<%BANNER%>

Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022114/00001

Material Information

Title: Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.
Physical Description: Book
Language: english
Creator: Gonzalez Alana, Laura
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Business Administration thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Statement of Responsibility: by Laura Gonzalez Alana.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: James, Christophe M.
Electronic Access: INACCESSIBLE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022114:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0022114/00001

Material Information

Title: Record for a UF thesis. Title & abstract won't display until thesis is accessible after 2010-08-31.
Physical Description: Book
Language: english
Creator: Gonzalez Alana, Laura
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Business Administration thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Statement of Responsibility: by Laura Gonzalez Alana.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: James, Christophe M.
Electronic Access: INACCESSIBLE UNTIL 2010-08-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0022114:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101221_AAAABQ INGEST_TIME 2010-12-21T19:45:20Z PACKAGE UFE0022114_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 33497 DFID F20101221_AABGFR ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
cbc04228f85ae2aed8b9d7f841f0262a
SHA-1
ee9a870db184a662aa8045e96db1f0c05c1ccf10
25271604 F20101221_AABFYU gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.tif
a96e21386df81b4809e65db381722100
ecf537c005139500b78fd93f47e55fee1be7c047
55095 F20101221_AABGAU gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.pro
9b0bcae1a1b3741815ec767a8cb300ec
d3dee5c88e2f51cfbdabbf5e85cd5832fb37e159
110333 F20101221_AABFTW gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.jpg
a442113c7f81ada737576a4fdc45d45c
156a8f39ade2cf1eaa2f8d5d53b55148f5849fae
33923 F20101221_AABGFS gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.QC.jpg
26b07247b2c3e7cf216315c6ad6c4a38
1d4e77596fb024d36d2156e6ed9517a00223cd78
F20101221_AABFYV gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.tif
520fb18a7851949d6cd32dbb1bdeecda
21d1ebd5900ab4d486422efbc68ed9ac22098a85
54707 F20101221_AABGAV gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.pro
e6716edd5dd9ca24a07f1626f31f11e8
e705ff399d3f9bdcae52594a2e89918bfd62e649
23783 F20101221_AABFTX gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.jpg
f14ac320689f5777e3686b76646f534e
79cb3d4ab1fc5ee9a551a480ae742dab2c51e4fe
19776 F20101221_AABGFT gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.QC.jpg
35233639522cde59db26845e83fe2c7a
b37cc7e78b3a1d0710664ba0c51b8ee87f64ceb3
F20101221_AABFYW gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.tif
71a1898ad7e0b896c56f4e4a10921b4f
03ccbd4c29c055fa8b14a6e4bf9207c6c19ec801
49505 F20101221_AABGAW gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.pro
1b669f5f7e8d057fc0b93bc8f4ab7ec5
50a743bf1e147b98ef14eae4f0bcb7f11f34f2a9
129433 F20101221_AABFTY gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.jpg
de2c007572cf42da198ccec07a558ce3
c1aa74f8de0f81eea6e824c0462e77a36b377f12
8697 F20101221_AABGFU gonzalezalana_l_Page_25thm.jpg
64cd8d92cf3071908bdbbefd13ee81c9
5677274190225fbefce070bcdba5c51c22c8d9fc
F20101221_AABFYX gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.tif
dbf168e7ef3d37e5f997ce4c25468bae
061d242679b19b0a44b33ba0d1985c8acc57fd3b
67674 F20101221_AABGAX gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.pro
4f796feea004b8b4803b28076e3d7d6a
ff0fd3b9078219d4adac5b3174aca2dbb186c310
126001 F20101221_AABFTZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.jpg
040fcd0fb36975fefc504c4dead71d6a
66ba91efca416b05aa292f48b05aeeb9416528a4
24447 F20101221_AABGFV gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.QC.jpg
504b1c06d969e448be1ccc6e69fc6586
4c753481dbc651df0353a0515e3e5c1bd99c0429
60543 F20101221_AABGAY gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.pro
8ce299d238815b58dd89b291eef6cdb0
0e13b97a9428f28357ba80473336dd578db04007
22340 F20101221_AABGFW gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.QC.jpg
6cf536d587e50cb044bc03f765676562
555bc6b5b2d333817b5d0ef9c15602d5e9ae8d18
1051986 F20101221_AABFWA gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.jp2
a9e388954524a5db87492300a2bcc774
0f7fbb4a2c23964a4da4fca5ac25c12ea6dc0cf8
F20101221_AABFYY gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.tif
b127b34aaef15bc80cc318dbd3649aea
f746edf13b121ade496b896da02c58ebb4309da5
55289 F20101221_AABGAZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.pro
e36940fe8505a92f9ba2cfdfca9fa005
62d184b64c3ebb61acffa9e2c078f6b83bdce743
8336 F20101221_AABGFX gonzalezalana_l_Page_34thm.jpg
4db1ad469b8c1b1c0f50a5662226a9cb
ed9765e10efb4b8fa4f2f897517dc2bfbe83c8c2
1051982 F20101221_AABFWB gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.jp2
44b02fdfe2dc4ad001343be586c156a9
bcf61a4d7da4f721871d04f10c17f03465c3917b
F20101221_AABFYZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.tif
257b842c0ab41b0ec2db303551106740
3ab4ab4e7f244157af08dd15b9eb46f8c92931f1
8805 F20101221_AABGFY gonzalezalana_l_Page_40thm.jpg
c5781f7a82b87528ea5f987eaf3c6f64
e847d4b1e98129fb4fa389f33c819268613de506
1027096 F20101221_AABFWC gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.jp2
045732225a91f7d9eab28eaf2b0defc6
1cf3560271140e7f5cc775db9fb933e76d0e08fa
2402 F20101221_AABGDA gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.txt
7bd4d837fac6bcf21c4754e4221eaa14
a6ca24323ba94496ec57c5d9db2ea1a1329a2385
9775 F20101221_AABGFZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.QC.jpg
47353a20f2ed5899ad81bd8cdcf92d96
58a55c35f628ffb47989e73093bcab491554c6ee
1051937 F20101221_AABFWD gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.jp2
18515ff3e2ff13385a0531626808fd19
bd383bc1df9c7ddac579872b342161a42a595e4a
909 F20101221_AABGDB gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.txt
53a5b0e670838599d1116e8650f957a2
97814ffe13deb817b8ec0b98000b56e07e62c221
1051978 F20101221_AABFWE gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.jp2
85086c60511cc69af3ff6457ee71edf0
5bcdd7246d77e5f049aa68a1319f2adba80c2879
19349 F20101221_AABGIA gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.QC.jpg
e9f644b37577a1a76ccdfb902cc49819
978a4bb9a6c6566bb601c092a9130dad8b930892
1051984 F20101221_AABFWF gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.jp2
eeefad298ed70d1534a75b56444914d1
4d8c8c2aa9f8cd833723288b8f67619e12167169
2016 F20101221_AABGDC gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.txt
4c0e01b616d8452d918bdd17ca1b3a32
538a9e0ea42f662e832dc115f659144ff5f624b8
35470 F20101221_AABGIB gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.QC.jpg
f0abf326929e28a97a1debeaca395c27
e33d61f8e81c8898bcd4a84cfa0dafd6586018db
1051975 F20101221_AABFWG gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.jp2
43b8a5d316910e333806f165adea9694
3600fc531f57f42c2338781e0e5173e16e2afcee
2211 F20101221_AABGDD gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.txt
de47c18f35e92a46ebbc727bf1d074b8
6350b0ad7deef100a4fbb4796b4b12d0253978ba
35225 F20101221_AABGIC gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.QC.jpg
54d388a5f28f475fef6425c45d199c20
1ab239ddf34ec3f5291f57366a86de9390d58c62
2150 F20101221_AABGDE gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.txt
7013882386681122243abac20fe54c44
2e492b2d8331cb5417577ba2942a5c2fa594dff0
236104 F20101221_AABFWH gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.jp2
91e978cad2ddefbba48e5147e0e6974d
18c64b5c6ac432b46cea3c5214e1a39e8a8a3a79
8853 F20101221_AABGID gonzalezalana_l_Page_39thm.jpg
0f77f089c15cc2da0deb9f41ca037629
bbb5aa5d32767d84a7d2e53e89bfadf904831581
2132 F20101221_AABGDF gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.txt
9730326250707c12170997ac05a2c6c7
6f0d4dc7ad8a0626920b5c0fb598935c3c9a88c3
1051940 F20101221_AABFWI gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.jp2
c1976439cc3def211c081438f8c7b30d
f7d5e76a6215e0c9af16b3bfe448c8f873ae539b
6162 F20101221_AABGIE gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.QC.jpg
76f7f33064c58b0b01470efe0e52c122
f9995ef587fc4644669790adde815da32a98809f
2565 F20101221_AABGDG gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.txt
0836db096c6f9e2bdbdb2b33c15e0751
be9097b0d3714d522facac196740f7a1dc5bba02
1051974 F20101221_AABFWJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.jp2
182e71890b01926769ba4825ab12f9db
408441c6953598aad9777cb09015e7d419dbf1d2
29413 F20101221_AABGIF gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.QC.jpg
3c7c82e56e4da6e2640032985536dfe9
b8389c9946bfd363956c92ccd7b13edf99908ed3
113611 F20101221_AABFRN gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.jpg
4b1e32d200c3e9e216fa61df90a2e23a
a990f83afa19c75106d10982ce546cee5a619d63
2661 F20101221_AABGDH gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.txt
610a67cf0283044039bf61d6b89c62ab
a2a6d77b5d918925d72bec463dbdea783a0389d6
1051972 F20101221_AABFWK gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.jp2
6a2c0593694186eed6abe7d3164d9d2a
9da42e0a58f0568bde7011d4254bc01caaf02765
7379 F20101221_AABGIG gonzalezalana_l_Page_42thm.jpg
8c1c98a56000e93f7d218a02af3d8bd7
b16672438279a0c360e4633e929f792840c3011a
F20101221_AABFRO gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.tif
08345057c22242aaa697f7514d90094b
f5232ea63bd5dfa9d496b414b756e2cd65318463
2358 F20101221_AABGDI gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.txt
c94ac293e1b67a263b31aa912e724b1b
5b7e5cdc6d243611dc2c2a57e266669dadab55cc
295583 F20101221_AABFWL gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.jp2
1c8808bd202d897a93f94e52eb89fc79
8c3513cc05207d7e1e544958112043aff2b2bcfd
34992 F20101221_AABFRP gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.QC.jpg
eb24dd23af94e27e53a57466e4ad704c
c7101730fb5b73e62b5a5997cab2daa5c6124795
2176 F20101221_AABGDJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.txt
12030a7c1e6e3e3738263c234e98d10b
75ad4fdbcd06766e8e4510f0b88a6383f0ac03ce
1051955 F20101221_AABFWM gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.jp2
e927bb247bfa3daf3d65cfb064f2eef2
f3830e964103201a1a31cc14269298549c88c5c9
3781 F20101221_AABGIH gonzalezalana_l_Page_43thm.jpg
5adf783a67519807d49e26b9bf3fe8a4
20c3bea3c7874234e8d01716b2263dbe08faadee
118424 F20101221_AABFRQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.jpg
80cc399a72be6e558a31cef17af95ae4
9cd3852d38a6d086eedb2782a2fed5a10426b8f8
413 F20101221_AABGDK gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.txt
4f61574e0d4b561f2baa6e219869e232
a294217263905f215ccf9e18ec38fe00fb3e0d77
680417 F20101221_AABFWN gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.jp2
a987a6826b973984a43004f9b0e90496
9f42cdbae0701fd533fcf32ac8954dd58e07f6e2
33945 F20101221_AABGII gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.QC.jpg
3a84a33643751c5d75f5cdacc759c55f
ef21f26c60c891e67183357b0712f6bcf036791c
2807 F20101221_AABGDL gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.txt
6de6a119b5298be4676dd4db7b228439
b1948d1bc1e33504cf6abacdd6a0501c7889ea46
1051962 F20101221_AABFWO gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.jp2
56442a35173e939c1dc467b8a5c1a411
14f675a2d2be038b57f10aa86e258fd498caf4d0
8983 F20101221_AABGIJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_45thm.jpg
f5c951996a617f74bfdc878c7c4f7705
16bc8f8b2e5f8753241f1ad33f889662b9ec3771
86410 F20101221_AABFRR gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.jpg
9f43ffe203a66fe2f62269d3209f2e70
f1cc42fb7bd73c7b36af8746cd0f654d1e52a739
2797 F20101221_AABGDM gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.txt
be89431558b260585f5e0802b611b3a0
a7657ad917678922f0121da4631812b7a8f414a0
F20101221_AABFWP gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.jp2
8193a85659f3c7c596928e68df073610
bee95d598c572d78ecdf3e0c96cf9b3be713809f
6687 F20101221_AABGIK gonzalezalana_l_Page_47thm.jpg
ae7e6d57d922199b8bab7a3fe74705c0
fe48c25c7c917ba33cd031241572ebd2ca4495f8
47596 F20101221_AABFRS gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.pro
9cea11c0961dfb609e650a4ee934b177
01046e475f053c7253f5282813dcc215fad9400d
2148 F20101221_AABGDN gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.txt
9bc49dcd2d801181f2dc9d77dbff5502
0e4f9b4a09c7591c5af6f7956e6ef0b4256dd5e3
F20101221_AABFWQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.jp2
36ab84353dcbc9f82150f863d82158e7
8c82438e81fbe5c2e0ba470b464131b2923910ae
2160 F20101221_AABGIL gonzalezalana_l_Page_52thm.jpg
9568c9940d576036e9d45f39b489e1bf
bb852e87fd40d973f0c3e18a70a589151e1bbbf6
7340 F20101221_AABFRT gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.QC.jpg
058e498a6d1b1ba920f7b305197750e8
dba2d005686cbc6d0784b381df82c521a22e6e66
515 F20101221_AABGDO gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.txt
9deb70e8b20d3e03495eb73861c2aa29
e7195dbf5bf944ea6cb78f57fc9a3c6e3e9a58b4
508329 F20101221_AABFWR gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.jp2
731cc9b9f1bc7d8fc0ad6eea1b978692
fd54a34c388a46c88ec03f1228b79925f6623cf0
8332 F20101221_AABGIM gonzalezalana_l_Page_53thm.jpg
cb7947e28c058664d84e43f558ea2e74
00560428a6e62505f1af7f5b21e17671315cf37f
448412 F20101221_AABFRU gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.jp2
9e6a60f86d6d5d8184ae02b68cf5c038
b066a9cb866981080f79338e823a0f63ea8e737d
930 F20101221_AABGDP gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.txt
c1d624272967bdd30c72c91586f93c92
d18c1d892849bc65d93c69302ad688e160f94bdf
F20101221_AABFWS gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.tif
94afe2cdccdf7d41ac617f1fde4dab1c
97a3a0d94d32c6cd23d32f1d6510d5e2dd2ee8ab
37560 F20101221_AABGIN gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.QC.jpg
9a1ef1fbba6c9ef39b197004eb47d188
4eef8c9387804bcdd60308704b2df3de3824bae9
2106 F20101221_AABFRV gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.txt
605db23267f1c4f9d33128b0b97ad7f8
bafdcdcbb134ca266ed372970fd57a2fba31951a
2227 F20101221_AABGDQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.txt
94c1538efd1441538d18c4b0f040df89
e544a67cea2b486c46290433389dd12de2adb452
F20101221_AABFWT gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.tif
07307a20d4814574a82abdbf13b8dd0c
29fe7e50ce19ce04d1b182f9cac7fe20dc03901a
20836 F20101221_AABGIO gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.QC.jpg
bb033eb069778b415b687184d701a6c0
b3a6ff9196caa4612df6ae18530c018670a7140a
78228 F20101221_AABFRW gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.jpg
c3ad8e7ac7bb2c597bc6fa6f832a6c04
2fbe5653802689cdedc9d7d96387eeaab28b9d76
1213 F20101221_AABGDR gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.txt
3a5a71ed3102a4875ea7eca42de1c0c1
1509a3f81d2e2647c98793b4c63c87d57e645b0f
F20101221_AABFWU gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.tif
98c20033b2c6e2a1691a132017c9d39a
11ed5edc5ebf31d3f6c0c081e2c1feed2411771b
8757 F20101221_AABGIP gonzalezalana_l_Page_60thm.jpg
7155b7b33f1b14d9addf26f317625ad9
5ba7184d3c242755d12f4abf33baedd9c1a11304
8968 F20101221_AABFRX gonzalezalana_l_Page_36thm.jpg
83bc69ee7db0773735e97d1c2d119be0
78dabf7d33666403f1e56846d0250a71ff57a1fa
2391 F20101221_AABGDS gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.txt
e2468f4dfcc5e380e25e259f79126aaf
875ad0efd81a26718cc06dee7d843aa0de3f5606
F20101221_AABFWV gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.tif
fea0b6e2f4d085ff43ffb25fdf6e126b
ae587e34984e6c4e48cc88e147abcf80d9aba05f
15804 F20101221_AABGIQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.QC.jpg
bd9d125fd923aab2a1165dbc9226a282
18dcccdffd173267f07f3a17d1622e0f11c23ae3
77169 F20101221_AABFRY UFE0022114_00001.mets FULL
5edf4634f208421cc00c27618bd56b5b
8096c9eea4f45473361357a9c6aee85a1e590c49
2333 F20101221_AABGDT gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.txt
f036c23bb69f7982aa463108c01cf8ac
4794b4a4287762b3243ded7d15d610350d0189d5
2131 F20101221_AABGDU gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.txt
0148e4bfc12839c7f69347ba156c836a
68d68aadd43d298b5be9a46a5d46095a4834206f
F20101221_AABFWW gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.tif
96eb2f9acdc13810fc3014675afdbee4
00885ca343d920335382f9a9e24ac5db7f27553a
910 F20101221_AABGDV gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.txt
64cf97b375e207768668295abefd4e55
e1b85b4be66dee42f02f72388c33b365acc0c01c
F20101221_AABFWX gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.tif
7b01009501bae43fd76938135f36b17c
9192579b6683e7438ba79100ce6b432c363af568
2044 F20101221_AABGDW gonzalezalana_l_Page_01thm.jpg
8fca2dcca1eca92cff81c93ffb6f1800
dd68975fdb66edea5f3d325fe10f70d0cbdc9e41
106239 F20101221_AABFUA gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.jpg
a0531b617b711add2a91bfcfca1b2c78
9871481634d1d354728cd6c97a858d925c6ba628
F20101221_AABFWY gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.tif
181fe732aa52fdf0d48282288b150de1
1b51ade55a1f309432db478dcdcd920cdb15d003
173162 F20101221_AABGDX gonzalezalana_l.pdf
9eefd3d218c866f679addc75217458a4
25380a41ac0bdb78bf9e4291e42cefa1eb38d79c
28792 F20101221_AABFUB gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.jpg
dd26ef370987dac7d76b3ee3da61a740
4043672d74a5cb01a80c4b027464c3440d217aa4
F20101221_AABFWZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.tif
db6c883d2bbd241061a8d996cf2bf208
74b4b3ed2b9790786cac63e291abad3303b9c2d9
37925 F20101221_AABGDY gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.QC.jpg
495f52b3d37aa6183d7284fb032270e2
57566bd5ff82221cead94c3eebcb1443d39f0b57
45638 F20101221_AABFUC gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.jpg
7d9abcf5f1a1fc2e98abe659a23db7f6
6d338f0f76bb5b9e53f8a5299d4914d351c37647
F20101221_AABFZA gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.tif
f3189aa824afa326cd3a96f36c6b8744
8cc5d57c01109355dbf57ba06d6c47fdf24c94c2
10280 F20101221_AABGBA gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.pro
e10aa08a6d6dd49b1f0bfad02669eaf6
f7cb9c252500370e4d6d2a8d915dc006e3b3e462
8957 F20101221_AABGDZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_38thm.jpg
b4cf58f503f3adaf19f4e198c4149afe
1c69c55b3405d4046ec2f9044c71311993b372b9
109583 F20101221_AABFUD gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.jpg
1e6667515233d9e3f41608a3f05e66bb
9ceb4c9f5dec027bcdb16bd2a157584bcacbd779
F20101221_AABFZB gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.tif
644277ae27b924e51371408cb8b928f6
e01b4136111184796b4dd9e3450796b4ad5b6e12
64133 F20101221_AABGBB gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.pro
7976402d8643504fce78fb10de44ff59
a99db68c9671edbd0c18aa47398f5ca540fd3b86
63312 F20101221_AABFUE gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.jpg
4e7752445c55cddf04f92624ad3969fb
c99a268b70a4f3252b23265f2f2b09aca4c1bba1
7795 F20101221_AABFZC gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.pro
7fe905f3c22fdf39dc6d204b9e74864a
426e952b617e54c3210462f0961b3ee57f7699a2
69251 F20101221_AABGBC gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.pro
c92861cec283b08d7d50c2d77ab5aa45
90d5a6840c1c46059eae2027f79145f23d66269f
114606 F20101221_AABFUF gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.jpg
fb64004b276bb8bc6baf3dd8750f9b29
07f27602fbad35fb3a195c83b228da6d17eb90fc
8718 F20101221_AABGGA gonzalezalana_l_Page_46thm.jpg
93673e92d9eced25a7a9aa3a511bb4af
7222e8cfed4eb35319815882b1c3cbdb81f1c2a3
52923 F20101221_AABGBD gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.pro
8a54bdeae379381aad9ed56b3d88b38d
2f4600cc6793f9385c692f3d283dec478497e999
106990 F20101221_AABFUG gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.jpg
c316645a639be86ddfdc40812687de88
7f6553d862424e5da7f7b5e102d196969e054c72
8894 F20101221_AABGGB gonzalezalana_l_Page_12thm.jpg
fc39d0ed011fbe0cc13ba84ac2a36845
a0c5216554c41825aac6f519478b77940c8c8e9e
992 F20101221_AABFZD gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.pro
c5a139cdbbf4410ef0fdc51ea76fb1b4
e49e27c032c30c14c424bc710b4eb58cea43009a
12922 F20101221_AABGBE gonzalezalana_l_Page_56.pro
b3af20c1c0ec8984500cad0c00dba895
4adf96e8502a022b57713556de18f6dc83e26445
48497 F20101221_AABFUH gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.jpg
c0f0caf94c0666e213520f19e410e728
f186d5371754622b2b22e6701be241481c4137a2
8906 F20101221_AABGGC gonzalezalana_l_Page_24thm.jpg
c1d58dd2289723ef764d1528deb72da9
3387887d4d2584627f9ad16fdc291f73f501cb50
913 F20101221_AABFZE gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.pro
c98a040008a93a1d3eb67df54d948cc8
25b884af7a024c406462c187f5d4cf11d6505cd3
20212 F20101221_AABGBF gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.pro
ab1f38c11cc9b9d03c3e60ac5b0ad231
1abf2d12b05ecfeece4499b2b3ed2b432bffc50d
240884 F20101221_AABFUI gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.jp2
7d921bb13db4812435228f0d771c0fe6
ee72b3709e824559b2c97b030a9b30d15eb4084f
1680 F20101221_AABGGD gonzalezalana_l_Page_41thm.jpg
dd00928ff0900731a355454ad0ff5693
81e46aa7e9f73ca7ba6d1682e973185508054855
7433 F20101221_AABFZF gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.pro
f50058a5e99482793a3fe5771df853ad
34f665045e72af6f5f00e5dd35f29a79c8ccfa6e
54837 F20101221_AABGBG gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.pro
455a9455b9728da4a5b1b46b19195d08
c25766bf2a108fff697e125e72e8054ae16df09b
29441 F20101221_AABFUJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.jp2
b074edda8fe6094f1361c943ab47b088
85c35c124c30f9189268d65d212b00c5e0a0bf7d
3153 F20101221_AABGGE gonzalezalana_l_Page_31thm.jpg
12c3dcff354e2a40c4ceec2aeb9c74b2
49bc1fbcacbcc3968040c53d624f77cc33171bb0
39153 F20101221_AABFZG gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.pro
e10959c76316313a5d8b8f40a80766fe
ebe9f687c5bfeb2982c604dddf6cae3e39134ea6
30449 F20101221_AABGBH gonzalezalana_l_Page_59.pro
beb30e27cd955d4df9deae1085a7c571
78249329770d359eccbfbc51dfebd5689ad2ea8f
25994 F20101221_AABFUK gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.jp2
1ce1d0ad2b80043511b1beccfbe42758
a277227a951dc15daa9ad9428a33cf62c46588e6
35978 F20101221_AABFZH gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.pro
95ba29d268d03f753f7bc46b34358a5c
3bce0da1308caa2bea8709e3bf7b3a3fb60da124
59086 F20101221_AABGBI gonzalezalana_l_Page_60.pro
d89a6339b2e6c04e57d0d9ef207306a9
b17a966c8cda011a0ec943693d77120df67f6b3b
181588 F20101221_AABFUL gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.jp2
3e3618867a91216a3f28d3f575af9d1c
a01e5ab7993b4bed668715edb6be37e41c8afcf8
35772 F20101221_AABGGF gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.QC.jpg
484a1b4caefbd3ed225eb06b003dc176
ac59c9902e54b8c57bb5504bcd37bbf2de95f590
35596 F20101221_AABFZI gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.pro
d1c4b62e51499c3d41a50461e3b87b51
e6acb73d4bc721f0951eeae04c69d37309be1adb
57610 F20101221_AABGBJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.pro
147496f3ba514746db7e84c0126c2a93
8e1aaaad5ae37ef56730042f144660c730f078dd
F20101221_AABFUM gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.jp2
b270e4d1a6ef68a5ad2f70cffce07aa3
74c72e48d1127aabbc9b9618dd5b412a2a9995da
23401 F20101221_AABGGG gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.QC.jpg
6208e6ddd9b51aaf30681839b3310fb8
6441bbf4c2ae37e678e906a7a19427aa429196d4
53634 F20101221_AABFZJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.pro
cc44d454ca6d99e11cba2daed2b17071
c10f30664cb72ba845317ecaa7391517d34be510
F20101221_AABFUN gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.jp2
d39d975fba95ecc8ebc42eda4335c57e
4a7faf23d5385ae952b3562a0cee721ffc23ff9a
34189 F20101221_AABGGH gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.QC.jpg
e088b8ae03ab31828231acec07055c71
02e225fca23fc530356adb3174d11791bb603b65
56031 F20101221_AABFZK gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.pro
ce98df7374627020c7f4b50ab4d1eb42
cd147ede27bbbe82433fe8755b2c713fd6199e6e
52538 F20101221_AABGBK gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.pro
456eff13f065cc8ee5abf63135a75b23
678b133fe2a4863d42488b5273416cde3209db3f
820878 F20101221_AABFUO gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.jp2
4b5bb47a99b4c7ea5aec228fc11700d7
ccac8625c16ea96c3850da483b3efb8803ddb36d
35713 F20101221_AABGGI gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.QC.jpg
7bf6dee7c866c3234e9547c934f2d55b
fdae909a71dcddfe4e7598f4388f14c56227fb4b
55943 F20101221_AABFZL gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.pro
d8f7dd08c905c7f8d1bb90a0e3a373f3
f782438853e1c6d84708bb23b0b93cc2df0161ad
21954 F20101221_AABGBL gonzalezalana_l_Page_63.pro
ed044582268b398a6f2312b577941b56
d2996c53f5649d874dfb69fddf981d914b81b9ff
1051979 F20101221_AABFUP gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.jp2
cdb2b4ffa21abef81d97c7aec4c66d98
d3152532d2bb40377fc36a68e851b386ce0bbce9
3981 F20101221_AABGGJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_63thm.jpg
567518ecf3fbbc853b11107413265083
3f4d9d5757a38d5327b156c82c00ae6285d886af
55981 F20101221_AABFZM gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.pro
22f1f6f68f238d184e80073dfe63baf6
b6702a6f09e50fb91d300dc33a57adf11767b2d3
421 F20101221_AABGBM gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.txt
d5988c7155f4b0b4906c681760ecaaf1
662dc484e0a0ae6556757c37a873d9a5f4b12c8d
1051922 F20101221_AABFUQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.jp2
39303bd9ca539eb72e79d44e579427e7
2ee558fff58b786125baa6f94c1e0f51dbf8f319
1171 F20101221_AABGGK gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.QC.jpg
76d7d2254b6c46f41fe0340cc3ee9ade
bff8bc3d2d862898ec8d1cbfeabca25ec242eecb
57415 F20101221_AABFZN gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.pro
a126ca9f241de48c8498c8e67e32da45
cab73ab864c41f9d0e996d5a7ab8afce8352d20c
102 F20101221_AABGBN gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.txt
69caff95492602b6e427dd27e1b843b9
ad35b9c65de81c890954fe9b5bb54dcbc97a1430
F20101221_AABFUR gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.jp2
9482b8963e4d9713651cd91fe49e2cc0
d3b6ae17d25db418999149f4b37e19cea10ebd74
35311 F20101221_AABGGL gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.QC.jpg
f4e681077839e05bcfe6da71d9076743
e117d4b3a8eb160ddb69ddca3d716a7bc01cb5f7
9538 F20101221_AABFZO gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.pro
803ccad25c431aca5bbfe1a30f22aa12
4fc7643d793ed1379aea31a42f5afd2706c33637
95 F20101221_AABGBO gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.txt
3341c88fe0be43ab9d2797f0d66b2463
c9a446b95e223d98e282e9749e82cd2f5b907325
1051983 F20101221_AABFUS gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.jp2
53a107ceae8b6dea7c0e570fe054e33f
cdbb975cced408f54ea413dee1cc5f7fed3f3db6
13635 F20101221_AABGGM gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.QC.jpg
56dbbc77d1efd002388bcef75bf2868f
db4a37bf58d9c01b9bc244a0d3903ac3d61ff379
51507 F20101221_AABFZP gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.pro
0ff3588da7a2f857515447531b6c826b
485b8fc4fb7b9312b51a93cd52f3e78a64229f11
334 F20101221_AABGBP gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.txt
bf64c9f35b60ed2467fd13a88ba1ec84
2e118d934687077c480fc22323ec8d05ed2acee0
1051963 F20101221_AABFUT gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.jp2
d45ce6fb69f724e2ad9383453ae07157
06c688831e8536e068244b726b4835a84424bc41
5448 F20101221_AABGGN gonzalezalana_l_Page_28thm.jpg
e88c1c43d1ab0ce8bf39c02effe8360d
a41857c45ad267017387739e48baae04d1a9887c
53306 F20101221_AABFZQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.pro
dd42b3627c71e022c8ddebe8b92cdd2a
dcc8cec97bb330f399946c22e163f64a0e6e7305
1704 F20101221_AABGBQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_05.txt
963ab1a6cd450303bced61e556f4762a
f2496624f87cbbf57ac19604c30877396348d13e
538 F20101221_AABGGO gonzalezalana_l_Page_03thm.jpg
e3135a5c0143a65119b1663b80152e99
8ddf96b15f95af0a86257815f235ff403e973c10
62394 F20101221_AABFZR gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.pro
c6851646e95ad6ae27bd7b2674ff1bff
5eddbe5fe785917cb466d20dd397d33460121b60
1472 F20101221_AABGBR gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.txt
af6c36078757917dbfadf407971b848a
c5aeb441dcfdb02bc503591fedf9837aba7b2169
220981 F20101221_AABFUU gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.jp2
7bae553dd676e408e131cb40577e9de1
da038e6413de2912a8bcdf35edd0b2a6d386f798
34970 F20101221_AABGGP gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.QC.jpg
345521917a4a8f73bb5454cc490f723d
6244e1b2ec65cdb3129d0fef35f52a8b8c4e10f9
65240 F20101221_AABFZS gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.pro
609699585163e38643a7193973866154
efb06e9f639e5168264515357b705c519bf43d99
1595 F20101221_AABGBS gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.txt
00f85ca522bce0bcc1c30518c55b7470
f9f51120f3929707ad72ae268b4139f52312322a
1051980 F20101221_AABFUV gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.jp2
c3cc32f1d3130a5d981756d87700f51c
f27dbb551930a6913632ee937aca0934380aeb2d
8091 F20101221_AABGGQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_62thm.jpg
d6a066c80c406f6d63bfc05d82dc8e2b
57fdbcebb089aedac4c825e3f901f2657339c96f
53116 F20101221_AABFZT gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.pro
eac32cba4f55cbb19f87fbe68a2dee29
736ecd701480337f4dac6906fc2e3d4e4119bf98
2185 F20101221_AABGBT gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.txt
87d1826163fbb5949e19fe48e99e2aea
f6f8486cc78c7d0b1b2a85ee390d2187b9e0fc96
F20101221_AABFUW gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.jp2
8583c130f3e6a04320fdb5af5fa37c64
b2d7ff0e763fa8bb191c5864da82f699f346f089
9179 F20101221_AABGGR gonzalezalana_l_Page_54thm.jpg
5a4011ced7326d78d32fc49d3e255590
9dca0416746fe3af8e3f919cfc69f6904b063dc8
64498 F20101221_AABFZU gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.pro
639614c05c72b29d54384532ca16b73a
17bdb5033d1a3425ab8b3aab2262c5508c0a2dae
2204 F20101221_AABGBU gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.txt
8ce03f95889c8c1ae76bb36fd9555c7c
7e913fb8ed2624dba521bf961d142ca0ff74a742
1051965 F20101221_AABFUX gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.jp2
a6ec55d815d7ab878e4621d4d6a95fee
4e0462fd8d6308c974a919930e97829e5aa0cd6e
8679 F20101221_AABGGS gonzalezalana_l_Page_16thm.jpg
074b0c129032cbe14e22fc3dd5afbdab
a892adb22b9de0c083faeb3bcb684e71d7795b87
59775 F20101221_AABFZV gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.pro
c59ae6e51ad60849d4c73574373e5429
005c29e83d8bfe4c96aeeb1c13708ff1f65a92cb
2205 F20101221_AABGBV gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.txt
0347cea39450b3c08d845181dee4ab49
9dee94be9170738ee8f4f26c30e94093424980f9
1051912 F20101221_AABFUY gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.jp2
afaa199595e72fda6a9ffd906b16e1a2
8980cfb20e3b028a74355d469ad7cfb49a68f10e
34619 F20101221_AABGGT gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.QC.jpg
e0a6b4838cbf9029f86cb92844670613
b28ac7cc02c962bd5d977ac9c613781f35deaa02
59506 F20101221_AABFZW gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.pro
7fb3dc0079038867d483d454b9433643
4860737f9f576d2141554aca0dc1a4404f0f18b9
2200 F20101221_AABGBW gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.txt
4bb5f392a5880ffcbdfeb9bd6fce0247
c719141200f8aafc183e547082867a839c83527b
1051967 F20101221_AABFUZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.jp2
786cd4a79b9891c0eda8bdcb0c70ace6
5cfdbe3c78b3d8855a402b6f61216ee187c9d7eb
15159 F20101221_AABGGU gonzalezalana_l_Page_57.QC.jpg
4de07546361629907cd43a84715bd23c
46c7e9a29c914ecc066ea8a3e6dad1cb9d480e4d
55632 F20101221_AABFZX gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.pro
dbb96468240eeb9eea37423a28bf7574
e3df4a008ee118a332af20d29ca50ca2eefdd406
2251 F20101221_AABGBX gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.txt
fd0e2ce58a85fd90b567bfd95c499c0e
e6c3ba1e20e5ef34d895c09f925bd452c8f05046
24525 F20101221_AABFSB gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.jpg
3e6d3cd47a9094e6599079e903081570
ff121a98ddc0792b4e7fb5a19a8f85e65ec8c79b
37074 F20101221_AABGGV gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.QC.jpg
8db365611fd1c2dba8f7dfc8d246defb
89421bc82b0765f49788a567937db7012065721b
56542 F20101221_AABFZY gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.pro
175e2428c7c274ba2c92ebfa522e8aee
ad181ea96235f86717acfd1060fcb860cc5ea1e8
382 F20101221_AABGBY gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.txt
fc90f6b2710b4b1d3527772362613e21
aed2cae2e0a95c79bbbbc989a3742b1c91bc7489
4303 F20101221_AABFSC gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.jpg
9ea127bd7a657bd6271b777581253001
6346acbcee40a00f02110bfe1b8dc1d8fe3d5af6
34167 F20101221_AABGGW gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.QC.jpg
1cbd9b53c132407c9313870773ae023c
4f868015b4e8a864043a267a9c96c893b6197b38
F20101221_AABFXA gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.tif
d919000d286e659ca825ba717374fa56
70ee89ae9a8f2cdf95e60a93e49022d0eb26e76c
2123 F20101221_AABGBZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.txt
75e9d48d2e8ef6efea72c2cb03e0af6f
5355bb816f7f9c7422253a47ad49f8356459b65b
4019 F20101221_AABFSD gonzalezalana_l_Page_03.jpg
c513c138c19adcab33734cd493c532bd
18cfd1f15bab06fd5e4fb6388f5b08b87be510ae
F20101221_AABGGX gonzalezalana_l_Page_35thm.jpg
49819d66d598a3cf0e8078889b133f16
6e4f83f0fe796b08510ee258b5b89508f734c7a3
F20101221_AABFXB gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.tif
045b30d253532fc629aa333dd9127fa9
19662b9beb808cd0515ae49d3c119f8db4173114
65056 F20101221_AABFZZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.pro
943f2fee50ccf9fd9fea3f4ec124e4dd
1d2b70947e3e6980315ebd6c9814e32810699fcc
19308 F20101221_AABFSE gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.jpg
f4b3a51541a467ef21de28f3c0efa039
0fdb01daf0c899869a046a74101efa5e4a862f39
35155 F20101221_AABGEA gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.QC.jpg
eb471d25e8fc6fbec9136b36f8da9375
241b33cf2638d060756c2c1140efe91217191ca3
8704 F20101221_AABGGY gonzalezalana_l_Page_58thm.jpg
82c3e0603336ab032cca803a696edc37
1824a9f8cd9abeff6adbe1fe12e8bd2138f09469
F20101221_AABFXC gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.tif
99fe289f52f45d2c0e5cd357f7de5738
78485cea35828baa726491ca37637658c01009bc
81518 F20101221_AABFSF gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.jpg
501f148c1a8681d9c7659552bfcfdc62
e019e1f755588741faf71a0042bc24536da994f8
34310 F20101221_AABGGZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.QC.jpg
8f63ef33434333c34bbd22e07792613e
6cf95091ee9561bc08fe308fe1b682c0d501e9ac
5011 F20101221_AABGEB gonzalezalana_l_Page_33thm.jpg
bfe648e751b0dc40b674b7b8a2bb45ea
c7137e1c97ef8946d4250e8f21f259f1c5dc5f93
F20101221_AABFXD gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.tif
9db943e02435a10f864337aa77f5dede
499a60f4a274695f886da80e0feadec0141d73ff
77295 F20101221_AABFSG gonzalezalana_l_Page_07.jpg
c24497cb6672cd8e1406282b1bb6531d
732be4ceaca4e152184411552e96c3565d30a49f
23631 F20101221_AABGEC gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.QC.jpg
c790fa383e2aefb39d850630515a15c0
c81a5aab85e7101af6254ee841443cf0f48844b8
F20101221_AABFXE gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.tif
930770fbdece1c94bbbf277eb600caa4
4cf8a97137a54efe9e2821876e4bde0300a2e4ec
107787 F20101221_AABFSH gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.jpg
f98e128ce14e07cbc43ae5a3b797c7d5
07843f6584471dceac426d0acac56a1009f313dc
F20101221_AABFXF gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.tif
0f6b838a88ca4a513bffdab2b7dc34a9
5876ca254948ff18b81f9c1e9562471ef895e37a
110454 F20101221_AABFSI gonzalezalana_l_Page_09.jpg
76a35152cbf8d2677f6df8ca8453ce95
46afbe011b301338fb8dcf9d9de3eb2d83570253
36476 F20101221_AABGED gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.QC.jpg
a86074576bfa0a2f72e3348031b07458
34ad199f59dec803ce22b032ef06a30080712f0f
F20101221_AABFXG gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.tif
182658bd6fcc965e31530810cd040a2d
05c2427280253638d636522d84e5f967477f7405
112005 F20101221_AABFSJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_10.jpg
c33d68a6b5606fdda6f65417a4402f15
2154e120c5286e51840fa5eb27bca1ef67157cff
5073 F20101221_AABGEE gonzalezalana_l_Page_59thm.jpg
94c350b7d68abaf675971ad76aff6759
189390102b807e2c604d5e9f5deb488bbff6de60
F20101221_AABFXH gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.tif
33c42ff658cd677b88da1e99bdcb64c3
31864a197756015ad31742d092dd6998233f52d1
110934 F20101221_AABFSK gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.jpg
a3a65cd87d48306dbaeee87c9f31bca5
638aa98f5e2b4c909911ad3a72942d8c0b5d331f
8584 F20101221_AABGEF gonzalezalana_l_Page_49thm.jpg
737197fece6eca686c2cc16dc08d10fd
480c2d6690d7406749be60759508a3d79b2d0191
F20101221_AABFXI gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.tif
cf4f503f167624136937455c9a5e8262
647204705a4adf1c5666eeb3e1d9f34ad572cd3e
109839 F20101221_AABFSL gonzalezalana_l_Page_12.jpg
3187893a4c74e67ab0fe8ea044377121
44b3767937a3a2f93df6811d8dcbb4f331101fec
F20101221_AABFXJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.tif
84696d1b1e037c4f752dae671da5544d
253574728450a83b8ad0534b6361ec16e139ac50
22371 F20101221_AABFSM gonzalezalana_l_Page_13.jpg
728c50bde8936045925aed7c477e8e98
88bf1e643846a70448cce05c53d5b7173dc4ea24
6186 F20101221_AABGEG gonzalezalana_l_Page_07thm.jpg
5412e37a54863164dfdd53f23987215b
7c03b918e6c097ce5c0a4508ced85e88f5489175
F20101221_AABFXK gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.tif
6fa79cf4bb6c35e04ddd8dbad93dfe8a
89e8dba83eb893d6b295c68fda98d4d2822f572a
107630 F20101221_AABFSN gonzalezalana_l_Page_14.jpg
d797ae25004721c237086c56acdbde49
1a4d5984d84e6dac1f2ee496060ecff9cf6728c1
9149 F20101221_AABGEH gonzalezalana_l_Page_61thm.jpg
91d24eaa8af35698f2805cf56f0a2a44
94054e8010d6afd18b0ea30c586d1f89b6944e20
F20101221_AABFXL gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.tif
9f21ea229c9e8923c1fd5fdeec372871
26cc3ce83a72747a92626ffb152c97500b3430e9
106180 F20101221_AABFSO gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.jpg
7ee916fdc6aa814214f34ea194aac825
aed2a8fd19a7ebb7225a06164309854b89007188
1246 F20101221_AABGEI gonzalezalana_l_Page_02.QC.jpg
8eda97d2834988bc2180c979bd981908
b6c6cff25e43497eb514261a6de25dcc5fdb45ea
F20101221_AABFXM gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.tif
09cf7279f7589e83a8a38d9b20dccff7
f911456fc33f0e83054e15a44fca6a0af6cb4dcd
112819 F20101221_AABFSP gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.jpg
0912d95b92b527a0d46ed040a082de6b
a0f0958248c986460d6c7076a2913d0788be6210
7775 F20101221_AABGEJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.QC.jpg
2402c2bc919a75378c83f08351bcb69a
0da74f2c90916ce1b36c90df2527e6b62a9e52b1
F20101221_AABFXN gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.tif
a06c4b2b6f8a332c2ed55a677f264804
6834d5c895088f5c34b292e7599a61e7a87db061
113202 F20101221_AABFSQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.jpg
55c90a7f304c0c5120fdaf2c021ea8ce
ea07471f1e7f1634d48463b3bcc3eb3803c0b087
33224 F20101221_AABGEK gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.QC.jpg
3cee3e06306e5fb9b50f8c549d8f611e
30000ccf0d2835f466a6e8450f2ce65f98503294
F20101221_AABFXO gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.tif
cd5ab0cc7129055a02e4f9fe3e3b08aa
abdb523a7b4ca6cdd1dcbe2919c92c2885d799cd
104863 F20101221_AABFSR gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.jpg
bd6e467b5a3b290a6f0efb904928b72a
a33744f3a618d02ca7d4adbf93c9b7b2533fc5ff
8967 F20101221_AABGEL gonzalezalana_l_Page_37thm.jpg
fef3d793d614824ccbcf44efc95ec757
b28af2aa4b153cebbd5b998b24d4af860649e42e
F20101221_AABFXP gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.tif
1387c43b111bee735e278ee0bd42eedf
1e159bfe9b9550a4128b403054572e7e58b63821
5754 F20101221_AABGEM gonzalezalana_l_Page_05thm.jpg
5ac91a8f99d6d8eed90f36ec6f2bf999
fe71065ea889f15452583248fd76843225853c6b
F20101221_AABFXQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.tif
d97d32bfcdc42695b93d4fa24fd61106
866e180da1bab57d15ac8be9832a80482903ef75
117158 F20101221_AABFSS gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.jpg
f44dbbc2db52367167710fb284ed73ff
01aa71e2f790262b4cc3b57934170cbc131280c4
34685 F20101221_AABGEN gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.QC.jpg
602f2c4b4be68516a4c03c9ada710e87
3e494ebac203d49e3230b2bf51a24737f307cb51
F20101221_AABFXR gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.tif
7a75ed5871b013c3356c8679899ff02a
1b1d26885d6bd72e3b6d19d96f01cbf085330809
113577 F20101221_AABFST gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.jpg
a222759923cb6d2588590deacba18af2
e1723639d55234dc4243fdbb186b2cd5d43d7bee
8974 F20101221_AABGEO gonzalezalana_l_Page_51thm.jpg
f9d31c517868698789e4367aa02e7021
a731ad5edbe0e552f5275585c4ba347e48cf2dcf
F20101221_AABFXS gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.tif
78852590b81f7b931531cdd66026a3d9
bfe75ccf6fcf38bc5acb12c85084eebeab007a54
117130 F20101221_AABFSU gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.jpg
147caa17574e99f734420446f7569dc1
44c41abeac75ffb1429678667ec8f125c3f33be6
22763 F20101221_AABGEP gonzalezalana_l_Page_06.QC.jpg
a8a6e594e5b45483f8f39934e74ed00d
de018441c49d4ad73a3b5a945280f49dbb334f1f
F20101221_AABFXT gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.tif
b1a06b2ed3c785ed9d980799bfeafd55
a2315a5e88a2a9b4c1df60e12dfc8e5d4db2df78
110790 F20101221_AABFSV gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.jpg
2ac45de4c55e8e2f72fa5f433c51c943
3a87d3673f46e2b0a538f60a1cd08dca74a2ec30
35731 F20101221_AABGEQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.QC.jpg
ec98ca8bab83f5b33fd460b0bb04cddf
b99f5bd3163570449adf7326752e304a16713619
F20101221_AABFXU gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.tif
646c49142364488851999a5f194576d5
e6b9b7586f717f7f00664af08e150104ffbd344f
113052 F20101221_AABFSW gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.jpg
25445307e593ac0480940d7788b69e36
ef216f4e8ba3fb580349878b0cbc49c247c57077
27181 F20101221_AABGER gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.QC.jpg
ac10e685762214a1bf05ead40c2affa5
06c6d90d4fe6800be0675655a11385a6254b533d
25265604 F20101221_AABFXV gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.tif
8320f003adeac25c65fcb74ec5207b05
0de31844faa7c0b824f6103ff4e56065e91fb9fa
106922 F20101221_AABFSX gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.jpg
b99df965d088441418a61f530541f751
b1629de328b30cb11cc52f4bd6470b82492d1c51
549 F20101221_AABGES gonzalezalana_l_Page_02thm.jpg
35cd68f909539b197077ba2793c7ee65
76c01e720d9873c64d76769c819247e61fc1248b
F20101221_AABFXW gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.tif
ab0e76ec07b0ee1375141b0de687a2c1
143f59cdd605da84c663934c9f868ad63e40b8a3
101461 F20101221_AABFSY gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.jpg
0b9a07462490df5cafef575e6c0e0d54
111ae8a8ae34e42fa713407c7efe355910d67fd2
34815 F20101221_AABGET gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.QC.jpg
08a414db64c323f798f26647ab777102
fa71e7d4e65b5f53a271a4970e0e0836e8873656
20017 F20101221_AABFSZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.jpg
1d9569632d73a7cfdfcf9e047bb5bca3
c54693abe3c949fafa3bc95d0f2e302eb4a33930
8263 F20101221_AABGEU gonzalezalana_l_Page_26thm.jpg
660c3db2b78bdb1fcaf87085c48ffd81
b36aaaccb998209562a49cb048f1cc7a1291cb40
F20101221_AABFXX gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.tif
d4ec0c21e0c9902e58f96ce909dc8801
5f826b7fbf8e1c0c174b71d537efa77e85a47cae
22089 F20101221_AABGEV gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.QC.jpg
89b7ce3c0c6ebf72d1c7c6785ada5cd2
294c727ccca52057fbb1d49f27ed1957531cd92b
F20101221_AABFXY gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.tif
5a445c7f5619441ddab0ed911a4a60b4
046c47ee7823febae8274745ced4f934b1fb39d8
5789 F20101221_AABGEW gonzalezalana_l_Page_04.QC.jpg
09e9ff9bd48c7c990c4d4ad14c54c20b
c8f0a6e025ea7df5bd36f72fca55dc59d119c1df
F20101221_AABFVA gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.jp2
bbbd92753b0116a1268b3b008409b928
b560f50050eaa098afa92633fc73a8143de71980
F20101221_AABFXZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.tif
04e1118c13058b3be813975bce44e535
672f7395887b55e9f21c8ba497be4166c57fd3e8
35579 F20101221_AABGEX gonzalezalana_l_Page_58.QC.jpg
c452ff749ec32418f66aa9214994ee73
c0ad8ff41972c9526fdafed63b6b57de8a522465
1051941 F20101221_AABFVB gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.jp2
460c346b6f895c309337ff180b64b89b
219f255c1024e87419025b9246fe51169af93a2b
2096 F20101221_AABGCA gonzalezalana_l_Page_15.txt
2de3a018d3552cba5e45404f32f1d1ee
0418728785ad073e83f602e9bcc05bad4fff4d3c
5911 F20101221_AABGEY gonzalezalana_l_Page_44thm.jpg
cecd5506aac502a8ebc4618421cc8f5e
98a3219d0c5b54f365f7253701787d556e071cdb
1051925 F20101221_AABFVC gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.jp2
dcae40c8d64a7abf9b02ba8b1219b2df
b7f7c3ac51bd429de4e5a4f8ab555674433101b7
2408 F20101221_AABGEZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_56thm.jpg
e1caf969465d1dd74440adaf96497ebb
44b9c504fa53228107e58b81049a0768e652040d
1051931 F20101221_AABFVD gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.jp2
a74c466ee56d75390ad2818011aa71c6
e8ba8bd63da02d7c973fd6b8dfc8afc7d9243620
2430 F20101221_AABGCB gonzalezalana_l_Page_16.txt
c012144962f2be1f0d5ed6dbcc97f221
64e732626c9214241f20d5c7dfcce508f3d1b083
1051973 F20101221_AABFVE gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.jp2
42c94c9f87432660bcd52f868923fc3b
642291ea7a865588b73d4c949a4804a3f70c253f
35771 F20101221_AABGHA gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.QC.jpg
dfaf780926de6a784fccc5deba47a363
c91284f0967c2190dc674b1d992aa4e4f68456cb
2564 F20101221_AABGCC gonzalezalana_l_Page_17.txt
4de07b692356393311eae9b31fe3a420
b0dd67d187a0c187976296995eb23999f8fc2940
1051971 F20101221_AABFVF gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.jp2
4c2fb7c3ca5c8f632d1901262fedf45f
742f8314999e7bdf61ae48ca9992d485b00088e4
8345 F20101221_AABGHB gonzalezalana_l_Page_55thm.jpg
551a1566ad027337d44159f6fc62861e
89056b177a0d2b29a921611b4e6e76238de6186a
2098 F20101221_AABGCD gonzalezalana_l_Page_18.txt
af62b26301f6b3c148edbceb98590adb
09a5cdc096e87eba51c6ebab5e3e31fe24013bbc
F20101221_AABFVG gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.jp2
564de8de3bbd8baff55f28c49ef4999e
aade87b1ad00c112bc2037a41eae18ad77b36cdf
99672 F20101221_AABGHC UFE0022114_00001.xml
87e4fec77d332b64a9148405ca4283f7
1aa23a9e5c8bc68e2df013707e72a902a99a427e
2496 F20101221_AABGCE gonzalezalana_l_Page_19.txt
311e3ba3a0065f70d9b540dd96ffb624
0e0516319423f52ac1d7f9301a3bbbf61ee3e08c
1051894 F20101221_AABFVH gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.jp2
bfd521739383c5d8f79e0cc3eafc2645
8d426579c5e9dae5fa7eaa0d00152ac13bb36fa5
8241 F20101221_AABGHD gonzalezalana_l_Page_01.QC.jpg
c14425c9cccfb62b996a7f13df612139
6907a85c517ce080203bef4b687f6868790d875d
2347 F20101221_AABGCF gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.txt
b2ed3bee06de0ed3eb3709554feefb16
f38c25aee289991ae7d9d8e71b44227e7191779c
194878 F20101221_AABFVI gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.jp2
219212de933e2905d931b29656e085e8
c1d0d125808e6ff894dd41d739064cd789e19d58
6075 F20101221_AABGHE gonzalezalana_l_Page_06thm.jpg
ed375b53424cfff80474b6fc6982f13c
729912cbfe33ee9b7c3f6ff8ea880dff2c8c9f84
2330 F20101221_AABGCG gonzalezalana_l_Page_21.txt
f1d7a658b275f01413c4b23e8bee0d54
893b5e0893b457a8d63025133f8ccbecd2614d34
871732 F20101221_AABFVJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.jp2
0062961b0e5dad2e45b62383b62ce67a
5a6527136317269d503a67860aae24846e25cb0f
33111 F20101221_AABGHF gonzalezalana_l_Page_08.QC.jpg
347a25db6298f17d9de0927dd4401fd3
29b0752d7d721c8c1bfee9efa2f8f6189705038f
F20101221_AABGCH gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.txt
a25f3bf327d5fa2be43d8e49147de544
410713d4ec2053108958c55e3b2c51189807208a
835572 F20101221_AABFVK gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.jp2
f2764f7f8fba49c29449d60d1a7a4967
1a69181225a2cca678bac7613d2783e22793ec99
2226 F20101221_AABGCI gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.txt
b414b4328aaa46a4f7eef80b368989cd
70a1a0f0d4a46da23e0d2df84e1ec3310087c2e1
F20101221_AABFVL gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.jp2
74a5f17fd22db9e4d2ff97543ca88436
e3fc6685e28ab6cf2c25ab77ef1402120552bbff
8196 F20101221_AABGHG gonzalezalana_l_Page_08thm.jpg
0e128c37d6a77d9e362e4210f4531660
6594ffab35c33ec43b17049fad4f95d95ba9f182
2519 F20101221_AABGCJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.txt
5fee8792b9726284bdb220def12b8581
dd8b2d1168694777027c3264e2144e63eee84c30
1051985 F20101221_AABFVM gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.jp2
2a8339b8b09e4982afc6cde4609ed805
363b7ee32d822e47b78c9a4a9de7e388e810a36f
8993 F20101221_AABGHH gonzalezalana_l_Page_10thm.jpg
5d8bea49077d34e7f4909ab4811e29a1
af73a5f85a16a6894bffab45bceaeb87665568bc
2115 F20101221_AABGCK gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.txt
73034d1dc18526b4969970f168a91fdb
dfeb09d4c14ce5e25eb423b7ac37fc98cd73cedb
F20101221_AABFVN gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.jp2
3edc2c3772170c6dc0ae4dffbd58d258
666e01839cf6ea1b0b75d30de8a711c010eb043c
35831 F20101221_AABGHI gonzalezalana_l_Page_11.QC.jpg
88efd15c69c087abf5a4838990b8e90d
70eff0e4f3aabdb3b800764309723ab1b96b195e
349 F20101221_AABGCL gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.txt
34717265d026be12bef2400a2dfd6c26
503e830e11b18823430e4844086cc7b0d74e53b6
F20101221_AABFVO gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.jp2
7f1a97784ecdf9b3c65cdcec99814828
e75161886a7cc6a88243d8a7b665f9a97ef1bb0b
8970 F20101221_AABGHJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_11thm.jpg
dbf300d71055fbfa35ad1d81e2844c35
1ecff9158e2402e6148e98b28e3512d9a2f096e4
1565 F20101221_AABGCM gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.txt
abe78caded3a8064d18b7dbbc413671f
c420bfadc3eb4e40f3104d59b266afcb2658f374
1051977 F20101221_AABFVP gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.jp2
0898ba2695094198954a31f910cd17ad
b9df8ad8f26a3422908d3baf1b176874852b33d2
2070 F20101221_AABGHK gonzalezalana_l_Page_13thm.jpg
b182f7d8565fae34638b46b0faf7eeeb
ab0c627d07e2972ba4c6a91a184635c296d2589c
1598 F20101221_AABGCN gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.txt
275c83faf36efc0e061b057df06d4bed
8138a7d997936ccaa7bc25aeb7421b70af33408a
1051981 F20101221_AABFVQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.jp2
203e09f13fcb4d72485c9f451e715e0e
93bdf0b569e1daedfb3676d98aa502a18640bd2d
8450 F20101221_AABGHL gonzalezalana_l_Page_15thm.jpg
4b305989fda46bd4307344e752dda704
a8759f221e8ad81a90a7ab06c575bd8682bbd598
2030 F20101221_AABGCO gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.txt
b78f5cf7b399118ed98ca7aaf4abed0b
926cf17ef3bc619024bede32f6a3a3c07e8598a7
F20101221_AABFVR gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.jp2
32ffa57b4f75d13ddc6e6c00a688af5d
f544c3d784b9812b381186b68289572683cd02da
8691 F20101221_AABGHM gonzalezalana_l_Page_17thm.jpg
89cba599f24d475294ee31faae64fe8e
0b4002fb0f6ea8f3de6291fb4935f03266afc0da
2031 F20101221_AABGCP gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.txt
1a1149bb1210ca88d744b6df306609ba
97593244e325828e0e63fab9cdb8c15739d40405
1051939 F20101221_AABFVS gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.jp2
7b1628203c26ecc9c9dfc368bb58c25c
753af3294944c809a9b1290d15444dc9fdfad4c1
8564 F20101221_AABGHN gonzalezalana_l_Page_19thm.jpg
ce781206f1566e3b9f1eb1f58c026540
ec81b52e5f70342dae340cde505f3a8fb870ed51
2715 F20101221_AABGCQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.txt
0a0b84a1d81c9c37e7c4e7a8d984999b
60169f9d5c5cecb875316aa098b71683cf8dd4f1
1051905 F20101221_AABFVT gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.jp2
c62f4efb8786d9400fe74a9c0679f919
eff24edb9437a45b0d562cbbce15efab560844ef
9048 F20101221_AABGHO gonzalezalana_l_Page_20thm.jpg
43dd4968fadf4c67a1886f5373a017bd
49698b0e7269c0eb35f75d16a0e13a1ed529b80b
2012 F20101221_AABGCR gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.txt
9cbbedc9478d16c6b93269583400d73b
a3d275b5b2f8d6fd3a526f4d0a988e9bc8d6b3af
1051976 F20101221_AABFVU gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.jp2
5d9ae44ab764e8c9bd67c055f9bd0760
7388c88b76b4b4b5bc882c018e3731ab5804334b
36420 F20101221_AABGHP gonzalezalana_l_Page_22.QC.jpg
73f58fe934de4d24f066d904088b33ac
6ad5804c12cd3ee8abf57f1dc08b4ecd191e7359
2085 F20101221_AABGCS gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.txt
f03ca8698c281cb2a42dd3baa64aa27f
de506c9669b833b327cfe0034570f42ff4b458ee
9050 F20101221_AABGHQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_22thm.jpg
7fabfec7ed2267d200d918746aba6cb6
995e225dff85f2c7b757abbcec7ca26b2c6fd3de
2252 F20101221_AABGCT gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.txt
bc61e2c593b03c213ee8d90681951379
190fa3aa33a1695089fe5e0fb3e0402e66d4b837
F20101221_AABFVV gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.jp2
6c6e06ff615b6e803852908f1305193a
bc1d4d1bd4a8bc10e282183d54821b45b271932e
37938 F20101221_AABGHR gonzalezalana_l_Page_23.QC.jpg
de91198db4f5d8eb8b215ddaa7428089
cee139851dea307c186f7f9428612538e526e6e2
2147 F20101221_AABGCU gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.txt
dcc344bbd849f7d4dfa4f9eb6944e671
1e65def4e04426447115a4f3f5f8703e1e751132
165219 F20101221_AABFVW gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.jp2
2c439ac6c6e88d695739eda575dbb145
b67fc38028633e69137dca0796ac8e2bd6739a92
9140 F20101221_AABGHS gonzalezalana_l_Page_23thm.jpg
84a703d70a2457dad8a2b111ff683b98
a77b4dc1f514b954f46cb1b6814a7880886645e2
2181 F20101221_AABGCV gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.txt
ef45ffd786969926cc42742d0e79f239
1b9ecb976a04945e4f9d73d58719513ccf11be48
F20101221_AABFVX gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.jp2
a581f56d550b58f9f01445d4be522771
3382cb8570c95dee3064493f0e5d8be48243a034
36629 F20101221_AABGHT gonzalezalana_l_Page_24.QC.jpg
848a4207100b00da3202ec8cdb3bf949
b47c043077cc45c48c499466e39a2554ae5ffc21
2282 F20101221_AABGCW gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.txt
e31514ba64926ba49dd826be2f03755b
0cb35d8327bb3d8928aa2933859d3330d1769723
81152 F20101221_AABFTA gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.jpg
e199cf98d04f1191f4a40e0a33f1c91d
28cdcb27b7202ca82c1ae3767971d71afe7ebe33
458684 F20101221_AABFVY gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.jp2
c0413a35ac899b69f02461b5d12cb1b7
eeb57526171ef4946377b9370f35e226c9af16eb
34828 F20101221_AABGHU gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.QC.jpg
6592ab381633505850f8523c11a9fbaa
b915c09fd68ff0fbb2efb885591afdf898f6e7bc
2145 F20101221_AABGCX gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.txt
eb01173751a8d6cf6a020a397b0050d8
87792cd2dcaea701c1e5dc60e47ceaf6bf358ad8
79152 F20101221_AABFTB gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.jpg
1e475c6b380cf02c25ec088bace04b06
fe41cf47d6b81a9d3fab1cbb38780e01cc4c5637
835062 F20101221_AABFVZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.jp2
497f266c86c08a3841d17d320aa5e7be
77d047f8a4b6e26ef21b74adc428f6662cc51ba5
6974 F20101221_AABGHV gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.QC.jpg
cb1260e477286a050275b051960bbafc
3cbe9efe3ef0e015088260b8f43b6c3a9ef4a1e1
2128 F20101221_AABGCY gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.txt
13f41cc49f82d2fb6c6470259a2ac128
c824ef97dd4e6da628c5e153eb287e6a40c19dbb
65866 F20101221_AABFTC gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.jpg
c52c80e80c93d0796246e8cf48c8a9ca
53ca707d884cca584a822c11b8abd1caefbd1b37
1908 F20101221_AABGHW gonzalezalana_l_Page_27thm.jpg
1f199753e7feede3fc386bbd981316d6
bc5a24ac001d09c815b08872e4042633acc68bfd
286 F20101221_AABGCZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.txt
a380ffaf80ce86e4451f69be5396e7b8
f52470d44091d0db807c1b9bd69fafa80f64007a
60130 F20101221_AABFTD gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.jpg
fd5c39122eb2092c7bb4cf0c65525d6c
e99ef188f0b727f4570079c8b497b4dfed39d5fd
F20101221_AABFYA gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.tif
281304c481bd99a81a343e429d159ff7
daff4f0086c7c76f4a13d448635805fc66a0319b
53744 F20101221_AABGAA gonzalezalana_l_Page_25.pro
41776f3aaebae970ec698513b8cd8a04
644dc6fb36957bddb635f1694954f5d767d290d9
21679 F20101221_AABGHX gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.QC.jpg
77205d18a86f066559187211d3a9ff3d
6595fa115ec4dd366908d9febc2e930792a3a124
83775 F20101221_AABFTE gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.jpg
e70a5f3c3115fb2cd2f5e8320bbc8710
b77a008242c11036137bc883d2b091e552d600fb
F20101221_AABFYB gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.tif
eef4c05d1c07f2d824c98e0e59f02bc1
94936f6584f3bce5f383163b716ed9c9a8cb633c
53384 F20101221_AABGAB gonzalezalana_l_Page_26.pro
13c20600b3e98a652a578398b019eef4
ecd1ae9f7dcff8b78722ecaf46f95c7ba1dcb70d
5326 F20101221_AABGHY gonzalezalana_l_Page_29thm.jpg
7a3561c1e59c00be6b4c8da6421869fb
4dacf6f4b754da0afb24d058c0e875db5555b86b
69543 F20101221_AABFTF gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.jpg
0a05972883d3f6087a17c34ce56a73ac
8d33005599c6a67b0fae9128f2e069abb01f3b47
32037 F20101221_AABGFA gonzalezalana_l_Page_62.QC.jpg
2c3a254b59852f36dc0223fd9e59c0de
ed41d59158309de042ee1b269ca4c5fcd252a63a
F20101221_AABFYC gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.tif
08f431a283bd19d03a6a4157d05e2a25
030768e710fd8f3e72c5245e744a1c77f97d94e3
8525 F20101221_AABGAC gonzalezalana_l_Page_27.pro
7d67c1b68b10773862fda74dc480d539
07c9ecca2a82d8923d698cf8868fedd513fd4969
5264 F20101221_AABGHZ gonzalezalana_l_Page_32thm.jpg
06998cc70b105ce41d4b41c90be77e3b
7030f654eea7e825fb4f7d11280c5b8962c4e814
105425 F20101221_AABFTG gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.jpg
7cd97f70cc689ae0a64abbeb20f3283d
6a7e1a0dd51564c9787c505939717008011e43ab
1689 F20101221_AABGFB gonzalezalana_l_Page_04thm.jpg
860a2e0a21fc612614e78695f731d913
3110a75769db51ff53cb13c045e70c59b8f05079
F20101221_AABFYD gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.tif
1813dfdda26718c65f65f0460c5beb03
1331397b544f7fa4f459dd3f2a562137b4290362
37384 F20101221_AABGAD gonzalezalana_l_Page_28.pro
4bc2a8057b4d56de7ab70c416dc479f2
7b6ccd118b290077e7387272944955df2d8186d5
112823 F20101221_AABFTH gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.jpg
b5f07598574a0fadc33a602473860897
1c76d56a2ee3ff6fcc4caecf5f1a1110d6a86b69
35817 F20101221_AABGFC gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.QC.jpg
eea8bc2a51be18a7b1e7966933fcfd60
200fd44e65e5b22962435fd710b71e2e0306ebdf
F20101221_AABFYE gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.tif
d85604289d7f8a47a48accaa2eb4f471
da3e99153987a19a944d38787d11327564241803
36482 F20101221_AABGAE gonzalezalana_l_Page_29.pro
e307750fc61f6c7a44b1bd259d360fb1
4d3aace7c4ac0b4fbc8dcbf899cb1cd784f40bb4
106586 F20101221_AABFTI gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.jpg
0282c5e8cacd99080a5bc7860b709acd
3e4315d2e8f8164b307f413be4679597bf1c5f97
6397 F20101221_AABGFD gonzalezalana_l_Page_48thm.jpg
3746d1defe59908acb7ccceb965004c1
91985a5e7f6ad569180ecd59d15f5370bbc037a5
F20101221_AABFYF gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.tif
21851cbd470e4802d64c8b6b136e88e1
2d344cdbad02c9dfefef43589a93a74cd9e5f5aa
49959 F20101221_AABGAF gonzalezalana_l_Page_30.pro
174c9c023c8898a5e7fccf84cc98f7e3
e8227aa6739e2b5effc05e9f48acc4df56a2ae62
111052 F20101221_AABFTJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.jpg
981004d5661e96cf1d8b0b9373e01e92
17d036ac0e75b3eeb61f53266378ed2c9ca12458
F20101221_AABFYG gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.tif
cb16deb02326bf8fc15a53ac017f1109
2b75fdd94000a899811b228f2fe52e61a7f4b8ed
53052 F20101221_AABGAG gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.pro
4167a928c131fe5e4f064ab5fc67e310
816fbd64a44a7bb2fb3a77eeadcb9225781b588e
114164 F20101221_AABFTK gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.jpg
cd37f3fa927cf2f57a812eef554152d6
21910d77087e3935ab740ef0be54db53070d6d6a
8781 F20101221_AABGFE gonzalezalana_l_Page_09thm.jpg
38c64a745864d58b45a67db52317116d
c66241c249f96518a1495c9470e45430d0606a80
F20101221_AABFYH gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.tif
00542ce389fbb8e0383f1d676c4bb2c5
4cba398f09d4742c65d6f25cfb872b4ae5034c47
65942 F20101221_AABGAH gonzalezalana_l_Page_32.pro
0e8318f891ae59f7934869a9c5f765bd
0ea93e0198f9288ec08e0abc96a1b4eae0cc2432
27472 F20101221_AABGFF gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.QC.jpg
94d2319048da44f39bd6a226cc176203
f861c96fd0bb21f99ab829720bb35b77f80fe3d6
F20101221_AABFYI gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.tif
0a7c0adb046b24c26bac9bb848cdcf78
659a5d60e6c2e96ea11acef55f2473d703f2265b
51069 F20101221_AABGAI gonzalezalana_l_Page_33.pro
469ca0f19df478f55c4b4d7a37431772
b92b802404ae690906a8ac99297eab6c76cdef19
108632 F20101221_AABFTL gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.jpg
b4753efcb675985a29015ed51fcd7424
1adef3f8a3fd7738677a63521497877bb93bca3b
F20101221_AABGFG gonzalezalana_l_Page_21thm.jpg
66ee061031ca7fd13621603353314951
066c71bd01dd77267c5a1d39485b2fe10cd55828
F20101221_AABFYJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.tif
2f861b2146aaa52b2b2e1a9ebe02b613
a84d21438c54fc311fb2d34a5e28ff72f595b409
50317 F20101221_AABGAJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_34.pro
130fd1b653b28498387f729fb34d02f7
3a21db4f1964b6115807143f38475841e2d75d98
106117 F20101221_AABFTM gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.jpg
07437652895db564091cc747d682e1f9
301670565ded30f3a43d06f867c1451ce22459b7
4017 F20101221_AABGFH gonzalezalana_l_Page_57thm.jpg
5abce14ac922a8bac0a603856bb82098
3b9c55cc4622927c96c8d463531526ce735ba68f
F20101221_AABFYK gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.tif
ab71686c63f6b61bdf352caffe681a1e
26682ef37c5957dd91b9927846d213d5219d1fe3
57228 F20101221_AABGAK gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.pro
5c6030ef7ea52df5fa6c1a89e791d690
877c30d0d4f4e6b425c6daa9a918845e242e2538
16907 F20101221_AABFTN gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.jpg
c0cad78e81a8e41c77b3a1f0dbcd5b50
6958a0745d6d3e2d6209379bfec530fcdef6d885
36285 F20101221_AABGFI gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.QC.jpg
fae563a44f611c326d4ab0285ea92f50
2e50a1709db2d65074585d0de418fc5b76da5ac1
F20101221_AABFYL gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.tif
78542572f58a95aecb59c21b15e5b3f5
2a0aedd33870998f20efd27a7b2e3a571f969a5e
54614 F20101221_AABGAL gonzalezalana_l_Page_36.pro
cba7c25b765a542f93b55ec2ed8e52ad
058d6a9c2696f96cfca096bbb34327c36f1c4535
101441 F20101221_AABFTO gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.jpg
b5c090ac18f758e67fafe1338ad2330b
113eaed0a04e118e30b09f034b0947987f6f1cba
8518 F20101221_AABGFJ gonzalezalana_l_Page_18thm.jpg
e85f600614f4b35b7d1e85d615c58ddc
4dc102c36093fd99140c4bd2ceed421106e4653c
F20101221_AABFYM gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.tif
d5bfbb2fa8a41e23577770cd697e69ef
d177c30d0986e3a67150e3f88cc83bfca704c145
55386 F20101221_AABGAM gonzalezalana_l_Page_37.pro
ffaccfd0b6cfbd85b44e1d266b3eaa16
8203677389cc8acbd8050c9d3453b42fd5de06df
42432 F20101221_AABFTP gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.jpg
67b6b545b6a04d60a6b424cf94c5dfc2
5bab3753930970b585df6728539cdcdb2976ec47
5200 F20101221_AABGFK gonzalezalana_l_Page_30thm.jpg
4b74ba9bfcf629e8334da40285562965
0ca699c4836d73cde54b89e109cd85d03e6d3aae
F20101221_AABFYN gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.tif
bc02802b8501651fb788030212d4c54b
064d2ba8cd26c390bf4e60846b76ac5a7f5d08cd
57531 F20101221_AABGAN gonzalezalana_l_Page_38.pro
37b6e53fffe6ee9c340a08e8dec5822a
1c311745620e88cdbb3689371a6aebbf8dbcb5be
107164 F20101221_AABFTQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_45.jpg
4cc3579d74e97019f881df96419a7487
253e380774e006cac7d44f6177bcc4b9bf202ec1
34463 F20101221_AABGFL gonzalezalana_l_Page_61.QC.jpg
67407970300743cf486ee71efcb9e672
15624de83569ba32ad3d779c0f257ced08235623
F20101221_AABFYO gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.tif
9fce6a99fc6923edde56808dca5945b3
f4913b6e09220789eab56f008d039b6a3487d1d0
54595 F20101221_AABGAO gonzalezalana_l_Page_39.pro
1f2741bda07d210fcb97f4bbe7c5776b
a6ba1a3bbc7cc27115d7e5e183c94d4beebd2314
108720 F20101221_AABFTR gonzalezalana_l_Page_46.jpg
f0033a6ed88f21108381e43e272f196e
dc16ce63297e7bfb858926322d8b81aea7b42cb7
8609 F20101221_AABGFM gonzalezalana_l_Page_50thm.jpg
96ba3f61358a4d74e01bf3e665465b96
560403d6ed70cc91cd48200a1f32afae2db0b92c
F20101221_AABFYP gonzalezalana_l_Page_51.tif
ae5f7b0a71379754b97f2989d7b5d32d
498e72754a38c1d0705853443a0b37ee4ce651ae
53978 F20101221_AABGAP gonzalezalana_l_Page_40.pro
c8c6e4c5c6dade8c90d7dc24ef94ffbd
73b0b385241e763bb73b50a751ce5308025eaaf1
97391 F20101221_AABFTS gonzalezalana_l_Page_47.jpg
e607fa076fc10ee4fecd02e349c96f0a
fae490554e835b779400a445538f57a609013ada
14343 F20101221_AABGFN gonzalezalana_l_Page_31.QC.jpg
f17a81b4c84f5064e7069d5a17a37080
c75aebd834c2a9e857ba4e07ce25bfb5a3edbccd
F20101221_AABFYQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_52.tif
6b31121a7a9742602f919d76b55f0dc3
86c45ba962fd55b1791bf3e7ce1e2a32ec60d2c7
7106 F20101221_AABGAQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_41.pro
5e55eb82103e93d698788b7672cebd0c
c82b1b5b8f29fecd5e896f86c17364e07186b28a
36580 F20101221_AABGFO gonzalezalana_l_Page_20.QC.jpg
5fc48d47ab66a6c2041632efd419e67c
2483742f4f4a1e8f0fd9757fcc1dc59bfb2b051d
F20101221_AABFYR gonzalezalana_l_Page_53.tif
7875c94a350f4bbcf463999be507ce1b
63da2f6f4e673daa2e4a18a3d33464a7eeb13800
52447 F20101221_AABGAR gonzalezalana_l_Page_42.pro
c314379e95382b254357f9dcfaf4fddd
a1664cda90d9645ce23b91442a1cece3cfb51bac
97448 F20101221_AABFTT gonzalezalana_l_Page_48.jpg
5e530447a65afc3d2ce36cdfbd62ebe4
45b36a4ba9f1063da0437c42af0cbfcf6bb470ab
8854 F20101221_AABGFP gonzalezalana_l_Page_14thm.jpg
92b6187b8775109d5c21e401550b1d62
a0ae58a80c755c927609564bde606745e08b07d9
F20101221_AABFYS gonzalezalana_l_Page_54.tif
9fe70d4ad9bc9987408fdde0b30a3485
d9681cc72e3f7eac9cd2dbcf0761b0f0bbb3b585
20305 F20101221_AABGAS gonzalezalana_l_Page_43.pro
06d8ec553c83550636ab9a8879f5d038
ae87d57f2947b747fe0fe9de183705ceb717a8fd
117951 F20101221_AABFTU gonzalezalana_l_Page_49.jpg
eefd291964a321093342a64ad56c76e2
dd3d820c1eb2cbe9f52479960f528f6e48c815a8
35368 F20101221_AABGFQ gonzalezalana_l_Page_35.QC.jpg
e6a2a844183529205c87d9d292bc8b3d
e47834906dc411ce5ce741d2c85c5106eb7c47b1
F20101221_AABFYT gonzalezalana_l_Page_55.tif
48e156500847fc75435d89b7d016ef01
26c7f2c2b1aec68497bcfc5405e2680ba9ce9d4e
37226 F20101221_AABGAT gonzalezalana_l_Page_44.pro
655f40879c81d226ef9d3b140ef2200b
82dd31a6a2020f4b2c8c79457bd4e66a5763828a
112221 F20101221_AABFTV gonzalezalana_l_Page_50.jpg
c61788f0a8cdbc8ed8ba87e088e7263f
6345e0ac560fe3f51280e2ecf65570e47c5f50e3







DOGS THAT BARK: WHY ARE BANK LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS NEWSWORTHY?


By


LAURA GONZALEZ ALANA














A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2008






































O 2008 Laura Gonzalez Alana




































To my parents and Gauray









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank Christopher James, my dissertation chair, as well as Joel

Houston, Mahendraraj ah Nimalendran, Andy Naranj o, and Ronal Ward for all their guidance,

encouragement, and advice in making sure I successfully completed this work.











TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............. ...............4.....


LIST OF TABLES .........__.. ..... .__ ...............6....

AB S TRAC T ..... ._ ................. ............_........7


CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ................. ...............8.......... ......


2 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS ................ ................. 14


Sample Selection and Data ................. ...............14................
Sum m ary Statistics ................ .. .... ............. ... ...............1
Summary Statistics of Market Reaction to Loan News and Loan Activation ................... .....23

3 DETERMINANTS OF LOAN, PUBLIC DEBT, AND NON-BANK PRIVATE DEBT
ANNOUNCE MENT S .............. ...............3 4....


Determinants of Bank Loan Announcements ............................. ............... 34.....
Determinants of Public Debt and Non-B ank Private Debt ........................... ...............3 8


4 STOCK PRICE REACTION TO LOAN NEWS. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS .............45

5 DETERMINANTS OF INCREMENTAL FINANCING OPTIONS............... ................4


6 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BANK BORROWERS ................. ......................55

7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................ ...............58................


LIST OF REFERENCES ................. ...............60........... ....

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............. ..............63.....










LIST OF TABLES


Table page

2-1 Annual Distribution of Loans by Year of Deal Activation ................. .......................28

2-2 Loan Deal Purpose ................. ...............29................

2-3 Firm and Loan Summary Statistics for Reported and Unreported Loans..........................30

2-4 Firm and Deal Summary Statistics for Reported and Unreported Public Debt and
Non-Bank Private Debt ................. ...............32........... ....

2-5 Market Reaction Summary Statistics ................. ...............33...............

3-1 Determinants of the Likelihood and Timing of Bank Loan Reporting in the Press ..........42

3-2 Marginal Effects of the Lowest and Highest Quartile Determinants on Loan
Rep orti ng ................. ...............43........... ....

3-3 Determinants of the Likelihood of Public and Non-Bank Private Debt Reporting ...........44

4-1 Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Loan Reports and Activation.....47

4-2 Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Public Debt and Non-Bank
Private Debt Reports and Activation .............. ...............48....

5-1 Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Incremental Financing Decisions ..........................53

6-1 Median Peer-Adjusted Measures of Subsequent Operating Performance ................... ......57









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DOGS THAT BARK: WHY ARE BANK LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS NEWSWORTHY?

By

Laura Gonzalez Alana

August 2008

Chair: Christopher James
Major: Business Administration

Virtually all publicly traded firms borrow from banks. However, despite their widespread

use, the reporting of bank loan agreements in the financial press is associated with a positive

share price reaction. In order to address this phenomenon, I empirically examine the frequency

and determinants of bank loan reporting, and find that the credit risk and asymmetric information

proxies behind incremental financing decisions determine loan reporting. In addition, loan

restructurings following covenant violations, and larger loans -relative to firm size- are also more

likely to be reported in the press. Moreover, and although all loans are disclosed, I find that the

market reacts to reported loans only when the news precedes loan activation. Overall, the

evidence suggests that reported loans are more noteworthy because they are more informative

about the potential of the borrower than non-reported loans, and that the information content of

the average reported bank loan decreases during the 1996 through 2004 period.









CHAPTER 1
INTTRODUCTION

In a recent study, Sufl (2007) documents that 94% of publicly traded firms have bank

lending relationships. In light of this fact, the reporting in the financial press of bank loan

agreements should be a routine, predictable event. Nevertheless, a number of previous studies

document a positive and statistically significant return associated to press articles on loan

agreements. This evidence suggests that market participants view press-reported bank loans as

material events (Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989),

Best and Zhang (1993), James and Smith (2000)). Furthermore, the positive share price reaction

to bank loan announcements (in contrast to the negative stock price reaction to most other

financing events) has been widely interpreted as evidence that banks play a unique or special role

in the capital acquisition process (Fama (1985) and Raj an (1992)). However, if all firms have

banking relationships, and if most bank loans are not reported in the press, then the share price

reaction may have more to do with the circumstances in which loan agreements are reported than

with the uniqueness of bank borrowing as a financing source (Smith (1986), and James and

Smith (2000)).

To further explore these issues, I begin by examining the frequency and determinants of

bank loan reporting in Dow Jones during the 1996 through 2004 time period. It is important to

note that the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) Deal Scan loans from which the sample is drawn -

are disclosed in some way, and consist of both press-reported and non-reported loan agreements.

More specifically, DealScan cites as sources of loan information Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) 8-K filings other public SEC filings, and industry sources. In addition,



1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require public firms to report any "material" event
through a Form 8-K. This form is described in more detail in Section III.a. of this paper.










DealScan offers affordable real-time web access to agreed-upon but not-yet-active loans2. Hence,

the loans reported in Dow Jones that the financial press views as noteworthy are a subset of a

pool of disclosed loans.

This distinction between "reported" and "disclosed" loans is subtle but nevertheless

important. If there is disclosure about the deals but, as I find, no significant market reaction

surrounding the activation of non-reported bank loans, and one assumes reported loans to be

significant, it can be argued that the market views reported loans differently than non-reported

loans.

SEC regulation requires firms to disclose any "material" event that can affect the stock

price and shareholders should know about. Furthermore, the literature on discretionary disclosure

describes how firms are more forthcoming when the news is good (Miller (2002)). Thus, given

that banks are considered superior screeners (Diamond (1991) and Fama (1985)) and effective

monitors (Nini et al. (2008)), and bank financing a credible signal of firm quality (Schenone

(2004), and James and Wier (1990)), one would expect firms to try to disclose all bank loans.

Accordingly, I find that the source of loan news is usually the borrower. On the other hand, the

source of news for non-bank private debt issues is usually "market participants."

Why would firms not report all of their bank loans? Bagnoli and Watts (2007) find that

firms are more likely to disclose higher values of private information when financial reports do

not contain sufficient good news and performance is significantly different than expected. In a

related study, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) document that firms are less likely to withhold

information in material contract filings when they issue long-term debt. Moreover, prior work

shows that riskier more opaque firms are more likely to choose reported bank debt over public


2 The subscription cost to the DealScan database and real-time website is $2,000 per month for corporations with
one user ($330/month is more than one user) and $7,304 per year for academic institutions.









debt (see, for, example, Hadlock and James (2002)). Thus, in light of these findings, one might

argue that loans obtained by borrowers with relatively more costly access to financing higher

information asymmetries and credit risk could be deemed more surprising and, therefore, be

more newsworthy and likely to get reported. This is exactly what I find.

I find that only 22% of syndicated Deal Scan loans obtained by public firms are reported

in the financial press, and that the borrowers whose loans are reported in the press are not

representative of the entire sample of bank borrowers. Reported borrowers are more highly

leveraged, present lower earnings, and higher surprise and dispersion of earnings forecasts.

Press-reported loans are also different from non-reported loans. More specifically, I find that

reported loans are larger, have longer maturities, higher covenant intensity indexes, and

constitute more often loan restructurings following covenant violations. Consistent with these

findings, I also find that information asymmetries, credit risk, loan size and maturity, and

whether or not the loan is a restructured loan determine the likelihood of loan reporting.

Thus, the distinction between reported and non-reported loans provides new insight into

the "specialness" of bank lending by documenting significant heterogeneity in the information

content of loans depending on whether the loan is reported or not. The firm and loan

characteristics that determine reporting require more lender access to private information about

the potential of the firm, a task at which banks have a comparative advantage with respect to

other lenders (Fama (1985) and Rajan (1992)). Thus, the reporting of a loan suggests the

presence of positive private information, although I find a time trend in reporting that leads to a

decrease in the information content of reported loans throughout the 1996 to 2004 period.

The higher likelihood of reporting among restructured loans complements recent work by

Ivashina and Sun (2007), who find 8.8% annualized profits during the month following loan










renegotiations in trading by institutional investors that are members of loan syndicates. The

profitability of this trading supports the argument that the private information revealed and

produced during the renegotiations is not only good, but also highly valuable, which would give

the borrower a particularly strong incentive to report it.

The disclosure literature documents how managers time voluntary disclosures in a

manner that maximizes insider trading profits while minimizing potential litigation costs

associated with disclosure (Cheng and Ko (2006). Additionally, the literature on the

announcement effects of financing events which spans for over two decades reports a

significant positive stock price reaction to announcements of bank loans, a negative reaction to

non-bank private debt placements, and an insignificant reaction to straight public debt issues

(James (1987), and Eckbo et al. (2007) for a recent review of this literature). Consistent with this

evidence, I find a significant positive market reaction to reported loans, but only when the news

precedes loan activation, and mainly driven by loan size and prior borrower stock performance

with respect to the market. This suggests that reported loans are considered more informative

when the news precedes the activation of the loan because it is arguably more surprising for

reported borrowers to obtain financing and timing intensifies the surprise factor.

Denis and Mihov (2003) find that credit risk is a significant determinant of the choice

between bank debt, public debt and non-bank private debt. However, their analysis considers

only the subset of loans that are reported, like other previous studies on incremental financing

decisions (Hadlock and James (2002)). In other words, the conclusions of previous work on

incremental financing derive from comparing the subset of reported bank loans to full samples of

other transactions such as public debt and non-bank private debt. Therefore, if reported loans are

a non-representative subset of the loans in Deal Scan, the analysis of the incremental financing










decisions should also consider cases of non-reported loans. In this context, I Eind that although

reported loans and borrowers differ significantly from non-reported loans and borrowers, the

factors that determine the choice between bank debt, public debt and non-bank private debt do

not change whether reported loans or all loans are considered. In consequence, one could argue

that non-reported loans are somewhat special and different from public debt.

Besides a more effective screening, the "specialness" of bank loans relative to other types

of Einancing also has to do with more intense monitoring, which would arguably be more

important for loans with higher covenant intensity, i.e., the reported loans. Furthermore, the

access to private information and contracting conditions that protect banks from the higher

potential default on reported loans could arguably lead or not to an improvement in operating

performance. In this context, I Eind that although reported borrowers present poorer measures of

operating performance during the year prior to loan activation (relative to non-reported

borrowers), there is relative improvement in the operating performance of reported borrowers

with respect to non-reported borrowers two years following loan activation. This result is

consistent with the recent literature on loan covenants (Roberts and Sufi (2007), Nini et al.

(2008)) that studies the relation between loan covenant violations, loan restructurings, and

subsequent performance

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of

the data sources for the unique samples of bank debt, public debt, and non-bank private debt. It

also provides summary statistics of the deals and borrowers, as well as market reaction. Section

III examines the determinants of bank loans, public debt, and non-bank private debt reporting in



3 Besides Nini et al. (2007), Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (lI r 14) show that the degree of protection granted to
investors has a significant effect on subsequent performance, especially in the case of firms that borrow from
institutional investors as opposed to hedge funds.










the press. Section IV studies the determinants of stock price reaction surrounding press reporting

or activation of non-reported issues. Section V examines the relationship between the

determinants of incremental financing options and loan reporting. Section VI studies long-term

operating performance. Section VII presents a summary and the conclusions.









CHAPTER 2
SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

Sample Selection and Data

The sample consists of 1,375 randomly selected loans that were activated between 1996

and 2004. I choose 1996 as the start year of the study period because since January 1996 the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all firms to submit their filings

electronically, and the analysis uses information on loan restructurings from 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K

filings. The number of loans per year is initially determined so that each year the proportion of

loans in the sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of loans in the DealScan

database. The reason for this sampling is the analysis of incremental financing choices between

bank debt, public debt, and non-bank private debt. This analysis requires three random samples,

one for each type of financing source, that maintain the yearly proportions of the universe of

issues reported in Deal Scan (bank loans) and Securities Data Corporation (SDC) (public debt and

non-bank private debt). In addition, the random sample maintains the overall proportions of total

number of issues for each financing choice with respect to the other two, and requires the

borrowers to be publicly traded at the time of loan activation. Moreover, the loan sample includes

only completed loans involving U.S. banks with roles other than participant, and excludes loans

granted to financial institutions.


DealScan is the source of data regarding the identity and role of all members of the loan

syndicate, loan maturity, type and purpose, credit risk measures, and covenant information.

Securities Data Corporation provides information on the proceeds and payment conditions of

public debt and non-bank private debt issues.

For the classification of reported and non-reported loans, public and non-bank private

debt issues, I do a Dow Jones search for news and wire articles and headlines published between










three months prior to one month after the effective date of the issue. I specifically look for

articles and headlines that contain the issue size and/or the usual key terms used in previous

studies. In the case of bank loan announcements the key terms are "line of credit," "credit line,"

"credit facility," "credit agreement," "credit extension," "new loan," "loan agreement," "loan

renewal," "loan revision," "loan extension," "finance company loan," "term loan," "commercial

loan," and "bank loan." Once the news and wire articles are selected, I collect data for the loan,

public debt or non-bank debt issue samples on the frequency of wire and press articles, timing of

the earliest article with respect to the issue date, news or wire source, and bundling of

information with other non-issue-related news in the earliest article. Furthermore, this hand-

collected news information identifies articles in which the only loan-related information is the

agreement size, those in which bank lending is inferred through terms such as "loan," and those

that specify it is a bank agreement, whether the identity of one or more members of the loan

syndicate is reported or not.

In 64 out of 304 cases of reported loans (out of 1,375 sample loans), the earliest news is

accompanied by other news concerning dividends, earnings, or control activity. Most empirical

studies of loan announcements exclude these confounding announcements so as to focus solely

on the information content of the financing news. In this paper, confounding press articles are

excluded in the analysis of the market reaction to loan announcements (I obtain similar results

when confounding articles are included). However, confounding press-reported loans are

considered in the examination of incremental financing choices because those decisions are made

earlier. Confounding articles are included as well as in the examination of reporting likelihood

given that earnings or dividend announcements, for example, may reduce information










asymmetries associated with selling securities. Thus, excluding confounding reporting may bias

the results and conclusions.

The news information on bank loans is supplemented with information from filings with

the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). More specifically, I collect data from the SEC

filings whenever available on whether the loans constitute a new agreement, renewal or a

restructure deal following a covenant violation and subsequent waiver. This manual search

within SEC filings covers the two years prior to loan activation because Roberts and Sufl (2007)

find in their study of renegotiation of financial contracts that the average effective maturity of

bank loans is half the average stated maturity, which Deal Scan reports to be of around four years

for the loans in the sample. More specifically, I search the SEC filings for specific expressions

used in previous studies, and check each passage to ensure that the expressions indeed refer to

financial covenant violations, waivers, and loan restructurings.

The data on issuing firm characteristics, stock price reaction, and analysts' forecasts, is

obtained from Compustat, the Center for Research of Security Prices (CRSP), and the

Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) data tape. As a result, the overall sample consists

of 1,375 bank loan deals, 355 public debt issues and 92 non-bank private debt deals. The news

search process identifies 304 loans that are reported in the financial press, 166 additional loans

that are identified in the wire but not reported in the press, 905 loans that are not reported in wire

or press articles, 207 reported public debt issues and 42 reported non-bank private debt issues. In





1 The specific terms are those also used by Roberts and Sufi (2007): "in violation of covenant," "in violation of a
covenant," "in default of covenant," "in technical violation of covenant," "in technical violation of a covenant," "in
violation of financial covenant," "in violation of a financial covenant," "in technical violation of a financial
covenant," "in technical violation of financial covenant," "in technical default of a financial covenant," "in technical
default of financial covenant," "not in compliance," "out of compliance," "received waiver," receiver a waiver,"
"obtained a waiver," "obtained waiver."










addition, I find that for 78.9% (240 out of 304) of reported loans there is no bundling of loan

information with other non-loan related news.

Summary Statistics

Table 2-1 provides the annual percentage of loans reported in the financial press, those

listed on the wire services but not reported in the press, or those not reported at all. More

specifically, I find that 22% (304 out of 1,375) of the sample loans are reported in the financial

press, while an additional 12% (166 out of 1,375) of loans are reported in the wire but are not

reported subsequently in the press. In addition, about 8% (not reported in the table) of the loans

that are not identified in wire or press articles are made public through 8-K filings.

The Form 8-K filings follow the SEC regulation that requires firms to report any

"material" event that may affect the stock price, or definitive agreement "not made in the

ordinary course of the registrant' s business."2 As Nini et al. (2008) note, as private agreements,

loans are not legal securities and, thus, are not subj ect to direct SEC regulation. However, the

SEC precedent has established a requirement that public companies include copies of all

"material" contracts, including bank loan agreements, with relevant SEC disclosures. These

contracts typically appear as exhibits at the end of a 10-K or 10-Q report, or as an attachment to

an 8-K filing.

Table 2-2 presents some initial evidence of how press-reported loans differ from non-

reported loans in terms of primary loan purpose, and introduces the hypothesis that the timing of



2 An agreement is deemed as material definitive when it "provides for obligations that are material to and
enforceable against the registrant or rights that are material to the registrant and enforceable by the registrant against
one or more parties to the agreement, in each case whether or not subject to conditions." The Form 8-K requires the
agreement date, the identity of the parties and a brief description of any material relationship between the registrant
or its affiliates and any of the parties, other than in respect of the material definitive agreement. Moreover, the
Additional Form 8-K, effective August 2004, expands the number of events that are reportable on Form 8-K and
shortens the filing deadline for most items to four business days. These amendments are said to further the goals of
Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.










the loan news relative to loan activation may not be random. In particular, takeover is the most-

common primary purpose of the loans reported in the news before activation (24% vs. 1 1% for

loans reported on or after activation, and 8% for non-reported loans). Debt repayment is also

stated as primary purpose of loans reported in the press before activation, but in a lower

proportion than for loans reported in the press on or after activation (21% vs. 32% of the cases

for loans reported or on after activation, and 23% for non-reported loans). On the other hand,

working capital is more frequently the main purpose of loans reported in the press on or after

activation (21% vs. 8% in the case of loans reported before activation, and 12% in the case of

non-reported loans). And, interestingly, non-reported loans are more likely to include 364-day

facilities (not specified in Table 2-2). These 364-day facilities are a maj or source of short-term

financing, given that non-reported loans are established significantly more often for corporate

purposes (32% vs. 24% for loans reported before activation, and 19% for loans reported on or

after activation). Thus, it may be argued that the frequent corporate purposes of non-reported

loans signal a more transaction oriented type of lending that would be deemed less noteworthy

by press editors.

Table 2-3 reports firm and loan summary statistics for the fiscal year preceding loan

activation. The results identify significant differences between reported and non-reported cases,

as well as some potential reasons for the timing of the earliest news with respect to loan

activation. The reported summary statistics include the cases in which loan reporting is bundled

with non-loan-related news information, but I obtain similar results if I exclude confounding

articles.

The summary statistics of the sample firms, shown in Table 2-3, have been used

frequently in the banking literature as proxies for information asymmetries and ex ante risk of










the borrower. The reason is that bank lending is credited for providing tailored and flexible

lending to firms that present more opaque riskier profiles (Houston and James (1996), Johnson

(1997), and Hadlock and James (2002)). Hence, since practically all public firms borrow from

banks, heterogeneity in the measures of opaqueness and credit risk within the loan sample may

explain why reported loans and their borrowers may be deemed different from non-reported

ones.

As shown in Table 2-3, firms with reported loans are on average smaller (in terms of

assets and sales), and have higher surprise and dispersion of earnings forecasts, higher leverage,

and poorer operating performance during the fiscal year preceding the activation of the loan as

measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)

to assets. The debt to EBITDA ratio, covenant included in about 50% of loan contracts

(Demiroglu and James (2007)), is also significantly higher during the year preceding the loan for

borrowers with reported loans. Thus, reported borrowers appear to be on average more opaque

and riskier than non-reported borrowers. This is insightful, because those same factors determine

as well the choice of bank debt over other sources of incremental financing, as previous work

finds. More specifically, previous studies document that firms with higher information

asymmetries and lower credit risk are more likely to choose reported bank debt over public debt

(Hadlock and James (2001)). Hence, the higher information content of reported bank loans

compared to non-reported ones can explain the need for reporting.





SLike Gomes and Phillips (2006), I compute the quarterly analyst earnings surprise as the absolute value of the
difference between the median quarterly earnings estimate and the actual quarterly earnings per share, normalized by
the stock price at the fiscal quarter end. Similarly, I compute the analyst earnings dispersion measure as the standard
deviation of outstanding earnings forecasts normalized by the stock price requiring a minimum of two outstanding
earning forecasts. Additionally, since firms may have incentives to disclose more information prior to a public issue
vs. prior to a private issue. Thus, the earnings surprise and dispersion measures use the average of the last four
quarters ending a quarter before the issue date.










The loan characteristics reported also in Table 2-3 show that reported loans are larger -

relative to the size of the borrower and have longer maturities than non-reported loans. In

addition, reported loans present significantly higher measures of the covenant intensity index

(4.5 vs. 3) that would arguably involve closer bank monitoring. The covenant intensity index, as

defined in previous studies (Bradley and Roberts (2004)), is an aggregate measure of covenant

structure. It equals the sum of six covenant indicators: collateral, dividend restrictions, asset sales

sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, and the existence of more than two Einancial

covenants. 4 Thus, the value of the intensity index ranges between 0 and 6, and implicitly

assumes that each covenant is equally restrictive for borrowers. Moreover, following also the

criteria of previous studies, the index is set to missing when the value of one of the indicators is

missing (64% of the reported loans and 83% of non-reported loans).

Reported loans are also more likely than non-reported loans (30% vs. 12% of the cases)

to constitute restructurings following loan covenant violations and subsequent waivers during the

two years preceding the loan agreement object of study. However, the percentage of reported

loans that include in the syndicate lenders from which the firm has borrowed previously is lower

than in the case of non-reported loans (37% of reported loans have at least a common lender with

previous syndicates, vs. 44% in the case of non-reported loans). Thus, reported loans are more

likely to be both loan restructurings and new loans with new lenders.

Reported loans also present significantly higher all-in-drawn spreads, a measure that

further reflects the riskiness of borrowers with reported loans suggested by the firm summary

characteristics. In particular, Deal Scan expresses the all-in-drawn spread as a basis point mark-



4 Dealscan includes covenant information on dividend payment restrictions under certain conditions, collateral
requirements and prepayments requirements (so called sweeps that mandate that a portion of the loan be repaid out
of excess cash flows, debt and equity financings, or asset sales proceeds).










up over the 6-month LIBOR that includes recurring fees associated with the credit facility.5 The

spread is used as a measure of per dollar cost of borrowing in a number of previous empirical

studies on loan pricing (for example, Bradley and Roberts (2004), Guner (2006) and Moerman

(2005)). It is interesting to note here that, besides the loan size relative to the firm size, all-in-

drawn spreads measures also differentiate, among reported loans, those that are reported before

loan activation with respect to those reported on or after activation, as shown in Table 2-3. More

specifically, I find that loans reported in the press before activation are larger (relative to firm

size) and present higher all-in-drawn spreads than those reported on or after activation, which

would arguably make their announcements even more noteworthy.

Overall, the firm and loan summary statistics in Table 2-3 show that reported loans and

their borrowers are not representative of the universe of loans and borrowers. Furthermore, the

firm characteristics that differentiate reported loans from non-reported loans also differentiate

bank borrowing from public borrowing in previous studies (Hadlock and James (2002)). In

consequence, it could be argued that non-reported bank borrowing constitutes an intermediate

debt source between reported bank borrowing and public debt borrowing.

Table 2-4 presents firm and issue characteristics for non-bank private debt and public debt

deals. Like bank loans, both in the case of public debt and non-bank private debt issues, bigger

deals (relative to firm assets or not) are more likely to be reported. However, there are important

differences in terms of frequency of reporting and potential determinants of press reporting

between bank loans, public debt and non-bank private debt issues. First, it is important to note

that about 40% of the non-bank private debt issues are reported and that 60% of the public debt

issues are reported. Thus, bank loans are much less likely to get reported than public debt and


5 LPC computes the spread for non-LIBOR based loans by converting index used to price the loan into a LIBOR
equivalent using the historical relationship between the index and the LIBOR.










non-bank private debt issues. This would explain why the summary statistics of non-bank private

debt borrowers and public debt borrowers show less statistical differences between reported and

non-reported borrowers than in the case of bank loans. More specifically, reported non-bank

private debt borrowers are smaller than their non-reported counterparts, but this is not the case of

public debt borrowers. Also, reported public debt borrowers present lower operating

performance than their non-reported counterparts, unlike non-bank private debt borrowers.

Table 2-4 introduces two other interesting facts related to credit rating and cumulative

returns. Like in the case of bank loans, non-bank private debt issues are reported more frequently

when the borrower does not have credit rating or its credit rating is below BBB. This is

consistent with the Eindings of Denis and Mihov (2003), who show that non-bank private debt

lenders have a niche among the riskiest borrowers. Furthermore, it can be argued that borrowers

without credit rating are not only riskier, but also more opaque, characteristics that also

differentiate reported borrowers from non-reported ones. On the other hand, the borrowers whose

public debt issues get reported are credit rated more often than non-reported borrowers, and the

credit rating is at least BBB more often than in the case of non-reported borrowers. Furthermore,

reported public debt borrowers also have higher cumulative returns during the year prior to the

issue. This is insightful because it suggests that the reporting of public debt issues in the press

may time the market.

How do the firm characteristics of bank, public debt and non-bank private debt borrowers

in the sample compare to those of previous studies of incremental Einancing decisions? To

address this issue I use the seasonally adjusted monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI), as provided

by the U. S. Department of Labor. I control for inflation by bringing the summary statistics of

previous studies from the mid-month of their study periods to June 2000, the mid-month of my









January 1996 to December 2004 period. Overall, and as expected for syndicated loan borrowers,

the firms in this paper are bigger. In terms of firm assets, Denis and Mihov (2003) study bank,

public debt and non-bank private debt borrowers that are significantly smaller than the borrowers

in my sample (firm asset medians of $162.24, $2,43 5, and $246.2 million respectively). James

(1987) also uses smaller public private debt borrowers (firm assets medians of $3,322.27), as

well as longer maturity bank loans (median of 72 months). In terms of leverage, Hadlock and

James (2002) study the choice between bank borrowing and public debt borrowing with higher

debt to assets ratios (median ratios of 0.52 and 0.44 respectively). Consistently with the higher

leverage, the bank and public debt firms in Hadlock and James (2002) study borrow less (median

commitment to assets ratios of 0.26 and 0.047 respectively). However, I observe no significant

difference in terms of firm assets when comparing the size of the bank borrowers in previous

studies with the subsample of reported loans in my sample. This is insightful, because previous

studies consider only reported loans. Hence, the similarities between my subsample of reported

borrowers and the samples of reported borrowers used previously in the literature allow a

comparison of results.

Summary Statistics of Market Reaction to Loan News and Loan Activation

How do loans come to be published through Dow Jones? The issuance of a press release

by the borrower constitutes one more source of information in the first step of the chain that

conveys the information to the market through the press. Thompson et al. (1987) describe the

process. Once reporters or firms transmit the story to the Dow Jones News Service, the editors

summarize them, weight their importance, and determine whether to make them press news. This

process takes place within hours or, in most cases, not more than one day.

One should note that the dissemination of news information through wire services does

not target only Dow Jones. In fact, the New York Stock Exchange regulations require










simultaneous disclosure of firm-specific news to Dow Jones and Reuters, and the American

Stock Exchange requires simultaneous disclosure to Dow Jones, Reuters, Associated Press,

United Press International, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Standard & Poor' s, and

Moody's Investor Service (Thompson et al. (1987)). Nevertheless, both practitioners and

academics rely on Dow Jones as the primary source of news existence and timing, most likely

because of its longer tradition and wider dissemination of information. 6 In any case, when I

select a random subsample of loans and search for press articles without limiting the source, I

find that Dow Jones captures all cases in which the loans are reported.

The nature of the publishing process raises several questions. First, can financial press

editors influence returns and trading volume through editing? Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find

that the number of news stories and market activity are directly related and that this relation is

robust to the size of the headlines and macroeconomic announcements. In addition, they find that

the association between larger size headlines and higher market returns does not have a

significant effect on trading volume.' Second, how much news is there in successive

announcements? Rippington and Taffler (1996) find that only preliminary announcements and

interim statements convey substantial amounts of new information. Thus, in light of the findings

in previous work, one could argue that multiple incomplete announcement returns could be

aggregated in the study of the market reaction to loan news. However, the loans in the sample are

reported in most cases through unique articles, and in the few cases where there is more than one



6 Dow Jones maintains five wire services in addition to publishing the Wall Street Journal and Barron 's. Dow Jones
also maintains the News Retrieval Service, which contains selected articles from the Dow Jones News Service, now
called Factiva, and the Wall Street Journal. In terms of coverage, the Journal appears to include the initial news
release data for approximately 96% of the items listed in the NYSE/ASE Index (Thompson et al. (1987)).

SMitchell and Mulherin (1994) find April to be the month with the smallest number of announcements per day. In
addition, Thompson et al. (1987) also document that firms are less likely to issue news releases on Fridays and in
December.









article about a loan (in most cases just two articles) they are either dated the same day with

practically verbatim information about the loan or one article is a summary of the key points in

the other one, or distant enough in time not to affect the two-day event study results.

The two-day-window event studies of bank, public and non-bank private debt

announcements use the earliest of the first news or the issue activation date as event date, a

standard market model estimation period that ends 46 trading days before the event date, and the

standard methodology by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) to measure the stock price reaction. In

addition, since there is "contamination" of loan, public debt and non-bank private debt news, I

control for it and find similar results when confounding news articles are included. Thus, I report

in this paper only the non-confounding results given that previous studies exclude confounding

press articles in their analysis of market reaction surrounding announcements. I find that for

78.9% (240 out of 304) reported loans, and 63.1% (53 out of 84) of loans reported before the

activation date, there is no bundling of loan information with other non-loan related news. I

classify as bundling or contamination of the earliest loan related article any information

within the same article that can affect the stock price. The nature of the bundling of information

can range, for example, from an earnings announcement that does not appear to be a repetition of

previous news, to the completion of an acquisition.

The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), average standardized prediction errors (SPE)

and Z values associated to loan, public debt and non-bank private debt reporting and activation

are reported in Table 2-5 and present four interesting findings. First, although the market can

gain access to information about the existence and deal activation date of the non-reported loans,

there is no significant market reaction surrounding the deal activation for the non-reported










loans More specifically, and as discussed in the introduction to this paper, Deal Scan uses as

sources of loan information public SEC Eilings and market sources, and maintains a real-time

website that reports the existence of not-yet active loans. Thus, it can be argued that the sample

loans are disclosed.

Second, I Eind that the significant market reaction to reported loans is driven by the

reaction to news articles that precede the activation of the loans. This is consistent with the

differences shown in Table 2-5 between loans reported before activation and loans reported on or

after activation. As mentioned before, loans reported before activation show a higher Deal Scan

spread and commitment size relative to assets that would arguably make them more noteworthy

among all the loans that are reported. In consequence, the reporting in the press of those loans

would more likely trigger a larger market reaction, especially if the timing of the article that

precedes loan activation cannot be foreseen and increases the surprise by which the news takes

the market. Sections III and IV discuss in more detail the determinants of loan reporting and

market reaction in relation to the timing of the news.

Third, the market reaction to public debt announcements is not significant when all

reported issues are considered. However, when press articles are classified by their timing with

respect to deal activation, the announcements following activation are associated with a

significant positive market reaction. This is interesting, because I Eind no difference between

public debt deals reported before activation and after activation in terms of borrower opaqueness

and credit risk, or in terms of deal characteristics.





8 Previous work by Thompson et al. (1987) also observes no significant market reaction to announcements in the
wire services that are not followed by announcements in the financial press, but their study does not distinguish bank
loan reporting from all other news types.










Fourth, although the reaction to non-bank private debt news is overall negative, I find no

significant market reaction to non-bank private debt news. The reason could be associated to the

bigger size of the non-bank private debt borrowers in my sample. Bigger firms tend to be less

opaque and therefore, less risky.










Table 2-1. Annual Distribution of Loans by Year of Deal Activation
Year of All Sample Loans Loans DJ & PR Wire Non-
Deal Bank Reported in Reported in Reported reported
Activation Loans Press Before Press On or Loans Loans
N=1375 Activation After N=166 N=905
N=84 Activation
N=220
1996 11.78% 8.33% 8.64% 11.45% 12.93%
1997 15.56% 15.48% 14.21% 15.66% 15.69%
1998 12.51% 20.24% 11.36% 8.43% 12.82%
1999 11.27% 16.67% 10.9% 7.83% 11.49%
2000 11.85% 7.14% 11.36% 11.45% 12.49%
2001 11.05% 9.52% 14.09% 7.23% 11.16%
2002 10.25% 14.29% 10% 11.45% 9.72%
2003 9.38% 4.76% 11.36% 12.05% 8.84%
2004 6.35% 3.57% 7.27% 14.45% 4.86%

The sample consists of 1474 randomly selected syndicated bank loan agreements activated
between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of loans randomly selected each year
was determined so that each year the proportion of loans in my sample equals the corresponding
annual proportion of loans in Deal Scan database. I include loans involving US banks and only
US publicly traded firms at the time of loan activation. I identify reported and unreported loans
searching the Wire and Dow Jones News Retrieval Service for articles and headlines containing
the deal amount and/or the key words "bank," "line" "credit," "loan." I require the financial press
and wire information to be published between three months prior to one month after the
activation of the loan as reported in Deal Scan.






























The sample consists of 1474 randomly selected syndicated bank loan agreements activated
between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of loans randomly selected each year
was determined so that each year the proportion of loans in my sample equals the corresponding
annual proportion of loans in Deal Scan database. I include loans involving US banks and only
US publicly traded firms at the time of loan activation. I identify reported and unreported loans
searching the Wire and Dow Jones News Retrieval Service for articles and headlines containing
the deal amount and/or the key words "bank," "line" "credit," "loan." I require the financial press
and wire information to be published between three months prior to one month after the
activation of the loan as reported in Deal Scan.


Debt. Repay 24.44 21.43% 32.73% 21.69% 23.2%

Working 14.62 8.33% 21.36% 19.88% 12.6%
Capital %
Takeover 10.4% 23.81% 11.36% 12.65% 8.51%
Corporate 28.8% 23.81% 19.09% 24.7% 32.38%
Purposes
Acquis. Line 4.51% 7.14% 4.09% 8.43% 3.65%
CP Backup 12.0% 5.95% 5.9% 5.42% 15.25%
Other 5.24% 9.53% 5.47% 7.23% 4.41%


Table 2-2. Loan Deal Purpose
Percent
tage wi
within
All
Loans


Percentage
thin Loans
Reported
Before
Activation


Percentage
within Loans
Reported On
or After
Activation


Percentage
within
DJ&PR Wire
Reported
Loans


Percentage
within Non-
reported
Loans










Table 2-3. Firm and Loan Summary Statistics for Reported and Unreported Loans
Loans Reported in Loans Reported in Press DJ & PR Wire Non-reported Loans
Press Before On or After Activation Reported Loans N=905
Activation N=84 N=220 N=166
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Assets (millions) 3680.28 504.87* 2355.06* 500.84* 4119.3 480.32* 4688.93 885.13
Sales (millions) 2261.74* 362.13* 1861.3* 499.22* 3066.3 530.59* 4027.94 819.96
Tangible/Assets 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.26 0.30* 0.24* 0.36 0.29
Earnings Surprise 0.85 0.38* 1.04 0.26* 0.53 0.18 0.55 0.14
(%)
Earnings 0.40 0.17*+ 0.25 0.10* 0.30 0.11* 0.28 0.07
Dispersion (%)
Debt/Assets 0.35* 0.36* 0.33* 0.34* 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.27
Debt/EBITDA 3.84* 3.08* 3.31 2.57* 3.25 2.22 3.01 2.07
EBITDA/Assets 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.13 0.14 0.13
Credit Rating 0.45 0 0.39* 0 0.43 0 0.47 0
Investment Credit 0.23* 0 0.18* 0 0.30* 0 0.38 0
Rating
Firm's 12-month 0.096 0.03 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.1 0.19 0.11
cum. return
Commitment 448.92 216.73* 392.55 175 565.79 192.22 400.33 150
(millions)
Commitment/ 0.69*+ 0.44*+ 0.44* 0.36* 0.42* 0.29* 0.26 0.16
Assets
Maturity (months) 51.65* 53.86* 46* 42.49* 43.60* 37.5* 35.09 31.43
Covenant Intensity 4.42* 5* 4.53* 4* 3.71* 3* 3.08 3
Index
Restructuring 0.30* 0 0.32* 0 0.16 0 0. 12 0
All-in-drawn 234.2*+ 238.6*+ 204.31* 181.88* 181.88* 160* 133.67 100
spread

The loan sample consists of 304 loans reported in the financial press, 166 loans reported in the wire, and 905 non-reported syndicated
bank loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt sample consists of 355 issues, and the non-bank
private debt sample of 92 issues, also activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of security issues randomly
selected is determined so that each year the proportion of security issues in the sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of









loans in Deal Scan database, and public debt and non-bank private debt deals in Securities Data Corporation (SDC). In addition, the
randomly selected issues maintain the overall proportions of total number of security issues for each Einancing type with respect to the
other two, as reported in Deal Scan and (SDC). I identify reported and non-reported deals searching Dow Jones sources for news and
wire articles that contain the deal amount and/or the key words used in the literature on loan, public debt and non-bank private debt
announcements. Tangible assets are plant, property and equipment divided by assets. Earnings Surprise is defined as the absolute
value of the difference between the median quarterly earnings estimate and the actual earnings per share, normalized by the stock
price. Earnings Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of earning forecasts normalized by the stock price. Credit Rating is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a debt rating, zero otherwise. The Investment Grade Rating is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm has an existing debt rating of BBB or higher, zero otherwise. Conanitnzent is the size of the loan commitment.
Maturity is the maturity of the loan agreement as reported in Dealscan. The covenant intensity index equals the sum of six covenant
indicators (collateral, dividend restriction, more than two Einancial covenants, asset sales sweep, equity issuance sweep, and debt
issuance sweep) when none of the six indicators is missing. All-in-drawn spread is calculated and reported by Dealscan as the total
borrowing cost of the drawn portion of a loan over and above LIBOR. The maturity and Deal Scan all-in-drawn spread are calculated
as the weighted average of the maturity and spread of each facility in the package loan.
* Significantly different from non-reported loan issue sample at the 0.1 level.
+ Significantly different from sample of reported loans on or after deal activation date at the 0. 1 level.















Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Assets (millions) 2303.2 481.16* 15983.7 867.53 22389.9 6852.44 19453.5 7609.65

Sales (millions) 2393.96 585.95 6877.85 673.2 18460.8 6120.5 17626.3 8358.2
Tangible/Assets 0.4 0.33 0.42 0.39 0.4 0.38 0.43 0.41
Debt/Assets 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.32
Debt/EBITDA 2.73 1.62 2.29 2.11 2.96 2.29 2.48 2.05
EBITDA/Assets 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15* 0.14 0.17 0.16
Credit Rating 0.36* 0 0.57 0 0.97* 0 0.93 0
Investment Credit Rating 0.14* 0 0.43 0 0.83* 0 0.75 0
Firm's 12-month cum. return 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.21* 0.14 0.12 0.09
Commitment (millions) 55.86* 48.25* 37.94 25 383.92* 250 110.62 36
Commitment/Assets 0.23* 0.1* 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.004

The loan sample consists of 304 loans reported in the Einancial press, 166 loans reported in the wire, and 905 non-reported syndicated
bank loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt sample consists of 355 issues, and the non-bank
private debt sample of 92 issues, also activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of security issues randomly
selected is determined so that each year the proportion of security issues in the sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of
loans in Deal Scan database, and public debt and non-bank private debt deals in Securities Data Corporation (SDC). In addition, the
randomly selected issues maintain the overall proportions of total number of security issues for each financing type with respect to the
other two, as reported in Deal Scan and (SDC). I identify reported and non-reported deals searching Dow Jones sources for news and
wire articles that contain the deal amount and/or the key words used in the literature on loan, public debt and non-bank private debt
announcements. Tangible assets are plant, property and equipment divided by assets. Credit Rating is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm has a debt rating, zero otherwise. The lnvestnzent Grade Rating is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an
existing debt rating of BBB or higher, zero otherwise. Conanitnzent is the size of the loan commitment.
* Significantly different from non-reported issue sample at the 0.1 level.


Table 2-4. Firm and Deal Summary


Statistics for Reported and Unreported Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt


Reported Non-Bank
Private Debt
N=42


Non-reported Non-
Bank Private Debt
N=50


Reported Public Debt
N=207


Non-reported Public
Debt
N=148










Table 2-5. Market Reaction Summary Statistics


Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Loans N=53 N=3 7 N=150 N=1071

CAR (%) 2.56*+ 0.13 0.033 0.26 0.46 0.16 0.25 -0.06
Average SPE 0.32 0.009 0.077 0.05
Z value 2.33 0.05 0.96 1.64

Public Debt N=52 N=111 N=3 6 N=146

CAR (%) 0.58 0.33 -0.11 -0.1 1.21 0.56 -0.18 -0.001
Average SPE 0.21 -0.03 0.39 -0.07
Z value 1.51 -0.31 2.34 -0.85

Non-Bank N=24 N=3 N=11 N=43

Private Debt
CAR (%) 1.12 0.003 -3.49 -4.54 -0.38 -0.42 1.67 -0.38
Average SPE 0.11 -0.67 -0.11 0.05
Z value 0.55 -1.2 -0.36 0.33

The sample consists of 240 loan news and 1071 non-reported bank loan agreements, 199 reported and 146 non-reported public debt
issues, and 38 reported and 43 non-reported non-bank private debt issues activated between January 1996 and December 2004, with
all news being free of contamination. Non-confounding news means that the loan information in the press articles are not bundled with
other non-loan related information such as earnings, dividends, changes in management or completion of acquisitions. I identify
reported and non-reported issues searching Dow Jones sources for articles containing the issue amount and/or the key words used in
the literature of bank loan, public debt and non-bank private debt announcements. CAR and SPE refer to the two-day Cumulative
Abnormal Returns and Standardized Prediction Errors of a 2-day window event study centered on the earliest of news date and deal
activation date. Z value is calculated as the square root of the number of observations times the average Standardized Prediction Error.
* Statistically different at 10% level from non-reported subsample.
+ Statistically different at 10% level from reported subsample that does not precede loan activation.


Non-Confounding News
Before Loan Activation


Non-Confounding News
On Loan Activation


Non-Confounding News
After Loan Activation


Non-reported Deals









CHAPTER 3
DETERMINANTS OF LOAN, PUBLIC DEBT, AND NON-BANK PRIVATE DEBT
ANNOUNCEMENT S

The substantial heterogeneity in firm and loan characteristics shown in Table 3-1

evidences that reported loans and their borrowers constitute a non-representative subsample of

the entire Deal Scan universe of loans and their public borrowers. Furthermore, the differences

between reported and non-reported loans may arguably involve differences in loan information

content that would explain the noteworthiness of reported loans and help identify the criteria

used by press editors. In addition, the widespread use of bank loans (94% of public firms borrow

from banks) and the fact that about 60% of public firms issue public debt (Sufl (2007)) also

raises the question of whether press editors follow the same firm and deal characteristics related

criteria when deciding which public debt and non-bank private debt issues to publish, as

compared to loan reporting.

Determinants of Bank Loan Announcements

A large theoretical literature in banking focuses on banks as screeners that reduce ex ante

information asymmetries when compared with public "arm's length" debt (Diamond (1991),

Fama (1985), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)). Furthermore, the banking literature argues

that loans constitute a unique source of financing because, among other reasons, banks have

access to information that is not available to other lenders and market participants while

screening loans and monitoring borrowers (Raj an (1992)). So, if non-reported loans require less

access to private information due to their less severe information asymmetries, one could argue

that the lenders of non-reported loans do not know significantly more than other market

participants about their non-reported borrowers. Consequently, those loans would constitute a

weaker signal of firm quality and be, therefore, less noteworthy.









Previous empirical studies document that more opaque firms are more likely to use bank

debt (Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Sufi (2007))' when the returns of the

borrower decrease with respect to the market (Hadlock and James (2002)), and that relatively

riskier firms also choose bank debt over public debt (Denis and Mihov (2003)). Moreover, and in

relation to disclosure decisions, Bagnoli and Watts (2007) find that firms are more likely to

disclose private information when the operating performance in Einancial reports falls below

expectations and/or does not contain sufficient good news. Thus, besides measures of

asymmetric information, market timing and leverage, EBITDA to assets ratio could also

constitute a significant determinant of reporting likelihood.

Roberts and Sufi (2007) report that, although over 90% of long term loan contracts are

renegotiated prior to their stated maturity, only 16% of the renegotiations are due to default

events such as covenant violations. In addition, a related study by Nini et al. (2008) shows that

following loan covenant violations and subsequent waivers there is an efficient reduction in firm

investment and subsequent increases in market valuation and operation performance. Thus, one

could argue that loan contracts following covenant violations could also be viewed as a

significant signal of firm potential and be, therefore, more noteworthy. Finally, and in relation to

loan characteristics that could make reporting more likely, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) find

that firms are less likely to withhold information in material contract filings when they issue

long-term debt. This suggests that, besides larger loans, loans with longer maturity could also be

more newsworthy.

Therefore, since summary statistics show heterogeneity in all the above-mentioned

borrower and loan characteristics suspected to determine reporting likelihood, the analysis of


SRecent studies by Sufi (2007) find increased access to capital of less informed investors following the introduction
of bank loan ratings as well as more concentrated syndicated loans in the case of opaque borrowers.










bank loan reporting determinants includes proxies for information asymmetries, credit risk,

market timing, loan restructuring following violations, loan size, and loan maturity. In addition,

one could argue that the largest firms are less opaque and the smallest firms of less interest to the

general investor, and that, consequently, their loans could be less likely to be reported. Thus,

given that the likelihood of reporting is suspected to have a non-linear dependency with respect

to borrower size, the analysis also considers a medium-firm-size dummy variable. This dummy

equals one if the firm has assets of less than $1 billion and more than $400 million in order to

include non-reported borrowers with below-median firm size and reported borrowers with

above-median firm size.

The analysis of loan-reporting determinants is based on a series of probit models. Table

3-1 reports the regression results and marginal effects for the two main probit models. The first

model studies the likelihood that a loan is deemed noteworthy through a press article or a Dow

Jones wire article that is not made press news. The dependent variable equals one if the bank

loan is reported in the financial press or on the Dow Jones wire but not in the press, and zero

otherwise. The second regression analyzes how the factors that determine the likelihood of

reporting can also affect the timing of the reporting, i.e., the likelihood that a loan is reported

before its activation date.

As shown in Table 3-1, higher measures of information asymmetries and credit risk

increase the likelihood of loan reporting. These determinants are measured by tangibles relative

to assets and EBITDA to assets, although other proxies used in the literature, such as volatility,

and surprise and dispersion in earnings forecasts, lead to analogous results. In addition, loan

restructurings, loans with longer maturities, and bigger loans relative to assets are also more

likely to be reported in the press. More specifically, I find that, evaluated at the sample means of









the other explanatory variables, the likelihood of a loan being reported is 13 percentage points

lower with higher tangibles relative to assets, 41 percentage points lower with higher measures

of EBITDA to assets, 21 percentage points higher in the case of loan restructurings, 17

percentage points higher when the commitment amount relative to firm size is bigger, and 11

percentage points higher when the borrower is a medium-size firm. It is important to note that

these are also the determinants that reporters of loan news in Dow Jones cite when asked on the

phone about the criteria followed to determine whether a particular loan is newsworthy. Thus,

both the analysis and anecdotal evidence suggest that reported loans are more surprising and also

informative about firm potential.

Beyond the average marginal effects reported in Table 3-2 reports how the lowest and

highest quartile measures of loan-reporting determinants in the 1,375 loan sample alter the

likelihood of reporting evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables. More

specifically, the likelihood of reporting decreases by 10 percentage points for the firms within

the highest quartile of tangibles to assets, increases by 8 percentage points (decreases by 7

percentage points) for the firms with EBITDA to assets within the lowest (highest) quartiles of

the sample, and increases by 20 percentage points (decreases by 17 percentage points) for the

firms with loan commitment to assets within the highest (lowest) quartiles of the sample.

The analysis of the loan reporting determinants also shows that the likelihood of loan

reporting is increases throughout the study period. This could be arguably be due to lower

reporting costs thanks to developments in information technology, and suggests that the

information content of the average reported loan decreases during the 1996 through 2004 period.

In order to confirm the non-linear dependency of loan reporting with respect to firm size,

I apply the reporting likelihood probit model to the firms in the sample that fall within the









smallest biggest size quartile in terms of assets (the regression results are not reported in the

paper). As expected, I find that when the loans are surprising and informative given loan

characteristics, information asymmetries, and borrower credit risk but the borrower is a small

firm, the wire article that is not followed by a press article is usually a press release wire. Thus,

once could argue that loans to smaller borrowers are less likely to draw attention from the press

because those firms are of less interest to the general investor. On the other hand, in the case of

the biggest firms, which receive greater analyst coverage, I find that not all their loans are

systematically reported. The loans obtained by the biggest firms are reported when credit risk

and loan characteristics justify it, given that these borrowers are generally less opaque.

The second probit model reported in Table 3-1 studies whether loan-reporting

determinants also influence the timing of the loan news with respect to loan activation. Overall, I

find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that firm characteristics affect the timing of the loan

news. However, the size of the loan commitment relative to borrower size increases the

likelihood that the loan is reported before loan activation.

Overall, only the loans that seem more informative about the potential of the borrower

are reported. This evidences deal variety in the loan market that had not been documented

before. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in information asymmetries and credit risk that

distinguishes reported from non-reported cases is insightful because it also determines the choice

of reported bank debt over public debt (Hadlock and James (2001)). In consequence, one could

argue that non-reported loans are more transactional, contrary to the belief that bank loans

always involve a more or less close relationship between borrower and lender.

Determinants of Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt

The news search for the samples of 355 public debt issues and 92 non-bank private debt

issues indicates that most public debt deals are reported in the press vs. 57% of the non-bank









private debt deals. In addition, the news search shows that almost 20% of non-bank private deals

are reported by the borrower, while in the case of public debt reporting by the firm is rare and

usually related to debt repayment. Thus, in the case of non-bank private deals, either the

borrowers or the lenders seem to want investors to know about the deals. This is interesting

given that previous studies document a negative market reaction to non-bank private debt (Eckbo

(2007)).

The borrower and lender incentives to report non-bank private debt despite the adverse

reaction of the market could be explained through the findings of Denis and Mihov (2003) and

Carey el al. (1998) that associate non-bank private lenders to the financing of the riskiest

borrowers. It seems that the good news of getting financing should increase the likelihood that

non-bank private debt is announced. However, only banks are considered to be special in terms

of access and generation of private information and efficient monitoring (Fama (1985), Raj an

(1992) and Denis and Mihov (2003)). On the other hand, in the case of reporting of public debt

issues, if those borrowers are significantly less risky and opaque than bank borrowers, one may

argue that the likelihood of reporting would decrease at least among the best performers. Thus,

how do the determinants of bank loan reporting differ from those of public debt and non-bank

private debt? The analysis of the likelihood of public debt and non-bank private debt reporting

through a press article or a Dow Jones wire article is shown in Table 3-3.

The probit analysis for non-bank private debt shows that, besides information

asymmetries, credit risk does not seem to play a significant role in the likelihood of reporting of

non-bank private debt issues (although it plays it in the choice of non-bank private debt

borrowing, as Dennis and Mihov find (2003)). The reason could be that although this type of

financing serves the niche of highest risk borrowers that cannot obtain financing from loans, the









lenders do not necessarily base the agreements on private information about firm potential, but

on control rights.

In relation to measures of risk, Table 3-3 also shows that although the size of the

proceeds relative for firm size does not affect the likelihood of reporting for public debt

borrowers, non-bank private debt issues are 125 percentage points more likely to be reported as

proceeds relative to firm size increase when evaluated at the sample means of the other

explanatory variables. The reason could be that public debt borrowers are not expected to default

on the agreements, while non-bank private borrowers could. Thus, bigger loans granted to riskier

borrowers may be considered good news because the lenders have positive private information

about the borrower, while bigger lending to the riskiest firms is negative news, since it may just

imply additional risk and a higher probability of default.

In addition, the likelihood of public debt reporting is found to be 22 percentage points

higher in the case of firms with higher cumulative returns when evaluated at the sample means of

the other explanatory variables. This is consistent with market sources echoing the new public

debt issues of the "market darlings," which would not require revelation of any particular insight

regarding firm potential, and would lead to an average null market reaction to the news.

Moreover, and as expected, the likelihood of public debt reporting is 85 percentage points lower

in the case of firms with better operating performance, and therefore, less risky, given that, as

mentioned before, public debt borrowers are less opaque.

Finally, the probit analysis shows that public debt issues, like loans, are more likely to be

reported over time, but that there is no significant time trend in the reporting of non-bank private

debt. The reason could be that while public debt issues are reported in Dow Jones, non-bank

private issues are announced mainly in specialized publications such as Private Placement Letter










and Private Placement Reporter. Thus, it may have become less costly over time to report loans

due to advancements in information technology in the case of Dow Jones, but not in the case of

other smaller news sources that do not benefit from economies of scale.










Table 3-1. Determinants of the Likelihood and Timing of Bank Loan Reporting in the Press

Likelihood of loan Likelihood of reporting
reporting before loan activation
Marginal Marginal
Effects Effects
Time trend 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.004


(3.12)
-0.39
(-2.18)
0.30
(1.40)
-1.2
(-2.54)
0.56
(5.32)
0.51
(3.O1)
0.01
(4.52)
0.32
(3.84)
-0.03

(-0.56)
0.01

(0.08)
-1.32
(-8.18)
0.11


(-0.31)
-0.13 0.27
(0.78)
0.10 0.09
(0.22)
-0.41 -0.94
(-1.09)
0.21 -0.03
(-0.17)
0.17 0.41
(2.47)
0.003 0.003
(1.06)
0.11 -0.16
(-0.90)
-0.01 -0.09


Tangibles/Assets

Debt/Assets

EBITDA/Assets

Restructure Loan

Commitment Amount/Assets

Maturity

Medium-size firm

Firm's past 12-month
cumulative return


Market's past 12-month
cumulative return


0.09

0.03

-0.3

-0.01

0.13

0.001

-0.05

-0.03



-0.19


(-1.22)
-0.61

(-1.63)
-0.71
(-2.14)
0.05

294


0.01


Constant

2
Pseudo R


1176


Table 3-1 provides the estimates of two probit models that relate firm and loan characteristics to
the likelihood that the press deems a loan noteworthy through a press article or a DJ wire, and
the likelihood that when there is loan news the press article precedes the loan activation date.
Both the results and marginal effects of the probit regressions are reported. The analysis is based
on a sample of 304 press-reported, 166 PR or DJ wire reported loans and 905 non-reported loans
activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported loans
searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the deal amount and/or the key words
used in the literature on loan announcements. Conanitnzent Amount is the size of the loan
commitment. Maturity is the maturity in months of the loan agreement as reported in Dealscan.
M~edium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets
and more than $400 million in assets. Z statistics are reported in parenthesis.










Table 3-2. Marginal Effects of the Lowest and Highest Quartile Determinants on Loan
Reporting


Table 3-2 reports how the lowest and highest quartiles of some firm and loan characteristics in
the sample significantly affect the marginal effects of a loan being deemed noteworthy by the
press through a press article or a DJ wire, as examined in the first Probit model of Table 3-1.
*Significant at the 0. 1 level.


Effect of Lowest
Ouartile
On Reporting
Likelihood


Effect of Highest
Ouartile
On Reporting Likelihood


Tangibles/Assets

Debt/Assets

EBITDA/Assets

Restructure Loan

Commitment
Amount/Assets

Maturity


Over $1Billion vs.
Below $400 Million


0.05


-0.06*

0.08*

-0.21*

-0.17*


-0.1*

-0.01

-0.07*

0.21*

0.2*



-0.04


-0.11*


-0.05


-0.04










Table 3-3. Determinants of the Likelihood of Public and Non-Bank Private Debt Reporting

Probit Reporting Non-Bank Private Public Debt
Debt
Marginal Marginal
Effects Effects
Time trend 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.06
(0.61) (5.24)
Tangibles/Assets -0.54 -0.22 -0.36 -0.14
(-0.96)(-.7
Debt/Assets 0.84 0.33 0.25 0.10
(1.13) (0.50)
EBITDA/Assets 1.72 0.69 -2.21 -0.85
(0.86) (-2.05)
Proceeds/Assets 3.12 1.25 0.46 0.18
(2.3 8) (0.69)
Medium-size firm 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.07
(0.28) (0.63)
Firm's past 12-month -0.13 -0.05 0.57 0.22
cumulative return
(-0.48) (2.81)
Market's past 12-month -0.36 -0.14 -0.13 -0.05
cumulative return
(-0.51) (-0.38)
Constant -0.91 -0.30
(-1.49) (-0.86)
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.10

N 92 355

Table 3-3 provides the estimates of a probit model relating firm and debt characteristics to the
likelihood that the press deems a public debt or non-bank private debt noteworthy through a
press articles or a DJ wire. The analysis is based on a sample of 92 non-bank private debt
agreements and 355 public debt agreements activated between January 1996 and December
2004. I identify reported and non-reported agreements searching the Dow Jones sources for
articles containing the key words used in the announcements literature. M~edium-size firm is a
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400
million in assets. Z statistics are reported in parenthesis.









CHAPTER 4
STOCK PRICE REACTION TO LOAN NEWS. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Among the several explanations for the general pattern of relative stock price effects in

event studies, Smith (1986) cites the unanticipated announcement hypothesis, which states that

the more predictable the issuance and its structure, the smaller the associated stock price

change. Another explanation mentioned in the study of the differences in announcement effects

across security types is the importance of asymmetric information problems. For example, since

debt and preferred stock are more senior claims, their valuation is expected to be less sensitive

than common stock to changes in firm value. In addition, James and Smith (2000) suggest a third

explanation for why bank loan announcements by large and medium-size companies elicit a

positive stock price reaction. According to their results, commitment-based financing is used by

larger companies when they believe themselves to be undervalued or when interest rates are too

high.2

In relation to loan announcements, and given that loan news articles are very brief, it

could be also argued that the articles per se are not informative. It could be argued that loan

articles mainly signal the existence of a noteworthy loan without giving further information

about the circumstances that make the loan noteworthy. Thus, the study of the magnitude of the

market reaction to loan news should consider the factors that make reported loans noteworthy,

i.e., credit risk, information asymmetries, loan characteristics and potential market timing

hypothesis.

The analysis of the stock price reaction to the earliest loan news vs. the reaction to the loan

activation of non-reported deals is presented in Table 4-1. It uses an OLS regression model that

SSee Marsh (1982) for evidence on the use of short-term debt and how to predict public debt issues.

2 For example, and at the time of the Asian crisis in the last quarter of 1998, $10 billion of commercial paper was
retired and $20 billion of net new commercial loans were booked.









studies the likelihood of a higher z-value (average standardized prediction errors times the square

root of the number of observations) in relation to whether the loan is reported and other potential

determinants of market reaction identified in the study of reporting determinants (Table 3-1).

Similarly, Table 3-2 presents the results of the OLS analysis of the market reaction for public

debt and non-bank private debt issues.

As shown in Table 3-1, the market reaction is driven by the size of the issue and market

timing considerations. More specifically, I find that the reaction to loan news increases with

lower measures of cumulative returns of the loan borrower relative to the market during the 12

months preceding the earliest of the news or loan activation of reported loans. This is consistent

with previous work by Hadlock and James (2002), who find evidence in support of a market

timing argument by which firms tend to choose announced bank lending over public debt when

their returns decrease with respect to the market.

The analysis of the market reaction for public debt and non-bank private debt news and

issues is, as expected, inconclusive given that no significant market reaction is observed, in

general, for these two types for issues surrounding news articles or activation of non-reported

issues. As such, and in the case of public debt issues, I find no evidence in support of the market

timing hypothesis, like suggested by the firm characteristics in Table 2-3. However, the size of

the issue relative to firm size still appears to have a positive effect on the market reaction,

especially in the case of public debt issues reported after activation, although the significance

level is a little over 10%. Finally, and although the market reaction is not significant either for

reported and non-reported non-bank private debt issues, I find that tangibles relative to assets can

increase the market reaction, although this firm characteristic does not differentiate reported

from non-reported non-bank private debt borrowers.










Table 4-1. Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Loan Reports and Activation


Non-Confounding Non-Confounding Loans
Loan News vs. Non- News Before Loan Activation
Reported Loans vs. Non-Reported Loans
-0.51 -0.56
(-0.26) (-0.23)
-0.03 -0.09
(-0.09) (-0.2)
0.08 -0.21
(0.02) (-0.05)
4.76 5.86
(1.04) (1.11)
-3.28 0.72
(-0.35) (0.07)
-3.59 -4.45
(-1.15)(-1.08)
5.96 5.95
(3.01) (2.16)
-0.03 -0.02
(-0.66) (-0.35)
1.75 1.62
(0.52) (0.38)
-1.84 -3.3


Press-reported

Time Trend

Tangible/Assets

Debt/Assets

EBITDA/Assets

Restructure

Commitment Amount /Assets

Maturity

Medium-size firm

Firm's past 12-month cumulative
return

Market's past 12-month cumulative
return


(-1.72)
9.43

(2.13)
-0.88
(-0.27)
1196


11.11

(2.12)
-1.53
(-0.4)
1014


Constant


Table 4-1 provides the estimates of two OLS regressions relating the magnitude of the market
reaction to loan news to reporting and firm and loan characteristics The market reaction is
measured as the Standardized Prediction Errors for a two day event window centered on the
earliest of the announcement date or activation date. The analysis is based on a sample of 240
non-confounding press news (53 precede the activation of the loan) and 1071 non-reported loans
activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported loans
searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the key words used in the
announcements literature. Commitment Amount is the size of the loan commitment. Maturity is
the maturity in months of the loan agreement as reported in Dealscan. Medium-size airm is a
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400
million in assets. t statistics are reported in parenthesis.










Table 4-2. Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Public Debt and Non-Bank
Private Debt Reports and Activation


Non-Bank Private Debt
Non-Confounding News
vs. Non-Reported Issues
-0.32
(-0.21)
-0.01
(-0.05)
7.95
(2.44)
-1.61
(-0.3)
-14.06
(-1.54)
-4.1
(-1.56)
-2.18
(-1.36)
-2.73


Public Debt
Non-Confounding News vs.
Non-Reported Issues
2.66
(1.58)
-0.53
(-1.58)
-2.43
(-0.7)
-2.1
(-0.41)
2.73
(0.26)
1.23
(1.69)
1.7
(0.61)
0.45


Press-reported

Time Trend

Tangible/Assets

Debt/Assets

EBITDA/Assets

Commitment Amount /Assets

Medium-size firm

Firm's past 12-month cumulative
return

Market' s past 12-month
cumulative return

Constant


(-1.46)
-3.7

(-1.03)
1.9
(0.52)
81


(0.23)
1.31

(0.31)
2.84
(0.69)
343


Table 4-2 provides the estimates of two OLS regressions relating the magnitude of the market
reaction to public debt and non-bank private debt news to reporting and firm and loan
characteristics The market reaction is measured as the Standardized Prediction Errors for a
two day event window centered on the earliest of the announcement date or activation date.
The analysis is based on a sample of 199 non-confounding public debt news, 146 non-reported
public debt issues, 38 non-confounding non-bank private debt news, and 43 non-reported non-
bank private debt issues activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify
reported and non-reported agreements searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing
the key words used in the announcements literature. Conanitnzent Amount is the size of the
loan commitment. Maturity is the maturity in months of the loan agreement as reported in
Dealscan. M~edium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1
billion in assets and more than $400 million in assets. t statistics are reported in parenthesis.










CHAPTER 5
DETERMINANTS OF INCREMENTAL FINANCING OPTIONS

Previous empirical studies of the determinants of incremental financing choices are based

on samples of bank loans that get reported in the press. Denis and Mihov (2003), Hadlock and

James (2002), Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Cantillo and Wright (2000) find

that smaller, younger, more levered firms are more likely to raise capital via bank debt. 1. In

addition, Hadlock and James (2002) document that higher volatility of returns and lower market

to book and market adjusted cumulative returns during the year prior increase the probability of a

bank agreement over a public debt issue. More recently, Bradley and Roberts (2004) report that

bank borrowers include more covenants in their debt agreements and have greater growth

opportunities and more volatile cash flows than firms that issue public debt.2 These findings are

insightful because they differentiate bank borrowers from bond borrowers using the same firm

characteristics that I have found differentiate borrowers with reported loans from those without.

Furthermore, if as I find, reported loans are not representative of the entire universe of loans, and

non-reported loans are suspected to have a more transactional nature, the determinants of the

choice between bank loans, public debt, and non-bank private could change when non-reported

loan borrowers are also considered.3





i In relation to agreement size, Smith (1986) specifies that firms are expected to use bank lines of credit until an
efficient public issue size is reached. The reason for this size criterion is that flotation costs for public debt issues
have a larger fixed component and more pronounced economies of scale than does bank debt. In addition, non-bank
private loans tend to have lower flotation costs than public issues and custom-designed covenants.
2 Although banks are considered the most efficient liquidity providers in the economy (Kasyap et al. (2002) and
Gatev et al. (2006)), firms are restricted access to bank credit if they do not maintain high enough cash flows (Sufi
(2007)). One explanation for this finding could be the use of marginal vs. book firm characteristics.

3 Regarding the choice between debt and equity, Gomes and Phillips (2005) find that firms with the greatest
asymmetric information problems tend to borrow from private equity, while the most transparent firms seem to issue
public equity, and those that are relatively more opaque prefer bank debt to public debt.










Bank debt and non-bank private debt differ in terms of regulatory requirements, maturity,

costs, placement structure, and creditor concentration (Carey et al. (1998)).4 Overall, since bank

and non-bank private debt offer higher flexibility of renegotiation, it should be optimal for the

riskiest borrowers to borrow privately instead of issuing public debt. 5 In this context,

Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict that firms with high and low credit ratings use public

debt, while firms with intermediate ratings use bank loans. However, Denis and Mihov (2003)

document that while firms with the highest credit quality are more likely to issue public debt, and

firms with medium credit quality establish bank loans, those with the lowest credit quality

establish non-bank private debt agreements. 6 Thus, as Raj an (1992) argues, the cost of bank

monitoring may outweigh the benefits for low-quality firms, and in consequence, low-quality

firms are more likely to issue non-bank private debt than bank debt.

To examine the determinants of the choice between bank debt, public debt and non-bank

private debt in a multivariate setting, I use a series of four multinomial logistic regressions. Table

5-1 reports the regression results, and Table 5-2 the marginal effects. The first multinomial

regression studies the choice between bank borrowing that is reported, public, and non-bank

private debt, while the third and fourth regressions do the same considering all loans and only

non-reported loans, respectively. The second regression studies the choice between reported

issues of bank, public and non-bank private debt.




4 See Bayless and Chaplinsky (1992), Chaplinsky and Hansen (1993), and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) for the
choice between public debt and equity.

5 Sufi (2005) documents that firms with higher lagged earnings to assets are more likely to establish bank loan
agreements as opposed to arm's length debt.

6 More specifically, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that bank and non-bank private borrowers present significantly
lower returns on assets, lower proportions of rated debt and credit quality when credit ratings are available, and
higher growth opportunities in terms of growth in capital expenditures, sales, and number of employees.









The results in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 show that, evaluated at the sample means of the

other explanatory variables, reported loans are 26 percentage points less likely to be chosen over

public and non-bank private debt with higher measures of tangibles to assets, and 23 percentage

points more likely to be chosen over public and non-bank private debt if the borrower is a

medium-size firm. In terms of credit risk, the choice of bank borrowing over public and non-

bank private debt borrowing decreases with higher measures of EBITDA to assets independently

of whether the loans are reported or not. More specifically, I find that, evaluated at the sample

means of the other explanatory variables, reported loans are 170 percentage points less likely to

be chosen over public and non-bank private debt with increases in EBITDA to assets. In

addition, I find that the likelihood that more leveraged firms relative to assets choose bank debt

is 10 percentage points lower for bank loans.

In terms of the effect of proceeds relative to assets on incremental financing choices, and

evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables, firms with higher financial

needs relative to assets are 120 percentage points more likely to choose bank debt over public

and non-bank private debt if only reported loans are considered.

Overall, the study of incremental financing decisions does not vary significantly when

considering only reported loans instead of both reported and non-reported loans. In other words,

whether reported deals or all deals are considered, the results are similar and consistent with

those of previous studies by Hadlock and James (2002), and Denis and Mihov (2003). Riskier

more opaque borrowers are more likely to borrow from banks instead of public debt, and non-

bank private debt has a niche among the riskier borrowers. This suggests that, even if they are

less noteworthy and more transactional, non-reported loans are still somehow special and

different from public debt. Moreover, since Deal Scan covers only syndicated loans, this study










may be excluding a significant proportion of smaller firms that borrow from one lender. Those

firms, as Houston and James (1996) find, are more likely to be subj ect to information

monopolies, and have greater incentives to time the market due to more severe asymmetric

information problems. This could explain the lack for evidence in the analysis for the market

timing hypothesis.









Table 5-1. Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Incremental Financing Decisions

(1.a) (1.b) (2.a) (2.b) (3.a) (3.b)
Time trend -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02
(-2.92) (-1.35) (-1.08) (-0.67) (-2.88) (-0.41)
Tangibles/Assets 1.02 1.21 0.92 1.2 0.28 0.93
(2.17) (2.0) (1.79) (1.42) (0.85) (1.75)
Debt/Assets 1.2 -1.85 1.02 -1.66 1.52 -0.54
(1.84) (-1.87) (1.58) (-.)(4.25) (-0.82)
EBITDA/Assets 7.65 3.65 6.94 2.98 4.81 1.44
(4.87) (1.92) (3.9) (1.22) (5.28) (1.03)
Deal Size/Assets -4.81 -4.74 -4.76 -2.7 -6.03 -4.53
(-2.04) (-2.58) (15)(-1.48) (-2.18) (-2.36)
Medium-size firm -1.81 0.94 -1.75 0.7 -1.17 1.39
(-4.99) (2.51) (-3.97) (1.52) (-4.31) (4.47)
Firm's past 12-month 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.05
cumulative return
(0.74) (0.78) (1.13) (0.13) (0.74) (0.45)
Market' s past 12-month -0.46 -0.64 -0.51 -1.12 -0.55 -0.46
cumulative return
(-1.05) (-1.11) (-1.07) (-1.35) (-1.88) (-0.93)
Constant 0.66 -0.42 -0.02 -1.37 -0.91 -2.72
(1.37) (-0.82) (-0.03) (-2.06) (-2.27) (-6.47)
Pseudo R 0.30 0.30 0.19
14 755 557 1822

Table 5-1 provides the estimates of a series of four multinomial logistic regressions relating the
choice of bank debt over public debt and non-bank private debt, as well as the likelihood and
timing of loan reporting in the context of incremental financing decisions. The analysis is based
on a sample of 304 press-reported, and 1071 non-reported syndicated bank loans, as well as 355
public debt and 92 non-bank private debt agreements, all activated between January 1996 and
December 2004. The public debt and non-bank private debt random samples keep the proportion
of total bank loans in Deal Scan to public debt and non-bank private debt issues in SDC, as well
as the yearly proportions in the original SDC samples. I identify reported and non-reported loan,
public and non-bank issues searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the deal
amount and/or the key words used in the announcements literature. Deal Size refers to the
commitment amount in the case of bank loans and proceeds in the case of public debt and non-
bank private debt. Z statistics are reported in parenthesis.

(1.a) Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(1.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(2.a) Reported Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(2.b) Reported Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(3.a) Public Debt vs. Bank Loans
(3.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Bank Loans










Table 5-2. Multinomial Logistic Regressions. Marginal Effects


(1.a)
Time trend 0.03
(2.85)
Tangibles/As -0.26
sets


_(1.b)_
-0.03
(-3.0)
0.19

(1.73)
0.38
(2.49)
1.69


_(1.c)_
-0.001
(-0.14)
0.07

(1.14)
-0.24
(-2.10)
0.01


_(2.a)_
0.01
(1.26)
-0.22


-0.08
(-0.61)
-1.31


_(2.b)_
-0.01

0.15

(1.27)
0.22
(1.85)
1.22


_(2.c)_
-0.002
(-0.47)
0.07

(1.04)
-0.14
(-1.38)
0.08


3.a)_
0,01
(2.5)
-0.04


_(3.b)_
-0.01
(-2.61)
0.02

(0.64)
0.13
(2.37)
0.39


_(3.c)
-0.001
(-0.23)
0.03

(1.37)
-0.02
(-0.93)
0.03


(-2.49)
-0.14
(-0.94)
-1.7


(-1.32)
-0.1
(-1.84)
-0.42


Debt/Assets

EBITDA/Ass
ets

Proceeds/Ass
ets

Medium-size
firm


Firm's past
12-month
cumulative
return


Market's past
12-month
cumulative
return


(-4.57) (5.27) (0.04) (-4.28) (4.24) (0.48) (-3.06) (2.81) (0.78)
1.2 -0.95 -0.24 0.93 -0.83 -0.1 0.6 -0.48 -0.13

(2.27) (-.)(-2.02) (2.34) (-2.29) (-0.96) (8.17) (-8.35) (-3.98)
0.23 -0.42 0.2 0.21 -0.29 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.06

(2.84) (-5.43) (6.23) (1.66) (-2.27) (2.87) (0.53) (19)(5.49)
-0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.001 -0.01 0.01 0.001


(-0.84) (0.62) (0.55) (-1.03) (1.31) (-0.05) (-0.86) (0.79) (0.39)


0.12


-0.08 -0.04 0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.013


(1.21) (-0.84) (-0.78) (1.39) (-0.78) (13) (1.68) (-1.45) (-0.77)


Table 5-2 provides the


marginal effects


of a series of four multinomial logistic regressions


relating the choice of bank debt over public debt and non-bank private debt. The analysis is
based on a sample of 304 press-reported, and 1071 non-reported syndicated bank loans, as well
as 355 public debt and 92 non-bank private debt agreements, all activated between January 1996
and December 2004. The public debt and non-bank private debt random samples keep the
proportion of total bank loans in DealScan to public debt and non-bank private debt issues in
SDC, as well as the yearly proportions in the original SDC samples. I identify reported and non-
reported loan, public and non-bank issues searching the Dow Jones sources for articles
containing the deal amount and/or the key words used in the announcements literature. Deal Size
refers to the commitment amount in the case of bank loans and proceeds in the case of public
debt and non-bank private debt. Z statistics are reported in parenthesis.
(1.a) Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(1.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(2.a) Reported Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(2.b) Reported Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans
(3.a) Public Debt vs. Bank Loans
(3.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Bank Loans









CHAPTER 6
LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BANK BORROWERS

As commented before, reported loans involve a closer relationship between lenders and

borrowers, while non-reported loans are more transaction oriented and, to a certain extent, more

equivalent to public debt. In consequence, one could argue that reported borrowers may improve

their operating performance with respect to the performance of non-reported borrowers. In a

related study, and since reported loans are more likely to be restructured loans following

covenant violations, Nini et al. (2008) show that, following covenant violations, there is an

effective reduction of capital expenditures that leads to higher performance and valuation.

In the study of long-term operating performance, I use two measures: EBITDA to assets,

and debt to EBITDA. I focus on these two ratios because they are closely linked to the

borrower' s ability to service both current and future bank borrowings. While stock returns and

net income are also important measures of performance used in previous studies, they are more

removed from the banker's principal focus. In addition, the debt to EBITDA ratio is present in

about half the loans that include financial covenants. Thus, firms have an incentive to improve

this ratio.

To limit the effect of outliers, I examine the medians of operating performance measures

for a period of seven years that covers four fiscal years preceding loan activation and the three

subsequent ones. The summary statistics for a fixed sample of firms are presented in Table 6-1 .

Year 0 refers to the fiscal year prior to the activation of the loan.

Overall, I observe in the balanced panel that reported borrowers present poorer operating

performance with respect to non-reported loans during the last three fiscal years prior to the

activation of the loan. However, and although the operating performance measures of reported

II find similar results when I exclude unannounced loans for which there is 8-K filing.









borrowers remain weaker than those of non-reported borrowers for two years following loan

activation, I observe no significant difference at the 5% level in EBITDA to assets during the

third fiscal year following loan activation. Furthermore, it is important to note that the

improvement in the operating performance of reported borrowers would be more pronounced if

the firms whose loans are reported mainly on the basis of loan size or maturity were excluded

from the study sample.











Table 6-1. Median Peer-Adjusted Measures of Subsequent Operating Performance


EBITDA/Assets (%)
Press Reported Unreported
0.13 0.143


Debt/EBITDA (%)
Press Reported Unreported
2.15 1.8


0.13


0.12*


0.12*


0.12*


0.12


0.12

179


0.138


0.136


0.134


0.129


0.124


0.124

593


2.2*


2.8*


1.86


1.93


2.07


2.44


2.78*


3.02*


Year -3


Year -2


Year -1


Year 0


Year 1


Year 2


Year 3


Table 6-1 presents summary statistics for a balanced panel of firms. Year refers to the number of
fiscal years following the loan activation date. Year zero refers to the last fiscal year prior to the
activation date.
* Significantly different from the unreported loan median at the .05 level.
+ Significantly different from the unreported loan median at the .1 level.









CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An important strand of the banking literature holds that banks play a special role in the

capital acquisition process through the close relationship they establish with their borrowers.

More specifically, banks can gain access to private information that is not available to other

credit claimants and provide more flexible lending conditions, which is of particular importance

in the case of private firms. However, it is not clear why the more established less opaque public

firms would need to establish the same type of "unique" relationships with banks in all cases.

Also, it is puzzling why there is a significant positive stock price reaction surrounding the press

reporting of bank loans, given that practically all public firms have bank loans.

To address this puzzle, I begin by examining the frequency and determinants of bank

loan reporting in the Einancial press. I find that only 22% of bank loans are reported, and that the

sub sample of reported loans and borrowers is not representative of the entire population of

syndicated loans and public borrowers. More specifically, I find that, besides bigger loans

relative to assets, longer maturity loans, and loan restructuring following loan covenant

violations are significantly more likely to be reported in the press. In addition, consistently also

with a greater need for lender access to private information, I find that more opaque riskier

borrowers are more likely to have their loans reported.

Reported loans seem more informative about the potential of the borrower than non-

reported ones, an heterogeneity that, to my knowledge, has not been documented before.

However, since the cost of reporting has decreased with technological developments, there is an

increase in the frequency of reporting during the 1996 through 2004 study period that makes the

information content of the average loan decrease overtime. In any case, the firm and deal factors

that explain what makes a loan more likely to be reported are also those that explain the choice









of bank borrowing over public debt borrowing. In consequence, one could argue that non-

reported loans require a less close relation between lender and borrower and are, therefore, more

transaction oriented, although somehow still special and different from public debt.

In general, and although the loans in the sample are disclosed, the market reaction is only

significant in the case of reported loans, especially when the earliest news precedes loan

activation. This reaction to loan reporting when the news precedes loan activation is more

intense when loans are bigger and when the performance of the borrower' s stock is poor with

respect to the market during the year prior. Thus, although borrowing is more difficult to obtain

in the case of reported loans, which makes them more surprising, and therefore newsworthy, loan

reporting also appears to time the market. Still, and consistent with the view that bank loans are

more informative about firm potential when they are reported in the press, reported borrowers

improve their operating performance with respect to non-reported ones over the three years

following the activation of the loan.









LIST OF REFERENCES


Andrade, Gregor, and Steven Kaplan, 1998, How costly is financial (not economic distress?
Evidence from highly leveraged transactions that became distressed, Journal ofFinance
53, 1443-1493.

Barber, Brad M., and John D. Lyon, 1996, Detecting abnormal operating performance: The
empirical power and specification of test statistics, Journal ofFinancial Economics 41,
359-399.

Bayless, Mark, and Susan Chaplinsky, 1991, Expectations of security type and the information
content of debt and equity offers, Journal of Financial Intermediation 1, 195-214.

Best, Ronald, and Hang Zhang, 1993, Alternative information sources and the information
content of bank loans, Journal ofFinance 48, 1507-1522.

Billett, Matthew, Mark Flannery and Jon Garfinkel, 2006, Are banks special? Evidence on the
post-announcement performance of bank borrowers, Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative
Analysis 41, 733-751.

Bradley, Michael, and Michael Roberts, The structure and pricing of corporate debt covenants,
SSRN working paper.

Brophy, David, Paige P. Ouimet, and Clemens Sialm, 2004, PIPE Dreams? The Performance of
Companies Issuing Equity Privately, NBER Working Papers 11011, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.

Cantwello, Miguel and Julian Wright, 2000, How do firms choose their lenders? An empirical
investigation, The Review ofFinancial Studies 13, 155-189.

Carey, Mark, Mitch Post, and Steven A. Sharpe, 1998, Does corporate lending by banks and
finance companies differ? Evidence on specialization in private debt contracting, Journal
ofFinance 53, 845-878.

Chaplinsky, Susan, and Robert Hansen, 1993, Partial anticipation, the flow of information and
the economic impact of corporate debt sales, Review ofFinancial Studies 6, 709-732.

Chemmanur, Thomas, and Paolo Fulghieri, 1994, Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice
between bank loans and publicly traded debt, Review ofFinancial Studies, 7, 475-506.

Denis, David, and Vassil Mihov, 2003, The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and
public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings, Journal ofFinancial Economics 70,
3-28.

Demiroglu, Cem, and Christopher James, The information content of bank loan covenants,
SSRN working paper.










Diamond, Douglas, 1991, Monitoring and reputation, the choice between bank loans and directly
placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99, 688-721.

Eckbo, Espen, Ronald Masulis, and Oyvind Norli, 2007, Security offerings, Handbook of
corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Vol. 1, North-Holland/Elsevier,
Handbooks in Finance series, Ch. 6, forthcoming.

Fama, Eugene, 1985, What' s different about banks?, Journal of2~onetazy Economics 17, 239-
249.

Gomes, Armando, and Gordon Phillips, 2005, Why do public firms issue private and public
securities?, SSRN working paper.

Guner, A. Burak, Loan sales and the cost of corporate borrowing, Review ofFinancial Studies,
forthcoming.

Hadlock, Charles, and Christopher James, 2002, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, Journal of
Finance 57, 1383-1419.

Houston, Joel and Christopher James, 1996, Bank information monopolies and the mix of private
and public debt claims, Journal ofFinance 28, 149-171.

Ivashina, Victoria, and Zheng Sun, Institutional stock trading on loan market information, SSRN
working paper.

James, Christopher, 1987, Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans, Journal ofFinancial
Economics 19, 217-235.

James, Christopher, and David Smith, 2000, Are banks still special? New evidence on their role
in the corporate capital-raising process, Journal ofApplied Corporate Finance 13, 395-
422.

Johnson, Shane, 1997, An empirical investigation of corporate debt ownership structure, Journal
ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 47-69.

Jung, Kooyul, Yong-Cheol Kim, and Rene Stulz, 1996, Timing, investment opportunities,
managerial discretion, and the security issue decision, Journal ofFinancial Econontics 42,
159-185.

Lummer, Scott, and John McConnell, 1989, Further evidence on the bank lending process and
the capital-market response to bank loan agreements, Journal ofFinancial Econontics 25,
99-122.

Marsh, Paul, 1979, equity rights issues and the efficiency of the UK stock market, Journal of
Finance 34, 839-862.

Mikkelson, Wayne H. and M. Megan Partch, 1986, Valuation effects of securities offerings and
the issuance process, Journal ofFinancial Economics 15, 3 1-60.









Mitchell, Mark L., and J. Harold Mulherin, 1984, The impact of public information on the stock
market, Journal ofFinance 49, 923-950.

Moerman, Regina Wittenberg, The impact of information asymmetry on debt pricing and
maturity, University of Chicago working paper, 2005.

Nini, Greg, David Smith, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment
Policy, Journal ofFinancial Economics, forthcoming.

Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arm's
length debt, Journal ofFinance 47, 1367-1400.

Ramakrishnan, R.T.S and Anjan Thakor, 1984, Information reliability and security design,
Review of Economic Studies 51, 415-432.

Rippington, Frederick, and Richard J. Taffler, 1996, The information content of firm financial
disclosures, Journal of business Finance & Accounting 22, 345-362.

Roberts, Michael, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical
Investigation, SSRN working paper.

Roberts, Michael, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Contingency and renegotiation of financial contracts:
Evidence from private credit agreements, SSRN working paper.

Smith, Clifford, 1986, Investment banking and the capital acquisition process, Journal of
Financial Economics 15, 3-29.

Sufi, Amir, 2005, Banks and flexibility: Empirical evidence on the mix of equity, bonds and
bank debt, MIT working paper.

Sufi, Amir, 2007, The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of
Bank Loan Ratings, Review ofFinancial Studies, forthcoming.

Sufi, Amir, 2007, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from
Syndicated Loans, Journal ofFinance 62, 629-668.

Sufi, Amir, 2007, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis, Review of
Financial Studies, forthcoming.

Thompson, Robert B., Chris Olsen and J. Richard Dietrich, 1987, Attributes of news about firms:
An analysis of firm-specific news reported in the Wall Street Journal Index, Journal of
Accounting Research 25, 245-274.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Laura Gonzalez Alana earned her Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering from

Superior College of Engineering of Bilbao (Spain) simultaneously with Bachelors of Arts in

music education and music performance from J.C. Arriaga, Bilbao, Spain. In 2002 and 2003

respectively, she earned her Master of Business Administration and Master of Arts in foreign

languages and literatures from Southern Illinois University-Carbondale. The requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in finance were completed at the University of Florida during

the spring of 2008. Upon graduation from the University of Florida, she will j oin Fordham

University, NY, as an assistant professor in finance. Laura' s research interests include Einancial

markets and institutions, corporate Einance, and international finance.





PAGE 1

1 DOGS THAT BARK: WHY ARE BANK LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS NEWSWORTHY? By LAURA GONZALEZ ALANA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008

PAGE 2

2 2008 Laura Gonzalez Alana

PAGE 3

3 To my parents and Gaurav

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to sincerely thank Christopher Jam es, my disserta tion chair, as well as Joel Houston, Mahendrarajah Nimalendran, Andy Naranjo, and Ronal Ward for all their guidance, encouragement, and advice in making sure I successfully completed this work.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........6ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................7 CHAP TER 1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................82 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA AN D SUMMARY STATISTICS ...................................... 14Sample Selection and Data.....................................................................................................14Summary Statistics.................................................................................................................17Summary Statistics of Market Reaction to Loan News and Loan Activation........................ 233 DETERMINANTS OF LOAN, PUBLIC DE BT, AND NON-BANK P RIVATE DEBT ANNOUNCEMENTS............................................................................................................34Determinants of Bank Loan Announcements......................................................................... 34Determinants of Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt..................................................... 384 STOCK PRICE REACTION TO LOAN NEWS. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS .............. 455 DETERMINANTS OF INCREMENTAL FINANCING OPTIONS..................................... 496 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BANK BORROWERS.............................................. 557 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................58LIST OF REFERENCES...............................................................................................................60BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.........................................................................................................63

PAGE 6

6 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2-1 Annual Distribution of Loans by Year of Deal Activation ................................................ 282-2 Loan Deal Purpose.......................................................................................................... ...292-3 Firm and Loan Summary Statistics for Reported and Unreported Loans.......................... 302-4 Firm and Deal Summary Statistics fo r Reported and Unreported Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt......................................................................................................322-5 Market Reaction Summary Statistics.................................................................................333-1 Determinants of the Likelihood and Timi ng of Bank Loan Reporting in the Press.......... 423-2 Marginal Effects of the Lowest and Highest Quartile Determinants on Loan Reporting............................................................................................................................433-3 Determinants of the Likelihood of Pub lic and Non-Bank Private Debt Reporting........... 444-1 Determinants of the Stock Price Reacti on Surrounding Loan Reports and Activation..... 474-2 Determinants of the Stock Price Reac tion Surrounding Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt Reports and Activation.................................................................................485-1 Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Incremental Financing Decisions.......................... 536-1 Median Peer-Adjusted Measures of Subsequent Operating Performance......................... 57

PAGE 7

7 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DOGS THAT BARK: WHY ARE BANK LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS NEWSWORTHY? By Laura Gonzalez Alana August 2008 Chair: Christopher James Major: Business Administration Virtually all publicly traded firms borrow from banks. However, despite their widespread use, the reporting of bank loan agreements in the financial press is associated with a positive share price reaction. In order to address this phenomenon, I em pirically examine the frequency and determinants of bank loan re porting, and find that the credit risk and asymmetric information proxies behind incremental financing decisions determine loan reporting. In addition, loan restructurings following covenant violations, and larg er loans -relative to firm sizeare also more likely to be reported in the press. Moreover, a nd although all loans are disclosed, I find that the market reacts to reported loans only when th e news precedes loan ac tivation. Overall, the evidence suggests that reported loans are more noteworthy because they are more informative about the potential of the borrowe r than non-reported loans, and th at the information content of the average reported bank loan decr eases during the 1996 through 2004 period.

PAGE 8

8 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In a recent study, Sufi (2007) documents that 94% of publicly traded firms have bank lending relationships. In light of this fact, the reporting in th e financial press of bank loan agreements should be a routine, predictable even t. Nevertheless, a number of previous studies document a positive and statistically significant re turn associated to press articles on loan agreements. This evidence suggests that market participants view pres s-reported bank loans as material events (Mikkelson and Partch (1986) James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (1993), James and Smith (2000)). Furthermore, the positive share price reaction to bank loan announcements (in contrast to the negative stock price reaction to most other financing events) has been widely interpreted as evidence that banks play a unique or special role in the capital acquisition process (Fama (1985) and Rajan (1992)). However, if all firms have banking relationships, and if most bank loans are not reported in th e press, then the share price reaction may have more to do with the circumstan ces in which loan agreements are reported than with the uniqueness of bank borrowing as a financing source (Smith (1986), and James and Smith (2000)). To further explore these issues, I begin by examining the frequency and determinants of bank loan reporting in Dow Jones during the 199 6 through 2004 time period. It is important to note that the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) Deal Scan loans from which the sample is drawn are disclosed in some way, and consist of both press-reported and non-repor ted loan agreements. More specifically, DealScan cites as sources of loan information Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 8-K filings1, other public SEC filings, and industry sources. In addition, 1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require public firms to report any material event through a Form 8-K. This form is described in more detail in Section III.a. of this paper.

PAGE 9

9 DealScan offers affordable real-time web access to agreed-upon but not-yet-active loans2. Hence, the loans reported in Dow Jones that the financial press views as noteworthy are a subset of a pool of disclosed loans. This distinction between reported and disclosed loans is s ubtle but nevertheless important. If there is disclosure about the deals but, as I find, no significant market reaction surrounding the activation of non-reported bank loans, and one assumes reported loans to be significant, it can be argued that the market views reported loans differently than non-reported loans. SEC regulation requires firms to disclose a ny material event that can affect the stock price and shareholders should know about. Furthermore, the literatu re on discretionary disclosure describes how firms are more forthcoming when the news is good (Miller (2002)). Thus, given that banks are considered superior screener s (Diamond (1991) and Fama (1985)) and effective monitors (Nini et al. (2008)), and bank financin g a credible signal of firm quality (Schenone (2004), and James and Wier (1990)), one would exp ect firms to try to disclose all bank loans. Accordingly, I find that the source of loan news is usually the borrower. On the other hand, the source of news for non-bank private debt i ssues is usually market participants. Why would firms not report a ll of their bank loans? Bagno li and Watts (2007) find that firms are more likely to disclose higher values of private info rmation when financial reports do not contain sufficient good news and performance is significantly different than expected. In a related study, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) docum ent that firms are less likely to withhold information in material contract filings when they issue long-term debt. Moreover, prior work shows that riskier more opaque firms are more likely to choose reported bank debt over public 2 The subscription cost to the DealScan database and real-time website is $2,000 per month for corporations with one user ($330/month is more than one user) and $7,304 per year for academic institutions.

PAGE 10

10 debt (see, for, example, Hadlock and James (2002 )). Thus, in light of these findings, one might argue that loans obtained by borrowers with relati vely more costly access to financing higher information asymmetries and credit risk could be deemed more surprising and, therefore, be more newsworthy and likely to get re ported. This is exactly what I find. I find that only 22% of syndicated DealScan loans obtained by public firms are reported in the financial press, and that the borrowers whose loans are reporte d in the press are not representative of the entire sample of ba nk borrowers. Reported borrowers are more highly leveraged, present lower earnings and higher surprise and disp ersion of earnings forecasts. Press-reported loans are also di fferent from non-reported loans. More specifically, I find that reported loans are larger, have longer maturitie s, higher covenant intensity indexes, and constitute more often loan restructurings follo wing covenant violations. Consistent with these findings, I also find that information asymmetrie s, credit risk, loan size and maturity, and whether or not the loan is a restructured lo an determine the likelihood of loan reporting. Thus, the distinction between reported and non-reported loans provide s new insight into the specialness of bank lending by documenting significant heterogeneity in the information content of loans depending on whether the loan is reported or not. The firm and loan characteristics that determine reporting require mo re lender access to private information about the potential of the firm, a task at which banks have a comparative advantage with respect to other lenders (Fama (1985) and Rajan (1992)). Thus, the reporting of a loan suggests the presence of positive private information, although I find a time trend in reporting that leads to a decrease in the information content of re ported loans throughout the 1996 to 2004 period. The higher likelihood of reporting among restru ctured loans complements recent work by Ivashina and Sun (2007), who fi nd 8.8% annualized profits during the month following loan

PAGE 11

11 renegotiations in trading by institutional investors that are members of loan syndicates. The profitability of this trading supports the argument that th e private information revealed and produced during the renegotiations is not only good, but also highl y valuable, which would give the borrower a particularly str ong incentive to report it. The disclosure literature documents how managers time voluntary disclosures in a manner that maximizes insider trading profits while minimizi ng potential litigation costs associated with disclosure (Cheng and Ko (2006). Additionally, the literature on the announcement effects of financing events wh ich spans for over two decades reports a significant positive stock price reaction to announ cements of bank loans, a negative reaction to non-bank private debt placements, and an insignifi cant reaction to straight public debt issues (James (1987), and Eckbo et al. (2007) for a recent re view of this literature). Consistent with this evidence, I find a significant positive market reac tion to reported loans, but only when the news precedes loan activation, and mainly driven by loan size and prior borrower stock performance with respect to the market. This suggests that reported loans are considered more informative when the news precedes the activ ation of the loan because it is arguably more surprising for reported borrowers to obtain financing and timing intensifies the surprise factor. Denis and Mihov (2003) find that credit risk is a significant determinant of the choice between bank debt, public debt and non-bank priv ate debt. However, their analysis considers only the subset of loans that are reported, like other previous studies on incremental financing decisions (Hadlock and James (2002)). In other words, the conclusions of previous work on incremental financing derive from comparing the s ubset of reported bank loans to full samples of other transactions such as public debt and non-bank private debt. Th erefore, if reported loans are a non-representative subset of the loans in DealScan, the analysis of the incremental financing

PAGE 12

12 decisions should also consider ca ses of non-reported loan s. In this context, I find that although reported loans and borrowers differ significantly from non-reported loans and borrowers, the factors that determine the choice between bank debt, public de bt and non-bank private debt do not change whether reported loans or all loans are considered. In conse quence, one could argue that non-reported loans are somewhat sp ecial and different from public debt. Besides a more effective screening, the speci alness of bank loans re lative to other types of financing also has to do with more intense monitoring, which would arguably be more important for loans with higher covenant intens ity, i.e., the reported loans. Furthermore, the access to private information and contracting co nditions that protect banks from the higher potential default on reported loans could arguably lead or not to an improvement in operating performance. In this context, I find that although reported borrow ers present poorer measures of operating performance during the year prior to loan activat ion (relative to non-reported borrowers), there is relative improvement in the operating performance of reported borrowers with respect to non-reported bo rrowers two years following loan activation. This result is consistent with the recent literature on loan covenants (Roberts and Su fi (2007), Nini et al. (2008)) that studies the relation between loan co venant violations, loan restructurings, and subsequent performance3. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of the data sources for the unique samples of bank debt, public debt, and non-bank private debt. It also provides summary statistics of the deals and borrowers, as well as market reaction. Section III examines the determinants of bank loans, pub lic debt, and non-bank private debt reporting in 3 Besides Nini et al. (2007), Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2004) show that the degree of protection granted to investors has a significant effect on subsequent performance, especially in the case of firms that borrow from institutional investors as opposed to hedge funds.

PAGE 13

13 the press. Section IV studies the determinants of stock pri ce reaction surrounding press reporting or activation of non-reported issues. Secti on V examines the relationship between the determinants of incremental financing options an d loan reporting. Secti on VI studies long-term operating performance. Section VII pres ents a summary and the conclusions.

PAGE 14

14 CHAPTER 2 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA AN D SUMMARY STATISTICS Sample Selection and Data The sam ple consists of 1,375 randomly select ed loans that were activated between 1996 and 2004. I choose 1996 as the start year of the study period because since January 1996 the Securities and Exchange Com mission (SEC) requires all firms to submit their filings electronically, and the analysis uses informati on on loan restructurings from 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K filings. The number of loans per year is initially determined so that each year the proportion of loans in the sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of loans in the DealScan database. The reason for this sampling is the anal ysis of incremental financing choices between bank debt, public debt, and non-ba nk private debt. This analysis requires three random samples, one for each type of financing source, that maintain the yearly proportions of the universe of issues reported in DealScan (bank loans) and S ecurities Data Corporation (SDC) (public debt and non-bank private debt). In addition, the random sample maintains the overall proportions of total number of issues for each financing choice w ith respect to the other two, and requires the borrowers to be publicly traded at the time of loan activation. More over, the loan sample includes only completed loans involving U.S. banks with ro les other than participant, and excludes loans granted to financial institutions. DealScan is the source of data regarding the identity and ro le of all members of the loan syndicate, loan maturity, type and purpose, cr edit risk measures, and covenant information. Securities Data Corporation provides information on the proceeds and payment conditions of public debt and non-bank private debt issues. For the classification of reported and non -reported loans, public and non-bank private debt issues, I do a Dow Jones search for news and wire articles and headlines published between

PAGE 15

15 three months prior to one month after the effective date of the issue. I specifically look for articles and headlines that contain the issue si ze and/or the usual key terms used in previous studies. In the case of bank loan announcements th e key terms are line of credit, credit line, credit facility, credi t agreement, credit exte nsion, new loan, loan agreement, loan renewal, loan revision, loa n extension, finance company lo an, term loan, commercial loan, and bank loan. Once the news and wire ar ticles are selected, I collect data for the loan, public debt or non-bank debt issue samples on the frequency of wire and press articles, timing of the earliest article with resp ect to the issue date, news or wire source, and bundling of information with other non-issue -related news in the earliest ar ticle. Furthermore, this handcollected news information identifies articles in which the only loan-related information is the agreement size, those in which bank lending is in ferred through terms such as loan, and those that specify it is a bank agreement, whether the identity of one or more members of the loan syndicate is reported or not. In 64 out of 304 cases of reported loans (out of 1,375 sample loans), the earliest news is accompanied by other news concerning dividends, earnings, or control activity. Most empirical studies of loan announcements exclude these co nfounding announcements so as to focus solely on the information content of the financing news In this paper, confounding press articles are excluded in the analysis of the market reaction to loan announcements (I obtain similar results when confounding articles are included). However, confounding press-reported loans are considered in the examination of incremental financing choices because those decisions are made earlier. Confounding articles are included as well as in the examination of reporting likelihood given that earnings or dividend announcem ents, for example, may reduce information

PAGE 16

16 asymmetries associated with selling securiti es. Thus, excluding conf ounding reporting may bias the results and conclusions. The news information on bank loans is supplem ented with information from filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Mo re specifically, I collect data from the SEC filings whenever available on whether the loans constitute a new agreement, renewal or a restructure deal following a covenant violati on and subsequent waiver. This manual search within SEC filings covers the tw o years prior to loan activation because Roberts and Sufi (2007) find in their study of renegotiation of financial co ntracts that the average effective maturity of bank loans is half the average st ated maturity, which DealScan re ports to be of around four years for the loans in the sample. More specifically, I search the SEC filings for specific expressions1 used in previous studies, and check each passage to ensure that the expressions indeed refer to financial covenant violations, waiv ers, and loan restructurings. The data on issuing firm characteristics, st ock price reaction, and an alysts forecasts, is obtained from Compustat, the Center for Res earch of Security Prices (CRSP), and the Institutional Brokers Estimate Sy stem (IBES) data tape. As a result, the overall sample consists of 1,375 bank loan deals, 355 public debt issues and 92 non-bank private de bt deals. The news search process identifies 304 loan s that are reported in the fina ncial press, 166 additional loans that are identified in the wire but not reported in the press, 905 loans that are not reported in wire or press articles, 207 reported pub lic debt issues and 42 reported nonbank private debt issues. In 1 The specific terms are those also used by Roberts and Sufi (2007): in violation of covenant, in violation of a covenant, in default of covenant, in technical violation of covenant, in technical violation of a covenant, in violation of financial covenant, in violation of a fina ncial covenant, in technical violation of a financial covenant, in technical violation of financial covenant, i n technical default of a financial covenant, in technical default of financial covenant, not in compliance, out of compliance, received waiver, receiver a waiver, obtained a waiver, obtained waiver.

PAGE 17

17 addition, I find that for 78.9% (240 out of 304) of reported loans there is no bundling of loan information with other non-loan related news. Summary Statistics Table 2-1 provides the annual percentage of loans reported in the financial press, those listed on the wire services but not reported in th e press, or those not re ported at all. More specifically, I find that 22% (304 out of 1,375) of th e sample loans are reported in the financial press, while an additional 12% (166 out of 1,375) of loans are re ported in the wire but are not reported subsequently in the press. In addition, about 8% (not reported in the table) of the loans that are not identified in wire or press ar ticles are made public through 8-K filings. The Form 8-K filings follow the SEC regul ation that requires firms to report any material event that may affect the stock pri ce, or definitive agreement not made in the ordinary course of the registrants business.2 As Nini et al. (2008) note, as private agreements, loans are not legal securities a nd, thus, are not subject to dire ct SEC regulation. However, the SEC precedent has established a requirement th at public companies include copies of all material contracts, including bank loan agreements, with relevant SEC disclosures. These contracts typically appear as exhibits at the end of a 10-K or 10-Q report, or as an attachment to an 8-K filing. Table 2-2 presents some initial evidence of how press-reported loans differ from nonreported loans in terms of primary loan purpose, and introduces the hypothes is that the timing of 2 An agreement is deemed as material definitive when it provides for obligations that are material to and enforceable against the registrant or right s that are material to the registrant an d enforceable by the registrant against one or more parties to the agreement, in each case whether or not subject to conditions. The Form 8-K requires the agreement date, the identity of the partie s and a brief description of any materi al relationship between the registrant or its affiliates and any of the parties, other than in re spect of the material definitive agreement. Moreover, the Additional Form 8-K, effective August 2004, expands the nu mber of events that are reportable on Form 8-K and shortens the filing deadline for most items to four business days. These amendments are said to further the goals of Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

PAGE 18

18 the loan news relative to loan activation may not be random. In pa rticular, takeover is the mostcommon primary purpose of the loan s reported in the news before activation (24% vs. 11% for loans reported on or after activ ation, and 8% for non-reported loan s). Debt repayment is also stated as primary purpose of loans reported in the press before activation, but in a lower proportion than for loans reported in the press on or after activa tion (21% vs. 32% of the cases for loans reported or on after activation, and 23% for non-reported loans). On the other hand, working capital is more frequently the main pur pose of loans reported in the press on or after activation (21% vs. 8% in the cas e of loans reported before ac tivation, and 12% in the case of non-reported loans). And, interest ingly, non-reported loans are mo re likely to include 364-day facilities (not specified in Tabl e 2-2). These 364-day facilities ar e a major source of short-term financing, given that non-reported loans are established significan tly more often for corporate purposes (32% vs. 24% for loans reported befo re activation, and 19% fo r loans reported on or after activation). Thus, it may be argued that the frequent corporate purposes of non-reported loans signal a more transaction oriented type of lending that would be deemed less noteworthy by press editors. Table 2-3 reports firm and loan summary st atistics for the fiscal year preceding loan activation. The results identify si gnificant differences between reported and non-reported cases, as well as some potential reasons for the timing of the earliest news with respect to loan activation. The reported summary st atistics include the cases in which loan reporting is bundled with non-loan-related news information, but I obt ain similar results if I exclude confounding articles. The summary statistics of the sample firms, shown in Table 2-3, have been used frequently in the banking literature as proxies for information asymmetries and ex ante risk of

PAGE 19

19 the borrower. The reason is that bank lending is credited for providing tailored and flexible lending to firms that present more opaque ri skier profiles (Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Hadlock and James (2002)). Hence, si nce practically all publ ic firms borrow from banks, heterogeneity in the measures of opaquene ss and credit risk within the loan sample may explain why reported loans and their borrowers may be deemed different from non-reported ones. As shown in Table 2-3, firms with reporte d loans are on average smaller (in terms of assets and sales), and have higher surpri se and dispersion of earnings forecasts3, higher leverage, and poorer operating performance during the fiscal ye ar preceding the activation of the loan as measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, deprec iation and amortization (EBITDA) to assets. The debt to EBITDA ratio, covenant included in about 50% of loan contracts (Demiroglu and James (2007)), is also significantly higher during the year preceding the loan for borrowers with reported loans. Thus, reported bor rowers appear to be on average more opaque and riskier than non-reported borrowers. This is insightful, because those same factors determine as well the choice of bank debt over other source s of incremental financing, as previous work finds. More specifically, previ ous studies document that firms with higher information asymmetries and lower credit risk are more likel y to choose reported bank debt over public debt (Hadlock and James (2001)). Hence, the highe r information content of reported bank loans compared to non-reported ones can explain the need for reporting. 3 Like Gomes and Phillips (2006), I compute the quarterly an alyst earnings surprise as the absolute value of the difference between the median quarterly earnings estimate an d the actual quarterly earnings per share, normalized by the stock price at the fiscal quarter end. Similarly, I com pute the analyst earnings dispersion measure as the standard deviation of outstanding earnings forecas ts normalized by the stock price re quiring a minimum of two outstanding earning forecasts. Additionally, since firms may have incentives to disclose more information prior to a public issue vs. prior to a private issue. Thus, the earnings surprise and dispersion measur es use the average of the last four quarters ending a quarter before the issue date.

PAGE 20

20 The loan characteristics reported also in Ta ble 2-3 show that reported loans are larger relative to the size of the borrower and have longer matu rities than non-reported loans. In addition, reported loans present si gnificantly higher measures of the covenant intensity index (4.5 vs. 3) that would arguably involve closer bank monitoring. The covenant intensity index, as defined in previous studies (Bradley and Robert s (2004)), is an aggregat e measure of covenant structure. It equals the sum of six covenant indicators: collater al, dividend restrictions, asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, and the existence of more than two financial covenants.4 Thus, the value of the intensity inde x ranges between 0 and 6, and implicitly assumes that each covenant is equally restrictive for borrowers. Moreover, following also the criteria of previous studies, th e index is set to missing when the value of one of the indicators is missing (64% of the reported loans and 83% of non-reported loans). Reported loans are also more likely than non -reported loans (30% vs. 12% of the cases) to constitute restructurings fo llowing loan covenant violations and subsequent waivers during the two years preceding the loan agreement object of study. However, the percentage of reported loans that include in the syndica te lenders from which the firm has borrowed previously is lower than in the case of non-reported loans (37% of reported loans have at least a common lender with previous syndicates, vs. 44% in the case of nonreported loans). Thus, reported loans are more likely to be both loan restructuri ngs and new loans with new lenders. Reported loans also present significantly hi gher all-in-drawn spreads, a measure that further reflects the riskiness of borrowers with reported loans suggested by the firm summary characteristics. In particular, DealScan expresses the all-in-drawn spread as a basis point mark4 Dealscan includes covenant information on dividend payment restrictions under certain conditions, collateral requirements and prepayments requirements (so called sweeps that mandate that a portion of the loan be repaid out of excess cash flows, debt and equity financings, or asset sales proceeds).

PAGE 21

21 up over the 6-month LIBOR that includes recurri ng fees associated with the credit facility.5 The spread is used as a measure of per dollar cost of borrowing in a number of previous empirical studies on loan pricing (for example, Bradle y and Roberts (2004), Guner (2006) and Moerman (2005)). It is interesting to note here that, besides the loan size relative to the firm size, all-indrawn spreads measures also differentiate, among reported loans, those that are reported before loan activation with respect to those reported on or after activati on, as shown in Table 2-3. More specifically, I find that loans reported in the press before activation are larger (relative to firm size) and present higher all-in-d rawn spreads than those report ed on or after activation, which would arguably make their announ cements even more noteworthy. Overall, the firm and loan summary statistics in Table 2-3 show that reported loans and their borrowers are not representative of the universe of loans and borrowers. Furthermore, the firm characteristics that differentiate reported loans from non-reported loans also differentiate bank borrowing from public borrowing in previo us studies (Hadlock and James (2002)). In consequence, it could be argued that non-reporte d bank borrowing constitutes an intermediate debt source between reported bank borrowing and public debt borrowing. Table 2-4 presents firm and issue characteris tics for non-bank private debt and public debt deals. Like bank loans, both in the case of pub lic debt and non-bank priv ate debt issues, bigger deals (relative to firm assets or not) are more likely to be reported. However, there are important differences in terms of frequency of reporting and potential determinants of press reporting between bank loans, public debt and non-bank privat e debt issues. First, it is important to note that about 40% of the non-bank private debt issues are reported and that 60% of the public debt issues are reported. Thus, bank loans are much less likely to get reported than public debt and 5 LPC computes the spread for non-LI BOR based loans by converting index us ed to price the loan into a LIBOR equivalent using the historical relationship between the index and the LIBOR.

PAGE 22

22 non-bank private debt issues. This would explai n why the summary statistics of non-bank private debt borrowers and public debt borrowers show le ss statistical differences between reported and non-reported borrowers than in the case of ba nk loans. More specifically, reported non-bank private debt borrowers are smaller than their non-re ported counterparts, but th is is not the case of public debt borrowers. Also, reported public debt borrowers present lower operating performance than their non-reported counterpart s, unlike non-bank private debt borrowers. Table 2-4 introduces two other interesting facts related to credit rating and cumulative returns. Like in the case of bank loans, non-bank private debt issues are reported more frequently when the borrower does not have credit rating or its credit rating is below BBB. This is consistent with the findings of Denis and Mihov (2003), who show that non-bank private debt lenders have a niche among the riskiest borrowers. Furthermore, it can be argued that borrowers without credit rating are not only riskier, but also more opaque characteristics that also differentiate reported borrowers from non-reporte d ones. On the other hand, the borrowers whose public debt issues get reported are credit rate d more often than non-reported borrowers, and the credit rating is at least BBB more often than in the case of non-reported borrowers. Furthermore, reported public debt borrowers also have higher cumulative returns during the year prior to the issue. This is insightful because it suggests that the reporting of public de bt issues in the press may time the market. How do the firm characteristics of bank, public debt and non-bank private debt borrowers in the sample compare to those of previous studies of incremental financing decisions? To address this issue I use the seas onally adjusted monthly Consumer Price Inde x (CPI), as provided by the U.S. Department of Labor. I control for inflation by bringing the summary statistics of previous studies from the mid-month of their study periods to June 2000, the mid-month of my

PAGE 23

23 January 1996 to December 2004 period. Overall, and as expected for syndicated loan borrowers, the firms in this paper are bigger. In terms of firm assets, Denis a nd Mihov (2003) study bank, public debt and non-bank private de bt borrowers that are significantly smaller than the borrowers in my sample (firm asset medians of $162.24, $2,435, and $246.2 million respectively). James (1987) also uses smaller public private debt borrowers (firm assets medians of $3,322.27), as well as longer maturity bank loans (median of 72 months). In terms of leverage, Hadlock and James (2002) study the choice between bank borro wing and public debt borrowing with higher debt to assets ratios (median ratios of 0.52 and 0.44 respectively). Consistently with the higher leverage, the bank and public debt firms in Hadlock and James (2002) study borrow less (median commitment to assets ratios of 0.26 and 0.047 re spectively). However, I observe no significant difference in terms of firm assets when compar ing the size of the bank borrowers in previous studies with the subsample of reported loans in my sample. This is insightful, because previous studies consider only reported loans. Hence, th e similarities between my subsample of reported borrowers and the samples of reported borrowers used previously in the literature allow a comparison of results. Summary Statistics of Market Reaction to Loan Ne ws and Loan Activation How do loans come to be published through Dow Jones? The issuance of a press release by the borrower constitutes one more source of information in the first step of the chain that conveys the information to the market through th e press. Thompson et al (1987) describe the process. Once reporters or firms transmit the stor y to the Dow Jones News Service, the editors summarize them, weight their importance, and determine whether to make them press news. This process takes place within hours or, in most cases, not more than one day. One should note that the dissemination of ne ws information through wire services does not target only Dow Jones. In fact, the New York Stock Exchange regulations require

PAGE 24

24 simultaneous disclosure of firm-specific news to Dow Jones and Reuters, and the American Stock Exchange requires simultaneous disclosure to Dow Jones, Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International, the Wall Street Journal the New York Times Standard & Poors, and Moodys Investor Service (Thompson et al. (19 87)). Nevertheless, bo th practitioners and academics rely on Dow Jones as the primary source of news existence and timing, most likely because of its longer tradition and wi der dissemination of information.6 In any case, when I select a random subsample of loans and search for press articles without limiting the source, I find that Dow Jones captures all case s in which the loans are reported. The nature of the publishing process raises several questions. First, can financial press editors influence returns and tr ading volume through editing? Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find that the number of news stories a nd market activity are directly re lated and that this relation is robust to the size of the headlines and macroeco nomic announcements. In addition, they find that the association between larger size headlines and higher market returns does not have a significant effect on trading volume.7 Second, how much news is there in successive announcements? Rippington and Taffler (1996) fi nd that only preliminary announcements and interim statements convey substantial amounts of new information. Thus, in light of the findings in previous work, one could argue that multip le incomplete announcement returns could be aggregated in the study of the market reaction to loan news. However, the loans in the sample are reported in most cases th rough unique articles, and in the few cases where there is more than one 6 Dow Jones maintains five wire services in addition to publishing the Wall Street Journal and Barrons Dow Jones also maintains the News Retrieval Serv ice, which contains selected articles from the Dow Jones News Service, now called Factiva, and the Wall Street Journal In terms of coverage, the Journal appears to include the initial news release data for approximately 96% of the items listed in the NYSE/ASE Index (Thompson et al. (1987)). 7 Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find April to be the month with the smallest number of announcements per day. In addition, Thompson et al. (1987) also document that firms are less likely to issue news releases on Fridays and in December.

PAGE 25

25 article about a loan (in most cases just two artic les) they are either dated the same day with practically verbatim information about the loan or one article is a summary of the key points in the other one, or distant enough in time not to affect the two-day event study results. The two-day-window event studies of bank, public and non-bank private debt announcements use the earliest of the first news or the issue activation date as event date, a standard market model estimation period that ends 46 trading days before the event date, and the standard methodology by Mikkelson and Partch ( 1986) to measure the stock price reaction. In addition, since there is contamination of loa n, public debt and non-bank private debt news, I control for it and find similar results when conf ounding news articles are included. Thus, I report in this paper only the non-confounding results given that previous st udies exclude confounding press articles in their analysis of market reaction surrounding announcements. I find that for 78.9% (240 out of 304) reported lo ans, and 63.1% (53 out of 84) of loans reported before the activation date, there is no bundli ng of loan information with other non-loan related news. I classify as bundling or contamination of the earliest loan related article any information within the same article that can affect the stock price. The nature of the bundling of information can range, for example, from an earnings announcemen t that does not appear to be a repetition of previous news, to the completion of an acquisition. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), aver age standardized prediction errors (SPE) and Z values associated to loan, public debt and non-bank private debt reporting and activation are reported in Table 2-5 and pr esent four interesting findings. First, although the market can gain access to information about the existence and deal activation date of the non-reported loans, there is no significant market reaction surrounding the deal activation for the non-reported

PAGE 26

26 loans8. More specifically, and as disc ussed in the introduction to this paper, DealScan uses as sources of loan information public SEC filings and market sources, and maintains a real-time website that reports the existen ce of not-yet active loans. Thus, it can be argued that the sample loans are disclosed. Second, I find that the signifi cant market reaction to repor ted loans is driven by the reaction to news articles that precede the activation of the loans. This is consistent with the differences shown in Table 2-5 between loans repo rted before activation and loans reported on or after activation. As mentioned be fore, loans reported before activation show a higher DealScan spread and commitment size relative to assets th at would arguably make them more noteworthy among all the loans that are reported. In conseque nce, the reporting in the press of those loans would more likely trigger a larger market reaction, especially if the timing of the article that precedes loan activation cannot be foreseen and increases the surprise by which the news takes the market. Sections III and IV discuss in more detail the determinants of loan reporting and market reaction in relation to the timing of the news. Third, the market reaction to public debt announcements is not significant when all reported issues are considered. However, when pr ess articles are classified by their timing with respect to deal activation, the announcements following activa tion are associated with a significant positive market reaction. This is in teresting, because I find no difference between public debt deals reported before activation and after activation in term s of borrower opaqueness and credit risk, or in terms of deal characteristics. 8 Previous work by Thompson et al. (1987) also observes no significant market reaction to announcements in the wire services that are not followed by announcements in the financial press, bu t their study does not distinguish bank loan reporting from all other news types.

PAGE 27

27 Fourth, although the reaction to non-bank private debt news is overall negative, I find no significant market reaction to non-bank private debt news. The reason could be associated to the bigger size of the non-bank private debt borrowers in my sample. Bigger firms tend to be less opaque and therefore, less risky.

PAGE 28

28 Table 2-1. Annual Distribution of Loans by Year of Deal Activation Year of Deal Activation All Sample Bank Loans N=1375 Loans Reported in Press Before Activation N=84 Loans Reported in Press On or After Activation N=220 DJ & PR Wire Reported Loans N=166 Nonreported Loans N=905 1996 11.78% 8.33%8.64%11.45% 12.93% 1997 15.56% 15.48%14.21%15.66% 15.69% 1998 12.51% 20.24%11.36%8.43% 12.82% 1999 11.27% 16.67%10.9%7.83% 11.49% 2000 11.85% 7.14%11.36%11.45% 12.49% 2001 11.05% 9.52%14.09%7.23% 11.16% 2002 10.25% 14.29%10%11.45% 9.72% 2003 9.38% 4.76%11.36%12.05% 8.84% 2004 6.35% 3.57%7.27%14.45% 4.86% The sample consists of 1474 randomly selected syndicated bank loan agreements activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of loans randomly selected each year was determined so that each year the proportion of loans in my sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of loans in DealScan database I include loans involving US banks and only US publicly traded firms at the time of loan activa tion. I identify reported and unreported loans searching the Wire and Dow Jones News Retrieval Service for articles and headlines containing the deal amount and/or the key words bank, l ine credit, loan. I requ ire the financial press and wire information to be published between three months prior to one month after the activation of the loan as reported in DealScan.

PAGE 29

29 Table 2-2. Loan Deal Purpose Percen tage within All Loans Percentage within Loans Reported Before Activation Percentage within Loans Reported On or After Activation Percentage within DJ&PR Wire Reported Loans Percentage within Nonreported Loans Debt. Repay 24.44 % 21.43%32.73%21.69% 23.2% Working Capital 14.62 % 8.33%21.36%19.88% 12.6% Takeover 10.4% 23.81%11.36%12.65% 8.51% Corporate Purposes 28.8% 23.81%19.09%24.7% 32.38% Acquis. Line 4.51% 7.14%4.09%8.43% 3.65% CP Backup 12.0% 5.95%5.9%5.42% 15.25% Other 5.24% 9.53%5.47%7.23% 4.41% The sample consists of 1474 randomly selected syndicated bank loan agreements activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The number of loans randomly selected each year was determined so that each year the proportion of loans in my sample equals the corresponding annual proportion of loans in DealScan database I include loans involving US banks and only US publicly traded firms at the time of loan activa tion. I identify reported and unreported loans searching the Wire and Dow Jones News Retrieval Service for articles and headlines containing the deal amount and/or the key words bank, l ine credit, loan. I requ ire the financial press and wire information to be published between three months prior to one month after the activation of the loan as reported in DealScan.

PAGE 30

30Table 2-3. Firm and Loan Summary Statistics for Re ported and Unreported Loans The loan sample consists of 304 loans reported in the financia l press, 166 loans reported in the wire, and 905 non-reported syn dicated bank loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt sample consists of 355 issues, and the non-bank private debt sample of 92 issues, also activated between Ja nuary 1996 and December 2004. The number of security issues randomly selected is determined so that each year the proportion of security issues in the sample equals the corresponding annual propor tion of Loans Reported in Press Before Activation N=84 Loans Reported in Press On or After Activation N=220 DJ & PR Wire Reported Loans N=166 Non-reported Loans N=905 Mean MedianMeanMedianMeanMedianMeanMedian Assets (millions) 3680.28 504.87*2355 .06*500.84*4119.3480. 32*4688.93885.13 Sales (millions) 2261.74* 362.13*1861 .3*499.22*3066.3530.59*4027.94819.96 Tangible/Assets 0.36 0.300.330.260.30*0.24*0.360.29 Earnings Surprise (%) 0.85 0.38*1.040.26*0.530.180.550.14 Earnings Dispersion (%) 0.40 0.17*+0.250.10*0.300.11*0.280.07 Debt/Assets 0.35* 0.36*0.33*0.34*0.290.270.280.27 Debt/EBITDA 3.84* 3.08*3.312.57*3.252.223.012.07 EBITDA/Assets 0.12* 0.12*0.12*0.12*0.12*0.130.140.13 Credit Rating 0.45 00.39*00.4300.470 Investment Credit Rating 0.23* 00.18*00.30*00.380 Firms 12-month cum. return 0.096 0.030.270.070.260.10.190.11 Commitment (millions) 448.92 216.73*392.55175565.79192.22400.33150 Commitment/ Assets 0.69*+ 0.44*+0.44*0.36*0.42*0.29*0.260.16 Maturity (months) 51.65* 53.86*46*42.49*43.60*37.5*35.0931.43 Covenant Intensity Index 4.42* 5*4.53*4*3.71*3*3.083 Restructuring 0.30* 00.32*00.1600.120 All-in-drawn spread 234.2*+ 238.6*+204.31*181.88*181.88*160*133.67100

PAGE 31

31loans in DealScan database, and public debt and non-bank private debt deals in Securities Data Corporation (SDC). In addition, the randomly selected issues maintain the overall proportions of total number of security issues for each financing type with respect to the other two, as reported in DealScan and (SDC). I identify reported and non-reporte d deals searching Dow Jones sources for news a nd wire articles that contain the deal amount and/or the key words used in the literatur e on loan, public debt and non-bank privat e debt announcements. Tangible assets are plant, property a nd equipment divided by assets. Earnings Surprise is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the median quarterly earnings estimate and the actual earnings per share, normalized by the sto ck price. Earnings Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of earning forecasts normalized by the stock price. Credit Rating is an indicator variable equal to one if the fi rm has a debt rating, zero otherwise. The Investment Grade Rating is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an existing debt rating of BBB or higher, zero otherwise. Commitment is the size of the loan commitment. Maturity is the maturity of the loan agreement as reported in Dealscan. The covenant intensity index equals the sum of six covenant indicators (collateral, dividend restriction, more than two financial covenants, asset sales sweep, equ ity issuance sweep, and debt issuance sweep) when none of the six indicators is missing. All-in-drawn spread is calculated and reported by Dealscan as the total borrowing cost of the drawn portion of a loan over and above LIBOR. The maturity and DealScan all-in-drawn spread are calculated as the weighted average of the maturity and spread of each facility in the package loan. Significantly different from non-reported loan issue sample at the 0.1 level. + Significantly different from sample of reported loans on or after deal activation date at the 0.1 level.

PAGE 32

32Table 2-4. Firm and Deal Summary St atistics for Reported and Unreported P ublic Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt The loan sample consists of 304 loans reported in the financia l press, 166 loans reported in the wire, and 905 non-reported syn dicated bank loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt sample consists of 355 issues, and the non-bank private debt sample of 92 issues, also activated between Ja nuary 1996 and December 2004. The number of security issues randomly selected is determined so that each year the proportion of security issues in the sample equals the corresponding annual propor tion of loans in DealScan database, and public debt and non-bank private debt deals in Securities Data Corporation (SDC). In addition, the randomly selected issues maintain the overall proportions of total number of security issues for each financing type with respe ct to the other two, as reported in DealScan and (SDC). I identify reported and non-reporte d deals searching Dow Jones sources for news a nd wire articles that contain the deal amount and/or the key words used in the literatur e on loan, public debt and non-bank privat e debt announcements. Tangible assets are plant, property a nd equipment divided by assets. Credit Rating is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a debt rating, zero otherwise. The Investment Grade Rating is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an existing debt rating of BBB or higher, zero otherwise. Commitment is the size of the loan commitment. Significantly different from non-repor ted issue sample at the 0.1 level. Reported Non-Bank Private Debt N=42 Non-reported NonBank Private Debt N=50 Reported Public Debt N=207 Non-reported Public Debt N=148 MeanMedianMeanMedianMeanMedianMeanMedian Assets (millions) 2303.2481.16*15983.7 3 867.5322389.96852.4419453.57609.65 Sales (millions) 2393.96585.956877.85673.218460.86120.517626.38358.2 Tangible/Assets 0.40.330.420.390.40.380.430.41 Debt/Assets 0.290.270.280.280.350.330.340.32 Debt/EBITDA 2.731.622.292.112.962.292.482.05 EBITDA/Assets 0.140.130.150.130.15*0.140.170.16 Credit Rating 0.36*00.5700.97*00.930 Investment Credit Rating 0.14*00.4300.83*00.750 Firms 12-month cum. return 0.160.120.240.170.21*0.140.120.09 Commitment (millions) 55.86*48.25*37.9425383.92*250110.6236 Commitment/Assets 0.23*0.1*0.070.030.100.040.050.004

PAGE 33

33Table 2-5. Market Reaction Summary Statistics The sample consists of 240 loan news and 1071 non-reported bank loan agreements, 199 reported and 146 non-reported public debt issues, and 38 reported and 43 non-reported non-bank private debt issues activated between Janua ry 1996 and December 2004, with all news being free of contamination. Nonconfounding news means that the loan information in the press articles are not bundled with other non-loan related information such as earnings, dividends, changes in management or completion of acquisitions. I identify reported and non-reported issues searching Dow Jones sources for articles containing the issue am ount and/or the key words used in the literature of bank loan, pub lic debt and non-bank private debt announcements. CAR and SPE refer to the two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Standardized Prediction Errors of a 2-day window event study centere d on the earliest of news date and dea l activation date. Z value is calculated as th e square root of the number of observations times the average Standardized Predicti on Error. Statistically different at 10% level from non-reported subsample. + Statistically different at 10% le vel from reported subsample that does not precede lo an activation. Non-Confounding News Before Loan Activation Non-Confounding News On Loan Activation Non-Confounding News After Loan Activation Non-reported Deals Mean MedianMeanMedianMeanMedianMeanMedian Loans N=53N=37N=150N=1071 CAR (%) 2.56*+ 0.130.0330.260.460.160.25-0.06 Average SPE 0.32 0.009 0.077 0.05 Z value 2.33 0.05 0.96 1.64 Public Debt N=52 N=111 N=36 N=146 CAR (%) 0.58 0.33-0.11-0.11.210.56-0.18-0.001 Average SPE 0.21 -0.03 0.39 -0.07 Z value 1.51 -0.31 2.34 -0.85 Non-Bank Private Debt N=24 N=3 N=11 N=43 CAR (%) 1.12 0.003-3.49-4.54-0.38-0.421.67-0.38 Average SPE 0.11 -0.67 -0.11 0.05 Z value 0.55 -1.2 -0.36 0.33

PAGE 34

34 CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF LOAN, PUBLIC DE BT, AND NON-BANK PRIVATE DEBT ANNOUNCEMENTS The substantial heterogeneity in firm a nd loan characteristic s shown in Table 3-1 evidences that reported loans and their borrowers constitute a non-repres entative subsample of the entire DealScan universe of loans and thei r public borrowers. Furthe rmore, the differences between reported and non-reported loans may argua bly involve differences in loan information content that would explain the noteworthiness of reported loans and help identify the criteria used by press editors. In addition, the widespread use of bank loans (94% of public firms borrow from banks) and the fact that about 60% of publ ic firms issue public debt (Sufi (2007)) also raises the question of whether press editors follow the same firm and deal characteristics related criteria when deciding which public debt and non-bank private debt issues to publish, as compared to loan reporting. Determinants of Bank Loan Anno uncements A large theoretical literature in banki ng focuses on banks as screeners that reduce ex ante information asymmetries when compared with public arms length debt (Diamond (1991), Fama (1985), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)). Furthermore, the banking literature argues that loans constitute a unique source of financing because, among other reasons, banks have access to information that is not available to other lenders and market participants while screening loans and monitoring bor rowers (Rajan (1992)). So, if non-reported loans require less access to private information due to their less se vere information asymmetries, one could argue that the lenders of non-reporte d loans do not know significantly more than other market participants about their non-reported borrowers Consequently, those loans would constitute a weaker signal of firm quality a nd be, therefore, less noteworthy.

PAGE 35

35 Previous empirical studies document that mo re opaque firms are more likely to use bank debt (Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Sufi (2007))1 when the returns of the borrower decrease with respect to the market (H adlock and James (2002)), and that relatively riskier firms also choose bank debt over public debt (Denis and Mihov (2003)). Moreover, and in relation to disclosure decisions, Bagnoli and Wa tts (2007) find that firms are more likely to disclose private information when the operating performance in financial reports falls below expectations and/or does not contain sufficient good news. Thus, besides measures of asymmetric information, market timing and le verage, EBITDA to assets ratio could also constitute a significant dete rminant of reporting likelihood. Roberts and Sufi (2007) repor t that, although over 90% of l ong term loan contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity, only 16% of the renegotiati ons are due to default events such as covenant viola tions. In addition, a related study by Nini et al. ( 2008) shows that following loan covenant violations and subsequent waivers there is an efficient reduction in firm investment and subsequent increases in market valuation and operation performance. Thus, one could argue that loan contract s following covenant violations could also be viewed as a significant signal of firm potential and be, therefore, more notewor thy. Finally, and in relation to loan characteristics that could make reporting more likely, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) find that firms are less likely to withhold information in material contract filings when they issue long-term debt. This suggests that, besides larger loans, loans with longer maturity could also be more newsworthy. Therefore, since summary statistics show heterogeneity in all the above-mentioned borrower and loan characteristics suspected to determine reporting likelihood, the analysis of 1 Recent studies by Sufi (2007 ) find increased access to capital of less in formed investors follo wing the introduction of bank loan ratings as well as more concentrated syndicated loans in the ca se of opaque borrowers.

PAGE 36

36 bank loan reporting determinants includes proxie s for information asymmetries, credit risk, market timing, loan restructuring following viola tions, loan size, and loan maturity. In addition, one could argue that the largest fi rms are less opaque and the smallest firms of less interest to the general investor, and that, cons equently, their loans could be less likely to be reported. Thus, given that the likelihood of repor ting is suspected to have a no n-linear dependency with respect to borrower size, the analysis also considers a medium-firm-size dummy variable. This dummy equals one if the firm has assets of less than $1 billion and more than $400 million in order to include non-reported borrowers with below-me dian firm size and reported borrowers with above-median firm size. The analysis of loan-reporting determinants is based on a series of probit models. Table 3-1 reports the regression results and marginal effects for the two main probit models. The first model studies the likelih ood that a loan is deemed noteworth y through a press article or a Dow Jones wire article that is not made press news. The dependent va riable equals one if the bank loan is reported in the financia l press or on the Dow Jones wire but not in the press, and zero otherwise. The second regression analyzes how the factors that determ ine the likelihood of reporting can also affect the timing of the repor ting, i.e., the likelihood that a loan is reported before its activation date. As shown in Table 3-1, higher measures of information asymmetries and credit risk increase the likelihood of loan reporting. These de terminants are measured by tangibles relative to assets and EBITDA to assets, al though other proxies used in the literature, such as volatility, and surprise and dispersion in earnings forecasts lead to analogous results. In addition, loan restructurings, loans with longer maturities, and bigger loans relative to assets are also more likely to be reported in the press. More specifically, I find that, evaluated at the sample means of

PAGE 37

37 the other explanatory variables, the likelihood of a loan being reported is 13 percentage points lower with higher tangibles relative to assets, 41 percentage points lower with higher measures of EBITDA to assets, 21 percen tage points higher in the ca se of loan restructurings, 17 percentage points higher when the commitment amount relative to firm size is bigger, and 11 percentage points higher when the borrower is a medium-size firm. It is important to note that these are also the determinants that reporters of loan news in Dow Jones cite when asked on the phone about the criteria followed to determine whether a particular loan is newsworthy. Thus, both the analysis and anecdotal ev idence suggest that reported loan s are more surprising and also informative about firm potential. Beyond the average marginal effects reported in Table 3-2 reports how the lowest and highest quartile measures of loan-reporting de terminants in the 1,375 loan sample alter the likelihood of reporting evaluated at the sample means of the othe r explanatory variables. More specifically, the likelihood of re porting decreases by 10 percentage points for the firms within the highest quartile of tangibles to assets, increases by 8 percentage points (decreases by 7 percentage points) for the firms with EBITDA to a ssets within the lowest (highest) quartiles of the sample, and increases by 20 percentage poin ts (decreases by 17 percentage points) for the firms with loan commitment to assets within the highest (lowest) quartiles of the sample. The analysis of the loan reporting determinan ts also shows that the likelihood of loan reporting is increases throughout the study period This could be arguably be due to lower reporting costs thanks to developments in information technology, and suggests that the information content of the av erage reported loan decreases during the 1996 through 2004 period. In order to confirm the non-lin ear dependency of loan reporti ng with respect to firm size, I apply the reporting likelihood prob it model to the firms in the sample that fall within the

PAGE 38

38 smallest biggest size quartile in terms of assets (the regressi on results are not reported in the paper). As expected, I find that when the loan s are surprising and informative given loan characteristics, information asymmetries, and bo rrower credit risk but the borrower is a small firm, the wire article that is not followed by a pr ess article is usually a press release wire. Thus, once could argue that loans to smaller borrowers ar e less likely to draw attention from the press because those firms are of less interest to the ge neral investor. On the other hand, in the case of the biggest firms, which receive greater analys t coverage, I find that not all their loans are systematically reported. The loans obtained by the biggest firms are reported when credit risk and loan characteristics justify it, given th at these borrowers are generally less opaque. The second probit model reported in Ta ble 3-1 studies whether loan-reporting determinants also influence the timing of the loan news with respect to loan activation. Overall, I find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that firm characteristics affect the timing of the loan news. However, the size of the loan commitme nt relative to borrower size increases the likelihood that the loan is re ported before loan activation. Overall, only the loans that seem more in formative about the potential of the borrower are reported. This evidences deal variety in the loan market that had not been documented before. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in in formation asymmetries and credit risk that distinguishes reported from non-reported cases is insi ghtful because it also determines the choice of reported bank debt over public debt (Hadlock and James (2001)). In consequence, one could argue that non-reported loans ar e more transactional, contrary to the belief that bank loans always involve a more or less close re lationship between borrower and lender. Determinants of Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt The news search for the samples of 355 pub lic debt issues and 92 non-bank private debt issues indicates that most public debt deals are reported in the press vs. 57% of the non-bank

PAGE 39

39 private debt deals. In addition, the news search shows that almo st 20% of non-bank private deals are reported by the borrower, while in the case of public debt reporting by the firm is rare and usually related to debt repayment. Thus, in the case of non-bank priv ate deals, either the borrowers or the lenders seem to want investor s to know about the deals. This is interesting given that previous studies document a negative market reaction to non-bank private debt (Eckbo (2007)). The borrower and lender incentives to report non-bank private debt despite the adverse reaction of the market could be explained th rough the findings of Denis and Mihov (2003) and Carey el al. (1998) that associate non-bank private lenders to the financing of the riskiest borrowers. It seems that the good news of gettin g financing should increa se the likelihood that non-bank private debt is announced. However, only banks are considered to be special in terms of access and generation of private information and efficient monitori ng (Fama (1985), Rajan (1992) and Denis and Mihov (2003)). On the other hand, in the cas e of reporting of public debt issues, if those borrowers are significantly less risky and opaque than bank borrowers, one may argue that the likelihood of reporting would decrease at least among the best performers. Thus, how do the determinants of bank loan reporting differ from those of public debt and non-bank private debt? The analysis of the likelihood of public debt and non-bank private debt reporting through a press article or a Dow Jones wi re article is shown in Table 3-3. The probit analysis for non-bank privat e debt shows that, besides information asymmetries, credit risk does not seem to play a significant role in the likelihood of reporting of non-bank private debt issues (although it plays it in the choice of non-bank private debt borrowing, as Dennis and Mihov find (2003)). The r eason could be that a lthough this type of financing serves the niche of hi ghest risk borrowers that cannot obtain financing from loans, the

PAGE 40

40 lenders do not necessarily base the agreements on private information about firm potential, but on control rights. In relation to measures of risk, Table 33 also shows that a lthough the size of the proceeds relative for firm size does not affect the likelihood of reporting for public debt borrowers, non-bank private debt issues are 125 percentage points more likely to be reported as proceeds relative to firm size increase when evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables. The reason co uld be that public debt borrowe rs are not expected to default on the agreements, while non-bank private borrowers could. Thus, bigger loans granted to riskier borrowers may be considered good news because the lenders have positive private information about the borrower, while bigger lending to the ri skiest firms is negative news, since it may just imply additional risk and a higher probability of default. In addition, the likelihood of public debt re porting is found to be 22 percentage points higher in the case of firms with higher cumulative returns when evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables. This is consistent with market sources echoing the new public debt issues of the market darlings, which woul d not require revelation of any particular insight regarding firm potential, and w ould lead to an average null market reaction to the news. Moreover, and as expected, the likelihood of public debt reporting is 85 percentage points lower in the case of firms with better operating perfor mance, and therefore, le ss risky, given that, as mentioned before, public debt borrowers are less opaque. Finally, the probit analysis show s that public debt issues, like loans, are more likely to be reported over time, but that there is no significa nt time trend in the reporting of non-bank private debt. The reason could be that while public debt issues are reported in Dow Jones, non-bank private issues are announced mainly in specialized publications such as Private Placement Letter

PAGE 41

41 and Private Placement Reporter Thus, it may have become less costly over time to report loans due to advancements in information technology in the case of Dow Jones, but not in the case of other smaller news sources that do not benefit from economies of scale.

PAGE 42

42 Table 3-1. Determinants of the Likelihood a nd Timing of Bank Loan Reporting in the Press Table 3-1 provides the estimates of two probit models that relate firm and loan characteristics to the likelihood that the press deems a loan notewor thy through a press article or a DJ wire, and the likelihood that when there is loan news th e press article precedes th e loan activation date. Both the results and marginal effects of the probi t regressions are reported. The analysis is based on a sample of 304 press-reported, 166 PR or DJ wire reported loans and 905 non-reported loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported loans searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the deal amount and/or the key words used in the literature on loan announcements. Commitment Amount is the size of the loan commitment. Maturity is the maturity in months of the lo an agreement as reported in Dealscan. Medium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400 million in assets. Z st atistics are reported in parenthesis. Likelihood of loan reporting Likelihood of reporting before loan activation Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Time trend 0.060.02-0.01 -0.004 (3.12) (-0.31) Tangibles/Assets -0.39 -0.130.27 0.09 (-2.18) (0.78) Debt/Assets 0.30 0.100.09 0.03 (1.40) (0.22) EBITDA/Assets -1.2 -0.41-0.94 -0.3 (-2.54) (-1.09) Restructure Loan 0.56 0.21-0.03 -0.01 (5.32) (-0.17) Commitment Amount/Assets 0.51 0.170.41 0.13 (3.01) (2.47) Maturity 0.01 0.0030.003 0.001 (4.52) (1.06) Medium-size firm 0.32 0.11-0.16 -0.05 (3.84) (-0.90) Firms past 12-month cumulative return -0.03 -0.01-0.09 -0.03 (-0.56) (-1.22) Markets past 12-month cumulative return 0.01 0.01-0.61 -0.19 (0.08) (-1.63) Constant -1.32 -0.71 (-8.18) (-2.14) Pseudo R2 0.11 0.05 N 1176 294

PAGE 43

43 Table 3-2. Marginal Effects of the Lowest and Highest Quartile Determinants on Loan Reporting Table 3-2 reports how the lowest and highest quartiles of some fi rm and loan characteristics in the sample significantly affect the marginal e ffects of a loan being deemed noteworthy by the press through a press article or a DJ wire, as examined in the first Probit model of Table 3-1. *Significant at the 0.1 level. Effect of Lowest Quartile Effect of Highest Quartile On Reporting Likelihood On Reporting Likelihood Tangibles/Assets 0.05-0.1* Debt/Assets -0.06*-0.01 EBITDA/Assets 0.08*-0.07* Restructure Loan -0.21*0.21* Commitment Amount/Assets -0.17*0.2* Maturity -0.05-0.04 Over $1Billion vs. Below $400 Million -0.04-0.11*

PAGE 44

44 Table 3-3. Determinants of the Likelihood of Public and Non-Bank Private Debt Reporting Table 3-3 provides the estimates of a probit model relating firm and debt characteristics to the likelihood that the press deems a public debt or non-bank private debt noteworthy through a press articles or a DJ wire. The analysis is based on a sample of 92 non-bank private debt agreements and 355 public debt agreements ac tivated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported agreem ents searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the key words us ed in the announcements literature. Medium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400 million in assets. Z statistics ar e reported in parenthesis. Probit Reporting Non-Bank Private Debt Public Debt Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Time trend 0.040.010.160.06 (0.61) (5.24) Tangibles/Assets -0.54-0.22-0.36-0.14 (-0.96) (-1.17) Debt/Assets 0.840.330.250.10 (1.13) (0.50) EBITDA/Assets 1.720.69-2.21-0.85 (0.86) (-2.05) Proceeds/Assets 3.121.250.460.18 (2.38) (0.69) Medium-size firm 0.080.030.180.07 (0.28) (0.63) Firms past 12-month cumulative return -0.13-0.050.570.22 (-0.48) (2.81) Markets past 12-month cumulative return -0.36-0.14-0.13-0.05 (-0.51) (-0.38) Constant -0.91 -0.30 (-1.49) (-0.86) Pseudo R2 0.11 0.10 N 92 355

PAGE 45

45 CHAPTER 4 STOCK PRICE REACTION TO LOAN NEWS. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS Among the several explanations for the genera l pattern of relative stock price effects in event studies, Smith (1986) cites the unanticip ated announcement hypothesis, which states that the more predictable the issuance and its struct ure, the smaller the associated stock price change.1 Another explanation mentioned in the stu dy of the differences in announcement effects across security types is the importance of asymme tric information problems. For example, since debt and preferred stock are more senior claims, their valuation is expected to be less sensitive than common stock to changes in firm value. In addition, James and Smith (2000) suggest a third explanation for why bank loan announcements by large and medium-size companies elicit a positive stock price reaction. According to their re sults, commitment-based financing is used by larger companies when they believe themselves to be undervalued or when interest rates are too high.2 In relation to loan announcements, and given th at loan news articles are very brief, it could be also argued that the articles per se are not informative. It could be argued that loan articles mainly signal the exis tence of a noteworthy loan wit hout giving further information about the circumstances that make the loan not eworthy. Thus, the study of the magnitude of the market reaction to loan news should consider the factors that make reported loans noteworthy, i.e., credit risk, information asymmetries, loan characteristics and potential market timing hypothesis. The analysis of the stock price reaction to the ea rliest loan news vs. the reaction to the loan activation of non-reported deals is presented in Table 4-1. It uses an OLS regression model that 1 See Marsh (1982) for evidence on the use of short-term debt and how to predict public debt issues. 2 For example, and at the time of the Asian crisis in th e last quarter of 1998, $10 billion of commercial paper was retired and $20 billion of net new commercial loans were booked.

PAGE 46

46 studies the likelihood of a higher z -value (average standardized pr ediction errors times the square root of the number of observati ons) in relation to whether the lo an is reported a nd other potential determinants of market reaction identified in the study of repor ting determinants (Table 3-1). Similarly, Table 3-2 presents the results of the OLS analysis of the market reaction for public debt and non-bank pr ivate debt issues. As shown in Table 3-1, the market reaction is driven by the size of the issue and market timing considerations. More specif ically, I find that the reaction to loan news increases with lower measures of cumulative returns of the lo an borrower relative to the market during the 12 months preceding the earliest of the news or loan activation of re ported loans. This is consistent with previous work by Hadlock and James ( 2002), who find evidence in support of a market timing argument by which firms tend to choose announced bank lending over public debt when their returns decrease with respect to the market. The analysis of the market reaction for public debt and nonbank private debt news and issues is, as expected, inconclusive given th at no significant market reaction is observed, in general, for these two types for issues surround ing news articles or activation of non-reported issues. As such, and in the case of public debt issues, I find no evidence in support of the market timing hypothesis, like suggested by the firm charact eristics in Table 2-3. However, the size of the issue relative to firm size still appears to have a positiv e effect on the market reaction, especially in the case of public debt issues reported afte r activation, altho ugh the significance level is a little over 10%. Fina lly, and although the market reacti on is not significant either for reported and non-reported non-bank privat e debt issues, I find that tangi bles relative to assets can increase the market reaction, although this firm characteristic does not differentiate reported from non-reported non-bank private debt borrowers.

PAGE 47

47 Table 4-1. Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Loan Reports and Activation Non-Confounding Loan News vs. NonReported Loans Non-Confounding Loans News Before Loan Activation vs. Non-Reported Loans Press-reported -0.51 -0.56 (-0.26) (-0.23) Time Trend -0.03 -0.09 (-0.09) (-0.2) Tangible/Assets 0.08 -0.21 (0.02) (-0.05) Debt/Assets 4.76 5.86 (1.04) (1.11) EBITDA/Assets -3.28 0.72 (-0.35) (0.07) Restructure -3.59 -4.45 (-1.15) (-1.08) Commitment Amount /Assets 5.96 5.95 (3.01) (2.16) Maturity -0.03 -0.02 (-0.66) (-0.35) Medium-size firm 1.75 1.62 (0.52) (0.38) Firms past 12-month cumulative return -1.84 -3.3 (-1.72) (-2.11) Markets past 12-month cumulative return 9.43 11.11 (2.13) (2.12) Constant -0.88 -1.53 (-0.27) (-0.4) N 1196 1014 Table 4-1 provides the estimates of two OLS regressions relating the magnitude of the market reaction to loan news to reporting and firm and loan characteristics The market reaction is measured as the Standardized Prediction Erro rs for a two day event window centered on the earliest of the announcement date or activation date. The analysis is based on a sample of 240 non-confounding press news (53 precede the activation of the loan) and 1071 non-reported loans activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported loans searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the key words used in the announcements literature. Commitment Amount is the size of the loan commitment. Maturity is the maturity in months of the loan agreement as reported in Dealscan. Medium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400 million in assets. t statistics are reported in parenthesis.

PAGE 48

48 Table 4-2. Determinants of the Stock Price Reaction Surrounding Public Debt and Non-Bank Private Debt Reports and Activation Non-Bank Private DebtPublic Deb t Non-Confounding News vs. Non-Reported Issues Non-Confounding News vs. Non-Reported Issues Press-reported -0.32 2.66 (-0.21) (1.58) Time Trend -0.01 -0.53 (-0.05) (-1.58) Tangible/Assets 7.95 -2.43 (2.44) (-0.7) Debt/Assets -1.61 -2.1 (-0.3) (-0.41) EBITDA/Assets -14.06 2.73 (-1.54) (0.26) Commitment Amount /Assets -4.1 1.23 (-1.56) (1.69) Medium-size firm -2.18 1.7 (-1.36) (0.61) Firms past 12-month cumulative return -2.73 0.45 (-1.46) (0.23) Markets past 12-month cumulative return -3.7 1.31 (-1.03) (0.31) Constant 1.9 2.84 (0.52) (0.69) N 81 343 Table 4-2 provides the estimates of two OLS regr essions relating the magn itude of the market reaction to public debt and non-bank private debt news to reporting and firm and loan characteristics The market reaction is measured as the Standardized Prediction Errors for a two day event window centered on the earliest of the announcement date or activation date. The analysis is based on a sample of 199 non-confounding public debt news, 146 non-reported public debt issues, 38 non-confounding non-bank private debt news, and 43 non-reported nonbank private debt issues activated between January 1996 and December 2004. I identify reported and non-reported agreements searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the key words used in the announcements literature. Commitment Amount is the size of the loan commitment. Maturity is the maturity in months of th e loan agreement as reported in Dealscan. Medium-size firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than $1 billion in assets and more than $400 million in asse ts. t statistics are repo rted in parenthesis.

PAGE 49

49 CHAPTER 5 DETERMINANTS OF INCREMENTAL FINANCING OPTIONS Previous empirical studies of the determinan ts of incremental financing choices are based on samples of bank loans that get reported in the press. Denis and Mihov (2003), Hadlock and James (2002), Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Cantillo and Wright (2000) find that smaller, younger, more levered firms ar e more likely to rais e capital via bank debt.1. In addition, Hadlock and James (2002) document that higher volatility of returns and lower market to book and market adjusted cumulative returns during the year prio r increase the pr obability of a bank agreement over a public debt issue. More recently, Bradley and Roberts (2004) report that bank borrowers include more covenants in thei r debt agreements and have greater growth opportunities and more volatile cash flow s than firms that issue public debt.2 These findings are insightful because they differentiate bank borrowe rs from bond borrowers using the same firm characteristics that I have found differentiate bor rowers with reported loans from those without. Furthermore, if as I find, reported loans are not repr esentative of the entire universe of loans, and non-reported loans are suspected to have a more transactional nature, the determinants of the choice between bank loans, public debt, and non-bank private could change when non-reported loan borrowers are also considered.3 1 In relation to agreement size, Smith (1986) specifies that firms are expected to use bank lines of credit until an efficient public issue size is reached. Th e reason for this size criterion is that flotation costs for public debt issues have a larger fixed component and more pronounced economies of scale than does bank debt. In addition, non-bank private loans tend to have lower flotation costs than public issues and custom-designed covenants. 2 Although banks are considered the most efficient liquidity providers in the economy (Kasyap et al. (2002) and Gatev et al. (2006)), firms are restrict ed access to bank credit if they do no t maintain high enough cash flows (Sufi (2007)). One explanation for this finding could be the use of marginal vs. book firm characteristics. 3 Regarding the choice between debt and equity, Gomes and Phillips (2005) find that firms with the greatest asymmetric information problems tend to borrow from private equity, while the most transparent firms seem to issue public equity, and those that are relatively more opaque prefer bank debt to public debt.

PAGE 50

50 Bank debt and non-bank private debt differ in terms of regulatory requirements, maturity, costs, placement structure, and credit or concentration (C arey et al. (1998)).4 Overall, since bank and non-bank private debt offer higher flexibility of renegotiation, it should be optimal for the riskiest borrowers to borrow privat ely instead of issuing public debt.5 In this context, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict that firm s with high and low credit ratings use public debt, while firms with intermediate ratings us e bank loans. However, Denis and Mihov (2003) document that while firms with the highest credit quality are more likely to issue public debt, and firms with medium credit quality establish bank loans, those with the lowest credit quality establish non-bank private debt agreements.6 Thus, as Rajan (1992) argues, the cost of bank monitoring may outweigh the benefits for low-qual ity firms, and in consequence, low-quality firms are more likely to issue nonbank private debt than bank debt. To examine the determinants of the choi ce between bank debt, public debt and non-bank private debt in a multivariate set ting, I use a series of four multi nomial logistic regressions. Table 5-1 reports the regression results, and Table 5-2 the marginal effects. The first multinomial regression studies the choice be tween bank borrowing that is reported, public, and non-bank private debt, while the third and fourth regres sions do the same consid ering all loans and only non-reported loans, resp ectively. The second regression studi es the choice between reported issues of bank, public and non-bank private debt. 4 See Bayless and Chaplinsky (1992), Chaplinsky and Hansen (1993), and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) for the choice between public debt and equity. 5 Sufi (2005) documents that firms with higher lagged ear nings to assets are more likely to establish bank loan agreements as opposed to arms length debt. 6 More specifically, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that bank and non-bank private borrowers present significantly lower returns on assets, lower proportions of rated debt and credit quality when credit ratings are available, and higher growth opportunities in terms of growth in ca pital expenditures, sales, and number of employees.

PAGE 51

51 The results in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 show that, evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables, repor ted loans are 26 percentage points less likely to be chosen over public and non-bank private debt with higher measur es of tangibles to assets, and 23 percentage points more likely to be chosen over public a nd non-bank private debt if the borrower is a medium-size firm. In terms of credit risk, the choice of bank borrowing over public and nonbank private debt borrowing decreases with higher measures of EBITDA to assets independently of whether the loans are reported or not. More specifically, I find that, evaluated at the sample means of the other explanatory variables, reported loans are 170 percentage points less likely to be chosen over public and non-bank private de bt with increases in EBITDA to assets. In addition, I find that the likelihood th at more leveraged firms relati ve to assets choose bank debt is 10 percentage points lower for bank loans. In terms of the effect of pr oceeds relative to assets on incr emental financing choices, and evaluated at the sample means of the other expl anatory variables, firms with higher financial needs relative to assets are 120 percentage poi nts more likely to choose bank debt over public and non-bank private debt if only reported loans are considered. Overall, the study of incremental financing decisions does not vary significantly when considering only reported loans instead of both re ported and non-reported loans. In other words, whether reported deals or all deals are consider ed, the results are similar and consistent with those of previous studies by Hadlock and Ja mes (2002), and Denis a nd Mihov (2003). Riskier more opaque borrowers are more likely to borrow from banks instead of public debt, and nonbank private debt has a niche among the riskier bo rrowers. This suggests that, even if they are less noteworthy and more transactional, non-reported loans are sti ll somehow special and different from public debt. Moreover, since Deal Scan covers only syndicated loans, this study

PAGE 52

52 may be excluding a significant pr oportion of smaller firms that borrow from one lender. Those firms, as Houston and James (1996) find, are more likely to be subject to information monopolies, and have greater incentives to time the market due to more severe asymmetric information problems. This could explain the lack for evidence in the analysis for the market timing hypothesis.

PAGE 53

53 Table 5-1. Multinomial Logistic Regressi ons on Incremental Financing Decisions (1.a)(1.b)(2.a)(2.b)(3.a) (3.b) Time trend -0.14-0.07-0.06-0.05-0.08 -0.02 (-2.92)(-1.35)(-1.08)(-0.67)(-2.88) (-0.41) Tangibles/Assets 1.021.210.921.20.28 0.93 (2.17)(2.0)(1.79)(1.42)(0.85) (1.75) Debt/Assets 1.2-1.851.02-1.661.52 -0.54 (1.84)(-1.87)(1.58)(-1.3)(4.25) (-0.82) EBITDA/Assets 7.653.656.942.984.81 1.44 (4.87)(1.92)(3.9)(1.22)(5.28) (1.03) Deal Size/Assets -4.81-4.74-4.76-2.7-6.03 -4.53 (-2.04)(-2.58)(-1.51)(-1.48)(-2.18) (-2.36) Medium-size firm -1.810.94-1.750.7-1.17 1.39 (-4.99)(2.51)(-3.97)(1.52)(-4.31) (4.47) Firms past 12-month cumulative return 0.070.090.110.020.07 0.05 (0.74)(0.78)(1.13)(0.13)(0.74) (0.45) Markets past 12-month cumulative return -0.46-0.64-0.51-1.12-0.55 -0.46 (-1.05)(-1.11)(-1.07)(-1.35)(-1.88) (-0.93) Constant 0.66-0.42-0.02-1.37-0.91 -2.72 (1.37)(-0.82)(-0.03)(-2.06)(-2.27) (-6.47) Pseudo R2 0.30 0.30 0.19 N 755 557 1822 Table 5-1 provides the estimates of a series of four multinomial logistic regressions relating the choice of bank debt over public de bt and non-bank private debt, as well as the likelihood and timing of loan reporting in the context of increm ental financing decisions. The analysis is based on a sample of 304 press-reported, and 1071 non-repor ted syndicated bank loans, as well as 355 public debt and 92 non-bank privat e debt agreements, all activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt and non-bank privat e debt random samples keep the proportion of total bank loans in DealScan to public debt and non-bank private debt issues in SDC, as well as the yearly proportions in the original SDC samples. I identif y reported and non-reported loan, public and non-bank issues searching the Dow J ones sources for articles containing the deal amount and/or the key words used in the announcements literature. Deal Size refers to the commitment amount in the case of bank loans an d proceeds in the case of public debt and nonbank private debt. Z statistics ar e reported in parenthesis. (1.a) Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (1.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (2.a) Reported Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (2.b) Reported Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (3.a) Public Debt vs. Bank Loans (3.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Bank Loans

PAGE 54

54 Table 5-2. Multinomial Logistic Regressions. Marginal Effects (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (2.a) (2 .b) (2.c) (3.a) (3.b) (3.c) Time trend 0.03 -0.03 -0.001 0.01 -0.01 -0.002 0,01 -0.01 -0.001 (2.85) (-3.0) (-0.14) (1.26) (-1.2) (-0.47) (2.5) (-2.61) (-0.23) Tangibles/As sets -0.26 0.19 0.07 -0.22 0.15 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.03 (-2.49) (1.73) (1.14) (-1.81) (1.27) (1.04) (-1.32) (0.64) (1.37) Debt/Assets -0.14 0.38 -0.24 -0.08 0.22 -0.14 -0.1 0.13 -0.02 (-0.94) (2.49) (-2.10) (-0.61) (1.85) (-1.38) (-1.84) (2.37) (-0.93) EBITDA/Ass ets -1.7 1.69 0.01 -1.31 1.22 0.08 -0.42 0.39 0.03 (-4.57) (5.27) (0.04) (-4.28) (4.24) (0.48) (-3.06) (2.81) (0.78) Proceeds/Ass ets 1.2 -0.95 -0.24 0.93 -0.83 -0.1 0.6 -0.48 -0.13 (2.27) (-1.9) (-2.02) (2.34) (-2.29) (-0.96) (8.17) (-8.35) (-3.98) Medium-size firm 0.23 -0.42 0.2 0.21 -0.29 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.06 (2.84) (-5.43) (6.23) (1.66) (-2.27) (2.87) (0.53) (-1.91) (5.49) Firms past 12-month cumulative return -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.001 -0.01 0.01 0.001 (-0.84) (0.62) (0.55) (-1.03) (1.31) (-0.05) (-0.86) (0.79) (0.39) Markets past 12-month cumulative return 0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.013 (1.21) (-0.84) (-0.78) (1.39) (-0.78) (-1.13) (1.68) (-1.45) (-0.77) Table 5-2 provides the marginal effects of a se ries of four multinomial logistic regressions relating the choice of bank debt over public debt and non-bank pr ivate debt. The analysis is based on a sample of 304 press-reported, and 10 71 non-reported syndicated bank loans, as well as 355 public debt and 92 non-bank private debt agreements, all activated between January 1996 and December 2004. The public debt and non-bank private debt random samples keep the proportion of total bank loans in DealScan to public debt and non-bank private debt issues in SDC, as well as the yearly proportions in the original SDC samples. I identify reported and nonreported loan, public and non-ba nk issues searching the Dow Jones sources for articles containing the deal amount a nd/or the key words used in the announcements literature. Deal Size refers to the commitment amount in the case of bank loans and proceeds in the case of public debt and non-bank private debt. Z sta tistics are reported in parenthesis. (1.a) Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (1.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (2.a) Reported Public Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (2.b) Reported Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Reported Bank Loans (3.a) Public Debt vs. Bank Loans (3.b) Non-Bank Private Debt vs. Bank Loans

PAGE 55

55 CHAPTER 6 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF BANK BORROWERS As commented before, reported loans involve a closer relationshi p between lenders and borrowers, while non-reported loans are more trans action oriented and, to a certain extent, more equivalent to public debt. In consequence, one could argue that reported borrowers may improve their operating performance with respect to the performance of non-reported borrowers. In a related study, and since reported loans are more likely to be restructured loans following covenant violations, Nini et al (2008) show that, following cove nant violations, there is an effective reduction of capital expenditures that leads to higher perf ormance and valuation. In the study of long-term operating performan ce, I use two measures: EBITDA to assets, and debt to EBITDA. I focus on these two rati os because they are closely linked to the borrowers ability to service bot h current and future bank borrowings. While stock returns and net income are also important measures of perfor mance used in previous studies, they are more removed from the bankers principal focus. In a ddition, the debt to EBITDA ratio is present in about half the loans that include financial covenants. Thus, firm s have an incentive to improve this ratio. To limit the effect of outliers, I examine the medians of operating performance measures for a period of seven years that covers four fi scal years preceding loan activation and the three subsequent ones. The summary statistics for a fixe d sample of firms are presented in Table 6-11. Year 0 refers to the fiscal year prior to the activation of the loan. Overall, I observe in the balanced panel that reported borrowers present poorer operating performance with respect to non-reported loans du ring the last three fiscal years prior to the activation of the loan. However, and although th e operating performance measures of reported 1 I find similar results when I exclude unannounced loans for which there is 8-K filing.

PAGE 56

56 borrowers remain weaker than those of non-re ported borrowers for two years following loan activation, I observe no significant difference at the 5% level in EBITDA to assets during the third fiscal year following loan activation. Fu rthermore, it is important to note that the improvement in the operating pe rformance of reported borrowers would be more pronounced if the firms whose loans are reported mainly on the basis of loan size or maturity were excluded from the study sample.

PAGE 57

57 Table 6-1. Median Peer-Adjusted Measur es of Subsequent Operating Performance EBITDA/Assets (%) Debt/EBITDA (%) Press Reported Unreported Press Reported Unreported Year -3 0.13 0.143 2.15 1.8 Year -2 0.13 0.138 2.2* 1.86 Year -1 0.12* 0.136 2.8* 1.93 Year 0 0.12* 0.134 2.78* 2.07 Year 1 0.12* 0.129 3.02* 2.44 Year 2 0.12 0.124 2.8 2.5 Year 3 0.12 0.124 2.8 2.5 N 179 593 130 494 Table 6-1 presents summary statistics for a balanced panel of firms. Year refers to the number of fiscal years following the loan activation date. Year zero refers to the last fiscal year prior to the activation date. Significantly different from the unre ported loan median at the .05 level. + Significantly different from the unre ported loan median at the .1 level.

PAGE 58

58 CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS An important strand of the banking literature holds that banks play a special role in the capital acquisition process through the close rela tionship they establish with their borrowers. More specifically, banks can gain access to priv ate information that is not available to other credit claimants and provide more flexible lendi ng conditions, which is of particular importance in the case of private firms. However, it is not clear why the more esta blished less opaque public firms would need to establish th e same type of unique relations hips with banks in all cases. Also, it is puzzling why there is a significant positive stock price react ion surrounding the press reporting of bank loans, given that practi cally all public firms have bank loans. To address this puzzle, I begin by examining the frequency and determinants of bank loan reporting in the financial pr ess. I find that only 22% of bank loans are reported, and that the subsample of reported loans and borrowers is not representative of th e entire population of syndicated loans and public bo rrowers. More specifically, I find that, besides bigger loans relative to assets, longer maturity loans, and loan restructurings following loan covenant violations are significantly more likely to be repo rted in the press. In addition, consistently also with a greater need for lender access to privat e information, I find that more opaque riskier borrowers are more likely to have their loans reported. Reported loans seem more informative about the potential of the borrower than nonreported ones, an heterogeneity that, to my knowledge, has not been documented before. However, since the cost of repor ting has decreased with technological developments, there is an increase in the frequency of reporting during the 1996 through 2004 study period that makes the information content of the average loan decrease overtime. In any case, the firm and deal factors that explain what makes a loan more likely to be reported are also those that explain the choice

PAGE 59

59 of bank borrowing over public debt borrowing. In consequence, one could argue that nonreported loans require a less close relation between lender and borrower and are, therefore, more transaction oriented, although somehow still sp ecial and different from public debt. In general, and although the loans in the sample are disclosed, the market reaction is only significant in the case of reported loans, especially when the earliest news precedes loan activation. This reaction to loan reporting when the news precedes loan activation is more intense when loans are bigger and when the perf ormance of the borrowers stock is poor with respect to the market during the year prior. Thus, although borrow ing is more difficult to obtain in the case of reported loans, which makes them more surprising, and therefore newsworthy, loan reporting also appears to time the market. Still, an d consistent with the view that bank loans are more informative about firm potential when they are reported in the pr ess, reported borrowers improve their operating performance with resp ect to non-reported one s over the three years following the activati on of the loan.

PAGE 60

60 LIST OF REFERENCES Andrade, Gregor, and Steven Kaplan, 1998, How co stly is financial ( not econom ic distress? Evidence from highly leveraged tran sactions that became distressed, Journal of Finance 53, 1443-1493. Barber, Brad M., and John D. Lyon, 1996, Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specifi cation of test statistics, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359-399. Bayless, Mark, and Susan Chaplinsky, 1991, Expecta tions of security type and the iinformation content of debt and equity offers, Journal of Financial Intermediation 1, 195-214. Best, Ronald, and Hang Zhang, 1993, Alternative information sources and the information content of bank loans, Journal of Finance 48, 1507-1522. Billett, Matthew, Mark Flannery and Jon Garf inkel, 2006, Are banks special? Evidence on the post-announcement performance of bank borrowers, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 733-751. Bradley, Michael, and Michael Roberts, The struct ure and pricing of cor porate debt covenants, SSRN working paper. Brophy, David, Paige P. Ouimet, and Clemens Sialm, 2004, PIPE Dreams? The Performance of Com panies Issuing Equity Privately, NBER Working Papers 11011, National Bureau of Econom ic Research, Inc. Cantwello, Miguel and Julian Wright, 2000, How do firms choose their lenders? An empirical investigation, The Review of Financial Studies 13, 155-189. Carey, Mark, Mitch Post, and Steven A. Shar pe, 1998, Does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ? Evidence on speci alization in private debt contracting, Journal of Finance 53, 845-878. Chaplinsky, Susan, and Robert Hansen, 1993, Partia l anticipation, the flow of information and the economic impact of corporate debt sales, Review of Financial Studies 6, 709-732. Chemmanur, Thomas, and Paolo Fulghieri, 1994, Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt, Review of Financial Studies 7, 475-506. Denis, David, and Vassil Mihov, 2003, The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 3-28. Demiroglu, Cem, and Christopher James, The in formation content of bank loan covenants, SSRN working paper.

PAGE 61

61 Diamond, Douglas, 1991, Monitoring and reputation, the choice betw een bank loans and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99, 688-721. Eckbo, Espen, Ronald Masulis, and Oyvind No rli, 2007, Security offerings, Handbook of corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Fi nance, Vol. 1, North-Holland/Elsevier, Handbooks in Finance series, Ch. 6, forthcoming. Fama, Eugene, 1985, Whats different about banks?, Journal of Monetary Economics 17, 239249. Gomes, Armando, and Gordon Phillips, 2005, Why do public firms issue private and public securities?, SSRN working paper. Guner, A. Burak, Loan sales and the cost of co rporate borrowing, Review of Financial Studies forthcoming. Hadlock, Charles, and Christopher James, 2002, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, Journal of Finance 57, 1383-1419. Houston, Joel and Christopher James, 1996, Bank in formation monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims, Journal of Finance 28, 149-171. Ivashina, Victoria, and Zheng Sun, Institutional stock trading on loan market information, SSRN working paper. James, Christopher, 1987, Some evid ence on the uniqueness of bank loans, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 217-235. James, Christopher, and David Smith, 2000, Are banks still special? New evidence on their role in the corporate capital-raising process, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13, 395422. Johnson, Shane, 1997, An empirical investigation of corporate debt ownership structure, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 47-69. Jung, Kooyul, Yong-Cheol Kim, and Rene Stul z, 1996, Timing, invest ment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the security issue decision, Journal of Financial Economics 42, 159-185. Lummer, Scott, and John McConnell, 1989, Furthe r evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 99-122. Marsh, Paul, 1979, equity rights issues and the efficiency of the UK stock market, Journal of Finance 34, 839-862. Mikkelson, Wayne H. and M. Megan Partch, 1986, Va luation effects of securities offerings and the issuance process, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 31-60.

PAGE 62

62 Mitchell, Mark L., and J. Harold Mulherin, 1984, The impact of public information on the stock market, Journal of Finance 49, 923-950. Moerman, Regina Wittenberg, The impact of information asymmetry on debt pricing and maturity, University of Chicago working paper, 2005. Nini, Greg, David Smith, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, Journal of Financial Econom ics forthcoming. Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arms length debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. Ramakrishnan, R.T.S and Anjan Thakor, 1984, In formation reliability and security design, Review of Economic Studies 51, 415-432. Rippington, Frederick, and Richard J. Taffler, 1996, The information content of firm financial disclosures, Journal of business Finance & Accounting 22, 345-362. Roberts, Michael, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Control Rights and Capital S tructure: An Empirical Investigation, SSRN working paper. Roberts, Michael, and Amir Sufi, 2007, Contingenc y and renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements, SSRN working paper. Smith, Clifford, 1986, Investment banking and the capital acquisition process, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 3-29. Sufi, Amir, 2005, Banks and flexibility: Empiri cal evidence on the mi x of equity, bonds and bank debt, MIT working paper. Sufi, Amir, 2007, The Real Effects of Debt Certificati on: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. Sufi, Amir, 2007, Information Asymmetry and Financi ng A rrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, Journal of Finance 62, 629-668. Sufi, Amir, 2007, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis, Review of Financial Studies, forthcom ing. Thompson, Robert B., Chris Olsen and J. Richard Dietrich, 1987, Attributes of news about firms: An analysis of firm-specific news re ported in the Wall Street Journal Index, Journal of Accounting Research 25, 245-274.

PAGE 63

63 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Laura Gonzalez Alan a earned her Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering from Superior College of Engineering of Bilbao (Spa in) simultaneously with Bachelors of Arts in music education and music performance from J.C. Arriaga, Bilbao, Spain. In 2002 and 2003 respectively, she earned her Master of Business Administration and Master of Arts in foreign languages and literatures from Southern Illin ois UniversityCarbondale. The requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in finance were completed at the University of Florida during the spring of 2008. Upon graduation from the Univ ersity of Florida, she will join Fordham University, NY, as an assistant pr ofessor in finance. Lauras res earch interests include financial markets and institutions, corporate fi nance, and international finance.