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Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022394/00001

Material Information

Title: Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.
Physical Description: Book
Language: english
Creator: Williams, Rania
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: English -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: English thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Statement of Responsibility: by Rania Williams.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Dobrin, Sidney I.
Electronic Access: INACCESSIBLE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022394:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022394/00001

Material Information

Title: Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.
Physical Description: Book
Language: english
Creator: Williams, Rania
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: English -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: English thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Statement of Responsibility: by Rania Williams.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Dobrin, Sidney I.
Electronic Access: INACCESSIBLE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022394:00001


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5c151dbdd97ddc01c6844be12077b004430832e9







THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, SOUTH AFRICA AND NELSON MANDELA: A CASE FOR
RHETORICAL URGENCY AND A STRATEGY FOR RHETORICAL SUCCESS





















By

RANIA L. WILLIAMS


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2008


































2008 Rania L. Williams


































To my parents, Robert and Theresa, who have helped me to get to this point in my education
through a lot of pushing and even more prayer.









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A special thank you is extended to Dr. Sid Dobrin and Dr. Brian McCrea for serving on

my Thesis team. I appreciate the feedback, suggestions, time, and effort that you put into

helping make this educational experience rewarding and successful. Your input was valuable

and will be used as I continue to matriculate through other educational endeavors. I definitely

did not get through this research and writing process without the valuable advice and much

needed prodding from my friends and fellow graduate students in the English Department.

Thanks to everyone; I'd still be staring at a blank page without you!









TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ..............................................................................................................4

ABSTRAC T .......................................................................... 7

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ............... ............................ .................................9

Nelson Mandela: The Beginnings of Rhetorical Genius ..................................................10
M andela: T he Student............. .... .......................................................... ........ ........ 10
M andela: The Orator ........................................................ ................ 11

2 RHETORICAL URGENCY, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND NELSON
M A N D E L A .................................................................................14

M andela and Rhetorical U urgency .................................. ................................................... 14
P rim ary M methodology .................................................................................... ........... 15

3 THE STUDY: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AND SECONDARY METHODOLOGY....... 18

R h etorical A n aly sis...................................................................... 18
Secondary M methodology ......... ......... ......... ......... ......................................... 19
The Prelim inary A analysis ............ ................................................... ............... 20
The R rhetorical A analysis .............. ........... ............................................................ 20
Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Speech at the Rivonia Trial............................................. 21
T he R rhetorical C ontext.......................................................................... ...................2 1
T he P relim inary A naly sis ................................................................... .. ... ............2 1
A u dien ce ....................................................... ............ .... ......... ...... 2 1
P u rp o se .................. ...................................................... ................... 2 2
P athos, ethos, and logos .................................................... ........ .................22
T he R rhetorical A naly sis ......................................................................... ...................23
Rhetoric of term inology .............. ... ............................. .................................. 23
Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics.......................................................24
Rhetoric of organization/form ............................................................. ... ............ 24
Rhetorical analysis conclusions: Rivonia trial speech ..........................................25
The Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Cape Town Release Speech...........................................26
T h e R h etorical C ontex t ......... .................. ...................................................................2 6
The Prelim inary A analysis ...................... .......................................... ............... 27
A u d ien ce ...................................... ................................................. 2 7
P u rp o se ...................................... .................................................. 2 7
P athos, ethos, and logos .................................................... ........ ....... ............27
T he R rhetorical A naly sis ......................................................................... ...................2 8
Rhetoric of Term inology ............. ................................ .................................28









Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics....................................................... 29
Rhetoric of organization/form ............................................ ............................. .... 30
Rhetorical analysis conclusions: Cape Town release speech...............................31
Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: The Inaugural Addresses ................. ....................................32
The Cape Town and Pretoria Inaugural Addresses ............................... ................ 32
The rhetorical context ............................................... ........ .. ............ 32
The Cape Tow n Inaugural A address ............................................... ............................. 33
T he P relim inary A naly sis ..................................................................... .....................33
A u d ie n c e ........................................................................................ 3 3
P u rp o s e ...................................................................................................... 3 3
P athos, ethos, and logos .................................................... ........ .................33
T he R rhetorical A naly sis ......................................................................... ................... 34
Rhetoric of terminology .................................. .......... ...................... 34
Rhetoric of sentence structure/form ........................................ ...... ............... 35
Rhetoric of organization/form ............... ....... ............ ....... ....... ............... 35
Rhetorical analysis conclusions: cape town inaugural speech.............................35
The Pretoria Inaugural A address ...........................................................................36
The Prelim inary A analysis ........................................................................... 36
A u d ie n c e ........................................................................................3 6
P u rp o s e ............................................................................................................... 3 6
P athos, ethos, and logos ............................................................. ................37
T he R rhetorical A naly sis ......................................................................... ...................37
Rhetoric of term inology .............. ............ .................. .................................. 37
R rhetorical analysis conclusion ............................. .......................... .. .. ........... .39

4 THE RHETORIC OF NELSON MANDELA: ANALYSIS CONCLUSION.....................40

A T h e o ry ............... ......... ... .... ................................................................................................. 4 2
A N ew Scope of Rhetorical A nalysis............................ ......................... ..... .......... 43
A R research Proposal .................. .............. ................. .......... .............. .. 44

APPENDIX

A TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FOUR ANALYZED SPEECHES............................................46

LIST OF REFEREN CE S ......................... ............... ....... .. ....................................74

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H .............................................................................. .....................75













6









Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, SOUTH AFRICA AND NELSON MANDELA: A CASE FOR
RHETORICAL URGENCY AND A STRATEGY FOR RHETORICAL SUCCESS

By

Rania L. Williams

August 2008

Chair: Sidney Dobrin
Major: English

In May 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected president of the newly democratic nation of

South Africa. After decades of oppressive apartheid rule, social and political activism, and the

assistance of key international neighbors, South Africa emerged from a dead-end governing

body, to one that would potentially elevate the country's status to that of a developed nation.

The success of South Africa can be explained in several ways, but none as efficiently as

attributing the success to Mandela's use of the English language. Using English and employing

strategic rhetoric played a significant and most profound role in the deliverance of South Africa

from apartheid rule. An in-depth rhetorical analysis of four key speeches points to the English

language as the key to success and political freedom for South Africans during the apartheid era.

This study will argue that with apartheid as the rhetorical situation, the use English language was

the rhetorical urgency that Mandela knew would help him accomplish his goals as a social and

political leader.

This paper will examine Mandela's four integral speeches presented during and just after

South Africa's journey to democracy. Mandela's purposes, audiences, and the specific rhetorical

techniques he uses provide overwhelming support for his use of the English language as the

integral weapon for combating the oppressive apartheid government. After presenting the key









findings in the rhetorical analysis, the paper will offer conclusions, a theory, and proposals for

further research into the use of English as a public relations and international diplomacy tool.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Language exerts hidden power, like a moon on the tides. RitaMae Brown

Communications analyst, Karin Dovring refers to the English language as a "lingua

franca," or a language extensively employed by many more people than just its native speakers

(Dovring, x). In other words, English is a global tongue. But what makes a language a universal

tongue? More specifically, what makes English a global language? Is it simply the millions of

people worldwide who speak it or does it hinge on a deeper aspect than just a large number?

Such questions regarding the English language can be answered looking at a variety of research

approaches: studies in nationalism, politics, economics and even national and international

identity. Understanding the globalization of English can even be achieved through intense

studies of specific developing countries and their progression through or influence by the

political, social, and economic uses of the English language. One country in particular-South

Africa-is a pivotal example of the importance of global universal language and the

unmistakable power of the English language.

A global language, as defined by David Crystal, is any tongue that "achieves a global

status when it develops a special role that is recognized in every country" (Crystal, 2). For the

purposes of this study, the apartheid-ruled nation of South Africa will be the specific stage upon

which the English language will have that "special role." Taking on the role of best supporting

actor is Nelson Mandela, who through his masterful command of the English language, put

South Africa on the international agenda and effectively brought about change in the developing

nation. Although English became an official language of the eastern Cape in 1822 (Crystal, 39),

the importance of the minority English tongue in South Africa was not fully acknowledged and

regarded until South Africa's struggle with apartheid through much of the Twentieth century









came to the international forefront. Through the examination of the rhetoric of Nelson

Mandela's key speeches, this study argues that the South African saga demonstrated not only the

power of English, but also the rhetorical urgency of using that power to accomplish pertinent

national goals.

Nelson Mandela: The Beginnings of Rhetorical Genius

The individual's whole experience is built upon the plan of his language. Henri Delacroix

Mandela: The Student

On 18 July 1918, Rolihlahla Mandela was born in rural South Africa at Qunu. As a

member and only son of the royal family of the Xhosa-speaking Thembu people, young Mandela

was raised as a traditional village child until he began attending a mission school. It was at this

school that he both learned English and adopted the name Nelson. Mandela was the first in his

family to attend school. As he progressed through the primary school, the history books

Mandela studied presented a South Africa far different from the peaceful countryside on which

he lived. He began to see a distinction between rural South Africa and urban South Africa, white

citizens and native citizens. Mandela also began to tune in to the current events of his country,

political and social. The legal aspects of the historical accounts and the current issues began to

interest Mandela

As Mandela grew older, his enthusiasm for school and formal education grew as well and

by age seventeen, he was enrolled at Clarkeberry, a training college. Around this time, he was

also being prepared by his tribe to be next chief, since his father had passed away. In the face of

such a responsibility, Mandela felt the strong opposing pulls of continuing his education and

claiming his position of tribal chief. The appeal of studying law was growing greater as well and

in the midst of a nation falling deeper and deeper into laws of racial discrimination and racial

segregation, Mandela saw a need for action. Abdicating his rights to the chieftainship in Qunu,









Mandela went on to begin his law studies at the University of Witwatersrand. After several

years of fighting for the cause of equality and freedom, he would go on to earn his Bachelors of

Laws through correspondence while in prison years later.

Mandela's early formal education is an integral part of this study, as he learned under the

tutelage of instructors teaching the English language in a country where English was the minority

language, used specifically for law, education, and public issues (Crystal, 39). Mandela was

exposed early on and consistently to the power of the English language-first through its use in

his studies and later on through its use as the language of the legal profession. His years as a

student of formal English education would prove to be the main weapon in his artillery against

the oppressive system of apartheid in South Africa, as his speeches and public discourses

demanded the respect and attention of English-speaking people nationally and worldwide

Mandela: The Orator

In 1941, a young and determined Nelson Mandela left the rural country and set off for the

city of Johannesburg. It was in this urban and densely populated environment that Mandela

began to witness firsthand the rising racial discrimination, segregation, and the adverse effects of

an impending system of racial segregation. Mandela took mental note of the starkly contrasting

living conditions of whites in the suburbs versus African natives in the slums. Mandela saw this

as a political issue ignored by the then current government-a political issue he immediately

determined to address. Having seen and experienced the social injustices and realizing that a

complacent government was leaving South Africa to remain a developing nation, Mandela made

it his priority to take action, both in his law education and in extracurricular activities, namely

those associated with the African National Congress (ANC).

Seven years after Mandela arrived in Johannesburg, in 1948, South Africa codified white

rule and racial segregation into the system of apartheid. Living and social conditions for African









natives and non-Europeans became worse as poverty, crime, and violence increased. Mandela,

with the partnership and association of the ANC began his career and mission as a powerful

orator, speaking at protests and demonstrations around the country. His English education, legal

discipline, and political aims would keep the South African government and apartheid under

pressure and the deliverance of the nation under the international spotlight for over forty years.

Mandela's oratory skills would play a profound role in the transformation of a nation from

oppressive apartheid to liberating democracy.

In "Mandela, Messianism, and the Media," Rob Nixon explores Mandela's rhetorical

impact through his relationship with the media and its effect on his image and the success of his

political and social aims. Though Nixon focuses closely on Mandela's media presence and not

so much on his rhetorical strategy, such a presence in the media would not have been possible

without the attention Mandela drew through his speeches and correspondences, both while

imprisoned and free. Nixon details and qualifies Mandela's media mysticism from the speech

just before the prison term to his powerful release speech at Cape Town. Commenting heavily

on Mandela's national and media popularity over a thirty year period, Nixon inadvertently

affirms that Mandela's rhetoric and oratorical skills not only grasped and maintained media

attention, but also had the ultimate bearing on South African's future as a democratic nation.

As Nixon documents Mandela's relationship to the media, he recounts the media hype

even during Mandela's imprisonment. While in prison, Mandela was effectively silenced by

jailers, who reasoned that if his visibility to the media led to fame, "invisibility would shut it out"

(Nixon, 44). In effect, the jailers were keeping Mandela's intricately arranged and articulated

words out of the public ear. Even here we can see the implications of the powerful influence of

Mandela's rhetoric. Nixon goes on to discuss Mandela's first (and also American) television









interview, an extraordinary case, since Mandela was considered "an international media colossus

[...] a Great Communicator [...] stirring in demeanor and rhetoric" (Nixon, 45). While Nixon

critiques only Mandela's composure and reflection throughout this interview, the resounding

implication is that even here Mandela demonstrates his command not only of rhetoric, but of

English rhetoric.

In his assessment of Mandela's release speech at Cape Town, Nixon comments on the

effect of Mandela's combining of "oratorical style and the crowd's spirit" (Nixon, 51). Though

not explicitly identified, rhetorical urgency is the key component of Nixon's critique. Mandela,

master of the media and oratorical strategy, has much success with the media and progress within

South Africa by never abandoning the concept of rhetorical urgency, a term that will be fully

defined and qualified later in this study.

Overall, Nixon's article presents a glorifying and admirable account of Mandela's

success with the media, a success that would not even exist to talk about had Mandela's grasp of

English language and English rhetoric not been of such exemplary caliber. "Mandela,

Messianism, and the Media," published in 1991, concludes with an assertion that Mandela's

media presence earned him international favor and can only provide a prediction of what that

may or may not mean nationally in South Africa's future. This study, although focusing on the

strategy rather than popularity, is an extension of Nixon's critical analysis, providing the last

puzzle piece to the strength of Mandela's rhetoric, its place in the English language, and its

effects on a developing nation.









CHAPTER 2
RHETORICAL URGENCY, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND NELSON MANDELA

If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. Ifyou talk to him in his
language, that goes to his heart. Nelson Mandela

Mandela and Rhetorical Urgency

In relating Mandela's speeches to rhetorical urgency, it is imperative to first recognize

that urgency is not a new concept, as it originates from the classical theory of exigency. Lloyd

Bitzer, known for discovering the rhetorical situation, is the key figure associated with exigency,

from which we see and understand rhetorical urgency. Bitzer describes the rhetorical situation as

that which arises from the necessity to know "the nature of those contexts in which speakers or

writers create rhetorical discourse" (Bitzer, par. 1). It is within this definition that exigency

occurs as a response to the situation. Exigency, Bitzer asserts, is the "imperfection" or

"obstacle" that must be addressed in order to achieve a successful and effective discourse

(Bitzer, par. 14). Exigency dictates how an orator must arrange and present his discourse in order

to achieve the desired effect. Within the exigent moment, we find rhetorical urgency which

points to the specific strategies and approaches that must be employed in order to sufficiently

address a particular obstacle. Whether it is the use of a certain tone, a specific arrangement, or

the use of a particular language-as in Mandela's case-after determining an exigent moment,

rhetorical urgency is the response to a rhetorical situation. This study focuses on English as the

main tool for the rhetorical urgency of South Africa's apartheid conflict, an urgency that

ultimately asked for and attained the attention of international arena.

Mandela's command of rhetoric and English language in his speeches speaks strongly to

his respect for and acknowledgement of rhetorical urgency, a key stimulus in the universality of

the English language. For the purposes of this study, rhetorical urgency is the focus of the









analyses and the basis for the overall conclusions. Rhetorical urgency is the starting point of my

proposed modern rhetoric formula:

Rhetorical urgency-)rhetorical strategy-)rhetorical success. It is with this formula

that I define and characterize Nelson Mandela's discourses. Basically, the formula asserts that

the certain needs of a situation (urgency) leads to the adoption of a particular, tailored plan of

organization (strategy), which in turn yields the desired effect of the original purpose (success).

Unless a communicator thoroughly and correctly identifies the urgency of a situation, he will be

unable to effectively determine what syntactical and organizational strategy will achieve the end

results he wants. As I performed the rhetorical analyses for the study, it was imperative to do

historical research, not only to be aware of the situational context, but also to understand the

audience sentiment and the overall desired effect. To understand Mandela's ultimate purpose, I

had to first understand his social environment-basically his rhetorical mindset.

Primary Methodology

Studying Thomas B. Farrells's Norms of Rhetorical Culture sheds light on the concept of

rhetorical urgency and its place in the rhetoric of modem historical eras. Applying Farrell's

considerations and conclusion to this study of Mandela's rhetoric helped set the tone for the

analysis of his speeches. Through implementing the classical traditions of rhetoric, Farrell

revives the practice of rhetorical analysis, using contemporary cases and contemporary

discourses. Though Farrell explores several milestone discourses, including a Kennedy eulogy,

Max Horkheimer's "The End of Reason" essay, and Governor Mario Cuomo's speech on

abortion, his explication of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first inaugural address in Chapter Two set

the precedent for my analysis of Mandela's speeches. Farrell begins the explication with a

discussion of rhetoric and its historical tie to the classical theories of Protagoras, Isocrates, and

Aristotle in order to build a justifying and preliminary foundation for his rhetorical analysis.









As Farrell presents the key ideas associated with Isocrates, modern parallels to Mandela

clearly emerge. For Isocrates, "great, ennobling themes bring quality to discourse as well as

virtue to orator and culture alike" (Farrell, 59). Isocrates maintained this assertion as he

presented rhetorical examples to his students, an idea that has survived over time and is

evidenced in Mandela's discourse. The themes this study uncovers through analysis not only

affect the "quality" of the speeches, but in retrospect imparted great, lasting "virtue" to Mandela

and South Africa. Mandela's discourse also parallels Isocrates beliefs about good "practice"

(Farrell, 60) of rhetoric. Virtue emerges from the art of rhetoric, an exercise that can be

perfected over time. Every effect of good rhetoric is a "by-product of an acquired rhetorical

competence" (Farrell, 60). Likewise, this study will present Mandela's rhetoric as an intricately

chiseled result of his superior command and grasp of English rhetoric.

Farrell asserts several conclusions about rhetoric through is discussion of Aristotelian

rhetoric, which he claims is a very useful tool in justifying rhetoric as a "significant human

practice" (Farrell, 62). In a critique of Aristotle's theory, Farrell presents a four-step justification

of rhetoric that not only helps in understanding its purpose and significance, but it also mirrors

the justification for Mandela's strategies in his speeches. Audience becomes a rhetorical agency

as it is this group of persons who "literally decides the fate of discourse" (Farrell, 69). The

reception of the audience, influenced by preexisting sentiment and influenced by discourse, holds

the ultimate success of the discourse. This study of Mandela's speeches will show that the

national and international groups to whom he spoke almost single-handedly determined what he

said and how he said it. Farrell goes on to explore and bring to modern relevance more of

Aristotle's classical theories on rhetoric. His discussions in this second chapter culminate in his

rhetorical analysis of Roosevelt's inaugural address. Taking into account the historical context









and the resulting national attitude and sentiment, Farrell explicates the structure and language of

the speech. Because of crucial similarities in rhetorical context and audience, this analysis

served as a blueprint for the in-depth analysis of Mandela's key speeches.

Reading Norms of Rhetorical Culture not only solidifies the secondary methodology for

examining Mandela's speeches, but also the foundational question for this study-what is the

significance behind Mandela's use of the English language? As stated earlier, English was a

minor official language in South Africa, trumped by the more common and most used Afrikaans.

English was not even Mandela's first language. In light of this, there is a specific and ulterior

reason for its use during South Africa's apartheid years. During this national conflict, the use of

the English language was a rhetorical urgency. Mandela ultimately used English as a strategy-

a political, economic, and social strategy-and not solely as a popular, transitional language. In

this age of modern discourse across international boundaries, Mandela is a powerful orator and

promising leader who became aware of his rhetorical situation and his desire for rhetorical

success, and used English and English rhetoric as the medium for rhetorical urgency.









CHAPTER 3
THE STUDY: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AND SECONDARY METHODOLOGY

Language is a process offree creation; its laws and principles are fixed, but the manner in which
the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied Even the interpretation and
use of words involves a process offree creation. Noam Chomsky

Rhetorical Analysis

In academia, a rhetorical analysis is a detailed examination of any aspect of life that has

an effect on the behavior or emotion of a person or group of people. For the purposes of this

study, which will focus on integral speeches of Nelson Mandela, the rhetorical analysis will be

in-depth study of the arrangement and presentation of the English language in a way that

undeniably had a profound impact on national and international sentiment, national and

international action. A rhetorical analysis, regardless of its specific scope of inquiry, is a highly

beneficial exercise both academically and socially.

Academically, rhetorical analyses (especially of literary works) allow one to revisit and

apply the old yet relevant theories of influential figures like Aristotle. Aristotle's foundational

concepts like pathos, ethos, and logos become the ancient building blocks for not only examining

and understanding modem rhetoric, but also forming modern theories for this established branch

of academia. Socially, doing a rhetorical analysis is an integral part of understanding

motivations behind not only contemporary human behavior, but even historical human behavior.

Without rhetorical analyses and the conclusions yielded across all areas of humanities and social

sciences, so many questions would be unanswered and basic understandings of human behavior

would not exist. Performing an analysis of Nelson Mandela's speech rhetoric will not only

highlight the specific strategies he uses, but it will shed light on the efficacy and universality of

Mandela's choice to use the English language.









For this study, performing a rhetorical analysis of Mandela's speeches is imperative for

three key reasons:

(1) Understanding rhetorical urgency through rigorous analysis-Mandela makes it
undeniably clear that there is a specific urgency addressed in all of his speeches, an
urgency that leads him both to use certain literary strategies and to articulate those
strategies in English, a minor language in South Africa.

(2) Attaining a new view of English rhetoric-Although the importance of English as a global
language is already evident, this study will increase the importance of its specific rhetoric.

(3) Furthering the research of and focus on modem rhetoric-The study of rhetoric is age-old
and constantly relevant. This will be merely a catalyst in the ongoing examination of
rhetorical urgency and strategy.

English rhetoric has a distinct relevance to the examination of Mandela's speeches. Through his

verbal discourses over the forty-six years of apartheid, Mandela implicitly aggrandizes the

popularity and efficacy of the English language, as a language for world communication. In a

country where English was not the dominant, commoner's tongue, Mandela used this global

language to catapult the South African dilemma onto the world stage. Mandela's speeches

represent a strong grasp of both the English language and the English rhetoric. He also implies a

certain value of English rhetoric that is worth exploring. There is something to be said about

Mandela's choice to speak in this global tongue, rather than Afrikaans (the first official language

and majority language of South Africa) and this study seeks to explore the reasons for and

efficiency of his choice.

Secondary Methodology

Nelson Mandela's speeches are selected based on the chronology of his battle against

apartheid and South Africa's reemergence as a democracy. The four speeches include: the

Rivonia Trial speech of 1964, the Cape Town release speech of 1990, and the two presidential

inauguration addresses of 1994. By using a narrow selection, the focus centers more on

Mandela's rhetorical patterns and on the specific rhetorical situations and the urgencies that









those called for. In terms of the methodology, two analyses are performed: a preliminary

rhetorical analysis and an in-depth rhetorical analysis.

The Preliminary Analysis

The preliminary analysis focuses on the basics of beginning a rhetorical study: audience,

purpose, and pathos, ethos and logos. Closely examining the audiences and purposes for each

speech sheds light on primary and secondary components of to whom a speech was delivered

and why the speech was delivered. Examining the pathos, ethos, and logos not only helps to

decipher the specific effect Mandela was seeking, but it also sets the precedence for

understanding Mandela's word and structure choices in the main analysis. The preliminary

analysis is an important first step in this study because it identifies the basics-aspects of the

speeches that represent the foundation of the larger, more in-depth conclusions that can be

reached when questioning Mandela's rhetoric and its overall effect and efficiency. Rhetorical

urgency became the most important focus, as it emphasizes not only the syntactical choices, but

also Mandela's language choice.

The Rhetorical Analysis

After the preliminary analysis, the in-depth rhetorical analysis centered on the main

question, what is the rhetorical urgency of this speech? Basically, why does Mandela use this

strategy or pattern? What effect is he lookingfor? To what urgency of context or audience

sentiment is he responding to? The rhetorical analysis is organized into an examination of

terminology, sentence structure, and overall organization/form. Detailed discussion on

Mandela's strategies, motives for those strategies, and the urgency he is trying to address is

provided in this analysis. The different divisions of the analysis also expand upon the initial

discussion of pathos, ethos, and logos, giving textual evidence for the overall effects of the









speeches. The analysis concludes with discussions on the overall relevance of rhetorical urgency

and the use of the English language as the overall urgency.

Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Speech at the Rivonia Trial

The language of 1 nrin is simple. Euripides

The Rhetorical Context

At the time of Nelson Mandela's speech at the Rivonia Trial, it has been 16 years since

the implementation of apartheid, 12 years since the African National Congress (ANC) began its

violent opposition of apartheid, and one year since the beginning of the trial. It is May 1964 and

the courts have just convicted Mandela and seven other defendants of numerous acts of sabotage

and sentenced them to life imprisonment, because of their fight for nation equality. After a year

of trial proceedings and in the wake of the prison sentencing, Mandela stands on a South African

dock at Rivonia and for four and a half hours, gives an account of his involvement in and reasons

for the opposition. Retrospectively entitled, "I am Prepared to Die," the Rivonia Trial speech

took place on the final court day in Pretoria. The speech is widely publicized, as national and

international audiences listens. Mandela is up against mixed sentiments as he delivers this

historic speech, from those of the white South African elite who oppose his revolutionary actions

to those South African and international supporters who sympathize with the plight he is trying

to resolve. Mandela will remain imprisoned for almost three decades, but his epic-caliber speech

will continue to resonate far into the Twentieth century and across nations worldwide.

The Preliminary Analysis

Audience

Mandela's primary audience at the Rivonia Trial is the Pretoria Supreme Court. After a

year of trial proceedings that has ultimately resulted in life imprisonment, Mandela addresses the

court that has decided against his defense. His secondary, and arguably most important,









audience is composed of three people groups: the South African white minority, and the

international and English-speaking audiences. Though he does not explicitly claim to be

addressing these groups, Mandela tailors his message to reason and present his case to those who

are opposed to his cause. By referring to World War II and the international fight against Hitler

and Nazi Germany, Mandela is addressing the English-speaking nations who have acted in the

past for the good of developing nations and peoples.

Purpose

The primary purpose of the Rivonia speech is to serve as Mandela's defense statement at

the trial. His secondary purposes effectively outline the speech and substantiate the ultimate

purpose for the nearly five-hour address. Mandela is explaining and defending the ANC;

presenting an appeal for democracy; challenging the current governing system; and laying the

groundwork for the forthcoming fight against apartheid.

Pathos, ethos, and logos

Mandela uses pathos, ethos, and logos liberally throughout this defense speech and the

techniques and strategies he uses are all directed not towards his primary audience, but towards

his secondary audience. In light of the rhetorical situation here, the secondary audience truly

becomes the primary audience, as the international interest and concern is Mandela's main goal.

The court officials and South African government have already convicted him; he is already

going to jail. No amount of defense can prevent or reverse that judgment. The South African

citizens already understand the crucial aspects of the day. They more than understand that

change is needed, but they are powerless to exact that change. The ears and nations outside of

the country become the honorary primary audience, because Mandela recognizes them as the

ones who will and can make a difference in South Africa. Mandela's strategic use of pathos,

ethos, and logos cater to the concerns and convictions of the English-speaking nations who can









ultimately make a difference. The following rhetorical analysis will present the specific

rhetorical approaches Mandela uses to increase the emotional appeal, build up his credibility, and

present a logical reasoning frame for his message.

The Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetoric of terminology

Throughout the majority of the speech, Mandela uses specific trigger words to stimulate

the sentiments and emotions of a nation that has recently endured violent uprisings in the fight

against apartheid, achieving pathos. Words like war, warfare, violent/violence, and terror-used

liberally throughout his speech-stand out significantly because of a reverse rhetorical

expectation. At a trial, it is expected that an individual defending himself would shy away from

words that further incriminate and that highlight the issues that initially led to the charges in the

first place. Avoiding emphasis on such words draws attention to more neutral or positive focus

with which to state a case. Mandela, even though he was on trial for his participation in violent

acts of sabotage, takes the opposite approach, puts these words out on table, and repeats them

forcefully. Such a strategy represents Mandela's rhetoric of il il/ he does not avoid the truth of

the matter at hand; rather, he confronts it and allows his audiences to confront it as well.

Mandela inundates the final paragraphs of"I am Prepared to Die" with the words

"struggle" and "fight" and the ideas and emotions (pathos) they evoke. After speaking for hours

about violence and war, Mandela presents his final appeal to his nation and its international

neighbors; this is his lasting impression and he wants to relay the message that the push for

national reconciliation does not end with his imprisonment. Mandela's final appeal is for the

outside to continue the work of reform and equality.









Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics

As mentioned in the primary analysis, Mandela characterizes his speech with short, terse

sentence constructions. Examples include his first sentence ("I am the first accused.") and

transitional and concluding sentences ("This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a

truly national one."). Analysis of these sentences and where they occur within the speech shows

that they most often signal a transition from one thought or an introduction into a new thought

within the text, often standing in place of subordinate, transitional phrases. The shorter, simple

sentences also work to relay an emphasized or important point in as few words as possible, in

order to avoid verbal fluff and loquacious language.

Within the Rivonia speech, it is interesting to note that although one of Mandela's

purposes is to challenge and push for a unified nation, he does not use this speech as a direct call

to action-there is a profound absence of imperative sentences. Seeing Mandela as a social and

political activist, people expect him to speak imperatively about the changes he wants to see.

The fact that he does not use imperatives throughout "I am Prepared to Die" portrays a great

understanding of what was necessary and appropriate for the time and place-rhetorical urgency.

A closer reading of the speech reveals, however, that Mandela, in choosing his rhetoric wisely,

does incorporate an imperative tone even though the actual sentences are not imperatively

structured. Mandela, employing a sense of logos, most likely chooses this strategy after

thoroughly considering his rhetorical situation and realizing that to use an imperative tone now

would be highly ineffective because until the then current government fixes itself, it can do

nothing for the South African people.

Rhetoric of organization/form

"I am Prepared to Die" follows an organizational pattern very similar to those heard in

courtroom proceedings, a fact that adds much to his credibility or ethos. Mandela begins with a









narration (to set the context), moves to defense statement (to rebut accusations and allegations),

presents appeals (to further explain his defense), and then ends with his final statements.

Mandela's speech is highly representative of legal communication and his choice of discourse

with the courts, the people, and international audiences shows his respect for and understanding

of his rhetorical situation. The Rivonia trial was not the time or place for an erratic, unstructured

activist's speech, as the sensational and provocative tone would gain nothing. Mandela has both

national and world audiences and the use of utmost structure and organization is more beneficial.

His use of extreme organization emphasizes the disorganization of a South Africa governed by a

racist and suppressive system. Mandela and seven others are on the way to prison, convicted of

sabotage; this speech is the antithesis of what audiences expected. By reverting to a nonviolent

tone, Mandela demonstrates logos and presents his central purpose: to accomplish his social and

political goals for South Africa.

Rhetorical analysis conclusions: Rivonia trial speech

* [1] As with most successful/effective speeches, Mandela's overall rhetorical form
directly reflects the rhetorical occasion. His overall tone reflects a greater rhetorical
urgency in getting his message across; he is not solely talking to his fellow South African
natives. In fact, it can be argued that he is not speaking to them directly at all; he is
speaking for them. His defense statements and his appeals mirror what the suppressed
majority wants the national and international audiences to know and respond to.

* [2] As discussed earlier, Mandela's rhetorical form and tone do not explicitly demand
anything of his listeners or the situation at hand; rather, the form and tone implicitly
demand attention and emotion (and ultimately, action) concerning the plight of South
Africa. By intentionally avoiding the imperative tone, Mandela achieves more than he
ever would have with a powerfully demanding speech. The rhetorical urgency calls for an
implicit call to action, not an explicit petition.

* [3] Final Conclusion: After reading Mandela's speech and taking into consideration the
historical context and strategies used, there is an obvious pattern followed:

Rhetorical situation4-rhetorical mindset-*rhetorical strategy. In each of these steps,

Mandela most likely questions himself as he composes this now famous discourse. With









rhetorical situation: where am I? In other words, what is the social andpolitical context? With

rhetorical mindset: what do I have to do? Or, what is the overall effect I need to accomplish my

goals? And with rhetorical strategy: how do Iget it done? Every word, sentence, and paragraph

in this speech is evidence of Mandela's meticulous deliberations in preparing this speech. In

each of the steps above, there is an overwhelming sense of rhetorical urgency, an urgency that

proves not only Mandela's skills as a leader, but also his skills as a national and international

figure who recognized the power of rhetoric, the power of the English language, and the power

of using them together.

The Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Cape Town Release Speech

Words differently arranged have a different meaning. and meanings differently arranged have a
different effect. Blaise Pascal

The Rhetorical Context

Twenty-seven years after the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial and Nelson Mandela's

proclamation that he is "prepared to die" for the aims of national equality, Mandela is released

from prison. Though he had been serving a life sentence, several changes in South Africa's

policies-including pivotal influences by the United Nations and western nations-have resulted

in the "relaxation of apartheid laws" ("1990: Freedom for Mandela," par. 2) and subsequently

Mandela's freedom. After leaving Victor Verster prison, Mandela travels 40 miles to Cape

Town where he is greeted at a city-wide rally. On the balcony of Cape Town's City Hall,

Mandela, as the ANC's deputy-president, addressed an audience of 50,000 people elated about

his release and hungry for the continuation of political and social reform. The "Cape Town

release speech" is the first of Mandela's televised addresses. The speech is both that of a victor,

having made exceptional strides in a 60-year struggle and that of a leader, knowing the race was

not yet over.









The Preliminary Analysis

Audience

At the Cape Town rally, Mandela's primary audience is the 50,000 loyal followers who

came to support him at his release from prison. Because this speech is televised, his secondary

audience includes the international countries and organizations that have been contributing and

continue to contribute to the change of government policies in South Africa. Another secondary

audience is the South African white minority who still has not fully relieved the nation of its

apartheid-led affliction. This secondary audience can be named because Mandela refers several

times to the existing conflict, the gains that have been made, and the fact that there is still work

to be done. Mandela is speaking most directly to the white minority when he asserts that he is

still "prepared to die" for the cause.

Purpose

Mandela's primary purpose for the "Cape Town release speech" is to make his first

public address after his release from a 30-year incarceration. His secondary purpose is a bit

more extensive and involved. With this speech, Mandela wants to show the continuation of the

goals to end apartheid completely. He wants to reiterate both the need for national unity and

reform and also the ongoing struggle. Finally, Mandela's speech is also an outpouring of praise

and gratitude for the past/previous and continual support for the cause.

Pathos, ethos, and logos

Mandela again employs pathos, ethos, and logos as he rallies the national and

international supporters. Again, as with the Speech at Rivonia, the true primary audience is the

English-speaking nations who have been assisting and will continue to assist in the elimination

of racial segregation in South Africa. As such, Mandela uses his emotional appeals and his

reasoning to reach out to those nations. Since Mandela is also revitalizing the weary psyche and









morale of the oppressed South African citizens, he also uses emotion evoking strategies and

credibility building ploys to strengthen the national support he has had for the past 30 years.

Mandela's pathos, ethos, and logos regain the attentions of his key audiences that have been

assisting him in reforming the government and reworking the social construct in South Africa.

After three decades, it is time to finish this race and this urgency is revealed and addressed with

his emotional, credibility, and logical rhetoric. The subsequent analysis will explain in detail the

specific rhetorical maneuvers Mandela to heighten the rhetorical appeals in his first speech after

his release from prison.

The Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetoric of Terminology

In the first of his remarks, Mandela declares, "I stand before you not as a prophet, but as

a humble servant." Earning his speech a high degree of ethos, that phrase, "humble servant, is an

early and significant indicator that Mandela is embracing a role that was not normal or expected

in a situation such as the one he faced upon his release from prison. The expected or assumed

role would be one of ultimate victor and persecuted, but triumphant leader. However,

Mandela-in view of the rhetorical occasion and in light of the response he needs-takes on the

antithetical role of the subservient and menial position of a "servant." Opting for this approach

rather than the leader approach puts Mandela at a very distinct advantage in terms of both his

opposition and his supporters. As a humbled worker, Mandela stands in stark contrast to the

existent, but dwindling, dominating powers of apartheid. In taking on a seemingly commonplace

and insignificant role, Mandela adds credibility to and overall identification with his connection

to the South African citizens, both black and white.

In this speech, Mandela also employs the rhetorical use of triggering words that implicitly

and explicitly evoke responsibility within his message. Towards the end of this public address,









Mandela constantly mentions the "task"/"tasks." He affirms that the nation and citizens of South

Africa are "duty bound" to continue efforts to unify the country as he conducts "negotiations"

with those in power. The words of responsibility not only depict Mandela's feelings about how

things were progressing, but also about his considerations for how his supporters should have

been thinking and acting at that time, an effective pathos strategy. These words are of particular

significance because they represent Mandela's rhetoric of importance. In other words, they

connote that which needs to be done. Mandela is explicitly stating that yes, South Africa has

made great strides, but the work is not yet complete.

Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics

As in his "I am Prepared to Die" speech, Mandela again makes remarkable use of double

and triple conjunction phrases in his release speech. These constructions are significant in that

they draw attention to Mandela's key points while maximizing the verbal and grammatical

fluidity throughout the speech. Examples include "exploitation and oppression," "pain and

suffering," "loyal and disciplined," and "democratic, non-racial, and unitary." In using these

conjunctions, Mandela effectively connects and highlights the most crucial and emotion-evoking

words of his thoughts.

Another recurring sentence strategy Mandela employs is the use of short, terse sentences

towards the end of the speech. As Mandela concludes his statements to the nation he remarks:

"Our struggle has reached a decisive moment [...] We have waited too long for our freedom [...]

Our march to freedom is irreversible." Used as both transitional and pivotal phrases, these

sentences express in pellucid terms Mandela's most significant thoughts regarding what had to

take place now that he was physically back on the battlefield of social equality in South Africa.

Again, Mandela's decision to use these short sentences had a two-fold purpose. With these

sentences, Mandela first avoids fluffy, poetic language characteristic of inspirational speeches in









favor of terse constructions that his audience would more easily recall. His main points, key

motivational thoughts, needed simple, to-the-point rhetoric in order to be most effective. Also,

the form of the sentences reflects the national behavior Mandela wants to evoke-quick and

concise actions of the South African citizens and equally quick and concise responses from the

South African lawmakers.

Rhetoric of organization/form

Mandela's "Cape Town release speech" follows a very basic outline that reflects and

addresses the major components of his extensive audience. He first extends statements of

salutation, gratitude, and recognition to his supporters. Mandela then moves on to discussions of

necessity (what needs to happen now) and action (how the needs can be met), directed at the

South African government and international supporters. In the final section of the speech,

Mandela presents a call to unity for South African citizens. Mandela's organization addresses

the logos of the situation, clearly marking out a reasonable response to what has happened and

what needs to happen.

Within the organization of his speech, Mandela deliberately and intentionally repeats his

final statements from "I am Prepared to Die." His last textual paragraph of the release speech is

verbatim final paragraph of his last statements before his imprisonment; so consequently, the

final words of Mandela's release speech are "I am prepared to die." These words of ethos and

the fact that Mandela revisits his sentiments from almost 30 years ago are significant indicators

of the rhetorical urgency of the occasion. The recitation of the final thoughts from the Rivonia

trial has two crucial purposes for Mandela's rhetoric:









* to work as a reminder that, even though Mandela has been released from prison and even
though apartheid laws have been relaxed ("1990: Freedom for Mandela," par. 2), there is
still work to be done and a struggle to overcome

* to serve as a personal affirmation that, yes, he spent nearly 30 years in prison, but he is still
not folding; he is still "prepared to die" for the cause of democracy and equality.

Rhetorical analysis conclusions: Cape Town release speech

* [1] Mandela's antithetical and unexpected acquisition of the role of South Africa's humble
servant speaks volumes about his consistent acknowledgment of the rhetorical urgency of
occasion and the effects both situation and urgency have on the tone and form of his public
address. At this specific time, South Africa needed a humble teammate, not a prideful
leader. Such was the urgency of the situation and-by setting the precedent of the
"humble servant"-Mandela planned his overall form and tone to reflect his awareness,
accordingly. By putting himself on a lower and more common social level rather than
asserting his obvious power as a national leader, Mandela successfully gained more respect
and more support.

* [2] The distinctive sentence structure Mandela employs, using double and triple
conjunctive phrases, is a critical rhetorical strategy for this speech. By connecting the most
crucial and important words of a sentence or thought, Mandela successfully keeps the key
words/feelings at the forefront. For a motivational/inspirational address such as this one,
accentuating key words that promote the cause, challenge the opposition, and rally the
supporters is the rhetorical strategy that responds directly and effectively to the rhetorical
occasion.

* [3] Final Conclusion: In returning to the discussion of the "Cape Town release speech,"
organization and form, in-depth analysis of the organization is key to understanding the
rhetorical urgency of the situation. Mandela's speech has a three-part structure and within
each section, he has a specific goal evidenced through the tone and language:

Part I: Thank those who got us this far.
Part II: Make demands of/challenge those who can do more
Part III: Encourage/uplift those who will ultimately benefit

Each of those goals, revealed both through implicit and explicit language, sentence form,

makes for a rhetorically considered and developed speech-crucial for 1990 South Africa and

pertinent to an understanding of modern English rhetoric.









Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: The Inaugural Addresses

Think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people. Williams Butler Yeats

The Cape Town and Pretoria Inaugural Addresses

The rhetorical context

Nelson Mandela's "Cape Town release speech" let the nation of South Africa and its

international supporters know that while his release and this relaxation of apartheid were great

national triumphs, the fight was not over; the battle had yet to be won. Immediately after his

release, as Mandela commenced the struggle for a democratic nation, South Africa began a

tumultuous four year conflict. From negotiations, government scandals and assassinations, to

negotiations and Nobel Prizes, Mandela and his nation pushed forward and in early 1993, plans

were cemented for a presidential election. One year later, on 2 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was

elected president of a new South African government that represented all citizens. The following

week, he gave two inaugural addresses, one at Cape Town and one at Pretoria. At Cape Town,

Mandela addressed the exhausted, yet invigorated crowd of people who had been waiting years

for this historic moment. At Pretoria, Mandela presented his victor address to an elated group of

international dignitaries, local political figures, and even more anticipating citizens. The speech

at Pretoria was also heard on televisions around the world as Mandela affirmed and "fulfilled the

promise made to the people" the day he walked out of prison.

NOTE: I present the analysis of these inaugural speeches separately, because though they center
on a single, historic event, the rhetorical urgencies and rhetorical strategies differ in key ways.









The Cape Town Inaugural Address


The Preliminary Analysis

Audience

Mandela's primary audience for the Cape Town Inaugural speech, as listed in the first

remarks, are the Master of Ceremonies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, and his fellow South

Africans, all guests of and participants in the Grand Parade celebration. Mandela's secondary

audience, most likely embodied in his address to "comrades and friends," includes his

international and intercontinental audience-those who supported and influenced the events and

circumstances that made the day's address even possible. It can be assumed that after years of

social and economic assistance, that the international allies who ultimately helped South Africa

eradicate apartheid rule would be tuned in on the triumphant day of Mandela's inauguration into

the newly democratic country.

Purpose

The primary intents of Mandela's first inaugural address are key components of any

inauguration speech: to recognize the election victory and to outline the next phase of

governmental progression. With his secondary purposes of his speech, Mandela effectively

tailors the general inaugural speech to the rhetorical needs of his national and international

audiences. Mandela both challenges his fellow South Africans and informs the international

interests of South Africa's future plans.

Pathos, ethos, and logos

This speech contains the most elements of pathos than any of the other three speeches

analyzed. Mandela's inaugural address at Cape Town signifies the end of a dark and hopeless

era and the beginning of a victorious and hopeful era. Mandela uses his emotional appeal to

reflect the mindset of the countless natives and the millions of international supporters who









worked relentlessly to see this day come to pass. His use of ethos and logos points to the success

of the social and presidential campaign that ended apartheid and prepared South Africa for

democratic governance. Mandela's terminology, sentence structure, and organization all manifest

his use of pathos, ethos, and logos in this triumphant discourse.

The Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetoric of terminology

Mandela's terminology in this speech carries a certain degree of pathos, as he emphasizes

the triumph of the day. After acknowledging his audience, Mandela begins his address with an

ordinary, yet pivotal and evoking word-"today." The entire first sentence reads, "Today, we

are entering a new era for your country and its people." Today may seem like just a benign or

banal term, but in the rhetorical context of the past forty years in South Africa, the word signifies

much more than just an indicator of time. Ultimately, in beginning his thoughts with "today,"

Mandela wants everyone to understand that the new focus of his aims and the country's aims

should be now. The ultimate priority is now: now that the struggle against apartheid is over; now

that the governmental system is working towards greater reform; now that Nelson Mandela is the

people's president.

In this first true victory speech analyzed in this study, Mandela purposes his chosen

terminology to reflect the breadth of this victory, using words characteristic of the victory after a

daunting and difficult battle-in a sense, epic language. By epic, I am referring to descriptive

terms that evoke images of gruesome battle, heroes, heroic actions, villains. Throughout the

"Cape Town Inaugural Speech," Mandela consciously uses words like "war," "dungeon,"

"strife," "fighters," "outcasts," and "legion." He employs phrases like "dragged in chains," "epic

wars of resistance," and "resistance fighters." These words and phrases poetically characterize

and sensationalize the decades of political and social struggle against apartheid. Just as epic









poems of ancient literature chronicle the seemingly impossible quests of heroes, poems that have

survived thousands of years, so Mandela forever encases the South Africans' struggle and

victory over apartheid into an epic parallel.

Rhetoric of sentence structure/form

Mandela again uses short, choppy sentence formations for the same effect as in his

previous speeches: to avoid literary/verbal fluff and to get right to the point of the message.

Again, many of these sentences also serve as transitions within the organizational structure.

Rhetoric of organization/form

In this inaugural address at Cape Town, Mandela structures his speech around a now,

then, and later on format. In other words, the speech focuses on where South Africa is now

(present), where South Africa has been (past), and where South African will go from here

(future). Such a form has a very crucial impact on the effectiveness of Mandela's rhetoric. Had

he rearranged the chronology (for example, doing past--present--future), the overall audience

comprehension and reception could have been different. Grounding the speech in a format that

first focuses on the present speaks to the overall rhetorical priority of the day and presents the a

firm reasoning (logos) for the progression of the nation.

Mandela's deliberate and obvious structuring of this speech also represents a rhetorical

timeline. Mandela effectively outlines the progression of the South African government, from

apartheid to democracy as he makes this victorious speech. Strong transitions and obvious

changes in tone evidence his high level of organization. Through this rhetorical strategy,

Mandela asserts the high value he puts on progression-social, national, and political.

Rhetorical analysis conclusions: cape town inaugural speech

S [1] Mandela's Cape Town Inaugural Speech is inundated with rhetorical strategies that
reflect the urgency of the occasion. His decision to draw a parallel between traditional
epics and South Africa's four-decade quest to unity and democracy reflects the rhetorical









urgency of audience appeal. Characteristic of an epic story, the stimulating words and
phrases in the speech fully and efficiently relay: (1) the urgency of the past and its
consequences, (2) the urgency of remembering the past, and (3) the urgency of not
returning to the ways of the past. Through the epic language, Mandela positions/places
South Africa in the books of epic historical eras, battling apartheid and rising to a unified
democratic nation.

[2] The long-standing piece of advice-choose your words wisely-is a phrase Mandela
undoubtedly understood. Different occasions require different uses of language and
Mandela evidences that understanding in this speech, as he makes wise decisions regarding
the rhetorical urgency of word choice and sentence construction. Initially, Mandela is
poignantly verbose and slightly poetic when addressing the historical relevance and the
nation's current status. He then seamlessly transitions into concise and to the point prose
during his statements on what needs to be done in moving forward. Mandela forgoes the
fluid, poetic language as he strategically mirrors the urgency of the time: South Africa
must move past today and towards greater unity in a concise, no nonsense manner.
Mandela's prose moves poetically through the inspirational rhetoric and then quickly
through the motivational rhetoric. Mandela's mastering of the rhetoric is evident in the
lasting effect that the speech leaves, even 14 years after the actual delivery of the speech.
He approaches the use of English in such a way that commands attention and commands
the respect of the language and its presentation.

The Pretoria Inaugural Address

After his speech at Cape Town on May 9th, Mandela traveled to Pretoria where the following
day he gave his second inaugural address. This speech is notably distinctive from the first,
raising questions about the differing rhetorical urgencies.

The Preliminary Analysis

Audience

Mandela's primary and sole audience for this second inaugural address is also directly

stated in the opening remarks: distinguished royalty, guests, and friends. While the Cape Town

speech addressed a rally of a mixed crowd, at Pretoria Mandela is speaking to a more formal and

specific group.

Purpose

Much like his intended audience, Mandela's purpose focuses on primary intentions

without any secondary aims that can be inferred from the text or tone. In this second speech,

Mandela purposes to accomplish four important tasks:









to accept and respond to his presidential election

to speak (directly) on behalf of South African people, showing gratitude for the
progression

to inspire

to ask for continued support and encouragement as South African redefines itself
as a true democracy

Pathos, ethos, and logos

Mandela's inaugural speech at Pretoria is a highly sensational address. He increases his

emotional appeal and the elements of pathos as he makes this final speech marking the end of the

apartheid era and the start of his career as president to the rehabilitating South Africa. In this

final inaugural address, Mandela chooses to employ only pathos and ethos, because now he can

put aside the attention-getting and reasoning strategy and focus on the victory and the years to

come for this revitalized nation. His emotional appeal is genuine and highly representative of the

exhausted excitement of several decades of struggling against an oppressive government

institution. His credibility is built not in effort to gain support, but to show his common

connection to South Africa's people and South Africa's future. The rhetorical analysis of the

Pretoria Inaugural address will present Mandela's specific word choices and structures as

elements of pathos and ethos.

The Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetoric of terminology

Mandela's second inaugural speech is 32 sentences long; just over half, 17, of those

sentences begin with "we," a strategy that is rooted in his development of pathos. Though this

sounds like an excessive and exhaustive use of the first person pronoun, Mandela effectively

uses the words to differentiate between his two purposes for the first and second addresses.

Mandela uses "we" at Pretoria more than at Cape Town for two specific reasons. First, he is









addressing a different audience. Rather than speaking to the South African citizens as he does at

the Cape Town rally, Mandela is speakingfor them as he addresses those who have had a hand

in getting the nation to its current state of progress. Second, on top of speaking for South Africa,

Mandela uses "we" to speak as a South African and not as an elected government official. He

accepts his election to the presidency as a humble equal and not as a governing figure lording

over the nation. Such an approach and implied role is an antithetical way to present an inaugural

address. It is expected and understood that Mandela is the new leader of his nation; he is

expected to present the speech of a strong leader, telling his audience what he will do, not what

"we" will do. By using "we," Mandela also creates a level playing field in terms of his

relationship with South African citizens and he also creates the precedent for how he wants his

presidential term to proceed-with equality and understanding between a leader and his country.

At the end of this inaugural address, Mandela again works pathos into his speech by

making an emotional and motivational exclamation: "God bless Africa!" This is the first time

Mandela refers to a Higher Power in the four speeches of this study and the statement is

extremely powerful and integral in more ways than one. Mandela's final statement is ultimately

the culmination of emotions about the South African saga that is ending with Mandela-the

freedom fighter-as the first president of the new democracy. "God bless Africa" is a way to

express the excitement and exhaustion, the elation and lethargy of the past forty years and the

culminating victory. Also, interesting note in this final sentence is Mandela's use of Africa

instead of South Africa. Why would he not have said "God bless SN,,/ih Africa?" Such a

statement is a deliberate declaration that Mandela has brought South Africa out of the darkness

of an oppressive system and he is ready to look outside of the South African nation and help









other countries. Mandela is demonstrating his understanding of responsibility as a president-

already thinking internationally about the progression of his fellow nations of Africa.

Rhetorical analysis conclusion

In this speech, as in others, Mandela demonstrates his versatility and ability to transition

to the role that addresses the rhetorical situation and ultimately the rhetorical urgency. For this

speech, Mandela deviates from speaking as South Africa's president to speaking as a fellow

South African. Mandela just as easily could have maintained the president's rhetoric that he

employed at Cape Town. He chooses, instead, to show his flexibility as a person and as a

leader-an action that earns him much ethos among his people. South Africa has just struggled

through and endured forty years under a government determined to avoid change, determined to

prevent versatile governing. Mandela recognizes that the rhetorical urgency of the moment

requires a demonstration of the new era to come. He can be the strong president with democratic

aims and national progression as his priority and he can be the humble South African citizen who

still sympathizes and empathizes with the people for whom and with whom he has fought.









CHAPTER 4
THE RHETORIC OF NELSON MANDELA: ANALYSIS CONCLUSION

High thoughts must have high language Aristophanes

Nelson Mandela, at the age of 90, has presented and continues to present powerful,

inspiring, and memorable speeches, both in national and international forums and all with

outstanding rhetorical caliber. The four speeches used in this analysis point to a specific

rhetoric, a rhetoric that transcends the classical traditions and speaks to its transformation into a

modern discipline. Mandela's rhetoric in these speeches-analytically evidenced by recurring

speech patterns, word choice, and even overall arrangement-extends beyond good articulation

and organization of thoughts, ideas, and concerns. The presentation, both rhetorical and lingual,

is the cornerstone of Mandela's oratory success. The rhetorical and lingual presentation of

Mandela's oratorical skills hinges on the notion of English as a global entity and a stepping stone

for international communication. James Levinsohn, in his discussion of globalization and South

Africa, bases his arguments around the assertion that English is "an international language of

commerce" (Levinsohn, 2). Basically, English is not merely a first or second tone for certain

nations and people groups; English is the language of motivation and stimulus. Levinsohn goes

on to analyze the progressive economic and political effects of South Africa returning to

speaking English as its attempted "integration with the rest of the industrialized world"

(Levinsohn, 1). South Africa before and during apartheid was an underdeveloped nation with a

dysfunctional governing system, racial inequality, and international economic isolation. South

Africa needed the attention and sympathies of developed, international neighbors-English-

speaking neighbors.

By using English, developing countries and their political/social leaders reel in the

attentions of developed, English-speaking nations. In the case of apartheid-bound South Africa,









Nelson Mandela put his country on the agendas of Britain, Canada, and the United States-all of

which exacted diplomatic pull in helping South Africa move towards democratic government.

While several factors, national and international, worked to end South Africa's struggle with

apartheid, Mandela's masterful use of a global tongue and his command of the rhetoric

implicates English rhetoric as an integral player both on the world stage and the academic stage.

As a world citizen and as an America scholar, I view this rhetorical analysis as a valuable insight

into the discipline of rhetoric and composition-a discipline that has been put on the backburner

in many academic institutions. This study sheds light on the obvious and obscure importance of

English rhetoric.

As with any conscientious public speaker who knows the criticalness of audience

sentiment and support, Nelson Mandela accents the crucial bones of his speeches with garnishing

of pathos, ethos, and logos. Though each of the four speeches uses different rhetorical strategies

to achieve emotion, credibility, and logic, there is one significant strategy that encompasses the

desired and achieved effects of all other elements of pathos, ethos, and logos-Mandela's use of

the English language. English grasped the emotions of several influential nations, one of which

had dealt with racial segregation in recent history. English achieved substantial credibility by

letting international and national audiences know that he was a seasoned orator, aware of the

measures and strategies it takes to get things done. Mandela's use of English established him as

an international figure and his country as an international interest and concern. English logically

reasoned that in order to truly change apartheid rule and make definite studies towards being a

democracy, South Africa had to reach out beyond its continent and beyond the national

languages (Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa) and appeal to a common tongue with the common desire

for political and social gains.









International communication is a powerful and profound maneuver in social economic

politics and Mandela showed great respect for and reverence to the effects of English as a global

language. In an analysis citing Mandela's use of language power, Theodore F. Sheckels asserts

that the rhetoric reflects a "qualified success," as Mandela did not ultimately "solidify the nation

and [...] give its people confidence" (Sheckels, 97). Sheckels argues that Mandela did not

efficiently and sufficiently use the power of language, but he fails to realize that the use of

English was the power of the language and not necessarily or only the arrangement of that

language. Mandela indeed does solidify the nation and encourage his people, by ultimately

doing what it took to put South Africa on the international agenda, ending apartheid and

rebuilding the nation as a democracy.

In reading Mandela's speeches as further conclusive evidence of the far-reaching

influence and potency of English rhetoric, we come to three crucial claims that all point to the

pertinent value of this research. We come to a theory, a new realm of rhetoric study, and a

research proposal-all of which assert the power of English and the extensive importance of

rhetoric.

A Theory

The first conclusion we can extract from the analysis of Mandela's rhetoric is that

English was key to South Africa's emergence from the apartheid conflict and rise to democracy.

Even though in South Africa, English is "the mother tongue of a fairly small [...] diverse portion

of the population" (Titlestad, 15), Mandela saw the use of English as a rhetorically urgent ploy to

gain the attention of the nations who could help his struggling country. Mandela recognized this

nationally minor language as "South Africa's window to the outside world" (Titlestad, 16); he

knew his success as an orator and the outlook of his country's future as a developed nation









hinged on this global tongue. English was the answer to three key as aspects of the situation at

hand:

* [1] It was the answer to the success of Mandela as a social activist. English was the
official language of major business, education, and governing entities (Titlestad, 16).
Mandela spoke the language of the institutions and industries that held the most power
over the oppressed. He spoke in the language of those who made the oppressive laws and
those who could change those laws.

* [2] It was the answer to the success of Mandela as an orator. Orators practice much
more than just the eloquent and articulate arrangement of thoughts into speeches; they
exercise rhetorical urgency in the way they speak, for whom they speak, and to whom they
speak. Mandela, in choosing a language not native to most South African citizens (those
for whom he was fighting), found ultimate success in English.

* [3] It was the answer to exposing the injustices and detrimental social effects of
apartheid. Money, wealth, and a strong economy is the universal symbol of national and
international development. Combine this with the use of a global language like English
and you have the prime answer to the successful eradication of apartheid in South Africa.
The United States, Canada, and Britain were the three nations that offered international
support to South Africa during the fight against apartheid In using the language of three
wealthy, influential, and developed nations-one of which endured its own historical
struggle with racial segregation-Mandela had the ultimate weapon with which to defend
his oppressed South African countrymen.

Each of these three aspects builds upon one another and reiterates the rhetorical urgency in

Mandela's public addresses. Mandela knew that English was a language of money and of world

relations and he therefore applied this to using English as a language of political and social

activism.

A New Scope of Rhetorical Analysis

From a rhetorical analysis of Mandela's speeches and in considering his use of English as

the success of those speeches, we as communicators gain a deeper insight into the prevalence of

rhetorical urgency. The foundational theories behind classical and modem rhetoric speak to the

importance of audience and purpose, because from these emerges the broad notion of rhetorical

urgency. To whom am I speaking? How do they feel about the situation? How do they feel about

me? What do they need to hear? Is this ,vc il//y In/,,i i //itl an opportune time for this message?









All of these considerations and many more reflect the all-encompassing question of rhetorical

urgency and from this study a new questions has emerged: What language can I speak in to

guarantee an ultimately positive and beneficial response? Retrospectively, the answer to that

question for Mandela and for other renowned international figures was English. To demonstrate

the success of English as a rhetorical strategy, I recall the aforementioned formula:

Rhetorical urgency-)rhetorical strategy- rhetorical success. By inserting English as

the rhetorical strategy, the formula used to move the country towards a democracy emerges:

Apartheid-)English rhetoric-racial equality. By inserting English as the rhetorical

strategy, the formula used to garner attention and support for South Africa's future as a

developed nation comes into view:

Oppressive government-English rhetoric-thriving democracy. Considering these

formulas and applying them to the measured success of Mandela and his campaign against

apartheid in the 1990's, South Africa is an integral case study into the success and importance of

employing English as the language of attaining national and international goals.

A Research Proposal

The final and arguably most significant conclusion reached in this extensive study is the

prospect for further and continuing research. Most readily obvious, this study limited its scope

to four speeches and a more extensive study will incorporate more of Mandela's speeches, which

range from activist campaigns, to presidential addresses, to even the international guest speeches

that Mandela has been doing during and since his presidency. His rhetoric and the rhetorical

urgency it evokes spans much farther than this study and inquiries into his shifting urgency and

the varying strategies he employs is valuable information. Another scope of investigation that

will stem from this primary study is research into the use of English by developing nations for

certain social, political, and economic problems. South Africa is not the first and will not be the









last developing nation to recognize the use of English as the key to international support and

national success. A new study will explore the rhetorical situations, rhetorical strategies, and

response and results of using English as a global language and global key into the doors of

success and development.









APPENDIX A
TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FOUR ANALYZED SPEECHES

"I am Prepared to Die"

Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964

I am the First Accused.

I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of
years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving
the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle
in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have
done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my
experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of
what any outsider might have said.

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days.
Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of
the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile,
Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then
that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble
contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in
relation to the charges made against me in this case.

Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of violence.
Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny
that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of
violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had
arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.

I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and
that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.

In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions which have
been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts
referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also
deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with the
part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the
part played by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to
explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of
these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to explain how I became
involved in the activities of these organizations.









I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy
of the organisation, and which have been charged in the indictment against us. I do not know
what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been
authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organization.

I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the
others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of
Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless
responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would
be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between
the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that
without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle
against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this
principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either
to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law.
We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was
legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its
policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.

But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all
members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence
and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to
all the people who live in it, and not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an
interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will
be seen that the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will
subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want,
therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people
which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were then being
threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years that is until 1949 it adhered strictly
to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the
Government in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion
and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments
remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the
words of my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952, and who was later
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

"who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently,
moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation?
The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress,
until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all".

Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there
was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the
past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid









legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy
the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This
campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied
apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of
this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role
which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because
the Judge found that discipline and non-violence had been stressed throughout. This was the time
when the volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word 'Amadelakufa' was
first used: this was the time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain
principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case,
but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the soldiers of a black army
pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. They were, and are. dedicated workers who are
prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do
whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to
face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for
such acts.

During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act
were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of
protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the ANC adhered to its policy of
non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were
arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. The
non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgment
some five years later, it found that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted
on all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state in place of
the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists.
This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and
never has been, a communist organization.

In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of a state of
emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I,
after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were
not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We
believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 'the will of the people
shall be the basis of authority of the Government', and for us to accept the banning was
equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve,
but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which
had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self-
respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared illegal by a government
in which it had no say.

In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of the Republic.
Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the population of South Africa, were not
entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us
were apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken
to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass









demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the
Convention. The conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the
Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the national stay-at-
home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all
strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen
to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go
into hiding to avoid arrest.

The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful
instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The
Government's answer was to introduce new and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and
to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force
designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to
rule by force alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkhonto.

Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it
will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons
and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the
dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963.

I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in
to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it and, if so,
how?

We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject
surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the
ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might
drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of
non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation,
and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for
a long time the people had been talking of violence of the day when they would fight the White
man and win back their country and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always
prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us
discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a
nonracial State by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to
lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.

It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of the South
African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women ofZeerust were
ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in
Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against
pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu
Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had
been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each
disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence
was the only way out it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches









the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and
were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a
danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not
properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as
Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form,
not of struggle against the Government though this is what prompted it but of civil strife
amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other
than a loss of life and bitterness.

At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African
situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was
inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and
non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels
of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms
of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a
course, but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of
Umkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said:

"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices submit or fight.
That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit
back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom".

This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the
National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.

We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations, including the
ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the
African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of
Umkhonto we Sizwe.

As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized as follows:

a. It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had
joined on the express policy of non-violence.
b. Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed.
One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely knit organization required for
sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members
ceasing to carry out this essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor
was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization.
c. On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC was prepared to
depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to this extent that it would no longer
disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity
would not be subject to disciplinary action by the ANC.









I say 'properly controlled violence' because I made it clear that if I formed the organization I
would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any
different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And I shall
now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.

As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took this
decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial
harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in
which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war
could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be
more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the
results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to
disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which
could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?

The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to
adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect
of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan
which was flexible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times;
above all, the plan had to be one which recognized civil war as the last resort, and left the
decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we
wanted to be ready if it became inevitable.

Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is
terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it
before taking any other decision.

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve
loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a
minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is
what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD):

"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and
civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a
realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we
will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the
Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil
war."

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our
country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign
trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone
communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for
goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a
heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to
reconsider their position.









Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government
buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to
our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the
adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we
had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that
sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be
brought to bear on the South African Government.

This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to
its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning
or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of 'Mr. X'
and 'Mr. Z'.

The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which
had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High
Command was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and
finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for
the direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the
National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be
attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no
authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of
sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation.
Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an importation from the
Jewish national underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between
1944 and 1948.

Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government buildings in
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets is proof of the
policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets
where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was
committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and had no connection
whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by
other organizations.

The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The response to
our actions and Manifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. The
Government threatened to take strong action, and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to
ignore the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they
responded to our call by suggesting the laager.

In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope
again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great
deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how
soon freedom would be obtained.









But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines were being drawn.
The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil
war were made less. The white newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by
death. If this was so, how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous
leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had
gathered to demand his release were killed by the police and white civilians. In 1921, more than
one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed
when the Administrator of South-West Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled
against the imposition of dog tax. On 1 May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police
shootings during the strike. On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.

How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more
Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day?
And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt
certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this
happened, how could black and white ever live together again in peace and harmony? These
were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions.

Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for
the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa
is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make
preparations as a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If
war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favourable to our
people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was
guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for
the possibility of guerrilla warfare.

All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to Africans. It
was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the
leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a
situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up
a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be
equipped to participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.

At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom
Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis
Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I
would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of
soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated
Africans. Training in both fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful
means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-
racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a State.









It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC.
My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All
Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and even in London I was received
with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was
promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa,
then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud,
President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of
Algeria; Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure,
President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda.
It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of
National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.

I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course
in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight
with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in
Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla
warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these
documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the
role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this
question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see
that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject from the East and from the
West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse
Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other.
Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal
views.

I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible
to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently
obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a
departure from the original decision of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa only. The
first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on
my way back to South Africa.

I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I
found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death
penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was
much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it
would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was
expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the
document which is Exhibit R. 14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead
with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a
sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened the
training would be of value.

I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing
so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth









and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons
during September, October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for
these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then
it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto.

One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party to a general conspiracy
to commit sabotage. I have already explained why this is incorrect but how, externally, there was
a departure from the original principle laid down by the ANC. There has, of course, been
overlapping of functions internally as well, because there is a difference between a resolution
adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field
of practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by banning and house
arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led to
individuals having to do work in different capacities. But though this may have blurred the
distinction between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction. Great
care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations in South Africa distinct. The ANC
remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the type of political work they had
conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto remained a small organization recruiting its members from
different races and organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that
members of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons served both
organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change the nature of the ANC or
give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than
the rule. This is why persons such as 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z', who were on the Regional Command of
their respective areas, did not participate in any of the ANC committees or activities, and why
people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their
ANC meetings.

Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto.
This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and knew that certain of the
activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently
explain) why I should not use the place.

I came there in the following manner:

1. As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the May general
strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country, living now in African
townships, then in country villages and again in cities.

During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of Arthur
Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political
association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.

2. In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered
me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take
me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of
an outlaw. Up to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and









could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could
live differently and work far more efficiently.
3. For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David.
In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family moved in. I stayed there until I went
abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was
arrested in Natal on 5 August.
4. Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African
National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the exception of myself, none of the officials or
members of these bodies lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held
there, and no activities connected with them were either organized or directed from there.
On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive
Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and
not on the farm.
5. Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in the main house
and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a
variety of subjects. We discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress
Alliance, Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the
Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the
Jewish National Movement in Palestine.
6. Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return to South
Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge
whether this was done.

Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC and the
Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position,
because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to
introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation
which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its head. But since the
allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the
ANC and the Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party.

The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is
not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea'.
The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for
the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the
ANC is the 'Freedom Charter'. It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for
redistribution, but not nationalization, of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks,
and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such
nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It
would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold
mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the
old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme
the nationalization of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital.
Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would take place in an economy based on private
enterprise. The realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous
African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of









its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it,
to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for
the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work
for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it
regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its programme.

The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was,
and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party's main
aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class
government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks
to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction.

It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist
Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal in this case the removal of white
supremacy and is not proof of a complete community of interests.

The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be
found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet
Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-
operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and
America were working to bring about a communist world.

Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after
Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party
would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.

I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for
their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would always correspond with the
long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus communists have played an important role in the
freedom struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these
States today are communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which
sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important role. Even
General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of communism, fought together
with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power
in China in the 1930s.

This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been repeated in the
National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party,
joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the Congress movements were accepted
practice. African communists could, and did, become members of the ANC, and some served on
the National, Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National
Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another
former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee.









I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting
communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which existed at times on specific issues
between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of
African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth
League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists from the ANC.
This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of
the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the
ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one
school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of
various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was
eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since.

It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism,
to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends.
But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against
oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades
communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as
human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and
work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans
for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many
Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief
by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as
communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the Suppression of
Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the Communist Party, I myself have
been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I
have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act.

It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our
cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United
Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian
struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of
the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist
bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these
circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the
Communists are our enemies.

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I think that in the
circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are.

I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in
Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of
Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata
Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from
Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early









African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the
tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.

It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also
true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such widely different persons as
Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some
form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and
to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists.

Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist Party has any
specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. The basic task at the present
moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the
basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I
realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the
impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and
reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system.

The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in
veneration by democrats throughout the world.

I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I
regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the
independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.

The American Congress, that country's doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the
independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments.

I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in
my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie
myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to
borrow the best from the West and from the East ...

There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I
wish to deal with this question.

Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources from funds raised by our
own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important
political case for example, the Treason Trial we received financial assistance from
sympathetic individuals and organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it
necessary to go beyond these sources.

But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we
realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of









our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad
in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states.

I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa
and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained
independence, had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from
the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African
states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received similar assistance.

On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that we should not
confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should also send a mission to
the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed.

I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to
name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the
organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so.

As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of 'Mr. X', the suggestion is that
Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary
grievances to enrol the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African
freedom, but in reality was fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be further from the
truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their
struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we
only wish that more sections of the community would join us.

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the State
Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships'. Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks
of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have
repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists
or so-called 'agitators' to teach us about these things.

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the
world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be
the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per
cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken
Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them to live
properly off the land. Thirty per cent are labourers, labour tenants, and squatters on white farms
and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30
per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them
closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are
impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living.

The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet
their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr,
Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the
average African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84 per









month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all African
families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going.

Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and
deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-
enteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is
one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria,
tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new
cases reported. These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in
retarded mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The
secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work
performed by African labourers.

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but
that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two
ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker
acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned,
both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.

The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education.
One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for African school
feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on this supplement to their diet.
This was a cruel act.

There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they
rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some
who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their
schooling than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race
Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African children in the age group
between seven to fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards
are vastly different from those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capital Government
spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46. In the same years,
the per capital spending on white children in the Cape Province (which are the only figures
available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures available to me, it can be stated,
without doubt, that the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from
wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent.

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Educational Journal, only
5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and
in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu
education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education
Bill in 1953:

"When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from
childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them ... People who believe in
equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native education









it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a
chance in life to use his knowledge."

The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial colour-bar
under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who
do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are
not allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of
collective bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in
the policy of successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated
by the so-called 'civilized labour policy' under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs are
found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages which far exceed
the earnings of the average African employee in industry.

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are
economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know
whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having
regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African
people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with
people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own
country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white
supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve white
supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by
Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an
African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of
attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as
people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions that they fall in
love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people
want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to
feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what 'house-boy' or 'garden-boy' or labourer
can ever hope to do this?

Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa,
render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single
African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his
pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even
worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown
of family life.

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the
streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go
to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be
two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an
alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but









everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without
somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white
living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and
robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such
offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of
doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable o Africans want to be
allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were
not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not to be
obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of
the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to
have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an
unnatural existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be
left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o'clock
at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed

to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labour
Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security
and a stake in society.

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be
permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority
of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy.

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee
racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in
racial domination. Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it
disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent half a
century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.

This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the
African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the
right to live.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought
against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal
of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal
opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal
for which I am prepared to die.









NELSON MANDELA'S ADDRESS TO RALLY IN CAPE TOWN ON HIS
RELEASE FROM PRISON

11 February 1990

Friends, comrades and fellow South Africans.

I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all.

I stand here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people. Your tireless
and heroic sacrifices have made it possible for me to be here today. I therefore place the
remaining years of my life in your hands.

On this day of my release, I extend my sincere and warmest gratitude to the millions of my
compatriots and those in every corner of the globe who have campaigned tirelessly for my
release.

I send special greetings to the people of Cape Town, this city which has been my home for three
decades. Your mass marches and other forms of struggle have served as a constant source of
strength to all political prisoners.

I salute the African National Congress. It has fulfilled our every expectation in its role as leader
of the great march to freedom.

I salute our President, Comrade Oliver Tambo, for leading the ANC even under the most
difficult circumstances.

I salute the rank and file members of the ANC. You have sacrificed life and limb in the pursuit of
the noble cause of our struggle.

I salute combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe, like Solomon Mahlangu and Ashley Kriel who have
paid the ultimate price for the freedom of all South Africans.

I salute the South African Communist Party for its sterling contribution to the struggle for
democracy. You have survived 40 years of unrelenting persecution. The memory of great
communists like Moses Kotane, Yusuf Dadoo, Bram Fischer and Moses Mabhida will be
cherished for generations to come.

I salute General Secretary Joe Slovo, one of our finest patriots. We are heartened by the fact that
the alliance between ourselves and the Party remains as strong as it always was.

I salute the United Democratic Front, the National Education Crisis Committee, the South
African Youth Congress, the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses and COSATU and the many
other formations of the Mass Democratic Movement.









I also salute the Black Sash and the National Union of South African Students. We note with
pride that you have acted as the conscience of white South Africa. Even during the darkest days
in the history of our struggle you held the flag of liberty high. The large-scale mass mobilisation
of the past few years is one of the key factors which led to the opening of the final chapter of our
struggle.

I extend my greetings to the working class of our country. Your organised strength is the pride of
our movement. You remain the most dependable force in the struggle to end exploitation and
oppression.

I pay tribute to the many religious communities who carried the campaign for justice forward
when the organizations for our people were silenced.

I greet the traditional leaders of our country many of you continue to walk in the footsteps of
great heroes like Hintsa and Sekhukune.

I pay tribute to the endless heroism of youth, you, the young lions. You, the young lions, have
energised our entire struggle.

I pay tribute to the mothers and wives and sisters of our nation. You are the rock-hard foundation
of our struggle. Apartheid has inflicted more pain on you than on anyone else.

On this occasion, we thank the world community for their great contribution to the anti-apartheid
struggle. Without your support our struggle would not have reached this advanced stage. The
sacrifice of the frontline states will be remembered by South Africans forever.

My salutations would be incomplete without expressing my deep appreciation for the strength
given to me during my long and lonely years in prison by my beloved wife and family. I am
convinced that your pain and suffering was far greater than my own.

Before I go any further I wish to make the point that I intend making only a few preliminary
comments at this stage. I will make a more complete statement only after I have had the
opportunity to consult with my comrades.

Today the majority of South Africans, black and white, recognize that apartheid has no future. It
has to be ended by our own decisive mass action in order to build peace and security. The mass
campaign of defiance and other actions of our organisation and people can only culminate in the
establishment of democracy. The destruction caused by apartheid on our sub-continent is in-
calculable. The fabric of family life of millions of my people has been shattered. Millions are
homeless and unemployed. Our economy lies in ruins and our people are embroiled in political
strife. Our resort to the armed struggle in 1960 with the formation of the military wing of the
ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was a purely defensive action against the violence of apartheid. The
factors which necessitated the armed struggle still exist today. We have no option but to
continue. We express the hope that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement will be created
soon so that there may no longer be the need for the armed struggle.









I am a loyal and disciplined member of the African National Congress. I am therefore in full
agreement with all of its objectives, strategies and tactics.

The need to unite the people of our country is as important a task now as it always has been. No
individual leader is able to take on this enormous task on his own. It is our task as leaders to
place our views before our organisation and to allow the democratic structures to decide. On the
question of democratic practice, I feel duty bound to make the point that a leader of the
movement is a person who has been democratically elected at a national conference. This is a
principle which must be upheld without any exceptions.

Today, I wish to report to you that my talks with the government have been aimed at normalising
the political situation in the country. We have not as yet begun discussing the basic demands of
the struggle. I wish to stress that I myself have at no time entered into negotiations about the
future of our country except to insist on a meeting between the ANC and the government.

Mr. De Klerk has gone further than any other Nationalist president in taking real steps to
normalise the situation. However, there are further steps as outlined in the Harare Declaration
that have to be met before negotiations on the basic demands of our people can begin. I reiterate
our call for, inter alia, the immediate ending of the State of Emergency and the freeing of all, and
not only some, political prisoners. Only such a normalised situation, which allows for free
political activity, can allow us to consult our people in order to obtain a mandate.

The people need to be consulted on who will negotiate and on the content of such negotiations.
Negotiations cannot take place above the heads or behind the backs of our people. It is our belief
that the future of our country can only be determined by a body which is democratically elected
on a non-racial basis. Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the over-
whelming demand of our people for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa. There
must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our
political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our
society thoroughly democratised.

It must be added that Mr. De Klerk himself is a man of integrity who is acutely aware of the
dangers of a public figure not honouring his undertakings. But as an organisation we base our
policy and strategy on the harsh reality we are faced with. And this reality is that we are still
suffering under the policy of the Nationalist government.

Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. We call on our people to seize this moment so that
the process towards democracy is rapid and uninterrupted. We have waited too long for our
freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts. To relax
our efforts now would be a mistake which generations to come will not be able to forgive. The
sight of freedom looming on the horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts.

It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured. We call on our white
compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political
home for you too. We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate









the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process
towards the complete eradication of apartheid.

Our march to freedom is irreversible. We must not allow fear to stand in our way. Universal
suffrage on a common voters' role in a united democratic and non-racial South Africa is the only
way to peace and racial harmony.

In conclusion I wish to quote my own words during my trial in 1964. They are true today as they
were then:

'I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have
cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony
and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs
be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.'









NELSON MANDELA'S ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF CAPE TOWN,
GRAND PARADE, ON THE OCCASION OF HIS INAUGURATION AS
STATE PRESIDENT

Cape Town, 9 May 1994

Mr Master of Ceremonies,
Your Excellencies,
Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
My Fellow South Africans:



Today we are entering a new era for our country and its people. Today we celebrate not the
victory of a party, but a victory for all the people of South Africa.

Our country has arrived at a decision. Among all the parties that contested the elections, the
overwhelming majority of South Africans have mandated the African National Congress to lead
our country into the future. The South Africa we have struggled for, in which all our people, be
they African, Coloured, Indian or White, regard themselves as citizens of one nation is at hand.

Perhaps it was history that ordained that it be here, at the Cape of Good Hope that we should lay
the foundation stone of our new nation. For it was here at this Cape, over three centuries ago,
that there began the fateful convergence of the peoples of Africa, Europe and Asia on these
shores.

It was to this peninsula that the patriots, among them many princes and scholars, of Indonesia
were dragged in chains. It was on the sandy plains of this peninsula that first battles of the epic
wars of resistance were fought.

When we look out across Table Bay, the horizon is dominated by Robben Island, whose infamy
as a dungeon built to stifle the spirit of freedom is as old as colonialism in South Africa. For
three centuries that island was seen as a place to which outcasts can be banished. The names of
those who were incarcerated on Robben Island is a roll call of resistance fighters and democrats
spanning over three centuries. If indeed this is a Cape of Good Hope, that hope owes much to the
spirit of that legion of fighters and others of their calibre.

We have fought for a democratic constitution since the 1880s. Ours has been a quest for a
constitution freely adopted by the people of South Africa, reflecting their wishes and their
aspirations. The struggle for democracy has never been a matter pursued by one race, class,
religious community or gender among South Africans. In honouring those who fought to see this
day arrive, we honour the best sons and daughters of all our people. We can count amongst them
Africans, Coloureds, Whites, Indians, Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews all of them united by
a common vision of a better life for the people of this country.









It was that vision that inspired us in 1923 when we adopted the first ever Bill of Rights in this
country. That same vision spurred us to put forward the African Claims in 1946. It is also the
founding principle of the Freedom Charter we adopted as policy in 1955, which in its very first
lines, places before South Africa an inclusive basis for citizenship.

In 1980s the African National Congress was still setting the pace, being the first major political
formation in South Africa to commit itself firmly to a Bill of Rights, which we published in
November 1990. These milestones give concrete expression to what South Africa can become.
They speak of a constitutional, democratic, political order in which, regardless of colour, gender,
religion, political opinion or sexual orientation, the law will provide for the equal protection of
all citizens.

They project a democracy in which the government, whomever that government may be, will be
bound by a higher set of rules, embodied in a constitution, and will not be able govern the
country as it pleases.

Democracy is based on the majority principle. This is especially true in a country such as ours
where the vast majority have been systematically denied their rights. At the same time,
democracy also requires that the rights of political and other minorities be safeguarded.

In the political order we have established there will regular, open and free elections, at all levels
of government central, provincial and municipal. There shall also be a social order which
respects completely the culture, language and religious rights of all sections of our society and
the fundamental rights of the individual.

The task at hand on will not be easy. But you have mandated us to change South Africa from a
country in which the majority lived with little hope, to one in which they can live and work with
dignity, with a sense of self-esteem and confidence in the future. The cornerstone of building a
better life of opportunity, freedom and prosperity is the Reconstruction and Development
Programme.

This needs unity of purpose. It needs in action. It requires us all to work together to bring an end
to division, an end to suspicion and build a nation united in our diversity.

The people of South Africa have spoken in these elections. They want change! And change is
what they will get. Our plan is to create jobs, promote peace and reconciliation, and to guarantee
freedom for all South Africans. We will tackle the widespread poverty so pervasive among the
majority of our people. By encouraging investors and the democratic state to support job creating
projects in which manufacturing will play a central role we will try to change our country from a
net exporter of raw materials to one that exports finished products through beneficiation.

The government will devise policies that encourage and reward productive enterprise among the
disadvantaged communities African, Coloured and Indian. By easing credit conditions we can
assist them to make inroads into the productive and manufacturing spheres and breakout of the
small-scale distribution to which they are presently confined.









To raise our country and its people from the morass of racism and apartheid will require
determination and effort. As a government, the ANC will create a legal framework that will
assist, rather than impede, the awesome task of reconstruction and development of our battered
society.

While we are and shall remain fully committed to the spirit of a government of national unity, we
are determined to initiate and bring about the change that our mandate from the people demands.

We place our vision of a new constitutional order for South Africa on the table not as
conquerors, prescribing to the conquered. We speak as fellow citizens to heal the wounds of the
past with the intent of constructing a new order based on justice for all.

This is the challenge that faces all South Africans today, and it is one to which I am certain we
will all rise.

Issued by:

The Department of Information and Publicity,
P.O. Box 61884,
Marshalltown 2107,
Johannesburg.









STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS NELSON ROLIHLAHLA MANDELA AT HIS INAUGURATION
AS PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
UNION BUILDINGS

Pretoria, 10 May 1994

Your Majesties,
Your Highnesses,
Distinguished Guests,
Comrades and Friends.

Today, all of us do, by our presence here, and by our celebrations in other parts of our country
and the world, confer glory and hope to newborn liberty.

Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a
society of which all humanity will be proud.

Our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce an actual South African reality that
will reinforce humanity's belief in justice, strengthen its confidence in the nobility of the human
soul and sustain all our hopes for a glorious life for all.

All this we owe both to ourselves and to the peoples of the world who are so well represented
here today.

To my compatriots, I have no hesitation in saying that each one of us is as intimately attached to
the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa
trees of the bushveld.

Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal renewal. The
national mood changes as the seasons change.

We are moved by a sense of joy and exhilaration when the grass turns green and the flowers
bloom.

That spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains the depth
of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw our country tear itself apart in a terrible
conflict, and as we saw it spurned, outlawed and isolated by the peoples of the world, precisely
because it has become the universal base of the pernicious ideology and practice of racism and
racial oppression.

We, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its bosom, that
we, who were outlaws not so long ago, have today been given the rare privilege to be host to the
nations of the world on our own soil.









We thank all our distinguished international guests for having come to take possession with the
people of our country of what is, after all, a common victory for justice, for peace, for human
dignity.

We trust that you will continue to stand by us as we tackle the challenges of building peace,
prosperity, non-sexism, non-racialism and democracy.

We deeply appreciate the role that the masses of our people and their political mass democratic,
religious, women, youth, business, traditional and other leaders have played to bring about this
conclusion. Not least among them is my Second Deputy President, the Honourable F.W. de
Klerk.

We would also like to pay tribute to our security forces, in all their ranks, for the distinguished
role they have played in securing our first democratic elections and the transition to democracy,
from blood-thirsty forces which still refuse to see the light.

The time for the healing of the wounds has come.

The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come.

The time to build is upon us.

We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our
people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other
discrimination.

We succeeded to take our last steps to freedom in conditions of relative peace. We commit
ourselves to the construction of a complete, just and lasting peace.

We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our people. We
enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and
white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right
to human dignity a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.

As a token of its commitment to the renewal of our country, the new Interim Government of
National Unity will, as a matter of urgency, address the issue of amnesty for various categories
of our people who are currently serving terms of imprisonment.

We dedicate this day to all the heroes and heroines in this country and the rest of the world who
sacrificed in many ways and surrendered their lives so that we could be free.

Their dreams have become reality. Freedom is their reward.

We are both humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that you, the people of South
Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first President of a united, democratic, non-racial and non-
sexist government.









We understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom

We know it well that none of us acting alone can achieve success.

We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation building,
for the birth of a new world.

Let there be justice for all.

Let there be peace for all.

Let there be work, bread, water and salt for all.

Let each know that for each the body, the mind and the soul have been freed to fulfill
themselves.

Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the
oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world.

Let freedom reign.

The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement!

God bless Africa!

Thank you.









LIST OF REFERENCES

"1990: Freedom for Nelson Mandela." BBC On This Day 2 January 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/.

Bitzer, Lloyd. "The Rhetorical Situation." Philosophy and Rhetoric January 1968: 1-14.

Crystal, David. English as a global language. Cambridge: University Press, 1997.

Dovring, Karin. English as Lingua Franca: Double Talk in Global Persuasion. London: Praeger,
1997.

Farrell, Thomas B. Norms of Rhetorical Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

Levinsohn, James. "Globalization and the Returns to Speaking English in South Africa."
December 2004. NBER Working Papers. 15 November 2007 http://www.nber.org/.

Mandela, Nelson. "Inauguration Speech." Selected Speeches, Statements, and Writings of
Nelson Mandela. 9 May 1994. 18 September 2007
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history.mandela/1994/inaugct.html.

Mandela, Nelson, "Inauguration Speech." Selected Speeches, Statements, and Writings of
Nelson Mandela. 10 May 1994. 18 September 2007
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history.mandela/1994/inaugpta.html.

Mandela, Nelson. "Speech on Relase from Prison." Selected Speeches, Statements, and Writings
of Nelson Mandela. 11 February 1990. 18 September 2007
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1990/release.html.

Mandela, Nelson. "Statement from the Dock at the Rivonia Trial." Selected Speeches,
Statements, and Writings of Nelson Mandela. 20 April 1964. 18 September 2007
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1960s/rivonia.html.

Nixon, Rob. "Mandela, Messianism, and the Media." Transition 51(1991): 42-55. 21 October
2007 http://www.jstor.org/.

Sheckels, Theodore F. "The Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: A Qualified Success." Howard Journal
of Communications 12:2 (2001): 85-99. 21 October 2007
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170119951.

Titlestad, Peter. "People's English, codification, function, and logic." English Today 18:2 (April
2002): 14-20. 21 October 2007 http://joumals.cambridge.org/









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Rania L. Williams was born April 21, 1984 in Jacksonville, Florida. She received the

Bachelor of Arts in English (with a Spanish minor) from Indiana Wesleyan University in 2006.

She is a member of Sigma Delta Pi, National Hispanic Honors Society. She has served as a

Teaching Assistant in the English Department and University Writing Program at University of

Florida.





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1 THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, SOUTH AFRICA AND NELSON MANDELA: A CASE FOR RHETORICAL URGENCY AND A STRA TEGY FOR RHETORICAL SUCCESS By RANIA L. WILLIAMS A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008

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2 2008 Rania L. Williams

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3 To my parents, Robert and Theresa, who have he lped me to get to this point in my education through a lot of pushing and even more prayer.

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A special thank you is extende d to Dr. Sid Dobrin and Dr Brian McCrea for serving on my Thesis team I appreciate the feedback, s uggestions, time, and effort that you put into helping make this educational experience reward ing and successful. Your input was valuable and will be used as I continue to matriculate th rough other educational end eavors. I definitely did not get through this research and writing pr ocess without the valuable advice and much needed prodding from my friends and fellow graduate students in the English Department. Thanks to everyone; Id still be st aring at a blank page without you!

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5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................7CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................9Nelson Mandela: The Beginnings of Rhetorical Genius........................................................ 10Mandela: The Student...................................................................................................... 10Mandela: The Orator....................................................................................................... 112 RHETORICAL URGENCY, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND NELSON MANDEL A........................................................................................................................ ....14Mandela and Rhetorical Urgency........................................................................................... 14Primary Methodology...................................................................................................... 153 THE STUDY: RHETORICAL ANALYSI S AND SECONDARY METHODOLOGY .......18Rhetorical Analysis............................................................................................................ .....18Secondary Methodology.................................................................................................. 19The Preliminary Analysis................................................................................................ 20The Rhetorical Analysis.................................................................................................. 20Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Sp eech at the Rivonia Trial.....................................................21The Rhetorical Context....................................................................................................21The Preliminary Analysis................................................................................................ 21Audience...................................................................................................................21Purpose.....................................................................................................................22Pathos, ethos, and logos...........................................................................................22The Rhetorical Analysis.................................................................................................. 23Rhetoric of terminology........................................................................................... 23Rhetoric of sentence st ructure/characteristics..........................................................24Rhetoric of organization/form.................................................................................. 24Rhetorical analysis conclu sions: Rivonia trial speech............................................. 25The Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Cape Town Release Speech............................................. 26The Rhetorical Context....................................................................................................26The Preliminary Analysis................................................................................................ 27Audience...................................................................................................................27Purpose.....................................................................................................................27Pathos, ethos, and logos...........................................................................................27The Rhetorical Analysis.................................................................................................. 28Rhetoric of Terminology.......................................................................................... 28

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6 Rhetoric of sentence st ructure/characteristics ..........................................................29Rhetoric of organization/form.................................................................................. 30Rhetorical analysis conclusions : Cape Town release speech................................... 31Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: The Inaugural Addresses......................................................... 32The Cape Town and Pretoria Inaugural Addresses.........................................................32The rhetorical context...............................................................................................32The Cape Town Inaugural Address........................................................................................33The Preliminary Analysis................................................................................................ 33Audience...................................................................................................................33Purpose.....................................................................................................................33Pathos, ethos, and logos...........................................................................................33The Rhetorical Analysis.................................................................................................. 34Rhetoric of terminology........................................................................................... 34Rhetoric of sentence structure/form......................................................................... 35Rhetoric of organization/form.................................................................................. 35Rhetorical analysis conclusions : cape town inaugural speech................................. 35The Pretoria Inaugural Address.............................................................................................. 36The Preliminary Analysis................................................................................................ 36Audience...................................................................................................................36Purpose.....................................................................................................................36Pathos, ethos, and logos...........................................................................................37The Rhetorical Analysis.................................................................................................. 37Rhetoric of terminology........................................................................................... 37Rhetorical analysis conclusion................................................................................. 394 THE RHETORIC OF NELSON MANDE LA: ANALYSIS CONCLUSI ON....................... 40A Theory.................................................................................................................................42A New Scope of Rhetorical Analysis..............................................................................43A Research Proposal........................................................................................................ 44APPENDIX A TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FOUR ANALYZED SPEECHES................................................46LIST OF REFERENCES...............................................................................................................74BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.........................................................................................................75

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7 Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, SOUTH AFRICA AND NELSON MANDELA: A CASE FOR RHETORICAL URGENCY AND A STRA TEGY FOR RHETORICAL SUCCESS By Rania L. Williams August 2008 Chair: Sidney Dobrin Major: English In May 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected pres ident of the newly democratic nation of South Africa. After decades of oppressive aparth eid rule, social and poli tical activism, and the assistance of key international neighbors, South Africa emerged from a dead-end governing body, to one that would potentially elevate the countrys status to that of a developed nation. The success of South Africa can be explained in several ways, but none as efficiently as attributing the success to Mandela s use of the English language. Using English and employing strategic rhetoric played a significant and most profound role in the deliverance of South Africa from apartheid rule. An in-depth rhetorical an alysis of four key speeches points to the English language as the key to success and political freed om for South Africans during the apartheid era. This study will argue that with apartheid as the rhetorical situation, the use English language was the rhetorical urgency that Ma ndela knew would help him accomplish his goals as a social and political leader. This paper will examine Mandelas four integr al speeches presented during and just after South Africas journey to democracy. Mandelas purposes, audiences, and th e specific rhetorical techniques he uses provide overwhelming suppor t for his use of the English language as the integral weapon for combating th e oppressive apartheid government After presenting the key

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8 findings in the rhetorical analysis, the paper wi ll offer conclusions, a th eory, and proposals for further research into the use of English as a public relations and international diplomacy tool.

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9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Language exerts h idden power, like a moon on the tides. Rita Mae Brown Communications analyst, Kari n Dovring refers to the E nglish language as a lingua franca, or a language extensively employed by many more people than just its native speakers (Dovring, x). In other words, English is a glob al tongue. But what make s a language a universal tongue? More specifically, what makes English a global language? Is it simply the millions of people worldwide who speak it or does it hinge on a deeper aspect than just a large number? Such questions regarding the English language can be answered looking at a variety of research approaches: studies in nationalism, politics, economics and even national and international identity. Understanding the globalization of English can ev en be achieved through intense studies of specific developing countries and their progression thr ough or influence by the political, social, and economic uses of the English language. One country in particularSouth Africais a pivotal example of the importa nce of global universal language and the unmistakable power of the English language. A global language, as defined by David Crysta l, is any tongue that achieves a global status when it develops a special role that is recognized in ever y country (Crystal, 2). For the purposes of this study, the apartheid-ruled nation of South Africa will be the specific stage upon which the English language will have that special role. Taking on the role of best supporting actor is Nelson Mandela, who through his mast erful command of the English language, put South Africa on the international agenda and effectively brought about change in the developing nation. Although English became an official langua ge of the eastern Cape in 1822 (Crystal, 39), the importance of the minority English tongue in South Africa was not fully acknowledged and regarded until South Africas st ruggle with apartheid through mu ch of the Twentieth century

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10 came to the international forefront. Through the examination of the rhetoric of Nelson Mandelas key speeches, this study argues that the South African saga demonstrated not only the power of English, but also the rh etorical urgency of using that power to accomplish pertinent national goals. Nelson Mandela: The Beginnings of Rhetorical Genius The individu als whole experience is built upon the plan of his language. Henri Delacroix Mandela: The Student On 18 July 1918, Rolihlahla Mandela was born in rural South Africa at Qunu. As a m ember and only son of the royal family of the Xhosa-speaking Thembu people, young Mandela was raised as a traditional villa ge child until he began attending a mission school. It was at this school that he both learned English and adopted the name Nelson. Mandela was the first in his family to attend school. As he progressed through the primary sc hool, the history books Mandela studied presented a South Africa far diffe rent from the peaceful countryside on which he lived. He began to see a distinction between rural South Afri ca and urban South Africa, white citizens and native citizens. Mande la also began to tune in to th e current events of his country, political and social. The legal aspects of the hi storical accounts and the current issues began to interest Mandela As Mandela grew older, his en thusiasm for school and formal education grew as well and by age seventeen, he was enrolled at Clarkeberry, a training college. Around this time, he was also being prepared by his tribe to be next chief, since his father had passed away. In the face of such a responsibility, Mandela felt the strong opposing pulls of continuing his education and claiming his position of tribal chie f. The appeal of studying law was growing greater as well and in the midst of a nation falling deeper and deeper into laws of racial discrimination and racial segregation, Mandela saw a need for action. Abdi cating his rights to the chieftainship in Qunu,

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11 Mandela went on to begin his law studies at th e University of Witwat ersrand. After several years of fighting for the cause of equality and freedom, he would go on to earn his Bachelors of Laws through correspondence wh ile in prison years later. Mandelas early formal education is an integr al part of this study, as he learned under the tutelage of instructors teaching the English language in a countr y where English was the minority language, used specifically for law, education, and public issues (Cryst al, 39). Mandela was exposed early on and consistently to the power of the English languagefirst through its use in his studies and later on through its use as the lan guage of the legal profession. His years as a student of formal English education would prove to be the main weapon in his artillery against the oppressive system of apartheid in South Af rica, as his speeches and public discourses demanded the respect and attention of Englis h-speaking people nationally and worldwide Mandela: The Orator In 1941, a young and determ ined Nelson Mandela le ft the rural country and set off for the city of Johannesburg. It was in this urban and densely populated environment that Mandela began to witness firsthand the ri sing racial discrimination, segregat ion, and the adverse effects of an impending system of racial segregation. Mand ela took mental note of the starkly contrasting living conditions of whites in the suburbs versus Af rican natives in the slums. Mandela saw this as a political issue ignored by the then current governmenta political issue he immediately determined to address. Having seen and experien ced the social injustices and realizing that a complacent government was leaving South Africa to remain a developing nation, Mandela made it his priority to take action, bot h in his law education and in ex tracurricular activities, namely those associated with the Af rican National Congress (ANC). Seven years after Mandela arrived in Joha nnesburg, in 1948, South Africa codified white rule and racial segregation into the system of apartheid. Living and social conditions for African

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12 natives and non-Europeans became worse as poverty, crime, and violence increased. Mandela, with the partnership and associ ation of the ANC began his car eer and mission as a powerful orator, speaking at protests a nd demonstrations around the countr y. His English education, legal discipline, and political aims would keep the South African government and apartheid under pressure and the deliverance of the nation under th e international spotlight for over forty years. Mandelas oratory skills would play a profound role in the tr ansformation of a nation from oppressive apartheid to liberating democracy. In Mandela, Messianism, and the Media, Rob Nixon explores Ma ndelas rhetorical impact through his relationship w ith the media and its effect on his image and the success of his political and social aims. Though Nixon focuse s closely on Mandelas media presence and not so much on his rhetorical strategy, such a presen ce in the media would not have been possible without the attention Mandela drew through his speeches and correspondences, both while imprisoned and free. Nixon details and qualifies Mandelas media mysticism from the speech just before the prison term to his powerful re lease speech at Cape Town. Commenting heavily on Mandelas national and medi a popularity over a thirty year period, Nixon inadvertently affirms that Mandelas rhetoric and oratorical skills not only grasped and maintained media attention, but also had the ultimate bearing on South Africans future as a democratic nation. As Nixon documents Mandelas relationship to the media, he recounts the media hype even during Mandelas imprisonment. While in prison, Mandela was effectively silenced by jailers, who reasoned that if his visibility to the media led to fame, invisibility would shut it out (Nixon, 44). In effect, the jailers were keeping Mandelas intricately arranged and articulated words out of the public ear. Even here we can see the implications of the powerful influence of Mandelas rhetoric. Nixon goes on to discuss Mandelas first (and also American) television

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13 interview, an extraordinary case, since Mandela was considered an international media colossus [] a Great Communicator [] s tirring in demeanor and rhetoric (Nixon, 45). While Nixon critiques only Mandelas com posure and reflection throughout th is interview, the resounding implication is that even here Mandela demons trates his command not onl y of rhetoric, but of English rhetoric. In his assessment of Mande las release speech at Cape Town, Nixon comments on the effect of Mandelas combining of oratorical style and the cr owds spirit (Nixon, 51). Though not explicitly identified, rhetor ical urgency is the key componen t of Nixons critique. Mandela, master of the media and oratorical strategy, has much success with the media and progress within South Africa by never abandoning the concept of rhet orical urgency, a term that will be fully defined and qualified later in this study. Overall, Nixons article presents a glor ifying and admirable account of Mandelas success with the media, a success that would not ev en exist to talk about had Mandelas grasp of English language and English rhetoric not b een of such exemplary caliber. Mandela, Messianism, and the Media, published in 1991, c oncludes with an assertion that Mandelas media presence earned him international favor a nd can only provide a prediction of what that may or may not mean nationally in South Afri cas future. This study, although focusing on the strategy rather than popularity, is an extension of Nixons criti cal analysis, providing the last puzzle piece to the strength of Mandelas rhet oric, its place in the English language, and its effects on a developing nation.

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14 CHAPTER 2 RHETORICAL URGENCY, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND NELSON MANDELA If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart. Nelson Mandela Mandela and Rhetorical Urgency In relating Mandelas speeches to rhetorical urgency, it is imperative to first recognize that urgency is not a new concept, as it originat es from the classical th eory of exigency. Lloyd Bitzer, known for discovering the rhetorical situati on, is the key figure associated with exigency, from which we see and understand rh etorical urgency. Bitzer descri bes the rhetorical situation as that which arises from the necessity to know the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse (Bitzer, par. 1). It is within this definition that exigency occurs as a response to the situation. Exigen cy, Bitzer asserts, is the imperfection or obstacle that must be addressed in order to achieve a successful and effective discourse (Bitzer, par.14). Exigency dictates how an orator must arrange and presen t his discourse in order to achieve the desired effect. Within the ex igent moment, we find rh etorical urgency which points to the specific strategies and approaches that must be em ployed in order to sufficiently address a particular obstacle. Wh ether it is the use of a certain tone, a specific arrangement, or the use of a particular language as in Mandelas caseafter de termining an exigent moment, rhetorical urgency is the respons e to a rhetorical situation. Th is study focuses on English as the main tool for the rhetorical urgency of South Africas aparth eid conflict, an urgency that ultimately asked for and attained the attention of international arena. Mandelas command of rhetoric and English language in his speeches speaks strongly to his respect for and acknowledgement of rhetorical urgency, a key stimulus in the universality of the English language. For the purposes of this study, rhetorical urgency is the focus of the

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15 analyses and the basis for the overall conclusions. Rhetorical urgency is the starting point of my proposed modern rhetoric formula: Rhetorical urgency rhetorical strategy rhetorical success. It is with this formula that I define and characterize Ne lson Mandelas discourses. Basi cally, the formula asserts that the certain needs of a situation (u rgency) leads to the adoption of a particular, tailored plan of organization (strategy), which in tu rn yields the desired effect of the original purpose (success). Unless a communicator thoroughly and correctly identifies the urgency of a situation, he will be unable to effectively determine what syntactical and organizational strategy will achieve the end results he wants. As I performed the rhetoric al analyses for the study, it was imperative to do historical research, not only to be aware of th e situational context, but also to understand the audience sentiment and the overall desired effect To understand Mandelas ultimate purpose, I had to first understand his social envir onmentbasically his rhetorical mindset. Primary Methodology Studying Thom as B. Farrellss Norms of Rhetorical Culture sheds light on the concept of rhetorical urgency and its place in the rhetoric of modern historical eras. Applying Farrells considerations and conclusion to this study of Mandelas rhetoric helped set the tone for the analysis of his speeches. Through implementing th e classical traditions of rhetoric, Farrell revives the practice of rhetor ical analysis, using contem porary cases and contemporary discourses. Though Farrell expl ores several milestone discou rses, including a Kennedy eulogy, Max Horkheimers The End of Reason essay, and Governor Mario Cuomos speech on abortion, his explication of Frank lin D. Roosevelts first inaugur al address in Chapter Two set the precedent for my analysis of Mandelas sp eeches. Farrell begins the explication with a discussion of rhetoric and its hist orical tie to the classical theori es of Protagoras, Isocrates, and Aristotle in order to build a ju stifying and preliminary foundati on for his rhetorical analysis.

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16 As Farrell presents the key ideas associated with Isocrates, modern parallels to Mandela clearly emerge. For Isocrates, great, ennobling themes bring quality to discourse as well as virtue to orator and culture al ike (Farrell, 59). Isocrates main tained this assertion as he presented rhetorical examples to his students, an idea that ha s survived over time and is evidenced in Mandelas discourse. The themes this study uncovers thro ugh analysis not only affect the quality of the speeches, but in retros pect imparted great, lasting virtue to Mandela and South Africa. Mandelas discourse also parallels Isocrates beli efs about good practice (Farrell, 60) of rhetoric. Virtue emerges from the art of rhetoric, an exercise that can be perfected over time. Every effect of good rhetor ic is a by-product of an acquired rhetorical competence (Farrell, 60). Likewise, this study w ill present Mandelas rhetor ic as an intricately chiseled result of his superior comm and and grasp of English rhetoric. Farrell asserts several conclu sions about rhetoric through is discussion of Aristotelian rhetoric, which he claims is a very useful tool in justifying rhetoric as a significant human practice (Farrell, 62). In a criti que of Aristotles theory, Farrell presents a four-step justification of rhetoric that not only help s in understanding its purpose and significance, but it also mirrors the justification for Mandelas strategies in hi s speeches. Audience becomes a rhetorical agency as it is this group of persons w ho literally decides the fate of discourse (Farre ll, 69). The reception of the audience, influenced by preexisti ng sentiment and influenced by discourse, holds the ultimate success of the discourse. This st udy of Mandelas speeches will show that the national and international groups to whom he spoke almost singl e-handedly determined what he said and how he said it. Farrell goes on to e xplore and bring to modern relevance more of Aristotles classical theories on rh etoric. His discussions in this second chapter culminate in his rhetorical analysis of Roosevel ts inaugural address. Taking in to account the historical context

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17 and the resulting national attitude and sentiment, Farrell explicates the st ructure and language of the speech. Because of crucial similarities in rhetorical cont ext and audience, this analysis served as a blueprint for the in-depth analysis of Mandelas key speeches. Reading Norms of Rhetorical Culture not only solidifies the secondary methodology for examining Mandelas speeches, but also the foundational question for this study what is the significance behind Mandelas use of the English language? As stated earlier, English was a minor official language in South Africa, trumped by the more common and most used Afrikaans. English was not even Mandelas first language. In light of this, there is a specific and ulterior reason for its use during South Africas apartheid y ears. During this national conflict, the use of the English language was a rhetorical urgency. Mandela ultimately used English as a strategy a political, economic, and social strategyand not solely as a popular, tran sitional language. In this age of modern discourse across international boundaries, Mandela is a powerful orator and promising leader who became aware of his rhetorical situation and his desire for rhetorical success, and used English and English rhetor ic as the medium for rhetorical urgency.

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18 CHAPTER 3 THE STUDY: RHETORICAL ANALYSI S AND SE CONDARY METHODOLOGY Language is a process of free creation; its laws a nd principles are fixed, but the manner in which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely vari ed. Even the interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation. Noam Chomsky Rhetorical Analysis In academ ia, a rhetorical analysis is a detailed examination of any aspect of life that has an effect on the behavior or emotion of a pers on or group of people. For the purposes of this study, which will focus on integral speeches of Nelson Mandela, the rhetorical analysis will be in-depth study of the arrangement and presen tation of the English language in a way that undeniably had a profound impact on national and international sen timent, national and international action. A rhetorical analysis, regardless of its specifi c scope of inquiry, is a highly beneficial exercise both academically and socially. Academically, rhetorical analyses (especially of literary works) allow one to revisit and apply the old yet relevant theories of influential figures like Aristotle. Aristotles foundational concepts like pathos, ethos, and logos become the ancient building blocks for not only examining and understanding modern rhetoric, but also forming modern theories for this established branch of academia. Socially, doing a rhetorical anal ysis is an integral part of understanding motivations behind not only contemporary human be havior, but even historical human behavior. Without rhetorical analyses and the conclusions yielded across all areas of humanities and social sciences, so many questions would be unanswere d and basic understandings of human behavior would not exist. Performing an analysis of Nelson Mandelas speech rhetoric will not only highlight the specific strategies he uses, but it will shed light on the efficacy and universality of Mandelas choice to use the English language.

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19 For this study, performing a rhetorical analysis of Mandelas speeches is imperative for three key reasons: (1) Understanding rhetorical urgency thr ough rigorous analysisMandela makes it undeniably clear that there is a specific urgency addressed in all of his speeches, an urgency that leads him both to use certain literary strategies and to articulate those strategies in English, a minor language in South Africa. (2) Attaining a new view of English rhetoricAlthough the importa nce of English as a global language is already evident, this stud y will increase the importance of its specific rhetoric. (3) Furthering the research of and focus on modern rhetoricThe study of rhetoric is age-old and constantly relevant. This will be me rely a catalyst in the ongoing examination of rhetorical urgency and strategy. English rhetoric has a distinct relevance to the examination of Mandelas speeches. Through his verbal discourses over the forty-six years of apartheid, Mandela implic itly aggrandizes the popularity and efficacy of the English language, as a language for world communication. In a country where English was not the dominant, commoners tongue, Mandela used this global language to catapult the South African dilemma onto the world stage. Mandelas speeches represent a strong grasp of both th e English language and the English rhetoric. He also implies a certain value of English rhetoric that is worth exploring. Th ere is something to be said about Mandelas choice to speak in this global tongue, rather than Afrik aans (the first official language and majority language of South Africa) and th is study seeks to explore the reasons for and efficiency of his choice. Secondary Methodology Nelson Mandelas speeches are selected based on the chronology of his battle against aparth eid and South Africas reemergence as a democracy. The four speeches include: the Rivonia Trial speech of 1964, the Cape Town re lease speech of 1990, and the two presidential inauguration addresses of 1994. By using a na rrow selection, the focus centers more on Mandelas rhetorical patterns a nd on the specific rhetorical s ituations and the urgencies that

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20 those called for. In terms of the methodology, two analyses are performed: a preliminary rhetorical analysis and an in-d epth rhetorical analysis. The Preliminary Analysis The prelim inary analysis focuses on the basics of beginning a rhetor ical study: audience, purpose, and pathos, ethos and logos Closely examining the audiences and purposes for each speech sheds light on primary and secondary components of to whom a speech was delivered and why the speech was delivered. Examining the pathos, ethos, and logos not only helps to decipher the specific effect Mandela was seeking, but it also sets the precedence for understanding Mandelas word and structure choi ces in the main analysis. The preliminary analysis is an important first step in this study because it identifies th e basicsaspects of the speeches that represent the foundation of the larg er, more in-depth conclusions that can be reached when questioning Mandelas rhetoric and its overall effect and efficiency. Rhetorical urgency became the most important focus, as it emphasizes not only the syntactical choices, but also Mandelas language choice. The Rhetorical Analysis Af ter the preliminary analysis, the in-depth rhetorical analysis centered on the main question, what is the rhetorical urgency of this speech? Basically, why does Mandela use this strategy or pattern? What effect is he looking for? To what urgency of context or audience sentiment is he responding to? The rhetorical analysis is orga nized into an examination of terminology, sentence structure, and overall organization/form. Detailed discussion on Mandelas strategies, motives for those strategies, and the urgenc y he is trying to address is provided in this analysis. The different divisions of the anal ysis also expand upon the initial discussion of pathos, ethos, and logos, giving textual evidence for the overall effects of the

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21 speeches. The analysis concludes with discussion s on the overall relevance of rhetorical urgency and the use of the English language as the overall urgency. Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Speech at the Rivonia Trial The language of truth is simple. Euripides The Rhetorical Context At the tim e of Nelson Mandelas speech at the Rivonia Trial, it has been 16 years since the implementation of apartheid, 12 years since the African National Congress (ANC) began its violent opposition of apartheid, and one year since the beginning of the trial. It is May 1964 and the courts have just convicted Mandela and seven other defendants of numerous acts of sabotage and sentenced them to life imprisonment, because of their fight for nation equality. After a year of trial proceedings and in the wake of the pr ison sentencing, Mandela st ands on a South African dock at Rivonia and for four and a half hours, gi ves an account of his involvement in and reasons for the opposition. Retrospectively entitled, I am Prepared to Die, the Rivonia Trial speech took place on the final court day in Pretoria. The speech is wi dely publicized, as national and international audiences listens. Mandela is up against mixed se ntiments as he delivers this historic speech, from those of the white South African elite who oppose hi s revolutionary actions to those South African and intern ational supporters who sympathize with the plight he is trying to resolve. Mandela will remain imprisoned for almost three decades, but his epic-caliber speech will continue to resonate far into the Twen tieth century and across nations worldwide. The Preliminary Analysis Audience Mandelas prim ary audience at the Rivonia Trial is the Pretoria Supreme Court. After a year of trial proceedings that has ultimately resulted in life imp risonment, Mandela addresses the court that has decided against his defense. His secondary, and arguably most important,

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22 audience is composed of three people groups : the South African white minority, and the international and English-speaking audiences. Though he does not explicitly claim to be addressing these groups, Mandela ta ilors his message to reason and present his case to those who are opposed to his cause. By referring to World War II and the international fight against Hitler and Nazi Germany, Mandela is addressing the En glish-speaking nations who have acted in the past for the good of developing nations and peoples. Purpose The prim ary purpose of the Rivonia speech is to serve as Mandelas defense statement at the trial. His secondary purposes effectively ou tline the speech and substantiate the ultimate purpose for the nearly five-hour address. Mandela is explaining and defending the ANC; presenting an appeal for democracy; challenging the current governing system; and laying the groundwork for the forthcoming fight against apartheid. Pathos, ethos, and logos Mandela uses pathos, ethos, and logos liberally throughout this de fense speech and the techniques and strategies he us es are all d irected not towards his primary audience, but towards his secondary audience. In light of the rhetor ical situation here, the secondary audience truly becomes the primary audience, as the international interest and concern is Mandelas main goal. The court officials and South African government have already convicted him; he is already going to jail. No amount of defense can prevent or reverse that judgment. The South African citizens already understand the crucial aspects of the day. They more than understand that change is needed, but they are powerless to exact that change. The ears and nations outside of the country become the honorary primary audien ce, because Mandela recognizes them as the ones who will and can make a difference in South Africa. Mandelas strategic use of pathos, ethos, and logos cater to the c oncerns and convictions of the English-speaking nations who can

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23 ultimately make a difference. The following rhetorical analysis will present the specific rhetorical approaches Mandela uses to increase the emotional appeal, build up his credibility, and present a logical reasoning frame for his message. The Rhetorical Analysis Rhetoric of terminology Throughout the m ajority of the speech, Mandela uses specific trigger words to stimulate the sentiments and emotions of a nation that ha s recently endured violent uprisings in the fight against apartheid, achieving pathos Words like war, warfare, violent/violence, and terror used liberally throughout his speechstand out signif icantly because of a reverse rhetorical expectation. At a trial, it is expected that an individual defending himself would shy away from words that further incriminate and that highlight th e issues that initially led to the charges in the first place. Avoiding emphasis on such words draw s attention to more neutral or positive focus with which to state a case. Mandela, even though he was on trial for his participation in violent acts of sabotage, takes the opposit e approach, puts these words out on table, and repeats them forcefully. Such a stra tegy represents Mandelas rhetoric of truth : he does not avoid the truth of the matter at hand; rather, he c onfronts it and allows his audiences to confront it as well. Mandela inundates the final pa ragraphs of I am Prepared to Die with the words struggle and fight and the ideas and emotions ( pathos ) they evoke. After speaking for hours about violence and war, Mandela presents his final appeal to his nation and its international neighbors; this is his lasting impression and he wants to relay the message that the push for national reconciliation does not end with his impr isonment. Mandelas final appeal is for the outside to continue the work of reform and equality.

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24 Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics As m entioned in the primary analysis, Mandela characterizes his speech with short, terse sentence constructions. Examples include his fi rst sentence (I am the first accused.) and transitional and concluding sentence s (This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one.). Analysis of these sentences and where they occur within the speech shows that they most often signal a transition from one thought or an introduction into a new thought within the text, often standing in place of subordinate, transitional phrases. The shorter, simple sentences also work to relay an emphasized or im portant point in as few words as possible, in order to avoid verbal fluff and loquacious language. Within the Rivonia speech, it is interesting to note that although one of Mandelas purposes is to challenge and push for a unified nati on, he does not use this sp eech as a direct call to actionthere is a profound absence of imperativ e sentences. Seeing Ma ndela as a social and political activist, people expect him to speak imperatively about the changes he wants to see. The fact that he does not use imperatives throughout I am Prepared to Die portrays a great understanding of what was necessary and appropriate for the time and placerhetorical urgency. A closer reading of the speech reveals, however, that Mandela, in choosing his rhetoric wisely, does incorporate an imperative tone even though the actual sentences are not imperatively structured. Mandela, employing a sense of logos, most likely chooses this strategy after thoroughly considering his rhetorical situation and realizing that to use an imperative tone now would be highly ineffective becau se until the then current government fixes itself, it can do nothing for the South African people. Rhetoric of organization/form I am Prepared to Die follows an organizati onal pattern very similar to those heard in courtroom proceedings, a fact that adds much to his credibility or ethos. Mandela begins with a

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25 narration (to set the context), moves to defense statement (to rebut accusations and allegations), presents appeals (to further explain his defense), and then ends with his final statements. Mandelas speech is highly representative of legal communication and his choice of discourse with the courts, the people, and international audiences shows his respect for and understanding of his rhetorical situatio n. The Rivonia trial was not the time or place for an erratic, unstructured activists speech, as the sensati onal and provocative tone would ga in nothing. Mandela has both national and world audiences and the use of utmost structure and organization is more beneficial. His use of extreme organization emphasizes the di sorganization of a South Africa governed by a racist and suppressive system. Mandela and seve n others are on the way to prison, convicted of sabotage; this speech is the antithesis of what audiences expected. By reverting to a nonviolent tone, Mandela demonstrates logos and presents his central purpos e: to accomplish his social and political goals for South Africa. Rhetorical analysis conclusions: Rivonia trial speech [1] As with most succes sful/effective speech es, Mandelas overall rhetorical form directly reflects the rhetorical occasion. His overall tone reflects a greater rhetorical urgency in getting his message across; he is no t solely talking to his fellow South African natives. In fact, it can be argued that he is not speaking to them dir ectly at all; he is speaking for them. His defense statements and his appeals mirror what the suppressed majority wants the national and interna tional audiences to know and respond to. [2] As discussed earlier, Mandela s rhetorical form and tone do not explicitly demand anything of his listeners or the situation at hand; ra ther, the form and tone implicitly demand attention and emotion (and ultimately, action) concerning the plight of South Africa. By intentionally avoiding the imperative tone, Mandela achieves more than he ever would have with a powerfully demanding speech. The rhetorical urgency calls for an implicit call to action, no t an explicit petition. [3] Final Conclusion: After r eading Mandelas speech and ta king into consideration the historical context and strategies used, there is an obvious pattern followed: Rhetorical situation rhetorical mindset rhetorical strategy. In each of these steps, Mandela most likely questions himself as he composes this now famous discourse. With

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26 rhetorical situation: where am I? In other words, what is the social and political context? With rhetorical mindset: what do I have to do? Or, what is the overall effect I need to accomplish my goals? And with rhetorical strategy: how do I get it done? Every word, sentence, and paragraph in this speech is evidence of Mandelas meticulou s deliberations in preparing this speech. In each of the steps above, there is an overwhelming sense of rhetorical urgency, an urgency that proves not only Mandelas skills as a leader, but also his skills as a na tional and international figure who recognized the power of rhetoric, the power of the E nglish language, and the power of using them together. The Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: Cape Town Release Speech Words differently arranged have a different me aning, and meanings differently arranged have a different effect. Blaise P ascal The Rhetorical Context Twenty-seven years after the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial and Nelson Mandelas proclamation that he is prepared to die for th e aims of national equalit y, Mandela is released from prison. Though he had been serving a life sentence, several changes in South Africas policiesincluding pivotal influences by the Unit ed Nations and western nationshave resulted in the relaxation of apartheid laws (: Fr eedom for Mandela, par. 2) and subsequently Mandelas freedom. After leaving Victor Vers ter prison, Mandela trav els 40 miles to Cape Town where he is greeted at a city-wide rally. On the balcony of Cape Towns City Hall, Mandela, as the ANCs deputy-president, addr essed an audience of 50,000 people elated about his release and hungry for the co ntinuation of political and social reform. The Cape Town release speech is the first of Mandelas televised addresses. The speech is both that of a victor, having made exceptional strides in a 60-year stru ggle and that of a leader, knowing the race was not yet over.

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27 The Preliminary Analysis Audience At the Cape Town rally, Mandelas prim ar y audience is the 50,000 loyal followers who came to support him at his release from prison. Because this speech is televised, his secondary audience includes the internationa l countries and organizations th at have been contributing and continue to contribute to the ch ange of government policies in S outh Africa. Another secondary audience is the South African white minority who still has not fully relieved the nation of its apartheid-led affliction. This s econdary audience can be named because Mandela refers several times to the existing conflict, the gains that have been made, and the fact th at there is still work to be done. Mandela is speaking most directly to the white minority when he asserts that he is still prepared to die for the cause. Purpose Mandelas primary purpose for the Cape Town release speech is to make his first public address after his release from a 30-year incarceration. His secondary purpose is a bit more extensive and involved. With this speech, Mandela wants to show the continuation of the goals to end apartheid completely. He wants to reiterate both the need for national unity and reform and also the ongoing struggle. Finally, Ma ndelas speech is also an outpouring of praise and gratitude for the past/previous and continual support for the cause. Pathos, ethos, and logos Mandela again em ploys pathos, ethos, a nd logos as he rallies the national and international supporters. Again, as with the Speech at Rivonia, th e true primary audience is the English-speaking nations who have been assisting and will continue to assist in the elimination of racial segregation in South Africa. As such, Mandela uses his emotional appeals and his reasoning to reach out to those nations. Since Ma ndela is also revitalizing the weary psyche and

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28 morale of the oppressed South African citizens, he also uses emotion evoking strategies and credibility building ploys to stre ngthen the national support he has had for the past 30 years. Mandelas pathos, ethos, and logos regain the attentions of his key audiences that have been assisting him in reforming the government and rewo rking the social constr uct in South Africa. After three decades, it is time to finish this race and this urgency is revealed and addressed with his emotional, credibility, and logical rhetoric. The subsequent analysis will explain in detail the specific rhetorical maneuvers Mandela to heighten the rhetorical appeals in his first speech after his release from prison. The Rhetorical Analysis Rhetoric of Terminology In the first of his rem arks, Mandela declares, I stand before you not as a prophet, but as a humble servant. Earning his speech a high degree of ethos, that phrase, humble servant, is an early and significant indicator that Mandela is embracing a role that was not normal or expected in a situation such as the one he faced upon his release from prison. The expected or assumed role would be one of ultimate victor and pe rsecuted, but triumphant leader. However, Mandelain view of the rhetorical occasion and in light of the response he needstakes on the antithetical role of the subservient and menial position of a servant. Opting for this approach rather than the leader approach puts Mandela at a very distinct advantag e in terms of both his opposition and his supporters. As a humbled worker Mandela stands in stark contrast to the existent, but dwindling, dominating powers of apartheid. In taking on a seemingly commonplace and insignificant role, Mandela adds credibility to and overall identificat ion with his connection to the South African citizens, both black and white. In this speech, Mandela also employs the rhetor ical use of triggering words that implicitly and explicitly evoke responsibility within his me ssage. Towards the end of this public address,

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29 Mandela constantly mentions the task/tasks. He affirms that the nation and citizens of South Africa are duty bound to continue efforts to uni fy the country as he conducts negotiations with those in power. The words of responsibilit y not only depict Mandela s feelings about how things were progressing, but also about his considerations for how his supporters should have been thinking and acting at that time, an effectiv e pathos strategy. These words are of particular significance because they represent Mandelas rhet oric of importance. In other words, they connote that which needs to be done Mandela is explicitly sta ting that yes, South Africa has made great strides, but the work is not yet complete. Rhetoric of sentence structure/characteristics As in his I am Prepared to Die speech, Mandela again makes remarkable use of double and triple conjunction phrases in his release speech. These construc tions are significant in that they draw attention to Mandelas key points while maximizing the verbal and grammatical fluidity throughout the speech. Examples in clude exploitation and oppression, pain and suffering, loyal and disciplined, and democra tic, non-racial, and unitary. In using these conjunctions, Mandela effectivel y connects and highlights the mo st crucial and emotion-evoking words of his thoughts. Another recurring sentence strate gy Mandela employs is the use of short, terse sentences towards the end of the speech. As Mandela concl udes his statements to the nation he remarks: Our struggle has reached a deci sive moment [ ] We have waited too lo ng for our freedom [] Our march to freedom is irreversible. Used as both transitional and pivotal phrases, these sentences express in pellucid terms Mandelas mo st significant thoughts regarding what had to take place now that he was physically back on the ba ttlefield of social equality in South Africa. Again, Mandelas decision to use these short se ntences had a two-fold purpose. With these sentences, Mandela first avoids fluffy, poetic la nguage characteristic of inspirational speeches in

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30 favor of terse constructions that his audience wo uld more easily recall. His main points, key motivational thoughts, needed simple, to-the-point rh etoric in order to be most effective. Also, the form of the sentences re flects the national behavior Ma ndela wants to evokequick and concise actions of the South Af rican citizens and equally quick and concise responses from the South African lawmakers. Rhetoric of organization/form Mandela s Cape Town release speech follows a very basic outline that reflects and addresses the major components of his extensive audience. He first extends statements of salutation, gratitude, and recognition to his supporters. Mandela then moves on to discussions of necessity (what needs to happen now) and action (how the needs can be met), directed at the South African government and international suppor ters. In the final section of the speech, Mandela presents a call to unity for South Afri can citizens. Mandelas organization addresses the logos of the situation, clearly marking out a reasonable respons e to what has happened and what needs to happen. Within the organization of his speech, Mandela deliberately and intentionally repeats his final statements from I am Prepared to Die. His last textual paragraph of the release speech is verbatim final paragraph of his last statements before his imprisonment; so consequently, the final words of Mandelas release speech are I am prepared to die. These words of ethos and the fact that Mandela revisits his sentiments from almost 30 years ago are significant indicators of the rhetorical urgency of the occasion. The recitation of the final thoughts from the Rivonia trial has two crucial purpose s for Mandelas rhetoric:

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31 to work as a reminder that, even though Mande la has been released from prison and even though apartheid laws have been relaxed (: Freedom for Mandela, par. 2), there is still work to be done a nd a struggle to overcome to serve as a personal affirmation that, yes, he spent nearly 30 years in prison, but he is still not folding; he is still prepared to di e for the cause of democracy and equality. Rhetorical analysis conclusion s: Cape Tow n release speech [1] Mandelas antithetical and unexpected acquisition of the ro le of South Africas humble servant speaks volumes about his consistent acknowledgment of the rhetorical urgency of occasion and the effects both situation and urge ncy have on the tone and form of his public address. At this specific time, South Af rica needed a humble teammate, not a prideful leader. Such was the urgency of the s ituation andby setting th e precedent of the humble servantMandela planned his overall form and tone to reflect his awareness, accordingly. By putting himself on a lower a nd more common social level rather than asserting his obvious power as a national leader Mandela successfully gained more respect and more support. [2] The distinctive sentence structure Ma ndela employs, using double and triple conjunctive phrases, is a critical rhetorical strategy for this speech. By connecting the most crucial and important words of a sentence or thought, Mandela successfully keeps the key words/feelings at the forefront. For a motivatio nal/inspirational address such as this one, accentuating key words that promote the cause, challenge the opposition, and rally the supporters is the rhetorical strategy that respond s directly and effectively to the rhetorical occasion. [3] Final Conclusion: In returning to the di scussion of the Cape Town release speech, organization and form, in-depth analysis of the organization is key to understanding the rhetorical urgency of the situ ation. Mandelas speech has a th ree-part structure and within each section, he has a specific goal ev idenced through the tone and language: Part I: Thank those who got us this far. Part II: Make demands of/challenge those who can do more Part III: Encourage/uplift those who will ultimately benefit Each of those goals, revealed both through im plicit and explicit language, sentence form, makes for a rhetorically consid ered and developed speechcrucial for 1990 South Africa and pertinent to an understanding of modern English rhetoric.

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32 Rhetoric of Nelson Mandela: The Inaugural Addresses Think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people. Williams Butler Yeats The Cape Town and Pretoria Inaugural Addresses The rhetorical context Nelson Man delas Cape Town release speech let the nation of South Africa and its international supporters know that while his release and this rela xation of apartheid were great national triumphs, the fight was not over; the battle had yet to be won. Immediately after his release, as Mandela commenced the struggle for a democratic nation, South Africa began a tumultuous four year conflict. From negotiati ons, government scandals and assassinations, to negotiations and Nobel Prizes, Mandela and his nation pushed forward and in early 1993, plans were cemented for a presidential election. On e year later, on 2 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected president of a new South African government that represented all citizens. The following week, he gave two inaugural addresses, one at Cape Town and one at Pretoria. At Cape Town, Mandela addressed the exhausted, yet invigorated crowd of people who had been waiting years for this historic moment. At Pr etoria, Mandela presente d his victor address to an elated group of international dignitaries, local po litical figures, and even more an ticipating citizens. The speech at Pretoria was also heard on televisions around the world as Mandela affirmed and fulfilled the promise made to the people the day he walked out of prison. NOTE: I present the analysis of these inaugural speeches separately, because though they center on a single, historic event, the rhetorical urgencies and rhetorical strategies differ in key ways.

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33 The Cape Town Inaugural Address The Preliminary Analysis Audience Mandelas p rimary audience for the Cape Town Inaugural speech, as listed in the first remarks, are the Master of Ceremonies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, and his fellow South Africans, all guests of and participants in the Grand Parade celebrati on. Mandelas secondary audience, most likely embodied in his addre ss to comrades and friends, includes his international and intercontinenta l audiencethose who supported a nd influenced the events and circumstances that made the days address even po ssible. It can be assu med that after years of social and economic assistance, that the internat ional allies who ultimatel y helped South Africa eradicate apartheid rule would be tuned in on the triumphant day of Mandelas inauguration into the newly democratic country. Purpose The prim ary intents of Mandelas first ina ugural address are key components of any inauguration speech: to recogni ze the election victory and to outline the next phase of governmental progression. With his secondary purposes of his speech, Mandela effectively tailors the general inaugural speech to the rhet orical needs of his na tional and international audiences. Mandela both challenges his fello w South Africans and informs the international interests of South Africas future plans. Pathos, ethos, and logos This speech contain s the most elements of pathos than any of th e other three speeches analyzed. Mandelas inaugural address at Cape Town signifies the end of a dark and hopeless era and the beginning of a victor ious and hopeful era. Mandela uses his emotional appeal to reflect the mindset of the countless natives and the millions of intern ational supporters who

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34 worked relentlessly to see this day come to pass. His use of ethos and lo gos points to the success of the social and presidential campaign that ended apartheid and prepared South Africa for democratic governance. Mandelas terminology, senten ce structure, and orga nization all manifest his use of pathos, ethos, and logos in this triumphant discourse. The Rhetorical Analysis Rhetoric of terminology Mandelas terminology in this speec h carries a certain degree of pathos as he emphasizes the triumph of the day. After acknowledging his audience, Mandela begins his address with an ordinary, yet pivotal a nd evoking wordtoday. The entire first sentence reads, Today, we are entering a new era for your country and its pe ople. Today may seem like just a benign or banal term, but in the rhetorical context of the past forty years in South Africa, the word signifies much more than just an indicator of time. Ultimately, in beginning his thoughts with today, Mandela wants everyone to understand that the new focus of his aims and the countrys aims should be now. The ultimate priority is now: now that the struggle agai nst apartheid is over; now that the governmental system is working towards greater reform; now that Nelson Mandela is the peoples president. In this first true victory speech analyzed in this study, Mandela purposes his chosen terminology to reflect the breadth of this victory, using words charac teristic of the victory after a daunting and difficult battlein a sense, epic language By epic I am referring to descriptive terms that evoke images of gruesome battle, heroes, heroic actions, villains. Throughout the Cape Town Inaugural Speech, Mandela consciously uses words like war, dungeon, strife, fighters, out casts, and legion. He employs phras es like dragged in chains, epic wars of resistance, and resistance fighters. These words and phrases poetically characterize and sensationalize the decades of political and social struggle ag ainst apartheid. Just as epic

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35 poems of ancient literature chro nicle the seemingly impossible quest s of heroes, poems that have survived thousands of years, so Mandela fo rever encases the South Africans struggle and victory over apartheid in to an epic parallel. Rhetoric of sentence structure/form Mandela again uses short, choppy sentence form ations for the sam e effect as in his previous speeches: to av oid literary/verbal fluff and to get right to the point of the message. Again, many of these sentences also serve as tr ansitions within the organizational structure. Rhetoric of organization/form In this inaug ural address at Cape Town, Mandela structures his speech around a now, then, and later on format. In other words, th e speech focuses on wher e South Africa is now (present), where South Africa has been (past) and where South African will go from here (future). Such a form has a very crucial impact on the effectiveness of Mandelas rhetoric. Had he rearranged the chronology (for example, doing past present future), the overall audience comprehension and reception could have been different. Grounding the speech in a format that first focuses on the present speaks to the overall rhet orical priority of the day and presents the a firm reasoning ( logos ) for the progression of the nation. Mandelas deliberate and obvious structuring of this speech also represents a rhetorical timeline. Mandela effectively outlines the pr ogression of the South African government, from apartheid to democracy as he makes this vi ctorious speech. Strong transitions and obvious changes in tone evidence his high level of organization. Through this rhetorical strategy, Mandela asserts the high value he puts on progressionsocial, national, and political. Rhetorical analysis conclusions: cape town inaugural speech [1] Mandelas Cape Town Inaugural Speech is in undated with rhetorical strategies that reflect the urgency of the occasion. His deci sion to draw a parallel between traditional epics and South Africas four-decade quest to unity and democracy reflects the rhetorical

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36 urgency of audience appeal. Characteristic of an epic story, the stimulating words and phrases in the speech fully and efficiently relay: (1) the urgency of the past and its consequences, (2) the urgency of remember ing the past, and (3) the urgency of not returning to the ways of the past. Through the epic language, Mandela positions/places South Africa in the books of epic historical eras, battling apartheid and rising to a unified democratic nation. [2] The long-standing piece of advice choose your words wisely is a phrase Mandela undoubtedly understood. Different occasions require different uses of language and Mandela evidences that understanding in this speech, as he makes wise decisions regarding the rhetorical urgency of word choice and se ntence construction. In itially, Mandela is poignantly verbose and slightly poetic when addressing the histori cal relevance and the nations current status. He then seamlessly transitions into concise and to the point prose during his statements on what needs to be done in moving forward. Mandela forgoes the fluid, poetic language as he st rategically mirrors the urgenc y of the time: South Africa must move past today and towards greater unity in a concise, no nonsense manner. Mandelas prose moves poetically through the inspirational rhetoric and then quickly through the motivational rhetoric. Mandelas ma stering of the rhetoric is evident in the lasting effect that the speech leaves, even 14 y ears after the actual delivery of the speech. He approaches the use of English in such a way that commands attention and commands the respect of the language and its presentation. The Pretoria Inaugural Address After his speech at Cape Town on May 9th, Mand ela tra veled to Pretoria where the following day he gave his second inaugural address. This speech is notably distinctive from the first, raising questions about the diff ering rhetorical urgencies. The Preliminary Analysis Audience Mandelas prim ary and sole audience for this second inaugural address is also directly stated in the opening remarks: distinguished roya lty, guests, and friends. While the Cape Town speech addressed a rally of a mixed crowd, at Pret oria Mandela is speaking to a more formal and specific group. Purpose Much like his intended audi ence, Mandelas purpose focu ses on prim ary intentions without any secondary aims that can be inferred from the text or tone. In this second speech, Mandela purposes to accomplish four important tasks:

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37 to accept and respond to his presidential election to speak (directly) on behalf of South African people, showing gratitude for the progression to inspire to ask for continued suppor t and encouragement as South African redefines itself as a true democracy Pathos, ethos, and logos Mandelas inaugural speech at Pretoria is a highly sensationa l address. He increases his em otional appeal and the elements of pathos as he makes this final speech marking the end of the apartheid era and the start of his career as presid ent to the rehabilitating South Africa. In this final inaugural address, Mandela chooses to em ploy only pathos and ethos, because now he can put aside the attention-getting a nd reasoning strategy and focus on the victory and the years to come for this revitalized nation. His emotional app eal is genuine and highly representative of the exhausted excitement of several decades of struggling against an oppressive government institution. His credibility is built not in effort to gain support, but to show his common connection to South Africas people and South Africas future. The rhetorical analysis of the Pretoria Inaugural address will present Mandelas specific word choices and structures as elements of pathos and ethos. The Rhetorical Analysis Rhetoric of terminology Mandelas second inaugural speech is 32 sent ences long; just over half, 17, of those sentences begin with w e, a strategy th at is rooted in his development of pathos Though this sounds like an excessive and exhaustive use of the first person pr onoun, Mandela effectively uses the words to differentiate between his two purposes for the first and second addresses. Mandela uses we at Pretoria more than at Cape Town for two specific re asons. First, he is

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38 addressing a different audience. Rather than speaking to the South African citi zens as he does at the Cape Town rally, Mandela is speaking for them as he addresses those who have had a hand in getting the nation to its curre nt state of progress. Second, on top of speaking for South Africa, Mandela uses we to speak as a South African a nd not as an elected government official. He accepts his election to the presidency as a hum ble equal and not as a governing figure lording over the nation. Such an approach and implied role is an antithetical way to present an inaugural address. It is expected and understood that Ma ndela is the new leader of his nation; he is expected to present the speech of a strong leader, telling his audi ence what he will do, not what we will do. By using we, Mandela also creates a level playing field in terms of his relationship with South African ci tizens and he also creates the precedent for how he wants his presidential term to proceedw ith equality and understanding between a leader and his country. At the end of this inaugural address, Ma ndela again works pathos into his speech by making an emotional and motivational exclamation: God bless Africa! This is the first time Mandela refers to a Higher Power in the four speeches of this study and the statement is extremely powerful and integral in more ways than one. Mandelas final statement is ultimately the culmination of emotions about the South Af rican saga that is ending with Mandelathe freedom fighteras the first president of the new democracy. God bless Africa is a way to express the excitement and exhaustion, the elatio n and lethargy of the past forty years and the culminating victory. Also, intere sting note in this final senten ce is Mandelas use of Africa instead of South Africa. Why w ould he not have said God bless South Africa? Such a statement is a deliberate declaration that Mande la has brought South Africa out of the darkness of an oppressive system and he is ready to look outside of the South African nation and help

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39 other countries. Mandela is demonstrating his understanding of responsibility as a president already thinking internationally about the pr ogression of his fellow nations of Africa. Rhetorical analysis conclusion In this speech, as in others, Mandela dem onstr ates his versatility and ability to transition to the role that addresses the rhetorical situati on and ultimately the rhetorical urgency. For this speech, Mandela deviates from speaking as Sout h Africas president to speaking as a fellow South African. Mandela just as easily could have maintained the presidents rhetoric that he employed at Cape Town. He chooses, instead, to show his flexibility as a person and as a leaderan action that earns him much ethos among his people. South Africa has just struggled through and endured forty years under a government determined to avoid change, determined to prevent versatile governing. Mande la recognizes that the rhetor ical urgency of the moment requires a demonstration of the new era to come. He can be the strong president with democratic aims and national progression as his priority and he can be the humble So uth African citizen who still sympathizes and empathizes with the pe ople for whom and with whom he has fought.

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40 CHAPTER 4 THE RHETORIC OF NELSON MANDELA: ANALYSIS CONCLUSION High thoughts must have hi gh language Aristophanes Nelson Mandela, at the age of 90, has pres ented and continues to present powerful, inspiring, an d memorable speeches, both in natio nal and international forums and all with outstanding rhetorical caliber. The four speeches used in this analysis point to a specific rhetoric, a rhetoric that transce nds the classical traditions and sp eaks to its transformation into a modern discipline. Mandelas rhetoric in these speechesanaly tically evidenced by recurring speech patterns, word choice, and even overall arrangementextends beyond good articulation and organization of thoughts, idea s, and concerns. The presenta tion, both rhetorical and lingual, is the cornerstone of Mandelas oratory success. The rhetorical and lingual presentation of Mandelas oratorical skills hinges on the notion of English as a gl obal entity and a stepping stone for international communication. James Levins ohn, in his discussion of globalization and South Africa, bases his arguments around the assertion th at English is an international language of commerce (Levinsohn, 2). Basically, English is not merely a first or second tone for certain nations and people groups; English is the langua ge of motivation and stimulus. Levinsohn goes on to analyze the progressive economic and political effects of South Africa returning to speaking English as its attempte d integration with the rest of the industrialized world (Levinsohn, 1). South Africa before and during apartheid was an underdeveloped nation with a dysfunctional governing system, racial inequality and international econo mic isolation. South Africa needed the attention and sympathies of developed, international neighborsEnglishspeaking neighbors. By using English, developing countries and th eir political/social l eaders reel in the attentions of developed, Englishspeaking nations. In the case of apartheid-bound South Africa,

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41 Nelson Mandela put his country on the agendas of Britain, Canada, and the United Statesall of which exacted diplomatic pull in helping South Africa move towards democratic government. While several factors, national a nd international, worked to end South Africas struggle with apartheid, Mandelas masterful use of a gl obal tongue and his command of the rhetoric implicates English rhetoric as an integral player both on the world stage and the academic stage. As a world citizen and as an Amer ica scholar, I view this rhetorical analysis as a valuable insight into the discipline of rhetoric and compositiona disc ipline that has been put on the backburner in many academic institutions. This study shed s light on the obvious and obscure importance of English rhetoric. As with any conscientious public speake r who knows the criticalness of audience sentiment and support, Nelson Mandel a accents the crucial bones of his speeches with garnishing of pathos, ethos, and logos. Though each of the four speeches uses different rhetorical strategies to achieve emotion, credibility, and logic, there is one significant strategy that encompasses the desired and achieved effects of al l other elements of pathos, ethos, and logosMandelas use of the English language. English grasped the emotions of several influential nations, one of which had dealt with racial segregati on in recent history. English achieved substantial credibility by letting international and nationa l audiences know that he was a seasoned orator, aware of the measures and strategies it takes to get things done. Mandelas use of E nglish established him as an international figure and his count ry as an international interest and concern. E nglish logically reasoned that in order to truly change apartheid rule and make definite studies towards being a democracy, South Africa had to reach out be yond its continent and beyond the national languages (Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa) and app eal to a common tongue with the common desire for political and social gains.

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42 International communication is a powerful and profound ma neuver in social economic politics and Mandela showed great respect for and reverence to the effects of English as a global language. In an analysis citing Mandelas use of language power, Theodore F. Sheckels asserts that the rhetoric reflects a qua lified success, as Mandela did not ultimately solidify the nation and [] give its people confidence (Sheckels, 97). Sheckels argues that Mandela did not efficiently and sufficiently use the power of langua ge, but he fails to realize that the use of English was the power of the language and not necessarily or only the arrangement of that language. Mandela indeed does solidify the na tion and encourage his people, by ultimately doing what it took to put South Africa on the international agenda, ending apartheid and rebuilding the nation as a democracy. In reading Mandelas speeches as further conclusive evidence of the far-reaching influence and potency of English rh etoric, we come to three crucial claims that all point to the pertinent value of this research. We come to a theory, a new realm of rhetoric study, and a research proposalall of which assert the power of English a nd the extensive importance of rhetoric. A Theory The first con clusion we can extract from the analysis of Mandelas rhetoric is that English was key to South Africas emergence from the apartheid conflict and rise to democracy. Even though in South Africa, English is the mo ther tongue of a fairly small [] diverse portion of the population (Titlestad, 15), Mandela saw the us e of English as a rhetor ically urgent ploy to gain the attention of the nations who could help his struggling c ountry. Mandela recognized this nationally minor language as South Africas window to the outsid e world (Titlestad, 16); he knew his success as an orator a nd the outlook of his countrys future as a developed nation

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43 hinged on this global tongue. Eng lish was the answer to three key as aspects of the situation at hand: [1] It was the answer to the success of Mandela as a social activist English was the official language of major business, edu cation, and governing enti ties (Titlestad, 16). Mandela spoke the language of the institutions and industries that held the most power over the oppressed. He spoke in the language of those who made th e oppressive laws and those who could change those laws. [2] It was the answer to the success of Mandela as an orator. Orators practice much more than just the eloquent and articulate arrangement of thoughts into speeches; they exercise rhetorical urgency in the way they speak, for whom they speak, and to whom they speak. Mandela, in choosing a language not native to most South African citizens (those for whom he was fighting), found ultimate success in English. [3] It was the answer to exposing the inju stices and detrimental social effects of apartheid Money, wealth, and a strong economy is the universal symbol of national and international development. Combine this wi th the use of a global language like English and you have the prime answer to the successful eradication of apartheid in South Africa. The United States, Canada, and Britain were the three nations that offered international support to South Africa during the fight against apartheid In using the language of three wealthy, influential, and developed nations one of which endured its own historical struggle with racial segregationMandela ha d the ultimate weapon with which to defend his oppressed South African countrymen. Each of these three aspects bui lds upon one another and reiterat es the rhetorical urgency in Mandelas public addresses. Mandela knew that English was a language of money and of world relations and he therefore applie d this to using English as a language of political and social activism. A New Scope of Rhetorical Analysis From a rhetorical analysis of Mandelas speech es and in considering his use of English as the success of those speeches, we as communicators gain a deeper insight into the prevalence of rhetorical urgency. The foundationa l theories behind classical and modern rhetoric speak to the importance of audience and purpose, because from these emerges the broad notion of rhetorical urgency. To whom am I speaking? How do they feel about the situation? Ho w do they feel about me? What do they need to hear? Is this socially /historically an opportune time for this message?

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44 All of these consideratio ns and many more reflect the allencompassing question of rhetorical urgency and from this study a new questions has emerged: What language can I speak in to guarantee an ultimately positi ve and beneficial response? Retrospectively, the answer to that question for Mandela and for other renowned intern ational figures was English. To demonstrate the success of English as a rhetorical st rategy, I recall the aforementioned formula: Rhetorical urgency rhetorical strategy rhetorical success. By inserting English as the rhetorical strategy, the formula used to move the country towards a democracy emerges: Apartheid English rhetoric racial equality. By inserting English as the rhetorical strategy, the formula used to garner attenti on and support for South Africas future as a developed nation comes into view: Oppressive government English rhetoric thriving democracy. Considering these formulas and applying them to the measured success of Mandela and his campaign against apartheid in the 1990s, South Afri ca is an integral case study into the success and importance of employing English as the language of atta ining national and in ternational goals. A Research Proposal The final and arguably most significant conclu sion reached in this extensive study is the prospect for further and continuing research. Mo st readily obvious, this study lim ited its scope to four speeches and a more ex tensive study will incorporate more of Mandelas speeches, which range from activist campaigns, to presidential addresses, to even the international guest speeches that Mandela has been doing during and since his presidency. His rhetoric and the rhetorical urgency it evokes spans much farther than this study and inquiries into his shifting urgency and the varying strategies he employs is valuable information. Another scope of investigation that will stem from this primary study is research in to the use of English by developing nations for certain social, political, and economic problems. S outh Africa is not the firs t and will not be the

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45 last developing nation to recogni ze the use of English as the ke y to international support and national success. A new study will explore the rh etorical situations, rhet orical strategies, and response and results of using English as a gl obal language and global key into the doors of success and development.

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46 APPENDIX A TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FOUR ANALYZED SPEECHES "I am Prepared to Die" Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964 I am the First Accused. I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting pe ople to go on strike at the end of May 1961. At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion ma de by the State in its op ening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigne rs or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said. In my youth in the Transkei I liste ned to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were prai sed as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is wh at has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case. Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court ar e true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitati on, and oppression of my people by the Whites. I admit immediately that I was one of the pers ons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arre sted in August 1962. In the statement which I am about to make I sh all correct certain false impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other thi ngs, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and coul d not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also deal with the relationship be tween the African National Congr ess and Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist Part y. In order to explain these ma tters properly, I will have to explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescr ibed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chos en. I will also have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.

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47 I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organisation, and which have been charged in the indict ment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate th at they could not have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer briefl y to the roots and policy of the organization. I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African peop le had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelin gs of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to th e African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to de fy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided a ny recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence. But the violence which we chose to adopt was no t terrorism. We who form ed Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political dis putes. We believe that S outh Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, a nd not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Cour t is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our organiza tion bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say, when I describe the tac tics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress. The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the S outh Africa Act, and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years that is until 1949 it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievan ces could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advan ce gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans beca me less instead of becoming greater. In the words of my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became Pr esident of the ANC in 1952, and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: "who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest num ber of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage wher e we have almost no rights at all". Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional me ans of protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision wh ich was taken to protest against apartheid

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48 legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More th an 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of viol ence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and ni neteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline a nd non-violence had been stresse d throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word Amadelakufa' was first used: this was the tim e wh en the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and thei r pledges has been introduced into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers we re not, and are not, the soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war agai nst the whites. They were, and are. dedicated workers who are prepared to lead campaigns initia ted by the ANC to distribute leafle ts, to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign required. They ar e called volunteers becau se they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts. During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harshe r penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the ANC a dhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of th e Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of high treason and charge s under the Suppression of Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgment some five years later, it found th at the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the presen t case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a communist organization. In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, whic h resulted in the proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decide d that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 't he will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the Government', and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Afri cans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no selfrespecting White political organiza tion would disband itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say. In 1960 the Government held a referendum whic h led to the establishment of the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cen t of the population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted ab out the proposed constituti onal change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the pr oposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conf erence to call for a National Co nvention, and to organize mass

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49 demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Repub lic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The conference was at tended by Africans of various po litical persuasions. I was the Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizi ng the national stay-athome which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike mu st avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to le ave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest. The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC polic y, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were given to or ganizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The Government's answer was to introduce new and ha rsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a m assive show of force designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision wa s a milestone on the road to Umkhonto. Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that th is was still so in 1963. I must return to June 1961. What were we, the lead ers of our people, to do ? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how? We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already we re. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothi ng but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for th is Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence of the day when they would fight the White man and win back their country and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a nonracial State by non-violence had achieved nothi ng, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were de veloping disturbing ideas of terrorism. It must not be forgotten that by this time viol ence had, in fact, become a feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when th e people of Cato Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans di ed in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Tr anskei had been a seethi ng mass of unrest. Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out it showed th at a Government which uses for ce to maintain its rule teaches

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50 the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already sm all groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent fo rms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would a dopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly di sturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Afri cans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government though this is what prompted it but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness. At the beginning of June 1961, after a long a nd anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the c onclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force. This conclusion was not easily arri ved at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government ha d left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Um khonto published on 16 December 1961, wh ich is Exhibit AD, we said: "The time comes in the life of any nation when th ere remain only two choices submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom". This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we deci ded to press for a change in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say th at I felt morally obliged to do what I did. We who had taken this decision started to consul t leaders of various organizations, including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe. As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a cl ear view which can be summarized as follows: a. It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence. b. Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the sma ll, closely knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity : political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization. c. On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-viol ence to this extent th at it would no longer disapprove of properly contro lled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be subject to di sciplinary action by the ANC.

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51 I say 'properly controlled violence' because I ma de it clear that if I formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidan ce of the ANC and would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplat ed without the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined. As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that th e country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the ANC st ood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of th e South African War to disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides? The avoidance of civil war had dominated our th inking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our polic y, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into accoun t in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us to ac t in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one which recogni zed civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable. Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open re volution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision. In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for futu re race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD): "W e of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is l eading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to thei r senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed befo re matters reach the desperate state of civil war." The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and in terference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seapor ts on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, t hus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

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52 Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be li nked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These a ttacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they w ould provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and woul d enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence. In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be ro used in other countries, and th at greater pressure would be brought to bear on the S outh African Government. This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sa botage, and strict instru ctions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referre d to in the evidence of Mr. X' and Mr. Z'. The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics a nd targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. With in the framework of th e policy laid down by the National High Command, the Region al Commands had authority to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit in to the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regi onal Command were an importation from the Jewish national underground orga nization Irgun Zvai Leumi, whic h operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948. Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 Decem ber 1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were att acked. The selection of ta rgets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations. The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the da y that operations commenced. The response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, an d called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. The White s failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by suggesting the laager. In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the town ships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained.

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53 But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lin es were being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers carr ied reports that sabota ge would be punished by death. If this was so, how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism? Already scores of Africans had died as a resu lt of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth ja il, twenty-four of a gr oup of Africans who had gathered to demand his release we re killed by the polic e and white civilians. In 1921, more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa le d a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1 May 1950, ei ghteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike. On 21 March 1960, sixt y-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville. How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more Sharpevilles could the country st and without violence and terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ours elves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could black and white ever live together again in p eace and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions. Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocen t Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertak ing to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favourable to our people. The fight which held out pr ospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare. All whites undergo compulsory mili tary training, but no such trai ning was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make prope r preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the gove rnment of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so. At this stage it was decided that I should at tend the Conference of th e Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtain ing facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the high er education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would be nece ssary, even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a nonracial State and so would men be necessary to control the army a nd police force of such a State.

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54 It was on this note that I left South Africa to pr oceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sy mpathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White S outh Africa, and even in London I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius Nyerer e, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modibo Keita, Presiden t of Mali; Leopold Senghor, Pres ident of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberi a; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujd a, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is desc ribed in my diary, one of the Exhibits. I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhi bit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been pr oduced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationa list should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of author ity on the subject from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clause witz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the wr itings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views. I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original deci sion of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Ta nganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South Africa. I returned to South Africa and repo rted to my colleagues on the result s of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the po litical scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. Th e attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotag e were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document which is Exhibit R.14. After a full disc ussion, however, it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened the training would be of value. I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth

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55 and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation ha d been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts ha d nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto. One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why th is is incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the original principle laid down by the ANC. There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internal ly as well, because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical activity. At a late r stage the position was furthe r affected by bannings and house arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led to individuals having to do work in different capacities. But t hough this may have blurred the distinction between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction. Great care was taken to keep the activit ies of the two organizations in South Africa distinct. The ANC remained a mass political body of Africans only carry ing on the type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto remained a sma ll organization recruiting its members from different races and organizations and trying to achieve its own part icular object. The fact that members of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons served both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change the nature of the ANC or give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than the rule. This is why persons such as 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z', who were on the Regional Command of their respective areas, did not pa rticipate in any of the ANC committees or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Regi nald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their ANC meetings. Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and kn ew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place. I came there in the following manner: 1. As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling thr oughout the country, living now in African townships, then in country vi llages and again in cities. During the second half of the year I starte d visiting the Parkto wn home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958. 2. In October, Arthur Goldreich informed m e that he was moving out of town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had been co mpelled to live indoors during the daytime and

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56 could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could live d ifferently and work far more efficiently. 3. For obvious reasons, I had to disg uise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his fam ily moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on 5 August. 4. Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. W ith the exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no meeti ngs of the governing bodies were ever held there, and no activities connected with them we re either organized or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm. 5. Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldre ich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed ideol ogical and practical qu estions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine. 6. Because of what I had got to know of Gold reich, I recommended on my return to South Africa that he should be r ecruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done. Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhi bits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treas on Trial and which has again r eared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party. The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always ha s been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea'. The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important politic al document ever adopted by the ANC is the Freedom Charter'. It is by no means a blueprint f or a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationaliza tion, of land; it provides for na tionalization of mines, banks, and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetua ted despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationali st Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines which, at th at time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would ta ke place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of

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57 its history advocated a revolutiona ry change in the economic struct ure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society. As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principl es of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the begi nning, and not the end, of its programme. The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Af ricans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and fu ll political rights. The Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalis ts and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to empha size class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction. It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a co mmon goal in this case the removal of white supremacy and is not proof of a complete community of interests. The history of the world is full of similar examples Perhaps the most striki ng illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitl er would have dared to suggest that such cooperation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist world. Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly. I believe that communists have always played an ac tive role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus co mmunists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as Ma laya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are communist coun tries. Similarly in the undergr ound resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitt erest enemies of communism, fought together with the communists against the ru ling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930s. This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communist s has been repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Part y and the Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists could, and did, be come members of the ANC, and some served on the National, Provincial, and local committ ees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a fo rmer member of the Central Committee.

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58 I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operati on which existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a wate ring down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a me mber of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved fo r the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a pol itical party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of vi ew and I have upheld it ever since. It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prej udice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They were the only political grou p which was prepared to work with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a st ake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands al l exponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have ne ver been a member of the Co mmunist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act. It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is a univers al condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voi ce than most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our enemies. I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a comm unist, and I think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state ex actly what my political beliefs are. I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the pres ent paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei. Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless so ciety, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, fr om my admiration of the struct ure and organization of early

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59 African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation. It is true, as I have already stat ed, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new indepe ndent States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists. Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is ope n to debate whether the Communist Party has any specific role to play at this par ticular stage of our political struggl e. The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle. From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists rega rd the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system. The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. I have great respect for British po litical institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judi ciary never fail to arouse my admiration. The American Congress, that country's doctrin e of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments. I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be ab solutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question. Our political struggle has always been financed fr om internal sources from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important political case for example, the Treason Trial we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and or ganizations in the Western co untries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources. But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy ca ll on our slender resources, and that the scale of

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60 our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states. I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistan ce from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received similar assistance. On my return to the Republic, I made a str ong recommendation to the ANC that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countr ies, but that we shoul d also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed. I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so. As I understand the State case, and in particular th e evidence of 'Mr. X', the suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enrol the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for a commun ist state. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communi sts and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of the community would join us. Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, ha rdships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships'. Basically, we fi ght against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa a nd which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are pove rty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called 'agitators' to teach us about these things. South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkab le contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, wh ilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hope lessly overcrowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of th e soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per cent are labourers, labour tenants, and squatters on white farms and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30 per cent live in towns where they have develope d economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living. The highest-paid and the most pros perous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affa irs Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg (acc ording to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84 per

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61 month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 pe r cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going. Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastroenteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only destroy th e vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions and lack of initia tive, and reduce powers of concentration. The secondary results of such condi tions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African labourers. The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are de signed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by form al education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus hi gher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation. The present Government has always sought to ha mper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on th is supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act. There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provide d for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, ho wever, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African ch ildren in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from those afforded to wh ite children. In 1960-61 the per capita Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimate d at R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in th e Cape Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures availabl e to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than Afri can children on whom R12.46 pe r head was being spent. The quality of education is also different. A ccording to the Bantu Educational Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whol e of South Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably cons istent with the policy of Bantu education ab out which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953: "When I have control of Native education I will re form it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. Wh en my Department controls Native education

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62 it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge." The other main obstacle to the economic advancemen t of the African is th e industrial colour-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-s killed occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have re cognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they ar e denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the be tter-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive South African Governme nts towards African workers is demonstrated by the so-called 'civilized labour policy' under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wa ges which far exceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry. The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whet her any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our compla int is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legi slation from altering this imbalance. The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferior ity. Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are i nvariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realiz e that they have emotions that they fall in love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to ea rn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what 'house-boy' or 'garden-boy' or labourer can ever hope to do this? Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to poli ce surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at so me stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thro wn into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life. Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no sch ools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but

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63 everywhere. Life in the townships is danger ous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after da rk. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death senten ce can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore. Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans wa nt to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable o Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to ow n land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. African s want to be part of the general population, and not conf ined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men's hoste ls. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little childr en. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society. Above all, we want equal pol itical rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to th e whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy. But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in th e way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not tr ue that the enfranchisem ent of all will result in racial domination. Political di vision, based on colour, is enti rely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one col our group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy. This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their strugg le is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live. During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live fo r and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

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64 NELSON MANDELA'S ADDRESS TO RALLY IN CAPE TOWN ON HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON 11 February 1990 Friends, comrades and fellow South Africans. I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all. I stand here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people. Your tireless and heroic sacrifices have made it possible fo r me to be here toda y. I therefore place the remaining years of my life in your hands. On this day of my release, I extend my sincer e and warmest gratitude to the millions of my compatriots and those in every corner of th e globe who have campaigned tirelessly for my release. I send special greetings to the people of Cape To wn, this city which has been my home for three decades. Your mass marches and other forms of struggle have served as a constant source of strength to all political prisoners. I salute the African National Congre ss. It has fulfilled our every expectation in its role as leader of the great march to freedom. I salute our President, Comr ade Oliver Tambo, for leading the ANC even under the most difficult circumstances. I salute the rank and file member s of the ANC. You have sacrificed life and limb in the pursuit of the noble cause of our struggle. I salute combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe, lik e Solomon Mahlangu and Ashley Kriel who have paid the ultimate price for the freedom of all South Africans. I salute the South African Comm unist Party for its sterling c ontribution to the struggle for democracy. You have survived 40 years of unrelenting persecution. Th e memory of great communists like Moses Kotane, Yusuf Dadoo, Br am Fischer and Moses Mabhida will be cherished for generations to come. I salute General Secretary Joe Slovo, one of our finest patriots. We are heartened by the fact that the alliance between ourselves and the Party remains as strong as it always was. I salute the United Democratic Front, the National Education Crisis Committee, the South African Youth Congress, the Transvaal and Nata l Indian Congresses a nd COSATU and the many other formations of the Mass Democratic Movement.

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65 I also salute the Black Sash and the National Un ion of South African Students. We note with pride that you have acted as th e conscience of white South Africa. Even during the darkest days in the history of our struggle you held the flag of liberty high. The large-scale mass mobilisation of the past few years is one of the key factors wh ich led to the opening of the final chapter of our struggle. I extend my greetings to the working class of our country. Your organised st rength is the pride of our movement. You remain the most dependable force in the struggle to end exploitation and oppression. I pay tribute to the many religious communities who carried the campaign for justice forward when the organisations for our people were silenced. I greet the traditional leaders of our country many of you continue to walk in the footsteps of great heroes like Hintsa and Sekhukune. I pay tribute to the endless heroism of youth, you, the young lions. You, the young lions, have energised our entire struggle. I pay tribute to the mothers and wives and sist ers of our nation. You are the rock-hard foundation of our struggle. Apartheid has inflicted more pain on you than on anyone else. On this occasion, we thank the world community fo r their great contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle. Without your support our struggle would not have reached this advanced stage. The sacrifice of the frontline states will be remembered by South Africans forever. My salutations would be incomplete without ex pressing my deep appreciation for the strength given to me during my long and lonely years in prison by my beloved wife and family. I am convinced that your pain and sufferi ng was far greater than my own. Before I go any further I wish to make the poi nt that I intend making only a few preliminary comments at this stage. I will make a more complete statement only after I have had the opportunity to consult with my comrades. Today the majority of South Africans, black and wh ite, recognise that apartheid has no future. It has to be ended by our own decisive mass action in order to build peace and security. The mass campaign of defiance and other actions of our or ganisation and people can only culminate in the establishment of democracy. The destruction cau sed by apartheid on our sub-continent is incalculable. The fabric of family life of millions of my people has been shattered. Millions are homeless and unemployed. Our economy lies in ruin s and our people are embroiled in political strife. Our resort to the armed struggle in 1960 with the formation of the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was a purely defensive action against the violence of apartheid. The factors which necessitated the armed struggle still exist toda y. We have no option but to continue. We express the hope that a climate con ducive to a negotiated sett lement will be created soon so that there may no longer be the need for the armed struggle.

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66 I am a loyal and disciplined member of the Af rican National Congress. I am therefore in full agreement with all of its objectiv es, strategies and tactics. The need to unite the people of our country is as important a task now as it always has been. No individual leader is able to ta ke on this enormous task on his own. It is our task as leaders to place our views before our organisation and to allo w the democratic structures to decide. On the question of democratic practice, I feel duty bound to make the point that a leader of the movement is a person who has been democratically elected at a national conference. This is a principle which must be upheld without any exceptions. Today, I wish to report to you that my talks with the government have been aimed at normalising the political situation in the country. We have not as yet begun di scussing the basic demands of the struggle. I wish to stress that I myself ha ve at no time entered into negotiations about the future of our country except to insist on a meeting between the ANC and the government. Mr. De Klerk has gone further than any other Na tionalist president in taking real steps to normalise the situation. However, there are further steps as outlined in the Harare Declaration that have to be met before negotiations on the ba sic demands of our people can begin. I reiterate our call for, inter alia, the immedi ate ending of the State of Emergency and the freeing of all, and not only some, political prisoners. Only such a normalised situation, which allows for free political activity, can allow us to consult our people in order to obtain a mandate. The people need to be consulted on who will nego tiate and on the content of such negotiations. Negotiations cannot take place above the heads or be hind the backs of our people. It is our belief that the future of our country can only be determined by a body which is democratically elected on a non-racial basis. Negotiations on the dismantli ng of apartheid will have to address the overwhelming demand of our people for a democratic non-racial and unitary South Africa. There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of aparthei d are addressed and our society thoroughly democratised. It must be added that Mr. De Klerk himself is a man of integr ity who is acutely aware of the dangers of a public figure not honouring his undertakings. But as an organisation we base our policy and strategy on the harsh rea lity we are faced with. And this reality is that we are still suffering under the policy of the Nationalist government. Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. We call on our people to seize this moment so that the process towards democracy is rapid and uni nterrupted. We have waited too long for our freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts. To relax our efforts now would be a mistake which generati ons to come will not be able to forgive. The sight of freedom looming on the horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts. It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured. We call on our white compatriots to join us in the sh aping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for you too. We call on the international co mmunity to continue the campaign to isolate

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67 the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now woul d be to run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid. Our march to freedom is irreversible. We must not allow fear to stand in our way. Universal suffrage on a common voters' role in a united demo cratic and non-racial S outh Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony. In conclusion I wish to quote my own words duri ng my trial in 1964. They are true today as they were then: 'I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democra tic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live fo r and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.'

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68 NELSON MANDELA'S ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF CAPE TOWN, GRAND PARADE, ON THE OCCASI ON OF HIS INAUGURATION AS STATE PRESIDENT Cape Town, 9 May 1994 Mr Master of Ceremonies, Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, My Fellow South Africans: Today we are entering a new era for our country and its people. Today we celebrate not the victory of a party, but a victory fo r all the people of South Africa. Our country has arrived at a de cision. Among all the parties that contested the elections, the overwhelming majority of South Africans have mandated the African Nati onal Congress to lead our country into the future. The South Africa we ha ve struggled for, in which all our people, be they African, Coloured, Indian or White, regard themselves as ci tizens of one nation is at hand. Perhaps it was history that ordained that it be here, at the Cape of Good Hope that we should lay the foundation stone of our new nation. For it was here at this Cape, over three centuries ago, that there began the fateful convergence of the peoples of Africa, Europe and Asia on these shores. It was to this peninsula that the patriots, among them many princes and scholars, of Indonesia were dragged in chains. It was on the sandy plains of this peninsula that fi rst battles of the epic wars of resistance were fought. When we look out across Table Bay, the horiz on is dominated by Robben Island, whose infamy as a dungeon built to stifle the spirit of freedom is as old as colonialism in South Africa. For three centuries that island was seen as a place to which outcasts can be banished. The names of those who were incarcerated on Robben Island is a roll call of resistance fighters and democrats spanning over three centuries If indeed this is a Cape of Good Hope, that hope owes much to the spirit of that legion of fighter s and others of their calibre. We have fought for a democratic constitution since the 1880s. Ours has been a quest for a constitution freely adopted by the people of Sout h Africa, reflecting their wishes and their aspirations. The struggle for democracy has neve r been a matter pursued by one race, class, religious community or gender among South African s. In honouring those w ho fought to see this day arrive, we honour the best s ons and daughters of all our peopl e. We can count amongst them Africans, Coloureds, Whites, Indi ans, Muslims, Christians, Hindus Jews all of them united by a common vision of a better life for the people of this country.

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69 It was that vision that inspired us in 1923 when we adopted the first ever Bill of Rights in this country. That same vision spurred us to put fo rward the African Claims in 1946. It is also the founding principle of the Freedom Charter we adopted as policy in 1955, which in its very first lines, places before South Africa an inclusive basis for citizenship. In 1980s the African National Congress was still sett ing the pace, being the first major political formation in South Africa to commit itself firmly to a Bill of Rights, which we published in November 1990. These milestones give concrete expression to what South Africa can become. They speak of a constitutional, democratic, politi cal order in which, regardless of colour, gender, religion, political opinion or sexual orientation, th e law will provide for the equal protection of all citizens. They project a democracy in which the governme nt, whomever that government may be, will be bound by a higher set of rules, embodied in a constitution, and will not be able govern the country as it pleases. Democracy is based on the majority principle. This is especially true in a country such as ours where the vast majority have been systemati cally denied their rights. At the same time, democracy also requires that the rights of political and other minorities be safeguarded. In the political order we have established there w ill regular, open and free elections, at all levels of government central, provincia l and municipal. Ther e shall also be a social order which respects completely the culture, language and relig ious rights of all sect ions of our society and the fundamental rights of the individual. The task at hand on will not be easy. But you ha ve mandated us to change South Africa from a country in which the majority lived with little hop e, to one in which they can live and work with dignity, with a sense of self-est eem and confidence in the future The cornerstone of building a better life of opportunity, freedom and prospe rity is the Reconstr uction and Development Programme. This needs unity of purpose. It needs in action. It requires us all to work to gether to bring an end to division, an end to suspicion and bu ild a nation united in our diversity. The people of South Africa have spoken in thes e elections. They want change! And change is what they will get. Our plan is to create jobs promote peace and reconciliation, and to guarantee freedom for all South Africans. We will tackle the widespread poverty so pervasive among the majority of our people. By enc ouraging investors and the democra tic state to support job creating projects in which manufacturing wi ll play a central role we will try to change our country from a net exporter of raw materials to one that expor ts finished products through beneficiation. The government will devise policies that encour age and reward productive enterprise among the disadvantaged communities African, Coloured a nd Indian. By easing credit conditions we can assist them to make inroads into the producti ve and manufacturing sphe res and breakout of the small-scale distribution to which they are presently confined.

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70 To raise our country and its people from the morass of racism and apartheid will require determination and effort. As a government, the ANC will create a legal framework that will assist, rather than impede, the awesome task of reconstruction and development of our battered society. While we are and shall remain fully committed to the spirit of a government of national unity, we are determined to initiate and bring about the ch ange that our mandate fr om the people demands. We place our vision of a new constitutional order for South Africa on the table not as conquerors, prescribing to the conquered. We speak as fellow citizens to heal the wounds of the past with the intent of constructing a new order based on justice for all. This is the challenge that faces all South African s today, and it is one to which I am certain we will all rise. Issued by: The Department of Information and Publicity, P.O. Box 61884, Marshalltown 2107, Johannesburg.

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71 STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS NELSON ROLIHLAHLA MANDELA AT HIS INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA UNION BUILDINGS Pretoria, 10 May 1994 Your Majesties, Your Highnesses, Distinguished Guests, Comrades and Friends. Today, all of us do, by our presence here, and by our celebrations in other parts of our country and the world, confer glory a nd hope to newborn liberty. Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud. Our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce an actual South African reality that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice, strengt hen its confidence in th e nobility of the human soul and sustain all our hopes fo r a glorious life for all. All this we owe both to ourselves and to the pe oples of the world who are so well represented here today. To my compatriots, I have no hesita tion in saying that each one of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautif ul country as are the famous jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the bushveld. Each time one of us touches the soil of this la nd, we feel a sense of personal renewal. The national mood changes as the seasons change. We are moved by a sense of joy and exhilarati on when the grass turns green and the flowers bloom. That spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw our country tear itself apart in a terrible conflict, and as we saw it spurned, outlawed and isolated by the peoples of the world, precisely because it has become the universal base of the pernicious ideo logy and practice of racism and racial oppression. We, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its bosom, that we, who were outlaws not so long ago, have today b een given the rare privilege to be host to the nations of the world on our own soil.

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72 We thank all our distinguished international guests fo r having come to take possession with the people of our country of what is after all, a common victory fo r justice, for peace, for human dignity. We trust that you will continue to stand by us as we tackle the challe nges of building peace, prosperity, non-sexism, non-racialism and democracy. We deeply appreciate the role th at the masses of our people and their political mass democratic, religious, women, youth, business, traditional and ot her leaders have played to bring about this conclusion. Not least among them is my Second Deputy President, the Honourable F.W. de Klerk. We would also like to pay tribute to our security forces, in all their ranks, for the distinguished role they have played in secu ring our first democratic elections and the transition to democracy, from blood-thirsty forces which st ill refuse to see the light. The time for the healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us. We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of povert y, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination. We succeeded to take our last steps to freedom in conditions of relative peace. We commit ourselves to the construction of a complete, just and lasting peace. We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our people. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the so ciety in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. As a token of its commitment to the renewal of our country, the new Interim Government of National Unity will, as a matter of urgency, addr ess the issue of amnest y for various categories of our people who are currently se rving terms of imprisonment. We dedicate this day to all the he roes and heroines in this countr y and the rest of the world who sacrificed in many ways and surrendered their lives so that we could be free. Their dreams have become reality. Freedom is their reward. We are both humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that you, the people of South Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first Pres ident of a united, demo cratic, non-racial and nonsexist government.

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73 We understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom We know it well that none of us act ing alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconcil iation, for nation building, for the birth of a new world. Let there be justice for all. Let there be peace for all. Let there be work, bread, water and salt for all. Let each know that for each the body, the mind and the soul have been freed to fulfill themselves. Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the i ndignity of being the skunk of the world. Let freedom reign. The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement! God bless Africa! Thank you.

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74 LIST OF REFERENCES : Freedom for Nelson Mandela. BBC On This Day 2 January 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/ Bitzer, L loyd. The Rhetorical Situation. Philosophy and Rhetoric January 1968: 1-14. Crystal, David. English as a global la nguage. Cambridge: University Press, 1997. Dovring, Karin. English as Lingua Franca: Doubl e Talk in Global Persuasion. London: Praeger, 1997. Farrell, Thomas B. Norms of Rhetorical Cultu re. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Levinsohn, James. Globalization and the Retu rns to Speaking Englis h in South Africa. December 2004. NBER Working Papers. 15 November 2007 http://www.nber.org/ Mandela, N elson. Inauguration Speech. Sele cted Speeches, Statements, and Writings of Nelson Mandela. 9 May 1994. 18 September 2007 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/hi story.m andela/1994/inaugct.html Mandela, Nelson, Inauguration Speech. Sele cted Speeches, Statements, and Writings of Nelson Mandela. 10 May 1994. 18 September 2007 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/hi story.m andela/1994/inaugpta.html Mandela, Nelson. Speech on Relase from Prison. Selected Speeches, Statements, and Writings of Nelson Mandela. 11 February 1990. 18 September 2007 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/hi story/m andela/1990/release.html Mandela, Nelson. Statement from the Dock at the Rivonia Trial. Selected Speeches, Statements, and Writings of Nelson Mandela. 20 April 1964. 18 September 2007 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/hi story/m andela/1960s/rivonia.html Nixon, Rob. Mandela, Messianism, and the Me dia. Transition 51(1991 ): 42-55. 21 October 2007 http://www.jstor.org/ Sheckels, T heodore F. The Rhetoric of Nels on Mandela: A Qualified Success. Howard Journal of Communications 12:2 ( 2001): 85-99. 21 October 2007 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170119951 Titlestad, Peter. Peop les Eng lish, codification, function, and logic. English Today 18:2 (April 2002): 14-20. 21 October 2007 http://journals.cambridge.org/

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75 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Rania L. Williams was born April 21, 1984 in Jacksonville, Florida. She received the Bachelor of Arts in English (w ith a Spanish minor) from Indiana Wesleyan University in 2006. She is a member of Sigma Delta Pi, National Hi spanic Honors Society. She has served as a Teaching Assistant in the English Department a nd University Writing Program at University of Florida.