<%BANNER%>

The Role of the Pathe in Aristotle's Conception of Virtue

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021776/00001

Material Information

Title: The Role of the Pathe in Aristotle's Conception of Virtue
Physical Description: 1 online resource (59 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Sullivan, Cyrena J
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: aristotle, emotion, ethics, virtue
Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: In this thesis, I undertake an investigation into the nature of Aristotle's conception of virtue in light of the relevance given to the pathe in his account. The centrality of the pathe in Aristotle?s conception of virtue raises several issues. Commentator L.A. Kosman raises a problem for Aristotle's conception of virtue, namely that the pathe that are the manifestations of virtue are not chosen. This creates a tension for Aristotle's account since virtue is supposed to be something that involves choice. Closely related to this problem is the question of how Aristotle might be able to say that the pathe or emotions are under the control of an agent. In order to more adequately address some of these problems, I offer an Aristotelian analysis of emotion along with some commentary on the role played by the pathe in his psychology of action. Utilizing these accounts, I suggest that Aristotle is equipped to address these problems. Specifically, I argue that Aristotle is prepared to offer an account of emotions in which they are under an agent?s control.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Cyrena J Sullivan.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Palmer, John A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021776:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021776/00001

Material Information

Title: The Role of the Pathe in Aristotle's Conception of Virtue
Physical Description: 1 online resource (59 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Sullivan, Cyrena J
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: aristotle, emotion, ethics, virtue
Philosophy -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Philosophy thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: In this thesis, I undertake an investigation into the nature of Aristotle's conception of virtue in light of the relevance given to the pathe in his account. The centrality of the pathe in Aristotle?s conception of virtue raises several issues. Commentator L.A. Kosman raises a problem for Aristotle's conception of virtue, namely that the pathe that are the manifestations of virtue are not chosen. This creates a tension for Aristotle's account since virtue is supposed to be something that involves choice. Closely related to this problem is the question of how Aristotle might be able to say that the pathe or emotions are under the control of an agent. In order to more adequately address some of these problems, I offer an Aristotelian analysis of emotion along with some commentary on the role played by the pathe in his psychology of action. Utilizing these accounts, I suggest that Aristotle is equipped to address these problems. Specifically, I argue that Aristotle is prepared to offer an account of emotions in which they are under an agent?s control.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Cyrena J Sullivan.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Palmer, John A.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021776:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101203_AAAAEW INGEST_TIME 2010-12-04T01:50:30Z PACKAGE UFE0021776_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 72912 DFID F20101203_AACADP ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH sullivan_c_Page_37.pro GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
b952ed25b2439c9a8253180899d28c9a
SHA-1
4f9cc08abaaaf5d94d9f239fa9631c61e14838d7
1870 F20101203_AACAIN sullivan_c_Page_23.txt
33660dcb2da8b5529fd730d87ec91ced
1598a415b3c654dfe0846b4409afad9f4bc73f68
27376 F20101203_AABZYH sullivan_c_Page_39.QC.jpg
da0ab6f3df74f030ffd7a9a936318a13
a813c214075d4037b1686d9eda7e9572651609d4
81851 F20101203_AACADQ sullivan_c_Page_58.jpg
899369d20efed0f0fd8f22045fe3dbda
ea9d113c95139760d4a4353c4ac8c5452ab55420
1335 F20101203_AACAIO sullivan_c_Page_25.txt
5515f944d908bbf63ac2c5e311b6cd4d
e1a3d850af4e20f882d8d0d005e0865fd6c01e32
87094 F20101203_AACADR sullivan_c_Page_39.jpg
582343a68905abb9228208925d5a803c
02798531a8a037c838bc72dc2a5ae97b61b7df71
2599 F20101203_AACAIP sullivan_c_Page_26.txt
d94e4d4b6db4def81cbbb9ce0d8953c0
ec3e515c95be8e41838d8424636b63b2f2002266
73519 F20101203_AABZYI sullivan_c_Page_22.jpg
3d455213a6777b53927eb283973477df
997000968f4280448af05f86edb242e8a5473c9d
1995 F20101203_AACADS sullivan_c_Page_42.txt
3d2da25f9bd70fbc168556920c618e55
386f1c338231193e780897b9bbee070468f618dd
2127 F20101203_AACAIQ sullivan_c_Page_27.txt
34815d58bd77ba134b6fffce44304b9d
599280dc0aee616376bb94fa9b232ad38a356bce
450237 F20101203_AABZYJ sullivan_c_Page_57.jp2
3434bedbf39232e2c4755a3d911b6046
4850f7e09290da208e8b2c26707389953cd940ee
49890 F20101203_AACADT sullivan_c_Page_24.pro
0af7884dac904268ddf26efe87ec4412
c89a68662ddd228f533efb11daf7e56be79a1554
2224 F20101203_AACAIR sullivan_c_Page_30.txt
2e52b80270934dcae3c126877f5116a4
50836b496116c1524ce21c8b80ea30f9c011c0f0
1030660 F20101203_AABZYK sullivan_c_Page_23.jp2
aaa94d2d5e71aa0591476fa8c17c9f78
c92496bd3a25cb3f35a416f6a3814c23ecf60891
25271604 F20101203_AACADU sullivan_c_Page_37.tif
9914f7c61672ac590ef8ac7ba463b5ab
6725c66dcf7e84b5f9dfee9262d627f493abec43
81575 F20101203_AABZYL sullivan_c_Page_31.jpg
177aa1fe3d7aa1b5f086bfca6fae2db8
aff23f75ab5eefd881183b0c058994d7ca56a1b4
55961 F20101203_AACADV sullivan_c_Page_50.pro
a04a923104e43bc307ca7160d3d332ab
53d1218a089119eacc1c97833bc4360b6d6aca3f
2241 F20101203_AACAIS sullivan_c_Page_32.txt
aec52c65baf5e413ce44dd8078e7c4fe
1ccf300adc15e6f4f42d5ba8af3554c2c805ca1e
7505 F20101203_AABZYM sullivan_c_Page_41thm.jpg
503cf70ac448af6ff80339ecfa23f5e6
96fb4f4c92fe0a58db1cf3de994e3f3218b6311d
F20101203_AACADW sullivan_c_Page_15.tif
ef9f305bc0356abd13a8e31020814d0c
63829c184062fbb0fc1efe6d9fc692bfe8b4530d
2041 F20101203_AACAIT sullivan_c_Page_36.txt
1d0c1552e42d2694c69331aaa16e0281
f876e0c56ef74ea6d58b127924e68b4fae468392
1051983 F20101203_AABZYN sullivan_c_Page_27.jp2
dd8b4c15ff20e54842e285040cf80496
cdfecc32a26880efd745ab66ecf949159576bb57
2120 F20101203_AACADX sullivan_c_Page_51.txt
97712a290e3dff10e60a1c3897d9f0da
ed524296be906975685ff67a2728fce20f470774
2144 F20101203_AACAIU sullivan_c_Page_40.txt
11deb8b094522f25f0e5033483c5cdf5
ee095f6631f37739b866d077bc90dec05ea2ecf0
2112 F20101203_AABZYO sullivan_c_Page_16.txt
bebb3d2f04e35b6cd1df41b22aed57c0
d8d9374ee6fbf0d71be8cfdc2aec6e470b450d09
2188 F20101203_AACAIV sullivan_c_Page_41.txt
b1c1040319ccf9acf17884bb3d50030f
b3d83832b36266022d47882cfc158e84c6ebd265
F20101203_AABZYP sullivan_c_Page_49.tif
0d8b505e7b42198a4f4095a8fb4545a3
d053de71d31e9c48729099440dfd1e1c8575c604
79 F20101203_AACABA sullivan_c_Page_02.txt
3173fa045a886a19bfe6af1540865d45
e19fd98609fd6045456931600dcbb716bc52b1a5
7067 F20101203_AACADY sullivan_c_Page_34thm.jpg
a50314bee76b121ea46a422779e8a358
0ae118e109f4bcc19e0905f08449bbe162c5f71e
2226 F20101203_AACAIW sullivan_c_Page_47.txt
4ae85d17d5fdf764fae0603a3f760fe4
580ea5050fa3c1f207c44d05d1dd675b8a89b1ce
1051931 F20101203_AABZYQ sullivan_c_Page_28.jp2
1e3f85b05301efe8c065a1c45e47780c
dfb125c26c241c9652797fe43b0121729c1dc3d9
F20101203_AACABB sullivan_c_Page_28.tif
4984a10ace866eb5a74e3f757f95fc77
47e3e37bc1702fd1b6d6ec2ba069da5814525a28
F20101203_AACADZ sullivan_c_Page_07.tif
53b0e9362233c64839ea4bc7a02696f1
5234a8efb00b7cc867c50d8ae3eb277511dca4e5
2105 F20101203_AACAIX sullivan_c_Page_49.txt
4a7f7d73c8a630276813cf6aced1173c
34f28746c5e66ca6dcbca6a693465d15e65ad45d
2222 F20101203_AABZYR sullivan_c_Page_38.txt
d242eed9a6457e8aba4b7662782e637b
adb1532d879569a7f39fd3f3569ae31b583cb4c6
6911 F20101203_AACABC sullivan_c_Page_35thm.jpg
dd71f03f19c5947ea457b6fc0120172c
a60c860ddb5bc6f9b4bbaab70146eefa3100ab51
F20101203_AACAGA sullivan_c_Page_04.tif
1fd3edfe7fd4a6e50317340cea654f2a
f90290e6478db48713ebd057c9c6169466cf0828
2190 F20101203_AACAIY sullivan_c_Page_50.txt
338f3c16aac3822da421f0c8a5f7868a
46f01ac9f0b6cbd6b3ff068c51d8799705cf1721
1051969 F20101203_AABZYS sullivan_c_Page_49.jp2
4cdf34e7f4469c46bb45764f0ff195c2
812677f6efa5a2c1b5bf71b8640cf32a1b38aced
57559 F20101203_AACABD sullivan_c_Page_10.pro
282c674659373dcfd8ca11282914ca14
d69aa77fc8aff1d497b88e884d2bcb81df6be62c
F20101203_AACAGB sullivan_c_Page_08.tif
f9d54aedffda1f689522f0d9deb02562
1673cefdf3af4af2c49b40ac1c10886417fec25f
2279 F20101203_AACAIZ sullivan_c_Page_52.txt
c19fd61fd222db740cfb839e831d306b
d34e65e7a79e16e1fbcf8156f221e0722fee6781
6957 F20101203_AABZYT sullivan_c_Page_20thm.jpg
ac60fc52c39b1cca1a4c40e250f114fb
c8822de378e872fdd8db9cb16274d938b2edd9a8
F20101203_AACABE sullivan_c_Page_44.tif
8795eaa8756f4249d1a5cae9e4a25e7d
7e854a24a159dfe01a33a1e6e94b36a64cdfad29
F20101203_AACAGC sullivan_c_Page_10.tif
8a3ed8bf34775c18e808d1deef0c7249
f252d848b55de2a9c5e5dd7c983c1f26ad4d1707
81353 F20101203_AABZYU sullivan_c_Page_17.jpg
650594a6c626f66baf21e610cd496ff6
0ca8288c03c584b09d0b080ce0634251f19c5dd9
26139 F20101203_AACABF sullivan_c_Page_07.QC.jpg
584b68d85b4017bd2afe43baf18d3459
81442add1aa7063694e979239de933d96aef2fe1
F20101203_AACAGD sullivan_c_Page_11.tif
e885761be371f19c691a806fe93a73a9
80800859d89ac811133364837260e453a22976f6
84234 F20101203_AABZYV sullivan_c_Page_20.jpg
3c31aceaec8b9552cec5a54580e9c7a3
1f4431fbaa5221c279e4a96d60e3b0b9f2d54b05
83293 F20101203_AACABG sullivan_c_Page_41.jpg
570941fc5c683c931c4a5e24caf4a59b
3a5fe3bb5eab7f95fca293efc0334f3623cb4ffa
F20101203_AACAGE sullivan_c_Page_12.tif
f0c031862809ac0172494ad9595089f3
f33b25069357c7748d8f7f8a09828cb5011aa73b
2344 F20101203_AABZYW sullivan_c_Page_21.txt
b2e6ff93cdd8d7e52f01a13c4b177e63
2b12c5444909c70dba9577f42bb24a1bb08f17cd
53975 F20101203_AACABH sullivan_c_Page_51.pro
f9b337d153941b284d69bac9042f02ea
a4efea9fa382cefeba1c87abfceb3eef1843f1b0
F20101203_AACAGF sullivan_c_Page_13.tif
164cc44bea0dedecdf97d3a67dbbb675
78db477bdabe8da6fa4fc331cd3a9bd554885b3e
97194 F20101203_AABZYX sullivan_c_Page_09.jpg
4fc97bee3bb41e9a40ae0ec718a80974
9d443ad4df61bf20fe59051a7b3d0a4bfa83db97
7463 F20101203_AACABI sullivan_c_Page_39thm.jpg
c9fe4d825190bbe3e23606aac2f51b90
2f249c7f7c078f7f8ca20d2d2a14b4e28a8d5ac5
F20101203_AACAGG sullivan_c_Page_14.tif
0db17d6514bf34267841cc52af118d4a
a3a9de0e92e4108a9ad5b231a1483c3b58bb9025
25365 F20101203_AABZWA sullivan_c_Page_28.QC.jpg
3fb0bf7b04fb522c2a4fdb4fd514b5fa
48e446a5b9cf991cbae8f3c5decf6148fe8ff1b9
1624 F20101203_AABZYY sullivan_c_Page_59thm.jpg
fb19916b9c0bee6b2258ca4f82e08706
772b489719327da022be4bc768432a9309837509
1051950 F20101203_AACABJ sullivan_c_Page_38.jp2
be68bb2e63715d66857eb60da0891b48
bf10be53c26cb8e17fda72697f480b446611a701
F20101203_AACAGH sullivan_c_Page_19.tif
67861770c5a366a3f9c58185291bce2a
05c2dca95c9aa370c52cec4cdd5797bf7718eab2
8631 F20101203_AABZWB sullivan_c_Page_13.QC.jpg
bbb0cc97e261e9cf79adbd367b84cf08
1207b2cdf18e1636615400c8a3cc570cef73e7ab
1051955 F20101203_AABZYZ sullivan_c_Page_17.jp2
82461ce277349da7ba852b374289e6df
e1185b6b3fb581268efcb6ed967af18549dd16ab
1051971 F20101203_AACABK sullivan_c_Page_51.jp2
007de174e8fa5d647afbe4a1d5ba42be
d323be6c384f75ca6993090f7ef9b67d2b200a68
F20101203_AACAGI sullivan_c_Page_20.tif
cb990f87dc40cbed8c99309f95c37ea3
6975a070185557d7baa0f9270c8b6f663337d513
F20101203_AABZWC sullivan_c_Page_39.tif
d02d8e8a77293f4951a17e3d295d0ac3
5b57b403f9d3e84ef97290c036a92ea9becfd8d1
F20101203_AACAGJ sullivan_c_Page_21.tif
d0a9371e9984f9e412875924b0e160ca
e8a7ef854d7f2908caead71b82a3c95cf44a0974
7251 F20101203_AABZWD sullivan_c_Page_53thm.jpg
94dcfdab1580fa5ee816bf763e86ff5a
889681b6fda91a64925c198fa0ceeb4900539bc3
85694 F20101203_AACABL sullivan_c_Page_45.jpg
fc2a7a15e8d0b9f5c8777c6409976bb8
b42d5c6e42793eb8c4c238c59c9c1491c0b73056
F20101203_AACAGK sullivan_c_Page_29.tif
5405fbd4ff5438279f6d1cc26b44a9d8
92abebfbc3c1aa7925c59b998cce99855f775cfd
746981 F20101203_AABZWE sullivan_c_Page_25.jp2
40e4db1d9b7fc22e070746669aa300b0
2dc2d9822898381001b62c0875199e674c280c58
26067 F20101203_AACABM sullivan_c_Page_17.QC.jpg
896dc9cacbb5602b0d61744f4890b95f
2c58a5ecd962edab5229dbaf7ef07f03367d4341
F20101203_AACAGL sullivan_c_Page_30.tif
7beabefb85837b0c567b0f7570975110
dbf8af51ac4617606557736c78e4f3ddd634b667
F20101203_AABZWF sullivan_c_Page_50.tif
353a281123c37b84c6594d2983539d6b
f3ca43469208acccf66a661c260b8a9f2e5f9f23
82921 F20101203_AACABN sullivan_c_Page_16.jpg
758972ee680074478b6d1b00768d1846
f1612327e41d7b6ded4d7d73f5375b5d5ad4fcff
F20101203_AACAGM sullivan_c_Page_31.tif
a7e7bd7dc5013317537069907bc2330a
3d4b01074e5c42f576c51be1928d0c4479ea9721
6813 F20101203_AACABO sullivan_c_Page_44thm.jpg
92990d14c2b32699ef284f415f997158
47ad24e6abd18cae79ad3c704286a102826e36b0
F20101203_AACAGN sullivan_c_Page_35.tif
478ae34511505ded4701934d0497984a
52784b6bbc3ac8c3150f705f7f97f43d82e5b28e
28602 F20101203_AABZWG sullivan_c_Page_37.QC.jpg
321767af0d360a8b59101a52161e174e
10fc97bd6d7a8c1154b81fa5246ea17c13eee987
1051976 F20101203_AACABP sullivan_c_Page_42.jp2
1281792b08f5e5c53fc683b92da91fae
c7cc8015d350e9af7ccd23b4eaab98103608fdcb
F20101203_AACAGO sullivan_c_Page_38.tif
76b3e35d0680531761c4bc1fe2bd4922
72f3011416bc443619ff53566925043afef56ba1
68220 F20101203_AABZWH sullivan_c_Page_09.pro
e4d98b5c8d2f297121bfc162f4988a9b
c68bee1e5e025eb61600288f357fe996a4a6ab79
75881 F20101203_AACABQ sullivan_c_Page_14.jpg
24639d382865b93c6031f4ca91d919ef
e1891d1df81e1c44f40b9673c382090ef91c9571
F20101203_AACAGP sullivan_c_Page_40.tif
4f6b31c6c11813c4e89ebc29e7e4167c
009e83980dc8021061d8abdb1a980406bdcc798e
58055 F20101203_AABZWI sullivan_c_Page_21.pro
f3c2914987d2351b6e5baa5c0ea28f96
c25e6245d82c6c3704de992d29b815223abce4c0
2047 F20101203_AACABR sullivan_c_Page_18.txt
6712e04c89023c9412afbbe0acbb225a
32b25c84035c9daa0770b5b2b20559bf263c5841
53737 F20101203_AABZWJ sullivan_c_Page_33.pro
d6882e3b529331c9d0697630c4bca457
08821f6eec389b8cab5734bbccda96e2d786aa98
90741 F20101203_AACABS sullivan_c_Page_11.jpg
b672fd3ad4a098381b3db4ea8d5de504
6ac01ca7d6fb87cac186a39fe815488700b494d0
F20101203_AACAGQ sullivan_c_Page_41.tif
0d6718f0354eb5adcde6235c116d4f38
79d689f076564e44e37e03c9a5fb71ba2cac7a9d
89196 F20101203_AABZWK sullivan_c_Page_52.jpg
fe75aa49787c3b816311edb59804ebd2
cf84298b2004f13e3fc69506fa142bf54bf5baae
25536 F20101203_AACABT sullivan_c_Page_42.QC.jpg
aa725f0f4a554a9e7f56ca3165f18509
a8dcab26ba9b8bd4a16fa2b65fbe78b4dd42e4a9
F20101203_AACAGR sullivan_c_Page_45.tif
7fc0ef15fd0405b6f27d362c81d5eaf9
dede2f57677e631722dc8540acd79c6ab051a23b
1051928 F20101203_AABZWL sullivan_c_Page_54.jp2
f351a3b8b47531b9877c24d80b9e6750
83fc5a1eec7a17f0a1a8d2b3ea2e5b08c60d0282
1051978 F20101203_AACABU sullivan_c_Page_07.jp2
358dcec384830d88a7412dfca84524c8
fd94b099fdb5c647c949a6453eb00393ada63257
F20101203_AACAGS sullivan_c_Page_46.tif
911360f8b59ad00f5d1f59293e9c7f4b
75c6e9078622d549dddeb56697a36a7210e28e44
2322 F20101203_AABZWM sullivan_c_Page_28.txt
083b67bdec20285e52955aa252ea01c0
f57751a88f4cbb31e52fdcb77d2df26e6b335b36
51957 F20101203_AACABV sullivan_c_Page_34.pro
59f77e5158107ace69017008a3c05cfb
25c374a92f918babd73a10e88d03926fc1647a6b
F20101203_AACAGT sullivan_c_Page_52.tif
c3c9eee78a0a4e8af64a338b66653bc5
6838fbd5da3f3787b3d611f8ad2738678d024737
83280 F20101203_AABZWN sullivan_c_Page_51.jpg
b85a1d514e80134b2c0644d3aa7d6c46
cf8b103cbe8b3449c2b051f6d76f518aab9e6cb7
188323 F20101203_AACABW sullivan_c_Page_04.jp2
0136f8a50f531bf4422c6f91f44eab96
58281de948962a87ff3a6fd42fb098de1472f412
27104 F20101203_AABZWO sullivan_c_Page_43.QC.jpg
257ee0dc5efc402724aa3d681d018b3d
7a507b2d6bc1e0b2424547fb58e0a61ae1f07515
84968 F20101203_AACABX sullivan_c_Page_12.jpg
476b40590f5b17c97ec2762bf1b9602f
3ecc2fb4026194fabe0d10590d25c18078fbd6ff
F20101203_AACAGU sullivan_c_Page_53.tif
f0348469f5bc47cadd9c759889eda6cb
c6423af24434bb1f296664c062544641f8104dfb
1051930 F20101203_AABZWP sullivan_c_Page_39.jp2
a107d5202c580cefdc74a2f47ac26a30
ad18a25b8b9a9c824ccc406a348f392bfff05198
F20101203_AACABY sullivan_c_Page_16.tif
43bd5b240dd163ce3eeb7b252cc285c9
25a50e3b8f77ec20c578426fc99983f5a0857ea2
F20101203_AACAGV sullivan_c_Page_55.tif
a51a4a94819e9df8c592728fd969b96f
2a1c8496853c540456d205b7fc9afd9b6c55102c
F20101203_AABZWQ sullivan_c_Page_01.tif
988a4f01d53b5446c2c647035145357e
8e5137879e8a4fabacdfd322b8b26155dba04038
F20101203_AACABZ sullivan_c_Page_26.tif
e6081b11ff2cba5df1c501c719bfb819
1ca3c78a038b2968f0ba096095ead9eea38de973
F20101203_AACAGW sullivan_c_Page_58.tif
bcc3d09b5ac09f5f7f4fdc4a8a500173
d7aa310cfba74de32b8c95947c0202e3cda115ec
F20101203_AACAGX sullivan_c_Page_59.tif
581ee493efc153075cb0eee00edcc373
0f1ba6f64226ee427d223f890fcca7ca10827838
82 F20101203_AABZWR sullivan_c_Page_03.txt
950ae12a6b3b3cdd3d7b4459343ae72f
2ff98a24e3a2cb2c168181fa3ed3d33fe66a98df
7034 F20101203_AACAEA sullivan_c_Page_49thm.jpg
d1a2d3e5d231dbbb0ce94a83dbc221df
2249fcc9ea49af09a6cb73275a46ea10201ed1f2
626 F20101203_AACAGY sullivan_c_Page_03.pro
399b2d4e40fa037fe14c5b1cb3b4e40e
abe5a175e6c78d30d348f3a258dd28240c1b9ba3
83981 F20101203_AABZWS sullivan_c_Page_33.jpg
ca35f701edde70bae67e4e22dcdae5b9
db74163eaa64180ab10f4db4c357979eb6c50c70
F20101203_AACAEB sullivan_c_Page_02.tif
449c5e80f7fdd56609b28d6659381eca
38d582679e15d33eba486eb6a0c7b805eee1d376
65949 F20101203_AACAGZ sullivan_c_Page_05.pro
ebd0e7f79c36cdb1198c88908af07218
7d019d5d55dcf97eb0dda8a4736c67b1452d6452
1963 F20101203_AABZWT sullivan_c_Page_14.txt
6fc12a79ecead81ec0e3ff451a7396f6
1efc7bdc3d1894307b415555eeed3a62bdc169b6
F20101203_AACAEC sullivan_c_Page_51.tif
e55f6043be13704cbb5d9cd4a35c8387
69ef232b50a9d58450a1eea1e858ece06f69f0d1
F20101203_AABZWU sullivan_c_Page_44.jp2
5823641d9d4dd1852af579a46cbc9b0a
ad6d6a367fbf78eb9e66ffb186c4fe7cd3e631ca
801 F20101203_AACAJA sullivan_c_Page_57.txt
2c6f0b34dd27c744c2d0eb86e84e29a9
68dbc4d6b1996b19def76ca546907125e704e1e1
6266 F20101203_AACAED sullivan_c_Page_15thm.jpg
13a4ca144db62f1a7f2171d0808d778f
39e0e8fd0c164ff0274b02f077e877c520c7c75e
7313 F20101203_AABZWV sullivan_c_Page_01.pro
4c623bf8c536e93a44af0a9460a47e43
2d662900f63b337fef6c4079284fc9635c5cfe1f
2169 F20101203_AACAJB sullivan_c_Page_58.txt
d21cb62f617c4033ed696af9905a0f1d
a1221d4c7c83811a9aa5db77922790ad9247290a
236095 F20101203_AACAEE sullivan_c.pdf
405ea53b835759659bea4ae8628cdac7
536b6246b0764765c0f071203a036725df303a1d
86693 F20101203_AABZWW sullivan_c_Page_10.jpg
0863defcc151c18c5583440692136e35
e60fa5a29d18146a9cb0ef818d0938397e1edb85
145 F20101203_AACAJC sullivan_c_Page_59.txt
04527a8a0625be36c3a3e18eceb2956f
08539747d671cab4f28f3ec8c77901cbe09522b5
1981 F20101203_AACAEF sullivan_c_Page_35.txt
05fff10d40657290f1d4612a7ea842d9
70c3f90c6ea1f9358f4e0ea373e474cfc51df812
1913 F20101203_AABZWX sullivan_c_Page_22.txt
ea2757d10e7214e85da3819674febd81
e52ddd4c4d5d491955a1bebf15a8096b992a043c
7057 F20101203_AACAJD sullivan_c_Page_01.QC.jpg
7f578edb1d4a1ab6f82f26bcb2034d28
058aba092285d0f40eae93748988976a2dcba5b5
19750 F20101203_AACAEG sullivan_c_Page_19.QC.jpg
7a6e5633a2936ee1bcb0b9209daff393
a7cc1e88b3812a072800cdda05f064457f4e8bd9
2173 F20101203_AABZWY sullivan_c_Page_43.txt
d04a78834c063aa62ac293bbcb7ff959
43f46b8546e6381f1e8c97f3021a78249ca4d4bf
5989 F20101203_AACAJE sullivan_c_Page_04.QC.jpg
383859ccfe43cda824379a061c693a6e
5ba5a644fc7204a8f8fc0ecfd8803bed2eb32a1e
24724 F20101203_AACAEH sullivan_c_Page_34.QC.jpg
3021aaa949404967919bcae2cc210a16
5dfa6598fb1d3dfb5333049405986bbd7277c32d
2983 F20101203_AABZWZ sullivan_c_Page_03.QC.jpg
fd91ed5a659ec0ce5ee831b0f910849a
4757d6eb7ff0b48d3d792042f43ad4df646e4d84
2145 F20101203_AACAJF sullivan_c_Page_04thm.jpg
923db8721a5e2b29575f325e55da3f7b
cd118cb212e90a0dbde515d7ff200048da055d9b
91585 F20101203_AACAEI UFE0021776_00001.xml FULL
5b412e2151af7e1a8eba09f5620796d6
9d75209c08df1c2186c548b3016b2035c55efe79
18322 F20101203_AACAJG sullivan_c_Page_05.QC.jpg
27f59b1e91a6dc6637f83b7ed006f835
aa7011d87fb841b67799de9835413d547498969e
F20101203_AABZZA sullivan_c_Page_54.tif
7387cb75807269037a255d4860b14cf3
eb23b335ac333cf9a9cbf14b449eb2289e3c9e82
4723 F20101203_AACAJH sullivan_c_Page_05thm.jpg
19bb9718f91e755ae84d7d56cc9f4df6
4227300b290f9293b9f1202d03c5ec81018c505c
F20101203_AABZZB sullivan_c_Page_17.tif
ba0953bd27e7ce2fb6935542fcd8c292
a33a90ca0a3e2a35844bad6c4049aab06eab7ac4
27387 F20101203_AACAJI sullivan_c_Page_08.QC.jpg
575d6c8b323ce92cf0c54d482d233a46
3dbe161540269ca1cae101edad62c6e6fade476c
63429 F20101203_AABZZC sullivan_c_Page_26.pro
9ca7a57da9356127494e0cc853c503dd
2286a919e94e59dc48451b3291ca264d23e1ff4f
9624 F20101203_AACAEL sullivan_c_Page_03.jpg
595e316b6b0fedebe4b02531e14024f0
be905c2f23e436a333cfd3547ddfd9ae7762b259
7342 F20101203_AACAJJ sullivan_c_Page_08thm.jpg
57bd530801acc363866d15183e088150
eee50ae01817d15b1d347691f5f93023ed1d48cc
2216 F20101203_AABZZD sullivan_c_Page_29.txt
3dd95a2fd071bbf5de463fb19978f8bd
5125ad6d1e399fd0ba02e7440f395d30fa3bc7c1
20531 F20101203_AACAEM sullivan_c_Page_04.jpg
f2d8a8a5ae8e0af5bd5a7d537327ac43
49f30adcd5a006522028e096d23497ab2fa1a208
7113 F20101203_AACAJK sullivan_c_Page_09thm.jpg
05cfe39ef5051430935e5425298e2520
a72eb335c049de22ed30823acf9b3a662129fedf
18282 F20101203_AABZZE sullivan_c_Page_03.jp2
4c9d053f352fd9b28a6dd1b9620769e3
c3af548ecdf18c2c80956e0e2e9ac6ce70f54c12
64983 F20101203_AACAEN sullivan_c_Page_05.jpg
ea9b1da5e71a26470a318510a7bffd2e
c32d865e82141d3b5661bb9adae2dde23a3e782e
7320 F20101203_AACAJL sullivan_c_Page_11thm.jpg
3b387323c83668f29a01c2c40fcab926
a2ef28a957d84239f5039ff8e0f288c3d143db98
23253 F20101203_AABZZF sullivan_c_Page_23.QC.jpg
3869f0afb67a488eed7aa2285eb0d24c
d19f5e05810c29474e2b7350598ad55b5735bc64
24147 F20101203_AACAJM sullivan_c_Page_14.QC.jpg
a7ff0db3557d52c6fb90d88fd4afdc99
155bbe2347ef378ad566f0fd959114044e338eac
F20101203_AABZZG sullivan_c_Page_20.jp2
a51467f53bfe10500001bfe6bf14e2aa
512c1b669565c4d7be91ff586d40bf4d161694d9
83983 F20101203_AACAEO sullivan_c_Page_07.jpg
a7d7638888947dd49b566c84fb32a1dd
d235f8ee533c1ae32dd7bb26bf5827ad3e8c8ba8
6344 F20101203_AACAJN sullivan_c_Page_14thm.jpg
6f64fe567df9756020c9e3fa73e45098
5086320d64af6f01c1357304c759f331fba7fd55
7371 F20101203_AABZZH sullivan_c_Page_29thm.jpg
10bab7ec3696eb883cec002d0980fd1c
972db0b9f4f0954d2080246347a5b72af8e85ec5
90132 F20101203_AACAEP sullivan_c_Page_08.jpg
d73ae9fa604092060a001aa70a25db4a
51a9cce0c00f10df0a82fd9a14d3e2af038078d1
25597 F20101203_AACAJO sullivan_c_Page_16.QC.jpg
6c2bc61ecb0cb003d631b9f9b02427bc
e1130419b184bbc5d2869faad82a110cd56543e3
7233 F20101203_AABZZI sullivan_c_Page_26thm.jpg
e7b6259571600679904ad5ae67b57768
25dd657c85bf315065494be60df24846921d06f0
26629 F20101203_AACAEQ sullivan_c_Page_13.jpg
c760d77786fa5d99c8204b622b4111d4
ae0edb5da6c33f0088f15e82185946eefec1f707
7353 F20101203_AACAJP sullivan_c_Page_16thm.jpg
4bc0fc55a59de0093323409275ec8bcd
17e32fe4f0160dbb58472f22cf0eab357b680173
80100 F20101203_AACAER sullivan_c_Page_18.jpg
d2f2300cddf9707b662e7a6eb303f134
9d93226e6c83ed79b4918b15898893c6ff53b788
7192 F20101203_AACAJQ sullivan_c_Page_17thm.jpg
e3932b13c4a1825535ffba2cfa310caf
90d2c631bd145b4dc10edfda4f2f7a2a4dffd6e2
6872 F20101203_AABZZJ sullivan_c_Page_24thm.jpg
d77827b8cab1a293f5a62ce2478b8ca7
2c40f9c1c72df417c21cc1794aa75285d9a0a108
73961 F20101203_AACAES sullivan_c_Page_23.jpg
6296cbd91a12f0fabd2f021e15e5ea8c
527e951c8aeae3d451ac6603e26d0b3c627d0c1f
2248 F20101203_AABZZK sullivan_c_Page_45.txt
5d21aae75c84c69b30bdafdcd5d9c609
fc622b61861cbd43c8f32716dcfde6a593b7fb26
85818 F20101203_AACAET sullivan_c_Page_28.jpg
51ff059b064ee8675a3396f0845098c9
6d88b65eb10c47fe15218c829dee8517e57293fd
5920 F20101203_AACAJR sullivan_c_Page_19thm.jpg
14ef534991767081c11c211a8ff1340c
4215a82a40897a9a1d68e07449f9e6820cf03db2
74572 F20101203_AABZZL sullivan_c_Page_59.jp2
51697e041324f2624099951687141fa2
1684a7606d1500869eb387bb8af357122a423689
80795 F20101203_AACAEU sullivan_c_Page_34.jpg
b28f60328c80776f6acfbfdd1431fc0a
b6d7c21851e528f03458e6cb780ce8b5c103628b
23287 F20101203_AACAJS sullivan_c_Page_22.QC.jpg
51409f5086c0bd428f014be767871f6d
5fdc83aee285f310065a7b932b78937e462d1ddd
2154 F20101203_AABZZM sullivan_c_Page_12.txt
f1877a013e4745caaa08610ea7f77dc4
110b56c23461293ef687e2073913ccfab4dc8073
101151 F20101203_AACAEV sullivan_c_Page_37.jpg
963fb9227369c5aeb15378ada013895c
147df01f21fa418b8c863ea342d5b41dc6c9cf33
84295 F20101203_AACAEW sullivan_c_Page_40.jpg
797ac3007ecaf92ce13b9a6246a216d1
d6f31c11efe484a62bfaf25311a6cd6e6b629b27
6693 F20101203_AACAJT sullivan_c_Page_22thm.jpg
4991f29a458d9c8d52edfd1a9c200f12
e0918e830f75fad47cc2e920a2b087673bbcf90b
2285 F20101203_AABZZN sullivan_c_Page_56.txt
3f52b344f2595ca0530da8dc240c30a8
d30fb31d2a419b1de85ee4527cd7a8bf383c8b40
80694 F20101203_AACAEX sullivan_c_Page_42.jpg
7511afa3ce5d04683b9da411ae29fd1e
5b8c594f1e93a5706468121e41c0b1ad9b7190e5
6692 F20101203_AACAJU sullivan_c_Page_23thm.jpg
130f1d62f6b871743ff6229b2b599f64
8eae6a4730e20fc52624eae65ee1fc255406d540
F20101203_AABZZO sullivan_c_Page_09.tif
a6cdea8b1d3e8ff455fa5e3695edeccd
68057b0cebe828cf766d690e7027e257a06d59a0
25831 F20101203_AACACA sullivan_c_Page_20.QC.jpg
1fe00728b28b5af60c10e438c61ef4ee
ed56683f3175301d320510c0655cdb0f1a94631e
85337 F20101203_AACAEY sullivan_c_Page_43.jpg
6e57b63741136367315fbfcf64125b9f
28a38cca51f5c8de24bed1790a7f8860279ba955
24997 F20101203_AACAJV sullivan_c_Page_24.QC.jpg
f4500721ef550bde1e38a7daa5b430e1
cc6f3f7b678f7597ce9d5aa1ef1d48da045426bd
F20101203_AABZZP sullivan_c_Page_56.tif
14226d6ab011e252151c719d108b0200
bd1b9ea435ef2c1ee7431c98972fcdf3eff56aff
23303 F20101203_AACACB sullivan_c_Page_15.QC.jpg
8f85f6e7769c80afa96b01cdb124bb03
1ed97a66c1eae1bdb03d9542234f98013c36e37c
85958 F20101203_AACAEZ sullivan_c_Page_46.jpg
b80895ceeb7f77d5427221e55cb1bb55
0dd7e434e140674b679a90ccd1ac9a5d7d4f1b54
17536 F20101203_AACAJW sullivan_c_Page_25.QC.jpg
5cd56fbfc35e5426dc1b4e1f7bb88101
da094dec363e50f490e7ba16a3db80b60f20f887
2184 F20101203_AABZZQ sullivan_c_Page_54.txt
e37ffe0cb3c2874b862d4990ffbfe492
d8d02d8031dd6197217680fe439dc8ee154bbc91
24861 F20101203_AACACC sullivan_c_Page_18.QC.jpg
4cc8f1c576a4cc1151f0aad9a178216c
7dc0916d3289dc07c0ce257e4e51a8b7c48138e2
2179 F20101203_AABZUU sullivan_c_Page_07.txt
66b304e376eb9463cbbb1f993c4e4232
f34adf939d76e06c46c408ee75831f6821f73a5b
26574 F20101203_AACAJX sullivan_c_Page_26.QC.jpg
d7793120a3ea7f5622d23a6a5f148830
c1deecfc2ae031a9f0fe1e91a52641d6db8835cc
5240 F20101203_AABZZR sullivan_c_Page_55thm.jpg
8d7aa3e7ef3b0d90ba8c63113565487d
dc89adb254f4f632baca0609f1aba9060a9fbf5d
992657 F20101203_AACACD sullivan_c_Page_15.jp2
4f8dd4a4302b9792e1e9bd64cb04513f
573065e6a53fa3c90fa520339773ce0e527dc7ed
56724 F20101203_AABZUV sullivan_c_Page_47.pro
f7c45608889654d7fdc04e90f20246d9
7e8257c2853e6a773b1e275eb34ff8adf1632bbf
35661 F20101203_AACAHA sullivan_c_Page_06.pro
b8a7642d0ff33a42cc64afa9265bfb5a
1d147b7638b02d118dc609a20505be4da3424e79
7202 F20101203_AACAJY sullivan_c_Page_27thm.jpg
f8808eefeb381ee4e347adca88a2f2e8
e29e3fa03566c7f2916c830d5743a7c901110846
63487 F20101203_AABZZS sullivan_c_Page_19.jpg
7c64dc718f43deafe7a57a0fce3e8e9f
873101e6b70578894359f79223cfd55118807936
47127 F20101203_AABZUW sullivan_c_Page_14.pro
7676cc7d55c14e731d40234fe29e26e0
b6259c028d0efc31a6ac0209c9e988b5d557effa
59097 F20101203_AACAHB sullivan_c_Page_08.pro
c86fb64a42f37df203a3a3645210941d
e120ce73843d3d2dbed4a534594cf3bdbf7e9228
7521 F20101203_AACAJZ sullivan_c_Page_30thm.jpg
13215801ec7f09c68ede662048fbdbdb
b46bc13fdbd080b5a12bbf006d77ff4048ea01f2
2799 F20101203_AABZZT sullivan_c_Page_59.pro
033df03ed5077c6de6460560134200a4
0c4b4cd78bac056dac9a6b4a7b27cb189f7a3f38
86684 F20101203_AACACE sullivan_c_Page_32.jpg
27ffda76fa9bc12ef6e7f3ce244d90dd
665723a5103d2ddd031bb275979d3e316a22a3b2
87198 F20101203_AABZUX sullivan_c_Page_30.jpg
b836dc43bda142a5b5ae9583f0c60f0e
31917d07b8408e686ef47c27cebabda608fd6c37
63646 F20101203_AACAHC sullivan_c_Page_11.pro
cb649a56f142fb8b42da4fbb5391a3fe
6db2b74b986de30ee9d89b4da6e2e7297e7596b6
1051982 F20101203_AABZZU sullivan_c_Page_48.jp2
0a40e47abb2df71b747f52f33853f77f
29e316bef58ef6d2dd7e99613194ecf83549df3f
F20101203_AACACF sullivan_c_Page_34.tif
63fa8878d4e0863376a21df5de6ff21e
e9ad99e16c64843dd06062fe90ab4b2a4fd0a987
89080 F20101203_AABZUY sullivan_c_Page_21.jpg
a176e7ab66d19c183be71c96d4d0fd23
5c52f3779440aba8d059bdf5ac0d277abc7c89a6
54335 F20101203_AACAHD sullivan_c_Page_12.pro
d8b9423c7f3c136962d179d941cc174f
9ac4dbec08ea7b6ec8cfd3e8816d6e7ffda1e693
84460 F20101203_AABZZV sullivan_c_Page_53.jpg
964aace0a3319ac0d0b0905c0e02e2c9
5c9afd6bf16de55bba3276ea8a633e4a6ec5ea5e
3089 F20101203_AACACG sullivan_c_Page_02.QC.jpg
e45fc88e54219bdadf8902486191274c
9f607bd3a5510feb9935fdd4c9634ed80eda76ec
27813 F20101203_AABZUZ sullivan_c_Page_30.QC.jpg
382019d2527738a85520022be182d254
ec4a673fb8d9ba0a418ca0dda87bf2331f03512e
12453 F20101203_AACAHE sullivan_c_Page_13.pro
9aa9bfabc00b4d87b4980e05920d9376
b7ecb0f13c3cf247f0afe3d0293f50ad0baa2294
1051947 F20101203_AABZZW sullivan_c_Page_29.jp2
b7153c7c2173e20599eadcd044e659f2
14e9cd67dca7d2f667855ccd3c970b830611ba57
1051949 F20101203_AACACH sullivan_c_Page_33.jp2
063cdc7524ae292dba56348efb0b6079
bd024fe3e894ec8e3f7d45617ad6bdfd976e2a35
45823 F20101203_AACAHF sullivan_c_Page_15.pro
cc21b0ca69c29f999a42feb88c492564
96eeba388f710b263a20e0ff33b7d50a4b45c00f
1051965 F20101203_AABZZX sullivan_c_Page_36.jp2
c9e62e1c20fa38aab7d5701db0c81d49
807b0e313c7f6ef480e34bb37a5a58f4a2f49a5a
1026817 F20101203_AACACI sullivan_c_Page_14.jp2
64fa4f716a5a2adaa99dda22f94991e2
3508be62f5bf92009be4cc08ef4d71419057ffd9
53285 F20101203_AACAHG sullivan_c_Page_16.pro
0dd8f35ff810e816bdb0c9805db26ee0
5125ed575518116657ffdaad0fb96298fdc28c11
83721 F20101203_AABZXA sullivan_c_Page_27.jpg
26180fa466f566b45bf5501e39e2048f
96b4cd0b1050414d5a7a1494c3d8c688be1da120
1306 F20101203_AABZZY sullivan_c_Page_03thm.jpg
5748da2fd2b02b33d9a7405da997dad7
ad95f14c41a4c74bdba3908bfff729de49ee179e
7002 F20101203_AACACJ sullivan_c_Page_18thm.jpg
405dff0b7cc097cae70c64c4de907376
d5d436a5655a6742ff73a64f7aeaf4d5c4217cf9
53275 F20101203_AACAHH sullivan_c_Page_17.pro
e722669fb9724f35fc237f87ec49585e
d6f9be3efe8e22203afcf14be49e8e74e1d93b92
788386 F20101203_AABZXB sullivan_c_Page_55.jp2
a18b33dd7d4667f37965bf7c1f7db007
d74da5ca63c93b39b98bae2f0984f7bf9497efe1
F20101203_AABZZZ sullivan_c_Page_48.tif
53d14b57d483631ec587c65e98f6a205
71dbafd2e02036bf844ee9f4e31ce0159577c367
5461 F20101203_AACACK sullivan_c_Page_06thm.jpg
cb112ae7274b3d942fca80223f0ede9d
7b0677c63b12b374a32431535361ce63569d19c6
40544 F20101203_AACAHI sullivan_c_Page_19.pro
4e930644ed7ceb11c14b6fcc00f5a964
c74bce3c36b565dae709303ca896b84d2799cc5d
F20101203_AABZXC sullivan_c_Page_24.txt
a8a114c05cdb2ab5e472e9045c1a63dd
d9ac5254b7078f77dfe91e309863ca395fe28493
18977 F20101203_AACACL sullivan_c_Page_06.QC.jpg
fc515c80066871f357227a910010d354
2c7c19fa8ec3a3c1238bcaaf286c9d156163bfdb
47277 F20101203_AACAHJ sullivan_c_Page_23.pro
0872692f3ca8f7eeaf01ff498b78db18
4380aff0c5f661676e5a7c847f39931ebf313159
56317 F20101203_AABZXD sullivan_c_Page_29.pro
e94c03433e7bfd3a8098426ce5737743
094a1e689c3fdc377924cc20babdb35a42ca0f31
33556 F20101203_AACAHK sullivan_c_Page_25.pro
338972d2bdf37fca7ccda46874c9c764
14366b7dfa4cae0039a45151a152d5a15e7e8cf3
56710 F20101203_AABZXE sullivan_c_Page_38.pro
6a9e140b2b419bc7151d523732445880
e1fcd031fec449af7ee5276b784b949e130dadec
F20101203_AACACM sullivan_c_Page_23.tif
e174ff988e389becbc4abcbf44e6a317
76e302734796f9398b615d6fd6cb0e8a1b604382
53937 F20101203_AACAHL sullivan_c_Page_27.pro
8232822095e5fb05972f2f4c0d38f919
1bfe0c176e45c9022d0f6638c922917fd2a7da30
26978 F20101203_AABZXF sullivan_c_Page_54.QC.jpg
cd671428fe98fc811e5794472e0c435a
d9e73704d0ed9d67ee7d730e0b276451cd7f95fb
7054 F20101203_AACACN sullivan_c_Page_21thm.jpg
a55885994f573da2285e4953cbd8aef5
68dd0b866199ee64fd6b6e32e80e7231bb54c47e
56633 F20101203_AACAHM sullivan_c_Page_30.pro
e61ee3c85539e73688ea493ca90ede74
4abb02bd5c4f90fac821e9911706fcc8ffa85b53
1343 F20101203_AABZXG sullivan_c_Page_02thm.jpg
68fa4b40821b2248314804c33885a414
1498a88ab2d8d2cc2a246a191e324a98b118a9ef
26271 F20101203_AACACO sullivan_c_Page_49.QC.jpg
a14b4e7e3b660779fcfb7380c1c94a3c
3bd1491e85bf64cb53585fa5b521d176eba58000
52119 F20101203_AACAHN sullivan_c_Page_31.pro
07b01a00d30f42084e3e680ffe10ae55
90fe26698d6cd8cc7c062dea41d2d5a1eb36bb27
27189 F20101203_AACACP sullivan_c_Page_09.QC.jpg
edf72f9418e51726cfcb277ef8c43d05
a8333b0cad13e0ccacc2f3ca94f0b38fb93b3d60
56790 F20101203_AACAHO sullivan_c_Page_32.pro
8134d6eb07e3c70f517e3c5d39c19fd6
d7fc8b9042c9244c2b3d7950f50bf61dad614fc8
F20101203_AABZXH sullivan_c_Page_18.tif
442de1c70411d737bdf8dd295690c567
4df64d4c27d396d163c82b39351187fcda14d1db
22834 F20101203_AACACQ sullivan_c_Page_58.QC.jpg
ac804aca69157b5889eb6086b1d95711
0285d37e7f9f09db894d2e2094ad09169794a2c8
56281 F20101203_AACAHP sullivan_c_Page_39.pro
635ea22a5522a6e9fb1ce42e4fd76ce9
c830df7fee58e7d962222aab4def688f0b9b790e
86321 F20101203_AABZXI sullivan_c_Page_50.jpg
3da18b798fd1d261666d32c6c7feca4f
3d1d62d92e10a46f43736c8db70fb45d26841035
F20101203_AACACR sullivan_c_Page_42.tif
4b963455809ceb2cb7904cf87ec22780
7eab2ab78d219555fe4fa969e325d431377e1faa
54353 F20101203_AACAHQ sullivan_c_Page_40.pro
fc5fee15ee51d6a5f3a9542e585432b7
72e467b3d885560b95d64fbdf2e4d83f2fb48c0f
26578 F20101203_AABZXJ sullivan_c_Page_33.QC.jpg
cf8602adc24ead59d6b70421b3d0012d
3154bdca3f791a71198f11c4d3b2a7cceae6048e
7504 F20101203_AACACS sullivan_c_Page_32thm.jpg
a0099ed199dfb3c94748b7519cdeacae
482b46c82c131abe9fd7e7d268ae9cb6f18541f6
7464 F20101203_AABZXK sullivan_c_Page_50thm.jpg
c1c88cd53feca523ab80838328d72f1d
5009f8a835eaa0d1b3c1ae1af21686818778e17e
54811 F20101203_AACACT sullivan_c_Page_45.pro
6e701708cb3ff4d1a8ee6945310f4221
229a2ce4ac94f3b79dca738bc739c568cc4af4df
55326 F20101203_AACAHR sullivan_c_Page_43.pro
3500e89be548c93ee14f664c99129681
0249eb1f82dc28bbdbeed5ecaa2470d14383fc83
26011 F20101203_AABZXL sullivan_c_Page_21.QC.jpg
01717cd7a4299ba085ad52825b86527b
fd1acad196e068fad629b88736bb351dd1462f38
2146 F20101203_AACACU sullivan_c_Page_53.txt
ed1b2d4380791016cace521c987b6a46
da438b9d9e2ba9cc076df02a930a1af3e34ab814
48877 F20101203_AACAHS sullivan_c_Page_44.pro
cbb9f7f652094048ef107d3fd22cf6c4
9b147d4be7d496b40d931277fe31d6309beb478e
1051942 F20101203_AABZXM sullivan_c_Page_45.jp2
db11ddd45351c49b96ffccc436686393
a3e540b2da669fa6332f8286ef58617c2e053454
4978 F20101203_AACACV sullivan_c_Page_25thm.jpg
c24f4a3bea846fde4325e2dc38ee98e2
6856bdf8a7b639775fdecb77c4312b210d355eef
55723 F20101203_AACAHT sullivan_c_Page_46.pro
c3a539e8780ceba4919e53c6a749a002
55cfbed83019012baf04551a377014dc31269111
4125 F20101203_AABZXN sullivan_c_Page_59.QC.jpg
29a0d7dc33b2cd3dd2b6f99fc00b34e1
7ee8ac869677e740acc6e6f872d7249980fc07cc
7134 F20101203_AACACW sullivan_c_Page_38thm.jpg
2cd9ccb4812653b0ff230920357a102c
12861f9dc263437eabea723f43545a4e40a78696
49910 F20101203_AACAHU sullivan_c_Page_48.pro
c5c88c16771c52e5d9e9d5e4ecb1a6ef
6cd4af4b584c786b4e82d1af2d71e3e18f8a7f8c
7062 F20101203_AABZXO sullivan_c_Page_48thm.jpg
68c19ff7daacfb543336f17ec96b7c75
a8d76f03ce23a4cc87dda2a0fc30f61660720e8a
1051952 F20101203_AACACX sullivan_c_Page_58.jp2
d46752584752dce25170d68001d71e02
27715af1849ea99c6f46e68cd233aba964203521
58300 F20101203_AACAHV sullivan_c_Page_52.pro
ae83f01971a8740b160743f7a64e41eb
5530d030f90869e5ba8f21b9a5239204f6e5d167
26255 F20101203_AABZXP sullivan_c_Page_27.QC.jpg
540bc20219fc8ed4271e6f82b1e26fa7
c77dda28f3cc085ff55705476e0c44839500b2a6
2267 F20101203_AACAAA sullivan_c_Page_01thm.jpg
c0b9c6e676fdd4ab5c4e739fe134831b
6994630e14df8a652e882f758541c8724be1c28e
72737 F20101203_AACACY sullivan_c_Page_15.jpg
9c576523a7a084572e2de5659fb380c0
47280cf0e498f3a674012a184f2378028be4f2c3
54412 F20101203_AACAHW sullivan_c_Page_53.pro
15f26e7ee695b5d47d94e2869b473aa8
27426d597e8c8575de692c0e15391c66fc62f532
6886 F20101203_AABZXQ sullivan_c_Page_28thm.jpg
b2685eff10178028b7ff91e941aef6f4
325b6769b2d3d6a8361bac0fb3be77ccdda582cd
26332 F20101203_AACAAB sullivan_c_Page_31.QC.jpg
f482fcdc81194134993d251f24c028e4
80a0a49f06e6eba19bed1fb828a2a1b573469718
862 F20101203_AACACZ sullivan_c_Page_02.pro
186b948ce9532a31ba87d536d8b26cc0
4560a8406a622f1c29cb4babd6985d753219829f
55685 F20101203_AACAHX sullivan_c_Page_54.pro
730b67e53c7ed5b47d13da7011127c87
dc21d940a2097c54d8d456c036515c71b4928897
53325 F20101203_AABZXR sullivan_c_Page_07.pro
52c0ae0e944eef5a41fce93015bbba15
7f3985e33cc1a5f2ec51abe61c56b6f0ea875e5f
54257 F20101203_AACAAC sullivan_c_Page_41.pro
f2d4a56f932058376bf33d3a74a0a0e7
df9c4677310a3977a2531f8897ed07b8cc009b5a
35911 F20101203_AACAHY sullivan_c_Page_55.pro
318dd4cfd541c8254a982d6a06441f8f
ffd2b26107c3f27844f9e9fc2b42748d0bc9c7e8
90323 F20101203_AABZXS sullivan_c_Page_26.jpg
52a7596bbef22153745137aa8ee754f9
a74f061888d23ba19e976f0a4e66610407ce088e
F20101203_AACAAD sullivan_c_Page_06.tif
3b829b9ac3741a734d72c83c517c3009
3624490c64d701a30e3eff5ce96c1c529f278fe6
77745 F20101203_AACAFA sullivan_c_Page_48.jpg
6c8315b82979f6315e011a67015a196e
925b46c108fc56b2fe811bb779ae5ce581404c99
56243 F20101203_AACAHZ sullivan_c_Page_56.pro
dd74f23faf1915388faf80f38a09605b
df6a4228779da333ba3602b4d10ed954efe2cac6
27873 F20101203_AABZXT sullivan_c_Page_29.QC.jpg
e464f33d34e2bd6951de376c3d864686
48c3ff2e721d31e63053c553acf4abeaf3d54c30
1428 F20101203_AACAAE sullivan_c_Page_55.txt
6d8ecd8653e78ae8a3252a4e29eda984
fc185874d0d8af37480be02c78aecd10bba3052f
82296 F20101203_AACAFB sullivan_c_Page_49.jpg
9f1580d517b3949eb241b28078364818
bd61a17dca2813259e99ef1fd9567501649dd5c9
18662 F20101203_AABZXU sullivan_c_Page_55.QC.jpg
7b17eb33c7e61158d5b95e63258f79f2
988901394d052cab1d260d093033f98c6560132f
7319 F20101203_AACAAF sullivan_c_Page_10thm.jpg
a74c5d93c4670edd895763a29c6fcb60
f05a0b095a1093acf50381b5be843f91725a6cda
86388 F20101203_AACAFC sullivan_c_Page_54.jpg
af997e81809cdb412714431c106c5478
282ddf94a4e6286cb2482491716e1527904571da
1051977 F20101203_AABZXV sullivan_c_Page_50.jp2
69411c9f3748f8fa3ddee5ec115c682e
3ab60d2aa3f66c7a834125cf310f9901c4f973d8
F20101203_AACAAG sullivan_c_Page_43.tif
8e687fbbbb5f1a07bda5b20c8ed8d9a2
dd1333200621466a40465a7ff069ea3eaf8ef89f
7182 F20101203_AACAKA sullivan_c_Page_31thm.jpg
46dd074d1fa8577b1efb388b48d66cce
70c4dda0df12ee7a68f8e879d3ba8d6e9aaa0cde
58508 F20101203_AACAFD sullivan_c_Page_55.jpg
ca28212f71d491463f358be55d457071
f26134a11d67ef8b32f7d9f3842f7fa1b83a9830
7451 F20101203_AABZXW sullivan_c_Page_51thm.jpg
e772c9d69cab10b2a3da15a466a33dba
a1c2f01bb31d6274c977cceebaaee533332cc467
77464 F20101203_AACAAH sullivan_c_Page_44.jpg
368498a22a699331c57cf8cc0cf66c35
1a73cb0b698ccb572cba33d37ea7a190c09ee3a7
24996 F20101203_AACAKB sullivan_c_Page_35.QC.jpg
e52951663523d9947dcd5bfa72972b14
8a09fa93540a75e5252a6409cbe86ffbaeb89fce
12609 F20101203_AACAFE sullivan_c_Page_59.jpg
ba367e4cd0172204b39e3bce2592caa0
5ae40853981e214f7d1b82720722260583ad9e82
F20101203_AABZXX sullivan_c_Page_32.jp2
55a093713119513e5e33ed9f6e6eb5a2
381d869db4b3f59c140538f8ff79abd8ee48ff22
25193 F20101203_AACAAI sullivan_c_Page_10.QC.jpg
6202d0736480955f7a328c6262f88d41
b31abba21db1a0fed2b3214909e31c3a5b3ea611
25664 F20101203_AACAKC sullivan_c_Page_36.QC.jpg
5a48ab15d736359859bb3a0d196aeacc
c54fe84b57cca87c6c099e88986475a3c57c09eb
F20101203_AACAFF sullivan_c_Page_05.jp2
985a00cbe4257cecd5a09ede4e0c6b82
b5745f8134c76d73bf193df7db036571eefe1c87
26160 F20101203_AABZXY sullivan_c_Page_53.QC.jpg
e716d734ef2c2fdb8e5498081d4deb6a
7d17f7c7cc689bf5166b80bca9bf23b5178c313f
F20101203_AACAAJ sullivan_c_Page_36.tif
c4008e4120deca24b1f215fb42cd504d
6212feaf0eeb3f445d24cb70c7fe440d0c66955f
7383 F20101203_AACAKD sullivan_c_Page_37thm.jpg
d29884af214503cfe80d74a0ac4c11e7
0b9044995f710254ab90f6339d5ddf82e54207e7
F20101203_AACAFG sullivan_c_Page_08.jp2
eaad6d83623fc704e39208e219632adf
757878a5e9d2f8f34befab3a39f1a1240b826510
F20101203_AABZVA sullivan_c_Page_27.tif
637510392c3fe9c470fc763f597c8c6f
db8a2f8edea13084d2c8a72deacc2ac150305a82
50436 F20101203_AABZXZ sullivan_c_Page_42.pro
014aad409ad454e2de219b5678907751
1cf150dcd0164cb8aa01dea1efc1849245911a78
F20101203_AACAKE sullivan_c_Page_40thm.jpg
6b3469ecc5c6515b48bf25b98d19f658
cf1ae5ce67b3b59a9fab543044d870167cbde56f
F20101203_AACAFH sullivan_c_Page_09.jp2
bc652dc649079755077579d7c42b75a3
6cbcdb8bd6a5ca7c7397e4045d82212efc649a1f
F20101203_AABZVB sullivan_c_Page_57.tif
a818fd95dc9ab4e3ef4a8d463fe8d43b
15d836517bf84f95df467f2ccfbf2a54e72e9e3e
80828 F20101203_AACAAK sullivan_c_Page_36.jpg
25dbbede03003bb2cbbfb797c6d29f8a
ff210fea0519566b9a216db1589738b156caa29e
26085 F20101203_AACAKF sullivan_c_Page_41.QC.jpg
914d3062d2c48adeaf5af48ad3ed955b
06480d61829100f98c61669c87e1e23ad1532e7d
1051966 F20101203_AACAFI sullivan_c_Page_10.jp2
9574b702cc1a479d2611e3df917a9fde
bf39a1b28ff50fc20ee60193dec9657b8d59ecf6
24841 F20101203_AABZVC sullivan_c_Page_44.QC.jpg
ef2f4538250983f3a57e7628f43bf8fc
fc6d16f16245fa55765939bef0d517dea52e6b73
7109 F20101203_AACAKG sullivan_c_Page_42thm.jpg
32022d890cca670e438208bed6803858
74454ed52488ec84e4597e158facc56d88896ddf
22620 F20101203_AACAAL sullivan_c_Page_01.jpg
a55dada08659f0caff31e685fc849376
2d24e94468eaca1f1291404329073050efd9c4ba
1051946 F20101203_AACAFJ sullivan_c_Page_11.jp2
72a6e8648b2d84817306ac1201e74a2e
7bf8cbfb5f8adca9ba8fcbe8c35ee594a12de174
F20101203_AABZVD sullivan_c_Page_24.tif
f51d39790fe1ed7be05a21f8c27f3423
6ea0206c441c65330a4273bad23b24c8bc1ac61b
7435 F20101203_AACAKH sullivan_c_Page_43thm.jpg
ba8b2e43be813bea45d7965d37e8786b
9b5d9ad18b4832322a6bd80707ca57f90d4f8741
26208 F20101203_AACAAM sullivan_c_Page_40.QC.jpg
172119d40d94117beb095ab6402ff177
a093e52144cd43cfe688d844bc3dbc92c7a9aad7
F20101203_AACAFK sullivan_c_Page_12.jp2
d40cf1c6370554a449a824c283025b60
19ec04edff0c1f8b9ed63850c5b5bf8b7fe6ebf3
F20101203_AABZVE sullivan_c_Page_46.txt
8ec000ab5a9909bb527003eb43699766
72015931cdd5f3eb325bb0da002114707848bce5
26747 F20101203_AACAKI sullivan_c_Page_45.QC.jpg
5b88569171232e39cf0072a7b0bb1573
9ee2b6725e1b231b4438ad3c7f5776a78b04c720
51038 F20101203_AACAAN sullivan_c_Page_18.pro
1b524f81d35e1a2be3be885f065548f9
9b01f08c35ac646cccf4df4dfd5c9e96f25eb885
285560 F20101203_AACAFL sullivan_c_Page_13.jp2
a8d2f62cb59b36dc557bb019b049a999
5482d502151bbe86f10d0439f89658dfc8618644
7271 F20101203_AACAKJ sullivan_c_Page_45thm.jpg
014ad3a8917f94c4a019cbfc6664e62a
f4b65a132373997cfd53251a9dbdfe7033884010
55460 F20101203_AACAAO sullivan_c_Page_25.jpg
0ead21cf639ff65c29efb7d1b3ae02af
ca78b1829d6b6d4f013a2f560ca133da540438ea
F20101203_AACAFM sullivan_c_Page_16.jp2
aac6bc9997ce0dbd3d6ab30ca946b106
a97473f559e23bd45c7236239a8a13ec90ceb8f5
F20101203_AABZVF sullivan_c_Page_33.txt
87f26af8982f8e6430c3617e766f73b9
9ac28a5a808081ec335d724cd70cc31a7b83f23b
27344 F20101203_AACAKK sullivan_c_Page_46.QC.jpg
e7a2ac690ba47c03c90e17d35158420d
ea1f3cb92f040d7dd5da82bed9999993fcbdff25
1051917 F20101203_AACAAP sullivan_c_Page_30.jp2
d9e2f8a985378014cdc724552172fe38
f6c19b9b56ec61b2cb87301fad57821408670f65
1051960 F20101203_AACAFN sullivan_c_Page_18.jp2
c129def3ed237b977dc3efa87a8d9462
c1749380ad6af4c638de6e1001af12a2e867d27a
1051974 F20101203_AABZVG sullivan_c_Page_40.jp2
3c9ed398299fc3cd161ecdf54ce81905
722a94bb9f0558e075c5295037206f5b61bfab32
7495 F20101203_AACAKL sullivan_c_Page_46thm.jpg
48972148966926ed08e54303f90ae7a6
5a8788d5fe2357d8e1b315d5484865ff5bd9f9b7
214230 F20101203_AACAAQ sullivan_c_Page_01.jp2
82509fe40e0698277aff173db9412512
f28deeacac0bb054c8fe5e2b2308e389bd330dc1
1038210 F20101203_AACAFO sullivan_c_Page_22.jp2
1bd9f292c2a485b5a7215122e6e81bbb
7587171f5d3e73286c27f56c861edff51efeba06
7847 F20101203_AABZVH sullivan_c_Page_04.pro
a1329c6bf5956e847e69908777dfa247
571192c9a647f69f524622860eaf3d37b6dcafa6
27985 F20101203_AACAKM sullivan_c_Page_47.QC.jpg
42dcc83051d7e8148a60c6b0bc6aa396
91b793b73c7b83a5ef85373ea82c69a0ee5eb5a7
F20101203_AACAAR sullivan_c_Page_47.tif
8293b51e4380cda43ad51ff796cfd65b
d387b699e883215b8d841eb325de8c1425428671
55021 F20101203_AABZVI sullivan_c_Page_20.pro
0c43fe7355b984cd14626418f9ad046a
a9402cd5b31050caa349d8d8c0481c8f2a251f38
7375 F20101203_AACAKN sullivan_c_Page_47thm.jpg
5b3a2b3989b69fb8a592e0346ad1afa7
8dffed090c480cc73c627bc6a8eaacd2050604a4
1828 F20101203_AACAAS sullivan_c_Page_15.txt
16e8c5c94a382abd7075e8beac99c7cc
618ea43d0f242e06d90ce7e38f209bb3cef54be9
F20101203_AACAFP sullivan_c_Page_26.jp2
42acc83757d1767ec976c574c003eae8
859e010d7f80376f51cd7b096d1fd1190a6a8d0c
2893 F20101203_AABZVJ sullivan_c_Page_37.txt
e0609510b08fbbd24e7f067e360ebad3
d779b672f541e562ad2b8d29d35454a6372fb3dc
24849 F20101203_AACAKO sullivan_c_Page_48.QC.jpg
64ac84ccc273d3dfdbabbc8387226166
61618cd7c9f5c1a488457703f0e6ac2f2ef0948e
800983 F20101203_AACAAT sullivan_c_Page_06.jp2
8b7426b62c879c30ec87159492905eec
a9a7b75b26ed46c8b844047dceb287bdf5d05dc6
F20101203_AACAFQ sullivan_c_Page_31.jp2
cd2317d3cc9d1b19a1cffc1f4613f930
267c13897f574baaeefc114a9e62c52fb04e7880
F20101203_AABZVK sullivan_c_Page_25.tif
ba27f7b9fb4593a94627363958beff35
d5e2bf58bff5340d11d9c3fc1464f8c4f8c21dfd
27518 F20101203_AACAKP sullivan_c_Page_50.QC.jpg
893238cde8e0f2e80e8e92020ab78403
eecf9f41101a1f00695cd9e1cad07733cc0f9723
7323 F20101203_AACAAU sullivan_c_Page_33thm.jpg
0c609af0b33b272cb461717e72ea6a70
4191e03ca0e530c0aaf678fcf01e7b3d0eec1611
1051940 F20101203_AACAFR sullivan_c_Page_34.jp2
00b028b818948ae904b4c66a69ea7662
b90261f5add6a0dcda2120c13bc58f73f758f229
55581 F20101203_AABZVL sullivan_c_Page_28.pro
6199a2ed177cfef801e645d91d90f410
aab6eaf7edeb244f8fdb205c295872a7240dddbc
28203 F20101203_AACAKQ sullivan_c_Page_52.QC.jpg
3e5ebdbc8b5ce76ffc929e6ba43e725b
a99ed5297b80f23abb8754fd0884325a13e32eb6
F20101203_AACAAV sullivan_c_Page_24.jp2
fc9730d14c5edf963a96af700b69f209
89f8f56619cd88eb8250e2178fefaf2bb26f5d84
1051924 F20101203_AACAFS sullivan_c_Page_35.jp2
b2674bee009c92f5e43cfa4014818c4a
1fbebd4de4b24fdfd213015f866206c51923b4bb
87807 F20101203_AABZVM sullivan_c_Page_56.jpg
b19181bbbc6ea939fd8d18abca4d338f
0d86e0214156c571abfb70f33d44731909fc3a1c
27176 F20101203_AACAKR sullivan_c_Page_56.QC.jpg
e0bf1c6cf71bb00e0df1dd69f0e9d7a6
40c41bee7238ff0420a9c25d02656de1ea182386
27787 F20101203_AACAAW sullivan_c_Page_11.QC.jpg
a4a54231827c82eb34a480e18fa93479
849b090b3e6d708f5796e3c455639ef36ea4303d
F20101203_AACAFT sullivan_c_Page_37.jp2
ed4a00c1defb9731c7452bafdabeb93c
34eb400f6caf4e0691036c8926ace009e2ec8824
2057 F20101203_AABZVN sullivan_c_Page_34.txt
38f989e2071803ab3cc74c0766947659
d08af843b0ceb769ac84f23c3ca50fe090f9768e
11527 F20101203_AACAKS sullivan_c_Page_57.QC.jpg
e1d9f7a559796c84a272fbb74d97c126
fee69cc0bbf324d99f0cb7fe21f1733eaee44a50
78207 F20101203_AACAAX sullivan_c_Page_24.jpg
8fc57fadb3d48254a146d34c147e0735
a945024716f5e9d3295231c7793ed6787d42e589
1051975 F20101203_AACAFU sullivan_c_Page_41.jp2
23908f668f3582b845b82e752c44b0f4
537a8afac9260b284221c307adde988d13077816
F20101203_AABZVO sullivan_c_Page_22.tif
62d04687edb04a3e81ecbb82caec297c
fbcc430775fe33e35e54d3dd63ef518051b545b0
3412 F20101203_AACAKT sullivan_c_Page_57thm.jpg
bc28fcd76004dea073edb9842bb5036b
d8e48a575fb17c934aa4bbf2ef16065ced2d88be
2008 F20101203_AACAAY sullivan_c_Page_48.txt
5a3da9ba1732b55db68d68ebf8b7dc06
c9c7ae2acaa8491c141a8d2083dea3474e721f86
1051985 F20101203_AACAFV sullivan_c_Page_43.jp2
3a6232f0a3af55ac78cd3f3823d6a2f0
50a83350e5c42ea302d667cb5391a7efde30fe4f
27039 F20101203_AABZVP sullivan_c_Page_12.QC.jpg
bc3bb80fd5ed92f7db75f15225a4e7b0
da6861da457225efb41e8c6b2f45af7824bbd203
F20101203_AACAAZ sullivan_c_Page_33.tif
60dc729293d5a29c782962b28f4e7091
83d193a56cb0dd4623363fc9a43f41808661fc04
1051948 F20101203_AACAFW sullivan_c_Page_46.jp2
783078d40b892e7d638858333f77fdc7
85a406e8eb2b3b71fe199c8c88a6a415c40b9c2c
28160 F20101203_AABZVQ sullivan_c_Page_32.QC.jpg
b6c2ea8f5e67d3c8f51634296d317bca
08cb7f3b087300b4b3148b739db5988cb09366e3
6143 F20101203_AACAKU sullivan_c_Page_58thm.jpg
c1c3a35992c3870690c1f462094b044a
e9b827270362012adf98896ee698664a6732bb7e
1051972 F20101203_AACAFX sullivan_c_Page_52.jp2
f48dd832664b87f6decbeeeae9b317ad
4f1293356d25b598d071ef9e4e8d8bd12762f29e
26767 F20101203_AABZVR sullivan_c_Page_51.QC.jpg
26903e55a4b09de0edf6a0fb60ad10d2
851d398362587704d303b78a582a2489e4865bc3
71059 F20101203_AACAKV UFE0021776_00001.mets
27adb7449e93d701e8d9a2b09da02c0f
67f88eeb128675a3d129616094a2c7528ac6f28a
7336 F20101203_AACADA sullivan_c_Page_12thm.jpg
9124e337721e01d8398a2935472eb93c
f5f32e79a88724e624878d353454a9aaf5b014d4
F20101203_AACAFY sullivan_c_Page_53.jp2
93d4c8d1df24b5d4e95bf3af8211780a
836659bad8b2e3de31a8ae6a3f9ec81369751eda
7368 F20101203_AABZVS sullivan_c_Page_56thm.jpg
53fd4e8ef1838966c579f89235e02ec1
a174eab0a0443fbd6d8da18ebcf954c360de441d
61143 F20101203_AACADB sullivan_c_Page_06.jpg
63e4f7db2e032305c86a0a5c2430cc86
4df1341fa7c6a28d01526e037a7e6626f693c64c
1051915 F20101203_AACAFZ sullivan_c_Page_56.jp2
f6d547a36f82ed343669a8f7d7d65796
67607fdadf9bc5e6adf2ea2e083f755176bf498a
78838 F20101203_AABZVT sullivan_c_Page_35.jpg
b105db650e156cff382b4bc9a779bfeb
7ec1439ed877d75e77dd4138e30d8d3bce037a9d
871494 F20101203_AACADC sullivan_c_Page_19.jp2
e6a905205bf810d3bb2fc0e25005b9fc
1d4901d25741af58b77a4735d948b4fed0fdeb19
F20101203_AABZVU sullivan_c_Page_32.tif
d8ed9621062d40857aac75add579345e
23284f2c19828080048f68bb5e5f28d8f8ee8298
1953 F20101203_AACADD sullivan_c_Page_44.txt
97d1b6f753aa25faee67ecd8bb2bc41f
20f4be09e6c748835a3b028672a31d0f84dd94fe
49982 F20101203_AABZVV sullivan_c_Page_35.pro
3b46fc9e293fc3f21da2c4c21bffc4b2
165a8358b1f926519572a813d03988db0df23daf
20231 F20101203_AACAIA sullivan_c_Page_57.pro
ba54ea67640b8516beaddcc1fe3777d4
841b25cdf4545824255b621a11f4e9927161ba6c
87032 F20101203_AACADE sullivan_c_Page_29.jpg
23b3ee880e29ec44ec821e8b34a1c6b5
5f26d7cd3bd00f7a67a53579b14468a3d50d0aad
F20101203_AABZVW sullivan_c_Page_47.jp2
4e18aeef03c11ad79e6a3d841c335943
ee0cb56d997cf964cdf1ca0ef1a1c1d280243ce6
51949 F20101203_AACAIB sullivan_c_Page_58.pro
b8035e56743dfcde8d72ee8152248b40
7a3da39839c598a5047013f6ae427d33c03e6f59
53491 F20101203_AACADF sullivan_c_Page_49.pro
5a5c57b77ceb8324d66969870e5c9cab
074a9c68d0910c6dbb8cded0d338289f60ef408e
2755 F20101203_AABZVX sullivan_c_Page_13thm.jpg
5ba53f17bfc6e9a272a10bef56b86259
e5f230a9b2759917dda508f653eb904feb887f16
422 F20101203_AACAIC sullivan_c_Page_01.txt
3c6ab002d28417bd0cd3349fbfface11
2fa8a9d8a9f6f2c01edab9b9d4659223878cf80f
7088 F20101203_AACADG sullivan_c_Page_07thm.jpg
29405ff223f68f72b92cc9a5e6200123
f2269458f357c3672fe44ef7ad4deffff8c3c5ab
6946 F20101203_AABZVY sullivan_c_Page_36thm.jpg
01d4aa5dbd47022d908ce1fdee663fea
886da32505888a08d52b533dad76fdb2f855816d
352 F20101203_AACAID sullivan_c_Page_04.txt
cee3b6ba561d9fa283f04e14e9afe346
9aa66f6c22140e389e7f4085cbbb8664c79729d6
2206 F20101203_AACADH sullivan_c_Page_39.txt
9b44e5c1d382694b7a985df9ebbfeaa0
1b372b5169ac977ab91600f394f936757cd87896
51462 F20101203_AABZVZ sullivan_c_Page_36.pro
2fc7faa56ff28a70f3d2bcf29a1854bb
42e55ad02ee640f4d4b0b377d10352eda4ae6ec4
2742 F20101203_AACAIE sullivan_c_Page_05.txt
e338ad1948981b5ccd434a00bafad1fc
c58f123822b0219c21cb2f78550af43867d5d52d
82769 F20101203_AACADI sullivan_c_Page_38.jpg
adbb60b44d8ac9c953c6866fedba02b9
17bcfab7cfe534fd4564d198fa67d4e39ff58de5
1615 F20101203_AACAIF sullivan_c_Page_06.txt
70f53e047c68c6a4970b480b20a5edd5
b4bc63533efd5c719b7aa555e0ab3aff067315cd
F20101203_AACADJ sullivan_c_Page_03.tif
4b64d67d280bb6a0c505539226165ac6
2ea328124b83b8125a3a96dc60535a43496e5ac5
2373 F20101203_AACAIG sullivan_c_Page_08.txt
da85b7fa4efab3982f97fedd5e83f243
7353a5ac990eb1383d04d25935852ed9d9ceb5e7
7430 F20101203_AABZYA sullivan_c_Page_54thm.jpg
1b96e2b9e7ea11ac17f6e37a07166bc6
023f2214c79d5f240b2dc4ce63e8c561abfe7a48
48473 F20101203_AACADK sullivan_c_Page_22.pro
bdc68b6e243944dfbe5fe64a0bf095ef
bb879637ef27fcf8c61c9c79762c2aeadd2c1423
2717 F20101203_AACAIH sullivan_c_Page_09.txt
5da4b65723a84466ad9c95a96eae7fc4
ad813c183458ea502a8e0bb104c952e410daee9a
87180 F20101203_AABZYB sullivan_c_Page_47.jpg
134d53bc92511dfa22bb7c045fbff865
697d29ba60cef75b7395055114a48fa56d627602
24738 F20101203_AACADL sullivan_c_Page_02.jp2
0980c3c6bbef1bf4211fb61768cc6f4c
48ac808dae7a1dd066807f7a0b4e8b5c20db9785
2475 F20101203_AACAII sullivan_c_Page_11.txt
96dd6a5a2a021fdaa4836822cbb9f338
8f570f41759fac57911c66d8e557d87d196f5be0
9589 F20101203_AABZYC sullivan_c_Page_02.jpg
139c0694f40d1fb38f0e74db88fac4fa
3b2f671399c84864ac46721c0c562ef2c2ca3e03
7624 F20101203_AACADM sullivan_c_Page_52thm.jpg
9325c668fa0d3fb32873c399fc21c89a
2658917f6029c66d55328765c8ce4152dc503d22
504 F20101203_AACAIJ sullivan_c_Page_13.txt
95f264e842bc8d67badd54256f752393
856ae00bd97427d53cd48c82425871b93ddced88
2299 F20101203_AABZYD sullivan_c_Page_10.txt
5d952b8175d6372f8f7111653bf319f6
000c26b2da40f997f730cba14feb254eed122fa9
2110 F20101203_AACAIK sullivan_c_Page_17.txt
5debb8f9a7d03ec1761170a86d622249
b24e869d30e1997bc84f105c8cbac100dcf03bdd
25441 F20101203_AABZYE sullivan_c_Page_38.QC.jpg
4d47fbb5f5476bf40e35432849d7d95b
1f0647cf8ce9fb2d1b4e97a8b36f2819e5dffc11
1051937 F20101203_AACADN sullivan_c_Page_21.jp2
07eb98499c33956db97fb8ef0b192a72
4d8aa5ae5bc9b1db63377964574c3ef6de82a889
F20101203_AACAIL sullivan_c_Page_19.txt
4b733751304bde4e800851018e5080c4
504da5caebea11cec8ef98915b167b005c694860
36208 F20101203_AABZYF sullivan_c_Page_57.jpg
5e27bdeeef21f0e55750348bc5a75147
9bb53170252e0003daf9fee8ee7dee4c67ce703b
2078 F20101203_AACADO sullivan_c_Page_31.txt
6ba754ce6ae5d641f633e00ab6487573
daa4ccd3c8f2e0d8ba0b30acd003317c78cb630e
2219 F20101203_AACAIM sullivan_c_Page_20.txt
fb9ae3cdeadf56faab160e073c0a8fab
d6a41a85d15a2c916da64915a1b1ba6abd1f3c36
F20101203_AABZYG sullivan_c_Page_05.tif
9d795d9b868470ea248962101ce428d8
beef9d5cee0d33a128ddca86e36cc79a13f97493







THE ROLE OF THE PA THE IN ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE


By

CYRENA SULLIVAN



















A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007




























2007 Cyrena Sullivan



































For my mother









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. John Palmer, for his unending patience and

help with this project. Thanks also go to Professors David Copp and Robert D'Amico for their

insight. I would also like to thank my friends and family and everyone else who supported me.









TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A CK N O W LED G M EN TS ........................................................ ....................................... 4

A B STR A C T ......... ....... ............. ..................... ................................. 6

CHAPTER

1 IN T R O D U C T IO N .......................................................................................... .......... .. .. 7

2 KOSMAN'S ACCOUNT OF BEING PROPERLY AFFECTED.......................................14

2.1 A Problem for Aristotle's Conception of Virtue ......................................... ............... 14
2.2 K osm an's Solution ................. ............... ......... ................... ......... ... 18
T he V irtue A rgum ent ............................................................................ .................... 19
T he F feeling A rgum ent............ ... .............................................................. ........ .. ...... .. 22

3 AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF THE PATH...........................................................26

3.1 The General N nature of the Pathe ..........................................................................26
3.2 Emotions as Species of the Pathe ......... ...... .. ......... ....................... 28
3.3 The Cognitive Element Involved in Emotion........................................ ............... 28
3.4 The Feeling Element in Em otion.................. ...... ........ ................... 31
3.5 A Defense of Phantasia as the Relevant Cognitive Component in Aristotelian
Em option ....................... .......... ... ......... .................... ............ 34
3.6 Aristotle's Psychology of A ction...................................................... ...................41

4 CON TROLLIN G EM OTION S ........................................... .................. ............... 45

4.1 A R eturn to K osm an' s V iew ..................................................... ................... ...................45
4.2 A N ew Proposal ............... ................. ........... ........................ .... 48

5 CON CLU SION .......... .............................................. .. .....................56

L IST O F R E F E R E N C E S ...................................................................................... ...................58

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H .......................................................................... ........................59









Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts



THE ROLE OF THE PATHE IN ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE

By

Cyrena Sullivan

December 2007
Chair: John Palmer
Major: Philosophy

In this thesis, I undertake an investigation into the nature of Aristotle's conception of

virtue in light of the relevance given to thepathe in his account. The centrality of thepathe in

Aristotle's conception of virtue raises several issues. Commentator L.A. Kosman raises a

problem for Aristotle's conception of virtue, namely that the pathe that are the manifestations of

virtue are not chosen. This creates a tension for Aristotle's account since virtue is supposed to be

something that involves choice. Closely related to this problem is the question of how Aristotle

might be able to say that the pathe or emotions are under the control of an agent. In order to

more adequately address some of these problems, I offer an Aristotelian analysis of emotion

along with some commentary on the role played by the pathe in his psychology of action.

Utilizing these accounts, I suggest that Aristotle is equipped to address these problems.

Specifically, I argue that Aristotle is prepared to offer an account of emotions in which they are

under an agent's control.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the nature of the relation between thepathO

(emotions or passions) and actions in the context of Aristotle's concept of virtue. Ultimately, I

argue that being properly affected, or having the right emotion, minimally requires the ability of

an agent to alter her emotions and, further, that Aristotle is equipped with the conceptual

machinery to advance such a proposal. My defense of this proposal as a plausible Aristotelian

account relies on an account of Aristotle's psychology of action and a considered view of

Aristotle's account of the emotions generally. I argue that Aristotelian emotions, taken as

intentional states of an agent that have at least narrow cognitive content, are the kinds of states

we can control and that this view helps clarify the role of thepathe in the virtuous agent.

The need for the advancement of such a proposal is motivated by the following two

considerations. The first is the exegetical task of explicating a central concept of Aristotle's

ethical theory about which he offers little analysis, namely, the specific role and nature of the

passions in the context of virtue and virtuous action. The second consideration is to remedy a

widely accepted proposal regarding the relation between actions and passions provided by L.A.

Kosman in his paper "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics."1 In

this paper, Kosman notes an apparent tension in Aristotle's concept of virtue as a hexis

prohairetike, namely that thepathe that play a central role in virtue are not chosen whereas the

virtues they partly constitute are. His solution to this problem depends on his characterization of

the relation between passions and actions, an account which I intend to show is at odds with

Aristotle's psychology of action and also one that we should not accept given an analysis of

Aristotle's views on emotions generally. While I do not wish to provide an account of being

1 Kosman 1980.









properly affected that resolves the tension originally noted by Kosman, I do wish to examine the

motivation behind some of the issues regarding passions and emotions in order to argue for how

we might at least be able to say that emotions are under an agent's control if not directly chosen.

The importance of being properly affected in Aristotle's ethical treatises may not be

immediately obvious on an initial reading of the texts. This is not to say that Aristotle makes

little mention of passions and their involvement in virtue, quite the opposite. Aristotle is

abundantly clear that the ethical theory developed in both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics

centers on the concept of virtue (arete) and its manifestation in the actions and passions pathh)

of agents. I will speak of the pathos both as a general concept in the Aristotelian corpus and as it

relates specifically to virtue and virtuous action. Broadly speaking, the path are ways in which

something can be affected or changed and the manifestations of these alterations. ThepathO

include experiencing emotions or having certain desires.

Aristotle refers to both passions and actions in the formal definition of virtue in EN.II.

ENII.6.1106b35-1107a6: Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying
in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which
the person of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two
vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again
it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in
both passions and actions, while excellence both finds and chooses that which is
intermediate.

Again, at EN III.1.1109b30, he asserts "excellence is concerned with passions and actions." We

have little reason, then, to doubt that there is more to virtue, for Aristotle, than the performance

of certain actions. But we might still wonder what the relation is between passions and actions

and how they function together in a virtuous life.

In the definition of virtue, Aristotle claims that there is something right about the

passions and actions of the virtuous person. Passions, then, are such as to be felt rightly or









wrongly, properly or improperly.2 The following passage, which expands upon the concept of

virtue, reinforces this idea.

EN 1.6.1106b16-23: I mean moral excellence; for it is this that is concerned with
passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.
For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in
general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both
cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what
is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence.

Now, we should be familiar with the thought of acting in the right way or doing the things that

one ought, but may be puzzled by the notion that there are right and wrong ways to feel and that

these are in some important way related to action and virtue. The idea that there are right or

wrong ways to feel seems to imply that agents are responsible for their feelings and should be

able to change or control them. But emotions appear to be the kinds of things that we cannot

control. And we often see people react angrily or joyfully for what seems like no reason at all.

And we should be puzzled by the absence of an explicit characterization or analysis of this

phenomenon on Aristotle's part given that the relevant concept is not transparent.

Despite the apparent lack of analysis, I think we can formulate an initial account of

right or proper feeling by looking at some passages that more clearly illustrate the relation

between passions and actions and between the passions and virtue. Consider, first, the following

two passages:

EN III. 1.1111a34-b2: "Again, what is the difference in respect of involuntariness
between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger? Both
are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are thought not less human than
reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite
are the man's actions."

2 We want to avoid, as we do similarly with actions, confusing proper or virtuous affective states with affective
states that are felt rightly or virtuously. The former description of affective states as virtuous suggests that the
rightness of the state depends on its being one type rather than another, love instead of anger say. That same
description might also seem to suggest that feeling the right affective state (ambiguous between types and tokens) is
sufficient for virtue.










EN V.8.1135bl9-2: "When he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is
an act of injustice e.g. the acts due to anger or to other passions necessary or
natural to man."


Here, Aristotle says that there are actions that proceed from or are due to an emotion, anger

specifically. He also suggests that actions might be due to other passions as well. These passages

clearly suggest that there is something like a causal relation between an agent's emotions or

passions and his actions. This might be the start of an adequate account of the relation between

passions and actions. But what is the relation between passions and virtue? The following

passage taken from the Eudemian Ethics serves to illuminate a possible answer.

EE II.2.1220bl0-20: Now we have to state in respect of what part of the soul we
have character of this or that kind. It will be in respect of the faculties of passion,
in virtue of which men are described, in reference to those passions, either as
feeling them in some way or as not feeling them.

Aristotle is suggesting that the quality of our character depends importantly on our emotions. If

someone feels them in the right way, she will be virtuous. But if she feels them in the wrong

way or not at all she will be vicious (or at least not virtuous). So, if actions are due to passions

or emotions in some sense, and exhibiting virtue depends on our having the right emotions, the

actions that are performed as the result of a virtuous character should be due to the emotions

that are felt in the right way.

I would now like to suggest a rough initial account of what Aristotle regards as

proper feeling. By properfeelings, I will mean those affective states of an agent that function

as a cause of her performing the actions that she ought. 3 This account, though not yet fully

developed, should serve to highlight the central ideas regarding the passions that we've seen


3 I identify 'cause' here with Aristotle's notion of efficient cause. I take it as sufficient for an affective state's
serving as the cause of an action its being given as a reason in explanations for why an agent performed a particular
action.









Aristotle offer, namely that they appear to be related, perhaps causally, to actions and that they

play a central role in virtue and in determining the character of a person generally. My main

task in this thesis is to expand upon this initial account. If the pathN are correctly characterized

as playing at least a causal role, if not a constitutive role, with respect to actions generally and

with respect to the actions of the virtuous agent specifically, they may be apt to serve as that in

virtue of which the actions they cause (or constitute) count as expressions of virtue.

Clearly not just any emotion will be related to virtue and virtuous action, only those that

are, as Aristotle would say, felt rightly. Anger, for instance, will result in the sorts of actions

which one ought to perform if felt properly. 4 An agent cannot perform the right action without

feeling in the right way. Two agents may perform the same action, fleeing from danger, for

instance, but only one may be the right action. Further, some emotions, such as hatred, are

simply exempt from being the sorts of feelings that can ever be rightly felt.

The account of proper feeling that I have offered serves the mere theoretical purpose of

explaining the general phenomenon, and if we are to follow Aristotle's lead and take interest in

the practical and prescriptive side of ethical inquiry instead of the theoretical and descriptive

side, we will want to know more about how this generalization might apply in particular

circumstances, how an agent comes to have the right feelings in the first place. We are,

intuitively I believe, far less familiar with the notion of feeling as we ought than we are with the

notion of acting as we ought. We are better acquainted with the thing to do than we are with the

way in which to do thing.

4 In saying that, on Aristotle's view, there are actions that one ought to perform, I am not suggesting that there are
certain voluntary actions simpliciter that one should perform. Rather, we should think of them as actions that are
performed in the way that they ought to be, namely, from a virtuous disposition. I use the term 'virtuous action' here
to refer to actions that arise from a virtuous character and not to describe actions as virtuous as such in order to
preclude the possibility of attributing to Aristotle the charge of leaving virtue to chance.









We can see that there are numerous questions surrounding Aristotle's conception of

emotions and passions and the role they play in virtue. These exegetical questions have no doubt

served as the motivation behind accounts such as Kosman's and certainly reveal the need to get

clearer about what the Aristotelian emotions are and what role they play in virtue.

In Chapter 2, I set out my formulation of the problem for Aristotle's conception of virtue

as conceived by Kosman. I then consider his proposed solution to the problem, including his

account of the relation between passions and actions, and point toward some primafacie

objections to this account. The questions raised by Kosman's characterization of the relation

between passions and action motivate a closer investigation of Aristotle's views about emotions

generally as well as his views regarding the psychology of action.

In Chapter 3, I consider Aristotle's account of thepathe generally. I also reflect on the

views of John Cooper, William Fortenbaugh, and Martha Nussbaum concerning both Aristotle's

conception of the emotions and his psychology of action. I begin my analysis with a discussion

of the nature of the path generally. I then turn to Aristotle's Rhetoric to examine the nature of

emotions specifically as a species of thepathe. Aristotle's Rhetoric offers what might be seen as

the most explicit (yet not nearly comprehensive) account concerning the nature of emotions. I

argue that Aristotelian emotions are complex, intentional states involving both a cognitive and

feeling element, a view that, I believe, is not fully appreciated in Kosman's account. Lastly, I

take up a discussion of the role of the path in Aristotle's explanation of animal movement found

in De Motu Animalium.

In Chapter 4, I return to Kosman's account in light of the broader analysis of Aristotle's

views regarding the path and their role in action. I use the analysis of emotion that I have

constructed as well as Aristotle's psychology of action to highlight the problems with Kosman's









account more clearly. I then suggest, drawing upon some of the motivations behind Kosman's

account, how we might utilize the considered view of Aristotelian emotion along with his

psychology of action to outline an account of being properly affected that supports the view that

the path/ are under an agent's control generally and what this means for Aristotle's conception

of virtue.

In Chapter 5, I survey the conclusions drawn in the main portions of the thesis.









CHAPTER 2
KOSMAN'S ACCOUNT OF BEING PROPERLY AFFECTED

2.1 A Problem for Aristotle's Conception of Virtue

In this section I set out a puzzle regarding Aristotle's conception of virtue from Kosman's

"Being Properly Affected". This puzzle motivates his account of the relation between passions

and actions that I explicate in the following section and with which I take issue in this thesis. I

begin by offering my formulation of the puzzle Kosman introduces by presenting three claims

that can each be supported by textual evidence from Aristotle's ethical texts. However, when

taken together, these claims seem to reveal an inconsistency in Aristotle's conception of virtue. I

offer textual support for each statement in turn and go on to place each within the context of

Kosman's formulation of the problem, highlighting their inconsistency.


Consider the following three claims:

(1) Virtue (/, ei'), or moral excellence, is a disposition to not only act but also to feel in

the right way.5

(2) Virtue is a state concerned with choice (hexisprohairetikW).

(3) Feelings pathh) are not objects of choice (prohaireta).

I first want to show that we have good reason to think that Aristotle endorses each of these

claims.

Kosman rightly notes that Aristotle's account of virtue is not concerned solely with

actions but with passions as well. I noted earlier that we have evidence in Aristotle's ethical

treatises to support his endorsement of this claim. At ENII.6.1106b 16-17, Aristotle explicitly

states that virtue "is concerned with passions and actions." Aristotle makes similar claims at EN


5 Another way of putting the same thought is to say that virtue is concerned with an agent's performance of the right
actions as well as her having the right feelings.









II.3.1104b13-14, 11.6.1106b 24-5, and III. 1.110930.6 Given this evidence, we should not attribute

to Aristotle the view that virtues such as courage or temperance are dispositions merely to act in

certain ways but are, as Kosman claims, "dispositions toward feeling as well as acting".7

We might worry that Aristotle might not mean to say that a virtue is a disposition to feel

as well as act since passions and actions differ in important ways, namely that the former are

things an agent experiences in a basically passive manner while the latter are obviously things

that an agent does. Kosman considers a solution proposed by H.H. Joachim.8 Joachim's solution

is that virtues are dispositions merely to act in ways that are the appropriate response to certain

feelings and are not dispositions to feel in certain ways. Kosman rejects this account, however,

because Aristotle says at EN II.5.1105b26 that, if we are excessively angered, we are badly

disposed and if not that, we are well-disposed.9 The general point Aristotle appears to be making

here is that the realization of virtue in an agent depends crucially on whether or not she feels in

the appropriate way, whether or not, for instance, she becomes angry too easily or not easily

enough. So part of what it means to realize virtuous dispositions is to feel in a certain way. If we

do not feel in the right way, we are badly disposed. An agent's failure to feel the appropriate

amount and intensity of anger at the right time indicates that she is not virtuous. Kosman

concludes, as I think we should, that feelings are "part of the concept of virtue considered as a

disposition."10




6 Emphasis mine

7 Kosman 1980, 104.

8 Joachim 1951.

9 Kosman 1980, 108.

10Ibid., 109.









We also have very clear textual evidence that virtue, for Aristotle, is a state concerned

with choice (prohairesis). In his formal definition at EN11.6, Aristotle's states that virtue is a

state concerned with choice. In saying that virtue is a state concerned with choice, Aristotle

means roughly that the manifestation of virtues such as temperance and courage in the virtuous

agent are the result of a process of deliberation about the good. And manifestations of virtue are

the result of deciding what should be done to realize this ultimate end. However, an agent cannot

choose or decide to be virtuous; she cannot, simply as the result of decision, be temperate or

courageous. What she can do is deliberate about what the good for her is and how best to achieve

that aim. Virtues, then, are the dispositions formed via the realizations of these completed

deliberations.

Finally, what evidence do we have to attribute to Aristotle the view that the pathN do not

involve prohairesis? At EN II. 5.1106a2-4, we find Aristotle saying that, "we feel anger and fear

ii ilh,,ut choice, but the excellences are choices or are not without choice." 1 Aristotle's aim in

the larger portion of text in which we find this passage is to deny that virtues are identical with

passions. He argues for this claim by asserting that emotions such as fear and anger are not

chosen and since, as we have seen, virtues involve choice in an important sense, virtues are not

identical to feelings or passions. If we feel anger and fear without choice, we do not come to feel

angry or fearful as the result of a process of deliberation about how to feel. In other words,

agents make no decisions about how to feel. Virtues on the other hand are ultimately realized by

agents who engage in a process of deliberation about the good.

We should remember also that the passions are not limited to emotions such as fear,

anger, or joy, but also include things like desire (epithumia). At EN II.5.1105b21-3, Aristotle


11 Emphasis mine









asserts "By passions I mean appetite (epithumia) anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred,

longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain."

Aristotle does not explicitly claim that desire, generally, does not involve choice. However, there

is evidence for the claim that appetitive desire (epithumia) does not involve prohairesis. At EN

I.13, Aristotle claims that there are two elements in the soul, one rational and the other irrational.

The irrational part of the soul is often at odds with the rational element in the soul and manifests

itself in the desires that run counter to what reason commands, but it is also at times obedient to

the dictates of reason.12 Appetite (epithumia) is the name Aristotle gives to this portion of the

irrational element in the soul.13 And appetite is a form of desire. Since the appetite takes no part

in processes of deliberation (only the rational element has that ability) and since prohairesis

explicitly involves processes of deliberation, as we see at EN 111.3.1113a10, appetite does not

involve choice. Further, in the midst of his discussion ofprohairesis at ENIII.2.111b 14-15,

Aristotle states, "Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again,

appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant."

So, given this evidence regarding epithumia along with what we see Aristotle saying about fear

and anger, we should attribute to Aristotle the view that the passions, broadly speaking, do not

involve choice.

Even though we have evidence that Aristotle endorses statements (1)-(3), a closer look at

the implications of (1) and (2) reveals an inconsistency in the original set of three. Statements (1)

and (2) seem to imply the following claim:

(4) Virtue involves acting with prohairesis and feeling with prohairesis.



12 This point will be crucial later in providing an account of being properly affected.

13 EN I.13.1102b13-1103a3









We might rephrase (4) to say that the actions and passions that are the manifestations of virtue

involve prohairesis, a claim that is in direct conflict with (3). The initial problem that we are

faced with, then, is how virtue can be, at least partly, a disposition to feel in the right ways and

involve choice if feelings themselves are not the objects of choice. Kosman highlights the

inconsistency of these statements by raising the following two questions: (i) how could choice be

involved in a fixed tendency toward that which does not involve choice (or that which is not

chosen); and (ii) is it possible to make sense of the notion that a virtue involves choice even

though the feelings that are its realizations are not the objects of decision?14 In what follows, I

discuss Kosman's solution to this initial problem in order to bring to light the relation that he

suggests holds between actions and passions

2.2 Kosman's Solution

In this section I discuss Kosman's solution to the problem raised for Aristotle's conception of

virtue with a view toward criticizing his account of the relation between actions and feelings

generally and in the case of virtue specifically. Kosman's solution relies on two parallel

arguments that I reconstruct here for purposes of clarity. The first argument, which I'll refer to as

the Virtue Argument (VA), aims to show how we might formulate an account of virtue in which

the virtues themselves are not chosen simpliciter but which might be chosen indirectly in virtue

of their relation to acts that are chosen. The second argument, which I'll refer to as the Feeling

Argument (FA), is aimed at showing how feelings might be chosen indirectly in virtue of their

relation to acts that are chosen. Ultimately, Kosman argues that since virtue is acquired through a

process of habituation and since this process is carried out by performing acts that are objects of





14 Kosman 1980, 110.









choice, the virtue, that an agent acquires as a result of a process of habituation is chosen as are

the feelings that, he claims, are "naturally associated" with those actions.

The Virtue Argument

1. Virtues are dispositions (hexeis) acquired through a process of habituation (ethinui\n\) and as

such cannot be acquired directly through decision.5,16

2. Particular performances of an action type can be chosen.

3. [What comes about as a result of an agent's performance of certain actions is itself chosen in

virtue of its relation to the relevant chosen acts.]1

4. So, a virtue that is acquired as the result of the repeated performance of acts that are chosen is

chosen.

The first premise is relatively uncontroversial given both our previous discussion about the

nature ofprohairesis and intuitions about acquiring dispositions. Kosman rightly claims "it is not

as a direct result of calculation, deliberation, [or] resolution.... that we become courageous,

temperate, or wise."18 Instead of acquiring virtuous dispositions directly as the result of decision,

an agent must behave in the ways that the person of virtue would until she behaves in those ways

habitually. Kosman puts the idea this way, "On this view one becomes virtuous by impersonating

a virtuous person, and in that impersonation, through the process of habituation, becomes the

virtuous person whom one impersonates."19




15 EN 11.6.1106b35

16 EN II.4.1105b9-10

1 This premise appears to be implicit in Kosman's discussion.

8 Kosman 1980, 111.

19 Ibid., 112









We should also be able to see the plausibility of the second premise. Particular actions

can be chosen since an agent can deliberate about what to do in any given circumstance and so

act as the result of her deliberation. Kosman notes that "a person might decide on... an occasion

to act virtuously" and "chooses on [some] occasion to be virtuous and so acts."20

The third premise is one which seems to be implicit in Kosman's account and is one on

which this argument relies. There may be problems with this premise, but these are independent

of the criticisms I have of Kosman's account. For now, then, we should accept this claim in order

to get at his entire solution to the problems raised earlier.

If this argument is right, then virtues are chosen if they are acquired through the

performance of acts that are chosen. This account seems to accord with what Aristotle says in the

ethical treatises regarding the way an agent acquires virtues and also with the intuition that a

person cannot acquire a virtue such as justice or temperance simply by deciding. Consider the

following passage:

EN 11.4. 1105b5-9: Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such
as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these
that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate
men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is
produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no
one would have even a prospect of becoming good.21

Aristotle is claiming that the acquisition of a virtue such as justice requires that an agent act

justly time after time until she acts that way out of habit, and so on for any virtue. But we should

remember that there is a distinction between acting virtuously and acting in accordance with

virtue. An agent that acts virtuously has already acquired the relevant virtuous dispositions. An

agent might act in accordance with virtue on a particular occasion; she might act justly, say,


20 Ibid., 111
21 Emphasis mine.









without also having acquired the relevant virtue of justice. At EN 11.4.1105al8-21 and 1105a28-

1105b1 we find Aristotle saying the following:

The question might be asked, what we mean by saying that we must become just
by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and
temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, if they do what is
grammatical or musical they are proficient in grammar and music....but if the acts
that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a certain character it
does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent must also be in
a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge,
secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and
thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.


VA, however, does not resolve the original worry raised by Kosman. We still need an

account of how feelings might be said to be objects of choice as well as an explanation of the

relation between feelings and actions. Recall the initial problem regarding feelings and choice in

light of VA. Since virtue cannot be chosen in the sense that we cannot choose simpliciter to

acquire the virtue of courage, say, or temperance, we may have been led to assume that "a

virtue's involving prohairesis must depend on the actualizations of that virtue being

prohairetic".22 In other words, given the view of virtue as a complex disposition that is

actualized as both the right sorts of actions and feelings in conjunction with the view that virtues

cannot be acquired by a single act of choice, we are led to the conclusion that the pathN which

constitute the realizations of virtue must also be chosen, a conclusion which, as we have shown,

creates a tension in Aristotle's conception of virtue. The questions that we raised earlier,

Kosman claims, are based on "the supposition that virtues whose actualizations are feelings may

only be acquired through choosing those feelings".23 In other words, the problem for Aristotle's

conception of virtue becomes salient if we take him to be advocating the view that the


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 112









actualization of a virtue might come simply in the form of having a certain feeling; that is, there

may be virtues that are concerned only with feeling appropriately and, conversely, there may be

virtues that are only manifested in the form of appropriate actions without regard to the agent's

feelings. Kosman argues that if this supposition is false we can show that the path are chosen in,

at the very least, an indirect sense. The following is my construction of what I take to be his

argument for this view.

The Feeling Argument

1. Virtue is a complex disposition that is actualized as a related set of actions and feelings.24

2. Particular performances of an action type can be chosen.

3. Actions and feelings are [logically] related in the sense that certain actions give rise to or

"bring about" feelings that are naturally associated with those actions.

4. [What comes about as a result of or is caused by an agent's performance of certain actions is

itself chosen in virtue of its relation to acts which are themselves chosen.]

5. So, the feelings that are brought about by the performance of action types which are chosen

are also chosen.

Kosman's solution, then, is to argue for the modest claim that feelings are chosen

indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that are chosen. He is essentially denying the claim

that feelings do not involve prohairesis. If he is right, we might be on the right track toward

getting around the original problem.5 However, Kosman does not think that his solution is

ultimately successful for reasons that I do not want to go into here. And, again, my aim is not to

criticize the solution that he offers but rather to use it as a jumping off point for getting clearer



24 Ibid.

25 Kosman thinks that his solution ultimately fails as a solution to the original problem.









about the relation between actions and passions. The solution centers on his characterization of

the relationship between actions and feelings, what we find here as the third premise in FA. I

want to take a closer look at this claim and note some prima facie problems.

Kosman stresses that there is a logical connection between certain ranges of actions and

feelings. He characterizes this connection in the following ways:

(i) Feelings are accompanied by concomitant actions.26

(ii) Actions on the part of an agent.. are characteristically and naturally associated with ..

feelings.27

(iii) One acts in ways that are naturally associated with and will "bring about" .... [certain]

feelings.28

What he is claiming in (i) and (ii), I take it, is that there are certain actions that we often find

accompanying certain feelings. For instance, the emotion of fear often accompanies instances of

flight and anger often accompanies retaliation. To further support this claim, Kosman appeals to

Aristotle's characterization of thepathN as enmattered accounts at De Anima I1.403a25-7. Here

Aristotle states, "Consequently [the affections] definitions ought to correspond, e.g. anger should

be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or a part or faculty of a

body) by this or that cause and for this or that end." Aristotle seems to say here that bodily

movements are part of what an emotion or feeling is, are part of the concept of each feeling. The

relationship between actions and feelings is not, for Aristotle, a matter of contingency. So

Kosman seems right in saying that actions and feelings are importantly connected. But the

notions of "accompanying" and being "naturally associated with" that he uses to express this

26 Ibid., 109
27 Ibid., 112

28 Ibid.









relation in (i) and (ii) are too vague to be helpful in understanding the nature of the relationship

between feelings and actions. We need to turn, then, to the more explicit characterization that he

offers in (iii).

Claim (iii) is included as a part of Kosman's account of how an agent goes about

acquiring the right sorts of dispositions. He claims that, "one recognizes through moral education

what would constitute appropriate and correct ways to feel in certain circumstances. One then

acts in ways that are naturally associated with and that will 'bring about' those very feelings".29

After the repetitive performance of these actions, an agent becomes disposed to have the feelings

that are brought about by the relevant actions. An agent does not, Kosman claims, have direct

control over her feelings. So in this way we can still say that the feelings are notprohairetic.

What we do have control over are the "actions that establish the dispositions, the virtues, which

are the source of our feeling in appropriate ways at appropriate times and in appropriate

circumstances."30

It is unclear, however, that we should characterize this relation in the way that he does.

His suggestion that certain actions give rise to or "bring about" certain feelings gives us a better

understanding of the relation between passions and actions than (i) or (ii) but is not obviously an

accurate characterization of Aristotle's views. It is certainly not a characterization that Aristotle

offers in his ethical treatises. And in spite of the fact that we find little if any textual evidence to

support this claim, Kosman provides little argument for why we should accept such a

characterization. To say that there is a connection between actions and feelings, even a logical

one, is not to say that certain actions cause certain feelings. Further, we already have textual



29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.









evidence that runs counter to this view. In EN III. 1 and ENV.8, for instance, Aristotle says that

actions proceed from or are due to passions such as anger. This evidence alone gives us reason to

question Kosman's claims about the relation between passions and actions. But if we reject his

characterization, we still do not have a very clear picture of the relation. In order to get at a

clearer understanding of the nature of this relation and its function in the virtuous life, we need a

more developed account of both passions and actions.

In what follows, I undertake a closer investigation of the nature of the pathN generally

and emotions as species ofpathW specifically as well as an investigation into Aristotle's

psychology of action to more clearly explicate the relation between the pathN and actions.

Ultimately I argue that Kosman's account of the relationship between feelings and actions fails

to represent Aristotle's views on this matter. And a close investigation of Aristotle's views about

the path generally and the emotions specifically as well as his views regarding the psychology

of action can help us form an account of the relation between passions and actions, an account

which may help us solve certain puzzles regarding the nature of virtue.









CHAPTER 3
AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF THE PATH

3.1 The General Nature of the Pathe

To understand Aristotle's views on the relation between actions and feelings and, in turn, their

relation to virtue, we need to investigate Aristotle's views concerning the emotions generally.

Unfortunately, Aristotle provides little analysis of emotion where we would want him to,

namely, in the ethical treatises. This is a peculiar situation given the central role he gives them in

the realization and acquisition of virtue. We must refocus our attention, then, on works outside of

the ethical treatises that will help shed light on this issue.

At Rhetoric II. 1.1378al9-20, Aristotle gives the following general definition of the path.

The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their
judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.

Aristotle's focus shifts to specific emotions such as anger and fear in subsequent portions of this

chapter. But before we look at those definitions, we should first consider what Aristotle means

when he talks about passions generally. What is translated in this passage as 'emotions' is ta

path, which we might also translate as 'passions' or 'affections.' Aristotle provides a general

characterization of the path in Metaphysics A.21. At 1022 15-20, he distinguishes between four

senses of affection.31

We call an affection (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g.
white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the
kind. (2) The already actualized alteration. -- (3) Especially injurious alterations
and movements, and above all, painful injuries. -- (4) Experiences pleasant and
painful when on a large scale are called affections.3

31 Kirwan 1971, 171-2.
32 Kirwan notes that Aristotle does not, in this chapter, provide all of the senses of pathos which he uses throughout
the corpus. Kirwan distinguishes between the following seven senses: (1) state or condition, (2) property, (3)
coincident, or non-essential, properties, (4) quality, (5) feeling, (6) happening, and (7) misfortune. For our present
purpose however, Aristotle's characterizations of the path inMet. A are sufficient to highlight the relevant sense(s)
in which we should understand his use of the terms 'emotions' and 'passions' throughout the Rhetoric and in the
ethical texts.










The first and second characterizations given by Aristotle suggest that the pathN,

generally, are both ways in which a subject, whether a person or an object, can be altered,

affected, or acted upon and the actualization of these alterations. For instance, if I paint the walls

of my room eggshell blue, their becoming or being blue would be considered, on Aristotle's

view, apathos. The third and fourth characterizations, however, suggest that thepathN are not

limited to something like the properties that an object has or takes on or the quality in respect of

which objects take on certain characteristics. They are something that is suffered or experienced;

something an agent, or patient rather, passively undergoes. These sorts of alterations can take the

form of psychological disturbances or feelings of elation. We often speak of people getting upset

or becoming angry or being afraid. When a person has these sorts of experiences, something has

happenedto her so as to change the state or condition that she is in, i.e. she has been affected.33

We should also be able to see why a desire, especially an appetitive one, is considered apathos.

Consider a case of hunger. When a person becomes hungry, she generally experiences or

undergoes some sort of pain. This pain might be both physical and psychological. And an agent

that experiences such pain consequently wants to alleviate her discomfort by eating some food.

Her desire to eat, characterized by her experience of pain, is a change in likely both her

physiological and psychological state and is something that has happened to her. Taking on this

characterization, we should understand Aristotle's use of the terms 'emotions', 'feelings', or

'passions', as well as the specific instances he discusses of these such as anger and fear, then, to

refer to ways that an agent is acted upon, something she experiences such that her state or

condition is altered in some way.



33 will talk more about the specific ways in which agents are affected in the proceeding sections.









3.2 Emotions as Species of the Pathe

Having gotten clearer about the general nature of emotions as species ofpathN, we need

to turn our attention to the specific nature of emotions as path. What we are interested in is what

about the emotions differentiates them from other sorts ofpathN such as becoming blue or

broken. Another way of asking this question might be, what conditions need to be met in order to

say that a person is experiencing a particular emotion? What conditions need to be met, for

instance, in order to rightly say that an agent is angry or afraid and what distinguishes one

emotion from another? We can return to the general definition that he offers at the outset of the

Rhetoric as well as to the definitions that he provides for specific emotions to get at the answers

to these questions. What we will find is evidence to support the view that Aristotelian emotions

are complex states that involve both cognitive and conative elements.

3.3 The Cognitive Element Involved in Emotion

After offering a general definition of the path at the outset of the Rhetoric, Aristotle

provides definitions of specific emotions. Consider the following:

Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous
[phainomenes]revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no
call to slight oneself or one's friends. 1378a30-32

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to imagining [phantasias] some
destructive or painful evil in the future. 1382a21-22

Confidence is the imaginative [phantasias] expectation of the nearness of what
keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible. 1383al7-18

Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether
present, past, or future, which seem [phainomena] likely to involve us in discredit.
1383b11-13

Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain at an apparent [phainomeno] evil,
destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we
might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us
soon. 1385b12-15









Though each definition includes a reference to feelings of pain, we should also note that the

definition of each emotion is not given merely in terms of the pain (or pleasure) that

characterizes it. We also find references to the way something seems or appears, or ways that a

person imagines a situation to be. The definitions of fear and confidence, for instance, both make

explicit reference to phantasia, and we find a form of this term in each definition provided. But

what are these appearances, and what role do they play in a person's experience of an emotion?

At De Anima III.3.428a1, Aristotle describes phantasia as "that in virtue of which an

image arises for us." Later, at 428b10-12, phantasia is said to be "impossible without sensation...

and to have for its content what can be perceived." We might say, then, thatphantasia functions

both, to present or represent the objects of sensation, and is the presentation or representation of

the objects of sensation. In other words, phantasia is both the active and passive faculty of

imagination, the power by which an object is presented to the mind or a mental representation of

an object or some state of affairs. Sense perception provides the raw material upon which the

faculty ofphantasia acts to represent some object or state of affairs to an agent as being of a

certain kind. An observer then has the appearance that something is a certain way. For instance,

phantasia might present some object to me as white or nearby. The appearance that something is

white or that something is nearby is results of the exercise of this faculty. If something appears to

me as white or nearby, I am having the thought that some object is white or nearby. We should

say generally then thatphantasiai are thoughts that arise in an agent who imagines something to

be the case.

What sorts of impressions are involved in the experience of an emotion? Each definition

specifies the impression that is constitutive of the relevant emotion. If we look back to Aristotle's

definition of fear, for instance, we see that an agent who is fearful has the appearance that there









is some destructive or painful evil in her future. In other words, she has a mental representation

that a situation or object is potentially destructive or painful. An agent who is experiencing

anger, on the other hand, has the appearance that another who has no cause to slight her has

indeed slighted her. And so on for each definition. We can see, then, that having a certain kind of

thought is, for Aristotle, at least a necessary condition for the experience of an emotion. In

addition, different emotions can be distinguished by the relevant thought of which they are partly

constituted.


The view that emotions are not merely disturbances or feelings is an intuitive one since

otherwise we would be hard pressed to distinguish an emotion such as fear from one such as

anger, both of which, we commonly think, involve disturbances. Further, since Aristotle includes

explicit reference to types of thoughts or impressions in his definitions of particular emotions, we

should be inclined to say that Aristotle advocates a cognitive theory of emotions, a view in which

emotions, minimally and importantly, require thoughts of some kind. And, conversely, we

should not want to say that Aristotle advocates a feeling theory of emotion, a view in which

emotions are nothing other than physiological (or psychological) disturbances of some kind.


Aristotelian emotions, then, are importantly intentional states, states that are directed at or

are about some particular object or state of affairs. For instance, an agent who is fearful is fearful

about something in particular, namely what appears to her as potentially harmful. She does not

simply have some kind of fearful feeling, and she is not merely disturbed in some undirected

way. And we often expect answers from people who claim to have certain experiences. Consider

a case where a person says that she feels frightened. We might ask her what she is afraid of, or,

at the very least, we are within our rights to ask such a question. If she responds by saying that

she is afraid of nothing at all or that she is not sure what she is afraid of, we would be tempted, I









think rightly, to say that she is not, in fact, scared. Rather, we might say that she is experiencing

some undirected feeling of anxiety. Without the thought that i,,nehil/g may cause her harm, we

may not want to say, and Aristotle clearly would not say, she is truly experiencing fear. And so,

generally for each of the definitions under consideration, the agent must have the relevant kind of

thought in order, on Aristotle's view, to have a particular emotion. We should be tempted to say,

then, that feelings of a certain kind are not sufficient, on Aristotle's view, for the experience of

an emotion. But, since Aristotle also makes explicit reference to feelings of pain or pleasure

(lupe and hedone) in his definitions, we have reason to think that they are also important and

necessary elements in his analysis of emotion. We thus need to get clearer about both the nature

of these feelings and their relationship to the impressions (phantasiai) involved in emotion.


3.4 The Feeling Element in Emotion

To obtain a clearer understanding of the relation between the thoughts and feelings that

constitute Aristotelian emotions, we should first focus on the nature of these pains and pleasures.

John Cooper notes that the pleasure and pain Aristotle has in mind here include both

psychological and physiological disturbances. Examples of physiological disturbances that a

person might feel are a quickening heartbeat or cold chills. Cooper also notes that, by 'lupe',

Aristotle likely means "both bodily pain and all kinds and degrees of negative mental response

and attitude."34 He cites DeAn. 11.2.413b23, EE III. 1.1229a34-41, and EE VII.8.1241b9 as

instances where Aristotle uses the term to refer to bodily pain. Psychological disturbances, on

the other hand, take the form of mental distress or depression. But the physiological

disturbances, Cooper suggests, "can be accompanied and qualified by psychic turmoil."35 We


34 Cooper 1999, 415.
35 Ibid., 416.









should not assume, then, that Aristotle's use of lupe, when translated as 'pain', is limited to

instances of bodily or physiological pain. We can say something similar for feelings of pleasure.

They are experienced both as psychological and physiological feelings of delight or excitement.


If we look again to specific definitions of emotions, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that

the physiological and psychological disturbances involved in emotions are related to the

constitutive impressions in a certain way. In the definition of fear, for instance, the pain or

disturbance felt by the agent is said to be due to her having a certain impression, in this instance,

the impression that she is in imminent harm. Pity is defined as pain at an apparent evil. In both

instances, the prepositions, which are flanked by references to pain and the impressions had by

the agent, seem to indicate that the relevant impression is either the cause of or that from or

because of which the disturbance arises. On Aristotle's view then, an agent has impressions that

cause her to experience feelings of pain or pleasure that are constitutive of emotions.

If we understand the accompanying relation mentioned in the general definition of

emotion at the outset of the Rhetoric as a causal relation between certain impressions had by an

agent and feelings of pleasure or pain, we can say that the nature of the relevant thoughts that are

involved in an agent's having an emotion are such as to bring about certain feelings whether

painful or pleasant. And if we are right to say that these psychological and physiological

alterations are the result of certain impressions had by an agent, we should ask what it is about

these impressions that causes an agent to have the relevant feelings, what it is in virtue of which

they give rise to these sorts of feelings.

Presumably, we can have a variety of impressions. I might have the impression that my

friend is in the room with me or the impression that it is raining outside. But it is unclear, or at

least not immediately obvious, that either one of these thoughts is the sort that would cause me to









experience the sorts of feelings involved in an emotion. I could certainly have one of these

thoughts without consequently feeling pain or pleasure. There must be something more to the

content of impressions that give rise to feelings of pain or pleasure, something about the way that

objects and situations are represented.

If we look back to the definitions of specific emotions like fear or pity, we see that the

relevant impressions are evaluative in nature. In other words, the thoughts that cause feelings of

pain or pleasure include some evaluation about the object or situation in question, i.e. whether it

is good, pleasurable, bad, or destructive. Objects and situations that appear destructive or

harmful, for instance, cause pain of some kind. In the case of fear, for example, someone feels

disturbed or pained when it seems to her that there is some sort of harm in her future. Someone

might have the impression, for instance, that another person is approaching with a weapon and

intends to harm her and consequently feels afraid. She becomes afraid, not simply because

someone is approaching with a weapon, but because she appears to be in imminent danger of

being harmed. The relevant content of her impression, then, includes some evaluation of the

object or situation.

But why exactly would evaluative impressions give rise to pains or pleasure? These

thoughts must be related in some important way to a subject's further goals and desires.

Generally, we experience pain when our goals are thwarted and our desires are hindered and

pleasure when they are fulfilled. Take as an example someone who desires respect from those

around her. Also suppose that she has the impression that someone has offended her without

warrant. Any offense hinders the achievement of the respect she desires. We should expect, in

this case, that she will experience pain as a consequence of her impression. On the other hand,

suppose that she has the impression that she is honored by the people around her. This honor









contributes toward her goal. We would expect her to feel pleasure as the consequence of her

impression.

We should accept, then, for Aristotle that the impressions involved in emotions are

evaluative in nature. And the value attributed to the object or situation in question, i.e. whether

something appears good or bad, will determine whether a person feels the disturbance of pain or

experiences feelings of pleasure. We can summarize our analysis of Aristotelian emotion by

saying that emotions are pathN experienced as physiological and psychological feelings of pain

or pleasure as the result of having an evaluative impression about an object or situation.

3.5 A Defense of Phantasia as the Relevant Cognitive Component in Aristotelian Emotion

Before moving on to discuss the relationship between emotions and our actions, I want to

spend some time defending the view that impressions are sufficient for the experience of an

emotion on Aristotle's view. We have reasons to attribute to Aristotle the view that emotions

involve cognitions of some sort. In addition, there is widespread consensus among commentators

that Aristotle advocates a cognitivist view of the emotions.36 What's not agreed upon, however, is

what the relevant cognition that is required for the experience of emotion is, whether an

impression or some stronger form of cognition such as belief or judgment. It makes no small

difference to an analysis of Aristotelian emotion, or for an account of the relation between

passions and action in the life of virtue, which form of cognition is involved. I will first present

some competing views on this matter.

John Cooper argues briefly that the relevant form of cognition in Aristotelian emotion is

impression (phantasia), as I have been suggesting. He claims that "Aristotle is quite firm and

explicit that the emotion arises from one's having the impression or appearance that something


36 See Nussbaum, Cooper, and Fortenbaugh.









good or bad has happened".37 The immediate evidence that we have for this view is that Aristotle

makes explicit reference to impressions in the definitions that he offers for specific emotions.

Contrary to this view, W.W. Fortenbaugh and Martha Nussbaum argue that the relevant

cognitive element is belief (doxa). Phantasia, they claim, is not sufficient, on Aristotle's view, to

cause emotional states. I submit that Aristotle would surely not want to deny that beliefs of the

relevant sort are sufficient for emotion. Nussbaum agrees that beliefs are clearly a sufficient

condition for Aristotelian emotion or, more specifically, that they are a sufficient condition for an

agent's feeling pleasure or pain. The question at hand, though, is whether impressions are

sufficient. I want to spend some time arguing, against Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum, that Aristotle

intends phantasia as the relevant cognitive constituent of emotion. Specifically, I want to argue

that Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum rely on a very limited characterization ofphantasia in making

the case that beliefs are necessarily involved in emotion. We can say that impressions are

sufficient for the experience of emotion if we appreciate the broader role that Aristotle has them

play. I'll first consider two arguments against the view that impressions are apt to serve as the

relevant cognition in emotion. The first centers on Aristotle's use of the term phantasia in the

Rhetoric. The second centers on the formal distinction he draws between phantasia and doxa in

the De Anima.


Both Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum argue that Aristotle does not attempt to "[dissociate]

phantasia from belief' in the Rhetoric.38 Nussbaum claims that "the account shows no awareness

of the more technical psychological distinctions of the De Anima."39 She does admit, however,



7 Cooper 1999, 246.
38 Fortenbaugh 2002, 97.

39 Nussbaum 1996, 321.









that "the distinction between phantasia and doxa seems to be introduced in one passage in Book

I."40 Fortenbaugh claims, similarly, that "Aristotle is using everyday language without special

reference to his biological psychology."41 The worry, then, is that Aristotle's failure to explicitly

draw a distinction between phantasia and doxa in the Rhetoric suggests that he has no interest in

bringing that distinction to bear on his discussion of the emotions. If this is right, we should not

regard his use of the term phantasia as an accurate expression of his view on the nature of the

cognitive component that is sufficient for the experience of emotion.

Clearly, Aristotle's aim in the Rhetoric differs from his aim in the De Anima. He is not

engaging in a biological investigation in the Rhetoric as he does in the De Anima, so it makes

sense that he would not offer an explicit treatment of the differences between phantasia and doxa

in the Rhetoric. But we have no reason to think that his failure to explicitly distinguish between

the two concepts is evidence for his ignoring his own distinction between the two. Unless the

discussion in the Rhetoric reflects a significant alteration in Aristotle's views over time, we

should assume that the distinction that he originally draws between phantasia and doxa in the De

Anima is still in play. Further, if Aristotle's aim in the Rhetoric is to provide orators with the

tools to influence their listeners, and ifphantasia is not sufficient for arousing emotions, it would

be misleading of Aristotle to make reference to phantasia in the definitions he offers of the

emotions. If beliefs are necessary for a person to experience emotions like anger, we would

expect him, given his aim, to make explicit reference to forms of doxa in the explicit definitions

he offers. Since he does not, and since we don't want to accuse Aristotle of being misleading in





40 Ibid., 321
41 Fortenbaugh 2002, 100.









his discussion here, we should infer that his use ofphantasia indicates that they are sufficient to

produce emotional states.

Another argument given by Fortenbaugh against the view thatphantasia is sufficient for

the experience of emotion relies on Aristotle's explicit treatment of the differences between

belief (doxa) and impression (phantasia) in the De Anima. Phantasia, as discussed at De Anima

III.3 is likened to viewing an artistic representation and is explicitly distinguished from doxa as

being unable to cause affective states to arise in an agent. At 427b21-4 Aristotle states, "Further,

when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately produced, and so

too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons

who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene." Aristotle is attempting to

distinguish imagination from both perception and discursive thinking. He carves out the role of

imagination further by saying also that, unlike thought or judgment, it is a faculty that is within

our power, the faculty by which we can call images to mind.

Fortenbaugh interprets the passage from the De Anima in the following way:

For Aristotle, it seems, believing is not idly entertaining a thought; it is
thinking that something actually is the case. And when the belief concerns things
terrible or encouraging, then emotional response follows: one feels frightened or
confident, seeks safety or acts aggressively. In contrast, phantasia apart from
belief does not have the same effect. Much as we view a painting or drawing of
something threatening without being frightened, for we do not believe the danger
real. Of course, there are occasions when imagining a danger, like viewing a
picture, has a bodily affect. Aristotle speaks of a movement of the heart, but such
a movement is no more than a physiological reaction. ... boiling of blood around
the heart ... by itself such a reaction does not constitute fear.42


42 Fortenbaugh seems right to say that the physiological reaction alone is not sufficient to constitute the feeling of
fear. However, if we have been right in saying that what constitutes the emotion of fear, for instance, is the
physiological reaction that is caused by the thought that the agent is in some kind of harm, then the case of a person
who views an artistic representation of some kind and that consequently experiences a physiological disturbance
would be a case of fear if that disturbance is caused by a thought that has the relevant content. And, likely, the agent
who views a painting and consequently experiences some sort of physiological disturbance does not believe that she
is in harm's way.











Fortenbaugh seems right to say that the physiological reaction alone is not sufficient to constitute

the feeling of fear. However, if we have been right in saying that what constitutes the emotion of

fear, for instance, is the physiological reaction caused by the thought that the agent is in some

kind of harm, then the case of a person who views an artistic representation of some kind and

that consequently experiences a physiological disturbance would be a case of fear if that

disturbance is caused by a thought that has the relevant content. And, likely, the agent who views

a painting and consequently experiences some sort of physiological disturbance does not believe

that she is in harm's way.


There is nothing surprising, though, in thinking that belief is sufficient to produce

emotional states such as fear, anger, or joy. But there is also nothing surprising in thinking that

phantasia may be insufficient to cause feelings of pain or pleasure. However, suggesting that

phantasia is never sufficient to produce emotional states assumes a more limited role of the

faculty than it actually plays. If Aristotle's characterization ofphantasia is not limited to

situations that are analogous to viewing a piece of art or to 'idly entertaining a thought', say, we

should be able to point to cases where it is sufficient to give rise to feelings of pain or pleasure.

In what follows, I expand upon the nature ofphantasia and then suggest a reading of the De

Anima passage that takes this fuller characterization into account.

Any time an image arises in us, phantasia is exercised.43 These images might often take

the form of memories, wistful imaginings, dreams, or even fantasies. But, for Aristotle,

phantasia serves as much more than the faculty by which we are presented with or which


43 I don't want to argue that Aristotle has an obviously imagistic view of mental representations since this sort of
view has been shown to be problematic. I wish to remain neutral on this issue so I use the term 'image', then, in a
very broad way to refer to whatever form these mental representations take for Aristotle.









facilitates our memories and fantastic thoughts. Phantasia plays a significant role in presenting

or representing our current perceptions as being a certain way. Nussbaum notes in that, for

Aristotle, phantasia presents the objects of perception to us in a certain way, as good or bad, say,

or as desirable or undesirable.44 We should say, then, thatphantasia is not merely the faculty by

which we call up images as we do in cases of remembering or fantasizing, though it functions in

these cases as well. An object or situation that affects us certainly has to be presented in a certain

way, for instance, as being dangerous. Without this presentation, we would not be inclined to

fear the object or situation in question. The suggestion that Fortenbaugh seems to be making is

that, for Aristotle, even in cases where an object is presented in the relevant way, no emotion will

arise unless there is also the belief that the way in which the object is presented is actually the

case. But this reading of the De Anima passage does not seem to take account of the broader and

more significant role that Aristotle gives to phantasia. I want to suggest that we do not need to

interpret the passage found in the De Anima in this way if we accept thatphantasiai are not

limited to fantastical thoughts. Rather, we can read Aristotle as saying that there are cases where

phantasiai fail to cause affective states, namely, cases where a person simply calls to mind an

image. Note that Aristotle says that we fail to be affected when we merely imagine, when we

simply call to mind some image. But not all cases of imagining are like this as evidenced by the

fact thatphantasia functions to present our current perceptions to us in a certain way. My calling

an image to mind of some frightening event is different from my thought that I seem to be in

harm's way, though these are both cases where I have an impression. In the former case, I may

not be affected unless I also have the belief that such an event is occurring. In the latter, I may be

affected whether or not I also have the explicit belief.


44 Nussbaum 1986, 232-41.









Cooper notes in his paper on Aristotelian emotions that "it seems likely that Aristotle is

using phantasia here to indicate the sort of non-epistemic appearance to which he draws

attention once in De Anima III.3.428b2-4, according to which something may appear to, or strike

one, in some way (say, as being insulting or belittling) even if one knows there is no good reason

for one to take it so. If so, Aristotle is alert to the crucial fact about the emotions, that one can

experience them simply on the basis of how, despite what one knows or believes to be the case,

things strike one how things look to one when, for one reason or another, one is disposed to

feel the emotions."45 Let's see how such a case might play out. Suppose that my best friend fails

to show up for a get together that we have planned. This event might immediately strike me as

insulting and consequently make me angry even if I know and believe that she generally intends

no ill will toward me. So even in a case where I have reasons not to believe and in fact don't

believe that I have been insulted, I may still become angry because of the way the situation

appears to me. If this view is right, then Aristotle has supplied us with a very intuitive account

of the emotions. We often speak of people who become angry or afraid at very little, or for what

seems like no good reason at all.

If we think ofphantasia as mental representations, the ways objects or situations are

represented as being, including being good or bad, desirable or undesirable, we need not limit

our talk of its manifestations as situations analogous to the way that a painting represents the

world as being. To adhere strictly to this analogy is to assume that every impression is merely

descriptive, an assumption that we have seen is false on Aristotle's view. Imagination is the

faculty by which we can call up memories but it is also the faculty by which what we are

experiencing is represented to us in a certain way, as perhaps harmful, threatening, beneficial,


45 Cooper 1999, 417.









and as good or bad in general. Fortenbaugh is right in suggesting that believing is more than

"idly entertaining a thought" but perhaps wrong in suggesting that entertaining a thought is

insufficient to arouse emotion if 'entertaining a thought' is construed broadly as being presented

with an image of a situation as it appears given some current perception.

Ultimately, whether and how an agent's emotions are in her control may turn on whether

phantasia is sufficient for her emotional states. I believe that by attributing to Aristotle the view

thatphantasia is the relevant cognitive component in emotion and that it is sufficient to cause the

pains and pleasure that are constitutive of emotion, we will be able to propose a more adequate

account of the relation between passions and actions.

3.6 Aristotle's Psychology of Action

Having gotten quite a bit clearer on the nature of Aristotelian emotion, we should now turn to the

specific role that the path play in Aristotle's psychology of action. I want to first turn to a

passage found at De Motu 8.702a17-19.

The organic parts are suitably prepared (for movement) by the affections, these
again by desire, and desire by imagination. Imagination in its turn depends either
upon thinking or upon sense perception.

We see here four major elements in Aristotle's explanation of animal movement; thought

or sense perception, imagination (phantasia), desire (orexis), and affections (pathN). Any

explanation of animal movement or action will need to make reference to each of these elements.

We see immediately that the path are intimately related to action. What we should want to get

clear about then is how each of these elements is related and what role the path specifically play

in this explanation.

An initial reading of the De Motu passage seems to indicate a causal relation between

each successive element. Aristotle employs the phrase "prepared by" to transition from one

element of action to the next. But it is not entirely clear how we should understand the idea of









preparation. So we should be careful not to make the move too quickly to saying that each

element is causally related before undertaking a closer analysis of the relations between each

element.

I spoke earlier about the relationship between sense perception and imagination. Let's

then turn to the second phase of preparation, desire by imagination. What does it mean to say

that desire is prepared by the imagination? What is the relation between phantasia and desire?

To answer this question, we should first say something about the nature of desire generally. John

Cooper notes that, for Aristotle, to desire, is "more than merely an inclination to want to have or

to experience or do something; it is a fully fledged, completed such want an active

psychological movement toward getting in an appropriate way, or experiencing or doing,

whatever it is the desire for." Desire, then, sets us in motion toward the objects of desire if

nothing else, no obstacle or competing or conflicting desire stands in our way. Further, Martha

Nussbaum notes that at DeAn III.3.432b26-30, Aristotle claims that an animal "cannot desire

without phantasia", a passage that parallels his claim in the De Motu "thatphantasia is necessary

for the operations of desire." In other words, desire would be impossible without impressions of

a certain kind. But what kinds of impressions are necessary? Cooper notes in his paper "Some

Remarks on Aristotle's Moral Psychology" that "desire involves) not just thoughts, but thoughts

about what is good or bad."46 So desire involves evaluative impressions, the kinds that are

involved in the experience of emotion. On this view of the relation between phantasia and

desire, if I am thirsty and am presented with a glass of water, I will not desire the water simply

by having the thought that it is before me. The water must appear to me as pleasant, refreshing,




46 Cooper 1999.









or thirst quenching. Only then will I be moved toward it. We can see that impressions are not

only necessary for desire, but that they are constitutive of desire.

How does desire prepare the pathP? The relation between desire and the pathN is peculiar

since, on a number of occasions, Aristotle identifies one form of desire, namely appetitive desire

(epithumia), as apathos. But in this passage, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between desire and

the affections. Though Aristotle identifies epithumia as apathos elsewhere, in the present

context, Aristotle uses the general term, orexis rather than epithumia, to denote desire. One

immediate question at hand concerns the nature of our general desires and their relation to the

pathN.

For Aristotle, we desire those things that we take to be good, things like pleasure, honor

and respect, or happiness. These things we are said to desire for their own sake. In turn, we

desire particular things that bear a certain relation to the objects of our general desires, namely

those things that contribute toward the fulfillment of our ultimate desires. If an agent desires

health, for instance, she will also see those things that contribute toward her health, things like

exercise, as desirable and good. So what is the relation between our general and particular

desires and emotion? An agent who has long-term goals and desires toward which she aims will

likely feel pained if it seems that those aims are impeded and pleased if circumstances contribute

toward them. Let's say that someone desires happiness and her own well being generally.

Suppose also that she has the impression that she is in imminent danger of being harmed. She

also realizes that this would hinder the achievement her desired goal. Realizing that her desire is

potentially frustrated by the prospect of harm, she becomes afraid. She feels pained, cold chills,

and her heart begins to race. Her experience of fear in this case is facilitated by the relation

between the appearance of her present circumstance and her desire for happiness. In other words,









the realization that harm would frustrate her desire gives her a reason to see the threat as painful

and bad and the fact that the harm appears to her in this way causes her to experience fear. What

her desires are helps determine the way in which certain objects and situations appear to her and

it is in this way that desires might be said to prepare thepathN.

So how are actions prepared by thepathP? If we consider the case above, the agent in

question who experiences fear in the light of the impression that she is in imminent harm will be

moved to avoid that particular object. She might be moved to flee the area for example. If, on the

other hand, one has the general desire for happiness and has the impressions that some object

helps contribute to that end, she will see that object as pleasing and consequently pursue it. These

actions of pursuit and avoidance are determined by the emotion that the agent has in light of the

relation between her impressions and general desires. Emotions that involve pain and thoughts

that objects are unpleasant, harmful, or bad will result in avoidance, while emotions that are

pleasurable and involve thoughts that objects are good, beneficial, and contribute toward the

fulfillment of some general desire result in pursuit.

So it should be clear that there is an intimate relationship between movement or action

and emotion for Aristotle. And often times, this relationship is so intimate as to appear

simultaneous. Aristotle states, "the simultaneity and speed are due to the natural correspondence

of the active and the passive."47 And we have seen that this correspondence can be characterized

by saying that movement and actions are caused by or manifestations of the emotions that an

agent has in light of the way things appear to her given her general desires and values.







4 De Motu 8.702a20-1.









CHAPTER 4
CONTROLLING EMOTIONS

4.1 A Return to Kosman's View

In this section I return to Kosman's solution to the problem raised for Aristotle's

conception of virtue in light of the discussion of Aristotle's views regarding emotion and action

in order to see more clearly whether or not his characterization of the relation between passions

and actions accurately reflects Aristotle's view. I first want to reiterate the problem and solution

discussed in earlier chapters. Secondly, I want to argue that, given the considered view of

Aristotelian emotion and its role in his psychology of action, Kosman's view, that actions give

rise to certain feelings, is in direct conflict with Aristotle's views. This conflict not only results in

the inadequacy of Kosman's solution to the problem regarding Aristotle's conception of virtue

but also leaves us with an inaccurate picture of the relation between passion and action generally.

Though I believe Kosman's solution ultimately fails, I also believe that his account reveals

something right about being properly affected, namely that virtuous actions and passions are

intimately connected, though not in the way that he wants to suggest. Lastly, I want to offer a

characterization of the relation between passions and actions that not only reflects Aristotle's

views but which also allows us to gesture toward a response to problems that motivate Kosman's

account. To do this, I want to distinguish between two questions that lie behind Kosman's

solution. Namely, I want to tease apart questions concerning (i) whether or not feelings are

chosen and (ii) whether or not they are under the control of an agent. I argue that Aristotle's

conception of virtue importantly involves the ability of an agent to control her emotions. I set out

a rough picture of how agents, on Aristotle's view, might be able to accomplish this task,

drawing a contrast between virtuous agents and agents that have not acquired virtuous

dispositions. Virtuous agents, arguably, do not need to control their emotions whereas agent's









who have not acquired virtuous dispositions do. By explicating the role that the path seem to

play in the life of virtue, we may be better able to see how those agents who have not acquired

virtuous dispositions can effectively alter their emotional states.

The initial problem noted by Kosman is that virtue, for Aristotle, is a complex disposition

involving both passions and actions, the former of which are not chosen though the virtues which

involve dispositions to feel (as well as act) in the right ways involve choice. His proposed

solution to this problem is that feelings are chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that

are chosen. The crucial element in his solution is the relation between actions and passions. He

characterizes the relation between the two as essentially a causal one, where actions give rise to

or bring about corresponding feelings, feelings, he says, that are naturally associated with the

actions performed.

Kosman seems right to suggest that there is an association of some sort between actions

and passions and we have seen Aristotle say as much in the De Motu. But should we accept that

actions give rise to feelings given what we have seen about the nature of Aristotelian emotions

and the role that Aristotle gives to thepathe in his psychology of action? We have seen that the

pathN play an integral role in Aristotle's explanation of animal movement. But there is no

indication in the De Motu that Aristotle's view of the relation between the feelings of an agent

and the actions of an agent is such that certain feelings "follow in the wake" of actions that are

chosen. If this view were right, we would expect to see Aristotle claiming that the path are

"prepared by" animal movement since he uses this expression to indicate causal and constitutive

relations between each element in his explanation. Rather, we have evidence to support an

opposing view; actions are a manifestation, in part, of the emotions felt by an agent. In other

words, experiencing emotions of a certain kind, such as fear or even joy, often result in action,









namely in movement toward or away from the relevant intentional objects. We have no reason to

think that Aristotle suggests that actions are such as to give rise to emotions even if we read him

as saying that the path are constitutive of animal movement as opposed to their cause. Recall

also that there are passages in the ethical treatises that accord with the view that actions are

caused by the passions and not the other way around. Aristotle claims that there are actions that

proceed from or are due to emotions such as anger. So, given this evidence along with Aristotle's

explanation of animal movement, we should say that Kosman's suggestion that actions give rise

to feelings does not conform to a view that Aristotle holds.

Further, if we consider the nature of emotion as a complex state involving impressions as

well as feelings, we have even less reason to say that actions give rise to emotions. For

Kosman's characterization to be correct, an agent's performance of an action would have to be

such as to give rise to both the relevant evaluative impressions and feelings involved in emotion

and he in no way provides an answer for how this might be done.

So, if actions do not give rise to feelings, what should we say about Aristotle's

conception of virtue, the passions, and their relation to action? Kosman claims that in order to

acquire any specific virtue, a performance of the virtuous action that gives rise to feelings of the

right kind is needed. A virtuous agent must act in ways, Kosman claims, "which will 'bring

about' those very feelings" which are necessary for the realization of a virtue. But if actions do

not give rise to feelings then the right actions will not give rise to the right feelings. And if this

relation does not hold then we cannot even say that feelings are chosen indirectly in virtue of

their relation to acts that are chosen. And if we cannot say that feelings are chosen even

indirectly, we do not yet have an answer to the problem for virtue initially noted by Kosman. We

do have reason, however, to attribute to Aristotle the view that the path are related essentially to









animal movement and actions, and so intimately as to occur simultaneously. Since we cannot

divorce actions from the feelings that accompany them, we might say that Aristotle's view is that

all human actions are in part being affected, that part of what it means to act just is to be affected

in a certain way.

4.2 A New Proposal

Since Kosman has failed to offer an accurate characterization of the relation between

passions and actions, we are left with the initial questions regarding the role of the path in

Aristotle's conception of virtue. Kosman is right to focus on the relation between passions and

actions to get clear about role that the path play in virtue. And though his characterization is

problematic, a clearer understanding of the relation may help us work toward answering some of

the questions that motivate his proposal. I want to distinguish, then, between two different but

important questions Kosman seems to address. He is very clear that he wants to answer questions

about how we can say that the path involve choice. But he also seems to want answer questions

about how we might say that the path are under an agent's control. I will first draw out the

distinction between two questions that serve as Kosman's motivation.

Kosman claims that, "one does not have direct control over one's feelings, and in this sense

the feelings are not chosen."48 He also states that "it appears to be a distinction between our

actions and our passions that actions are / i/hin our control, whereas passions are not; we are the

initiating principle of what we do, but not of what is done to us" to argue that the path are not

chosen.49 He cites EN 11.5.1106a2, where Aristotle claims that we feel anger and fear without

choice, as evidence for the view that the path are not under our control. 50 Note that he is


48 Kosman 1980, 112.

49 Ibid., 106.
50 Ibid. Emphasis mine.









making two importantly distinct claims. The first is that the path are not under an agent's

control. The second is that the path are not chosen. He also seems to suggest that if an agent

does not have control over her feelings, they are not chosen. And his solution aims at showing

how we can say that the path are chosen by way of saying how they might be indirectly under

an agent's control in virtue of their relation to acts that are under direct control of an agent. So,

behind Kosman's proposal that actions give rise to feelings is not only a question about how

feelings might involve choice but also questions concerning whether the path are within our

control.

But, for Aristotle, what is chosen is not the same as what is under our control. Something that

is chosen is also under an agent's control, but whatever is under an agent's control is not

necessarily chosen. The crucial point to realize here is that whether or not emotions are under our

control is a separate question from whether or not they are chosen.

If we appreciate the distinction between questions about whether our emotions are chosen

and questions about whether they are under our control, we should expect that the answers differ

for each. We have already seen that Kosman's account fails to show that the path involve

choice. But the failure of this account to show that the path are chosen does not preclude us

from showing that emotions are under an agent's control. If we can show that emotions are or at

least can be under our control, we may be able to provide a clearer account of the way they

function in the context of a virtuous life.

The view that we cannot control our emotions is very intuitive. People lash out in anger

or erupt in tears seemingly without reason and often justify their reactions by saying that they

couldn't be helped. These sorts of cases might lead us to believe that there is nothing we can do

about how we feel toward or about something. But such a view, though strongly intuitive, is at









odds with Aristotle's conception of virtue as something for which we are responsible. So

questions about whether the emotions are under our control are central when considering

Aristotle's account of virtue. The virtuous person is characterized as responsiblefor who she is

and the dispositions that she has. And if virtue involves having emotions of a certain kind, then

we should want to say that the virtuous agent is responsible for her emotions as well as her

actions. For Aristotle, then, it seems we are responsible for our character and our feelings and

emotions are central to our character. But how can we be responsible for something that we

seemingly have no control over?

Being in control of one's feelings and emotions might seem less counterintuitive if we

attend to the fact that emotions are complex states involving thoughts and feelings. If we are able

to control our emotions then we will have to be in control of these elements. But, as Kosman

notes, an agent cannot simply choose to be angry or joyful. And surely the psychological and

physiological feelings of pain and pleasure that constitute emotions are not under our control.

This leaves the evaluative impressions that give rise to these feelings of pain and pleasure. I want

to investigate, then, whether or not we might be said to be in control of this element of

Aristotelian emotion. The thought that agents are in control of and responsible for their

evaluative impressions accords well with what Aristotle says at ENIII.5.1114bl. Here he claims

that "some one may say that all men aim at the apparent good, but have no control over how

things appear to him; but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. We

reply that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he will also be himself

somehow responsible for how things appear." Further, he states at EN II.3.1105a5-6 that "to feel

delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions." And since impressions

incite our feelings of pain or pleasure, feeling delight and pain rightly must then be a matter of









having the right impressions. So, clearly, for Aristotle, we must be responsible for how things

appear to us, for the impressions that we have, in order to have a character of a certain kind. In

other words, to have a virtuous character depends crucially on having impressions of a certain

kind.

What would it be, then, to have the right thoughts or impressions about objects,

situations, or goals? The thoughts or impressions that cause the sorts of feelings that are

constitutive of emotions are importantly evaluative in nature; they include reference to whether

or not the object or situation perceived by the agent is good or bad, painful or pleasant. So the

right impressions cannot simply be an accurate representation of the sensory qualities or

characteristics of any object. The right impressions must include the right evaluation of an object

as good or bad for the agent having the thought. Presumably, then, the action that is manifest as a

result of an emotion that includes the right impression is an instance of virtuous action.

Controlling one's emotions, then, will be a matter of altering the impressions that one has about

an object or situation. More specifically, controlling one's emotions is a matter of altering the

evaluation involved in the relevant thought since the physiological pains and pleasures follow

from these evaluations.

But how might an agent go about altering the evaluative content of her impressions?

Before answering this question, we must first ask what counts as the right evaluation. I want to

take some time and discuss the sorts of impressions had by the virtuous agent since this is a

paradigm case of proper feeling and action. The virtuous agent aims toward the good. It is what

she desires for its own sake and that on account of which she desires other things, namely the

sorts of things that are a means to her end. And she acts in ways that contribute toward that end

and refrains from acting in ways that to do not contribute to that end. Further, she doesn't desire









those things that she sees as frustrating her overarching desire. And as we have seen, the

evaluative content of impressions depends importantly on a person's desires and whether

situations and objects are represented as frustrating or fulfilling those desires. Anything that

either frustrates or contributes toward the virtuous agent's ultimate aim will rightly appear to her

as such. Her impressions about the way things are is always right with respect to their relation to

the good. As such, it doesn't look like the virtuous agent will need to be in control of her

emotions at all in the sense that she will never need to alter them. This is why the virtuous agent

is pleased when performing those actions that she ought. They simply appear to her as pleasant.

Being able to control emotions only seems to come into play when there is the possibility that the

agent in question will have the wrong impression, the sort of impression that doesn't present

objects and situations as being good if they actually are or as being bad if they actually are. The

crucial thing to note in the case of the virtuous agent is that the rightness or wrongness of her

impression depends on how it relates to her overarching desires. To get at cases where an agent's

impressions might require alteration, we need to look to agents that aren't yet virtuous, but are

perhaps on their way toward acquiring virtuous dispositions. I want to draw a contrast then

between the virtuous agent and the continent (enkratic) agent.

The ultimate aim of the continent agent is the same as the virtuous agent. The difference

between the two consists in the fact that the continent agent often has desires that conflict with

her larger goal. For instance, the continent agent and the virtuous agent may both desire health.

When presented with a piece of chocolate cake, the virtuous agent will have the impression that

the cake is bad for her and will avoid it. It never even occurs to the virtuous agent that the cake is

something that she should go for. The continent agent on the other hand, might see the cake as

pleasing and desire to eat it. She also realizes that the way that the cake appears to her is not in









accord with her ultimate aims. Realizing this, she does not go for the cake. But the reason she

acts in this way is because she recognizes the way her initial impression lines up with her

ultimate desires. Her recognition of this conflict gives her a reason to see the cake in a different

way, as something bad, essentially altering her impression of the object before her. If this sort of

case is remotely plausible and if it helps us explain the actions of the continent agent, then it does

look like there are cases where our impressions are under our control. And if impressions are

under our control, then so too are our emotions.

In what cases then, can we see that an agent's emotions, specifically, are under her

control? Consider the virtue of courage. Courage is a virtue with respect to fear (and confidence)

and requires feeling fear in the right way and at the right times and to the right degree. Aristotle

claims that "the man, then, who faces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, in the

right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is

brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way

reason directs.""51 An agent who is not courageous either feels too much or too little fear and is

considered a coward or rash respectively. But some amount of fear will be involved in every act

or manifestation of courage though to a differing degree. Further, Aristotle claims that the

ultimate aim of the brave or courageous person is honor and nobility. It is for the sake of these

things that she acts. If nobility is her ultimate desire, acting courageously will require doing

those things that contribute toward this end.

Recall that the thought associated with fear, for Aristotle, is the impression that one is in

imminent harm. So, to be courageous, an agent needs to have the right impression about how

much danger she is actually in with respect to the noble end toward which she aims. Suppose that


51 EN 11I.7 111517-19.









someone is faced with an oncoming enemy who intends her harm. She might have the

impression that she is in danger. If she is a coward, the pain that she feels on account of her

impression will result in her fleeing her present situation. She sees the situation only as one that

will cause her great pain and avoids it without any thought about the ultimate good toward which

she aims. In short, the imminent harm appears to her as worse than it actually is and,

consequently, she feels too much fear. In this case, her impression of the situation is shaped, not

by her view toward the nobility that she desires, but simply by her desire to avoid pain. However,

this same person could alter her impression of the situation to act courageously. She could see

the imminent harm as painful or destructive and be tempted to flee but then also see it as a

situation that should be confronted for the sake of the noble. If she can make the connection

between the impression that the situation is painful and her desired end of nobility, she will see

the situation in a different way, as painful but also as good since facing her present enemy is the

noble thing to do. In both cases, she has the impression that she is in imminent harmed and feels

pained because of the threat. And in both cases she experiences fear. But the fear that she feels in

the latter case is not as strong as the fear she feels in the former since she also sees the situation

as something good, as something that is a means to her desired end though she may immediately

see the situation as painful and be tempted to flee. But in light of her altered impression, she does

not flee but stands to face the oncoming threat in spite of the potential pain. And this action

counts as courageous for Aristotle for "it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts

as courage directs."52 The agent who acts courageously does so because her overarching desire

gives her a reason to view the situation in a different way; it changes her impression and,

consequently, the measure of fear that she experiences.


52 EN III.7.1115b23-4.









If what I have said about cases of courage is correct, then we should be able to tell the

same sort of story for any emotional reaction in an agent, namely that her evaluative impressions

can be altered if they are measured against her deliberated desire for what is actually good. These

sorts of cases should also help us see why Kosman's characterization of the relation between

passions and actions is incorrect. For it isn't by virtue of acting differently that the coward comes

to have the right feelings. Rather it is by the alteration of her emotions that she comes to act

differently. And Aristotle seems equipped to tell this kind of story. The acquisition of virtue,

then, will ultimately depend on an agent's being able to alter her impressions time after time

until she simply sees things just as they relate to her desired ends. And we can only tell this story

if we appreciate that emotions are complex states involving impressions that give rise to certain

feelings. Further, we see why it is important that impressions serve as the cognitive element in

Aristotelian emotions rather than belief. Impressions are something that we can control whereas

beliefs are something that is out of our control. If beliefs were necessary for Aristotelian

emotions, we would have a more difficult time explaining how we can control and be responsible

for them.









CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

My aim in this thesis has been to examine a widely accepted view of the relation between

virtue and emotion in Aristotelian ethics in order to clarify some of the issues surrounding this

relation. I have shown that L.A. Kosman's account of the relation between action and feeling is

in conflict with Aristotle's views concerning the psychology of action and fails to account for a

considered view of Aristotelian emotion. Kosman suggests that feelings are chosen in virtue of

their relation to actions that are chosen. The relationship that he proposes between actions and

feelings is that actions are such as to give rise to corresponding feelings. Thus, in the case of

virtue, the right actions will give rise to the right feelings. However, an appreciation of

Aristotelian emotions as complex states involving both thoughts and feelings as well as an

appreciation of Aristotle's account of the role of the pathW in animal movement found in the De

Motu suggest that Kosman's view fails to represent an accurate account of Aristotle's views.

However, his account raises important questions about the nature of emotions and their

relation to virtue and action that help us distinguish between the issues that need clarifying. By

teasing apart two characterizations regarding the nature of the path that seem to motivate

Kosman's account, namely that they are not chosen and that they are not under an agent's

control, I hope to have highlighted the importance of latter and to have shown that we do have

the resources to alleviate the worry that thepathe are not under the control of an agent. In order

to alleviate this concern, we need to return to Aristotle's views concerning emotions generally as

complex states. The view that Aristotelian emotions involve evaluative thoughts that give rise to

psychological and physiological feelings of pain or pleasure helps us see that at least part of what

an emotion is, for Aristotle, is something that is under our control, namely our evaluative

impressions. In the case of virtuous action, the evaluative impression that an agent has can be









altered if she reflects on their relation to her desires about the actual good. The alteration of

evaluative impressions results in different psychological or physiological disturbances or

pleasures and consequently different emotional experiences that are manifest in action. Aristotle

does not, however, explicitly offer this sort of explanation. So the account that I offer should be

taken as a rough estimate of the sort of story he ispreparedto tell. I believe that any account of

the role of thepathW in Aristotle's conception of virtue needs to rely on a considered view of his

account of the emotions generally and I hope to have gestured toward a successful, though not

nearly comprehensive, view that is consistent with Aristotle's views in this thesis.









LIST OF REFERENCES


Aristotle. 1984. De Anima. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works ofAristotle. Vol. I, ed. J.
Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
De Motu Animalium. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works ofAristotle. Vol. I, ed.
J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
-Ethica Eudemia. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works ofAristotle. Vol. II, ed. J.
Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Ethica Nicomachea. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works ofAristotle. Vol. II, ed.
J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Metaphysics. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works ofAristotle. Vol. II, ed. J.
Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, John M. 1999. An Aristotelian Theory of Emotions. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on
Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, 406-23. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
-Some Remarks on Aristotle's Moral Psychology. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on
Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, 237-51. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.

Fortenbaugh, W.W. 2002. Epilogue to Aristotle on Emotion. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth.

H.H. Joachim. 1951. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 85.

Kirwan, Christopher. 1971. Aristotle's Metaphysics Books 1' A, and E Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kosman, L.A. 1980. Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics. In
Essays in Aristotle 's Ethics, ed. A.O. Rorty, 103-16. Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California: University of California Press.

Nussbaum, Martha. 1996. Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion. In Aristotle 's
Rhetoric, ed. A.O. Rorty, 303-23. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of
California Press.
-1986. The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle's Explanation of Action. In Aristotle's De Motu
Animalium, 221-69. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Cyrena Sullivan is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Florida.





PAGE 1

1 THE ROLE OF THE PATHE IN ARISTOTLES CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE By CYRENA SULLIVAN A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

PAGE 2

2 2007 Cyrena Sullivan

PAGE 3

3 For my mother

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. John Palmer, fo r his unending patience and help with this project. Thanks also go to Professors David Co pp and Robert DAmico for their insight. I would also like to th ank my friends and family and everyone else who supported me.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................................... 4 ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................6 C HAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... .7 2 KOSMANS ACCOUNT OF BEIN G PROPERLY AFFECTED ......................................... 14 2.1 A Problem for Aristotles Conception of Virtue .............................................................. 14 2.2 Kosmans Solution............................................................................................................18 The Virtue Argume nt......................................................................................................19 The Feeling Argument..................................................................................................... 22 3 AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF THE PATH ............................................................26 3.1 The General Nature of the Path e ......................................................................................26 3.2 Emotions as Species of the Path e .....................................................................................28 3.3 The Cognitive Element Involv ed in Emotion................................................................... 28 3.4 The Feeling Elem e nt in Emotion...................................................................................... 31 3.5 A Defense of Phantasia as th e Relevant Cognitive Component in Aristotelian Emotion...............................................................................................................................34 3.6 Aristotles Psychology of Action......................................................................................41 4 CONTROLLING EMOTIONS.............................................................................................. 45 4.1 A Return to Kosmans View.............................................................................................45 4.2 A New Proposal............................................................................................................. ...48 5 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................56 LIST OF REFERENCES...............................................................................................................58 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH......................................................................................................... 59

PAGE 6

6 Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts THE ROLE OF THE PATHE IN ARISTOTLES CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE By Cyrena Sullivan December 2007 Chair: John Palmer Major: Philosophy In this thesis, I undertake an investigation into the nature of Aristotles conception of virtue in light of the relevance given to the pathe in his account. The centrality of the pathe in Aristotles conception of virtue raises several issues. Commentator L.A. Kosman raises a problem for Aristotles concepti on of virtue, namely that the pathe that are the ma nifestations of virtue are not chosen. This creates a tension for Aristotl es account since virtue is supposed to be something that involves choice. Closely related to this problem is the question of how Aristotle might be able to say that the pathe or emotions are under the cont rol of an agent. In order to more adequately address some of these problems, I offer an Aristotelia n analysis of emotion along with some commentary on the role played by the pathe in his psychology of action. Utilizing these accounts, I suggest that Aristotl e is equipped to ad dress these problems. Specifically, I argue that Aristotle is prepared to offer an account of emotions in which they are under an agents control.

PAGE 7

7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Th e aim of this thesis is to investigat e the nature of the relation between the path (emotions or passions) and actions in the context of Aristotles concept of virtue. Ultimately, I argue that being properly affect ed, or having the right emotion, mi nimally requires the ability of an agent to alter her emotions and, further, th at Aristotle is equipped with the conceptual machinery to advance such a pr oposal. My defense of this propos al as a plausible Aristotelian account relies on an account of Ar istotles psychology of action and a considered view of Aristotles account of the emotions generally. I argue that Aristotelian emotions, taken as intentional states of an agent th at have at least narrow cognitive content, are the kinds of states we can control and that this view helps clarify the role of the path in the virtuous agent. The need for the advancemen t of such a proposal is mo tivated by the following two considerations. The first is the exegetical task of explicating a central concept of Aristotles ethical theory about which he of fers little analysis, na mely, the specific role and nature of the passions in the context of virtue and virtuous action. The seco nd consideration is to remedy a widely accepted proposal regarding the relation between actions and passions provided by L.A. Kosman in his paper Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotles Ethics.1 In this paper, Kosman notes an apparent tension in Aristotles concept of virtue as a hexis prohairetik namely that the path that play a central role in vi rtue are not chosen whereas the virtues they partly constitute ar e. His solution to this problem depends on his characterization of the relation between passions a nd actions, an account which I inte nd to show is at odds with Aristotles psychology of action and also one th at we should not accept given an analysis of Aristotles views on emotions ge nerally. While I do not wish to provide an account of being 1 Kosman 1980.

PAGE 8

8 properly affected that resolves the tension originally noted by Kosman, I do wish to examine the motivation behind some of the issu es regarding passions and emoti ons in order to argue for how we might at least be able to say that emotions are under an ag ents control if not directly chosen. The importance of being proper ly affected in Aristotles ethical treatises may not be immediately obvious on an initial re ading of the texts. This is not to say that Aristotle makes little mention of passion s and their involvement in virtue, quite the opposite. Aristotle is abundantly clear that the ethical theory de veloped in both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics centers on the concept of virtue ( arte ) and its manifestation in the actions and passions ( path ) of agents. I will speak of the pathos both as a general concept in th e Aristotelian corpus and as it relates specifically to virtue and virtuous action. Br oadly speaking, the path are ways in which something can be affected or changed and the manifestati ons of these alterations. The path include experiencing emotions or having certain desires. Aristotle refers to both pass ions and actions in the form al definition of virtue in EN .II. EN II.6.1106b35-1107a6: Excellence, then, is a stat e concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reas on and in the way in which the person of practical wisdom would dete rmine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vice s respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions while excellence both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Again, at EN III.1.1109b30, he asserts excellenc e is concerned with passions and actions. We have little reason, then, to doubt th at there is more to virtue, for Aristotle, than the performance of certain actions. But we migh t still wonder what the relation is between passions and actions and how they function toge ther in a virtuous life. In the definition of virtue, Aristo tle claims that there is something right about the passions and actions of the virtuous person. Passions then, are such as to be felt rightly or

PAGE 9

9 wrongly, properly or improperly.2 The following passage, whic h expands upon the concept of virtue, reinforces this idea. EN II.6.1106b16-23: I mean moral excellence; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt bot h too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence. Now, we should be familiar with the thought of acting in the right way or doing the things that one ought, but may be puzzled by th e notion that there are right and wrong ways to feel and that these are in some important way related to action and virtue. The idea that ther e are right or wrong ways to feel seems to impl y that agents are responsible fo r their feelings and should be able to change or control them. But emotions appear to be the kinds of things that we cannot control. And we often see people react angrily or joyfully for what seems like no re ason at all. And we should be puzzled by the ab sence of an explicit characteri zation or analysis of this phenomenon on Aristotles part given that th e relevant concept is not transparent. Despite th e apparent lack of analysis, I think we can formulate an initial account of right or proper feeling by looki ng at some passages that more clearly illustrate the relation between passions and actions a nd between the passions and virtue Consider, first, the following two passages: EN III.1.1111a34-b2: Again, what is the differen ce in respect of involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger? Both are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are t hought not less human than reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are the mans actions 2 We want to avoid, as we do similarly with actions, confusing proper or virtuous affective states with affective states that are felt rightly or virtuously. The former description of affective states as virtuous suggests that the rightness of the state depends on its being one type rather than another, love instead of anger say. That same description might also seem to suggest that feeling the right affective state (ambiguous between types and tokens) is sufficient for virtue.

PAGE 10

10 EN V.8.1135b19-2: When he acts with knowledge but not after de liberation, it is an act of injustice e.g. the acts due to anger or to other passions necessary or natural to man. Here, Aristotle says that there are actions that proceed from or are due to an emotion, anger specifically. He also suggests that actions might be due to other pa ssions as well. These passages clearly suggest that there is something like a causal relation between an agents emotions or passions and his actions. This mi ght be the start of an adequate account of the relation between passions and actions. But what is the relati on between passions and virtue? The following passage taken from the Eudemian Ethics serves to illuminate a possible answer. EE II.2.1220b10-20: Now we have to state in resp ect of what part of the soul we have character of this or that kind. It will be in respect of the faculties of passion, in virtue of which men are described, in reference to those passions, either as feeling them in some way or as not feeling them. Aristotle is suggesting th at the quality of our character depe nds importantly on our emotions. If someone feels them in the righ t way, she will be virtuous. But if she feels them in the wrong way or not at all she will be vici ous (or at least not virtuous). So, if actions are due to passions or emotions in some sense, and exhibiting virtue depends on our having the right emotions, the actions that are performed as th e result of a virtuous character should be due to the emotions that are felt in the right way. I would now like to s uggest a rough initial account of what Aristotle regards as proper feeling. By proper feelings I will mean those affective stat es of an agent that function as a cause of her performing the actions th at she ought. 3 This account, t hough not yet fully developed, should serve to highli ght the central ideas regarding the passions that weve seen 3 I identify cause here with Aristotles notion of efficien t cause. I take it as sufficient for an affective states serving as the cause of an ac tion its being given as a reason in explanations for why an agent performed a particular action.

PAGE 11

11 Aristotle offer, namely that they appear to be related, perhaps causally, to actions and that they play a central role in virtue and in determining the character of a pe rson generally. My main task in this thesis is to expa nd upon this initial account. If the path are correctly characterized as playing at least a causal role if not a constitutive role, with respect to actions generally and with respect to the actions of th e virtuous agent specifi cally, they may be apt to serve as that in virtue of which the actions th ey cause (or constitute) count as expressions of virtue. Clearly not just any emotion will be related to virtue and virtuous action, only those that are, as Aristotle would say, felt rightly. Anger, for instance, w ill result in the sorts of actions which one ought to perform if felt properly. 4 An agent cannot perform the right action without feeling in the right way. Two agents may pe rform the same action, fleeing from danger, for instance, but only one may be th e right action. Further, some em otions, such as hatred, are simply exempt from being the sorts of fee lings that can ever be rightly felt. The account of proper f eeling that I have offered serves the mere theoretical purpose of explaining the general phenomenon, and if we are to follow Aristotle s lead and take interest in the practical and prescriptive side of ethical inquiry instead of the theoretical and descriptive side, we will want to know more about how th is generalization might apply in particular circumstances, how an ag ent comes to have the right feeli ngs in the first place. We are, intuitively I believe, far less fa miliar with the notion of feeling as we ought th an we are with the notion of acting as we ought. We are better ac quainted with the thing to do than we are with the way in which to do things 4 In saying that, on Aristotles view, there are actions that one ought to perform, I am not suggesting that there are certain voluntary actions simpliciter that one should perform. Rather, we sh ould think of them as actions that are performed in the way that they ought to be, namely, from a virtuous disposition. I use the term virtuous action here to refer to actions that arise from a vi rtuous character and not to describe ac tions as virtuous as such in order to preclude the possibility of attributing to Aristotle the charge of leaving virtue to chance.

PAGE 12

12 We can see that there are numerous questions surrounding Aristotles conception of emotions and passions and the role they play in virtue. These exegetical questi ons have no doubt served as the motivation behind accounts such as Kosmans and certainly reveal the need to get clearer about what the Aristote lian emotions are and what ro le they play in virtue. In Chapter 2, I set out my formulation of th e problem for Aristotle s conception of virtue as conceived by Kosman. I then consider his proposed solution to the problem, including his account of the relation between passions and actions, and point toward some prima facie objections to this account. The questions raised by Kosmans characteri zation of the relation between passions and action motivat e a closer inve stigation of Aristotle s views about emotions generally as well as his views regarding the psychology of action. In Chapter 3, I consider Aristotles account of the path generally. I also reflect on the views of John Cooper, William Fortenbaugh, and Martha Nussbaum concer ning both Aristotles conception of the emotions and his psychology of action. I begin my analysis with a discussion of the nature of the path generally. I then turn to Aristotles Rhetoric to examine the nature of emotions specifically as a species of the path Aristotles Rhetoric offers what might be seen as the most explicit (yet not nearly comprehensive) account concerni ng the nature of emotions. I argue that Aristotelian emotions are complex, intentional states involving both a cognitive and feeling element, a view that, I believe, is not fully appreciated in Kosm ans account. Lastly, I take up a discussion of the role of the path in Aristotles explanati on of animal movement found in De Motu Animalium In Chapter 4, I return to Ko smans account in light of the broader analysis of Aristotles views regarding the path and their role in acti on. I use the analysis of emotion that I have constructed as well as Aristotle s psychology of action to highli ght the problems with Kosmans

PAGE 13

13 account more clearly. I then sugg est, drawing upon some of th e motivations behind Kosmans account, how we might utilize th e considered view of Aristo telian emotion along with his psychology of action to outline an account of being properly affected that supports the view that the path are under an agents control generally and what this means for Aristotles conception of virtue. In Chapter 5, I survey the conclusions dr awn in the main portions of the thesis.

PAGE 14

14 CHAPTER 2 KOSMANS ACCOUNT OF BEING PROPERLY AFFECTED 2.1 A Problem for Aristotles Conception of Virtue In this section I set out a puzzle regarding Aristotles con ception of virtue from Kosmans Being Properly Affected. This puzzle motivates his account of the relation between passions and actions that I explicate in th e following section and with which I take issu e in this thesis. I begin by offering my formulation of the puzzle Kosman introduces by presenting three claims that can each be supported by textual evidence fro m Aristotles ethical texts. However, when taken together, these claims seem to reveal an inconsistency in Ar istotles conception of virtue. I offer textual support for each statement in turn and go on to place each w ithin the context of Kosmans formulation of the problem, highlighting their inconsistency. Consider the following three claims: (1) Virtue (aret ), or moral excellence, is a disposition to not only act but also to feel in the right way.5 (2) Virtue is a state con cerned with choice ( hexis prohairetik ). (3) Feelings (path ) are not objects of choice ( prohaireta) I first want to show that we have good reason to think that Aristotle endorses each of these claims. Kosman rightly notes that Aristotles account of virtue is not co ncerned solely with actions but with passions as well. I no ted earlier that we have evid ence in Aristotles ethical treatises to support his endorse ment of this claim. At EN II.6.1106b16-17, Aristotle explicitly states that virtue is concerned with passions and actions. Aristotle ma kes similar claims at EN 5 Another way of putting the same thought is to say that virtue is concerned with an agents performance of the right actions as well as her having the right feelings.

PAGE 15

15 II.3.1104b13-14, II.6.1106b 24-5, and III.1.1109b30.6 Given this evidence, we should not attribute to Aristotle the view that virtue s such as courage or temperance are dispositions merely to act in certain ways but are, as Kosman claims, dis positions toward feeli ng as well as acting.7 We might worry that Aristotle might not mean to say that a vi rtue is a disposition to feel as well as act since passions a nd actions differ in important wa ys, namely that the former are things an agent experiences in a basically passive manner while the latter are obviously things that an agent does. Kosman consider s a solution proposed by H.H. Joachim.8 Joachims solution is that virtues are dispositions me rely to act in ways that are the appropriate response to certain feelings and are not dispositions to feel in cer tain ways. Kosman reject s this account, however, because Aristotle says at EN II.5.1105b26 that, if we are excessively angered, we are badly disposed and if not that we are well-disposed.9 The general point Aristotle appears to be making here is that the realiza tion of virtue in an agent depends cr ucially on whether or not she feels in the appropriate way, whether or not, for instance, she becomes angry too easily or not easily enough. So part of what it means to realize virtuous dispos itions is to feel in a certain way. If we do not feel in the right way, we are badly disposed. An agents fa ilure to feel the appropriate amount and intensity of anger at the right time indi cates that she is not virtuous. Kosman concludes, as I think we should, th at feelings are part of the con cept of virtue considered as a disposition.10 6 Emphasis mine 7 Kosman 1980, 104. 8 Joachim 1951. 9 Kosman 1980, 108. 10Ibid., 109.

PAGE 16

16 We also have very clear textual evidence that virtue, for Aristotle, is a state concerned with choice ( prohairesis ). In his formal definition at EN II.6, Aristotles states that virtue is a state concerned with choice. In saying that virtue is a state c oncerned with choice, Aristotle means roughly that the ma nifestation of virtues such as temp erance and courage in the virtuous agent are the result of a proce ss of deliberation about the good. A nd manifestations of virtue are the result of deciding what should be done to realize th is ultimate end. However, an agent cannot choose or decide to be virtuous; she cannot, simply as the result of decisi on, be temperate or courageous. What she can do is de liberate about what the good for her is and how best to achieve that aim. Virtues, then, are th e dispositions formed via the realizations of these completed deliberations. Finally, what evidence do we have to attribute to Aristotle the view that the path do not involve prohairesis ? At EN II.5.1106a2-4, we find Aristotle saying th at, we feel anger and fear without choice but the excellences are choices or are not wi thout choice. 11 Aristotles aim in the larger portion of text in wh ich we find this passage is to de ny that virtues ar e identical with passions. He argues for this claim by asserting that emotions such as fear and anger are not chosen and since, as we have seen, virtues involve choice in an important sense, virtues are not identical to feelings or passions. If we feel anger and fear without choice, we do not come to feel angry or fearful as the result of a process of deliberat ion about how to feel. In other words, agents make no decisions about how to feel. Vi rtues on the other hand are ultimately realized by agents who engage in a process of deliberation about the good. We should remember also that the passions are not limited to emotions such as fear, anger, or joy, but also in clude things li ke desire ( epithumia ). At EN II.5.1105b21-3, Aristotle 11 Emphasis mine

PAGE 17

17 asserts By passions I mean appetite ( epithumia) anger, fear, confidence envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in gene ral the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain. Aristotle does not explicitly claim that desire, ge nerally, does not involve choice. However, there is evidence for the claim that appetitive desire ( epithumia) does not involve prohairesis At EN I.13, Aristotle claims that there are two elements in the soul, one rational and the other irrational. The irrational part of the soul is often at odds with the rational element in the soul and manifests itself in the desires that run counter to what reason commands, but it is also at times obedient to the dictates of reason.12 Appetite (epithumia) is the name Aristotle gives to this portion of the irrational element in the soul.13 And appetite is a form of desire Since the appet ite takes no part in processes of deliberation (only the rati onal element has that ability) and since prohairesis explicitly involves processes of deliberation, as we see at EN III.3.1113a10, appetite does not involve choice. Further, in th e midst of his discussion of prohairesis at EN III.2.1111b14-15, Aristotle states, Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but no t appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pl easant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant. So, given this evidence regarding epithumia along with what we see Aristotle saying about fear and anger, we should attribute to Aristotle the view that the passions, br oadly speaking, do not involve choice. Even though we have evidence th at Aristotle endorses statements (1)-(3), a closer look at the implications of (1) an d (2) reveals an inconsiste ncy in the original set of three. Statements (1) and (2) seem to imply the following claim: (4) Virtue involves acting with prohairesis and feeling with prohairesis 12 This point will be crucial later in providing an account of being properly affected. 13 EN I.13.1102b13-1103a3

PAGE 18

18 We might rephrase (4) to say that the actions and passions that are the manifestat ions of virtue involve prohairesis a claim that is in direct conflict with (3). The in itial problem that we are faced with, then, is how virtue can be, at least partly, a dispos ition to feel in the right ways and involve choice if feelings th emselves are not the objects of choice. Kosman highlights the inconsistency of these statements by raising the following two ques tions: (i) how could choice be involved in a fixed tendency to ward that which does not involv e choice (or that which is not chosen); and (ii) is it possible to make sense of the notion that a virtue involves choice even though the feelings that are its realizations are not the objects of decision?14 In what follows, I discuss Kosmans solution to this initial problem in order to bring to light the relation that he suggests holds between actions and passions 2.2 Kosmans Solution In this s ection I discuss Kosmans solution to the problem raised for Ar istotles conception of virtue with a view toward crit icizing his account of the relatio n between actions and feelings generally and in the case of virtue specifically. Kosmans solution relies on two parallel arguments that I reconstruct here for purposes of cl arity. The first argument, which Ill refer to as the Virtue Argument (VA), aims to show how we might formulate an account of virtue in which the virtues themselves are not chosen simpliciter but which might be chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that ar e chosen. The seco nd argument, which Ill re fer to as the Feeling Argument (FA), is aimed at showing how feelings mi ght be chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that are chosen. Ultimately, Kosman argues that since virtue is acquired through a process of habituation and since this process is carried out by performing acts that are objects of 14 Kosman 1980, 110.

PAGE 19

19 choice, the virtue, that an agent acquires as a re sult of a process of habitu ation is chosen as are the feelings that, he claims, are natur ally associated wi th those actions. The Virtue Argument 1. Virtue s are dispositions ( hexeis ) acquired through a proc ess of habituation (ethismos ) and as such cannot be acquired di rectly through decision.15,16 2. Particular performances of an action type can be chosen. 3. [What comes about as a result of an agents performance of ce rtain actions is itself chosen in virtue of its relation to the relevant chosen acts.]17 4. So, a virtue that is acquired as the result of the repeated performan ce of acts that are chosen is chosen The first premise is relatively uncontroversial given both our previous discussion about the nature of prohairesis and intuitions about acquiring dispositions. Kosman rightly claims it is not as a direct result of calculati on, deliberation, [or] resolution.... that we become courageous, temperate, or wise.18 Instead of acquiring virt uous dispositions directly as the result of decision, an agent must behave in the ways that the person of virtue would until sh e behaves in those ways habitually. Kosman puts the idea this way, On th is view one becomes virtuous by impersonating a virtuous person, and in that impersonation, through the process of habituation, becomes the virtuous person whom one impersonates.19 15 EN II.6.1106b35 16 EN II.4.1105b9-10 17 This premise appears to be implicit in Kosmans discussion. 18 Kosman 1980, 111. 19 Ibid., 112

PAGE 20

20 We should also be able to s ee the plausibility of the sec ond premise. Particular actions can be chosen since an agent ca n deliberate about what to do in any given circumstance and so act as the result of her deliberat ion. Kosman notes that a pers on might decide on an occasion to act virtuously and chooses on [some] occasion to be virtuous and so acts.20 The third premise is one which seems to be implicit in Kosmans account and is one on which this argument relies. There may be problems with this prem ise, but these are independent of the criticisms I have of Kosmans account. Fo r now, then, we should accept this claim in order to get at his entire solution to the problems raised earlier. If this argument is right, then virtues are chosen if th ey are acquired through the performance of acts that are chos en. This account seems to accord w ith what Aristotle says in the ethical treatises regarding the way an agent acquires vi rtues and also with the intuition that a person cannot acquire a virtue su ch as justice or temperance simply by decidi ng. Consider the following passage: EN II.4.1105b5-9: Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a pr ospect of becoming good.21 Aristotle is claiming that the acqu isition of a virtue such as justice requires that an agent act justly time after time until she acts that way out of habit, and so on for any virtue. But we should remember that there is a distinction between acting virtuously and acting in accordance with virtue. An agent that acts virtuou sly has already acquir ed the relevant virtuous dispositions. An agent might act in accordance with virtue on a particular occasion; she might act justly, say, 20 Ibid., 111 21 Emphasis mine.

PAGE 21

21 without also having acqu ired the relevant virt ue of justice. At EN II.4.1105a18-21 and 1105a281105b1 we find Aristotle saying the following: The question might be asked, what we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temp erate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are alre ady just and temperate, exact ly as, if they do what is grammatical or musical they are proficie nt in grammar and mu sic.but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they ar e done justly or temperately. The agent must also be in a certain condition when he do es them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose th e acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. VA, however, does not resolve the original worry raised by Kosman. We still need an account of how feelings mi ght be said to be objects of choi ce as well as an explanation of the relation between feelings and actio ns. Recall the initial problem rega rding feelings and choice in light of VA. Since virtue cannot be chosen in the sense that we cannot choose simpliciter to acquire the virtue of courage, say, or temperance, we may have been led to assume that a virtues involving prohairesis must depend on the actualizatio ns of that virtue being prohairetic .22 In other words, given the view of vi rtue as a complex di sposition that is actualized as both the ri ght sorts of actions and feelings in conjunction with th e view that virtues cannot be acquired by a single act of choice, we are led to the conclusion that the path which constitute the realizations of vi rtue must also be chosen, a co nclusion which, as we have shown, creates a tension in Aristotles conception of virtue. The ques tions that we raised earlier, Kosman claims, are based on the supposition that virtues whose actualizations are feelings may only be acquired through choosing those feelings.23 In other words, the problem for Aristotles conception of virtue becomes sa lient if we take him to be advocating the view that the 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 112

PAGE 22

22 actualization of a virtue might come simply in the form of having a certain feeling; that is, there may be virtues that are concerne d only with feeling appropriate ly and, conversely, there may be virtues that are only manifested in the form of appropriate actions without regard to the agents feelings. Kosman argues that if this supposition is false we can show that the path are chosen in, at the very least, an indirect sense. The follow ing is my construction of what I take to be his argument for this view. The Feeling Argument 1. Vi rtue is a complex di sposition that is actuali zed as a related set of actions and feelings.24 2. Particular performances of an action type can be chosen. 3. Actions and feelings are [logica lly] related in the sense that cer tain actions give rise to or bring about feelings that are natu rally associated with those actions. 4. [What comes about as a result of or is caused by an agent s performance of certain actions is itself chosen in virtue of its relation to act s which are themselves chosen.] 5. So, the feelings that are br ought about by the performance of action types which are chosen are also chosen. Kosmans solution, then, is to argue for the modest claim that feelings are chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that are chosen. He is essentially denying the claim that feelings do not involve prohairesis If he is right, we might be on the right track toward getting around the original problem.25 However, Kosman does not think that his solution is ultimately successful for reasons that I do not want to go into here. And, ag ain, my aim is not to criticize the solution that he offers but rather to use it as a jumping off point for getting clearer 24 Ibid. 25 Kosman thinks that his solution ultimately fails as a solution to the original problem.

PAGE 23

23 about the relation between actions and passions. The solution centers on his characterization of the relationship between actions and feelings, what we find here as the third premise in FA. I want to take a closer look at this claim and note so me prima facie problems. Kosman stresses that there is a logical connection between cer tain ranges of actions and feelings. He character izes this connection in the following ways: (i) Feelings are accompanie d by concomitant actions.26 (ii) Actions on the part of an agent .. are char acteristically and natura lly associated with .. feelings.27 (iii) One acts in ways that are naturally asso ciated with and will b ring about .... [certain] feelings.28 What he is claiming in (i) and (i i), I take it, is that there are certain actions th at we often find accompanying certain feelings. For instance, the emotion of fear often accompa nies instances of flight and anger often accompanies retaliation. To further support th is claim, Kosman appeals to Aristotles charact erization of the path as enmattered accounts at De Anima I.1.403a25-7. Here Aristotle states, Consequently [t he affections] definitions ought to correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or a part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and fo r this or that end. Aristotle seems to sa y here that bodily movements are part of wh at an emotion or feelin g is, are part of the co ncept of each feeling. The relationship between actions and feelings is not, for Aristotle, a matter of contingency. So Kosman seems right in saying th at actions and feelings are importantly connected. But the notions of accompanying and bein g naturally associat ed with that he us es to express this 26 Ibid., 109 27 Ibid., 112 28 Ibid.

PAGE 24

24 relation in (i) and (ii) are too va gue to be helpful in understandi ng the nature of the relationship between feelings and actions. We n eed to turn, then, to the more explicit characteri zation that he offers in (iii). Claim (iii) is included as a part of Ko smans account of how an agent goes about acquiring the righ t sorts of dispositions. He claims that, one recogn izes through moral education what would constitute appropriate and correct ways to feel in certain circumstances. One then acts in ways that are naturally associated with and th at will bring about those very feelings.29 After the repetitive performance of these actions, an agent becomes disposed to have the feelings that are brought about by the relevant actions. An agent does not, Kosman claims, have direct control over her feelings. So in this way we can still say that the feelings are not prohairetic What we do have control over are the actions that establish the di spositions, the virtues, which are the source of our feeling in appropriate ways at approp riate times and in appropriate circumstances.30 It is unclear, however, that we should characterize this relatio n in the way that he does. His suggestion that certain actions give rise to or bring about certain feelings gives us a better understanding of the relation between passions and actions than (i) or (ii) but is not obviously an accurate characterization of Aristotl es views. It is ce rtainly not a characteri zation that Aristotle offers in his ethical treatises. And in spite of the fact that we find little if any textual evidence to support this claim, Kosman provides little argument for why we should accept such a characterization. To say that ther e is a connection between actions and feelings, even a logical one, is not to say that certain actions cause certain feelings. Further, we already have textual 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

PAGE 25

25 evidence that runs coun ter to this view. In EN III.1 and EN V.8, for instance, Aristotle says that actions proceed from or are due to passions such as anger. This evidence alone give s us reason to question Kosmans claims about th e relation between passions and actions. But if we reject his characterization, we still do not ha ve a very clear picture of the relation. In order to get at a clearer understanding of th e nature of this relation and its func tion in the virtuous life, we need a more developed account of bot h passions and actions. In what follows, I undertake a closer investigation of th e nature of the path generally and emotions as species of path specifically as well as an investigation into Aristotles psychology of action to more clearly explicate the re lation between the path and actions. Ultimately I argue that Kosmans account of the relationship between feel ings and actions fails to represent Aristotles views on this matter. And a close investigation of Aristotles views about the path generally and the emotions specifically as well as his vi ews regarding the psychology of action can help us form an account of the relation between pa ssions and actions, an account which may help us solve certain puzzl es regarding the nature of virtue.

PAGE 26

26 CHAPTER 3 AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF THE PATH 3.1 The General Nature of the Pat he To understand Aristotles views on the relation be tween actions and feelin gs and, in turn, their relation to virtue, we need to investigate Aris totles views concerning the emotions generally. Unfortunately, Aristotle provide s little analysis of emotion where we would want him to, namely, in the ethical treatises. This is a peculiar situation given th e central role he gives them in the realization and acquisition of virtue. We must refocu s our attention, then, on works outside of the ethical treatises that will help shed light on this issue. At Rhetoric II.1.1378a19-20, Aristotle gives the follo wing general definition of the path The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also a ttended by pain or pleasure. Aristotles focus shifts to specific emotions such as anger and fear in subseq uent portions of this chapter. But before we look at those definitions we should first consider what Aristotle means when he talks about passions generally. What is translated in this pa ssage as emotions is ta path which we might also translate as passions or affections. Aristotle provides a general characterization of the path in Metaphysics .21. At 1022b15-20, he distinguishes between four senses of affection.31 We call an affection (1) a quality in resp ect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and b itter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. (2) The already actualiz ed alteration. -(3) Especi ally injurious alterations and movements, and above all, painful injuries. -(4) Expe riences pleasant and painful when on a large s cale are called affections.32 31 Kirwan 1971, 171-2. 32 Kirwan notes that Aristotle does not, in this chapter, provide all of the senses of pathos which he uses throughout the corpus. Kirwan distinguishes between the following seven senses: (1) state or condition, (2) property, (3) coincident, or non-essential, properties, (4) quality, (5) feeling, (6) happening, and (7) misfortune. For our present purpose however, Aristotles characterizations of the path in Met are sufficient to highlight the relevant sense(s) in which we should understand his use of the terms emotions and passions throughout the Rhetoric and in the ethical texts.

PAGE 27

27 The first and second charact erizations given by Aris totle suggest that the path generally, are both ways in wh ich a subject, whether a person or an object, can be altered, affected, or acted upon and the actua lization of these alterations. For instance, if I paint the walls of my room eggshell blue, th eir becoming or being blue woul d be considered, on Aristotles view, a pathos The third and fourth characteri zations, however, s uggest that the path are not limited to something like the proper ties that an object ha s or takes on or the qu ality in respect of which objects take on certain char acteristics. They are something th at is suffered or experienced; something an agent, or patient rather, passively u ndergoes. These sorts of alterations can take the form of psychological disturbances or fee lings of elation. We often speak of people getting upset or becoming angry or being afraid. When a person has thes e sorts of experiences, something has happened to her so as to change the state or condition that she is i n, i.e. she has been affected.33 We should also be able to see why a desire, especially an ap petitive one, is considered a pathos Consider a case of hunger. When a person becomes hungry, sh e generally experiences or undergoes some sort of pain. This pain might be both physical and psychological. And an agent that experiences such pain consequently wants to alleviate her discomfort by eating some food. Her desire to eat, characterized by her experience of pain, is a change in likely both her physiological and psychological stat e and is something that has ha ppened to her. Taking on this characterization, we should under stand Aristotles use of the te rms emotions, feelings, or passions, as well as the specifi c instances he discusses of these such as anger and fear, then, to refer to ways that an agent is acted upon, something she experiences such that her state or condition is altered in some way. 33 I will talk more about the specific ways in which agents are affected in the proceeding sections.

PAGE 28

28 3.2 Emotions as Species of the Pat he Having gotten clearer about the general nature of emotions as species of path we need to turn our attention to the sp ecific nature of emotions as path What we are intere sted in is what about the emotions differentia tes them from other sorts of path such as becoming blue or broken. Another way of asking this question might be, what conditions need to be met in order to say that a person is experiencing a particular emotion? What c onditions need to be met, for instance, in order to rightly sa y that an agent is angry or a fraid and what distinguishes one emotion from another? We can return to the general definition that he offers at the outset of the Rhetoric as well as to the definitions that he provid es for specific emotions to get at the answers to these questions. What we will find is evidence to support the view that Aristotelian emotions are complex states that involve bot h cognitive and conative elements. 3.3 The Cognitive Elemen t Involve d in Emotion After offering a general definition of the path at the outset of the Rhetoric Aristotle provides definitions of specific emotions. Cons ider the following: Anger may be defined as a desire acc ompanied by pain, for a conspicuous [ phainomenes ]revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or ones friends. 1378a30-32 Fear may be defined as a pa in or disturbance due to imagining [phantasias] some destructive or painful evil in the future. 1382a21-22 Confidence is the imaginative [ phantasias ] expectation of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible. 1383a17-18 Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in rega rd to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem [ phainomena] likely to involve us in discredit. 1383b11-13 Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain at an apparent [ phainomeno ] evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall oursel ves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon. 1385b12-15

PAGE 29

29 Though each definition includes a reference to feelings of pain, we should also note that the definition of each emotion is not given merely in terms of the pain (or pleasure) that characterizes it. We also find references to the way something seems or appears, or ways that a person imagines a situation to be The definitions of f ear and confidence, for instance, both make explicit reference to phantasia and we find a form of this term in each definition provided. But what are these appearances, and wh at role do they play in a pers ons experience of an emotion? At De Anima III.3.428a1, Aristotle describes phantasia as that in virtue of which an image arises for us. Later, at 428b10-12, phantasia is said to be impo ssible without sensation... and to have for its content what can be perceived. We mi ght say, then, that phantasia functions both, to present or represent the ob jects of sensation, and is the pr esentation or representation of the objects of sensation. In other words, phantasia is both the active a nd passive faculty of imagination, the power by which an object is presented to the mi nd or a mental representation of an object or some state of affairs. Sense perception provide s the raw material upon which the faculty of phantasia acts to represent some obj ect or state of affairs to an agent as being of a certain kind. An observer then ha s the appearance that something is a certain wa y. For instance, phantasia might present some object to me as white or nearby. The appearance that something is white or that something is nearby is results of the exercise of this faculty. If something appears to me as white or nearby, I am ha ving the thought that some object is white or nearby. We should say generally then that phantasiai are thoughts that arise in an ag ent who imagines something to be the case. What sorts of impressions are involved in the experience of an emotion? Each definition specifies the impression that is c onstitutive of the releva nt emotion. If we look back to Aristotles definition of fear, for instance, we see that an agent who is fea rful has the appearance that there

PAGE 30

30 is some destructive or painful ev il in her future. In other words, she has a mental representation that a situation or object is potentially dest ructive or painful. An agent who is experiencing anger, on the other hand, has th e appearance that another who ha s no cause to slight her has indeed slighted her. And so on for each definition We can see, then, that having a certain kind of thought is, for Aristotle, at least a necessary condition for the experience of an emotion. In addition, different emotions can be distinguished by the relevant thought of which they are partly constituted. The view that emotions are not merely disturba nces or feelings is an intuitive one since otherwise we would be hard pressed to distinguish an emotion su ch as fear from one such as anger, both of which, we commonly think, involve disturbances. Furt her, since Aris totle includes explicit reference to types of thoughts or impressions in his definitions of particular emotions, we should be inclined to say that Ar istotle advocates a cogn itive theory of emotions, a view in which emotions, minimally and importa ntly, require thoughts of so me kind. And, conversely, we should not want to say th at Aristotle advocates a feeling th eory of emotion, a view in which emotions are nothing other than physiological (or psyc hological) disturbances of some kind. Aristotelian emotions, then, are im portantly intentional states, stat es that are directed at or are about some particular object or state of affairs. For instance, an agent who is fearful is fearful about something in particular, namely what appear s to her as potentially harmful. She does not simply have some kind of fearfu l feeling, and she is not merely disturbed in some undirected way. And we often expect answers from people who claim to have certain experiences. Consider a case where a person says that she feels frighten ed. We might ask her what she is afraid of, or, at the very least, we are with in our rights to ask such a ques tion. If she responds by saying that she is afraid of nothing at all or that she is not sure what she is afraid of, we would be tempted, I

PAGE 31

31 think rightly, to say that she is not, in fact, scared. Rather, we mi ght say that she is experiencing some undirected feeling of anxiety. Without the thought that something may cause her harm we may not want to say, and Aristotle clearly would not say, she is truly experiencing fear. And so, generally for each of the definitions under consider ation, the agent must have the relevant kind of thought in order, on Aristotle's vi ew, to have a particular emoti on. We should be tempted to say, then, that feelings of a certain kind are not sufficient, on Aristotles view, fo r the experience of an emotion. But, since Aristotle also makes expl icit reference to feelings of pain or pleasure ( lupe and hedone ) in his definitions, we have reason to think that they are also important and necessary elements in his analysis of emotion. We thus need to get clearer about both the nature of these feelings a nd their relationship to the impressions (phantasiai) involved in emotion. 3.4 The Feeling Element in Emotion To obtain a clearer understandi ng of the relation between th e thoughts and feelings that constitute Aristotelian emotions, we should first focus on the nature of these pains and pleasures. John Cooper notes that the pleasure and pa in Aristotle has in mind here include both psychological and physiological di sturbances. Examples of physio logical disturba nces that a person might feel are a quickeni ng heartbeat or cold chills. Cooper also notes that, by lupe, Aristotle likely means both bodily pain and all kinds and degrees of negative mental response and attitude.34 He cites DeAn. II.2.413b23, EE III.1.1229a34-41, and EE VII.8.1241b9 as instances where Aristotle uses the term to refe r to bodily pain. Psychological disturbances, on the other hand, take the form of mental di stress or depression. But the physiological disturbances, Cooper suggests, can be acco mpanied and qu alified by psychic turmoil.35 We 34 Cooper 1999, 415. 35 Ibid., 416.

PAGE 32

32 should not assume, then, th at Aristotles use of lupe when translated as pain, is limited to instances of bodily or physiological pain. We can say something similar for feelings of pleasure. They are experienced both as ps ychological and physiological feelin gs of delight or excitement. If we look again to specific definitions of emotions, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that the physiological a nd psychological disturba nces involved in emoti ons are related to the constitutive impressions in a cer tain way. In the definition of fe ar, for instance, the pain or disturbance felt by the agent is said to be due to her having a certain impr ession, in this instance, the impression that she is in immine nt harm. Pity is defined as pain at an apparent evil. In both instances, the prepositions, which are flanked by references to pain and the impressions had by the agent, seem to indicate that the relevant impression is either the cause of or that from or because of which the disturbance arises. On Aristotles view then, an agent has impressions that cause her to experience feelings of pain or pleasure that are cons titutive of emotions. If we understand the accompanying relation mentioned in the general definition of emotion at the outset of the Rhetoric as a causal relation between certain impressions had by an agent and feelings of pleasure or pain, we can say that the nature of the relevant thoughts that are involved in an agents having an emotion are such as to bring about certain feelings whether painful or pleasant. And if we are right to say that thes e psychological and physiological alterations are the result of certai n impressions had by an agent, we should as k what it is about these impressions that causes an agent to have the re levant feelings, what it is in virtue of which they give rise to these sorts of feelings. Presumably, we can have a variety of impres sions. I might have th e impression that my friend is in the room with me or the impression that it is raining outside. But it is unclear, or at least not immediately obvious, that either one of th ese thoughts is the sort that would cause me to

PAGE 33

33 experience the sorts of feelings involved in an emotion. I coul d certainly have one of these thoughts without consequently feel ing pain or pleasure There must be some thing more to the content of impressions that give ri se to feelings of pain or pleas ure, something a bout the way that objects and situations are represented. If we look back to the definitions of specific emotions like fear or pity, we see that the relevant impressions are evaluative in nature. In other words, the thoughts that cause feelings of pain or pleasure include some ev aluation about the object or situation in ques tion, i.e. whether it is good, pleasurable, bad, or dest ructive. Objects and situations that app ear destructive or harmful, for instance, cause pain of some kind. In the case of fear, for example, someone feels disturbed or pained when it seems to her that there is some sort of harm in her future. Someone might have the impression, for instance, that another person is approaching with a weapon and intends to harm her and consequently feels a fraid. She becomes afrai d, not simply because someone is approaching with a weapon, but because sh e appears to be in imminent danger of being harmed. The relevant cont ent of her impression, then, includes some evaluation of the object or situation. But why exactly would evaluative impression s give rise to pains or pleasure? These thoughts must be related in some important way to a subjects further goals and desires. Generally, we experience pain when our goals are thwarted a nd our desires are hindered and pleasure when they are fulfilled. Take as an example someone who desi res respect from those around her. Also suppose that sh e has the impression that someone has of fended her without warrant. Any offense hinders the achievement of the respect she desires. We should expect, in this case, that she will experience pain as a consequence of her impression. On the other hand, suppose that she has the impression that she is honored by the people around her. This honor

PAGE 34

34 contributes toward her goal. We would expect her to feel pleasure as the consequence of her impression. We should accept, then, for Aristotle that th e impressions involved in emotions are evaluative in nature. And the value attributed to the object or situation in question, i.e. whether something appears good or bad, will determine whether a person feel s the disturbanc e of pain or experiences feelings of pleasure. We can summarize our analysis of Aristotelian emotion by saying that emotions are path experienced as physiological and psychological feelings of pain or pleasure as the result of having an evaluative impression a bout an object or situation. 3.5 A Defense of Phantasia as th e Relevant Cognitive Comp onent in Aristotelian Emotion Before moving on to discuss th e relationship between emotions and our actions, I want to spend some time defending the view that impressions are sufficient for the experience of an emotion on Aristotles view. We ha ve reasons to attribute to Aris totle the view that emotions involve cognitions of some sort. In addition, th ere is widespread consensus among commentators that Aristotle advocates a cogn itivist view of the emotions.36 What's not agreed upon, however, is what the relevant cognition th at is required for the experien ce of emotion is, whether an impression or some stronger form of cognition such as belief or judgment. It makes no small difference to an analysis of Aristotelian emotion, or for an account of the relation between passions and action in the life of virtue, which form of cognition is involved. I will first present some competing views on this matter. John Cooper argues briefly that the relevant form of cogniti on in Aristotelian emotion is impression ( phantasia) as I have been suggesting. He claims that "Aristot le is quite firm and explicit that the emotion arises from ones having the impression or app earance that something 36 See Nussbaum, Cooper, and Fortenbaugh.

PAGE 35

35 good or bad has happened.37 The immediate evidence that we have for this view is that Aristotle makes explicit reference to impressions in the defi nitions that he offers for specific emotions. Contrary to this view, W.W. Fortenbaugh a nd Martha Nussbaum argue that the relevant cognitive elemen t is belief (doxa ). Phantasia they claim, is not suffic ient, on Aristotles view, to cause emotional states. I submit that Aristotle would surely no t want to deny that beliefs of the relevant sort are sufficient for emotion. Nussbau m agrees that beliefs ar e clearly a sufficient condition for Aristotelian emotion or, more specifica lly, that they are a suff icient condition for an agents feeling pleasure or pain. The question at hand, though, is whether impressions are sufficient. I want to spend some time arguing, against Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum, that Aristotle intends phantasia as the relevant cognitive constituent of emotion. Specifically, I want to argue that Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum rely on a very limited characterization of phantasia in making the case that beliefs are neces sarily involved in emotion. We can say that impressions are sufficient for the experience of emotion if we appr eciate the broader role that Aristotle has them play. Ill first consid er two arguments against the view that impressions are apt to serve as the relevant cognition in emotion. The first ce nters on Aristotles use of the term phantasia in the Rhetoric The second centers on the formal distincti on he draws between phantasia and doxa in the De Anima Both Fortenbaugh and Nussbaum argue that Aristotle does not attempt to [dissociate] phantasia from belief in the Rhetoric .38 Nussbaum claims that the account shows no awareness of the more technical psycho logical distinctions of the De Anima .39 She does admit, however, 37 Cooper 1999, 246. 38 Fortenbaugh 2002, 97. 39 Nussbaum 1996, 321.

PAGE 36

36 that the distinction between phantasia and doxa seems to be introduced in one passage in Book I.40 Fortenbaugh claims, similarly, th at Aristotle is using ever yday language without special reference to his biol ogical psychology.41 The worry, then, is that Aristotles failure to explicitly draw a distinction between phantasia and doxa in the Rhetoric suggests that he has no interest in bringing that distinction to bear on his discussion of the emotions. If this is right, we should not regard his use of the term phantasia as an accurate expression of his view on the nature of the cognitive component that is sufficient fo r the experience of emotion. Clearly, Aristotles aim in the Rhetoric differs from his aim in the De Anima He is not engaging in a biological investigation in the Rhetoric as he does in the De Anima so it makes sense that he would not offer an explicit treatment of the differences between phantasia and doxa in the Rhetoric But we have no reason to th ink that his failure to exp licitly distinguish between the two concepts is evidence for his ignoring his own distinct ion between the two. Unless the discussion in the Rhetoric reflects a significant alteration in Aristotles views over time, we should assume that the distinction that he originally draws between phantasia and doxa in the De Anima is still in play. Further, if Aristotles aim in the Rhetoric is to provide orators with the tools to influence their listeners, and if phantasia is not sufficient for arousing emotions, it would be misleading of Aristotl e to make reference to phantasia in the definitions he offers of the emotions. If beliefs are necessa ry for a person to e xperience emotions like anger, we would expect him, given his aim, to ma ke explicit refere nce to forms of doxa in the explic it definitions he offers. Since he does not, a nd since we dont want to accuse Ar istotle of being misleading in 40 Ibid., 321 41 Fortenbaugh 2002, 100.

PAGE 37

37 his discussion here, we should infer that his use of phantasia indicates that they are sufficient to produce emotional states. Another argument given by Fort enbaugh against the view that phantasia is sufficient for the experience of emotion relie s on Aristotles explicit treatment of the differences between belief ( doxa ) and impression (phantasia ) in the De Anima Phantasia as discussed at De Anima III.3 is likened to viewing an artistic repres entation and is explicitly distinguished from doxa as being unable to cause affective states to arise in an agent. At 427b21-4 Aristotle states, Further, when we think something to be fearful or thr eatening, emotion is imme diately produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging s cene. Aristotle is attempting to distinguish imagination from both perception and discursi ve thinking. He carve s out the role of imagination further by saying also that, unlike thought or judgment, it is a facu lty that is within our power, the faculty by which we can call images to mind. Fortenbaugh interprets the passage from the De Anima in the following way: For Aristotle, it seems, believing is not idly entertaining a thought; it is thinking that something actua lly is the case. And when the belief concerns things terrible or encouraging, then emotional re sponse follows: one feels frightened or confident, seeks safety or acts aggressively. In contrast, phantasia apart from belief does not have the same effect. Mu ch as we view a painting or drawing of something threatening without being frighte ned, for we do not believe the danger real. Of course, there ar e occasions when imagini ng a danger, like viewing a picture, has a bodily affect. Aristotle speaks of a movement of the heart, but such a movement is no more than a physiol ogical reaction. ... boiling of blood around the heart ... by itself such a reaction does not constitute fear.42 42 Fortenbaugh seems right to say that the physiological reaction alone is not sufficient to constitute the feeling of fear. However, if we have been right in saying that wh at constitutes the emotion of fear, for instance, is the physiological reaction that is caused by th e thought that the agent is in some kind of harm, then the case of a person who views an artistic representation of some kind and that consequently experiences a physiological disturbance would be a case of fear if that disturba nce is caused by a thought that has the re levant content. And, likely, the agent who views a painting and consequently experiences some sort of physiological disturbance does not believe that she is in harms way.

PAGE 38

38 Fortenbaugh seems right to say that the physiologica l reaction alone is not su fficient to constitute the feeling of fear. However, if we have been ri ght in saying that what constitutes the emotion of fear, for instance, is the physiological reaction ca used by the thought that the agent is in some kind of harm, then the case of a person who views an artistic representation of some kind and that consequently experiences a physiological disturbance would be a case of fe ar if that disturbance is caused by a thought that has the relevant content. And, likely, the agent who views a painting and consequently experi ences some sort of physiological disturbance do es not believe that she is in harms way. There is nothing surprising, though, in thinki ng that belief is su fficient to produce emotional states such as fear, anger, or joy. Bu t there is also nothing su rprising in th inking that phantasia may be insufficient to caus e feelings of pain or pleasur e. However, suggesting that phantasia is never sufficient to produce emotional states assumes a more lim ited role of the faculty than it actually plays. If Aristotles characterization of phantasia is not limited to situations that are analogous to viewing a piece of art or to idly entertaining a thought, say, we should be able to point to cases wh ere it is sufficient to give rise to feelings of pain or pleasure. In what follows, I expand upon the nature of phantasia and then suggest a reading of the De Anima passage that takes this fuller characterizati on into account. Any time an image arises in us, phantasia is exercised.43 These images might often take the form of memories, wistful imaginings, dreams, or even fa ntasies. But, for Aristotle, phantasia serves as much more than the faculty by which we are presented with or which 43 I dont want to argue that Aristotle has an obviously imagistic view of mental representations since this sort of view has been shown to be problematic. I wish to remain ne utral on this issue so I use the term image, then, in a very broad way to refer to whatever form these mental representations take for Aristotle.

PAGE 39

39 facilitates our memories and fantastic thoughts. Phantasia plays a significant role in presenting or representing our cu rrent perceptions as being a certain way Nussbaum notes in that, for Aristotle, phantasia presents the objects of perception to us in a certain way, as good or bad, say, or as desirable or undesirable.44 We should say, then, that phantasia is not merely the faculty by which we call up images as we do in cases of remembering or fantasiz ing, though it functions in these cases as well. An object or si tuation that affects us certainly has to be presented in a certain way, for instance, as being danger ous. Without this presentation, we would not be inclined to fear the object or situation in question. The suggestion that Fortenbaugh seems to be making is that, for Aristotle, even in cases where an object is presented in the relevant way, no emotion will arise unless there is also the belief that the way in which the object is pr esented is actually the case. But this reading of the De Anima passage does not seem to ta ke account of the broader and more significant role th at Aristotle gives to phantasia I want to suggest th at we do not need to interpret the passage found in the De Anima in this way if we accept that phantasiai are not limited to fantastical thought s. Rather, we can read Aris totle as saying that there are cases where phantasiai fail to cause affective stat es, namely, cases where a pers on simply calls to mind an image. Note that Aristotle says that we fail to be affected when we merely imagine, when we simply call to mind some image. But not all cases of imagining ar e like this as evidenced by the fact that phantasia functions to present our current perceptio ns to us in a certain way. My calling an image to mind of some frighte ning event is different from my thought that I seem to be in harms way, though these are both cases where I have an im pression. In the former case, I may not be affected unless I also have the belief that such an event is occurring. In the latter, I may be affected whether or not I also have the explicit belief. 44 Nussbaum 1986, 232-41.

PAGE 40

40 Cooper notes in his paper on Aristotelian emotions that it seems likely that Aristotle is using phantasia here to indicate the so rt of non-epistemic app earance to which he draws attention once in De Anima III.3.428b2-4, according to which somethi ng may appear to, or strike one, in some way (say, as being insulting or be littling) even if one know s there is no good reason for one to take it so. If so, Aristo tle is alert to the crucial fact about the emotions that one can experience them simply on the ba sis of how, despite what one knows or believes to be the case, things strike one how things look to one when, for one reason or another, one is disposed to feel the emotions.45 Lets see how such a cas e might play out. Suppose th at my best friend fails to show up for a get together th at we have planned. This event might immediately strike me as insulting and consequently make me angry even if I know and believe that she generally intends no ill will toward me. So even in a case where I have reasons not to believe and in fact dont believe that I have been insult ed, I may still become angry be cause of the way the situation appears to me. If this vi ew is right, then Aristo tle has supplied us with a very intuit ive account of the emotions. We often speak of people who become angry or afra id at very little, or for what seems like no good reason at all. If we think of phantasia as mental representations, th e ways objects or situations are represented as being, including be ing good or bad, desirable or und esirable, we need not limit our talk of its manifestations as situations analogous to the way that a painting represents the world as being. To adhere strictly to this analogy is to assume that every impression is merely descriptive, an assumption that we have seen is false on Aristotles vi ew. Imagination is the faculty by which we can call up memories but it is also the faculty by which what we are experiencing is represented to us in a certain way, as perhaps harmful, threatening, beneficial, 45 Cooper 1999, 417.

PAGE 41

41 and as good or bad in general. Fortenbaugh is ri ght in suggesting that believing is more than idly entertaining a thought but perhaps wrong in suggesting th at entertaining a thought is insufficient to arouse emotion if entertaining a thought is constr ued broadly as being presented with an image of a situation as it appears give n some current perception. Ultimately, whether and how an agents emotions are in her control may turn on whether phantasia is sufficient for her emotional states. I beli eve that by attributing to Aristotle the view that phantasia is the relevant cognitive component in emotion a nd that it is sufficient to cause the pains and pleasure that are constitu tive of emotion, we will be able to propose a more adequate account of the relation betw een passions and actions. 3.6 Aristotles Psychology of Action Ha ving gotten quite a bit clearer on the nature of Aristote lian emotion, we should now turn to the specific role that the path play in Aristotles psychology of action. I want to first turn to a passage found at De Motu 8.702a17-19. The organic parts are suitably prepared (for movement) by the affections, these again by desire, and desire by imagination. Imagination in its tu rn depends either upon thinking or upon sense perception. We see here four major elem ents in Aristotles explanati on of animal movement; thought or sense perception, imagination ( phantasia ), desire ( orexis ), and affections ( path ). Any explanation of animal movement or action will need to make reference to each of these elements. We see immediat ely that the path are intimately related to acti on. What we should want to get clear about then is how eac h of these elements is re lated and what role the path specifically play in this explanation. An initial reading of the De Motu passage seems to indicate a causal relation between each successive element. Aristotle employs th e phrase prepared by to transition from one element of action to the next. Bu t it is not entirely clear how we should understand the idea of

PAGE 42

42 preparation. So we should be car eful not to make the move to o quickly to saying that each element is causally related befo re undertaking a closer analysis of the relations between each element. I spoke earlier about the relationship betw een sense perception and imagination. Lets then turn to the second phase of preparation, desire by imagin ation. What does it mean to say that desire is prepared by the imagination? What is the relation between phantasia and desire? To answer this question, we s hould first say something about the nature of desire generally. John Cooper notes that, fo r Aristotle, to desire, is more than merely an inclination to want to have or to experience or do something; it is a full y fledged, completed such want an active psychological movement toward getting in an appropriate way, or experiencing or doing, whatever it is the desire for. Desire, then, sets us in motion toward th e objects of desire if nothing else, no obstacle or compe ting or conflicting desire stands in our way. Further, Martha Nussbaum notes that at DeAn III.3.432b26-30, Aristotle claims that an animal cannot desire without phantasia a passage that parallels his claim in the De Motu that phantasia is necessary for the operations of desire. In other words, desire would be impossibl e without impressions of a certain kind. But what kinds of impressions are necessary? C ooper notes in his paper Some Remarks on Aristotles Moral Psyc hology that desire involve(s) not just thoughts, but thoughts about what is good or bad.46 So desire involves evaluative impressions, th e kinds that are involved in the experience of emotion. On this view of the relation between phantasia and desire, if I am thirsty and am pr esented with a glass of water, I will not desire the water simply by having the thought that it is before me. The water must app ear to me as pleasant, refreshing, 46 Cooper 1999.

PAGE 43

43 or thirst quenching. Only then will I be moved toward it. We ca n see that impressions are not only necessary for desire, but that they are constitutive of desire. How does desire prepare the path ? The relation between desire and the path is peculiar since, on a number of occasions, Aristotle identifi es one form of desire, namely appetitive desire ( epithumia ), as a pathos But in this passage, Aristotle clear ly distinguishes between desire and the affections. Though Ar istotle identifies epithumia as a pathos elsewhere, in the present context, Aristotle uses the general term, orexis rather than epithumia, to denote desire. One immediate question at hand concerns the nature of our general de sires and their relation to the path For Aristotle, we desire t hose things that we take to be good, things like pleasure, honor and respect, or happiness. These th ings we are said to desire fo r their own sake. In turn, we desire particular things that bear a certain relation to the ob jects of our general desires, namely those things that contri bute toward the fulfillm ent of our ultimate desire s. If an agent desires health, for instance, she will also see those things that contribute toward her health, things like exercise, as desirable and good. So what is the relation between our general and particular desires and emotion? An agent who has long-term goals and desires toward which she aims will likely feel pained if it seems that those aims are impeded and pleased if circumstances contribute toward them. Lets say that someone desires happiness and her own well being generally. Suppose also that she has the impression that she is in imminent danger of being harmed. She also realizes that this would hi nder the achievement her desired goa l. Realizing that her desire is potentially frustrated by the prosp ect of harm, she becomes afraid. She feels paine d, cold chills, and her heart begins to race. He r experience of fear in this case is faci litated by the relation between the appearance of her present circumstance and her desire for happiness. In other words,

PAGE 44

44 the realization that harm would frustrate her desire gives her a reason to see the th reat as painful and bad and the fact that the harm appears to her in this way causes her to experience fear. What her desires are helps determine th e way in which certain objects a nd situations appear to her and it is in this way that desires might be said to prepare the path So how are actions prepared by the path ? If we consider the case above, the agent in question who experiences fear in the light of the impression that she is in imminent harm will be moved to avoid that particular ob ject. She might be moved to flee the area for example. If, on the other hand, one has the general desire for happine ss and has the impressi ons that some object helps contribute to that end, she will see that object as pleasi ng and consequently pursue it. These actions of pursuit and avoidance are determined by the em otion that the agent has in light of the relation between her impressions and general desi res. Emotions that in volve pain and thoughts that objects are unpl easant, harmful, or bad will result in avoidance, while emotions that are pleasurable and involve thoughts that objects are good, beneficial, and contribute toward the fulfillment of some general desire result in pursuit. So it should be clear that th ere is an intimate relationshi p between movement or action and emotion for Aristotle. And often times, this relationship is so inti mate as to appear simultaneous. Aristotle states, the simultaneity and speed are due to the natural correspondence of the active and the passive.47 And we have seen that this co rrespondence can be characterized by saying that movement and actions are caused by or manifestati ons of the emotions that an agent has in light of the way things appear to her given he r general desires and values. 47 De Motu 8.702a20-1.

PAGE 45

45 CHAPTER 4 CONTROLLING EMOTIONS 4.1 A Return to Kosmans View In this section I return to Kosmans so lution to the problem ra ised for Aristotles conception of virtue in light of the discussion of Aristotles views rega rding emotion and action in order to see more clearly whether or not his charact erization of the relation between passions and actions accurately reflects Aris totles view. I first want to re iterate the problem and solution discussed in earlier chapters. Se condly, I want to argue that, gi ven the considered view of Aristotelian emotion and its role in his psychology of action, Kosm ans view, that actions give rise to certain feelings, is in direct conflict with Aristotles vi ews. This conflict not only results in the inadequacy of Kosmans solution to the probl em regarding Aristotles conception of virtue but also leaves us with an inaccurate picture of the relation between pa ssion and action generally. Though I believe Kosmans solution ultimately fails I also believe that his account reveals something right about being properly affected, namely that vi rtuous actions and passions are intimately connected, though not in the way that he wants to sugge st. Lastly, I want to offer a characterization of the relation between passions and actions that not on ly reflects Aristotles views but which also allows us to gesture toward a response to problems that motivate Kosmans account. To do this, I want to distinguish betw een two questions that lie behind Kosmans solution. Namely, I want to teas e apart questions concerning (i) whether or not feelings are chosen and (ii) whether or not th ey are under the control of an agent. I argue that Aristotles conception of virtue importantly in volves the ability of an agent to control her emotions. I set out a rough picture of how agents, on Aristotles view, might be able to accomplish this task, drawing a contrast between vi rtuous agents and agents that have not acquired virtuous dispositions. Virtuous agents, ar guably, do not need to control their emotions whereas agents

PAGE 46

46 who have not acquired virtuous dispositions do. By explicating the role that the path seem to play in the life of virtue, we ma y be better able to see how thos e agents who have not acquired virtuous dispositions can effectivel y alter their emotional states. The initial problem noted by Ko sman is that virtue, for Aris totle, is a complex disposition involving both passions and actions the former of which are not chosen though the virtues which involve dispositions to feel (as well as act) in the right ways involve choice. His proposed solution to this problem is that feelings are chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that are chosen. The crucial element in his solution is the relation be tween actions and passions. He characterizes the relation between the two as essentially a causal one, where actions give rise to or bring about corresponding feelin gs, feelings, he says, that are naturally associated with the actions performed. Kosman seems right to suggest that there is an association of some sort between actions and passions and we have seen Aristotle say as much in the De Motu But should we accept that actions give rise to feelings gi ven what we have seen about the nature of Aristotelian emotions and the role that Aristotle gives to the path in his psychology of action ? We have seen that the path play an integral role in Aristotles explanation of animal movement. But there is no indication in the De Motu that Aristotles view of the relati on between the feelings of an agent and the actions of an agent is su ch that certain feelings follow in the wake of actions that are chosen. If this view were right, we would expect to see Aristotle claiming that the path are prepared by animal movement since he uses this expression to indicate causal and constitutive relations between each element in his explanation. Rather, we have evidence to support an opposing view; actions are a manife station, in part, of the emoti ons felt by an agent. In other words, experiencing emotions of a certain kind, such as fear or even joy, often result in action,

PAGE 47

47 namely in movement toward or away from the relevant intentiona l objects. We have no reason to think that Aristotle suggests that actions are such as to give rise to emotions even if we read him as saying that the path are constitutive of animal moveme nt as opposed to th eir cause. Recall also that there are passages in the ethical treatises th at accord with the vi ew that actions are caused by the passions and not the other way around. Aristotle claims that there ar e actions that proceed from or are due to emotions such as ange r. So, given this eviden ce along with Aristotles explanation of animal movement, we should say th at Kosmans suggestion that actions give rise to feelings does not conform to a view that Aristotle holds. Further, if we consider the nature of emotion as a comple x state involving impressions as well as feelings, we have even less reason to say that actions give rise to emotions. For Kosmans characterization to be correct, an agents performanc e of an action would have to be such as to give rise to both the relevant evaluative impressions and feelings involved in emotion and he in no way provides an answ er for how this might be done. So, if actions do not give ri se to feelings, what shoul d we say about Aristotles conception of virtue, the passions, and their relation to action? Kosm an claims that in order to acquire any specific virtue, a perfor mance of the virtuous ac tion that gives rise to feelings of the right kind is needed. A virtuous agent must act in ways, Kosm an claims, which will bring about those very feelings which are necessary fo r the realization of a vi rtue. But if actions do not give rise to feelings then the right actions will not give ri se to the right feel ings. And if this relation does not hold then we canno t even say that feelings are chosen indirectly in virtue of their relation to acts that ar e chosen. And if we cannot say th at feelings are chosen even indirectly, we do not yet have an answer to the problem for virt ue initially noted by Kosman. We do have reason, however, to attribute to Aristotle the view that the path are related essentially to

PAGE 48

48 animal movement and actions, and so intimately as to occur simultaneously. Since we cannot divorce actions from the feelings th at accompany them, we might say that Aristotles view is that all human actions are in part being affected, that part of what it mean s to act just is to be affected in a certain way. 4.2 A New Proposal Since Kosma n has failed to offer an accur ate characterization of the relation between passions and actions, we are le ft with the initial questions regarding the role of the path in Aristotles conception of virtue. Kosman is right to focus on th e relation between passions and actions to get clear about role that the path play in virtue. And though his characterization is problematic, a clearer understandi ng of the relation may help us wo rk toward answering some of the questions that motivate his proposal. I want to distinguish, then, between two different but important questions Kosman seems to address. He is very clear that he wants to answer questions about how we can say that the path involve choice. But he also se ems to want answer questions about how we might say that the path are under an agents control. I will first draw out the distinction between two questions that serve as Kosmans motivation. Kosman claims that, one does not have direct control over ones feelings and in this sense the feelings are not chosen.48 He also states that "it appears to be a distinction between our actions and our passion s that actions are within our control, whereas passions are not; we are the initiating principle of what we do, but not of what is done to us to argue that the path are not chosen.49 He cites EN 11.5.1106a2, where Aristotle claims that we feel anger and fear without choice, as evidence fo r the view that the path are not under our control. 50 Note that he is 48 Kosman 1980, 112. 49 Ibid., 106. 50 Ibid. Emphasis mine.

PAGE 49

49 making two importantly distinct claims. The first is that the path are not under an agents control The second is that the path are not chosen. He also seems to suggest that if an agent does not have control over her feelings, they are not chosen. A nd his solution aims at showing how we can say that the path are chosen by way of saying how they might be indirectly under an agents control in virtue of th eir relation to acts that are under direct control of an agent. So, behind Kosmans proposal that ac tions give rise to feelings is not only a question about how feelings might involve c hoice but also questions concerning whether the path are within our control. But, for Aristotle, what is chosen is not the sa me as what is under our control. Something that is chosen is also under an ag ents control, but whatever is under an agents control is not necessarily chosen. The crucial point to realize here is that whether or not emotions are under our control is a separate qu estion from whether or not they are chosen. If we appreciate the distinc tion between questions about whether our emotions are chosen and questions about whethe r they are under our control, we sh ould expect that the answers differ for each. We have already seen that Ko smans account fails to show that the path involve choice. But the failure of th is account to show that the path are chosen does not preclude us from showing that emotions are under an agents control. If we can show that emotions are or at least can be under our control, we may be able to provide a clearer account of the way they function in the context of a virtuous life. The view that we cannot control our emotions is very intu itive. People lash out in anger or erupt in tears seemingly wit hout reason and often justify thei r reactions by saying that they couldnt be helped. These sorts of cases might lead us to believ e that there is nothing we can do about how we feel toward or about something. But such a view, though strongly intuitive, is at

PAGE 50

50 odds with Aristotles conception of virtue as something for which we are responsible. So questions about whether the em otions are under our control are central when considering Aristotles account of virtue. The vi rtuous person is characterized as responsible for who she is and the dispositions that she has. And if virtue involves having emotions of a certain kind, then we should want to say that the virtuous agent is responsible for her emotions as well as her actions. For Aristotle, then, it seems we are responsible for our character and our feelings and emotions are central to our character. But how can we be responsible for something that we seemingly have no control over? Being in control of ones feelings and emot ions might seem less counterintuitive if we attend to the fact that emotions are complex states involving thought s and feelings. If we are able to control our emotions then we will have to be in control of these elements. But, as Kosman notes, an agent cannot simply choose to be angry or joyful. And surely the psychological and physiological feelings of pain and pleasure that constitute emotions are not under our control. This leaves the evaluative impressions that give rise to these feelings of pa in and pleasure. I want to investigate, then, whether or not we might be said to be in control of this element of Aristotelian emotion. The thought that agents are in control of and responsible for their evaluative impressions accords well with what Aristotle says at EN III.5.1114b1. Here he claims that some one may say that al l men aim at the apparent good, but have no control over how things appear to him; but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he will also be himself somehow responsible for how things ap pear. Further, he states at EN II.3.1105a5-6 that to feel delight and pain rightly or wr ongly has no small effect on our actions. A nd since impressions incite our feelings of pain or pleasure, feeling delight and pain rightly must then be a matter of

PAGE 51

51 having the right impressions. So, cl early, for Aristotle, we must be responsible for how things appear to us, for the impressions that we have, in order to have a character of a certain kind. In other words, to have a virtuous character depends crucially on having impressions of a certain kind. What would it be, then, to have the right thoughts or im pressions about objects, situations, or goals? The thought s or impressions that cause th e sorts of feelings that are constitutive of emotions are impor tantly evaluative in nature; they include reference to whether or not the object or situation perceived by the agent is good or ba d, painful or pleasant. So the right impressions cannot simply be an accurate representation of the sensory qualities or characteristics of any ob ject. The right impressi ons must include the right evaluation of an object as good or bad for the agent having the thought. Presumably, then, the action that is manifest as a result of an emotion that incl udes the right impres sion is an instance of virtuous action. Controlling ones emotions, then, will be a matter of altering the impressions that one has about an object or situation. More sp ecifically, controlling ones emoti ons is a matter of altering the evaluation involved in the rele vant thought since the physiologi cal pains and pleasures follow from these evaluations. But how might an agent go about altering th e evaluative content of her impressions? Before answering this question, we must first ask what counts as the right evalua tion. I want to take some time and discuss the sorts of impres sions had by the virtuous agent since this is a paradigm case of proper feeling and action. The virtuous agen t aims toward the good. It is what she desires for its own sake a nd that on account of which she de sires other things, namely the sorts of things that are a means to her end. And she acts in ways that contribute toward that end and refrains from acting in ways that to do not contribute to that end. Further, she doesnt desire

PAGE 52

52 those things that she sees as frustrating her overarchi ng desire. And as we have seen, the evaluative content of impressi ons depends importantly on a persons desires and whether situations and objects are represented as frustratin g or fulfilling those desires. Anything that either frustrates or contributes toward the virtuous agents ultimate aim will rightly appear to her as such. Her impressions a bout the way things are is always right with resp ect to their relation to the good. As such, it doesnt look like the virtuous agent will need to be in control of her emotions at all in the sense that she will never need to alter them This is why the virtuous agent is pleased when performing those actions that she ought. They simply appear to her as pleasant. Being able to control emotions onl y seems to come into play when there is the possibility that the agent in question will have the wrong impression, the sort of impression th at doesnt present objects and situations as being good if they actually are or as being bad if th ey actually are. The crucial thing to note in the case of the virtuous ag ent is that the rightn ess or wrongness of her impression depends on how it relates to her overarching desires. To get at cases where an agents impressions might require alterati on, we need to look to agents th at arent yet virtuous, but are perhaps on their way toward acqui ring virtuous dispositions. I want to draw a contrast then between the virtuous agen t and the continent ( enkratic ) agent. The ultimate aim of the continent agent is the same as the virtuous ag ent. The difference between the two consists in the fa ct that the continent agent often has desires that conflict with her larger goal. For instance, the continent agen t and the virtuous agent may both desire health. When presented with a piece of chocolate cake, the virtuous agent will ha ve the impression that the cake is bad for her and will av oid it. It never even occurs to the virtuous agent that the cake is something that she should go fo r. The continent agen t on the other hand, might see the cake as pleasing and desire to eat it. She al so realizes that the way that th e cake appears to her is not in

PAGE 53

53 accord with her ultimate aims. R ealizing this, she does not go fo r the cake. But the reason she acts in this way is because sh e recognizes the way her initia l impression lines up with her ultimate desires. Her recognition of this conflict gives her a reason to see the cake in a different way, as something bad, essentially al tering her impression of the object before her. If this sort of case is remotely plausible and if it helps us explain the actions of the continen t agent, then it does look like there are cases where our impressions ar e under our control. A nd if impressions are under our control, then so too are our emotions. In what cases then, can we see that an agents emoti ons, specifically, are under her control? Consider the virt ue of courage. Courage is a virtue with respect to fear (and confidence) and requires feeling fear in the ri ght way and at the right times a nd to the right degree. Aristotle claims that the man, then, who f aces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way reason directs.51 An agent who is not courageous either feels too much or t oo little fear and is considered a coward or rash re spectively. But some amount of fear will be involved in every act or manifestation of courage t hough to a differing degree. Furthe r, Aristotle claims that the ultimate aim of the brave or courageous person is honor and nobility. It is for the sake of these things that she acts. If nobility is her ultim ate desire, acting courageously will require doing those things that contri bute toward this end. Recall that the thought associated with fear, for Aristotle, is the impression th at one is in imminent harm. So, to be courageous, an agen t needs to have the right impression about how much danger she is actually in with respect to the nob le end toward which she aims. Suppose that 51 EN III.7 1115b17-19.

PAGE 54

54 someone is faced with an oncoming enemy who intends he r harm. She might have the impression that she is in danger. If she is a co ward, the pain that sh e feels on account of her impression will result in her fleei ng her present situation. She sees the situation only as one that will cause her great pain and avoids it without any thought about the ultimate good toward which she aims. In short, the imminent harm appear s to her as worse than it actually is and, consequently, she feels too much fe ar. In this case, her impression of the situation is shaped, not by her view toward the nobility th at she desires, but simply by he r desire to avoid pain. However, this same person could alter her impression of the situation to act courageously. She could see the imminent harm as painful or destructive and be tempted to flee but then also see it as a situation that should be confront ed for the sake of the noble. If she can make the connection between the impression that the s ituation is painful and her desire d end of nobility, she will see the situation in a differ ent way, as painful but also as good si nce facing her present enemy is the noble thing to do. In both cases, she has the impression that she is in imminent harmed and feels pained because of th e threat. And in both cases she experience s fear. But the fear that she feels in the latter case is not as strong as the fear she feels in the form er since she also sees the situation as something good, as something th at is a means to her desire d end though she may immediately see the situation as painful and be tempted to flee. But in light of her altered impression, she does not flee but stands to face the oncoming threat in spite of th e potential pain. And this action counts as courageous for Aristo tle for it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs.52 The agent who acts courag eously does so because her overarching desire gives her a reason to view the situation in a diff erent way; it changes her impression and, consequently, the measure of fear that she experiences. 52 EN III.7.1115b23-4.

PAGE 55

55 If what I have said about cases of courage is correct, then we should be able to tell the same sort of story for any emotional reaction in an agent, namely that her evaluative impressions can be altered if they are measur ed against her delibera ted desire for what is actually good. These sorts of cases should also help us see why Kosmans character ization of the relation between passions and actions is incorrect. For it isnt by virtue of acting differently that the coward comes to have the right feelings. Rather it is by the alteration of her emotions that she comes to act differently. And Aristotle seems equipped to tell this kind of st ory. The acquisition of virtue, then, will ultimately depend on an agents being able to alte r her impressions time after time until she simply sees things just as they relate to her desired ends. And we can only tell this story if we appreciate that emotions are complex states involving impressi ons that give rise to certain feelings. Further, we see why it is important that impressions serve as the cognitive element in Aristotelian emotions rather than belief. Impressions are somethi ng that we can control whereas beliefs are something that is ou t of our control. If beliefs we re necessary for Aristotelian emotions, we would have a more difficult time explaining how we can control and be responsible for them.

PAGE 56

56 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION My aim in this th esis has been to examine a widely accepted view of the relation between virtue and emotion in Aristotelian ethics in order to clarify some of the issues surrounding this relation. I have shown that L.A. Kosmans accoun t of the relation between action and feeling is in conflict with Aristotles views concerning the psychology of action and fails to account for a considered view of Aristotelian emotion. Kosman suggests that fee lings are chosen in virtue of their relation to actions that are chosen. The relationship that he proposes between actions and feelings is that actions are such as to give rise to correspondi ng feelings. Thus, in the case of virtue, the right actions will gi ve rise to the right feelings However, an appreciation of Aristotelian emotions as comple x states involving both thoughts and feelings as well as an appreciation of Aristotles account of the role of the path in animal moveme nt found in the De Motu suggest that Kosmans view fails to repres ent an accurate account of Aristotles views. However, his account raises im portant questions a bout the nature of emotions and their relation to virtue and action that help us distinguish between the issues that need clarifying. By teasing apart two char acterizations regardi ng the nature of the path that seem to motivate Kosmans account, namely that they are not chosen and that they are not under an agents control, I hope to have highlight ed the importance of latter and to have shown that we do have the resources to allevi ate the worry that the path are not under th e control of an agent. In order to alleviate this concern, we need to return to Aristotles views concerning emotions generally as complex states. The view that Aristotelian emotio ns involve evaluative th oughts that give rise to psychological and physiological feelings of pain or pleasure helps us see that at l east part of what an emotion is, for Aristotle, is something that is under our control, namely our evaluative impressions. In the case of virt uous action, the evaluative impre ssion that an agent has can be

PAGE 57

57 altered if she reflects on their relation to her desires about the actual good. Th e alteration of evaluative impressions results in different psyc hological or physiologi cal disturbances or pleasures and consequently differ ent emotional experien ces that are manifest in action. Aristotle does not, however, explicitly offe r this sort of explanation. So the account that I offer should be taken as a rough estimate of the sort of story he is prepared to tell. I believe that any account of the role of the path in Aristotles conception of virtue needs to rely on a considered view of his account of the emotions generally and I hope to have gestured toward a successful, though not nearly comprehensive, view th at is consistent with Aristo tles views in this thesis.

PAGE 58

58 LIST OF REFERENCES Aristotle 1984. De Anima. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. I, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Pr inceton University Press. De Motu Animalium. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. I, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. -Ethica Eudemia. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. II, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Pr inceton University Press. Ethica Nicomachea. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. II, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press. Metaphysics. Trans. W.D Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. II, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Cooper, John M. 1999. An Aristote lian Theory of Emotions. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychol ogy and Ethical Theory 406-23. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. -Some Remarks on Aristotles Moral Psychology. In Reason and Emotio n: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychol ogy and Ethical Theory 237-51. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Fortenbaugh, W.W. 2002. Epilogue to Aristotle on Emotion 2nd ed. London: Duckworth. H.H. Joachim. 1951. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Oxford: Oxford University Press. 85. Kirwan, Christopher. 1971. Aristotles Metaphysics Books and Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kosman, L.A. 1980. Being Properly Affected: Virtue s and Feelings in Aristotles Ethics. In Essays in Aristotles Ethics ed. A.O. Rorty, 103-16. Be rkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. Nussbaum, Martha. 1996. Aristotle on Em otions and Rational Persuasion. In Aristotles Rhetoric, ed. A.O. Rorty, 303-23. Berkeley a nd Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. -1986. The Role of Phantasia in Aris totles Explanation of Action. In Aristotle's De Motu Animalium 221-69. Princeton, New Jersey: Pr inceton University Press.

PAGE 59

59 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Cyre na Sullivan is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Florida.