<%BANNER%>

The Multiple Presidencies Thesis

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021939/00001

Material Information

Title: The Multiple Presidencies Thesis
Physical Description: 1 online resource (340 p.)
Language: english
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: congress, foreign, policy, presidency, relations
Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: This project examines executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs during the Post-War Era. Accordingly, this research posits and answers the question: What is the inter-institutional policy making relationship between the president and Congress regarding foreign affairs? The Multiple Presidencies Thesis? In the office of a single foreign policy president there exist multiple presidencies, wherein differential sets of executive-legislative relations co-exist at the unit level but are subject to periods of both stasis as well as dynamism due to structural level influences. Presidential power in foreign policy is security determined and hence dependent, while the 'heart' of congressional power is a function of its ability to draw the foreign into the domestic which is most possible among issue areas that are more naturally intermestic in orientation. Thus, conflict/cooperation between the president and the Congress is best sceen along a dimensionality characterized by a securitizing president v. a domesticating Congress across the six issue areas of foreign policy and the vagaries of 'political time.' I utilized a three stage methodological inquiry which was comprised initially of a content analysis of presidential position roll call votes relating to foreign policy from annual editions of CQ Almanacs. I coded these votes by issue area along a dimension which captured high politics arenas which are more prone to presidential securitization (security, domestic security and diplomacy) and low politics arenas that are by nature more intermestic and hence more prone to congressional domestication (trade, foreign aid and immigration). Then, I conducted longitudinal analysis in order to garner the 'broad historical and economic patterns' from 1953-2004 relating to aggregate annual presidential success on roll call votes with the Congress across the six issue areas. Lastly, I engaged in cross-sectional analyses using simple OLS multivariate regressions in order to determine the impacts of unit level political determinants on presidential foreign and issue area success rates relative to the Congress.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Conley, Richard S.
Local: Co-adviser: Dodd, Lawrence C.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2010-05-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0021939:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021939/00001

Material Information

Title: The Multiple Presidencies Thesis
Physical Description: 1 online resource (340 p.)
Language: english
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: congress, foreign, policy, presidency, relations
Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: This project examines executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs during the Post-War Era. Accordingly, this research posits and answers the question: What is the inter-institutional policy making relationship between the president and Congress regarding foreign affairs? The Multiple Presidencies Thesis? In the office of a single foreign policy president there exist multiple presidencies, wherein differential sets of executive-legislative relations co-exist at the unit level but are subject to periods of both stasis as well as dynamism due to structural level influences. Presidential power in foreign policy is security determined and hence dependent, while the 'heart' of congressional power is a function of its ability to draw the foreign into the domestic which is most possible among issue areas that are more naturally intermestic in orientation. Thus, conflict/cooperation between the president and the Congress is best sceen along a dimensionality characterized by a securitizing president v. a domesticating Congress across the six issue areas of foreign policy and the vagaries of 'political time.' I utilized a three stage methodological inquiry which was comprised initially of a content analysis of presidential position roll call votes relating to foreign policy from annual editions of CQ Almanacs. I coded these votes by issue area along a dimension which captured high politics arenas which are more prone to presidential securitization (security, domestic security and diplomacy) and low politics arenas that are by nature more intermestic and hence more prone to congressional domestication (trade, foreign aid and immigration). Then, I conducted longitudinal analysis in order to garner the 'broad historical and economic patterns' from 1953-2004 relating to aggregate annual presidential success on roll call votes with the Congress across the six issue areas. Lastly, I engaged in cross-sectional analyses using simple OLS multivariate regressions in order to determine the impacts of unit level political determinants on presidential foreign and issue area success rates relative to the Congress.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Conley, Richard S.
Local: Co-adviser: Dodd, Lawrence C.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2010-05-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0021939:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text

PAGE 1

1 THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS By MATTHEW M. CAVERLY A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULLFILLM ENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008

PAGE 2

2 Matthew M. Caverly

PAGE 3

3 To M. Margaret Conway, Ph.D. who first worked with me on this idea

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A dissertation is a long, arduous, and at tim es painful process; I would not be where I am today if not for the support of my friends and fa mily. I would also like to thank my supervisory committee for their advice, criticism, and support. Regarding financial matters, I would like to thank the Price Fellowship Program at the University of Floridas Department of Political Science for their generous contribution in funding aspects of this project. Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to three people who have had the most impact on my educational development: my father (Edward A. Caverly) w ho will always be my hero, my mother (Sharon A. Matthews Caverly) who emplaced within me the need for learning, and my maternal grandfather (Edgar D. Matthews) who taught me to reach beyond the confines of my station in life.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................................4 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........8 LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................................13 ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................................14 CHAP TER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS AND ISSUE AREAS ANAL YSIS....................................................................................................................... ......16 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..........16 The Multiple Presidencies Thesis........................................................................................... 18 Issue Areas Analysis........................................................................................................... ....23 Political Time................................................................................................................. .........26 Methods..................................................................................................................................27 Contextual Development........................................................................................................29 Project Plan................................................................................................................... ..........30 Literature Review.............................................................................................................. .....35 Whither the Two Presidencies?....................................................................................... 35 Critical Literature Review of the Two Presidencies Thesis: ........................................... 37 The Methodological Critique: The Constr uction of the Two Presidencies .................40 The Empirical Critique: The Real vs the Im agined Two Presidencies................... 46 Theoretical Critique: The Institutional vs. the Partisan Two Presidencies..................... 48 The Normative Critique: A Two Presidencies full of Prom ise but Little Reward.......... 53 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................58 State-Centrism versus Domestic Variables Approaches to A merican Foreign Policy Analysis....................................................................................................................... ........60 State-Centrism/Statism.................................................................................................... 61 Domestic Variables Approach......................................................................................... 66 2 THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS: A R E-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATI ONS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS............................... 73 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..........73 Theory: The Multiple Presidencies Thesis: An Alternative to the Two Presidencies ........ 78 Political Time in Executive-Legislativ e Foreign Policy Issue Area Relations ....................... 82 The War Power Order 1953-1972................................................................................... 82 The Confrontation Politics Order 1973-1989.................................................................. 82 The Imperial Presidency Politicized Order 1990-2000 ................................................... 83 The Post-9/11Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order 2001-2004............................................. 83 Issue Areas Analysis........................................................................................................... ....86

PAGE 6

6 Discussion...............................................................................................................................88 Summary.................................................................................................................................93 3 AN ISSUE AREAS ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN FOR EIGN POLICY: A SYNTHESIS OF STATIST AND DOMESTIC VARIBALES APPROACHES............... 99 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..........99 Issue Areas Methodology: A Transformativ e Historical-Institutional Analysis .................. 102 Data Gathering and Operationalization................................................................................107 Dependent Variables............................................................................................................ .111 Independent Variables..........................................................................................................113 Structural Level Models Te sting Across Political Tim e....................................................... 121 Unit Level Models Testing Within Political Time............................................................... 121 Hypotheses............................................................................................................................122 Summary...............................................................................................................................128 THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES ACROSS THE ISSUE AREAS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN PRESIDEN TIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS ................. 130 Introduction................................................................................................................... ........130 Issue Areas across Political Time......................................................................................... 132 Empirical Findings................................................................................................................140 The Multiple Presidencies across th e Issue Areas of Foreign Policy ................................... 155 Summary...............................................................................................................................156 4 THE WAR POWER COMETH!: THE SECURI TIZED TIME OF THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1953-1972 ..................................................................................................................171 Introduction................................................................................................................... ........171 Foreign Issue Areas und er Securitys Yoke .........................................................................172 Eisenhower 1953-1961......................................................................................................... 174 JFK & LBJ 1961-1969..........................................................................................................177 Nixon I 1969-1973................................................................................................................179 Empirical Findings I: The Longitudinal Politic al Determ inants of Presidential Foreign Policy Success...................................................................................................................181 Empirical Findings II: Cross-S ectiona l Political Determinants of Presidential Success in Foreign Policy during the War Power Order 1953-1972.................................................. 194 The Multiple Presidencies during the W ar Power Order...................................................... 196 Summary...............................................................................................................................197 5 CONFRONTATION POLITICS: THE RISE OF THE DOMESTICATING FOREIGN POLICY CONGRESS DURIN G DTENTE AND IN THE AFTERM ATH OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 1973-1989.............................................................................................. 223 Introduction................................................................................................................... ........223 The Confrontation Politics Order, 1973-1990: E xecutive-Legislativ e Conflict across the Issue Areas of Foreign Policy........................................................................................... 224 Empirical Findings................................................................................................................227

PAGE 7

7 The Multiple Presidencies of the C onfrontation Politics Order, 1973-1989 ........................ 230 Summary...............................................................................................................................231 6 THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY PO LITICIZED: PRESIDENTIAL REEMPOWERMENT AGAINST AN UNENCUM BERED CONGRESS IDEOLOGICAL PARTY GOVERNMENT, 1990-2000..................................................... 247 Introduction................................................................................................................... ........247 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy across the Orde r of the Imperial Presidency Politicized, 1990-2000.........................................................................................................................249 Empirical Results.............................................................................................................. ....254 The Multiple Presidencies of the Imperial Presidency Politici zed Order, 1990-2000 ......... 257 Summary...............................................................................................................................259 7 CONCULSION/IMPLICATIONS: THE EXTRA-SYSTEMIC DILEMMA OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATI ONS IN A POST-9/ 11 WORLD..........................270 Introduction................................................................................................................... ........270 The Issue Areas of the Extra-Systemic Dilemm a in Executive-Legislative Foreign Policy................................................................................................................................272 Empirical Results.............................................................................................................. ....275 Summary of the Project: The Multiple Presid en cies Thesis across the Issue Areas of Foreign Policy throughout the Political Time of the Post-War Era, 1953-2004............... 281 Future Research....................................................................................................................290 APPENDIX SUPPORTING DATA........................................................................................301 LIST OF REFERENCES.............................................................................................................326 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................340

PAGE 8

8 LIST OF TABLES Table page 1-1 Institutional Structures of the President and Congress Policy Characteristics ............... 70 1-2 Institutional Policy Context circa Cold War Era............................................................... 70 1-3 Institutional Policy Context Ci rca late and/or Post-Cold W ar...........................................71 1-4 The Two Presidencies Scholarship at a Glance................................................................. 72 2-1 Average Presidential Success Rates by Pr esidency on Foreign Policy Position Votes ..... 98 4-1 National Security v. Trade Policy Su ccess across Political T ime (1953-2004).............. 159 4-2 National Security v. Foreign Aid Poli cy Success across Political Tim e (1953-2004).... 159 4-3 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Central Core Issue Area Success (National Security and T rade) Across Political Time (1953-2004)................................. 165 4-4 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of All Issue Area Policy Success (National Security, Domestic Securit y, Diplomacy, Trade, Foreign Aid and Immigration) Across Political Time (1953-2004)........................................................... 165 4-5 Models of the Impacts of Securitization and Domestication of Foreign Policy Votes on Various Annual Presidential Success Rates. Model 1 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Secu ritiza tion and Domesticati on of Foreign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004)................................................................................... 166 4-6 Models 2a & 2b National Security Po licy Success Regression Analysis of Securitiza tion and Domestication of Fore ign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004)......................................................................................................................166 4-7 Model 2c Trade Policy Success Regre ssion Analysis of Securitization and Dom estication of Foreign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004)................... 167 4-8 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Executive-L egislative Orders of Political Time in Foreign Affair s across Political Time (1953-2004)............................. 167 4-9 Macro-Level Historical-Economic Conditions as Determ inants of Presidential Core Issue Area Success. Model 1 National Security Success Regression Analysis of Macro-Historical Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)................................168 4-10 Model 2 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Macro-Economic Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004)............................................................ 169 4-11 Model 3 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Macro-E conomic Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)............................................................ 170

PAGE 9

9 5-1 Foreign Policy Success Regression An alysis of Popular Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004):............................................................................................. 198 5-2 National Security Policy Success Regres sion Analysis of P opular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)................................................................................... 198 5-3 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of P opular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)............................................................................................................199 5-4 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Popular Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 199 5-5 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Electoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 200 5-6 National Security Policy Success Regressi on Analysis of Electoral Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004)................................................................................... 201 5-7 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Electoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)............................................................................................................202 5-8 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Electoral Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 203 5-9 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 204 5-10 National Security Policy Success Regressi on Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)................................................................................... 205 5-11 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004)............................................................................................................206 5-12 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 207 5-13 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 207 5-14 Presidential National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determ inants across Political time (1953-2004).............................................................. 208 5-15 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants across Political T ime (1963-2004).............................................................................................. 208 5-16 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Anal ysis of Ideological Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004).............................................................................................. 209

PAGE 10

10 5-17 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and Type of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Tim e (1953-2004).............................209 5-18 National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy and T ype of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Time (1953-2004).................. 210 5-19 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and Type of Foreign Policy Vote Ac ross Political T ime (1953-2004)................................... 210 5-20 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and T ype of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Time (1953-2004).................. 211 5-21 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)...........................................................................................................211 5-22 National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)................................................................................................212 5-23 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)...........................................................................................................213 5-24 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)................................................................................................214 5-25 Mixed Issue Area Policy Success Regression An alysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)................................................................................................215 5-26 Annual Presidential Success Scores in Foreign P olicy & Issue Areas*+1953-1961 Eisenhower Presidency acro ss 83rd-86th Congresses.....................................................216 5-27 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy For Kennedy Adm inistration (1961-1963), 87th-88th Congresses*........................................ 218 5-28 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Johnson Adm inistration (1963-1969) 88th-90th Congresses*......................................................... 219 5-29 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Nixon Adm inistration (1969-1974) 91st-93rd Congresses*......................................................... 221 6-1 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)...........................................................................................................233 6-2 National Security Policy Success Regressi on Analysis of Ideological Determ inants War Power Order (1953-1972)........................................................................................ 233 6-3 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)...........................................................................................................234

PAGE 11

11 6-4 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972)................................................................................................234 6-5 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989).......................................................................235 6-6 National Security Success Regression Analysis o f Ideological Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989):......................................................................235 6-7 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) .......................................................................236 6-8 Annual Presidential Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideolog ical Determinants Confrontati on Politics Order (1973-1989)................................................ 236 6-9 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determ inants Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989)..............................................................................................237 6-10 National Security Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) .......................................................................238 6-11 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989)..............................................................................................239 6-12 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989).......................................................................240 6-13 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Nixon Adm inistration (1969-1974) 91st-93rd Congresses*......................................................... 241 6-14 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Ford Adm inistration (1974-1977) 93rd-94th Congresses*........................................................ 243 6-15 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Carter Adm inistration (1977-1981) 95th-96th Congresses*......................................................... 244 6-16 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Reagan Adm inistration (1981-1989) 97th-100th Congresses*+....................................................245 7-1 Mixed Issue Area Success Regression Analysis o f Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989).......................................................................261 7-2 Mixed Issue Area Success Regression Analysis o f Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000)....................................................................... 262 7-3 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determ inants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000)....................................................................... 263

PAGE 12

12 7-4 National Security Policy Success Regressi on Analysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000)........................................................ 264 7-5 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000)....................................................................... 265 7-6 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Anal ysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000)....................................................................... 266 7-7 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Bush Adm inistration (1989-1993) 101st-102nd Congresses*+..................................................267 7-8 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Clinton Adm inistration 103rd -106th Congresses*+......................................................................268 8-1 Mixed Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Success cor relation analysis with Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present)........................................ 293 8-2 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present)........................................................................ 293 8-3 National Security Policy Success Regressi on Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present).............................................................. 294 8-4 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemm a Order (2001-present)........................................................................................ 294 8-5 Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression An alysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present)........................................................................ 295 8-6 Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. W. Bush Adm inistration (2001-present) 107th-108th Congresses*+#.............................................296 8-7 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Mi xed Categories, 1953-1968 Eisenhower-Johnson ....... 297 8-8 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Mixed Categories, 1969-1980 Nixon-Carter ...................298 8-9 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Mi xed Categories, 1981-1992 ReaganBush.................. 299 8-10 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Mixe d Categories, 1993-2004. Clinton-W Bush............ 300

PAGE 13

13 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2-1 Path Diagram of Presidential Policy Securitization Relative to Congress .....................95 2-2 The Mapping of Securitization Potential for Policies on a Continuum of Foreign Policy Issue Areas ..........................................................................................................95 2-3 Political Time Orders (Str uctural L evel Interactions)....................................................... 96 2-4 Presidential-Congressional Foreign Issue Area Relations (Unit Level Interactions) ........ 96 2-5 Level of Inherent Security and Degree of Intermestic Quality in Issue Areas of Foreign Policy ....................................................................................................................97 4-1 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Bar Ch art Across Political Time (1953-2004) ................ 158 4-2 Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Pie Ch art Across Political Time (1953-2004) ................. 158 4-3 Models of Foreign and Issue Area Pres idential Success Relative to Congress Tim e Series Autocorrelation Analysis...................................................................................... 160 4-4 Models of Presidential Foreign Nation al Security and Trade S uccess Relative to Congress Time Series Cro ss Correlation Analysis..........................................................164

PAGE 14

14 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS By Matthew M. Caverly May 2008 Chair: Richard S. Conley CoChair: Lawrence C. Dodd Major: Political Science This project examines executive-legislative rela tions in foreign affairs during the Post-War Era. Accordingly, this research posits and answers the question: What is the inter-institutional policy making relationship between the president and Congress regarding foreign affairs? The Multiple Presidencies ThesisIn the office of a single foreign policy president there exist multiple presidencies, wherein differential sets of executive-legislative relations co-exist at the unit level but are subject to periods of both st asis as well as dynamism due to structural level influences. Presidential power in foreign policy is security determined and hence dependent, while the heart of congressional power is a function of its ability to draw the foreign into the domestic which is most possible among issue areas that are more naturally intermestic in orientation. Thus, conflict/cooperation between the president and the Congress is best sceen along a dimensionality characterized by a secu ritizing president v. a domesticating Congress across the six issue areas of foreign policy and the vagaries of political time. I utilized a three stage methodol ogical inquiry which was comprised initially of a content analysis of presidential position roll call vote s relating to foreign policy from annual editions of CQ Almanacs. I coded these votes by issue area along a dimension which captured high politics

PAGE 15

15 arenas which are more prone to presidential securitization (security, domestic security and diplomacy) and low politics arenas that are by natu re more intermestic and hence more prone to congressional domestication (trade, foreign aid and immigration). Then, I conducted longitudinal analysis in order to garner the broad hist orical and economic patterns from 1953-2004 relating to aggregate annual presidential success on roll call votes with the Congr ess across the six issue areas. Lastly, I engaged in cross-sectional analys es using simple OLS multivariate regressions in order to determine the impacts of unit level political determinan ts on presidential foreign and issue area success rates relative to the Congress.

PAGE 16

16 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS AND ISSUE AREAS ANAL YSIS There is one president but in the office of a single president there are two presidencies, one for defense and foreign policy a nd the other for domestic policy. Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies Thesis, Trans-Action (4) (December 1966) Introduction W ith that line, Aaron Wildavsky drew a map of executive-legislative relations bordered on its edges by the political society writ large and composed in the interior by two policy making continents. One such continent was exclusive to foreign affairs where the president rules as an absolutist monarch protecting the interests of a ll by ensuring the rule of the one. However, on the other continent existing for the domestic sphere the Congress reigned supreme as a democraticpolity standing virtuous in its representative ense mble ensuring the rule of the many or at least the few.1 Nothing short of a cottage industry of scholarship emanated out of Wildavskys thesis wherein attempts to measure explain a nd refute the phenomenon competed against one another for over a forty plus year period.2 However, in all that time very little real empirical results have been found which either fully corrobora te or effectively refute the basic thesis that presidents dominate the construction of policy in foreign affairs but are impeded in those efforts in the domestic sphere by a recalcitrant C ongress which has carved out its own place of institutional power (from Wildavsky 1966). As an empirical theory, the findi ngs of this study contrary to some of the extant literature produced in recent years regarding the two presidencies is that it is a real depiction of the actual executive-legislative policy making relationship. The vast majority of the studies on the two 1 Taken from Aristotles The Politics (Ernst Barker edition 1958). 2 See Shull 1991 for the most comprehensive review of th e two presidencies literature though a number of studies have been added to the canon already in place in the decade and a half sinc e Shulls edited volum e was published.

PAGE 17

17 presidencies in some fashion or form find evidence for differential policy success rates for presidents in their relationship with the Congress. Presid ents do significantly better in foreign policy construction relative to the Congress than they do in such attempts within the domestic sphere. However, the explanation for such succe ss rates is not clear as to whether it is an institutional, partisan or cu ltural phenomenon but some pattern s are existent. The classical version of the thesis (the instit utional) is most associated with support for the two presidencies while the cultural version is most associated with rejecting it. The partis an two presidencies may be overstated as to its actual role in explaining the executive-legis lative divide but this point is still very much in contention. Furthermore, most of the research on the tw o presidencies has actually had discordant findings, with one study or anothe r supporting the thesis and yet others refuti ng it. However, all of them have been consistent in that they have been leveled on the noti on of presidential strength in foreign policy versus its lack thereof in do mestic policy. This facet is the primary reason I believe for the lack of consistency within the em pirical findings themselves Thus, the fate of the two presidencies lies not on its fi ndings or lack thereof but rath er on its assumptions. What is needed is a new analytical and methodologi cal approach to understanding and studying executive-legislative relations in foreign policy which captures the inhe rent nuances of the relationship yet also identifies a theoretically consistent pattern to those relations. This project moves away from the canonical analytical and methodological treatments of the past which portrayed foreign policy as this one thing. I have opene d the door to a new way of conceptualizing the politics of foreign affair s which will allow for the development of a more encompassing theory of executive-legislative Po st-War (since the end of the Korean War in 1953) foreign policy relations. Als o, the empirical shortcomings of the two presidencies thesis

PAGE 18

18 central claim that presidents dominate the construction of policy in the foreign relations sphere needs to be addressed. On the surface it seems almo st endemic that presidents are so empowered in foreign policy making. However, the systematic tests of this thesis have not provided any conclusive findings as to the duration or even the existence of the two presidencies as an accurate and predictable theory of executive -legislative relations (Shull 1991). The Multiple Presidencies Thesis Theoretically, I cla im that there are in fact multiple issue area presidencies within the office of a single foreign policy president. Wherei n a security dominant and dependent president squares off against a domestically oriented and hence intermestic driven Congress. Intermestic policies are those which exist amidst issue areas of foreign affairs being composed of a comixture of domestic and foreign policies At one end of the spectrum, exist those foreign issue areas with the least domestic component (hence, least inte rmestic)the high politics arena issue areas of national security, domes tic security and diplomacy. At the other end are those foreign issue areas with the most domestic composition (hence, most intermestic)the low politics arena issue areas of trade, foreign aid and immigration. Patterns of executive -legislative conflict and corroboration appear across up to six distinct as well as mixed policy issue areas within the realm of foreign affairs. These issue areas can be arranged along a dimension which groups them into first high politics arenas (secur ity, domestic security and dipl omacy)essentially those issue areas of foreign policy which deal with the politics of war and peace. Secondly, another set of issue areas can be categorized as bei ng roughly consistent with the notions of low politics (trade, foreign aid and immigration)essentially those issue areas which are most prone to have domestic aspects (the politics of ev erything else). Thus, the multiple presidencies thesis claims that foreign policy is best seen as a series of up to six issue areas arranged in high and low politics arenas. Furthermore, trade, foreign aid and immigration can

PAGE 19

19 be thought of as being fully intermestic in nature (a co-mixture of international with national politics) (Manning 1977). As Manning (1977) has shown, foreign policy is actually a polyglot of potential issue areas based around the degree of interpenetration between foreign and domestic politics. What Manning did not contend and what is vital to my theoretical reasoning is that such interpenetration exists along a c ontinuum from being almost comp letely absent as in national security affairs to being interlinked as in trad e. Finally, in the area of immigration the foreigndomestic divide is virtually completely absent Each issue area or mixed issue area has its own set of presidential-congressional relations which display some interdependence with one another but are in fact distinct enough to be treated as separate cases of inter-institutional interaction. Therefore, the multiple presidencies thesis tells us that there are multiple sets of presidentialcongressional foreign issue area relations and k ey to understanding that re lationship is the role or relative absence of intermestic (co-mixture of foreign and domes tic policy attributes) aspects within each issue area Presidential power in foreign policy diffused across these disparate yet related issue areas is a function of the ability of pr esidents to securitize the issue at hand and at times even entire issue areas. Securitization is the notion that issues and issue areas of foreign policy are prone to being presented and argued within the light of a war and peace discourse of high over low politics. When this happens and is successful, the institution most suited to take advantage in the policy making process is the one most histor ically, philosophically and institutionally strengthened in the conduction of high politics. That institution is now and has always been the executive branch. Likewise, congressional power acr oss the same issue areas can be seen as a product of the ability of the C ongress to domesticize the issue or even the whole issue area. These two arenas of power (secu ritization v. domestication) within executive-legislative foreign

PAGE 20

20 policy making are then the fundamental bases from which the empirical patterns derive. In sum, the multiple presidencies thesis suggests that executive-legislative fore ign policy relations are best summarized as a securitizing pr esident versus a domesticating Congress. Therefore, the multiple presidencies thesis further contends that there is an opportunity structure of power in security which allows the high politics arena of foreign issue areas to be largely set by presidentialized conditio ns for policy making. Also, the low politics arena is subject to congressionalization of policy construction conditi ons due to its component foreign issue areas as being more intermestic in orientation (hi gher degree of interpenet ration between foreign and domestic aspects within the fo reign issue areas themselves) Presidentialization of foreign issue areas polic ies is akin to the notion of securitization meaning that the president dominates the process of policy construction relative to the Congress The president can do this because the presidency itself as an institution is in a better position vis-vis the Congress regarding agenda control. In other words, we can say that the conditions governing presidential-congressi onal policy making in the hi gh politics arena take on a presidency-centered aspect. Hence, the presiden cy as an institution is largely setting the terms of debate by invoking its historical-institutional prerogatives as an opportunity structure of power in the high politics of war and peace (Figure 2-2). Congressionalization of foreign issue areas policies is the same thing as domestication meaning that the Congress dominates the process of policy construction relative to the presidency The Congress can do this because of its historical-institutional prerogatives in the sphere of domestic policy construction. Therefore, as issues within foreign affairs take on a more domestic cast, in other words as they become more intermestic and hence less securitized then it is the Congress that increasi ngly sets the parameters of policy making debate. Additionally, there ar e two forces which exert influence on the

PAGE 21

21 presidential-congressional forei gn policy/issue ar ea relationship which oper ate at two distinct levels of analysis (Figure 2-2). At the unit level of the two competing/cooperati ng institutions themselves (the presidency and the Congress), presidential securitizing plays out most effectively in its institutional locus of power within and proximate to th e security issue area itself. In other words, the high politics issue areas are arrayed in order of proximity to the opportunity st ructure of securitized power as national security policy, domestic security policy and diplomatic policy. Similarly, congressional domestication is most pronounced among those issue areas that are the more naturally intermestic in orientation within foreign policy. In other words, the low politics issue areas of foreign policy can be arrayed along a spectrum of least to most domestic in the foreign-domestic admixture including trade policy, forei gn aid policy and immigration policy. The unit level of analysis is an important operating principle for this study because it locates the conduct of in quiry directly at the major pol itics producing forces involved (Mannheim and Rich 1995). Units are collections of aggregates. The most common employed in international relations research has been the state (Waltz 1956). In this study, I have broken the black box of the state wide open, by locating my rese arch at two of its most prominent parts at least as regards foreign policy production, the pr esidency and the Congress. By viewing the presidency and the Congress as institutional aggregates I hold constant the impacts of much of the individual agency which other previous research privileges. Besides offering a new theoretical twist to a lo ng examined research tradition, I provide a fully developed institutional account that transcends the lim itations of single personality based studies of individual administrations foreign policy rela tionship with the Congress. Othe r research on th is topic often does treat the Congress as a unit (r ead collection of aggregates) but treats the presidency as an

PAGE 22

22 institution of one rather than what it is: an inst itution which privileges the rule of the one but is composed of the many (i.e. the White House Staff, The Executive Office of the President and the Cabinet). In fact, among the high politics issue arena of foreign policy there is some bureaucratic dispersal that plays out along its component issue area lines. Some such differentiation includes but is certainly not limited to the Department of Defense and the National Security Council for national security, the Department of Homeland Security for dome stic security and the State Department for diplomacy. Also, amidst the low politics issue arena we find the US Office of Trade Representative, Departments of Treasury a nd Commerce as well as Labor for trade policy. Foreign aid policy has been subject to administra tion and policy from en tities such as USAID, the Department of Energy as well as all other de partments previously discussed and of course the myriad of organizations under the Directorate of Central Intelligence. Lastly, immigration administration and policy development has been looked over by the US Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration as well as others. In sum, a unit level of analysis treats the presidency and Congress as what they in fact are, institutions which have and continue to influence foreign policy development across time regardless of their individual actor compositions by treating them as compositions of aggregates. Operating at the structural level of analysis (also called the systemic), macro-oriented political, economic and historical forces exer t an exogenous influenc e over presidentialcongressional relations. The struct ural or in other words system ic level of analysis focuses attention on the environmental effects conditioning the behavior of the sub-ordinate actors (in this case the executive and legislative bran ches) themselves (Mannheim and Rich 1995 and Waltz 1956). The employment of this level of anal ysis is important for two reasons, one because

PAGE 23

23 it provides the widest empirica l scope possible while retaining a high degree of parsimony. Second, this level provides researchers of US fo reign policy the ability to place the American case in its international contexts. Additionally, the structural level serves as a facilitating device for cross-time inquiry by capturing the political ebb and flow of time itself as an exogenous variable. Specific to this study the above impacts move the multiple sets of foreign policy issue area relationships between the national executive and legislature. They do this across time itself pushing and pulling those relationships into periods of stasis punctuated with dynamic reconstitutions in the nature of the inter-rela tionships themselves. The above theory may be termed the multiple presidencies thesis and I believe that it serv es as a strong analytical alternative to the two presidencies thesis. However, it is only the first objective of this research project. For in order to unders tand the nuances and complexities of executive-legislative foreign issue area relations we must examine them by empl oying as wide an analyt ical lens as possible and that is what I now turn to. I do this by offering a methodologi cal-theoretical approach which by its design captures the inherent nuances of foreign policys component issue areas. Issue Areas Analysis Issue area analysis is critical to understa nd ing the multiple presidencies framework because it opens up the executive-legislative fo reign policy divide with its emphasis on the component issue areas themselves We must first turn our attent ion to the conceptualization of foreign policy issue areas, as prior attempts to theorize about executive power in the constitutional order have either exaggerated or otherwise over lim ited such conditions relative to foreign policy construction. In previous research into the fundamental question of powers locat ion in foreign policy construction, two competing streams of research have been proffered. One such endeavor has been articulated by Realists who ca ll for a statist appr oach which suggests that the best way to

PAGE 24

24 view foreign policy making is an outcome of a unified, centralized and elite dominated core foreign policy executive or the even more self-s elected national security state (from Krasner 1978, Kennan 1979 and Rothkopf 2005). Another such method called the domestic variables approach suggests that foreign polic y is in fact the result of a c onfluence of actors that engage in a pluralist interaction when constructi ng policy in foreign a ffairs (from Rogowski 1987, Wittkopf and McCormick 1999 as well as Gourevitc h 1996). Therefore, statist approaches tend to down play internal factors by treati ng foreign policy as the outcome of the few Likewise, the domestic variables approach tends to get a bi t unwieldy by including an ever expanding number of external factors in the production of foreign policy as the result of the many Thus, the employment of issue areas analysis in this sense calls for the co-integration of state-centered and domestic variable approaches by viewing foreign policy as the product of presidencycentered versus Congress-centered conditions More specifically, presidency-centered conditions for US foreign affairs policy making follow the assumptions of a state-centered approach. Meanwhile, those foreign policy making condi tions which are said to privilege the Congress follow the assumptions of the domestic variables method of analysis. Combining the issue areas approach with the multiple presid encies thesis leads to the conclusion that the high politics issue arena issue areas (national security, domestic secu rity and diplomacy) are given more to being defined in terms of presidency-centered conditions regarding execut ive-legislative foreign policy making. Likewise, low politics arena issue areas (trade, foreign aid and immigration) are more prone to be seen as following the prescriptions of Congress-centered conditions regarding presidential-congre ssional foreign policy relations. The statist/state-centrist method of foreign policy anal ysis certainly privileges the president as the leader of the national security state. And, for that matter the president serves as the very

PAGE 25

25 embodiment of the core foreign policy executive, which is fruitful for a presidency-focused analysis. Unfortunately, as a tool to guide th e conduct of inquiry fo r executive-legislative relations state-centrism fails to account for congr essional behavior and influence, if any, on the processes of foreign policy development. Statist scholars preoccupation w ith parsimony (as it is most persuasively witnessed in formal modeling scenarios of the foreign policy process like Alisons (1971) rational actor model) in pr actice limits its own utility as a methodological endeavor because it limits the conduct of inqui ry by making strict assu mptions on the scope of analysis. These studies do this through biasing the selection of the unit of analysis in a presidency-focused direction at the expense of ot her actors in the foreign policy process like the Congress. What hurts the statist approach helps th e domestic variables method by opening up the door of model inclusion to external as well as increasing numbers of internal variables. This development allows for a process of model specifica tion that is more prone to reducing variance and increasing robustness regarding inferential capacities and expl anatory forces. However, this process also leads to over-speci fication where the land of parsim ony has been sacrificed to a bewildering sea of context and in terpretation. The simple truth is that domestic forces have a more variable impact on the foreign policy proces s; therefore they are both more tenuous and tertiary in their overall and even specific influe nces relative to the o ccupants of the executive branch and its head in particular For the purposes of this study, what is most helpful about the domestic variables system for foreign affairs study is its allowance for ongoing congressional agency within the foreign policy structure itself. What is needed is a methodological approach that keeps the best of parsimony from the state-centered perspec tive and compliments it with the best of context as offered by the domestic variables framework.

PAGE 26

26 As a methodological-theoretical frame, the issue areas analysis of foreign policy serves as something of a synthesis between the two extremes of state-centrism and do mestic variables. It does this by assuming the potential for co-existent di fferential sets of relationships within foreign policy. In application to this pr esent study that means the simultaneous existence of a series of relationships between the president and the Congress w ithin the issue areas of foreign policy which captures the context dimension. Furthermor e, that means that those relationships are governed by both static and dynamic forces (inclu ding history itself) but are given to a certain pattern predicated on the notions of institutio nal powerfor the president the high politics security arena and for the Congress the low pol itics domestication arena. The final area of inquiry which needs to be attended to in a more in-depth manner is the role which political time itself plays in this analysis of executiv e-legislative foreign issue area relations. Political Time The idea of political tim e emanates out of the study of American political development which privileges the role of politics as a fundamental force in the development of historical phenomenon of interest (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Taking this notion one step further we find that the two analytical operating principlesthe unit and struct ural level of analyses are the principle structuring entities conditioning and being conditioned by foreign issue area policy behavior across time. Hence, time itself is subject to and in this case is a fully politicized construct that can be examined as such. It is one of the purposes of this project to do just that by operationalizing an ongoing test of presidential success in institutional foreign issue area policy relationships. Another purpose is to theorize about the exact inter-institutional foreign affairs relationship shared between the president and the Congress across history itself during the PostWar Era (1953-2004). Political time serves as a vehicle fo r both of those projects by setting the

PAGE 27

27 scope of inquiry for the analysis and privileging the specifically political roles of the presidency and the Congress in the conduct of inquiry Furthermore, the multiple presidencies of the issue areas of foreign policy can be identified and then tracked in order to develop periods of dominant and subordinate presidentialcongressional relations during the Post War Era. Of course, such privileging and identification is easier said than done and a more precise statement of methods is needed in order to flesh out the finer details of this examination of Post-War executive-legislative foreign policy developments across its component issue areas. Methods As previously stated the overarching m ethodol ogical-theoretical appr oach which guides all methods prescriptions in this pr oject is the employment of an i ssue areas analysis. However, the specific methods themselves are posited in order to test the strength of presidential success vis-vis the Congress across the Post War Era (19532004). They do this by measuring the success rate of presidencies (E isenhower-W. Bush) on the population of foreign policy roll call votes taken between 1953 and 2004 sub-categorized by myself according to their component issue area. The actual presidential success rate itself in foreign policy and in the various issue areas and even mixed issue areas is annualized as a measure for both convenience and ease of comparison with similar roll call ba sed studies. Therefore, the ongoing primary and secondary dependent variables of interest (what is to be explained) are the aggregate annual presidential success rates on foreign, issue ar ea and mixed issue area roll call votes in the Congress during the Post War Era (1953-2004) These variables provide a solid proxy measure of the executivelegislative foreign and issue area relationship at specific points in time. But, these variables real contribution is their ability to approximate a direct measure of such a relationship systematically as well as across (political) time

PAGE 28

28 The independent variables were selected according to their ability to serve as measures of macro-level historical, economic and political impacts on extant pres idential-congressional foreign, issue and even mixed issu e area annual presidential roll call success ra tes. The historical and economic forces are measured at the struct ural (systemic) level of analysis as these conditions are best seen as being impact-full from this perspe ctive. The reason for this is that they are condition setting forces which are either products of history itself like the relative size of the armed forces, the presence of war/peace a nd size of the defense budget, etc Likewise, additional condition setting forces can be discer ned from prevailing and ever changing economic conditions. These conditions incl ude such things as a measure of overall national economic performance Real GDP growth (or decline) or the degree of unit level (for the presidency or Congress) opportunity/constraint conditions provided by the size of the budget surplus (or deficit). The models utilized to capture the across pol itical time executive-legislative foreign, issue and mixed issue area relationship take on a longitudinal format as first order autoregressive time series. These models track the primary and secondary dependent variables as a series of autoregressions moving backward in time from point Y at T What this means is that the annual presidential success rates in foreign, issue and mixed issue areas in 2004 serve as the base end points and are tracked along a trend line of auto-regressions back to the base origination point of 1953. The results of these longitudinal models as well as their implications for executivelegislative foreign issue area interactions are gon e over in chapter 4. In sum, I will examine the above conditions through the lenses provided by the basic notions of the multiple presidencies thesis and employing an issue areas analysis

PAGE 29

29 Models that were specifie d in order to capture the within political time presidentialcongressional foreign issue area relationship took the form of cross-sectional un-standardized ordinary least squares regression (OLS). In thes e, all variables (both de pendent and independent) were operationalized according to distinct time frames that were bounded by a periodization scheme. This scheme divided US executivelegislative foreign policy relations into four distinct systemic (environmental) orders of inter-institutional interactions including: the War Power Order (1953-1972), the Confronta tional Politics Order (1973-1989), the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) and the Extr a-Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-2004). These orders represent prevailing c onditions under which the presiden cy and the Congress (the unit level actors) debated, conflicted and either collaborated or deadlocked over the specific issues of foreign policy. The results and implications of these cross-sectional models for extant presidential-congressional foreign is sue area relations are discussed in chapters 5-8. Lastly, I take all of the above and examine it in a fashion c onsistent with a hypothesi s testing process that emanates out of the multiple presidencies thesis This procedure is done by using an issue areas analysis based around fundamental notions of presidency versus Congress-centered conditions as to the direction of the inter-institutional relationships involved. Contextual Development Keeping with the historical nature of this ente rprise, I engage in a series of context-setting qualitative narratives relevant to both the across and within polit ical time analyses. While, these should not be viewed as systematized historical study they do se rve as empirical jumping off points for future fully developed qualitativ e study. First, I set the broad contours of event-based executive-legislative history in foreign affairs in chapter 4. Then, in ch apters 5-8 I overview some of the legislative histories drawn from my archival research in the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs that speak to the level of collaboration or confront ation between the

PAGE 30

30 president and the Congress in international affairs policy maki ng. In both of the above efforts, I carry forth with my issue area analysis by attending to relevant issue areas role within and across political time throughout. Finally, I tie everything togeth er by stating the findings and implications in terms of the multiple presidencies thesis itself Having laid out the basic purpose, argument, method and context for articulating and ultimately defending the multiple presidencies thesis, I will now turn to more prosaic matters by engaging the reader with a discussion of the plan for this research project. Project Plan The rem ainder of this introduc tion is given over to laying out the general plan of action for this research project. Chapter 2 details the premis es and provides the basics for an answer to the guiding research question, What is the inter-institutional policy making relationship between the president and Congress in foreign affairs? The theorized answer is the multiple presidencies thesis wherein a securitizing president faces a domesticating Congress across the six issue areas of foreign policy. Furthermore, this relationship is subject to both periods of stasis as well as dynamism over the e bb and flow of political time. Chapter 3 details the methodologies employe d to test relevant hypotheses emanating out of the multiple presidencies thesis by employing an issue areas analysis. Synthesizing the parsimony of the statist method of interpretation with the contextu ally rich domestic variables approach will allow for a truer picture of Amer ican foreign policy to be taken and framed. Hypothesis generation and testi ng will use presidency-centered versus Congress-centered conditions as its operating principle. This t echnique is done to showcase the places of institutional power via forei gn policy issue areas regardi ng presidential dominance, collaboration or even acquiescence relative to the Congress. Furthermor e, once these loci of

PAGE 31

31 power are identified they can be tracked across political time for observations of stasis or dynamism in the foreign issue area executive-legislative relationship. Chapter 4 presents the longitudinal findi ngs, mapping out executive-legislative relations across the last half cen tury. Chapter 5 takes a look at th e early Cold War (1953-1972) wherein securitization by the president was predominant in forei gn affairs. During this time period, issue areas of foreign policy were presented by the executive branch to the legislative branch from a high politics perspective. The pres idency set the legislative age nda in foreign policy by arguing that all foreign policy was essentially security in orientation Furthermore, the presidency largely controlled the outcomes of legi slative deliberations by routinely emphasizing the national security aspect of foreign policy in an intensifie d Cold War political environment. The success of this strategy, whether intenti onal or implied, was that the C ongress routinely acquiesced to presidential prerogatives in forei gn affairs. Hence, we can concl ude that foreign policy itself was completely given over to a process of regularized securitization. This period of American foreign policy history saw a de-politicization in executivelegislative international relations. This process was engendered by the presence of a bi-partisa n conservative Congress relative to Cold War policy making in the so called Cold War Consen sus regarding a hawkish stance toward the Soviet Union and its satellites. This stance existed regardless of whether the Congress was controlled by Democrats (as it normally was dur ing this time) or Republicans. Likewise, the maintenance of presidential securitized prerogatives in the realm of foreign policy promoted an atmosphere where foreign affairs issues and issu e areas were presented in a discourse of high over low politics with a corre sponding expectatio n of congressional acquiescence to the presidency. Specifically, the combination of the C onservative Coalition on defense issues and the Liberal Coalition on foreign aid a nd immigration issues allowed pr esidents of both parties to

PAGE 32

32 govern in a relatively harmonious manner during the height of the individualized committee dominated Textbook Congress (Davidson and Oleszek 2005).3 I call this period of political time the War Power Order (1953-1972) because of the privileged role of securitization and hence presidential dominance over the Co ngress in foreign policy relations. Chapter 6 will deal with another cross-sectiona l set of findings that indicate the rise of a resurgent partisan and liberal C ongress anxious to establish and in some cases re-establish its institutional prerogatives in in ternational policy making. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the start of dtente, a confrontational Congress began to domestic ate the issue areas of foreign policy and continued to do so until the end of the Cold War (1973-1989). During this time there was an emerging view of an imperial presidency that had abus ed power in Vietnam. The Congress, partially in response to these events, engaged in a seri es of institutional changes in order to displace the Southern Democratic c onservative committee barony with a sub-committee government system of liberal Northern Democrats known as the Post-Reform Congress. This Congress would prove to be a thorn in subseque nt presidencies sides as it became a place of alternative institutional power th at would effectively permeate all issue areas of foreign policy by the end of the Confrontation Politics Order. Additionally, as high politics declined in importance due to the Nixon Doctrine, SALT I & II, the development of the Vietnam Syndrome in defense affairs, and most impor tantly dtente with the Soviet Union and Communist China soft power began to overtake hard power as a guiding dogma in foreign policy construction within the Congress and even certain presidencies like Jimmy Carters (Nye 2000). 3 I am synthesizing notions derived from James MacGreogor Burns (1963) ideas about regional coalitional voting and presidential support known as four-party politics with Roger Davidsons (1996 in Thurber 1996) notions about the presidency in congressional time.

PAGE 33

33 Additionally, there was an emergence of a more defined role for low politics due to increasing economic interdependence (made real to the average American by the oil shocks and their corresponding recessions) allowed for the steady domestication of foreign policy across its component issue areas (Keohane and Nye 1977) Deference by the Congress previously given to presidents in traditionally nonsecurity issue areas such as tr ade, foreign aid and immigration was no longer as quickly given as congressmen a nd women as well as senators found that much of foreign policy had in fact become intermestic in natu re (Manning 1977). Indeed, the employment of politics by the Congress during th is time often utilized the low politics issue areas as starting points for encroaching upon the hi gh politics realm of presidential foreign policy making. I refer to this category of political time as the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) because of its central character istic of congressional domesticating opposition to an exclusively presidentialized (and hence s ecuritized) foreign policy. In chapter 7, the aftereffects of the end of the Cold War take pre-eminence and new structural opportunities as well as constraints contribute to th e evolution of the presidentialcongressional relationship in fore ign affairs. These changes incl ude but are certainly not limited to the outgrowth of economic interdependence into the disparate socio-cultural forces of integration and fragmentation that comprise what is collectively re ferred to as globalization (see Dierks 2001). The Post Cold War promise of its peace dividend, coinciding with the emergence of new security dilemmas led to executive-legislative conflict/cooperation over such issues as base force restructuring and arms procurements emanating out of the revolution in military affairs. Additionally, the two instituti ons battled over domesticated struggles like the war on drugs or the renewed saliency of in ternational terrorism. In sum, presidentialcongressional foreign policy relatio ns had developed into a new status quo with a rough parity

PAGE 34

34 held between the two branches across all issue areas but cont inued loci of power in their traditional arenas as especially seen in the fi rst Bushs Persian Gulf War in 1991. I term this period of political time The Imperial Presiden cy Politicized Order ( 1990-2000) because of the intermittent expansion and subsequent debilitation of presidential power in foreign affairs due to ideological party government in the Congress.4 Following the completion of the substantive ch apters, I conclude in chapter 8 with some summary commentary and a discussion of the potentia l opportunities as well as constraints of the Post-9/11 world in which we now live regarding executive-legislative relations in foreign policy. The promises of an extra systemic internationa l environment driven by extra-state actors like multinational corporations (M NCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) under both legal and illegal conditions lead s one to the conclusion that extant presidential-congressional foreign policy relations will increasingly reflect a Post-Systemic character. Presidentialcongressional relations in forei gn policy will be more completely merged with domestic politics as all policy becomes intermestic during the 21st century. This means that the historic institutional centers of power th at have governed the unit level in teractions may no longer be as prescient since the line between s ecurity and domesticated politics is fading. Perhaps of even greater significance, is the potential merging of high and low politics at the structural level as new security supplants old security and soft pow er overtakes hard power. Foreign policy orders of political time in the future may no longer be subject to a patterned understanding as nuanced context may indeed overtake parsimony in theory and methods. The heart of the problem for future executive-legislative foreign issue area rela tions is found in the term I have coined for our current state of political timethe Extr a-Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-2004). 4 See Schlesinger (1989) for a discussion of the theoretical concept her refers to as the imperial presidency.

PAGE 35

35 Prior to delving into the substance of this project, I would like to bring the readers attention to the theoretical and methodologica l background of this effort. I will do this by reviewing the extant body of relevant literature th at collectively informs both the multiple presidencies thesis and its component issue areas analysis. This review is off-set into an unnumbered chapter all its own in order to emphasize its contributions to the larger work but also to allow for its simultaneous separation so that readers already familiar with this body of literature can skip over the discussions and move di rectly into the argument itself (see chapter 2). Literature Review Whither the Two Presidencies? This critical literature re view of the two presidencies thes is is done in order to answer a very basic question, Whither th e two presidencies? This question emanates naturally out of Wildavskys (1966) formulation that no less than tw o presidencies existed within the office of a single president. One presidency was defined by broad executive prerogatives in the realm of foreign policy construction while another was defined by a recalcitrant Congress which forced the president to share if not acquiesce in domestic policy construction (Wildavsky 1966). The extant body of literature produced over the last four decades has led some scholars to support (62.5%) and others to reject (38.5%)5 the tenets of the two presidencies thesis (see Shull 1991 for an excellent review). With this in mind, I will conduct a literatu re review of the major published scholarly works done on the two presidencies thesis (N=24). I critically revi ew the literature in a systematic fashion searching for points of comm onality and dissimilarity between the works. I then map out the two presidencies thesis theoretically, empirical ly, methodologically and 5 Data drawn from a previous study by the author entitled, The Two Presidencies an unfinished Project: A Theoretical, Methodological, Empirical and Normative Meta-Analysis paper presented at the Southwest Social Science Associations Annual Conference at San Antonio, Texas April 2006.

PAGE 36

36 normatively in order to expose both its contributions as well as its deficiencies. Finally, I call for the theorys displacement at least as regards its position as a device fo r understanding extant Post-War executive-legislativ e relations in internati onal affairs policy making. I find ample evidence, in concert with previ ous studies, to support the two presidencies thesis. But this study offers a far more subtle approach to understanding the phenomenon. I also find that the two presidencies exist in one of thre e main versions including: a classic institutional one (Wildavsky 1966), an alternative partisan version (Edwards 1986) and a cultural version used principally to reject the two presidenci es as an empirical theory (or at least an institutional one) (Peppers 1975). Further, I find that relationshi ps exist between the type of methodology employed and the version of the th eory supported. For instance, the strongest supported version of the two presidencies is the institutional one as an aggregate level phenomenon. The review also reveals that the partis an version of the two pr esidencies is perhaps overstated as there is no direct link between supp ort and opposition to the thesis itself. Finally, the perceived role played by the in dividual level of analysis within the partisan two presidencies (see Conley 1997) while supportable ha s limits in its generalizability.6 Therefore, the basic methodological design employed by the individu al researcher when examining the two presidencies may in fact be pr ivileging certain outcomes as to whether or not the thesis is supported. Also, such design formulations may be dictating what form the two presidencies thesis ultimately takes as an institutio nal, partisan or cultural phenomenon. Additionally, there is an utter lack of normative inquiry into the thesis itself as well as any reflexive discussion that resear chers biases (ide ological, paradigmatic, philosophical, etc) 6 See Caverly (2006) The Two Presidencies an Un finished Project: A Theoretical, Methodological, Empirical and Normative Meta-Ana lysis, paper presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association 2006 Annual Meeting at San Antonio, TX April 11-15, 2006.

PAGE 37

37 may have on the conclusions rega rding the two presidencies. Howe ver, I do find that there does not seem to be a periodized in other words, a time-bounding character to the two presidencies literature in that time is not re lated to support or refutation of the thesis itself. There is no Golden Age of the two presidencies when it was a near-universally accepted theory of executive-legislative policy construction, in fact it has always been challenged. Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that in a later period of time, the two pres idencies thesis was regularly rejected as having little or no utility as a theore tical device. This theory has always had a certain level of acceptance among presidential -congressional rela tions scholars. Lastly, I believe that this revi ew calls for a re-theorization of executive-legislative policy making relations. Perhaps, there has been an over reliance upon dualism in the attempt to produce the most parsimonious theory possible probably due to the over whelming empirical quality of the two presidencies thesis itself. A more nuanced examination of the domains themselves will inevitably lead to a multipli cation of executive-legislative relations across multiple issue areas. Also, the theory needs to be moved beyond the empirical and into the realm of normative political science in order to revita lize it for a world of internationalized domestic politicsi.e. globalizations co-mixture of foreign and domestic politics within intermestic policies (see Manning 1977, Keohane and Nye 1977) and domesticated foreign policies i.e. the War on Terror (Dodd in Conley 2003). Critical Literature Review of the Two Presidencies Thesis: The two presidencies thesis is prem ised by th e assertion that policy is best examined from a domain-specific orientation (fro m Spitzer 1983). Furthermore, th at domain structure to policy making is best seen in a bifurcated manner with the intent of the policies being differentiated along their teleological goals as fundamentally endogenous ( domestic) or exogenous (foreign) in nature (from Snow and Brown 1999). Additiona lly, the more proactive policy initiators are

PAGE 38

38 viewed as the most appropriate units of analysis, those being the president and the Congress at the national level of inquiry (from Shull and Shaw 1999). Finally, the choice of our national executive and legislative branches of government is in keeping with a long held view that institutions do matter as foci of inquiry for social scientific and specifically politically based research (from Weaver and Rockman 1993). With these thoughts in mind let us turn to the two presidencies thesis itself. Simply stated, the two presidencies thesis s uggests that at least two presidencies exist within the confines of the office occupied by a single president (Wildavsky 1966). Aaron Wildavsky (1966) was the progenitor of this id ea claiming that execu tive-legislative policy making relations was in fact governed by a bi -presidencies notion; wherein an unrestrained foreign policy president co-existed with a congre ssionally restrained domestic policy president. This idea was suggested to be an institutional phenomenon that held across time regardless of the composition of the Congress, the occupant of the White House, the condition of the economy, or even the presence of war or peace (1966). Wildav sky explained this condition by positing that the president is constitutionally and institutionally set up to be the dominant actor in foreign policy construction because of his greater c ontrol over informational and general policy construction/implementation resources in th is policy arena (1966). Regarding the second presidency, the president is constrained by a mo re proactive Congress in the realm of domestic initiative production (1966). In dom estic affairs, the Congress is seen by Wildavsky to have the same level of informational as well as general policy production/implemen tation resources as the president (1966). Analytically, this theory exists in a broader context of presiden tial-congressional policy making theories that emphasize the role of the pr esident at the expense of the Congress as the

PAGE 39

39 primary focus of inquiry and device for expl anation/prediction (e.g., Rossiter 1956, Neustadt 1960, Robinson 1967, Huntington 1961 and Edward s 1980). Methodologically, this theory employed roll call analysis placing it into a larger school of thought which suggests that quantitative vote studies can re veal empirical support for theo retical contentions regarding political behavior (e.g., Niemi and Weisberg 2001 for general American voting behavior, Key 1949 and 1955 for early regional application, Bl ack and Black (2002) for later regional application, Stewart 2001 for applic ation in the Congress, Cameron (2000) for application to the presidency, and Conley (2002) fo r application to American ex ecutive-legislative relations). Finally, the two presidencies can be seen to be in a larger paradi gmatic context as an institutional theory; whereby it is the institu tion(s) that has the most theoretical power in discerning the nature of political conditions as well as relationships (e.g., Weaver and Rockman 1993 for a general application of institutionalism in comparative contexts, Pierson and Skocpol 2002 for an application of new institutionalism in American politics, Skowronek 1997 for an application of the phenomenon in the Ameri can presidency, and Wilson 1885 for an early application of the old institutiona lism to the American Congress). Regarding Wildavskys (1966) study, he tested his theory by analyz ing congressional roll call votes from the New Deal Era forward (to 1965) that were listed in th e congressional roll call record as congressional box scores. These scor es were derived from those roll call votes on presidential initiatives in both Houses of Congress during the period under an alysis, 1933-1965 (1966). The results indicated support for a tw o presidencies phenomenon regardless of the exogenous or endogenous conditions ex istent during the time frame of the research (1966). As an example of this, Wildavsky reported that in an examination of congressional responses to presidential legislative initia tives from 1948 to 1964 the president prevailed about 70% of the

PAGE 40

40 time in foreign and defense policies and only about 40% of the time in domestic policies (1966). Admittedly, the explanatory and predictive power of these findings is a bit questionable due to the limited time frame but it does cross pres idencies and congresses under both divided and unified government, in war and peace, and thr ough economic recession and recovery (from Shull and Leloup 1979, ch. 16 in Shull and Leloup 1979). Ne vertheless, it is a point from which to begin.7 There are three general points of criticism that are leveled at the two presidencies theory, which can also be utilized as heuristics fo r the purpose of organizing the methodological, empirical and most importantly the theoretical development of the two presidencies literature through time. Of course, this portion of the analys is reveals the most a pparent though understated gap in the two presidencies literature itself that being the pronounced lack of a normative account of the two presidencies bo th as a research agenda and its implications for real world application. The Methodological Critique: The Const ruction of the Tw o Presidencies The first such criticism aime d at Wildavskys thesis is f ound in the argument made that the theory was methodologically flaw ed in its initial testing phase thus leading to conclusions that were possibly misinterpreted if not comple tely open to accusation as being nothing more than a tautology. For instance, Sigelmans (1979) st udy of the two presidenci es contends that the usage of congressional box scores as the de pendent variable for indicating presidential success/failure rates on congressi onal roll calls was an insuffi cient operationalization of presidential success/failure vis--vis the Congr ess. Sigelman (1979) made this claim based on the fact that the congressional box scores only included presidential legislative initiatives and not 7 I will engage in a stronger critique and discussion of th e two presidencies literature in the future, for the purposes of this paper I will keep my commentary to a minimum.

PAGE 41

41 those congressional initiatives that the president took a positio n on. Unfortunately, after making this statement, Sigelman did not actually reoperationalize the dependent variable in his own analysis (Sigelman 1979). Instead, he re-wor ked the congressional box scores to reflect presidential success on key votes. These votes were roll calls wherein support or rejection of the proposed presidential legislative initiative was garnered at or below an 80% threshold (Sigelman 1979). These votes are called by the re corders of them (the Congressional Record) contentious as opposed to consensual votes with the so named consensual votes being characterized as those ro ll calls that have an 80% or above threshold of support or rejection ( Congressional Almanacs published annually). Sigelman was th e first scholar to conclude based on his own independent study of the two presiden cies that the phenomen on was non-existent and to him was the result of nothing more than m easurement error on Wildavskys part (Sigelman 1979). Sigelmans usage of key votes as the i ndependent variables a nd usage of the same dependent variable congressional box scores during the time frame of 1957 and 1978 provides some cross-over with its cotemporaneous study (Leloup and Shull 1979) as well as Wildavskys (1966) analysis but the difference in operationalizations on the i ndependent variables prevents a one-to-one comparison of the findings. Another point of methodological criticism given in Wildavskys direction is found in the initial studys lack of replicab ility, especially for the purpos es of updating because of the abandonment of recording presid ential legislative initiative s by the editorial staff of Congressional Quarterly in 1975 (Leloup and Shull 1979 and forward to Congressional Almanac 1975). This prevented scholars from recrea ting the congressional box scores for time frames beyond the mid-1970s. For their own part Leloup and Shull (1979) updated Wildavskys data set through 1974 and found support for a tw o presidencies phenomenon though they found

PAGE 42

42 that the gap between success rate s for the president in the rele vant policy domains had narrowed significantly over the previous decade. Beginning in 1975, Congressional Quarterly began recording a new measure of presidential-congressional polic y making relations with presi dential box scores (now more routinely referred to as presidential position support scores) which record the aggregate percentage totals of presidenti al success/failure relative to aggregate congressional vote support/opposition to legislative initiatives that the president takes a stated position on regardless of the origin of the initiative (forward to the Congressional Almanac 1975 ). Since that time, scholars using roll call analysis to te st for the two presidenci es have relied on this measure for their operationalizations on both depe ndent (the aggregate scores themselves) and independent variables (the disa ggregated votes themselves) (S hull 1991 Introduction to Shull 1991). Most contend that the new variables are adequate proxies to the previous measures, however, this is an assumption therefore we shoul d be wary of attempts to compare one study with another because they are different at their methodological origination. Terry Sullivan (1991) introduced an alternative to Sige lmans key votes by conducting congressional headcounts in order to get a sense of the ebb and flow of congressional responses to presidential positioning. Sullivan (1991) refuted the institutional basis for the two presidencies finding that it was the result of partisanship.8 9 This finding was consistent with George C. Edwards (1986a, 1986b and 1989) work s where he suggested that presidential position scores had to be disaggreg ated in order to get at the tr ue nature of the relationship between the president and the C ongress which was an individually not an aggregate based one. 6 There is a whole school of thought regarding a partisan ra ther than an institutional basis for the two presidenicies or lack thereof.

PAGE 43

43 The result of Edwards research was that the two presidencies was at its heart a partisan not an institutional phenomenon but what was perhaps most telling was that Edwards was the first to employ an individual level of an alysis to the two presidencies (Edwards 1989). Unfortunately, Edwards research has been criticized for not bei ng able to discern whether the president wins more on foreign policy votes relative to domestic policy votes because of the effect of the disaggregating process (B ond and Fleisher 1990). Despite this, there has been at least one atte mpt to develop a proxy measure that has utility for longitudinal analyses. Jeffrey Cohen (1982) utilized presidential propo sal enactments by the Congress as a measure for asse ssing domain specific policy making relations between the president and the Congress from th e Lincoln to the early Nixon admi nistrations. To this day, this is the longest time frame ever analyzed by two presidencies researcher s and interestingly, in contrast to some later accusa tions about the two presidencies being a time and culture bound phenomenon, Cohen found a two presidencies playing out across over 100 years of American political history (Cohen 1982). The question arises, is individual presidential proposal enactment success or individual presidential position success equate-able to aggregate presidential initiative or aggregate presidential position success? They all very well could be, however, a single measure at a given level of analysis is needed in order to provide results that can actually be compared both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. This is especially true given the differential findings regarding the inclusion ve rsus the exclusion of contentious versus consensus voting and whether or not presidential initi ation of policy is actually im portant regarding presidentialcongressional policy making relations as well as whether or not you can safely compare varying levels and even units of analysis.

PAGE 44

44 Other recent scholarly attempts to test th e two presidencies phenomenon have moved beyond the confines of roll call an alysis because it has been felt by these scholars that mere presidential success/failure rates on one measurelegislation is inadequate for use as a sole set of independent variables and/or the depende nt variable regarding the executive-legislative policy making relationship (Lindsay and Steger 1993, Lewis 1997, Page and Jordan 1992). Methodologically, these social scientists emphasize alternatives to roll call analysis like content analysis of presidential addr esses (Lewis 1997). Also, these so cial researchers call for the employment of new independent variables indicative of presidential policy making discretion like executive orders and executive agreements. Th ey also advocate the re -operationalization of the dependent variable in terms of agenda setting (Lindsay and Steg er 1993). Finally, noninstitutionally oriented studies employing behavioral tools like pub lic opinion surveys have been used recently to get a broader sense of the executive-legislative policy relationship (Page and Jordan 1992). Lindsay and Stegers (1993) study is not an in dependent analysis but functions more as a call to research. Basically, theses scholars sugges t alternative measures to roll call analysis for American executive-legislative policy making relations. These measures include looking at procedural reforms as explanatory devices in or der to get at a perceive d ebb and flow to the executive-legislative policy making divide (1993). Another proposal is m easuring the degree of oversight engaged in by the Congress relative to administration activitie s with a hypothesis that differential levels of oversight will be found in separate policy domains of administration activity (1993). Along similar lines Lindsay and Steger (1993) cal l for the study of legislative escape clauses premised by the idea that legi slation in different policy domains will allow different levels of executive discretion in pol icy action. The problem with these scholars

PAGE 45

45 suggestions is just that, they are only sugges tions and no one in the discipline has undertaken their call to anal ytical and methodological arms. Lewis (1997) does seem to follow at least the letter of Lindsay and Stegers intent by conducting a content analysis of presidential public discretionary a ddresses between 1947 and 1991. He concludes that there exists a rhetori cal two presidencies regarding foreign and economic policies. Wherein, presidents addresse s in economic policy areas tend to take on an advertising modus operandi; the president engages in a going public strategy using calls for public support, congressional legislative ac tions and citizen mobilization for grassroots lobbying of the Congress (1997).10 Meanwhile, in the realm of foreign affairs the president engages the public in a complete ly different manner; where the president assumes a singular leadership role and conveys that image to the country by shaping his public addresses in such a way as to imply this power (Lewis 1997). While Lewis work is empirically sound it perhaps overstates the role pres idential public discretionary addre sses have in the actual policy construction process, especially as an executive-legislative relations phenomenon. Also, Lewis tests foreign versus economic policy making which does not portray the actu al tenets of the two presidencies thesis because economic policies ar e not analogous to domestic policies. In fact, economic policies may be either domestic or fo reign in origin, therefore, they are actually portions of both the general categories established in the two presidencies literature. However, Lewis greatest contribution may be that he expands the two presidencies as a test of more than just domestic and foreign affairs influence, by introducing a new categoryeconomic affairs to the presidential-congressional policy influence divide. 7 See Kernells (1997) Going Public: New strategies of Presidential Leadership

PAGE 46

46 Page and Jordan (1992), utilizing public op inion research with surveys and content analyses of administration policy advertisements, find that the two presidencies thesis is not supported since the policy impact on the electorat e is essentially the same regardless of the domain involved. In other words, the shaping of public opinion relative to international relations is not substantially different from that used by presidents in constructing domestic initiative support (1992). While this research is important for political behavioralists, however, it does not address the institutional relationship between th e executive and the legislative branches of government. The Empirical Critique: The Real vs the I magined Two Presidencies The second general area of criticism levele d at Wildavskys pers pective involves the correctness or existence of the th eory in the real world. What this entails is the question as to whether the two presidencies ever actually existed, and if it di d, does it still govern American national executive-legislative policy making rela tions? In other words, many of Wildavskys critics and he himself later in life came to be lieve that the two presidencies was a time and culture bound phenomenon, a produ ct of a now non-existent Cold War consensus (Peppers 1975; Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989). According to this view, the Cold War placed a certain structure over the relations be tween the executive and legisl ative branches (Peppers 1975; Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989). This structure governed relations between the two institutions in such a manner that the executive was continually deferred to in matters of foreign policy due to the imminent threat posed by the Cold War (Peppers 1975; Oldfield and Wildvasky 1989). However, when the structure changed (as the Co ld War was cooled by dtente and eventually ended with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall followed by the subsequent implosion of the USSR) the relations between the two branches of government also changed (from Peppers 1975; Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989).

PAGE 47

47 Table 1-1 tells a story that the president and the Congress live in two different policy making worlds. However, to those researchers that label the two presidencies nothing more than a character of historical space and time these structures are merely fluid variables altering through political time in response to both intern al and external circumstances. In the first major criticism of the two presid encies thesis, Peppers (1975) suggested that the policy context which encapsulated executive-legisl ative relations had fundamentally been altered by a series of systemic changes. These changes included; th e lessening of congressional acquiescence to presidential military adventurism because of the debacle in Southeast Asia, lack of faith in executive secrecy due to the excesses of the Nixon White Hous e regarding Watergate, the relative economic decline of th e American macro and micro economies due to the advance of world industrialism in the years since the end of the Second World War, and the rise of intermestic affairs with both strong domestic and foreign policy aspects to them in an era of dtente and economic interdependence (1975). Th ese developments led Peppers (1975) to conclude that the free hand once given to the president in the conduct of foreign affairs was merely a product of a Cold War consensus on presid ential deference in that realm that would no longer be observed. Similar to Peppers (1975) assertions Ol dfield and Wildavsky (1989) in a follow-up analysis to the original thesis likewise concluded that the syste mic structure which had allowed for a two presidencies was no longer valid. In fact, these scholars found that with the end of the Cold War there was no basis whatsoever for a dual presidencies phenomenon governing American executive-legislative po licy making relations (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989). Oldfield and Wildavsky concluded and even popularized th e phrase that the two pr esidencies was nothing more than a time and culture bound phenomenon (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989). Tables 1-2

PAGE 48

48 and 1-3 highlight this systemic change by comparing Wildavskys (1966) original institutional policy context w ith those dissimilar settings as portrayed by Peppers (1975) as well as Oldfield and Wildavsky (1989). The seco nd table (Table 1-3) has also been updated by the author with some additional information from relatively recent events in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the space and time argument for the two presidencies or more appropriately the lack of it is in itself compelling, such a thesis raises more questions than it does answers. For example, studies have shown the presence of differential policy success rates for the president vis--vis the Congress regardless of a Cold War timeline. As we have already seen Cohen (1982) found a two presidencies phenomenon dating back to the Lincoln administration, some twenty years before the US began its rise as a great econo mic power and at least thirty-five to fifty years before American rise as a world polit ical power (from Kennan 1979, Kissinger 1994, and Zakaria 1999). Also, as we will see in the upcom ing critique of the partisan two presidencies some of these studies extend beyond the confin es of the Cold War and at times do find differential levels of success or invalidate the two presidencies regardless of time or location (those that favor or somewhat favor i.e., Fl eisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000; those that mostly do not support i.e., Malbin and Brookshi re 2000). On a positive finishing note, the contextually oriented studies are a bit revolutiona ry in that they suggest the strong utility for qualitative analysis regarding executive-legislative policy making relations. More than anything else these studies, few as they are, indicate that there is a need to look below the numbers to get at the true nature of this inter-institutional relationship. Theoretical Critique: The Institutional vs. the Partisan Two Presidencies The f inal area of criticism garnered from a literature review of the two presidencies is found in the notion that the real policy making re lationship exhibited between the president and

PAGE 49

49 the Congress is characterized not as an instituti onal one but is in fact a partisan based process. George Edwards (1986a, 1986b and 1989) was the first such scholar to find evidence for a partisan two presidencies. Edwards (1989) found that the two presidencies was the result of differential levels of policy support given to presidents by opposition party members in the Congress. Hence, the two presidencies is a by-product of opposition support for presidential positions in foreign policy which less frequently appears in domestic policy affairs. Furthermore, with the increase in periods of divided government this scholar found that there was a precipitous decline in the power of the tw o presidencies (Edwards 1989). Th is is fascinating because it suggests that institutional conceptions of the two presidencies have actually attributed the causal mechanism for differential policy making outcome s to the wrong sourceinstitutional power; when in fact, it has been and continues to be nothing more than Republicans versus Democrats. The fact that these partisans are in different institutions be comes virtually a moot point (from Edwards 1989). Bond and Fleisher (1988 and 1990) also find a partisan basis for the two presidencies by updating Sigelmans (1979) data into the 1980s covering the Reagan a nd some of the Bush administrations. These scholars find a more nuanced version of the partis an two presidencies than that one found by Edwards (1989), in that, it seems to only hold for Republican presidents. In fact, the causal force for this relationship is found by these two researchers to be in the discovery of a Conservative Coalition of S outhern Democrats and Re publicans relative to issues of foreign policy (Bond and Fleisher 1988 and 1990). Additionally, such a coalition is lacking in domestic policy and there is no such coalition among moderate Republicans and Democratic presidents regardless of po licy domain (Bond and Fleisher 1988 and 1990). Interestingly, this research may actually suggest for an ideologi cal two presidencies except that

PAGE 50

50 it does not seem to find a modera te/liberal Republican to libera l Democratic coalition on foreign policy between the presidency and the Congre ss even though there may be one within the Congress itself regarding domestic policy.11 Sullivan (1991) further fine tuned the notions of a partisan two presidencies. Like Bond and Fleisher (1988 and 1990), it wa s only applicable for Republican presidents. However, unlike his predecessors, Sullivan (1991) discovered that the two presidencies may indeed be more nuanced. He found the Republican pres ident needed to have partisan control in at least one of the two houses of Congress in order to acquire a higher level of foreign policy success. While this is an interesting finding, we seem to be getti ng very parochial in our understanding of this phenomenon but that may be the decisive me thod needed to understand executive-legislative policy making relations.12 Unlike previous and some current studies, onl y two analyses are in the extant literature regarding the two presidencies that deal w ith the phenomenon in administration specific circumstances (e.g., Renka and Jones 1991; Conl ey 1997). Both of these present the two presidencies from partisan rather than strictly institutional perspectives and find evidence for the presence/refutation of a two presidencies. Renka and Jones (1991) find s upport in their analysis of the Reagan administration in a year-byyear study of presiden tial success rates on congressional roll call votes regard ing controversial issues. Of c ourse, this leads to the same problem as Sigelmans (1979) key votes wherei n certain non-controvers ial issues which may say a lot about congressional deference or th e lack thereof are not kept in the study. 11 This is pure conjecture because as P oole and Rosenthal (1997) show conservative Democrats still tend to be to the ideological left of liberal Republicans overall. 12 More on this in the theory section.

PAGE 51

51 Unlike Renka and Jones (1991) and similar to Sigelman (1979), Conley (1997) generally rejects the two presidencies in his study of the first two years of the Clinton presidency under unified government. Specifically, C onley (1997) tests the partisan two presidencies associated with Republican presidents. As already stated, Conley (1997) finds only weak evidence for differential levels of policy making and largely e xplains the phenomenon as the result of highly ideological and partisan support/opposition to President Clinton during the 103rd Congress. This study is groundbreaking in that Conley (1997) al ong with Lewis (1997) are the first and so far only researchers to increase the division of polic y areas into more than just two domains. While Conley (1997) tri-furcated policy along domestic foreign/defense and i ntermestic lines Lewis (1997) used the categories of domestic, fore ign/defense and economic policies. Even though Conley largely refutes the two presidencies and Lewis basically supports it, they both find some difference in levels of congressional support (f or Conleys (1997) study) or how policies are presented to the public (for Lewis (1997) st udy). This is consistent with Oldfield and Wildavskys (1989) review of the new political environment faced by the president in his relations with the Congress. It is also consiste nt with King and Ragsdale s (1988) call for the possibility of a multiple policy presidency impact on multiple policy domains with the Congress. Finally, Conley (1997) does find some evidence for an ideological and partisan refutation of the two presidencies thesis overall. However, his conclusions are limited due to the time constraints placed on his study. Most importantly, the general limitation of Conleys (1997) research is that it was located in a period of unified government when the broader confines of recent presidential-congressional histori cal context have been characterized by divided and not unified government. Additionally, Conleys (1997) research is a bit unique and possibly limited

PAGE 52

52 in that rather than looking for the presence of the two presidencies he is actually looking for the absence of such a phenomenon. The final studies that cast the two presidencies in a mostly partisan/institutional light have an expansive scope regarding their time boundary, essentially encompassing the era of the modern presidency. However, these studies have a lternative interpretations as to the presence or inexistence of a two presidencies of any kind--partisan, institutiona l or otherwise. The first is actually an older study but it has had a great deal of influence regardi ng re-interpreting the dynamics of the two presidencies. Harvey Ze idensteins (1981) expansion of Sigelmans (1979) study using key votes fi nds evidence for a nuanced two presidencies being present in the presidential-senatorial relationship only at least since 1973. It could be suggested that this is evidence for a Republican two presidencies as well as a senatorial two presidencies both being based on foreign policy bi-parti sanship. Of course, it is diffi cult to see where the Carter presidency fits into the above formulation under such condi tions (from Zeidenstein 1981). One interesting note is that Zeidenstein uses Sige lmans study as his base and finds an alternate conclusion, one where the two presidencies is su pported with qualification for institutional and partisan effects (from Zeidenst ein 1981 and Sigelman 1979). In more recent work, Fleisher, Bond, Kr utz and Hanna (2000) find weak evidence supporting the two presidencies. They suggest that it is in decline due to the increased levels of party line voting as a result of the ideological and partisan polariz ation of the Congress in recent years. Finally, Malbin and Brooks hire (2000) suggest that the tw o presidencies was actually an overstatement of executive-legis lative policy making relations. These authors do find support for a Cold War two presidencies between 1945 an d 1972 but only as a strictly presidentialsenatorial relations phenomenon ( 2000). Like the other two final an alyses, this study leaves open

PAGE 53

53 the question as to how much the two presidencies, if it is there at all, is a partisan or an institutional phenomenon as the resu lts of these studies seem to be able to be interpreted either way. A part of my dissertation and possibly broader research project is to try to answer that very question because if there are differential levels of policy making authority vested in the president relative to the Congress, then it could be attribut ed to either partisan/ideological or institutional reasons. I believe that it is primarily institutional where partisan/ideological conflict is played out within a broader opportunity structure of inst itutional power between th e presidency and the Congress. The Normative Critique: A Two Presidencies full of Promise but Little Reward What is striking about the two presidencies literature is its pronounced lack of nor mative analysis both at the implications of an imperial foreign policy presidency and an imperiled domestic policy presidency (from Schlesinger 1973, 1989 & Ford 1980). Additionally, and perhaps more profoundly, an intellectual historiogr aphy of the topic has never been conducted as to the possible inherent researc h biases regarding normative implications of a presence or lack of a two presidencies phenomenon in the real wo rld of executive-legisla tive relations. While the methodological debates regarding the proper meas uring, variable operatio nalization and extant time frame of the two presidencies have been engaged ad nauseum, little effort has been made regarding the outcomes of such studies implica tions (from Bond et al. 1991 in Shull 1991). In the executive-legislative relations literature writ large, such a debate has been present and is ongoing between those, like James Sundquist (1981) who, see a resurgent Congress checking the more abusive executive excesses in the wake of the Vietnam War a nd Watergate scandals. Another group of scholars, led principally by Lo uis Fisher (2000 and 2004) in political science and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1973, 1989 and 2005) in history, find a presidency still

PAGE 54

54 empowered (excessively in their view) particular ly in the realm of foreign/defense policy making relative to the Congress and even th e totality of the American polity. The vast majority of the studies contained within the two presidencies literature are behaviorally oriented empirical analyses that emphasize parsimonious theorizing and methodological rigor. However, they do this at the expense of th e possibilities i nherent within this topic for normative value-laden political sc ience. For instance, even in Wildavskys (1966) initial analysis there is littl e time given to the ethical and even moral implications of a Constitutional Dictator in the realm of presidential foreign/defense policy construction (from Rossiter 1956). This is particularly interesti ng given the fact that Wildavskys study was only four years removed from the C uban Missile Crisis where pres idential decision making would eventually be critiqued as be ing too hastily made, with too few options put forward (Alison and Zelikow 1999). As Ellsberg (1971) has demonstrated, presid ential decision making (i n this case regarding US intervention into Southeast Asia) was hamp ered by pre-set Cold War oriented images leading to what Irving Janis would eventually describe as a groupthink phenomenon (Janis 1982). Ellsbergs (1971) idea of a quagmire mach ine model to explain such a case specific intervention (Vietnam being that case) could be seen as a normative (and hence subjective) example of Putnams formal theoretic (and hence objective) two level games scenario with one game of interactions accounting for domestic policy construction (composed of multiple sets) and another game of in teractions (composed of a more finite number of relevant setsEllsbergs quagmire machine-model) accounting for foreign policy development (Putnam 1988). A similar applicatio n, in theory at least, could exist within the two presidencies framework but a review of the extant lite rature on the subject does not find one.

PAGE 55

55 Why is it the case that the two presidencies literature lacks such a normative component? I believe the answer rests in two parts, one genera l and one more specific. First, the behavioral revolution, for good or bad, has left the social sc iences with a predilection toward empirical theorizing. While in and of itself this is not an undesirable deve lopment, the treatment of the empirical vs. normative divide within the social sc iences (and in particular political science) as a zero-sum phenomenon has left the two groups la rgely ignorant and even worse dismissive of each others work. This is disappointing on many leve ls least of which is that the persistence of differential levels of policy making success be tween the executive a nd the legislature has continued even in the wake of executive exces ses in foreign policy like the Vietnam War and possibly (according to some anyw ay) the current war(s) (War on Terrorism, War In Afghanistan, War In Iraq) (from Dodd in C onley 2003). Also, the inability of presidents to govern on the domestic front under both divided and unified go vernment conditions has continued to feed the tendency for presidents to emphasize foreign ove r domestic policy because that is where they can win regardless (Shull and Shaw 1999). Finall y, periods of governmental domestic success continue to be more tenuous and contingent on short term elector al/public opinion forces relative to presidential foreign policy activism. These la st two points cry-out fo r an interpretive-based examination that brings out the inherent nuances often missed in more positivist based research (from Bond and Fleisher 1990, Conley 2002, Edwards 2000 in Shapiro, Kumar & Jacobs 2000).13 More specifically, the attempt by two presidencies researchers to produce the most parsimonious theory possible or to negate it in a similar such fashion has kept the two 13 Interpretivism as a philosophy of science has not been employed in the study of the two presidencies or in presidential research in general. Howeve r, its strengths in identifying underly ing causes and deeper attention to the role of context in shaping inter-actor behavior would be a fi rst step in improving theorization in this field (see Thiele 2003).

PAGE 56

56 presidencies relatively undevel oped as a reflexive concept but highly developed as a research program. In other words, the current level of two presidencies research is basically an extended methodological debate which emphasizes the m easuring (or lack thereof) of the phenomenon disguised as a theoretical on e looking for the presence or absence of the phenomenon itself. What of course is missing is why such a policy making differential between the presidency and the Congress in the realms of domestic and fo reign policy construction is even important. The answer should be obvious that since the Founding over 200 militarized disputes involving the US (many involving some level of combat) have occu rred and they have larg ely been the exclusive domain of presidential power (Fisher 2004). Also, that in an age of polarized politics the national government is often impeded in domestic action and what action th at does occur is often contradictory leading to massi ve budget deficits, inefficient decision making procedures and often ineffective governance processes (Bond and Fleisher 2000). However, the two presidencies literature not only does not answer these questions. Indeed, in large measure it does not even ask the questions. Given the size of the normative gap in the two presidencies literature, and to paraphrase the Democratic response to the 2005 pr esidential inauguration speech by Virginia Governor Kaine, There is a better way! (CNN State of the Union Speech January 20, 2005). While promoting such an alternative is beyond th e scope of this paper it should suffice to say that the normative implications of the two pres idencies at a minimum at least need to be addressed in future research and not just ignored as unscientific. A final normative area for examination regarding the two presidencies is the need for some type of phenomenological recognition of the rese archers role as analyzers of this phenomenon. A reflexive analysis of the scholar s own contextual biases is need ed in order to see where they are coming from and provide a map for the intelle ctual history of the tw o presidencies thesis.

PAGE 57

57 Examining the intellectual history of the two presidencies thesis through reflexive lenses indicates that the two presidencies to at least a certain extent are what the researchers make of it! This is consistent with some construc tivist international relations and post-modern deconstruction political theory analyses that find reified and objectified empirical referents. Furthermore, the conclusions reached through such referents have led to absolutist determinations a la positivistic and even ideologically based inte rpretations (Oren 2003, Best and Kellner 1991 and Thiele 2003). For example, researchers have largely l ooked at the same general type of data, presidential position roll calls yet have concluded numerous ly different findings either supporting, refuting or somehow or a nother qualifying the presence rise, decline or absence of a two presidencies (Wildavsky 1966, 1989, Sigl emen 1979, Zeidenstiein 1981, Shull and Shaw 1979, Bond and Fleisher 1988, Fleisher et. al. 2000, Conley 1997, Conley in Conley 2003). Another area of criticism emanating out of the tw o presidencies as a reflexive approach is that the search for a bi-furcated answer to the quest ion of Whither a two pr esidencies? actually limits the number of potential questions. This is especially true regarding notions of differential policy outcomes as a result of domain specific contexts because it presages any answer by framing it in zero-sum terms (which in itself is a bit ironic given the pronounced lack of rational choice ap plications in the two presidencies lit erature). Lastly, those who go out to find a two presidencies almost inevitably do, while those who go out to negate the phenomenon also accomplish their task The fi nders include Wildavs ky (1966) (initially), Zeidenstein (1981), Shull and LeLoup (1979) Sh ull (1997), Shull and Shaw (1999), Bond and Fleisher (1988) (initially), Edwards (1986) among others.14 The negators of the two 14 I have subsumed both the institutional and partisan versio ns of the two presidencies into the same category as finders of the two presidencies thesis.

PAGE 58

58 presidencies thesis include Wild avsky and Oldfield (1989), Fleish er et al. (2000), Conley (1997), (Conley in Conley 2003), Sigelman (1979), Pe ppers (1975), Malbin and Brookshire (2000), Fleisher et. al (2000) an d others despite the fact that for th e most part not only the same data have been examined but also the same time fr ame and no real conclusion has been reached (see Table 1-4 for this and other information). In keeping with the idea that the two presid encies is often what sc holars make of it, as Table 1-4 indicates the methodological biases of the researchers seem to have a bearing on how they interpret the presence or lack of a two presidencies. Those using an aggregate approach (quantitative or qualitative) rega rding the level of analysis employed largely finding support for the two presidencies thesis as either an inst itutional or partisan executive-legislative policy making relationship. However, those scholars mo re predisposed to study the phenomenon with an individual level of analysis approach tend to find evidence contrary to a predicted two presidencies domain-specific presidential-congressional policy making relationship. As previously discussed in the paper, Malb in and Brookshire (2000) and Fleisher et al. (2000) both in some form or anot her support but also suggest a decl ine in the two presidencies in some qualified form as a partisan and cultura l phenomenon that was bui lt around the Cold War. These studies seem to represent some kind of m iddle category that neither supports nor refutes the two presidencies; therefore I left them out of Table 1-4. Conclusion This critical literature review has exam ined the two presid encies thesis as a body of scholarly work across the last four decades. In this effort I have developed four propositions assessing the quality of the two presidencies thesis as an empirical theory, a methodological debate and most critically as its unfulfilled promise to serve as a normative critique on extant executive-legislative policy making relations. A fourth proposition coming out of the two

PAGE 59

59 presidencies scholarship rests wi th the notion that the research has been trapped by its own dualistic nature. As an empirical theory, the findi ngs of this study contrary to some of the extant literature produced in recent years regarding the two presidencies is that it is a real depiction of the actual executive-legislative policy making relationship. The vast majority of the studies on the two presidencies in some fashion or form find ev idence for differential policy success rates for presidents in their relationship with the Congress. Presid ents do significantly better in foreign policy construction relative to the Congress than they do in such attempts within the domestic sphere. However, the explanation for such succe ss rates is not clear as to whether it is an institutional, partisan or cu ltural phenomenon but some pattern s are existent. The classical version of the thesis (the instit utional) is most associated with support for the two presidencies while the cultural version is most associated with rejecting it. The partis an two presidencies may be overstated as to its actual role in explaining the executive-legis lative divide but this point is still very much in contention. As a methodological debate th e two presidencies thesis sh owed some tendencies toward being methodologically determined but a systematic review of the literatu re reveals that it is not principally a produc t of methodology despite early critic s contentions (see Sigelman 1979 and Edwards 1986). Left unexamined are the larger paradigmatic roles played by elitist versus pluralist accounts of Americ an politics in the two presidencies analysis, however, I believe that they may prove fruitful for a broader inquiry currently beyond the sc ope of this study. Finally, and also somewhat beyond the scope of this current study, the greatest area for future research on the two presidencies must come from its realization as a tool for normative critique. Not a single study I reviewed ever systematically addresses the potential of the two

PAGE 60

60 presidencies as a platform for questioning the policy making divide between the president and the Congress. Also, the lack of a reflexive interpretation of the i ndividual authors own philosophical biases (towards sc ience as well as politics) prevents the two presidencies from being more than just an empirical phenomenon. The last conclusion that can be reached regarding th e results of this literature review is that the two presidencies must be more than ju st a mere report on behaviorally based empirics but truly explained according to the hidden nuanc es within its own fram ework. Nearly 40% of the researchers who have examined the two presiden cies thesis have rejected it as a theory of American politics. Therefore, a closer examination of the tenets of the thesis is needed in order to re-theorize executive-legislative policy making relations so as to produce greater empirical fit, stronger explanative/predictive power, as well as begin to establish a normative critique of extant presidential-congre ssional policy making. State-Centrism versus Do mestic Variables Approaches to American Foreign Policy Analysis Next, I will discuss the stat ist-domestic variables alternatives as methodological-theoretic approaches to the study of US foreign policy from extant international re lations research. This review of the literature, while not comprehensive is presented w ith an eye for direct relevance to the issue areas alternative that I propose in the third ch apter. Accordingly, I will first present the basics and some exemplifying canonical statist/state-centrist based US foreign policy analyses by showcasing their strengths but more importantly their weaknesses as method and theory devices for such exploration. In particular, I plan to present th e statist method and theory as a presidential-centered device which garners its strength from privileging those conditions associated most with a presidenti alist perspective on foreign policy.

PAGE 61

61 Then, I follow the same pr ocedure for discussing the domestic variables alternative to analyzing American foreign policy. However, in this effort I will propose that the domestic variables approach is essentially a Congress-centered mechanism for US foreign policy study because it privileges those conditions associated with a congressionalist take. Finally, I will briefly tell how an issue areas analysis is an improvement on this prior research tradition which will serve as a bridging tool for the more develo ped treatment discussed in the methods chapter (see chapter 3). State-Centrism/Statism Under the auspices of the statist/state-centrist ap proach to the study of US foreign policy, foreign policy constru ction is seen to be biased in favor of central over adjacent decision makers. What this means in practice is that certain rela tionships between real a nd potential actors in foreign policy are such that some basic assu mptions can be made asserting that (1) the presidency will dominate the Congr ess, (2) the foreign policy E stablishment will be more influential than the non-Establishment actors and (3) the core fore ign policy executive will ultimately make its decisions independent of the other executive branch actors. Finally, as a theoretical approach this assumes that outside interests like parties, interest groups, non-foreign policy oriented congressional committees and non -military/foreign policy or iented interests will have little if any impact on the creation of foreign policies. The methodological principle produced from the above theoretical premise is that central/core actors serve as the primary variables of interest for any study of US foreign policy. The primary reason given for the above conditi ons is that central decision makers in foreign policy share a common or ganizational culture includi ng similar policy goals, views regarding interventionism, state-to-state relation s and the primary control over the definition and hence application of the natio nal interest (Kennan 1979). Furt hermore, the external policy

PAGE 62

62 makers are viewed as too isolated from the form al powers granted to the central decision makers either by constitutional or legislative delegations. This is perhaps most important regarding the assumption of an asymmetrical information flow for foreign policy that empowers the core foreign policy executive (the president and a clos e coterie of advisors to day represented in the National Security Council and some economic e quivalents like the Office of the US Trade Representative) at the expense of those outside the black box of the st ate (from Waltz 1979). In large measure, state-centr ist analyses have been the dom inant theoretical starting point for most US foreign policy rese arch since the start of the Co ld War. Early game theory applications regarding the developm ent of state-to-state strategic interactions and eventually the establishment of deterrence theory both as an academic and practical foreign policy program were in place by the 1950s.15 In these presentations the US state was nothing more than the people at the top who all were presumed to think alike, act alike a nd in general be alike while this may seem simplistic it was and is vi ewed as very parsimonious. For instance, as complex interactions like those that occurred between Kennedy and Khrushchev over the Cuban Missile Crisis can be examined in an empirically valid manner through a mechanism like the chicken game matrix (Snyder and Diesing 1977). Or the rise of an aggressive based American foreign policy doctrine like Containment or even Roll Back as a by-produc t of the failure at Munich leading to the need to provide a credib le threat in the face of inevitable attack (Payne 1970).16 15 See Von Neuman 1943, Schelling 1960, Shubick 1964, Snyd er and Diesing 1977 for game-theoretic applications both in general and in specific foreign policy dilemmas as well as George and Smoke 1974 and Payne 1970 for deterrence theory and its specifi c application to the US case. 16 The failure at Munich is a common utilized phrase within the foreign policy community to indicate the negative consequences of appeasement of aggressors as a dipl omatic initiative and strategy. The specific reference is employed to showcase the risks of appeasement as witnes sed by Chamberlains diplomatic venture with Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938 which was seen in retrospect to give Hitler a carte blanche to carry our further aggression on the European continent.

PAGE 63

63 The Munich analogy of the ultimate failure of appeasement in dealing with foreign policy crises involving naked aggre ssion is taken one step further by Yuen Foong Khong. Khong (1992) attributes Trumans war decision regarding the Ko rean War as a direct outcome of the perceived negative results of US isolationism duri ng the interwar years (the 1920s and 1930s). Furthermore, this study claims that the negative outcomes of the 1938 Munich Agreement between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler over Czechoslovakia served as the direct guiding principle in checking communist aggression on the Korean peninsula (Khong 1992). Earnest Mays (1973) historical analysis claims th at virtually all US foreign policy decisions are based on previous evaluations of those situatio ns that are deemed similar, however, it is stressed throughout his work that it is only a small number of pe ople that are doing this activity which leads to certain misuses of history. Perhaps th e greatest single app lication of a statecentrist model for foreign policy decision making is in the prevalence of the rational actor model which posits that states unitary actors utilize cost vs. benefits analyses in reaching decisions regarding foreign policy situati ons (see Alison and Ze likow 1999). Bueno de Mesquitas (1981) war trap model based on expected utility maximi zation is probably the best single employment as well as the most favorable one for the usage of the rational actor m odel as an exploratory device. One possible reason for this exists in the models own negation because many American foreign policy researchers have found little a pplicability for this model beyond Bueno de Mesquitas version of war de cision implementation (see Snyder and Diesing 1977 and Anderson 1987 in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau 1987 for criticisms). Braybroke and Lindblom (1969 in Rosenau 1969) suggest that incrementalism is a better way of examining foreign policy decision maki ng by accounting for Simons (1959) ideas about satisficing due to the lack of review potential rega rding all possible policy alternatives. These

PAGE 64

64 authors are responding to the long held criticis m of the rational actor model as not being empirically possible due to the strictness of its assumptions which while excellent for parsimonious modeling may in fact be detrimen tal in real world application (see Green and Shapiro 1994 for an extended empirically based criticism). Incrementalism is based on making decisions around evaluations by cent ral decision makers of the prev ious policy already in place. The result of this model is that policies rou tinely chosen are in fact non-optimal, but the authors of this thesis conclude that war decisi ons lie outside the parameters of normal foreign policy decision making and hence cannot be accounted for by this model (Braybroke and Lindbolm 1969 in Rosenau 1969). What is interesti ng is that the preferred model used to explain/predict American foreign policy decisi on making seems to be dependent on the issue area it is being applied to. Other applications of the statist model have looked at certain issue area specific points in US foreign policy construction like for inst ance in foreign economic policies. Krasners (1978) suggests that US foreign economic policy regarding raw material investments reflected the concerns of a small group of central decisi on makers leading rath er than being led by corporate interests who were quite hostile at the start of these efforts in the late 19th century. This is particularly noted given the fact that most analyses of US foreign economic policies have given the Congress not the executive branch (m uch less the presidency) the central place in policy formulation during that time period (Lindsay 1994). Lake (1988) claims that US trade policy between 1884 and 1934 actually reflected a supply side approach to trade strategy development which supported a state-centered argument rather than the more conventional view of a demand side strategic approach that supports a society-centered ex planation. Ikenberry et al. (1983) contrast the systemic, state and society oriented analys es regarding the development of

PAGE 65

65 US foreign economic policies and find support for the state as an interv ening variable between the systemic and domestic forces. However, thes e researchers also find that the US state is limited in its ability to be that intervening vari able due to its persiste nce as a generally weak force in regulating the economy (Ikenberry et al. 1983). Therefore, a relationship seems to exist between the levels of impact a state can have de pending on the particular issue area of foreign policy. Hence, in the realm of security where cen tral decision makers have the most impact the study of them (a statist formulation) is called fo r but where it is doubtful or even absent (i.e. foreign economic policies) then an al ternative conception is called for. Psychological approaches to foreign polic y construction in themselves do not support state-centrism because they operate at a differe nt level of analysis. However, they do offer insights as to the elitist quality of foreign policy construction re lative to that found in domestic politics. For instance, in the 1980 s Reagans very personalized view s of the Soviet Union as an Evil Empire had a profound impact on East-Wes t relations regarding the massive defense buildup undertaken by the US during that time. Howe ver, in domestic affairs, Reagans views regarding the need to scale back the welfare state did have some impact regarding a devolution revolution in federa lism. In fact, the simple truth of the matter is that domestic spending remained largely intact throughout his administration (with 1981 as something of an outlier) leading directly to the deficit crisis of th e early 1990s. What this suggests is that in the elite politics of foreign affairs the psychological predisposition of a president has a greater direct policy impact than those same predilections do in the more pluralistic domestic arena. Khongs (1992) perspective of basing fore ign policy decision making on analogy with perceived similar situations from the past is an example of in-direct statist application from the psychological approach literature. Since according to the statist model the number of decision

PAGE 66

66 makers is kept naturally at a minimum then sk ewed ideas about extant and previous conditions will appear and guide such decision making. Furthe rmore, such decision making can lead to the groupthink phenomenon as articulated by Irving Jani s (1982) where altern ative policy proposals are kept off the table due to a certain go al ong attitude that emer ges among isolated groups as foreign policy decision makers are if the state-centered perspect ive is the correct one. The Iraq War decision possibly fits this conception since ther e are reports that right from the start a certain consensus built around the President, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor that war with Iraq was necessary and de sirable (Phillips 2005). However, it is difficult if not impossible to find an application of groupthink outside of security po licy decision making. In sum, then the statist approach has its most profound utility regardi ng the development and execution of national security po licies whether viewed as a produc t of the rational actor model, incrementalist model or even indirec tly in the psychological approaches. Domestic Variables Approach The dom estic variables approach assumes a mo re society centered approach to the study of foreign policy design where diverse sets of interests, each with their own group of elites contend for influence under conditions that r oughly approximate pluralism and the outcomes produced generally reflect this give and take (f rom Ikenberry et. al. 1983, as well as Snow and Brown 1999). It is important to note that this approach does not assume that the state is a unitary actor but rather a composite of diverse interests who work through as well as outside the extant institutions of the society in order to come up with aggregate solutions to aggregate problems. The organizational process model formalized but later revised by Graham Allison (1971) views the state as a kind of corporation of loosely alli ed semi-feudal organizatio ns whose behavior is largely determined by standard operating procedures (SOPs). Under this formulation, central decision makers have only an influence and not a determinative impact on the behavior of these

PAGE 67

67 organizations because problems are deliberated over and solutions conceived largely independent of one another as the responsib ility for such foreign policy construction is divided up according to preset operational codes (Allison 1971). It is interesting to note, Allison rejects this model for explaining his central case study the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. However, when ut ilized in combination with the governmental process model as the Bureaucratic Politics Model Alison found that SOPs in conjunction with the independent agency of actors within the structure (in this case the executive branch) was the determining factor in the decisions made dur ing those eventful 13 days in October of 1962 (Allison and Zelikow 1999). While these results certa inly question the utility of a statist model for foreign policy crisis resolution they are not n ecessarily generalizable outside the case Allison analyzed. For instance, US response to the October War by the Nixon administration was almost entirely contained to a few people around President Nixon (principally his then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger), so it seems that the individual character of a president and his National Security Council may be the intervening va riable as to how much influence is allowed in foreign policy decision ma king particularly in crisis periods (from Ambrose 1979). Likewise, Andersons (in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau 1987) analysis suggests just this by finding no direct relationship between institut ional/organizational domain and foreign policy suggestions among the actors in those domains. Shep ard (1988) also finds that it is difficult to determine the effect of Secretaries of State and Defenses roles on the posi tions that they took on issues involving the employment of US force. Bo th of these studies we re cross-case and crosstime in formulation and hence may be seen as superior systematic evidence opposing the bureaucratic politics model and indirectly not su pporting the domestic va riables approach writ large.

PAGE 68

68 The domestic variables approach seems to have its greatest utility in foreign economic affairs policy making where a number of domestic interests are directly involved including but certainly not limited to political parties, interest groups, the Congress a nd judiciary, as well as various state and even local governments, corporations and labor unions (Wittkopf & McCormick in Wittkopf & McCormick 1999). Ev en the well known example used to support elitist perspectives on US policy making in ge neral the military-industrial complex made popular with C. Wright Mills (1956) power elite school is in f act an agglomeration of said elites including relevant interest groups, c ongressional committees and the Department of Defense. While this may seem elitist with regards to domestic policy making which is said to be governed by issue networks rath er than iron triangles of s ub-governments it is still a composition where unitary action (rational or not ) cannot be assumed (Loomis and Baumgartner 1994). In the realm of trade policy in particular a predominant amount of evidence has been suggested to support the thesis that until th e Trade Act of 1934 it was the Congress not the president who was the dominant actor in this area. The reason for such preeminence is found in the activities of state and local party organizations and pressu re groups of various economic interests battling it out over the contours of American trade po licy throughout the 18th and 19th centuries as the word lobbying came into being in the halls of Congress (Lindsay 1994, Lindsay in Wittkopf and McCormick 1999, Coope r in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005, and Fisher 2000). Furthermore, in the wake of the Cold Wa r growing economic interdependencies as well as congressional resurgence in such matters has beco me par for the course rather than the aberration as evidenced in the establishment of an economica lly oriented rather than a politically/militarily

PAGE 69

69 oriented New China Lobby on K-Street (Ber nstein and Munro in Wittkopf and McCormick 1999). Lastly, even in the realm of humanitarian activities that i nvolved the employment of US military force like in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo the Congress as well as public opinion and trans-national interest groups have been shown to have played a central role in either supporting or opposing these Bush-Clinton foreign policies (S now and Brown 1999). In particular, the rise of new security issues involving basic humanitarian needs like water and food security have been seen as places for adjacent actor incursion because the systemic life and death issues of Cold War old security are to some extend modi fied if not moved out of prevalence (Mathews 1989). However, the events of 9/11 have shown us th at the old ways are not in fact gone forever, but have just re-emerged under new guises. Wh ether Huntingtons well known thesis about a Clash of Civilizations comes to pass may be th e determining point as to whether central or adjacent decision makers will be the F oreign Policy Establishment of the 21st century (see Huntington 1996)? The real problem w ith the domestic variables approa ch is not that it is invalid but that it is only valid in certain areas at certain times. This limitation is similar to the statist approachs own constraints in examining American foreign policy, though of course the areas and times of validity are what separate the ap plicability of the two competing approaches. Accordingly, I will attempt a synthesis of the two that keeps what is best and rejects what is worst in order to produce a methodological-theo retical approach to US foreign policy that captures its inherent nuances but yet also retains its unique qualities.

PAGE 70

70 Table 1-1. Institutional Structures of the President and Congress17 Policy Characteristics Foreign Domestic President centered Congre ss/bureaucracy centered few participants many participants unity diversity uncertain, high risk more certain, low risk secret, stable more visible, fluid few options many options intangible tangible low information high information short decision time long decision time bior non-partisan partisan Table 1-2. Institutional Policy Context circa Cold War Era18 (1) Much of the presidents power derives from the immediacy of the Cold War. (2) The presidents formal powers to commit re sources in foreign affairs and defense are vast. (3) The need for secrecy restricts the ability of others to compete with the president in foreign affairs. (4) The rise of defense intellectuals has given the president enhanced ability to control defense policy. (5) Presidents devote a great deal of resources to foreign policy because they are perceived to be both important and irreversible. (6) Presidents refuse to become prisoners of th eir advisors and remain in control of their staff. (7) Reactions against the blatant is olationism of the 1930s has led to a concern with foreign policy that is worldwide in scope. 17 from Shull and Leloups (1979) Presidential Impact: Foreign versus Domestic Policy in The Presidency: Studies in Policy Making Shull and Leloup (1979) 18 Taken from Wildavsky (1966) and Peppers (1975) also reprinted in Oldfield and Wildasvsky (1989)

PAGE 71

71 Table 1-3. Institutional Policy Contex t Circa late and/or Post-Cold War (1) The Cold war has lost its sense of urgency as a result of the loss in Vietnam, the start of dtente, glastnost, perestroika, and ultimatel y the fall of the USSRthe end of the Cold War. (2) The War Powers Act and a resu rgent Congress in general ha s curtailed the presidents formal powers in military foreign affairs. (3) The impacts of investigations into the CIA, Watergate, the Penta gon Papers, Iran-Contra, etc have opened the political environmen t to make subordinates in the executive branch more willing to violate protocol, Congress more willing to use its oversight power relative to the executive, and the public more skeptical regarding executive discretion. (4) Negative reactions to Vietnam, the nuclear arms race, Cold War interventions, and military spending deficits has led to the establishment of a group of experts and supporters exogenous to administrations w ho openly question the president and the Pentagon. (5) Due to the failure of US policy in Vietna m, sloganeering which previously led to irreversible positions (like in the Cuban Missile Crisis) may not tempt a president as much as it once did since he/she may not want to risk the political capital necessary for such sloganeering to be successful. (6) Foreign policy formulation and execution by pres idents has been revealed to be the result of a process characterized by numerous and multiple inputs within his/her own administration. (7) An emergent neo-isolationism has developed within both political parties, the Congress, the executive branch itself, and even within the electorate which will stifle presidential interventionism in the future.

PAGE 72

72 Table 1-4. The Two Presidencies Scholarship at a Glance Support 2 Presidencies Thesis Institutional 2 Presidencies Wildavsky 1966,** LeLoup and Shull 1979, ** Shull and Leloup 1981, ** Shull 1997, ** Shull and Shaw 1999, ** Cohen 1982 ** Oppose 2 Presidencies Thesis Cultural 2 Presidencies Peppers 1975, ** Wildavsky and Oldfield 1989, ** Conley in Conley 2003* Partisan 2 Presidencies Edwards 1986, 1989, Bond and Fleisher 1988, 1990 Sullivan 1991, Zeidenstein 1981, Renka and Jones 1991 ** Methodological 2 Presidencies Siglemen 1979, Siglemen 1981, Page and Jordan 1992, Conley 1997* *=individual level of analysis **=aggregate level of analysis (Source=compiled by author)

PAGE 73

73 CHAPTER 2 THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES THESIS: A R E-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELA TIONS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS Introduction This chapter proposes an alternative theoretica l fram ework that will attempt to discern the exact inter-institutional policy maki ng relationship which the president shares with the Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. This theory is the multiple presidencies thesis which proposes that multiple foreign policy presidencies occupy the o ffice of a single president in his policy making relationship with the Congress. Additionally, I will promote the employment of a new methodological-theoretical approach to American foreign policy analysis which amounts to a synthesis of previous work. This synthesis is called an issue areas analysis which breaks American foreign policy down into its component issue areas and studies them accordingly. The reason for proposing such an effort is that the extant scholarship on Am erican national executivelegislative foreign policy making relations has missed the trees for the forest. The idea that foreign policy is somehow different in its forma tion and execution relative to domestic policy is pervasive throughout both American politics and international relations literature in political science (e.g., Almond 1950 and Huntington 1961 for early examples). However, it is my contention that despite Snow and Browns (1999 ) suggestion that forei gn relations lies beyond the waters edge, foreign policy is as nua nced and differentiated among its various subcategories as domestic policy is. Lowi (1964, 1972) posited that domestic policy was best viewed as being composed of a series of issue domains that had differen tial types and levels of policy conflict. In fact, Spitzer (1983) used Lowis policy typology thesis to suggest that the president had different levels of influence in the construction of policy relative to the Congress across these domains. If that was true for Spitzer, why cannot a similar such dynamic be occurring between the presiden t and Congress over the constr uction of foreign policy across

PAGE 74

74 multiple issue areas including national securit y, domestic security, diplomacy, international trade, foreign aid and immigration? A strong case can be made that such a dyna mic is going on and has so possibly through time, particularly in the Post War Era of th e Eisenhower to W. Bush administrations (19532004). It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the nuances of that dynamic from a new theoretically informed framework. Accordingly, this fr amework answers the fundamental question: What is the inter-instituti onal relationship between the president and Congress in foreign policy? This question stems naturally from previous works accomplishments and even more importantly from their failures to get at the heart of the presidential-congressional foreign affairs relationship. A number of scholars have addr essed the issue of executivelegislative relations. According to an excellent recent summary of that work by Shull and Shaw (1999) most if not all of those studies can be broadly categorized as being presidencyor congressionalcentered studies. This body of research calls for the emplacement of the locus of power within one or the other institution. The difficulty is that this body of work despite being labeled as executive-legislative analyses they are in fact single institution centered studies that view one or the other institution as posing/lack ing some causal force on the institution that actually concerns them. This analysis provides a conceptual model for additional work on the presidential-congressional relationship because it treats both institutions as proactive entities in the process and does not pr ivilege the role of one institution over the other.1 Accordingly, the central argumen t of this chapter is that executive-legislative relations in PostWar foreign affairs are best examined through a multiple issue areas pe rspective. Each issue 1 Some presidentially based studies include, among others, Rossiter 1956, Neustadt 1960, Robinson 1967, Huntington 1961 and Edwards 1980. Congressionally based analyses include, among others, Chamberlain 1946, Sundquist 1968, Moe & Teel 1970, Fisher 1972, Orfield 1975, Gallagher 1977, Edwards 1989, Bond & Fleisher 1990, Ripley and Lindsay 1994, Peterson 1994 and Brady & Volden 1998.

PAGE 75

75 area is characterized by a unique albeit related set of interactions that are themselves contingent on time and context. Furthermore, the examination of these afore-mentioned relations is guided by a theoretical framework called the Multiple Presidencies Thesis. The framework accounts that at least in the realm of foreign affairs the presidential-congressional policy making relationship is contingent on the larger forces of political time and exhibits a nuanced pattern across multiple issue areas. The causal mechanism governing the inter-instit utional foreign policy process consists in a two part endeavor with one part existing at the unit le vel of institutional interaction between the presidency and the Congress. The other process operates at the structural level of the political environment itself influencing in a systemic manne r how the unit level activity takes place. First, the unit level activity between the presidency a nd the Congress is a function of the executive branchs historical-institutional opportunity structure of power within national security Therefore, issue areas within the high politics arena (national security, do mestic security and diplomacy) are subject to higher levels of ongoing control by the president vis--vis the Congress. Second, as the foreign policy construction pro cess moves outside th e national security domain into the other issue areas th e component issue areas become more intermestic in orientation (the co-mingling of foreign a nd domestic policies like in the low politics arena of trade, foreign aid and immigra tion). Thus, the Congresss own opportunity structure of power within the domestic sphere comes into greater play in influencing foreign policy outcomes in the executive-legislative relationship by empowering the Congress at th e expense of the presidency. Third, when the political environment itself alters the conditions regarding the number of opportunities versus constraints w ithin the presidentia l-congressional forei gn policy relationship then the executive-legislative relationship is subj ect to a shift of in the direction of institutional

PAGE 76

76 policy making power. This shift in power can eith er impede or strengthen one institution (the presidency or the Congress) ove r another regarding the construc tion of foreign policy. Such a shift can never have a negligible impact on the inter-institutional relationship because power is not a neutral quantity. Therefore, at tention to such shifts as well as the recognition of historical conditions of institutional power (like national security for the presidency and domestic qualities of policy for the Congress) is absolutely necessary for understanding the foreign policy dynamic in executive-legislative relations. In sum, executive-legislative relations in foreign policy are best thought of as a securitizing presidency versus a domesticating Congress across the issue areas of foreign policy. This theoretical notion can be used to periodize the executive-legislative foreign relations policy making dynamic during the Post war Era (1953-2004). These are the separate orders of presidential-congressional relations according to the historical context they are found in. First is a War Power Order from 1953-1972 characterized by presidential dominance and congressional acquiescence to successfully s ecuritized foreign policy making. Second is a Confrontation Politics Order from 1973-1989 characterized by an aggressive presidentialcongressional foreign policy politic s where even the presidents pow er over security affairs is openly questioned. During this time, the Congress asserts its institutional prerogatives in foreign policy and the presidency battles on for a continua nce of the old order. Presidential derailment occurs in the wake of Vietnam but some rest oration of foreign policy prominence occurs under Reagan. Third is the Imperial Presidency Politi cized Order from 1990-2000 where a reempowered commander-in-chief gra pples with a very partisan Congress over the various issue areas of foreign policywith de ference given to security (but not acquiescence) and open defiance presented in all ot her domains not successfully securitized by the president. The

PAGE 77

77 promise of the Persian Gulf War victory for a full restoration of presidential power in international affairs is offset by the difficulties over trade and foreign aid policies faced by both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Fourth, th ere are the possibilities and constraints of an ongoing Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-2004) as the defining char acteristic governing the foreign policy relationship between the two na tional proactive institutions in the Post-9/11 world. However, the reliance of a new securiti zed opportunity structure of power built around the War on Terror has by its very intermestic natu re served as an invitation for continued congressional encroachment. A subset of the extant literature on executive-legi slative relations is of particular interest to this study because it serves as its starting point. These studie s propose the idea that the best way to examine relations between our nati onal executive and legisl ature is through the mechanism of institutional pol icy making authority. These st udies tend to either locate institutional policy making authority as either ex isting within the presidency, the Congress or in one or the other varying across hi storical and contextual circum stances (within the presidency Mezey 1989 and Spitzer 1993; within the Congr ess-Bond and Fleisher 1990 & Ripley and Lindsay 1993; in tandem (or equal) institutions Peterson 1990, Leloup and Shull 1993 and Thurber 1996). It is in this last group of sc holars that will ground the multiple presidencies project as a contribution to understanding execu tive-legislative policy making authoritative relations in foreign affairs. However, as Shu ll and Shaw (1999) suggest, all of these scholars, even themselves, view foreign affairs policy making as a whole. This is what I find to be the root of the problem revealed in the inconsistent findings of the two presidencies thesis discussed in Part I of the literat ure review (see Wildavsky 1966).

PAGE 78

78 Theory: The Multiple Presiden cies Thesis: A n Alternative to the Two Presidencies The multiple presidencies thesis suggests that executive-legislative relations in foreign policy making exist in historically and contextually sp ecific patterns that are based on an issue areas perspective wherein the president is most empowered in national security affairs relative to the Congress. Additionally, the Congress exis ts in a more equal and of-times empowered position relative to the presidency in those issue areas that exist in an arena (low politics issue areas which include trade, foreign aid and im migration) that is more subject to being domesticated. This last point is especially true when the political environment disallows presidential securitization of policies and domains beyond his normal arena of power (high politics issue areas which include national and domestic security as well as diplomacy).2 Given the criticisms leveled against the two pr esidencies thesis rega rding its theoretical, methodological, empirical and normative shortcomi ngs, what does this have to say about the advantages of a multiple presidencies effect regarding presidential-congressional foreign affairs policy making in the Post War Era? First, extant schol arship on the two presidencies establishes the notion that foreign affairs is a unique aren a of policy making because of the presidencys perceived or real authoritative role in this activity relative to the Congress. Second, given the inconsistent findings of the two presidencies literature, no one knows th e authoritative role, if any, for the presidency in such executive-legisl ative relations. Third and more specifically, the role of context, partisanship and most important ly institutional relationships have never been adequately mapped-out. Finally, a comparativ e, institutionally based methodology has not been adequately applied to the subject of authoritative policy making in foreign relations. I 2 I borrow a number of analytical tools from other resear chers to construct the multiple presidencies thesis and will discuss those contributions in this section including no tions of transformative analysis, opportunity structures of power, historical-institutionalism as a paradigm and ra tional choice theory as a paradigm for understanding individual actor actions as well as peri odicity for historical analysis of political time (Dodd 1986, McAdam 1982, Orren and Skowronek 1994 in Dodd and Jilson 1994, Mayhew 1974, Skowronek 1997 and Conley 2003).

PAGE 79

79 believe that a multiple presidencies conception w ill address all of these areas left either not studied or inadequately pursued by the previous wo rk on this topic. I engage each area in turn. However, methods will be discussed in the methodology chapter. Before engaging the nuances of the theory itself, I will set forth the reasons for selecting its placement within the Post War Era (1953-2004). According to both Louis Fisher (2000) and James Sundquist (1981) the Post War Era (the time after the end of WWII) has been a seminal point in the political history of executivelegislative policy making relations. These scholar s disagree as to what has actually happened regarding the power distribution of authoritative policy making in foreign policy. To Sundquist (1981) the legislative presidency in foreign affairs first develope d into an unchallenged dominant force but then declined in the wake of a resurgent Congress fed up with the imperial presidencies of Johnson and Nixon (see also Sc hlesinger 1973 & 1989). Fisher (2000), on the other hand, sees that Congress fail ed in its resurgence attempt and the imperial presidency in foreign affairs as well as spe nding policies has actually advanced rather than retreated in the intervening years since the end of Sundquists (1981) analysis. Both scholars are correct but in their own nuanced ways and the multiple presidencies thesis will be the keystone that links their perspectives together. The reason for this is due to the theorys notion of executive-legislative orders at the structural level (t he notion of the political enviro nment as a function of political time) and altering opportunity structures at th e unit level of presiden tial-congressional issue area-specific policy construction (the idea of a securitizing presidency versus a domesticating Congress). Regarding the contention that there is someth ing unique about foreign relations where the presidency and Congress are concerned the basic a ssumptions of the two presidencies thesis are

PAGE 80

80 correct on this matter. The problem has lain in the fact that when we are discussing foreign affairs we are actually discussing a very disparat e group of issue areas. These issues/policies include national security, domestic security, di plomacy, trade, foreign aid and immigration. In other words, foreign affairs are virtually as di verse as domestic relations regarding the sheer scope of policies and hence pol itics involved. The two presidencies thesis, in my view, erred right from the beginning because it assumed that in ternational relations we re not as diverse and hence easier to be guided by a policy of na tional interest (from Shull and Leloup 1979). What makes international policy making diffe rent from domestic policy construction regarding executive-legislative relations is not the scope of the policies within the issue areas but the opportunity structures in pl ace across those areas. In the realm of national security affairs, the president is constitutionally, institutionally, and historically advantaged so as to allow him/her to dominate the construction of policies. The Congress is likewise subordinate relative to the presidency in this area. In no other i ssue area of foreign policy does the president have such advantages but the fact that he/she has this advantage in fo reign affairs but not the domestic sphere makes all the difference. This is because in the domestic realm no such favorable opportunity structure is even possible. In fact the structures in that realm largely favor the Congress at the expense of the presidency That last point will be an area for later research but will not be examined in this project because it is the opportunity structure in national security affairs that allows the executive-legislative proc ess to play-out the way it does. This process ultimately leads to the classification of orders for executive-legislative foreign policy relations across political time. The above comments also speak to the second gap in the two pres idencies by suggesting how the authority dynamic in executive-legislative foreign policy making re lations is distributed.

PAGE 81

81 However, the role of the structural level compon ent of history and context is important to note here. While the presidency may lose instituti onal authority over policy construction relative to the Congress when policies move outside the realm of national security and its larger arena of high politics, historical contexts differ over time. In certain orders of political time like the War Power Order (1953-1972) the president ofte n successfully securitized issues that under different orders, say the Confrontation Po litics Order (1973-1989), were resisted by a recalcitrant Congress. This notion of securitizing issues comes from Mathews (1989) concept of a new type of security which included human itarian concerns in a way that previous Realist conceptions of old security did not recognize because of their predilection toward viewing material concerns. I expand the notion to include any issue in foreign policy that the president can sell successfully to the Congress as a security issue thus invoki ng the opportunity structure favoring presidential empowerme nt and hence congressional ac quiescence. In application, as Figure 2-1 shows the probability of presidential success vis-vis the Congress on a foreign policy issue is a direct function of the presidents ability to securi tize that issue or even entire issue area. Regarding the third weakness in the two presiden cies literature, the multiple presidencies thesis takes on the issues of partisan versus institutional c onceptions of executive-legislative relations by suggesting that both rather than one or the other pl ay a predominant role in the governing of this relationship by taking into account the contex t of political time. The categorization that arises out of an analysis of presidential-co ngressional foreign policy making relations across issues areas leads to the conclusion that in general national security affairs and to a lesser extent the rest of the high politics arena is less poli ticized and hence less partisan

PAGE 82

82 (meaning more institutional in its character of policy construction relations). However, in all other issue areas, especially thos e found in the low politics arena such a condition is absent and hence less institutional and more politicized (meaning more partis an in the character of policy making relations). These issue areas are more s ubject to being domesticated because they are characterized by an intermestic nature (the confluen ce of foreign and domestic policies), therefore, the Congress has an increased proba bility of successfully challenging presidential prerogatives (Manning 1977, Conley 1997, Lewis 1997). What follows is a brief section dedicated to laying out the cont ours of the map of presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy as revealed through th e multiple presidencies thesis. Political Time in Executive-Legislative Foreign Policy Issue Area Relations The War Power Order 1953-1972 National sec urity affairs expands into all/ most other issue areas of foreign policy establishing the president as a fo reign affairs hegemon with C ongress relegated to a virtually complete acquiescent and peripheral status as a foreign policy actor. The politics that the president and Congress make regarding one an other is one of master-servant and is institutional, non-partisan and de-politicized. The Confrontation Politics Order 1973-1989 In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, a re surgent challenger Congr ess juxtaposed to a weakly dominant presidency in foreign rela tions is openly and vi gorously questioning presidential prerogatives in the vaunted realm of national securit y. The power of the president to successfully securitize issues outside national security affairs is deterred and quite often the president fails in the effort as intermestic (the co-integration of forei gn and domestic policy) affairs become the norm rather than the aberra tion in foreign policy construction. The politics

PAGE 83

83 that the president and the Congr ess make in international re lations is characterized as reactionary-revolutionary and is partisa n, non-institutional and highly politicized. The Imperial Presidency Politiciz ed Order 1990-2000 A re-empowered national security affairs presidency that is said to be strongly dominant relative to the Congress in the c onstruction of internat ional relations policie s but does not reattain a hegemonic position due to continued Cong ressional assertion of institutional and partisan prerogatives. However, a Congress that neve r fully backed down impedes presidential discretion with limits placed at the same time that authority is given. While the president has regained the ability to successf ully securitize issues/policies outside the realm of national security and thus invoke the powers of that realms opportunity structure he/she is held at abeyance from exerting a renewed hegemonic pres ence and is often forced to compromise and even to follow the lead of the Congress in some non-secu ritized foreign policy domains. The relationship between the president and the C ongress as well as the politics that they make in foreign affairs is said to be one of management-labor and is partially partisan based, partially institutionally based as well as being at times de-polit icized and at other times highly politicized. Furthermore, this rela tionship is a function not only of security but also the continued role of intermestic politics left over from the previous order. The Post-9/11Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order 2001-2004 What tim e do we find ourselves in now regard ing presidential-congres sional foreign policy relations? The simple problem is that there is no simple solution. Presidential hegemony over foreign affairs is a thing of the past; however congressional resurgence has also been left incomplete. The line between foreign and domestic affairs is now so porous as to be virtually transparent. Existing research has seemingly been unable to grapple the ne w empirical reality of a globalized world, what Friedman (2002) refers to as the world going flat. Finally, at the level

PAGE 84

84 of presidential-congressional interaction the abil ity to discern the persp ective loci of power under the conditions of an increasingly interd ependent and even synergistic foreign policy making process are formidable to say the least. If we integrate more subtle issue areas into the analysis, a multiple presidencies approach has the potential to provide a lasting theoretical framework and methodology due to its adap tability to changing contexts. Analytically, this is a work of historical-institutionalism which employs quantitative based research to a field that is largely qualitative in nature. This research does import some concepts from rational choice theory, especially regarding th e presidents role as an individual seeker of policy primacy through his/her securitization effo rts. However, beyond that application this is a work very much grounded in institutionalist c onceptions of politics. This is especially true regarding the employment of opportunity structures as historical, institutional and constitutional avenues for policy making empow erment (from McAdam 1982). Also, my usage of political time for the purposes of periodizing the history of executive-legislative relations is a by-product of the historical-institutiona l perspective (Orren and Skowronek 1994 in Dodd and Jilson 1994). Theoretically, I borrow from American foreign policy research regarding state-centered versus domestic variables approaches to understanding policy formation. Emanating out of these notions, the high politics issue ar ena (national security, domestic security and diplomacy) is understood from the perspective of a state-cente red approach. Likewise, the low politics arena (trade, foreign aid and immigration) are characterized as responding more to a domesticvariables approach (Kissi nger 1994 and Gourevitch 1996). Though, in this project these approaches are mostly utilized as the principl e foundation for the development of my issue areas methodology (see chapter 3). Additionally, Dodds (1986) transformative approach is employed

PAGE 85

85 to showcase the ebb and flow of the presidents ab ility to securitize policies as a function of both the unit level endogenous conditions (presi dential-congressional rela tions) among the issue areas and the exogenous structuring forces of historical context (the political environment as determined by political time). Furthermore, in th is effort, rational choice assumptions about selfdirected behavior in instituti ons are imported regarding the impet us to securitize in the first place (from Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1973 and Dodd 1977). Finally, the theoretical relationship between the securiti zation of issues can be mapped out along a continuum of high to low politics arenas which in clude those that are already security (essentially, th e politics of war and peace) in nature to those increasingly reflective of intermestic (the politics of everything else) po licy making. As Figures 2-2-5 display, the high politics arenas i ssue areas are arrayed in order of proximity to the presidencys opportunity structure in national se curity. This includes national and domestic security as well as diplomacy where the president is most institutiona lly empowered to set the agenda and control it. Furthermore, there is an internal hierarchy wher e the closer the issue area is to the security opportunity structure (i.e ., national security) the most likely it is to be securitized (see Figures 22 and 2-4-5). Meanwhile in the low politics arena which includes the following issue areas trade, foreign aid and immigration are arraye d along a continuum of increas ing domestic composition (hence, these issue areas are ever more intermestic in th eir general orientation). Figure 2-4 shows that the Congress will play a more proactiv e role in its foreign policy relationship with the presidency the more intermestic the general orientation of the foreign policy issue area (Manning 1977; Conley 1997). Running along that continuum we see that there is a hierarc hy like that observed amidst the high politics issue arena though in this sense the more intermestic the issue area (i.e.,

PAGE 86

86 immigration) the less likely the president is able to securi tize (see Figure 2-2). Now, we will examine the larger methodological-theoretica l approach which complements the multiple presidencies thesis. This approach was initially in troduced in part II of the literature review and serves as a synthesis between the state-centered and domestic variables techniques of US foreign policy examination issue areas analysis Issue Areas Analysis The issue areas approach does two things, on a theoretical level it suggests that the Aristotelian Golden Mean between statist and d omestic variables approaches is found in their joint applicability as a function of time and spa ce regarding the specific issue areas of foreign policy and the temporal period in question. Secondly, from a purely methodological perspective this approach produces models that account for the inherent nuances of foreign policy construction behavior by dealing with them in a disaggregated manner. Collectively, by breaking foreign policy up into its distinct issu e areas national security, domestic security, diplomacy, trade, foreign aid and immigration as well as looking at mixed categories we can see those inherent nuan ces of foreign policy making come to empirical light. Furthermore by looking for within category differences according to the traditional oppo rtunity structures of power, security orientations for statist formulations and domes tic orientations for domestic variables approaches we may be able to ascertai n the true nature of foreign affairs activities.3 As has been shown in the previ ous literature review, statist ap proaches seem to have their best applicability in the realm of security politics. The reason for this is three-fold; first, the American separation of powers system with its di vision of responsibilities for policy construction 3 See the State-Centrism and Domestic Variables sections for evidence supporting this notion of opportunity structures. For a more detailed account of the utility fo r opportunity structure analyses see the Comparative and American Political Development literature especially Orren and Skowronek 2002.

PAGE 87

87 gives to the president and the Executive Branch more generally a prominent if not pre-eminent role in foreign policy construction (See Hamilton [1787] Federalist 70 in Rossiter 1965). However, the concept of checks and balances led to the establishment of a constitutional system of separate institutions sharing powers (see Neustadt [1960] 1990) Since the Senate is constitutionally mandated a role in foreign polic y construction and the H ouse of Representatives has the power of initiation for spending bills, the president has in fact never dominated all aspects of foreign affairs except onethe war powe r and to a lesser extent security policies in general. As Vessey (1987) stated, Congress may have the power to declare war but presidents make war. Perhaps it is the prevalence of high politics over low politics in mainstream US foreign policy research that developed dur ing the Cold War which led to the conclusion that presidents dominated foreign policy writ larg e. Therefore, with such a pr edilection the incorporation of such models as the rational actor, deterrence theory and psychological ba sed leadership decision making became the standard for foreign policy research. Or, perhaps it was due to the requirements of positivistic behaviorally and rational choice oriented social sciences call for parsimony. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that such theories and methods have had difficulty accounting for low politics in fore ign policy activities. This is espe cially true as there has been a rise in the saliency of such issues emanating out of low politics among both the lay and the academic communities since the end of the Cold War (and many would say beforeKeohane and Nye 1977). Therefore, with the rise of low politics we al so have the commensurate rise of the domestic variables approach as its wider theoretical and methodological le nses have reached out to the various domestic communities influencing or being influenced by world politics (Wittkopf and

PAGE 88

88 McCormick in Wittkopf & McCormick 1999). In a wo rld that is increasingly interdependent as was displayed in glaring detail by the 1970s era oil shocks, even superpower security was shown that it could be threatened in a nonsecurity way (Keohane and Nye 1977). The stress on adjacent over central decision makers has brought more and more groups and individuals into the foreign policy environment at the expanse of parsimony in methods (and theory for that matter). Unfortunately, at least among some in th e foreign policy research community this has led to scholars over looking the ve ry real fact that like it or not high politics still matters. The strongest utility for an issu e areas approach is in its applicability to examine American foreign policy in the widest way possible but still be attendant to the nuanc es within such policy construction and execution. By assuming that lo w politics is the purview of the domestic variables approach and high politic s the central concern of the sta tist approach due to historic, political and economic opportunity structures. Then, using these two as methods prescription devices in tandem rather than at paradigmatic poles provides the most parsimonious yet encompassing method to analyze US foreign policy from an empirical perspective. Discussion This sec tion of the chapter calls the readers attention to some empirical work that provides at least a glimpse at the complexities of the executive-legislative foreign policy making divide and the possibilities for my theoretical accountin g of these empirical referents. Stemming from my current research, I have some empirical referents to report wh ich, while merely suggestive of the utility for a multiple presidencies conception of executive-legislative foreign relations policy making, have some warrant for supporting the continuance of this research project. First, I have found a significant diversity with in presidential position roll call voting in both houses of the Congress, though the Senate seem s to be more proactive probably due to its greater constitutional role regarding foreign affairs. For example, in Eisenhowers first year in

PAGE 89

89 office (1953) he won all 7 of the foreign pol icy votes he took a position on in the 83rd Congress House of Representatives of the votes were s ecurity, 2 securitized fo reign aid, 1 conventional foreign aid vote and 1 on immigration. In the Senate, Ike took 18 roll call positions in 1953 on foreign policy matters and won 13 of them vote s occurred on domestic security issues, 1 on immigration, 2 on diplomacy, 4 on trade, 3 on secu rity proper and 2 on securitized foreign aid. Eisenhowers losses occurred on 4 of the domestic security issues and 1 of the trade votes. Eisenhowers victories in both the House and th e Senate reflect a securitizing-domesticating dynamic between the president and the Congress. In the arena where Eisenhower loses the most (domestic security) it is due to Senators be ing more hawkish on Cold War issues than Eisenhower was himself (this is after all the height of McCart hyism) and the trade vote was a Senate resolution to call for the restricting of presidential authority in negotiating executive agreementshence, an early attempt at senatorial resumption of trade authority long before the Era of Congressional Resurgence popularized by James Sundquist (1981). As a final example, the president receives hi s lowest support threshold among his first five House position votes on an immigration issue (t he Refugee Act) which was sold as a security issue by Eisenhower surrogates (see debates in CQ Almanac 1953 edition). Even in the height of the Cold War an issue like immigra tion with its inherent intermestic overtures made its potential for securitization an uphill battle to begin with. This is quite telling as an empirical referent for the multiple presidencies. As a final area for theoretical potential, I have found some anecdotal evidence that supports the possibility of a periodization scheme for executiv e-legislative orders. Other research has shown that differential policy maki ng environments have appeared and then been summarily displaced across time. For instance, C onley (2003) found that th e character of divided

PAGE 90

90 government faced by presidents since the time of R eagan has been substantia lly more partisan in character than previous peri ods of divided government. The bipartisan context of congressional relations in the Eisenhower presiden cy serves as a counterpoint, or historical anomaly. Similarly, Bond and Fleisher (in Bond and Fleisher 2000) s uggest an even more expansive degree of polarized politics virtually nullifying the bi-p artisan coalitions both within the Congress and between the president and the Congress over the last two decades. This can be seen as evidence for the fall of an era of consensus politics a nd the emergence of an era of confrontational politics. Finally, some scholarship has shown th at there is an ongoing ebb and flow between the president and Congress and it ha s persisted since the start of the republic (Dodd in Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977). As for my current research, I have some qualitative evidence garnered from my content analysis of congressional roll calls which shows an increase in congressional challenge of presidential foreign policy maki ng during the late 1960s. Furthermor e, review of the legislative histories on a number of these votes in foreign ai d, national and domestic security (all dealing directly or indirectly with th e Vietnam War) indicates an incr easing reluctance by the members of the Congress to trust the ini tiatives of the Johnson administrati on. It also is indicative of the responses by congressmen and senators to th eir constituencies, for this level of activity corresponds to declining poll numbers rega rding support for the war and the Johnson administration more broadly. These accounts can be taken as generally descriptive evidence of a significant change in the nature of the executive-legi slative foreign affairs policy ma king relationship, which suggests support for at least part of my proposed period ization scheme for such inter-institutional relations. Future research will have to deal with th is material in a more systematic manner, as my

PAGE 91

91 current study is aimed at assessing the foreign affairs relationship between the president and the Congress utilizing roll calls as the primary unit of analysis. From that then the primary dependent variable of interest to this study is the presid ential success rate on foreign policy position votes within the Congress.4 From a more quantitatively oriented pe rspective, I have found some additional corroborating evidence. Something decisive occurred in the early 1970s relative to presidentialcongressional relations at least as far as those relations is s ubject to measurement by roll call analysis. A cursory review of the average fo reign policy success ra te across individual presidencies (see Table 2-1) indicates that the Eisenhower through Nixon administrations success rate was a robust 82%. The success rate for the Ford through W. Bush administrations was a significantly reduced 69%. Re-calculating the scores by (1) removing Nixon from the earlier group in order to remove the effects of Watergate and (2) re moving W. Bush from the later group to hold constant any 9/11 impacts rev eals that presidential success in foreign policy drops to 66%. Finally, adding Nixon to the late r group with first W. Bush included and then removed leads to only modest increases in the ov erall foreign policy success rates for presidents (70.1% in the first case and 67.8% in the second case). In sum, this suggests that around the time of the start of Nixons second term (1973) the fundamental relationship between the executive a nd the legislature altere d irrevocably. In fact, there is a drop in the rate of presidential success in foreign affairs that be gins from a high of 93% in 1969 to a low of 59% during 1974, when Nixon resigned5. Finally, this decline is most present in Nixons re-election year (1972, success ra te=70%) and his second term (1973, success 4 See Chapter 4 for more on this subject. 5 See Nixon Table (Tables 5-28 and 6-13) for individuated foreign policy success scores as well as by issue area.

PAGE 92

92 rate=60%). It needs to be stated that this high level of variatio n occurs entirely under conditions of divided government and Nixon s electoral mandate wa s actually higher in his second term (60.8% of the popular vote) than in his first term (he only defeated the Democratic nominee Humphrey by .01% of the popular vote) when his fo reign policy success rate was at its height. Previous explanations that discuss cultural alterations to the political environment (Wildavsky and Oldfield 1989 or Peppers 1975) do not specifically addr ess the role of the Congress itself in the decline of presidenti al foreign affairs success rates. And, those explanations that do assert a role to Congress do so in such a manner as to make the condition of the Congress determinant on pr esidential succ ess itself (Bond and Fleisher 1988 and 1990). In both cases, some empirical refere nts are missing and hence any reas onable way to develop an allencompassing theory of presidenti al-congressional relations in fore ign policy. First, the president himself is missing as an empirical actor with i ndependent agency potential especially regarding issue framing and general age nda setting as the modern legislative president that he is.6 Second, context-alteration is not the same as context-depe ndency and the cultural two presidencies school of thought seems to have conflated those. If it was true that the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate so altered the existi ng relationship between the president and the Congress in foreign policy we woul d not find success rate averages that are still far above the 50% threshold. Also, if it were true that it is all about congressi onal conditions like the existence and even type of divided government th en we would see greater variance in the foreign policy success rate averages due to the persistence of the divided govern ment condition since the start of our time frame (1953). In fact, the ge neral conditions point to relative stasis in presidential success rates in fo reign policy with the exception of the dynamic drop in the 6 See Clinton Rossiter (1956) The Constitutional Dictator for a classic treatment of the rise and impact of the legislative presidency.

PAGE 93

93 average starting in the early 1970s and the possibility of even more nuanced changes which I will deal with in later chapters. Summary This chapter has offered an alternativ e theory called the multiple presidencies thesis reinterpreting the first of the two presidencies governing executive-legi slative foreign policy making. I argue that there are multiplicities of inte r-institutional relations within foreign policys component issue areas of national security, domes tic security, diplomacy, trade, foreign aid and immigration. These sets of relations hips are also a reflection of th e historical context that they are found in referred to as poli tical time. Furthermore, I s uggest that those relations are contingent on the ability of the president to successfully securitize issues relative to the Congress. Juxtaposed against this activity of presidential agency, the Congress is engaged in an ongoing process of domestication, wherein, th e members of Congress as individuals and groups attempt to re-orient forei gn policy issue areas in such a way as to favor their own unit level opportunity structure in domestic affairs. Finally, the a rrangement of the issue areas themselves reflect their existence within larger arenas of politics, wherein high politics issue areas like national and domestic security as well as diplomacy are more given to presidentialization/secu ritization. Likewise, low politics issue areas like trade, foreign aid and immigration are by their nature cl oser to domestic politics due to their high level of intermestic character (the mixing of forei gn and domestic politics in a si ngle issue). Their increased intermestic nature makes them more subject to the processes of congressionalization/domestication. This phenomenon is given to a certain ebb and flow throughout time and within policy domains, which then allows for a re-worki ng of the executive-leg islative foreign policy relationship into a series of ove rarching orders that has guided those inter-institutional relations

PAGE 94

94 since the start of the Post War Era (1953-2004) Also, periods of dynamic change do occur wherein one order of presidential-congression al foreign policy cons truction falls and is summarily displaced by a new such constituted orde r. And, now in the next chapter I will detail the corresponding methodology that carries the theo retical nuances of the multiple presidencies into the conduct of inquiry itself. I conduct this effort by offering a methodological synthesis of the statist and domestic variables approaches to understanding US foreign policy making as an issue areas analysis I believe that this synthesis shows th e best promise as a tool for finding the empirically nuanced trees within the American foreign policy forest.

PAGE 95

95 Figure 2-1. Path Diagram of Presidential Po licy Securitization Re lative to Congress Figure 2-2. The Mapping of Secu ritization Potential for Policies on a Continuum of Foreign Policy Issue Areas

PAGE 96

96 Figure 2-3. Political Time Orders (Structural Level Interactions) Figure 2-4. Presidential-Congressi onal Foreign Issue Area Relations (Unit Level Interactions)

PAGE 97

97 Figure 2-5. Level of Inherent Security and Degr ee of Intermestic Quality in Issue Areas of Foreign Policy

PAGE 98

98 Table 2-1. Average Presidential Success Rates by Presidency on Foreign Policy Position Votes DDE .80 JFK .89 LBJ .82 RMN .77 GRF .64 JEC .79 RWR .69 GB .56 WJC .62 GWB .84

PAGE 99

99 CHAPTER 3 AN ISSUE AREAS ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A SYNTHE SIS OF STATIST AND DOMESTIC VARIBALES APPROACHES Introduction In this chapter, I m ap out the contours of an issue areas analysis by placing it within its proper theoretical frame, prescribing the a ppropriate secondary methodologies which are necessary for testing the properties of the multip le presidencies thesis through longitudinal and cross-sectional means. Then, I will operationalize the dependent and independent variables of interest along two dimensions including presidency-centered and Congress-centered conditions in order to capture as much of the within case as well as without case variance as possible. What I mean by this is that the variables will perform a dual function by being able to measure longitudinal and cross-sectional patterns of presidential-congressional policy making. This will allow for the maintenance of parsimony thr oughout the empirical tests of the hypotheses emanating out of the multiple presidencies thesis Finally, we will engage in a discussion about the future potential for th is line of methodological i nquiry at least as far as the possibilities of the multiple presidencies thesis allow us. I believe that the issue areas analysis serves as a dynamic alternative to the more static statist and domestic variables approaches by casting a specific li ght on the inherent nuances of foreign policy construction. By filling this theoretic al and empirical gap in the extant literature the issue areas analysis will help bring a rigor and multifaceted characteristic to foreign policy research that has previously been neglected in standard accounts. This form of rigorous analysis already exists in the study of US domestic po licy. However such studies methods are difficult to translate into the foreign policy research agenda because they do not account for foreign policys uniqueness relative to those w ho study the politics within as opposed to from without the

PAGE 100

100 waters edge1. Specifically, this methodology measures the central empirical hypotheses that statist approaches have their gr eatest applicability in understanding the high politics of war and peace. Meanwhile, the domestic variables approach is superior for discerning the low politics of economy and society. Given the precepts of the multiple presidenci es thesis, certain ot her secondary hypotheses present themselves for empirical testing. In this study, I will test some of the most profound of these statements based around the twin notions of an ongoing interact ion between unit and structural level factors regarding the forei gn policy divide between the president and the Congress throughout the Post War Era (1953-200 4). Regarding presid ential-congressional foreign policy construction, presidents tend to dominate the construc tion of issue area policies in the realms of national and domes tic security as well as diplom acy, while other issue areas of foreign policy such as trade, foreign aid and immi gration are more the province of a domestically dominant Congress. Additionally, these coming directly out of the multiple presidencies theory itself are notions that as the Cold War receded into the past the president lost power to successfully securitize issue ar eas outside of the high politics realm. Also, the Congress has become increasingly involved in the activitie s of high politics by domesticating them while continuing and even increasing its institutional do minance over the low politics issue arenas of economy and society. Finally, if it is true that the issue ar eas of foreign policy can be successfully arrayed along a spat ial-dimension capturing their gene ral locations as to the high and low politics arenas then it is true that di fferential levels of presidential success can be discerned as well as position taking itself. In fact, we can predict that presidents will take more 1 Taken from Snow and Browns (1999) Beyond the Waters Edge: An Introduction to US Foreign Policy St. Martins Press: NY, NY.

PAGE 101

101 positions in the high politics arenas relative to the low politics ones and will have significantly higher levels of success. Additionally, if it is also true that we can array those same issue areas along a spatial-dimension that captures their specific proximity to presidentialization/secu ritization and congressionalization/do mestication (see Figure 2-2) then we can assert that presidential position taking as well as success rates are a function of the issue areas position along that continuum. These manifestations of issue area location can be interpreted from a presidentialist perspective as running from most to least securitized in potential (in other words, as the issue areas are arrayed by proximity to the presidents security opportunity structure). Or, alte rnatively those same issue areas can be seen from a congressionalist perspective as moving from least to most in their potent ial for domestication (in other words, the issue areas can be seen as in creasing in their intermestic composition as they move closer to the Congresss domestic opportunity structure). Th erefore, presidents will take more positions and exhibit higher success rates among the issue area s most proximate to security (national security, domestic security and diplom acy). Finally, presidential success and position taking will be less prevalent among the issue areas most removed from security and hence the most subject to routine congressi onalization or in other words, domestication (those foreign issue areas that are by nature more intermestic). A more specific hypothesis deals with the i ssue area of trade which potentially seems to represent somewhat of an outlier as popular notions support presid entialization of this normally low politics issue area. Presidential dominance of this issue area as a result of the Trade Act of 1934 was sold to the Congress as an economic securi ty issue by FDR but this is only a periodspecific account. Louis Fisher (2002) offers a more longitudinally oriented explanation by suggesting that congressional deference conti nued after the global c risis of the Great

PAGE 102

102 Depression as a by-product of Cold War nece ssities. However, the Congress has become increasingly active in this issue area since the end of the Cold War perhaps indicative of a change regarding the connection of trade to high politics with its return to a low politics issue area and hence congressional involvement. Of course, empirical validation is necessary for any of these contentions to be seen as systematic ally legitimate and the empirical chapters (4-7) will deal with this dilemma. For our purposes righ t now, we need to turn the discussion over to a methods-theory grounding by examining each in turn, the statist/state-centrist, domestic variables and finally the issue areas alternative as methodological frames for this and other foreign policy studies, especially those dealing wi th executive-legislative relations. Issue Areas Methodology: A Transformative Histo rical-Institutional Analysis The multiple presidencies thesis employs a type of transformative historical-institutional analysis applying it to executive-legislative fo reign policy relations dur ing the Post War Era (since 1953 in this study). Empirically, this type of study couches the presidential-congressional divide in foreign policy within two levels of analysis (the unit and the structural). This is done to account for within as well as across case stas is and dynamism simultaneously. Additionally, it accounts for the role of political time by suggesting that orders of executive-legislative relations rise remain and ultimately fall as the very political environment faced by the unit level actors in foreign policy evolves gradually or suddenly. The usage of the term issue areas analysis should be interpreted as a type of method from within a larger paradigmatic frame associated with the New Institutionalist appr oach to American politics. In utilizing that approach, I test a number of hypotheses relating to the role of both the structural (systemic) and unit (presidential-congre ssional) levels of analyses imp acts on presidential-congressional international policy relations. I do this to measure the environmental impacts of historical and economic conditions across political time at the structural level of analysis (the political

PAGE 103

103 environment itself) with longitudi nal study. Also, I look at the within political time effects on the units themselves (the presiden cy and the Congress) using cross-sectional study of specifically political factors including popular, electoral and partisan/ideological forces. However, before introducing such things I must fi rst answer the next logical qu estion, How to operationalize the variables of interest themselves? Fortunately, some of the groundwork has already been laid by previous research on related topics (particularly those emanati ng out of the two presidencies th esis). Since, 1953 the editors of the annual editions of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac have recorded roll call votes on policies/issues in which the president has taken a position. Furthermore, the CQ Almanacs have listed these votes by policy domain (foreign or do mestic). Additionally, researchers have used these votes to develop either aggregate or i ndividual level success/support scores in the perspective domains (i.e., Wildavsky 1966). At this point some commentary is necessary regarding the employment of success versus support scores. First, the two scores derive from the same unit of analysis which is the roll call votes themselves but after that there is a wide divergence in their look an d application. So much so, that it has been suggested as revealed in the introductions cr itical literature review that differential impacts have been observed as the l evel of presidential success v. support. Second, the success scores are aggregate level scores as opposed to the support scores which are done at the individual level of analysis. The success scor es are the victory percentages of presidents across all or some subset of pos ition votes within the Congress. The sub-sets can be derived by using annualized, aggregated or within as well as across presidencies success scores. Another way of sub-dividing the data to achieve success scores is to develop cut-points for data inclusion which can be as arbitrary as a thres hold for passage like excluding unanimous or near

PAGE 104

104 unanimous votes from ones analysis thus conc entrating on contentious or close votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990 and Conley 1997). Another way is to utilize Congressional Quarterlys own method of vote division by restric ting your data set to their key votes on important legislative issues (though you have to further discount the ones that are not position vot es which restricts the size of your data set even further) (Sigelma n 1979). Coming off CQs method, you can create your own sub-sets of relevant position votes util izing the divisions they keep by policy domain itself. Moving beyond the confines of CQ, you can utilize previous coding rules for deciding which votes are important versus which ones are not. A classic though now dated approach is to utilize William Rikers (1962) defi nition of an important vote as measured by the size of the minimum winning coalition necessary for passage Or, a more recent effort by David Mayhew (1986) defines votes according to their relevance to the creation of significant laws, this approach has been utilized in conjunction with another whereby you take the last vote as the significant vote for inclus ion in your data set. There are a number of problems with all of the data collec tion schemes ranging from their lack of comparability, to their lack of generalizab ility regarding the picture that they present for presidential-congressional relati ons and most important of all the fact that they reduce the population of presidential pos ition votes down to samples.2 Normally, this is par for the course, as seen in survey research b ecause the population of anything is normally too large to adequately account for it in a single empirical study. However, in foreign affairs this is not the case. In fact, if you excessively utilize any of these data generating schemes what in fact you are doing is privileging the results of your study regarding some central facet like significant laws or important/close votes. The en tire population of foreign polic y position votes between 1953 and 2 See Literature Review Part I of the two pres idencies thesis for more on these matters.

PAGE 105

105 2004 is approximately 3300. While this seems high, painstaking content analysis of them is possible and in fact this is what I have done. This widens the lens of research so that the picture taken becomes a widescreen movie wherein pres idential-congressional foreign policy relations can play out across time. The third feature of roll ca ll voting as a primary means of analyzing the executivelegislative divide is the usage of the support score as an alterna tive to the success score as an indicator of presidential influence in what is generally seen as a legislative arena (Bond and Fleisher 1990). The support scores are gathered by finding the percen tage of legislators supporting the same position as the president on each of the roll call votes. Then, usually some means of reducing the size of the data set is employed in a similar fashion as has already been detailed but in the case of support scores often th e average support score rath er than each score is what is used as the dependent variable. This of course produces the pr oblem of the ecological fallacy as first pointed out in the literature re view from the introductory chapter. Additional, criticisms already detailed in the literature review have to do with the support scores inborn bias toward congress-centered outcomes, its existence as a measure of support not success and its ultimately in-direct measure of presidential-congressional relations. The literature contrasting success v. support scores suggests th at success scores generally te nd to be higher and are not as subject to as much volatility both within a nd across presidencies (Shull and Shaw 1999). This same body of studies has also concluded that the success score tends to not be as subject to declination again both within a nd across presidencies (Edwards 1986). The principle reason for this is that the scores are generally lower and have less of a space within which to fall (Shull and Shaw 1999). Lastly, support scores are individua l indicators of presid ential support and to a lesser extent influence while success scores ar e aggregate factors prov iding an empiric for

PAGE 106

106 presidential success but not necessarily legislativ e support (Ragsdale 1998). In sum, I feel that the best dependent variable of interest for any study of presidential-cong ressional relations in foreign policy is the one which contains the mo st nuances within while capturing the widest scope from without. That is the success score, not the support score. The success score is presidentially oriented, measures success not support, and because of its aggregate nature allows for standard statistical procedures which limit the amount of vari able transformations and hence holds model variance in check. Of course, it is also true that Wildavsky (1966) employed success not support scores as his depende nt variable. Thus, studies which attempt to build on that original work should keep the success score for comparative-hypothesis r easons if nothing else. Finally, foreign affairs is the hist oric domain of presidential powe r at least in the time span of this study and as a measure the pres idential success ra te is the best indicator possible in order to capture this domains uniqueness within th e executive-legislative policy framework. Finally the fourth feature of roll calls as a unit of analysis for presid ential-congressional policy making has been seen in that, some later researchers have broken apart the domains into sub-domains or issue areas. These researcher s then developed new scores reflecting that effort (e.g., Conley 1997, Ragsdale 1998). Conley s (1997) effort util ized the notion of intermestic composition among issues that cros s foreign and domestic affairs boundaries but limited it in practice. Ragsdales (1998) systematic coding of s upport and congruence (success to us) across seven issue areas including four (secu rity, trade, foreign aid and immigrationwhich she treats as a domestic issue area) is certainly the most developed treatment to date regarding issue areas analysis. However, Ragsdale (1998) lacks any theory to properly account for the differential patterns that she describes. Overall, the level of sophistication devoted to these nuanced coding schemes has been limite d. Therefore I offer an alternative.

PAGE 107

107 For ease, comparative research and the reasons I laid out previous ly I will utilize the success score method for operationalization pu rposes. However, I propose doing it more systematically and hopefully more objectively. Als o, due to the institutional nature of the study as well as my previous commentary regarding this issue I will operate at the aggregate level of analysis as far as the roll ca ll votes are concerned. I fundame ntally believe it is a better expression of inter-institutional relations whereas individual level analyses on this subject test the actors within the institutions and not the inst itutions themselves. I believe evidence for that exists gathered from my critical literature review of the two presidencies thesis (see Literature Review) within notions of a partisan two presid encies. The reader will remember that all of those studies were conducted at the individual level of analys is, whereas the institutional two presidencies was associated with aggregate leve l data. In my opinion then, previous comparisons of these groups of analyses by past researchers are open to being challenged as committing the ecological fallacy. This methodological fallacy is built around the notion of making individual conclusions (like presidential s upport scores) from aggregate leve l data (like that used in presidential success scores) (Ma nnheim and Rich 1995). By remaini ng true to the aggregate level at least as far as the longitudinal analysis is concerned I will avoid this methodological trap (Mannheim and Rich 1995). What fo llows is the step-by-step plan of action that was utilized to test the various hypotheses related to the multiple presidencies thesis. Data Gathering and Operationalization First, I did a content analysis of the foreign po licy presidential position votes themselves as recorded by CQ from 1953-2004. This was a huge undertaking that produced a data set which is as complete as is possible regarding this policy domain. Additionally, it covers the extant time frame in its entirety and allows for a true population based analysis rather than a sample based one As previously stated, there ar e no less than 3300 data points li sted in chronological order by

PAGE 108

108 day, month and year. Each vote is coded for pres idential term, relevant Congress, legislative session, presidential position, presidential posi tion outcome, vote outcome, number of yeas and number of nays. Furthermore, each vote accounts for the total number of partisans voting yea or nay in both the major congressional parties (t he Democrats and the Re publicans), partisans voting with as well as agai nst the presidents position, the presence or lack of regional/ideological coalitions in voting for or against a presiden ts position as recorded by CQ. The coalitions recorded are the Conservative Coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans as well as the Liberal Coaliti on of Northern Democrats and Re publicans. In both cases, I also recorded whether or not the respective coalitions position triumphed on the vote. At this point, I need to ma ke a clarification regarding th e coding of the Liberal Coalition. CQ never recorded the Liberal Coalition as I ut ilize the term. What the organization did was record an anti-conservative coal ition from amongst the individua l MC votes. The problem with using its data on this point is that it does not work well for aggregating pur poses and it is not the traditional scholarly accepted definition of the Libe ral Coalition as the coalition of Northern Democrats with Republicans known to manifest itsel f along social issues in domestic affairs and foreign aid as well as immigration (at least in the past) within forei gn policy (Burns 1963). What CQ did record and which I could use wa s from 1958-1988 it recorded the democratic-split votes where the congressional Democratic Party split between its Northern and Southern wings ( CQ Almanac 1958). Within those votes, the ones th at were not also recorded as the Conservative Coalition were by default the Liberal Coalition. I then replicated the methodology for inclusion of cross-party coal ition (when a majority of one in tra-party faction votes with the majority of another in tra-party faction (from CQ Almanac 1997, Appendix A; see also Bond and Fleisher 1990) for all votes from 1989-2004 in orde r to get a coherent se t of coalition votes.

PAGE 109

109 I coded each foreign policy vote along the dime nsion of issue areas discussed in chapter 2 from national security to immigration (see Figu re 2-2). I quantified th e foreign issue areas concept by developing a rank ordina l variable which utilized th e presidentialized/securitized concept as its ordering principle. Issu e areas that are most prone to being presidentialized/securitized can be said to be of the highest na tural ordering. What that means is that the issue area with the highest value on this scale is the one that is the most prone to being successfully presidentialized/securitized, in other words national se curity affairs. Also, issue areas that are least given to this process are of the lowest natural ordering. For our purposes that means the most intermestic and hence congressionalized/dom esticated issue area serves as the baseline for the variables operationalizationimmigration =0. The remaining categories then are presented in hierarchical order as: foreign aid= 1, trade=2, diplomacy=3, domestic security=4 and national security=5. It n eeds to be remembered that this coding scheme is meant to capture the issue areas position re lative to the historic domain of presidential powernational security. Therefore, trade in practice is closer to the high politics arena than the other issue areas of foreign policy. Trade is fund amental to peace and often a precursor to war; it is fed by and in turn feeds the processes of s ecurity and diplomacy. Additionally, since the Trade Act of 1934, trade power has been largely legislatively delegated to the executive branch. According to Lindsay (1994), congressional resurgence of trade pr erogatives did not occur until well into the Ford administration. I also developed a coding scheme for mixed category votes where I took the mean of the two issue area values as the new value for the mi xed category in question. Next, I looked at each vote and qualitatively reported its title, final resu lt and type. Then, I created another rank ordinal variable which captured the inherent nuance that not all votes are the same in their qualitative

PAGE 110

110 impact. For this purpose, I once again referenced the notion of presidentialization/securitization as my basic operating principle. Accordingly, votes that were least given to such activity, simple majority procedural votes (like a bill amendment), would serve as the baseline (0) and those most given to such a process, supermajority fina l votes (like a Constitutional Amendment) would receive a (3). Finally, those in the middle categories, majority final votes (like a bill passage/rejection) and supermajorit y procedural votes (like a vote to invoke cloture in the Senate or suspend the rules in the House) got a (1) and (2) respectively. Another component of the data set was meas ures of partisanship and ideology that I included, especially to capture po litical effects. In order to ex amine the nuances within party control conditions, I established another rank ordina l variable ag ain using the presidentialized/securitized condi tion as my operating principle. The variable is coded (0) for divided government when the C ongress and the presidency are institutionally composed of different parties and (1) under sp lit control government when the presidency and one branch of the national legislature are under the control of a single party. Lastl y, the variable is coded as (2) in order to represent the condition of unified government when a single party controls both branches of the Congress and the presidency. This last condition provide s the greatest partycentered orientation for pr esidential agency and even agenda se tting in foreign affairs especially (from Shull 1997). Finally, I developed presidential success scores by annum out of the votes for foreign policy, the six issue areas and the mixed categories. These scores serve as the primary and secondary dependent variables for the study, upon which I conduct my hypothesis testing. The empirical models are specified as such to test the contentions of the multiple presidencies thesis at the unit and structural levels. The m odels do this by examining presidency-centered v. congress-centered conditions at each level of analysis. Simultaneously, they examine

PAGE 111

111 presidential success rates along three related but independent explanatory factors including macro-political, macro-economic and macro-histor ical contexts. Prior to specifying specific models, we need to first examine the variable s themselves and the theoretical reasons behind their inclusion in this effort. Dependent Variables While I have already discussed the reasons for employing success over support scores as the prim ary and secondary dependent variables fo r this analysis, I have not discussed their division into first and second tiers Nor, have I explained the im portance of the three types of outcome variablesforeign policy, issue area and mixed issue area as well as the usage of year for the baseline measure. It is to these issues that we now must turn. The tracked annual foreign policy success scor e is the primary dependent variable of interest (the collection of a nnual presidential success scores on foreign policy votes from 19532004) for this study because it measures the widest scope of presidential success with the Congress regarding legislative prod uctivity and especially outcomes. This variable is limited in its lack of capturing presidential influence ove r the legislative proce ss until final outcomes. However, as Bond and Fleisher (1990) report if a researcher is studying presidential success and not support than there is no reason to worry a bout this limitation. Additionally, much of the legislative process is not only clos ed to public influence it is also closed to any external actors potential for systematic influence due to wide disbursement of individual and group responsibility throughout including legislative initiation, committee/sub-committee activities, rule formation, position taking, logrolling, credit claiming and pork barrel legislating(Davidson and Oleszek 2006). Therefore, an an alysis of outcomes rather than procedures is called for since this is the place where presidential agency is best recorded and in fact has been so by CQ for six decades now. The wide spread availability of th is data and its base quantitative nature allow for

PAGE 112

112 the employment of statistical analysis in order to tease out readily identifiable empirical patterns. I should make one final note about the nature of the annua l foreign policy success score that I utilize which makes mine different from previous employments. In my case I have recalculated the annualized scor es by including immigration as a foreign policy issue area. Previous extant research that looks at the foreign policy success score does not include immigration as such an issue area, when used at all immigration is seen as an issue areas within domestic affairs not international relations (see Ragsdale 1998). I find this usage to be problematic at best because by excluding immigr ation but including trade within foreign policy you are probably not getting an accurate picture of intermestic characteristics within the foreign policy dimension. Finally, the exclusion of immi gration has probably systematically inflated foreign policy success scores because of its highly domestic nature the Congress has historically been very active in this issue area thus acquies cence to presidential for eign policy prerogatives has not been the norm (Gimpel and Edwards 1998 ). The issue area and mixed issue area success sc ores were calculated by replicating the process for garnering the annualized foreign policy scores. This was done through finding the percentage of presidential win s on roll call position votes across the year for all years in the extant time frame 1953-2004. Thus, I have six issu e area scores and where applicable mixed issue area scores for each year, these scores alon g with the aggregated foreign policy scores are included in the relevant tables differentiated throughout the empiri cal chapters (4-7). Together, these scores serve as the secondary dependent va riables for this study with in the cross-sectional aspect of this analysis. Additionally, these variables serve as explanatory factors in the longitudinal portion of the study. I will save discu ssion of basic trends within and across them

PAGE 113

113 for those chapters themselves and conclude this section with commentar y on the employment of annualized as opposed to some other a ggregation of presi dential success. It may seem a bit arbitrary to locate presid ential position vote su ccess rates on a year-byyear basis since it is equally possible for other loci to be employed. For instance, why not utilize the bi-annual congress itself as th e indicator, this certainly w ould increase the n especially for the issue area and mixed issue area scores. Also, it is conceivable to think of the presidential term or even an entire decade as an ordering pr inciple for this kind of data. However, there is somewhat of an accepted norm among executive-legis lative relations specialists as well as roll call analysts in general that the year is the best single indicator of presidential-congressional interaction (Shull and Shaw 1999). This being said, there are some profound methodological reasons for employing this measure including its ease for systematic time series analysis and its convenience as a regression outcome in cros s-sectional study (Shull and Shaw 1999; Shull 1997). Now, we will engage in a more in-depth examination of the independent variables for this study. Independent Variables The explanatory variables of interest for this study m easure macro-le vel characteristics of the internal and external polit ical environment governing presid ential-congressional foreign policy relations. These variables account for th e political, economic and historical conditions which influence the day-to day as well as crosstime interactions between our national executive and legislative actors in American foreign polic y. The political factor s including public opinion, electoral, partisan and ideological forces provide evidence for th e nuances of power directly impacting the institutions proxim ity to one another on an issue-by-issue basis. The economic forces which are composed of national level m easures for economic prod uctivity/decline provide the underlying basis for presidential/congression al agency by establishing parameters for

PAGE 114

114 constraint. Finally, presidential/congressional agency is promoted by the overlying base conditions established through historical contexts. In other words, agent-structures are established indirectly by the histor ical-economic contexts that the unit level actors (the president and the Congress) find themselves in. Another wa y of thinking about this is that the economic conditions are establishing agentconstraints, while the histori cal forces are providing for agent-opportunities. In sum, these structures are in fact setting th e static elements of foreign policy relations for the presiden cy and the Congress. Meanwhile the more volatile political factors set the agent-inte raction processes in a direct a nd far more dynamic fashion. It is among these factors that the daily push and pull of inter-institutional rela tions is seen rather than just felt. These factors capture the movement of presidential-c ongressional relations in foreign policy by tracking the ebb and flow of each relational wave, however; the sea upon which these waves move is subject to the t ides of the structural forces involved. Beginning with the historical structures, the major problem faced by any quantitative study is the restricted ability to capture tempor al context itself. Previous research by both anecdotal and systematic analyzers has suggested that there are general ordering principles for American foreign policy history (Papp, Johnson a nd Endicott 2005). Both presidency as well as congressional researchers have developed periodizati on schemes, respectiv ely, for the study of American national institutions. The goal has been to account for the development, stability and change in such institutions across time (i.e., Skowronek 1997 fo r the presidency and Stewart 2001 for the Congress). Finally, presid ential-congressional relations itself have been subject to such periodizations (i.e., Lindsay 1994). Ho wever, these studies have employed a more Congress-centered perspective at the expense of a presidencycentered one. Furthermore, their degree of systematization is open to question as it is not robustly theorized at the level of the

PAGE 115

115 inter-institutional relationship itself (see Conley 2003 in Conl ey 2003; Lindsay 1994, Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989 as well as Malbin and Bro okshire 2000). The periodization scheme I am using is a relatively accepted one wi thin the literature at least as fa r as a broad view of American foreign policy is concerned. The early, late a nd post Cold Wars are accepted as the major environmental structures influenci ng the American states interacti ons with the rest of the world both in the recent and distant past of the last fifty years (see Snow and Brown 1999). However, the 9/11 impact and recent development over th e previous ten years to that time are not adequately reducible to a post-Cold War form ulation and so I am treading new ground in this period of political time. Additi onally, I have subsumed some elements of Davidsons (1996) periodization scheme regarding the ideological policy orientations of the Congress since the 1930s. Davidsons employment of conservative bipartisan (1938-1964), li beral partisan (19651978), post-reform (1979-1983) a nd conservative retrenchment periods (1984-present) is a profound systematization of not only congression al activities but also their ideological predilections. However, this theory does not ad equately account for presidential agency in its scheme. Furthermore, despite Conleys (2002) up dating through the lens of divided government foreign policy has not been exclusively examined in these periodized te rms. Davidsons work does serve as an example of unit level systemati zation regarding the trac king of agency-behavior across time. It is from that perspective which I borrow his ideas. Replicating Conleys methodology from that work I have developed du mmy variables to account for a synthesis of both the environmental setting (the Cold War and its Aftermath) with the agent-interactions (the presidential-congressional relati onship) in US foreign policy construction. I code 1 for the presence of such an order including; the War Power Order (1953-1972), the Confrontation

PAGE 116

116 Politics Order (1973-1989), the Imperial Presid ency Politicized Order (1990-2000) and the Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) as well as 0 for the lack thereof. Furthermore, I attempt to account for anothe r macro-historical condition which contains presidency-centered v. Congress-centered cond itions-the presence of war/peace. War is a phenomenon that lies at the heart of presidential power in foreign affairs, in fact, according to my thesis it is the principle place of potential as well as realized presidenti alized/securitized power in the executive-legislative divide. If war is such an empowering mechanism for presidential agency, then it is reasonable to expect that a systemic condition of peace serves the interests of the Congress often at the expens e or at least the diminishing of presidential encroachment. Therefore, peace is a Congress-centered condition with certain expectations as to its influence of congressionalization/domestication of issue(s) within internationa l relations. A final indicator emanating out of historical conditions is to be found in two related areasthe size of the armed forces on a year-by-year basis as well as the pe rcentage of the federal budget dedicated to the Department of Defense (DoD). These of course are standard quantitative measures which do not require any transformations for asymptotic purposes.3 These measures are indicative of the influence of the military-industrial complex in our society. They also suggest differential centering conditions for pr esidentialization/securi tization and congressiona lization/domestication of issue(s). When the size of the armed forces is high and a greater perc entage of the budget is given over to the Department of Defense (DoD ) then the environment is more favorable for presidential agency and vice versa. Regarding the economic contexts of executive-legislative relations in foreign policy, I have gathered relatively standard macro-level indi cators including the presence or absence of 3 Asymptotic relationships are direct linear correlations or as sociations between variables of interest like in ordinary least squares regression (OLS) models as an example.

PAGE 117

117 recovery/recessionary conditions as well as the size of the annua l budget surplus/deficit. These two conditions work together to influence the amount of budgetary and general fiscal latitude allowed for policy making by both the president a nd the Congress. They also contain conditions which either constrain or provi de opportunities for agency on e ither institutions behalf. For instance, recessions will be more negatively felt by presidents than by the Congress due to the influences of socio-tropic evaluations of the national economy on presidential elections and job approval ratings (Lewis-Beck 1989, Edwards 1980 and Fiorina 1981). Also, the Budget Reform and Impoundment Act of 1974 has brought the Congr ess back in to the budget process on a year-by-year basis being a centr al component to notions of bot h a resurgent as well as a redundant Congress in the foreign policy making process (Sundquist 1981 and Fisher 2000). Looking at recessions is difficult as there is a deba te as to how to define them much less measure them. I employed the Department of Commerces definition as being a consecutive decline in Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for two quarters ( www.whitehouse.gov/doc 04-01-07). Recognizing the difficulties of this definition I also included the period of business cycle decline as a proxy which along with the trough of the business cycle, the recession itself according to the Department of Commerce (DoC ), would serve to represent macro-economic recessionary conditions as a whole (from Pate rson 1993). I represented my combined measure as a dummy variable where 1 is indicative of recovery in the business cycl e and 0 as recession. I operationalized in this manner for consistency sake with the project as a whole where I utilize notions of presidency-centered conditions as my base operating principle. The budgetary conditions variable has its own problems, in th at it requires a log transformation in order to impose asymptotic properties within it for pur poses of regression analysis. However, once accomplished it garners relatively easily interpreta ble findings. The percentage of Gross National

PAGE 118

118 Product (GNP) accounted for by trade as well as th e percentage of the budget devoted to foreign aid programs are potential economic indicators of the level of presidenti al success and so are included as explanatory variables. The political variables measure popular, elec toral and partisan c onditions which either favor or disfavor one or the ot her actors (the president or the Congress) in the foreign policy making endeavor. Public opinion has been shown to have differential effects relative to foreign policy construction with some concluding that it has an impact (Edwards 1980, Light 1983 and Page and Jordan 1993) while others suggest that no such influence is directly detectable (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Edwards 1989 and Almond 1 950). Nevertheless, annual aggregate presidential public job approval ra tings have been shown to have a direct and measurable impact on presidential roll call success (Edw ards 1997). Lights (1983) work in particular is important to note since he concluded that public approval levels had diffe rential impacts on presidential success by issue area which is something that Ragsdale and King (1989) also found. Therefore, I follow the examples of this previous research by incorporating the annual average presidential job approval rating (garnered by Gallup Polls and calculated by Ragsdale (1998) (1953-1997) as well as updated by me for 1998-2004) as a potential influencer on the international relations divide between the president and the Congress. While data limitations abound regarding the public opinion of the presidents handling of fore ign policy issues, some analysis is possible. From the Hastings Polling Service I gathered data from 1975 on which shows public approval ratings of the presidents hand ling of foreign policy as a domai n specific activity. These data allow one to get past the Almond-Lippman thesis which has long suggested that the public is largely unknowing and uncaring about politics, especially foreign affairs (Almond 1950).

PAGE 119

119 Electoral outcomes have the potential to influence the internal environment of presidential-congressional relations regarding the establishment of mandates or the lack thereof. High electoral conditions certainly favor the presid ent, especially in an area of historic power like foreign affairs with the reverse being true among low electoral conditions. I utilized turnout rates in presidential as well as mid-term elections and the percentage victories for the president and his party in each (Dye 2007 and Boller 2006). Finally, I included a variable on Electoral College support in the most recent presidential election due to its notion as an exaggerator of the winning candidates performance in the el ection (Edwards 2006 in Edwards 2006). Besides testing the obvious conditionalitys involved, these variables also speak to the debate within the literature about the positive/negative effects of electoral suppor t found in the mandate thesis (Gergen 1988), crisis re-election thesis (Hun tington 1965), the decay curve thesis (Brace and Hinckley 1992), the coattails theses (Berelson et. al 1954 & Campbell et. al.1960) as well as the mid-term loss thesis (Fiorina 1981). Therefore, I have also developed dummy variables for time in term or proximity indicators including election years (both presidential and mid-term), first year of term, last year of term and first year after mid-terms (the third and seventh years). The basis for these is that the more proximate the pr esident is to his electi on/re-election the more empowered he is for policy making in foreign policy in particular. Whereas, the more distal he is from that election or the more proximate to a mid-term election the less empowered he will be and hence the more emboldened the C ongress in international relations. I also look at partisan/ideol ogical forces influencing the day-to-day foreign affairs relationship between the presiden t and the Congress. I examine th ese forces by gathering data indicative of them including; the percentage of co ngressional seats held by the presidents party in each session, the ideological rating by the Am ericans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the

PAGE 120

120 American Conservative Association/American Conservative Union (ACA/ACU) interest groups given to each president as well as both the percen tage of party unity votes and partisan votes in the Congress he faces in both chambers per legisl ative session. Finally, the persistence of the Conservative and Liberal Coaliti ons as determinants in presiden tial position vote success/failure were also recorded as a measure of congression al ideology. Using the interest group ratings for presidents along with the CQ coalition voting may seem conflicting, however, studies have shown that these two rating systems roughly appr oximate one another and hence can be used simultaneously (see Bond and Fleisher 1990 & P oole and Rosenthal 1997). Likewise partisan voting and party unity scores track one another at least as far as previous trends analyses have shown; however there are some limitations with relying exclusively on party unity scores due to data gaps (Jacobson in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). As a final commentary on this topic, Jacobson (2006 in Edwards 2006) has discerned that partisanship as well as party unity voting has become closer in their ties to presidential support among ro ll call votes. However, this does not suggest a correlation with the success score itself which begs for a needed hypothesis test which I do in this study, albeit th rough the issue areas framework. Additionally, in order to capture the ongoing influence of the opportunity structures at play in executive-legislative foreign policy re lations I have coded for the presence/lack of securitization and domestication for each vote in the data set. I developed this measure from my content analysis of the indivi dual roll calls themselves by looki ng at their vote summaries and determining if the issue covered within the vote had security or domestic aspects to it. I then created two dummy variables to capture these tend encies within the various issue area votes with the default (0) being the lack of their presence in both and (1) for its presence. I operationalized two other dummy variables to measure the presen ce or lack of securitization and domestication

PAGE 121

121 amongst the mixed issue area votes using the same operating principles. After reviewing these sets of variables, we must turn our attention to model specification issues. Structural Level Models Testing Across Political Time The structural level m odels will employ a time-series formulation with the dependent variable as the tracked annual pr esidential succ ess rate in foreign and i ssue area affairs explained as a function of a first order autoregressive trend from the base year of 2004 to the origination year in 1953 In other words, I will do a univariate regression of each annual presidential success score in foreign policy (the dependent-dependent variable) against the previous years success score (the independent-dependent variable) in a time-sequential fashion from 2004 back to 1953. An un-standardized ordinary least squares (OLS ) longitudinal regression model will look at the impacts of the proposed orders of executi ve-legislative relations on the success rate. Additionally, other macro-level historical conditions will be tested in another ordinary least squares (OLS) longitudinal model in order to dis cern the individual patterns of those relations as the opportunity structures are impacted by hist orical-contextual alteration. Also, another structural based ordinary least squa res (OLS) model will employ various macro-economic variables in order to test the role of prevaili ng economic conditions on the executive-legislative foreign issue area rela tionship. Finally, the securitization versus domestication phenomenon is tested by another longitudinal ordi nary least squares (OLS) regres sion on the presidential foreign issue area success rate. Unit Level Models Testing Within Political Time At the unit level, th e presidential issue area /mixed issue area succe ss rates are tested by using them as dependent variable s in empirical models including individual differencing tests for presidencies within orders and aggregate differencing tests across orders. Next, simple multivariate cross-sectional regression models are specified in order to test the impacts of

PAGE 122

122 specifically macro-level political variables on the presidential-c ongressional foreign issue area divide. As previously discussed the political variables come in three distinct forms with each capturing a different aspect of th e political forces at play in the executive-legislative foreign issue area relationship. First the popular determinants measure the role, if any, of public opinion as an external force on presidential foreign issue area succe ss vis--vis the Congress. And second, the electoral determinants operationalize the role play ed by voting outcomes as setting conditions for policy making opportunities/constraints These are derived from American national presidential and mid-term elections. Finally third, the partisan and ideologi cal determinants showcase the internal forces driving presidentialcongressional interactions al ong the issue areas of foreign policy. Before laying out the map for how the empirical chapters will be presented, I must first discuss the major and minor hypothe ses which the methods will test. Hypotheses As was previously discussed, the central hypotheses related to the developm ent of the multiple presidencies thesis as an empirical theory of presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy suggest that differe ntial issue area relationships ex ist. Furthermore, that those relationships are governed by the st atic forces of the political e nvironment itself as well as the dynamic forces of the unit level factors invol ved. Accordingly, the primary hypothesis of concern to us is that presidential power in foreign policy is a function of his primary opportunity structure which lies with security affairs A related hypothesis is that congressional power in international relations is a function of the Congresss ability to domesticate issue area(s) of foreign policy by emphasizing their intermestic character Other primary hypotheses deal with the longitudinal impacts of the presidentialcongressional relationship in fo reign affairs. Differential i ssue area success rates should be

PAGE 123

123 observed along a continuum of those that are cl osest to presidentialization/securitization and hence highest to those that are most distal (thus lowest) and hence subject to routine congressionalization/domesticati on. More specifically, high politic s arena issue areas (national security, domestic security and diplomacy) w ill exhibit the least decline, have the most presidential position votes, have the higher general presid ential position vote success rate, be the more static across political time and have the greatest influence overall in presidential success but be subject to the most visib le declinethat occurring systematically as even the politics of war and peace become domesticized in later ye ars. Likewise, the low politics arena (trade, foreign aid and immigration) will have the lowe r overall success rates, the fewest presidential position votes, be more dynamic in variability across political time but also subject to the most visible increase as the politics of everything else become the norm rather than the aberration in US foreign policy. Furthermore, there should be an observable di fference in the impact of political time itself as presidentialization/securitization will decline with a corroborating rise in congressionalization/domesticati on of issue areas as we move from the War Power Order into the Confrontational Politics Order. Lastly, a limited retrenchment of this phenomenon should characterize the Imperial Presidency Politiciz ed Order with a somewhat uncertain outcome regarding the last Extra-Systemic Order. The secondary hypotheses engendered by this res earch include the notions of the various macro-level historical, political and economic variables on the cross-sectional executivelegislative foreign policy relationship. Using B ond and Fleisher (1990) as a framework from which to proceed, the individual impacts of va riables relating to presidency-centered and

PAGE 124

124 Congress-centered conditions can be systematically examined. I refer the reader back to the independent variables section for discussi on of some of these specific hypotheses. There are additional hypotheses not discusse d in the previous section, I should like to develop them now. In addition to the suggested outcomes relating to political influences that I have already discussed, I would like to conti nue with contrasting presidency-centered v. Congress-centered conditions rega rding the role of public opinion. First, it should be axiomatic that high presidential popularity and its revers e have differential impacts on both foreign policy success rates in general as well as on the variou s issue area and mixed issue area success rates specifically. Second, popularity will matter the most where the issue areas are most visible, which is in the high politics arena. Third, lower presidential popularity and the prevalence of less visible issue areas of foreign policy (like those in the low politics arena) are associated with Congress-centered conditions. Hence, lower levels of general and specific presidential success in foreign relations as well as i ssue and mixed issue areas of fore ign policy should be observed. The electoral-oriented statements have already been discussed, I now m ove to the partisan/ideological determinants. First, partisanship should have a growing in fluence over presidential success in foreign policy as this domain becomes increasingly pol iticized over time. Second what is true of partisanship in the last hypothesi s is also true of ideology. Howe ver, it will not be as pronounced in its impacts due to its lower correlation with partisanship amongst the congressional party-ingovernment. Third, party unity works in favor of th e Congress at the expense of the president in the low politics arena. And, a fourth related hypothesis is that pa rty unity works in favor of the president at the expense of the Congress in the high politics arena. A fifth suggested outcome is that partisan voting follows the same patterns as party unity voti ng but will not be as pronounced

PAGE 125

125 in its impacts due to its more diffuse nature. At this point some clarif ication may be necessary regarding notions of party unity and partisan voting in relation to executive-legislative relations. First, party unity a nd partisan voting are not the same thing, though they are related. Party Unity is a measure developed by the editorial st aff at Congressional Quarterly, recording the proportion of votes in a legislative sessi on that a majority of each party voted together (CQ Almanac 2004, vote studies appendix). Meanwhile, Partisan Voting is a measure first developed by James MacGregor Burns (1963, introduction) designating certain vot es as having support thresholds where more than half of congressional partisans voted against more than half the congressional partisans in the other party. Therefore, partisan votes are a subset of party unity votes but not all party unity votes are correctly classified as part isan votes. The prevalence in the literature has been to rely on party unity scores ra ther than partisanship scores because they are easier to operationalize since CQ has recorded them since 1972 (Shull 1997). The difficulty is that they contain near-unanimous and unanimous votes which in a population study like this they remain self-contained. However, most extant resear ch uses samples of votes thus the inclusion of party unity scores actually has votes which are not included in the rest of the indicators (Lindsay and Steger 1993). Unfortunately, pa rtisan voting has its own set of problems, for instance, just because a vote is partisan does not mean it is important. Many, largely symbolic votes are taken in the Congress every year involving i ssues that are designed strictly to promote party solidarity by demoting the attributes of the other party. As an example of this, in the 1990s it was common for the Republican Party in Congress to promote le gislation that placed restrictions on abortion access at overseas military hospitals (CQ Almanacs 1990-1998). First they did this to show party solidarity with President Bush and later to oppose President Clinton (CQ Almanac 1998, abortions in military hospitals). I believe that my employment of population data (the entire set

PAGE 126

126 of presidential position votes in foreign policy 1953-2004) offsets both part y unity and partisan voting problems by capturing all nuances simultaneously Second, party unity and partisan voting have been seen to be on the rise in recent years, especially since the 1980s (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Shull and Sh aw 1999). This comports with more general notions as to the rise of a more polarized politics in the Congress as well as between the executive and legislative branches (Bond and Fleisher 2000). Furthermore, if Conley (2002) is correct about a new environment for executive-legisl ative relations being hinged on the rise of partisanship. Then systematic quantitative measures of such phenomenon are directly found with the employment of party unity and partisan voting scores as they relate to presidential position voting. Specifically, Conleys (2002) work was devoted to domestic policy construction, a sphere more prone to congressionalization. In this work, I am operati ng in the international relations sphere of greater presidential authority (at least in theory). Thus, the rise of a more partisan Congress should be made manifest in the more domesticized low politics arena than in the high politics arena within fo reign policy. In other words, pr esidential success will suffer a greater negative impact where it is most vulnerable in the low politics arena. While in the high politics arena such impact will be less pronounc ed, however, it will be more visible as any decline at all will be more significant since in this arena presidential success has further to fall. Finally, securitization and domestication will show systematic relationships with their perspective institutional opportunity structures (the presidency for securitization and the Congress for domestication). Additionally, over tim e domestication will matter more as it is indicative of the environmental changes in the presidential-congre ssional foreign policy relationship, particularly afte r 1972. Suffice it to say, we can now discuss how this project will develop beginning with the report of longitudinal findings in the fourth chapter and concluding

PAGE 127

127 with the individuated cross-sec tional chapters. These last th ree chapters are broken down according to the relevant order of presidential -congressional international relations policy making (5-7). The empirical chapters that follow will each be premised with an introduction that provides an overall frame for the narrative and analysis. Next there will be a section devoted to setting the broader historical, economic and political contexts. In the fourth chapter this will be a lengthy discussion of the macro-level st ructural developments influe ncing presidentia l-congressional relations across political time (1953-2004). In chapters 5-7 this narrative will look at the specific legislative interactions between the presidency and the Congress dur ing each of the orders of political time including the War Power Orde r (1953-1972 in chapter 5), the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989 in chapter 6) and the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (19902000 in chapter 7). Then, we will examine the rele vant findings for the specified period of study, in other words, we will look at the outcomes of the empirical models asso ciated with each frame of political time. Likewise, chapter 4 will deal with the longitudinal findings examining the macro-level impacts of historical and economic fo rces on the structural level of the political environment in which executive-legislative fo reign issue area relati ons takes place. And, chapters 5-7 will deal with the results from cr oss-sectional models looking at specifically political impacts regarding popul ar, electoral and partisan/i deological factors on annual presidential success vis--vis the Congress in foreign issue areas. After that, I will present a discussion of the relevance of each set of findings to the broader historical context they occur in by using the multiple presidencies thesis as a framing device and tabular analysis of the foreign issue area success rates. The eighth chapter, while a conclusion will contain a section devoted to findings relevant to the Extra-Systemic Dile mma Order (2001-2004) th at we currently find

PAGE 128

128 ourselves in relative to executive-legislative fo reign issue area relatio ns. Finally, each chapter will conclude with a summary of the major points that have been previously dissected. Summary This chapter has attem pted to put forward a new methodological synthesis which combines what is best out of the Realist oriented statecentrist and Liberal orie nted domestic variables approaches to understanding US foreign policy. Acco rdingly, I have posited that an issue areas analysis is called for whereby the composite issue areas of foreign policy are examined separately in order to capture the inherent nuances within them. I suggest that in issue areas of foreign policy which are built around the traditional high politics arenas of presidential strength (as in national security, domestic security and diplomacy) a statist/state-centrist approach is called for. The reason for this is because forei gn policy construction is la rgely reducible to and hence reliant upon central over adja cent decision makers. Furthermor e, in issue areas of foreign policy where they are more subject to domesticati on due to their inherently intermestic nature as they are a part of the low politics arena (trade, foreign aid and immigration) a domestic variables approach is called for. Again, this is because adjacent decision makers will now have as much (and at times even more) influen ce over the construction of such policies. The implications of the above proposed anal ysis suggest that a certain paradigmatic pluralism is possible for methodologies coming out of differing perspectives (i.e., state-centrism and domestic variables or even Realism and Liberalism themselves). More research should be done that attempts to amalgamate seemingly diverg ent perspectives in order to develop empirical or even normative research programs that are as diverse as the world that they find themselves trying to understand. Following th e framework provided for by the issue areas approach, I have proposed a series of secondary methodological steps including content, time series and regression analyses on roll call presidential succe ss rates. Such ancillary techniques naturally

PAGE 129

129 emanate out of the issue areas methodology as it is put into practice examining extant Post War Era executive-legislative foreign policy relations (1953-2004). Specifically, I utilize this process to test the explications of the multiple presidenci es thesis and to develop implications out of the results themselves. These implications suggest no t only the utility of the multiple presidencies thesis itself to examine and evaluate the pres idential-congressional fore ign affairs relationship. They also support the app licability of future use of an issu e areas analysis as a methodological approach. It does this by allowing researchers to discern the contours of the American foreign policy landscape by capturing its inherent nuance s but still promotes parsimonious mapping of that landscapes totality. To this end, I have developed structural a nd unit level models which capture macro-level factors coming from historical, political and econ omic sources. These independent variables are to be regressed on the unit of analysiss (cong ressional roll call votes ) primary and secondary dependent variables--the tracked annual presidential success rates on congressional roll call votes in foreign policy as well as the issue areas and mixed issue areas within the domain. Lastly, hypotheses emanating out of the multiple presidenci es thesis are examined by the employment of the before-mentioned models with variable operationalization that looks at presidency-centered v. congress-centered conditions. I move now to an examination of the longitudinal findings regarding the movie of the Post-War Eras execu tive-legislative relationship in foreign policy.

PAGE 130

130 CHAPTER 4: THE MULTIPLE PRESIDENCIES ACROSS THE ISSUE AREAS OF AMERICAN FOR EIGN POLICY IN PRESIDENTIAL -CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS Journeys, great and small, al ways begin at the beginning! Mark Twain, Tom Sawyer Introduction In this chapter, we will e xamine the broad contours of the multiple presidencies thesiss findings by looking longitudinally across the 50 pl us year history of the Post War Era (19532004). In that effort, I will follow the basic struct ure laid out in the prev ious chapters for report and analysis of the relevant fi ndings including an in troduction, followed by se tting the historical contexts in political and economic terms for ex tant presidential-congre ssional foreign policy relations and then a dissection of the findings regarding the longitudinal models. Lastly, I will engage in a discussion of thos e base findings emanating out of the time series and regression analyses within the politico-economic historical contexts that they find themselves in. This chapter will close with a summary of the finer points of the studys findings and serve as a stepping stone into the cross-sectional analyses to come. First of all, the historical context is more than just an anecdotal narrative of the presidential-congressional foreign affairs relationshi p. It is in fact a se tting event, which serves as the springboard for the quant itative modeling that follows it. Variables do not exist as phenomena unto themselves, rather they are themse lves both products of and inhabitants within a certain context (or, in theory anyway multiple cont exts). It is vitally important to remember that these variables are only indicativ e of their mutual and co-depe ndent interaction with the unit level actors (the president and C ongress) within the specified tim eframe of the study itself. The history is important because it pr ovides for the appropriate selec tion of indicators and conditions

PAGE 131

131 their temporal impacts. With th at in mind, I will concentrate on de veloping a narrative of the role played by the issue areas of fore ign policy across political time. The findings result from two general types of models, both of which are leveled at the structural impacts on presidential-congression al relations as meas ured by the dependent variable the annual presidential success rate (in e ither foreign policy or the various issue areas of foreign policynational securi ty, domestic security, diplomacy, trade, foreign aid and immigration). One model type is a time series form ation which tracks relati ons as either single entities (autocorrelations) or as groups (cross-correlations) across a given time frame by accounting for the role of time in a quantitativ e fashion (McClary and Hay 1975). I employ both in order to check for stasis and dynamism with in as well as across th e dependent variables. Another model that I utilize is a simple multivar iate regression of the role that the various issue area success scores (the secondary depende nt variables) play in relation to overall presidential foreign policy success (the primary dependent variable).1 This is important because it answers a basic contention of the multiple presiden cies thesis that foreign policy is in actuality a polyglot of only loosely related issue areas. Other secondary suppor t measures are also employed but I will discuss those within the text of the section itself. Finally, additional longitudinal regression models employing some of the secondary dependent variables are specified and run in order to l ook at basic patterns of relation ships that were hypothesized in Chapter 2. These models look at certain historical and economic conditions operating at the macro-level whereby they exert a phenomenon-sp ecific relationship influencing the structural settings of presidency-centered v. congress-centered conditio ns. In this effort, I also test for the influence of periods of presidential-congres sional foreign policy history (War Power 19531 See relevant portions of the methods chapter (3) for a deeper discussion of these contrasting dependent variables.

PAGE 132

132 1972, Confrontation Politics 1973-1989, Imperial Presidency Politic ized 1990-2000 and the Extra-Systemic Dilemma 2001-2004?). These last m odels serve as the starting off point for the cross-sectional analyses containe d in the rest of this work. Finally, the discussion section matches the em pirics with the theory, by pulling together the elements of the historical context section with those of the empirical findings section. The history sets the context, while the models analyze it and then in this section, the two are brought together by the theoretical premises of the mu ltiple presidencies thesis. Essentially, the two previous sections are re-discussed but under the fr amework of an analogy provided by the theory which not only suggests the utility of the theo ry but also brings wh at would otherwise be somewhat disparate analyses into a coherent sy stematized framework. Lastly, we take a final review of the chapter as a whole before moving on to the further articulations promised for in the cross-sectional porti on of this study. Issue Areas across Political Time Throughout the path of tim e followed in this analysis, one overarch ing initial conclusion can be made regarding the role of the issue ar eas of foreign policy, that beingthey matter and they do so in a systematic fashion. Having said that, how they matter, when they matter and their potential for mattering in the future is subject to a great deal of within and across case variance. The reason for this is simple; time itself has ha d a political impact on the executive-legislative relationship in foreign policy. Our study begins in the year 1953, which was or iginally selected by me for methodological reasons since that is when the editorial staff at Congressional Quarterly began to systematically record presidential position voting within the Congre ss. It has proved to have a strong analytical prowess as well. In this year, we as a country saw the end of the first major point when the Cold War got hot. The Korean War (1950-1953) was certainly not the first place of American-

PAGE 133

133 Soviet conflict but in the short decade after th e end of the Second World War (the Post-War Era) it was the most intense by any measure of magni tude. Unlike the preceding Cold War conflicts of the late 1940s over Greece, Turkey and Germany; Korea was a major power war. This type of war not only reaches the magnitude measures of intensity and duration associated with designating major from minor wars (Singer and Small 1983).2 It also has the characteristic of involving one or more major powers (states in the Westphalian system ), in this case not only the US but also Britain and to a much reduced extent France (due to their protracted involvement in the Indochina War 1946-1954) (Cashman 1993). Fu rthermore, Communist China certainly qualified as a quasi-major power at least militarily and after the Yalu River intervention in late fall 1950 they took the place of the North Koreans as the central antagonists faced by the United Nations (UN).3 The Korean War arguably had almost as gr eat an impact on the domestic populace of the United States as World War II, being the fact that, Truman utilized the war to engage in a partial mobilization of men and materiel (Milkis and Nelson 2003). This partial mobilization included a permanent extension of the draft, reserve and guard duration call-ups, increases in income and corporate taxes, rationing of industrial and cons umer goods as well as perhaps most pervasively placing war economy controls over strategic resources like steel, coal and oil (Milkis and Nelson 2003). In fact, it was because of this mobiliza tion activity that the United States economy suffered a severe retraction beginning in the summe r of 1953 as the Armistice took effect and the country moved to a major de-mobilization of its war economy and conventional armed forces 2 These measure are usually indexes developed based around casualties, size of forces, duration of deployment, size and number of battles and material costs as well as the geographic scope of what must be seen as a type of militarized dispute (Singer and Small 1983, Vasques 1994, Cashman 1993, Singer 1999). 3 While it is now known that the Soviets were directly involved militarily in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, such combat involvement was mostly constrained to air power and air defense in limited quantities.

PAGE 134

134 (Milkis and Nelson 2003). The corresponding Korean War Recession, while not as pervasive in its impacts regarding the recessionary macr oeconomic readjustments following each of the two World Wars (1919-1921 and 1946), this rece ssion was deep enough and entrenched enough that it caused the Democratic Party to lose th e Congress and was instrumental in Stevensons defeat in the 1952 elections (Milkis and Neslon 2003 and Department of Commerce 2006, archive report). While this was the first time in twenty years that the Republican Party had gained control of the White House as they did with Eisenhow ers inauguration in 1953, just before between 1947 and 1948 the 80th Congress had been a Republican one. Therefore in the early days of the mid-1950s, notions of the entrenchment of the New Deal realignment were certainly not as powerful as they are now seen in retrospect to have been (from Mayhew 2002). A new Red Scare driven by the activities of Joseph Mc Carthy (R-WI) coupled with Eisenhowers New Look foreign policy with its emphasis on deterr ence through Mutually Assured Destruction made the Cold War into an ever present and ominous everyday fear for the common man and woman in America (Snow and Brown 1999). In contrast to David Halberstams (2000) picture of 1950s America as a lost age of innocence and opportunity, the 1950s from a foreign policy perspective were a series of cr ises some seen, some inferred. The question of military intervention into the Indochina War at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 split the Eisenhower war cabinet betw een Hawks calling for some form of military solution led by Vice-president Nixon and Doves cautioning against such an endeavor as led by a ground war weary Pentagon (Green stein 1993). Eisenhower defected from direct intervention but set the US on a course for increased militar y, political and economic involvement in what would soon be the countries of North and Sout h Vietnam (Ellsberg 1971). Real, though minor

PAGE 135

135 military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as well as the diplomatic efforts during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 would foreshadow future Amer ican military adventures in years to come. Additionally, shows of force in the South China Sea and the Black Sea by the US Navy against communist counterparts were fl ashpoints that bord ered on the deadly during this time. Despite recessions in 1953-54 and 1958, the American economy grew at unprecedented rates during the 1950s as it enjoyed the fruits of its Post-War position as the clear global economic hegemon. The other great powers were still rebuilding after th e destruction of the Second World War including Americas rivals in the Sino-Soviet bloc. The US economy accounted for about of the worlds GNP during this period, it had the worlds gold reserves, the US dollar was the de facto world currency upon which all others were pegged and the US enjoyed wide trade and international finance balances (Kegley and Wittkopf 2001; Department of Commerce 2006, archive report s). Finally, the United States had the highest industrial capacity and was the number one provider of gl obal goods and services for all economic sectors (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2006, Department of Commerce 2006, archive reports) Perhaps due to this as well as its free world leadership position, the US was the number one provider of foreign aid to both the First (though reconstruc ting) and Third Worlds (US AID 2006, archive reports and Snow and Brown 1999). As the fifties came to a close, the US looked ahead with promise as well as consternation to the decad es to comethey would be both delighted and dejected by what they found. The 1960s saw a return to Democratic contro l over the White Hous e after regaining the Congress six years previously in 1954. Along with the arrival of Camelot, came an influx of liberal Northern Democrats in the 1958 midterm elections, calling for the completion of Roosevelts policy promises which included a mo re idealist-centered foreign affairs (from

PAGE 136

136 Davidson 1996 in Thurber 1996 and Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2006). The Kennedy doctrines flexible response in combination with a more ope n diplomacy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961 and the hairbreadth nuclear show down brought on by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 saw the start of diplomatic accomodationism between the American and Soviet empires (Sorensen 1965 and Alison 1971). However, the dagge r of Southeast Asia would plunge into the heart of such diplomatic accomplishments as the Open Air Test Treaty of 1963. At the time of the Kennedy assassination, a new optimism had deve loped regarding US foreign affairs but that optimism would be surely tested in the second ha lf of the decade in the place called Vietnam. The Vietnam War (1965-1973) amounted to a mode rn crucible at least as regards US foreign policy making. As the public opinion polls supporting Johns ons War declined, especially in the wake of the Tet Offensiv e in 1968the Congress f ounds its voice in the vaunted realm of national security politics. First, a within party debate broke out between the Old Guard Democrats who would ultimately support Vice-president Hubert Humphreys campaign for the White House in 1968 and the Young Turks rallying around such figures as Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. In the Congress, a politics of deference continued but extensions of Johnsons leadership outside of national security began to be questioned, especially in areas as diverse as immigration, foreign aid, trade and even Cold War di plomacy with the USSR itself (CQ Almanacs 1967-1968, various le gislative histories and Sundquist 1981). After Tet not even national security was left to the purview of the president. The return of divided government with th e election of Republican Richard Nixon in 1968 exacerbated the conflict between the presidency and the Congress into an all out war of central v. adjacent decision makers in both foreign policy and domestic policy (fro m Fisher 2000, Aldrich and Rohde 2005 as well as Papp, Johnson and E ndicott 2006). Specifically, regarding foreign

PAGE 137

137 policy this battle would lead to the resurgence of congr essional authority both real and imagined in a fashion not seen since the revolt agains t Wilsons foreign policy Idealism in the 1920s ratification fight over the Treaty of Versailles.4 The 1970s saw the immediate aftereffects of this protracted struggle with the War Powers Ac t of 1973 passed over Nixons veto, the mid-1970s era congressional investigations of the CIAs covert activities both at home and abroad over the previous thirty years, the Jackson-Vanick Am endments regarding Jewish emigration from the USSR and the subsequent de-funding of the Vi etnam War through the foreign aid appropriations process (Sundquist 1981). The 1980s, which is sometimes viewed as a re storation of presidential power resulting from the prominence of the Reagan presidency, was in fact, a time of exte nded partisan conflict between the Republican president and the Democratic House of Representatives.5 After the 1986 mid-term elections, a fully Democratic Congress offered routine foreign policy alternatives to Reagans efforts in South Africa, military policy, defense budgets and perhaps most notably Central America. Complicating all of this was that by the 1970s, US relative decline was pervasive and being felt by the domestic polity. Dollar overhang, a condition where more US cu rrency was in float in international markets than the US Mint could account for was in place as early as 1960 (Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). The pervasiveness of this problem led to the Nixonian scheme of dollar devaluation which ended formalized liquidity of internati onal financial and currenc y markets (Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). Additionally, trad e surpluses had turned into trade deficits by the mid 1960s, 4 Idealism as a philosophy of foreign policy stresses cooper ation through open diplomacy, international institutional development and nation-state adherence to the precepts and conditions of international law (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005). 5 See Milkis and Nelson (2003) for this alternative viewpoint regarding the Restoration Presidency of Ronald Reagan.

PAGE 138

138 routine budget surpluses had b ecome routine budget deficits after 1969. Then there was the emergent problem of First World competition from Japan and the European Community which placed the US industrial and agricu ltural sectors in tight economic straits as some worried that the American Eagle was being displaced by th e Japanese economic Samurai (Kennedy 1986). Free trading presidents of both parties faced off against ever increasing numbers of protectionists in the Congress again of bot h parties (Lindsay 1994). In the debate over the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Free Trade Area of th e Americas (FTAA) free trading regimes this familiar pattern of a protectionist Congress v. a free trading president continued well into the 1990s. However, the most prolific structural change to the international system was political not economic as the Soviet Empire collapsed into th e dustbin of world history in late 1991. The end of the Cold War provided the opportunities of a peace dividend due to the decline of systemic conflict but this promise was left unfulfilled as the realities of a world without super power boundaries set in (Snow and Brown 1999, Papp, Johns on and Endicott 2006). War in the Persian Gulf followed by conflicts and potential conflicts brought on by the new securitys ethnopolitical strife and the old securitys concerns regarding the maintenance of a national strategic interest (from Mathews 1989 and Mearsheimer 2001). The Balkans, Somalia, the Sudan, Rawanda, Haiti, Liberia, Senegal, Russian descent, Chinese ascent and of course Iraq would test both the first Bushs new world order and Clintons selective engagement foreign policy doctrines. However, that would only be the begi nning of the real impor tance of a globalized world with its attendant forces on integration ju xtaposed against the forces of fragmentation. These countervailing forces have led to creation of a political world that is unipolar only in

PAGE 139

139 military concerns, multipolar economically and most troubling for foreign policy decision makers and analysts polyglot socio-culturally (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2006). The foreign policy polity that we now occ upy is one where diffusion and confluence go hand in hand on any array of issue areas from national security all the way to immigration. The aftermath of the twin towers attack on September the 11th 2001, have led us to re-evaluate the role of presidency-centered v. Congress-centered conditions re garding where the power in foreign policy lies, if it should lie there and why this is so. Recently, we have seen the securitization of immigration as a part of the War on Terror with prolonged employment of troops both regular and guard. Port and border security has brought trade into the security realm and an entirely new Cabinet Department devoted to domestic security has since been established. But, this has not necessarily led to a re-presidentialization of foreign policy as recent research has shown that the Congress has been heavily involved in the creation and implementation of these foreign policy efforts (Wolfsenberger in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Nevertheless, W. Bushs Bull Horn Moment cannot be underestimated as to its initial and even long term impact as envisioned in the real Wars in Afghan istan and Iraq accomplished with overwhelming support/acquiescence by the Congress, including the opposition party. Finally, the Patriot Act and other domestic surveillance initiatives by th e current administration have allowed for the development or at least the potential developmen t of a domestic intelligence capability not seen since the height of the Soviet Unions Comm ittee on State Security (KGB). And, again the Congress largely acquiesced to th is securitized power into th e domestic sphere. The ebb and flow of executive-legislative relations in foreign policy construction and implementation continues but it has been subject to some patterns and it is to thes e patterns that we now turn.

PAGE 140

140 Empirical Findings One of the central hypotheses that em anates out of the prescriptions of the multiple presidencies thesis is that the issue areas of fo reign policy can be shown to manifest themselves in divergent patterns. The initial descriptive findings of the longitudinal analysis certainly support that contention. As Figur es 4-1 and 4-2 suggest (see th eir supporting table in the appendix), the multiple issue areas of foreign polic y whether as discrete or mixed entities appear in a robust fashion.6 Taking a closer look at these two fi gures, we can see some significant differences in the distribution of the issue areas. First of all, th e discrete issue areas: national security, domestic security, diplomacy, trade, fo reign aid and immigration which are at the core of the theorys expectations re garding their presence as roll call phenomena are more prevalent in their presence within the data set than the mixed versions (which are composites of core categories). Second, among these core categories there are a big three, composed of national security (31% of all votes), trad e (23% of all votes) and foreign aid (20% of all votes). Third, national security is the category with the largest percentage of votes which is something that is consistent with hypothesized notions for the ex istence of an opportunity structure for presidential empowerment within this area of foreign policy.7 Lastly, the lack of a sustained systematic presence regarding most of the issu e areas, including the mixed issue areas rejects hypothesized conditions regarding the steady disper sion of foreign policy into a multiplicity of issue areas. I believe that the core strength ex erted by national security trade and foreign aid as points of ongoing confluence for issue develo pment between the exec utive and legislative branches accounts for this finding but future research needs to be done in this area. 6 All figures and tables relevant to this chapter ar e found in sequential order after the summary section. 7 See Chapter 2s extended discussion of the importan ce of opportunity structures role within the multiple presidencies thesis.

PAGE 141

141 A related finding is the lack of a systematic role for the domestic security (5.9% of all votes) and diplomacy (7.7% of all votes) categori es. As high politics aren a categories, one would expect that they would be more pr evalent within the data than they actually are. However, it is conceivable that the domestic security issue area has been largely over-shadowed by position taking in the national security category so much to the point that domestic security and to a lesser extent diplomacy is in effect a sub-category. If this is true, then the hypothesized relation between presidential position ta king and success more generally is even more a function of the inherent opportunity struct ure that security represents for pres idential power in foreign affairs. Moving on to more analytical findings, we discern differential patterns as to the longitudinal success rates of presiden ts regarding the core issue area s. I concentrated on these at the expense of the mixed formulations because of their stronger appearance, analytical role within the theory and easier me thodological interpretability. I w ill save discussion of the mixed issue areas for the cross-sectional chapters where they become most manifest (chapters 6-8). As Tables 4-1 and 4-2 indicate, there are statistically significant diffe rences in the mean percentage success rates for presidents across the three main issue areasnational security (74% success), trade (71% success) and fore ign aid (72% success). This not only supports hypothesized contentions, it also follows the expected patte rns of success with presidents routinely doing better in the high politics arena than in the low po litics one, however this is offset by the lack of sustained presence of three of the issue area s across timedomestic security, diplomacy and immigration. It also follows expected pattern s with national security as the single most successful issue area for presidential foreign policy position vote w ins (74% overall). Additionally, as the table points out the mean success rate for pr esidents is greater on national security than on trade and forei gn aid. A means test confirms a st atistically significant difference

PAGE 142

142 in success between the issue areas (p=.05). It is a debatable question as to the substantive significance of such an empirical claim, therefore deeper analytical inquiry is necessitated. Standard deviations and standard mean errors are quite small, which is indicative of the fact that I am employing population rather than sample statistics. As an implication, it is entirely possible that much of the variati on or lack thereof noted in the two presidencies literature is a result of its overwhelming reliance on sample s and even sub-samples as opposed to the population data which is availabl e, just painstaking to get at (see Bond and Fleisher 1988, Malbin and Brookshire 2000 and Conley 1997 for some relatively recent sampling endeavors). One major analytic finding out of this table is that despite hypothesized claims there is no marked difference in the degree of presidential success relative to the n on-security issue areas (see Tables 4-1 and 4-2). We woul d expect a variation in the su ccess rate regarding comparisons between national security success-trade and national security success-foreign aid. However, these expectations were not born out; in fact there is no discerni ble difference in the success rates in trade (71%) v. foreign aid ( 72%) (Again, see Tables 4-1 a nd 4-2). There are two possible explanations, one is methodological and the othe r theoretical. Methodologically, it is conceiva ble that the sheer number of data points is overwhelming any inherent differences that lie below the surface due to the reliance on population data. A future research project may differentiate these votes out along types ba sed on the relative value of the vote itself (majority procedural, majo rity final, supermajority procedural and supermajority final). I do this in the cross-sect ional chapters, but looking at it longitudinally is certainly something to examine at a later date. Theoretically, if we are keeping in mind the notion that what is presidency -centered serves as the base ordering principle for the study overall, then the further we move away from security (e.g., the low politics arenas) the less

PAGE 143

143 subject issue areas are to the ordering princi ple itself and hence within low politics arena variance may not be able to be discerned with th is type of research program. Not only is this a point for further study unto itself, it also provides an empirical referent which in large measure supports the basic thesis regarding the role of issue areas an d opportunity structures in the presidents foreign policy success rate (Chapter 2). So far, the study is supported by basic descriptive and minor analytic empirics but what happens wh en those empirics are examined in a more robustly systematic manner? Time series analysis examines data longit udinally with the specific contribution that it accounts mathematically for the impact of tim e itself on the phenomenon of interest (from McCleary and Hay 1975). Its principal limitation is its tendency to devel op systematic error over time which is referred to by time series analysts as serial autocorrela tion of the disturbance term (McCleary and Hay 1975, introduction). While this problem is particularly endemic to ordinary least squares (OLS) models, the relatively limited nature of this studys application of such analyses should serve to limit the negative impacts at least generally. Looking at a base univariate ARIMA model tracking the foreign polic y success and core issue area success scores across time we can gain at least a modest syst ematic perspective on the executive-legislative foreign affairs relationship. The models specified take on the following characteristics: Model 1 FPn~(1,0,0) Where >0 Model 2 NSn~(1,0,0) Where 1>0 Model 3 DSn~(1,0,0) Where 2>0 Model 4 Dn~(1,0,0) Where 3>0

PAGE 144

144 Model 5 Tn~(1,0,0) Where 4>0 Model 6 FAn~(1,0,0) Where 5>0 Model 7 IMMn~(1,0,0) Where 5>0 Lags for all models= 50, where each lag is an annualized measure beginning with 2004 as the base year of interest and closing with the year 1953 (the origination point). What the above is referring to is the statisti cal distribution of each of the time series models as to their specific type and character of the observations being tracked across time. For instance, model 1 is specified as FPn~(1,0,0) where >1. What this is referencing is that the time series model for the dependent variable pres idential foreign policy success is distributed (represented by the tilda symbol ~ ) as a population (represente d by the capital letters FP) of all presidential position votes on foreign policy between 1953 and 2004 (represented by the letter n ). Furthermore, the numbers contained within the parentheses (1,0,0) indicate the type of time series model being employed as a first-order auto regressive model. In th is case, the dependent variable is regressed against it self at descending intervals begi nning at the base year of 2004 and working back in time (the notions of t and t-minu s) to the origination point for the study in 1953. Finally, the concept of is the Greek letter thet a and is a statistical conve ntion for any number or integer. But, in this analysis the numbers employed as primary and secondary dependent variables (the respective 19532004 annual presidential success rates in foreign, national security, domestic security, diplomacy, trade, fo reign aid and immigrati on policies) are always greater than zero. The models are of the type first-order auto regressive and measure the alteration in the various core success rates across time. One limitation of this type of auto regressive integrated

PAGE 145

145 moving average (ARIMA) modeling is that it has limited forecasting abilities because it only accounts for within rather than across case variance over time (McCleary and Hay 1975, introduction). However, as Figure 4-1 indicates the models map out in an expected fashion with some interesting twists which previous non-time series analys is neglected. This type of time series model is best thought of as a regression on itself, whereby the curre nt observation (presidential success in some issue area of foreign policy in 2004) is seen as the outcome of previous annualized presidential success rates back in de-seq uential order to the year 1953 (McCleary and Hay 1975, chapter 2) Finally, since seasonality is not of concern due to the annualized nature of the data, simple first diffe rencing is all that is necessary to re-impose stationarity on the series of c oncern by accounting for natural drif t in the respective trend lines (from McCleary and Hay 1975, chapter 2). First of all, model stationarity is met in the first 20 lags within foreign policy as well as national security, trade and foreign aid success rates. Stationarity is a time series concept that roughly approximates a mode l fitness te st like the F-test in regression analysis It is referring to the lack of natural drift or seasonal presence of trend within the data. This means that the model can be said to be actually explaining an outcome as opposed to one appearing by mere chance. In other words, the sooner a time series attains st ationarity the stronger the model is as an explanatory device. This is an indicator of the systemic presence that the big three have as indicators of foreign policy inte raction between the pres ident and the Congress. On the other side of the coin, diplomacy does not attain stationarity until the thirty-seventh lag, well over halfway into the distribution of the data and most impor tantly, domestic security as well as immigration never attains stationarity (Figure 4-3). Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from these empirics. First, security abroad is a place of presidential power not secu rity within. Second, the

PAGE 146

146 dominant presence of the big th ree (national security, trade and foreign aid) are once again limiting the potential for the lesser three (domes tic security, diplomacy and immigration) as places of presidential-congressional interaction. Following the issue of stationarity, we see th e pattern repeat itself when analyzing the modified Q statistics (the Box-Ljung statistic). The modified Q statistic measures each autocorrelation for its probability of difference from zero and the presence of a white noise phenomenon amidst the stochastic and trend pro cess terms (together they amount to the measure of endogenous variance in a time series) (B ox and Ljung 1978). As Table 4-3 indicates, measurable autocorrelations are present in all of the models except immigration and somewhat surprisingly domestic security. However, a s econd look at the domestic security category does indicate a high probability for re jecting the null hypothesi s that all inferred autocorrelations will be 0 and just the opposite conclusion is reached by interpreting the probabil ities emanating out of the immigration modified Q statis tics (Appendix Table 4-1 data). Additionally, Figure 4-3 indicates that there are two ge neral trends prevalent among the big three (national security, trade and foreign aid) regarding the movement of the respective success rates across time. The first major trend is th at national security te nds to be relatively steady state and since foreign polic y success is high (also revealed in this figure) then that means that variation in the ove rall success rate is more associated with non-security oriented issue areas. This confirms a major hypothesis of the multiple presidencies thesis and even identifies those issue areas responsible for the before men tioned variance (Figure 4-3). It is in the low politics arena of trade and foreign aid where such variations in the series trends are observed. For instance, while the trend line for national security success ha s only a single major break in it after stationarity, trade has four (Figure 4-3). And, in both trade and foreign aid, the success rates

PAGE 147

147 are subject to a high rate of in crease in the size of the Q statis tic relative to national security which follows a more incremental pattern that is easier to explain through the increase in T the total number of observations (Appendix Table 4-1 data) (Box and Ljung 1978). The foreign policy success rate series has two major breaks an d since these are at distal places in the time series itself, this indicates that the foreign polic y success rate today is not as correlated with that of the past. What explains this? From our analysis so far, change in trade and foreign aid seems more likely candidates than national security but let us take a closer look with some crosscorrelations. The cross-correlations look at between case differences across time and project inferences regarding the overall relationships between the elements of the series themselves (McCleary and Hay 1975, chapter 5). As Figure 4-4 shows, foreign policy success is a function of national security success (model A), ceteris paribus due to its high correlation coefficient function (CCF) of .564. However, as the figure al so shows a case can be made for trade given its equally high CCF of .525 (model B). Foreign ai d places in third with a CCF of .24 but from a time series perspective we cannot discern the exact determinant mechanism for presidential foreign aid success (see Appendix Table 4-2). We can only elim inate foreign aid and all other issue areas by implication as contenders. So, the question remainsis it national security or is it trade? Simple multiple regression models applied longitudina lly can shed some light on this question. For this portion of the analysis, I specify two models, the first is a multivariate ordinary least squares regression (OLS) employing foreign policy success as the de pendent variable and both national security success as well as trade success as th e explanatory factors with a disturbance term for error. All of the three variables are the full cross-time annualized position

PAGE 148

148 vote success scores with no attention paid to poli tical time differencesthose will be dealt with in coming chapters. Therefore the first model takes the form: Foreign Policy =National Security + Trade + E Where all variables ar e population indicators The second model is posited in order to test two of the fundamental hypotheses coming from the multiple presidencies thesis. That i ssue area success is indicative of the degree of presidentialization/securitizati on v. congressionalization/domesti cation of the specific votes themselves within the foreign policy domain. With that in mind, this model takes two forms with the first as: Model 2-A1: National Security=Securitization + Domestication + e Where securitization and domestication are dummy variables coded as a result of the content analysis of the relevant vote summaries. Model 2-A2: Trade =Securitization + Domestication + e Model 2-B Foreign Policy=Securitization + Domestication + e Where this serves as the baseline model for comparison relative to not ions of presidencycentered v. Congress centered conditions. As Table 4-3 tells the findings are within the expected range for the predictions of the theory. According to the results of the first m odel, while both explanatory variables correlate positively and robustly (p-value=0) with foreign policy success, the un-standardized correlation coefficient is significantly higher for national security beta=.42 than for trade beta=.364. When

PAGE 149

149 the model is re-specified to include all issue areas the results are even more emblematic of a multiple presidencies interpretation of executive-legislative relations in foreign policy. As Table 4-4 indicates, while trade has the highest correlati on value, the two security oriented issue areas together trump it by a significant amount (.31 for trade, .22 for national security and .19 for domestic security). Also, in general trade is th e only substantively sign ificant factor amongst the low politics arena, although it is true and also supportive of the larger theory that all issue areas of foreign policy enjoy a statistically sign ificant relationship (alpha set at .05) with the dependent variable (Table 4-4). The second model(s) shows a clear role for secu ritization in the success rate of presidents in foreign policy along predicted directions. As a presidency-centered condition, securitization has a significant relationship with national secu rity and foreign policy success, however the correlations are relatively weak (Tables 4-5-6). Even more troubling, as Tables 4-5-6 reveal the relationship is negative suggesting that as the presence of securitization among foreign policy votes increases there is a corresponding decrease in the success rate whether foreign or national security in orientation. Wh y is this so? Perhaps, it is because of the longitudinal aspect of the data itself since actual va riance within is not captured by th is particular model. Therefore, we will leave this topic for now and re-address it in the cross-sectional models where a more specified approach is possible. Additionally, when securitization is utilized in the trade version of the success model and subject to a backwards elimination technique for model specification, it is maintained in the re-specified model (Table 4-7). As a side note, this also occurs when the formulation is run with foreign aid success as th e secondary dependent variable in place of the trade success rate.

PAGE 150

150 When taking the view of Congress-centered conditionality, similarly supportive yet qualified results are also found. Domesti cation of votes serves the sa me role in influencing the foreign policy success rate and non-security i ssue area success rates (measured with trade success as a proxy) for the Congress as the secu ritization phenomenon dies for the presidency (Table 4-7). Whereas securitizati on does not drop out of the model for trade (and foreign aid as well), it is domestication that d rops out of the national security model but remains as a strong and negative indicator of trade (and foreign aid) success (Table 4-7). What this really means is that domestication is inherent to the lo w politics arena (with trade as the proxy beta= -.07) and likewise, securitization holds a similar position in both politics arena (with national security as the proxy beta=-.019 ). Lastly, as you can see in Tabl e 4-7, a negative relationship between domestication and trade success is found. Unlike th e results for securitzations impact, these findings are in comportment with the precepts of th e multiple presidencies. It is to be expected that as an issue is subject to successful dom estication (read congressionalization) then the president will have a more difficu lt time getting his way on the vote in question due to the nature of the Congress opportunity stru cture in domestic (read more intermestic) types of foreign policies. The last set of longitudinal empirics deals with the role played by the concept of political time as an explanatory (potential or real) of presidential succe ss rates in foreign policy and its component issue areas. The model uses our stan dard dependent variable of annual presidential success in foreign policy and regress the impacts of the four periods of political time. Therefore, the model is specified as follows: Foreign Policy=War Power Order + Confronta tion Politics Order + Imperial Presidency Politicized Order + Extra Systemic Dilemma Order + E

PAGE 151

151 Where each order is operationalized by a dummy variable. The results as seen in Table 4-8, portray the start of a complex story th at the rest of this work attempts to clarify. Three of the four periods have a statistically significant relationship with foreign policy success. This is a fascinating finding and difficult to interpret but as an initial observation the one period that l acks significance, the Confrontat ion Politics Order 1973-1989, is the one most associated within the literature as congressional resurgen ce in foreign policy. If anything the association ought to be negative but it is simply non-ex istent. Or, is it? Think about this. A large amount of scholarship on roll cal l analysis has found th at during the 1970s and 1980s there was something of a roll call boom. The Congress as part of its reform efforts began to record more and more votes, especial ly on procedural mechanisms which themselves increased during this time (Shull and Shaw 1999, Rohde 1991, Page and Jordan 1992, Lindsay and Steger 1993). Therefore, it is possible that the votes during this time are flooding the data set, essentially polluting the observations le ading to counterintuitive inferences in a population based model that is longitudinal in its composition (from Enders 2004, chapter 5). Another interesting finding is th at despite only being four years in length, the last period the Extra-Systemic Dilemma has a significant rela tionship with position vote success in foreign policy. While this does support the expectations of the theory, the reader should take this finding with some caution as our current president is well known for not taking positions on roll call votes (Leloup and Shull 2003). Therefore, this period may have the same problem as the previous one discussed but only from the opposite di rection. Too few position votes, just like too many may also cause this period of time to not be directly comparable with ones around it (see Shull and Shaw (1999) for an extended discussion on the comparability of presidential position voting across different periods of time).

PAGE 152

152 A final finding that comports well with expectations of the multiple presidencies thesis but may seem counterintuitive relates to the Imperi al Presidency Politiciz ed (1990-2000). As Table 4-8 suggests, there is a negative significant relationship between this period of time and the success rate in foreign policy. While some may feel this is not in keeping with the theory, I can assure them that it is. Here is why. What was once freely given for extended periods of time is now quickly taken away (see the di fficulties our current president is having relative to the Iraq War). Furthermore, the highly politicized nature of the executive-legislative divide that has been particularly pervasive since th e late Reagan administration ha s worked in general against presidents and for the Congress. This is because divided government is best seen as a Congresscentered condition and unified as a presidency-cente red. However, W. Bushs year and a half of split control government betw een May of 2001 and Decembe r of 2002 might represent something of an aberration from the norm. Of course, much of that time saw an unusually high level of of bi-partisanship in the wake of 9/11. But, even during this time the Congress was already returning to its partisan roots as the 2002 mid-term campaign season came under way (CQ Almanac 2002, election report). Finally, we need to examine the role of othe r historical and economic indicators exerting a macro-level impact on the extant executive-legisl ative foreign policy relationship. The first such model tests the historical conditionality rega rding the size and scope of the US military establishments role in determining national secu rity success. This model is specified in the following manner: Model 1 National Security=War + Armed Forces + Defense Budget + E

PAGE 153

153 What this models findings portray, as show n in Table 4-9, is a mixed bag, as to the applicability of the theory acro ss time. For instance, while the base hypothesis of the military establishment as measured by the size of the armed forces and the pe rcentage of the budget allocated to it is upheld. Only size of the armed for ces is in the expected direction wherein, as the size of the armed forces increases there is a corresponding increase in the national security success rate. And, the budget measure is actually in a reverse relationshi p regarding expected outcomes where as the percentage increases, ther e is a corresponding system atic declination in the presidents rate of success in national security votes. What might be most interesting is the fact that the war dummy variable has a negative relationship with national security. However, in this case it could be that the limited amount of actual war during the time frame of the analysis might be limiting the inferential capa cities of this measure. I shoul d also like to point out that while the relationship is negative and passes stat istical significance (p=.05) it is quite weak ( beta =-.07) so how reliable the interp retation is certainly open to question. Cross-sectional study with this variable should lead to a truer assessment of this variab les impact (see Chapter 5). The next two models within Tables 410-11 examine the impacts of macro-level economic indicators and presidential success in trade and foreign aid respectively. Accordingly, each model is specified as such: Model 2 Trade=Budgetary Conditions + GDP + Business Cycle + International Finance/Trade + E And Model 3 Foreign Aid= Budgetary Conditions + GDP + Bu siness Cycle + International Finance/Trade + E

PAGE 154

154 The second model, which correlates the econom ic indicators with trade success across time, finds statistically significant relationships across the board. These re sults support the broad hypothesis regarding macro-level impacts on issu e area success rates. The signs are in the expected directions with one exception. Regarding the general condition of the economy, when it is healthy (read non-recessionary), when the budget deficit is low or even in surplus conditions and when the level of economic interdependence is low (as measured by trade/finance surpluses (or at least only modest deficits), then presiden ts have more success in trade votes. But when the opposite is true, such success is in decline due to the emergence of congressional conditionality over presidential conditionality within the variables (Table 4-10, Model 2). The deviating factor is economic growth (in this case measured as Real GDP), these results suggests that as real gross domestic product (GDP) grows success in trade dec lines. This is a bit co unterintuitive, however, it can be explained on methodological grounds as a proxy or indirect variable which cannot adequately capture the real relationship with tr ade success as the more direct observations in the other variables do. Model 3 offers up an interesting set of fi ndings by replicating the previous models independent variables and looking at their relationship with fore ign policy success. Only Real GDP and business cycle conditions have demonstrable impacts on pr esidential success in foreign aid across time. Additionally, the correlations are modest among both variables and only the business cycle behaves in expected ways ( beta =.04). Of course, remember that Real GDP ( beta =-.031) had a similar deviating impact on tr ade success and due to a smaller proportion of foreign policy votes related to foreign aid; this deviation impact would be even more decisive (Table 4-11, Model 3). Now, let us return to the movie of executive-legislative foreign policy relations and bring it all together.

PAGE 155

155 The Multiple Presidencies across the Issue Areas of Foreign Policy So how do we relate the events of th e contextual narrative with the systematic findings of the longitudinal study? The answer is the multiple presidencies thesis. The story of executivelegislative relations in foreign policy during th e Post-War Era is a long and extremely complex one, however, if viewed from the perspective of multiple sets of pr esidential-congressional relations across the component issue areas of foreign affairs it is not nearly as complex as first thought. The reason for this is that security serves somewhat as an anchor to the ship of state steered by the president and crewed by the Congress. As this analogy goes, when the ship hits troubled waters in the sea of foreign policy, then the president-captain is in charge like in the time of the War Power Order 1953-1972 with its heightened Cold War tensions that led immediately out of one hot war in Korea and in to another in Vietnam. Meanwhile, as dtente became the diplomacy of the day, Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine became focal points for future Cold War strategy the waters of the foreign policy sea calmed down but the crew got antsy.8 The captain(s) (in the form of Nixon himself and later at least in an electoral fashion Ford and Carter) were displaced in mutinies by a recal citrant Congress. Finally, a moderated status quo develops wherein the president-captain and the Congress-crew develop a tandem institutional relationship where st orms rise (like wars in the Mi ddle East) with a congressional rally-round-the president phenomenon. However, as quickly as the crisis comes it begins to fade and the calm waters bring about congressional-c rew discontent with the president-captains dayto-day voyaging in the foreign policy sea. Keep this rough analogy in mind, as we move into the cross-sectional chapters and take snapshots of the executi ve-legislative foreign policy 8 Vietnamization refers to a strategic policy initiated by the Nixon administration in 1969 to gradually drawdown American forces in the Vietnam War and ultimately lead to a peace with honor as America would retreat from active participation in Southeast As ian conflict. The strategy was built around a combination of aggressive diplomacy with the enemy and the simultaneous movement toward turning over first combat and ultimately logistical operations against the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese government.

PAGE 156

156 relationship. The album that will ultimately result will provide a companion to the movie of presidential-congressional longit udinal foreign relations that wa s offered in this chapter. Summary This chapter has discussed the longitudinal analysis and findings relative to the multiple presidencies across the issue areas (national security, domestic security, diplomacy, trade, foreign aid and immigration) of foreign policy. In this effort, I have started with an opening historical narrative regarding the broad contours of executive-legisl ative relations in this domain of policy making. Next, we examined the findings related to such foreign affairs relations by employing time series, mean percent differencing a nd simple multiple regressions. While not all of the findings support the thesis, most of them do and they do so in both general as well as specific ways. Essentially, foreign policy success is a function of the component issue area success rates, especially those in the high politics arena (national security, domestic security and diplomacy). Within that, national security has the most privileged position and hence impact on positively influencing presidential success as hypothesized by the notion of presidency-centered conditions. However, it was found that the negati ve impact of securitization on foreign and national security success is a major impediment for the theorys general application. Clearly, more research needs to be done in order to explain this discordant finding or at least account for its presence within the established framework of the multiple presidencies. Likewise, the low politics arena (trade, forei gn aid and immigration) are least associated with presidential success as they are Congress-centered conditi ons. This is especially true of foreign aid and immigration but trade is also qu ite limited in its systematic impact as well. Finally, the big three of national security, trade and foreign aid s eem to be the driving forces within the foreign policy domain, something vitally important to realize for this and other studies employing an issue areas analysis.

PAGE 157

157 Then, we examined the quantitative indicato rs for periodicity re gressed against the dependent variable and found significant if not always intuitive relationships. Coming out of these findings, we saw how the multiple presiden cies thesis, as a theory of presidentialcongressional foreign policy relations can be sh own to provide a strong heuristic for bringing together the qualitative narrativ e with the quantitativ e indicators themselves through analogous reasoning. And, now let the War Power Cometh!

PAGE 158

158 Figure 4-1. Issue Areas of Fo reign Policy Bar Chart Across Political Time (1953-2004) trade/immigration trade/foreign aid trade/diplomacy trade security/trade security/foreign aid security/diplomacy security immigration foreign aid/immigrat foreign aid domestic security/tr domestic security/im domestic security/di domestic security diplomacy/trade diplomacy/immigratio diplomacy/foreign ai diplomacy/domestic s diplomacy Figure 4-2. Issue Areas of Fo reign Policy Pie Chart Across Political Time (1953-2004)

PAGE 159

159 Table 4-1. National Security v. Trade Polic y Success across Political Time (1953-2004) t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper Annual presidential success score in national security policy 266.943 3142.000.746402.740919 .751884 Annual presidential success score in trade policy 196.990 3343.000.713475.706374 .720576 Table 4-2. National Security v. Foreign Aid Policy Success across Political Time (1953-2004) t df Sig. (2tailed) Mean Difference 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper Annual presidential success score in national security policy 266.943 3142.000.746402.740919 .751884 Annual presidential success score in foreign aid policy 217.138 3197.000.723677.717143 .730212

PAGE 160

160 A Figure 4-3. Models of Foreign and Issue Area Presidential Success Relative to Congress Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. A) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presidential Foreign Policy Success Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. Note: see Appendix Table 4-1 data for readout of this and the following six models. B) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presiden tial National Security Success Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. C) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presidential Domestic Security Success Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. D) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Pres idential Diplomatic Policy Success. Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. E) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presidential Trade Policy Success Time Seri es Autocorrelation Analysis. F) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presiden tial Foreign Aid Policy Success Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis. G) Across Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presidential Immigration Policy Success Time Series Autocorrelation Analysis.

PAGE 161

161 B C Figure 4-3. Continued

PAGE 162

162 D E Figure 4-3. Continued

PAGE 163

163 F G Figure 4-3. Continued

PAGE 164

164 A B Figure 4-4. Models of Presidential Foreign Na tional Security and Trade Success Relative to Congress Time Series Cross Correlation An alysis. A) Across Political Time (19532004): Annual Presidential Foreign and Nationa l Security Policy Success Time Series Cross-Correlation Analysis. B) Acro ss Political Time (1953-2004): Annual Presidential Foreign and Trade Policy Success Time Series Cross-Correlation Analysis. Note: see Appendix Table 4-2 data for readouts of this and the other crosscorrelation analyses (A, B and Conly shown in the appendix).

PAGE 165

165 Table 4-3. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Ce ntral Core Issue Area Success (National Security and Trade) Ac ross Political Time (1953-2004) Foreign Policy=National Security + Trade + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .155 .007 .000 annual presidential success sc ore in national security policy .420 .009 .000 annual presidential success sc ore in trade policy .364 .006 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .702 .702 .072 .026 Predictors: (Constant), Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade Policy, Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335 Table 4-4. Foreign Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of All Issue Area Policy Success (National Security, Domestic Securit y, Diplomacy, Trade, Foreign Aid and Immigration) Across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .126.011.000 annual presidential success sc ore in trade policy .314.008.000 annual presidential success score in foreign aid policy .044.008.000 annual presidential success scor e in immigration policy .020.005.000 annual presidential success sc ore in national security policy .222.011.000 annual presidential success sc ore in domestic security policy .196.007.000 annual presidential success scor e in diplomatic policy .068.005.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 808 .807 .046 .036 Predictors: (Constant), A nnual Presidential Success Scor e in Immigration Policy, Annual Presidential Success Score in Dipl omatic Policy, Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy, Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Po licy, Annual Presidential Success Score in Domestic Security Policy, Annual Pres idential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy

PAGE 166

166 Table 4-5. Models of the Impact s of Securitization and Domesti cation of Foreign Policy Votes on Various Annual Presidential Success Rates. Model 1 Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Secu ritization and Domesticati on of Foreign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004) Foreign Policy=Securitization + Domestication + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .753 .004 .000 Securitization of Vote -.030 .006 .000 Domestication of Vote -.034 .005 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .013 .013 .131 .034 Predictors: (Constant), Domestica tion of Vote, Securi tization of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presiden tial Success Score in Foreign Policy Table 4-6. Models 2a & 2b National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Securitization and Domestication of Fore ign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004) Models Model 2a: National Secu rity=Securitization + Domestication + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. Model 2b: National Secu rity=Securitization + E B Std. Error 2a (Constant) .759 .005 .000 Securitization of Vote -.023 .007 .001 Domestication of Vote -.008 .007 .250 2b (Constant) .754 .003 .000 Securitization of Vote -.019 .006 .002 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .004 .003 .155 .035 Predictors: (Constant), Domestica tion of Vote, Securi tization of Vote Dependent Variable: annual presidential success score in national security policy

PAGE 167

167 Table 4-7. Model 2c Trade Policy Success Re gression Analysis of Securitization and Domestication of Foreign Policy Votes across Political Time (1953-2004) Model Trade=Securitization + Domestication + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error 2c (Constant) .760.006.000 Securitization of Vote -.047 .009.000 Domestication of Vote -.076 .009.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .024 .023 .206 .052 Predictors: (Constant), Domestication of Vote, Securitization of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade Policy Table 4-8. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Executive-Legislative Orders of Political Time in Foreign Affair s across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .700 .016 .000 War Power Order 1953-1972 .134 .016 .000 Confrontation Politic s Order 1973-1989 .005 .016 .777 Imperial Presidency Politicized 1990-2000 -.125 .016 .000 Extra-Systemic Dilemma 2001-2004 .143 .018 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .479 .478 .095 .030 Predictors: (Constant), Extra-Systemic D ilemma 2001-2004, Imperial Presidency Politicized 1990-2000, War Power Order 1953-1972, Confront ation Politics 1973-1989 Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy

PAGE 168

168 Table 4-9. Macro-Level Historic al-Economic Conditions as Determinants of Presidential Core Issue Area Success. Model 1 National Security Success Regression Analysis of Macro-Historical Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) National Security = War/Peace + Armed Forces + Defense Budget + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .386 .013 .000 war -.072 .006 .000 Annual Size of US Armed Forces in millions .239 .012 .000 Defense Outlays as a % Annual Federal Budget -.518 .060 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .223 .222 .132 .032 Predictors: (Constant), Defens e Outlays as a % Annual Federal B udget, war, Annual Size of US Armed Forces in millions Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy

PAGE 169

169 Table 4-10. Model 2 Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Macro-Economic Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Trade=Budgetary Conditions + GDP + Business Cycle + International Finance/Trade + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .766 .008 .000 Annual Trade and International Finance Balance in Billions -3.286E-05 .000 .000 Annual Real GDP as measured by current dollars in trillions -.015 .001 .000 Business Cycle Conditions .074 .008 .000 Budgetary Conditions in Billions of current dollars .001 .000 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .252 .251 .180 .030 Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Conditions in Billions of current do llars, Business Cycle Conditions, Annual Trade and Inte rnational Finance Balance in Billions, Annual Real GDP as measured by current dollars in trillions Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Policy

PAGE 170

170 Table 4-11. Model 3 Foreign Aid Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Macro-Economic Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Foreign Aid= Budgetary Conditions + GDP + Business Cycle + International Finance/Trade + E Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .778.007 .000 Annual Trade and International Finance Balance in Billions 1.179.000 .622 Annual Real GDP as measured by current dollars in trillions -.031.001 .000 Business Cycle Conditions .047.007 .000 Budgetary Conditions in Billions of current dollars 2.844.000 .444 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .177 .176 .173 .036 Predictors: (Constant), Budge tary Conditions in Billions of current dollars, Business Cycle Conditions, Annual Tr ade and International Finance Balance in Billions, Annual Real GDP as measured by current dollars in trillions Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy

PAGE 171

171 CHAPTER 5 THE WAR POWER COMETH!: THE SECURITI ZED TIME OF THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1953-1972 Introduction In this chapter, we examine the W ar Power Order from 1953-1972, a time when the presidents opportunity structure in security reaches its zenith. Th e early days of the Cold War provide an almost perfect instrument for the pr esidency to orchestrate the conduction of foreign policy. The reason for this is simple, the crisis mentality of these times had taken on a structural level impact whereby the Congress (and for that matter all other relevant members of the American polity) had essentially acquiesced to the presidencys force of will in foreign policy. In particular, the Congress had become the servant of a securitized presidential master.1 The question, is how the presidents whet her Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson or early Nixon were able to effectively reduce all of the disp arate six issue areas of foreign policy into a securitized domain of high over low politics. The answer is provided by the presidents opportunity structure in national security in combination with the structural securitized political environment offered by the early Cold Wa r. These two factors, operating in concert at both the unit and systemic levels made this pe riod of US foreign po licy executive-legislative history into one where the two presidencies was prominent to the point of being axiomatic (Wildavsky 1966). The problem of course was that this period of time proved to be more the aberration than the norm for the presidential-cong ressional foreign policy relationship. This is especially true when foreign affairs are vi ewed across its component issue areas and the perspective arenas that differen tiate them one from another. 1 See the outline for the War Power Order, in particul ar its Hegelian dialectical structure in Chapter 1.

PAGE 172

172 This chapter will follow a similar struct ure as the last one by opening with an encompassing narrative built around executive-legis lative foreign policy relations across the issue areas and the timeframe they are found in. The narrative will be divided by presidency in sequential order beginning with Eisenhowers two terms and ending with Nixons first. Specific attention will be given to the ro le of security in influencing overall foreign policy development including seemingly ancillary issue areas like fo reign aid, trade and not so ancillary domestic security. Next, it will move on to an examination of the empirical findings emanating out of the remaining longitudinal and the first set of cro ss-sectional studies. These studies will look specifically at the unit level relationship betw een the president and the Congress in foreign affairs by studying the impacts of political factors including public, electoral and partisan/ideological forces. The longitudinal regressions are empl oyed in order to establish a baseline for comparison with the cross-sectional findings. This will showcase both the continuities and even more importantly the diffe rences regarding the pr esidential-congressional relationship from across time and within time fr ameworks. Then, I will attempt to once again bring the narrative into systematic synthesis wi th the findings through a ta bular analysis of the various presidential success rates across the com ponent issue areas of fo reign policy as provided by the multiple presidencies thesis. Of course, I will conclude with a brief summary of the chapters major discussion points. And, now for Act I Scene I of the execu tive-legislative foreign affairs relationshipThe War Power Cometh! Foreign Issue Areas under Securitys Yoke The first thing to rem ember about the War Power Order 1953-1972 is the privileged role that security has during this time. This early period in Cold War history reduces all other potential conflicts and channels all potential confluences thro ugh the lens of the US-Soviet superpower struggle. Older read ers may recall as children having their parents build fall out

PAGE 173

173 shelters or experience th e civil defense emergency drills. Younge r readers may not be as able to appreciate how real the Cold War was made in everyday political, economic and even sociocultural life. Too often we remember these times as an idyllic period of plenty, already reduced to nostalgia in the early seventies movie American Graffiti (1972). Or, we only remember the second half of this period as a time when the ve ry traditions of our soci ety were questioned as a result of the masses movements for change and th e inevitable counter-reac tion that arose against them. In this case, one may find themse lves re-reading thei r copy of Hoffmans Steal this Book! or Kerouacs The Road Less Traveled But, the fact of the matter is that, all of the above are true statements of this period of American history. S o, the real question for us is, Where do we find the president, the Congress and foreign policy during this time? The answer is that presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy were not very visible to the outside observer and so they were somewhat hidden. Where they were visible and most important where they remained invisible, the president clearly dom inated and the Congress routinely if somewhat masochistic ally was subordinated. Things did not have to be that way but they were. This was not because presidents were so great as to be unquestioned in foreign policy nor that the Congress was incompetent in international relations and hence in consequential. No, it was that way because people, the president, th e Congress and the polity writ-large wanted it to be that way. While a fully developed normative analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this particular research, it needs to be addressed that power is only held (at least in democracies like ours) through acceptance by the followers and persuasion by the leaders (from Neustadt 1960). During the War Power Order, the polity itself was enraptured by the messianic virtues of the modern presidency as ushered in by no less th an FDR. America coul d do anything, it should do

PAGE 174

174 everything and such a virtuous people were clearly led by a virtuous leaderthe president of the United States. In no where was this more true than in foreign policy, as the Congress was characterized by a domestic liberal economic agenda a socially conservative tradition and most importantly for us, virtually absolute acquiescence to executive leadership in the politics that lie beyond the waters edge (Dodd 2005 in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005, Snow and Brown 1999, Davidson 1996 in Thurber 1996 and Sinclair 2005 in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Now let us study the War Power Order by its component presid encies and the issue areas of foreign policy that they dealt with in their interactions with the Congress. Eisenhower 1953-1961 From an issue areas perspective, non-secur ity was for all intents and purposes non-existent during the Eisenhower years. This was observed not only in openly nation al security oriented policies like the size of the armed forces or the percentage allocate d to defense within the federal budget (both high during this time) but also domes tic security (the Subversives Activities Act and Amendments), trade (restrictions placed on East-West trade and sanctions to those who traded with the Warsaw PactThe Eisenhower Doct rine came out of this), immigration (checks against communist infiltrations) and foreign aid (t he Mutual Security Acts). What tied all of these disparate legislative in itiatives together was the ove rwhelming employment of a securitized language in their construction and purpose. This study is not subject to linguistic analysis; however, it would be an area of fruitful research for th e future. For our purposes, it can be thought of as a major empirical referent in suppor t of the thesis for this section that it was all about security and hence presiden tialization of foreign policy. It also needs to be noted that fully constituted legislative histories of these a nd other initiatives during this period need to be conducted in order to get a true sense of their co ntribution to this resear ch program. However, for the purposes of this project such analyses will have to wait and we will instead concentrate on

PAGE 175

175 detailing enough of the narrative ne cessary for an initial understan ding of executive-legislative foreign policy relations during this crucial time. In this effort, I will concentrate on issue areas exclusive of security because they showcase the pronounced impact that the national security issue area had on all issue areas of foreign policy. During the Eisenhower years, dom estic security became a pronoun ced issue area of foreign policy unto itself. The investigative oversight of the House Un-American Activities Committee as well as McCarthyism in the Senate placed th e executive branch of first Truman and later Eisenhower under the watchful eyes of a fire alarm Congress.2 As the reader should recall from the last chapter, Eisenhower was swep t into office on an electoral strategy which emphasized Corruption, Communism and Korea. His early experience with unified Republican government for the first time since Hoovers first two years (1929-1931) was certainly emblematic of a mandate, at least as regards foreign policy. However, as the Almond-Lippman (1950) thesis suggested regarding the lack of public a ttention to foreign affairs issues how long such a mandate could be capitalized on by Pr esident Eisenhower in his relationship to the Congress was certainly questiona ble. Within two years the 84th Congress opened with divided government and Eisenhowers contro l over the public policy agenda was no longer absolute as 1954 returned a normal vote outcome, which for Ei senhower disfavored him at least as far as partisanship was concerned.3 It is an interesting si de note that a modest re view of the legislative history involving the Subversive Activities Ac t and its subsequent Amendments suggests the appearance of certain co alitions of interest diversified by both region and ideology. Essentially, 2 See McCubbins & Scwartz (1984) Congressional Ov ersight Overlooked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarm, AJPS vol.1, pages 165-177, Mid-West Political Science Association, University Of Indiana, IN: Blackstone Publishing. 3 See Campbell et. al. (1960) for a fuller discussion of the normal vote.

PAGE 176

176 an order promoting Conservative Coalition (Republicans and Southern Democrats) acts in opposition to Ikes interests and a more liberty positing Liberal Coa lition (Republicans and Northern Democrats) manifests itself in support of the ideologically moderate president (CQ Almanacs 1958-59, vote studies appendices). We w ill see this appearance of countervailing forces manifesting itself routin ely, if not always systematica lly, across other issue areas of foreign policy regarding the presid ents legislative agenda(s). What explains it best seems to be the presidents relative position to the various co alitions regarding the issue area of concern; presidents (even Eisenhower) seem to engage in strategic alliance maki ng much in support of broader coalition formation theories (Rik er 1962, Burns 1963, Bond and Fleisher 1990). Thinking about the above statements, we see a similar though at first thought counterintuitive pattern of alliance making regarding the Conservative and Li beral Coalitions and presidential success. Particularly in the areas of foreign aid and to a lesser extent in trade and immigration at least anecdotal patt erns of coalitional formation a ppear, albeit not necessarily in any fully systematized fashion. Regarding fore ign aid, the various Mutual Security Acts formalize the granting of Post-Marshall Plan ai d to the new arena of Cold War conflictthe Third World. In this effort, the Conservative Coalition manifests itself in a neo-isolationist fashion opposing Eisenhowers expansions into this issue area as even afte r the death of Robert Taft (R-OH) in 1953 a fully interventionist Repub lican Party has not yet manifested itself (CQ Almanac 1959, vote summary appendix). Meanwhile the Liberal Coalition shows itself in support of the presidents agenda regarding this attempt to win the Cold War through economic and political development of the Third World over the force of arms (CQ Almanac 1959, vote summary appendix). Relatively modest measures in trade and immigration follow the patterns

PAGE 177

177 observed in foreign aid as to coalition formati on; however, there infrequent appearance makes any inferences drawn open to severe question. Moving back into the relatively exclusive ar ena of high politics, we see that national security policies are places of overawing opportunity for presidential agency. The extension of war economy controls well after the end of th e Korean War, continuance of the system of conscription, expansion of the military reserve forces and procurement policies favoring the New Look (expansion of the stra tegic nuclear forces into the t riad as well as the creation of the strategic air and sea lift capab ilities) tended to be overwhelm ingly supported in a bi-partisan fashion. These tendencies were offset by the emer gence of a hawkish Conservative Coalition in support of the Eisenhower national security program and a dovish Liberal Coalition opposed to it but again, its systematic appearance is not as robust (from CQ Almanacs 1958-60, vote summary appendices). In a last bit of national se curity dominance, it should be noted that all troop deployments and doctrine applications (like the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East) were overwhelmingly supported by a Congress that was usually controlled by the opposition party. Finally, national security was so prominent in the Eisenhow er White House that domestic initiatives like the Highway Ac t of 1956 (the largest publics work s project in American public policy history) was sold as a means for swift m ilitary transit during conditions of systemic war (see CQ Almanac 1956, legislative history for Highway Act). JFK & LBJ 1961-1969 The Kennedy and Johnson presidencies saw a foreign policy focus which has two som ewhat contradictory trends, at the superpower level conflict was actually reduced after the world blinked, at the end of those fateful 13 days in October of 1962 (see Alison 1971 for a systematic analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis). The Open Air Test Treaty in 1963 and a return to summitry with the USSR after the U-2 s py plane incident during the late Eisenhower

PAGE 178

178 administration would if nothing el se be a precursor for the dte nte to come (see May 1969 for a cogent and somewhat contemporized review of thes e). However, at the level of proxy actors in the Cold War struggle no such re duction was present; in fact a major increase in the intensity of relations to the point of open c onfrontation is what occurred. The Gulf of Tonkin incident and its corresponding congressional resolution in 1964 led the United States down a foreign policy path to open warfare with the communi sts over a piece of Southeast Asia called Vietnam (see Elsberg 1971 for a review of this process). While it is easy to see this as the beginning of the end, it was in fact far from that. Public approval of US action in Vietnam would remain high until the Tet Offensive and the Congress would not begin to seriously defect from stated administration policies relative to Southeast Asia until well into 1968 (from S undquist 1981 and CQ Almanacs 1966-68, congressional debates ov er Vietnam policy). In fact continued congressional acquiescence to presidential dominance regarding the war was the norm throughout this time (CQ Almanac 1967, Fulbright committee statemen ts). However, some chinks in the presidential foreign policy armor were being exposed once one leaves the safety of the national security issue area. For instance, the Conservative Coalition, whil e continuing to support presidential national security policies in Vietnam, the Dominican Re public and elsewhere balked against the Great Society prescriptions for opening immigrati on through increases in quota allowances for immigrants (CQ Almanac 1965, vote summary appendi x). Also, the Liberal Coalition a hallmark of support for civil rights advances in the dom estic sphere parts way with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations emphasis on military aid over economic development and humanitarian aid to the Group of 77 Non-Aligned Nations (NAM) of the Third World (from Axelrod 2007,

PAGE 179

179 Morrison 1990 and CQ Almanacs 1962 and 1968, congressional debates over the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 and subsequent Amendments). In fact, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 is somewhat of a bridge between the two contradictory developments in foreign policy during the Kennedy and Jo hnson years. The reason for this is that, the codificati on of US foreign aid as an ongoing permanent instrument of the Cold War via the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 at first dictated a con tinued presid entialization of foreign policy through the nati onal security lens. However, by the end of the 1960s this same instrument would be the vehicle by which the C ongress would reassert itself as an institutional alternative to the presidency in foreign policy construction. With the return of divided government after the 1968 presiden tial election, that vehicle woul d take on a life all its own as the Congress specifically drove into the quagmire of Vietnam War policy. Nixon I 1969-1973 The first term of Richard Nixons presidenc y, represented the set ting sun of a fully presiden tialized and securitized foreign polic y. While presidential success remained high in foreign policy it was now due primarily to the of fsetting impact of the Conservative Coalition supporting Nixons policies in foreign affairs, especially regarding Vietnam (see Malbin and Brookshire 2000). The days of comp lete bi-partisanship, when the president, the Congress and the rest of the polity spoke with a single voic e (through the mouth of the presidency) were now a thing of the past. The fact that we are almost forty years removed from this time and the past has yet to reassert itself, s hows the longstanding impact of this sea change in presidentialcongressional relations where foreign affairs are concerned. It might be helpful to conceptualize the Nixon years as exhibiting two presidencies all their own, one for hi s first term which will be articulated here and another for his second term which is presented (along with Fords) in the next chapter (see chapter 6).

PAGE 180

180 The first Nixon presidency represents continuity with the immediate pa st, like the Eisenhower through Johnson years; Nixon dominates foreig n policy albeit through a modified technique (reliance on the Conservative Coalitions ongoing securitized support as a base). The Cold War Consensus on foreign policy, especially regarding security and securitized policies was still the predominant force in pr esidential-congressional relations. But, the chinks first exposed in the late Johnson administration regarding foreign aid applications to Southeast Asia opened up into fissures and finally cracks in the executive-legislative Cold War Consensus. A systematic review of the foreign aid appropria tions process in particular during this time is beyond the scope of this studys examination, however, a cursory gl ance is revealing in itself. By the early 1970s, the foreign ai d appropriations process had beco me a place of intense floor battles between the Conservative (supporting Nixon) and Liberal (opposing the president) Coalitions over the increasing proclivity a nd scope of the Cooper (R-KY)-Church (D-MA) Amendments. These amendments came out of th e Appropriations Committee in the House of Representatives and had corollaries with various senatorial amendments offered during floor debate by Fulbright (D-AR), Proxmire (D-WI) and others mostly Northern Democrats and a small faction of Northeastern Republicans. S upporting Nixon was Senators such as Scoop Jackson (DWA) and Michael Mansfield (R-MI) and of course others, mostly Republicans and Southern Democrats (CQ Almanacs 1971-1972, vote summaries). It needs to be noted that these procedural maneuvers appeared after the escalations of ground and air US combat operations by Nixon in Cambodia in 1970 and Laos 1971. Those two operations and the dome stic protests that led out of them across American university cam puses need to be understood as what they actually representeda fundament al revolution in how fo reign policy was constructed regarding the locus of institutional power. Esse ntially after 1972, the president would no longer

PAGE 181

181 hold a hegemonic position because after 1972 forei gn affairs were no longer reducible to the needs and dictates of national security. Empirical Findings I: The Long itudinal Polit ical Determinants of Presidential Foreign Policy Success The results for this section come in two related but differentiated forms. First, for the purposes of continuity with th e previous chapter as well as to set baseline conditions for comparative purposes I will continue with longitudi nal study of foreign policy and relevant issue area success. In this case, though we will l ook at specifically polit ical factors roughly differentiated along three dimensi ons public, electoral and partisan /ideological. Together these forces can be seen to be driving the unit le vel relationship between the president and the Congress in foreign policy. The l ongitudinal findings provide usef ul empirical referents for how the multiple presidencies have played out acr oss time as unit level phenomenon; however they are limited in their inability to be utilized as explanatory devices for within time studythat is where the cross-sectional regressions come in. These regression models will further illuminate the executive-legislative foreign policy relationship by looking at the unit le vel interactions with in the specified time frame of the War Power Order. By comparing similarly constitute d models based around the three dimensions of the political forces, we can determine what the nuances of the presidential-congressional relationship really were during this dynamic period of US foreign policy history. But, first let us look at the longitudinal relationshi ps of these political forces on pr esidential success in foreign and issue area policies. Similar to the last chapter, all relevant tables are found at the end of this chapter in sequential order with the longitudinal empirics reported first and then followed by the cross-sectionals.

PAGE 182

182 Tables 5-1 through 5-4 cover the longitudinal analyses regarding the influence of public opinion factors on the foreign polic y and relevant issue area success rates. For these and all other analyses in this chapter, I chose the national security, trade and foreign aid success rates as emblematic of all issue area success. My reason, for doing this is found in the last chapters results regarding the strong presence of the b ig three foreign policy issue areas, which I referred to as the core issue areas (see Chapte r 4). Accordingly, the expl anatory factors for all of these models include: annual presidential job approval ratings annual presidential foreign policy approval ratings, annual congressional job approval ratings and annual congressional job disapproval ratings. The dependent variables are of course the annual presidential position vote success rates in foreign policy, national security policy, trade policy and foreign aid policy. As Table 5-1 reveals, all four independent variables have sign ificant as well as relatively robust correlations with foreign policy success. Tw o of the variables, congressional job approval and presidential job appr oval are signed in the right direct ions as far as expectations are concerned. Using the working framework of pr esidency-centered versus Congress-centered conditions as our guide, we can see that incr eases in congressional j ob approval will have a depressed effect on foreign policy success becau se higher congressional job approval is a congress-centered condition. Like wise, higher presidential approva l is a presidency-centered condition which exerts a positive and strong relationship on the presidencys overall foreign policy success rate. However, contradictory findings result fr om the other two variables congressional disapproval as well as presidentia l foreign policy approvals has st rongly negative correlations with foreign policy success. This stands in dir ect contradiction to hypothesized effects and seems to be somewhat counterintuitive because you woul d think that presidential approval in foreign

PAGE 183

183 policy would track with overall presidential public approval and that the disapproval rating for Congress would have an inverse re lationship with its approval ra ting. While the R square for the model as a whole is modestly r obust (.408), perhaps the inclusion of such related factors as the two presidential approval rati ngs and the two congr essional approval ratings is causing a multicollinearity effect. Since this is a baseline measure only, I will not indulge in further model manipulation but it is a place for further study. Table 5-2, measures the impacts of the for ces of public opinion on presidential national security success with expected results once one ta kes into account the findings in Table 5-1. Due to the high rate of presence that national securi ty success has in foreign policy success writ large, it should not surprise anyone that the findings largely tr ack each other with a slight decrease in the R square (.338). This decrease is to be expect ed since success in this category is actually a sub-set of success in the other. Also, the reader sh ould note that the model still fits very well; this is a strong indicator of national s ecuritys role in dictating fo reign policy success in general. Regarding trade success, as Table 5-3 suggest s only the two congres sional public approval ratings follow expected predicti ons out from a congress-centered versus a presidency-centered perspective. It is clear that as an inherently intermestic i ssue, trade substantively affects presidential success and latitude vi s--vis Congress. It is also i ndicative that the contradictory findings in the negative relationship between presidential appr oval even in foreign policy and trade success, suggest that in fact presidents are not as advantaged under presidency-centered conditions in the more congressi onalized issue area of trade. As Table 5-4 indicates, there is an across-the-board negati ve (yet still significant) correlation between the public opinion factors an d presidential success in foreign aid. While congressional approval is in the expected di rection as premised by our bifurcation into

PAGE 184

184 presidency-centered and congress-centered conditions the weak R square (.19) limits the utility of this model as far as inferential and even explanatory purposes are concerned. Again, it is conceivable that presidency-cente red conditions are playing less and less a role as the issue area of concern moves further out of the high politics arena. Howeve r, the fact that congressional disapproval continues to have a negative relationship is disconcerting. But, it is conceivable that congressional disapproval is offs et by presidential disapproval which could explain this outcome, particularly given the widespread evidence th at Americans do not like foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy (f rom Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). The next set of tables (Tables 5-5-8), deal with the longitudinal effects of electoral forces on presidential success relative to the Congress regardi ng foreign affairs policy making. As before, the dependent variables are the perspe ctive presidential position vote success rates in foreign policy, national security, trade and forei gn aid relative to the Congress. The independent variables for each of the models are: presidenti al popular vote percentage victories, Electoral College percent victories, turnout rates for pr esidential elections, tur nout in House elections during mid-terms, turnout in House elections dur ing quadrennial elections and dummy variables indicating whether it is a presidenti al or a mid-term election year. Table 5-5 shows the relationship between the el ectoral forces and the overall foreign policy success rate, turnout has an expected relationship with it being positive for presidential elections and negative in mid-term electi ons (turnout is insignificant regard ing the within case relationship of House turnout in presiden tial elections). Somewhat unexpe ctedly, Electoral vote has a negative (albeit weak) correlation with foreign policy success but this is offset by the positive (and stronger) effect seen with th e popular vote. This probably says more about the in-directness of the Electoral College as a vote function th an any real impact on roll call position vote

PAGE 185

185 outcomes. Lastly, presidential election years have a negative (though weak) impact on foreign policy success over time. Despite its appearance, th is is probably a campaign effect due to the increased role of presidential issues (like forei gn policy) in presidential election years. In other words, during the presidential campaign season norm ally non-politicized issues of foreign policy will tend to become salient with the public and hence take on a mo re politicized (read partisan) character in ongoing presidential-c ongressional relations Therefore, presid ential success in foreign policy will systematically decline duri ng presidential election years but then re-bound somewhat when the status quo of governing begins again in the next year after the presidential election. When examining the effects of electoral forces on national security succ ess, as in Table 5-6 we see similar results as in the foreign policy writ-large category. Again, see the commentary on the last set of findings for why this is probably the case. However, the within case scenario of turnout in House races during the presidential election now appear s as a significant indicator and follows an expected negative direction. The reason for this is that turnout in these elections which is high would be indicative of a congre ss not a presidency-cente red condition. Electoral forces do not seem to have the staying impact which public opinion does. As we start to break apart the foreign policy box into its component elements a massi ve increase in the level of variance takes place. The R square for this model is still relatively strong (.250); however, this is a decline from the previous models robust (.444). Wh at explains this? Probably, it is due to the more anecdotal appearance of electoral forces, they are more dynamic, less routine and hence more variable in the degree and level of thei r impacts as determinants of presidentialcongressional relations, esp ecially in foreign policy.

PAGE 186

186 Table 5-7 looks at the electoral determinants and presidential trade success. Both electoral year variables are statistically significant, how ever, the weakness of their respective correlations is such that they are questionable at best as strong (or even weak) determinants of executivelegislative trade relations. The rest of the variables perform in unexpected ways, having uniformly negative relationships with trade su ccess despite hypothesi zed conditions. The only outlier to this phenomenon is Hous e turnout in presiden tial elections; in this case it is strong and positive. Perhaps, this is due to presidential pork regarding the construction of trade policy with individual representatives a nd senators in mind. Again, as so much is true about any initial endeavor this is a case worthy of further study. The last table that interprets the role of el ectoral forces in foreign policy success takes aim at presidential success in forei gn aid policy. Table 5-8 shows that f our of the six variables behave in the predicted direction, how ever presidential vote turnout is just short of statistical significance (.09). Of the remaini ng two variables, one electoral vote defects from hypothesized conditions (though this is probably offset by the popular vote anyway ) and the other House turnout in presidential el ections is insignificant. Despite the fact, that this m odel has fairly strong results la rgely corroborating the multiple presidencies thesis it is somewhat weakly specified with a modest R square (.174). Of course, it needs to be stated that R squares are not pe rfect predictors of model strength. The limited number of variables in this and other regression models in th ese cross-sectional studies is probably the main reason for the decline in the size of the R squares. As you decrease the size of your models as to variable count you will tend to produce underspecified outcomes, which are manifest in lower R square values. However, you will simultaneously increase the precision of your model regarding overall inference capacity relative to its specific va riables. Therefore, as

PAGE 187

187 the generality of your model as a device for explana tion decreases with the lowering of R squares (due to the increase in model variance left unexplained) it actually increases as to its specificity for explaining individual independent-dependent variable interactions. What this means is that the average individual residual distance decreases while the average aggregate residual distance increases (Agres ti and Finlay 2001, chapter 11). The next set of tables (Tables 5-9-12) explore the role of partisan ship as an across time determinant of the character of the foreign po licy relationship shared between the executive and the legislature. As always, the outcome variables are the annualized success scores for the president across foreign, national security, trade and foreign aid po licies in his relationship with the Congress. For these analyses, the input variables are partisan indicators including: unified government, percent presidents party in House an d Senate, percentage partisan roll calls in House and Senate and the various party unity scor es for the House and Senate by their respective major parties (the Democrats and the Republicans). Regarding the presidential success rate in fore ign policy, Table 5-9 indi cates that there are three basic interpretations emanating out of the impact of partisan factors. First, partisanship in general is deleterious for pres idential success in foreign policy as indicated by the percent partisan roll call measures for bot h the House and the Senate. This is to be expected for bipartisanship and to a lesser ex tent cross-partisanship is more associated with congressional deference to presidential leadership in fo reign affairs policy c onstruction. Second, also, following the prescriptions of a presidency-centered condition is that partisanship has a more positive impact relative to presidential success in the Senate than in the House. The reason is that in the Senate the strength of the parties is natu rally lower than in the House due to their more egalitarian and individualist make-up (from Davidson and Oleszek 2005). Therefore, in the

PAGE 188

188 Senate partisan activity in foreign affairs is used to create presiden tial support rather than offset it as occurs in the House. The Se nate can be thought of as a more presidency-cente red legislative institution than the House, thus the parties are a source of power. Ho wever, the opposite is true in the House which is institutiona lly more congress-centered and its parties are sources then of congressional not presidential empowerment in foreign policy. In a related finding the differential impacts of the relative strength of th e presidents party in the two chambers also provides corroborating support for a presidency-oriented Sena te in foreign policy and a congressionally-oriented House. Third, unified government itself fo llows predicted patterns with a positive and significant impact on foreign policy success. The real strength of this model can be found in its measure of variance control. The R square is a very robust .68 which suggests that the impact of partisanship may deserve independent study itself. Table 5-10 looks at partisanship and national se curity success. It follows a similar pattern as the foreign policy model with the exception that the relationship with partisanship generally is not quite as strong (the Senate partisanship i ndicator reduces to stat istical insignificance). However, all other variables are in the predicted direction and this model is as robust as the previous with a .67 R square. As expected, once we leave the presidentially oriented confines of the national security issue area there is a perceptible decline in the congressional political party as an organizing instrument for presidential governance in foreign policy. While partis an roll call voting and presidents party percentages in each chamber follow expected pa tterns, party un ity and unified government diverge. Party Unity divides out along a left-right basis, wher ein Republican unity is positively associated with presidential trade success regardless of chamber and Democratic unity has a negative association (though in one case it is insignificant). In other words, the strength of

PAGE 189

189 the hypothesis that the Senate is some bastion of strength for presidential success in foreign policy only seems to hold in the high politics arena. In the more intermestic low politics arena, of which trade is the most prominent issue area, no such case can be made for a presidentialsenatorial special relationship. Finally, unified government drops out as a signif icant indicator suggesting that its role as a presidency-centered i ndicator is in question once we leave the vaunted realm of security politics. The over arch ing role of security during the War Power Order may actually be masking some level of pres idential-congressional discord regarding the nonsecuritized issue areas of foreign policy. The bedroc k of security may be so thick that the more naturally politicized (a nd hence partisan) issue strata of executive-legislative foreign policy relations are actually hidden from systematic view. Table 5-12 studies foreign aid success as a f unction of partisan forces. The result is somewhat of a mixed bag. Unified government returns to statistical significance and has a predicted positive relationship with foreign aid success but has a weak correlation ( beta = .161). Meanwhile, as with the above tabl e, any sense of a presidential-s enatorial special relationship in foreign aid is lost as the sign reverses to a negati ve direction. In fact, if anything there seems to be a modest presidential-House relationship positive ly influencing foreign ai d success. This is a strong indicator that by looking at the component issue areas of foreign policy we can garner interesting patterns that are nuanced to the point of contradiction as this presidential-House foreign aid relationship is juxta posed against the pres idential-senatorial national security finding. Again, this is a place for further inquiry; how ever it currently lies beyond the scope of this project. The last set of longitudinal fi ndings (Tables 5-13-16) discu sses the role of ideology on our four dependent variables of interest. Acco rdingly, the explanatory variables employed in

PAGE 190

190 these analyses were: the Conservative Coalition votes for the presidents foreign policy position and those against, the Liberal Coalitions votes for the presid ents foreign policy position and those against as well as the annualized ideologi cal assessment of the presidents legislative positions by the liberal interest group the Ameri cans for Democratic Action (ADA). Essentially, this is a proxy measure as it captures the foreign policy votes contained within the data set but it also is based off all position vot es each year including those in domestic and economic policies. Together these measures are giving us a picture of the ideological distribution between as well as within the presidency and the Congress across time. Regarding overall foreign policy success, ideology tends to support hypothesized conditions; wherein presidential su ccess is positively associated with coalition voting in support of presidential positions and negatively correlat ed with opposition coali tional conditions. It is also, telling that the stronger co rrelation coefficients are among the supporting coalitions, in fact the Conservative Coalition votes against the pr esidents position fail to meet statistical significance. While the model is instructive ove rall as to its basic support for the multiple presidencies thesis, it is offset by the fact that there is a hi gh level of unaccounted for variance contained within (R square=.19). However, I would repeat that as with my previous explanation regarding a similar matter this may be due to th e decrease in the number of variables involved. Which actually means that the specific variable relationships are stronger than one might first believe. Additionally, there are two possibilities dr iving this outcome, one theoretical the other methodological. From a theoretical perspective, ideology is subsumed within more generally consistent partisan voting (from Poole a nd Rosenthal 1997). Meanwhile, methodologically speaking the coalitional voting (wheth er liberal or conservative) is in fact only a small sample of the position roll call vote population and hence might be subject to being lost in the residual

PAGE 191

191 white noise of the massive amount of foreign polic y voting contained within the data set itself. This, by the way, could also be accounting for the low R square in the model as a whole. Finally, the rating of presidenti al ideology is interesting, in that it suggests that more liberal presidents have higher foreign policy su ccess rates than conser vative ones. This is fascinating because it places doubt in the notion of a partisa n two presidencies which is suggested to help Republican presidents only due to the Conservative Coalitions more pronounced presence as a foreign policy support device for presidential position taking (Bond and Fleisher 1988). Again, I think that a theoretical as well as a methodological explanation possibly accounts for this outcome. Theoretically, lib eral presidents tend to be associated with broader legislative agendas in ge neral, thus there are just mo re legislative items for the Congress to address in all domains of policy (P ika and Maltese 2006). Likewise, as reported by Shull and Shaw (1999), methodologica lly liberal presidents take more roll call positions and given the generally high success ra te in presidential roll call voti ng, it makes sense that they would conceivably have a highe r success rate. As further evid ence of this hypothesis, look at the correlation coefficient at ( .127) it is relatively low even though it is statistically significant (p=.05). Therefore, at least in the aggregate, the real difference between conservative and liberal presidents success rates in foreign policy may not be as great as these results seem to suggest at first glance. Moving on to the issue areas studies, we fi rst examine ideologys impact on national security success. As Table 5-14 reveals, the resu lts are in the right di rection as far as the predictions emanating out of the multiple presiden cies thesis is concerned. But the model is too weak statistically to be taken seriously (R square =.011). However, regarding substantive interpretations it is interesting to note that the weakness of the model may actually be in-direct

PAGE 192

192 evidence of the thesis as a whole. What I mean by this is that national security success can be inferred form this model to not be subject to ideology. This is important because it suggests that this domain is not as politicized across time as some of the othe r issue areas and thus it supports the prolonged existence of a bi-partisan nonideological consensu s around presidential prerogatives in the national security issue area. In contrast to the above conc lusions, trade is indeed subjec t to such politicization as measured by ideology (R square=.513). In this case, the Conservative Coalition drops out of statistical significance as does the Liberal Oppositi on Coalition. This is important because it is suggesting that the Conservative Coalition is more high politics (securi ty drivensee Table 514) and the Liberal Coalition is more low politics (non-security drivensee Table 5-15). Taking an ideological view of the foreign affairs issu e areas, this makes sense given the philosophical predilections of the two ideologies as far as foreign policy is concerned (conservatives tend toward Realist (read Hawkish) assessments of world politics while liberals tend to a more Idealist (read Dovish) conception of the USs position in world affairs) (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005). Looking at the results regardin g foreign aid success (Table 5-16) we can see continued support for the above hypotheses. However, the correlations weak en considerably with the two opposition coalitions fal ling to statistical insignifican ce. The poor showing of the R square (.025), while in general s upport of the notion that things get political as we move away from the presidentialized high politics arena leaves any stronger inferences from this model open to question. Before finishing this section of the chapter, I must discuss a somewhat ancillary topic that is only indirectly related to the political determinants of the unit level foreign policy relationship between the American executive and national legi slative branches. The questions of influence

PAGE 193

193 regarding type of vote and value of issue area serve at th e heart of the mechanistic or instrumental process represented by executiv e-legislative relations. While a complete examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this present study, it still needs to be addressed in at least a modestly systematic fashion. As the reader may recall, presidency-centeredness would imply that the more high pol itics arena the vote and the more super-majoritarian as well as final the vote the more likely the outcome will favor the presidents previously stated position. A cursory examination of these trends (see Tables 5-17-20), indicates weak support for hypothesized conditions regarding trade and fore ign aid success but no support for expected patterns in national security or foreign policy su ccess. The overwhelmingly weak strength of any of these models as shown in their low R squares suggests that in practice type of vote and issue area value have little to do with presidential position success rates in foreign policy relations with the Congress. This is instructive because it reveals a weakness in prior roll call analysis. Populations are just better to ut ilize than samples. Much prior research has utilized various ordering rules whether they are contentious votes, close votes, significant votes, nonunanimous votes or something else in roll call anal ysis. All of these operate from a basis that the type of vote matters. However, my findings suggest otherwise; in fact, the true picture of roll call relations at least as far as fo reign affairs is concerned is left unrevealed when such ordering schemes are employed. Clearly, this is a place for further inquiry as I have thrown down a gauntlet which gets at the heart of presidential-co ngressional roll call resear ch but that will have to wait for further study and debate. For, at this point in time we must move on to the crosssectional findings relative to foreign, issue and now mixed issue area presidential success relative to the Congress.

PAGE 194

194 Empirical Findings II: Cross-S ect ional Political Determinants of Presidential Success in Foreign Policy during the War Power Order 1953-1972 By way of review regarding the last sections overall results, it is important to recall that amongst the various political determinants of foreign and issue area success only the partisan factors exerted a consistently strong longitudinal correlation. Therefore, for this next analysis I have limited my inquiry to a re-examination of t hose partisan factors as determinants of the within political time framework provided by the War Po wer Order, 1953-1972. Tables 5-2125 contain the relevant findings; regarding overa ll foreign policy success during this time (see Table 5-21) we see results that strongly comport with the basics of the multiple presidencies thesis. For starters the model is extremely robus t with 96% of the variance accounted for (see the R square). Secondly, all variables are significant and signed in the right direction with strong correlations. From these findings, we can strongly infer that partisanship when unified (the unified government variable) served as a source of presidential empowermen t in foreign affairs. We can also suggest that when the parties-in-the Congress dive rged (as indicated by the other variables) it had little detrimenta l impact on presidential success b ecause the increase in partisan roll calls is offset by the differential impact of party unity voting within the chambers themselves. Therefore, the president during the War Power Order was in a win-win situation where presidential-congressional foreign policy relations were concerned. Essentially, where partisanship was shown to be least beneficial to the presidencycentered position (in the Senate) is precisely where partisanship has long been known to matter the least amidst the two chambers (from Leloup and Shull 2003). Thus, we can suggest th at partisanship was a source of strength in presidential-House relations during this time and bi-partisanship was the main source of power for the foreign affairs presidential-Senate relationship.

PAGE 195

195 Table 5-22 details the national security su ccess relationship among executive-legislative affairs during the War Power Order. Though pa rtisanship plays a positive role in the presidencys congressional re lationship with the Senate it has an almost uniformly negative impact on War Power Order national security succe ss. Why is this so? Well, if you keep in mind the fact that this is a time in US foreign polic y history dominated by the Conservative Coalitions support for national security polic ies then it makes sense that this phenomenon would push out the forces of partisanship in this domain. As Table 5-23 portrays, this phenomenon continues in trade with the exception that now it is party unity that is offsetti ng partisan roll cal l voting but the interpretation is largely the same. As the multiple presidencies would predict, during this period of political time security is so pronounced that trade ha s been largely securitized this is shown in its distributional impact which follows what occurred in the national security issue area. Finally, foreign aid success (see Table 5-24) fo llows the established pattern with the exception that unified government returns as a positive indi cator of presidential success. Even though the power of security is overawing during this time, we must remember that foreign aid is much further removed from the high politics arena than trade. Thus, its great er intermestic congresscentered conditionality makes it more politicized and hence given to partisanship (which the unified government variable is indicating in this case). So where do we go from here? As was indicate d in the previous ch apter (4), the mixed issue areas of foreign policy do not assert themse lves well in a longitudinal fashion. However, it is conceivable that a within time formulation like the War Power Order will shed some systematic light on this until now only anecdotal s ubject. Comparing the partisan factors findings from Table 5-25s mixed issue area success with t hose of overall foreign policy success (Table 5-21) we can see that there is li ttle discernible difference between the two. This is indicative of

PAGE 196

196 the fact that at least as far as the War Power Or der is concerned, the same partisan factors that impact presidential success in foreign policy as a whole also work in favor (and disfavor) of mixed issue area success. This is telling because it means that there just may not be anything distinctive about mixed issue area s, another point for future re searchs departure but beyond our present concerns. The Multiple Presidencies during the War Power Order So how do we m ake sense out of all this? Well, the first step is to take a broader view regarding the differential rates of foreign po licy and issue area success enjoyed by the various presidencies that held office during the War Power Order. As Tables 5-26-29 indicate presidential success in foreign policy is high throughout, in bot h chambers and regardless of president or Congress. However, th ese tables also indica te that across the va rious issue areas of foreign policy there is some not so subtle variat ion in the level of succe ss. National security and the high politics arena in genera l tend to exhibit high patterns of success. The great outlier though is trade, technically a part of the low polit ics arena it routinely exhibits success rates on a par with those found in the high politics arena. A final conclusion that can be drawn from these tables is the substantive lack certain issue areas like immigra tion have in their systematic appearance. However, diplomacy and domestic security which tend to fall out as issue areas under longitudinal circumstances do exhibit a robust showi ng in this cross-sectio nal, albeit descriptive account. Foreign aid is present as expected given its role as on e of the core issue areas of foreign policy but it is not as subject to variat ion as one might expect (roughly on par with trade and diplomacy to a lesser extent). Again, this is probably due to the massive presence of security and its environmental potential to securitize/pr esidentialize all other issue areas of foreign policy. Lastly, there is a trend for greater varia tion amidst the issue area success rates as time in

PAGE 197

197 an individual presidential term goes by. But, th is phenomenon does not seem to impact national security or domestic security (though the lesser appearance of this issue area throughout leads to some questions about this particul ar descriptive inference). Of course, this is in keeping with the precepts of the multiple presidencies thesis, particularly during this extant period of political time. Summary In this chapter, I hav e discussed the War Power Orders impact on the multiple presidencies across the issue areas of forei gn policy. The dominance of the national security issue area (and to a lesser extent th e high politics arena in general) was so pervasive that most of foreign policy became a securitized/presidentialized domain. The narrative discussed the subordination and later rumblings of the Congress as it and the presidency dealt with the various issue areas of foreign affairs. Then, we looked at the unit level relationships between the presidency and the Congress over those same issu e areas by first continuing with longitudinal studies of various political factors including popular, electoral a nd partisan/ideological aimed at the success rates in the core issue areas (natio nal security, trade and foreign aid) as well as foreign policy itself. The longitudinal findings pointe d us in the direction of partisan factors as determinative of the presidenti al-congressional inte rnational relations policy dynamic. Crosssectional analyses of these politic al factors and the four dependen t variables led to a look at the various individuated success rates for the various presid encies of the War Power Order. Security can be said to be king during this time, however does it hold across time or was it an artifact of Cold War contingency? The answer to this qu estion awaits us in the next chapter.

PAGE 198

198 Table 5-1 Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Popular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004): Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 1.984 .045 .000 Public Approval of Presidential Foreign Policy -.512 .027 .000 Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings -1.107 .050 .000 Congressional Job Appr oval ratings -2.134 .080 .000 Average Annual Presidential Public Approval .363 .030 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .409 .408 .105 .064 Predictors: (Constant), Av erage Annual Presidential Public Approval, Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings, P ublic Approval of Presidentia l Foreign Policy, Congressional Job Approval Ratings Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335 Table 5-2. National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Popular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 2.191.053 .000 Public Approval of Presidential Foreign Policy -.331 .031 .000 Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings -1.468 .059 .000 Congressional Job Appr oval ratings -2.253 .094 .000 Average Annual Presidential Public Approval .345 .035 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .338 .336 .1226539 .046 Predictors: (Constant), Av erage Annual Presidential Public Approval, Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings, Public Approval of Presidentia l Foreign Policy, Congressional Job Approval ratings Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy N=3335

PAGE 199

199 Table 5-3. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Popular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .977.073.000 Public Approval of Presidential Foreign Policy -.411 .043.000 Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings .369 .081.000 Congressional Job Appr oval ratings -.270 .129.036 Average Annual Presidential Public Approval -.492 .048.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .274 .272 .168 .049 Predictors: (Constant), Av erage Annual Presidential Public Approval, Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings, Public Approval of Presidentia l Foreign Policy, Congressional Job Approval ratings Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Policy N=3335 Table 5-4. Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Popular Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 1.938.080.000 Public Approval of Presidential Foreign Policy -.186 .046.000 Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings -1.159 .092.000 Congressional Job Appr oval ratings -1.531 .140.000 Average Annual Presidential Public Approval -.226 .050.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .195 .193 .175 .038 Predictors: (Constant), Average Annual Presidential Public Approval, Congressional Job Disapproval Ratings, P ublic Approval of Presidential Foreign Policy, Congressional Job Approval ratings Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy N=3335

PAGE 200

200 Table 5-5. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of El ectoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -.147.032.000 % of Voting Age Population part icipation in House elections during presidential election years -.198.202.329 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent House Mid-term Election -.846.078.000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent Presidential Election 2.523.216.000 Presidential Electoral Vote Victory in Most recent election -.319.018.000 Presidential Popular Vote Victor y in Most recent election .285.052.000 Mid-Term Election Year .006.004.175 Presidential Election Year -.036.005.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson .444 .442 .099 .023 Predictors: (Constant), presidential election ye ar, % voting age population participation in most Recent presidential election, presidential electoral vote victory in most recent Election, mid-term elect ion year, presidential popular vote victory in most recent Election, % voting age population participation in most recent House mid-term Election, % of vo ting age population participatio n in House elections during Presidential election years Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335

PAGE 201

201 Table 5-6. National Security Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Electoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -.348 .046.000 % of Voting Age Population part icipation in House elections during presidential election years -3.621 .285.000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent House Mid-term Election -1.748 .111.000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent Presidential Election 6.057 .302.000 Presidential Electoral Vote Victory in Most recent election -.349 .025.000 Presidential Popular Vote Victor y in Most recent election 1.010 .071.000 Mid-Term Election Year .012 .006.034 Presidential Election Year -.089 .007.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .250 .249 .135 .035 Predictors: (Constant), presidential election ye ar, % voting age population participation in most Recent presidential el ection, presidential electoral vote victory in most recent Election, mid-term electi on year, presidential popular vo te victory in most recent Election, % voting ag e population participation in most recent House mid-term Election, % voting ag e population participation in House elections during Presidential election years Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy N=3335

PAGE 202

202 Table 5-7. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Electoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) -.190 .044 .000 % of Voting Age Population part icipation in House elections during presidential election years 7.500 .277 .000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent House Mid-term Election -1.499 .107 .000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent Presidential Election -3.684 .295 .000 Presidential Electoral Vote Victory in Most recent election -.265 .024 .000 Presidential Popular Vote Victory in Most recent election -.213 .071 .003 Mid-Term Election Year .052 .006 .000 Presidential Election Year .014 .006 .028 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .583 .582 .135 .042 Predictors: (Constant), Pres idential Election Year % voting age population participation in most recent Presidential election, presidential electoral vote victory in most recent election, mid-Term election year, presidential popular vote victory in most recent election, % Voting age population participation in most recent House mid-term election, % of Voting age population participation in House elections during presidential election years Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Policy N=3335

PAGE 203

203 Table 5-8. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Electoral Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) -.055 .063 .379 % of Voting Age Population part icipation in House elections during presidential election years .296 .378 .434 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent House Mid-term Election .609 .143 .000 % Voting Age Population participation in most recent Presidential Election .696 .410 .090 Presidential Electoral Vote Victory in Most recent election -.180 .032 .000 Presidential Popular Vote Victor y in Most recent election .282 .095 .003 Mid-Term Election Year -.059 .008 .000 Presidential Election Year .018 .008 .025 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .174 .172 .171 .034 Predictors: (Constant), presiden tial election year, % voting age population participation in most Recent presidential el ection, presidential electoral vote victory in most recent Election, mid-term electi on year, presidential popular vo te victory in most recent Election, % voting age population participation in most recent House mid-term Election, % of voti ng age population participation in House elections during Presidential election years Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy N=3335

PAGE 204

204 Table 5-9. Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) 1.066 .026 .000 Unified Government .147 .004 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) .240 .038 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) 1.549 .071 .000 House Party Unity (R) -.362 .049 .000 House Party Unity (D) -1.474 .078 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.614 .031 .000 House Partisan Roll Calls -.170 .024 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives-.650 .048 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate .518 .060 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .676 .675 .077 .031 Predictors: (Constant), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), Unified Government, Senate Party Unity (R), Presidential Party Seat % in House of Re presentatives, Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335

PAGE 205

205 Table 5-10. National Security Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 1.253.030 .000 Unified Government .219 .005 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.842 .044 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) 2.458 .080 .000 House Party Unity (R) -.593 .055 .000 House Party Unity (D) -1.129 .087 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls .050 .036 .162 House Partisan Roll Calls -.493 .027 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives-2.099 .056 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 1.270 .072 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .668 .667 .086 .033 Predictors: (Constant), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), Unified Government, Senate Pa rty Unity (R), Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives, Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy N=3335

PAGE 206

206 Table 5-11. Trade Policy Success Regression Analys is of Partisan Determ inants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) -.040 .050 .426 Unified Government -.015 .008 .060 Senate Party Unity (R) .737 .074 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) -.068 .136 .616 House Party Unity (R) .471 .094 .000 House Party Unity (D) -.626 .149 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.412 .060 .000 House Partisan Roll Calls -.424 .045 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives .698 .092 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate .809 .116 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .495 .493 .147 .035 Predictors: (Constant), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Call s, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), Unified Government, Senate Party Unity (R), Presidentia l Party Seat % in House of Representatives, Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Annual Presiden tial Success Score in Trade Policy N=3335

PAGE 207

207 Table 5-12. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) 2.093 .058 .000 Unified Government .161 .009 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.130 .082 .113 Senate Party Unity (D) -.822 .160 .000 House Party Unity (R) .748 .109 .000 House Party Unity (D) -.701 .173 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.870 .068 .000 House Partisan Roll Calls .804 .052 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives .651 .103 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -2.379 .130 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .298 .296 .161 .035 Predictors: (Constant), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), Senate Party Unity (R), Unif ied Government, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives, Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy N=3335 Table 5-13. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients B Std. Error Sig. (Constant) .674 .004 .000 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .127 .006 .000 Conservative Coalition For .009 .003 .006 Conservative Coalition Against .007 .005 .171 Liberal Coalition For .040 .007 .000 Liberal Coalition Against -.015 .016 .336 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .191 .189 .108 .048 Predictors: (Constant), Liberal Coalition Against, Liberal Coalition For, Conservative Coalition Against, Conserva tive Coalition For, ADA Pres idential Interest Group Rating Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335

PAGE 208

208 Table 5-14. Presidential Nationa l Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants across Political time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .748 .005 .000 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .027.008 .000 Conservative Coalition For .005.004 .183 Conservative Coalition Against .010.007 .137 Liberal Coalition For .023.009 .017 Liberal Coalition Against -.035.020 .083 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .011 .009 .135 .028 Predictors: (Constant), Liberal Coalition Against, Liberal Coalition For, Conservative Coalition Against, Conserva tive Coalition For, ADA Pres idential Interest Group Rating Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Policy N=3335 Table 5-15. Trade Policy Success Regression An alysis of Ideological Determinants across Political Time (1963-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .530 .005 .000 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .342.007 .000 Conservative Coalition For .007.004 .092 Conservative Coalition Against .005.007 .440 Liberal Coalition For .046.008 .000 Liberal Coalition Against -.024.020 .224 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .513 .512 .135 .059 Predictors: (Constant), Liberal Coalition Against, Liberal Coalition For, Conservative Coalition Against, Conserva tive Coalition For, ADA Pres idential Interest Group Rating Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Policy N=3335

PAGE 209

209 Table 5-16. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Id eological Determinants across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .671 .006 .000 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .069.010 .000 Conservative Coalition For .013.005 .016 Conservative Coalition Against .000.009 .987 Liberal Coalition For .037.011 .001 Liberal Coalition Against -.035.028 .203 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .025 .023 .187 .040 Predictors: (Constant), Liberal Coalition Against, Liberal Coalition For, Conservative Coalition Against, Conser vative Coalition For, ADA Pres idential Interest Group Rating Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy N=3335 Table 5-17. Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and Type of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .751 .005 .000 Value for Type of Vote -.002 .002 .476 Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value -.007 .001 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .007 .006 .131 .024 Predictors: (Constant), Issu e Area of Foreign Policy Value, Value for Type of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Foreign Policy N=3335

PAGE 210

210 Table 5-18. National Security Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy and Type of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .760 .006 .000 Value for Type of Vote -.008 .003 .002 Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value -.001 .002 .388 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .003 .002 .155 .034 Predictors: (Constant), Issu e Area of Foreign Policy Value, Value for Type of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Nati onal Security Policy N=3335 Table 5-19. Trade Policy Success Regression Anal ysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and Type of Foreign Policy Vote Across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .751 .008 .000 Value for Type of Vote .012 .003 .000 Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value -.015 .002 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .019 .019 .206 .043 Predictors: (Constant), Issu e Area of Foreign Policy Value, Value for Type of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presid ential Success Score in Trade Policy N=3335

PAGE 211

211 Table 5-20. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value and Type of Foreign Policy Vote across Political Time (1953-2004) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .739 .007 .000 Value for Type of Vote .008 .003 .007 Issue Area of Foreign Policy Value -.008 .002 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .007 .006 .187 .037 Predictors: (Constant), Issu e Area of Foreign Policy Value, Value for Type of Vote Dependent Variable: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Policy N=3335 Table 5-21. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Par tisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 3.642.075.000 House Partisan Roll Calls 1.020 .036.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls .696 .037.000 House Party Unity (D) 2.767 .058.000 House Party Unity (R) -.891 .054.000 Senate Party Unity (D) -1.842 .101.000 Senate Party Unity (R) .421 .053.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -9.688 .295.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives 1.467 .044.000 Unified Government .791 .024.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .960 .959 .013 .030 Predictors: (Constant), Unifie d Government, Senate Party Unity (D), Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (R), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Se at % in House of Representatives, House Party Unity (D), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate Dependent Variable: War Power Or der Annual Foreign Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 212

212 Table 5-22. National Security Policy Success Regres sion Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .354.329.283 House Partisan Roll Calls -.650 .160.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -1.695 .176.000 House Party Unity (D) -4.908 .308.000 House Party Unity (R) -2.457 .235.000 Senate Party Unity (D) 6.102 .455.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -1.463 .249.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 10.424 1.270.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -3.629 .210.000 Unified Government -.502 .103.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .796 .793 .056 .094 Predictors: (Constant), Unif ied Government, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (D), Senate Party Un ity (R), House Party Unity (R), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Se at % in House of Representatives, House Party Unity (D), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate Dependent Variable: War Power Order A nnual National Security Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 213

213 Table 5-23. Trade Policy Success Regression Anal ysis of Partisan De terminants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -2.016.180.000 House Partisan Roll Calls -2.475 .085.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -1.068 .089.000 House Party Unity (D) 3.978 .138.000 House Party Unity (R) -7.292 .129.000 Senate Party Unity (D) 2.937 .240.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -1.449 .127.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 13.676 .704.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -1.305 .105.000 Unified Government -1.096 .057.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .944 .943 .031 .148 Predictors: (Constant), Unifie d Government, Senate Party Unity (D), Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (R), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives, House Party Unity (D), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate Dependent Variable: War Power Or der Annual Trade Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 214

214 Table 5-24. Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 7.628.135.000 House Partisan Roll Calls 4.019 .064.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls 2.307 .067.000 House Party Unity (D) 5.291 .103.000 House Party Unity (R) -.317 .097.001 Senate Party Unity (D) -5.404 .180.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.483 .096.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -22.711 .528.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives 3.688 .079.000 Unified Government 1.707 .043.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .975 .975 .023 .033 Predictors: (Constant), Unified Government, Senate Party Unity (D), Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (R), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives, House Party Unity (D), Presidential Party Seat % in Senate Dependent Variable: War Power Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 215

215 Table 5-25. Mixed Issue Area Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Partisan Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 1.948.000 .000 House Partisan Roll Calls .301 .000 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls 1.254 .000 .000 House Party Unity (D) 3.261 .000 .000 House Party Unity (R) 1.868 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) -3.536 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) 1.741 .000 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -10.270 .000 .000 Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives2.100 .000 .000 Unified Government .680 .000 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .026 Predictors: (Constant), Unifie d Government, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (D), Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (R), Hous e Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (D), Presiden tial Party Seat % in House of Representatives, Presidential Party Seat % in Senate Dependent Variable: War Power Order Annual Mixed Issue Area Success Score N=96

PAGE 216

216 Table 5-26. Annual Presidential Success Scores in Foreign Policy & Issue Areas*+ 1953-1961 Eisenhower Presidency across 83rd86th Congresses Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration N 1953 C=80% (20:5) H=100% (10:0) S=66% (10:5) C=100% (5:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (2:0) C=20% (1:4) H=n/a (0:0) S=20% (1:4) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=83% (5:1) H=100% (1:0) S=80% (4:1) C=100% (5:0) H=100% (5:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (1:0) N=25 N=10 N=15 1954 C=67% (24:12) H=85% (11:2) S=57% (13:10) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=41% (5:7) H=67% (4:2) S=17% (1:5) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=92% (12:1) H=100% (4:0) S=89% (8:1) C=80% (4:1) H=100% (3:0) S=50% (1:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=36 N=13 N=23 1955 C=86% (57:9) H=86% (20:3) S=86% (36:6) C=85% (22:4) H=90% (9:1) S=81% (13:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=80% (4:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=80% (4:1) C=91% (21:2) H=89% (8:1) S=93% (13:1) C=83% (10:2) H=75% (3:1) S=88% (7:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=66 N=23 N=43 1956 C=79% (33:9) H=75% (9:3) S=80% (24:6) C=38% (3:5) H=40% (2:3) S=33% (1:2) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (8:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (4:0) C=85% (17:3) H=100% (3:0) S=82% (14:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a% (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=42 N=12 N=30 1957 C=91% (43:4) H=80% (12:3) S=97% (31:1) C=86% (12:2) H=67% (4:2) S=100% (8:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=75% (3:1) H=100% (1:0) S=67% (2:1) C=100% (10:0) H=100% (2:0) S=100% (8:0) C=94% (15:1) H=80% (4:1) S=100% (11:0) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (1:0) N=47 N=15 N=32

PAGE 217

217 Table 5-26. Continued Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration N 1958 C=79% (45:12) H=78% (21:6) S=75% (9:3) C=73% (11:4) H=70% (7:3) S=80% (4:1) C=70% (7:3) H=100% (4:0) S=50% (3:3) C=50% (1:1) H=50% (1:1) S=n/a (0:0) C=94% (15:1) H=83% (5:1) S=100% (10:0) C=86% (12:2) H=80% (4:1) S=89% (8:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=57 N=27 N=30 1959 C=75% (45:15) H=75% (12:4) S=70% (31:13) C=100% (6:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (5:0) C=70% (7:3) H=40% (2:3) S=100% (5:0) C=75% (3:1) H=100% (1:0) S=67% (2:1) C=63% (5:3) H=n/a (0:0) S=63% (5:3) C=86% (19:3) H=100% (7:0) S=80% (12:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=60 N=16 N=44 1960 C=83% (34:7) H=85% (11:2) S=82% (23:5) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=50% (1:1) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (3:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (3:0) C=88% (14:2) H=100% (4:0) S=83% (10:2) C=80% (16:4) H=86% (6:1) S=77% (10:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=41 N=13 N=28 *Annual foreign policy percentage success of presid ential position roll call votes as recorded by CQ Almanacs 1953-1960 (Issue area success scores compiled by author from content analysis of vote summaries in the relevant almanacs). +ratios of counts wins to losses in parentheses -Some years votes contain mixed categoriesthose votes are indi viduated on another set of tables but are included in the aggre gate annual foreign policy success scores of this table.

PAGE 218

218 Table 5-27. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy For Kennedy Admi nistration (1961-1963), 87th88th Congresses* year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid ImmigrationTotals 1961 C=89% (58:7) H=96% (23:1) S=85% (35:6) C=89% (8:1) H=100% (4:0) S=80% (4:1) C=50% (1:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=50% (1:1) C=89% (8:1) H=100% (3:0) S=83% (5:1) C=94% (15:1) H=100% (7:0) S=89% (8:1) C=89% (24:3) H=90% (9:1) S=88% (15:2) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=65 N=24 N=41 1962 C=92% (59:5) H=95% (20:1) S=91% (39:4) C=73% (8:3) H=80% (4:1) S=67% (4:2) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (2:0) S=100% (2:0) C=96% (27:1) H=100% (6:0) S=95% (21:1) C=90% (18:2) H=88% (7:1) S=92% (11:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=64 N=21 N=43 1963a1 C=86% (59:10) H=70% (14:6) S=92% (45:4) C=95% (18:1) H=83% (5:1) S=100% (13:0) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (3:0) C=75% (9:3) H=75% (3:1) S=75% (6:2) C=81% (25:6) H=56% (5:4) S=91% (20:2) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=69 N=20 N=49 *All position votes, including mixed categories are contained in the annual aggregate fo reign policy success scores but mixed c ategory votes are excluded from the indi viduated issue area scores and are included on another table. 1 1963a contains all position votes on foreign policy that Kennedy took including the ones that Johnson also took to ensure cont inuity with Kennedy administration policy after LBJs assumption to office.

PAGE 219

219 Table 5-28. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Johnson Administration (1963-1969) 88th-90th Congresses* year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1963b2 C=86% (18:3) H=67% (6:3) S=100% (12:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (2:0) S=100% (2:0) C=80% (12:3) H=57% (4:3) S=100% (8:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=21 N=9 N=12 1964 C=83% (45:9) H=79% (15:4) S=86% (30:5) C=86% (6:1) H=100% (2:0) S=80% (4:1) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=0% (0:1) S=100% (1:0) C=86% (18:3) H=80% (4:1) S=88% (14:2) C=84% (16:3) H=83% (5:1) S=85% (11:2) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=54 N=19 N=35 1965 C=89% (74:9) H=96% (24:6) S=86% (50:8) C=60% (6:4) H=75% (3:1) S=50% (3:3) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=86% (6:1) H=100% (3:0) S=75% (3:1) C=94% (17:1) H=100% (4:0) S=93% (13:1) C=92% (33:3) H=100% (9:0) S=89% (24:3) C=100% (5:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (1:0) N=83 N=25 N=58 1966 C=73% (47:17) H=80% (24:6) S=68% (23:11) C=69% (9:4) H=80% (4:1) S=63% (5:3) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=91% (10:1) H=86% (6:1) S=100% (4:0) C=61% (14:9) H=88% (7:1) S=43% (6:8) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=64 N=30 N=34 2 1963b these votes are recorded as having been taken by Kennedy and JohnsonJohnson took these positions to ensure continuity i n administration policy in the wake of President Kennedys assassination.

PAGE 220

220 Table 5-28. Continued year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1967 C=80% (75:19) H=76% (22:7) S=82% (53:12) C=89% (24:3) H=82% (9:2) S=94% (15:1) C=80% (4:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=80% (4:1) C=100% (9:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (9:0) C=73% (8:3) H=25% (1:3) S=100% (7:0) C=60% (12:8) H=70% (7:3) S=50% (5:5) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=94 N=29 N=65 1968 C=82% (75:17) H=81% (22:5) S=82% (53:12) C=96% (27:1) H=100% (5:0) S=96% (22:1) C=44% (4:5) H=33% (1:2) S=50% (3:3) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=90% (19:2) H=67% (2:1) S=94% (17:1) C=64% (7:4) H=83% (5:1) S=40% (2:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=92 N=27 N=65 *Some votes are in mixed categories which are in a separate ta ble but are included in the aggregate foreign policy success scor es but not in the individuated i ssue area success scores.

PAGE 221

221 Table 5-29. Annual Presidential Succe ss Scores across Issue Areas of Forei gn Policy. Nixon Admini stration (1969-1974) 91st-93rd Congresses* Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1969 C=93 (40:3) H=89% (8:1) S=94% (32:2) C=91% (20:2) H=100% (3:0) S=89% (17:2) C=100% (3:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (3:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (3:0) C=100% (5:5) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (4:0) C=88% (7:1) H=75% (3:1) S=100% (4:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=43 N=9 N=34 1970 C=93% (27:2) H=90% (9:1) S=95% (18:1) C=75% (6:2) H=0% (0:1) S=86% (6:1) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (8:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (5:0) C=100% (7:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (4:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (1:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=29 N=10 N=19 1971 C=84% (57:11) H=95% (19:1) S=79% (38:10) C=87% (45:7) H=100% (18:0) S=79% (27:7) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=60% (3:2) H=0% (0:1) S=75% (3:1) C=89% (8:1) H=100% (1:0) S=88% (7:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=68 N=20 N=48 1972 C=70% (26:11) H=92% (12:1) S=58% (14:10) C=65% (15:8) H=100% (7:0) S=50% (8:8) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=0% (0:1) S=100% (1:0) C=66% (2:1) H=100% (1:0) S=50% (1:1) C=50% (1:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=50% (1:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=37 N=13 N=24

PAGE 222

222 Table 5-29. Continued 1973 C=60% (74:49) H=46% (19:22) S=67% (55:27) C=47% (23:26) H=26% (5:14) S=60% (18:12) C=50% (1:1) H=100% (1:0) S=0% (0:1) C=100% (7:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (6:0) C=51% (18:17) H=50% (6:6) S=52% (12:11) C=75% (9:3) H=86% (6:1) S=60% (3:2) C=0% (0:1) H=0% (0:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=123 N=41 N=82 1974a3 C=59% (29:20) H=50% (9:9) S=65% (20:11) C=71% (12:5) H=100% (3:0) S=64% (9:5) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (1:0) C=48% (10:11) H=38% (3:5) S=54% (7:6) C=67% (4:2) H=50% (2:2) S=100% (2:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=49 N=18 N=31 *Some votes are in mixed categories, which are in a separate table but are included within the ag gregate annual foreign policy success scores but not individuated in the issue area scores. 3 1974a refers to Nixons position votes during the year of his resignation from office the rest of the position votes for that year are recorded under the new president Gerald R. Ford and hence, not included in this table.

PAGE 223

223 CHAPTER 6 CONFRONTATION POLITICS: THE RISE OF THE DOMESTICATING FOREIGN POLICY CONGRES S DURING DTENTE AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 1973-1989 Introduction Now, we enter the second act of our movi e regarding presidentia l-congressional foreign policy relations by looking at the extant inter-institutional rela tionship during the years 1973 and 1989. This period of political tim e is being referre d to as the Confrontat ion Politics Order and its dominant characteristic is the increased role of the Congress as a factor in dictating the issue area success rates of the presidencies beginning with Nixons second term and ending with the start of the first Bush administration. The fact that this period of US foreign policy executivelegislative history is not well demarcated by its component presidential administrations is instructive in itself. The simple fact of the matter is that during this time, presidents did not govern foreign policy themselves but rather in tandem with (a nd often against) the Congress (from Sundquist 1981). Why, this is so will be revealed in the na rratives descriptive account in combination with the cross-sectional regression analyses th at follow this introduction. Speaking of the narrative, it will emphasi ze the changed role of the Congress in its interactions with the executive across the issue areas of foreign policy. For starters, the role played by internal reforms in combination with legislative critique of executive foreign policy dominance will be looked at. Then, we will examine certain specific issue areas including domestic security, diplomacy, trade and fore ign aid policy that exemplified congressional attempts to de-securitize or in ot her words domesticate foreign policy. The systematic study will be leveled at presiden tial success in core issue areas and foreign policy itself as a function of partisan and to lesse r extent ideological factors. These should be seen in comparative terms with the cross-sectional as well as l ongitudinal findings from the last

PAGE 224

224 chapters empirical studies. Th e picture will come in to full light by another tabular based analysis of the differentiated su ccess rates across the component issue areas of foreign policy and then we will conclude with a small su mmary of the chapters basic points. The Confrontation Politics Order, 1973-1990: Executive-Legislative Conflict across the Issue Areas of Foreign Policy The m ost dramatic change in the executivelegislative foreign policy relationship occurred in the environmental changes rega rding the development of dtente, the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the emergence of a fully integrated world economy (Rosati 2005). However, I dealt with these in the third chapter so instead we will concentrate on the unit level alterations. There are two of significance which need to be mappe d out. First, change in extant executivelegislative relations was a phenomenon internal to Congress that stemmed from organizational reforms in the committee and leadership st ructure (Rohde 1991). Second was an exogenous development whereby the Congress began to rou tinely re-assert and in many cases assert its institutional, partisan and to some extent ideo logical prerogatives in fo reign policy construction relative to the presidency (Sundquist 1981). This last point was of course exacerbated by the persistence of divided and split control government throughout the Confrontation Politics Order, in fact only Jimmy Carter had uni fied government and analyses have indicated that even he did not enjoy as many of the fruits of such a cond ition as the presidencies of the War Power Order had under similar circumstances (see LeLoup and Shull 2003, Shull and Shaw 1999 & Shull 1997). Regarding the reforms themselves, collectively they amounted to a re-distribution of internal power in the Congress, especially in the House of Representatives by moving it away from the congressional committees (especially their chairs) and placing it within the subcommittees and the parties-in-Congress (Rohde 1991, Dodd 1986, Smith 2000 & Cox and

PAGE 225

225 McCubbins 1993). These early seven ties era reforms, while not specifically done to influence foreign policy construction had a direct influence nonetheless. As Lindsay (1994) has shown, at least trade policy was given over to what I w ould call a congressional ization/domestication phenomenon as the Trade Act of 1934 while not re scinded was after the early 1970s subject to intense congressional involvement. This is es pecially true among members of Congress with high levels of international trade in their respective states and districts (Lindsay 1994). Specifically relative to the increased role of the parties, especi ally in the House these instruments provided a mechanism whereby proactive speakers such as Tip ONeil, Jim Wright and to a lesser extent Tom Foley could serve as their pa rties alternative spokesmen for a number of issues in foreign policy by the 1980s. Such activ ities occurred in the ar ea of sanctions policy regarding South Africa, MX missile development, the star wars defense initiative and perhaps most pervasively the Boland (D MA) Amendments to defense and foreign aid authorization and appropriations bills (CQ Almanacs 1985-89, various legislative histories). Any one of these would be an instructive case study for deeper evaluation, however th at would take us away from the more general purposes of this research project so further study will have to wait. As to the more directed issue of congression al resurgence in forei gn affairs during this period of political time (1973-1989). The unit leve l interactions between the executive and the legislature were intense, conflictu al and more politicized as part isanship intensified and ideology began to manifest itself more profoundly. The most pervasive example of this conflict occurred in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle as the War Powers Act of 1973 was passed over President Nixons veto with a near-unanimous support rate in excess of 80% (CQ Almanac 1973, War Powers Resolution study). The Church (D-AR) Committee investigations into the CIAs domestic and foreign intelligence operations are emblematic of a domestication of

PAGE 226

226 domestic and even national security (CQ Al manac 1975, committee reports). Despite Fishers (2000) dismissal of the Church Committee activities bans such as President Fords executive order proscribing assassination as a tool of foreign policy can be seen from the perspective of a congress-centered issue promoti on with presidential acquiescence. This reverses the dominant trend of the War Power Order where it was the president proposing and the Congress disposing (though often supporting) foreign affa irs legislative initiatives. In the realms of diplomacy and foreign aid, the Congress shut off military aid to Southeast Asia during the North Vietnamese mechanized offensive in the spring of 1975 (CQ Almanac 1975, Vietnam War study). They also prevented th e Ford administration from providing military aid overt or covert to anti-com munist forces (both state and non-state in form) in Uganda, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Sundquist 1981, Lowi 1985 and CQ Almanac 1976, foreign aid reports). Finally, the Cart er administration faced back-to-back battles with the Conservative Coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans over the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978 and their empowering acts in 1979 (CQ Almanacs 1978-79, Panama Canal Treaties studies). The conservative opposition to Cart er was so pervasive, that it caused a record number of mostly procedural roll calls during these two ye ars (Shull and Shaw 1999). While Carter won these, what he lost was more important as he himself admits the Republicans were able to so effectively chip aw ay at the Democratic Partys st rength in the 1978 elections as a result of the divisive Panama Canal debates. Th is action set the stage for an eventual Republican take over of the Senate two year s later (Carter 1982). From this survey it should be easy to see that the politics of foreign policy were no long er what the president made of them but were now subject to a push and pull as the two proactive national institutions of American government

PAGE 227

227 jockeyed for positional power. However, this survey needs to be emboldened by more systematically based analysis and to that we now turn. Empirical Findings Given the notions about the Conservative Coalitions role as a device of both congressionalization (read dom esti cation) of issue areas during the Confrontation Politics Order and for that matter its perceived impact on limiting partisanship, it is instru ctive to look back at the impact of ideological factors during the previous War Power Order. Looking at tables 6-1 6-4, we can see that ideology of the Congress or for that matter the pr esidency had little systematic impact on presidential success in forei gn policy or any of the core issue areas during the War Power Order. This is not surprising fo r two reasons; first the overwhelming Cold War consensus around foreign policy writ large which included deference to pr esidential leadership would mean that ideological conflict was reduced during the 1953-1972 timeframe. Second, bipartisanship not cross-partisanship would be the norm of the day under such non-ideological conditions. In other words, presidency-centere d conditions (bi-partisanship and consensus ideology) would predictably trump Congress-ce ntered (cross-partisan ship/partisanship and internally divided ideology within each party) throughout the War Power Order. From a comparative perspective we should see some alterations in the role of ideology as a determinant of presidential succ ess with the Congress in forei gn policy and its component issue areas. And as detailed in Table 6-5, this is true. Ideology is a relatively str ong predictor of presidential success in foreign policy writ large as a coalitional support phenomenon but not as a coalitional opposition factor. What is important about this as far as the multiple presidencies is concerned is that presidencycentered conditions are still dominant; however they are beginning to take on a politicized aspect. This is particularly shown in the models strong R square (.393),

PAGE 228

228 but it is offset by the relative w eakness of the correlations overall (see Table 6-5). Nonetheless, it does at least call for furthe r inquiry and that it what the next three tables do. In national security success (Table 6-6), th e same elements which factor into general foreign policy success repeat themselves, except th at the Liberal Coalition becomes lost as a support (or opposition) mechanism. This is probably due to the increases in partisanship that begin to take effect, even in foreign policy vo ting in the Congress by th e late 1970s and that impact was first felt in the decline of the liberal coalition (CQ Almanac 1978, coalition voting study). Finally, the strength of the model overall as an explainer of the ou tcome variable is in itself problematic due to the severe decline in the variance control elem ent (R square=.119). In fact, this is the kind of variance control levels associated with the War Power Order tables where ideology was shown to largely be negligible as a factor in dict ating presidential roll call success with the Congress (see Tables 6-1-4). Looking specifically at trade and foreign aid success during the Confrontation Politics Order (Tables 67-8), we see a familiar pattern of variables not being significant and having low correlation co efficients when they do. Additionally, despite model strength for trade outcomes, the model for foreign aid is not very robust at all (compare the R squares in Tables 6-7 and 6-8). Therefor e, despite alternative hypothesized conditions, ideology is still not a strong determinant in presid ential success; at leas t as far as the more nuanced view of the issue areas perspective is concerned. Presidents still get their way in foreign policy, however we can say that the Cold War Consensus is in jeopardy because when viewed holistically, foreign po licy is increasingly becoming politicized. However, the ideological politicization of foreign policy tended to help not hurt presidential position success as a basis for coalitional support during this extant period of po litical time. The real question

PAGE 229

229 emanating out of these sets of empirical findings is what changed? The answer could lie in the parties-in-Congress themselves and that is where we now turn. When examining partisanship, the first overwhe lming factor is the ge neral strength of all the models (Tables 6-9-12), us ing variance control as a measure of model strength (the R squares) one can see that all of the models accoun t for in excess of 2/3 of the variance factor. For social scientific statistical models this is impr essive indeed. Furthermore, there seems to be a pattern that exhibits itself in the followi ng manner: Republican party unity is positively associated with presidential foreign policy success and corresponding Democratic unity (in the House) has a negative association. In addition to a partisan di vide, there is also a chamber differentiation wherein the presidents party stre ngth matters more in the House than in the Senate. This is probably due to the Senates increased role in foreign policy generally as well as the peculiarities of the Senate wher e party does not matter as much due to a lack of limitations on procedural measures like floor debate and amendment recommendation (from Sinclair 2000). But it is instructive in suggesting that things ar e heating up from a part isan perspective because conflict is increasingly b ecoming a function of the party divide itself. It is this last reason why the unified government variable has such a weak outcome (r=.08) relative to presidency-centered predictions. Basically, the unified government of the Carter pr esidency and the split control government of the Reagan years worked to embolden presidential partisan/coalitional support in the Senate and opposition in the House. Finally, the election year measures support predictions regarding a positive relation between presidential elections and foreign policy success but defy such expectations from a congress-centered perspective relative to mi d-term elections. These election years are also positively associated with foreign policy success, however as with presidential elections the co rrelations are on the whole weak (r=.078 and .035 respectively).

PAGE 230

230 Furthermore, the increase in the number of part isan roll calls in bot h chambers is standing juxtaposed to the previous statements as a negative relationship develops in presidentialsenatorial foreign affairs relations and a corresponding positive (though weaker) relationship develops between the executive and the House (see Table 6-9). So, what are the nuances of this periods executive-legislative issue area dynamic? In national security (see Table 6-10), the presidents succe ss rate seems immune to the presence of mid-term elections as deviating out comes appear (thus, being positively rather than negatively associated with annual national s ecurity success). Additionally, the pronounced patterns regarding party and chamber that were so important in foreign policy success do not seem to reappear in any systematized fashion. In fact, party strength seems to matter more in the House than it does in the Senate, which is somewh at counterintuitive. However, it could be that the increased role of the procurement and basi ng policy among the roll call votes is driving a domestication process all its ow n in the House at this time. The model predicts extremely well for trade (s ee Table 6-11), with the previously observed patterns in foreign policy writ large re-manifesting themselves. The R square of .872 is so high that the model could be subject to the critique of being over sp ecified. For foreign aid success during the Confrontation Politics Order, the model follows expected patterns as seen in trade and foreign policy. The one exception is that the previously obser ved chamber differences do not seem to manifest themselves as systematically. The models strength does decline relative to trade but it is still very robust (see Table 6-12 s R square). Now, I will supplement these findings with some tabular analysis of the success rates themselves during this cut of political time. The Multiple Presidencies of the Confrontation Politics Order, 1973-1989 As indicated in Tables 6-1316, beginning in 1973 there is an overall decline in the rate of presidential success in foreign policy. Further re view of these tables indicates that the decline

PAGE 231

231 is not felt equally amongst the issue areas of fo reign policy. Descriptive an alysis indicates that the majority of the decline in foreign policy success occurs in the lo w politics arena (trade, foreign aid and immigration). This is especially true for foreign aid and immigration, the two issue areas that are in routine pr actice the most removed from th e security-driven issue areas of the high politics arena (national security, domestic security and diplomacy). However, closer inspection does show that in diplomacy, especially during the non-unified government presidencies (the others minus Carter) is subject to a lower level of success when seen in comparison to the administrations of th e War Power Order (see Tables 5-25-28). Finally, domestic security proves problematic at least for Ford and late Nixon. Also, and quite telling for future developments is that Cart ers success rate in trade (particularly in the second half of his term) is not particularly robust given a unifi ed presidency-centered condition with the Congress. This is important because it is telling us that as the intermestic character of the low politics arena increases as corresponding deference to pres idential prerogatives (even of the same party) declines. Summary This chapter has dealt with a period of political time that can best be summarized as a time of transition in the presidential-congressional fo reign policy relationship. From the perspective offered by an issue areas analysis with the multiple presidencies thesis as its guiding frame, we can see that the component core issue areas of fo reign policy (national security, trade and foreign aid) were subject to a process of politicization. This process was in turn defined by the increased role of partisanship (though not n ecessarily) ideology as a decisive fa ctor in dictating presidential success rates on roll call position votes in foreig n affairs during the extant timeframe of inquiryThe Confrontation Politics Order, 1973 -1989. Both the narrative and the systematic studies found these factors and in turn saw them corroborated in the succe ss rates themselves as

PAGE 232

232 derived from tabular analysis. We now turn our attention to how the politicization process relative to executive-legislative foreign policy rela tions came to fruition in the next act of our drama calledThe Imperial Presidency Politicized!

PAGE 233

233 Table 6-1. Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .845 .006 .000 Conservative Coalition For -.005 .004 .262 Conservative Coalition Against -.007 .004 .133 Liberal Coalition For .014 .004 .001 Liberal Coalition Against .011 .020 .593 ADA Presidential Interest Group Rating -.013 .007 .083 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .025 .018 .059 .069 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition For Dependent Variable: War Power Or der Annual Foreign Policy Success Score N=1157 Table 6-2. National Security Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .841 .014 .000 Conservative Coalition For -.007 .009 .432 Conservative Coalition Against -.006 .010 .546 Liberal Coalition For -.004 .011 .701 Liberal Coalition Against -.026 .041 .535 ADA Presidential Interest Group Rating -.024 .016 .147 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .005 -.003 .123 .027 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition For Dependent Variable: War Power Order A nnual National Security Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 234

234 Table 6-3. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .743 .012 .000 Conservative Coalition For -.027 .007 .000 Conservative Coalition Against -.003 .008 .723 Liberal Coalition For .030 .008 .000 Liberal Coalition Against -.026 .037 .482 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .157 .014 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .244 .239 .109 .098 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition For Dependent Variable: War Power Or der Annual Trade Policy Success Score N=1157 Table 6-4. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants War Power Order (1953-1972) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .837 .015 .000 Conservative Coalition For -.005 .009 .567 Conservative Coalition Against -.015 .010 .151 Liberal Coalition For .028 .010 .006 Liberal Coalition Against .041 .046 .379 ADA Presidential Interest Group Rating -.091 .017 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .059 .053 .137 .053 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition Agains t, Conservative Coalition For Dependent Variable: War Power Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=1157

PAGE 235

235 Table 6-5. Foreign Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .664 .003 .000 Conservative Coalition For .006 .002 .012 Conservative Coalition Against .006 .005 .207 Liberal Coalition For .024 .008 .002 Liberal Coalition Against .013 .013 .317 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .171 .006 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .393 .390 .067 .030 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservative Coalition For, C onservative Coalition Against Dependent Variable: Confrontation Po litics Order Annual Foreign Policy Success N=1524 Table 6-6. National Security Success Regressi on Analysis of Ideological Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989): Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .725 .004 .000 Conservative Coalition For .006 .003 .058 Conservative Coalition Against .004 .007 .590 Liberal Coalition For .018 .011 .102 Liberal Coalition Against .003 .018 .873 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .114 .009 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .119 .116 .097 .020 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pres idential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, C onservative Coalition For, C onservative Coalition Against Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual National Security Policy Success N=1524

PAGE 236

236 Table 6-7. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Dete rminants Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .530 .004 .000 Conservative Coalition For .003 .004 .361 Conservative Coalition Against .015 .008 .050 Liberal Coalition For .004 .012 .744 Liberal Coalition Against .001 .021 .971 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .309 .010 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .448 .446 .110 .033 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, Conservati ve Coalition For, Conservative Coalition Against Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual Trade Policy Success Score N=1524 Table 6-8. Annual Presidential Foreign Aid Poli cy Success Regression Analysis of Ideological Determinants Confrontati on Politics Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .715 .006 .000 Conservative Coalition For .003 .005 .627 Conservative Coalition Against -.004 .011 .733 Liberal Coalition For -.004 .017 .801 Liberal Coalition Against -.056 .029 .051 ADA Presidential Intere st Group Rating .060 .014 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .016 .012 .154 .038 Predictors: (Constant), ADA Pr esidential Interest Group Rating, Li beral Coalition For, Liberal Coalition Against, C onservative Coalition For, C onservative Coalition Against Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=1524

PAGE 237

237 Table 6-9. Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .597 .033 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -1.262 .035 .000 House Partisan Roll Calls .489 .032 .000 House Party Unity (D) -1.799 .077 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) .256 .051 .000 House Party Unity (R) 1.509 .077 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) .555 .023 .000 Unified Government .080 .002 .000 Mid-Term Election Year .078 .005 .000 Presidential Election Year .035 .004 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .834 .833 .036 .026 Predictors: (Constant), Presidential Election Y ear, House Party Unity (R), Unified Government, Senate Party Un ity (R), Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Mid-Term Election Year, House Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (D), House Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual Foreign Policy Success N=1524

PAGE 238

238 Table 6-10. National Security Success Regressi on Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -.926.061.000 Unified Government .022 .010.036 Mid-Term Election Year .222 .009.000 Presidential Election Year .104 .008.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -.963 .092.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 1.389 .176.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.088 .055.111 Senate Party Unity (D) .408 .085.000 House Party Unity (R) 3.658 .123.000 House Party Unity (D) -2.354 .118.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.424 .062.000 House Partisan Roll Calls .916 .061.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .754 .752 .050 .040 Predictors: (Constant), Hous e Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Year, Presidenti al Party Seat % in Senate, House Party Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (R), Mi d-Term Election Year, Senate Party Unity (D), House Party Unity (D), Unified Governme nt, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual National Security Policy Success N=1524

PAGE 239

239 Table 6-11. Trade Policy Success Regression Analys is of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -1.531.068.000 Unified Government -.132 .011.000 Mid-Term Election Year .333 .010.000 Presidential Election Year .082 .008.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives 2.600 .102.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -1.787 .195.000 Senate Party Unity (R) 1.509 .061.000 Senate Party Unity (D) -2.616 .095.000 House Party Unity (R) 7.077 .137.000 House Party Unity (D) -2.118 .131.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -3.215 .069.000 House Partisan Roll Calls 1.063 .067.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .872 .871 .055 .027 Predictors: (Constant), Hous e Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Year, Presidential Party Seat % in Sena te, House Party Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (R), Mid-Term Election Year, Senate Party Unity (D), House Party Unity (D), Unified Government, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politic s Order Annual Trade Policy Success Score N=1524

PAGE 240

240 Table 6-12. Foreign Aid Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) .299.102.003 Unified Government -.435 .017.000 Mid-Term Election Year .242 .015.000 Presidential Election Year .224 .013.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives .208 .154.177 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 2.630 .295.000 Senate Party Unity (R) 2.386 .092.000 Senate Party Unity (D) -5.163 .143.000 House Party Unity (R) 5.218 .206.000 House Party Unity (D) -4.742 .197.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.550 .104.000 House Partisan Roll Calls 2.742 .101.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .697 .695 .083 .036 Predictors: (Constant), Hous e Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Year, Presidenti al Party Seat % in Senate, House Party Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (R), Mi d-Term Election Year, Senate Party Unity (D), House Party Unity (D), Unified Governme nt, Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=1524

PAGE 241

241 Table 6-13. Annual Presidential Succe ss Scores across Issue Areas of Forei gn Policy. Nixon Admini stration (1969-1974) 91st-93rd Congresses* Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1969 C=93 (40:3) H=89% (8:1) S=94% (32:2) C=91% (20:2) H=100% (3:0) S=89% (17:2) C=100% (3:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (3:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (3:0) C=100% (5:5) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (4:0) C=88% (7:1) H=75% (3:1) S=100% (4:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=43 N=9 N=34 1970 C=93% (27:2) H=90% (9:1) S=95% (18:1) C=75% (6:2) H=0% (0:1) S=86% (6:1) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (8:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (5:0) C=100% (7:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (4:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (3:0) S=100% (1:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=29 N=10 N=19 1971 C=84% (57:11) H=95% (19:1) S=79% (38:10) C=87% (45:7) H=100% (18:0) S=79% (27:7) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=60% (3:2) H=0% (0:1) S=75% (3:1) C=89% (8:1) H=100% (1:0) S=88% (7:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=68 N=20 N=48 1972 C=70% (26:11) H=92% (12:1) S=58% (14:10) C=65% (15:8) H=100% (7:0) S=50% (8:8) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=0% (0:1) S=100% (1:0) C=66% (2:1) H=100% (1:0) S=50% (1:1) C=50% (1:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=50% (1:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=37 N=13 N=24 1973 C=60% (74:49) H=46% (19:22) S=67% (55:27) C=47% (23:26) H=26% (5:14) S=60% (18:12) C=50% (1:1) H=100% (1:0) S=0% (0:1) C=100% (7:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (6:0) C=51% (18:17) H=50% (6:6) S=52% (12:11) C=75% (9:3) H=86% (6:1) S=60% (3:2) C=0% (0:1) H=0% (0:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=123 N=41 N=82

PAGE 242

242 Table 6-13. Continued Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1974a1 C=59% (29:20) H=50% (9:9) S=65% (20:11) C=71% (12:5) H=100% (3:0) S=64% (9:5) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (1:0) C=48% (10:11) H=38% (3:5) S=54% (7:6) C=67% (4:2) H=50% (2:2) S=100% (2:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=49 N=18 N=31 *Some votes are in mixed categories, which are in a separate table but are included within the ag gregate annual foreign policy success scores but not individuated in the issue area scores. 1 1974a refers to Nixons position votes during the year of his resignation from office the rest of the position votes for that year are recorded under the new president Gerald R. Ford and hence, not included in this table.

PAGE 243

243 Table 6-14. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy. Ford Administration (1974-1977) 93rd-94th Congresses* Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1974b2 C=58% (38:28) H=57% (13:10) S=58% (25:18) C=75% (6:2) H=60% (3:2) S=75% (3:1) C=40% (2:3) H=67% (2:1) S=0% (0:2) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=86% (6:1) H=100% (1:0) S=83% (5:1) C=75% (18:6) H=67% (6:3) S=80% (12:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=66 N=23 N=43 1975 C=68% (54:25) H=47% (16:18) S=91% (38:7) C=76% (16:5) H=83% (5:1) S=73% (11:4) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=70% (7:3) H=40% (2:3) S=100% (5:0) C=52% (15:14) H=39% (7:11) S=73% (8:3) C=88% (7:1) H=100% (1:0) S=86% (6:1) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=79 N=34 N=45 1976 C=66% (23:12) H=69% (11:5) S=63% (12:7) C=79% (15:4) H=75% (6:2) S=82% (9:2) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (2:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=63% (5:3) H=67% (2:1) S=60% (3:2) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=35 N=16 N=19 *Some votes are in mixed categories (see separate table); these ar e included in the aggregate annual foreign policy success sco res but are excluded from the individuated issue area success scores. 2 1974b refers to President Fords position votes that he took after assuming power in the wake of Nixons resignation from offi ce.

PAGE 244

244 Table 6-15. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy. Carter Admini stration (1977-1981) 95th-96th Congresses* Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid ImmigrationTotals 1977 C=82% (47:10) H=74% (23:8) S=92% (24:2) C=75% (15:5) H=80% (12:3) S=60% (3:2) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (3:0) C=100% (13:0) H=100% (7:0) S=100% (6:0) C=71% (10:4) H=67% (4:2) S=75% (6:2) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) N=57 N=31 N=26 1978 C=85% (109:19) H=70% (35:15) S=95% (74:4) C=91% (31:3) H=63% (5:3) S=100% (26:0) C=92% (12:1) H=83% (5:1) S=100% (7:0) C=100% (14:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (13:0) C=79% (31:8) H=61% (11:7) S=95% (20:1) C=72% (18:7) H=65% (11:6) S=88% (7:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=128 N=50 N=78 1979 C=79% (121:33) H=72% (54:21) S=85% (67:12) C=80% (16:4) H=75% (9:3) S=88% (7:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=83% (20:4) H=89% (8:1) S=80% (12:3) C=78% (46:13) H=70% (21:9) S=86% (25:4) C=75% (33:11) H=67% (16:8) S=85% (17:3) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) N=154 N=75 N=79 1980 C=71% (60:24) H=69% (29:13) S=74% (31:11) C=76% (19:6) H=77% (10:3) S=75% (9:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=67% (4:2) H=100% (1:0) S=60% (3:2) C=61% (14:9) H=60% (6:4) S=62% (8:5) C=83% (20:4) H=77% (10:3) S=91% (10:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=84 N=42 N=42 *Some votes contain mixed categories (see se parate table); these are included in th e aggregate annual fore ign policy success sc ores but are excluded from the individua ted issue area success scores.

PAGE 245

245 Table 6-16. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy. Reagan Administration (1981-1989) 97th-100th Congresses*+ Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1981 C=75% (51:17) H=67% (16:8) S=80% (35:9) C=77% (23:7) H=69% (9:4) S=82% (14:3) C=100% (2:0) H=100% (2:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=89% (8:1) H=100% (1:0) S=88% (7:1) C=63% (12:7) H=50% (4:4) S=73% (8:3) C=86% (6:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=86% (6:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=68 N=24 N=44 1982 C=79% (66:18) H=63% (22:13) S=88% (38:5) C=77% (23:7) H=63% (12:7) S=100% (11:0) C=90% (9:1) H=67% (2:1) S=100% (7:0) C=0% (0:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=0% (0:1) C=67% (12:6) H=73% (8:3) S=57% (4:3) C=33% (1:2) H=0% (0:2) S=100% (1:0) C=93% (14:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=93% (14:1) N=84 N=35 N=43 1983 C=76% (78:24) H=59% (26:18) S=90% (52:6) C=80% (37:9) H=75% (18:6) S=86% (19:3) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=89% (16:2) H=33% (1:2) S=100% (15:0) C=47% (9:10) H=11% (1:8) S=80% (8:2) C=88% (7:1) H=83% (5:1) S=100% (2:0) C=78% (7:2) H=0% (0:1) S=88% (7:1) N=102 N=44 N=58 1984 C=78% (58:16) H=71% (29:12) S=88% (29:4) C=73% (16:6) H=58% (7:5) S=90% (9:1) C=50% (2:2) H=33% (1:2) S=100% (1:0) C=75% (6:2) H=100% (2:0) S=67% (4:2) C=70% (7:3) H=60% (3:2) S=80% (4:1) C=92% (11:1) H=75% (3:1) S=100% (8:0) C=82% (9:2) H=82% (9:2) S=n/a (0:0) N=74 N=41 N=33 1985 C=66% (52:27) H=54% (20:17) S=76% (32:10) C=86% (24:4) H=71% (10:4) S=100% (14:0) C=60% (3:2) H=60% (3:2) S=n/a (0:0) C=83% (10:2) H=67% (2:1) S=89% (8:1) C=50% (6:6) H=25% (1:3) S=63% (5:3) C=50% (7:7) H=50% (3:3) S=50% (4:4) C=0% (0:3) H=0% (0:1) S=0% (0:2) N=79 N=37 N=42

PAGE 246

246 Table 6-16. Continued Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1986 C=59% (57:40) H=29% (13:32) S=85% (44:8) C=75% (18:6) H=60% (6:4) S=86% (12:2) C=58% (7:5) H=29% (2:5) S=100% (5:0) C=18% (2:9) H=0% (0:7) S=50% (2:2) C=36% (8:14) H=15% (2:11) S=67% (6:3) C=79% (15:4) H=40% (2:3) S=93% (13:1) C=0% (0:1) H=0% (0:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=97 N=45 N=52 1987 C=61% (50:32) H=53% (24:21) S=70% (26:11) C=83% (20:4) H=79% (15:4) S=100% (5:0) C=56% (5:4) H=40% (2:3) S=75% (3:1) C=45% (5:6) H=17% (1:5) S=80% (4:1) C=60% (12:8) H=38% (3:5) S=75% (9:3) C=63% (5:3) H=50% (3:3) S=100% (2:0) C=33% (1:2) H=0% (0:1) S=50% (1:1) N=82 N=45 N=37 1988 C=62% (60:37) H=48% (24:26) S=79% (37:10) C=73% (19:7) H=61% (11:7) S=100% (8:0) C=30% (3:7) H=13% (1:7) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (4:0) H=100% (1:0) S=100% (3:0) C=48% (10:11) H=25% (2:6) S=62% (8:5) C=50% (3:3) H=50% (2:2) S=50% (1:1) C=50% (1:1) H=50% (1:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=97 N=50 N=47 *Some votes contain mixed categories, thes e are included in the aggregate annual fore ign policy success scores but are excluded (and included on a separate table) from the individuated issue area success scores. +Win-Loss Ratios of votes in specific issue areas are contained in the parentheses.

PAGE 247

247 CHAPTER 7 THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY POLITICI ZED: PRESIDENTIAL RE-EMPOWERMENT AGAINST AN UNENCUMBE RED CONGRESS IDEOLOGICAL PARTY GOVERNMENT, 1990-2000 Introduction This chapter brings us right up to the edge of political tim e that we currently occupy. Like previous empirical chapters, we will follow the now set pattern of setting the context, analyzing it, interpreting it and finally, summarizing the bi g story of our presidential-congressional drama regarding foreign policy relations. The Imperial Presidency Politicized covers the extant period of political time during the tumultuous decade of the 1990s. A time in US foreign affairs that began with the promise of a Post-Cold War peace dividend but saw that promise eroded, compromised and ultimately shattered on the shores of a fully politicize d, partisan driven and ideologically codified executive-legislative conf lict. First a Republican president facing a fully liberal Democratic Congress and was impeded every step of the way. Then, after a brief return to unified government a Democratic president f aced ultimate censure from an unapologetically conservative Republican Congress. What changed during this time was not the qua lity of the personnel involved. Both sides were well meaning in their efforts to construc t a foreign policy that spoke with a unanimous voice in world affairs. Instead, it was the nature of the relationship itself, the age of bi-partisan support for presidential initiative s and/or positions in foreign policy during the War Power Order (1953-1972) had given way to a more partisan atmosphere offset by the lack of ideological unity within the two major parties in the Congress duri ng the Confrontation Politics Order (19731989). The persistence of the cross-partisan coal itions, albeit in a much muted form offset partisanships role in such a way that presidents were still able to construct coalitions of support within (and to a lesser extent) acr oss congressional party lines fo r their preferred positions and

PAGE 248

248 initiatives in foreign policy. However, by the e nd of this period of political time the liberal coalition was a distant memory and the conservative coalition was in such severe decline that its strength as an influencer on pr esidential success had been reduced to near negligibility (see Bond and Fleisher 1990 for corr oborating evidence). As a series of recent articles have shown that by the 1990s, the dynamics of party government in the Congress have changed. (Smith and Gamm in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Ideological polarization had taken hol d, influencing the appointment process on committees, prescribing procedural maneuvering in the Senate, defining electoral districting for the House, and establishing a new type of partis an leadership in the House of Representatives.1 Basically, as the parties-in-C ongress became ideologically coherent executive-legislative relations completed a process of politicization during th e Imperial Presidency Politicized Order that had begun in the previous order. In other words, with great power comes great responsibility and an ideologi cal party government in the Congr ess began to hold the president to the same level of accountability long seen in domestic affairs.2 Likewise, the presidency itself had attained a level of restor ation, particularly through the results of the Reagan administration.3 This was especially true in foreign policy as Reagan had re-asserted US free world leadership in the struggl e with the USSR in the late Cold War and had passed on a perceived victory to his successo r (Milkis and Nelson 2003). Reagan had set a precedent for coalition building regarding defense po licies in particular, so it is reasonable to 1 See Aldrich and Rohde 2005, Evans and Lipinski 2005, Oppenheimer 2005 and Schickler and Pearson 2005 all in Dodd and Oppenheimers (2005) Congress Reconsidered 2 The comment, with great power comes great responsibility originated with Stan Lee and Steve Ditkos (1962) Amazing Fantasy #15the comic book where the supe rhero character Spiderman was first introduced. 3 See Jones (in Jones 1988), Tullis 1987 and Smith (in Cronin 1982) for explicit scholarly examples of the concept of the Reagan Restoration Presidency.

PAGE 249

249 think that his successors woul d have similar such opportunities (Jones 1988 and Smith 1982). The fact that they did not is instructive in itself as regard s the extreme congressionalized limitations which would now face the foreign policy presidencies of Bush and Clinton. We now turn to the employment of this phenomenon th rough the eyes of the uni t level foreign policy relationship between the presiden cy and the Congress in the Orde r of the Imperial Presidency Politicized! Issue Areas of Foreign Policy across the Order of the Imperial Presidency Politiciz ed, 19902000 When examining the Order of the Imperial Pr esidency Politicized, we must first look at why I have given such a name to this period of executive-legislative foreign policy history. The historian and political scientist Ar thur M. Schlesinger, Jr. first coined the term the imperial presidency, in a normative critique of the expa nsion of presidential power especially in foreign affairs during the Cold War (Schlesinger 1973). Schlesinger had argued that the Johnson-Nixon presidencies were something of a tipping point in presidential-polity relations and an inevitable backlash to executive prerogatives was at that very point in time underway (Schlesinger 1973). Years later he would look back at that predic tion and claim that it was largely successful, however, in recent times he has suggested that we are once again in a time of presidential excess, regarding foreign re lations (Schlesinger 1989, 2005). Of course, Schlesingers reassessment is actually based on security policy making and not foreign affairs writ-large, thus while instructive it should not be thought of as axiomatic, especi ally regarding an issue areas perspective to understanding foreign policy. Nevertheless, the security initiatives undert aken by the Reagan administration including placing US forces in harms way in small s cale military operations like Urgent Fury (the invasion of Grenada in 1983) we re subject to considerable exponentiation under Bush and

PAGE 250

250 Clinton. The first Bush built his security polic y profile off a War on Drugs which included Operation Just Cause (the invasion of Pa nama) among others involving militarized drug interdiction exercises in Latin America. Of course Bush is best remembered for his international as well as national security lead ership in the build up for, execu tion of and follows through to the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Clinton, while never as fully aggressive in his employment of military power as the first Bush, did show a proclivity toward pulling out the Big Stick of US military might as a credible instrument of foreign policy. As Michael Mandel baum (1996) has detailed and subsequent real world empirics have shown, Clinton deployed tro ops abroad in more places and in higher numbers with more direct action potential than any of his peacetime presidential predecessors did in combination. This led to wi thin and without security critiques around the Pentagon Establishment about mission creep and operational overste p (Mandlebaum 1996). Therefore, on a cursory review of the Bush a nd Clinton security policy presidencies we can suggest that any notion of a congr essional resurgence is certainly que stionable. However, as this project has demonstrated again and again, not all foreign policy is security. And, the main thing to remember from the last order of executive-legislative foreign relations is that security may not even be the main thing in foreign policy anymore. Even a cursory review of the legislative hist ories during this period of political time is revealing as far as pr esidential-congressional conflict in foreign policy is concerned. For instance, the divisive abortion de bate long a hallmark of social policy in the domestic sphere became a place of congressionalization/domestication in the security realm itself. Entrenched battles over defense auth orization and appropriations bills we re fought as Bush attempted to restrict abortion access at military hospitals both at home and abroad and a liberal Democratic

PAGE 251

251 Congress tried to expand such access (CQ Al manacs 1990 and 1992, legislative histories). The fight would begin again in the 104th Congress as the protagonists changed chambers of power with a Democratic president facing off ag ainst a conservative Republican Congress (CQ Almanac 1995, legislative history). This fight would continue throughout the rest of the Clinton presidency and only be resolved by the return of unified govern ment with the second Bush (CQ Almanac 2001, special study on abortion in military hospitals). While, this conflict was new to the foreign policy relationship between the presidency and the Congress it was in keeping with a tradition of congressionalized attempts to take over the foreign policy prerogatives of presidents (regardless of party) by domesticating the issue involved. More generally, trade was now open to full di spute between the executive and legislative branches as the battles over NAFTA, FTAA and the results of the Uruguay Round (the creation of the WTO in 1994). While, on the surface both Bu sh and later Clinton won these insurgent challenges to their respective roles as chief trad e negotiators, these challenges are emblematic of the fact that the Congress no longer recognized that role as a single claim to power but rather as a place for congressionalized advice and consent. (see the special report on NAFTA ratification in the 1993 CQ Almana c). It also suggests the potential for new issue area crosspartisan coalition formation, which despite their more amorphous nature relative to the liberal and conservative coalitions of old; they can still exert a largely unpr edictable dynamic on the already politicized executive-legislative international affairs relationship. The fair trade movement within the Congress unites populist for ces within both the Repub lican and Democratic parties-in-Congress as social conservatives a nd economic liberals united in opposition to free trading forces led by both Bush and Clinton (Lindsay 1994 and CQ Almanac 1993, legislative

PAGE 252

252 history). Clearly, more study is need ed in this area but due to time considerations it must remain beyond the scope of this inquiry. Foreign operations funding, long a kind of mixed category containing trade, foreign aid and security elements within it was for the first time in its existence (these specific funding devices date back to the 1960s) a place for prol onged political conflict between the presidency and the Congress. Why, is instrumental to a multiple presidencies understanding of the executive-legislative dynamic in foreign relati ons. For starters, since these votes have combinations of issue areas within them, they tend to be subject to certain disarray in how the president and Congress come to agreement during this timeframe. The fact that they did not follow such a diffuse pattern even as early as the Confrontation Politics Order is telling as far as the extent to which the politicization of the fo reign policy process across these issue areas has become. In the past, such mixed aggregations go t swallowed up in the broader politics of the day. Now, foreign policy itself has developed into such a nuanced process th at it is possible that there has been a multiplication of issue areas (see CQ Almanacs 1995-2000, foreign operations section summaries) We can see that by l ooking at the fights over foreign operations authorizations and appropriations as this mix of issue areas means that no single one like security (and hence presidentialization) or foreign aid (and hence congression alization) can take place. In fact, these may represent something of an ex cellent case study for pred icting the future of presidential-congressional relations in foreign po licy though of course that will have to wait for another time. Base closings are another interesting case for future study during this time, as members of Congress regardless of partisanship or stated ideology try to hold on to bases recommended by the military and outside groups for closing due to the restructuring needs of a military in post-

PAGE 253

253 Cold War transition (from CQ Almanac 1990, report from Base Closure Commission). Immigration becomes subject to a push and pull e ffect as presidents push domestic security in the War on Drugs and the Congress emphasizes the free flow of goods and services in trade commodity relations (CQ Almana c 1990, legislative history). Finally, in the vaunted realm of national s ecurity policy congressional deference to presidential agency is no longe r even thought of as anything othe r than a rhetorical statement. With great power, Bush and Clinton deployed troops abroad to East Africa, Southeastern Europe, Southwestern Asia and the Caribbean but with great responsibility the Congress questioned, placed limits on activities and of ten threatened (though never actually did) to cut funding (CQ Almanacs 1992-1999, various legislativ e histories). One could suggest that this is maintenance of security power within the executive. However, a closer inspection reveals that all is not quite what it seems on the surface because previous operations were not even questioned as recently as the Grenada invasion the Congress was openly snubbed by President Reagan who told the leadership about Urgent Fury after it was already under wa y (from Fisher 2000). Bush and Clinton did not, nor could they ignore the Congre sss role both real and imagined in security policy execution. Despite his protestations otherw ise, the first Bush did actively seek (and eventually won) congressional au thorization to wage war on Iraq in early 1991 before he ordered the start of Operation Desert Storm (CQ Alman ac 1991, special report on th e Persian Gulf War). And, Clintons Air War over Kosovo was accompanied by anothe r air war as a campaign strategy where he maintained congressional support by a combination of a media blitz over the heads of the Congress and a se lf-limitation as to ends and means (Holbrooke 2005, PBS 2000, documentary). The Imperial Presidency Politic ized, 1990-2000 is our most recent period of political time relative to the executive-legislative divide in foreign relations. But, in order to

PAGE 254

254 develop the kind of understanding needed for gene ralizable findings from this period of political time we must engage in more systematic unit level study and to that we now turn. Empirical Results Harkening b ack to established patterns, we will begin our systematic examination by way of comparison regarding time order effects on the foreign affairs relationship between our institutions of interests and in this case mixed issue area success. Comparing the results of the two regressions is revealing in th e extent of the environmental cha nge in the role of partisanship as a determinant of presidential mixed issue area success with the Congress. The greatest change is in the role of the constitution of government itself. Unified government, which has a relatively strong and positive correlation with presidential success in mixed issue areas of foreign policy during the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) (r=.689), actually reverses direction in the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) with a perfect negative partial correlation of (partial r=-1.0). However, this is offset by the failure of a collinerarity tolerance test, so the variable was actually purged from the model in or der to maintain inter-variable co-relational stability (Agresti and Finlay 2001). The interpreta tion that is most telli ng deriving out of this relationship is that unified gove rnment is now the overwhelming aberration from the norm of national level executive-legislative relations and cannot be routinely coun ted upon as a factor in dictating presidential success. In fact, during this entire decade, onl y two years (under Bill Clinton 1993-1995) were actually subject to unified governmental conditions. Thus, the pattern we saw in the Confrontat ion Politics period of a declining influence for unified government as a presidency-centered condition is now completed as the partisan reality of the more congresscentered divided government condition has taken ove r as the determinativ e factor in foreign policy interactions.

PAGE 255

255 Regarding other partisan political factors re vealed by comparing these two models results, include a general trend toward increasing influence of the variables from one period to the next. Both the measures of overall robustness (the R squares) and the influence measures (the individual correlation coefficients) increase exponentially (see Ta bles 7-1-2). Also, previously discerned patterns regarding chambe r and party differences continue with party mattering more in the House than in the Senate with Democratic unity this time supporting and Republican unity standing in opposition to presidentia l success. This is to be expected given the fact that for much of this time it is a Democr atic president juxtaposed against a Republican Congress. What is important here is that the institutional relationship is now determined more by partisan composition of government A final observation garnered from comparing these two tables is that unlike the War Power Order, mixe d issue areas are now numerous enough that they matter as units of analysis unto themselves. Th is supports one of the more general hypotheses coming out of the multiple presidencies thesis wh ich is that as time goes by there is in fact a multiplication of issue areas in foreign policy as the presidential-congressional relationship in that domain becomes more and more nuanced. This is supporting evidence for notions about the general decline of presidential success in forei gn policy, its increased politi cization as a partisan (and even ideological entity) and its increased likelihood for congressionalization/domestication. This last phenomenon is due to the fact that the mere notion of a mixed issue area of foreign policy is itself an invitation for the inclusion of greater degrees of intermestic composition amidst the extant body of issue areas. Looking specifically at the foreign polic y success during the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order we find supporting evidence for the claims emanating out of the previous analysis. In fact, partisanship seems now to be about an equal factor in dictating both the House

PAGE 256

256 and the Senates relationship with the president in foreign policy writ large. However, there is some residual bi-partisanship w ithin the Senate as the Republican Party unity variable is indicating (see Table 7-3). However, the rela tively robust (r=-.556) negative relationship between the percentage of partis an roll calls in the Senate a nd the proportion of presidential position vote success tends to serve as an offsetti ng (in this case a re-politicizing) factor in presidential-senatorial foreign affairs. Within the House, th e strongly negative relationship between presidential success and within chambe r party unity is perhap s the single most telling systematic representation of the highly poli ticized relationship. Remember that since the Democrats held the White House during much of this decade (seven of the 10 years), strong Democratic positive correlation with pres idential success as well as strong Republican negative association is indicative of a hi ghly partisan (read politicized) un it level environment for foreign policy construction. Likewise, the unified government variable is once again falling out of the model for the same reasons as the mixed issue areas model. This is to be expected, especially when looking at foreign policy as a totality during this period of political time. Taking a more nuanced perspective, we see in Table 7-4 that national security success has suffered severe decline at least as far as its par tisan determinants are concerned. In general, the co-relational strength has declined in a number of the variables in comparison to foreign policy success. This is indicative of the more amorphous nature that foreign polic y has taken during this order relative to previous ones. However, the strength of the m odel overall as measured by the R square (.993) is still very robust so we cannot say that national security has been reduced to the dustbin of foreign policy history in the executive-legislative relationship. But, we can say that it has been reduced to one among many component s of foreign policy and not necessarily the

PAGE 257

257 dominant component issue area, especially in peacetime as this is the condition which defines most of this period. In the areas of trade and foreign aid (see Ta bles 7-5-6), the models have corroborating results with an extreme qualification. The model fo r foreign aid (Table 7-6) is over specified as given by its perfect R square (1.0). This makes it problematic as an inferential device. This is a problem with population data at times, so any interpretations made from this model are questionable at best, for instance the return of unified government as an accurate predictor of the presidential-congressional foreign policy relationship. Therefore, we will spend our time on the less problematic outcomes associated with the trade success model for the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order. Fi rst of all, the role of partisanship as a strong indicator is supported overall regarding significance tests an d co-relational coeffici ents (see Table 7-5). Secondly, there has been some issue specific movement among the indicators with trade success now being associated with the Senate more so than the House as measured by the percentage of the presidents party seats, the percentage of pa rtisan roll calls and Republican party unity within the Senate (remember, this is a time defined mostly by divided government). What this supports is the notion that much of the intensity of the partisan heat between the presidency and the Congress ove r trade relations is locate d in the presidential-House relationship. And, trade is theref ore still subject to a degree of traditional deference in the presidential-senatorial relationship well into this otherwise politicized order. Now, let us try to pull things together by looking at these issue ar eas form the perspective offered by the multiple presidencies. The Multiple Presidencies of the Imperi al Presidency Politiciz ed Order, 1990-2000 Perhaps there is no stronger indicator of the alteration in the unit level foreign policy relationship between the presidency and the Congress than to indi cate the within case variance

PAGE 258

258 by comparing Bush and Clintons success rates in the vaunted realm of national security policy making. Excepting the first two years of Clinton from study because of the unified government condition, we see that Clintons success rate in national secu rity was 58.3% v. Bushs 65.5% on average (Tables 7-7-8). Taking a closer look at Bush we see that in the presidential election year of 1992 his success rate in na tional security policies was a pa ltry 42%. Clinton drops to a 30% success rate in national security in 1995, the first year of the Republican Revolution in the 104th Congress. In fact, despite re election in 1996 Clintons natio nal security rates are below 60% throughout every year of his second term with the exception of 1999 (73% success in national security). Of course, that was the year of the Kosovo Air War, as well as the senatorial failure to convict in Clintons impeachment trial (CQ Almanac 1999, special reports Kosovo Air War and Clinton Impeachment). More than anything else, what this tabular analysis is suggesting is that we can draw a descriptiv e inference relative to the degree of presidential empowerment in foreign policy. That inference is simply this, things are not what they once were. The ability of presidents to dominate the foreign policy constr uction process relative to the Congress has been impeded to the point that even the once secur e category of national se curity is no longer the exclusive domain of presidentialized foreign affairs. The fact of the matter is that security itself has become subject to the congressionalization/ domestication process and this is largely a function of the politicization (read partisan driven) developmen t which has now coalesced in inter-institutional foreign policy making. Of course, this inference is subject to the critique that national security was not an overarching arena of power for presidents Bush and Clinton because of the declined role of security in world affairs during this time. Th e Cold War was over, the Persian Gulf War was short and Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, etc were just not much of anything! So, what would

PAGE 259

259 happen if there really was a new systemic level threat, for starters the president would be reempowered relative to the Congress as he c ould once again securitiz e/presidentialize the various issue areas of forei gn policy. However, the 1990s an d to a lesser extent the two preceding decades showed that War Power Order st yle deference by the Congress to presidential leadership was a thing of the now distant past. After, a short time of adjustment the Congress would routinely re-assert itself in mini-confrontation politics, possibly playing out across the by now well differentiated issue areas of foreign po licy. Unfortunately, for us we do not need to run some counterfactual simulation in order to find these conditions and test them. The real world attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 provided us with such a place to visage the responses of our two proactive institutions of national government (the presidency and the Congress). A nd, in the conclusion to this project we will examine these events and the role, if any of the po litical determinants of interest (the partisan factors) governing the foreign po licy relationship between the pr esident and the Congress across the component issue areas and their attendant multiple presidencies. Summary This chapter has asses sed the extant execu tive-legislative relationship across the issue areas of foreign policy during the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order of 1990-2000. In this effort, we have seen the completion of the politicization process driven by increasing within as well as across chamber partisansh ip in the Congress. The po litics that the foreign policy presidencies make are now subject to inte nse scrutiny and opposition by the ideological partisans of the Congress. While, there were some differences in the patterns, like a House that tended to be more partisan driv en generally in foreign policy. Or, a Senate that still tended toward some bi-partisanship across its issu e area relationship with the president.

PAGE 260

260 But, the big story is still that presidential success in foreign po licy is no longer as driven as it once was by the security dynamic. Hence, there has been a successful congressionalization/domestication of fore ign policy. This has been facilitated by the multiplication of issue areas in foreign policy as revealed in the mixed issue area analysis. And, also in the narrative where even security po licy making is now subject to a phenomenon of intermestic politics, as suggested in the strugg les over abortion policy in military hospitals and base closures that helped to define the presid ential-congressional foreign affairs of the 1990s. The conclusion to this overall study will come in three parts, with the first two following previously established patterns and the third dive rging from the rest of the analysis. We will engage in a narrative analysis of the current context of pres idential-congressi onal foreign and issue area relations in the early Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order of the 2000s. Next, we will look at cross-sectional anal ysis of the partisan determinants, if any of the before-mentioned relationship. Finally, this project will close with a review of the study overall, an assessment of implications deriving from it and a pr escription for future research.

PAGE 261

261 Table 7-1. Mixed Issue Area Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Confrontation Politic s Order (1973-1989) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 5.652.176.000 Mid-Term Election Year .181 .025.000 Presidential Election Year -.170 .022.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -3.645 .267.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -.769 .510.132 Unified Government .689 .030.000 House Partisan Roll Calls -.385 .176.028 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -3.823 .181.000 House Party Unity (D) 3.034 .341.000 House Party Unity (R) -2.097 .357.000 Senate Party Unity (D) 1.503 .247.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -4.804 .160.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .650 .648 .144 .049 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R), Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Year, Presidential Part y Seat % in Senate, Mid-Term Election Year, Senate Party Unity (D) House Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), Unified Government Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Confrontation Politics Order Annual Presidential Success Score in Mixed Issue Areas N=544

PAGE 262

262 Table 7-2. Mixed Issue Area Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -22.817.545.000 Mid-Term Election Year .095 .013.000 Presidential Election Year .779 .008.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -3.442 .345.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate -1.238 .353.000 House Partisan Roll Calls 6.846 .065.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -2.557 .034.000 House Party Unity (D) 18.222 .648.000 House Party Unity (R) -3.533 .260.000 Senate Party Unity (D) 13.968 .314.000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.679 .202.001 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .988 .988 .0331.894 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Year, Mid-Term Electi on Year, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Pa rty Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (D), Presidential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Imperial Presidency Politicized Order Annual Pr esidential Success Score in Mixed Issue Areas N=544

PAGE 263

263 Table 7-3. Foreign Policy Succe ss Regression Analysis of Par tisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -7.296.092.000 Mid-Term Election Year .229 .002.000 Presidential Election Year .069 .001.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -4.200 .058.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 7.718 .059.000 House Partisan Roll Calls -.109 .011.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls -.556 .006.000 House Party Unity (D) 4.033 .109.000 House Party Unity (R) -1.648 .044.000 Senate Party Unity (D) .309 .053.000 Senate Party Unity (R) 5.152 .034.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .999 .999 .0051.894 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential El ection Year, Mid-Term Election Year, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Part y Seat % in Senate, House Pa rty Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (D), Pres idential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Imperial Presidency Order Annual Success Score in Foreign Policy N=544

PAGE 264

264 Table 7-4. National Security Policy Success Regr ession Analysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 2.949.271.000 Mid-Term Election Year -.017 .006.008 Presidential Election Year -.157 .004.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -1.885 .171.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 6.497 .175.000 House Partisan Roll Calls -.121 .032.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls .066 .017.000 House Party Unity (D) -8.191 .322.000 House Party Unity (R) -5.135 .129.000 Senate Party Unity (D) 5.299 .156.000 Senate Party Unity (R) 2.506 .100.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .993 .993 .0161.894 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R ), House Party Unity (D), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Election Y ear, Mid-Term Election Year, Se nate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Party Seat % in Senate, House Party Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (D), Presidentia l Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Imperial Presidency Po liticized Order Annual Na tional Security Success Score N=544

PAGE 265

265 Table 7-5. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -1.323.243.000 Mid-Term Election Year .156 .006.000 Presidential Election Year .082 .003.000 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives -6.013 .154.000 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate 15.820 .158.000 House Partisan Roll Calls -3.509 .029.000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls 1.169 .015.000 House Party Unity (D) -7.569 .290.000 House Party Unity (R) 2.397 .116.000 Senate Party Unity (D) -2.551 .140.000 Senate Party Unity (R) 5.787 .090.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson .997 .997 .0141.894 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D), House Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential El ection Year, Mid-Term Election Year, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Presidential Part y Seat % in Senate, House Pa rty Unity (R), Senate Party Unity (D), Pres idential Party Seat % in House of Representatives Dependent Variable: Imperial Presidency Politicized Order Annual Tr ade Policy Success Score N=544

PAGE 266

266 Table 7-6. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Pa rtisan Determinants Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 17.175 .000. Mid-Term Election Year -1.489 .000. Presidential Election Year .180 .000. Unified Government .461 .000. House Partisan Roll Calls -15.805 .000. Senate Partisan Roll Calls 8.721 .000. House Party Unity (D) 19.442 .000. House Party Unity (R) 19.671 .000. Senate Party Unity (D) -43.676 .000. Senate Party Unity (R) -10.408 .000. R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .509 Predictors: (Constant), Senate Party Unity (R), Unified Government, Pres idential Election Year, House Partisan Roll Calls, Mid-Term Election Year Senate Partisan Roll Calls, House Party Unity (R), House Party Unity (D ), Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Imperial Presidency Politicized Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=544

PAGE 267

267 Table 7-7. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy. Bush Administration (1989-1993) 101st-102nd Congresses*+ Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1989 C=72% (52:20) H=55% (16:13) S=84% (36:7) C=70% (16:7) H=38% (3:5) S=87% (13:2) C=33% (2:4) H=25% (1:3) S=50% (1:1) C=88% (7:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=88% (7:1) C=67% (2:1) H=50% (1:1) S=100% (1:0) C=80% (20:5) H=83% (10:2) S=77% (10:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=72 N=29 N=43 1990 C=53% (33:29) H=37% (13:22) S=74% (20:7) C=76% (16:5) H=70% (7:3) S=82% (9:2) C=60% (3:2) H=100% (1:0) S=50% (2:2) C=0% (0:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=0% (0:1) C=40% (6:9) H=10% (1:9) S=100% (5:0) C=22% (2:7) H=20% (1:4) S=25% (1:3) C=50% (3:3) H=40% (2:3) S=100% (1:0) N=62 N=35 N=27 1991 C=59% (45:31) H=47% (21:24) S=78% (25:7) C=74% (25:9) H=57% (12:9) S=100% (13:0) C=100% (7:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (7:0) C=100% (3:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (3:0) C=36% (4:7) H=38% (3:5) S=33% (1:2) C=29% (5:12) H=31% (4:9) S=25% (1:3) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=76 N=45 N=32 1992 C=40% (21:32) H=31% (11:24) S=56% (10:8) C=42% (5:12) H=23% (3:10) S=50% (2:2) C=80% (4:1) H=100% (3:0) S=50% (1:1) C=29% (2:5) H=0% (0:4) S=67% (2:1) C=31% (5:11) H=9% (1:10) S=80% (4:1) C=83% (5:1) H=100% (3:0) S=67% (2:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=53 N=35 N=18 *Some votes contain mixed categories (which are included on a se parate table) those votes are included in the aggregate annual foreign policy success scores but excl uded in the issue area success scores. +Win-Loss Ratios in parentheses.

PAGE 268

268 Table 7-8. Annual Presidential Success Scores across Issue Areas of Foreign Policy. Clinton Administration 103rd -106th Congresses*+ Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1993 C=85% (39:7) H=83% (25:5) S=88% (14:2) C=88% (23:3) H=83% (15:3) S=100% (8:0) C=50% (1:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=50% (1:1) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (6:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (2:0) C=78% (7:2) H=67% (4:2) S=100% (3:0) C=0% (0:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=0% (0:1) N=46 N=30 N=16 1994 C=83% (43:9) H=83% (25:5) S=82% (18:4) C=85% (28:5) H=81% (17:4) S=92% (11:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=67% (2:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=67% (2:1) C=100% (7:0) H=100% (5:0) S=100% (2:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=52 N=30 N=22 1995 C=38% (28:45) H=32% (14:30) S=53% (16:14) C=30% (10:20) H=29% (5:12) S=38% (5:8) C=67% (4:2) H=100% (1:0) S=60% (3:2) C=14% (1:6) H=0% (0:4) S=33% (1:2) C=57% (4:3) H=40% (2:3) S=100% (2:0) C=42% (8:11) H=23% (3:10) S=83% (5:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=73 N=44 N=30 1996 C=58% (26:19) H=52% (15:14) S=69% (11:5) C=53% (10:9) H=45% (5:6) S=63% (5:3) C=25% (1:3) H=0% (0:1) S=33% (1:2) C=50% (1:1) H=100% (1:0) S=0% (0:1) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=60% (3:2) H=60% (3:2) S=n/a (0:0) C=71% (5:2) H=60% (3:2) S=100% (2:0) N=45 N=29 N=16 1997 C=43% (24:29) H=29% (8:20) S=68% (17:8) C=39% (10:18) H=27% (4:11) S=54% (7:6) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (4:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (4:0) C=50% (4:4) H=20% (1:4) S=100% (3:0) C=67% (4:2) H=50% (2:2) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=53 N=28 N=25

PAGE 269

269 Table 7-8. Continued Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 1998 C=61% (23:15) H=47% (7:8) S=70% (16:7) C=55% (5:4) H=25% (1:3) S=80% (4:1) C=100% (2:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=38% (3:5) H=38% (3:5) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=40% (2:3) H=n/a (0:0) S=40% (2:3) N=38 N=15 N=23 1999 C=58% (15:11) H=53% (9:8) S=67% (6:3) C=73% (5:3) H=60% (3:2) S=67% (2:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=0% (0:1) S=100% (1:0) C=75% (6:2) H=67% (4:2) S=100% (2:0) C=20% (1:4) H=25% (1:3) S=0% (0:1) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=27 N=17 N=10 2000 C=70% (14:6) H=67% (10:5) S=80% (4:1) C=50% (3:3) H=60% (3:2) S=0% (0:1) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (8:0) H=100% (6:0) S=100% (2:0) C=33% (1:2) H=0% (0:2) S=100% (1:0) C=0% (0:1) H=0% (0:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=20 N=15 N=5 *Some votes contain mixed categories (these are on a separate table); they are included in the aggregate annual foreign policy success scores but excluded from the individuated issue area success scores. +Win-Loss Ratios are in parentheses.

PAGE 270

270 CHAPTER 8 CONCULSION/IMPLICATIONS: THE EXTRA-SYSTEMIC DILEMMA OF EXECUTIVELEGISLATI VE RELATIONS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD Introduction The reader(s) of this docum ent can probably tell where they were, what they were doing and even the minutest details of th eir immediate responses to the tragic events of the fateful day in not quite mid-September, when as Presiden t W. Bush has repeated ly stated everything changed. Certainly, the largest most intrusive as well as pervasive atta ck on the United States since Pearl Harbor had altered foreign policy re lations not only between the executive and the legislature but between both and the polity writ large as well. Or, had it? There were major historical differences between the Japanese at tack on Pearl Harbor a nd Al Qaedas attacks on the twin towers of the World Tr ade Center, the Pentagon and thei r failed attempt at the White House itself. For our perspective, that major di fference was in the mere recognition by the enemy about the disparate issue areas of foreign policy, the Japanese atta cked the strategic center of foreign policy power for the US in the Paci fic on December 7, 1941. Al Qaeda struck nearly simultaneously at the centers of US economic power in world affairs (the World Trade Center), deployable security power (the Pentagon) and fina lly, the center of diplomatic power in the form of the White House. Also, the Japanese were a great power empi re challenging the US for regional hegemony over the Pacific Rim in the balance of power politics of global multipolarity. But, Al Qaeda was a non-state actor challenging what it felt to be the Great Sa tan of global socio-cultural debasement, politico-religious corruption, global ized capitalist explo itation and imperialist military-centric hegemony. Japan was not only a stat e but an empire standing within the game of great power politics while Al Qaeda is a terr orist organization of self-proclaimed Islamic revolutionaries operating outside the international system in the only way they can with the

PAGE 271

271 weapons of the weak deployed against the strong. President W. Bush was correct, everything had changed but Al Qaeda had nothing to do with it. The change had been ongoing since the Cold War started its retreat after Vi etnam and during dtente (the C onfrontation Politics Order, 19731989). With the decline of superpower driven conflic t, the bipolarity of th e international system began to give way to the forces of interdependenc e first in economics and then in socio-cultural matters. Toward the middle and end of the Cold War John Spanier (1975) had suggested that the new international order would remain bipolar onl y in politics as in economics (and presumably) other areas it had already devel oped multipolarity. Still others, lik e Fukayama (1989) declared an end to history, as inter-state c onflict had reached its apex with the super power struggles of the Cold War but would not be displaced by other c oncerns previously deemed low politics. W. Bushs own father had suggested a New Wo rld Order, driven by democratic-capitalism something still prescient in the Clinton doctrines notion of the selective engagement principle. Finally, the notion of new s ecurity had taken hold within the foreign policy research community analyzing the growing internecine conflicts over ethno-religious divides and resource access/control as the fortunes of globalization tended to help the already there (read the Global North) at the expense of the still trying (re ad the Global South) (Matthews 1989, Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). In fact, all religious rhetoric (from both prot agonists and antagonists) aside much of what probably lies behind the machinati ons of Al Qaeda is that it as an organization purports to represent the many (the Global South masses) in the face of the few (the Global North elites). Nonetheless, by taking a closer look at the legislative history of the presiden tial-congressional relationship can we find evidence supporting ou r presidents now regularized claim that

PAGE 272

272 everything changed on September the eleventh of 2001 (Bush 2002, inauguration speech excerpt)? The Issue Areas of the Extra-Systemic Dilemm a in Executive-Leg islative Foreign Policy Regarding the sine qua non of security, presidential dom inance was so high that even domestic politics seemed to follow the dictates of this presidentialized/securitized sphere of authority. For instance, air, sea and to some extent ground transportation was federalized at least as far as cargo and personne l inspections were concerned. The creation of the Transport Security Administration as well as the increase in the domestic inspection authority of the US Coast Guard, Customs Office and even the Post al Service were clear examples of this phenomenon. Another interesting note, emanating out of this condition is that much of it was done through administrative rule changes and executive orders, thus by-passing the normal legislative route (Sincl air in Conley 2005). However, it was in the realm of national securi ty itself where presidential power seemed to re-assert itself fully. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom both agitated for by President W. Bush and overwhelmingly supported by the members of Congress (CQ Almanacs 2001 and 2003, special reports on Afghanistan and Iraq Wars). But, it is interesting to note that in both cases (especially for Iraq where a direct link w ith 9/11 could only be inferred) the president engaged in a public relations campaign reminiscen t of his fathers for Desert Shield/Storm and even Clintons varied overseas military adventures. Despite Vice-President Cheneys articulation of the unitary executi ve theory, whereby executive authority was unquestionable in security matters (Cheney 2002, Russert interview on Meet the Press) because only the president could determine the level and t ype of threat faced by the American people, President W. Bush still felt th e need to garner popular and congressional support for his two major security initiatives Additionally, recent research has shown that the Congress in particular

PAGE 273

273 was directly involved in all of the security activities loosely grouped under the rather innocuous term the War on Terror (Wolfensberger in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Major concessions over funding, time durations, limits of authority, oversight guarantees and extended hearings over the merits of such procedures were im posed by the Congress under unified government conditions (Wolfsenberger in Dodd and Oppenheim er 2005). Of course these concessions were set against a president who was seen as the ideolo gical heir to the conservative movement that so dominated Republican Party congre ssional politics at that time (Wolfsenberger in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Moving away from national security policy making into the realm of domestic security policy construction we find even more examples of presidential prerogative execution juxtaposed to congressional re-assertions of will. The most famous case of course is the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and 2003 (collectively referred to as the Patriot Act) which increased the level of allowance for internal domestic intelligence gath ering to its highest levels since the largely unregulated days of the red scares. While, init ially supported w ith relatively high levels of bipartisanship in both houses of the Congress in 2001 by 2003 it had become a hot button election issue which tore the Republican Party apart from within and moved it ideologically distal from the Democratic Party at least as far as the Congress was con cerned. The next time the Patriot Act came through the halls of Congress it was subject to intense domestication/congressionalization as members became more responsive to their constituent interests than to the security prerogatives of the current administration (Wolfensberger 2005 in Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Another place for the ebb and flow of power between the president and the Congress is to be found in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. DHS was constructed out of the immedi ate post-9/11 needs for internal coordination

PAGE 274

274 between the disparate apparatuses of domestic security (22 separate agencies in all) and began as an entity within the White House Staff. As C onley (2005 in Conley 2005) makes clear this was about as far as the limited government Republi can George W. Bush wanted to go but the Congress with certain allied cl ientele groups wanted something more. The end result was a president pushed into endorsi ng the largest reorganization of the federal government since the Truman era National Security Act of 1947 wh ich established the National Military Establishment that shortly evolved into the Department of Defense. Any one of these cases, either as discrete entities or in comparison woul d make excellent analyses of the ebb and flow of issue area specific power between the executive a nd legislative branches of national government but that will have to wait for further study late r on. For now let us close out this section by looking at a couple of cases of presidential empowerment outsi de of national or domestic security which can be directly linked to the aftermath of 9/11. Fast-track trade negotiating authority has been a sore point for presidents and congresses of both parties since the late 1980s. The bipartisan consensus on deference to the president as chief trade negotiator has been discussed earlier but what is important to remember is that it was clearly in jeopardy as early as the 1970s and gone by the 1990s. From the last two years of the Reagan presidency through most of the C linton administration, fully divided government forced presidents to lose valuable political capital in largely unsuccessful battles with the Congress in order to regain what from FDR to Reagans first six y ears had largely been seen as a rubber stamp for executive fiat in trade relations. But, the foreign relations crises of the Great Depression, World War and Cold War had given way to intermes tic crises of job outsourcing, windfall profiteering, overseas black marketeerin g, accusations of foreign neo-mercantile trade activities and generally a fair trade Congress v. a fr ee trade presidency (Lindsay 1994,

PAGE 275

275 Ripley & Lindsay 1993 and McCormack 1999) It took a securitized argument with unified (and not coincidentally largely conservative) Republican Part y congressional government by President George W. Bush to win fast track reauthorization in late 2001 (from CQ Almanac 2001, vote summary). Lastly, we can examine the foreign funding of the Extra-Systemic Order (2001-present) and see that presidential initiatives regarding the allocati on of funding took on a particularistic tone as funding was tied to alliance in the War on Terror. Of course it led to some strange bedfellows like Pakistan which had just recently been under sanctions for its unlawful entry into the nuclear club in 1998. But on the whole, we can suggest that W. Bush got his way in this effort, except that there is considerable ev idence to show that a lot of domestic pork was allowed into various appropriations bills in order to get the kinds of military foreign aid (and to a lesser extent humanitarian) that the pr esident wanted (CQ Almanacs 2002-2003, vote summaries). This hardly seems like a wartime president in complete control of the foreign policy process when he has to bargain with a Congress even if it was s ubject to split control conditions (the Democrats had the Senate at the time). Nevertheless, it is time now to take a more systematic look at the presidential su ccess rates in foreign and issue area policies. Empirical Results One way of testing notio ns about the multiplic ation effect of mixed issue areas in the Extra-Systemic Dilemma (2001-2004 in this case) is to repeat the regressi on relating to success in these areas relative to the partisan indicators th at have served us so well in the past. As Table 8-1 indicates, only descriptive indicators are possibl e as the dependent variab le is purged from the model due to the lack of any systematically present co-relational eff ect when the explanatory variables (the various partisan indicators) are regressed on it. Supporting notions for the multiple presidencies thesis are to be found amidst the descriptive variables when you observe the high

PAGE 276

276 rate of occurrence regarding the mixed issue indica tor itself (n=60). It is also interesting to note that all sixty votes that appear as mixed issues are found in only two of the four years examined in this table. However, the fact th at no systematic relations hips were uncovered is troubling, though it is possible that the limited nature of the size of the relevant portion of the data set in this analys is is reducing the relationships or in fact imposing a non-linearity condition amongst them. Further study is needed on this ques tion as well as additional data collection and operationalization but that will have to wait for another day. Regarding the issue of the multiplication effect for issue areas, we can assert th at it is upheld but its true systematic impact on presidential foreign policy success if any is not at this time known. Looking ahead a bit, if we engage in a tabul ar study of the various mixed issue area success scores across the presidential administ rations of the Post-War Era (see Tables 8-710) we can make some descriptive inferences th at speak to the idea of a multiplication effect among the issue areas in general and the mixed issue areas specifically. There are two striking patterns that appear and in general support the co ntentions of a multiple presidencies theory for inter-institutional foreign policy making. First, there is a multiplication regarding the sheer presence of mixed issue areas of foreign policy, this is especial ly true regarding comparing the War Power Order (1953-1972) (Table 8-7 and earl y Nixon in Table 8-8) w ith the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989) (Table 8-8 and 89). Second, there is a corresponding observable decline in the presidential success rate among the individual mixed issue areas across those first two orders of political time (again see tables 8-7-9). This also supports conceptions of the multiple presidencies because as foreign policy gets more nuanced, it becomes less subject to single-issue concerns. Where this regards that co mponent of foreign affair s devoted to security,

PAGE 277

277 the president will be correspondingly constrained in his ability to persuade the Congress to support his efforts to dominate th e construction of foreign policy. Offsetting these two above trends but s upporting the notion that there was some restoration of presidential power in foreign po licy during the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order and in the current Extra-Systemic Dilemma Or der (if there can be said to be one that is?) we actually see a decline in the number of mixe d issue area votes and a corresponding increase in the presidents success rate. This of course supports that portion of the multiple presidencies which suggests that as much as things change at the structural level (i .e. the rise and fall of orders of political time), at the unit level much remains the same where a securitizing president can and still does get his way when political time allows him to. Of course, further inquiry is necessary, especially that of a more systematic fa shion but for right now let us return to the core issue areas of foreign policy for a stronger analysis of the impacts of par tisan determinants on the executive-legislative association in this regard. As done in previous portions of this projec t, we will first look at foreign policy success writ large during the Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-2004) and see if we can find any differences with the previous order. Because, if we cannot find such differences then the notion that 9/11 changed everything, in foreign polic y relations may exist more in the mind of President W. Bush than anywhere else, especially the Congress. Table 8-2 is revealing in that there is a significant change in the extant presidential-congressional relationship in foreign affairs but perhaps not in the ways one would expect. For in stance, many of the partisan factors drop out of the model due to a lack of co-relational association On the one hand, this could be used as evidence for the notion of a de-politicization however independent correlation analysis (Table 8-1) does indicate a sign ificant relationship. It just does not seem to maintain in

PAGE 278

278 systematized regression. This, of course, could be explained as an unintended consequence of the relatively small N but remember I am utilizing population not sample data. Probably there is some type of non-linear relationshi p here but it is proba bly better to wait for more data points (derived from future years) and see if this in consistency does not just wash out as we move forward in this period of political time. A fi nal observation which places further doubt on the alternative hypothesiss contention that since 9/11 there has been a de-politicization of executivelegislative relations in foreign policy is found in the fact that certain political variables like unified government are portraying directional correlations in counterintuitive manners (in this case its negative association with foreign policy success). Again, this may be due to the limited nature of the data since almost half the time the president faced a split control governmental condition which if anything would have a neutral or even negative impact on presidential success. Read from that perspective then the fi ndings may not be as counterintuitive as first viewed. Looking at the first of the co re issue areasnational securitywe see that it generally follows the predicted pattern of matching well with the observed rela tionships in foreign policy success. In this case, that even includes the number and type of variables that drop out of the model due to non-correlation. Interesting, though is that in both foreign as well as national security success we see that Se nate Democratic Party Unity is associated with presidential success (Tables 8-2-3). Remember that the form split control government took during this timeframe was with a Democratic majority Sena te juxtaposed against both a Republican House and presidency. Therefore, senato rial bi-partisanship was a source of continued strength for the president in the immediate years after 9/11. This is evidence for no tions of a de-politicization and it will be interesting in the future work to s ee if it continues as a systematic phenomenon long

PAGE 279

279 after 9/11 has been displaced as the ce ntral US foreign policy issue of the 21st century (which many might suggest that the Iraq War has done just that during Mr. Bushs second term). Comparing the results for the models dealing w ith presidential success in trade and foreign aid relative to the Congress (Tables 8-4 and 85), we can discern that trade success tends to follow predicted partisan patterns (with the exception of the role of the presidential election variable but that could be due to compounding effects brought on by the high role of national and domestic security politics in the 2004 election). Nevertheless, th is output looks more like a continuance of the Imperial Presidency Politiciz ed than any notions of a new order in the aftermath of 9/11. Meanwhile, foreign aid policy also seems to follow a somewhat deviating pattern that might suggest a new order of presid ential-congressional forei gn policy relations as a review of the Senate Democratic party unity va riable indicates but the Senate partisanship indicator offsets this, so we are left largely unknowing on this particular question. So what, if anything can we conclude from this statistical analysis of presidential success in foreign and core issue areas ? Well, unfortunately not much at least as far as anything conclusive regarding the extant executive-legislative relationship is concerned. The data is too limited overall and has severe problems regarding asymptotic properties but as far as we can make inferences from it, it tends to not support the presidents statement that everything changed in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy. This tends to support the narratives assessment that presidential-congressional relati ons across the component issue ar eas of foreign policy remain politicized and hence more governed by partisan relations rather than some re-institutionalization of a presidentialized/securitized foreign policy. President Bush utilized his restored power in security to push a national security and domestic security agenda but the impetus for this was not 9/11 but rather an ongoing

PAGE 280

280 employment of his base opportu nity structure in national se curity that was re-emboldened during the first Bush administration. Likewise, the fact th at such activities have been subject to congressional scrutiny has been a characteristic norm of the executive-legislative foreign affairs relationship since the Confrontati on Politics of the early 1970s. They have been able to do this because absent a new credible systemic dilemma, the opportunity structure that presidents enjoy in national security is weakened and therefore their own opportunity struct ure in domestic affairs is emboldened. Helping this process out is the fact that issue areas outside of security which have always been more intermestic by nature have come into their own as nexus points for presidential-congressional inte raction. Thus, the wo rld of internationa l relations policy construction is still defined by a securitizing pr esident versus a domesticating Congress under the conditions begun in the Confrontation period and coalesced in the Imperial Presidency Order. Lastly, as tabular study of the current admini strations success rates across foreign policy reveals, outcomes are not always what they seem. President W. Bush was overwhelmingly successful across the seemingly not so disparate i ssue areas of foreign policy (Table 8-6). On the surface, this clearly supports hypotheses regarding the de-political nature of the Post-9/11 represidentialized foreign policy frame. But, does th at not countermand the previous studies in this chapter? This re-presidentializa tion process is well supported by an examination of the specific issue area as well as overall foreign policy success rates the president enjoyed with the Congress during his first term, however, this fact rema ins true only as long as you avoid looking too closely at Table 8-6. For starters President W. Bush takes very few positions in foreign (or any other) type of policy; in his most prolific year (2002the mid-term election year where his party regained control over the Congres s) he took a mere thirty-five positions across both chambers of the

PAGE 281

281 Congress. Presidential position taking has been in decline since the late Reagan presidency but W. Bush is known as the least prone to take roll ca ll positions (Leloup and S hull 2003). It is also true that in general more positions are taken in domestic policy votes by presidents than in foreign policy ones but it is also true that the president wins more in foreign policy (Shull and Shaw 1999). Nevertheless, these tw o facts together means that to some extent our current president stacked the deck regarding which foreign policy votes he took positions on and which ones he did not in order to gui de the outcomes in his favor. LB J was known for his strategic position taking on roll calls and Cart er for his propensity to do it. But, W. Bush may be known for combining strategic with a lack of propensity. Thus a kind of ne gative power seems to be in play here (from Shull and Shaw 1999). This concl udes our last act in the drama of presidentialcongressional foreign policy relations but before the movie concludes we will take a look back at the main highlights. We do this to get the allegorical message out of the movie by achieving a sense of overall continuity and to foreshadow some natural implications/prescriptions which emanate out of the film as we leave the meta phorical theater and go ho me for the evening. Summary of the Project: The Multiple Pres idencies Thesis across the Issue Areas of Foreign Policy through out the Political Time of the Post-War Era, 1953-2004 This summation will involve three principl e elements, a review of the basic argument relative to the multiple presidencies and issue ar eas of foreign policy, a re-articulation of the general as well as some of the specific findings across political time. And, it will close with a discussion of the implications a nd prescriptions which attend the theory and its findings for the future of executive-legislative relations in this policy domain. Finally, I will close this section by offering up additional opportunities for furthe r study and make some final remarks on the importance of this piece as a contribution to the extant body of knowledge regarding its component elements including presidential-congre ssional relations, forei gn policy research and

PAGE 282

282 the employment of the historical construction of politics.1 This last point will be driven by both empirical as well as normative concerns and serve as a genera l invitation for more scholarly study in these two often though not exclusiv ely divergent resear ch trajectories. This project began by asking a relatively simple question, Whither the two presidencies? And, what I meant by that was that since the tw o presidencies scholarship which purported to suggest that presidents domina ted the general and specific construction of foreign policy vis-vis the Congress, why was there such an em pirical gap in demonstrating the phenomenon? Furthermore, then a specific research question ar ose like a phoenix out of the ashes of a failed two presidencies, What is the exact inter-instituti onal relationship between the national executive and legislature in the construction of foreign policy? This larger question actually contained two component questions of mutual significance within it, first what was the governing principle for the unit level relationshi p between the president and the Congress? and what was the structuring principle for that sa me relationship within a larger foreign policy environment seen as part and parcel of political time? My answer given to these questions has been two-fold and has served as the operational principle for this entire project. From an analytical perspective I have offered up a new theory of executive-legislative relations and applied it specifically to the case of US foreign policy construction during the extant Post-War Era of 1953-2004. I called this theory the Multiple Presidencies Thesis which states that presidential-congressional relations is best viewed as a struggle for power in foreign policy by a securitizing presidency versus a domesticating Congress across component issue areas including national security, domestic s ecurity, diplomacy, trade, foreign aid and 1 From Orren and Skowronek (2004) The Search for American Political Development wherein they offer the notion of the historical construction of politics, as the uni fying theme of American Political Development (APD) research.

PAGE 283

283 immigration policies. Each institution has reser voirs of power known as opportunity structures and utilizes them to impose their will on the competing institution. For the presidency, that opportunity st ructure lies with national secu rity as the historical and constitutional locus of nati onal executive authority. Issue ar eas most proximate to national security are the ones best emplaced for a process of presidentialization For the Congress its historical and constitutional pla cement of prerogatives is found out side of foreign policy itself in the realm of domestic politics. Therefore, issue areas which are further removed from security and thus contain a higher level of confluen ce regarding the mix of foreign and domestic politics, called intermestic policie s have a greater likelihood of being congressionalized The above describes an ongoing static unit leve l relationship between the presidency and the Congress which was codified by constitution al doctrine, institutionalized by historical practice and upheld by the tr aditions of the po litical culture itself. Howe ver, it is only half the analytical story, as the setti ng of the political environment provides the structural impulses to either uphold or impede the interplay of the executive-legislative foreign affairs relationship. Accordingly, certain orders of time cause a p ush or pull phenomenon relative to the various sets of executive-legislative relations amidst the component issue areas of foreign policy. In the early days of the Post War Era, what I call the War Power Order (1953-1972), the president was able to fully (or at least nearly so) securi tize hence presidentialize foreign policy. Then, during the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the height of dtente betw een the superpowers the Congress conducted a relatively successful confront ation politics agai nst presidential prerogatives in foreign policy constructionI call this timeframe the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989). Finally, the process of foreign policy politic ization which began in the previous order as more and more issue areas of foreign policy became subject to domestication

PAGE 284

284 and hence congressionalization came to fruition with an attendant yet incomplete restoration of presidential power through the re vitalization of the secu rity apparatus of foreign affairs. I call this last period the Imperial Presidency Po liticized (1990-2000) and concluded it with an examination of the current Extra-Systemic D ilemma Order (2001-2004). In this last effort, I found little real evidence that the now highly politicized and even ideological nature of presidential-congressional intern ational relations in the aftermath of 9/11 has actually been systematically altered. In addition to the analytical perspective offere d by this account, I have also endeavored to suggest a new way of looking at foreign policy from a methodological pe rspective. In this project, I called for the employment of an i ssue areas alternative to the dominant domainspecific approaches associated with both the st atist and the domestic variables studies in American foreign policy research. I have sugge sted that by looking at foreign policy as a polyglot of component issue areas we can see the forest for the trees as well as the trees for the forest. From the perspective of the multiple presidencies thesis, I envisioned six inter-related yet distinct issue areas of foreign policy and arranged them along two interconnected dimensions. First, I placed them along a fron tier defined by their proximity to the opportunity structures of power for the presidency and the Congress in or der to conceptualize th e unit level relationship. Beginning with national security affairs, we see a movement of issue areas in descending proximity to the source of presidential power in foreign affairsnational security itself. The movement continues from domestic security to di plomacy, to trade, through foreign aid and ends at immigration; the place with the greatest level of intermestic quality and hence highest potential for subse quent domestication by the Congress.

PAGE 285

285 Second, I accounted for the structural level determinants of the issue areas of foreign affairs by conceptualizing these disparate entities as co-existing within larger arenas of issue areas. I based the issue areas placement on their proxi mity to the high (the politics of war and peace) versus low (the politics of everything else, especially economics) politics framework so common in classical depictions of the US foreign policy process. I did this because these larger issue arenas capture in aggregate the influences of the macro-level historical and economic factors in the political time of American foreign policy, in other words they record the systemic changes to the background setting for the unit level executive-legislative relationship. Finally, I proposed that the unit leve l relationship would be tested by the relevant political factors involved measured along popular, electoral and partisan/ideol ogical factors. And, I also suggested that a related phenomenon needed to be examined which was central to the sele cted unit of analysis (that being presidential position roll call votes in foreign and issue area policies) which was the role of the type of vote as we ll as the presence (or lack thereo f) regarding the employment of securitization-domestication and mixed issue areas as influencers of the presidentialcongressional foreign policy dynamic. So what were the results of a ll of this? Each one of the empirical chapters (4-7) followed a moderately similar pattern by first setting the contex t with historical analys is of the structure and unit level factors. Then, we looked at the systema tic results deriving out of longitudinal and later cross-sectional examinations of the impacts of various hist orical, economic and political indicators on our dependent variables of intere stthe presidential succes s rates in foreign and component issue area policies. Finally, we closed out each empirical chapter by synthesizing the narrative and statistical compone nts through the lens provided by the multiple presidencies thesis. This process was done with analogy and tabular analysis of the va rious success rates in

PAGE 286

286 order to draw some descriptive inferences a bout the executive-legislative relationship from within and across time perspectives. In all of thes e efforts, I tried to ope rationalize the variables involved in such a way as to te st hypotheses in the direction of supporting/refuting presidencycentered versus Congress-centered conditions. The cross-time findings were developed from three types of statistical methods aimed at the success rates themselves including percent di fferencing with significance tests, time-series analysis and longitudinally applied simple multivariate regression. The explanatory factors involved included macro-historical, macro-economic and to a le sser extent macro-political. Additionally, internal factors includ ing type of vote, the role of mixed issue areas and the extent of securitization or domestication were also examined in a longit udinal manner. The initial set of findings largely supported the view s of the multiple presidencies thesis, in that, generally speaking differential success rates exist, persist over time and follow expected patterns as to the level of success enjoyed by presidents in thei r relationship with the Congress. These findings further suggested that within foreign policy there exists a core set of issue areas including national security, trade and foreign aid All issue area re gression on foreign policy presidential success indicates that the core issue areas, especi ally national security are in fact driving the presidents success rate vis--vis the Congress in foreign affairs. Also, the time series and later the longitudinal regressions support basic notions with some modest deviations about the role of political time as well as economic indicators in pushing presidential su ccess in either positive (presidency centered conditionality) or negative (Congress-centered condi tionality) directions. Regarding the cross-sectional analyses, th ese were all accomplished by a qualitative overview of legislative histories built around the various issue areas of foreign policy. Then, this was followed up with more systematic study based on employing simple multivariate regressions

PAGE 287

287 of the various political factor s on the success rates in foreign and core issue areasnational security, trade and foreign aid. In general, amidst the various political factors only partisan determinants seemed to have an ongoing systematic relationship with the presidents foreign and core issue area roll call success rate. This is pr obably because popular and electoral determinants are more behavioral in both their design and their impact; they do not tend to have ongoing relational impacts on the inter-institutional re lationship shared by th e presidency and the Congress in foreign policy. Hence, one of the mo st profound lessons to be learned from this study is the inter-institutional analysis should utilize institutional determinants like partisanship and ideology (though ideology by itself in this st udy was not found to be a decisive indicator). Partisanship within the Congress as an organizing force, a programmatic instrument, a locus of ideology (or lack thereof) has been found to be central to understanding the unit level executive-legislative relationship in internati onal affairs. During the War Power Order (19531972) a bi-partisan Cold War Consensus that was non-ideological and de-politicized characterized presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy. During the Confrontation Politics Order (1973-1989), the Cold War Consen sus broke down and the inter-institutional policy making relationship began a process of politic ization, where the old cross-partisan coalitional formation of old began to take on a decidedly ideological cast. We can say that during the Confrontation Politics Order, presidential-co ngressional relations in foreign policy began to be congressionalized/domesticated. Or, in othe r words, that the Congress has increasingly approached foreign policy issues as domestic policy matters. In the Imperial Presidency Politicized Order (1990-2000), ex ecutive-legislative relations in foreign policy became fully politicized as the parties divide d along strictly ideological gr ounds sounding the final death knell of the Conservative Coalition along with the already dead Liberal Coalition. Despite, a

PAGE 288

288 restoration of presidential prerogatives in the security realm as witnessed by the first Bushs statement after the Persian Gulf War that, the ghost of the Vietnam syndr ome has been laid to rest!2 The results indicate that despite initially hy pothesized claims we are probably still in this last period of political time as the Extra-System ic Dilemma Order (2001-present) is probably not a decisive break with the immediate past and some reinvigoration of the presidentialized/securitized War Power Order. In fact, the time we live in today is probably a continuance of more of the same, where to whom great power is given (the presidency), great responsibility is requir ed (the Congress). Implications and prescriptions which come out of the above findi ngs suggest two basic conclusions about the future of executive-legislative relations in the sphere of foreign politics. First, they contend that absent a true systemic level dilemma the presidential-congressional relationship will remain a politicized and hence partisan phenomenon. The president has largely lost the battle that the War on Terror represents some new Cold War and without such a structural securitizing force the Congress will not routinely acquiesce to the will of presidential government in foreign policy. Unified government is now more important than ever for presidents to push their foreign policy agenda through the Congress but offsetting this is the inherent inconsistencies caused by the fact that foreign policy is not one thing but many things. This brings us to our second basic implicati on, that the divide among issue areas of foreign policy is becoming thinner and thinner. The ever increasing intermestic content of issue areas in foreign policy allows for interesting mixes of the two institutions opportunity structures, however, they now require a degree of nuanced st rategizing by both actors that was unheard of 2 George Bush said this in an off the record statement to reporters after the advance of US forces into Iraq was halted on February 28, 1991.

PAGE 289

289 as early as Reagans last term. This is because the extra security dilemma represented by the War on Terror and to a lesser extent by other phenomena like the War on Dr ugs, etcetera is in itself intermestic in its very nature. Thus, securitizatio n may not even be a privileged activity within the national security (and definitely not in the domestic security) areas of foreign policy anymore. Complicating this is the fact that thes e are still dilemmas, therefore the Congress will never be likely to be able to actually displace the inherent op portunity structure of power so jealously held by every president Republican or Democratic. Therefore, we are in a cycle of granting and then rescinding power in ever more nuanced and complicated fashions as foreign policy both explodes and implodes with issue areas within and acr oss spans of political time. So what can future presidents and Congresses learn from this project? Well, for one thing they can learn to appreciate the others stake in foreign policy. Too often presidents (and want to be presidents) think that any encroachment on their prerogati ves in foreign policy by the Congress (or anyone else for that matter) is an attack on their fundamental roles as Chief Diplomat, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive of foreign aid provision as well as immigration and finally, Chief Trade Negotiator for the countr y as a whole. This is not true because a separation of powers system like ours with its a ttendant checks and balan ces requires shared governance even in the vaunted realm of national security affairs. The Congress needs to recognize that the Founding Fath ers were on to something in their call for energy in the executive, especially in foreign and defense affairs. The Congress needs to recognize presidential rights as the national executive in international affairs elected by the people and held accountable ultimately to them, not the Congre ss. Presidents should be given their due with congressional support on issues of national impor tance in the foreign affairs realm but that support should be qualified with aggressive oversight. In our most recent presidential-

PAGE 290

290 congressional conflict over th e Iraq War it should be remembered that many who now oppose the president signed away massi ve amounts of policy making discre tion without so much as an afterthought, until it was too late. With great power, comes great responsibility; both the presidency and the Congress need to remember that as national s ecurity frequently costs lives, trade often costs jobs and forei gn aid while small overall may cost our very values. Especially, given the tendencies for this country to make deal s with the devil in order to achieve some, often short sighted diplomatic/security goallike sup porting Iraq in the Iraq-Ir an War and then having to fight our one time ally within a handful of years. Future Research On the issue of suggestions for further research, I would like to make some basic contentions as to places to go from here. In the first place, a more rigorous qualitative empirical study is needed of these issue areas wi thin foreign policy. A natural outcrop of this inquiry is found in the event and legislative histor ies utilized in the empi rical portions of this analysis. However, these studies were rudimentar y and excessively tertiary in their employment. A full blown comparative historical analysis of specific exemplifying and deviating case studies and legislative histories is calle d for. One technique could be to compare and contrast different legislative histories across issue areas within the same period of political time. Or another way of comparing/contrasting through the st udy of legislative histories is to do the same thing only in a single issue area across different pe riods of political time in order to get a sense of how the foreign policy production process has altered ac ross history. Another t echnique could involve employing larger event histories to showcase elemen ts of presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy by engaging in a deep description, of those activities across issue areas and even across periods of political time.

PAGE 291

291 Also, more specifically normative study is needed as the search for the locus of interinstitutional power in foreign a ffairs construction has fundamentally normative implications; it is not solely an empirical question. While norma tive study was not openly addressed in this research it could serve as the starting point for su ch a constituted study in the future. For instance one could follow the prescriptions above by tracing the historical development of executive versus legislative power both as theories in practice within the Constitution, Federalist Papers, state and colonial constitutions, etcetera. Also, a prospective researcher c ould look at the search for executive versus legislative foreign policy power as components in the history of ideas emanating out of the philosophical works of Lock e, Montesquieu, Blackstone and others. In both the prospective analyzer would want to employ an issue areas perspective to find which issue areas of foreign policy differentiate themselves as historical entities and are captured within either the executive or legislative sphere as points of activity. As to the issue of the historical constructi on of politics, Orren a nd Skowronek (2004) have claimed recently that this is the great nexus point for all past current and future inquiries into American political development. They make this claim suggesting that hi story should be viewed as a systematic matrix wherein events and pr ocesses intersect across, within and between historical periods (Orren and Skowronek 2004). At both the structural and unit levels the multiple presidencies offers an empirical and theoretical application of such a matrix in action. The intersecting flows of history are captured at the nexus points of executive-legislative foreign issue area interaction conditioned by the dynamism of the larger political environment itself. Therefore both the vectors of intersection and the matrix of the structure itself are wedded together in a systematic flow that carries the executive-legislative foreign policy divide across a political template of time. And, now to conclude the conclusion!

PAGE 292

292 The movie is almost finished, people are starti ng to file out of the theater but as you leave you may be thinking, so what have I learned. Hopefully, you have developed an appreciation for both the multiple presidencies thesis and the opportunities inherent in viewing foreign policy as a sum of parts rather than just this one thi ng. Analytically, the multiple presidencies thesis provides both a unit and structural level explanation for executivelegislative relations within the foreign policy domain. This is something not of ten done in either foreign policy studies and especially not in presidential-congressional anal ysis. Methodologically, th e issue areas approach offers a kind of synthesis relative to state-centrist versus domestic variables conceptions of US foreign policy construction. This kind of mixing is not done much in an academic world defined by vested paradigmatic interests and should be seen as the Aristote lian Mean between the Extremes that it is. Finally, I hope that someone somewhere gets something worthwhile out of this effort!

PAGE 293

293 Table 8-1. Mixed Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Success correlation analysis with Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) MeanStd. Deviation N Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order an nual mixed issue area success score 1.000.00060 House Partisan Roll Calls .420.01560 Senate Partisan Roll Calls .495.04860 House Party Unity (D) .847.01460 House Party Unity (R) .904.00460 Senate Party Unity (D) .855.02960 Senate Party Unity (R) .856.01960 Presidential Party Seat % in Senate .490.00060 Presidential Party Seat % in H ouse of Representatives .510.00060 Presidential Election Year .00.00060 Mid-Term Election Year .58.49760 Unified Government 1.03.18160 Table 8-2. Foreign Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 1.216 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) .269 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.654.000 .000 Presidential Election Year -.101.000 .000 Unified Government -4.227.000 1.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .008 Predictors: (Constant), Unified Government, Sena te Party Unity (D), Presidential Election Year, Senate Party Unity (R) Dependent Variable: Extra-Systemic Dilemm a Order annual forei gn policy success score N=110

PAGE 294

294 Table 8-3. National Security Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -1.812 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) 3.692 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) -.538.000 .000 Presidential Election Year .062.000 .000 Unified Government -1.351.000 1.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .005 Predictors: (Constant), Unified Government, Senate Party Unity (D ), Presidential Election Year, Senate Party Unity (R) Dependent Variable: Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order annual national security success score N=110 Table 8-4. Trade Policy Success Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) 4.518 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) -6.308 .000 Senate Party Unity (R) 1.962 .000 Presidential Election Year -.338 .000 Unified Government 1.709 .000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .005 Predictors: (Constant), Unified Government, Sena te Party Unity (D), Presidential Election Year, Senate Party Unity (R) Dependent Variable: Extra-Systemic Or der Annual Trade Policy Success Score N=110

PAGE 295

295 Table 8-5. Foreign Aid Policy Su ccess Regression Analysis of Partisan Determinants Extra Systemic Dilemma Order (2001-present) Un-standardized Coefficients Sig. B Std. Error (Constant) -6.548 .000 .000 Senate Partisan Roll Calls 1.219 .000 .000 Senate Party Unity (D) 7.724 .000 .000 Unified Government -1.803 .000 1.000 R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the EstimateDurbin-Watson 1.000 1.000 .000 .025 Predictors: (Constant), Unified Government, Senate Partisan Roll Calls, Senate Party Unity (D) Dependent Variable: Extra-Systemic Dilemma Order Annual Foreign Aid Policy Success Score N=110

PAGE 296

296 Table 8-6. Annual Presidential Success Sc ores across Issue Areas of Foreign Polic y. W. Bush Administra tion (2001-present) 107th108th Congresses*+# Year Foreign Policy Security Domestic Security Diplomacy Trade Foreign Aid Immigration Totals 2001 C=88% (22:3) H=82% (14:3) S=100% (8:0) C=100% (8:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (4:0) C=100% (6:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (1:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=100% (1:0) C=63% (5:3) H=57% (4:3) S=100% (1:0) C=100% (1:0) H=100% (1:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=25 N=17 N=8 2002 C=89% (31:4) H=89% (16:2) S=88% (15:2) C=80% (8:2) H=83% (5:1) S=75% (3:1) C=88% (7:1) H=83% (5:1) S=100% (2:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=93% (14:1) H=100% (4:0) S=91% (10:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) N=35 N=18 N=17 2003 C=83% (25:5) H=93% (14:1) S=73% (11:4) C=82% (9:2) H=75% (3:1) S=86% (6:1) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=100% (6:0) H=100% (4:0) S=100% (2:0) C=83% (10:2) H=100% (7:0) S=60% (3:2) C=0% (0:1) H=n/a (0:0) S=0% (0:1) N=30 N=15 N=15 2004 C=75% (15:5) H=67% (10:5) S=100% (5:0) C=83% (5:1) H=75% (3:1) S=100% (2:0) C=100% (3:0) H=100% (2:0) S=100% (1:0) C=n/a (0:0) H=n/a (0:0) S=n/a (0:0) C=71% (5:2) H=60% (3:2) S=100% (2:0) C=50% (1:1) H=50% (1:1) S=n/a (0:0) C=50% (1:1) H=50% (1:1) S=n/a (0:0) N=20 N=15 N=5 *1st term only. +Some votes contain mixed categories (these are on a separate table) they are included in the aggreg ate annual foreign policy s uccess scores but excluded from the individuated issue area success scores. #Win-Loss Ratios are in parentheses.

PAGE 297

297 Table 8-7. Issue Areas of Foreign Polic y Mixed Categories, 1953-1968 Eisenhower-Johnson Year Issue Area of Foreign Policy Total Votes Win-Loss Ratio Annual Presidential Success Score 1953 none n/a n/a n/a 1954 none n/a n/a n/a 1955 none n/a n/a n/a 1956 D-T 5 3:2 60% 1957 D-S 1 1:0 100% 1958 none n/a n/a n/a 1959 FA-T D-T D-DS 3 6 1 1:2 3:3 1:0 33% 50% 100% 1960 none n/a n/a n/a 1961 none n/a n/a n/a 1962 none n/a n/a n/a 1963a FA-T 1 1:0 100% 1963b none n/a n/a n/a 1964 FA-T D-S FA-D 2 1 1 1:1 1:0 1:0 50% 100% 100% 1965 T-I FA-T D-T 2 3 1 2:0 3:0 1:0 100% 100% 100% 1966 FA-T D-T FA-D D-S 7 5 1 1 5:2 4:1 1:0 1:0 71% 80% 100% 100% 1967 FA-T D-T FA-D S-D S-T 12 6 2 1 1 8:4 6:0 2:0 1:0 1:0 67% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1968 S-D FA-T D-T FA-D 5 10 6 2 2:3 8:2 6:0 2:0 40% 80% 100% 100%

PAGE 298

298 Table 8-8. Issue Areas of Foreign Po licy Mixed Categories, 1969-1980 Nixon-Carter Year Issue Area Total Win-Loss Ratio % Success 1969 T-D 1 1:0 100% 1970 D-DS 1 1:0 100% 1971 FA-D 1 1:0 100% 1972 S-D FA-T 4 3 4:0 3:0 100% 100% 1973 S-D T-D FA-S D-DS 1 10 3 3 0:1 10:0 3:0 3:0 0% 100% 100% 100% 1974a DS-T FA-T FA-D 1 1 1 0:1 1:0 1:0 0% 100% 100% 1974b FA-T I-T 16 3 5:11 3:0 31% 100% 1975 FA-T FA-S T-DS T-D 2 4 1 1 1:1 3:1 1:0 1:0 50% 75% 100% 100% 1976 T-D FA-T 1 4 1:0 0:4 100% 0% 1977 FA-T DS-D S-D T-D 2 1 1 1 0:2 1:0 1:0 1:0 0% 100% 100% 100% 1978 T-D 3 3:0 100% 1979 FA-T T-D D-I FA-I D-DS 2 1 1 1 1 2:0 0:1 1:0 1:0 1:0 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 1980 FA-T 6 3:3 50%

PAGE 299

299 Table 8-9. Issue Areas of Foreign Polic y Mixed Categories, 1981-1992 ReaganBush Year Issue Area of Foreign Policy Total Win-Loss Ratio % Annual Presidential Success Rate 1981 FA-T 1 0:1 0% 1982 DS-I 1 1:0 100% 1983 T-D 1 1:0 100% 1984 D-FA 7 7:0 100% 1985 FA-T FA-D 1 4 0:1 3:1 0% 75% 1986 FA-D D-DS FA-T 5 2 1 5:0 1:1 1:0 100% 50% 100% 1987 T-D D-S S-T 1 1 5 1:0 0:1 2:3 100% 0% 40% 1988 FA-D S-D FA-T DS-D 2 18 3 5 1:1 16:2 2:1 5:0 50% 89% 67% 100% 1989 D-S FA-T FA-D 3 1 3 2:1 0:1 3:0 67% 0% 100% 1990 S-D T-D T-S I-T 2 1 1 1 1:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 50% 0% 0% 0% 1991 T-D FA-T 1 3 1:0 0:3 100% 0% 1992 FA-D T-D 1 1 1:0 1:0 100% 100%

PAGE 300

300 Table 8-10. Issue Areas of Foreign Policy Mixed Categories, 1993-2004. Clinton-W. Bush Year Issue Area Total Win-Loss Ratio % Success 1993 FA-T 2 2:0 100% 1994 T-S S-FA 6 3 3:3 3:0 50% 100% 1995 S-D FA-T T-S 1 1 1 0:1 1:0 0:1 0% 100% 0% 1996 FA-T T-S D-S D-FA 3 3 1 1 2:1 3:0 1:0 0:1 67% 100% 100% 0% 1997 S-T DS-D S-D DS-T 1 3 1 1 1:0 0:3 0:1 0:1 100% 0% 0% 0% 1998 D-FA D-T S-D S-T DS-D S-FA 2 1 7 1 1 1 1:1 1:0 7:0 1:0 0:1 1:0 50% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 1999 S-D S-FA 1 1 0:1 1:0 0% 100% 2000 S-D 1 1:0 100% 2001 DS-D 1 1:0 100% 2002 DS-T FA-S 1 1 1:0 1:0 100% 100% 2003 none n/a n/a n/a 2004 none n/a n/a n/a

PAGE 301

301 APPENDIX SUPPORTING DATA Supporting Table for Figures 4-1 & 42 Issue Area of Foreign Policy Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Deleted Cases 29.9.9 .9 diplomacy 2577.77.7 8.6 diplomacy/domestic security 1.0.0 8.6 diplomacy/foreign aid 341.01.0 9.6 diplomacy/immigration 1.0.0 9.6 diplomacy/trade 571.71.7 11.3 domestic security 1965.95.9 17.2 domestic security/diplomacy 18.5.5 17.7 domestic security/immigration 1.0.0 17.8 domestic security/trade 4.1.1 17.9 foreign aid 67920.320.3 38.2 foreign aid/immigration 1.0.0 38.2 immigration 822.52.5 40.7 security 103631.031.0 71.7 security/diplomacy 501.51.5 73.1 security/foreign aid 14.4.4 73.6 security/trade 19.6.6 74.1 trade 76823.023.0 97.1 trade/diplomacy 1.0.0 97.1 trade/foreign aid 892.72.7 99.8 trade/immigration 7.2.2 100.0 Total 3344100.0100.0

PAGE 302

302 Supporting data for Table 4-1, Model 1 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Policy Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 2 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 20 .024 .017 .*. 1.924 1.000 21 .000 .017 .*. 1.924 1.000 22 .000 .017 .*. 1.924 1.000 23 .000 .017 .*. 1.924 1.000 24 .000 .017 .*. 1.924 1.000 25 .002 .017 .*. 1.938 1.000 26 .000 .017 .*. 1.938 1.000 27 .000 .017 .*. 1.938 1.000 28 -.004 .017 .*. 1.991 1.000 29 .000 .017 .*. 1.991 1.000 30 .005 .017 .*. 2.087 1.000 31 .000 .017 .*. 2.087 1.000 32 .000 .017 .*. 2.087 1.000 33 .000 .017 .*. 2.087 1.000 34 .000 .017 .*. 2.087 1.000 35 -.004 .017 .*. 2.146 1.000 36 -.027 .017 *. 4.674 1.000 37 .016 .017 .*. 5.487 1.000 38 .000 .017 .*. 5.487 1.000 39 .000 .017 .*. 5.487 1.000

PAGE 303

303 40 .000 .017 .*. 5.487 1.000 41 .005 .017 .*. 5.583 1.000 42 -.009 .017 .*. 5.875 1.000 43 .000 .017 .*. 5.875 1.000 44 .000 .017 .*. 5.875 1.000 45 .001 .017 .*. 5.881 1.000 46 -.043 .017 *. 12.203 1.000 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Policy AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 -.016 .017 .*. 13.065 1.000 48 -.006 .017 .*. 13.186 1.000 49 .000 .017 .*. 13.186 1.000 50 .000 .017 .*. 13.186 1.000 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 3342 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Listwise deletion. Missing cas es: 146 Valid cases: 3198 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series. 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Variable: NATSEC Missing cases: 201 Valid cases: 3143 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series.

PAGE 304

304 Supporting data for Table 4-1, Model 2 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Error. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .018 .*. .000 .997 2 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 20 -.061 .018 *. 11.996 .916 21 .000 .018 .*. 11.996 .940 22 .000 .018 .*. 11.996 .957 23 .000 .018 .*. 11.996 .971 24 .000 .018 .*. 11.996 .980 25 -.053 .018 *. 21.125 .686 26 .000 .018 .*. 21.125 .735 27 .000 .018 .*. 21.125 .780 28 -.022 .018 .*. 22.698 .748 29 -.010 .018 .*. 23.039 .775 30 .000 .018 .*. 23.039 .814 31 .005 .018 .*. 23.122 .845 32 .000 .017 .*. 23.122 .874 33 .000 .017 .*. 23.122 .900 34 .000 .017 .*. 23.122 .921 35 -.003 .017 .*. 23.147 .938 36 .000 .017 .*. 23.148 .952 37 .021 .017 .*. 24.587 .941

PAGE 305

305 38 .000 .017 .*. 24.587 .955 39 .000 .017 .*. 24.587 .965 40 .000 .017 .*. 24.587 .974 41 .000 .017 .*. 24.587 .980 42 .000 .017 .*. 24.587 .985 43 .004 .017 .*. 24.646 .989 44 .000 .017 .*. 24.646 .992 45 .024 .017 .*. 26.612 .987 46 -.024 .017 .*. 28.578 .979 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Su ccess Score in National Security (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 -.033 .017 *. 32.198 .951 48 .048 .017 .* 39.736 .796 49 .000 .017 .*. 39.736 .825 50 .000 .017 .*. 39.736 .850 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 3135 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Variable: DOMSEC Missing cases: 813 Valid cases: 2531 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series.

PAGE 306

306 Supporting data for Table 4-1, Model 3 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Domestic Security Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 2 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .020 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 20 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 21 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 22 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 23 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 24 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 25 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 26 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 27 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 28 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 29 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 30 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 31 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 32 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 33 .000 .019 .*. .000 1.000 34 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 35 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 36 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 37 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000

PAGE 307

307 38 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 39 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 40 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 41 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 42 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 43 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 44 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 45 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 46 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Domestic Security (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 48 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 49 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 50 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 2509 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Variable: DIP Missing cases: 140 Valid cases: 3204 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series.

PAGE 308

308 Supporting data for Table 4-1, Model 4 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Diplomacy Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .018 .*. .000 .999 2 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 20 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 21 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 22 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 23 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 24 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 25 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 26 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 27 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 28 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 29 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 30 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 31 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 32 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 33 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 34 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 35 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 36 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 37 -.033 .017 *. 3.493 1.000

PAGE 309

309 38 .000 .017 .*. 3.493 1.000 39 .000 .017 .*. 3.493 1.000 40 .000 .017 .*. 3.493 1.000 41 -.004 .017 .*. 3.535 1.000 42 -.007 .017 .*. 3.676 1.000 43 .000 .017 .*. 3.676 1.000 44 .000 .017 .*. 3.676 1.000 45 .000 .017 .*. 3.676 1.000 46 -.007 .017 .*. 3.841 1.000 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Diplomacy (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 .008 .017 .*. 4.058 1.000 48 .000 .017 .*. 4.058 1.000 49 .000 .017 .*. 4.058 1.000 50 .000 .017 .*. 4.059 1.000 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 3198 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing.

PAGE 310

310 Supporting data for Table4-1, Model 5 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 2 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 11 -.017 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 12 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 13 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 14 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 15 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 16 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 17 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 18 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 19 .000 .017 .*. 1.013 1.000 20 -.031 .017 *. 4.167 1.000 21 .000 .017 .*. 4.167 1.000 22 .000 .017 .*. 4.167 1.000 23 .000 .017 .*. 4.167 1.000 24 .000 .017 .*. 4.167 1.000 25 -.037 .017 *. 8.714 .999 26 .000 .017 .*. 8.714 .999 27 .000 .017 .*. 8.714 1.000 28 .031 .017 .* 11.876 .997 29 .000 .017 .*. 11.876 .998 30 -.007 .017 .*. 12.028 .999 31 -.004 .017 .*. 12.076 .999 32 .000 .017 .*. 12.076 .999 33 .000 .017 .*. 12.076 1.000 34 .000 .017 .*. 12.076 1.000 35 .020 .017 .*. 13.486 1.000 36 .000 .017 .*. 13.486 1.000 37 -.003 .017 .*. 13.516 1.000

PAGE 311

311 38 .000 .017 .*. 13.516 1.000 39 .000 .017 .*. 13.516 1.000 40 .000 .017 .*. 13.516 1.000 41 .005 .017 .*. 13.600 1.000 42 .000 .017 .*. 13.600 1.000 43 .000 .017 .*. 13.600 1.000 44 .000 .017 .*. 13.600 1.000 45 .025 .017 .*. 15.689 1.000 46 -.071 .017 *. 32.860 .927 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 .000 .017 .*. 32.860 .941 48 -.045 .017 *. 39.826 .793 49 .000 .017 .*. 39.826 .822 50 .000 .017 .*. 39.826 .848 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 3342 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Variable: FORAID Missing cases: 146 Valid cases: 3198 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series.

PAGE 312

312 Supporting data for Table4-1, Model 6 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidenti al Success Score in Foreign Aid Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .018 .*. .000 .999 2 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .018 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .017 .*. .000 1.000 20 .031 .017 .* 3.070 1.000 21 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 22 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 23 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 24 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 25 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 26 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 27 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 28 .000 .017 .*. 3.070 1.000 29 -.005 .017 .*. 3.142 1.000 30 .000 .017 .*. 3.142 1.000 31 -.002 .017 .*. 3.159 1.000 32 .000 .017 .*. 3.159 1.000 33 .000 .017 .*. 3.159 1.000 34 .000 .017 .*. 3.159 1.000 35 -.012 .017 .*. 3.663 1.000 36 -.002 .017 .*. 3.678 1.000 37 -.034 .017 *. 7.628 1.000

PAGE 313

313 38 .000 .017 .*. 7.628 1.000 39 .000 .017 .*. 7.628 1.000 40 .000 .017 .*. 7.628 1.000 41 -.002 .017 .*. 7.641 1.000 42 .001 .017 .*. 7.642 1.000 43 .010 .017 .*. 7.986 1.000 44 .000 .017 .*. 7.986 1.000 45 .000 .017 .*. 7.986 1.000 46 .004 .017 .*. 8.052 1.000 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Su ccess Score in Foreign Aid (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 -.003 .017 .*. 8.074 1.000 48 .000 .017 .*. 8.074 1.000 49 .000 .017 .*. 8.074 1.000 50 .000 .017 .*. 8.074 1.000 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 3190 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Variable: IMM Missi ng cases: 1797 Valid cases: 1547 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series.

PAGE 314

314 Supporting data for Table 4-1, Model 7 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidenti al Success Score in Immigration Transformations: difference (1) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 1 .000 .025 .*. .000 .997 2 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 3 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 4 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 5 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 6 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 7 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 8 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 9 .000 .025 .*. .000 1.000 10 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 11 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 12 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 13 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 14 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 15 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 16 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 17 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 18 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 19 .000 .024 .*. .000 1.000 20 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 21 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 22 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 23 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 24 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 25 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 26 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 27 .000 .023 .*. .000 1.000 28 -.208 .023 ***.. 84.675 .000 29 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 30 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 31 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 32 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 33 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 34 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 35 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 36 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 37 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000

PAGE 315

315 38 .000 .022 .*. 84.675 .000 39 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 40 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 41 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 42 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 43 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 44 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 45 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 46 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .000 Autocorrelations: Annual Presidential Su ccess Score in Immigration (continued) AutoStand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob. 47 .000 .021 .*. 84.675 .001 48 .000 .021 .*. 84.676 .001 49 .000 .021 .*. 84.676 .001 50 .000 .020 .*. 84.676 .002 Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable first lags after differencing: 1523 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing.

PAGE 316

316 Supporting data for Table 4-2, Model A Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Succes s Score in National Security Transformations: difference (1) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -50 .000 .018 .*. -49 .000 .018 .*. -48 .026 .018 .* -47 -.046 .018 *. -46 -.035 .018 *. -45 -.002 .018 .*. -44 .000 .018 .*. -43 .000 .018 .*. -42 .000 .018 .*. -41 .000 .018 .*. -40 .000 .018 .*. -39 .000 .018 .*. -38 .000 .018 .*. -37 .018 .018 .*. -36 .000 .018 .*. -35 .013 .018 .*. -34 .000 .018 .*. -33 .000 .018 .*. -32 .000 .018 .*. -31 -.002 .018 .*. -30 -.001 .018 .*. -29 .011 .018 .*. -28 .017 .018 .*. -27 .000 .018 .*. -26 .000 .018 .*. -25 .004 .018 .*. -24 .000 .018 .*. -23 .000 .018 .*. -22 .000 .018 .*. -21 .000 .018 .*. -20 -.033 .018 *. -19 .000 .018 .*. -18 .000 .018 .*. -17 .000 .018 .*. -16 .000 .018 .*. -15 .000 .018 .*.

PAGE 317

317 -14 .000 .018 .*. -13 .000 .018 .*. -12 .000 .018 .*. -11 .000 .018 .*. -10 .000 .018 .*. -9 .000 .018 .*. -8 .000 .018 .*. -7 .000 .018 .*. -6 .000 .018 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -5 .000 .018 .*. -4 .000 .018 .*. -3 .000 .018 .*. -2 .000 .018 .*. -1 .000 .018 .*. 0 .564 .018 ..********** 1 .000 .018 .*. 2 .000 .018 .*. 3 .000 .018 .*. 4 .000 .018 .*. 5 .000 .018 .*. 6 .000 .018 .*. 7 .000 .018 .*. 8 .000 .018 .*. 9 .000 .018 .*. 10 .000 .018 .*. 11 .000 .018 .*. 12 .000 .018 .*. 13 .000 .018 .*. 14 .000 .018 .*. 15 .000 .018 .*. 16 .000 .018 .*. 17 .000 .018 .*. 18 .000 .018 .*. 19 .000 .018 .*. 20 .048 .018 .* 21 .000 .018 .*.

PAGE 318

318 22 .000 .018 .*. 23 .000 .018 .*. 24 .000 .018 .*. 25 -.029 .018 *. 26 .000 .018 .*. 27 .000 .018 .*. 28 .005 .018 .*. 29 .000 .018 .*. 30 .000 .018 .*. 31 .000 .018 .*. 32 .000 .018 .*. 33 .000 .018 .*. 34 .000 .018 .*. 35 .001 .018 .*. 36 .000 .018 .*. 37 .020 .018 .*. 38 .000 .018 .*. 39 .000 .018 .*. 40 .000 .018 .*. 41 .000 .018 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in National Security (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 42 .000 .018 .*. 43 -.014 .018 .*. 44 .000 .018 .*. 45 -.019 .018 .*. 46 -.033 .018 *. 47 -.012 .018 .*. 48 -.012 .018 .*. 49 .000 .018 .*. 50 .000 .018 .*. Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable 0-or der correlations after differencing: 3139 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing

PAGE 319

319 Supporting data for Table 4-2, Model B Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade Transformations: difference (1) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -50 .000 .017 .*. -49 .000 .017 .*. -48 .040 .017 .* -47 .000 .017 .*. -46 -.047 .017 *. -45 .002 .017 .*. -44 .000 .017 .*. -43 .000 .017 .*. -42 .007 .017 .*. -41 .009 .017 .*. -40 .000 .017 .*. -39 .000 .017 .*. -38 .000 .017 .*. -37 -.004 .017 .*. -36 .010 .017 .*. -35 .000 .017 .*. -34 .000 .017 .*. -33 .000 .017 .*. -32 .000 .017 .*. -31 .000 .017 .*. -30 -.003 .017 .*. -29 .000 .017 .*. -28 .027 .017 .* -27 .000 .017 .*. -26 .000 .017 .*. -25 -.002 .017 .*. -24 .000 .017 .*. -23 .000 .017 .*. -22 .000 .017 .*. -21 .000 .017 .*. -20 .027 .017 .* -19 .000 .017 .*. -18 .000 .017 .*. -17 .000 .017 .*. -16 .000 .017 .*. -15 .000 .017 .*.

PAGE 320

320 -14 .000 .017 .*. -13 .000 .017 .*. -12 .000 .017 .*. -11 .000 .017 .*. -10 .000 .017 .*. -9 .000 .017 .*. -8 .000 .017 .*. -7 .000 .017 .*. -6 .000 .017 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -5 .000 .017 .*. -4 .000 .017 .*. -3 .000 .017 .*. -2 .000 .017 .*. -1 .000 .017 .*. 0 .525 .017 ..********** 1 .000 .017 .*. 2 .000 .017 .*. 3 .000 .017 .*. 4 .000 .017 .*. 5 .000 .017 .*. 6 .000 .017 .*. 7 .000 .017 .*. 8 .000 .017 .*. 9 .000 .017 .*. 10 .000 .017 .*. 11 -.009 .017 .*. 12 .000 .017 .*. 13 .000 .017 .*. 14 .000 .017 .*. 15 .000 .017 .*. 16 .000 .017 .*. 17 .000 .017 .*. 18 .000 .017 .*. 19 .000 .017 .*. 20 -.027 .017 *. 21 .000 .017 .*. 22 .000 .017 .*. 23 .000 .017 .*. 24 .000 .017 .*.

PAGE 321

321 25 .033 .017 .* 26 .000 .017 .*. 27 .000 .017 .*. 28 -.005 .017 .*. 29 .000 .017 .*. 30 .011 .017 .*. 31 -.002 .017 .*. 32 .000 .017 .*. 33 .000 .017 .*. 34 .000 .017 .*. 35 -.004 .017 .*. 36 .001 .017 .*. 37 .013 .017 .*. 38 .000 .017 .*. 39 .000 .017 .*. 40 .000 .017 .*. 41 .003 .017 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Trade (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 42 .000 .017 .*. 43 .000 .017 .*. 44 .000 .017 .*. 45 .022 .017 .*. 46 -.061 .017 *. 47 -.004 .017 .*. 48 .007 .017 .*. 49 .000 .017 .*. 50 .000 .017 .*. Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable 0-or der correlations after differencing: 3343 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. 1 case(s) will be lost due to differencing. Listwise deletion. Missing cas es: 146 Valid cases: 3198 Some of the missing cases are imbedded within the series. _

PAGE 322

322 Supporting data for Table 4-2, Model C Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid Transformations: difference (1) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -50 .000 .018 .*. -49 .000 .018 .*. -48 .000 .018 .*. -47 -.008 .018 .*. -46 -.020 .018 .*. -45 .000 .018 .*. -44 .000 .018 .*. -43 .000 .018 .*. -42 .002 .018 .*. -41 -.003 .018 .*. -40 .000 .018 .*. -39 .000 .018 .*. -38 .000 .018 .*. -37 .028 .018 .* -36 -.028 .018 *. -35 .014 .018 .*. -34 .000 .018 .*. -33 .000 .018 .*. -32 .000 .018 .*. -31 .001 .018 .*. -30 .000 .018 .*. -29 -.008 .018 .*. -28 .000 .018 .*. -27 .000 .018 .*. -26 .000 .018 .*. -25 .000 .018 .*. -24 .000 .018 .*. -23 .000 .018 .*. -22 .000 .018 .*. -21 .000 .018 .*. -20 .017 .018 .*. -19 .000 .018 .*. -18 .000 .018 .*. -17 .000 .018 .*. -16 .000 .018 .*. -15 .000 .018 .*.

PAGE 323

323 -14 .000 .018 .*. -13 .000 .018 .*. -12 .000 .018 .*. -11 .000 .018 .*. -10 .000 .018 .*. -9 .000 .018 .*. -8 .000 .018 .*. -7 .000 .018 .*. -6 .000 .018 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 -5 .000 .018 .*. -4 .000 .018 .*. -3 .000 .018 .*. -2 .000 .018 .*. -1 .000 .018 .*. 0 .240 .018 ..**** 1 .000 .018 .*. 2 .000 .018 .*. 3 .000 .018 .*. 4 .000 .018 .*. 5 .000 .018 .*. 6 .000 .018 .*. 7 .000 .018 .*. 8 .000 .018 .*. 9 .000 .018 .*. 10 .000 .018 .*. 11 .000 .018 .*. 12 .000 .018 .*. 13 .000 .018 .*. 14 .000 .018 .*. 15 .000 .018 .*. 16 .000 .018 .*. 17 .000 .018 .*. 18 .000 .018 .*. 19 .000 .018 .*. 20 .058 .018 .* 21 .000 .018 .*. 22 .000 .018 .*. 23 .000 .018 .*.

PAGE 324

324 24 .000 .018 .*. 25 .000 .018 .*. 26 .000 .018 .*. 27 .000 .018 .*. 28 .000 .018 .*. 29 .000 .018 .*. 30 .000 .018 .*. 31 -.001 .018 .*. 32 .000 .018 .*. 33 .000 .018 .*. 34 .000 .018 .*. 35 .004 .018 .*. 36 -.003 .018 .*. 37 -.026 .018 *. 38 .000 .018 .*. 39 .000 .018 .*. 40 .000 .018 .*. 41 .005 .018 .*. Cross Correlations: Annual Presidentia l Success Score in Foreign Policy Annual Presidential Success Score in Foreign Aid (continued) Cross Stand. Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1 42 -.005 .018 .*. 43 .010 .018 .*. 44 .000 .018 .*. 45 .000 .018 .*. 46 .010 .018 .*. 47 -.007 .018 .*. 48 .000 .018 .*. 49 .000 .018 .*. 50 .000 .018 .*. Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations Two Standard Error Limits Total cases: 3344 Computable 0-or der correlations after differencing: 3194

PAGE 325

325 C

PAGE 326

326 LIST OF REFERENCES Aldrich, J. and Rohde, D. (2005) Co ngressional Committees in a Partisan Era, in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.) Congress Reconsidered 8th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Alison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999) The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Boston, MA & NY, NY: Longman. Alison, G. (1971) The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Boston, MA: Longman Almond, G. (1950) The American People and Foreign Policy New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Anderson, P (1987) What do Decision Makers do when they Make Foreign Policy? The Implications for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, in Hermann, Kegley & Rosenau (eds.) New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin. Axelrod, A (2007) Political History of Americas Wars Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Bernstein, R. & Munro, R. (1999) The Ne w China Lobby, in Wittkopf & McCormick The Domestic Sources of American foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Best, S. & Kelner, M. (1991) Post Modern Theory: Critical Interrogations NY, NY: Guilford Press. Black, E. & Black, M. (2002) The Rise of Southern Republicans Cambridge, MA & London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Braybroke, D. & Lindbolm, C. (1969) Types of Decision Making, in Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy revised edition NY, NY: Free Press. Bond, J & Fleisher, R. (2000) Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Bond, J. & Fleisher, R. (1990) The President in the Legislative Arena Chicago, IL &London, England: University of Chicago Press. Bond, J. & Fleisher (1988) Are There Two Presidencies? Yes, but only for Republicans, Journal of Politics 50(3): 747-67. Bond, J., Copeland, G., LeLoup, L., Renka, R. & Shu ll, S. (1991) Implications for Research in Studying Presidential-Congre ssional Relations: Conclu sion, in Shull (ed.) The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall. Box, G. & Lijung, (1978) Modified Q Sta tistics in Time Series Analysis, Behavioral Science

PAGE 327

327 Brady, D. & Volden C. (1998) Revolving Gridlock Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bueno De Mesquito, B (1981) The War Trap New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Burns, J. M. (1963) The Deadlock of Democracy: F our Party Politics in America Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Cameron, C. (2000) Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power New York: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, A. Converse, P. Miller, W. & Stokes, D. (1960) The American Voter NY, NY: John Wiley. Carter, J. (1982) Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President New York: Bantam Books. Caverly, M (2006) The Two Presidencies an Unfinished Project: A Theoretical, Methodological, Empirical and Normative Meta-Analysis, paper presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association 2006 Annual Meeting at San Antonio, TX April 11-15, 2006. Chamberlain, L.H. (1946) Preside nt, Congress and Legislation, Political Science Quarterly 61: 42-60. Cheney, R. (2002) The Unitary Executive Theo ry, interview with Timothy Russert on March 30, 2002 at NBCs Meet the Press in NY, NY. Cigler, A. & Loomis, B. (1997) Interest Group Politics 6th edition, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Cohen, J. (1982) A Historical Reassessment of Wildavskys Two Presidencies Thesis, Social Science Quarterly 63/3 (September 1982): 549-555. Congressional Quarterly 1953 CQ Almanac Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1954) Election Report, 1954 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1955 CQ Almanac, Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1957 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1958) Election Report, 1958 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1959) Economic Report, 1959 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1961 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press

PAGE 328

328 Congressional Quarterly (1962) R eport on Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1963) N uclear Test Ban Treaty Report, 1963 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1964) G ulf of Tonkin Incident Report, 1964 CQ Almanac Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1966) Election Report, 1966 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1966 CQ Almanac, Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1967 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1967) Senate Foreign Relations Committee Reports on Vietnam War, excerpts; 1967 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1968) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbrights public remarks on Johnson Vietnam War Policy, 1968 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1971) Report on Nixon Global Currency Policy, 1971 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1971 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1972 CQ Almanac, Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1973) R eport on War Powers Resolution, 1973 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1975 CQ Almanac Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975 Foreword Washington, D.C.: CQ Press Congressional Quarterly (1975) Rep ort on War in Southeast Asia, 1975 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1975) R eport on Operations and Intellig ence Activities, excerpts from Church Committee Hearings; 1975 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1976) Report on Foreign Aid Restrict ions leveled at the Executive Branch, 1976 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1977) Report on Ex ecutive-Legislative Relations with Carter Administration, 1977 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

PAGE 329

329 Congressional Quarterly 1978 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1979) Report in Panama Canal Treaties and Enforcement Legislation, 1979 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1979) Report on Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, 1979 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1979) Report on Carter Energy Policy and the Oil Shocks, 1979 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1980) Rep ort on Iranian Hostage Crisis, 1980 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly ( 1980) Elections Report, 1980 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1981 CQ Almanac, Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly ( 1981) Report on 1982 Budget, 1981 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (198589) Legislative Histories, 1985-89 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1986) Report on South African Sanctions Policy, 1986 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly ( 1986) Elections Report, 1986 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1990) Base Closure Commission Report, excerpts 1990 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1991) Persian Gulf War Report, 1991 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1991 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1992) Election Report, 1992 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 1993 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly ( 1995) Report on Balkans, 1995 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (1999) Report on Kosovo, 1999 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

PAGE 330

330 Congressional Quarterly (2001) Presidential Address on 9/11 Attacks, given September 12, 2001 to joint session of Congress at Capito l Hill, Washington, D.C. reprinted in 2001 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (2001) Report on War in Afghanistan, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 2001 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 2002 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (2002) State of the Union Address, reprinted in 2002 CQ Almanac Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly (2002) Election Report, CQ Almanac Washington D.C.: CQPress. Congressional Quarterly, (2003) Report on War in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Congressional Quarterly 2003 CQ Almanac, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Conley, R. (2005) Presidential and Congressional Struggles over the Formation of the Department of Homeland Security, in Conley (ed.) Transforming the American Polity Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall. Conley, R. (2003) Comparing th e Legislative Presidencies of Eisenhower and Reagan: The Lessons of Political Time, in Reassessing the Reagan Presidency Conley (ed.) Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Conley, R. (2002) The Presidency Congress and Divided Government: A Postwar Assessment College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Conley, R. (1997) Unified Government, the Tw o Presidencies Thesis, and Presidential Support in the Senate: An Analysis of President Clintons First Two Years, Presidential Studies Quarterly 27/2: 229-251. Cox, G. & McCubbins, M. (1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Davidson, R. (1996) The Presidency in Congressional Time, in Rivals for Power: PresidentialCongressional Relations (ed.) Thurber Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Deering, C. and Smith, S. (1997) Committees in Congress 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Department of Commerce (2006) Archive Reports on Economic Bu siness Cycles, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office www.whitehouse.gov/DoC accessed on April 1, 2 006. Dierks, R. (2001) Introduction to Globalization NY, NY: Burnham.

PAGE 331

331 Dodd, L (2005) Entrapped in the Narrative of War: Reflections, Questions and Commentary, in Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism Conley (ed.) Upper Saddle Rive r, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall. Dodd, L (1986) The Cycles of Legislative Change, in Weisberg (ed.) Political Science: The Science of Politics New York: Agathon Press. Dodd, L. (1977) Congress and the Quest for Power, in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.) Congress Reconsidered Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Edwards, G. (2000) Neustadts Power Approach to the Presidency, in Shapiro, Kumar & Jacobs Presidential (eds.) Power: Forging the Presidency for the 21st Century NY, NY: Columbia University Press. Edwards, G. (1989) At the Margins: Presiden tial Leadership of Congress New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Edwards, G. (1986a) Presidential Legislative Skills: At the Core or at the Margin? Paper presented at the 1986 Annual meeting of th e Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL April 10-12, 1986. Edwards, G. (1986b) The Two Presidencies: A Reevaluation, American Politics Quarterly 14 (July): 247-263. Edwards, G. (1980) Presidential Influence in Congress San Francisco, CA: WH Freeman. Ellsberg, D. (1971) The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine, Public Policy 16 (spring 1971):217-274. Enders, W. (2004) Applied Econometric Time Series 2nd edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Evans, C. & Lipinski, D. Obstruction and Leadership in the US Senate, in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.) Congress Reconsidered 8th ed. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Fearon, J. (1994) Domestic Political Audiences a nd the Escalation of International Disputes, American Political Science Review 88(1994): 577-592. Fenno, R. (1973) Congressmen in Committees Boston, MA: Little Brown Publishing. Fisher, L (2000) Congressional Abdication on War & Spending College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Fisher, L. (2004) Presidential War Power 2nd edition, revised Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas. Fisher, L. (1972) President and Congress Power and Policy New York: Free Press.

PAGE 332

332 Fleisher, R. Bond, J. Krutz, G. & Hanna, S. (2000) The Demise of the Two Presidencies, American Politics Quarterly 28/1: 3-25. Freedman, L & Karsh, E. (1993) The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ford, G. (1980) Two Ex-Presidents Asse ss the Job: The Imperiled Presidency, Time Magazine (November 10, 1980) 116/19: 1-9. Gallagher, H.G. (1977) The President, Congress and Legislation, in Cr onin and Tugwell (eds.) The Presidency Reappraised 2nd ed. New York: Praeger Publishing. Gimple, J. & Edwards, J (1998) The Congressional Politic s of Immigration Reform NY, NY: Pearson-Longman. Gourevitch, P. (1996) Squaring the Circle: The Do mestic Sources of International Relations, International Organizations 50 (1996): 349-373. Gourevitch, P. (1978) The Second Image revers ed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, International Organization 32 (1978): 881-911. Greenstein, F. (1988) Introducti on: Toward a Modern Presid ency, in Greenstein (ed.) Leadership in the Modern Presidency Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hamilton, A. (1960 [1789]) Federalist Paper Nu mber Seventy, Hamilton, Madison & Jay in The Federalist Papers edited by Rossiter, NY, NY: Basic Books Hastedt, G. & Eksterowicz, A. (1999) Preside ntial Leadership and American Foreign Policy: Implications for a New Era, in Wittkopf & McCormick (eds.) The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights & Evidence Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Holbrooke, R. (1998) To End a War New York: Random House. Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations New York: Simon & Schuster. Huntington, S. (1965) Congression al Responses to the Twentieth Century, in Truman (ed.) Congress and Americas Future Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Huntington, S. (1961) The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics NY: Columbia University Press. Ikenberry, J., Krasner, S. & Mastanduno, M. (19 88) Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American foreign Economic Policy, International Organization 42/1 (Winter 1988): 114. Janis, I. (1982) Groupthink Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. Jones, C (1988) Ronald Reagan an d the US Congress, in Jones (ed.) The Reagan Legacy Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

PAGE 333

333 Kaine, T (2004) Democratic Rebuttal to State of the Union Address, aired on CNN January 20, 2004 from Virginia Governors Mans ion located at Jefferson, VA. Kegley, C. & Wittkopf, E. (2001) Introduction to World Politics 7th edition NY, NY: PearsonLongman. Kennan, G. (1979) American Diplomacy Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kennedy, P. (1986) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers New York: Vintage-Random House. Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (1977) Power and Interdependence Boston, MA: Little Brown. Kerouac, J (1957) On the Road New York: Viking Press. Key. V.O. (1955) A Theory of Critical Elections, Journal of Politics 17: 3-18. Key, V.O. (1949) Southern Politics in State and Nation New York: Knopf. Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy NY, NY: Touchstone Book/Simon & Schuster. Kissinger, H. (1956) Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. King, G. and Ragsdale, L. (1988) The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns In the Presidency Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Krasner, S. (1978) Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lee, S & Ditko, S (1962) Amazing Fantasy No. 15, NY, NY: Marvel Comics Group. LeLoup, L. & Shull, S. (2003) The President and Congress: Collaboration and Conflict NY, NY: Longman-Pearson. Leloup, L. & Shull, S. (1979) Congress vers us the Executive: The Two Presidencies Reconsidered, S ocial Science Quarterly 59 (March 1979): 704-719. Lewis, D. (1997) The Two Rhetorical Presid encies: An Analysis of Televised Speeches 19471991, American Politics Quarterly 25/3: 380-395. Lindsay, J. (1999) End of an Era: Congress & Fo reign Policy after the Cold War, In Wittkopf & McCormick The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Lindsay, J (1994) Congress and Foreign Policy Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lindsay, J. & Steger, W. (1993) The Two Pr esidencies in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis, Congress and the Presidency 20/2.

PAGE 334

334 Lowi, T. (1964) American Business, Public policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, World Politics Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Lowi, T. (1972) Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, Public Administration Review (July/August 1972). Low, T. (1985) The Personal President: Power Invested Promise Unfulfilled Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Malbin, M. & Brookshire, R. ( 2000) Two Presidencies? A ssessing the First Two Hundred Years, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25/1: 156-157. Mandelbaum, M. (1996) Foreign Policy as Social Work, Foreign Affairs 75/1 (January/February 1996). Mannheim and Rich (1995) Empirical Political Analysis: Resear ch Methods in Political Science 4th edition, New York: Longman Publishers. Manning, B. (1977) The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, Foreign Affairs (1977) 55/2: 306-320. Mathews, J. (1989) R edefining Security, Foreign Affairs 68/2 (spring 1989). May, E. (1973) Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misu se of History in American Foreign Policy NY, NY: Oxford University Press of New York Mayhew, D. (2002) Electoral Realignments New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Developmen t of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. McCleary, R. & Hay, R. (1975) Applied Time Series for the Social Sciences Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. McCubbins & Scwartz (1984) Congr essional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarm, American Journal of Political Science 1:165-177. Association, University of Indiana, IN: Blackstone Publishing. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of the Great Powers NY, NY: Norton & Company. Mezey, M. (1989) Congress, the President and Public Policy Boulder, CO: Westview. Mills, C. Wright (1956) The Power Elite Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Milkis, S. & Nelson M. (2003) The American Presidency: Origins and Development Washington D.C.: CQ Press.

PAGE 335

335 Moe, R.C. and Teel, S. (1970) Congress as Policymaker a Necessary Reappraisal, Political Science Quarterly 85: 443-470. Morgenthau, H. (1993) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power &Peace revised by Thompson, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. Morrison, W. (1990) The Elephant and the Tiger: The Full Story of the Vietnam War, NY, NY: Hippcrene Books. Neustadt, R. (1990) Presidential Power and the Modern Pr esidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan NY, NY: The Free Press. Neustadt, R. (1960) Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership New York: John Wiley. Niemi, R & Stanley, H (2006) Vital Statistics on American Politics 6th edition, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Niemi, R. & Weisberg, H. (2001) Part IV Introduction, Niemi and Weisberg (eds.) Controversies in Voting Behavior Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Oldfield, D. & Wildavsky, A. (1989) Reconsidering the Two Presidencies, Society 26 (July 1989): 54-59. Oppenheimer, B. (2005) Deep Red and Blue Congressional District s: The Causes and Consequences of Declining Party Competitiv eness, in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.) Congress Reconsidered 8th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Orfield, G. (1975) Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change New York: Harcourt Brace-Jovanovich. Oren, I. (2003) Our Enemies & US: Americas Rivalrie s and the Making of Political Science Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Orren, K. & Skowronek, S. (2004) In Search of American Political Development NY, NY: Oxford University Press of New York. Orren, K. and Skowronek, S. (1994) Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a New Institutionalism in D odd and Jillson (eds.) The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches & Interpretations Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page, B. & Jordan, D (1992) Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News, Journal of Conflict Resolution 36/2: 227-241. Papp, D. Johnson, L. & Endicott, J. (2006) American Foreign Policy, History, Politics and Policy NY, NY: Pearson-Longman. Parkin, M. (1993) MacroEconomics 2nd edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

PAGE 336

336 Peppers, D. (1975) Two Presidencies Thes is: Eight Years Later, Wildavsky (ed.) Perspectives on the Presidency Boston, MA: Little and Brown. PBS (2000) Kosovo documentary aired June 1, 2000 narrated by Bill Moyer. Peterson, M. (1990) Legislating Together: The White Hous e and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Peterson, P.E. (ed.) (1994) The President, the Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Pierson, P. & Skocpol, T. (2002) Historical Ins titutionalism in Contempor ary Political Science, Katznelson & Milner (eds.) Political Science: the State of the Discipline NY: WW Norton. Pika, J. A. & Maltese, J. A. (2006) The Politics of the Presidency 7th edition, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Putnam, R. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42: 427-460. Ragsdale, L. (1998) Vital Statistics on the Presidency: Washington to Clinton 2nd edition, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Renka, R. & Jones, B. (1991) The Two Presidenci es in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, Congress and the Presidency 18/1 USA. Renka, R. & Jones, B. (1989) The Two Presidencies in the Reagan and Bush Administrations paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference held at Memphis, TN on November 2-4, 1989. Ripley, R.B. & Lindsay, J.M. (1993) Introduction, in Ripley and Lindsay (eds.) Congressional Resurgence in Foreign Policy Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Robkopf, B. (2005) International Politics New York: Pearson-Longman. Robinson, J. (1967) Congress and Foreign Policymaking: a Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative revised edition, Homeword, IL: Dorsey Press. Rogowski, R. (1987) Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade, American Political Science Review 81 (1994): 1121-1138. Rohde, D. (1991) Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform Congress Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Rosati, J. (2006) US Foreign Policy Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. Rossiter, C. (1956) The American Presidency New York: Harcourt Brace.

PAGE 337

337 Schelling, T. (1978) Micromotives for Macrobehavior Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schickler, E. and Pearson, K. (2005) The House L eadership in an Era of Partisan Warfare, in Dodd and Oppenheimer, (eds.) Congress Reconsidered 8th edition, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Schlesinger, A. M. Jr. (2005) War and the American Presidency NY, NY: WW Norton Schlesinger, A.M. Jr. (1989) The Imperial Presidency 2nd edition, Boston, MA: HoughtonMifflin. Schlesinger, A. M. Jr. (1973) The Imperial Presidency Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. Shubick, M (1964) Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introductory Exposition, in Shubick (ed.) Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior NY, NY: Wiley. Shull, S. (1997) Presidential-Congressional Relations: A Policy and Political Time Perspective Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Shull, S. (1991) Introduction, Shull (ed.) Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. Shull, S & Leloup, L. (1979) Introdu ction, in Shull and Leloup (eds.) The Presidency: Studies in Policy Making Brunswick, OH: Kings Court Communications. Shull, S. & LeLoup, L. (1981) Reassessing the Reassessment: Comment on Sigelmans Note on the Two Presidencies Thesis, Journal of Politics 43 (May 1981): 563-564. Shull, S. & Shaw, T. (1999) Explaining Congressional-Presidential Relations: A Multiple Perspectives Approach Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Sigelman, L. (1979) A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis, Journal of Politics 41:1195-1205. Sigelman, L. (1981) Response to Critics, Journal of Politics 43 (May 1981):565. Sinclair, B (2005) Patriotism, Partisanship, and Institutional Protec tion: The Congressional Response to 9/11, in Conley (ed.) Transfor ming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall. Skowronek, S. (1997) The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams To Bill Clinton Cambridge, MA & London, England: The Be lknap Press of Harvard University Press.

PAGE 338

338 Smith, H. (1982) The President as Coalition Builder: Reagans First Year, in Cronin (ed.) Rethinking the Presidency Boston, MA: Little Brown. Smith, S. and Gamm, G. (2005) The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in Dodd and Oppenheimer, (eds.) Congress Reconsidered 8th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Snow, D. & Brown, E. (1997) Beyond the Waters Edge NY, NY: St. Martins Press. Snyder, J. (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Po litics and International Ambition Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Snyder, J & Diesing, P. (1977) Conflict among Nations: Barg aining, Decision Making and System Structuring in International Crisis Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sorensen, T.(1965) Kennedy New York: Harper & Row. Spanier, J. (1975) Games that Nations Play 2nd edition, New York: Praeger. Spitzer, R. (1993) The President and Congress New York: McGraw Hill Publishing Spitzer, R. (1983) The Presidency and Public Policy: A Preliminary Inquiry Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press. Stewart, C. (2001) Analyzing Congress: The New Inst itutionalism in American Politics NY, NY & London, England: WW Norton and Company. Sullivan, T. (1991) A Matter of Fact: The Two Presidencies Thesis Revisited, in Shull (ed.) The Two Presidencies Thesis: A Quarter Century Assessment Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall. Sundquist, J. (1981) The Decline and Resurgence of Congress Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Sundquist, J. (1968) Politics and Power: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Thiele, L. (2003) Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancien t, Modern and Postmodern Political Theory, 3rd edition, New York: Chatham House. Thurber, J. (1996) Intro duction, in Thurber (ed.) Rivals for Power: PresidentialCongressional Relations Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Tullis, J. (1987) The Rhetorical Presidency Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vessey, J. (1984) To Provide for the Common Defense, paper presented at 1984 Conference on the Presidency at the Center for the Study of the Presidency at American University in Washington D.C. March 12-15, 1984.

PAGE 339

339 Von Nuemann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1943) Game Theory, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics NY, NY: Random House. Weaver, B. & Rockman, R.K. (1993) Do Institutions Matter? Go vernment Capabilities in the United States and Abroad Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. Wildavsky, A. (1966) The Two Presidencies, Trans-Action 4 (December): 7-14, Philadelphia, PA: Transaction Publishing, Inc. Wilson, W. {1963(1885)} Congressional Government Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company. Wittkopf, E. & McCormick, J. (1999) Introduc tion, in Wittkopf and McCormack (eds.) The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights & Evidence 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wolfsenberger, D. (2005) Congress and Policymaking in an Age of Terrorism, in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.) Congress Reconsidered Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Zakaria, F. (1999) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zeidenstein, H. (1981) The Two Presidencies Thesis is Alive and Well and Has Been Living in the US Senate since 1973, Presidential Studies Quarterly 11: 511-525.

PAGE 340

340 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Matthew Mark Caverly was born in 1971 in W o odruff, Wisconsin to Edward and Sharon Caverly. He moved to Florida in 1985 and graduated from Vero Beach Sr. High School in 1990. After serving 3 years in the U.S. Army, he attended Santa Fe Community College (SFCC) in Gainesville, FL, earning an associates degree in general studies in 1995. Caverly went on to earn bachelors and masters degrees in history an d political science at the University of Florida (UF) Gainesville, FL in 1998 and 2001 respectively. Since 2001, he has been a doctoral student at UFs Department of Political Science, studying and teaching American government and politics as well as international relations. In the mid and late 1990s, he worked for th e Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and in the early 2000s for UFs Housing Division. Caverl y currently works as a Visiting Instructor at the University of North Floridas Department of Political Science and Pu blic Administration in Jacksonville, FL. His pastimes include exer cising, reading, and going to coffee houses. Eventually, he would like to cont inue his education by earning a s econd masters degree in either a humanistic or hard science discipline. In the future, he aspires to retu rn to government service in some capacity and hopefully do further readi ng/writing on issues re lating to politics and history.