT on empathy was estimated at .18, the

direct effect of empathy on positive affect was .68, and the direct effect of positive affect on the

intrinsic motivation posttest was -. 14. Multiplying these three parameters yielded an estimate of

the indirect effect of NRT of -.01 on the intrinsic motivation posttest, as mediated by empathy

and positive affect.

The same mediational relationships existed for reading NRT to the delayed posttests of

intrinsic motivation; the only difference was the additional direct effect of the intrinsic

motivation posttest on the delayed posttest of intrinsic motivation. Including this parameter

changed the estimated effect of the first mediational path to -.03 and maintained the second at -

.01. A third path from NRT to the delayed intrinsic motivation posttest mediated by intrinsic

motivation posttest was estimated at .23. Adding the estimates of these three mediational paths

yielded a significant and positive indirect effect of reading NRT vs. ERT on delayed posttest of

intrinsic motivation, (y = .19, z = 2.99).

For the extrinsic motivation posttest, the direct effect of NRT was not significant, yet the

indirect effect was significant, (y = .06, z = 2.49), suggesting total mediation. An analysis of

these indirect effects revealed two paths of mediation: (a) from NRT to systematic processing to

extrinsic motivation posttest and (b) from NRT to empathy to extrinsic motivation posttest. For









the first path, the direct effect of NRT on systematic processing was estimated at -.28, whereas

the direct effect of systematic processing on posttest of extrinsic motivation was -.10.

Multiplying these two parameters yielded an estimate of .03 for the indirect effect of NRT as

mediated by systematic processing on the extrinsic motivation posttest. For the second path, the

direct effect of NRT on empathy was estimated at .18, and the direct effect of empathy on the

extrinsic motivation posttest was .20. Multiplying these two parameters yielded an estimate of

.03 for the indirect effect of NRT on the intrinsic motivation posttest, as mediated by empathy.

The same mediational relationships existed for reading NRT to the delayed posttests of

extrinsic motivation; as with intrinsic motivation the only difference was the additional direct

effect of the extrinsic motivation posttest on the delayed extrinsic motivation posttest. Including

this parameter maintained the estimated effects of both mediational paths at .03. Adding the

estimates of these two mediational paths yielded a significant and positive indirect effect of

reading NRT vs. ERT on delayed posttest of extrinsic motivation, (y = .07, z = 2.50).









Table 3-1. Means and standard deviations for pre- and posttreatment measures by treatment condition
Pretreatment Measures
Expository Refutational Text Narrative Refutational Text
Measure M SD N M SD N t pa

SAT-Verbal 547.98 80.51 72 555.11 83.52 75 -.53 .599
Pretest Intrinsic Motivation 8.32 1.36 93 7.80 1.98 97 2.10 .037
Pretest Extrinsic Motivation 4.33 2.09 93 4.05 2.23 97 .90 .370
Epistemological Beliefs 1.40 .58 93 1.53 .63 97 -1.52 .130
Posttreatment Measures
Familiar 3.10 1.14 93 3.04 1.19 97 .33 .372
Challenged 2.02 1.18 93 2.19 1.18 97 -.96 .170
Distinction 4.19 .85 93 3.92 1.04 96 2.00 .024
Effort 3.46 1.10 93 3.60 1.04 96 -.91 .182
Useful 4.11 .88 93 4.23 .91 96 -.93 .176
Interesting 3.41 1.02 93 3.46 1.02 96 -.34 .369
c Agreement 3.79 .92 92 3.86 .94 96 -.53 .300
Empathy 13.31 4.33 93 14.41 4.04 97 -1.81 .036
Positive Affect 15.97 8.40 93 18.13 8.83 97 -1.73 .043
Negative Affect 2.94 3.98 93 4.89 5.57 97 -2.77 .003
Systematic Processing .56 .33 93 .41 .31 97 3.23 .001
Heuristic Processing .16 .21 93 .36 .32 97 -5.07 .000
Posttest Intrinsic Motivation 8.91 1.46 93 9.06 1.24 97 -.75 .227
Posttest Extrinsic Motivation 6.34 2.79 93 6.61 2.58 97 -.65 .257
Delayed Posttest Intrinsic Motivation 8.88 1.48 86 9.14 1.23 81 -1.23 .110
Delayed Posttest Extrinsic Motivation 6.28 2.73 86 6.28 2.45 81 0.00 .500
Note: Higher scores on tests of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation represent more accurate conceptions of motivation. Higher scores on
epistemological beliefs represent more naive beliefs in simple and certain knowledge.
a p-values for posttreatment measures were for one-tailed test of directional hypotheses.









Table 3-2. Polychoric correlations for pre- and posttreatment measures for ERT condition (N= 86)
SAT PRI PRE EBS EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE
SAT 1.00
PRI -.14 1.00
PRE .31** .10 1.00
EBS -.20 -.11 -.14 1.00
EMP -.09 .27* .25* -.03 1.00
AFP -.26* .19 .20 .02 .57****1.00
AFN -.03 -.10 -.11 -.09 -.05 .02 1.00
SPG -.04 .06 -.17 .06 -.04 -.02 .17 1.00
HPG .12 .04 .13 -.12 .03 -.01 .01 -.69****1.00
PSI -.02 .70**** .15 -.02 .05 .07 -.08 .02 -.03 1.00
PSE .27* .18 .60*** -.15 .35*** .34** .08 -.20 .24* .36*** 1.00
DPI .03 .67**** .20 -.12 .17 .10 .08 .00 -.02 .74**** .39*** 1.00
DPE .22* .23* .61****-.20 .38*** .28** .10 -.23* .24* .46**** .80**** .47** 1.00
Note: SAT = SAT verbal scores. PRI = pretest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PRE = pretest of conceptions of extrinsic
c motivation. EBS = naive epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge. EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN =
negative affect. SPG = systematic processing; HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PSE
= posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; DPE = delayed
posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation.
=p< 5.05. ** =pl .01. *** =p .001. **** =p_ .0001.









Table 3-3. Polychoric correlations for pre- and posttreatment measures for NRT condition (N= 81)
SAT PRI PRE EBS EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE
SAT 1.00
PRI .12 1.00
PRE .05 49****1.00
EBS -.29** -.13 -.06 1.00
EMP .02 -.10 -.07 -.10 1.00
AFP -.11 .06 -.01 .00 .58****1.00
AFN -.17 -.09 -.04 .07 .32** .31** 1.00
SPG -.10 .01 -.08 .32** .10 .05 .14 1.00
HPG .11 -.03 .07 -.28* -.18 -.20 -.12 -.76****1.00
PSI .06 .68**** .32** -.09 -.07 -.08 -.03 -.04 -.03 1.00
PSE .17 .09 .57"*** -.12 .07 .00 -.08 -.12 .05 .34** 1.00
DPI .12 .46**** .29** -.22* -.09 -.10 -.06 -.07 .00 .66**** .31** 1.00
DPE .14 .20 .58**** -.21 .04 .03 -.02 -.25* .06 .44**** .85**** .40****1.00
Note: SAT = SAT verbal scores. PRI = pretest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PRE = pretest of conceptions of extrinsic
2 motivation. EBS = naive epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge. EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN =
negative affect. SPG = systematic processing; HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PSE
= posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; DPE = delayed
posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation.
=p< 5.05. ** =pl .01. *** =p .001. **** =p_ .0001.









Table 3-4. Total, direct, and indirect effects in the revised model (N


Variable Effect EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE
NRT Total .18* .12* .29* -.28* .44* .41* .06* .49* .07*
Direct .18* -- .25* -.28* .44* .49* -- .30* --
Indirect -- .12* .04 -- -.08* .06* .19* .07*
SAT Total -- -.17* -- -- .02 -- .01 -.13*
Direct -- -.17* -- -- -.13
Indirect -- -- -- .02 -- .01 --
EMP Total -- .68* .21 -- -- -.10* .20* -.04 .21*
Direct -- -- -- -- .20* -- --
Indirect -- -- -- -.10* -- -.04 .21*
AFP Total -- -- -- -- .14* -- -.07 --
Direct --
Indirect -- -- -- -- .14* -- -.07
AFN Total --
Direct
Indirect
SPG Total -- -- -- -.10* -- -.10*
Direct -- -- -- -.10*
Indirect -- -.10*
HPG Total -- -- -- -- .15* -- -.07* --
Direct -- -- -- -- .15*
Indirect -- -- -- -- -- .07* --


Note: NRT = narrative refutational vs. expository refutational text. SAT


SAT verbal scores.


EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN = negative affect. SPG = systematic processing;
HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PSE = posttest
of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic
motivation; DPE = delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation.
* =p <.05.


167)































Figure 3-1. Revised exploratory model of change of conceptions of motivation.









CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this dissertation study is to increase our understanding of conceptual

change in preservice teachers by testing the model of conceptual change, presented in Figure 1-1,

which addresses a number of weaknesses in current research. These weaknesses include the need

to identify more effective interventions to effect conceptual change, the failure to identify

personal characteristics that influence conceptual change, and the lack of specification of

cognitive and affective processes involved in conceptual change. The model addresses these

weaknesses by specifying that the intervention of instructional text (specifically, narrative

refutational text vs. expository refutational text), epistemological beliefs, and verbal ability

directly affect change in conceptions of motivation, and that type of text also directly affects

systematic and heuristic processing, which in turn directly affect change in conceptions of

motivation. Furthermore the model specifies that the text directly affects affect, which in turn

affects processing and change in conceptions of motivation, and that the text directly affects

empathy, which in turn affects affect, processing, and conceptual change. A preliminary analysis

indicated a poor fit of the model to the data, and an analysis of the residuals indicated directions

for improving the model fit. Results of the revised model shown in Figure 3-1 will be discussed

in terms of seven research questions. In this section I summarize those findings by analyzing the

results for proposed influential personal characteristics, interventions, and mediators of

conceptual change. Finally, I identify weaknesses of the study, suggest areas for further research,

and describe the study's implications for practice and policy.









Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change

Epistemological Beliefs

The study includes epistemological beliefs as one potential influence on conceptual change when

reading narrative refutational text. In the original model it was hypothesized that preservice

teachers who hold the beliefs that knowledge is simple and certain exhibit less conceptual change

after the instructional intervention. However, no significant relationships were found between

epistemological beliefs and change in conceptions of either extrinsic or intrinsic motivation

immediately at posttest or 4 weeks later at delayed posttest. This finding was surprising in that

previous studies showed those who have less sophisticated epistemological beliefs exhibited less

conceptual change after reading expository refutational text (Gregoire, 2002; Qian & Alvermann,

1995). Therefore there is a need to continue to examine this relationship to determine whether

this finding was due to chance or some important difference in the treatment in my study

compared to other studies.

Verbal Ability

I also investigated verbal ability as another potential influence on conceptual change when

reading narrative refutational text. On the basis of Gregoire's (2002) finding that verbal ability

did not influence conceptual change, I did not expect a significant direct effect of verbal ability

on conceptual change immediately after reading or 4 weeks later. However, in my study, higher

verbal ability as measured by SAT or ACT scores has a direct negative effect on conceptions of

extrinsic motivation 4 weeks after the instructional intervention, with higher verbal ability

resulting in less accurate conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Thus, although verbal ability does

not predict students' beliefs about the value of extrinsic motivation strategies immediately after

reading the refutational texts, 4 weeks after the intervention those with higher SAT scores are

more likely to report that extrinsic motivation strategies are a good way to motivate than are









students with lower SAT scores. This finding was unexpected, and the reason for such a

relationship is unclear. Further research is needed to determine whether this finding is a chance

occurrence or represents a consistent result in need of explanation.

Another unexpected finding in my study is that higher verbal ability as measured by SAT

or ACT scores leads to less positive affect during the instructional intervention. In other words,

those with higher verbal ability enjoy reading the text less than those with lower verbal abilities.

One possible interpretation of this finding is that participants with higher ability were more

capable of understanding the conflict between the two views of motivation, leading them to feel

less positive while reading the text. However, in her study Gregoire (2002) did not hypothesize

or report any relationship between ability and affect after reading expository or expository

refutational text. To advance our understanding of the role of affect in motivating conceptual

change, further research on a potential relationship between verbal ability and affect when

reading refutational texts seems warranted.

Interventions for Conceptual Change

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether reading a narrative refutational

text has a stronger effect on conceptual change in preservice teachers' conceptions of motivation

than reading an expository refutational text. The results of the study are mixed, as reading NRT

had a direct effect on conceptions of intrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest, but no

effects on conception of extrinsic motivation at either posttest or delayed posttest. It is interesting

and potentially important to note that participants' scores on the intrinsic motivation measure are

quite high, with pretest averages of 7.80 for participants in the NRT condition and 8.32 for

participants in the ERT condition on a scale of 0 tolO and posttest averages of 9.06 for the NRT

condition and 8.91 for the ERT condition. In contrast, participants' scores are much lower on the

extrinsic motivation measure, with pretest averages of 4.05 for NRT and 4.33 for ERT and









posttest averages of 6.61 in the NRT condition and 6.34 in the ERT condition. These results

indicate that participants hold very positive views of the scenarios in which intrinsic motivation

strategies are used by the teacher but still hold positive attitudes toward some extrinsic

motivation strategies even after reading refutational texts focusing on their potential negative

effects on students' motivation. Unfortunately it is impossible to directly compare the results of

this study with other studies because of differences in the measures of conceptual change. In this

study the measure was divided into two subscales, one for extrinsic motivation and the other for

intrinsic motivation and a true/false response option was used. In contrast, Salisbury-Glennon

and Stevens (1999) reported results for the combined intrinsic and extrinsic subscales and,

although Kutza (2000) used the two subscales, she used a 5-point Likert type scale for the

response options. It is evident that Kutza's (2000) participants' scores on the 5-point scale were

slightly higher than participants' scores in this study for the intrinsic items, with a mean of 3.83

and standard deviation of .60, than for the extrinsic items with a mean of 3.30 and standard

deviation of .69. Kutza (2000) reported "moderate agreement among the participants that both

intrinsic and extrinsic means are both good ways of motivating students" (p. 52); however, in

responding to the dichotomous response options used in this study participants showed a much

higher initial acceptance of intrinsic strategies than extrinsic ones. Given that my study occurred

more than 5 years after Kutza's (2000) study, it is possible that preservice teachers are learning

more about contemporary research on motivation, a possibility supported by several thought-

listings in which participants reported having learned these concepts or heard about them

already. Of course if they had heard and accepted all these views on motivation, one would

expect the pretest scores on the extrinsic subscale to be higher as well.









Potential Mediators of Conceptual Change

In this study I initially proposed a causal model for conceptual change (Figure 1-1)

suggesting that the instructional intervention of narrative refutational text would, via empathy,

generate affect that would in turn generate cognitive processing resulting in conceptual change.

The results of this study failed to support the causal link from affect to processing to conceptual

change; however, results of the analysis of the revised model does show that some of these

mediating relationships exist for this sample, though the effects are not in the expected direction.

I will discuss these specific findings and conclude this section by assessing the causal chain on

the whole.

I investigated whether reading a narrative refutational text has a stronger effect on

preservice teachers' systematic and heuristic processing of information regarding conceptions of

motivation than reading an expository refutational text. I found that reading NRT leads to more

heuristic processing and less systematic processing than reading an ERT, but neither type of

processing leads to conceptual change. This result is contrary to Gregoire's (2002) finding that

neither refutational nor expository refutational text was related to systematic processing, but

systematic processing in both conditions did predict conceptual change. In my study, heuristic

processing leads to less change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and systematic processing

leads to less change in conceptions of extrinsic motivation.

Some researchers have looked to systematic processing as a potential mediator of the

relationship between instructional interventions and conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998;

Gill, 2003). However, little evidence exists supporting this hypothesis (Gill et al., 2004). The

results of this study also fail to support this contention, because systematic processing is

unrelated to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation and inversely related to change of

conceptions of extrinsic motivation. I used the same measure of systematic processing as Gill et









al. with different texts, continuing to raise doubts about systematic processing as a significant

mediator or about using thought listings with this coding rubric (Appendix B) as a measure of

systematic processing. An alternative to this thought-listing methodology is the use of a think-

aloud methodology, by which participants are interrupted during the actual comprehension

process and asked to report what they are thinking at that moment (Kendeou & van den Broek,

2007). These responses, generated during rather than after reading, can then be coded as

indicators of cognitive processing or affect. More thoughtful consideration of the methodologies

to measure cognitive processing may help researchers isolate cognitive resources for conceptual

change.

A unique component of this study is the effort to identify heuristic processing as a potential

mediator of conceptual change. I hypothesized that the narrative refutational text would generate

heuristic processing about the narrative elements (characters, setting, and plot) as well as non-

message elements of the text such as tone, credibility, and effect on the audience. Though the

NRT does lead to an increase in heuristic processing, heuristic processing, in turn, is inversely

related to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation. Heuristic processing did not emerge as

a significant resource for conceptual change in this study.

In this study in addition to looking for separate direct effects of heuristic and systematic

processing, I also investigated their combined effects. The sufficiency principle of the heuristic-

systematic model maintains that systematic processing does not occur in isolation, but occurs

only when heuristic processing is not sufficient to reach the desired level of confidence.

Therefore, when systematic processing is motivated, it is attenuating, adding to, or being biased

by heuristic processing (Chen et al., 2000). The narrative refutational text used in this study was

designed to elicit the additive effects of heuristic and systematic processing.









If additive effects are operative, then the NRT would lead to more heuristic and systematic

processing than the ERT; however, I found that the NRT leads to more heuristic and less

systematic processing than the ERT, suggesting that the NRT did not sufficiently widen the gap

between confidence and desired confidence to motivate more systematic processing than the

ERT. If the NRT had led to more heuristic and systematic processing, then their effects on

conceptual change could be examined to see if there were additive effects, or whether heuristic

processing attenuated the effects or biased the effects of systematic processing; however,

because the NRT did not yield more systematic processing than the ERT, these questions are not

answerable in this study. However, future research that includes a text known to sufficiently

widen the gap between confidence and desired confidence and increase systematic processing

may help researchers to ask and answer these questions in regard to conceptual change.

I investigated the role of affect in conceptual change after reading a narrative refutational

text in contrast to an expository refutational text. I hypothesized that the NRT elicits more

positive affect and less negative affect than reading an expository refutational text. As

hypothesized, the NRT generates more positive affect via empathy than the ERT. Contrary to my

hypothesis, the NRT also generates more negative affect, though this relationship is not mediated

by empathy.

Several theorists have speculated about the kind of affect that motivates conceptual

change. For example, Piaget's (1975) equilibration theory, the Posner et al. (1982) theory of

conceptual change, and Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all explain cognitive

change in terms of the human need to reduce negative affect that occurs when two ideas conflict.

In contrast, Bless (2000) has proposed that positive affect motivates conceptual change by

helping readers overcome the threat of contrary information or by motivating a greater reliance









on general knowledge structures (i.e., schemas, heuristics) that can actually free cognitive

resources for the accommodative processing of inconsistent information (Bless, 2001). In

support of this contention, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) reported that positive affect was

positively related and negative affect was negatively related to conceptual change after reading

an expository refutational text.

This study does not provide clear support for either negative or positive affect serving as a

resource for conceptual change, in that neither led to conceptual change after reading an NRT.

The only significant finding regarding affect is that positive affect is negatively related to change

in conception of intrinsic motivation, which does cast doubt on Bless's (2001) contention that

positive affect can overcome the threat of inconsistent information or free cognitive resources for

accommodation. It is also of interest that the NRT leads to an increase in both positive and

negative affect, suggesting that affect is complex and perhaps not best considered in this

dichotomous fashion. An alternative approach would be to consider discrete emotions as

opposed to generalized positive and negative affect (Izard, 2007). Some discrete emotions that

have been proposed to affect conceptual change include anxiety, fear (Gill, 2003), frustration,

annoyance (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002) or interest (Andre & Windschitl, 2003; Pintrich,

1999).

I investigated whether NRT has a stronger effect than ERT on the empathy that preservice

teachers experience after reading. I found that reading the NRT does lead to more empathy than

reading the ERT, but the resulting effects on conceptual change are mixed. Empathy has been

identified as an important resource for comprehension and conceptual change. Chebat et al.

(2003) found that empathy led to increased conceptual change after reading a public service

announcement in either an expository or dramatic format, quite similar to the contrast between









the ERT and NRT used in this study. With a topic determined to have little self-relevance for the

sample studied, empathy led to increased conceptual change mediated by information

processing, a causal chain similar to the one hypothesized in this study.

In this study, the empathy the NRT generates does lead to conceptual change regarding

motivation, but only for the extrinsic subscale. It should be noted empathy is the only

endogenous variable with a direct effect on any aspect of conceptual change in this study. Given

that change on the intrinsic motivation may have been limited by a ceiling effect, the effect of

empathy may not be measurable on that subscale. With these considerations, the possibility of

empathy as a potential resource for conceptual change may be the most promising finding in this

study for future research.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the effects of empathy on conceptual change are direct

and not mediated by either positive or negative affect. Given that Bourg (1996) defined empathy

as a cognitive and affective process including (a) interpreting the emotional states of others and

(b) having an affective understanding or congruent affective response, and that empathy's effects

on conceptual change are not mediated by affect in this study, it may be that the cognitive

aspects of empathy are most germane as a resource for conceptual change. Alternatively, given

that empathy is related to an increase in both positive and negative affect, neither of which

served as a resource for conceptual change, researchers may need to identify more specific

emotions rather than look to generic positive or negative affect as a resource for conceptual

change.

Finally, I want to discuss the results of this study in view of the proposed causal model for

conceptual change. Specifically I hypothesized that the instructional intervention of narrative

refutational text, via empathy, would generate affect that in turn would motivate cognitive









processing resulting in conceptual change (Figure 1-1). Generally, the final model presented in

Figure 3-1 failed to support the proposed causal chain, in that no measure of conceptual change

was influenced in turn by empathy, affect, and cognitive processing. As described above, pieces

of that chain exist for conceptual change for either conceptions of extrinsic or intrinsic

motivation. For example, there are significant paths from NRT to heuristic processing to change

in conceptions of intrinsic motivation and from NRT to systematic processing to change in

conceptions of extrinsic motivation. However both of the relationships from processing to

conceptual change are negative; more processing is significantly related to less conceptual

change, casting doubt that either type of processing could be a resource for conceptual change.

As it seems unlikely that conceptual change can occur without some type of cognitive

processing, my results considered in light of similar results in Gregoire (2002) raise serious

questions about the validity of the measure of thought-listings used in these two studies.

The other piece of the proposed causal chain that found some support in this study pertains

to the role of empathy. Specifically, the results revealed significant paths from NRT to empathy

to change in conceptions of extrinsic motivation and from NRT to empathy to positive affect to

change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation. However the relationship of positive affect to

change in conceptions of motivation is negative, casting doubt that this chain could represent a

significant resource for conceptual change. The path directly through empathy is the most

promising as described in the discussion of empathy, though it should be noted that the overall

effect of NRT on change in conceptions of extrinsic motivation (.03) is small. In sum, the results

of this study fail to support the proposed causal model, suggesting that if a chain from text to

empathy to affect to processing can be a resource for conceptual change it will require different

conceptions or measures of affect or processing.









Weaknesses of the Study and Need for Further Research

Several weaknesses in this study may have resulted in an inability to replicate findings

from previous studies or find support for novel hypotheses, limiting its implications for policy

and practice but providing insight into areas in need of further research. Given that the results of

the intervention did not confirm oft-replicated findings and that the manipulation checks did not

show any of the predicted differences between the texts (that is, that the narrative refutational

text would be evaluated as more familiar, useful, interesting, clear, and persuasive, and less

challenging and requiring less effort than the expository refutational text), the effectiveness of

the intervention for this group of students is questionable. As I used only two texts, the study

might have been strengthened by including a third text type of expository non-refutational text or

by including more examples of expository refutational or narrative refutational text. Also with

fewer than 1,000 words each, the intervention was brief; perhaps adding a discussion of the text,

as suggested by Guzzetti (2000), might have increased the effectiveness of the intervention,

perhaps by increasing participants' metacognitive awareness or their ability to engage in

intentional learning (Vosniadou, 2007). Furthermore, augmented activation was confounded with

each of the two experimental texts. That is, augmented activation in the form of a brief statement

alerting students that they might hold a belief about motivation that is contrary to research

evidence was combined with each refutational text. This strategy was used because augmented

activation has been shown to be effective in facilitating conceptual change in preservice teachers

(Gregoire, 2002; Guzzetti et al., 1993), and I believed that augmented activation would set a

purpose for reading the narrative refutational text. Gregoire (2002) found differences between an

expository text without augmented activation and an expository refutational text with augmented

activation, leading her to speculate that augmented activation and not the refutational text might

have accounted for the effect of text in her study. Similarly, I found few differences between the









two texts that both included augmented activation, raising further questions as to the extent to

which the results of these studies are due to the text or due to augmented activation.

Weakness in the measure of conceptual change used in this study also should be addressed.

Though the subscales used to assess conceptual change were designed to measure beliefs about

the use of motivation strategies in classroom contexts, they fail to measure anything more than

beliefs. Changing beliefs is important, but the need remains for researchers of conceptual change

to demonstrate that change in beliefs does in fact lead to change of practice in the classroom, a

need underscored by the recent focus on bridging the divide between researchers who examine

conceptual change that occurs in the individual mind and those who examine change in

participation in communities of practice (Mason, 2007).

In regard to dual processing, I used a rubric (Appendix B) to code thought-listings as

evidence of systematic, heuristic, or irrelevant processing. The rubric was modified from the one

devised by Gregoire (2002) in which thought-listings were coded as either systematic or

irrelevant. I followed Gregoire's coding procedure for systematic processing; however, thought-

listings regarding narrative elements such as plot, character, or setting, and non-message based

elements such as text style, length, difficulty, credibility, or audience reaction were coded as

evidence of heuristic processing. As the coding progressed, one area of difficulty arose. The

rubric for systematic processing included thought listings that were "extensions, such as personal

examples, if relevant to the text meaning (e.g., relating the text to how she or he was taught)" and

"other relevant specific examples." Therefore, thought-listings that connected concepts to the

readers' experiences, their personal narratives, were coded as systematic, whereas thought-

listings that connected concepts to the characters' experiences were coded as heuristic. Difficulty

in distinguishing between systematic processing that reflected personal examples related to text









meaning and heuristic processing related to the narrative became a complication as the purpose

of the study was to differentiate between systematic processing characterized by abstractions and

principles and heuristic processing characterized by concrete events and stories. The study was

designed to explore the weaknesses of many teacher education programs that, as described by

Doyle and Carter (1996), emphasize abstract rationality and miss the mark because teachers'

understandings have a narrative structure. Therefore this study has made apparent the need to

further differentiate between these two types of processing in the heuristic-systematic model

(HSM; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and in cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST; Epstein &

Pacini, 1999).

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of research in education is to improve educational practice. This study

was designed to aid textbook authors and teacher educators to help preservice teachers think and

act in ways consistent with educational research. If the results of this study had revealed

significant advantages of reading narrative refutational text compared to expository refutational

text, it would have been the first such finding with teacher education students and would have

required replication and extension before confident recommendations could be made. Given that

no significant advantages were found for narrative refutational text, this study raises more

questions than it answers. However, some valuable insights are evident for those who are

interested in helping preservice teachers think and act in ways consistent with educational

research.

Patrick and Pintrich (2001) suggested that preservice teachers have conceptions about

motivation that are not consistent with contemporary views, a point supported by those who have

researched conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in preservice teachers (Kutza, 2000;

Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999). Compared to these previous studies, the results of this









study suggest that current preservice teachers exhibit a greater accuracy in their conceptions of

motivation, at least in regard to their acceptance of intrinsic motivation. Importantly, preservice

teachers still maintain the conception that some use of extrinsic motivation is good for learning.

Helping preservice teachers adopt conceptions of extrinsic motivation consistent with

educational research should continue to be a focus of instructors in teacher education programs.

The results of the protests and the content of the thought listings suggest that preservice teachers

believe that, though intrinsic motivation may be a little better, thorough and long-lasting learning

is motivated by both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and teachers should welcome any

motivation for learning regardless of its source. It is not surprising that preservice teachers hold

this view given the long and contentious debate about the merits of intrinsic and extrinsic

motivation (see Ryan & Deci, 2000, for summary). However, consensus has been reached

among motivation researchers that initial intrinsic motivation for a learning task will likely be

diminished when students expect to receive a tangible arbitrary reward (e.g., stickers, prizes) for

completion of the task (Lepper & Henderlong, 2000). I hope future researchers of conceptual

change will find ways to help preservice teachers think and act in ways consistent with this

research as they enter the classroom.

Finally, the role of affect in conceptual change is a key finding in this study that, though

hypotheses were not entirely supported, is relevant to theory and practice. Gregoire (2002) found

that students who read an expository refutational text generated less favorable thought listings

than those who read an expository text with refutation, though her measures of affect and belief

change were unrelated. Still she maintained that her study demonstrated "cognitive

disequilibrium is a negative affective state" (p. 137) consistent with Feldman's (2000) assertion

that "teachers need to be discontent" (p. 600), in order to experience conceptual change. Before









unequivocally recommending this idea to teachers, researchers should take into account findings

that conceptual change can be motivated by positive affect (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002) or

that interventions designed to facilitate conceptual change may lead to an increase in both

positive and negative affect such as occurred in this study. It is my hope that research of the role

of affect in conceptual change, recently described as the "warming trend" (Sinatra, 2005), will

continue so that researchers can accurately describe this role and provide clearer findings to

guide appropriate practice.









APPENDIX A
NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT (NRT)

You are about to read a passage that will most likely challenge the way you think about
student motivation. To understand why this might be so, read the following sentence and decide
whether or not you agree with it:

Teachers who give tangible rewards, like stickers or prizes, will increase their students'
motivation to learn.

If you agreed with this statement, you are not alone. Many preservice teachers just like
you agree with this statement. The problem is that this statement reflects an underlying belief
about student motivation that is opposed to what research has demonstrated about student
motivation.

In the selection you are about to read, the belief represented by the statement above is
called a reinforcement theory of motivation. As you read the following text, see if you can
clarify your own beliefs about student motivation. Be sure to pay attention to how your own
beliefs might differ from the material presented in the following text. Also, notice what
implications your beliefs have for instruction.

Intrinsic vs. reinforcement theory of motivation

Wendy Palmer is excited about beginning her first position as a fifth grade teacher, but
she is concerned with her students' motivation. Wendy shared her thoughts with Mary, who has
taught fifth grade for seven years.
Wendy explained to Mary, "I have rewards, like stickers and prizes, to motivate my
students to learn."
"I'm definitely no expert," Mary shrugged, "but students also possess an internal or
intrinsic motivation to learn. Students don't work only for external reinforcement"
"Absolutely," replied Wendy, but she didn't think a theory could help her practically.
Initially Wendy's class proceeded smoothly. Her students exhibited curiosity and
eagerness for their studies. Most talking was regarding the lessons, and the students appreciated
the rewards Wendy provided.
However, the situation deteriorated when students grew apathetic about the rewards.
When one student didn't receive a sticker for completing his homework he said nonchalantly,
"That's okay, I already have five of those."
In science class, Wendy offered the students little water-powered rockets as prizes for
satisfactory achievement on their test about the planets. Initially the students were interested in
learning about the planets. However they quickly became more concerned about getting the
rocket. The distractions were mounting, so Wendy decided to seek the advice of her friend,
Mary.
"Many beginning teachers have similar experiences," Mary replied, "Remember intrinsic
motivation? We cannot rely solely on external or extrinsic factors. Rather, motivation must come
from within, from students' own internal beliefs and emotions."
"But how can I facilitate my students' intrinsic motivation, isn't that just a theory?"
Wendy was frustrated and desperately wanted practical help.









"Yes, it's a theory but so is the reinforcement theory you've been using," Mary
explained, "Research has shown although motivation may occur as the result of reinforcers, it's
often short-lived. Students may grow tired of the reinforcers and they may cease to be
motivating. Reinforcement may actually decrease an individual's intrinsic motivation to engage
in a task. Often, receiving the reinforcer becomes the primary goal for the student rather than
learning the information."
"I don't need research to demonstrate that," Wendy laughed, "My classroom
demonstrates that. But what should I do instead?"
"Well," Mary continued earnestly, "an intrinsic theory of motivation does provide some
practical advice. For example, conditions that draw upon student interest and foster choice and
autonomy facilitate intrinsic motivation within students. This happens in classrooms where
teachers encourage students to choose tasks based on their own interests, and take responsibility
for their own learning.
"That will make all the difference?" Wendy asked hopefully.
"Well, I can't promise you that" Mary grinned, "but I do know that intrinsic motivation
facilitates conceptual learning. When information is learned at a conceptual level, it's more
likely to be retained, applied, or transferred. In contrast, when students engage in learning
because they are reinforced or externally motivated, they are less likely to become actively
involved in the task itself and do only as much as is necessary to receive the reward."
"Yes, my students thought more about the water-powered rocket than about the material
they needed to learn," Wendy said sheepishly.
"Yes, research has also demonstrated that conditions supporting intrinsic motivation
foster greater creativity. In contrast, reinforcement has been shown to cause students to develop
negative attitudes about their learning and has been shown to hinder creativity," Mary finished a
little out of breath, "Sorry to go on, but I think it's a message that needs to be heard."
"Well, I need to hear it!" Wendy smiled.









APPENDIX B
CODING RUBRIC FOR THOUGHT LISTINGS


Systematic Processing (S) Heuristic Processing (H) Irrelevant Processing (X)

Recall of the text Recall of the text Recall of the text

* Paraphrases of text Summary of narrative Isolated fragments or
meaning structure (i.e., plot, single words
* Restatements of the text setting, character)
meaning (phrases not Restatement of the
single words) narrative structure


Reactions to the text


* Counterarguments
* Qualifications (e.g. "I
agree because..." or "X
is good because..." or "I
agree with [restatement
of text meaning]"
* Replies to text's
argument
* Elaborations (e.g.
"Motivation is an
important part of
learning" or "Good
teachers help students
be motivated")
* Extensions, such as
personal examples, if
relevant to the text
meaning, e.g., relating
the text to how s/he was
taught
* Other relevant specific
examples
* Pertinent questions


Reaction to the text


* Reactions or judgments
to narrative structure
(e.g. "I like how the
teacher helped the
other" or "I didn't like
how the teacher
changed her style").
* Broad, general,
sweeping statements or
cliches that do pertain to
the text meaning or
structure (e.g. ""I like
learning from stories" )
* Thoughts about the
audience reading the
text (e.g., "Teachers
won't understand this")
* Comments about the
text itself (i.e., its
difficulty level, the
usefulness of specific
examples in the text, the
quality of writing, the
length of the text)


Reaction to the text


* Reactions or judgments
without reference to text
meaning or structure
(e.g. "I like it" or "I
agree with it")
* Broad, general,
sweeping statements or
cliches that do not
pertain to the text
meaning or structure
(e.g. "Teaching is a
calling" or "Teachers
make learning fun.")
* Irrelevant statements
(e.g., "I'm hungry")









Notes


* Just writing that something in the text meaning is good or bad, or I agree or disagree,
without restating or paraphrasing part of the message argument (more than a single word
or concept), e.g., "I agree with intrinsic motivation" should be coded as 'X'.

* However, stating agreement or liking for something while restating or paraphrasing the
text should be coded as 'S.'

* Just writing that the narrative structure is good or bad, or I agree or disagree, without
restating or paraphrasing part of the structure, e.g., "I agree with how she acted" should
be coded as 'X'. However, stating agreement or liking for something while restating or
paraphrasing the text should be coded as 'S.'

* Unclear pronouns, e.g. "I agree with this idea" or "It is good" should be considered to be
referring to the main topic of both passages facilitating students' intrinsic motivation.

* If in doubt about the meaning of a particular thought listing, you can always check back
to the previous thought listing (if it has the same ID code) to help understand the context
of the thought listing.









LIST OF REFERENCES


Alvermann, D., Hynd, C., & Qian, G. (1995). Effects of interactive discussion and text type on
learning counter-intuitive science concepts. Journal ofEducational Research, 88, 146-
154.

Andre, T., & Windschitl, M. (2003). Interest, epistemological belief, and intentional conceptual
change. In. G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional conceptual change (pp.
173-197). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Armbruster, B. (1984). The problem of "inconsiderate text." In G. G. Duffy, L. R. Roehler, & J.
Mason (Eds.), Comprehension instruction (pp. 207-217). New York: Longman.

Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1987). The affective dimension of learning: Faculty-student
relationships that enhance intellectual development. College Student Journal, 21, 46-58.

Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1992). Knowing and reasoning in college students: Gender-related
patterns in students' intellectual development. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). Women's ways of
knowing: The development of the self, voice, and mind. Basic Books: New York.

Bless, H. (2000). The interplay of affect and cognition: The mediating role of general knowledge
structures. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social
cognition (pp. 201-222). Paris: Cambridge University Press.

Bless, H. (2001). Mood and the use of general knowledge structures. In L. L. Martin & G. L.
Clore (Eds.), Theories of mood and cognition: A user's handbook. (pp. 9-26). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Bourg, T. (1996). The role of emotion, empathy, and text structure in children's and adults'
narrative text comprehension. In R. J. Kreuz & M. S. MacNealy (Eds.), Empirical
approaches to literature and ae(Ithe'liL (pp. 241-260). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Bourg, T., Risden, K. C., Thompson, S., & Davis, E. C. (1993). The effects of an empathy-
building strategy on 6th graders' causal inferencing in narrative text comprehension.
Poetics, 22, 117-133.

Bruner, J. (1985). Narrative and paradigmatic modes of thought. In E. Eisner (Ed.), Learning and
teaching the ways of knowing (84th yearbook of the National Society for the Study of
Education, pp. 97-115). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Buehl, M. M., & Alexander, P. A. (2001). Beliefs about academic knowledge. Educational
Psychology Review, 13, 385-418.

Calderhead, J. (1996). Teachers: Beliefs and knowledge. In D. C. Berliner & R. C. Calfee (Eds.),
Handbook of educational psychology (pp. 709-725). New York: Macmillan.









Caravita, S., & Hallden, 0. (1994). Re-framing the problem of conceptual change. Learning and
Instruction, 4, 89-111.

Carter, K. (1993). The place of story in the study of teaching and teacher education. Educational
Researcher, 22(1), 5-18.

Chaiken, S., Duckworth, K. L., & Darke, P. (2000). When parsimony fails.... Psychological
Inquiry, 10(2), 118-123.

Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing:
Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude
judgment. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 66(3), 460-473.

Chebat, J. C., Vercollier, S. D., & Gelinas-Chebat, C. (2003). Drama advertisements: Moderating
effects of self-relevance on the relations among empathy, information processing, and
attitudes. Psychological Reports, 92, 991-1014.

Chen, S., Duckworth, K., & Chaiken, S. (2000). Motivated heuristic and systematic processing.
Psychological Inquiry, 10(1), 44-49.

Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A
theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. Review of Educational
Research, 63, 1-49.

Coulson, J. S. (1989). An investigation of mood commercials. In P. Cafferata & A. M. Tybout
(Eds.), Cognitive and affective responses to advertising (pp. 21-30). Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books.

D'Agostino, R. B., Belanger, A., & D'Agostino, R. B. Jr. (1990). A suggestion for using
powerful and informative tests of normality. American Statistician, 44, 316-321.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1980). The empirical exploration of intrinsic motivational processes.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 39-80).
New York: Academic Press.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human
behavior. New York: Plenum Press.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In
R. Dientsbier (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation Vol. 38. Perspectives on
motivation (pp. 237-288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Dole, J. A., & Sinatra, G. M. (1998). Reconceptualizing change in the cognitive construction of
knowledge. Educational Psychologist, 33, 109-128.









Doyle, W. (1997). Heard any really good stories lately? A critique of the critics of narrative in
educational research, Teaching and Teacher Education, 13(1), 93-99.

Doyle, W., & Carter, K. (1996). Educational psychology and the education of teachers: A
reaction. Educational Psychologist, 31(1), 51-62.

Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich.

Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T., & Sadovsky, A. (2006). Empathy-related responding in children. In
M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 517-549). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.

Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1999). Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the
perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual
process ithew i'\, in social psychology (pp. 462-482). New York: Guilford Press.

Feldman, A. (2000). Decision making in the practical domain: A model of practical conceptual
change. Science Education, 84, 606-623.

Feshbach, N. D., & Feshbach, S. (1987). Affective processes and academic achievement. Child
Development, 58, 1335-1347.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective influences on social information processing. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.),
Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 163-185). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Fry, E. (1977). Fry's readability graph: Clarifications, validity, and extension to level 17. Journal
ofReatdilg. 21, 242-252.

Gill, M. (2003). Is it a challenge or a threat? A dual-process model of teachers' cognitive and
appraisal processes during conceptual change. Educational Psychological Review, 15,
147-179.

Gill, M. G., Ashton, P. T., & Algina, J. (2004). Changing preservice teachers' epistemological
beliefs about teaching and learning in mathematics: An intervention study. Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 29(2), 164-185.

Golden, J. M., & Guthrie, J. T. (1986). Convergence and divergence in reader response to
literature. Reading Research Quarterly, 21, 408-421.

Gordon, C. J.,& Rennie, B. J. (1987). Restructuring content schemata: An intervention study.
ReadingResearch andInstruction, 26(3), 162-188.









Gregoire, M. (2002). Effects of augmented activation, refutational text, efficacy beliefs,
epistemological beliefs, and systematic processing on conceptual change. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville.

Guzzetti, B. J. (2000). Learning counter-intuitive science concepts: What have we learned from
over a decade of research? Reading and Writing Quarterly, 16, 89-98.

Guzzetti, B. J., Snyder, T. E., Glass, G. V., & Gamas, W. S. (1993). Promoting conceptual
change in science: A comparative meta-analysis of instructional interventions from
reading education and science education. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 117-155.

Guzzetti, B. J., Williams, W. O., Skeels, S. A., & Wu, S. M. (1997). Influence of text structure
on learning counterintuitive physics concepts. Journal ofResearch in Science Teah-iing.
34(7), 701-719.

Hiebert, J., Carpenter, T., Fennema, E., Fuson, K. Human, P., & Murray, H. (1996). Problem
solving as a basis for reform in curriculum and instruction: The case of mathematics.
Educational Researcher, 25(4), 12-21.

Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability and salience. In E. T.
Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles
(pp. 133-168). New York: Guilford Press.

Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs
about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational
Research, 67, 88-140.

Holt-Reynolds, D. (1992). Personal history-based beliefs as relevant prior knowledge in course
work. American Educational Research Journal, 29, 325-349.

Hynd, C. (2003). Conceptual change in response to persuasive messages. In G. M. Sinatra & P.
R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional conceptual change (pp. 391-315). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas, and a new paradigm.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(3), 260-280.

Kardash, C. M., & Scholes, R. J. (1996). Effects of preexisting beliefs, epistemological beliefs,
and need for cognition on interpretation of controversial issues. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 88, 260-271.

Kendeou, P., & van den Broek, P. (2007). The effects of prior knowledge and text structure on
comprehension processes during reading of scientific texts. Memory & Cognition, 35(7),
1567-1577









King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgement: Understanding and
promoting intellectual gi ,i thi and critical thinking in adolescents and adults. San
Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Kitchener, R. F. (1992). Piaget's genetic epistemology: Epistemological implications for science
education. In R. A. Duschl & R. J. Hamilton (Eds.), Philosophy of science, cognitive
psychology, and educational theory and practice (pp. 116-146). Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.

Kutza, D. M. (2000). The role of prior beliefs, refutational text, intrinsic and extrinsic goals, and
extrinsic reward structure in the conceptual change of preservice teachers (Doctoral
dissertation, University of Florida, 2000). Dissertation Abstracts International, 61, 3052.

Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical
data. Biometrics 33, 159-174.

Leean, C. (1979). Foundations of education: Making the known unknown. Journal of Teacher
Education, 30(3), 5-6.

Lepper, M. R., & Henderlong, J. (2000). Turning "play" into "work" and "work" into "play": 25
years of research on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. In C. Sansone & J. M.
Harackiewicz (Eds.), Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: The search for optimal
motivation andperformance (pp. 257-307). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

Lim6n, M. (2001). On the cognitive conflict as an instructional strategy for conceptual change: A
critical appraisal. Learning andInstruction, 11(4-5), 357-380.

Lim6n, M., & Mason, L. (2002). (Eds.). Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and
practice. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

Linderholm, T., & van den Broek, P. (2002). The effects of reading purpose and working
memory capacity on the processing of expository text. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 94(4), 778-784.

Linderholm, T., Virtue, S., Tzeng, Y., & van den Broek, P. (2004). Fluctuations in the
availability of information during reading: Capturing cognitive processes using the
landscape model. Discourse Processes, 37(2), 165-186.

Linnenbrink, E. A., & Pintrich, P. R. (2002). The role of motivational beliefs in conceptual
change. In M. Limon & L. Mason (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in
theory and practice (pp. 115-135). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

Lipson, M. (1986, December). Making sense ofprior knowledge research: Discussant's remarks
on symposium titled "Complex issues in prior knowledge research." Paper presented at
the meeting of the National Reading Conference, Austin, TX.









Lortie, D., (1975). Schoolteacher: A sociological study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mackie, D. M., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Cognitive deficits and the mediation of positive affect in
persuasion. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 57, 27-40.

Maheswaran, D., Mackie, D. M., & Chaiken, S. (1992). Brand name as a heuristic cue: The
effects of task importance and expectancy confirmation on consumer judgments. Journal
of Consumer Psychology, 1(4), 317-336.

Maria, K., & Johnson, J. M. (1990). Correcting misconceptions: Effect of type of text. National
Reading Conference Yearbook, 39, 329-337.

Marshall, N. (1990, November). Can text overcome scientific misconceptions? An experimental
study. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Reading Conference, Miami Beach,
FL.

Mason, L. (2007). Introduction: Bridging the cognitive and sociocultural approaches in research
on conceptual change: Is it feasible? Educational Psychologist, 42(1), 1-7.

Mayer, R. E. (2002). Understanding conceptual change: A commentary. In M. Limon & L.
Mason (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice (pp. 101-
111). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

Pajares, F., & Bengston, J. K. (1995). The psychologizing of teacher education: Formalist
thinking and preservice teachers' beliefs. Peabody Journal ofEducation, 70, 83-
98.

Pajares, F., & Graham, L. (1998). Formalist thinking and language arts instruction: Teachers' and
students' beliefs about truth and caring in the teaching conversation. Teaching and
Teacher Education, 14, 855-870.

Patrick, H., & Pintrich, P. R. (2001). Conceptual change in teachers' intuitive conceptions of
learning, motivation, and instruction: The role of motivational and epistemological
beliefs. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the intuitive
mind (pp. 117-143). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Perry, W. G., Jr. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years: A
scheme. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

Peterson, P. L., Fennema, E., Carpenter, T., & Loef, M. (1989). Teachers' pedagogical content
beliefs in mathematics. Cognition andInstruction, 6, 1-40.

Phillips, D. C. (1994). Telling it straight: Issues in assessing narrative research. Educational
Psychologist, 29(1), 13-21.









Phillips, D. C. (1997). Telling the truth about stories. Teaching and Teacher Education 13(1),
101-109.

Phillips, L. M. (1988). Young readers' inference strategies in reading comprehension. Cognition
and Instruction, 5, 193-222.

Piaget, J. (1975). The development of thought: Equilibration of cognitive structures. New York:
Viking Press.

Pintrich, P. R. (1999). Motivational beliefs as resources for and constraints on conceptual
change. In W. Schmotz, S. Vosniadou, & M. Carretero (Eds.), New perspectives on
conceptual change (pp. 33-50). New York: Pergamon.

Pintrich, P. R., Marx, R. W., & Boyle, R. A. (1993). Beyond cold conceptual change: The role
of motivational beliefs and classroom contextual factors in the process of conceptual
change. Review of Educational Research, 63, 167-199.

Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. (1982). Accommodation of a
scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66, 211-
227.

Putnam, R. T., & Borko, H. (1997). Teacher learning: Implications of new views of cognition. In
B. J. Biddle, T. L. Good, & I. F. Goodson (Eds.), The international handbook of teachers
and teaching (Vol. 2, pp. 1223-1296). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

Qian, G., & Alvermann, D. (1995). Role of epistemological beliefs and learned helplessness in
secondary students' learning science concepts from text. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 87,282-292.

Raygor, A. L. (1977). The Raygor readability estimate: A quick and easy way to determine
difficulty. In P. D. Pearson (Ed.), Reading: Theory, research, and practice (Twenty-
Sixth Yearbook of the National Reading Conference, pp. 259-263). Clemson, SC:
National Reading Conference.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). When rewards compete with nature: The undermining of
intrinsic motivation and self-regulation. In C. Sansone & J. M. Harackiewicz (Eds.),
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: The search for optimal motivation and performance
(pp. 13-54). San Diego: Elsevier.

Salisbury-Glennon, J. D., & Stevens, R. J. (1999). Addressing preservice teachers' conceptions
of motivation. Teaching and Teacher Education, 15, 741-752.

Schlinger, M. J. (1979). A profile of responses to commercials. Journal ofAdvertising Research,
19(2), 37-46.









Scholes, R. (1981). Language, narrative, and anti-narrative. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), On
narrative (pp. 200-208). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension.
Journal ofEducational Psychology, 82, 498-504.

Schommer, M. (1993). Epistemological development and academic performance among
secondary students. Journal of Educational Psychology, 85, 406-411.

Schommer, M., & Dunnel, P. A. (1992, April). Epistemological beliefs among gifted and
non-gifted students. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, San Francisco, CA.

Schommer, M., Rhodes, N., & Crouse, A. (1992). Epistemological beliefs and mathematical text
comprehension: Believing it is simple does not make it so. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 84, 435-443.

Schraw, G., Bendixen, L. D., & Dunkle, M. E. (2002). Development and validation of the
Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI). In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal
epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 261- 275).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Sinatra, G. M. (2005). The "warming trend" in conceptual change research: The legacy of Paul
R. Pintrich. Educational Psychologist, 40(2), 107-115.

Sinatra, G. M., & Pintrich, P. R. (2003) (Eds.). Intentional conceptual change. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.

Strauss, S. (2001). Folk-psychology, folk pedagogy, and their relations to subject-matter
knowledge. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the
intuitive mind (pp. 217-242). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Torff, B. (1999). Tacit knowledge in teaching: Folk pedagogy and teacher education. In R.
Sternberg & J. Horvath (Eds.), Tacit knowledge in professional practice (pp. 195-213).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Torff, B., & Sternberg, R. J. (2001). Intuitive conceptions among learners and teachers. In B.
Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the intuitive mind. (pp. 3-26).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Trabasso, T., Secco, T., & van den Broek, P. (1984). Causal cohesion and story coherence. In H.
Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Learning and comprehension of text (pp. 83-
111). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.









Valencia, S. W., & Stallman, A. C. (1988, December). Multiple measures of prior knowledge:
Comparative predictive validity. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Reading
Conference, Tucson, AZ.

van den Broek, P., Young, M., Tzeng, Y., & Linderholm, T. (1999). The landscape model of
reading: Inferences and the on-line construction of memory representation. In H. van
Oostendorp & S. R. Goldman (Eds.), The construction of mental representations during
reading (pp. 71-98). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Vosniadou, S. (1999). Conceptual change research: State of the art and future directions.In W.
Schnotz, S. Vosniadou, & M. Carretero (Eds.), New perspectives on conceptual change
(pp. 3-13). Kidlington, Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science.

Vosniadou, S. (2007). The cognitive-situative divide and the problem of conceptual change.
Educational Psychologist, 42(1), 55-66.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.

Wideen, M., Mayer-Smith, J., & Moon, B. (1998). A critical analysis of the research on learning
to teach: Making the case for an ecological perspective on inquiry. Review of Educational
Research, 68, 130-178.

Windschitl, M., & Andre, T. (1998). Using computer simulations to enhance conceptual change:
The roles of constructivist instruction and student epistemological beliefs. Journal of
Research in Science Tea hliiig. 35, 145-160.

Woolfolk Hoy, A. (1996). Teaching educational psychology: Texts in context. Educational
Psychologist, 31(1), 35-40.

Woolfolk Hoy, A., & Murphy, K. (2001). Teaching educational psychology to the implicit mind.
In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the intuitive mind (pp.
145-185). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Zahn-Waxler, C., Robinson, J. L., & Emde, R. N. (1992) The development of empathy in
twins. Developmental Psychology, 28(6), 1038-1047.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Clay Austin was born and raised in Frankfort, Kentucky, the home of horse racing,

bourbon making, and tobacco farming. He was the only child of a single parent, an elementary

teacher and librarian; when school was not in session he was still often in school and around

teachers, growing accustomed to their laughter and complaints. One day, he went downtown

with the other fifth graders to hear a distinguished man tell them to read "great books" and take

part in the "great conversation." In that crowded coliseum Mortimer Adler seemed to him like a

rock star of reading.

Upon graduation, Clay commenced his "Great Tour of Southern Colleges and

Universities" an eight-year course of study at Florida State University, Eastern Kentucky

University, Belmont College, and finally University of North Florida, where he graduated with a

degree to teach social studies in grades 6-12, and still maintains the world record of most credit

hours earned toward a bachelor's degree at 192. He then took a position teaching a combined

class of eleven third- and fourth-grade students at St. John's Academy, a one-year old classical

Christian school. Mortimer Adler no doubt smiled from heaven, as Clay spent the next 10 years

teaching classics, history, religion, logic and rhetoric to students from grades 3 through 12,

spending 8 of those years also serving as assistant principal, an experience that deterred him,

thankfully, from pursuing graduate studies in educational leadership.

Instead, he took a master's degree in education in the Department of Curriculum and

Instruction of the University of North Florida, where the graduate course in educational

psychology allowed Clay to wonder how philosophy, psychology, and education might be

related. Now, 5 years, 120 graduate credits, and a Ph.D. later, he still wonders.





PAGE 1

1 EFFECTS OF NARRATIVE REFUTA TIONAL TEXT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS, EMPATHY, AFFECT, AN D SYSTEMATIC AND HEURISTIC PROCESSING ON CONCEPTUAL CHANG E IN PRESERVICE TEACHERS By CLAYTON D. AUSTIN A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008

PAGE 2

2 2008 Clayton D. Austin

PAGE 3

3 To my wife, Wendy, who came into my life in a da rk time, and continues to brighten and warm each day with Gods Light

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS How could one student have th e two best m entors in the business? During my masters studies at the University of Nort h Florida, Paul Eggen was my Aris totle, a citizen of the world of ideas but continually groundi ng me with the question, What are the implications for classroom teaching? During my doctoral progra m, Patricia Ashton was my Socrates, whose considered silence was as effective as her ge ntle but pointed questi ons in guiding and prodding me. Both of my mentors extended themselves w ithout limit for my benefit, blending excellence in academics and character in a way that earns them the title to which I aspire, teacher. Along with my other committee members Drs. Farrar, Linderholm, and Miller, they never stepped down but always stooped down to lift me to a higher level of scholarship. I want to thank the Board of Governors of St. Johns Academy and Principal Wallis Brooks for accommodating my every request rega rding duties and schedule to allow me the opportunity to pursue my studies. Dr. Matt McCrudde n graciously allowed me to come into his classes at UNF to gather data. Elaine Green never abandoned me even when I pushed every deadline beyond the breaking point and convinced me to take a semester off when I was determined to quit. My personal network of support was second to none. My best friend, John Hays was enrolled in seminary while I pursued this degree, always ready to step into my world and more importantly, to allow me into his and share th ese burdens of joy. My children, Madeline and Logan Austin and Amanda Cruz, have been a bl essed distraction. Finall y, my lovely wife Wendy has always applied the swift kick or gentle touch to move me where God would have me.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........7 LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................................8 ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................9 CHAP TER 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................11 Teacher Conceptions............................................................................................................ ..11 Conceptual Change.............................................................................................................. ...13 Interventions for Conceptual Change.....................................................................................15 Expository Refutational Text.......................................................................................... 15 Narrative Text..................................................................................................................17 Augmented Activation..................................................................................................... 24 Mediators of Conceptual Change...........................................................................................26 Affect...............................................................................................................................26 Empathy........................................................................................................................ ...29 Systematic and Heuristic Processing............................................................................... 31 Personal Characteristics Infl uencing Conceptual Change ......................................................36 Epistemological Beliefs................................................................................................... 36 Verbal Ability..................................................................................................................38 Purpose of the Study........................................................................................................... ....39 Significance of the Study for Theory.............................................................................. 41 Significance of the Study for Practice.............................................................................44 2 MATERIALS AND METHODS........................................................................................... 46 Research Questions............................................................................................................. ....46 Participants.............................................................................................................................46 Experimental Treatm ents........................................................................................................ 47 Pretreatment Measures.......................................................................................................... ..48 Conceptual Change.......................................................................................................... 48 Epistemological Beliefs................................................................................................... 50 Verbal Ability..................................................................................................................51 Posttreatment Measures......................................................................................................... .52 Affect...............................................................................................................................52 Systematic and Heuristic Processing............................................................................... 52 Empathy........................................................................................................................ ...54 Procedures..................................................................................................................... ..........54 Phase 1.............................................................................................................................54

PAGE 6

6 Phase 2.............................................................................................................................54 Phase 3.............................................................................................................................55 Analysis....................................................................................................................... ...........55 3 RESULTS...............................................................................................................................58 Descriptive Statistics......................................................................................................... .....58 Manipulation Checks..............................................................................................................59 Analysis of the Correlation Matrix......................................................................................... 59 Model Fit...................................................................................................................... ..........61 Suggested Model Modifications............................................................................................. 62 Research Questions............................................................................................................. ....64 4 DISCUSSION.........................................................................................................................74 Personal Characteristics Infl uencing Conceptual Change ......................................................75 Epistemological Beliefs................................................................................................... 75 Verbal Ability..................................................................................................................75 Interventions for Conceptual Change.....................................................................................76 Potential Mediators of Conceptual Change............................................................................ 78 Weaknesses of the Study and Need for Further Research...................................................... 84 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................86 APPENDIX A NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT (NRT)................................................................... 89 B CODING RUBRIC FOR THOUGHT LISTINGS................................................................. 91 LIST OF REFERENCES...............................................................................................................93 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................102

PAGE 7

7 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2-1 Descriptive statistics for nom inal variables....................................................................... 56 3-1 Means and standard deviations for preand posttreatm ent measures by treatment condition............................................................................................................................69 3-2 Polychoric correlations for preand posttreatm ent measures for ERT condition............. 70 3-3 Polychoric correlations for preand posttreatm ent measures for NRT condition............. 71 3-4 Total, direct, and indirect effects in the revised model...................................................... 72

PAGE 8

8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1-1 Proposed model of conceptual change............................................................................... 45 3-1 Revised exploratory model of chan ge of conceptions of m otivation................................ 73

PAGE 9

9 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy EFFECTS OF NARRATIVE REFUTA TIONAL TEXT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS, EMPATHY, AFFECT, AN D SYSTEMATIC AND HEURISTIC PROCESSING ON CONCEPTUAL CHANG E IN PRESERVICE TEACHERS By Clayton D. Austin August 2008 Chair: Patricia T. Ashton Major: Educational Psychology Preservice teachers enter teacher education prog rams with many strongly held beliefs that conflict with findings of educati onal research. In this study two in terventions were compared that were designed to enable pres ervice teachers to recognize the c onflicts between their entering beliefs and new research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will contribute to their effectiveness as teachers. Conceptual change theorists have identified refutational text that explicitly contrasts nave and accurate conceptions, as effective in facilitating conceptual change. The effectiveness of adding narrative elements of plot, character and setting to refutational text for effecting ch ange in concepts of motivation in preservice teachers was investigated in this study. Weakne sses of previous conceptual change research, such as failing to investigate the personal char acteristics of epistemological beliefs and verbal ability and affective and cogniti ve factors that could serve as resources for change were addressed. Pretreatment questionnaires on conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and epistemological beliefs were given to 190 students majoring in education. Then participants were randomly assigned to read an expository refutationa l or narrative refutatio nal text and complete measures of empathy, affect, cognitive processi ng, and conceptions of motivation. Conceptions

PAGE 10

10 of motivation were measured again one month la ter. Structural equation modeling was used to test the fit of the proposed model of conceptual change and to analyze hypotheses regarding the relationships among the intervention and indivi dual differences and conceptual change. The revised model included a significant direct effect of narrative refutational text compared to expository refutational text on chan ges in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and, indirectly via empathy, on conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Narrative refutational text was also causally related to positive and negative a ffect and heuristic processing, but none of the affective or cognitive factors served as a resource for conceptual change. Contrary to prediction, epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge did not affect conceptual change. However, the results show that empathy may influence conceptual change when reading narrative refutational text.

PAGE 11

11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Preserv ice teachers enter teacher education pr ograms with many conceptions of teaching and learning that conflict with findings of e ducational research (HoltReynolds, 1992; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001). Research in a variety of di sciplines, including social and developmental psychology as well as education, ha s shown that many of these con cepts are very resistant to change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Wideen, MayerSmith, & Moon, 1998). Research is needed to enable preservice teachers to recognize the conflicts between their entering conceptions and new research findings and to help them resolve these conflicts in ways that will contribute to their effectiveness as teachers. Therefor e, the purpose of this dissertati on study was three-fold: first, to compare two interventions designed to foster co nceptual change in preservice teachers, second, to explore pre-existing personal characteristics, specifically verbal ability and epistemological beliefs, that may influence their conceptual chan ge, and third, to identify cognitive and affective processes that account for conceptual change. Teacher Conceptions As noted by Torff and St ernberg (2001), Far from being blank slates with little knowledge about education, prospective teachers' prior beli efs, expectations, and knowledge influence what they come to understand, value, and use from co urses in teacher education (p. 21). Prospective teachers come to their teacher education cour ses with prior conceptions about teaching and learning. Some of these conceptions may have their origins in common human experience, as described by evolutionary or cognitive-developmental psychologi sts, or in a more specific cultural basis as described by anthropologists or cultural psychologists (Torff & Sternberg, 2001). Yet other conceptions may have their origin s in prospective teachers unique experiences as students (Lortie, 1975). Although these prior conceptions can be useful frameworks for

PAGE 12

12 effective practice, unfortunately preservice te achers have many conceptions regarding teaching and learning that conflict with research findings (Holt-Reynolds, 1992; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001). For example, one conception of learning that has received significant attention from researchers is characterized as the transmission model of learning (Sternberg & Torff, 2001). In the transmission model, the students mind is co nceived as a vessel to be filled with knowledge that only teachers and texts can provide (Torff, 1999, p. 200). Howe ver, most teacher educators maintain that the transmission model does not ad equately capture the co mplexity of learning, because knowledge is not merely imparted to st udents, it is actively constructed by students (Torff, 1999; Woolfolk Hoy, 1996). The transmissi on model of learning is very resistant to correction (Torff, 1999) and even when concep tions are correct, actions may not be. For example, Strauss (2001) described how even pr ofessors who do not endorse the transmission model still teach their cl asses as if they do. In addition to these misconceptions about teaching and learning, many prospective teachers conceptions about motivation conflict with contemporary theoretical perspectives. Patrick and Pintrich (2001) claimed that among prospective and novice teachers the most common conception about motivation is that it is a stable trait-like characteristic of students (see Calderhead, 1996; Holt-Reynolds, 1992); however, contemporary researchers characterize motivation as the ongoing dynamic process of interactions between the student and the context, rather than as an object that students either have or do not have (p. 129). A related conception contrary to research but commonl y held by prospective teachers is that only positive feedback will increase motivation (Pajares & Bengston, 1995; Pajares & Graham, 1998).

PAGE 13

13 Research on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation has led to findings th at conflict with many preservice teachers conceptions of motivation. Extrinsic motivati on refers to motivation for a task that originates from outside the individual, typically in th e forms of reinforcers such as rewards and punishments. In contrast, intrinsic mo tivation refers to motivation for a task that originates from within the learner, such as a desire to achieve mastery. Intrinsic motivation for a learning task has been associated with deeper understanding and increased creativity (see Deci & Ryan, 1980, 1985, 1991). The finding that extrinsic rewards can decrease intrinsic motivation for a learning task initiated a significant debate (see Ryan & Deci, 2000, for summ ary). However, according to Lepper and Henderlong (2000), over 100 studies performed over thr ee decades has resulted in a consensus among researchers that in itial intrinsic motivation for a learning task will likely be diminished when students expect to receive a tangible arbitrary reward (e.g., stickers, prizes) for completion of the task. Two intervention studies (Kutza, 2000; Salis bury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999) have focused on fostering change in preservice teachers conceptions of intrin sic and extrinsic motivation. In these studies a text was used to refute the conception that extrinsic or reinforcement motivation is the only or best motivation for learning and ex plain the concept of intrinsic motivation and its positive effects on learning. I investigated the e ffect of adding narrative structures to the expository refutational text used in these studies. Conceptual Change Researchers investigatin g changing teachers prio r conceptions to be more consistent with research have looked to the literature on conceptual change as a theoreti cal framework (e.g., Gill, 2003; Patrick & Pintrich, 2001; Salisbury-Gle nnon & Stevens, 1999). Important models of conceptual change have emerged from resear ch in developmental and social psychology and

PAGE 14

14 science education (Vosniadou, 1999). Piaget (1975) explai ned how individuals confronted with a new concept either assimilate it into existing mental schemes or restructure their schemes to accommodate the new concept. This accommodation has been the focus of conceptual change research in science education, a domain that often requires learners to change nave concepts or theories in favor of scientific ones. Posner Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) posited four conditions for conceptual change: (a) dissatisfaction with existing concepts, (b) intelligibility of new concepts, (c) plausibility of new concepts, and (d) fruitfulness of new concepts. Posner et al. (1982) described the relati onship between existing and new concepts, but others criticized their model for its narrow con ception of conceptual chan ge. Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (1993), for example, crit icized the model as overly col d and stressing cognition while ignoring the influence of affect and motivation. Caravita and Hallde n (1994) criticized a foundational metaphor of conceptual change models that of the student as scientist. They claimed students learn more inductively, are more concerned with outcome than method, and have more egocentric peer relations than sc ientists. Mayer (2002) claimed researchers of conceptual change have yet to identify mechanisms of change or methodologies to effect change. In response to these criticisms, researchers ha ve looked to social ps ychological theories on attitude change, particularly Festingers ( 1957) cognitive dissonance theory, and more recent processing models (for reviews, see Dole & Si natra, 1998; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As a result, researchers of conceptu al change (e.g., Lim n & Mason, 2002; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003) have begun to identify the complex inte rplay of knowledge, affect, and mo tivation that contributes to the process of change in knowledge, be liefs, and attitudes during learning. From this important new scholarship, I identified key questions: What types of interventions effect the great est and longest lasting concep tual change? What learner

PAGE 15

15 characteristics play a role in conceptual change? What cognitive and affective processes are used in conceptual change? Then I proposed a nd tested a model based on these questions. Specifically, I investigated narrative refutational text as a potentially e ffective and long lasting intervention, verbal ability and epistemological beliefs as important learner characteristics, and the influence of learners empathy, affect, and sy stematic and heuristic pr ocessing in conceptual change. Interventions for Conceptual Change Given that conceptual change is an important go al of teacher education programs, it is important to identify the kinds of instructional interventions that can be used to effect conceptual change. Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, and Gamas (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of the interventions used in reading and science education to induce conceptual change. Examples of interventions in their meta-analysis include discussion, demonstration, Socratic questioning, concept mapping, summarizing, activating back ground knowledge, and reading expository, refutational, and narrative texts. Interventions th at made use of some ki nd of text were more effective and longer-lasting than those that did not (effect size = .49), provided the text was refutational or used with a strategy to induce cognitive conflict. Expository Refutational Text Plain expository text, typically used in school textbooks, sim ply explains concepts. Expository refutational text, in cont rast, explains a widely accepted concept and then refutes it by describing a new and conflicting concept. On the basis of their meta-analysis, Guzzetti et al. (1993) concluded that expository refutational text is one of the most effective approaches researchers have used to achieve conceptual change. In eight studies, expository refutational text had a greater effect on conceptual change than a typical expository nonrefutational text (average

PAGE 16

16 effect size = .24). Guzzetti (2000) re ported that conceptual change effected from expository refutational text lasted a month or more, which is longer than other methods studied to date. Expository refutational text has been more eff ective than plain exposito ry text in inducing conceptual change in preservice teachers. Sali sbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) investigated the use of expository refutational text in changing prospective teachers c onceptions of motivation. Participants read either a plain expository text that simply desc ribed intrinsic motivation or an expository refutational text that criticized ex trinsic motivation and then described intrinsic motivation. After reading one of th e texts, participants responded to 20 brief classroom scenarios that endorsed either an intrinsic or extrinsi c view of motivation. Part icipants who read the expository refutational text demonstrated more evidence of conceptual change than those who read the plain expository text on an immediate posttest (effect si ze = .71) and a posttest delayed 1 week (effect size = .54). In her dissertation study, Kutza (2000) us ed the same text as Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) but analyzed the 20 scenarios as two 10-item intrinsic and extrinsic subscales to look for more precise and specific evidence of change. Furthermore, she used the texts in conjunction with a contextual variable of reward structure. Kutza found that expository refutational text facilitated concep tual change only with regard to the rejection of an extrinsic theory and only when paired with an external controlling reward structure. This result was observed on the immediate and delayed posttest. Gill, Ashton, and Algina (2004) contrasted expository refutational and plain expository text in a study of prospective teachers epistemological beliefs about mathematics, described as either constructivist or procedur alist. Those who hold constructiv ist beliefs endorse teaching for deep understanding using authentic problems (Hiebe rt et al., 1996). In co ntrast, those who hold

PAGE 17

17 proceduralist beliefs endorse using rote drill and practice. Both texts described the more research-based constructivist ep istemological beliefs, but the e xpository refutational text also refuted the proceduralist beliefs. After reading one of the two texts, particip ants completed outcome measures designed to assess explicit and implicit epistemological beliefs of mathematics. Explicit beliefs were measured by two subscales of the Cognitively Guided Instruction Belief Survey developed by Peterson, Fennema, Carpenter, and Loef (1989). Im plicit beliefs were meas ured by participants responses to eight short scenarios the first author constr ucted to represent eith er constructivist or proceduralist teaching practices in mathematics. The expository refutational text was superior to the plain expository text in changing explicit and implicit beliefs. Narrative Text Although expository refutational an d plain expository text we re used in the research described above, som e researchers have suggested that narrative text may have a stronger positive effect on learning than either expository refutational text or plain expository text (Lipson, 1986; Maria & Johnson, 1990; Valencia & Stallman, 1988). A narrative text is a symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matte r and related by time (Scholes, 1981, p. 205). It may or may not involve human agents and intentions; for example, the description of the formation of a tropical storm would be na rrative without human agents. However, a story is a type of narrative that consis ts of events, characters, and settings arranged in a temporal sequence implying both causal ity and significance (Carter, 1993, p. 6) and encourages the projection of human values (Scholes, 1981, p. 206). From this perspective I investigated the use of stories, not merely narrative texts, in conceptual change; however, conceptual change researchers have used the terms narrative text and narrative structures in describing stories and their characteristics (A lvermann, Hynd, & Qian, 1995; Guzzetti et al.,

PAGE 18

18 1993; Guzzetti, Williams, Skeels, & Wu, 1997). I ha ve followed this convention and refer to stories as narrative texts and th eir characteristics (characters, settings, and cause and effect sequences) as narra tive structures. Researchers have advocated the use of storie s, movies, or videotaped or written case studies in teacher education programs (Put nam & Borko, 1997; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001). The use of narrative texts and st ructures in teacher education programs may be warranted given that preservice teachers concep tions tend to be in the form of events and stories (Doyle & Carter, 1996) that are often grounded in their ex periences as students (Lortie, 1975). However, researchers have also warned against the danger s of using narrative texts and structures for research or communication. Phillip s (1994, 1997) warned that narrat ives must be demonstrated by analytical methods as true, not merely cohere nt or plausible, especially when they are designed to influence public po licy or classroom practice. Doyle (1997) responded to the criticism of us ing narratives in teacher education arguing that story offers the only possibility for tru th in the study of teaching (p. 95). Instead of addressing epistemological questions about whet her analytic or narr ative text is most representative of truth, Doyle outlined how those who are interested in u nderstanding and improving teaching, an event and action with resp ect to a curriculum, can use narratives of teaching as provisional models to capture the floating value of truth (p. 95). Without endorsing Doyles (1997) view, I believe the use of na rrative refutational text in my dissertation study avoids the criticisms of Phillips (1994, 1997). Narrative refutational text consists of narrative structures th at have been added to pre-exis ting expository refutational text that was constructed based on results of the use of analytical methods. Th erefore the meaning of both narrative refutational text and expository re futational text, specifical ly the refutation of a

PAGE 19

19 misconception and explaining a more accurate con ception, remains open to analytical tests for truth. Thus, the narrative refuta tional text is quite different from other narrative texts and structures such as movies, books, or even case studies. Some researchers have investigated the use of narrative text in effecting conceptual change. Maria and Johnson (1990) noted that exposito ry texts may present scientific conceptions in an abstract or decontextualized manner, making it difficult for students to relate the information to their pre-existing conceptions. To overcome this difficulty Maria and Johnson suggested the use of narrative texts in science classes. Go rdon and Rennie (1987) had fifth graders read a short story about a boy and a lion to help them change their misconceptions that wild animals are always ferocious. However, stude nts who read the narrativ e text in addition to an expository refutational text exhibited more ev idence of conceptual change than students who read only the narrative text, cas ting doubt about the effectivene ss of straight narrative in effecting conceptual change. Other researchers have blended na rrative and expository structures in a single text to effect conceptual change. For example, results have been promising for soft expository text, a hybrid of narrative and expository structures. Guzzetti et al. (1993) reported that the largest effect size found in their meta-analysis was for considerate soft expository text. Considerate text exhibits global coherence, such as an overall cause-and-ef fect or problem-and-solution structure, and local coherence at the sentence le vel, such as clear references, substitutions, and connections (Armbruster, 1984). Considerate soft expository te xt demonstrated strong effects when compared with inconsiderate plain expository text (average effect size = -1.26, n = 4) and moderate effects compared against expository refutational c onsiderate text (avera ge effect size = .59, n = 4). These effect sizes were calculated from Mari a and Johnsons (1990) study in which considerate

PAGE 20

20 soft expository text was more eff ective than inconsiderate text in producing conceptual change as measured on all immediate and de layed recognition and application tests in fifthand seventhgrade students who were learning about seasonal change in a gifted and talented program. In contrast with the effectiveness of narrative structures in effecting conceptual change in elementary school students, researchers have not found narrative structures to be more effective than expository structures with secondary or undergraduate students. In their meta-analysis Guzzetti et al. (1993) reported that narrative refutational text was inferior to expository refutational text in producing con ceptual change in high school stude nts (average effect size = .25). This divergence from findings in elementary grades may indicate that students outgrow the need for narrative structures (Gu zzetti et al., 1993) or that these structures may distract learners from important information (Guzzetti et al., 1997). For example, Alvermann et al. (1995) investigated the effect of narra tive refutational text and expositor y refutational text in promoting conceptual change in ninth-grade physics st udents conceptions of impetus theory and Newtonian mechanics. Expository refutational text was superior to narrat ive refutational text on two of the three posttests, an application task, and short-answer task. The application task required students to use a diagram to draw the path a projectile would take and explain their conclusions. The short-answer task was comprised of six items that either cued the subjects free recall of the text or asked them a high-order qu estion about the concepts described in the text. There were no significant differenc es on a 21-item true/false postte st. The authors suggested that, by ninth grade, students may no longer read everything like a story and may find the story elements distracting from the technical material in the passage, expecting expository text to be tested one way and narrative text in another. Alvermann et al. recommended that future researchers should try to clarify whether the superiority of expos itory text over narrative text

PAGE 21

21 with high-school students is due to the increase in olde r students ability to distinguish their approach to learning depending on the type of text or whether the story grammar of narratives interferes with the learning of technical material. To achieve th is understanding, Alvermann et al. (1995) suggested that researchers should include methods, such as talk-alouds or self-reports. Guzzetti et al. (1997) used the narrative refuta tional text and exposito ry refutational text texts devised by Alvermann et al. (1995) and a cartoon in a qualitative study of conceptual change in the physics domain. The study include d three high school physics classes, a physics honors class for advanced student s, a physics class for collegebound juniors and seniors, and basic physical science class for freshmen. Stude nts were randomly assigned to the text conditions. Students were interrupt ed several times while reading and asked if anything they had read was surprising or new. Later, individual stud ents were interviewed to find out how credible, easy to understand, or helpful they considered the texts. Only 11% to 25% of the class members reported using their textbook at all. Instead of using the textbook, the students in the honors and junior and senior clas ses preferred hands-on activities and labs, whereas the freshman students preferred studying notes and memorization. When asked how to improve the textbook, most of the students suggested making it easier to unders tand. Though all types of texts were viewed as credible, 53% of students in the basic classes and 80% of student s in the honors classes preferred expository refutational text to plain expository text The majority of students in each class also preferred expository refutational text to narrative refutational text or the refutational cartoon. To typify this preference, the aut hors included the response of a st udent who reported that reading the narrative refutational text was like mixing ple asure reading with study reading and made it hard to put your brain into the gear of learning (p. 711).

PAGE 22

22 In their meta-analysis of interventions to foster conceptual change, Guzzetti et al. (1993) reported only one study that used na rrative refutational text with pr eservice or inservice teachers. In that study, Marshall (1990) c ontrasted expository and narrative refutational text in changing preservice teachers conceptions of seasonal change. Using immediate free recall and delayed multiple-choice and application items to measure conceptual change, no significant differences due to text type were found. The paucity of resear ch on narrative refutational text with preservice teachers reflects a need to further investigate if narrative structure in an expository refutational text might be helpful to pres ervice or inservice teachers. In sum, the empirical results demonstrating the benefits of narrative structures combined with expository refutational text on conceptual cha nge differ by grade level. The evidence to date is that narrative structures may effect conceptu al change with elementa ry students but not with secondary students or undergraduates (Guzzetti et al., 1993). However, it is important to note that in their meta-analysis Guzzetti et al. only included research using narrative structures with concepts from the natural science domain. The possibility that narrative refutational text may be more effective than expository refutational text in producing con ceptual change in the social science domain, as opposed to the natural science domain, is intr iguing. Concepts from natural science domains should be distinguished from those in social science domai ns, like teacher education, that involve familiar life experiences (Leean, 1979). Expos itory refutational text has been effective in the natural science domain (e.g., physics) a nd the social science domain (e .g., psychology). In regard to preservice teachers, expository refutational text has been eff ective in producing conceptual change in the social science domain, specifically with theories of motivation (Kutza, 2000; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999) and mathematic s instruction (Gill et al., 2004). Narrative

PAGE 23

23 refutational text, however, though researched with various age groups including preservice teachers, has only been researched in the na tural science domain, where for high school and college students expository refu tational texts were more effec tive in inducing change than narrative refutational texts. Narrative refutational text may be more effective than expository refutational text in the social science dom ain, like teacher education, because teachers conceptions about teaching tend to be in the fo rm of events and stor ies (Doyle & Carter, 1996) that are often grounded in their experiences as st udents (Lortie, 1975). Like concepts in teacher education, narrative text is concer ned with the explication of human intentions in the context of action (Bruner, 1985, p. 100). Because teachers conceptions, c oncepts in teacher education, and narrative text structures involve human agents in familiar life experiences, conceptual change in the social science domain of teacher e ducation might be more susceptible to influence by narrative text structures. For example, Maria and Johnsons (1990) hypot hesis that realistic narrative may help students overcome tendencie s to separate real-world knowledge from information learned in texts may be more plausible for social science concepts, such as theories of motivation or learning, than for natural science concepts, such as projectile motion. The narrative structures common to teacher knowledge and narrative refu tational text may facilitate conceptual change. In addition to the study of refutational text, the widespread use of case studies, contrived scenarios, movie clips, and anecdotes in teach er education courses call for research on the effectiveness of narrative structures in affec ting conceptual change. Therefore, a major purpose of my dissertation was to examine the question of whether narrative refu tational text produces greater and longer-lasting conceptual change than expository refutational text with preservice teachers in the domain of social science, specifically on the topic of motivation.

PAGE 24

24 Augmented Activation In a conceptual change framework, augmente d activation is a brief activity designed to activate and then refute students prior misconceptions. In contrast an activation activity merely activates the prior misconception w ithout refuting it. In their meta-analysis, Guzetti et al. (1993) reported small effects on conceptual change for activation (average effect size = .08) and large effects for augmented activation (a verage effect size = .80). In a refutational text intervention, augmented activation may take the form of a short paragraph read immediately before the refutational text. Gregoire (2002) used augmente d activation in conjunction with expository refutational text in her study of conceptual change of teach ing mathematics in preservice teachers. She administered her control group an activation acti vity and an expository text, neither of which explicitly refuted the common misconception. As a check of th e effects of augmented activation, participants reported to what degree they felt th e reading challenged their own beliefs. Consistent with her hypothesis, participants who read th e augmented activation and expository refutational text rated the passage as signifi cantly more challenging to their be liefs than did those who were only exposed to the activation activity and the expository text. The use of augmented activation may be es pecially salient for a study contrasting expository refutational text and narrative refutational text. Qual itative and quantitative methods have produced evidence that students process expository and narrative texts differently. For example, Guzzetti et al. (1997) re ported students complaints that reading narrative refutational text was like mixing pleasure reading with study readin g and made it hard to put your brain into the gear for learning (p. 711). To increase the likelihood that part icipants in both the narrative and refutational text c onditions in this study would adopt the goal of reading the text for the purpose of study, I included augm ented activation in both conditions.

PAGE 25

25 Recent research has demonstrated that read ing purpose, specifically reading for study versus reading for entertainment, significantly a ffects processing of exposito ry text. According to the Landscape model of reading comprehensi on (van den Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999), reading purpose helps determine an individual s standard of coherence, specifically that reading for study is associated with a highe r standard of coherence than reading for entertainment. Higher standards of coherence are hypothesized to be a ssociated with more complex processing. Researchers have used da ta from computer simulations based on the Landscape model to suggest that re ading for study is associated w ith the activation of sentence information across reading cycles for the purpose of making referential, causal, logical, and contrastive relations (Linderholm, Virtue, T zeng, & van den Broek, 2004). The assertion that those who read to study make mo re causal connections than thos e who read for entertainment has also been supported in a related quantitativ e behavioral study (Linderholm & van den Broek, 2002). This research on the effects of reading purpose on expository text processing is particularly salient for this study of the processing of narra tive refutational text. One could hypothesize that the narrative structures in narra tive refutational text may influe nce readers to adopt the purpose of reading for entertainment. If so, one could expect less complex processing from those in the narrative refutational text condition than from t hose in the expository text condition. However, augmented activation, which has been shown to f acilitate conceptual change, may also address the concern that different text conditions may lead to different reading purposes. The use of an augmented activation that explicitly states that the purpose of the text is to challenge and help clarify readers beliefs is designe d, in part, to influence all read ers, regardless of text condition, to adopt the purpose of reading for study. To increase the likeli hood that students in both the

PAGE 26

26 narrative and refutational text c onditions would adopt the goal of reading the text for study, I included augmented activation in both text conditions in the design of my study. Mediators of Conceptual Change Affect Several influential psychologica l theories converge on the idea that negative affect is necessary to motivate conceptual change. Piagets (1975) equilibration theory, the Posner et al. (1982) theory of conceptual change, and Festin gers (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all explain cognitive change in terms of the human need to reduce negative affect, that is, the feeling of discomfort or tensi on that results when two ideas conflict. Similarly, with regard to teacher education, Feldman (2000) suggested that teachers need to be discontent in order to experience conceptual change (p. 622). In their meta-analysis of research on instru ctional interventions fo r producing conceptual change, Guzzetti et al. (1993) c oncluded that all the approaches successful in inducing large or moderate effects on conceptual change involved some type of cognitive conflict. In further support of the role of the fee ling of dissatisfaction in induci ng conceptual change, Kitchener (1992) contended that cognitive conf lict is a negative affective state. Does this research mean that No pain, no gain should be the motto of those teaching for conceptual change? Direct support for the theorists claim that negative a ffect motivates conceptual change is mixed. Gregoire (2002) provided preliminary support fo r the idea that exposito ry refutational text is associated with negative affect. She found that students who read an ex pository text that did not challenge their beliefs genera ted more favorable thoughts than those who read an expository refutational text that challenged their beliefs, though the effect size (.28) was relatively small. However, she found no relationship between affect and explicit belief change as measured by self-report, or between affect and implicit belief change as m easured by response to teaching

PAGE 27

27 scenarios. Furthermore, contrary to her hypothesis, negative affect was not associated with systematic processing; in fact positive affect wa s marginally significantly related to systematic processing, t = 1.94, p = .055. In contrast to Gregoires (2002) hypothesis, Linnenbrink and Pintrich (2002) hypothesized that positive affect would be associated with c onceptual change from e xpository refutational text. In their two studies, Linnenbrink and Pintrich used an expository refutational physics text derived from Qian and Alverma nns (1995) study. In the first study positive affect was positively related, ( r = .22, p < .05), and negative affect was inversely related, ( r = -.21, p < .05) to knowledge of physics after reading an expository refutational text. In the replication study with revised self-report scales to measure affect, positive affect was no longer significantly related, but negative affect was still inversely related to physics knowledge after reading an expository refutational physics test, ( r = -.36, p < .001). These findings raise doub t about the contention that expository refutational text leads to conceptual change through a negatively felt cognitive conflict. Specifically Linnenbrink and Pi ntrich (2002) hypothesized th at those with mastery or learning goals would have higher positive affect, lower negative affect, and greater use of cognitive strategies resulting in greater concep tual change. They found partial support for this hypothesis. They found evidence that those with mastery goals exhibited more conceptual change mediated by lower negative affect and hi gher elaborative strategy use. Negative affect was negatively related to conceptual change, su ggesting negative affect may distract students from the material to be learned. As a theoretical basis for their hypothesis th at positive affect would lead to increased conceptual change, Linnenbrink a nd Pintrich (2002) cited Blesss (2000) contention that those in

PAGE 28

28 positive moods are less likely to feel threatened by information that contradicts their existing conceptions and in turn are more likely to link that new knowledge with existing knowledge. Given that researchers agree that negative aff ect is generally associated with accommodative processing and positive affect is associated with assimilative processing (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2001), one might argue that the quality of concep tual change motivated by positive rather than negative affect would be either comparatively weak, short-term, or both. However, Bless (2001) explained that, though positive mood is associat ed with greater reliance on general knowledge structures (i.e., schemas, heuristics) in an a ssimilative sense, reliance on those structures can actually free cognitive resources for the accommod ative processing of inconsistent information. Therefore, in Blesss view, the assimilation associated with positive affect does not lead to a decrease in the amount of processing as main tained by some theorists (Mackie & Worth, 1989), but rather can lead to cognitive processing that is more efficiently allocated to assimilative and accommodative processing. This view seems par ticularly salient for my study of narrative refutational text in that I attempted to use it to increase the positive affect and assimilative or heuristic processing a ssociated with narrative structures, but also to encourage the accommodative or systematic processing asso ciated with the refutation of preexisting misconceptions and acceptance of more accurate conceptions. In sum, two rival hypotheses have been proposed to explain the role of affect in the process of conceptual change. Accordi ng to one hypothesis, conceptual change occurs because a new idea conflicts with an individuals understanding and this cognitive conflict creates negative affect that motivates the indivi dual to resolve the conflict. Ac cording to the other hypothesis, conceptual change is more likely to occur as a result of positive affect because individuals in a positive emotional state are more likely to use ge neral knowledge structures, such as heuristics,

PAGE 29

29 to process consistent information, allowing cogni tive resources to process inconsistent but nonthreatening information. To test these hypotheses, I investigated how the experience of affect is related to the amount and quali ty of processing of narrative refutational and expository refutational text. Empathy It seem s likely that positive affect can be e xperienced empathically while reading narrative refutational text. For example, reading a narrative in which a character displayed increased competence could be an occasion for empathic positive affect. Furthermore, if this characters increased competence was the result of conceptu al change, in which a misconception is refuted by experience and a more accurate conception is st rengthened by experience, then readers might be more likely to exhibit similar conceptual ch ange. The empathic experience of positive affect could increase processing and the resulting conceptual change. Empathy has been described as experienci ng someone elses emotional, physical, or psychological state (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992). It is generally accepted that empathy is a cognitive and affective process: (a) interpreting the emotional states of others and (b) having an affective understa nding or congruent affective response (Bourg, 1996; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006). Empathy has been meas ured variously through self-report, facial expressions, gestures, and pi cture story verbalizations. Empathy has been related to comprehension of narratives in a number of studies. Empathic ability of 8and 9-year old female students ha s been found to predict re ading ability at age 10 and 11 (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1987). Empathizing with a particular character affected how ninth-grade students interpreted a texts theme (Golden & Guth rie, 1986). Sixth-grade students who used an empathy strategy when reading na rrative texts comprehende d well (Phillips, 1988). Bourg, Risden, Thompson and Davis (1993) found th at, in sixth grade re aders of all ability

PAGE 30

30 levels, empathy led to greater comprehension of coherent narrative texts (texts with many connected goal, action, outcome sequences, see Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984). Reviewing these findings, Bourg (1996) suggested a possible causal chain from (a) text coherence to (b) identif ication of goal-action-outcome (GAO) sequences to (c) inferencing of character emotions to (d) development of empat hy with characters to (e ) creation of motivation to (f) increased comprehension. These studies have demonstrated that em pathy is an important variable in the comprehension of straight narrative texts, but is there any evidence empathy is associated with the kind of conceptual change that is the goal of narrative refutational texts? Chebat, Vercollier, and Gelinas-Chebat (2003) found em pathy plays a key role in at titude change when reading public service newspaper advertisements. They had participants read one of four advertisements, ranging from 11 to 14 sentences in length and comp arable in other measures of readability. The advertisements were about a topic predetermine d to be of high relevance (AIDS) or low relevance (malaria) to the study participants. The advertisements were also manipulated by message format, either lecture or drama format. Th e lecture format was a straight expository text, and the drama format was a narrative about an individual who finds hi s friend has a disease (AIDS or malaria) and becomes motivated to lear n more and get involved in finding a cure. The researchers used structural eq uation modeling to test hypotheses about the direction of the relationship of information processing and empathy in attitude change. The researchers measured empathy by self-re port and information processing by thoughtlistings. Results indicated that (a) empathy was si gnificantly related to information processing in both high and low self-relevant c onditions and (b) the direction of influence between empathy and information processing differed according to se lf-relevance. In high self-relevant conditions,

PAGE 31

31 information processing increased empathy and subs equent attitude change regardless of message format. However, in low self-relevant conditi ons, the drama format generated empathy that increased information processing and attitude change. Will similar results be obtained in a study of conceptual change in preservice teachers using expository refutational text and narrative re futational text? To iden tify a specific condition, such as text format, and describe how that c ondition influences the degree and direction of empathy and cognitive processing in conceptual ch ange deserves close attention. Therefore, in this study I explored the role of empathy as a potential mediator of the relationship between narrative refutational text and conceptual change. In summary, those teaching for conceptual change have attempted to motivate conceptual change by inducing a negatively felt cognitive conflict. Influencing conceptual change by the process of cognitive conflict has met with mixed results, perhaps due to failure in making the conflict salient to students (Lim n, 2001). There is yet a further que stion as to whether cognitive conflict is motivated or accompanied by negativ e affect. Alternatively, there is theoretical support for the idea that change may be accomp anied or motivated by positive affect, perhaps empathically experienced by thos e reading narrative refutational te xts; in this study I looked for empirical support of these possibilities. Systematic and Heuristic Processing In the search for processes that account for c onceptual change, researchers have looked to the social psychological literature of persuasion and attitude change specifically the research on dual-process theories (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gi ll, 2003). Dual-process theories were developed to explain why people sometimes adopt attitudes after careful considera tion of the evidence, whereas other times they seem to bypass this pro cess and make decisions based on heuristics, or rules of thumb. To address this inconsistenc y, researchers have proposed two independent, yet

PAGE 32

32 interactive, processing systems, one for effort ful rational processing and another for automatic processing based on heuristics. Researchers have proposed several dual-proce ss theories, but the most heavily researched is the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a review). Within the HSM, systematic processing is described as rational, effortful, analytic, and verbal. Those engaged in systematic processing attend to, ev aluate, elaborate, and integrate information (Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992, p. 318). In addition to thoughts representative of the message, novel or self-generated thoughts related to the message ar e also indicative of systematic processing (Chaiken, Duckworth, & Darke, 2000). In contrast heuristic processing is dominate d by rules that are stored in memory and activated by cues (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 2000). These rules, heuristics, are used to bypass the effort required for systematic processi ng. To operate, heuristics must be available (learned, stored in memory), accessible, (retrieved from memory), and applicable (relevant to the situation) (Higgins, 1996). Some examples of widely held and well-re searched heuristics are experts can be trusted, majority opinion is correct, and long messages are valid messages (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Ster eotypes like men are assertive or Asians are intelligent can also operate as heuristics (C hen et al., 2000). Heuristics provide expectancies or diagnostic information for decision-making ac tivities (Maheswaran et al., 1992). Some researchers have hypothesi zed that systematic processi ng might serve as a process that mediates the relationship between an instru ctional intervention and c onceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003). To date, however, this hypothesis has not been supported by empirical evidence. Gill et al. (2004) sought to identify systema tic processing as the process through which an instructional intervention using e xpository refutational text effected conceptual

PAGE 33

33 change in preservice teachers epistemological beliefs about mathematics. Participants completed a measure of their general and domain-specific ep istemological beliefs a nd read either a plain expository or expository refutational text on the nature of mathematical knowledge. Gill et al. measured systematic processing by thought-listings about the message of th e text generated after reading. The authors hypothesized that an expos itory refutational text would lead to belief change, with systematic processing serving a medi ational role, but the results did not support this hypothesis, raising doubt about the importance of systematic processing in conceptual change. The authors, however, speculated that their measur e of systematic processing may not have been sensitive enough to detect its mediating role in conceptual change and suggested investigating alternative measures. A third alternative is to l ook for evidence of the combined effects of systematic and heuristic processing. As described in HSM, systematic processing does not occur in isolation, but in conjunction with heuristic pr ocessing. This assumption is an implication of the sufficiency principle of HSM. The sufficiency principle ho lds that thinkers are economy minded, but also desire confidence in their decisions; they want to exert merely sufficient effort to reach the desired confidence level. Systematic processing is used when heuristics alone cannot close the gap between confidence in a decisi on and desired confidence. Ther efore, low motivation leads to only heuristic processing, but high motivation wi dens the gap and incr eases the likelihood of systematic processing (Chen et al., 2000). The sufficiency principle therefore allows for he uristics to operate al one or in conjunction with systematic processing. When both systems operate in conjunction, researchers have described three possible outcomes (Chen et al., 2000): (a) Heuristics may be attenuated; for example, the heuristic accidents never happen can be attenuated by systematically processing

PAGE 34

34 incongruent messages describing the danger of a product. (b) Heuris tic and systematic processing can be additive in their effects on attitude change. This additive outcome can occur when the message and heuristic cue are congr uent. For example, the consensus implies correctness heuristic activated by favorable opinion poll results can have an additive effect on endorsement of a product if that pr oduct is also logically superior. (c) Finall y, heuristics can bias systematic processing. For example, Chaiken an d Maheswaran (1994) found that the experts are right heuristic will bias systematic processing of a produc t description of ambiguous quality. From this research, they described how the firs t two outcomes are likely when the message for systematic processing is unambiguously str ong or weak. Unambiguously strong or weak messages should lead to attenuation when the he uristic cues are incongr uent with the message and additivity when the heuristic cues are c ongruent with the message Messages that are of ambiguous quality will more likely lead to the biasing of systematic processing by heuristic processing. To understand the processes of conceptual change in order to effect conceptual change, the possibility of additive effects of heuristic and systematic processing is most promising. If the effects of the processing systems are additive then the likelihood of change, the strength of change, and the duration of change should be gr eater. If refutational te xt effects conceptual change by increasing systematic processing, as so me have proposed (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003), then an implication of the sufficiency prin ciple is that refutationa l text widens the gap between confidence and desired confidence and motivates systematic processing. If systematic processing is engaged while re ading refutational text, another implication of the sufficiency principle is that this systema tic processing occurs only in relationship to the default heuristic processing. Specifically, system atic processing is attenuating, adding to, or

PAGE 35

35 being biased by heuristic processing. Theoretica lly, heuristics that ar e congruent with an unambiguously strong message should lead to add itive effects. For those using refutational text for conceptual change, what text characteristic s might serve as congruent cues for heuristic processing, leading to additive effects with systematic processing and producing greater conceptual change? Hynd (2003) claimed that cues such as style, length of argument, and credibility are always heuristics even when expe rts use them consciously and systematically. She suggested people use every means they can to construct meaning, so those teaching for conceptual change should learn how to harness heuristics. The possibility that systematic and heuristi c processing can have an additive effect on conceptual change is theoretically supporte d by another important dual-process model, cognitive-experiential self-the ory (CEST; Epstein & Pacini, 1999). CEST includes a rational conscious system that operates in a systematic manner and an experiential system that operates by heuristics, specifically those grounded in narrative, metaphor, and affect. Therefore, the heuristic processing described by Hynd (2003) and CEST may be an important process in conceptual change. Harnessing these heuristics grounded in experi ence, narrative, metaphor, and affect may have an especially important place in teacher education. Doyle and Carter (1996) pointed to a disturbing mismatch between teacher education programs and teacher knowledge, claiming that teacher education courses are full of abstractions and principles, whereas teachers knowledge is in the form of concrete events and stories. Th ey suggested the emphasis on abstract rationality may miss the mark because teachers unders tandings have a narrative structure. Thus, it seems possible that, especially for preservice teachers learning social science concepts, narrative refutational text might yield great er heuristic processing and, if congruent

PAGE 36

36 with systematic processing, result in greater conc eptual change. It also seems possible that this processing could be motivated by positive affect, perhaps experienced empa thically, and without the negative affect assumed to be necessary for conceptual change in the theories of Piaget (1975), Posner et al. (1982), a nd Festinger (1957). Therefore, I examined the relationship of systematic and heuristic processing as well as empa thy and affect as mediators of the relationship between text type and conceptual change. Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change Epistemological Beliefs Broadly speaking, epistemology is the philosoph ical study of the nature of knowledge and knowing. Personal epistemology is the em pirical study of individuals beliefs about the characteristics and sources of knowledge (Bue hl & Alexander, 2001). Perry (1970) initiated research on personal epistemology using semi-structured interviews and found that male undergraduates construct their ow n theories about the nature of knowledge. Specifically, he found that these personal epistemo logies exist on a developmental continuum from dualism, that is, the idea that knowledge is either true or false, to a more comp lex relativism that in contrast accounts for differences in knowledge acco rding to perspective and contexts. A host of researchers followed Perrys ( 1970) lead with various emphases. King and Kitchener (1994) expanded Perrys work by incl uding females and more age groups but still maintained a very general and stage-like co nception of epistemological beliefs. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) focu sed on the unique beliefs of women, suggesting womens knowledge is not merely dualistic or rela tivistic but can be classified as subjective, procedural, received, or constructed, for exam ple. Baxter Magolda (1987, 1992) investigated specific academic or subject-centered beliefs rather than general beliefs. In contrast to a unitary and stage-like conceptualization of persona l epistemology, Schommer (1990) proposed a

PAGE 37

37 multidimensional approach by identifying five distinct epistemological beliefs: (The beliefs are listed negatively so that strong belief suggests an imma ture personal epistemology.) Simple knowledge: Knowledge is easily grasped. Certain knowledge: Knowledge is unchanging. Omniscient authority: The source of knowledge is external to the knower. Innate ability: The amount learning is determined by ones unchanging intelligence. Quick learning: Learning occurs over a short period. Researchers have identified several pr oblems with Schommers (1990) five epistemological beliefs. Schraw, Bendixen, and D unkle (2002) criticized the factor analysis techniques Schommer used in the validation of her 63-item Likert-scale measure of epistemological beliefs. Hofer and Pintrich (1997 ) questioned if beliefs in innate ability and quick learning are indeed epistemological beli efs, because they concern learning and not knowledge. Despite these problems, epistemological belief s continue to have si gnificant explanatory power. For example, in her initial work, Sc hommer (1990) described how epistemological beliefs are related to the way students process information and monitor comprehension. Specifically, she found that the belief in simple knowledge was related to poorer comprehension, the belief in quick learning was related to ove rsimplification and overestimation of learning, and the belief in certain knowledge was related to mo re absolute and definiti ve conclusions. Kardash and Scholes (1996) had college students read contradictory ev idence about HIV/AIDS and found that belief in certain knowledge was associated with a misinterpretation of contradictory evidence, whereas a belief in uncertain knowledge wa s associated with a more valid inconclusive interpretation of c ontradictory evidence. Researchers have also looked to the explanatory power of epistemological beliefs as a contributor to conceptual change Pintrich (1999) suggested that more mature epistemological

PAGE 38

38 beliefs may lead to more conceptual change, perhaps by fostering a mastery orientation that encourages deeper cognitive processing. Some research has supported this possibility. For example, in her study of the effect of expository and refutation al text on conceptual change, Gregoire (2002) used the 11 items identified in Qian and Alverma nns (1995) factor analysis to measure beliefs in simple and certain knowledge and found that those epistemological beliefs were related to conceptual change, as evidence d on measures of explicit and implicit beliefs about teaching mathematics. The Cognitively Guided Instruction Belief Survey (CGI; Peterson et al., 1989) is a self-report measure of explicit beliefs about mathem atics. Those who had a belief in simple and certain knowledge exhibited less conceptual change as measured by the CGI ( t = 2.97, p < .002). As a measure of implicit beliefs ab out mathematics, Gregoire devised eight teaching scenarios that depicted either constructi vist or procedural teaching practices. Belief in simple and certain knowledge was not correlated with conceptual change as measured by agreement with the constructivist scenarios ( t = -1.08, p < .141), but was as measured by disagreement with procedural scenarios ( t = 2.22, p < .014). Consistent with this research I investigated the effect of ep istemological beliefs on change in conceptions of motivation. Verbal Ability In reading refutational texts, students with lower verbal ability might have difficulty recognizing the conflict be tween theories and, as a consequen ce, might exhibit less conceptual change than students with higher verbal abilit y. In her study of conceptual change, Gregoire (2002) examined the relation of ve rbal ability, as measured by self-reported verbal scores on the SAT, to conceptual change in beliefs about mathematics instruction. However, she found no relationship between verbal abilit y and conceptual change on m easures of either explicit or implicit beliefs. To explore further the role of verbal ability in read ing refutational text, I investigated whether verbal ability influenced ch ange in conceptions of motivation in this study.

PAGE 39

39 Purpose of the Study My purpose in this study was to increase our understanding of conceptual change in preserv ice teachers by testing the model pres ented in Figure 1-1, which specifies that instructional text (i.e., narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text), epistemological beliefs, and verbal ability directly affect conceptual change and th at type of text also directly affects systematic and heuristic pr ocessing, which in turn directly affect change in conceptions of motivation. Furthermore the model specifies that te xt directly affects posit ive and negative affect which in turn affects processing, and conceptual ch ange. Finally, the model sp ecifies that the text directly affects empathy, which in turn aff ects positive and negative affect, processing, and conceptual change. This model addresses a num ber of weaknesses in cu rrent research. These weaknesses include the need to further identify effective interventions to effect conceptual change, the failure to identify individual character istics that influence conceptual change, and the lack of specification of cognitive and affectiv e processes involved in conceptual change. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertati on study was three-fold: One purpose was to compare two instructional interv entions, expository refutational a nd narrative refutational text, designed to foster conceptual change in pres ervice teachers. A second purpose was to explore two personal characteristics, specifically epistemo logical beliefs and verbal ability that may influence preservice teachers conceptual change A third purpose was to investigate whether the affective and cognitive processes of positive an d negative affect, empathy, and systematic and heuristic processing mediate the relationship between the instructional intervention and conceptual change in the preservice teachers conceptions of motivation. First, I compared instructional interventi ons designed to effect conceptual change. Specifically I compared the extent of conceptual change in an experimental group that read a narrative refutational text to a comparison group th at read a comparable expository refutational

PAGE 40

40 text. Both the narrative refutationa l and expository refutational text refute an extrinsic theory of motivation and explain an intrinsi c theory of motivati on, but the narrative re futational text was constructed by adding narrative struct ures such as setting, characte r, and plot to the expository refutational text. Second, I explored two persona l characteristics hypothesized to affect the process of conceptual change. Specifically, I investigated th e role of general epistemological beliefs and verbal ability in the process of conceptual change. Prior research has demonstrated that some epistemological beliefs, such as the beliefs th at knowledge is simple a nd certain, can influence the relationship between specific instructional interventions and conceptual change (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Windschitl & Andre, 1998). To furt her explore this relationship, I tested the hypothesis that individuals who hol d epistemological beliefs that knowledge is simple or certain demonstrate less evidence of conceptual change after reading a narrative refutational text. Although Gregoire (2002) did not find a relationship between ve rbal ability and conceptual change in her study of expository text versus refu tational text, I examined whether verbal ability influenced conceptual change in my study to determine whether it affected change in conceptions of motivation when reading two types of refutational text. The third purpose of my study was to explore cognitive and affective processes hypothesized to account for conceptual change. To do this I investigated whether the positive or negative affect experienced from reading narrative refutational and expository refutational text was associated with conceptual change. Some researchers have hypothesi zed that, after reading refutational text, an individual who experiences negative affect will allocate the cognitive resources necessary for conceptual change to alleviate the negatively felt disequilibrium (Gregoire, 2002), whereas other re searchers have hypothesized that positive affect will increase

PAGE 41

41 the processing for conceptual change (Linne nbrink & Pintrich, 2002). In addition to these affective processes, I explored the cognitive processes of systematic and heuristic processing in conceptual change. Some researchers have clai med that systematic processing may serve an important role in conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003), but others have also looked to heuristic processing (Hynd, 2003). Howeve r, in light of work in social psychology suggesting that systematic and heuristic processi ng have additive eff ects (Chen et al., 2000), I looked for the additive effects of both systematic and heuristic processing on conceptual change while reading narrative refutational text. Significance of the Study for Theory Mayer (2002) recently reviewed the state of the literature on conceptual change. He concluded that researchers have reached consen sus that conceptual change is a cognitive process in which the learner actively constructs coherent and useful knowledge. Yet he also concluded researchers do not agree on how change occurs specifically regarding the mechanisms or processes of conceptual change, and the methods teachers can use to effect conceptual change. My dissertation study was designed to address these theoretical issu es of conceptual change in the context of teacher education. First, this study has the potential to increas e our understanding of methodologies used to effect conceptual change in preservice teachers. Expository refutational te xt, designed to induce a cognitive conflict in the reader, has been am ong the most effective me thodologies to effect conceptual change in the natural science domai n among students from elementary school to the university (Guzzetti et al., 1993). Furthermore, expository refutational text has been more effective than plain expository text in effecting conceptual change in the social science domain among preservice teachers (Gregoire, 2002; Kutz a, 2000; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999). However, research is needed that explores the eff ect of narrative refutational text in the social

PAGE 42

42 science domain of teacher educa tion on conceptual change in preservice teachers, even though teacher conceptions of teacher education often ta ke the form of narratives rather than general principles (Doyle & Carter, 1996; Lortie, 1975) Given that methods of inducing cognitive conflict may fail because they fail to make the conflict salient to the reader (Lim n, 2001), it is important to investigate the eff ectiveness of narrative refutational text in contrast to expository refutational text in changing these preservice te achers conceptions of teaching to be more consistent with contemporary research. Second, this study can help us understand personal learner charac teristics that influence the change process. Researchers have identified epistemological belie fs as a personal characteristic that influences the effect of methods of intervention on c onceptual change. Specifically individuals with less mature epistemological beliefs, for example the belief that knowledge is simple or certain, show less evidence of change than those with more mature epistemological beliefs when reading an expository refutationa l text (Gregoire, 2002; Qian & Alvermann, 1995) or when using instructional materials that re quire hypothesis formation and testing (Windschitl & Andre, 1998). I investigated whet her epistemological beliefs influence the effect of reading narrative refutational text on conceptual change to help us further understand how personal characteristics such as preexisting beliefs may influence conceptual change. The third purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the cognitive and affective processes of conceptual change. Prominent rese archers have disagreed on whether positive or negative affect motivates the cognitive processi ng necessary for conceptual change. Piagets (1975) equilibration theory, the Posn er et al. (1982) theory of c onceptual change, and Festingers (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all explain c ognitive change in terms of the human need to reduce the negative affect that is felt when individuals are confront ed with conflicting

PAGE 43

43 information. This negative affect theoretically motivates the cognitive processing necessary to resolve the cognitive conflict and reduce the accompanying dissonance, or feeling of discomfort. Bless (2000, 2001), in contrast, hypothesized that positive affect will ameliorate the threat posed by conflicting information and lead to the use of general knowledge structures, such as schemas or heuristics, freeing cognitive resource s to process conflicting information and achieve conceptual change. I hypothesized that a narrative refuta tional text about a teacher who increases her competence by changing her conceptions about te aching to be more consistent with research will lead to an increase of positive affect in the reader, either directly or indi rectly through the mediation of empathy. If readi ng a narrative refutational text increases positive affect, then according to Blesss hypothesis, readers will activate their general knowledge structures, specifically those schema or he uristics about teaching that exist in narrative from (Doyle & Carter, 1996; Lortie, 1975), and allocate cognitive resources to the discrepant but nonthreatening information and achie ve greater conceptual change than those who read expository refutational text. In addition to the divergent theori es about the role of affect in conceptual change, a lack of agreement exists regarding the cognitive processe s that influence conceptual change (Mayer, 2002). To identify cognitive processes involved in conceptual change some researchers have looked to dual process models of cognition, su ch as the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) involving systematic processing and a more automatic or affect-driven type of processing, often described as heuristic (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Within this dual process framework, some researchers have suggested that systematic pr ocessing, that is, a logi cal, effortful type of information processing, might be the primary c ognitive process involved in conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gregoire, 2003). Hynd (2003), in contrast, argued for the importance of

PAGE 44

44 heuristic processing, such as thoughts about styl e, length of argument and credibility, in conceptual change. Evidence is needed that clarif ies the role of these pr ocessing types; therefore I investigated the additive effect s of these dual processes (see Ch en et al., 2000) in conceptual change. The use of narrative refutational text de signed to increase heuristic processing by the inclusion of narrative structures and increas e systematic processing by the inclusion of refutational text will help us understand how systematic and heuristic processing influence conceptual change. Significance of the Study for Practice Preserv ice teachers possess many conceptions ab out teaching that are incongruous with findings of educational research (HoltReynolds, 1992; Woolfolk Hoy & Murphy, 2001). Research in a variety of disc iplines, including social and deve lopmental psychology as well as education, has shown that such conceptions are very resistant to cha nge (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Wideen et al., 1998). Specifically, preservice teache rs have conceptions about motivation that are not consistent with contemporary views (Patrick & Pintrich, 2001), creating a need to identify effective interventions that promote such con ceptual change. Expository refutational text has been among the most effective interventions for conceptual change studied to date (Guzzetti et al., 1993), yet important questions regarding text, domain, and read er characteristics remain. For example, is narrative refutational text more effective in inducing conceptual change in the social science domain than expository refutational te xt? Are these effects influenced by readers epistemological beliefs or verbal ability? By addressing these questions, this studys purpose was to provide information to writers of texts used in teacher education progr ams, and those teacher educators who use these texts, as to how different types of text influence conceptual change in preservice teachers.

PAGE 45

45 Figure 1-1. Proposed model of conceptual change.

PAGE 46

46 CHAPTER 2 MATERIALS AND METHODS To investigate the effect of text type, ep istem ological beliefs and verbal ability on conceptual change and the role of empathy, aff ect, and systematic and heuristic processing as mediators of the effect of text type, I tested th e model of conceptual change illustrated in Figure 1-1. Specific hypothesis implied by the model are presented below. Research Questions 1. Do epistem ological beliefs or verbal ability influence change in preservice teachers conceptions of motivation im mediately after reading narra tive refutational text and 4 weeks later? 2. Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect on conceptual change in preservice teachers conceptions of motiva tion than an expository refutational text immediately after the reading and 4 weeks? 3. Does reading a narrative refutational text ha ve a stronger effect on preservice teachers systematic and heuristic processing of info rmation regarding conceptions of motivation than reading an expository refutational text? 4. Does reading a narrative refutational text elicit more positive emotion in preservice teachers than reading an expository refutational text? 5. Does reading a narrative refutational text e licit less negative emotion in preservice teachers than reading an expository refutational text? 6. Does reading a narrative refutational text have a stronger effect on the empathy that preservice teachers experience af ter reading than reading an expository refutational text? 7. Do empathy, positive affect, systematic, and he uristic processing mediate the relationship between text type (narrative refutational text vs. expos itory refutational text) and conceptual change in preservice teachers conceptions of motiva tion immediately after the reading and 4 weeks later? Participants Two hundred sixteen undergraduat e students enrolled in teache r education program s in the 2006-2007 school year participated in the pretest, intervention, a nd posttest phases of this study. Ninety-five of these participants were enrolled in one of four secti ons of a required child development course at a large, southern st ate university in the fall semester. One hundred

PAGE 47

47 twenty-one of these participants were enrolled in one of three sections of a required educational psychology course at a medium-sized, southern st ate university in the following spring semester. All students recruited were volunteers who signed informed cons ent agreements to participate in the study and were given course credit up to 1% of their final grade fo r their participation. Twenty six students (6 from the large univers ity and 20 from the medium-sized university) did not complete all the measures and were deleted from the analyses. Of the remaining participants ( N = 190), 89 were from the large univers ity, and 101 were from the medium-sized university. Of the participants 93 % were female, and 79% were juni ors in their teacher education program. Seventy-nine percent of the participants were Caucasian, 10% were Black, 5% were Hispanic, 1% were Asian, and 3% identified them selves as Other or did not respond. Gender, ethnicity, and year in school by univers ity group are reported in Table 2-1. Experimental Treatments I compared the effect of an expository refuta tional text (ERT) and a narrative refutational text (NRT) on conceptual change. The ERT is an expository text, that simply explains concepts such as that typically used in te xtbooks, but it is also a refutational text in that it first explains a commonly accepted concept and then refutes that concept by contrasting it with a different concept that is better suppor ted by research. I used the ER T devised by Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999). The ERT contrasts a commonly accepted extrinsic or reinforcement theory of motivation to an intrinsic theory of motiva tion better supported by research. The NRT also contrasts extrinsic and intrinsi c theories of motivation, but in a narrative about a preservice teacher who experienced the limitations of an extrinsic view of motiv ation and realized the benefits of changing her conception of motivation to an intrinsic view. I created the NRT (Appendix A) by adding narrativ e structures to the pre-existing ERT. In the NRT, a novice teacher endorses and operates he r classroom consistent with an endorsement

PAGE 48

48 of extrinsic motivation. After she notices adve rse effects in her classroom, she receives information on how to operate her classroom to facilitate intrinsic motivation from an experienced teacher. I placed as many phrases an d whole sentences from the ERT into the NRT as practicable. In previous studies the NRT has di ffered from the ERT in length or readability or both. For example, in their study of conceptual change in high-school physics students, Alvermann et al. reported a length of 606 word s for their ERT and 782 words for their NRT (NRT was 29% longer) and a Fry (1977) readabi lity level of seventh gr ade for both. In their study of conceptual change in fifth-grade scie nce students, Maria and Johnson (1990) reported a length of 1,075 words for their ERT and 1,533 word s for their NRT (NRT was 42% longer), and Raygor (1977) readability scores of sixth grade for the ERT and fourth grade for the NRT. The difference in length, readability, or both may acc ount for the differences in treatment effects rather than differences in the content of the te xt; therefore, I designed the texts in my study to have nearly identical lengths and levels of r eadability. The ini tial draft of the NRT was longer and had a lower readability level than the ERT, so I excised selected monosyllabic words and added polysyllabic words to reduce the word count and increase the readability level to be consistent with the ERT. The ERT has a length of 573 words, and the NRT has a length of 569 words. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score, a function of average sent ence and word length, is 13.25 for the ERT and 13.17 for the NRT. Pretreatment Measures Conceptual Change Conceptual change was m easured by contra sting preand posttest scores on 20 items regarding motivation theories developed by Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999). Each item on the instrument is a short scenario that participan ts identified as true or false, by marking 0 for true and 1 for false on their response sheet See, for example, the following item:

PAGE 49

49 Dr. White is pleased to see that his daught er is very motivated to read her biology assignments. In fact, she often reads biology books from the library that are not assigned. In order to encourage her to continue to learn about biology, Dr. White pays her $3 for every chapter that she reads. This is a good way to motivate her to continue reading the biology books. For items, like this one, that endorse an ex trinsic view of motiva tion, a response of 1 for false was counted as correct and summed. Howeve r, for intrinsic motivation items a response of 1 for false would be incorrect, so I reversed th e scores on these items before summing. Therefore in my analysis, higher scores represent conceptions of motivation consistent with Decis theory of intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985); that is, high scor es on the extrinsic preand posttests indicated that the responde nt did not endorse teacher stra tegies involving reinforcement as good ways to motivate students for learni ng, and high scores on the intrinsic measure indicated that the respondent endorsed teacher strate gies that assisted students to learn for the sake of learning. Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) used this m easure of conceptual change as a pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest and re ported internal consistency estimates of participants scores on the total scale of .68, .74, and .74, respectively. In her disse rtation study, Kutza (2000) reported a Cronbachs alpha reliability estimate of .70 for participants scores on the 20-question instrument. However, in her analysis she divi ded the instrument into two subscales of 10 questions each, using one scale to measure a preference for extrinsic motivation theory and the other to measure a preference fo r intrinsic motivation theory. Ku tza also changed the response options from true or false to a 5-point Likert scale that participan ts used to rate their level of agreement with each scenario. For the respondents scores on the extrinsic and intrinsic subscales scores, she reported internal c onsistency estimates of .81 and .77, respectively. Kutza analyzed the two 10-item subscales rather than the total score in order to assess conceptual change as rejection of an extrinsic theor y, endorsement of an intrinsic th eory, or both. For these reasons, I

PAGE 50

50 also measured change using the two 10-item subscales, but I maintained the dichotomous response options used by Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens. For the scores on the pretests of the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales, internal consistency estimates were .58 and .61 for the participants sc ores, respectively. For the participants scores on the posttests of the intrinsic and extrinsic s ubscales, internal consistency estimates were .59 and .77, respectively. For the delayed posttests administered 4 weeks after the posttest, I obtained internal consistency estimates for the participants scores on the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales estimates of .63 and .74, respectively. Epistemological Beliefs Using Schommers (1990) Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, a 63-item Likert-type scale, researchers have conducted large quantit ative studies of epistemological beliefs (e.g., Schommer & Dunnell, 1992; Scho mmer, Rhodes, & Crouse, 1992). However researchers have identified some methodological and conceptual problems with that instrument (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schraw et al., 2002). To address some methodological problems, Qian and Alvermann (1995) conducted an exploratory factor analys is of Schommers (Schommer & Dunnell, 1992) Epistemological Belief Questionnaire that led to a three-factor model with factors named Quick Learning, Innate Ability, and Simple-Certain Knowledge. I used the 11-item Simple-Certain subscale devised by Qian and Al vermann (1995) as a measure of epistemological beliefs in this st udy. Qian and Alvermann found that responses to this subscale, with a reported alpha of .68, were inversely related to con ceptual change in highschool physics students. Subscale items include, for example, Most words have one clear meaning and If scientists try hard enough, th ey can find the truth to almost anything. Response options for the items ranged from 0 ( strongly disagree) to 5 (s trongly agree ). Gregoire (2002) used the same subscale in her dissertati on study, similarly finding be lief in simple-certain

PAGE 51

51 knowledge was inversely related to change in pr eservice teachers conceptions of mathematics teaching. She reported a Cronbachs alpha of .73 for the preservice teachers scores. The Cronbachs alpha of .72 for participants scores on this instrument in my dissertation sample was consistent with these previous studies. Verbal Ability Participants were asked to re port their scores on the verbal portion of the SAT or their score on the reading porti on of the ACT or both as an indicator of verbal ability. Sixty-six of the 216 particip ants reported SAT scores, though 4 were obviously incorrect because they were single-digit numbers or exceeded the maximum possible score of 800. Forty-seven of the 216 participants reported their ACT reading scor es, though 1 was obviously incorrect. In addition, participants were asked to give their permission for me to request their scores from the registrar to verify the accuracy of their scores or s upply missing scores. One hundred twenty-five of the 216 participants gave permission to request their scores from the regi strar. If the scores from the registrar differed from the self-re ported scores, I used the scores fr om the registrar. If I had only ACT scores, I transformed them to a metric comparable to the SAT scores by using a transformation based on z -scores1. 1 Transformed score = {[ACT score Mean (ACT)] [SD(SAT)/SD(ACT)] + Mean (SAT)} The standard deviation (SAT) and the mean (SAT) for 2004the year most participants took the examwere obtained from the College Board website at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/about/new s_info/cbsenior/yr2004/2004_CBSNR_total_group.pdf For ACT scores, this information was obtained from www.act.org/news/data/04/data.html

PAGE 52

52 Posttreatment Measures Affect To m easure affect, I used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales. Participants rated their positive and negative affect on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) very slightly or not at all to (5) extremely Examples of positive affect include interested, excite d, and attentive; examples of negative affect include distre ssed, guilty, and afraid. The PANA S can be used for various time frames from the present moment, to the past few weeks, to generally. In an attempt to measure affect induced by the reading I used the PANAS w ith the instruction, Indicate how the selection you read makes you feel right now at the present moment. In initial development and validation studies of the PANAS using the present mome nt instruction, Watson et al. reported alpha coefficients of .89 for respondents scores on th e positive affect scale and .85 for their scores on the negative affect scale and a correlation of -.15 between th e two scales. In my sample I obtained an alpha coefficient of .90 for the participants scores on the positive affect scale and .82 for scores on the negative affect scale and a correlation of .22 between the two scales. Systematic and Heuristic Processing Processing type was m easured by coding partic ipants thought listings (TLs) after reading the text. Gregoire (2002) devised a rubric for coding TLs as either message-based or nonmessage-based with message-based TLs reflecting systematic processing. I followed Gregoires coding procedure for systematic processing. An ex ample of a TL that was coded as systematic processing was I knew about in trinsic and extrinsic rewards, but I never knew that giving rewards would hinder students motivation. Al so like Gregoire, I coded TLs that were fragmented, sweeping affective judgments, or clichs, as non-messagebased processing. However, her coding procedure for non-message -based TLs included what is described as

PAGE 53

53 relevant heuristic processing (Hynd, 2003). For exampl e, statements regarding text style, length, difficulty, credibility, or audience reaction are relevant heuristics, but were coded by Gregoire as non-message-based. In my study, I coded relevant he uristic processing in a separate category. An example of a statement coded as relevant heuris tic processing was I think that this reading needs more examples on not rewarding the children with prizes and stickers. Also, because of the narrative aspects of heuristic processing (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), TLs regarding the story elements (plot, character, and setting) of the NRT were coded as relevant heuristic processing. An example of such a statement was I understo od the anxiousness Wendy had about wanting to motivate her students to learn. In her disse rtation study, Gregoire divided the number of message-based TLs by the total number of TLs to obtain a score for systematic processing; my coding procedures (Appendix B), however, resulted in scores for systematic and heuristic processing. An assistant transcribed the participants TLs word-for-word, including spelling errors, into a table labeled by their id entification number, but not by th eir treatment condition, so the raters were blind as to treatment condition. A second assistant and I coded each TL as an example of systematic, heuristic, or irrelevant pr ocessing. As a measure of interrater reliability, Cohens kappa for the ratings was calculated at .63, indicating substant ial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). For each raters codings, I divided the number of TLs coded as systematic by the total number of TLs to get a systematic processing score in the form of a ratio that could range from 0 to 1. I repeated the process for the TLs coded as heuristic processing. Cronbachs was .89 for participants systematic processing scores and .94 for participants heuristic processing scores. I then averaged the two raters systematic and heuristic processing scores to get one systematic processing score and one heuristic processing score for each participant.

PAGE 54

54 Empathy I m easured empathy using a 5-item, 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 ( strongly disagree with the statement ) to 6 ( strongly agree with the statement ) published by Coulson (1989), but originally devised by Schlinger (1979) to assess em pathic response to television commercials. Chebat et al. ( 2003) revised the scale for use with public service newspaper advertisements and obtained an internal consiste ncy estimate of participants scores of .84. I revised the scale by replacing the word advertisement with the word reading, so that participants indicated the extent to which they liked the reading because it was personal and intimate, whether they felt they were right there in the reading experiencing the same thing, whether the characters were expressing what they felt lik e at times, whether they were involved in the reading and whether the reading represented, their ideal--the life th e reading showed. Cronbachs alpha for participants scores in this study was .81, sli ghtly lower than that reported by Chebat et al. Procedures Phase 1 On the first occasion that las ted approxima tely 10 minutes, participants completed the informed consent form, the 11-item epistemologi cal belief measure, and the 20-item conceptual change measure as a pretest. Phase 2 One week after Phase 1, participants were random ly assigned to read the expository refutational text (ERT) or narrative refutati onal text (NRT) about motivation. After reading, participants reported affect on the PANAS, completed the thought listing, and then completed the 20-item conceptual change measure as an im mediate posttest. This phase took approximately 20 minutes.

PAGE 55

55 Phase 3 The final data collection of the study took pl ace approxim ately 1 m onth after Phase 2 and lasted approximately 5 minutes. On this third day, the participants completed the conceptual change measure as a delayed posttest. Analysis My conceptual model (Figure 1-1) specifies that initial concepti ons of motivation, the experimental treatment, epistemological beliefs, and verbal ability directly affect subsequent conceptions of motivation and that the treatment also directly affects sy stematic and heuristic processing which in turn directly affects change in conceptions of mo tivation. Furthermore the model specifies that the experimental treatment directly affects posit ive and negative affect, which in turn affects processing and subseque nt conceptions of motivation, and that the treatment directly affects empathy, which in tu rn affects positive and negative affect, which in turn affects processing, which affects subsequent conceptions of motivat ion. I used structural equation modeling to estimate the effects. Th e model contains seven endogenous variables: empathy, positive affect, negative affect, systema tic processing, heuristic processing, subsequent conceptions of intrinsic motivation and subse quent conceptions of ex trinsic motivation. The model contains five exogenous variables, initia l conceptions of intrinsi c motivation and initial conceptions of extrinsic motivation, the experime ntal treatment, episte mological beliefs, and verbal ability. In a study of conceptual change that utilizes a pretest, the decision must be made whether to use as the outcome variable the posttest scores or the change in scores from pretest to posttest. Using change scores can create the misleading co nclusion that pretests scores were negatively related to change. Therefore, similar to the analysis conducted by Gill et al. (2004), I used

PAGE 56

56 posttest scores on the conceptions of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation measures rather than change scores as the outcome variable.

PAGE 57

57 Table 2-1. Descriptive statis tics for nominal variables Expository Refutational Text Narrative Refutational Text Measure % N % N Gender Female 96% 89 91% 88 Male 4% 4 9% 9 Ethnicity White 78% 73 80% 78 Black 9% 8 11% 11 Hispanic 4% 4 6% 6 Asian 2% 2 1% 1 Other 5% 5 0% 0 Year Sophomore 3% 3 4% 4 Junior 74% 69 84% 81 Senior 15% 14 11% 11 Other 2% 2 0% 0 Note: Percentages may not total 100% because in each group one participant did not respond to the ethnicity item, and five participants in th e expository refutational text group and one in the narrative refutational text group did not respond to the year-in-school item.

PAGE 58

58 CHAPTER 3 RESULTS Descriptive Statistics Dem ographic statistics for the participants were reported in Table 2-1. The sample, consisting of predominantly white female partic ipants, was fairly typical for the undergraduate education programs at the two universities. Means and standard deviations by experimental condition for all pre-treatment and post-treatm ent measures are repo rted in Table 3-1. The mean SAT verbal score was 7.13 points higher for the narrative refutational text (NRT) group than for the expository refutational text group (ERT), though the difference was not significant, t (146) = -.53, p = .60. For the pretests of concep tions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, scores could range from 0 to 10 with higher scores represen ting more accurate conceptions. Participants in both conditions scored an average of 3 to 4 points higher on the pretest of intrinsic motivation than on the pr etest of extrinsic motiv ation. This difference suggests that participants had more accurate in itial conceptions of intrinsic than extrinsic motivation. Participants epistemological beliefs were on average more sophisticated than nave with scores well below the mid-point on the 5-poin t Likert scale with lower scores representing more sophisticated beliefs. Partic ipants epistemological beliefs were also more sophisticated than the sample in Gregoires (2002) dissertation study. Particip ants in my experimental and control group averaged 1.40 and 1.53 respectively on the measure of epistemological beliefs, whereas participants in Gregoires gr oups averaged 2.41 and 2.27. Despite the random assignment of participants to text condition, one pretreatment measur e revealed significant differences by text condition. Participants assign ed to read the ERT scored significantly higher on the pretest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation than participants assigned to read the NRT with a mean difference of .51 questions correct, t (189) = 2.04, p = .04.

PAGE 59

59 Manipulation Checks I asses sed the effectiveness of the treatment with a series of manipulation checks that participants completed immediately after reading the assigned text. Specifi cally, I predicted that participants who read the NRT would describe thei r text as more familiar, useful, interesting, and more clearly making the distinct ion between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation than those who read the expository text. Only one significan t difference was found. Contrary to my hypothesis, participants who read the ERT described their text as more clearly making the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva tion than those who read the NRT (p < .05). In addition, on the basis of Blesss (2000) c ontention that those in positive moods are less likely to feel threatened by information that contradicts their existing conceptions and in turn are more likely to link that new knowledge with existing knowledge, I hypothesized that those who read the NRT would find it less challenging, requiring less effort, and would be more likely to agree with conceptions in the text than t hose who read the ERT; however, ag ain contrary to my hypotheses, no differences by text type were repo rted on these manipulation checks. Analysis of the Correlation Matrix There were 43 participants, 22 in the NRT and 21 in the ER T condition for whom I was unable to obtain SAT or ACT scores from the partic ipants or the registrar. For these participants I used pattern matching in LISREL to impute values to these missing scores. As evident in the means presented in Ta ble 3-1, despite random assignment to text condition, those assigned to the NRT had significa ntly lower scores on th e pretest of intrinsic motivation, but there were no sign ificant correlations with othe r pretreatment measures. For posttreatment measures, reading the NRT was positively correlated with empathy, positive affect, and negative affect. In regard to cogni tive processing, the NRT was negatively correlated

PAGE 60

60 with systematic processing and positively correlated with heur istic processing. The NRT had no significant correlation with any posttest or delayed posttest of conceptions of motivation. Tables 3-2 and 3-3 present the correlation matric es for all preand posttreatment measures by treatment condition, ERT and NRT, respectivel y. A few correlations were significant across both conditions. The tests of conceptions of extrin sic motivation were significantly correlated at pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest, as were the te sts of conceptions of intrinsic motivation. For posttreatment measures, empathy and positive affect were positively correlated in both text conditions. Systematic processing was negativel y correlated with heuristic processing and delayed posttest of conceptions of extrin sic motivation for both text conditions. However, several differences by text condition were found in pretreatment and posttreatment measures. For the ERT condition, verbal SAT scores were significantly positively correlated with conceptions of extrinsic motivati on at pretest, posttest and delayed posttest. For the NRT, verbal SAT scores were only significantly correlated with epistemological beliefs; specifically, higher SAT verbal scor es were negatively correlated with nave beliefs in certain and simple knowledge. It should be noted that th is correlation was close to significant for the ERT condition. For the ERT conditi on, pretests of conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation were significantly positively correlated with empathy. Nave beliefs in simple and certain knowledge were only signif icantly correlated with other measures in the NRT condition. Specifically these epistemological beliefs were significantly positively correlated with systematic processing and negatively correlated with heuristic processing. Al so for the NRT condition only, nave beliefs in simple and certain knowledge we re significantly correlated with lower scores on the delayed posttest of intrinsic motivation.

PAGE 61

61 Some notable differences in correlations of posttreatment measures by text condition were found as well. For the ERT condition, empathy wa s significantly positively correlated with conception of extrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest In addition to the significant positive correlation of empathy and positive affect in both conditions, empathy and positive affect were correlated with negative affect for the NRT condition. For the ERT condition, positive affect and heuristic processing were significantly correlated with conceptions of extrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest. In summary some patterns of correlations we re distinct by text condition. For the ERT condition, SAT verbal scores, empathy, positive affect, and heuristic processing were significantly and positively correl ated with posttest and delaye d posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation, though no nontes t measure was significantly co rrelated with any posttest or delayed posttest measure for the NRT condition. Also nave beliefs in simple and certain knowledge were only significantly correlated w ith other variables in the NRT condition. Model Fit The hypothesized m odel in Figure 1-1 was estim ated from the correlation matrix with LISREL 8.80. Because I had only one measure of each variable I subtracted the internal consistency estimates from 1.00 as the fixed error variance of the observed variables in order to estimate the relationships among late nt variables. The model was si gnificantly different from the saturated model at 2(44) = 221.71, p = 0.0, indicating an overall poor fit of the model to the data. Other indices of fit incl ude a comparative fit index (C FI) of .80, a non-normed fit index (NNFI) of .58, a root mean square residual (RMR ) of .09 and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .14. All of these indices are further ev idence of the poor fit of the hypothesized model to the data.

PAGE 62

62 Suggested Model Modifications An analysis of the residuals associated with the hypothesized m odel indicated several relationships that could be significantly im pr oved. The relationship between the indicators of heuristic and systematic processi ng had the largest fitted residual (-.59) and standardized residual (-9.08), with a modification index for the errors of these indicators of 67.97. Therefore, I allowed the errors of these indicators to correlate. Also the modificatio n index for the errors on observed scores on the pretests of intr insic and extrinsic motivation was 25.64 and subsequent analyses contained a modification index of 4.65 for the e rrors on observed scores on the posttests of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. These were the three sets of e rrors, all significant at the .05 level, I allowed to correlat e in the revised model. A number of relationships among the latent va riables deserve atten tion and revision. Paths with z -scores less than 1.96 are not statistic ally significant at the .05 level and subject to deletion, whereas paths not included with a m odification index > 3.84 are significant at the .05 level and were candidates for incl usion in the revised model. For example, the model depicted the exogenous variable for text type (narrative re futational text vs. expository refutational text) as having a direct effect on concep tions of motivation, but the path from text type to the posttest and delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation was not significant with a parameter of = .07, z = .79, and = -.09, z = -1.32, respectively. Finally, the model depicted text type with a direct effect on positive and negative affect, but the path from text type to positive affect was not significant at = .04, z = .56 so that path was deleted from the revised model. The model also included the effect of episte mological beliefs on conceptions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; however none of the pa ths from epistemological beliefs to change in conceptions of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation were significant, = .12, z = .98 and = .04, z = .34, respectively at posttest, and = -.10, z = -.99 and = -.02, z = -.34, respectively at delayed

PAGE 63

63 posttest. None of the paths from epistemological beliefs were in the revised model because the hypothesized parameters were not significant. The relationship from affect to processing was also different than hypothesized. The hypothesized model depicted direct effects for both negative and positive affect on heuristic and systematic processing; however the paths from positive affect to heuristic and systematic processing were not significant, = -.12, z = -1.59 and = .01, z = .09, respectively. The path from negative affect to heuris tic processing was not significant, = -.14, z = -1.73, but the path to systematic processing was significant, = .19, z = 2.00. However, this path was found nonsignificant in further analyses and was removed from the revised model. In summary, none of the paths from affect to processing were in cluded in the revised model. However, the modification index of 4.81 for the direct effect of positive affect on posttest of intrinsic motivation was significant so that path was included in the revised model. Also the direct effect of empathy to posttest of extrinsic motivati on had a significant modification index of 10.18 so that path was included in the revised model. In the analysis of the hypot hesized model, heuristic and systematic processing were differentially related to change in conceptions of intrinsic mo tivation and extrinsic motivation. Specifically, heuristic processing was not significantly related to either posttest or delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation, = -.08, z = -.98 and = -.07, z = -1.10, respectively. Systematic processing, in contrast, was not significantly rela ted to either delayed posttest of conceptions of intr insic and extrinsic motivation, = -.11, z = -1.41 and = -.09, z = 1.12, respectively. These nonsignifi cant paths were not included in the revised model. Only the path from SAT verbal to delayed pos ttest of extrinsic motiv ation was significant ( = -.15, z = -2.10), whereas the paths to posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation ( = .03,

PAGE 64

64 z = .30), extrinsic motivation ( = -.08, z = -.77) and delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation ( = .03, z = .41) were all nonsignificant and were not included in the revised model. However, the modification index from SAT verbal scores to positive affect, 6.49, was significant at the .05 level and was include d in the revised model. Finally the relationships among pretests, posttests, and delayed posttests of conceptions of intrinsic motivation were significant, as were those among conceptions of extrinsic motivation, with the exception of the path fr om pretest to delayed posttest, = .05, z = .17. There was one significant relationship between te sts of conceptions of intrinsi c and extrinsic motivation; the pretest of intrinsic motivation was significantly related to the delayed posttest of extrinsic motivation with a modification index of 5.80 and was in the revised model. The revised model (Figure 3-1) was significantly different from the saturated model, 2(58) = 75.05, p = .07, indicating an overall good fit of the model to the data. Other indices of fit include a comparative fit index (CFI) of .98, a non-normed fit i ndex (NNFI) of .97, a root mean square residual (RMR) of .07, and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .04. These indices indicated a good fit of the model to the data and allowed for interpretation of the total, direct, and indirect effects of variables in the revised model (Table 3-4). Research Questions Research Q uestion 1 was, Do epistemological be liefs or verbal ability influence change in preservice teachers conceptions of motivation immediately afte r reading narrative refutational text and 4 weeks later? As described above, ep istemological beliefs were hypothesized to be causally related to change in conceptions of motivation; howev er, none of these paths were significant and did not appear in the revised model and analysis. In regard to the relationship between verbal ability and change in conceptions of motivation, only the effect of verbal ability on conceptions of extrinsic motivation at delayed posttest was significant ( = -.13, z = -2.40).

PAGE 65

65 Research Question 2 was, Does reading a narrative refutational text (NRT) have a stronger effect than reading an expository refutational text (ERT) on conceptual change in preservice teachers conceptions of motivation immediately after the reading and 4 weeks later? The revised model included a direct effect of NRT on conceptions of intrinsic motivation at posttest ( = .49, z = 4.95) and delayed posttest ( = .30, z = 3.85), suggesting that reading an NRT had a stronger effect than ERT on preservice teachers conceptions of intrinsic motivation. In contrast, the direct effects of NRT on con ceptions of extrinsic mo tivation at posttest and delayed posttest were not significant; however, th e total effects were significant and were addressed by research question 7 regarding me diation of the effects of NRT on conceptual change. Research Question 3 was, Does reading a narrative refutational text ha ve a stronger effect than reading an expository refutational text on preservice teachers systematic and heuristic processing of information regarding conceptions of motivation? The revi sed model included the direct effects of NRT on both sy stematic and heuristic processi ng. Reading the NRT had a direct positive effect on heuristic processing ( = .44, z = 5.73) but, contrary to prediction, a direct negative effect on systematic processing ( = -.28, z = -3.38). Research Question 4 was, Does reading a narr ative refutational text elicit more positive emotion in preservice teachers than reading an ex pository refutational text ? A direct effect of NRT on positive emotion was not included in the revised model. However, results showed that the relationship was totally mediated by empathy. The total effect of NRT on positive affect was significant, ( = .12, z = 2.06), and was fully mediated throug h empathy, given that the inclusion of the paths from NRT to empathy ( = .18, z = 2.09) and empathy to positive affect ( = .68, z =

PAGE 66

66 9.21) reduced the direct effect of NRT on positive a ffect to a nonsignificant level. Thus, in the revised model empathy fully mediated the relationship between NRT and positive affect. Research Question 5 was, Does reading a narr ative refutational text elicit less negative emotion in preservice teachers than reading an ex pository refutational text ? The direct effect of NRT on negative affect was significant ( = .25, z = 2.99), suggesting that, contrary to my hypothesis, reading a NRT elicited greater negative emotion in pres ervice teachers than reading an ERT. However, empathy was not a significant mediator of the effect of NRT on negative affect, as it was for the relationship between the reading of NRT and positive emotion. Research Question 6 was, Does reading a narrative refutational text ha ve a stronger effect on the empathy that preservice teachers experien ce after reading it than reading an expository refutational text? As discussed in the preced ing description of th e mediation of NRT on positive affect by empathy, the hypothesized direct effect of NRT to empathy was significant in the revised model,( = .18, z = 2.09), suggesting that reading an NRT had a stronger effect on empathy in preservice teachers than reading an ERT. Research Question 7 was, Do empathy, pos itive affect, systematic, and heuristic processing mediate the relationship between text type (narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text) and conceptual change in preservice teachers conceptions of motivation immediately after the reading and 4 weeks la ter? Though the results provided evidence of mediation of the relationship between reading NRT vs. ERT and conceptions of motivation, the relationship differed by the type of motivation m easured. For the intrinsi c posttest, the direct effect of NRT was significant ( = .49, z = 4.95), and the indirect e ffect was significant, yet negative, ( = -.08, z = -2.84), suggesting a partial mediation of this relationship.

PAGE 67

67 An analysis of this indirect effect revealed two paths of media tion: (a) from NRT to heuristic processing to posttest of intrinsic motivation and (b) from NRT to empathy to positive affect to the intrinsic motivation posttest. For the first path, the direct effect of NRT on heuristic processing was estimated at .44, wher eas the direct effect of heur istic processing on the intrinsic motivation posttest was -.15. Multiplying these tw o parameters yielded an estimate of -.07 for the indirect effect of NRT on the posttest of intrinsic motivation, as mediated by heuristic processing. For the second path, the direct eff ect of NRT on empathy wa s estimated at .18, the direct effect of empathy on positive affect was .68, and the direct effect of positive affect on the intrinsic motivation posttest was -.14. Multiplying these three parameters yielded an estimate of the indirect effect of NRT of -.01 on the intrin sic motivation posttest, as mediated by empathy and positive affect. The same mediational relationships existed for reading NRT to the delayed posttests of intrinsic motivation; the only di fference was the additional dir ect effect of the intrinsic motivation posttest on the delayed posttest of intrinsic motivation. Including this parameter changed the estimated effect of the first mediatio nal path to -.03 and maintained the second at .01. A third path from NRT to the delayed intrinsic motivation posttest mediated by intrinsic motivation posttest was estimated at .23. Adding the estimates of these three mediational paths yielded a significant and positive indirect effect of reading NRT vs. ERT on delayed posttest of intrinsic motivation, ( = .19, z = 2.99). For the extrinsic motivation posttest, the direct effect of NRT was not significant, yet the indirect effect was significant, ( = .06, z = 2.49), suggesting total mediation. An analysis of these indirect effects revealed tw o paths of mediation: (a) from NRT to systematic processing to extrinsic motivation posttest and (b) from NRT to empathy to extrinsic motivation posttest. For

PAGE 68

68 the first path, the direct effect of NRT on systematic pro cessing was estimated at -.28, whereas the direct effect of systematic processi ng on posttest of extrinsic motivation was -.10. Multiplying these two parameters yielded an estima te of .03 for the indirect effect of NRT as mediated by systematic processing on the extrin sic motivation posttest. For the second path, the direct effect of NRT on empat hy was estimated at .18, and the di rect effect of empathy on the extrinsic motivation posttest was .20. Multiplying th ese two parameters yielded an estimate of .03 for the indirect effect of NR T on the intrinsic motivation pos ttest, as mediated by empathy. The same mediational relationships existed for reading NRT to the delayed posttests of extrinsic motivation; as with intrinsic motiva tion the only difference was the additional direct effect of the extrinsic motivation posttest on the delayed extrinsic motivat ion posttest. Including this parameter maintained the estimated eff ects of both mediational paths at .03. Adding the estimates of these two mediational paths yielded a significant and positiv e indirect effect of reading NRT vs. ERT on delayed po sttest of extrinsic motivation, ( = .07, z = 2.50).

PAGE 69

69Table 3-1. Means and standard deviations for preand posttreatment measures by treatment condition Pretreatment Measures Expository Refutational Text Narrative Refutational Text Measure M SD N M SD N t pa SAT-Verbal 547.98 80.51 72 555.11 83.52 75 -.53 .599 Pretest Intrinsic Motivation 8.32 1.36 93 7.80 1.98 97 2.10 .037 Pretest Extrinsic Motivation 4.33 2.09 93 4.05 2.23 97 .90 .370 Epistemological Beliefs 1.40 .58 93 1.53 .63 97 -1.52 .130 Posttreatment Measures Familiar 3.10 1.14 93 3.04 1.19 97 .33 .372 Challenged 2.02 1.18 93 2.19 1.18 97 -.96 .170 Distinction 4.19 .85 93 3.92 1.04 96 2.00 .024 Effort 3.46 1.10 93 3.60 1.04 96 -.91 .182 Useful 4.11 .88 93 4.23 .91 96 -.93 .176 Interesting 3.41 1.02 93 3.46 1.02 96 -.34 .369 Agreement 3.79 .92 92 3.86 .94 96 -.53 .300 Empathy 13.31 4.33 93 14.41 4.04 97 -1.81 .036 Positive Affect 15.97 8.40 93 18.13 8.83 97 -1.73 .043 Negative Affect 2.94 3.98 93 4.89 5.57 97 -2.77 .003 Systematic Processing .56 .33 93 .41 .31 97 3.23 .001 Heuristic Processing .16 .21 93 .36 .32 97 -5.07 .000 Posttest Intrinsic Motivation 8.91 1.46 93 9.06 1.24 97 -.75 .227 Posttest Extrinsic Motivation 6.34 2.79 93 6.61 2.58 97 -.65 .257 Delayed Posttest Intrinsic Mo tivation 8.88 1.48 86 9.14 1.23 81 -1.23 .110 Delayed Posttest Extrinsic Motivation 6.28 2.73 86 6.28 2.45 81 0.00 .500 Note: Higher scores on tests of intrinsic and extrinsic motivat ion represent more accurate conc eptions of motivation. Higher sc ores on epistemological beliefs represent more nav e beliefs in simple and certain knowledge. a p-values for posttreatment measures were for one-tailed test of di rectional hypotheses.

PAGE 70

70Table 3-2. Polychoric correlations for prea nd posttreatment measures for ERT condition ( N = 86) SAT PRI PRE EBS EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE SAT 1.00 PRI -.14 1.00 PRE .31** .10 1.00 EBS -.20 -.11 -.14 1.00 EMP -.09 .27* .25* -.03 1.00 AFP -.26* .19 .20 .02 .57****1.00 AFN -.03 -.10 -.11 -.09 -.05 .02 1.00 SPG -.04 .06 -.17 .06 -.04 -.02 .17 1.00 HPG .12 .04 .13 -.12 .03 -.01 .01 -.69****1.00 PSI -.02 .70**** .15 -.02 .05 .07 -.08 .02 -.03 1.00 PSE .27* .18 .60**** -.15 .35*** .34** .08 -.20 .24* .36*** 1.00 DPI .03 .67**** .20 -.12 .17 .10 .08 .00 -.02 .74**** .39*** 1.00 DPE .22* .23* .61****-.20 .38*** .28** .10 -.23* .24* .46**** .80**** .47** 1.00 Note: SAT = SAT verbal scores. PRI = pretes t of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PRE = pretest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. EBS = nave epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge. EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN = negative affect. SPG = systematic processing ; HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation ; PSE = posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motiv ation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; DPE = delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. = p .05. ** = p .01. *** = p .001. **** = p .0001.

PAGE 71

71Table 3-3. Polychoric correlations for prea nd posttreatment measures for NRT condition ( N = 81) SAT PRI PRE EBS EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE SAT 1.00 PRI .12 1.00 PRE .05 .49****1.00 EBS -.29** -.13 -.06 1.00 EMP .02 -.10 -.07 -.10 1.00 AFP -.11 .06 -.01 .00 .58****1.00 AFN -.17 -.09 -.04 .07 .32** .31** 1.00 SPG -.10 .01 -.08 .32** .10 .05 .14 1.00 HPG .11 -.03 .07 -.28* -.18 -.20 -.12 -.76****1.00 PSI .06 .68**** .32** -.09 -.07 -.08 -.03 -.04 -.03 1.00 PSE .17 .09 .57**** -.12 .07 .00 -.08 -.12 .05 .34** 1.00 DPI .12 .46**** .29** -.22* -.09 -.10 -.06 -.07 .00 .66**** .31** 1.00 DPE .14 .20 .58**** -.21 .04 .03 -.02 -.25* .06 .44**** .85**** .40****1.00 Note: SAT = SAT verbal scores. PRI = pretes t of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; PRE = pretest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. EBS = nave epistemological beliefs in simple and certain knowledge. EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN = negative affect. SPG = systematic processing ; HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation ; PSE = posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motiv ation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; DPE = delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. = p .05. ** = p .01. *** = p .001. **** = p .0001.

PAGE 72

72 Table 3-4. Total, direct, and indir ect effects in the revised model ( N = 167) Variable Effect EMP AFP AFN SPG HPG PSI PSE DPI DPE NRT Total .18* .12* .29* -.28* .44* .41* .06* .49* .07* Direct .18* -.25* -.28* .44* .49* -.30* -Indirect -.12* .04 ---.08* .06* .19* .07* SAT Total --.17* ---.02 -.01 -.13* Direct --.17* -------.13* Indirect -----.02 -.01 -EMP Total -.68* .21* ---.10* .20* -.04 .21* Direct ------.20* --Indirect ------.10* --.04 .21* AFP Total ------.14* --.07 -Direct ---------Indirect ------.14* --.07 -AFN Total ---------Direct ---------Indirect ---------SPG Total -------.10* --.10* Direct -------.10* --Indirect ---------.10* HPG Total ------.15* --.07* -Direct ------.15* ---Indirect --------.07* -Note: NRT = narrative refutationa l vs. expository refutational te xt. SAT = SAT verbal scores. EMP = empathy. AFP = positive affect; AFN = negative affect. SPG = systematic processing; HPG = heuristic processing. PSI = posttest of con ceptions of intrinsic motivation; PSE = posttest of conceptions of extrinsic mo tivation. DPI = delayed posttest of conceptions of intrinsic motivation; DPE = delayed posttest of conceptions of extrinsic motivation. = p .05.

PAGE 73

73 Figure 3-1. Revised exploratory model of change of conceptions of motivation.

PAGE 74

74 CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION The purpose of this dissertation study is to increase our understanding of conceptual change in preservice teachers by testing the m ode l of conceptual change, presented in Figure 1-1, which addresses a number of weaknesses in curren t research. These weaknesses include the need to identify more effective interventions to eff ect conceptual change, the failure to identify personal characteristics that influence conceptu al change, and the lack of specification of cognitive and affective processes involved in conceptual change. The model addresses these weaknesses by specifying that the intervention of instructional text (specifically, narrative refutational text vs. expository refutational text ), epistemological beliefs, and verbal ability directly affect change in conceptions of motivation, and that type of text also directly affects systematic and heuristic processi ng, which in turn directly aff ect change in conceptions of motivation. Furthermore the model specifies that th e text directly affects affect, which in turn affects processing and change in conceptions of motivation, and that the text directly affects empathy, which in turn affects affect, processing, and conceptual change. A preliminary analysis indicated a poor fit of the model to the data, and an analysis of the residuals indicated directions for improving the model fit. Results of the revised model shown in Figure 3-1 will be discussed in terms of seven research ques tions. In this section I summari ze those findings by analyzing the results for proposed influential personal char acteristics, interventions, and mediators of conceptual change. Finally, I identify weaknesses of the study, suggest areas for further research, and describe the studys impli cations for practice and policy.

PAGE 75

75 Personal Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change Epistemological Beliefs The study includes epistem ological beliefs as one potential influence on c onceptual change when reading narrative refutational text. In the or iginal model it was hypothesized that preservice teachers who hold the beliefs that knowledge is si mple and certain exhibit less conceptual change after the instructional intervention. However, no significant relationshi ps were found between epistemological beliefs and change in conceptions of either extrinsic or intrinsic motivation immediately at posttest or 4 weeks later at dela yed posttest. This finding was surprising in that previous studies showed those who have less soph isticated epistemological beliefs exhibited less conceptual change after reading expository refu tational text (Gregoire, 2002; Qian & Alvermann, 1995). Therefore there is a need to continue to examine this re lationship to determine whether this finding was due to chance or some importa nt difference in the treatment in my study compared to other studies. Verbal Ability I also inves tigated verbal abil ity as another potential influe nce on conceptual change when reading narrative refutational text. On the basis of Gregoires (2002) findi ng that verbal ability did not influence conceptual change I did not expect a si gnificant direct effect of verbal ability on conceptual change immediatel y after reading or 4 weeks later. However, in my study, higher verbal ability as measured by SAT or ACT scores has a direct negative effect on conceptions of extrinsic motivation 4 weeks afte r the instructional in tervention, with higher verbal ability resulting in less accurate conceptions of extrinsic motivation. Thus, although verbal ability does not predict students beliefs about the value of extrinsic motivation strate gies immediately after reading the refutational texts, 4 weeks after the intervention those with higher SAT scores are more likely to report that extrinsic motivation strategies are a good way to motivate than are

PAGE 76

76 students with lower SAT scores. This findi ng was unexpected, and the reason for such a relationship is unclear. Further re search is needed to determine whether this finding is a chance occurrence or represents a consistent result in need of explanation. Another unexpected finding in my study is that higher verbal ability as measured by SAT or ACT scores leads to less positive affect durin g the instructional interv ention. In other words, those with higher verbal ability en joy reading the text less than thos e with lower verbal abilities. One possible interpretation of this finding is that participants with hi gher ability were more capable of understanding the conflict between the two views of motivation, leading them to feel less positive while reading the te xt. However, in her study Gregoire (2002) did not hypothesize or report any relationship between ability and affect after reading expository or expository refutational text. To advance our understanding of the role of af fect in motivating conceptual change, further research on a potential relations hip between verbal ability and affect when reading refutational texts seems warranted. Interventions for Conceptual Change The prim ary purpose of this study is to invest igate whether reading a narrative refutational text has a stronger effect on con ceptual change in preservice teach ers conceptions of motivation than reading an expository refutational text. Th e results of the study ar e mixed, as reading NRT had a direct effect on conceptions of intrinsic motivation at posttest and delayed posttest, but no effects on conception of extrinsic mo tivation at either posttest or delayed posttest. It is interesting and potentially important to note that participan ts scores on the intrinsic motivation measure are quite high, with pretest averages of 7.80 for pa rticipants in the NRT condition and 8.32 for participants in the ERT conditi on on a scale of 0 to10 and posttes t averages of 9.06 for the NRT condition and 8.91 for the ERT condition. In contrast participants scores are much lower on the extrinsic motivation measure, with pretest averages of 4.05 for NRT and 4.33 for ERT and

PAGE 77

77 posttest averages of 6.61 in the NRT condition and 6.34 in the ERT condition. These results indicate that participants hold very positive view s of the scenarios in which intrinsic motivation strategies are used by the teacher but still hold positive attitudes toward some extrinsic motivation strategies even after reading refuta tional texts focusing on their potential negative effects on students motivation. Unfortunately it is impossible to directly compare the results of this study with other studies becaus e of differences in the measures of conceptual change. In this study the measure was divided into two subscales, one for extrinsic motivation and the other for intrinsic motivation and a true/false response option was used. In contrast, Salisbury-Glennon and Stevens (1999) reported resu lts for the combined intrinsic and extrinsic subscales and, although Kutza (2000) used the two subscales, she used a 5-point Likert type scale for the response options. It is evident th at Kutzas (2000) participants sc ores on the 5-point scale were slightly higher than participants scores in this study for the intrinsic items, with a mean of 3.83 and standard deviation of .60, th an for the extrinsic items with a mean of 3.30 and standard deviation of .69. Kutza (2000) reported moderate agreement among the participants that both intrinsic and extrinsic means are both good ways of motivating students (p. 52); however, in responding to the dichotomous response options used in this study participants showed a much higher initial acceptance of intrinsi c strategies than ex trinsic ones. Given that my study occurred more than 5 years after Kutzas (2000) study, it is possible that preservice teachers are learning more about contemporary research on motiva tion, a possibility supported by several thoughtlistings in which participants reported having learned these c oncepts or heard about them already. Of course if they had heard and accepted all these views on motivation, one would expect the pretest scores on the extrinsi c subscale to be higher as well.

PAGE 78

78 Potential Mediators of Conceptual Change In this study I initially pr oposed a causal m odel for con ceptual change (Figure 1-1) suggesting that the instructiona l intervention of narra tive refutational text would, via empathy, generate affect that would in turn generate cognitive processing resulting in conceptual change. The results of this study failed to support the causal link from aff ect to processing to conceptual change; however, results of the analysis of th e revised model does show that some of these mediating relationships exist for this sample, t hough the effects are not in the expected direction. I will discuss these specific findings and conclude this section by assessing the causal chain on the whole. I investigated whether reading a narrative refutational text has a stronger effect on preservice teachers systematic and heuristic proc essing of information regarding conceptions of motivation than reading an expos itory refutational text. I found th at reading NRT leads to more heuristic processing and less system atic processing than reading an ERT, but neither type of processing leads to conceptual change. This result is contrary to Gregoi res (2002) finding that neither refutational nor expository refutational text was related to systematic processing, but systematic processing in both conditions did pred ict conceptual change. In my study, heuristic processing leads to less change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and systematic processing leads to less change in concep tions of extrinsic motivation. Some researchers have looked to systematic processing as a potential mediator of the relationship between instructional interventions and conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gill, 2003). However, little evidence exists suppo rting this hypothesis (Gill et al., 2004). The results of this study also fail to support this contention, beca use systematic processing is unrelated to change in conceptions of intrinsi c motivation and inversely related to change of conceptions of extrinsic motivati on. I used the same meas ure of systematic processing as Gill et

PAGE 79

79 al. with different texts, conti nuing to raise doubts about systema tic processing as a significant mediator or about using thought listings with this coding r ubric (Appendix B) as a measure of systematic processing. An alternative to this thought-listing methodology is the use of a thinkaloud methodology, by which participants are in terrupted during the actual comprehension process and asked to report what they are thi nking at that moment (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007). These responses, generated during rather than after reading, can then be coded as indicators of cognitive proce ssing or affect. More thoughtful c onsideration of the methodologies to measure cognitive processing may help research ers isolate cognitive resources for conceptual change. A unique component of this study is the effort to identify heuristic processing as a potential mediator of conceptual change. I hypothesized that the narrative refutational text would generate heuristic processing about the narra tive elements (characters, setting, and plot) as well as nonmessage elements of the text such as tone, cr edibility, and effect on the audience. Though the NRT does lead to an increase in heuristic proces sing, heuristic processing, in turn, is inversely related to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation. Heuris tic processing did not emerge as a significant resource for con ceptual change in this study. In this study in addition to looking for separate direct effects of he uristic and systematic processing, I also investigated th eir combined effects. The suffic iency principle of the heuristicsystematic model maintains that systematic pr ocessing does not occur in isolation, but occurs only when heuristic processing is not sufficien t to reach the desired level of confidence. Therefore, when systematic processing is motiva ted, it is attenuating, addi ng to, or being biased by heuristic processing (Chen et al., 2000). The narrative refutational text used in this study was designed to elicit the additive effects of heuristic and systematic processing.

PAGE 80

80 If additive effects are operative, then the NRT would lead to more heuristic and systematic processing than the ERT; however, I found that the NRT leads to more heuristic and less systematic processing than the ERT, suggesting that the NRT did not sufficiently widen the gap between confidence and desired confidence to mo tivate more systematic processing than the ERT. If the NRT had led to more heuristic a nd systematic processing, then their effects on conceptual change could be examined to see if there were additive effects, or whether heuristic processing attenuated the effects or biased the effects of sy stematic processing; however, because the NRT did not yield more systematic pr ocessing than the ERT, these questions are not answerable in this study. However, future research that includes a text known to sufficiently widen the gap between confiden ce and desired confid ence and increase systematic processing may help researchers to ask and answer these questions in regard to conceptual change. I investigated the role of affect in conceptual change after reading a narrative refutational text in contrast to an expos itory refutational text. I hypothesi zed that the NRT elicits more positive affect and less negative affect than reading an expository refutational text. As hypothesized, the NRT generates more positive affect via empathy th an the ERT. Contrary to my hypothesis, the NRT also generates more negative affect, though this relationship is not mediated by empathy. Several theorists have speculated about the kind of affect that motivates conceptual change. For example, Piagets (1975) equilibrati on theory, the Posner et al. (1982) theory of conceptual change, and Festingers (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance all explain cognitive change in terms of the human need to reduce negative affect that occurs when two ideas conflict. In contrast, Bless (2000) has proposed that pos itive affect motivates conceptual change by helping readers overcome the threat of contrary information or by motivating a greater reliance

PAGE 81

81 on general knowledge structures (i.e., schemas, heuristics) that can actually free cognitive resources for the accommodative processing of inconsistent information (Bless, 2001). In support of this contention, Linnenbrink and Pint rich (2002) reported that positive affect was positively related and negative affect was negatively related to conceptual change after reading an expository refutational text. This study does not provide clear support for ei ther negative or positiv e affect serving as a resource for conceptual change, in that neither le d to conceptual change after reading an NRT. The only significant finding regardin g affect is that positive affect is negatively related to change in conception of intrinsic motivation, which doe s cast doubt on Blesss (2001) contention that positive affect can overcome the thre at of inconsistent information or free cognitive resources for accommodation. It is also of interest that the NRT leads to an increase in both positive and negative affect, suggesting that affect is comp lex and perhaps not best considered in this dichotomous fashion. An alternative approach w ould be to consider discrete emotions as opposed to generalized positive and negative affect (Izard, 2007). Some discrete emotions that have been proposed to affect conceptual change include anxiety, fear (Gill, 2003), frustration, annoyance (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002) or in terest (Andre & Windschitl, 2003; Pintrich, 1999). I investigated whether NRT has a stronger eff ect than ERT on the empathy that preservice teachers experience after reading. I found that reading the NRT does lead to more empathy than reading the ERT, but the resul ting effects on conceptual change are mixed. Empathy has been identified as an important resource for comprehe nsion and conceptual change. Chebat et al. (2003) found that empathy led to increased conc eptual change after reading a public service announcement in either an expository or dramatic format, quite similar to the contrast between

PAGE 82

82 the ERT and NRT used in this study. With a topic determined to have little self-relevance for the sample studied, empathy led to increased c onceptual change mediated by information processing, a causal chain similar to the one hypothesized in this study. In this study, the empathy the NRT generates does lead to conceptual change regarding motivation, but only for the extrinsic subscale. It should be noted empathy is the only endogenous variable with a direct effect on any aspect of conceptu al change in this study. Given that change on the intrinsic mo tivation may have been limited by a ceiling effect, the effect of empathy may not be measurable on that subscale. With these considerations, the possibility of empathy as a potential resource fo r conceptual change may be the most promising finding in this study for future research. In addition, it is noteworthy that the effects of empathy on c onceptual change are direct and not mediated by either positive or negative affect. Given that Bourg (1996) defined empathy as a cognitive and affective proce ss including (a) interpreting the em otional states of others and (b) having an affective understand ing or congruent affective respons e, and that empathys effects on conceptual change are not mediated by affect in this study, it may be that the cognitive aspects of empathy are most germane as a reso urce for conceptual change. Alternatively, given that empathy is related to an increase in both positive and negative affect, neither of which served as a resource for conceptual change, re searchers may need to identify more specific emotions rather than look to generic positive or negative affect as a resource for conceptual change. Finally, I want to discuss the results of this study in view of the proposed causal model for conceptual change. Specifically I hypothesized th at the instructional intervention of narrative refutational text, via empathy, would generate affect that in turn would motivate cognitive

PAGE 83

83 processing resulting in conceptual change (Figur e 1-1). Generally, the final model presented in Figure 3-1 failed to support the pr oposed causal chain, in that no measure of conceptual change was influenced in turn by empathy, affect, and cognitive processing. As described above, pieces of that chain exist for conceptual change for either conceptions of extrinsic or intrinsic motivation. For example, there are significant paths from NRT to heuristic processing to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation and from NRT to systematic processing to change in conceptions of extrinsic motivation. However bot h of the relationships from processing to conceptual change are negative; more processing is significantly rela ted to less conceptual change, casting doubt that either type of processing could be a resource for conceptual change. As it seems unlikely that conceptual change can occur without some type of cognitive processing, my results considered in light of similar results in Gregoire (2002) raise serious questions about the valid ity of the measure of thought-listi ngs used in these two studies. The other piece of the proposed causal chain th at found some support in this study pertains to the role of empathy. Specifically, the results revealed significant path s from NRT to empathy to change in conceptions of ex trinsic motivation and from NRT to empathy to positive affect to change in conceptions of intrinsic motivation. However the relationship of positive affect to change in conceptions of motivation is negative casting doubt that this chain could represent a significant resource for conceptual change. The path directly through empathy is the most promising as described in the discussion of em pathy, though it should be noted that the overall effect of NRT on change in concep tions of extrinsic motivation (.03) is small. In sum, the results of this study fail to support the proposed causal model, suggesting that if a chain from text to empathy to affect to processing can be a resource for conceptual change it will require different conceptions or measures of affect or processing.

PAGE 84

84 Weaknesses of the Study and Need for Further Research Several weaknesses in th is study may have resu lted in an inability to replicate findings from previous studies or find support for novel hypotheses, limiting its implications for policy and practice but providing in sight into areas in need of further research. Given that the results of the intervention did not c onfirm oft-replicated findings and that the manipulation checks did not show any of the predicted differences between th e texts (that is, that the narrative refutational text would be evaluated as more familiar, usef ul, interesting, clear, and persuasive, and less challenging and requiring less effort than the expository refutational text), the effectiveness of the intervention for this group of students is qu estionable. As I used only two texts, the study might have been strengthened by including a third te xt type of expository non-refutational text or by including more examples of e xpository refutational or narrativ e refutational text. Also with fewer than 1,000 words each, the intervention was br ief; perhaps adding a discussion of the text, as suggested by Guzzetti (2000), might have increased the effectiveness of the intervention, perhaps by increasing participants metacognitive awareness or their ability to engage in intentional learning (Vosniadou, 2007). Furthermore, augmented activation was confounded with each of the two experimental texts. That is, augm ented activation in the form of a brief statement alerting students that th ey might hold a belief about motivatio n that is contrary to research evidence was combined with each refutational text. This strate gy was used because augmented activation has been shown to be effective in fac ilitating conceptual change in preservice teachers (Gregoire, 2002; Guzzetti et al., 1993), and I beli eved that augmented activation would set a purpose for reading the narrative refutational text. Gregoire (2002) found differences between an expository text without augmente d activation and an expository re futational text with augmented activation, leading her to speculate that augmented activation and not the refutational text might have accounted for the effect of text in her study. Similarly, I found few differences between the

PAGE 85

85 two texts that both included augm ented activation, raising further questions as to the extent to which the results of these studies are due to the text or due to augmented activation. Weakness in the measure of conceptual change us ed in this study also should be addressed. Though the subscales used to assess conceptual ch ange were designed to measure beliefs about the use of motivation strategies in classroom c ontexts, they fail to measure anything more than beliefs. Changing beliefs is important, but the need remains for researchers of conceptual change to demonstrate that change in beliefs does in fact lead to change of pr actice in the classroom, a need underscored by the recent focus on bridging the divide between researchers who examine conceptual change that occurs in the indi vidual mind and those who examine change in participation in communities of practice (Mason, 2007). In regard to dual processing, I used a rubric (Appendix B) to code thought-listings as evidence of systematic, heuristic, or irrelevant processing. The rubr ic was modified from the one devised by Gregoire (2002) in which thought-listings were code d as either systematic or irrelevant. I followed Gregoires coding proced ure for systematic processing; however, thoughtlistings regarding narrative elements such as plot, character, or setting, and non-message based elements such as text style, length, difficulty, credibility, or audience reaction were coded as evidence of heuristic processing. As the coding progressed, one area of difficulty arose. The rubric for systematic processing included thought listings that were extensions, such as personal examples, if relevant to the text meaning (e.g., re lating the text to how she or he was taught) and other relevant specific examples. Therefore, thought-listings that connected concepts to the readers experiences, their personal narratives, were coded as systematic, whereas thoughtlistings that connected concepts to the characters experiences were coded as heuristic. Difficulty in distinguishing between systematic processing th at reflected personal examples related to text

PAGE 86

86 meaning and heuristic processing related to the narrative became a complication as the purpose of the study was to differentiate between systematic processing characterized by abstractions and principles and heuristic proces sing characterized by concrete ev ents and stories. The study was designed to explore the weaknesses of many teach er education programs that, as described by Doyle and Carter (1996), emphasize abstract ra tionality and miss the ma rk because teachers understandings have a narrative stru cture. Therefore this study has made apparent the need to further differentiate between these two types of processing in the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and in cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST; Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Conclusion The ultim ate goal of research in education is to improve e ducational practice. This study was designed to aid textbook authors and teacher e ducators to help preser vice teachers think and act in ways consistent with educational resear ch. If the results of th is study had revealed significant advantages of reading narrative refuta tional text compared to expository refutational text, it would have been the first such finding w ith teacher education students and would have required replication and extensi on before confident recommendati ons could be made. Given that no significant advantages were found for narrative refutational text, this study raises more questions than it answers. However, some va luable insights are evident for those who are interested in helping preservice teachers thi nk and act in ways consis tent with educational research. Patrick and Pintrich (2001) suggested that preservice teachers have conceptions about motivation that are not consistent with contem porary views, a point s upported by those who have researched conceptions of intrinsic and extrin sic motivation in preservice teachers (Kutza, 2000; Salisbury-Glennon & Stevens, 1999). Compared to these previous studies, the results of this

PAGE 87

87 study suggest that current preservice teachers exhi bit a greater accu racy in their conceptions of motivation, at least in regard to their acceptance of intrinsic mo tivation. Importantly, preservice teachers still maintain the conception that some use of extrinsic motivation is good for learning. Helping preservice teachers adopt conceptions of extrinsi c motivation consistent with educational research should continue to be a focus of instructors in teacher education programs. The results of the pretests and the content of th e thought listings suggest th at preservice teachers believe that, though intrinsic motivation may be a little better, thorough and long-lasting learning is motivated by both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and teachers should welcome any motivation for learning regardless of its source. It is not surprising that preservice teachers hold this view given the long and c ontentious debate about the meri ts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (see Ryan & Deci, 2000, for summary) However, consensus has been reached among motivation researchers that initial intrinsi c motivation for a learning task will likely be diminished when students expect to receive a tangible arbitrary reward (e.g., stickers, prizes) for completion of the task (Lepper & Henderlong, 2000) I hope future resear chers of conceptual change will find ways to help preservice teacher s think and act in ways consistent with this research as they enter the classroom. Finally, the role of affect in conceptual change is a key finding in this study that, though hypotheses were not entirely suppor ted, is relevant to theory a nd practice. Gre goire (2002) found that students who read an expository refutational text generated less favorable thought listings than those who read an expository text with refutation, though her measures of affect and belief change were unrelated. Still she maintain ed that her study dem onstrated cognitive disequilibrium is a negative affec tive state (p. 137) consistent with Feldmans (2000) assertion that teachers need to be discontent (p. 600), in order to experience conceptual change. Before

PAGE 88

88 unequivocally recommending this idea to teachers, researchers should take into account findings that conceptual change can be motivated by pos itive affect (Linnenbri nk & Pintrich, 2002) or that interventions designed to f acilitate conceptual change may lead to an increase in both positive and negative affect such as occurred in this study. It is my hope that research of the role of affect in conceptual change, recently desc ribed as the warming trend (Sinatra, 2005), will continue so that researchers can accurately desc ribe this role and provide clearer findings to guide appropriate practice.

PAGE 89

89 APPENDIX A NARRATIVE REFUTATIONAL TEXT (NRT) You are abo ut to read a passage that will mo st likely challenge the way you think about student motivation. To understand why this might be so, read the following sentence and decide whether or not you agree with it: Teachers who give tangible rewards, like sticker s or prizes, will increase their students motivation to learn. If you agreed with this statement, you are not alone. Many preservi ce teachers just like you agree with this statement. The problem is th at this statement reflects an underlying belief about student motivation that is opposed to what research has demonstrated about student motivation. In the selection you are about to read, the be lief represented by the statement above is called a reinforcement theory of motivation As you read the following text, see if you can clarify your own beliefs about st udent motivation. Be sure to pay attention to how your own beliefs might differ from the material presen ted in the following text. Also, notice what implications your beliefs have for instruction. Intrinsic vs. reinforcement theory of motivation Wendy Palmer is excited about beginning her first position as a fifth grade teacher, but she is concerned with her students motivati on. Wendy shared her thought s with Mary, who has taught fifth grade for seven years. Wendy explained to Mary, I ha ve rewards, like stickers and prizes, to motivate my students to learn. Im definitely no expert, Mary shrugged, but students also po ssess an internal or intrinsic motivation to learn. Students dont work only for external reinforcement Absolutely, replied Wendy, but she didnt th ink a theory could help her practically. Initially Wendys class proceeded smoothl y. Her students exhibited curiosity and eagerness for their studies. Most talking was rega rding the lessons, and the students appreciated the rewards Wendy provided. However, the situation deteriorated when students grew apathetic about the rewards. When one student didnt receive a sticker for completing his homework he said nonchalantly, Thats okay, I already ha ve five of those. In science class, Wendy offered the students little water-powered rockets as prizes for satisfactory achievement on their test about the plan ets. Initially the student s were interested in learning about the planets. However they quick ly became more concerned about getting the rocket. The distractions were mounting, so We ndy decided to seek th e advice of her friend, Mary. Many beginning teachers have similar expe riences, Mary replied, Remember intrinsic motivation? We cannot rely solely on external or extrinsic factors. Rath er, motivation must come from within, from students' own internal beliefs and emotions. But how can I facilitate my students intr insic motivation, isnt that just a theory? Wendy was frustrated and desper ately wanted practical help.

PAGE 90

90 Yes, its a theory but so is the reinfo rcement theory youve been using, Mary explained, Research has shown a lthough motivation may occu r as the result of reinforcers, its often short-lived. Students may grow tired of the reinforcers and they may cease to be motivating. Reinforcement may actually decrease an individual's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. Often, receiving the reinforcer become s the primary goal for th e student rather than learning the information. I dont need research to demonstr ate that, Wendy la ughed, My classroom demonstrates that. But wh at should I do instead? Well, Mary continued earnestly, an intrin sic theory of motiva tion does provide some practical advice. For example, conditions that dr aw upon student interest and foster choice and autonomy facilitate intrinsic mo tivation within students. This happens in classrooms where teachers encourage students to choose tasks based on their own interests, and take responsibility for their own learning. That will make all the di fference? Wendy asked hopefully. Well, I cant promise you that Mary gri nned, but I do know that intrinsic motivation facilitates conceptual learning. When information is learned at a conceptual level, its more likely to be retained, applied, or transferred. In contrast, when students engage in learning because they are reinforced or externally motiv ated, they are less likely to become actively involved in the task itself and do only as much as is necessary to receive the reward. Yes, my students thought more about the wate r-powered rocket than about the material they needed to learn, Wendy said sheepishly. Yes, research has also demonstrated that conditions supporting intrinsic motivation foster greater creativity. In cont rast, reinforcement has been shown to cause students to develop negative attitudes about th eir learning and has been shown to hinder creativity, Mary finished a little out of breath, Sor ry to go on, but I think its a messa ge that needs to be heard. Well, I need to hear it! Wendy smiled.

PAGE 91

91 APPENDIX B CODING RUBRIC FOR THOUGHT LISTINGS Systematic Processing (S) Heuristic Pr ocessing (H) Irrelevant Processing (X) Recall of the text Paraphrases of text meaning Restatements of the text meaning (phrases not single words) Recall of the text Summary of narrative structure (i.e., plot, setting, character) Restatement of the narrative structure Recall of the text Isolated fragments or single words Reactions to the text Counterarguments Qualifications (e.g. I agree because or X is good because or I agree with [restatement of text meaning] Replies to texts argument Elaborations (e.g. Motivation is an important part of learning or Good teachers help students be motivated) Extensions, such as personal examples, if relevant to the text meaning, e.g., relating the text to how s/he was taught Other relevant specific examples Pertinent questions Reaction to the text Reactions or judgments to narrative structure (e.g. I like how the teacher helped the other or I didnt like how the teacher changed her style). Broad, general, sweeping statements or clichs that do pertain to the text meaning or structure (e.g. I like learning from stories ) Thoughts about the audience reading the text (e.g., Teachers wont understand this) Comments about the text itself (i.e., its difficulty level, the usefulness of specific examples in the text, the quality of writing, the length of the text) Reaction to the text Reactions or judgments without reference to text meaning or structure (e.g. I like it or I agree with it) Broad, general, sweeping statements or clichs that do not pertain to the text meaning or structure (e.g. Teaching is a calling or Teachers make learning fun.) Irrelevant statements (e.g., Im hungry)

PAGE 92

92 Notes Just writing that something in the text mean ing is good or bad, or I agree or disagree, without restating or paraphrasing part of th e message argument (more than a single word or concept), e.g., I agree with intrinsic motivation should be coded as X. However, stating agreement or liking for so mething while restating or paraphrasing the text should be coded as S. Just writing that the narrativ e structure is good or bad, or I agree or disagree, without restating or paraphrasing part of the structure, e.g., I agr ee with how she acted should be coded as X. However, stating agreemen t or liking for something while restating or paraphrasing the text should be coded as S. Unclear pronouns, e.g. I agree with this idea or It is good should be considered to be referring to the main topic of both passages facilitating students intrinsic motivation. If in doubt about the meaning of a particular thought listing, you can always check back to the previous thought listing (if it has the same ID code) to help understand the context of the thought listing.

PAGE 93

93 LIST OF REFERENCES Alverm ann, D., Hynd, C., & Qian, G. (1995). Effects of interactive discussion and text type on learning counter-intuitive science concepts. Journal of Educational Research, 88, 146 154. Andre, T., & Windschitl, M. (2003). Interest, epis temological belief, and intentional conceptual change. In. G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional conceptual change (pp. 173). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Armbruster, B. (1984). The problem of inconsiderate text. In G. G. Duffy, L. R. Roehler, & J. Mason (Eds.), Comprehension instruction (pp. 207-217). New York: Longman. Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1987). The affectiv e dimension of learning: Faculty-student relationships that enhance intellectual development. College Student Journal, 21, 46-58. Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1992). Knowing and reasoning in college students: Gender-related patterns in students in tellectual development. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldbe rger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). Womens ways of knowing: The development of the self, voice, and mind. Basic Books: New York. Bless, H. (2000). The interplay of affect and co gnition: The mediating role of general knowledge structures. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 201-222). Paris: Cambri dge University Press. Bless, H. (2001). Mood and the use of general knowledge structures. In L. L. Martin & G. L. Clore (Eds.), Theories of mood and cognition: A user's handbook (pp. 9-26). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Bourg, T. (1996). The role of emotion, empathy, a nd text structure in children's and adults' narrative text comprehension. In R. J. Kreuz & M. S. MacNealy (Eds.), Empirical approaches to litera ture and aesthetics (pp. 241-260). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Bourg, T., Risden, K. C., Thompson, S., & Davis, E. C. (1993). The effects of an empathybuilding strategy on 6th graders causal inferencing in narrative text comprehension. Poetics, 22, 117-133. Bruner, J. (1985). Narrative and paradigmatic modes of thought. In E. Eisner (Ed.), Learning and teaching the ways of knowing ( 84th yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, pp. 97-115). Chicago: Un iversity of Chicago Press. Buehl, M. M., & Alexander, P. A. (2001). Beliefs about academic knowledge. Educational Psychology Review, 13 385-418. Calderhead, J. (1996). Teachers: Beliefs and knowledge In D. C. Berliner & R. C. Calfee (Eds.), Handbook of educational psychology (pp. 709). New York: Macmillan.

PAGE 94

94 Caravita, S., & Hallde n, O. (1994). Re-framing the problem of conceptual change. Learning and Instruction, 4 89-111. Carter, K. (1993). The place of story in th e study of teaching and teacher education. Educational Researcher, 22 (1), 5-18. Chaiken, S., Duckworth, K. L., & Darke, P. (2000). When parsimony fails. Psychological Inquiry, 10 (2), 118-123. Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: Effects of source credibility, argument ambi guity, and task importance on attitude judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66 (3), 460-473. Chebat, J. C., Vercollier, S. D., & Gelinas-Cheba t, C. (2003). Drama advertisements: Moderating effects of self-relevance on the relations among empathy, information processing, and attitudes. Psychological Reports, 92 991-1014. Chen, S., Duckworth, K., & Chaiken, S. (2000). Mo tivated heuristic and systematic processing. Psychological Inquiry, 10 (1), 44-49. Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. ( 1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. Review of Educational Research, 63, 1-49. Coulson, J. S. (1989). An investigation of mood commercials. In P. Cafferata & A. M. Tybout (Eds.), Cognitive and affective responses to advertising (pp. 21-30). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. DAgostino, R. B., Belanger, A., & DAgostino, R. B. Jr. (1990). A suggestion for using powerful and informative tests of normality. American Statistician, 44, 316-321. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1980). The empirical e xploration of intrinsic mo tivational processes. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experime ntal social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 39-80). New York: Academic Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational a pproach to self: Integrat ion in personality. In R. Dientsbier (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation (pp. 237-288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Dole, J. A., & Sinatra, G. M. (1998). Reconceptu alizing change in the cognitive construction of knowledge. Educational Psychologist, 33, 109-128.

PAGE 95

95 Doyle, W. (1997). Heard any really good stories lately? A critique of the critics of narrative in educational research, Teaching and Teacher Education, 13( 1), 93-99. Doyle, W., & Carter, K. (1996). Educational psychology and the education of teachers: A reaction. Educational Psychologist, 31(1), 51-62. Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T., & Sadovsky, A. (2006) Empathy-related responding in children. In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 517-549). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1999). Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-t heory. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp. 462-482). New York: Guilford Press. Feldman, A. (2000). Decision making in the practical domain: A model of practical conceptual change. Science Education, 84, 606-623. Feshbach, N. D., & Feshbach, S. (1987). Affective processes and academic achievement. Child Development, 58, 1335-1347. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective influences on social information processing. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 163-185). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Fry, E. (1977). Fry's readability graph: Clarif ications, validity, and ex tension to level 17. Journal of Reading, 21, 242-252. Gill, M. (2003). Is it a challenge or a threat ? A dual-process model of teachers cognitive and appraisal processes during conceptual change. Educational Psychological Review, 15, 147-179. Gill, M. G., Ashton, P. T., & Algina, J. (2004). Changing preservice teachers' epistemological beliefs about teaching and learning in mathematics: An intervention study. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29 (2), 164-185. Golden, J. M., & Guthrie, J. T. (1986). Conve rgence and divergence in reader response to literature. Reading Research Quarterly, 21 408-421. Gordon, C. J.,& Rennie, B. J. (1987). Restructuring content schemata: An intervention study. Reading Research and Instruction, 26 (3), 162-188.

PAGE 96

96 Gregoire, M. (2002). Effects of augmented activation, refu tational text, efficacy beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and systema tic processing on conceptual change. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville. Guzzetti, B. J. (2000). Learning counter-intuitive science concepts: What have we learned from over a decade of research? Reading and Writing Quarterly, 16 89-98. Guzzetti, B. J., Snyder, T. E., Glass, G. V., & Gamas, W. S. (1993). Promoting conceptual change in science: A comparative meta-analysis of instructional interventions from reading education and science education. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 117-155. Guzzetti, B. J., Williams, W. O., Skeels, S. A., & Wu, S. M. (1997). Influence of text structure on learning counterintuitive physics concepts. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 34(7), 701-719. Hiebert, J., Carpenter, T., Fennema, E., Fuson, K. Human, P., & Murray, H. (1996). Problem solving as a basis for reform in curriculum and instruction: The case of mathematics. Educational Researcher, 25 (4), 12-21. Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessi bility, applicability and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 133-168). New York: Guilford Press. Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The deve lopment of epistemologi cal theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67 88-140. Holt-Reynolds, D. (1992). Personal hi story-based beliefs as relevant prior knowledge in course work. American Educational Research Journal, 29, 325. Hynd, C. (2003). Conceptual change in response to persuasive messages. In G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional conceptual change (pp. 391-315). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural ki nds, emotion schemas, and a new paradigm. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2 (3), 260-280. Kardash, C. M., & Scholes, R. J. (1996). Effects of preexisting beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and need for cognition on interpre tation of controversial issues. Journal of Educational Psychology, 88, 260-271. Kendeou, P., & van den Broek, P. (2007). The effect s of prior knowledge and text structure on comprehension processes during reading of scientific texts. Memory & Cognition 35 (7), 1567-1577

PAGE 97

97 King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective j udgement: Understanding and promoting intellectual growth and criti cal thinking in adolescents and adults. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Kitchener, R. F. (1992). Piagets genetic epistemology: Epistemol ogical implications for science education. In R. A. Duschl & R. J. Hamilton (Eds.), Philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and educational theory and practice (pp. 116-146). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Kutza, D. M. (2000). The role of prior beliefs, re futational text, intrinsic and extrinsic goals, and extrinsic reward structure in the conceptu al change of preservice teachers (Doctoral dissertation, University of Florida, 2000). Dissertation Abstracts International, 61, 3052. Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics 33, 159-174. Leean, C. (1979). Foundations of education: Making the known unknown. Journal of Teacher Education, 30 (3), 5-6. Lepper, M. R., & Henderlong, J. (2000). Turning pla y into work and work into play: 25 years of research on intrinsic versus extr insic motivation. In C. Sansone & J. M. Harackiewicz (Eds.), Intrinsic and extrinsic motivati on: The search for optimal motivation and performance (pp. 257-307). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Lim n, M. (2001). On the cognitive conflict as an in structional strategy for conceptual change: A critical appraisal. Learning and Instruction, 11 (4-5), 357-380. Lim n, M., & Mason, L. (2002). (Eds.). Reconsidering conceptual chan ge: Issues in theory and practice. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Linderholm, T., & van den Broek, P. (2002). The effects of reading purpose and working memory capacity on the processing of expository text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 94(4), 778-784. Linderholm, T., Virtue, S., Tzeng, Y., & van den Broek, P. (2004). Fl uctuations in the availability of information during reading: Capturing cognitive processes using the landscape model. Discourse Processes, 37 (2), 165-186. Linnenbrink, E. A., & Pintrich, P. R. (2002). The role of motivational beliefs in conceptual change. In M. Limon & L. Mason (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice (pp. 115-135). Dordrecht, Th e Netherlands: Kluwer. Lipson, M. (1986, December). Making sense of prior knowledge research: Discussants remarks on symposium titled Complex issues in prior knowledge research. Paper presented at the meeting of the National R eading Conference, Austin, TX.

PAGE 98

98 Lortie, D., (1975). Schoolteacher: A sociological study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mackie, D. M., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Cognitive defi cits and the mediation of positive affect in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 27. Maheswaran, D., Mackie, D. M., & Chaiken, S. (1992). Brand name as a heuristic cue: The effects of task importance and expectan cy confirmation on consumer judgments. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1 (4), 317-336. Maria, K., & Johnson, J. M. (1990). Correcting misconceptions: Effect of type of text. National Reading Conference Yearbook, 39 329-337. Marshall, N. (1990, November). Can text overcome scientific misconceptions? An experimental study. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Reading Conference, Miami Beach, FL. Mason, L. (2007). Introduction: Bridging the cognitiv e and sociocultural approaches in research on conceptual change: Is it feasible? Educational Psychologist, 42 (1), 1-7. Mayer, R. E. (2002). Understanding conceptual change: A commentary. In M. Limon & L. Mason (Eds.), Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice (pp. 101111). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Pajares, F., & Bengston, J. K. (1995). The ps ychologizing of teacher education: Formalist thinking and preservice teachers' beliefs. Peabody Journal of Education, 70 83 98. Pajares, F., & Graham, L. (1998). Formalist thinking and language arts instru ction: Teachers' and students' beliefs about truth and caring in the teaching conversation. Teaching and Teacher Education, 14 855. Patrick, H., & Pintrich, P. R. (2001). Conceptual change in teachers in tuitive conceptions of learning, motivation, and instruction: The ro le of motivational and epistemological beliefs. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teac hing the intuitive mind (pp. 117-143). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Perry, W. G., Jr. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical deve lopment in the college years: A scheme. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Peterson, P. L., Fennema, E., Carpenter, T., & Loef, M. (1989). Teachers pedagogical content beliefs in mathematics. Cognition and Instruction, 6, 1-40. Phillips, D. C. (1994). Telling it straigh t: Issues in assessi ng narrative research. Educational Psychologist, 29 (1), 13-21.

PAGE 99

99 Phillips, D. C. (1997). Telli ng the truth about stories. Teaching and Teacher Education 13 (1), 101-109. Phillips, L. M. (1988). Young readers infere nce strategies in r eading comprehension. Cognition and Instruction, 5, 193-222. Piaget, J. (1975). The development of thought: Equilib ration of cognitive structures New York: Viking Press. Pintrich, P. R. (1999). Motivational beliefs as resources for and constraints on conceptual change. In W. Schmotz, S. Vosniadou, & M. Carretero (Eds.), New perspectives on conceptual change (pp. 33-50). New York: Pergamon. Pintrich, P. R., Marx, R. W., & Boyle, R. A. (1993). Beyond cold conceptual change: The role of motivational beliefs and classroom contextual factors in the process of conceptual change. Review of Educational Research, 63 167-199. Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66, 211227. Putnam, R. T., & Borko, H. (1997). Teacher learning: Implications of new views of cognition. In B. J. Biddle, T. L. Good, & I. F. Goodson (Eds.), The international handbook of teachers and teaching (Vol. 2, pp. 1223). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Qian, G., & Alvermann, D. (1995). Role of episte mological beliefs and learned helplessness in secondary students learning science concepts from text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 87,282-292. Raygor, A. L. (1977). The Raygor readability estim ate: A quick and easy way to determine difficulty. In P. D. Pearson (Ed.), Reading: Theory, research, and practice (TwentySixth Yearbook of the Na tional Reading Conference, pp. 259-263). Clemson, SC: National Reading Conference. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). When rewa rds compete with nature : The undermining of intrinsic motivation and self-regulation. In C. Sansone & J. M. Harackiewicz (Eds.), Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: The sear ch for optimal motivation and performance (pp. 13-54). San Diego: Elsevier. Salisbury-Glennon, J. D., & Stevens, R. J. (1999) Addressing preservice te achers' conceptions of motivation. Teaching and Teacher Education, 15 741-752. Schlinger, M. J. (1979). A profile of responses to commercials. Journal of Advertising Research, 19(2), 37-46.

PAGE 100

100 Scholes, R. (1981). Language, narrative, and anti-narrative. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), On narrative (pp. 200-208). Chicago: Univer sity of Chicago Press. Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498-504. Schommer, M. (1993). Epistemological deve lopment and academic performance among secondary students. Journal of Educational Psychology, 85, 406-411. Schommer, M., & Dunnel, P. A. (1992, April). Epistemological beliefs among gifted and non-gifted students. Paper presented at the meetin g of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA. Schommer, M., Rhodes, N., & Crouse, A. (1992). Ep istemological beliefs and mathematical text comprehension: Believing it is simple does not make it so. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 435-443. Schraw, G., Bendixen, L. D., & Dunkle, M. E. (2002). Development and validation of the Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI). In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of be liefs about knowle dge and knowing (pp. 261275). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Sinatra, G. M. (2005). The warmi ng trend in conceptual change research: The legacy of Paul R. Pintrich. Educational Psychologist, 40 (2), 107. Sinatra, G. M., & Pintrich, P. R. (2003) (Eds.). Intentional conceptual change. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Strauss, S. (2001). Folk-psychology, folk peda gogy, and their relations to subject-matter knowledge. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the intuitive mind (pp. 217-242). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Torff, B. (1999). Tacit knowledge in teaching: Folk pedagogy and teacher education. In R. Sternberg & J. Horvath (Eds.), Tacit knowledge in professional practice (pp. 195-213). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Torff, B., & Sternberg, R. J. (2001). Intuitive co nceptions among learners and teachers. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teachi ng the intuitive mind. (pp. 3-26). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Trabasso, T., Secco, T., & van den Broek, P. (1984) Causal cohesion and stor y coherence. In H. Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Learning and comprehension of text (pp. 83111). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

PAGE 101

101 Valencia, S. W., & Stallman, A. C. (1988, December). Multiple measures of prior knowledge: Comparative predictive validity. Paper presente d at the meeting of the National Reading Conference, Tucson, AZ. van den Broek, P., Young, M., Tze ng, Y., & Linderholm, T. (1999). The landscape model of reading: Inferences and the on-line construc tion of memory representation. In H. van Oostendorp & S. R. Goldman (Eds.), The construction of mental representations during reading (pp. 71-98). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Vosniadou, S. (1999). Conceptual change research: State of the art and futu re directions.In W. Schnotz, S. Vosniadou, & M. Carretero (Eds.), New perspectives on conceptual change (pp. 3-13). Kidlington, Oxfor d, UK: Elsevier Science. Vosniadou, S. (2007). The cognitive-situative divide and the problem of conceptual change. Educational Psychologist, 42 (1), 55-66. Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). De velopment and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. Wideen, M., Mayer-Smith, J., & Moon, B. (1998). A cr itical analysis of the research on learning to teach: Making the case for an ecological perspective on inquiry. Review of Educational Research, 68, 130-178. Windschitl, M., & Andre, T. (1998). Using computer simulations to enhance conceptual change: The roles of constructivist instruction and student epistemological beliefs. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 145-160. Woolfolk Hoy, A. (1996). Teaching educat ional psychology: Texts in context. Educational Psychologist, 31 (1), 35. Woolfolk Hoy, A., & Murphy, K. (2001). Teaching educational psychology to the implicit mind. In B. Torff & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Understanding and teaching the intuitive mind (pp. 145-185). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Zahn-Waxler, C., Robinson, J. L., & Emde, R. N. (1992) The development of empathy in twins. Developmental Psychology, 28 (6), 1038-1047.

PAGE 102

102 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Clay Austin was born and raised in F ra nkfort, Kentucky, the home of horse racing, bourbon making, and tobacco farming. He was the only child of a single parent, an elementary teacher and librarian; when school was not in session he was still of ten in school and around teachers, growing accustomed to their laughter and complaints. One day, he went downtown with the other fifth graders to hear a distinguished ma n tell them to read great books and take part in the great conversation. In that crowded coliseum Mortimer Adler seemed to him like a rock star of reading. Upon graduation, Clay commenced his Gre at Tour of Southern Colleges and Universities an eight-year course of study at Florida State Univer sity, Eastern Kentucky University, Belmont College, and fi nally University of North Florida, where he graduated with a degree to teach social studies in grades 6-12, and still maintains the world record of most credit hours earned toward a bachelors degree at 192. He then took a position teaching a combined class of eleven thirdand fourth-grade student s at St. Johns Academy, a one-year old classical Christian school. Mortimer Adler no doubt smiled fr om heaven, as Clay spent the next 10 years teaching classics, history, religion, logic and rhetoric to students from grades 3 through 12, spending 8 of those years also serving as assistan t principal, an experience that deterred him, thankfully, from pursuing graduate studies in educational leadership. Instead, he took a masters degree in edu cation in the Departme nt of Curriculum and Instruction of the University of North Florid a, where the graduate course in educational psychology allowed Clay to wonder how ph ilosophy, psychology, and education might be related. Now, 5 years, 120 graduate credit s, and a Ph.D. later, he still wonders.


xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101202_AAAACH INGEST_TIME 2010-12-02T23:51:22Z PACKAGE UFE0022429_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 54504 DFID F20101202_AABNPT ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH austin_c_Page_033.pro GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
1e60b07175472e58c74549a59b9b8dfd
SHA-1
c6281b4b6da41225fbd2527f34884b751d67e882
53883 F20101202_AABNQI austin_c_Page_052.pro
47165dcf68ed5fb049718a9dfa470c0f
0347fbcbad8acfbe834cb3f9cd98df662847281c
53061 F20101202_AABNPU austin_c_Page_035.pro
d8c92e3434bf88efb5805c7f90843452
964fd59dd972ef2c0eb87a2aa8eae2beca87aba6
55628 F20101202_AABNQJ austin_c_Page_053.pro
9c256b357ec4b99a2d70a123c2858ec9
4f767519d756aa27081f11335dd742d85fcdbb1f
54542 F20101202_AABNPV austin_c_Page_036.pro
91b05c4bff88f0ccbded2fc85c1d5f1e
3dba68aae50535e2588b79f00fffe8bbbef8e78b
44820 F20101202_AABNQK austin_c_Page_054.pro
9ad295a858965a660aa20919664bb075
c9dc3a3270b638bbaba9efcdb167f237e79489c7
52958 F20101202_AABNPW austin_c_Page_037.pro
d6658f48918804bbd9cd6c82420c5fd1
747d9d5dde860cab0ae73c1b5507aa651e5694f6
57702 F20101202_AABNPX austin_c_Page_038.pro
2b283ff76c6aeef97befb968d5d92216
5eac5ad65f322ea302015a36b55cbb98f5a973b2
39018 F20101202_AABNRA austin_c_Page_071.pro
2afc85e420e89282141f9c35c2951e2e
985bae802759d06408f7aafd7b669a18583d4341
49468 F20101202_AABNQL austin_c_Page_055.pro
445f785ec2416ff3c5e196e985e40f88
9f491a306b502258ff66267fc67393d8adca9218
57622 F20101202_AABNPY austin_c_Page_039.pro
c44d1efc394abb84918d4c195eb77a15
73fd532541391fe0bd2e6e1ff786015e04d42ff1
47332 F20101202_AABNRB austin_c_Page_074.pro
6647834fc9bccdf70633a04ec28a171d
0b78a09bb3b86c24005cee6fdb2ac3023870d164
3733 F20101202_AABNQM austin_c_Page_056.pro
7fd9ab3237d66c34929522ff7c4495e7
ff0ebf5c66168462bbfaba8621b25d3f62f655d5
54827 F20101202_AABNPZ austin_c_Page_040.pro
13f9eb104607cb34f5d945b805f31d7d
562e09d11c8c5bea8f30f7943287e510373f0642
54444 F20101202_AABNRC austin_c_Page_075.pro
64442164e2face8754fd2f9a5171917a
cf1e3c6a9912f5bb973607d8494c03f977ec81e2
24762 F20101202_AABNQN austin_c_Page_057.pro
0cdd2e13a5cb1fde31e4128f85793e7f
ad103ac966bd4656fc6f3256fd45c4b1c0006b57
54910 F20101202_AABNRD austin_c_Page_077.pro
aac8c5eeb9869d56d6868d7e7234626b
bb5988b03a35f76665cf5c8f81ddbebed20eebd0
52363 F20101202_AABNQO austin_c_Page_058.pro
ebaefdb96982ae51fb4cccbe3511c157
0ecded04262d0755f4fa80ec5a208b0eabf08e40
56148 F20101202_AABNRE austin_c_Page_078.pro
6acc62ba0cfa6fd522cbfa76d2b0ab18
11cf237cdea17accb8c32d0175e0891aa65778ff
52783 F20101202_AABNQP austin_c_Page_059.pro
b7d054bce1047f3ab57ccfdcec71c0b7
dace2c68ad470995baf0b524edcc07c9d8ad6cec
53441 F20101202_AABNRF austin_c_Page_081.pro
01eef2b826090ee52f5d4d1c9cfb29a5
c285e3487c40bb83cf7e8fcec307f29145aaae25
53368 F20101202_AABNQQ austin_c_Page_060.pro
41b306be2e6fc55a5ac894ece9cfc504
762eb4303e17de44749b657046f031068e424bf0
52599 F20101202_AABNRG austin_c_Page_082.pro
3fbb6610503764404eb8f0f1701bf651
74dc520635b88ac9599de0572ad559d6380d800c
51421 F20101202_AABNQR austin_c_Page_061.pro
fd55b72d11930e1d7010a3ab9344f735
8ea6d39a76abc71fd267a9dcbcb244f5e7e0d004
56318 F20101202_AABNRH austin_c_Page_083.pro
3f27e23879915be23d8ca8776888b50d
caa7f825933db90526cb1d4091b7804e3f25cfcd
58807 F20101202_AABNQS austin_c_Page_062.pro
5cd1c9fea9f4bec4351b2cb27ac79cba
a12a872497870689cd352c04fc9ae40493e75674
60494 F20101202_AABNRI austin_c_Page_084.pro
da501fc5fda84e1ba0f89760842f9225
401ce87fa1b64b66ed619fef7d2e7e65d5257a82
54994 F20101202_AABNQT austin_c_Page_063.pro
28e1fd3ae414bb59d8d55af15c7c5f18
d8f6fec27d816916cb3585bbe4b6afa0014ac418
56797 F20101202_AABNRJ austin_c_Page_085.pro
11316ca7c17551bba8a7c1f05662d964
8f3cc4e7d05ceb51cd537f857962285337e70600
57264 F20101202_AABNQU austin_c_Page_064.pro
68114ebc8db967bebddd74df52c68ce6
f12f586be88cb01291b77723206953e304e079e9
53285 F20101202_AABNRK austin_c_Page_086.pro
51158be7249d6f0bc9efb846a782b147
662521598f52c13aac325e6b4dcb1b3b5cbc223b
51862 F20101202_AABNQV austin_c_Page_065.pro
5c8d4afb1f6bd32e4d61e3482feed5c1
5fd4eb53e5c604a28edf4a9bdecea3db6c94acec
56749 F20101202_AABNRL austin_c_Page_087.pro
2771d59e3368d657b7d8e6fd81b287be
60f01b6a2e4271d00dbb835777296e1c66b20133
52850 F20101202_AABNQW austin_c_Page_066.pro
2ce0f7c2a5168f7a26350737dc8ac416
03c2588e5954b84781f2c60f13cf250c01c624c2
350 F20101202_AABNSA austin_c_Page_008.txt
c6863fd3c505b8c9c1e81fe1e1d65b00
fa518ccbaa6c835c15c7878fa1edb0cae1a1c97e
32187 F20101202_AABNQX austin_c_Page_068.pro
e0b073dbe3079c319aae229367b92eae
27ceaea04f9df7f78d82720727502c9c41246e27
2110 F20101202_AABNSB austin_c_Page_009.txt
9fe0ee2fcc5414e5bcb4946e7b5e2152
aca391b06c11494d942eedd5b82fcd7257deab87
15976 F20101202_AABNRM austin_c_Page_088.pro
036dac8456957c6a16d1d0236529fd7d
ea6a343243d189c956e5413060564c76f1bc7d93
59211 F20101202_AABNQY austin_c_Page_069.pro
1629f3e7cc4f411761666da8c5508c5b
f29ca1f0b6678fff9762322f157a0f7977936abf
1005 F20101202_AABNSC austin_c_Page_010.txt
791f9d4d6d16f399189e517e44a05649
8f3f992e65d57514fab7db6c75a62d3cf0955f07
77430 F20101202_AABNRN austin_c_Page_089.pro
0ab9e5e4b07fc47e17a5ebc426e1deb2
11163a26fc8a13d5ad14819b59efc827c51c8f37
38770 F20101202_AABNQZ austin_c_Page_070.pro
7f07d9ebf1ed1634a837035628eb6347
99383a3b8cd21019fc1e0262f6fbaf7d28aebd7b
2176 F20101202_AABNSD austin_c_Page_011.txt
4a1fa210a96dc46271ee6cbfbdf762d4
d0e78eb435070567b605fe54efb46e15e7b4afa2
54274 F20101202_AABNRO austin_c_Page_090.pro
7b570be4fa07da8da062d838ecace40d
a1d7d368400ff1a2c02338c2ac1a906d4a4ff3e2
1981 F20101202_AABNSE austin_c_Page_012.txt
0319d423e51ed1ed810c09da0d36b592
523cdc3d4a6e371a9dd81a05f5f91380731a89b9
28918 F20101202_AABNRP austin_c_Page_092.pro
b608a4130eef12a5dd29314e1a910eb4
607c34bd8f7aca5de2e424f786ddb941817aa647
2154 F20101202_AABNSF austin_c_Page_013.txt
f2630714db2e7cb4c140b92edf827c08
06dde4e74adfd49d34f3b01198fac9f41b874d4b
67497 F20101202_AABNRQ austin_c_Page_093.pro
2d4defee29c078ca7ff502a72fb689d3
b882ce5a949fa0ffe1c77eb5e97529bc2782947d
2202 F20101202_AABNSG austin_c_Page_014.txt
6653bb6d9897e0090ba253713eac01f3
1cc11f95d3de049a481d6107f22132af85649874
59896 F20101202_AABNRR austin_c_Page_094.pro
641bd38a84666dfca9dae201f529d7ad
aab82d2492c3f1982d9646c627dd9d273fa85786
2044 F20101202_AABNSH austin_c_Page_015.txt
760ac3a7b34b0831877c1c2dd66d8403
2dc74ce965561730f55391958f0a655a8baee4e4
58792 F20101202_AABNRS austin_c_Page_095.pro
ee48b4e0fe6a376793f865056cfc27e0
d418d7f0ae86206f09d72b595f14d731ed1ad94f
2152 F20101202_AABNSI austin_c_Page_016.txt
2eb5c09d2d6bbdf44020f673cf143e95
fff77b01458c88c8d75be0c832194c17e5f23445
60953 F20101202_AABNRT austin_c_Page_098.pro
8c0b5eaa00d058cc4f0bfbc02d88a8ee
6a1fffd8660eb53099d0700346da84b2e49e7fc7
2170 F20101202_AABNSJ austin_c_Page_017.txt
843c5d1e908c2fb463a110a4ee7969e9
107b666c4e5bac8cd0bfff893e9800fd479451eb
60292 F20101202_AABNRU austin_c_Page_099.pro
2e262553e7d1954290c013dd4b3a5f5a
f427dd15a0adbb6f6a1d63f8bf3565c202bb6250
2142 F20101202_AABNSK austin_c_Page_018.txt
2018d5c7d9e49835641235f495cac2d4
287a44f0e177844ce54008cc2e8ae117bf847b0e
52068 F20101202_AABNRV austin_c_Page_101.pro
5f49f50d549d1ce44cfab405aaed967f
c41d0f8f83407c1b8b4d20e7ffd68f8bb1851e68
2162 F20101202_AABNSL austin_c_Page_019.txt
d2458733f2e76aefcc51a04ad07702c6
aa041033f93de036aca8a6451d56a5b0c01d4e3b
544 F20101202_AABNRW austin_c_Page_001.txt
a648c8334dce320cd6b0ef91545608f6
1d45d91588602bcbf4871c9c072c66bc54ade925
2265 F20101202_AABNSM austin_c_Page_020.txt
340eadf9ac93592316fa8a4d536f6c2d
a878015b02bef753c4d6d95468634a56cf2b489d
199 F20101202_AABNRX austin_c_Page_003.txt
dfb5ccb9989b6a05e032b27570b3bf86
dc3ba4b60af9d31eb5505b54249ad3862cec5603
2148 F20101202_AABNTA austin_c_Page_048.txt
af7d82d67ac6d87557450a9a0c6584e2
91eee619e98749c73a77208eab63c5d19c3e6647
4446 F20101202_AABNRY austin_c_Page_005.txt
fe882b89d79aba4dd90bd36da42b8757
b478dda8d46908fd3bd0bf487bd871d54545bbc7
2423 F20101202_AABNTB austin_c_Page_049.txt
5247ecdac71211513adadbbe6fed7604
2cdb2f3984456914862296ce88ae7ab5cde21a07
F20101202_AABNSN austin_c_Page_026.txt
2ab56ef5e92768704229719457757e4a
42a3b666d48f78ff3b3e50b6765cfad4d22527d8
2518 F20101202_AABNRZ austin_c_Page_006.txt
557640c40908f9da20136665b375ca83
99c047a6526710c818ee2c6df99821d8b7f17582
2146 F20101202_AABNTC austin_c_Page_050.txt
8b81ec54bd81097ed1b6b0ba7d5bb133
7e79ee0b2b46805f85ecd1d86c590643edc90854
2111 F20101202_AABNSO austin_c_Page_029.txt
f9de3dc629fa31badf9668e878eb2b02
dc7f655b994a8001f5cd8aa91bc15ac82cbbe064
1814 F20101202_AABNTD austin_c_Page_051.txt
42cb9924b654b79299cfdf7079d8dabf
46fea807f6b3597b5d28433183e7a6701a5122cf
2137 F20101202_AABNSP austin_c_Page_030.txt
f51ba8c3cbd0cf3ff445a14b95612783
79256b280e7e5ba491acc46400b56a4902a41d44
152 F20101202_AABNTE austin_c_Page_056.txt
ff19eca726450b9a465392617e70cece
b9480904854635a10dc2cad83ca70f7a30ffc07f
2172 F20101202_AABNSQ austin_c_Page_031.txt
1b053ba7a83e814e01919c4bf49911ac
3863420a4a7e9c442ec61f708b5716cfd01e5b76
1400 F20101202_AABNTF austin_c_Page_057.txt
03ae7917a1c57b0cebc7f17d1cd07998
647d5e3e910df3e7c39bb3cba6fe68ceec7724ea
F20101202_AABNSR austin_c_Page_034.txt
876c7d740e43be3fab5e2b89dfde49eb
6031f29122bbfe5ab002c1372d96c2de8617cf1a
2145 F20101202_AABNTG austin_c_Page_059.txt
7590db1f71126687ea006a8560888034
88fabd972efbe56275270744d2d0a43c666b64f5
2091 F20101202_AABNSS austin_c_Page_035.txt
c187752ddd77a8b6733db0ff23c80eaa
9eb5d363406d596c630c12e755bf523b89c49ce3
2104 F20101202_AABNTH austin_c_Page_060.txt
50e52590000a6c0a229e7c58956c52b4
c68e52dedf5b8dcf3e390c487d57e1297fb0181e
2138 F20101202_AABNST austin_c_Page_037.txt
a0ac8458fd9bd34cf8e1e41203834680
04e0f2f79abe56fa71df41086f67a1f1ad2d7703
2337 F20101202_AABNTI austin_c_Page_062.txt
a36856472647267cb0328ba10758e445
161be82d0f49c03bec7c0f326ff4cf2cf926f439
2252 F20101202_AABNSU austin_c_Page_038.txt
c171a4dc3ab5f2074d0ed3433d9c8567
ea4409f8642173fdbeec02844926d63ced901443
2164 F20101202_AABNTJ austin_c_Page_063.txt
bed94dabb171acd51630183e6db1527a
b3852d865ee48370d7b9b55a3627ae161c4e297f
2300 F20101202_AABNSV austin_c_Page_039.txt
4dfcdd392c9289c9ad7b425db1c47a1c
166f9cdc67deb22324b28b60b940a1a73779133d
2283 F20101202_AABNTK austin_c_Page_064.txt
a25c81b511694bd4b84e630624dccac9
e230b844492c9c47ebc3db74a33d6b21d6d2706b
2173 F20101202_AABNSW austin_c_Page_041.txt
1462c1336cfedbb98c9236575697dbf0
b711a9f6dc89019d9199859dde05e9a87eab25d0
2048 F20101202_AABNTL austin_c_Page_065.txt
51725f47f12773811fdc6c683569de20
975aae1868f8071f62d0cb6144c7bce1ec71cb52
2180 F20101202_AABNSX austin_c_Page_042.txt
bb9a458e5bac2d64fd684be72dba389b
23239ec8b4348d38de4e24f254aaa3110a965f7c
2206 F20101202_AABNUA austin_c_Page_083.txt
ee2228b75d71a8848d69fe59d4c1b7e2
93ab9daacd68ceb9034d13657db1bfd36d116356
2087 F20101202_AABNTM austin_c_Page_066.txt
f78816cb60d829293497270568b16e08
b0cf9f28394b1ac691456b4252aa2dde5b331a8e
F20101202_AABNSY austin_c_Page_043.txt
919b232f380b92b4a9966b56169f7eca
760f98b14514de96caf5069bca8d78ffe9d79f76
2377 F20101202_AABNUB austin_c_Page_084.txt
d81efb9d80bba2afddcc4d90a6a99f7c
86077a3d75b31c15d701f0d3879accfab037ccba
2168 F20101202_AABNTN austin_c_Page_067.txt
7b7b8f1ea7c1fbfbbb811cd47a3bed8f
6bd1caed795588bff2c0b6e01ba177ea818ee0a5
2227 F20101202_AABNUC austin_c_Page_085.txt
4346aa1dda419b909c42efbfa120d3ea
545a3d55629ee710c4dfb8c25ee4a69db2e4f032
2058 F20101202_AABNSZ austin_c_Page_044.txt
0cb9d8eb1ff3e5e1ef1d74b6853f993a
6ea08f25a3d9e2f1151aa98f770ea4386461892c
2220 F20101202_AABNUD austin_c_Page_087.txt
ea68ab74aa069f5996fa3b6f494af124
d034978eb5e51d820fb9ac8a775fa4ecdbb186c1
1279 F20101202_AABNTO austin_c_Page_068.txt
b4223157c4ffa5c49783da3332bc3554
b7c619823678464705e250d7fb3bd20df4003712
635 F20101202_AABNUE austin_c_Page_088.txt
5c5e8f7121f704297f370e7d2f2431cb
20c7715a1b47791a4c20b92b065bb3ce580bd40b
3337 F20101202_AABNTP austin_c_Page_069.txt
600058cb7e59735af7181b5b4733b33c
3b5c8b27e4c6d4e7ce60b43e98498cdb9b0881b2
2189 F20101202_AABNUF austin_c_Page_091.txt
b123a54583fcd3014c73996ca9c007b5
2fa881c92e9a49df0f4d6bf5f3e82e02fcd29034
1845 F20101202_AABNTQ austin_c_Page_070.txt
bb18a6f3bfc7f7d8f7e80a5679892fa7
99333946570653e8ac2cc2ec509f91c472014741
1163 F20101202_AABNUG austin_c_Page_092.txt
d517a4c4c8f10086777949dc99eee902
e9e2f52c69da78c4edc7de46bb65c778ea575e6c
F20101202_AABNTR austin_c_Page_071.txt
be696af72bdd7d232e2eccb2e297fbfb
099c6d9a84ac95af7a4f0a76f2e5de9bd4b6079c
2741 F20101202_AABNUH austin_c_Page_093.txt
930d68062b5091fec1fa3749c4b3d63a
dd95f2e4fdc8c907b612721200bac5bab805f815
2291 F20101202_AABNTS austin_c_Page_072.txt
50b4086739eb5f02b66a7208db2b28f1
af7111983075f1b39dbddce8410705ee34b58cd2
2575 F20101202_AABNUI austin_c_Page_096.txt
ea57aad5f867896313ef9a450f2f4f75
5f488651ce5a7125be03a436c911325f83c96eb0
138 F20101202_AABNTT austin_c_Page_073.txt
72e1a85b4e5370d1efc366fcb952f71c
4a1c9093e28a0b9f14b30835978c230803562ab1
2754 F20101202_AABNUJ austin_c_Page_097.txt
ef64a7b6ff131eaa4510be9cd41fd3b7
55e131968ba6295635eff4e9e99d7075c19877bf
1954 F20101202_AABNTU austin_c_Page_074.txt
86311b0e5cbed1df9d03dd38179e46c2
cbe0cce8437272c0b8e5bd0b52897ac3fbec4437
2499 F20101202_AABNUK austin_c_Page_098.txt
0f7b55961abc7931ebba55dfbd45a676
bf06d39d80e117c0e7cacc51bb34fba9c2b68e29
F20101202_AABNTV austin_c_Page_075.txt
a1a53353cdd34979c4352e1e81ce4ef0
7debe8bd2ea380bc5c41051b1522b3fa2609c441
2487 F20101202_AABNUL austin_c_Page_099.txt
32c0b1e1c50dbc8c327f71b4a8be89bc
8f96803296695b0d8f26cb358220b3350077517c
2150 F20101202_AABNTW austin_c_Page_077.txt
eabd417b3dfdd1d69ca352c315e39ef4
e162b895192f78ff7950a5ccbda4ab382722a520
2414 F20101202_AABNUM austin_c_Page_100.txt
c6ec61ffe951e0780fa043a2be0bac33
85e83ce4c55ebdd09c6282b3ca69b7088ebf5bcd
2229 F20101202_AABNTX austin_c_Page_078.txt
c9e092ac5e55ed993e6f7414914d0bd3
5a9326b9801dbf6f2f43e78c258fa3f30375e5bb
6423 F20101202_AABNVA austin_c_Page_066thm.jpg
3562c81441b5d6d4ccfebf3471c6a6da
f9408b7de36106347375fb443312812e1125c92b
F20101202_AABNUN austin_c_Page_101.txt
c9ccf128afd9238277e679f9332392fd
a098f2448eb0b33a98a93ebc5e1bfb1c4c4919c8
2151 F20101202_AABNTY austin_c_Page_079.txt
9ec52b57264d62bb5fd8bd15e75f1c3b
cb5f37f1e2322ee3f5828fb61f0377a2dabb560f
27597 F20101202_AABNVB austin_c_Page_013.QC.jpg
e62b1a0bd5f708cf760e2987ceb95cbc
654fa21e5130096ac07ea6ee10a8b4da692399dc
1964 F20101202_AABNUO austin_c_Page_102.txt
dff91174a51c73ea2604ac3f83182144
6e12ebe3f7b6b1ed5bdd48d5e8202e648b653502
2078 F20101202_AABNTZ austin_c_Page_082.txt
5b8fbfe8952651229d561be1632d66e3
91d492cb246662d3eff0ed8fd089e97cfdc28943
31102 F20101202_AABNVC austin_c_Page_089.QC.jpg
4a07bd361de3e52d9bbd8fdaa7e28449
a5a8d8f0025e777f42c5d38ff285725284f4c78e
6788 F20101202_AABNVD austin_c_Page_047thm.jpg
49e5670c86a7c704899ff75869523c94
0e59e75cb3a38f6cc67be4182497a06c03bd4096
2103 F20101202_AABNUP austin_c_Page_001thm.jpg
6b1aeff10c08bc897e60c6f7895d5204
cc0c68bfe95baa4b4e98884a5504a7000a01dce3
6596 F20101202_AABNVE austin_c_Page_100thm.jpg
1467ca8089aa3db51c501bd28ad263ec
74bbb6544eb6dda47db38a03c797ed054996b427
313805 F20101202_AABNUQ austin_c.pdf
002c00e0137bd9f4baf1cd4f5d03c226
67812285740b521ef59b26bc868425d1b971d2ef
3326 F20101202_AABNVF austin_c_Page_010thm.jpg
6db92075f8eee79983aeac754fcb5c19
e33d8bb610f56c1beceee9f01824bda645f35e11
6110 F20101202_AABNUR austin_c_Page_102thm.jpg
8acf5adaf487fa7c22efe98185060422
8a9a83005c423cfccfc439bb58a7513ab1178acf
6844 F20101202_AABNVG austin_c_Page_087thm.jpg
2e30fe788118fa0e4164e937e2ae6143
4088ebd1fb1023b19d62727e3681d058612c71c1
26875 F20101202_AABNUS austin_c_Page_044.QC.jpg
842765660a90ee59b98dd4ac9dbb4ce0
ce1a0578ab668cf0a394d662fa7b3515ee2076df
27494 F20101202_AABNVH austin_c_Page_032.QC.jpg
014aa1f6e20b6ccd68779b61c1306b35
62ab62588bae6ec6af1d48ef38904946d01b189d
6855 F20101202_AABNUT austin_c_Page_038thm.jpg
41b8c9bb5012b267d02cf535c14f3e67
3e5ca5d9e1088b535143e7ae8d807f4eeeabd89d
5759 F20101202_AABNVI austin_c_Page_101thm.jpg
93fa2d0581cdb07af7fbb65cf43b501c
873630f46548450b7ffe344b8af26fda65f9d0c2
27493 F20101202_AABNUU austin_c_Page_075.QC.jpg
e384279eb52ef59203f266919c23c04a
d3ba011fce1d490970b135601126af41927e9f33
28863 F20101202_AABNVJ austin_c_Page_050.QC.jpg
aa0e6c88df6741799ad8e9c2d7d5b9fd
e4d03e6bc8e261a2331439988406e459341722a9
6637 F20101202_AABNUV austin_c_Page_025thm.jpg
e50155fc3d104592426bbd8fd998c3b9
6c0330a24f9e1c4fb71b1ca7cd33e4fcab92f0e3
28787 F20101202_AABNVK austin_c_Page_026.QC.jpg
290314ad7a9ac4eb07624bdcf997a066
08945bcd977d7355574591fa7f817e116f5320c4
6705 F20101202_AABNUW austin_c_Page_053thm.jpg
6bc6c803919b26bbea157897804230a6
a8ca9c2a8c212ac69d7d196fdd99f49f5c5d2b4a
13901 F20101202_AABNVL austin_c_Page_010.QC.jpg
0a13725534a01342c667ef854e33223e
ad66a27e716c745baaf5068997adbbb63db3badf
6553 F20101202_AABNUX austin_c_Page_032thm.jpg
fa718878cb88e871a42d8a91a702a41a
19c509b21ddf6e36dc9f0fbab6d63e51776f3436
24263 F20101202_AABNWA austin_c_Page_004.QC.jpg
d86c6d4705d518f1e3568ef27ffed99d
6f0169e82836669f65086f66131f0a1811856bcb
6378 F20101202_AABNVM austin_c_Page_035thm.jpg
502b0dbfa4c5fa882fc08cd014ebe3d8
15813f36312e362c866f44da0f2a7db96c17c777
26969 F20101202_AABNUY austin_c_Page_035.QC.jpg
0a89dcb38b06a32e94f6ad18084c3626
8be110cc7af0ec0849f55df21af7d34450a40be9
6038 F20101202_AABNWB austin_c_Page_004thm.jpg
41cbcc2026f78c4ad5d91b7afb33cc9a
755b67d7416f0196ffc14c97dde5bc10556f0f65
24075 F20101202_AABNVN austin_c_Page_101.QC.jpg
8f677f82965f7e72d4f36d3ca9dae4d0
ce255ec5d52ced71ee7275a8b046b6eeca4f81d3
28052 F20101202_AABNUZ austin_c_Page_021.QC.jpg
f8f61295ad48228891807d8c34ad1d05
80d0d5886232ffb5c566b881f1961f2797dca64c
18714 F20101202_AABNWC austin_c_Page_005.QC.jpg
fdb8b8ef679ddd0b58f9881bd606ac31
019c91f7803f40d228c713ae2fb840853015893b
29086 F20101202_AABNVO austin_c_Page_031.QC.jpg
199514926e850334cdd9f8f05ef4b0db
38ee1b6892d3e683117c0dad5a0985e473dde555
3646 F20101202_AABNWD austin_c_Page_006thm.jpg
0b83d608887d8d4bac54c0a1a74de6c8
fafa1ba5c38043b1fc26f09da138a8c441287721
30039 F20101202_AABNVP austin_c_Page_093.QC.jpg
d238c72204eb98cdf4c737df63a135de
f34372731e65d51be3632833f1f36f2b7051d22e
8209 F20101202_AABNWE austin_c_Page_007.QC.jpg
7207aeda86ec701a3425927795617c8a
0b55566052bb6756281f2edca5b5a3dd53998f4d
2067 F20101202_AABNWF austin_c_Page_007thm.jpg
dafc58d2575ae9bf90bff4f42d552776
46bb43acef7a2dd96cd702e96ac3fd9941ed95e5
29675 F20101202_AABNVQ austin_c_Page_064.QC.jpg
f35931bb625ebcbd6a3590f002a969f6
ab269d1afcf44b5fe61184a41c10af66ae6c8257
26470 F20101202_AABNWG austin_c_Page_009.QC.jpg
e007a21186cc663a0db993edae14bc12
e17f3d002c7fdeae43883fa0f25543a13888ec29
26413 F20101202_AABNVR austin_c_Page_012.QC.jpg
30bea28da5c9c356a1ca7b6c550219ab
5083e6178a042ce4d138369a32cfe50339a7d161
5961 F20101202_AABNWH austin_c_Page_009thm.jpg
7eb9fe6bc1933e4eec4b00771359460e
2d2b64df6a76eb20b253d6f3e96af350dc0dead3
30625 F20101202_AABNVS austin_c_Page_084.QC.jpg
0c510cb0ee99730bfefa52344df4661f
610bb0b6aa54144bfdd5bc67976dfbdfb1b115c5
6560 F20101202_AABNWI austin_c_Page_011thm.jpg
faab4e2b011c6d79a222e12cf8b6f7f6
3c71c1f8c58e57f69d929c3def9be79c5035768b
28431 F20101202_AABNVT austin_c_Page_024.QC.jpg
e910a13cf6c0f63ca773247a8c040152
7cf67cba3590a3b5e09ec5900926f793ad4909c1
6264 F20101202_AABNWJ austin_c_Page_012thm.jpg
17bdcc3232a2cd75de4889e728b092a2
a865b193863b355716e14cfd1802d773e09fef6c
6628 F20101202_AABNVU austin_c_Page_079thm.jpg
63186f97c571eacdc90791ec97314969
54260265db25a9f0937b95f2d0f0217a5b3bd567
6091 F20101202_AABNWK austin_c_Page_013thm.jpg
4b50063ff59d43b047cece4e0e11e080
ed1e77d0f1fdba22e31869cceb1be30ae4b5186a
154063 F20101202_AABNVV UFE0022429_00001.xml FULL
03c9a4a4b1fed03eac84ab045e1f0443
aeddeed3b700236bd199ce478132c5c86fcc469c
28952 F20101202_AABNWL austin_c_Page_014.QC.jpg
87dba058333fa1515b1d2db24ef7e592
d20362e4d43269ef0b48b370fbdecabd5ca0262e
1072 F20101202_AABNVW austin_c_Page_002.QC.jpg
40cb008ef1fc1998c02b332834080f98
116aee3e7ab7a20e36f969355b5f0a5283b1c2f5
27466 F20101202_AABNXA austin_c_Page_033.QC.jpg
2b10e1e1c6171555ef009e86862340a4
abc0380eb2b429deb489665686e7d3d2534a67c6
6732 F20101202_AABNWM austin_c_Page_014thm.jpg
812d96a7ba399b004afc9291480c9ba5
635aa3b47c92204c02c31abdadbd84e9ed6c3483
462 F20101202_AABNVX austin_c_Page_002thm.jpg
f23622985932db3bf9fad1f7a61d7cdb
a675028decf776cea9b3e470d07080cd6d4913bf
28005 F20101202_AABNXB austin_c_Page_034.QC.jpg
3bbc12b81e23669c482ebb06c61fe911
ccc15f93445942da62af5d04c7ad3880faa328d0
6216 F20101202_AABNWN austin_c_Page_015thm.jpg
497cef3c6b83c709e234a2f557eefd2c
8852ad9cae24799e9dfd21bc59ce34fe308f84cb
2160 F20101202_AABNVY austin_c_Page_003.QC.jpg
44939823f62354e16ec7c73c2e0635a2
0ee1a958cebb58895aec16427ff30d12a81e17c8
28908 F20101202_AABNXC austin_c_Page_036.QC.jpg
fa838a6ac4da31bbf2213e4e13f4933a
0bb39d49ca1f49d0d2ac105bb20db842c64c3079
27581 F20101202_AABNWO austin_c_Page_016.QC.jpg
fd9c96cbb75a69ebb31abed2f4b78b01
e42c3647c5adc0ff40ed704764bec21befe4947d
731 F20101202_AABNVZ austin_c_Page_003thm.jpg
2812d2bc62ead4357784fb144e9416de
f47d2beb829e76d34a1f8cbba8538631f73f3af5
29959 F20101202_AABNXD austin_c_Page_038.QC.jpg
cc15b20c7764f719b2f9442174e3555a
c2eccde05087dc01c093b920d06112d112fb6db5
6662 F20101202_AABNWP austin_c_Page_017thm.jpg
4ed726335607fd2115077b89ab97abf7
4f871c0eb62500f9ba5b9482e3554eac64cb9e5c
29177 F20101202_AABNXE austin_c_Page_039.QC.jpg
4722f65b9cbcac0ef63ff74a07115398
167ec63ab302d45f0cbfe72b7e1555cbc8c50b86
28000 F20101202_AABNWQ austin_c_Page_018.QC.jpg
8797e66e15bb1e1082896dc162f40188
530bb80396a8c3dba4d2801dadf124f4411140b9
28125 F20101202_AABNXF austin_c_Page_040.QC.jpg
f9b39420eb0ea94fb8b3a4e558ab5e8c
d278639bb384b5c6c3c7d8ab7312a27d6ad61abf
29422 F20101202_AABNXG austin_c_Page_041.QC.jpg
2a9d06b4833b925883588263ef14c618
018fc26f11c044a7c035ce0048bc88e24d9ac144
27943 F20101202_AABNWR austin_c_Page_019.QC.jpg
8e6aaa32f51303edb834bb87c910146f
6e343989c606bb763da6a577dcfb388671f52a8d
28218 F20101202_AABNXH austin_c_Page_042.QC.jpg
4444217758075e367de11bf134c29157
9598c44f74c688f38d7fd60d8f22f3ff77fcbd95
6554 F20101202_AABNWS austin_c_Page_019thm.jpg
42f85062ff683147c1aec8c2ed650709
46cd7e0a3b4f3bc72d6294d20c297605cd941e3a
6645 F20101202_AABNXI austin_c_Page_042thm.jpg
26fa1ecc87edad9bc73ca5ab9642bb24
f07ab7445894f342d609b09491b4ca6b929ebea3
28257 F20101202_AABNWT austin_c_Page_022.QC.jpg
09e826c4024e084129600eed9fc1453d
6042c9462cb8a0b760e03828fa99f14acf86686a
721639 F20101202_AABNAA austin_c_Page_068.jp2
5f3c7aeb0f3e9b6dd6df0ffd92da9c4f
dac98f068ef7c071467c80001d32f0e4df533ea1
28264 F20101202_AABNXJ austin_c_Page_043.QC.jpg
1322dc212857734af58896cc02c6cdba
e212f8becf81663862d7b3484596161c4d8f5140
6534 F20101202_AABNWU austin_c_Page_022thm.jpg
9220f7fc1fba1c20e74825e368f0647f
c1efc8e186d9ca8a089baa13a109383040dfd03f
2196 F20101202_AABNAB austin_c_Page_022.txt
20934864cff50a0a5b16b8587057ad31
1c05decbf7d9a1bc06b396db5e52c01b45d6b59f
6266 F20101202_AABNXK austin_c_Page_044thm.jpg
8bb4bddf84d5aa2bafde969765c78d02
5e4e4ce24f99554f8abfcfd4ad5a4a05f94ade94
6454 F20101202_AABNWV austin_c_Page_024thm.jpg
7b13d723289a14106ee4365f913f7a89
90f5be50f91a4e84aeb709a185a98b0b2eb0b554
25271604 F20101202_AABNAC austin_c_Page_086.tif
5d296498cfd3e263879e9ab9b1caf7ea
ca77902e696bbe1520fde5b28627feee6ca3e117
9311 F20101202_AABNXL austin_c_Page_045.QC.jpg
1616d40327608d12da20102c7edf36e0
dcaf7dd9c85a6ebf64d0120f805a991aca5d6af6
28506 F20101202_AABNWW austin_c_Page_025.QC.jpg
1090b942cccc065bfe117007f45ad882
47fc435dc25dc43267389e53e7f0b74fcfb92b7a
1265 F20101202_AABNAD austin_c_Page_008thm.jpg
8bdbfc7fdd1fc53d118db1b8ea3857b3
62c1a1937d7e366b8796dbd2849ba9aedd01bc0e
2492 F20101202_AABNXM austin_c_Page_045thm.jpg
a9a440308e12c19e606d73f57fe45dab
8271be9551fce034a9d61befde9d966b27acbacd
6618 F20101202_AABNWX austin_c_Page_026thm.jpg
0a3ff1935f1b397e35ce60bcef0bfeaa
53a1250e07b03264ce50734edf2d472c719f7dc6
2288 F20101202_AABNAE austin_c_Page_073.pro
da1088b950e63bdc2c4ee06f23880f12
90ca4d2d9c66cfe9455794cf165b0f8dfced0b73
6298 F20101202_AABNYA austin_c_Page_058thm.jpg
7b3779ba3019ad80b419c42ab5ff880c
87e4016395c60b8cffef4775c87758338bcec3ba
26760 F20101202_AABNXN austin_c_Page_046.QC.jpg
bde7783f87799b8615facea2bf5d08a5
f57a766d32bd200f3632cb27758ffb1453dfc5b6
28627 F20101202_AABNWY austin_c_Page_028.QC.jpg
fe933d89b231bdacd33feb5ab8a59c51
a73808d595a949879fe29ded0dffe5024eb1d436
F20101202_AABNAF austin_c_Page_059.tif
31fb6ad60f74a0306b63f2d19deb4337
2bb7e4204d8350eeabd18b20f00bd5ff3df60f44
26982 F20101202_AABNYB austin_c_Page_059.QC.jpg
481b418ea5864a42a539970722201a2a
5a56364f6e7f3e98f53382f0d92d08b8e6b2454d
29926 F20101202_AABNXO austin_c_Page_047.QC.jpg
09288e7ba446df4f54b502989302caf8
bcf8b53bd6351767bcf84cdf739d17d54e69f5e3
28161 F20101202_AABNWZ austin_c_Page_029.QC.jpg
e6a9e38553f710cf37124eaa1908c674
17467c5364475749ede620fa3cb3388748643aa5
1051931 F20101202_AABNAG austin_c_Page_087.jp2
7c20d8fa33e0ceaaff7838198be8c9a8
fc0310babf4c348acef5ccece1b29da1b9b25488
27343 F20101202_AABNYC austin_c_Page_060.QC.jpg
c59ff5b8d3e56f6dd3713d4842d6b6fa
54821758776e9d88a1125d133caf8ef34670d118
28482 F20101202_AABNXP austin_c_Page_048.QC.jpg
2547c89e18eff7b3357babe78b0016dd
2d3e8c962166878cf968c04a870923df0fbd9c55
2099 F20101202_AABNAH austin_c_Page_081.txt
9974c7ac5297c4c0a06d655adaaabfef
e5a50e541676b18e28e0c397fa3ef307f27a564a
26199 F20101202_AABNYD austin_c_Page_061.QC.jpg
3ca34f44dad580e9bb06b40b0dbc21b0
8df9a3d819a92b51fd97d71e221686d6c76581f8
29919 F20101202_AABNXQ austin_c_Page_049.QC.jpg
93988f5503ddad20bedb8bf7924c34d6
4cd123a48491ff8a49afd17064a2cffce9a121d0
2531 F20101202_AABNAI austin_c_Page_046.txt
ccb5257abd8833cd5303929e0a185d96
8d6287ccb1f9148a934ada442cf0de152a6d6b45
6221 F20101202_AABNYE austin_c_Page_061thm.jpg
8eb70ab8851b0d06813ebdc74b3f7ba4
1b805bb83f9bc4ffbe9c2eab66174d211bd43da4
24062 F20101202_AABNXR austin_c_Page_051.QC.jpg
6c1ec0868cce30c72cc9916ed20c166a
7e82933fd2b9cbc8e9fbfb04e0fd110942536d7f
6704 F20101202_AABNAJ austin_c_Page_049thm.jpg
dfac787f2ac4c1cb5f24d64cba3facc3
0a34cff6ce81d6161b57315a10a844ee16c15671
29298 F20101202_AABNYF austin_c_Page_062.QC.jpg
f5898d2c3e16e15a9108fde75c9b2e37
4bfa84fe0ba9d27daa922156024c20614b4f45d5
F20101202_AABNAK austin_c_Page_076.txt
b4d2a7a8cba32cbcf5f9cd27cd02f2cb
8d297986fb5f8848285dd72191371b8cf4a67d62
6700 F20101202_AABNYG austin_c_Page_062thm.jpg
15fb5d5dbd29b14bbc9771b1acca90d4
259ed9f5508030518a9efb950c3422025ffa4dad
5829 F20101202_AABNXS austin_c_Page_051thm.jpg
1da83f7fd5225a2f3c3fd87015f244b3
614654426e85a2c72c65556eef30faa9b2fc6982
90805 F20101202_AABNAL austin_c_Page_042.jpg
e96f83dc9bc4d98288b26c66e3903b34
c98f839f6eb2f71cf5b4f695cfce7414009bbfa6
27111 F20101202_AABNYH austin_c_Page_063.QC.jpg
df0bf6e624a4dcc6ce7c2fe64ecbef13
ffe5d103c3be013fd8b13cc1bc7ff215b9f0512e
28465 F20101202_AABNXT austin_c_Page_052.QC.jpg
c8deff17f5e10a08f810d5fecd2a1966
a8c566dc7802a0b65c5633c9ec918e5194feaa2f
48766 F20101202_AABNBA austin_c_Page_102.pro
44ca2b868d02cda1a2647b8e9c0fd7e3
f5f040df450195c6e2e13c7a74dc846cbd082221
54639 F20101202_AABNAM austin_c_Page_050.pro
cf97ef287ccdb682244123de20bd8fe1
2143a38006ad9df7afd33615153ffa0f216c32b3
F20101202_AABNYI austin_c_Page_063thm.jpg
d0f6c7f16464850829564f6a4a663e1e
ebda5fc73bad2355a50b9978911ab54b544c151b
6759 F20101202_AABNXU austin_c_Page_052thm.jpg
06fedaaada8a947a733081bbd5412c1d
ca879138d515a407d24d41d85f5e436047958c64
F20101202_AABNBB austin_c_Page_098thm.jpg
1848a1d1ef41e26c0df21c2a5d8cf842
0734c9dfad4ada6b2e688bb6b890fcca4625af86
6330 F20101202_AABNAN austin_c_Page_060thm.jpg
692605c1e06b1decb070ad0a25e08e5a
ff86b1c7b59a6493b64315ff30597319a6596084
26335 F20101202_AABNYJ austin_c_Page_065.QC.jpg
256c6008102738f148c81f7e5cb6904b
eb8fedadb9b58574376583b9bda62284ba40d30a
23051 F20101202_AABNXV austin_c_Page_054.QC.jpg
a9618828e30b2e2256487782f94b6525
0c94fd3596edeb1b71d347198b0bb3ae36b6c940
6599 F20101202_AABNBC austin_c_Page_043thm.jpg
6e00b287589a1c7943ba821b574a7906
22b35a061b8c9e43e8467faaa4e08b072dc8e199
3343 F20101202_AABNAO austin_c_Page_092thm.jpg
4442639a87739fb8dda75b013f5d88df
7501f87f25b4204df46a001a2bd0199bb068d242
6613 F20101202_AABNYK austin_c_Page_065thm.jpg
441aa6635bd2c5c8be05b98899235f40
c54566e4e65bc98efce5642a18dca769fc6840dd
6489 F20101202_AABNBD austin_c_Page_075thm.jpg
045831c41202b5e5612f9fb080880e5d
2422fee7d6cbb83fbb0b4d7bf7bfe12d236e4222
6685 F20101202_AABNAP austin_c_Page_018thm.jpg
e875ebbbeff65fcca0e160964bfa8824
7617d650fd65aca00e021e07be12c70f50c0f833
27284 F20101202_AABNYL austin_c_Page_066.QC.jpg
5ee6d0e01adf1631c1a803f8996b90c0
29a321b9192994717f6f49204b8c847f5eb14288
5445 F20101202_AABNXW austin_c_Page_054thm.jpg
18bdf85f5ad9ff9661fac4c455c82e2b
cdb6e2aec674a78e221c7959955ed084d93564e2
6750 F20101202_AABNBE austin_c_Page_023thm.jpg
a5f424da6448b3a6b3181730e4b1e200
6019f543e0842c6bcfab3af50b82f803cd47828d
55104 F20101202_AABNAQ austin_c_Page_067.pro
e058e905f43a7c62fed9e762827c7d98
f2b00949cbf1898df8c494c84e21c122251819e8
27853 F20101202_AABNZA austin_c_Page_079.QC.jpg
4b9abab6e3a76289de3024145912deee
1c24bf2728c5f4274d216c6ddcaadec8f9852b56
27176 F20101202_AABNYM austin_c_Page_067.QC.jpg
1c08ffc0ec5e15e8f0845df0e07b3846
aabbb65c481d3bb0d93c999a3ac2203e30fd84c0
10208 F20101202_AABNXX austin_c_Page_057.QC.jpg
5c7782a5118baf54cb2ef986dc56ebab
cd29b285b1f2f64d39c4175d08f5b4684dfef456
88469 F20101202_AABNBF austin_c_Page_037.jpg
dedfdda0e5fc84f155ae587585f0b6a9
e2b700c682fd63f36c54f852de71a4eb7b36284b
2181 F20101202_AABNAR austin_c_Page_024.txt
ff28760196f9fa7c26a87d4b7be26843
2ef2bcee4ac3fc48a54c3e42d6ae5a43f4926000
28166 F20101202_AABNZB austin_c_Page_080.QC.jpg
3ae092af091c1b98f07286ec7922842f
c5b4a9ac39e4da51ca656760ef207f54cb369359
6663 F20101202_AABNYN austin_c_Page_067thm.jpg
6893177023234fc0b343eea937922f97
6cedfc7ce0f3e58b3ee33ae4decb5014480d8f3b
2814 F20101202_AABNXY austin_c_Page_057thm.jpg
fe1531aed1638b0ddaa2c7f4870758a5
5d57ef70e506e640cc5cb547fb680f1e9427b148
54619 F20101202_AABNBG austin_c_Page_026.pro
19fd26ab8c07bddf7afd4bc0aaac942d
2fc0ac351a1e191c1187381cf92b8cf8c06feed5
2274 F20101202_AABNAS austin_c_Page_047.txt
f471fbad85a363a7f3c0d777432177ef
a46b6d87b7e547a830b4ce088714e84c8721f2a1
6813 F20101202_AABNZC austin_c_Page_080thm.jpg
bb3615e87d5f4a12fa5b7eb0bfc0c0a7
7f6ce1bb8ca1173fdf02d5014c8c4761f5df8485
17057 F20101202_AABNYO austin_c_Page_068.QC.jpg
e7b88e3b67246a7637aa05eaa007c100
54dc3624174364c5e1dfc2b9a9a67ed2fee25a18
26996 F20101202_AABNXZ austin_c_Page_058.QC.jpg
f1326811e4e714dc00d4b2d8c69db25d
750a85de2c4fe95389bef2fd1dca5c896e922d0d
2403 F20101202_AABNBH austin_c_Page_095.txt
bb56ad9d852727c4ad3a74a1c890dd5f
611465044c5ce3af836a4f91f91465677eaffd4a
6754 F20101202_AABNAT austin_c_Page_040thm.jpg
69931e04f1febfd4f5230aafb93769e4
73e2a4bee97ce6e09a2c9432cb97fc2b9ee7eb57
27262 F20101202_AABNZD austin_c_Page_081.QC.jpg
ee2e7631aa90304a3977a998e39ca729
a6bc176e28c833fb7829d76bffb430c3eeb2c347
3549 F20101202_AABNYP austin_c_Page_069thm.jpg
023e55552e3a7e13df9c20018415df77
95ce078e47e859568823935d98fbc04e3337f236
5915 F20101202_AABNBI austin_c_Page_055thm.jpg
52547e393e7e3947fa0ca8a862e24443
cfa045a9cf3d1787035e9ebae781afff289bae23
2156 F20101202_AABNAU austin_c_Page_036.txt
5fb27170b0903a399a0636625e250707
162217d87a95b88c4190f5d5ce900c7f22e8be71
26467 F20101202_AABNZE austin_c_Page_082.QC.jpg
7ea174929fec7594268555127475d53d
8371fe9ac828bd50dd4b235595311bd08c16d381
10421 F20101202_AABNYQ austin_c_Page_070.QC.jpg
2994fa3c7a66083cd31a45325e938b7d
1148246b5c0dc7c36bb6acd644afcac2131febb7
6349 F20101202_AABNAV austin_c_Page_046thm.jpg
639c091ae413157072016f7e88840e36
008a86193844525c86f1096ab293ef2eda185066
6594 F20101202_AABNZF austin_c_Page_082thm.jpg
5293059165902a7bf760747d80c94128
e7e7174e223bc3f0fa654c935297af1ba0f1ad35
2631 F20101202_AABNYR austin_c_Page_070thm.jpg
f64e92e707b5d0a2d86665b4b44ef2ae
e46caf91c668f5c8e0c6c4200f6a8c6b2d1f287a
F20101202_AABNBJ austin_c_Page_005.tif
ffdb9659f5809081d74a5a02ca1804b5
f9bbc644ccd268942e9d2e5a110433f9b458e522
6693 F20101202_AABNAW austin_c_Page_041thm.jpg
33d2f971c1324b51dba7829785b9ed9e
52b261d87d249ab06afb764f45230717424cbd40
28543 F20101202_AABNZG austin_c_Page_083.QC.jpg
2e23499279c0cd2230962958f4ce7c30
a70dae5fa688d529df436c51c879c5bf66f0480f
10353 F20101202_AABNYS austin_c_Page_071.QC.jpg
1143765ead19f1a214f0b3359a27a0cf
9df45137dfb923f516bf23694804c81d5d9736da
1997 F20101202_AABNBK austin_c_Page_055.txt
4ebd89a16ed28c869560b38adb72d4d3
3e155ba5393249d0b016ea79c4be6c5fdb91afd0
27063 F20101202_AABNAX austin_c_Page_094.QC.jpg
01078f7757d6e099c8f8cf629bfc529f
92ade2ff2264e2b5a527fa8ba18b2fcd737757ee
6766 F20101202_AABNZH austin_c_Page_083thm.jpg
46beb337ef223e18ebf90fad46bf2f7e
2e5c048825770d79ff65de33e13f23271cadc824
54786 F20101202_AABNBL austin_c_Page_079.pro
d19eaefe4d75732ad50461766f7a28a6
058197b85cf86e9a0ecedd97f424a102596427e5
9539 F20101202_AABNAY austin_c_Page_088.QC.jpg
e31f0968f9c8fc9dbe70654367be2732
dc54d13d444253fc39e7aba1a6bcc564cd03f1ea
6910 F20101202_AABNZI austin_c_Page_084thm.jpg
7657d2d131dd0650bcf3cc8bfbd1965e
37d39d0268f0566aaebf33d5c7a7e3467aa23966
2621 F20101202_AABNYT austin_c_Page_071thm.jpg
60a11db50b96b98cb3d57c005698066f
5b4c52ac5630276cc79d9fd70b54bf3388f6185a
2161 F20101202_AABNCA austin_c_Page_021.txt
5316eab12dc9e6ec5eb4d6ea159ef5cd
05aa9acb722b771d9b850078fae13fd8e2ec31d3
118225 F20101202_AABNBM austin_c_Page_089.jpg
a1f373b95768224cec4956f219935b5e
3d0c34764fa79167055e20ef76bac85f0ddcc00b
56850 F20101202_AABNAZ austin_c_Page_028.pro
16d6709a05b34bed66ef8cf1cd00ca64
eec238fd5c484a658687caeff5166c2105f9dad6
28443 F20101202_AABNZJ austin_c_Page_085.QC.jpg
565bc89cac55948d5a986b51aabf152c
6824080c442d94a025285be924a8f0adad7c470f
18554 F20101202_AABNYU austin_c_Page_072.QC.jpg
d30eea0a0e934f93e3c9d483a206a876
f683c234dff3c50a45786abb8fd7affad123efae
F20101202_AABNCB austin_c_Page_053.tif
bcb0574f59df2dfabd07241c445b8c35
71f6241d94c382f4323fc8467244fc1792490e80
62664 F20101202_AABNBN austin_c_Page_096.pro
67e2fad6666a46c1ef06badaa28ff221
6f611830e30e21b4eac8332c6a1b57c7a8d8601d
6358 F20101202_AABNZK austin_c_Page_086thm.jpg
188222df1b83f3f68bfcda51e0d451c4
d81c8e465c058e9235f2c084ef711d37542aaf4a
4717 F20101202_AABNYV austin_c_Page_072thm.jpg
69dcff65174ef2ef71e24bcc76f8ba08
6ab4720bdd7296f8b556eb54c1d180d7b9bc15db
1051940 F20101202_AABNCC austin_c_Page_028.jp2
0c6cb931ff556041bb96540ddc3f4c8b
3e4027f194044f72dd6cd4ab4bc9088485c93210
344720 F20101202_AABNBO austin_c_Page_001.jp2
459d1ac04cf51717a614dbd02dd3b5c0
5fdae26e7a2253c0ee5b8aa4b826296926fad32c
28311 F20101202_AABNZL austin_c_Page_087.QC.jpg
8e93296121846b64098dfcdc6ca8ad35
4fa0741a17d68ddf58ddee8a8833f690bca184ec
5728 F20101202_AABNYW austin_c_Page_074thm.jpg
7f145ce38c83d4182a15772407a1c242
4f7629a7a236878e5ef4458c30ff27d215da31ef
1051984 F20101202_AABNCD austin_c_Page_006.jp2
891f403dda37601b4144470c07256df8
9ccae5f081c428b6390006eab03c8c9a91104e44
6753 F20101202_AABNBP austin_c_Page_081thm.jpg
df709a8e6795a118b8d58254890860bb
4135b98191b92c91e19dc85148e925343281793b
2218 F20101202_AABNZM austin_c_Page_088thm.jpg
b65ac45796a75ed316b9b2af2c5dccbd
5daf0e2c31c8734c1f662d38c20c71bd9344e3ef
29417 F20101202_AABNYX austin_c_Page_076.QC.jpg
eed555b30dfe815ad47b6d505c0d54f5
cb6a4e2e72cca1a8eebf34fb0a145a17252a4294
6634 F20101202_AABNCE austin_c_Page_033thm.jpg
86c5e12f3f1dbc75980bfac6b77312ff
e934b3db684b77690610eef98ed4b6ab5bb3b584
26906 F20101202_AABNBQ austin_c_Page_027.QC.jpg
5141d9966f48649a78b724ef4de4ee41
fa3da9d973f52f0de10cfffdc811c78e9076c5cc
7104 F20101202_AABNZN austin_c_Page_089thm.jpg
d213e1efbf3fea5e72a679d68719e6ed
90987bf9b6641c14a88a7e6f77487bec8275ec7e
28409 F20101202_AABNYY austin_c_Page_078.QC.jpg
ab787665c1413f409effee23bb8ca72c
1a2edc9c8e98d66f29940a85d532485f7e5a6802
94161 F20101202_AABNCF austin_c_Page_047.jpg
49ae841588cea833405b1cb29ed7d607
185f6a5a56aa7b033d93a0b5aeb9cf9e7db7c275
6640 F20101202_AABNBR austin_c_Page_031thm.jpg
6fa8332d9bb35e74d9a2181933825924
15315e26d8de1e1954bf2abf4c3a5b8e3f07889b
20959 F20101202_AABNZO austin_c_Page_090.QC.jpg
17ac8fe040f8376565a3fb84cb58686d
4de96ff97e63975619122a5642080f3a02f2258b
6566 F20101202_AABNYZ austin_c_Page_078thm.jpg
e1efe22461531eb5c66a43caf4be233c
fd5ac684a219f192bfcba79b049e059a2807c263
54438 F20101202_AABNCG austin_c_Page_018.pro
ea092df8ca01cee8bec1d0e8a0ff7d58
b9390f8a829285441f0f0ff5e343908714d55478
49590 F20101202_AABNBS austin_c_Page_072.pro
73da7274c7b07b64be5d5ee036b2d27a
429df83b95a7153bab53104ff2d589a77456a944
22920 F20101202_AABNZP austin_c_Page_091.QC.jpg
20d8e5ae26ca41621f1a7b56ece93fd9
0ad68043a9cb07d326d27f7cf869bb0296e42a5b
6760 F20101202_AABNCH austin_c_Page_097thm.jpg
a6ba56acd5074c1edf31bf90353be232
373030e5be0835730842641ac01b9857e4b8a8a3
91865 F20101202_AABNBT austin_c_Page_085.jpg
ac45cbdbe83f71f9cee0837c52869503
fbf0df6e5ab49cb93119e03bd18efc8fe575decb
12488 F20101202_AABNZQ austin_c_Page_092.QC.jpg
ff71bdf0693d4d03837435ae83ee2403
e0e3ff65ba8676875898d309c0daa6a2b374a840
24528 F20101202_AABNCI austin_c_Page_055.QC.jpg
a47f2a8007471b96bca11e791c6a8a49
d1ab1e4652fa9648e846a05c0bf59b0ae40ca142
87729 F20101202_AABNBU austin_c_Page_060.jpg
5d2e5e034507df73c84b3192b2ec5451
43c551fa14f1189e108b6374d329d7a41e4ad3c5
7028 F20101202_AABNZR austin_c_Page_093thm.jpg
0fbbbcac247cd6508159eeae6271d682
0ec903863d2ce2a0da4e30242a0ee14ce3f072bc
F20101202_AABNCJ austin_c_Page_083.tif
9fa2cfb3c5ede12f0e7ff35680a8acb1
0a9f124439c09729f43180c92b079c2b6b1c1a84
F20101202_AABNBV austin_c_Page_064.tif
2106eb1094382f9476b37995b76f31a1
c5799bb81b44d1d7323736f830b8dd228550e053
27125 F20101202_AABNZS austin_c_Page_095.QC.jpg
4152ccb542af8d731813e243e6ac7a53
311a902f564aa91a9e3b13d5136bcbb1231b33d0
2223 F20101202_AABNCK austin_c_Page_028.txt
3e6bc06ea617b00190c3d8e5ed6fee82
06e400a6ca5f0b21c4581d08c80851e4da3dd340
6820 F20101202_AABNBW austin_c_Page_020thm.jpg
84856cde091080a92a26530697e48def
2ae62072e1e433356a3f104731979a135303610e
6616 F20101202_AABNZT austin_c_Page_095thm.jpg
9d2cb695f25c009ab809def1e108a3a6
718b9b2a79f27b65cf584627b0041964a8c435a7
28428 F20101202_AABNCL austin_c_Page_017.QC.jpg
b77889743b8dc0992b1ce50b43bfb269
2ca896bd5c40c7ab05fef489b0bdc78287345b28
92440 F20101202_AABNBX austin_c_Page_076.jpg
37534f5b89a8a04b5f7cd9b9274b732a
14ac664196eee9913a4403139fa1677d3c67c099
F20101202_AABNDA austin_c_Page_061.tif
697ed0f0711397d909753d08526f68a6
3b2e91488b9e21e9cf33aee546c5908b58daf863
82164 F20101202_AABNCM austin_c_Page_102.jpg
483c28eda132af82927a23c62f7cac73
ef30684bfaaab1cff94121e46c3cc717da175a77
49880 F20101202_AABNBY austin_c_Page_069.jpg
42d2f8526aab13a7656f62055b4b71f0
ef9c8ed814b426eaa9c6e68d8420038903df2cc5
27457 F20101202_AABNZU austin_c_Page_096.QC.jpg
e061cd3ca998f970e64e6cb41570275b
b525d310b83f9fcb4cf69cd3127bf87c36a49b74
1051911 F20101202_AABNDB austin_c_Page_027.jp2
e34ad07506225b84606f39fa42f987d0
85e78287413db4b8491b7d3c35e1e93d362066a5
F20101202_AABNCN austin_c_Page_060.tif
5013441dccf9bf0ab46861e5470fc64b
05e5968e7c58b38ec84370d0a01ffa63c6951f1e
54621 F20101202_AABNBZ austin_c_Page_080.pro
06e4a8ae104c22c24125ce78f7498972
7a48e7f238d410991968c82f193c9f2719f5ea20
28785 F20101202_AABNZV austin_c_Page_097.QC.jpg
5729841627d4e6e5919a16a06d36efd6
98c30f166022ad27da69d6b4777f37bd7af895b9
F20101202_AABNDC austin_c_Page_056.tif
5909ff68a364946a94fe6e403a0329a5
db5b3a108a9de687f73e45a1af16a69ffea889b1
86322 F20101202_AABNCO austin_c_Page_027.jpg
c2e127a73e79f6bf5de63feae85a954e
d38465318a32b8934ef2889942582a833d2823ab
F20101202_AABNZW austin_c_Page_099.QC.jpg
daf98a14e80e5be67b972f3350eb7fcd
26c2a074ea8a235de9e3dfe7267c1a01c59a09e2
96549 F20101202_AABNDD austin_c_Page_095.jpg
7957c36b9e8468c07ddc9f87cd63fe81
7c6de1936902a31229db1ea4460ee8a493f82da0
6541 F20101202_AABNCP austin_c_Page_021thm.jpg
e75be1c2aa1c04301c55d99cb87b6b94
f8fd411df0970c811427403e6718158a36c35d09
26391 F20101202_AABNZX austin_c_Page_100.QC.jpg
42d385fc3cbeac005e2401ffaa199dbc
b9477b9ba96380aa0ca3bf3ddbe3f7587357edae
61326 F20101202_AABNDE austin_c_Page_049.pro
ff50feef23e648eab7d56deb5be0c0cb
45fe10bb006682e67c8b0415cce49b05aa2ef905
87571 F20101202_AABNCQ austin_c_Page_081.jpg
06df0ab67896a472a0dc9e3b07c9b19d
7daadfb6bb238a92db18c3f02c87cc70e2503790
25507 F20101202_AABNZY austin_c_Page_102.QC.jpg
a2755cfb0cc3bfe4a423d8a123c7737c
4773149c2f7f5eb2a6afaeffbf4da1046b5d98c0
6610 F20101202_AABNDF austin_c_Page_036thm.jpg
5addb1bdc9313d6f137a2abd211aacb5
20f4d27bb4f05c25fa6fb5a6a6260f2fe10f5b24
27486 F20101202_AABNCR austin_c_Page_086.QC.jpg
362d52c29487e22ea585647960c525a6
63540e8e0eac04471ef287e53c4a4fa13f334d98
13722 F20101202_AABNDG austin_c_Page_069.QC.jpg
351a05d740ada80170cab320160ea440
6550c088a62c368ace630d142209593cd82dc1cd
1051978 F20101202_AABNCS austin_c_Page_096.jp2
f41725bf8e5d2e61041f02ba017ac8ce
df6561d6570c44be53833b42e5747a0639a3041f
F20101202_AABNDH austin_c_Page_003.tif
09aa69488835a47938c4d2044105955d
b002233f47cd740a46b56ccfda56ae03fbf8a44a
1051973 F20101202_AABNCT austin_c_Page_035.jp2
69755753d474e1b1bace144b50ceed9c
21b6662bbb141095d5994ea382f7b70d374f2c1f
1051950 F20101202_AABNDI austin_c_Page_039.jp2
4d6105284609245f0c24c3958dddf225
60844ad4a08fbcf2bbdcb49880f781d4e382146d
6502 F20101202_AABNCU austin_c_Page_034thm.jpg
b099ab443eb1ec4a14258b24f98cf45b
3841f551dc2fa6ffca704794fdf33e6dcfb09035
54808 F20101202_AABNDJ austin_c_Page_034.pro
3d34a5fd2968f94959b643f08541f606
d622f378e3393be4d4e071e5e79e8f39b2613ff4
49875 F20101202_AABNCV austin_c_Page_091.pro
36236d066ea086400ea29298388e15c6
41237df0a6bf232e832ff189e88a8169a67d3476
27881 F20101202_AABNDK austin_c_Page_077.QC.jpg
b7886908a3556936ebddcf7c7fa3e36f
1a3209edcfda2de022d3018892b7041162c61f4e
93382 F20101202_AABNCW austin_c_Page_062.jpg
a607d6db84df7294605f2bb8b556ff33
082c705acec6fe599dcd2fd3a4e20dd73e122558
F20101202_AABNDL austin_c_Page_027thm.jpg
581fe2d52dce6dd508b5639d2a7751de
74929e0b188767979571c1435b678669846f96fa
94204 F20101202_AABNCX austin_c_Page_038.jpg
20fd03094741464b88b6961fb5ecb531
7d5253e2580bc2f35782cb890d077174f95d46ec
51268 F20101202_AABNDM austin_c_Page_015.pro
4638a063e370dd61c946763495f7d920
2bf77b85bac1316ea000bba6e1d5984b71c936d3
6448 F20101202_AABNCY austin_c_Page_016thm.jpg
526fd2ff87ee7551eae4379547b76683
5d08af151b146dcdd75afac91b6a4a36a95e5287
756 F20101202_AABNEA austin_c_Page_007.txt
72adeb6ae52838936af4c4d469c94f58
7f583f621896739f10529f23ba6dcb3e68246425
1051908 F20101202_AABNDN austin_c_Page_025.jp2
6c9885675d4a6456e6f1621e576c89d0
8d92d7147777243929b31b522a54c02244fbfeb5
5839 F20101202_AABNCZ austin_c_Page_091thm.jpg
fd285c308f89f53929aee99021e6e8e5
69859567c85006c412aae83530b8a7e6c1064afc
1051969 F20101202_AABNEB austin_c_Page_005.jp2
946f15125c9c24aeb1570745d9e8722e
65ae71e359827550b52a02e817d0f7e5026f80a0
58567 F20101202_AABNDO austin_c_Page_100.pro
1969f3258bd3a1d6b2c50e09e1b978e5
5e7add95141d6ba0650e2c2911c1af6ee53b3abd
108712 F20101202_AABMYI austin_c_Page_093.jpg
f36d5546f9e5ed86e5a2d665e23c784a
31689a10f866c3803f9cc5293b925411da145954
57626 F20101202_AABNEC austin_c_Page_076.pro
71bb0c89b0b8abff0f965f39e3f6519b
19bee07ce5f12e3aedd98c4bf8032567ac7f7157
6777 F20101202_AABNDP austin_c_Page_099thm.jpg
42da59c0221a30fab9d507d515a9886b
56e752d5783e3efd5cb2f18f10f25d7d190e9534
28349 F20101202_AABMYJ austin_c_Page_053.QC.jpg
56787ba9f739571ea103f7d115af0cb8
b61b782653ef82fde850e633602c3063ae5bb274
6755 F20101202_AABNED austin_c_Page_028thm.jpg
b55d528e830c939a4128980351c50e52
a8f6080bcff44c4c382bef32743dcdddd4db7711
107 F20101202_AABNDQ austin_c_Page_045.txt
56b6b0ba17a22e78ba8810a9829b6982
4e88b85baa123d8023c4d87f36c32dbd1101e0ae
6469 F20101202_AABMYK austin_c_Page_096thm.jpg
adfbbc0c8192fb39a4260d08852f356d
9e3d918ee4f565fcbf0ee0738a2d161ffb7e2830
F20101202_AABNEE austin_c_Page_050.tif
46945f26743ced63f1912c852898a665
1410d11495aaa5c36ca7c51d83a51de9e88dd56e
F20101202_AABNDR austin_c_Page_049.tif
d2911307033409079e455c1a1a56504c
24e61df07f86a36cb3616da7eb957de9237e8e15
2174 F20101202_AABMYL austin_c_Page_058.txt
7e4e3f1e02b60107e2f6e5ac3ae67d57
000b4c56137f515574e2df7e342e9c80a7d5c24c
8745 F20101202_AABNEF austin_c_Page_001.QC.jpg
03c328e7c3158f2570376f88ef969fc3
76cb24b347526a5b15b3ab9d01efa1d06b1486b3
2175 F20101202_AABMZA austin_c_Page_025.txt
f3c16d6924b8b0aa351a0911e66b1cf5
f8c0558ae546d44fdd0dff951869e0bf485ba6c1
2060 F20101202_AABNDS austin_c_Page_027.txt
d96e58a20e92a67796a623e8ffd48feb
15fc6b1b03875e5ce48d129886fa184833215d14
1051986 F20101202_AABMYM austin_c_Page_011.jp2
a28e81307840ef10025a18d976f8bfe2
f0a04e51e695ccada0bc290e77f7222079f13808
82277 F20101202_AABNEG austin_c_Page_003.jp2
4f6708214e8096c011306d56c6938cf9
ccb76efdc4a2c06c61a9739cce1ffb60864cfae1
F20101202_AABMZB austin_c_Page_016.tif
23ce29476a5ff23648c398ebea0d63cb
0a4c4b57df1bfb843132e40436bfe9dafaa55bac
1051977 F20101202_AABNDT austin_c_Page_081.jp2
507e02cc440de4dfaab3f910098c1cc4
ac7a8569764f2a4fe6ef4141775b80ba0cc740d7
2177 F20101202_AABMYN austin_c_Page_053.txt
47a823f18b25e0517e6470c66f349c54
9d1ca8ebccfd72ebdd10a99aa302162a8ba2055c
F20101202_AABNEH austin_c_Page_020.tif
31eefea2ed38db482ef298ee4a63893a
d86adcb63d39f2205dc632ca78d0194c534b0e78
F20101202_AABMZC austin_c_Page_038.tif
ae99e10cbaf897deb429778517a3782c
8ddd2233020f4164d0950a3f9be8eb352c88426f
F20101202_AABNDU austin_c_Page_035.tif
b28ea470963e3749ddd22c7df24df577
00cf2154dbfee88ff73a36b3504d1c4306f1cb53
624808 F20101202_AABMYO austin_c_Page_007.jp2
270ac7415a32bc025e80f71a82555fe4
a95d92c2c8a94a7758fdde8aa5d49240cc214c57
6482 F20101202_AABNEI austin_c_Page_077thm.jpg
1c8611a0606425d8e57c0858bad71c06
814894513d08ac52c21776d85d12a6cd84dedfe7
2115 F20101202_AABMZD austin_c_Page_052.txt
a50c729b1238a34c9b24e14497b57536
c725bb0faf5a25a4fff7cccb2501592897da9d3b
4107 F20101202_AABNDV austin_c_Page_008.QC.jpg
0ba7b324e226af0156e98e8ab1e49a7c
8249c5b79878c5cc133de3db3d0600bb7a937b2b
4694 F20101202_AABMYP austin_c_Page_090thm.jpg
ecbb546c3f0ccdb25ab2d4dc5db550be
7f3cfdf70722f093811e9999294e76f9fde61e15
F20101202_AABNEJ austin_c_Page_043.tif
21a3b37d047f33585e8bb29510b04bb7
a9d880dcee7fead517abae043284695f1f8498bf
F20101202_AABMZE austin_c_Page_050thm.jpg
ae9cb5a1a09287825973371a7fcca4e0
f1e1ecd1d298948d68488e2da43af42ab5438d35
6495 F20101202_AABNDW austin_c_Page_029thm.jpg
c83972da1f19b647fa74598d895a3678
9071353976358d3fb244138a877126c737a80935
1051979 F20101202_AABMYQ austin_c_Page_030.jp2
31bc5acd3cfa8cd451414f236051150e
d4cbe81e63b7c4aa7ff7539f075c372b26931a7f
F20101202_AABNEK austin_c_Page_023.txt
c4ba1eb52347583643886899f5b541ba
2580d6af79df9763e8e8044d789e4196f54085e2
F20101202_AABMZF austin_c_Page_055.tif
223c2c87f899d5caf67e225b4af568ac
34901ba5f943a0e59d52208190a711df31bea48d
1051916 F20101202_AABNDX austin_c_Page_033.jp2
ebcb801904c8c9860582c48e872e09eb
83cf6eb0e1b7a324bf61464e6c121ab771b9f853
F20101202_AABMYR austin_c_Page_065.jp2
e6d7757dd9f963e8b6deb76dd300073d
748d1908ed32f73b79c51e7007bc7abef49f01f4
79 F20101202_AABNEL austin_c_Page_002.txt
a2d1500393d87b6d5fee9618132542d8
1ecd171fd1b04896ba8802ba79e27965ee95de94
F20101202_AABMZG austin_c_Page_082.tif
565260ade4d039c3b751e9e4631bfc7b
431bbbae439230a62383a234592a72b6d36f300a
6923 F20101202_AABNDY austin_c_Page_064thm.jpg
8d7d0493e8b15b1d4239341a9e148a91
699766cb425460938a76c5c74572c5d0e1d7041a
25265604 F20101202_AABMYS austin_c_Page_069.tif
a4ad1aee6674478caf2d6c449b0798b2
aff9c9a5b835a00979d591bf23c58186367920c9
55569 F20101202_AABNFA austin_c_Page_042.pro
de31bbb86674b0406c408b0e84658818
0e453907d0c626536fd40a4d37c9f9d90a53ad99
28926 F20101202_AABNEM austin_c_Page_020.QC.jpg
5e69b6ea7c4b6a160f0f7fa18be120b6
7ea2b9040b8c934ecc159de036d5f1b6cd71e269
F20101202_AABMZH austin_c_Page_095.tif
833702c114bc08037cad44acaf8981e1
624b44404e4cdb3514c66382eb1281f4766711fa
27489 F20101202_AABNDZ austin_c_Page_098.QC.jpg
b11c52e6586f1292b91cb1833404303f
05fe00cc44d9a2a648e224719232884f054403eb
84007 F20101202_AABMYT austin_c_Page_012.jpg
deaf3386ba97f360d1420e60a1c297e2
8811f6345df05296b66481b06d80c4d757866b0b
F20101202_AABNFB austin_c_Page_090.txt
f96e831bf379c209d9769b50362f6da0
b98fb0aec9a36465e419749455f08b70caded7bc
3971 F20101202_AABNEN austin_c_Page_068thm.jpg
ac4998311c525a7642554fc636204033
6bd9e7ded6951bd479aa8004fa7f3a1e953c1f00
6487 F20101202_AABMZI austin_c_Page_030thm.jpg
e9ffe45485e5dfa03fc005dc5fed73bd
4b824aac69fef588776119482d3cbbb513dfb25e
363342 F20101202_AABNFC austin_c_Page_088.jp2
e28ec752c68495b9ae32388ec10825f6
c45939a661d3630e74cca0c698b43962fafb5f20
F20101202_AABNEO austin_c_Page_040.txt
1ea2e42cab0c3526a98f0fa1422780a6
dbf12b70af1a5a6a98c2a0fde89a9ae3ab0e7b81
29114 F20101202_AABMYU austin_c_Page_088.jpg
1b66b3ad71bc8f2ad434a0f229094e2e
882df507279b52749e2b2772921c2e35f4cd44c7
50231 F20101202_AABNFD austin_c_Page_012.pro
40a8470bc5547cb4e9f9786555a1d31d
0a994d054a2c4e8b3c3746a23eb67b893d074a8a
2134 F20101202_AABNEP austin_c_Page_086.txt
e914673b3139a62d7912c85f02ce90f5
703111dff980b60c44c8e2cd57cbda049c026982
1051943 F20101202_AABMZJ austin_c_Page_032.jp2
b9a8fd109c34fb1400a396f962b57221
eb598fc641fe6cae26356f9fb5581aafbb199697
1051914 F20101202_AABMYV austin_c_Page_046.jp2
ce36095ba93944c59f58391a188844e0
ac93812c1ed073939516766bd036f3a8554c9f6e
6535 F20101202_AABNFE austin_c_Page_039thm.jpg
26846e05fa8a208d15f3a1b9ab3bd1f8
ccb085bae5c2f07829177d9531f354f46e9264ae
10412 F20101202_AABNEQ austin_c_Page_073.QC.jpg
e15d3ab770a80a1062164fdcd7685853
efc6673c77f991523f72c515a6e7dd82df0cb85d
F20101202_AABMZK austin_c_Page_024.tif
0f4441f9437a43d645854fe70c3769fc
26941688e0cebac9d824447298a8f3c15f6ac4aa
F20101202_AABMYW austin_c_Page_096.tif
fa868b9cd61fde4cadfd4f7e96159210
af416b817c243c99286fb62157726699675696e9
13857 F20101202_AABNFF austin_c_Page_006.QC.jpg
16a26ba86ba236a872e50332ff5fe37d
1ef8cb0dbe7c6fa3a6e13aecb006c3afea0f8df3
3083 F20101202_AABNER austin_c_Page_056.QC.jpg
f79db939a654166d537d8f9d21203850
916cb3c9d3c2c75171f15dc7c8031af937a6f213
67440 F20101202_AABMZL austin_c_Page_097.pro
c34355e737820163ed9e78e0550e84c6
092db51fc720b95aac9839015737fb9ee9487393
37478 F20101202_AABMYX austin_c_Page_071.jpg
00277e12f7ab8c292421e6d740adea3a
2279ce1ab726cc11a89ee17af8235c3b0a2d0a9f
26570 F20101202_AABNFG austin_c_Page_015.QC.jpg
a1260db8bf7c0219807ee11bed61f31c
9597360f080569a47747005bbca492dddc5d8379
F20101202_AABNES austin_c_Page_064.jp2
037e8d1ecaccd15ae3affa9196bbf61c
52ec5e551719408ae8ed506d5f4e086fb834a6bf
6442 F20101202_AABMZM austin_c_Page_059thm.jpg
55b554c7c7935444c9eb7439a59807f6
67555e713ff3a6245f88d3f213dc8ab1f3b4a5df
F20101202_AABMYY austin_c_Page_004.txt
16b94b01c09a2d09f686044342b85940
2e48323629277736b0708608ae70d28966cedfae
27711 F20101202_AABNFH austin_c_Page_045.jpg
1dc6a1656515574b6d2b0e764dd3aa2f
967fc0adf80bb7bff9fb5146d76ce6511908dff1
2074 F20101202_AABNET austin_c_Page_061.txt
dd10bf528846fa5bc05fbbd33d6cd1e9
6b447548156bbe55648082d9c63b4c0c35407d21
27614 F20101202_AABMZN austin_c_Page_030.QC.jpg
8343d59693d6105cbc9cbb16e8e7b2cd
d51e5588712ec1703a3a4eebee329b99ad0a6abe
3109 F20101202_AABMYZ austin_c_Page_089.txt
c0332f1be41c8f7b3eb76f2fb471adfc
882d52a0a8682401e8a4abae0460618139a7cab0
88020 F20101202_AABNFI austin_c_Page_086.jpg
75f7e18e307f2fa7d72cc2be323e77b5
82e8f0c12a17f3baadb09c4a3b8d563ee3c818d6
1051985 F20101202_AABNEU austin_c_Page_050.jp2
bf530505c70d7b19897084314e230de6
4b8a75dd5232ab0b0088c27e422e7f5091273c7e
49225 F20101202_AABMZO austin_c_Page_009.pro
d9cf923f6c62eb82d1c495ad340a9b4a
e27ccec5d47d04536e7e446e41e006310fa81223
26798 F20101202_AABNFJ austin_c_Page_037.QC.jpg
693bd4d6516c682f74cde72351da17b1
2102d7b245c64678cf80daade38b4bfa42024fe9
2451 F20101202_AABNEV austin_c_Page_094.txt
9e8b1b87a1d3c4793cc250cec08ad930
ca8ce6c75fb2f53106b003d2e45bd2b672131db2
89759 F20101202_AABMZP austin_c_Page_036.jpg
89d0539aa78f57d9700234b6288afb3e
1b4df7ce97445410709302cfebb74875095e10a6
28026 F20101202_AABNFK austin_c_Page_023.QC.jpg
84f5a34d7b111e0d582231534dfdcf5c
9b36c0e8b42723d8912bfc786a00d9658367391b
F20101202_AABNEW austin_c_Page_022.tif
cd73f99aa031064bdd75e0c87d0aedde
003e91bfb64d265ab2faa36d20c7672d6995f0d7
6863 F20101202_AABMZQ austin_c_Page_085thm.jpg
38e291f255326de564d067895281ccdf
3867ca2198252093761df35186fdccf625920938
3601 F20101202_AABNGA austin_c_Page_002.jpg
df21129e1b10cdfe7cf672c4d539ad55
6c6561fb3ae9776f5ce672294d86addb83f64d66
34777 F20101202_AABNFL austin_c_Page_073.jpg
14a3400d0db85b9e11a2760033c9cc8b
2cd93932c5397e44b3f885719cc35bc24add60b0
1051889 F20101202_AABNEX austin_c_Page_082.jp2
60f39ff72bde9463330fda385144ee79
9176ab713c0198c6dd42228cbdd233a87ead3f5a
818 F20101202_AABMZR austin_c_Page_056thm.jpg
7a77f249249971af023e1d1f993d5a47
53eabb5785a2eb68456c5233646afd020db6aa69
96219 F20101202_AABNFM austin_c_Page_099.jpg
8474e7499c3ae9aad109ebbd540457b7
be2337c04acd9f036733106fa7a5bcb1be6bfa82
91991 F20101202_AABNEY austin_c_Page_014.jpg
56b4ef01d901c038615e5518dea14e50
786facc648e0bbf58f57d4d52dc3a2b002db7b75
6611 F20101202_AABMZS austin_c_Page_048thm.jpg
3c5fe54e365fe6a4367756a41f6973f8
212c3fd145d83a66a4d22d123a0d9593acb4924b
8337 F20101202_AABNGB austin_c_Page_003.jpg
47423e27c4e52af40ebb7235d6ab54b6
1bf6537da8d164a341e26be2f38fe46f2d2509cf
24276 F20101202_AABNFN austin_c_Page_074.QC.jpg
76758c27ba5cfc0a4a96485c75b474b3
0ae6d37b3a7948bf8763b099c89c7a0cd8fd3917
1051928 F20101202_AABNEZ austin_c_Page_012.jp2
045d00c6b6fffd675fced847947ce6c9
29eba002f451dd1fd3fab3a4c76d56f0ea1870e6
6707 F20101202_AABMZT austin_c_Page_076thm.jpg
ef92ad898dc7e45b9b36ebc5c3a3a956
91c624dc6de567a409c55891d09a176584309dd6
78278 F20101202_AABNGC austin_c_Page_004.jpg
e5c5e47ca839a333575a55040e50883f
f4488e8a1a070c6b34a0cd97fbbe42e2cd202600
1817 F20101202_AABNFO austin_c_Page_054.txt
a68db69c37a6eea29663083d8612a05d
64c2611bf4cf681ce20bfae5cc524af17614e434
4631 F20101202_AABMZU austin_c_Page_005thm.jpg
93cec11735ce54a52a94a36c33eed888
3f1df1112b817060bdaaa294dcd6659e89798154
92354 F20101202_AABNGD austin_c_Page_005.jpg
81ba07018ad53e66c6901b91c9e8cdaa
1f59a36976bc4722f6f5fabd13a6f7972c6188fa
6735 F20101202_AABNFP austin_c_Page_094thm.jpg
86092b4789cf8387c4036ce7b1c0d444
287075a9a8be39a73d2d1694d1b434819153a2a3
64408 F20101202_AABNGE austin_c_Page_006.jpg
987971b33ea820ced6218bd31de2177f
5e710ff3331553d3a1dea73b260d234048c62fc9
27056 F20101202_AABNFQ austin_c_Page_011.QC.jpg
23316976b675a74620653dcbb3c1d943
423caecbd73e37879f81e43cee2de9a4a48e7aed
88991 F20101202_AABMZV austin_c_Page_079.jpg
6b0cf93365da016084d686cb3ebb593f
c85ac306c8d653326e2c4a16d7b613438c2f9715
27773 F20101202_AABNGF austin_c_Page_007.jpg
0f25b8836ff6cebaa0938f2bc2430b6a
6adddf8c3fb027d67f02edfe8ac97aa4c66b35d3
92042 F20101202_AABNFR austin_c_Page_083.jpg
01cb5b172765e8d0ee1aaadd76689297
2cf930bf3ff979ea938bb09e60f55ef27e596b3a
2124 F20101202_AABMZW austin_c_Page_032.txt
06847a629ae8a8b3930049cda14ab524
56137eda0eee4967189d57855d0e9a4157279622
91744 F20101202_AABNFS austin_c_Page_087.jpg
7d40cdf281b9e9c501605061cbd1cc05
dafb3cea52bdd5f797e140bc7b8f3e8078dfe977
F20101202_AABMZX austin_c_Page_057.tif
29d751e1c3d022b7ebe74a48d04adff3
318ca6141d0844c2ea3b6d6d647ebd06d71ab1a7
12815 F20101202_AABNGG austin_c_Page_008.jpg
3e73794a4da9eb6cfa7d09781b63ecd9
baed1d534193b7f257328c3abff0742dfc4ac86e
87254 F20101202_AABNFT austin_c_Page_066.jpg
db2219fc7d5954c2ed5149ace478a8ca
93eed5d58d3c4f1eb9ade47a53d5ca6d6b28445c
6319 F20101202_AABMZY austin_c_Page_037thm.jpg
3cd00d5f7601083816cd23a7c75da434
fea51f5f3e980ba31fff232e1352f69d0ba06307
87701 F20101202_AABNGH austin_c_Page_009.jpg
af176fe222b79a1534959237da02f893
0605aa65971c717d6d53bd6e6b5591c9a1aef758
2845 F20101202_AABNFU austin_c_Page_073thm.jpg
02396293bdcc8cd28bbb4a39653265de
cabb22814a80fb94a0f47559922528866d774677
F20101202_AABMZZ austin_c_Page_080.txt
de4cf86c7293313a9131adcf05f0202b
c5feef4f56b22253c167a3f6f840c995b8925326
43944 F20101202_AABNGI austin_c_Page_010.jpg
35f3f779563be7cf463bc6335347cd6b
4b9c75ec167eec57ba1284b74076d990213f13f2
2140 F20101202_AABNFV austin_c_Page_033.txt
235313204e2239988e5a24d86e9f88db
3d0577943f05fb7d205e183746f4698ac6111559
87515 F20101202_AABNGJ austin_c_Page_011.jpg
6d0a6cb3255fb57eb17d6958aacf5079
556b8263e716600ecb2d01789ac385671e313505
119167 F20101202_AABNFW UFE0022429_00001.mets
716ff1a31a7f243db8f890ab7d795576
05553f6210409d3bdd08731140fa3c69ff54db56
87597 F20101202_AABNGK austin_c_Page_013.jpg
575144f73b88fa2e24f7df3784d97c56
60d23511d60f5245e18a472ac94024110f7f11fe
89873 F20101202_AABNHA austin_c_Page_031.jpg
e02f45b190639b0acbcfae3284eaa3cf
167a35949a6659863dc12c11a6dbee933f41ec78
84134 F20101202_AABNGL austin_c_Page_015.jpg
5000108145cc7479002975c12aced450
a5ca58cfc5b1b95b67acf6318d7b7b0675e26b51
88617 F20101202_AABNHB austin_c_Page_032.jpg
bdaf562feb822595b9577fbb4c5b9056
aec3ae551ce33d98f224ad5ca38cf038a0e8f17f
89022 F20101202_AABNGM austin_c_Page_016.jpg
696cfa2303b65d7cc82f6215eacc9b6c
88a5f0a1f1619573e1723d9c6dcea0cff9827c28
30657 F20101202_AABNFZ austin_c_Page_001.jpg
74b81aac588754161e655759e7277b61
1d2fca2c3be889aed895cd4618cc75b79c46639b
91765 F20101202_AABNGN austin_c_Page_017.jpg
d038a1a50647802731b5e54d70ec1ca1
a4c027e940ab8ec5df5612eb1901d74f6ead00c4
89283 F20101202_AABNHC austin_c_Page_033.jpg
c5edad7c5942e2d1ed01450fbbd38af9
1fbb4db6963234b41f31f36307e8321c60265f07
89138 F20101202_AABNGO austin_c_Page_018.jpg
d7ae8d4b661661ac2111ab81999b73d2
7247552e064def628f1418db79c7910bbc1469f1
89652 F20101202_AABNHD austin_c_Page_034.jpg
d01743d7531ca43ff990702b89223691
81f12ac2398599e209951e1a2bbd2dd01a91bf7f
88830 F20101202_AABNGP austin_c_Page_019.jpg
37846b35367ea92d15c0aa727e01ae11
e2cc0575052969af56e1e131227fea72322c7e84
86845 F20101202_AABNHE austin_c_Page_035.jpg
0b65a2876a29568d027841ecdb60dbc7
afad800b635d3b68be0d521f0f84301580b1326b
92726 F20101202_AABNGQ austin_c_Page_020.jpg
05ba1e2132ee5a87799cadce81ac19df
09b44624d88af94edf84bf9ea6170adaa7f3ff59
93539 F20101202_AABNHF austin_c_Page_039.jpg
b83c52135356bc7bac643ab04474524a
edee473d1d66a1c2db288783c214abdc8837d9a6
90117 F20101202_AABNGR austin_c_Page_021.jpg
ae1c9fdbd1b17db24e49379970dda26f
1817e8a16806c90f778fee18b0638d1a2c70b56d
88817 F20101202_AABNHG austin_c_Page_040.jpg
1a5017babb1ae199ec808a89274fce49
66064cc237bb669dfff0cd70b073b701dd2f21b8
90458 F20101202_AABNGS austin_c_Page_022.jpg
690b0e12a88cc8951186e042ad97793f
c04ac3c9923f97fb4ec2a7f0318afa60126efad5
91275 F20101202_AABNHH austin_c_Page_041.jpg
aa01e7f7e29b7ada0e76425b55604ddc
b8e587492902a76aac4f61f2501809612ab3b238
88815 F20101202_AABNGT austin_c_Page_023.jpg
b63de6b45471892fa0d0eef62f6fcb7c
e37ba037ee633a1cea4596b2e419460e50c07448
91459 F20101202_AABNHI austin_c_Page_043.jpg
08ffd302523a240a2402d5e1927f5bc9
74aea4700c30fcb3ab9c52e41dfb5d4999d93e74
90030 F20101202_AABNGU austin_c_Page_024.jpg
f77ef590c0cc8a2c0e0b61310bb6099b
d285cb474800e0434a6f41255181d010fb497617
85449 F20101202_AABNHJ austin_c_Page_044.jpg
af3e1454cce804c8013f2adc76b03a2c
669c73365a30acc2c183a43a8e596de96cffca06
90252 F20101202_AABNGV austin_c_Page_025.jpg
e65eb2cf0247a6b02ad0d277bac089e6
21bc72fbb9e8e6646694c51594b6eeb85daa7397
95976 F20101202_AABNHK austin_c_Page_046.jpg
b57e45cc1c747dc836cd8a761861503d
589fc7b88aef7aed1377f714554f2ebda6bf45f2
90141 F20101202_AABNGW austin_c_Page_026.jpg
8329256b970fdf5360972454e718df7a
a8cc2e4369ade599eea35b4f033f4676f3c888e0
85354 F20101202_AABNIA austin_c_Page_065.jpg
0b838be85eac03a9c3d8d9bd26329a24
7ec5834242c8a834bc867834c200d8de369d1d5d
89312 F20101202_AABNHL austin_c_Page_048.jpg
d8518bfacdf22930bcbb1dd59dd8f22c
6f162e379ddaaab9ce5f3671a13b25394c5ea4c6
91920 F20101202_AABNGX austin_c_Page_028.jpg
fa93483fcd549be689666fcd23598f00
7bfd575b68cffb78f88e9f20405d9d8f7bf1eeac
88792 F20101202_AABNIB austin_c_Page_067.jpg
af177c5a1a731f7261f538b02fb72027
960f7e414e0d33c518bfee56a6e34a04f6c6e34a
97022 F20101202_AABNHM austin_c_Page_049.jpg
62b48227717f7f2ec69ec779e39919c6
11af5f6268a6ad01c51cbb9732dbe8f6ab9b888f
88256 F20101202_AABNGY austin_c_Page_029.jpg
54cc9a19ca4bf5cc6aaf709092c5100d
e85961cd68bd76bb6d880bffc5553e91612eb126
55011 F20101202_AABNIC austin_c_Page_068.jpg
b96b0a705b1eba86859899d78e5cca73
fd802dca1ece4f57beaac6b2ad5e3159f593969e
90501 F20101202_AABNHN austin_c_Page_050.jpg
cac63bfd33685501c7ca2e92dfa250ae
e54fa41d1572b3e82a45423e19932b4c2843bb37
89538 F20101202_AABNGZ austin_c_Page_030.jpg
ba2900baa69690ec33feff6df50af3c5
2294fe9db6bffc139feb03b64141c36a363834c0
76279 F20101202_AABNHO austin_c_Page_051.jpg
d140c648069619860f4ee1cc4f5456f3
932b643fcee88b3c2e9eea4c5d082f82cc026bc8
37540 F20101202_AABNID austin_c_Page_070.jpg
2e12c8d543b4a847eab75cb76141dce2
12f129e9fcf56b21fa0cb25b2310a760389120ba
88409 F20101202_AABNHP austin_c_Page_052.jpg
79997edfaa621322dd346e75617032f9
8c8e526e3c0d47022a9568be78aea58bf59e5f37
58272 F20101202_AABNIE austin_c_Page_072.jpg
1e9b13523b7521a58ad1170db04c8513
8d752cce2a1e20ff4c6942515bc40404c7f7a7bb
90441 F20101202_AABNHQ austin_c_Page_053.jpg
b6007318304f7001f9e95a7ce2de6413
b8669c7b0dbfa11e3375c187d14d5ccbffc10f48
78080 F20101202_AABNIF austin_c_Page_074.jpg
7764a4a6600bab3480e5b7a5a9cce7af
de10571206d3cda92c6850e0cc080115a860950b
73413 F20101202_AABNHR austin_c_Page_054.jpg
01e5b5287fc6e78d001149ac46488f69
938d9de2d6f47fe901dc92c7a99943d114dfb075
88772 F20101202_AABNIG austin_c_Page_075.jpg
1f7bf857c2ab9d14f012548ee012f8b1
2f687577989327bfc4c79845751e50089f11fe8a
81490 F20101202_AABNHS austin_c_Page_055.jpg
c56d0342f6780519273225562f12505e
569f622b86c6205a90069844a6345318712fb2c1
89591 F20101202_AABNIH austin_c_Page_077.jpg
992479ddee2bb05922487d31fc7e2b8d
63ae942f5c5ee539210353a4492ba80464f09f28
8603 F20101202_AABNHT austin_c_Page_056.jpg
8662e9610574f4fb804c232bf21fffd8
f7dbb1425f8dc532ea2ddda4ab28a969b83aa6a5
92036 F20101202_AABNII austin_c_Page_078.jpg
911c21fb248596b2888ac15de0810348
c0d2bf13fb483a8b1186f8d54b4b6244f2fe0515
33732 F20101202_AABNHU austin_c_Page_057.jpg
c15a4c562ee84d65fc543e7be8f249db
524a5da7779919c514327f64dfde5446755ba105
89308 F20101202_AABNIJ austin_c_Page_080.jpg
7fb3123daaf68bb7bf3771411eeb21e1
6aef5a4b63bc5eba88a6600877353d162b22f830
86467 F20101202_AABNHV austin_c_Page_058.jpg
937992e9c0d6d3ef4c150ff204c45b4d
be529cbc1cf2f30c4b70db5fa016d5b4c44c2784
85644 F20101202_AABNIK austin_c_Page_082.jpg
db44d1904e6fea124376f23c21b4cef2
a5148f8cdd0ee83362b6c93c291119c1a3de5df4
88608 F20101202_AABNHW austin_c_Page_059.jpg
f82837f540699c86bdc3d96ad385e002
57314acd3b6211438ebcf3905cc153f1dabc30d9
97773 F20101202_AABNIL austin_c_Page_084.jpg
67e7f7e5069b42b89e88ced1a857f258
bfc4bc6db3428a734e691178bc5b4b6c3fa2e3ad
84942 F20101202_AABNHX austin_c_Page_061.jpg
b99ae890f576844ffc28633c865ad606
c2506d4f35ea298fefff775198fcc435ba7f4d3d
1051949 F20101202_AABNJA austin_c_Page_013.jp2
79bfa543f778e3512193eb86fb56b573
de2774c774a27a54d59c804457fe33eb83884b19
86512 F20101202_AABNIM austin_c_Page_090.jpg
b4f462fd8c8e7e4a532e14a6808b75b0
43257283420ac794f508f4deeae6af9d702c71e6
87643 F20101202_AABNHY austin_c_Page_063.jpg
47a91bdd5127b1cd8058ec5733dc68da
bf25f8d3759a551269a526054d9c7befd5e949e8
1051962 F20101202_AABNJB austin_c_Page_014.jp2
79e650bb81517ad043af6da15ae6ad8d
ba2c90e51ac47f456515dc65692e84da1ac42df5
83620 F20101202_AABNIN austin_c_Page_091.jpg
002cdcce93e32a97465f799e61173772
2e5ae395ab202d38b28cb5a4f9b6a5c49d0d8cd4
91566 F20101202_AABNHZ austin_c_Page_064.jpg
c5e095bd3c6772a8b3f58a6f01a06f9f
4e548a65d9d2379ef7618044a18d4d177ff1d3cf
1051972 F20101202_AABNJC austin_c_Page_015.jp2
60d7d1eed2340fa691068bf6ba9a714f
d8ce4c8ee731f32fb7682932bb614816d77b7729
47197 F20101202_AABNIO austin_c_Page_092.jpg
3739d2ff0198a9ae3f835c6330c658b4
4fbce744960aae240acbd4c1a1012d6c6c845077
1051910 F20101202_AABNJD austin_c_Page_016.jp2
73727ff7e5adff46e2510ea2ceaf39cb
8c700c6d52f48224dfc231fb5a9eed65a969d2c8
97149 F20101202_AABNIP austin_c_Page_094.jpg
0e1df79ea03b88bc0331f4907b5703fb
6ba868c648bc94145b285a043b943385eb17ae46
102974 F20101202_AABNIQ austin_c_Page_096.jpg
27c8c4318f91d8b4b8be0dd217d418b3
b5280409b77973dc2c1099bf4488872d4fa7b064
F20101202_AABNJE austin_c_Page_017.jp2
2f29d6476e7ba452bb1f2adeadfe913c
6f12a212f50a529e8e94546e0524ac31f1b4066b
107123 F20101202_AABNIR austin_c_Page_097.jpg
39a9a39a00df69bc202bd11770c56d0b
ed0a8eed0f78ac8a5ef33c8c46020e2a8daa0c76
F20101202_AABNJF austin_c_Page_018.jp2
5069a4b98ec9c225a01438320a8b1bc6
ea79ee4c17db574dc49df69fd5d2c4e69fc3fea3
100186 F20101202_AABNIS austin_c_Page_098.jpg
e6d77cd99649d65fce6f7fabf0325745
fd0bfac5fcdcba244ba1bd881755c5000c0404c6
1051980 F20101202_AABNJG austin_c_Page_019.jp2
3b9decfee79006fab7018f5eb3de0e21
668183f3ef55cbe7bae3139f2c8570b6d15340fb
99837 F20101202_AABNIT austin_c_Page_100.jpg
d8c21e0017b4c19d9b8b8b575e3f9e47
8efb08e0a39fc767f08794b10d54229dcb829888
1051899 F20101202_AABNJH austin_c_Page_020.jp2
976d5f03b11c89d6d48115f3ecf1f310
f71d4cc9f92e4ade0f0666679fe186108e32c5a4
87706 F20101202_AABNIU austin_c_Page_101.jpg
026c288c1926d62ca8b12786a9c37288
7c78196c60263fd855573de46230c95c3f455674
1051932 F20101202_AABNJI austin_c_Page_021.jp2
7e71a4a764c42712f4621bba072a806c
36d54c6e1d8b6c57cdc86a061e6c533bbb9cef38
26259 F20101202_AABNIV austin_c_Page_002.jp2
e880a854793f2403ef3fd1d3e142396e
019d8d5790da8f806377ab775f1d8992d824eee4
1051965 F20101202_AABNJJ austin_c_Page_022.jp2
f0f3c6870f0abf8aaf8e9513b9acd93e
b7fa56be6dfc50edea55e5bfc1024de8f8e301c3
1044907 F20101202_AABNIW austin_c_Page_004.jp2
843a2b08c7146c15e1d3935bc9b12e6f
1cfdf38a37fdcebb0b9e473baf1fbb803d8583a4
1051933 F20101202_AABNJK austin_c_Page_023.jp2
7d9e5d64ed5151f8a253fa31d1b2b886
b1fbf81a3db9f0226b98f5406257c55ed8a83483
230414 F20101202_AABNIX austin_c_Page_008.jp2
93ae2407567d4c9488a5940e045f23fb
6f748bced2b85686dee920ad70acff152eeebeec
1051959 F20101202_AABNKA austin_c_Page_048.jp2
09dbea685cd6803551b2c38a7a2e1948
b411426bd8084aa351f81d6907bbc375688945e9
1051922 F20101202_AABNJL austin_c_Page_024.jp2
61bcd76cb9f3f68488cbc20f9b144361
a847c9e8a3591c3fa6d6c809da4fa4db99e9c555
1051909 F20101202_AABNIY austin_c_Page_009.jp2
87795a61956a34c9487514cc0a813f1d
b1654dfa2c65b7d3823aeb2637c0b3c49ecdc4f6
1051957 F20101202_AABNKB austin_c_Page_049.jp2
7a216f93ec6ee391fea596d8cb4f2b51
055ad579b1a6789c87fe110ff3519e563bbc735a
F20101202_AABNJM austin_c_Page_026.jp2
dc4b8ef4b1d6ed8db916c48c11bb3c79
f0ccaea4795dcaca76bbc4b134aca225b79b35e8
572474 F20101202_AABNIZ austin_c_Page_010.jp2
1158a322f1990470deb23977e43cfda1
df100ee876af1ecf284d1f9e87da14d125363b03
1051970 F20101202_AABNKC austin_c_Page_051.jp2
f3eb2d1570a71266e61c85d35d9130ce
8bcbfda501203081d8c5136642437eb291dd6f9b
F20101202_AABNJN austin_c_Page_029.jp2
6a6b843f978d6d7eb5f1c289f19f973c
c2a41489bddbeb9f3cffc7b244011181d52f5cbd
F20101202_AABNKD austin_c_Page_052.jp2
241015eb286461deb467f2a31d44331f
572098efed4e181faa1230cf0bc89efefaa3261b
F20101202_AABNJO austin_c_Page_031.jp2
d54316602bf555e69cfd5bdc43ad9891
d71df4fecbc2994b6eaae8977b043b329758f180
1051953 F20101202_AABNKE austin_c_Page_053.jp2
7dd3fd890135dd3280a2a204455b5b15
66a5ad0b7ab1436aa2673ec9de59d75651f8c94f
1051937 F20101202_AABNJP austin_c_Page_034.jp2
ba77dfbed9720ba7e7ac9a8c35bd426c
84ffbe9cf817fbf83ff5e795f5ec1b0eb84debf4
1051929 F20101202_AABNJQ austin_c_Page_036.jp2
403aebe6346d2f628e2f1c128a536a4c
a262e9c3b38080b0990d492052cd2c06fcca92cf
1001845 F20101202_AABNKF austin_c_Page_054.jp2
24811253fd4ea0064469e2c7836532f3
b233494c0fc3a0e0693f51f190419a7e952928ec
1051976 F20101202_AABNJR austin_c_Page_037.jp2
e6715a75b16e8717583687d3b24d1223
bcaa4a72d7e39532d3d487c937bf2c548c46201d
1051945 F20101202_AABNKG austin_c_Page_055.jp2
ea1529ab16270872a4da3435a9c33c56
01352244d90f772cbab4e6447043f38808556db2
1051966 F20101202_AABNJS austin_c_Page_038.jp2
53093eeed6020fe6f3cef765e940b6ee
f79f21b2c9c8c43e2fcf3648e2de39f9938f5e20
88972 F20101202_AABNKH austin_c_Page_056.jp2
7abcbaca514117f71b1d571ac3efd605
003028863b6a0ccd7315ac1fbe4ae2a6534fa3fe
1051938 F20101202_AABNJT austin_c_Page_040.jp2
4d86e9ae2591b195ec4b8db5963061df
9f335f4d9784b257fdb7ca21d24d6f4604b29950
409993 F20101202_AABNKI austin_c_Page_057.jp2
1e385e4a9b902ea9fa885d205863b313
888ce4c0ee8a1c951ee226aa5161ff405d953bd2
F20101202_AABNJU austin_c_Page_041.jp2
043cd087cf72fea97434508dd3a1919d
30992fefff9197821db41c4ae123e3f3bf392502
F20101202_AABNKJ austin_c_Page_058.jp2
cf81fa69bcdc70be47ecc9775b0bf2cf
540256d461e338788d7fcb3c4304922ea573842a
F20101202_AABNJV austin_c_Page_042.jp2
9d99f7a129094092d455c4c1eb3a22e7
59babd930c67572a27eedce4ef8806e9e0f6d209
1051971 F20101202_AABNKK austin_c_Page_059.jp2
5620a3556a636cfa71df167a4c0fa202
ee5e73f50c23f1f96b20f159b7e5df499350983a
1051879 F20101202_AABNJW austin_c_Page_043.jp2
229955907643272a4ecdb3cf925ab72c
d3030ae3afe49946c415e2e235392d4fbafa899f
1051913 F20101202_AABNLA austin_c_Page_078.jp2
164754172f272bebeae4ae849855de7b
d779ddee7f9136a5c2f42edcfbdde5619d0d1f19
F20101202_AABNKL austin_c_Page_060.jp2
aeec4e330746ef3b32db25ca5a7eb684
53cfaba14a36d6759d9a00a57ad024e53821fc64
1051967 F20101202_AABNJX austin_c_Page_044.jp2
d3d4a018738720d78c1c47cc55f0c92a
38793f1005490d755f2ec6792fd70a88c2ea4a13
F20101202_AABNLB austin_c_Page_079.jp2
2d7652a14f00d48cad3779073159e948
0530237c1a3c9c504ff8909b6bb9393ac8838000
F20101202_AABNKM austin_c_Page_061.jp2
bc9f086d83863a92abda91e85dc23c85
06cfd1e148533a19f04e8a7c8c86f425ef0f78bd
291247 F20101202_AABNJY austin_c_Page_045.jp2
81ce37a4078f4aef8a16dc6e77ca8e6c
b5bc54bbdbea3e3e55970e1d2a8ce923f5120cda
1051983 F20101202_AABNLC austin_c_Page_080.jp2
031e56a51e9e82ca3bf74f0e1b00a732
6c1a8f038285df9427a98f4bcb623c7a2153ac78
F20101202_AABNKN austin_c_Page_062.jp2
52c0fbb3485efa6dce89b9683f9e26b3
4b485bfb9618d0215d7640c25b7497b4f682996c
1051968 F20101202_AABNJZ austin_c_Page_047.jp2
153705ce4f619e4ce2bae9d393643d85
bbb4d4f6281f8201e9665044c0b1d138823ecbb7
F20101202_AABNLD austin_c_Page_083.jp2
ef951a32fe088f9aed396fade3a43895
a37cebc5f3dc192a3aee039ebaa4020708b55b3b
1051975 F20101202_AABNKO austin_c_Page_063.jp2
0734b0f838daf1a1fc8554de0b611c7b
fea5a8cab3bba97bd294dcb99349b5c13a074cfa
F20101202_AABNKP austin_c_Page_066.jp2
c1f7b791f265dd412ec7c882002d9394
c9938947e1c8e12ad8623ee494f7d6d53e1e6944
1051974 F20101202_AABNLE austin_c_Page_084.jp2
956c09c07526542e3e6f54413a4514b9
62294b49fa685613178c2008359e36e4f8c3d880
F20101202_AABNKQ austin_c_Page_067.jp2
6baef1cde63d51fdfd26673157f818f4
d39ac6150b5489f818901ef02bbe0cd300ea0455
1051919 F20101202_AABNLF austin_c_Page_085.jp2
9f4c4140b125c18489993288f42712d2
e95b42c9e5633bb4c6970a693ea2511628fee88a
968608 F20101202_AABNKR austin_c_Page_069.jp2
b0aa6aa37b8a5b22981084c41df935a8
e03a4527a59c1515f2ee6d530b68ea7487d0438d
735001 F20101202_AABNKS austin_c_Page_070.jp2
0661761438773fb45ee47c1f03482cc9
30bb7eb71f594189dea9990b0f1b6905a499881a
1051982 F20101202_AABNLG austin_c_Page_086.jp2
8c662096dbd19c24441aecfdf506900a
18cec5348b6fd11ce0e5c1da906102bb493861cb
734605 F20101202_AABNKT austin_c_Page_071.jp2
08c359b52b761372b2beba6c0c9c50b1
159747a2ffc10d5f0727d1d08bc6b64029fad87a
F20101202_AABNLH austin_c_Page_089.jp2
f822b636e1ef61f848b71c670b1d01d6
bbd24b3038573a36909d6aaf3debe30676a2330b
667288 F20101202_AABNKU austin_c_Page_072.jp2
039250ddcd09797209a3400d0ee55b3c
d9bf4554990b804fedac126c1506f0ea3a39b06d
F20101202_AABNLI austin_c_Page_090.jp2
aed39c2221a8bee6ed03f47c01aceab1
019be84fb10676e017b2aa5dd46707bfadc2f7f3
396210 F20101202_AABNKV austin_c_Page_073.jp2
db84ab4c486eefbbe6c87f1432e0c531
531d0526062d7775253a57b58e04d8918504ac35
1051934 F20101202_AABNLJ austin_c_Page_091.jp2
6a6de3fd6a5c52b085df0486a2a8ee64
3894b9d9ba36480a75d108179f6959a0df47509c
1051961 F20101202_AABNKW austin_c_Page_074.jp2
b62996bdf68f0bccc9b11d22b21cec96
cbeb6f7073a957d52d05bb5c8528865940fd671d
618058 F20101202_AABNLK austin_c_Page_092.jp2
a0346fd9d7d09f48146ae9093842c5b4
5f109f8cb4c5123f52fa88d52cf5259be8ef6cf9
F20101202_AABNKX austin_c_Page_075.jp2
0d190da8b6e5fd7966fdf500b9087fe4
8c08427f88268f09598dfdbf0c90fca66291fbef
F20101202_AABNMA austin_c_Page_009.tif
5ecdea9eb48d25e84f0a36be8399f0dd
9530965037bddc72ba0ac5d9130b2aa881da0039
F20101202_AABNLL austin_c_Page_093.jp2
5439c9acfcff3f4e8b7312e24d219565
9ae2664b264e1a306295a82d3bc840364f8c87d5
F20101202_AABNKY austin_c_Page_076.jp2
8fa3e4bc3c30134fb8555040a3473cd5
0d46d3f4a4d10c805c63ace59b037a5b8b351b12
F20101202_AABNMB austin_c_Page_010.tif
8292524cd774f72cd65d0d145350a1c8
b7a1b1bece0f048127a03a6c54c4c2d96920673d
F20101202_AABNLM austin_c_Page_094.jp2
ff5d8a07c2b1876b7beb7b1d071824bf
bd43d9420a476c0b928ae081876559be1fb67504
F20101202_AABNKZ austin_c_Page_077.jp2
df02e09b7e509e3b794ecf6f1e8c66c9
a06d645fb6080119e41e770a4c5487b242db037a
F20101202_AABNMC austin_c_Page_011.tif
9fa20d8b93986294ba006a2804373395
0c546638a7528bb31c6ef99f883941a15d4468da
F20101202_AABNLN austin_c_Page_095.jp2
2eb6e78466f9eb2e397893738bd42f40
5fe983f9368ef662c9b76ae3c19d924af4c45302
F20101202_AABNMD austin_c_Page_012.tif
82cbd72cfad41934a44288a6cd923031
6ccc0b77e403a8cd1dbffe935b6fcc5497ce5d5d
1051941 F20101202_AABNLO austin_c_Page_097.jp2
19e2f77e347658c46dfb930c7136e480
f5beecbeb5a29829ae919485743369b0cd4fcf00
F20101202_AABNME austin_c_Page_013.tif
f5b60571c2a46f258f472747fda7e6b4
412c76c5d1428242525ff0ff31b9cccc119feb9b
1051952 F20101202_AABNLP austin_c_Page_098.jp2
c482f6e67c721668529a15bb76fbda75
faee0f2931ed74432bf6fea04344d601c150c44a
F20101202_AABNMF austin_c_Page_014.tif
0e326ea5f82da6a5c3edfeef419ee19c
e3ba740fc1e72c6a3ce2ff766fb53368e31760b0
F20101202_AABNLQ austin_c_Page_099.jp2
2726ffd110d3abd714662dcb6b4027ff
c3a131c6bf3ceb3ccff6f4469bed3e77b95d8ee7
F20101202_AABNMG austin_c_Page_015.tif
35c8b05f9faea66a3236d56dec059a69
b11bba651bb9e594b3a8a88c12158b6d2520a5bc
1051850 F20101202_AABNLR austin_c_Page_100.jp2
bffe40c417919eeb78d9fa731a93e15d
b288dda36f2cd1a52aeb96a0ef7a0c760d4cacf7
F20101202_AABNLS austin_c_Page_101.jp2
45636f8f98692af37b994ef06329d676
45ae92d87b4a813179fc42103ff2d403a0bbcb3b
F20101202_AABNMH austin_c_Page_017.tif
973167f43f242638913e08e811994284
d86f9805dd86e5214e2c47158b7689ee569503de
1051964 F20101202_AABNLT austin_c_Page_102.jp2
ab58505e76bbcb2e7dc5e93c8f6d7021
f5fe5cdba69fd769c0a917e7fbdea5bda1a560f9
F20101202_AABNMI austin_c_Page_018.tif
e94b30ecf886bd2d1b3e186ec123fdfe
707840a23d8e5421d9ed6e1838aacc9c25dba46b
F20101202_AABNLU austin_c_Page_001.tif
16520511175d152af24bdf3c2c7b3cec
87538d92d4ce5a99cc5dcb42f168d8448cbcb9ae
F20101202_AABNMJ austin_c_Page_019.tif
3ea7c965d45d3e4d0980849826c8ff43
b431414fef129de105655e912fd16c97ae43103d
F20101202_AABNLV austin_c_Page_002.tif
f7b6488c08300ecfb60867b39e0205ef
7bbe0572302069bbf4960d7556c83362b6270037
F20101202_AABNMK austin_c_Page_021.tif
d71729c6c968cce343e5154f30704771
d8e677f503e3b41b3ac3e545cbe972e9e14d46cb
F20101202_AABNLW austin_c_Page_004.tif
e326d7ad907216aea781ba0e5fb2b6ea
5ee37c20e2f845a98cef226279c562ca6298a3fc
F20101202_AABNNA austin_c_Page_041.tif
9f37d2f7d14984aeff46a85312b8f5cb
3410e21be6d62fa8b33af3b94accbf546f65596f
F20101202_AABNML austin_c_Page_023.tif
96925260f3183591140cb42924223bd7
c046f80d319c9fe75e4d898ec500184e3e862b51
F20101202_AABNLX austin_c_Page_006.tif
69242897aad7fd59754c5d5f82116ac0
1ec95b26ca3b93214736e66b6177bac0f13ec5b9
F20101202_AABNNB austin_c_Page_042.tif
044f5b2a83fcfdcbbcbf51ffaecf14e9
2d1bd946cfaa4c46d0cb8fbe2e0aa4ad80b07d62
F20101202_AABNMM austin_c_Page_025.tif
13610a12c530313f7ec253d1146c0b56
c5aee8e58ca61e96eff62dc1a8c2bce10fd624c5
F20101202_AABNLY austin_c_Page_007.tif
b252cb8f5cbbcef1417773add89fd3b8
4ac743ffeb572b5e80d64442f403c7eb49ed474e
F20101202_AABNNC austin_c_Page_044.tif
1c341cfb66b3986024bbe6c91fc7a173
2c099202d1767ab3b966764959057fe6797ad311
F20101202_AABNMN austin_c_Page_026.tif
b3d9cfe75495d7dae1f29ecfa9ece4a2
059817a7a56d37b07256f8ce2de5b3f4000fa06a
F20101202_AABNLZ austin_c_Page_008.tif
db80dfa1902929061cdcee56e6a83c43
999975f4c7d28742bfdac8921544f39442e9cbc4
F20101202_AABNND austin_c_Page_045.tif
0e5f92f740025afe4a906571650feb7d
c46a2914b0474e4b86799252fe7af15339656e5b
F20101202_AABNMO austin_c_Page_027.tif
b590730222946040fe7f0dd4ab1cfa42
417d2a83d135ee60212e7c8fbfd58b8ecf03f075
F20101202_AABNNE austin_c_Page_046.tif
8a5f795d41bdd547a76f06710a938dbc
e09adc8c21b479cfff5b85ee38a563e0f8cca2bd
F20101202_AABNMP austin_c_Page_028.tif
34bb3ee2fdbe42a5470e3d23fa92ff64
022c49d5a4b556c2cf42d3a89060ee81733a8c89
F20101202_AABNNF austin_c_Page_047.tif
4ba56b44e07bb98f49ca2830ddaf3a56
82b1c24fad8d7d9d0e5ef7c92e40a7bf458d89c3
F20101202_AABNMQ austin_c_Page_029.tif
cc18c7e7ab5e6d33607294addabd55af
768c2bb44ae95fcc49a66529ef96f62cf6a3aaad
F20101202_AABNNG austin_c_Page_048.tif
b9e403f4deebd4aee01aeaa2d566ab87
5543f165094e8caea7ef7bba42f97e6e2aaffb2c
F20101202_AABNMR austin_c_Page_030.tif
32f4351aa346059ae9109b0921e76b8e
bcc9edb731478e84d1b77b39cf37c6663f94696d
F20101202_AABNNH austin_c_Page_051.tif
a1c694ccdfb6df796c2660ebf3b9df4d
36f8e1370f0d83e6cb80fdc02afffc75de48fd46
F20101202_AABNMS austin_c_Page_031.tif
a36578e0161d29b9676d3510aa98c621
69393e5f5ee85fd4462537910652e428c874b1cf
F20101202_AABNMT austin_c_Page_032.tif
c62e26c9bc0e61cdd760daeb13761380
b06ba2eaa5f41438e6e2b287230d140400b13da4
F20101202_AABNNI austin_c_Page_052.tif
a42e3bec2b3254c37f014a9d0a86953c
d2c6fd751d9a9e895e797356aa4ec2afc1d54b5b
F20101202_AABNMU austin_c_Page_033.tif
34deb51e330319379de49a10de9c7233
ad5d96eca508989909a7fffb17133e2db0159017
F20101202_AABNNJ austin_c_Page_054.tif
8f9ec0201a13e6c7915e1fbe2983fc77
0a51068d6eb1e99b2e1c447df7839a7452c53cdf
F20101202_AABNMV austin_c_Page_034.tif
9dbefa5b94b1877379a1deecaf0c0480
8c2e4cf36e2029bbe225f0c2039f999e0f2ce938
F20101202_AABNNK austin_c_Page_058.tif
c19af8d4819e2d61ab5d507b3c38e916
b44ac1d00481ce59a0895e084c8fb029430a97ed
F20101202_AABNMW austin_c_Page_036.tif
85a422e28a8186b5a478d9cc5a67f232
018af53116516cceb3f7495ed36fd588694b4a84
F20101202_AABNNL austin_c_Page_062.tif
265e35a0a106f1fca86b4c906b92fa80
b3d672ddbd4e8623fa5767ca268711ac27004b79
F20101202_AABNMX austin_c_Page_037.tif
1a71a7a1d6de7be6ef141af269886fde
93bccb3b59ee1b0fe0ea6c4e916a386767f24a5f
F20101202_AABNOA austin_c_Page_079.tif
6368d67be6b914065ab22b904bf9ef28
065f09615892a038a32482e401c6a6d24c97b472
F20101202_AABNNM austin_c_Page_063.tif
eebcc8b0822e7e11d9c7595ab8f1d6f4
684297bba604e2622d9fadad1b752c03749957ac
F20101202_AABNMY austin_c_Page_039.tif
2a538a5e198c115de910f3853674104c
a2479b27eb97f51f974dafccec5b32ab8d730750
F20101202_AABNOB austin_c_Page_080.tif
bf653880beb2ee284bd69f2e9a77ce3c
49cb50231bf942678a408d4face8e155a531de93
F20101202_AABNNN austin_c_Page_065.tif
0cf41aecffcfaf6f3e3032c5ba9dff0c
220f559d7d8ad90fa9a29fb1b724a0baacf14a27
F20101202_AABNMZ austin_c_Page_040.tif
09bc54bf251bd6cf40625976b8330db2
02c6ed197dc4b268a44d90621e8763bab425795a
F20101202_AABNOC austin_c_Page_081.tif
f7a31a15772540ba3bc02042357a3249
6d82e7f00e7736103988bb2c5668643c941b7feb
F20101202_AABNNO austin_c_Page_066.tif
b73b98ff08e52f340168d771e118a162
b45f52388daba3da2efe80a362a70e9e1b24534f
F20101202_AABNOD austin_c_Page_084.tif
c4a5437e494e34cbb2438cc6b188c6b0
d57cd03cc0402bc98c6e68877a2f92533d25ff03
F20101202_AABNNP austin_c_Page_067.tif
4176c8b6d7e6b0bd5d5ce91e751192c5
5465e8975583be971a7630743d047ce73bc9d079
F20101202_AABNOE austin_c_Page_085.tif
1a0405a4f32cf0b00ad3bf67750bb065
67a12f81ed71e9df6734d2dd2cb8c40de3ec6e16
F20101202_AABNNQ austin_c_Page_068.tif
1bec3903a87a7599f4f90fe7972760e7
24fbc3b0d17085f3e975b326206a93e4924b49bc
F20101202_AABNOF austin_c_Page_087.tif
42b23ae7efa45978e449b437d2d07620
6d3b6e8ce620d4698ed62ca5c1cd3c321ab0441e
F20101202_AABNNR austin_c_Page_070.tif
ca2e748778403b31fdd4995e904158b1
acc24bbee4b68e1eb6a0dbc34f2579cc507d989e
F20101202_AABNOG austin_c_Page_088.tif
4ccc3cf88810a3dd21f0355f6859f08a
d813847332c6d083c9a149a164c5d95fe79133c4
F20101202_AABNNS austin_c_Page_071.tif
2a12a9991a473156e464d56665b635a9
8d192085dbe23d5efe54bf9fa168e1d6354ea5ed
F20101202_AABNOH austin_c_Page_089.tif
6b7cb22114d946f5f4e06ee3aa73be77
df02d9585950b5abfec47e39e00174d51653020c
F20101202_AABNNT austin_c_Page_072.tif
61421929b48c0554d3c556a101335ae8
169b3fb9dc294202ae5b484b9f97b4feba78842d
F20101202_AABNOI austin_c_Page_090.tif
d0db8c66e6adac2bf7466e65ee99ca49
2b7e72b94df8b5c8b26fead081b113958109568d
F20101202_AABNNU austin_c_Page_073.tif
222f998c21367de022d27412c64f211b
ea3e14b519b095a9aef3b4290dcfda1907c50a3d
F20101202_AABNNV austin_c_Page_074.tif
ad4f6f18dbfbf1b458d54a4b3ba395d1
d13f37de33669e90424ef01d9421ff177747fc14
F20101202_AABNOJ austin_c_Page_091.tif
440565cf5fd1583d5ad498bee9b64301
79254a8e8c23f46868af83fcc7c5c25609731290
F20101202_AABNNW austin_c_Page_075.tif
ba9946df30bbd50f474ebf4164602bc7
ed78fdbce1eb815cc038932c2ceace81d8965a13
F20101202_AABNOK austin_c_Page_092.tif
cf8a59556a5fd601d8310fc19ebd69c4
f02e22752914e335fd6a803cf5ef579cd9418a4f
F20101202_AABNNX austin_c_Page_076.tif
d77f26b96be591534035a6dd841bcc0e
907cbfbb649c194df6b89da0559644100d028f91
8136 F20101202_AABNPA austin_c_Page_008.pro
135fd01272ac8046ee24dffe83e8c779
f72902640dae4d4e93e4ca930e531410518253f4
F20101202_AABNOL austin_c_Page_093.tif
4e7fccc65bb697a3297145fdfe41f0f6
b2ce5b30fd37da0833cbb8623ac66432b6f25055
F20101202_AABNNY austin_c_Page_077.tif
bf18cf964285bdc2f0bc6dc4f333e5c2
77f445a52bc13324697bf2236829b6df4314cb3a
25163 F20101202_AABNPB austin_c_Page_010.pro
5477285f5d4d3196858c5764c0c8794d
368db8f89b5e2645df09a1e91714423478068697
F20101202_AABNOM austin_c_Page_094.tif
f8d963617bb3c58b71959b426335ff82
a303949e4849ae905a72bcb491f8a0a842d2fb62
F20101202_AABNNZ austin_c_Page_078.tif
2fbb46f8abb0e626c8dbc445ad6aa0be
4736ed49f7816fe9edadb79f24e6bb4d606be0fe
52591 F20101202_AABNPC austin_c_Page_011.pro
565a67a90d522419e1aba43b26d57fee
4cc02518de8c620bd866f88afbcb3985d410eefb
F20101202_AABNON austin_c_Page_097.tif
8008cfa75cb1ab468e93f05c0b4b8bae
bbd532a7a5e8ff366f287b82cefa30dc5c702711
53604 F20101202_AABNPD austin_c_Page_013.pro
256e082cc073a627ec309b6d555797e0
6a43cd399cdcf242df1d50f5becf13d32e141143
F20101202_AABNOO austin_c_Page_098.tif
85654815d0f7ba62be0c55f064bbda22
388e43343c43e065ef855c77683e012786b8da05
55871 F20101202_AABNPE austin_c_Page_014.pro
ef2c8db79fd860db0e1216eef12812d8
f8e64ab456f96b49822a2b48d40b97b7cd216ff5
F20101202_AABNOP austin_c_Page_099.tif
bb72b83f94d9c74c7e5183bd6c1adcbb
7baa6e4fc376e5d3cb2f93b9aef0e832b68e92da
54674 F20101202_AABNPF austin_c_Page_016.pro
10e908568d164d5db0c09bdc7e17eccd
dcb907fda3c8158fea0ad89b34f126a2fc37c65c
F20101202_AABNOQ austin_c_Page_100.tif
eaf4994e17b4c4baa27d3e5629916b22
94a9907d74dcadb6f736e0879dedd9b991b2cd5a
55382 F20101202_AABNPG austin_c_Page_017.pro
d7a4ffc3db2919f2681af075b9f4cf9f
5e40a324c9aa191981a71a1c260e30136d4a2e75
F20101202_AABNOR austin_c_Page_101.tif
cea7a934401cf03a81a83b86e6c773a4
d0fd1b1c72663fa61e538476f1975681f414dbc4
55103 F20101202_AABNPH austin_c_Page_019.pro
842083b5adea6804c656762d8db3d099
6a48b06cffbde058ddf0ce2f379dc006e2050cd3
F20101202_AABNOS austin_c_Page_102.tif
57ff7171c395a2adca0ee96082aa51cf
558a337ccadf755081b043e6385ee56730b3507d
57917 F20101202_AABNPI austin_c_Page_020.pro
33316e10728b35a4a7b08f4f394633ba
b2fdcf63c70d9ee72b9d456946902ba5c679ccb8
10545 F20101202_AABNOT austin_c_Page_001.pro
a4e7ad706f4d5f43ad2bf69667292023
db2b7a3ef306eec29aaad7cdaea783539ecc610e
55043 F20101202_AABNPJ austin_c_Page_021.pro
a2e9b210bc5887f5e1ac3d349b4f1979
b1d79bd036edd6a195225b8eec67574bb5639111
912 F20101202_AABNOU austin_c_Page_002.pro
3441cbd5466fedc9501fa7aafb56f79c
a6e7b818b788a000ae9089c9ab27baafa7ed85df
F20101202_AABNOV austin_c_Page_003.pro
83f139b73f527f83152148a1b82b689a
2350a2158e6c63309e4daf2d70c5cf8aa65108d6
55810 F20101202_AABNPK austin_c_Page_022.pro
f432eb0df1de757c0316a70dd0718390
193588c9da79fd92c9aa3f681084d6a422c2ab0b
45688 F20101202_AABNOW austin_c_Page_004.pro
9fd4106a96d20fd9eccbb43e64b5d548
41e89f12949f3db0449d35a545d4e91344b08d12
55490 F20101202_AABNQA austin_c_Page_041.pro
d658e893a114ff8c4d3736b8dc4299b0
d9ba066cdc710d5fb703a238ea01fd67b4c73319
55291 F20101202_AABNPL austin_c_Page_023.pro
251e5163b36adde23b9211c4dd9f9048
8d8cfc7111de1cd69a49b0412852480a42a257fa
108522 F20101202_AABNOX austin_c_Page_005.pro
151c514bf18c88d2df5fb091a4a27b71
2bd5ad3829394c5a6f1b43c84d4a6663b62d926a
F20101202_AABNPM austin_c_Page_024.pro
01d32778a461bc4c5882a8efd2d62682
f93df4b4cb597d27f858bae196e3418bb81388dc
60159 F20101202_AABNOY austin_c_Page_006.pro
1df38e43a77f8f092fa274e6c6a345a0
3c687c1ad94a4ba19e9589ba66a58b0ea16a80fe
55535 F20101202_AABNQB austin_c_Page_043.pro
df01c31537723b19998bb3cbc3561d13
271865af474db895e3186cdca94fab53aa507e4b
55464 F20101202_AABNPN austin_c_Page_025.pro
320b250b2b352193d5df54bcf0989be8
07a7b96a3971911a38e3caaf014562f1d923d1ce
17940 F20101202_AABNOZ austin_c_Page_007.pro
d35dc7de9a726bc32fae36122d9736ab
54c929a51f2c102dd32bab7473097c572dc67378
52393 F20101202_AABNQC austin_c_Page_044.pro
afbf8cdc871fcc74b70b09513e1daa9b
ff847aea804b61f6b500381e8838e8c19f2ceea6
52163 F20101202_AABNPO austin_c_Page_027.pro
bc4a0ea78fee5a9cd6669bc0936be9bc
2189885db62af42a9f86b428c9e2d12aeec93710
1534 F20101202_AABNQD austin_c_Page_045.pro
48eb896648e6fe673b973051a64102ab
6263b5eaa9e4996c7c322fb78b874c6189d3322f
53703 F20101202_AABNPP austin_c_Page_029.pro
896db7c68e22607fe5f6ea8d6b190098
1f54a4a26939c10f3fb9ae7337f65f444e6ba788
58176 F20101202_AABNQE austin_c_Page_046.pro
4f1fab54468897102d13f3876e090e57
8372bc8029cc5ceec772b01e9a97c3014a785a2f
54452 F20101202_AABNPQ austin_c_Page_030.pro
9056eaf31fb74c85adeb181f8f3c6d65
9b0c4074fc34a6133bce0e61e99f44f97e60bb52
57012 F20101202_AABNQF austin_c_Page_047.pro
e99dff12f226880d6a485e2ff2856ac0
03c1ff483875650a2e705439c95073f60a4f929e
55317 F20101202_AABNPR austin_c_Page_031.pro
e950f5f0da6c696cd5d2d90918e5abf8
a9719324945ae65216b558b414ed0a1305f4a972
53981 F20101202_AABNQG austin_c_Page_048.pro
2f91a3ccfeaaf14fa049c3e0890fea4e
929d22873988b57350df46c16c287f2618f819a1
53955 F20101202_AABNPS austin_c_Page_032.pro
53af5b79938b2cbb9122098214a6b92f
8de4a95305fc043e65edd65c482be69fa8a1057e
45966 F20101202_AABNQH austin_c_Page_051.pro
57e8a911978cea6463a7fc5dd967649a
7b491e9a814ef0e7dd4d61f12b847d851b5ca0c2