<%BANNER%>

Conceiving-of and Conceiving-That

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021788/00001

Material Information

Title: Conceiving-of and Conceiving-That
Physical Description: 1 online resource (81 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Savage, Kevin
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Philosophers use technical notions of conceiving to argue for a number of theses. However, very little has been done to illuminate what this act of conceiving consists in. So, we may fall into one of several traps when relying on what we can conceive in order to argue for some theory or other. For one, we may fail to provide a valid argument or we may have assumed our conclusion in one of our founding premises. In order to ensure we are not falling into one of these traps we should gain a fuller understanding of what conceiving is. Once we do that we see that many things that have been assumed about conceiving are in fact not the case. In particular, philosophers have argued that our ability to conceive that particular things could have been the case shows us that minds are not physical. But this argument rests on the assumption that what we can conceive is always possible. But there is a type of conceiving, the performing of which does not allow us to draw conclusions about what is possible. That is because there is a type of conceiving which allows us to conceive impossible objects. And so, if we are not careful we may believe we are performing an act of conceiving relevant to demonstrating the possibility of what we conceive but turn out to be wrong in fact. Thus, our arguments which rely on what we can conceive would fail in those cases.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Kevin Savage.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Ludwig, Kirk A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021788:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021788/00001

Material Information

Title: Conceiving-of and Conceiving-That
Physical Description: 1 online resource (81 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Savage, Kevin
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Philosophers use technical notions of conceiving to argue for a number of theses. However, very little has been done to illuminate what this act of conceiving consists in. So, we may fall into one of several traps when relying on what we can conceive in order to argue for some theory or other. For one, we may fail to provide a valid argument or we may have assumed our conclusion in one of our founding premises. In order to ensure we are not falling into one of these traps we should gain a fuller understanding of what conceiving is. Once we do that we see that many things that have been assumed about conceiving are in fact not the case. In particular, philosophers have argued that our ability to conceive that particular things could have been the case shows us that minds are not physical. But this argument rests on the assumption that what we can conceive is always possible. But there is a type of conceiving, the performing of which does not allow us to draw conclusions about what is possible. That is because there is a type of conceiving which allows us to conceive impossible objects. And so, if we are not careful we may believe we are performing an act of conceiving relevant to demonstrating the possibility of what we conceive but turn out to be wrong in fact. Thus, our arguments which rely on what we can conceive would fail in those cases.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Kevin Savage.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Ludwig, Kirk A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021788:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20110331_AAAADK INGEST_TIME 2011-03-31T21:04:54Z PACKAGE UFE0021788_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 32091 DFID F20110331_AACPFT ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH savage_k_Page_65.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
be42059f85bf5dc96b780be7956cc0a5
SHA-1
8308a49dbafc79944fc97f06928d1044f0248428
25271604 F20110331_AACOTY savage_k_Page_22.tif
76bd263b627ad5e12b5ba6b71c576d3c
c6ece922ecfd79a5af158779ba38daa56d10ab70
6852 F20110331_AACOMD savage_k_Page_34thm.jpg
7034dc2fab9c84c1b1107db2c7389e38
5464b5fd9110f4140da38c8d767365382add3ba0
47704 F20110331_AACOYV savage_k_Page_63.pro
8e819e5ddeeaab45e3adf1eb0744e105
7fd6b97e50cbca1841bedc5f92e29b2509a17324
99113 F20110331_AACPAW savage_k_Page_67.jpg
6af06abe3a78505d204fd083410d5ecf
9f878ec4ee394f53f92f0dba85ffbab655c36325
2048 F20110331_AACORA savage_k_Page_66.txt
1ee6d49c8c63c93befda597777996993
9adf89b500d4a9f1ec48d05685e0c228355bb65d
29088 F20110331_AACPFU savage_k_Page_68.QC.jpg
8e7703e119086bf92b48a75a34cf5b4c
9f602e97131ec2242429d6699db46bd80f7c5e36
F20110331_AACOTZ savage_k_Page_23.tif
194b8f5da66c98d797f92ec18862552e
f39bd3bb0733e17d650a5e0021eb1b79ba89dd30
2335 F20110331_AACOME savage_k_Page_60.txt
9873b712244c02233493f76d64779850
abd9f1a5936b1fce8b5a1f70469386cd8d138157
57529 F20110331_AACOYW savage_k_Page_64.pro
e62fbdb0a729786abc4253424e1c9d19
a9ab249612c40d34c6e5df10300890b4cc592912
69326 F20110331_AACPAX savage_k_Page_69.jpg
40cf0089ae42d579a7060907dd7dbf3f
cb74cec1eb880e6ae7f24260b81439078bae00db
F20110331_AACORB savage_k_Page_30.tif
1b35b9917595e816bfa24b097c9a5169
a7ff51c51efa8347d5c53ffac02b6b33a07d1737
31027 F20110331_AACPFV savage_k_Page_71.QC.jpg
713608155f4c19aef199143fc31e7cef
a85f4789370bdb4db9ab238aea5ab0621e9c5ec4
821245 F20110331_AACOMF savage_k_Page_26.jp2
663f08610ccc450635458b8e1b4ae62b
ff708efa2ef0818c9d1011e48d4699e8decb13da
52182 F20110331_AACOYX savage_k_Page_68.pro
ca48c1739e4d89d8f267d0cbca932e31
fec583f52b063d36e77aef2f2424b0c16b160357
93981 F20110331_AACPAY savage_k_Page_71.jpg
6ea31bc3f64174169f0ff15e6fb98345
a1ab872a0b8a6f4c4689df9d7180bda61a644820
99498 F20110331_AACORC savage_k_Page_59.jpg
a0d0428817ba877332495af61a03c0b1
3ce5dfd73445702f1064c5b0cecc3292c92a2ad4
29654 F20110331_AACPFW savage_k_Page_74.QC.jpg
6f694f346e12bd03b9e22a0b1bd1b6b4
45e580161c236d31d0e2f2a422702d63896a1711
2205 F20110331_AACOWA savage_k_Page_27.txt
fafb16735e85748d17fb8cff8b8f57c3
28179ca4dfcf1f2d3529323d343a0b36e11bde6d
42400 F20110331_AACOYY savage_k_Page_69.pro
253505314e01381092390c6ca6418dd5
763bdd771af2987dab8ac67f7a5f94d54d1db9d9
32111 F20110331_AACORD savage_k_Page_36.QC.jpg
58074abae48b16779399af5efb14e47a
26d0d113be2bf2bc5c82624fb0e2cd6439c8f095
16961 F20110331_AACPFX savage_k_Page_75.QC.jpg
5898fb6e8cc00e6e1bc9e1e8810d8432
e8f1cabe671021f3f582d727f2ff9c8e5afb5382
92657 F20110331_AACPAZ savage_k_Page_74.jpg
00958c6a123c0f8a03b5db621acbc253
0bc698feae9eff85c1a6d00fa072d6456c3ed4d1
3538 F20110331_AACOMG savage_k_Page_05.txt
2eee22513600ba422abe986cd5a8f912
70b569ba375bf6f36725a2211ee7408482c9d289
1867 F20110331_AACOWB savage_k_Page_29.txt
0c5f847c36a2b418347d543359e3c285
3778d622ff93a9b0ea9904a24e1f299963db5132
47425 F20110331_AACOYZ savage_k_Page_70.pro
aa5c490b303604bf934adcbe55426407
d1ca6311016851651cdaa21c1a8116f8e91d1840
100691 F20110331_AACORE savage_k_Page_51.jpg
85e9968bcee65ca4217fefbc86331cf6
30db383770bbc69050516865670d6f7a9f2e17cb
28567 F20110331_AACPFY savage_k_Page_77.QC.jpg
0e1572b001484d3860843b701516f719
8aadfd8375ae3ee59d686b2e6831323031e60800
1051948 F20110331_AACOMH savage_k_Page_72.jp2
15b634bca9724ab21fe51e8453ee5e84
8688e6fa02e9539ffff0dc10ed4b144b61409925
2118 F20110331_AACOWC savage_k_Page_30.txt
02c2ca4591b375a525d963141bc3e06d
99319d358666ac013bc19f961435659506200bcd
F20110331_AACORF savage_k_Page_27.tif
d2201a7cab7793d5189eb22343f81fbb
f6343980ea90017cdd91a3527e442353a0af0f1e
1525 F20110331_AACPFZ savage_k_Page_01thm.jpg
82db9ce04c6e8609a68ffbe2fda60f1a
d71f44e6a084012ac34006af852cd4385f51af4f
9879 F20110331_AACPDA savage_k_Page_81.jp2
9ffa889a9ec97f45402d54c8fd038553
e844b854771335512cd9af730e4fe87d97a93867
993920 F20110331_AACOMI savage_k_Page_49.jp2
4c871a003b6301342a589e18d9bcd621
27c6486f69217955f6cc58a61c9bd50894956490
1740 F20110331_AACOWD savage_k_Page_35.txt
dbf0c403cc086d222b4b586e3f932359
1bcd60ad15511a8913bcfa96c6f4d6264e251a65
22707 F20110331_AACORG savage_k_Page_43.QC.jpg
faf3b2091eb1c26c84296eed813fb223
ee87b790fb88bdda1e9a6cdc71cbe0a6cf4f8e5f
32246 F20110331_AACPDB savage_k_Page_61.QC.jpg
d8bb045fd263c5efd3fe3830dad0c3d4
ce6916904af58b2fd2076d4c93a55c1930f67254
1051964 F20110331_AACOMJ savage_k_Page_10.jp2
855f72dc39985ebf85452c5ec231b770
7c8807c5d05683afa7fbd6749c57f9fb587bf55a
2177 F20110331_AACOWE savage_k_Page_36.txt
411258d7ce31f4756c3f3d43a882ed13
4d21f4104f7e3f2432ad719e8e90a87ad38ef818
143 F20110331_AACORH savage_k_Page_81.txt
d37b9e9208e6c7225697d56aae5ebeeb
3686ac3198442fda4e5b1b14e50dd2946ee4e5af
8153 F20110331_AACPDC savage_k_Page_53thm.jpg
1b359693eeaa293548604c84372f0805
bb8e9cf841924d5948ebb485356669a6531a4527
57141 F20110331_AACOMK savage_k_Page_30.pro
a8f474e4d964f2e568df9b00af4cbf18
0b36974dcc0c2fd1541082b6363ada2cb901f4a9
2018 F20110331_AACOWF savage_k_Page_37.txt
231cf3ba1b30c0fa0393562158a2022b
00360351ba233e64aa6ec29cb51109bb833676da
84 F20110331_AACORI savage_k_Page_02.txt
a5f965303d004f9e40d8ffe6dc8271ab
10463676adff8bfbdbe5766a0dccd60cf74de3f3
31674 F20110331_AACPDD savage_k_Page_49.QC.jpg
d0cf8fefb88db78468dd6b5afec222d2
d097e5dda86bd2eef515c3b724e0dc7d817d1e74
1051930 F20110331_AACOML savage_k_Page_16.jp2
e07ba40197d48c594ecc200e80178ae7
155f0be0b161912357bde39ad6a40bf8a83b8bf4
1853 F20110331_AACOWG savage_k_Page_38.txt
4117063b0e71e0eb9acf88d4fa628c7c
b8a37d1f334aa71f77d7cf2a33ecbe62d3fb250a
30942 F20110331_AACORJ savage_k_Page_53.QC.jpg
617b92d6f8cd594562aa26df83b653dd
d9a93830a5122f444d472c03c9b1ca6524892232
34473 F20110331_AACPDE savage_k_Page_72.QC.jpg
c78e171bd602f4137fe41ca2450c1bc4
911e143aee5eb9fdbb8777eed8738dda48f080e7
92733 F20110331_AACOMM savage_k_Page_14.jpg
a688406f1ecd9031fb3da58050e5572e
b301d6786880607fe66a4b19b561def1d84f8fab
1590 F20110331_AACOWH savage_k_Page_39.txt
1523bc5da26c325c462304faa2366c2a
142e8555323ec635f3b4e48d4b6cdcb0f1104fca
1694 F20110331_AACORK savage_k_Page_31.txt
4772f4a23bd3d8dceec1e561ec9a6d89
e5d4372f16644e6416eb284c1682ea06c15aaae5
7464 F20110331_AACPDF savage_k_Page_52thm.jpg
0a3d57311f2a446620c3d628f42d52a0
adb6ffc05f9ab0c746a595c20b40c303d3c1fd80
46676 F20110331_AACOMN savage_k_Page_42.pro
39693a4bf1b4ddba14aa96a4f25dfde8
a1ecba0488c50e2e8a75f454aca575eeb5f82f69
2297 F20110331_AACOWI savage_k_Page_40.txt
72775207311a99236522ebc84ecacf65
9c712dbe134292b5ad3f51cec60175b661c86a13
8700 F20110331_AACPDG savage_k_Page_11thm.jpg
e9b94e42b7969aced14928e1d4757570
7a4d26579a83b36867977c960036278bc35070b1
2268 F20110331_AACOMO savage_k_Page_54.txt
8c816aa2abe8761fff9966754219c481
47456fd13b406bd6c2d1d66f56270c7afdcdbb54
1829 F20110331_AACOWJ savage_k_Page_42.txt
1af2242dcb96bd3ba7fc334befbcf0cd
00329595c433f4578059804ab409bb75c666762a
1956 F20110331_AACORL savage_k_Page_41.txt
468ebf32cee20165ea653901d7667cef
a5a2ab8db833209a91b73989ae7a44d6b5982901
25558 F20110331_AACPDH savage_k_Page_78.QC.jpg
a0029b051f1730d51bb4b2b2e3f17ad2
8512212ce7ec179f4a09855f1bf508fa86ffde58
F20110331_AACOMP savage_k_Page_67.tif
699aed4ea32a8a0c62886f4f1c8a3ac0
47b6dc6c024915de6c0ad33ad4f63bd2a2dede5f
1559 F20110331_AACOWK savage_k_Page_43.txt
a5aa6396436652713619768e40ef5451
738dd60a50a8c4e0163cbf0d74b43020377979a5
83627 F20110331_AACORM savage_k_Page_29.jpg
b96bb919c931a51cc616f190324bfaa5
e0f295b70d84b0a5cf6f9dfe0456ff4f7356ad21
7894 F20110331_AACPDI savage_k_Page_21thm.jpg
8db38291d9e83c8649163b288c95295d
2f8254dac6d1a550c76d9a644c7aed0b0a582d52
30378 F20110331_AACOMQ savage_k_Page_22.QC.jpg
5f6857970ffe2a66ca226e81484e4c47
710debbc4f127f29fd5b1114363f58b592d4273e
2339 F20110331_AACOWL savage_k_Page_44.txt
a4a12b2974b26a42a7e514df3665078f
2815aec8c6f331acfc20213c27b83427b2b2d365
2181 F20110331_AACORN savage_k_Page_56.txt
401d07b46e0126fed5234be7ae46eb6e
3378c9cf4f676dafd2d4506f744ce165e2c9f356
8450 F20110331_AACPDJ savage_k_Page_73thm.jpg
f9386893068c6b0e20dbeef046b0214e
b1de6e76e4c410e5b3d7a9cbf74e00886b5bf131
96865 F20110331_AACOMR savage_k_Page_48.jpg
4833c2b57d2eafd860ff47ed5bfa9ce2
f2fdb6a02e47f58408708865069f759a654e7efc
1981 F20110331_AACOWM savage_k_Page_45.txt
2f3a63cde569b5668edc7ea3716ba19c
f3aaa7b06e04e9957f4322c9ba6ef5b91a49d676
138988 F20110331_AACORO savage_k_Page_01.jp2
c8a55d5a5a7ba4586fb9fe1f0f756cab
2c71d6bde81920424e91238884b9a49aeb242709
7175 F20110331_AACPDK savage_k_Page_32thm.jpg
c4feebd492423543d8269d06b5d079c9
c83029662a0b5d6fda8d9af1d33a4d7dd8637b17
2186 F20110331_AACOMS savage_k_Page_08thm.jpg
9435f08efe613523778d52e745497024
27596116679523cb979a3cd5d4fc462b670d0d91
2222 F20110331_AACOWN savage_k_Page_46.txt
158a8326f5d4273cebdbd216befc946a
8332ec72c8ab6b46fd9e93b3e0a35b55e9881ea3
14276 F20110331_AACORP savage_k_Page_03.jp2
e0cd22cfe16460ca411ada02dc66253e
2d0b38103902b9203669c2acd8d1cf2a82e1dbe2
9038 F20110331_AACPDL savage_k_Page_08.QC.jpg
2d4cff46d32df87ca2db921eaa7dd97a
393af144588470dbc2bddf539d7da572f11ebbf3
1801 F20110331_AACOMT savage_k_Page_09.txt
1e7fdfb9d815f65e2e12048bc227ecbf
92b4b9330410ad97e710e3695a4d18dc91259373
2135 F20110331_AACOWO savage_k_Page_49.txt
35502ef163c8fd62f929e1db418557e2
092d1518baf2d79ff4469f1488b0858234009ea6
F20110331_AACORQ savage_k_Page_15.tif
4ae3534946027993dc174800032b0ee0
c72d80c6d2d66ca2463b8cd80ea8acba8fe00a13
F20110331_AACPDM savage_k_Page_15thm.jpg
c5e1d36c3dfc3a8332ce4637db348918
7531eba6cefbed6a87330c7d4b5c0503cbc4101d
976778 F20110331_AACOMU savage_k_Page_56.jp2
6964a65d9a0fd9f53d069c01695042ea
986af56b673cc202063f29b4e4d03240a45f20b8
2289 F20110331_AACOWP savage_k_Page_50.txt
9b6a6afce082d5b731730f27c4b12db3
ba9031b0082a341e84179e634d655e7aafdc9cae
939125 F20110331_AACORR savage_k_Page_21.jp2
9c5d46b2b5113493b861773dde2eeb5f
1a1a7a453a800cff2d966d39f0342cf3c1dda223
16066 F20110331_AACPDN savage_k_Page_12.QC.jpg
b63bc3b88261503989c1cf1f7f25634b
f3de0070f724fecf505a17e0290a2e83154875d5
21998 F20110331_AACOMV savage_k_Page_05.QC.jpg
95b78ff1528b670628455df1bb5c472a
104badb6062bd2cde087ab483839da71e579a835
79178 F20110331_AACORS savage_k_Page_70.jpg
3e90b6aa234fe5035838b1b30eb1ee03
d5eaa6dfa899732e2a944498158ba8f043e2bd12
8547 F20110331_AACPDO savage_k_Page_40thm.jpg
14d5d95d45cd16d9586dd57438d8417c
d3eda3ba1c161cf3d19d3468a0bd742e9ebfd395
2184 F20110331_AACOWQ savage_k_Page_51.txt
b9c7fa751d3888e08b8cce7dcbba0fa9
a0f319c18e0078650f745f4862536593116eab96
F20110331_AACORT savage_k_Page_70.tif
a375eb9f121085dc9a404cf37a9f8c7d
e642f4a411ccb5d5a9a881ca2004956eb480f086
41842 F20110331_AACOMW savage_k_Page_13.pro
cfc219186c78f38d322ce3aac9419079
7069f1b450901b400395c4ffdf2af858a3ff1055
33768 F20110331_AACPDP savage_k_Page_40.QC.jpg
79a933b2dedf47385f74357ecdf7fba4
e0874fd7a9c1d1085b3d1d8feaab1b498f9602f3
2116 F20110331_AACOWR savage_k_Page_53.txt
e657bb468338e33d04e091e7fddb18c1
8e4d32ad8dc104ebce057df11777e630505f842a
8081 F20110331_AACORU savage_k_Page_30thm.jpg
4f1b9963ecad34b36515387ce4f13c32
356590ec807787186d4009ce307cf71270b81458
F20110331_AACOMX savage_k_Page_04.tif
271dadbe97fa5f260c64ba79edb93ce2
5340d0e6d066dc836969bf1291659d0becfab05e
8013 F20110331_AACPDQ savage_k_Page_49thm.jpg
202e453cf6939e0c8de338a3bfa2834f
d2c2698c8ddb31894d86a8de71fb8ace35681368
1850 F20110331_AACOWS savage_k_Page_57.txt
b70badbcac53d470f3ea9aad52573bb7
5ecde8169a5e258598fa691ec407aa7a5ad78608
8071 F20110331_AACORV savage_k_Page_58thm.jpg
a3d4f662fa110de46b7df73e186cef52
42e775b243a7c258f4fcdafd74be51c13b431f8b
28508 F20110331_AACOMY savage_k_Page_38.QC.jpg
f62763a639b5d738ecaca5c8471368c4
023016d2d559135e37f3bcbdda2b98eebcef8d1f
6314 F20110331_AACPDR savage_k_Page_13thm.jpg
a7fd5d926994ee908da6ab8e88fc4039
4493998a9751bce685e64709660b69cfb2678b48
2117 F20110331_AACOWT savage_k_Page_61.txt
47f25e1e825e38ff3ba94c38154d1324
b607dcdbc00bbcb03a02f71532076f7a74d025b4
23867 F20110331_AACORW savage_k_Page_31.QC.jpg
bbad84f9fa6ae30dda514dc9f4ccfd37
3f6bf7076efc2564798887558c5995bc3bf78844
5126 F20110331_AACOMZ savage_k_Page_05thm.jpg
07408ee8c141c8f43528a26e6af66453
3b3764ded03ef6128e37e8b28bc6a1a1aa49785f
8610 F20110331_AACPDS savage_k_Page_16thm.jpg
086e0bff575187427ed39ce02ae421ca
9176bedb7158dc0eb4973bd58bf2a21e6f69ff00
2059 F20110331_AACOWU savage_k_Page_65.txt
107565a7ec78ac3465961a337041a4b6
7a85ed4df926393a4c7fedd9ace5668b978810e6
83207 F20110331_AACORX savage_k_Page_77.jpg
b7720e499bce47085f7db064168e6907
1ba629ee99423330fc72c330aa71b725e2f425c0
6760 F20110331_AACPDT savage_k_Page_69thm.jpg
342375a933ca6550717b1bc3ae8f9599
de8fe471ae13522dc0fe165644d1fdff7876bc5d
1970 F20110331_AACOWV savage_k_Page_68.txt
c379a2af5b25e0f938592b0cc13364d5
1472109c593befd258978d00fc83621777b39a56
57214 F20110331_AACOPA savage_k_Page_33.pro
21a6897aaa47a7b8385255489cf087a8
c1ed258d1f219467fe68ec048ff811c64d8775e6
2170 F20110331_AACORY savage_k_Page_73.txt
2295f2311a6b33c08a9d4c207fbbe9f2
9ee2df15d5d5393ca42368dee8b400f6c41789e7
6944 F20110331_AACPDU savage_k_Page_57thm.jpg
cef693d26e46e4bd201cadf47e8408b2
715b6a288dac4e646b3c500e88b6dff6effea0ff
1672 F20110331_AACOWW savage_k_Page_69.txt
70e809887e92f52353edda8964903781
b0acfbb1f61fee20d8c485ca118b693b6d76acf0
8635 F20110331_AACOPB savage_k_Page_10thm.jpg
bfac00730dcf351fb305d9ad3c3db8ff
dfe23ae20dcb2d3667976cc9a9533f6f37d3ae6f
2284 F20110331_AACORZ savage_k_Page_72.txt
1062c6ea6a572f65cad40af9ab7080f5
9050e5b38df037c1aa220e942997b5f33a91310d
31615 F20110331_AACPDV savage_k_Page_67.QC.jpg
934e373440b3db8a711fedc10cbcadc1
6ca1a74de62cf92ddf0a1d6efec63647d0c148b6
2110 F20110331_AACOWX savage_k_Page_71.txt
0c1536c9d5aa26abada92ae0f195694c
86cecacde76120401fe8501226c7fbbf30b63f3b
775 F20110331_AACOPC savage_k_Page_81.QC.jpg
3d21a3a87125f2048c181aafc204cc25
f7fc2cd662d3d8117a4d74fdbaa705b46907339b
31992 F20110331_AACPDW savage_k_Page_59.QC.jpg
beaf9ce6f7937239c960d3c3f84ebba1
b4fc7aa6bf68ffbb24ffadabb4570444ad63c5f7
1985 F20110331_AACOWY savage_k_Page_74.txt
6c5a078116c5275e2998fdbc20a0215b
df79703eaf3c6bb729328c2937c96c0e3c65dbb7
1608 F20110331_AACOPD savage_k_Page_15.txt
f74f6c906644fe553cb0de62c9b3ffa2
c6749da876fb298365912dcc36c1041d3d9a128a
F20110331_AACOUA savage_k_Page_24.tif
be8eca90897131344c04added57efbf0
e89e4cf6420a301f6f5fc29d15eba89ece26d520
31506 F20110331_AACPDX savage_k_Page_64.QC.jpg
331d6b53e820eb13157b632264d95529
d571039bcb0e16b57f3fdd03a18a89ab1bf96805
1031 F20110331_AACOWZ savage_k_Page_75.txt
7c19da0af17a9dce7c7ab8493c718a19
ecfac38ec9f3cdf71657b96952115d80ca6c4021
33501 F20110331_AACOPE savage_k_Page_73.QC.jpg
365d9609d67c885b026ddc3962dae4c4
c01efeb79f8e50e016590c49f0169319379e14b9
F20110331_AACOUB savage_k_Page_26.tif
50bde9053d47663eb9b6fb078a710b66
e1d216ff3ce0184aa48ef3c60ac48f0cd37eae84
32065 F20110331_AACPDY savage_k_Page_33.QC.jpg
f01ce99e936398c02e6ca14bb486b061
d1ae290be2e1823ec5ca5ccbfb04a8b32cf28158
2199 F20110331_AACOPF savage_k_Page_64.txt
096aa00115fa62c7fbf22fa47ebd8dbb
887e828fc7fa819b18be294cf0f1f06de8121b2e
F20110331_AACOUC savage_k_Page_28.tif
6f3e786abd533945d874532ddea42a0d
e810fbf52eead2371cbfb212fd8bb31edca2307e
24781 F20110331_AACPDZ savage_k_Page_19.QC.jpg
acf0a1d3ef856a4d3dc903249c805af3
902c3f011e57a298ca0ebe3931d3a80bf360596a
49504 F20110331_AACPBA savage_k_Page_75.jpg
347cee79e7966cc1db9ba884eab77f2f
d47d8c1344bdbf485768629716a66409cc78db1e
23695 F20110331_AACOPG savage_k_Page_69.QC.jpg
df1f260bf01a51da5f3e29831eaa4812
6a39172997b8596cb3ea80feac1d9bab1bdb7686
62106 F20110331_AACOZA savage_k_Page_72.pro
557ddca95f85a4c0ab622f48e45ee5af
0909f931100ab70862f14b814b7177c44b0ff80c
F20110331_AACOUD savage_k_Page_29.tif
e0f99230b45dbc0bb2bd8896ecc969af
ba5539c8da2192efcc5d0f967681c667486f12e1
13977 F20110331_AACPBB savage_k_Page_76.jpg
b484e4e9aeacb2514dad8bb67d55ebaa
11109c9be2b961f929292b49a1a07f2aece62894
97191 F20110331_AACOPH savage_k_Page_36.jpg
f9d7f0f209d68e522676339873de6ffa
ec2573cad8c5e55100cc7011cd32557e5555d7bf
52012 F20110331_AACOZB savage_k_Page_74.pro
108555050b6597ba6ba6866bf883047d
1def452968cdf5dc47e8180a787d7ef626a59356
F20110331_AACOUE savage_k_Page_31.tif
b52d465ed50663f6306d0d43b3bbbcdc
25a0a2faadf6ad7fef78aed87277c531b2e923c7
74360 F20110331_AACPBC savage_k_Page_78.jpg
df9ec69cfaebc227a4f884fb5a54c145
fa1959a53d2c51809d4fc4e9d7d6c36eff54a89d
4711 F20110331_AACOPI savage_k_Page_06.pro
9f0a3a64e064555b3229ef61a3c60afa
c07ec112ba5691b84a89735fb66a0c352f3601fe
27661 F20110331_AACOZC savage_k_Page_75.pro
c004fbf6cc3bd6218bf7d69732c587a5
e89e51c8e49a51859849952d7bed63d6022442ea
F20110331_AACOUF savage_k_Page_33.tif
c2bf2bed599aefc4a3efbb1d18e791ac
6d57b6f4fa65a3b12a367cf0e8e2de261e75f728
389 F20110331_AACPGA savage_k_Page_03thm.jpg
fe8d7088a9fe68d7df636f80c9ed318d
f903b6d71af93cbde7c886db38b88e137e5126f0
57368 F20110331_AACPBD savage_k_Page_79.jpg
015259ed167dbc518c7602c715a1c515
5355915947ec3925254a0494f9c5ed031f01d259
1014 F20110331_AACOZD savage_k_Page_76.pro
df70c7196265d859146c2dbdebf66b7c
3db2fec48eabad87393c0baf10f9a25fbf0041e4
F20110331_AACOUG savage_k_Page_34.tif
cad0b6e04a202e0c07bf0978465fe69b
7f50a9f2d7b91af0f192529d664416e5367a86aa
1930 F20110331_AACPGB savage_k_Page_04thm.jpg
137ec45212dddd37d1e36b1f35ec0dc2
93448de2e20b4ebec262b5c9f040e91a7e212d0d
17462 F20110331_AACPBE savage_k_Page_80.jpg
934be7d5eb07be1e0e4a35fed6f7381e
7e57a20d7e0255808ff5e0c51c96643472923a8e
60125 F20110331_AACOPJ savage_k_Page_67.pro
73eb5afa2c4b8271cede822f47614900
4924d8e9a5f872d024a3b3cff7b27f4039039dff
30952 F20110331_AACOZE savage_k_Page_79.pro
3cb13d8d6a095c4f536918bd30a70432
bb930ccbab8c31640e0dfe413276fc128e645788
F20110331_AACOUH savage_k_Page_35.tif
ad8d506db2c9afbb5f23308448a5cd99
e752a72778fc7962734f645c61fd398fdaa661aa
967 F20110331_AACPGC savage_k_Page_06thm.jpg
67ac4eb323489d36ab0ed6a7aa64cae8
a989805ce219f053eef605385b198d2f3037a587
212293 F20110331_AACPBF savage_k_Page_04.jp2
0deb6505791d1c5bdfce5d4cc4e961f1
61b295a98081c81a0d89b7a1bea9cfcdb9a1c24b
56318 F20110331_AACOPK savage_k_Page_28.pro
5711acf407c592e95f1b173b5d254d14
b04462fb83f6088a65fdb8dd8d5ed1d0169d0257
8333 F20110331_AACOZF savage_k_Page_80.pro
777a1e9a6da689ea0d5022ea4e197447
902acd0bbfb4cfb9948a1633e8ff44ebb6ec7c81
F20110331_AACOUI savage_k_Page_38.tif
b23c1695046ec9eddd0768c284920d8f
f4446f6afa85e3d1ef5f827b725e9d0970a9399d
5197 F20110331_AACPGD savage_k_Page_07thm.jpg
68fdfec204dfc2ab9c389d9d3e19403d
406e60f5dbc53179a706f3bd606ef77522fb3e60
1051985 F20110331_AACPBG savage_k_Page_05.jp2
1a50eea63c5a72e4e849ce6a94474e88
86e8e55cf27fa118eada7c172b6a70d2712c6c9e
959901 F20110331_AACOPL savage_k_Page_66.jp2
8a24152071e05944556ba9d4b7c890cd
749f088c0d7cd2026ecf16eaad863da00e15264c
344 F20110331_AACOZG savage_k_Page_81.pro
b4cb82c50ed375028944c6a81d0bfbf3
76253c113bfbfb68e9266bce505e525bc212dda1
F20110331_AACOUJ savage_k_Page_39.tif
b015d6992a059dbcd2f99cc766c23ff2
b5b4d2a3c7d466fd76e119f65220c705056cc657
6755 F20110331_AACPGE savage_k_Page_09thm.jpg
a71acc1d0740254a797f5b013b7db29d
27817fac447c8da606bf186e09782beb5acd105d
579270 F20110331_AACPBH savage_k_Page_07.jp2
165205c12d53d9d6b6771acb8cb16931
03a56921aeb0d975559bda5e35e69ab53b97d89c
F20110331_AACOPM savage_k_Page_56.tif
10347049fc6c38ea89af3c5c7d9d6b31
8a42c7192fd940ee40f7994b969293e354195140
17484 F20110331_AACOZH savage_k_Page_01.jpg
8d12c293ad39bcd393d8fa41f333cf8f
9b9954902d1eaa228dbfa90113501fa5a9be19cf
F20110331_AACOUK savage_k_Page_42.tif
2dcd4635ba1df7b90860060319a86746
99264dcbb5d2feb45873ec67828651022c718674
7681 F20110331_AACPGF savage_k_Page_14thm.jpg
eb0e76ac1df36ad57c86c2aef5959d7d
93bf3185f0143fcd886a6ea6023bdc21aa5f3bd0
1051941 F20110331_AACPBI savage_k_Page_11.jp2
33e8217c85ea38528f77967a484d7b19
4bbf5feea08df751ab69bc97d8ddbca879ef5254
983029 F20110331_AACOPN savage_k_Page_61.jp2
853e0737861a4b5a86ef7068eb26a640
aab26e281ca35da39a19b19eb4aab7b578c1a118
3620 F20110331_AACOZI savage_k_Page_02.jpg
59488437d00026ac844c450c7f83fdce
c75c8a55e6bf80ff9ef028e59026d53b9a02f48c
F20110331_AACOUL savage_k_Page_43.tif
b67180bcec770bf4a70bd384bde28ac2
4109b1b83b3d6413b8b2531f895efcca37314652
6676 F20110331_AACPGG savage_k_Page_17thm.jpg
84c3ca19ca04732b1fb6bacf63baecbe
a21c8b40b5c42dbb3d4767fd334304843ec16262
483290 F20110331_AACPBJ savage_k_Page_12.jp2
13346eb84247f32e4b207fa78ac8f31b
71f647f75c8472345bf91aeeaad24ef54a96b08f
740794 F20110331_AACOPO savage_k_Page_17.jp2
e3f359328808c5aa896e3e07661a54ec
c1cf71316ce5ee76277c154b8d9995a981b5c3dc
2821 F20110331_AACOZJ savage_k_Page_03.jpg
89ad27b6106b130ac306a250c0872b5d
efee4746454ce591254112f9b22d6d4d7bb435c4
F20110331_AACOUM savage_k_Page_44.tif
28f31de2905eb2f6ceb3ca1f77627b80
7ea9acb16ce202bd3a6b5231e9c397b280375148
8092 F20110331_AACPGH savage_k_Page_20thm.jpg
55e202b9ab0e213e8b346e51f9af097e
4681a56d562b305065a30847d196d22b67e61058
730701 F20110331_AACPBK savage_k_Page_13.jp2
8342c821b3978c1f9a29ef7937770b27
8cef1f23bd3672f8b6af045dfc2b3963540404bd
1986 F20110331_AACOPP savage_k_Page_21.txt
c43387c7b45fa4dfba04300e0dfd5054
01fe9d0da9bc3e8c577bcdc8f1bc726e718ba4f3
24106 F20110331_AACOZK savage_k_Page_04.jpg
6e1c3de43d1b668db2449f1fcc51837a
b85babf278d31d413ebbd316449f7f6e4183161f
F20110331_AACOUN savage_k_Page_46.tif
4ec788a0bae64b30b96297426dd3a8d0
c69e7f6d2efecbe45e057e5d66987aeceaa2c8e5
7606 F20110331_AACPGI savage_k_Page_22thm.jpg
18bda97f1016276fba81778a1cc8cbc3
a4ad75e0f7d3e930a9cc45673e17c936bfbf47c6
967356 F20110331_AACPBL savage_k_Page_14.jp2
b7b1569d45d6c2c992b173735be60c94
1c83a75f9e4dc8f722ba87051445c5b4ad9c5434
94353 F20110331_AACOPQ savage_k_Page_33.jpg
09331e0539182e56e4f5d592a29766c0
170ab97b27f0cf414f75b732ded18b50bdf31cbb
95562 F20110331_AACOZL savage_k_Page_05.jpg
687f0a4a9dd0a19343a374e96db86a75
b801c27103df1e7401717e3f53a7df73ff17997b
8038 F20110331_AACPGJ savage_k_Page_23thm.jpg
21eec6218689e1ef389b755ebde14e4c
3ac3fb3b9ba22dd4a9756d9531c8ba2753f3baf0
766511 F20110331_AACPBM savage_k_Page_15.jp2
3022dff3e0cfa0a2ad3521cf9e866442
dbdb2eeb724c8433a1117e5a1334631ee9b13fa3
54921 F20110331_AACOPR savage_k_Page_14.pro
b2f596dec646b52d4b31c84f5ac24358
2741009af0579d867d6a819d2b1c6c255b655865
25831 F20110331_AACOZM savage_k_Page_08.jpg
674956acddd4983fdeec14b854024613
857a57df5489e831240ca14c2a5f856467de60d0
F20110331_AACOUO savage_k_Page_47.tif
cf5539dd0126623609c247bba21e8de8
87c90b7ad9e14cf48344f66c96e504b4c822e629
6606 F20110331_AACPGK savage_k_Page_31thm.jpg
ab8c1042eb912184d5166ca94348543f
b712436490c8a154b8d9e7238c6529dc7d72f9ce
822006 F20110331_AACPBN savage_k_Page_18.jp2
4ecfb34076c8994e1357218f6417fb26
d784067162bd09812ab3310fab0458d759221d20
80043 F20110331_AACOZN savage_k_Page_09.jpg
c7bfa3d9a7a537be678a8bb5fb03c443
0881f9164e8ab64164d6ddfaf2f527be1f82d6fe
F20110331_AACOUP savage_k_Page_48.tif
127ad9f341ff95eb0c2024e423867e1e
2f1c59b1287e6e518ff34b50450fc714370550cd
99938 F20110331_AACOPS savage_k_Page_40.jpg
bf57365599d65ee67d62b3981d9d7a6c
89bcdf56f180d73c462eb6517a349c2af2746d1e
7962 F20110331_AACPGL savage_k_Page_33thm.jpg
7e280bf61461e8900f5b21a7bda43328
7cb3765544d1c6986397044a2eca7a068ac75907
762458 F20110331_AACPBO savage_k_Page_19.jp2
c09391df22e0f392ce8e799abdfefa77
0decf10e088712c4f85e498bea0253c18bdf303e
103078 F20110331_AACOZO savage_k_Page_11.jpg
70af94d0e239669a9d2454f04a823201
e32291296cca9f99864e9acb86b919dd6b835f99
F20110331_AACOUQ savage_k_Page_49.tif
6887d0c99897b5d4db6567b3b217bb94
b7498e2ac99b5090bd7bd7379be353414de744dc
50490 F20110331_AACOPT savage_k_Page_77.pro
3da8ba5de83a547f04b50397770e3695
2751fe38e01603b3cc75e19c22caff01dd0fa20d
6730 F20110331_AACPGM savage_k_Page_35thm.jpg
d6b5bbe04384afabac31af32319c1929
30ca83bc3b4fa92a9f8601f219e75eb76b04deee
969117 F20110331_AACPBP savage_k_Page_20.jp2
44e3803d00626b6501ebfe472d8221a7
d3a42e946e90f501607634473b41f75393a78a1b
71078 F20110331_AACOZP savage_k_Page_13.jpg
f94d6b73dcb7c830d824dcbc32ce9300
d9d4ff3e45d2409a57be7a6064a8dfca2369e6bb
F20110331_AACOUR savage_k_Page_50.tif
a371ac8d4e9e340f3e0aea726e9a950e
c62ea6190daca320b2aa64407d665c40ef8bea10
8310 F20110331_AACOPU savage_k_Page_64thm.jpg
224243e8858c69de3508d47cbfe87d26
d532bebd4bbec9bdf44313e486b2b9c2ebb6e612
8390 F20110331_AACPGN savage_k_Page_36thm.jpg
7630d552059b68314ef7c406e18305e4
d2a0fb30791544e49a2d14f8cb875fd60b8718bf
959056 F20110331_AACPBQ savage_k_Page_22.jp2
d17a8b94ab69e2c551646e1e6b98380c
77d39153bbcd1f1d1147fc2259069f9066989f95
72672 F20110331_AACOZQ savage_k_Page_17.jpg
8f7bb9d843d9040e971da3d009bc38fb
d07e7bd91421646c27529995728c5e5f80323e28
F20110331_AACOUS savage_k_Page_52.tif
5ad54f136e936dd326527c9c28e122f7
5fa261feb786e6e4a7f5b162bfb4f9d68d0949f8
86360 F20110331_AACOPV savage_k_Page_52.jpg
659e904b61e8454ad5ddd7d0240872e0
e9323f07a050923d4979cd81e592c133b1428b8d
7510 F20110331_AACPGO savage_k_Page_37thm.jpg
f9fd58a893cfbe07d751763b55950585
ffb8b010cc0ac56e05e8e841d314b0fb16addb42
984058 F20110331_AACPBR savage_k_Page_23.jp2
6516358660aa25afa3ca1155a0682fd6
8b05741cd120471b3713ead19892638a0439bf94
78353 F20110331_AACOZR savage_k_Page_18.jpg
73f20047f00219d26cbf0a089f9fa2de
d0bab3f32d7b8b71a7e033be9295c731b8afe0b6
F20110331_AACOUT savage_k_Page_53.tif
ee460398ca604f89f684a8d7a8bf99f3
0f99d685b97f549816049013fda086cd55840b4c
2307 F20110331_AACOPW savage_k_Page_11.txt
1de9cb4a60ab7ed6820bd5a6e8ebd638
4fc0d938fc11098e3778ba99a79c7ad023736021
7221 F20110331_AACPGP savage_k_Page_38thm.jpg
4c617623628e15409092fae83c6566bb
93674c5b5caa9f7ec0440f6d758b3e09ce0dab72
999983 F20110331_AACPBS savage_k_Page_24.jp2
bdd25e84fb606c4867e6803afbb42c80
4f418bc7b11b7b2e0da8c46e2c32ef870fde050b
74804 F20110331_AACOZS savage_k_Page_19.jpg
01062e1931543dcfa610909ebd514792
c2a25af4e8e51aeb82cb217c92682af1b7cadbcd
F20110331_AACOUU savage_k_Page_55.tif
8e02caaf6c90d15f01474550a753eb1b
4a150b1f7c943f42607c1502b5cf90bd968f15f9
42461 F20110331_AACOPX savage_k_Page_15.pro
56d309534438388f01ee11852b5c3936
69d3cf0018e33ac1dcd2b4c16aa2a1f58742f9b0
6585 F20110331_AACPGQ savage_k_Page_39thm.jpg
d4d1bf8d4dfa49c54eeb933094c4e8cc
0dfc0ae56a4ec4935f45e726050f73a52cb37b77
249717 F20110331_AACPBT savage_k_Page_25.jp2
0f2aa4776af29ac9e8b5cefd15d78719
33ba1cb3c956783c0ef74210fe122349d9caec20
F20110331_AACOUV savage_k_Page_58.tif
4e8fd66889410280695620a496e595a5
1a93b8b814b18c34a6e66ec444d544592e79847a
105878 F20110331_AACONA savage_k_Page_60.jpg
b726589a9b799c64e8d3376acb1e6523
db1d6e1cbf2e1982e47c23e7aeea924a2ee2836d
54076 F20110331_AACOPY savage_k_Page_37.pro
260950b70284d1a6e2cbf7c97becfb3f
1fa662c1c61ca1a6e41c4d356c8f17265599efcc
7405 F20110331_AACPGR savage_k_Page_41thm.jpg
cf0b4e8cb8e3d272c19b99621727b0f1
1378d7c51237ba7575552f9e0021e6d848a7b233
840627 F20110331_AACPBU savage_k_Page_29.jp2
2a6034730ab9188316b1d20d644de986
f645b6255f66f7d4449edd51fad067d0eabb8643
98067 F20110331_AACOZT savage_k_Page_20.jpg
eac1dee5c1b8b660e5fdf478ec1f2bdd
74df72ebbdba4f26284964280eb4f53ee3780a7b
F20110331_AACOUW savage_k_Page_59.tif
df9ef90361b6431b3793494e2ae29164
76b4cadeaf716e03143d09a8572858480b4acd2f
31820 F20110331_AACONB savage_k_Page_48.QC.jpg
31ce15eb5b75c18da44f7e56a913ae7d
46bdf439199d954e8bf9cede45bfaa1f99043cb8
90321 F20110331_AACOPZ savage_k_Page_68.jpg
dc0a92ad67f11ba94b0b9375413ddcdc
f6d2178ee879510115362d90bbaff914ba3001a1
6328 F20110331_AACPGS savage_k_Page_43thm.jpg
764f3acd0422019e6cb200ccc8aa0e12
e463a70152a79c18a0722cb38657ce758dc63f52
970492 F20110331_AACPBV savage_k_Page_30.jp2
cdbdc0f8b8005f51f28995aaa05b8fb2
8a005ecc5ffdf01afb3d48cac5ffb9b9d46a1159
89217 F20110331_AACOZU savage_k_Page_21.jpg
f345ecd837008d1c7dd3418e4cdfaec2
26463e7c95362c65462f05b4b25ecc814fef8754
F20110331_AACOUX savage_k_Page_60.tif
60e8c2f747bcfbc08fb0a0f84ffb9732
03572f986f347390b031877cfdf7ea20b216b5d1
40520 F20110331_AACONC savage_k_Page_43.pro
13fc05be914d4184023ec4c67342e302
cd669881ffcd9d24456b740cea88187221bfeb01
8121 F20110331_AACPGT savage_k_Page_46thm.jpg
a9a5b0e0b7d6a630d4843eb26828527d
e83c3479422c73c0467c4b5b6b103f6922437a4f
976453 F20110331_AACPBW savage_k_Page_33.jp2
003f2e1b0abb0b0e76bba3b21f2a9d3e
d2f757265b7d224ba05a0fbab9300752a48a1983
90591 F20110331_AACOZV savage_k_Page_22.jpg
af94d45685bbcf48b0726b5f3797b061
1e623cb9de6dd9cc6bcf79ed2acffef82aea3cc1
45673 F20110331_AACOSA savage_k_Page_35.pro
75154f505ada1e1370dc50881beb33e1
9004a66c144cdd55d887f127194905ac865123d5
F20110331_AACOUY savage_k_Page_61.tif
b8bdd1f01c33d4f1218ccbddc6ed2cae
9baa76d9211521b6e8b9ebc17adcb7521637a40f
7154 F20110331_AACOND savage_k_Page_29thm.jpg
8afb253db3daa3b3b740417d5bdc6d06
c2bf145cdf80ea1cd7e5805377ea466392c89c80
8181 F20110331_AACPGU savage_k_Page_47thm.jpg
4d7383c0499d6ab12a62ced943f8a246
e5c7c7e171df96ef2d97ea1822c53d4aed50c865
788669 F20110331_AACPBX savage_k_Page_35.jp2
4b6d5589a8cf2ab09f21a646f4dc24de
cb3d81c348eb8537a81e6ba0290d231d783ac5de
97085 F20110331_AACOZW savage_k_Page_23.jpg
d786c33d877f3f14d6f2699410a9b3ec
1a2f30cefb42fc57445da78a984ae6c4af2c27d6
8114 F20110331_AACOSB savage_k_Page_55thm.jpg
ea29589d973960326c049798be8f119c
725a35b6105817dfea3c76841d2a8c07c18d94e7
F20110331_AACOUZ savage_k_Page_62.tif
659bfbb39ef0ba0575068e01b53c5417
a4a61519da7db3ce2aeee68ab2bdc3f6929293ae
F20110331_AACONE savage_k_Page_45.tif
d0d44f499d744c12c990e13ed7dff8d9
795e5ef93e435957967b69168211bf60e2209834
8371 F20110331_AACPGV savage_k_Page_48thm.jpg
6e3e71fed0f5b4b9ef30ec23d64e383e
d37bbb974ceb98eeee8a3951951dfc691969e3c2
1024706 F20110331_AACPBY savage_k_Page_36.jp2
4cf085b373cf60ab7998ec4eb33a1ff4
a1608037e55417fef4f898e429ccd90dc21fdd57
26524 F20110331_AACOZX savage_k_Page_25.jpg
0f46d760f02291cdbc32cee6a46f8697
39687e7dd5fd1bc5e8845447554c603d7493d175
877623 F20110331_AACOSC savage_k_Page_77.jp2
515579bf24383c1bee2f2fa6a8e0b6ad
e74186ba5d63393badf9d20eb0d03ddf6171acb6
58500 F20110331_AACONF savage_k_Page_36.pro
d3fdacc4ba4195b0e7f2fbfbf43f73d5
77ac6cbbdd52f8b1885c05a96e0ff3020d5bb9f8
8419 F20110331_AACPGW savage_k_Page_51thm.jpg
60de93e4aea8f2f14c5eba8888ef87ff
98362a7b7454a507716f0a5ddec33ce0adf00a5d
870239 F20110331_AACPBZ savage_k_Page_38.jp2
2db7cdcc05bf63288b0fea49f5c699ff
3af864e70a24f4d133404bf0587a6e71632627b5
77351 F20110331_AACOZY savage_k_Page_26.jpg
5557a27deb793b177bf7050cd501cfa5
96844a950ce4eeff311b588089a280b4ccd249a5
532 F20110331_AACOSD savage_k_Page_25.txt
1c0ae41236fb6bd7e6961c2eedf0fa8d
5e129c102f03b23e368243ba1004a39adb6c2e73
34252 F20110331_AACONG savage_k_Page_16.QC.jpg
0599b9b68224d54239cac4eeb5e30c16
d58c121a21bb1f75ef5a436fd03237a24488b2fb
77 F20110331_AACOXA savage_k_Page_76.txt
df30ca874037b48371db0a578416bc56
6fbb84fdf4c47a0cd32c59bed207b655c6714bbe
8792 F20110331_AACPGX savage_k_Page_54thm.jpg
4fc3d8b899301956f7e30f39ee9616fa
3d30313a99d631bb7e22cc1bcfdc0f6b4cb8c3c7
93643 F20110331_AACOZZ savage_k_Page_28.jpg
105654e8e7c58a6d6aa370863b62e85d
621af36bba79ac4ae71cef2254fff05628cb44dc
99722 F20110331_AACOSE savage_k_Page_46.jpg
8218c9705e032faf4cb1135d9fc756b4
4cd0e877edde7fe76918ac7e824170835990316d
1934 F20110331_AACOXB savage_k_Page_77.txt
93f3a7461a03b6386d6bb3230acafb7b
c956694861526acc9d9de37764fa3c734497460f
8341 F20110331_AACPGY savage_k_Page_59thm.jpg
98d5296bd307fb1ed4edac1f7c916886
9da73d897f6a144e69a719168ae587c8e6b04f5c
967177 F20110331_AACOSF savage_k_Page_28.jp2
9a077bc980201c75895f639cb236f6dc
4ef4200a9fef42062458933dd4884616f813cc03
1033841 F20110331_AACONH savage_k_Page_67.jp2
0f5f8be908fc9c69942f8375fd6ff6a4
2d5d54284471f63078392878c741ca6fe6a2c6c0
F20110331_AACOXC savage_k_Page_78.txt
83420cb9e0210bc69c38f65385e06527
4a251f98f69e83699ce2282a27d9fb3f9e182f53
8288 F20110331_AACPGZ savage_k_Page_60thm.jpg
1b5fa8c5b2ff63aec4ef90bd803a26ff
f78c7c407a51b620418f6723ce54f184c64c6b81
7055 F20110331_AACPEA savage_k_Page_70thm.jpg
f1524eca23802b8fb380a46a22849339
0f80eb97a2c6402de6a6c95f5014aad7014455c5
F20110331_AACOSG savage_k_Page_25.tif
019df42b1032caca69eb7c8af0455f31
bfd5ff0d661ad8f1f1c9188911881a9e4e031238
8110 F20110331_AACONI savage_k_Page_24thm.jpg
f5f581d18b2920ffeee4e62c7c5ec41a
6a35686261bed6b010fc8d428fbf94caedad6617
1206 F20110331_AACOXD savage_k_Page_79.txt
279de1edc7193055bc35d9b5dde0e06e
e94ce8790951998c84fb3f47b86026598b223604
34063 F20110331_AACPEB savage_k_Page_60.QC.jpg
3563f8c68797b4b92a044435610d95bb
91f2770e7dfda958ea7b925bba7f70a3fc855c87
930781 F20110331_AACOSH savage_k_Page_37.jp2
e35ba9ca5994d27e13168341e58cd50c
25a636c7c2ffdf204dfdda0d866c61f3110db6cf
1030486 F20110331_AACONJ savage_k_Page_27.jp2
05e969d25b6fe6c5d21d78b640fa82a5
38cc94921f8d9542d2f93ce064142cdeea372409
362 F20110331_AACOXE savage_k_Page_80.txt
f4e2207548c4e61c4931a39fc610307a
19029aace4ced4c63ac9024842e93a3090fb41e8
32327 F20110331_AACPEC savage_k_Page_46.QC.jpg
4b90bf91b7736e8708ae22469ca6d2e5
0587175191202261773eae99da68cceb1074fdbe
2276 F20110331_AACOSI savage_k_Page_10.txt
dd2a3d79f398426c287327ce93bef3c9
33a218d3231dec4d57955ae9b2834d67b680ab5d
1005535 F20110331_AACONK savage_k_Page_59.jp2
a8e1aacbbed3c6c7fff41b1a337900ff
e563712cf4134671b09b19ce793467cbd1a57d2f
6780 F20110331_AACOXF savage_k_Page_01.pro
62010b19dae0f1f96ed6a6327c0ae6a1
19b058c1fa77275396da4c08a911aec743321c3b
7905 F20110331_AACPED savage_k_Page_45thm.jpg
e8b5302e77c92011f4f1c51695a204eb
8680c511197e8586b663776ccefdf3de064a0b99
58412 F20110331_AACOSJ savage_k_Page_07.jpg
f37f7596dd01fbfd40092e0eac5dccc4
dd78dd4b4e51890b64a9a2cb05eff15450cde5fd
2028 F20110331_AACONL savage_k_Page_14.txt
c6d84bc957e0846e9db261aa1c2aa3e1
e13d69d13fabd075d35eeb3e782fff46ade417ba
494 F20110331_AACOXG savage_k_Page_03.pro
ed37b4a31134aeae476ef460117d868a
cd138ea8da79919ffc8396b08bb4eb4337224c5e
7799 F20110331_AACPEE savage_k_Page_28thm.jpg
6ad974bf6f133efd2f1bdc5a5b1caf0c
8e561a809b70bc8891a0f6df815e45dd4ef3985c
101163 F20110331_AACOSK savage_k_Page_10.jpg
978f2a0fa7db9d68554f8d855d681835
83e8ae8d64d5646e28f2ad2f4a44200404ba94a8
14170 F20110331_AACONM savage_k_Page_25.pro
8a9a489aedaa4bc9cb5eb80ad2a3b901
1891d5d7c5062933276e0b7fcf1ebfdad979bbea
11601 F20110331_AACOXH savage_k_Page_04.pro
3b71126b7f89211cd72ffa813accdc0a
12e7ca160d1cebf173ed2b454625776579a33d94
27707 F20110331_AACPEF savage_k_Page_57.QC.jpg
057ad4459a2c59eb4a209339711b2907
b115429474d4b04993b8cc46044b58fec064da2a
2236 F20110331_AACOSL savage_k_Page_59.txt
dc6e5b98b5a60753574e9daf1883816d
bd7a0554502408e35903a2a37db6f3c37d46a8c8
2071 F20110331_AACONN savage_k_Page_48.txt
ee399d4fe4d317ca64a1f74f03af139e
8152eaf1eb09b34ab88e7f4269a6558cb907f118
33053 F20110331_AACOXI savage_k_Page_07.pro
ea501cc7654ba13d4a3ce1bec122d8fd
70b4e9b4da63bffd8a22840fd0fe5f492a1c5b9d
31336 F20110331_AACPEG savage_k_Page_14.QC.jpg
05ee443276a00c69f87200307f292993
3179154300d0fea95c851970f25aa5d37c257731
F20110331_AACONO savage_k_Page_36.tif
579194d95b6cdd7b18f182cd7093893e
e5b944e10906fdc33da9d5da6829e4bf29e506d6
13666 F20110331_AACOXJ savage_k_Page_08.pro
dee13bd2fac7559c6faba32c0300c800
48fa94de8d6c902db727211317a690b6c2a901ce
8518 F20110331_AACPEH savage_k_Page_50thm.jpg
955e3ca1e6d4c91a784092068b59984d
d4165fd23ca6291b7f0d761d600644d21096fcd3
1781 F20110331_AACOSM savage_k_Page_70.txt
a9be390f6451043cfb4c11301366dd8b
23c1207b581ae46a64f6cdcfe16aa86dfe9ab1c8
47176 F20110331_AACONP savage_k_Page_12.jpg
b9206d81730edfdf64bee16ab430bdd1
14b20c23a19e9be23ff2d26ac106f8c824199dbb
45952 F20110331_AACOXK savage_k_Page_09.pro
f658f72b7ac2570c3f9d7693a3a331c6
56be2a04c86e2c6fab874c54629d893b8eddb32e
34940 F20110331_AACPEI savage_k_Page_54.QC.jpg
9ab39b3f664a0256c8f67f1a316b721d
4034e92e160afe35793a5eab24b34de015a5d854
F20110331_AACOSN savage_k_Page_41.tif
26cdd4fc833ddc7df56a9139b02de859
82da4cfd4be717d0cdca509eab048d72cdf47e2d
5330 F20110331_AACONQ savage_k_Page_79thm.jpg
15a11a7f8733eea4982fe352bda000fe
fcc606cbb7a47ab9f8faaea41b4c44c1bfc38f74
61844 F20110331_AACOXL savage_k_Page_10.pro
7206557f09ce3a1fd7de64842173dff9
d92108444e5912db1fc01fb197f044f1766ab2c1
5541 F20110331_AACPEJ savage_k_Page_80.QC.jpg
ca578386c7099d03b8c9b976c0308180
0d8728f5d8b9c5dfeae0ad9cf659622d1b40d954
17549 F20110331_AACONR savage_k_Page_79.QC.jpg
705237da98d4c900ddd5a401cc0c96af
4f8e9bfde7f8abd0b5f8e3ba938ac26fb467ee11
62600 F20110331_AACOXM savage_k_Page_11.pro
7b95fa9fe80b24182ad0ebdab58085d3
3ec767b326f9c77b526eb507b6296138e7d55451
7251 F20110331_AACOSO savage_k_Page_18thm.jpg
1de867ff270fa6ae0a9314a358143c84
bccc6f51cd277282998d3b27c7053c4f0acab79a
30587 F20110331_AACPEK savage_k_Page_37.QC.jpg
a6f90db9c55fe1e709cd60c1c25ab582
255aeca3342ca10753be0c17f28967245eb4a1c6
55004 F20110331_AACONS savage_k_Page_66.pro
d66f9c21d259c9a04ae31020db17e040
03552f0092a1ec81513b6113576bb1dc7fced4e8
27829 F20110331_AACOXN savage_k_Page_12.pro
f690cc120d2b1ee0be72684fa35d54de
0af3e6f9ae9ea2644384259ce019d6d03424c5a8
87326 F20110331_AACOSP savage_k_Page_41.jpg
ef1f974f24b803c0294914b621eb77bf
27bf5fcbff5862e6d2e7a4ff68384ad11f83a8e4
8667 F20110331_AACPEL savage_k_Page_44thm.jpg
a8212f61a9b7cf8177b061ac290b5209
a4c17b7e36d6ba8624ff800418285ad8a6667f9c
F20110331_AACONT savage_k_Page_32.tif
53b9253f4d9f9d8339d55cbae583fa4e
2d869efbcc9825a1e09c2833df043540551f28a0
59735 F20110331_AACOXO savage_k_Page_16.pro
727e62627e51e1fdac4b2f61708ce7df
83ce5b5267f806dc5f3107bcf647e015deab03ed
72633 F20110331_AACOSQ savage_k_Page_39.jpg
a89f4f9adcab1cbc46778093c5c06879
822e0da20569bf6e1d8ee1e5ff69928dbf1fd9b4
6798 F20110331_AACPEM savage_k_Page_42thm.jpg
0cfa1941c24dbdcb3e0bc19ec00079db
ca4830e98a0141e371e843a145aef775693efae0
103186 F20110331_AACONU savage_k_Page_72.jpg
6a9e6ce3c7d5bd662f4ecf6f441c72ef
f8dc4d2b0ed470c5c5c1c3d42aa1a2667fff33b7
42867 F20110331_AACOXP savage_k_Page_17.pro
8b123c43b28107e521f5df3d4aa74744
02a097ffe5401baddc0190a1f59819f85b949392
60048 F20110331_AACOSR savage_k_Page_27.pro
337274018621727d98ec3fb76772f671
32f5b6898a591587e4db918260e133d197cd4eaa
131470 F20110331_AACPEN UFE0021788_00001.xml FULL
ed61779777f9e4fa3505970bd8c4c4c2
9ec7f1f4757bf74777ec5b1b359bcbc1be6ba11b
2162 F20110331_AACONV savage_k_Page_23.txt
6f4051318f2d2991d795b0f4f89f4bf6
1d14b6ec171837bc4c2938f8d7a3630c91fdb7c4
46830 F20110331_AACOXQ savage_k_Page_18.pro
b350e4721e172d5e2ced8b2678cc4967
0878f1deb567291046a9bf4974d064b15e9531ba
464 F20110331_AACOSS savage_k_Page_02thm.jpg
d60622785d9b6c22d614f09eb62e9ead
a240f734ddce9772a03a6ce656088e16ee676ce7
5348 F20110331_AACPEO savage_k_Page_01.QC.jpg
dc2629768523ec7e03aab96c3e46388b
e4ed569f5faf8c6d365b6049f56eb4dbcb21cb15
1627 F20110331_AACONW savage_k_Page_76thm.jpg
d28ea6522dde331dffd93b31b4bce7c7
8aa0701ce75d050194690ef9a0179489b8ba3a46
1679 F20110331_AACOST savage_k_Page_13.txt
e140a2a7fca3143770e817682a086095
d5dae18fa19d6fcfa5364b1a02aafb6c710c6dc2
1071 F20110331_AACPEP savage_k_Page_02.QC.jpg
da8ae7f23f580566726d0eff0f60b196
c98c9048811c6e29f81dfbfedf7a38bb9c17c44a
98265 F20110331_AACONX savage_k_Page_50.jpg
fde3c5cc3bd0edf8d835b2b1a85778aa
5650fe9501e278a8d4a3674e5b62c1a683474c3f
43930 F20110331_AACOXR savage_k_Page_19.pro
a1b2528b3813b50d5c7a7126c743af79
05b3d997a5688ba6c98ff61e853ed0a2c8ee0d8b
56299 F20110331_AACOSU savage_k_Page_71.pro
d7c80fd12eae4f9b0666ae8502da6787
1e84fc9138c0b4d9843d0f82f97f7ac89beaf3a7
977 F20110331_AACPEQ savage_k_Page_03.QC.jpg
097690b56c8dffc729d889faf7f8fec1
95650b0e06e2d00289d5e8bea1595808d958b734
1791 F20110331_AACONY savage_k_Page_32.txt
94163aa3d86027e678ac6b529ba9a142
6fe5143b43026e20ffb296735830043a1c353e08
56806 F20110331_AACOXS savage_k_Page_20.pro
e194c057b076748b032dea0e63096da7
359a3e0645a3e928509d5cdc832b583e9381e6ba
F20110331_AACOSV savage_k_Page_40.tif
12304fa5610ee48b1d730cf3e6cab3ed
dea99bb634d00318ba4ce0f534b3f49a938c021d
7907 F20110331_AACPER savage_k_Page_04.QC.jpg
6e3397f87f59c1e2b4d701b99ed454c4
ebc8934672e59607da27606a888b1da205d028d0
961137 F20110331_AACONZ savage_k_Page_71.jp2
161f7cb3d31259f9f83ddfb4ad816f55
5686eb32e4e7d85e0317b4571a9e60de935df739
53397 F20110331_AACOXT savage_k_Page_21.pro
6866e61342c98875f82ace728e674d08
2fadb90e3dc2c2c56c16b7543af8d825f4262467
8572 F20110331_AACOSW savage_k_Page_27thm.jpg
029a0dcd37169c4bfd0975235a5370d1
9f60332cac3ee75bfea33f23fdefc962923c0ef2
17872 F20110331_AACPES savage_k_Page_07.QC.jpg
aeca0d8f7b48f921e763c27a46d95a5f
c0187f5c52277d1c11c1f37761b0d059e51d7a61
54752 F20110331_AACOXU savage_k_Page_22.pro
a1d4b8c14cb5e6c53224ef19de5d115b
da1f3a251ee038227cd4fb8218114d1bba1321b5
2413 F20110331_AACOSX savage_k_Page_81.jpg
39bec73001815b53c8cd5f64fc0f7ff5
7f88e1e2cc6ecf0737188b7f84a333d3d7cbd60d
26146 F20110331_AACPET savage_k_Page_09.QC.jpg
85f700f002456967d5c9937800a91ce2
33257769a2c57092b7b97a780148e1d4870a9deb
56975 F20110331_AACOXV savage_k_Page_23.pro
427501d021298519dbec1249ee6a7f6f
f44c8454d30bd98990c2dbab3e45cb36e5684049
1845 F20110331_AACOQA savage_k_Page_18.txt
8d9a2929c481d375588036a8d1f6ba8b
64613bd82049da74e951972b1fdafd3fa4e92e20
797540 F20110331_AACOSY savage_k_Page_09.jp2
0fc5e9aedf188757e7ded8974d4bdb0f
9aa5a83dbd06cc1a4315d1de3fa8f2e6d94ebc62
33673 F20110331_AACPEU savage_k_Page_10.QC.jpg
cc5748357e9a3e2d376adfe4b946cf04
3ae4aa05fcd1bbac0cb81f28910fcbaece23f946
56647 F20110331_AACOXW savage_k_Page_24.pro
39d8ca67f916ae6c91fa234c67ce1129
e30a50e589850c38c2ed50fb9451843aa7967768
7617 F20110331_AACOQB savage_k_Page_77thm.jpg
60c209278119081d286ac87e9fad981d
c207eafeb210ccf9e0efb600c6bb407b23f5e81a
4726 F20110331_AACOSZ savage_k_Page_76.QC.jpg
6c5f5a212d65743e7196b5c6a36a0d18
e7fb0f71b4bb1efe6e2e5638716956725790d0fe
23029 F20110331_AACPEV savage_k_Page_13.QC.jpg
f67eeb7798cfd0aa6b2896839651558d
245cd7fe40a80e19b866fe60325b5348b104c295
46958 F20110331_AACOXX savage_k_Page_26.pro
a5d9ddf2e09630e775f64283c308eaa6
51f35b6f0b8792290ab835671c0a4e1808f20d32
99779 F20110331_AACOQC savage_k_Page_55.jpg
3bc9de7debce505e59457e0c18b5d6cb
0a4193dbf663c18297b53ac30eeb14f5aa04a6a4
31527 F20110331_AACPEW savage_k_Page_20.QC.jpg
64eaa3e5a4370f7b8ddd2f85a96e77f1
f1e097f4a87b6867299c49c3e9a5bfd35daec2e3
F20110331_AACOVA savage_k_Page_64.tif
13be0453d7672e638d337dfa5d6ad4b4
a3b8ef1c16ea6004672b2c5a2f2b251d7c427280
44476 F20110331_AACOXY savage_k_Page_31.pro
f1767bf284d2463eb7048e3db72b189c
d1b7d9a32709609313da70d7902502c25b14eb79
24510 F20110331_AACOQD savage_k_Page_26.QC.jpg
38882776f70f3ad71755bfe9c6463cff
f7717d47bf1cb42dc4f746c8e25b0aaf18a491d3
31862 F20110331_AACPEX savage_k_Page_23.QC.jpg
d1d0af6db0670175e4fd68531ed1a698
fc9dd0951d508cf3e4fee64153fac5e269027af4
F20110331_AACOVB savage_k_Page_65.tif
db7c542c7d049f885af6f181d882bb41
f1b0888cc6d9ac448bb4688c378196a7cc0fb674
47480 F20110331_AACOXZ savage_k_Page_32.pro
95cabc325b3280b3fb14a630d52b0d80
ead436dcd216d550157d6b7dbe691c72697f8ef6
1805 F20110331_AACOQE savage_k_Page_63.txt
e5173af88ce7b87c11ca20ab73cc3225
2ecdf79b561588e091baeccc214d73857ecb7152
31835 F20110331_AACPEY savage_k_Page_24.QC.jpg
38924d55c8b00cac70e18ab334086dc4
fd79d53690fed233ca6dd5f5eb1ce16d03237738
F20110331_AACOVC savage_k_Page_66.tif
c615ef2a826e7fb3eac68f74901a2ec5
bc830eb5d56311aeefb8011a0d9c7cd9406c47bd
49707 F20110331_AACOQF savage_k_Page_57.pro
341cbd95f0179ea7ceeb09570d2fcbf6
7e8153d0a6fffbd80752f0b2f913b48541d30b79
9299 F20110331_AACPEZ savage_k_Page_25.QC.jpg
94598b475452570973cd8956f19cc905
717c9adb42904f5a9c77774a879266323b07998d
751307 F20110331_AACPCA savage_k_Page_39.jp2
7570562c09db24ed1ad807358d0a1fe9
ff744aa0357b7329063e33a063849701e504cba4
F20110331_AACOVD savage_k_Page_68.tif
39a6e02093907abb4a24e2da06668142
93e59cf8a51e4165ecc707aafefa2c2ded84d022
886107 F20110331_AACOQG savage_k_Page_41.jp2
3ac414f1bd989de471cc8b0c4e196f52
4bb06cc5dbba470d523b09a6f3a2afded6003ea3
1051977 F20110331_AACPCB savage_k_Page_40.jp2
554c0c5e816093f86ddcf15deddaa9fa
27647eaefea214332e35ed43f4e4c69e61433e65
F20110331_AACOVE savage_k_Page_69.tif
f26dff10be7f524fcbdc4180f47132bd
78ab5dcd550427ef22907659507b23b55128246f
90760 F20110331_AACOQH savage_k_Page_05.pro
9d4d378814244c35b6889ac686182634
ce46eb224cb90806ca8211c73081ad05ebf160d3
804005 F20110331_AACPCC savage_k_Page_42.jp2
64805655e01c58fe4c530129b19f24ed
6f4e820c7e5fd247e0f466bba465603af2a02bdb
F20110331_AACOVF savage_k_Page_71.tif
5ba11f83773b6a50b442a841f053e3b8
f91362f8d020bf11cc6151256f808cab5f517c6d
30373 F20110331_AACOQI savage_k_Page_66.QC.jpg
2adb265c53f43ae7df02e6e2b4c2df48
2d0fcb66dde64547a83e6cd47f90c9c5e1885900
8096 F20110331_AACPHA savage_k_Page_61thm.jpg
a3a03383608d2b94a2eb501f759cecc3
5a365353a370e67e2a17ae1bb8d43c703e435590
704581 F20110331_AACPCD savage_k_Page_43.jp2
29a0e3abedf7ce98dd5133067420d9b4
73ba170e4b13e4c2590a9fe651ded5ecf7fc535e
F20110331_AACOVG savage_k_Page_72.tif
5735782076c19924a0aeedea6f7d33bd
0bb57de1cd437a612d7b8e11a714ff4309897cdc
F20110331_AACOQJ savage_k_Page_54.tif
453239498fb455419548dc1dfbf0595f
48d55b7379a4eaa850312f8cf30d076840b82f20
7943 F20110331_AACPHB savage_k_Page_62thm.jpg
a93a41a056103face4710425159a5ec8
0a1d5bc7d97f42ae435673605acb85231b706adf
1051968 F20110331_AACPCE savage_k_Page_44.jp2
5b54587d6de8d72421cdaba7b94ac5a7
d2f2ce2df854c02a2a2bd8d6c27d2d3e40aad924
F20110331_AACOVH savage_k_Page_74.tif
9cb2e5884355fb3f089d00938679883e
3580d50585d590197241c39d24fc8b956e89d123
7324 F20110331_AACPHC savage_k_Page_63thm.jpg
83f5fb7bae601046635cb67f30dc6aea
b87e844f6158854067844e70029d417392e32661
929430 F20110331_AACPCF savage_k_Page_45.jp2
c4b13f154360f4f361d00a6c7bdb0be4
925ae947b681b97fd5127384f6f46312e511e70a
F20110331_AACOVI savage_k_Page_76.tif
64a7f2fd718b23cf1eb26b433f5a6226
ec8e26bddfef516300dcb1f0e61592ba3c0aaaa2
7629 F20110331_AACOQK savage_k_Page_56thm.jpg
af71fd96ac424b68084488907b631389
7a8f8633fd144d54a7aec0835ed8e70a3d863d6d
21644 F20110331_AACOLN savage_k_Page_02.jp2
9eb9e226edfd795e40f084152ae2ab26
67c0a4883c6d470e377e78350d4eec1332eaf77d
8139 F20110331_AACPHD savage_k_Page_65thm.jpg
060e23e02440e96fabcc833d750de81d
5b445b0caca8c751e23e9ddfcc595edc62ba0560
1051923 F20110331_AACPCG savage_k_Page_46.jp2
2ce0afeb88630e778c9774758f3a1959
836ea9eb5603dd091ddb1fd97557dd8755acfdea
F20110331_AACOVJ savage_k_Page_77.tif
ec9ccfbdcaa95111102fc1d6639471d9
30b4b53f6c2d480a2b9814cd86fa1bcefd0f6c36
816 F20110331_AACOQL savage_k_Page_02.pro
291c001a8d5a54df5aae3c0943086715
6abd90147a7bd4065e9e91f525e10174364d8ab3
29380 F20110331_AACOLO savage_k_Page_41.QC.jpg
8a7ed0cd8f017951111b21838cc6ea3a
b4b844d76accde3d661f7ebba7780f497a57e822
7910 F20110331_AACPHE savage_k_Page_66thm.jpg
2cc0cadb7ecb107be05702f6c6736fa5
c1f4110df0446cfebf970a6e93ebfebaf3575916
1051922 F20110331_AACPCH savage_k_Page_47.jp2
97533ec5699fea4fe1025f4a97c5acad
1f456864ac5a68ada9a4ecabb9293ba03bda02e8
F20110331_AACOVK savage_k_Page_78.tif
5ce10499cc78dc619cdcea7d4087e3fb
9c728b395cd959c73ef0d01c69c01e5bf2e95fdd
726344 F20110331_AACOQM savage_k_Page_69.jp2
c81e89b867f3ba97dc9e4c0c087f8af2
3abccd8991cca4191ef6c56ade0ca2fce9d86298
1038 F20110331_AACOLP savage_k_Page_12.txt
24155ca47f7744a44380e81d4ded271a
daa1cc04b47a037450ceb0b5cfc65ea820fd350b
7821 F20110331_AACPHF savage_k_Page_68thm.jpg
d3fbf89c5104a9f97f0c01964e77a0fb
7aac0f5719d2922654bb41433f48a042f43acceb
1038219 F20110331_AACPCI savage_k_Page_50.jp2
80c2677d4ed1fc5a419b2af62ebd0966
da426c577ee437c9696089f2a4ca500b72373ce5
F20110331_AACOQN savage_k_Page_05.tif
8dd4c32cd23eebf87d8ab541d02e7e53
d602dc8a8081ee81bf0aa9089b2b83b2a7a5ad30
F20110331_AACOLQ savage_k_Page_75.tif
3f147bd4f56f5bf7cc7c1097571f1db6
1ca0f32eeeeee2abfd015455277a2ac070d6d4b3
F20110331_AACOVL savage_k_Page_79.tif
bd807d6dee994057dcf14b35f09e0224
d2d946c349b959932fc16d590a5b12f0b4760467
8102 F20110331_AACPHG savage_k_Page_71thm.jpg
8c658ea2f8db1205d8c4edaa821809d6
9a44203d668ea7e861f38ca5714bd5e62fb3c591
985346 F20110331_AACPCJ savage_k_Page_53.jp2
78218de94d933d9c283e28657e34c9be
2b07cf4df966cc757e39d23dac27b3f68726996a
2226 F20110331_AACOQO savage_k_Page_67.txt
10ecb3afe1c2e363de14ad27b33721f2
c6579dd1149f4a1e606ce5bd4481e9ea9af53c93
F20110331_AACOLR savage_k_Page_37.tif
967bb76dcc8cb31742627abfa0bcc41e
533ba0aa2df04918db836d6909cb97b1bf336ba9
F20110331_AACOVM savage_k_Page_80.tif
88c47c9a82d3d2100ee4a10c0a653fc0
62c95ad5a917d622f78990fa8a620988bc785677
8645 F20110331_AACPHH savage_k_Page_72thm.jpg
aa3e791fbd4959d66b0ff614aa5245a6
45b5a87d19874f95d370c4246adcd65627b8eaa2
F20110331_AACPCK savage_k_Page_54.jp2
ec7155ff088ce6d62d9599075571085a
f8bd1a31abbfa41338903c664f3c5a77fb2af05e
858409 F20110331_AACOQP savage_k_Page_52.jp2
28890755fde58968f5c102a56c28e884
39ae72673370ff173453a379340ad66467c4340b
F20110331_AACOLS savage_k_Page_57.tif
cd02c8e84f13baff8c439aa0f319c1f8
2b9c73752c468b9a68e7c80740e5178300807eeb
F20110331_AACOVN savage_k_Page_81.tif
d503ca89c34727263566dfdafe917bce
32d189b4fbf73a2c1366938358efcc217ccabd71
7692 F20110331_AACPHI savage_k_Page_74thm.jpg
73e3b413058f4d0b6f8f1d75fa0e56e9
60c64066e085f31babaf9d78a55d7e42deedf8ab
1016100 F20110331_AACPCL savage_k_Page_55.jp2
a90f827cb4f8224b81a9ce11c8e0b0b2
c0d9e01076963a3ec21f04998d17e50de119c80e
30446 F20110331_AACOQQ savage_k_Page_21.QC.jpg
67d820c66d41b38842a998c7834f93bd
e384516c0f2389344fe97ad65b66c8793fe52e28
2168 F20110331_AACOLT savage_k_Page_25thm.jpg
ee2f779bdc963bfbff548ee3210f037e
26630262d2347995f679c954d7f07972f17fd5e9
409 F20110331_AACOVO savage_k_Page_01.txt
8ad86bd9f168874264f30a1131e226da
04186cf53fcb23fa089d825c70d8c497ba5d42e1
4268 F20110331_AACPHJ savage_k_Page_75thm.jpg
92505063c5111bffa569a87df63a75d4
ea5e43eb050033acff7b39946db62168bad9c13d
873805 F20110331_AACPCM savage_k_Page_57.jp2
b695feafd20cfe49b1a9bf4720736c2e
57fb2de473fbb4727f226e219d01adf3eb7945f1
870002 F20110331_AACOQR savage_k_Page_34.jp2
5196c124bc1bf3eaa99eb4141a2b1e81
97c8c0dafba9578e8542834debbfd77a12ecb2fe
99317 F20110331_AACOLU savage_k_Page_73.jpg
2f05a5420ea7d58d92f438b08d6c452c
8300fc1fda9baa3c6be85fc79da52d8f9d5287a9
6238 F20110331_AACPHK savage_k_Page_78thm.jpg
f7dfc868dc8da3b06c88ba995a39fbbb
90565aa6a16be3cbf739de8b424fe449c8537bec
979154 F20110331_AACPCN savage_k_Page_58.jp2
9afc8510aff9eed17b478899062a50c6
9cbcbc7f4e2a784caa75b737635651363dd7166c
1041584 F20110331_AACOQS savage_k_Page_51.jp2
6f4f76ee00d1841c6d2675b0add198b6
2f14bc39a938b6998d3a35243d9417b5345740cf
58976 F20110331_AACOLV savage_k_Page_73.pro
91aca69f5b1300cb5d0b9c14a8510eff
eaae05bb79050c6a626aaf3c6c94f4a61db60f53
105 F20110331_AACOVP savage_k_Page_03.txt
9ab9524df87e48184e723a2d056537c5
b81e8ccdfec74463be9bb759efdc2d6a826b280f
1574 F20110331_AACPHL savage_k_Page_80thm.jpg
f5d94fa318ecc190e82dfb1683ef3cd2
5b44de315ad0f80868f7b2214855c438ddcd67aa
F20110331_AACPCO savage_k_Page_60.jp2
7f8bedac6c97d3c9da1e87eb7647b059
b8b56f659041de53697244469b45a5b3edb38a47
24121 F20110331_AACOQT savage_k_Page_15.QC.jpg
3c7c3451710249be85b7b80accbe4fa7
ec432dda145f52a1c92cda66e95ac0f46ba36cf0
8323 F20110331_AACOLW savage_k_Page_06.jpg
be3d32dda02b76a2dc68d22e1847bffe
d99eeb9606f827af4933e5c0caf53a1034ffdc12
440 F20110331_AACOVQ savage_k_Page_04.txt
ab5b8548e7c6e69d805f41d87fa2668a
7c1f1a9d956242805e1e31e08106a35be16def75
326 F20110331_AACPHM savage_k_Page_81thm.jpg
20cc73d04fef310662326cd4b521cf84
93ed1ef0f06d23173315be429f2f275ec5ba0448
946572 F20110331_AACPCP savage_k_Page_62.jp2
a8f67053e45917d0ebdd56bf79fd7fa7
d403c44b81898484f64a4013870a2bbebde1260f
49529 F20110331_AACOQU savage_k_Page_29.pro
984e0eb6a7476aa14218114f1bac8804
d0e31e61f91b8e043889111d8c1d59448d7cef06
6826 F20110331_AACOLX savage_k_Page_26thm.jpg
886b23ae3e660a1e204f4cd65a254231
029e28131858656c8402a60bc091151a65cd3b6c
228 F20110331_AACOVR savage_k_Page_06.txt
419555ba9beec5f2736842ef978812eb
f207fc75a353710df7b581fda85b34fe42861d74
832420 F20110331_AACPCQ savage_k_Page_63.jp2
67e55bc2b73ea3b83b36f020c49ccdb3
2c9c056b3af247d4b025717c61001d12a62786a1
992840 F20110331_AACOQV savage_k_Page_48.jp2
25ca3292f9a3e38fd7f893ff6e82d9c1
b4832493b0dcbcb3d9f7a1c0c528186f0f0c8b4a
2126 F20110331_AACOLY savage_k_Page_28.txt
ae36b21c9d47435969c5e66a312cec81
dcf20a28f339bd1af5fc1d0364088f88b337efe0
1486 F20110331_AACOVS savage_k_Page_07.txt
10f40afa7558c3c297b32fb1311f3416
e8f50d5f2b59cb0d56e5fefc2e51952b2950cecc
1006067 F20110331_AACPCR savage_k_Page_64.jp2
95fe7aac9562230312a2a8918c76f8b9
885f828d89e877cd1adda9b52eb97d70a0a79e8d
24283 F20110331_AACOQW savage_k_Page_17.QC.jpg
7db1b9ffdc929d0b583ee7adb5f0a895
58daff59af5bbf9a934f727b65430d4ba1567fd9
91819 F20110331_AACOLZ savage_k_Page_62.jpg
b5baa1e3f3b68445af8bdd258e40aa7d
66cfa0bab4d39c1429e70f7d1534df5df1e62308
514 F20110331_AACOVT savage_k_Page_08.txt
d435e842a31d04bd51880bb2caa4cb8a
34a72c288478102b7e397df72dc958958724ad52
984573 F20110331_AACPCS savage_k_Page_65.jp2
d46d42fd8052d7c8080719586ddd3d4f
d4cc8be47f16c6772ca8826a7d192a098ca0a43b
26191 F20110331_AACOQX savage_k_Page_70.QC.jpg
da4aa9c4107d14fc65eccac38112a558
532e8c5b5a30259cdb4df597f751f6d26508a19a
2200 F20110331_AACOVU savage_k_Page_16.txt
c58972377267b79b522d33278944fe72
de9f9f52a0d9d3ac827cc5d61a5f2a8616b19a4f
915778 F20110331_AACPCT savage_k_Page_68.jp2
f277ec6b30fa7ccb6aa4d04cbb22ffa8
c0557f0572dd652c6fffc52602a4efcdab4feabb
58728 F20110331_AACOQY savage_k_Page_59.pro
a745278263d7f4f40dbb8b4a493f3def
8104f7f45967487d64bdf1779d988ef296fad763
1617 F20110331_AACOVV savage_k_Page_17.txt
9ca25d6a3d4c0d765200d62622432920
4ffa38ad898ce3b183caa0f031916b1c3091c338
93938 F20110331_AACOOA savage_k_Page_06.jp2
aa79fe9f4bac4487d5cb1ecaae13a03b
fb83f7e6336f70cf5f6fda3752a9dfc795919427
814744 F20110331_AACPCU savage_k_Page_70.jp2
8101cb7901c21443fe8b298167d03734
b4616ed8fa1f98245877cff9e44c85f2ab6e669a
97982 F20110331_AACOQZ savage_k_Page_27.jpg
3ed0b9466065ed895a1c003d3de8e601
bf6ee4eee4d3c0167ad502389808e82124e82a73
2187 F20110331_AACOVW savage_k_Page_20.txt
dde77a545f6a270038f7d7b91c7a4a3e
1f998241d6fd8877177940a319a0832a367ee358
2479 F20110331_AACOOB savage_k_Page_47.txt
7736e1fe4858d502348f4dd233024646
a7c9a428ff7b7e668883cfcccd0562aa948a3e38
1030903 F20110331_AACPCV savage_k_Page_73.jp2
5ceaf929b978debd73c0a8b93278b0f7
f2939c23225b2e28a989c26c7f16418160cfd00d
2040 F20110331_AACOVX savage_k_Page_22.txt
6c58d1118bbccebd2090606fceab5177
390564485dea3e8f50bed98d7f904a1aaf45e0f4
2111 F20110331_AACOOC savage_k_Page_33.txt
aeb3e524e916333cdf733cc1638bacc9
bbfb4b3b44e39540a006cbd27d932e3a71d7cdfb
922928 F20110331_AACPCW savage_k_Page_74.jp2
e99089576a236801ec8e59028314d905
0f5f6b542c59347ecb48ca97eea338167c366c83
2019 F20110331_AACOTA savage_k_Page_62.txt
4856f831205b0569792ba7c534f7219f
1d8527af7a574590f4152b3d4364b78d55aa2947
2087 F20110331_AACOVY savage_k_Page_24.txt
c2f890be1e9a2476a60509aa85774d50
4f3eb416303cb7d5ddc0bc3125c49d0de1872f77
2240 F20110331_AACOOD savage_k_Page_06.QC.jpg
167b004468315f6e863c4a5b59968bd8
241f4c8e7bfdf09e49d524b05db62b770d9dbd04
114191 F20110331_AACPCX savage_k_Page_76.jp2
aa9d86e1546b512aed8dcdc8c5b544bd
532fc0565268392453718eb0e5aa2a38e9fd380f
1182280 F20110331_AACOTB savage_k.pdf
87f14dfa382cbf437c66f4e394bda49d
b3ab380112b9fcd7ec717487707906b1ebbd9a17
1866 F20110331_AACOVZ savage_k_Page_26.txt
84dc967b73889f3db0e8d337bfa3a58f
6c8055e33aa6db4e5ccee4a292a65ece627556fd
1743 F20110331_AACOOE savage_k_Page_19.txt
04addbfb973da960bdfe9c136803baa6
363a6ccb6f22f1e9fef4c824c56a77bf59bc5a23
576191 F20110331_AACPCY savage_k_Page_79.jp2
77e73395d592d6e76d632cb19f860191
ea625ccc09a58e815570338368ac561c0938aecf
50661 F20110331_AACOTC savage_k_Page_34.pro
bb3ded9e1d8a6f05e1a849382ea7427c
0b25fc3ed99a3fa657a6d370bba59d2bd23a0be1
2157 F20110331_AACOOF savage_k_Page_55.txt
cb2ab1dae445f39bc45666a5732adbee
96171d2bc4f0daefb1c034d547ce2b4eca54fbf2
156438 F20110331_AACPCZ savage_k_Page_80.jp2
5516d6815c615d8e2b55184b9f7ed04f
2f3f608e891c84c4025d74f27e39f0412323358b
49648 F20110331_AACOYA savage_k_Page_38.pro
08a82405b3aece1d9c86f5e58c7d56ec
adbfdf94849846972ca5ee70da6b9148b091c13f
93749 F20110331_AACPAA savage_k_Page_30.jpg
d8340f65ac5258764c5eb5fc81b3e3ce
ee4ce24940f2d46d2c32fc2ca52aeb0ce2bc1fd3
F20110331_AACOTD savage_k_Page_51.tif
bf90f0a32a4bb0b8279dcb1706211d1c
3b54dba365d572ccdbcc181f9f82a1087a779394
4267 F20110331_AACOOG savage_k_Page_12thm.jpg
61ab97cdb0a8899920d1a91ff2c57593
6c0ab3fdb9ea37f89c81af24b51a85f54b3be59f
41254 F20110331_AACOYB savage_k_Page_39.pro
8e6e46bf9bcabea78895bc57c404f83b
61a0e3f43fd3cea0279616de9cdc8bc6ad7d9708
72586 F20110331_AACPAB savage_k_Page_31.jpg
6403013fe1742b38c3085f5526fc15a9
55f14ec697b6fc68d74871b68d36561a95600bec
7370 F20110331_AACOTE savage_k_Page_19thm.jpg
c59a01e7e63ea32ceeb49023058bf75b
dff7a23a8998d98bd34c44cc7b0cb0aeabbfe325
F20110331_AACOOH savage_k_Page_63.tif
d0aa5f6c70eeb24a380379195cb0364c
94e169bcf653a6df72879f72c53fdaed3d512141
62143 F20110331_AACOYC savage_k_Page_40.pro
f2120ad99fb0cc29f10931dbf6b86a9b
8b89a1aab47e11e8de6941dc66fa081346adc750
80948 F20110331_AACPAC savage_k_Page_32.jpg
3707f30e8f2736b494c8969c71314841
14aa9c163ae4a68a9c9146de1586874a35e394ac
96061 F20110331_AACOTF UFE0021788_00001.mets
0d0eb1a8d832cb1956ac44edb6165369
5c12127e8bd579f7dfaf8ba3d3b8128076cecb94
32879 F20110331_AACPFA savage_k_Page_27.QC.jpg
af4eded2ea2e981fb9515a09672b5194
9c894b5fb20e76c05602ca04a977bed27bf6039d
51473 F20110331_AACOYD savage_k_Page_41.pro
d34e6c2c346d15ed47e084f993e95865
0f78743b254e8d4260ddb865a616a25e744fcf0f
86614 F20110331_AACPAD savage_k_Page_34.jpg
ff6bbcbd00f98a50c9403ad58a417279
1bb30731a52799c09c2c4fb647120e8a55d8089d
496100 F20110331_AACOOI savage_k_Page_75.jp2
ceced84268d9a06a6fd7c4dcf3e122de
aca97a3a0ee786ae17b769003c03e417aef57997
32336 F20110331_AACPFB savage_k_Page_28.QC.jpg
40be552c0ac4e3f01af903f429a9ab4f
ab5b7b3a4cbd8ad0dac45e7edb7370496dae9a84
63552 F20110331_AACOYE savage_k_Page_44.pro
22c72b6b2358b87ae627d6dc5e0de68c
8535dcaf247690a703ce9ff20fb0f642e30b28fa
76674 F20110331_AACPAE savage_k_Page_35.jpg
26d65869b944cbe774f4ce4319b1d9b2
b57059c472ed7c02cd55513bd3995093058277fe
2143 F20110331_AACOOJ savage_k_Page_58.txt
32b0b2c02cc3a9b17a905fa2ec409353
6a0dc7fdfced7a8a7eea6417b3000ce2eb1cef7b
26460 F20110331_AACPFC savage_k_Page_29.QC.jpg
62a6a859df77a15025d2c3d565a1fbea
0dfedb336589f27efe01600a3ead23e199b78696
52995 F20110331_AACOYF savage_k_Page_45.pro
372750cc9f5aacb4c70312037856024c
03c89d346581d48ef600a6ce5ca4fada83287cd1
89541 F20110331_AACPAF savage_k_Page_37.jpg
ba91fcfe79d5eb617651ce958817b51e
f33ae39a2c248fd072f3265db0d3d3a680dc8098
F20110331_AACOTI savage_k_Page_01.tif
53011a1c636c02d0512092613b9e8959
00aa1277eb2d1b396f9ff1cb30c3e81ad59ce71c
F20110331_AACOOK savage_k_Page_18.tif
e46b999634ec160e5d9bc20df572f21d
1069e328977099a5fbf40758ad978c5624256f1b
30472 F20110331_AACPFD savage_k_Page_30.QC.jpg
2af5a79d0892b34abbcfeb5746f0e56b
91f304be32c529f14515a99c462a8be95dc74337
60211 F20110331_AACOYG savage_k_Page_46.pro
dd9fbc8afe2faf6808aaead24e4849f2
3413221859a796703164f8b977d827d0adc814cb
85644 F20110331_AACPAG savage_k_Page_38.jpg
b58a53c56394a984be2d1bd28de83642
e4b2771fcdb75bedb143f601c725e9a1e7fa967e
F20110331_AACOTJ savage_k_Page_02.tif
9cdae71d447e312c6c7f91bde4c6f53b
204d422b0186f015d4d4fab602bd716adb3c87ad
34887 F20110331_AACOOL savage_k_Page_11.QC.jpg
3b76adcbc95b0dc9e12e96739afaf647
d01cb94346feea3e49e32692021fccd167bc59bf
28583 F20110331_AACPFE savage_k_Page_32.QC.jpg
1088f736ef9412e440ddc4c83ad84faa
07c6eec8de0a3fecf65f23d60847783fe9c5915b
76630 F20110331_AACPAH savage_k_Page_42.jpg
def6e9e160dd3bbb3131d7b84bad1339
9fd7fc4e6dc8780f2551a8c8651ca989a9466e10
F20110331_AACOTK savage_k_Page_03.tif
afcb97f3885ed68e709359f7ed6cdcf7
2bc48562bb3eeeeb3ad9a04c747e42c97e5dc829
26391 F20110331_AACOOM savage_k_Page_18.QC.jpg
4e80362db576c47ee8de3cfe97d7ff0a
9e630465e32690b17806cb8492fddcbef78945cd
65839 F20110331_AACOYH savage_k_Page_47.pro
0f647befc1397fafd8e14e34f6a5932c
2f18e1a02a3577e01bd456f9b10cba8607dc4cc5
28509 F20110331_AACPFF savage_k_Page_34.QC.jpg
6d5e11c220ae95d7e6cf450ee43a8ed6
b2be1638dc9f6df20b2dd9e04c732a79948b17d2
67572 F20110331_AACPAI savage_k_Page_43.jpg
62a0c27dfaba65e92d3e1c61dde83ef8
8c8e62d396946c2cf0e5afd7fbe210027faf5cd6
F20110331_AACOTL savage_k_Page_06.tif
9ca17b7b33020791ae43f9575f401d7d
608a74b75f684842ba424e9631bceec66dfb3ac5
96007 F20110331_AACOON savage_k_Page_61.jpg
59da3a6957ff0efdd4b15a9027945d5c
cfaf6d0773792ca79c379012442d11b927852915
55363 F20110331_AACOYI savage_k_Page_48.pro
067ddec15a0b69927977ca1c288f60f3
b409e84bbe5d4985d0a4a2df02677d4398c69181
26709 F20110331_AACPFG savage_k_Page_35.QC.jpg
1b641cd5aafdff084db1eb387e0dbddd
d7f35ed7fa2dd349c62064922185bae840f903a1
103451 F20110331_AACPAJ savage_k_Page_44.jpg
5b7ffc77490117da5c3485db9d1bd3ec
1abb79e2e47e9f79948e0dc08f4e043f068fdbbf
F20110331_AACOTM savage_k_Page_07.tif
754439917fe904f0b112780e7935990d
ff92d3ea23a209f931dcc58779284bfa59761034
759599 F20110331_AACOOO savage_k_Page_78.jp2
f79cdbc4c04ecc91e5e940861159a266
48426d878cecea5c21cb378af691e3a8315f251c
57574 F20110331_AACOYJ savage_k_Page_49.pro
922ec9772651cb9cbb1ae824187e8830
735b1304150c144274d410bbbe91ecbaf7cb12dd
22071 F20110331_AACPFH savage_k_Page_39.QC.jpg
ad22cb2459958a55a8b3a5f20df59d49
95d6adcfe11900bf6320a01477b22f3fa64ab251
90311 F20110331_AACPAK savage_k_Page_45.jpg
5d84947379bd847b608e984ba3859c41
20f0907ce7604aacdafb07a30d140917eaba474f
42657 F20110331_AACOOP savage_k_Page_78.pro
0c6b70b2c89174da916ca284f68936fd
b218c5c3ce75b8317d675d9ab0132c996c5804c0
60447 F20110331_AACOYK savage_k_Page_50.pro
3c8a382e0c8087572ffb962b9cc58359
be8028af375244c749bdcbe236bde12ff50d893f
35369 F20110331_AACPFI savage_k_Page_44.QC.jpg
0810182facb9f4ff411d7e0bc9bb5688
6bba8893c7237e2c3c4ebc858f359506308f0702
110976 F20110331_AACPAL savage_k_Page_47.jpg
62b3719d503a0170cf542df265b6ad36
86b1254eda4201aa59e76317c85e8f132ab141b1
F20110331_AACOTN savage_k_Page_08.tif
0255fd4e1f3bc49406f315e8633e5dfe
371a3a0ddee8be3f26ee5d7af006aa2e0095df4c
55424 F20110331_AACOOQ savage_k_Page_65.pro
f56e0981a3d94adec2d2fb3db4721971
26a0936ebb88a7a1118c131ef2d0240c1da1701f
59238 F20110331_AACOYL savage_k_Page_51.pro
649b03379393cb37b07a2d84b2ae75a1
1ad8575c26ff52b180383215b42bcb021bac4681
30658 F20110331_AACPFJ savage_k_Page_45.QC.jpg
afbc785d67bcb239e2954374d0d566f2
fb1ba7642878defcfd479cd5448b82bfc9798e5e
95371 F20110331_AACPAM savage_k_Page_49.jpg
c3a1e261966a7a78e896c5a8f537a268
f0d158605658e845915d1b59646c7c7afab25642
F20110331_AACOTO savage_k_Page_09.tif
a7829ee82f20e391b2313dfe14e917c0
1c55e96fda9a6e2fef679919ea30f5e85b930a01
244976 F20110331_AACOOR savage_k_Page_08.jp2
128f2618ec1e1e2aba9226d70280c413
4113b823a187fd59a695e50a1bdb6edb700a7758
49958 F20110331_AACOYM savage_k_Page_52.pro
3223eec9ab3516b5116579c28e3bcfdc
0c0e2fda538a3a09a03d0a703571eac52091b4fc
33037 F20110331_AACPFK savage_k_Page_47.QC.jpg
356ddc6763732be70664bb87b52c958e
75b176c378a9b54c9c86972f5fd2c39419c78cd0
93628 F20110331_AACPAN savage_k_Page_53.jpg
b5de7a6a2054dc4acb3c9821150fc2ca
c205792b8b504d368445e5f89f8d8803f4aea7aa
F20110331_AACOTP savage_k_Page_11.tif
b6baba894c01bed3f9a8470a2995af1d
210831636d1da5f5cf36ac24958d41216f7da56b
829409 F20110331_AACOOS savage_k_Page_32.jp2
f548b8e83a7504e9c1b25b53de0353ac
d48b106fb60aeac32adea9c59ae797cea81cb20f
57057 F20110331_AACOYN savage_k_Page_53.pro
cc02c3b2f039cdc5c70064c76a13a242
1bd30b91d3e7b5fead59ad40c2597d8e649daaca
34416 F20110331_AACPFL savage_k_Page_50.QC.jpg
ecab5e669cb87ae89bbc703dd6ae5c04
08125cc3e7b17ffed80c5f80c8ea66ea600f4a95
F20110331_AACOTQ savage_k_Page_12.tif
1d0bac262dfcaa7a33b973c670b80def
9b0e051d4d3b2a471245ea061b3c255a8732eae6
77930 F20110331_AACOOT savage_k_Page_15.jpg
3c710b3937061e976e044d3db67648b8
413a8bb28c23665f0268fff3ee5489a8a45bd2dd
61516 F20110331_AACOYO savage_k_Page_54.pro
383e806a8cb2df28ad82246383276a05
674b517bdb768a167510c383bf330ca4aeaf2cb8
104813 F20110331_AACPAO savage_k_Page_54.jpg
9c049d59a25c263df41304b7ea021825
ce151ebb08ee12f7139419021409ec2cdecfe7dd
32911 F20110331_AACPFM savage_k_Page_51.QC.jpg
bd78954efe652365943e09b38ff343bc
f7d5e1c3a73e29122e046860196f871a717c54b4
F20110331_AACOTR savage_k_Page_13.tif
0fea1911c4daed4fd0987dd49f5bf392
5e00413b98450cbf9734108e91733824846095b9
94685 F20110331_AACOOU savage_k_Page_24.jpg
ace39a53fc92934f4e55199f1b3c3a52
e44eb0a41000b25b991afc1ff8597f3c699317e6
58295 F20110331_AACOYP savage_k_Page_55.pro
b323382d03d586fbc1d3206c0a4f06ec
8d9c98f08dc05d57b6f4be8620e06f8807a5143e
92802 F20110331_AACPAP savage_k_Page_56.jpg
1d0eae42d93ff921c971b12a080e8389
4eb57292d7a9b6f25e947845321626902b505814
28367 F20110331_AACPFN savage_k_Page_52.QC.jpg
45ca20fba371c7c859af3a43d1c8897d
1e6e5a2f30a54c760eb6f092a3b45815584c99bd
F20110331_AACOTS savage_k_Page_14.tif
13ac225f43948e21754e0411dd40b9d7
ee62c493d7e8a59cc72a8b92ff57ada3b5e951ae
758259 F20110331_AACOOV savage_k_Page_31.jp2
fdfeadd5db6156e9c5790bd0f3c2c8f9
c204f94dc76159fe2b62b46ac9793fc1732f756b
56587 F20110331_AACOYQ savage_k_Page_56.pro
14598296fffb3f2ab717c1abd46b1b1d
e238e2dd88da35595b483d4b439101e6a2a8427a
82812 F20110331_AACPAQ savage_k_Page_57.jpg
67b0e0857cec4d0a94bf7efba1d43070
c9f8f557f89963f40fd64034504e15cd4c56cc00
32469 F20110331_AACPFO savage_k_Page_55.QC.jpg
64de021e8956deb7e0be2d10cc42ab2c
d5fc16647f2df3becc6f915026f54af40158cb5e
F20110331_AACOTT savage_k_Page_16.tif
f3dd00d4d576f2c28ae40267ba99d5f4
1e590793e91b581344c46a40f84bec681287bf68
F20110331_AACOOW savage_k_Page_73.tif
5abec1d0968fb00f00b7dc7771b8c53f
457cc9a43d6d2ec4fb0cf06f1eaf2a9ac93a854c
55423 F20110331_AACOYR savage_k_Page_58.pro
0484af4a282eef8f5631b3420ba7d4ef
ac1b56872f6d7209284f956ec98027154f48d464
93988 F20110331_AACPAR savage_k_Page_58.jpg
8e244f7ca1d8aa99a1ca219dda33ecbb
41055c14a0eeb788d268600294ca17178e96f78f
31949 F20110331_AACPFP savage_k_Page_56.QC.jpg
3372f8c698bb4abc19985ff0408d33e2
3d67d1e928215d7bf4169e68290f24e9a0aa90f0
F20110331_AACOTU savage_k_Page_17.tif
b8f20abb0a17a7ab2cbce846b03ea0e1
ce5dcfad625cc7c4238d5f0fb238c44f68e6a9c9
1885 F20110331_AACOOX savage_k_Page_52.txt
f1b2af7b35e1b749d83a47fce977baa3
24f3c69e323bebd1acf793ab668148f61756726d
83145 F20110331_AACPAS savage_k_Page_63.jpg
56aa614ab06352fd4283e05cb9669b15
29ed68f2ef1e8cc6ff3ffc0672731e8cfe71f587
F20110331_AACPFQ savage_k_Page_58.QC.jpg
096a6b3b2a3af48726c0c734ece94da3
c8c2938b15a1d1571c811176dd3ab49dcbd0a773
F20110331_AACOTV savage_k_Page_19.tif
2a14593b2b5cbf10493365bfa17142c8
aaf0cbf616b004a8d1e7e8dd4f02de3d9b596264
101268 F20110331_AACOMA savage_k_Page_16.jpg
1164062ebe7c151e93da1721c4610575
f756dbaf6d7ee278188394b93f98192abc201132
22966 F20110331_AACOOY savage_k_Page_42.QC.jpg
6d27387c8735bfad48d4affff18bd21e
316596bfc337cd4b3477ab15fe997bdfb7fc4a5b
63145 F20110331_AACOYS savage_k_Page_60.pro
ca4c2dac6eaf1070711a0af500a4501b
1799d1c86438910052f6dcbb3706bf45dcb1b20e
94265 F20110331_AACPAT savage_k_Page_64.jpg
a87cb0292c88f71c487dc8aeeae6aff0
b5779b401a22d5e167754981cfdb29e4edae7026
30473 F20110331_AACPFR savage_k_Page_62.QC.jpg
de56b14d2987ac96b30d69a46b7971ad
234b61a6f42324bcc1161191456e5ca1c74af10f
F20110331_AACOTW savage_k_Page_20.tif
7d18cd1709f08b7e9ed4598e890570fd
35222ad813481c3e38bd498c5fa073df64806df3
1920 F20110331_AACOMB savage_k_Page_34.txt
e79515229e231dfc1d6bc208cfa9564a
635ac7e99fdced3aa60f90c0fc55d602d796c244
8416 F20110331_AACOOZ savage_k_Page_67thm.jpg
3fff10e82a596ea8ba0bb02b8e5314db
8526030927bc1e648df7937a70aa7b918cac5d6c
56979 F20110331_AACOYT savage_k_Page_61.pro
1dd31f2ff79e5bf328d79fb92571a22d
4ed1b8b4308ce5a37af4f4dcda06fbbc8da6e805
94431 F20110331_AACPAU savage_k_Page_65.jpg
10ec7c804a41116a09bf682d354bcf2e
1fbc51069b7ff060c0f65efcb305b7d471d25827
28647 F20110331_AACPFS savage_k_Page_63.QC.jpg
19991596c69553d32df169f5026cc1b7
9ed95f97d06b3c7c6ce9243dd609b16e9ce9dc22
F20110331_AACOTX savage_k_Page_21.tif
2788ac882c482752cf9b100c9d67f8d6
9a57c9027b6d8b78624e793acf0594635592141d
F20110331_AACOMC savage_k_Page_10.tif
c7121006c8a43f31b40ec73d09f1694e
87d995166ff68d25f6d2a4841f0a9826ca6fab37
53942 F20110331_AACOYU savage_k_Page_62.pro
942200ce16f03c01a396263e828d7132
5130ab88c225e8fce9a7c2975100e5d9b5076327
94943 F20110331_AACPAV savage_k_Page_66.jpg
e2dbab00721d170ac3041dc55bf0e18a
70520e157bd4fe16d05092b1881c1184f14935fe








CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT


By




KEVIN SAVAGE


















A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS




UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA




2007
































2007 Kevin Savage

















































For Sara










ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


I would like to thank Sara, without whose support I could never have stayed motivated. Thanks

also go to Kirk Ludwig, whose advice and ability to reason were invaluable. I also thank Gene Witmer,

without whom I might not be in philosophy, for his admirable ability and integrity. And lastly, thanks go

to Michael Jubien, who very graciously stepped into my committee at the 11th hour.














Table of Contents
ACKNO W LEDG M ENTS .......................................................................... ........................................ .... 4

L IST O F F IG U R E S ......................................................................................... ....................... ............ 6

A BST RA CT......................................................................................... ................... ............... ........ 7

1 INTRO D UCTIO N ............................................................ ............................................. ............. 9

2 MOTIVATION AND INITIAL WORRIES...................................................................... ...................... 13

2.0 Introd uctio n .................................................................................. ........................................... 13

2.1 Motivation................................ ........................................... 13

2.2 Initial W worries for the Project ............................................ ..................................................... 18

2 .3 C o n clu sio n ........................................................................................... .............................. ........... 2 3

3 THE REFUTATION OF THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CONCEIVING ..................................................... .. 26

3 .0 Intro d u ctio n .................................................................................. ............................................... 26

3.1 'Conceiving of and 'Conceiving that'................................................. ...................................... 28

3.2 Yablo and Conceiving of the Existence of the Impossible ................................ ...................... 39

3.3 Confusions That Could Lead to a Berkeleyan View...................................................... 47

3 .4 C on clu sion ......................................................................................... ................................ .........5 6

4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT.......................... 58

4 .0 Introduction ........... ............................................................................. .............................................58

4.1 An Objection to the Distinction Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that....................... .. 59

4.2 The Relation Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that............................... ............. 62

4.3 The Implications of the Distinction for Zombies.................................... ............................. 67

4 .4 C on clu sion ......................................................................................... ................................ .........74

5 C O N C L U S IO N ............................................................................................................... ............ ....... 7 7

LIST O F R EFER EN C ES .............................................................................................................................. .... 79

BIO G RA PH ICA L SKETC H ............................................................................................... ........................... 80













LIST OF FIGURES
1 A pe n ro se triang le ........................................................................................... ........................ .... 7 6















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT

By

Kevin Savage

December 2007

Chair: Kirk Ludwig

Major: Philosophy



Philosophers use technical notions of conceiving to argue for a number of theses. However,

very little has been done to illuminate what this act of conceiving consists in. So, we may fall into one of

several traps when relying on what we can conceive in order to argue for some theory or other. For

one, we may fail to provide a valid argument or we may have assumed our conclusion in one of our

founding premises.


In order to ensure we are not falling into one of these traps we should gain a fuller

understanding of what conceiving is. Once we do that we see that many things that have been assumed

about conceiving are in fact not the case.


In particular, philosophers have argued that our ability to conceive that particular things could

have been the case shows us that minds are not physical. But this argument rests on the assumption

that what we can conceive is always possible.










But there is a type of conceiving, the performing of which does not allow us to draw conclusions

about what is possible. That is because there is a type of conceiving which allows us to conceive

impossible objects. And so, if we are not careful we may believe we are performing an act of conceiving

relevant to demonstrating the possibility of what we conceive but turn out to be wrong in fact. Thus,

our arguments which rely on what we can conceive would fail in those cases.

















CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION


The fact that something is conceivable or inconceivable has been used as the basis for many

philosophical arguments. For example, the conceivability of various scenarios has been used to argue

for skeptical theses. The supposed inconceivability of an object being unconceived was used by

Berkeley to argue for phenomenalism. Contemporarily, the conceivability of so-called philosophical

zombies has been used to argue against physicalism.


The claim of the conceivability of any of the relevant situations relies on our having conceived

those situations. So, there is some act we must perform, the performing of which allows us to hold that

the situation is conceivable. Therefore, all of the aforementioned arguments, as well as others, rely on

our being able to perform this act of conceiving. But, if we do not understand what it is we are doing

when we conceive, we may not be able to recognize when we have successfully conceived. I will argue

in this study that there is a type of conceiving that has not been clearly recognized, but that we do

perform, namely, the type of conceiving is normally denoted with reports using the 'conceive of'

locution (and its various tenses and moods).


There are two complementizers 'conceive' ordinarily takes in assertions: 'of' and 'that'. It has

traditionally been assumed that whether 'conceive' takes the complement 'of' or 'that' is

inconsequential. Both 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' assertions report the same kind of cognitive

operation, according to the tradition. Further, it has been held that both what is impossible is not










conceivable and that we can conceive of particulars (e.g. God, people we know, etc.). In chapter 3, I will

argue that all of these assumptions are false.


First, I will argue that reports using 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are reports of substantively

different cognitive operations. I will perform a series of comparisons between 'conceive of' and

'conceive that' sentences in order to show first that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are not

intersubstitutable and thus not synonymous. I will use further comparisons between sentences of both

sorts to demonstrate that there are some 'conceive of' sentences that cannot be paraphrased as

'conceive that' sentences. This gives us strong reason to think that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that'

report different types of operations. The argument that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' report

different operations is intertwined with my denial of the second assumption: that we cannot conceive

what is impossible.


Second, I will argue that we can conceive of impossible objects, but that we cannot perform any

cognitive acts reported with 'conceive that' sentences which are about impossible objects. This is

because conceiving-that requires that we think of the objects we are conceiving as existent in some

sense. For example, we can conceive of round squares but we cannot conceive that round squares exist,

that there are houses adorned with round squares, or that the president was born in a round square

cupola. I will consider an objection not that my requirements for what we can conceive is too weak but

that they are too strong. The objection supposes that we can conceive that impossible objects exist or

conceive of them as existing. I will suggest that what may make it seem conceivable that impossible

objects exist is a failure to distinguish between conceiving-of and conceiving-that.


Third, I will argue that we cannot conceive of particulars or conceive that particulars exist. Of

course, particulars do exist. But the way we must think about particulars in acts of conceiving does not

uniquely pick out any particulars. Conceiving requires us to leave open that particulars could be or could










have been different than we believe they are or how they are in fact. Anything that we believe picks out

or in fact picks out a particular uniquely could be other than how it is or how we believe it to be.


In chapter 2, I will discuss preliminary considerations for this study. Section 2.1 will discuss the

motivation for the project. In brief, if one either does not understand what conceiving is or does not

recognize all of the different ways which we conceive, confusions may result. The specific forms these

confusions can take will be looked at in 2.1. Section 2.2 will be an exploration of various prima facie

problems for the project.


In chapter 3, I will address the three assumptions of the third paragraph. In section 3.1, I argue

that there is a substantive distinction between conceiving-of and conceiving-that. From the observation

that 'conceive of' may take as its object an ordinary noun or noun phrase whereas 'conceive that' must

take a sentence as its object, I argue that the sentential objects of 'conceive of' may be nouns or nouns

phrases which have as their ersatz referents types of impossible objects. In section 3.2, I argue against

the suggestion that we may conceive that some impossible objects exist (or that there be impossible

objects). I suggest that the reason it seems that we can conceive that some impossible objects exist is

that we have confused conceiving-of for conceiving-that. In section 3.3, I suggest a way of

understanding Berkeley's argument for phenomenalism which suggests that Berkeley's mistake might be

based on a misunderstanding of the limits of what we can conceive. I argue that one could argue for

phenomenalism as Berkeley did if he were to think that we can conceive particulars. Further, I suggest

that this is a mistake and that what appears to be conceiving particulars is conceiving something

general. I argue that any time we think we have conceived a particular we have made a mistake

because we cannot conceive particulars.


In chapter 4, I further delineate the difference between conceiving-of and conceiving-that while

also showing how the two types of conceiving are related and explain why it is important to distinguish










the two. In section 4.1, I consider the objection that all conceiving is conceiving-that. I argue that

conceiving-of and conceiving-that are substantively different and that there are common situations in

which we conceive-of and do not conceive-that. In section 4.2, I suggest that conceiving-of is a

precondition of conceiving-that. And, in so doing, I attempt to further explain the differences between

the two types of conceiving. In section 4.3, I suggest that a failure to recognize the distinction between

conceiving-of and conceiving-that may lead one to the false belief that he has conceived that zombies

exist. This, in turn, may lead one to argue that physicalism is false based because it is conceivable that

zombies exist (which is required for the zombie conceivability argument against physicalism) though in

fact one has only conceived of zombies.


I will close the study in chapter 5 with a brief conclusion in which I summarize the findings of the

chapters 2-4.



















CHAPTER 2


MOTIVATION AND INITIAL WORRIES


2.0 Introduction


In this chapter, I will discuss preliminary considerations for this study, laying out the motivations

and addressing some possible problems at the outset. In section 2.1, I discuss more fully the motivation

for this study and various problems that might arise without a more complete understanding of the act

(or acts) of conceiving. Those problems are that a less-than-full understanding of conceiving may lead

us to make arguments that are either not formally valid or are question-begging. In section 2.2, I

explore the prima facie problems that might be posed for this study. There are two prima facie

problems relating to apparent circularity: the paradox of analysis and what might be called "the paradox

of performance." There is also a third possible problem which is that one might have to perform an

iterated act of conceiving in order to analyze conceive.1 I conclude that none of these prima facie

problems, whether serious or not, should adversely affect this study.


2.1 Motivation



Let me being with looking at a contemporary example of an argument that relies importantly on

conceiving to arrive at its conclusion. In "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?" (Chalmers, 2002), David

Chalmers has argued that (the right kind of) conceivability entails possibility. So, if Chalmers is right, if

1Words in italics will be used to denote concepts as in conceive, conceiving, etc.










one conceives that there be zombies, then it is possible for there to be zombies. And from this

possibility, one may conclude that physicalism is false. It is not necessary to go into detail about

zombies and physicalism2 to see that the argument will fail if when we think we have conceived that

there be zombies, we have failed to do so. The argument will also fail if when we think we have

conceived that there be zombies we have conceived zombies in some other way.


There is a general concern that if one's understanding of conceiving is impoverished in some

ways there are at least some arguments that rely on conceiving that one may not make. Suppose

someone, Luke, understands that currency is the physical representation of money, that American

dollars are the form of currency used in America and that Yen are the form of currency used in Japan.

Luke might understand what money is in some impoverished sense e.g., that it has physical

representations called 'currency', and that the type of currency used is in some way tied to political

entities. So, there might be some arguments that rely on grasping money that Luke could properly

make. But were we to know that Luke had this impoverished understanding of money, we would

probably not take seriously any arguments Luke makes about, for example, the global economy, nor

should we.


Similarly, in some instances we should not take seriously arguments relying on conceiving made

by people who have only an impoverished understanding of conceiving. So, it is important that we get

clear about conceiving. If our understanding of conceiving is incomplete, vague, or muddled then we

may not be able to make arguments relying on our ability to conceive. And, if our understanding is

incomplete, vague, or muddled it is unlikely that we would be able to tell when it is that we are justified

in making arguments that rely on conceiving.


2This will be done in section 4.3.










To more clearly see the danger, we may examine the structure of the argument that

philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible schematically3:


1. (Vx) (Conceivable(x) Possible(x))


2. Conceivable(a) Possible(a) (1)


3. Conceivable(a)


4. Possible(a) (2,3)


The argument above is obviously formally valid, assuming univocality of terms. But of course an

argument's conclusion may be false even if the argument is formally valid, if one or another premise is

not true.


The charge against arguments like Chalmers' that I wish to examine is not that the third premise

is false. Normally, one would argue against Chalmers' argument by arguing that the existence of

zombies is inconceivable. The worries I want to suggest are a bit different and not aimed only at

Chalmers' argument but any argument relying on acts of conceiving. Any argument which relies on

some fact(s) about what we can conceive will be adversely affected by an incomplete understanding of

the act of conceiving.


The first worry is that one might be using different concepts from one step of the argument to

the next. Simple misunderstandings stemming from the use of homophones or alternate definitions of





31n these examples, 'conceivable' and 'possible' will be treated as predicates, for simplicity's
sake. And for present purposes, 'x' and 'a' can take anything whatsoever for their values.
These examples are only meant to demonstrate problems that can arise from arguments
superficially of this form.










the same word are examples of the type of mistake that might be made. This is the type of mistake that

is highlighted by puns.4


Sometimes we make mistakes that are easily discoverable. Suppose that one were to overhear

a conversation in which one man, explaining to another why his wife could not make it to the party, says

"Mary is a little hoarse." A man overhearing the conversation comments to the man with the ill spouse

"I have an Appaloosa myself." Funny or not, these types of mistakes do get made even in situations in

which we can give somewhat clear analyses of the concepts in question. We can easily identify the

mistake in the example just given. For one, 'horse' and 'hoarse' are spelled differently, so anyone

reading an account of the scenario just described, even someone who does not know the difference in

meaning between the two, will immediately be predisposed to believe that they 'horse' and 'hoarse'

mean different things. And, anyone who does understand what each term means should not have any

trouble noticing the difference between 'horse' and 'hoarse' as the two are so different in meaning.

Even if one were to misspell one of the terms in an account above, the difference would still be easily

spotted because the contexts of utterance of each term would cue a reader to the mistake.


But differences between what terms mean need not be so obvious. Sometimes differences may

go unnoticed. Consider 'unintended' and 'accidental'. Although there is a difference between what the

two terms mean, both terms may be used in almost all of the same contexts and they are often used

interchangeably.


If instead of with two terms, what is meant by 'unintended' and 'accidental' were expressed

with a single term, it would be incredibly difficult to notice that there were two different concepts at

work. And if 'conceive' is a polysemous term which expresses multiple distinct, albeit inter-related


4While one does not mistakenly make a pun (in fact, one would not be making a pun if the act in
question were unintentional), one plays at making a mistake with a pun.










concepts, then different uses would be particularly difficult to notice. If such a conflation is going on in

the argument that it is possible for philosophical zombies to exist, then the argument fails as it is not

formally valid. Instead of conforming to the form presented on page three, it would instead be of this

form:


1. (Vx)(Conceivablel(x) -> Possible(x))


2. Conceivablel(a) -> Possible(a) (1)


3. Conceivable2(a)


4. Possible(a) (2,3)


The problem then is that there is no valid rule of inference that will allow one to derive the conclusion,

4, from 2 and 3, i.e., the argument is not formally valid.


There is a further problem that we might encounter with an argument the success of which

depends on the use of an unanalyzed term. We may be in danger of begging the question if, unknown

to us, we have smuggled our conclusion into our premises, that is, if one of our premises is in effect the

conclusion worded differently. Consider, for example, the terms 'impossible' and 'inconceivable'.

Sometimes, when we say that something is inconceivable we mean it is virtually impossible or

impossible in the sense of being ruled out by what we know. If at least some senses of 'impossible' and

'inconceivable' are synonymous then it stands to reason that some senses of 'possible' and 'conceivable'

are synonymous. If one were to use 'possible' and 'conceivable' in the same sense in an argument like

Chalmers' then the argument would be of the following form:


1. (Vx)(Possible(x) -> Possible(x))










2. Possible(a) Possible(a) (1)


3. Possible(a)


4. Possible(a) (2,3)


The argument is valid, but question-begging (and thus not informative), for it assumes the conclusion as

a premise.


In this section I have tried to motivate the project by explaining several ways in which one may

be confused about what conceiving is and why this is important. I have shown that if we are confused in

the ways described above, then arguments we take to be valid may not be. A theory of conceiving will

help guard against these types of confusions; what we do not know about conceiving can hurt us.


2.2 Initial Worries for the Project



In this section I will look at some prima facie problems for an examination of conceiving that

stem from the nature of conceiving and philosophical methodology. This study will in some instances

examine conceiving by means of thought experiments. These thought experiments will sometimes have

conceiving and conceivability as the objects) of the thought experiments. They will be used to tell us

something about the limits of conceiving and about what conceiving is.


There is at least a prima facie worry that might arise about this methodology. I will be

examining conceiving and related concepts by way of conceiving. So, there is at least a hint of circularity

looming in the wings for my proposed analysis.


In section 2.1, I argued that there could be problems with particular arguments which rely on

acts of conceiving without a fuller understanding of conceiving. I will have to perform the thought

experiments meant to provide a fuller understanding of conceiving without that fuller understanding I

18










used to motivate the project. So, I will in essence be committing the philosophical sin which the pursuit

of this project was to enable us to avoid. But it is not my contention that we have absolutely no starting

point. We can perform the act of conceiving without an analysis. But without the analysis we may not

always have the tools to determine when it is we have conceived in the way that is relevant to what our

aim is. I contend that we perform a type of conceiving that has not yet been discussed in the literature.

And, although we do perform this act, we have not yet examined it so we do not recognize it. If we

could not perform any specific mental acts without analyses, we would never have any acts subject to

analysis. So, this worry is really a red herring, but I think it important to get it on the table nonetheless.


The second worry relates in a general way to the first although more serious. Part of what will

be done in this study is both a conceptual and linguistic analysis. But analyses are subject to the

paradox of analysis. Below are the definitions of 'conceive' and its forms from the Oxford English

Dictionary:


Word Part of Speech Definition


conceivable adjective that can be conceived of or thought of; imaginable,

supposable


conceived adjective admitted into, or originated in, the mind; imagined, thought

of, etc.


conceivement noun conception


conceiver noun one who conceives


conceiving noun conception



SDefinitions are the first relevant definitions for each term in the OED.










conception noun The action or faculty of conceiving in the mind, or of

forming an idea or notion of anything; apprehension,

imagination.


conceive verb to take into, form in, the mind


conceiving verb forming in the mind


If we look at the list above, 'conceivable' and 'conceiver' both explicitly have 'conceive' in their

definitions. So on their own, those definitions of 'conceivable' and 'conceiver' will not be helpful in

understanding the definition of 'conceive' because we would want a definition to provide us with an

explication of 'conceive' that does not have 'conceive' in the definition, for that would be an obviously

circular definition. If we look at the definition of 'conceive' it is not explicitly circular.


While the circularity resulting from the definition of 'conceive' is not precisely the same as the

one resulting from particular definitions of 'conceivable' and 'conceiver', it is problematic. What we

want to understand in trying to understand what the act of conceiving is, is not something only

linguistic. My contention is only that there is a problem with understanding the term 'conceive' but that

there is a problem with understanding what it is to take something into the mind in the relevant way

and the ways that we conceive or take something into the mind.6


If 'to take into...the mind' is strictly synonymous with 'conceive', then understanding either term

or phrase would require one to grasp precisely the same conceptss. So, in order to grasp conceive one

would have to first grasp conceive. This appears to be viciously circular. If in order to understand A one


6Additionally, 'to take into the mind' may be a phrase that describes some of what it is to
conceive, but which does not provide necessary or sufficient conditions on conceiving and
which is vague. One might describe perceiving as a kind of 'taking into the mind' but it is
wrong to think that perceiving is conceiving (although Berkeley did not think so).










must first understand A,then it looks like we might be unable to perform an analysis of A. This would be

a problem for any conceptual analysis.


However, it is only a problem for analysis if we hold that the analysans must provide us with the

ability to grasp a new concept. That is not what I hold. Analysis gives us an explanation of a concept we

already grasp.


We do not gain the ability to grasp specific concepts through analysis. In order to be able to

analyze a concept, C, we must be already possess the concept or we would not be able to determine

when to apply C. If one argues to the contrary, he might as well argue that because we come to know

something if we correctly analyze knowledge the analysis of knowledge would thereby be circular. Not

at all: it simply means the analysis fits the state we are in with respect to it.


We cannot require that in order for one to analyze knowledge, he must not prejudice himself

toward some specific analysis of knowledge in virtue of what he already thinks knowledge is. Analysis

done correctly should provide us with an explicit explanation of what we already grasp. If we perform

some act that provides us with something we did not understand going in then either an analysis has not

been performed or something has been performed in addition to an analysis.


When we perform analysis of some concept, C, we consider candidates for application

conditions for C and judge which ones are application conditions for C. At least one of the ways we do

this is by conceiving of some object or situation, 0, and then deciding whether C applies to O. If we

decide that C does apply to O, then we move on to some other object or situation in our considerations

until we find one to which C does not apply. If C does not apply to O then we hypothesize which

characteristics) of O would need to be different for Cto apply to O.










If we were to analyze conceive in this way, then we would conceive of some act and ask whether

that conceived-of act is conceiving. If successful, then we would be conceiving of an act of conceiving.

Conceiving requires a conceiver. So, a successful analysis of conceive using this methodology would

require us to conceive that someone conceive; we must rely on an act of iterated conceiving. That

might then require us to first-personally experience some mind other than our own. But even

hypothetically we can only experience our own mind. So, we might be closed off from this method of

analysis.


Perhaps we can get around this worry if we merely acknowledge that the conceiver within the

iterated act of conceiving is the same as the conceiver in the first-order act of conceiving. So, in order

for one to evaluate what it takes to conceive that P, he must conceive that he conceives that P. But

what it is that I conceive when I conceive that I conceive that P other than conceiving that P is puzzling.

Regardless, whether or not I can perform iterated conceivings, iterated conceivings would not tell us

anything more about what conceivings are than first order acts of conceiving.


But then we do not have the same method of conceptual analysis that we normally do because

we would not be conceiving anything that is a candidate for something to which conceiving applies.

Rather, the mental act itself would be a candidate for conceiving.


I raise this worry not because it is particularly problematic but rather to highlight a difference in

performing a conceptual analysis of conceive from performing an analysis of some other types of

concepts. It is performed by looking at actual (and not hypothetical) acts of conceiving. They may be

framed as hypothetical acts, particularly when we consider what people are doing when they make

specific conceiving reports, but it is our own mental acts that we use as evidence.










2.3 Conclusion


In this chapter, I discussed the motivations for this study as well as some prima facie worries

that one might have about it. Philosophers have frequently made arguments that rely on conceivability

claims. But if we are unclear about what conceiving is or about distinctions between types of

conceiving, various problems can arise. Further clarification about conceiving would help us to avoid

those pitfalls. But there may be pitfalls in attempting to clarifying what conceiving is. So before the

discussion begins it is important to address the worries that might arise at the outset.


In section 2.1, I considered two problems that might arise with arguments relying on the

application of an unanalyzed concept. First, we might think that there is only one concept we are

applying, when in fact we are applying two closely related concepts by way of the same term. If that is

the case then arguments relying on conceivability claims may be invalid if different concepts are used in

each claim. Second, if conceivability is also expressed by some other term in the argument that looks as

if it expresses something distinct, then some arguments may be in danger of begging the question. For

example, Chalmers argues that conceivability entails possibility (and from there argues that

philosophical zombies are possible), but if conceivability


is nothing over-and-above possibility, then his argument begs the question as the conclusion is not only

contained in, but the same in content as one of the premises.


In section 2.2, I discussed three prima facie worries for this study. The first and third worries

stem from the methodology of conceptual analysis when applied to conceive, conceivable, etc. The

second worry is a worry about conceptual analysis in general.


The first worry is that if one does not fully understand what conceiving is, he cannot perform the

acts of conceiving necessary for analyzing what conceiving is. However, it was never my contention that

23










we cannot perform the act of conceiving without analysis. My claim was, less ambitiously, that we need

to have a fuller understanding of conceiving in order to be sure that our arguments employing

conceiving do not fail to be formally valid or beg the question. So the first worry is not genuinely a

problem for this study.


The second worry stems from what is known as the 'paradox of analysis'. We cannot perform

any conceptual analysis without already grasping the concepts) in question. So, analysis cannot bring

us any understanding we did not already possess. But this is only a problem if we perform analysis with

the aim of acquiring new concepts or gaining some sort of new understanding. I do not purport to be

doing any such thing. Analysis, while not providing us with any new understanding, reveals what state it

is we are in with respect to some concept. One of my aims in chapter three will be to argue that there is

a species of conceiving that, while we understand what it is, has not been distinguished from other

types of conceiving or has been thought of as something else entirely. Consequently, this study should

not be affected by the paradox of analysis.


The third worry is that the method of conceptual analysis might fail in the instance of conceive

because we cannot make sense of iterated conceivings. If we were to conceptually analyze book we

might conceive of some book-candidate and consider whether the concept book applies to the book-

candidate. If we use the same method when we analyze conceiving, we would conceive of some

conceiving-candidate then consider whether conceiving applies to it. In order to make sense of this, we

must be the conceiver in this iterated act. But whatever we might learn from an iterated act of

conceiving can be learned just as well from a first-order act. For we can learn just as much through

investigation of what we conceive or fail to conceive as we do through considering what hypothetical

objects qualify as books.










With the motivations and preliminary concerns taken care of, I will in chapter three move onto

the argument for the distinction between conceiving-of and conceiving-that. On the basis of this

distinction, I will also be arguing for two other theses. First, I will argue that we can conceive of

impossible things but not that those things exist. Second, I will argue that we cannot conceive about

particulars per se. Rather, we can only conceive particulars insofar as they fall under some type.












CHAPTER 3

THE REFUTATION OF THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CONCEIVING

3.0 Introduction




The goal of this chapter is to establish that there are two importantly different types of

conceiving which are reported using the locutions 'conceiving that' and 'conceiving of' respectively, the

latter of which is not usually distinguished from the former, and to show that conceiving of in the

relevant sense is never of particulars but only types of things, and that the types of things we can

conceive involve inter alia impossible objects. I show in developing this account how this distinction can

be used to diagnose some problematic objections to it and some other well-known philosophical

arguments.


The method of this chapter is to examine the sorts of mistakes we make when we conceive or

attempt to conceive as a way of articulating what is involved in it. I approach this by examining the

types of mistakes people make when they report conceiving something. I consider whether the

mistakes people make in these reports are about the content of the act of conceiving or about the act in

which they were engaged. Looking at mistakes in conceiving in this way will illuminate both the range of

what is conceivable, what conceiving is more generally, and whether there are types of conceiving

heretofore unconsidered.


The plan of the chapter is as follows.


In section 3.1, I look at the 'conceive that' construction and consider whether it is the

construction we should be using exclusively. I argue it is not and in particular that the 'conceive of'

construction expresses a substantively different mental act from the mental act one reports with the










'conceive that' construction, on at least some uses. Consideration of the difference between the acts

reported using each construction shows that we can conceive of types of impossible objects, which is

not to say that one can conceive of the existence of impossible objects (e.g., one cannot conceive that

round squares exist).


In section 3.2, I consider an objection that might be raised against the view that we can conceive

of impossible entities but not their existence. This objection, raised by Stephen Yablo, though not

directed at the view developed in this study, is that we can conceive both of the existence of God and

the non-existence of God. If, as it has been argued, either the existence or non-existence of God is

impossible, it follows that we can conceive impossible things to exist. I conclude that Yablo's argument

does not constitute an objection to my view. I argue rather that one can explain away the apparent

conceiving of the existence of impossibilities with the 'conceive of'/'conceive that' distinction I am

drawing.


In section 3.3, I propose a reading of Berkeley's argument for phenomenalism. It is, I think, a

plausible reading, but I am not so much concerned with the historical interpretation of Berkeley (or

whether phenomenalism is true) as with using the argument as a foil for the discussion of the limits on

what can be the objects of conceivings-of. I will argue that there are limits to what one can stipulate in

conceiving and that we cannot conceive of contingent particulars as opposed to types. If we can

conceive of particulars we must be able to think about them in some way that uniquely picks them out

as the particulars they are. The starting point for a criterion of identity for ordinary objects is Leibniz's

Law. I will consider whether the criteria of Leibniz's Law provide us with the tools to pick out particulars

in our acts of conceiving. I will conclude that they do not and that in the absence of some way to think

about particulars in our acts of conceiving we should conclude that we cannot perform acts of

conceiving about particulars.













3.1 'Conceiving of' and 'Conceiving that'


Philosophers tend to be concerned only with the verb 'conceive' when it takes a sentential

complement, either a that-clause (conceiving that there is extraterrestrial life), a nominalized sentential

complement (conceiving there being extraterrestrial life), or an infinitive sentential complement

(conceiving there to be extraterrestrial life). They are concerned with the 'conceive that' construction in

part because there is a tendency in philosophy of mind to be concerned with propositional attitudes and

in part because of the interest in whether a proposition's conceivability entails its possibility.


I will not in this section directly address whether the content of our conceivings must be

propositional. Instead, I will consider whether the 'conceives that' construction is the only one that

should be considered. It is my view that we should also examine the 'conceive of' construction.


The reason that we should look at the 'conceive of' construction is that reports using the

'conceive of' and 'conceive that' constructions differ not only in the complements 'conceive' takes in

those reports but also in that they are reports of substantively different types of acts. If the two

constructions are intersubstitutable salva veritate in all reports then 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are

likely synonymous and thus reports using the 'conceive of' construction would be reports of the same

type of act as that expressed in 'conceive that' constructions; the differences would be merely verbal

and not substantive. But, if they are not intersubstitutable salva veritate then there is prima facie

reason to think that reports with the 'conceive of' or 'conceive that' construction are reports of different

types of acts.


However, even if the two constructions are not intersubstitutable salva veritate, the differences

between the two constructions may still be merely verbal if one may say everything with the 'conceive










of' construction as one can say with the 'conceive that' construction (and vice versa). But if it can be

shown that there are some things that can be said with reports using one construction and not the

other, then the two constructions are not used in all cases to report the same acts.


Before I get to the argument for the distinction between the two types of conceiving, it is

important that we first settle on a general form of report that does not prejudice our view of conceiving.

If we first look at the present tense uses of 'conceive that' as in (a), it is obvious that there is something

unnatural about them:


(a) I conceive that George is a minister.


(a) reads as if it were a performative like (b):


(b) I hereby state that George is a minister.


Whatever conceiving is, it is not a speech act, so it cannot be that (a) is a performative, at least not in

the normal way.


Perhaps (a) is a report of some pseudo-auditory experience of "I conceive that George is a

minister" the having of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of (a). But of course one could

have a pseudo-auditory experience of "I conceive that George is a minister" without knowing what

'minister' means. So it cannot be sufficient for the truth of (a) that one have a pseudo-auditory

experience of (a). And while there may be something like a pseudo-auditory experience one normally

experiences before an utterance of (a), one need not have any, and even if one did it does not seem to

have any bearing on the truth or falsity of (a).


Since there is this tendency is to read (a) in a way that cannot be the correct way to understand

(a), we should use some other form of the 'conceive that' (and 'conceive of') construction for this

discussion.










There is a strong pull to add the auxiliary 'can' to 'conceive that' as in (c):


(c) I can conceive that George is a minister.


(c) sounds natural and may convey what we normally want to convey with (a) but there is still an

important semantic difference between 'can conceive that' and 'conceive that'. One may truthfully and

sincerely assert that he can conceive that p without having conceived that p. Normally, when we make

an assertion that we can conceive that p, it is assumed that the evidence one has that he can conceive

that p is that he has conceived that p. Although it may be difficult to imagine what evidence we could

have for our being able to conceive that p without conceiving that p, it is not semantically required that

one conceive in order to truthfully and sincerely make an assertion that one can conceive that p. If such

a requirement were to be made then (d) should not make sense to us:


(d) John can conceive that George is a minister but he hasn't yet conceived that George is

a minister.


When we put the assertion in the third person it is easier to separate the act of conceiving from the

ability to conceive. Our evidence for thinking (d) true is different from the reason we would have for

thinking (c) true. While we would normally have as our justification for believing (c) the fact that we had

performed some act of conceiving, our justification for believing (d) would be some belief we have

about John's abilities. So the 'can conceive' locution does not merely convey something about

performing an act but rather something about the ability to perform such an act, whether or not one

has in fact performed the act. So, I will not in this study use the 'can conceive' locution. Even if it is

normally used to report the performance of an act, we should use some other locution to keep the

other semanticallyy correct) use of 'can conceive' from running interference.


I will instead use the auxiliary verb 'have' and put the reports in past tense, as in (e):










(e) I have conceived that George is a minister.


(e) is true or false solely in virtue of whether or not one has performed the mental act of conceiving that

George is a minister.


Now I turn to the difference between those sentences that take the complementizers 'that' and

'of' after 'have conceived'. First, I will look at whether 'have conceived of' and 'have conceived that' are

intersubstitutable salva veritate.


(e) I have conceived that George is a minister.


(f) I have conceived of George is a minister.


Obviously, 'conceived of' and 'conceived that' are not intersubstitutable, as evidenced by (e) and (f).

While (e) is truth valuable, (f) is not a grammatical sentence, and so not truth valuable. It follows that

the two phrases are not synonymous.


If there are things that can be said with sentences using the 'conceive of' construction that

cannot be said with any sentences using the 'conceive that' construction then there is further reason to

think that there is a substantive difference in the acts reported by each construction.


A mere failure of intersubstitution will not show that there are two substantively different

mental acts reported with each locution. So I will attempt to demonstrate that the way in which

'conceive of' and 'conceive that' fail to be intersubstitutable cannot be bridged by changing other terms

in the sentences.


First, we should look at whether what is said with (e) can be said with any sentence using

'conceive of'. As seen with (f), 'conceive of' cannot be substituted for 'conceive that' in (e). But there










might be some other way to say what is said with (e) with another sentence using the 'conceive of'

construction.


(g) I have conceived of George being a minister.


On a natural reading, (e) seems to be about the utterer having some evidence that George is a minister

and also that the utterer cannot rule it out that George is a minister. On the other hand, (g) is not

obviously about some attitude toward George being a minister. In order to make clearer the difference

between (e) and (g), we can perform a test.


If what is conveyed with (e) is that it is epistemically open that George is a minister, then it

should be contradictory to assert both that one has conceived that George is a minister and that one

knows that George is not a minister. So we can test (e) and (g) with (e') and (g'), respectively:


(e') I have conceived that George is a minister but I am certain (and was certain at the time of

conceiving)7 that he isn't (and wasn't) a minister.


(g') I have conceived of George being a minister but I am certain (and and was certain at the

time of conceiving) that he isn't (and wasn't) a minister.


It is clear that (g') is not contradictory, while (e') only seems non-contradictory if one forces an unnatural

reading.


One might attempt to alter (e) in some other way than in (e') in order to get the result that what

is expressed by (e) is also expressible with some sentence using the 'conceive that' construction:




7The parenthetical clause here is included to guard against a reading to the effect that the
knowledge that George isn't a minister came after conceiving that George is a minister. On
that reading, the test would be invalid.










(h) I have conceived that George be a minister.


If we perform the test with (h) that we did with (e) then we get:


(h') I have conceived that George be a minister but I am certain (and was certain at the time of

conceiving) that he isn't.


(h') is not contradictory so (h) does not convey that it is epistemically open that George is a minister.

Rather, (h) seems to be about one's consideration of a hypothetical situation. Further, the utterer of (h)

is reporting that he entertained a hypothetical situation in which George was a minister. Whether or

not the act reported by (h) is precisely, or only, the consideration of a hypothetical situation is not at

issue. The important point here is that (e) and (h) are not reports of the same act. Also, when (h) is

compared to (g), it is difficult to see a difference in acts reported by the two sentences. It looks like (g)

and (h) report the same act. If all 'conceive of' sentences can be used interchangeably with some

'conceive that' sentence as with (g) and (h) then there may not be any substantive difference in the acts

reported with sentences using each of the phrases.


But so far what has been suggested by the examples is that what is expressed with all 'conceive

of' statements can also be expressed with some 'conceive that' statement'. I want to suggest that there

is some act reported by at least some 'conceive of' statements that is substantively different from acts

reported by 'conceive that' statements. It is no matter to this study that it may not be that there are

acts reported with 'conceive that' statements that may not be reportable by any 'conceive of'

statement. If that is true, then it would be consistent with the position that acts reported with 'conceive

of' are merely a subset of the set of acts reported by 'conceive that'. That would not give evidence that

there are two substantively different acts, but merely some that cannot be reported with one of the

locutions for what might be merely pragmatic reasons.










What is needed to show that there is a different act reported with 'conceive of' is a

demonstration that there are words or phrases that come after the complementizer 'of' that cannot be

paraphrased into a 'conceive that' construction. The content of (g) is also expressible as (h). But if we

look at (g), the of-clause attributes a property to a particular. But the of-clause need not be of that

form. If we look at (i),(j), and (k) below, we find that replacing 'of' with 'that' is problematic:


(i) I have conceived of George.


(j) I have conceived of ministers.


(k) I have conceived of being a minister.


Clearly, "I have conceived that George"/ "I have conceived that ministers"/ "I have conceived that being

a minister" are ungrammatical. One might suggest that (i), (j), and (k) implicitly include that the

referent(s) of the ordinary nouns and noun phrases after 'of' exist. So perhaps the content of (i), (j), and

(k) may also be expressed by (i'), (j'), and (k'):


(i') I have conceived that George exists.


(j') I have conceived that ministers exist.


(k') I have conceived that being a minister exists.


Looking back at (e), it is apparent that when the phrase after 'that' is in the present tense

'conceive that' statements like the three above are about what is epistemically open. But (i), (j), and (k)

do not necessarily convey that the existence of anything is epistemically open, even if the utterer of (i),


8There is a reading of (k) which reads the same as "I have conceived of my being a minister"
which would be expressible also with the 'conceive that' locution. I am here assuming that
there is a literal reading of (k) that is not elliptical for "I have conceived of my being a
minister". It is that reading which is important for the example.










for example, believes that it is epistemically open that George exists. Consider the difference between

(I) and (m):


(I) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes.


(m) I have conceived that Sherlock Holmes exists.


One need not think that it is epistemically open that Sherlock Holmes exists in order to sincerely and

truthfully utter (I) but the belief that it is epistemically open that Sherlock Holmes exists would be

required for one to sincerely and truthfully utter (m) as shown by (n) and (o):


(n) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes but I am certain (and was certain at the time of

conceiving) that he does not exist.


(o) I have conceived that Sherlock Holmes exists but I am certain (and was certain at the

time of conceiving) that he does not exist.


It is evident that (n) is consistent while (o) is contradictory. Perhaps if the that-clause in (o) is put in the

subjunctive mood then the problem can be remedied:


(o') I have conceived Sherlock Holmes to exist/that Sherlock Holmes be existent but I am

certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that he does not exist.


There are theoretical reasons to be wary of (o'). First, (o') treats existence as a property. But existence

is not normally treated as a property. Second, even if we table concerns about treating existence as a

property, there is a further problem presented for 'conceive that' sentences which are about the

existence of fictional characters or types. Some philosophers hold that fictional characters are

impossible. Even so, those philosophers can sincerely utter (I). If we look at (p) there does not seem to










be any obvious contradiction and it does not look like people who utter (p) must be irrational in uttering

(p) even if they hold that fictional characters are impossible beings:


(p) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes but I am certain (and was certain at the time of

conceiving) that it is impossible for Holmes to exist.


But if we look at (q), there is some significant tension:


(q) I have conceived Sherlock Holmes to exist/that Sherlock Holmes be existent but I am certain

(and was certain at the time of conceiving) that it is impossible for Holmes to exist.


In order to derive a contradiction from (q) one would have to hold that conceivability entails possibility.

I do not here want to presume that conceivability entails possibility. But even if one does not hold that

all fictional characters are impossible there are reasons to think that at least some fictional characters

are impossible. An obvious example would be a round-square-shaped character. Even if we cannot

make sense of a round-square-shaped character, there are other types of fictional characters and

creatures we can make sense of that are nonetheless impossible for reasons other than being fictional.

In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke gave an argument that a unicorn is a type of fictional creature that

is impossible for reasons other than just its being fictional.9


Tiger is a species of animal. And unicorn is supposed to be a species in the same way that tiger

is. If we found some creature that looked superficially like a tiger but had different organs inside or

perhaps different DNA, then such a creature would not be a tiger. The same would go for unicorns. But

the difference between tigers and unicorns is that while we have some non-superficial ways of

identifying members of the species, tiger, we do not have any non-superficial ways of picking out

9Kripke, pp 156-158. Kripke discusses both the metaphysical and epistemological impossibility
of unicorns. I have here abridged and combined the metaphysical and epistemological
arguments into one.










unicorns. So, were we to come across two creatures resembling horses with horns, each one with vastly

different DNA and internal organs, we would have no way of deciding which was the unicorn and which

was not. And, the reason we would not be able to tell which is in fact the unicorn is that neither is. We

should consider two claims that might be made about the conceivability of unicorns:


(r) I have conceived of unicorns.


(s) I have conceived that unicorns exist/ be existent.


The preceding digression is important to the discussion because it is not merely that the

existence of unicorns is impossible that should differentiate (r) from (s) but also why the existence of

unicorns is (at least according to Kripke) impossible that should help us distinguish the two.


The reason that unicorns are allegedly impossible creatures is that there is no description of

unicorns that would single them out as members of some species. And, since they do not exist, we

cannot fix the term 'unicorn' to any particular creatures and those things relevantly like them. So, any

attempt to conceive that unicorns exist would have to fail because there would be nothing to distinguish

our conceiving that unicorns exist from our conceiving that something superficially indiscernible from

unicorns exists.


But then can we conceive of unicorns? I believe that we can. Just think about Kripke's

argument that the existence of unicorns is impossible. In order to argue against their existence he must

be able to perform some mental act that at least resembles conceiving. There must be something

towards which his thoughts are directed. And that object is, at least in some sense, the fictional species

unicorn. In what way one is able to conceive of unicorns will be addressed later in the chapter. For

now, it will be enough that we can in some way conceive of impossible creatures so long as the content










of those conceivings does not entail the existence of the creatures in question, factually or

counterfactually.


Of course, there is no reason to think that we are able to conceive of impossible creatures or

characters and not impossible objects. If we can conceive of unicorns we should also be able


to conceive of round squares. We cannot conceive that round squares exist or conceive of the existence

of round squares.


But why could we not conceive of round squares simpliciter? It certainly looks like we can in

some sense. Again, look at the linguistic evidence. Although we do hold that round squares are

impossible we also hold that if they did exist they would be round and square. So, they must in some

way be the objects of our thoughts about them. Undoubtedly, the concept round square exists.

Conceiving of round squares requires only that one gain an understanding as to what would be required

for some object to, per impossible, fall under both round and square.


In this section I have attempted to show that the acts reported by certain 'conceive of'

sentences differ substantively from the acts reported by 'conceive that' sentences. First, I demonstrated

that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are not intersubstitutable. Paraphrasing that-clauses in present

declarative tense and mood into present subjunctive will allow 'conceive that' assertions to report many

of the same particular acts that are reported by 'conceive of' assertions. But no amount of paraphrasing

will make 'conceive that' assertions report what is reported with a 'conceive of' assertion when the

direct object of the complement is a noun or noun phrase, with the paradigm examples being those in

which the noun or noun phrase denotes an impossible object.










3.2 Yablo and Conceiving of the Existence of the Impossible


Can we conceive the existence of only what is possible? A complete answer to this question

would be beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, most accept that there is at least some

connection between conceivability and possibility. Conceiving seems to give us some epistemic access

to possibility.'0


However, it seems clear is that there are at least some things we do not think can be conceived

because they are conceptually impossible. The types of things we exclude are things like the existence

of impossible objects and situations which we know are logically impossible. We do not think that

anyone can conceive of the existence of round squares or dogs that are not mammals. And we think it's

inconceivable for a stone to be bigger than itself.


But what about people who do think they can conceive of the existence of round squares and

stones larger than themselves? That is, how is it that we understand what is going on with those

people? We have four options:


1. They are genuinely conceiving of some impossibility and we are mistaken that such things

cannot be conceived of.


2. Those things we thought were impossible are not impossible.


3. They are not conceiving anything at all.


4. They are conceiving of something but are mistaken about how to describe what it is they are

conceiving.



10Whether or not conceiving is a reliable guide to possibility is another matter.










If there is any limit to what is conceivable, it is most likely the existence of impossible objects.

So, if option 1 is correct then there is likely no meaningful string of words that does not correspond to

something that can be conceived. In itself, this is not an objection but an observation that should make

one uneasy about going with option 1. "It is conceivable that P" would be nearly synonymous with "'P'

is a meaningful sentence." Conceiving is undoubtedly more than evaluating sentences for their

meaningfulness. Even if such an evaluation is important to conceiving, it is incumbent upon us to

discover what the other part of conceiving is. The terms 'round' and 'square' are both meaningful terms.

But I cannot fathom what it would be to conceive of a round square's existing.


Option 2 would not raise an objection to the thesis that we cannot conceive of the existence of

impossibilities. Rather, it would be an objection to particular claims about what we cannot conceive.

So, it might be that we can conceive of some round-square's existence and we think we can't because

we are confused and their existence isn't impossible at all. But, even if something like this were true, we

could still hold that whatever is genuinely impossible is inconceivable. So long as we admit that we may

be confused regarding what is impossible, this option should not pose any threat to our opening thesis

about the extent of what we can propositionally conceive, i.e. that it is limited to what is possible.


Option 3 is probably not an entirely legitimate option. What I mean is that if one sincerely

makes a claim to have conceived something and he is familiar with conceiving, he must be conceiving

something, even if what is being conceived is not what he thought it was.


This brings us to option 4. Option 4 is the option with the most intuitive pull. We can imagine

that someone might picture something that shifts shapes from circular to square and describe it as a

round square. And the existence of that shape-shifting object is not hard to conceive. So, option 4 is at

least plausible in some cases. And, it is undoubtedly true that we do make mistaken reports about not










just what we conceive but what we see, hear, taste, etc. We are even likely to be mistaken in some

instances about our beliefs.


We must then wonder what the nature of the mistake is. We are going to assume that the

person mistaken has at least a basic understanding of what conceiving is so that he does not fail to

conceive of anything. Further, we must assume that whoever makes the claim:


(RS) I am conceiving of a round square's existence.


is a competent speaker of the English language who understands all of the term in question. That is, he

does not report RS in virtue of not knowing the meaning of the term 'round' (or 'square' or 'existence',

etc.). If one sincerely asserts RS, is a competent speaker of the English language but fails to conceive of

the existence of a round square then he must have attempted to conceive of round square but failed to

do so:


(MC) For all speakers S and languages L, if S is a competent speaker of L, sincerely utters 'I am

conceiving of x', then S sincerely attempts to conceive of x, and if S fails to conceive of x, S


succeeds in conceiving of something else.


According to the above principle, if one were to report that he conceived of a round square and failed to

do so (which I am holding by hypothesis that he must) he would not of course be conceiving of a round

square, but he would succeed in conceiving of something.


A principle similar to the one above is suggested by Saul Kripke. Stephen Yablo calls a similar

view 'Textbook Kripkeanism':


A lot of people appear to have drawn the same 'good news-bad news' lesson from their reading
of Saul Kripke on conceivability. The bad news is that conceivability evidence, particularly of the
'conceptual' or 'a priori' sort, is highly fallible. Very often one finds a statement E conceivable,










when as a matter of fact, E-worlds cannot exist. So it is, for instance, with the conceivability of
water in the absence of hydrogen, or Hesperus without Phosphorus.

The good news is that (although conceivability evidence is fallible) the failures always take a
certain form. A thinker who (mistakenly) conceives E as possible is correctly registering the
possibility of something and mistaking the possibility of that for the possibility of E. There are
illusions of possibility, if you like, but no outright delusions or hallucinations.1




Textbook Kripkeanism assumes something about the connection between conceivability and

possibility. But one need not assume that conceivability entails possibility to hold onto the spirit of

Textbook Kripkeanism. I believe the spirit is captured by MC.


Yablo's examination of Textbook Kripkeanism is particularly relevant to the present issue

because Yablo contends that one may conceive of impossibilities.


Yablo's counterexample to Textbook Kripkeanism centers on the conceivability of a necessary

being. The argument goes like this (for some S):


1. Conceiver S can conceive that God exists.


2. S can conceive that God does not exist.


3. If S can conceive that P then P is possible.


4. So, it is possible that God exists and also possible that God does not exist. (1, 2, 3)


5. God exists in some possible worlds and does not exist in other possible worlds. (analysis of 4

using the heuristic of possible worlds)


6. But, if God exists, he is a necessary existent.


1 Yablo, Stephen. "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81
(2000): p. 108










7. If God does not exist then God is an impossible being.


8. So, if God exists then God exists in every possible world and if God does not exist he exists in no

possible world.


9. Textbook Kripkeanism is false.


No problem would arise if one were to conceive of the existence of Pegasus and also of the non-

existence of Pegasus.12 No impossibilities arise from either the possibility of Pegasus' existence or the

possibility of Pegasus' nonexistence; Pegasus will exist in some possible worlds and not exist in others.

God is supposed to exist in all of them or none at all. It is impossible that he should exist in some but

not others.


Yablo's challenge is to the traditional view that conceivability entails possibility. So, his

argument is not directly aimed at a proposal like the one that I am working with currently. But, on his

way to arguing against the conceivability-possibility entailment, he does suppose that one can conceive

that there be impossible beings or situations. In order for his argument to work it must be either

impossible that God exists or impossible that he not exist. Consequently, in order for Yablo's argument

to succeed one must be able to conceive of some impossibility.


At first glance there are three options:


1. It is inconceivable that God exists.


2. It is inconceivable that God does not exist.


3. Both are conceivable.




12Or, at the very least, the same problem would not arise.










What I propose is that the problem lies in a confusion between conceiving of and conceiving

that. I suggested in the last section that one can conceive of impossible objects but not of the existence

of impossible objects. If one conceives that where the subject of the that-clause is an impossible object,

10, then the that-clause, taken alone, would entail the existence of 10. Likewise, if one conceives of IO's

existing then the content of the conceiving also entails IO's existing13 trivially. And it is the existence of

10 that is inconceivable, or so I have argued.


My proposal would get around the problem that results from Yablo's supposed counterexample

to Textbook Kripkeanism because, although there would be some act of conceiving performed when one

believes he is conceiving that God exists, it would not be a conceiving that God exists. For, there is a

confusion. But the confusion is not about the type of necessity that God possesses or some

misunderstanding regarding the other properties God is supposed to possess. Rather, the confusion is

about the type of conceiving one is performing. Although 'conceiving of' is the more natural phrasing

for conceiving reports, philosophers almost exclusively use the 'conceiving that' construction. This

preference prejudices us toward thinking that all conceiving must be of some propositional content.


If we do not presume that acts of conceiving must have propositional content, at least as

normally thought of, then we can explain away the apparent problem presented above. What is

impossible is that impossible objects exist. It follows (at least intuitively, if not logically) that it is

impossible that we can conceive that those impossible objects exist. This is because conceiving that

some objects exist requires specifying at least the relevant circumstances under which such an object

exists. But it is clear that no such conditions can be specified in the case of impossible objects. So, if

God is one of these impossible objects then it is inconceivable that God exists. But I have left it open

that one can conceive of God. And so, one can explain away the apparent problem in the argument


"This presumes an intelligible notion of property entailment.










above as a confusion between conceiving of God and conceiving that God exist. There would not be any

problem because if one were confused in the way described he would not be both conceiving that God

exist and conceiving that God not exist. Rather, he would be conceiving of God and conceiving that God

not exist.


Supposing that God is not an impossible object (and thus exists), the confusion can be explained

away in terms of 'conceiving of' and 'conceiving that', but with a slightly different approach. On the

model above, what one does (if God exists) when he believes he has conceived that God does not exist

is conceive of a world without God. If God exists and is metaphysically necessary then a world without

God is an impossible object. So while one would be able to conceive of a world without God, he would

not be able to conceive that such a world exist.


Some might try to explain away the apparent conceiving that something impossible exist with

only the 'conceiving that' locution. And if that is possible, then one might wonder why we should admit

that there is a substantive difference between conceiving of and conceiving that. It looks like David

Chalmers already gave us the relevant distinction with his categories of prima facie and ideal

conceivability:


Prima Facie Conceivability: "S is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is conceivable for

that subject on first appearances."


Ideal Conceivability: "S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable on ideal rational

reflection." (Chalmers, 2002, p. 147)


One might think that conceiving of some object o is the same as prima facie conceiving that o exist and

that conceiving that o exist (on my account) is the same as ideally conceiving that o exist (on Chalmers'

account). But I hold that conceiving of o need not include anything about o's existence. Consider some










obviously impossible object like the completely red and completely green ball. I do not think we can

even prima facie conceive that such an object exist, as even a minimal grasp of the concepts red and

green precludes a completely red and completely green ball existing. But, we can conceive of such an

object and draw conclusions about what features it would have to have were it possible for it to exist,

such as that it would be colored, have a surface, etc.


In this section, I have looked at what I suggest are some of the confusions people have when

they conceive. When people think that they have conceived that some impossible object exists at least

one of the explanations is that one has confused conceiving of the impossible object for conceiving that

the impossible object in question exists (or conceiving it to exist). What one can conceive as existing is

limited by what is possible. But what one can conceive of is not so limited.


I then considered an objection not to the suggestion that one can conceive of impossibilities but

to the suggestion that one cannot conceive that impossible objects exist. The objection is one suggested

by Stephen Yablo. Yablo suggests that we can both conceive that God exist and conceive that God not

exist. Since God, if he exists, is supposed to be necessary, either his existence or non-existence is

impossible. I attempted to show that this apparent problem can be explained away with the distinction

I suggest between 'conceiving of' and 'conceiving that'.


Lastly, I considered an objection that the kind of solution I suggest has already been offered in a

different way. Yablo's confusion could also be explained away with Chalmers' distinction between prima

facie and ideal variants of conceiving. And so, one might think that the distinction between conceiving

of and conceiving that is nothing over-and-above the distinction between prima facie and ideal

conceiving. I argued that conceiving of differs in type from prima facie conceiving in that one may

conceive of some types of obviously impossible objects which one cannot even prima facie conceive.










3.3 Confusions That Could Lead to a Berkeleyan View


In this section, I will consider the type of confusion that might lead one to the Berkeleyan

conclusion that nothing exists other than minds and mind-dependent ideas. Consider the following

well-known passage from Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge:


But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be
things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the
mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a
colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but ever so little into
our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our
ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are
the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are
ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it
be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something
which is intangible; and so the rest. (Berkeley, 1.8)



We can only perceive objects by way of their sensible properties. The objects which instantiate sensible

properties are either themselves perceivable or are not. If they are, then there is nothing more to

objects than their sensible properties. If they are not, then one must suppose that there is some

intimate connection between objects and their sensible properties. That intimate connection is

supposed to be resemblance. In order for something to resemble a sensible property it must itself be

sensible. So, if objects resemble their sensible properties, objects must be nothing over-and-above their

sensible properties. So, there is nothing more to objects than how we perceive them. Without our

perceiving them, then they would not exist. Hence, supposed external objects are mind-dependent.


Berkeley assumes that the limits our ability to conceive is given by what we perceive: "Hence as

it is impossible for me to see or feel any thing without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is

impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or










perception of it" (Berkeley, I. 5).14 It is impossible to conceive of a sensible object without sensible

properties. Clearly, what it is to be a sensible object is to be something which can be perceived.


But Berkeley is here confused. The confusion commonly attributed here to Berkeley is that he is

confused between the objects of perception and the objects of introspection.


I do not want to suggest that Berkeley is not confused in the way people normally suggest he is.

What I want to do here is suggest that there is a further mistake Berkeley may be making. The mistake

lies in thinking that one can conceive of particulars as such. We normally do act as though conceiving

can be about particulars as such. But I want to suggest that that is something we cannot do (some

exceptions to be mentioned aside).


First, I will examine how holding that our conceiving can be about ordinary particulars could lead

one to phenomenalism. I will then argue that acts of conceiving cannot be about ordinary contingent

particulars.15 We should look at an example in which we purportedly do conceive of a particular.


Suppose that we try to conceive of the Statue of Liberty. So I conceive of a tall greenish figure

on a large pedestal. Conceiving of a tall greenish figure on a large pedestal is unproblematic.16 But in

order for it to be a conceiving of the Statue of Liberty, we need to provide some way of ensuring that

what we conceive of is the Statue of Liberty and not some other tall greenish figure.





14Jonathan Dancy notes that in the 1710 edition, Berkeley continues: In truth the object and
sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.

5"Objects like numbers and sets, if they exist, will differ from ordinary contingent particulars in
this respect.

161 am here overlooking possible vagueness issues. If terms like 'pedestal' are vague it may be
that it is indeterminate whether there are any pedestals.










Perhaps we can provide some definite description of the Statue of Liberty. But for any definite

description we give of the Statue of Liberty, that description might have failed to apply to the Statue of

Liberty. It might have been shorter, constructed somewhere other than Ellis Island, designed earlier or

later than it was, etc. It may be that there is no problem with picking out a particular like the Statue of

Liberty with some mental acts, but I want to suggest that conceiving is importantly different. When we

conceive we are directing ourselves toward modal concerns. So we must leave open that particulars

could have been different than they are.


We might think that the Statue of Liberty falls under the definite description "the actual tall

greenish statue on Ellis Island." Of course, it cannot fail to be the case that the Statue of Liberty is the

actual tall greenish statue on Ellis Island. But when we conceive that the Statue of Liberty be

somewhere other than Ellis Island we are considering whether we think that situation could have been

actual. But if we represented the Statue of Liberty as "the actual tall greenish statue on Ellis Island" we

could not have conceived that the Statue of Liberty actually be assembled anywhere other than Ellis

Island. In possible worlds speak, if our modal


considerations are about anything, they should be about how the actual world could be, not about how

some other world is.


Of course, objects like numbers (if they exist) would be exceptions, as it is uncontroversial that

they fall under definite descriptions that could not have failed to apply to them. Another notable

exception is in first-person conceivings. Whenever I conceive of myself first-personally, it is undoubtedly

me that my conceiving is about. And that is because I do not need to represent myself with some

definite description in order to guarantee that it is me about whom I am conceiving.17




17Perry, John. "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", Nous Vol. 13 No. 1 (1979): pp. 3-21










One might object that when we conceive we need not represent particulars with definite

descriptions in order to pick out those particulars. We need only stipulate that it is the Statue of Liberty

about which I am conceiving in order for it to be the Statue of Liberty about which I am thinking. But

one's conceiving of some particular cannot amount merely to stipulating that one has done so. For

simplicity's sake, we can consider a quasi-perceptual type of conceiving to illustrate that there are limits

to what one can stipulate. Suppose that one were to report that he had conceived of a specific shade of

blue, say robin's egg blue. We would not think that someone had successfully conceived of robin's egg

blue if he had in fact formed a quasi-perceptual image of a field of Titian (a shade of red), no matter

what one reports or stipulates.


Perhaps one might object to the example by arguing that quasi-perceptual conceiving requires

quasi-perceptual stipulation. One cannot stipulate merely linguistically. One must have an

understanding of the concepts involved in order to stipulate. And, where phenomenal


concepts are involved, one must be able to form a quasi-perceptual picture of a named color in order to

stipulate that one will be conceiving of that color.


But if that is what is required of stipulating that one has conceived of something, then the

stipulation is no different in type from the conceiving. So, it is of no use to argue that one can conceive

of a specific particular A merely because one stipulates that he conceives of A. One must further have

an understanding of A. The problem with conceiving of particulars is that it does not look like we

understand what ordinary objects like the Statue of Liberty are in addition to our understanding of the

many concepts under which they fall.


One might still think that we do not think about particulars as falling under some description.

But think about a supposed particular like God. When we think about who God is or would be, the way

we think about God requires that we think about God as falling under some description. God is that

50










being which is omnipotent and omniscient.18 Anything which meets those criteria is God. Suppose one

were to say:


(G) I met God but he's not omniscient or omnipotent.


A natural response to an utterance of (G) would be that whoever or whatever the utterer met was not

God. That is because there are necessary and sufficient conditions on being God, as there are with

numbers. But ordinary particulars have accidental properties. And even if one believes that some

ordinary particulars have essential properties, (e.g. such as Humphrey having the property of being

human necessarily), it is still controversial whether there are properties are properties the having of

which suffices for an object to be the particular object it is.


There have been attempts at finding properties that individuate (suffice for being) contingent

ordinary particulars, but it is unclear that any of these attempts have been successful. And, even if one

had an account of ordinary particulars which included a non-controversial sufficient property, it is far

from obvious that when we think of ordinary particulars, we think about those types of properties. For

example, there have been theories about particulars which have as necessary and sufficient conditions

for being some object, 0, that O be composed of a certain group of sub-atomic particles. Even if such an

account is correct it does not seem like that is the type of thing we think about when we think about

ordinary particulars. And, even if we did think about ordinary particulars in that way, we do not have

the information regarding which elementary particles compose what in order for us to have in mind the

relevant properties necessary and sufficient for being any specific complex particular. That is, it may be

that one thinks in general that what individuates particulars is something about the particles of which



"There are arguably other descriptions which apply to God, like a being which is
omnibenevolent and the being who created the world. But whatever specific descriptions
one uses to pick out God is of no matter.










they are composed, but it is unlikely that there are any particulars for which one can enumerate which

particles that particular is composed of.


So, while some conceivings may be about certain odd particulars like God or numbers, it is

because what they are can be captured by a definite description which we do in fact have in mind when

we think about them. And those definite descriptions which apply to these odd particulars pick out

these particulars uniquely and apply to those particulars necessarily. With ordinary particulars, it is not

obvious that there are any descriptions which uniquely pick out those particulars and apply to those

particulars necessarily. Even if there are it is unlikely that we have such descriptions in mind when we

think about them.


To demonstrate the point that there is no necessary description under which we can uniquely

pick out particulars I will look at Max Black's argument against the Principle of the Identity of

Indiscernibles. Black's argument takes the form of a dialogue between two characters, A and B. B

presents a counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (Pll):


(PII) For all objects x and y and properties F, if (x has F iff y has F) then x = y.


(PII) provides a condition sufficing for the identity of particulars. The principle is difficult to state in

ordinary English as in (P1l)19 but it may be better put in ordinary English if we first put it in the logical

equivalent of (PII), (P112):


(P112) For all objects x and y, if x # y then ~for all properties F(x has F iff y has F)






191t is natural to say that for any two objects which have all the same properties, they are
identical. But then there is a problem because there is only one object, not two as first
stated.










(P112) may be stated in ordinary English. What (P112) says is that for any two distinct objects there is at

least one property that one has that the other does not.


The counterexample presented by B is a world empty except for two brass spheres which have

all their intrinsic properties in common. The two spheres are the same size, same density, same mass,

etc. And since they are the only two things in the world, they have all the same relational properties as

well. So although there are two objects they do not differ in any properties, which is exactly what (P112)

says cannot be.


One way to object to Black's counterexample is to propose that space is absolute. So, although

there are no purely qualitative properties that the two spheres differ in, they do differ in location.


If space is absolute, then Black's counterexample fails but it should not bear on what I am trying

to show here. I am not arguing that there are no real differences between distinct particulars. I am

arguing that there is nothing in our conceivings of particulars that would suffice to determine which

particular the conceivings are about. Even if we did include in our conceiving of the two spheres their

locations in absolute space, it would not be necessary that those two spheres be in the locations that

they are; one thing we do seem to know about ordinary particulars is that they could have been in

different spatio-temporal locations than they are in in fact.


Even though there may be some property that one sphere has that the other does not e.g. being

at such-and-such spatio-temporal location, it is not a necessary property. We may be able to think

about particulars in such a way as to pick them out uniquely. But when we conceive we need to leave

open that those properties instantiated by those particulars might have failed to be instantiated by

those particulars. And we further need to leave open that something else could have had the properties

of whatever particulars we are considering.










So then what is it we are doing when we think we are conceiving particulars? This is where

Berkeley comes in. What he had right was that when think about objects we think about their

properties. Even if there is some underlying substratum, it is not about that that we think. When we

conceive about contingent particulars we need to leave open that the particulars instantiate properties

other than the ones they instantiate in fact or the ones we believe they do in fact.


There is no favored property by which we pick out ordinary particulars, but I am suggesting that

when we supposedly conceive particulars we are conceiving properties. More precisely, we are grasping

a concept or group of concepts. From there we can draw conclusions about what would be required for

something to fall under a specific group of concepts all at once. So we conceive of a round square by

grasping both round and square. We can then draw conclusions about what it would take for something

to be a round square.


Berkeley does use the 'conceive of' locution that I propose denotes a substantively different act

from the act denoted by 'conceive that'. But I want to suggest that Berkeley is confused as to the level

of generality that can be conceived. Berkeley argues that one cannot conceive of an object

unconceived. Suppose we have a tree named Joe. If one conceives of Joe, Joe cannot be unconceived.

And the same goes for any particular. But the mistake is in thinking that our conceivings can be about

Joe at all. What one can conceive of is some co-instantiation of properties that the tree normally

instantiates.20 And what that amounts to is grasping the concepts under which any tree falls. But if all

conceiving is at this level of generality, there is no particular that has been conceived at all. While one

may not be able to conceive of any particular and have that particular be unconceived, that is only

because particulars cannot be conceived at all. What we can conceive is that there be something or



20One can likewise not conceive that Joe be taller or shorter, etc. but rather conceive that there
be a co-instantiation of such-and-such properties.










other falling under a concept, e.g. that of a tree, and that there be things like that which are not

conceived. Whether or not Berkeley made this mistake, it is a mistake that one might make on his way

to arguing for phenomenalism.


In this section, I have discussed a way in which one might be confused about the limits of

conceiving that would lead one to holding a phenomenalist view. The confusion is about the level of

generality of what we can conceive. Although we can seemingly have conceivings about ordinary

particulars, we cannot in fact.


When we think about ordinary particulars we think about them in terms of some description.

Even if we think about them in terms of some definite description,21 we cannot do so when we conceive.

Conceiving requires us to leave open that either something might in fact be different than we believe it

is or that something could have been different than it is in fact. Even though there may be some

concepts under which ordinary particulars fall necessarily, falling under those concepts is not sufficient

for uniquely picking out some contingent particular. And without such a concept which can only apply

to one contingent particular there is no principled reason that our conceiving about some particular, A,

is not also a conceiving about some other particular, B. But then our conceiving is not about A or B but

rather about the application conditions of the relevant concepts that both A and B fall under.


One might come to hold a phenomenalist view if one were to be confused in the way just

discussed. If one were to think that conceiving could be about particulars then he would come to the

conclusion that when one attempts to conceive of some unconceived object, he has conceived of some

particular and thus the object in question is no longer unconceived. And so it will go with all particulars.

But I am suggesting what one conceives of must be at a higher level of generality. If what is conceived is




21Although we often think about particulars through some indefinite description.










at a higher level of generality then there is no conceptual impossibility as there is with some specific

particular being both conceived and unconceived.





3.4 Conclusion



In this chapter I have looked at some mistakes that can be made when one allegedly conceives.

Each mistake I looked at led to some conclusion about the range of things which can be conceived.


In section 3.1, I suggested that a mistake that has been made, particularly in recent discussions,

is in considering only conceiving about propositional contents. I argued that there are mental acts

reported by sentences using the 'conceive of' locution that are substantively different from any acts that

can be reported by sentences using the 'conceive that' locution. Those acts that differ are the ones

reported by 'conceive of' followed by an ordinary noun or noun phrase. I considered the suggestion that

(i)'conceive of A', where 'A' is an ordinary noun or noun phrase, is elliptical for (ii)'conceive that A exist'.

I concluded that the (i) is not elliptical for (ii) because we can in some way conceive of impossible

objects (and believe that those objects are impossible). But the way we can conceive of impossible

objects must be a way which does not require us to conceive that they exist.


In section 3.2, I considered an objection that the existence of impossible objects is conceivable.

The objection came from an argument made by Stephen Yablo against Textbook Kripkeanism. Yablo's

argument presumes that both the existence and nonexistence of God are conceivable. One of either the

existence or nonexistence of God is necessary and one of them is impossible. So, if both of them are

conceivable, something impossible is conceivable. I argued that one might be misled into believing both

the existence and nonexistence of God are conceivable if he is confused between conceiving of and

conceiving that. Lastly, I argued that in spite of appearances, the distinction between conceiving of and

56










conceiving that is different from the distinction between prima facie conceiving and ideal conceiving.

The difference is made evident by the fact that there are some things that can be conceived of (e.g.

round squares) that one cannot even prima facie conceive existing. Prima facie conceiving requires

some propositional content which further requires that one be able to conceive of conditions on the

existence under which those things the content is about exist. But object-types which fall under

concepts that are obviously conceptually incoherent cannot even be prima facie conceived. That is

because some concepts are such that grasping them immediately puts one in a position to recognize

that they cannot apply to any objects.


In section 3.3, I looked at a confusion one might have that would lead one to have a

phenomenalist view. The confusion is about the level of generality at which we can conceive. We

cannot conceive about specific particulars. What we can conceive about is types of particulars. There is

nothing that can be both conceived and unconceived. But that is only a problem for non-

phenomenalists if we conceive of particulars. But not only do we not have to conceive of specific

contingent spatio-temporal particulars, but we cannot do so. What we do when we purportedly

conceive of contingent spatio-temporal particulars is evaluate the conditions anything would have to

satisfy in order fall under some concept or concepts we associate with those particulars.


In chapter 4, I will further explain the act we report with 'conceive of' sentences. I will also

further explain the relationship between conceiving of and conceiving that. Lastly, I will look at how one

might use this distinction to argue that zombie arguments fail.










CHAPTER 4

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT


4.0 Introduction



There are three objectives of this chapter. First, I will further defend the distinction between

conceiving-of and conceiving-that. Second, I will discuss the relation between conceiving-of and

conceiving-that. And third, I will suggest how the distinction between these two types of conceiving

might help explain away the apparent conceivability of zombies existing.


In chapter 3, I argued for a number of different proposals regarding the range of those things

that can be conceived. When philosophers appeal to what can be conceived in arguments, the type of

conceiving they normally focus on is reported with the 'conceive that' construction (or similar

constructions with a sentential complement). I argued that there is another type of conceiving reported

with the 'conceive of' construction. Conceivings-of may seem to be about ordinary objects but not be

about the existence of those objects. So, one may be able to conceive of some type of thing without

conceiving that that type of thing exists. Because we may conceive of types of things without conceiving

that they exist, we can conceive of types of impossible objects.


I also argued that we cannot conceive anything about particulars qua particulars. Conceiving

requires that we leave open the possibility that things be different than they are or than we believe

them to be. If one conceives that, for example, Smith is taller than six feet tall, his success in conceiving

that Smith is taller than six feet tall does not depend on Smith's actual height. In order for it to be Smith

that we have conceived to be six feet tall, we must be able to differentiate between Smith and, for

example, Jones in our acts of conceiving about Smith and Jones. The way in which we pick out Smith is

by way of some descriptionss. But we can conceive that any or all descriptions which in fact apply to










Smith fail to apply top Smith. There is nothing in the content of our acts of conceiving that would

uniquely pick out any particular in all possible circumstances. Particulars exist. I am not promoting an

eliminativist thesis. Rather, I hold that the contents of our conceivings represent the world in such a

way that they cannot be about particulars as such.


In section 4.1, I will consider an important objection to the view that conceiving-of is a

substantively different type of conceiving from conceiving-that. Specifically, one might argue that

conceiving-of, in the instances it differs from conceiving-that, is not a type of conceiving at all. I argue

that we do recognize this difference in normal parlance and in logic as well, at least implicitly. I conclude

that the suggestion that substantively different conceivings-of are not conceivings at all is mistaken.


In section 4.2, I will attempt to show that conceiving-of is a precondition on conceiving-that and

further discuss what is required for conceiving-that. What is required to conceive-that is more involved

than what is minimally required for conceiving-of, but one may not conceive-that without first

conceiving-of.


In section 4.3, I will suggest that the failure to recognize this distinction could be behind the

apparent conceivability of philosophical zombies. A full argument that such a confusion is going on in

zombie arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I will demonstrate how such a confusion

could lead one to believe that philosophical zombies are conceivable.


4.1 An Objection to the Distinction Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that



One might argue that there really is no reason to think that in addition to the type of conceiving

normally discussed (conceiving-that) that there is also some other type of conceiving (conceiving-of). I

argued in chapter two that there is a substantive difference between conceiving-of and conceiving-that

which is demonstrated by the fact that we do make reports of the form 'I have conceived of x' where x is

59










replaced by a noun or noun phrase. I considered the suggestion that 'I have conceived of x' is elliptical

for 'I have conceived that x exists (x to exist)' and found that although the former may seem to be

elliptical for the latter for some substitutions for 'x', the former is obviously not elliptical for the latter

for all substitutions for 'x.' The substitutions for 'x' which most obviously do not admit of the ellipsis are

those substitutions which denote impossible objects. And from that, it should follow that 'conceive of'

sentences are in general not elliptical for 'conceive that' sentences.


One could argue that the problem lies in thinking that we can conceive of impossible objects.

Hume made this point in A Treatise of Human Nature:


'Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the
idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain
may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it
as impossible. (Book 1. Part 2.Section 2. Paragraph 8)



Hume argues, as many have, that what is impossible is inconceivable. From the passage above,it is clear

that Hume's view is that we cannot conceive of conceptual impossibilities.22 The conceptual

incoherence ofx leads to an inability to conceive ofx. Whether or not we can form an idea of a golden

mountain depends on whether the concept golden mountain is coherent. But merely detecting the

coherence of golden mountain is not enough to conceive of a golden mountain on this view. Conceiving

of a golden mountain is something we can do in virtue of golden mountain being a coherent concept.





22Just what types of possibility and impossibility there are is beyond the scope of this paper. For
purposes of this study, I am assuming that there are conceptual, logical, and nomological
possibilities. Whether conceptual and logical possibility are the same or not is another issue
beyond the scope of this paper. However, nothing important should hang on whether or not
conceptual and logical possibility are distinct notions.










Round square is not a coherent concept, yet I have argued that we can conceive of round

squares. What we cannot do is conceive that round squares exist (conceive round squares to exist).

Hume says we cannot clearly conceive of impossibilities. I would take this to be saying that we cannot

ideally conceive that there be impossible objects. And that is not in conflict with anything I have

suggested in this study. One might still object that even if that is what Hume has in mind, there is no

reason to think that there is this distinction between conceiving-of and conceiving-that.


But we do conceive of impossible objects at some times, even while admitting that they are

impossible. When we talk about round squares we have done something which allows us to sincerely

say about them what we do. Even though round square is an incoherent concept, we can make sense of

what it would take for something to be a round square. We can draw conclusions about what would be

true of round squares were they to exist. If we could not conceive of round squares then we should

think that (CORS) and (COET) have the same truth conditions:


(CORS) I have conceived of a round square.


(COET) I have conceived of an elliptical triangle.


But it is not obvious that (CORS) and (COET) have the same truth conditions. Further, I have the

intuition that the truth of (CORS) require an utterer to perform an act different from the act required for

one to truthfully utter (COET). I think we have this intuition in spite of the fact that we know at the

outset that both round squares and elliptical triangles are impossible.


In logic, we have a model of this type of conceiving with the reduction ad absurdum. When one

performs a reduction, one withholds judgments about the assumption of the reduction until it has been

revealed that the assumption implies a contradiction. It is in this way that we conceive of

impossibilities. We grasp the concept or concepts and from there draw conclusions. Reductio ad










absurdum is, of course, not a perfect model. Reductio ad absurdum works with propositions but

conceiving-of manipulates concepts rather than propositions. But if we can make sense of an intuitive

notion of conceptual entailment, we see that the two are not far off from each other.


Of course, one could object that while we do perform this type of act, it is not a form of

conceiving. Instead, it should be called 'considering' or 'supposing'. My reply is that it is fine to call the

act whatever one wants to call it. However, as I will suggest in section 4.2, there is an intimate

connection between conceiving-of and conceiving-that which warrants putting both under the heading

of conceiving. And, as I have suggest throughout this study, we do perform both of these acts and use

forms of the word 'conceive' to refer to both acts. In section 4.3, I will suggest that the fact that we do

use 'conceive' to refer to both acts may have led to a confusion in contemporary philosophy of mind in a

matter of some importance.


In this section, I have considered the objection that there really is no distinction between

conceiving-of and conceiving-that. I have argued that we do perform something which looks a lot like

conceiving-of with the reduction ad absurdum. I also argued that we do conceive of impossible objects.

The evidence that we do so was that we do think that the contents of conceiving reports of different

types of impossible objects are different reports.


4.2 The Relation Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that


I have described conceiving-of thus far as an act that puts us in the position to understand the

application conditions for some concept, whether it is simple or complex. Because conceiving-of does

not require that one conclude that the concept is coherent, one may conceive of types of impossible

objects. But one cannot conceive that impossible objects exist.










Before I get to the discussion of conceiving-that and its relation to conceiving-of, I will discuss

what conceiving-of is, which has only been touched upon earlier. In the previous section, I suggested

that the reduction ad absurdum provides us with a model of conceiving-of.


If we examine what goes on in reduction we will get a better idea as to what conceiving-of

comes to. In a reduction we make an assumption in order to show that that assumption, either by itself

or along with other premises, entails a contradiction. So, in at least some cases, the assumption itself is

necessarily false and so impossible.23 And in some cases it takes quite a bit of work to reveal the

contradiction. That work which reveals the impossibility is analogous to conceiving-of. But even if we

do reveal that some premise is necessarily false we may draw entailments from it which are not

contradictions. Consider (RS):


(RS) Round(a) & Square(a)


Although (RS) is necessarily false we can draw inferences from (RS) which are not, such as (R) and (S):


(R) Round(a)


(S) Square(a)


So we can sincerely utter a sentence like "I have conceived of a round square and if there could be such

a thing it would be round." Conceiving-of is analogous to the mental act that first presents (RS) to us

and then gets us from (RS) to (R).


Of course, there are limits to the analogy between reduction ad absurdum and conceiving-of.

The aim of conceiving-of is not to draw a contradiction. Conceiving-of is an act we perform without



23There can, of course, be reduction within reduction. In some of those cases, there may be
assumptions made for purposes of reduction that are not impossible.










considering whether a contradiction is entailed. Conceiving-of is not therefore limited to types of

impossible objects, but rather impossible objects are used in the examples to make clearer the

differences between conceiving-of and conceiving-that. Second, reduction ad absurdum is merely a

model for conceiving-of. One must be careful not to confuse the model for the thing being modeled.


Conceiving-of is performed by first entertaining a concept and then drawing conclusions about

application conditions for that concept as with round square above.


There are two important questions that still need to be answered. First, what is conceiving-

that? Second, what is the relation between conceiving-of and conceiving-that? Both questions will be

answered together.


It seems uncontroversial that whatever conceiving-that p is will require one to grasp all of the

concepts in its content. And I have argued that we cannot conceive that p where p entails the existence

of an impossible object. To illustrate, we can sincerely and truthfully assert (CORS) but not (CTRS):


(CORS) I have conceived of a round square. Whatever is a round square must be round.


(CTRS) I have conceived that there be a round square that is round.


One difference between (CORS) and (CTRS) is that truthfully and sincerely uttering (CTRS) requires that

one consider the existence of round squares while (CORS) does not. So we can safely say that

conceiving that p (where p entails the existence of a) requires minimally that one consider a as existing.

The second thing to notice is that one can conceive-of without requiring the attribution of a property to

anything. But conceiving-that ordinarily requires the attribution of some property or properties to some

(type of) object or objects when we conceive ordinary contingent particulars.


That is because conceiving-of requires only a sufficient understanding of concepts and not a

further awareness of whether or not they could apply to any instances. We may even be aware that

64










nothing could exist to which the concept round square would apply and still succeed in conceiving of

round squares. But once one is aware that round squares cannot exist, he cannot truthfully and

sincerely utter something like (CTRS).


We should next consider an utterances like (CPE) and (CCRS):


(CPE) I have conceived that pigs exist (pigs to exist).


(CCRS) I cannot conceive that round squares exist (round squares to exist).


(CPE) is an assertion that one has performed some positive act which includes pigs existing. (CCRS)

reports either the failure to perform some positive act including round squares or, more likely, a

detection of some incoherence in the concept round square. At the very least, conceiving-that requires

that one not detect an incoherence either in the concepts the act of conceiving is about or in the

relations that the proposition designated by the that-clause puts those concepts in. Chalmers' prima

facie conceiving (discussed in section 2.2) is a type of conceiving-that which may be about impossible

objects. Even prima facie conceiving-that cannot be about objects that fall under concepts such that

grasping them puts one in the position to know they are incoherent. But one can conceive of concepts

and relations of concepts even if he knows them to be incoherent at the outset. Conceiving-of is an act

we perform when we consider hypothetical situations per impossible.


There is undoubtedly more to conceiving-that than can be explored in this study, and much of

that has been explored elsewhere.24 So I will at this point lay out the differences between conceiving-of

and conceiving-that and what the relation is between them. Conceiving-of amounts to first entertaining

a concept then drawing conclusions about at least some of the application conditions. Conceiving that p



24Much of this exploration has been published in the anthology Conceivability and Possibility
(eds. Gendler and Hawthorne).










requires that one already has figured out the application conditions for all the relevant concepts need to

evaluate p. So, conceiving-of is a precondition on conceiving-that. Conceiving that p (where p is about

some x) further requires that one not detect that there are any incoherent concepts in the content of

conceiving of x.


In this section, I have discussed what conceiving-of and conceiving-that are. Further, I have also

discussed the differences between these two types of conceiving and the relation between them.


Conceiving-of is a two stage process whereby one first entertains a concept and then draws

conclusions regarding that concept's application conditions. The figuring out of application conditions is

modeled by the reduction ad absurdum. Unlike reduction ad absurdum, the aim of conceiving-of is not to

draw a contradiction, but rather to draw out whatever inferences one can about the application of the

concept, coherent or not.


Conceiving-that p requires first that one conceive of a, where p is about a. So, conceiving of a is

a precondition on conceiving that p. Conceiving that p further requires that one not detect and any

incoherence in the concepts under which x falls. So, while conceiving-of is a precondition of conceiving-

that, conceiving-that further requires one to evaluate a proposition. If one does not detect that the

proposition is necessarily false then one has conceived that p, either ideally or in a prima facie manner.25

If one does detect that the proposition is necessarily false, then one does not conceive that p.









251t is important to note that one will not be excluded from conceiving on the grounds that he
has a greater capacity for rational reflection. Even an ideal conceiver can prima facie
conceive that p where p is not ideally conceivable. Such a situation would be one in which
the conceiver merely abstains from conceiving to the extent his ability allows.










4.3 The Implications of the Distinction for Zombies


Physicalism is a thesis in philosophy of mind about what types of things there are in the world.

According to physicalism, all things in our world, including minds, are wholly determined by the physical.

Physicalism does not hold that necessarily everything is physical or determined by the physical. It is

rather a supervenience thesis, the thesis that all the properties of things are supervenient on physical

properties. The idea is, roughly, that fixing the physical, everything else follows. The purpose of putting

physicalism in terms of a supervenience thesis is to guard against independent variation (Jackson, 1994).

That is, physicalism is stated in terms of a supervenience thesis to ensure that the thesis of physicalism

does not allow for mental states to change without a change in physical states. It follows that according

to physicalism there can be no change in mental states without a change in physical states. Frank

Jackson expresses the main thesis of physicalism in this way:


(III) Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our
world. (Jackson, 1994, p. 164)



A minimal physical duplicate is a duplicate only of the physical stuff of the world and nothing more. The

requirement that we first consider a minimal physical duplicate rather than just a physical duplicate

guards against us considering a physical duplicate of the world that includes ghosts or spirits or any

other non-physical things. It is obvious that if a physical duplicate of our world replete with ghosts and

spirit-stuff were a duplicate simpliciter of our world, this world would have to include non-physical

objects. (III) entails that our world is a minimal physical duplicate of itself. That is, everything in our

world is either a physical object or necessitated by the existence of those physical objects.


There is one contemporary line of argument which relies on the supposition that conceivability

entails possibility to refute (III). In a world which is a minimal physical duplicate of this world there










would also be creatures which are minimal physical duplicates of us. Some have argued that it is

conceivable for such creatures in such a world to lack mental states. These minimal physical duplicates

of us that lack mental states are called 'zombies'.


Zombies are also behavioral duplicates of us. They appear to walk. They seem to laugh and cry,

but are not amused by what we would think of as jokes and are not saddened by what we would call

'tragedies'. So, a zombie world would be behaviorally and physically just like ours.


Although he was not the first to hold that conceivability entails possibility (of some kind) David

Chalmers has argued that conceivability entails possibility (Chalmers, 2002). Chalmers is careful to

explain that it is only a specific type (or types) of conceivability that entails metaphysical possibility. But

all types of conceiving that Chalmers discusses are varieties of conceiving-that.


Jointly holding that zombies are conceivable (in the right way) and that (the right kind of)

conceivability entails possibility will commit one to the falsity of physicalism.26 Below, I will give a

simplified version of the argument:


1. Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our

world. (thesis of physicalism as in (III))


2. It is conceivable that there be a a minimal physical duplicate of our world in which there are

zombies.


3. It is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which lacks mental



26Chalmers argues that one is actually committed to either the falsity of physicalism or the truth
of panprotopsychism. However, it is unclear whether panprotopsychism should be
considered a type of physicalism. Regardless, it is not the view that philosophers generally
have in mind when they talk about physicalism.










states.


4. This world has mental states.


5. It is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate

simpliciter of our world. (3, 4)


6. If it is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a

duplicate simpliciter of our world then it is possible that there be a minimal physical duplicate of

our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (Thesis that conceivability entails

possibility)


7. It is possible that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate

simpliciter of our world. (5, 6)


8. There is some world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate

simpliciter of our world. (Restatement of 7 through the use of possible worlds semantics)


9. Physicalism is false. (1, 8)


One might worry that this talk of possible worlds takes them too seriously. I am only using

possible worlds here for heuristic purposes and remain neutral on the matter of whether or not they

exist. The argument above may also be put in non-possible worlds terms:


Let P express a proposition that exhausts the physical facts of the world and let M express a

proposition that exhausts the mental facts of the world. If physicalism is true, then P entails M.


1. It is conceivable that there be zombies, i.e. the P be true and M be false.


2. If it is conceivable that P be true and M be false then it is possible that P be true and M be false.










3. It is possible that P be true and M be false. (2,1)


4. If P entails M then it is not possible that P be true and M be false.


5. ~(P entails M) (4, 3)


6. Physicalism is false.


Even though the argument can be given without talk of possible worlds, I believe that the

heuristic of possible worlds is useful for this discussion. If we keep in mind that it is used only as a

heuristic, there should be no problem. It is enough that the argument can be made without the use of

the heuristic to show that one need not be committed to possible worlds in any substantive way to

argue against physicalism by way of the conceivability of zombies.


It is controversial whether zombies are conceivable. Physicalists often argue that the existence

of zombies is inconceivable and that it only seems conceivable. We do not have all of the relevant

physical information regarding what it would take for zombies to exist. One might prima facie conceive

some proposition P which is in fact ideally conceivable, but that would not provide strong enough

evidence for the claim that P is possible. So, while we may prima facie conceive that zombies exist, we

cannot conceive that they exist upon ideal rational reflection. And so, the argument against physicalism

fails.


I would like to suggest that there may be another type of confusion at work. If the type of

conceiving one is engaged in when he allegedly conceives that zombies exist is not propositional

(conceiving-that) then the argument against physicalism fails. The first version of the argument above

turns on premises 5 and 6. If the type of confusion I suggest were to occur then premise 5 would look

like 5':










5'. I can conceive of a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate

simpliciter of our world.


Premise 6 would remain unchanged:


6. If it is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not

a duplicate simpliciter of our world then it is possible that there be a minimal physical

duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world.


Whereas the statement in premise 5 was the antecedent of the conditional of premise 6, 5' is not the

antecedent of 6. So, then it does not follow that zombie-worlds are possible. Likewise, it does not then

follow that physicalism is false.


The question then is: what is the substantive difference between 5 and 5'? It is the difference

between conceiving-of and conceiving-that has been the main focus of this study. Conceiving-of is not

evaluative in the way that conceiving-that is. Conceiving-of consists of entertaining a concept (coherent

or not) and drawing conclusions as to what falls under the concept, as we do with conceptual analysis.

Conceiving-that requires that one not detect that the concepts are incoherent, while conceiving-of does

not. Because conceiving-of does not require this failure to detect incoherence, one can conceive of

impossible objects. Further, since propositions are not the objects of conceiving-of nothing one

conceives of can be either true or false, so conceiving-of cannot have metaphysical implications. So,

whether or not zombies are possible, they are conceivable in the sense that they may be conceived of.


To illustrate, one may conceive of fictions. And even if one does not hold that fictions are

impossible in virtue of being fictions, there are fictions which are impossible and yet we still do not fail

to conceive in the way that we conceive other fictions. One might write a story in which all of the

physical laws are explicitly stated. Also in this story is a naturally blond-haired woman named Callie










whose DNA sequence is also explicitly stated in the story. However, the DNA sequence along with the

physical laws entail that Callie be brown-haired. Even if we are aware of this problem, we do not have

any problem conceiving of Callie and her blond-hair. One might argue that what we do in such an

instance is really think of the story as having different physical laws or Callie's DNA being different. But

we need not do so. All we need do is ignore the impossibility as in a reduction ad absurdum before we

conclude that there is an impossibility.


I suggest that we conceive of zombies in the same way we might conceive of Callie. Further, I

want to suggest that the difference between the appearance that zombies are conceivable and zombies

in fact being conceivable is not merely a matter of the degree of rational reflection, but rather a

confusion between types of conceiving.


Consider the penrose triangle in figure 1. A picture of a penrose triangle represents surfaces

that go away from and come toward a viewer at the same time. A true penrose triangle is impossible,

but we can look at the picture and understand what it depicts. And we can look at the picture all at

once. But it is not until one considers the picture as representing a way that things could be that a

problem arises. When one looks at the picture merely as a picture there is no problem. By this I mean

that some impossible things may be represented with pictures and we do not have any trouble

understanding the picture as such. An inconsistent co-instantiation of properties may be represented.

And, so long as we do not look at the picture as something to be evaluated we do not have any problem.

Of course, these pictures are more interesting after evaluating them as pictures of impossible things.

But, no matter, we can look at them without evaluating them and understand what they depict.


I want to suggest that that is what goes on with zombie-conceivings. We may consider what is

in some sense a representation of a zombie world. And we even grasp all of the concepts and group

them together as one. And in this way we can conceive of zombie-worlds just as we can look at pictures










of staircases that face two directions at once. What is particularly insidious about this type of confusion

is that there are no more concepts or physical laws that one must grasp or know in order to detect the

incoherence.


I do not here want to argue that this is the type of confusion that is going on when people

allegedly conceive that there be zombies. I only want to make the more modest claim that this is a

possible confusion that should be explored.


Some confusions of this type are going to be harder to fall into than others. Few people will fall

into a confusion as to whether they can conceive there to be round squares. Almost no one will think

that he or she can. The fact that some forms of this type of confusion rarely occur, e.g. rarely will

anyone think he can conceive that a round square exists because of a confusion between conceiving-of

and conceiving-that, should not prejudice us toward thinking that this type of confusion does not occur

in other instances. When we conceive of round squares we do not tend to confuse that act with

conceiving there to be round squares. The reason we do not is that in order to conceive of round

squares we must grasp both the concepts round and square. And the concepts round and square are

such that grasping them immediately puts one in a position to know that the two concepts cannot both

apply to the same object simultaneously. But there are some concepts, unlike round square, which are

incoherent but whose incoherence is not evident simply in virtue of grasping the concept or concepts

involved.


Consider a concept like greatest prime number. One might grasp greatest prime number and

not detect the incoherence. We can imagine a competent speaker sincerely reporting that he has

conceived that there be a greatest prime number and that he grasps greatest prime number. Either the

speaker has failed to engage in enough rational reflection to conclude that there is no greatest prime

number or he has not engaged in that evaluative type of reflection. In other words, he has either prima










facie conceived there to be a greatest prime number or merely conceived of a greatest prime number.

Whichever is the case, it is important to notice that grasping greatest prime number does not by itself

put one in the position to detect the incoherence.


In this section, I have looked at what implications the conceiving-of/conceiving-that distinction

might have for the zombie-argument against physicalism. I argued that there could be a confusion

between conceiving-of and conceiving-that in the argument. If there is such a confusion then it would

be particularly hard to detect as one may merely conceive of zombies and possess all of the non-

inferential knowledge one would need to conceive that zombies exist. But like some fictions and

impossible drawings, we can conceive of zombies even if they are impossible.




4.4 Conclusion



In this chapter, I have discussed the significance of the distinction between conceiving-of and

conceiving-that. In section 4.1, I considered the objection that the distinction does not really exist. I

argued that we do perform an act that we call 'conceiving' that allows us to conceive impossible objects.

And conceiving-of is that act which allows us to conceive impossible objects.


In section 4.2, I discussed the relation between conceiving-of and conceiving-that. Conceiving-of

is a precondition of conceiving-that. I also further discussed the requirements on conceiving-that. In

order to conceive that p27 one must: (1) first conceive of all x's that p is about.; and (2) not detect any




27Again, we should keep in mind that one may prima facie conceive that p even if p is
contradictory. Hence the requirement is that we not detect an incoherence rather than
there being no incoherence or no detectable coherence, regardless of the amount and
quality of rational reflection.










conceptual incoherence in p. There is undoubtedly more to conceiving-that but the aim of this section

was to give some of the minimal requirements on conceiving-that.


In section 4.3, I looked at the zombie-argument against physicalism. I argued that one way a

physicalist might object to the argument is by pointing out that one who purportedly conceives there to

be a world with zombies really is conceiving of zombies. If that confusion is committed by one who

alleges to have conceived that zombie-worlds exist then the way in which zombies have been conceived

does not provide evidence that it is possible for zombies to exist. And thus, the argument fails to be

valid. I further suggested that the way one might conceive of zombies is the way we can conceive of

impossible fictions and impossible pictures. We perform these acts by entertaining the appropriate

concept, be it simple or complex, and drawing some conclusions which do not have metaphysical

implications.

























Figure 1. A Penrose Triangle










CHAPTER 5


CONCLUSION


In this study, I have examined the act of conceiving. The main conclusion of this study is that

'conceive of' denotes a substantively different cognitive act from 'conceive that'. This distinction is

useful in explaining confusions one might fall into regarding what is conceivable.


Before the main arguments for the distinction I motivated the study by suggesting that without

a better understanding of this act, arguments having premises about what we can conceive may prove

to be incorrect. There were two main reasons I suggested they may be incorrect. First, if 'conceive' is

used to report distinct acts from premise to premise, then arguments relying on conceivability claims

may be invalid. Second, if conceivability is the same concept as some other concept we thought to be

distinct, then some arguments relying on conceivability claims may be question-begging.


I later argued that acts reported by 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are distinct acts. A failure to

distinguish the two might result not only in problems with validity and question-begging but further

confusions as well.


One confusion one might fall into is believing that it is conceivable that impossible objects exist.

I argued that the confusion lies in thinking one has conceived there to be some impossible object.

However, what one has in fact done in such cases is conceive of some type of impossible object.


Another way one might be confused regards the level of generality about which one may

conceive. I argued that conceiving cannot be done at the level of particulars. All conceiving is


of general types of things. I argued that a confusion about the level of generality about which we can

conceive might lead one to mistakenly argue for phenomenalism.










I then considered the objection that conceiving-of is not conceiving at all. I concluded that this

objection is mistaken. One might call conceiving-of by some other name but it has an intimate relation

to conceiving-that which warrants the use of the term 'conceiving'.


When we conceive-of we entertain a concept, whether simple or complex, and figure out

application conditions for that concept. This type of act is modeled, albeit inexactly, by reduction ad

absurdum. In a reduction we perform the operations necessary to draw a contradiction from an

assumption. Conceiving-of is analogous to the figuring out part of reduction ad absurdum but is

disanalogous in that conceiving-of does not aim at drawing a contradiction.


When we conceive that p we must know at least some of the application conditions of the

concepts in p. And the mechanism by which we come to know these application conditions is

conceiving-of. So, conceiving-of is a precondition on conceiving-that.


With this distinction, we might be able to diagnose argumentative mistakes we did not earlier

believe to be mistakes. Or, we might have a different understanding of the mistakes we do think have

been made in arguments. I suggested that this distinction might be useful in diagnosing the mistake

made when one apparently conceives that zombies exist. Whether or not zombies are conceivable, it is

worth exploring whether the mistake I suggest is made with zombie arguments, as with other

arguments that rely on conceivability claims.










LIST OF REFERENCES


Berkeley, George

1998 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge edited by Jonathan Dancy (New York:
Oxford University Press).



Black, Max

1952 "The Identity of Indiscernibles" in Michael J. Loux (ed.), Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings
(New York: Routledge).


Chalmers, David

2002 "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?" in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.),
Conceivability and Possibility (New York: Oxford University Press).



Hume, David

1978 A Treatise of Human Nature edited by by L. A. Selby-Bigge (New York: Oxford University Press).



Jackson, Frank

2002 "Finding the Mind in the Natural World" in David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: classical
and contemporary readings (New York: Oxford University Press).



Kripke, Saul

1980 Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).



Perry, John

1979 "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous Vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 3-21.


Yablo, Stephen

2000 "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts," Pacific Philsophical Quarterly 81, pp.
98-122.












BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kevin Savage received his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Florida in December 2003.

Kevin is currently a graduate student in the philosophy department at the University of Florida

specializing in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.







































































81





PAGE 1

1 CONCEIVING OF AND CONCEIVING THAT By KEVIN SAVAGE A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

PAGE 2

2 2007 Kevin Savage

PAGE 3

3 For Sara

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Sara, without whose support I could never have stayed motivated. Thanks also go to Kirk Ludwig, whose advice and ability to reason were invaluable. I also thank Gene Witmer, without whom I might not be in philosophy, for his admirable ability and integrity. And lastly, thanks go to Mi chael Ju bien, who very graciously stepped into my committee at the 11th hour.

PAGE 5

5 Table of ContentsACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................................................... 4 LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... 6 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 9 2 MOTIVATION AN D IN ITI AL WORRIES ...................................................................................................... 13 2.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... ....... 13 2.1 Motivation ......................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2 Ini tial Wo rries for the Project ........................................................................................................... 18 2.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... .......... 23 3 THE REFUTATION OF THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CONCEIVING ............................................................ 26 3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... ....... 26 3.1 'Conceiving of' and 'Conceiving that' ................................................................................................ 28 3.2 Yablo and Conceiving of the Existence of the Impossible ............................................................... 39 3.3 Confusions That Could Lead to a Berkeleyan View ......................................................................... 47 3.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 56 4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT ........................... 58 4.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 58 4.1 An Objection to the Distinction Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that ................................ 59 4.2 The Relation Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that ............................................................. 62 4.3 The Implications of the Distinction for Zombies .............................................................................. 67 4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 74 5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 77 LIST OF RE FERENCES ............................................................................................................................... .... 79 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............................................................................................................................... 80

PAGE 6

6 LIST OF FIGURES 1 A penrose triangle .................................................................................................................................... 76

PAGE 7

7 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts CONCEIVING OF AND CONCEIVING THAT By Kevin Savage December 2007 Chair:Kirk Ludwig Major: Philosophy Philosophers use technical notions of conceiving to argue for a nu mber of thes es. However, very little has been done to illuminate what this act of conceiving consists in. So, we may fall into one of several traps when relying on what we can conceive in order to argue for some theory or other. For one, we may fail to provide a valid argumen t or we may have assumed our conclusion in one of our founding premises. In order to ensure we are not falling into one of these traps we should gain a fuller understanding of what conceiving is. Once we do that we see that many things that have been assumed about con ceiving are in fact not the case. In particular, philosophers have argued that our ability to conceive that particular things could have been the case shows us that minds are not physical. But this argument rests on the assumption that what we can conceive is always possible.

PAGE 8

8 But there is a type of conceiving, the performing of which does not allow us to draw conclusions about what is possible. That is because there is a type of conceiving which allows us to conceive impossible objects. And so, if we are not careful we may believe we are perform i n g an act of conceiving relevant to demonstrating the possibility of what we conceive but turn out to be wrong in fact. Thus, our arguments which rely on what we can conceive would fail in those cases.

PAGE 9

9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The fact that something is conceivable or inconceivable has been used as the basis for many philosophical arguments. For example, the conceivability of various scenarios has been used to argue for skeptical theses. The supposed inconceivability of an object being unconceived was used by Berkeley to argue for phenomenalism. Contemporarily, the conce ivability of so called philos ophical zombies has been used to argue against physicalism. The claim of the conceivability of any of the relevant situations relies on our having conceived those situations.So, there is some act we must perform, the performing of which allows us to hold that the si tuation is conceivable. Therefore, all of the afo rementioned arguments, as well as others, rely on our being able to perform this act of conceiving. But, if we do not understand what it is we are doing when we conceive, we may not be able to recognize when we have successfully conceived. I will argue in this study that there is a type of conceiving that has not been clearly recognized, but that we do perform, namely, the type of conceiving is normally denoted with reports using the 'conceive of' locution (and its various tenses and moods). There are two comple mentizers 'con ceive' ordinarily takes in assertions: 'of' and 'that'. It has traditionally been assumed that whether 'conceive' takes the complement 'of' or 'that' is inconsequential. Both 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' assertions report the same kind of cognitive operation, according to the tradition. Further, it has been held that both what is impossible is not

PAGE 10

10 conceivable and that we can conceive of particulars (e.g. God, people we know, etc.). In chapter 3, I will argue that all of these assumptions are false. First, I will argue that reports using 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are reports of substantively different cognitive operations. I will perform a series of comparisons betwe en 'conc eive of' and 'conceive that' sentences in order to show first that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are not intersubstitutable and thus not synonymous. I will use further comparisons between sentences of both sorts to demonstrate that there are some 'conceive of' sentences that cannot be paraphrased as 'conc eive that' sentences. This gives us strong reason to think that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' report different types of operations. The argument that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' report different operations is intertwined with my denial of the second assumption: that we cannot conceive what is impossible. Second, I will argue that we can conc eiv e of impossible objects, but that we cannot perform any cognitive acts reported with 'conceive that' sentences which are about impossible objects. This is because conceivingthat requires that we think of the objects we are conceiving as existent in some sense. For example, we can conc eive of round squares but we cannot conceive that round squares exist, that there are houses adorned with round squares, or that the president was born in a round square cupola. I will consider an objection not that my requirements for what we can conceive is too weak but that they are too strong. Th e objection supposes that we can conceive that impossible objects exist or conceive of them as existing. I will suggest that what may make it seem conceivable that impossible objects exist is a failure to distinguish between conceivingof and conceiving that. Third, I will argue that we cannot conc eive of particulars or conceive that particulars exist. Of course, particulars do exist. But the way we must think about particulars in acts of conceiving does not uniquely pick out any particulars. Conceiving requires us to leave open that particulars could be or could

PAGE 11

11 have been different than we believe they are or how they are in fact. Anything that we believe picks out or in fact picks out a particular uniquely could be other than how it is or how we believe it to be. In chapter 2, I will discuss preliminary considerations for this study. Section 2.1 will discuss the motivation for the project. In brief, if one either does not understand what conceiving is or does not recognize all of the different ways which we conceive, confusions may result. The specific forms these confusions can take will be looked at in 2.1. Section 2.2 will be an exploration of various prima facie problems for the project. In chapter 3, I will address the three assumptions of the third paragraph. In section 3.1, I argue that there is a substantive distinction between conceivingof and conceiving that. From the observation that 'conceive of' may take as its object an ordinary noun or noun phrase whereas 'conceive that' must take a sentence as its object, I argue that the sentential objects of 'conceive of' may be nouns or nouns phrases which have as their ersatz referents types of impossible objects. In section 3.2, I argue against the suggestion tha t we may conceive that some impossible objects exist (or that there be impossible objects). I suggest that the reason it seems that we can conceive that some impossible objects exist is that we have confused conceivingof for conceiving that. In section 3.3, I suggest a way of understand in g Berkeley's argument for phenomenalism which suggests that Berkeley's mistake might be based on a misunderstanding of the limits of what we can conceive. I argue that one could argue for phenomenalism as Berkeley did if he were to think that we can conceive particulars. Further, I sugg est that this is a mistake an d that wha t appears to be conceiving particulars is conceiving something general. I argue that any time we think we have conceived a particular we have made a mistake because we cannot conceive particulars. In chapter 4, I further delineate the difference between conceiving of and conceiving that while also showing how the two types of conceiving are related and explain why it is important to distinguish

PAGE 12

12 the two. In section 4.1, I consider the objection that all conceiving is conceiving that. I argue that conceiving of and conceiving that are substantively different and that there are common situations in which we conceive of and do not conceivethat. In section 4.2, I suggest that conceiving of is a precondi tion of conceivi ng that. And, in so doing, I attempt to further explain the differences between the two types of conceiving. In section 4.3, I suggest that a failure to recognize the distinction between conceiving of and conceiving that may lead one to the false belief that he has conceived tha t zombi es exist. This, in turn, may lead one to argue that physicalism is false based because it is conceivable that zombies exist (which is required for the zombie conceivability argument against physicalism) though in fact one has only conceived of zombies. I will close the study in chapter 5 with a brief conclusion in which I summarize the findings of the chapters 2 4.

PAGE 13

13 CHAPTER 2 2.0 Introduction In this chapter, I will discuss preliminary considerations for this study, laying out the motivations and addressing some possible problems at the outset. In section 2.1, I discuss more fully the motivation for this study and various problemsthat might arise without a more complete understanding of the act (o r acts ) of conceiving. Those problems are that a lessthan full understanding of conceiving may lead us to make arguments that are either not formally valid or are questionbegging. In section 2.2, I explore the prima facie problems that might be posed for this study. There are two prima facie problems relating to appa rent circularity: the paradox of analysis and what might be called the paradox of performance. There is also a third possible problem which is that one might have to perform an iterated act of conceiving in order to analyze conceive.1I conclude that none of these prima facie problems, whether serious or not, should adversely affect this study. 2.1 Motivation Let me being with looking at a contemporary example of an argument that relies importantly on conceiving to arrive at its conclusion. In Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? (Chalmers, 2002), David Chalmers has argued tha t (the right kind of) conceivability entails possibility. So, if Chalmers is right, if 1Words in italics will be used to denote concepts as in conceive conceiving etc.

PAGE 14

14 one conceives that there be zombies, then it is possible for there to be zombies. And from this possibility, one may conclude that physicalism is false. It is not necessary to go into detail about zombies and physicalism2 to see that the argument will fail if when we think we have conceived that there be zombies, we have failed to do so. The argument will also fail if when we think we have conceived that there be zombies we have conceived zombies in some other way. There is a ge neral con c ern that if one's understanding of conceiving is impoverished in some ways there are at least some arguments that rely on conceiving that one may not make. Suppose someone, Luke, understands that currency is the physical representation of money, that American dollars are the form of currency used in America and that Yen are the form of currency used in Japan Luke mig ht u nderstand what money is in some impoverished sense e.g., that it has physical representations called 'currency', and that the type of currency used is in some way tied to political entities. So, there might be some arguments that rely on graspin g money that Luke could properly make. But were we to know that Luke had this impoverished understanding of money, we would probably not take seriously any arguments Luke makes about, for example, the global economy, nor should we. Similarly, in some instances we should not take seriously arguments relying on conceivi ng made by people who have only an impoverished understanding of conceiving. So, it is important that we get clear about conceiving. If our understanding of conceiving is incomplete, vague, or muddled then we may not be able to make arguments relying on our ability to conceive. And, if our und erstanding is incomplete, vague, or muddled it is unlikely that we would be able to tell when it is that we are justified in making arguments that rely on conceiving. 2This will be done in section 4.3.

PAGE 15

15 To more clearly see the danger, we may examine the structure of the argument that philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible schematically3: 1. ( x) (Conceivable(x) Possible(x)) 2. Conceivable(a) Possible(a) (1) 3. Conceivable(a) 4. Possible(a) (2,3) The argument above is obviously formally valid, assuming univocality of terms. But of course an argument's conclusion may be false even if the argument is formally valid, if one or another premise is not true. The charge ag a inst arguments like Chalmers' that I wish to examine is not that the third premise is false.Normally, one would argue against Chalmers' argument by arguing that the existence of zombies is inconceivable.The worries I want to suggest are a bit different and not aimed only at Chalmers' argum e nt but any argument relying on acts of conceiving. Any argument which relies on some fact(s) about what we can conceive will be adversely affected by an incomplete understanding of the act of conceiving. The first worry is that one might be using different concepts from one step of the argument to the next. Simple misunder standings stemming from the use of homophones or alternate definitions of 3In these examples, 'conceivable' and 'possible' will be treated as predicates, for simplicity's sake. And for present purposes, 'x' and 'a' can take anything whatsoever for their values. These examples are only meant todemonstrate problems that can arise from arguments superficially of this form.

PAGE 16

16 the same word are examples of the type of mistake that might be made. This is the type of mistake that is highlighted by puns.4 Sometimes we make mistakes that are easily discoverable. Suppose that one were to overhear a conversation in which one man, explaining to another why his wife could not make it to the party, says Mary is a little hoarse. A man overhearing the conversation comments to the man with the ill spouse I have an Appaloosa myself. Funny or not, th ese types of mistakes do get made even in situations in which we can give somewhat clear analyses of the concepts in question. We can easily identify the mistake in the example just given. For one, 'horse' and 'hoarse' are spelled differently, so anyone reading an account of th e scenario just describe d, even someone who does not know the difference in meaning between the two, will immediately be predisposed to believe that they 'horse' and 'hoarse' mean different things. And, anyone who does understand what each term means should not have any trouble noticing the differe nce betw een 'horse' and 'hoarse' as the two are so different in meaning. Even if one were to misspell one of the terms in an account above, the difference would still be easily spotted because the contexts of utterance of each term would cue a reader to th e mistak e. But differ ences between what terms mean need not be so obvious. Sometimes differences may go unnoticed. Consider 'unintended' and 'accidental'. Although there is a difference between what the two terms mean, both terms may be used in almost all of the same contexts and they are often used interchangea b ly. If instead of with two terms, what is meant by 'unintended' and 'accidental' were expressed with a single term, it would be incredibly difficult to notice that there were two different concepts at work. And if 'conceive' is a polysemous term which expresses multiple distinct, albeit inter related 4While one does not mistakenly make a pun (in fact, one would not be making a pun if the act in question were unintentional), one plays at making a mistake with a pun.

PAGE 17

17 concepts, then different uses would be particularly difficult to notice. If such a conflation is going on in the argument that it is possible for philosophical zombies to exist, then the argument fails as it is not formally valid.Instead of conforming to the form presented on page three, it wo uld in stead be of th is form: 1. ( x)(Conceivable 1 (x) Possible(x)) 2. Conceivable 1 (a) Possible(a) (1) 3. Conceivable 2 (a) 4. Possible(a) (2,3) The problem then is that there is no valid rule of inference that will allow one to derive the conclusion, 4, from 2 and 3, i.e., the ar gument is no t formally valid. There is a further problem that we might encounter with an argument the success of which depends on the use of an unanalyzed term. We may be in danger of begging the question if, unknown to us, we have smuggled our conclusion into our premises, that is, if one of our premises is in effect the conclusion worded differently. Consider, for example, the terms 'impossible' and 'inconceivable'. Sometimes, when we say that something is inconceivable we mean it is virtually impossible or impossible in the sense of being ruled out by what we know. If at least some senses of 'impossible' and 'inconceivabl e' are synonymous th en it stands to reason that some senses of 'possible' and 'conceivable' are synonymous.If one were to use 'possible' and 'conceivable' in the same sense in an argument like Chalmers' then the argument would be of the following form: 1. ( x)(Possible(x) Possible(x))

PAGE 18

18 2. Possible(a) Possible(a) (1) 3. Possible(a) 4. Possible(a) (2,3) The argument is valid, but questionbegging (and thus not informative), for it assumes the conclusion as a premise. In this section I have tried to motivate the project by explaining several ways in which one may be confused about wha t conceiving is an d why this is important. I have shown that if we are confused in the ways described above, then arguments we take to be valid may not be. A theory of conceiving will help guard against these types of confusions; what we do not know about conceiving can hurt us. 2. 2 Initial Worries for the Project In this section I w ill look at some prima facie proble ms for an examination of conceiving that stem from the nature of conceiving and philosophical methodology. This study will in some instances examine conceiving by means of thought experiments. These thought experiments will sometimes have conceiving and c o nceivability as the object(s) of the thought experiments. They will be used to tell us something about the limits of conceiving and about what conceiving is. There is at least a prima facie worry that might arise about this methodology. I will be examining conceiving and related concepts by way of conceiving. So, there is at least a hint of circularity looming in the wings for my proposed analysis. In section 2.1, I argued that there could be problems with particular arguments which rely on acts of conceiving without a fuller understanding of conceiving I will have to perform the th ought experi ments meant to pro vide a fuller understanding of conceiving without that fuller understanding I

PAGE 19

19 used to motivate the project. So, I will in essence be committing the philosophical sin which the pursuit of this project was to enable us to avoid. But it is not my contention that we have absolutely no starting point. We can perform the act of conceiving without an analysis. But without the an a l ysis we may not always have the tools to determine when it is we have conceived in the way that is relevant to what our aim is. I contend that we perform a type of conceiving that has not yet been discussed in the literature. And, although we do perform this ac t we have not yet examined it so we do not recognize it. If we could not perform any specific mental acts without analyses, we would never have any acts subject to analysis. So, this worry is really a red herring, but I think it important to get it on the tabl e nonetheless. The second worry relates in a general way to the first although more serious. Part of what will be done in this study is both a conceptual and linguistic analysis. But analyses are subject to the paradox of analysis.Below are the definitions of 'conceive' and its forms from the Ox f ord English Dictionary5: Word Part of Speech Definition conceivable adjective that can be conceived of or thought of; imaginable, supposable conceived adjective admitted into, or originated in, the mind; imagined, thought of, etc. conceivement noun conception conceiver noun one who conceives conceiving noun conception 5Definitions are the first relevant definitions for each term in the OED.

PAGE 20

20 conception noun The action or faculty of conceiving in the mind, or of forming an idea or notion of anything; apprehension, imagination. conceive verb to take into, form in, the mind conceiving verb forming in the mind If we look at the list above, 'conceivable' and 'conceiver' both e xplicitly have 'co nceive in their definitions. So on their own, those definitions of 'conceivable' and 'conceiver' will not be helpful in understanding the definition of 'conceive' because we would want a definition to provide us with an explication of 'conceive' that does not have 'conceive' in the definition, for that would be an obviously circular defini tion. If we lo ok at the definition of 'conceive' it is not explicitly circular. While the circularity resulting from the definition of 'conceive' is not precisely the same as the one resulting from particular definitions of 'conceivable' and 'conceiver', it is problematic. What we want to un derstand in trying to un derstand what the act of conceiving is, is not something only linguistic. My contention is only that there is a problem with understanding the term 'conceive' but that there is a problem with understanding what it is to take something into the mind in the relevant way and the ways that we conc eive or tak e something into the mind.6 If 'to take into...the mind' is strictly synonymous with 'conceive', then understanding either term or phrase would require one to grasp precisely the same concept(s). So, in order to grasp conceive one would have to first grasp conceive. This appears to be viciously circular. If in order to understand A one 6Additionally, 'to take into the mind' may be a phrase that describes some of what it is to conceive, but which does not provide necessary or sufficient conditions on conceiving and which is vague. One might describe perceiving as a kind of 'taking into the mind' but it is wrong to think that perceiving is conceiving (alth ough Berkeley did not think so).

PAGE 21

21 must first understand A,then it looks like we might be unable to perform an analysis of A. This would be a problem for any conceptual analysis. However, it is only a problem for analysis if we hold that the analysans must provide us with the ability to grasp a new concept. Th at is not what I hold. Analysis gives us an explanation of a concept we already grasp. We do not gain the ability to grasp specific concepts through analysis. In order to be able to analyze a concept, C, we must be already possess the concept or we would not be able to determine when to appl y C. If one argues to the contrary, he might as well argue that because we come to know something if we correctly analyze knowledge the analysis of knowledge would thereby be circular. Not at all: it simply means the analysis fits the state we are in wit h res pect to it. We cannot require that in order for one to analyze knowledge, he must not prejudice himself toward some specific analysis of knowledge in virtue of what he already thinks knowledge is. Analysis done correctly should provide us with an explicit explanation of what we already grasp. If we perform some act that provides us with something we did not understand going in then either an analysis has not been performed or something has been performed in addition to an analysis. When we perform analysis of some concept, C we consider candidates for application conditions for C and j udge which ones ar e appli cation conditions for C. At least one of the ways we do this is by conceiving of some object or situation, O, and then deciding whether C applies to O. If we decide that C does apply to O, then we move on to some other object or situation in our considerations until we find one to w hich C does not app l y. If C does not apply to O then we hypothesize which characteristic(s) of O would need to be different for C to apply to O.

PAGE 22

22 If we were to analyze conceive in this way, then we would conceive of some act and ask whether that conceived of act is conceiving. If successful, then we would be conceiving of an act of conceiving. Conceiving requires a conceiver. So, a successful analysis of conceive using this methodology would require us to conceive that someone conceive; we mu st rely on an act of itera ted conceiving. That might then require us to first personally experience some mind other than our own. But even hypothetically we can only experience our own mind. So, we might be closed off from this method of analysis. Perhaps we can get around th is worry if we merely acknowledge that the conceiver within the iterated act of conceiving is the same as the conceiver in the first order act of conceiving. So, in order for one to evaluate what it takes to conceive that P, he must conceive tha t he conceives that P. But what it is that I conceive when I conceive that I conceive that P other than conceiving that P is puzzling. Regardless, whether or not I can perform iterated conceivings, iterated conceivings would not tell us anything more about what conceivings are than first order acts of conceiving. But then we do not have the same method of conceptual analysis that we normally do because we would not be conceiving anything that is a candidate for something to which conceiving applies. Rather, the mental act itself would be a candidate for conceiving. I raise this w o rry not because it is particularly problematic but rather to highlight a difference in performing a conceptual analysis of conceive from performing an analysis of some other types of concepts. It is performed by looking at actual (and not hypothetical) acts of conceiving. They may be framed as hypotheti c al acts, particularly when we consider what people are doing when they make specific conceiving reports, but it is our own mental acts that we use as evidence.

PAGE 23

23 2.3 Conclusion In this chapter, I discussed the motivations for this study as well as some prima facie worries that one might have about it. Philosophers have frequently made arguments that rely on conceivability claims. But if we are unclear about what conceiving is or about distinctions between types of conceiving, var i ous problems can arise. Further clarification about conceiving would help us to avoid those pitfalls. But there may be pitfalls in attempting to clarifying what conceiving is. So before the discussion begins it is important to address the worries that might arise at the outset. In section 2.1, I considered two probl e m s that might arise with arguments relying on the application of an unanalyzed concept. First, we might think that there is only one concept we are applying, when in fact we are applying two closely related concepts by way of the same term. If that is the case then argume nts r elying on conceivability cla ims may be invalid if different concepts are used in each claim. Second, if conceivability is also expressed by some other term in the argument that looks as if it expresses something distinct, then some arguments may be in danger of begging the question. For example, Chalmers argues that conceivability entails possibility (and from ther e argues that philosophical zombies are possible), but if conceivability is nothing overandabove possibility then his argument begs the question as the conclusion is not only contained in, but the same in content as one of the premises. In section 2. 2, I discussed three pri m a facie worries for this study. The first and third worries stem from the methodology of conceptual analysis when applied to conceive, conceivable, etc. The second worry is a worry about conceptual analysis in general. The first worry is that if one does not fully understand what conc e iving is, he cannot perform the acts of conceiving necessary for analyzing what conceiving is. However, it was never my contention that

PAGE 24

24 we cannot perform the act of conceiving without analysis.My claim was, less ambitiously, that we need to have a fuller understanding of conceiving in order to be sure that our arguments employing conceiving do not fail to be formally valid or beg the question. So the first worry is not gen uinely a problem for this study The second w orry stems from what is known as the 'paradox of analysis'. We cannot perform any conceptual analysis without already grasping the concept(s) in question. So, analysis cannot bring us any understanding we did not already possess. But this is only a problem if we perform analysis with the aim of ac quiring new concepts or gaining some sort of new understanding. I do not purport to be doing any such thing. Analysis, while not providing us with any new understanding, reveals what state it is we are in with respect to some concept. On e of my aims in chapter three will be to argue that there is a species of conceiving that, while we understand what it is, has not been distinguished from other types of conceiving or has been thought of as something else entirely. Consequently, this study should not be affected by the par a dox of analysis. The third worry is that the method of conceptual analysis might fail in the instance of conceive because we cannot make sense of iterated conceivings. If we were to conceptually analyze book we might conceive of some book candidate and consider whether the concept book applies to the book candida te. If we use the same method when we analyze conceiving, we would conceive of some conceiving candidate then consider whether conceiving applies to it. In order to make sense of this, we must be the conceiver in this iterated act. But whatever we might learn from an iterated act of conceiving ca n be learne d just as well from a first order act. For we can learn just as much through investigation of what we conceive or fail to conceive as we do through considering what hypothetical objects qualify as books

PAGE 25

25 With the motivations and preliminary concerns taken care of, I will in chapter three move onto the argument for the distinction between conceiving of and conceiving that. On the basis of this distinction, I will also be arguing for two other theses. First, I will argue that we can conceive of impossible th ings bu t not that those things exist. Second, I will argue that we cannot conceive about particulars per se. Rather, we can only conceive particulars insofar as they fall under some type.

PAGE 26

26 CHAPTER 3 THE REFUTATION OF THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CONCEIVING 3.0 Introduction The goal of this chapter is to establish that there are two importantly different types of conceiving which are reported using the locutions 'conceiving that' and 'conceiving of' respectively, the latter of which is not usually distinguished from the former, and to show that conceiving of in the relevant sense is never of particulars bu t only types of things, and that the types of things we can conceive involve inter alia impossible objects. I show in developing this account how this distinction can be used to diagnose some problematic objections to it and some other well known philosophical arguments. The method of this chapte r is to e xamine the sorts of mistakes we make when we conceive or attempt to conceive as a way of articulating what is involved in it. I approach this by examining the types of mistakes people make when they report conceiving something. I consider whether the mistakes people ma ke in these reports are about the content of the act of conceiving or about the act in which they were engaged. Looking at mistakes in conceiving in this way will illuminate both the range of what is conceivable, what conceiving is more generally, and whether there are types of conc e iving heretofore unconsidered. The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.1, I look at the conceive that construction and consider whether it is the construction we should be using exclusively. I argue it is not and in particular that the conceive of construction expresses a s ubstantively different me ntal act from the mental act one reports with the

PAGE 27

27 conceive that construction, on at least some uses. Consideration of the difference between the acts reported using each construction shows that we can conceive of types of impossible objects, which is not to say that one can conceive of the existence of impossible objects (e.g., one cannot conceive that round square s exist). In section 3. 2, I consider an objection that might be raised against the view that we can conceive of impossible entities but not their existence. This objection, raised by Stephen Yablo, though not directed at the view developed in this study, is that we can conceive both of the existence of God and the non existence of Go d. If, as it has been argued, either the existence or non existence of God is impossible, it follows that we can conceive impossible things to exist. I conclude that Yablos argument does not constitute an objection to my view. I argue rather that one ca n ex plain away the apparent conceiving of the existence of impossibilities with the conceive of/conceive that distinction I am drawing. In section 3.3, I propose a reading of Berkeleys argument for phenomenalism. It is, I think, a plausible reading, but I am not so much concerned with the historical interpr etation of Berkeley (or whether phenomenalism is true) as with using the argument as a foil for the discussion of the limits on what can be the objects of conceivings of. I will argue that there are limits to what one can stipulate in conceiving and that we cannot con ceive of contin gent particulars as opposed to types. If we can conceive of particulars we must be able to think about them in some way that uniquely picks them out as the particulars they are. The starting point for a criterion of identity for ordinary objects is Leibnizs Law. I will consider whether th e cri teria of Leibnizs Law provide us with the tools to pick out particulars in our acts of conceiving. I will conclude that they do not and that in the absence of some way to think about particulars in our acts of conceiving we should conclude that we cannot pe rform acts of conceiving about particulars.

PAGE 28

28 3.1 'Conceiving of' and 'Conceiving that' Philosophers tend to be concerned only with the verb 'conceive' when it takes a sentential complement, either a that clause (conceiving that there is extraterrestrial life), a nominalized sentential complement (conceiving there being extraterrestrial life), or an infinitive sentential complement (conceiving there to be extraterrestrial life). They are concerned with the 'conceive that' construction in part be cause there is a tendenc y in philosophy of mind to be concerned with propositional attitudes and in part because of the interest in whether a proposition's conceivability entails its possibility. I will not in this section directly address whether the content of our conceivings must be propositional. Inst e ad, I will consider whether the 'conceives that' construction is the only one that should be considered. It is my view that we should also examine the 'conceive of' construction. The reason that we should look at the 'conceive of' construction is that reports using the 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' construc tions differ not only in the complements 'conceive' takes in those reports but also in that they are reports of substantively different types of acts. If the two constructions are intersubstitutable salva veritate in all reports then 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are likely synonymous and thus reports using the 'con c eive of' construction would be reports of the same type of act as that expressed in 'conceive that' constructions; the differences would be merely verbal and not substantive. But, if they are not intersubstitutable salva veritate then there is prima facie reason to think that reports with the 'conceive of' or 'con c eive that' construction are reports of different types of acts. However, even if the two constructions are not intersubstitutable salva veritate, the differences between the two constructions may still be merely verbal if one may say everything with the 'conceive

PAGE 29

29 of' construction as one can say with the 'conceive that' construction (and vice versa). But if it can be shown that there are some things that can be said with reports using one construction and not the other, then the two constructions are not used in all cases to report the same acts. Before I ge t to the argum e nt for the distinction between the two types of conceiving, it is important that we first settle on a general form of report that does not prejudice our view of conceiving. If we first look at the present tense uses of 'conceive that' as in (a), it is obvious that there is s o mething unnatural about them: (a) I conceive that George is a minister. (a) reads as if it were a performative like (b): (b) I hereby state that George is a minister. Whatever conceiving is, it is not a speech act, so it cannot be that (a) is a perfor mative, at lea st not in the normal way. Perhaps (a) is a report of some pseudo auditory experience of I conceive that George is a minister the having of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of (a). But of course one could have a p seudo auditory experience of I conceive that George is a minister without knowing what 'minister' means. So it cannot be sufficient for the truth of (a) that one have a pseudo auditory experience of (a). And while there may be something like a pseudo auditory experience one normally experie nces before an utterance of (a ), one need no t have any, and even if one did it does not seem to have any bearing on the truth or falsity of (a). Since there is this tendency is to read (a) in a way that cannot be the correct way to understa nd (a), we should use some ot her form of the 'conceive that' (and 'conceive of') construction for this discussion.

PAGE 30

30 There is a strong pull to add the auxiliary 'can' to 'conceive that' as in (c): (c) I can conceive that George is a minister. (c) sounds natural and may convey what we normally want to convey with (a) but there is still an important semantic difference between 'can conc eive that and 'conceive that' One may truthfully and sincerely assert that he can conceive that p without having conceived that p. Normally, when we make an assertion that we can conceive that p, it is assumed that the evidence one has that he can conceive that p is that he has conc ei ved that p. Although it may be difficult to imagine what evidence we could have for our being able to conceive that p without conceiving that p, it is not semantically required that one conceive in order to truthfully and sincerely make an assertion that one can conceive that p. If such a requirement were to be made then (d) should not make sense to us: (d) John can conceive that George is a minister but he hasn't yet conceived that George is a minister. When we put the assertion in the third person it is easier to separate th e act of conceiving from the ability to con c eive. Our evidence for thinking (d) true is different from the reason we would have for thinking (c) true. While we would normally have as our justification for believing (c) the fact that we had performed some act of conceiving, our justification for believing (d) would be som e beli ef we have about John's abilities. So the 'can conceive' locution does not merely convey something about performing an act but rather something about the ability to perform such an act, whether or not one has in fact performed the act. So, I will not in this study use the 'c an con c eive' locution. Even if it is normally used to report the performance of an act, we should use some other locution to keep the other (semantically correct) use of 'can conceive' from running interference. I will instead use the auxiliary verb 'have' and pu t th e reports in past tense, as in (e):

PAGE 31

31 (e) I have conceived that George is a minister. (e) is true or false solely in virtue of whether or not one has performed the mental act of conceiving that George is a minister. Now I turn to the difference between those sentences that take the complementizers 'that' and 'of' after 'have conc eived' First, I will look at whether 'have conceived of' and 'have conceived that' are intersubstitutable salva veritate. (e) I have conceived that George is a minister. (f) I have conceived of George is a minister. Obviously, 'conceived of' and 'conceived that' are not intersubstitutable, as evidenced by (e) and (f). While (e ) is truth evaluable, (f) is not a grammatical sentence, and so not truth evaluable. It follows that the two phrases are not synonymous. If there are things that can be said with sentences using the 'conceive of' construction that cannot be said with any sentences usi ng the 'conceive tha t' construction then there is further reason to think that there is a substantive difference in the acts reported by each construction. A mere failure of intersubstitution will not show that there are two substantively different mental acts reported with each locution. So I will attempt to demo nstrate that the way in which 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' fail to be intersubstitutable cannot be bridged by changing other terms in the sentences. First, we should look at whether what is said with (e) can be said with any sentence using 'conceive of'. As seen with (f), 'conceive of' ca nnot be substituted for 'conceive that' in (e). But there

PAGE 32

32 might be some other way to say what is said with (e) with another sentence using the 'conceive of' construction. (g) I have conceived of George being a minister. On a natural reading, (e) seems to be about the utterer having some evidence that George is a minister and also that the utterer cannot rule it out that Geo rge is a minister. On the other hand, (g) is not obviously about some attitude toward George being a minister. In order to make clearer the difference between (e) and (g), we can perform a test. If what is conveyed with (e) is that it is e p istemically open that George is a minister, then it should be contradictory to assert both that one has conceived that George is a minister and that one knows that George is not a minister. So we can test (e) and (g) with (e') and (g'), respectively: (e') I have co nceived that Geo rge is a minister but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving)7 that he isn't (and wasn't) a minister. (g') I have conceived of George being a minister but I am certain (and and was certain at the time of conceiving) that he isn't (and wasn't) a minister. It is clear that (g') is not contradictory, while (e') only seems non contradictory if one forces an unnatural reading. One migh t attempt to alter (e) in some other way than in (e') in order to get the result that what is expressed by (e) is also expressible with some sentence using the 'conceive that' construction: 7The parenthetical clause here is included to guard against a reading to the effect that the knowledge that George isn't a minister came after conceiving that George is a minister. On that reading, the test would be invalid.

PAGE 33

33 (h) I have conceived that George be a minister. If we perform the test with (h) that we did with (e) then we get: (h') I have conceived that George be a minister but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that he isn't. (h') is not con tradictory so (h) does not convey that it is episte mical ly open that George is a minister. Rather, (h) seems to be about one's consideration of a hypothetical situation. Further, the utterer of (h) is reporting that he entertained a hypothetical situation in which George was a minister. Whether or not the act rep o rted by (h) is precisely, or only, the consideration of a hypothetical situation is not at issue. The important point here is that (e) and (h) are not reports of the same act. Also, when (h) is compared to (g), it is difficult to see a difference in acts reported by the two sentences. It looks like (g) and (h) repor t the same act. If all 'conceive of' sentences can be used interchangeably with some 'conceive that' sentence as with (g) and (h) then there may not be any substantive difference in the acts reported with sentences using each of the phrases. But so far what has be en suggested by the examples is that what is expressed with all 'conceive of' statements can also be expressed with some 'conceive that' statement'. I want to suggest that there is some act reported by at least some 'conceive of' statements that is substan t ively different from acts reported by 'conceive that' statements. It is no matter to this study that it may not be that there are acts reported with 'conceive that' statements that may not be reportable by any 'conceive of' statement. If that is true, then it would be consistent with th e posi tion that ac ts reported with 'conceive of' are merely a subset of the set of acts reported by 'conceive that'. That would not give evidence that there are two substantively different acts, but merely some that cannot be reported with one of the locutions for what might be merely pra g matic reasons.

PAGE 34

34 What is needed to show that there is a different act reported with 'conceive of' is a demonstration that there are words or phrases that come after the complementizer 'of' that cannot be paraphrased into a 'conceive that' construction. The content of (g) is also expressible as (h). But if we look at (g) th e of clause attributes a property to a particular. But the of clause need not be of that form. If we look at (i),(j), and (k) below, we find that replacing 'of' with 'that' is problematic: (i) I have conceived of George. (j) I have conceived of ministers. (k ) I have conceived of being a minister.8 Clearly, I have conceived that George/ I have conceived that ministers/ I have conceived that being a minister are ungrammatical. One might suggest that (i), (j), and (k) implicitly include that the referent(s) of the ordinary nouns and noun phrases after 'of' exist. So perhaps the content of (i), (j), and (k) may also be expressed by (i'), (j'), and (k'): (i') I have conceived that George exists. (j') I have conceived that ministers exist. (k') I have conceived that being a minister exists. Looking back at (e), it is apparent that when the phrase after 'that' is in the present tense 'conc eive tha t' statements like the three above are about what is epistemically open. But (i), (j), and (k) do not necessarily convey that the existence of anything is epistemically open, even if the utterer of (i), 8There is a reading of (k) which reads the same as I have conceived of my being a minister which would be expressible also with the 'conceive that' locution. I am here assuming that there is a literal reading of (k) that isnot elliptical for I have conceived of my being a minister. It is that reading which is important for the example.

PAGE 35

35 for example, believes that it is epistemically open that George exists.Consider the difference between (l) and (m): (l) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes. (m) I have conceived that Sherlock Holmes exists. One need not think that it is epistemically open that Sherlock Holmes exists in order to sincerely and truthf ully utter (l) but the belief that it is epistemically open that Sherlock Holmes exists would be required for one to sincerely and truthfully utter (m) as shown by (n) and (o): (n) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceivi ng) that he does not exist. (o ) I have conceived that Sherlock Holmes exists but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that he does not exist. It is evident that (n) is consistent while (o) is contradictory. Perhaps if the that clause in (o ) is put in the subjunctive mood then the problem can be remedied: (o') I have conceived Sherlock Holmes to exist/that Sherlock Holmes be existent but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that he does not exist. There are theoretical reasons to be wary of (o'). First, (o ') treats existence as a property. But existence is not normally treated as a property. Second, even if we table concerns about treating existence as a property, there is a further problem presented for 'conceive that' sentences which are about the existence of fictional characters or types. Some philo sophers hold that fi ctional characters are impossible. Even so, those philosophers can sincerely utter (l). If we look at (p) there does not seem to

PAGE 36

36 be any obvious contradiction and it does not look like people who utter (p) must be irrational in uttering (p) even if they hold that fictional characters are impossible beings: (p) I have conceived of Sherlock Holmes but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that it is im po ssible for Holmes to exist. But if we look at (q), there is some significant tension: (q) I have conceived Sherlock Holmes to exist/that Sherlock Holmes be existent but I am certain (and was certain at the time of conceiving) that it is impossible for Holmes to exist. In order to derive a cont r adiction from (q) one would have to hold that conceivability entails possibility. I do not here want to presume that conceivability entails possibility. But even if one does not hold that all fictional characters are impossible there are reasons to think that at least some fictional characters are impossible. An obvious exampl e would be a round square shaped character. Even if we cannot make sense of a round square shaped character, there are other types of fictional characters and creatures we can make sense of that are nonetheless impossible for reasons other than being fictional. In Naming an d Necessity Saul Kripke gave an argument that a unicorn is a type of fictional creature that is impossible for reasons other than just its being fictional.9 Tiger is a species of animal. And unicorn is supposed to be a species in the same way that tiger is. If we found some creature that looked superficially like a tiger but had different organs inside or perhaps different DNA, then such a creature would not be a tiger. The same woul d go for unicorns. But the difference between tigers and unicorns is that while we have some non superficial ways of identifying members of the species, tiger we do not have any non superficial ways of picking out 9Kripke, pp 156 158. Kripke discusses both the metaphysical and epistemological impossibility of unicorns. I have here abridged and combined the metaphysical and epistemological arguments into one.

PAGE 37

37 unicorns. So, were we to come across two creatures resembling horses with horns, each one with vastly different DNA and internal organs, we would have no way of deciding which was the unicorn and which was not. And, the reason we would not be able to tell which is in fac t the uni corn is that neither is. We should consider two claims that might be made about the conceivability of unicorns: (r) I have conceived of unicorns. (s) I have conceived that unicorns exist/ be existent. The preceding digression is important to the discussion because it is not merely that the existence of unicorns is i m possible that should differentiate (r) from (s) but also why the existence of unicorns is (at least according to Kripke) impossible that should help us distinguish the two. The reason that unicorns are allegedly impossible creatures is that there is no description of unicorns that would single them out as members of some species. And, since th ey do not exist, we cannot fix the term 'unicorn' to any particular creatures and those things relevantly like them.So, any attempt to conceive that unicorns exist would have to fail because there would be nothing to distinguish our conc eiving that unicorns exist from our conceiving that something superficially indiscernible from unicorns exists. But then can we conceive of unicorns? I believe that we can. Just think about Kripke's argument that the existence of unicorns is impossible. In order to argue against their existence he must be able to perform some mental act that at le ast resembles conceiving. There must be something towards which his thoughts are directed. And that object is, at least in some sense, the fictional species unicorn. In what way one is able to conceive of unicorns will be addressed later in the chapter. For now, it will be enough that we can in some way conceive of impossible creatures so long as the content

PAGE 38

38 of those conceivings does not entail the existence of the creatures in question, factually or counterfactually. Of course, there is no reason to think that we are able to conceive of impossible creatures or characters and not impossible objects. If we can conceive of unicorns we should also be able to conc eive of round squares. We cannot conceive that round squares exist or conceive of the existence of round squares. But why could we not conceive of round squares simpliciter? It certainly looks like we can in some sense. Again, look at the linguistic evidence. Although we do hold that ro und squares are impossible we also hold th at if they did exist they would be round and square. So, they must in some way be the objects of our thoughts about them. Undoubtedly, the concept round square exists. Conceiving of round squares requires only that one gain an understanding as to what would be required for some object to, per impossible, fall under both r o und and square In this section I have attempted to show that the acts reported by certain 'conceive of' sentences differ substantively from the acts reported by 'conceive that' sentences. First, I demonstrated that 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are not int ersubstitutable. Paraphrasing that clauses in present declarative tense and mood into present subjunctive will allow 'conceive that' assertions to report many of the same particular acts that are reported by 'conceive of' assertions.But no amount of paraphrasing will make 'conceive that' assertions report what is reported with a 'conc eive of' assertion when the direct object of the complement is a noun or noun phrase, with the paradigm examples being those in which the noun or noun phrase denotes an impossible object.

PAGE 39

393.2 Yablo and Conceiving of the Existence of the Impossible Can we conceive the existence of only what is possible? A complete answer to this question would be beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, most accept that there is at least some connection between conceivability and possibility. Conceiving seems to give us some epistemic access to possibility.10 However, it seems clear is that there are at least some things we do not think can be conceived because they are conceptually impossible. The types of things we exclude are things like the existence of impossible objects and situations which we know are logically impossible. We do not think that anyone can conc eive of th e existence of round squares or dogs that are not mammals. And we think it's inconceivable for a stone to be bigger than itself. But what about people who do think they can conceive of the existence of round squares and stones larger than themselves? That is, how is it that we un derstand what is going on with those people? We have four options: 1. They are genuinely conceiving of some impossibility and we are mistaken that such things cannot be conceived of. 2. Those things we thought were impossible are not impossible. 3. They are not conceiving an ything at all. 4. They are conceiving of something but are mistaken about how to describe what it is they are conceiving. 10Whether or not conceiving is a reliable guide to possibility is another matter.

PAGE 40

40 If there is any limit to what is conceivable, it is most likely the existence of impossible objects. So, if option 1 is correct then there is likely no meaningful string of words that does not correspond to something that can be conceived. In itself, this is not an obje ction but an observation that should make one uneasy about going with option 1. It is conceivable that P would be nearly synonymous with 'P' is a meaningful sentence. Conceiving is undoubtedly more than evaluating sentences for their meaningfulness.Even if such an evaluation is important to conceiving, it is incumbent upon us to discover wha t the other part of con ceiving is. The terms 'round' and 'square' are both meaningful terms. But I cannot fathom what it would be to conceive of a round square's existing. Option 2 would not raise an objection to the thesis that we cannot conceive of the existence of impossibilitie s. Rather, it would be an objection to particular claims about what we cannot conceive. So, it might be that we can conceive of some round square's existence and we think we can't because we are confused and their existence isn't impossible at all. But, even if something like this we re true, we could still hold that whatever is genuinely impossible is inconceivable. So long as we admit that we may be confused regarding what is impossible, this option should not pose any threat to our opening thesis about the extent of what we can propositionally conceive, i.e. that it is li mite d to what is possible. Option 3 is probably not an entirely legitimate option.What I mean is that if one sincerely makes a claim to have conceived something and he is familiar with conceiving, he must be conceiving something, even if what is being conceivedis not what he thought it was. This brin gs us to option 4. Option 4 is th e option with the most intuitive pull. We can imagine that someone might picture something that shifts shapes from circular to square and describe it as a round square. And the existence of that shape shifting object is not hard to co nceive. So, option 4 is at least plausibl e in some cases. And, it is undoubtedly true that we do make mistaken reports about not

PAGE 41

41 just what we conceive but what we see, hear, taste, etc. We are even likely to be mistaken in some instances about our beliefs. We must then wonder what the nature of the mistake is. We are going to assume that the person mistaken has at least a basic understanding of what conc ei ving is so that he does not fail to conceive of anything. Further, we must assume that whoever makes the claim: (RS) I am conceiving of a round square's existence. is a competent speaker of the English language who understands all of the term in question. That is, he does not report RS in virtue of not knowing the mea ning of the term 'round' (or 'square' or 'existence', etc.). If one sincerely asserts RS, is a competent speaker of the English language but fails to conceive of the existence of a round square then he must have attempted to conc eive of ro und square but failed to do so: (MC) For all speakers S and languages L, if S is a competent speaker of L, sincerely utters 'I am conceiving of x', then S sincerely attempts to conceive of x, and if S fails to conceive of x, S succeeds in conceiving of something else. According to the above principle, if one were to report that he conceived of a round square and failed to do so (which I am holding by hypothesis that he must) he would not of course be conceiving of a round square, but he would succeed in concei ving of something. A principle similar to the one above is suggested by Saul Kripke. Stephen Yablo calls a similar view 'Textbook Kripkeanism': A lot of people appear to have drawn the same 'good news bad news' lesson from their reading of Saul Kripke on conceivability. The ba d news is that conceivability evidence, particularly of the 'conceptual' or 'a priori' sort, is highly fallible Very often one finds a statement E conceivable,

PAGE 42

42 when as a matter of fact, E worlds cannot exist. So it is, for instance, with the conceivability of water in the absence of hydrogen, or Hesperus without Phosphorus. The good news is that (although conceivability evidence is fallible) the failures always take a certain form. A thinker who (mistakenly) conceives E as possible is correctly registering the possibility of something and mistaking the possibility of that for the possibility of E There are illusions of possibility, if you like, but no outright delusions or hallucinations.11 Textbook Kripkeanism assumes something about the connection between conceivability and possibility. But one need not assume that conceivability entails possibility to hold onto the spirit of Textbook Kripkeanism. I believe the spirit is captured by MC. Yablo's examination of Textbook Kripkeanism is particularly relevant to the present issue because Yabl o conte nds that one may conceive of impossibilities. Yablo's counterexample to Textbook Kripkeanism centers on the conceivability of a necessary being. The argument goes like this (for some S): 1. Conceiver S can conceive that God exists. 2. S can conceive that God does not exist. 3. If S can conc eive that P then P is possibl e. 4. So, it is possible that Go d exists and also possible that God does not exist. (1, 2, 3) 5. God exists in some possible worlds and does not exist in other possible worlds. (analysis of 4 using the heuristic of possible worlds) 6. But, if Go d e x ists, he is a necessary existent. 11Yablo, Stephen. "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): p. 108

PAGE 43

43 7. If God does not exist then God is an impossible being. 8. So, if God exists then God exists in every possible world and if God does not exist he exists in no possible world. 9. Textbook Kripkeanism is false. No problem would arise if one were to conceive of the e xistence of Pegasus and also of the non existence of Pegasus.12No impossibilities arise from either the possibility of Pegasus' existence or the possibility of Pegasus' nonexistence; Pegasus will exist in some possible worlds and not exist in others. God is supposed to exist in all of them or none at all. It is impossible that he should exist in some but not others. Yablo's challe nge is to the traditional view that concei vability entails possibility. So, his argument is not directly aimed at a proposal like the one that I am working with currently. But, on his way to arguing against the conceivability possibility entailment, he does suppose that one can con ceive that there be impossible beings or situations. In order for his argument to work it must be either impossible that God exists or impossible that he not exist. Consequently, in order for Yablo's argument to succeed one must be able to conceive of some impossibility. At first glance there are three options: 1. It is inco nceivable that God exists. 2. It is inconceivable that God does not exist. 3. Both are conceivable. 12Or, at the very least, the same problem would not arise.

PAGE 44

44 What I propose is that the problem lies in a confusion between conceiving of and conceiving that. I suggested in the last section that one can conceive of impossible objects but not of the existence of impossible objects. If one conceives that where the subject of the that clause is an i mpossible object, IO, th en the that clause, taken alone, would entail the existence of IO. Likewise, if one conceives of IO's existing then the content of the conceiving also entails IO's existing13 trivially. And it is the existence of IO that is inconceivable, or so I have argued. My proposal would get around the problem that results from Yablo's supposed counterexample to Textbook Kripkeanism because, although there would be some act of conceiving performed when one believes he is conceiving that God exists, it would not be a conceiving that God exists. For, there is a confusion. But the confusion is not about the type of necessity that God possesses or some misunderstanding regarding the other properties God is supposed to possess. Rather, the confusion is about the type of conceiving one is performing. Alth ough 'con ceiving of' is the more natural phrasing for conceiving reports, philosophers almost exclusively use the 'conceiving that' construction. This preference prejudices us toward thinking that all conceiving must be of some propositional content. If we do not presume that acts of conceiving must have propositional content, at least as normally tho ught of, th en we can explain away the apparent problem presented above. What is impossible is that impossible objects exist. It follows (at least intuitively, if not logically) that it is impossible that we can conceive that those impossible objects exist. This is because conceiving that some objects exist requires specifying at least the relevant circu m stances u nder which such an object exists. But it is clear that no such conditions can be specified in the case of impossible objects. So, if God is one of these impossible objects then it is inconceivable that God exists. But I have left it open that one can conceive of God. And so, on e ca n explain away the apparent problem in the argument 13This presumes an intelligible notion of property entailment.

PAGE 45

45 above as a confusion between conceiving of God and conceiving that God exist.There would not be any problem because if one were confused in the way described he would not be both conceiving that God exist and conceiving that God not exist. Rather, he would be conceiving of God and con c ei ving that God not exist. Supposing that God is not an impossible object (and thus exists), the confusion can be explained away in terms of 'conceiving of' and 'conceiving that', but with a slightly different approach. On the model above, what one does (if God exists) when he believes he has conceived that God doe s not exist is conceive of a world without God. If God exists and is metaphysically necessary then a world without God is an impossible object. So while one would be able to conceive of a world without God, he would not be able to conceive that such a worl d exist. Some might try to explain away the apparent conceiving that something impossible exist with only the 'conceiving that' locution. And if that is possible, then one might wonder why we should admit that there is a substantive difference between conceiving of and conceiving that. It looks like David Chalmers already gave us the relevant distinction with his cate gor ies of prima facie and ideal conceivability: Prima Facie Conceivability: S is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is conceivable for that subject on first appearances. Ideal Conceivability: S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable on ideal rational reflection. (Chalmers, 2002, p. 147) One migh t think that con ceiving of some object o is the same as prima facie conceiving that o exist and that conceiving that o exist (on my account) is the same as ideally conceiving that o exist (on Chalmers' account). But I hold that conceiving of o need not in clude anything about o 's existence. Consider some

PAGE 46

46 obviously impossible object like the completely red and completely green ball.I do not think we can even prima facie conceive that such an object exist, as even a minimal grasp of the concepts red and green precludes a completely red and completely green ball existing. But, we can conceive of such an object an d dr aw conclusions about what features it would have to have were it possible for it to exist, such as that it would be colored, have a surface, etc. In this section, I have looked at what I suggest are some of the confusions peoplehave when they conc eive. When peoplethink that they have conceived that some impossible object exists at least one of the explanations is that one has confused conceiving of the impossible object for conceiving that the impossible object in question exists (or conceiving it to exist). What one can conceive as existi ng is limite d by what is possible. But what one can conceive of is not so limited. I then considered an objection not to the suggestion that one can conceive of impossibilities but to the suggestion that one cannot conceive that impossible objects exist. The objection is one suggested by Stephen Yabl o. Yablo suggests that we can both conceive that God exist and conceive that God not exist. Since God, if he exists, is supposed to be necessary, either his existence or non existence is impossible. I attempted to show that this apparent problem can be explained away with the distinction I suggest between 'con c eiving of' and 'conceiving that'. Lastly, I considered an objection that the kind of solution I suggest has already been offered in a different way. Yablo's confusion could also be explained away with Chalmers' distinction between prima facie and ideal variants of conceiving. And so, one might think that the distinction between c onceiving of and conceiving that is nothing over and above the distinction between prima facie and ideal conceiving. I argued that conceiving of differs in type from prima facie conceiving in that one may conceive of some types of obviously impossible objects which one cannot even prima facie conc eive.

PAGE 47

473.3 Confusions That Could Lead to a Berkeleyan View In this section, I will consider the type of confusion that might lead one to the Berkeleyan conclusion that nothing exists other than minds and mind dependent ideas. Consider the following wellknown passage from Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge : But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothi n g but another colour or figure If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be the mselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, li ke something which is in ta ngible; and so the rest. (Berkeley, I.8) We can only perceive objects by way of their sensible properties. The objects which instantiate sensible properties are either themselves perceivable or are not. If they are, then there is nothing more to objects than their sensible properties. If they are not, then one must suppose that there is some intimate connection between objects and their sensible properties.That intimate connection is supposed to be resemblance. In order for something to resemble a sensible property it must itself be sensible. So, if objects resemble their sensible properties, objects must be nothing over and above their sensible properties. So, there is nothing more to objects than how we perc eive them. Without our perceiving them, then they would not exist. Hence, supposed external objects are mind dependent. Berkeley assumes that the limits our ability to conceive is given by what we per ceive: Hence as it is i mpossible for me to see or feel any thing without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or

PAGE 48

48 perception of it (Berkeley, I. 5).14It is impossible to conceive of a sensible object without sensible properties. Clearly, what it is to be a sensible object is to be something which can be perceived. But Berkeley is here confused. The confusion commonly attributed here to Berkeley is that he is confused between the objects of perception and the objects of introspection. I do not want to suggest that Berkeley is not confused in the way people normally suggest he is. What I want to do here is suggest that there is a further mistake Berkeley may be making. The mistake lies in thinking that one ca n con ceive of particulars as such. We normally do act as though conceiving can be about particulars as such. But I want to suggest that that is something we cannot do (some exceptions to be mentioned aside). First, I will examine how holding that our conceiving can be about ordinary particulars could le ad one to pheno menalism. I will then argue that acts of conceiving cannot be about ordinary contingent particulars.15 We should look at an example in which we purportedly do conceive of a particular. Suppose that we try to conceive of the Statue of Liberty. So I conceive of a tall greenish figure on a large pedestal. Conceiving of a tall greenish figure on a large pedestal is unproblematic.16But in order for it to be a conceiving of the Statue of Liberty, we need to provide some way of ensuring that what we conceive of is the Statue of Liberty and not some other tall greenish figure. 14Jonathan Dancy notes that in the 1710 edition, Berkeley continues: In truth the object and sensation are the same thing,and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other. 15Objects like numbers and sets, if they exist, will differ from ordinary contingent particulars in this respect. 16I am here overlooking possible vagueness issues. If terms like 'pedestal' are vague it may be that it is indeterminate whether there are any pedestals.

PAGE 49

49 Perhaps we can provide some definite description of the Statue of Liberty. But for any definite description we give of the Statue of Liberty, that description might have failed to apply to the Statue of Liberty. It might have been shorter, constructed somewhere other than Ellis Island, designed earlier or later than it was, etc. It may be tha t there is no pr oblem with picking out a particular like the Statue of Liberty with some mental acts, but I want to suggest that conceiving is importantly different. When we conceive we are directing ourselves toward modal concerns. So we must leave open tha t particulars could have been different than they are. We might think that the Statue of Liberty falls under the definite description the actual tall greenish statue on Ellis Island. Of course, it cannot fail to be the case that the Statue of Liberty is the actual tall greenish statue on Ellis Island. But when we conceive that the Statue of Liberty be somewhere other than Ellis Island we are considering whether we think that situation could have been actual. But if we represented the Statue of Liberty as the actual tall greenish statue on Ellis Island we could not have conc eived that the Statu e of Liberty actually be assembled anywhere other than Ellis Island. In possible worlds speak, if our modal considerations are about anything, they should be about how the actual world could be, not about how some other world is. Of course, objects like numbers (if they exist) would be exceptio ns, as it is un controversial that they fall under definite descriptions that could not have failed to apply to them. Another notable exception is in first person conceivings. Whenever I conceive of myself first personally, it is undoubtedly me that my conceiving is about. And that is because I do not ne ed to repr esent myself with some definite description in order to guarantee that it is me about whom I am conceiving.17 17Perry, John. The Problem of the Essential Indexical, Nous Vol. 13 No. 1 (1979): pp. 3 21

PAGE 50

50 One might object that when we conceive we need not represent particulars with definite descriptions in order to pick out those particulars. We need only stipulate that it is the Statue of Liberty about which I am conceiving in order for it to be the Statue of Liberty about w hich I am thinking. But one's conceiving of some particular cannot amount merely to stipulating that one has done so. For simplicity's sake, we can consider a quasi perceptual type of conceiving to illustrate that there are limits to what one can stipulate. Suppose that one were to report that he had conceived of a spe c ific shade of blue, say robin's egg blue. We would not think that someone had successfully conceived of robin's egg blue if he had in fact formed a quasi perceptual image of a field of Titian (a shade of red), no matter what one reports or stipulates. Perhaps one migh t object to the example by arguing that quasi perceptual conceiving requires quasi perceptual stipulation. One cannot stipulate merely linguistically. One must have an understanding of the concepts involved in order to stipulate. And, where phenomenal concepts are involved, one must be able to form a quasi perceptual picture of a named color in order to stipulate tha t one will be conceiving of that color. But if that is what is required of stipulating that one has conceived of something, then the stipulation is no different in type from the conceiving. So, it is of no use to argue that one ca n conceive of a specific particular A merely because one stipulates that he conceives of A. One must further have an understanding of A. The problem with conceiving of particulars is that it does not look like we understand what ordinary objects like the Statue of Liberty are in addition to our un derstan ding of the many concepts under which they fall. One might still think that we do not think about particulars as falling under some description. But think about a supposed particular like God. When we think about who God is or would be, the way we think about God re quir es that we think about God as falling under some description. God is that

PAGE 51

51 being which is omnipotent and omniscient.18Anything which meets those criteria is God. Suppose one were to say: (G) I met God but he's not omniscient or omnipotent. A natural response to an utterance of (G) would be that whoever or whatever the utterer met was not God. That is because there are necessary and sufficient condi tions on bei ng God, as there are with numbers.But ordinary particulars have accidental properties. And even if one believes that some ordinary particulars have essential properties, (e.g. such as Humphrey having the property of being human necessarily), it is still controversial whether there are properties are properties the having of which suffices for an object to be the pa rticular object it is. There have been attempts at finding properties that individuate (suffice for being) contingent ordinary particulars, but it is unclear that any of these attempts have been successful. And, even if one had an account of ordinary particulars which included a non controversial sufficient property, it is far from obvious that when we think of ordinary particulars, we think about those types of properties. For example, there have been theories about particulars which have as necessary and sufficient conditions for being some object, O, that O be composed of a certain group of subatomic parti c les. Even if such an accoun t is correct it does not seem like that is the type of thing we think about when we think about ordinary particulars. And, even if we did think about ordinary particulars in that way, we do not have the information regarding which e l ementary particles compose what in order for us to have in mind the relevant properties necessary and sufficient for being any specific complex particular. That is, it may be that one thinks in general that what individuates particulars is something about the particles of which 18There are arguably other descriptions which apply to God, like a being which is omnibenevolent and the being who created the world. But whatever specific descriptions one uses to pick out God is of no matter.

PAGE 52

52 they are composed, but it is unlikely that there are any particulars for which one can enumerate which particles that particular is composed of. So, while some conceivings may be about certain odd particulars like God or numbers, it is because what they are can be captured by a definite description w hich we do in fact have in mind when we think about them. And those definite descriptions which apply to these odd particulars pick out these particulars uniquely and apply to those particulars necessarily. With ordinary particulars, it is not obvious that there are any descriptions which uniquely pick out those particulars and apply to those particulars ne cessarily. Even if there are it is unlikely that we have such descriptions in mind when we think about them. To demonstrate the point that there is no necessary description under which we can uniquely pick out particulars I will look at Max Black's argu me nt against the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Black's argument takes the form of a dialogue between two characters, A and B. B presents a counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII): (PII) For all objects x and y and properties F, if (x has F iff y has F) then x = y. (PII) provides a condi tion s ufficing for the identity of particulars. The principle is difficult to state in ordinary English as in (PII)19 but it may be better put in ordinary English if we first put it in the logical equivalent of (PII), (PII2): (PII2) For all objects x and y, if x y then ~for all properties F(x has F iff y has F) 19It is natural to say that for any two objects which have all the same properties, they are identical. But then there is a problem because there is only one object, not two as first stated.

PAGE 53

53 (PII2) may be stated in ordinary English. What (PII2) says is that for any two distinct objects there is at least one property that one has that the other does not. The counterexample presented by B is a world empty except for two brass spheres which have all their intrinsic properties in common. The two sphe res are the same size, same density, same mass, etc. And since they are the only two things in the world, they have all the same relational properties as well. So although there are two objects they do not differ in any properties, which is exactly what (PII2 ) says cannot be. One way to object to Black's counterexample is to propose that space is absolute. So, although there are no purely qualitative properties that the two spheres differ in, they do differ in location. If space is absolute, then Black's counterexample fails but it should not bear on what I am trying to show here I am not arguing that there are no real differences between distinct particulars. I am arguing that there is nothing in our conceivings of particulars that would suffice to determine which particular the conceivings are about. Even if we did include in our conceiving of the two spheres thei r locations in absolute space, it would not be necessary that those two spheres be in the locations that they are; one thing we do seem to know about ordinary particulars is that they could have been in different spatio temporal locations than they are in in fact. Even thoug h there may be some property that one sphere has that the other does not e.g. being at such and such spatio temporal location, it is not a necessary property. We may be able to think about particulars in such a way as to pick them out uniquely But when we conceive we need to leave open that those properties instantiated by those particulars might have failed to be instantiated by those particulars. And we further need to leave open that something else could have had the properties of whatever particulars we are considering.

PAGE 54

54 So then what is it we are doing when we think we are conceiving particulars?This is where Berkeley comes in. What he had right was that when think about objects we think about their properties. Even if there is some underlying substratum, it is not about that that we thi nk. When we conceive abo ut contingent particulars we need to leave open that the particulars instantiate properties other than the ones they instantiate in fact or the ones we believe they do in fact. There is no favored property by which we pick out ordinary particulars, but I am sugg esting that when we supposedly con ceive particulars we are conceiving properties. More precisely, we are grasping a concept or group of concepts. From there we can draw conclusions about what would be required for something to fall under a specific group of concepts all at once. So we conceive of a round square by grasping bo th round an d square. We ca n then draw conclusions about what it would take for something to be a round square. Berkeley does use the 'conceive of' locution that I propose denotes a substantively different act from the act denoted by 'conceive that'. But I want to suggest that Berkel ey is confused as to the level of generality that can be conceived. Berkeley argues that one cannot conceive of an object unconceived. Suppose we have a tree named Joe. If one conceives of Joe, Joe cannot be unconceived. And the same goes for any particular.But the mistake is in thinking that our conceivings ca n be about Joe at all. Wh at one can conceive of is some co instantiation of properties that the tree normally instantiates.20 And what that amounts to is grasping the concepts under which any tree falls.But if all conceiving is at this level of generality, there is no particular that has been conceived at all.While one may not be able to conceive of any particular and have that particular be unconceived, that is only because parti culars cannot be conceived at all. What we can conceive is that there be something or 20One can likewise not conceive that Joe be taller or shorter, etc. but rather conceive that there be a co instantiation of such and such properties.

PAGE 55

55 other falling under a concept, e.g. that of a tree, and that there be things like that which are not conceived. Whether or not Berkeley made this mistake, it is a mistake that one might make on his way to arguing for phenomenalism. In this section, I have discussed a way in which one might be con fusedabout the limits of conceiving that would lead one to holding a phenomenalist view. The confusion is about the level of generality of what we can conceive. Although we can seemingly have conceivings about ordinary particulars, we cannot in fact. When we think about ordinary parti culars we think about them in terms of some description. Even if we think about them in terms of some definite description,21 we cannot do so when we conceive. Conceiving requires us to leave open that either something might in fact be different than we believe it is or that something could have been different than it is in fact. Even though there may be some concepts under which ordinary particulars fall necessarily, falling under those concepts is no t sufficient for uniquely picking out some contingent particular. And without such a concept which can only apply to one contingent particular there is no principled reason that our conceiving about some particular, A, is not also a conceiving about some other particular, B. But then our con c eiving is not about A or B but rather about the application conditions of the relevant concepts that both A and B fall under. One might come to hold a phenomenalist view if one were to be confused in the way just discussed. If one were to think that conceiving coul d be about particulars then he would come to the conclusion that when one attempts to conceive of some unconceived object, he has conceived of some particular and thus the object in question is no longer unconceived. And so it will go with all particulars. But I am suggesting what one con c eives of must be at a higher level of generality. If what is conceived is 21Although we often think about particulars through some indefinite description.

PAGE 56

56 at a higher level of generality then there is no conceptual impossibility as there is with some specific particular being both conceived and unconceived. 3.4 Conclusion In this chapter I have looked at some mistakes that can be made when one allegedly conceives. Each mistake I looked at led to some conclusion about the range of things which can be conceived. In section 3.1, I suggested that a mistake that has been made, particularly in recent dis cussions, is in consideri ng only conceiving about propositional contents. I argued that there are mental acts reported by sentences using the 'conceive of' locution that are substantively different from any acts that can be reported by sentences using the 'conceive that' locution. Those acts that differ are the ones reported by 'conceive of' f o llowed by an ordinary noun or noun phrase. I considered the suggestion that (i)'conceive of A', where 'A' is an ordinary noun or noun phrase, is elliptical for (ii)'conceive that A exist'. I concluded that the (i) is not elliptical for (ii) because we can in some way conceive of i m possible objects (and believe that those objects are impossible). But the way we can conceive of impossible objects must be a way which does not require us to conceive that they exist. In section 3.2, I considered an objection that the existence of impossible objects is conceivable. The obje ction came from an argument made by Stephen Yablo against Textbook Kripkeanism. Yablo's argument presumes that both the existence and nonexistence of God are conceivable. One of either the existence or nonexistence of God is necessary and one of them is impossible. So, if both of them are conceivable, something impossible is conceivable. I a r gued that one might be misled into believing both the existence and nonexistence of God are conceivable if he is confused between conceiving of and conceiving that. Lastly, I argued that in spite of appearances, the distinction between conceiving of and

PAGE 57

57 conceiving that is different from the distinction between prima facie conceiving and ideal conceiving. The difference is made evident by the fact that there are some things that can be conceived of (e.g. round squares) that one cannot even prima facie conceive existing. Prima facie conceiving requires some propositional content which further requir es th at one be able to conceive of conditions on the existence under which those things the content is about exist.But object types which fall under concepts that are obviously conceptually incoherent cannot even be prima facie conceived. That is because some concepts are such that grasping them immediately puts one in a position to re cognize that they can not apply to any objects. In section 3.3, I looked at a confusion one might have that would lead one to have a phenomenalist view. The confusion is about the level of generality at which we can conceive. We cannot conc e ive about specific particulars. What we can conceive about is types of particulars. There is nothing that can be both conceived and unconceived. But that is only a problem for non phenomenalists if we conceive of particulars. But not only do we not have to conceive of specific contingent spatio tempora l parti culars, but we cannot do so. What we do when we purportedly conceive of contingent spatio temporal particulars is evaluate the conditions anything would have to satisfy in order fall under some concept or concepts we associate with those particulars. In chapter 4, I will further explain the act we report with 'conc eiv e of' sentences. I will also further explain the relationship between conceiving of and conceiving that Lastly, I will look at how one might use this distinction to argue that zombie arguments fail.

PAGE 58

58 CHAPTER 4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONCEIVING-OF AND CONCEIVING-THAT 4.0 Introduction There are three objectives of this chapter. First, I will further defend the distinction between conceiving of and conceiving that. Second, I will discuss the relation between conceiving of and conceiving that. And third, I will suggest how the distinction between these two types of conceiving might help explain away the apparen t conceivability of zombies existing. In chapter 3, I argued for a number of different proposals regarding the range of those things that can be conceived. When philosophers appeal to what can be conceived in arguments, the type of conceiving they normally focus on is reported with the 'conceive that' constr uction (o r similar constructions with a sentential complement). I argued that there is another type of conceiving reported with the 'conceive of' construction. Conceivings of may seem to be about ordinary objects but not be about the existence of those objects. So, one may be able to conceive of some type of thing without conceivi ng th at that type of thing exists. Because we may conceive of types of things without conceiving that they exist, we can conceive of types of impossible objects. I also argued that we cannot conceive anything about particulars qua particulars. Conceiving requires that we leave open the possibility that t hings be different than they are or than we believe them to be. If one conceives that, for example, Smith is taller than six feet tall, his success in conceiving that Smith is taller than six feet tall does not depend on Smith's actual height. In order for it to be Smit h that we have conceive d to be six feet tall, we must be able to differentiate between Smith and, for example, Jones in our acts of conceiving about Smith and Jones. The way in which we pick out Smith is by way of some description(s). But we can conceive that any or all descri ptions which in fact apply to

PAGE 59

59 Smith fail to apply top Smith. There is nothing in the content of our acts of conceiving that would uniquely pick out any particular in all possible circumstances. Particulars exist. I am not promoting an eliminativist thesis. Rather, I hold that the contents of our conceivings represent the world in such a way that th e y cannot be ab out particulars as such. In section 4.1, I will consider an important objection to the view that conceiving of is a substantively different type of conceiving from conceivingthat. Specifically, one might argue that conceiving of, in the instances it differs from conceiving that, is not a type of conceiving at all. I argue that we do recognize this difference in normal parlance and in logic as well, at least implicitly. I conclude that the suggestion that substantively different conceivings of are not conceivings at all is mistaken. In section 4.2, I will atte mpt to show tha t conceiving of is a precondition on conceiving that and further discuss what is required for conceiving that. What is required to conceivethat is more involved than what is minimally required for conceivingof, but one may not conceive that without first conceiving of. In section 4. 3, I will suggest that the fail ure to recognize this distinction could be behind the apparent conceivability of philosophical zombies. A full argument that such a confusion is going on in zombie arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I will demonstrate how such a confusion could lead one to believe that philosophical zombies are conceivable. 4.1 An Objection to the Distinction Betw een Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that One might argue that there really is no reason to think that in addition to the type of conceiving normally discussed (conceivingthat) that there is also some other type of conceiving (conceivingof). I argued in chapter two that there is a substantive difference between conceivingof and conceiving that which is dem o nstrated by the fact that we do make reports of the form 'I have conceived of x where x is

PAGE 60

60 replaced by a noun or noun phrase. I considered the suggestion that 'I have conceived of x is elliptical for 'I have conceived that x exists ( x to exist)' and found that although the former may seem to be elliptical for the latter for some substitutions for x ', the former is obviously not elliptical for the la tter for all substit utions for x. The substitutions for x which most obviously do not admit of the ellipsis are those substitutions which denote impossible objects. And from that, it should follow that 'conceive of' sentences are in general not elliptical for 'conc eive th at' sentences. One could argue that the problem lies in thinking that we can conceive of impossible objects. Hume made this point in A Treatise of Human Nature : 'Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other wor d s, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible. (Book 1. Part 2.Section 2. Paragraph 8) Hume argues, as many have, that what is impossible is inconceivable. From the passage above,it is clear that Hume's view is that we cannot conceive of conceptual impossibilities.22 The conceptual incoherence of x leads to an inability to conceive of x Whether or not we can form an idea of a golden mountain depends on whether the concept golden mountain is coherent. But merely detecting the coherence of golden mountain is not enough to conceive of a golden mountain on this view. Conceiving of a golden m o untain is something we can do in virtue of golden mountain being a coherent concept. 22Just what types of possibility and impossibility there are is beyond the scope of this paper. For purposes of thisstudy, I am assuming that there are conceptual, logical, and nomological possibilities. Whether conceptual and logical possibility are the same or not is another issue beyond the scope of this paper. However, nothing important should hangon whether or not conceptual and logical possibility are distinct notions.

PAGE 61

61 Round square is not a coherent concept, yet I have argued that we can conceive of round squares. What we cannot do is conceive that round squares exist (conceive round squares to exist). Hume says we cannot clearly conceive of impossibilities. I would take this to be saying that we can not ideally concei ve that there be impossible objects. And that is not in conflict with anything I have suggested in this study. One might still object that even if that is what Hume has in mind, there is no reason to think that there is this distinction between conceiving of and conceiving tha t. But we do conceive of impossible objects at some times, even while admitting that they are impossible. When we talk about round squares we have done something which allows us to sincerely say about them what we do. Even though round square is an incoherent concept, we can make sense of what it would tak e for something to be a round square. We can draw conclusions about what would be true of round squares were they to exist. If we could not conceive of round squares then we should think that (CORS) and (COET) have the same truth conditions: (CORS ) I have conc eived of a round square. (COET) I have conceived of an elliptical triangle. But it is not obvious that (CORS) and (COET) have the same truth conditions. Further, I have the intuition that the truth of (CORS) require an utterer to perform an act different from the act r equired for one to truthfully utter (COET). I think we have this intuition in spite of the fact that we know at the outset that both round squares and elliptical triangles are impossible. In logic, we have a model of this type of conceiving with the reductio ad absurdum. Wh en one performs a reductio, one withholds judgments about the assumption of the reductio until it has been revealed that the assumption implies a contradiction. It is in this way that we conceive of impossibilities. We grasp the concept or concepts and from there draw conclusions. Reductio ad

PAGE 62

62 absurdum is, of course, not a perfect model. Reductio ad absurdum works with propositions but conceiving of manipulates concepts rather than propositions. But if we can make sense of an intuitive notion of conceptual entailment, we see that the two are not far off from each other. Of course, one could object that w h ile we do perform this type of act, it is not a form of conceiving. Instead, it should be called 'considering' or 'supposing'. My reply is that it is fine to call the act whatever one wants to call it. However, as I will suggest in section 4.2, there is an int i mate connection between conceivingof and conceiving that which warrants putting both under the heading of conceiving. And, as I have suggest throughout this study, we do perform both of these acts and use forms of the word 'conceive' to refer to both acts. In section 4.3, I will suggest that the fa ct that we do use 'c onc eive' to refer to both acts may have led to a confusion in contemporary philosophy of mind in a matter of some importance. In this section, I have considered the objection that there really is no distinction between conceivingof and conceiving tha t. I have argued that we do perform something which looks a lot like conceiving of with the reductio ad absurdum. I also argued that we do conceive of impossible objects. The evidence that we do so was that we do think that the contents of conceiving reports of different types of im po ssible objects are different reports. 4.2 The Relation Between Conceiving-of and Conceiving-that I have described conceiving of thus far as an act that puts us in the position to understand the application conditions for some concept, whether it is simple or complex. Because conceiving of does not require that one conclude that the concept is coherent, one may conceive of types of impossible objects. But one can n ot conceive that impossible objects exist.

PAGE 63

63 Before I get to the discussion of conceivingthat and its relation to conceiving of, I will discuss what conceiving of is, which has only been touched upon earlier. In the previous section, I suggested that the reductio ad absurdum provides us with a model of conceiving of. If we examine what goes on in reductios we will get a be tter idea as to what conceiving of comes to. In a reductio we make an assumption in order to show that that assumption, either by itself or along with other premises, entails a contradiction. So, in at least some cases, the assumption itself is necessarily false and so i m possible.23 And in some cases it takes quite a bit of work to reveal the contradiction. That work which reveals the impossibility is analogous to conceiving of. But even if we do reveal that some premise is necessarily false we may draw entailments from it which are not contradictions. Consider (RS): (RS) Round(a ) & Square(a) Although (RS) is necessarily false we can draw inferences from (RS) which are not, such as (R) and (S): (R) Round(a) (S) Square(a) So we can sincerely utter a sentence like I have conceived of a round square and if there could be such a thing it would be round. Conceiving of is analogous to the men tal act that first presents (RS) to us and then gets us from (RS) to (R). Of course, there are limits to the analogy between reductio ad absurdum and conceiving of. The aim of conceivingof is not to draw a contradi ctio n. Conceiving of is an act we perform without 23There can, of course, be reductios within reductios. In some of those cases, there may be assumptions made for purposes of reductio that are not impossible.

PAGE 64

64 considering whether a contradiction is entailed. Conceiving of is not therefore limited to types of impossible objects, but rather impossible objects are used in the examples to make clearer the differences between conceivingof and conceiving that. Second, reductio ad absurdum is merely a model for conceivingof. One must be careful not to confuse th e model for the thing being modeled. Conceiving of is performed by first entertaining a concept and then drawing conclusions about application conditions for that concept as with round square above. There are two important questions that still need to be answered. First, what is conceiving that? Se cond what is the relation between conceivingof and conceiving that?Both questions will be answered together. It seems uncontroversial that whatever conceiving that p is will require one to grasp all of the concepts in its content. And I have argued that we cannot conceive that p where p entails the e xistence of an impossible object. To illustrate, we can sincerely and truthfully assert (CORS) but not (CTRS): (CORS) I have conceived of a round square.Whatever is a round square must be round. (CTRS) I have conceived that there be a round square that is round. One difference be tween (C ORS) and (CTRS) is that truthfully and sincerely uttering (CTRS) requires that one consider the existence of round squares while (CORS) does not. So we can safely say that conceiving that p (where p entails the existence of a) requires minimally that one consider a as existing. The second thing to noti ce is that one can conceive of without re quiring the attribution of a property to anything. But conceiving that ordinarily requires the attribution of some property or properties to some (type of) object or objects when we conceive ordinary contingent particulars. That is because conceiving of requires only a sufficient un derstanding of concepts and not a further awareness of whether or not they could apply to any instances. We may even be aware that

PAGE 65

65 nothing could exist to which the concept round square would apply and still succeed in conceiving of round squares. But once one is aware that round squares cannot exist, he cannot truthfully and sincerely utter something like (CTRS). We should next consider an utterances like (CPE) and (CCRS): (CPE) I have conc eived tha t pigs e xist (pigs to exist). (CCRS) I cannot conceive that round squares exist (round squares to exist). (CPE) is an assertion that one has performed some positive act which includes pigs existing. (CCRS) reports either the failure to perform some positive act including round squares or, more likel y, a detection of some incoherence in the concept round square. At the very least, conceiving that requires that one not detect an incoherence either in the concepts the act of conceiving is about or in the relations that the proposition designated by the that clause puts those concepts in. Chalmers' prima facie conceiving (discussed in se ction 2.2) is a type of conceiving that which may be about impossible objects. Even prima facie conceiving that cannot be about objects that fall under concepts such that grasping them puts one in the position to know they are incoherent. But one can con ceive of conc epts and relations of conce pts even if he knows them to be incoherent at the outset. Conceiving of is an act we perform when we consider hypothetical situations per impossible. There is undoubtedly more to conceiving that than can be explored in this study, and much of that has been explored elsewhere.24 So I will at this point lay out the differences between conceiving of and conceiving that and what the relation is between them. Conceiving of amounts to first entertaining a concept then drawing conclusions about at least some of the application conditions. Conceiving that p 24Much of this exploration has been published in the anthology Conceivability and Possibility (eds. Gendler and Hawthorne).

PAGE 66

66 requires that one already has figured out the application conditions for all the relevant concepts need to evaluate p So, conceiving of is a precondition on conceivingthat. Conceiving that p (where p is about some x ) further requires that one not detect that there are any incoherent concepts in the co nten t of conceiving of x In this section, I have discussed what conceiving of and conceiving that are. Further, I have also discussed the differences between these two types of conceiving and the relation between them. Conceiving of is a two stage process whereby one first entertains a conc ept and th en draws conclusions regarding that concept's application conditions. The figuring out of application conditions is modeled by the reductio ad absurdum. Unlike reductio ad absurdum, the aim of conceiving of is not to draw a contradiction, but rather to draw out whatever inferences one can about the application of the conce pt, coh erent or not. Conceiving that p requires first that one conceive of a, where p is about a. So, conceiving of a is a precondition on conceiving that p. Conceiving that p further requires that one not detect and any incoherence in the concepts under which x falls. So, while conceiv ing of is a pre condition of conceiving that, conceiving that further requires one to evaluate a proposition. If one does not detect that the proposition is necessarily false then one has conceived that p, either ideally or in a prima facie manner.25 If one does detect that the proposition is necessarily false, then one does not conceive that p. 25It is important to note that one will not be excluded from conceiving on the grounds that he has a greater capacity for rational reflection. Even an ideal conceiver can prima facie conceive that p where p is not ideally conceivable. Such a situation would be one in which the conceiver merely abstains from conceiving to the extent his ability allows.

PAGE 67

674.3 The Implications of the Distinction for Zombies Physicalism is a thesis in philosophy of mind about what types of things there are in the world. According to physicalism, all things in our world, including minds, are wholly determined by the physical. Physicalism does not hold that necessarily everything is physical or determined by the physical. It is rather a supe rvenience the sis, the thesis that all the properties of things are supervenient on physical properties. The idea is, roughly, that fixing the physical, everything else follows. The purpose of putting physicalism in terms of a supervenience thesis is to guard against independent variation (Jackson, 1994). That is, physicalism is stated in ter ms of a superven i ence thesis to ensure that the thesis of physicalism does not allow for mental states to change without a change in physical states. It follows that according to physicalism there can be no change in mental states without a change in physical states. Frank Jackson expresses the main th esis of physicalism in this way: (III) Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (Jackson, 1994, p. 164) A minimal physical duplicate is a duplicate only of the physical stuff of the world and nothing more. The requirem ent that we first consider a mi nimal ph ysical duplicate rather than just a physical duplicate guards against us considering a physical duplicate of the world that includes ghosts or spirits or any other non physical things. It is obvious that if a physical duplicate of our world replete with ghosts and spiritstuff we r e a d uplicate simpliciter of our world, this world would have to include non physical objects. (III) entails that our world is a minimal physical duplicate of itself. That is, everything in our world is either a physical object or necessitated by the existence of those physical objects. There is one contem porary line of argument which relies on the supposition that conceivability entails possibility to refute (III). In a world which is a minimal physical duplicate of this world there

PAGE 68

68 would also be creatures which are minimal physical duplicates of us. Some have argued that it is conceivable for such creatures in such a world to lack mental states. These minimal physical duplicates of us that lack mental states are called 'zombies'. Zombies are also behavioral duplicates of us. They appear to walk. They seem to laugh and cry, but are not amu s ed by what we would think of as jokes and are not saddened by what we would call 'tragedies'. So, a zombie world would be behaviorally and physically just like ours. Although he was not the first to hold that conceivability entails po ssibility (o f some kind) David Chalmers has argued that conceivability entails possibility (Chalmers, 2002). Chalmers is careful to explain that it is only a specific type (or types) of conceivability that entails metaphysical possibility. But all types of conceiving that Chalmers discusses are varieties of conceiving that Jointly holding that zombies are conceivable (in the right way) and that (the right kind of) conceivability entails possibility will commit one to the falsity of physicalism.26 Below, I will give a simplified version of the argument: 1. Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (thesis of physicalism as in (III)) 2. It is conceivable that there be a a minimal physical duplicate of our world in which th ere are zombies. 3. It is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which lacks mental 26Chalmers argues that one is actually committed to either the falsity of physicalism or the truth of panprotopsychism. However, it is unclear whether panprotopsychism should be considered a type of physicalism. Regardless, it is not the view that philosophers generally have in mind when they talk about physicalism.

PAGE 69

69 states. 4. This world has mental states. 5. It is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (3, 4) 6. If it is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a dupli c ate sim pliciter of our world then it is possible that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (Thesis that conceivability entails possibility) 7. It is possible that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a d uplicate simplici ter of our world. (5, 6) 8. There is some world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. (Restatement of 7 through the use of possible worlds semantics) 9. Physicalism is false. (1, 8) One might w orry that this talk of possible worlds tak es them too seriously.I am only using possible worlds here for heuristic purposes and remain neutral on the matter of whether or not they exist. The argument above may also be put in non possible worlds terms: Let P express a proposition that exhausts the physical facts of the world and let M express a proposition that e x hausts the mental facts of the world. If physicalism is true, then P entails M. 1. It is conceivable that there be zombies, i.e. the P be true and M be false. 2. If it is con ceivablethat P be tru e and M be false then it is possible that P be true and M be false.

PAGE 70

70 3. It is possible that P be true and M be false. (2,1) 4. If P entails M then it is not possible that P be true and M be false. 5. ~(P entails M) (4, 3) 6. Physicalism is false. Even though the argument can be given without talk of possible wor l d s, I believe that the heuristic of possible worlds is useful for this discussion. If we keep in mind that it is used only as a heuristic, there should be no problem.It is enough that the argument can be made without the use of the heuristic to show that one nee d not be committed to possible worlds in any substantive way to argue against physicalism by way of the conceivability of zombies. It is controversial whether zombies are conceivable. Physicalists often argue that the existence of zombies is inconceivable and that it only seems conceivable. We do not have all of the relevant physical i nformation regarding what it would take for zombies to exist. One might prima facie conceive some proposition P which is in fact ideally conceivable, but that would not provide strong enough evidence for the claim that P is possible. So, while we may prima facie conceiv e tha t zombies exist, we cannot conceive that they exist upon ideal rational reflection. And so, the argument against physicalism fails. I would like to suggest that there may be another type of confusion at work. If the type of conceiving one is engaged in when he allegedly conceives that zombies exist is not propositional (conceiving that) then the argument against physicalism fails. The first version of the argument above turns on premises 5 and 6. If the type of confusion I suggest were to occur then premise 5 would look like 5':

PAGE 71

71 5'. I can conceive of a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. Premise 6 would remain unchanged: 6. If it is conceivable that there be a minimal physical duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world then it is possible that there be a mini mal physic al duplicate of our world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of our world. Whereas the statement in premise 5 was the antecedent of the conditional of premise 6, 5' is not the antecedent of 6. So, thenit does not follow that zom b ie worlds are possible. Likewise, it does not then follow that physicalism is false. The question then is: what is the substantive difference between 5 and 5'? It is the difference between conceivingof and conceiving that has been the main focus of this study. Conceiving of is not evaluative in the way that conceivi ng that is. Conceiving of consists of entertaining a concept (coherent or not) and drawing conclusions as to what falls under the concept, as we do with conceptual analysis. Conceiving that requires that one not detect that the concepts are incoherent, while conceiv ing of does not. Because conceiving of does not require this failure to detect incoherence, one can conceive of impossible objects. Further, since propositions are not the objects of conceivingof nothing one conceives of can be either true or false, so conceiving of cannot have metaphysical implications. So, whether or not zombies are possible, they are conceivable in the se n se that they may be conceived of. To illustrate, one may conceive of fictions.And even if one does not hold that fictions are impossible in virtue of being fictions, there are fictions which are impossible and yet we still do not fail to conc eive in th e way that we conceive other fictions.One might write a story in which all of the physical laws are explicitly stated. Also in this story is a naturally blond haired woman named Callie

PAGE 72

72 whose DNA sequence is also explicitly stated in the story. However, the DNA sequence along with the physical laws entail that Callie be brown haired. Even if we are aware of this problem, we do not have any problem conceiving of Callie and her blond hair. One might argue that wha t we do in such an instance is re ally think of the story as having different physical laws or Callie's DNA being different. But we need not do so. All we need do is ignore the impossibility as in a reductio ad absurdum before we conclude that there is an impossibility. I sugges t that we conceive of zombies in the same way we might conceive of Callie. Further, I want to suggest that the difference between the appearance that zombies are conceivable and zombies in fact being conceivable is not merely a matter of the degree of rational reflection, but rather a confusion between types of conceiving. Consider the penrose triangle in figure 1. A picture of a penrose triangle represents surfaces that go away from and come toward a viewer at the same time. A true penrose triangle is impossible, but we can look at the picture and understand what it depicts. And we can look at the pictur e all at once. But it is not until one considers the picture as representing a way that things could be that a problem arises.When one looks at the picture merely as a picture there is no problem. By this I mean that some impossible thi n gs may be represented with pictures and we do not have any trouble understanding the picture as such. An inconsistent co instantiation of properties may be represented. And, so long as we do not look at the picture as something to be evaluated we do not have any proble m. Of course, th ese pictures are more interesting after evaluating them as pictures of impossible things. But, no matter, we can look at them without evaluating them and understand what they depict. I want to suggest that that is what goes on with zombieconceivings.We may consider what is in some sense a representation of a zombie world. And we even grasp all of the concepts and group them together as one. And in this way we can conceive of zombie worlds just as we can look at pictures

PAGE 73

73 of staircases that face two directions at once. What is particularly insidious about this type of confusion is that there are no more concepts or physical laws that one must grasp or know in order to detect the incoherence. I do not here want to argue that this is the type of co nfusion that is going on wh en people allegedly conceive that there be zombies. I only want to make the more modest claim that this is a possible confusion that should be explored. Some confusions of this type are going to be harder to fall into than others. Few people will fall into a confusi o n as to whether they can conceive there to be round squares. Almost no one will think that he or she can. The fact that some forms of this type of confusion rarely occur, e.g. rarely will anyone think he can conceive that a round square exis ts because of a confusion betwee n conceivingof and conceiving that, should not prejudice us toward thinking that this type of confusion does not occur in other instances. When we conceive of round squares we do not tend to confuse that act with conceiving there to be round squares. The reason we do no t is th at in order to conceive of round squares we must grasp both the concepts round and square. And the concepts round and square are such that grasping them immediately puts one in a position to know that the two concepts cannot both apply to the same object si multaneously. But there are some concepts, unlike round square which are incoherent but whose incoherence is not evident simply in virtue of grasping the concept or concepts involved. Consider a concept like greatest prime number. One might grasp greatest prime number and not detect the incoherence.We can i magine a competent speaker sincerely reporting that he has conceive d that there be a greatest prime number and that he grasps greatest prime number. Either the speaker has failed to engage in enough rational reflection to conclude that there is no greatest prime number or he has not engaged in that evaluative ty pe of reflection. In other words, he has either prima

PAGE 74

74 facie conceived there to be a greatest prime number or merely conceived of a greatest prime number. Whichever is the case, it is important to notice that grasping greatest prime number does not by itself put one in the position to detect the incoherence. In this section, I have looked at what im plica tions the conceiving of/conceivingthat distinction might have for the zombieargument against physicalism. I argued that there could be a confusion between conceivingof and conceiving that in the argument. If there is such a confusion then it would be particularly hard to detect as one may merely conceive of zo mbies and po ssess all of the non inferential knowledge one would need to conceive that zombies exist. But like some fictions and impossible drawings, we can conceive of zombies even if they are impossible. 4.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed the significance of the distinction between conceivingof and conceiving that. In section 4.1, I considered the objection that the distinction does not really exist. I argued that we do perform an act that we call 'conceiving' that allows us to conceive impossible objects. And conceiving of is that act w hich allows us to conceive impossible objects. In section 4.2, I discussed the relation between conceivingof and conceiving that. Conceiving of is a precondition of conceiving that. I also further discussed the requirements on conceiving that. In order to conceive that p27 one must: (1) first conceive of all x 's that p is about.; and (2) not detect any 27Again, we should keep in mind that one may prima facie conceive that p even if p is contradictory. Hencethe requirement is that we not detect an incoherence rather than there being no incoherence or no detectable coherence, regardless of the amount and quality of rational reflection.

PAGE 75

75 conceptual incoherence in p. There is undoubtedly more to conceiving that but the aim of this section was to give some of the minimal requirements on conceivingthat. In section 4.3, I looked at the zombie argument against physicalism. I argued that one way a physicalist might object to the argument is by pointin g out tha t one who purportedly conceives there to be a world with zombies really is conceiving of zombies. If that confusion is committed by one who alleges to have conceived that zombie worlds exist then the way in which zombies have been conceived does not provide eviden ce that it is pos sible for zombies to exist. And thus, the argument fails to be valid.I further suggested that the way one might conceive of zombies is the way we can conceive of impossible fictions and impossible pictures.We perform these acts by entertaining the appropriate concept, be it simple or complex, and drawing some conclusions which do no t have metaphysical implications.

PAGE 76

76 Figure 1. A Penrose Triangle

PAGE 77

77 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION In this study, I have exam in ed the act of conceiving. The main conclusion of this study is that 'conceive of' denotes a substantively different cognitive act from 'conceive that'. This distinction is useful in explaining confusions one might fall into regarding what is conceivable. Before the main arguments for the distinction I motivated the study by s uggesting that without a better understanding of this act, arguments having premises about what we can conceive may prove to be incorrect. There were two main reasons I suggested they may be incorrect. First, if 'conceive' is used to report distinct acts from premise to premise, then argume nts relying on conceivability claims may be invalid. Second, if conceivability is the same concept as some other concept we thought to be distinct, then some arguments relying on conceivability claims may be question begging. I later argued that acts reported by 'conceive of' and 'conceive that' are distinct acts. A failur e to distinguish the two might result not only in problems with validity and question begging but further confusions as well. One confusion one might fall into is believing that it is conceivable that impossible objects exist. I argued that the confusion lies in thinking one has conceived there to be some im possible object. However, what one has in fact done in such cases is conceive of some type of impossible object. Another way one might be confused regards the level of generality about which one may conceive. I argued that conceiving cannot be done at the level of partic u lars. All conceiving is of general types of things. I argued that a confusion about the level of generality about which we can conceive might lead one to mistakenly argue for phenomenalism.

PAGE 78

78 I then considered the objection that conceiving of is not conceiving at all. I concluded that this objection is mistaken. One might call conceiving of by some other name but it has an intimate relation to conceiving that which warrants the use of the term 'conceiving'. When we conceive of we ent e rtain a concept, whether simple or complex, and figure out application conditions for that concept. This type of act is modeled, albeit inexactly, by reductio ad absurdum. In a reductio we perform the operations necessary to draw a contradiction from an assumption. Conceiving of is analogous to the figuring out part of reductio ad a b surdum but is disanalogous in that conceiving of does not aim at drawing a contradiction. When we conceive that p we must know at least some of the application conditions of the concepts in p. And the mechanism by which we come to know these application condi tions is conceivi ng of. So, conceiving of is a precondition on conceiving that. With this distinction, we might be able to diagnose argumentative mistakes we did not earlier believe to be mistakes. Or, we might have a different understanding of the mistakes we do think have been made in argume nts. I suggested th at this distinction might be useful in diagnosing the mistake made when one apparently conceives that zombies exist. Whether or not zombies are conceivable, it is worth exploring whether the mistake I suggest is made with zombie arguments, as with other arguments that rely on conceivability claims.

PAGE 79

79 LIST OF REFERENCES Berkeley, George 1998 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge edited by Jonathan Dancy (New York: Oxford University Press). Black, Max 1952 The Identity of Indiscernibles in Michael J. Loux (ed.), Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings (New York: Routledge). Chalmers, David 2002 Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? in Tamar Ge ndler and Joh n Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility (New York: Oxford University Press). Hume, David 1978 A Treatise of Human Nature edited by by L. A. Selby Bigge (New York: Oxford University Press). Jackson, Frank 2002 Finding the Mind in the Natural World in David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mi nd: classical and contemporary readings (New York: Oxford University Press). Kripke, Saul 1980 Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Perry, John 1979 The Problem of the Essential Indexical, Nous Vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 3 21. Yablo, Stephen 2000 Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, Pacific Philso phical Quarterly 81, pp. 98 122.

PAGE 80

80 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Kevin Savage received his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Florida in December 2003. Kevin is currently a graduate student in the philosophy department at the University of Florida specializing in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.

PAGE 81

81