<%BANNER%>

Walking the Tightrope

University of Florida Institutional Repository
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021911/00001

Material Information

Title: Walking the Tightrope Americans for Democratic Action in the South, 1947-1963
Physical Description: 1 online resource (286 p.)
Language: english
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: ada, liberalism, south, united
History -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: History thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: My study explored the history of the liberal political organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as its leaders attempted to establish a series of chapters in the southern United States and influence the political fortunes of liberals in those states in the period following the end of the Second World War. ADA boasted a number of prominent members in its ranks and claimed to have a great deal of influence in national politics, but its efforts in the South were largely unsuccessful in attracting new members and contributing to the debate in southern politics. ADA leaders made no fewer than three separate attempts to organize southern chapters with dedicated organizers on the scene in the region. The organization's lack of success in the South was the result of a combination of factors. Its leaders were never able to sustain organizational efforts financially as a result of chronic shortages of money throughout its early history. They also had to deal with frequent charges that ADA, despite a clear repudiation of Communism dating to the group's founding in 1947, had a close working relationship with Communists and their allies. The charge carried some weight in the South because of the willingness of other southern liberals to work with Communists during the Great Depression and World War II. A more fundamental problem was that ADA's leaders did not understand the political dynamics of the South during this period. Liberals in positions of national prominence hoped that the long-standing conservatism of southern politics was coming to an end, and the election of several liberals to state and national office in the post-war years buoyed their optimism. However, several years of struggling to attract southerners to ADA did not create the network of chapters its leaders had hoped to create, and this dissertation shows how and why that process failed and contributes to the political history of the post-war South.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Zieger, Robert H.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0021911:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021911/00001

Material Information

Title: Walking the Tightrope Americans for Democratic Action in the South, 1947-1963
Physical Description: 1 online resource (286 p.)
Language: english
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: ada, liberalism, south, united
History -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: History thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: My study explored the history of the liberal political organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as its leaders attempted to establish a series of chapters in the southern United States and influence the political fortunes of liberals in those states in the period following the end of the Second World War. ADA boasted a number of prominent members in its ranks and claimed to have a great deal of influence in national politics, but its efforts in the South were largely unsuccessful in attracting new members and contributing to the debate in southern politics. ADA leaders made no fewer than three separate attempts to organize southern chapters with dedicated organizers on the scene in the region. The organization's lack of success in the South was the result of a combination of factors. Its leaders were never able to sustain organizational efforts financially as a result of chronic shortages of money throughout its early history. They also had to deal with frequent charges that ADA, despite a clear repudiation of Communism dating to the group's founding in 1947, had a close working relationship with Communists and their allies. The charge carried some weight in the South because of the willingness of other southern liberals to work with Communists during the Great Depression and World War II. A more fundamental problem was that ADA's leaders did not understand the political dynamics of the South during this period. Liberals in positions of national prominence hoped that the long-standing conservatism of southern politics was coming to an end, and the election of several liberals to state and national office in the post-war years buoyed their optimism. However, several years of struggling to attract southerners to ADA did not create the network of chapters its leaders had hoped to create, and this dissertation shows how and why that process failed and contributes to the political history of the post-war South.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Local: Adviser: Zieger, Robert H.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2008
System ID: UFE0021911:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101203_AAAAFI INGEST_TIME 2010-12-04T03:51:46Z PACKAGE UFE0021911_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 76148 DFID F20101203_AACISA ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH gallagher_d_Page_124.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
349b4346ee3024aaed8c0d389719f40a
SHA-1
fda0f1cc5186a9558f65f74910d70855bf2bbf74
1053954 F20101203_AACHVH gallagher_d_Page_181.tif
1365dddc0953b67f06275f349a9958ca
19feba5251eef0a5ac0d245a0cae5be85e6d1874
76289 F20101203_AACISB gallagher_d_Page_125.jpg
080fa3d57d0423b9a4005ab5011c1f4e
c6a5316c763db413e749811a5cae1107e9ed1ce2
22177 F20101203_AACHVI gallagher_d_Page_282.QC.jpg
e82ea1c6b3d19353cb706d371c4940cd
bbe61ffaf564365d6d8b573817562c2abdbaceea
33502 F20101203_AACISC gallagher_d_Page_127.jpg
c8d1b2ced221b70299eb69834bb0edb9
bcdb864ae96b107f4365ea6baa2b14e224f45578
74897 F20101203_AACHVJ gallagher_d_Page_061.jpg
65344bc81f407689da6490ed9299cefd
b71d49c0f6724a3d42538ef03dfb829f638ee39c
83092 F20101203_AACISD gallagher_d_Page_128.jpg
7ad9fa801f580193292d364bfc0b0531
bc5c127f299becf36e5a6f65e27a12409e5d439d
2264 F20101203_AACHVK gallagher_d_Page_145.txt
045716d3f87584d39aece9414878771f
6d77832d9351b4dca68aca4abeeee526eff8b179
70720 F20101203_AACISE gallagher_d_Page_133.jpg
975e1d72988bf384b156946ba14f6fdf
5116ba511b2f0aed1c63ba30d82ab266b910ff29
127261 F20101203_AACHIA gallagher_d_Page_139.jp2
a8ae3ef661f0f4ac11fb0cbecaa788a2
4dcb41225dc04a407aa408264b915e161da1279d
69276 F20101203_AACHVL gallagher_d_Page_081.pro
610aadc592dfda8c388e87aec60a1242
c26d0d1f1729da4d47765a307f5539483d025549
77090 F20101203_AACISF gallagher_d_Page_137.jpg
f52fae6ba76949505110c0019cc94f5f
950d2cc1762584db937aaa3fbe5fdd63dc7cc246
25486 F20101203_AACHIB gallagher_d_Page_140.QC.jpg
d8ca72211c29b1a8ce7104b4844578c4
9d03402dcfb9cbc3d904a345f72a98edf36dc601
53837 F20101203_AACHVM gallagher_d_Page_146.pro
2236f64e1858fd40be1850fd78d9992e
bf86c9090f4a35853bd770b235e037ddd36ec55f
77282 F20101203_AACISG gallagher_d_Page_140.jpg
3b85491c283b5e462ce5ab76c45cc227
ee18d82a60b97f83c014dabb2426199606951dce
7110 F20101203_AACHIC gallagher_d_Page_015thm.jpg
e490833a1a52c05663b26a3a8bca97cf
d7909a34e03af77165ed09101a89c0d24bcca433
25608 F20101203_AACHVN gallagher_d_Page_190.QC.jpg
e6ce304bd628cc79473fca23fe4000ac
beb22601e39ab06c32fd9ec5ef353762087465d9
7031 F20101203_AACJPA gallagher_d_Page_016thm.jpg
2f43331c2c4f7771e747220ca9861447
431bd2302bbf8a7f60ec975091f3e62c220b4307
79297 F20101203_AACISH gallagher_d_Page_142.jpg
6c2ee156cea43e781d7a488cee212cab
a946185a787debcca8bd94cb397c27b93f3e5cfe
109896 F20101203_AACHID gallagher_d_Page_010.jp2
7fad8e00b4f48b05f11e6e92cbc324cd
8bead8ab507ccb5062976672f10419c41596240f
F20101203_AACHVO gallagher_d_Page_213.tif
d05ec76075393b204e3ec3f6d40bb2ea
b1c35955ce7043faed0d8f43a14bffe3da97f2e9
24572 F20101203_AACJPB gallagher_d_Page_017.QC.jpg
1c17df9445fd44c385e01f18a6094c92
e15aaf64671216c4495b9e96172b41a83f996626
73516 F20101203_AACISI gallagher_d_Page_143.jpg
d2370f63a6f4df40e13c520caa960090
f84290bbb7ce08baf1ca6cecc8770727c5efe062
24574 F20101203_AACHIE gallagher_d_Page_045.QC.jpg
d0149f5d4341b41f20f7cb04af9d48c6
d244a2edeae0ed9b1a1c6014a6fa32f7950fd54a
F20101203_AACHVP gallagher_d_Page_011.tif
5d652723ca8887b916145aa6a8af92e1
eaa7673c507085e6353216c85b36888149516b7b
6963 F20101203_AACJPC gallagher_d_Page_017thm.jpg
876f00bc2e2170c666b15bc92ec41058
bc09a5036ebcb609e0e5edc348829b913eda5bb3
75697 F20101203_AACISJ gallagher_d_Page_151.jpg
dcb8b29aecc187fed15ec275c3df5513
c396d9b6ac8be755ae0baa733418ce316cbad771
76941 F20101203_AACHIF gallagher_d_Page_051.jpg
1beed2365d8fb54ee359d952b6860732
c45e3633cc958d9c24794b33c2f6bb60d2294e67
F20101203_AACHVQ gallagher_d_Page_168.tif
1b24dd1a912ff8391a537116f2b1b79e
1d3eda65f3361a42de7b75bbaa0923908c3b09ed
6916 F20101203_AACJPD gallagher_d_Page_019thm.jpg
ec4b7aad9ec8f0291c17628664d49600
09872324287f5819985febdb921cd8a390857b26
78375 F20101203_AACISK gallagher_d_Page_154.jpg
a8bd845bd149b36bc8bdf7656b47e98c
2a71e6cf40c8832fc6471c6718f7bee07c981f38
7047 F20101203_AACHIG gallagher_d_Page_039thm.jpg
3f8d4c34d82dc0895bfa1f5ba4317fdf
57b92a349d08773978bf4ee9a8a8f63cd288179c
25131 F20101203_AACHVR gallagher_d_Page_161.QC.jpg
5b6256e8f3147e7c1bb4e4f84efe95cb
5eaca497e2a1c84d7c3af60155585a57bf0cfe41
7253 F20101203_AACJPE gallagher_d_Page_020thm.jpg
717cb833305732cc3262a461f3117ad6
5fd43c951ed67ca8a3cdca2127752c4fc79d4096
75845 F20101203_AACISL gallagher_d_Page_158.jpg
6fd44fd6e0ff62aa86faaa93a1812a1f
2cc2ac8f0ff7c6697abcfaf6334c49ac29da6bb8
116322 F20101203_AACHIH gallagher_d_Page_224.jp2
42da3ae9b608eeaaf3883374bad0ec95
fa54871f99a04392a8841b5c3c5619676d95db6a
7352 F20101203_AACGYZ gallagher_d_Page_153thm.jpg
7c431aafa9dbcd16e483f68259500d70
6498b6ab2ec584b1ae24cfddb70b2760887ffa57
54363 F20101203_AACIFA gallagher_d_Page_178.pro
8188baa46e0ad4d575dff608b423b03d
45087ec50fb2633195ea3a239965cf154e80f6dc
110537 F20101203_AACHVS gallagher_d_Page_029.jp2
d5856e00a93cb0ceaf820b1f0bd74247
5d38c57098efbc6e7ebd367a25466490f2270712
6820 F20101203_AACJPF gallagher_d_Page_021thm.jpg
70d3e49d6134742280e55e18db419fe1
d3bd356b077a37e3c2a3481494e77405eac710ce
74312 F20101203_AACISM gallagher_d_Page_161.jpg
cc8a9b30197a5554cc901535c9c5b035
e40e90cf8772739ad4d35f92e7c2d944f052c5bb
7358 F20101203_AACHII gallagher_d_Page_145thm.jpg
1f4f515188574a6db092cab21cbd1de4
a9831c11ccbc3cf81b358aebec6471708aedc1a1
7055 F20101203_AACIFB gallagher_d_Page_257thm.jpg
de00efad423e0eb5318cc57636284c6f
e4c80b0e56065d70616f0e522195fb7d6938ab0d
27214 F20101203_AACHVT gallagher_d_Page_286.jpg
9964f22af5193f83c683f04d4cec7c66
98f880ac530f93e1c371077f24ffd6f1c97f3407
25803 F20101203_AACJPG gallagher_d_Page_022.QC.jpg
f1a57ce73e58b6b9dbe049e8cef4b7a6
d1e7da1601edb56f79fc91bb64f4fb00d46b5e24
76198 F20101203_AACISN gallagher_d_Page_163.jpg
ed081dc39c13517d0e237c3cbc5d208e
d06a257e0b431d90ca51090579ae303e4aa49ed4
56277 F20101203_AACHIJ gallagher_d_Page_067.pro
e847346f8a3364402df359d907bd00b1
ec5f47abb2ddd49f8fa944ca5837aabd72b49f52
79333 F20101203_AACIFC gallagher_d_Page_082.jpg
e669da3507c5cb7a35cf664328eedc63
dc361835cb96e9f8e19c1195c5b1a6e73026a606
53467 F20101203_AACHVU gallagher_d_Page_138.pro
db1e70cc478288ba0f6f706a97cf9b6e
017673c6d345dbefff672b69d934e5d15003ede0
22547 F20101203_AACJPH gallagher_d_Page_025.QC.jpg
6e5347cab85262cdd7bdb6e85bf644d3
a6188594e9e08848f2acf703783c9bfccd9432d2
77795 F20101203_AACISO gallagher_d_Page_165.jpg
0717678bd8fcb507a30a3840c5513d84
d8189c2539811db2e6ad15452bae85922c34617c
F20101203_AACHIK gallagher_d_Page_279.tif
7d26d8094c30da342528aa27d5160941
87130508cc44531011a19f84c2af8186e073e67a
30864 F20101203_AACIFD gallagher_d_Page_211.pro
5087f7707ed14d4736a450086ebd9742
b7d12ae8502e262340387e2d23f0f02b4f6cc1dc
54095 F20101203_AACHVV gallagher_d_Page_065.pro
495301bcb578943d01c708e5b4dc7b0c
d6fe9d68203ff8e7c6b62daac714bb5ba4e59394
6454 F20101203_AACJPI gallagher_d_Page_025thm.jpg
2687a94b740a314307ec5c6919f0eda5
ca7ff179615423a4af95ae05cdde764f5b0d66be
75809 F20101203_AACISP gallagher_d_Page_166.jpg
03c7291c7a65ba7bf6da04d952fd9080
26b7f22ed0084928ae30d74cba61f19c4b1b8bb0
56259 F20101203_AACIFE gallagher_d_Page_015.pro
1bb37b61594618a97004de6a57849bbb
7cad2c43193730085c8e6fc28b5d8bb56dd08867
117241 F20101203_AACHVW gallagher_d_Page_106.jp2
d87d83a19809c9fd09f2b5e70d85c357
a0d03774c0d2546f8af1eb578c98897cc4e19b1a
25451 F20101203_AACJPJ gallagher_d_Page_026.QC.jpg
d4f0a0a887e236671373fa2b8d7c1615
1d632f6e9c3f982fcfe729ee3b18bd0c29c81f05
80871 F20101203_AACISQ gallagher_d_Page_167.jpg
196c078026c31775ae54039b3f4b0065
4e9321883239cbb404908f531da3e4eb714abb1f
1920 F20101203_AACHIL gallagher_d_Page_044.txt
ad5e9b3204d3c59ca98f8e992bfaa5db
46f8f15f27e2715644edda5f0a496c28114c8e21
F20101203_AACIFF gallagher_d_Page_252.tif
10e3c84b6b4ecc6f4f2fd69173cff821
fde5db77b3e6f3f4077cdf6e3230df1498bb21b0
F20101203_AACHVX gallagher_d_Page_159.tif
ab1f625f39b003d3fcefdc3055d1c799
fd32b2bd05f4d3f356a988b973f357162a613aa8
7138 F20101203_AACJPK gallagher_d_Page_026thm.jpg
8f97ec2b4498add089aad4f7c0b92b8f
a929c1aaacf374b79d9f8823fb83688505734699
76966 F20101203_AACISR gallagher_d_Page_169.jpg
98f197ab26d18708ec85f5af949947ce
c39a8ac54ab193cd225576f58421fa1f6e3bb007
2128 F20101203_AACHIM gallagher_d_Page_066.txt
b59f7ef6c43c13bccfe40745ddf9f055
71e6f085f6c5ccf54fccb54dd18edc81ac266b20
20594 F20101203_AACIFG gallagher_d_Page_285.QC.jpg
4fbbf944347fa59f2ed1caaa5a2499ba
9d9186c581913cdfb6a7072e1af4b9b746397b6a
24542 F20101203_AACJPL gallagher_d_Page_027.QC.jpg
ea8caab84ddc236900689b9f5674487e
56a2a62b652a7645b1e6324c2db7edefd6ca6f50
74830 F20101203_AACISS gallagher_d_Page_170.jpg
670cf0dcefc4384f8ca62dd16a675c97
cfed7678ae69ea5088587a24ff80f59b85479451
F20101203_AACHIN gallagher_d_Page_089.tif
eb5afb31d17d34fafa0f8e229711fdbd
58f51b1434666d38841a44706b6fc4e8ac0e049a
34047 F20101203_AACHVY gallagher_d_Page_286.jp2
9fd5c1faf6015ef5e757cdfee8b14fd9
02f37edf2232ae972d3b0d0b3b50c8ab1a327c97
F20101203_AACJCA gallagher_d_Page_117.tif
bdc1535ab3caccecf01b33840904dd31
3e6792709d25152e454f45cbac41ddc403a8effd
6673 F20101203_AACJPM gallagher_d_Page_027thm.jpg
990c9643c3859e7ef0a0f3bc8976e23f
9ba6ec52a3be7147e30c5cf963745c94d70b1600
75658 F20101203_AACIST gallagher_d_Page_172.jpg
7e14d8f41f46c5dfd5f32598baedb820
f01a472c70ccdea2144376a1702a40e6644777ee
F20101203_AACHIO gallagher_d_Page_268.tif
131767b16d9df29a377f10bcd988b704
3b017fc4ecbe43ed94b8e1e0224f4c580f882e41
F20101203_AACIFH gallagher_d_Page_122.tif
e0dfc3feb172e38052f6e2e2dfadf0e1
160cc0aee8674b77281eca88917c75a9b1a8c481
124503 F20101203_AACHVZ gallagher_d_Page_265.jp2
25e733f0b2da113539a94016c986d3b6
4d3604bfce795c87d36cd768b9188698667e3f20
F20101203_AACJCB gallagher_d_Page_118.tif
03d592b596150892728605216320506c
ac6c89ad338da3a46ab9bd2d7578718dbf66168d
7011 F20101203_AACJPN gallagher_d_Page_028thm.jpg
5e345135e00e570503741739dd5d17aa
51b52f15cdd67bf52569f236387ff574f10f4554
79964 F20101203_AACHIP gallagher_d_Page_091.jpg
c2cd4efc933ce843c0f20bdc8d8cd5f1
8fcff1614866b16fbe381402ef57efdc2b52ce6a
F20101203_AACIFI gallagher_d_Page_218.tif
dfcc25bdf6f3170a8657279ab2e63fa9
035706a2812fbad613475b2bbac6664251a04078
F20101203_AACJCC gallagher_d_Page_121.tif
58899ba6852dc89b338f8dc09cda1334
4bcce6ed2cced8c0719e8502f9534397a9a95fb8
6808 F20101203_AACJPO gallagher_d_Page_029thm.jpg
9f8cae5cdf59775a1506ca3e0da5b5a7
90a676c78c59de020d85ea4e2385056393a02c18
79983 F20101203_AACISU gallagher_d_Page_173.jpg
8359e8de335107ef021c980354fced08
b4ef703b5b611bd8805aa69e7986a5a4a43f3c7a
7375 F20101203_AACHIQ gallagher_d_Page_274thm.jpg
81327e73fe2444b0f7209e7fccccfe75
0ea55adab950a1438bf0072ffa30d4c5fa81544e
1986 F20101203_AACIFJ gallagher_d_Page_069.txt
24478eff8376bc4fa967895fff995955
98303f72e84f74332501b3625b866a16738b76ad
26407 F20101203_AACJPP gallagher_d_Page_031.QC.jpg
7c10fa5723205c43ed572c4d2574ab0f
f65c1669c91756f90333de971b92e996cbacc643
75453 F20101203_AACISV gallagher_d_Page_174.jpg
fb401670509ca3a154bf7eb4d43fd771
944df2984ea919b22a440efe1cd5b1e95ed02775
1357 F20101203_AACHIR gallagher_d_Page_002thm.jpg
88eabeacdb6a0a6e63285f4e6e49635f
e2682c66ef6f7e959cf32ef949bf669d471fbb9a
26207 F20101203_AACIFK gallagher_d_Page_054.QC.jpg
1057b6c51ecc14f28b83308b50838619
11c813de7ea681f9f67e46b86a9abdc31f0085c4
F20101203_AACJCD gallagher_d_Page_125.tif
538f7bc6484a4f471406a98d0daae28b
1207e00052d9dea6c2bee2dbe2123744ab2b659c
79090 F20101203_AACISW gallagher_d_Page_176.jpg
33c937b4d50b6a2ff001c283e38b105e
571c34b589d0acb965e5791b4c80fe15b269c07e
24660 F20101203_AACHIS gallagher_d_Page_280.QC.jpg
2ee89d42181dd03e4e7efdf783dbe64e
fcc84e8aad4349f8738ce9aecf450ed4f26a2ce0
110427 F20101203_AACIFL gallagher_d_Page_088.jp2
49bef983883a3329cd4a21a2af20866a
33d98c934f79eeb4f8544a9de3d68dc0f4bfa3ec
F20101203_AACJCE gallagher_d_Page_129.tif
feb6c09d3024bf4bc7c659580721ddac
186b17267437ebace3fa1a3c67b34867fc5b416f
24967 F20101203_AACJPQ gallagher_d_Page_032.QC.jpg
52417b2e998c055dab1d86faf09f3c9e
deafe74ca635712c9fdad921ae0b9a74f370eb82
78206 F20101203_AACISX gallagher_d_Page_179.jpg
2fbb43832423ddf173dfe2b0d24ea670
c383e3b1fbf7c0fd5a694835c19e6430cd020fe4
2193 F20101203_AACHIT gallagher_d_Page_215.txt
e57491e1c5dd737dab4228bb950aca5f
835431d0bcb77105debf136b272cee6785b94812
50695 F20101203_AACIFM gallagher_d_Page_096.pro
415e2b6b2eff29d63cfe03ce8160aa46
deeeaea0d90294366e4a0da8ba54700880871fe6
F20101203_AACJCF gallagher_d_Page_135.tif
6ecc8c76995ceb023b923375907fa8ea
e846b3c541f5a2c0b5cb01bd06906fdf6634ed3d
6764 F20101203_AACJPR gallagher_d_Page_033thm.jpg
0d18a43d05b5d7a1fd12b8e74feeffdb
a6245547b6ce1aaaaa47e0ab2dfc155a527b7318
85410 F20101203_AACISY gallagher_d_Page_180.jpg
e0521bbef150a8d6ccb0c3698326cb2d
3b689235e368643d8232bc75743c87de98aaa5cc
F20101203_AACHIU gallagher_d_Page_207.tif
cf7c7e4d652c2851d7c2e0801d744a10
bc909ca0ac8620d50d75a5118f3e7dd685721a00
74309 F20101203_AACIFN gallagher_d_Page_269.jpg
a8630a599d273e09b2cff6254d18df1f
f988eb9076b212fc022d40b7415462d8f0c1efef
F20101203_AACJCG gallagher_d_Page_137.tif
34594e04bc77380901b6c22245b72348
04edff0a68d219b94418892441db6ab578ab7b56
6722 F20101203_AACJPS gallagher_d_Page_034thm.jpg
f363e991972f6a5193c97cf32e03f813
89a2ab0fed84be0093bf50370748ede5dd7a68d9
69553 F20101203_AACISZ gallagher_d_Page_181.jpg
84f828e5490958da0f9935752b474540
a44405924a65a744aaae868360c3f4cbbc049202
23864 F20101203_AACHIV gallagher_d_Page_189.QC.jpg
e0f42bdaaae62c7467405855b9131c91
4aad404528ff42cb3363914faaf38edd9ecf29c1
24988 F20101203_AACIFO gallagher_d_Page_185.QC.jpg
9c62bb9b58bdb6483b1b8ba5db912bee
213bb8f254c31a7b13190ef9457e8c95d130c79b
F20101203_AACJCH gallagher_d_Page_138.tif
7804786352aab9096b80f7ef9343b386
fbee5dc41de4accd48a0bb1a225d61a08b089011
24240 F20101203_AACJPT gallagher_d_Page_037.QC.jpg
7b8e90c46a4940fb4410380021cf83a9
67152023a919fe77e7e3f8ca92332413ad2c3379
80388 F20101203_AACHIW gallagher_d_Page_201.jpg
d8b30cd55d649c6597ac5945f20e6d92
b4a05d5664b634404240679c29ea5a7cf8ee9518
23977 F20101203_AACIFP gallagher_d_Page_129.QC.jpg
e54f54932c6f1476c725b64cb859aa93
20e7c1e62616ef54cedb6c79fda08033a6721e40
F20101203_AACJCI gallagher_d_Page_144.tif
a4ce42c4c20c014c99f8bc55b48956e1
c1e48133eaa74995488f99f02e073f39f286fcd2
25240 F20101203_AACJPU gallagher_d_Page_038.QC.jpg
0d8f441579291a2014f6c9dd41777d48
8cbe3ccfa6ff98f17b92889ffb4b25da798a90db
F20101203_AACHIX gallagher_d_Page_040.tif
c5be35b551de3bc3cd47257f8bdcde84
fc63257b930d0460dda048a768730d9f52582edc
55496 F20101203_AACIFQ gallagher_d_Page_224.pro
b6297e69a5109fdfbc75009bf8e4c581
b71504411d880d6d088c6e697ea576c021c02872
F20101203_AACJCJ gallagher_d_Page_146.tif
5701a155c13824af0fbaef50a7bba292
f71c97a2aab02a7d11e077c2e23f1f8202e67a69
26038 F20101203_AACJPV gallagher_d_Page_040.QC.jpg
8c3f6271cf847d27cff4962acd53e943
bd4bb986ee21104340254d452b5cfa2ada1379b6
6529 F20101203_AACHIY gallagher_d_Page_055thm.jpg
894f15dc63a457c75736e3cc5cad5da2
a702dc9d0d537d228cd81097d4ea1215e1b4cd2c
50617 F20101203_AACIFR gallagher_d_Page_239.pro
962199485b1b77e09135d9eb92eff61e
05e590afb450e516cf0931275de434c18f8fa0a4
F20101203_AACJCK gallagher_d_Page_148.tif
aa90e6a299a91d107300fea75d4f4475
419809baca2bad777969ffe1cc7acd2dda348434
24541 F20101203_AACJPW gallagher_d_Page_041.QC.jpg
3f3e6aad31215d45db8191efb6a39995
176f8d0999689cfbcaa7125d3b36c909a6bacdb1
80428 F20101203_AACHIZ gallagher_d_Page_015.jpg
72a7c833311c37181f859fc926460f59
5ceec05512572c236f9e28c83cb5116eed67bd5c
117569 F20101203_AACIFS gallagher_d_Page_231.jp2
5051a6978df492b3b04b91d3d351a76c
733d88d1586113a523adf85054b8fdfdb8e41743
F20101203_AACJCL gallagher_d_Page_150.tif
41a3cf169d4c12542a08aeae151e667e
96d51816fc0db84ef9f23ea9b971446c053ddc29
25544 F20101203_AACJPX gallagher_d_Page_042.QC.jpg
8267c8792f148b7b2aada3b0b5a47dad
b1469835b44e3a17e49bdac1915c96e0ca0a25c3
1946 F20101203_AACIFT gallagher_d_Page_133.txt
7a73ad6ec8646764ded76ae77757fa41
687189795583378440d51b194888ff8fc220b811
F20101203_AACJCM gallagher_d_Page_151.tif
f885a1a5e9cff0b7b33759640c087fb8
44501182fe5d711006572d572217df3b17c15912
25818 F20101203_AACJPY gallagher_d_Page_043.QC.jpg
a415e35da13b990b097e5544ff52f554
95787d75ff5ec6987e85cbe2e770e5b113405659
F20101203_AACIFU gallagher_d_Page_009.tif
ed41fefc3bb8d30043490959cb554d9d
bde27467f7b28ba9b00a56dc6afb4c36819cfb05
F20101203_AACJCN gallagher_d_Page_154.tif
a49210c56e08befc7c07b7c5e1f85443
8102252ff16656b78b11ed0da508abe08d50abf3
6735 F20101203_AACJPZ gallagher_d_Page_045thm.jpg
822c800c7121a7e04a477187d6cf2e7e
9e0a6b5ecf4375e3c824daa7b638652dc47d5820
F20101203_AACIFV gallagher_d_Page_248.tif
1b781202ef0837bcb716c4fb844abb7f
242c1cf7116909e72be8c5bba1d4e655d3e79fa1
F20101203_AACJCO gallagher_d_Page_156.tif
de12a1ea8c2a0e4eb201585c60882516
6b0994bbec5b43701622d8770295099dc79452f1
744 F20101203_AACIFW gallagher_d_Page_004.txt
81834447d4ce94bd3d3a5ede384dcb15
6f9ef1cc59642b5cdb8d030ffea09478d73faf61
F20101203_AACJCP gallagher_d_Page_161.tif
933ad843427e65874e7eea481e0b708c
ded6f5f5c7187973f91691d6e21fd8a7630c2428
133520 F20101203_AACIFX gallagher_d_Page_180.jp2
dd59d1be7b19b51323f30e7cb02a347e
9790ce1ba8f043e40430e067e6a8d0330f0498c8
114157 F20101203_AACIYA gallagher_d_Page_175.jp2
d05bc83914b6b039d8d843b0b164f553
76a420d6641962e876b87d0a8242237b96025b49
F20101203_AACJCQ gallagher_d_Page_162.tif
a64cf40fc9f678c2a758ca0bb4d24e5a
9014bb769dfd5c28664dbf6a4ce0ae48ea60587a
6603 F20101203_AACIFY gallagher_d_Page_273thm.jpg
19aac4947d04e48421d094791dd3f409
06e129edf33ea39a5c4b00080e523cdfc4346522
117750 F20101203_AACIYB gallagher_d_Page_176.jp2
8b8ec6674f130ceaf7d2cd1b79a65f44
1028784a4de4fe08e4a5b8f794cac9a9b3e1c1f7
F20101203_AACJCR gallagher_d_Page_166.tif
45487c1f78abfa5424772869d37c6c31
88009d0d84757b5fa04e9020f86029f3fa11ca91
2096 F20101203_AACIFZ gallagher_d_Page_092.txt
2bb3a0f2e4efde5cbffbef03a73cdd9b
bd02dcbdd37622e1d4c6e6b081a96cac55dd8f46
105509 F20101203_AACIYC gallagher_d_Page_181.jp2
3fe849634462619c032b5932adb97690
18bbf06b27b4950c45063124bf22bb0830927584
F20101203_AACJCS gallagher_d_Page_170.tif
e52adb8b66890864e61a8dfd1de25143
08ec38446b55560821168e0586273c782f07fdd9
110560 F20101203_AACIYD gallagher_d_Page_182.jp2
2d8841e881b820ab87b499459cb11880
6f744da874f0de8d48b685a063c5da7fb53a06cc
F20101203_AACJCT gallagher_d_Page_171.tif
00ae4825d0176629490c25f32bb8ff39
576c5fdd63743828d80c6a23e38347314ac2e5c8
78582 F20101203_AACHOA gallagher_d_Page_113.jpg
e8e60c4cbbab681577d4ad29dfa79440
8298799cd23b1932a7a92e85c7059209d1f5c432
121372 F20101203_AACIYE gallagher_d_Page_183.jp2
de8907795909e4f35e50c4e27b251d87
597d1c4743815f14246aa9b8c92bf58f76d7cb7d
F20101203_AACJCU gallagher_d_Page_173.tif
0163faac61347bca0a418b5048a756d4
1c67febfef07442849c31c1a708fb06ea652b031
114923 F20101203_AACHOB gallagher_d_Page_039.jp2
7848326750c1ce7b745bb0b90a08d7a0
e82f1d47a75c26ffe79960ec747cd725ede13055
107092 F20101203_AACIYF gallagher_d_Page_186.jp2
ce3eb4437d303c6845e099559e30defe
c2b9266859b24a48ff3a13e328d21576270e5f82
F20101203_AACJCV gallagher_d_Page_174.tif
ea5ce37219041325e3fb363d453b361b
673e13d1f87bace857cd8bc38dc7beaf09e06127
F20101203_AACHOC gallagher_d_Page_093.tif
7b0e4ba0d23414636b1924fc7b921cc8
d74f789a52c6fbec7903ee123678d3728c6c5a8f
120784 F20101203_AACIYG gallagher_d_Page_188.jp2
c39f0df5f837e260787b9f3ca6e7bfc4
950158c0af44af078f83e0f95d344539dd6d69fd
F20101203_AACJCW gallagher_d_Page_177.tif
372bcb25c12f9f138895f9fd5fe1b3bb
9b74c6671cbaf7204ca60f39c4af32bb2a5fed1f
25528 F20101203_AACJVA gallagher_d_Page_191.QC.jpg
ee168a418be16f1e3b38d413ec9a96a0
795a67827edc768d4b3b397f6ad571b4166f4089
2151 F20101203_AACHOD gallagher_d_Page_082.txt
05b7f8e4dd29d6d01c107a842ef0b790
0cd3f0ae64b2ab9c0ef56919aa2547b5617cc735
107983 F20101203_AACIYH gallagher_d_Page_189.jp2
47ed3c9eeea92408ed30a2622c3e2d34
6d815f75dd4fab51103ec3a7eb813df3b17b130d
F20101203_AACJCX gallagher_d_Page_179.tif
ec42e4799b5df004e22ab0df37dc1fd3
895502c42992579b5a8f3e314b058abbd58be314
7007 F20101203_AACJVB gallagher_d_Page_191thm.jpg
3808ad919564c3fa9b6ece8c2062b1d7
941c220a4e12957127a25e1c01feecb8986a2f2e
26051 F20101203_AACHOE gallagher_d_Page_202.QC.jpg
38259606e71f0d0f4288820c1a24016a
81a64c54d6b829b13a4c151d57e3be0cfa2c85ca
107650 F20101203_AACIYI gallagher_d_Page_192.jp2
9d4dd8232d5cf4a9937c9f34324b6c78
29900d7c3a3911f9cf5f820001db170a8eb662e7
F20101203_AACJCY gallagher_d_Page_183.tif
1eca35b8a0cb20d300d10df9137f3279
a98bfb15a650d829e2a0df9f86abf5aab8b91bd4
6630 F20101203_AACJVC gallagher_d_Page_192thm.jpg
b6f29c6988ce341229c719524dd76de2
84a94ab781a94c2a4e126c413a108ccbf1276d90
2131 F20101203_AACHOF gallagher_d_Page_035.txt
44f6e1b812780e317ca18677cafdc5ce
5e65702df18a3c8fd2170a08b2e0953728e14679
102247 F20101203_AACIYJ gallagher_d_Page_194.jp2
6e69923274730b2dfcab943c593fb1ba
45f47b29d4c14ac192be11a1aa4e7954e0a999ac
F20101203_AACJCZ gallagher_d_Page_185.tif
1cbf1115afceb1a7a4a87cbfefb639cf
275bb5e46301c6ccf413abc3c08677371b7e35ba
22637 F20101203_AACJVD gallagher_d_Page_193.QC.jpg
978b750536e4aff11ceff490905a9feb
9bc0ef848989ba97663e6d73f14e5f39da7ac451
52130 F20101203_AACHOG gallagher_d_Page_033.pro
74bb0ae4f8dd6c6534b0e2775fb1d430
8532490dcbfff8cf003c9c8170aa26e252060ca0
126409 F20101203_AACIYK gallagher_d_Page_196.jp2
557d5d46f9eb9a44e9580122ef366d51
d2652209ec4494fa17dc2dd1682fab5109b46b41
22665 F20101203_AACJVE gallagher_d_Page_194.QC.jpg
d22ef04fda5820f44ae62c64ae39c40c
4eb4b16d56431a7513e083ec90c26e66c4c11e52
110696 F20101203_AACHOH gallagher_d_Page_250.jp2
9b3c5f58e311451a333f7d5118e37f7e
67b8e07da768a262a6a91922014967ef9084b535
85292 F20101203_AACILA gallagher_d_Page_071.jpg
570b93344fcd5ac7fbeffa546f8ff862
f7ab8740f8a7344a2858f3a2af4b9a5d76db3c01
114354 F20101203_AACIYL gallagher_d_Page_197.jp2
fdd4e69248878983ce20d9497609e493
0833ae79029314b4a88b5c145dbc9e794a9bb200
24689 F20101203_AACJVF gallagher_d_Page_195.QC.jpg
39a24f33ed88eb940b63fcbd24a7f899
fae5c5d6b11db26857a98e42ee9a968f8bd4caf8
7136 F20101203_AACHOI gallagher_d_Page_220thm.jpg
a8b1312325549795a26284c65dd07df1
fcfa38c3e08d5cedc9dff86339e181362c51f961
7091 F20101203_AACILB gallagher_d_Page_177thm.jpg
57654bcda1c7a886369fde16c43e16a2
bce51c132a43190a5e785dc4ea172ab09fb2513d
119430 F20101203_AACIYM gallagher_d_Page_201.jp2
58879c874a462849f62e85cc8a936ef1
c1b209aff7d0a235373773573a8cace9c5df6c34
6924 F20101203_AACJVG gallagher_d_Page_195thm.jpg
e0a8d801fc584b52bef87aa13f3a7b3e
7f2cfd0df9067b46a5d58cdaf23fa928a5db5643
1927 F20101203_AACHOJ gallagher_d_Page_094.txt
0a1c5553066700ae04d1d50e687e9bae
c333ee64648fd2330c6ff7eecb0724588cd7a6d1
24153 F20101203_AACILC gallagher_d_Page_123.QC.jpg
cf886cae3c7974347a8139befeade443
e5024319d8f70b462512cccf0ae459acfa0bbda9
117037 F20101203_AACIYN gallagher_d_Page_202.jp2
359bce1f7b3683d1259d61e7dd0411c7
056abb61877f1f179353dd7363731d3043f82857
25928 F20101203_AACJVH gallagher_d_Page_196.QC.jpg
559303a47e1207b4842d267435ce14ed
ca28531309c983c6599ac074455267b296549d57
26045 F20101203_AACHOK gallagher_d_Page_222.QC.jpg
e266300e805cbe44c5fdb3f5ed3e23c1
a724da58a276f9674bbf7b1643d4d18bcfa2265a
F20101203_AACILD gallagher_d_Page_274.tif
2ec95b08776796c72c948a09d9122243
f555e33be7bc93dca4158d4e115ead6d5dea9a66
111978 F20101203_AACIYO gallagher_d_Page_205.jp2
4e1cd3c7c04f376ba8094529a882409e
aeaacb880da9e58a0443d16d8ef014b6dff80b71
6939 F20101203_AACJVI gallagher_d_Page_196thm.jpg
e87c196475f69b81c9236763ede4dd30
597c5c020aa49790f96526c3da73df684d0c62c1
F20101203_AACHOL gallagher_d_Page_136.tif
59bf8e373e10c679d4629eb97e4ca081
fa465a7809ca6c3e404b082d909ce5691c143290
50109 F20101203_AACILE gallagher_d_Page_069.pro
01e30b3e4ebcff059e7d5db4939e7936
9c7297dd169a3761a5c8cbf073d1f28ad2973e49
2078 F20101203_AACHBA gallagher_d_Page_117.txt
7be9ecfbb30f421aa92ab1f1bd8f68c4
c8172f19e8cf5f44d1cd62bdba62533570873ee4
112564 F20101203_AACIYP gallagher_d_Page_210.jp2
79c72a5747322ae3ffb269eb427a531b
8f6375c07a5120f1c2cfb2af426e1b2501a0026c
26112 F20101203_AACJVJ gallagher_d_Page_197.QC.jpg
5388682b52f3453cab5416187fa259f4
db009f21647e068990e896e664662a6b8877e617
7084 F20101203_AACHOM gallagher_d_Page_255thm.jpg
ff130876692bbe17ef9cf172943ff6a6
19f92d64a7818f54aa4f9c02ae5940c3a6c6047a
1608 F20101203_AACILF gallagher_d_Page_263thm.jpg
adc1b233d96dbb5e311dea2b45a8a997
a26c4939cc4d9790f3e9f252b539f49ea1d165ab
F20101203_AACHBB gallagher_d_Page_227.tif
75f374d398f9f6d6b9827dae1a2b2ceb
386129d58a27274cfc46e1905e0b0eccde48cf1c
122619 F20101203_AACIYQ gallagher_d_Page_212.jp2
7b5fe2b3a6a195ea8bb0901ce22c0ae3
4b306fc7bdcb0f5a8046692d44b9c31b34d41490
25595 F20101203_AACJVK gallagher_d_Page_199.QC.jpg
f398604d3ed28fa9b2758f79a8feda5a
8861c2b98aad030e7910ffcf0e5d98d66461e198
F20101203_AACHON gallagher_d_Page_132.tif
0039baa455f96e2e9733485cd7806e02
80c8ca42c2da2e0220334c691103edefec4d7991
F20101203_AACILG gallagher_d_Page_128.tif
65e32a841181b72c7676830cffca8d6e
83c79ae64bac8fed59028b96372127d39005b528
25798 F20101203_AACHBC gallagher_d_Page_169.QC.jpg
c74e101c9a2bc938dd2306d6e142bab9
9a58dc594a6b0c4d581dbafcb4fb8b035dfe254e
118144 F20101203_AACIYR gallagher_d_Page_215.jp2
f7f6d2369325c4a6d297ae90f9ff9785
4f1955af1dbf37e8a36efdcba15a8c317bbe125b
7126 F20101203_AACJVL gallagher_d_Page_199thm.jpg
815c339c95cb668dc23a42df2c5171b1
e83a3fa305707a437538db27da825ba0e4619e46
F20101203_AACHOO gallagher_d_Page_105.tif
f4a2ed1b701b4f88977577931d58b983
97ade5ef0ec93272da7877a3db6a509d5c2b16ec
7213 F20101203_AACILH gallagher_d_Page_062thm.jpg
3eeb26bf40a781a257dcf5be7aa7e99a
35b95d1d86047191ce7e2a2e1c9c7e142fcbc0db
51266 F20101203_AACJIA gallagher_d_Page_182.pro
322d625bdcda70917138253669a0ebe2
5c8b798719b0f32ea8767df70b96c4544e62436c
2130 F20101203_AACHBD gallagher_d_Page_202.txt
5d21fd188ce32b7e5f08468800cb7c5c
dc19e441f7574ed72b28b8d3f7d2e5d707266754
115862 F20101203_AACIYS gallagher_d_Page_216.jp2
cff219acccd70145c4bde618e15a0ab9
f713d69dfb9417deec4ef2d6057bdf9eba5f1152
7294 F20101203_AACJVM gallagher_d_Page_201thm.jpg
6720d8de61d9e2de9d1e720e00d23e04
03a048a29314cc46ceded09ac14570b6704b533e
75097 F20101203_AACHOP gallagher_d_Page_219.jpg
c74ac879b9434a66929d562ee0380262
ec6e96cc0f72720bf3d3febca0bf8c6aebdf73dc
68903 F20101203_AACILI gallagher_d_Page_285.jpg
fd1ea3df5b542c4b929e7c2ed15f080a
46775d41ec23c7432b678ffead82dc6612af5395
56446 F20101203_AACJIB gallagher_d_Page_183.pro
ff0b4a1a8a3c75520b938715dc2fd45d
6edcb0844ded871e7640094552bc5fe85f6376e7
115601 F20101203_AACIYT gallagher_d_Page_220.jp2
54f71409e3e877a7abe6b9b3dec49fdd
adfa5bad446d6ff8abbaa7ae1b8fd0a88a343209
7105 F20101203_AACJVN gallagher_d_Page_202thm.jpg
aacefce3e1df0cce9dc2da414e79611f
584487f971902cbda1b67bafcc64f02ba2e3992d
88338 F20101203_AACHOQ gallagher_d_Page_120.jpg
32c8614cc66abface5ef0155cafa2f99
07b248247032f6cba886b7af4bddb41177f3941a
24422 F20101203_AACILJ gallagher_d_Page_214.QC.jpg
a4f884d43a88569423b0337f81d1a193
c1bedb783956880c3141c0ec392234c0d6680a21
53580 F20101203_AACJIC gallagher_d_Page_184.pro
3d6dfa8c8d0056869ec723e3682d8ddc
829bea4f5c4385ec41d7375dbb518094c8d91091
F20101203_AACHBE gallagher_d_Page_032.tif
a02e83fd6c9e708e46836187b8c99ead
2d1d2e1d725550713e82ca01fb71824b40d2cf3a
115251 F20101203_AACIYU gallagher_d_Page_221.jp2
9d318156fee8c0b254eafd91a224e58b
712d2cde65bbc9f981d237624d125b3be3759009
23829 F20101203_AACJVO gallagher_d_Page_203.QC.jpg
36b4f6b9bbb8b723cdce33b26903538f
03f1e26f2c317ca649a09cfa26bbf560a601735c
117918 F20101203_AACILK gallagher_d_Page_134.jp2
b3c9125d72f7d6e1858777c097566f15
166f6e7835e9f4fc5163732b7e0c8dd0f0845f12
53632 F20101203_AACJID gallagher_d_Page_185.pro
b1436d57063b11fcb21e9cac71e537a8
ad4856f5571a8c248b62bc1354856de712530e05
F20101203_AACHBF gallagher_d_Page_222.tif
333dde9071cf6f29cfcad2c9512310c7
bd80105666cc7e5cc3567b061a70086e572fd228
120289 F20101203_AACIYV gallagher_d_Page_223.jp2
3e60dc0a239c0665cbed0e41330b46f1
3e7a35e5259e3aa61d2bb73b9de1839f7eb7a937
6412 F20101203_AACJVP gallagher_d_Page_203thm.jpg
5fe00462269c4aaba65a632d5b1f2d16
bd0752159ae649b49d77cd4a87684f74bf289c1e
31554 F20101203_AACHOR gallagher_d_Page_004.jpg
da64eed56bc38fa900d1653f2e4adbe9
a4aed347e52c3d599cff3f1119a96a122d426b93
102436 F20101203_AACILL gallagher_d_Page_225.jp2
a2d5af3c832703567c96378d6ce7108e
f25efda89182b28f67f584e997299cb837faf7ee
55973 F20101203_AACJIE gallagher_d_Page_188.pro
ac8f8551b2326a49f827e8c2fb92f34b
033e3199ee6cfcf7711d7cabf1e2459d5bbe3139
75328 F20101203_AACHBG gallagher_d_Page_164.jpg
fa75b954b99dfae91962cb6dc18db5ce
1254b968484f3cf0c716b1c4d1b34ba91ba674ba
115091 F20101203_AACIYW gallagher_d_Page_228.jp2
dc3feb834d594dbc3d6bcf0e1a097516
045294b5169194b16f74456d05491848b0baafd8
25168 F20101203_AACJVQ gallagher_d_Page_204.QC.jpg
ac91899e014723ea285e87644527d280
50c8b40ce1114cd341576cabfec7fc76829af918
119005 F20101203_AACHOS gallagher_d_Page_122.jp2
ce9306142743d5f3f448dab5519ec0a7
7f35193f58d6f540b6e5acec9b4a26b2c8edb43c
24653 F20101203_AACILM gallagher_d_Page_250.QC.jpg
4adb13007c4d99ab671edd6bee53e009
876e32970d1aafffeaab41283a8ab27d129853ca
49556 F20101203_AACJIF gallagher_d_Page_189.pro
7e7be665bd1b07688b9e38a63fae72d1
e0f46e15868fe979f929a6085b1e1a9139f6a490
F20101203_AACHBH gallagher_d_Page_208.tif
ba74a7faa2eda363dda162be642fc9cb
fefb8bcf05b46c37097faf0178b13a7b963c4977
115104 F20101203_AACIYX gallagher_d_Page_230.jp2
3e35600ad3dd5619bbadf42f0272b234
20cdc61df79fefeeaf845913228fd9f464b29810
7085 F20101203_AACJVR gallagher_d_Page_204thm.jpg
07a172354d37ae4f195e81c665ec80f1
c29fe2c59d1399be5238fb594f52f08e3b1de04d
118502 F20101203_AACHOT gallagher_d_Page_190.jp2
e65e2091fe1756684f0bccb5f39b1457
3ee7b616e19753d5a1f21500629402b8e2287347
56431 F20101203_AACJIG gallagher_d_Page_190.pro
93048be08e4091c6b7bfee399204b72e
aeeb3b8ab7c68a4bc583f6d43ce725e940a3a743
71334 F20101203_AACHBI gallagher_d_Page_116.jpg
c5677b09b93067e4f660364bbc7fe1e0
73aaa5f3908b2f9090c09dfecce86436c56b28f1
119963 F20101203_AACIYY gallagher_d_Page_235.jp2
43f3705ec25b38b841c32689c4eee900
1a8774a0d12739b62e92d73a894ff6bb6e23eff5
23991 F20101203_AACJVS gallagher_d_Page_208.QC.jpg
03dd316c611004b2d5682ab40c7f83f6
78f5eb8b884c14573fb28a7b8bb6306cc763503a
25780 F20101203_AACHOU gallagher_d_Page_051.QC.jpg
3dd75fcd29ecdeebe366a410e947ea07
dc01d1aeb6516239c94caec57b24a9a03f6301eb
53294 F20101203_AACILN gallagher_d_Page_172.pro
6ab2363d307e9b9b59db1bf8f4252673
d62081838e87c6f15f2ec1fa5d0a71eb60afe0b1
49617 F20101203_AACJIH gallagher_d_Page_192.pro
7a70da45cbd00a79677f53f81ac3522e
445816ce1114c7889850190e885f8bbe3fbb918c
F20101203_AACHBJ gallagher_d_Page_160.tif
cc040c4546bdcb92cbf535da75b0689e
df257280a06cfcd5f973ae8e32286ef13b80c157
116602 F20101203_AACIYZ gallagher_d_Page_237.jp2
949aced9902df6f293954eb4b7af0eb7
931dcf0b0a1020911590becf5ffe9f6033088db5
7254 F20101203_AACJVT gallagher_d_Page_209thm.jpg
c4a54bf866619f1e4fe18fc306b7b8fd
cadf09c711f0d15f82e1a6631033a5e896edaaac
25010 F20101203_AACHOV gallagher_d_Page_039.QC.jpg
2e816bd084f7d49a52cdb34943910e0b
8696f96f02647933fbaaeb92498e5252d1f372b8
53994 F20101203_AACILO gallagher_d_Page_024.pro
ad89f6909aeecd8d526d0f10b9c70b06
db171361e16294e8e4a5d06e6c4648d49a1ae641
47320 F20101203_AACJII gallagher_d_Page_193.pro
7e45dafc043db84891960875b4cef4f5
c8a9ab2a82a16a39c707ad6f7264529ee0679e3d
109177 F20101203_AACHBK gallagher_d_Page_236.jp2
57dd8a8396bfe99136afc94d3b9cbf45
86cfaea653c1a18a5ef04923def7c77115b45f37
25248 F20101203_AACJVU gallagher_d_Page_210.QC.jpg
99dcbb8cac45d176ee086e2ef6a770d5
1b301c26fc1870951d1922d7cfe812afe5bf3751
121783 F20101203_AACHOW gallagher_d_Page_144.jp2
2b567e2a4dfea7e56e44560569b7a670
b3a6ed223fb655322b7299024a9ac28e2053fa1b
F20101203_AACILP gallagher_d_Page_241.tif
3910d6a439141ebb62ad27776bde8fdd
3adce7184a6394094926796a066446bb9b1d0c20
7241 F20101203_AACHBL gallagher_d_Page_212thm.jpg
373e314120e4968f210c8d0700db3457
3920a5ba4fd80a22894054878d492ca208ddc887
26523 F20101203_AACJVV gallagher_d_Page_212.QC.jpg
100c3b9812d0df40569387bf35909ff6
80cbc2355e6b02c3c5f03bfcffd0c64bffa90920
119288 F20101203_AACHOX gallagher_d_Page_043.jp2
bc312ce78e42234bf32af1a042bffdec
8dc9638ded16aa9bcacf488c45fa30c07d9fcc95
25858 F20101203_AACILQ gallagher_d_Page_232.QC.jpg
60a4345c27e98c7798d82ecffb8ccbae
81fcc111423b8dec4d14fe0023f9bffa3fbea0e9
47209 F20101203_AACJIJ gallagher_d_Page_194.pro
dbee91472611e22700efdb8298d5fc6a
6c9524ddd460875013c57d4b2cf2e78d6a02fc09
26225 F20101203_AACHBM gallagher_d_Page_188.QC.jpg
13d3819e44d2dc0bff7286d7b66c7f19
202f04efd27b276cacc079d4a6be355cdf60f437
6911 F20101203_AACHOY gallagher_d_Page_187thm.jpg
8963547eeadcf0b3ed5be656bd3b1e56
3322c6555a5bf5e787735b0b8be54cdca6b1b7d0
26466 F20101203_AACILR gallagher_d_Page_095.QC.jpg
ec5856f85af788b79e3fb5278aad8b6d
9c4550b9d9af343f02137292ef15e2d806d51f25
53869 F20101203_AACJIK gallagher_d_Page_195.pro
0982d9ddaa1131aa594d782543034ca6
39a0aef13766094820fab36f16c76fffb7958fa5
3349 F20101203_AACHBN gallagher_d_Page_127thm.jpg
84f029a5c12d28ef8e1f32ee9cffdfbf
92f84862feea95a934ae61f3f6c0c947c09f1d73
7195 F20101203_AACJVW gallagher_d_Page_215thm.jpg
2f9fb93b8ca95187056cf8685ce600a7
01d1cbfc5a168502136cda202a82af3e3c49030e
2451 F20101203_AACHOZ gallagher_d_Page_120.txt
abf249f16bdae0b25dc2bb9bf3305640
7f0bef261eed2235bd2622f78204b02f9066546e
F20101203_AACILS gallagher_d_Page_237.tif
8624bfbfd98ce23aef50a6b339c4a44b
c295f4689036da8628c298ceb9415d6e3415cad2
59654 F20101203_AACJIL gallagher_d_Page_196.pro
d3927046c9c47090e7fcbd33814408ab
e2a3b75d18e83400608b9bbc44fe70817a53d3a9
54325 F20101203_AACHBO gallagher_d_Page_237.pro
245b0a5e252dc457ae078d3686f7c72c
e6beeeb9d8897fa950f4a31e2de940c39e97612c
24955 F20101203_AACJVX gallagher_d_Page_216.QC.jpg
e9107be12d385259248d7f99bb9013a4
fd626a19f42137afddd5a0313238c3b135482ef1
54298 F20101203_AACILT gallagher_d_Page_278.pro
fe98adf8f047c1efb3a9b5609ae230c5
6e8776e189d260d586c0410e1c80c7cf956186f6
54137 F20101203_AACJIM gallagher_d_Page_197.pro
399950102ecf35e84fbe931c5127076e
f4f01f429741534274fef3cc5b293926a244d873
F20101203_AACHBP gallagher_d_Page_280.tif
d831eb61544125cefdece11b17c2b9e5
34d81a525a7d9ba8239c2515618a1ed222f4f8c5
6947 F20101203_AACJVY gallagher_d_Page_216thm.jpg
525bf15abd38c2d80929efd99c08bc5b
d69f8589c2c4d12612011f93f2ac033b127b3c41
6850 F20101203_AACILU gallagher_d_Page_234thm.jpg
cc9d5b7a287c9b428f250e666779fe63
3355c78167439d35ce9bade2f7f082a05e387cd4
58320 F20101203_AACJIN gallagher_d_Page_198.pro
4f2f405bcf1175497a0d6f74bf547cf0
9afb270c1ad44c0369f10d792274d7ec469ffe09
F20101203_AACHBQ gallagher_d_Page_070.tif
84f1ec10036eb075eb382dc7d3ab974e
91a63fdc0620d9b6ac5e3513e6dd8dbe00bedaf3
7176 F20101203_AACJVZ gallagher_d_Page_217thm.jpg
e357c7f42762d8de68b8748511179892
55aeab0692dd3d5e9372b0f7dbb5ee63a86b4cb0
51760 F20101203_AACILV gallagher_d_Page_037.pro
b2b29066d1c57b1ee52ce6c472c3b0e8
0ff7426b470e7d94a9fa4fb52e1810351d6d5666
54107 F20101203_AACJIO gallagher_d_Page_202.pro
5a4d4a54f94f5050891029dc8971af95
ed21f203807808b938b9fa58954c834a9b11a7f8
75023 F20101203_AACHBR gallagher_d_Page_058.jpg
9dfce3e7bd686a38045a4ce664857c0c
3a9eed18f6c4816a14dd9c5abd2580bcae8fe99e
81008 F20101203_AACILW gallagher_d_Page_090.jpg
dddadc3f9392818dcd1eba8b78503b3a
3e22f9fb08a1f26e8d00a9d4b1666089cfe2bcfb
49350 F20101203_AACJIP gallagher_d_Page_203.pro
df018f068e79c3512d4d20b693452288
dca99044112aa106235ed0a9b14b4490220c73b2
25495 F20101203_AACHBS gallagher_d_Page_179.QC.jpg
f4f1b73098022652e6565070d2815d0a
d1f3b6c122391d300237b98a6365068d51ea3cbe
25271604 F20101203_AACILX gallagher_d_Page_283.tif
5201b938d362239bd5a105cc430e0978
fe0ee3410ae573bfa7c21db8bc81b4c12528b907
52244 F20101203_AACJIQ gallagher_d_Page_205.pro
c1ac85f86d66354de68eb4f8f64a4bbf
3a52e805370190fa5e6b420f08c8a0e51609eb85
25790 F20101203_AACHBT gallagher_d_Page_200.QC.jpg
f1569f816ed5ba506564496f40a982ea
ab7317f5795d7291bf0ac4b17d21cb93faea7792
76771 F20101203_AACILY gallagher_d_Page_244.jpg
e1a97933a1494dd55c1eca020cdbc543
a40c6fa7194d1ef78737d85225ae743468aa35ec
47936 F20101203_AACJIR gallagher_d_Page_208.pro
ae548dd933d35776669fbfbc05452bd8
d6cea5e358a1d37a517ef61180ec897ee06beb08
7141 F20101203_AACHBU gallagher_d_Page_083thm.jpg
9bd06f28e4065bdd777fdd22bd615943
61eea40e56be9b703449190d51cc01ea60c4778d
81347 F20101203_AACILZ gallagher_d_Page_031.jpg
11f13c14bc28c896265742b84fcd5357
256d7422cf3a00daf88aac8b823b5af77c948909
55803 F20101203_AACJIS gallagher_d_Page_215.pro
4255eb465973cadc06025a3e329700c8
add6f35601766ae63cf03686b9d69f55cda72833
82270 F20101203_AACHBV gallagher_d_Page_274.jpg
1eb76a1afea4971b868a8ea44be21296
f366559bc4f013b112c5b4d4166c11095c86ac5c
54032 F20101203_AACJIT gallagher_d_Page_220.pro
31a89372d290b89cfa87e2cfa3aba735
c791db05f295635ed7733385fd81a2ea9695d6bb
F20101203_AACHBW gallagher_d_Page_254.tif
65ac853b1c20aafef2dc87e0215f0a0a
511b1cb52d85760dc861ff2ef7e91ceeaa3a48ce
56145 F20101203_AACJIU gallagher_d_Page_222.pro
9b9112b04d6c5b7c9d6988a8d2356a31
f15495a33480e477040d2cf37e587c4af9f1651c
7002 F20101203_AACHBX gallagher_d_Page_074thm.jpg
3f789ce361219896d707c7d4e6212828
2ecc2219cf14aa145c6418dc54695ff445d73f8f
6994 F20101203_AACHUA gallagher_d_Page_279thm.jpg
4267dc169ff34ab0c440a647c7819d27
2337dcce6b9d0db272e912219e1c437f894b6ff3
57187 F20101203_AACJIV gallagher_d_Page_226.pro
f65a8c29499a9711827726547f2abdb3
1821e6f34e37c1accdb424171f1f47a0206377f0
5804 F20101203_AACHBY gallagher_d_Page_023.QC.jpg
77dfecfff6f5f6676bb8cc59f3d0be43
cb6a3c2339a3a44c3264144dc41c0a1475558d1d
25238 F20101203_AACHUB gallagher_d_Page_206.QC.jpg
1a44fba42f79ced7e7d8b79c8477f84d
9fa913c4c619d1f70994e344f3778c250e1c32a6
54527 F20101203_AACJIW gallagher_d_Page_232.pro
ae38b7b7a276802ec78c40bf9010ff68
f830709b7209a1eea5f8a17ec8c42e963201dc2e
F20101203_AACHBZ gallagher_d_Page_234.tif
1c95d5d1e506936cf05a01c06c941251
2efb7acedc38965c576aee2881815206487eadc0
F20101203_AACHUC gallagher_d_Page_256.tif
ad6f1d9ac7183cada9840b2b7d8e18d2
0610231f3cfcac2e1d254c5ee8de8aa2958a9b56
51431 F20101203_AACJIX gallagher_d_Page_234.pro
56800c963180f7bed80e4349a7b2ff9f
a2cfc2216b357578e34b79c509221a864d991f05
54696 F20101203_AACHUD gallagher_d_Page_053.pro
af87e72e5a24287d02b8ab8ec79a2f15
090b2ca523d811362e875f076fd9b4d112f180a2
54419 F20101203_AACJIY gallagher_d_Page_251.pro
94d09e498a7957c37bceb963773fd2bb
579de134e2939143c56e0f6fc3c94953906099b5
1978 F20101203_AACHUE gallagher_d_Page_088.txt
5adfead31e80601e4f7534489c0de6ec
c9cd43f23103ba83eab09ce000112952a2bc20a2
53406 F20101203_AACJIZ gallagher_d_Page_253.pro
a1c9daaa0ef02752bb1eee468311cb0a
49c6fbb9f8a53447359fa2791a5aa801dd17fca8
54958 F20101203_AACHUF gallagher_d_Page_054.pro
f26483f510187d8c6d198a3256ad1e56
ab241e8900bb343a864f54420714430d4625cf7d
26604 F20101203_AACHUG gallagher_d_Page_139.QC.jpg
466bdc262373ecaddbfd215158f7c515
bb7861e24fcf9d46a654740e23f1c738bb791dcb
80753 F20101203_AACIRA gallagher_d_Page_049.jpg
00c0de0579c1d8f2ca4ff9d2111e6934
81c5b6246d65ea4b30a3b108beccd690e7e4ca2c
24109 F20101203_AACHUH gallagher_d_Page_029.QC.jpg
b233d4523272695bde32b6f53fd1ab2e
d248d30c653bda3f699dba193b1a30a47b910e2d
76043 F20101203_AACIRB gallagher_d_Page_052.jpg
2a8eef532d4dbad9afc8fd843a90bdff
a4931be5e34cdca4fba5e628dd58bdd7c7e06816
76206 F20101203_AACHUI gallagher_d_Page_147.jpg
24c9d2110c033537b7e7dbe596264e08
90655aee5c1ad1c209c7755a46eea4e367009622
78378 F20101203_AACIRC gallagher_d_Page_053.jpg
1d912fbde14462a51a390978a8aed1c0
a9be341a6ad3e95ea17b0a52e051b8e90bb384e0
70777 F20101203_AACHUJ gallagher_d_Page_044.jpg
db8c3eb35c5ebc778f30c0f8abb78880
8e9784587cc8cbd85f1442b0d10df873fe8a46a5
78071 F20101203_AACIRD gallagher_d_Page_057.jpg
20a44d86a62a83b1bfcb09b06fde3fca
f578099ceb618a3dc367eed7dad4cd56ea11de19
F20101203_AACHUK gallagher_d_Page_019.tif
a8518c14fd766ca8399f08d0faf10d9c
8e7369133ea47db205c8b88b02e0d29b5dc247e5
76149 F20101203_AACIRE gallagher_d_Page_059.jpg
652c5e669795528fd7c6ddee6774dfec
14a7805e47a7011d2718e21c0d72b67149713c38
24838 F20101203_AACHHA gallagher_d_Page_072.QC.jpg
cc343c103c03c696dbe13a0c900737ce
b64ad4834068d015038241491210c5f2aefaf8b9
55662 F20101203_AACHUL gallagher_d_Page_122.pro
d223606b4db4b0ab92f65a54cf61e16c
02bffca88799ef676d804b32458b63f858055301
79018 F20101203_AACIRF gallagher_d_Page_060.jpg
0ecc614509985cd92ed3aa9d3a83d935
dc4155e95c93599e5fbdc990785d37fdc50a81f2
53679 F20101203_AACHHB gallagher_d_Page_187.pro
8083fdd7ffbb84066fe7fcfd9ae55b0d
adde521c982af0b6b60d63c347cc6c4e4be3fee1
6581 F20101203_AACHUM gallagher_d_Page_186thm.jpg
e38ba93f53c4ae29d8ee6460ca87d6f5
f14c460b542875f9c185282f492765e1a18dec72
78487 F20101203_AACIRG gallagher_d_Page_062.jpg
0dd5e16af66e08bf487b9811560ae68b
c4606dc94e181c2f5b58f304ce30b0aa945aefb9
F20101203_AACHHC gallagher_d_Page_198.tif
5caa326ace9d97b2a8ba23dbe482f290
225416a0c6d5ccf92cb6c9b202853a6f09c566de
53770 F20101203_AACHUN gallagher_d_Page_157.pro
d1b4edcf2b3eec166fb4b851756e54d6
12fc125dfcb9317abf93cff81ae39a4453ad4a18
2180 F20101203_AACJOA gallagher_d_Page_266.txt
a1bd800a6ac3940a95861281e7c9d0f0
00a18bfce0c2cf51953f8b335c7aa172f9e417e7
72086 F20101203_AACIRH gallagher_d_Page_069.jpg
efbadc5097c17e43cae8ff3ec512541f
0f5766e9748dd5708aa525da18ecd2694314594c
7189 F20101203_AACHHD gallagher_d_Page_076thm.jpg
8c376045e55dedcb560d9c7969ebd829
706fe594a2c135844cb3dd2238afcf0038276137
56243 F20101203_AACHUO gallagher_d_Page_091.pro
e23807c4208c1e39ce913afc71e1ceb7
0b2b62e76edc98eb8c7451ca85702b1513ded29f
2122 F20101203_AACJOB gallagher_d_Page_268.txt
c646c3bfaf384a99412f5bfb1d24c0ee
b943236d989d33a9b7b7dea8787b598e23293522
75534 F20101203_AACIRI gallagher_d_Page_073.jpg
788eaa8e0e1c2e93164b5be94147f239
a7b7d16ed0a45185fd058b49ba6c15de4d95f31f
2101 F20101203_AACHHE gallagher_d_Page_147.txt
0ef35f7f0292c06bd3f26039bf56d197
1d5b78eab1722555e6178ca1a696fd5fd8853fde
12948 F20101203_AACHUP gallagher_d_Page_048.pro
1299dde8e58236375bd533566ad27b6f
4979d21ce41ad2b48cc10dde5510d3513279b259
2051 F20101203_AACJOC gallagher_d_Page_269.txt
74f444bc31e2bd8e06da56fd1005b6ae
38cda74a0547185889c09767124f130a83f7f39e
74262 F20101203_AACIRJ gallagher_d_Page_074.jpg
afb9d3979dfdb718956ca687732025a6
205e30c0ea7310957664d225ea8febcee3ea8cd0
51436 F20101203_AACHHF gallagher_d_Page_129.pro
0c835a1e14da1bf5230c9e5a46de0de9
5944f898c650539446632d3e680cebce6db77173
50170 F20101203_AACHUQ gallagher_d_Page_171.pro
72eb40319e7545abfc3ca9a0ccfa5358
24a0d707e10ac86ddaf61676051100e9c1d7dbf7
2107 F20101203_AACJOD gallagher_d_Page_271.txt
8d1d769c35bdd671259ddaa9450bc0c3
910d378293616611dcc7023af7ba8f9b6c20dbac
81154 F20101203_AACIRK gallagher_d_Page_076.jpg
ea07f22a4f053b3e4fd269f8288d094c
6cf7fe7ee5f6f85587f0e3a2fbd38ae3dc269ec3
75247 F20101203_AACHHG gallagher_d_Page_242.jpg
7e9536ec09db3e503181348a4924df46
87b7f921690ddb770220a397bfe86773e981ba30
F20101203_AACHUR gallagher_d_Page_284.tif
2095ef77f09fb08f245a8578c075eb31
e18209084fa4cd92cc208da184ab9a3afe092c65
2008 F20101203_AACJOE gallagher_d_Page_273.txt
09f37e410fcccdf6d391639a1a146970
9d9a9bef75552fe88b70dd1d00533d4be06a0bf6
75905 F20101203_AACIRL gallagher_d_Page_077.jpg
5f076d4fe90d97b497ff4cc2c946828c
f03c5c83e4760b3e8069831f649c65fca073828c
6992 F20101203_AACHHH gallagher_d_Page_280thm.jpg
796b2a282ccf8c3819f549ea42eb1ae7
894ab1d494decb2aa0ce14b277bb0864f97c7d6c
53364 F20101203_AACIEA gallagher_d_Page_036.pro
780c974769235640aaefc9823f8216e3
c6818b97172497fc9188e0348f4a321d920d8fea
7272 F20101203_AACHUS gallagher_d_Page_168thm.jpg
4db2b30d5e074612c108700ae6b2537f
9ab42c1a4ad0d5abd820b3037797fe84eef5d8e0
2084 F20101203_AACJOF gallagher_d_Page_277.txt
8f9eabc93faad2357fe9b51c9377ecb6
8ac2ff1b48fb74e75235a13d9ac7845be8a8a4d3
78556 F20101203_AACIRM gallagher_d_Page_078.jpg
d68c75f08fbce71070c10625ecc824a4
ec8c6930ed41962fdee039418f05200c213ef632
7010 F20101203_AACHHI gallagher_d_Page_092thm.jpg
f36908f33cdad74196730049c19a62e8
5b29b00312e438473331abe6bc67cc6d996491fe
F20101203_AACIEB gallagher_d_Page_220.tif
ee9994f9212af6bab735dbf48208693e
13519eed606df3169894209b1ab2b38bfb0ca32e
115502 F20101203_AACHUT gallagher_d_Page_264.jp2
8210a0c7b6c0164538293be099ece59d
d4797352c9cdbe5363988b817e82db8a43b8c603
2137 F20101203_AACJOG gallagher_d_Page_278.txt
b370fff4edd0bae0308f13aaa51b71f6
d0f10f61d369b0d0f5ad7e9c30892b69d8f48bdc
72119 F20101203_AACIRN gallagher_d_Page_080.jpg
3672dfc5752b160a6ce14ad274572818
1d4abbf9894f7cf290d4744debfe390b014423c1
75672 F20101203_AACHHJ gallagher_d_Page_177.jpg
d523188ea6d740937504f61bf2ec64b0
740b50b27a6a14cc91fd38ba7d04895b04ea3df5
14945 F20101203_AACIEC gallagher_d_Page_089.QC.jpg
fd78fc4ce0a5806986633e40e9354db7
0ca291d825c9d7df6e6280202c2f31eeba27bd10
25037 F20101203_AACHUU gallagher_d_Page_103.QC.jpg
01e9cd63929367e804132f411cbb7ba7
9ba2e4fdcc3a15cc21f169c6fbaa6435c1c5e77a
2168 F20101203_AACJOH gallagher_d_Page_279.txt
79b2c4488068fe5cd99f8e5c812d5109
2a8a6e76816898dd31952a90a58941d2d83d4823
70555 F20101203_AACIRO gallagher_d_Page_084.jpg
c5105ac8b524d5210b0a2841c333c62f
6b84bddc37c1933c3e6a3ac9dd92d239f5b53cb3
2074 F20101203_AACIED gallagher_d_Page_219.txt
3275037e06509758bdd37fcfad36f350
76ed8b196c1bcb4f9b66bea68f07265f05fbc512
2104 F20101203_AACHUV gallagher_d_Page_172.txt
0f5fa959ce7632b1f3671851c8c869f0
75390d07e201d408598777f95718aa1679db03be
2089 F20101203_AACJOI gallagher_d_Page_280.txt
0dcea63a6700fd9517e703097a892d36
85d7a0c1d3d2a9cfd6fc4d4a2b98568dc8a0cb69
73753 F20101203_AACIRP gallagher_d_Page_086.jpg
e292d7b94909426a537f2fd0a5a6bc8e
8cddab98183b1859705dc772b4b961edf24ad169
77097 F20101203_AACHHK gallagher_d_Page_228.jpg
1ff171939b082b02b235e49bf38945f5
47f56ba7c693607791c7a13bd762bb17756ca00a
F20101203_AACIEE gallagher_d_Page_017.tif
1f2b17389661709987a60cd19944abba
6bc37720d00e1919b256d2e664eb4a1f7bc30ffe
52815 F20101203_AACHUW gallagher_d_Page_131.pro
296f8a86637f7f5a61539692e434af3f
d56a874686818513f35a8372a04579c2537e69a5
1136861 F20101203_AACJOJ gallagher_d.pdf
61a6a58bd39d3e49c4a240760c5e64b4
6b0a0bb474d77d8622cf25feda3de183fcf12306
76516 F20101203_AACIRQ gallagher_d_Page_092.jpg
ece863c804410221dfb0a03e4cf3ec76
b6f9ae92cf4c58e3365e1c5d64c3e427fd41236b
121341 F20101203_AACHHL gallagher_d_Page_130.jp2
843680d26bc8c8bd09d270e716da4e54
534ffc3ffe41bcde70679f6230f4ebbd3b49ecbc
119972 F20101203_AACIEF gallagher_d_Page_209.jp2
4e42119d0b16ac8d10976829bf070acf
ef8b3bbbfff1cea6e38bee2e055f6c9d78200b8b
2317 F20101203_AACJOK gallagher_d_Page_001thm.jpg
3acd5c2ba8bd4df261048c6759f463a0
6894060f911239716c632d5945600d61ad6c072e
69925 F20101203_AACIRR gallagher_d_Page_094.jpg
78f4ed4c7e38941e5e7ddcc1f6bb4f85
6460c324e7d996a5925f3f87a9f26c140fd2383f
2189 F20101203_AACHHM gallagher_d_Page_255.txt
25289b55f2297c0ebcb9f2287f3234b1
c1d5c2ee40e5b5ff4e548b9c821f2a844aefbaf8
53007 F20101203_AACHUX gallagher_d_Page_179.pro
0c3df8ab55c90584a2692e7ce2c34e82
885af5df893ee5eaa14bfaee2cabaa4a147e7215
3419 F20101203_AACJOL gallagher_d_Page_003.QC.jpg
d31adc2bdbd6e829e56aaf34de78a42c
b3d7410ed68fba9d705ca2c4f434931d26c2ffd7
74757 F20101203_AACIRS gallagher_d_Page_099.jpg
e1016d2ecd73bdaf8df506522f32ab02
04303a2160ba55b383b3bb6636ddd3609a43a933
126340 F20101203_AACHHN gallagher_d_Page_145.jp2
a0bec8b5e6751d3025b1f17c2aa3ef2d
f7d8b52997d1d1c63451b0e01be071f4b9ae0662
24757 F20101203_AACIEG gallagher_d_Page_048.jpg
3577cbaef955ee95060d00edac8006ff
3ed6095777ac62adc062ba9306e46601675e5b7e
2281 F20101203_AACHUY gallagher_d_Page_128.txt
599c8790d6925e514e5d2a56d9df8816
2ca72fc66bf4f213c14c00577d840e5e6a591068
F20101203_AACJBA gallagher_d_Page_067.tif
0c1b62459885ed81cfd7e9574424e365
93b6c53eb2b1dce1946c5450169119d7ea47a9e3
1365 F20101203_AACJOM gallagher_d_Page_003thm.jpg
5a60342e0ba4506b2225075c3764d1a2
cd3beaa8e919e1fce0fb4f26c869f629e9f1da45
F20101203_AACHHO gallagher_d_Page_056.tif
a1afc400f7e3f8ecdc13af26ce1c9a73
0a44dff03ea66fedcaf89535cf6df5ea72ac229a
F20101203_AACIEH gallagher_d_Page_167.tif
8aa9d6fd67ad30744a51fa5288e75f7a
0c7c377be9b6e7c86a55488dda31b98482c3f74f
7050 F20101203_AACHUZ gallagher_d_Page_157thm.jpg
58b1e5c44b6a0bbfd39ab3ae08d814fe
52bbfd5e3c934c6f62e51751e36d0d8820d6f980
F20101203_AACJBB gallagher_d_Page_068.tif
bea653c869b9cb1d15d0f9583c169ee4
3b7f8e50f3882b43d0a907f51f464e0ceaee3c16
18519 F20101203_AACJON gallagher_d_Page_005.QC.jpg
9b4b0f3872f4fd94022ffe1276808a66
9be1c76d66c1dd465e9cc320c7baf5422ad26d46
76799 F20101203_AACIRT gallagher_d_Page_100.jpg
bd0530b98d236732c29e326b209a3f3f
c01500f5109c42a2b068824920dbea281da34755
56509 F20101203_AACHHP gallagher_d_Page_212.pro
e450a1c036e33b0d72dbe0bee823f4dc
6a02611b5d59859a9dcff53a8f44752c394984e5
2017 F20101203_AACIEI gallagher_d_Page_143.txt
73ae5fd7e6d259002033f7d9d7ac8dbe
3648e20f7cda66ba5c656dcaa535b40a2c447e5e
19420 F20101203_AACJOO gallagher_d_Page_006.QC.jpg
51d10d676eaf311ff7739ed5f2ba6792
d68c1035bd0f99a3fc68c2fe81923e15fb2363cf
76686 F20101203_AACIRU gallagher_d_Page_105.jpg
bb2206812217a6bd26a08835590ddb5b
bba8113b4dac88d872cec4db478bfa695cecde1f
51625 F20101203_AACHHQ gallagher_d_Page_101.pro
43a32be39791169c7d068f6fc553e0cb
ec4d19766dbcd37f30338976cfe5bfdaabefc88d
118003 F20101203_AACIEJ gallagher_d_Page_022.jp2
1efdfd6d69ca509fe698be468569db61
add0e2c416f6a5043b3a54114a48f7d5d91a7d02
F20101203_AACJBC gallagher_d_Page_069.tif
f26b34356b19b05efe84efe1e100ea9e
3038d82f9681078728f5711cbbd6a5e43c6a3012
79991 F20101203_AACIRV gallagher_d_Page_107.jpg
90d4cc4386a8f2c837bd57611f1bc039
d495c50fe7cb3e3c2fa2605376003a21aad03566
79299 F20101203_AACHHR gallagher_d_Page_156.jpg
d6f8eb817b298273bdb14820929ff6d5
e2dcb0b1979b8a074c44782788f130796f6d6309
131383 F20101203_AACIEK gallagher_d_Page_120.jp2
64227527c461d6adf688206aad886942
94f61eeaabf9ec26f13de6c5a061ff3ee3e96a0e
F20101203_AACJBD gallagher_d_Page_071.tif
65f69c1ce78a6abb5f8a1f7787cef865
cff033f150c7d2776d5dc74f276c3ffdee9012a6
5793 F20101203_AACJOP gallagher_d_Page_006thm.jpg
7745ee0ffda8ecc7b07ae696ee8fea73
b28ada0e8cfdc7efbd94fa16d0a97082926dbd0f
77560 F20101203_AACIRW gallagher_d_Page_108.jpg
d71f023199a4082a045c008d15a930d4
8f3e50de17789d4761840af9c46990d517e30d07
2198 F20101203_AACHHS gallagher_d_Page_050.txt
2b759bd2624dfddcc6249ed9828f8c8b
266a2942fe514e8fe2ecb60b66dd81edb84f0625
F20101203_AACIEL gallagher_d_Page_108.tif
166742d0cc29a87aa121cccdd151b0f9
f84b11065530fb84470ef19be6c5906ae1870218
F20101203_AACJBE gallagher_d_Page_072.tif
86a256a83f68d226a681c1d5dc2b1f43
7566e2e1763a1d6bc8d79a3b118a9a1648c798b4
10386 F20101203_AACJOQ gallagher_d_Page_007.QC.jpg
5b1392292f37c499fbb83b1c4150d0ae
574275e3ed3372c4864896685b6afcee64015db5
72415 F20101203_AACIRX gallagher_d_Page_110.jpg
965b17a77d99488d128fbe111af30291
261b8e73c5853bd5fc795dcca99d4f4117c64343
54142 F20101203_AACHHT gallagher_d_Page_066.pro
2161d511b6e953d3d0a56344a6c38f01
c48c8a76fdfe2c0d658198a742b572fb70e9d688
F20101203_AACIEM gallagher_d_Page_273.tif
7f2e3871514da9ba7173c3366e8c4cec
9ea221e9a8376c67d817ab7db7dc3e31eeed0564
F20101203_AACJBF gallagher_d_Page_075.tif
ba9efedde7383e4499087cc3a5ae8f03
14d22026ef4997a949796f545f248f4dd76f5ac2
3307 F20101203_AACJOR gallagher_d_Page_007thm.jpg
1146e55dcf2e2851319a4adcb568128c
fe5987854622f11404b58e7724129532a1ce2848
74847 F20101203_AACIRY gallagher_d_Page_117.jpg
c0c4e9f93941bb7d8b8520adb20304d5
0b7a08f181cb63d2345d37278b2deecbc67d6858
F20101203_AACHHU gallagher_d_Page_139.tif
2b87d5342e66f96a65b3092bdc3e3066
d15453fca4b9b17b786205f7b473c05f48959915
52243 F20101203_AACIEN gallagher_d_Page_244.pro
8646dd0e863acc070edf708f3685525c
eae02acbbc2a977aefe53478c4f28010955399cb
F20101203_AACJBG gallagher_d_Page_077.tif
c658bfddbdf9bde9519faf2ee9225fb9
aeee4a5b986b0c9948c364a13b3766178b49c1b8
24384 F20101203_AACJOS gallagher_d_Page_008.QC.jpg
e61b48b56299e46d34bb402767eaaa1b
626b5e0fcda94dd552c72511ee2e7ff926ce4efb
67757 F20101203_AACIRZ gallagher_d_Page_121.jpg
4582dce6961aad572f313f675c19f6fe
48c7c2a409e49786d01495953977facea9314a79
2013 F20101203_AACHHV gallagher_d_Page_041.txt
ca068d10787e5acafcce0b836368cf06
25c94ee2792cf920d48443fdeaddbab30fc4fba3
77420 F20101203_AACIEO gallagher_d_Page_232.jpg
7524a9c61687167cf0ad8dedba9fd1ae
21551d2aa4b8ab4c931d88e5dbbf5cd8a75846fc
F20101203_AACJBH gallagher_d_Page_079.tif
7c9b16fb227cad0325a6c85cc5714e2a
9ef7efbfa2f1dddbe02a4f524256e550e82fdcd7
F20101203_AACJOT gallagher_d_Page_009.QC.jpg
2a644538724b2346b08676d31b957d51
c2ae7c27aba6dba4c94914d90fd3d73b90703d34
19571 F20101203_AACHHW gallagher_d_Page_007.pro
7208c855fddb483d1fced51de219e48f
f40620aa7daca3b5aab691c9c9240503c3e3d319
26064 F20101203_AACIEP gallagher_d_Page_024.QC.jpg
39956c040bfb013007912835d80369e3
e8b3406f2e328f491388414a0c62bed242f1f4c3
F20101203_AACJBI gallagher_d_Page_082.tif
b5288f30b0990ca0c1bd3afec82de801
74842a8128e128065722e8ea15860296dd73947a
7194 F20101203_AACJOU gallagher_d_Page_009thm.jpg
117ddc805989334c204d1ea3459f8508
bd6969dc68a5df45cdb919d4845856691aaf6bce
51686 F20101203_AACHHX gallagher_d_Page_114.pro
66006f5b0f139802b01eb240f8f90939
098198cf6cf208b0ba1bdb49380ba80c828597fe
6882 F20101203_AACIEQ gallagher_d_Page_174thm.jpg
5c2a0717f3c4fe9fdfc19a90e2307b1b
5e89d321905dac467001280d7eb5f4f6cd83ae91
F20101203_AACJBJ gallagher_d_Page_084.tif
371c26feeeff2682e2786c4b8f493804
76c83bc4f0116ad67cd884d10f6e5199f9f0cbde
25182 F20101203_AACJOV gallagher_d_Page_012.QC.jpg
04b88fb715537f0982c0fc73ed420853
81db558dd35f04332307e6719fedd1442406057d
7222 F20101203_AACHHY gallagher_d_Page_270thm.jpg
92145d4025e096df83f847c0057bbfd8
fe5ce0709d71e8897f61dac76b9f13ae229f7b74
6577 F20101203_AACIER gallagher_d_Page_208thm.jpg
74fc0ad7607dc20fa14b0abf15fe520d
45310d354ea9c8642e007fc32166d28d89b7f4b2
F20101203_AACJBK gallagher_d_Page_086.tif
c23cfe6b6d451a949bdcf7fbb8996d5a
3cd50014f0296add593bee64b0770a20b02b0167
25917 F20101203_AACJOW gallagher_d_Page_013.QC.jpg
0aefcf4a62b463502e7ba8ee306e690d
d9e60d278b06c5a8dffcf1f1ea5ab815bda28ae2
24726 F20101203_AACHHZ gallagher_d_Page_033.QC.jpg
f74cb554077e1b18586dfd928a12496e
c44d0ad8b56698b72af59e6a0e4c6df75d0ac4b6
F20101203_AACIES gallagher_d_Page_074.tif
a1e47c22df1e1b1574da28dc272806e6
6bf59523ee3e541f1f3150e56877e3bdbeb353ba
F20101203_AACJBL gallagher_d_Page_087.tif
53a154fb2fe2519e3c418db92522d21e
95aa8934dcb30133fb8c7b6d5becca60ab758aed
F20101203_AACJOX gallagher_d_Page_013thm.jpg
78d3c29d1d6b97d968e156cc396b7788
f177debd710913f4a6c81a4671ce47ff4a93b973
25557 F20101203_AACIET gallagher_d_Page_056.QC.jpg
ba3c18a20bfa273d30fe236173a10c1d
ae9b3baa04ea097ca5eae330578823305d4aaf91
F20101203_AACJBM gallagher_d_Page_091.tif
c74648085345edc000f6a48dc8903d00
547b775676d8e07e44d9391df507920a3c1a5f14
7223 F20101203_AACJOY gallagher_d_Page_014thm.jpg
86a04225ebe82c3c5dddaadbf25fd24e
5e6642ff4b9909f2d067f7619f5f3790401115be
7043 F20101203_AACIEU gallagher_d_Page_210thm.jpg
5a05364d1178e6c0e05a474edb513004
2803bc5ef741f72d67cd64db04c81f7bb1cfefa9
F20101203_AACJBN gallagher_d_Page_092.tif
802738a9258d4293aef57e01fea80d5e
df5e5316d0219f22086f6a227765d170858a69f8
26390 F20101203_AACJOZ gallagher_d_Page_015.QC.jpg
532650e15f40d08a1e633d466fb4aef9
07a0bc7d81c7dc1cefb828bb15b8eff09691bdf2
62289 F20101203_AACIEV gallagher_d_Page_006.jpg
4f3e017e8e90601416166c8e5d8f68fb
33ac74e672dbc7a3e771f742fe4a3cdfb5d6b6a8
F20101203_AACJBO gallagher_d_Page_095.tif
c077eb8f1abc8c7f03040d7b95eef698
faad71dd99399c600ccec9dbd07837241e6061d0
77000 F20101203_AACIEW gallagher_d_Page_221.jpg
e189a9b095c96dcc7bea7eb76f77254d
c8ff5895463c4e5edc75c1a7d4c0b015300baceb
F20101203_AACJBP gallagher_d_Page_097.tif
e74027dc08b6f039673c22c8ffd5e4b9
bc3eadafaa4b19b9ad0a0a5ef8d8b6fc13689ed0
2169 F20101203_AACIEX gallagher_d_Page_022.txt
08ec2bad31d0b05612ba38f9498f3781
fb444a1ad2a4ddd53b282ac2329b5feaa0229a89
115588 F20101203_AACIXA gallagher_d_Page_125.jp2
1dd66a8ad3276ba6491b64e42897489b
8d0d614eda8026ea16d35d1ce6e3691b1a373e29
F20101203_AACJBQ gallagher_d_Page_098.tif
eae754854f5799fd7fc1178a3cc3af6d
f6cc09941436c7cafee25eb25eb5311ebd52323b
52870 F20101203_AACIEY gallagher_d_Page_158.pro
4de16170925d7aa7b7455ab5c6e7a3d2
774fef9a81247ec60945e0671306d9f97e1b2f44
116863 F20101203_AACIXB gallagher_d_Page_126.jp2
a595a57a57a144c74828c2ec4fda8b73
2d9a1e42d9dacc2c5c2df56f91fcdc59594dc9c4
F20101203_AACJBR gallagher_d_Page_099.tif
b91c4cf1a41b66f9e64ef4c3148da930
04478f31bfa1520b84a8026dc40b1b86121e371b
6980 F20101203_AACIEZ gallagher_d_Page_085thm.jpg
7620580c2fa5daa24183bfc0218b3246
2875463eeea48c62dcaeb4348a1e56089c274693
122393 F20101203_AACIXC gallagher_d_Page_128.jp2
c11966cdb88df2c484092bed1c13062a
4b2be3e3275da130f95c01e7f640403a0afa9852
F20101203_AACJBS gallagher_d_Page_102.tif
f3884ad1416b6164f640e91b77d57fdb
3ced13a2ea6c1287e7da921266c9c3c83361ea3d
113882 F20101203_AACIXD gallagher_d_Page_131.jp2
3c51f817661d7f7c80fa83843a0fb795
4f97d31e8455a6e6fc5ada7c590c28e94c72db88
F20101203_AACJBT gallagher_d_Page_109.tif
0c77387b2803d9c6ea775cd34490d749
24e7025d03a0eb44e08a0cffda5a831411077982
49021 F20101203_AACHNA gallagher_d_Page_227.pro
3f696eb8ae46b82daffffa510f43b6a7
0cdf057775274b099ec07ff27e81248b55c98720
118421 F20101203_AACIXE gallagher_d_Page_132.jp2
ac48da6698382f64e8cdfeaad95db7db
b172a263b34cc99ffe308975e66f83223544faa7
F20101203_AACJBU gallagher_d_Page_110.tif
aad7c84c4d337d7bdf1fc1ffcfc561bd
dbbeef6615d819b55c3b868b18ac182946fee2d5
F20101203_AACHNB gallagher_d_Page_158thm.jpg
d7772c3ab6cd5a01810c15755c88b43e
a659070744afbd4c06fd5c3be9ea461726fbee68
107668 F20101203_AACIXF gallagher_d_Page_133.jp2
4168b7eb395b323c792db660371cfc47
377a7f9c9263113af28d79681ef1707543a888b8
F20101203_AACJBV gallagher_d_Page_111.tif
76c5004e6f165e2f0b5f6b5db76541d8
586dcdab494a19cf7513a99e1b030e615250bf1f
2103 F20101203_AACHNC gallagher_d_Page_175.txt
8f48c88affcc4f5d4284fbb91232f7a2
5b6bb775b882408fa322e7deecc800728b723084
110284 F20101203_AACIXG gallagher_d_Page_135.jp2
72b1f1925bb5eef8e814af36ae852432
1406a420be3560e363fcace83c61c7f9c8b3c55e
F20101203_AACJBW gallagher_d_Page_112.tif
c275f26bfbfb1f53c8c29e4dd7a689cd
4c392c4c09d6fbbaed73865bf2a98e0ed1356ae4
27482 F20101203_AACJUA gallagher_d_Page_160.QC.jpg
d4102e200449c77a745eb380682cfe8b
aed8399c1c51c3fba437a76db769724293ff20d2
25350 F20101203_AACHND gallagher_d_Page_237.QC.jpg
f935f8f8bf477697c7afc8b7492aa46a
880bf057f791667247dbd0854a4eac0663d923f5
116141 F20101203_AACIXH gallagher_d_Page_137.jp2
fe8480c299f140051d0194f5e8a05833
0ea74f89f3d410562e878af98161aa1d5aaf5d29
F20101203_AACJBX gallagher_d_Page_113.tif
4ec205d9ab6adbcc6632ec2f89d5b7d2
68333c5eb6575af45fc9b5d4d3ccd37ebc2f4a6b
7147 F20101203_AACJUB gallagher_d_Page_160thm.jpg
18c4699037dfd49c973b33de69552826
a43bba8149ace523cd2d8e051860ca8dba862f8c
F20101203_AACHNE gallagher_d_Page_211.tif
afb48c9e8938a239be0774ebd883d2a7
5bfcb4596fe2115fb4b5a527677139da2e333066
114719 F20101203_AACIXI gallagher_d_Page_138.jp2
49dafab8490482c027fd3bd1bab9a128
0399a2034fd19d3024cbc7ad6e01f27b30847a45
F20101203_AACJBY gallagher_d_Page_114.tif
c7266c4b7b4fd2ae577584190fc3047b
f0fd7cb1d1ae35b9a4f4ec58fa8ace5a7d6f3b43
25769 F20101203_AACJUC gallagher_d_Page_163.QC.jpg
7039cc866674f75cc1bea1e3e6e0a5bb
6522cafc1538f3d3e05537b712dcdc5c936e9e05
24813 F20101203_AACHNF gallagher_d_Page_205.QC.jpg
8215a2c626924f71a62614b356d848bb
d2e95c6df6facdac709c42bde3e588214ac84bdf
109731 F20101203_AACIXJ gallagher_d_Page_141.jp2
6b01a55daf7eca80255816e1da281ab8
bbdc950b8a86c72d9c46597324afbbaec4f22a41
F20101203_AACJBZ gallagher_d_Page_116.tif
d9da8d7533404b0ec0dc87ecdc039d3e
ffc5ad91129e45a9d52a04f18ed81bc95be9e9ab
25279 F20101203_AACJUD gallagher_d_Page_164.QC.jpg
cd116a83a42a7ea196fae8397d46e12a
4c65a0f8ac7aec0c7555da25e78fb6fa28c8428b
58681 F20101203_AACHNG gallagher_d_Page_098.pro
37837986574f7d267215a95bb19f71cc
f5292d7aa639f617a75ad7cf4b3fcecb34b3697d
118162 F20101203_AACIXK gallagher_d_Page_142.jp2
b377fb6ad5f3c79913c9cf08419e679a
97b5a814fde5eef775f366cc229a027459bc0a0a
7170 F20101203_AACJUE gallagher_d_Page_164thm.jpg
db5c84bf00c38182a95a92e0049b76da
cdc499b01dabfaad2f37d6571a0135797447f915
52727 F20101203_AACHNH gallagher_d_Page_093.pro
4e636e2e508f1b663a73b810a7049736
38b3a3ea6780943c54a8ec168618923dee0691c6
1994 F20101203_AACIKA gallagher_d_Page_171.txt
9b8eb93531701181f9294cc092f77ba7
b753f825841978cbc2877d71e615df449565fdb4
109736 F20101203_AACIXL gallagher_d_Page_143.jp2
d877c9b817164f4e67b0fbeb2eb01ed1
b999f3f18a7c477ebe5f6b39d5ce5b5f766bb2be
25467 F20101203_AACJUF gallagher_d_Page_165.QC.jpg
292b52f5244962c5fe221896af261de0
f37261e243d9313efb11bc172b3585972a1b9364
F20101203_AACHNI gallagher_d_Page_182.tif
99797c173748395f4499b3d0deaa5027
a8a9d08e9a32817b5e784dd5425396d76e1e0233
F20101203_AACIKB gallagher_d_Page_015.tif
fdaa671d04b3e67700d5e021e3f0be11
acff8186a2503265b4369b964f50dbff565fc74d
115705 F20101203_AACIXM gallagher_d_Page_146.jp2
2601f01b83fe9d7982ea1ceb8189f7eb
4c5fc65c5034b9906fe3ea15214f7e48403cf4fa
7208 F20101203_AACJUG gallagher_d_Page_165thm.jpg
8c815c798df4c18ce730d82119db3810
94a843baf82ef580f341ee4b071bdcfedafea994
7234 F20101203_AACHNJ gallagher_d_Page_235thm.jpg
93e9faa6aa845220c0f06453287253f2
b11700cc7ee291cfaeb8be92464ed0b4bebd7940
114627 F20101203_AACIKC gallagher_d_Page_256.jp2
1715e803d112b88f8a2713675cf041da
b8b70d07745f6dc26a9af7ba005cefea287ecc11
112348 F20101203_AACIXN gallagher_d_Page_147.jp2
4589110c5acf9e8689204d0ece1d7a80
a1ef1e51879732cf9ac46a1dba1ee49de5c8019b
25403 F20101203_AACJUH gallagher_d_Page_166.QC.jpg
8a09ef8c7bba549190994e15ab09071a
2eda5d7d53c9d31f351947ccb03e6032bbdc67eb
55323 F20101203_AACHNK gallagher_d_Page_115.pro
7b2a0570f56056d8b5bc9e6832b3d876
35a0ab8dad5a781241e5861a90a8e2919b6abd43
1963 F20101203_AACIKD gallagher_d_Page_189.txt
a548fb3507329bea58de6c571edbdefe
c153bea498d21e004f4d699c2ac9b3a45dc54830
115982 F20101203_AACIXO gallagher_d_Page_148.jp2
d885102156d5a85d6ff758ca6315bb3b
83f07633788d147b09c7a51184d4966a28292e5e
26141 F20101203_AACJUI gallagher_d_Page_168.QC.jpg
574f3ac51d32fa7d030fbfb1445d74d8
b2cc1d0f4cb7dc15348d089ac4adb6c58a8493dd
101582 F20101203_AACHNL gallagher_d_Page_121.jp2
87093d1849374d899b1958f1604e7e93
a92914c7e69504ddb75903e0c397f2ef55abe704
F20101203_AACIKE gallagher_d_Page_081.tif
f80e8206ead84a0db0118ef10d2ea97a
efc160b92cf3baa041a369e9a898fcc0fb03333c
12778 F20101203_AACHAA gallagher_d_Page_263.jpg
813ce104baeff60a40627145424b5320
2e660204d280f06c9562ea109cdeb2d6ac39c7ee
111656 F20101203_AACIXP gallagher_d_Page_149.jp2
f5511a9b1e3f2a20e51d1024b610be91
7dcaae85e5d90cfcc44562dd590d0f50c6d6807f
6990 F20101203_AACJUJ gallagher_d_Page_169thm.jpg
e314d9c800809468859a41eea2a2e701
aebf1545fa7da95be8daff29877660ab6fdbdc5b
76312 F20101203_AACHNM gallagher_d_Page_093.jpg
0233a307081973145577118d23083a4a
62e17d1b0bd54087282536fcdeae55197a879923
113903 F20101203_AACIKF gallagher_d_Page_280.jp2
f012dc9b8d5a1f7861e04fa80add816d
60add4bfc6690ac6b69e7d0080066d44745709a5
2221 F20101203_AACHAB gallagher_d_Page_031.txt
de2138250592f795df2fb81ee94997a0
d39fd28032e8bc9db16dd3f3caa8372ef203c334
118714 F20101203_AACIXQ gallagher_d_Page_150.jp2
79c55c8f8aa2749760407c19b56c946c
73f7c6eb99438ee7ac0dd5b4770686c5edc12163
6821 F20101203_AACJUK gallagher_d_Page_170thm.jpg
2718e20c90ceb3132a838a085d66b7db
08553373407c85a0235c4f80103191083a1d4b5d
1157 F20101203_AACHNN gallagher_d_Page_089.txt
9af9ea967fc00490d8fcdf3c3c39b4bc
77df6bf4fcc749de942c06d510d7902f794282c5
F20101203_AACIKG gallagher_d_Page_242.tif
cc797f429dddf2a2dc802a48593e43eb
018eda3759c62e44fb887735741523b0504d605d
119634 F20101203_AACHAC gallagher_d_Page_008.jp2
14710b61646d8c103b70340643faface
eb63d1a0519a4ebf0cb162564e66df4eb07fdaf6
112523 F20101203_AACIXR gallagher_d_Page_151.jp2
ecd64070258e18b0decabdf1e19e172b
28542b38fd8fee40faf31b619d882c72c828d70f
6724 F20101203_AACJUL gallagher_d_Page_171thm.jpg
19e331a7bdbb1677bb5afb12f00a8f49
c1ef3e01d1a0aa8abb02f28c16d62c41ec520651
6734 F20101203_AACHNO gallagher_d_Page_064thm.jpg
e95803bc2bd474d87306ca6223098367
4974bb5e334105f2ee5a0d1529ee48bf56feecc7
74005 F20101203_AACIKH gallagher_d_Page_214.jpg
9a043773ecee558bb325e99089c8d444
be23d5be0f7eab57d19f0ed2d8695a6e0855b6ee
55604 F20101203_AACJHA gallagher_d_Page_142.pro
b38c4ef5cc7e3f5a4a96f290369862f2
166e5e42786da18ea7858174f3dc00c5b1d8bc9f
109697 F20101203_AACIXS gallagher_d_Page_152.jp2
0b0ebe517bbfbe79bb315f8d97804610
029b03100fa9f05c5c28392af541f4745878f48f
25418 F20101203_AACJUM gallagher_d_Page_172.QC.jpg
7bd49de50691c052d4063d486c2caf91
2fb1cf5c2aa89972d35504811b9bbd116b219069
115887 F20101203_AACHNP gallagher_d_Page_083.jp2
ee8115d4da3f718684b0c1365ea9ec74
6712abd8d8ff916d9f948f6649aa8f82df37311a
71527 F20101203_AACIKI gallagher_d_Page_055.jpg
07f16663869efb3765c3bb9139c4f6a6
6a994b143e34af90a588f3f5837374417eed989e
51086 F20101203_AACJHB gallagher_d_Page_143.pro
6efbad7a8194a2115f272b4d2087f69b
e8bd4a7daf1bfd33b94005c4929ce0b89646a4da
109845 F20101203_AACHAD gallagher_d_Page_110.jp2
3e1422c09f38ceef9cfae98c765064b0
03c6191a31a4a0e9df1a4e5040037f00394465bd
111369 F20101203_AACIXT gallagher_d_Page_155.jp2
8c7543fb4bf19d8eb16fe6b8010b1e95
f9e9e7cf1b3a6ed29deb26f2b83877cb073a3f57
26504 F20101203_AACJUN gallagher_d_Page_173.QC.jpg
a34a5a32316485275c856336de2e3fc8
da91be77b332f07073a4fe6e2fa95e32a412d512
10343 F20101203_AACIKJ gallagher_d_Page_003.jpg
01bfff0e4703393a96e132554f032a91
95247956adc00f7826591f6c26137c05eca898a5
56269 F20101203_AACJHC gallagher_d_Page_144.pro
e330312991bfdfc40c5c57980c3ebd61
bf5d2d187c03075089c987de9c759dfb7ba89538
90647 F20101203_AACHAE gallagher_d_Page_160.jpg
59f7ad9a34daaefcd5b216fd29a2dfd3
4145c45b3a9e464e1bffd04f2c526d5ca49a0b2b
110118 F20101203_AACIXU gallagher_d_Page_159.jp2
4eac5992095bc0e9f4bd1582495857c5
68a460788845ffbebdf3e6d10d2379aba37d29c3
7269 F20101203_AACJUO gallagher_d_Page_173thm.jpg
0ee7d66e308f4dbd87de50315f59f5fb
42c0b62d5a344dfeae5859d659116259b8f1fbd4
71087 F20101203_AACHNQ gallagher_d_Page_070.jpg
6a7fde2d6bb92245e43b233ffd840d44
ff10731436cc7865e0cfa88efb5542229c14bd82
25301 F20101203_AACIKK gallagher_d_Page_158.QC.jpg
617e89393b2c29f50955e14af4cd8e6f
c63d19606496e8e3932b5976b0960e574198ba27
57904 F20101203_AACJHD gallagher_d_Page_145.pro
049693e7f06882c6303398762623ac24
dfd61cf2281ca95752843648dd75745012f5a2c7
6813 F20101203_AACHAF gallagher_d_Page_119thm.jpg
b16f3f202ac24b5ee633a79c59771c45
dabc35e5865305b62801f82e1468cc8efba97e9c
113539 F20101203_AACIXV gallagher_d_Page_163.jp2
01757db00df9df7189547ecce56befc9
78a1158eba5a1b91e2931c3fb436bf9df1ef49da
24597 F20101203_AACJUP gallagher_d_Page_175.QC.jpg
c46a6119b7c6bd7c04e3fcc9a9088d5d
4d446cb6cccd0808dc8a02c24f5c108bd56d1d0c
7248 F20101203_AACHNR gallagher_d_Page_031thm.jpg
028b5379a6e17b8d6d047e1a2581502b
cab154521905c9e73dec040db2797b64cd5769ad
26649 F20101203_AACIKL gallagher_d_Page_223.QC.jpg
0f41b6df31950c1cd83a016ea19c6d78
8e59c0b72b37e92a36c23ce35b3388fabc86f03a
51774 F20101203_AACJHE gallagher_d_Page_149.pro
d6dc0231089a02a5f6d623ce08a669b2
723e8a449beafcbeb3e669435a5020354fce6c08
75214 F20101203_AACHAG gallagher_d_Page_018.jpg
f675a5bd823c95db7f0c1c663e35850d
b1e156935814134eeeadc2307057043e5cc70e8a
115678 F20101203_AACIXW gallagher_d_Page_165.jp2
ec8096232df54f81348da6384d9eb5df
62a7a06854498b164286956494b8e553b1adb0c4
25319 F20101203_AACJUQ gallagher_d_Page_177.QC.jpg
918a24bddbfc79d09afb6a62366fca68
375243d84b8a682f1e35105eeaa00052111378a2
74125 F20101203_AACHNS gallagher_d_Page_155.jpg
6335da0dba24d6eb6012d0438a34b433
83b58c79ed08b5a7454827dacdc1d671d656b251
55741 F20101203_AACJHF gallagher_d_Page_150.pro
f740ee3b675f92a2847811a41e11a7e5
8b5787bd4bc68680dff1e580cc7a4b036ceede0e
F20101203_AACHAH gallagher_d_Page_126.tif
a743e63a3dc809bfe62f71850303b1ac
87cdf72a5a7b5873657b6268c6c05c8ac44e0f4f
121539 F20101203_AACIXX gallagher_d_Page_167.jp2
50094a3397f55f8c27a4f97927026c6b
e2a3e99fceea98f001f848d0f43bedb9bf7550b6
7119 F20101203_AACJUR gallagher_d_Page_179thm.jpg
728e572d7499ea51c3fa43db1d46beb8
b64ecd34e89b608ce4dd47e7dac7c878450223f4
F20101203_AACHNT gallagher_d_Page_130.tif
d8b78a6de7ff6aabbaf1d8d65038fb9e
508410495dd0f262ca04601a3861f37ade6f9106
6401 F20101203_AACIKM gallagher_d_Page_193thm.jpg
a42b47fa714a27f39a1f899c4c118c3c
bb78cc6ca6d79d6fc0a81a1bd2b43a0180ffe41b
53944 F20101203_AACJHG gallagher_d_Page_151.pro
5dc9550b5504f410ef9da5869e06139e
f6a3ff9e2d9e8e2c78d1a3c3bb86ed5287a20595
105993 F20101203_AACHAI gallagher_d_Page_084.jp2
c58f3d1f67466c09d8329783ad97bbd8
7c0202ec15b0355e8e64d0a9219c562ddd42096a
112963 F20101203_AACIXY gallagher_d_Page_170.jp2
7a113fb030583718988bf36bfcbacbe8
6c19ffaeca340f9f419f419b10d765f69cc892b0
26979 F20101203_AACJUS gallagher_d_Page_180.QC.jpg
edffc4604f72962c8093b4ec50da738b
534962b0a204180abb75a2a80455f8db0fcfe914
2187 F20101203_AACHNU gallagher_d_Page_060.txt
0fb86a66536165cf58335025d584aac0
98cbada17ca218f9a797e07fcac450b309669734
55781 F20101203_AACIKN gallagher_d_Page_266.pro
f6ede319e3efd03ab612335df946d0bf
a6ef3e2198d25c9defadc1d96b8f0d7adfa4d266
50919 F20101203_AACJHH gallagher_d_Page_152.pro
3814022ab044413a8f4a23a138de48e5
6a70c5aed64e07f43a38eae38534a6d162c97176
53638 F20101203_AACHAJ gallagher_d_Page_254.pro
1f26cd132629a14ce88911f59211cae3
787cb5ca429fd3be04c74d3158605f588b181064
7086 F20101203_AACJUT gallagher_d_Page_180thm.jpg
b9e2ef666f7bbb2b53eeabd695276d2b
1f1387e0f2871a4e7b71ae4db86a1ccb6e7af877
74369 F20101203_AACHNV gallagher_d_Page_259.jpg
49d7fce54277f73856979aa4ab227ec9
22a7b07286f61c13215ea89b37178d4631f4dc82
114294 F20101203_AACIKO gallagher_d_Page_093.jp2
89c168e9b8b79e255f46bab6e6c07443
e8f34a2fc26c5335724d2557d16883008ec899a8
55423 F20101203_AACHAK gallagher_d_Page_043.pro
94c9312db4763b748a5642c681d5a45b
daf8f714c05b7bf3beb00233ec2b7ee546c373f9
106729 F20101203_AACIXZ gallagher_d_Page_171.jp2
ade9cb2f861c1a82ee521c3c994b44c4
2f04eb4dcdc59cbe3b4cb30f01c658a6f0cd55a5
23643 F20101203_AACJUU gallagher_d_Page_181.QC.jpg
14dd7ce23e93cad23bbb84a708dbc0ba
6bd48ffc706a95827d8d6f4953f20846b2a8e2bf
25229 F20101203_AACHNW gallagher_d_Page_253.QC.jpg
848e67d983efb9c7932b05abfa94c7ea
d46bdbe1a32f23a483cff6fa60670da1ad674951
24770 F20101203_AACIKP gallagher_d_Page_155.QC.jpg
c552facc498839e7855b4ac1d1a3acd2
271cd6962359b2c20e55f535c049b8e0fd101301
56608 F20101203_AACJHI gallagher_d_Page_153.pro
8dc022fe65def110222c47480069758a
615e06c30375bafd5b823ef027ee0e8e01364b27
2036 F20101203_AACHAL gallagher_d_Page_241.txt
8df513e5716b5e6b8a7cb01bb2ef1b13
4da5088032e75ecf591485d6b2aac24e84f96e74
53633 F20101203_AACHNX gallagher_d_Page_019.pro
e537c0010075ffe69c4347fc66aaaea0
ec2210da91ae8ca73f4cc4698a10a653ad4c54cd
119708 F20101203_AACIKQ gallagher_d_Page_222.jp2
1de312eebdcd134ce11e74fcadd9f5ac
58d71a14052614ce81581a0cc612751f29c49fb3
55444 F20101203_AACJHJ gallagher_d_Page_154.pro
0d841e5e59c29a75e97282ae066a863c
ee98aa85eb1c2b5ebdc03992746d55cc78aeec1e
6499 F20101203_AACHAM gallagher_d_Page_070thm.jpg
b1bce8ee8d3f5d9accaef6c20c5dfc65
3c7bb9262f6bc88718176ccc70ee7ec8d6ce3900
24404 F20101203_AACJUV gallagher_d_Page_182.QC.jpg
a8810b0eed985aa247ab229e89361658
6c9f7e110606144e6443404898829274513936ee
7308 F20101203_AACHNY gallagher_d_Page_213thm.jpg
360e74b170f24938f0c680ad3719a06a
4e58484fe30d13717eeadd81d878c9bd69c5f446
112834 F20101203_AACIKR gallagher_d_Page_097.jp2
532a36a719246749b6faa7b686a7becf
8a7df476036bb2e856f11aba543485096bc0211d
51071 F20101203_AACJHK gallagher_d_Page_155.pro
cea1a5e207b70fd2075ccc1f7be8ae57
44e50b5e7a733b87a2ecfb8fcc9a78c7e56b07b8
F20101203_AACHAN gallagher_d_Page_123.tif
1e1a8fc3b93fa95f303d310b2bc40746
8525f1bcbd96debffd8fcda95eb60be6266fa16c
F20101203_AACJUW gallagher_d_Page_182thm.jpg
7c6c94c227f7c7857d5dd48ebb6db96b
9f853072c0bf8f79208456725a876ea8e102d9d0
56213 F20101203_AACHNZ gallagher_d_Page_235.pro
9a94aa916d3fc582faf7e62b11f36888
86ef610912006d6a56a3eb483be32da918290013
50897 F20101203_AACIKS gallagher_d_Page_041.pro
c653c1c46fba31c5a267c5b9220d8e52
c82e16cc66688cb9e554ff2a3ccbb089bfe1d7b0
51100 F20101203_AACJHL gallagher_d_Page_159.pro
1702301017709581ca260e5d5d76b6ea
74195d989ae011b7cb94677a20b6eddba1c42c2f
76838 F20101203_AACHAO gallagher_d_Page_085.jpg
f296fd35b5d97122dacb88a4d79258ab
da9de1dd94808695cf44ea8e0a8141e85a3f0069
6982 F20101203_AACJUX gallagher_d_Page_185thm.jpg
44992b42bef2732e8adb708c97e55b6c
e9b49af50b303e1f2aeb99ac8d63a788ac09007a
79519 F20101203_AACIKT gallagher_d_Page_270.jpg
0deff17edb165ae7ac06d4ba52267469
a1ec93b694c5a74cb625ffb3e33a888c443319e0
65567 F20101203_AACJHM gallagher_d_Page_160.pro
a468f58566f4bb98324a6a4a4af552d0
3a115c3c0b5a95a68cf404f7fd98513c31e5ed6c
2257 F20101203_AACHAP gallagher_d_Page_212.txt
ffeb2b4390643ac88e1b57c65f8c895e
275b09e619717d54aab9e45fbc91cf9a25e0fe5b
23646 F20101203_AACJUY gallagher_d_Page_186.QC.jpg
63d2f9bdec3f17767bc78f4be1bf3d21
310908b815249390b3b361fec721e61461782e5f
119444 F20101203_AACIKU gallagher_d_Page_091.jp2
e4f1e99643f82554bf49497c58d390dd
4f26b075286a08cba74ddb69c5f133dcb6420daf
52016 F20101203_AACJHN gallagher_d_Page_161.pro
99409e212f8a122550f2efd927521597
21a212d754a05e9bb1881efa81c3861d4252b30f
F20101203_AACHAQ gallagher_d_Page_163.tif
13156a3408288dd496470c71a2c89ec8
0170873312de2d05ecdce4984afc21b5d913ab6a
F20101203_AACJUZ gallagher_d_Page_188thm.jpg
3ec83c5260f99847279d9f6797210e7b
e15720e0aea9d8df1b05020283627b9ff2f7f749
54295 F20101203_AACIKV gallagher_d_Page_199.pro
1089070497638879f2476e7ae04673e6
a57f912536fb33f4881a325b493ee9ce127b8401
54969 F20101203_AACJHO gallagher_d_Page_162.pro
ce1c9c05aa86a6077dd9098cc5d694d9
281c476765851ef727c9c93d19869e0816160686
115542 F20101203_AACHAR gallagher_d_Page_195.jp2
79795eeb508922077d28e4475b9c4128
0fe23f47120afefcbe2078a0888de63e92c70374
79443 F20101203_AACIKW gallagher_d_Page_067.jpg
623d4f4f210fed038fd4ef484cc5f1d4
d480c138b1c65039fee0f2864cb0a682d6c81a32
52028 F20101203_AACJHP gallagher_d_Page_164.pro
d01e1e48e16d3044bfd84cf942ce9c6e
88f834e7961369b5582fb901f4f7465b12a2583a
116671 F20101203_AACHAS gallagher_d_Page_011.jp2
dc8cc834ace983b07ef812cf0199dfdb
bef1e208269f31dc78bec492a7b870d1ce60f677
1945 F20101203_AACIKX gallagher_d_Page_285.txt
b058b598a8e808e14b2aabddb641ac64
83c62f9a31713aa9d906047897a36378621b92df
53476 F20101203_AACJHQ gallagher_d_Page_165.pro
3efe2dab5e93d53e5a067b5813505cfc
fff2904b2c6d1b83ecdad5b4f31d4006dcd86c83
116535 F20101203_AACHAT gallagher_d_Page_154.jp2
5904e399e5a606a50ac11daaed912657
d545240767ce9e98e03ad8421f5ac5297e10e932
2197 F20101203_AACIKY gallagher_d_Page_024.txt
f1596f08a3ebd9f17edd99d3fe6c7605
12d13941caf8cdaca36f4faa02fc9a6cad83133d
56873 F20101203_AACJHR gallagher_d_Page_167.pro
0cac10cfcd02956b4fadc9e34aef709d
08cc232cfb8c9800ee2bb6baa83382fb62d2dd9c
112999 F20101203_AACHAU gallagher_d_Page_058.jp2
d85bd76cbbe4ed0950a06bab4c3cf242
d138c2943aad13ec555247ee3238917b9e3b7a68
2077 F20101203_AACIKZ gallagher_d_Page_077.txt
abb18375498ee2886b501b37e37b0c93
5a10cf4a532efb00bd7265eac7305d423f71da31
58227 F20101203_AACJHS gallagher_d_Page_168.pro
5257f9fd4e1906e8ef4cc3b19d0c2edf
3ac8767d37278e1e68c0766464ef09b4edc39992
F20101203_AACHAV gallagher_d_Page_180.tif
f3b756db9abe998d9ac44c5e4bcda6b6
47853e7ea2ad24f523fec76614e31706e1104667
53663 F20101203_AACJHT gallagher_d_Page_169.pro
f11dce1de34baee582b90d522c31c08e
d76f0ecafc82b092df7a217596dbec35e173d7b7
23889 F20101203_AACHAW gallagher_d_Page_171.QC.jpg
44ded2d86a30edebcfa2ae878f5df171
ec635edb1c2d0b1b40a4c6723db0e71d51a48fec
52333 F20101203_AACJHU gallagher_d_Page_170.pro
af73f149ab2cdf286bfb8332170812a9
eeb6bbb7852f92881f03a7c7db354a10baa046ec
F20101203_AACHAX gallagher_d_Page_195.tif
eff87f874502b107c07e46f50befd6f0
84a02b8f021625b4494829f837e5d1628570854e
52788 F20101203_AACHTA gallagher_d_Page_136.pro
60fe43a3a1e23946a2f7cbef0134b894
a33e5806a357b03cd82a36d41bab042841af0432
56304 F20101203_AACJHV gallagher_d_Page_173.pro
22813c4d423abeccc705608191f2c69b
5b87a8f7f7589551a8f22a96e22ded1a61500d2d
25746 F20101203_AACHAY gallagher_d_Page_157.QC.jpg
4a0755e5a1804c0a2b2a596d09eccd5e
59a7847f02e68d9ad7273111091bee2cdee13416
6825 F20101203_AACHTB gallagher_d_Page_141thm.jpg
ecd7074dfa01ea5d07a5d6d12c80fb95
0a25b733a734176a3dacb31b568efd4397332c79
52229 F20101203_AACJHW gallagher_d_Page_174.pro
a74034e3b6940fca25f4c6db0d95ab61
4bf956032c14e9018dd95f202abbc840c8291eaa
55947 F20101203_AACHAZ gallagher_d_Page_032.pro
096030976bd4cbcd21afcdce43c12083
fefde041489ddb978e0d5163a5c4bfec78591d9f
6920 F20101203_AACHTC gallagher_d_Page_011thm.jpg
71312474c30d36e0cf77ca3cca6d5389
2b5883b1a2f306e8ef0758b39bab5a5989f035d9
53566 F20101203_AACJHX gallagher_d_Page_175.pro
ccc9b458510b9c0433fd1b2df9d37a4a
17939869cdce6d4bd82a68306e1f0fb9fb0eaf65
55600 F20101203_AACHTD gallagher_d_Page_275.pro
3f203c2f9e5f842f26a6c97de046c926
655d064718392abd554d32bdc33dcf5e540431ef
53161 F20101203_AACJHY gallagher_d_Page_177.pro
ce5dc8696cfe482d74bd74f486c58c1e
67a564875825807578b5f671312c124aef4086d3
51599 F20101203_AACHTE gallagher_d_Page_241.pro
1e64b46cc39310bfa00f2e844060454a
5ec307309d7055994a5ba0420d1de253815f55c8
47979 F20101203_AACJHZ gallagher_d_Page_181.pro
0d0adc60ae627d8717ecf4fae8cb3890
162896527acd4d26c96604f2e681a495721cb340
6875 F20101203_AACHTF gallagher_d_Page_041thm.jpg
f46d803d62b33ea7883a181f12ded151
57c372655c633a3b3e0cef7e9addc06d1f09f3e2
6725 F20101203_AACHTG gallagher_d_Page_250thm.jpg
fe7753d40919b93c74a84be4e934a4b7
17b5cac6b39b99dd254e2135f753ae8b5bd72d47
25530 F20101203_AACIQA gallagher_d_Page_053.QC.jpg
6ad8c2c2f54b81326659b889b17454ae
1b6d1196d85f45914f931cd15f594d55f7eda3cf
2276 F20101203_AACHTH gallagher_d_Page_198.txt
a01559b2de2a63ac457500d7b689d9a4
7cadc0fbf10130f4878fa75774b09091ffc14d7a
81368 F20101203_AACIQB gallagher_d_Page_130.jpg
8a73709116756bded044915fc1880b55
55b21dd8e22151f9b9a739b6c50541aaae59e9be
F20101203_AACHTI gallagher_d_Page_227.txt
1873e78cf779d2bec12ba73d3a1ab614
e2dadf5a02a6341a9a3fa3c058322fa1ec93eb9f
25365 F20101203_AACIQC gallagher_d_Page_271.QC.jpg
3d3e9cf8635e524ae895c04bb9d0ce93
8152a8c6f464ea21297180f7f6eea896ebdb6548
116604 F20101203_AACHTJ gallagher_d_Page_157.jp2
fda6f668a6c9c8996ec4a3ea32f8b0f1
75ccf4f6f4e4a7432fbef7b12c1212c2016da4b5
53349 F20101203_AACIQD gallagher_d_Page_228.pro
20fe38020382ab48f0ab18b07f9d0991
920bd6dfdc32d4cf57918213bad0c42849a87329
F20101203_AACHTK gallagher_d_Page_101.tif
d49c89a5f0fa3304a6942cae220cc0d1
e97c9887b944af799db474d58ce0574b08fe133e
430103 F20101203_AACIQE UFE0021911_00001.xml FULL
aa968c3d583a79d63e0afb93c6d907c2
b42b2cdb8618f05f21f89b661521ddff3a2f3c1f
F20101203_AACHGA gallagher_d_Page_224.tif
4f20c2b31026fb21de4d92d09ac4ed11
dc56af3fd0670374440d034c096fcab00d81faae
55121 F20101203_AACHTL gallagher_d_Page_056.pro
66e1ec07d73bb61ba2a0abc0dad3fdd4
e2b1f2eae8dff2d63eb186354f6be85f750244aa
53067 F20101203_AACHGB gallagher_d_Page_016.pro
369dcba74bff493477540111a45fe4dc
d0d2a0b94f5ddc026389e2b7ed669128a3d5c604
75068 F20101203_AACHTM gallagher_d_Page_271.jpg
31767b4817d74d64d0b2a08ac2dbcc5c
955ae9dfc2efb6391d477d5192c35001345e9bae
58949 F20101203_AACHGC gallagher_d_Page_009.pro
23a7ff6e94ac6b6d76381721e94d3847
834b55e32085966dc1a8396de5123118312f0b56
26005 F20101203_AACHTN gallagher_d_Page_231.QC.jpg
6a05d50129cdf14497a4b124d02790c3
d27f0278c2d1b0899b8eeafe8418f2e27eb2da6a
F20101203_AACJNA gallagher_d_Page_204.txt
5f405c6556012cfe671f3735643129cb
ad8162b68123b2b197a5ed23d5a3ac90a6c71cdf
23321 F20101203_AACIQH gallagher_d_Page_001.jpg
962aeabf948632870af9afa486d58d39
47a9f68af1686695666da0b810bdaaac06bba310
116899 F20101203_AACHGD gallagher_d_Page_162.jp2
3064b2bb04e8d7211bc97d9edd04a3c0
16aafd3cc36b78cfea4538d701637a968d4ebc32
49432 F20101203_AACHTO gallagher_d_Page_116.pro
4104f3f90640343c5212b6b390548720
995bf0ed8de7df05e8d29b79ae57fb30197a55d5
2091 F20101203_AACJNB gallagher_d_Page_207.txt
0b7d09d49b13c2a4b893135f0d7f67e1
733ae35ef09a3a5105f2133466c853f2a33e0b3e
9982 F20101203_AACIQI gallagher_d_Page_002.jpg
27ad2e2225e3e12419ce9cdb0177805a
fb74154e2e6bda37776c35a292a645dded05c287
118577 F20101203_AACHGE gallagher_d_Page_054.jp2
94d9bb06aeebe67f4ea71b1a0da53bb5
736dc63b31568ef7df24e19552147280038504ce
784 F20101203_AACHTP gallagher_d_Page_007.txt
168c34bbc2657716408faf219b66537e
4fd4baba709a9735da6fc7ba0a2584f9b42d699f
1898 F20101203_AACJNC gallagher_d_Page_208.txt
844312dd7ec76dab1f60bcde850c12b5
bdb6040220b759d1e0b854f063c19688c5f7e1ed
77427 F20101203_AACIQJ gallagher_d_Page_011.jpg
fddf26ed0fe74e052796436df331cd38
32a3f41e4018eabc4950ab30ed0bcc41f1ec2ff4
74667 F20101203_AACHGF gallagher_d_Page_112.jpg
3ba8c05b9adadca052a7c30d13aa7dc8
3015e06ce38b917824784cc97d5c143048a844c5
25107 F20101203_AACHTQ gallagher_d_Page_119.QC.jpg
4e80d83df79f5c3f7f659e176e19a17a
2f4df5746422f4488fec34ddb8d0c2260befb7b9
2192 F20101203_AACJND gallagher_d_Page_209.txt
8b001a0d8c336824ba4dd87980e7186c
36ba69229e4ba192d7b03175c40b230c9b03c41f
76639 F20101203_AACIQK gallagher_d_Page_012.jpg
ee7d83cd5adc4b39fb692740ee06c470
eb83dea16225c8b8fb1d667b5d802e7d9755821d
24996 F20101203_AACHGG gallagher_d_Page_058.QC.jpg
d4ef247cc281669d6861d9f40e7e1339
c92e7d1b9ec450ec4ac75d35fcd3f0ea7e0e5609
79026 F20101203_AACHTR gallagher_d_Page_215.jpg
4f36f15758f2e6fa54531caf7d1e10cc
236b0a0c08fc2b5431b03229fd3039c65a2a5351
2070 F20101203_AACJNE gallagher_d_Page_210.txt
6f00dcbaf3a12afbaac5233d4297d05e
2f67789d5ab67d732686cc0012241f378a207084
79249 F20101203_AACIQL gallagher_d_Page_013.jpg
8de25d4089194c0680300a1bbac427d4
c73201eb68e56ce5effdd90cafb969348bcafd19
7052 F20101203_AACHGH gallagher_d_Page_097thm.jpg
34e46f7d4b23a3ca7b6852073cb14c8c
2befb245e804a255306195a0398bc7c832e69f25
2069 F20101203_AACIDA gallagher_d_Page_034.txt
7824e07335126602d7966db1509539a6
77cafcbe1cc15bc64303554b8fcb8d27a7445ca7
76792 F20101203_AACHTS gallagher_d_Page_187.jpg
21df3dce20bb16cf822659c1f56c48ad
9bf18adc15fd85e1a004fc98535f2e904ef4e370
2046 F20101203_AACJNF gallagher_d_Page_214.txt
8f986a014653a3c77567619da1bac170
224fdcf00cef246c82fea1a4e1be008cf0410e05
76886 F20101203_AACIQM gallagher_d_Page_016.jpg
869933586637ccedc2380bb6e06fa1be
0a7d4c4fff1e84f1703f6b93b156c4f5045a5456
76431 F20101203_AACHGI gallagher_d_Page_175.jpg
cd00ee9de226b124463a70d01b05e683
0eac8dfc553c44ba156465fa9701689c681e235f
6385 F20101203_AACIDB gallagher_d_Page_238thm.jpg
3b43727afe5401a88f22935d38bf5c0f
3ed99e93991b49dd75406cca676945ed8d8a8f03
25353 F20101203_AACHTT gallagher_d_Page_151.QC.jpg
5d09df8ea827ce6bda1246e6e76b533e
2e11cbcf408f9d8f65a62a46d8e9b0aa4bf208a6
2228 F20101203_AACJNG gallagher_d_Page_218.txt
4b0673c56035e1fa9a2d7e456dab5e4a
6e9d80befa70c1e215d051fa0d93e9235f387958
77105 F20101203_AACIQN gallagher_d_Page_019.jpg
6628213a0bccf4aa49e8b2c0841327be
16e4457a9e7bc4c7d17f44b6572af564d77dc27c
24600 F20101203_AACIDC gallagher_d_Page_147.QC.jpg
2c426b4ac7e17a90b8a8f1b52b178242
924c9d2f087397fda69d4ebb6c4b59369b59572c
78245 F20101203_AACHTU gallagher_d_Page_042.jpg
c5b6b169c519521b24fc9b508b504d68
47c45e3f5669dd6bd33706f19fa8c75e9849919d
2127 F20101203_AACJNH gallagher_d_Page_220.txt
3b137c280b3dd4b82c44755e66f16a44
e4f2ba7082fbcc678740f5e71415cab7e0e6cf9e
75316 F20101203_AACIQO gallagher_d_Page_021.jpg
4d9757bc6ab3344804dc47cb01720af4
2b11f5c4e155bb79d34868ce3a0efffa86993848
53091 F20101203_AACHGJ gallagher_d_Page_124.pro
c7939587dfcbaf2dc62c74b4c049a056
11ed3aa8b97c2560104a2f14150da78ea1d84832
7257 F20101203_AACIDD gallagher_d_Page_167thm.jpg
64ce317c827ac5a703ce3875fce33d64
1b816f23360f6e65579e948ea286787967a8fce8
51446 F20101203_AACHTV gallagher_d_Page_248.pro
c595ac19cd6c349774493bda862b9a67
1630d9476f4bb70138b8f07645cc8550436dd229
2139 F20101203_AACJNI gallagher_d_Page_221.txt
90c5197a43151f5d56242f6e8ca66684
5e0e0c6e0097e3e560dacc66d810c7c5a00feb1f
78123 F20101203_AACIQP gallagher_d_Page_022.jpg
31fa1f7f6bb286a291dc059250144fd9
464e3d7a7aa181c39e4a1d6ce4d595e2b36a1464
116705 F20101203_AACHGK gallagher_d_Page_042.jp2
b747b6695f49c395524dca870e15a2ff
fb892861541c56c2cc9ba0b3bed2c7c24276fbd2
2397 F20101203_AACIDE gallagher_d_Page_071.txt
95a539e35731489ad83a7e21aa543176
37d353476bb10116be94d8decc612b0d8728ae67
2238 F20101203_AACJNJ gallagher_d_Page_226.txt
b9c153efc8ea6dbbff191e30708a0594
b2de063750b824383518029a6ce044b0ae7e8a9b
77776 F20101203_AACIQQ gallagher_d_Page_028.jpg
40ad2a09282da8cb8cd2f5694713173f
3e91246bc2837653d7e83855bfa0e214e276b778
52134 F20101203_AACHGL gallagher_d_Page_242.pro
8f5c95b322ba8ce35db3afeaff22415e
12455a38ff94e86f68d75e9df07370aefe752c4a
25223 F20101203_AACHTW gallagher_d_Page_242.QC.jpg
1ebc6d8aba9145ff7c535ab3b284f01b
4d517e30926e1357d72bea954ac642b161553f12
F20101203_AACJNK gallagher_d_Page_229.txt
4a48aa34acd8ae91cea4bc55f5980431
2a2c2f7c1a9fba88730cb185dbc1a949d5a7a03a
73666 F20101203_AACIQR gallagher_d_Page_029.jpg
3b7810700161ac2a3d312c9bb7864291
bb59260952f4ef18df368b33d573f8098745b1be
2279 F20101203_AACHGM gallagher_d_Page_168.txt
2cdaff0287e65495506f3bee0a01183b
1b2e199959ce1994c8ae238bef573445f9634e77
24517 F20101203_AACIDF gallagher_d_Page_236.QC.jpg
09897ad2c0799d568c7da17d493c54e8
d2f48b5967579d1e5c02e2405e7343f88716a457
25839 F20101203_AACHTX gallagher_d_Page_146.QC.jpg
c61b78192bee725ff94771b5a8438848
fdfee9e9fe2db5a18c3292ac4d846679bcaa45e6
2134 F20101203_AACJNL gallagher_d_Page_230.txt
95d7eeab63a91dd8ffa07d50e6b8b386
403a043578beb17cef6fe02569c67475daabc430
F20101203_AACJAA gallagher_d_Page_003.tif
4109d9a2f189a335aa3113bef5bf8060
4ae45c8e611aac92e3207d2eb24ab19b10f9e7b7
51634 F20101203_AACHGN gallagher_d_Page_064.pro
667977bd5221efd7440cedc854f85139
2333d0d47d68859303d16fd460cbb75493a6c693
F20101203_AACIDG gallagher_d_Page_155.txt
462cce7c81aa5e9871e5440b9f92b324
35de9a9905ec8990e736aa65f95a5138beca0b7a
2336 F20101203_AACHTY gallagher_d_Page_030.txt
0cd40f18b0e3069f19a6c1ff922fb64c
75ebc565c599fabc7e15f39ad210299cdc247dd5
2140 F20101203_AACJNM gallagher_d_Page_232.txt
e8881b72c425ac61c0470df6d69a7226
59fd9571f1a25ff2b6f73d5a7803b1d510417153
83326 F20101203_AACIQS gallagher_d_Page_030.jpg
1d10caecfe74c1e2cd3514cbce9ffa5d
cf0d36d8e07d662295c5ed3f051b11a2c114a16e
77398 F20101203_AACHGO gallagher_d_Page_258.jpg
09d5cc451448464968656a637f206b43
47774e74c3168d221ed9c39b29b0d50a7d461050
47155 F20101203_AACIDH gallagher_d_Page_285.pro
4121c028a7cce15f996b3be310274eb1
ae983af49f65c4935ead613675c144a90062e4c1
119110 F20101203_AACHTZ gallagher_d_Page_270.jp2
4e8c4c5e380a326eda9487232f91feb3
af956b7b72e8862a9b55e3bc3d951f2bc0d139f8
F20101203_AACJNN gallagher_d_Page_233.txt
82a4569978f883f8fb6177e7e1cb0c7d
77c90db93d1d14d80b610515c2cf32ab4f56f07a
74571 F20101203_AACIQT gallagher_d_Page_033.jpg
5faca26135f06454991186235db1f7fb
b4775758902d1a0aa30654ebf6478ca7b31ee7bb
72618 F20101203_AACHGP gallagher_d_Page_239.jpg
124e514f8e3a67105c93c801d32f8f72
69a0190cf3ec45e9b0b6793839ad8415cf2df83f
115719 F20101203_AACIDI gallagher_d_Page_206.jp2
cbb37ebbeeea689eb32423f6f1ce9bde
f327d0601cc5f1f441f1edb403235c7bd76a6efe
F20101203_AACJAB gallagher_d_Page_007.tif
2ba0cdfcf35a7caa2b6dd1ffe6188423
253f3d34df24e3f6ae882f5fdda065f318f30fbb
74926 F20101203_AACIQU gallagher_d_Page_034.jpg
64a3316c0a223de1b22b6f53bfe66136
95613cc282cec4eb47251e6706676d1c45d2c15d
6845 F20101203_AACHGQ gallagher_d_Page_264thm.jpg
27f91721ac6db5fefdc7391af2eb5919
e042f615006db03007a0ca3271048bec9c7142ab
78717 F20101203_AACIDJ gallagher_d_Page_111.jpg
ba3727fb3ff4d2eebde4cf605af2837b
732b85739eac2d1ec543c0d55240ac823ea2b9fc
F20101203_AACJAC gallagher_d_Page_010.tif
51d59d065f7fd9b258b3fb6ae71cad76
53731a9eb32ae0f16b930f573503a73ae61106db
2014 F20101203_AACJNO gallagher_d_Page_236.txt
930883b92ae3d1d7ac24bec93e0e8c37
bce470684a1d224042ee0d278201fb39599e1d37
74572 F20101203_AACIQV gallagher_d_Page_038.jpg
55be580f164dfc83e6e1037d70e330c8
097b426b2c5d41c4d5f72c5fbe35b9db51d9914f
F20101203_AACHGR gallagher_d_Page_104.tif
3e9a9769a7820f4324ce4564fe78e95f
deba467231f0899b09fe8a601b2031f9ffa386ca
32568 F20101203_AACIDK gallagher_d_Page_007.jpg
52c0b445d26e1fd279abcde82768afff
542b6ad5aaf06aa1c041e2b6bce779dc679e50f8
F20101203_AACJAD gallagher_d_Page_012.tif
337f52b8defae2134ea885c37dc71ce7
d492e4b3c0e197ceed48dad4b03ece88b00810ec
1921 F20101203_AACJNP gallagher_d_Page_238.txt
772a73b0c6bfbf283eb1ee767dbbcc10
ec5959b33b6fa7c63a2fcd5a72eb48654105cbd1
76266 F20101203_AACIQW gallagher_d_Page_039.jpg
5ad87a3fad65eaf00d367fd488f65f9d
10243e5a494ad61f507ca86e0991ae67c0d919e9
6757 F20101203_AACHGS gallagher_d_Page_129thm.jpg
395761fa5e6f1398017614e15c53f46a
914e71c940efe3a2105de57d1fb983ca8447875f
107445 F20101203_AACIDL gallagher_d_Page_123.jp2
2f3ecd95c84afcdf0deffcf2d55af78f
ec8e9e35de703996de39b8d16a9a56d8eb4bf285
F20101203_AACJAE gallagher_d_Page_020.tif
f61d45d1f4f19061225d49044662f077
3cdcbf2a72fb4042e0c44ebc420221671763128a
F20101203_AACJNQ gallagher_d_Page_240.txt
9b0f8982680cbd6873292c81cedd1775
284031ac1226d93957632c60bea2e1a6156c1886
78797 F20101203_AACIQX gallagher_d_Page_043.jpg
01d014216343962f7fa400d30cb53730
c3a16f7c38eb95c045af490d0f7246bb9f97ee78
114825 F20101203_AACHGT gallagher_d_Page_038.jp2
954f390dd6cd3fef7756bc3ab43571c1
c141d1068fed6ac4e0175845bf1bf303b0024ba8
26899 F20101203_AACIDM gallagher_d_Page_266.QC.jpg
a9c29d7d55c0cbbc0afe1025516be214
1ff6dcbadfb135eee6914c788fb66c5af79b6b57
F20101203_AACJAF gallagher_d_Page_024.tif
545ffbaac737738d1d1b91bdec79cb3a
d780a504b931166265171c7f9c038c85fe71c682
F20101203_AACJNR gallagher_d_Page_245.txt
4ac0bcce526ea6f73c4db7f4e3f8b4ee
1f1ea49210d6b8abae31c17aab7df1482afd5d59
73588 F20101203_AACIQY gallagher_d_Page_046.jpg
34e0110d7989c3cbbd46927122fb3130
1d361a662bd6e2e231508070a7e500fb65448b7a
6977 F20101203_AACHGU gallagher_d_Page_178thm.jpg
18d040059c3b30dfb5d39594668a21b9
105abd20b1c5f2ab36509efa2a43418df9f307f5
116929 F20101203_AACIDN gallagher_d_Page_024.jp2
a21bcef18278d346185e658dde49a80a
801a264af6d282969dd5fdd8ac0ee2880384171a
F20101203_AACJAG gallagher_d_Page_025.tif
e3fe9973c394876e883dcdc08e2fce19
4cb5360142edbe19b0ee32544269e0dd742ff345
2030 F20101203_AACJNS gallagher_d_Page_248.txt
ab88e7f2d9aec0750c82af7bcbafd1e7
7d374874a0ffd96dca0837e9376826cfd09eeae6
76499 F20101203_AACIQZ gallagher_d_Page_047.jpg
72ecc90d1196bdadd7c266c622bc47ca
7cf9bf85fd33e4981cf1368261a23e805a727c92
114119 F20101203_AACHGV gallagher_d_Page_172.jp2
d355d62b121fa056943cfb0a71f4d9dd
c3b8c5ef527f0de122f961b344586ac5204c10d3
76539 F20101203_AACIDO gallagher_d_Page_066.jpg
789652ec89016857ea2f593ac02cacd2
389ba0c46974bbfffbb5c6a58661833ba6828f52
F20101203_AACJAH gallagher_d_Page_026.tif
efe81a02c6be27ecc0ae6944909c1a7a
73c8cdb3b18e7b5b3d4635ae505aa5b4144ef274
F20101203_AACJNT gallagher_d_Page_250.txt
049c321c1d0545baf5a39f5da0acd44c
2b0cc8a5364f9eff02721c3bb77fe1dda311fe8b
73604 F20101203_AACHGW gallagher_d_Page_096.jpg
93e496ff96efd273cf217126f83a91db
fe13498342a8c0463a2b54757be76a1c87fa333f
6814 F20101203_AACIDP gallagher_d_Page_018thm.jpg
dd4948d25000a81536a6e2ffd8492daa
82eea5bd9e1eaf34a1316d12325aa118744699de
F20101203_AACJAI gallagher_d_Page_027.tif
069b04af3eaaca5dc1ed83bb25d99244
3d62e50acac9a9d0ef5e632e9058dd05d4efd8d2
2094 F20101203_AACJNU gallagher_d_Page_253.txt
288a77b931c371f7f4eb8027fd5d2013
15ee717a3a36fe5bb9fa4bc714fec9c61fd63c25
2054 F20101203_AACHGX gallagher_d_Page_073.txt
e24d97f2f8a2f1ef14e181796aa069e4
e043976bbf6a0e57f15d5c07245d163ada530988
F20101203_AACHZA gallagher_d_Page_100.tif
5c5b7e5d0e150d86a029ea8970b95832
365b6cef93b0ff2afa121193ac063b9deea8d2e1
26043 F20101203_AACIDQ gallagher_d_Page_036.QC.jpg
149cf2a2a306e0b10ca310cf91ff9b2f
89bb27d0e41af6ba7a190953cad1d8785b14aa32
F20101203_AACJAJ gallagher_d_Page_028.tif
9470cacea0be97c5dad156d518ea8ea4
f58fe17de456a6c57f321d89dcd16bf6dc4884a3
2166 F20101203_AACJNV gallagher_d_Page_257.txt
d5f9dfaef1a12ea9d95cc59e3442e8ab
9b3a2812cf22ae74608ce9516566a240c1739aaf
6978 F20101203_AACHGY gallagher_d_Page_056thm.jpg
62b932f64f530ff1477755bd69411fc0
5f11d6640229abf19abb3a41ca75977ba375554b
26902 F20101203_AACHZB gallagher_d_Page_128.QC.jpg
5f3154320717161204d82470969b4c85
1c1f59be0f99353244388d7ab89607f8e129980d
77666 F20101203_AACIDR gallagher_d_Page_268.jpg
fdf4658331acbbd654baf393aacf59b8
e57fb44f9d8a63dd5a012f07be30bd93ac133ab9
F20101203_AACJAK gallagher_d_Page_029.tif
8e2a060e9cacfab9d9be5b3b8b1dbd9e
1ff3def89b317e43269edd00b67c9c6dc59d7bd0
2121 F20101203_AACJNW gallagher_d_Page_260.txt
d1d1a14aeaf86732d0d8cffb0cc42a74
66b5b62d9f9ad2c88dd88b4bd6251e578159b0f9
2110 F20101203_AACHGZ gallagher_d_Page_100.txt
01d765a47e8bc0d5bbb5cb1976d26ae5
d4ffc5a42b87b7696124cdfcb521e09bcf05c9f1
81340 F20101203_AACHZC gallagher_d_Page_014.jpg
42f7cc815c05e24635df49f46cd37dfa
031cf2a73cda5bf462e91c3a96a4a9f922e35827
26082 F20101203_AACIDS gallagher_d_Page_107.QC.jpg
540899afb2109a8e9cffce85cd6add38
f1b7d5a3845f20ece3035d00768126dd18726a08
F20101203_AACJAL gallagher_d_Page_033.tif
b0ea76bd436d43395942cada91471d06
4ef8d901b2bf3b59508903efda20546036d106dd
2143 F20101203_AACJNX gallagher_d_Page_261.txt
e68150f1a64af1115aff7cc6600efd46
edd687a48493eb01520889e57fa53fbb6e31213c
78518 F20101203_AACHZD gallagher_d_Page_275.jpg
a3bebac17d5d5c81b48f188e96729afe
79a25ed040612d365c5cfafb9fe5d73ac15688ce
26619 F20101203_AACIDT gallagher_d_Page_020.QC.jpg
67d69f8f54e5e4f8289c1301735c8fef
5e5c98e3693d05de0cd059cdb0fdecf4df044c3c
F20101203_AACJAM gallagher_d_Page_034.tif
adeb9e72d27db6a34eacec9d24780560
3ffda16301208314dcaa4a24f7dc61144269aea4
141 F20101203_AACJNY gallagher_d_Page_263.txt
eefd4e5bca60098721dbba0b4f8a9ee5
877e45d23be6d7bee12375a5ba5d86b478ca910b
2114 F20101203_AACHZE gallagher_d_Page_206.txt
cb815841f6271468fa7b4f0b387f8c25
929c14773a45c9754d05e82682ae63ec1109d8aa
2097 F20101203_AACIDU gallagher_d_Page_165.txt
af4b8b8ad038430f04aea83a4986c8ee
7b98676c6539dae7ad1001a611a75e8f560b7620
F20101203_AACJAN gallagher_d_Page_035.tif
1e0f09346e045da21136bfa214f3ea07
5596159579fe1b1ddbdd0483c131c1cf789ac7a7
2165 F20101203_AACJNZ gallagher_d_Page_264.txt
eea46e5b7f60adb6f85c5f9ed758c7a9
578e0f6bf94f119505bbef9c0f46d326a05951d5
112511 F20101203_AACHZF gallagher_d_Page_034.jp2
b7c730d2067cc60d2bf3cc8d5ad97725
279f5988eb401e75f5d39a9f6c1a317f1cceae14
25433 F20101203_AACIDV gallagher_d_Page_254.QC.jpg
1717c980b33e6396e677688070882ba3
ac223bce4bddd8af8756233ad638dd23ee02cae6
F20101203_AACJAO gallagher_d_Page_038.tif
84687d78ef1db8d87d73af57d8d5bfb6
b4075f6fdc685a0edcd3a4ece5966d5336f6d05d
F20101203_AACHZG gallagher_d_Page_022.tif
4822f273f90b088aee1c10e73405d522
cdd79860c7497f40c688f11fb903c405dbed82a2
6575 F20101203_AACIDW gallagher_d_Page_189thm.jpg
63e5a9fa70ef94852b7efde8c64d9da1
e8cef842042c8d100e66bdaa20ac18a9ee2bde43
F20101203_AACJAP gallagher_d_Page_039.tif
053a36b8b25a4645dc88e30cf3cf08f5
3e3917f8b8d4adfd16b934effde6bd51b22d7ef0
56506 F20101203_AACHZH gallagher_d_Page_201.pro
5c65b1b6a3a3bc0738f7af3108713f76
4f9b7360e14b4d515139d58c6cbd8a315371e957
26139 F20101203_AACIDX gallagher_d_Page_176.QC.jpg
1f05140185a0aea95ed4f44cb7e1e2cd
e277a94923f6b562acb18dd568e3b1334c336448
128622 F20101203_AACIWA gallagher_d_Page_071.jp2
f1d5fcdff9ecd192abfbc16aeb70c1da
49c13117d88e22e35a5d4d9630f531707ca6e45a
F20101203_AACJAQ gallagher_d_Page_044.tif
329c023b0c066a00a0ad91b6019266fc
ae65ef4ece609d917d665eaed35b9a01064e46ed
48506 F20101203_AACHZI gallagher_d_Page_240.pro
591fa80285f885f973611eb1aae10e10
1acd7b44d37d06e125c242db8d3ad5213d0b0414
6954 F20101203_AACIDY gallagher_d_Page_131thm.jpg
932112de72f822b22b39e852233f6b05
56da22b2fa5637e92999225c8d92bca281aeaf16
110685 F20101203_AACIWB gallagher_d_Page_072.jp2
d2f47e07dc2cbc1c88350864c0ab4cfe
a7ebc759c0f72b335e696ed990b98e0c6ac0b53f
F20101203_AACJAR gallagher_d_Page_045.tif
4e7ffa10bf1c0376d4f4b916fac67ce0
9cefb1c132ce5e7c365290fa88605221afba1b5a
7401 F20101203_AACHZJ gallagher_d_Page_001.QC.jpg
0b5edf77c96be79e81c5c887dca429c3
9fb09295be181fee98530af797df430ae18e2d86
78281 F20101203_AACIDZ gallagher_d_Page_063.jpg
11082592958abcc426b0dd7a980125f6
f6056e0d5346b9d64c2861910585162009c5e7e9
112078 F20101203_AACIWC gallagher_d_Page_073.jp2
56068f6ee236d7498afc975f7789d81b
b7c6e4726302b1607b3aa6eb9be989e09b5b4291
F20101203_AACJAS gallagher_d_Page_050.tif
ee4317088bc05c5573bc4c32c427f44b
b19f1799fa54c3a007dfe962e15117fdff7d43a6
F20101203_AACHZK gallagher_d_Page_214.tif
7f8fcd59ac0e6858703e008462d17879
659629b497f24d5d8134680870e133a27109099b
106066 F20101203_AACIWD gallagher_d_Page_075.jp2
cf8bb62cfab32097c366550ec276e0b0
a39946bba176bca082422d18c51c60cf6133c4d0
F20101203_AACJAT gallagher_d_Page_052.tif
b8e9d1d8050b0e7e2746a4c9fc150d14
7c756c2955787f18cfcb2f59f0df3922ffc00ec5
2066 F20101203_AACHMA gallagher_d_Page_021.txt
e2a38b680f2acd7d56fe16c277e96b60
585fc25e85c727b0763ce4f2efa7fd2a10a8883f
7168 F20101203_AACHZL gallagher_d_Page_107thm.jpg
9d46596eb8776160c6c336e0e6faff38
ee64e4e05b3beefb4f86532021cf4937ea00d8fb
123376 F20101203_AACIWE gallagher_d_Page_076.jp2
1e11b4abd151f8af24e1bd9291df5830
03bfd1864b4bb56fa998aa8d7796ea89e65bf27c
F20101203_AACJAU gallagher_d_Page_053.tif
6f93ff2484e5934c14a120cf9fc85a1e
7479d6769c6655d6aa670545728efc5ee45d889e
109642 F20101203_AACHMB gallagher_d_Page_282.jp2
0daf28de6a0d81f244759e080f24b7ad
127320777dcce2b3dbf92e2d00aef6565b009e53
48640 F20101203_AACHZM gallagher_d_Page_094.pro
2e2231655363ab5d53e0bd7f3b69df78
26a4ca7be3d0e143dd183e746faf9cb4a0a6889e
107587 F20101203_AACIWF gallagher_d_Page_079.jp2
630ac097a368a4414811324621040913
b89914e48352a0c0734af32cbba1102bfd128511
F20101203_AACJAV gallagher_d_Page_055.tif
9d0da73bcbfa44805cfe6f8712fc0340
ef6897593408eed5c673b901e31d00b4b1542801
56556 F20101203_AACHMC gallagher_d_Page_223.pro
7344aa028a17998e68fa316e0d496c43
2b7520cb1702dd2e59ceae5083e048d177f1570a
51030 F20101203_AACHZN gallagher_d_Page_086.pro
2df2f2073e90b9779f78821f1a16364c
6b3cf0f9c7608c1ede507b4120552654c51cca8b
107342 F20101203_AACIWG gallagher_d_Page_080.jp2
50817c7ad0273c23020b63e2edea7573
d4921d16c541a8b9cb4933638129236f33927339
F20101203_AACJAW gallagher_d_Page_059.tif
43b729dc78a5485ae4966f9bd4904e4e
3ad15f6630f722c608d6bd5fc762b1ae0e868268
24992 F20101203_AACJTA gallagher_d_Page_124.QC.jpg
f50d47b8eda6c34177bf30e49b76a98d
a16732eb68fe1097753e37391baa600d04c06d8b
26474 F20101203_AACHMD gallagher_d_Page_213.QC.jpg
8de013df408601535c643e25351fca66
7c4780a38f91c68e3c0a46615a0a30bcdca621a6
77004 F20101203_AACHZO gallagher_d_Page_106.jpg
6dac8e75655f670f03ad96589515b1b3
e994c64277c8961cab6095b9acd80c9008c65e52
118446 F20101203_AACIWH gallagher_d_Page_082.jp2
3fe8c6179eafba22ed2b16b5502fc728
86cfe6dc968f2f6b7da20ff2cd3be58d4d6b1269
F20101203_AACJAX gallagher_d_Page_061.tif
ba9e2d533c64ebc987c7ee8c7e89e1f4
c560d9d8e21718e83ae9354204fa6d2d1c2bfb50
25106 F20101203_AACJTB gallagher_d_Page_125.QC.jpg
d1a38abe7d9141321d5b4b335000d83b
7e42fd96947d8d5ae1d7af62f6866d78c73ba114
7276 F20101203_AACHME gallagher_d_Page_040thm.jpg
02df8ffb84f49c0186e0e07ce78f01a3
e77ad074d8f4c16b13364901c2234e0cb5d3a752
71593 F20101203_AACHZP gallagher_d_Page_079.jpg
23bf403a64376c2dfadc59ecc13cc14d
0b25bac36d641d3c397d643b1395da9a08642105
109568 F20101203_AACIWI gallagher_d_Page_086.jp2
d30e1fbeaeb9f5d90f30002ccce4bd3b
15fcb2a5e27e82beea07705af8420e3087a518bb
F20101203_AACJAY gallagher_d_Page_063.tif
0b898a4d138f0cef10da9fc38ac5f50c
3bcb63ea46db9106b6986457d181b07dd22fb49e
6937 F20101203_AACJTC gallagher_d_Page_125thm.jpg
d87ae30a138515b2536fd1b36efac2d4
f677b65d9e8b9da75a91788943591c61dc9f0160
79765 F20101203_AACHMF gallagher_d_Page_122.jpg
6c011670b8cf833de3cd70d2205168c8
e7c29485cf2b6bb82bd7ac905ac5f42e937e0f90
2144 F20101203_AACHZQ gallagher_d_Page_137.txt
c45a9c973e6ec3716d8aa922c6dfa63e
025008a04462b5392766b55262219fc9a329ab87
115392 F20101203_AACIWJ gallagher_d_Page_092.jp2
0eebad8eea3a5e83306d8ff84a54a575
e9b9c014e84a70fe4e1af5b37561cc1090a8e60e
F20101203_AACJAZ gallagher_d_Page_064.tif
bbd87f64e98f0bf61d3f51b8b98bbd73
285ab379173af743dd82cdfc32b27a7a425f34d2
25697 F20101203_AACJTD gallagher_d_Page_126.QC.jpg
a8e3ddfee5a85907485b5b723437d2f5
86e14b29a11d6368995b24db3aa30c6926482e85
7205 F20101203_AACHMG gallagher_d_Page_218thm.jpg
9361772eb03737e677ced76e644afaff
6b24c7281075db1f9fdee37e92b6ef42eb8bb5fb
26615 F20101203_AACHZR gallagher_d_Page_209.QC.jpg
226262b0dc095af43c06d89800914b35
7d7ce6c66cc3a9debc0ec8402985314202403f21
105082 F20101203_AACIWK gallagher_d_Page_094.jp2
417eaf0f82069af85a83018fbaaa57ff
d036a32b430d7cb514022883003f1390459df0d1
7262 F20101203_AACJTE gallagher_d_Page_128thm.jpg
28a8897796ebfd894696d53a01047495
b57e91265b67fab9a454abe319fc7bf73212eedc
50057 F20101203_AACHMH gallagher_d_Page_123.pro
788766f7cfdac11e586a1cd93de2dd0f
9b9ea207377777a3b473c68b800a6f31c1b1e075
73895 F20101203_AACIJA gallagher_d_Page_109.jpg
89fed30f34b5b9cbb5e4bdfef3701a76
b3dd37ee46cafd563bc46a9c3dbb8d5c14623c02
77423 F20101203_AACHZS gallagher_d_Page_200.jpg
1298d4c42dee4f98e41689005e634349
086cc68966574ca2bccd0676541a1437e87f9efc
121435 F20101203_AACIWL gallagher_d_Page_095.jp2
12bea77e90f0513cb98e3cdfcb197fd7
afab625d0766e63d114f49c9b68704da01f56793
7251 F20101203_AACJTF gallagher_d_Page_130thm.jpg
623178c7d5855d78b516f3c84a808c1f
52793cb0808e6c07148eeb1569341f49df0ecf6c
2061 F20101203_AACHMI gallagher_d_Page_259.txt
66709040fd7683defe4cf6445df1ed86
4450a5fb5b84bde6a1780e3eee0c45b4a843fc41
7044 F20101203_AACIJB gallagher_d_Page_118thm.jpg
d5e7ae912b25f367e566fff899acdca4
44ce224821f61dbebaa8989ef8a3615c095740b2
73801 F20101203_AACHZT gallagher_d_Page_088.jpg
4edec12bba418cfe202c1c6ffd9a949a
3c935bc2d4424ae74f02e092f23c9d71a20e5805
124868 F20101203_AACIWM gallagher_d_Page_098.jp2
47a7535565510fe8c15a6e0dd168f2dc
a840a9cc41bb694f67e35a3a869734e7c4031a47
25032 F20101203_AACJTG gallagher_d_Page_131.QC.jpg
950ef73df2130b7e617c68344535fc21
c1afab50e6dcfd30d9d3d02ab8bbee97206b8949
71929 F20101203_AACHMJ gallagher_d_Page_189.jpg
6a1cb48edcfa0d5fd3a53ac8d76043fb
d0c1b6e0108753677e6b83819ba34c094998110a
F20101203_AACIJC gallagher_d_Page_283.txt
aca647e4e594c48c176421ad3cfaaa64
674976895b687454b3bb8cc2ba79665e4ec0cadd
2215 F20101203_AACHZU gallagher_d_Page_067.txt
0854f97f48e289dbfbb919863323a6b4
0ce029eecba1c37e3a011e351dc8dd706e40caa3
110500 F20101203_AACIWN gallagher_d_Page_099.jp2
d60dfed80667d904a22900fb1761845b
9dbedcbd6401178abebf11c82ff2110adbc2b9c9
25742 F20101203_AACJTH gallagher_d_Page_132.QC.jpg
d0b29b711f29684228a21399066dbc01
93cca555ffee2f3395588c9f1175c6b73e867b6f
6424 F20101203_AACHMK gallagher_d_Page_282thm.jpg
5ceb30d07e94e883899e0b10ef9c0f94
c011c83233490f64866a09e6906e4982736e59e6
77704 F20101203_AACIJD gallagher_d_Page_036.jpg
5673caf53dc0721a96a1443b3e8aa512
b7869235f3effdc2d6ed76ed043954ecdf4cced5
6877 F20101203_AACHZV gallagher_d_Page_096thm.jpg
0448eaec034cc7e17b00b548e01a18fe
88162bd2db9a185e8ca73ad9fb31ef8e456acfd6
114283 F20101203_AACIWO gallagher_d_Page_100.jp2
22d29492e624c96b3f56a1a88355127a
22c5ff324df8baf4da8e35e9a154cfb96c8b04f2
7092 F20101203_AACJTI gallagher_d_Page_134thm.jpg
f01229237d93cefecf3cb64a3e859f7f
b9f1fe67637a527547c654000976277ceaee164c
F20101203_AACHML gallagher_d_Page_054.tif
1c759829daeee155b29e3d8d9a9f6b45
5714720a671df11ae527a4b851970cf282d38e66
F20101203_AACIJE gallagher_d_Page_046.tif
a9a636b54f525268ab0c33d500aa5747
7bc4890ccda03dae5cf67ba53bda9484b250230e
111332 F20101203_AACHZW gallagher_d_Page_219.jp2
44904504681e9620a90d0d04465d0b2a
533b7388ce63560fab56bd1e735699cce55c7351
110770 F20101203_AACIWP gallagher_d_Page_101.jp2
e87aa3ab683c5440f6d877b496be03ab
46930ef670d3124706c3416ac0e19d8f31420627
25216 F20101203_AACJTJ gallagher_d_Page_136.QC.jpg
6f791e340f40b610057740577ab0c74c
53e967c07c281960e3437e16130d122d644f96f3
71688 F20101203_AACHMM gallagher_d_Page_123.jpg
381cdc63d0cc10920c3a5be0e2de061f
46aff75dc275345f59254f90de42d4d1408ae444
F20101203_AACIJF gallagher_d_Page_134.txt
abade1bc7174c4de1039505bae6fab3d
bd4a73b8e8b5a2a06fff2b6177161804304af582
F20101203_AACHZX gallagher_d_Page_275.txt
2b44c0eda49842ac86769e2d3f559cd5
9dcfadf31739fff75ea846f8a15b5a2868a3976e
111068 F20101203_AACIWQ gallagher_d_Page_102.jp2
3b83dd5fa2eadeef3623880b8a052a7f
22b1b8f95c983ea5a6ed87598d9f48a9ac71ceb9
25452 F20101203_AACJTK gallagher_d_Page_137.QC.jpg
4f1f6bd8fc6fed21ffe6ba143331f8c1
3f958ac8e864f50b5007ca74ecabe8e7784f0dbc
116666 F20101203_AACHMN gallagher_d_Page_268.jp2
913ba612f7f4d2e2b75d9c09d71f681d
98f0e808807d52ff19b67f9d41d8c800c13b0bef
63302 F20101203_AACIJG gallagher_d_Page_005.jpg
2b9ac8be0b9fff31fc8e38b8132ebb79
3c4eebc758f8acde5ff43e3c05602695364f58d3
25786 F20101203_AACHZY gallagher_d_Page_243.QC.jpg
3c1bfd48d6ee05592e9a0402454b263e
2b628af39b4c7f5c4618edc5a7ed4f3dcd8f65ff
112150 F20101203_AACIWR gallagher_d_Page_103.jp2
6a8530f5a52d6c6ee02a35ce3043863f
f17f87a4a45e4cc11929f196baccdcb6c4e848d7
6952 F20101203_AACJTL gallagher_d_Page_137thm.jpg
bba26b86fbba6daab799071c91aac637
490c9d1017afa1cad0e3abd6a60082c3b6928e24
6796 F20101203_AACHMO gallagher_d_Page_219thm.jpg
d1f4747018ee86cd634ab6378597525e
b39f6acbc60ca19919c5ec473cd149bd5fbdb318
F20101203_AACIJH gallagher_d_Page_149.tif
a895d082c0f95025d83e79d50764828f
12c7d463deeac80a2769975c43b4d49bcd52e541
7045 F20101203_AACHZZ gallagher_d_Page_161thm.jpg
bec4d91c7038d72efe9abdc7f797b69c
30675a03dc3c7f75e2d306cce63716492e033683
53284 F20101203_AACJGA gallagher_d_Page_092.pro
b1da9766d25712004bcaeec0de901f6d
875a8d2e0cfe7793c711d46b1a91cb6cf0c2d2d2
119341 F20101203_AACIWS gallagher_d_Page_107.jp2
501cc1cb127aaf213369582aef362075
b4fc39fdae254f09555dfae258ff6bb2598c5b89
25591 F20101203_AACJTM gallagher_d_Page_138.QC.jpg
b75852c531d77f69d737360dbad67e40
eb9008b642ad74b31a9daa099ca71c08194b871e
7013 F20101203_AACIJI gallagher_d_Page_136thm.jpg
2cf1580b4afe8419e3f70e4f8cef1dc0
bd89716e6a9d901aaaf275a1e2c983ca8e9504ff
57396 F20101203_AACJGB gallagher_d_Page_095.pro
90933e8bae119e5bff4afbe3b94ea59d
b13e3d3ddc5a31dd6b2c83d1af876f03e0b4d89d
119099 F20101203_AACIWT gallagher_d_Page_111.jp2
24398a3733252e64e100ef5cf09e97a7
1c1ae5e2e7220ef70a0d5aa509330e4c41c611a0
7239 F20101203_AACJTN gallagher_d_Page_138thm.jpg
4d5ec6a8c36075e2a318b022ebd0e077
0472931c0b851f66c5e4342b5ad8b479513d5d88
77278 F20101203_AACHMP gallagher_d_Page_256.jpg
02e37a33c1a0de28adf10b670c87c87e
a70990611b910e9591c53fbf0df42092772ab9c1
60317 F20101203_AACIJJ gallagher_d_Page_030.pro
c85d3628fae8c170585f85b92ec001b9
6702915ed3be852ce9babd10b40741721e56791e
52474 F20101203_AACJGC gallagher_d_Page_097.pro
4be48836dd812be45e8253087a911bfb
244b492a529f1a0e3809560c0209af4e53594190
111721 F20101203_AACIWU gallagher_d_Page_114.jp2
7a478c8ca05b93fdb25f27bed685375a
eada1395353c697cd748ab329383c2f387321e98
7310 F20101203_AACJTO gallagher_d_Page_139thm.jpg
8cf50555f4601d23edefaeaab42321ab
e9091cf5c2ecc4b41000a2510ec889caf5745abf
6987 F20101203_AACHMQ gallagher_d_Page_230thm.jpg
a160d8e0cad8dbf5ccce433fb4125229
926dea4ede99214bd4a3b181924a21d6a3daaa40
2135 F20101203_AACIJK gallagher_d_Page_251.txt
282a3310ecbcb0105c51f3e5b1ddec58
4d72db40ff345c74c0d14bc6818c46d3b3db0d56
51782 F20101203_AACJGD gallagher_d_Page_099.pro
e48ea2bbf620686b267fea97e450bfad
9191c2145fd19a3959432457ebd6031b7f3b0464
117597 F20101203_AACIWV gallagher_d_Page_115.jp2
4bc02e829df0ca51dcc28eaabbb3649c
adabc1544aa9067fc227c12a6aa6d98f13a3c602
25081 F20101203_AACJTP gallagher_d_Page_141.QC.jpg
eaf9fd318a7dea8415d05a97f6c9700e
002ecbbf86942c3f2168830eb69c3f71b6777596
F20101203_AACHMR gallagher_d_Page_078.tif
02738e8851c58df36a3df3b284a95d00
997cdbca74313ecd4a1e5392b7412e99532c5631
53639 F20101203_AACJGE gallagher_d_Page_100.pro
57c1e49d5c4bc2b4bc867f050932f6b0
897b9a79c779b6b87884db99718cfa25da6ab6cf
106344 F20101203_AACIWW gallagher_d_Page_116.jp2
8c6ae1ab3db2212749a3b4a71d5ff238
96b8711936935b75a4a09f8ce95848dd9a47e6de
26317 F20101203_AACJTQ gallagher_d_Page_142.QC.jpg
b1ef960bc4abff1c99400b131c311ecf
4e03806abdf4aa56448d1c9329d26ba302d89637
73527 F20101203_AACHMS gallagher_d_Page_159.jpg
0c669b4fac0bc27096352be474244f81
56e4edb3b5a4f60409cf9525ba34528baf004014
23970 F20101203_AACIJL gallagher_d_Page_116.QC.jpg
03b176be4924b007b4637abcf2574fb5
21f99bd1f36f81e78008a8d53deae8e3fa74e5ba
51721 F20101203_AACJGF gallagher_d_Page_102.pro
0868c9eaad00b597ac2c0475f1d5308b
7679f840a859c9a7c7b9c012dc1a46ffac56b17d
111424 F20101203_AACIWX gallagher_d_Page_117.jp2
c7557a8c0851e037e62924a975997686
2fe7b92981299aa33191e128f5bf267e90317c99
7311 F20101203_AACJTR gallagher_d_Page_144thm.jpg
084707eb72e52a9f2f523077185dd9b9
656f1eeb3e0a5e0527da58af801492ed9b99ca20
2145 F20101203_AACHMT gallagher_d_Page_156.txt
8f0e8dfd3c0cababfe450c6f968f9fcd
fe67945ab800a337ce023358b5cbcf677c8da344
75612 F20101203_AACIJM gallagher_d_Page_119.jpg
51b4a57dea905b1327027dd130538612
d33ec3c78a4f23138e44806af1531a13309d5f90
51314 F20101203_AACJGG gallagher_d_Page_104.pro
4b39dc8c88ba2226d17581320c64a6ac
efeae956a65d137ca9d4f9a3bdc93feaf8c042f4
27330 F20101203_AACJTS gallagher_d_Page_145.QC.jpg
de0fcbb77499ade01243d39fb53698a0
dbb22b4b7712d23fda0c3089fcada82ddaf2dc28
73646 F20101203_AACHMU gallagher_d_Page_045.jpg
f1d460005928522800366f9c4b24131a
3164cc528f41d40873a1cc95da73b085a82dd61c
23450 F20101203_AACIJN gallagher_d_Page_055.QC.jpg
b5aa6900eaedb54d30de7d14f4c8f89c
461ece9d5116e27311ec25ce3ef16a19f2530b5d
117498 F20101203_AACIWY gallagher_d_Page_118.jp2
cebf5eef2b5da91a8fb3bd8e07a91a9b
8312daaa54dffb76b313ba60a076ca13884b5547
6929 F20101203_AACJTT gallagher_d_Page_146thm.jpg
fe712901151bade34e69740368aa1e30
3a795bdf83efdeb477ed27a1abf411f5bef490ce
52568 F20101203_AACHMV gallagher_d_Page_021.pro
388f3f3b3b98a4c7502cfe9273a26122
7521b63c339ef449f34bb20aa156c7c4b6bbd84d
2185 F20101203_AACIJO gallagher_d_Page_150.txt
9d962ef88e4d398d570b3d3e61411033
e78353f61839a5618c8e7ebfc8e243c782d53974
54541 F20101203_AACJGH gallagher_d_Page_106.pro
00b23043793f4061b486df956f67f777
25b46e1bd42eaed9b1d9b74752ad239cc5cf9f9b
114806 F20101203_AACIWZ gallagher_d_Page_124.jp2
69dea000510a218a2cb4d7bc5afb8304
756a00cce29f32093e986416e1bb73c060cd3ff1
69164 F20101203_AACHMW gallagher_d_Page_211.jp2
ed6b28ba88df624fa5912e539058987a
117a4698d6a19a90ad1ff470f46cce9e688c3e87
73372 F20101203_AACIJP gallagher_d_Page_041.jpg
49274bcb06dd7c45e07348d404cb06cc
28659ffffc4ad5ea337831521d6c82e6c55249ca
55667 F20101203_AACJGI gallagher_d_Page_107.pro
9cf4bb0552af6731977c886d761860d2
5483749cbca89d5c68a4e75bf40809b0ba3f794f
7000 F20101203_AACJTU gallagher_d_Page_147thm.jpg
641e33fed4fd1f0b2a494ecb951ace56
2b187301f730bfb462f9bfecbbc358ecf0f079a3
53783 F20101203_AACHMX gallagher_d_Page_216.pro
3c99b9235002c4001df2fbf3b65a27ff
e76261f54ecebbb825d223d9c6a495b25636a4a3
6799 F20101203_AACIJQ gallagher_d_Page_037thm.jpg
6e4d2509295f266bf38e7f702a6fd429
e7bcb2f42bfbf8db20c7e7452ee619d9e7dde384
54273 F20101203_AACJGJ gallagher_d_Page_108.pro
7dae829fd425d1ec3ae62293b8a24bd1
20568c92a6b15f61193050eefab33b747e2f91f3
25134 F20101203_AACJTV gallagher_d_Page_148.QC.jpg
bc33360f427976302f7e875877514322
d40c26a5bbb1a2e8e670be3ea335269e27c6a2d3
2136 F20101203_AACHMY gallagher_d_Page_237.txt
f49976cbca9c0cb4720bf49f88aa0b09
e1a270c48097d7407e73033ee4b92481f3ff71c7
120326 F20101203_AACIJR gallagher_d_Page_255.jp2
db847807d7fb90005ddf7aee2fd77860
751e7208c592e4c5b55f87cb9f1374451ce1d468
50856 F20101203_AACJGK gallagher_d_Page_110.pro
489d4bb8ce55d987798c81e38ed3f1f1
2afeeaa00a5b46c164b8f186a0227e20e8ccf995
6838 F20101203_AACJTW gallagher_d_Page_148thm.jpg
6bfd1d8566fef28b9e21e2c5990a971d
7d53e7ae3472e7a5281e0eeaf49fd5782a8d42bf
4262 F20101203_AACHMZ gallagher_d_Page_263.QC.jpg
4c64e02fa4cb57c194bb6e8b04e15b7e
fe88af14a7be17d38b2ce1a9009a403165bd69cb
50483 F20101203_AACIJS gallagher_d_Page_010.pro
218c55a747461f0ab221c9cfdac04446
5d0d3eb4b886e6247e5a1ac464abb20f2249b96d
56060 F20101203_AACJGL gallagher_d_Page_111.pro
e24871372aa659cbaea3967d05c4eaff
4895c08e8606db99b081a220b583e969a5209c46
7144 F20101203_AACJTX gallagher_d_Page_151thm.jpg
73b7e02ff6a7d1da6eed4d4edf9575e0
653d836955389ed3775f9a80ae3b3d21b2f672f8
F20101203_AACIJT gallagher_d_Page_253.tif
d2ce6f5552acab82d0690b0e5327b6b3
34936a071483283c7cdfc6eaf49959969cf787e4
52127 F20101203_AACJGM gallagher_d_Page_112.pro
1db8477ddbc132f98d51a3b79736f0eb
66c5c816e07bf0ddd034a921692fa0cf0d8cbfc8
7202 F20101203_AACJTY gallagher_d_Page_156thm.jpg
5e535728a6e20fcf162896837b0329f2
2a0b159657d71ca9c52ece1c79e7ea8880f672fc
119292 F20101203_AACIJU gallagher_d_Page_090.jp2
46d6c2bb8dd3e55200e0a539bf890607
eaa869dc6a3e2d4892aebe67edf92929c42f0061
54940 F20101203_AACJGN gallagher_d_Page_113.pro
a9b49aa16e3d9dc735f165b1e22a4fdc
ddd23398d54790d5181d00569b5d4637a710dfae
F20101203_AACJTZ gallagher_d_Page_159thm.jpg
6ffd82b599dc620b7cf8af879f33dfe8
723e736c5cf7cecbd72664b978c0424c8204d879
F20101203_AACIJV gallagher_d_Page_147.tif
76a423634ee9b85b531c8c0f072768fe
638df3981cdbb8d8ea3d681600e6fc5c438601c2
52452 F20101203_AACJGO gallagher_d_Page_117.pro
1c2ea4b30de1aa86dfa81bfdf0dff00d
0d7817cf814ae0669d7fa24be6ae2482954ad80c
7069 F20101203_AACIJW gallagher_d_Page_059thm.jpg
361c3be456dc2f2588a8e0366aaed7d3
b169ea19385448839aeda99b22d58ed225a4644c
55178 F20101203_AACJGP gallagher_d_Page_118.pro
eacf70ddb676658580445a91274d6ab4
9208b144fe05c70f48ef923ae2c22e82899e580a
25675 F20101203_AACIJX gallagher_d_Page_217.QC.jpg
1c417fc9d5b10dd6f21741f3c3f66b92
fa4cce24a967453a14fc87dfb6fc938e1ef164d5
63301 F20101203_AACJGQ gallagher_d_Page_120.pro
518060d873ecef580bcba2b52d4422ae
da1277d4546596b18e16cabc1762e558639b8244
7016 F20101203_AACIJY gallagher_d_Page_038thm.jpg
96567fa1a203a3509e644416ade6b413
219797fcc20831473d1ba2282be3b197987fba30
47322 F20101203_AACJGR gallagher_d_Page_121.pro
d04c37b2300195732d3968cfc9e25269
10414f41f1d38d8230eb002411b8e6dfd7d1ae33
F20101203_AACIJZ gallagher_d_Page_260.tif
d7886bf7aceac2b9fcf80e292b282304
c6cdb78d0c6de61db79e856b279d9a916f14cae5
54373 F20101203_AACJGS gallagher_d_Page_125.pro
224fb1c44a30e8297d5f6771840d12fa
2defaebb08da11cdf9cc9e5b47c1d0eed4f99de4
55309 F20101203_AACJGT gallagher_d_Page_126.pro
cf0dd0150859a62ea2c5bdd64a2d4cc9
e7748804192688a6a3a4ea844de06a36f10c8064
19738 F20101203_AACJGU gallagher_d_Page_127.pro
9a0f19fb0b7fdedebb3bf268589ba1d9
a4e4e78d6e81e4885583c5e7e367db96c24bb000
81228 F20101203_AACHSA gallagher_d_Page_218.jpg
5ccd795d56f3ebc5a912dbd4f07e6f58
62c9dccde18518b6a9efa58e179380005f1f94a9
55019 F20101203_AACJGV gallagher_d_Page_132.pro
4f0f2a66c33227fd710c91d588ebdab6
be2ac8d8482e5c1cd358420fd05c8d9fea384e41
25243 F20101203_AACHSB gallagher_d_Page_077.QC.jpg
804a31c8b2d195ca850421d39db23868
afd43321fe8d0183acf17b27ace55f7f567001e2
49412 F20101203_AACJGW gallagher_d_Page_133.pro
1577fb52135f5bc743c3d5d2411e7e21
6d9649e2ed3fbc49ccaefe888b09a27b78187e24
2060 F20101203_AACHSC gallagher_d_Page_249.txt
070700072f02e89ae3c93efa3426a2d3
b92f34d0e37b9e44f5961eb7a3f096abd5f44622
54099 F20101203_AACJGX gallagher_d_Page_134.pro
df5744b0ec3f66b474cff8dfa9c4e39e
b474f8693ece33399d209fd4a32c3672af6d8dae
114612 F20101203_AACHSD gallagher_d_Page_052.jp2
2c879c32b45e687953df39e08ba7f231
93dc2f93f363e6693bb905cec5b547dcee039ea5
59102 F20101203_AACJGY gallagher_d_Page_139.pro
d662c8c877f1bad6e03618da5a39f3db
611e994e6f90d1614374ef73273c553807c0ae1e
74458 F20101203_AACHSE gallagher_d_Page_072.jpg
bf65c81f05e5e8d4f924a1f84b19dce2
18577d5fec1ca63fe0cdf0a3758728894f6a54e2
50809 F20101203_AACJGZ gallagher_d_Page_141.pro
f649cc1f4966f71df9eddeac5ac6f0be
d71d2fe994bec8f6ff253a97838e11e95b394ba4
F20101203_AACHSF gallagher_d_Page_178.tif
6ae59c3ccf362f2a1f79f27b1195f792
16b144382e93e291255418101d75eda64af95634
53186 F20101203_AACHSG gallagher_d_Page_264.pro
95b810564ff1a9b26c3cf99ba0909a2c
fb9f50fb2dcbb303c1d81876f540daa375565add
96 F20101203_AACIPA gallagher_d_Page_002.txt
ccbecfa1b04de4cfb4cf7f3fd4207c1e
7f576ca3ecc51dbd6825a8832da68a26d3cdd559
23727 F20101203_AACHSH gallagher_d_Page_044.QC.jpg
7219bc68adb485bb9ae074f703cae9cc
7df658f9102b989b9243980de7081c6ce950039c
2205 F20101203_AACIPB gallagher_d_Page_235.txt
fb294e3421a06c95d73b2e8f86e7b055
e35139cfe966275c7c0622f886073bb31ce15118
112492 F20101203_AACHSI gallagher_d_Page_214.jp2
0707d9918f1df72949053a2c918add0a
8656bff7a0d63b0d628337f9ff3f0dfdcf598b21
54658 F20101203_AACIPC gallagher_d_Page_229.pro
4387cd41071bc7fbc2c37d2e8c8d9b05
948748b708da9b546516433d9d42650ba24d5f56
F20101203_AACHSJ gallagher_d_Page_051.txt
55b931f9523c60579da9d71d552c6cdd
8da859a2d75798c9f081e98226bff5877d3c2181
52848 F20101203_AACIPD gallagher_d_Page_277.pro
82ff37d6c76a8008ee55ddd4e832bb4e
5e8fbd03714cc621dcd98c17efc20764312d748e
105422 F20101203_AACHSK gallagher_d_Page_203.jp2
e1a6531155e7f27f012105bf08e67191
719f156bec72776fcc747ae21decb5eb99266d6f
115999 F20101203_AACIPE gallagher_d_Page_019.jp2
57d00c139d5bde13bf24dedbcd66523f
28db7b4083aeedb4d82e974af45cfd53670512b1
7180 F20101203_AACHFA gallagher_d_Page_067thm.jpg
801d30281abcae3d0e81c14162345d5f
828ec983a2aaf0a8599e32a6cf6626e4df056dc9
16009 F20101203_AACHSL gallagher_d_Page_211.QC.jpg
ca9afd4c7066013f71c68dc0d44e3051
2de595febff52ba7479729e4864126553856bc35
2146 F20101203_AACIPF gallagher_d_Page_217.txt
cebe3566d7fcde4d4fc1b64b55bdd5bb
ed828b695a8fd3add3b0f8638cda43a16d314f63
76213 F20101203_AACHFB gallagher_d_Page_249.jpg
5258a3861ac9c18f3ed90613ad45d4c9
03b6dcbb623843cedc4b2495282911f423a662ba
113383 F20101203_AACHSM gallagher_d_Page_164.jp2
2e26366d64fc8e8510af8863298941a8
47d1bf0cf6b50fc87763fed2c3ec1f6479d2cff5
48283 F20101203_AACIPG gallagher_d_Page_282.pro
82cb879d0e2896876e7213dd6797774f
7783497e229b377897d8506c840ca0aa43f33a0f
26384 F20101203_AACHFC gallagher_d_Page_014.QC.jpg
493808412905053ba636aec7844d52e9
9937c419294d88e2f6e56c0fc0d6c496daa28fc4
F20101203_AACHSN gallagher_d_Page_085.txt
2eb6143d962dbf97a333baad67a5a211
2bc2c9d56fe41fb35baed23c7d48467d54c733b8
F20101203_AACIPH gallagher_d_Page_083.txt
535b9e25c815951e92d84205d776da4a
a7d7f7aeadd01a1c255ef66806001897dbb4f425
2173 F20101203_AACJMA gallagher_d_Page_154.txt
2b78560195f8345e516b39e058e51ddb
e489f219933205e59feb464bf74f8c24bc63fbfd
81657 F20101203_AACHFD gallagher_d_Page_265.jpg
4d4e6e842620158982c989f39afeb1ba
b323d670f00ea92631306f1fa8a26a33f3212851
116615 F20101203_AACHSO gallagher_d_Page_217.jp2
c7f10b2844249088ecfbed6351789e20
7071f053f4c4e44c24dde1449c497fd78430878f
F20101203_AACIPI gallagher_d_Page_175.tif
e3bff5fe115384d9399f094afef51f80
f96ed5d63379f8813a2453620dcb804c8145d6a3
2117 F20101203_AACJMB gallagher_d_Page_157.txt
e85cbfb17e41db9caeb9d1b75adde149
db9ddedc643b027eba1283c7c2f6e57e2f224a51
24018 F20101203_AACHFE gallagher_d_Page_272.QC.jpg
81750a63f112599a4d3a105fdd9d7b1e
869f950ac5590e3cb6fb4ad51e285d59f8516954
25924 F20101203_AACHSP gallagher_d_Page_091.QC.jpg
535e96beec78fc157a1c8106884257f3
948568d2e8ab9ae72d75c35b0b361927a63b70f2
24971 F20101203_AACIPJ gallagher_d_Page_021.QC.jpg
69df2cf5597dbe5c8589ac71ccddb038
7786f86b0c9c07536ab0b118987a8e55ec9b70bf
2086 F20101203_AACJMC gallagher_d_Page_158.txt
68e6bd3194b8af967e77c9283209c46f
1c0dd37f8406004e29d92a47e6cc88f5450e9e35
2011 F20101203_AACHFF gallagher_d_Page_110.txt
b4173110c1c436587c4d8a8fe32c4bb9
e0ac9b759074f938a776d6bb5d199b37fb143c36
2025 F20101203_AACHSQ gallagher_d_Page_234.txt
9ab39913af6691b09ca3d6becebf063c
28e517b21587e9fd8da58488a911ef86ee4df83b
F20101203_AACIPK gallagher_d_Page_105thm.jpg
1e7876c7dd21a7f844610fecaa3ffe24
0ecc847607903ad3cc7256146303412350fdf3f1
2021 F20101203_AACJMD gallagher_d_Page_159.txt
91cbcfe4716f90ac231c1cc3d8053912
d8c5c76381091dae61fb3fb69f86a4fd69ae8fc6
23153 F20101203_AACHFG gallagher_d_Page_225.QC.jpg
aa2edc94eecd1d63266abd24fef682af
b3a42fd9955f88ab6573f5daa42ee19cc95ba16a
F20101203_AACHSR gallagher_d_Page_164.tif
d3c4f1c083e77a2aa78c7cf7855f2ee5
841eb84eaeba72b572037c30fc00fa6e1c760d0a
F20101203_AACIPL gallagher_d_Page_060.tif
a08cb7c313e04c679ffe753bef52c164
33d2c50e4c283fb851072223b8434a3b025f5efc
2156 F20101203_AACJME gallagher_d_Page_162.txt
2aa205b9ebe29c1c7267d64878d3ac4c
88fa1bd790d44b8125adde829bee5a11f927ccb7
F20101203_AACHFH gallagher_d_Page_284.txt
7f7c98c2ca0fa5087e385c8bbd8371aa
a558eccb2579c53b90a9950d364a637eed0e5da0
50732 F20101203_AACICA gallagher_d_Page_029.pro
56cf290d0da77b51f10a242afdfcabcc
1668bf99761b37b06d96b195b54ea205d6747b0d
7193 F20101203_AACHSS gallagher_d_Page_140thm.jpg
23dc23d6991681cdced8808cb7f6bfc0
671b68894e1d32efb2a0b53131ad17dcc173ece9
F20101203_AACIPM gallagher_d_Page_255.tif
a44a7976b723767f47a123a05a4570b7
fe558f46e1c22b671fcb739001cc8d6f82897c2f
2055 F20101203_AACJMF gallagher_d_Page_164.txt
9dceb428ada2894e708cd775dc64a6e0
a49c1f31609384ce963c507a06b4bca9727de2e1
6934 F20101203_AACICB gallagher_d_Page_012thm.jpg
8c926979ea11d544b67454b890f60bf5
81406bb482662db97fd5522098de158e2d877d0e
F20101203_AACHST gallagher_d_Page_135thm.jpg
6d9db37a863bdd0356873b699e4cebb1
25699d2163fc4301cb3f3cfd530f5b7048713916
52772 F20101203_AACIPN gallagher_d_Page_018.pro
1fe10559051a87edb22f57fe31309043
d7f70fa0dc21cfce3172e8d4c58910d063ed0c38
2063 F20101203_AACJMG gallagher_d_Page_170.txt
ba185aa8c78d63ad3c68000c699c568a
fabaff8378a15bc8c86dc4632264844f9d39e241
F20101203_AACHFI gallagher_d_Page_190thm.jpg
b2ac97fd8efbe6cbd6750d69a25f8fb9
ff3b6f31a98993b650ad0c726a4482eeccfeb29c
F20101203_AACICC gallagher_d_Page_066.tif
c26baa8d66e1ccc0e751707d16b55458
3838c65775b2df776f81edda7fa07ea41aede460
F20101203_AACHSU gallagher_d_Page_249.tif
1eed04051494fa1288382980bd6683b8
629eaff97253126838e8c076a57e611f21d72c25
2211 F20101203_AACJMH gallagher_d_Page_173.txt
8232af31b101dfa9b513dc1b62486a29
884686b53c45216a87fb8ddbaa2e2fb133e805f3
115427 F20101203_AACIPO gallagher_d_Page_200.jp2
ad2e3327841df7575f99ea35a3ef5ddc
7d67e6401a3e5778731b1e62154d5bd20e7abe97
52995 F20101203_AACHFJ gallagher_d_Page_051.pro
b87a8e2afe14cc3b30066e60854b2a6d
bf16b7fc04e69cb5b4af9e24e5035c5d9ec5d718
24658 F20101203_AACICD gallagher_d_Page_018.QC.jpg
dbe118a4cc2145f903b3aac58e4fde3b
da6e60dc5a18b30cf1734bf791327f12be44ae3d
F20101203_AACJMI gallagher_d_Page_174.txt
c5ec0147a106c4d8a5f110603b5626c8
1105d6a2360b324cbfbe27ee10aa4495244fef60
F20101203_AACIPP gallagher_d_Page_226.tif
c04d21b328715e36d113200ad060f6d2
7e48e8ae433962c38da9f6c59d62667d5e153ef5
25878 F20101203_AACHFK gallagher_d_Page_215.QC.jpg
57530080277f9b81d96be794e8478510
71e24146ba0908a2f1bc6b3be48a8d67f4519273
6891 F20101203_AACHSV gallagher_d_Page_259thm.jpg
10628d5b8144c1c262f703f944fb8c62
c226d635aaef302fce8b4bdc331f2ee838736b1c
2181 F20101203_AACJMJ gallagher_d_Page_176.txt
11826bf75b8a4865294c0e1b2c893636
4213526cc8f66061d0db27b7b10b08f392c3d2a0
54664 F20101203_AACIPQ gallagher_d_Page_217.pro
92da9462baa4f3fecfece9b6d61366c9
c94c9754511787c7dc1f6f76a5d99ac74490913d
122286 F20101203_AACHFL gallagher_d_Page_218.jp2
e19340eac89718395b0a5705dc21d9e1
43fc8daf90cf3b0a59f1cfdbea57af053006d534
F20101203_AACICE gallagher_d_Page_016.tif
a902fe63ca560f24564b3e8d28283d99
79c9d46b9ef5eec36668faccd6729653a7605df1
F20101203_AACHSW gallagher_d_Page_073.tif
543535878edbdbe715f2d01636e38a6c
bfa02c4899005374557c1b3919b4b177cc37eed6
2095 F20101203_AACJMK gallagher_d_Page_177.txt
6e5127107a7e8c02ae54101b66832630
5de794fd3f1e7510348cf9180c200eecb3adcfd7
F20101203_AACHFM gallagher_d_Page_158.tif
15686e883b9538dea9eff6254df793ba
178be3f6e97e33b4f5a1a87439173665ca692a89
52331 F20101203_AACICF gallagher_d_Page_249.pro
11bd6186407f5c5b3f738e1f1975dd10
c8b0753ad2ea759bb5a14fef5acb0376fe180ccb
73131 F20101203_AACHSX gallagher_d_Page_064.jpg
c5adf6a270750c4c8d7d95956a41d92e
9912759fb3fef956e7917743b8184659d3dd095e
F20101203_AACJML gallagher_d_Page_179.txt
25d847685e2c0aaf3965ec932543ea80
289472a961c0613142278c9091627322c2b924de
26132 F20101203_AACIPR gallagher_d_Page_062.QC.jpg
945ae082d0304e5ea2ab95b82c7b1aa0
4467c97252018c53cc9fb9307781e5c49a407791
6876 F20101203_AACHFN gallagher_d_Page_277thm.jpg
f9d097e08a5793afd675281a09345621
e93c51e7c62f498770b6dbd4469aeb67663aec2f
24969 F20101203_AACICG gallagher_d_Page_170.QC.jpg
82c520c39fe0ee68310a6bd6ece51839
d0d85520f6eee4dac6d2e93ec460d9101646e55e
2309 F20101203_AACHSY gallagher_d_Page_009.txt
7d059c4db53c6fa99d940d2ba7a26676
bca0ff2bf54c2e0eb35e2f7bd336e002e40f19a1
1906 F20101203_AACJMM gallagher_d_Page_181.txt
221c4c37e9b01dd3403c8942bf012daf
c97119e38aba2cb72fba9f606c379352bd4b8233
6914 F20101203_AACIPS gallagher_d_Page_251thm.jpg
49f4f2180647a2bc024dd4a11ed03db0
60ed9ae1f286dd288ad7196cbe8231d2ab64916d
25673 F20101203_AACHFO gallagher_d_Page_078.QC.jpg
78c9bb01542c8dcf42c0ee4bb6fdebed
47bbfc98c1e227d4d85229c9ddde613f6ec25498
F20101203_AACICH gallagher_d_Page_172thm.jpg
7a931b478bc1cc6fae0dd5129639d794
65822170b367ad70822a476188ac72e844c62818
F20101203_AACHSZ gallagher_d_Page_198thm.jpg
805f91f53ca796087b350052348c3769
7582dc9155b111df9ce93e630376353bcb22ec7c
24846 F20101203_AACIPT gallagher_d_Page_143.QC.jpg
ad279fa491541c612453f2d311131bd6
f968c812e86bf645c0864daa46586ea51720531f
25006 F20101203_AACHFP gallagher_d_Page_016.QC.jpg
ce52ffe6285689eaeec911bc67a2f4a9
f0e46b0da8e842951f2919e4e83c3062dad6a72d
6997 F20101203_AACICI gallagher_d_Page_275thm.jpg
b2a2e6b8beeab7b7ba3472b82118a0c2
f1e3f9a3024ae7d18dceb32560759af7c5b92abe
2099 F20101203_AACJMN gallagher_d_Page_184.txt
671f2c7e269edd90087c5c55322128da
7eca6a71c5dffac9e3eeef92a5ee15c58af13982
6780 F20101203_AACIPU gallagher_d_Page_046thm.jpg
fd2806e5e4244d9d2c036d7399aa661d
691bf93be224f02b002823b763d950ca12c86876
26668 F20101203_AACHFQ gallagher_d_Page_198.QC.jpg
96b873963369d7016ec330d972535cce
48717016e52072dea0af21b9cf96e6ba5a017b31
6556 F20101203_AACICJ gallagher_d_Page_236thm.jpg
9c1fa66afd5b2f7e6254e30afeaa9ff0
f456b9ddeb0907e879842978a04e556232e19d97
1975 F20101203_AACJMO gallagher_d_Page_186.txt
56446d2b2d5ff283a1a57766efd3058d
bd37d67351d8fbbc26b030765f571cf3c15e4138
24250 F20101203_AACIPV gallagher_d_Page_080.QC.jpg
d1c093c72d539faf4a429b87118c8eda
d779dd1cdba8b2cec90efca90e0848a68f263f10
74552 F20101203_AACHFR gallagher_d_Page_248.jpg
2165fca7f4195edce830aa3472b607cb
093586023a5427757353014d70060da2e06d3f09
6898 F20101203_AACICK gallagher_d_Page_030thm.jpg
2970c094de4b91310dc91d4334117f2f
f21ba7c6421c736f7661d665eeebb1bed80529cd
2109 F20101203_AACJMP gallagher_d_Page_187.txt
5377ffbc77df0b3df2c371abf7458c17
7f652e2539e0277f1123d4511fa906beac526065
2207 F20101203_AACIPW gallagher_d_Page_183.txt
167f43017f6d1318870767aa4d566fcb
9606af98cbcc92a9cc34e9ef62ddc505afe038ee
49829 F20101203_AACHFS gallagher_d_Page_186.pro
73fe6702556c055f382adc47fbb78a48
8a1ca5bf32d2b7242d7be9e8c72946d85337e80d
74634 F20101203_AACICL gallagher_d_Page_087.jpg
47adcd541f7118c63968f253fbe81b15
be6a9c5d4d1ff371e64209ec9a4e3eb6d2219ea4
2203 F20101203_AACJMQ gallagher_d_Page_190.txt
716bf9520907604fbf67e6e811c7b95e
5e20dd83250da19e43fed8f2c97d75fae95cfd1a
81739 F20101203_AACIPX gallagher_d_Page_020.jpg
00930a081fb31b43d1f4f912c2e6eb18
19b7f0bdc74df52fc1f0733a5fdab42c17684516
2263 F20101203_AACHFT gallagher_d_Page_265.txt
5efd4886615e2f4e48abd03f1afa05fb
2279df5a4544a40b47512fb9a17e3a522f0278f2
F20101203_AACICM gallagher_d_Page_058.tif
12d47c7d57f18587cad0eac5c4d2af49
b79f8a6e5746f8d104b0bcbec43f77c4f8773d9d
2120 F20101203_AACJMR gallagher_d_Page_191.txt
d4c8c175c044ca15c447acb603c2a45c
506a068bf2cca3730c3c9de5bc6a78197fa0421e
7029 F20101203_AACIPY gallagher_d_Page_206thm.jpg
7033a430274b6a20370816f8a27d80b7
70e7844facd3188b669487205e9ccb8b7405e0a0
61931 F20101203_AACHFU gallagher_d_Page_247.pro
01ca2f552013c35c3dc99468a17d7a20
97fc6e49b1f07d3e3288fb83a823cb7d1daf05ac
7118 F20101203_AACICN gallagher_d_Page_245thm.jpg
1fcd6bbafa5bb97f16a2ad82afce5120
f90429a182a9c3195767244b83398fa5e2308169
1962 F20101203_AACJMS gallagher_d_Page_192.txt
d4575e7ad741f382ee537d1899e9e77d
2f600e3a69702f3fca418ffd01b32694c2749167
78191 F20101203_AACIPZ gallagher_d_Page_162.jpg
bb45c11008cc82463d4378b6c8d2a634
e6c7ab1e8dcd6e7a2f5d1cc3665570c0fae0b596
81263 F20101203_AACHFV gallagher_d_Page_226.jpg
62c41534252961e2c5abe7f76191b6b0
ad984313d40b9cfd6724e6c8743c72075fa6355f
118137 F20101203_AACICO gallagher_d_Page_028.jp2
05c5801d31944a2aaf8debb1915c285a
d78b44d9448f2c40100eaad436e99e2eb9986168
1879 F20101203_AACJMT gallagher_d_Page_193.txt
5d680c1ee133fe1cc2df7733a4e9e512
b28ceff0804851267e1b9302a77b8fe0215f942f
2113 F20101203_AACHFW gallagher_d_Page_195.txt
e5edc627f56441a16f9370e16a07e4ce
7ca6f339dbebcb560e7d4c13613d6ebe623755af
27150 F20101203_AACICP gallagher_d_Page_153.QC.jpg
448ac8475a2a3d5fece5a5d4e2aa665e
821ba70a5aac530117a9cc5bf49e726f46d50f8e
1875 F20101203_AACJMU gallagher_d_Page_194.txt
e522709befcaec715e083b57ba4c9a34
81830d232f8252e96428bd7c421325c3511318ee
7128 F20101203_AACHFX gallagher_d_Page_082thm.jpg
d1d2054ecf3378849948a8cb5f92cf48
c7f543ee3fe43e70b7c81def6be2db6187ecbd7f
7104 F20101203_AACHYA gallagher_d_Page_224thm.jpg
f1af5005910a504cab434489f72a04a9
c513e2960813b25f19997f93d5c488cfb659ba64
77578 F20101203_AACICQ gallagher_d_Page_178.jpg
c7da1ca6bd5fbd49970e44d13ef84ed0
0b19b353258f49f3a47e9c02b2479fbe32d7cfab
2321 F20101203_AACJMV gallagher_d_Page_196.txt
9b8bc90a008729d0bedbac08a90a5867
87eb6cbebcd0eaf548d0a88f14abeb6266734074
2079 F20101203_AACHFY gallagher_d_Page_093.txt
69b5fd6c94a7520a56cae5d2ac108960
77cb7f3cc31102dbbb89a1ba413243841e5abe52
25970 F20101203_AACHYB gallagher_d_Page_030.QC.jpg
9ef9f2f690558721484709e231d9ce84
7054df89e481b4ee9cd9dc7201e0b4485bb4a824
F20101203_AACICR gallagher_d_Page_133.tif
e55d8503143708a5eeab2dfcdbbaa054
94768e1c97bdc9b160df4ebe674202b06fb5b80f
2125 F20101203_AACJMW gallagher_d_Page_197.txt
5715bd7dc88e417e8fe82a310c9dacdd
f13a5a02ddcfba9a45e243e8df0f7eebfb8071f1
F20101203_AACHFZ gallagher_d_Page_043.tif
c7e315b8bdff1ebe6d85b43f5ec0590e
29f926a11fdf5dbe6947fca78a5a85a0d2494ba7
76372 F20101203_AACHYC gallagher_d_Page_035.jpg
d7e2fcc6971d29c11633d440065730c6
9de5bf8b5f3d47e3576421d7bc9371817f15cee5
25672 F20101203_AACICS gallagher_d_Page_049.QC.jpg
982223bc61fb38511ecb9b6aa36a9660
f47aa1118da38493a77911e6ae7afb8d605dfff9
F20101203_AACJMX gallagher_d_Page_199.txt
edcbd365168fc2b449bcd15602406444
5ae1a4b06d112b34a8286793667e2d9ffb05ebf5
2003 F20101203_AACHYD gallagher_d_Page_096.txt
52e4910abe61cbad1af5df51766c3c9e
ffdf9d72286dce51841156e176e795cfd5c3c3e6
122338 F20101203_AACICT gallagher_d_Page_031.jp2
30538b0ab32ce02082a7ca50f48cec92
354413bb28a62cb67c7a23b2f957c63c24bc70a8
2219 F20101203_AACJMY gallagher_d_Page_201.txt
53e1635c050bf9a6d6615d0fdb0292d0
679dbfc653fe71ada9b8ef137c902aad4994dfa7
2040 F20101203_AACHYE gallagher_d_Page_037.txt
f842c05e4f0d18a5e83e65ccc06bbd5a
6b24081d27ee19b669564c9d35822a3695e1a058
F20101203_AACICU gallagher_d_Page_005.tif
3e25118b04a4f4c450dd6f903d6c0c2a
ddbe1fce0826cf033771531032b336b508f893c0
F20101203_AACJMZ gallagher_d_Page_203.txt
ae5b75580aef9a18fa1788fdcd242293
4feb7e9a653f0a09e0e511167c14fe7bb328c6ed
F20101203_AACHYF gallagher_d_Page_134.tif
48d17ba1092f5a9c01f71076602609fe
ad29a390cabc0e07292bf7931114fea5586fac35
25136 F20101203_AACICV gallagher_d_Page_035.QC.jpg
9fa37a6084775b551c6a3a2e46c5bc0c
68aaf93fbb004c5765f761a89c5a41a40e23f911
26028 F20101203_AACHYG gallagher_d_Page_258.QC.jpg
a2dcf84bc3fd5cd38ca44838c477c8f5
320aec3ccb12cd804bbb4ef819540adbbfce3fbe
56676 F20101203_AACICW gallagher_d_Page_213.pro
42fca37efe1ee50568efabbc16198d14
bb9756a88ad6a769d1b312afd1a2724078db961b
6738 F20101203_AACHYH gallagher_d_Page_010thm.jpg
62ce1c304f0e88586a2475311253f3a3
40aead0b5002db0bddb8a0d75b092b701fa2763f
2224 F20101203_AACICX gallagher_d_Page_130.txt
856e99163cd1f51f32fca48d881a12e9
4be4c5177e6d0af9733acceac01eb48c9dd7d302
114538 F20101203_AACIVA gallagher_d_Page_018.jp2
8ba761c653f8479a438bb18a155ca08b
00140cc103d47f2ad844fc4c3caa47de7e376015
54236 F20101203_AACHYI gallagher_d_Page_011.pro
f24dda1842a6043a4843f864434c082b
8c91aec28dbffb846b562e05236453b5c93f0623
115108 F20101203_AACICY gallagher_d_Page_066.jp2
8e9b2fdd6809d42c851771dfcbb5b845
2738c70606ae459cd5e38c7e8755f7ec6a13c6d4
114000 F20101203_AACIVB gallagher_d_Page_021.jp2
c816ea582c568f9a5ee8eb7813df6e43
b3d0f84e98f30722fb1a072d20d06e796c04b040
6887 F20101203_AACHYJ gallagher_d_Page_149thm.jpg
ccbdb9e3c4aad5e57078f488ab019608
34f4f4817b9a1d7f2472bc2f27690a934fa8c03f
112410 F20101203_AACICZ gallagher_d_Page_074.jp2
9d0fef7e2e69cecf2efff5bbe99d3942
bff60c8cd795a7f937b3a46f9042229ca50e1c51
106025 F20101203_AACIVC gallagher_d_Page_025.jp2
9ec6f359febf521abcdb93fc3c857419
9b57fdbf98dccf113c86b9e3faa1b8ea1ad0a094
77049 F20101203_AACHYK gallagher_d_Page_224.jpg
7eae3e0b1f804e9ea2d2947c2219f231
eb47f62859bb77cad6062499f23ba70e7e993d92
114053 F20101203_AACIVD gallagher_d_Page_027.jp2
0c04dbf1b3df7cdad634ac2319eed8ec
b3d4b1a74851803d0b203ab5c8fd906f53c50876
116861 F20101203_AACHLA gallagher_d_Page_178.jp2
18f964317fbaeb22046176e938664076
d8e8e2d78d7eb7f81badf7d06e5f04884d604263
120399 F20101203_AACHYL gallagher_d_Page_153.jp2
3c4ba55bc38bccb1cad824792a3120f6
a5473fefb31594593c5695aab83b4c0d465ba6a1
128670 F20101203_AACIVE gallagher_d_Page_030.jp2
c08bcf32a54b21bc033b936890c96726
e26e8b18e81ff2d611efe76b7c482eb8275f6cae
7035 F20101203_AACHLB gallagher_d_Page_042thm.jpg
14a0f35fc72a262a36a19edb484a3742
1837a47db0b5b160fb09c14f5ed9013123a96cd9
F20101203_AACHYM gallagher_d_Page_193.tif
8af9378f4b4b34f6b5a034b90cf51e9b
9d14f24f7ca36195da9d74a0179b8e4296a0163a
112668 F20101203_AACIVF gallagher_d_Page_033.jp2
ab8fe824e0c08d8d72a4095c055ceea1
3f7fe8ec94aa5b1cd337cbbcd521ddb0b2eb7cf3
114699 F20101203_AACHLC gallagher_d_Page_191.jp2
f8a6c24e3ff645c8ee34c0ba0fc331fd
c35e5ca1775c55e49ea13fcba613cc65c55285ca
F20101203_AACHYN gallagher_d_Page_267.tif
4c2a6bfb12079572f19d2e8416001c45
f3d52250bd0c9a38ca6210cb8175c528e6eb9d2e
116013 F20101203_AACIVG gallagher_d_Page_035.jp2
e1cbbe9718ba84d6e4117362caecb5fb
9b67590d5a072222b6781562cd00580018797ff9
25366 F20101203_AACJSA gallagher_d_Page_097.QC.jpg
449527bd78b0f56a5a5a3cec48785c2a
653cd54b7336602efb04ac2c2fe82433f4caf7be
F20101203_AACHLD gallagher_d_Page_282.tif
e6a90d1400c5750c591be69e93aac03d
2886ec17d0bd72dfb9307ef2f2259652a15090c6
54111 F20101203_AACHYO gallagher_d_Page_204.pro
524515115afefa0b2a7b45c7f7b718fa
f412db645a0d2ca3c0937f51e7de9d2d734706f4
119568 F20101203_AACIVH gallagher_d_Page_040.jp2
0199a1a6c859562c2f93934e5686458d
8b9d54b78fba7bd8440a0cf4ecb6a55b8a91aa5a
7299 F20101203_AACJSB gallagher_d_Page_098thm.jpg
a99e78479cff5059bc6cc504bce3c433
5196ed59007a683b6ac27f3c02081727b7d6ff93
F20101203_AACHLE gallagher_d_Page_140.tif
b0730d40a9e7faca1d75e70362e464fb
42d098ae22fb631cbcfcdb4bc324168eb38850f9
2106 F20101203_AACHYP gallagher_d_Page_185.txt
410dc1af90694adaad9d8b5f1c834c2b
c4684642d5ff7189b5d97f1014e1bd264d69e6ff
106152 F20101203_AACIVI gallagher_d_Page_044.jp2
e0c0c5e288b492eddd385a2f0dc8984c
664f0ad3150b25f26cfa08d0bd2dd07fbdd2e626
24792 F20101203_AACJSC gallagher_d_Page_099.QC.jpg
cbb7025356320d52823ad3d94bd37103
80bec72e875b87ae704ff074da1c56124abae2d1
F20101203_AACHLF gallagher_d_Page_001.tif
971524bfdeb06a235a02b71f70310d68
b51af2204ea489a4e6f6470c448d36a7df652493
118173 F20101203_AACHYQ gallagher_d_Page_173.jp2
83eb980ad760d36c812ad5f27035646b
f5c6f2b8cca880c7fa3de83a5b589cc57088c021
111608 F20101203_AACIVJ gallagher_d_Page_046.jp2
1fa7bed6d02824be021768ab9f4e7b25
f0113b4b6caf0536c20ccdd57c6fab5b113ce387
7109 F20101203_AACJSD gallagher_d_Page_099thm.jpg
75ff5a2f04c558469dec1108dbdc72a7
86d7ac2302e554bee5201ae7d4456f240db447c2
121610 F20101203_AACHLG gallagher_d_Page_226.jp2
ec0e329296621a17942924353061f0f9
10d321dfe12903c9687d358ad85c3222a7d150a6
F20101203_AACHYR gallagher_d_Page_252thm.jpg
29723e9317618f303a39fe8e78297b8a
58b5fb87ea6b8a96882724342ffd94d5b177eea4
114193 F20101203_AACIVK gallagher_d_Page_047.jp2
d7971e8842119c6d5a0daf01ada91012
6c0e446bf4e5ee2bac00f2c174a8bd6559c14571
25363 F20101203_AACJSE gallagher_d_Page_100.QC.jpg
a25ce04d6393966aad31ee3529956628
1e03d38d04e6e5d229d60e27f7b87f1b0de46351
110906 F20101203_AACHLH gallagher_d_Page_017.jp2
d2130926e5e4268c19efcf6b2608fb0b
9e01a199e1264cc333ce255d453553835af3d0ad
7291 F20101203_AACIIA gallagher_d_Page_120thm.jpg
9fe2dd2112c83302bf50bb74a659b731
c671f1d89edac310f74e0e0518d19ee497bb53c3
79599 F20101203_AACHYS gallagher_d_Page_222.jpg
97acb49cfdac7d0dcb16415e00eb2286
9cb31c2752e6994e427f350ce96a71a52621a763
116525 F20101203_AACIVL gallagher_d_Page_049.jp2
d26a171c5766a2d02e658eb4fd8c1bec
caa2b234e81864447e5529450b7e353a94bec52f
24672 F20101203_AACJSF gallagher_d_Page_101.QC.jpg
c4e3d6c344e304628d7a94c6c39db6b4
42fcc4bd18d8450cc0e6107a5584b9ea12e6f4d2
24946 F20101203_AACHLI gallagher_d_Page_245.QC.jpg
2c06774a04abf05cb2684b7b2ecdff40
4b48fa1b78655bc42c1891cdc7e3f375d12faddc
116156 F20101203_AACIIB gallagher_d_Page_108.jp2
037269245b2ec3e39c93c5e5686cce84
0d1527b830969a8fe7e327db3d8c3648a3e408a8
F20101203_AACHYT gallagher_d_Page_209.tif
2358616f2c8c8b8c4b1e059391f7baa9
4dc47cb564dd42aa17d3b7108b7962041075e69d
115273 F20101203_AACIVM gallagher_d_Page_051.jp2
92b7a65c1f3ed51cad2505b55fd43744
18b0ddeba21ff212581a969b4bc6f3f0277d7f23
7107 F20101203_AACJSG gallagher_d_Page_102thm.jpg
25cb53acca4cbf7cd7ca1693ec46ea6d
b154c572fdc1991bf1a3218334890f937599448f
F20101203_AACHLJ gallagher_d_Page_112.txt
6b6c2aba774c9e202457fc644e9fc153
636cd441cd2a9e10d60b1141fbc26c0c503be115
25665 F20101203_AACIIC gallagher_d_Page_162.QC.jpg
cc0b6e4b72ccffc5142847565d34d721
4a2dfc0d2379c449389901708ca8c5071c06b092
2243 F20101203_AACHYU gallagher_d_Page_076.txt
b6e6e1316b1c825d76a23ba837ec25bb
8a7ce37f0ef4ae00b4de8df24b53ddc048f61be0
117080 F20101203_AACIVN gallagher_d_Page_053.jp2
d779651914c8e1f43fe6571727d1b3d2
cf6fcd85b33e60c32ad0f51b4ae5333dba4fbc19
24029 F20101203_AACJSH gallagher_d_Page_104.QC.jpg
07a39e898cbd7a3b24b5a8bdc0e945ff
8c855bf6fa92e19a48b761c0099feb6550cd4b9e
2163 F20101203_AACHLK gallagher_d_Page_113.txt
fd8edf9e5f61c2e424d57844c014e55b
f35be19eff03e6bf7ea0168eb4c577416402beaf
2071 F20101203_AACIID gallagher_d_Page_281.txt
7ad520b492f8096638e349bf365e90b2
3b9fc544a595fcbff16a62423d2a751a306e1fac
F20101203_AACHYV gallagher_d_Page_062.tif
908d74e5c89d5d0116d575aa2ac6e997
76c5d6396ed2138d9053dffe5331a7e1b83a30fa
105835 F20101203_AACIVO gallagher_d_Page_055.jp2
e5a6dc6b044a332c79be3273c88d349b
925ab86a15701f9d74ad4590c20d7f9e3d7434e3
6590 F20101203_AACJSI gallagher_d_Page_104thm.jpg
6f4dc7a3e9b7024effe88691dcf22cb1
98454c92145b10ff52d62192579d05429d1e0498
53470 F20101203_AACHLL gallagher_d_Page_243.pro
71531fe09994551477353bfc0378373e
7b5dc3d9024bdce4e293c3c98ff241f24e415083
2241 F20101203_AACIIE gallagher_d_Page_095.txt
38a75fe13c3f97e640cda533b76c5995
b6508195def6b91fa256a7d49c15744422b7b756
F20101203_AACHYW gallagher_d_Page_143.tif
cd1982370a5f37203062b060b3c884ef
0a36170774a2f14553e524455d7258dd6b188edf
116707 F20101203_AACIVP gallagher_d_Page_056.jp2
ac98f8d19528c8e04aac523fc292fada
0d99c263900f2c938220806db7a1b09d764aad41
25708 F20101203_AACJSJ gallagher_d_Page_106.QC.jpg
cf162f6cec379696e97600e6453e7bc7
6fb10b3f76ae47f0a356d5442cd4572a9f3cfcb5
6942 F20101203_AACHLM gallagher_d_Page_106thm.jpg
3f059e97ee18ff8685a5cf693c70886f
385604e5281c95dfcb81885a1f6ca7b4b52e90c3
F20101203_AACIIF gallagher_d_Page_107.tif
6e4375bc3caa81a79cdc2c4075e15509
97c82eed5cf18f569917aac76d2c38fd6c499a2e
24892 F20101203_AACHYX gallagher_d_Page_047.QC.jpg
5e695b6ecf23fd59bda47cadaa4ba71e
5b7ab3e2ab1b28dba01e08f59cfa9d3d2388db05
117899 F20101203_AACIVQ gallagher_d_Page_057.jp2
622590e661ac7f478ff013a160e200be
0961d19086ec65ba92e6053960b72d4370e55fe0
25565 F20101203_AACJSK gallagher_d_Page_108.QC.jpg
559d99b404e5c530c91aee048b2a0d5c
f21ffedcd27fdc7d895255cefdf7ccec581169fd
50908 F20101203_AACHLN gallagher_d_Page_245.pro
c9ba8a1989a74342c691e3a1a78ceb1f
65fe50f0a9583b03457b05c6815fb92a4357b187
6932 F20101203_AACIIG gallagher_d_Page_032thm.jpg
363e9b73f130405f35c9287aeb523e1d
6b57a4f8a7fc3cba1a5ff6b4557d18e3052b4a81
115290 F20101203_AACHYY gallagher_d_Page_251.jp2
c1ee796b039bd7f3a6c2a03f7b791258
681664087f6d1bdb4f044ccfd75c97e52085cb96
115470 F20101203_AACIVR gallagher_d_Page_059.jp2
bc65b117d2cca3097026ebdf44c484c7
e140215dd1b7872cde2572864e5e37ed41f031b0
6940 F20101203_AACJSL gallagher_d_Page_109thm.jpg
63bbb4c5ddefabe03357be8287ab3865
bccf5f8e13ddcbe38c3351639bc274a3b6453368
75379 F20101203_AACIIH gallagher_d_Page_136.jpg
c0f73d3ccb3df438d9e9cd0cfa44f1b4
cf48535cbadc62e0c06c1a654568a9f573ac506f
25175 F20101203_AACHYZ gallagher_d_Page_244.QC.jpg
0237bbd4faf152991ad1d32a6f49fcf3
a63196dbd5825c912f8c65027e229197cdce05bd
6741 F20101203_AACJFA gallagher_d_Page_023.pro
e7e8af55a840da33c34360c92353893b
fe2a170dd35ba347a8aa6313c174073f34a4f176
118736 F20101203_AACIVS gallagher_d_Page_060.jp2
5d811dbc6adc207379e968c9744fcc50
b8b386a9f05da0a46c6919f24dc796ec55e734c7
24364 F20101203_AACJSM gallagher_d_Page_110.QC.jpg
250bbabd8490d3e37336b7fd1ecbd012
1049175d5bf9af2fa4b59fefd4bcb504995d744c
7236 F20101203_AACHLO gallagher_d_Page_246thm.jpg
3c198d0019d11ba1206a9c647e292c7b
4c9a938f05c64f37f57c1fc59da23643318c8909
2142 F20101203_AACIII gallagher_d_Page_011.txt
5c8f366b41a2deb39a40a074cacb8647
d6a7c32d32da76ebd5287edb257d48f58fbaa64c
47895 F20101203_AACJFB gallagher_d_Page_025.pro
1022c5a4f7b6ae9a257be829df028c57
6bcef214ee3d0d3748b8d82766d67938fe12cd0d
112848 F20101203_AACIVT gallagher_d_Page_061.jp2
a77208789cc5abe41a73f7df23dae629
ae889d2acb5c2fd8dd0062f8e128a734470e3554
25791 F20101203_AACJSN gallagher_d_Page_111.QC.jpg
7ae404469d720aed98064a922af0862d
6fca67550e78434d75d4556ccf3cf3d8c683fbd3
133988 F20101203_AACHLP gallagher_d_Page_160.jp2
8b2b27985cb55b6bf5ed04869e53634b
3b53e8934c418e12db385fbefb7a1050c4c8c619
56639 F20101203_AACIIJ gallagher_d_Page_031.pro
cce9700eedc6ee461f52f2732f6fc5ae
25b1fd6e717d9812dcfea76c0cb711db8a168e92
51914 F20101203_AACJFC gallagher_d_Page_027.pro
53690dbe0ae674ae9c6d4bec22b321b6
985f4d4e88e0b4495324c5cd3666fff6410469b5
118302 F20101203_AACIVU gallagher_d_Page_062.jp2
ddb669c7fb5f4c68d39cfb5c2efa1e5f
42fd67846420b1131804e1944da10d86efee347a
F20101203_AACJSO gallagher_d_Page_111thm.jpg
6ea121269220d1a741a1ec33c0e60803
15d932e4de71e6e14291af1f2e742635df32095b
1051982 F20101203_AACHLQ gallagher_d_Page_005.jp2
96f6c2c9aac3e7588de6bbeae52d6b70
98581bc532f14bb136c0a9465abe80f812130d60
52419 F20101203_AACJFD gallagher_d_Page_038.pro
f99f08e0a899c0f73a3d2f1204cd2b3b
ad66c13c5fa3dad152c492d876977c9a08413203
115433 F20101203_AACIVV gallagher_d_Page_063.jp2
2b8e6648e358f04589cdc478a23f70c7
4f0a4092909dc3e75b5e9a790497781dcbe19232
24561 F20101203_AACJSP gallagher_d_Page_112.QC.jpg
25bdd994f33c01515d369b29bec4bbc9
96d6fc64ab978325bcc64e863c8c4f633f3fbb5a
24725 F20101203_AACHLR gallagher_d_Page_159.QC.jpg
ae7cda522e393d4a453eb9992570a851
42f3df32d9976bc8b6caeccecf6c1f096e5a24f6
F20101203_AACIIK gallagher_d_Page_230.tif
01bf1c2838cf0e513cc7b3f1431dadb2
74294852bca5f2e25f2576a4d99bb744527a2cba
54208 F20101203_AACJFE gallagher_d_Page_042.pro
cdf979c74024af2f13024b12649a6cf9
6c1adb48b5a1fc64ca2704341f0cd24cca16dd6f
111086 F20101203_AACIVW gallagher_d_Page_064.jp2
60e2374a689d8822c4cbc65568c02fd6
8a54c0ec54269f6d15ba5350791c8e44ba681e37
26109 F20101203_AACJSQ gallagher_d_Page_113.QC.jpg
feef9bee9c3dd50cfcb9bf218e061add
8832f481f7b044454709949d5d2be6b1c36cd928
F20101203_AACHLS gallagher_d_Page_155.tif
fba837b742ead2a934904231512d6c6f
aad44342a13fb730dcf45237a5fa9652aa597159
80950 F20101203_AACIIL gallagher_d_Page_050.jpg
c6c78ea2919ee49dd16eca0ad48107dc
e1eb80c091da5e6afa7ab279b75787a123f48ea4
48145 F20101203_AACJFF gallagher_d_Page_044.pro
b5df1047b3ed481054917ca21e89bbd3
3ff9ba9b4209518810f41bab73664cb838ec22ae
25271 F20101203_AACJSR gallagher_d_Page_115.QC.jpg
436835a0fde010305cb84b0b7199b755
9c4101459a93b1fecb4066d24aa595b6b9360df7
8856 F20101203_AACHLT gallagher_d_Page_286.QC.jpg
091f49569f46a76e21469e52f0a73907
d21f2e2f802939dd462259b6b1757df3d27cf5c1
52109 F20101203_AACIIM gallagher_d_Page_072.pro
e34bd9e5a340235752491e997eb5ecd0
28305881927e91eea1198b1979fa2a9718fc47bb
115103 F20101203_AACIVX gallagher_d_Page_065.jp2
40ff36cc2ba178ceec07e86aa7ee0b0d
1d04c15c38866ea5d4e9a949b094397df362fda8
7078 F20101203_AACJSS gallagher_d_Page_115thm.jpg
841f841278f27cb5cdc914ce2b8bfdf7
4ce7324eadf6189067a1fc037397416ed79a2419
122771 F20101203_AACHLU gallagher_d_Page_020.jp2
c7326d0fcd9e2f99ba04ff564b6bf588
6e551a9af512b41a7fed6bea157fced8dc362312
73334 F20101203_AACIIN gallagher_d_Page_010.jpg
3c262fad3ecea6ca8fe87a26df63d1c5
38ccd64ddea85e458909dfc96383a335e883cf0d
53450 F20101203_AACJFG gallagher_d_Page_049.pro
d686fc257bffbf6bf47ee1d597d4890d
892f717b563fec4885dd0300041d342fa87141d2
119562 F20101203_AACIVY gallagher_d_Page_067.jp2
2c36b6b859871a22a7134c3085fad492
a1101bb18cd84020b2cc6645d1e843aeda9623f3
31417 F20101203_AACHLV gallagher_d_Page_048.jp2
344e6d54317138e64d4ad504c4f9c2e0
f85800b50fba9892e80db6403fb8fb1aba165340
F20101203_AACIIO gallagher_d_Page_231.txt
e53bf06a46656f91c60d5d6bad2627e9
836c4156b7df1f2586e6d349f272aa1c6ea7c126
56122 F20101203_AACJFH gallagher_d_Page_050.pro
e313954f182975e4a7cb36473e85b7b2
68d7d07c18d661a372dff70e15f7b26f8f2cb72e
107531 F20101203_AACIVZ gallagher_d_Page_069.jp2
eab7199b68a66f7973160ae426fd2655
fd235f32644b95c2eae554109d580e11ce3e9840
6512 F20101203_AACJST gallagher_d_Page_116thm.jpg
605b666461b405dc6ba210b09fa6568e
7386fc764d66f46fb652a178668ca86cfeb37f75
1940 F20101203_AACHLW gallagher_d_Page_252.txt
eb278a5f9108e7147193c958a3649de7
4ed1d0e0be1c5e004f8b8e71a783895541b67179
83694 F20101203_AACIIP gallagher_d_Page_145.jpg
e898cb69a3bee0d2403a9eea91183897
91152d5ad6ac10d7a4ef0ef4ec9e56c6f51d24a9
49299 F20101203_AACJFI gallagher_d_Page_055.pro
59af778bbc78cf24e7cc5200073b6457
a50b99684a2903c99df37c6db398805a8d7730d2
24750 F20101203_AACJSU gallagher_d_Page_117.QC.jpg
44b1b253bc3ea29ca1a9c80b87594e5b
3883cec3342feb7b2a2cd1d80e05f2d22cbc2b53
74726 F20101203_AACHLX gallagher_d_Page_250.jpg
2c192643004fb04a20824f2299a622e0
42989cc41a21b55c7f6bfa130e442c7040314adc
F20101203_AACIIQ gallagher_d_Page_277.tif
3f85815787bde89027a4d614cc8ab46c
b3fd785bce97c2d9b4caf29845f60751dfdcf447
54764 F20101203_AACJFJ gallagher_d_Page_057.pro
45b031557f85de95aa1e4ecb9811e5a5
aea76e182d81436eb3a37cccf4d531f218735d08
6908 F20101203_AACJSV gallagher_d_Page_117thm.jpg
bbd3deaee4938acd4fa622f3647c8cd9
58992a2c238bf23144c515df69c6fe44c1a0d119
53239 F20101203_AACHLY gallagher_d_Page_207.pro
875d1a15c52cd79b1abd13cef9e28624
028fb73257c272f72b9801930e0bf98144845f33
74527 F20101203_AACIIR gallagher_d_Page_027.jpg
2ee01e359d0a5b590c203e695bc4c2bd
c99f6c9e8d441e29d91bd8d37eeffb61d0b98a0a
52385 F20101203_AACJFK gallagher_d_Page_058.pro
3ed64a31f2e12534a05c88d13a85f879
d02fecac25b1c67687bc416f151c2ab14eed0521
25639 F20101203_AACJSW gallagher_d_Page_118.QC.jpg
6219425c7da6b9d173b26e3adc0c32c7
3dda5e8338e28407243f2c6402a5f8f304499a0f
F20101203_AACHLZ gallagher_d_Page_049.tif
b5e68f23cc0e92f729f5078373d0bf5b
233a455e8e610d20c69fc6500cf0ecae0db14542
2033 F20101203_AACIIS gallagher_d_Page_182.txt
7e8ffff39f7a05e010ed912b275c46ee
42f1785296ed0de27af357183c852b9322e7cac9
54540 F20101203_AACJFL gallagher_d_Page_063.pro
db84940a5b98fc279405dc15d80a8b7b
356102e3e4d4b5811339f8ad3ae57925413eb141
27507 F20101203_AACJSX gallagher_d_Page_120.QC.jpg
ed70841d9aeb9a09c93b92f896bb2d62
31fb125bf17549dd2503235bb081541f2810ef7b
78521 F20101203_AACIIT gallagher_d_Page_040.jpg
11158605eacb06113705d6d731d8e62a
e71c8d7908165c95933e30586d668a7dbdb292c0
55269 F20101203_AACJFM gallagher_d_Page_068.pro
6e651e310b468963a0853a27621a6ee9
66f9f99c8e5cc96b9469aba9010fd831a43083f6
22584 F20101203_AACJSY gallagher_d_Page_121.QC.jpg
74cbc3a843743f141ebbfc1e94d51634
07f54c12251f13a4252a0ae3a40504104dc7b41a
81272 F20101203_AACIIU gallagher_d_Page_095.jpg
a2719e915891e7538dbdb6afb2438f66
021110e0bf6a4e5d32ba96929b889a28cc7f09aa
48973 F20101203_AACJFN gallagher_d_Page_070.pro
4bedbefc3d7b42123c68eb6e9237c84d
c79795c1b95eafe9d7336dea0e9a1ef85396cb64
26123 F20101203_AACJSZ gallagher_d_Page_122.QC.jpg
3ddeb81495d7edaab1e31715b3ab23b0
896d35676fc72d04434590d4c8a696eee824a991
52934 F20101203_AACIIV gallagher_d_Page_119.pro
652fb1b54f9b57dc6b020ca6c94efdbe
d00c006aba7f337229a12fc25bc25fe537c5a1ed
61823 F20101203_AACJFO gallagher_d_Page_071.pro
3b488e13a9bcc8db48a770e72ff02304
2e778091dc6b7477348358beae3db109e43dad32
6860 F20101203_AACIIW gallagher_d_Page_101thm.jpg
a18961fdba0f8a9cacd60b4884cab744
c46227ebf43641b8b950a11ca24522d2fc0c9191
51833 F20101203_AACJFP gallagher_d_Page_073.pro
768b4ebe39a89bed06a1102b25cefe47
d5bb50b5ac13c41e5970145006dfaeb9f120415b
25881 F20101203_AACIIX gallagher_d_Page_220.QC.jpg
942df51a3d77d949162ff063b802d7f7
e014b751188e5020ed8c49c29d58c3d25e92558b
53028 F20101203_AACJFQ gallagher_d_Page_074.pro
058546a89591e93d62605ec1bdaaf0c1
d9b2eb3be4ff1a103dedd7af82f07758e503c347
6971 F20101203_AACIIY gallagher_d_Page_124thm.jpg
5e1d51fe93f23a2af5c2c7b51a6ba9d5
49bb5f4b8c125d584a7cd0876a5ac75d85bd511f
57554 F20101203_AACJFR gallagher_d_Page_076.pro
62d62465716a12c5955cf5e7cf6d60a4
dafa8b5ace84e728437de5a1c40fac05c57d56fb
7137 F20101203_AACIIZ gallagher_d_Page_050thm.jpg
fb90e87a502b57b8719426762f5f0701
d6fa9c9eec2b645389d264ff3caf0b2698bc3525
52893 F20101203_AACJFS gallagher_d_Page_077.pro
6fa1295781b5e530822071084da238ba
a4de21bc0196708cd60d8da239f6de84da8e2270
54785 F20101203_AACJFT gallagher_d_Page_078.pro
4a3119ac26daf6ef5217d6214b05685b
59f06795bc8a09280ee13411dcb62409432dfcc1
F20101203_AACHRA gallagher_d_Page_004.tif
4b73b35b20a26d008bb6b239496712f7
b09d4579c4eef5eba85c52e003b1ab0da2132ed0
49255 F20101203_AACJFU gallagher_d_Page_079.pro
54d865c4e7ee1d0e3de9d5d9f63f842b
ca345841e005f6a3eee252eae481fe72a5de4821
2049 F20101203_AACHRB gallagher_d_Page_027.txt
a041356ae41ef05778804890a1e2ac8d
ed1f2b639e5abb870e9d2981821f0ce7aff363e7
55066 F20101203_AACJFV gallagher_d_Page_082.pro
6a8798bda5fb392becf4e56d45fe4d7b
981903abd15258b67925942cb908300a67cf47f3
2111 F20101203_AACHRC gallagher_d_Page_216.txt
bcc736f22b0e66b45060045ccaa3a1ab
68196e1599d4590db48f0f1540b167a58df89f72
54552 F20101203_AACJFW gallagher_d_Page_083.pro
b4f6b5c471f735464d6cbd586f31245e
335c3e4c0084aac1f85acf89cbd39eeeb88b2b3e
6448 F20101203_AACJYA gallagher_d_Page_284thm.jpg
b4c9af07bae1d20a41f9bfc1f8cb65ea
1f4a71de2b494ba36148b9b2fb66133a17be09b3
72566 F20101203_AACHRD gallagher_d_Page_152.jpg
431308da76fc8fdeaa10f02a3fc49d67
dfe2e61191dc6bfcab6d885d0b6e6fbb83c54f3d
51645 F20101203_AACJFX gallagher_d_Page_087.pro
d977542b2a8bd89d9d38bcdab600431c
e7e3ff003d2f7abff2d384e083f6a83722545b4a
5835 F20101203_AACJYB gallagher_d_Page_285thm.jpg
bab87eda991dc38358f7074d793ce3d0
11f2de13e2662d7312be0cec49b60b5daf21081b
29018 F20101203_AACJFY gallagher_d_Page_089.pro
e27d66b66ef4769af8705c79e0985f2c
0712abb4459a28dc036c07d756d828cd4276a147
111167 F20101203_AACHRE gallagher_d_Page_041.jp2
96055414e5f8463cb1098623d609a615
7d02c88b44716c055f00e0f3e4f24d85a5b0454a
2721 F20101203_AACJYC gallagher_d_Page_286thm.jpg
7d0a69602eb2e922d0e4c431ecaa5e2a
106054bc7e56d3bf7aef0b53c85062fb8b94b9cc
55311 F20101203_AACJFZ gallagher_d_Page_090.pro
4f217ad1e47c74d0f44a3cae52cd70be
c8e4fc5e66074d65c26e6827f366dcd9e7c4b579
80270 F20101203_AACHRF gallagher_d_Page_235.jpg
8873d02a2f73ddbc2d92be172b4eda27
77283e4364c511bc53414c8b93d157a10c082ede
331311 F20101203_AACJYD UFE0021911_00001.mets
a41372701b04ba04674fd9602c737a67
68b1dacbf0cb5656217eb34369210294cf43534c
52692 F20101203_AACHRG gallagher_d_Page_039.pro
d4cc1b0f20f3a7c945d56222b45b7be4
ed25eadd4f87808a4128d176dc0f0b862b311169
F20101203_AACIOA gallagher_d_Page_152.tif
405a84e5150090993e650d030fb2335f
36f5590a35852a1ae820b7a1d57cc034b100bff1
6812 F20101203_AACHRH gallagher_d_Page_155thm.jpg
a8ec01822888f99098c44aeb21644e8d
0426c2f87bb51bba9bf9d7827f64b80d3cc0b7dc
118311 F20101203_AACIOB gallagher_d_Page_168.jp2
b14cb0280bf2684edeba25c101bedf30
5f96f6a89492d69c5cd236d78578359bfe616976
F20101203_AACHRI gallagher_d_Page_251.tif
49990516b5357d00ca10ac74571f86d8
dc1b539a58d20ecad2010aecc02d28bf710d9b58
75959 F20101203_AACIOC gallagher_d_Page_246.jpg
e43f29fb96b5bddabe0f9920cc9f8c96
b3029061f7001ea4238333fa58b7d0006f5783a5
113621 F20101203_AACHRJ gallagher_d_Page_037.jp2
8a59d6fd16f8c50cd4bf6f8e5c6a44a0
7b8e77dfceb11a28715f082e0d6bbb69bea1d883
7090 F20101203_AACIOD gallagher_d_Page_197thm.jpg
3195ec8320300a78e65a01ad18682643
171cea143311b378ad40349773322528ebc739ae
80638 F20101203_AACHRK gallagher_d_Page_188.jpg
13a09396bc101210d244755346cb978c
8f9f4487b991442dcbee4cc4cc6883e44f5c287c
6540 F20101203_AACIOE gallagher_d_Page_240thm.jpg
2dbbbe75b30a665847cafd63bd81bc4a
0a1979560fdaeff2f9405c8b4f3c4f7937e47b9e
25754 F20101203_AACHEA gallagher_d_Page_228.QC.jpg
ae3944828b029bbafb77d520a002cc57
c406e781a3d82a9193e5b6d3f6be070ef286321b
55440 F20101203_AACHRL gallagher_d_Page_062.pro
b742e396e695ba157f96f01304cff3ac
0ccb93e6879c38bfa3e781472c0fb1f51a63fab7
7171 F20101203_AACIOF gallagher_d_Page_162thm.jpg
87cb228d5147ea66a847685b1dc3f689
fe49dddb9d4be731a50ff59392bc586fc771d8a8
79168 F20101203_AACHEB gallagher_d_Page_150.jpg
89ff8448e333671f34ce2812bd79be06
8556d1385f7a317ec215e0fb6f1afc33fd68b036
80065 F20101203_AACHRM gallagher_d_Page_153.jpg
b8d4185dea1e0fc9212bfa5a73ea8699
8977dcb85e0e81af48572de909d25476a4395e6e
117862 F20101203_AACIOG gallagher_d_Page_026.jp2
361ec372a06159bafa01242012256368
56df1a02c56b421f5f42ffed86d600ebed27b50e
51304 F20101203_AACHEC gallagher_d_Page_046.pro
14543dc0e5b4cae08e3fa4d60faa78af
441d91c07226364f50bdebae417e98ed0a9c3300
53205 F20101203_AACHRN gallagher_d_Page_256.pro
fe86396ddf2b957b8112ea85bd07cc37
757982649a941d961f773a03843c35853eaa05dd
F20101203_AACIOH gallagher_d_Page_258.txt
b024b8e7e77f0c9622e885ca0db6a845
dd4ee91b4e77cfa86cbbc024e904bd02759b9169
2067 F20101203_AACJLA gallagher_d_Page_097.txt
6058bdae9b9b8bfcf2576d5473224d7f
e37b2255db1d3eb52ee5f5339ce9bf36010a9624
53136 F20101203_AACHED gallagher_d_Page_246.pro
41dcebeae4445787aa0df7d20b822494
7782c4c303e411540fd9fe085ef4deecd4cc112a
53549 F20101203_AACHRO gallagher_d_Page_140.pro
c20f86a4d100294a897af4d41203d422
319568c475a15ef7e1040e81cf7c2cb53d4ff68e
F20101203_AACIOI gallagher_d_Page_221.tif
df78e1c968c92703d7627215f5022529
88021d1f487787bd331d702d1a16f8b0db70d638
2285 F20101203_AACJLB gallagher_d_Page_098.txt
080b498b023f2effb0e02e20a5b5f3cc
1f78913a13577a13e416527f261dbc3b6be06b5a
6858 F20101203_AACHEE gallagher_d_Page_077thm.jpg
efc40e70f8d1d1c012f3e787dd3e3a03
b83a77fcc91804654ef1cbc5217fa0cc1ba3f96f
25737 F20101203_AACHRP gallagher_d_Page_134.QC.jpg
ff1413ff0c9ca0e43d64813581069590
08f8e2a81918c06e7b7755340fc907073c217ab5
6839 F20101203_AACIOJ gallagher_d_Page_184thm.jpg
c79c14a8311256519bdddc79a870c090
1e823b8c2a9d8643a1a073ea3dac700bc270df93
2042 F20101203_AACJLC gallagher_d_Page_099.txt
7ff7f81678bb16652e3aebef71d19093
dc206503e8d74c9b6f4770ff0af339844d51179e
112585 F20101203_AACHEF gallagher_d_Page_119.jp2
ee6f137ff93eb35d4a078bdb58517be7
3abc1a10693d27063d9d385de94ca55a6aac43b3
52313 F20101203_AACHRQ gallagher_d_Page_262.pro
3d24b6a9f132f0659df5fd107f9d09e7
99586a4ba8037c38b6fd853f985657142863297a
25482 F20101203_AACIOK gallagher_d_Page_011.QC.jpg
e7e878f1822044cb188d140b22ffd066
3bee5680564c6f9222b7bac652af3c98e913b50e
2037 F20101203_AACJLD gallagher_d_Page_102.txt
6b1775e769d916f7f9ac949fd1ef5860
76b6cf3cb258c32ee21b96f215135a6cbf71d4dd
7112 F20101203_AACHEG gallagher_d_Page_024thm.jpg
8f01dcc6a09f4ed25af270bc004fccbb
bd6b00f884910e799d621a3beba01ab3fb505b2d
95701 F20101203_AACHRR gallagher_d_Page_081.jpg
5ad48943b3d44e51f4aa0d7ffdd491b0
150c94b3f0b0caf4b7f60938e0c87fc4adb6e71c
2184 F20101203_AACIOL gallagher_d_Page_224.txt
5aa8b7e3f6f9d9d1e7f319eed046068c
c937d326469818b8a0925be32cd2270d22fefb56
2058 F20101203_AACJLE gallagher_d_Page_103.txt
0a2f836a3e96cdc990237efc6642501d
8ad59a1169efb48d5c1f8708cb2cd8b10b336ae8
F20101203_AACIBA gallagher_d_Page_033.txt
8162d5782771f537ddfc06e22848628e
1f8fcdd245174d9a13cb057817e05d0c4486ee0f
23454 F20101203_AACHRS gallagher_d_Page_239.QC.jpg
b062114c35f888959a65ef7b9f1825b7
d83145ffbf907490918677e44e3745e508aeee35
F20101203_AACIOM gallagher_d_Page_085.pro
b4102c1e1c935165da6bdddeae7c399f
33afb8e545fed7eb8751b544a01942054861e536
F20101203_AACJLF gallagher_d_Page_106.txt
f48108f5d7470b1b90244d2c6586b177
844c2a7212b474548380433050a8f1e308ed79fd
53999 F20101203_AACHEH gallagher_d_Page_148.pro
10c0eb81620a74f50af623f3570a06ee
8dd1a65848412e53914cecd717e66449be1963fb
6336 F20101203_AACIBB gallagher_d_Page_044thm.jpg
bd2e743d51879c8bdfbe4223e038179b
fcf80cfe52d882840fa06a9d268e1ee7a5c35b89
25825 F20101203_AACHRT gallagher_d_Page_255.QC.jpg
67da19f62511dedef3ff52fcdc2c51db
9a167a1d6dd40551055da0e004ca061b136ec9fa
2400 F20101203_AACION gallagher_d_Page_247.txt
0492a5d28f6bacb7d19fa19aa1a7f9d1
c5e96f9c32f8f716f84ec613843efc1d9b91df7e
2191 F20101203_AACJLG gallagher_d_Page_107.txt
8975d7ea5dce6edbf0b22038e249b08b
74f638fa3a36ad143a0ad8950326bfb9f5855c27
51844 F20101203_AACHEI gallagher_d_Page_135.pro
826c87de34d44ee9439bc2de49b4a745
f5e784b5866ebb0779dac2a4508d0ae0230179d6
F20101203_AACIBC gallagher_d_Page_178.txt
1a2e448f66ef907821f3c679717d6294
54646b6936be7a2595eb6831b4573164d6a89a04
25560 F20101203_AACIOO gallagher_d_Page_187.QC.jpg
6c7c7fbba4a95c70e391f1ca4c1a5912
72b37e4e29b6630a8000006d5438842abee5c216
2138 F20101203_AACJLH gallagher_d_Page_108.txt
ddf05454a8be9f38e3b7eac89c7f3976
89c37f706ef788924007aa49effc5b7f75832838
7097 F20101203_AACHEJ gallagher_d_Page_108thm.jpg
9b16a5adaa1a5218001a7ef13233351a
891d9706f4a990266bb179cf71dbf6835fdce550
77954 F20101203_AACHRU gallagher_d_Page_157.jpg
654999bda0853489d914866a48c1abfb
d1e82c90c23475e6ba37d6ecf56e0d2fabdda16a
118583 F20101203_AACIOP gallagher_d_Page_233.jp2
404644aad67dd797013a69a10b8bd5fe
b6c16928da3cbb45234bff55e1ef44bf3b07660f
1964 F20101203_AACJLI gallagher_d_Page_116.txt
5b5fb302daaf591a3c28107c8486d58b
5bf851451f7d185547a268cf524c690084b6ab17
114248 F20101203_AACHEK gallagher_d_Page_177.jp2
753d7178808e553225b541980acb0b26
e9ad2e47c4b02cced6c3a8d2be829469804a279e
25011 F20101203_AACIBD gallagher_d_Page_102.QC.jpg
3efe1f9d4645a1cf7f317a1c0c52c4b8
77e05c16b8cb8edd642e0d16db85c4c1ca6761ce
F20101203_AACHRV gallagher_d_Page_042.tif
2272b8e197b739427f5e0e8a9b5a1861
6482c21ac707a639a9bd79f3c2b4810ea8cb4049
F20101203_AACJLJ gallagher_d_Page_118.txt
6502f0ac76969784a8c8f82646f41113
57d2abc75b31702ee8fdb6397cc3e4a1a469467c
2100 F20101203_AACHEL gallagher_d_Page_228.txt
ceb8910701e223b41ea3aa52be44ffda
763426e14d90c576df51d8f9f9f9c3f2e6368753
7317 F20101203_AACIBE gallagher_d_Page_043thm.jpg
1956ae01b1ccbf54288f35ab13218410
8e931d85b29c2da97a40d1f5841c83a6e989a12a
25789 F20101203_AACHRW gallagher_d_Page_154.QC.jpg
f2852f844b5e68257d3de01a446db407
abb27aedca144aa990c8c3a59d6f39815f0ef7a4
120604 F20101203_AACIOQ gallagher_d_Page_032.jp2
df26db1e70cf32989113b575a3fd734f
9d0d716e04f3bb58ccbbb673e1f47fd1cb252063
2090 F20101203_AACJLK gallagher_d_Page_119.txt
b4fb3c13d8bfd01e71e23e363a276f92
49aa52f644889c2e55ece08f851e45a5b1bf2218
143401 F20101203_AACHEM gallagher_d_Page_081.jp2
c2e7240f1b00f90736d9c1ec1b069ce6
148537686142fe7c35bc8ac8cfa9f6db0e7c3ed5
52272 F20101203_AACIBF gallagher_d_Page_281.pro
64c160c5a3df6f59276341e06039e45c
2e01ebc6a4d1359ba7cdcf2831176840619abc13
54447 F20101203_AACHRX gallagher_d_Page_137.pro
05f5cf9a72c48418529e497706529e28
2c4f69477f94ee02c70aafa29ab993cf51cea546
115295 F20101203_AACIOR gallagher_d_Page_246.jp2
017764db24f7c261dd20ed55aac5e3a2
c8c9420f4f655a5724da966f331eee9676e15fbb
1878 F20101203_AACJLL gallagher_d_Page_121.txt
410c5ec71271244e1fdb4dcda0f72b0d
44c27dd2fc0dbc24595026be9e13a7db63b8d16d
55783 F20101203_AACHEN gallagher_d_Page_209.pro
89c80c8000a8184009a9354e2481c85d
8a9208701a01bb721ec796e5d45f099da6ab8aa0
6758 F20101203_AACIBG gallagher_d_Page_123thm.jpg
2276646d24701111b1be7a4c8eb3ce61
6f0a0ea8efa4c414580f9717998cf4f5743deb40
80845 F20101203_AACHRY gallagher_d_Page_190.jpg
6ec30dd6c6ba9876e4a85c4b9b4702a1
6bb4424adbe69d9842a6f967b20230b7ca792d49
118313 F20101203_AACIOS gallagher_d_Page_036.jp2
011175a4482f27cc7375c6e875a405b6
b155d6798d4f0b5442b9d175522b04573ba503e9
50940 F20101203_AACHEO gallagher_d_Page_045.pro
2c7ae18de9895b96fffb6e7212ebfc5d
e9bbba516005a3887e578a252023555dc1fdff72
52409 F20101203_AACIBH gallagher_d_Page_210.pro
4e68a16b7aceef286419a5f285d578ea
cdff90c778d585d7401155fd37cadbad41936566
107043 F20101203_AACHRZ gallagher_d_Page_252.jp2
e0fd1e76d98669f716711a0c251d8391
dc1ce800dc733ccd1197d8e23b153fc1858bc7f9
25694 F20101203_AACIOT gallagher_d_Page_260.QC.jpg
019ba43d6fda64da3f04eed00054eb5e
b7c1e31c1dafb40e0442f2a774eef52820c8c1c6
F20101203_AACJLM gallagher_d_Page_124.txt
a878d803d03af3c00f4c01d9fb17b1eb
03c73519b9553cbf171467a7f2bf77cd7a2c3230
76035 F20101203_AACHEP gallagher_d_Page_230.jpg
2795e90a27db08a2dd742343efe9a580
d908549aa4a0b72355cbeb089a0b6785dc865d8f
24170 F20101203_AACIBI gallagher_d_Page_283.QC.jpg
b7d8c53effb988c5da1943c35346bbb0
39cdd1a697dd8b0fe69363a5d1035313bfc41ac9
2047 F20101203_AACIOU gallagher_d_Page_161.txt
2d488386acd6d0ec66fe84bc2794b31a
6a85a33a78b8992afe8dac89a94b2a0e799c35ce
2170 F20101203_AACJLN gallagher_d_Page_126.txt
4f327f30695c12646d4d38622859ef52
4364fcf3512999ae41d2c56e8dbbb68bfd806ba9
74136 F20101203_AACHEQ gallagher_d_Page_017.jpg
7f5624710e6107568c75d3f61d0d8d38
15194815a0279062cd4683290977d760d12086b4
26800 F20101203_AACIBJ gallagher_d_Page_144.QC.jpg
3c3aa46a1828f2fb67c76c4bb85904a4
069a9a2407ef2264dfdceab3d295809bf774cc8d
2124 F20101203_AACIOV gallagher_d_Page_151.txt
848c087798e2433cb077a1143f0b8b45
a1bdd96de9e485935eca94fe46f17b8bb71912bd
2085 F20101203_AACJLO gallagher_d_Page_131.txt
5a8a4f4031bdec41c0078f27b147a960
1830cb131cb7cb6cf3012b92249659b063b888b9
F20101203_AACHER gallagher_d_Page_157.tif
a2372cb76a9bc44177d334f7712b8f4c
8ef36d70f0a20e8ea5c48c367fd2ca362af1d675
121920 F20101203_AACIBK gallagher_d_Page_266.jp2
55d71921464303ae6a4ad717e8ed11d7
db183662839436f23b44a243b162684835f7b8b2
23668 F20101203_AACIOW gallagher_d_Page_133.QC.jpg
e57550f832bb40f3fad5e401e86638ef
338b40c600e9762ecf4cb5a0936b0063cf9c2eb4
2159 F20101203_AACJLP gallagher_d_Page_132.txt
49ea435e401f31e101fcf230b36e8a5c
6a046b51f23465034c494cc5d34799e0fc76acb4
F20101203_AACHES gallagher_d_Page_181thm.jpg
35bd1924529705db5041817057174fdc
a17f8fb3043bd1a05af27acdbee21a996196c50f
F20101203_AACIBL gallagher_d_Page_016.txt
4fe7501de69e2ce138c627da9cd4c83a
9638d067014fc11abf2f34fea28fd00805d110d4
77054 F20101203_AACIOX gallagher_d_Page_083.jpg
348090e7d6e1b5e977c517a932bc7753
06195c869bed16bc82d515492fd21b22884bc845
2080 F20101203_AACJLQ gallagher_d_Page_136.txt
bc7457a98e900f82021361eca07a574d
92f26a91eb1ca0512d4453cadf92ec214580d24a
53657 F20101203_AACHET gallagher_d_Page_191.pro
2ed6a189f880f9606ac2119fdefceb81
6200e68e4a5955871881c5f7fc2e13c2914ca463
105122 F20101203_AACIBM gallagher_d_Page_238.jp2
ef345417fe8426ebcdc18fc6a851ad24
64a931006d608ae219a70be6d091939889fb2d32
6508 F20101203_AACIOY gallagher_d_Page_227thm.jpg
b90ffeb6f2460a6c0e74f4b6e9df6034
09f276844e034e704db1691a7d13bdff0a03bafd
F20101203_AACJLR gallagher_d_Page_138.txt
2927366f7564ab6a5405884b08df2c6c
bf79d85c1bc19945802f7e4bc99dae2a9ef578a2
F20101203_AACHEU gallagher_d_Page_023.tif
6a7c49777e95976d26a026987ed65a6c
780736d585afc8fd2ce7a94160f1576566e6b330
7230 F20101203_AACIBN gallagher_d_Page_053thm.jpg
9908a5c7ec6ac62c402b42ff0096e365
0d86f353100983e08dcccd0a141447148c576267
57089 F20101203_AACIOZ gallagher_d_Page_218.pro
ea839b87a1acbe1d3772ed3e2b3eff86
26464f94acf02b6136a71ecbd401e4fa8ffc8129
2298 F20101203_AACJLS gallagher_d_Page_139.txt
6f54e4bcb9c17bee0371dfd4374b1478
c9b15ea44854684e532d5dbccba6cedc2c375745
F20101203_AACHEV gallagher_d_Page_127.tif
debff8845025f857c519a2cb25a8df8d
dba165c4a0042866c312bbb35b763b78eeb5083b
24921 F20101203_AACIBO gallagher_d_Page_135.QC.jpg
0b55de8f1d382495c69c19abd9614104
2c13b36329eb5504ea0a7e58cc661ed81d36327e
F20101203_AACJLT gallagher_d_Page_140.txt
72c0801f3e856c4244cfa1ab50140667
b73dd22ff90f14da2d18f6f855494fd49a4a74f2
F20101203_AACHEW gallagher_d_Page_106.tif
760fc3177bcb1522db891d67c2a023ae
b0e6b4528072cee08dd22de5872b71670d3ecf43
106579 F20101203_AACIBP gallagher_d_Page_208.jp2
7a90c410d00de799a52c312a7be0cde8
2117eaa685b982f0fdcb330dea9728d77fa15ad8
F20101203_AACJLU gallagher_d_Page_142.txt
7ea5ebec7fa09edecd175e0b2ca5b0ba
0f3533c7f16e3fb2249142c3bc9540c0a54b0226
11082 F20101203_AACHEX gallagher_d_Page_127.QC.jpg
2e562124bccdb8fcbcbf412abb6109a2
a090825d01c7999ae3baa76f3bdf505908b4dd7e
F20101203_AACHXA gallagher_d_Page_240.tif
13563309b44b530b758c7d54b56fdd5f
21cfcda92998cadf63cbe26f00e50374795311a5
F20101203_AACIBQ gallagher_d_Page_169.tif
79ad822ad0520a6b1366cd74874ec39b
61b5d4af5fbfc8eff52a114ebea5c47115b69b41
F20101203_AACJLV gallagher_d_Page_144.txt
d47a18be3100c201695d74510e96d5a5
03d36ea59608de2296d2f8c705c2b819398f336f
114191 F20101203_AACHEY gallagher_d_Page_242.jp2
536e367f98d391f6fea51334e7dd2604
645d046f38b0988c705e4ed2e7419e6ec32a7ff6
6899 F20101203_AACHXB gallagher_d_Page_072thm.jpg
d540d3cf3f35bf49e168325d649371ef
f75f635d39a47fe26c7944729baa70b2ed935f11
F20101203_AACIBR gallagher_d_Page_023thm.jpg
5c579344fe77f9b52154e9b7ab3740d1
6c4f6fa8ec83425081e347252ce306c727fdd563
F20101203_AACJLW gallagher_d_Page_146.txt
dadf3f2151c14e093159c803b32bc0c1
ef26bc46baba5747ebd8185e19f46eedfe71070c
115188 F20101203_AACHEZ gallagher_d_Page_085.jp2
3eb6070683c48ebcb412738cff6fdf02
773d6234fba595e62ed6a5113268109327ef93e3
68133 F20101203_AACHXC gallagher_d_Page_194.jpg
e9514924b93e0c80ca7f97c4cbf4b32e
7818ab2b312ad6e2e241a3eff19ece096a531cc5
106743 F20101203_AACIBS gallagher_d_Page_227.jp2
ba2360a3a6c607555670714e8a70e869
98ecba327073bc910ae41ebfe9c343d08489d696
F20101203_AACJLX gallagher_d_Page_148.txt
8be797fdcf0b6915e7dcca5b516a47dc
315e76a34b6fca02b3242df35f0525aa54434473
F20101203_AACHXD gallagher_d_Page_114thm.jpg
1c9145e0304431f3e3998a23326d741b
fb71c3d994dfc4680f0b2862d1c24ea95525e2ce
F20101203_AACIBT gallagher_d_Page_223.jpg
8b6592558453fa08fbc71032fe3150d6
1c96cffaa58ff886d672a4fceeacf472f059518f
F20101203_AACJLY gallagher_d_Page_152.txt
02480fc63e92863d7501661238d8603f
47a1b39fdac14a626fa0488b7aff89ffbde457f8
7070 F20101203_AACHXE gallagher_d_Page_200thm.jpg
0a188f8b9f714b66f70d78b055999f65
c2b39cb2a0b9a1678eea76757d72bbcc23fba3e5
F20101203_AACIBU gallagher_d_Page_262.txt
eb9d3de340f13d126ead524b99ad6d29
73ac222bace86851466b647191674635e5274d18
F20101203_AACJLZ gallagher_d_Page_153.txt
11e6737f20beb78bb607ddb0d90c673f
424d83a5a203123f7ab079e1bce23e259343cb6a
78157 F20101203_AACHXF gallagher_d_Page_054.jpg
4f569a77726d7f8c3b30bf426fb38010
c55b540c75f30d41026b814b2ed155d529be9637
7266 F20101203_AACIBV gallagher_d_Page_095thm.jpg
30259ae0c2b6d235f4deca30d828b920
3be33304ace931dc80751235d6733f06b7224ada
25446 F20101203_AACHXG gallagher_d_Page_184.QC.jpg
c8bce60e5a86fab7458ef7a45ac3d5e1
e5236349f8b49c3d357efb521c9cd52780d06669
F20101203_AACIBW gallagher_d_Page_238.tif
21e5b00bf7d2ce0b2e04783220be4a25
720ca98afeb615acdecb0f1cea699b997e3e48af
72849 F20101203_AACIUA gallagher_d_Page_252.jpg
e9e75404a40ed488d1365848e493917f
e1b1ffa5de38ab808c5f052403e6b9f915e5f0a0
6991 F20101203_AACHXH gallagher_d_Page_143thm.jpg
6093e577df9e255e6cca80eda3ff2b50
bdd80283780b4c9b26a5beb5ab64cbdcfc281ae7
78007 F20101203_AACIBX gallagher_d_Page_217.jpg
0f9d2ce4fc6224ff1d3678d3824e7adc
26db1cc6bf78bb55d07b77e351f44c9704aa3aed
76522 F20101203_AACIUB gallagher_d_Page_253.jpg
683422ca6e7a21cbc7f52c4e16aac98d
e9176d644b324c11bb595d4dcd043d471ca99584
F20101203_AACHXI gallagher_d_Page_241thm.jpg
cd8f6893a770e66fb014ea5f6dcc0750
416259a06a27ffead17afbd045be95d693697d2a
F20101203_AACIBY gallagher_d_Page_105.txt
eb68866c62046016ccbadb4192103fa5
b7d5240827525f5c05e4a2d914d96c74b4e5d7cd
76880 F20101203_AACIUC gallagher_d_Page_254.jpg
ff91004c2327ea8710c4cd6ced57636a
7827786a546122e090e479f107134ff1cece557a
2038 F20101203_AACHXJ gallagher_d_Page_064.txt
cc8ee9bbb8fc7f588d617fd0ff050b1b
1190edac7381b1430573dc9b247ee5831ff5d18f
F20101203_AACIBZ gallagher_d_Page_244.txt
d59a5b98cef50a85f322f02793b59513
95aedc93dd924a2001c74f138daf81c185f6f5b8
79811 F20101203_AACIUD gallagher_d_Page_255.jpg
34a8ed5974a6f4ec6e2d71ca6f2b2527
0e4749cd3e00487f5bca0b81e414b663112f0662
26223 F20101203_AACHXK gallagher_d_Page_130.QC.jpg
cac9543a4a01c7cadad869c98688d95a
9a7372ca838f53b35b2c431c1c028b849f9f6f78
78383 F20101203_AACIUE gallagher_d_Page_257.jpg
a18df5747a3a092e497caa006fd921bd
5824eb8278bd66503cbd292a2c2c398d5ebcc443
F20101203_AACHKA gallagher_d_Page_019.txt
dea066bc26888ad1368970dca26e6ebb
5714c293352f2dd775f56fde5b146e593fdb3dd4
F20101203_AACHXL gallagher_d_Page_038.txt
aaf3dc5f79f1316d8ee38924b4eac9d1
451464b1923838fb4825c27368ca9c7ff4a06f8b
78364 F20101203_AACIUF gallagher_d_Page_260.jpg
cbfe8ee6de94b90002ccc9c065d6bda2
ac649ffe2f959579af0f620473a96d875557c6d1
F20101203_AACHKB gallagher_d_Page_192.tif
19b4cdf4f1acf3365c3ef912d60459e3
29cc66f4d95493b3371361204f27bd2f78c6bb99
126800 F20101203_AACHXM gallagher_d_Page_009.jp2
cd35e4c619304879094492bab12da7e3
d3399aed8eadcbd690109b3af368e91721bee15d
72788 F20101203_AACHKC gallagher_d_Page_236.jpg
4db458169719ec7a34fab8d06bcf8183
175378e7436fc0d2d0784d751f26352e0bad7a35
6665 F20101203_AACHXN gallagher_d_Page_079thm.jpg
be49b1b6539fb0da5ffe097eaa3f0bb1
15bd7983de411169a53f14dc0472b6bc9d5a229f
77663 F20101203_AACIUG gallagher_d_Page_261.jpg
bfebf68e0ed0c431f36e877200bac37b
d002c750c8b71c00242446d90937ecf26bc1a6f7
6723 F20101203_AACJRA gallagher_d_Page_069thm.jpg
aa01fe6ee844af8245c144178bab9262
61a38ca5a2c6662611078307ba8ca6b8b1e4736c
54113 F20101203_AACHKD gallagher_d_Page_200.pro
9c256b4745256903b52267af139489cb
53d35e06d627be30e9f0f08b77212bac5baf3a8d
74780 F20101203_AACHXO gallagher_d_Page_210.jpg
75baccef1c5d7c3be0af3dd7d428b5eb
e1a14fb9f7298a09c09decc96c5f0f79fa9a4c5e
75024 F20101203_AACIUH gallagher_d_Page_262.jpg
783f213985e2aaee1d807840d350643e
ce68e44e37337c68c20a962488b528d3aec70bb3
23731 F20101203_AACJRB gallagher_d_Page_070.QC.jpg
dbb976495426c1a4175f7fb42d8d8054
e3f2d07f54d84603feac5f4af0ac0180098d4bb5
78599 F20101203_AACHKE gallagher_d_Page_168.jpg
51a87588ef08262abcd65f681d19b9af
fb5eea2922422bbc8dc4c40a8298af1fd1b29ef0
73378 F20101203_AACHXP gallagher_d_Page_273.jpg
729929b9ab6a512b85f723f092020865
aed97d65610f9c2c47f1f60cbfaad8215044973f
77779 F20101203_AACIUI gallagher_d_Page_264.jpg
d28ef05a7f7dcca4923101e9cab2db27
fb7c0621e824247de59a39f5d532a453e6899794
26821 F20101203_AACJRC gallagher_d_Page_071.QC.jpg
a966953c6bf3c68df59bb34c297f0d35
818259b77328723e3011361bd6b63af669354395
F20101203_AACHKF gallagher_d_Page_229.jpg
ca5b1d65eef4002d532d111f3f3f4252
d788bb7201d6703a2a82ca0670ce2ebf3f96b6b1
F20101203_AACHXQ gallagher_d_Page_197.tif
971b3fbae3d48d2e65f06ec180fab6b7
d89298cba7bad34199910f0c8cbf2cce8e4b6474
76013 F20101203_AACIUJ gallagher_d_Page_267.jpg
275f3378b3746a65bd24b1e66904a712
cf51bb5134c842fdaa904783225e631b454f1309
7101 F20101203_AACJRD gallagher_d_Page_071thm.jpg
3bd8bb823a63c68f61e8ecec44ed7fa8
ace5c82184afe2194df31d8e431225cab5029bb6
49987 F20101203_AACHKG gallagher_d_Page_088.pro
7285c95096dcca80b59ecc63ba0a55da
dfcb10d5eae731e5b2c3e1417e3d56a6901c8214
24635 F20101203_AACHXR gallagher_d_Page_248.QC.jpg
354277d99ed30f751e631610379b7705
13891cd21ce72ca0ce19cbc85ddd06d60fed62f3
72816 F20101203_AACIUK gallagher_d_Page_272.jpg
4a5e726b3c06df5a0b0c4b9823b0cb6b
18fd1c21da08b08258d4416bf37fafcf0c323607
25089 F20101203_AACJRE gallagher_d_Page_073.QC.jpg
0bb367943b3cffd378018dcd95bcb45c
9e68521d2e8fe664c50a105ddd27d9e0ceee0620
2162 F20101203_AACHKH gallagher_d_Page_054.txt
1e8c77ba9bb2d9c4ea00c52400f6ee82
49474ec9bca71ec541d4a0272644d2543d045119
F20101203_AACIHA gallagher_d_Page_124.tif
61674488201f02e66a217a5820503aeb
8cb5c21fcd73369d23ee73a85dadc7af354849ae
110965 F20101203_AACHXS gallagher_d_Page_259.jp2
35cde445ebdd6d383a9a7cef447d1253
f7d2bb1d6be13115c916689eeaa5f874f3df9406
77225 F20101203_AACIUL gallagher_d_Page_276.jpg
140e355a22f80f0d2ae7e32a45aa54fb
72d8a5267e251e5db379f4a16c2aa4b1e7ead98d
6998 F20101203_AACJRF gallagher_d_Page_073thm.jpg
603a38b4cc1fe1835477b1eba56235c0
102511d6db19b3ccec9e6758fe549c033f21e942
2217 F20101203_AACHKI gallagher_d_Page_274.txt
264495f1311f5e12d88168df657e5d90
bcd4ade0425a636838c537769870a9ecd144f98f
F20101203_AACIHB gallagher_d_Page_275.tif
e40689fe76b4d59d416ceb49bcecd4fa
7df1fbfde7be517723937ea41736a6c587ebfea3
110820 F20101203_AACHXT gallagher_d_Page_112.jp2
747f9516884d0c479bd2b939e509c1f4
9630985e72182d1103f53d05734a06e7c78447b4
76192 F20101203_AACIUM gallagher_d_Page_277.jpg
a95aafe81ae5b88e5be31fc4cb4f5b45
f618096efc1ff8e8a8b4bb74d078cc0e35875f4f
23736 F20101203_AACJRG gallagher_d_Page_075.QC.jpg
7b6c255fbf9f58fda1959d3726da6626
924039850aca92e502d2815421da2b9a9484ebd2
F20101203_AACHKJ gallagher_d_Page_247.tif
e54d27438b6d3758eb8271902256f6e6
16b7edf6547e430de63e8ed63d3db09bdeed09cf
84066 F20101203_AACIHC gallagher_d_Page_098.jpg
f768686c1bdadf953af48b39580ed078
b5e0d2817ad5d325948858bc962734ee525fa982
25174 F20101203_AACHXU gallagher_d_Page_174.QC.jpg
5397f0a8abf023f3ac242936737e4967
40f722e6f94cb3bdc7c310e438c9fa1f08a2a31f
77212 F20101203_AACIUN gallagher_d_Page_278.jpg
9ce4c1bd5745db3b44b1b1b696f7f637
e5d35a67a46b860b5391334f2fb30992d83338ff
24301 F20101203_AACJRH gallagher_d_Page_079.QC.jpg
83a28cae9e074affd88aebc83fabb530
dbb8bebe7c0f3a36ba49934b6054f82f4361d1fa
54607 F20101203_AACHKK gallagher_d_Page_261.pro
835429625173a70badfc8487d7a3878d
9d576fd328b79773af0b6540bfe2f83fa9a74ecd
62508 F20101203_AACIHD gallagher_d_Page_180.pro
6d282cc5810c952b13a4373ce94f5927
a3d9e82bf94144d499b87a135c5835d3a75dc93b
24126 F20101203_AACHXV gallagher_d_Page_192.QC.jpg
c08136b4d227f67574c4e9e24bbd6fbd
f631309aae4465099246159759da80bdf6d170b2
75317 F20101203_AACIUO gallagher_d_Page_280.jpg
e8ac816edea366082dd161d2aace19b8
562a988e3c3d34b1d3d968ecb33b4189c0b75017
6607 F20101203_AACJRI gallagher_d_Page_080thm.jpg
4acb5b357865f0f2bfec941013ce96dd
59ec4702a87663058d0689a0bd468a5fe17652e0
114855 F20101203_AACHKL gallagher_d_Page_184.jp2
19a864dbbb751cbbb64044769f01b5b2
7cb955949fd9c5932fbaf3b00e4d8b4b7fc0bbc3
2083 F20101203_AACIHE gallagher_d_Page_246.txt
a03257978c1c6a5cb2680c112848f9ba
8daf5f35f0317b8dd686f3bd93f11c3664c9fed6
52640 F20101203_AACHXW gallagher_d_Page_219.pro
eb39706b95ef4d6ef6a643500c993d13
f60b8b38905f5c7005eeda7d85a99096a577e8d8
74478 F20101203_AACIUP gallagher_d_Page_281.jpg
779c691745125fed5b5459a7909aecf8
032d81459f6539e92b90446b5c140fe7b6e2c309
28692 F20101203_AACJRJ gallagher_d_Page_081.QC.jpg
fb23c5758e731107bd7da05c33d89daf
4c0ce7ad88b2fa20023eca4a0592e7e807a9250c
F20101203_AACHKM gallagher_d_Page_111.txt
671fb376ff652dc03cbcecc92c2272cb
71539ef5b70669ca651becc0ec9f9e47771c591b
F20101203_AACIHF gallagher_d_Page_216.tif
cbd6aa2a9032b1ba9a8c76f6271f7b57
e79a1bfaf3be81139e6ffe21f471626e7fb34166
2685 F20101203_AACHXX gallagher_d_Page_081.txt
2c85cdb6c9d0a23f7d557e90eda700e2
7bda64c227fbfed44e0aced6bdd02037019fc58b
84483 F20101203_AACIUQ gallagher_d_Page_283.jpg
8eb613dab26b8be9285526e98761e7d8
e8f3806020990718d6e2a4458ebb526c27885812
7509 F20101203_AACJRK gallagher_d_Page_081thm.jpg
4dfacfc9084d125e437c7e2b46797307
71df844e21fb2bd8021bba363347a3bb400a43a7
6905 F20101203_AACIHG gallagher_d_Page_087thm.jpg
2b894a3ed250cd350f1485a2ecf1ed78
1973c74f9a0cf724beb6c9a232484121efaff5b6
7190 F20101203_AACHXY gallagher_d_Page_226thm.jpg
82cbb70adbbae047627f50ddc5a8f373
8db9633e17e9804d227a1e3865df7e8a662b0084
72966 F20101203_AACIUR gallagher_d_Page_284.jpg
4877981ec6ec570f1acff750d5c0e907
036cdd84ad21fe82488ff2984e1fca6280fb006b
25470 F20101203_AACJRL gallagher_d_Page_083.QC.jpg
f27035a83fbcc96c508c13173e08c49a
e17637a1c0ca61c3b4218dd32fbb58c1baf21a91
3229 F20101203_AACHKN gallagher_d_Page_004thm.jpg
b6669e3edd3f2970c3645c535a7e93d9
53b2b3ebf5e53578d2219b0b09fc169568b0eada
F20101203_AACIHH gallagher_d_Page_141.tif
3483c6451d78777903edb85d282c71e4
6a4ecd4ad6c7e37225da5128bdfcac9e80beb303
115484 F20101203_AACHXZ gallagher_d_Page_187.jp2
d6c66992c10d7fc5fcd5f82edd5076c8
dcef22fc0f5f20a0750c388260c9ab300b1c66d8
F20101203_AACJEA gallagher_d_Page_246.tif
afd729df94132eca1050407d5c33d520
3a006c7c76c4832c92ebc739e8cea929d9ee5bc6
25692 F20101203_AACIUS gallagher_d_Page_001.jp2
9ba22e5d3f7806f1ea7624daf7cd842d
d0f29f1bb0fe2907753c84298d7851e1c9d2ecd5
23822 F20101203_AACJRM gallagher_d_Page_084.QC.jpg
b354ce3697b40b971d5a8f20fc964a34
72ffea0b23ca513405c3695b5612c672aa4e97f9
6653 F20101203_AACHKO gallagher_d_Page_002.jp2
08d0ff70fa7b392e1bce00a6f8e5d602
3d7d303267096930a1677d23900538445d893dcb
104928 F20101203_AACIHI gallagher_d_Page_193.jp2
542871e3f96ef53df8722240edaeb62c
fcee3f69504811328a51953112e50fdab2889644
F20101203_AACJEB gallagher_d_Page_250.tif
0e87c312021a83e1c268dcd7aba67897
59f2dda793eae6e52d4f995385c031528a1c524a
40736 F20101203_AACIUT gallagher_d_Page_004.jp2
005050990bcccd6f2bfaae9f55158083
5958e32d97673441ae00316a7c065acbc981d3c7
6462 F20101203_AACJRN gallagher_d_Page_084thm.jpg
0a49abad0b46be771c0676d11941ce43
036394c3bef0554255d555e3027a5fa51ca83c31
2188 F20101203_AACHKP gallagher_d_Page_122.txt
9d6c13c4a2e9a089c3bc03803cfe997c
012e0457b269a7f3ce7a7b86402e89b94c97f748
F20101203_AACJEC gallagher_d_Page_258.tif
9cefd589f06dad2d8586d04d4112176c
810cd6dd679d63d8593a62893ced9ef379d2878b
90259 F20101203_AACIUU gallagher_d_Page_006.jp2
72a5b92d820f59d0adb6ac2dc6b176ec
066fcaa4cf6d68da643f4ad931c8a327ff7a307c
25269 F20101203_AACJRO gallagher_d_Page_085.QC.jpg
5a1a426d7cea48a8f62ee4e0f2413ac7
5a66bf48ae5ba878adffcf67681a6273f3d44cbd
71790 F20101203_AACHKQ gallagher_d_Page_282.jpg
81feb5602663e2f48b5f407b5cbe8210
42acad0adcdddfecbfd84c90baa266c33ef3c22c
F20101203_AACIHJ gallagher_d_Page_166.txt
3574179548e10af3f9a460796b30dc90
be2cc6a6622d6c737f9d6c5a3be69e904a0f76bf
F20101203_AACJED gallagher_d_Page_259.tif
f9fb5ae2585fc071e2292cabdd1388a3
588e355347dfec5c89b91ca15a2292fd4abb0277
45084 F20101203_AACIUV gallagher_d_Page_007.jp2
a1d0bc43a631aa2114f784311cc4ab77
44604acef946e774012f317b6fe86191f4e70a78
24585 F20101203_AACJRP gallagher_d_Page_086.QC.jpg
aea2f5832d406be2c73350f9fc42c810
2ad2f036df24b6a10ee53e3d8568d92f29ccc4e7
112765 F20101203_AACHKR gallagher_d_Page_109.jp2
1a5078a93f463f1a5a847d88cbed8e7a
e8125feb5f394b97f395d071cc43950ff101e33e
26106 F20101203_AACIHK gallagher_d_Page_082.QC.jpg
d81382aabef9a99d989859a389ed0126
a91d8ff3af5ae4b5e70199acc0ebea2468698916
F20101203_AACJEE gallagher_d_Page_261.tif
a1ab742c10893b49281d99303290171d
9949fca732b29912d54c2e733ef917b1a59c431e
F20101203_AACJRQ gallagher_d_Page_086thm.jpg
d1cc91fee504693640397bc9d8c20e43
20ee8367136871b98c2faf5e63f81e3abce62ece
54606 F20101203_AACHKS gallagher_d_Page_156.pro
7850c8878240ac706f39a67de6c15dab
ddfd93c93b2f70c417ac08e3ef2d1fb1e0f0e40e
53454 F20101203_AACIHL gallagher_d_Page_059.pro
d2644fd9934697727d6ac9c21639355b
efc5eb3b5f9a4fd68711cef740624ca4468ef9c9
116433 F20101203_AACIUW gallagher_d_Page_012.jp2
d7511325b6ee469ef48bd80b345a1864
aafccf2600d02249019b423a13dc4e7c3f26dba7
24392 F20101203_AACJRR gallagher_d_Page_088.QC.jpg
61c0af4979cdf0270c9bc8bdd094a563
6a8ac765d9ff86263b1d48298eb76744c79b65fa
113720 F20101203_AACHKT gallagher_d_Page_136.jp2
ef5711cb847d627cf247aecb09b6deec
32e58ddddfde8bd6f6496061dafb733674d1532e
7290 F20101203_AACIHM gallagher_d_Page_176thm.jpg
818d3d1ccc32129b951e4d4fad42a724
195386774d4c5539aa1e001147aea29779a85ca7
F20101203_AACJEF gallagher_d_Page_263.tif
abd0570923dacc5d2135bfbf6eeda300
162aaa664573e1d6db5ca3aa51122717aa51bbc8
117958 F20101203_AACIUX gallagher_d_Page_013.jp2
e21bd23e32ae4f4a244dbfa7aa8e8ac9
362fd3cdb114e7e6455d0d5d4a83d43db22e35c3
2056 F20101203_AACHKU gallagher_d_Page_205.txt
3f25a5bf462b6d8e5eb2f3bd8a5ca349
c110934a06f739ef2a3119f585abd5792f409941
54860 F20101203_AACIHN gallagher_d_Page_040.pro
5cf365b349ad8bb4256e050ab83d7f1a
0f4c28664ea344922a14286fd6b999c0c17b73ba
F20101203_AACJEG gallagher_d_Page_264.tif
40b798667853e7c9912a8866d416b3a0
407ddb26712e1add469784c073074b673b5fb255
121591 F20101203_AACIUY gallagher_d_Page_015.jp2
078a486bcb30920c25537294565ac056
64d08457489f36ccf1b695c8a829e8d3f37a232e
6742 F20101203_AACJRS gallagher_d_Page_088thm.jpg
b7e811f7a7aee1853fb428a25ebf1d56
353d96622a0b2de7099ffa1d45d591aefd47c4c0
7289 F20101203_AACHKV gallagher_d_Page_132thm.jpg
863c0b1f5fa32a65f85bb54bd4565677
4c3a6bd41d69d6b78fbf749707056aa598bd8f75
26354 F20101203_AACIHO gallagher_d_Page_090.QC.jpg
45f73b352d8f8ef10e644ae17d13c826
85f61bf7aaf737ca4e054211c743f5d760f4e737
F20101203_AACJEH gallagher_d_Page_265.tif
b81835a6231f550f72bda578cbf6552f
41d20bba1b7b8c35b8a7e8f944272a4b9384aa4b
113279 F20101203_AACIUZ gallagher_d_Page_016.jp2
002d63cbb55996825eb8d6dc59951eda
82b8c93d8bc49f4b164dd9795979aba1eb3c73f1
4328 F20101203_AACJRT gallagher_d_Page_089thm.jpg
12a29602798730444886098d8b3c35d4
9c5c861af4519fa08cb0b540c317664c38b805d6
F20101203_AACHKW gallagher_d_Page_026.txt
931f7b9c6b3e9f3d8542443e263c1f17
8c208edb915c681df2cb6a38c01cf7032b4c3597
26713 F20101203_AACIHP gallagher_d_Page_167.QC.jpg
f579ded8444f60282d9a60a47f9e1d75
f8e8ab9ebd81eb446daa051a33a9948a97f8988e
F20101203_AACJEI gallagher_d_Page_266.tif
4705d6043a44d3f541dcbbc1ef109a7a
9ddf91809b837d8917c40247e1a6f0d41e99bf03
7098 F20101203_AACJRU gallagher_d_Page_090thm.jpg
3c13ed6240d7ce4e5a13bcf1d424f55d
52f60cf2de5a3b9d3a85d426582409ae99aec64a
F20101203_AACHKX gallagher_d_Page_096.tif
b130d3cb6853c2c0546538bf8f2ec362
ff6dad47cce7e398f84e54eecdf99a5231ced752
110519 F20101203_AACIHQ gallagher_d_Page_045.jp2
2d8cda874e0fb2428105a1aec5e6be5d
35f6bd26cf5a8064e9a01d8db77232d665064c17
F20101203_AACJEJ gallagher_d_Page_271.tif
ccbc1fe97d44f106965d51a20689c4f0
727f426001216b6d61ca44de99d978ac15db6a94
7315 F20101203_AACJRV gallagher_d_Page_091thm.jpg
89d8213c312354120cfabd98161fe42d
876f563cf072946abf3dda55b27a50e272a96656
55617 F20101203_AACHKY gallagher_d_Page_176.pro
4e43b36a72cd40594ec7e4dd0ae51c90
00f4149f4c2206cbb58a3465dfb7af92816da0f1
6579 F20101203_AACIHR gallagher_d_Page_075thm.jpg
cad3fe492fb0bf9a0aec75d77cee6d0d
b553dc278340844385f114fdf4a73e9942c2feb3
F20101203_AACJEK gallagher_d_Page_272.tif
e445930768bee4dcc3d6caab6906bb89
4d1afb992084bea5ce0d8881e9a86b4dbb693910
F20101203_AACJRW gallagher_d_Page_093.QC.jpg
ae0fa87ba365d4d0ab713eab22185d73
7ce1b4086979c27d5e280fdce93b1e82fa6010f5
7073 F20101203_AACHKZ gallagher_d_Page_163thm.jpg
ebdc2828083876e27f5ae812687ef4e2
bcd43aa4cfc6cb2198b4e9a6a0d661bf8f708799
54035 F20101203_AACIHS gallagher_d_Page_028.pro
5b72044725e2dfa744c60825d0473222
d7228d6b432766b7aa7f41ea69ce2d081acfbb5a
F20101203_AACJEL gallagher_d_Page_278.tif
3a144ea48c91edd596f900c766c62bb6
23350d4a3d8937cef24d9999806a3d85bb9c78cc
7033 F20101203_AACJRX gallagher_d_Page_093thm.jpg
6762b1fc191f21a2df96b7a62e38190f
dc407328ae701c02463cfea4c6cdf3b03e0378bb
24453 F20101203_AACIHT gallagher_d_Page_074.QC.jpg
2cbeff3c336e156ac35fb6e71908b38d
ca42fd6ccd065b85b420ad6db50d4b6b92ce0b23
F20101203_AACJEM gallagher_d_Page_281.tif
c68bed095236da545b77a09800e99fcb
1f49be0e9dc57e54dcfd3ff48243c7e9243934b3
23502 F20101203_AACJRY gallagher_d_Page_094.QC.jpg
8476ae78f5b09a60fa24b9150a97762e
821348db599ea56bce0c308c84857a635c4a4a56
26748 F20101203_AACIHU gallagher_d_Page_098.QC.jpg
9249d3ca09262858c846945195284cf4
4a878c1d3cb7c4991673121fda4051a739b40cb2
F20101203_AACJEN gallagher_d_Page_286.tif
7554aba2e76a68933117c558b44de016
bd19795e8290dec85ecd516044786cc0ac5e1aa9
24331 F20101203_AACJRZ gallagher_d_Page_096.QC.jpg
8416e5f25f4cc82596bf82bbc943f22b
c2da04206d19911200aa613bcb96109f942af141
25684 F20101203_AACIHV gallagher_d_Page_028.QC.jpg
1bd0cf6ba4fb59973c1a881962eb2277
69bcf0a1e45361a06ad52e2adef453e43684595a
8598 F20101203_AACJEO gallagher_d_Page_001.pro
9ea6fcb7b5829df6c254c2cb8a90a3c4
a4224aef8041533a8077f0ec2193deacaf0acf3a
F20101203_AACIHW gallagher_d_Page_141.txt
c479f6c9c88ecd6021852fa4388a0544
e4aa9f9c24de4be120d6257a7cb3aceb74c3aced
1097 F20101203_AACJEP gallagher_d_Page_002.pro
599aae56c46ddf319707ee169bd8305f
3153a842170f3125ef4fe0e6d2da516cc4eb594e
F20101203_AACIHX gallagher_d_Page_204.tif
0b5ce4ac9023a11c4643fe62604b098b
b0326b57c2e054416f8442ba5edade18b0f5621a
1355 F20101203_AACJEQ gallagher_d_Page_003.pro
75250612dcd3b021780507ba87cf21b0
0692580ff5375755c6f70114311097817c7c7587
110943 F20101203_AACIHY gallagher_d_Page_234.jp2
b7bf236b84ba4fc3d4eeb61e68f3786c
5f6e93158c26a741b9b4a8821ea2b116bc20254e
17569 F20101203_AACJER gallagher_d_Page_004.pro
e79e9a0bc3207d8267c5ef9ea74543a1
b92b4228e44816eff2450aa43f63441ddf6401ae
F20101203_AACIHZ gallagher_d_Page_135.txt
4c007e0d6d4c22e4e1c2e693da118078
0dd6b39c07c91045d8c1410a3baa2f6a841dbdb1
43001 F20101203_AACJES gallagher_d_Page_005.pro
8d368156bfca029d28da7cd108d2b3a2
00f344646524223986d4bafc5cb03c2ff11a2a22
41111 F20101203_AACJET gallagher_d_Page_006.pro
12cdb67b388354f9bd53b81c126b5247
a8f407ff3683317fd09446b1635ef789d7b02cfa
115637 F20101203_AACHQA gallagher_d_Page_105.jp2
913d090ba03f0fa20b4f91bc5b9392f4
71b83b6cdf6d5843d090abfe32507ccaa4ce6472
55329 F20101203_AACJEU gallagher_d_Page_008.pro
23d2689e0965df97c16d899e0985e495
552b1cedcf184d97eeeeac553849341c435f11a9
48892 F20101203_AACHQB gallagher_d_Page_075.pro
91fbb0b02a2f0f93562360f3fa405113
52d140012ea95976df72dc05cab1c809bb461ffd
53647 F20101203_AACJEV gallagher_d_Page_012.pro
27635d28437ba38b2b149fbeb4d69884
6522040b6f64d1227242f12254807477c2b25617
F20101203_AACHQC gallagher_d_Page_030.tif
190c142d45b938c84b9201e6613291a3
632cf8734f499564d5c7d4f9de689130fa9e3587
55457 F20101203_AACJEW gallagher_d_Page_013.pro
cbb3140cfe2b40ed62e8167e304cdc6e
e9d4fc8f1f41c410e307f089e224459a3a3d5960
6972 F20101203_AACJXA gallagher_d_Page_256thm.jpg
98542b44909238d3aad4b434d06df9d4
3473930a2b15e47fd68dd47d8848d5b794b11ebf
117674 F20101203_AACHQD gallagher_d_Page_068.jp2
9a77a726ef092571fcd4e747ec831d78
c0ee694caf261c0d11442f539e8f160f4a15a2f9
51781 F20101203_AACJEX gallagher_d_Page_017.pro
a10c266fcf3ff5c84f2cd3250fe0a13d
a41b4b61a553c3949bd8a1018506e920ba2c35e0
25979 F20101203_AACJXB gallagher_d_Page_257.QC.jpg
cdcfe0d9641b76585f9994e85ab9438d
054958c6b0a7047ac4f1f33bb9a51a000f6b8271
F20101203_AACHQE gallagher_d_Page_036.txt
1b4d6aeb945be569801c4da875258dbe
e8d52af8541469696905dc8efd8cc45f8dc7dcd4
57265 F20101203_AACJEY gallagher_d_Page_020.pro
4d51c154da49d9d37903cd917603472c
a8db71331c31f4b6e22e51ef545a19dca26de5a1
F20101203_AACJXC gallagher_d_Page_258thm.jpg
cf6beb94886d65ba21204da2d6479b64
ba55a7ab7fb12ed55dd9985a33343f7fb3809ccc
F20101203_AACHQF gallagher_d_Page_094.tif
e79adbf443a75de2c9b38ed229119c53
4748fbf11992cc4dbac15330101993c1392be696
55245 F20101203_AACJEZ gallagher_d_Page_022.pro
73a014b8b48b0d8d3ba226346f3a39c7
f4de0f675a49518b4c07b9d89cf5a22934a9f800
F20101203_AACJXD gallagher_d_Page_260thm.jpg
54dd944b804bb959ce15cbae8aa0eab5
aa7339bec413aab4f12d7931fccddd68789b24b3
70534 F20101203_AACHQG gallagher_d_Page_075.jpg
0d5e2f4c1d9f04f07fd5ac5917808afa
e8497039a402224210b024db138abc1356f6177d
25894 F20101203_AACJXE gallagher_d_Page_261.QC.jpg
543f4480938597c33d99c46c01298bda
95e910958a801d17ba85b95c56f861f6569740a3
24682 F20101203_AACHQH gallagher_d_Page_034.QC.jpg
afe6d395e15df1aa4b32c8044d1f4a62
037fa56436d463f4bea0f8fba4baab5af40434c8
F20101203_AACINA gallagher_d_Page_276.tif
6d679686949b4f2d0245d1515c6243a0
4291841281ecd4a1f5bd0a7c3e8d5c8c5b4cdc0a
7017 F20101203_AACJXF gallagher_d_Page_261thm.jpg
bd671e69714fb09d83b7ef93f2c50a5a
4e8cd54118914d044914d6774c40fa8c50b21e6a
25604 F20101203_AACHQI gallagher_d_Page_230.QC.jpg
3345b4d0559c56b34b09ab5584566be3
0bd8c2e5750f59e879554b2944e13fc10b4c5270
F20101203_AACINB gallagher_d_Page_277.jp2
d4a459ccbf739c1a02225be675a7b06d
82a51d5948623b9b2191fc969a116b2f742877f0
25334 F20101203_AACJXG gallagher_d_Page_264.QC.jpg
ed1930794f8ffe842c2a9c4a6d7cc03c
34f260267b6e4f324ebdb346044c8d81565146fd
F20101203_AACHQJ gallagher_d_Page_233.tif
5fb20b4cffdfde48949d121fe4ec99f7
9098f11e89c57fcc8da4acdee5afa9f890d13780
F20101203_AACINC gallagher_d_Page_176.tif
c4774a3ab9036956c77e4d982e0d7fee
19586867dccc29db13daa74852be3b7ed7b9ab2e
26434 F20101203_AACJXH gallagher_d_Page_265.QC.jpg
876b06ce1735db474bbfc73aec0bab67
fac236a77528a71cb435dbea1b7a32d5b69a096f
25800 F20101203_AACHQK gallagher_d_Page_178.QC.jpg
406cce29ddeefdd1c2efbbe05465f7aa
43ff2b6defb9660835d1fcfb63db33dd3a9af027
25208 F20101203_AACIND gallagher_d_Page_207.QC.jpg
e53c0822cb6e12d858097282be3c17b6
167d0077a2b75a0021cbccd2bd9747883403b032
7225 F20101203_AACJXI gallagher_d_Page_265thm.jpg
b7acc57c5f2d107b5568366f1f6c8bb4
4891768bf828d5dfa8ccbd00ac71cf7174bc6222
4491 F20101203_AACHQL gallagher_d_Page_211thm.jpg
87dd2e47c4c4055d0c67b4ff23452825
e8241d4f8f1692e2e094adaadb945957e573cb49
70956 F20101203_AACINE gallagher_d_Page_186.jpg
073b0d9ac295c9dfade5739dc128ec91
db8dd4371947ad730b91d7213c90d7ee15da7621
78682 F20101203_AACHDA gallagher_d_Page_132.jpg
84502c6e3270ef8b5c1835b51e2201c8
09fc71486296e431ad22eb0fdb7e58d51b65874d
7228 F20101203_AACJXJ gallagher_d_Page_266thm.jpg
a3927aa82d4f460df8e385cddd55f71f
f4a6b4b52c4a42f8d06203dac202ffbc7d348b53
80527 F20101203_AACHQM gallagher_d_Page_266.jpg
2cb55f8fa449b01110433e3d71790432
f7aa661c15caf82f64abd56808f81fa6289a821a
F20101203_AACINF gallagher_d_Page_041.tif
3b5a7d1ae1e00e8fcf98dfe9dd5660ae
56c03d48d1f6c9c6e1a052466e9754d6fd2b81df
6769 F20101203_AACHDB gallagher_d_Page_281thm.jpg
d1dc532d45f36e16210eb7bfa7ec5cbd
bdae2cde1fc9b20bcf92c0b73f7cde867a47363d
24831 F20101203_AACJXK gallagher_d_Page_267.QC.jpg
bfc0b9747e6e9e7366f87b86f66774d0
f7ba1f6511037361f90244ea1ad8e4a7b2351c8c
F20101203_AACHQN gallagher_d_Page_114.txt
0b89e586c5cb4961976976becbf27a10
5713e20433af2e3700938f716977eda02db4c7ec
78330 F20101203_AACING gallagher_d_Page_279.jpg
634646c7156cd854ca1f08c20a9653a2
77bbd588fb9158d64f14c885cb21ec4ff0d2b777
118494 F20101203_AACHDC gallagher_d_Page_279.jp2
6e45a8c2f8de2aa4c8b3e6a0210875e7
9ed8512011f80d2a6956a6375b017eee6cb33a64
25156 F20101203_AACJXL gallagher_d_Page_268.QC.jpg
2174ce558f531bfa6f6289ddee905744
a733b283719da708c4570c0db9994de87d50bb16
77111 F20101203_AACHQO gallagher_d_Page_216.jpg
f92ac7e94e6d75e35b48935a8f216ea7
b9e5a1a17585422bd7560883d1ef0b7a063f4b1c
77850 F20101203_AACINH gallagher_d_Page_126.jpg
9dab757ae2701e38c7aec98ada082c19
45d91fdfdf5e3d6b4a1b61eb5c25f2e704619951
2155 F20101203_AACJKA gallagher_d_Page_040.txt
34ade81d37c9061d5cebe81ba5f5d259
b1d70407129660dfdb5dfacd126e5d96094e961f
105804 F20101203_AACHDD gallagher_d_Page_070.jp2
a859a6402e9c95f74c3bc83299348da5
11c7da7b890c03892b6bbac02c5c1bbec3136b19
6840 F20101203_AACJXM gallagher_d_Page_268thm.jpg
6a1389c15524c6f3586a4fa6be58a04b
7a49f34a6bb2bc73a682183029592539dcc794ca
55255 F20101203_AACHQP gallagher_d_Page_279.pro
82fc5dd4cfd09e58b48defcdddde3320
31e5322b1b00d7b8a5ea43f0d4785928754812b8
121281 F20101203_AACINI gallagher_d_Page_014.jp2
efa7c876e92952bdaa3f81298d57b552
58cd53d3c3628c98e35f670a3bb2a156c52295c1
F20101203_AACJKB gallagher_d_Page_042.txt
3ac2e9b477c475de4a9472ae1b959c7a
dd09d98bf3ebdc9e1a37a1391dea31c9e09651c8
111043 F20101203_AACHDE gallagher_d_Page_104.jp2
5036372ed923a4668596a399b45a4420
a939387dba28cd41712d06b53fab645e9dc54176
24297 F20101203_AACJXN gallagher_d_Page_269.QC.jpg
149ae115ac7f59a4b477cec29ff65ce0
7bee8ca2e904d2792b9db61b3a1a5311adfa248d
109497 F20101203_AACINJ gallagher_d_Page_241.jp2
e3befbf419055fdfad1f08339742f78a
b4fec89ec4d1bae0a309ea78a88905cf26d070fc
2178 F20101203_AACJKC gallagher_d_Page_043.txt
16de58716a683cd8a396be3573b38052
6fed2f390404848db5c18f0c9765cee46feb8dee
F20101203_AACHDF gallagher_d_Page_115.tif
e42354a0814363323af561496b85d6d7
165c732092d7f27941011a29964bac6f4d5012d3
F20101203_AACHQQ gallagher_d_Page_031.tif
c64ba9d27d4bc3167fa618e11aac5f78
a609f0a58ae08c6566400d5f66063e619189d668
6833 F20101203_AACJXO gallagher_d_Page_269thm.jpg
0afb028960c5522fc80bc11e2bf65203
2b5bf2b8a3f62738244ef3a18f51f226d9f1c98e
52485 F20101203_AACINK gallagher_d_Page_250.pro
bc0b32af3dccaa052d0f8e6a84977bdf
a4df17951c463c667b31dda39c3efc297d770c14
2016 F20101203_AACJKD gallagher_d_Page_045.txt
3ff701fe6da81d7da4afd08c82517bf6
92d130110d800372bd78b76f8d270a771f97c1a2
F20101203_AACHQR gallagher_d_Page_142.tif
955884f13d89cd0e959003e4d553523a
510114a64863f0a34ae01ccbadb8190911361837
25755 F20101203_AACJXP gallagher_d_Page_270.QC.jpg
f584d9ab5a3878b35b0700105395d042
e879fce87e2024a8e62a867a40c507974b76552c
F20101203_AACINL gallagher_d_Page_205.tif
9e921587d54fd5dfecb466cbd31d8d38
c62486d6c5303eaccea247cb1730f232165ee140
F20101203_AACJKE gallagher_d_Page_046.txt
84111b252f98a8fbf5e2de66d52f0344
167db922808dbce3f0ae253c4a5818dc1500b0dd
71415 F20101203_AACHDG gallagher_d_Page_171.jpg
76f7d00a6b66f614aa315f954054ea95
1cec1511faf45ca3cbeabd619ae090d8873f70b4
6125 F20101203_AACIAA gallagher_d_Page_003.jp2
2b720aef380da974f935e01539f9b764
1fd92aa9d91f10e626a193452cc0289676c8ba98
112508 F20101203_AACHQS gallagher_d_Page_281.jp2
a09b9fe0ae6e66c3fbabfec557d2633d
6d1dad2d8095c6cdd05e59ef1118dd4ad09519a2
6993 F20101203_AACJXQ gallagher_d_Page_271thm.jpg
912792166e6cd3f527b6d5144f431a05
42771ddd1604fb52c4f63313af7454720f4b9cce
2209 F20101203_AACINM gallagher_d_Page_015.txt
72a0364a9ab1923f3aabef7378926e25
25a320171eb243a2445ea55e1e41c998ec31a6ad
F20101203_AACJKF gallagher_d_Page_047.txt
6153122eb4439fef17cdd42caaedd0b0
11a24d9c26d977e940ec043638fc278c693a0f19
F20101203_AACHDH gallagher_d_Page_165.tif
e04bb26ffeaf0c9b88489e98612803e7
38a3aecbbd5895d9e393e819485080f131c9e6ea
F20101203_AACIAB gallagher_d_Page_231.tif
a0cff80ac0dd0a20f66d78be55ecdc9b
5eedf5dd24b74e54e85838527ada023204bdeef8
23872 F20101203_AACJXR gallagher_d_Page_273.QC.jpg
074091650ec005c8604ccc3c00710c8d
55a8dc09628858fe829510df0b67c332cc5aef5d
112141 F20101203_AACINN gallagher_d_Page_161.jp2
9ce774b483dff00fc992edc1fec1256c
d84300eb8618d58a1b5b39f166218120a8b5c725
516 F20101203_AACJKG gallagher_d_Page_048.txt
616b7f132fec083ffc371b7ae1a7c646
6d754314ab9801feda020d2545d33c34e5372a3c
F20101203_AACHDI gallagher_d_Page_231thm.jpg
f59fb5eb5b2fce0ce572c545bb224379
b943682431eaae736c0896eca8037499187085ad
24260 F20101203_AACHQT gallagher_d_Page_010.QC.jpg
0917e02347ec9cdf7e9075b19b9f6aad
eed6ad02fadcbf137b2dd3b793f402bd9e94ccb4
25792 F20101203_AACJXS gallagher_d_Page_276.QC.jpg
8a5010d5216eb2cc9b691afd797ba016
86bc1bf378c107bac63945087233c1b47ee4f5de
83045 F20101203_AACINO gallagher_d_Page_139.jpg
30fce3fbaa2b3edf7b6cd0d30241ee24
9c89ea2b64b3d774748cc9d0c928c3a3cc4e56e1
F20101203_AACJKH gallagher_d_Page_049.txt
d5d8208918027bf2c3b51b803e5f98aa
38f01ad388a4a75d69136cea2dcbac9433bd0b10
22539 F20101203_AACHDJ gallagher_d_Page_238.QC.jpg
0dc68426bd29e143846bcfab147b68af
dbfa6dabae659828a528491c4d73c6efc13a119d
77941 F20101203_AACIAC gallagher_d_Page_065.jpg
7d7085e437cc3e3891e3e6bd6536d542
594cdaab55d2b63dee29f4fe5bca7b57c66ba60b
7293 F20101203_AACHQU gallagher_d_Page_154thm.jpg
ac36ab906cc43d0a197705b23c640faf
103d5d410c11b331f3c78a0a0cb1f58cdf70b694
F20101203_AACJXT gallagher_d_Page_276thm.jpg
a7761171630d1c519a366b5f8c3ef6de
365ad4a400fd300450dd37f58dee917794396a93
2082 F20101203_AACJKI gallagher_d_Page_052.txt
ce7016802702482065a6401ae50b642b
9a980f7c96eb254e65bb5b91e8ca70bee284f4d2
F20101203_AACHDK gallagher_d_Page_188.txt
fbfb8b582d49a1d3487ce6f241968c60
eff84fa466571332b89bd9b9ff355727f51aedf9
6222 F20101203_AACIAD gallagher_d_Page_121thm.jpg
109d3aed767e55ea169377b61b0bab64
2c322ae89c68cd7d57fd53661740c02e9088b955
116558 F20101203_AACHQV gallagher_d_Page_169.jp2
781544ad7e9c8858ed54155c500e0561
c10b5c4d7ce7a4e87f42635d955d50d2f27c2fd0
F20101203_AACJXU gallagher_d_Page_277.QC.jpg
75410fec84db3862a8a84cdbe0fbb70e
b724d6087aff88f86283a478c34beab4a64e0048
78082 F20101203_AACINP gallagher_d_Page_008.jpg
d94ab41c03cd7799f8d8609cb9fdc830
caee9a8ea453a1d9b41608c9d26ed3836259ce2e
F20101203_AACJKJ gallagher_d_Page_053.txt
97015443dbb161fa4968db317f8cb996
5a6f9ec37603c3e0e5e4c382722a859c3ab121e3
2076 F20101203_AACHDL gallagher_d_Page_039.txt
ebd3cda2fd3b0d1aaa60bfddceb1ad7f
83331bb9241faadd359620975e6b7a880dfbd3c0
73981 F20101203_AACIAE gallagher_d_Page_141.jpg
126e45c1f642677839b857f19a579837
4a768ef44c2eacc131e3f4175ecc1af78e379bf3
F20101203_AACHQW gallagher_d_Page_014.tif
c27e0d203880e2816657b4b7b2b253b7
b4cabc81a58e965793519c2bfed84c37c4a62972
6935 F20101203_AACJXV gallagher_d_Page_278thm.jpg
d5a1e98a2052010b207e511c539e5753
7afbc211b532d03361152b1ffb7b319a134e24cd
6631 F20101203_AACINQ gallagher_d_Page_008thm.jpg
8236f326416cbfdef72a0bb078903ee1
91f799eb5ef8bd15e468e859d112a00e30e57f01
F20101203_AACJKK gallagher_d_Page_055.txt
4644ccd25b137128043ed0af451a4e0d
574cc4a6da7ac7aac1e6752de5a03faef48d2aa7
F20101203_AACHDM gallagher_d_Page_022thm.jpg
c6da378cf5c0e4c1b79ae8b5b9153f60
010586703fdda5504dd3d92d2ef82fadcfbc9de1
56972 F20101203_AACIAF gallagher_d_Page_128.pro
1872760c92edb2e7c3a159173b20e01a
7039a4ebce21ecc8d97ecf177342b94619ef5c04
7143 F20101203_AACHQX gallagher_d_Page_244thm.jpg
e84e88ea54be1a430e5e2efee0f110bd
b5b0e8ec35305db8f49f5a078130e743b54036ef
25719 F20101203_AACJXW gallagher_d_Page_279.QC.jpg
84e1561edcddad4feef644b83fe2c103
615b625865b70c78f3b931792b460c37424bb5dd
F20101203_AACINR gallagher_d_Page_153.tif
190add361cb7b44daea2db1569019413
a59291ee7d76fac30387f34aec998c66a27b681f
F20101203_AACHDN gallagher_d_Page_200.txt
e740ba83f05861c1783b8c81eb0c9645
6792603f9e61e54d915d499b242964b8dbcb51d7
55702 F20101203_AACIAG gallagher_d_Page_231.pro
cb15ee182ac291e31f872a71e57a9e87
a2a3510905b2bba5aec0a9b627e7dde539735c5c
24945 F20101203_AACHQY gallagher_d_Page_105.QC.jpg
2e2673f243581d25a9dfb6d8062c4cae
e9523485bbade755d43e622df8d07dcd739a2627
24357 F20101203_AACJXX gallagher_d_Page_281.QC.jpg
8f9d30be6d26549bfc501b91abdb9d7f
a67babea732a2ad4507e4553012bbdeb72d37a69
6698 F20101203_AACINS gallagher_d_Page_112thm.jpg
9bf13c25ef6756b72b4bb73a4bbb4864
3e3e6a1949e33fc35013b8fd6b502bf14749c5c6
F20101203_AACJKL gallagher_d_Page_058.txt
af386bd622261f0c92f5a81db960b15e
8d815ec480f12bfcf9d573d14a8ca4d49f18a3d0
79497 F20101203_AACHDO gallagher_d_Page_024.jpg
c0294d155a00847feecd30f450f1b074
6e72eba845cd1e914c22b45747878ed56106f926
2233 F20101203_AACIAH gallagher_d_Page_167.txt
2a560f46e00dd01017ff300e6b31c5e6
ed5acbb8f67e15efbd1456c855410e34c237ee02
78097 F20101203_AACHQZ gallagher_d_Page_118.jpg
c8c59b92c111d656f089b9e0ad66ac02
0c9609998ef5f752b9a4cd43c1a9346471ccd014
F20101203_AACINT gallagher_d_Page_210.tif
a894442246d3c0e20551ec976d7a0fa9
13b8a4591c36f5c4c9286bc9cc2989f9e6017523
2102 F20101203_AACJKM gallagher_d_Page_059.txt
d212a484cdc5ffd78c274729585197e9
db5f8e8ad01d1028962a26f7c1b3e24a7c5a7f90
F20101203_AACHDP gallagher_d_Page_063.txt
b2f98c1d478d77db2ea14235f8e4d5bd
b3d95878387a4b23a6dd64b6d780dfb46356e5f3
6930 F20101203_AACIAI gallagher_d_Page_036thm.jpg
066253bf7bbde3bafbee992bd2fa3859
1793d47db3c5ccb792d037b2f573d6a0de1c1293
6641 F20101203_AACJXY gallagher_d_Page_283thm.jpg
5383304a0e6038890b02de1f55ec03ae
dc8179a91d69d584c2e86d9bf053fb574c6e129a
6822 F20101203_AACINU gallagher_d_Page_103thm.jpg
6294432b26064acf2d949c9b457313e3
504d5a65bae6064533bf1a46f09d1478d97ef1eb
F20101203_AACJKN gallagher_d_Page_061.txt
944eb60215badfc92aa374934004a580
b394d356eba716b3c7fda16d9c961bd6656d66f7
121683 F20101203_AACGZA gallagher_d_Page_050.jp2
1899df0cf404457061d31e274485717d
41534cf8074bfd5e139ed9ae3a815d7233d5e686
24733 F20101203_AACHDQ gallagher_d_Page_262.QC.jpg
4c00242535b74664768c017aeaf0510f
1fcbc38123d81c9d33f846e368b7ea3a13bad63b
F20101203_AACIAJ gallagher_d_Page_239.tif
077cfde82baa042a7d056123241808b9
b884e35dd0262b71e29fc47ed032a1db4b1b1138
22230 F20101203_AACJXZ gallagher_d_Page_284.QC.jpg
ee15111cf4f2c38ab63b9972740a4890
377bb47e7cf7b64e9b8732599669f42b871e28b5
53498 F20101203_AACINV gallagher_d_Page_061.pro
bb9764403b96715d7673847540862c09
91059f76dd254573ab2ea870d53240643c5474f9
2176 F20101203_AACJKO gallagher_d_Page_062.txt
0a4cf871429e135a84123af9de588e0e
086b7a06c8a0c33e7980d93af593ede01ab0d0eb
7318 F20101203_AACGZB gallagher_d_Page_247thm.jpg
6e130c05e3dd6da13d52535a9ad03ae0
a87c8c757f1770c78c52de684d74978a9cf62aef
F20101203_AACHDR gallagher_d_Page_008.txt
180fb4f2df1b3e6336be6a3f817214e5
d9c120a72288a76d8423779bd3f8f7cc786e16b7
76245 F20101203_AACIAK gallagher_d_Page_191.jpg
254544a197dad3436e4203bd573d2a88
02a3ff5f455f36e81502e3004db1662a4d6fff69
F20101203_AACINW gallagher_d_Page_115.txt
00b11dabe45be17652f047bd3e9585f0
6f2079e1ed3e3777585c56fd47e31cae8a3faa05
F20101203_AACJKP gallagher_d_Page_065.txt
a0fa1b3a82e6f9bfe9d59933f3a03c25
cf3ecb9969af9d647e0442ba644157cbe1bea8ca
48883 F20101203_AACGZC gallagher_d_Page_084.pro
584140652aa697041b200e031271efcd
b0e56c1e2faa82fb8ad51a57203233db69f63188
F20101203_AACHDS gallagher_d_Page_147.pro
11234208b4e66edfa275ab491d1263b2
25eaa70dc17c11e39dcfcc1f156ab574a5e63b44
F20101203_AACIAL gallagher_d_Page_065.tif
ab0638932e414174e7e581418043e5a7
39ac6030c21e758ce7b81eee948440d9b531aaf0
25264 F20101203_AACINX gallagher_d_Page_278.QC.jpg
4375e62539af4bf16790a82e21464955
ae7c640fd57ae298a58467f41d80b3f0f21f0086
1949 F20101203_AACJKQ gallagher_d_Page_070.txt
94cfc98cb8b97fe725738cf288f4fd10
b30e1880766a69a57195a98b51a4890def8dfa23
78555 F20101203_AACGZD gallagher_d_Page_134.jpg
b8a775942b687612b73d3b2cde3f61f7
0014f7ddd7a5de58a8f57565837205d1984a7192
F20101203_AACHDT gallagher_d_Page_088.tif
981fff85a4f5dfe61123c8133b9c2201
18c3957b91d91a5d44736ea71bce8edbfc4c3629
75677 F20101203_AACIAM gallagher_d_Page_148.jpg
c741a63fc3158e13441e40f317ab3269
963187c6bffe71a02e06791310fbeaf114266a18
120594 F20101203_AACINY gallagher_d_Page_213.jp2
27c25849a136e9e5546b6847e950b5d3
a18901ec6bb21395624366758c1cfb55d0158714
F20101203_AACJKR gallagher_d_Page_072.txt
447484b4c4ce295adc96a5b87d20adf2
563d9bea6c9a28a74a64f3c56aca90f07742e5cf
53708 F20101203_AACGZE gallagher_d_Page_206.pro
a1c14b574004afa17342f958bdde433c
d405dbdbc7416dea89835dd722cc2c2eca4dfeb0
77726 F20101203_AACHDU gallagher_d_Page_026.jpg
ce37ca52fd4f21dcbb1d1dd72d79fb4b
c555d2b9f901cf5351cbb4a499e0b5346b2a1440
F20101203_AACIAN gallagher_d_Page_184.tif
15dd85e87ac23f57767dc44420b53f3f
500c1a3e583cc1b32650988953543c5bf74abf0d
F20101203_AACINZ gallagher_d_Page_051.tif
bad810674b439f04f622f80bc7bff194
973cc72fb23ea8faf991d343e51ddf2003cd527a
F20101203_AACJKS gallagher_d_Page_075.txt
14650ee9604f89f9e750448e86b06085
3fde5163cf45255891b5efd94bd67327bcb9425d
1998 F20101203_AACGZF gallagher_d_Page_239.txt
bc569e3b68a849965e2f7a5c9700349f
6b7ceaf4c7eb05f2a7b0a0b89acc53764dd18e96
2153 F20101203_AACHDV gallagher_d_Page_056.txt
e8cf6faca5ac52161e504558fc9a3acb
1fb6bfcd314019a6cd940f3341a52a3ed31ef722
24483 F20101203_AACIAO gallagher_d_Page_114.QC.jpg
ddd5396b4a970d16ae3e2a3e0bc2f7a9
bd3a7bd557088d3c3c6f5942d0cd908e7ce3767d
2157 F20101203_AACJKT gallagher_d_Page_078.txt
80383cced4a2eaa28c3ec3b11f715255
7aa425e8c177cc1bea44db54bde738a12c925a06
6795 F20101203_AACGZG gallagher_d_Page_214thm.jpg
6f0964b07a86faa551f5eb86e0936d86
0cc55fcd930ab7af2f01225336c6b81f6384e2a0
50913 F20101203_AACHDW gallagher_d_Page_236.pro
114e6e89133e8617fdbd3623e8623d19
275fdd5dadb3190df3437921ae9a9cb0871b6cca
115243 F20101203_AACIAP gallagher_d_Page_207.jp2
a7e71fe1bba5366d3a4374cb7b8c87bc
2d640d143053fd26de6d293dbfeea96b90f8b6ac
1959 F20101203_AACJKU gallagher_d_Page_079.txt
12c9a3beb03d856da96ec7bf5d33cbfe
58530cee2d33dbcce2db394676ffd6f0e6447e87
75034 F20101203_AACGZH gallagher_d_Page_037.jpg
98f1435844fe583ee937d7e1d7644b22
a5602cd8bc5ed989563c26a257d0bd6f0e2aed0b
117477 F20101203_AACHDX gallagher_d_Page_199.jp2
7ace4a9e3058bca215d691f91986b66d
1f073abd58b0e4679730028a138ae6a7a071b450
F20101203_AACHWA gallagher_d_Page_197.jpg
0bbb6a8ef9d7f8d299e43d63ed35c425
c0c2657bbdac409e8b65ab51af46910f48fcb9ad
52686 F20101203_AACIAQ gallagher_d_Page_166.pro
46133a11451c1945c754791cbb500ce5
fd6f3aec62d010ccd881fdffaddba09979e6071f
1982 F20101203_AACJKV gallagher_d_Page_080.txt
a759d2141f204df9835ccc6f84962c49
a6c0ecf7e3207f1446f5d7eaf436451a54f825d7
F20101203_AACGZI gallagher_d_Page_080.tif
4fb4699d75e99dbd86c7aee9e33c1c98
4a5e3b27a964a2245c8900a4dc6873d9057e1993
1900 F20101203_AACHDY gallagher_d_Page_225.txt
355fb3e2b6191c9f85e1ab6edfa3b454
fec276e02959b610f79c1bf5f0e2fe05cc3a50c0
7089 F20101203_AACHWB gallagher_d_Page_113thm.jpg
3768a2cf16c59f45e54cd43b46487c42
9b024f07da6c21a84861525df4dacf21fe75d9c8
F20101203_AACIAR gallagher_d_Page_094thm.jpg
2a463efbe52aa37476691d4c37b98ce4
d703f3bd80c3ae7db8dc0fa903943c56c845364d
1936 F20101203_AACJKW gallagher_d_Page_084.txt
e5fb73872548a896b4b9e405742b4b70
a4eff6423fceaad3fc16c5f284c30928909c40bc
54863 F20101203_AACGZJ gallagher_d_Page_026.pro
0fb6660ea1f2c97d40bba34e59264f26
c9beeb11b2ca2f0f1e64235a419d8aec7cbfb078
7240 F20101203_AACHDZ gallagher_d_Page_142thm.jpg
d45197fb33caef41aa0f3b0872a87aef
2dbf68f888b4257675742e5d5d9cd779419a29a6
F20101203_AACHWC gallagher_d_Page_063thm.jpg
27a45c5baf2d1691f4ad9b6c7024ab12
8c397ab11cdf087072f800ab463a920b81903197
582 F20101203_AACIAS gallagher_d_Page_286.txt
49fe6e624bb6a7d2a8186b70df5f4462
5b337a68d5703c157f17778affe13ebb17faa9ed
2023 F20101203_AACJKX gallagher_d_Page_086.txt
7bf22188f72b4d1ce588d7f5ba781f2b
23a70310cbd524952146b659cd39b79f45db239e
F20101203_AACGZK gallagher_d_Page_006.tif
ac7f95fa43486904658568592309a6a4
a7a45cc692ee7f5efbede718bf4819a06c0614f9
1222 F20101203_AACHWD gallagher_d_Page_211.txt
b9ddb494404581266bd8b64507e0602d
21e16c5704aa1408f40ba170aa4acf634d74e2e9
78154 F20101203_AACIAT gallagher_d_Page_231.jpg
851351b95c1d659fcf38ee5c9a8d04bc
ffef31decdcb6abf2124182d2dadbc647192b672
F20101203_AACJKY gallagher_d_Page_087.txt
4a47c4b106430ecc08f1ecaa705c58ec
fcddb4964382c711b35ea58ee9a4de090de876f6
117396 F20101203_AACGZL gallagher_d_Page_113.jp2
9029f8456282eca031477e59e95eded8
ef669d696c4c9903cbee1e268d197623c923e45f
52674 F20101203_AACHWE gallagher_d_Page_163.pro
ba6a7a5f2c7cf4f2e579793b30d531f6
ffe11ebc5645f959d46a9e2c19a91436ef2c642d
F20101203_AACIAU gallagher_d_Page_169.txt
33e26b1c81f531464248de974771181e
25382ff74d249b86c444be1eef198fbe12267fb2
2237 F20101203_AACJKZ gallagher_d_Page_090.txt
f6c8d784b07ea517f7d905d84690665e
6ac24544c6b850dfe8f04bb0971c9d1398c81ef5
F20101203_AACGZM gallagher_d_Page_012.txt
00f8b2f31f6a1c75f0553472c8977edc
50226cad666b09f02a1065397a5eb65779a55b36
F20101203_AACHWF gallagher_d_Page_036.tif
7eb84db694aeb0d52032f48624450bf4
bdd79e147a07e2a31eaf33b4b24044a48b76d539
54924 F20101203_AACIAV gallagher_d_Page_270.pro
25a889009d39807dc137b58afdd80655
de13800f1e492c323c499b93132e7204869f8d16
26442 F20101203_AACGZN gallagher_d_Page_076.QC.jpg
ce4b11f745d7b31fbdaab52181a1e51e
43aff01e720d2e9b01d121fe20f6bc13f4d28132
2201 F20101203_AACHWG gallagher_d_Page_222.txt
191d8029ad0c7f613162ea5f35fda8b3
0363ea97c90cc7cf11dec96999171b1b8b81ca6a
F20101203_AACIAW gallagher_d_Page_120.tif
15a6a1f3bcbcb8fbc66b6cbbb7f2f4b0
7ba99e21fd329e8c557a3614176ca51f17516536
74264 F20101203_AACITA gallagher_d_Page_182.jpg
d0c74ca69cd278008482ec3d10f1b6e5
78e416e0adfc6dbd8e20e84c49f0810e88aceeaf
F20101203_AACGZO gallagher_d_Page_166thm.jpg
92c3d12f1e32ca50b6ca14d29faa005d
dba0ff630574111a45e9d860473ad70b34debc81
23874 F20101203_AACHWH gallagher_d_Page_252.QC.jpg
715e7d2b9b058d11884402eeebe8379c
221e99029ea1729c581bc6b0ec6347080f00d50e
113339 F20101203_AACIAX gallagher_d_Page_158.jp2
4477d3c66db39f21f2448ccd2e7956d9
97ae6c0ee70b623a90322ddf5a292d3f1a4a24cb
80394 F20101203_AACITB gallagher_d_Page_183.jpg
138475cabce834e8958bb986f3112b8f
605bbced9608fabf4d9dafb79c16865043ab4e60
78830 F20101203_AACGZP gallagher_d_Page_056.jpg
b0e9036d0046c2405ebde3a66095361c
64f832c8dc58dd8779d38603e2f08e6eadd3395b
F20101203_AACHWI gallagher_d_Page_021.tif
8750d4790556dfa932ac0a02d8de6bc1
62faa18de01e78769dc47c9452b1646e3c558cda
F20101203_AACIAY gallagher_d_Page_257.tif
babea1ea58b9bf7e9420ee31aa7e7290
8999633c24cc167abd686e88de023c2492771762
70907 F20101203_AACITC gallagher_d_Page_192.jpg
3cddc5e7a3d793ffef09d21d3c8c5556
1b16bf5ab779afaf2d97083af8f5f76db27605c2
54395 F20101203_AACGZQ gallagher_d_Page_221.pro
740fdeddfaf7e57577ab5c7866ae892d
c7130fd6231c4d38570c6a05c60fb978a16e2308
25144 F20101203_AACHWJ gallagher_d_Page_092.QC.jpg
4c4ca2e49091875b7f04d7b55229a548
62579176ca7a8fd3dfc67b7c01e8544219d4406f
6996 F20101203_AACIAZ gallagher_d_Page_100thm.jpg
4904b6cb9abd72d8edc8d1b1f14e948d
3db91241f4a7266a052e8f710c76cbbf400c2ede
69669 F20101203_AACITD gallagher_d_Page_193.jpg
b4da362c1d45257cc9eece4480bca8e3
5db05358d5d32a3bd6482cdd4360a601802de53a
110667 F20101203_AACGZR gallagher_d_Page_129.jp2
22166caa40ade6cd1b94f2dc0540d5dc
3d693c04a04ab73fa56b0e49db056b7260119c5d
F20101203_AACHWK gallagher_d_Page_163.txt
20aa1fd09cc40f8179fee3ce7510ce39
db2e514e4357d0d965fdc8f8be55140429489b43
76821 F20101203_AACITE gallagher_d_Page_195.jpg
c42312cbb0c82f032b4a3584ab99e9c3
e29d8d28cf3056381788b47daf6ade14f43bef6a
78220 F20101203_AACHJA gallagher_d_Page_068.jpg
002e98b13fe1945e5ce021c2377d5203
723a0e7d7c7017c28380d37d581b7800ac056f77
F20101203_AACGZS gallagher_d_Page_262.tif
000d9748f2054bf8b0334f17df536cdc
7a0367f11b4b47c1652c3e864a9488b630680043
52317 F20101203_AACHWL gallagher_d_Page_109.pro
3610bdca2df4362e632de82a1d7e450d
2f8e6b6183307c7992abc918644a456b18db79b5
82616 F20101203_AACITF gallagher_d_Page_196.jpg
69708bd9803e19740f4cb0b7ab3320db
0eed184eda3dbb74a9858e7fcfe0a43bdeb216ec
25814 F20101203_AACHJB gallagher_d_Page_275.QC.jpg
81be6f1d0a0f0403766be5f89fe35237
450985e61f4eb121a6fe70772b55b37345efa9d3
F20101203_AACGZT gallagher_d_Page_104.txt
de3281b7a59a97f1a8586f89fc699dc9
45e8dc8b9c1e986e74c08b0c85a3ea10c782da68
5190 F20101203_AACHWM gallagher_d_Page_005thm.jpg
c52dddbdb16da8c5a455beee05cf08cf
a273c51717f0ec91e684532f50bf6d2fd8817ba2
82746 F20101203_AACITG gallagher_d_Page_198.jpg
ae5dc62869faccb88cd7f2155d0dd353
506b86df359ffba21fc926a3c54b896ddf85a07c
F20101203_AACHJC gallagher_d_Page_013.tif
8452f92556af6bbba0ee683574af1528
8a46fa4a98b1cf15a1528701f98da0a5655ffc49
F20101203_AACGZU gallagher_d_Page_129.txt
ba4af9febae437a06bf4e369b8667724
db5a8586200a72afb0a605c6906e1cfe12727261
70367 F20101203_AACHWN gallagher_d_Page_240.jpg
aa7996239eef81e7997cad32d68fcb4c
b4fd82fd8fe69530cc847be7b3220fb993fc6bc1
24232 F20101203_AACJQA gallagher_d_Page_046.QC.jpg
d6335371e895dd903e552021432967c2
043ae19a4a2238918d0ad3bfdb8453ccefeb3508
78207 F20101203_AACITH gallagher_d_Page_199.jpg
f42ba1f8aeeb90af3f9db7c86599c23e
9926800576faf9e96eda0031552de936d29035d5
52847 F20101203_AACHJD gallagher_d_Page_052.pro
ffd64fd84a0ae02201ad57c1b11efe18
0f61d5a7854bdc39bc85d465703eb45670cdc5ef
F20101203_AACGZV gallagher_d_Page_243.txt
6b6d134a15a087f01f873285113b5c44
06db6642afbe07be61a89154587273a2312a5dcc
75712 F20101203_AACHWO gallagher_d_Page_097.jpg
e53271e81ebca76d8ef148d5d44e4e45
8161fc2433261e30df9f93a2eb0c4df1c0ade8e7
8209 F20101203_AACJQB gallagher_d_Page_048.QC.jpg
95784ed1a64107e9932e369ba8f37a0d
3cb0edf9935346ffb557df5851bf1f206c0d2c75
77634 F20101203_AACITI gallagher_d_Page_202.jpg
df13f1e62e70a6fba9e4197d6675cbc0
f5fe4bc5d4fa124b5109e9af34714abcc383fafb
F20101203_AACHJE gallagher_d_Page_272.txt
ef96183b18a0e972e777952d248e6f0a
de5f6ccdc208ff7ffefd2a6a259bbf26a4f35e4b
7258 F20101203_AACGZW gallagher_d_Page_232thm.jpg
b04d22503cb4dab1da17d99185ecdfc9
139fc672a048d97330ed70980c5c869291096531
7018 F20101203_AACHWP gallagher_d_Page_175thm.jpg
8640bbfb58e52e93517b563b2fdf5bfa
2aac66b48f460b593cf7c20db442b028ecc089fb
2547 F20101203_AACJQC gallagher_d_Page_048thm.jpg
9836f20fc0d332694a0ce07de44bbb9e
f064e06d82cf134f39ab4c833f572573be41e6d2
70817 F20101203_AACITJ gallagher_d_Page_203.jpg
cfafd7a509b380c845689aff7fe2f62b
715561b118841edf2e66db05f1dd5fe1544466e0
112250 F20101203_AACHJF gallagher_d_Page_174.jp2
baf8513c40343d34f571696e3cd5045f
b0bbf2994071c81e1f0ec65b8705dcbc4d7760c9
85894 F20101203_AACGZX gallagher_d_Page_247.jpg
d7ef97e3425fbefddba89f1cd1943e82
5c7315963c29d5b0c2b1c2d81d1e494ccc794b4f
18012 F20101203_AACHWQ gallagher_d_Page_023.jp2
37c462cd39fd7ff66ed0a2fe9e2d257c
25d77df2150c64c6656b351b262f74cc7b23e200
F20101203_AACJQD gallagher_d_Page_049thm.jpg
386e114888de8835ec7ca6ab66b3ebfb
5200a3c7934bd1ddea0bf3409175acc6297174bf
77484 F20101203_AACITK gallagher_d_Page_204.jpg
ca9f0c231b185af7e77ea5cb78059a11
19b9faddfdb0b27b381b84d74e5ce645c05c6987
49996 F20101203_AACHJG gallagher_d_Page_080.pro
dbed8077c69a7efb2ddf9eebae392ead
f8d924ab6bd4f8d0f7d4aa022c695a70d2d9184d
47661 F20101203_AACGZY gallagher_d_Page_225.pro
4bd781f94454b3e67bb2df692db6e8a5
b5aa846b70a87a74ca6c816018bcb4df5c078513
7006 F20101203_AACHWR gallagher_d_Page_035thm.jpg
2dcfa97016f95b5c60e5fa5b1c8b8833
992b4ee607aeae28c9c77858f3b9e7ef78342dfa
26499 F20101203_AACJQE gallagher_d_Page_050.QC.jpg
f85d4834173c21421a059bb21d355d10
5abcdddc22808d7bea770d31d0ee6525a6f8078b
77742 F20101203_AACITL gallagher_d_Page_206.jpg
c3ad3ffb918cfc9fd0d9656fa7eacb19
cffc5536f7dae41429c573b729ed1dc4a2b37b2e
2075 F20101203_AACHJH gallagher_d_Page_018.txt
3cfe3e665369e491edfb1423fc95c9f4
18b51f49d85c8ff93476112887e5465876fb0b53
F20101203_AACGZZ gallagher_d_Page_183thm.jpg
1ee47c99fb5d1d22a796dc9073528bf6
ec12fe6d76b0f771997bf224266e7e9f04f08e13
56711 F20101203_AACIGA gallagher_d_Page_014.pro
d461b2a8fcc8931eab476850d55b01e3
80d0fcc735374d33a11523236aadadbe2cf5fe04
24700 F20101203_AACHWS gallagher_d_Page_109.QC.jpg
0d7ac6cc8fc5a2a8b6ef9c8901e863cb
73d5dd4325fa2da3588b505e9fc410966cb49a73
F20101203_AACJQF gallagher_d_Page_051thm.jpg
37943f033d879e3290cd062a0c8850e1
7d000817ca9c0740d5805b69f91ea90bf02530d4
77254 F20101203_AACITM gallagher_d_Page_207.jpg
c95c56e5fd30e5e6e05885b1eca2a586
4e748f19d447350dd3e74edc74569d510dc2c105
7210 F20101203_AACHJI gallagher_d_Page_078thm.jpg
eed23d27522dc86077af583490e173cc
553231c6ed91bfbbbcc55ccc8faac8c47d78f846
6686 F20101203_AACIGB gallagher_d_Page_133thm.jpg
fa78b6b76e7c6f4c1861f945da4b225c
a56875b776abc54565722ce9c07a655c5e83264e
F20101203_AACHWT gallagher_d_Page_119.tif
5b94c83125e856bccba1bf48432fa624
403710808044c441df6d6f9cd96597f621b9e9c6
F20101203_AACJQG gallagher_d_Page_052thm.jpg
57a956f90722f8fce9b1ecbbfcbf106d
33583f8cd557c936a3cfba49b44aed407ff93721
70810 F20101203_AACITN gallagher_d_Page_208.jpg
44d35b2c8869c293539d4f3af7edc070
6d8d4275ed29ba4f4e8c153dc6b73a4446dd4de6
7198 F20101203_AACHJJ gallagher_d_Page_221thm.jpg
b90c4b785a421f8d7215ad48539a0ea1
2f73f05617d68176328eb399889d541cb2908713
112048 F20101203_AACIGC gallagher_d_Page_248.jp2
a8a61a55d0f724e0e7104bd930e92b90
32928c8214d359d244834a377b994bc1abe221ed
124128 F20101203_AACHWU gallagher_d_Page_198.jp2
4f77f82ccbe0b0cc3107d38e717fafbd
ba6d513e917f269290a8fe078e07fb275d73d160
7077 F20101203_AACJQH gallagher_d_Page_054thm.jpg
f94ae7793a71413d519249f971ea702c
76b35d3c532e38f1546c3dafc459c17ab8cd3628
79713 F20101203_AACITO gallagher_d_Page_209.jpg
bfb248003e848c656a1037a013f4ada0
cba6f5f739a1b5d3e97af994297d756bd6e15fda
78068 F20101203_AACHJK gallagher_d_Page_115.jpg
3e40d4148bfdc942acb53bd56c5c45b6
3ee82ef6d5f51829fc15be2f4f3ad9a1ad500fce
76907 F20101203_AACIGD gallagher_d_Page_138.jpg
fac754481c87a45d935d1e1d0ac4af6f
f65a33f76f6a48a20a97cbb5c49988e22e4f8827
26131 F20101203_AACHWV gallagher_d_Page_150.QC.jpg
761046670ab5b4602b5cffb3f1554e2d
4ee68bba26ca1bda4910fc4ca50d584df8c41028
25870 F20101203_AACJQI gallagher_d_Page_057.QC.jpg
6b4291219d724f2d305efb29d5fce66a
e4ab6caf33c69c16bddb37bfceb805c038af2b92
48176 F20101203_AACITP gallagher_d_Page_211.jpg
e16bea485121a9817d27fd1ceb323fe8
121b7f16f8ebc5682ce11f20fd721ff55f300a3a
25944 F20101203_AACHJL gallagher_d_Page_183.QC.jpg
4e4954400d8ea8bd100f9cba9a4248b5
97d3b97636669c336bd07ee6e1e9e2d672d73978
73832 F20101203_AACIGE gallagher_d_Page_129.jpg
959f4bb0b0597b145dc5729cbecffc37
650408ec19441997750d5014dde7105db04c3494
25777 F20101203_AACHWW gallagher_d_Page_019.QC.jpg
d20c7eb49d4c21cbd0dff8a0969a7d9a
67c88a62534ee0de12ec478c708cbc686e05c4a8
7129 F20101203_AACJQJ gallagher_d_Page_057thm.jpg
386e5566fa64974f4d908d94efd17bf0
c1103cb2665313dd5d81c6ab72a96190bd392a6d
84371 F20101203_AACITQ gallagher_d_Page_212.jpg
fcc7fafc56e1952487f469610b4547e6
2332f948e0268c4f4b6b89768c97425c4468ab67
F20101203_AACIGF gallagher_d_Page_037.tif
cdede1c4e10a8228448af16e8a55969e
247010b3b7e6ba55c56bd75caf94148e8a98b6bb
55391 F20101203_AACHWX gallagher_d_Page_233.pro
42ec3cf12a25083adf776ade95813e91
233bd52b720f27c4aea70776654c5a2f1d51caf0
6871 F20101203_AACJQK gallagher_d_Page_058thm.jpg
9d594632c51408d268f8d7b4baae98a5
b2a0d76b0a0092fa138cde83f4e690163f5b9388
80611 F20101203_AACITR gallagher_d_Page_213.jpg
dc4c5f09fb6816f56f29bb3c2ba837ca
585395dd9fe5381223826081f05181175240f66f
78843 F20101203_AACHJM gallagher_d_Page_146.jpg
8ec5b65b69c9d357aae34a1bef911cea
fda706ae0087c9d668c9a78996074726d428c91e
F20101203_AACIGG gallagher_d_Page_076.tif
88c571fac1de08702b0f49fa6ea3648e
62b374b4c3b435d9320fc4168eb9b5307d2b7982
F20101203_AACHWY gallagher_d_Page_262thm.jpg
d88e7ff23dd3c735afa7c013f1c94a19
0a685ef8b6b6a2d30ee74cb24fa3ae372507138b
24824 F20101203_AACJQL gallagher_d_Page_059.QC.jpg
7281e5f593baeede11bb251d14563ca2
7ca5071e0aa03d78f77f1f9c077a7e24ce1aeb71
F20101203_AACHJN gallagher_d_Page_090.tif
68ff077cfbcc6f5ea9cca77dd4e32429
cde059fa4fb736d2218416ee1b57f642cc16093f
25068 F20101203_AACIGH gallagher_d_Page_052.QC.jpg
820e028f52a58c45e1f417f107b1433e
2e4512c613e4fd0e1920c627d1838dcb12e44095
F20101203_AACJDA gallagher_d_Page_186.tif
4f6c53e6f47fcddf5caaf872cabdd56c
85648a10471a9d4d8edf927e1322d8f0f48919c3
76746 F20101203_AACITS gallagher_d_Page_220.jpg
9f1e78d64984d2e84f1d80ca91e54f39
fe4c5a95910978cb095e6c2c971649cac2289784
26413 F20101203_AACJQM gallagher_d_Page_060.QC.jpg
1503b4886656133c72674ea71f6f9df3
8f7f2922ffdec0ce5437a23a0347845eba307472
25345 F20101203_AACHJO gallagher_d_Page_149.QC.jpg
2672061f610b3471293677a9da3ff417
0d319468a3fdfbca39c453f2b85427578d897465
51897 F20101203_AACHWZ gallagher_d_Page_214.pro
26b37c1a31762d77ff0607d09fd6effa
afb8abd922e5a2a0e6c1114b750614afbd2b9688
F20101203_AACJDB gallagher_d_Page_187.tif
c241fc1e012fe378277640a95aaae2b8
4bdaba615a497c599f8ca3952bf153c0af14df55
68399 F20101203_AACITT gallagher_d_Page_225.jpg
504729517721b04f91e805caaa11a671
3f3a6310803afb1690f98efadf37d1cb8886222f
F20101203_AACJQN gallagher_d_Page_060thm.jpg
eaa89fb336acb93352ef673635b8d906
957f0645d48ecae2b66034ed3740745c4a8dd35c
53817 F20101203_AACHJP gallagher_d_Page_035.pro
488c62bc1bba8293cd8dc9e57a195dd3
36635368a61219905aefe0191bc9c5d4458549a1
111946 F20101203_AACIGI gallagher_d_Page_087.jp2
a61c7d51606869b2561a33f92f3e06d6
57f2ed2e821767e50d6299e53aff7b32febd3584
F20101203_AACJDC gallagher_d_Page_188.tif
44079d56b948ad03ede5f31b948c6a68
b2834113c1eae0357816af3406b0b9387aea3802
70950 F20101203_AACITU gallagher_d_Page_227.jpg
7e9a0598f58682f0f8c41b58e8335800
2625935c82e60f46126e1f250e09b9c4344b8948
F20101203_AACJQO gallagher_d_Page_061.QC.jpg
a3c6ed2f151f551b13458b6bcbdc1ad0
a18e09038e5448b8512399d7108d2dba231d7851
25838 F20101203_AACHJQ gallagher_d_Page_246.QC.jpg
6cb4add4f19451ffeb19af36807300ef
57762379810d57cd719503b587f89f53402c8df1
69941 F20101203_AACIGJ gallagher_d_Page_025.jpg
fe4f4113902d614c1dfa1ad2a1920c3b
0124995c632404488f9987fbedc08471327605b4
F20101203_AACJDD gallagher_d_Page_189.tif
9beaef24450d002f37b987dfd2bbf0d1
f2ae2efc3c188ede1a6ce18365880f33d9308513
7054 F20101203_AACJQP gallagher_d_Page_061thm.jpg
d96b3093060609c9ba25b9a6b8a280db
67e71823a210f6f9863b0cacd550f048879ae81d
117144 F20101203_AACHJR gallagher_d_Page_140.jp2
5213c97b2d927f81ffcc55f69af16e6c
9d48ae369b2481740b8b0a933ada3376e9c38938
F20101203_AACIGK gallagher_d_Page_048.tif
20383106cbedf0b836edab3b50a661ed
30d575f62d0b2c1421383d6a6d24775d49458d3f
77908 F20101203_AACITV gallagher_d_Page_233.jpg
8b952b402f88ed5fad31f77b57e1837f
d745f8127d27608c3a833ece6833cfa35ad7249d
25774 F20101203_AACJQQ gallagher_d_Page_063.QC.jpg
4228d59226ef3788826d16c4cd2bdce6
b1de11d62405496a9d6408b60814fb5b65156dff
113480 F20101203_AACHJS gallagher_d_Page_077.jp2
b319d5783c4ea7aa25e537cfe8c6add9
ccacb30946299b7f868df3184d8ea9396489eb32
56792 F20101203_AACIGL gallagher_d_Page_274.pro
93193590fe6944af50e52d7238764e11
1c1fd3e04aaf21f9a0c3dea6d6cdc6a581a2c5d4
F20101203_AACJDE gallagher_d_Page_190.tif
aaefcd7e193253989da6ce7b32aeeb3f
6f76d2fa4bfb1742bff19cbac68a85e414b074e6
77585 F20101203_AACITW gallagher_d_Page_237.jpg
3a4cdb341b5bf6cc15c6767eedc30c63
64767ff62eb12b98208de2c08a456021c1a6e61e
7166 F20101203_AACHJT gallagher_d_Page_122thm.jpg
aa4e9b75802c3d5e2f55c988c7701abd
4628281e024b338fa1502c8d33982dcef721d0e2
6562 F20101203_AACIGM gallagher_d_Page_272thm.jpg
98c56748904b218069d55c7951e4d8cd
c6cf4844fa177ccd78fee47ae808b1f29d792c64
F20101203_AACJDF gallagher_d_Page_191.tif
c1b728aea4354cd65b97397a7295bba1
4a240b5f5ac31b31fefc04f0ff30f30ea8eac240
70074 F20101203_AACITX gallagher_d_Page_238.jpg
fcc2ab06a2936556428d4160e1753b1d
19116828751c234d3dde52c3a60782abd5f8732c
24843 F20101203_AACJQR gallagher_d_Page_064.QC.jpg
a2b9d319587a5d46def89e8939f2bdad
393f523ef53801ef3cc507f89db9c84009531196
81895 F20101203_AACHJU gallagher_d_Page_009.jpg
3323372e1faa5dda5f4d4d4f40dbbe3c
8c27da537dbaabb54198e11012b223bd21294bd3
F20101203_AACIGN gallagher_d_Page_226.QC.jpg
dceaca526ccd16cedcb504fe6b39e485
3691ac7aa3edfd575f208775aae8d2d60688459b
F20101203_AACJDG gallagher_d_Page_194.tif
27940786f52a995678b69c0a57451d18
0dd1bd5aeb244a880f0a43d55467f67963b0827d
75163 F20101203_AACITY gallagher_d_Page_245.jpg
99b3f93ec2704e163eaafcd27636c2b1
97e2ced08aae6f733be24ac70ba1b1cf3df34b2d
F20101203_AACJQS gallagher_d_Page_065.QC.jpg
f702a846fb99eda2872e22ad23ef6c45
d710541c0ace7ea26a01bbdf93cc24460a3ca598
48991 F20101203_AACHJV gallagher_d_Page_252.pro
6aafabb1d888133583fa6aa750c04ee1
67863ccd28ef1d899456717ebf6d4c6478efc509
2044 F20101203_AACIGO gallagher_d_Page_149.txt
6a83a8cf3723022722f93e3eaf5096ab
20c00f5ffd28193fa535b1ae128c03aa62ac5952
F20101203_AACJDH gallagher_d_Page_196.tif
77daf6baea6f2c3a483590d564bbef6c
0e3ef7ab924c619821080fdc4b6b74451a555589
77609 F20101203_AACITZ gallagher_d_Page_251.jpg
fe40145f65cfc7e6d1d0837c98a70f89
e8f3f7f9f04348917ee7586d7fbc1e18b4333de7
7042 F20101203_AACJQT gallagher_d_Page_065thm.jpg
20b5eab0edd8c3a603ec6eb72a13c561
4e10561dd298b1814f405343f77ddb000917a970
F20101203_AACHJW gallagher_d_Page_225.tif
d81ab0247c0da34f6261322f37d48f51
d36cd37fc83b014574001c136592a59314f6b2f9
6957 F20101203_AACIGP gallagher_d_Page_248thm.jpg
cedd4d54ab9c5303988ab0b4f2848601
fca80df819b2c6364ebf15847a4c73ac07d0aab8
F20101203_AACJDI gallagher_d_Page_199.tif
d8a923b55cb83a7f7262abdc209a38dd
740fc231a574cf26e825b9d4069d2f17e0dbdb0b
25513 F20101203_AACJQU gallagher_d_Page_066.QC.jpg
d2835f974d953da1dc08ac8d363b8578
bddcfaabb73ca03ef243c8124412ec4a6737b210
54492 F20101203_AACHJX gallagher_d_Page_105.pro
2e6ad713c5b0664020955389b0972d04
791cd77e427f590d2e5f35968cc3dce4f261ade2
F20101203_AACIGQ gallagher_d_Page_244.tif
b31c0411eb5efcda087e760902744124
f19f237a449bfab5164cb3042dc1f9041fcfb6c1
F20101203_AACJDJ gallagher_d_Page_200.tif
e5173810cdb8dad8b61afa77cff2885e
22780745b73985974d41a80971a72632ed227c16
F20101203_AACJQV gallagher_d_Page_066thm.jpg
e7557e6d4b90b841c3e753ebf29f41e7
d7bff500209bb6c53cd22eb16c4b836f43a69513
117893 F20101203_AACHJY gallagher_d_Page_156.jp2
a5705ec2430e888b2a78d968ade0779b
cdaf98c7157051f31413d32a3c3c9e54db90b884
51144 F20101203_AACIGR gallagher_d_Page_272.pro
8630a8b09f1d851a8ca2ebe362475fa9
e93fe6d35eb830e36f34105284db9e5cb93dd51f
F20101203_AACJDK gallagher_d_Page_201.tif
3c24836f1f24b671eb4373b531a04608
c97eccd8acdd647256fb7d868edf37dcc03be8a9
26353 F20101203_AACJQW gallagher_d_Page_067.QC.jpg
b9e253e5cdce8faa7193bca4abcc52df
ff1999681d5ce7ee7215722666ac049089ec5497
F20101203_AACHJZ gallagher_d_Page_018.tif
adaaef81e5076a1db36700d1462bc782
32137763efbb7eb1b407e10644ddf8a85dd2b6f3
F20101203_AACIGS gallagher_d_Page_101.txt
68894800a7eca3137427b6d10fe0e67f
c5825d8ac0c1da2ea5a85892bf0eef0eafd00a13
F20101203_AACJDL gallagher_d_Page_202.tif
e3b9ebc11be05a90d9ade7fdeac1d144
f293ba0e96efa6652dc18593ffc4bbf09cd141ce
26069 F20101203_AACJQX gallagher_d_Page_068.QC.jpg
d157c2010b6cf33247821afad89cd880
30a7e132cb091f135e80b378511b2cc5e9042b65
F20101203_AACIGT gallagher_d_Page_083.tif
f9a43d8f49f2d82fd7f8102f651ef6b1
9b22004f660d4b1cff6fa94c24587ba99bd3c1f2
F20101203_AACJDM gallagher_d_Page_203.tif
7927fd729838379882ece377623939f7
8ee974334f9181a590b4ce401ad4bf0c6c1a2e2d
7106 F20101203_AACJQY gallagher_d_Page_068thm.jpg
a4eaab32e4116f3946baf38556ae429a
9eefe9044d3aa3861c19d820c60728e55931f057
6437 F20101203_AACIGU gallagher_d_Page_194thm.jpg
ca01bc2263b11d368864fb8adf90fc13
88e96b9633d2075246a37692f8d4bd4421566883
F20101203_AACJDN gallagher_d_Page_206.tif
d7d7a1424019da36a02be0248264e309
585fb47017b19dc996d71bc4466fd0b8c57e187f
24096 F20101203_AACJQZ gallagher_d_Page_069.QC.jpg
7e337c650a81d0fc87e64da3d87e28a5
16fb70e064ac3f1931f9fdb1a002af21d2c7e875
2154 F20101203_AACIGV gallagher_d_Page_270.txt
d73dc54496e82f21513c01cde02e2462
83586ca2b4c94b0afe1a19dc117e4c848330d801
F20101203_AACJDO gallagher_d_Page_212.tif
fb0b1c557815acbd45a1de0c03747f44
b7c6842c9227edb244649a74a4113d13dcdc7a71
26356 F20101203_AACIGW gallagher_d_Page_201.QC.jpg
9fe26d010cac50dad2259a4207ff66ed
67f3afa8e33c54d6976ae2fd9ce317131facd271
F20101203_AACJDP gallagher_d_Page_215.tif
df3863dbeb0872ff3bf24d27e56fc9c5
e2d9565c34f5d29181da5acf4e8b8947cd28f45c
52524 F20101203_AACIGX gallagher_d_Page_034.pro
90d27bc338aacc4528e3859b99a807f7
c41e7c1d137dc50c40a2666358cf3e63da703b70
107905 F20101203_AACIZA gallagher_d_Page_239.jp2
9b91a8e38bacdde49ffbb9a8b9efded7
11962685c9e0305c74d0b241a275b97e28a41489
F20101203_AACJDQ gallagher_d_Page_217.tif
0765dd35392a4adb4bce050a73c9a7ea
d7871f54a3a7c6cae996efd0c5f86c4db85e4376
24575 F20101203_AACIGY gallagher_d_Page_087.QC.jpg
e1128bf6c947f8c0d7344adf6e7264c5
89c46f8e0a66da18ed80f4aa220b9f859977d5f7
104579 F20101203_AACIZB gallagher_d_Page_240.jp2
668048ec8e05bc77abaf0bb8f0d25339
de0b4a03ecf150b2913db155bd2d42d9bf3810b0
F20101203_AACJDR gallagher_d_Page_219.tif
91ad82f5c17cdbcebc7f9d1c6c3532ae
938079641c58e398890261bdc8c0da525bf5dbd6
115074 F20101203_AACIGZ gallagher_d_Page_166.jp2
9c81ae6d770c3ead58e6a25127b2416e
0b037b915fe83c0b3abf7b47c8cef5a0862209e3
115809 F20101203_AACIZC gallagher_d_Page_243.jp2
81cd3cc7c43f363614ad678dcf5602af
4f930b15c4ee081bc86b62692093181492ee7156
F20101203_AACJDS gallagher_d_Page_223.tif
296fe990b1098d83bb2999bc8815e247
141447e538afc2eba52a8a9416d8ebf0dbd1f18c
114959 F20101203_AACIZD gallagher_d_Page_244.jp2
9ed0df9a8e3e8f01fb0886c6ccdb73ea
0ad7e63dd77f4bb97e7cc69e5d09925368201370
F20101203_AACJDT gallagher_d_Page_228.tif
94f3c090fc8ea51ed9fcc2aeebc026e4
b8849def7d5f56b9d1bbd8301d7f0f867150f0cd
6792 F20101203_AACHPA gallagher_d_Page_152thm.jpg
0594aa346d9057f7201184ba2106a7de
621cde2dbdd8f8016679b8cb29d3c5c3b6240141
110278 F20101203_AACIZE gallagher_d_Page_245.jp2
78296903656e2b8a25a613a2f9612add
e8573a8ea1277b07df50be622c59a70a16322ff3
F20101203_AACJDU gallagher_d_Page_229.tif
47879c6651f9239af7f2c068f70af843
af3c5b5ed1d9cc127c645463f523bf196a42024d
74955 F20101203_AACHPB gallagher_d_Page_205.jpg
be28722203e5b383fd9bc328debf3029
e593bcb08800afacf75b9f8bf7af9fac779ed022
128874 F20101203_AACIZF gallagher_d_Page_247.jp2
4528f243f9869cf3910f9a18c4ed004f
db234e9f6a81f9a46e3ae1ede846b37b4b966344
F20101203_AACJDV gallagher_d_Page_232.tif
e45fb62ad0ddcd0830961b2407dd8869
8845de6649666910740c6bacf5f68ce8acc7492e
48664 F20101203_AACHPC gallagher_d_Page_238.pro
497aba89d66560027e2c1dc53c4901f1
427fe306fa397723447ae35659943a7fffec6a8e
111998 F20101203_AACIZG gallagher_d_Page_249.jp2
fc8e8f9d7911b8f04a5d9b07933017c7
74df57a495b2f319df5973353704d75f3d34c4c2
F20101203_AACJDW gallagher_d_Page_235.tif
d1dc2b31ff1306151630d092ad903948
92079023f5a3f49a6cfe6388853bbb5a3f8e315f
26171 F20101203_AACJWA gallagher_d_Page_218.QC.jpg
5f7b0a542b5a93bc7883e0ba37873895
2d560253097d12dc2cbacbcd68acd1f8d11a6e0d
2199 F20101203_AACHPD gallagher_d_Page_091.txt
7527f60016019ff1a9dfe057794a82ca
5f26f58289bac0d1ac9cdc42d1dc5f8229282ac2
114735 F20101203_AACIZH gallagher_d_Page_253.jp2
781d26f8a87b90021498cd74d3e42c29
106fd52c89932d145dbaf18a711b795b4d648af9
F20101203_AACJDX gallagher_d_Page_236.tif
0c58c2627c6baf93a44b4fde54b2ae48
f02a318b9b69f39f453cec10d498e4dcd896b803
24719 F20101203_AACJWB gallagher_d_Page_219.QC.jpg
407ae5d641cbf8399f5628e00aca5f1b
b0d8727560a87739fd0a610d98e5fb92b839aa40
51768 F20101203_AACHPE gallagher_d_Page_047.pro
0a9ea830f9556e26f4bdc66f5a72fcfb
5ec4f09113032357c8ebd3b2aefea4e0c0fe1574
116426 F20101203_AACIZI gallagher_d_Page_254.jp2
034e84d378a4e7a458c665593b4f2ede
1431121454833034431425ec0f4bce9f7c3f2e1e
F20101203_AACJDY gallagher_d_Page_243.tif
ff0da3a092d4ff4bfbbca2b19a40c37b
f2a209d8af2322fb05b4b809cf17fbf8c352d577
25739 F20101203_AACJWC gallagher_d_Page_221.QC.jpg
8feaa5ba94a41b690fdb6c1b8fd743f2
f4f9987c883fc1ca3fc16d8ca0c216513b82c715
F20101203_AACHPF gallagher_d_Page_267thm.jpg
5a830d27416372c8a9b25275f0a630ed
465bcfe3c9bf87e4cef16a52c4aea0f0788cd916
117926 F20101203_AACIZJ gallagher_d_Page_257.jp2
57f3b95cfae23b6c8b6f68e90fddda8e
f73ca0c25d8e431bd6311db0ff9ebd9a044a256e
F20101203_AACJDZ gallagher_d_Page_245.tif
f82167a9d8bd031d02ddda936aafab5d
e4753e3e9067096d9ce19aa9473ba78c40929d1d
7283 F20101203_AACJWD gallagher_d_Page_222thm.jpg
ce505334669beb49ce4aed23e97259f7
6a48374cdcb9ae494bc69f6dbc3915aa452aa798
10130 F20101203_AACHPG gallagher_d_Page_004.QC.jpg
96ad748468fc215389a625d2d55e5aca
92f10146ec982b59b99c37870a6f2b3a702074ba
118409 F20101203_AACIZK gallagher_d_Page_258.jp2
495d61a9e5d4b353b2ea2d7636e80103
e91b815c10ab5be76c8d869e2550a296bda69030
F20101203_AACJWE gallagher_d_Page_223thm.jpg
38b3db6d71ca0278d01b2f73bf6f728f
0fe8442f8a17b9a9a2657f3726fac75ef0b21bb3
F20101203_AACHPH gallagher_d_Page_253thm.jpg
504f870d4eef27fcf5075b7337349dc8
5a25c88b8096d6afd39dfdb87ae740154c8d4b21
117056 F20101203_AACIMA gallagher_d_Page_078.jp2
3d40b3d4cd0aff91d0617cc6477539ac
a23584109d8aad0c903becc0fde9bbf1a2a67b8b
115736 F20101203_AACIZL gallagher_d_Page_260.jp2
dbe26af8def7238d4227794e86b05369
96225c5f703827dd9725ff190e9701109c90f2eb
F20101203_AACJWF gallagher_d_Page_224.QC.jpg
e70f4dae25c853c60a92b8e0805b3367
89c8f405e46df24686ff7559ccbd3f45a5f46095
2005 F20101203_AACHPI gallagher_d_Page_282.txt
f7aba6d93cba7e5ce113f51123622140
19c972fb588a8f1a215e8141337a8dca3cc0fcad
1990 F20101203_AACIMB gallagher_d_Page_123.txt
b6ff1daba4ca4f6897c465cc7fa11f5d
350aa42ddf4ff2792eec7900b65e6ceb2ddebe92
116953 F20101203_AACIZM gallagher_d_Page_261.jp2
1d74da01e0bece0db3203bfbc607bd2a
08bf39ceff40d09ebdd3a662dc1e538060a3cbe7
6559 F20101203_AACJWG gallagher_d_Page_225thm.jpg
0ca0403f8f9794eba4659d5b5b89517a
98ce14806d63b5e6ddd23a265af1c8c71531d37e
25132 F20101203_AACHPJ gallagher_d_Page_256.QC.jpg
bdf6236deb666b6753f1a4c3cd6daf17
9ae80d4c4f7a6331ef583d7b0c0a8c79f8faf783
6576 F20101203_AACIMC gallagher_d_Page_110thm.jpg
af22756d0f45726f3038658086332c7f
038906c1052524c8c8eb7a405d3e39e92e60bbbc
113175 F20101203_AACIZN gallagher_d_Page_262.jp2
93808938c9e4de198cf9b09ef6723225
8eea3771d0375a60a46e2ade9824ade0d64083bd
24134 F20101203_AACJWH gallagher_d_Page_227.QC.jpg
d50539dae14f8cd3d5f997871a325ee4
44b9d2c0930ad27da4a4e7908cb54f1ed20f1742
65526 F20101203_AACHPK gallagher_d_Page_089.jp2
3e09d1b65441dd7ecc80420d1ee5986d
f0852a9177051d660dbb07cbffc87fdea36d8e62
116345 F20101203_AACIMD gallagher_d_Page_229.jp2
7bb3501a6848830e3c2ce5614c4baf5b
2bf18a9bb4494f87d2841b9c8767fd0f1b18cc7f
10909 F20101203_AACIZO gallagher_d_Page_263.jp2
8232d4581970833f57dc0dd416242f7a
d40e257c0beceae453513b49fc82910cbf11cc5b
F20101203_AACJWI gallagher_d_Page_228thm.jpg
1b68e90576a49c6fbb16d229ee6cbfa6
8e32ae6b14926e4fa14fc5f9b03e4a6c43b3590c
F20101203_AACHPL gallagher_d_Page_125.txt
59bc4d9b5fb90c8f85c96cd6dbc713ec
9b0c2beae8e97db71f4e46561e6736e7ace62726
F20101203_AACIME gallagher_d_Page_057.tif
dd507a54241cde1faffd83d791ae5728
c584bc15cd9c67c559401faf8942885b94a4f2a0
77510 F20101203_AACHCA gallagher_d_Page_185.jpg
24d69bf4007c51d82fd9ba98a76ffe8e
b6eb1a7bd598af48d14a73eaaba470c20869cbf1
112019 F20101203_AACIZP gallagher_d_Page_269.jp2
5d4f0026aebd02880ec9fd45b9431f4a
56f3e0fa1a1d8fb22de4d9231abeb17bfa9b0782
F20101203_AACJWJ gallagher_d_Page_229.QC.jpg
eb31a2fb6816b0c8b47d9ab33005c5c4
8dc75f458d9e2dd3004304167a08815da32dc4ab
74188 F20101203_AACHPM gallagher_d_Page_101.jpg
49c0abc395b0b4ac42a5012dd9199b7b
7fa917ff635533738153cee32c773c893d15b329
2530 F20101203_AACIMF gallagher_d_Page_160.txt
35c8042b736a48368c4d04b252472daa
2277417d23bcee7f8ba321657afcccfd43878c94
118131 F20101203_AACHCB gallagher_d_Page_275.jp2
c988026be7e5dc32f3393e3c96d3ce50
350600545b9fd77dfbce84edb1610b0990429914
113897 F20101203_AACIZQ gallagher_d_Page_271.jp2
eb4f22127eb0b7f4ed5c5ff5083e1e63
97dbd709af32b6f1eb8dd90aaf30a270b2ba5cd7
F20101203_AACJWK gallagher_d_Page_229thm.jpg
cb6ada6280ed11d4d5ddcf8f724f4e68
f7172fc56710af5936f125253eb4bd35fd246341
2105 F20101203_AACHPN gallagher_d_Page_267.txt
ee1f71477a74401d2c8a9f8980b99760
f267436776e10d074caf8e08806c6d3afcebce53
2050 F20101203_AACIMG gallagher_d_Page_242.txt
688b744a653cd706573d12de269534de
70d5aaa8bb6d5cb71f03b4b6bebb6278a64d304d
6923 F20101203_AACHCC gallagher_d_Page_047thm.jpg
d50e0df80e704af0324e84b296d07849
20451160713fba6fa63ff02a9b0a2c669dc81ccc
110276 F20101203_AACIZR gallagher_d_Page_272.jp2
175a3a0d3c5d2682317c340afea4d802
621a0a2afd2375f8a8943faaae0442877da3bc33
26266 F20101203_AACJWL gallagher_d_Page_233.QC.jpg
388d7b07550dd9a468fdaf82c4ce1c25
02a077e0e62a9ded812ea0f93f21ba32477898f7
1838 F20101203_AACHPO gallagher_d_Page_006.txt
3259262a36c194041cb4c2ee584605d1
3571faa2b5ca741f0f6543b2a8d4c41558436825
2161 F20101203_AACIMH gallagher_d_Page_276.txt
6b51d36bf6897fc8bbff7c70d8250885
98784756667ad872fee3114d5873791726b43d9a
55808 F20101203_AACJJA gallagher_d_Page_255.pro
49a9a50e9cc1013013efa3e8bd6adcd5
0c7366f2fececbcdda9fb6e9b544dce9090419a3
F20101203_AACHCD gallagher_d_Page_172.tif
a928a4af8a8a60d6eb73713d49d52d84
8c0d6fb5ac2ecc1ad8533f6ec4e75be995a6cd00
110502 F20101203_AACIZS gallagher_d_Page_273.jp2
8f5e9836afa5522d0a1cc25da31459e8
b9b12778b152cb03214821a182725a9b8575ceda
F20101203_AACJWM gallagher_d_Page_233thm.jpg
9e0f29fd5ac4d9ddf2ac397d371ac37c
2bd66fad38547c3447b7227e9a1bf15b9be0df26
117120 F20101203_AACHPP gallagher_d_Page_232.jp2
08d49ad5f5648ac89de2362a6b696291
c2f05bec88a8cc9619c32529ed5be2996ecbd81e
24632 F20101203_AACIMI gallagher_d_Page_259.QC.jpg
0e0968ea15899b50bb44576ca38f6fb6
af6efbbb5f8f9e71cf7d26f7ae9ad77ec766bf8b
55061 F20101203_AACJJB gallagher_d_Page_257.pro
bd3952feae62a99919fc178ca4a44602
68f83ac6255d1aac0168e5a5e85229b68d7484d9
F20101203_AACHCE gallagher_d_Page_145.tif
ee552455773cc880db304a9a1b8284f8
9ec4e276712a0925f82757eaaa570cd5e82bd84f
121879 F20101203_AACIZT gallagher_d_Page_274.jp2
532150bb7db1451a0384e8dbf34d32d8
f710dac7c8af07d0f278b8b701be27108be30b32
24772 F20101203_AACJWN gallagher_d_Page_234.QC.jpg
2c1beaf8d10ca6557ba58701423ff093
2be0fa6315c0bb0cfffabeceeac87f45f24a4f7c
24374 F20101203_AACHPQ gallagher_d_Page_152.QC.jpg
582a1309fed9125d8b77be06c56e2e38
2d0cb1a9cb9be1f3ed8ba36f314e87014a3fc474
2236 F20101203_AACIMJ gallagher_d_Page_020.txt
2400c06c64be4fba0550d76a9939effa
089bd936e98cb568ef57c09313a70884d9c17112
54590 F20101203_AACJJC gallagher_d_Page_258.pro
43ce267511ce3e43cef2431fd43378a2
16647cd069f664949de6599c9ac8532d471d4555
116788 F20101203_AACIZU gallagher_d_Page_276.jp2
34830653a5038f715dd27a4f5260694a
7bec15c1d405a67aaeda18a158446dbd0c344d0e
25929 F20101203_AACJWO gallagher_d_Page_235.QC.jpg
df37f2ba30e9181fa79dd985245fc570
f1b3a29d03f474c7f3f0b233f6f9e40c8db6dbd6
F20101203_AACHPR gallagher_d_Page_270.tif
9dd6e53f601df6c7a784798a2515358d
95dc1820f6295e3ff4d650891bf676bbf2419ec0
F20101203_AACIMK gallagher_d_Page_205thm.jpg
4784386ccdb62d5e72b835b33fe8de93
ee3a74d9b94efe7406ce2a604c7a641210ecb0a1
52286 F20101203_AACJJD gallagher_d_Page_259.pro
c0caec5bb55f40cc3f7eb64c1c48c5ca
bb3a3da12287927f5fd39c69b864eb4c4df14209
81241 F20101203_AACHCF gallagher_d_Page_144.jpg
91228b93d7614ba8180bb04097f29b4a
a415923836ac9ab03afc1526a5fa71c40b0447e1
117116 F20101203_AACIZV gallagher_d_Page_278.jp2
6e217028e3156d845ff7cf05e7ed3ac7
5bb81e5aa92fe509ed0f133b811e6b75236422aa
7188 F20101203_AACJWP gallagher_d_Page_237thm.jpg
b0c4ed92de4e91254b17d646de7e1e8d
d66cf02417ea4ae1ad73517b559d8b67106c756e
3182 F20101203_AACIML gallagher_d_Page_002.QC.jpg
bf00aece868033d752275da2f877bb8d
dc1a501034f96ef07e344ea6e8232350dbe49f6b
54156 F20101203_AACJJE gallagher_d_Page_260.pro
631162df0422b7150b29fdd6ef1aecca
0b7003d5f02b0876415cb86de812dfe722a1c994
55690 F20101203_AACHCG gallagher_d_Page_060.pro
509e3c1dc3f169bd8c771cafee5ffa78
57deec784b149e55a37e69a75327ce539faf7145
1051929 F20101203_AACIZW gallagher_d_Page_283.jp2
fcb370d1349c811fb22af0c92537154f
179383fd18e283a74f7800f0b0c0b052a5735088
6662 F20101203_AACJWQ gallagher_d_Page_239thm.jpg
2dc78317dc6d12684935ad1c525aac47
9c3fc485375a0ad40f1bc9c7f68bea49ecfba834
115518 F20101203_AACHPS gallagher_d_Page_267.jp2
94d442784c8c8b4d5dcf0358870d807a
32173cd6be74a1a185e4707dc11783f5af6ae73d
76613 F20101203_AACIMM gallagher_d_Page_131.jpg
2db7a01025257618f9e3b5846ff5690c
67fa060c9167acc15a8b60c53e914bed17eaa22c
3450 F20101203_AACJJF gallagher_d_Page_263.pro
19663dac7dd2e4c329c26f72727df3e6
b9e7e7f8ebd5b490dfe78e2a60f577c5522ec4ab
73986 F20101203_AACHCH gallagher_d_Page_234.jpg
f7e64d24dad84e16a1fa81de691beb1f
d4e51868e7daf7c16dcc601f29af34db220b801c
112619 F20101203_AACIZX gallagher_d_Page_284.jp2
aa0c0a2b4ddc98e6e2216f565f0fc56b
7034a3d4d2b0802ec16e0b164526ecc51eea0fc7
23109 F20101203_AACJWR gallagher_d_Page_240.QC.jpg
aca2c621977d7fd1a67c6e659788d359
03e62a3afdcdd2aab3f3af77152d2c6b7855d8e6
78738 F20101203_AACHPT gallagher_d_Page_032.jpg
f9b2b47b558bbc354f6690912b701209
a356bb35b176f7f504bc2049301a0da4c08c5245
1995 F20101203_AACIMN gallagher_d_Page_010.txt
68a3a8fad8bd8d317b6a26e610f3f3fb
e54fa23e41d02aa955426a346ed45de270a5dfa9
57783 F20101203_AACJJG gallagher_d_Page_265.pro
a66e1ff32e7f4ac3d918bb32517268a0
57b6e5f60f2e1b326f86031dc6893753c01c3dbb
F20101203_AACHCI gallagher_d_Page_008.tif
1500d17e1913eff336602875d46b4f25
af1c1eb6e4492b27744a12d8cbf0cbec81f5ae76
107381 F20101203_AACIZY gallagher_d_Page_285.jp2
bc3ab7fa68b2b27a38789c944331d6a6
b620129cc80a45e73e124284a0672ff4c4b973ff
24386 F20101203_AACJWS gallagher_d_Page_241.QC.jpg
2f9699a48d99e86a12e9a870cebffe51
83415b776eba24080f9fc90ab55fcf3ab9b59b9d
26475 F20101203_AACHPU gallagher_d_Page_274.QC.jpg
2a8c70c04beea0e1e2833d016f4e419a
d282c6284dd47a158bba1483737bb5f47379d30d
F20101203_AACJJH gallagher_d_Page_267.pro
5552e37cdbeacf14317ec9c051fb363e
52f7ba2db92cc54d4f10b22a74fde2f8d8cbfd27
F20101203_AACHCJ gallagher_d_Page_068.txt
349904e47d96399efb9527fcb205a314
7d243d53917fce787201dcfe08f55d6ca93d51e8
F20101203_AACIZZ gallagher_d_Page_002.tif
d2d0d4ca41802de9ff40515022d15996
edbe4bc44f860b814ccde51486ca204f8107f8e6
6880 F20101203_AACJWT gallagher_d_Page_242thm.jpg
2b9572d168269e7b55ad7c5eae30099a
818f7f8b773c194558c99f99c42e3787b3366d86
115871 F20101203_AACHPV gallagher_d_Page_185.jp2
af0406b48e2f7192cff5498591b56af8
2762348f8afca4b393e7bc467fa6f548d4b5660f
74118 F20101203_AACIMO gallagher_d_Page_102.jpg
13226b666be5c9cff8a6287cc8be1cba
70132faedeb04674238e8fd7b4e943e4693de576
53926 F20101203_AACJJI gallagher_d_Page_268.pro
b9270ca9cb65a72a9f7736ecea00bda8
2b34c39235c2ded393bf0b0a134fc7a35b1d5884
74788 F20101203_AACHCK gallagher_d_Page_184.jpg
6ce34699941da07309125c927ceec715
41f632e4425e7ed25d480a3a7cc1506bad6f89b4
F20101203_AACJWU gallagher_d_Page_243thm.jpg
84590bc94337f3cae75a4db67fda4350
b1df2b00c8ab2ffa65ec41d33c9333a71a88bfb0
F20101203_AACHPW gallagher_d_Page_254.txt
9531b1161adcb7995de9eb355f085f9c
5b2d47aeb5c136a37b8bd9cddc3b1507cd7bdb63
782 F20101203_AACIMP gallagher_d_Page_127.txt
22d5fdd75fde2cb045c670c6d121573b
7116805ee1360636909c0775da36181ff523cc3e
52098 F20101203_AACJJJ gallagher_d_Page_269.pro
f34c53725c05f721fcb1d3f7fa13ed07
ba06e2b38124f1707ca1dcf26700984d5d037472
2424 F20101203_AACHCL gallagher_d_Page_180.txt
8f61d2c63349d79f5cd54fe0040fded1
f523093cd341bed2ee613416616c4c38147efb02
27187 F20101203_AACJWV gallagher_d_Page_247.QC.jpg
4cec65148d871a7140eab8bf9f8ad7c2
089c0330b04a9010a37974658e9d67455a33e198
F20101203_AACHPX gallagher_d_Page_213.txt
51019471ca481843426ac9b843a180ed
c3bf13416615afb74e3ee6e0b61b3ce2fcc44fa6
73963 F20101203_AACIMQ gallagher_d_Page_135.jpg
c53b86c78168d187ee60b915f6404e79
a0f338dd0ea70121eb13468bd315fa053ff7374f
73373 F20101203_AACHCM gallagher_d_Page_104.jpg
6e93f72901015639131ef12f887114b5
388a2e6f82ccb9d6de610a665c79500479daba65
24966 F20101203_AACJWW gallagher_d_Page_249.QC.jpg
4fa2245a656e0905b4e4af2f1c2a92c9
d6d6fd06fcb2575ebd3edfc45c6b9d4d4633c413
56674 F20101203_AACHPY gallagher_d_Page_130.pro
80044a1d3eec0366270d88eeb35c69c9
9fa2965e1d51eef1289dd3fe1d9707b2448b66af
115507 F20101203_AACIMR gallagher_d_Page_179.jp2
0686178d0d9eb61f60a47d3106fcc556
3de9f46d34a9319674a001b2d99ac1374e3bf89d
53541 F20101203_AACJJK gallagher_d_Page_271.pro
e6df589129b4f1950cfa760f6b4d2fac
9001fbdbe5055c7f6c0c1d81daf39b7ad5d9185a
74194 F20101203_AACHCN gallagher_d_Page_149.jpg
745d0a5ba20712f795f98af201c6678e
d2c05bb337d6c80fcad9d36d3f5a07fdace7c233
53465 F20101203_AACHPZ gallagher_d_Page_283.pro
1e0a8ed89978e4401672719284fb1014
1379ebb88d621bab3f134a9badd28d734368d77a
1779 F20101203_AACIMS gallagher_d_Page_005.txt
578e9425a9f2ad2314dc359a8eedef63
0755dabdfaa74f5d8628727a0331fbb9a588625a
50844 F20101203_AACJJL gallagher_d_Page_273.pro
a26de2becca45ac0e0278662abd1ae9d
9afcdda4111d4d3fbfb66b2124decea3c6ec957b
2092 F20101203_AACHCO gallagher_d_Page_256.txt
9588cdae5cd710c8b8b48c12c506365b
e26376581a8914671a2e369f799946c37c39c9b0
6750 F20101203_AACJWX gallagher_d_Page_249thm.jpg
a200141d8c294027f77a45c9f7381339
0d406ed7a93e08a143d9a6ddac206805cb674ee8
F20101203_AACIMT gallagher_d_Page_150thm.jpg
b583284868a2c42e37380fd6c0b956ad
513d46516787a7d1453699959a9a6d776f91f969
55058 F20101203_AACJJM gallagher_d_Page_276.pro
7cf54fc18643e56252ca4371c0eb6506
753f76c0f8bdaa2484596a2dc16c80774d9ff966
74292 F20101203_AACHCP gallagher_d_Page_241.jpg
d8d4b832477821f797245a4b320926a3
fa704b58f6bcc8be540b7a9169a58ae500326e56
25057 F20101203_AACJWY gallagher_d_Page_251.QC.jpg
199b6b3a651232b16a653189111504b2
27ec32f448758320438b73d40bfc1f0a9e672011
F20101203_AACIMU gallagher_d_Page_131.tif
0ab3404e8b87a78015c8b66689f35b6e
4f6432c758363c4d1ca7266a177264bbfa7015dc
53013 F20101203_AACJJN gallagher_d_Page_280.pro
d3ad9f5a35ff7e6fba138f277aa0119e
c324b659f8e59b0a3fc5a78d8841c14d1650d0a0
F20101203_AACHCQ gallagher_d_Page_057.txt
99bf9a40a9d9ec65ff8c39533a56c6e0
28c6b1605fcb76feb26e85e467bc5413bda67431
7026 F20101203_AACJWZ gallagher_d_Page_254thm.jpg
a44881fcb2859e6415aeb1d21d8e6e09
d9ca646ceeaaa65a88cf89d82e5ab7ee017f80a8
109780 F20101203_AACIMV gallagher_d_Page_096.jp2
dc4fd0a870a10cd5dab052833dba8b28
7420c53edf7bc8fd677b457b40368851efb93c86
50520 F20101203_AACJJO gallagher_d_Page_284.pro
7f6cb2b4a2255870c2b335d6f7fd6c02
f53abbb243bb3c3f7aaf79a158b5c17d6336f6bf
F20101203_AACHCR gallagher_d_Page_047.tif
7e0816fa76b3ee01d87a83320e61d5ef
66669c441ac5c41bb8814f2bf5ce95d177643381
17025 F20101203_AACIMW gallagher_d_Page_023.jpg
061273c37867a2512905564a86722c27
252a1a155b26a9beae0065314e4e76cefc867891
13717 F20101203_AACJJP gallagher_d_Page_286.pro
ba2a821ebd9308760e53d305419a25b9
0e834ba242e552b44e1399ded3a52e7d9811dcad
F20101203_AACHCS gallagher_d_Page_074.txt
ca768efaf883ec74192eb3b57f259678
0bd5f259280c3a4a35517e9b33a8dd2107465df6
74548 F20101203_AACIMX gallagher_d_Page_114.jpg
c5b8873e5fcc3297c6211e64d1646d81
833a422efd24544f85628fc94acfbba978eca558
403 F20101203_AACJJQ gallagher_d_Page_001.txt
87d3e0502ef91dcd833e99a4a7c4bd4a
cbc79bbc6261e551152d5416f6b519a7db7a6542
74643 F20101203_AACHCT gallagher_d_Page_103.jpg
9a4b67caef7b068a9d612e4167304f55
5e185927f153aba44047c242e3c43139f8fd4482
F20101203_AACIMY gallagher_d_Page_269.tif
b9c954371d00104ca9c040940653ce00
c2162c54663fdfccb593f174719ca56ffcca09fe
112 F20101203_AACJJR gallagher_d_Page_003.txt
8e87bc9ca7775df01b1237eee2c4ee02
d9f9abbdbb67f491a14b5cbb469f5743abd2ca75
F20101203_AACHCU gallagher_d_Page_223.txt
df2e57a968472b4d3312e590aecb461a
9b1c8e76d0d5ba00c46d4051f27ff940bbeb18f1
7124 F20101203_AACIMZ gallagher_d_Page_207thm.jpg
704d83ce2f1120ca70843a2dcc0e6b57
bd4d5cd4f1e51d6a6016323a2eb415479fdce265
2174 F20101203_AACJJS gallagher_d_Page_013.txt
fdee97ec9ec78fe5af12708b2327790f
6f132c7aa4aa204a924da44abeb6fe2d1bcddc01
26285 F20101203_AACHCV gallagher_d_Page_156.QC.jpg
61011c36cadea4da228511e3bb4437cf
083f882a83241c380435b9491d9a999f21168157
2225 F20101203_AACJJT gallagher_d_Page_014.txt
481e8827ef902d49a41e21e19cc91b09
57178278575a103f596e53358aebe4a430f794d7
6883 F20101203_AACHCW gallagher_d_Page_126thm.jpg
68d3a8570e20b952917f29d0dd4323f1
bb9d223abcb739c330495c4d45bdf931119cf2d7
2048 F20101203_AACJJU gallagher_d_Page_017.txt
e5b21d33418d04d9dd2a3af30f6b768d
0e8228e82dbaa045e50ed4d1d65273f2ccf5e9b9
54106 F20101203_AACHCX gallagher_d_Page_230.pro
029b330eb659cedd07f246cb8d9a09f1
f5cfad0b637bcded9693548a053333afdfa153ce
45807 F20101203_AACHVA gallagher_d_Page_127.jp2
9c9a50ad6bd6f2009167ec4284923e21
85a52dd3bb0087fca23770569036b90ec322f7b9
270 F20101203_AACJJV gallagher_d_Page_023.txt
0c99b432ae4d9661227792452b9304dd
806dce88e556edd43f7c4a3b395956559d0fe1f5
F20101203_AACHCY gallagher_d_Page_285.tif
ef80332b2b5054a77740fdf424283f11
d230f71d2603c89f862486581203b3d34488212b
115576 F20101203_AACHVB gallagher_d_Page_204.jp2
2bfbc47b5c36ce95ed48a09a829c62bd
15cdb3d24d0f3a15fe7d7e7a4d3d4c37c4c166cf
1892 F20101203_AACJJW gallagher_d_Page_025.txt
96df1b44e2f07713f3b311ee26596b4d
49f15e1e3473c946a28ffa6de5a4fb9ece5c9593
52110 F20101203_AACHCZ gallagher_d_Page_103.pro
d5c0125ab0b804031b1bdb5473b3d539
e82bcaa12ab7f1cf1e3773d7665243a08ddd6f44
45692 F20101203_AACHVC gallagher_d_Page_089.jpg
b28f5660c8f872827f9bb40cbe6b2ac6
b2d5ed607d4297c08373c6403c49ae54234c8488
2118 F20101203_AACJJX gallagher_d_Page_028.txt
92a2aa78f2e591b32d6a054019b76298
2062eda7afee528a1b0025e063513b3698676da2
F20101203_AACHVD gallagher_d_Page_109.txt
7b31b5f11295408fdb70facf99a4859b
230ca26fd22724c233e4af18ffb2a367a51c9d31
2004 F20101203_AACJJY gallagher_d_Page_029.txt
ed55fab6e40db31ce4ffb9d42d927c17
649beb21445cf965874d07f6d055bda819ae8330
F20101203_AACHVE gallagher_d_Page_085.tif
47f06d160bbf42f664ccb9a8ee2f5287
6afdc4194022f1f1778e64ea0b103e5ec4923fce
2186 F20101203_AACJJZ gallagher_d_Page_032.txt
c1e0a0248badff7b12ef4a54d8574736
adeebaa36df9e24ca9a0017904e03eca1d5c5a80
F20101203_AACHVF gallagher_d_Page_103.tif
364a0c6e3795fae8665694332522883f
d5a4c7c80a0d4993f705270759d4d4caef3e21c1
77061 F20101203_AACHVG gallagher_d_Page_243.jpg
56160f5291448444ad5686daf54c663c
0391b5674f353bc12ba380b72fe67c4943b19836







"WALKING THE TIGHTROPE":


AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION IN THE
SOUTH, 1947-1963


By

DOUGLAS STEVEN GALLAGHER


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2008
































2008 Douglas Steven Gallagher




































To my parents, for their love and support









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project could not have been completed without the moral and financial support of my

parents, Douglas and Susan Gallagher. They have never wavered in their belief that I was

capable of accomplishing everything I set out to do.

I also thank the members of my dissertation committee for their input on this project, as

well as the staff at the University of Florida Libraries and all libraries in which I conducted

research. However, I must pay special tribute to my advisor, Dr. Robert H. Zieger. His editorial

skills are second-to-none, and his support for my work was constant and tireless. I cannot ever

truly repay the debt I owe to him.









TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

A C K N O W LED G M EN T S ...................................................... ..............................................

ABSTRAC T ............. .............................................................................

CHAPTER

1 IN T R O D U C T IO N ............................... .................. ............................................................ ..

2 RED LIGHT, GREEN LIGHT: SOUTHERN LIBERALISM, COMMUNISM, AND
THE UDA/ADA IN THE 1940s ........................................................................ 24

3 "THE HELL WITH IT": BARNEY TAYLOR AND THE FIRST INCARNATION OF
THE ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE IN MEMPHIS, 1947-1948 ...................................49

4 JOHN THOMASON, THE ATLANTA CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 1949, AND
A REASSESSMENT OF ADA's FUTURE IN THE SOUTH.............. ................90

5 "OUR PROPOSED SOLUTION...HAS COLLAPSED": ALDEN HOPKINS AND
THE REINCARNATION OF THE ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE, 1949-1950................128

6 THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM: GEORGE LAMBERT, THE ADA IN TEXAS, AND
THE FIGHT FOR THE TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1953-1956 ...........................179

7 "THE SOUTH IS AFLAME": STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE FIGHT FOR SOUTHERN LIBERALISM....212

8 CONCLUSION..................... ... .. .... .... ................. 264

L IST O F R E FE R E N C E S ............................................................................. ..........................282

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H ............................................................................. ....................286









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

"WALKING THE TIGHTROPE": AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION IN THE
SOUTH, 1947-1963

By

Douglas Steven Gallagher

May 2008

Chair: Robert H. Zieger
Major: History

My study explored the history of the liberal political organization Americans for

Democratic Action (ADA) as its leaders attempted to establish a series of chapters in the

southern United States and influence the political fortunes of liberals in those states in the period

following the end of the Second World War. ADA boasted a number of prominent members in

its ranks and claimed to have a great deal of influence in national politics, but its efforts in the

South were largely unsuccessful in attracting new members and contributing to the debate in

southern politics.

ADA leaders made no fewer than three separate attempts to organize southern chapters

with dedicated organizers on the scene in the region. The organization's lack of success in the

South was the result of a combination of factors. Its leaders were never able to sustain

organizational efforts financially as a result of chronic shortages of money throughout its early

history. They also had to deal with frequent charges that ADA, despite a clear repudiation of

Communism dating to the group's founding in 1947, had a close working relationship with

Communists and their allies. The charge carried some weight in the South because of the









willingness of other southern liberals to work with Communists during the Great Depression and

World War II.

A more fundamental problem was that ADA's leaders did not understand the political

dynamics of the South during this period. Liberals in positions of national prominence hoped

that the long-standing conservatism of southern politics was coming to an end, and the election

of several liberals to state and national office in the post-war years buoyed their optimism.

However, several years of struggling to attract southerners to ADA did not create the network of

chapters its leaders had hoped to create, and this dissertation shows how and why that process

failed and contributes to the political history of the post-war South.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Those southern liberals who worked against the prevailing conservative nature of politics

in the South have always seen themselves as at least somewhat exceptional and unique. As a

result, it is not surprising to learn that modem historians of southern liberalism have treated their

subjects in a similar fashion. Over the past thirty years, historians have produced dozens of

biographies that have attempted to explain how these men and women arrived at their views and

how they responded to the challenges they faced as a result of their convictions. For example,

Warren Ashby's 1980 biography of Frank Porter Graham recounts Graham's rise to prominence

as president of the University of North Carolina and a United States senator. Graham's

philosophy centered on better treatment for black Americans, "new rights for the laboring man,

new concerns for the farmer, and a fair treatment of the businessman," all in the service of

"building a new South rather than tearing down an old one." Ashby also shows how Graham's

liberalism, and his association with organizations such as the Southern Conference for Human

Welfare (SCHW), led to charges that he was a Communist and un-American.1 Each southern

liberal's story and personal philosophy was unique, but their willingness to challenge the

southern way of life united them.2





1 Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham. A .,lilhe n Liberal (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1980), 155-
156.

2 For additional examples of biographies of southern liberals, see Charles W. Eagles, Jonathan
Daniels and Race Relations: The Evolution of a S.nlthei n Liberal (Knoxville, 1982); Wilma
Dykeman, Seeds of .Snihei n Change: The Life of Will Alexander (Chicago, 1962); Barbara
Barksdale Clouse, Ralph McGill: A Biography (Macon, GA, 1998); Louise Blackwell and
Frances Clay, Lillian .Smith (New York, 1971); Anne C. Loveland, Lillian S.,ith, A S. ,nthiC/ er
Confronting the .Snith (Baton Rouge, 1986); John Salmond, A .Snithei II Rebel: The Life and
Times ofAubrey Willis Williams, 1890-1965 (Chapel Hill, 1983).









As historians have told the individual stories of southern liberals, they have also sought to

explain how their collective efforts affected the course of southern history in the twentieth

century. The most important difference between these historians concerns the importance they

place on racial issues. Morton J. Sosna, John Dittmer, David Chappell, and Jason Sokol have all

concentrated almost exclusively on the process by which certain southerners became racial

liberals and traced the effect these liberals had on the debate over legal and social segregation in

the South.3 Sosna's In Search of the Silent .Salh is most explicit in defining southern liberalism

along these lines, "classifying as 'liberal' those white Southerners who perceived that there was a

serious maladjustment of race relations in the South" and fought against it by advocating anti-

lynching legislation, voting rights for blacks, and desegregation of public facilities.4

Other historians have advocated a more comprehensive view of what it meant for a

twentieth-century southerner to be "liberal." Patricia Sullivan's Days of Hope does not

deemphasize racial issues, but she does believe that southern liberals who were politically active

during the 1930s and 1940s were just as concerned with overturning the region's "defeating

culture of poverty" through economic development and labor activism.5 Numan Bartley's

history of the "New South" also emphasizes the important role of southern labor in liberal

activism, though he detects a shift in liberalism between the end of World War II and the mid-

1950s. During the post-war period, according to Bartley, "economic reform had gone out of


3 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent .o,nil .,n/lhei ni Liberals and the Race Issue (New
York, 1977); John Dittmer, Local People: The Sltrnigle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana,
Ill., 1994); David L. Chappell, Inside Agitators. White .Si/lhei nci in the Civil Rights Movement
(Baltimore, 1994); Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White .SNiwlhi wui in the Age of
Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New York, 2006).

4 Sosna, viii.

5 Patricia Sullivan, Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill,
1996), 2, 3-5.









style, and the new liberal fashion was to define objectives in racial terms." This placed southern

liberals in a difficult position, and many liberals became moderates who tried to gradually

change the South without resorting to "northern intervention" in southern society.6

Bartley's definition comes closest to defining what it meant to be a liberal southerner in

the period following the Second World War. However, one aspect of the history of southern

liberalism that has not received enough attention from historians concerns how southern liberals

interacted with their northern allies. One of the most important liberal organizations of the mid-

twentieth century was Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), founded in the wake of the

1946 Republican congressional landslide. From the beginning, this organization, which included

such New Deal luminaries as Eleanor Roosevelt, economist John Kenneth Galbraith, United

Auto Workers president Walter Reuther, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and Pulitzer-Prize

winning historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., was dedicated to promoting the interests of "free

men everywhere" by opposing Communism at every turn. Its founders announced that

conscientious liberals could not support an ideology "hostile to the principles of freedom and

democracy on which the Republic has grown great," and they would not accept for membership

those who were Communists, or those who wanted to work with Communists (or fascists) to

achieve the goals of New Deal domestic liberalism.7 It is clear that ADA's founders wanted to

define liberalism along these lines and work to convince Americans that their prescriptions

would lead to freedom and prosperity.





6 Numan V. Bartley, The New S.,ih, 1945-1980 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1995), 70-73.

7 Peter Beinart, "A Fighting Faith: An Argument for a New Liberalism," New Republic,
December 13, 2004, p. 18.









The fate of ADA liberalism in the South is the subject of this study, and it shows how the

entrenched political conservatism of the region frustrated liberals who had convinced themselves

that their philosophy could succeed in the South. In the period between 1947 and 1963, ADA

leaders worked hard to establish a political and organizational presence in the South, and they

believed they could succeed. According to historian Kevin Mattson, Niebuhr and Schlesinger

succeeded in making Cold War liberalism "a humanist project committed to pushing people to

think beyond the interests of the self." Practically speaking, this meant they avoided

"fanaticism" of all types and encouraged citizens to reach out to others.8

The problem for ADA liberals was that they possessed an inflated view of their own

effectiveness. As Mattson has noted, they wrote for the best magazines and newspapers, held

prestigious positions at the best universities, and traveled in the same "privileged, white, and

well-educated" circles, largely through organizations like ADA. However, having influence over

public debate did not translate into tangible political power. Their chosen presidential candidate

in 1952 and 1956, Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, lost each election he contested. In

addition, political conservatives had organizations and intellectuals of their own making their

case. In short, says Mattson, the idea of"a liberal consensus during [the 1950s] is little more

than a myth," and nowhere was that myth more painfully exposed than in the South.9

ADA liberals did have some success to show for their efforts. At the 1948 Democratic

National Convention, Hubert H. Humphrey, mayor of Minneapolis and soon-to-be-elected

senator from Minnesota, stirred the delegates with his call for a strong stand on civil rights. His

words ("To those who say that we are rushing this issue of civil rights, I say to them, we are 172

SKevin Mattson, When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith ofPostwar Liberalism (New
York, 2004), 8-9.

9 Mattson, 12-14.









years too late") led to the withdrawal of several southern delegations and the creation of the

Dixiecrat ticket with South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond at its head.10 In the face of this

conservative challenge (and Wallace's challenge from the left), ADA campaigned hard for a

resurgent Truman, who won an unexpected victory in November. In 1948, the ADA's efforts

also had influence on any number of state and local races, particularly in the Northeast and on

the West Coast. In this first election since its creation, congressional candidates, governors, and

mayors consulted ADA, counted on its support, and worked for legislation to promote fair

employment practices, expand public housing and education, extend Social Security and labor

rights, and combat Soviet influence around the world.

ADA's early successes were real and tangible, but their prestigious membership list and

ability to wield influence in Washington masked serious political and organizational problems.

While ADA boasted of its political effectiveness, it faced chronic shortages of almost everything

such a group needed to remain a significant political force. One such shortage was in

membership. As Steven M. Gillon notes in his comprehensive history of the ADA, and as its

membership lists show, the group's boasts about its size did not conform to reality. In 1953, to

cite one example, the publicity brochure The Story ofADA claimed that the group's membership

exceeded 40,000, but ADA records showed that the real figure was closer to 20,000.11 The

desire to exaggerate ADA's membership numbers for the benefit of the media or politicians is

understandable, but staffers and board members knew the truth.

Organizations such as ADA faced two additional problems, each tied strongly to the

South: the limits of cooperation with political parties and other liberal organizations; and the

10 Humphrey quoted in Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American
Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York, 1987), 48.

11 Gillon, 57-58.









need to build a truly national organization. First, many of ADA's potential members already had

commitments to other groups, including the Democratic Party, labor unions, ethnic

organizations, and the NAACP. ADA leaders tried to address this problem by portraying the

organization as a clearinghouse for liberals. Its leaders acknowledged the role that other groups

played in highlighting injustices on a narrower front (with the NAACP leading the fight on racial

issues and civil rights, for example) while billing ADA as an organization for people who were

concerned about all of the important issues of the day and needed a place to pool their

intellectual and financial resources. Thus, ADA national conventions became gathering places

for the liberal elite, whether or not attendees were actually members of the organization.

The other problem ADA faced, the problem highlighted in this study, was regional. If

"Americans for Democratic Action" was to become more than a name, ADA had to find ways to

expand its base of support in regions where liberalism had not been strong. Local chapters in the

Northeast, the industrial Midwest, and California did not have trouble finding liberals committed

to the ADA platform, but the same could not be said of Texas, Alabama, and Georgia.

Nevertheless, the importance of the South in national politics and the intransigence of its

politicians dictated that ADA needed to make strong efforts in the region, and between 1947 and

the mid-1960s ADA leaders worked hard to interest southerners in their program. Liberals had

long wanted to break what they thought of as a self-destructive cycle in southern politics,

educating southerners on the virtues of liberalism so that they would begin to reject the

conservative politicians they routinely elected. By electing people who were not afraid of

integration or government intervention in the economy, liberals believed that southerners would

accelerate the long, hard task of bringing their region in line with the rest of the country, which

they believed had already accepted the New Deal.









In order to do this, ADA members needed to perform the long, hard work of writing

letters, visiting communities, and educating potential members. In May 1947, ADA's Executive

Committee called for an expanded budget of $30,000 for organizing activities in regions where

ADA did not yet have a large presence, including the South. According to the minutes of the

meeting, James A. Loeb, ADA's executive secretary, "stated that the greatest need at the moment

was for additional field staff. He pointed out, for example, that we had only one organizer for

the whole Midwest and only one for the whole South. The $30,000 proposed budget will permit

several additional organizers."12 However, Loeb was speaking of an ideal financial and political

situation for ADA, one which he hoped southern contributions would enhance. It is clear that

ADA faced a dilemma in the South: it certainly would have attracted many more members if it

had organizers in every southern state, but it could not commit resources until organizers were

sure that they could recruit more dues-paying members.

Moreover, the ADA's decentralized nature made organizing politically difficult. While

national ADA figures such as Mrs. Roosevelt and Schlesinger claimed, in the media and before

Congress, to represent all ADA members, and while ADA's constitution commanded all of its

members to adhere to all of its policy pronouncements, in fact deep disagreements over the

nature and extent of economic, political, and social change were rife. This was particularly true

in the South, where national leaders and local members engaged in a difficult, tricky dance over

civil rights. The issue was not ADA's support for civil rights, but rather how this public stand

would affect recruitment and retention of southerners who might share ADA's goals in most

other fields, but not its commitment to integration. Southern ADA members never explicitly


12 Minutes of ADA Executive Committee meeting, May 3, 1947, reel 33, no. 63, Americans for
Democratic Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville, microfilm collection
(hereafter cited as ADA Papers).









pressured national leaders to change the platform, and many southerners shared their beliefs in

voting rights and fair employment practices. At the same time, however, in most cases they did

all they could to deemphasize civil rights when appealing to prospective members. For example,

southern ADA members pressed for changes in ADA literature so that civil rights declarations

would appear at the end of pamphlets instead of the beginning. Southern liberals thought ADA

leaders were forcing them to make uncomfortable choices, and many potential members stayed

away from the organization because of its liberal stance on civil rights.

The decisions about when and how stringently to pursue organization in the South were

made exclusively at ADA's national headquarters in Washington and at national board meetings,

but the effects of these decisions were felt at the southern grass-roots level. In the first three

years of its existence, ADA employed two Southern Field Representatives. Barney Taylor and

Alden Hopkins traveled thousands of miles, speaking to hundreds of southerners, including labor

leaders, prominent southern blacks, college presidents and students, and unaffiliated liberals who

saw ADA as a chance to connect with liberalism on a national level. They reported promising

leads, started chapters and exploratory membership committees, and engaged in fund-raising

drives. In the end, however, their efforts were largely unrewarded. No southern chapters created

in this period attracted more than fifty members. Taylor and Hopkins never raised more than a

few hundred dollars for ADA (and spent thousands of dollars raising that money), and many of

the people who expressed interest in ADA never actually became members.

As tireless as these early organizers were (and as promising as their leads seemed), they

were stretched thin considering the territory they had to cover. In the end, the organizers had to

make decisions about which areas they were to cover, and electoral politics dictated these

decisions. For example, Hopkins, ADA's southern organizer from April 1949 to February 1950,









confined her organizing to North Carolina and Florida. She did this because each of these states

was electing a United States senator in 1950, and each incumbent was a prominent southern

liberal with significant political problems. One of them was Frank Porter Graham, whose

affiliation with SCHW, coupled with accusations that Graham supported integration, helped

Willis Smith's victory over Graham in the June 1950 Democratic primary. In Florida,

conservative Democrats had criticized Claude Pepper for his pro-Soviet sentiments. In the 1944

election, when the United States was a wartime ally of the Stalinist state, this had not hurt

Pepper. In 1950, these associations were among the factors that caused his bitter loss to

Congressman George Smathers in that summer's Democratic primary.

ADA leaders knew that Graham and Pepper needed all of the assistance they could get.

This was the main impetus for sending Hopkins to these two states during the primary

campaigns. However, she found it difficult to organize in the South. Indeed, in North Carolina

and Florida, the politicians she was attempting to help did not want her help. The organizational

problems were primarily political: it was difficult to sell big-government liberalism in the South,

particularly if liberals also championed black civil rights. That being said, the requirements for

organizing a working chapter (25 dues-paying members) were not onerous, even if potential

ADA members had other political commitments. Hopkins' more basic problem was that she

could never attract competent local leadership. During her time with ADA, Hopkins traveled

constantly, but she could not be in all places at once. There was only so much she could do via

telephone, telegram, and the mail to rally support during those long stretches when she could not

be in Charlotte, Raleigh, Tampa, or Miami. In her absence, the ADA staff in Washington needed

committed volunteers to pick up the slack, but these men and women often did not exist.









Hopkins' efforts, like those of Taylor before her, were frustrated, and in 1950 she left

ADA. However, her passion on the subject of southern organization was not dead. She had

always acknowledged the difficulty of organizing ADA chapters in the South without

compromising on the core ideals for which the organization stood, especially its support for

racial integration. Nevertheless, Hopkins believed that liberals could be elected to Congress

from the South, especially from major cities such as Nashville, New Orleans, and Atlanta. Her

commitment to the South had not dissipated. "It seems to me building up liberal sentiment and

organization in the South is much more than a matter of political expedience; it is a matter of

political life or death nationally."13 Hopkins thought that the fate of liberalism in the 1950s

depended on organizing the South, which would bolster liberalism's credibility at home and

abroad.

Hopkins certainly believed in the political importance of the South, but that did not

change the fact that, most of the chapters Taylor and Hopkins attempted to organize failed to last

beyond 1950. Hopkins believed that getting ADA off the ground in the South was a matter of

"political life or death," but she was unable to convince national leaders to commit thousands of

organizing dollars to the region for such modest results when the same financial resources

yielded far greater returns in New York, Washington, or Los Angeles. ADA leaders never

stopped trying to attract support for liberalism in the South, but after 1950 it did so in a far more

informal manner, waiting for inquiries about its platform from interested southerners before

committing resources to the region. In the 1950s, ADA's staff adopted an essentially passive

approach. This approach mirrored important trends in liberal thinking during the 1950s, when




13 Alden Hopkins, memo to James A. Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









intellectuals concentrated on consolidating liberal gains made over the previous decades instead

of attempting to conquer new territory.

This passivity did not, however, preclude more substantive attempts at organization if an

interesting possibility presented itself One such opportunity arose in 1953, national ADA

leaders seized an opportunity to organize in Texas, with the help of a former labor organizer,

George Lambert. Texas was a unique case for ADA because of the open intransigence and

double-dealing of the state's conservative politicians, all of whom continued to proclaim

themselves to be members in good standing of the national Democratic Party. However, these

conservatives thought that their nominal loyalty to the party should have allowed them to

exercise an absolute veto over the Democratic platform and the party's presidential nominees. In

1948 and 1952, conservatives had thrown their support behind the Republican ticket when the

national Democratic Party failed to conform to their agenda. Texas liberals such as Maury

Maverick, Wright Patman, and Ralph Yarborough worked hard to lessen the power of

conservative Democrats, but Dwight Eisenhower's 1952 victory in Texas showed how little

influence liberals actually had.

In 1953, Lambert proposed that ADA join the liberal campaign to blunt the power of

Governor Allan Shivers, who led the conservative faction in the state. These "Shivercrats" (to

use Lambert's term for them) opposed the national liberal agenda, but they wanted to keep their

positions of power and influence within the Democratic Party. Lambert and his allies in Texas

wanted to expose Shivers and his allies, and ADA leaders approved a campaign designed to

boost membership in the state while working with local liberals to reduce conservative power

within the party. They wanted national Democrats to look past the money and power Texas

conservatives controlled and excommunicate them as punishment for attempting to destroy the









party from the inside. Lambert also wanted to send a message to two prominent Democrats in

Washington, Representative Sam Rayburn and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. These two Texans

were particularly susceptible to outside pressures: while they were enormously influential in

Washington, D.C., they were vulnerable to challenges from Shivers, who always suspected them

of being too liberal in supporting public housing, education, and government health insurance.

For their part, liberals thought Rayburn and Johnson too conservative on civil rights and too

zealous in protecting Texas oil and gas industries. Each side thought it could influence these two

powerful men and seize control of the state Democratic Party in the mid-1950s.

In the end, neither side truly won the war. Rayburn and Johnson fended off challenges to

their political positions through deft maneuvering that kept everyone off balance, and Shivers

maintained his hold on the state's political system for most of the 1950s. Years of struggle and

organization amounted to little for Lambert beyond a few new ADA chapters in Fort Worth,

Houston, and several smaller communities. Like Hopkins, Lambert found that organizing a

place such as Texas required finding committed and hard-working people in those communities

who were willing to sacrifice for the sake of their chapter, and those people were hard to find.

He also suffered even more acutely as a result of the financial burdens ADA was carrying in the

1950s. Lambert was tireless in his quest to foster ADA liberalism to Texas. However, his

efforts went largely unrewarded. The national organization ended its financial support for

Lambert before the 1956 elections, in which Texas again cast its electoral votes for the

Republican ticket.

Clearly, a new strategy for ADA organization was needed, and while ADA leaders never

truly gave up on the South, their focus shifted to ADA's student division, known as Students for

Democratic Action (SDA) before 1958 and Campus ADA (CADA) afterward. This









organization, whose local leaders during the period included future Michigan Senator Carl Levin

and future Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Walter "Fritz" Mondale, was

founded at the same time as ADA, but the bulk of its work in the post-war South happened after

1955. Before that year, the SDA chapters that had been formed at southern universities were

much like their ADA counterparts: small, ineffective, and contributing little to the fight for

liberalism. One of the main problems the student affiliates faced was that SDA members did not

know what kind of relationship they should have with other liberal groups, especially on the

campuses of historically black colleges.

In 1955, new SDA Field Secretary Yale Bernstein, who had spent several years working in

New York state as an ADA organizer, brought new energy to the task of starting new chapters

and cajoling existing ones into stronger action. Bernstein was especially eager to organize the

South. He argued passionately that "there are few, if any, organizations working for liberalism,

either on the student or adult level, in the South. Some church groups, sometimes some of the

unions, and sometimes the NAACP will be active. These groups do not, however, because of

their restrictive membership attraction, reach the majority of the liberal students." Bernstein

believed that "SDA could bring about a push toward this new South, which would be far out of

proportion to its numbers, and could bring into the active, aware political arena, many students

who would otherwise be lost to the movement."14 With Bernstein's enthusiasm and the

assistance of newly energized young liberals, SDA and CADA were far bolder in addressing

important political issues of the South in the 1950s and 1960s. SDA students assisted blacks

who boycotted the bus system in Montgomery, Alabama in the wake of the Rosa Parks incident.

They also protested bans on interracial athletic competitions in Mississippi and Georgia,

14 Yale Bernstein, "Organization in the South: A Prospectus," memo to Students for Democratic
Action national office, reel 122, series VIII, no. 2, ADA Papers.









supported the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s, and fought for freedom of expression at

southern universities. ADA's student division made a bigger impact on the South than its adult

division ever did.

The biggest impact this younger generation had on ADA was its willingness to challenge

the status quo. Most ADA leaders who thought about the problems of the South had been

cautious when addressing problems such as segregation. They knew that many potential

members who might have agreed with them on other issues were unwilling to integrate schools

and public accommodations. They also believed the primary goal of the organization was

organizing: recruiting members, starting chapters, soliciting contributions, finding common

cause on issues that could lead to successful campaigns for political change. Student organizers,

in contrast, believed that the South had fundamentally changed between ADA's founding in

1947 and the Brown decision of 1954. Timidity, compromise, and vacillation for the sake of the

organization would no longer help liberals.

In the end, though, these students had an inconclusive impact on southern politics. The

problems they faced were twofold, and they could do little about either. First, liberal students

were largely unwilling to compromise their beliefs on civil rights in order to attract more

members, and this made them pariahs on many campuses. Second, the transitory nature of the

college experience meant that chapters were in a constant state of flux, with politically

experienced students leaving the scene as they graduated. This meant that an organization such

as SDA or CADA was unable to sustain pressure for liberal change on southern campuses. It

also meant that this pressure was largely the work of committed individuals at certain

flashpoints. The most significant of these campaigns was the 1962 fight to integrate the

University of Florida in Gainesville. Campus ADA was involved in this fight largely because of









the effort of a handful of committed students who corresponded with black leaders in the state

and pressured state and university officials to integrate the campus. The successful integration of

the university was ADA's most tangible contribution to liberalism in the post-war South.

This success, however, did not translate into the kind of organization ADA enjoyed outside

of the South. The bulk of its membership continued to come from the Northeast, particularly

New York and Washington, as well as Chicago, Los Angeles, and other large cities outside of

the South. ADA members from the South attended board meetings and national conventions

throughout this period, but in most cases they existed merely as curiosities, people who would

normally have little contact with members from the rest of the country. They also failed to create

a strong financial base in the South: most of the money ADA used in its organizing came from

labor unions and wealthy patrons outside of the South, meaning any activity in the region was a

financial drain throughout the two decades following World War II. The political fortunes of

New Deal liberalism in the South were better than this record indicates, especially when

considering the civil rights successes of the period. However, it would be a mistake to credit

these accomplishments to the efforts of ADA.

It is also important to acknowledge that as ADA was trying to change the South, the

organization itself was changing during the decades that followed the end of World War II.

What it meant to be a liberal was also changing during that period, and many on the left had

become disenchanted with Cold War liberalism by the 1960s. This disenchantment was partly

philosophical, since the "New Left" was more concerned with personal liberation and tired of

worrying about "great-power" politics. However, the rift within liberalism also had its practical

causes. Many people believed that old-style liberalism was reaching the limits of its

effectiveness, and the South was the most damning example of liberalism's failure. ADA's









failure to organize in the South, given the intellectual and political weight behind the

organization, is an important aspect of the story of how a seemingly ascendant liberalism

responded to the challenges its adherents faced in post-war America.









CHAPTER 2
RED LIGHT, GREEN LIGHT: SOUTHERN LIBERALISM, COMMUNISM, AND THE
UDA/ADA IN THE 1940S


In the immediate wake of World War II, American liberals faced two key dilemmas: how

to deal with Communists and their political allies; and what to do about the American South.

The liberals who founded the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) explicitly addressed the

former issue. Their concern about pro-Soviet elements on the American left, and the effect these

elements had on the ability of liberals to win and retain political power, was the issue that

originally brought them together in January 1947. Concern over what to do about the South's

political conservatism, its hostility toward organized labor, and its racial injustices would emerge

as another key challenge as ADA activists sought to build a vigorous national organization.

In the same period, tensions among white southern liberals replicated the challenges that

ADA activists faced nationally. Throughout World War II, two liberal organizations vied for

influence in a South undergoing rapid industrial and demographic change. While the leadership

of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) openly welcomed Communist

participation, the leaders of the Southern Regional Council (SRC) criticized SCHW's approach

and explicitly banned Communists and socialists from participating in their organization. With

signs of progressive political rebirth emerging in the aftermath of war, the South posed both a

complex dilemma and a rare opportunity for liberals at the national level.

Underscoring all of this were the events of 1945, which shook all Americans in a profound

way. By August, Germany and Japan had surrendered to the Allies. Harvard-trained historian

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. was in Paris at the end of the war, freshly drafted into the U.S. Army

after several years of working with the Office of Strategic Services in England and France as an

intelligence analyst and writer. For many Americans, the end of the war was a curious moment.









They were enthusiastic about the prospect of peace, but the death of President Franklin D.

Roosevelt on April 12 had come as a great shock to people of Schlesinger's generation. There

had been a great deal of speculation on Roosevelt's health in the months leading up to the 1944

election, but his death was still unexpected. As Schlesinger notes in his memoirs, "people my

age hardly remembered any president before FDR. We unconsciously supposed that he would

be president forever."1

The inability of younger Americans to comprehend what Roosevelt's death meant was

understandable, but Schlesinger's reaction was also political. Schlesinger was a liberal, and his

career to that point reflected his liberalism. His Pulitzer Prize-winning Age ofJackson,

published in 1945, was a self-conscious attempt to place the events of pre-Civil War America in

the context of the Great Depression and New Deal, arguing that the Jacksonian Democrats were

proto-New Dealers like himself. Now the great champion of American liberalism had died, and

Schlesinger told his wife that "his death leaves a kind of awful vacancy."2 He had been so

effective in pushing the country to accept liberal legislation such as Social Security, banking

reform, public power, and labor legislation. Moreover, he had created a solid Democratic

coalition that passed liberal legislation and protected the gains of the New Deal from a

conservative backlash. Now he was gone, and liberals were not at all sure where they fit in

under Roosevelt's successor, former Missouri senator Harry S Truman.3





1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Life in the 20th Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950 (Boston,
2000), 346.
2 Schlesinger, Life, 346.

3 Steven Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York,
1987), 3.









Not all Americans reacted to Roosevelt's death with sorrow. Many southerners,

particularly the vast majority of elected officials and power brokers in the Democratic Party, had

cooperated with the New Deal only begrudgingly, if at all. They looked forward to dealing with

a President who seemed to think and act like "one of them," especially on racial issues.

However, not all southerners cheered Roosevelt's passing. Atlanta Constitution editor

Ralph McGill, for one, made a trip to Roosevelt's southern White House in Warm Springs to pay

his respects, and he recorded his impressions of the trip through rural Georgia for his newspaper.

McGill saw little of the negativity that the region's political classes felt toward Roosevelt,

reporting instead on the respect and admiration ordinary Americans had for the man who had

been their greatest champion, even if his rhetoric often outpaced his achievements. This

reaction, in part, led McGill to write that "all I can see for this country is the green light."4

McGill's conclusion was optimistic in its assessment of the ability of the country to deal with the

challenges of post-war life, with or without Roosevelt.

In a sense, both McGill's cautious optimism and Schlesinger's negativity were each valid.

The divisions that had existed in the United States before the war had not disappeared, but had

merely faded as international problems took precedence. One of these divisions was between

North and South. Many Americans, particularly liberals, emerged from the war with the sense

that they could no longer ignore pressing social and economic problems in their own country.

Some of them were native southerners whose opinions, particularly on racial issues, had not

survived their wartime experiences. Liberals hoped that this cohort of southerners was a large

one. Guy Johnson, chairman of the SRC at the end of the war, boldly asserted that "the majority



4 McGill quoted in John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil
Rights Movement in the S.,ulh (Chapel Hill, 1995), 332.









of our fighting men have had experiences which have taught them a new appreciation of their

fellow Americans of another race."5

McGill was also sure that the South would become more liberal. He acknowledged the

problems and divisions that were a fundamental part of the postwar political and social

landscape. However, he also thought that the problems the United States faced should be viewed

in the context of the five years that had just passed. His country was the most powerful, and

richest, on earth, possessed of technology (including the atomic bomb) that now awed the world.

America's soldiers, along with the British and Russians, had beaten back the most fearsome

armies mankind had ever produced. Under such circumstances, how could any challenge be

daunting? McGill "wanted desperately to believe that people were basically decent and that,

given a chance, they would do the right thing."6 Others who shared McGill's generally liberal

outlook were not so sure, and events in the months that preceded the founding of ADA in

January 1947 showed that New Dealers who wanted to keep their vision of the country alive in

the wake of Roosevelt's passing would have to work hard to do so.

First, liberals had to reckon with a new president. Almost from the moment he assumed

the office, Harry Truman had appeared unable to grasp the enormity of his position, and New

Deal liberals had no confidence in his ability to lead as Roosevelt had. He took the side of large

defense contractors when these businesses laid off tens of thousands of workers who were no

longer needed in a peacetime economy. In May 1946, he shocked liberal sensibilities when he

asked Congress for authorization to draft striking railroad workers, claiming that a national




5 Johnson quoted in Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White S.nli/ uei \ in the Age of
Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New York, 2006), 20.

6 McGill quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 332-333.









emergency necessitated the move.7 Although he publicly proclaimed his support for a permanent

Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to combat racial discrimination in the workplace,

he did not fight for it when powerful southern members of Congress blocked it. Several

members of Roosevelt's old cabinet did not last one year under Truman, resigning to protest

what they considered to be troubling trends toward moderation or conservatism. In short,

liberals believed that Truman's domestic policies were far different from Roosevelt's, and

liberals had convinced themselves they would have to fight to remain a viable force within the

Democratic Party.8

Truman appeared to be equally unsure of his footing in foreign affairs. His limited

experience in the international arena did not inspire confidence, especially in a postwar world

where everything appeared to be up for grabs. He had to deal with the Roosevelt's legacy here

as well, but liberals were less sure of what that legacy was. The wartime Allies had defeated

fascism and Nazism, but with that common enemy no longer a threat, prewar differences

between the coalition partners reasserted themselves. Roosevelt had overcome these differences

with deft personal diplomacy, especially in talks with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. However, by

the end of the war many Americans had come to the conclusion that Stalin could not be trusted.

It remains unclear whether the Soviet Union was a real threat to the United States in the early

years of the Cold War, but the anxiety with which Americans regarded Stalin was certainly real.9

Truman believed that an American projection of strength would force Stalin into uncomfortable


7 Gillon, Politics and Vision, 4.

s Patricia Sullivan, Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill,
1996), 223-225 (quote on 225).

9 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York,
1987), 20-29; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002 (Boston, 2002),
29-31.









positions, and his earliest use of this tactic came at the July 1945 conference held in Potsdam,

Germany, where Truman casually informed Stalin that the United States, working with British

and other Allied scientists, had successfully tested a special weapon (the atomic bomb) in the

deserts of New Mexico. Truman hoped to scare Stalin into keeping his promises concerning

self-determination in Eastern Europe with this new weapon, though he thought he could

accomplish this whether or not the bomb worked.10

The moment that Truman informed Stalin of the existence of this "new weapon of unusual

destructive force," however, was surprisingly anti-climactic, as Stalin showed little interest in it

beyond its potential use in ending the war against Japan. The reason his reaction was much less

dramatic than Truman had wanted it to be was that the Soviets already knew about the bomb. A

German-born British scientist, Klaus Fuchs, had been passing along detailed scientific and

mechanical information about the research at Los Alamos to Communists in Britain, who

eventually relayed it to Soviet officials. Fuchs's spying allowed the Soviet nuclear program,

which had begun in 1942, to progress much faster than it would have otherwise. It also meant

that Stalin was well-informed about what was going on in New Mexico. Truman's news,

therefore, was not news to Stalin.ll

Klaus Fuchs was not the only person working for the government of the United States who

had a hidden agenda. Communist spies in the American government were active and important,

and recently declassified documents have revealed important details about these spies. For

example, although Alger Hiss defended himself to the end of his life against charges that he

passed secrets from his offices in the State Department and White House to top-level Soviet


10 David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 442.

11 McCullough, Truman, 442-443.









agents, in fact he was a long-time member of the Communist Party and had been leading a

double life during and after the Second World War.12 He was one of several well-positioned

government functionaries who were spying on behalf of the Soviet government during the 1930s

and 1940s.13

The public had little knowledge of this espionage as it was happening, but Americans

across the political spectrum were already coming to the conclusion that while the Soviets may

have been wartime allies, Communism and capitalism were fundamentally incompatible. New

Deal liberals in particular found themselves at a crossroads as they debated how the United

States should deal with Communism. Some, including former vice president and Secretary of

Commerce Henry A. Wallace, saw no reason why the wartime alliance could not continue. He

argued that the United States should recognize Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and share

military and nuclear knowledge with the Soviets, believing that confrontation with Communism

would be the worst possible idea. He also saw little difference between Stalin's purges of the

1930s and the actions of "reactionary" elements in his own country, especially in the South.14





12 G. Edward White, Alger Hiss's Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 220-230.
13 Revelations about the extent of Soviet espionage within the Manhattan Project continue to this
day. One such spy was Dr. George Koval, an Iowa-born scientist who worked at the Oak Ridge
nuclear laboratories in 1944 and 1945 after earning his doctorate at the Mendeleev Institute in
Moscow and receiving special training from Soviet military intelligence. American intelligence
kept his espionage a secret for decades, but his usefulness to the Soviets became clear in
November of 2007, when Russian President Vladimir Putin posthumously honored Koval as a
"Hero of the Russian Federation" for his "his courage and heroism while carrying out special
missions" on behalf of the USSR. William J. Broad, "A Spy's Path: Iowa to A-Bomb to Kremlin
Honor," New York Times, 12 November 2007, available from
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/us/12koval.html (accessed January 8, 2008).

14 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 225-227.









Others, including Schlesinger, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and New York Post editor

James Weschler, thought there was no contradiction between a continued commitment to the

New Deal and recognition of the Soviet Union as an enemy that needed to be confronted. These

men believed that the United States was far from perfect, and that domestic reform was vital to

the realization of American greatness. No liberal could be completely proud of his nation while

legal and cultural barriers separated blacks from whites in everyday life, or when thousands of

American workers found themselves unemployed after they had helped to defeat fascism and

Nazism through their efforts on the home front. However, they did not believe that Communism

had any solutions to offer the United States. Not only did they believe that Communism did not

work economically or socially, but they abhorred the fact that Communists, in practice, refused

to allow any formal opposition of any kind. No good liberal could work with any person,

American or otherwise, who would allow such infringements on human rights.15

The division among liberals had its parallels in the South as well, though the debate was

somewhat different. While Communism was a significant marker of the battle lines among

liberals, a far more important issue in the South was how one stood on racial issues. The debate

about the South's future had been raging since the end of the Civil War, but the Great

Depression, the New Deal, and World War II highlighted the role of the federal government in

race relations. Roosevelt did not overtly challenge the South on its racially segregated practices

during his presidency, but he did make many enemies in the region with his harsh words toward

those congressmen who opposed his reforms. He was not anti-southern, but he did want the

region's political class to acknowledge its most pressing economic and social problems and

confront them. Northern liberals agreed with Roosevelt, laying down a clear challenge to their

15 Kevin Mattson, When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith ofPostwar Liberalism (New
York, 2004), 50-51, 65.









southern brethren and imploring them to solve these problems before outside pressures forced

change upon the region.16

Southern liberals wanted to show their support for New Deal reforms in the South. As a

result, in November 1938, a group of these liberals attended a political conference in

Birmingham, Alabama that acted as the opening meeting for the Southern Conference for Human

Welfare (SCHW). A flyer urging people to attend the Birmingham meeting advertised the

existence of a liberal South, but it argued that "[liberal] leaders have heretofore been isolated and

scattered, the effectiveness of their work limited by their lack of coordination. The Conference,

by providing a meeting ground for all Southern progressives, will promote mutual trust and

cooperation between them for greater service to the South."17 The conference also vowed to

challenge the South's laws against integration, though SCHW's leaders did not intend to flout

the segregationist customs of Birmingham during the meeting itself.

The Birmingham meeting attracted over 1,200 participants, 20 percent of whom were

black. The liberal star power present at the meeting was impressive: Supreme Court Justice

Hugo Black, University of North Carolina President Frank Porter Graham, and First Lady

Eleanor Roosevelt each addressed the convention.18 Few remembered what these attendees said,

but most attendees remembered Mrs. Roosevelt's actions on this occasion. When Birmingham

police reminded conference organizers that their meeting was to be strictly segregated, the


16 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent .nalh .nlihe ii Liberals and the Race Issue (New
York, 1977), 88.
17 Sosna, In Search of the Silent .Salh, 90.

18 While Graham and Roosevelt certainly qualified as racial liberals, it should be noted that other
attendees, including Senator Lister Hill and Governor Bibb Graves of Alabama, did not share the
liberal views of many at the conference. Their attendance stemmed primarily from their
reputations as good New Deal liberals on non-racial issues. Sosna, In Search of the Silent .Snlih,
91-92.









organizers complied, but Mrs. Roosevelt refused to move from her seat among the black

participants even after police ordered her to move. After the confrontation, organizers placed

themselves on the side of the First Lady by resolving never to hold another segregated meeting.

This was an important symbolic confrontation with the conservative power structure that

signaled at least some liberals were willing to cast aside their customary caution in challenging

the status quo. This cost SCHW some members in the short term, but many liberals throughout

the country praised the stand the Southern Conference took in Birmingham.19

It was more difficult for many liberals to accept that SCHW welcomed the assistance of

Communists in their work. At least six known members of the Communist Party attended the

Birmingham conference. Conservative southerners seized upon this fact, and the anti-

segregation resolution passed at the end of the conference, to confuse the two issues, implying

that all racial liberals were Communists and vice versa. The issue of Communism in America

(and in the Southern Conference) did not take center stage in the country for some time,

especially after the outbreak of war and the creation of a tenuous alliance with the Soviet Union

for the duration of that war. Graham, for one, refused to allow this talk to dissuade him from

participating in SCHW, maintaining that Communist influence in the organization was

insignificant.20 Nonetheless, the SCHW's willingness to accept Communists into the fold before

the war caused the group serious problems after the war ended.

While the war raged, liberal southerners on the home front focused on ending voting

restrictions that prevented thousands of blacks and poor whites from going to the polls. They

reasoned that a true majority of southern voters would reject the racially poisonous politics of



19 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 99-101.

20 Sosna, In Search of the Silent S.N,,ll, 97-98.









elected leaders such as Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi and Governor Eugene Talmadge

of Georgia. There was an important strain of optimism in this logic that colored the thinking of

liberals throughout the era. Liberals worked and organized in the South under the assumption

that the region was not as politically reactionary as most Americans made it out to be. They

disagreed when it came to determining why southerners continued to elect conservatives to

public office, however. Some argued that the true voice of the South was never really heard,

since thousands of potential voters had never cast their ballots. Others argued that the political

class that ruled the South had misled the voters, keeping them focused on relatively unimportant

racial issues while failing to address the economic and social problems that had plagued the

region for decades. Either way, liberals were convinced that a systematic, sustained campaign to

register voters and educate them on the issues would result in a change in liberal electoral

fortunes.21

Another trend in the fight for southern liberalism was that liberals in the region needed to

continually remind southerners of their own southern roots. They wanted to defuse the notion

that the real impetus behind southern liberalism came from outside the South. Florida Senator

Claude Pepper made such an argument in 1942, when he introduced a bill that would have

outlawed poll taxes in all federal elections. Responding to criticism from Alabama Governor

Frank Dixon that implied he was not a true southerner, Pepper retorted, "my people have been

southerners as long as Governor Dixon's, and since 1600 I have not had a direct ancestor who

did not fight for and did not die for the South."22 This declaration of loyalty to the South did not

prevent reactionaries from labeling him a Communist or integrationist, but Pepper vowed that



21 Sosna, In Search of the Silent .Slh, 98.

22 Sosna, In Search of the Silent .,Slh, 101.









these slanders would not prevent him from fighting for what he thought was right, and thousands

of southern liberals made similar arguments during and after World War II.

In the end, liberals were unable to force large-scale reforms to the poll tax system in the

South. Anti-poll tax bills introduced into Congress died quickly, and states refused to budge on

the issue. Despite these failures, however, the transformations of the war years had heartened

liberal reformers, especially in 1944, when the Supreme Court declared the all-white Democratic

primary in Texas to be unconstitutional in Smnith v. Allwright. The decision did not prevent

southern states from placing legal barriers between black voters and the polls, but it did signal

that practices that had not been challenged for decades were coming under fire.23

Liberals also benefited from wartime changes to the southern economy. Southerners had

eagerly sought defense contracts and welcomed the creation of large new factories to fill them.

Along with these economic opportunities, however, southerners had also accepted increased

scrutiny of their way of life. Labor leaders, for example, had long lamented the manner in which

southern factory owners prevented them from organizing workers, and the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO) had failed to establish a foothold in the South despite its aggressive

approach to organization. During the war, however, CIO leaders vehemently argued that the

southern status quo resulted in wasted manpower and production delays that hurt the war effort.24

Most of these "occupational patterns" had an important racial component, and the CIO was

committed to integrationist unionism. Labor's challenges to the southern racial order also helped

southern liberals in their quest for reform. The most significant victory won on this front during

the war was won by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,



23 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 3 80-3 81.

24 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 135.









who had threatened President Roosevelt with a march on Washington in the summer of 1941 if

the government did not end discriminatory practices in defense industries. Roosevelt responded

to the pressure with Executive Order 8802, which established a Fair Employment Practices

Committee (FEPC) to investigate hiring and labor practices, as well as racial discrimination

against workers in defense and government. The creation of the FEPC did not stop racial

discrimination, nor did it prevent reactionaries from stalling change to the status quo in the

South. Nevertheless, it showed that the federal government was willing to investigate what was

really going on in the South.25

As these events unfolded, SCHW continued to grow under the leadership of executive

secretary James Dombrowski. He was a native of Tampa, a student at Reinhold Niebuhr's Union

Theological Seminary, and the co-founder of the Highlander Folk School in rural Tennessee.

During the 1930s, Dombrowski's focus had been getting white workers in the South to look

beyond racial differences and toward common economic interests. In this regard, Dombrowski's

ideas conflicted with the policies of the CIO, which financed Highlander and wanted to avoid

any direct confrontation with segregation that might have hurt the CIO's membership numbers.

In December 1941, this issue caused Dombrowski to resign from Highlander and join SCHW.

He focused SCHW's efforts on how racial prejudice and economic backwardness hindered the

effort to defeat fascism. He also blocked changes in SCHW bylaws, proposed by board member

Frank McAllister in 1943, that would have barred Communists from the group, arguing that such

a change would have hindered the campaign to promote democracy and liberal values.26 This




25 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 213-216; Michael S. Sherry, In the .sh, \/,ll of War: The
United States Since the 1930s (New Haven, 1995), 50, 145-146.

26 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 150-155; Sosna, In Search of the Silent South, 142-144.









policy battle attracted little attention during the war, but it would cause serious problems for the

Southern Conference after the war.

The other major organization for southern liberals, the Southern Regional Council (SRC),

was a product of the war itself. It differed from the Southern Conference in several key respects.

It kept membership rolls small, as opposed to SCHW, which sought to attract as many members

as possible. SRC cultivated ties to middle-class Southerners, while the Southern Conference

concentrated on the working classes. Most importantly, SRC projected a relatively conservative

public image, excluding not only Communists and Socialists but members of the NAACP as

well. Certainly NAACP members were not pleased at being associated with political radicals,

but SRC members wanted to eliminate any hint of "radicalism," as they saw it. Most SRC

members agreed that reform was needed. Its resolutions supported FEPC and condemned the

white primary and the poll tax. However, the organization did not endorse an immediate end to

racial segregation. Some individual members did advocate desegregation, either as a practical

reallocation of human resources or as a needed moral reform. Most, however, were either

against desegregation entirely or wanted to avoid a confrontation that would provoke the wrath

of reactionaries. Throughout the 1940s, SRC and SCHW were rivals for the affections of

southern liberals, though many people, including SCHW President Clark Foreman and Fisk

University president Charles S. Johnson, became members of both.27 In 1947, the rivalry

between the two groups continued.

Other reports out of the South during the war were more ominous. They showed that the

problems of the region went far beyond the failure to hire or train black workers for jobs in

southern defense plants. Southern blacks began to challenge segregationist practices in the


27 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 432-439.









military, on public transportation, and in education, and white reactionaries responded violently.

Lynchings, which had been declining for years, increased throughout the South, and white mobs

often targeted decorated black soldiers as a sign that military bravery was no protection against

entrenched white supremacy.28

Politicians seized on the fears of whites, both during and after the war, though the results

of such fear-mongering were mixed. Georgia's Eugene Talmadge was the face of this

intimidation for many, particularly in the 1942 Democratic gubernatorial primary. Ironically,

Talmadge's unsuccessful campaign turned on a matter that was unrelated to racial issues. The

governor's decision to purge the state's universities of liberal faculty members caused the

universities to lose their national accreditation. The public embarrassment the scandal generated

caused voters to turn to his opponent, former state attorney general Ellis Arnall, as a credible

alternative. Arnall won the election, and his term as governor included successful efforts to end

the poll tax, end rebates for railroads, and destroy the Klan in Georgia. His governorship seemed

to indicate that liberal political change was possible in the South.29

However, reactionaries and conservatives still held a great deal of political power in the

South. Many observers concluded that the fate of the South was uncertain, since both sides

could claim successes. For example, while Arnall was able to push through liberal reforms in

Georgia, Talmadge did not fade away. He spent the four years of Arnall's administration

opposing the governor's reforms. In 1946, he survived the changes brought about by Georgia's

compliance with Smithl v. Allwright to win the governorship back from Amall.30 Talmadge's



28 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 358-375; Sosna, In Search of the Silent Son,th, 34-36.

29 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 378-379.
30 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 385-386.









victory served as a reminder to liberals that success was often temporary, and that permanent

realignment in favor of liberalism was going to be difficult to achieve.

In short, the South appeared to be up for grabs in the wake of the changes brought on by

World War II. Liberals and conservatives alike were eager for the opportunity to take advantage

of this situation. Nowhere was the battle for the region more noticeable than in Georgia, where

Talmadge's 1946 election turned into a free-for-all when the governor-elect died of cancer

before he could assume the office. Because Talmadge was such a polarizing figure, and because

Arnall's administration had been so good to liberals and moderates, anti-Talmadge forces were

determined to prevent the governor's son Herman from taking over for his father. The

controversy over the governorship of Georgia lasted several months, with Arnall and Talmadge

supporters literally fighting one another outside the capitol when Talmadge attempted to claim

the office. Pro-Talmadge men changed the locks on Arnall's office with the connivance of state

troopers, and Talmadge's forces made extra-legal attempts to overturn Arnall's changes to the

state's electoral system. The state's Supreme Court eventually threw Herman Talmadge out of

office, but his supporters had shown that they were willing to do almost anything to stop liberal

reform.31

In this highly charged atmosphere, it was difficult for the Southern Conference and its

allies to find solid footing. The problem for SCHW was its close association with known

Communists and fellow-travelers, which became a problem once the bitterness of the struggle

between the United States and the Soviet Union became clear. In March 1946, when Winston

Churchill warned the world of an "iron curtain" descending upon Eastern Europe (with President

Truman in attendance), Americans believed him, and they blamed Communists for this. As the


31 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 386-389.









political realignment that resulted from the Cold War became clear, people associated with

Communism became targets, whether or not their associations had national security implications.

No one could reasonably claim that James Dombrowski posed a threat to the United States, but

his conservative opponents claimed that he did, and this hurt SCHW's organizing efforts.

SCHW and its liberal allies began to feel immense pressure, in part because their

organization had never been more successful than at the end of World War II. By the end of

1945, SCHW had three thousand members, including most of the prominent southerners who

had been present at the Birmingham meeting, and it boasted a budget of $85,000, augmented by

fund-raising events held throughout the country. Dombrowski and Foreman looked forward to

continued growth in the post-war years. However, the success it enjoyed during this period did

not last. The powerlessness of the Southern Conference became clear in 1947, when SCHW's

Georgia chapter refused to take a public stand on the Amall-Talmadge "civil war," despite its

private sympathy for Arnall. Political observers had long thought Georgia had the best-financed,

most organized state committee for the Southern Conference. The group's refusal to help Amall,

either because it did not want to associate with what they saw as a losing cause or because it did

not want to hurt Amall's chances at victory with their endorsement, was difficult for fellow

liberals to understand.32

That same year, SCHW suffered a more significant blow to its effectiveness when the CIO,

its main financial backer, withdrew most of its support. The roots of CIO disaffection with

SCHW dated from the end of the war, when postwar "re-conversion" caused large scale short-

term unemployment, particularly in the South. CIO leaders wanted to organize these workers,

but to do that meant that the federation needed to significantly expand its presence in the region.


32 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 440-441; Sosna, In Search of the Silent Snurh, 144-145.









To that end, in May 1946 they launched "Operation Dixie," aiming to add one million southern

workers to their ranks by the end of the decade and using a war chest of one million dollars to

underwrite the effort. One key to the campaign was its determination to avoid discussion of

racial segregation in southern factories. Conservatives in the CIO argued that challenging white

racism was futile and would distract the federation from its stated goal of attracting southern

workers. At the press conference announcing the program, Operation Dixie director Van Bittner

also announced that he wanted no help from Communists, Socialists, or their allies, which

included SCHW. As a result, CIO support for the Southern Conference gradually declined,

falling to almost nothing by the end of 1947. The decision devastated Foreman and

Dombrowski, but they could do little to stop it.33

They also saw dozens of SCHW members come to the conclusion that the organization no

longer represented them, primarily because of their personal anti-Communism. Frank Graham,

Eleanor Roosevelt, and novelist Lillian Smith were among those who cut their ties to the

Southern Conference after the war over this issue. Smith, a native Floridian who had lived most

of her life in Georgia, had always suspected that political radicals had played too prominent a

role in SCHW, and it had taken years of persuasion from friends before she agreed to a position

on the board in 1942. When she resigned in May 1945, she told Foreman and Dombrowski that

she did not like that board members associated openly with Communists. Moreover, she did not

like the way the board had excluded her from its decision-making processes, complaining,

"SCHW was actually being run in a grossly undemocratic fashion."34 She still believed in racial





33 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 208; Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 442-443.

34 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 442.









equality and political reform, but she did not believe that these goals could be achieved through

the Southern Conference, and this conclusion lead to her resignation.

The tension within southern liberalism was palpable. It mirrored a similar split among

liberals at the national level in which the question of what to do about Communism was pivotal.

Many liberals had agreed with Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, but many others had grave

reservations about a tough stance toward the Soviet Union, especially because of the wartime

alliance. The most vocal critic of Truman's anti-Communist policies was a member of his own

cabinet, Secretary of Commerce Wallace, who would have become president himself had

Franklin Roosevelt died during his third term. In September 1946, Wallace's disagreements with

Truman about the dangers of Communism became public knowledge when the secretary gave a

speech at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Wallace warned that a great-power rivalry

with the Soviets would lead to an expensive, dangerous arms race that neither side would truly

win. To forestall this rivalry, he recommended that the United States recognize the Soviets' right

to control certain areas of Eastern Europe. He also lamented the tendency of some Americans to

use Communism to demonize fellow citizens and play upon their fears of subversion.35

He enjoyed support in this fight from Florida Senator Claude Pepper, who also spoke at

Madison Square Garden. Pepper had first been elected to the Senate in a special election in

1936. In 1938 and 1944, he had won re-election campaigning as a committed New Dealer and

an early critic of Hitler. Near the end of World War II, Pepper had traveled to the Soviet Union,

where he met with Stalin and expressed his admiration for the Russian people and the Soviet

leader. On March 20, 1946, he had spoken on the Senate floor urging the United States to

destroy its nuclear arsenal as a sign to the Communist bloc that it had no intention of starting


35 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 225-227.









another world war. Pepper's relentless attacks on Truman's foreign policy attracted attention

from the American press and from fellow politicians, most of it negative. His decision to cast his

lot with Wallace had important consequences for his political career and for ADA.36

For the time being, Wallace, Pepper, and the Southern Conference challenged those

Americans who supported Truman's toughness toward the Soviet Union. The organizational and

political challenges these pro-Soviet "progressives" posed was especially difficult for anti-

Communist liberals. American liberalism was in trouble without Roosevelt, and Truman did not

appear to be the strong leader liberals wanted. Conservatives were more united and had as their

goal a return to power after nearly two decades without it. Liberals were fighting to hold on to

what they had, a difficult task in the best of times. Ironically, progressives and anti-Communist

liberals agreed on a great deal, including the general outlines of the New Deal and the need for

racial justice in the South. Could these two factions afford a fight with each other over foreign

policy and domestic Communism when other issues demanded that they cooperate?

Labor unions faced the same problem, as organizers debated whether they wanted the

assistance of Communists or fellow travelers. On the one hand, Communists had proven in the

past that they could reach workers and swell union ranks. However, the leaders of the United

Auto Workers (UAW) and United Steel Workers (USW) knew that attracting a few thousand

new members with Communist assistance would mean little if their opponents were able to

discredit them by portraying them as Communists. As a result, the leaders of many AFL and

CIO unions, including UAW President Walter Reuther, worked to convince their members that a

purge was necessary. Reuther argued that unions needed political purity in order to tackle the



36 James C. Clark, "Road to Defeat: Claude Pepper and Defeat in the 1950 Florida Primary,"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1998), 58-60, 70-73, 76-77, 80-82.









challenges of the post-war world, especially since Republicans and conservative Democrats were

giving every indication that they wanted to roll back the power of the unions.37

In 1946, the tension between progressives and anti-Communist liberals caused a formal

split as a result of Truman's decision to fire Wallace for his Madison Square Garden speech.

Wallace used his immense personal popularity to create a new liberal coalition which included

Clark Foreman and NAACP President Walter White. In December 1946, these liberals founded

the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), explicitly committing themselves to a New Deal

platform at home and a desire to revive the wartime Allied coalition abroad. One of Wallace's

main liberal rivals was the Union for Democratic Action (UDA), which had been founded in

1941 by disgruntled Socialists and liberals who disagreed with the prevailing "Popular Front"

ideology of the war period. They appealed to educated, politically-minded northerners who

wanted to join a liberal organization free of ties to Communism, but throughout the war UDA

remained small compared to its progressive counterparts.38

The stakes for liberals were never higher, and not just because of the PCA-UDA rivalry.

Conservatives had taken advantage of divisions within liberal ranks, suspicions of Communist

influence in the Democratic Party and labor unions, and a national desire for political change to

make significant gains in the 1946 mid-term elections. Republicans captured a majority of seats

in the House and Senate and strengthened their alliance with conservative southern Democrats

on labor and anti-Communism. A now formally-divided liberal coalition now had to reckon with

a conservative resurgence in American politics.





37 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 228-229.

38 Sullivan, Days ofHope, 230.









The conventional wisdom among liberal politicians and strategists was that the

Communism issue had been decisive in the 1946 Republican victory, affecting liberals regardless

of their stance on international affairs. Conservatives had been able to convince voters that

liberal candidates who accepted the support of the unions, the NAACP, or other liberal

organizations were under Moscow's control, and enough tangible evidence existed to lend

credence to this idea among a crucial part of the electorate. Certain Communists, after all, made

no secret of the fact that they were members of the party, and that meant any organization which

accepted their help appeared to be "infested" with "Reds." This was a particular problem in the

South, where the Southern Conference remained committed to the "Popular Front" mentality of

the late 1930s and the war period. James Dombrowski and Clark Foreman did not think that

accepting Communist support was a problem, but voters and politicians did, and this hurt the

public perception of all liberals.39

One group of liberals, however, presented itself as a viable alternative to the PCA and the

Southern Conference. On May 13, 1946, in a letter to The New Republic, James A. Loeb,

UDA's national director, spelled out liberalism's problems and offered potential solutions to

those problems. He attacked "progressives" for turning a blind eye to Soviet violations of human

rights and economically stagnant policies. He asked whether people who were enthusiastic

supporters of the Soviet Union, taking direct orders from Moscow, should be welcomed into

progressive organizations. He also warned that Communists had a long track record of

subverting those groups that they joined, warning that it would happen again to the Wallace

coalition if it was not pro-active in preventing it. Anti-Communist liberals who wanted to avoid




39 Sosna, In Search of the Silent Sn ulh, 145-146.









these problems were welcomed in UDA, and Loeb made an explicit plea for new membership at

the end of the letter.40

Another prominent UDA member, Arthur Schlesinger, also spoke out, writing an article

for Life magazine in July 1946 that attempted to unmask the Communist movement in the United

States. In preparing his article, Schlesinger spoke with former Communist Party leader Earl

Browder and Time magazine's Whittaker Chambers, a former Communist who was determined

to reveal the scope of the Communist conspiracy. The product of that research was a stinging

indictment of American Communism, which Schlesinger asserted had more in common with

religions such as the Mormons or Jesuits than other political parties. He did not think the

Communist Party posed a threat to the internal stability of the United States, at least not at that

moment. Instead, he criticized the dishonesty that was central to Communist political tactics,

and he warned that their organizing talents could appeal to Americans if the American economy

suffered through a second depression in the postwar years.41

The conclusions Loeb and Schlesinger drew about Communism created controversy, but

they reflected a growing consensus about which political philosophies American voters would

accept in the postwar period. If liberals wanted to compete in this new political environment,

they would have to purge Communists and their sympathizers from their ranks. This would

make liberalism more appealing in the long term, which would allow liberal ideas to have a

better chance at political success. Subsequent legislative successes would, in turn, make the

United States a better place to live, thereby decreasing the appeal of radical ideologies. This was

the plan UDA liberals wanted to implement, and they thought that as the only liberal



40 Sosna, In Search of the Silent S.mn 231; Gillon, Politics and Vision, 11.
41 Schlesinger, Life, 398-400.









organization that had never accepted Communism, they would be able to attract non-Communist

liberals, academics, labor leaders, and independents into the fold.

In January 1947, UDA leaders convened a conference to plan for the future of liberalism in

America. The Washington conference attracted numerous dignitaries, including Eleanor

Roosevelt and her son Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr, New York Post editor James

Weschler (a former Communist himself), and lawyer Joseph Rauh, who had served as a law

clerk to two Supreme Court justices and served on Douglas MacArthur's staff in the Pacific

theater before opening a private practice in Washington after the war. Others included Walter

Reuther of the UAW, David Dubinsky of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union

(ILGWU), and Minneapolis mayor Hubert H. Humphrey. This became the founding meeting for

Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and this group announced its opposition to the

progressive coalition now under the leadership of Henry Wallace.42

What was also clear at the time of ADA's creation was that it would work to change the

political culture of the South. The Southern Conference had attempted to attract southern

liberals, but its unwillingness to adapt to America's changing views on Communism caused

problems, and it appeared that the Southern Conference would be nothing more than a fringe

group. The Southern Regional Council had fewer problems with the Communist issue (though

conservatives would often accuse SRC of being in league with Communists anyway), but its

membership was so small and so politically diverse that agreement on key issues was difficult.

ADA liberals wanted to avoid the problems both had suffered, openly rejecting the

assistance of Communists and refusing to accept them as members while offering a platform that

championed the New Deal and sought to expand it. ADA would work closely with some SRC


42 Schlesinger, Life: 410.









members, but they wanted independence from all groups, including the existing Democratic

power structure. This was particularly important in the South, where elected Democrats could be

counted upon to oppose ADA at every turn. They wanted to prove that social and economic

reform was possible without radical ideology. The numerous problems of the South presented a

perfect opportunity to agitate for that change, especially since southern politics were in such a

state of transition.









CHAPTER 3
"THE HELL WITH IT": BARNEY TAYLOR AND THE FIRST INCARNATION OF THE
ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE IN MEMPHIS, 1947-1948

In January 1947, when a group of anti-Communist liberals formed Americans for

Democratic Action (ADA), the political situation in the South was not their primary focus. The

threat posed by the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and the Progressive Citizens

of America (PCA), led by former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, was the main impetus

behind the creation of ADA.' The South's continued resistance to economic and social change

was important to liberals, but the region's intransigence had comparatively little to do with the

decision to form ADA.

However, ADA's founders did include prominent southerners in their initial discussions.

Wilson W. Wyatt, former mayor of Louisville, was one of ADA's cofounders and its first

president. They also asked several well-known southerners to join ADA, including Delta-

Democrat Times editor Hodding Carter of Greenville, Mississippi; Dr. Rufus Clement, president

of Atlanta University; Representative Estes Kefauver of Tennessee; novelist Lillian Smith of

Clayton, Georgia; and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) organizer Franz Daniel of

Spartanburg, South Carolina.2 The liberals who founded ADA wanted their organization to be

truly national, and the way in which they reached out to these distinguished southerners showed

that they did not want to ignore the South.

Several events in the years following the end of World War II indicated liberalism had a

fighting chance in the South following the social and political upheaval of the Second World


1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Life in the 20th Century. Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950
(Boston, 2000), 394-417.
2 Inclusion on this list did not mean that the chosen individual would become an integral part of
the ADA's plans. Some, including Smith, raised funds and wrote mass-mailed appeals for ADA;
others, including Carter, wanted little to do with ADA.









War. Reform-minded liberal and moderate governors had been elected in the mid-1940s,

including James "Big Jim" Folsom in Alabama and Ellis Amall in Georgia, whose criticism of

the Ku Klux Klan and promises to restore academic freedom to Georgia's university system

seemed to be a refreshing change from politics as usual.3 The Southern Regional Council (SRC),

religious leaders, university professors, and liberal politicians had joined forces with labor unions

affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the CIO to form a loose coalition of

liberal southerners that hoped to disrupt pre-war patterns of political and economic life in the

South.4 CIO leaders had already shown a commitment to changing the South with the launch of

its southern organizing campaign in March 1946. The CIO hoped that "Operation Dixie" would

add one million southern workers to membership rolls by the end of the 1940s.

ADA leaders, including Executive Secretary James Loeb, corresponded with southerners

of all races and economic backgrounds in an attempt to determine how best to deal with the

region. Their advice was varied. David Burgess, executive director of the Fellowship of

Southern Churchmen in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, declared himself ecstatic that "some of the

ideologically homeless can find an abode with the like-minded." He recommended that ADA

create a "youth movement" to counter Communist success in attracting young people, fashion a

detailed platform that went beyond "uncritical praise for FDR," and keep an open mind about the

formation of a third party. Burgess also pledged his organization's support for ADA. He

claimed that unless something was done, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW)




3 John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day. The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement
in the S.,,lnh (Chapel Hill, 1995), 378-383. Arnall's 1946 defeat, and the spectacle in which
Arnall locked himself in the governor's office to protest the legislature's decision to throw him
out of office, destroyed his political reputation.

4 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 397.









would create trouble for "non-commies" in places such as Atlanta.5 The Southern Conference

maintained an unsavory reputation because of its acceptance of Communists and other radicals

as members. Loeb needed no prompting to keep an eye on SCHW, having campaigned against it

for years prior to the founding of ADA.

He also communicated with Barney Taylor, the Memphis-based director of organization

for the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU). Taylor was a native of Belton, Texas and a

graduate of Texas A&M. He had served in World War II and participated in Operation

Overlord, suffering combat wounds that caused him to lose one eye and the use of his right leg.

He received a Purple Heart and the Distinguished Service Cross for his service. In 1946, he

joined the NFLU and moved to Memphis with his wife Laura, a former first lieutenant in the

Women's Air Corps. He became an ADA member in 1947. He also joined the SRC, NAACP,

American Veterans' Committee (AVC), and the American Newspaper Guild. Taylor was a bona

fide war hero and a committed liberal with experience in dealing with southern liberals, and his

input shaped the thinking of Loeb and other ADA leaders.6

Loeb used Taylor as an informal ADA adviser, and he saw an opportunity to use Taylor's

skills when Taylor began a leave of absence from NFLU in late January 1947. Loeb wanted to

know how the bitterness between the AFL and CIO would affect ADA organization, what ADA

should do about SCHW, and whether or not a regional conference in and about the South would

serve any useful purpose.7 Taylor saw no reason why labor leaders would not assist ADA unless



5 David Burgess to James A. Loeb, January 13, 1947, reel 59, no. 18, Americans for Democratic
Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville, microfilm collection (hereafter cited
as ADA Papers).

6 Barney Taylor, memo to John F. P. Tucker, June 10, 1947, reel 50, no. 270, ADA Papers.

7 Loeb to Taylor, January 24, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









"top leadership" in their federations forbade it, an unlikely development since many had helped

to found ADA. He advised Loeb to "forget" SCHW, except insofar as they might be able to

convince some "good" liberals, including Frank Porter Graham and Eleanor Roosevelt, to leave

the organization. Finally, Taylor agreed that a regional conference was an important step and

offered his services as a part-time assistant to organize it.8

However, two factors tempered Taylor's enthusiasm for the project. First, he wondered

about "the interracial aspects of the situation." Specifically, he thought ADA needed to make

any conference multi-racial so that it could address the political, economic, and social problems

black southerners faced. He also referred to the logistical nightmare an interracial conference

would entail, since finding a hotel or meeting space that would allow such a conference to take

place would be difficult at best.9

Second, Taylor brought up the subject of Atlanta Constitution editor Ralph McGill, whom

Loeb had mentioned as a potential ADA member. Others had objected, saying McGill was not

"liberal enough" for ADA because, while he favored the New Deal and a tough stance toward

the Soviet Union, many southern liberals believed his racial views were troubling and

inconsistent.10 Taylor understood Loeb's trepidation in approaching McGill, but he warned that

"I wonder how liberal we can afford to be and still attract the maximum."11 Would ADA force

its potential members to take a racial litmus test before joining? Would ADA accept members

who fell short of the agreeing to its entire platform? If it did require southerners to agree with

each plank of the platform before joining, how many members could ADA possibly attract?

8 Taylor to Loeb, February 1, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

9 Taylor to Loeb, February 1, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.
10 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 256-258.

11 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 256-258.









These are questions that ADA leaders would have to answer as they organized in the South, and

opinions would vary widely on what needed to be done.

Loeb also wanted to know how ADA would fit into the liberal political picture in the

South. In late April 1947, Taylor and Rev. Samuel F. Freeman, Jr. of Pulaski Heights Christian

Church in Little Rock, Arkansas discussed this very issue. Taylor wrote to Freeman in an

unofficial capacity, but he was already singing ADA's praises, and he pressed Freeman to

disassociate himself from the Southern Conference. Taylor noted that the NFLU and CIO had

cut off support for SCHW and that several of its most prominent members had resigned, and he

recommended ADA "as a more effective and reliable substitute," especially on the issue of

Communism. Freeman disagreed. He chided Taylor for giving him "great concern that the

liberal forces of our Southland and the nation are so much divided and separated from one

another." Freeman was "not greatly interested in labels. I am convicted with ideals, issues and

men." He declined Taylor's offer to join ADA because he did not want to divide his energies

between two liberal organizations.12 Many southern liberals shared Freeman's caution about

ADA, wondering what it could do that SCHW or SRC were not already doing. If Taylor and

ADA were going to succeed in the South, they need to tell people about what made them

different from other liberal groups.

This issue notwithstanding, Taylor was eager to get ADA off the ground in the South,

and in February 1947 he outlined the prospects of a regional conference to be held in Atlanta or

Birmingham in March or April. Liberals would be invited from Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia,

Florida, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Taylor recommended that

southern ADA members submit lists of people they should consider for membership in the

12 Taylor to Rev. Samuel F. Freeman, Jr., April 25, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers; Freeman
to Taylor, May 1, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









organization; each person on the lists would then receive a letter from the national office in

Washington inviting them to the conference. This was a decentralized approach to organization,

which made financial sense to Taylor. He also expressed some trepidation about organizing the

region by himself, and he wanted to solicit advice from long-time liberal activists. Taylor cast

his lot with those in ADA who wanted no compromise on its platform. "Only those who have

accepted the policies and principles laid down by the Committee of the whole should attend," he

declared, and he recommended that "no time be wasted in appeasing race-baiters."13

As Taylor made these recommendations, Loeb disseminated information from

Washington to prospective members everywhere, including the South. When dealing with

southern contacts, he assured them that the South was a priority. For example, he assured Nelle

Morton, general secretary for the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen, "we are very anxious to do

some work in the South, but we realize that the South presents a special problem which much be

handled separately and with considerable delicacy."14 Morton was optimistic, calling ADA "the

most hopeful sign in the political horizon I have seen."15

Many liberals thought the South desperately needed political change, and they thought

even an "outsider group" such as ADA had a unique opportunity to foster that change. Such was

the perspective attorney Moss A. Plunkett of Roanoke, Virginia, president of the Southern

Electoral Reform League, who had made unsuccessful runs for Congress in 1942 and governor

in 1945. Plunkett was determined to break the Harry F. Byrd machine that controlled

Democratic politics in Virginia, and he saw a chance to do that in a 1948 referendum on ending


13 Taylor to Loeb, "Memorandum on a Southern Conference of Americans for Democratic
Action," February 12, 1947, reel 78, no. 94, ADA Papers.

14 Loeb to Nelle Morton, February 20, 1947; reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

15 Morton to Loeb, March 14, 1947, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









the state's poll tax. Plunkett's focus on ending the poll tax, and the precarious state of his

personal finances, would not permit him to assist ADA at that time, he wrote Loeb, but he did

express his support for ADA's objectives. "One of the reasons why the United States [cannot]

make a greater contribution to world government than she is now making is that we do not have

democracy in the South. Virginia should take the lead in correcting this situation," he

insisted.16

For his part, Loeb knew that the South was going to present special problems for ADA.

He discussed with Franz Daniel the possibility of seven or eight regional conferences throughout

the country, including one in the South. He listed three major problems he thought ADA would

have in the South: "the race question," rivalry between the AFL and CIO, and the manner in

which the Southern Conference and "liberalism" in general had become synonymous in southern

minds. While Loeb could not come up with a solution to the first two problems, he had one for

the latter. He wanted to get Frank Porter Graham on board with ADA and to get him away from

the influence of SCHW and its secretary, Clark Foreman.17 Graham had been intimately

involved with SCHW since 1938, when he had attended its inaugural conference in Birmingham

and joined the majority that had defied the city's ban on integrated meetings. He remained

active in SCHW for several more years, "adamant in the belief that if the genuine liberals stuck

by the Southern Conference, they could defeat any Communists or fellow travelers in any fair

and open fight."'8




16 Moss A. Plunkett to Loeb, March 24, 1947, reel 78, no. 100, ADA Papers.

17 Loeb to Franz Daniel, February 1, 1947, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

18 Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham: A .Snluheil n Liberal (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1980), 154-
168, 234.









While ADA leaders worked on Graham, in May 1947 Loeb and other ADA officials

approached Taylor with an offer made possible by Taylor's leave of absence from NFLU.19

Taylor had been working for ADA on a part-time, volunteer basis as an informal liaison between

southern liberals and the ADA leadership in Washington, but Loeb wanted to make Taylor a

permanent ADA employee. For his part, Taylor acknowledged that "on several other questions,

I have a completely open (or blank) mind; and will need guidance by better brains." He also

made a concession to the national office on policy matters. As he put it, "be assured that I am

organizationally minded enough to carry out policy thoughtfully arrived at, whether it represents

my own thinking or not."20

In return, Taylor wanted a three-month commitment from ADA, beginning in May 1947,

which would coincide with his NFLU leave. He wanted to postpone any regional conference,

arguing that "we will work on actual organization of community and campus chapters at the

same time. I wouldn't expect big dough from such efforts, but there will be some dues and

contribution income to the National Office. That policy will also make toward a more

representative subsequent conference by having chapter delegates as well as prominent liberal-

labor leaders among those present." Finally, Taylor wanted the title of Southern Organizer to

supersede any local responsibilities, saying, "I feel that I must avoid being regarded as a paid

local executive secretary, and plan to form working organizing committees in each state, city and

community."21


19 There is no indication that Taylor's parting from NFLU was anything but amicable. In fact,
Taylor made an important gesture to his former employer when he resigned from ADA's
Executive Board in mid-May 1947. He suggested that H.L. Mitchell, president of NFLU, serve
in his place. Taylor to Loeb, May 16, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.
20 Taylor to Loeb, April 17, 1947, reel 78, no. 94, ADA Papers.

21 Taylor to Loeb, April 17, 1947, reel 78, no. 94, ADA Papers.









Loeb agreed to each of Taylor's requests, and he also agreed to set up ADA's southern

headquarters in Memphis, where Taylor had been working since the end of World War II. This

was important for personal reasons, as Taylor's wife was now expecting their first child. He also

thought it would help in getting the project up and running quickly, as "I can at least have the

physical setup in readiness to begin fulltime operations May 1-the office rented, necessary

equipment purchased, telephone installed, and secretary hired."22 National headquarters

budgeted $5,200 for Taylor's salary over the next three months and an additional $3,000 for

expenses, including rent, telephone and telegraph service, office supplies, postage, and printing

costs. There was every indication that if Taylor succeeded, he might be rewarded with an

extended ADA contract or with reduced responsibilities that might make his job easier. Loeb

justified the expense of Taylor's project to the ADA Executive Committee at their May 1947

meeting, calling the need for additional organizers ADA's "greatest need at the moment." He

also assured those worried about money that "the $30,000 proposed budget will permit several

additional organizers. This [budget] item covers not only the salary of the organizers but also

their travel, office equipment and all other expense."23 The South had become a part of the

larger ADA organizational strategy that focused on putting maximum pressure on southern

liberals. The more noise ADA could make the better for attracting new members, and Loeb

hoped the incoming money would eventually cover all of Taylor's activities.

The desire to get ADA going in the South animated a meeting Taylor convened in

Atlanta on May 9. Participants included Lillian Smith, Dorothy R. Tilly from the President's

Commission on Civil Rights, Guy John of the Southern Regional Council, and Frank McAllister



22 Taylor to Loeb, April 17, 1947, reel 78, no. 94, ADA Papers.

23 ADA Executive Committee meeting minutes, May 3, 1947, reel 33, no. 63, ADA Papers.









of the Georgia Workers Education Service. These Georgians wanted to create an Atlanta chapter

of ADA, but they also wanted to assist Taylor in his larger southern project. They concluded

that, "[ADA] should not attempt to get an impressive [regional] gathering until September ....

They believe that chapter organization, plus an intensive mail and personal campaign should

precede the meeting-and they do not believe that two months is sufficient time." However,

Taylor also considered the revised date a case of "[shoving] the date forward," which makes little

sense until one considers Tilly's presence in the meeting.24 As a member of the commission that

was due to submit its comprehensive report on civil rights to the President before the end of the

year (it was submitted in late October), Tilly knew that ADA had to position itself to take

advantage of the publicity the report was bound to generate. These southerners knew they were

fighting an uphill battle, but good timing would help Taylor maximize the impact of the regional

meeting he wanted to convene.

On May 26, Taylor told ADA headquarters about the energetic schedule he planned to

keep. "[The third week of May] has been spent in the formation of an organizing committee for

Memphis, in compiling card files of liberals throughout the South, in forming a southwide

'Southern Committee' and in initiating correspondence with every lead or contact in my

possession." In June, he planned to visit Little Rock, Arkansas for private meetings with liberal

contacts and attend the state AFL convention, as well as travel to Birmingham and Montgomery,

Alabama for more meetings.2

Despite Taylor's desire to work across the South, he also committed to work with

Memphis liberals in forming their ADA chapter. In a confidential memorandum to the national



24 Taylor, memo to Tucker, May 13, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

25 Taylor to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 26, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









office written in late May, he referred to developments in west Tennessee as "stupendous." His

enthusiasm resulted from the local unions' decision to put their organizational differences aside

and form a "United Labor Committee" to foster liberal political action. The unions wanted to

create mailing lists down to the block level in the city and submit recommendations during

elections, "[supporting] candidates put forward by a broad cross-section citizen's group-namely

ADA." Taylor had formed an organizing committee earlier that month. Members included B. R.

Allen of the Memphis Industrial Union Council (CIO) and Frank Miles of the Tennessee State

Federation of Labor (AFL), as well as several local attorneys, two journalists (including John

Rodgers of the Memphis Press-Scimitar, a past president of the Newspaper Guild of Memphis),

and two local Episcopal ministers.26

The time seemed ripe for a challenge to the political authority of Edward H. "Boss"

Crump, a former mayor of Memphis and congressman who had run the city politically for more

than three decades, primarily through proxies he controlled. He had a reputation for clean

government, but liberals detested the way in which his machine anointed governors and senators

without consulting liberal elements in the city or state.27 Crump had been able to keep most

liberals in line, but World War II's social and political dislocations presented an opportunity to

liberals who had been searching for a way to break the Boss's grip. Taylor and the organizing

committee were convinced that a determined effort over the next year would, Taylor said, "at

least cut down the customary machine majority [in Memphis] to the point where

[Representative] Estes Kefauver can be elected to the Senate." Taylor suggested that one way to

get liberals excited, and simultaneously drive Crump insane, would be to invite Kefauver's



26 Taylor, confidential memo to Loeb, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

27 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 225.









House colleague Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. of New York to "come down and install our chapter

one evening and to speak at an open mass meeting the following evening. Mr. Crump, bless his

heart, has helped considerably in making the name Roosevelt a magic one in this area" with his

constant criticism of the New Deal and Truman. Taylor sensed that the 1948 election would be

important for liberals in their efforts to preserve the Tennessee Valley Authority, repeal the poll

tax, and make changes to the state's legislative apportionment procedures.28

In order to make this plan work, Tennessee liberals had to engage in some political

maneuvering of their own. Kefauver was reluctant to leave his relatively safe seat in the House

for a Senate run, and former governor and World War II veteran Gordon Browning wanted to

run for the Senate on the anti-Crump slate. Taylor thought Kefauver's relationship with ADA's

Washington leadership would help their plans. If Loeb could convince Kefauver to run for the

Senate, they could then convince Browning to make another run for the governorship.29

The 1948 congressional elections were important to Tennessee liberals, but Taylor had

other issues with the Memphis chapter that needed his attention. He was concerned about the

heavy union representation in the Memphis chapter, which would cause critics to call ADA little

more than a labor front organization. Taylor tried to counter that impression by keeping the

"non-labor liberals" in most of the main leadership positions. He also had to deal with

Memphis's black population, which had always had an important place in the Crump machine.

Taylor met with Hollis Price, president of historically black LeMoyne College, to get his advice.

Before the meeting, he had told Loeb that he suspected Price and "the Negro leaders will advise

[liaison] rather than integration." He hoped that ADA leaders would "agree that it would be well


28 Taylor, confidential memo to Loeb, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

29 Taylor, confidential memo to Loeb, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









for me to accept their advice. We seem to have the choice of being a principled but futile

liberal inter-racial outpost or a successful political movement." Taylor thought a segregated

chapter was a small price to pay for success, but such a decision meant compromising ADA's

membership standards, and he was unsure how his employers in Washington would react.30

Loeb chose to trust Taylor's judgment, especially concerning black participation in

southern chapters. "I think we would all agree that we want to be a successful political

movement. If you accept advice from the progressive Negro leaders of the South, I am sure that

that advice would be acceptable to us and to our Negro leaders here."31 This was not ideal for

ADA, but Loeb also realized that problems in the South were different from those in other parts

of the country, and so he hoped that a cautious initial approach would allow them to be more

aggressive in the future.

Conditions also varied state by state, and Taylor saw this at the end of May when he took

his scheduled trip to Arkansas. Publicly, Taylor would not go into details, saying only that

"Arkansas, by its very nature will function more effectively with a statewide unit than with city

chapters. Little Rock is practically the only thing resembling a city in the state." He expressed

mild concern at the fact that "Rev. Freeman feels that he must continue with organization of

SCHW. Since he knows most of the liberals in Arkansas, his attitude will present a distinct

handicap."32 Privately, Taylor was far less restrained in his criticism of the Southern

Conference. He had conversed extensively with Freeman in person and in writing, and he

thought he had struck up a friendly rapport with him, only to find out that Freeman was still



30 Taylor, confidential memo to Loeb, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

31 Loeb, memo to Taylor, June 5, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

32 Taylor to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 31, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









continuing with SCHW work. Taylor also continued his feud with SCHW leaders Clark

Foreman and James Dombrowski, who found themselves under siege for their associations with

Communists and criticized anti-Communist liberals, including Taylor, as being responsible for

their organizational and financial problems. According to Taylor, the two men "wrote letters

teeming with indignation, containing such phrases as 'vile slander,' 'insidious whispering

campaign,' and other such juicy pleasantries. In Dombrowski's letter, the closing bit of rhetoric

was 'What is Barney Taylor up to anyhow? Is he trying to create his own little organization? Or

is he trying to help the common man in his fight against reaction?"'33

While dealing with criticism from the left, Taylor tried to set regional policy on matters

such as anti-lynching legislation. Most southern liberals wanted to end lynching, but many

agreed with southern conservatives that this was an issue that southern legislatures, not

Congress, should handle. However, by 1947 several failed attempts at federal legislation and a

new wave of violence against southern blacks, including some decorated World War II veterans,

was changing the political climate, or so Taylor thought. In discussions with Frank McCallister,

Taylor mentioned that Loeb had told him ADA would endorse new efforts at national anti-

lynching legislation and told McCallister that "most thoughtful southerners now believed that

federal legislation is necessary." He did not attempt to convince McCallister that federal

intervention was the right course of action; in fact, he sought the Georgian's advice on the

matter.34 However, Taylor's willingness to consider federal anti-lynching legislation showed his

frustration at the South's intransigence on this most basic of civil rights issues. He believed this

frustration was something that ADA could use to appeal to pro-civil rights southerners.



33 Taylor, confidential memo to Loeb, May 31, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

34 Taylor to Frank McCallister, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 275, ADA Papers.









Another positive for the ADA effort in the South was their enlistment of novelist Lillian

Smith to their cause. The Florida native first came to public attention with her 1944 novel

Strange Fruit, whose indictment of the racial status quo in the South and unsparing depiction of

an interracial romance caused a sensation. The Boston Public Library banned the book, and the

Postal Service would not allow it to be mailed in the United States.35 Smith was a loud voice for

liberalism in the South, and she had no problem helping anyone who was willing to address the

injustices about which she wrote.

She had joined ADA's Committee of the Whole, attended its first convention, and offered

her services for ADA speaking engagements, including one in Boston after the city's libraries

banned her book. In late May, Loeb talked to Smith about assisting in ADA's recruitment efforts

in the South, and she was "prepared to do anything the ADA asks her to do, including the signing

of an appeal letter." Loeb's plan was to "send her a draft; she will rewrite it in her own style; we

will then have the letters, envelopes and everything prepared and stamped, and send them to

Memphis to be dropped in the mailbox so that the postmark is Memphis. The return envelopes,

with the money, will be addressed to [Taylor's] office."36 The hope was that Smith's passion

would be especially powerful given her southern roots, which would hopefully overcome some

southerners' wariness of a group that seemed "foreign." These liberals would then join the

group, contribute money, and contribute to a liberal revival in the region.

Smith's mass mailing, dated June 20, 1947, was a stinging indictment of "the sad and

tragic events that have piled up so tall a monument to racial hate this past year," including



35 For more information on the controversy surrounding Strange Fruit and an analysis of what
made it so provocative, see Louise Blackwell and Frances Clay, Lillian Smithl (New York, 1971),
37-41.

36 Loeb to Taylor, May 29, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









several lynchings that had occurred in Georgia and the Carolinas in the first six months of 1947.

There was nothing especially unique about these murders, as thousands of them had occurred in

the past several decades across the South. However, Smith now had a platform from which to

criticize these crimes, and ADA gave her a chance to spread that message throughout the

country. "Our people's prejudice has overflowed the bounds of reason. Increased by world

tensions, whipped on by a loose-floating hate that is sweeping across the minds of men

everywhere, it has reached proportions so destructive of law and order and justice and human

values that only the fool, or the sick, can now say, 'Leave us alone and we'll handle it."'37

Rejecting the old philosophies of states' rights, Smith appealed to northern liberals,

writing, "We are asking our own people to help us now, Americans like ourselves, whose

concern it is and who should share in this responsibility. Only by our securing a Federal bill

against lynching can we draw fully upon the resources of our government and our Federal courts

to help us meet this cultural disaster." She touted ADA as an organization that "in democratic

ways, [is] trying to make democracy work in this country and throughout the world," and she

urged supporters to "give them your money and your support; do it now while we have the

chance to stop this infamy."38 Taylor sent this letter to 5,000 ADA supporters out of the

Memphis office, and the response to her appeal encouraged people in Memphis and Washington.

Assistant Executive Secretary John F. P. Tucker told Smith he had received over 230 responses

to the letter and contributions to the southern office totaling over $1,100.39





37 Lillian Smith, mass mailing, June 20, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.
38 Lillian Smith, mass mailing, June 20, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

39 Tucker to Smith, July 23, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









While Taylor worked with Smith, he continued to travel the South. In early June, he

traveled to Birmingham and met with Charles Fiedelson, a former regional director for the

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and current associate editor and columnist for the

Birmingham News, as well as local United Mine Workers (UMW) leader William Mitch. Taylor

"secured" their "cooperation" with ADA, and he thought this was especially important because

the personalities of Birmingham's liberals did not mesh as well as they had in Memphis. He

wrote, "I talked with some 25 people there, almost all of whom expressed resentment against at

least one or two others. However, [Fiedelson] and Mitch appear to have the approval of all."

With these two men on board, Taylor hoped to have an organizational meeting by the end of

June. He had also wanted to meet with enigmatic .S,,inl/hl Farmer editor Aubrey Williams

while in town, but Williams' public support of Henry Wallace forestalled any productive contact

with Taylor.40

Taylor also returned to Little Rock in mid-June, which seems surprising given the

generally negative reception he had received from local liberals earlier in the year. However, an

Arkansas-born architecture student at Cornell, Scott D. Hamilton, Jr., was firmly convinced that

"Little Rock needs ADA, and ADA needs Little Rock!" Hamilton expressed frustration with the

political scene in Arkansas in his discussions with Taylor. He wrote, "in the past, liberals have

never been outstanding locally. A union endorsement has been the kiss of death to leaders

running for office. To the average Arkansan anything to the left of status quo arch-conservatism

resembles 'communism.' Therefore people like our pride and joy, Bill Fulbright in the senate

[sic], talk little and do much cautiously." This was nothing new to an experienced organizer

such as Taylor. However, Hamilton's insistence that "there are many businessmen and leaders


40 Taylor, "Weekly Report" memo to Loeb, June 9, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









who will find a means of independent political expression in a Little Rock ADA," and his

willingness to work with liberal college students at state universities won Taylor over, and he

made plans to meet with Hamilton.41 Taylor also thought things were looking up in Arkansas

because of the disintegration of the local SCHW chapter, though he cautioned that "this hurts

us more than it helps [in the short term], since the SCHW has a good many of the Arkansas

liberals somewhat gun-shy."42

Taylor saw numerous positive signs for organizing the South, but there was one looming

negative on the horizon that ADA could not ignore. Lillian Smith's anti-lynching appeal had

brought in some money, but ADA remained chronically short of financial support, and Taylor's

office was no exception. These problems became the subject of a rather testy exchange between

Taylor and the national office in late June, as Taylor had used much of his mailing budget on the

Smith letter. John Tucker chided Taylor because "all items of the Southern Office costs are

exceeding its approved budget. This is impossible both because this office cannot authorize such

excesses, but also because the financial receipts during the summer months are reduced to a point

that makes it essential to scrutinize carefully the most modest expenditures." Tucker and his

superiors were particularly upset at Taylor's purchase of a fluorescent desk lamp without first

consulting Washington about the purchase. They did not appreciate that Taylor had made this

purchase without considering the fact that the national office was sacrificing similar creature

comforts for the benefit of the field offices. The budget ADA approved for Taylor had not

allowed for such extravagance, and Tucker wanted him to bring the situation under control.43



41 Scott D. Hamilton, Jr. to Taylor, June 9, 1947, reel 50, no. 274, ADA Papers.

42 Taylor to Loeb, "Weekly Report," June 17, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

43 Tucker to Taylor, June 25, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









Taylor was not willing to admit he had been wrong. He wrote, "a close examination of

expenditures of this office fails to support your initial statement that 'All the Southern Office

costs are exceeding its approved budget.'" He contended that his travel expenses had been well

within reason, even though Tucker had not questioned them; he had paid two months' advance

rent on their office space; and sixty dollars remained from the initial ADA appropriation. As for

the lamp, Taylor noted that his secretary had indicated that she would "be glad to pay for it

herself in case the national office disapproved," which they clearly did. Taylor acknowledged

the concern about individual expenditures over ten dollars, asking only, "in return that your

office expedite, better than it has in the past, approval or disapproval of such requests."44 The

tension between the local and national offices concerning financial matters was quite clear.

Despite this tension over finances, ADA could not claim that Taylor was not working hard

to organize chapters in the South. At the end of June, Taylor summed up his early activities in

his weekly report to Loeb. He had finally started a chapter in Memphis, and in early July he

planned to head to Birmingham to chair an organizational meeting headed by Fiedelson and

Mitch, though their participation was not yet official or public knowledge. He touted "the next

most likely spots" for organization as being Nashville and Chattanooga. "My most extensive list

of names, however, are [sic] from North Carolina, where I should make an extensive trip as soon

as possible. Chapters, I believe, can be rather easily established at Chapel Hill, Greensboro,

Raleigh and Charlotte."45 Taylor's approach to organization was to be involved at the very

beginning of a city's chapter formation, providing literature about ADA's liberal platform and

reassuring residents who were concerned about the group's stances on civil rights, Communism,



44 Taylor to Tucker, June 27, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

45 Taylor to Loeb, "Weekly Report," June 30, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









or anything else. Once the requisite number (usually 25) of liberals had signed on and crafted a

charter, Taylor generally left them alone, concerning himself with repeating the process in other

cities. The chapters, with the exception of Memphis, would be forced to sink or swim on their

own, through the time and effort of the local leadership.

Considering the time and financial pressures Taylor faced, as well as the physical

limitations his war wounds had caused, this was a sound, prudent strategy. However, the timing

of this southern campaign had some problems. No major local or national elections were taking

place in 1947. That is not to say that there were no important issues for politically-conscious

Americans. The year featured debates over the Truman Doctrine, anti-lynching legislation, the

creation of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, the Taft-Hartley Act, and

hearings that began to probe into the extent of Communist influence on American life,

particularly in the entertainment industry. While politicians and strategists were gearing up for

elections the following year and ADA prepared itself to be fully functioning when the campaigns

began, the general public was often focused on other things, and Taylor could do little to interest

people not already engaged by local or national politics.

He also had to deal with summer weather, a problem that he should have expected to face

having been a labor organizer in the South for some time before coming to ADA. Taylor began

his work during May and June, and southerners knew that those who could escape the heat, in an

era of minimal air conditioning, would do so. That is not to say that Memphis or Birmingham

were completely empty, but many of the people who might have been interested in joining ADA

had left for vacation homes in other parts of the country. It was unusual to have someone such as

Scott Hamilton come from upstate New York to Arkansas for the summer. As a result, Taylor

had to deal with local organizers such as Frances Schulter of Birmingham, whose husband John









worked with the local UMW, telling him that a July meeting had "a very small attendance." This

forced Taylor to follow Schulter's suggestion "that we just sort of nurse [the chapter] along until

after the summer was over before trying to hold a mass meeting."46 In a situation where

momentum was so important, having local chapters stop their organizing activities for months at

a time was a bad blow to Taylor's project.

Moreover, bureaucratic snafus plagued his campaign, especially since Taylor only had the

assistance of one or two other people in Memphis. For example, in late May Taylor

inadvertently sent ADA membership appeals to several individuals who were already members,

including Arthur C. Joy of Atlanta, a local NLRB field examiner. Joy chided Taylor for the

mistake, telling him to "'leave us' not waste our funds in soliciting those who are already

members. There is too much need of both the funds and the energy." However, at around the

same time Joy had caused a similar problem, saying, "I was getting set to slightly bawl [Taylor]

out for not answering my letter of May 24th-but when I opened my file I found both the original

and carbon copy of said letter. Consequently I must admit that you have the best of reasons for

not answering the letter [you] never received." The whole affair had a Keystone Kops feel to it.

Ironically, the failure of these two men to communicate did not prevent Joy from being

enthusiastic about ADA's prospects. He offered his assistance in starting an Atlanta chapter (and

was named secretary for its organizing committee in early August), and he endorsed Taylor's

organizing strategy, urging quick action "to build ADA chapters in as many cities and towns as

possible. ... I am convinced that there is a surprisingly large number of real liberals in the South,







46 Frances Schulter to Taylor, July 27, 1947, reel 50, no. 273, ADA Papers.









but they need to be dug up and coordinated. To do this is going to require a substantial amount

of work and cooperation from the members."47

Buoyed by Joy's advice and enthusiasm, Taylor continued his organizing activities.

However, his correspondence began to betray a lack of confidence in the results he was

achieving. In July, for example, he traveled to Nashville and Chattanooga, Tennessee; Charlotte,

Raleigh, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Rock Hill and Spartanburg, South Carolina; and back

through Birmingham. Publicly, he urged ADA's publicity department to announce the formation

of organizing committees in Nashville, Chattanooga, and Chapel Hill.

Privately, he expressed frustration toward circumstances and individuals he thought were

hindering his activities. His trip through the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Alabama had convinced

him that "the principal obstacle to ADA organization in the south [sic] is the virtually complete

lack of publicity. Many otherwise intelligent and well informed people had never heard of ADA,

and those that had knew only the barest facts." Taylor found himself doing a door-to-door sales

job, and while he thought he could make the sale given enough time, he wrote, "It is only too

apparent that there is no wave of enthusiasm sweeping the south [sic]." He almost felt guilty for

accomplishing so little, "but if the organization can stand it, I am certain that ADA will grow to

potency in the south in another 6 months."48 This optimism stemmed in part from letters of

interest he continued to receive from people such as Harold L. Trigg, newly elected president of

St. Augustine's College in Raleigh, North Carolina (and an Associate Executive Director with







47 Arthur C. Joy to Taylor, July 30, 1947, reel 50, no. 275, ADA Papers.
48 Taylor, memo to Loeb, July 30, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









the SRC); H.C. Nixon of the Vanderbilt University Press; and William L. Kolb, a professor of

sociology at Tulane's Newcomb College in New Orleans.49

Taylor was not sure that ADA was viable in the South, but he refused to give up. He

wrote, "generally, people I meet everywhere are inclined to delay things until after Labor Day.

We, too, are enjoying (?) the record heat wave. The fall, however, should see excellent results

from this summer's groundwork." As of early August, chapters or organizing committees

existed in Memphis (where the focus that summer was on registering voters for the 1948

Democratic primaries), Birmingham, Chapel Hill, Nashville, and Atlanta, where 340 people had

responded to Arthur Joy's initial ADA mailing. Prospects were bright for New Orleans, Baton

Rouge, and cities in Tennessee and the Carolinas. Taylor was "very much encouraged by recent

progress in all areas and believe that a regional meeting for the late fall would be a good idea." 50

Despite these encouraging signs, in late August Taylor cautioned the national office about

several continuing problems. He wrote, "We are still lacking in publicity all over the south and

need to do something slightly sensational in order to get ADA before the public." As Taylor saw

it, "what is done this fall will be indicative of ADA's future both in the south and elsewhere." In

addition, more mundane problems provided an important reminder of the financial constraints

under which he was operating. For example, Taylor did not have his own letterhead; he was

forced to use the national office's letterhead and attach a crude addendum to it. He also received


49 Letters to Taylor written between August 4 and August 8, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.
Kolb's letter of August 8 was especially interesting to Taylor because Kolb expressed his
dissatisfaction with the fact that "many of the liberal faculty are dissatisfied with the only
possibly liberal organization in the field, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. I say
possibly liberal because there are many of us who suspect this organization of being Communist
infiltrated." Given Taylor's dislike for SCHW, Kolb's expression of disgust with the group
likely found a sympathetic ear.
50 Taylor, memo to Loeb, August 8, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









a notice from Memphis' telephone company saying that if ADA did not pay their bill by the end

of the month, their service would be cut off. Taylor's response was exasperated and comical.

He told Loeb, "O.K., so be it. If it gets cut off, it gets cut off-the hell with it."51

Taylor's exasperation carried over to the situation in Arkansas, where Rev. Samuel

Freeman continued to resist moving away from the Southern Conference in favor of ADA.

Before returning to Comell for the fall semester, Scott Hamilton provided one more update on

the rivalry. Taylor, because of his respect for Freeman's efforts in Arkansas, did not want to

upstage Freeman, which is why he told Hamilton, "I do not want to give the appearance of being

competitive with their efforts. If the Southern Conference is now a more or less dead issue, then

I want to come down as soon as possible and get an ADA organizing committee started."52

Hamilton consulted Freeman on the future of SCHW, and Freeman remained adamant about

wanting to stick with the Southern Conference. Hamilton wrote, "[Freeman] is still sticking by

SCHW, for he feels he cannot run away. It seems that a great deal of pressure was applied to his

board members."53 Freeman explained himself directly to Taylor, saying, "I cannot appear

completely enthusiastic either for A.D.A. or S.C.H.W. Neither of them has yet sufficiently

recognized the fundamental change which must come in our Society for Human Welfare-

therefore, both talk of working within two morally dead parties each competing with reaction

against the other."54 Freeman sounded like a beaten man under the pressure of liberal factions

pulling him in different directions.


51 Taylor, memo to Loeb, August 27, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.
52 Taylor to Hamilton, August 13, 1947, reel 50, no. 274, ADA Papers.

53 Hamilton to Taylor, August 17, 1947, reel 50, no. 274, ADA Papers.

54 Freeman to Taylor, August 19, 1947, reel 50, no. 274, ADA Papers.









Hamilton could not understand Freeman's decision, especially in the wake of a report from

the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) that had criticized SCHW for soliciting

the help of Communists for organizing and fund-raising activities. The bigger problem for

SCHW, however, was that it never created a base of support in the South. It depended far too

heavily for financial support from outside sources, including CIO unions.55 Taylor and his allies

in the South may have claimed that their true motivation for fighting SCHW was to free southern

liberalism from the taint of Communism in a time of Cold War, but the situation was more

complicated. ADA's position in the South was just as precarious as that of the Southern

Conference, and perhaps even more so. Taylor and Loeb were fearful of following in the failed

footsteps of Clark Foreman and James Dombrowski. SCHW's experience was a cautionary tale

for ADA. There was always a chance that the support they expected to find was not there.

Therefore, Taylor was after one of two things: either confirmation that ADA could be

organized in the South, or confirmation that his efforts would prove useless in the end. Either

way, he wanted to know so he could plan accordingly, and the national office acknowledged

Taylor's impatience. At the end of August, Tucker broached the subject. He wrote, "I am sure it

is warm and uncomfortable in Memphis as it is in Washington, if not more so, but nevertheless, I

am constrained to ask for a little more patience with us from you." Tucker then provided some

reasons, or "excuses" from Taylor's point of view, detailing why he had neglected Taylor's

correspondence, including a heavily reduced staff during the summer months and the national

office's own financial problems during the summer. Tucker reassured Taylor that "one of the






55 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent S.,lh S.nlihei I Liberals and the Race Issue (New
York, 1977), 145, 146.









chief reasons for the existence of this office is to service our people in the field and believe me,

we are anxious to do it with the maximum disposition."56

Taylor's reply did not apologize for his impatience with matters in Washington. In fact, he

wrote, "I count impatience among my principal virtues. From long experience with liberals and

laborites I have discovered that little gets done without prodding, needling, agitating,

importuning and threatening. If I am to remain on ADA's staff, you and the rest of the national

office personnel may continue to expect prompt reaction on my part to any delay or mistake on

your part," including delays in reimbursement for expenses or troubles with delivery of the ADA

World newsletter to ADA members. He went further, asking, "why the hell any part of the staff

of an organization just beginning to get under way should be on vacation at a time as crucial as

this. I suppose, however, it would cause riot and revolution if anyone was asked to forego

vacation, since all you Yankees are vacation-mad anyhow." In fact, he wondered if he should be

taking a vacation and ignoring his desire to "do big things in as short a time as possible." Taylor

closed on an ominous note, telling Tucker, "Ye may ask for patience, John, but ye shall not

receive."57

Taylor's frustration with a lack of support from the national level did not stop him from

organizing, however. In the late summer of 1947, Taylor worked harder than ever to enhance

ADA's chances at survival in the South. He received regular reports from southern chapters, as

well as newcomers such as Dr. Kolb at Tulane. On September 1, Dr. Kolb told Taylor about the

political situation in New Orleans, breaking down the city's liberals into several distinct groups.

He dismissed the Communists in SCHW and student organizations at Tulane as keepers of a


56 Tucker to Taylor, August 25, 1947, reel 52, no. 304, ADA Papers.

57 Taylor to Tucker, August 28, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









"spurious liberalism," urging Taylor to focus instead on "genuine liberals, who are unconcerned

about the problems of cooperating with communists (or who feel that they can outwit them in the

struggle for power)." The "genuine liberals'" naivete, and their numbers compared with the

larger liberal community of New Orleans, would pose major problems, according to Kolb.58

This report did not buoy Taylor's spirits, and Taylor acknowledged that "[Kolb's] picture of the

general groups is generally typical of liberals throughout the south, although not to the extent

that your letter indicated. ADA has offered me a means of implementing my liberal views

with leaders and members in whom I have full confidence. There were no such means

previously available. In short, realistic non-communistic liberals have 'found a home.'"59

Taylor was attempting to stay positive, but these statements must be examined in the context of

his frustrated tirades against Tucker which he wrote at approximately the same time.

Taylor was frustrated, but he nevertheless continued his exhausting travel schedule, which

included stops in Birmingham, Atlanta, and Chattanooga during the month of September. He

also saw major promise in his home base of Memphis, where an organizational meeting at the

end of September promised what Taylor cryptically referred to as "a few bombshells," as well as

a "substantial" increase in the number of local ADA members.60

On September 20, James Loeb made a report to the ADA Executive Committee about

Taylor that glossed over the problems of the Southern Office and gave the impression that Taylor







58 Dr. William Kolb to Taylor, September 1, 1947, reel 50, no. 277, ADA Papers.

59 Taylor to Kolb, September 4, 1947, reel 50, no. 277, ADA Papers.

60 Taylor, memo to Loeb, September 5, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









was making progress.61 According to Loeb, Tennessee looked most promising, with chapters or

organizing committees established in Memphis, Nashville, and Chattanooga. Their success was

especially vital because of the need to help Kefauver and Browning in 1948. Loeb also

mentioned several communities in North Carolina and Louisiana where work was just beginning

or would begin shortly, arguing that ADA had more work to do in the South and that funding for

Taylor's project should continue.62

In addition, Atlanta seemed to be coming around, though this development barely received

a mention in Loeb's report. In September, Taylor's meeting with Atlanta liberals had suffered

from a "relatively light turn-out," according to one attendee, but the group they had assembled

seemed committed to making ADA work, and they had established good relations with people

like Tilly, who now worked for the SRC.63 As Director of Organization Evelyn Dubrow told

Vice President Carmen Lucia of the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International

Union (AFL), "we are delighted to see ADA going so well in Atlanta because we think of your

city as a stronghold of liberal ideas where our organization should flourish."64 The key,

according to Arthur Joy, was continued effort at the local and regional level to get people

interested in ADA liberalism and keep them interested while the chapter got started. "The very

fact that we had only between 45 and 50 at the meeting in response to 340 invitations; the rather

apathetic reaction of the gathering; and the fact that only 14 of those present signed applications


61 The report was based on a "long, rambling letter" Taylor wrote to ADA's Washington office
in early September detailing his work and the backgrounds of the people he had brought into the
fold. Taylor to Violet Megrath, September 5, 1947, reel 52, no. 305, ADA Papers.

62 Loeb, "Executive Secretary's Report to ADA National Board," September 20, 1947, reel 50,
no. 264, ADA Papers.
63 Phillip G. Hammer to Taylor, September 17, 1947, reel 50, no. 275, ADA Papers.

64 Evelyn Dubrow to Carmen Lucia, September 25, 1947, reel 61, no. 33, ADA Papers.









(of course, some were already members) are all indicative of the fact that there is a real job to be

done." Joy thought "Brother Taylor" should be induced[d" to spend more time in Atlanta

instead of attempting to start chapters in Chapel Hill or New Orleans.65 Taylor moved quickly to

dispel the notion that he had considered his work "finished," reiterating his commitment to

Atlanta.66

One way in which Atlanta's chapter hoped to make noise was through the quick

production and distribution of "An Action Program for Atlanta," which it began circulating in

early November. Their six-point program called for a new approach to the public housing

problem, based on a "balanced program of demolition and replacement, financed by public funds

if necessary." It called for increased regulation of children's boarding homes to prevent abuses

by caretakers, new programs to increase the number of public parks and playgrounds, changes in

school curricula to "give adequate and fair attention to social, racial and economic problems," an

increase in the number of black officers on the police force, and progressive taxation to pay for

new social programs.6

Local politicians in Atlanta never took the "Action Program" seriously, but the production

of this pamphlet was an important act. As Taylor noted, one of his main goals in working with

ADA was "convincing a large number of people that ADA does not propose to be a dilletantish

'paper' organization of intellectuals."68 He hoped to do so in Memphis as well by leading the

fight against the Crump machine, which was already in trouble thanks to a new wave of political

activity by soldiers freshly home from the Second World War.

65 Arthur C. Joy to Hammer, September 21, 1947, reel 50, no. 275, ADA Papers.

66 Taylor to Hammer, September 25, 1947, reel 50, no. 275, ADA Papers.
67 "An Action Program for Atlanta," November 3, 1947, reel 61, no. 33, ADA Papers.

68 Taylor, memo to Loeb, October 1, 1947, reel 52, no. 305, ADA Papers.









The executive committee of the Memphis chapter sought to capitalize on discontent with

Crump. On September 30, the committee blasted a "failure of democracy to function in

Memphis and Shelby County, [which] has given rise to a form of political methods which has the

dangers of dictatorship and the eventual loss of freedom of the ballot." Their resolution called

upon members of Memphis ADA to "stir up interest in real elections in the democratic tradition

of the nation, encourage unbossed candidates with proper qualifications, real integrity and moral

honesty to run for office, and to do all that it can to see that real competition exists in all races for

public office." Most importantly, the committee wanted to encourage voters to choose "the

candidate of [their] choice without being told by any political boss, corporation executive, labor

leader or anyone else for whom to vote."69 The local chapters of ADA were showing signs of

moving beyond talking and toward action. Any hope of changing the political climate in the

South had to include large gestures and a "few bombshells," and Taylor was proud of the

Memphis chapter for its willingness to take a public stand against the Crump machine.

Despite the promise of success, by late September and early October 1947, the job was

beginning to take a toll on Taylor. As he said to Evelyn Dubrow at the time, "it will be nice

having you to work with; but look out for all sorts of bitching and complaints from the impatient

individual who does your southern organizing. You have probably already been warned that

chewing the staff is my personal pastime." For example, he wrote, "for God's sake get the damn

CIO situation cleared up so that all of these local southern CIO people understand that

membership and participation in ADA on local and state levels is not forbidden by the national

body." He believed that "most of them seem to have the impression that [CIO president] Phil



69 Memphis ADA Executive Committee, "Political Action Resolution," September 30, 1947, reel
50, no. 289, ADA Papers.









Murray definitely disapproves of us and has pronounced a plague on the houses of both ADA

and PCA [Progressive Citizens of America] with fine impartiality."70

Taylor knew this because he was regularly receiving communications from southern union

leaders such as Paul R. Christopher of the CIO Organizing Committee in Knoxville, who

declined Taylor's request for assistance in starting ADA chapters in East Tennessee. According

to Christopher, "CIO's position is that we will stick to our own Political Action Committee

program, and both PCA and ADA are left off the recommended list of political organizations to

join. So I would not be able to join ADA however sympathetic I may be toward it or how much

I might prefer ADA over PCA.71 Confusion and poor communication were hindering Taylor's

efforts to get labor on board with ADA, and his frustration was palpable.

Other southern liberals disagreed with Taylor's public optimism about the South, ironically

agreeing with his private pessimism about the job. In September, for example, Atlanta attorney

(and local organizing committee member) Joseph Jacobs had written Loeb on this issue. Unlike

Taylor, Jacobs had not been impressed with the diversity of the initial Atlanta gathering. He

wrote, "there were no particularly outstanding people in the community; there was a dearth of

what might be called New Dealers and college people." Most of those interested were members

of labor unions, and ADA had always tried to avoid the impression that it was not just an

extension of the AFL or CIO. Non-affiliated liberals had stayed away in Atlanta, and Taylor

could not earn their allegiance in a week or ten days. Jacobs concluded, "It was the feeling of a







70 Taylor to Dubrow, September 23, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.
71 Paul R. Christopher to Taylor, December 22, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









number of us that if Barney would be able to spend some time in here that he might be able to

persuade some of these so-called 'Big Names' to participate and work with us."72

Loeb tried to persuade Jacobs that Taylor was not foolishly optimistic about ADA in

Atlanta, writing, "it is true that Barney's reports with regard to Atlanta have been encouraging,

and perhaps slightly optimistic, but I don't think that they have indicated that the Atlanta ADA

was going to sweep the community over night." However, Loeb then acknowledged something

that was becoming clear about the entire southern project. "The South is a big area. Barney's

territory is really too big for one person."73 ADA's finances prevented them from hiring

organizers to work on a state-by-state basis, so Taylor was forced to solve the problems he

encountered as best he could, with no guarantee of additional support from Washington. In fact,

Taylor had complained about this issue in one of his reports. In early October 1947, he asked,

"Why don't you people let me hear from you once in a while? I haven't had a communication

from [Loeb or Tucker] in weeks. I'd like to know whether the job I am doing in your view is

good, bad or indifferent."74

Loeb's excuses for not corresponding with Taylor included his required presence at ADA

National Board meetings and the fact that "my correspondence is piled so high at the moment

that it looks as if it will be impossible to get through it." As for Taylor's performance, Loeb

pronounced himself generally satisfied, though he cautioned, "I was very much impressed that

you had assembled all of the labor element in the Memphis group; but, of course, there is a





72 Joseph Jacobs to Loeb, September 18, 1947, reel 61, no. 33, ADA Papers.

73 Loeb to Jacobs, October 2, 1947, reel 61, no. 33, ADA Papers.

74 Taylor to Loeb, October 1, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









danger they will become just a unified labor committee."75 The withdrawal of the local chapter

chairman, attorney C. Rudolph Johnson, from ADA activity did not help this impression. Loeb

then lamented his inability to honor Taylor's request to have prominent liberals come south on

behalf of the local chapters. He wrote, "This problem has us completely floored. There are only

a few people the Chapters want, and we have worked these people to death. Most of them will

do two or three meetings for ADA and then will beg off."76 Arthur Schlesinger and Eleanor

Roosevelt could only be asked to do so much. Despite this problem, and continuing financial

hardships, Loeb believed, "our Chapters have become increasingly active, are taking the

leadership on many issues, and are doing a pretty good job. We are not at all discouraged. Quite

the contrary. ADA is growing both in size and in guts."77

Taylor continued to work into October and November 1947, traveling to New Orleans to

supervise the creation of that city's chapter, which formally started on October 14 with forty

members, including several "persons of considerable means." He continued to answer

inquiries from Tennessee, the Carolinas, and Virginia about the progress of chapters in those

75 The irony of such a statement was that, as ADA historian Steve Gillon notes, "labor was
crucial to any attempts to build a sustained liberal movement in America." In addition, much of
ADA's financial support came from AFL- and CIO-affiliated unions, even if certain labor
leaders (like CIO president Phillip Murray) were cool to ADA's efforts. Steven M. Gillon,
Politics and Vision: The ADA andAmerican Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York, 1987), 13.

76 Even when prominent speakers were in areas where their presence would be a positive,
Taylor's problems concerning communication with Washington would often be most acute. For
example, Taylor lamented the fact that he had not been told that ADA National Chairman (and
former Louisville mayor) Wilson W. Wyatt was in Nashville in early November, while Taylor
had been in Nashville meeting with local liberals (including H.C. Nixon of the Vanderbilt
University Press, who headed the city's organizing committee). As he put it, "It seems that I am
usually finding out that national leaders of ADA are in the South by accident, and always too late
to get them to do anything for ADA." Taylor, memo to Dubrow, November 12, 1947, reel 50,
no. 269, ADA Papers.

77 Loeb to Taylor, October 4, 1947, Reel 50, No. 264, ADA Papers.

78 Taylor, memo to Dubrow, October 24, 1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









cities, and he continued to request assistance from national headquarters as questions arose.

Finally, he supervised a campaign by the Memphis chapter urging quick congressional action on

President Truman's package of military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey under the

Truman Doctrine.79

The Memphis chapter also fought to ensure that the "Freedom Train" would stop in their

city. It criticized the city government after the American Heritage Foundation pulled Memphis

off the Freedom Train schedule when the city refused to modify its segregationist laws to

accommodate its January 1948 arrival. In response to Crump's criticism of ADA as a "Red"

organization, the Freedom Train resolution declared, "The Communist Party has ridiculed the

Freedom Train and has put pickets around it at several stops. Totalitarian communism, they

realize, cannot compete with Americanism as exemplified by the documents the Train carries

[which included the Declaration of Independence and Constitution]. Nor can any other form of

totalitarianism."s8

All of this was merely a prelude, however, to a discussion of Taylor's future at ADA,

which he previewed during a late October conversation with ADA Political Director Andrew

Biemiller. In it, Taylor broke down the political climate in each state where he had been active,

and he previewed what he wanted to do in the year leading up to the Democratic primaries of

1948. For example, Taylor was optimistic about the chances of Sidney McMath, the populist

district attorney of Hot Springs, to become governor of Arkansas, and urged ADA to assist

McMath. He thought ADA could have a major impact in Tennessee, where Gordon Browning

79 The letters from Memphis to southern members of Congress came at the behest of the ADA
Executive Committee, which was coordinating a national campaign to support what became
known as the Truman Doctrine. Hollis Reid, mass mailing to members of Congress, October 13,
1947, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

so Memphis ADA resolution, November 25, 1947, reel 50, no. 289, ADA Papers.









and Estes Kefauver had a good chance of upsetting the plans of the Crump machine. However,

the Atlanta chapter was in a bad spot because both major candidates in the 1948 governor's race,

incumbent M.E. Thompson and challenger Herman Talmadge, were reactionaries. Taylor

believed "that we should stay out of the governor's race in Georgia and concentrate entirely on

[the] election of a liberal from the Atlanta Congressional District," though the identity of said

liberal was not yet clear.81

The battle over the future of the ADA southern project came to a head with Biemiller's

pessimistic reply to Taylor's suggestions. Biemiller led off with bad news for Taylor, writing, "I

am still of the opinion that political action in the south, outside of Tennessee, is not worthwhile

in view of our limited budget." This was in spite of the fact that Biemiller agreed with Taylor's

assessment of southern politics. Concerning Arkansas, he believed liberal prospects "were

taking a turn for the better," assuming McMath was a solid candidate. He thought Kefauver was

an excellent anti-Crump candidate in Tennessee, adding that he had met with the Congressman

recently to "[work] out certain plans concerning support from the National Office. This involves

both financial aid and the planting of stories with columnists."82 In short, Biemiller thought

liberals had a very good chance of earning some key electoral victories in the South in 1948.

However, he did not think Taylor could have an impact on those chances.

Biemiller's pessimism did not stop Taylor from continuing his travels. He concentrated on

Birmingham, Nashville, and Atlanta, places where he believed that chapters with 75 to 100

members could be built during the first three months of 1948. Limiting his travels to larger cities

would allow these chapters to work for liberal candidates during the primaries. He refused to



81 Taylor, memo to Andrew Biemiller, October 28, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.

82 Biemiller, memo to Taylor, December 8, 1947, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers.









abandon the Carolinas, telling his superiors, "in addition to [numerous contacts in] Durham,

Greensboro, Chapel Hill and Charlotte-a recheck of my correspondence files show equally

good prospects for Raleigh, Asheville and Winston-Salem."83 Taylor was impressed with the

work that CIO State Director William Smith was doing in Charlotte, planning a series of

meetings in early January that would feature Jim Loeb as a dinner speaker in Durham, Raleigh,

and Charlotte.84 However, Taylor was not in a position to exploit those contacts at the beginning

of 1948, when Alabama and Tennessee consumed his attention.

In February, Taylor came down with what he described as a "rather severe appendicitis

attack." While he recovered from his illness, he was sidelined for a few weeks as chapter leaders

across the region looked to him for assistance.85 In addition, the Nashville chapter Taylor had

hoped would be organized by the end of February had collapsed. The acting secretary of the

Nashville group, Adele R. Schweid, had told Taylor that a late February meeting would signal

the start of a membership drive, but the meeting never took place because of scheduling

conflicts. Over the next few weeks, some of the Nashville liberals who had taken an early

interest in ADA concluded that, as Schweid told Taylor, "the outlook for an active, energetic

Nashville chapter was so gloomy that we felt it would be wiser, not only from our own

standpoint, but for ADA, to give up the idea and urge those interested to be members at large of

the National." Anti-Communist liberals in Nashville were tired of giving their time and effort to







83 Taylor to Dubrow, January 15, 1948, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

84 Smith, letters to ADA Washington office, n.d., reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

85 Taylor to Dubrow, March 2, 1948, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









"just another small gathering of the few Nashville liberals" that they knew already, and so they

abandoned the idea of a Nashville chapter for the foreseeable future.86

Taylor had come to similar conclusions about the entire southern project, and he tendered

his resignation to the national office on March 21, 1948, with his last day scheduled for April 24.

It was an unusual decision, given that important election campaigns were getting underway. In

his letter of resignation to Loeb, Taylor told him that his decision "does not offer any

discouragement as to ADA's future in the South. Things look as good as ever." If that was the

case, why was he leaving? He wrote, "I believe I have made clear to you and to others on the

staff, that I am totally without any personal funds-no savings, no bonds and nothing much that

a pawnbroker would have. It has therefore been almost impossible for me to work to the best

advantage without regular and prompt payments of expenses. I have been repeatedly

embarrassed by long delays in payment of rent and telephone bills." Taylor spoke of "other

irritations" that he refused to go into at that moment, but the financial burden of the Southern

Office had finally brought Taylor to the breaking point.87

Loeb expressed thanks for Taylor's service to ADA in what he called "the toughest

assignment of all, covering the enormous area in the South." Nevertheless, he thought it was

important to set the record straight regarding Taylor's financial complaints. Loeb wrote, "I must

confess that it has been our impression from time to time that you considered our financial

difficulties as applying only to yourself. I have been at work in the liberal movement for seven

years, and finances have always been the biggest headache." He also criticized Taylor for failing

to hold up his end of the financial bargain. "When we originally discussed this job, you were


86 Adele R. Schweid to Taylor, March 12, 1948, reel 50, no. 290, ADA Papers.

87 Taylor to Loeb, March 21, 1948, reel 52, no. 304, ADA Papers.









quite convinced that some considerable funds could be raised in certain states of the South.

During this year, our receipts from our Southern Chapters have amounted only to minimum

membership requirements [$1.00 per member per year] and nothing more."s

As to the possibility of finding a successor to Taylor, Loeb was of the opinion that hiring a

new southern organizer would not be prudent in 1948 because of the possibility that President

Truman would win the Democratic presidential nomination. ADA was hoping to organize a

movement to draft NATO commander Dwight D. Eisenhower or Supreme Court Justice William

O. Douglas at the Democratic convention that summer. However, if Truman fended off those

challenges, ADA's problems would be even worse, and "it wouldn't be fair to put someone on

our staff and then find in three months that we could not go on."89

On April 22, 1948, Taylor continued to profess his "esteem" for Loeb and denied he was

"quitting in a 'huff," but he also saw an opportunity to "[get] all our bitches out of our system."

Taylor chided the Washington staff for failing to keep him abreast of the unexpected problems

they were having with raising money, which affected Taylor's travel schedule and office

expenditures. He disputed Loeb's assertions that the national office was reimbursing him for

expenses and petty cash outflow in a timely fashion. In short, Taylor thought that he was not

"given adequate opportunity to earn [his] salary." Despite his dissatisfaction with how matters

were ending with ADA, he wrote, "I don't think it will serve any useful purpose to let it be

known that unhappiness had anything to with my resignation. I'm informing my friends and

associates that I'm simply returning to fields I know best-organized labor and public relations."





88 Loeb to Taylor, April 19, 1948, reel 52, no. 304, ADA Papers.

89 Loeb to Taylor, April 19, 1948, reel 52, no. 304, ADA Papers.









He would do so with the United Auto Workers, working as a top public relations lieutenant for

UAW president Walter Reuther.90

Loeb honored Taylor's wishes and kept any negativity between the two from becoming

public. In a letter to the southern chapters on the day Taylor's resignation was to take effect,

Loeb said that he had accepted Taylor's decision with "disappointment and reluctance," and he

praised the "fine work Barney has done for ADA throughout the South." Loeb vowed that this

work would continue. He wrote "to assure [the chapters] that while waiting to name his

successor, the National Office will do everything to preserve and develop an effective

movement. We shall give direct supervision and service to the established chapters and

organizing committees as well as undertake the setting up of new groups in as many Southern

communities as possible." Loeb's rhetoric was designed to make southern members think that

things would go on as they had while Taylor had been in Memphis. He did not tell them that

ADA leaders had no intention of naming a new southern organizer until after the 1948 general

election, if at all.91

In many ways, this was an appropriate end to Taylor's year as an ADA employee. No one

had ever drafted a comprehensive, coherent plan for what Taylor was supposed to accomplish in

the South, beyond the creation of chapters in the region's major cities. Because ADA leaders

expected its members and chapter leaders to follow Washington's lead on national issues, no one

in the national office considered how local issues would affect recruitment, counting on Taylor

and local liberals to be their eyes and ears on these matters. The approach made some sense,

given ADA's financial difficulties. However, ADA officials ended up depending almost entirely


90 Taylor to Loeb, April 22, 1948, reel 52, no. 304, ADA Papers.

91 Loeb to southern ADA chapters, April 24, 1948, reel 42, no. 162, ADA Papers.









on the energies of individuals on the ground in those cities where chapters had formed. Because

of Taylor's personal involvement with the Memphis chapter, west Tennessee was the most

fruitful ground for fund-raising and membership. This allowed the chapter to campaign against

segregationist practices, host panel discussions on hot-button issues like the role of the

government in the national economy, create lists of the city's registered voters (at a cost of over

$1,000 to the chapter), and become a small thorn in the side of the already-embattled Boss

Crump.92

However, Memphis was the only chapter that could point to any significant

accomplishments during Taylor's tenure with ADA. Most other chapters did not progress

beyond initial organizing efforts, largely because they depended so heavily upon Taylor's

presence at their meetings. One thing they did accomplish was adding to the Washington

office's already overflowing piles of correspondence, mainly with requests for prominent

speakers that would drum up interest in local liberal activity. The problem was that local leaders

had no other ideas for how to get people interested in ADA, which did not help Taylor's cause.

However, the most important problem Taylor faced when attempting to organize liberals in

the South was money. When the southern project began in May 1947, ADA budgeted thousands

of dollars to Taylor's office for his salary and business expenses, a significant commitment for

an organization that had several field organizers already in place, an office in Washington with

numerous salaried employees, and a total annual budget of less than $200,000.93 This budget





92 Minutes of Memphis ADA Executive Committee meetings, December 15, 1947 and January
13, 1948, reel 50, no. 289, ADA Papers.

93 Clifton Brock, Americansfor Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics (Washington,
1962), 67.









was contingent on the staff s ability to raise money, and when those efforts began to falter, field

operations had to be rethought.

The problems ADA experienced nationally during its first months were especially acute in

Taylor's office, about which many staffers in ADA had been skeptical from the start. When

financial troubles combined with bureaucratic snafus, Taylor began to express frustration at

Washington for failing to support his efforts, which led to resentment on both sides because

Loeb, Tucker and others thought Taylor did not understand their problems. The ad hoc nature of

ADA's activities and the group's inability to formulate long-term organizational plans doomed

their chances at effective action in the South, a place where long-term planning was crucial. The

failure of ADA's Southern Office in Memphis also ensured that when future operations were

planned, more thought would be put into where to organize and how organization would be

attempted. However, the question of whether the South would accept ADA liberalism had yet to

be answered definitively in the late 1940s.









CHAPTER 4
JOHN THOMASON, THE ATLANTA CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 1949, AND A
REASSESSMENT OF ADA'S FUTURE IN THE SOUTH

In the wake of the startling Democratic victory in the 1948 elections, ADA leaders

renewed their efforts to create a viable presence in the South. Encouraged by the election of

southern liberals such as Estes Kefauver in Tennessee and by Truman's ability to carry seven

southern states despite the challenge of the insurgent Dixiecrats, they organized a conference to

meet in Atlanta in February 1949. There southern liberals reviewed the prospects and challenges

for ADA in a South undergoing rapid political and economic transformation. Those attending

the conference, which resulted in a new ADA-funded effort to build local organizations in

several southern states, discussed at length such topics as the role of race and civil rights, the

condescending attitudes toward the South held by northern liberals, and the distinctive problems

facing liberals in the various southern states.

Indeed, the frank and free-ranging discussions brought forth a number of difficulties facing

a southern liberal initiative. Probably the most contentious issue related to race relations, with

even prominent liberals such as North Carolina's Frank Graham urging ADA to exercise caution.

Others outlined the distinctive dilemmas of the various southern states, the problematic relations

between organized labor and other activists, and the need to reassure even liberal southerners of

ADA's respect for states rights and local customs. Although all of these matters were potentially

crippling for the liberal organization, the Atlanta conference did result in the appointment of a

new southern organizer and a renewed commitment, one everyone hoped would benefit from

knowledge of the mistakes made during Barney Taylor's tenure, to create a vigorous ADA

presence in the heart of Dixie.

In that sense, Taylor's abrupt resignation in April 1948 was a blessing in disguise, since it

forced ADA to reassess its efforts in the South. This was particularly true considering the









importance of the South on the national stage in this presidential election year. ADA liberals had

been convinced that Harry Truman, who had not yet been elected president in his own right, had

little to no chance of winning in 1948. Former Vice President Henry Wallace, at the head of the

Progressive ticket, seemed certain to take votes away from the Democrats in the fall, weakening

Truman's position still further. With these considerations in mind, ADA descended on the

Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia in July spoiling for a fight. James Loeb, Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., and others campaigned to remove Truman from the ticket entirely and supported

either NATO Commander Dwight Eisenhower or Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in

his place. When those campaigns failed to rouse any significant support, ADA activists turned

their attention to the Democratic platform, determined to force the Democrats to adopt liberal

positions.1

Taylor was not part of the ADA team in Philadelphia, having left the organization for a

job with the United Auto Workers in Detroit. His stint in Memphis, however, did have an

important long-term impact on ADA. Over a period of eighteen months, its leaders had tried to

accommodate themselves to the peculiarities of the South and work within the system. The end

result of this effort was disappointing at best, and liberals were now convinced that if real

political change was going to come to the South, they had to confront the system. In July 1948,

the confrontation came over a proposed amendment to the Democratic platform plank on civil

rights. President Truman and his allies had written the plank as an innocuous call for legislation

to "assure that due process, the right to vote, the right to live and the right to work shall not turn

on any consideration of race, religion, color or national origin." Such language had been part of

the Democratic platform for decades, and pro-civil rights Democrats had not added stronger

1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Life in the 20th Century. Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950
(Boston, 2000), 458-459, 462.









language because of the influence of the southern caucus within the party. These southerners did

not want the Democrats to commit to specific legislation in their platform, and the threat of a

walkout by southern Democrats had hung over previous party gatherings.2

Establishment Democrats feared that states' rights southerners would bolt the convention.

ADA functionaries, on the other hand, wanted to call the bluff that southerners had been playing

for years. President Truman himself, writing in his diary during the convention, believed that

these ADA "crackpots hope the South will bolt."3 The "crackpots" did indeed want that, and

they also wanted to expose the two-faced nature of politicians who wanted to remain in good

standing with the party during election cycles while denouncing most of what the party stood for

at all other times. The best way to do that was to change the platform on which the Democratic

candidate would be forced to stand, most notably on civil rights. Thus, ADA and CIO leaders

worked to craft an alternative plank. Their final product also denounced discrimination in

general terms, but it differed dramatically in that it offered concrete proposals to be submitted to

the next Congress. The liberal alternative called for anti-lynching legislation, an end to

segregation in the armed forces, and the creation of a permanent fair employment practices

commission, based on the wartime Federal Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).4

President Truman's own Civil Rights Committee had made these recommendations the previous

year, and Truman had endorsed them in the State of the Union message at the beginning of 1948,

meaning that liberals believed their modifications could succeed.



2 Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA andAmerican Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New
York, 1987), 48.

3 Gillon, Politics and Vision, 49.

4 Gillon, Politics and Vision, 48; Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the
Solid Sm,,h, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill, 2001), 129.









When the Democratic platform committee rejected the liberal draft, liberal delegates were

happy to make its case before the full convention and a national radio and television audience on

July 14. They had wanted to force a dramatic showdown on the issue. Former Wisconsin

congressman (and ADA National Board member) Andrew Biemiller placed the plank before the

convention. The most dramatic moment, however, came when Minneapolis mayor and

Minnesota Senate candidate Hubert H. Humphrey, an ADA member, implored the convention to

ignore states' rights southerners and "walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights,"

concluding that the country was "one hundred seventy-two years too late" in ensuring equal

rights for all citizens.5

This was an open challenge to southern Democrats who had been threatening to walk out

of any convention that adopted such a platform, and liberals had thrown down the gauntlet. The

challenge became even more apparent when the convention adopted the ADA-supported civil

rights plank, 65112 to 5811/, and rejected a southern attempt to include a commitment to states'

rights into the platform. The southern Democrats reacted angrily to this defeat, though many

delegates did not follow through on their threat to publicly bolt from the convention. Alabama

and Mississippi led the way for those delegates who did walk out of the convention, following

the lead of Alabama's Handy Ellis. In a speech to the convention, he lamented that "we are

faced with the necessity of carrying out our pledges to the people of Alabama," which included

not supporting Truman if he was re-nominated and not supporting the civil rights plank as

written. Other southerners were extremely unhappy with the 1948 convention, but they did not

walk out, choosing instead to support Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell as a protest

presidential candidate and casting 263 votes for him. The public-relations effect of the


5 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 129.









convention as a whole was all that liberals could have hoped for. Press reports stressed their

strength while casting the southerners as "rather small, shrunken-looking men" (in the words of

one observer) who had looked like children who had taken their ball and gone home when they

did not get their way.6

In the aftermath of the 1948 convention, the Truman Democrats and their liberal allies,

including ADA, essentially wrote off the South in terms of campaigning and fund-raising. In

August, the states' rights "Dixiecrats" had traveled to Houston for their own convention,

nominating South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond and Mississippi governor Fielding Wright

as their presidential ticket. This presented obvious problems to a Democratic party that had

always counted on the "solid South" in presidential elections, but Truman and the loyal

Democrats gambled. They believed that the South had been solid for so long that states' rights

dissidents would be unable to break those bonds in most of the southern states. In the end,

Dixiecrats were unable to supplant Truman on the ballot in many states, despite their best

efforts.7 Even if the Dixiecrats were to succeed in capturing a majority of the region's electoral

votes, however, the Democrats thought they had a chance to win the election anyway. Their

growing strength in large metropolitan areas and among black voters outside the South, who

reacted favorably to the new civil rights plank, would more than counter expected southern white

defections.8

ADA was not an official arm of the Democratic Party, but few in the organization's

leadership questioned Truman's decision to campaign almost exclusively outside the South.



6 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 130-131.

7 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 147-186.
s Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 130-131.









They were already receiving signals that indicated their actions in Philadelphia were not playing

well in many parts of the region. Forrest F. Reed, the owner of the Tennessee Book Company in

Nashville, was one such angry southerner. He claimed to be a supporter of civil rights, but he

thought ADA had gone about forcing changes in the wrong way. As he put it, "I believe in civil

rights for every citizen of America regardless of race or creed, and that includes the right to vote,

but I do not believe in unconstitutional and dictatorial methods of guaranteeing those rights. It is

historically clear that mistaken laws do more harm than good." He believed that "the race

problem in America has not yet approached solution for the simple reason that for more than one

hundred years the wrong methods have been used to solve it." If ADA people did not think

states' rights and federalism mattered, Reed declared, they should work to repeal the Tenth

Amendment to the Constitution, which expressly granted states certain rights.9 Of course, more

southerners were angry with ADA because of the way in which they had committed the

Democrats to specific civil rights proposals in the platform.

Nevertheless, ADA had cast its lot with Truman and the Democrats, and its leaders saw the

1948 campaign as an opportunity to force voters to make real choices. A policy statement from

ADA's first National Board meeting following the convention made the point clear: ". .. the

successful outcome of ADA's battle for a strong civil rights plank in the platform marked a

turning point in the Party's history. In large part, this victory justified our hope that the

Democratic Party could prove the most effective instrument for the achievement of ADA's

objectives."10 If the South was going to ignore the majority's decision to make progress on civil


9 Forrest F. Reed to ADA, August 4, 1948, reel 49, no. 250, Americans for Democratic Action
Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville, microfilm collection (hereafter cited as
ADA Papers).
10 "Draft of Political Statement for ADA National Board meeting," August 29, 1948, reel 45, no.
188, ADA Papers.









rights and other important liberal issues, then they would be left behind. The practical

experience they had gained through Barney Taylor's efforts influenced the tough,

uncompromising rhetoric on display here.

Even so, ADA leaders did not abandon all efforts to start chapters in the South during

1948. For his part, Jim Loeb wanted to encourage small groups of liberals to organize whenever

possible, and he even took time out of the fall campaign season to take a short trip to Charlotte,

North Carolina, where several local people had expressed an interest in forming a chapter. Ten

people met Loeb on a Saturday in late October to "have a full and free discussion of all of our

common problems in terms of the possibility of an ADA in Charlotte.""11 Loeb, in essence, was

doing the job Taylor had been doing while in Memphis, traveling to promising locations and

encouraging committed liberals to join ADA.

The Charlotte group made no formal plans to start a chapter during Loeb's October visit in

light of the upcoming election. However, Loeb's after-hours meeting with William Smith, the

CIO Regional Director based in Charlotte who had been his primary contact, was significant

because it concerned John Thomason. Thomason had come to the meeting from Greensboro,

where he had been working with the World Federalist movement to reform the United Nations

and make the UN the basis for a single world government. Thomason expressed an interest in

working for ADA during the meeting, but his commitment to world federalism seemed much too

strong for Loeb's taste. As Loeb would later write, "What concerned me was the rather

absolute quality of John's mind. His insistence on immediate world government as a panacea

tends to show a kind of inflexibility which might be a severe handicap in organizational work for




11 James A. Loeb to Rev. John H. Morgan, October 1, 1948, reel 42, no. 162, ADA Papers.









ADA."12 In a subsequent letter, Loeb said as much to Thomason, though he conceded that "there

are a good many people in ADA, I suspect, who accept your viewpoint on world government and

on international affairs generally."13

At the time, Thomason's interest in working for ADA on political projects in the South

seemed to be of minor importance in light of the upcoming election. The fate of the Dixiecrats

had been sealed long before Election Day, since they had been unable to get their candidates on

the ballots in many southern states as replacements for the regular Democratic ticket. Their

victories in four states (South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana) took 39 electoral

votes away from the Democrats, but Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and several others voted for

Truman. Their support helped put Truman over the top in the electoral count with 303 votes

compared with 189 for Thomas Dewey, the Republican governor of New York whom most

observers had expected to win.

The Truman upset in 1948 pleased most liberals, even those who had wanted him off the

Democratic ticket just a few months earlier. Indeed, there were signs that the liberal trend was

not confined to north of the Mason-Dixon Line. In Arkansas, World War II veteran Sidney

McMath, returning from the Pacific theater committed to liberal political reform, capped his rise

to prominence with a narrow victory in the Democratic gubernatorial primary (which guaranteed

victory in the general election at this time). W. Kerr Scott, a former dairy farmer and the North

Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture, won the governor's race with a progressive platform that

urged vast improvements in the state's infrastructure and educational system. Scott even

expressed support for some aspects of President Truman's civil rights program. Finally,


12 Loeb to William Smith, October 25, 1948, reel 42, no. 162, ADA Papers.

13 Loeb to John Thomason, October 25, 1948, reel 42, no. 162, ADA Papers.









Chattanooga's Estes Kefauver, a five-term congressman who had supported the Tennessee

Valley Authority and repeal of state poll taxes that prevented most blacks (and many poor

whites) from voting, won election to the U.S. Senate. His win defied the machinations of

Memphis' "Boss" Ed Crump, who had exercised near dictatorial control over the state's

Democratic Party since the early 1930s. None of these men were completely satisfactory to

ADA, but their victories were significant steps toward liberal reform in the South.14

Hard work would be needed, however, to translate this apparent surge in liberal sentiment

and translate it into organizational achievements for ADA. In December 1948, the ADA position

was that "in these formerly one-party states, the whole political situation is chaotic at the

moment. It is precisely at this point that the liberal-labor coalition can and should make itself

felt.""15 ADA liberals, most of whom were based in the Northeast and around Washington, knew

that they ran the risk of being too "national" in their perspective on political issues. To rectify

that imbalance, the Subcommittee on Public Policy argued that since "the South represents a

special problem which the members of the subcommission feel incompetent to discuss[,] we urge

the national office to appoint a special subcommission to consider political policy in the

South."16 While the national Executive Committee did not act on that proposal at their

December 1948 meeting, the committee did endorse a second wave of organization and activism

in the South, including "a systematic attempt to organize chapters in the South, both in cities and,

where possible, in rural areas," and "the addition of new Southern members to the National


14 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 49, 155; John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The
Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the S,ilnh (Chapel Hill, 1995), 511-512.
15 "American Liberals in Politics (A Suggested Outline for a Political Four-Year Plan: November
1948-November 1952)," October 30, 1948, reel 33, no. 63, ADA Papers.

16 Minutes for meeting of Subcommission on Political Policy, November 7, 1948, reel 33, no. 63,
ADA Papers.









Board of ADA." Finally, the subcommittee decided that "ADA should [call] a conference of

Southern liberals to consider the immediate prospects of liberals there and the special problems

which confront them in connection with the civil rights program."17

If national officials needed any further convincing that southern liberals wanted ADA to

play a role in the South, some new voices began to provide it. William Billingsley, who was

attempting to start a chapter in Greensboro, North Carolina, agreed that "the results of the

election last month seem to me to make it clearer than ever that a great deal of intensive work by

labor and liberal forces must be concentrated in this region if we hope to re-mold the Democratic

Party closer to our heart's desire." However, existing chapters had neither the finances nor the

manpower to sustain a long campaign. Therefore, he wrote, "the National ADA is going to have

to subsidize the South for several years. It would appear to me that there should be several ADA

representatives in this region." Billingsley added that these organizers "should not have to be

worrying about where the hell next week's pay check is coming from .. ."" Support also came

from Dr. Frank Porter Graham, president of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who

telegrammed ADA National Director Leon Henderson "urging consideration of the South for

your new fund allocation," citing the importance of the South in the Democratic victories of

1948.19

Loeb's inclination was to be cautious about any sustained campaign to organize liberals in

the South, primarily because of financial considerations. As he told Billingsley, "I wish the



17 "Report of the Committee on Political Action," December 11, 1948, reel 33, no. 63, ADA
Papers.

1s William Billingsley to Loeb, December 1, 1948, reel 42, no. 162, ADA Papers.
19 Frank Porter Graham, telegram to Leon Henderson, December 9, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA
Papers.









ADA had the kind of finances your letter suggests. You indicate that there should be several

representatives of ADA in the South alone. Unfortunately, we do not have the finances of the

CIO at our disposal. We would be glad to undertake our own 'Operation Dixie' on the scale you

suggest, if you could figure out how to finance it."20 At the moment, Loeb declared, the more

pressing need was to explore ADA's role in the South, and that meant acting on the Executive

Committee recommendation for convening a regional conference to explore that role.

Loeb enlisted John Thomason to organize the conference, to be held in Atlanta on

February 19-20, 1949, and enlist prominent southern liberals to participate. In the end,

Thomason's passionate commitment to world federalism did not disqualify him from working on

this project. He negotiated a fee of one hundred and fifty dollars per week with the national

office plus expenses, and he began to compile a list of southerners with whom he wished to talk.

His initial list included journalists, politicians, lawyers, businessmen, clergymen and labor

leaders, with names like Ralph McGill, Douglas Southall Freeman, Estes Kefauver, Florida

Governor Fuller Warren, and even incoming Vice President Alben Barkley scattered

throughout.21 It was obvious at this juncture that Thomason was aiming high in his effort to

solicit opinions about the viability of southern liberalism.

Loeb was also clear about the purposes of the conference, especially when he thought

Thomason would attempt to downplay the organizational value of the meeting in Thomason's

correspondence. As Loeb stressed to Thomason, "I want to be completely institutional, and I

would therefore emphasize your first objective, 'to hammer out a role for ADA in the South.'"

He did not want to conference to turn into a meeting where the participants discussed politics


20 Loeb to Billingsley, December 7, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

21 Thomason to Loeb, December 16, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









only in the most general terms. "This conference is being called on the premise that the ADA

has a role in the South. The purpose of the conference is to decide what that role is. ... [and] it

is our general concept that the ADA can, and should, be the agency in which, and through which,

the good, solid non-Communist liberals find means of communicating with each other and

working out their common strategy."22

That common strategy would also have to take into account a vital question Thomason

asked Loeb about the proposed conference. He wanted to know whether the national office

wanted "to include Negroes in the conference and, if so, [as] what percentage of the total?"23 In

asking the question, Thomason acknowledged the thorny nature of the entire enterprise and

returned to a question that had dogged Taylor throughout his tenure in Memphis. Loeb's answer

reflected his own uneasiness with the matter, not out of any personal animosity toward black

participation but over the organizational problems ADA had to overcome. "On the one hand, we

do not want, nor can we afford, a Jim Crow ADA in the South. On the other hand, it is of no

advantage to our Negro friends to build an organization which will work exclusively on race

relations and which will therefore accomplish little, either for the South generally or for Southern

Negroes." Loeb was thinking specifically of the example of the Southern Conference for Human

Welfare (SCHW), founded in 1938 as an integrationist (and fully integrated) liberal organization

that had run into trouble in recent years because of its suspected ties to Communists. Loeb's

solution was a compromise where "if all of you consider it feasible, one or two of the more

knowledgeable and realistic Negro leaders should definitely be invited" to "[thrash] out" the





22 Loeb to Thomason, December 18, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

23 Thomason to Loeb, December 16, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









problem. "Remember that this is an off-the-record meeting with no publicity purposes at all."24

National leaders would defer to locals for their opinion on how closely they would want to be

associated with black churchmen or newspaper editors, several of whom were included on

Thomason's list.

Loeb also had some misgivings about the viability of some of the individuals Thomason

had wanted to invite. He thought, for instance, that Kefauver "might want to stay away from

ADA publicly," and he doubted "whether Ralph McGill would touch ADA with a 10-foot pole."

He thought it would be a terrible idea to invite Florida Senator Claude Pepper because of his

public support of Henry Wallace's presidential bid. Alabama Senators Lister Hill and John

Sparkman were "friendly on economic and some labor matters" but would "tend to discourage

ADA organization in the South. After all, Sparkman is the national spokesman for the anti-civil

rights people." Finally, "Barkley is obviously a bad idea. After all, you can't have an off-the-

record conference with the Vice President of the United States in Atlanta."25 It is obvious that

Thomason wanted to hold a conference that, though off-the-record, would attract some political

star power to Atlanta, while Loeb wanted to focus on building the organization through contacts

that had already been established.

The people Loeb had in mind were not nearly as prominent as those on Thomason's list,

but they were all committed to ADA. Instead of the two senators from Alabama, for instance,

Loeb suggested inviting John and Frances Schulter of Birmingham. Frances had tried

unsuccessfully to start a chapter there, and John had numerous labor contacts deriving from his

work with the local CIO. Writer Lillian Smith would add some star power as a potential invitee


24 Loeb to Thomason, December 18, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

25 Loeb to Thomason, December 18, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









from Georgia, but Loeb also recommended Kenneth Douty of the Textile Workers (CIO) and

Frank McAllister of the Georgia Workers' Education Service as participants. Instead of

newspaper editor and author Hodding Carter, Loeb wanted Charles G. Hamilton, who was

chairman of the Young Democrats of Mississippi ("about as powerful as the Mississippi ADA,

which in turn is non-existent") and, on several occasions, an unsuccessful congressional

candidate.26 These men and women were not nearly as famous as the people Thomason

suggested, but they had shown a commitment to ADA that Thomason's list lacked.

With Loeb's suggestions in mind, Thomason spent the last weeks of 1948 preparing for a

tour of the South that included visits with prominent elected officials, journalists, and several

long-standing ADA members. In Thomason's view, "the convention prospects in Atlanta look

good... If the interest continues all over the South at the high level I have so far found it, I have

no fears on the success of the meeting and the prospects for a good follow-up throughout the

Southern states." He also noted that, "practically every one I have talked to agrees that several

Negroes should be invited and that their support will be valuable. It is pretty generally

recognized now," he added, that "in most Southern states that Negro support politically is no

longer the kiss of death."27 Thomason's optimism on the subject of race stemmed in part from

the positive results of the recent elections, in which southern whites had rejected what liberals

considered to be the poisonous racial politics of the Dixiecrats and stayed loyal to a Democratic

party that had committed itself to racial reform. This was "one more golden opportunity-in

retrospect, [the South's] last best chance-to take control of its own social reformation," and





26 Loeb to Thomason, December 18, 1948, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

27 Thomason to Loeb, December 22, 1948, reel 51, no. 301, ADA Papers.









men like Thomason wanted to be at the head of the fight against the conservatives who still

politically controlled most southern states.28

Any resolution of the "civil rights controversy" would have to involve some sort of

compromise, at least according to Thomason, and he wanted part of the Atlanta meeting to be

devoted to working out a package of reforms that ADA leaders could present to politicians.

These reforms would include repealing poll taxes and providing stronger protections against

lynching while eschewing mention of the creation of a permanent FEPC or a movement to end

segregation in public accommodations or education. Loeb was uneasy about the idea of the

southerners creating their own platform, since he did not want the southerners' solutions to

contradict the positions of the national office. He knew that this was "a very delicate problem,"

but he forcefully asserted the national office's right to overrule local chapters if their policy

positions contradict the national office.29

Nevertheless, it was an encouraging sign that matters of political policy were taking center

stage for the Atlanta meeting. One of the things that had made Taylor's tenure in Memphis

unsuccessful was that he had devoted nearly all of his energy to organizational and bureaucratic

minutia. He spent comparatively little time on substantive matters. His decision to do so was

understandable, particularly in light of the need to attract new members who might have fled an

overly doctrinaire organization. On the other hand, Thomason's goal was to promote coherence

and a comprehensive approach to political matters and policy proposals.

Thomason's trip around the South during the last weeks of 1948 and the first weeks of

1949 tempered his optimism about the prospects for the Atlanta conference. He made a



28 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 513.

29 Loeb to Thomason, December 29, 1948, reel 51, no. 301, ADA Papers.









systematic analysis of the realistic prospects for existing and future chapters in the region, on the

basis of the assessments long-time ADA members gave him. For example, he reported that

Atlanta "has the best of intentions but is too much dominated by labor leaders. These persons

have statewide interests, which will be helpful to our conference, but cuts its effectiveness in the

Fulton County area." The Schulters of Birmingham were "defeated by their estimate of the

city," in part because they wanted to emphasize civil rights to the detriment of the rest of the

liberal agenda. He could not even arrange a meeting with his contacts in Memphis, despite

having spent days putting together an itinerary that would allow such a meeting. Thomason

could not hide his disappointment with what he learned during the trip, writing, "my conclusions

after this trip are the task before us is much bigger than even the most pessimistic had imagined."

He also rejected the notion that "one man for the South aided only by voluntary supporters"

could undertake the task, noting that "Barney Taylor's experience seems to prove this point."

Finally, as always, there was the financial situation. He wrote, "Money is naturally the principal

problem and I must confess that there is little hope that the South can provide enough to do the

job."30

Despite the pessimism with which Thomason now regarded organizing southern liberals,

plans for the Atlanta conference went forward. Loeb drafted the formal letters inviting

important southern politicians, educators, labor leaders, and private citizens to the February

meeting. In it, he pointed to the success liberals had enjoyed in the November elections and

reiterated that this success presented a unique opportunity to liberals in upcoming legislative

battles. He declared, "Americans for Democratic Action-which, as you know, has become an

effective focal point for non-Communist liberal activity nationally-can be the agency in which,


30 Thomason to Loeb, January 12, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









and through which, liberals in the South can communicate with each other, and work out

common plans for action." The letter was sent to dozens of potential participants, but Loeb

informed them that a maximum of thirty people would be at the meeting. He also noted that

"since ADA has no desire to exploit the meeting in publicity, no press releases will be issued

before or after the conference."31 He knew that a large meeting would attract attention, and he

wanted to reassure people who did not want public association with ADA's "radical" politics that

their participation would not be a matter for public discussion.

Despite these repeated assurances, many southern liberals avoided the Atlanta conference.

Most respondents who declined invitations did so because of financial constraints or prior

engagements, but these excuses may have been hiding other political or social considerations.

The truth was that many southerners, even liberals who shared ADA's views on civil rights,

labor, and health care, were skittish about cooperating with ADA, even in the most indirect way.

This reluctance was partly due to the general southern unwillingness to acknowledge northern

criticism of their society and economic structure. Even committed liberals such as Frank

Graham and Dorothy Tilly of the Southern Regional Council, the two southern members of the

President's late Commission on Civil Rights, argued for softening that group's recommendations

and deplored the "bias" they detected in To Secure These Rights, the report the group submitted

to Truman in October 1947. Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond (VA) Times-Dispatch and

one of the "notables" Thomason had named as a potential participant in Atlanta, had publicly

declared that criticism from Americans outside of the South was delusionaryy and self-

defeating."32


31 Loeb to W. Harold Flowers et al., January 25, 1949, reel 57, no. 4, ADA Papers.

32 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent .,nalh i .inlhei n Liberals and the Race Issue (New
York, 1977), 150-160 (quote on 158).









These criticisms struck a chord among many southern moderates and liberals. However,

another factor was at work with regard to the timing of the Atlanta conference and the

organization that hosted it. Though none of the negative responses to the invitation mentioned

the previous summer's Democratic convention, events in Philadelphia may have weighed on

their decisions as well. ADA had taken a very public lead in the fight to commit the Democrats

to a stronger position on civil rights and southern reform, and they now wanted to take that fight

into the South itself, even though their initial steps were tentative and low-key. ADA and its

leaders, particularly Senator Humphrey, had taken a great deal of heat from southern politicians

and journalists for their actions in Philadelphia. Many liberals who might have been inclined to

join the Atlanta meeting declined with their reputations in mind. At a moment when being

labeled as an ADA liberal was a potential political liability, even the most informal meeting

could have severe negative consequences for participants.

Despite the logistical and political problems the Atlanta conference posed, a strong list of

participants eventually emerged. Skittishness about being associated with ADA did not prevent

Frank Graham or Dorothy Tilly from being present, and Hodding Carter came from Greenville,

Mississippi along with his wife Betty, his partner in running the Delta Democrat-Times. Several

residents of Atlanta attended, as did representatives from chapters in New Orleans and

Chattanooga, Moss Plunkett from Virginia, and Charles Hamilton from Mississippi. The

delegates represented eight of the eleven states mentioned as possible targets for ADA growth.

Loeb acted as the group's moderator and as the main voice for the national organization.33

The conference also included Thomason, who had announced that he would be leaving his

post with ADA after the conference ended. He had accepted a publishing job in northern

33 Elizabeth Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," February 19-20, 1949, p. 1, reel 61, no. 33,
ADA Papers.









Virginia two weeks before the meeting. He lamented the fact that he would be leaving what he

called the "the most challenging opportunity I have ever known." However, his close proximity

to the nation's capital would allow him to "work in every way possible with the national D.C.

chapter offices to further the liberal program we support." At the same time, his base in northern

Virginia would allow him to work against that state's Democratic machine, controlled by Senator

Harry F. Byrd. He also told Loeb that he would be keeping an eye out for potential successors.34

Despite the fact that Thomason would be leaving ADA in February, his final

correspondence with Loeb continued to think the problems ADA would face in the South. In his

mind, "there [were] many dangers and there [were] many opportunities to contribute to an

improvement in the politics of the South. ADA's course must be courageous and it must

acknowledge the force of ingrained social habits." ADA had to guard against becoming "the

special pleader for any particular group," since the NAACP and labor organizations already

existed for that purpose. What it could do in the evolving political environment of the late 1940s

was "fill the aching need for a spokesman for the not inconsiderable group of people who oppose

the ownership of the Democratic Party by traditional rulers." The "surest weapons" ADA

leaders could use in filling this need were "court rulings, [and] appeals to reason and education,"

which would put them in direct opposition to the "headline methods" Wallace and the Southern

Conference typically used in pursuit of liberal reform.35

Thomason thought that there was another aspect of the political situation in the South that

needed to be addressed, both at the Atlanta conference and in subsequent campaigns. He

questioned "whether Southern representatives misrepresent or truly reflect the desires of their



34 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

35 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









constituents. If they are misrepresentatives, the job will be much simpler (certainly such a tag

should be placed upon them). If our national representatives are gauges of our wishes, education

remains the sole method of replacing them."36 Thomason believed that many of the region's

most reactionary politicians had begun their careers portraying themselves to the voters as

"liberals." Even someone as notorious as Strom Thurmond had begun his political life as a

"progressive outsider" campaigning for education reform and muting attacks on racial

integration.37 It might not be the voters' fault that they had elected someone such as Thurmond

in South Carolina, or Eugene Talmadge in Georgia, if they had presented a false face to the

voters. Thomason was a lifelong southerner himself and even he could not be sure of the true

political leanings of most southerners.

There was also the matter of where the working class and the "Negro" fit into their plans.

Thomason criticized mainstream black organizations (though not by name), saying that they

were "infamously reactionary except on the race question." He even believed that "political

freedom for Negroes could result in even worse representation" for liberals in the South. As for

labor organizations, Thomason noted that "the primary objective of a labor group is to organize

workers. There is no requirement that the workers be liberal. A real danger is that a strong,

reactionary labor movement will develop in the South."38 Conservative unionists had seized

upon the issue of Communism in CIO locals to draw strength away from their left-wing

counterparts. At its 1949 convention, the CIO countered the conservative backlash by expelling

more than one million workers who belonged to Communist-backed locals. The South was



36 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.

37 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 50-52.
38 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









becoming a significant battleground for the labor movement after the war, as thousands of jobs in

textiles and heavy industry were moving south, in part because the business climate was largely

anti-union.39 Thomason hoped that unions would attract liberal members, but there was no

guarantee that workers who joined ADA-affiliated unions would share ADA's politics, and

Thomason wanted to make sure Loeb understood that.

Thomason saw the "clannishness" of Southern politics as the biggest hurdle ADA was

going to have to overcome to organize the region. He thought characterizations of the South as

"clannish" were valid, if overdrawn. "There is some justification for this united front against

outside interference," he declared, adding that "the South has been the colonial province of

Eastern banking and industrial interests for a long time." He believed that southern liberal

defensiveness on political matters, especially race, was understandable. "They are made to

appear narrow and partisan because they point out that there is just as much race hatred in New

York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Los Angeles as can be found in the South. They see growing

tensions in the North while [sic] the problem in the South has been steadily declining."40 Indeed,

the "clannishness" of the North was just as much of a problem as that of the South, but the

default representation of the North as the "normal" region of the country immediately placed the

southern liberal in a defensive posture. This was nothing new to the social and political history

of the United States. While southerners claimed to a distinctive regional identity in contrast to

northerners, northerners have often characterized themselves as "true Americans" and defined






39 Numan V. Bartley, A History of the .i,,th, Volume 7X: The New .mt,,h, 1945-1980 (Baton
Rouge, 1995), 58-60.
40 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









their identity in contrast with the South.41 Thomason's defense of his home region, even as he

tries to push it toward a more liberal posture, exemplified this recurrent theme.

Given the problems southern liberals faced, the question remained: what should they

advocate, and how should they go about getting what they wanted? Thomason argued that while

"the South needs federal aid in the areas of health, education, [and] housing[,] it would be more

healthy to make it possible for the South to take a fairer share of the load." Specifically, he

wanted the Atlanta conference to advocate expanding social security benefits, repeal or reform of

the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, raising the federal minimum wage, national health insurance, and

legislation against lynching and the poll tax. As for how to achieve these goals, Thomason

thought it important to avoid the appearance of the "paternalism" that he thought was a constant

in relations between North and South. He wanted the Atlanta meeting to present a united front

on the issues that mattered to those attending, showing that southern liberals truly wanted these

things and that they advocated these policies without northern pressure or influence. He knew

that conservative politicians would "[criticize] all programs they oppose as projects of Northern

and Eastern interests," and that such a strategy usually worked, but he was willing to go ahead

with the effort anyway because liberal ideas were worth the fight.42

It was in this atmosphere of cautious hope that the ADA and its southern allies gathered in

Atlanta on Saturday morning, February 19, 1949, to discuss the possible future of their

organization in the South. Interestingly, one of the first decisions taken that morning was to

ignore the original intent of having no press coverage. The conference's participants prepared a

brief statement for release to the wire services, the two Atlanta newspapers, and John Popham of



41 James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A History of .in,,ihei n Identity (New York, 2005), 7.
42 Thomason to Loeb, February 6, 1949, reel 59, no. 18, ADA Papers.









the Chattanooga Times, who had requested the statement in the first place. Loeb was the first to

speak. He lauded ADA's achievements and stressed the prominence of many of its members.

He then insisted that ADA's position was that the South "is still a part of the nation," and that the

national leadership "wants to know what southern liberals are thinking and doing, particularly in

view of the change in the South since the last election." The meeting's goal was to serve this

purpose, as well as to put southerners who might otherwise have been isolated in contact with

information and support that would help them in their struggles.43

The next to speak was Frank Graham, who declared that the conference would be a

positive experience because "I think it is good for us once in a while to get together to just sit

down and talk." His contribution to the conversation focused on policies that he thought were

possible in the near-future, including increased federal aid to education (which he regarded as "a

matter of national welfare"), introduction of state minimum wages that would exceed the federal

wage, and continued implementation of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The issue of

education was of particular importance to this university president, especially since the United

States could no longer rely on recruiting intellectuals from European institutions; most of whom

were already in the United States. Graham argued that "if we could unite-North and South,

East and West. ., this could be a great Congress. Or else it can bog down because of

extremists on both sides."44

Graham thought any national liberal program might founder over the civil rights issue,

which was interesting given his position on the President's Commission on Civil Rights (and his

endorsement, however qualified, of the commission's conclusions). He reiterated that "I stand



43 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 1.

44 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 2-3.









by that report," but he took issue with the notion that "every meeting of southerners should just

let that matter take over, when there are other things that are important." Attention to civil rights

to the exclusion of everything else would be impractical, in part because "nobody knows what

Truman's civil rights program is," despite the President's public endorsement of the Philadelphia

platform. Above all, he did not want too much attention, financial and political, to go to black

southerners at the expense of the problems white southerners faced. Graham believed that liberal

pressure against segregation could not proceed until liberals were able to implement broader

economic and social reform, which was a reflection of the "popular-front" liberalism that he had

advocated during his time with SCHW.45 He wanted ADA to keep these considerations in mind

when coming up with its program, saying, "The thing that appeals to me about ADA is that it

doesn't compromise its principles, but it is also willing [to] fight for things that are possible."46

Despite Graham's plea to not devote all of the conference to civil rights, the first topic

covered after Graham's speech was the prospect for the creation of a permanent FEPC by the 81st

Congress. Loeb thought it would be tough to get FEPC through in 1949, and he dissuaded the

participants from making it their top organizational and political priority, since most of the votes

for FEPC would come from outside the South regardless of how hard they worked to earn votes

from southern congressmen. The conferees believed that most civil rights measures, especially

FEPC, would provoke an almost uniformly negative reaction in the southern political class.

Chattanooga's Stanton Smith agreed with Graham and Loeb, saying that "our problem is not one

of finding compromises and substitute measures [on race], but a problem of keeping ADA from

being solely a civil rights organization." Loeb's solution was the sort of compromise Smith



45 Bartley, The New S.mith, 64-65.

46 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 3-4.









wanted. "As far as ADA nationally is concerned, it continues its own program on civil rights.

As far as any program in the South is concerned, strategy and tactics would be taken into account

by local groups."47 Loeb was serious in his commitment to an understanding of the peculiar

problems southern liberals faced on several fronts, and his willingness to allow southern

members to go their own way on civil rights was one example of this commitment.

On Sunday, South Carolina county court judge Richard Foster, an SRC member, asked

another important, narrower civil rights question. He wanted to know whether or not southern

ADA chapters should hold meetings and receptions that were fully integrated. The minutes

recorded that "several persons .. said they had found it best not to make an issue of Negro

membership and attendance," while others cautioned that "If you start without Negroes, you

never get them in... Try to get in the beginning at least some representative Negro leaders."

Martha Ragland of Chattanooga offered a compromise on black membership, saying that

"you've got to remember the local customs and yet not sacrifice the principle of non-

segregation."48 The willingness of the participants to at least temporarily accept this type of

solution shows how distasteful the whole question was for so many of them. No one had the

stomach to tackle the question in any depth.

Loeb also wanted to discuss the constraints under which ADA was working and how that

would affect the South. He reiterated ADA's financial problems, warning those assembled not to

expect organizers who would concentrate on single states. At best, southerners could expect

"one full-time organizer plus his expenses," something similar to Taylor's "Southern Office" in

Memphis. This was a risk, since Taylor's tenure had ended without much tangible success, but



47 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 5-6.

48 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 26.









there was no way around the money issue. There was also the matter of attracting speakers who

could (a) draw large crowds to ADA events and (b) not alienate a significant percentage of

potential ADA members. This was one of the reasons Loeb had vetoed the idea of bringing

Hubert Humphrey to the conference. Humphrey close association with the civil rights issue

meant that any ADA event he headlined would be controversial from the start, and ADA would

come off badly under this scenario. Nancy Smith, Stanton Smith's husband and the driving force

behind ADA's Chattanooga chapter, thought this would not be a problem. She proposed

bringing in Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, Connecticut Governor Chester Bowles, and others,

insisting that "Southern people are ready to hear" them.49

There was also the question of how many new members chapters should be looking to

attract. Stanton Smith asked Loeb about this, and Loeb cautioned that ADA "is not a mass

organization... It has to be in the first sense the conscience of the community... a 'meeting-

ground' for action." What this meant, practically speaking, was that the chapters would not

merely gear up for certain candidates or campaigns. Chapters would instead focus on issues, and

they would "[have] constantly in mind the question of the structure and control of the political

parties." Others agreed that "it is better to start as a small group and then, if we find we can

become a larger group, we can do that."50

Some of these southerners, however, objected to Loeb's description of this role as

"coordinating." The consensus was that "if you use the term 'coordinating' it suggests



49 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 26. Loeb's worries about bringing speakers to the South
ran in both directions. While worrying about whether southerners would listen to what someone
like Douglas or Bowles had to say, he wondered whether these speakers would agree to go south
without some assurance that their speeches would be well-attended, thus making it worth their
while.
50 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 26.









dominating," and no one in the room wanted to give the impression that they wanted ADA to

dictate policy positions from above. Instead of "coordinating," there was some thought given to

ADA as "the yeast or the conscience of a community," whether that community was a single city

or an entire state. Stanton Smith did not think this description went far enough, and he did not

see how ADA was going to function effectively without either casting its lot with a political

party or even forming one of its own. After all, Smith said, "You have to remember that the

labor groups are going to retain their own separate identity in the political field," and ADA was

going to have a tough time overcoming that separateness without a clear plan of its own.5

However, attorney Jim Hart of Roanoke, Virginia cautioned that ADA faced an even more

basic problem. He said, "I have been impressed by the lack in each southern state of the people

in one town knowing who in other towns in the state is with them [i.e. liberal]." Any organizer

ADA sent to the South would have to introduce the various liberal elements in a given

community to each other. Therfore, Hart wanted "to see in each congressional district

representatives making up an over-all coordinating group-with some representatives from

labor, from the Negro groups, and so on." Harriet Doar, the Women's Editor for the Raleigh

(NC) News and Observer, agreed, adding that it "is terribly important to have that state set-up. It

would give encouragement to the local groups, particularly in the South where your cities are

small and your people are scattered." State organizations would allow individuals, who had

previously seen themselves as "scattered [and] lonesome," to "get a certain amount of confidence

behind their ideas."52





51 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 27.

52 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 28.









There was the question, however, of just how much encouragement these "local groups"

really wanted from ADA. Specifically, Loeb "raised the question of whether a local independent

organization is better than a local division of a national organization." Richard Foster thought

the former was better in a place like South Carolina, explaining that liberals in the state had

formed a Democratic Voters League that used ADA literature. This allowed South Carolina

liberals to "not identify itself with ADA because it was not expedient for them to come out for

FEPC." In other words, liberals could express their support for most of the points on the liberal

agenda, including public housing, increased spending on education, and the Marshall Plan, while

still being on the "right" side of the segregation issue in the state politically.53

The Atlanta conference came to no definitive conclusions on any of these issues, primarily

because the majority of the time allotted to the conference was devoted to what Loeb called the

"political realities of the situation" in each southern state. Loeb wanted the delegates to discuss

"the present political climate," the effect of the Dixiecrat split on that climate, and the

"controlling forces" liberals had to deal with in the one-party South. Loeb decided to tackle

these questions on a state-by-state basis, recognizing that a consideration of local conditions was

vital.

The first state to be considered was Tennessee, a bright spot given Kefauver's victory over

the Crump machine in 1948. Martha Ragland, who had chaired the Women's Division for both

the Kefauver campaign and the Democratic Party overall, lauded this "great liberal victory," but

she cautioned that "it would be unwise to assume that Tennessee is a liberal state."54 The real

issue in Tennessee, she insisted, was dissatisfaction with Crump, particularly in his home base of



53 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 28.

54 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 7.









Memphis. Kefauver benefited from the fact that he had faced two opponents in the Democratic

primary, incumbent Senator Tom Stewart and Judge John Mitchell, Crump's candidate (who

finished third in a humiliating repudiation of the machine).5

Indeed, despite the anti-machine victories the previous year, Ragland was not at all

optimistic about liberalism in the short-term. Crump was giving no indication of fading away.

Ragland's solution was to educate the public about ADA's close ties to the Democrats. "It

seems to me," she argued, "we should emphasize as much as we can the point that we are

implementing the platform of the [D]emocratic party." She also thought that liberals could take

heart from Kefauver's passionate defense of liberalism during the campaign, noting that

"Kefauver emphasized world peace and TVA. He was for federal aid to education, [and] anti-

poll tax. .. ." The trick now, according to Mrs. Ragland, was to "[make] it politically possible

for him to continue to be as good, as senator, as he has been a congressman."56

Virginia attorney Moss Plunkett was next with a discussion of his home state. The Old

Dominion "has a national reputation of being a liberal state," but in fact "it is the most

conservative I know of." He was hopeful that the black vote (which in 1948 had reached 50,000)

and new emphasis on southern organizing by the labor federations would tilt the state's politics

away from the Byrd machine. Nevertheless, there were practical problems to keep in mind.

Most of the important positions in state government were appointed; the state's voters elected

only the governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general. Jim Hart added that the state's

opposition to Byrd in the state was scattered and ineffective, which hurt liberals and labor

because "it is a thousand times harder to be elected to an office at the local level than to the U.S.

55 For a breakdown of the 1948 Tennessee Democratic primary, see William D. Miller, Mr.
Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge, 1964), 322-333.

56 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 8-10.









Senate. Any program we have must start at the local level."7 Moreover, there was also little

chance of help for liberals through the media, since most newspapers and radio stations sided

with the machine. As with Tennessee, the climb for liberals in Virginia would be tough.

Mississippi presented its own peculiar problems. Rev. Charles G. Hamilton spoke for his

state's tiny liberal contingent. In 1948, he had run for lieutenant governor on a loyal Democratic

ticket and received 80,000 votes. Despite his relatively strong showing, Hamilton was not

expecting improvement in his state. "We are the poorest state in the union. As a result, we

depend for everything from the outside. We have to depend on outside money for elections. The

corporations, of course, are the only donators of outside money." In order to stop what he called

a Dixiecrat "reign of terror," Hamilton had some specific requests. First, "we need for the public

to learn about the corporation backing of Dixiecrats. We need it in magazines, in newspapers.

We need a book on it." He named Mississippi Power, Pure Oil Company, and several New

Orleans businesses as large contributors to the Dixiecrats. Hamilton thought this activity would

be relatively easy to publicize and would play into the natural resentment Mississippians had

toward outsiders. Second, liberals had to "get someone on the problem of starting to educate

Negroes in voting." If 20,000 or 30,000 voted in the next election, blacks would become a

potential swing vote in the next campaign cycle, and liberals needed to make sure they voted for

liberals. He was already sure that the next generation of Mississippi Democrats would be better

than the last, particularly on civil rights, declaring them to be "liberal on all of the issues we have

raised today." He even believed that "one-tenth [of white Mississippians] would be in favor of

abolishing segregation."5



57 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting,"l 1-12.

58 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 13-14.









Graham was more optimistic about North Carolina, where Kerr Scott's unexpected win in

the governor's race lent credence to the notion that a liberal revival was possible. He also

praised Scott's predecessor, J. Melville Broughton, as "a very progressive governor," particularly

on education, having taken a "position for equalization of school teachers' pay and [a] 9-month

state-supported school system." William Billingsley, who worked with the Textile Workers

Union of America (TWUA) local in Greensboro, lauded the political power labor had wielded in

the election, especially as it the unions had helped Scott win in November. Billingsley also

thought the elections were interesting in terms of the black vote, noting that "the Progressive

party had counted on a lot of support from the Negro community but did not get it." When

Graham asked why that had been the case, Billingsley chalked it up to "the innate good sense of

the Negroes," many of whom he hoped would join the small but "fairly decent" ADA chapters

that had formed in Greensboro, Chapel Hill, and Durham.59

The SRC's George Mitchell then spoke on the political situation in Georgia, whose quirks

highlighted the importance of the state-by-state approach ADA wanted to follow in this

meeting.60 Liberalism had dimmer prospects in Georgia than in Tennessee or North Carolina, he

said. The election of Herman Talmadge as governor in 1948 only highlighted the problems




59 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 15-16.

60 Mitchell's participation in the conference, along with that of Dorothy Tilly, also highlighted an
important shift in SRC's attitude toward the "problem" of "outside agitation," or northern
interest in southern problems. As Robert J. Norrell has noted in his study of the SRC, "By 1948
the Council had come to embrace the notion that change in southern race relations would
probably be imposed from outside," with the wartime expansion of the federal government and
the President's Committee on Civil Rights (in which Tilly participated) each playing a role in
that conclusion. Robert J. Norrell, "Triangles of Change: The Southern Regional Council in the
Civil Rights Movement," paper delivered at the conference "The Southern Regional Council and
the Civil Rights Movement," University of Florida, Gainesville, October 23-26, 2003 (in
Douglas S. Gallagher's possession).









liberals faced.61 Mitchell reiterated that the most important problem for liberals was Georgia's

county unit apportionment system, which allowed conservative rural areas to exert power far

beyond their numbers, while "in the city of Atlanta a vote counts about 1/200 as much as it does

in some of the rural counties." This was "the big obstacle toward getting a democracy," and the

relative strength of the Ku Klux Klan in the state "intimidated" liberals during political

campaigns.62

Kenneth Douty, who worked with the TWUA local in Atlanta, thought liberalism's

chances in Georgia hinged on the potential strength of labor. He said, "the liberal forces are

split. If the labor groups could have some sort of effective working relationships, it could be a

tremendous force." He believed there were "200 to 250 thousand organized workers" in the

state, and that "there are places ... where local unions have done magnificent jobs, are

completely organized and completely active. They have the balance of power in those counties."

Unfortunately for liberals, according to Douty, "the only real leadership against the Talmadge

administration is the Atlanta Journal," while Ellis Arnall had distanced himself from local and

national liberals after his term as governor. As Douty put it, "he became increasingly bitter as he

came out of office. The farther he traveled from home, the more liberal he became, and this

worked to his discredit here."63 Without a popular and effective leader to unite liberals, they

stood little chance of overturning the county unit system and, thus, little chance at winning

political power except at the local level.





61 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 382-389.
62 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 16-17.

63 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 17-18.









Florida was another state in which liberals believed there was potential that ADA could

exploit, and Jerry Carter, the state's Railroad Commissioner and Democratic Committeeman,

told the attendees how he thought they could do that. He sang the praises of Senator Pepper,

who was up for reelection in 1950. He then talked about the need for "somebody that can think

in the language of the people," which in a practical sense meant politically savvy operatives who

could reach "crackers" like himself. He contrasted these people with the "intellectuals," who

would "write a book" if they found out the people did not agree with them. He also spoke of the

need for "tolerance," bothfor those who were "left of center" and among them. Others had

spoken of the need for liberals to unite around a common platform, but Carter was most explicit.

As he saw it, "all the disgruntleds, soreheads [and] free-thinkers, rally and fight each other, until

the common enemy looms into sight." One potential bright spot in the state was Governor Fuller

Warren, who Carter called "very amenable to his friends" and a good governor.64

Liberals were less sure about prospects in Alabama, and former Montgomery Advertiser

editor Charles Dobbins reflected this confusion. Dobbins' opinion was "perhaps paradoxical,"

for he said he was "hopeful about Alabama, the only state in the union that would not let its

citizens vote for the President of the United States." He could not figure out Governor "Big Jim"

Folsom's "dual character." Dobbins believed that Folsom "stands for the right things, but he has

compromised himself in some ways that have shaken the real liberal leadership in Alabama-for

example, putting a candidate out against Sparkman." In the same vein, Dobbins said, "he has, to

his credit, absolutely refused to make any use of the Negro issue. Unfortunately he has

surrounded himself with men of second and third-rate quality." Dobbins also praised members

of the state's congressional delegation, including Senators Hill and Sparkman, each of whom had


64 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 18-19.









worked hard for the Truman ticket. With good people in national and statewide offices, he

recommended a renewed focus on the "minor offices" and less attention "just on the

congressional and gubernatorial offices."65

The problem with the latter approach, according to Dobbins, was that local officials

controlled the Democratic machinery in Alabama, which meant that when liberals attempted to

fight Dixiecrats and conservatives, they were starting with a tremendous disadvantage. Another

Alabaman, John Schulter of the CIO's Birmingham office, thought the best way to win those

battles was through conscientious work on building a coalition in the state "marrying labor to the

Tuscaloosa and Auburn [university] intellectuals who refuse taking a stand... plus a marriage

with Folsom's [small] farmers," who were prominent in Folsom's governing coalition.66

The final two states covered were Louisiana and South Carolina, two states that voted for

the Dixiecrats in 1948. Dr. E. Terry Prothero, an assistant professor of psychology at Louisiana

State University, led the discussion on his "reactionary" state, where the most important political

issue was "absentee ownership" of land and industrial enterprises. Prothero, like his colleagues

in Mississippi, thought Louisiana liberals could make an issue of "outsiders" controlling the state

politically and economically. ADA leaders would also have to reckon with the divide between

New Orleans and the rest of Louisiana.67

In South Carolina, Judge Foster talked about the deep split in Democratic ranks that had

resulted from the Dixiecrat schism, to the point where there were now two Democratic parties in

the state. ADA's task was to build up the "real" Democrats so that they could challenge



65 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 19-21.

66 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 19-21.

67 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 21-22.









Thurmond's Dixiecrats when the former presidential candidate ran against incumbent Senator

Olin Johnston in 1950 in a campaign that was "no secret" to political observers in South

Carolina. One big problem for loyal Democrats, as another participant noted, was that "no

person in South Carolina could run on the platform of the national democratic party [sic] and get

elected," and not even a comprehensive political education program would help that cause.68

These reports took a lot of time, but they gave the participants had a great deal to ponder,

as Loeb had undoubtedly hoped they would. The reports had served two main purposes. First,

national ADA wanted to introduce these liberals to each other in a politically safe environment

for an open discussion of the problems they faced in organizing the South. Second, Loeb wanted

to get a sense of the relative difficulties each southern state presented. Even if those outside the

South did not see it, southerners themselves were well aware that Tennessee and North Carolina

were very different from South Carolina and Mississippi. Loeb said, "This group was brought

together in a hit-or-miss fashion. Yet there was a common approach, while there were

differences in strategy and tactics."69 It would be now much easier to determine where and when

effort and money would be expended most effectively.

Before adjourning, Loeb asked for short-term suggestions that would allow ADA to act on

the advice they had been given quickly. Some of these suggestions included a series of large-

scale mailing campaigns, contacting local labor federations to inquire about office space, and

enlisting people who were already traveling to certain locations for volunteer work while they

were in those communities. Plunkett suggested, to widespread agreement, that the first

membership drive after Atlanta begin in Tennessee. Loeb offered $400-500 to states for 30-day


68 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 22-23.

69 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 25.









organizing drives, with the idea that a full-time organizer would be on board after that period.

Hart asked Loeb for help with the national news outlets, hoping to get news concerning liberal

activities in the South into national publications. As he noted, "it would be of great value to us

to get something in the New York Times, in Time, Newsweek, and so on."70 On that note, the

Atlanta conference came to a close, with mutual promises to provide whatever assistance would

be needed in making the recommendations of the conference a reality.

The press release ADA sent to media outlets after the conference talked about the subjects

participants had discussed, saying, "the discussion was devoted to those [parts] of a liberal

program which have to do with building up the South in the broader fields of education, health,

housing, citizenship, industrial and agricultural development and race relations." It also

emphasized that the conference was a decidedly informal affair that was not meant to draw up a

detailed program for action.71 As informal as the discussion may have been, it was vitally

important to the future activities of Americans for Democratic Action in the South. The national

office may not have known who would be their next southern organizer, but they had a better

idea of what that spokesman should be saying and where he or she should be saying it.

The liberals who gathered in Atlanta were optimistic that many of the ideas liberal

politicians and journalists championed in the rest of the country could become part of the

political agenda of the South as well. They saw no reason why southerners would not support

public housing, laws to protect unions, and increased funding for education, if they were only

given the facts on each of these issues. ADA had already prepared literature and solicited the

talents of public speakers that could make the case for them. The election of politicians like



70 Taylor, "Notes on Atlanta Meeting," 29-30.
71 ADA press release, February 19, 1949, reel 61, no. 33, ADA Papers.









Estes Kefauver and Kerr Scott was also an encouraging sign, especially since they made no

secret of their stands on the issues. Much was possible for liberals in the South, as long as too

much was not made of the civil rights issue. In a surprising development, Jim Loeb, speaking for

ADA in Atlanta, had even showed a willingness to back off the harsh anti-southern rhetoric that

had marked the Democratic National Convention in 1948 in their deliberations. If a de-emphasis

on racial issues would increase ADA membership, this was a risk Loeb wanted to take, at least in

the short term.

As for where the organizer was expected to go, the consensus seemed to be that it would

not be prudent to send that person into certain states, especially the four states the Dixiecrat

ticket had carried the previous year. There was no sense that Mississippi or South Carolina was

ripe for a large-scale liberal effort, and so correspondence would be the main tool an organizer

would use in these states. The organizer would concentrate on states like Tennessee, North

Carolina, and Florida. The election results of 1948 had seen several promising liberals elected to

higher office in these states, signaling a potential turn away from reactionary politics. If the

South was going to change, it would change first in these states, creating a base from which

further campaigns would be possible in more difficult areas. The plan of action was, in this

sense, almost military in nature, though no one discussed it in these terms.

This was a marked departure from ADA's previous course of action, which involved

sending an organizer throughout the South, at great expense, with the hope that he would be able

to stir up liberal sentiment across a broad area. The end result of his work was a few small

southern chapters and no significant financial windfall. If ADA leaders wanted to reignite its

southern efforts (and it is clear that they did), the next campaign had to be planned in much more

detail. ADA also had to acknowledge that their image had changed since Taylor left his job in









April 1948. Most southerners knew something about ADA, and it was likely that their opinion

of ADA was not positive. Despite the fallout from Philadelphia, however, the results of the

elections of 1948 offered at least some hope that the South could change politically and socially,

and ADA wanted to make these changes possible. The Atlanta conference offered a glimpse of

what policies could secure the most support (and which would have trouble), where to organize

(and where not to), and how any newly-appointed organizer should go about their duties (and

what they should not do). It became an important interim step in ADA's quest for a voice in the

South, and it signaled that the next two years would be a crucial period in its history.









CHAPTER 5
"OUR PROPOSED SOLUTION ... HAS COLLAPSED": ALDEN HOPKINS AND THE
REINCARNATION OF THE ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE, 1949-1950

In ADA's second major effort to establish itself in the South, a new southern director,

Alden Hopkins, both learned from the mistakes of her predecessor Barney Taylor and

encountered variations of the same problems that had bedeviled him. During her stint, which

lasted from April 1949 to February 1950, Hopkins found that three major problems frustrated her

efforts in North Carolina and Florida. Too often, she found, the distasteful legacy of the

Southern Conference and the failed presidential campaign of Henry Wallace lingered, both

dividing liberals and tainting ADA activists with an unearned but tenacious association with

allegedly pro-Soviet views. Equally troublesome for her, as was the case with Taylor, was the

problem of race and civil rights: African Americans were the most consistent liberal group she

encountered, but at the same time no issue was more divisive, even among relatively progressive

whites, than civil rights. Finally, Hopkins found that electoral politics simultaneously provided

the most significant focal point for liberal initiatives and distracted her and fellow liberals from

the difficult task of building a liberal political infrastructure.

By February 1949, when ADA officials convened its informal meeting of southern liberals

in Atlanta to discuss the prospects of New Deal liberalism in the South, ADA had existed for

more than two years. This meeting was the first moment at which ADA leaders openly

discussed the question of whether liberals could win converts in the region. It was also the first

time these men and women had raised questions of strategy and tactics. They attempted to

determine where ADA's limited resources could be used effectively in organizing new chapters,

strengthening old ones, and backing liberal candidates for state and federal office. The

consensus reached in Atlanta centered on an approach far different from Taylor's. Instead of

sending the organizer all over the South, Taylor's successor would concentrate on two or three









states where liberal candidates had succeeded in the past. He or she would organize the rest of

the South primarily through correspondence and over the telephone. ADA leaders would be

happy to help liberals in Mississippi and Alabama if they wanted to start chapters or join ADA as

individuals, but the new organizer would not be sent these places to invigorate the process.

Liberals would have to show their commitment to political action without someone like Taylor to

hold their hand.

There was already evidence that certain southern cities had committed liberals in place

and would carry on with ADA work with or without the help of a regional organizer. For

example, John Schulter of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (CIO) in

Birmingham, who attended the Atlanta meeting, informed ADA Executive Secretary James Loeb

that he had met with the "lead editorial writer" of the Birmingham News shortly after his return

from Atlanta in mid-February. Schulter wanted to sound out this unnamed editor on the

possibility of "a Liberal-Labor coalition in this state [Alabama] and the possibility of a meeting

to create such a coalition." The News writer suggested that such a meeting would be most

productive if Schulter could convince Frank Graham, who had just chaired the Atlanta

conference on ADA's behalf, to attend it. Schulter wanted Loeb to approach Graham about

traveling to Birmingham to speak before about fifty Alabama liberals, while Schulter would

handle Graham's expenses and travel arrangements. He also wanted representatives of

Alabama's two Democratic senators, Lister Hill and John Sparkman, to address the group. His

final request reminded everyone involved that the South was far from being a liberal utopia. He

wrote, "At this time it would be better to refrain from inviting any of the leaders of the negro

[sic] community as it might give the opposition the kind of ammunition that they would use to









destroy such a coalition."' Indeed, the question of what to do with black southerners remained a

vexing one, even for those whites who supported changes to the segregationist status quo.

While Schulter and others forged ahead, ADA concentrated on finding a new southern

organizer. One advantage this new organizer would have was time, a luxury that Taylor had

never enjoyed. In May 1947, Taylor had been thrown into his ADA job with no real thought as

to what he should do, beyond identifying southern liberals and encouraging the formation of

ADA chapters. He was also stuck with the task of handling the affairs of the Memphis chapter,

by far the most politically and organizationally active during his time with ADA. Most

significantly, he had only a few months to focus on these tasks before the 1948 presidential

campaign began to monopolize the attention of those in Washington whose help he required to

do his job. The attention ADA's national staff paid to the election helped Harry Truman upset

Republican Thomas Dewey in November, but it did little to help Taylor's aborted efforts to make

ADA work in the South. In 1949, however, with no major electoral contests on the horizon,

Taylor's successor would have more energy available to devote to organizational matters.

Even so, Taylor's successor could count on more attention to the South because of

several significant races in the 1950 congressional elections, where liberals with strong ties to

ADA faced significant challenges. One such contest in Florida featured incumbent Senator

Claude Pepper, whose previous elections to the Senate in 1938 and 1944 had been close, hard-

fought affairs. Pepper had always had an uneasy relationship with New Dealers who were also

hard-line cold warriors. In 1949, his standing within the Democratic Party was under serious

scrutiny, even though he had eventually repudiated Henry Wallace's third-party run for the


1 John Schulter to James A. Loeb, February 21, 1949, Reel 42, No.162, Americans for
Democratic Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville, microfilm collection
(hereafter cited as ADA Papers).









presidency on the Progressive ticket. Pepper's opponents maintained that the senator had been

too supportive of the Soviet Union in his statements opposing an American nuclear build-up.

Florida conservatives had succeeded in blocking Pepper's efforts to send his hand-picked slate of

delegates to the 1948 Democratic Convention in Philadelphia, selecting instead a states'-rights

slate pledged to Mississippi Governor Fielding J. Wright. Wright would end up as Strom

Thurmond's running mate on the Dixiecrat ticket, and Pepper's failure to stop Florida Democrats

from supporting Wright showed how vulnerable his political situation was.2

Despite Pepper's political liabilities and pro-Soviet views, the senator did share some

common ground with ADA. For example, once his personal presidential aspirations appeared

dead, Pepper had joined with ADA in supporting former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D.

Eisenhower as the Democratic nominee in Philadelphia. The fact that Eisenhower expressed no

interest in being President and repeatedly declined to run did not stop Pepper, ADA officials, and

other disaffected liberals from trying to draft him. When the general finally convinced liberals

he was not interested, Pepper revived his own candidacy as an anti-Truman alternative for

liberals. He publicly declared himself a candidate on the second day of the convention,

describing himself as a New Deal liberal, a supporter of labor, and a "good southerner" on civil

rights. The national and state press denounced the effort, calling Pepper's candidacy "sad" and

"preposterous," and even ADA chairman Leon Henderson distanced himself from the senator.

Even before voting began, Pepper withdrew his name from nomination, and he supported the

Democratic ticket in the fall, but his presidential aspirations had dire political consequences in






2 James C. Clark, "Road to Defeat: Claude Pepper and Defeat in the 1950 Florida Primary"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1998), 111-118, 125-127.









1950.3 It would be very difficult for the organization to support Pepper in his re-election fight,

but liberals had few southerners they could rely on in the Senate, and they could ill afford to lose

one, regardless of his views on Communism and the Soviet Union.

The other battleground on which ADA leaders focused in preparation for the 1950

election cycle was North Carolina, where, not long after the Atlanta conference adjourned, an

unexpected opportunity presented itself On March 6, 1949, former governor and newly elected

Senator J. Melville Broughton died, leaving Governor Kerr Scott the task of naming a

replacement to serve twenty months of Broughton's term before a special election in November

1950. Scott's list of potential replacements grew to over fifty names, though some of the

governor's closest confidants, including his wife Mary, urged him to select Frank Graham.

When Scott offered Graham the job, Graham balked, protesting that he already had a job as

president of the University of North Carolina. It is possible that Graham may have also had

political reasons for initially refusing a seat in the Senate. Graham knew that he had potential

liabilities as a candidate and that his enemies would use his past as a founding member of the

Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) to accuse him of Communist sympathies, if

not outright membership in the party. Earlier in 1949, he had endured a taste of what his life

might be like in Washington. In January, he learned that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

had been investigating him for more than two years without his knowledge, trying to find reasons

not to grant him "complete security clearance" as president of the Oak Ridge Institute for

Nuclear Studies. The AEC report found fault with Graham for his alliances with "suspect

persons and organizations," but it eventually found no reason not to trust him with nuclear



3 Clark, "Road to Defeat," 119-131; John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation
Before the Civil Rights Movement in the S.lum (Chapel Hill, 1995), 479.









secrets.4 Graham was used to people questioning his political associations, but his post at North

Carolina offered a safe haven from the troubles he faced. The United States Senate would be a

hornet's nest, and Graham knew it.

In the end, however, Raleigh News and Observer editor (and ADA member) Jonathan

Daniels convinced Graham that it was his duty to accept the office. He pointed out that in the

coming months Graham's "yes" vote on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty

would be vital to its passage. Scott's official announcement on March 22 of Graham's

appointment at a UNC faculty dinner stunned everyone, but in fact the reactions were

predictable. Liberals were ecstatic, none more so than those in ADA. Jim Loeb sent a telegram

to the "great liberal governor" of North Carolina expressing admiration for Graham's selection

and claiming that the decision "confirms our conviction that new liberal leadership in the South

will serve to unify America and wipe out anachronistic sectional divisions."5 He told Duke

University Law professor Douglas B. Maggs that Graham's appointment was "the greatest thing

that ever happened in North Carolina" and claimed Graham would "certainly give a shot in the

arm to all liberal organizational work in the State of North Carolina."6 In a radio address

delivered on the day Graham was sworn in as a senator, Loeb identified him as one of three

southern senators who would "vote with the liberals on all important questions, including most

of the civil rights issues."7




4 Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham: A S.'lnll n Liberal (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1980), 237-
238, 243.

5 Loeb to Kerr Scott, March 23, 1949, reel 17, no. 1, ADA Papers.

6 Loeb to Douglas B. Maggs, March 29, 1949, reel 17, no. 1. ADA Papers.

7 Transcript of Loeb radio address, March 29, 1949, reel 42, no. 163, ADA Papers.









Claude Pepper and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee were the other senators Loeb singled out

for praise, and this short list provided the impetus for ADA's organizing activities in the coming

months. Kefauver would not be up for re-election until 1954, but Pepper and Graham would be

on the ballot in 1950, and each would face a difficult battle to remain in the Senate. Graham had

an indication that certain people would not welcome him to the Senate the day after Scott

announced his appointment. On March 23, isolationist Ohio Republican John W. Bricker stood

on the floor of the Senate and denounced Graham for his association with the Southern

Conference. North Carolina Democrat Clyde Hoey and Oregon Republican Wayne Morse, an

ADA board member, each defended Graham's loyalty and patriotism against Bricker, and Pepper

noted that it was highly unusual for a senator to publicly impugn another senator's character in

open debate.8 Nevertheless, Graham knew this was only the beginning of his political troubles.

There were no rules against criticizing a politician's patriotism during a campaign, and Graham

knew such attacks would happen during his re-election bid in 1950.

ADA leaders knew that too, and they wanted to help Graham in any way they could.

Loeb's congratulatory telegram to Graham on March 23 pledged[] [ADA's] fullest possible

support for 1950," and it soon became apparent that the new southern organizer would have to

concentrate all of his or her attention on Florida and North Carolina for the next 12-18 months.

One additional reason for focusing on these two states was a series of encouraging signs from

cities that indicated they would be receptive to the ADA message. In early April, John Schulter

traveled to Miami April for a meeting with James Crawford. Crawford was a native Miamian

with strong ties to ADA through the American Veterans Committee (AVC), an organization of

liberal veterans begun as an alternative to the conservative American Legion and Veterans of


8 Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, 244-246.









Foreign Wars. Crawford was positive about possibilities for liberal initiatives in Dade County,

since a large contingent of New Yorkers and other northerners had made the area their second

home. Sending an organizer to Miami would make sense politically as well, "[s]ince this is the

home state of Claude Pepper."9

On April 15, Loeb would contact Crawford directly, but Loeb could do little at that

moment because he had failed to hire an organizer as of that date. Indeed, the two months

between the February conference in Atlanta and the end of April represented a lost opportunity

for ADA, and Loeb's rhetoric conveyed the sense that he knew it had been lost. "Believe it or

not, I still have the same problem that I discussed with you, I don't know how many months

ago," he told Crawford. John Thomason had been the obvious choice for the position in view of

his hard work in setting up the conference, but his commitment to the World Federalist

movement precluded him from taking ajob with ADA. On the other hand, Loeb did have some

good news for Crawford. "We cannot expect one person to do the whole South within a few

months. We must therefore concentrate on those areas where we think organization is most

possible and also where we think the political situation in 1950 will be most significant." As a

result, Loeb wrote, "From the political point of view, the most important races for liberals in the

South will be in North Carolina and in Florida." Loeb hoped that the re-election of Pepper and

Graham, with ADA help, would "disprove once and for all the theory that no one can be elected

in the South unless he has racist ideas."'1 It would also prove that ADA anti-Communist

liberalism had a fighting chance at success in the South, which would boost membership and

fund-raising efforts significantly.



9 Schulter to Loeb, April 6, 1949, reel 49, no. 261, ADA Papers.
10 Loeb to James Crawford, April 15, 1949, reel 17, no. 1, ADA Papers.









These chances for success largely depended on finding the right person to handle the task,

and Loeb told Crawford cryptically, "I am negotiating with a person who has been highly

recommended in Chattanooga and who attended our National Convention."11 He did not name

this person, but her identity became public knowledge soon enough. Alden Hopkins was a

graduate of Goucher College, a small liberal-arts school in Baltimore, and the University of

North Carolina. She had been working for the past five years as a field examiner for the

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), traveling through Texas, Alabama, the Carolinas, and

Florida conducting surveys and examining workplace complaints in factories and mills. At the

time of her first contact with Jim Loeb, she was the head of the NLRB field office in

Chattanooga and, during her time there, had become an ADA member.12

Hopkins was willing to take on the challenge of being ADA's Southern field

representative, but she would not do so without assurances from Washington about her financial

security. In her negotiations with Loeb, she requested a $5,000 annual salary plus expenses,

though the question of which expenses would be covered could wait. She would work alone out

of her home or apartment, though she had not yet decided where she would live. Finally,

Hopkins wanted to maintain a post office box for official correspondence, and to hire a

stenographer for a few days each month to assist her with answering it.13 Hopkins had high

ambitions for this project, and she wanted all of the tools she needed to be in place as she began

her work. She did not want to spend time worrying about office supplies and expense

reimbursement, as Taylor had been forced to do in the first incarnation of the southern office.



11 Loeb to James Crawford, April 15, 1949, reel 17, no. 1, ADA Papers.
12 Alden Hopkins to Loeb, April 18, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

13 Hopkins to Loeb, April 13, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









Loeb readily agreed to her basic salary demands. He also agreed to pay for her meals,

hotel costs, and telephone expenses, and to provide twenty dollars minimum per week for her

automobile for time spent on behalf of ADA. However, he had one request for Hopkins.

Mindful of the importance of North Carolina in the upcoming election cycle, Loeb wanted her to

establish her base of operations in the state. He anticipated that North Carolina would be the

"permanent headquarters" for ADA in the South, and he knew that for the foreseeable future she

would be doing most of her organizing work in the state. Because Loeb and the Washington

office wanted this new southern project to be sharply focused, having Hopkins based in North

Carolina would cut down on expenses. Loeb was "quite confident that we shall have no

difficulty whatsoever," promised all of the cooperation his office could offer, and expressed

confidence in Hopkins' ability to do the job. He also sounded loftier ambitions for Hopkins'

work, writing, "I feel equally certain that you will receive from your association with the ADA

family a real sense of satisfaction in terms of your contribution to the things that are really of

importance in this crazy world."14

Hopkins agreed to Loeb's request and moved to Durham to set up shop. She believed that

the close proximity of the state's three major universities would put her in contact with a large

number of liberals, including students, faculty, local union leaders, and other liberals. With that

detail settled, she wanted to set up a better communication process between southern chapters,

mainly through encouraging each chapter to send copies of its correspondence to the officers of

the other chapters.15 Hopkins wanted the more active southern chapters to motivate those that

were less active with news of their successes. News that the Atlanta chapter had helped to elect



14 Loeb to Hopkins, April 29, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

15 Hopkins to ADA southern chapters, May 20, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









liberals to the school board or the city council, for example, might motivate the Greensboro

chapter to work for liberals running for the city council there. This correspondence network

would also remind ADA's southern members that they were not isolated from each other, which

would also serve as a spur to increased activity.

She also undertook an assessment of the chapters in her home base of North Carolina. She

wanted to know how committed the officers of these chapters were to the ADA project, and she

wanted to know how many members these chapters could count upon. Her first stop was Chapel

Hill, where developments were not encouraging. As of May 1948, the chapter's chairman, UNC

political science professor C.B. Robson, had simply "stopped calling meetings" and had failed to

restart the chapter when the new school year began in the fall. In the month prior to Hopkins'

arrival in the state, it fell to sociology professor Nick Demirith and history graduate student

Charles Sellers to force Robson to call two informal meetings, which had a few dozen interested

liberals. This turnout was fairly encouraging, but Hopkins did not expect Robson to translate

their interest into any sustained action. She also blamed unidentified "wet blankets" in the

town's liberal community for broadcasting their opinion that "nothing could be done" with ADA

in Chapel Hill.16

The good news for Chapel Hill was that Robson was "apologetic" for his leadership

failures and was willing to step aside for the good of the chapter. Hopkins wanted Helen Gillin,

a former organizer of the city's League of Women Voters, to take over the chapter, though those

who recommended her for the job also thought she would not accept. The bad news was that

Chapel Hill's reputation as a liberal city in North Carolina was, in fact, untrue. Hopkins "was

surprised [at] how much conservative element there is in Chapel Hill, and [there was] also


16 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









considerable anti-Graham feeling among faculty because of his alleged non-aggresiveness [sic]

as a money-raiser and salary-raiser." She was confident, however, that Graham's re-election

campaign would be a plus for ADA, and she was willing to test that hypothesis in June when

Graham returned to UNC to give the school's commencement address. She hoped that the new

senator would be willing to make some appearances on ADA's behalf in Chapel Hill and a few

other cities to help with membership and fund-raising.17

She also stopped in Greensboro, where the roster of thirty-five members was more diverse

than the one in Chapel Hill had been. There were some students from the UNC Women's

College in the chapter, but there were also labor organizers, a few local lawyers, and several

students and faculty members from the two black colleges in the city. The prospect of expanding

the chapter beyond the existing members was poor, however, and much of the blame again fell

on a lack of leadership. The chapter chairman was attorney Robert S. Cahoon,18 but much of the

actual work of running the chapter fell to secretary Anna Seaburg. Seaburg's attitude toward

ADA's possibilities in Greensboro, however, was not positive. Hopkins thought Seaburg's "age

and long, disappointing experience with liberal organizations" would be a brake on the chapter's

ambitions.19

Getting new leadership for these two chapters became extremely important. Events at the

state and local level were accelerating, and ADA needed to work hard to ensure that liberal


17 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

8 Cahoon would later become famous as one of the court-appointed lawyers for the Ku Klux
Klan members who shot and killed several members of the Communist Workers Party during a
Greensboro anti-Klan rally in December 1979. For more on Cahoon's role in this case, see
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, transcript of "Public Hearing #2 of the
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission," August 27, 2005,
http://www.greensborotrc.org/cahoongreesonwall.doc (accessed January 30, 2008).

19 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









causes in North Carolina had an effective champion. For example, the Greensboro chapter of the

NAACP was planning to file suit in state court to overturn the city's segregated school system.

Liberals also needed to throw their weight behind Governor Scott's plan to pressure the

legislature into issuing hundreds of millions of dollars in bonds for the state's schools and

highways. In 1948, Scott had campaigned on the issue, which was one of the main reasons

liberals had been so excited about his candidacy. Hopkins wanted to show that ADA recognized

the opportunity these bonds represented by campaigning hard for their passage.20

There was also the matter of the U.S. Senate race of 1950, in which Graham was not at all

sure whether he would even have an opponent. The state's other senator, Clyde Hoey, was also

up for re-election, which meant any number of scenarios was possible. One of Hopkins' theories

was that "should a good candidate be put up against Hoey, whom Graham would like to support,

[North Carolina Democrats] may ask Graham to maintain a hands-off attitude in Hoey's race, in

return for his being unopposed in his race."21 If he campaigned against Hoey, the state party

might decide to draft a viable conservative candidate, making Graham's chance of re-election

more tenuous.

However, as of May 1949 there did not appear to be a serious candidate running against

Graham. Graham would remain the focus of ADA's efforts nevertheless, especially considering

the lack of quality liberals in other southern Senate races. Capus Waynick, Scott's former

campaign manager, had considered running against Hoey until President Truman appointed him

as U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua. Jonathan Daniels, whose advice to Scott had led to Graham's

appointment, was not appealing as an opponent for Hoey, especially after Hopkins learned of a


20 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

21 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









conversation he had had with Duke law professor Douglas Maggs. Hopkins had thought of

Daniels as a potential ally in the state, but Maggs found Daniels to be much less liberal than

some people thought, especially after "three stiff drinks." According to the Duke professor,

Daniels had said, "labor is just trying to use the negro for its own purposes-it is dangerous to

have negroes voting-[and he] cussed out ADA, primarily on account of [its] civil rights stand at

Philadelphia." The most likely candidate for Hoey's seat at that moment appeared to be

Greensboro lawyer L. P. McLendon, who had supported Scott in 1948. However, most of his

legal work came from corporations. According to Hopkins, "liberals and labor-especially the

latter-could not work up much enthusiasm about campaigning for him."22

Hopkins' assessment of North Carolina politics was harsh, but Graham's apparent

popularity in the state was heartening, and her schedule did not betray any doubts she had about

the possibility of succeeding in the state. In late May, she traveled to Wrightsville Beach on the

Atlantic coast for the state CIO convention, met with several promising contacts at a dinner for

the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen in Greensboro, and found another possible political ally

in Congressman Charles Deane of Rockingham. Hopkins called Deane "as fine a liberal as you

would find in a Southern state. He is for the public housing bill, federal aid to education, etc. ...

He is against compulsory health insurance, but has entered a bill for aid in hospital and medical

school construction." Hopkins thought he would not need ADA support for his 1950 campaign,

but she was heartened to find that someone like Deane was representing North Carolina in the

House.23





22 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," May 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

23 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," June 2, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









Hopkins also strengthened her contacts with prominent North Carolina Democrats. For

example, she met with Capus Waynick in the weeks before he left the United States for his

ambassadorial appointment in Nicaragua. She wrote that many ADA members saw Waynick,

who had aspirations of running for governor in 1952, as a politician who was "as liberal as Frank

Graham-or at least more effective." In late May, she saw him in action arguing in favor of

Governor Scott's highway bond issue. Not all liberals in the state were in favor of the bond,

believing that the state needed to spend money on education and agriculture instead.

Nevertheless, Hopkins thought Waynick was impressive, and she listened closely to his advice.24

When it came to Graham's chances in 1950, Waynick thought he would face no

opposition, and he hoped the same would be true for Senator Hoey. Waynick's reasoning was

that the 73-year-old Hoey would either die in office before his full term expired, allowing for

Governor Scott to appoint another liberal in his place. If Hoey survived his six-year term,

Waynick believed that liberals would "have someone good to run against him" in 1956. This

view reflected Waynick's optimism about North Carolina politics. He told Hopkins, "there is a

progressive, liberal trend running in the State-one evidence of which was Scott's victory over

the [conservative] machine," adding that, "if adroitly led and handled, this trend will result in

the kind of state we would like to see. The people, if properly led, will go along with a liberal

program generally-but not with civil rights or spending which would put the State in the red."25

A bright future for liberalism did not necessarily translate into a bright future for ADA,

however. A week after their meeting, Waynick told Hopkins, "I have not yet had time to read

[the ADA] material [she had given to Waynick] but I will do so at my first opportunity, in order


24 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," June 2, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

25 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report," June 2, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









to familiarize myself with your cause. As I assured you in Durham, I am not sufficiently

acquainted with it to have a very clear notion of its value."26 ADA was still an unknown

commodity, even to liberal North Carolinians, and no one knew whether they would respond

positively to ADA.

If Hopkins needed further proof that ADA faced a tough task in the state, she needed only

to look at her home base of Durham. Hopkins was surprised to learn that ADA had not been able

to "get off the ground" in Durham considering the population of interested liberals at Duke in the

student body and faculty. There was also a tradition of labor activism in the city, making

Durham "the best organized city in the state." The AFL had organized 13,000 workers, over half

of whom came from the city's tobacco plants, and the CIO had attracted an additional 3,000

members. Hopkins did not think all of these workers were candidates for ADA membership, but

a good nucleus of liberals would likely be found among union members. Durham also benefited

from a tradition of political action through the Voters for Better Government (VBG), founded in

January 1948. VBG featured a cross-section of Durham liberals, including several AFL and CIO

leaders, two Duke professors, and two prominent "negroes." It reported on legislative activity at

the federal and state level, worked to get its members elected to precinct committees, and helped

to elect the city's mayor, Dan Edwards, and one member of the city council, E.R. Williamson, in

1948.27

All of this activity was promising for liberals, but there was one glaring problem that

Hopkins would have to address: why would Durham need Hopkins to come in as the

representative of an entirely new organization if a group like VBG had already proved its



26 Capus Waynick to Hopkins, June 7, 1949, reel 50, no. 281, ADA Papers.

27 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, June 6, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









effectiveness? However, VBG had a significant problem in that, once the 1948 campaign ended,

its energy had dissipated. According to Hopkins, Councilman Williamson "was disappointed

recently by the results of a trial mailing to 500 union members asking them to join for $1; they

only got 4 replies." Hopkins saw an opportunity for ADA to take VBG's place in Durham as the

city's clearinghouse for liberal activity, and she had quietly recruited Williamson as a member.

Williamson wanted a Durham ADA chapter to open a "school for practical politics" that could

draw on intellectual talent in the area, and Hopkins wanted the chapter to help the various liberal

factions to agree on a candidate to oppose conservative congressman Carl Durham in his re-

election campaign in 1950. Most anti-Durham people wanted Mayor Edwards to run against the

congressman, but Hopkins was skeptical about liberal influence in labor unions. As a member of

the state legislature, Edwards had voted against North Carolina's version of the Taft-Hartley Act,

but he had also voted against an increase in the state's minimum wage.28 Hopkins had no litmus

test for political candidates. However, she had enough experience with southern politics to know

that liberal candidates had a habit of distancing themselves from liberals once in office.

Another problem that became clear as Hopkins traveled across North Carolina was the

legacy of the Southern Conference. During his time in Memphis, Barney Taylor had been forced

to deal with SCHW on several occasions. Some SCHW members had been unwilling to join

ADA, and conservatives had succeeded in convincing many southerners that SCHW leaders

represented all liberal opinion. This was particularly bad for ADA because of SCHW's past

willingness to accept Communists and Socialists as members. This affected Hopkins' efforts in

places such as Asheville, which she called "probably the most liberal city in the state." SCHW had

attracted over one hundred members in Asheville. However, the chapter had fallen apart in May


28 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, June 6, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









1947 "over the Communist issue," according to Hopkins, and anti-Communist liberals "who

were active in the Conference [were] very discouraged about the organization of another group

composed 'just of liberals'." Some Asheville liberals even thought "ADA should not try to

organize a chapter but just get together a few individuals to work for liberal ends without any

name or organization."29 ADA leaders had done all they could to convince people of the

organization's anti-Communist credentials, but they faced an uphill battle in this regard.

Hopkins believed that this controversy was not going to fade quickly, especially in North

Carolina. Some of the most notorious incidents of the 1948 campaign had occurred in the state

during the southern campaign of Progressive presidential candidate Henry A. Wallace in August

of that year. Wallace enjoyed support from several SCHW officers, including chairman Clark

Foreman, who served as Wallace's campaign treasurer. Southern audiences reacted negatively to

Wallace's progressive, anti-segregation message, and North Carolina set the tone. Hundreds of

protesters greeted Wallace everywhere he went in the state, waving Confederate flags, heckling

his speeches, and throwing tomatoes and eggs at him and his supporters while threatening

violence against the candidate. The near-rioting that accompanied Wallace's campaign was the

subject of extensive media coverage, and it tarnished North Carolina's public image.30

The Progressive Party and the Southern Conference collapsed in the wake of the 1948

election, but Hopkins understood that liberals would have to deal with its legacy. As Hopkins

told Loeb, "The history of the Southern Conference will have a definite influence on ADA. Just

how much I can't assess at present, but it is in the back of everyone's mind when you talk about

29 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report: 6/1 to 6/7/49," June 17, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA
Papers.

30 Patricia Sullivan, Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill,
1996), 260-264; John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil
Rights Movement in the .m,,ll (Chapel Hill, 1994), 504-505.









ADA. Certainly, for many, the experience was discouraging and dampens their enthusiasm for

ADA."31 Even those who remained enthusiastic might not be welcome in ADA because of their

association with Wallace or the Southern Conference, which might tar ADA with the Communist

label. Hopkins told one ADA member to "[not] let anyone know you ever had anything to do

with the Progressive Party. I know you'll understand the basis for this." She also instructed him

to keep Charlotte attorney Charley Myers out of ADA completely, fearing that his outspoken

connections to Wallace would hurt ADA in the long run.32

Hopkins' concern with letting the "wrong people" into ADA was ironic, considering that

one of the most prominent figures associated with the legacy of liberal political action in the

South was Frank Graham, who had been present at the 1938 founding of SCHW in Birmingham

and had served on its board for several years. Hopkins may have wanted to distance herself from

the Southern Conference, but she had no problems working with Graham to support his election

to the Senate with ADA help. She kept up a running correspondence with Graham, much of

which was designed to encourage his liberal tendencies. For example, she noted that the AFL

and CIO appreciated his efforts in support of a bill to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act sponsored by

Utah Democrat Elmer Thomas.33 She assured Senator Graham that "their appreciation will

unquestionably be expressed in more concrete form at the polls next spring."34 North Carolina

liberals such as Hopkins wanted Graham to resist the temptation toward conservatism that had



31 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, June 6, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

32 Hopkins to Bob Sain, July 11, 1949, reel 50, no. 280, ADA Papers.

33 For more on the Thomas bill, see "Dream Bill," Time, February 7, 1949, republished online:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799744,00.html (accessed online January 31,
2008).

34 Hopkins to Graham, July 2, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









ensnared so many promising politicians in the past. She wanted Graham to be a candidate

worthy of their continued support.

In June, she met personally with the senator in Washington at an informal dinner in his

home. Hopkins wanted to work closely with Graham in the 1950 campaign, but Graham's

reaction to her was troubling. As she later told Jim Loeb, "Since it was the first time I'd ever

talked to the man, I didn't feel I could push him at all." She wanted Loeb to "get a line on how

closely he is going to work with us. If his reason for evasiveness is that he doesn't want himself

tied up publicly with ADA down here, that's fine with me, if he would just come out and say so."

She found it curious that Graham stressed that "an organization which doesn't want any credit

does the best job (I agree, but it made me wonder what his motive was for stressing that fact)."

As a result of their meeting, Hopkins made an important request of Loeb. "If ADA is going to

put this kind of money and time into North Carolina primarily for Graham's sake, I think we are

entitled to a clearer understanding of our relationship to him and his campaign."35 In truth,

Hopkins likely knew the answer to her question as she asked it. Graham wanted ADA's help in

his campaign, but only if its role was kept as quiet as possible to avoid the risk of embarrassment

to the senator.

Graham's desire to keep ADA at arm's length was interesting, given that he had no

intention of moderating his liberal positions while in the Senate. Old friends were already

cautioning him that being a member of the Senate was not the same as being a university

president. They wanted him to recognize the value of compromise and appeal to the state's

moderates, who held the key to his election. However, he served notice to friends and critics

alike that he would not compromise his deeply-held beliefs. He continued to favor an end to the

35 Hopkins to Loeb, "Weekly Report: 6/1 to 6/7/49," June 17, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA
Papers.









poll tax in federal elections, supported government health insurance and Truman's full

employment proposals, and the rest of what the President was now calling the "Fair Deal." In

short, he was, in all but name, an "Americans for Democratic Action liberal." However, the

ADA label was toxic, especially in southern states where negativity remained from the 1948

election. Graham thought his ties to the group would harm his political fortunes, so he wanted to

make the election a referendum on his personality and character, where he believed he would

hold an edge over potential opponents. He would keep his associations with groups such as

ADA as informal as possible.36

Graham's attitude toward ADA frustrated Hopkins, but there was little she could do to

change his mind. The disposition of some North Carolina chapters added to her frustration and

showed that Graham's skittishness about associating with ADA had some justification. In

Charlotte, for instance, things were so bad in late June that Hopkins indicated she "was ready to

quit [the state], and suggest [the chapter's] charter be revoked. We might as well have no

chapter here as what we have now." Too many of the members that local leadership recruited

had been Wallace backers, and the "wideawake liberals" Hopkins wanted to recruit were "scared

to death of another Southern Conference," especially since so many former Socialists had joined

the Charlotte chapter. One member, dentist Sam Freedland, told Hopkins he "would join only as

a member-at-large, with the understanding that he would not be identified with the local group in
,,37
any way.3

Another problem was that the Charlotte chapter was not representative of the community

as a whole. Most of the members were either black or Jewish, and the four Protestant members

36 Julian M. Pleasants and Augustus M. Burns III, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate
Race in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1990), 40, 42, 44-45.

37 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 1, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









were Unitarians. Hopkins wrote, "an ADA chapter will never get anywhere in Charlotte without

some good native, Trinitarian leadership and membership. The present members realize this as

much as I do." In other words, the Charlotte chapter was not "southern" enough, and this was

bad news in a city that was the center of opposition to Graham. If Hopkins could not create a

chapter more in line with ADA's principles and free of the Communist taint, Graham and other

liberal politicians would never work with her.38 In Charlotte, the best Hopkins could do for the

time being was to install a new chairman, Charlotte News state government correspondent

Robert Sain, and hope that she could convince liberals that ADA was not another SCHW.39

Most of Hopkins' North Carolina contacts understood her frustration, and the Charlotte

leadership was willing to step aside to make her job easier. Not everyone was so pleased with

her work, however. William J. Smith, the director of the state CIO organizing committee and a

Graham supporter, criticized Hopkins' approach to organization. Smith thought she unwilling to

work with labor leaders such as himself, though he hoped that could be corrected with a few

face-to-face meetings. What concerned him more was Hopkins' "methods of approach in

handling individuals," including candidates for ADA membership.40 Smith did not elaborate, but

the tone of her communications with Washington clarifies his meaning. Hopkins was not happy

with the North Carolina chapters, and she was not willing to hear excuses from people skeptical

of the ADA program. She wanted ADA to campaign hard for Graham in the coming months,

and they would not be able to do so if chapters were not yet functioning.





38 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 1, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

39 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

40 William Smith to John F. P. Tucker, July 19, 1949, reel 49, no. 261, ADA Papers.









Hopkins had reason to be careful about the kinds of associations ADA made in the South,

especially since the North Carolina media was beginning to take an interest in her organization.

One example appeared in the July 21 edition of the Charlotte Observer, which published a

critical "Dossier on A.D.A." in its editorial section. The Observer referred to ADA as a

"pseudo-socialist organization," labeled its founders as "New Deal lame ducks," and described

its anti-inflation program as "clinging to the old absurdity that prices could be cut back 10 per

cent and wages could be raised 15 per cent at the same time." The paper paid a backhanded

compliment to ADA for opposing the Wallace campaign and supporting the Marshall Plan, but

declared that ADA's opposition to Senator Karl Mundt's bill requiring Communists to register

with the State Department was proof that ADA's anti-Communism did not go far enough.

According to the Observer, the final straw was the 1948 presidential campaign, including the

civil-rights battle at the Democratic convention and ADA's decision to endorse Truman after it

had campaigned against him at the convention.41 Hopkins sent this editorial to Washington,

though the rhetoric of the piece was nothing new to those closely associated with ADA. What

was curious about the editorial was its national focus. It said nothing about Hopkins' activities

in the state and gave no indication that the paper knew anything about what she was doing in

North Carolina.

One of the reasons the Observer said nothing about Hopkins was that she had little to show

for her efforts over the previous three months. In late July, her exasperation with the situation

boiled over. As she put it, "to be liberal in the South is to endanger your friendships and your

capacity to make a good living. This is not to say that I am discouraged, but I have had to

readjust my thinking, attitudes and expectations a lot in the last two months." She was having

41 "Dossier on A.D.A.," editorial, Charlotte Observer, July 21, 1949, page 8-A, reproduction in
reel 50, no. 280, ADA Papers.









trouble finding more than a handful of people outside of the unions and the universities to

"whom one can give [ADA literature] without getting sort of a horror reaction." Hopkins wrote,

"We are asking a very great deal of southerners, all in one step; to be liberal economically-

possible the hardest person to find is an economic liberal; to be liberal on all other issues; and,

lastly, to join an interracial group."42

Hopkins also thought that Barney Taylor's unrealistic reports on the South contributed to

her problems. "I do think I can do better than Barney, but I am going to do one thing differently:

I will try to give you all as honest a picture of the situation as I can." That picture, as things

stood in late July 1949, was rather grim. "Organizing here will be ... slow, so slow," but "if the

National office can stand it, so can I." One advantage to working in North Carolina was that "10

people down here can do as much in politics as 100 up north." She thought this was the result of

several factors, including "general political apathy, the very poor organization of the Democratic

Party as a result of its having had no serious opposition for decades, the small size of the

electorate and the small number of those registered who vote in elections, etc." If she could

create the kind of "liaison groups" ADA wanted in the South, her chances of organizational and

electoral success were much greater.43

Unfortunately for her, ADA leaders in Washington had not learned an important lesson

from the example of Barney Taylor's office in Memphis. That lesson was that attempting to do

political work in the South during the summer of a year when no state or national elections were

to be held was futile. Taylor had complained to ADA's national office in the summer of 1947

about the fact that many of the people he wanted to recruit were vacationing, and their absence


42 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

43 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









was a drain on ADA's financial resources. Two years later, Hopkins made a similar complaint,

writing, "this is one h--- of a time of year to be organizing. Everybody is on vacation ... It has

been over 90 in the Carolinas for six weeks; over 95 every day the last two weeks; and hit 100

today." As a result, "I see little use in trying to do much chapter organizing in August." She

thought it was "useless to sell people in August and then have to come back in September and

sell them again. That is bad selling technique anyway-giving people a chance to think things

over and change their minds."44 Hopkins was not happy with the idea that her hardest organizing

push would have to wait a month, but she could not avoid acknowledging the vacation patterns

of her North Carolina neighbors.

As Hopkins contemplated the future of ADA in North Carolina, she was hearing

interesting things about Florida, the other major liberal battleground of the 1950 campaign. A

small group of attorneys, government employees, and college students had been working since

May to start an ADA chapter in Miami, and they were looking to Washington for organizational

help. They had gathered lists of potentially interested parties, mailed several hundred individuals

whom they thought were good candidates, and had spent the summer of 1949 contemplating

further action. Loeb attempted to encourage these activities, telling one potential member that

"the reelection of Senator Pepper in Florida is ... important. While some of us have had

disagreements with Senator Pepper, particularly on matters of foreign policy in previous years,

we all recognize that he has been a stalwart fighter for liberal issues, and his defeat would be

disastrous to the whole development of liberalism in the South."45





44 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, July 23, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

45 Loeb to Robert G. Beeler, May 5, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.









For now, though, Hopkins continued to focus Senator Graham's election, understanding

that his race was the top priority of the national office. However, it appeared that no one else

was taking the job as seriously as she was. For example, she wanted to meet with former

Congressman John Folger to get his assessment of the political climate, only to be turned

down.46 She could not organize a meeting of the Charlotte chapter, since one or more officers

were consistently out of town at any given moment. This was important, since it appeared that

no one was willing to take the lead in organizing and recruiting new members.47 One of the few

places where she received any sort of positive response was from labor. In September, she spoke

at the annual conference of the North Carolina Federation of Labor and reported that "my speech

[on ADA] was well received and generated considerable interest in political action; numerous

delegates voluntarily approached me for information and advice." She encouraged the CIO, the

AFL, and its Labor's League for Political Education (LLPE) to "put someone on in the state if at

all possible." She wrote, "The importance of the Graham race cannot be overemphasized and, in

my opinion, is second only to [that of Robert A. Taft, the Ohio Republican running for reelection

to the Senate in 1950]." Hopkins concluded that "if we can't elect Graham, then nothing can be

done anywhere to change the complexion of our southern delegation in Congress."48

Few in North Carolina seemed to have Hopkins' sense of urgency, though, and in the fall

of 1949 she began to echo the frustration Taylor had expressed two years earlier. She told the

national office, "things are not going well in the South," and "this is the toughest job I've ever

had, from the viewpoint of doing it right." She could not resist taking a shot at Taylor's strategy



46 Charles M. LaFollette to John Folger, September 14, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

47 Hopkins to David Wallas, September 11, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

48 Hopkins to William G. McSorley, Jr., September 25, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









of gathering people in a room, proclaiming them to be a chapter, and moving on to the next

community without subsequently following up on their progress. "Anybody, including myself,

could set up chapters down here-like the one in Charlotte or the ones Barney set up. Perhaps

I'm too much a perfectionist, but I will not do anything at all unless it is done well and

effectively." She explained her difficulties as a "result of the fact that, in the South, movements

are identified with local personalities; personalities are more important than ideals or issues."

One factor that benefited ADA was the personality of Senator Graham, whom everyone,

regardless of their politics, seemed to like. With that in mind, Hopkins vowed to make one more

effort in North Carolina. "If I can't get real results [by the end of October], then I will resign

with very real regret, having come to the conclusion that this job can't be done at this particular

moment of history-by me or anyone else I know of."49

She had the full support of Jim Loeb, who had been touring Europe during the summer and

meeting with numerous social democratic politicians on the Continent. Loeb returned to the

United States with what he referred to as a "real sense of rededication" to the liberal project,

which came from European liberals who looked to ADA for reassurance that liberalism had a

fighting chance in America. He wrote, "It seems to me that we have to build in as many

communities as we can reach groups of understanding American progressives, no matter how

small they may be or how difficult the circumstances." That included the South, which Loeb

conceded had always been the most difficult section of the country to organize. He knew that

Hopkins never had any illusions about the difficulty of the task, but he assured her that she was

"one of those front-line fighters who are tackling the toughest of all American problems, and also

the most essential." Loeb concluded, "Once we admit that the South is hopeless, we give up on


49 Hopkins to Loeb, September 23, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









the whole country, since we cannot solve the national problem without solving the Southern

problem."50 They were not going to fight a losing battle forever, and it was looking more likely

that Graham would face opposition in the 1950 Democratic primary, so Hopkins would need to

show real progress in recruiting members. Nonetheless, Loeb told her she could count on his

continued support.

There was, however, a continued gap between the hopeful and supportive rhetoric of the

Washington staff and the practical assistance Hopkins was receiving on the ground. This was

another troubling parallel with Taylor's Memphis experience, as he had regularly complained

about a lack of financial support and the staff s refusal to do anything about it. Hopkins was

starting to have the same sorts of problems in the fall of 1949. In mid-September, she

complained to staff secretary Olga Tabaka that "for several weeks I have not received any

mimeographed directives, pronouncements, legislative news letters, etc. from National ADA. ...

Also, since the end of July, I haven't received any tissue copies of form letters,

acknowledgements of contributions, memberships, etc. from the Southern states."51 Many ADA

prospects in the South had no contact with Hopkins because they did not know who she was or

what she was doing in North Carolina. As a result, they would often join as "members-at-large,"

receiving correspondence from, and paying their membership dues to, the national office without

joining a chapter. Hopkins wanted to know about these isolated members and where they were

so that she could encourage them to start organizing chapters in their communities. However,

the national office was not staying on top of these developments, and Hopkins wanted more help

from them.


50 Loeb to Hopkins, September 27, 1949, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

51 Hopkins to Olga Tabaka, September 19, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









Hopkins believed that the national office was doing a poor job of informing "at-large"

members of ADA's organizational activities in the South. For example, E. Terry Prothro had

been an assistant professor of psychology at Louisiana State University in December 1948 when

he first contacted ADA. When he contacted Washington again in October 1949 to inquire about

ADA, he had joined the psychology department at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville.

What made Prothro unusual was that he knew about the Atlanta conference, but he was under the

impression that "at that meeting it was tentatively decided that a new southern field

representative would be appointed, and that he should begin his work in the state of

Tennessee."52 The Washington office had sent out an announcement to ADA's southern

members about Hopkins' appointment and her office in North Carolina, but it is clear that some

members did not know about this. Postal problems might account for this communications mix-

up, but Taylor and Hopkins had experienced similar problems, suggesting that the problems may

have originated in the national office and were systematic within ADA.

Another problem that Hopkins faced was Graham's Senate candidacy, which had been the

main reason for her move to North Carolina. In the fall of 1949, the entire ADA enterprise in the

state was in limbo, in part because the Graham campaign was itself in limbo. The problem was

that no one seemed to know who would run against Graham. Early speculation centered on

former U.S. senator William B. Umstead, who had received a raucous welcome from the state's

Young Democrats at their mid-September convention. Graham also spoke before the Young

Democrats, but delegates showed little enthusiasm for him, particularly when he spoke in favor

of civil rights for racial minorities. Another problem, according to close friend and political

advisor Jonathan Daniels, was that Graham "was so modest that he would have to be pushed


52 E. Terry Prothro to Loeb, October 17, 1949, reel 78, no. 94, ADA Papers.









hard to campaign." While Daniels and organizations including the NAACP and CIO-PAC

supported Graham's candidacy and worked hard to persuade Umstead and other potential

candidates to stay out of the race, Graham stayed in the background. One close advisor claimed

that if it had been left up to him, "he probably would never have done anything to organize his

campaign."53 It was difficult for Hopkins to get people excited about the Graham candidacy, and

liberalism more generally, if the candidate himself appeared indifferent about the whole exercise.

This dilemma mirrored one of Hopkins' most significant problems. Graham expected his

personal integrity and his jovial personality to resonate with North Carolina voters, and Hopkins

now believed that personal relationships counted for a great deal with potential candidates for

ADA membership. For example, when Hopkins met with one potential member in Charlotte, he

had lost some of the enthusiasm he had expressed to her at their first meeting. She "finally found

out it was because he 'didn't want to have anything to do with anything Bill Smith had anything

to do with.'" Others expressed similar reservations about the Charlotte group and Smith's

leadership of it.54

In an effort to solve her continued recruiting problems, Hopkins sought to enlist a "State

Chairman" for ADA, "a liberal with an unimpeachable name." She thought it was an important

step because "people down here (like people everywhere, but much worse) will 'do it if Mr.

Jones done it,' i.e., join a liberal, non-segregated organization." She had three people in mind for

the job: former Congressman John Folger, Jonathan Daniels, and Mayne Albright, a Raleigh

lawyer and Graham supporter who had finished third in the 1948 Democratic gubernatorial

primary. Unfortunately for Hopkins, none of them wanted the job. Albright was pessimistic



53 Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 48-52.

54 Hopkins, memo to Tucker, October 24, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









about ADA's chances to organize in North Carolina, recalling negative experiences with other

liberal groups in the state. Daniels could not be convinced even as Hopkins "threw the book at

him including, as he said, a 'roster of his friends' who are southern liberals and gradualists, and

yet allow their names to be used for ADA." Hopkins knew that ADA's anti-segregation platform

was simply too radical for Daniels, even though she did extract a promise from him that he

would not actively campaign against ADA. Folger's excuse was not political, but medical: he

had been in the hospital for some time and unavailable for a meeting with Hopkins.55 In the end,

Hopkins could not find a North Carolina liberal who could unite the state's liberals and convince

them ADA would be an effective political force.

Communication problems, Graham's disinterest in building a campaign structure for 1950,

and personality clashes were all hampering Hopkins' North Carolina efforts. Nevertheless,

Hopkins still professed to be optimistic with many correspondents when talking about ADA's

regional and national prospects. For example, when she talked with John O'Hare, president of

the Tobacco Workers International Union, she thanked him for his praise of ADA and claimed

that "ADA has made a real dent in the political picture in cities and states where it is well

organized," and that the group was "the best way for labor to achieve political unity and liaison

with other liberal groups and independent voters in their communities." She wanted O'Hare to

help ADA become a stronger organization by "[writing] your staff members and Local officers

in the various cities in North Carolina a short letter endorsing ADA and urging their participation

in the formation of chapters."56 O'Hare provided his North Carolina locals with informational





55 Hopkins, memo to John F. P. Tucker, October 24, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

56 Hopkins to John O'Hare, October 24, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









materials about ADA.57 This was especially helpful to Hopkins because of the unique

importance the tobacco industry had in the state.

It would have been even more helpful to Hopkins had she stayed in North Carolina.

However, by the end of 1949 her frustration about the state's liberals had reached a breaking

point. She still thought Graham had a good chance of winning the 1950 Democratic primary

despite several political blunders. For example, he encouraged a reputation as a "radical" on

civil rights when he agreed to the appointment of a black North Carolinian, Leroy Jones, to the

United States Military Academy at West Point.58 Jones was only a second alternate for the

position, but Graham's consideration of his application caused trouble later in the campaign. For

her part, as of late October Hopkins believed that "the reaction seems to have died down [on the

Jones issue] and the status quo is restored."59

Graham was only part of her problem. The bigger problem, Hopkins believed, was that

"the labor people are awfully dumb about politics and candidates, particularly those staff people

who travel and do not have opportunities to keep in touch with other liberal elements and

political powers in the community." For example, the big unions did not know that Graham

wanted liberals to keep their support for him low-key, and they were "hurting Graham and

helping Hoey when they [kept] announcing support of the former and opposition to the latter."

She did not think ADA should put any pressure on Graham to vote for a permanent FEPC, either.

Finally, there was the communication issue, both between the national office and Hopkins, and

between Hopkins and North Carolinians. On the former, she pleaded for "a gold engraved



57 O'Hare to Hopkins, November 1, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

58 Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, 262.

59 Hopkins, memo to Tucker, October 24, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









statement signed by the Attorney General that ADA is not a subversive organization and has

never been investigated by Congress or the FBI?! I could save about one day a week's talking

time with such a gimmick." On the latter, she kept losing potential members because they did

not want to join an integrated organization. One possible solution to this problem was a change

in ADA printed material. She suggested not issuing ADA publications "which over-emphasized

civil rights even for the Northern member, and was particularly repulsive to our over-sensitive

Southern liberal." Sensitivity to southern sensibilities would "ease our [recruiting] problem

somewhat" without forcing ADA to compromise its principles.60

What made Hopkins' job even tougher under the circumstances was that the national ADA

leadership appeared to be turning a blind eye to Hopkins' political analysis. For instance, when

Loeb reported on Hopkins' work to the ADA Executive Committee, he painted a fairly positive

picture. "It was Miss Hopkins' feeling that the work was increasingly promising. She felt that

there was a good chance of organizing six additional Chapters in North Carolina." He

recommended that "that another three months be given to organizing in North Carolina as a

testing ground for organizational work in the South, and that ADA later give consideration to






60 Hopkins, memo to Tucker, October 24, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers. This topic was of
particular importance to Hopkins, and she would continue to emphasize it. In late November,
she implored Loeb's assistant, John F. P. Tucker, to pass along a message to those in charge of
writing ADA's platform at its annual convention. "Please move the civil rights plank further
down in the draft and in the proof sheets that go to the printers, so it won't appear on the first
page of Where We Stand [the pamphlet ADA distributed to members and interested parties
which contained its platform]. I believe I mentioned this in my very 1st report, and that simple
little gimmick has made WWS utterly useless to me as organizing material. I bring it up now
because in Jerry Carter's words ... a Southerner who read everything else and then read our civil
rights plank would not mind too much, but when that's the first thing he reads, he either tears the
pamphlet up or reads the remaining material with a closed mind." Hopkins, memo to Tucker,
November 27, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









continuing this work during Senator Graham's primary campaign if opposition developed."61 At

the same time, Loeb was writing Lillian Smith about her recently published Killers of the Dream

and telling the Georgian that he was "certainly anything but an authority on the Southern

problem myself' and that "this ADA job is sometimes heartbreaking, very often discouraging."62

There are two possibilities: either Hopkins was sending mixed messages to Loeb in her

correspondence and in their one-on-one meetings, or Hopkins was telling him the bleak truth

about North Carolina and Loeb was ignoring her reports. The latter scenario seems more likely.

Given the negativity in Hopkins' written reports, it seems unlikely that she would make false

claims about new chapters and fund-raising in face-to-face meetings or correspondence with her

superiors.

Another sign of Hopkins' lack of enthusiasm about North Carolina was her willingness to

travel to Miami in early November. Robert Beeler, a part-time employee with the New York

Stock Exchange who lived in Miami during the winter, informed Hopkins that "our local group

down here [was] about to give birth to a new ADA chapter."63 The group in Miami had spent

much of the year gathering names and raising money for a new chapter, and they wanted to

"make [their] debut a gala affair," possibly including Senator Humphrey or Franklin D.

Roosevelt Jr. in a large, heavily advertised banquet to be held in early December.64

The national office thought it would be difficult, if not impossible, to get a nationally-

known figure to Miami on such short notice, but Loeb did think it would be a good idea for


61 Minutes for ADA Executive Committee meeting, October 31, 1949, reel 33, no. 63, ADA
Papers.

62 Loeb to Lillian Smith, November 3, 1949, reel 50, no. 262, ADA Papers.
63 Beeler to Tucker, October 26, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.

64 Beeler to Tucker, November 2, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.









Hopkins to head south. As he told her, "we have never organized a single Chapter without

knowing some of the people involved, and I think that it is well that we not make an exception in

this case. Also, Florida might be very important, and it is just as well that the thing gets] off to a

good start." According to Loeb, her Miami trip on ADA's behalf was "just another incident

which testifies to your devotion to ADA, and we are fully aware of it." She was also aware of

the political situation in Florida. Claude Pepper's re-election to the Senate was a priority,

especially since "he has been very friendly [with ADA] during the past year. He has been

particularly friendly with [Humphrey], who has a great respect for him." Pepper would not be a

perfect candidate, particularly since it was likely that he would have to oppose civil rights

legislation during the campaign. Nevertheless, ADA leaders thought his re-election was

important to the overall success of their agenda.65

One thing the national office could count on from their people in Miami was enthusiasm.

The events of the postwar period had convinced Beeler of the "immediate need for decisive

political action to keep our country going on a sound basis; that seems to be very well recognized

by most active progressives." What set Beeler apart from many past ADA recruits was his desire

to develop what he called "a long-range program which will produce an ultimate goal and a

working philosophy for the liberal movement." In short, Beeler wanted to turn ADA into a

socialist organization. Beeler had been a member of the Socialist Party, and he was convinced

that "the ADA economic program is practically socialist, although it stops short of public

ownership of banks and the credit system and socialization of land." Many of ADA's

conservative critics had labeled the organization as socialist, but Beeler did not see anything

wrong with that label. If ADA chose to reject socialism, Beeler did not see "how it can get many


65 Loeb to Hopkins, November 8, 1949, reel 50, no. 264., ADA Papers.









new members or obtain anything more in the way of social progress than the present limited

welfare legislation now pending in Congress," and he "would feel inclined to help another

organization" instead of ADA.66

Beeler wanted ADA to operate more like the British Fabian Society, but Loeb balked at his

ideas. Beeler's "doctrinaire" approach to political action concerned Loeb in light of his summer

tour of Europe. In mid-October 1949, he told Beeler that "there is much to be said for the kind

of non-doctrinaire liberalism that has been in the American tradition as against the doctrinaire

variety which is current in Europe." The former was much more likely to win elections, though

Loeb acknowledged that long-term political education was important to the long-term success of

liberalism.67 Most liberals in Miami were not socialists, nor did they want ADA to become a

"Fabian" organization, but the fact that one of their leaders was proposing such radical ideas did

not bode well for the Miami chapter's effectiveness.

Despite these ominous signs, Hopkins traveled to Miami in November. When she arrived,

she found that the leadership in South Florida was far from ideal. She wrote that Max Singer, the

organizing committee's executive secretary and a Deputy Commissioner of the Dade County

Department of Motor Vehicles, "was organizing ADA as a political machine and primarily from

the motive of self-interest; and [he] had planned a chapter with segregated white and negro

branches." Singer wanted to use ADA as a launching pad for his own political ambitions, and he

had taken advantage of the relative disinterest of the rest of the Miami group.68 Singer had also

completely ignored the local labor unions, which forced Hopkins to "[talk] personally with every



66 Beeler to Loeb, November 11, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.

67 Loeb to Beeler, November 17, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.

68 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, November 27, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









AFL representative who was halfway progressive and who could be seen in two days." She also

talked with people at the American Jewish Congress, the Dade County Democratic Party, and the

University of Miami, where thirty students turned out for Hopkins' lunchtime speech.

Hopkins also ran afoul of local government over her desire to hold an integrated executive

committee meeting. She told Loeb that Singer had already publicized the meeting in a mass

mailing, but "[he] had chosen a meeting place which does not allow non-segregated meetings, in

a town-Coral Gables-in which a negro [sic] is not allowed after 6:00 p.m. It was impossible

to secure the cooperation of either the Coral Gables mayor, which [University of Miami student

James Strachan] tried, or the Police Department, which [Singer] tried halfheartedly. Under the

circumstances, I compromised by saying we wouldn't try to have negroes in the audience but

would have a couple negro speakers." Singer's opposition to ADA's integrationist policies made

him unacceptable as the driving force behind the chapter. She did not want Singer to resign from

ADA over this issue, however, so she passed the issue off to the national office and "told him we

would postpone the question until December 3rd, when the Executive Board would meet and

could make a policy decision for all Southern chapters to follow." She knew the Executive

Board had no intention of doing this, but she wanted to avoid the negative publicity that might

result from Singer's resignation.69

Hopkins was determined to "get control of the organization away from Singer, at the same

time insuring that we would have some active people to carry on the work." Her most important

ally in this work would turn out to be Kurt Singer (no relation to Max), a writer from Miami

Beach who worked for the Speakers' Bureau of the United Nations and had emigrated to the




69 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, November 27, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









United States from Germany (via Sweden) during the 1930s.70 When Hopkins inquired as to

whether Kurt would assist her in forcing Max Singer out of the Miami chairmanship, his positive

response pleasantly surprised her. Kurt Singer had grown tired of Max's use of ADA as his own

personal political machine, and the two were able to quickly minimize Max Singer's role in the

next series of ADA meetings. They even convinced Max to drop his objections to integrated

ADA meetings. Once that had been accomplished, however, Hopkins was unsure of what to do

with this "small time politician in a patronage job," as one unidentified Miami liberal referred to

him. He was anti-Communist, he did support Pepper's re-election, and he did have a following

in Miami. In the end, Hopkins thought Max Singer would do less damage to the liberal cause in

southern Florida if she could keep him on the fringes of the Miami chapter during the 1950

election cycle.7

As Hopkins attempted to put the Miami situation on a more solid foundation, she

continued her work in North Carolina. In some cases, she could not solve the problems she

encountered. For example, the Greensboro chapter had blatantly disregarded national rules and

set up two organizational structures, one for white members and another for blacks. Hopkins

appreciated that the Greensboro chapter was willing to accept black members, but having a white

chairman and a black chairman only perpetuated the notion that southern ADA chapters were

going to be perpetually segregated.72 Like most liberal southerners, the Greensboro ADA was

attempting to follow the path of least resistance, not wanting to provoke an open confrontation

on the South's patterns of racial relations until they believed that conditions were more palatable.


70 Beeler to Loeb, May 22, 1949, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.
71 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, November 27, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

72 Hopkins, "Progress Report" memo to Tucker, December 6, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA
Papers.









Lillian Smith, whose 1949 book Killers of the Dream had received widespread acclaim from

liberals (and ringing endorsements from Loeb, National Chairman Robert LaFollette, and other

ADA leaders), was an anomaly in her passionate denunciation of segregation.73 Hopkins was

beginning to believe that expecting liberal southerners to follow Smith's lead was unrealistic.

She had become as frustrated with the South as Barney Taylor had been, and she did not

hide her disappointment and anger from her correspondents in the national office. After what

she called "months of thinking about this [Southern] problem," she had concluded that "we

[should] give up our policy of non-segregated meetings in the South." She thought ADA needed

to concentrate on winning elections, and "studying the history of other organizations which have

tried to work here on a non-segregated basis and my own experiences in trying to organize

ADA" led her to abandon the idea of integrated chapters. She wanted to keep working in the

South because of its importance to national politics, believing that "in the long run, liberals are

either going to have to defeat every Republican outside the South and replace him with a

Democrat in Congress; or else we are going to have to start sending a substantial number of Fair

Deal Democrats to Congress from the South." ADA had to encourage southern liberals to seize

control of the Democratic Party, but at the end of 1949 all Hopkins could see was "a weakly

organized group of factions" that could not compete with southern conservatives. She realized

that abandoning integrated chapters was a drastic step for ADA to take, but since "Negroes will

not come to our meetings unless we go out and practically force them to," the practical effect of

the change was minor.74




73 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent .Salh .,nlihe ii Liberals and the Race Issue (New
York, 1977), 172, 186-197.

74 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, December 14, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









Hopkins was imploring the national office to think in a practical manner, and LaFollette

agreed that it was not in ADA's interest "to make a business of soliciting, urging, or forcing

Negroes in the South to join ADA Chapters if they don't want to." However, LaFollette wanted

ADA to stick to its principles and strive for integrated chapters. He wrote, "Any decision to

remain in the South on any other basis is a surrender of principle which I do not think ADA

should make in the interest of political expedience."75 Loeb agreed with LaFollette, telling

Hopkins that ADA could not sponsor a local chapter that excluded black members, at least not

without "some kind of a meeting with our Negro friends, in order to determine on a policy which

would be carried out with their understanding and on their recommendations."76

Hopkins thought the idea of a conference with black leaders to discuss changes in ADA

policy was fine, as long as southerners were included in the conversation. However, she also

thought Loeb, LaFollette, and the rest of the Washington staff were not her most important

audience. Her biggest problem was that southerners were beginning, once again, to defend their

society and their traditions in the wake of the 1948 Dixiecrat campaign. Some historians have

dated the "backlash" against integrationist liberalism to the 1954 Supreme Court's decision in

Brown v. Board ofEducation.77 Hopkins would have disagreed with this historical verdict. She

wrote, "Many, many persons have pointed out to me the severely aggravated feelings on the race

question, especially non-segregation. There is a rising tide of feeling [since the 1948 election];

the atmosphere of fear is heavier; the consequences for a person who violates the traditional

customs are more serious, in terms of earning a living, keeping his friends and maintaining his


75 LaFollette, memo to Loeb, December 19, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

76 Loeb to Hopkins, December 29, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

77 Michael J. Klarman, "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis," Journal of
American History 81.1 (June 1994), 81-118.









social standing." The national staff needed to understand that "southerners do not think of non-

segregation as a civil rights question, or a question of justice, but as a social question."78

If they did not wake up to the consequences of their philosophy, the results would be

disastrous, both for the organization and for the national hopes of anti-Communist liberals. "It

would not be hard to elect liberal Congressmen from any of the larger cities in the South, with

proper organization." However, that organization did not exist, for reasons that were peculiar to

the South. As Hopkins wrote, "in Chattanooga, we have either two or four Negro members in a

total of 80, and there is usually one Negro at our meetings. Think for a minute what real purpose

is accomplished by this token attendance? Only one, which is to keep away a number of white

liberals who would come in otherwise."79 She believed that ADA needed to take a more

practical approach to political organization in the South, which meant working with potential

members and supporters instead of alienating them. She had returned to the question that had

plagued ADA's approach to the South: how important were its principles?

At the same time that she was trying to persuade Loeb on the segregation issue, she wanted

to change to the focus of the southern office. On December 31, 1949, she informed the national

office that she wanted to move her base of operations from North Carolina to Florida,

specifically Miami. Her time in south Florida had convinced her that "Miami is almost certainly

the only place in the South where we can build a strong and sizable ADA chapter, comparable to,

say, the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh chapters," each of which had several hundred members. It

was also the only place in the South where ADA could raise a substantial amount of money.

Hopkins also liked Miami because it was the least "southern" city in the region. As she put it, "It


78Hopkins, first memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.
79 Hopkins, first memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.
79Hopkins, first memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









is more cosmopolitan statewide, due to the influx of Northern residents." Even though there

were still questions about some prominent Democrats and officeholders in Florida, she was

convinced that they would work for ADA. 8

The final reason Hopkins wanted to work in Florida was political. She knew that Frank

Graham had not been the most attentive candidate in shoring up his political base and dissuading

potential rivals for the Democratic nomination, and even Governor Scott expressed his surprise

at Graham's unwillingness to acknowledge that someone might oppose him. At the end of 1949,

he had no organization in place, no campaign headquarters, and no plans to raise money for a

campaign.81 Nevertheless, Hopkins had convinced herself that "not only is it entirely possible

Graham will be unopposed, but even if he has opposition, both conservatives and liberals predict

he will win in a walk."82 Her North Carolina correspondents had apparently reinforced this

impression, and the withdrawal of former Senator William Umstead from the Graham race for

health reasons strengthened the idea that Graham would have an easy time winning his Senate

83
race.

Claude Pepper's race for a third full term in the Senate, however, was another matter. He

had a serious opponent, two-term Congressman George Smathers of Miami, who had actually

worked for Pepper's 1938 campaign while he was a law student at the University of Florida. He

had won his seat in Congress as an anti-Communist Democrat, and he had broken with the

Dixiecrats in 1948 by supporting President Truman at the Philadelphia convention and

campaigning for him. By October 1949, he had decided to run against Pepper, though his

so Hopkins, second memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

81 Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 51-52.

82 Hopkins, second memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

83 Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 53-54.









personal connections to the Senator were still strong. In fact, Smathers had met with Pepper in

the summer of 1949 to tell him that "a lot of people have approached me about" running for the

Senate in 1950, only to have Pepper dismiss the notion of a Smathers campaign. Pepper's

victories in 1938 and 1944 had deluded the senator into thinking that he could convince the

voters of Florida to overlook what they might consider "troublesome" views on foreign policy

and civil rights and re-elect him anyway.84

Pepper may not have sensed the danger Smathers posed, but his supporters, including

Hopkins, did. Contrasting his situation with Graham's, Hopkins told Loeb that Pepper "will

definitely have opposition unless a miracle intervenes; and will have a hard race. Again, Miami

is the toughest locale for Pepper in '50 for several reasons, including the fact that Smathers is

Miami's native son and congressman." She conceded that liberals "feel less strongly about

Pepper than Graham for obvious reasons; but, he does have the most consistently liberal voting

record of any Southern Senator."85

The obstacles facing Hopkins in Florida would be similar to those she faced in North

Carolina, especially since Miami "needs plenty of attention to get started right and to build up in

a reasonably short period to its potential membership, effectiveness and lucrativeness." Only a

full-time organizer could provide this attention, and she believed that "Miami is too important to

take a chance on haphazard organizing by committee members who can give it only such time as

they can spare from their own jobs." Nevertheless, she found the Florida situation far preferable

to North Carolina. She agreed wholeheartedly with organizers who had worked with

organizations like the American Veterans Committee (AVC), who had told her that "North


84 Clark, "Road to Defeat," 137-152 (quote on 150).

SHopkins, second memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









Carolina was the hardest state to organize" in the South. She thought it was time for a change of
86
scenery.8

Hopkins' request for a transfer put the ADA national staff in an interesting position. As

Jim Loeb told her, "Although we are looking for another organizer in California, you are now the

only full-time organizer on our staff." It was a sign of how much importance ADA had placed

on the southern project. However, her disillusionment with North Carolina liberals was clear,

and Loeb thought "it is apparent that you are somewhat discouraged and that you have sought a

way of getting out of the State," no matter how useful her work had been. The real problem for

Loeb was that ADA had never planned on having a full-time organizer in Florida, and she could

not move without first consulting the Executive Committee or National Board.87

In the end, Loeb allowed Hopkins to temporarily move her base of operations to Miami,

since "it would seem that there are financial possibilities in Miami." He even suggested that she

should organize a fund-raiser for the end of February, and he told her he would try to convince

Hubert Humphrey to speak at the gathering. In order to maximize the benefit to the Miami

chapter, Loeb even offered to take care of the Senator's travel expenses and allow the chapter to

keep one hundred percent of the profits from the dinner. If the Miami chapter did not succeed in

establishing itself, however, Loeb told Hopkins that ADA would declare her "experiment,

perhaps not a failure, but certainly not sufficiently a success to warrant its continuation," and

terminate her contract, which was scheduled to expire on January 27, 1950.8





86 Hopkins, second memo to Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

87 Loeb to Hopkins, January 11, 1950, reel 50, no. 276, ADA Papers.

ss Loeb to Hopkins, January 11, 1950, reel 50, no. 276, ADA Papers.









Hopkins understood the time and financial constraints under which she would be operating

in Miami, but she wanted to continue her work for ADA beyond the timeframe Loeb had

suggested, though she was unsure about how to proceed. At first, she wanted to borrow

organizational techniques from the CIO, which had successfully created new locals on an ad-hoc

basis since its founding in the 1930s. However, ADA's financial constraints would not allow

Loeb to fund an organizer for "several months" in a single community, as the unions had. She

also thought a targeted campaign that concentrated on major cities like Houston, Atlanta, and

Miami would also be feasible. She believed that "due to their size, those cities should be

potential ADA material because there are a sufficient number of liberals to form an effective

chapter." The problem with that idea was the size of the territory an organizer would have to

cover, which would necessitate a large travel budget that ADA could not afford.89

The only other option, as Hopkins saw it, was "to send an organizer into a city whenever

National receives information that there is an interested group of individuals ready and willing to

organize a chapter." There would be no permanent staff member working in the region, but

ADA would always have someone available in case an interested liberal asked the national office

for literature, membership cards, or other material that might be useful in getting people excited

about ADA. Such an approach would cost less, and it would "almost certainly result" in the

founding of a new chapter. It was a less ambitious alternative to what ADA had been attempting

to do for the previous three years, but given the modest results their approach had shown to this

point, a change in tactics was reasonable. Hopkins even offered to be the on-call organizer for

the South.90


89 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, January 18, 1950, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

90 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, January 18, 1950, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









Hopkins' planning for her future with ADA hit a serious roadblock in mid-January 1950,

however, when Dr. Thomas Wood, a professor in the government department at the University

of Miami and the Miami chapter's temporary chairman, told the national office about the

chapter's future plans. "It is our belief that at the present time it is unfortunately out of the

question that we should undertake the financial responsibility for an organizer although we have

reason to believe that after the middle of the year or perhaps somewhat sooner we shall be in a

position to aid substantially in underwriting an organizer for this area." The terms Hopkins had

suggested for the chapter's fundraising plans were generous, particularly in light of the national

organization's financial troubles, but "in the immediate future our funds will scarcely be

adequate to carry on our activities here in Greater Miami." This was not necessarily an

admission of failure for the Miami chapter. In fact, the chapter was receptive to the idea of a

fundraiser in February or March. However, he did not think Senator Humphrey would "have the

drawing power in this area" to attract potential members or donors. Instead, he suggested

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. or Democratic Senator Herbert Lehman of New York, noting that the

two men "could better promote [their] New York interest by a speech in Miami than in any other

city in the country outside of New York." He believed that getting the chapter off to a good start

was critical, especially since the Pepper-Smathers election was beginning to heat up.91

In Loeb's mind, Wood's rejection of a full-time organizer for the Miami chapter and his

desire to have someone other than Humphrey speak at an ADA banquet meant that "our

proposed solution to the Hopkins problem has collapsed." Since Miami would not underwrite

her activities, he wrote Hopkins, "We find no alternative to that of merely saying, as I suggested

in my previous letter, that the Southern experiment, without being a total failure by any manner


91 Dr. Thomas Wood to Loeb, January 19, 1950, reel 61, no. 32, ADA Papers.









of means, did not prove to be sufficiently successful to warrant its continuance." He did not

hesitate to add that "we have all appreciated your devotion to ADA and the self-sacrificing job

you have done for us in the most difficult section of the country," but it was little consolation for

the acknowledgment that her "Southern Office" would be closing at the end of January 1950.92

Theoretically, this should have ended Hopkins' employment with ADA, and given her lack

of success in both North Carolina and Florida, an immediate change of scenery would have been

understandable. However, she refused to accept defeat without making an effort at holding the

Miami banquet as scheduled. She still believed that "the group, particularly the university and

labor members, underestimated the financial possibilities of a Miami Beach cocktail party and

Fair Deal meeting in Miami with Humphrey." With that in mind, she made an arrangement with

Senator Pepper's campaign team in Dade County to split her time between ADA work and the

Pepper campaign, with her salary of one hundred dollars a week divided equally. The Miami

chapter would cover the ADA salary once it had raised sufficient funds from the late February

banquet, and she asked the national office to cover her salary until then.93

There is a palpable sense of desperation in Hopkins' efforts to keep the southern

"experiment" alive. Whatever her reasons for wanting to stay in Florida, Hopkins was

determined to make the Miami chapter work, and she did everything in her power to convince

Senator Humphrey to come south for the February banquet. However, in a series of telegrams

attempting to make final arrangements with the senator, it became clear that the national office

"[did] not see [a] sufficiently definite prospect of Humphrey visit Miami to make feasible





92 Loeb to Hopkins, January 21, 1950, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

93 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, January 23, 1950, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.









undertaking arrangements we have discussed for you."94 With that, Hopkins' role as an ADA

organizer came to an end.

This was a depressing end to the "experiment," but ADA leaders were keeping their

options open. A confidential memo from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to Joseph Rauh and Jim

Loeb hints at another possible course of action in the South. Schlesinger sent the memo shortly

after he had traveled to Chattanooga for that city's celebration of Roosevelt Day, which ADA

had created to honor the former president, in January 1950. He was positive about the meeting,

especially the way in which ADA members in Chattanooga had shown they were "genuine,"

meaning that they "[welcomed] northern prodding and [acknowledged] that the South would do

very little without it."95

Still, there were problems in the South that he could not ignore. At the forefront was the

civil rights issue. Schlesinger agreed with Hopkins, saying that while no one thought ADA

should modify its support for equal employment opportunity or desegregation, "life is made

more difficult for [southern liberals] by anything which makes ADA seem exclusively or largely

concerned with the civil rights issue." He disagreed with the ADA consensus on Lillian Smith,

for while most people in the national office loved her, "there seems to be some feeling [in the

South] that while Lillian is an admirable moral character, that her thinking and influence are

somewhat irrelevant in the south to those concerned with political problems and particularly with

influencing political leaders in a liberal direction." Finally, he suggested that ADA make an

effort to make southern liberals a more significant part of ADA's intellectual product. In other

words, he wanted a distinguished group of southern liberals to "prepare a program, addressed

94 La Follette, telegram to Hopkins, February 2, 1950, reel 50, no. 264, ADA Papers.

95 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., confidential memo to Rauh and Loeb, January 25, 1950, reel 78,
no. 95, ADA Papers.









particularly to the economic and political problems of the South, pointing out what could be done

by federal, state and local action to improve the regional position of the South. Civil rights could

be put in its appropriate place in that program. [ADA leaders would then] call a meeting in the

South with representatives from all existing ADA chapters, and have them adopt the program."96

This was an intriguing suggestion from an important liberal, but its timing meant that

nothing would come from it. It would have been much better for all concerned if ADA had

crafted this sort of program immediately after the 1949 Atlanta conference. This would have

ensured that southerners would understand exactly where ADA stood on issues that mattered to

them. Such a platform coming from the likes of Frank Graham, historian C. Vann Woodward,

political scientist V. O. Key, and Lowell Mellett, who had written the Report on the S.n,ilh in

1938 for President Roosevelt, all of whom Schlesinger suggested, would have given Hopkins a

head start in convincing interested southerners that ADA was right for them. Instead, she

organized the region much as Barney Taylor had. Like Taylor, she had to spend too much time

finding out where liberals were and not enough time trying to prod them to join local chapters.

When liberals proved unwilling to listen, either because they disagreed with parts of the ADA

platform or because they remembered the examples of other failed liberal groups, Hopkins'

frustration level grew.

Hopkins' final memo to ADA headquarters in Washington was a testament to that

frustration. She thought any further work in the region had two major obstacles to overcome.

First, "particularly in the smaller cities, it takes too long to find enough real liberals who will

serve on an organizing committee." Independent liberals had no stake in ADA, and politicians

with liberal tendencies thought identification with ADA would hurt them in the long run. Frank

96 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., confidential memo to Rauh and Loeb, January 25, 1950, reel 78,
no. 95, ADA Papers.









Graham's unwillingness to associate with ADA publicly was a perfect example of that. The

other obstacle was that "when you do get a group sold on organizing ADA in their community,

the organizer has already found a large number of the available liberals and crossed off other

possibilities. Then they meet lack of interest in some of the remaining people and fear or distaste

in others." She had personal experience with the often bitter personal rivalries within the liberal

communities of North Carolina and Florida, and they prevented a significant number of liberals

from being interested in dealing with ADA even if they did agree with the program.97

She also thought that it would be difficult for ADA to attract a new organizer to work in

the South. She wrote that anyone who took on this job had to have the best qualities of a

successful salesman, including "the ability to bounce back from discouragement and the ability

to persuade people to 'buy' your product, idea, project or whatever." The new organizer would

also have to deal with a staggering amount of clerical work, including bookkeeping,

correspondence with chapters throughout the South, and the memos and letters that kept the

national office informed about his or her activities. She thought a potential solution to this

problem was "to spend a little more money on part time clerical assistance or public

stenographers," as opposed to making it necessary "for the professional to do all the clerical

work."98

The biggest obstacle to finding her replacement, according to Hopkins, was the dismal

track record ADA had built over the previous two-and-a-half years. Two separate southern

organizers, based in three different states, had accomplished almost nothing. The decision to

focus her attention on North Carolina had much to recommend it, especially since Frank Graham



97 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, February 23, 1950, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.

98 Hopkins, memo to Loeb, February 23, 1950, reel 40, no. 137, ADA Papers.









had received his unexpected appointment to the U.S. Senate not long before she got the job.

ADA wanted Graham elected for a full term in 1950, and functioning chapters supporting the

former college president seemed like they could only help him. Unfortunately for Hopkins,

long-standing rivalries within the liberal community and a general lack of interest in many North

Carolina cities meant that those chapters which Hopkins did found during her year in the state

were small, ineffectual, and unable to raise money for their activities.

In addition, Hopkins and other Graham supporters had to deal with their candidate's

seeming indifference with his political fate, which would prove costly to him during the 1950

Democratic primaries. He won the first primary, but his failure to capture a majority forced a

run-off with conservative lawyer Willis Smith in June. Smith's attempts to portray Graham as a

supporter of FEPC and a "tool" of labor unions made this race one of the most notoriously racist

campaigns of the century, and Smith's narrow victory confirmed many of the worst impressions

liberals had about North Carolina in particular and the South more generally.99 The other

southern candidate ADA supported, Florida Senator Claude Pepper, also lost a racially-charged

campaign to George Smathers, though Pepper's deficiencies as a candidate and his difficulty in

understanding changes in the foreign-policy climate in his state also contributed to his defeat.

Graham and Pepper were the southern candidates on which ADA, and most other liberals, had

invested so much hope, and both lost. Not only did they lose, they did so in a manner that was

terribly discouraging for liberals who had hoped the changes which World War II had caused

might have some political effects on the region. It was now clear that conservative politics still

had tremendous appeal in the South, and that liberalism had not made as much headway as its

adherents believed it had.


99 Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 203-246.









CHAPTER 6
THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM: GEORGE LAMBERT, THE ADA IN TEXAS, AND THE
FIGHT FOR THE TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1953-1956

Charles C. Alexander's history of the 1950s concludes that the decade was one in which

government and society attempted to "hold the line" against the expansion of the welfare state at

home and Communism abroad.' Richard H. Pells's intellectual history of the same decade

broadly agrees with Alexander's thesis and extends it to the intellectuals who challenged the

conservative nature of the era. Because of their "disenchantment with the political and cultural

radicalism of the 1930s," liberal intellectuals "neither proposed nor trusted any sweeping

solutions to the difficulties of their time."2 The problems Americans for Democratic Action

(ADA) liberals faced in the South in the aftermath of World War II had not responded to

"sweeping solutions." The result was a period in which the organization's leaders eschewed

grand organizational plans in favor of smaller-scale efforts.

However, ADA leaders working during the 1950s did not give up on the South. They still

believed that if they did enough work, southerners would finally join the national consensus in

favor of their program. One of the most important places where ADA tested this belief was

Texas. The state offered some intriguing possibilities for liberals. Texas was a right-to-work

state, as was North Carolina and Florida, but its larger population (7.7 million in 1950) meant a

pool of unionized workers that numbered in the tens of thousands and was reliably liberal.

Texas was also more culturally diverse than the rest of the South. Its black population was much

smaller than in other southern states, but the southern half of the state was between ten and



1 Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington,
1975), xvi.

2 Richard H. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s
& 1950s (New York, 1985), viii, ix.









fifteen percent Hispanic, and Texas liberals had begun to appeal to black and Hispanic

constituencies after World War II. As a result, the state's congressional delegation, which

included House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson, were not

as beholden to the racist politics prevalent in other states. Liberals also thought they would

benefit from Johnson's national political ambitions, which they believed would encourage him to

transcend the racial and social conservatism of his southern colleagues in the Senate. In a sense,

Johnson fulfilled these liberal hopes when he almost single-handedly steered the 1957 Civil

Rights Act through a deeply divided Congress.3

There were promising signs for liberals in Texas, but other trends seemed to indicate that

they would have a tough time reforming the state. The dominance of conservatives, most of

whom had made their money through the oil business and related industries such as insurance

and banking, had faced continued challenges from liberal and progressive interests dating as far

back as the Farmer's Alliance movement of the 1880s. The New Deal of the 1930s was another

liberal attempt to challenge established national and state interests, with mixed success. This

history of political combat affected Texas dramatically, though that change was difficult for

outsiders to notice because these battles almost always took place within the Democratic Party.4

A combination of policy differences and personal antagonism fueled the divisions within

the Texas party that emerged after the end of the war. Democrat Allan Shivers, who served six



3 Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of .S,,ihel n Politics: Social Change and
Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York, 1976), 328-329, 336-337; Chandler Davidson,
Race and Class in Texas Politics (Princeton, N.J., 1990), 18-23; Numan V. Bartley, A History of
the .Swith, Volume XI: The New .Sui, h, 1945-1980 (Baton Rouge, 1995), 48-49; William Earl
Maxwell and Ernest Crain, Texas Politics Today (St. Paul, Minn., 1978), 156-159; "United
States and Texas Populations, 1850-2006," Texas State Library and Archives Commission,
http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.html (accessed January 30, 2008).

4 Bass and DeVries, Transformation, 305-307; Davidson, Race and Class, 18-23.









years as the state's governor between 1950 and 1956, was the state's most powerful

conservative. He brooked no opposition to his rule over the party. He and his conservative allies

thwarted liberal challenges to the status quo and made sure that Texas Democrats who served in

Washington did not become too independent under the influence of national liberals. Shivers'

two most significant political victories came during the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections.

While Rayburn and Johnson worked for Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson, Shivers delivered

the state to Republican nominee Dwight Eisenhower, a native Texan with whom he had served

during World War II. 5

His most important liberal opponent at the state level was Ralph Yarborough. This county

court judge began his feud with Shivers in 1952, when the governor refused to allow him to run

for state attorney general against Shivers' hand-picked candidate. Angered by Shivers'

arrogance, Yarborough ran for governor instead, winning 36% of the vote as the liberal candidate

in the Democratic primary. He ran against Shivers again two years later, this time winning 47%

of the primary vote. By 1954, Yarborough had become the champion of liberal causes in the

state. Yarborough's platform called for workers' right to organize, expansion of unemployment

benefits, an end to restrictive electoral laws that discouraged political participation for poor,

black, and Hispanic voters, higher tax rates for upper-income Texans, and regulation of the oil

and gas industries. Some of these issues were unique to the state, but the overall philosophy that

governed liberal thinking on these issues placed them squarely within the mainstream of national

liberal politics in the era.6





5 Bass and DeVries, Transformation, 309-310.
6 Davidson, Race and Class, 26-28.









In this complicated and combative political climate, ADA leaders wanted to play a part,

though its leaders were critically lacking in information that could guide their efforts to organize

liberals in Texas and turn the tide toward liberal politics. ADA officials wanted to join the fight

for liberalism in Texas, but they were not sure that the state's voters were ready to reject the

conservatives that had been in power for decades. Political scientist (and Texas native) V. O.

Key was convinced that there were possibilities for southern liberalism, particularly among the

working classes and ethnic minorities. However, his native state's one-party system effectively

excluded liberals from participation, which helped conservative Democrats to monopolize both

elected offices and the bureaucracy. Liberals wanted to break up this monopoly, but they also

wanted to work within the system rather than try to overthrow it. In this effort, they could count

on fierce resistance to expanding the electorate, since conservatives knew that expanded voter

participation would hurt their hold on political power.7

After Shivers' frustrating usurpation of the Democratic machine in Texas on behalf of

Eisenhower in 1952, ADA leaders turned to George Lambert, a veteran liberal-labor activist and

former Socialist, in an effort to learn more about Texas politics.8 Between 1953 and 1956, in a

series of detailed memoranda and letters to ADA's national office in Washington, Lambert

reported on the personality conflicts within the Texas Democratic Party, his efforts to expand

ADA's role among Texas liberals, and liberal efforts to take back the Democratic Party for "real"

Democrats in the short term, prior to the 1956 presidential election.





7 Davidson, Race and Class, 19.

SUniversity of Texas at Austin, The Handbook of Texas Online,
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/LL/fla61.html (accessed January 30,
2008).









Lambert's involvement with ADA dated to 1946, the year before it reorganized out of the

ashes of the wartime anti-fascist and anti-Communist Union for Democratic Action (UDA). His

wife Latane, a long-time political and labor activist in her own right, joined the Dallas

Committee for Democratic Action (UDA/ADA's local chapter) and quickly became involved in

the chapter's attempts to bolster liberalism in the area. She coordinated a series of fund-raising

parties in local homes to raise money for the Austin-based Texas Spectator weekly newspaper.9

She campaigned for liberal candidates for the Dallas County Democratic executive committee,

established connections between ADA and other prominent liberal groups (including the

NAACP),10 and worked unsuccessfully to secure the re-nomination of Leland Olds as chairman

of the Federal Power Commission in 1949, a major liberal cause of the time thwarted in no small

part by the efforts of newly-elected Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson."

Despite the efforts of Mrs. Lambert and other Texas liberals, ADA's record in the state

consisted of failed measures, organization in fits and starts, and electoral setbacks that

disillusioned many who wanted to change the state's political fortunes. The Dallas chapter could

count on little from people at the national level, largely because of ADA's chronic financial

problems. Declining contributions from labor unions and increasing expenditures forced ADA





9 Latane Lambert to Badger Reed, March 8, 1947, box 2, folder 8, George and Latane Lambert
Papers, Texas Labor Archives, University of Texas at Arlington Special Collections (hereafter
cited as Lambert Papers).
10 Minutes of DCDA meeting, March 14, 1948, box 2, folder 8, Lambert Papers.

11 Latane Lambert to ADA National Director Charles LaFollette, October 10, 1949, reel 42, no.
154, Americans for Democratic Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville,
microfilm collection (hereafter cited as ADA Papers). For more details on the Olds nomination,
see Robert A. Caro, The Years ofLyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate (New York, 2002), 232-
303.









to operate with tens of thousands of dollars in debt through most of the 1950s.12 As a result,

ADA's national ambitions went largely unrealized.

One of these continuing ambitions was the creation of a network of southern chapters. In

the late 1940s and early 1950s, ADA's leaders firmly believed that "the whole political situation

[in the South] is chaotic the liberal-labor coalition can and should make itself felt."13 North

Carolina liberal activist John Thomason, whom ADA executive secretary Jim Loeb had hired in

the summer of 1948 to travel the South assessing the organization's prospects in the region, had

originally wanted to stop in Dallas during his trip. However, he was not sure that Texas should

be included in his jurisdiction. It was Dallas liberal Ken Ellinger "expressed the opinion that

Texas should be lumped together with several other states for a Southwestern region," that would

include Arkansas and Oklahoma.14 As things stood in the early 1950s, ADA's southern

organizers had concentrated on organizing chapters in Tennessee, Florida, and North Carolina,

ignoring Texas almost completely.

Despite these obstacles, by the early 1950s liberals had come to believe that something had

to be done to force liberal political change in Texas. As one correspondent wrote just before the

1952 election, "Isn't there someone who can put the South right concerning [Democratic

presidential candidate Adlai] Stevenson?"15 It was with this in mind that George Lambert

approached ADA's leadership with a proposition that would make him one of their most



12 Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New
York, 1987), 58.
13 "American Liberals in Politics (A Suggested Outline for a Political Four-Year Plan: November
1948-November 1952)," October 30, 1948, reel 42, no. 146, ADA Papers.

14 John Thomason to James A. Loeb, December 22, 1948, reel 51, no. 301, ADA Papers.

5 R.V. Shoemaker to ADA, October 13, 1952, reel 49, no. 261, ADA Papers.









important political operatives as part of ADA's plan to make a political survey of the South

before the 1954 and 1956 elections.

In early 1953, Lambert had become the Dallas chapter's executive secretary. His activities

included soliciting the national office's help with getting prominent liberals to make speeches in

Dallas on ADA's behalf, fighting off accusations that ADA was a Communist front, and

assisting liberals in Austin as they tried to create their own chapter. He asked the national office

for local subscription lists to liberal publications such as The New Republic and The Nation, and

he wanted ADA leaders to invite prominent Texas liberals, including state representative Maury

Maverick, Jr. and San Antonio Voters' League chairman Henry B. Gonzalez, to the

organization's 1953 national convention. He believed that these people "should be members of

ADA," and they were the "logical people to take the initiative in establishing ADA Chapters in

their communities."16

Lambert's work pleased the Dallas organization so much that chapter chairman Pat Dailey

wrote ADA Executive Secretary Reginald Zalles on May 9, 1953, proposing to put Lambert's

talents to better use. Responding to the national office's appeal for a Dallas delegation to the

upcoming ADA convention in Washington, Dailey wrote, "we are at present in the position of

having to determine whether it might not be better for us to use our limited available funds for

continuing and expanding our program here. The expenses of a convention delegation would

divert a needed part of our resources from our total program and obligations here." Instead,

Dailey wanted to use the chapter's funds to organize ADA chapters throughout Texas, with

Lambert acting as the paid organizer for the state. The Dallas chapter would contribute 50% of

Lambert's salary and expenses, the national office in Washington would provide the rest, and

16 George Lambert to Reginald Zalles, March 22, 1953 and April 14, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA
Papers.









Lambert would organize chapters, report on local conditions, and work to bolster liberalism in

Texas.17

On May 24, 1953, Lambert spoke on behalf of this idea at the monthly National Board

meeting, arguing that the need for organizing Texas (and the Southwest more generally) was

acute and needed help from the national level to succeed. Lambert carried the Dailey proposal

with him, along with details left out of Dailey's letter. The Dallas chapter proposed that

Lambert's contract would run for six months and pay him $800 a month, half to be paid by

Dallas and half to be paid by the national office.18

The timing of the Dallas proposal was perfect, since ADA leaders had just approved a

larger project at the 1953 national convention. In June, Political Secretary Violet Gunther

detailed the project in a memorandum to other top ADA officials. In an effort to better

understand the South, ADA would "make a survey of liberal political strength in the Southern

States." Gunther reported that "the purpose of this survey would be to make an on-the-spot

study of the Democratic Party in the several Southern States with a view to developing allies in

what will be undoubtedly a major political struggle in '56; i.e., the effort of the non-Fair Deal

Southern Democrats to take over both the policy direction and the nominating machinery at the

'56 Democratic Convention." Data collected in the survey would "be used as background for

increased ADA work in the South and to establish state and local contacts, both as a continuing

source of information and as a basis for cooperative work on mutually agreed-upon political

objectives either at the state level in 1954 or particularly looking toward '56." The budget for





17 Patrick Dailey to Zalles, May 9, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

18 Minutes to ADA National Board meeting, May 24, 1953, reel 46, no. 194, ADA Papers.









this project was $3,000, and ADA leaders' willingness to spend such a sum on the survey shows

how important they believed the South to be.19

Lambert knew what he was getting himself into, especially in a conservative city such as

Dallas. In March 1953, he told the national office that an editorial in the Dallas Morning News

had informed the Dallas chapter that their activities were being "watched." As Lambert pointed

out half-jokingly, "the editorial didn't bother to mention who is doing the watching." As far as

Lambert could tell, "the newspapers haven't been doing the 'watching' themselves since they

have had no official reporters at our meetings in the past three months, and the only non-ADA

people who have been at our meetings have been those associated with a group called 'The

Minute Women' who have apparently set themselves up to investigate anything and anyone who

could possibly be disapproved of by [Wisconsin Senator] Joe McCarthy."20 Despite the political

and organizational obstacles, he began soliciting Texas liberals and taking notes about the

political developments in the state.

The job was difficult, as Lambert knew it would be. Part of the problem was that ADA,

though affiliated with liberal Democrats in Texas, organized separately from them. The fortunes

of the state's Democratic Organizing Committee (DOC) were the top priority of most Texas

liberals.21 Formed in May 1953, the Committee was meant to counter the strength of the

Shivers-led conservative Democrats in the official Democratic organization of Texas. Lambert,

like most liberals, wanted badly for it to succeed, but he worked for ADA, and they were paying



19 Violet Gunther, memo to Robert Nathan and Edward Hollander, "Political survey in the
Southern States," June 16, 1953, reel 39, no. 129, ADA Papers.

20 George Lambert to Gunther, March 7, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

21 George Lambert, memo to Hollander, "Report on Activities in Texas-June 1 to June 14,"
June 14, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









his salary. Was Lambert attempting to build an independent liberal organization, or did local

political conditions mean that taking energy and money away from loyalist Democrats would do

more harm than good? Lambert's employers in Dallas believed he was doing "an excellent job,"

but the eventual goal of his work remained unclear.22

While leaders in Dallas and Washington worked to establish these long-term goals,

Lambert's plan for the summer of 1953 was to organize chapters in Fort Worth (where several

Dallas chapter members already lived), San Antonio, Houston (where liberals had "complete

control" of the local Democratic Party), Beaumont-Port Arthur ("the State's only consistently

liberal political stronghold of any size and importance for more than ten years"), and several

other smaller communities. Lambert expected to spend two weeks in San Antonio and two

weeks in Houston, indicating the breadth of the work he hoped to accomplish in those cities.

The short-term goal was to assist the Democratic Organizing Committee of Texas in November

at the state Democratic convention, when observers expected the conservative "Shivercrats" to

maintain control of the party machinery.23

Lambert also provided ADA leaders with his detailed reports about matters of national

interest. His first report covered Democratic national chairman Steve Mitchell's tour of Texas in

June 1953. Many liberals feared Mitchell's visit, since none of them had been consulted before

the trip. Lambert thought that Governor Shivers would use the trip to get back in the good

graces of the party he had spurned in 1952, and liberals did not trust Rayburn or Johnson to lead

the anti-Shivers movement. Johnson in particular was difficult to gauge, and Lambert believed

that he "is a man without a Party and without visible means of support in Texas now," alienating

22 Pat Dailey and Bette Morgan to Hollander, June 21, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.
23 "ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS FOR SOUTHWESTERN STATES," memo attached to
Dailey and Morgan letter to Hollander, June 21, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









conservatives with his tepid support for Stevenson in 1952 and liberals with his conservative

voting record in the Senate.24

In the end, however, Mitchell's tour surprised Texas liberals. According to Lambert,

Mitchell acknowledged the role the Organizing Committee had had in Stevenson's 1952

campaign. Mitchell also noticed that Shivers and other conservatives stayed away from the

events on the tour. Many of the conservatives went out of their way to denounce Mitchell

publicly. "If there was no public embracing of the leaders of the Organizing Committee and of

the Loyal Democrats who had fought hardest and done most of the work to keep the State's

electoral vote from being stolen from Roosevelt and Truman and Stevenson, at the same time

there was no public or, as far as can be determined, private embracing of Shivers and the

Shivercrats."25 In an atmosphere where small liberal victories meant a great deal, Mitchell's tour

was an important success for Texas liberals.

By the summer of 1953, people outside of ADA were beginning to recognize Lambert as a

potential source of information about Texas. In late July, Reporter magazine writer Dorothy

Kahn contacted him seeking information that for a possible upcoming issue on Texas politics.

Lambert's reply to Kahn was pessimistic. He thought not much had changed in the state since

1938, with conservatives dominating the state politics and challenged by a much smaller group

of liberals and loyal Democrats. Republicans were a non-factor, having thrown their support

behind conservative Democrats for political and financial reasons. Lambert told Kahn that one

local newspaper even speculated that "the Republicans would not even run candidates for any





24 George Lambert to Hollander, July 8, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

25 George Lambert to Hollander, July 8, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









office in Dallas County because of general satisfaction with the incumbent 'Democrats' and the

cost of staging their own primaries."26

His frustration with Texas politics is clear in his letter to Kahn. He noted that "there are

several Republican controlled States, some almost continuously Republican, that have such

things as Minimum Wage Laws, FEPC Laws, little Wagner Acts, progressive taxation, adequate

control of utilities, higher unemployment compensation, and other types of socially-advanced

legislation which the Corporations haven't even had to worry about in Texas."27 The DOC was

the first major attempt at changing this status quo to be attempted since 1932. It was the only

institution in the state that could effect change, but no one knew whether Rayburn or Johnson

intended to challenge Shivers. Lambert was particularly dismissive of Johnson as a liberal

savior, indicating that the Senator would have liberals' support "only if [liberals] had no other

choice!" He even believed that Johnson had made a deal with the governor in which Shivers

would maintain control of the state party and Johnson would avoid a contest in the 1954

Democratic primary.28

Lambert had a great deal of contempt for Johnson, but he knew liberals had to deal with

him. Lambert suggested that Kahn cover several issues in her articles on Texas, including

whether Republicans intended to make Texas a true two-party state, Johnson's chances for re-

election in 1954, and the hold oil companies had over the entire political system.29


26 George Lambert to Dororthy N. Kahn, July 22, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

27 George Lambert to Dororthy N. Kahn, July 22, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

28 George Lambert to Dororthy N. Kahn, July 22, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

29 Ironically, nothing actually came of these conversations, since Lambert indicated in a
subsequent letter to the national office that Kahn's editor at Reporter had told him there was
"much less interest in doing much on Texas than Mrs. Kahn had thought." George Lambert to
Gunther, August 11, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









While he tried to educate outsiders about his home state, Lambert traveled the state looking

for ADA prospects. His August 1953 reports were mixed. He was optimistic that he could start

several chapters in Texas before his six-month trial run ended. Things had progressed slower

than he had hoped, partly because his wife had been forced to have surgery over the summer.

Nevertheless, he thought there was a place for ADA in each city.30 Fort Worth was his most

problematic city because his main concern there was to create an "organization of the

Independent liberals, presently largely without organization, and to make them an effective force

in the political situation in the community." In order to do that, he needed to find the right

leaders, and this meant finding people with experience, contacts in the liberal community, and

practical political skills. By the end of August, Lambert was convinced that he had done so.31

Another of Lambert's August reports was more pessimistic, however, not only about the

chapters but about the whole ADA enterprise. He believed that Texas liberals were spread too

thin and had too many competing loyalties. For example, in August the Dallas County division

of the DOC asked him to "put together a schedule of activities through next year's primaries and

conventions, arrange for the printing of precinct maps showing the new precincts in Dallas

County, arrange for printing of letterheads and other material for the Committee," and draw

up their budget. Lambert did as he was asked, but these tasks took him away from his job as

ADA organizer.32

There were also logistical and political problems that hamstrung Lambert's efforts. For

example, in late August Lambert told Gunther that he had attempted to issue a statewide ADA



30 George Lambert to Hollander, August 8, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

31 George Lambert to Gunther, August 11, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

32 George Lambert to Hollander, September 6, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









newsletter, only to find that the duplication facilities he wanted to use at the state CIO in Austin

could not accommodate his project. He also had to deal with the fear of attempted "Communist

infiltration," noting that "several people have shown up at meetings recently who were either

identified with the Progressive Party or with other of the Party's front activities."33 Lambert

decided to tighten screening procedures for new members in response to questions from potential

members, with the expressed approval of the national office. However, ADA's commitment to

anti-Communism meant that financial and political resources that would have gone toward

organization and political activity could not be used for those purposes.34

Nevertheless, the national office was very pleased with Lambert's work, and late that

summer Violet Gunther effusively praised his work on the Mitchell trip and the Kahn letter. She

said Lambert's work was so good that she had copied it for distribution to the ADA executive

committee. However, Gunther's knew that hard work would not be enough to make ADA viable

in Texas. She wanted Lambert to find out whether the DOC would be represented at a

Democratic Party caucus in Chicago in mid-September, assuming that both sides in the fight for

control of the Texas party would make their case at the meeting. Liberals feared that Texas

Democrats who supported Eisenhower in 1952 would attempt to return to the party as if nothing

had happened, and that Mitchell would not stop them from doing so.35 In early September,

Gunther made her concern more explicit, worrying that Shivercrat Democratic National







33 George Lambert to Hollander, September 6, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

34 Hollander to George Lambert, September 9, 1953, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

35 Gunther to George Lambert, July 31, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.









Committeeman Wright Morrow would be allowed to remain in the party after the Chicago

meeting.36

Lambert, recognizing that liberals had to work against conservatives who acted as though

they were still "Democrats," responded to Gunther's appeal with a proposal that would kill two

birds with one stone. Harris County (Houston) Democratic executive secretary Bernice Smith

was to attend the Chicago meeting with several other Houston liberals, "all but one of [whom

were] very favorable to ADA and would be pleased with the opportunity of meeting liberals at an

ADA-sponsored gathering there." The primary purpose of the Houston delegation's trip would

be to work against the Shivers forces, but Lambert realized that the national ADA leadership

would be able to meet with the Houston group in Chicago and exchange ideas and policy

proposals.37

No minutes from this meeting survive, but Gunther believed that the Chicago gathering

had been useful to northern liberals as "a give and take of information and ideas about how

Northerners could help the Democratic Organizing Committee in Texas get recognized by the

National Party." However, "there was no formal decision or even agreement at the meeting"

about what to do next, and many of the leading lights of ADA, including Philadelphia Mayor

Joseph Clark and Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, were not able to meet with the Texans

because they were at party functions. The lack of action in Chicago frustrated Gunther, and it

seemed to sum up the relationship between liberals in Texas and the leadership of national liberal






36 Violet Gunther to George Lambert, September 1, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

37 George Lambert, memo to Hollander, "Chicago Democratic Party Meetings," September 9,
1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.









organizations such as ADA.38 By the end of 1953, ADA leaders understood that they had been

unable to convince more than a handful of Texas liberals to join their organization.

Nevertheless, in November 1953 Dallas chapter chairman Carl Brannin suggested that the

50-50 arrangement for Lambert's employment should continue through January 31 of the

following year. Brannin had no illusions about Lambert's ability to recruit Texans for ADA

chapters, but he thought Lambert had furthered "the cause of liberal democracy in this area and

[increased] awareness of liberal political organization in the Democratic Party over the State."

He also praised Lambert's wife, calling the couple "a good team, devoted to the work and

effective."39 Hollander echoed Brannin's assessment of Lambert's work, saying, "We also have

been very much impressed with the activities in Texas and with the good job that George has

done."40

This short-term arrangement did not address Lambert's future with beyond January.

Brannin wanted to know whether ADA official wanted Lambert to continue his work in

"[guiding] the liberal program toward a practical political orientation," not to mention his role

"as an unofficial secretariat for the Democratic Organizing Committee on the county and state

level in Texas." Brannin credited the organization of the DOC on the county level in Dallas

almost entirely to Lambert's efforts. However, Brannin also knew that the Dallas chapter did not

have the money to continue paying Lambert beyond January. Still, he thought that losing an







38 Gunther to George Lambert, October 28, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

39 Carl Brannin to Hollander, November 11, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

40 Hollander to Brannin, November 13, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.









organizer of Lambert's quality at the beginning of an election year would be a serious blow to

liberals in Texas.41

As if to underscore Lambert's usefulness as an educational resource to ADA, he continued

submitting memos to the national office concerning the prospects for liberals as they tried to

seize control of the state Democratic Party. His reports were not encouraging. On January 6,

1954, he concluded that "any chance of there being an effective statewide political program and

organization 'to return the Democratic Party to the Democrats' in Texas this year is dead." Like

many liberals, Lambert blamed Rayburn for failing to organize anything more than scattered

opposition to Shivers, and for de-emphasizing the DOC in favor of an "Advisory Committee to

the Democratic National Committee" (Democratic Advisory Council, or DAC) with "the limited

announced purposes of raising money for the National Party and advising it, through Sam

Rayburn, of the political situation in Texas." Lambert worried that Rayburn would support

conservative Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell as the Democratic nominee for President in

1956. The problem for Rayburn was the quixotic nature of such a campaign, since "it is hard to

conceive that he seriously believes that Russell stands a chance of being nominated." He

also detailed Rayburn's unwillingness to commit to the DOC and how it was ruining the DOC's

chances of success, as well as Johnson's unwillingness to commit to either side in the struggle

for control of the party.42

Up to this point, Lambert had merely reported what had been happening in Texas, but he

was now offering opinions on what this all meant to Texas liberals. Rayburn wanted desperately

to be Speaker of the House again, but he also worried about his own prospects for re-election in

41 Brannin to Hollander, January 6, 1954, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

42 George Lambert, confidential memo to National ADA, "Texas Political Scene," January 6,
1954, pp. 1-3, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.









1954. This may seem somewhat odd considering that he ended up winning three-quarters of the

vote in that year's Democratic primary, but Rayburn's prospects were not as bright at the

beginning of the year.43 Most of his worries centered on a pending redistricting plan that would

have brought many conservative areas of North Texas into Rayburn's district.44

Shivers and other conservatives had the power to make Rayburn's re-election bid more

difficult, but Raybum also knew that how they proceeded depended a great deal on Rayburn's

attitude toward the governor. As Lambert put it, "[liberal Austin Democrat Fagin] Dickson is of

the opinion that Rayburn is afraid to be identified with any effective organization against

Shivers, and that he will actively sabotage any organization that is established" in order to keep

Shivers from adding conservative counties to his district. Liberals knew that Rayburn's voting

record was generally good, but they hated that his political survival appeared to be more

important than his principles.45 Lambert's report on Rayburn's political troubles in Texas is

significant as an example of the service Lambert provided to ADA officials in Washington. It

allowed them to understand what was going on in Texas, from a point of view they would not

have received from the largely conservative press in the state.

Hollander recognized Lambert's usefulness, and he frankly admitted that "except for the

very good results that have accrued from the arrangement up to now, we would have felt



43 For another perspective on Rayburn's 1954 primary campaign, see Anthony Champagne,
Congressman Sam Rayburn (New Brunswick, N.J., 1984), 131-136.

44 Rayburn's Fourth District contained just over 210,000 people when he first won the seat in
1912; by the 1960 census, the Fourth had just under 260,000 in a state that had grown from 3.9
million in 1910 to 9.6 million in 1960. All census figures from Champagne, Congressman Sam
Rayburn, 13-14, except for 1960 state census figures, from Texas State Library and Archives
Commission, "United States and Texas Populations, 1850-2006,"
http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.html (accessed January 30, 2008).

45 Lambert, "Texas Political Scene," 5-7.









compelled to terminate the arrangement." ADA leaders could not afford to lose Lambert, but he

also needed to earn a living, and Hollander was not sure ADA could keep him as an employee.

The National Board wanted Lambert to continue his work, but only if Dallas could finance pay

for it.46 The limbo under which Lambert operated continued into mid-March, when Brannin told

Hollander that the Dallas chapter would conducting a membership and fund-raising drive in an

attempt to save Lambert's job.47 In the meantime, Lambert was remained an ADA employee,

but he had no assurances that he would remain on the payroll for long.

Until the Dallas chapter raised more money, the national office decided to pay all of

Lambert's salary for the first few months of 1954, but Hollander told Lambert that these

arrangements could not last much longer without assistance from Dallas. Hollander regretted the

situation, but he could not disagree with those ADA officials who cautioned that "at least a

modicum of financial prudence has to take precedence over our hopes and ambitions. There is

no doubt we are over extended and that we must be prepared to retrench if additional funds are

not forthcoming."48 No matter how productive Lambert was, and no matter how important

Texas was to national Democratic politics, cost-cutting was vital for an organization facing tens

of thousands of dollars in debt, and Lambert's $9,600 annual salary seemed a logical place to

start.49

While the national office debated whether or not to keep Lambert on the payroll, he

continued to tell the office in Washington about political events in Texas. In February 1954, he

reported on Shivers' attempts to gain control of the Texas Young Democrats, the only major

46 Hollander to Brannin, February 16, 1954, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

47 Brannin to Hollander, March 13, 1953, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

48 Hollander to George Lambert, June 9, 1954, reel 22, no. 1, ADA Papers.

49 Robert Nathan to Louis J. Hexter, June 7, 1954, reel 40, no. 130, ADA Papers.









Democratic organization that had backed Stevenson in 1952. The Governor wanted to control

this rogue element within the party. His solution to the dilemma was to create his own "Young

Democrats," deny recognition to the other group, and thoroughly confuse the national party. In

late March, to confer legitimacy on his group, Shivers invited Stevenson and Mitchell to speak to

them, realizing "that an invitation to Stevenson would tend to show the good faith of the Shivers

crowd when they took over the Young Democrats or at least would give them a powerful

argument for recognition by the National organization." To ensure his control, Shivers stacked

the county meetings of the "Young Democrats" with supporters who were far from young. Some

of them were between fifty and seventy years of age, a fact that even conservative newspapers

could not ignore in their coverage of the Shivers meetings.50

On March 6, Lambert's traveled to Miami for the Democratic Party's Southern States

Dinner, and he reported "a few of [his] personal impressions with some of the reasons for [his]

having gotten these impressions." He decided to "leave any of the large conclusions for you and

others to draw both from my information and other information you, and others, may have on

this affair."51 Lambert was willing to take direction from ADA leaders, but he also had strong

opinions about what that direction should be.

In short, he was frustrated with the southern Democrats' complete unwillingness to talk

about civil rights, labor legislation, or changes to American foreign policy, although he was

surprised to find that "there also must have been some sort of an agreement by the Southerners

not to wave the bloody shirt of FEPC, school segregation, stricter labor legislation, [or]

50 George Lambert, memo to National ADA, "Background of Governor Shivers' invitation to
Adlai Stevenson, Steve Mitchell, et al to speak at 'Young Democrats' Convention in Texas,"
February 14, 1954, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.

51 George Lambert, memo to National ADA, "Report on Democratic Party's Southern States
Regional Dinner at Miami, Florida, March 6, 1954," undated, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.









tidelands," as they had at other Party functions. He was frustrated with the almost complete lack

of minorities at the dinner, noting that that the three or four black Democrats present had been

placed in a corner with "CIO people ... or by National Committee functionaries who, it was

known, would not be embarrassed by their presence." He was frustrated with Governor

Stevenson's inability to remember the names of southern Democratic leaders, wondering

whether he was as out of touch as he seemed at one of his pre-dinner press conferences. On the

other hand, the selection of Texas Agricultural Commissioner John C. White as a speaker at the

functions preceding the dinner was encouraging, since White had been the only state official in

Texas to back Stevenson in 1952. Lambert took this as "a direct slap at Shivers" and his cronies,

some of whom were in Miami. Even this encouraging sign was not without its problems,

however, since "there seemed to have been a deliberate effort made to assure that [these policy

discussions] would be poorly attended," especially by the general public.52

As for the dinner itself, Lambert tried to gauge the popularity of Democratic leaders,

especially southerners, based on the reception they received when they rose to speak (he had also

done this when Mitchell toured Texas the previous year). Rayburn received a long standing

ovation, Johnson's name was received with tepid applause, and Russell appeared to be

somewhere in the middle. Lambert paid attention not only to what was said, but what the

conservative Texas Democrats were doing during the speeches. For example, Lambert noted

that when Johnson spoke out against Senator Joseph McCarthy, Wallace Savage, whom Lambert

called the "'Benedict Arnold' Democratic State Chairman" in Texas, ignored the senator and

began taking notes. He barely acknowledged the popular Rayburn when he spoke. According to

Lambert, "Savage got up only after everyone else at his table had gotten up and after a few


52 Lambert, "Report on ... Regional Dinner."









handclaps lit a cigarette in what looked like a gesture of contempt."53 One thing that seemed

clear from listening to the speeches in Miami was that the need for "unity" and the unwillingness

of Democrats to commit to more substantial reform was a bad sign for liberals.

The usefulness of reports like these to ADA leaders convinced them to keep Lambert on

the payroll through the 1954 Democratic primaries, even though the Dallas chapter had not

raised any money toward his salary.54 Looking at the quality and detail of the information

Lambert was providing, it is easy to see why ADA officials did not want to lose him. He had a

gift for telling liberals in Washington what was going on in Texas from a unique point of view.

With this in mind, the Washington office was willing to swallow an expense that might have

seemed prohibitive under any other circumstances. However, Lambert knew that he had to

deliver tangible results to ADA if its officials were going to continue to fund him.

In mid-May, after the window of opportunity for candidates to register for the Democratic

primaries in Texas had closed, he summed up where liberals stood at that moment. He was not

optimistic about his prospects. According to Lambert's report, Rayburn had done little with the

Democratic Advisory Council beyond turning it into a personal fund-raising tool that would

funnel money to the national party. Raybum would not let the group back liberals and loyalists

in the primaries and would not invite Stevenson to Texas for speeches or fund-raisers. As a

result, liberals had washed their hands of the DAC for the time being, choosing instead to

campaign for Shivers' main rival for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1954, Ralph

Yarborough. "Work and money is being shifted to the Yarborough campaign in the hope that

Yarborough can be elected and that, if elected, his prestige as Governor will cause enough of the



53 Lambert, "Report on ... Regional Dinner."

54 Hollander to Ruth Ellinger, July 7, 1954, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









County level politicians who normally control delegates from their Counties to the State

Conventions to vote with him in the Conventions to enable the Democrats to have control." The

relative strength of Democratic loyalists in some of the state's largest cities, including Houston

and Dallas, also encouraged Lambert. Nevertheless, Lambert was not expecting miracles in

1954 or 1956, recognizing that Shivers' control of the Democratic machinery would be difficult

to overcome considering the liberals' relative lack of organization beyond the precinct level.55

As a result, when the 1954 Texas Democratic primaries ended with victories for Rayburn,

Johnson, and Shivers, liberals in the state knew that they had failed to significantly influence the

party. In these circumstances, the fact that ADA's financial situation had not improved over the

summer could no longer be ignored. On November 19, 1954, not long after the birth of the

Lamberts' second child, Hollander regretfully terminated the Texas project. In his letter,

Hollander offered his thanks for Lambert's part "in the stirring of great things that are coming

out of Texas" and noted that "Bob [Nathan] and I have rather over-stretched the instructions of

the Executive Committee in carrying [the project] this long."56

Lambert accepted the decision of the Executive Committee humbly. He wrote, "I hardly

feel that my work here merits the praise you gave it in your letter." He also understood that

ADA's grim financial outlook could no longer be ignored, regretting that "we somehow should

have been able to justify it more fully in terms of additional organization and resources for

ADA." He offered to continue reporting on Texas politics for ADA's benefit on an expenses-

only basis, and the national office agreed to retain him in this capacity.57 He also continued to


55 George Lambert, "Texas Political Developments of Significance to Liberals," May 12, 1954,
reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.

56 Hollander to George Lambert, November 19, 1954, reel 24, no. 1, ADA Papers.

57 George Lambert to Hollander, November 29, 1954, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.









fight attacks on ADA from both sides of the political spectrum. For example, in April 1955, he

campaigned against a planned "Southwide Regional Conference" on racial issues to be held in

Texas because the Southern Conference Educational Fund, which had organized in the wake of

the failure of SCHW in the late 1940s, was a group of "fellow-travelers" with unclear motives.58

However, the most interesting aspect of Lambert's ADA work was that he had begun to

believe that liberals and loyal Democrats in Texas were gaining the upper hand. In 1955, Indiana

lawyer Paul Butler had become chairman of the national party, and one of his first actions as

chairman was a visit to Texas. He wanted to end the split between conservatives and liberals in

the party. "Real" Democrats hoped to convince Butler that Shivers would never support the

1956 Democratic presidential nominee unless he was able to play the role of kingmaker, and they

also wanted most of the money Butler raised on his trip to be turned over to the liberal faction.

However, Lambert found out that Butler and Shivers had been quietly begun meeting to work out

a truce for the sake of Democratic unity. Lambert did not know exactly what had been promised,

but he suspected that the deal involved Shivers' Lieutenant Governor, Ben Ramsey, replacing

Morrow on the National Committee in return for Butler's pledge not to seek a loyalty oath of any

kind from the Texas delegation in 1956.59 Lambert did not know the details, but he had a true

believer's suspicion of any deal in which "Democratic Party contributions [would be] handled by

a man who had just announced flatly and publicly, as Allan Shivers just had, that he would again

desert the Democratic Party's ticket next year if Adlai Stevenson was again the Presidential

nominee."60



58 Hollander to George Lambert, April 29, 1954, reel 78, no. 97, ADA Papers.

59 Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York, 1975), 300.

60 George Lambert, "Report from Texas," August 15, 1955, p. 4, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.









Despite their suspicions of Butler, liberals decided that the best thing to do under the

circumstances was to support his tour. If Butler chose to refuse that support, they could expose

the national chairman as Shivers' puppet. If he accepted their help, they hoped to convince him

that dealing with Shivers would do nothing to assist the national party and might hurt it

significantly. Liberals, the major labor federations, and ADA leaders agreed that helping Butler

was the best course of action, and they had support from DAC leaders in several East Texas

counties who refused to have anything to do with Butler unless he refused to associate with

Shivers.61

In the end, however, Shivers turned out to be the best friend of the loyalist Democrats. In

May 1955, the DAC announced that it would be handling all of Butler's arrangements for the

tour. Shivers' response was to publicly announce, through his political lieutenants, that

conservative Democrats would be boycotting Butler's tour. Elected officials, most of whom

owed their political fortunes to Shivers, and the state's major conservative newspapers followed

suit and denounced Butler, but liberals and loyalists exploited the opportunity. The East Texas

loyalists who had threatened to ignore Butler now arranged a luncheon in his honor. Democrats

across the state now lined up for tickets to Butler events, and Shivers was forced to "invite" the

chairman to a private lunch in Austin at a point in the schedule when Butler could not possibly

accept. Shivers then turned around and blasted Butler for snubbing him, conveniently ignoring

the fact that "Shivers [had] earlier announced that he would completely ignore the visit of the

man with whom a few weeks earlier he had been so chummy."62 Lambert did not see this as a





61 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 5-6.

62 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 7-8.









final victory for Texas liberals, but he thought that the state party's influence could be tempered

to the point that Shivers would not be a national spoiler in 1956.

Butler's tour began in Lubbock on June 14. Lambert thought Butler began timidly with a

speech that stressed a hope for party unity, and Lambert speculated that this was because Butler

feared that much of the audience would be pro-Shivers. For his part, Butler saw few avowed

Shivercrats in the Lubbock audience. The only major figure in the Shivers camp who attended

the event "refused to sit on the platform and his introduction was met with something less than

cordial recognition by the crowd." Lambert sensed a change in Butler's mood, however, when

the crowd refused to acknowledge Senator Johnson but loudly cheered when he mentioned

Rayburn's name. This happened frequently during Butler's tour, and Butler tailored his message

for the liberals and loyal Democrats who were showing up to hear him. He did not repeat the

mistake he had made in Lubbock, when a remark praising Shivers "had a deadening effect on the

crowd from which it never quite recovered, even when towards the end of his talk he got on to

more safe and familiar ground by delivering an able attack on some of the more glaring

deficiencies in the Republican Administration's record in office."63

His next stop, two days later in Dallas, showed that Butler had learned an important lesson

about the dynamics of Texas Democratic politics. It did not hurt that twelve hundred people

came to his Dallas event, double the size of the Lubbock crowd. As a result, Butler gave the

"wild-eyed radicals, left-wingers, ADAers and fellow Democrats" (to quote a Shivercrat press

statement that criticized the Dallas gathering) who came to hear him a stronger performance. He

urged "real" Democrats not to support Republican candidates and criticized the "infiltration" of

the party by those who had no intention of supporting its principles. In a meeting with local


63 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 8-11.









labor leaders after the speech, he declared himself a liberal in the Roosevelt-Truman tradition,

supported civil rights legislation and national health insurance, and urged the defeat of

conservative "Democrats" in future elections. Lambert took these statements to imply that

Butler was calling for the defeat of the entire Texas congressional delegation, since even

Rayburn hated the idea of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission. He was

stunned that Butler would say these things when he could be fairly certain that these statements

would get back to Johnson and Rayburn.64 Lambert and other liberals were ecstatic about the

effects Butler's visit might have on their political fortunes in Texas, and Lambert communicated

that sentiment to Washington.

Still, liberals and loyalists could not be overly confident about where they stood in Texas.

Butler attempted to tailor his message to the audience before whom he spoke. In Waco, he

echoed the sentiments of his Dallas speech in a liberal city that backed Stevenson strongly in

1952. When he traveled to McAllen and Corpus Christi, however, he toned down his criticism

of conservative Democrats in front of crowds that backed Shivers.65 By the time Butler's tour

reached Houston for the Young Democrats convention on June 18, no one was quite sure what to

make of him. At a press conference prior to his Houston speech, Butler revealed that Shivers

would have to force Wright Morrow to resign as Texas' Democratic National Committeeman

and replace him with a loyal Democrat if he expected to remain in the party's good graces. This

appeared to be a strong statement in support of Democrats who would not betray the party in

future elections. However, as had been the case so often on the tour, Butler remained enigmatic.

He promised Shivers a great deal of influence in the selection of the Texas delegation to the 1956


64 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 11-14.

65 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 14-17.









convention. This caused a poor reception to his speech before the Young Democrats, who

almost canceled Butler's engagement in retaliation for the chairman's overtures to Shivers,

because Butler limited his attacks to Eisenhower and the Republicans.66

In the end, Lambert and the liberals did not know where they stood and what the Butler

tour would mean. Lambert tried to reach some conclusions about the Butler tour in a separate

report to the national office. The central question was how ADA leaders should reconcile

Butler's criticism of "Democrats" who supported the GOP to make a clean break and join the

other party with the reality of Butler's attempts to woo Shivers. Lambert believed that the tour

had helped their cause, and he listed several reasons for his optimism. First, large numbers of

loyalists had gathered at Butler's speeches, discussing organization and fund-raising for the

fights to come. Second, Lambert did not discount the significance of the "spectacle." Seeing

hundreds of people gathering together to denounce Shivers sent the message that he was not

invincible. Third, and most importantly, the Butler tour had forced many Texas Democrats to

choose sides, especially after Shivers turned his back on Butler publicly. Even Rayburn and

Johnson, who had refused to publicly "cross swords" with Shivers, endorsed Butler's tour and

praised the chairman on several occasions. Shivers' opponents now had money with which they

could organize against him, had split the Shivercrats over Morrow's departure from the national

committee, and had convinced Butler that Shivers could not be trusted.67

All liberals did not share Lambert's optimism about liberalism in Texas, however, and

Lambert acknowledges their reasoning as well. Some activists worried that Butler would not

press for concessions from Shivers beyond replacing Morrow on the National Committee. The

66 Lambert, "Report from Texas," 17-19.

67 George Lambert, "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS," undated, pp. I-IV, reel 52, no. 308, ADA
Papers.









money (more than $20,000) that the national party had raised in Texas had not yet been

transferred to the party loyalists, and some liberals were beginning to think they would never get

their hands on it. In fact, some of the more conspiratorial liberals thought that Shivers would

seize the money in exchange for a $250,000 payment to the national party. "That Shivers is

shrewd enough to try to make this kind of trade is not doubted. That the National Party

leadership could resist the temptation is considered most doubtful." Lambert quoted one

anonymous Texan as saying that if the national party wanted to sell out to Shivers, they needed

to ask for $10 million instead. Another problem for liberals was that, just as the "Texas

Democratic Party" centered itself on the personality of Governor Shivers, the liberal-loyalist

opposition depended heavily on Speaker Rayburn, and he could disband the DAC at any time,

without explanation.6

Who was right? Lambert acknowledged in August that he would not know for some time.

Since 1955 was not an election year, the political game slowed down considerably after the

Butler tour, only to pick up again in March 1956 with another of Lambert's reports to the ADA

leadership. He reported on a potential schism within the anti-Shivers ranks over the makeup of

the delegation they would choose for the 1956 national convention. Rayburn and Johnson had

expected the DAC to allow them to choose a delegation as they saw fit, but the DAC board

rejected their request by a 9-2 vote. Instead, liberals pressed for a "pro-New Deal, Fair Deal, and

probably pro-Stevenson" delegation that would not depend on the Washington politicians. The

proposed liberal delegation would be beholden to no one and had to pledge its support for the

Democratic ticket before that ticket was selected. Rayburn wanted the delegation to support

Senator Johnson as a "favorite-son" candidate throughout the balloting, only giving way when


68 Lambert, "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS," VI-VII.









Johnson himself withdrew.69 Once again, liberals were in a bind. They could not support

Shivers, of course, but they did not want Rayburn to turn the state Democratic Party into a pro-

Johnson organization either.

Texas Democrats disapproved of Rayburn's "dictatorial" handling of the Texas delegation

to the Democratic convention. There was every indication that several DAC members would

openly declare their displeasure with Rayburn's attempts to take over the delegation. Most DAC

members favored Stevenson, and Rayburn wanted to keep his reputation as a "democratic" figure

within the party, in the sense of allowing the organizers and activists to decide on policy for

themselves.70 Rayburn was also feeling heat from the right. On March 25, Shivers appeared on

Meet the Press to publicly insult the House Speaker and make "a sarcastic promise to support

Johnson if only he knew his views on such issues as federal aid to education, states' rights and

desegregation."71

Therefore, Lambert was quite optimistic that the circumstances of the moment precluded

any sort of compromise between Shivers, Rayburn, and Johnson. As he wrote, "given the kind

of terms Shivers could be expected to exact-Shivers as delegation Chairman, and a majority of

Shivercrats (disloyal Democrats) on the delegation ... and the consequences of these terms to

the national Party prestige of both Rayburn and Johnson if they should again show up in Chicago

supporting, or as part of, a party-bolting delegation-it would seem that the liberal DACers'

alternative would likely be more palatable."72


69 George Lambert, "TEXAS POLITICAL REPORT," March 18, 1956, pp. 1-2, reel 52, no. 308,
ADA Papers.

70 George Lambert, "TEXAS POLITICAL REPORT," 2-3.

71 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, 301.
72 Lambert, "TEXAS POLITICAL REPORT," 3-4.









In mid-April, Lambert again reported to ADA from Chicago in a manner that, in his own

words, was not "fully reported in the press." On March 21, Johnson had met with DAC

members in Washington, but he told them that he thought he had the power to decide who would

be representing Texas at the 1956 national convention, where he fully expected to be a strong

contender for the nomination despite recent health problems.73 He did not want an "extremist"

delegation representing Texas, and he would be using his own organization at the 1956

convention. Lambert worried that in "many, if not most, instances Johnson's County leadership

is the same as Shivers' leadership and many, if not most, of these County leaders for Johnson are

also Eisenhower Democrats." At the same time, Johnson was playing his usual games with both

sides of the party, telling liberals in Washington that he had not yet decided to be a candidate

while giving the opposite impression to Rayburn and others within the DAC.74

Lambert thought that this meant Johnson was over-confident in his ability to round up the

delegates for the convention, only to be quickly disabused of that notion by some of his people in

the state the day after the DAC meeting. On March 23, 1956, Johnson returned to Texas for

meetings with his top political advisors. Lambert thought Johnson was fearful of repeating his

1952 performance, when he had stayed out of the credential fight within the Texas delegation

contested between Rayburn and Shivers. His neutrality in that fight earned the nickname of

"lyin'-down Lyndon." Liberals and labor leaders in the DAC made their sentiments clear in a

meeting of the DAC's steering committee on March 25. The delegates were asked to consider a

sub-committee proposal that "called for DAC support of the Rayburn proposal that Johnson be

[sic] favorite son candidate and delegation chairman only if the loyal Democratic delegation is



73 See Caro, Master of the Senate, 801-830, for more on Johnson's plans in 1956.

74 George Lambert, "Texas Report," March 26, 1956, pp. 1-3, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.









selected through DAC and the delegation is under no obligation to Johnson other than to vote for

him on the first ballot." The DAC agreed to this proposal because they had canvassed county

Democratic leaders and found that a majority of them were refusing to give Johnson the power

he wanted.7

The next domino to fall in the fight over the Texas delegation was Rayburn, who had

stayed out of the limelight during Johnson's machinations. DAC State Secretary Kathleen Voigt

did reach Rayburn in Washington, however, for an off-the-record conversation about the

proposal. Voigt spoke on behalf of the loyal Democrats in insisting that something be done to

get the rank-and-file to fight for the Democratic ticket in the fall, and Rayburn's response

indicated he was willing to work with DAC liberals to protect his own interests.

This represented the end of Lambert's ultimately futile quest to turn what Robert Nathan

referred to as "the wonderful people he met in Texas, [and] the feeling of kinship and the

dynamic liberalism he found there" into thriving local ADA chapters and a liberal shift in the

Democratic Party in Texas. His struggles highlight in miniature the dilemma Americans for

Democratic Action faced in the years following World War II.76 The biggest problem ADA

faced was that its leaders were primarily outsiders, and like reformers throughout American

history, they saw the South "as a problem requiring remedial action."77

ADA officials never explicitly put matters in those terms, but that was how many Texans

viewed northern liberals, and the gap between these regions was never truly bridged in the years

following World War II. The state's Democratic party was so reactionary, so unwilling to


75 George Lambert, "Texas Report," 4-5.

76 Hollander to George Lambert, November 19, 1954, reel 52, no. 308, ADA Papers.

77 Larry J. Griffin and Don Doyle, introduction to The Sm,,/lh as an American Problem, Griffin
and Doyle eds. (Athens, 1995), 4.









change, so outside what liberals considered to be the "mainstream" of American political life that

many Texas liberals believed "outside" pressure was the only way to force change. Others

wanted national liberals to stay out of the fray, thinking their efforts would be counter-productive

at best. Lambert was often caught in the middle of these arguments, appreciating the perspective

the national office could provide while advising them to stay out of the fights between liberal and

conservative Democrats. There was also deep skepticism about whether ADA should shoulder

the task of attempting to change Texas, or the South more generally. Part of this skepticism was

based on an assessment of ADA's finances, but the way in which Allan Shivers, Sam Rayburn,

and Lyndon Johnson fought each other for control of the state while Lambert was working for

ADA undoubtedly confused national liberal leaders observing the situation at a distance. In

short, there was a fundamental gap between the "vision" ADA leaders had for their organization

and the practical problems that constrained that vision, and Lambert's adventures in Texas are an

illuminating example of that.









CHAPTER 7
"THE SOUTH IS AFLAME": STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE FIGHT FOR SOUTHERN LIBERALISM

In the mid-1950s, responding to past failures in the South, ADA leaders abandoned

regional organization in the South. They never stopped seeking out individual liberals who

might have been good candidates to start chapters, but they had abandoned ambitious, costly

projects designed to accelerate this organization. There is evidence that ADA officials had

learned this lesson long before they began to apply it. As early as March 1951, James A. Loeb,

who had been with ADA since its birth, admitted to the organization Executive Committee that

"there are certain communities, states and even regions in the U.S. where, for different reasons, it

is neither feasible nor possible to organize active, functioning chapters of ADA." In some

places, including Wisconsin, this was because the regular Democratic organization was strong

enough, and liberal enough, to satisfy ADA leaders. In the South, however, the opposite was

true. As a result, "ADA organization in the South is next to impossible and often self-

defeating[,] except in a few communities where special circumstances prevail." If ADA was to

organize southern liberals in the future, it could do so only at the state level and only with

Washington collecting all dues from individual members.

However, ADA had not completely given up on the South. The 1950s was a decade in

which economic, political, and social change in the region was a national priority for liberals. In

March 1956, as one anonymous correspondent wrote the official publication ADA World, "In the

areas of the hard core of resistance [to integration], the atmosphere is for all the world like

McCarthyism." He or she believed that the both races suffered from some fear. "White people

1 James A. Loeb, memorandum to ADA Executive Committee, "Special Organizational
Problem," March 13, 1951, reel 33, no. 63, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Papers,
University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville, microfilm collection (hereafter cited as ADA
Papers).









are afraid of white people, and look over their shoulders before they speak. Negro people are not

afraid in the sense of a new panic, but have a stolid determination to see it through." One thing

southern liberals like this writer believed, however, was that "the old patterns will no longer do

(and all know this, consciously or not) and the new ones have not been established .... There's

all the harshness and tension of the last-ditch stand that cannot win but can take a terrible toll."2

Something had to change, but no one truly knew how it would change.

There was the hope that a new generation of southerners could spark social and political

change in the region, and ADA and other liberal organizations could participate in that change.

Liberals hoped that this new generation would not adhere to the political and racial conventions

of the past. The vehicle through which ADA hoped to mold southern liberalism was its student

division, first known upon its founding in 1947 as Students for Democratic Action (SDA) and

renamed Campus ADA (CADA) in 1958. Since its founding, SDA organizers had been creating

chapters across the country, but in 1956 a new executive secretary, Yale Bernstein, saw potential

for the liberal students in the South. By the mid-1950s, as he put it, "the clarity of the issues in

the South" was so obvious that organizing chapters on southern campuses would be not only

fruitful, but necessary for the hopes of liberalism, both regionally and nationally.3 The increased

interest in civil rights issues that resulted from the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v.

Board of Education facilitated organization, and ADA's student wing soon found itself involved

in some of the most important events of the civil rights movement that followed Brown. These

included bus boycotts in Montgomery, Alabama and Tallahassee, Florida; northern boycotts of


2 "From and About the South," ADA World 11.3 (March 1956), 2M, reel 141, series IX, no. 2,
ADA Papers.

3 Yale Bernstein, memorandum to Students for Democratic Action (SDA) national office,
February 29, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60, ADA Papers.









southern colleges that refused to allow black athletes to participate in intercollegiate athletics;

and the campaign to desegregate the University of Florida. SDA and CADA chapters were not

often the driving forces behind these campaigns, but the association with ADA gave these

students an important organizational backing for their activities. It also gave ADA leaders a

chance to affect the next generation of southern liberals and create a base from which liberalism

could grow in the coming decades.

The actions of these students, most of them white, flew in the face of the conventional

wisdom about the region, which ADA's previous experiences in the South had only reinforced.

Barney Taylor, Alden Hopkins, and George Lambert had all traveled the South attempting to

attract support for ADA liberalism, but they had convinced themselves that liberal southerners

would never be more than a tiny minority of the region's population. However, they failed to

recognize that this minority could potentially be decisive in the struggle against segregation.

Historians have begun to reevaluate the strength of integrationist sentiment in the white South.

They now recognize that the white South "was not a monolithic wall of resistance" to the

demands of the civil rights movement. White liberals in the South may not have "considered

themselves radicals," but they were useful to the civil rights movement as an example of the kind

of new southerner movement leaders wanted to create.4 Novelist Lillian Smith, who had been a

founding member of ADA and had written passionate pamphlets for ADA criticizing southern

society, was the embodiment of the kind of southerner ADA had always wanted to attract.

Students who joined SDA or CADA thought of themselves as part of the vanguard of southern

liberalism.



4 David L. Chappell, Inside Agitators: White S.Nilih nuei in the Civil Rights Movement
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), xxi, xxii.









The enlistment of southern college students in ADA was not a phenomenon unique to the

1950s, however. SDA had been created at the same time as the parent organization, and the

South was one of its top priorities almost from the beginning. Its first field secretary, Charles G.

Sellers, Jr., was a student at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, and he spent much

of 1947 traveling through the South to gauge how much support SDA might be able to attract.

He told one potential campus leader, Brandon Locke of the University of Virginia, that "about

fifteen new SDA chapters [would] result" from his efforts. Like his ADA counterparts, Sellers

understood that southern students faced "a very discouraging situation" in places such as

Charlottesville. However, he hoped that Locke would take the lead in forming an SDA chapter,

since the conservative nature of the university's politics "[made] it even more imperative that a

dissenting voice be raised on the campus."5

Locke's response to Sellers' request to form an SDA chapter illustrates one of the unique

problems SDA faced in trying to organize students. Locke told Sellers that, since they had met

over the summer, "many scholastic problems have come up that kept me close to my books."

Liberal students may have been committed to liberalism, but they could never forget that they

were students first, and their academic responsibilities had to take priority. He had also talked

with leaders of other liberal groups, including the American Veterans Committee (AVC), about

liberal prospects at Virginia, only to be told that they "[were] not at all optimistic about the

chances of success of a SDA chapter and felt that it would entail an enormous amount of time if

attempted."6 This problem was more familiar to ADA leaders. Liberals who had tried to

organize in the South over the previous decades had become profoundly pessimistic about the

5 Charles G. Sellers, Jr. to Brandon Locke, August 18, 1947, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA
Papers.

6 Locke to Sellers, August 25, 1947, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.









prospects for southern liberalism, and they had shared their negative attitude with Sellers and

others.

Despite this consistent negativity from liberals in the South, SDA continued with its

southern efforts. Many of those efforts centered on Nashville, where in May 1950 twenty-one

students from Vanderbilt, Scarritt, Peabody, Cumberland, Fisk, and Tennessee A&I formed an

SDA chapter. Campus liberals formed the chapter at a moment when Vanderbilt was beginning

a "great leap forward" in its academic standing under Chancellor Harvie Branscomb.

Branscomb had become chancellor in 1947, and he wanted to make the university a national

institution. In order to do that, Branscomb had to curtail the power of the university's Board of

Trust, and in June 1950 he succeeded in convincing the board to remove older, more

conservative board members from active duty on the board. This was important to campus

liberals because the old alumni had a reputation for being "suspicious of innovations" and were

notorious for "[keeping a lookout for any form of liberal or radical heresy on campus," including

those advocating black civil rights and supporters of "New Deal regulatory or welfare policies."

These board members were never able to stop reform, but they held powerful positions on the

board, and Branscomb's ability to remove them from those positions meant that liberals would

have a better chance of making their voices heard.7

In 1949, Ralph Dummit had become SDA Field Secretary, and he saw the creation of the

Nashville chapter as an encouraging sign for southern organization. The inclusion of students

from black and white colleges in the city made it SDA's first integrated chapter in the South, and

Dummit hoped "to get six chapters in the South in order that a Southern Region may be set up.

If such a Region is established, there are hopes for a full-time field organizer and an office for

7 Paul K. Conkin, Gone ii i/h the Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University (Knoxville, 1985),
434-435, 450-455.









the South." By the middle of June 1950, the chapter had attracted twenty new members,

showing that it was possible to expand an SDA chapter beyond a small core of already

committed liberals.8 The Nashville chapter also proved that it could be politically effective when

it helped convince a local theater, the Circle Player, to integrate its seating arrangements.

Sherman Conrad, a Vanderbilt student and the chapter secretary, credited a quiet campaign from

SDA members with bringing about a change without much fanfare. He called the Circle Player's

integration the "farthest step forward so far" for race relations in the city.9 While that was an

exaggeration, Conrad's enthusiasm over SDA's early success in Nashville was an encouraging

sign for its future prospects.

In February 1951, the situation appeared so positive that David Heinlein, the Vanderbilt

student who chaired SDA there, requested that his school's members secede into a separate

chapter, leaving students from the rest of the city in their own "Nashville" organization. It was a

problem born of "extreme problems of successful action and growth," and Heinlein's proposal

would "enable the Nashville unit to function as a recognized campus organization, facilitating

the growth and increasing the activity of the unit, but in no way impairing the cooperation of the

Nashville SDA groups." The split would become official when the students outside of

Vanderbilt had built up their numbers to a point where they were able to function on their own.

Until then, the Nashville students would remain a single chapter.10

The situation in Nashville seemed positive, except when SDA officials actually looked at

their records to determine how many members the Nashville chapter actually had. Al Ettinger,


8 Ralph Dummit to Lee Levitt, May 16, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

9 Sherman Conrad to Dummit, September 11, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.
10 David Heinlein to SDA National Board, February 15, 1951, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170,
ADA Papers.









SDA's executive secretary, told Heinlein that those records showed a grand total of one paid-up

member from Vanderbilt. He also told Heinlein that he wanted a status report on SDA's

activities in Nashville, assuming there was still a functioning chapter there.11 The most

intriguing aspect of this situation is that Ettinger wrote his letter to Heinlein in January 1952, ten

months after Heinlein had reported that two separate Nashville chapters had to be formed. Why

had Heinlein not written a report to the Washington office since then? Why had no one in

Washington noticed that the membership increase in Nashville had featured no corresponding

increase in the financial contribution the chapter was making to SDA? Why was no one

communicating with anyone? No correspondence exists to explain the complete collapse of the

SDA chapter in Nashville or the lack of communication between the Nashville chapter and

SDA's Washington headquarters.

Dummit hoped that Knoxville, home of the University of Tennessee, would be a more

promising city for SDA organization, but the situation at UT presented in microcosm the various

difficulties that SDA faced in attempting to establish liberal student organizations. Like many

southern campuses, UT was "not exactly a hotbed of wild-eyed [political] innovators," and

university president Dr. Cloide Everett Brehm was adept at fending off politicians who criticized

professors for "questionable" political affiliations.12 At first glance, it appeared that liberals who

wished to organize on the UT campus would have relatively minor problems in so doing, but

prospective SDA leaders in Knoxville faced several challenges. Initially enthusiastic student

leaders lost interest or abruptly left school. At times students who bravely headed-up SDA

efforts on campus proved also to be headstrong and lacking in tact. Timid university

11 Al Ettinger to David Heinlein, January 21, 1952, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

12 James Riley Montgomery, Stanley J. Folmsbee, and Lee Seifert Greene, To Foster
Knowledge: A History of the University of Tennessee, 1794-1970 (Knoxville, 1984), 224-227.









administrations used delay and obfuscation to discourage "controversial" student initiatives. The

mass of students remained politically inert or, when race issues emerged, actively hostile to

progressive efforts.

Nevertheless, Dummit encouraged students in Knoxville to form a chapter. His point man

in that effort was UT student Lee Levitt. In late April 1950, Levitt had called a meeting in late

April to discuss the prospects of SDA on the campus. He had also attempted to meet with the

dean of students at UT concerning whether SDA would have a charter to operate on campus.

Levitt was optimistic about their chances of getting a fair hearing from the dean, since SDA's

officially non-partisan stance would side-step the university's prohibition on political parties

operating on campus. If they failed to get the dean's permission, however, Levitt thought he

could follow the lead of students in Nashville by starting a chapter with no official ties to the

school. They could also attract students from surrounding colleges with an unofficial chapter,

including predominantly black Knoxville College, thereby creating a second integrated chapter

in Tennessee.13

The issue of obtaining official permission for the UT chapter, however, proved to be a

stumbling block. Levitt placed the issue before the dean of students, and provided him with

some SDA literature, "having decided to be completely frank about our 'radical' intents."14 Six

months after Levitt had first approached the dean, he had received no word on their application,

and he promised Dummit that he would "prod" the administration for a decision. However,

these intentions soon conflicted with another basic fact of life on a college campus. Levitt, like

many college students, changed his plans in the middle of his UT career and in late July he



13 Levitt to Dummit, May 18, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

14 Levitt to Dummit, May 26, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









decided to leave the school to become journalist at what he described as a "weekly about 50

miles west of here." Levitt's departure forced him to turn over the organizing in Knoxville to

two other students, Harry Cohany and Buford Rhea, neither of whom had the kind of personal

relationship with the administration that Levitt had claimed to have.15

Cohany and Rhea represented SDA before the school's administrative council when it met

in September to consider the group's application, but the council forced them to endure another

delay while it sent the matter to a subcommittee for further study. While Cohany and Rhea were

optimistic about the application, thanks to the presence of several "liberal faculty members" on

the committee, the delay into November would severely hamper further organization, as would

the "dispersal" of students that accompanied the end of summer school.16

Dummit fumed at the "disgusting performance of the Administrative Council" at UT, but

there was little he could do about it. The school's administration had reserved the right to accept

or reject organizations on its campus, and Dummit knew that SDA's support of integration and

academic freedom in a McCarthyist atmosphere would cause college officials across the South to

balk at allowing SDA on their campuses. He also suffered, as ADA organizers had, under a

debilitating lack of information from those chapters he had been able to organize. In November

1950, when Dummit resigned from SDA to join the Army, the situation at Tennessee had not yet

been resolved, and he concluded that "SDA is about dead there." He suspected that the

administration there had much to do with its collapse thanks to its foot-dragging on SDA's

application to become an official organization on campus.17



15 Levitt to Dummit, September 16, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.
16 Levitt to Dummit, September 16, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

17 Dummit to Conrad, November 28, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









In late November, the bad news became official. UT's administration had rejected the

application, and it had done so without making public its reasons for doing so. Levitt, who had

remained in contact with the UT chapter since his departure, suspected that his own reputation as

an "irritating troublemaker" had something to do with the rejection of SDA. He was now

worried that he had allowed himself to "to be pushed to the forefront of our campaign to get on

the campus." It turned out that Levitt had been one of the most outspoken students at the

university, and his opinion columns for the Daily Beacon, the campus's student newspaper, had

contributed to the administration's decision. He had also participated in "a bitter fight a month

or so ago over the abolishment of U-T's literary magazine, which [Levitt] edited last year." He

did not think that he was the deciding factor in the rejection of SDA, since "most of the members

of our chapter were involved in the same controversies I was or else expressed strong

sympathetic opinions concerning them at the time." However, "few of them were as directly

associated with previous battles with the Administration as I was." Levitt was no longer a

student at UT, but his past actions were casting a shadow over SDA's activities. Finally, the

Korean War had drawn in most of the promising members of the chapter or was threatening to

do so.18 In short, the appearance of a strong start to the University of Tennessee SDA chapter

was illusory.

SDA in Knoxville had been able to do little to protect student publications from regulation

by the UT administration, and they had been ineffective when it came to the other major issue for

campus liberals. Liberals had been pushing for the integration of southern universities since the

end of the Second World War, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP) had brought several lawsuits against those schools that continued to


18 Levitt to Dummit, December 1, 1950, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









discriminate against black students. In 1950, the Supreme Court's ruling in Sweatt v. Painter

had integrated the law school and graduate school at the University of Texas. Other cases were

making their way through the judicial system, but liberals were pressuring segregated schools to

admit black students before the courts forced them to do it.

In December 1950, SDA leaders petitioned UT to end its segregationist policies, but the

school's administration ignored their efforts. Unfortunately, ADA World, the organization's

official newspaper, had already credited Tennessee with integrating its state universities, and

Robert K. Owens, chairman of the Knoxville ADA chapter, attempted to correct that

misconception. While state Attorney General Roy Beeler had ordered the integration of

Tennessee's public graduate and professional schools, the university administration in Knoxville

had overruled him, arguing that "the Constitution and the statutes of the State of Tennessee

expressly provide that there shall be segregation in the education of the races in schools and

colleges in the state and that a violation of the laws of the state in this regard subjects the violator

to prosecution, conviction and punishment as therein provided."19 Owens and other liberals

protested the justice of this decision, but they feared that the final dispensation of the case would

take another court case that would last for years.

Despite repeated failures in Nashville and Knoxville, SDA kept trying to gain a foothold in

the South. In the spring of 1952, the SDA National Board approved another Southern organizing

trip to connect with liberal students in the region and assess organizational possibilities.

Sherman Conrad traveled to New Orleans, Atlanta, and several cities in Texas on his tour. In

Houston, he suffered a broken nose in a confrontation between a group of liberal students he was

meeting at a local hotel and a group of conservatives, meeting at the same hotel, who supported

19 Robert K. Owens, letter to the editor, ADA World, December 11, 1950, reel 135, series VIII,
no. 170, ADA Papers.









Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell's presidential campaign. Ettinger's facetiously

recommended that SDA "establish the 'Order of the Pink Heart' as a reward for those injured in

the line of duty, and that Sherman Conrad be the first recipient of this distinguished award."20

Despite this painful incident, Conrad believed that SDA still had a chance of succeeding in

the South, and Ettinger agreed with his optimism. In the summer of 1951, he had seen

encouraging signs at the University of Miami, where student liberals had decided, in lieu of

starting an SDA chapter, to attempt a takeover of the Young Democrats in Dade County.

Ettinger thought this made sense because the Florida Democratic Party was loosely organized.

This meant that "by enlisting a sufficient number of liberals in the organization we can gain

control and influence a more liberal trend in state policy and legislation." Activities with the

Young Democrats would not preclude the creation of a chapter in the future, since the two

organizations would serve different functions. SDA leaders would "keep alive liberal issues and

serve an important educational function on the campus," while liberals who thought SDA to be

too "radical" could join a broader-based Young Democratic Club. The attempt to take over the

Young Democrats eventually failed because of the strength of its conservative faction, but

Ettinger liked the way the Miami students were thinking, and in 1952 liberals at St. Petersburg

Junior College and the University of Florida in Gainesville also started SDA chapters.21

The chapter in St. Petersburg was a particular point of pride for Ettinger because of its

leader, Bill Haddad, who had attracted significant attention to SDA in the fall of 1951 with his

protests against campus segregation. In one debate, Haddad proudly reported, he had "beat the

living verbal hell out of the KKK" in favor of integration. Ettinger liked Haddad's approach

20 Galen A. Martin, SDA National Board minutes, May 17, 1952, reel 129, series VIII, no. 108,
ADA Papers.

21 Ettinger to George H. Jones, Jr., May 10, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.









because the chapter was "in a constant state of turmoil, and they manage to find a way to operate

and publicize their position in every situation that arises. They know they're right; they yell it

to the world; and they don't give a damn what the world thinks." This was how to bring about

real change. As Ettinger wrote at the time, "in terms of ideology, we have everything on our

side-all the salient values of democracy. But without aggressive people who are willing to

proclaim and work for that ideology, it is nothing."22

Ettinger best described his organizing philosophy for the South in his response to criticism

he had received from John H. Harris, a student and SDA member at the University of North

Carolina in Chapel Hill. Harris believed that the college campuses of the South were too

inherently conservative, that students were too apathetic to care about politics, and that chapters

could not receive meaningful assistance from the national office. Ettinger believed that the

notion of entrenched conservatism at southern colleges was a "fallacious generalization." He

understood that continued racial prejudice undermined liberalism, but "in other respects, I

believe [southern universities] are frequently more liberal than northern colleges. For example,

accomplishments of the New Deal are held in much higher regard by people in the south than

they are in the north." Ettinger also believed that liberals in southern college towns had a higher

sense of purpose than northern liberal student, who had comparatively less to do.23

He disagreed with Harris's characterization of college students as ill-informed and

apathetic, an opinion probably stemming from Harris's frustration after several years of failed

effort in the Chapel Hill community. Ettinger knew that the effects of McCarthyism were taking

a toll on college students, but he thought the result was fear, not apathy, and fear, as he put it,



22 Ettinger to Jack W. Hopkins, November 6, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.

23 Ettinger to John H. Harris, May 18, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.









"has a tendency to inspire action of one kind or another." If students thought that the

government or school administration was attempting to take away their rights, chances were

good that they would fight back.24

Finally, if Harris believed that the national office in Washington needed to do more for

SDA chapters, an increased flow of communication from the chapters would help. "Speakers do

not drop out of the blue by parachute of their own inspiration. They are usually requested by the

local chapter and the request is acted upon by the national office whenever possible." Since

Ettinger had only received two letters from SDA at North Carolina in the spring of 1951, and

neither letter had requested a speaker, he had assumed the UNC chapter did not desire one.

Ettinger knew that SDA members were receiving regular communications from Washington. "If

you have not seen these memos, or read the material in our chapter mailings-especially the staff

letters and the Executive Committee minutes, I can only attribute this either to irresponsibility of

your chapter chairman or your own disinterest."25 Ettinger was harsh with Harris, but he did not

want to take the blame for the unwillingness of liberal students in the South to organize and work

for what they wanted.

What made Harris's attitude so frustrating was that southern students elsewhere were

doing their best for liberal causes. It was a difficult challenge, made more difficult because of

"how discouraging it is for a few people to try and carry the whole load of organizational

activity. And yet, that is the way it usually is." Ettinger believed that "a few people inspired by







24 Ettinger to John H. Harris, May 18, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.

25 Ettinger to John H. Harris, May 18, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.









a vision-called by whatever name-do most of the thinking and the work. They try to inject

enthusiasm and rally support even when they feel there will be no response."26

In late 1951, Ettinger left SDA. His replacement as SDA executive secretary was Galen A.

Martin, a West Virginia native who had been active in the SDA chapter at Berea College in

Kentucky while he was a student there. He would later refer to his time with SDA as a

"revelation."27 His first major project with SDA was an attempt to revive the chapter in

Nashville. The catalyst for Martin's interest in Nashville was the ultimately unsuccessful

presidential campaign of Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver. On two separate occasions in the

summer and fall of 1952, Martin contacted Vanderbilt political science professor Lee McLean,

who had worked on Kefauver's campaign, to ask whether he would become SDA's faculty

sponsor at Vanderbilt.28 Martin had also written liberal contacts at William and Mary in

Virginia, North Carolina A&T and the University of North Carolina to gauge their interest in

SDA. Most of the responses he received "did not indicate that it would be worth [his] while to

take such a long trip," so he abandoned the idea of an extended trip through the South.29

McLean's response to Martin's inquiry, written in February of 1953, was cautiously

optimistic. He recounted the history of the Nashville SDA chapter, noting that its biggest

problem had been that "its meetings were restricted to the campuses of our two Negro schools

here. Due partially to the inconvenience in going crosstown to attend meetings, the white

26 Ettinger to John H. Harris, May 18, 1951, reel 51, no. 299, ADA Papers.

27 Galen Martin interview by Betsy Brinson, November 4, 1999, p. 9, Kentucky Civil Rights Oral
History Project, Kentucky Oral History Commission, Kentucky Historical Society,
http://205.204.134.47/civil rights_mvt/media/KCRP.20.B.28.Martin.pdf (accessed January 30,
2008).

28 Martin to Lee McLean, July 8, 1952 and October 25, 1952, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA
Papers.

29 Martin to McLean, February 11, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









membership was small and the organization was not as effective as it might have been."

McLean wanted to restrict any new SDA activity to Vanderbilt. He also wanted to make sure

any new organizing had better timing. Liberals had spent the fall semester working for Adlai

Stevenson's presidential campaign, and his defeat had caused "a somewhat natural despondency"

among the liberal element at Vanderbilt. This malaise had carried over to the spring, and

McLean had advised liberal students that "the time is not ripe now" for organizing SDA. He

believed that a chapter with fifteen or twenty students, organized that spring, would make less of

an impact than a chapter with fifty or one hundred students might make in the fall of 1953.

McLean thought that SDA's had to make a big impression in Nashville and that it had to do so

right away. He was "becoming increasingly concerned about the willingness with which the

American people seem to be accepting McCarthyism and its challenge to civil liberties. ... I am

convinced now is the time we must ascert [sic] ourselves even more than before, even though

these are certainly distressing days."30

McLean was determined to go ahead with a Vanderbilt group, and Martin pledged to help

him. In the summer of 1953, he encouraged McLean to send someone to the SDA annual

convention in August so that he or she could meet with fellow liberals and exchange ideas on

how best to promote liberal causes.31 McLean had also pass along favorable reports on the

possibilities at the University of Kentucky and the University of Alabama, though Martin wanted

more information on whether any previous efforts at those schools had borne fruit before







30 McLean to Martin, February 3, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

31 Martin to McLean, February 10, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









proceeding.32 Part of the problem was that Martin could not think of anyone potential members

at Kentucky or Alabama beyond those students who had supported Stevenson.33

The name McLean passed along to Martin was that of Marshall Cox, whom Martin urged

to attend some of SDA's summer workshops in Washington. He tried to excite Cox about

working with SDA by spelling out the platform on which they would organize. Their top issue

for 1953 and 1954 was opposition to the Bricker Amendment, which would have restricted the

President's authority to negotiate treaties and agreements with foreign nations and increased the

Senate's power over these matters. They would also support Senator Lister Hill's "Oil-for-

Education" proposal, which earmarked revenue from off-shore oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico

toward federal aid to education. Finally, Martin wanted SDA to focus on discrimination in the

broadest possible sense. This meant continuing to campaign for the desegregation of southern

universities, but he also wanted SDA chapters to work for the repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act

of 1952, which had introduced of quotas to restrict immigration. What made the bill truly

repulsive to SDA, however, was that it barred political "subversives" from entering the country.

President Truman had vetoed the bill, but a conservative coalition of Republicans and Democrats

had overridden the veto, and Martin wanted SDA chapters to get behind a campaign to repeal it.

The bill was a reminder to liberals that Americans did not discriminate merely against African-

Americans.34

Vanderbilt was not the only school that was pro-active in organizing SDA chapters. In

August 1953, Arnold Rieger, a student at the University of Virginia, told Martin he wanted to



32 McLean to Martin, March 30, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

33 Martin to McLean, April 10, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.

34 Martin to Marshall Cox, April 10, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 170, ADA Papers.









revive an inactive chapter at the school. Martin considered this possibility "a real break in, for

our purposes, the almost solid south [sic]."35 As was the case in Nashville and Knoxville,

however, the hope for a breakthrough in Charlottesville turned out to be unrealistic. The biggest

problem Rieger faced at Virginia was a university culture in which, as the student Cavalier Daily

editorialized, the vast majority of students "attend classes occasionally, the flicks [movies]

frequently, and have a 'great time' on weekends." These students were simply oblivious to the

notion that they should care about world affairs or reforming campus life, and this allowed a

small group of committed students to control campus affairs. Unfortunately for Rieger, most of

these students were conservative, leaving a small pool of liberals for him to organize.36

As a result, in the fall of 1953, when Rieger returned to Charlottesville, he found that

"things have not been breaking the way I had hoped." He could not convince a liberal member

of the faculty to sponsor SDA, finding them either in poor health, out of the country, deeply

involved with their own research, or unwilling to organize a chapter. He also had to deal with

the Young Republicans and Young Democrats, who formed the solidly conservative political

bloc on campus. As Rieger later wrote, "the reactionaries have taken over." Worse still,

Rieger's main lieutenant with SDA urged Rieger to work with the conservative Young

Democrats in lieu of the "'loaded name' of ADA." Rieger refused, saying "I am a fighter, and I

will not call a spade a diamond."37

Rieger may have welcomed the ADA label, but he also knew the political climate in

Charlottesville, and his experiences with the Young Democrats on campus taught him to keep



35 Martin to Arnold Rieger, August 17, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.

36 Virginius Dabney, Mr. Jefferson's University: A History (Charlottesville, 1981), 301-302.

37 Rieger to Martin, October 4, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.









attention off SDA until the time was right. As a result, he rejected Martin's offer to make a trip

to the university for a public appearance. He knew that "a speaker from National Headquarters

could either (1) serve as an incentive for those already interested, or (2) cause resentment among

the student body, which spontaneously from its number, and not from outside pressures." He did

not believe that "this is the time to take such a risk." Instead, he wanted Martin to come to

Charlottesville for private consultations.38

This approach highlights a problem that plagued SDA's attempts to organize in the South.

Southerners seemed not to know whether they wanted to operate out in the open or behind the

scenes, and they often changed their minds on this subject. National SDA officials did their best

to understand the predicament southern liberals faced, but the confusion hampered effective

organization. It also fueled the delusions of those reactionaries who thought SDA and ADA

were part of some larger liberal conspiracy that was never willing to show itself publicly.

Martin showed as much patience as he could with his southern contacts. In October 1953,

he told Rieger that he was very pleased with the progress at Virginia, despite "the difficult

environment in which you have to work." He also agreed that "a publicized visit from an outside

'organizer' would not be of much help to you to this time."39 However, Martin's patience and

understanding could only last so long, and the news Rieger reported to Martin in the last months

of 1953 only got worse. Martin already knew that the conservative Democrat Thomas B. Stanley

had won the state's governorship and that, as Rieger put it, "Stanley is nothing but a puppet for

[Harry Byrd, the state's Democratic kingmaker]."40



38 Rieger to Martin, October 4, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.

39 Martin to Rieger, October 6, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.

40 Rieger to Martin, November 7, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.









Things were not much better for the chapter in Charlottesville, either. In November 1953,

conservative students at Virginia began to accuse SDA of being a Communist organization. This

was a familiar tactic for conservatives to try, but Rieger could not pinpoint who was behind it.

The shadowy nature of conservative organizations on campus meant "that you can't put your

finger on any one individual, and if you don't have any counter-support, you are licked. You

can't fight by yourself." He also had to deal with infiltrators to SDA meetings, mainly from the

Young Republicans, who showed up only to cause trouble. In this kind of hostile environment,

Rieger referenced his military training, writing that "if you can't advance and you are too proud

to retreat, you've got to dig in.... I'm sending an ultimatum to all those on our mailing list to

send their membership cards filled in, or forever hold their peace."41

The fights of the fall semester had taken their toll on Rieger. If he could not convince

campus liberals to join SDA, he would close down the chapter. He could take some solace in the

student council's unanimous rejection of the conservative Students for America group, despite its

association with General Douglas MacArthur and radio commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr. Rieger

took some credit for the decision to turn down SFA. As bad as things had become for him, he

feared they would only get worse if SFA were permitted to operate on campus. "God knows, if

they ever get rolling my head will be the first to go on the block."42

The irony of Rieger's success against the SFA in December 1953 was that it came at the

expense of one of SDA's most cherished values, the right to freedom of expression for students

of all political persuasions. Martin understood Rieger's desire to keep what he called the "Junior

Thought Police" from operating at Virginia, but "on the basic consideration of their right to be



41 Rieger to Martin, November 7, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.

42 Rieger to Martin, November 14, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.









recognized as a campus group, I think we must support them." SDA had supported the rights of

liberal and conservative student groups at other schools, and Martin wanted their position to be

consistent throughout the country. Martin also considered the moral ramifications of SDA

defending SFA's right to organize after SFA's attack on campus liberals. As he told Rieger, "I

should think it would be rather embarrassing to them for us to defend their rights after the way

they have attacked [SDA]. if they were recognized on your campus, I do not see how they

could possibly fail to recognize SDA, if we had sufficient members there." They could claim the

moral high ground because of their positive program, while SFA appeared to exist "just to attack

other groups."43

In the end, SDA at the University of Virginia under Rieger's leadership was another failed

experiment. Rieger tired of the constant criticism from conservative groups, and he decided to

close the chapter in the spring of 1954. However, by this point Albert Leong at the University of

Texas in Austin had contacted Martin about starting a chapter there, reenergizing SDA's

southern efforts. Leong's motivation for organizing SDA at Texas was straightforward. As he

put it, "factors like regimentation, conformity, loyalty oaths, and indirect methods of suppression

of free thought all engender distress and alarm among both faculty and students."44 One

advantage that Leong possessed was that ADA's Texas organizer, George Lambert, was

available for constant consultation. This would ensure that there would be no problems of

communication between the local SDA and the national office. Martin expressed concern about

the quality of the group Leong had assembled. In fact, as he told Lambert, "we would

particularly like your help in insuring that Albert and his associates at Texas are 'good liberals'



43 Martin to Rieger, November 23, 1953, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.

44 Albert Leong to SDA, November 20, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.









whom we would like to have in SDA."45 For all of the talk about fighting against loyalty oaths

and advocating intellectual diversity, it was somewhat ironic that Martin asked Lambert to help

make sure that the Texas SDA would be politically acceptable.

Lambert believed Leong was a solid liberal with good organizational skills, though he was

"skeptical of [Leong's] ability to find enough like-minded people the undergraduates to get

together a Chapter."46 Leong had no such reservations, in part because he had done a great deal

of preparation before contacting Martin. "We have secured two of the finest professors on the

campus as sponsors; we have adopted a constitution and by-laws; we have official school

approval; we are cooperating wholeheartedly with the Austin ADA; we have elected officers;

[and] we are planning top-notch discussions and debates between prominent faculty members."47

His goal was to attract thirty to fifty students, out of a student population of around 13,000, "who

can institute a progressing, expanding program-which, when developed, can be applied to

augment membership."48

In January 1954, Leong established a chapter with eleven paid members, and he

immediately began sponsoring events for local liberals. His first major SDA event was a

discussion on "How Economics Has Influenced American and Russian Political Development."

The topic was intellectually intriguing, but Leong had scheduled the event at the same time as

that season's basketball game between Texas and SMU. Still, "we attracted some thirty students

along with two staunch reactionaries-the questions of the latter livened the meeting

considerably. All in all, it was a success-with informative talks and the collection of badly-

45 Martin to George Lambert, November 20, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.
46 Lambert to Martin, December 20, 1953, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.

47 Leong to Martin, January 5, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.

48 Leong to Martin, January 11, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.









needed dues."49 It was successful enough that Leong scheduled a debate on the Bricker

Amendment for February 16, even though, as Martin noted, the Senate would have voted on the

amendment by that date.50

After the defeat of the Bricker Amendment, Leong sponsored a panel discussion on

Indochina in February and a speech from economics professor Clarence Ayers on "The New

Economics" in March. These events were important successes for SDA at Texas, but Leong still

had important problems he needed to address. He had to deal with harassment from right-wing

groups on campus, though it amounted to little more than the defacing of a few posters. The

bigger issues were "lack of funds and a non-expanding membership. Liberal students attend our

discussion-meetings but hesitate to join. Our development seems to have reached an impasse."51

There was little Leong could do to expand on SDA's educational activities. He had

positioned SDA as one of the campus's most important groups in terms of educating students on

current events from a liberal perspective. However, he wanted to encourage students to take a

stand by joining SDA, and on that score he had little success, mirroring the experiences of

students at Tennessee, Vanderbilt, and Virginia. The national office responded by telling Leong

to "play up and publicize the more famous liberal names in ADA" and tackle the Communism

issue head on, perhaps through "a discussion meeting in which you discuss just such a problem

so as to bring the question out into the open to thoroughly ventilate it and thus put to shame those

people who are frightened."52



49 Leong to Martin, February 3, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.
50 Martin to Leong, February 4, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.

51 Leong to Martin, March 3, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.

52 Hughes to Leong, May 25, 1954, reel 135, series VIII, no. 172, ADA Papers.









Leong continued to work throughout the spring of 1954 was floundering. The chapter's

leadership decided to move beyond education and into action on local issues. The main issue in

Austin, as it was in many southern cities, was segregation. The chapter did not press the

university to expand the mandate of the Sweatt decision and admit black students to its

undergraduate programs. Instead, SDA leaders focused on forcing the integration of public

accommodations and the city's public schools. As part of the campaign, chapter chairman Leslie

Ghetlzer surveyed several restaurants near the campus in May, asking them if they would serve

black patrons. Some respondents favored immediate desegregation, while others told her they

would integrate their facilities only if the courts or the city ordered them to do so. She also

polled the student population to find out where they stood on the issue.53

The enthusiasm and energy of SDA at the University of Texas was a good sign for the

future of the organization in the South. It was with this example in mind, and not SDA's failed

efforts in Tennessee and Virginia, that Yale Bernstein worked as SDA Field Secretary. He

began working with SDA in the spring of 1954, but he did not make his first tour of the South

until the spring of 1956. The timing of this tour was crucial. The effects of the Supreme Court's

decision in Brown v. Board of Education two years earlier had become clear by this point.

Virginia's Democratic political boss, Harry F. Byrd, had promised "massive resistance" against

any efforts to integrate schools in his state, and in 1956 a group of southern members of

Congress were working on a "Southern Manifesto" that promised to use all methods at their

disposal to turn back desegregation. In such a politically charged environment, the universities

of the South would be an important battleground, especially since the region's colleges would be

an important test case for the South's continued commitment to segregation.

53 Leslie Ghetzler, "Texas SDA Chapter Monthly Report," May 15, 1954, reel 135, series VIII,
no. 172, ADA Papers.









It was this South that Bernstein toured in 1956. His first impression of southern

universities, which he formed before he the tour began, was that they "must be organized," either

in 1956 or at some future moment.54 Like other SDA organizers who had visited these

campuses, he found a mixed reception for SDA. He met with the student body president and

vice-president at North Carolina College, Durham's school for black students, and thought he

could start a chapter there immediately. Meanwhile, at Duke, he could barely rouse a response

from liberal students, even those who had expressed interest in SDA.55

The University of North Carolina also looked to be a tough sell for Bernstein, especially

since campus liberals were more concerned with a campaign to reinstate the editors of the

university-funded student newspaper, the Daily Tar Heel. The editors had criticized the

administration for its hiring of Jim Tatum as the university's head football coach. The Tar Heel

wrote that Tatum's hiring was a sign that the school planned to emphasize athletics at the

expense of education. Bernstein suspected, however, that the newspaper's public support for

integrating the university was the real reason behind the campaign to fire these editors.

Nevertheless, he found himself impressed with the students he met at UNC, calling them "the

best group I've seen at any SDA meeting, anywhere. Liberal but mature and knew what they

were doing." One problem he foresaw in Chapel Hill was that they were split between

Stevenson and Kefauver for the 1956 presidential campaign, but he thought their maturity would

moderate any rifts that might occur over the summer.56




54 Bernstein, memo to SDA, January 18, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60, ADA Papers.

55 Bernstein, "North Carolina Organizing Trip, 1/30/56-2/5/56," undated, reel 127, series VIII,
no. 60, ADA Papers.

56 Bernstein, "North Carolina Organizing Trip."









In the end, Bernstein was extremely optimistic about the overall results of his North

Carolina trip. If he was able to get through to the liberals at Duke, "we will have the top three in

the state ([Women's College in Greensboro], UNC and Duke) plus several smaller Negro

colleges." With such an extensive network of chapters, "we will have a Carolina region" that he

thought was worth the effort. There was, however, one problem that needed to be addressed,

namely "heavy-handed" NAACP tactics that put white liberals on the defensive. He believed

that "there is no disagreement as to ends, and not even a strong one as to means, but the

disagreement seems to be that the white liberals view the situation is [sic] more complex than do

the Negro, and the whites are looking for lasting solutions." His solution was to convene a series

of "regional meetings" in the hope that he could "[bring] them together into an effective team. I

believe the differences are semantic and superficial."7 Ironically, Bernstein wanted SDA

members at black colleges in North Carolina to push the benefits of SDA over the summer, when

they attended local and statewide NAACP conventions.5 Bernstein wanted NAACP members to

join SDA, but he also thought the NAACP needed to change its tactics in North Carolina for the

sake of liberal unity.

As he traveled the South in 1956, Bernstein also engaged in a larger reconsideration of the

question of race and segregation and how it affected the drive to attract southern whites to SDA

chapters. Bernstein believed that white and black students were talking past each other. White

liberals wanted to probe the "armor" of segregation on their campuses, but they did not want to

push for complete and immediate integration. They referred to themselves as a "third force," one

that disagreed with both reactionary intransigence on segregation and the NAACP's all-or-

57 Bernstein, "North Carolina Organizing Trip."

5Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 14, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.









nothing approach. According to Bernstein, whites believed that "discrimination must be fought

on the economic sphere before it could be won on the social sphere. They believed that the

political and economic battles (and general liberal measures raising the standard of living and

bringing industrialization) must be fought first and that demand for immediate integration was

forcing the issue into a two sided war where the 3rd force was being silences by both sides."

They favored integration, but they thought an open confrontation with segregationists would

delay the desired outcome.59 In this sense, the new generation of white liberals had the same

approach to the issue as older liberals.60 It was the attitude that Martin Luther King would

criticize in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail." As King wrote, "I guess it is easy for those who

have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say "Wait."'61

Bernstein did not attack the motives of white liberals in the way King did. He saved his

criticisms for other "politically aware" students. "Many I spoke with were liberal as they come,

but so ingrained with their southern past that they could not recognize the reasons for

integration." These liberals did not believe themselves to be superior, but they had concluded

that "separation was desirable." What really surprised him was that these opinions "were held by

people, [who were surprisingly] liberal in general, and surprisingly educated, intelligent, and

politically aware." Bernstein believed that education would help to change the attitudes of these







59 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 14, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.
60 Chappell, Inside Agitators, 48-49.

61 King quoted in Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963
(New York, 1988), 739.









students, but "we must alter 100 years of upbringing, an upbringing they themselves are uneasy

about."62

Finally, Bernstein considered the black liberals he had encountered, who often posed the

most complicated problems. He believed that the leadership of the NAACP and other black

organizations was "woefully unaware of most of the non-racial issues around us and their

relation to the race question. ... It is easy to understand their primary concern, but they do not

have the tools with which to fight those tools being general political awareness." Liberal

black students were even less likely than adults to making these kinds of connections. He

thought it was not a question of goals, but of the tactics needed to achieve them. "[The]

disagreement seems to be that the white liberals view the situation is more complex than do the

Negro, and the whites are looking for lasting solutions." Worse still, "the average Negro

students, so I am told by the leaders I met, have a background of 'uncle Tomism.' That is, they

are so used to their second class position, they haven't the tools, or even the interest in bringing

themselves up."63

How could SDA leaders help the problems liberals faced on southern campuses?

Bernstein thought that SDA could be "the most effective solution to the southern problem"

because it was not a "One Issue organization." Its leaders could "see the complexity and

interrelation of the problems" all southern liberals faced. "SDA can be the meeting ground. The

whites can be made to understand the tactics and ideas of the Negro liberals and the Negroes can

be made to understand the tactics and ideas of the white liberals." He also wanted to integrate



62 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 14, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.

63 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 14, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.









the South into national discussions about tactics and politics. "I think our meetings in the North

have been void of any real appreciation of the problem."64 Bernstein thus allied himself with a

particular strain of northern thinking on the South, one which believed that the region was

fundamentally different from the North. Consciously or not, Bernstein was agreeing with the

idea that the region was the "other," a place that needed to be made more like the North in order

to fully "Americanize" it.65

In mid-February 1956, Bernstein visited campuses in Nashville and Knoxville, and his

interactions with liberal students in Tennessee only strengthened Bernstein's conviction that

SDA needed the South as much as the South needed SDA. "If we can program in civil rights and

toward the economic problems of the south [sic], we would be accomplishing what would be, in

my opinion, the most worthwhile of all possible SDA projects." He believed that "SDA as of

now is the ONLY student organization training the necessary leadership ability in the South ...

where the outcome of the total situation depends on this leadership." Given the response he was

receiving, "a Southern conference next year by SDA could be a milestone in student liberalism

and a keystone in southern progress. Many of the students I've met will be the leaders tomorrow

(especially in the Negro schools). The South is aflame and SDA can capture this fire." He

had also concluded that a broader program for action, though still desirable in the long term, was

not necessary to organize chapters in the South. "The race question in its broadest terms







64 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 14, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.

65 James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A History of i.wnle i Identity (New York, 2005), 215-
216.









(including the southern economic question), is, in my opinion, THE issue. Academic freedom is

NOT an issue here."66

What made Bernstein's approach to organizing southern colleges different was the urgency

in his rhetoric. In his opinion, SDA officials would not "have another crack in the South," and

this made the region SDA's most important priority. He thought SDA was "re-evaluating our

reasons for existing. A short time in the South would answer these questions. We don't have to

sell ourselves here we're needed badly. Our national resources should be directed toward a

program for our southern chapterss]" If successful, Bernstein believed, SDA "can be part of the

future. It can be built into a force that will help solve the race question ... that will aid the

unionization and industrialization of the South ... and ultimately the backbone of the emerging

liberal politics in this area." He believed that "for the first time since I took this job, I feel as if

I'm accomplishing something." Bernstein kept his optimism in the face of the difficulties he

faced in the South, even when a police officer drew his weapon against Bernstein while he was

in a parked car having a conversation with a black female student. It seemed that nothing could

temper his excitement about the possibility of SDA becoming a force for liberal politics in the

South.67

Bernstein's encouraging conclusions about SDA's prospects in the South kindled a new

optimism in ADA's most influential leaders, including executive director Edward Hollander.

Hollander liked what the "bright Jewish boy from New York" was doing at southern colleges,

and in February 1956 Hollander asked George S. Mitchell, the executive director of the Southern



66 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 29, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.

67 Bernstein, memo to SDA national office, February 29, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60,
ADA Papers.









Regional Council (SRC), whether he thought "there are constructive purposes to be served under

the circumstances in our continuing to organize among Southern students." Hollander thought

Bernstein's approach to the South was worthwhile. He thought that SDA had "been

overweighted [sic] with intellectuals from the Atlantic Seaboard whose principal activities have

been to agitate themselves and ADA on some very fine-almost theological-point of academic

freedom." Segregation and civil rights, on the other hand, had "so much more reality and

significance than the comparatively sterile issues on which many of the students have

concentrated their energy, that it would be very healthy for the organization, as such, to build up

a wider membership of students in the South who would make their cause SDA's." He also

agreed with Bernstein's criticism of the lack of cooperation between white and black liberals. "It

would seem to us that establishing communications and avenues of collaboration among white

and Negro students would be constructive for its own sake, apart from the benefit to SDA as an

organization."68

That benefit would be immediate, since Hollander had concluded that "no other liberal

organization is [organizing liberals at southern colleges]. The Young Democrats of course are

not liberal in this sense and the NAACP student organizations are under severe handicaps of

course and cannot organize in white colleges." Before giving Bernstein an unqualified

endorsement, however, Hollander wanted to know whether SRC or other liberal groups would

object to a new, aggressive SDA campaign.69 Mitchell raised no such objections, telling

Hollander, "your people will do good." He warned ADA leaders about the demographic

differences between the southern states and included a detailed map to highlight those


68 Edward Hollander to George S. Mitchell, February 24, 1956, reel 40, no. 135, ADA Papers.

69 Hollander to Mitchell, February 24, 1956.









differences. The available statistics on race in the South forced Mitchell to conclude that the

"Black Belt" of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia would be most difficult for SDA to organize,

though Mitchell still encouraged forays into those states. He thought that Bernstein should

concentrate on areas outside the Deep South, including North Carolina, Tennessee, and Florida,

confirming Bernstein's instincts about colleges in those states.70

One other aspect of the southern politics in the mid-1950s that Hollander and Mitchell

considered was the changing political awareness of southern blacks. From Washington,

Hollander concluded that white liberals needed to acknowledge "the tendency of the Southern

Negroes to cut loose from their dependence on the goodwill of the whites and to organize

themselves for action on their own behalf." He believed this added "a new dimension which is

only very slowly being recognized in the North."71 Mitchell agreed, but he thought southerners

were just as slow to recognize this growing political consciousness. Whites who had joined the

burgeoning Citizens' Council movement "[supposed] that they are dealing with the Negro people

their daddies knew, being people who could be bullied back into 'their place; by threats and

scaring this one and that." Mitchell knew that southern blacks were beginning to challenge this

ancient stereotype, and SDA leaders needed to recognize this fact.72

By the spring of 1956, it was clear that the nature of race relations in the South had

changed dramatically. No single event symbolized that change more than the bus boycott in

Montgomery, Alabama, which started in December 1955. The catalyst for the boycott had been

the arrest of local NAACP secretary Rosa Parks for her refusal to adhere to the segregated



70 Mitchell to Hollander, February 27, 1956, reel 40, no. 135, ADA Papers.

71 Hollander to Mitchell, March 12, 1956, reel 40, no. 135, ADA Papers.

72 Mitchell to Hollander, March 16, 1956, reel 40, no. 135, ADA Papers.









seating arrangements on the city's buses. When Parks decided to fight the case, community

leaders, including the young Atlanta-born Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., organized a boycott of

Montgomery's public transportation system that eventually lasted more than a year. Thousands

of people who had depended on buses for transportation to work or school now walked, used

taxis, or organized carpools, inspired by King's stirring oratory and the efforts of the

Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA). MIA leaders suffered persistent police

harassment and often violent opposition from the Citizens' Councils and the Ku Klux Klan, but

they eventually convinced the Supreme Court to rule that the city's segregated bus system was

unconstitutional.73

In the spring of 1956, SDA's national leadership decided to help the boycott in whatever

way it could. On March 24, when the SDA National Board convened in Philadelphia, Civil

Rights Vice Chairman David Kotelchuck "suggested that SDA undertake a national program to

provide some kind of aid to the Montgomery boycott and that campus activity commence." The

board was unsure at that time about what "aid" they would provide, though they eventually

decided unanimously to proceed pending the expressed approval of the MIA.74

Kotelchuck immediately wrote Martin Luther King for approval. He referenced a speech

by Rev. Ralph D. Abernathy, pastor of Montgomery's First Baptist Church and one of King's

closest advisors, in which Abernathy had pleaded for assistance from students in the MIA

boycott. SDA, according to Kotelchuck, "felt a conscious desire to lend our moral and financial

support, especially to the many young people who are participating effectively in this program."

To that end, he announced the creation of Indorse Montgomery Protest Action City Transit, or

73 Branch, Parting the Waters, 128-203.

74 SDA National Board meeting minutes, March 24-25, 1956, reel 129, series VIII, no. 108,
ADA Papers.









IMPACT, to consolidate SDA's efforts on behalf of the Montgomery boycott. He suggested to

Dr. King that IMPACT would raise money for the purchase of a station wagon that the

boycotters could use in their carpools.75

While Kotelchuck implied that SDA's decision to proceed with IMPACT would depend on

King's prior approval, on March 29 Kotelchuck approved and mailed an appeal to SDA chapters

across the country, before King could respond to his letter. In the appeal, Kotelchuck implored

members to understand the "refusal to ride in shame" and "desire to walk in dignity" that

sustained the boycott, as well as the urgent financial needs of the MIA. The circular estimated

the cost of a station wagon for the boycotters at $2,500. He hoped that IMPACT would raise

enough money to provide more than one car to the MIA. All it required was that members

"GIVE GENEROUSLY NOW!"76

Perhaps realizing that his enthusiasm had led to undue haste in his solicitations,

Kotelchuck sent King a copy of the March 29 circular one week after he had sent it to SDA

chapters, reiterating that while "response to our initial mailing has been tremendous ... we

cannot encourage this interest and channel it into activity connected with IMPACT, until we hear

from you." Kotelchuck also awaited news on the status of the boycott before proceeding. In late

April, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed segregation in intrastate commerce, and Montgomery

City Lines had subsequently announced it would adhere to the court's ruling. While the status of

the boycott remained in doubt, Kotelchuck informed the chapters that "actual solicitation of

funds [should] be suspended briefly." The campaign resumed, however, after King told



75 David Kotelchuck to Martin Luther King, Jr., March 28, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73,
ADA Papers.

76 SDA mailing to chapters on IMPACT project, March 29, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73,
ADA Papers.









Kotelchuck that he was "deeply gratified to know that your organization is interested in

contributing a station wagon to aid in our struggle here. I assure you that this would be a most

welcomed gift. I am sure that it would give a big lift to our people both morally and

physically."77

With that encouragement, Kotelchuck restarted IMPACT with the encouragement of ADA

national chairman Joseph Rauh, who told SDA chairman Samuel Perelson that IMPACT "is a

wonderful way to involve students on campuses across the nation in constructive action in

support of the boycott." He also urged Perelson to keep the campaign going despite the Supreme

Court ruling against segregation in intrastate commerce. Rauh, whose legal expertise was well

respected in Washington, argued that the Supreme Court had side-stepped the issue. As a result,

the IMPACT campaign was still viable.78 With that in mind, Kotelchuck redoubled SDA's

efforts to raise money for IMPACT, designating the period between May 7 and May 20 as a

special period for fund-raising activities.79 These activities appeared at first to make a significant

dent in IMPACT's fund-raising goals. The chapter at Temple University in Philadelphia, for

example, sent $130 to Washington toward the station wagon.so

Unfortunately for SDA, the Temple contribution was one of very few that the organization

collected in the spring and summer of 1956. As had been the case in previous campaigns and

organizational drives, the rhythms of the student calendar caused Kotelchuck's plans to go awry.

Students had scattered for the summer, which meant that fund-raising appeals and other


77 King to Kotelchuck, May 1, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.
78 Joseph Rauh to Samuel Perelson, May 2, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.

79 Kotelchuck, mass mailing to SDA chapters, May 4, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA
Papers.
so Evelyn Jones to Rosalind Schwartz, June 25, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.









correspondence were not getting to liberal students. These circumstances forced SDA to

reintroduce the IMPACT campaign when students returned in the fall. The Montgomery boycott

continued, and the appeal the organization sent out in August suggested that every member

contribute the equivalent of one day's pay from their summer job to IMPACT. "To spend one

day working for the dignity of man is little enough to ask of anyone. If every single SDA'er

makes it a personal obligation to contribute, Montgomery can have its station wagon within a

month." However, the circular also acknowledged that the campaign might have to focus on

other communities in the South if the boycott ended abruptly. "Should the Montgomery boycott

be settled before the station wagon is purchased, the money will be sent to Tallahassee,

Florida-site of another bus boycott-or it will be used for some similar purpose."81

In the end, IMPACT failed to raise the $2,500 necessary to buy an automobile for the

Montgomery boycotters, but SDA leaders earned a great deal of praise for their efforts. Martin

Luther King called the program "a big lift to our people both morally and physically" that

"[gave] us renewed courage and vigor to carry on."82 Joseph Rauh called the campaign "a

wonderful way to involve students on campuses across the nation in constructive action in

support of the boycott."83 In May 1956, ADA's Executive Committee acknowledged IMPACT




81 SDA mailing to chapters on IMPACT, August 7, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA
Papers. In fact, some of the money from IMPACT eventually found its way to the Tallahassee
boycott. SDA sent over $340 to the Tallahassee Inter Civic Council, the Florida capital's
equivalent to the MIA and pledged, "This is our way of saying that we recognize that whether we
live in the north or the south, whatever our race or color, the struggle for equality that is going on
in Tallahassee is our fight as well; and our dignity and value as human beings is going to be
enhanced or reduced depending on whether you win or lose." Charlotte Lubin to Dr. M.C.
Williams, November 27, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.
82 King to Kotelchuck, May 1, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.

83 Rauh to Kotelchuck, May 2, 1956, reel 127, series VIII, no. 73, ADA Papers.









by passing a motion that publicly supported the effort to help the people of Montgomery.84 Even

though IMPACT was ultimately a failure, everyone associated with it thought it had been a noble

effort.

The effort was necessary for moral reasons, but there was also a political dimension to

SDA's efforts on behalf of the growing civil rights movement. At the time, Americans were

unsure of how the civil rights issue would affect the nation politically. Since the 1930s, black

voters had largely supported the Democratic Party, but there were signs that an electoral

realignment was occurring in the black community. The continued intransigence of many

southern Democrats on racial issues, expressed most vividly in the "Southern Manifesto" of

March 1956, was disheartening to many blacks. They also recognized that the administration of

President Dwight Eisenhower was taking steps to deal with racial issues. As a result, the

November election dealt a harsh and surprising blow to the Democrats. Eisenhower had

received nearly 60% of the black vote in the election, stunning Democrats who had counted on

that constituency as part of their electoral strategy for nearly a generation. 85 In order to counter

growing Republican strength among black voters, liberals needed to show their commitment to

the movement, and IMPACT was one way to do that.

IMPACT was also a sign that Bernstein's message about the significance of the South in

the organization's national plans was getting through to SDA leaders. He continued to preach

that message throughout 1956. In April, he wrote a confidential memorandum to the

Washington office reiterating his conclusion that "there are few, if any, organizations working

for liberalism, either on the student or adult level, in the South," which meant continued



84 ADA Executive Committee meeting minutes, May 24, 1956, reel 34, no. 63, ADA Papers.

85 Branch, Parting the Waters, 180-182, 191-192.









opportunities for SDA. It "could become the clearing house of student and adult liberalism in

many areas of the South, and because of its political orientation could provide the necessary

informed leadership so lacking in the South." It could also expand the definition of what it

meant to be a southern liberal. Civil rights was still the most important issue to liberal students,

but "many of the liberal concepts and principles assumed by students in the North are unheard of

in the South. In this area, SDA could perform an educational job which is not being done by the

established educational institutions."86

He then addressed the question of how best to attract southerners to SDA. He

recommended that "the organizer be a Southerner himself." A native southerner would "be

someone who understands the thought processes and the problem in that area," and he or she

would also be able to attract "confidence from the wavering whites." Bernstein also thought it

would be important to get help from the Southern Regional Council, the NAACP, and the largest

liberal labor unions in the South, and a southerner would more easily attract that kind of help

from fellow southerners.87

Bernstein then discussed where he would send a new southern organizer. He thought

Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina would be "comparatively easy," and though "the

chapters would not be large, [they] could be effective." He thought enthusiasm for SDA would

be high in these states. His hopes for the "Deep South," including Florida, Alabama, Georgia,

Mississippi, and Louisiana, were far less ambitious, and he invoked the example of the Roman

general Fabius Cunctator, who famously avoided battle with the Carthaginian general Hannibal

and successfully wore him down. "Often SDA [chapters] as such cannot be organized, but

86 Bernstein, "Organization in the South: A Prospectus," April 1956, reel 122, series VIII, no. 4,
ADA Papers.

8Bernstein, "Organization in the South."









individuals can join, receive help and information, and work through 'front' groups and do a

'Fabian' sort of job."88 Ironically, this put SDA's leadership in the position of endorsing the

kind of tactics that liberals had vehemently criticized Communists and Socialists for using in the

1930s and 1940s. In the late 1940s, for example, ADA leaders had explicitly dismissed the

Southern Conference for Human Welfare as a front organization. Now Bernstein was asking his

superiors to endorse a similar strategy in the Deep South, where organizational prospects seemed

bleakest.

There were potential bright spots. Bernstein thought the contacts SDA leaders had

established with Martin Luther King during the Montgomery boycott would help them in

Alabama, and he believed that many of the predominantly black schools in Georgia and

Louisiana might be receptive to SDA's message. However, he was not particular about who

received the credit for SDA's organizational activities. "The most important thing is to get the

job done, whether it be done under the title SDA or not, and in the deep South, often a front

group such as 'Campus Political Club,' is more effective but SDA must offer the leadership."89

Bernstein traveled across the South as he mapped out this strategy. In late March and early

April 1956, he met with prospective members on campuses in Louisiana. He met with nine

potential members at Tulane in New Orleans, only to find that most were graduating seniors or

graduate students. In addition, they were all Unitarians in an overwhelmingly Catholic city.

Finally, Tulane liberals had endured persistent investigation by authorities at the state and federal

level. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi had taken a particular interest in whether

Communists were at work on the Tulane campus. He had sponsored a Senate investigation into


s Bestein, "Organization in the South."
89 Bernstein, "Organization in the South."
Bernstein, "Organization in the South."









Communism in Louisiana which Bernstein described as a "farce." Despite the obstacles,

Bernstein thought "a fairly active chapter can come out of Tulane." The other main possibility in

New Orleans was the city's main black college, Dillard University, where Bernstein believed

that SDA could work as a useful front for the NAACP and other unaffiliated liberals.90

His first-hand experience of the situation in Louisiana convinced him that the state was

potentially a civil rights battleground. In the mid-1950s, the state NAACP found itself in a tough

spot because the state government had forced the organization to turn over its membership rolls

"under an old anti-[Klan] Statute [the NAACP] helped pass." Bernstein thought they had a good

chance of getting the courts to throw out the request, but the pending case hampered NAACP

organization. As he put it, "The issues are clear, but there is fear." On a more positive note, "the

Catholic Church has taken a firm and absolute stand in favor of immediate integration, and [New

Orleans] is predominantly catholic [sic]." This was important because "more students attend

Catholic school than public school. The Unitarians have, of course, taken a similar stand, but

here, the main force for integration is the Catholic Church, and in my opinion, if I had to have an

ally, I would take the Church."91 The Archdiocese of New Orleans had not yet desegregated its

schools, but Archbishop Joseph Rummel had admitted black students to the Notre Dame

Seminary and desegregated mass services in the city.92 Bernstein hoped that SDA would "bring

together the liberal catholic, the liberal non-catholic and the Negro elements." These groups had





90 Bernstein, "Louisiana till 4/9/56," undated, reel 127, series VIII, no. 60, ADA Papers.

91 Bernstein, "Louisiana till 4/9/56."

92 Peter Finney, Jr., "Lay persons launched 1961 desegregation drive," New Orleans Clarion-
Herald, January 10, 2001, http://clarionherald.org/20010118/art501.htm (accessed October 25,
2007; article no longer available online).









been independent from each other and Bernstein believed that "SDA can solve that [problem] by

definition."93

Above all, Bernstein's time in Louisiana served to strengthen his conviction that "SDA

should, (and this should be its first project) raise enough money ($5000) to get a FULL TIME

ORGANIZER IN THE SOUTH. THIS PERSON SHOULD BE SOUTHERN AND SHOULD

STAY IN THE SOUTH FOR A YEAR." He firmly believed that SDA could have chapters in

thirteen different southern states by April 1957 and that SDA would work with the NAACP,

SRC, and other liberal groups without taking money from them. As he saw it, "It can easily be

done. It should be done."94

The question was, would it be done? Bernstein's optimism about the group's southern

prospects was not limitless, and in the summer of 1956 he left his post as SDA organizer. Would

his departure signal an end to talk about organizing SDA in the South? IMPACT had been an

interesting campaign, but it had only raised a few hundred dollars before it had ended. Still,

there were other issues that could focus attention on the South, including segregation in college

athletics. Some SDA leaders recognized the impact athletics had on southern universities and

hoped to exploit it. For example, in November 1956, Tony Adona, an officer in SDA's chapter

at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, wrote other chapters across the country urging

northern universities not to play football or basketball games against southern schools. No

southern university had integrated its athletic teams as of 1956, but the fact that several southern

states banned integrated athletic competitions was the impetus behind Adona's appeal. The

"underlying principle" of his message was that "racial discrimination is incompatible with good



93 Bernstein, "Louisiana till 4/9/56."

94 Bernstein, "Louisiana till 4/9/56."









sportsmanship," and he wanted universities to follow the lead of Harvard's basketball team,

which had canceled a fall tour of the South despite not having a single black player on its

roster.95

As with so many of SDA's calls for action, little came of Adona's mass mailing, but SDA

leaders still thought a great deal about southern issues. One student who took notice of what

became known as "Operation Integration" was Allan C. Brownfield of the College of William

and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. In October 1957, he wrote SDA in Washington to express

his displeasure with Adona's campaign, which had just recently come to his attention. He

thought the campaign would "[undermine] college administration" and "[attempt] to place the

responsibility for major educational decisions in the hands of students (and their leftist friends)

instead of in the constituted leaders responsible for these decisions." He called SDA "a

shadowy pressure group-working for its self-assigned goals and using any methods (boycott-

pickets-pressure) to do it." Brownfield found it ironic that many of the schools trying to force

integration on southern schools were barely integrated themselves, sometimes with only three or

four black students on campuses with enrollments in the thousands. He concluded ominously,

"We in the schools of the South (no matter what we personally believe about the race problem)

will not be slapped in the face. If you succeed and some colleges refuse to play us-well it

won't hurt us as much as it will them."96

Realistically, Brownfield did not have to worry about SDA's impact on the South in the

short term. Given Bernstein's ambitious rhetoric, it is interesting to note that SDA chapters in

the region did very little during the 1956 campaign season. While ADA publicly campaigned for

95 Tony Adona to SDA chapter officers, November 13, 1956, reel 124, series VIII, no. 25, ADA
Papers.
96 Allan C. Brownfield to SDA, October 17, 1957, reel 136, series VIII, no. 183, ADA Papers.









the Democratic ticket of Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver and participated in discussions

about how to lessen the influence of the White Citizens' Councils and the Klan, SDA did

nothing. In fact, there is no indication from SDA records that any of their southern chapters

functioned at all during the 1956-1957 school year, even during the fall semester, when the

presidential campaign was in full swing. The reasons for this inactivity are unclear, though

continued financial problems and fear of the Citizens' Councils and other segregationists may

have played a role. Despite these and other obstacles, it is still surprising to note that Bernstein's

repeated and passionate insistence that the South was ripe for organization, and vital for national

liberalism's success, resulted in no activity during such a crucial year.

That does not mean that SDA was permanently inactive, however. The October 1957

edition of ADA World included a story entitled "Help, Support for Southern Liberals Sought in

North," which highlighted a new area upon which SDA wanted to concentrate. The article

talked about the intersection of academic freedom issues and civil rights in cases where

professors and students who had spoken out against segregation. An SDA report on the issue

concluded that "one of the fundamental conditions for academic freedom is integration. But,

while this may be so, academic freedom is also a necessary condition for integration." Their

opponents "recognized this dependence and so have sought to stifle dissent and the free

exchange of ideas with special legislation, dismissals of professors, expulsions of students, and a

powerful campaign of intimidation directed against the universities." The story urged SDA

chapters to condemn the dismissal of faculty and students who did not support segregation.

These condemnations would "let those who have been silenced knows that they do not stand

alone."97


97 "Help, Support for Southern Liberals Sought in North," ADA World 12.8 (October 1957), p. 4.









The easiest way to convey that message was to fight against the forces that made

segregation possible. As SDA leaders rebranded their organization as Campus ADA in 1958,

southern members began to embrace a more direct approach to the problem that mirrored the

confrontational approach civil rights leaders embraced in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1960, the

ADA Executive Committee expressed its frustration with "massive defiance of law [that could]

no longer be met by half-hearted gestures or facile compromise." What made many in ADA

particularly upset was that such defiance continued even in the face of congressional legislation

and Supreme Court decisions in favor of voting rights and desegregation.98 As they had learned

during the 1950s, however, strongly worded resolutions and expressions of support for civil

rights legislation could only do so much. They still needed to win the support of southerners

who could use their influence on the ground, and students remained a vital part of that effort. In

the spring of 1960, for example, CADA members at the University of Texas demonstrated

against segregation on the streets of Austin. The university had officially desegregated in 1950

as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Sweatt v. Painter, but the protesters demanded steps

that would completely integrate the campus, including integrated student housing, black

participation in productions of the drama and music departments, and integration of the

university's athletic teams. However, the ADA label still carried a stigma that campus liberals

did not want attached to their campaign. As chapter secretary Hubert Beare noted, "the

demonstrators did not want any outside group sponcering [sic] it."99

Liberals at Texas may have wanted to keep CADA at arm's length, but the protests in

Austin were an encouraging sign. The same could be said for developments at the University of

98 "Draft Statement for Executive Committee," February 18, 1960, reel 34, no. 63, ADA Papers.

99 Hubert W. Beare, Jr. to Sheldon Pollack, March 26, 1960, reel 139, series VIII, no. 234, ADA
Papers.









Florida. In the spring of 1961, history graduate student Warren Dean organized a chapter and

presented its credentials to the national office in the summer. Dean worked quickly to make the

UF chapter relevant. "[We] expressed support of the Jackson, Mississippi Freedom Riders

through wires to the New York Times and Jackson, Mississippi; then we obtained a great deal of

publicity by welcoming another group of Freedom Riders who came to Gainesville." This

activity brought Dean to the attention of the Gainesville NAACP chapter and liberal students at

all-black Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach.100

More importantly, he had become active in the effort to integrate the university. The UF

law school had admitted its first black graduate student in 1958 under pressure from the NAACP

and under court order, but the university's undergraduate schools were still segregated as of

1961. Dean had worked with other campus liberals to prepare admission applications for five

black students. At the beginning of the fall semester, these applications were still pending before

the state's Board of Control of Higher Education. Dean found the prospect of participating in the

integration of the university exciting, as it would "give our membership a great feeling of

accomplishment and also will give liberalism a real boost here." He intended to pursue these

five cases through the state's legal system if the Board of Control rejected the applications, and

he asked CADA officials in Washington for help in obtaining legal representation for the black

applicants if they needed it.101

Dean even contacted Martin Luther King in the fall of 1961 to ask his assistance in

desegregating UF. He expressed confidence that the Board of Control "will back down without a

court struggle if they are confronted with qualified students." He also told King that "the climate

100 Warren Dean to Howard Wachtel, August 2, 1961, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA
Papers.
101 Dean to Wachtel, August 2, 1961.









of opinion on campus is not at all rabid-in fact, a majority of students in a poll taken a few

years ago came out in favor of integration." Dean wanted King to write a letter supporting the

Gainesville chapter's efforts and "asking for the co-operation of Florida's Negro teachers and

students." Doing so would place Dean's efforts in the context of the final push to integrate

southern universities, which was taking place in the early 1960s across the region.102

Dean suffered through a long delay in waiting for King's response, confessing to the

Washington office that "we are pressed for time" as a result. Nevertheless, Dean pressed on,

working with the principals of black high schools in the state to secure financial assistance that

applicants could use in case the university accepted them. "We have a couple of possibilities,

but you [in the Washington office] might be considering a fund of our own if only one or two

students qualify."103 In late January 1962, Dean finally received a reply from King, and the

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) chairman did express support for the

Gainesville chapter's efforts. King also expressed confidence that "the principals of the Negro

high schools in Florida [would be] anxious to participate in this project."104

The activist nature of the chapters in Gainesville and Austin was an encouraging sign for

the national office. So too was the organization, in March 1962, of the Southern Student

Freedom Fund (SSFF). SSFF partnered CADA with several important liberal organizations,

including Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the National Student Association (NSA),

and SDA chairman Howard Wachtel explained that the coalition would "educate non-southern

sections of the country to the problems which confront Southern Negroes," as well as "embark


102 Dean to King, November 21, 1961, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.

103 Dean to Lambert, December 27, 1961, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.

104 King to Dean, January 27, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.









upon a nationwide fund raising campaign on U.S. campuses for groups involved in the front-line

fight for equal rights for all." In a sign of the increased radicalization of CADA leaders, Wachtel

announced that the first recipient of SSFF money would be the Student Non-Violent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which had already gained a reputation for its radical approach

to civil rights activism in Mississippi, the state many liberals considered to be a "last frontier" for

liberalism. As Wachtel noted, "SNCC is in desperate need of funds for bail, jail fines,

subsistence wages, administrative expenses, and many other vital items. Several fund raising

affairs are already planned at NYU, Columbia, the University of Chicago, Swarthmore and

several other schools."105

The establishment of SSFF benefited CADA as well, since SSFF acted as a clearinghouse

that brought liberals from several different organizations together. This was good news for

Warren Dean, whose work in Gainesville was now gaining national attention from liberals.

Wachtel made sure that Walter Williams of the NSA, who administered SSFF, knew what Dean

was trying to accomplish at UF. Wachtel noted that the integration campaign had spread, with

sixty black students preparing applications for admission to the university in the fall of 1962.106

Williams wrote Dean directly after hearing of his project, calling it "worthy of praise" and asking

Dean for additional information on what sort of assistance he might want.107

Dean would need considerable assistance to make the project work. In May 1962, he

informed CADA's national office of the specific financial requirements he would need to

succeed. Dean's goal was to subsidize as many black students as possible for one academic year.

105 Wachtel mass mailing to CADA chapter chairmen, March 27, 1962, reel 137, series VIII, no.
204, ADA Papers.
106 Wachtel to Walter Williams, April 10, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.

107 Williams to Dean, April 18, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.









He thought that "since there are bound to be a high number of drop-outs," the financial burden

on whoever would be supporting the students would decline significantly for the second year,

and other sources would "probably be able to cover the survivors for the sophomore year." Rauh

assured Dean that he had secured sources for at least some of that funding, including CADA's

three chapters in Washington and several chapters in the Midwest. However, Dean wanted to

make sure he was at the head of the campaign. As he told Rauh, "[if] you have no objection

we'll decide who will receive the scholarships at this level." This project was part of a larger

campaign in Florida designed to flood the university with black applicants, though Dean was not

yet sure how many they had collected. 10

This was the most significant project a student chapter of ADA had undertaken in the

South since its founding fifteen years earlier, and Dean expressed great satisfaction with it.

"[You] can't imagine how exciting it is to be involved in this project." He compared working

with ADA in Gainesville to being "a cat in the dog kennel." He faced constant harassment from

the local chapter of the John Birch Society and received little support from the university's

administration. Many of the forty members of the chapter would not be present to see the end

result of the project, but "if we can accomplish this, I'll feel everything's been worth it. Florida

is certainly ripe. If we can do this, we're ready to integrate the local high schools." The events

of the previous months had convinced Dean that "the walls are cracking," and he was proud to

have played a part in cracking them.109

The culmination of Dean's effort came in late July, when Dean called political secretary

Richard Lambert to inform him that the university had accepted one of the seven black


10s Dean to Lambert, May 13, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.
109 Dean to Lambert, May 13, 1962.









applicants who had been working with CADA in preparing his application. The school had also

accepted another female student who had applied without any assistance from CADA or the

NAACP.110 In total, there were seven African-American students accepted into the University of

Florida in the fall of 1962, and CADA, through Lambert's efforts, had raised one thousand

dollars on their behalf, enough to support two of them for their first year's studies. The UF

chapter of CADA trumpeted their accomplishments to the university community in a public

statement that recounted the beginning of the campaign and the abortive attempts at admitting

three Daytona Beach students in the fall of 1961. The chapter acknowledged the financial help

Lambert and others in the national office provided for the project, and the release also detailed

several trips chapter members had made to Jacksonville, Miami, and other cities looking for

qualified black applicants. Once CADA in Gainesville had found the applicants, the chapter

made sure their applications received proper consideration, found additional funding for one of

the students from Gainesville-area churches, and made sure "all of the students were welcomed

on arrival" to UF. Their plan for the fall of 1962 was to set up a permanent fund for black

students who needed financial assistance and "to provide tutorial sessions for first semester

students who request them."111

The success of the integrationists' campaign, compared with the public firestorm that had

erupted earlier that year when James Meredith had attempted to integrate the University of

Mississippi, was a great coup for the Gainesville chapter of CADA. However, Dean did not

want to stop their campaign. A November 1962 resolution commended the university


110 Richard Lambert, File Note on "University of Florida," July 24, 1962, reel 138, series VIII,
no. 211, ADA Papers.
111 UF Campus ADA, "Statement on the Integration of the University of Florida," November 2,
1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.









administration and the state government for its "stated aim" of "the creation of a public school

and higher education system second to none in the nation," but it criticized "the infringement of

academic freedon [sic] and inquiry" at UF.112 Their target was the Johns Committee, a Florida

Senate panel charged with finding and eliminating "subversives" from state government,

academia, and society. Under the leadership of former governor Charley Johns, the committee

targeted suspected Communists and homosexuals in a campaign that destroyed the reputations of

many UF faculty members and students.113

The Johns Committee had been operating in the state for eight years by the time the

Gainesville chapter of CADA spoke out, but its condemnation of the state's "self-appointed

heresy-hunters and thought-controllers" was an important introduction to a second major

campaign for the chapter. The resolution also called for the immediate reinstatement of

professors and students whom the Johns Committee had targeted, and it asked the university

administration to establish new guidelines that would "protect faculty and students from attacks

by those who are insulated from civil action for slander." Finally, it admonished the state

legislature to abolish the Johns Committee, calling it "a committee which has brought only

disgrace rather than honor to the State of Florida and its citizens."114 Clearly, liberals and

conservatives were still contesting the meaning of academic freedom and the extent of

Communist subversion in American institutions on the UF campus.

It is also clear that the UF chapter of Campus ADA was the organization's most active

chapter in the organization's fifteen-year history. Dean and his lieutenants deserve some credit


112 UF Campus ADA resolution, November 2, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.

113 Julian M. Pleasants, Gator Tales: An Oral History of the University of Florida (Gainesville,
2007), 48-50.
114 UF Campus ADA resolution, November 2, 1962, reel 138, series VIII, no. 211, ADA Papers.









for the integration of the university, but CADA's true impact on the process is not clear. Stephan

Mickle, one of the seven black students that enrolled at the University of Florida in 1962, credits

George Allen, the university's first black law school graduate, with convincing him to be a

pioneer. He makes no mention of CADA as a group that assisted him in any meaningful way,

though he does acknowledge that he "was able to establish some relationships with some of the .

.. more friendly] and liberal white students" later in his career at UF.115 It is possible that some

of these "friendly" students were members of CADA, but Mickle does not mention any group

affiliations these friendly students had. Since Dean and other CADA members never mentioned

Mickle's name in any of their correspondence concerning their campaign, it is possible that he

received assistance from the NAACP or other organizations instead.

In the two decades prior to the mid-1960s, Gainesville is the only success story of any

significance in the history of the student wing of ADA as it attempted to organize southern

students and mobilize them for action against the entrenched political and social structure of the

region. In most cases, attempts to organize SDA and CADA chapters at universities in

Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, Florida, and Texas produced minimal results. Liberal

students on southern campuses fought against student apathy, hostility from university

administrations, and smear campaigns orchestrated by conservative students. Despite the

obstacles, SDA and CADA leaders continued to organize, recognizing that the South had

become an important battleground in American politics. As the fight for black civil rights

intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, campus liberals continued to agitate for change. In the end,

campus liberals who joined the student wing of ADA became loud voices for liberalism in a way




115 Mickle interviewed in Pleasants, Gator Tales, 340.









that their adult counterparts could never truly manage, though their record of successful action is

less than impressive.









CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

In the fifteen years following the end of World War II, Americans for Democratic Action

(ADA) attempted to position itself as an anti-Communist, politically savvy liberal alternative to

the "Popular Front" approach that had characterized many liberal organizations and political

movements before the war. One aspect of their approach to the problems America faced was

very different from their rivals on the left. While some people on the left believed that reformers

needed to loudly and publicly proclaim the need for economic reform or black civil rights, ADA

leaders were more conservative and defensive in their approach to political organization. They

believed that liberals needed to defend what they had won during the New Deal and World War

II, protecting themselves against big business conservatism and McCarthyism at home and the

influence of the Soviet Union abroad. This approach did not preclude further reform, but they

wanted to protect the liberal consensus with which they believed most Americans had come to

agree. Some Americans remained unconvinced, of course, but ADA leaders believed that a

steady application of reason and political pressure would move more citizens into agreement

with the assumptions of liberalism.

This approach to liberal organization worked for ADA outside of the South, where large

chapters with hundreds of members exerted real influence over local and national politics.

However, the defensive liberalism of ADA did not work in the South, though its failure was not

from a lack of trying. ADA leaders tried to organize southern chapters in several waves of

activity, beginning with Barney Taylor's Memphis-based efforts in 1947 and 1948. After Taylor

resigned from the organization, ADA commissioned an extensive reexamination of their

prospects in the South, decided that a renewed effort was needed, and enlisted labor bureaucrat

Alden Hopkins for a second "southern office," which opened in the spring of 1949. When her









year-long efforts in North Carolina and Florida failed to attract liberals to ADA's cause, the

organization abandoned the idea of costly, regional organizing in the South, endorsing small-

scale local activity instead. Taylor, Hopkins, and Texas organizer George Lambert were all

conscientious, hard-working ADA organizers, but the entrenched conservatism of southern

politics proved too difficult to change. While ADA leaders never stopped encouraging southern

liberals to join the group, in the mid-1950s their emphasis shifted toward the younger generation

of southerners, and their student auxiliary could point to some success in the South, especially on

the movement for social and political integration of African-Americans. At a time when civil

rights was becoming the most important domestic political issue in America, ADA's younger

generation made an impact on the debate in the South, particularly at the local level.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1960s even the most optimistic liberals were willing to concede

that a shift had taken place within the liberal movement. The murder of President Kennedy in

November 1963 had stunned the nation, but liberals had a particularly difficult time dealing with

its meaning. Many on the left saw this as a moment in which great possibilities and hopes died

along with the president, and it deeply affected intellectual liberals, including Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., who had served on Kennedy's White House staff and would become the

unofficial historian of his administration. Political scientist James Piereson has convincingly

argued that the Kennedy assassination took a "confident, practical, and forward-looking

philosophy, with a heritage of genuine accomplishment," and turned it into "a pessimistic

doctrine-and one with a decidedly negative view of American society and its institutions."

It is possible, however, to note this transition toward pessimism and radicalism among

liberals before the Kennedy assassination. In November 1962, for example, Arthur Gorson,

1 James Piereson, Camelot and the Cultural Revolution: How the Assassination of John F.
Kennedy h, \lciwl eAmerican Liberalism (New York, 2007), x.









Campus ADA's national chairman, announced to its chapters across the country that the Student

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) had granted CADA "observership status." CADA

had also agreed to financially support one of SNCC's field workers for one year, at a cost of

$2,200. These steps had gained the approval of CADA's national board, but Gorson needed the

chapters' approval before they could move forward with the field worker project.2 By March of

1963, Gorson was able to report to Charles Sherrod, coordinator of SNCC's operations in

Albany, Georgia, that CADA had approved the project, and the first payment of funds to SNCC

was made in May of that year.3

CADA's endorsement of SNCC was a telling moment in its history. While SNCC was not

yet the lightning rod for criticism it later became, even among some within the civil rights

movement, its methods and goals were certainly far more radical than the methods and goals

ADA had embraced at its founding in 1947. By the 1960s, the lack of political and

organizational progress in the South had led to deep frustration and an embrace of more radical

solutions, which the partnership with SNCC hinted at. Until now, younger liberals had

acquiesced to what many considered to be a relatively conservative, gradual approach to reform

during the postwar period. They also consented to an approach that agreed with conservatives on

the importance of the Communist threat. By the 1960s, a growing number of left-leaning

Americans had concluded that this approach had failed. Many ADA members had come to agree

with New York Post columnist James Weschler, who argued that ADA had become "primarily a

mating ground for those with sentimental ties to the liberal and radical past, a sort of Alumni



2 Arthur Gorson, memo to CADA chapters and National Board, November 1962, reel 137, series
VIII, no. 204, Americans for Democratic Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries,
Gainesville, microfilm collection (hereafter cited as ADA Papers).

3 Gorson to Charles Sherrod, March 13, 1963, reel 137, series VIII, no. 204, ADA Papers.









Association that recruits too few of its members from more recent classes."4 In order to forestall

movement toward radical solutions that would undermine conventional liberal reform, he argued,

ADA officials needed to make their organization more relevant to a new generation of liberals.

ADA's experiences in the South in the years following World War II helped to pave the

way for the radicalization of a significant portion of its membership in the 1960s. For twenty

years, its leadership attempted to organize liberals in the region, and it had tried to do so as

quietly as possible. Their view of the South was complicated. They believed that conservatives

controlled government, the business community, and social institutions. ADA leaders regarded

hostility of these "reactionaries" as irrational, and they believed that conservatives would react

violently to any attempt to challenge the political status quo, whether through incendiary rhetoric

or actual violence.

The hopes of ADA leaders, and of liberals more generally, rested on what they believed to

be the latent sympathies of the general southern population. These hopes rested on two

important assumptions. First, ADA leaders believed that the South was not nearly as politically

and socially retrograde as intellectuals had always believed it was. Its leadership may have been

reactionary and anti-democratic as ADA philosophy defined it, but southerners were

fundamentally no different from their counterparts in the rest of the country, and liberals had

convinced Americans everywhere else of the righteousness of strong, New Deal liberalism.

They saw no reason why the South had to be any different. The story of ADA in the South

suggests that this liberal optimism about the South was exaggerated. Southerners continued to

elect conservatives because they were conservative themselves, not because politicians were

deceiving them.

4 Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New
York, 1987), 152.









Their second assumption was that the dislocations and upheavals of World War II had

created an especially positive atmosphere for liberal reform. Many southerners had begun to

publicly question the beliefs of previous generations as they served with black soldiers in the

Army, worked in large government installations that contributed to the war effort, or joined labor

unions that had begun to organize in southern factories. Each of these actions validated liberal

assumptions, and ADA officials saw no tangible reason why these trends could not continue after

the war.5

There was an important caveat to liberals' optimism about the South, however. They knew

they faced powerful obstacles to their program in state and local government in the South.

Moreover, most of the print and broadcast media in the region was conservative and therefore

unlikely to be sympathetic to liberal organizations or politicians. First impressions counted for a

great deal, and ADA leaders wanted to make sure the initial contacts its representatives had with

southerners were as free from prejudice as possible. ADA leaders thought that if southerners

saw ADA members as people just like them, southerners would be more likely to listen to their

program and, therefore, to discount the incendiary rhetoric politicians and writers often used to

paint ADA as subversive. In order to make the best first impression, however, most ADA

leaders wanted to keep their activity as quiet as possible until their chapters had reached a critical

mass of local support.

The first place where ADA officials thought they had created that kind of liberal

community was Memphis in 1947 and 1948, where war veteran Barney Taylor had set up the

headquarters for what he and his superiors had hoped would be a permanent "Southern Office."

Postwar Memphis was a promising place in which liberals could operate, primarily because the

5 Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White S.nlihe nuei in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-
1975 (New York, 2006), 19-22.









city's political machine, under the control of "Boss" Ed Crump, was such an inviting target for

reform-minded liberals. Taylor's experience began a long-term trend in the history of ADA

activity in the South. Because of ADA's limited financial resources, Taylor and his successors

had to be selective in terms of where they operated. The staff in Washington, in concert with

Taylor, selected Memphis not only because it was convenient for Taylor but because it offered a

chance to affect the 1948 gubernatorial and senatorial elections in Tennessee. ADA leaders

wanted to slowly chip away at the entrenched position conservative Democrats enjoyed in the

South. They hoped that the results of the 1948 elections, in which Gordon Browning returned to

the governor's mansion and Estes Kefauver was elected to the Senate, were the start of a liberal

trend in the South that would make the region more politically balanced.

The elections of Browning and Kefauver in Tennessee were good news for liberals, but

these electoral victories did not translate into increased support for ADA, in Memphis or

anywhere else in the South. The financial troubles of the organization meant that it had to

concentrate on achieving the most possible success with the least expense. ADA leaders had to

use the organization's resources in places where it could get the best returns, and it quickly

became apparent that those places were all outside the South. The staff could not afford to spend

thousands of dollars on a southern organizer if that organizer could only recruit a few dozen new

members. Taylor had some important assets he could bring to bear, most notably the indignant

eloquence of Lillian Smith, who continually implored southerners to reject their retrograde

assumptions on race and class and embrace modernity. However, in fact the majority of the

financial contributions and letters of support ADA received as a result of Smith's appeals came

from outside the South.









Taylor also had to deal with the issue of Communism. Liberal intellectuals dismissed

concerns about Soviet infiltration of the United States as paranoid and without merit. However,

Communists, socialists, and fellow travelers had been influential in the formation of

organizations such as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), standing side-by-

side with Eleanor Roosevelt and Frank Porter Graham to denounce segregation and economic

exploitation. ADA leaders thought they had dealt with the issue of Communists in the liberal

movement as best they could.6 Its leaders had loudly and repeatedly claimed that Communists

were not welcome in their organization. Despite these denials, many southerners, particularly

those in the print media, claimed that the doctrines of the New Deal and Fair Deal, which ADA

supported, had links to Communism. Taylor did his best to convince people that ADA was not

linked in any way to the Southern Conference, and he worked to limit the Conference's

influence. He also worked against the 1948 presidential campaign of Progressive Party

candidate Henry Wallace, whom the Communists supported. Many southerners, including some

who might have otherwise been interested in joining the chapters Taylor was trying to create in

the South, continued to believe that ADA was a Communist organization as a result of the

Wallace campaign.

Taylor's bitter resignation from ADA in 1948 reflected liberal frustration with the South's

resistance to liberal reform. The question had become whether ADA leaders should write off the

South as hopeless for liberal organization. The political and business class of the South had

revealed itself as the stiffest domestic challenge to American liberalism, but what made the

South interesting was the challenge it presented to ADA. By the late 1940s, liberals outside the

South had become temperamentally conservative. According to Piereson, they saw the New

6 Richard H. Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s
& 1950s (New York, 1985), 263.









Deal as "something to be defended and preserved, but also a roadway into the future through

future acts of reform."7 This work was important, but it was not particularly exciting, especially

when compared with the struggles of the 1930s. Leftist critics of "Cold War" liberals agreed,

and they thought this approach was flawed because of its rejection of radical change and its

detachment from the lower classes, which the liberal consensus seemed to ignore.

In the intellectual and political climate of postwar America, the South represented an

opportunity for liberals. It opened the possibility of restoring a crusading, moralistic spirit to

liberalism, a spirit that had animated the Progressives around the turn of the century.8 Since the

beginning of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency, liberals had been able to "solve" so many

American problems, but the South had remained beyond their collective reach. The idea that

"life in the region was so harsh and so at odds with the nation's self-understandings that America

repeatedly had to step in and clean up the messes the South had intentionally or otherwise

created" was nothing new for liberal reformers.9 What made postwar liberals unique was their

optimistic belief that they could convince the South to embrace liberalism if they worked hard

enough and educated enough people on what liberalism truly meant. It was a political crusade in

which success would have placed postwar liberals on a pedestal that previous generations had

failed to reach.

This belief in the importance of this "crusade" explains why early failures in the South

failed to convince ADA's national staff to abandon the South. By the late 1940s, several events

reinforced the idea that the South was an opportunity for liberals. The renegade southern


7 Piereson, Camelot, 7.
8 Piereson, Camelot, 5.

9 Larry J. Griffin, "Why was the South a Problem to America?", in Griffin and Don H. Doyle,
eds., The .N',,/i as an American Problem (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 13.









Democrats who became Dixiecrats in the summer of 1948 generated a lot of noise, but their

electoral impact in that fall's election was small. Liberals could point to several new southern

members of Congress and governors who had run on progressive platforms or had challenged

entrenched political machines. Most importantly, ADA had played a prominent role in shaping

the national debate during the year, committing the Democratic Party to a stronger position than

southerners had wanted in favor of black civil rights. It was in this cautiously optimistic

atmosphere that ADA leaders now explored their possibilities in the South with the assistance of

North Carolina activist John Thomason.

ADA's strategy for organizing in the South reflected an acceptance of its perception as a

controversial group, even if its staff did not think of liberalism as particularly controversial. The

list of invitees for the Atlanta conference it convened in February 1949 was short on elected

officials and long on labor leaders, independent liberals, and academics. Thomason and Loeb

understood that southern liberals did not appreciate outside criticism of the South any more than

conservatives did, so they carefully emphasized that they would engage in as little criticism as

possible. The records of the conference show a group trying to find its way through a confusing

political landscape. The southerners defended traditional patterns of racial relations against

northern criticism while acknowledging that changes had to be made, though the southerners

warned against concentrating on civil rights and ignoring education, public works, and other

issues. They concluded that the southern political class did not truly represent the people, but

they did not necessarily trust politicians who claimed to be liberal or progressive. Above all,

these southerners wanted to act, and they hoped ADA's national reputation would help them do

so.









This Atlanta meeting was a catalyst in ADA's decision to hire a second full-time southern

organizer in the spring of 1949. Another catalyst was a change in strategy, also related to the

conclusions of the conference. Taylor had traveled extensively from his home base in Memphis,

visiting liberal prospects in cities throughout the South. It had been a grueling schedule, and it

had been expensive. Given the organization's continuing struggles to raise money, its financial

problems were critical. The second southern office, run by former National Labor Relations

Board researcher Alden Hopkins, concentrated its efforts in North Carolina and Florida, states

that appeared to have better prospects for liberals. Coincidentally, these states also had

prominent liberal politicians facing tough elections in the summer of 1950. Senators Frank

Graham and Claude Pepper were darlings of the liberal establishment in Washington, which

made them obvious targets for conservative Democrats.

ADA's decision to limit Hopkins' organizational activities to those two states showed that

reliable politicians could expect the enthusiastic backing of liberal activists. Graham and Pepper

would welcome the assistance of outside organizations. The same would be true of their

conservative southern opponents. The 1950 election cycle was the first that registered the effects

of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy's campaign against Communist infiltration of the

American government. The truth of his allegations notwithstanding, his charges affected voter

perceptions in several key races, including North Carolina and Florida. Graham's association

with the Southern Conference and the Pepper's criticism of the Cold War consensus left each of

them vulnerable to McCarthyist charges. Reactionaries also assailed the senators for their

support of anti-poll tax and anti-lynching legislation, which branded them as radicals in southern









politics.10 Under such powerful attack, it would seem to make sense for Graham and Pepper to

accept help from liberal organizations, no matter how much their opponents criticized those

groups.

As Hopkins found out, however, neither Graham nor Pepper welcomed ADA assistance.

Hopkins quit ADA well before either Democratic senatorial primary in 1950, but her experience

showed that the long-standing tension between activists and politicians was still strong. She had

to deal with the legacy of the 1948 campaign in North Carolina, where some of the most

notorious abuse of Henry Wallace's southern tour took place. Opponents of ADA had succeeded

in lumping it with the Southern Conference and Wallace's Progressives, which was a real

problem in North Carolina given Senator Graham's association, while he had been president of

the University of North Carolina, with SCHW. Graham's concern with the ADA label, despite

his continued support for ADA positions, meant that he shunned Hopkins' assistance. It did not

help her cause that when she traveled the state, she discovered that the vast majority of the

members ADA organizers had attracted were on the fringes of the liberal movement. Moreover,

in 1949 she had to deal with the uncertainty plaguing the Graham campaign, primarily because

no one seemed to know who would run against the senator in the Democratic primary.

When it became clear that Hopkins would get nowhere with her efforts in North Carolina,

she abandoned the state at the end of 1949 and traveled to Miami, where a new, more

enthusiastic group had launched a chapter and pledged to work for Pepper's re-election the

following year. The liberals in South Florida were more doctrinaire and intellectual in their

approach than those in North Carolina, who were drawn more heavily from the labor community

10 Julian M. Pleasants and Augustus M. Burns III, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate
Race in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1990), 147-149, 203-246; James C. Clark, "Road to
Defeat: Claude Pepper and Defeat in the 1950 Florida Primary" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Florida, 1998), 169-176, 180-189.









in the state. Hopkins did her best to steer the Miami liberals toward a more practical political

approach that would have less concern with doctrinal purity. She continued to run into trouble,

however, particularly on issues of race. She could never convince southern ADA chapters to

totally embrace integration. ADA leaders had run into this question in the past, and they

continued to do so throughout their attempts to organize in the South. Its platform repeatedly

called for an end to segregation in support of black civil rights, but how could the organization

advance such views when its southern chapters held segregated meetings, as they often did?

Was ADA attempting to organize all liberals, or should it concentrate on attracting only white

liberals to its banner? Hopkins failed to persuade her superiors in Washington to relax

restrictions on segregated meetings, no matter how distasteful she thought they were personally.

This conflict was a key factor in her failure to establish an independent source of financial

support in either state, which doomed her southern office to the fate of Taylor's.

The same financial constraints that frustrated Taylor and Hopkins also doomed the efforts

of Texas liberal activist George Lambert, who went to work for ADA in 1953 in an attempt to

organize the state and learn more about its politics. Texas' support for Dwight Eisenhower in the

1952 presidential election had frustrated liberals, particularly because conservative Democrats

had been so instrumental in throwing Texas into the Republican column. Liberals wanted to cut

into the power Governor Allan Shivers had over the state's Democratic machine, but they needed

to understand how it worked before they could do so. That is where Lambert entered the picture.

As the Dallas chapter's executive secretary, he had gathered information about contacts

throughout the state and encouraged the creation of chapters in Houston, San Antonio, and

several other cities. He also offered to be ADA's eyes and ears in Texas, giving them a sense of

how bright liberal prospects truly were.









The problems Lambert faced were the same as those that vexed Taylor and Hopkins. The

most important problem was the fitful financial and political support from Washington and the

almost universal hostility of the local press. One additional problem, however, was unique to

Texas. The state had a fairly fluid political situation that most liberals found confusing. As was

the case in most southern states, the bipartisan politics familiar to the rest of the nation took place

entirely within the confines of the Democratic Party. Liberals had to contend with the constantly

shifting loyalties of Shivers, who worked to maintain his good standing with the national

Democratic establishment while undermining its liberal principles with nearly every action he

took in office. They also had to reckon with Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, whose national

leadership positions within the party did not guarantee them political survival in Texas. Could

liberals trust the Speaker and the Senate majority leader? Lambert's reports to Washington

reflected his ambivalence toward the two, especially Johnson, whose ties to conservatives made

him nervous.

Between the 1952 and 1956 elections, Lambert worked for ADA, producing a series of

fascinating memorandums and confidential reports about the activities of the various Democratic

factions. Given the state's electoral importance, liberals had to do all they could to gain in

strength and put the "Shivercrats" on the defensive. ADA liberals and fellow Democratic

"loyalists" did their best to convince national party leaders that throwing the party's support

behind Shivers and the conservatives would do the party no good, but Shivers had numbers on

his side. Thus, national Democrats sought to avoid confrontation with the governor in the hopes

that he would support the national ticket in 1956. In the end, Lambert experienced the same sort

of frustration that plagued other southern organizers, but his detailed reports on Texas politics

represent an intriguing, and underused, source of information about the subject.









In the years following Lambert's failed effort in Texas, ADA officials avoided large-scale

organizational efforts in the South. Instead, its leaders decided to wage a long-term campaign

aimed at creating liberals who would be politically active in the 1960s and beyond. The vehicle

for this campaign was its student division, Students for Democratic Action (SDA). In the wake

of the Brown decision and the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-1956, the campaign for black

civil rights became a national story, and liberals again tried to convince themselves that they

were not dealing with a monolithic, reactionary southern population. They hoped college

administrators would be particularly understanding of their desire to organize on campus, since,

at least in theory, they would be committed to free speech and would welcome diverse political

opinions.

SDA organizers ran into trouble on political grounds, however. Concerns about

Communist influence over American institutions extended to academia. Beginning in the early

1950s, congressional investigations of colleges and universities touched nearly every institution

in the country formally or informally. 11 These investigations had at least some merit for those

who wanted to purge American liberalism of Communists and fellow-travelers, but the manner

in which conservatives conducted these probes angered Cold War liberals. They deplored the

way in which federal and state politicians ignored concerns about civil liberties, and they hated

how administrators caved to political pressure and dismissed politically "questionable" faculty.

SDA chapters in the South were quick to protest against civil liberties violations on campus, but

this left them vulnerable to attack from the same administrators and politicians. The more SDA

protested, the more its leaders might be seen as "troublesome" and "radical," and students would

be less likely to join SDA if the group appeared to be too radical.


11 Pells, The LiberalMind, 287-295.









SDA organizers also dealt with more mundane organizational problems, including the

transitory nature of college life and the fact that the students most likely to be politically

motivated were often more concerned with their studies. As a result, many of the schools where

SDA was most active, including the University of Florida, Vanderbilt University, and the

University of Texas, had chapters that formed, dissolved, and re-formed on at least one occasion.

Despite the challenges, ADA's student organizations turned out to be the most satisfying

chapters they formed during the post-war period. The issues they dealt with during the 1950s

and early 1960s, including McCarthyism and civil rights, were familiar, but they brought an

enthusiasm to these issues that led to louder calls for change and more action. SDA and Campus

ADA chapters on southern campuses organized debates on hot-button issues of the day, sent

numerous letters to campus newspapers opposing segregation and supporting federal aid to

education, and urging qualified black students to apply for admission to their schools.

The civil rights issue was most crucial to the effectiveness of ADA's student organizations.

Yale Bernstein, the SDA organizer who was most adamant about the need to organize in the

South, knew that layers of distrust existed between white and black students in liberal

organizations. He thought of ADA liberalism as a "third force," one that could work on the

political and economic change that had to precede integration. In working toward such change,

white and black liberals would each have to compromise. Whites would have to acknowledge

the importance of civil rights, while southern blacks would have to expand their definition of

"liberalism" to include economics, civil liberties, and other issues. SDA, according to Bernstein,

could be the catalyst for such change because it had no natural constituency to placate. ADA

leaders had always thought of themselves in these terms, and now it had a chance to make a

difference in the South.









In the end, the students ADA recruited in the South were not able to live up to the lofty

ideals of Bernstein and other national SDA leaders, who had convinced themselves that a large,

untapped reservoir of liberal students existed in the region. However, their accomplishments

were more noticeable than those of their ADA counterparts, who never seemed to act in favor of

liberal reform in the South. SDA publicly supported the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955,

raising money to help boycotters with their transportation needs and earning the praise of Martin

Luther King, Jr. in the process. SDA's decision to engage in such a campaign was a calculated

risk, given ADA's past discretion in the South. However, ADA leaders needed to acknowledge a

new wave of student activism. The confrontational ethos of SNCC, Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS), and other groups became a defining characteristic of the 1960s, but it did not

emerge suddenly. In the late 1950s, many younger liberals had already begun to reject the

"conservative" liberalism that had been in the ascendancy since World War II and that had

informed ADA's approach to the South in the same period. SDA leaders thought they could

channel this dissatisfaction into support for a comprehensive liberal program that included, but

was not limited to, civil rights.

The problem with SDA's all-encompassing approach to liberal reform in the South was

that, by the late 1950s, civil rights had become the issue in the region, at the expense of other

important political and economic issues. This was not necessarily a detriment to campus

organization, since liberal students came to recognize they could make a difference on a local

level, whether through organizing boycotts of intercollegiate athletics in southern states that

refused to allow integrated competition or encouraging qualified black students to apply for

enrollment in southern schools. This brought liberals in direct conflict with the political and

academic power structure of the South, something ADA officials had been trying to avoid since









the organization's founding. ADA liberals had always reassured southerners that they were not

radicals, but the events of the 1950s and early 1960s had convinced many liberals that more

radical solutions were needed. They concluded that the South needed a crusade, and younger

liberals were determined to recapture the crusading spirit of previous generations.

One defining characteristic of this spirit was impatience. Younger liberals were impatient

with resistance from the southern power structure and the resulting slow pace of reform, largely

because they were so convinced that integration was necessary. If something was morally right,

why was it necessary to wait to achieve it? They were also growing impatient with fellow

liberals who refused to answer this question to their satisfaction. They could not understand why

people who publicly proclaimed their commitment to civil rights balked at the opportunity to act

on their ideals.

One of the elder statesmen of ADA liberalism, Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey,

had made this very point in 1948, when he was a younger politician seeking a seat in the United

States Senate. His famous speech at that year's Democratic convention in Philadelphia argued

that the country had waited nearly two centuries too long to live up to its promise of equality for

all. By the time of the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City, an older Humphrey,

seeking his party's vice-presidential nomination, had reversed course. He urged the

representatives of the Mississippi "Freedom Democrats," who had traveled to the convention

intending to challenge the all-white regular Democratic delegation of that state, to compromise

their principles in the interest of political unity.12 Humphrey's backroom dealing was the

antithesis of his eloquence in Philadelphia sixteen years earlier, and many liberals believed that

he (and others like him) had betrayed their principles to benefit their own careers.


12 Gillon, Politics and Vision, 162-163.









The frustration that accompanied that conclusion was palpable, and it was the result of

years of struggle. The story of ADA's repeated attempts to gain a foothold in the South

represent a small part of that process, one that highlights the obstacles liberals faced in the

region. It is surprising that, in the face of intense opposition from southern politicians and their

allies in the press, ADA leaders made numerous separate attempts to organize chapters and

create interest in their brand of Cold War liberalism. They did so because liberals had convinced

themselves that the South represented a last frontier for their ideas, which they believed a

majority of Americans had permanently and irrevocably embraced. By reaching out to the

South, liberal intellectuals and activists could recapture the crusading spirit that had animated

previous generations and "save" the one part of the country that most needed their help.

The fact that many southerners either actively campaigned against ADA or simply ignored

the group was a challenge to liberalism's vision of itself. Liberalism had established itself as a

consensus philosophy in the post-war period, one that its adherents believed all Americans would

eventually embrace. The recalcitrance of the South in the two decades following the end of

World War II appeared to be empirical evidence that contradicted this theory, and it led many on

the left to abandon traditional liberalism for more radical ideas. These "new radicals" attacked

Cold War liberalism "as lacking in vision, as shoring up the status quo through incremental

reforms, as too pragmatic to affect far-reaching changes, as too boring to command the interest

of creative men and women."13 The shift away from consensus liberalism and toward radicalism

was gradual and based on experience, and ADA's frustrating experiences in the South were one

part of the experience that caused such a change to take place in the 1960s.




13 Piereson, Camelot, 24.









LIST OF REFERENCES

Alexander, Charles C. Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

Ashby, Warren. Frank Porter Graham: A .S,,ithei n Liberal. Winston-Salem, N.C.: John
Blair Publishers, 1980.

Bartley, Numan V. A History of the .S,,lh, Volume X:. The New .Snil Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1995.

Bass, Jack, and Walter DeVries. The Transformation of .SNihei In Politics: Social
Change and Political Consequence Since 1945. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Beinart, Peter. "A Fighting Faith: An Argument for a New Liberalism." New Republic
231 (December 13, 2004). 17-19, 22-24, 29.

Blackwell, Louise, and Frances Clay. Lillian S.mith New York: Twayne Publishers,
1971.

Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1988.

Broad, William J. "A Spy's Path: Iowa to A-Bomb to Kremlin Honor." New York
Times, November 12, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/us/12koval.html.

Brock, Clifton. Americans for Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics.
Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962.

Caro, Robert A. The Years ofLyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate. New York:
Vintage Books, 2002.

Champagne, Anthony. Congressman Sam Rayburn. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1984.

Chappell, David L. Inside Agitators: White .Sinhe'i nli in the Civil Rights Movement.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Clark, James C. "Road to Defeat: Claude Pepper and Defeat in the 1950 Florida
Primary." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1998.

Clouse, Barbara Barksdale. Ralph McGill: A Biography. Macon, GA: Mercer University
Press, 1998.

Cobb, James C. Away Down South: A History of .,linhel In Identity. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005.









Conkin, Paul K. Gone i//h the Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1985.

Dabney, Virginius. Mr. Jefferson's University: A History. Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1981.

Davidson, Chandler. Race and Class in Texas Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1990.

Dittmer, John. Local People: The S.truggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi. Urbana, Ill.:
University of Illinois Press, 1994.

"Dream Bill." Time. February 7, 1949. Republished online:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799744,00.html.

Dykeman, Wilma. Seeds of .Sntlh' ii Change: The Life of WillAlexander. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Eagles, Charles W. Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations: The Evolution of a .S ,tlhei 1
Liberal. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982.

Egerton, John. Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights
Movement in the .u,,,h Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

Erickson, Jack T., ed. Americans for Democratic Action Papers, 1932-1965. Sanford,
N.C.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1978. Microfilm collection.
University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville.

Finney, Peter, Jr. "Lay persons launched 1961 desegregation drive." New Orleans
Clarion-Herald, January 10, 2001. http://clarionherald.org/20010118/art501.htm
(accessed October 25, 2007; article no longer available online).

Frederickson, Kari. The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid .S, nlh, 1932-1968.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Gillon, Steven M. Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. "Public Hearing #2 of the
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission." August 27, 2005.
http://www.greensborotrc.org/cahoongreesonwall.doc.









Griffin, Larry J., and Don Doyle, eds. The .N,,itl as an American Problem. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1995.

"Help, Support for Southern Liberals Sought in North." ADA World 12, no. 8 (October
1957). Page 4.

Klarman, Michael J. "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis."
Journal ofAmerican History 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 81-118.

LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002. Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2002.

Lambert, George. George andLatane Lambert Papers, 1943-1987. Texas Labor
Archives. University of Texas at Arlington Special Collections.

Loveland, Anne C. Lillian S.mitlh, A .,i/wlhei ner Confronting the .',,n/t Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1986.

Martin, Galen. Interview by Betsy Brinson. Kentucky Civil Rights Oral History Project,
Kentucky Oral History Commission, Kentucky Historical Society. November 4, 1999.
http://205.204.134.47/civil rightsmvt/media/KCRP.20.B.28.Martin.pdf

Mattson, Kevin. When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith ofPostwar Liberalism.
New York: Routledge, 2004.

Maxwell, William Earl, and Ernest Crain. Texas Politics Today. St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Company, 1978.

McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Touchstone, 1992.

Miller, William D. Mr. Crump of Memphis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1964.

Montgomery, James Riley, Stanley J. Folmsbee, and Lee Seifert Greene. To Foster
Knowledge: A History of the University of Tennessee, 1794-1970. Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1984.

Norrell, Robert J. "Triangles of Change: The Southern Regional Council in the Civil
Rights Movement." Paper delivered at the conference "The Southern Regional
Council and the Civil Rights Movement." University of Florida, Gainesville,
October 23-26, 2003.

Pells, Richard H. The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the
1940s & 1950s. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.









Piereson, James. Camelot and the Cultural Revolution: How the Assassination of John F.
Kennedy .\shni, lAmerican Liberalism. New York: Encounter Books, 2007.

Pleasants, Julian M. Gator Tales: An Oral History of the University of Florida.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2007.

Pleasants, Julian M., and Augustus M. Burns III. Frank Porter Graham and the 1950
Senate Race in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.

Salmond, John. A .Si/he iin Rebel: The Life and Times ofAubrey Willis Williams, 1890-
1965. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Life in the 20th Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

Sherry, Michael S. In the .\l/hl'\ of War: The United States Since the 1930s. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Sokol, Jason. There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights,
1945-1975. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

Sosna, Morton J. In Search of the Silent .,tntli .,nliilhi II Liberals and the Race Issue.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Steinberg, Alfred. Sam Rayburn: A Biography. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975.

Sullivan, Patricia. Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Texas State Library and Archives Commission. "United States and Texas Populations,
1850-2006." Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.html.

University of Texas at Austin. The Handbook of Texas Online. University of Texas at Austin.
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/LL/fla61.html.

White, G. Edward. Alger Hiss's Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Douglas Steven Gallagher was born in 1977 in South Miami, Florida. The oldest

of four children, he grew up in South Miami and Coral Gables, Florida, graduating from

Coral Gable High School in 1995. He earned his B.A. in history, with a minor in

philosophy, from Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee in 1998, graduating

summa cum laude. He earned his M.A. in history from the University of Florida in 2001,

where he has worked as a teaching assistant and teaching associate since 2001.





PAGE 1

1 EMOCRATIC ACTION IN THE SOUTH, 1947 1963 By DOUGLAS STEVEN GALLAGHER A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIR EMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2008

PAGE 2

2 2008 Douglas Steven Gallagher

PAGE 3

3 To my parents, for their love and support

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project could not have been completed without the moral and financial support of my parents, Douglas an d Susan Gallagher. They have never wavered in their belief that I was capable of accomplishing everything I set out to do. I also thank the members of my dissertation committee for their input on this project, as well as the staff at the University of Flo rida Libraries and all libraries in which I conducted research. However, I must pay special tribute to my advisor, Dr. Robert H. Zieger. His editorial skills are second to none, and his support for my work was constant and tireless. I cannot ever truly repay the debt I owe to him.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 6 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTI ON ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 8 2 RED LIGHT, GREEN LIGHT: SOUTHERN LIBERALISM, COMMUNISM, AND THE UDA/ADA IN THE 1940s ................................ ................................ ............................. 24 3 ND THE FIRST INCARNATION OF THE ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE IN MEMPHIS, 1947 1948 ................................ .............. 49 4 JOHN THOMASON, THE ATLANTA CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 1949, AND ................................ .............. 90 5 THE REINCARNATION OF THE ADA SOUTHERN OFFICE, 1949 1950 .................... 128 6 THE LIMITS OF LIBERALI SM: GEORGE LAMBERT, THE ADA IN TEXAS, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1953 1956 ............................. 179 7 CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE FIGHT FOR SOUTHERN LIBERALISM .... 212 8 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 264 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 282 BIOG RAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 286

PAGE 6

6 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTIO N IN THE SOUTH, 1947 1963 By Douglas Steven Gallagher May 2008 Chair: Robert H. Zieger Major: History My study explore d the history of the liberal political organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as its leaders attempted to establish a series of chapters in the southern United States and influence the political fortunes of liberals in those states in the period following the end of the Second World War. ADA boasted a number of prominent members in i ts ranks and claimed to have a great deal of influence in national politics, but its efforts in the South were largely unsuccessful in attracting new members and contributing to the debate in southern politics. ADA leaders made no fewer than three separat e attempts to organize southern chapters South was the result of a combination of factors. Its leaders were never able to sustain organizational efforts finan cially as a result of chronic shortages of money throughout its early history. They also had to deal with frequent charges that ADA, despite a clear repudiation of Com munists and their allies. The charge carried some weight in the South because of the

PAGE 7

7 willingness of other southern liberals to work with Communists during the Great Depression and World War II. erstand the political dynamics of the South during this period. Liberals in positions of national prominence hoped that the long standing conservatism of southern politics was coming to an end, and the election of several liberals to state and national of fice in the post war years buoyed their optimism. However, several years of struggling to attract southerners to ADA did not create the network of chapters its leaders had hoped to create, and this dissertation shows how and why that process failed and co ntributes to the political history of the post war South.

PAGE 8

8 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Those southern liberals who worked against the prevailing conservative nature of politics in the South have always seen themselves as at least somewhat exceptional and un ique. As a result, it is not surprising to learn that modern historians of southern liberalism have treated their subjects in a similar fashion. Over the past thirty years, historians have produced dozens of biographies that have attempted to explain how these men and women arrived at their views and how they responded to the challenges they faced as a result of their convictions. For example, as president of the Un liberalism, and his association with organizations such as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), led to charges that he was a Communist and un American. 1 Each southern southern way of life united them. 2 1 Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham: A Southern Liberal (Winston Salem, N.C., 1980), 155 156. 2 For additional examples of biographies of southern liberals, see Charles W. Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations: The Evolution of a Southern Liberal (Knoxville, 1982); Wilma Dykeman, Seeds of Southern Change: The Life of Will Alexander (Chicago, 1962); Barbara Barksdale Clou se, Ralph McGill: A Biography (Macon, GA, 1998); Louise Blackwell and Frances Clay, Lillian Smith (New York, 1971); Anne C. Loveland, Lillian Smith, A Southerner Confronting the South (Baton Rouge, 1986); John Salmond, A Southern Rebel: The Life and Times of Aubrey Willis Williams, 1890 1965 (Chapel Hill, 1983).

PAGE 9

9 As historians have told the individual stories of southern liberals, they have also sought to explain how their col lective efforts affected the course of southern history in the twentieth century. The most important difference between these historians concerns the importance they place on racial issues. Morton J. Sosna, John Dittmer, David Chappell, and Jason Sokol h ave all concentrated almost exclusively on the process by which certain southerners became racial liberals and traced the effect these liberals had on the debate over legal and social segregation in the South. 3 In Search of the Silent South is mos t explicit in defining southern liberalism lynching legislati on, voting rights for blacks, and desegregation of public facilities. 4 Other historians have advocated a more comprehensive view of what it meant for a twentieth Days of Hope does not deemphasize ra cial issues, but she does believe that southern liberals who were politically active 5 Numan Bar activism, though he detects a shift in liberalism between the end of World War II and the mid 1950s. During the post mic reform had gone out of 3 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue (New York, 1977); John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana, Ill., 1994) ; David L. Chappell, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore, 1994); Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945 1975 (New York, 2006). 4 Sosna, viii. 5 Patricia Sullivan, Da ys of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill, 1996), 2, 3 5.

PAGE 10

10 liberals in a difficult position, and many liberals became moderates who tried to gradually change the South without resorting to 6 the period following the Second World War. However, one aspect of the history of southern liberalism that has not re ceived enough attention from historians concerns how southern liberals interacted with their northern allies. One of the most important liberal organizations of the mid twentieth century was Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), founded in the wake of th e 1946 Republican congressional landslide. From the beginning, this organization, which included such New Deal luminaries as Eleanor Roosevelt, economist John Kenneth Galbraith, United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, an d Pulitzer Prize to the principles of freedom and those who were Communists, or those who wanted to work with Communists (or fascists) to achieve the goals of New Deal domestic liber alism. 7 define liberalism along these lines and work to convince Americans that their prescriptions would lead to freedom and prosperity. 6 Numan V. Bartley, T he New South, 1945 1980 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 70 73. 7 Peter Beinart New Republic December 13, 2004, p. 18.

PAGE 11

11 The fate of ADA liberalism in the South is the subject of this study, and it shows how the entrenched political conservatism of the region frustrated liberals who had convinced themselves that their philosophy could succeed in the South. In the period between 1947 and 1963, ADA leaders worked hard to establish a political and o rganizational presence in the South, and they believed they could succeed. According to historian Kevin Mattson, Niebuhr and Schlesinger think beyond the interests 8 The problem for ADA liberals was that they possessed an inflated view of their own effectiveness. As Mattson has noted, they wrote for the best magazines and newspapers, held well influence over public debate did not translate into tangible political power Their chosen presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, lost each election he contested. In addition, political conservatives had organizations and intellectuals of their own making their 9 ADA liberals did have some success to show for thei r efforts. At the 1948 Democratic National Convention, Hubert H. Humphrey, mayor of Minneapolis and soon to be elected senator from Minnesota, stirred the delegates with his call for a strong stand on civil rights. His e rushing this issue of civil rights, I say to them, we are 172 8 Kevin Mattson, When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith of Postwar Liberalism (New York 2004), 8 9 9 Mattson 12 14.

PAGE 12

12 Dixiecrat ticket with South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond at its head. 10 In the face of this c also had influence on any number of state and local races, particularly in the Northeast and on the West Coast. In this first election since its creation, congressional candidates, governors, and mayors consulted ADA, counted on its support, and worked for legislation to promote fair employment practices, expand public housing and education, extend Social Security and labor rights, and combat Soviet influence around the world. ability to wield influence in Washington masked serious political and organizational problems. While ADA boasted of its political effectiveness, it faced chronic shortages of almost everything such a group needed to remain a significant political force. One such shortage was in membership. As Steven M. Gillon notes in hi s comprehensive history of the ADA, and as its cite one example, the publicity brochure The Story of ADA exceeded 40,000, but ADA records showed that the real figure was closer to 20,000. 11 The understandable, but staffers and board members knew the truth. Organizations such as ADA f aced two additional problems, each tied strongly to the South: the limits of cooperation with political parties and other liberal organizations; and the 10 Humphrey quoted in Steven M. Gillon Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism 1947 1985 (New York, 1987), 48. 11 Gillon, 57 58.

PAGE 13

13 commit ments to other groups, including the Democratic Party, labor unions, ethnic organizations, and the NAACP. ADA leaders tried to address this problem by portraying the organization as a clearinghouse for liberals. Its leaders acknowledged the role that oth er groups played in highlighting injustices on a narrower front (with the NAACP leading the fight on racial issues and civil rights, for example) while billing ADA as an organization for people who were concerned about all of the important issues of the da y and needed a place to pool their intellectual and financial resources. Thus, ADA national conventions became gathering places for the liberal elite, whether or not attendees were actually members of the organization. The other problem ADA faced, the pr oblem highlighted in this study, was regional. If expand its base of support in regions where liberalism had not been strong. Local chapters in the Northeast, the i ndustrial Midwest, and California did not have trouble finding liberals committed to the ADA platform, but the same could not be said of Texas, Alabama, and Georgia. Nevertheless, the importance of the South in national politics and the intransigence of i ts politicians dictated that ADA needed to make strong efforts in the region, and between 1947 and the mid 1960s ADA leaders worked hard to interest southerners in their program. Liberals had long wanted to break what they thought of as a self destructive cycle in southern politics, educating southerners on the virtues of liberalism so that they would begin to reject the conservative politicians they routinely elected. By electing people who were not afraid of integration or government intervention in the economy, liberals believed that southerners would accelerate the long, hard task of bringing their region in line with the rest of the country, which they believed had already accepted the New Deal.

PAGE 14

14 In order to do this, ADA members needed to perform the long, hard work of writing Committee called for an expanded budget of $30,000 for organizing activities in regions where ADA did not yet have a large presence, in cluding the South. According to the minutes of the was for additional field staff. He pointed out, for example, that we had only one organizer for the whole M idwest and only one for the whole South. The $30,000 proposed budget will permit several additional organizers. 12 However, Loeb was speaking of an ideal financial and political situation for ADA, one which he hoped southern contributions would enhance. It is clear that ADA faced a dilemma in the South: it certainly would have attracted many more members if it had organizers in every southern state, but it could not commit resources until organizers were sure that they could recruit more dues paying membe rs. national ADA figures such as Mrs. Roosevelt and Schlesinger claimed, in the media and before mmanded all of its members to adhere to all of its policy pronouncements, in fact deep disagreements over the nature and extent of economic, political, and social change were rife. This was particularly true in the South, where national leaders and local members engaged in a difficult, tricky dance over other fields, but not its commitment to integration. Southern ADA members never explicitly 12 Minutes of ADA Executive Committee meeting, May 3, 1947 reel 33, n o. 63 A mericans for Democratic Action Papers, University of Florida Libraries, Gainesville microfilm collection (hereafter cited as AD A Papers)

PAGE 15

15 pressured national leaders to change the platform, and many southerners shared their beliefs in voting rights and fair employment practices. At the same time, however, in most cases they did all they could to deemphasize civil rights when appealing to prospective members. For example, southern ADA members pressed for changes in ADA literature so that civil rights declarations would appear at the end of pamphlets instead of the begin ning. Southern liberals thought ADA leaders were forcing them to make uncomfortable choices, and many potential members stayed away from the organization because of its liberal stance on civil rights. The decisions about when and how stringently to pursu e organization in the South were but the effects of these decisions were felt at the southern grass roots level. In the first three years of its existence, ADA e mployed two Southern Field Representatives. Barney Taylor and Alden Hopkins traveled thousands of miles, speaking to hundreds of southerners, including labor leaders, prominent southern blacks, college presidents and students, and unaffiliated liberals wh o saw ADA as a chance to connect with liberalism on a national level. They reported promising leads, started chapters and exploratory membership committees, and engaged in fund raising drives. In the end, however, their efforts were largely unrewarded. No southern chapters created in this period attracted more than fifty members. Taylor and Hopkins never raised more than a few hundred dollars for ADA (and spent thousands of dollars raising that money), and many of the people who expressed interest in AD A never actually became members. As tireless as these early organizers were (and as promising as their leads seemed), they were stretched thin considering the territory they had to cover. In the end, the organizers had to make decisions about which areas they were to cover, and electoral politics dictated these

PAGE 16

16 confined her organizing to North Carolina and Florida. She did this because each of these states was el ecting a United States senator in 1950, and each incumbent was a prominent southern liberal with significant political problems. One of them was Frank Porter Graham, whose affiliation with SCHW, coupled with accusations that Graham supported integration, h elped conservative Democrats had criticized Claude Pepper for his pro Soviet sentiments. In the 1944 election, when the United States was a wartime ally of the Stalinist state, this had not hurt Pepper. In 1950, these associations were among the factors that caused his bitter loss to ADA leaders knew that Graham and Pepper needed all of the assistance they could get. This was the main impetus for sending Hopkins to these two states during the primary campaigns. However, she found it difficult to organize in the South. Indeed, in North Carolina and Florida, the politicians she was attempting to help did no t want her help. The organizational problems were primarily political: it was difficult to sell big government liberalism in the South, particularly if liberals also championed black civil rights. That being said, the requirements for organizing a workin g chapter (25 dues paying members) were not onerous, even if potential could never attract competent local leadership. During her time with ADA, Hopkins traveled consta ntly, but she could not be in all places at once. There was only so much she could do via telephone, telegram, and the mail to rally support during those long stretches when she could not be in Charlotte, Raleigh, Tampa, or Miami. In her absence, the ADA staff in Washington needed committed volunteers to pick up the slack, but these men and women often did not exist.

PAGE 17

17 Taylor before her, were frustrated, and in 1950 she left ADA. However, her passion on the subject of sout h ern organization was not dead She had always acknowledged the difficulty of organizing ADA chapters in the South without compromising on the core ideals for which the organization stood, especially its support for racial integration. Nevertheless, Hopki ns believe d that liberals could be elected to Congress from the South especially from major cities such as Nashville, New Orleans, and Atlanta Her commitment to the South had not dissipated organizatio n in the South is much more than a matter of political expedience; it is a matter of political life or death nationally 13 Hopkins thought that the fate of liberalism in the 1950s ity at home and abroad. Hopkins certainly believed in the political importance of the South, but that did not change the fact that, most of the chapters Taylor and Hopkins attempted to organize failed to last beyond 1950. Hopkins believed that getting AD A off the ground in the South was a matter of organizing dollars to the region for such modest results when the same financial resources yielded far greater r eturns in New York, Washington, or Los Angeles. ADA leaders never stopped trying to attract support for liberalism in the South, but after 1950 it did so in a far more informal manner, waiting for inquiries about its platform from interested southerners b efore approach. This approach mirrored important trends in liberal thinking during the 1950s, when 13 Alden Hopkins memo to J ames A. Loeb, December 31, 1949, reel 50, no. 269, ADA Papers

PAGE 18

18 intellectuals concentrated on consolidating liberal gains made over the previous decades instead of attempting to conquer new territory. This passivity did not, however, preclude more substantive attempts at organization if an interesting possibility presented itself. One such opportunity arose in 1953, national AD A leaders seized an opportunity to organize in Texas, with the help of a former labor organizer, George Lambert. Texas was a unique case for ADA because of the open intransigence and double inued to proclaim themselves to be members in good standing of the national Democratic Party. However, these conservatives thought that their nominal loyalty to the party should have allowed them to exercise an absolute veto over the Democratic platform a 1948 and 1952, conservatives had thrown their support behind the Republican ticket when the national Democratic Party failed to conform to their agenda. Texas liberals such as Maury Maverick, Wright Patman, and Ra lph Yarborough worked hard to lessen the power of influence liberals actually had. In 1953, Lambert proposed that ADA join the liberal campaign to blunt the power of Go positions of power and influence within the Democratic Party. Lam bert and his allies in Texas wanted to expose Shivers and his allies, and ADA leaders approved a campaign designed to boost membership in the state while working with local liberals to reduce conservative power within the party. They wanted national Democ rats to look past the money and power Texas conservatives controlled and excommunicate them as punishment for attempting to destroy the

PAGE 19

19 party from the inside. Lambert also wanted to send a message to two prominent Democrats in Washington, Representative S am Rayburn and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. These two Texans were particularly susceptible to outside pressures: while they were enormously influential in Washington, D.C., they were vulnerable to challenges from Shivers, who always suspected them of being too liberal in supporting public housing, education, and government health insurance. For their part, liberals thought Rayburn and Johnson too conservative on civil rights and too zealous in protecting Texas oil and gas industries. Each side thought it c ould influence these two powerful men and seize control of the state Democratic Party in the mid 1950s. In the end, neither side truly won the war. Rayburn and Johnson fended off challenges to their political positions through deft maneuvering that kept e veryone off balance, and Shivers organization amounted to little for Lambert beyond a few new ADA chapters in Fort Worth, Houston, and several smaller communi ties. Like Hopkins, Lambert found that organizing a place such as Texas required finding committed and hard working people in those communities who were willing to sacrifice for the sake of their chapter, and those people were hard to find. He also suffe red even more acutely as a result of the financial burdens ADA was carrying in the 1950s. Lambert was tireless in his quest to foster ADA liberalism to Texas. However, his efforts went largely unrewarded. The national organization ended its financial s upport for Lambert before the 1956 elections, in which Texas again cast its electoral votes for the Republican ticket. Clearly, a new strategy for ADA organization was needed, and while ADA leaders never truly gave up on the South, their focus shifted to A Democratic Action (SDA) before 1958 and Campus ADA (CADA) afterward. This

PAGE 20

20 organization, whose local leaders during the period included future Michigan Senator Carl Levin and future Vice President and Democratic founded at the same time as ADA, but the bulk of its work in the post war South happened after 1955. Before that year, the SDA chapters that had been formed at southern universities were much like their AD A counterparts: small, ineffective, and contributing little to the fight for liberalism. One of the main problems the student affiliates faced was that SDA members did not know what kind of relationship they should have with other liberal groups, especial ly on the campuses of historically black colleges. In 1955, new SDA Field Secretary Yale Bernstein, who had spent several years working in New York state as an ADA organizer, brought new energy to the task of starting new chapters and cajoling existing one s into stronger action. Bernstein was especially eager to organize the South either on the student or adult level, in the South. Some church groups, sometimes som e of the unions, and sometimes the NAACP will be active. These groups do not however, because of their restrictive membership attraction, reach the majority of the believed that SDA could bring about a push toward this new South, which would be far out of proportion to its numbers, and could bring into the active, aware political arena, many students who would otherwise be lost to the movement. 14 assistance of newly energized young libera ls, SDA and CADA were far bolder in addressing important political issues of the South in the 1950s and 1960s. SDA students assisted blacks who boycotted the bus system in Montgomery, Alabama in the wake of the Rosa Parks incident. They also protested ba ns on interracial athletic competitions in Mississippi and Georgia, 14 mocratic Action national office, reel 122, series VIII, no 2 ADA Paper s

PAGE 21

21 supported the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s, and fought for freedom of expression at div ision ever did. The biggest impact this younger generation had on ADA was its willingness to challenge the status quo. Most ADA leaders who thought about the problems of the South had been cautious when addressing problems such as segregation. They knew that many potential members who might have agreed with them on other issues were unwilling to integrate schools and public accommodations. They also believed the primary goal of the organization was organizing: recruiting members, starting chapters, solic iting contributions, finding common cause on issues that could lead to successful campaigns for political change. Student organizers, 1947 and the Brown decision of 1 954. Timidity, compromise, and vacillation for the sake of the organization would no longer help liberals. In the end, though, these students had an inconclusive impact on southern politics. The problems they faced were twofold, and they could do little about either. First, liberal students were largely unwilling to compromise their beliefs on civil rights in order to attract more members, and this made them pariahs on many campuses. Second, the transitory nature of the college experience meant that cha pters were in a constant state of flux, with politically experienced students leaving the scene as they graduated. This meant that an organization such as SDA or CADA was unable to sustain pressure for liberal change on southern campuses. It also meant t hat this pressure was largely the work of committed individuals at certain flashpoints. The most significant of these campaigns was the 1962 fight to integrate the University of Florida in Gainesville. Campus ADA was involved in this fight largely becaus e of

PAGE 22

22 the effort of a handful of committed students who corresponded with black leaders in the state and pressured state and university officials to integrate the campus. The successful integration of liberalism in the post war South. This success, however, did not translate into the kind of organization ADA enjoyed outside of the South. The bulk of its membership continued to come from the Northeast, particularly New York and Washington, as well as Ch icago, Los Angeles, and other large cities outside of the South. ADA members from the South attended board meetings and national conventions throughout this period, but in most cases they existed merely as curiosities, people who would normally have littl e contact with members from the rest of the country. They also failed to create a strong financial base in the South: most of the money ADA used in its organizing came from labor unions and wealthy patrons outside of the South, meaning any activity in the region was a financial drain throughout the two decades following World War II. The political fortunes of New Deal liberalism in the South were better than this record indicates, especially when considering the civil rights successes of the period. Howe ver, it would be a mistake to credit these accomplishments to the efforts of ADA. It is also important to acknowledge that as ADA was trying to change the South, the organization itself was changing during the decades that followed the end of World War II. What it meant to be a liberal was also changing during that period, and many on the left had become disenchanted with Cold War liberalism by the 1960s. This disenchantment was partly iberation and tired of causes. Many people believed that old style liberalism was reaching the limits of its effectiveness, and the South was the most damni

PAGE 23

23 failure to organize in the South, given the intellectual and political weight behind the organization, is an important aspect of the story of how a seemingly ascendant liberalism responded to the challenges its ad herents faced in post war America.

PAGE 24

24 CHAPTER 2 RED L IGHT G REEN L IGHT : S OUTHERN L IBERALISM C OMMUNISM AND THE UDA/ADA IN THE 1940S In the immediate wake of World War II, American liberals faced two key dilemmas: how to deal with Communists and their poli tical allies; and what to do about the American South. The liberals who founded the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) explicitly addressed the former issue. Their concern about pro Soviet elements on the American left, and the effect these elements h ad on the ability of liberals to win and retain political power, was the issue that political conservatism, its hostility toward organized labor, and its racial in justices would emerge as another key challenge as ADA activists sought to build a vigorous national organization. In the same period, tensions among white southern liberals replicated the challenges that ADA activists faced nationally. Throughout World W ar II, two liberal organizations vied for influence in a South undergoing rapid industrial and demographic change. While the leadership of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) openly welcomed Communist participation, the leaders of the Souther and explicitly banned Communists and socialists from participating in their organization. With signs of progressive political rebirth emerging in the aftermath of war, the South posed both a complex dile mma and a rare opportunity for liberals at the national level. Underscoring all of this were the events of 1945, which shook all Americans in a profound way. By August, Germany and Japan had surrendered to the Allies. Harvard trained historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. was in Paris at the end of the war, freshly drafted into the U.S. Army after several years of working with the Office of Strategic Services in England and France as an intelligence analyst and writer. For many Americans, the end of the wa r was a curious moment.

PAGE 25

25 They were enthusiastic about the prospect of peace, but the death of President Franklin D. had been a great deal of speculation on Roosev age hardly remembered any president before FDR. We unconsciously supposed that he would 1 career to that point reflected his liberalism. His Pulitzer Prize winni ng Age of Jackson published in 1945, was a self conscious attempt to place the events of pre Civil War America in the context of the Great Depression and New Deal, arguing that the Jacksonian Democrats were proto New Dealers like himself. Now the great c hampion of American liberalism had died, and 2 He had been so effective in pushing the country to accept liberal legislation such as Social Security, banking reform, public power, a nd labor legislation. Moreover, he had created a solid Democratic coalition that passed liberal legislation and protected the gains of the New Deal from a conservative backlash. Now he was gone, and liberals were not at all sure where they fit in under R 3 1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Life in the 20 th Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917 1950 (Boston 2000), 346. 2 Schlesinger, Life 346 3 Steven Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947 1985 (New York, 1987), 3.

PAGE 26

26 particularly the vast majority of elected officials and power brokers in the Democratic Party, had cooperated wit h the New Deal only begrudgingly, if at all. They looked forward to dealing with Atlanta Constitution edito r his respects, and he recorded his impressions of the trip through rural Georgia for his newspaper. cal classes felt toward Roosevelt, reporting instead on the respect and admiration ordinary Americans had for the man who had been their greatest champion, even if his rhetoric often outpaced his achievements. This reaction, in part, led McGill to write t 4 challenges of post war life, with or without Roosevelt. The divisions that had existed in the United States before the war had not disappeared, but had merely faded as international problems took precedence. One of these divisions was between North and South. Many Americans, particularly liberals, emerged from the war with the sense that they could no longer ignore pressing social and economic problems in their own country. Some of them were native southerners whose opinions, particularly on racial issues, had not survived their wartime experiences. Liberals hoped that this cohort of southerners was a large 4 McGill quoted in John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Chapel Hill 1995), 332.

PAGE 27

27 of our fighting men have had experiences which have taught them a new appreciation of their 5 McGill was also sure that the South would become more liberal. He acknowledged the problems and divisions that were a fundamental part of the postwar political and social landscape. Ho wever, he also thought that the problems the United States faced should be viewed in the context of the five years that had just passed. His country was the most powerful, and richest, on earth, possessed of technology (including the atomic bomb) that now awed the world. armies mankind had ever produced. Under such circumstances, how could any challenge be e were basically decent and that, 6 outlook were not so sure, and events in the months that preceded the founding of ADA in January 1947 showed that New Dealers wh o wanted to keep their vision of the country alive in First, liberals had to reckon with a new president. Almost from the moment he assumed the office, Harry Truman had appeared unable to grasp the enormity of his position, and New Deal liberals had no confidence in his ability to lead as Roosevelt had. He took the side of large defense contractors when these businesses laid off tens of thousands of workers who were no longer needed in a p eacetime economy. In May 1946, he shocked liberal sensibilities when he asked Congress for authorization to draft striking railroad workers, claiming that a national 5 Johnson quoted in Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945 1975 (New York 2006), 20. 6 McGill quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 332 333.

PAGE 28

28 emergency necessitated the move. 7 Although he publicly proclaimed his support for a perm anent Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to combat racial discrimination in the workplace, he did not fight for it when powerful southern members of Congress blocked it. Several resigning to protest what they considered to be troubling trends toward moderation or conservatism. In short, liberals had convinced themselves they would have to fight to remain a viable force within the Democratic Party. 8 Truman appeared to be equally unsure of his footing in foreign affairs. His limited experience in the international arena did not inspire confidence, especially in a postwar world where everyth as well, but liberals were less sure of what that legacy was. The wartime Allies had defeated fascism and Nazism, but with that common enemy no longer a threat, prewar diffe rences between the coalition partners reasserted themselves. Roosevelt had overcome these differences with deft personal diplomacy, especially in talks with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. However, by the end of the war many Americans had come to the conclu sion that Stalin could not be trusted. It remains unclear whether the Soviet Union was a real threat to the United States in the early years of the Cold War, but the anxiety with which Americans regarded Stalin was certainly real. 9 Truman believed that a n American projection of strength would force Stalin into uncomfortable 7 Gillon, Politics and Vision 4. 8 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill 1996) 223 225 (quote on 225). 9 John Lewis Gaddis, The L ong Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), 20 29; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945 2002 (Boston, 2002), 29 31.

PAGE 29

29 positions, and his earliest use of this tactic came at the July 1945 conference held in Potsdam, Germany, where Truman casually informed Stalin that the United States, working with Bri tish and other Allied scientists, had successfully tested a special weapon (the atomic bomb) in the deserts of New Mexico. Truman hoped to scare Stalin into keeping his promises concerning self determination in Eastern Europe with this new weapon, though he thought he could accomplish this whether or not the bomb worked. 10 climactic, as Stalin showed little interest in it beyond its potential use in ending the war against Japan. The reason his reaction was much less dramatic than Truman had wanted it to be was that the Soviets already knew about the bomb. A German born British scientist, Klaus Fuchs, had been passing alon g detailed scientific and mechanical information about the research at Los Alamos to Communists in Britain, who which had begun in 1942, to progress much faster than it would have otherwise. It also meant that Stalin was well therefore, was not news to Stalin. 11 Klaus Fuchs was not the only person working for the government of the United States who ha d a hidden agenda. Communist spies in the American government were active and important, and recently declassified documents have revealed important details about these spies. For example, although Alger Hiss defended himself to the end of his life again st charges that he passed secrets from his offices in the State Department and White House to top level Soviet 10 David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 442. 11 McCullough, Truman 442 443.

PAGE 30

30 agents, in fact he was a long time member of the Communist Party and had been leading a double life during and after the Second World War. 12 He w as one of several well positioned government functionaries who were spying on behalf of the Soviet government during the 1930s and 1940s. 13 The public had little knowledge of this espionage as it was happening, but Americans across the political spectrum we re already coming to the conclusion that while the Soviets may have been wartime allies, Communism and capitalism were fundamentally incompatible. New Deal liberals in particular found themselves at a crossroads as they debated how the United States shoul d deal with Communism. Some, including former vice president and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, saw no reason why the wartime alliance could not continue. He argued that the United States should recognize Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and s hare military and nuclear knowledge with the Soviets, believing that confrontation with Communism ntry, especially in the South. 14 12 G. Edwar d White, Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 220 230. 13 Revelations about the extent of Soviet espionage within the Manhattan Project continue to this day. One such spy was Dr. George Koval, an Iowa born scientist who worked at the Oak Ridge nuclear laboratories in 1944 and 1945 after earning his doctorate at the Mendeleev Institute in Moscow and receiving special training from Soviet military intelligence. American intelligence kept his espionage a secret for decades, but his usefulness to the Soviets became clear in November of 2007, when Russian President Vladimir Putin posthumously honored Koval as a his courage and heroism while carrying o ut special missions Bomb to Kremlin New York Times 12 November 2007, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/us/12koval.html (accessed January 8, 2008). 14 Sullivan, Days of Hope 225 227.

PAGE 31

31 Others, including Schlesinger, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and New York Post editor James Weschler, thought there was no contradiction between a continued commitment to the New Deal and recognition of the Soviet Union as an enemy that needed to be confronted. These men believed that the United States was far from perfect, and that domestic reform was vital to the realization of American greatness. No liberal could be completely proud of his nation while legal and cultural barriers separated blacks from whites in everyday life, or when thousands of American workers found themselves unemployed after they had helped to defeat fascism and Nazism through their efforts on the home front. However, they did not believe that Commun ism had any solutions to offer the United States. Not only did they believe that Communism did not work economically or socially, but they abhorred the fact that Communists, in practice, refused to allow any formal opposition of any kind. No good liberal could work with any person, American or otherwise, who would allow such infringements on human rights. 15 The division among liberals had its parallels in the South as well, though the debate was somewhat different. While Communism was a significant marker of the battle lines among liberals, a far more important issue in the South was how one stood on racial issues. The debate Depression, the New Deal, and World War II h ighlighted the role of the federal government in race relations. Roosevelt did not overtly challenge the South on its racially segregated practices during his presidency, but he did make many enemies in the region with his harsh words toward those congres smen who opposed his reforms. He was not anti southern, but he did want the confront them. Northern liberals agreed with Roosevelt, laying down a clear challenge t o their 15 Kevin Mattson, When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith of Postwar Liberalism (New York 2004), 50 51, 65.

PAGE 32

32 southern brethren and imploring them to solve these problems before outside pressures forced change upon the region. 16 Southern liberals wanted to show their support for New Deal reforms in the South. As a result, in November 1938, a group of these liberals attended a political conference in Birmingham, Alabama that acted as the opening meeting for the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW). A flyer urging people to attend the Birmingham meeting advertised the existence of a liberal South, bu scattered, the effectiveness of their work limited by their lack of coordination. The Conference, by providing a meeting ground for all Southern progressives, will promote mutual trust and 17 The conference also vowed to the segregationist customs of Birmingham during the meeting itself. The Birmingham meeting attracted over 1,200 participants, 20 percent of whom were black. The liberal star power present at the meeting was impressive: Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, University of North Carolina President Frank Porter Graham, and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt each addressed the convention. 18 Few remembered what these attendees said, police reminded conference organizers that their meeting was to be strictly segregated, the 16 Morton J. Sosna, In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue (New York, 1977), 88. 17 Sosna, In Search of the Silent South 90 18 While Graham and Roosevelt certainly qualified as racial liberals, it should be noted that other attendees, including Senator Lister Hill and Governor Bibb Graves of Alabama, did not share the liberal views of many at the confer ence. Their attendance stemmed primarily from their reputations as good New Deal liberals on non racial issues. Sosna, In Search of the Silent South 91 92.

PAGE 33

33 organizers complied, but Mrs. Roosevelt refused to move from her seat among the black participants even after police ordered her to move. After the confrontation, organizers placed themselves on the side of the First Lady by resol ving never to hold another segregated meeting. This was an important symbolic confrontation with the conservative power structure that signaled at least some liberals were willing to cast aside their customary caution in challenging the status quo. This cost SCHW some members in the short term, but many liberals throughout the country praised the stand the Southern Conference took in Birmingham. 19 It was more difficult for many liberals to accept that SCHW welcomed the assistance of Communists in their wor k. At least six known members of the Communist Party attended the Birmingham conference. Conservative southerners seized upon this fact, and the anti segregation resolution passed at the end of the conference, to confuse the two issues, implying that all racial liberals were Communists and vice versa. The issue of Communism in America (and in the Southern Conference) did not take center stage in the country for some time, especially after the outbreak of war and the creation of a tenuous alliance with the Soviet Union for the duration of that war. Graham, for one, refused to allow this talk to dissuade him from participating in SCHW, maintaining that Communist influence in the organization was insignificant. 20 ept Communists into the fold before the war caused the group serious problems after the war ended. While the war raged, liberal southerners on the home front focused on ending voting restrictions that prevented thousands of blacks and poor whites from goin g to the polls. They reasoned that a true majority of southern voters would reject the racially poisonous politics of 19 Sullivan Days of Hope 99 101. 20 Sosna In Search of the Silent South 97 98.

PAGE 34

34 elected leaders such as Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi and Governor Eugene Talmadge of Georgia. There was an important strain of optimism in this logic that colored the thinking of liberals throughout the era. Liberals worked and organized in the South under the assumption that the region was not as politically reactionary as most Americans made it out to be. They disagreed when i t came to determining why southerners continued to elect conservatives to public office, however. Some argued that the true voice of the South was never really heard, since thousands of potential voters had never cast their ballots. Others argued that th e political class that ruled the South had misled the voters, keeping them focused on relatively unimportant racial issues while failing to address the economic and social problems that had plagued the region for decades. Either way, liberals were convinc ed that a systematic, sustained campaign to register voters and educate them on the issues would result in a change in liberal electoral fortunes. 21 Another trend in the fight for southern liberalism was that liberals in the region needed to continually rem ind southerners of their own southern roots. They wanted to defuse the notion that the real impetus behind southern liberalism came from outside the South. Florida Senator Claude Pepper made such an argument in 1942, when he introduced a bill that would have outlawed poll taxes in all federal elections. Responding to criticism from Alabama Governor t had a direct ancestor who 22 This declaration of loyalty to the South did not prevent reactionaries from labeling him a Communist or integrationist, but Pepper vowed that 21 Sosna In Sear ch of the Silent South 98. 22 Sosna In Search of the Silent South 101.

PAGE 35

35 these slanders would not prevent h im from fighting for what he thought was right, and thousands of southern liberals made similar arguments during and after World War II. In the end, liberals were unable to force large scale reforms to the poll tax system in the South. Anti poll tax bills introduced into Congress died quickly, and states refused to budge on the issue. Despite these failures, however, the transformations of the war years had heartened liberal reformers, especially in 1944, when the Supreme Court declared the all white Demo cratic primary in Texas to be unconstitutional in Smith v. Allwright The decision did not prevent southern states from placing legal barriers between black voters and the polls, but it did signal that practices that had not been challenged for decades we re coming under fire. 23 Liberals also benefited from wartime changes to the southern economy. Southerners had eagerly sought defense contracts and welcomed the creation of large new factories to fill them. Along with these economic opportunities, however, southerners had also accepted increased scrutiny of their way of life. Labor leaders, for example, had long lamented the manner in which southern factory owners prevented them from organizing workers, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) ha d failed to establish a foothold in the South despite its aggressive approach to organization. During the war, however, CIO leaders vehemently argued that the southern status quo resulted in wasted manpower and production delays that hurt the war effort. 24 southern liberals in their quest for reform. The most significant victory won on this front during the war was won by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 23 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 380 381. 24 Sullivan Days of Hope 135.

PAGE 36

36 who had threatened President Roosevelt with a march on Washington in the summer of 1941 if the government did not end discriminato ry practices in defense industries. Roosevelt responded to the pressure with Executive Order 8802, which established a Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to investigate hiring and labor practices, as well as racial discrimination against workers i n defense and government. The creation of the FEPC did not stop racial discrimination, nor did it prevent reactionaries from stalling change to the status quo in the South. Nevertheless, it showed that the federal government was willing to investigate wh at was really going on in the South. 25 As these events unfolded, SCHW continued to grow under the leadership of executive Theological Seminary, and the co founder o f the Highlander Folk School in rural Tennessee. ideas conflicted with t he policies of the CIO, which financed Highlander and wanted to avoid In December 1941, this issue caused Dombrowski to resign from Highlander and join SCHW. He effort to defeat fascism. He also blocked changes in SCHW bylaws, proposed by board member Frank McAllister in 1943, that would have barred Communists from the group, ar guing that such a change would have hindered the campaign to promote democracy and liberal values. 26 This 25 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 213 216; Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven, 1995), 50, 145 146. 26 Sullivan, Days of Hope 150 155; Sosna In Search of the Silent South 142 144.

PAGE 37

37 policy battle attracted little attention during the war, but it would cause serious problems for the Southern Conference after the war. The other majo r organization for southern liberals, the Southern Regional Council (SRC), was a product of the war itself. It differed from the Southern Conference in several key respects. It kept membership rolls small, as opposed to SCHW, which sought to attract as m any members as possible. SRC cultivated ties to middle class Southerners, while the Southern Conference concentrated on the working classes. Most importantly, SRC projected a relatively conservative public image, excluding not only Communists and Sociali sts but members of the NAACP as well. Certainly NAACP members were not pleased at being associated with political radicals, members agreed that reform was needed. Its resolutions supported FEPC and condemned the white primary and the poll tax. However, the organization did not endorse an immediate end to racial segregation. Some individual members did advocate desegregation, either as a practical reallocation of huma n resources or as a needed moral reform. Most, however, were either against desegregation entirely or wanted to avoid a confrontation that would provoke the wrath of reactionaries. Throughout the 1940s, SRC and SCHW were rivals for the affections of sout hern liberals, though many people, including SCHW President Clark Foreman and Fisk University president Charles S. Johnson, became members of both. 27 In 1947, the rivalry between the two groups continued. Other reports out of the South during the war were more ominous. They showed that the problems of the region went far beyond the failure to hire or train black workers for jobs in southern defense plants. Southern blacks began to challenge segregationist practices in the 27 Egerton Speak Now Against the Day 432 439.

PAGE 38

38 military, on public transportatio n, and in education, and white reactionaries responded violently. Lynchings, which had been declining for years, increased throughout the South, and white mobs often targeted decorated black soldiers as a sign that military bravery was no protection again st entrenched white supremacy. 28 Politicians seized on the fears of whites, both during and after the war, though the results of such fear intimidation for many, particularly in the 194 2 Democratic gubernatorial primary. Ironically, universities to lose their national accreditation. The public embarrassment the scandal generated caused voters to turn to his opponent, former state attorney general Ellis Arnall, as a credible alternative. Arnall won the election, and his term as governor included successf ul efforts to end the poll tax, end rebates for railroads, and destroy the Klan in Georgia. His governorship seemed to indicate that liberal political change was possible in the South. 29 However, reactionaries and conservatives still held a great deal of p olitical power in the South. Many observers concluded that the fate of the South was uncertain, since both sides could claim successes. For example, while Arnall was able to push through liberal reforms in Georgia, Talmadge did not fade away. He spent t compliance with Smith v. Allwright to win the governorship back from Arnall. 30 28 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 358 375; Sosna, In Search of the Silent South 34 36. 29 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 378 379. 30 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 385 386.

PAGE 39

39 victory served as a reminder to liberals that success was often temporary, and that permanent realignment in favor of liberalism was going to be difficult to achieve. In short, the South appeared to be up for grabs in the wake of the changes brought on by World War II. Liberals and con servatives alike were eager for the opportunity to take advantage of this situation. Nowhere was the battle for the region more noticeable than in Georgia, where for all when the governor elect died of cancer be fore he could assume the office. Because Talmadge was such a polarizing figure, and because Talmadge forces were his father. The controversy over the governorship of Georgia lasted several months, with Arnall and Talmadge supporters literally fighting one another outside the capitol when Talmadge attempted to claim the office. Pro Talmadge men changed the locks on office, but his supporte rs had shown that they were willing to do almost anything to stop liberal reform. 31 In this highly charged atmosphere, it was difficult for the Southern Conference and its allies to find solid footing. The problem for SCHW was its close association with kn own Communists and fellow travelers, which became a problem once the bitterness of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union became clear. In March 1946, when Winston rn Europe (with President Truman in attendance), Americans believed him, and they blamed Communists for this. As the 31 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 386 389.

PAGE 40

40 political realignment that resulted from the Cold War became clear, people associated with Communism became targets, whether or not their associations had national security implications. No one could reasonably claim that James Dombrowski posed a threat to the United States, but SCHW and its liberal all ies began to feel immense pressure, in part because their organization had never been more successful than at the end of World War II. By the end of 1945, SCHW had three thousand members, including most of the prominent southerners who had been present at the Birmingham meeting, and it boasted a budget of $85,000, augmented by fund raising events held throughout the country. Dombrowski and Foreman looked forward to continued growth in the post war years. However, the success it enjoyed during this period did Georgia chapter refused to take a public stand on the Arnall private sympathy for Arnall. Political observers had long thought Georgia had the best financed, either because it did not want to associate with what they saw as a losing cause or because it did ances at victory with their endorsement, was difficult for fellow liberals to understand. 32 That same year, SCHW suffered a more significant blow to its effectiveness when the CIO, its main financial backer, withdrew most of its support. The roots of CIO d isaffection with term unemployment, particularly in the South. CIO leaders wanted to organize these workers, but to do that meant that the federation needed to signi ficantly expand its presence in the region. 32 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 440 441; Sosna In Search of the Silent South 144 145.

PAGE 41

41 workers to their ranks by the end of the decade and using a war chest of one million dollars to underwrite the effort. One key to the campaign was its determination to avoid discussion of racial segregation in southern factories. Conservatives in the CIO argued that challenging white racism was futile and would distract the federation from its stated goal of attracting southern workers. At the press conference announcing the program, Operation Dixie director Van Bittner also announced that he wanted no help from Communists, Socialists, or their allies, which included SCHW. As a result, CIO support for the Southern Conf erence gradually declined, falling to almost nothing by the end of 1947. The decision devastated Foreman and Dombrowski, but they could do little to stop it. 33 They also saw dozens of SCHW members come to the conclusion that the organization no longer repr esented them, primarily because of their personal anti Communism. Frank Graham, Eleanor Roosevelt, and novelist Lillian Smith were among those who cut their ties to the Southern Conference after the war over this issue. Smith, a native Floridian who had lived most of her life in Georgia, had always suspected that political radicals had played too prominent a role in SCHW, and it had taken years of persuasion from friends before she agreed to a position on the board in 1942. When she resigned in May 1945, she told Foreman and Dombrowski that she did not like that board members associated openly with Communists. Moreover, she did not like the way the board had excluded her from its decision making processes, complaining, 34 She still believed in racial 33 Sulli van Days of Hope 208; Egerton Speak Now Against the Day 442 443. 34 Egerton Speak Now Against the Day 442.

PAGE 42

42 equality and political reform, but she did not believe that these goals could be achieved through the Southern Conference, and this conclusion lead to her resignation. The tension within southern liberalism was palpable. It mirrored a similar split among liberals at the national level in which the question of what to do about Communism was pivotal. reserva tions about a tough stance toward the Soviet Union, especially because of the wartime Communist policies was a member of his own cabinet, Secretary of Commerce Wallace, who would have become president himse lf had Truman about the dangers of Communism became public knowledge when the secretary gave a speech at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Wallace warned that a great power rivalry with the Soviets would lead to an expensive, dangerous arms race that neither side would truly to control certain areas of Easte rn Europe. He also lamented the tendency of some Americans to use Communism to demonize fellow citizens and play upon their fears of subversion. 35 He enjoyed support in this fight from Florida Senator Claude Pepper, who also spoke at Madison Square Garden. Pepper had first been elected to the Senate in a special election in 1936. In 1938 and 1944, he had won re election ca