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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

University of Florida Institutional Repository
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021508/00001

Material Information

Title: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Effects of International Tobacco Regulation in Brazil, 1990-Present
Physical Description: 1 online resource (95 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Catala, Lourdes I
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: brazil, control, convention, effects, framework, regulation, tobacco
Latin American Studies -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Latin American Studies thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The globalization of the anti-tobacco campaign has gained momentum over the last two decades as a result of the increasing, disproportionate number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. Today, more than 70% of tobacco-related deaths take place in developing countries. The increase in tobacco consumption is defined by a significant business-related factor: the business of selling and marketing tobacco products by transnational tobacco corporations. In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the growing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first treaty to single out a particular industry for regulation at an international level. Many governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business in the interest of public health by ratifying the FCTC can be successful in halting the tobacco epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study analyzes the impact of Brazil's tobacco control policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a good case study because of its unique position within the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating tobacco even before its government ratified the FCTC. Perhaps more than any other party to the FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public health can be a top priority without compromising economic stability. This study finds that tobacco control measures such as those in the FCTC can be implemented without compromising the economic stability of developing countries. The Brazilian case, while unique and only in its second year of officially implementing the treaty, offers positive results for both health advocates and those concerned with the country's economic well being.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Lourdes I Catala.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: McCoy, Terry L.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021508:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021508/00001

Material Information

Title: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Effects of International Tobacco Regulation in Brazil, 1990-Present
Physical Description: 1 online resource (95 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Catala, Lourdes I
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: brazil, control, convention, effects, framework, regulation, tobacco
Latin American Studies -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Latin American Studies thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The globalization of the anti-tobacco campaign has gained momentum over the last two decades as a result of the increasing, disproportionate number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. Today, more than 70% of tobacco-related deaths take place in developing countries. The increase in tobacco consumption is defined by a significant business-related factor: the business of selling and marketing tobacco products by transnational tobacco corporations. In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the growing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first treaty to single out a particular industry for regulation at an international level. Many governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business in the interest of public health by ratifying the FCTC can be successful in halting the tobacco epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study analyzes the impact of Brazil's tobacco control policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a good case study because of its unique position within the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating tobacco even before its government ratified the FCTC. Perhaps more than any other party to the FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public health can be a top priority without compromising economic stability. This study finds that tobacco control measures such as those in the FCTC can be implemented without compromising the economic stability of developing countries. The Brazilian case, while unique and only in its second year of officially implementing the treaty, offers positive results for both health advocates and those concerned with the country's economic well being.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Lourdes I Catala.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: McCoy, Terry L.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021508:00001


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THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION INT BRAZIL, 1990-PRESENT


















By

LOURDES I. CATALA


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007




































O 2007 Lourdes Catala



































To my mother and father, Carmen and Antonio Catala, whose courage and example have taught
me the importance of always moving forward









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks to my committee chair Dr. Terry McCoy for his patience and direction

throughout this process and Dr. Elizabeth Lowe McCoy, for incessantly believing in me and

granting me the graduate assistantship that allowed me to complete my master's degree. Dr.

Lowe McCoy has been a mentor, a friend and has set a wonderful example in my life. She has

opened my eyes to many new things and given me opportunities to explore my interests. I am

eternally grateful for her support. I also thank Dr. Marilyn Roberts for her enthusiasm on my

thesis topic and her valuable insight into tobacco advertising.

I also thank my parents, who never doubted me, who have always allowed me the freedom

to explore and whose strength I will always admire and try to duplicate. Thank you to my aunt

and uncle, two of my favorites. Many thanks to the rest of my family and each one of my best

friends; Julian, Gaby, Michelle, Esther, Vanessa and Dianna, the most eminent blessings in my

life. I would also like to thank my unconventional heroine, BLZ.












TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

ACKNOWLEDGMENT S .............. ...............4.....


LI ST OF T ABLE S ....___ ................ ...............7.......


LI ST OF FIGURE S .............. ...............8.....


AB S TRAC T ..... ._ ................. ............_........9


CHAPTER


1 INTRODUCTION ................. ...............11.......... ......


Problem Statement-Research Question ................. ...............11........... ....
Background ................. ............ ...............14.......
W ho is Big Tobacco? .............. ...............14....
FCTC .............. ...............14....
Literature Review .............. ...............15....
Tobacco Regulation ................. ...............16.................
International Regulation ................... ...............18.......... ......
Economic Impact of Regulating Tobacco ................ ...............20........... ...
Significance of this Thesis. ................ ............... .................. .............22
Approach and Organization ................. ...............22........... ....

2 DEVELOPlVENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION ............................25


Introducti on ................ ... ....... ... ...............25.......
Tobacco Regulation in the U.S. ............. ...............26.....
International Trade and Tobacco ................. ...............32................
The Case of Thailand .............. ..................... ..........3
History of the Trade vs. Public Health Debate ................. ...............36..............
International Organizations and Tobacco Control ................. ...............38........... ...
W orld Bank .............. .. .... ................ .......3
The World Health Organization (WHO) ................. ...............40........... ...
Conclusion ................ ...............42.................


3 2003 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL .............. ..................44


Introducti on ............... .. ........... ...............44.......
FCTC and International Law ................. ...............45................
International Treaty Law ................. .... .......... ...............45......
International Requirements and the FCTC ................. ...............47........... ...
FCT C Provisions ................. .... ...............48.
Economic Implications of the FCTC ................ ...............49........... ...
Price and Tax Increases ................. ...............50................












Sm uggling ................. .... ........ .. ......... ... ..........5
Tobacco Advertising Promotion and Sponsorship .............. ...............54....
Economically Viable Altemnatives to Tobacco ................. ...............57........... ...
Big Tobacco and the FCTC .............. ...............59....
Conclusion ................ ...............61.................


4 TOBACCO CONTROL INT BRAZIL................ ...............63


Brazil' s Tobacco Economy............... ...............64
Tobacco Control before the FCTC .............. ...............66....
Brazil and the FCTC ................ ...............69................

Impact of Control Measures .............. ...............71....
Tobacco Farming in Brazil ................. ...............72.......... ....
Tobacco Taxes and Govemnment Revenue ................ ...............76........... ...

Smuggling ................. ...............78................
Conclusion ................ ...............8.. 1..............


5 CONCLU SION................ ..............8


M ain Findings ................. ... ... ......... ............ ..... ..........8
Development of Intemnational Tobacco Control ................. .............. ......... .....84
FCTC and the Economy .............. ... ...............84..
Impact of Tobacco Regulation: Brazilian case ................. ...............85...............
Significance and Future Research .............. ...............87....

LI ST OF REFERENCE S ................. ...............89................


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............. ...............95....










LIST OF TABLES

Table page

4-1 Recent B razilian tob acco regul ati ons ................. ...............68........... .

4-2 Brazilian cigarette market (billion units) ....._._.__ ... .... ..... ....___...........8










LIST OF FIGURES


Figure page

2-1 US State Cigarette Taxes, 2007. ............. ...............30.....

4-1 Prices (USD$ per Pack) of Imported and Local-Brand Cigarettes at Purchasing
Power Parity, Selected Economies, March 2001 ................ ...............79........... ..










Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION INT BRAZIL, 1990-PRESENT

By

Lourdes I. Catala

December 2007

Chair: Terry L. McCoy
Major: Latin American Studies

The globalization of the anti-tobacco campaign has gained momentum over the last two

decades as a result of the increasing, disproportionate number of tobacco related deaths in

developing countries. Today, more than 70 % of tobacco-related deaths take place in developing

countries. The increase in tobacco consumption is defined by a significant business-related

factor: the business of selling and marketing tobacco products by transnational tobacco

corporations.

In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on

Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the growing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first

treaty to single out a particular industry for regulation at an international level. Many

governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have

harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business

in the interest of public health by ratifying the FCTC can be successful in halting the tobacco

epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study

analyzes the impact of Brazil's tobacco control policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a good

case study because of its unique position within the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a









developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating

tobacco even before its government ratified the FCTC. Perhaps more than any other party to the

FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public health can be a top priority without compromising

economic stability.

This study finds that tobacco control measures such as those in the FCTC can be

implemented without compromising the economic stability of developing countries. The

Brazilian case, while unique and only in its second year of officially implementing the treaty,

offers positive results for both health advocates and those concerned with the country's

economic well being.









CHAPTER 1
INTTRODUCTION

The globalization of the anti tobacco campaign has gained momentum over the last two

decades as a result of the increasing, disproportionate number of tobacco related deaths in

developing countries. Today, more than 70 % of tobacco related deaths take place in developing

countries. Unlike several other health problems, the increase in tobacco consumption is defined

by a significant business-related factor: the business of selling and marketing tobacco products

by transnational tobacco corporations (TTC's).

In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on

Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the growing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first

treaty to single out a particular industry for regulation at an international level. Many

governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have

harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business

with the interest of public health by ratifying the FCTC can be successful in halting the tobacco

epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study

will analyze the impact of Brazil's tobacco control policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a

good case study because of its unique position within the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a

developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating

tobacco even before its government ratified the FCTC. Perhaps more than any other party to the

FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public health can be a top priority without compromising

economic stability.

Problem Statement-Research Question

This thesis deals with the regulation of a harmful, yet legal consumer product in the

interests of public health through an international regulatory agreement. Tobacco is different









from many other health challenges. Cigarettes are demanded by consumers and form part of the

social custom of many societies. Cigarettes are extensively traded and profitable commodities,

whose production and consumption have an impact on the social and economic resources of

developed and developing countries alike. Economic considerations are therefore critical to the

debate on tobacco control. Until recently these aspects have received little global attention.

The FCTC is the first maj or step at regulating tobacco on a global scale. Countries are not

forced to become members and are often afraid that ratifying the convention will have negative

economic consequences. To date, less than half of the countries in Latin America have ratified

the FCTC, despite the region' s escalating number of tobacco related deaths (World Health

Organization, 2005). It is important to see if the massive public health benefits that accompany

the implementation of tobacco control policies can be realized without high economic costs.

Both of these issues are important ingredients for development, but are viewed as conflicting

interests in many countries. The harmonization of the two issues has been hampered by the

complex views and differing agendas of the parties involved in the debate. The TTC's, as well

as some trade economists view tobacco control policies as a form of protectionism (Jha et al.,

2000). Public health advocates and many international development organizations, such as the

World Bank and IlVF, view tobacco consumption as a hindrance to the sustainable development

of countries and advocate tobacco control policies (World Bank, 1999). This study will examine

the dispute in a historical framework and through the perspective of an international treaty, the

FCTC and a developing country, Brazil, to understand the economic implications of enforcing a

public health agenda that involves the regulation of an industry.

Historically, the international community has given priority to transnational corporations

because their globalization and trade liberalization are considered essential to development.









Within the past two decades, the environmental community has pushed for environmental issues

in trade agreements. The public health community has not gained the same amount of

recognition.

There is a growing consensus among scholars and international organizations that public

health should be a key aspect within the trade regime, and therefore, attention must be given to

how trade and public health should interact. To date, the FCTC is the only international

regulatory framework that addresses the issue of public health, and, unfortunately does not carry

the same legal weight as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) regulations would carry.

Because the WTO regulates the commerce of goods in the international marketplace, it is

assumed that tobacco products would fall under its jurisdiction. Perhaps if every country were

confident enough to become party to the FCTC, the WTO would be compelled to regulate

tobacco within the trade regime.

Tobacco is among the greatest causes of preventable and premature deaths in human

history (World Bank 1999). Yet comparatively simple and cost effective policies that can reduce

its impact are already available through the FCTC. For governments that are intent on improving

health within the framework of sound economic policies, action to control tobacco represents an

unusually attractive choice. This main question addressed by this study is: What does the

experience of Brazil tell us about the politics and economics of implementing the FCTC? This

study aims to address the economic consequences of implementing tobacco control policies in a

developing country using Brazil's implementation and consequent ratification of the WHO's

FCTC tobacco control policies.









Background


Who is Big Tobacco?

"Big Tobacco" is the term that is usually applied to the "big three" tobacco corporations in

the United States; Phillip Morris Inc. (PMI), British American Tobacco (BAT) and RJ Reynolds,

but can also include other companies with a maj or stake in tobacco consumption, such as

Lorillard or Brown & Williamson. For this study, the term Big Tobacco will refer to Philip

Morris International and British American Tobacco Ltd., the largest multinational companies

operating in Latin America, controlling 90 percent of the cigarette market. Philip Morris

manufactures the world's most widely smoked cigarette, Marlboro, and manufactures one in

every six cigarettes sold around the world. In 2003, Philip Morris changed its name to Altria

Group and acquired the food processing company, Kraft Foods (Altria Group, 2007).

British American Tobacco (BAT) is the second largest private tobacco company, whose

leading brands include Lucky Strike and Benson and Hedges. BAT was one of the first

multinational companies to move into emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and

is now the market leader in more than 50 countries. Although headquartered in the United

Kingdom, most of its business is in less developed countries (Callard et al., 2001). Similar to the

use of various terms in the literature on the subj ect, this study uses the terms Big Tobacco and

transnational tobacco corporations (TTC's) interchangeably.

FCTC

The FCTC is a milestone in the history of international collaboration in the field of public

health. As an international agreement adopted by the 192 member states of World Health

Organization. This treaty has the potential to impact the ways TTC's like PMI and BAT operate.

Since the beginning of the FCTC's negotiation process, developing countries pushed for

effective measures to reverse the global tobacco epidemic and hold TTC's accountable for their









abuses. India, Iran, Jamaica, Palau, Senegal, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand played key

leadership roles during the negotiations. Early in the treaty's development, evidence from once-

secret corporate documents showed that the tobacco industry had operated for years with the

expressed intention of subverting the role of governments and WHO in implementing health

policies (World Health Organization, n.d). The World Health Assembly responded in 2001 with

a resolution, calling on WHO to monitor the global impact of the tobacco industry's political

activities and urging governments to ensure the integrity of health policy development. This

paved the way for the treaty to include provisions protecting public health policies from

interference by TTC's. The WHO explains that the FCTC was:

...developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic. The spread of the
tobacco epidemic is exacerbated by a variety of complex factors with cross-border effects,
including trade liberalization, direct foreign investment, global marketing, transnational
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and the international movement of
contraband and counterfeit cigarettes (World Health Organization, 2005).

Within a year there were 168 signatories, making it one of the most quickly embraced UN

treaties ever. Over 40 countries had ratified it by late 2004, triggering its entry into force on

February 27, 2005 in the ratifying countries. The 40th ratification made it the first international,

legally binding public health treaty under the auspices of WHO. The main provisions of the

FCTC will be discussed later in this study.

Literature Review

The literature examining tobacco and international regulation is vast and covers various

subjects including globalization, trade, public health, economics and science. The scope of this

study requires a review of the literature related only to the economic aspects of tobacco control.

The specific body of literature that examines the globalization of the tobacco epidemic has

grown in recent years as the number of smokers in developing countries disproportionately

increases despite decreasing numbers in high income countries. The main questions touched










upon by virtually every piece of literature concerning tobacco are: 1) Is the use of tobacco

products harmful to users' health? 2) Should tobacco products be regulated? There is an

overwhelming consensus among scholars, international organizations and even the tobacco

industry itself concerning the first question. Since about 1950, more than 70,000 scientific

studies have proven that smoking causes disease, disability and death (US Dept. of Health and

Human Services, 1994). The literature on the scientific evidence against tobacco use will not be

reviewed for this study.

Tobacco Regulation

The literature examining the second question, the issue of tobacco regulation, is

contentious. Despite the strong consensus that smoking harms health, there is much debate about

proper government roles, if any, in reducing smoking. Many argue that smoking is voluntary

and is not illegal for adults, so the existence of an enormous health problem is not sufficient to

justify interference with the tobacco industry's ability to sell its product as it sees fit. From a

purely economic standpoint, there is little that economics can say about the preferences that

determine smoking, except to try to understand how the addictive nature of cigarettes influences

subsequent consumption.

Economists approach the tobacco question from two directions: 1) Individual choice and

market failure and 2) The impact of reduced smoking on the local economy, specifically to the

tobacco industry. A study by Jha, Musgrove, Chaloupka and Yureki titled "The Economic

Rational for Intervention in the Tobacco Market" provides one of the most complete analyses on

consumer choice and tobacco. Economic theory starts with the assumption that a consumer

usually knows what is best for him or herself. This is known as the notion of "consumer

sovereignty." The theory also assumes that privately determined consumption choices, including

the decision whether to consume a particular product at all within a free competitive market, will










most efficiently allocate society's scarce resources. Within this framework, economic theory

holds that if smokers consume tobacco with full information about its health consequences and

addictive potential, and bear all costs and benefits of their choice themselves, there is no

justification for governments to interfere. Mureki et al. suggest that an economic rationale for

such intervention is justified when there are "failures" in tobacco markets.

In practice, the market for tobacco is characterized by three specific "market failures" or

features that result in economic inefficiencies and that may therefore justify public intervention.

A study by the World Bank, "Tobacco Control in Developing Countries" discusses the market

failures that make the choice to buy tobacco products different from the choice to buy other

consumer goods:

* First, there is an "information failure" about the health risks of smoking, especially in
developing countries. Incomplete information about the risks of smoking leads to behavior
that smokers would not otherwise choose for themselves.

* Second, most smokers start when they are children or adolescents when they are unable to
make an informed choice; by the time they try to quit, many are addicted.

* Third, there is evidence that smokers impose costs on other individuals, both directly and
indirectly.

Although a number of studies agree that regulating tobacco products is economically

justifiable as a result of the failures in information and external costs that smoking poses to non-

smoker, methods of regulation are not often specified. A bulk of the literature focuses on

answering the following three questions:

1) Should tobacco be regulated internationally?

2) How should tobacco be internationally regulated and who should enforce those
regulations?

3) What would be the economic effects on developing countries that opted to regulate
tobacco?









There is a considerable amount of literature concerning all three issues. The third question

has only been answered in theory, since the only form of international tobacco regulation to date

is the WHO's FCTC, which recently came into force in February 2005.

International Regulation

A growing body of literature attributes the globalization of the "tobacco epidemic" as

referred to by health related literature, to trade liberalization and regional and economic

integration. A study by Callard, Collishaw and Swenarchuk suggests that the increase in tobacco

consumption can be traced to the vectors of liberalized trade, more active marketing by

multinational corporations and increased Westernization.

Taylor et al. provided the most comprehensive text on the impact of trade liberalization on

tobacco consumption in "Tobacco Control in Developing Countries." Their research found that

A variety of trade agreements in recent years have significantly reduced the barriers to
trade in tobacco products. Economic theory suggests that the reductions in these barriers
will increase competition within tobacco markets, reduce prices, and increase marketing
efforts, as well as raise incomes. As a result, tobacco use is likely to increase, particularly
in low income and middle-income countries (p.343).

The fact that trade liberalization is itself a very complex phenomena, regulating tobacco

within that process is difficult. According to the World Health Assembly (WHA), international

action to regulate tobacco is needed because a number of aspects of the tobacco problem are

particularly transnational in nature and can only be dealt with effectively by international action.

At present there are about 5 million deaths a year worldwide due to tobacco related disease, with

the balance split approximately between developed and developing countries. By 2030, if present

trends continue, the figure will have increased to 10 million deaths per year, with 70 % of these

deaths taking place in developing countries. In a study commissioned by the Pan American

Health Organization (PAHO) Bialous and Aguinaga (2002) concluded that the TTC's are

stepping up their activities in developing countries in search of new markets as a result of the









increasing awareness of the health risks of smoking in Europe and North America. Callard,

Collishaw and Swenarchuk also point out that as the disease burden of tobacco and ease of

access because of trade liberalization shifts from the developed to the developing world, so does

its accompanying economic burden. They explain that, poor nations, like poor individuals, are

poorly equipped to deal with the health effects or economic consequences of smoking.

Most health epidemics are not inherently tied to the consumption of a specific, legal

consumer good. Since there is a growing consensus among scholars that the most influential

vector of globalization on the tobacco epidemic is trade liberalization, many argue that the WTO

should take into consideration the effects of trade on public health and regulate the tobacco

industry through trade agreements (Jha et al. 2000; Bloom, 2001; Woo, 2002; Taylor et al. 1999).

Trade advocates seek to increase availability and use of products and services; while public

health advocates struggle to decrease availability and use of tobacco. Public health advocates

respond that the benefits of liberalized trade (increased access to improved and cheaper

consumer products) are actually drawbacks in when it comes to tobacco goods, since increased

access results in negative health consequences, so they should be regulated, if not excluded from

trade agreements (Weissman, 2001).

There are rationales for trade barriers that are economically justifiable, such as the

temporary protection of an infant industry and the use of protectionist interventions as a

temporary strategy for promoting economic development, protection of the environment and

labor rights. As evidence on the health consequences of smoking has accumulated, some have

argued for restricting tobacco-related trade as a way to reduce the death and disease resulting

from tobacco use. Similar arguments have been used to defend trade restrictions in the case of

other goods with negative externalities. These arguments are most well-developed in the area of









environmental policies, with recent research adapting these arguments to consider the negative

externalities associated with tobacco use (Bloom, 2001).

In "Public Health, International Trade and the FCTC" Bloom et al. suggests that because

trade agreements treat tobacco as a conventional good, they incorporate an inaccurate

presumption that expanding commerce in tobacco products is beneficial for society. Bloom et al.

suggests the reasons why trade rules have not been developed for tobacco products as they have

for so many other products:

1) The principles of free trade are deeply held within the trade community and the burden
of proof on a proposal for special treatment of any product is formidable.

2) The public health community, unlike the environmental movement, has not been
significantly engaged in international trade issues.

3) The tobacco industry is one of the most politically and economically powerful entities
in the world and has been fully engaged in the trade community at the multinational level
for decades and has made trade liberalization in tobacco products a top priority.

Economic Impact of Regulating Tobacco

Although the WHO's FCTC was not ratified until 2003, there is a significant amount of

literature examining the impact that such a treaty would have on the economies of developing

countries. Advocates of tobacco control argue that regulating tobacco is justified and would

eventually help the economies of the signing parties. Parties advocating against the

implementation of the FCTC, namely the TTC's, argue that restricting tobacco sales and

promotion would cause the loss of thousands of j obs, a decrease in government revenues, and an

increase in illegal activity, especially smuggling (World Health Organization, 2000).

In its landmark 1999 report, "Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of

Tobacco Control" the World Bank explored the economic dimensions that need to be addressed

if nations were to become party to an international agreement such as the FCTC. The World

Bank concluded that tobacco control is very desirable because even small reductions in a disease









burden of such large size bring highly significant health and economic gains. The World Bank

deemed the tobacco industry's policy arguments to be unpersuasive, given that new j obs replace

old jobs, tobacco taxes empirically increase government revenues, and tobacco taxes still reduce

consumption and increase revenues in places where smuggling is high. The World Bank has

since decided to prohibit the use of the Bank' s resources to finance tobacco production. The

IMF, aligned with the World Bank' s tobacco policy has established similar conditions for its

loans. Both organizations encourage countries to become signatories of the FCTC (World Bank,

1999).

Jacobs et al. describe the size and nature of the tobacco industry, both farming and

manufacturing. They then examine the impact of tobacco control measures on countries'

economies, in particular on employment. They found that, if tobacco consumption were to fall

because of control policies, the net impact on total employment would be minimal or zero in

most countries, since the money consumers once spent on tobacco would be spent instead on

other goods and services, hence generating jobs.

Another belief among parties that are opposed to regulating tobacco is that governments

will lose revenues if they increase cigarette taxes because people will buy less The World Bank

suggests that even substantial cigarette tax increases will reduce consumption while increasing

tax revenues. The proportionate reduction in demand does not match the proportionate size of the

tax increase, since addicted consumers respond relatively slowly to increases in price.

Most scholars and international organizations agree that the FCTC offers a long term

approach to global coordination on tobacco control (Taylor et al.; 1999 Jha et al. 1999; World

Bank, 1999).









Significance of this Thesis

While there was no shortage of analysis that speculates on the economic effects of

regulating tobacco, no single study has examined the actual impact of FCTC policies. Few

people now dispute that smoking is damaging human health on a global scale. Many

governments have avoided taking action to control tobacco such as higher taxes,

comprehensive bans on advertising and promotion, and encouraging farmers to diversify away

from growing tobacco because of concerns that their interventions might have harmful economic

consequences. For example, some policymakers fear that reduced sales of cigarettes would mean

the permanent loss of thousands of jobs; that higher tobacco taxes would result in lower

government revenues; and that higher prices would encourage massive levels of cigarette

smuggling. This thesis examines the global challenge, brought on by public health advocates,

facing Big Tobacco, one of the most powerful industries in the world. It aims to test the

assertions that tobacco control policies are damaging to the economy using Brazilian experience.

The FCTC is a critical tool for promoting public health and corporate accountability and its

implementation would help to end the global tobacco epidemic. Its history to date provides

lessons that may be applicable when challenging other industries that threaten health,

environmental and human rights. The 2003 issue of Tobacco Reporter, a prominent industry

journal stated that: "Tobacco executives caution other industries about allowing WHO to assume

such control over their global market." BAT pointed out that as the world's first international

health agreement, the FCTC sets a precedent that could affect many other industries (Lerner,

2003).

Approach and Organization

Primary sources from the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health

Organization, the World Bank, Phillip Morris International and British American Tobacco Ltd.









aided in compiling the research. An analysis was conducted, relying primarily on industry

documents, scholarly journal articles, news articles, and reports relating to the economic impact

of the FCTC in Brazil and elsewhere. To gain a better understanding of the globalization of

tobacco, I attended the World Conference on Tobacco or Health (WCTOH), a global meeting of

governments, advocates, businesses and researchers in Washington DC in June 2006. There, I

attended sessions on the FCTC, tobacco advertising, smuggling, trade and other topics relating to

the business end of the global tobacco issue. I also had the opportunity to speak with several

Brazilian public health officials, professors, government officials and businessmen connected to

both sides of the tobacco issue in several Latin American countries.

Chapter 2 of this study provides an overview on the history of international tobacco

control. Prior to the FCTC's entry into force, there had been attempts at international tobacco

regulation between countries and the World Trade Organization. This chapter explores the

barriers to controlling tobacco that trade agreements have posed in the past, highlighting the

dispute settlement process within the WTO. This chapter covers attempts at international

tobacco control up until the ratification of the FCTC.

Chapters 3 examines the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This will

include a discussion on the nature of conventions, the measures and provisions set forth in the

convention and its enforceability. Chapter 3 also documents the drafting of the FCTC and lists

the countries that have signed and ratified the convention.

Chapter 4 will discuss tobacco control in Brazil to date. This will include a discussion

about the scope of the tobacco problem in Brazil, its tobacco economy, and the government' s

first steps in regulating tobacco before the FCTC was ratified. A discussion of the drafting and

ratification process including the hurdles posed by the tobacco industry's lobby will also be









included in this section. Further, this chapter will examine Brazil's commitment to tobacco

control and the economic impact of tobacco control policies despite the countries' heavy

economic interests in tobacco exporting and manufacturing.

Chapter 5 concludes the study with an analysis of the economic impacts of Brazil's

tobacco policies and ratification of the FCTC. Future research and recommendations for policy

makers is also presented along with generalizations about changing policy and behavior.









CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPlVENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION

Introduction

Although tobacco is considered the single most significant threat to global public health,

international efforts to regulate tobacco and transnational tobacco corporations (TTC's) have

only emerged within the past fifteen years. Because tobacco is a legal consumer good, justifying

its restriction has been difficult despite consensus about its harmful side effects. The main factor

that drew international attention to the tobacco epidemic was explosive increase in consumption

of tobacco in developing countries in the 1990's. This increase was surprising, since most of the

high income countries had experienced a decrease as a result of the widespread knowledge of the

dangers of smoking. This chapter sets the stage for the WHO's development of an international

tobacco treaty by discussing the evolution of international tobacco control.

First, this chapter provides an overview on the history of the beginnings of tobacco control

that took place in the U.S. This includes a discussion on the discovery of the dangers of

smoking, laws put in place to restrict the tobacco industry and improvements in public health

recorded among the U.S. population after restrictions were put in place. Despite recorded health

improvements in the U.S. and in other high income countries, it soon became evident that

globalization of the TTC's was shifting the tobacco epidemic to the developing world. The

second part of the chapter focuses on the trade-public health debate that arose in response to the

increasing number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. This section includes a

discussion on trade liberalization and its links to the spreading of tobacco diseases and the

WTO's past handling of trade disputes involving tobacco products. Finally, this chapter outlines

the position taken by international regulatory organizations including the World Bank and the










WHO to regulate tobacco internationally. A discussion about the events leading up to the UN' s

adoption of the FCTC concludes the chapter.

Tobacco Regulation in the U.S.

Regulating tobacco first became a national concern in 1964 when U.S. Surgeon General'

Luther Terry's Report on Smoking and Health was published, detailing scientific evidence on the

harms of smoking (Center for Disease Control, n.d). Since that report was published, federal

regulations have been placed on tobacco products in the U.S. Limited federal regulations

include: required Surgeon General Warnings on cigarette packs, prohibition of television

advertising, and some agricultural safeguards (American Heart Association, n.d). Individual

states have taken further action by passing clean indoor air laws that require public areas to be

smoke-free. In addition, Big Tobacco voluntarily regulated its advertising practices as a result of

the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) the largest civil settlement in U.S. history. These

actions have proven to be successful in reducing the number of smoking related deaths in the

U.S. over the past fifty years (Center for Disease Control, n.d). This section discusses the

federal, statewide and voluntary regulations that have shaped the history U.S. tobacco control.

During the past three decades, the US Supreme Court has struggled with a maj or

contemporary American issue the role of advertising and its regulation in matters of public

health and corporate freedom of speech. Although the findings in the 1964 Surgeon General's

report sparked controversy over the role of advertising in consumers' choice to smoke, the

tobacco industry asserted that advertising does not cause adults to start smoking nor does it

increase the amount they may already smoke. Instead, the industry claimed, and continues to


SThe Surgeon General of the United States is the head of the United States Public Health Service Commissioned
Corps and is the leading spokesperson on matters of public health in the U. S. government. The Surgeon General is
nominated by the U.S. President and confirmed via majority vote by the Senate (US Department on Health and
Human Services, n.d.).










claim, that advertising merely enhances the market share of a particular brand over another

(Bayer et al., 2002). Agencies like the Better Business Bureau (BBB)2 and the Federal Trade

Commission (FTC)3 warned the tobacco industry that it should adhere to basic principles of truth

and fairness in its campaigns in anticipation of a public backlash, since concealing the possible

dangers of smoking from their consumers could cost them their advertising freedoms. The

industry did not adjust their campaigns and people became outraged that Big Tobacco continued

to advertise despite the established medical and health findings published in the Surgeon

General's report. Critics of the industry's continued advertising practices argued that "A more

flagrant assault against public welfare had never been witnessed in the United States" (Bayer et

al., 2002).

Public outcry over the tobacco industry's inaction prompted the creation of the Public

Health Cigarette Smoking Act, one of first the maj or bills passed by the U. S. Congress since the

1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report. The Act, signed into law by President Richard Nixon in

1970, required that health warning labels be placed on all cigarette packs. In 1981, the FTC

reported that the health warning labels as mandated by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act

had little effect on American smoking habits, so Congress the passed the Comprehensive

Smoking Education Act of 1984, requiring more specific health warnings which read:

*SURGEON GENERAL' S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.



2 The Better Business Bureau (BBB), founded in 1912, is an organization based in the United States and Canada.
The BBB states its purpose is to act as a mutually trusted intermediary between consumers and businesses to resolve
disputes, to facilitate communication, and to provide information on ethical business practices (Better Business
Bureau, n.d)

SThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the United States government, established in
1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Its principal mission is the promotion of consumer protection and the
elimination and prevention of anticompetitive business practices (Federal Trade Commission, n.d)










* SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health.
* SURGEON GENERAL' S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal
Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
* SURGEON GENERAL' S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
(Center for Disease Control, n.d).


This federal move prompted many states to adopt new tobacco regulations, forcing the

industry's lobbying group, the Tobacco Institute, to ask for federal intervention on state and local

matters that they felt infringed on their First Amendment Rights.

In 1996 the U. S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)4 attempted to assert jurisdiction

over tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. For decades, the FDA said it

lacked authority to regulate tobacco, but in 1996 it cited new evidence that the industry intended

its products to feed nicotine addictions, therefore making cigarettes a drug delivery system. The

FDA proposed to regulate cigarettes as a hybrid involving both a drug and a medical device. It

intended to dictate tobacco advertising and promotional campaigns, strengthen warning labels

and tightening sales restrictions (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001). In response, Big

Tobacco sued the federal government, arguing that the FDA lacked legal authority to regulate

tobacco products. The case eventually landed in the Supreme Court. In June 2000, The United

States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that Congress had not expressly given the FDA legal authority to

regulate the tobacco industry, and that the Congress must specifically enact legislation to allow

the FDA to regulate tobacco. As a result, all FDA' s attempts to further regulate tobacco at the

federal level were dropped, including the federal minimum age requirement for purchasing



SThe Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an agency of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services and is responsible for regulating food, dietary supplements, drugs, biological medical products, blood
products, medical devices, radiation-emitting devices, veterinary products, and cosmetics in the United States (Food
and Drug Administration, n.d).









tobacco products (18 years old), as well as federal rules requiring retailers to check photo

identification. (American Heart Association, n.d).

In February 2007, a bipartisan group of lawmakers reintroduced legislation, once again

pushing to give FDA the same authority over cigarettes and other tobacco products that it already

has over many other consumer products. Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy said that

"Congress cannot in good conscience allow the federal agency most responsible for protecting

public health to remain powerless in dealing with the enormous risks of tobacco, the most deadly

of all consumer products." Many tobacco companies opposing this legislation, set to be voted on

in 2007, have argued that the bill would favor companies like Phillip Morris, who enj oys strong

brand loyalty that could allow them to weather advertising restrictions without losing market

share. They claim that they will continue to oppose any bill that conveys an unfair advantage or

disadvantage to any manufacturer (LSU Law Center, 2000). Because restricting tobacco

products brings into question general principles such corporate freedom of speech, unfair

advantage and the role of advertising in consumer choice, it is likely that the U.S. government

will continue to struggle with the federal regulation of tobacco.

Although federally tobacco regulation is lax, many U.S. states have enacted their own set

of tobacco control policies. These restrictions range from tax increases to full smoking bans in

bars, workplaces, restaurants and hotels. In 1988, California voters passed Proposition 99, which

raised the tobacco excise tax by twenty-five cents and allocated $90 million annually for tobacco

control. Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, referenda have increased tobacco excise taxes and

dedicated a fraction of the revenues to reducing tobacco use. Legislatures in other states such as

Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Washington have increased

tobacco taxes substantially. Figure 1.1 lists the cigarette taxes rates imposed by each state and










ranks them from highest to lowest. By acknowledging the danger of cigarettes, raising tobacco

taxes and restricting advertising has not only discouraged people from buying pricier cigarettes,

it has changed society's perception of smoking.


TAX RATE
(( per pack)
42.5
180
200
59
87
84
151
55
33.9
37
160
57
98
56.5
36
79
30
36
200
100
151
200
123
18
17
170


TAX RATE
(( per pack)
64
80
80
257.5
91
150
35
44
125
103
118
135
246
7
53
20
141
69.5
179
30
202.5
55
77
60
100


STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delawa re
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
lowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana


RANK
40
7
4
33
24
25
11
36
45
41
10
34
22

42
28
46
42
4
20
11
4
17
49
50
9


STATE
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Ve rmont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Dist. of Columbia


RANK
31
26
26
1
23
13
44
39
16
19
18
15
2
51
38
48
14
30
8
46
3
36
29
32
20


U. S. Median 80.0
Figure 2-1. US State Cigarette Taxes, 2007. Source: Tax Policy Center, 2007

The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was also an important factor in regulating

tobacco in the U. S. The MSA arose out of many separate law suits brought by various individual

States against the tobacco industry for Medicare costs associated with smoking-related diseases.

The agreement was originally negotiated between the four largest tobacco companies (Philip

Morris USA, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and

Lorillard Tobacco Company) and 46 U.S. States and 6 U.S. Territories. The MSA exempted the










companies from liability from state governments and settled the lawsuit in exchange for a

combination of yearly payments to the states, estimated at over $206 billion, and voluntary

restrictions on advertising and marketing of tobacco products (Geyelin, 1998). The MSA also

created and currently funds The American Legacy Foundation, an anti-smoking advocacy group

that is responsible for such anti-smoking campaigns like The Truths. The agreement was meant

to provide state governments with compensation for smoking related medical costs and to help

reduce smoking in the United States. Another maj or contribution that came out of the MSA was

that the tobacco companies were forced to make their private industry documents open to the

public (California Office of Attorney General, n.d). The information extracted from these

documents has shed light on the tobacco industry's business practices around the world and

aided in jump starting international tobacco regulation.

Public health advocates have criticized the MSA as being too lenient on the maj or tobacco

companies. An article in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute described the MSA as an

"opportunity lost to curb cigarette use", citing public health researchers' views that not enough of

the MSA money was being spent on anti-smoking measures (Twombly, 2004).

Federal and state regulations along with voluntary campaigns funded by the Industry, are

responsible for changing the social acceptability of smoking in the U.S. According to the CDC,

46.5 million U.S. smokers have quit over the last 40 years (Center for Disease Control, 2006).

Smoking rates have been steadily declining among men and women since the 1964 Surgeon

General's report, with a 50 year low recorded in 2004 (Center for Disease Control, 2006).




5 The Truth campaign is the largest national youth-focused anti-tobacco education campaign ever. It is designed to
engage teens by exposing Big Tobacco's marketing and manufacturing practices. The campaign has been
successful, with nearly 90 percent of youths aged 12 to 17 25 million said the ad they saw was convincing (Truth
Campaign, n.d).









Globally evidence on the dangers of smoking has not had the same effect on developing

countries as has on high income countries, nor has the tobacco industry fallen under the same

amount of scrutiny and regulation. Today, approximately 1 in 3 adults, or 1.1 billion people

smoke. Of these, a disproportionate 80% are live in developing countries. Increased trade

liberalization is often cited as the main reason for this imbalance, since the removal of trade

barriers increases demand, fuels competition, lowers prices and attracts new customers.

International Trade and Tobacco

The idea that trade liberalization exacerbated tobacco use became evident when expansion

of trade in tobacco products began in the 1980's. The most notable example of tobacco trade

expansion took place when the U. S. applied pressure on behalf of the tobacco companies to open

the markets of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. These actions were taken by the

United States Trade Representative under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 (Chaloupka

and Laixuthai, 1996). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, is the US legislative device

designed to open foreign markets to U.S. exports of goods and services. The US government

succeeded in negotiating bilateral agreements that removed excise taxes and distribution

practices that discriminated against U.S. tobacco products, except in Thailand. Studies found

that the market share of U. S. cigarettes in countries affected by the Section 301 agreements rose

sharply after their tobacco markets were opened (Taylor et al., 1999). Estimates implied that

U.S. market shares for the American cigarettes were 600% higher, on average, in 1991 than they

would have been had these markets remained closed. Most notably, research found that the

opening of the Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean, and Thai cigarette markets led to a

significant increase in cigarette smoking in these countries. They estimated that per capital

cigarette consumption, by 1991, was 10% higher, on average, in the four countries than it would

have been in the absence of the bilateral agreements (Chaloupka and Laixuthai, 1996).









The issue of trade liberalization influencing international tobacco consumption are matters

that lie under the authority of the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization.

Since WTO controls the international movement of tobacco products around the world, many

feel that the WTO should take on the responsibility of controlling the tobacco epidemic by

allowing countries to restrict the importation of foreign tobacco. The ways in which the WTO

interprets and rules on trade-public health issues have historically been narrow and mostly trade-

focused (Taylor et al, 1999). Although the WTO does not deny the significance of protecting

public health within trade practices, since there is a direct relationship between health and

development, there is little mention about trade and public health within the WTO's agreements.

(World Trade Organization and World Health Organization, 2002).

The WTO was established in 1995 to replace the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

(GATT), which dated back to 1948. This was the consequence of a decision made by

governments after seven years of negotiations during the Uruguay Round which ended in 1994

(World Trade Organization, n.d) With the WTO's creation, trade rules were expanded to cover

new issues that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. While the GATT dealt with trade in goods

only, the WTO covers trade in services and intellectual property and introduced a new dispute

settlement system equipped to deal with new trading concerns (World Trade Organization, n.d)

The only reference to a country's ability to restrict trade in the name of health lies in Article

20(b) of the GATT, which dates back to the 1948. Article 20(b) provides a highly limited

exception for national measures designed to protect public health that would otherwise violate

GATT obligations and are only relevant if a trade violation is found. Article 20(b) GATT reads:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means ofarbitrat~rtrt~ ryt~rt~t~r or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this










Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
part of measures;

(b) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant hife or health (World Trade Organization
and World Health Organization, 2002).

The only instance where Article 20(b) has been applied to tobacco products and health

took place in 1989 between Thailand and the WTO. This first international attempt to control

tobacco trade internationally emerged out of the same U. S. agreements that opened the Asian

markets discussed above. Examining U.S. efforts to open the cigarette market in Thailand will

help to assess the impact of the trade liberalization with respect to cigarettes.

The case of Thailand

In 1966, Thailand enacted a bold tobacco control program that included a comprehensive ban on

both cigarette advertising and a ban on tobacco imports. U.S. tobacco companies challenged

Thailand's ban on advertising and imports, prompting an investigation by the United States Trade

Representative who referred the matter to the WTO's GATT. Thailand contended that the ban

on imports was justified by the obj ective of public health policy and was therefore covered under

Article 20(b) of the GATT.

In a landmark decision, GATT's panel found that Thailand could "give priority to human

health over trade liberalization as long as the proposed measures were "necessary." The panel

concluded that Thailand's restriction on imports could be considered "necessary" in terms of

Article 20, only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the GATT, or less

inconsistent with it, that Thailand could reasonably be expected to achieve its health policy

objectives. Based on the GATT panel's analysis of the "necessity" of the Thai measures, the

panel concluded that Thailand' s practice of permitting the sales of domestic cigarettes, while

banning the importation of foreign cigarettes, was not "necessary" and, therefore, not justifiable









under Article 20(b), since alternatives to banning the importation of cigarettes were available to

protect public health (World Trade Organization and World Health Organization, 2002).

The panel further found that requiring foreign tobacco companies to abide by tobacco-

control regulations that applied equally to domestic and foreign tobacco products was

appropriate and consistent with GATT obligations. GATT upheld Thailand's advertising ban and

went on to state that various tobacco control measures could be adopted and applied to both

domestic and imported tobacco, in lieu of an import ban, and still be consistent with GATT. The

panel also noted that a ban on advertising applying to both domestic and imported cigarettes

would be justified under the GATT, even if it created unequal competitive opportunities between

domestic and foreign firms, because advertising may stimulate demand for cigarettes (World

Trade organization and World Health Organization, 2002). This was the first and only WTO

decision involving manufactured tobacco products.

According to the World Bank, the Thailand decision it set a critical precedent for other

countries, and sends a message that member nations can adopt strong anti-tobacco control

legislation as long as the measures are aimed at protecting health and do not discriminate

between domestic and imported tobacco. Many scholars have noted that it cannot be assumed

that Article 20(b) of the GATT will be applied in a manner that supports the protection of public

health in future tobacco decisions (Bettcher et al., 2001). After all, the WTO regime is primarily

aimed at limitation of health-based restrictions to those that are necessary and minimally

burdensome to trade.

Critics of the GATT panel's decisions regarding tobacco products claim that the panel's

interpretation of the necessary requirement under Article 20(b) excessively restricts the capacity

of countries to adopt standards to protect public health (Schoenbaum, 1997). They claim that the










standard employed by the GATT panel when considering Thailand's import ban requires

countries to adopt the least trade restrictive policy possible, inordinately favoring the expansion

of free trade over national authority to protect public health (Taylor et al., 1999). Other critics

say that the Thai case has been mistakenly viewed by some as an important victory for public

health advocates. They claim that although the GATT's decision upheld strong, non-

discriminatory public health measures as consistent with international trade commitments, the

liberalization of the tobacco trade in Thailand, as well as the other 3 Asian nations that were

prompted to open their markets to expand the imports of cigarettes considered qualitatively

superior to those produced by the domestic tobacco companies led to an overall increase in

tobacco consumption in these nations. The Thai trade case and the research concluding that

smoking in the Asian countries had increased significantly after opening their markets for

tobacco expansion intensified the international debate between the public health and trade

regimes.

History of the Trade vs. Public Health Debate

The interests of the WHO and the WTO are at odds within the trade vs. health debate, but

much more so when manufactured tobacco products are involved. In 2000, the annual World

Conference on Tobacco or Health held its first debate that centered on the issue of international

trade in tobacco. Specifically, the debate focused on whether the rules governing international

trade inhibits nations from being able to adopt strong tobacco control measures. This question fit

in with the central trade issue of the 1990's: whether trade agreements and WTO system of trade

rules overrode other important societal values, such as environmental protection, food safety, and

public health. Trade advocates argued that the main setback to tobacco control was not the

international trade rules. Rather, it was the failure of governments around the world to Eind the

political will to adopt strong tobacco control policies in the face of powerful tobacco companies.









They suggested that the increasing amount of smokers in developing countries could be

attributed to governments' failure to put the public health concerns of their people above the

commercial interests of the tobacco companies and of those who make their living from growing

tobacco. In addition, trade advocates added that the WTO rules, particularly Article 20(b) of the

GATT, provided governments with far more latitude to adopt measures to safeguard public

health than the WTO critics acknowledged.

Although the WTO advocates did not deny the significance of protecting public health

within trade practices, they emphasized that the ultimate goal of free trade is the increased

production and consumption of beneficial products, or, goods, which justifies free trade policies.

The problem with tobacco, of course, is that it is not a beneficial product. Each additional unit of

consumption has been shown to cause additional suffering and death, as well as a net economic

loss to the economy of the nation in which it is consumed and to the global economy. According

to Bloom et. al., the distinction between a beneficial product and a harmful one essentially turns

the traditional presumption in favor of free trade on its head with respect to tobacco. Bloom et

al. points out if the use of a product is uniformly harmful; the presumption should be against

promoting increased trade in that product (Bloom, 2001)

Public health advocates argued that trade advocates focused too much attention on the

workings of WTO provisions, and not enough attention on the actual problem: the unique nature

of the product in question (Shapiro, 2002). The facts suggest that smoking is the leading

preventable cause of death and disease in the world, and that about half of all long term smokers

die of diseases caused by their addictive habit. Public health advocates argued that the very fact

that tobacco products are so lethal, even when they are consumed in a normal way, sets them










apart from other products in commerce, and requires that they be treated as an exception to

ordinary trade rules.

Many public health advocates argue that the Thailand case illustrates problem with the

treatment of tobacco products within the trade regime. Even though closed markets and clear

discrimination against foreign products are "abomination" to trade, they may have significant

public health benefits (Shapiro, 2002). A closed market allows the government to maintain

control over the market, prevent marketing and pricing competition that accompany trade

liberalization, and exclude products that may be especially enticing to children.

Some tobacco control advocates believe that WTO panels will always err on the side of

trade at the expense of public health in trade disputes (Weissman, 2001). Trade advocates point

to recent WTO appellate decisions to refute that accusation. In 2000, the WTO ruled in favor of

French ban the production and import of asbestos products from Canada. The WTO panel

decided that France has the right to maintain its ban under Article 20, which allows for actions

instituted for the protection of public health (Callard et al., 2001). It is difficult to predict how

trade disputes involving tobacco will be determined under an international tobacco treaty like the

FCTC.

International Organizations and Tobacco Control

In light of the growing consensus that trade liberalization contributes to for the spread of

the tobacco epidemic, it has been assumed that regulating tobacco trade policies would be the

best way to control tobacco. WTO agreements outline the difficulty facing the regulation of

tobacco control at an international level via the trade regime. Other international organizations

have adopted policies that control tobacco indirectly. This section details the actions taken by

the World Bank and the World Health Organization that have shaped international tobacco

control in recent years.









World Bank

Since 1991 the World Bank has had a formal policy of not lending for tobacco production

and encouraging tobacco control. The policy contains five main points (World Bank, 1999):

* First, the Bank' s activities in the health sector discourage the use of tobacco products.
* Second, the Bank does not lend directly for, invest in, or guarantee investment or loans for,
tobacco production, processing or marketing
* Third, the Bank does not lend indirectly to tobacco production activities, to the extent that
this is practicable. For countries highly dependent on tobacco growing, the Bank's aim is
to help the countries diversify away from tobacco.
* Fourth, tobacco and its related processing machinery and equipment cannot be included
among imports financed under loans.
* Fifth, tobacco and tobacco-related imports may be exempt from borrowers' agreements
with the Bank to liberalize trade and reduce tariffs.

These World Bank policies have been applauded for their leadership in establishing

different norms for tobacco enterprises than for other commercial activities. Some World Bank

policies may remain in conflict with public health obj ectives, such as the Bank support of

privatization of state monopolies. Before 1999, the economic aspects of controlling tobacco

received little global attention, since most focus on tobacco issues revolved around the health

effects of smoking. The World Bank published a landmark report titled "Tobacco Control in

Developing Countries" which filled the gap between the health and economic aspects of tobacco.

The report focused on issues such as; the costs of tobacco use, the economic rationale for

government intervention in the tobacco market, policies to reduce demand and supply, the

impact of advertising and promotion and the taxation of tobacco products (Jha et al., 1999). This

report is responsible for much of the dialogue about international tobacco control and provided a

sound economic basis for the WHO to begin negotiations on an international health treaty

focusing on tobacco.









The World Health Organization (WHO)

In 1996, the WHO decided to exercise their treaty making ability to establish the

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first international public health treaty. Since its

establishment in 1948, the WHO only used its constitutional powers to propose legally binding

international law sparingly. Before the FCTC, the WHO's only notable contributions to binding

international law were the International Health Regulations (IHR), concerning the control of

three contagious diseases: cholera, plague, and yellow fever (Woo, 2002). As the scope of

international law broadened beyond the traditional international law issues of diplomacy, trade,

and war to include human rights and environmental protection agreements, international

consensus regarding health law was becoming more and more probable. This growth in

international law, the inaction by other international organizations of the issue of tobacco

contributed to the WHO's decision to use international law to achieve its obj ectives by creating

the FCTC.

The WHO Constitution defines its wide international responsibilities in the field of health

generally as the "attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Health is

very broadly defined as "a state of consplete physical, mental and social well-being and not

merely the absence of disease or injirnzity." The Constitution also says that "All necessary

action to attain the objective of the Organization is within the functions of the WHO. Since

most of the functions in the WHO Constitution are administrative, technical, or developmental in

nature, the WHO has been more active in these methods of promoting health rather than in the

making of international health law. The exception to this rule is Article 2(k), an enumerated

function stating that the WHO may "propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and

make recommendations 1 1 ithr respect to international health matters and to perforns such duties

as may be assigned thereby to the Organization and are consistent ~I ithr its objective." (Woo,









2002). The WHO had been addressing the issue of tobacco control by issuing resolutions since

1986. As non-binding international law, the resolutions had little effect, so in 1996, the World

Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO's governing body, passed Resolution 49.17 to begin work

on the FCTC.

In 1998, WHO Director-General, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland made global tobacco control

a priority through the establishment of a Cabinet Proj ect, The Tobacco Free Initiative, whose

goal was to focus international attention, resources and action upon the global tobacco epidemic.

Brundtland worked with WHO member states to secure a negotiating mandate for the FCTC and

began mobilizing public opinion in favor of global rules for tobacco control (World Health

Organization, n.d).

In May 1999, the 52nd World Health Assembly opened up multilateral negotiations on the

FCTC. Resolution WHA52. 18 established two bodies to draft the framework convention, to

complete negotiations, and to submit the final text for consideration by the 56th World Health

Assembly. These two bodies included a technical working group to prepare the proposed draft

elements and an intergovernmental negotiating body to draft and negotiate protocols. Both

bodies were open to all Member States and regional economic integration organizations to which

their Member States had transferred competence over matters related to tobacco control (World

Health Organization, n.d).

The WHO Director-General; opened a public hearing in 2000 to provide a forum for the

public health community, the tobacco industry, and farmers' groups to submit their case. After

six negotiating sessions were conducted by the Intergovernmental Negotiation Body (INB) the

final text of the FCTC was transmitted to the 56th World Health Assembly for Consideration. On

May 21, 2003, the World Health Assembly unanimously adopted the WHO FCTC.









Conclusion

Chapter 2 laid out the development of international tobacco regulation. It detailed the U. S.

experience in regulating tobacco which began the anti-smoking movement that inspired other

countries to adopt tobacco control policies. Importantly, this chapter illustrated that despite

public awareness of the dangers of smoking, developing countries had a disproportionate and

rising number of smokers when compared to high income countries. The opening of tobacco

markets in the 1980's in developing countries is revealed as the key factor responsible for that

trend. These findings eventually fueled the debate between the public health community and the

trade regime, which centered around the issue on whether tobacco should be restricted through

trade agreements. The inherent principles behind free trade and the case of Thailand suggest

that, presently, the trade regime is perhaps not the appropriate realm that should be used to

regulate tobacco. This chapter introduced the World Bank and the World Health Organization as

the leading international organizations with respect to tobacco control. The World Bank has

contributed to global tobacco policy by providing an economic rationale for regulation in their

landmark report Tobacco Control in Developing Countries and has also adjusted their lending

policies to discourage tobacco production and processing. The chapter concludes with the

WHO's bold move to address the tobacco issue under their jurisdiction by creating the

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

The history on the development of tobacco control surveyed in this chapter suggests that

international regulation is becoming a top priority within the international community.

Regulation is becoming less of an option and more of an obligation, especially in developing

countries where a disproportionate number of people are dying from smoking related diseases. It

seems that the initiative taken by the international community is one that is willing to enforce its

public health agenda even it means foregoing economic and trade principles. Chapter 3 provides









an overview of the FCTC's provisions, implementation and enforceability with special attention

given to the controversial provisions impacting the economies of its signing Parties.









CHAPTER 3
2003 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL

Introduction

The World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is a

groundbreaking treaty in many aspects: it is the first international public health treaty; the first

treaty proposed by WHO, and the first to regulate a legal consumer good at an international

level. The treaty has been signed by 168 countries and is legally binding in 147 ratifying

countries, representing over 2.3 billion people (World Health Organization, n.d). The FCTC

"reaffirms the right of all people to the highest standard of health." The treaty is unique in nature

because it represents a paradigm shift in developing a strategy to address addictive substances.

The FCTC was developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic which has

been facilitated through a variety of complex factors with cross-border effects, including trade

liberalization and direct foreign investment by TTC's. Other factors also addressed by the treaty,

such as global marketing, transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and

international movement of smuggled cigarettes have also contributed to the substantial increase

in tobacco use. The Convention is intended as a global regulatory complement to national and

local actions to control tobacco use, and it is expected to facilitate international commitments to

tobacco control and harmonization of national policies in this area. The treaty also includes

mechanisms designed to "enhance the technical capacity of poor countries in developing tobacco

control programs and strengthening their implementation" (Bettcher et al., 2001). This chapter is

divided into 3 sections, each discussing one aspect of the Framework Convention on Tobacco

Control .

The first section of Chapter 3 discusses the nature of the FCTC and international law, with

special attention given to the legality of the FCTC, its relationship with other existing









international obligations and the process by which State parties to the FCTC incorporate the

treaty into domestic law and policy. In addition, the general provisions set forth in the FCTC are

presented. Second, this chapter focuses on the FCTC's articles that are most likely to impact the

economies of countries that become Parties to the treaty. This includes a discussion on the

tobacco industry's argument that such provisions are detrimental to the economies of developing

countries and provides findings from several studies, namely studies conducted by the World

Bank, that counter the industry's contentions. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion about Big

Tobacco's response to the FCTC and its attempts to undermine its ratification and

implementation. The Articles set forth in the FCTC to combat activities by the tobacco industry

that undermine FCTC's efforts are also presented.

FCTC and International Law

The FCTC is a legally binding international treaty as defined by the 1969 Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT, drafted by the Intemnational Law

Commission (ILC) of the United Nations, is responsible for codifying and defining international

law on treaties. It defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in

written form and governed by international law." The generic term "convention" is a title used

for negotiations associated with international organizations, and is synonymous with the generic

term "treaty." The basic principles regarding the observance of treaties comes from Article 26 of

the VCLT, which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must

be performed in good faith" (United Nations, 1963).

International Treaty Law

As a general rule, conventional international law, or, treaty law, is a voluntary undertaking

and its provisions are only binding only upon those states that have consented to them. The

adoption of a treaty represents the close of negotiations and is followed by its entry into force.









The FCTC details the requirements for entry into force in the Einal clauses of the convention. In

virtually all cases, multilateral treaties allow States to accept the treaty by means of either (a)

signature followed by ratification or (b) accession, the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the

opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. In the

former case, signature is merely a preliminary step (International Law Commission, 2005).

Member States that have signed the Convention indicate that they will strive in good faith to

ratify, accept, or approve it and show political commitment not to undermine the obj ectives set

out in it. Ratifieation is the process whereby a state expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty,

involving formal confirmation by the state of its initial signature to the treaty. Ratifieation is

normally required before a treaty becomes binding in member states. A treaty usually enters into

force as international law after a certain number of states ratify it. The FCTC required 40

ratifications for entry into force (Framework Convention Alliance, n.dB). The treaty met its 40-

member mark in November 2003 when Peru completed its ratification (Framework Convention

Alliance, n.dC).

In the event of a dispute with respect to interpretation or application of the Convention,

Article 27 of the FCTC states that "the Parties concerned shall seek through diplomatic channels

a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice,

including good offices, mediation or conciliation"(World Health Organization, 2005).

Throughout the United Nations system, the general rule is that once a treaty has been

adopted by an organ or conference of an international organization, then that organization "takes

no substantive interest in the steps to bring the treaty into force, except to the extent that the

organization may act as a depositary and carry out formal steps required in that capacity" (Szasz,

1997). In the case of the FCTC, the WHO's actions are limited to symbolic steps to encourage









ratification, such as recommending the treaty to its members, adopting resolutions, encouraging

member nations to participate in the treaty, or requiring its executive head to report periodically

on progress made in bringing the treaty into force among Member States (Blanke and Silva,

2004).

International Requirements and the FCTC

A series of international and domestic requirements must be met before a treaty enters into

force. Discrepancies between national obligations pursuant to some international agreements

and countries that have ratified the treaty may not be congruent. The WTO and other trade and

investment agreements contain far reaching liberalization provisions that go beyond regulating

tariffs and requiring countries to treat domestic and foreign producers equally. These include

provisions placing limits on country flexibility in the areas of product standards and intellectual

property. Countries have a strong incentive to comply with WTO requirements since countries

found violating WTO rules must either change their laws or face costly trade sanctions (Callard

et al., 2001).

Normally, in the case of a conflict between two treaties, two rules of international law

outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply. First is the principle of lex

specialist, which says that treaties of a specific nature take precedence over treaties of a more

general nature (Szasz, 1997). Second is the principle of lex posterior, or the "later in time" rule,

which stipulates that more recent treaties will take precedence over earlier treaties. According to

the International Law Commission (ILC), Lex specialis and lex posterior can apply only to States

which are parties to both treaties in question. Since the FCTC is a relatively new treaty, it is

expected that these international laws will favor tobacco control measures (Blanke and Silva,

2004). With the constant negotiation of new trade agreements, many trade agreements will soon









be "later in time." than the FCTC. This leaves the FCTC in a gray area as far as precedence over

conflicting agreements.

During the drafting process for the FCTC, three resolutions called for the international

tobacco control community to work vigorously to exclude and remove tobacco and tobacco

products from bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that would have negative public health

consequences. The final draft of the treaty is silent on its relationship to trade agreement.

(Mitka, 2000). It is still uncertain how conflicts between FCTC implementation and trade

agreement obligations, if any, will be resolved (Callard et al., 2001).

As discussed in Chapter 2, many public health advocates have voiced concerns over the

tobacco industry's reaction to FCTC provisions that may not be in the industry's best interests.

The fear is that the tobacco companies will be quick to push for action to be taken against

countries enforcing tobacco control laws. To date, the only dispute related to tobacco control

that has arisen under WTO agreements involved Thailand's import and advertising ban on

manufactured tobacco products, where a health exception under Article 20 of the GATT allowed

Thailand to ban advertising on tobacco products as long as the ban was equally applied to both

domestic and imported tobacco products. Despite overlapping interests between trade and public

health agreements, the WHO is working closely with the WTO to minimize potential conflicts

between the FCTC and other agreements (Bloom, 2001).

FCTC Provisions

Provisions set in the final draft of the WHO's FCTC are wide and varied. Main provisions

include regulation of tobacco through: advertising, promotion and sponsorship; illicit trade;

liability; packaging and labeling; training and education; and research and surveillance. FCTC

also establishes institutions and mechanisms necessary for the functioning of the treaty, such as

the Conference of Parties, the Secretariat and the dispute settlement procedures (Framework









Convention Alliance, n.dB). Most measures deal primarily with demand reducing strategies and

are contained in Articles 6-14. These include 1) Price and tax measures to reduce demand

(increasing price and taxes on tobacco products and 2) Non-price measure to reduce demand,

which include:

* Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke
* Regulation of the contents of tobacco products
* Regulation of tobacco product disclosures
* Packaging and labeling of tobacco products
* Education, communication and public awareness
* Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and
* Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation

The core supply reduction provisions in the FCTC are contained in Articles 15-17 and include:
* Illicit trade (smuggling) in tobacco products
* Sales to and by minors; and,
* Provisions of support for economically viable alternative activities to tobacco production.

In addition to the goals set out in the provisions, drafters say that these measures should:

* Raise the profile of tobacco issues in the media and legislatures around the world
* Give new impetus to efforts to strengthen national legislation and action to control the
harm caused by tobacco
* Help mobilize national and global technical and financial support for tobacco control;
* Bring new national ministries, including those dealing with foreign affairs and finance,
more deeply into the tobacco control effort; and
* Provide tobacco control organizations with critical opportunities to build alliances
nationally and internationally, educate policymakers, and raise public awareness of the
health hazards of tobacco and the activities of the tobacco industry
(Mitka, 2000).


Economic Implications of the FCTC

Countries that want to support the FCTC at the national level face some obstacles.

According to the American Cancer Society, TTC's attempt to persuade governmental authorities

and the public that smoking has economic benefits. They claim that FCTC measures to control

tobacco will reduce tax revenues and increase unemployment and cigarette smuggling. Many

governments seriously consider arguments of the tobacco industry that adopting the FCTC will









affect the economy by reducing the fiscal gains from growing, processing, manufacturing,

exporting and taxing tobacco. These concerns are a formidable barrier to tobacco control. The

provisions set forth in the FCTC that are most controversial in terms of negatively impacting a

country's economic stability are those related to tobacco tax increases, alternatives to tobacco

production, smuggling of tobacco products and control in advertising, promotion and

sponsorship. This section details those FCTC provisions and develops the arguments by the

tobacco industry, economists and the World Bank on why these tobacco control measures laid

out by the FCTC are beneficial or detrimental to countries that enforce them.

Price and Tax Increases

Tax and price increases are widely recognized as one of the most powerful policy tools in

reducing tobacco use and the single most cost-effective intervention (World Bank, 1999).

Increasing the price and tax on cigarettes is considered an especially effective way to reduce

consumption in developing countries, since people with low incomes tend to be highly sensitive

to price increases (Vargas and Campos, 2005). Article 6 of the FCTC commits Parties to treat

tobacco taxation as a health measure, rather than a fiscal measure, and encourages Parties to

adopt tax and price policies to discourage tobacco consumption. Although it is difficult and

undesirable to develop a common tax regime under the FCTC, it is suggested within Article 6

that each party should commit to raise its tobacco taxes to at least the rate of growth of incomes,

and considerably ahead of inflation (Action on Smoking and Health, 2002). The Article also

suggests that some fraction of tobacco tax revenue should be dedicated to funding tobacco

control and cessation programs like the Truth campaigns in the U.S. Also, Article 6 stipulates

that duty free sales of tobacco products should be suspended, since duty free is an unjustified tax

break to travelers, and opens a back door route to the black market by allowing retail access to

tobacco products on which the full duties have not been paid (World Health Organization, 2005).










Article 6 is the one of the more controversial provisions in the FCTC because increasing

tobacco taxes has many economic implications for countries that opt to become Parties to the

FCTC. The most common concern is that increases in tobacco taxes will lead to reductions in

tobacco tax revenues for governments. Another argument is that tax increases would lead to

significant reductions in employment in tobacco growing and manufacturing, as well as more

general wholesaling, retailing, and other sectors. In addition, some TTC's argue that raising

taxes on cigarettes will increase smuggling activity, which is a maj or concern for governments,

especially in developing countries where crime is already a problem. Several studies indicate

that that raising tobacco taxes can only be beneficial to individuals and governments for both

Financial and health reasons (World Bank, 1999; Jha et al., 2000; Iglesias and Nicolau, 2006).

Big Tobacco and some policymakers frequently argue against raising tobacco taxes on the

basis that the resulting reduction in demand will cost governments vital revenue. Given the

relatively inelastic demand for tobacco products and the current share of tobacco taxes in price,

nearly every country has substantial room for increasing tobacco tax revenues by increasing

tobacco taxes (Sunley et al., 1999, 409). Moreover, even in countries where demand is relatively

more elastic and taxes account for a relatively high share of tobacco prices, increases in these

taxes will lead to increases in tax revenues. A good example that illustrates the benefits of

raising tobacco taxes is the United Kingdom, where cigarette taxes have been raised repeatedly

over the past three decades. Partly because of these increases, and partly because of the steady

increase in awareness about the health consequences of smoking, consumption has declined

sharply over the same time, with the annual number of cigarettes sold falling from 138 billion to

80 billion over the last thirty years. Despite the decreasing number of sales, tobacco tax

revenues for the government are still rising. For every tax increase of 1% in the U.K.,










government revenues increased between 0.6 and 0.9 percent. In 1999, a model developed by

Sunley et al. (1999) using the experiences of the UK and several other countries indicated that an

increase of 10% in cigarette taxes would lead to an increase of almost 7%, on average in

cigarette tax revenues (Sunley et al., 1999).

Advocates of the FCTC argue that policymakers should hope that tobacco consumption

falls to such low levels that, eventually, tobacco tax revenues would begin to fall as well.

Ideally, an ultimate loss in government revenue would be considered a success, since the

ultimate aim for the FCTC is to benefit public health. Based on current patterns, the number of

smokers is expected to grow in low income countries over the next three decades so it is unlikely

that raising taxes would affect revenue in the short run. Because it is a possibility that in the long

term governments may indeed lose tobacco tax revenues, FCTC panels encourage governments

to introduce alternative income taxes or consumption taxes that would replace the revenue from

tobacco taxes (World Health Organization, 2005).

Smuggling

The second most common argument against FCTC provisions for raising tobacco taxes is

that doing so will contribute to increased cigarette smuggling and criminal activity. Each year,

approximately 400 million cigarettes are illegally smuggled across international borders, making

cigarettes the world's most widely smuggled legal consumer product (World Bank, 1999). This

presents a maj or problem, especially for developing countries because it allows for the evasion

of duty fees and taxes that would normally go towards improving public health, education and

infrastructure. Normally, cigarettes legitimately move through an 'in-transit' regime without

bearing tax until they reach their final end market, at which point tax is payable. Most

smuggling involves the cigarettes moving out of the untaxed distribution chain and entering the

final end-market illegally, often through a third country. This can happen by legal export









followed by illegal re-import or cigarettes in transit may be diverted from the legal to the illegal

distribution chain (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001B).

One of the key measures in the FCTC is the development of a regime to tackle tobacco

smuggling, an issue important for both fiscal and human health. Under Article 15 of the FCTC,

Parties accept a number of obligations which are aimed at eliminating illicit tobacco trade. They

accept these obligations recognizing that "the elimination of all forms of illicit tradert~t~rt~t~rt~t~rt~ in tobacco

products, including smuggling, illicit manufacturing and counterfeiting, and the development of

and insplententation of related national law, in addition to sub-regional, regional and global

agreements, are essential components of tobacco control" (World Health Organization, 2005).

It has been argued by the TTC's that higher taxes will contribute to increased cigarette

smuggling and associated criminal activity. In fact, the TTC's advise governments to reduce

tobacco tax rates in order to discourage smuggling (Bialous and Shatenstein, 2002). Some

studies have shown that even in the face of high rates of smuggling, tax increases bring increased

revenues and reduce cigarette consumption (Mackay et al., 2006; World Bank, 1999). While

smuggling is a serious problem, and while steep differing tax rates between countries are an

incentive to smugglers, the appropriate response to the smuggling problem is not to reduce tax

rates or forego tax increases. Instead, taxes should be increased and governments should be

more vigilant against crime (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001B).

One particular study that looked at reducing tobacco taxes to counter smuggling activity

references Canada' s experience in 1991. The Canadian government cut taxes sharply because

they were experiencing an increase in smuggling activities. As a result of the tax cut, the

prevalence of smoking among the entire population rose as a whole and federal tobacco tax

revenues fell by more than twice as much as predicted (Jha et al. 1999). In South Africa,









tobacco taxes were raised by more than 450% in the 1990's. On average, smuggling activity

rates rose from 0% to 6% during that time and sales fell by 20%. Despite an increase in

smuggling, total tax revenues more than doubled (Jha et al., 1999). In order maintain or even

increase government revenue despite the prevalence of smuggling, the FCTC encourages the

harmonization of cigarette tax rates between neighboring countries and advises governments to

crack down on crime associated with the illicit trade of cigarettes.

Tobacco Advertising Promotion and Sponsorship

The tobacco industry spends billions of dollars per year on advertising, marketing and

promotion. In the United States alone, with less than 5 percent of the world's smokers, tobacco

companies spent over US$8 billion on advertising and promotional expenditures in 1999

(Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001A). The FCTC includes non-price measures to control

tobacco advertising and promotion, since the only form of advertising restrictions in some

countries are voluntarily adopted by the tobacco industry and prove to be ineffective (Bialous

and Shatenstein, 2002). Article 13 of the FCTC details the conditions set on tobacco related

advertising and promotion:

* Each Party...shall undertakett~~~~~ttttt~~~~ a comprehensive ban of all tobacco a th e i i ing. promotion
and sponsorship. This shall include ...a comprehensive ban on cross-border a hei l11 iving.
promotion and sponsorship originating fr~om its territory.
* As a minimum, and in accordance 0I ithr its constitution or constitutionalprinciples, each
Party shall: (a Prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising promotion and sponsorship that
promote a tobacco product by any means that are false, misleading or deceptive or likely
to create erroneous impressions about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or
emissions. (World Health Organization, 2005).


Tobacco advertising is defined as any commercial communication whose main, secondary

or incidental aim or effect is to promote a tobacco brand or to promote tobacco use (FCA, 2001).

Direct and indirect advertising methods include sponsoring sporting events and teams; promoting









rock concerts and discos; placing their brand logos on t-shirts, backpacks and other merchandise

popular with children; branding non-tobacco items with tobacco brands and logos such as

clothing, holidays and contests; and giving away free cigarettes and brand merchandise in areas

where young people gather, such as at rock concerts, discos and shopping malls (Framework

Convention Alliance, 2001B).

It is important for policymakers who are interested in controlling tobacco, while

maintaining government revenue, to know whether cigarette advertising and promotion affect

consumption. Based on the strength of current studies, the World Bank recently concluded that

bans on advertising and promotion prove to be effective, but only if they are comprehensive,

covering all media and all uses of brand names and logos (Jha et al., 1999). There is a strong

debate about the impact of cigarette advertising on consumers. Public health advocates argue

that such advertising increases consumption. The tobacco industry has argued that advertising

does not recruit new smokers, it merely encourages confirmed smokers to stay with, or switch to

a particular brand (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001A). Since empirical studies on the

issue of whether cigarette advertising increases demand have been historically inconclusive,

researchers have turned instead to studying what happens when tobacco advertising and

promotion are banned in order to determine if consumption rises or falls.

A recent study of 22 high income countries based on data from 1970 to 1992 concluded

that comprehensive bans on cigarette advertising can reduce smoking, but partial bans have little

to no effect (Framework Convention Alliance, 2001A). Another study of 102 countries found

that per-capita cigarette consumption in countries with comprehensive (total) declined by about 8

%, while consumption rates in countries with partial bans declined by only 1% ( Framework

Convention Alliance, 2001B).









While many tobacco users generally know that tobacco use is harmful, studies show that

most are unaware of the true risks, even in countries in which there has been a great deal of

publicity about the health hazards of tobacco (Nathan, 2004). In 1999, the World Bank said that,

"People' s knowledge of the health risks of smoking appears to be partial at best, especially in

low- and middle-income countries where information about these hazards is limited." The

FCTC's alliance believes that health warning labels help inform consumers of these dangers and

are an important component in a national health education program at no cost to the government

(Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B). Health warnings labels are now required in the

maj ority of countries and increasingly creative methods are being used to present their messages.

In one of its strongest provisions, Article 11 of the FCTC requires that warning messages should

cover at least 50% of the principal display areas of the package (i.e. both the front and back), but

at a minimum must cover at least 30% of the principal display areas (Mackay et al., 2006). It

also requires that the messages be rotated and encourages the use of pictures and pictograms as

well as the use of non-health messages (e.g. "Quit smoking-- Save money") (World Health

Organization, 2005). Misleading words implying reduced health risk, such as "light" or "mild"

are also prohibited.

The tobacco industry has argued that neither increasing the size of the warning labels nor

the use of pictures will be any more effective than the existing labels in reducing consumption

(Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B). In Poland in the late 1990's, new warning labels that

occupy 30 % of the two largest sides on the cigarette pack were found to be strongly linked with

smoker' s decisions to quit. In Australia, warning labels were strengthened in 1995 and also

proved to have been greater in causing smokers to quit than when the older, less strongly worded

labels were used. In Canada, a survey suggested that half of the smokers intending to quit or cut










back their consumption were motivated by what they had read on their cigarette packs after

warning labels were made more graphic (Jha et al., 1999). One key weakness of warning labels

that is noted by the World Bank is that they will not reach some poorer individuals, particularly

in developing countries since it is common to buy cigarettes singly rather than in packs.

If consumption rates fall dramatically as a result of the FCTC's provisions requiring its

signing Parties to undertake non price measures such as comprehensive bans on all forms of

advertising and requiring stronger warning labels, it is expected that government revenues from

tobacco sales would decrease. Advocates of the FCTC's advertising provisions argue that such

impact on revenue would be gradual, and any losses due to advertising and promotion bans

would be offset by the increase in revenue generated by increasing tobacco tax rates (World

Bank, 1999).

Economically Viable Alternatives to Tobacco

As tobacco is an important cash crop in some countries, Articles 4.6, 17 and the Preamble

of the FCTC urges countries to promote economically viable alternatives for those involved in

tobacco production. The Framework Convention Alliance says that economic incentives can

encourage tobacco farmers and workers involved in cigarette manufacturing and distribution to

shift towards more productive types of employment, improving overall public welfare without

sacrificing livelihoods or creating undue hardship (Mackay et al., 2006):

Article 17

Parties shall, in cooperation 11 ithr each other and as ithr competent international and
regional inter governmental organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically viable
alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and as the case may be, individual sellers.

Article 4.6

The importance of technical and financial assistance to aid the economic transition of
tobacco growers whose livelihoods are seriously affected as a consequence of tobacco
control programs in developing country PartiesPPP~~~~PPP~~~PPP as well as Parties~PPP~~~~PPP~~~PPP 11 irlh economies in









ttrttrttrtranstionrtrt~t~ should be recognized and addressed in the context of nationally developed
strategies for sustainable development.

Preamble:

M~indjid of the social and economic difficulties that tobacco control programs may
engender in the medium and long term in some developing countries and countries nI irlh
economies in transtion,~r~rt~r~rt~r~rt~ and recognizing their need for technical and financial assistance
in the context of nationally developed strategies for sustainable development.

Tobacco is grown in over 120 countries, of which about 80 are developing countries.

Globally, tobacco production has doubled since the 1960's, totaling 6.5 million metric tons in

2004 (Mackay et al., 2006). In developing countries, increasing demand and favorable policies

have resulted in a threefold increase in production, while production has declined by more than

50% in developed countries. Four countries account for two-thirds of the total global

production: China was responsible for 42 % of all tobacco grown, with the U.S., India, and

Brazil producing 24% between them. Assessing the way falling demand will affect tobacco

farming communities is critical for countries that want to become Party to the FCTC. Studies in

most high income countries suggest tobacco growing areas have been diversifying and making

successful economic adjustments for decades (Jha et al., 1999). The Framework Convention

Alliance believes that countries should take measures at the national level to explore alternatives

to tobacco crops, encourage diversification and develop mechanisms to promote alternative

livelihoods. They argue that similar substitution programs have been supported by governments

for other products. The success and impact of crop diversification in developing countries has

not been thoroughly established.

Another risk in encouraging alternatives to tobacco agriculture, manufacturing and

production is governments' fear of creating unemployment. This fear is mainly derived from the

arguments of the tobacco industry, which say that control measures will result in millions of job

losses around the world (Framework Convention Alliance, n.dA). For all but a very few agrarian









countries heavily dependent on tobacco farming, such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, the World

Bank argues that that there would be no net loss of jobs, and there might be job gains if global

tobacco consumption fell. This is because money once spent on tobacco would be spent on other

goods and services, thereby generating more jobs. It is predicted that even the few tobacco

dependent economies will have a market big enough to ensure their j obs for many years, even in

the face of gradually declining demand because with the numbers of smokers set to rise, this

process will occur over many decades. (Ranson et al., 1999).

Big Tobacco and the FCTC

The tobacco industry was against a strong, legally binding FCTC, and originally felt that

"The WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [was] fundamentally flawed and

[would] not achieve its objectives" (British American Tobacco, 2000). For most TTC's, the

FCTC "represents an unprecedented challenge to the tobacco industry's freedom to continue

doing business," as noted in a BAT industry document proposing a broad strategy to confront the

WHO (World Health Organization, 2000). Several tobacco industry documents detail the

industry's anticipation and concern over the implementation of the FCTC:

Now that the World Health assembly has conducted and approved the process to proceed
with the drafting of the [FCTC] and the accompanying protocols, it is timely that we now
take stock and draw up a strategy and action for the coming year (World Health
Organization, 2000).


BAT and PMI say that they support the FCTC's attempts to regulate tobacco

internationally. A BAT industry document says that they "Accept that tobacco should be

regulated, but are in favor of sensible regulation, and feel that FCTC is a one-size-fits-all

approach and needs to be looked at more nationally, [Since] what may work in one country may

not work in another country" ( World Health Organization, 2000). According to Phillip Morris'

website, their position on the FCTC is a positive one:









The FCTC marks a big step forward because it sets global standards for tobacco control
measures. We hope it will encourage more governments to move towards comprehensive
tobacco regulation that is, a regulatory framework where fiscal policy, consumer
information, licensing and other measures complement each other. Above all, the FCTC is
an opportunity to take a fresh look at tobacco regulation, to ask what measures are most
likely to reduce the harm done by smoking and to combine those measures into effective
regulatory regimes (Phillip Morris International, n.d).

In 2000, the WHO released a report detailing the tobacco industry's tactics in obstructing

tobacco control policy processes. The report found that the tobacco companies spent vast

amounts of money diverting attention away from the public health issues raised by tobacco use,

attempted to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy activities carried out by the WHO and

sought to foster views that WHO's tobacco control programs were a "First World" agenda

carried out at the expense of the developing world (Framework Convention Alliance, n.dA). It

has also been noted that the tobacco industry has interfered in the implementation process in

countries who were already Parties to the FCTC. Three weeks after Mexico ratified the FCTC,

both Phillip Morris and BAT conducted private negotiations with the Ministry of Health that led

to an agreement that prevented the government from raising taxes if the tobacco companies

would, in return, fund certain unrelated health programs. That agreement led to the defeat of

numerous tobacco control regulations, including tax increases and an advertising ban called for

by the treaty. After international uproar about the agreement between the industry and the

Ministry of Health erupted, Congress successfully passed annual tobacco tax increases through

2009 (Sebrei, 2006).

Industry documents also show Philip Morris/Altria profied regions to determine which

countries would support the treaty, and would be susceptible to industry influence:

Clearly, there is a marked contrast between those end markets that have capability to act
(Argentina, China, Germany)...and the big players that [will] be a priority (Brazil,
Germany. Japan). We may want to put some thought to establishing a core group of
managers from around the world to target these countries. More sniper, less scatter gun
(Bialous and Shatenstein, 2002).









In light of the evidence that the tobacco industry was prepared to strategize against the

ratification and implementation of the FCTC, the WHO included provisions to provide

governments with the support of the international community to stand up to interference from the

tobacco industry. The FCTC's Preamble, Article 12(e), Article 20.4(c) and Article 5.3 each

mention the responsibility of the Parties to protect tobacco control measures from the tobacco

industry. Article 5.3 of the FCTC states that;

In setting and insplententing their public health policies 1 1 ithr respect to tobacco control,
Parties shall act to protect these policies fions conanercial and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry in accordance 11 ithr national law (World Health Organization, 2005).

Recognizing the need to be alert to any efforts by the tobacco industry to undermine or
subvert tobacco control efforts and the need to be informed of activities of the tobacco
industry that have a negative impact on tobacco control efforts (World Health
Organization, 2005).

Each Party shall cooperate 11 ithr competent international organizations to progressively
establish and maintain a global system to regularly collect and disseminate information on
tobacco production, manufacture and the activities of the tobacco industry which have an
impact on the Convention or national tobacco control activities (World Health
Organization, 2005).

Conclusion

Chapter 3 introduced the FCTC and described its legality, provisions, and context within

the international legal system. Most importantly, Chapter 3 laid out those FCTC provisions

deemed most controversial in terms of the economic impact they would have on the FCTC's

signing Parties: increasing tobacco price and taxes, tobacco advertising and sponsorship and

support for economically viable alternatives to tobacco. Analysis by health economists

concluded in most cases that the FCTC will not harm national economies, even those of tobacco

growing nations, especially as the FCTC deals primarily with demand reduction strategies,

except for the control of smuggling. Much of the evidence supporting the FCTC's tobacco

control measures is from high income countries. For developing countries, where the FCTC's









economic implications are of most interest, only theoretical implications have been made. The

next chapter looks at the economic impact of FCTC's provisions in a developing country-

specific setting. Using Brazil's experience in ratifying and implementing FCTC's tobacco

control measures will help to determine if a developing country with strong interests in tobacco

can enact strong anti-tobacco measures to improve health without hurting their economy.









CHAPTER 4
TOBACCO CONTROL IN BRAZIL

Brazil has established itself as a global leader in tobacco control. Brazil's legislation

controlling tobacco has been praised for its strength, comprehensiveness and integration of

measures at the national, state and municipal levels (Blanke and Silva, 2004). Strikingly, Brazil

has achieved these results even though tobacco plays an important role in its economy. Brazil

has a population of 186 million living in more than 5500 municipalities located in 26 states, and

the capital, the Federal District of Brasilia. With over 750,000 tobacco growers, Brazil is the

world's largest tobacco leaf exporter, third largest tobacco producer and eighth largest cigarette

exporter (Blanke and Silva, 2004)

The primary goal for this chapter is to examine Brazil's tobacco control policies and

determine whether those policies were detrimental to the economy to date. This assessment will

require a discussion about tobacco control policies prior to the FCTC, the FCTC's ratification in

Brazil, enforcement of those policies, and most importantly, whether those policies actually

decreased tobacco consumption amongst the Brazilian population. It is important to note that

although Brazil did not ratify the FCTC until 2005, tobacco control policies were already in sync

with a majority of the FCTC's provisions. Effects of tobacco control policies on Brazil's

economy can be interpreted as strong indicators of the FCTC's effects on the economy of a

developing country.

First, this chapter discusses the tobacco economy in Brazil. Next, it reviews Brazil's

tobacco control policies before it became a party to the FCTC. This includes a discussion about

tobacco regulations that were put in place during the 1990s when Brazilians were becoming

increasingly concerned with the health effects of tobacco. Third, a discussion about Brazil's

ratification of the FCTC and the obstacles that public health officials encountered while the









Treaty was being debated in the Senate. Lastly, this chapter will examine several studies

assessing Brazil's efforts in finding economically viable alternatives to tobacco farming, its

experiences with regard to tobacco tax revenues despite decreases in consumption, and its

struggle with the illegal trade of tobacco products.

Brazil's Tobacco Economy

Brazilian cigarette manufacturing began in 1903 in Rio de Janeiro with the founding of

Souza Cruz, the country's first tobacco company. Souza Cruz became a subsidiary of British

American Tobacco (BAT) in 1914, and BAT currently owns 75% of the company. Plantations

established in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana in the 1920s

and 1930s introduced Virginia and Burley tobacco varieties in the 1950s. In the 1980s, Brazil's

tobacco processing facilities were modernized and a genetically manipulated strain of high

nicotine tobacco was smuggled into the country by BAT's North American subsidiary, Brown

and Williamson Tobacco, which increased demand for Brazilian tobacco. The cigarette export

sector expanded rapidly and by 1994, Brazil was the world's third largest tobacco producer (after

China, USA, and India), the world's top exporter of tobacco leaf, and the world's eighth largest

cigarette exporter (Shafey et al., 2002).

In 2002, Souza Cruz was Brazil's fourth largest company, controlling 84% of the legitimate

domestic cigarette market, employing 5046 people, and reporting profits of more than US$253

million on sales of US$1.044 billion in 2000. Philip Morris Intemnational dominates the

remainder of Brazil's cigarette market (Vargas and Campos, 2005).

Currently, Brazil is the biggest tobacco exporter and the third largest tobacco producer in

the world (Vargas and Campos, 2005). In 2000 it produced 595,000 metric tons of tobacco

leaves and exported 341,000 tons which brought in US$ 961.2 million in revenues (Vargas and

Campos, 2005). The position reached by Brazil in the world tobacco leaf marketplace can be









attributable to: (1) the comparatively low cost of production, resulting mainly from the

employment of tobacco growers and their families, which means less spending on salaries, (2)

the integrated production system, involving contracts directly between farmers and the industry

and (3) the high quality of the tobacco produced in Brazil (Vargas and Campos, 2005). With

regard to opportunities for the Brazilian tobacco in the international market, a combination of

circumstances, such as the decrease of world stocks and the reduction of tobacco production in

Zimbabwe and in the U.S. have helped Brazil maintain its position as the biggest world exporter

(National Cancer Institute of Brazil, 2002).

Tobacco represents an important source of permanent jobs. The tobacco industry has

argued that enacting tobacco control policies will result in million of job losses in Brazil. The

Brazilian Tobacco Grower' s Association (AFUBRA) claims that there are approximately 1.5

million people working in a tobacco related sector. There are no government studies that support

or even come close to these estimates. Surveys carried out by the Brazilian Institute of

Geography and Statistics (IBGE) indicate that AFUBRA significantly overestimates the number

of workers associated both directly and indirectly with the tobacco industry. In IBGE' s

comparative analysis of the total number of people employed in the production, distribution,

manufacturing and all other activities associated with tobacco between 1996 and 2000 they

concluded that the maximum number persons working in tobacco were less that one million

(Iglesias and Nicolau, 2005). Whatever the numbers, it is clear that the tobacco industry is

important to the Brazilian economy. The amount j obs that the industry provides is often skewed

by the TTC's in order to strengthen the argument that tobacco control policies will have a

negative effect on the economy.









Tobacco Control before the FCTC

The first time the Brazilian people were officially given information about the health

effects of tobacco came in 1987, when the Ministry of Health established an Advisory Board on

Tobacco Use Control. Three years later, and inspired by U.S. actions, Brazil's Ministry of

Health issued Ruling No. 490, which recommended that smoking be restricted in indoor public

places, that tobacco advertising should be regulated, and that tobacco companies include health

warnings on all tobacco product packaging and advertisements was mandatory (Cavalcante,

2004). Health warning labels were to be written clearly, in contrasting colors and would read

"The M~inistry of Health Advises: Smoking causes damaddd~~~~~ddddd~~~~ge to health" (Blanke and Silva, 2004).

Public campaigns against tobacco grew in importance as tobacco's harmful side effects became

known, and radio and TV campaigns discussing the effects of secondhand smoke began

changing public perceptions on smoking.

In 1989, the Brazilian National Cancer Institute (Instituto Nacional de Ccincer) (INCA),

under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, started the National Tobacco Control Program

(NTCP). The NTCP sought to strengthen regulations on cigarette health warnings. In 1994,

NTCP proposed a bill banning all direct and indirect advertising and promotion of tobacco

products and required stricter health warning labels. When the proposed bill arrived in congress,

an intense debate about its constitutionality broke out between the government and the tobacco

industry and its allies, which included advertising professionals and representatives of television

and radio advertisers (Cavalcante, 2003). The industry and its allies argued that the bill violated

their corporate freedom of expression. Tobacco control advocates welcomed this debate because

they felt it provided additional publicity about the harmful effects of smoking (Silva, 2003). The


6 Portuguese Cigarette Pack Health Warning: "O Ministerio de Sazide 41erta: Fwnar Faz Mau a Sazide "









outcome of this debate was relatively weak legislation that restricted tobacco advertising

between the hours of 9pm and 6pm and included less assertive warnings on cigarette packs.

Tobacco control measures in the early 1990's were not as strong as public health advocates

would have liked, but studies show that these measures did have an impact on cigarette

consumption (Silva et al., 1999). Decreases in real cigarette prices in 1990-1991 because of high

inflation rates and between 1992 and 1994 should have led to an increase in consumption, but it

actually fell in the late 1980's and early 1990's. This suggests that the usual effects of lower

prices was counteracted by other factors such as health warnings on cigarette packs, limits on

indoor smoking and restrictions on tobacco advertising (Silva et al., 1999).

In 1999, the creation of a regulatory agency represented a landmark in tobacco control for

Brazil. The National Health Surveillance Agency (Agdncia Nacional de Vigilcincia Sanitaria),

ANVISA, was set up in order to regulate and enforce laws that restricted tobacco packaging and

advertisements. In 2000, the Senate passed a tobacco advertising ban, covering ads on

television, radio, newspapers, magazines, outdoor billboards and merchandising. The new law

also prohibited tobacco sponsorship of sports and cultural events, with a two year grace period to

end all sponsorship contracts (Blanke and Silva, 2004). Both tobacco growers and

manufacturers alleged that such measures would promote a negative social and economic impact

to the tobacco industry (US Department of Agriculture, 2007). ANVISA Resolution No.46

(2001) made Brazil the first country in the world to prohibit the use of any labeling or

advertising of tobacco products as "mild" "light" or "low tar." In 2006, the U.S. passed the same

law restricting the use of those same terms. Table 4. 1 lists ANVISA' s tobacco control

regulations in recent years.










Table 4-1. Recent Brazilian tobacco regulations
Federal Tobacco Legislation Year Tobacco Control Provision
Resolution 46 2001 Banned the use of the terms "light" "mild" and "low
tar" in labeling of cigarette packs.
Resolution 104 2001 Mandated the insertion of images and warnings that
must cover 100% of one of the largest surfaces on
each tobacco product.
Resolution 302 2002 Banned sales of food and packages promoting tobacco
products .
Resolution 14 2003 Banned the use of sentences like "only for adults" and
replaced them with: "Prohibits sales to all persons
under eighteen."
Resolution 15 2003 Bans online sales and advertisements: Prohibits
Advertisements in newspapers, magazines, internet
and national events.
Resolution 335 2003 Called for more aggressive and graphic images and
messages to be printed images obtained from real
patients
In addition to the provisions detailed in Figure 4. 1, the beginnings of the FCTC negotiation

process and the Brazilian government's involvement with the FCTC negotiations reflected

further strengthened political will to regulate tobacco (Cavalcante, 2003). In 2003, Resolution

335 called for even stricter and more graphic warning labels. Today, warning labels in Brazil are

extremely graphic. The images consist of patients with amputated limbs, photos of actual

smokers' lungs, and fetuses affected by smoking. The most recent images play on the fact that

smoking can cause impotence. A survey conducted shortly after Resolution 335 was passed

found that these images caused 67% of smokers to think about quitting smoking and caused 54%

to change their opinions about the health effects of smoking (Blanke and Silva, 2004). The

tobacco industry, perceiving these changes in social perception as a threat to the well being of

the industry, began obscuring the warnings by inserting pamphlets similar in size to the warning

labels between the cigarette pack and the wrapping film. By doing this, warning labels were

hidden within the pamphlet and would easily fall out of the pack once the consumer opened the

product. As the agency responsible for enforcing resolutions on tobacco packaging, ANVISA










imposed fines on Philip Morris and British American Tobacco for violating mandatory health

warning regulations (ANVISA, n.d).

Aside from laws banning advertising and promoting health warnings, the Brazilian

government also passed a resolution forbidding the Central Bank of Brazil from issuing loans for

tobacco production in partnership or association with the tobacco industry. This decision took

place after the Brazilian government discovered that resources allocated to the National Program

for the Strengthening of Family Farming (PRONAF) were being used to subsidize tobacco crops

because of the intervention by tobacco companies (National Cancer Institute of Brazil, 2004).

Although the government' s intentions were not aimed at restricting tobacco loans to improve

health, it was a decision that restricted tobacco in general and brought into question the integrity

of the TTC's operating in Brazil.

These national measures illustrate Brazil's early commitments to tobacco control, even

before the FCTC negotiations began. Although most of the regulation was adopted before the

FCTC came into force, most Brazilian tobacco regulations were already in accordance with the

FCTC provisions.

Brazil and the FCTC

After having played an important role in the negotiations of the FCTC, Brazil was the

second country to sign on the first day it was available for signature. The Brazilian Congress

began reviewing the FCTC text on August 27, 2003, after its official presentation to the House of

Representatives by the Minister of Health. Having been granted the rank of highest priority, the

issue did not have to be considered by a Special House Committee and its ratification was

approved on May 13, 2004 and sent to the Senate. A move to give the FCTC priority was halted

at the request of a Senator who represented the Southemn region where a maj ority of Brazil's

tobacco is grown. The Senator said his request was based on the desire to carefully consider the









situation of the tobacco growers. Controversy arose over the Senator' s concerns because he was

linked with officials from the Brazilian Tobacco Industry Association (AFUBRA), a high

ranking member organization of the International Tobacco Grower' s Association (ITGA). ITGA

and its member organizations have notoriously been linked with and influenced by the TTC's in

various countries (Bialous, 2004).

Ratification of the FCTC was put on hold while the Senate called public hearings on the

economic impact of tobacco control policies. At the same time, AFUBRA launched surveys on

its website, which asked peoples' opinions on "WHO's proposal to eradicate tobacco." Even

though the FCTC does not prohibit countries from planting tobacco, neither does it force

countries to replace tobacco growing with alternative crops (National Cancer Institute of Brazil,

2004). AFUBRA also ran advertisements and generated press reports supporting its stance

against Brazil's ratification of the FCTC in regional and national news media, emphasizing that

the economic benefits of tobacco and the "eradication" of tobacco would cause millions of job

losses and prompt a "mass rural exodus" in addition to billions of dollars in lost government

revenue (Bialous, 2004).

In August 2004, the Senate issued its opinion in favor of ratification. A tobacco industry

dominated chamber under the Ministry of Agriculture called for delaying the decision until after

municipal elections were held during the following October. Despite the efforts of governmental

and non-govemnmental groups to clarify that ratification would not mean an immediate end to

tobacco production, ratification was postponed with no new date set for reconsideration. The

industry's assertions that maj or economic loss and social unrest would follow ratification of the

FCTC made headlines in Brazil and were effective in postponing FCTC discussions.

Organizations such as National Cancer Institute (INTCA) and the National Tobacco Program










(NTCP) worked hard to counter and dispel what they called misinformation about the FCTC's

provisions.

It was important for public health advocates to attract attention to the issue because if

Brazil failed to ratify the FCTC, a message of inconsistency would be sent to the international

community, since Brazil had a leading role during the whole negotiation process. The medical

community played an important role in the struggle to approve the FCTC, sending letters to each

senator, asking for their support of its approval. In addition, public health advocates participated

in public pro-FCTC hearing held in tobacco growing communities. After two years of

negotiation in the Senate, on November 3, 2005, the Brazilian government finally ratified the

FCTC.

Impact of Control Measures

The impact of Brazil's tobacco control legislation remains difficult to measure. Although

direct evidence is not available to attribute changes in cigarette consumption to specific laws and

programs, few observers doubt that Brazil's laws are important factors in reducing consumption.

Indirect evidence of Brazil's success or failure in reducing tobacco consumption can be deduced

based on: (1) comparisons between the prevalence of smoking in large Brazilian cities, (2) the

declining cigarette sales in the country. The only national survey on smoking available that can

be used for comparison with present consumption rates was carried out in a 1989 national

household survey conducted by the Ministry of Health. In 2003, the World Health Survey

carried out by the WHO used similar variables, cluster sampling procedures and applied them to

all Brazilian households. The 1989 survey used two questions to evaluate smoking: (1) "Do you

smoke cigarettes, a pipe or cigars?" and (2) "How much do you smoke per day?" The 2003

survey also asked similar questions: (1) "Do you currently smoke any tobacco product?" (2) "If

yes, what amount?" More current studies based on these comparative household surveys









conclude that smoking prevalence in Brazil has decreased significantly between 1990 and 2004.

The most comprehensive study on the subj ect, published by the WHO, is Monteiro et al.'s

"Population based evidence of a strong decline in the prevalence of smokers in Brazil that

concluded that smoking prevalence dropped from 34.8% in 1989 to 22.4% in 2003, a decrease of

approximately 35% over 14 years (Monteiro et al., 2007). This particular study attributes the

decline to: (1) A concentration of efforts on behalf of the Brazilian government' s NTCP, and (2)

The total ban on cigarette advertising and promotion.

Although cigarette consumption is still high, the 22.4% prevalence places Brazil in a

favorable position in relation to other countries undergoing economic transition. In the

Americas, the percentage of smokers in Brazil is closer to that of the U. S. (20.8% in 2004) and

Canada (20% in 2005) than to that of other Latin American countries such as Mexico (34.8% in

1998), Cuba (37.2% in 1995), or Argentina (40.4% in 2000) (Monteiro et al., 2007).

Tobacco Farming in Brazil

Recognizing the impact that a drop in consumption will have on the long term production

demand, governments who are party to the FCTC search for economically viable alternatives for

tobacco growers. Tobacco production and processing are very important economic activities in

the southern states of Brazil where the hilly terrain in conducive to growing tobacco. Rio

Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Parana account for almost 90% of the land devoted to tobacco

farming and for 93% of the tobacco produced in the country. According to the Brazilian

Tobacco Growers Association (AFUBRA), more than 600 districts and almost 160,000 growers,

mainly small landowners, are involved in growing tobacco in these states. Although there is an

increasing will to stop planting tobacco, particularly by tobacco farmers from the Southern

region, a 2002 survey showed that 74.7% of tobacco growers in the South want to stop growing

tobacco, but feel lack of support from the government in doing so (Etges et al., 2002).









Evidence of economically viable alternatives to tobacco growing is scarce, so many

countries are hesitant to even consider large scale transitions away from tobacco. Most studies

only theorize on the impacts that such transitions would have on local and national economies.

In Brazil, there has been one maj or study that examines the economic impact of tobacco control

policies that encourage the substitution of tobacco crops. Crop Substitution and'Diversification

Strategies: Empirical Evidence from Selected Brazilian M~unicipalities, by M.A. Vargas and R.

Campos was commissioned in 2004 by the World Bank and analyzes three selected experiences

of diversification and crop substitution in the South of Brazil. This study concluded that there

are viable alternatives for tobacco crops, which have provided equivalent net returns and more

sustainable livelihoods (Vargas and Campos, 2005). Despite obstacles, the case studies

demonstrate that specific development programs, placed within broader rural development

programs make it possible to switch from tobacco to alternative crops, even in regions that are

heavily reliant on tobacco. Also, the three case studies show that efforts to foster crop

substitution have been linked with identification of new market channels and opportunities for

adding more value to alternative food crops (Vargas and Campos, 2005, 7).

Vargas and Campos' study focused on the municipalities of Santa Cruz do Sul, Schroeder

and Santa Rosa de Lima. Santa Cruz do Sul, also referred to as "The Brazilian Capital of

Tobacco" is an important area for the Brazilian tobacco industry because of its network of small

family farms that are closely linked to TTC's. Most municipalities surrounding the area of Santa

Cruz do Sul are significantly dependent on activities associated with the tobacco industry.

During the 1990s, the region became highly vulnerable to the competitive pressures that came

about when the TTC's began increasing tobacco production in other developing countries. The

modernization of tobacco plants that came about as a result of that increased competition resulted









in drastic job losses. Several initiatives to diversify from tobacco began taking place soon after.

The Center of Assistance for Small Farmers (CAPA) played a key role in assisting farmers in

selling "agro-ecological products" that included vegetables, rice and erva-mate (Brazilian tea).

The average annual income from tobacco per family had been estimated at US$ 1,181 compared

to $US 4,684 estimated for families associated with CAPA initiatives (Vargas and Campos,

2005). Another pilot proj ect in this area, the Association of Brazilian Fish Farmers (Braspeixe)

was supported by the municipal Secretary of Agriculture, the State Government and the

University of Santa Cruz do Sul. Although this project is still in its first stages, Vargas and

Campos say that the proj ect has already created 50 reservoirs representing 20 small farms and

intends to serve as a model for diversification away from tobacco.

In the state of Santa Catarina, both the municipalities of Schroeder and Santa Rosa de

Lima were less reliant on income from tobacco growing activities than in Santa Cruz do Sul. In

these areas, the success of crop substitution initiatives were aided by the existence of favorable

conditions for growing alternative crops. In Schroeder, tobacco was phased out gradually and

has not been grown since 2001. Farmers in this municipality were dissatisfied with their

dependence on tobacco and its dwindling revenues. Ninety two growers got together and formed

the Banana Producer's Association of Schroeder (AB S) and slowly diversified away from

tobacco. The gross income per hectare was approximately US$2700 for bananas, a considerably

higher net income than they had experienced when growing tobacco, although figures were not

given (Vargas and Campos, 2005). In Santa Rosa de Lima, tobacco was attractive for its

profitability and for providing financial security to farmers because sales were guaranteed. In

the mid 1990s government restrictions on agricultural benefits for tobacco products and the

volatility of the tobacco market resulted in revenue loss by producers and led many of them to










give up tobacco production. The Federal University and the State's government agency for

agricultural research and rural extension services (EPAGRI) came together to support tobacco

transition towards organic food crops. The Brazilian National Agency for Small Business

(SEBRAE) also helped cover farmers' training costs. In this municipality, the value of

agricultural production for tobacco decreased from 82. 17% in 1994 to 64.68% in 2002 (Vargas

and Campos, 2005). The 17.49% difference was substituted successfully with organic food

production.

Although Vargas and Campos' results were favorable and indicate that tobacco control

policies that encourage crop diversification, as stated by FCTC Article 17, three significant

barriers remain: 1) farmers' financial dependence on tobacco companies, 2) public policies to

support the tobacco industry and 3) the high profitability from tobacco crops, especially when

compared with other traditional food crops (Vargas and Campos, 2005).

The most significant barrier to crop diversification is farmers' financial dependence on

tobacco companies. Brazilian tobacco farming involves an integrated production system where

contractual obligations between small farmers and TTC's exists. Within this system, TTC's

provide all inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation systems and guarantee the

purchase of each farmer' s entire tobacco crop. In exchange, farmers are bound to selling the

crop for whatever price the TTC demands. This system allows TTC's to assume complete

control over the tobacco value chain at local levels (Vargas and Campos, 2001). Vargas and

Campos explain that this system has become a strong mechanism to increase farmers'

dependence on tobacco companies. Vargas and Campos' second barrier to successful crop are

the public policies that presently support the tobacco industry. Since tobacco growing in Brazil

is concentrated in several specific regions in the South that are much more heavily dependent on









tobacco than the country as a whole, the "political weight" of tobacco in the regional economy

does not leave much room for policies that encourage crop substitution (Vargas and Campos,

2005, 9). For example, the state government of Rio Grande do Sul created a program

specifically focused on the development of the tobacco industry during the 1990s. This kind of

program is what allowed BAT subsidiary, Souza Cruz to take advantage of tobacco tax revenues

and use them to build a US$900 million processing plant (Vargas and Campos, 2005). These

existing tax benefits for the TTC's will remain in place at least until tobacco control becomes a

larger political issue. The third barrier to diversifying away from tobacco in the South of Brazil,

according to Vargas and Campos, is the tobacco crop's high profitability. Although the

profitability of tobacco farming has fallen during recent years, tobacco remains a highly

attractive crop to small family farmers, providing higher income per unit than other crops

(Curbing, 1999). The costs of tobacco production are five times higher than the costs associated

with corn, and six times higher than those associated with bean production (AFUBRA, n.d). A

study by Silva (2002) points out that the cost of land, a maj or operational cost is not taken into

account for these AFUBRA figures.

Despite the obstacles, the case studies in Vargas and Campos report demonstrated

diversification programs could make switching from tobacco to alternative crops viable, even in

areas that are heavily dependent on tobacco. More importantly, these cases show the Brazilian

government taking action to assist their farmers in finding economically viable alternatives to

tobacco farming. These efforts by the government were documented before Brazil ratified the

FCTC and agreed to foster this sort of diversification.

Tobacco Taxes and Government Revenue

Tobacco is an important source of government revenue in Brazil, since tobacco products

are considered luxury items and have a heavy tax burden. Parties to the FCTC commit to raise









tobacco taxes to at least the rate of growth of incomes, and considerably ahead of inflation

(FCTC Article 6). But, governments are often hesitant to increase tobacco taxes because they

believe it reduces consumption and in turn decreases government revenues. Because the demand

for cigarettes is inelastic, an increase in tax or price results in an increase in revenue. This

section documents Brazil's tobacco tax policies over the past decade and explains the

relationship between those policies and their effects on the illegal cigarette trade.

R. Iglesias and J. Nicolau' s 2006 report, A Economia do Controle do Tabaco nos Paises do

M~ercosul e Associados is the most recent and comprehensive study on the effect of tobacco tax

increases on government revenue and smuggling in Brazil. Iglesias and Nicolau point out that,

although the Brazilian government has followed the advice of the World Bank in many aspects

of tobacco control, its history of tobacco taxation has not always followed the prescription given

by the FCTC to raise cigarette taxes in order to discourage consumption. There are three key

issues that the Brazilian government must keep in mind: 1) Cigarette prices and consumption

show opposite trends; If prices and taxes are raised, per capital consumption will decline; 2) A

decrease in consumption as a result of higher prices will not generate losses in government

revenue; and 3) Higher prices and taxes increase smuggling activity. The contradictory nature

of these issues make it difficult to adopt a sound tobacco tax policy.

During the 1990s, before the threat of smuggling became a reality in Brazil, the

government increased tobacco taxes in order to discourage consumption. Cigarette IPI taxes, a

tax on manufactured goods, were doubled from 15% to 30%. The price measures in combination

with non price measures, such as advertising bans and health restrictions reduced cigarette

consumption and increased government tobacco tax revenues. In 1999, the IPI taxation system

was altered, reducing the effectiveness of IPI taxation on cigarettes. When compared with the










early 1990s, tobacco prices and tax revenues are less today than they were during that time. As a

result, between 1996 and 2003 government revenue from tobacco taxes decreased from US$ 2.9

billion to US$ 648 million. Iglesias and Nicolau found that the price elasticity of demand for

Brazilian cigarettes is 0.42, meaning that increasing prices or tax on cigarettes by 10% would

generate a 4.2% decrease in consumption. Given the low price elasticity, a tobacco tax increase

would actually increase government tobacco tax revenue. Iglesias and Nicolau conclude that the

Brazilian government should revert back to the same tax policies used during the 1990s in order

to regain government tobacco tax revenue.

In a study by Guindon et al., 2002 Trends and affordability of cigarette prices, data from

Brazil indicated that there is ample room to increase tobacco prices through taxation, since Brazil

is a country with one of the lowest cigarette prices (Figure 4.2). Guindon et al. found that

cigarette prices have failed to keep up with increases in the general price level

of goods and services, rendering them more affordable in 2000 than they were at the beginning

of the decade. Opportunities to increase government revenue and improve health through

reduced consumption brought about by higher prices have been overlooked in Brazil.

Iglesias and Nicolau say that tobacco price and tax increases have not been overlooked, but

avoided in Brazil for two reasons 1) Non price measures have been successful in reducing

cigarette consumption among the population, and 2) the Brazilian government fears that raising

prices will further exacerbate cigarette smuggling.

Smuggling

Cigarette smuggling is a widespread problem undermining tobacco control efforts by

providing cheap unregulated cigarettes that stimulate demand while simultaneously decreasing

tax revenues needed for tobacco control and health promotion. Globally, smuggled cigarettes are











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Internal Revenue Service (SRF) believes that Brazil's smuggling problem is due to taxation

differences between Brazil and neighbor countries. In Brazil, cigarettes taxes are 73.3% of the

price, whereas in Argentina it is 67%, Uruguay, 67%, and Paraguay, 13% (Food and Agriculture

Organization, 2003). The illegal market can sell cigarettes cheaper than in the formal market.

While the average price in the formal market is US$ 0.46, in the illegal market it is US$ 0.30

(Food and Agriculture Administration, 2003). These illegal cigarettes now represent 34% of the

volume of cigarettes sold per year, jumping from 5 percent of the market in 1991 and 20 percent

in 1995. According to the Brazil-U.S. business council, Brazil would net $500 million a year in

lost cigarette tax revenue if counterfeiting were eliminated.

The table below shows the evolution of the Brazilian cigarette market, according to the

Nielsen/IDS survey. The table indicates that between 1991 and 2004, total sales of cigarettes

have fallen, while smuggled (unfair competition) cigarettes have steadily increased.

Brazil's commitment to the FCTC and its provisions against smuggling will hopefully

encourage the government to monitor smuggling routes more closely, set up a tracking system to

detect counterfeit cigarettes, and punish those involved in illicit border trade.

Table 4-2. Brazilian cigarette market (billion units)
Year Legal sales Illegal sales Total sales Percentage of total
illegal sales
1991 148 9 157 5.1%
1992 123 6 129 4.6%
1993 115 15 130 11.5%
1994 105 24 129 18.6%
1995 116 28 144 19.4%
1996 115 36 151 23.8%
1997 108 44 152 28.9%
1998 91 56 147 38.1%
1999 97 45 142 31.7%
2000 95 47 142 33.1%
2001 100 51 151 33.8%
2002 96 46 142 32.4%
2003 92 41 133 30.1%
2004 92 41 133 30.1%
Source: USDA 2004









Conclusion

Chapter 4 laid out the history of tobacco control in Brazil. More importantly, this chapter

examined the economics of tobacco control in Brazil over the past decade. Brazil's efforts to

Eight the tobacco epidemic yielded important results early on: annual per capital cigarette

consumption decreased 35% between 1989 and 2004. These outcomes are unprecedented for a

developing country with strong economic interests in tobacco. This chapter exposed the realities

of a developing country's struggle to Eight the tobacco epidemic while trying to lessen the burden

that a decrease in tobacco consumption may have over its citizens.

The concept that there is nothing as profitable as tobacco no longer makes any sense.

There are several examples in the South of Brazil where local society initiatives got organized to

search for economically feasible alternatives and were successful. Vargas and Campos detailed

the practices of tobacco growing municipalities that were successful in finding economically

viable alternatives to tobacco farming.

Although Brazil's tobacco tax policies are not those prescribed by the FCTC, Brazil's case

does serve two important lessons: Decreasing tobacco taxes seems to promote smuggling, but

does not guarantee stability in government revenue. Iglesias and Nicolau's study points out the

opposite: government revenues from tobacco taxes have decreased since the government

decreased IPI taxes in 1999. Before 1999, government revenues from tobacco taxes had been

increasing as a result of the IPI tax increases in the early 1990s.

The most difficult barrier to achieving a successful tobacco control agenda are the realities

of cigarette smuggling. There is an overwhelming consensus among scholars that tobacco

control policies in Brazil have proven to be effective in reducing cigarette consumption. The

illegal cigarette market severely undermines tobacco control efforts because there is no way to









control the market. Iglesias et al (2006) says that the main weakness in Brazil's tobacco control

policies to date is the lack of effective measures to address and control the cigarette smuggling.









CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The questions posed at the beginning of this study dealing with whether and how tobacco

products should be regulated internationally have been studied in depth by scholars and

international organizations. Consensus among these parties that tobacco is dangerous and should

be regulated, coupled with the fact that developing countries are increasingly carrying the burden

of the tobacco epidemic shaped a new question for this study: What are the economic

consequences of implementing tobacco control policies in a developing country? This study

found that, although trade advocates and the tobacco industry have argued that regulating

tobacco internationally through the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on

Tobacco Control would be detrimental to the economies of developing countries, improved

public health and economic stability can be achieved simultaneously. This study used Brazil's

experiences implementing the WHO's FCTC to provide a lens through which the politics and

economics of implementing tobacco control policies in a developing country could be better

understood.

Main Findings

The main finding of this study was that implementing tobacco control policies such as

those proposed by the FCTC would not hurt the economies of countries that became Parties to

and enforced those measures. This study is intended as a starting point for countries to

understand the positive outcomes that can result from becoming a Party of the FCTC. The

Brazilian case, while unique and only in its second year of officially implementing the Treaty,

offers positive results for both health advocates and those concerned with the country's

economic well being. Each chapter of this study contributed to laying out the path to which

international tobacco regulation has become a reality.









Development of International Tobacco Control

The main finding concerning the history of the development of tobacco control was that, at

present, the trade regime is perhaps not the appropriate realm that should be used to regulate

tobacco internationally. The inherent principles behind free trade, the conflict between public

health advocates and trade advocates and an analysis of the outcome for Thailand' s tobacco trade

dispute cited in Chapter 2 were indicative of the international attitude towards tobacco regulation

to date. Despite inaction within the trade regime, this study identifies the World Bank and the

World Heath Organization as being the leading international organizations regulating tobacco.

The World Bank has contributed to global tobacco policy by providing an economic rationale for

regulation in their landmark report Tobacco Control in Developing Countries and adjusted their

lending policies to discourage tobacco production and processing.

FCTC and the Economy

The World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first

international public health treaty was the first of its kind to offer countries a transnational path to

regulating tobacco in order to improve overall public health. Despite the fact that some countries

have their own set of tobacco policies, this Treaty made a bold statement against the

transnational tobacco corporations that had been shifting their marketing and production efforts

to developing countries during the 1990s. This study concluded that regulating tobacco seems

to be a global goal, as evidenced by the speed with which countries signed and are ratifying the

treaty, many having already met several of its recommendations. After reviewing FCTC policies

in Chapter 3, led to several findings: (1) implementation of the FCTC measures is not

compulsory (2) The text of the treaty imposes no constraints to production, subsidies to

production, tobacco consumption or trade, and (3) the wording of the text provides flexibility

that allows countries to adopt the proposed measures and, at the same time, respects their









constitutional limitations. Although these finding are clear from the wording of the treaty itself,

it is important to emphasize them because they refute tobacco industry claims that the FCTC is a

rigid, compulsory document.

The economic impact of specific FCTC provisions in this report were assessed using the

World Bank' s 1999 report Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco

Control. This report reviewed a large body of evidence and concluded strongly that in most

countries, tobacco control would not negatively impact the economy. The World Bank' s team

recommended strongly that governments not forego the benefits of tobacco tax increases because

they feared the possible impact on smuggling, but rather act to deter, detect and punish

smuggling. This study found that, still, many governments hesitate to act decisively to

implement FCTC provisions because they fear that tax increases and other tobacco control

measures might harm the economy by reducing the economic benefits their country gains from

growing, processing manufacturing and taxing tobacco (Jha et al., 2000; Mackay et al., 2006,

Mitka, 2000).

Impact of Tobacco Regulation: Brazilian case

Implementation of FCTC measures have proven positive for the Brazilian economy overall

and will continue to be beneficial. Despite tobacco's importance in Brazil's economy,

recognition of tobacco's health consequences by Brazilian authorities led to some important

tobacco control measures. Banned practices include sales of cigarettes to minors, radio and

television advertising, sale of tobacco products in health centers and schools, and smoking in

public places, libraries and public transportation. More stringent advertising regulations became

effective in January 2002, requiring graphic anti-smoking images on cigarette packs and

prohibiting the use of deceptive descriptive terms such as "light" and "mild". In addition, the

Brazilian government had already been adjusting cigarette taxes and prices in an effort to reduce










consumption. When Brazil became a Party to the FCTC in 2005, after strong opposition from

the tobacco lobby, more provisions were added to Brazil's already broad set of tobacco policies.

In addition to the advertising restrictions and public smoking laws that were in place, the FCTC

required that the government promote economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers and

growers.

A maj or finding of this study was that Brazil's experiences restricting advertising, raising

tobacco taxes, and finding alternatives to growing reduced tobacco consumption, were not

detrimental to the economy This is important because a bulk of the FCTC's prescriptions are

related to these types of non-price measures. The Brazilian case strongly suggests that finding

alternative, economically viable livelihoods for tobacco farmers that have been historically

dependent on tobacco is promising. Several municipalities in the South of Brazil, all dependent

on tobacco on some level worked with local government and organizations to find alternative

crops.

If present national agrarian policies adopt FCTC proposals, the future scenario may show

employment instead of unemployment, and farming activities that would be beneficial to the

Brazilian population. Brazil's tax policies toward tobacco have not been uniform over the past

decade because of the country's cigarette smuggling problem. Brazil's tax policies in the early

1990s were in sync with the World Bank and the FCTC's prescription for reducing tobacco

demand without losing, and possible increasing government revenue. When taxes were high,

consumption fell, and government revenue increased. Cigarette smuggling activity increased

around the same time. This caused the government to keep cigarette prices the same and reduce

taxes. Today, smuggling rates in Brazil are higher than ever, accounting for an average 35% of

the market. Despite the high smuggling rates, one significant finding of this study was that










cigarette smuggling is caused at least as much by general corruption as by high tobacco product

tax increases. One significant policy suggestion would be that governments take stricter action

against illegal cigarette smuggling in order to balance out the positive gains that result from

FCTC policies.

Another maj or Einding of this study was that advertising bans and strict health warnings are

economically sound tobacco control policies and strong reasons for countries to support the

FCTC. Most international organizations credit advertising bans and strict health warnings for the

astonishing 35% decrease in cigarette consumption documented in Brazil over the past 14 years

(Cavalcante). Despite a decrease in consumption during these years, government revenue did

not fall. This study also suggested that price measures were also responsible for Brazil's success

in reducing consumption during that time.

Significance and Future Research

It was clear that there was a great need for country-specific analysis in order to provide a

basis for policy making on tobacco control within a sound economic framework. Examining the

recent progress of tobacco control policies in a developing country is the best way to lend

support to the analysis of the economics of tobacco control. Brazil served as an excellent case

for this study because it is a developing country that had enacted tobacco control policies for

over a decade before the FCTC came into force.

Since health is a central issue for sustainable development, tobacco control is being

increasingly viewed by governments as an important component of a strong development

agenda. This study suggests that the FCTC is not something to be feared because its main

obj ective is to promote human welfare. As pointed out in this study, the consensus between

societies that health gains are desirable is reflected in the tobacco policies and actions of the









World Health Organization and in other international organizations. This study takes a first step

by looking at actual outcomes in a country that has historically been a leader in tobacco control.

Also, this study can be beneficial for other types of international regulatory agendas that

countries are hesitant to adopt. It introduces the idea that national governments should defend

global public health in the same way that they have gradually embraced environmental

protection policies that have made a significant impact on the interaction between global

commerce and the well being of the environment.

The study is limited because of time, information available and because of the difficulty in

defining direct versus indirect effects of tobacco control policies on the economy. The FCTC is

only in its second year in Brazil, and, although tobacco control policies had been in effect for

several years prior to the FCTC, specific information about the success or failure of tobacco

regulations and the economy are not clear. As scholars and economists point out, clearly

separating outcomes from FCTC policies can be difficult, especially when illegal cigarette trade

is taking place on a large scale.

While this study found that tobacco control policies could be enacted without reducing

tobacco tax revenue for governments and eliminating tobacco farming and j obs in the short term,

more research and time is needed in order to quantify results for countries who remain hesitant to

regulate tobacco. Also, future research should focus on specific countries with different

interests in tobacco in order to understand if the effects of tobacco control policies are general or

country-specific. Additionally, a more close examination of the inner working of illegal

cigarette trade are paramount in achieving accurate data on the effects of tobacco regulations in

developing countries.









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Woo, A. (2002), 'Health versus trade: The future of the WHO's Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control,' Vanderbuilt Journal of Transnational Law. 3 5: 173 1-1767.

World Bank (1999), 'Operational Policies: Tobacco Procedures,' Washington D.C.: World Bank.

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World Health Organization. Retrieved on June 5, 2007, from
(http ://www.who.int/features/2003/08/en/).

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Control Activities at the World Health,' Geneva: World Health Organization, Retrieved on
June 3, 2007, from (http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who~inquiry~d)

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World Health Organization. Retrieved on June 1, 2007, from
(http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/ WHOFCTC_english.pdf).

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Organization.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lourdes Catala was born and raised in West Palm Beach, Florida. She graduated with

honors from the University of Florida in 2004 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a

minor in Latin American studies. In 2005, she returned to the University of Florida to pursue a

master of arts degree with a concentration in Latin American Business Environment Program

and a graduate certificate in translation studies. During her time in graduate school, Lourdes

studied abroad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil where she learned Portuguese and became familiarized

with the Brazilian business culture. Lourdes also studied abroad in Santiago, Chile where she

was also exposed to the Chilean business environment. The idea for her thesis on international

regulation of tobacco products grew out of her experiences with and interest in American

businesses operating in Latin America.





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1 THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION IN BRAZIL, 1990-PRESENT By LOURDES I. CATAL A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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2 2007 Lourdes Catal

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3 To my mother and father, Carm en and Antonio Catal, whose c ourage and example have taught me the importance of always moving forward

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many thanks to my committee chair Dr. Te rry McCoy for his patience and direction throughout this process and Dr. Elizabeth Lowe McCoy, for incessantly believing in me and granting me the graduate assistantship that allo wed me to complete my masters degree. Dr. Lowe McCoy has been a mentor, a friend and has set a wonderful example in my life. She has opened my eyes to many new things and given me opportunities to explore my interests. I am eternally grateful for her support. I also tha nk Dr. Marilyn Roberts fo r her enthusiasm on my thesis topic and her valuable insight into tobacco advertising. I also thank my parents, who never doubted me who have always allowed me the freedom to explore and whose strength I will always admire and try to duplicate. Thank you to my aunt and uncle, two of my favorites. Many thanks to the rest of my fa mily and each one of my best friends; Julian, Gaby, Michelle, Es ther, Vanessa and Dianna, the mo st eminent blessings in my life. I would also like to tha nk my unconventional heroine, BLZ.

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5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........7 LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................ .........8 ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ..............9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................11 Problem Statement-Research Question..................................................................................11 Background..................................................................................................................... ........14 Who is Big Tobacco?......................................................................................................14 FCTC........................................................................................................................... ....14 Literature Review.............................................................................................................. .....15 Tobacco Regulation.........................................................................................................16 International Regulation..................................................................................................18 Economic Impact of Regulating Tobacco.......................................................................20 Significance of this Thesis...............................................................................................22 Approach and Organization....................................................................................................22 2 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION............................25 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..........25 Tobacco Regulation in the U.S...............................................................................................26 International Trade and Tobacco............................................................................................32 The Case of Thailand...................................................................................................... 34 History of the Trade vs. Public Health Debate................................................................36 International Organizations and Tobacco Control..................................................................38 World Bank.....................................................................................................................39 The World Health Organization (WHO).........................................................................40 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .........42 3 2003 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL...................................44 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..........44 FCTC and International Law..................................................................................................45 International Treaty Law.................................................................................................45 International Requirements and the FCTC......................................................................47 FCTC Provisions.............................................................................................................48 Economic Implications of the FCTC......................................................................................49 Price and Tax Increases...................................................................................................50

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6 Smuggling...................................................................................................................... ..52 Tobacco Advertising Promotion and Sponsorship........................................................54 Economically Viable Alternatives to Tobacco................................................................57 Big Tobacco and the FCTC....................................................................................................59 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .........61 4 TOBACCO CONTROL IN BRAZIL.....................................................................................63 Brazils Tobacco Economy.....................................................................................................64 Tobacco Control before the FCTC.........................................................................................66 Brazil and the FCTC............................................................................................................ ...69 Impact of Control Measures...................................................................................................71 Tobacco Farming in Brazil..............................................................................................72 Tobacco Taxes and Government Revenue......................................................................76 Smuggling...................................................................................................................... ..78 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .........81 5 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... ..83 Main Findings.................................................................................................................. .......83 Development of International Tobacco Control..............................................................84 FCTC and the Economy..................................................................................................84 Impact of Tobacco Regulation: Brazilian case................................................................85 Significance and Future Research..........................................................................................87 LIST OF REFERENCES............................................................................................................. ..89 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.........................................................................................................95

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7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 4-1 Recent Brazilian tobacco regulations.................................................................................68 4-2 Brazilian cigarette market (billion units)...........................................................................80

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8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2-1 US State Cigarette Taxes, 2007.........................................................................................30 4-1 Prices (USD$ per Pack) of Imported and Local-Brand Cigarettes at Purchasing Power Parity, Selected Economies, March 2001...............................................................79

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9 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION IN BRAZIL, 1990-PRESENT By Lourdes I. Catal December 2007 Chair: Terry L. McCoy Major: Latin American Studies The globalization of the anti-tobacco campaign has gained momentum over the last two decades as a result of the increasing, dispropor tionate number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. Today, more than 70 % of tobacco-related deaths take place in developing countries. The increase in tobacco consumpti on is defined by a significant business-related factor: the business of selli ng and marketing tobacco produc ts by transnational tobacco corporations. In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the grow ing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first treaty to single out a particul ar industry for regulation at an international level. Many governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business in the interest of public health by ratifying th e FCTC can be successful in halting the tobacco epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study analyzes the impact of Brazils tobacco control policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a good case study because of its unique position within the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a

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10 developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating tobacco even before its government ratified the FC TC. Perhaps more than any other party to the FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public heal th can be a top priority without compromising economic stability. This study finds that tobacco control measur es such as those in the FCTC can be implemented without compromising the economic stability of developing countries. The Brazilian case, while unique and only in its seco nd year of officially implementing the treaty, offers positive results for both health advocat es and those concerned with the countrys economic well being.

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11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The globalization of the anti tobacco campai gn has gained momentum over the last two decades as a result of the increasing, dispropor tionate number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. Today, more than 70 % of t obacco related deaths take place in developing countries. Unlike several other he alth problems, the increase in tobacco consumption is defined by a significant business-related factor: the business of selling and marketing tobacco products by transnational tobacco co rporations (TTCs). In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in response to the grow ing tobacco problem. The FCTC is the first treaty to single out a particul ar industry for regulation at an international level. Many governments have hesitated to ratify the FCTC for fears that its implementation may have harmful economic consequences. This study seeks to determine if the regulation of big business with the interest of public heal th by ratifying the FCTC can be su ccessful in halting the tobacco epidemic without damaging the economies of its signing parties. To accomplish this, this study will analyze the impact of Brazils tobacco cont rol policies on the economy. Brazil serves as a good case study because of its unique position with in the tobacco-control debate: Brazil is a developing country with strong economic stake in tobacco, but was committed to regulating tobacco even before its government ratified the FC TC. Perhaps more than any other party to the FCTC, Brazil has set an example that public heal th can be a top priority without compromising economic stability. Problem Statement-Research Question This thesis deals with the regulation of a harmful, yet legal consumer product in the interests of public health through an international regulatory agr eement. Tobacco is different

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12 from many other health challenges. Cigarettes are demanded by consumers and form part of the social custom of many societies. Cigarettes are extensively traded and profitable commodities, whose production and consumption have an imp act on the social and economic resources of developed and developing countries alike. Economic considerations are ther efore critical to the debate on tobacco control. Until recently these aspects have received li ttle global attention. The FCTC is the first major step at regulati ng tobacco on a global scal e. Countries are not forced to become members and are often afraid that ratifying the convention will have negative economic consequences. To date, less than half of the countries in Latin America have ratified the FCTC, despite the regions escalating number of tobacco re lated deaths (World Health Organization, 2005). It is important to see if the massive public he alth benefits that accompany the implementation of tobacco control policies ca n be realized without high economic costs. Both of these issues are important ingredients for development, but are viewed as conflicting interests in many countries. The harmonization of the two issues has been hampered by the complex views and differing agendas of the partie s involved in the debate. The TTCs, as well as some trade economists view tobacco control po licies as a form of protectionism (Jha et al., 2000). Public health advocates and many interna tional development organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, view tobacco consumption as a hindrance to the sustainable development of countries and advocate tobacco control polic ies (World Bank, 1999). This study will examine the dispute in a historical framework and through the perspective of an international treaty, the FCTC and a developing country, Br azil, to understand the economic implications of enforcing a public health agenda that involve s the regulation of an industry. Historically, the international community has gi ven priority to transnational corporations because their globalization and tr ade liberalization are considered essential to development.

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13 Within the past two decades, the environmental community has pushed for environmental issues in trade agreements. The public health co mmunity has not gained the same amount of recognition. There is a growing consensus among scholars an d international organi zations that public health should be a key aspect within the trade re gime, and therefore, attention must be given to how trade and public health shou ld interact. To date, the FCTC is the only international regulatory framework that addresses the issue of public health, and, unfor tunately does not carry the same legal weight as the World Trade Or ganizations (WTO) regulations would carry. Because the WTO regulates the commerce of go ods in the internati onal marketplace, it is assumed that tobacco products would fall under its jurisdiction. Perhaps if every country were confident enough to become party to the FCTC the WTO would be compelled to regulate tobacco within the trade regime. Tobacco is among the greatest causes of prev entable and premature deaths in human history (World Bank 1999). Yet co mparatively simple and cost effective policies that can reduce its impact are already available through the FCTC. For government s that are intent on improving health within the framework of sound economic polic ies, action to control tobacco represents an unusually attractive choice. This main quest ion addressed by this study is: What does the experience of Brazil tell us about the politics and economics of implementing the FCTC? This study aims to address the economic consequences of implementing tobacco control policies in a developing country using Brazils implementati on and consequent ratification of the WHOs FCTC tobacco control policies.

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14 Background Who is Big Tobacco? Big Tobacco is the term that is usually app lied to the "big three" tobacco corporations in the United States; Phillip Morris Inc. (PMI), Br itish American Tobacco (BAT) and RJ Reynolds, but can also include other companies with a major stake in tobacco consumption, such as Lorillard or Brown & Williamson. For this study, the term Bi g Tobacco will refer to Philip Morris International and British American Toba cco Ltd., the largest multinational companies operating in Latin America, controlling 90 perc ent of the cigarette market. Philip Morris manufactures the worlds most widely smoked cigarette, Marlboro, and manufactures one in every six cigarettes sold around the world. In 2003, Philip Morris changed its name to Altria Group and acquired the food processing compan y, Kraft Foods (Altria Group, 2007). British American Tobacco (BAT) is the sec ond largest private tobacco company, whose leading brands include Lucky Strike and Benson and Hedges. BAT was one of the first multinational companies to move into emerging ma rkets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and is now the market leader in more than 50 c ountries. Although headqua rtered in the United Kingdom, most of its business is in less developed countries (Callard et al ., 2001). Similar to the use of various terms in the literature on the subj ect, this study uses the terms Big Tobacco and transnational tobacco corporati ons (TTCs) interchangeably. FCTC The FCTC is a milestone in the history of inte rnational collaboration in the field of public health. As an international agreement adopted by the 192 member states of World Health Organization. This treaty has the potential to im pact the ways TTCs like PMI and BAT operate. Since the beginning of the FCTCs negotiati on process, developing countries pushed for effective measures to reverse th e global tobacco epidemic and hold TTCs accountable for their

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15 abuses. India, Iran, Jamaica, Palau, Senegal, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand played key leadership roles during the negotia tions. Early in the treatys de velopment, evidence from oncesecret corporate documents showed that the t obacco industry had operated for years with the expressed intention of subvert ing the role of governments and WHO in implementing health policies (World Health Organi zation, n.d). The World Health A ssembly responded in 2001 with a resolution, calling on WHO to mo nitor the global impact of th e tobacco industrys political activities and urging governments to ensure the integrity of health policy development. This paved the way for the treaty to include provi sions protecting public health policies from interference by TTCs. The WHO e xplains that the FCTC was: developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic. The spread of the tobacco epidemic is exacerbated by a variety of complex factors with cross-border effects, including trade liberalization, direct forei gn investment, global marketing, transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorsh ip, and the international movement of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes (World Health Organization, 2005). Within a year there were 168 signatories, ma king it one of the most quickly embraced UN treaties ever. Over 40 countries had ratified it by late 2004, triggering its entry into force on February 27, 2005 in the ratifying countries. The 40th ratif ication made it the fi rst international, legally binding public health trea ty under the auspices of WHO. The main provisions of the FCTC will be discussed later in this study. Literature Review The literature examining tobacco and internati onal regulation is vast and covers various subjects including globalization, trade, public hea lth, economics and science. The scope of this study requires a review of the literature related only to the ec onomic aspects of tobacco control. The specific body of literature that examines th e globalization of the tobacco epidemic has grown in recent years as the number of smokers in developing countries disproportionately increases despite decreasing numbers in high in come countries. The main questions touched

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16 upon by virtually every piece of literature concer ning tobacco are: 1) Is the use of tobacco products harmful to users health? 2) Should tobacco products be regulated? There is an overwhelming consensus among scholars, interna tional organizations an d even the tobacco industry itself concerning th e first question. Since about 1950, more than 70,000 scientific studies have proven that smoking causes disease, disability and death (US Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1994). The literature on the scien tific evidence against tobacco use will not be reviewed for this study. Tobacco Regulation The literature examining the second questi on, the issue of tobacco regulation, is contentious. Despite the strong c onsensus that smoking harms healt h, there is much debate about proper government roles, if any, in reducing sm oking. Many argue that smoking is voluntary and is not illegal for adults, so the existence of an enormous health problem is not sufficient to justify interference with the toba cco industrys ability to sell its product as it sees fit. From a purely economic standpoint, ther e is little that econo mics can say about the preferences that determine smoking, except to try to understand how th e addictive nature of cigarettes influences subsequent consumption. Economists approach the tobacco question from two directions: 1) Individual choice and market failure and 2) The impact of reduced smoking on the local economy, specifically to the tobacco industry. A study by Jha, Musgrove Chaloupka and Yureki titled The Economic Rational for Intervention in the Tobacco Market provides one of the most complete analyses on consumer choice and tobacco. Economic theory starts with the assumption that a consumer usually knows what is best for him or hersel f. This is known as the notion of consumer sovereignty. The theory also assumes that priv ately determined consumption choices, including the decision whether to consume a particular product at all within a free competitive market, will

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17 most efficiently allocate societ ys scarce resources. Within this framework, economic theory holds that if smokers consume tobacco with full information about its health consequences and addictive potential, and bear all costs and benefits of their choice themselves, there is no justification for governments to in terfere. Mureki et al. suggest that an economic rationale for such intervention is justified when ther e are failures in tobacco markets. In practice, the market for tobacco is charac terized by three specific market failures or features that result in economic inefficiencies and that may ther efore justify public intervention. A study by the World Bank, Tobacco Control in Developing Countries discusses the market failures that make the choice to buy tobacco prod ucts different from the choice to buy other consumer goods: First, there is an informati on failure about the health ri sks of smoking, especially in developing countries. Incomplete information about the risks of smoking leads to behavior that smokers would not otherwise choose for themselves. Second, most smokers start when they are child ren or adolescents when they are unable to make an informed choice; by the time th ey try to quit, many are addicted. Third, there is evidence that smokers impose co sts on other individuals, both directly and indirectly. Although a number of studies agree that re gulating tobacco products is economically justifiable as a result of the failures in inform ation and external costs that smoking poses to nonsmoker, methods of regulation are not often specified. A bul k of the literature focuses on answering the following three questions: 1) Should tobacco be regulated internationally? 2) How should tobacco be internationally re gulated and who should enforce those regulations? 3) What would be the economi c effects on developing countries that opted to regulate tobacco?

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18 There is a considerable amount of literature concerning all th ree issues. The third question has only been answered in theory, since the only form of international tobacco regulation to date is the WHOs FCTC, which recently came into force in February 2005. International Regulation A growing body of literature attributes the globalization of the tobacco epidemic as referred to by health related literature, to trade liberali zation and regional and economic integration. A study by Callard, Collishaw and Sw enarchuk suggests that th e increase in tobacco consumption can be traced to the vectors of liberalized trade, more active marketing by multinational corporations a nd increased Westernization. Taylor et al. provided the most comprehensive text on the impact of trade liberalization on tobacco consumption in Tobacco Control in Deve loping Countries. Their research found that A variety of trade agreements in recent years have significan tly reduced the barriers to trade in tobacco products. Economic theory sugge sts that the reductions in these barriers will increase competition within tobacco markets, reduce prices, and increase marketing efforts, as well as raise incomes. As a result, tobacco use is likely to increase, particularly in low income and middle-income countries (p.343). The fact that trade liberali zation is itself a very comple x phenomena, regulating tobacco within that process is difficult. According to the World Health Assembly (WHA), international action to regulate tobacco is needed because a number of aspects of the tobacco problem are particularly transnational in natu re and can only be dealt with e ffectively by international action. At present there are about 5 million deaths a year worldwide due to tobacco related disease, with the balance split approximately between develope d and developing countries. By 2030, if present trends continue, the figure will have increased to 10 million deaths per year, with 70 % of these deaths taking place in developing countries. In a study commissioned by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Bialous and Agui naga (2002) concluded that the TTCs are stepping up their activities in deve loping countries in search of ne w markets as a result of the

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19 increasing awareness of the health risks of sm oking in Europe and North America. Callard, Collishaw and Swenarchuk also point out that as the disease burden of tobacco and ease of access because of trade liberaliza tion shifts from the developed to the developing world, so does its accompanying economic burden. They explai n that, poor nations, like poor individuals, are poorly equipped to deal with the health e ffects or economic consequences of smoking. Most health epidemics are not inherently tied to the cons umption of a specific, legal consumer good. Since there is a growing cons ensus among scholars that the most influential vector of globalization on the tobacco epidemic is trade liberalization, many argue that the WTO should take into consideration the effects of trade on public health and regulate the tobacco industry through trade agreements (J ha et al. 2000; Bloom, 2001; W oo, 2002; Taylor et al. 1999). Trade advocates seek to increase availability and use of produc ts and services; while public health advocates struggle to d ecrease availability and use of t obacco. Public health advocates respond that the benefits of liberalized trad e (increased access to improved and cheaper consumer products) are actually drawbacks in when it comes to tobacco goods, since increased access results in negative health c onsequences, so they should be regulated, if not excluded from trade agreements (Weissman, 2001). There are rationales for trade barriers that are economically justifiable, such as the temporary protection of an infant industry a nd the use of protectionist interventions as a temporary strategy for promoting economic deve lopment, protection of the environment and labor rights. As evidence on the health conse quences of smoking has accumulated, some have argued for restricting tobacco-related trade as a way to reduce the death and disease resulting from tobacco use. Similar arguments have been used to defend trade rest rictions in the case of other goods with negative externalities. These arguments are most well-de veloped in the area of

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20 environmental policies, with recent research ad apting these arguments to consider the negative externalities associated with tobacco use (Bloom, 2001). In Public Health, Internati onal Trade and the FCTC Bloom et al. suggests that because trade agreements treat tobacco as a conve ntional good, they incorporate an inaccurate presumption that expanding commerce in tobacco pr oducts is beneficial for society. Bloom et al. suggests the reasons why trade rule s have not been developed for tobacco products as they have for so many other products: 1) The principles of free trade are deeply he ld within the trade community and the burden of proof on a proposal for special treat ment of any product is formidable. 2) The public health comm unity, unlike the environmental movement, has not been significantly engaged in in ternational trade issues. 3) The tobacco industry is one of the most politically and economica lly powerful entities in the world and has been fully engaged in the trade community at the multinational level for decades and has made trade liberalizati on in tobacco products a top priority. Economic Impact of Regulating Tobacco Although the WHOs FCTC was not ratified until 2003, there is a significant amount of literature examining the impact that such a tr eaty would have on the economies of developing countries. Advocates of tobacco control argue that regulating tobacco is justified and would eventually help the economies of the signi ng parties. Parties advocating against the implementation of the FCTC, namely the TTCs argue that restricting tobacco sales and promotion would cause the loss of thousands of j obs, a decrease in government revenues, and an increase in illegal activity, especially smuggling (World Health Organization, 2000). In its landmark 1999 report, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control the World Bank explored the ec onomic dimensions that need to be addressed if nations were to become party to an intern ational agreement such as the FCTC. The World Bank concluded that tobacco control is very desi rable because even small reductions in a disease

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21 burden of such large size bring highly significan t health and economic gains. The World Bank deemed the tobacco industrys policy arguments to be unpersuasive, given that new jobs replace old jobs, tobacco taxes empirically increase government revenues, and tobacco taxes still reduce consumption and increase reve nues in places where smuggli ng is high. The World Bank has since decided to prohibit the use of the Banks resources to finance tobacco production. The IMF, aligned with the World Banks tobacco po licy has established similar conditions for its loans. Both organizations enc ourage countries to become signato ries of the FCTC (World Bank, 1999). Jacobs et al. describe the size and nature of the tobacco industry, both farming and manufacturing. They then examine the impact of tobacco control measures on countries economies, in particular on employment. They f ound that, if tobacco consumption were to fall because of control policies, the net impact on to tal employment would be minimal or zero in most countries, since the money consumers on ce spent on tobacco woul d be spent instead on other goods and services, hence generating jobs. Another belief among parties that are opposed to regulating tobacco is that governments will lose revenues if they increase cigarette ta xes because people will buy less The World Bank suggests that even substantial cigarette tax increases will re duce consumption while increasing tax revenues. The proportionate reduction in de mand does not match the proportionate size of the tax increase, since addicted consumers respond relatively slowly to increases in price. Most scholars and internati onal organizations ag ree that the FCTC offers a long term approach to global coordination on tobacco control (Taylor et al. ; 1999 Jha et al. 1999; World Bank, 1999).

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22 Significance of this Thesis While there was no shortage of analysis that speculates on the economic effects of regulating tobacco, no single study has examined the actual impact of FCTC policies. Few people now dispute that smoking is damagi ng human health on a global scale. Many governments have avoided taking action to co ntrol tobacco such as higher taxes, comprehensive bans on advertising and promoti on, and encouraging farmers to diversify away from growing tobacco because of concerns that their interventions might have harmful economic consequences. For example, some policymakers fear that reduced sales of cigarettes would mean the permanent loss of thousands of jobs; that higher tobacco taxes w ould result in lower government revenues; and that higher prices w ould encourage massive levels of cigarette smuggling. This thesis examines the global ch allenge, brought on by public health advocates, facing Big Tobacco, one of the most powerful indus tries in the world. It aims to test the assertions that tobacco control policies are damaging to the econom y using Brazilian experience. The FCTC is a critical tool for promoting publ ic health and corporat e accountability and its implementation would help to end the global tob acco epidemic. Its history to date provides lessons that may be applicable when challe nging other industries th at threaten health, environmental and human rights. The 2003 issu e of Tobacco Reporter, a prominent industry journal stated that: Tobacco executives caution other industries about allowing WHO to assume such control over their global market. BAT point ed out that as the worl ds first international health agreement, the FCTC sets a precedent th at could affect many ot her industries (Lerner, 2003). Approach and Organization Primary sources from the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the World Bank, Phillip Morris Inte rnational and British American Tobacco Ltd.

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23 aided in compiling the research. An analysis was conducted, relying primarily on industry documents, scholarly journal articles, news articl es, and reports relating to the economic impact of the FCTC in Brazil and else where. To gain a better unders tanding of the globalization of tobacco, I attended the World Conference on Tob acco or Health (WCTOH), a global meeting of governments, advocates, businesses and researcher s in Washington DC in June 2006. There, I attended sessions on the FCTC, tobacco advertis ing, smuggling, trade and other topics relating to the business end of the global toba cco issue. I also had the oppor tunity to speak with several Brazilian public health officials, professors, government officials and bus inessmen connected to both sides of the tobacco issue in several Latin American countries. Chapter 2 of this study provides an overview on the history of international tobacco control. Prior to the FCTCs entry into force, there had been attempts at international tobacco regulation between countries a nd the World Trade Organization. This chapter explores the barriers to controlling tobacco th at trade agreements have posed in the past, highlighting the dispute settlement process within the WTO. This chapter cove rs attempts at international tobacco control up until the ratification of the FCTC. Chapters 3 examines the Framework Conven tion on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This will include a discussion on the nature of conventions the measures and provisions set forth in the convention and its enforceability. Chapter 3 also documents the drafting of the FCTC and lists the countries that have signe d and ratified the convention. Chapter 4 will discuss tobacco control in Brazil to date. This will include a discussion about the scope of the tobacco problem in Br azil, its tobacco economy, and the governments first steps in regulating tobacco before the FCTC was ratified. A discussion of the drafting and ratification process including th e hurdles posed by the tobacco industrys lobby will also be

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24 included in this section. Furthe r, this chapter will examine Brazil's commitment to tobacco control and the economic impact of tobacco control policies despite the countries heavy economic interests in tobacco exporting and manufacturing. Chapter 5 concludes the study with an anal ysis of the economic impacts of Brazils tobacco policies and ratification of the FCTC. Future research and recommendations for policy makers is also presented along with genera lizations about changing policy and behavior.

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25 CHAPTER 2 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO REGULATION Introduction Although tobacco is considered the single most significant threat to global public health, international efforts to regulate tobacco and tr ansnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) have only emerged within the past fifteen years. B ecause tobacco is a legal consumer good, justifying its restriction has been difficult de spite consensus about its harmful si de effects. The main factor that drew international attenti on to the tobacco epidemic was explosive increase in consumption of tobacco in developing countries in the 1990s. This increase was surprising, since most of the high income countries had experienced a decrease as a result of the widespread knowledge of the dangers of smoking. This chapter sets the stage for the WHOs development of an international tobacco treaty by discussing the evolution of international tobacco control. First, this chapter provides an overview on the history of the beginnings of tobacco control that took place in the U.S. This includes a discussion on the discovery of the dangers of smoking, laws put in place to restrict the tob acco industry and improvements in public health recorded among the U.S. population af ter restrictions were put in pl ace. Despite recorded health improvements in the U.S. and in other high in come countries, it soon became evident that globalization of the TTCs was shifting the tobacco epidemic to the developing world. The second part of the chapter focuses on the trade-pub lic health debate that ar ose in response to the increasing number of tobacco related deaths in developing countries. This section includes a discussion on trade liberalizati on and its links to th e spreading of tobacco diseases and the WTOs past handling of trade disputes involving tobacco products. Finally, this chapter outlines the position taken by internati onal regulatory organizations in cluding the World Bank and the

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26 WHO to regulate tobacco internat ionally. A discussion about the events leading up to the UNs adoption of the FCTC conc ludes the chapter. Tobacco Regulation in the U.S. Regulating tobacco first becam e a national concern in 1964 when U.S. Surgeon General1 Luther Terrys Report on Smoking and Health was published, detailing scientific evidence on the harms of smoking (Center for Disease Control, n. d). Since that report was published, federal regulations have been placed on tobacco products in the U.S. Limited federal regulations include: required Surgeon General Warnings on cigarette packs, pr ohibition of television advertising, and some agricultural safeguards (American Heart Associ ation, n.d). Individual states have taken further action by passing clean indoor air laws th at require public areas to be smoke-free. In addition, Big Tobacco voluntarily re gulated its advertising pr actices as a result of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) the larg est civil settlement in U.S. history. These actions have proven to be successful in reduci ng the number of smoking related deaths in the U.S. over the past fifty years (Center for Diseas e Control, n.d). This section discusses the federal, statewide and voluntary regu lations that have shaped the hist ory U.S. tobacco control. During the past three decades, the US S upreme Court has struggled with a major contemporary American issue the role of advert ising and its regulation in matters of public health and corporate freedom of speech. Alt hough the findings in the 1964 Surgeon Generals report sparked controversy over the role of a dvertising in consumers choice to smoke, the tobacco industry asserted that advertising doe s not cause adults to start smoking nor does it increase the amount they may already smoke. Instead, the industry claimed, and continues to 1 The Surgeon General of the United States is the head of the United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps and is the leading spokesperson on matters of public health in the U.S. government. The Surgeon General is nominated by the U.S. President and confirmed via majority vote by the Senate (US Department on Health and Human Services, n.d.).

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27 claim, that advertising merely enhances the ma rket share of a partic ular brand over another (Bayer et al ., 2002). Agencies like the Better Business Bureau (BBB)2 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)3 warned the tobacco industry that it shoul d adhere to basic principles of truth and fairness in its campaigns in anticipation of a public backlash, sin ce concealing the possible dangers of smoking from their consumers could cost them their advertising freedoms. The industry did not adjust their campaigns and pe ople became outraged that Big Tobacco continued to advertise despite the established medical and health findings published in the Surgeon Generals report. Critics of th e industrys continued advertising practices argued that A more flagrant assault against public welfare had never been witnesse d in the United States (Bayer et al ., 2002). Public outcry over the tobacco industrys inaction prompted the creation of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, one of first the major bills passed by the U.S. Congress since the 1964 U.S. Surgeon Generals report. The Act, signed into law by President Richard Nixon in 1970, required that health warning labels be pl aced on all cigarette p acks. In 1981, the FTC reported that the health warning labels as ma ndated by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act had little effect on American smoking habits so Congress the passe d the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, requiring more specific health warnings which read: SURGEON GENERALS WARNIN G: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy. 2 The Better Business Bureau (BBB), founded in 1912, is an organization based in the United States and Canada. The BBB states its purpose is to act as a mutually trusted intermediary between consumers and businesses to resolve disputes, to facilitate communication, and to provide info rmation on ethical business practices (Better Business Bureau, n.d) 3 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the United States government, established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Its principal mission is the promotion of consumer protection and the elimination and prevention of anticompetitive business practices (Federal Trade Commission, n.d)

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28 SURGEON GENERALS WARNIN G: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health. SURGEON GENERALS WARNIN G: Smoking by Pregnant Wo men May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight. SURGEON GENERALS WARNIN G: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. (Center for Disease Control, n.d). This federal move prompted many states to adopt new tobacco regulations, forcing the industry's lobbying group, the Tobacc o Institute, to ask for federal intervention on state and local matters that they felt infringed on their First Amendment Rights. In 1996 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)4 attempted to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Co smetic Act. For decades, the FDA said it lacked authority to regulate to bacco, but in 1996 it cited new ev idence that the industry intended its products to feed nicotine a ddictions, therefore making cigarett es a drug delivery system. The FDA proposed to regulate cigarettes as a hybrid involving both a drug and a medical device. It intended to dictate tobacco adve rtising and promotiona l campaigns, strengthen warning labels and tightening sales restrictions (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001). In response, Big Tobacco sued the federal government, arguing that the FDA lacked legal authority to regulate tobacco products. The case eventually landed in the Supreme Court. In June 2000, The United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 th at Congress had not expressly gi ven the FDA legal authority to regulate the tobacco industry, and that the Congre ss must specifically enact legislation to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco. As a result, all FDAs attempts to further regulate tobacco at the federal level were dropped, including the fe deral minimum age requirement for purchasing 4 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA ) is an agency of the United States Department of Health and Human Services and is responsible for regulating food, dietary supplements, drugs, biological medical products, blood products, medical devices, radiation-emitting devices, veteri nary products, and cosmetics in the United States (Food and Drug Administration, n.d).

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29 tobacco products (18 years old), as well as fe deral rules requiring retailers to check photo identification. (American Heart Association, n.d). In February 2007, a bipartisan group of lawm akers reintroduced le gislation, once again pushing to give FDA the same authority over cigare ttes and other tobacco products that it already has over many other consumer products. Demo cratic Senator Edward Kennedy said that "Congress cannot in good conscience allow the fe deral agency most responsible for protecting public health to remain powerless in dealing with the enormous ri sks of tobacco, the most deadly of all consumer products. Many tobacco companie s opposing this legislation, set to be voted on in 2007, have argued that the bill would favor co mpanies like Phillip Morris, who enjoys strong brand loyalty that could allow them to weather advertising restrictions without losing market share. They claim that they will continue to oppose any bill that conveys an unfair advantage or disadvantage to any manufacturer (LSU Law Ce nter, 2000). Because restricting tobacco products brings into question general principl es such corporate freedom of speech, unfair advantage and the role of adver tising in consumer choice, it is likely that the U.S. government will continue to struggle with th e federal regulation of tobacco. Although federally tobacco regulation is lax, ma ny U.S. states have enacted their own set of tobacco control policies. Thes e restrictions range from tax in creases to full smoking bans in bars, workplaces, restaurants and hotels. In 1988, California voters passed Proposition 99, which raised the tobacco excise tax by twenty-five cents and allocated $90 million annually for tobacco control. Massachusetts, Arizona Oregon, referenda have increas ed tobacco excise taxes and dedicated a fraction of the revenues to reducing tobacco use. Legislat ures in other states such as Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Jerse y, New York, and Washington have increased tobacco taxes substantially. Figure 1.1 lists th e cigarette taxes rates imposed by each state and

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30 ranks them from highest to lowest. By acknowledg ing the danger of cigarettes, raising tobacco taxes and restricting advertisi ng has not only discouraged people from buying pricier cigarettes, it has changed society s perception of smoking. Figure 2-1. US State Cigarette Taxe s, 2007. Source: Tax Policy Center, 2007 The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) wa s also an important factor in regulating tobacco in the U.S. The MSA arose out of many separate law suits brought by various individual States against the tobacco industr y for Medicare costs associated with smoking-related diseases. The agreement was originally negotiated betwee n the four largest tobacco companies (Philip Morris USA, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Comp any, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company) and 46 U.S. States and 6 U.S. Territories. The MSA exempted the

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31 companies from liability from state government s and settled the lawsuit in exchange for a combination of yearly payments to the stat es, estimated at over $206 billion, and voluntary restrictions on advertising and marketing of tobacco products (Geyelin, 1998). The MSA also created and currently funds The American Le gacy Foundation, an anti-smoking advocacy group that is responsible for such anti-smoking campaigns like The Truth5. The agreement was meant to provide state governments with compensation for smoking related medical costs and to help reduce smoking in the United States. Another majo r contribution that came out of the MSA was that the tobacco companies were forced to ma ke their private industry documents open to the public (California Office of Attorney General, n.d). The information extracted from these documents has shed light on the tobacco indus trys business practices around the world and aided in jump starting intern ational tobacco regulation. Public health advocates have criticized the MSA as being too lenien t on the major tobacco companies. An article in the Journal of the Na tional Cancer Institute described the MSA as an "opportunity lost to curb cigare tte use, citing public health res earchers' views that not enough of the MSA money was being spent on anti -smoking measures (Twombly, 2004). Federal and state regulations along with vol untary campaigns funded by the Industry, are responsible for changing the social acceptability of smoking in the U.S. According to the CDC, 46.5 million U.S. smokers have quit over the last 40 years (Center for Disease Control, 2006). Smoking rates have been steadily declining among men and women since the 1964 Surgeon General's report, with a 50 year low recorded in 2004 (Center for Disease Control, 2006). 5 The Truth campaign is the largest national youth-focused anti-tobacco education campaig n ever. It is designed to engage teens by exposing Big Tobacco's marketing and manufacturing practices. The campaign has been successful, with nearly 90 percent of yout hs aged 12 to 17 25 million said the ad they saw was convincing (Truth Campaign, n.d).

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32 Globally evidence on the dangers of smoking ha s not had the same effect on developing countries as has on high income countries, nor has the tobacco industry fallen under the same amount of scrutiny and regulation. Today, approx imately 1 in 3 adults, or 1.1 billion people smoke. Of these, a disproportionate 80% are live in developing countries. Increased trade liberalization is often cited as the main reason for this imbalance, since the removal of trade barriers increases demand, fuels competition, lowe rs prices and attracts new customers. International Trade and Tobacco The idea that trade liberalization exacerbate d tobacco use became evident when expansion of trade in tobacco products began in the 1980 s. The most notable example of tobacco trade expansion took place when the U.S. applied pressure on behalf of the tobacco companies to open the markets of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, a nd Thailand. These actions were taken by the United States Trade Representative under Sect ion 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 (Chaloupka and Laixuthai, 1996). Section 301 of the Trad e Act of 1974, is the US legislative device designed to open foreign markets to U.S. expor ts of goods and services. The US government succeeded in negotiating bilatera l agreements that removed excise taxes and distribution practices that discriminated against U.S. t obacco products, except in Thailand. Studies found that the market share of U.S. cigarettes in coun tries affected by the Section 301 agreements rose sharply after their tobacco markets were opened (Taylor et al ., 1999). Estimates implied that U.S. market shares for the American cigarettes were 600% higher, on average, in 1991 than they would have been had these markets remained cl osed. Most notably, research found that the opening of the Japanese, Taiwanese, South Ko rean, and Thai cigarette markets led to a significant increase in cigarette smoking in thes e countries. They estimated that per capita cigarette consumption, by 1991, was 10% higher, on av erage, in the four c ountries than it would have been in the absence of the bilateral agreements (Chaloupka and Laixuthai, 1996).

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33 The issue of trade liberalization influencing international tobacco consumption are matters that lie under the authority of the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization. Since WTO controls the international movement of tobacco products around the world, many feel that the WTO should take on the responsib ility of controlling the tobacco epidemic by allowing countries to restrict the importation of foreign tobacco. The ways in which the WTO interprets and rules on tr ade-public health issues have histor ically been narrow and mostly tradefocused (Taylor et al, 1999). Although the WT O does not deny the sign ificance of protecting public health within trade prac tices, since there is a direct relationship between health and development, there is little mention about trad e and public health within the WTOs agreements. (World Trade Organization and Wo rld Health Organization, 2002). The WTO was established in 1995 to replace the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which dated back to 1948. This wa s the consequence of a decision made by governments after seven years of negotiations during the Uruguay Round which ended in 1994 (World Trade Organization, n.d) With the WTO's creation, trade rules were expanded to cover new issues that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. While the GATT dealt with trade in goods only, the WTO covers trade in services and inte llectual property and intr oduced a new dispute settlement system equipped to deal with new tr ading concerns (World Trade Organization, n.d) The only reference to a country's ab ility to restrict trade in the na me of health lies in Article 20(b) of the GATT, which date s back to the 1948. Article 20(b) provides a highly limited exception for national measures designed to protect public health that wo uld otherwise violate GATT obligations and are only relevant if a trad e violation is found. Ar ticle 20(b) GATT reads: Subject to the requirement that such measures are not appl ied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifia ble discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on intern ational trade, nothing in this

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34 Agreement shall be construed to prevent th e adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures; (b) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (World Trade Organization and World Health Organization, 2002). The only instance where Article 20(b) has been applied to tobacco products and health took place in 1989 between Thailand and the WTO. This first internatio nal attempt to control tobacco trade internationally em erged out of the same U.S. ag reements that opened the Asian markets discussed above. Examining U.S. effort s to open the cigarette market in Thailand will help to assess the impact of the trade liberalization with respect to cigarettes. The case of Thailand In 1966, Thailand enacted a bold tobacco control program that included a comprehensive ban on both cigarette advertising and a ban on tobacco imports. U.S. tobacco companies challenged Thailand's ban on advertising and imports, prompti ng an investigation by the United States Trade Representative who referred the matter to the WTOs GATT. Thailand co ntended that the ban on imports was justified by the objective of public health policy and was therefore covered under Article 20(b) of the GATT. In a landmark decision, GATTs panel found that Thailand could giv e priority to human health over trade liberalization as long as the proposed measures were "necessary." The panel concluded that Thailands restri ction on imports could be consid ered "necessary" in terms of Article 20, only if there were no alternative measure consis tent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, that Thailand could reason ably be expected to achieve its health policy objectives. Based on the GATT pane ls analysis of the necessity of the Thai measures, the panel concluded that Thailands practice of pe rmitting the sales of domestic cigarettes, while banning the importation of foreign cigarettes, was not necessary and, ther efore, not justifiable

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35 under Article 20(b), since alternatives to banning the importation of cigarettes were available to protect public health (World Trade Organization and Worl d Health Organization, 2002). The panel further found that requiring foreign tobacco companies to abide by tobaccocontrol regulations that applied equally to domestic and foreign tobacco products was appropriate and consistent with GATT obligations GATT upheld Thailand's advertising ban and went on to state that various tobacco control measures could be adopted and applied to both domestic and imported tobacco, in li eu of an import ban, and still be consistent with GATT. The panel also noted that a ban on advertising appl ying to both domestic and imported cigarettes would be justified under the GA TT, even if it created unequal competitive opportunities between domestic and foreign firms, because advertisi ng may stimulate demand for cigarettes (World Trade organization and World H ealth Organization, 2002). This was the first and only WTO decision involving manufactured tobacco products. According to the World Bank, the Thailand deci sion it set a critical precedent for other countries, and sends a message that member nations can adopt strong anti-tobacco control legislation as long as the meas ures are aimed at protecting he alth and do not discriminate between domestic and imported to bacco. Many scholars have not ed that it cannot be assumed that Article 20(b) of th e GATT will be applied in a manner th at supports the protection of public health in future tobacco decisions (Bettcher et al ., 2001). After all, the WTO regime is primarily aimed at limitation of he alth-based restrictions to those that are necessary and minimally burdensome to trade. Critics of the GATT panel's decisions regarding tobacco products claim that the panel's interpretation of the necessary requirement under Article 20(b) excessively restricts the capacity of countries to adopt standards to protect public health (Schoenbaum, 1997). They claim that the

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36 standard employed by the GATT panel when co nsidering Thailands import ban requires countries to adopt the least trade restrictive pol icy possible, inordinately favoring the expansion of free trade over national authority to protect public health (Taylor et al ., 1999). Other critics say that the Thai case has been mistakenly view ed by some as an important victory for public health advocates. They claim that although the GATT's decision upheld strong, nondiscriminatory public health measures as consis tent with international trade commitments, the liberalization of the toba cco trade in Thailand, as well as th e other 3 Asian nations that were prompted to open their markets to expand the imports of cigarettes c onsidered qualitatively superior to those produced by the domestic toba cco companies led to an overall increase in tobacco consumption in these nations. The Thai trade case and the research concluding that smoking in the Asian countries had increased significantly after opening their markets for tobacco expansion intensified the internationa l debate between the public health and trade regimes. History of the Trade vs. Public Health Debate The interests of the WHO and the WTO are at od ds within the trade vs. health debate, but much more so when manufactured tobacco prod ucts are involved. In 2000, the annual World Conference on Tobacco or Health he ld its first debate that centere d on the issue of international trade in tobacco. Specifically, the debate focused on whether th e rules governi ng international trade inhibits nations fr om being able to adopt strong tobacco control measures. This question fit in with the central trade issue of the 1990s: whether trade agr eements and WTO system of trade rules overrode other import ant societal values, su ch as environmental pr otection, food safety, and public health. Trade advocates argued that th e main setback to tobacco control was not the international trade rules. Rath er, it was the failure of governments around the world to find the political will to adopt strong tob acco control policies in the face of powerful tobacco companies.

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37 They suggested that the increasing amount of smokers in developing countries could be attributed to governments failure to put the public health con cerns of their people above the commercial interests of the tob acco companies and of those who make their living from growing tobacco. In addition, trade advocat es added that the WTO rules, pa rticularly Article 20(b) of the GATT, provided governments with far more latit ude to adopt measures to safeguard public health than the WTO critics acknowledged. Although the WTO advocates did not deny the significance of protecting public health within trade practices, they emphasized that th e ultimate goal of free trade is the increased production and consumption of bene ficial products, or, goods, which ju stifies free trade policies. The problem with tobacco, of course is that it is not a beneficial product. Each additional unit of consumption has been shown to cause additiona l suffering and death, as well as a net economic loss to the economy of the nation in which it is consumed and to the global economy. According to Bloom et. al., the distinction between a benefi cial product and a harmfu l one essentially turns the traditional presumption in favor of free trade on its head with respect to tobacco. Bloom et al. points out if the use of a product is uniform ly harmful; the presumption should be against promoting increased trade in that product (Bloom, 2001) Public health advocates argued that trade advocates focused too much attention on the workings of WTO provisions, and not enough atten tion on the actual proble m: the unique nature of the product in question (Shapiro, 2002). Th e facts suggest that smoking is the leading preventable cause of death and disease in the worl d, and that about half of all long term smokers die of diseases caused by their addictive habit. Pu blic health advocates argu ed that the very fact that tobacco products are so lethal, even when they are consumed in a normal way, sets them

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38 apart from other products in commerce, and requir es that they be treated as an exception to ordinary trade rules. Many public health advocates argue that th e Thailand case illustrates problem with the treatment of tobacco products within the trad e regime. Even though cl osed markets and clear discrimination against foreign pr oducts are abomination to tr ade, they may have significant public health benefits (Shapiro, 2002). A clos ed market allows the government to maintain control over the market, prevent marketing a nd pricing competition that accompany trade liberalization, and exclude products that may be especially enticing to children. Some tobacco control advocates believe that WTO panels will always err on the side of trade at the expense of public health in trade disputes (Wei ssman, 2001). Trade advocates point to recent WTO appellate decisions to refute th at accusation. In 2000, the WTO ruled in favor of French ban the production and import of asbe stos products from Canada. The WTO panel decided that France has the right to maintain its ban under Article 20, which allows for actions instituted for the protection of pub lic health (Callard et al., 2001). It is difficult to predict how trade disputes involving tobacco will be determin ed under an international tobacco treaty like the FCTC. International Organizations and Tobacco Control In light of the growing consensus that trade li beralization contributes to for the spread of the tobacco epidemic, it has been assumed that regulating tobacco trade policies would be the best way to control tobacco. WTO agreements outline the difficulty facing the regulation of tobacco control at an internati onal level via the trade regime. Other international organizations have adopted policies that control tobacco indire ctly. This section deta ils the actions taken by the World Bank and the World Health Organizati on that have shaped international tobacco control in recent years.

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39 World Bank Since 1991 the World Bank has had a formal pol icy of not lending for tobacco production and encouraging tobacco control. The policy co ntains five main points (World Bank, 1999): First, the Banks activities in the health sector discourag e the use of tobacco products. Second, the Bank does not lend directly for, invest in, or guarantee inve stment or loans for, tobacco production, processing or marketing Third, the Bank does not lend indirectly to tobacc o production activities, to the extent that this is practicable. For countries highly dependent on tobacco growing, the Banks aim is to help the countries dive rsify away from tobacco. Fourth, tobacco and its related processing m achinery and equipment cannot be included among imports financed under loans. Fifth, tobacco and tobacco-related imports ma y be exempt from borrowers agreements with the Bank to liberalize trade and reduce tariffs. These World Bank policies have been appla uded for their leadership in establishing different norms for tobacco enterprises than for other commercial activities. Some World Bank policies may remain in conflict with public he alth objectives, such as the Bank support of privatization of state monopolies. Before 1999, the economic aspects of controlling tobacco received little global attenti on, since most focus on tobacco issues revolved around the health effects of smoking. The World Bank published a landmark report titled Tobacco Control in Developing Countries which filled the gap between the health a nd economic aspects of tobacco. The report focused on issues such as; the costs of tobacco use, the economic rationale for government intervention in th e tobacco market, po licies to reduce demand and supply, the impact of advertising and promotion and the taxati on of tobacco products (Jha et al., 1999). This report is responsible for much of the dialogue ab out international tobacco control and provided a sound economic basis for the WHO to begin nego tiations on an internat ional health treaty focusing on tobacco.

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40 The World Health Organization (WHO) In 1996, the WHO decided to exercise thei r treaty making ability to establish the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first international public health treaty. Since its establishment in 1948, the WHO only used its constitutional powers to propose legally binding international law sparingly. Before the FCTC, the WHOs only notable contributions to binding international law were the International Health Regulations (IHR), concerning the control of three contagious diseases: cholera, plague, and yellow fever (Woo, 2002). As the scope of international law broadened beyond the traditional international la w issues of diplomacy, trade, and war to include human rights and envir onmental protection agreements, international consensus regarding health law was becoming more and more probable. This growth in international law, the inaction by other interna tional organizations of the issue of tobacco contributed to the WHOs decision to use international law to achieve its objectives by creating the FCTC. The WHO Constitution defines its wide internati onal responsibilities in the field of health generally as the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Health is very broadly defined as a state of complete physical, me ntal and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The Constitution also says that All necessary action to attain the obje ctive of the Organization is within the functions of the WHO. Since most of the functions in the W HO Constitution are administrative, technical, or developmental in nature, the WHO has been more active in these me thods of promoting health rather than in the making of international health law. The exception to this rule is Article 2(k), an enumerated function stating that the WHO may propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make recommendations with respect to internatio nal health matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the Organiza tion and are consistent with its objective. (Woo,

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41 2002). The WHO had been addressing the issue of tobacco control by issuing resolutions since 1986. As non-binding international law, the resolutions had littl e effect, so in 1996, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHOs govern ing body, passed Resolution 49.17 to begin work on the FCTC. In 1998, WHO Director-General, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland ma de global tobacco control a priority through the establishm ent of a Cabinet Project, The Tobacco Free Initiative, whose goal was to focus international attention, resources and action upon the global tobacco epidemic. Brundtland worked with WHO member states to secure a negotiating mandate for the FCTC and began mobilizing public opinion in favor of global rules for tobacco control (World Health Organization, n.d). In May 1999, the 52nd World Health Assembly opened up multilateral negotiations on the FCTC. Resolution WHA52.18 established two bodi es to draft the framework convention, to complete negotiations, and to submit the final text for consideration by the 56th World Health Assembly. These two bodies included a technica l working group to prepar e the proposed draft elements and an intergovernmental negotiating body to draft and negotiate protocols. Both bodies were open to all Member St ates and regional economic inte gration organizations to which their Member States had transferred competence over matters related to tobacco control (World Health Organization, n.d). The WHO Director-General; opened a public h earing in 2000 to provide a forum for the public health community, the toba cco industry, and farmers groups to submit their case. After six negotiating sessions were conducted by the Intergovernmental Negot iation Body (INB) the final text of the FCTC was transmitted to the 56th World Health Assembly for Consideration. On May 21, 2003, the World Health Assembly unanimously adopted the WHO FCTC.

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42 Conclusion Chapter 2 laid out the developmen t of international tobacco regul ation. It detailed the U.S. experience in regulating tobacco which began th e anti-smoking movement that inspired other countries to adopt tobacco contro l policies. Importantly, this ch apter illustrated that despite public awareness of the dangers of smoking, de veloping countries had a disproportionate and rising number of smokers when compared to hi gh income countries. The opening of tobacco markets in the 1980s in developing countries is revealed as the ke y factor responsible for that trend. These findings eventually fueled the deba te between the public h ealth community and the trade regime, which centered around the issue on whether tobacco should be restricted through trade agreements. The inherent principles behi nd free trade and the case of Thailand suggest that, presently, the trade regime is perhaps not the appropriate realm that should be used to regulate tobacco. This chapter introduced the World Bank and the World Health Organization as the leading international organi zations with respect to tobacco control. The World Bank has contributed to global tobacco pol icy by providing an economic rati onale for regulation in their landmark report Tobacco Control in Developing C ountries and has also adjusted their lending policies to discourage tobacco production and processing. The chapter concludes with the WHO's bold move to address the tobacco issue under their jurisdiction by creating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The history on the development of tobacco cont rol surveyed in this chapter suggests that international regulation is becoming a top prio rity within the international community. Regulation is becoming less of an option and more of an obligation, especially in developing countries where a disproportionate number of people are dying from smoking related diseases. It seems that the initiative taken by the international community is one that is willing to enforce its public health agenda even it means foregoing econo mic and trade principles. Chapter 3 provides

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43 an overview of the FCTC's provisions, implementa tion and enforceability w ith special attention given to the controversial provisions impac ting the economies of its signing Parties.

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44 CHAPTER 3 2003 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL Introduction The World Health Organizations Framewor k Convention on Tobacco Control is a groundbreaking treaty in many aspects: it is the first international public health tr eaty; the first treaty proposed by WHO, and the first to regula te a legal consumer good at an international level. The treaty has been signed by 168 countri es and is legally binding in 147 ratifying countries, representing over 2.3 billion people (W orld Health Organization, n.d). The FCTC reaffirms the right of all people to the highest standard of health. The treaty is unique in nature because it represents a paradigm shift in developi ng a strategy to address addictive substances. The FCTC was developed in response to the gl obalization of the tobacco epidemic which has been facilitated through a variety of complex factors with cr oss-border effects, including trade liberalization and direct foreign investment by TTC's. Other factor s also addressed by the treaty, such as global marketing, transnational toba cco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and international movement of smuggled cigarettes have also contributed to th e substantial increase in tobacco use. The Convention is intended as a global regulatory complement to national and local actions to control tobacco us e, and it is expected to facilit ate international commitments to tobacco control and harmonization of national polic ies in this area. The treaty also includes mechanisms designed to enhance the technical ca pacity of poor countries in developing tobacco control programs and strengthening their implementation (Bettcher et al ., 2001). This chapter is divided into 3 sections, each discussing one aspect of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The first section of Chapter 3 discusses the natu re of the FCTC and international law, with special attention given to the legality of the FCTC, its relationship with other existing

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45 international obligations and the process by whic h State parties to the FCTC incorporate the treaty into domestic law and policy. In addition, the general provisions set forth in the FCTC are presented. Second, this chapter fo cuses on the FCTCs articles that are most likely to impact the economies of countries that become Parties to th e treaty. This includes a discussion on the tobacco industrys argument that such provision s are detrimental to the economies of developing countries and provides findings from several st udies, namely studies conducted by the World Bank, that counter the industrys contentions. Ch apter 3 concludes with a discussion about Big Tobacco's response to the FCTC and its a ttempts to undermine its ratification and implementation. The Articles set forth in the FC TC to combat activities by the tobacco industry that undermine FCTCs efforts are also presented. FCTC and International Law The FCTC is a legally binding internati onal treaty as defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT, drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations, is respon sible for codifying and defining international law on treaties. It defines a treaty as an inte rnational agreement concl uded between States in written form and governed by intern ational law. The generic term convention is a title used for negotiations associated with international organizations, and is synonymous with the generic term treaty. The basic princi ples regarding the observance of treaties comes from Article 26 of the VCLT, which provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith (United Nations, 1963). International Treaty Law As a general rule, conventional international la w, or, treaty law, is a voluntary undertaking and its provisions are only binding only upon those states that have consented to them. The adoption of a treaty represents the close of nego tiations and is followed by its entry into force.

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46 The FCTC details the requirements for entry into force in the final clauses of the convention. In virtually all cases, multilateral treaties allow Stat es to accept the treaty by means of either (a) signature followed by ratification or (b) accession, the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty alrea dy negotiated and signed by other states. In the former case, signature is merely a prelim inary step (International Law Commission, 2005). Member States that have signed the Convention indicate that they will strive in good faith to ratify, accept, or approve it and show political commitment not to undermine the objectives set out in it. Ratification is the process whereby a state expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty, involving formal confirmation by the state of its in itial signature to the tr eaty. Ratification is normally required before a treaty becomes binding in member states. A treaty usually enters into force as international law after a certain numbe r of states ratify it. The FCTC required 40 ratifications for entry into force (Framework Co nvention Alliance, n.dB). The treaty met its 40member mark in November 2003 when Peru comp leted its ratification (Framework Convention Alliance, n.dC). In the event of a dis pute with respect to interpretation or application of the Convention, Article 27 of the FCTC states that the Parties concerned shall seek thr ough diplomatic channels a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice, including good offices, mediation or concilia tion(World Health Organization, 2005). Throughout the United Nations system, the genera l rule is that once a treaty has been adopted by an organ or conference of an interna tional organization, then th at organization takes no substantive interest in the steps to bring the tr eaty into force, except to the extent that the organization may act as a depositar y and carry out formal steps requi red in that capacity (Szasz, 1997). In the case of the FCTC, the WHO's actions are limited to symbolic steps to encourage

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47 ratification, such as recommending the treaty to its members, adopting resolutions, encouraging member nations to participate in the treaty, or requiring its executive head to report periodically on progress made in bringing the treaty into force among Member States (Blanke and Silva, 2004). International Requirements and the FCTC A series of international and domestic requirement s must be met before a treaty enters into force. Discrepancies between national obligatio ns pursuant to some international agreements and countries that have ratified the treaty may not be congruent. The WTO and other trade and investment agreements contain far reaching li beralization provisions that go beyond regulating tariffs and requiring countries to treat domestic and foreign pr oducers equally. These include provisions placing limits on country flexibility in the areas of pr oduct standards and intellectual property. Countries have a strong incentive to comply with WTO requirements since countries found violating WTO rules must either change thei r laws or face costly tr ade sanctions (Callard et al ., 2001). Normally, in the case of a conflict between two treaties, two rules of international law outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply. First is the principle of lex specialis which says that treaties of a specific natu re take precedence over treaties of a more general nature (Szasz, 1997). Second is the principle of lex posterior or the "later in time rule, which stipulates that more recent treaties will take precedence over earlier treaties. According to the International Law Commission (ILC), Lex specialis and lex posterior can apply only to States which are parties to both treatie s in question. Since the FCTC is a relatively new treaty, it is expected that these international laws will favor tobacco control measures (Blanke and Silva, 2004). With the constant negotiation of new tr ade agreements, many trade agreements will soon

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48 be "later in time." than the FCTC. This leaves the FCTC in a gray area as far as precedence over conflicting agreements. During the drafting process for the FCTC, thr ee resolutions called for the international tobacco control community to work vigorously to exclude and remove tobacco and tobacco products from bilateral and multilate ral trade agreements that woul d have negative public health consequences. The final draft of the treaty is silent on its relationship to trade agreement. (Mitka, 2000). It is still uncertain how conflicts betw een FCTC implementation and trade agreement obligations, if any, will be resolved (Callard et al ., 2001). As discussed in Chapter 2, many public health advocates have voiced concerns over the tobacco industrys reaction to FCTC provisions that may not be in the industry's best interests. The fear is that the tobacco companies will be quick to push for action to be taken against countries enforcing tobacco control laws. To da te, the only dispute rela ted to tobacco control that has arisen under WTO agreements involve d Thailands import and advertising ban on manufactured tobacco products, where a health exception under Article 20 of the GATT allowed Thailand to ban advertising on t obacco products as long as the ba n was equally applied to both domestic and imported tobacco products. Despite overlapping interests between trade and public health agreements, the WHO is working closel y with the WTO to minimize potential conflicts between the FCTC and othe r agreements (Bloom, 2001). FCTC Provisions Provisions set in the final draft of the WHO's FCTC are wide and vari ed. Main provisions include regulation of tobacco through: advertis ing, promotion and sponsor ship; illicit trade; liability; packaging and labeling; training and edu cation; and research and surveillance. FCTC also establishes instituti ons and mechanisms necessary for the functioning of the treaty, such as the Conference of Parties, the Secretariat and the dispute sett lement procedures (Framework

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49 Convention Alliance, n.dB). Most measures deal primarily with demand reducing strategies and are contained in Articles 6-14. These includ e 1) Price and tax measures to reduce demand (increasing price and taxes on tobacco products and 2) Non-pr ice measure to reduce demand, which include: Protection from exposur e to tobacco smoke Regulation of the contents of tobacco products Regulation of tobacco product disclosures Packaging and labeling of tobacco products Education, communication and public awareness Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and Demand reduction measures concerni ng tobacco dependence and cessation The core supply reduction provision s in the FCTC are contained in Articles 15-17 and include: Illicit trade (smuggling) in tobacco products Sales to and by minors; and, Provisions of support for economically viable alternative activities to tobacco production. In addition to the goals set out in the provision s, drafters say that these measures should: Raise the profile of tobacco issues in the media and legislatures around the world Give new impetus to efforts to strengthen na tional legislation and action to control the harm caused by tobacco Help mobilize national and global technical a nd financial support for tobacco control; Bring new national ministries, including those dealing with foreign affairs and finance, more deeply into the tobacco control effort; and Provide tobacco control organizations with critical opportunities to build alliances nationally and internat ionally, educate policymakers, and raise public awareness of the health hazards of tobacco and the ac tivities of the tobacco industry (Mitka, 2000). Economic Implications of the FCTC Countries that want to support the FCTC at the national level face some obstacles. According to the American Cancer Society, TTC's attempt to persuade governmental authorities and the public that smoking has economic benefits. They claim that FCTC measures to control tobacco will reduce tax revenues and increase unemployment and cigarette smuggling. Many governments seriously consider arguments of the tobacco industry that adopting the FCTC will

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50 affect the economy by reducing the fiscal gains from growing, pro cessing, manufacturing, exporting and taxing tobacco. These concerns are a formidable barrier to tobacco control. The provisions set forth in the FCTC that are most controversial in terms of negatively impacting a country's economic stability are t hose related to tobacco tax incr eases, alternatives to tobacco production, smuggling of tobacco products and control in advertising, promotion and sponsorship. This section details those FCTC provisions and develops the arguments by the tobacco industry, economists and the World Bank on why these tobacco control measures laid out by the FCTC are beneficial or detrim ental to countries that enforce them. Price and Tax Increases Tax and price increases are widely recognized as one of the most pow erful policy tools in reducing tobacco use and the single most co st-effective intervention (World Bank, 1999). Increasing the price and tax on cigarettes is cons idered an especially effective way to reduce consumption in developing countries, since people with low incomes tend to be highly sensitive to price increases (Vargas and Campos, 2005). Ar ticle 6 of the FCTC co mmits Parties to treat tobacco taxation as a health measure, rather than a fiscal measure, and encourages Parties to adopt tax and price policies to discourage to bacco consumption. Although it is difficult and undesirable to develop a common tax regime under the FCTC, it is suggested within Article 6 that each party should commit to raise its tobacco ta xes to at least the rate of growth of incomes, and considerably ahead of inflation (Action on Smoking and Health, 2002). The Article also suggests that some fraction of tobacco tax re venue should be dedica ted to funding tobacco control and cessation programs like the Truth campaigns in the U.S. Also, Article 6 stipulates that duty free sales of tobacco products should be suspended, since duty free is an unjustified tax break to travelers, and opens a back door rout e to the black market by allowing retail access to tobacco products on which the full duties have no t been paid (World Health Organization, 2005).

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51 Article 6 is the one of the more controversia l provisions in the FCTC because increasing tobacco taxes has many economic im plications for countries that opt to become Parties to the FCTC. The most common concern is that increases in tobacco taxe s will lead to reductions in tobacco tax revenues for governments. Another ar gument is that tax increases would lead to significant reductions in employ ment in tobacco growing and manufacturing, as well as more general wholesaling, retailing, and other sectors. In addition, so me TTC's argue that raising taxes on cigarettes will increase smuggling activ ity, which is a major concern for governments, especially in developing countries where crime is already a problem. Several studies indicate that that raising tobacco taxes can only be beneficial to indi viduals and governments for both financial and health reasons (World Bank, 1999; Jha et al ., 2000; Iglesias and Nicolau, 2006). Big Tobacco and some policymakers frequently argue against raising tobacco taxes on the basis that the resulting reducti on in demand will cost governme nts vital revenue. Given the relatively inelastic demand for tobacco products and the current share of t obacco taxes in price, nearly every country has substantial room fo r increasing tobacco tax revenues by increasing tobacco taxes (Sunley et al., 1999, 409). Moreover, even in countries where demand is relatively more elastic and taxes account for a relatively hi gh share of tobacco prices, increases in these taxes will lead to increases in tax revenues. A good example that illustrates the benefits of raising tobacco taxes is the Unite d Kingdom, where cigarette taxes have been raised repeatedly over the past three decades. Partly because of these increases, and partly because of the steady increase in awareness about the health cons equences of smoking, consumption has declined sharply over the same time, with the annual number of cigarettes sold falling from 138 billion to 80 billion over the last thirty years. Despite the decreasing number of sales, tobacco tax revenues for the government are still rising. For every tax increase of 1% in the U.K.,

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52 government revenues increased between 0.6 and 0.9 percent. In 1999, a model developed by Sunley et al. (1999) using the experiences of the UK and several other countries indicated that an increase of 10% in cigarette ta xes would lead to an increase of almost 7%, on average in cigarette tax revenues (Sunley et al., 1999). Advocates of the FCTC argue that policym akers should hope that tobacco consumption falls to such low levels that, eventually, tob acco tax revenues would be gin to fall as well. Ideally, an ultimate loss in government revenu e would be considered a success, since the ultimate aim for the FCTC is to benefit public hea lth. Based on current patterns, the number of smokers is expected to grow in low income countr ies over the next three de cades so it is unlikely that raising taxes would affect re venue in the short run. Because it is a possibility that in the long term governments may indeed lose tobacco tax revenues, FCTC panels encourage governments to introduce alternative income taxes or consum ption taxes that would replace the revenue from tobacco taxes (World Health Organization, 2005). Smuggling The second most common argument against FCTC provisions for raising tobacco taxes is that doing so will contribute to increased cigare tte smuggling and criminal activity. Each year, approximately 400 million cigarettes are illegall y smuggled across international borders, making cigarettes the worlds most widely smuggled le gal consumer product (World Bank, 1999). This presents a major problem, especially for developing countries because it allows for the evasion of duty fees and taxes that would normally go towards improvi ng public health, education and infrastructure. Normally, cigarettes legitimately move through an in-tr ansit regime without bearing tax until they reach their final end mark et, at which point tax is payable. Most smuggling involves the cigarettes moving out of the untaxed distribution chain and entering the final end-market illegally, ofte n through a third country. Th is can happen by legal export

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53 followed by illegal re-import or cigarettes in trans it may be diverted from the legal to the illegal distribution chain (Campaign fo r Tobacco Free Kids, 2001B). One of the key measures in the FCTC is the development of a regime to tackle tobacco smuggling, an issue important for both fiscal and human health. Under Article 15 of the FCTC, Parties accept a number of obligations which are ai med at eliminating illicit tobacco trade. They accept these obligations recognizing that the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco products, including smuggling, illicit manufactu ring and counterfeiting, and the development of and implementation of related national law, in addition to sub-regional, regional and global agreements, are essential com ponents of tobacco control (World Health Organization, 2005). It has been argued by the TTCs that higher ta xes will contribute to increased cigarette smuggling and associated criminal activity. In fact, the TTCs advise governments to reduce tobacco tax rates in order to discourage sm uggling (Bialous and Shatenstein, 2002). Some studies have shown that even in the face of high rates of smuggling, tax increases bring increased revenues and reduce cigare tte consumption (Mackay et al ., 2006; World Bank, 1999). While smuggling is a serious problem, and while steep differing tax rates betw een countries are an incentive to smugglers, the appropriate response to the smuggling problem is not to reduce tax rates or forego tax increases. Instead, taxes should be increased and governments should be more vigilant against crime (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001B). One particular study that looke d at reducing tobacco taxes to counter smuggling activity references Canadas experience in 1991. The Canadian government cut taxes sharply because they were experiencing an increase in smuggling activities. As a result of the tax cut, the prevalence of smoking among the entire population rose as a whole and federal tobacco tax revenues fell by more than twi ce as much as predicted (Jha et al 1999). In South Africa,

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54 tobacco taxes were raised by more than 450% in the 1990s. On average, smuggling activity rates rose from 0% to 6% duri ng that time and sales fell by 20%. Despite an increase in smuggling, total tax revenues more than doubled (Jha et al ., 1999). In order maintain or even increase government revenue despite the preval ence of smuggling, the FCTC encourages the harmonization of cigarette tax rates between ne ighboring countries and advises governments to crack down on crime associated with the illicit trade of cigarettes. Tobacco Advertising Promotion and Sponsorship The tobacco industry spends billions of do llars per year on advertising, marketing and promotion. In the United States alone, with le ss than 5 percent of the worlds smokers, tobacco companies spent over US$8 billion on advertis ing and promotional expenditures in 1999 (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001A). The FCTC includes non-price measures to control tobacco advertising and promotion, since the only form of advertising restrictions in some countries are voluntarily adopted by the tobacco industry and prove to be ineffective (Bialous and Shatenstein, 2002). Article 13 of the FCTC details the conditions set on tobacco related advertising and promotion: Each Partyshall undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. This shall includea co mprehensive ban on cross-border advertising, promotion and sponsorship orig inating from its territory. As a minimum, and in accordance with its constitution or constitutional principles, each Party shall:(a) Prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising promotion and sponsorship that promote a tobacco product by any means that ar e false, misleading or deceptive or likely to create erroneous impressions about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions. (World Health Organization, 2005). Tobacco advertising is defined as any co mmercial communication whose main, secondary or incidental aim or effect is to promote a to bacco brand or to promote tobacco use (FCA, 2001). Direct and indirect advertising methods include sponsoring sporti ng events and teams; promoting

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55 rock concerts and discos; placing their brand l ogos on t-shirts, backpacks and other merchandise popular with children; branding non-tobacco items with tobacco brands and logos such as clothing, holidays and contests; and giving away fr ee cigarettes and brand merchandise in areas where young people gather, such as at rock conc erts, discos and shopping malls (Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B). It is important for policymakers who are in terested in controlling tobacco, while maintaining government revenue, to know whether cigarette advertising and promotion affect consumption. Based on the strength of current studies, the World Bank recently concluded that bans on advertising and promotion prove to be e ffective, but only if they are comprehensive, covering all media and all uses of brand names an d logos (Jha et al., 1999 ). There is a strong debate about the impact of cigarette advertisi ng on consumers. Public health advocates argue that such advertising increases consumption. The tobacco industry has argued that advertising does not recruit new smokers, it merely encourages confirmed smokers to stay with, or switch to a particular brand (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2001A). Since empirical studies on the issue of whether cigarette advertising increase s demand have been historically inconclusive, researchers have turned instead to studying what happens when tobacco advertising and promotion are banned in order to determ ine if consumption rises or falls. A recent study of 22 high income countries based on data from 1970 to 1992 concluded that comprehensive bans on cigarette advertising can reduce smoking, but par tial bans have little to no effect (Framework Convention Alliance, 2001A). Another study of 102 countries found that per-capita cigarette consump tion in countries with comprehens ive (total) declined by about 8 %, while consumption rates in countries with partial bans declined by only 1% ( Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B).

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56 While many tobacco users generally know that tobacco use is harmful, studies show that most are unaware of the true risks, even in c ountries in which there has been a great deal of publicity about the health hazards of tobacco (Nathan, 2004). In 1999, the World Bank said that, Peoples knowledge of the health risks of smoking appears to be partial at best, especially in lowand middle-income countries where inform ation about these hazards is limited. The FCTCs alliance believes that health warning labe ls help inform consumers of these dangers and are an important component in a national health education program at no cost to the government (Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B). Hea lth warnings labels are now required in the majority of countries and increasi ngly creative methods are being us ed to present their messages. In one of its strongest provisions, Article 11 of the FCTC requires that warning messages should cover at least 50% of the principal display areas of the package (i.e. both the front and back), but at a minimum must cover at least 30% of the principal display areas (Mackay et al ., 2006). It also requires that the messages be rotated and encourages the use of pictures and pictograms as well as the use of non-health messages (e.g. Quit smoking Save money) (World Health Organization, 2005). Misleading words implying redu ced health risk, such as light or mild are also prohibited. The tobacco industry has argued that neither in creasing the size of the warning labels nor the use of pictures will be any more effective than the existing labels in reducing consumption (Framework Convention Alliance, 2001B). In Pola nd in the late 1990s, new warning labels that occupy 30 % of the two largest sides on the cigarett e pack were found to be strongly linked with smokers decisions to quit. In Australia, warn ing labels were streng thened in 1995 and also proved to have been greater in causing smokers to quit than when the olde r, less strongly worded labels were used. In Canada, a survey suggested that half of the smokers intending to quit or cut

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57 back their consumption were motivated by what they had read on their cigarette packs after warning labels were made more graphic (Jha et al., 1999). One key wea kness of warning labels that is noted by the World Bank is that they wi ll not reach some poorer i ndividuals, particularly in developing countries since it is common to buy cigarettes singly rather than in packs. If consumption rates fall dram atically as a result of the FCTCs provisions requiring its signing Parties to undertake non pr ice measures such as comprehensive bans on all forms of advertising and requiring stronge r warning labels, it is expected that government revenues from tobacco sales would decrease. Advocates of the FCTCs advertising provisions argue that such impact on revenue would be gradual, and any lo sses due to advertising and promotion bans would be offset by the increase in revenue ge nerated by increasing toba cco tax rates (World Bank, 1999). Economically Viable Alternatives to Tobacco As tobacco is an important cash crop in some countries, Articles 4.6, 17 and the Preamble of the FCTC urges countries to promote economica lly viable alternatives for those involved in tobacco production. The Framework Convention Alliance says that economic incentives can encourage tobacco farmers and workers involved in cigarette manufacturing and distribution to shift towards more productive t ypes of employment, improving ove rall public welfare without sacrificing livelihoods or creating undue hardship (Mackay et al ., 2006): Article 17 Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent international and regional intergovernmental organizations, pr omote, as appropriate economically viable alternatives for tobacco wor kers, growers and as the case may be, individual sellers. Article 4.6 The importance of technical and financial assi stance to aid the economic transition of tobacco growers whose livelihoods are seriousl y affected as a consequence of tobacco control programs in developing country Part ies, as well as Parties with economies in

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58 transition, should be recognized and addressed in the context of nationally developed strategies for sustainable development. Preamble: Mindful of the social and ec onomic difficulties that t obacco control programs may engender in the medium and long term in so me developing countries and countries with economies in transition, and recognizing their need for technical and financial assistance in the context of nationally developed st rategies for sustainable development. Tobacco is grown in over 120 countries, of which about 80 are developing countries. Globally, tobacco production has doubled since the 1960s, totaling 6.5 million metric tons in 2004 (Mackay et al., 2006). In developing countr ies, increasing demand and favorable policies have resulted in a threefold in crease in production, while producti on has declined by more than 50% in developed countries. Four countries account for two-thirds of the total global production: China was responsible for 42 % of a ll tobacco grown, with the U.S., India, and Brazil producing 24% between them. Assessing the way falling demand will affect tobacco farming communities is critical for countries that want to become Party to the FCTC. Studies in most high income countries suggest tobacco gr owing areas have been diversifying and making successful economic adjustments for decades (Jha et al ., 1999). The Framework Convention Alliance believes that countries should take measur es at the national level to explore alternatives to tobacco crops, encourage diversification a nd develop mechanisms to promote alternative livelihoods. They argue that similar substituti on programs have been supported by governments for other products. The success and impact of cr op diversification in developing countries has not been thoroughly established. Another risk in encouraging alternatives to tobacco agriculture, manufacturing and production is governments fear of creating unemploym ent. This fear is mainly derived from the arguments of the tobacco industry, which say that c ontrol measures will result in millions of job losses around the world (Framework Convention Allianc e, n.dA). For all but a very few agrarian

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59 countries heavily dependent on tobacco farming, such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, the World Bank argues that that there would be no net loss of jobs, and there might be job gains if global tobacco consumption fell. This is because m oney once spent on tobacco would be spent on other goods and services, thereby generating more jobs. It is predicted that even the few tobacco dependent economies will have a market big enough to ensure their jobs for many years, even in the face of gradually declining demand because w ith the numbers of smoke rs set to rise, this process will occur over many decades. (Ranson et al., 1999). Big Tobacco and the FCTC The tobacco industry was against a strong, lega lly binding FCTC, and originally felt that The WHOs Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [was] fundamentally flawed and [would] not achieve its object ives (British American Tobacco, 2000). For most TTCs, the FCTC represents an unprecedented challenge to the tobacco industry's freedom to continue doing business," as noted in a BA T industry document proposing a br oad strategy to confront the WHO (World Health Organization, 2000). Seve ral tobacco industry doc uments detail the industrys anticipation and concern ove r the implementation of the FCTC: Now that the World Health assembly has c onducted and approved the process to proceed with the drafting of the [FCTC] and the accomp anying protocols, it is timely that we now take stock and draw up a strategy and ac tion for the coming year (World Health Organization, 2000). BAT and PMI say that they support the FCTC's attempts to regulate tobacco internationally. A BAT industry document says that they Accept that tobacco should be regulated, but are in favor of sensible regulati on, and feel that FCTC is a one-size-fits-all approach and needs to be looked at more nationa lly, [Since] what may work in one country may not work in another country ( World Health Organization, 2000). Accord ing to Phillip Morris website, their position on th e FCTC is a positive one:

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60 The FCTC marks a big step forward because it sets global standards for tobacco control measures. We hope it will encourage more governments to move towards comprehensive tobacco regulation that is, a regulatory framework where fiscal policy, consumer information, licensing and other measures compleme nt each other. Above all, the FCTC is an opportunity to take a fresh look at tobacco regulation, to ask what measures are most likely to reduce the harm done by smoking and to combine those measures into effective regulatory regimes (Phillip Morris International, n.d). In 2000, the WHO released a report detailing th e tobacco industrys tactics in obstructing tobacco control policy processes. The report found that the tobacco companies spent vast amounts of money diverting attention away from th e public health issues raised by tobacco use, attempted to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy activities ca rried out by the WHO and sought to foster views that WHOs tobacco c ontrol programs were a First World agenda carried out at the expense of the developing wo rld (Framework Convention Alliance, n.dA). It has also been noted that the tobacco industry ha s interfered in the implementation process in countries who were already Parties to the FCTC Three weeks after Mexico ratified the FCTC, both Phillip Morris and BAT conducted private negotiations with the Ministry of Health that led to an agreement that prevented the government from raising taxes if the tobacco companies would, in return, fund certain unrelated health pr ograms. That agreement led to the defeat of numerous tobacco control regulations, including tax increases and an advertising ban called for by the treaty. After international uproar about the agreement between the industry and the Ministry of Health erupted, Congress successfu lly passed annual tobacco tax increases through 2009 (Sebrei, 2006). Industry documents also show Philip Morris/Al tria profiled regions to determine which countries would support the tr eaty, and would be susceptibl e to industry influence: Clearly, there is a marked contrast between t hose end markets that have capability to act (Argentina, China, Germany)and the big pl ayers that [will] be a priority (Brazil, Germany. Japan). We may want to put so me thought to establishing a core group of managers from around the world to target thes e countries. More sn iper, less scatter gun (Bialous and Shatenstein, 2002).

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61 In light of the evidence that the tobacco i ndustry was prepared to strategize against the ratification and implementation of the FCTC the WHO included provisions to provide governments with the support of the international community to sta nd up to interference from the tobacco industry. The FCTCs Preamble, Artic le 12(e), Article 20.4(c) and Article 5.3 each mention the responsibility of the Parties to prot ect tobacco control measures from the tobacco industry. Article 5.3 of the FCTC states that; In setting and implementing thei r public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law (World Health Organization, 2005). Recognizing the need to be alert to any e fforts by the tobacco i ndustry to undermine or subvert tobacco control efforts and the need to be informed of activities of the tobacco industry that have a negative im pact on tobacco control efforts (World Health Organization, 2005). Each Party shall cooperate w ith competent international or ganizations to progressively establish and maintain a global system to re gularly collect and di sseminate information on tobacco production, manufacture and the activi ties of the tobacco industry which have an impact on the Convention or nati onal tobacco cont rol activities (World Health Organization, 2005). Conclusion Chapter 3 introduced the FCTC and described it s legality, provisions, and context within the international legal system. Most importan tly, Chapter 3 laid out those FCTC provisions deemed most controversial in terms of the ec onomic impact they would have on the FCTCs signing Parties: increasing tobacco price and ta xes, tobacco advertising and sponsorship and support for economically viable alternatives to tobacco. Analysis by health economists concluded in most cases that the FCTC will not harm national economies, even those of tobacco growing nations, especially as the FCTC deal s primarily with demand reduction strategies, except for the control of smuggling. Much of the evidence supporting the FCTCs tobacco control measures is from high income countries For developing countries, where the FCTCs

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62 economic implications are of most interest, only theoretical implications have been made. The next chapter looks at the economic impact of FCTCs provisions in a developing countryspecific setting. Using Brazil s experience in ratifying and implementing FCTCs tobacco control measures will help to determine if a de veloping country with strong interests in tobacco can enact strong anti-tobacco measures to impr ove health without hurting their economy.

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63 CHAPTER 4 TOBACCO CONTROL IN BRAZIL Brazil has established itself as a global leader in tobacco control. Brazils legislation controlling tobacco has been praised for its st rength, comprehensiveness and integration of measures at the national, state and municipal levels (Blanke and Silva, 2004). Strikingly, Brazil has achieved these results even though tobacco pl ays an important role in its economy. Brazil has a population of 186 million living in more than 5500 municipalities located in 26 states, and the capital, the Federal District of Brasilia. With over 750,000 tobacco growers, Brazil is the world's largest tobacco leaf exporter, third larg est tobacco producer and eighth largest cigarette exporter (Blanke and Silva, 2004) The primary goal for this chapter is to examine Brazils tobacco control policies and determine whether those policies were detrimental to the economy to date. This assessment will require a discussion about tobacco control policies prior to the FCTC, the FCTCs ratification in Brazil, enforcement of those policies, and most importantly, whether those policies actually decreased tobacco consumption amongst the Brazil ian population. It is im portant to note that although Brazil did not ratify the FCTC until 2005, t obacco control policies were already in sync with a majority of the FCTCs provisions. E ffects of tobacco contro l policies on Brazils economy can be interpreted as strong indicato rs of the FCTCs effects on the economy of a developing country. First, this chapter discusses the tobacco ec onomy in Brazil. Next, it reviews Brazils tobacco control policies before it became a party to the FCTC. This includes a discussion about tobacco regulations that were put in place du ring the 1990s when Brazilians were becoming increasingly concerned with th e health effects of tobacco. Third, a discussion about Brazils ratification of the FCTC and the obstacles that public health officials encountered while the

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64 Treaty was being debated in the Senate. Las tly, this chapter will examine several studies assessing Brazils efforts in finding economically viable alternatives to tobacco farming, its experiences with regard to t obacco tax revenues despite decr eases in consumption, and its struggle with the illegal trade of tobacco products. Brazils Tobacco Economy Brazilian cigarette manufacturing began in 190 3 in Rio de Janeiro with the founding of Souza Cruz, the country's first tobacco compa ny. Souza Cruz became a subsidiary of British American Tobacco (BAT) in 1914, and BAT current ly owns 75% of the company. Plantations established in the southern stat es of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paran in the 1920s and 1930s introduced Virginia and Burley tobacco varieties in the 1950s. In the 1980s, Brazil's tobacco processing facilities were modernized and a genetically manipulated strain of high nicotine tobacco was smuggled into the country by BAT's North American subsidiary, Brown and Williamson Tobacco, which increased demand fo r Brazilian tobacco. The cigarette export sector expanded rapidly and by 1994, Brazil was the world's third la rgest tobacco producer (after China, USA, and India), the world's top exporter of tobacco leaf, and th e world's eighth largest cigarette exporter (Shafey et al ., 2002). In 2002, Souza Cruz was Brazil's fourth larges t company, controlling 84% of the legitimate domestic cigarette market, employing 5046 people, and reporting profits of more than US$253 million on sales of US$1.044 billion in 2000. Ph ilip Morris International dominates the remainder of Brazil's cigarette ma rket (Vargas and Campos, 2005). Currently, Brazil is the biggest tobacco exporter and the thir d largest tobacco producer in the world (Vargas and Campos, 2005). In 2000 it produced 595,000 metric tons of tobacco leaves and exported 341,000 tons which brought in US$ 961.2 million in revenues (Vargas and Campos, 2005). The position reac hed by Brazil in the world tob acco leaf marketplace can be

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65 attributable to: (1) the comparatively low co st of production, resulting mainly from the employment of tobacco growers and their familie s, which means less spending on salaries, (2) the integrated production system, involving contr acts directly between farmers and the industry and (3) the high quality of the tobacco produced in Brazil (Vargas and Campos, 2005). With regard to opportunities for the Br azilian tobacco in the international market, a combination of circumstances, such as the decrease of world stocks and the reduction of tobacco production in Zimbabwe and in the U.S. have helped Brazil ma intain its position as th e biggest world exporter (National Cancer Institu te of Brazil, 2002). Tobacco represents an important source of permanent jobs. The tobacco industry has argued that enacting tobacco control policies will result in million of job losses in Brazil. The Brazilian Tobacco Growers Association (AFU BRA) claims that there are approximately 1.5 million people working in a tobacco related sector There are no government studies that support or even come close to these estimates. Surv eys carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) indicate that AFUBRA significantly overestimates the number of workers associated both directly and indi rectly with the tobacc o industry. In IBGEs comparative analysis of the total number of people employed in the production, distribution, manufacturing and all other activities associ ated with tobacco between 1996 and 2000 they concluded that the maximum numb er persons working in tobacco were less that one million (Iglesias and Nicolau, 2005). Whatever the numbe rs, it is clear that the tobacco industry is important to the Brazilian economy. The amount j obs that the industry provides is often skewed by the TTC's in order to strengthen the argum ent that tobacco control policies will have a negative effect on the economy.

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66 Tobacco Control before the FCTC The first time the Brazilian people were offi cially given information about the health effects of tobacco came in 1987, when the Ministry of Health established an Advisory Board on Tobacco Use Control. Three years later, and in spired by U.S. actions, Brazils Ministry of Health issued Ruling No. 490, which recommended th at smoking be restrict ed in indoor public places, that tobacco advertising should be regulat ed, and that tobacco companies include health warnings on all tobacco product packaging and advertisements was mandatory (Cavalcante, 2004). Health warning labels were to be writte n clearly, in contrasting colors and would read The Ministry of Health Advises: Smoking causes damage to health6 (Blanke and Silva, 2004). Public campaigns against tobacco grew in importa nce as tobaccos harmfu l side effects became known, and radio and TV campaigns discussi ng the effects of secondhand smoke began changing public perceptions on smoking. In 1989, the Brazilian Nati onal Cancer Institute ( Instituto Nacional de Cncer ) (INCA), under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, started the National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP). The NTCP sought to strengthen regu lations on cigarette heal th warnings. In 1994, NTCP proposed a bill banning all direct and i ndirect advertising and promotion of tobacco products and required stricter health warning labe ls. When the proposed bill arrived in congress, an intense debate about its constitutionality broke out between the government and the tobacco industry and its allies, which incl uded advertising profe ssionals and representatives of television and radio advertisers (Cavalcante, 2003). The industr y and its allies argued that the bill violated their corporate freedom of expression. Tobacco control advocates welcomed this debate because they felt it provided additional publ icity about the harmful effects of smoking (Silva, 2003). The 6 Portuguese Cigarette Pack Health Warning: O Ministrio de Sade Aler ta: Fumar Faz Mau a Sade

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67 outcome of this debate was relatively weak le gislation that restrict ed tobacco advertising between the hours of 9pm and 6pm and included less assertive warnings on cigarette packs. Tobacco control measures in the early 1990s we re not as strong as public health advocates would have liked, but studies show that thes e measures did have an impact on cigarette consumption (Silva et al ., 1999). Decreases in real cigarett e prices in 1990-1991 because of high inflation rates and between 1992 and 1994 should have led to an increase in consumption, but it actually fell in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This suggests th at the usual effects of lower prices was counteracted by other factors such as health warnings on cigarette packs, limits on indoor smoking and restrictions on tobacco advertising (Silva et al ., 1999). In 1999, the creation of a regulatory agency repr esented a landmark in tobacco control for Brazil. The National Health Surveillance Agency ( Agncia Nacional de Vigilncia Sanitria ), ANVISA, was set up in order to regu late and enforce laws that re stricted tobacco packaging and advertisements. In 2000, the Senate passed a tobacco advertising ban, covering ads on television, radio, newspapers, magazines, outd oor billboards and merchandising. The new law also prohibited tobacco sponsorship of sports and cultural events, with a two year grace period to end all sponsorship contracts (Blanke and Silva, 2004). Both tobacco growers and manufacturers alleged that such measures woul d promote a negative social and economic impact to the tobacco industry (US Department of Agriculture, 2007). ANVISA Resolution No.46 (2001) made Brazil the first country in the wo rld to prohibit the use of any labeling or advertising of tobacco products as mild light or low tar. In 2006, the U.S. passed the same law restricting the use of those same term s. Table 4.1 lists ANVISAs tobacco control regulations in recent years.

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68 Table 4-1. Recent Brazilian tobacco regulations Federal Tobacco Legislation Year Tobacco Control Provision Resolution 46 2001 Banned the use of the terms light mild and low tar in labeling of cigarette packs. Resolution 104 2001 Mandated the inserti on of images and warnings that must cover 100% of one of the largest surfaces on each tobacco product. Resolution 302 2002 Banned sales of f ood and packages promoting tobacco products. Resolution 14 2003 Banned the use of se ntences like only for adults and replaced them with: Prohibits sales to all persons under eighteen. Resolution 15 2003 Bans online sale s and advertisements: Prohibits Advertisements in newspapers, magazines, internet and national events. Resolution 335 2003 Called for more aggressive and graphic images and messages to be printed images obtained from real patients In addition to the provisions detailed in Figure 4.1, the beginn ings of the FCTC negotiation process and the Brazilian governments involv ement with the FCTC negotiations reflected further strengthened political will to regulat e tobacco (Cavalcante, 2003). In 2003, Resolution 335 called for even stricter and more graphic warn ing labels. Today, warni ng labels in Brazil are extremely graphic. The images consist of pa tients with amputated limbs, photos of actual smokers' lungs, and fetuses affected by smoking. The most recent images play on the fact that smoking can cause impotence. A survey conducted shortly after Resolution 335 was passed found that these images caused 67% of smokers to think about quitting smoking and caused 54% to change their opinions about the health effects of smoking (Blanke and Silva, 2004). The tobacco industry, perceiving these changes in soci al perception as a threat to the well being of the industry, began obscuring the wa rnings by inserting pamphlets si milar in size to the warning labels between the cigarette pack and the wrappi ng film. By doing this, warning labels were hidden within the pamphlet and would easily fall out of the pack once the consumer opened the product. As the agency responsible for enfo rcing resolutions on t obacco packaging, ANVISA

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69 imposed fines on Philip Morris and British Ameri can Tobacco for violating mandatory health warning regulations (ANVISA, n.d). Aside from laws banning advertising and promoting health warnings, the Brazilian government also passed a resolution forbidding th e Central Bank of Brazil from issuing loans for tobacco production in partnership or associati on with the tobacco indus try. This decision took place after the Brazilian government discovered that resources allocated to the National Program for the Strengthening of Family Farming (PRONAF ) were being used to subsidize tobacco crops because of the intervention by tobacco companies (National Cancer Institu te of Brazil, 2004). Although the governments in tentions were not aimed at rest ricting tobacco loans to improve health, it was a decision that rest ricted tobacco in general and br ought into question the integrity of the TTCs operating in Brazil. These national measures illustrate Brazils ear ly commitments to t obacco control, even before the FCTC negotiations began. Although mo st of the regulation was adopted before the FCTC came into force, most Br azilian tobacco regulations were already in accordance with the FCTC provisions. Brazil and the FCTC After having played an important role in the negotiations of the FCTC, Brazil was the second country to sign on the first day it was av ailable for signature. The Brazilian Congress began reviewing the FCTC text on August 27, 2003, afte r its official presenta tion to the House of Representatives by the Minister of Health. Having been granted th e rank of highest priority, the issue did not have to be considered by a Special House Committee a nd its ratification was approved on May 13, 2004 and sent to the Senate. A move to give the FCTC priority was halted at the request of a Senator who represented the Southern region where a majority of Brazils tobacco is grown. The Senator said his request wa s based on the desire to carefully consider the

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70 situation of the tobacco growers. Controversy arose over the Senators co ncerns because he was linked with officials from the Brazilian T obacco Industry Association (AFUBRA), a high ranking member organization of the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA). ITGA and its member organizations have notoriously b een linked with and influenced by the TTC's in various countries (Bialous, 2004). Ratification of the FCTC was put on hold while the Senate called pub lic hearings on the economic impact of tobacco control policies. At the same time, AFUBRA launched surveys on its website, which asked peoples opinions on WHOs proposal to eradi cate tobacco. Even though the FCTC does not prohibit countries fr om planting tobacco, neither does it force countries to replace tobacco growing with alterna tive crops (National Cancer Institute of Brazil, 2004). AFUBRA also ran advertisements and generated press reports supporting its stance against Brazils ratification of the FCTC in regi onal and national news media, emphasizing that the economic benefits of tobacco and the eradi cation of tobacco would cause millions of job losses and prompt a mass rural exodus in additi on to billions of dollars in lost government revenue (Bialous, 2004). In August 2004, the Senate issued its opinion in favor of ratification. A tobacco industry dominated chamber under the Ministry of Agricu lture called for delaying the decision until after municipal elections were held during the following October. Despite the e fforts of governmental and non-governmental groups to clarify that ratif ication would not mean an immediate end to tobacco production, ratification was postponed with no new date set for reconsideration. The industrys assertions that major economic loss and social unrest would foll ow ratification of the FCTC made headlines in Braz il and were effective in pos tponing FCTC discussions. Organizations such as National Cancer Instit ute (INCA) and the National Tobacco Program

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71 (NTCP) worked hard to counter and dispel what they called misinformation about the FCTCs provisions. It was important for public health advocates to attract attention to the issue because if Brazil failed to ratify the FCTC, a message of inconsistency would be sent to the international community, since Brazil had a lead ing role during the whole negotiation process. The medical community played an important ro le in the struggle to approve th e FCTC, sending letters to each senator, asking for their support of its approval. In addition, public health advocates participated in public pro-FCTC hearing held in tobacco growing communities. After two years of negotiation in the Senate, on November 3, 2005, th e Brazilian government finally ratified the FCTC. Impact of Control Measures The impact of Brazils tobacco control legisl ation remains difficult to measure. Although direct evidence is not available to attribute change s in cigarette consumption to specific laws and programs, few observers doubt that Brazils laws are important f actors in reducing consumption. Indirect evidence of Brazils su ccess or failure in reducing tobacco consumption can be deduced based on: (1) comparisons between the prevalence of smoking in large Brazilian cities, (2) the declining cigarette sales in the country. The onl y national survey on smoking available that can be used for comparison with present consum ption rates was carried out in a 1989 national household survey conducted by the Ministry of Health. In 2003, the World Health Survey carried out by the WHO used similar variables, cluster sampling procedures and applied them to all Brazilian households. The 1989 survey used two questions to evaluate smoking: (1) Do you smoke cigarettes, a pipe or cigars? and (2) H ow much do you smoke per day? The 2003 survey also asked similar quest ions: (1) Do you currently smoke any tobacco product? (2) If yes, what amount? More cu rrent studies based on these co mparative household surveys

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72 conclude that smoking prevalen ce in Brazil has decreased si gnificantly between 1990 and 2004. The most comprehensive study on the subject, pu blished by the WHO, is Monteiro et al.s Population based evidence of a strong decline in the prevalence of smokers in Brazil that concluded that smoking prevalence dropped from 34.8% in 1989 to 22.4% in 2003, a decrease of approximately 35% over 14 years (Monteiro et al ., 2007). This particular study attributes the decline to: (1) A concentration of efforts on behalf of the Brazilian governments NTCP, and (2) The total ban on cigarette advertising and promotion. Although cigarette consumption is still hi gh, the 22.4% prevalence places Brazil in a favorable position in relation to other count ries undergoing economic transition. In the Americas, the percentage of smokers in Brazil is closer to that of the U.S. (20.8% in 2004) and Canada (20% in 2005) than to that of other Latin American countries such as Mexico (34.8% in 1998), Cuba (37.2% in 1995), or Ar gentina (40.4% in 2000) (Monteiro et al ., 2007). Tobacco Farming in Brazil Recognizing the impact that a drop in cons umption will have on the long term production demand, governments who are party to the FCTC s earch for economically viable alternatives for tobacco growers. Tobacco production and proce ssing are very important economic activities in the southern states of Brazil where the hilly terrain in conducive to growing tobacco. Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paran accoun t for almost 90% of the land devoted to tobacco farming and for 93% of the tobacco produced in the country. According to the Brazilian Tobacco Growers Association (A FUBRA), more than 600 districts and almost 160,000 growers, mainly small landowners, are involved in growing tobacco in these states. Although there is an increasing will to stop planting tobacco, partic ularly by tobacco farmers from the Southern region, a 2002 survey showed that 74.7% of tob acco growers in the South want to stop growing tobacco, but feel lack of support from the government in doing so (Etges et al ., 2002).

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73 Evidence of economically viable alternatives to tobacco growing is scarce, so many countries are hesitant to even c onsider large scale transitions aw ay from tobacco. Most studies only theorize on the impacts that such transitions would have on local an d national economies. In Brazil, there has been one ma jor study that examines the econom ic impact of tobacco control policies that encourage the s ubstitution of tobacco crops. Crop Substitution and Diversification Strategies: Empirical Evidence from Selected Brazilian Municipalities, by M.A. Vargas and R. Campos was commissioned in 2004 by the World Bank and analyzes three selected experiences of diversification and crop substi tution in the South of Brazil. This study concluded that there are viable alternatives for tobacco crops, which have provided equivalent net returns and more sustainable livelihoods (Varga s and Campos, 2005). Despit e obstacles, the case studies demonstrate that specific development programs, placed within broader rural development programs make it possible to switch from tobacco to alternative crops, even in regions that are heavily reliant on tobacco. Also, the three cas e studies show that efforts to foster crop substitution have been linked w ith identification of new market channels and opportunities for adding more value to alternative f ood crops (Vargas and Campos, 2005, 7). Vargas and Campos study focused on the munici palities of Santa Cruz do Sul, Schroeder and Santa Rosa de Lima. Santa Cruz do Sul, al so referred to as The Brazilian Capital of Tobacco is an important area for the Brazilian to bacco industry because of its network of small family farms that are closely linked to TTCs. Most municipalities surrounding the area of Santa Cruz do Sul are significantly dependent on activi ties associated with the tobacco industry. During the 1990s, the region became highly vulnerable to the competitive pressures that came about when the TTCs began increasing tobacco production in other developing countries. The modernization of tobacco plants that came about as a result of that increased competition resulted

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74 in drastic job losses. Several in itiatives to diversify from tobacco began taking place soon after. The Center of Assistance for Small Farmers (CAP A) played a key role in assisting farmers in selling agro-ecological products th at included vegetables, rice and erva-mate (Brazilian tea). The average annual income from tobacco per family had been estimated at US$ 1,181 compared to $US 4,684 estimated for families associated with CAPA initiatives (Vargas and Campos, 2005). Another pilot project in this area, th e Association of Brazilian Fish Farmers ( Braspeixe ) was supported by the municipal Secretary of Agriculture, the State Government and the University of Santa Cruz do Sul. Although this pr oject is still in its fi rst stages, Vargas and Campos say that the project has already created 50 reservoirs representing 20 small farms and intends to serve as a model for divers ification away from tobacco. In the state of Santa Catarina, both the m unicipalities of Schroeder and Santa Rosa de Lima were less reliant on income from tobacco gr owing activities than in Santa Cruz do Sul. In these areas, the success of crop substitution initia tives were aided by the existence of favorable conditions for growing alternative crops. In Sc hroeder, tobacco was phased out gradually and has not been grown since 2001. Farmers in this municipality were di ssatisfied with their dependence on tobacco and its dwindling revenues. Ninety two growers got together and formed the Banana Producer's Associat ion of Schroeder (ABS) and sl owly diversified away from tobacco. The gross income per hectare was a pproximately US$2700 for bananas, a considerably higher net income than they had experienced when growing tobacco, although figures were not given (Vargas and Campos, 2005). In Santa Ro sa de Lima, tobacco was attractive for its profitability and for providing fina ncial security to farmers beca use sales were guaranteed. In the mid 1990s government restrictions on agricu ltural benefits for tobacco products and the volatility of the tobacco market resulted in revenue loss by producers and led many of them to

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75 give up tobacco production. The Federal Univer sity and the States government agency for agricultural research and rural extension services (EPAGRI) cam e together to support tobacco transition towards organic food crops. The Brazilian National Agency for Small Business (SEBRAE) also helped cover farmers' training costs. In this muni cipality, the value of agricultural production for toba cco decreased from 82.17% in 1994 to 64.68% in 2002 (Vargas and Campos, 2005). The 17.49% difference was s ubstituted successfully with organic food production. Although Vargas and Campos results were fa vorable and indicate that tobacco control policies that encourage crop dive rsification, as stated by FCTC Article 17, three significant barriers remain: 1) farmers financial dependenc e on tobacco companies, 2) public policies to support the tobacco industry and 3) the high profitability from tobacco crops, especially when compared with other traditional food crops (Vargas and Campos, 2005). The most significant barrier to crop diversif ication is farmers financial dependence on tobacco companies. Brazilian tobacco farming i nvolves an integrated production system where contractual obligations between small farmers and TTCs exists. Within this system, TTCs provide all inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pe sticides and irrigation sy stems and guarantee the purchase of each farmers entire tobacco crop. In exchange, farmers are bound to selling the crop for what4ever price the TTC demands. This system allows TTCs to assume complete control over the tobacco value ch ain at local levels (Vargas an d Campos, 2001). Vargas and Campos explain that this system has become a strong mechanism to increase farmers dependence on tobacco companies. Vargas and Campos second barrier to successful crop are the public policies that presently support the tobacco industry. Since tobacco growing in Brazil is concentrated in several specific regions in th e South that are much more heavily dependent on

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76 tobacco than the country as a w hole, the political weight of tobacco in the regional economy does not leave much room for policies that encourage crop substitution (Vargas and Campos, 2005, 9). For example, the state government of Rio Grande do Sul created a program specifically focused on the development of the t obacco industry during the 1990s. This kind of program is what allowed BAT subsidiary, Souza Cr uz to take advantage of tobacco tax revenues and use them to build a US$900 million proces sing plant (Vargas and Campos, 2005). These existing tax benefits for the TTCs will remain in place at least until tobacco control becomes a larger political issue. The third barrier to divers ifying away from tobacco in the South of Brazil, according to Vargas and Campos, is the t obacco crops high profitability. Although the profitability of tobacco farming has fallen during recent years, tobacco remains a highly attractive crop to small family farmers, provi ding higher income per unit than other crops (Curbing, 1999). The costs of tob acco production are five times hi gher than the costs associated with corn, and six times higher than those asso ciated with bean produc tion (AFUBRA, n.d). A study by Silva (2002) points out that the cost of land, a major opera tional cost is not taken into account for these AFUBRA figures. Despite the obstacles, the case studies in Vargas and Campos report demonstrated diversification programs could make switching from tobacco to alternative crops viable, even in areas that are heavily dependent on tobacco. Mo re importantly, these cas es show the Brazilian government taking action to assist their farmers in finding economically vi able alternatives to tobacco farming. These efforts by the government were documented before Brazil ratified the FCTC and agreed to foster this sort of diversification. Tobacco Taxes and Government Revenue Tobacco is an important source of government revenue in Brazil, since tobacco products are considered luxury items and have a heavy tax burden. Parties to the FCTC commit to raise

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77 tobacco taxes to at least the ra te of growth of incomes, and considerably ahead of inflation (FCTC Article 6). But, governments are often he sitant to increase tob acco taxes because they believe it reduces consumption and in turn decr eases government revenues. Because the demand for cigarettes is inelastic, an increase in tax or price results in an increase in revenue. This section documents Brazils tobacco tax policie s over the past decade and explains the relationship between those policies and thei r effects on the illegal cigarette trade. R. Iglesias and J. Nicolaus 2006 report, A Economa do Controle do Tabaco nos Pases do Mercosul e Associados is the most recent and comprehensiv e study on the effect of tobacco tax increases on government revenue and smuggling in Brazil. Iglesias and Nicolau point out that, although the Brazilian government has followed th e advice of the World Bank in many aspects of tobacco control, its history of tobacco taxation has not always followed the prescription given by the FCTC to raise cigarette taxes in order to discourage consumption. There are three key issues that the Brazilian government must keep in mind: 1) Cigarette prices and consumption show opposite trends; If prices and taxes are raised, per capita consumption will decline; 2) A decrease in consumption as a re sult of higher prices will not generate losses in government revenue; and 3) Higher prices and taxes increase smuggling activit y. The contradictory nature of these issues make it difficult to adopt a sound tobacco tax policy. During the 1990s, before the threat of smuggling became a reality in Brazil, the government increased tobacco taxes in order to discourage consumption. Cigarette IPI taxes, a tax on manufactured goods, were doubled from 15 % to 30%. The price measures in combination with non price measures, such as advertising ba ns and health restrictions reduced cigarette consumption and increased government tobacco ta x revenues. In 1999, the IPI taxation system was altered, reducing the effectiv eness of IPI taxation on cigarette s. When compared with the

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78 early 1990s, tobacco prices and tax revenues are less today than they were during that time. As a result, between 1996 and 2003 government revenue from tobacco taxes decreased from US$ 2.9 billion to US$ 648 million. Iglesias and Nicolau found that the price elasticity of demand for Brazilian cigarettes is 0.42, m eaning that increasing prices or tax on cigarettes by 10% would generate a 4.2% decrease in consumption. Given the low price elasticity, a tobacco tax increase would actually increase government tobacco tax revenue. Iglesias and Nicolau conclude that the Brazilian government should revert back to the same tax policie s used during the 1990s in order to regain government tobacco tax revenue. In a study by Guindon et al., 2002 Trends and affordability of cigarette prices data from Brazil indicated that there is ample room to incr ease tobacco prices thro ugh taxation, since Brazil is a country with one of the lowest cigarette prices (Figure 4.2). Guindon et al. found that cigarette prices have failed to keep up with increases in the general price level of goods and services, rendering them more afford able in 2000 than they were at the beginning of the decade. Opportunities to increase gove rnment revenue and improve health through reduced consumption brought about by higher pri ces have been overlooked in Brazil. Iglesias and Nicolau say that tobacco price and tax increases have not been overlooked, but avoided in Brazil for two reasons 1) Non pri ce measures have been successful in reducing cigarette consumption among the population, and 2) the Brazilian government fears that raising prices will further exacerb ate cigarette smuggling. Smuggling Cigarette smuggling is a widespread probl em undermining tobacco control efforts by providing cheap unregulated cigare ttes that stimulate demand wh ile simultaneously decreasing tax revenues needed for tobacco control and heal th promotion. Globally, smuggled cigarettes are

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79 Figure 4-1. Prices (USD$ per Pack) of Impor ted and Local-Brand Cigarettes at Purchasing Power Parity, Selected Economies, Marc h 2001. Source: Source: Guindon, Tobin, and Yach (2002). Reprinted from Tobacco Control 11 (1): 38(2002), with permission of the BMJ Publishing Group. estimated to account for 6.5% of total consumpti on, but in Brazil, smuggl ed cigarettes were estimated to account for 31% of the total market (Shafey et al ., 2002). Brazil has one of the largest incidences of contraband cigarettes in Latin America. Smuggled cigarettes account for approximately US$1.4 billion in tax evasion. Desp ite several attempts to combat contraband sales in Brazil, no si gnificant declines were register ed over the period of 2005 and 2006 (Euromonitor, 2007). According to industry expe rts, more than educating consumers, it is essential for the country to ove rsee its borders, particularly th ose of Argentina and Paraguay, where there is a great volume of illegal tradi ng. Although studies show that the problem of smuggling is related to organized crime, rather than tax differences am ong countries, Brazils

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80 Internal Revenue Service (SRF) believes that Brazils smuggling problem is due to taxation differences between Brazil and neig hbor countries. In Brazil, ciga rettes taxes are 73.3% of the price, whereas in Argentina it is 67%, Ur uguay, 67%, and Paraguay, 13% (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2003). The illegal market can sell ciga rettes cheaper than in the formal market. While the average price in the formal market is US$ 0.46, in the illegal market it is US$ 0.30 (Food and Agriculture Administration, 2003). These illegal cigarettes now represent 34% of the volume of cigarettes sold per year, jumping from 5 percent of the market in 1991 and 20 percent in 1995. According to the Brazil-U.S. business co uncil, Brazil would net $500 million a year in lost cigarette tax revenue if counterfeiting were eliminated. The table below shows the evolution of the Brazilian cigarette market, according to the Nielsen/IDS survey. The table indicates that between 1991 and 2004, total sales of cigarettes have fallen, while smuggled (unfair competiti on) cigarettes have steadily increased. Brazils commitment to the FCTC and its provisions against smuggling will hopefully encourage the government to monitor smuggling rout es more closely, set up a tracking system to detect counterfeit cigarettes, and punish those involved in illicit border trade. Table 4-2. Brazilian cigare tte market (billion units) Year Legal sales Illegal sales Total sales Percentage of total illegal sales 1991 148 9 157 5.1% 1992 123 6 129 4.6% 1993 115 15 130 11.5% 1994 105 24 129 18.6% 1995 116 28 144 19.4% 1996 115 36 151 23.8% 1997 108 44 152 28.9% 1998 91 56 147 38.1% 1999 97 45 142 31.7% 2000 95 47 142 33.1% 2001 100 51 151 33.8% 2002 96 46 142 32.4% 2003 92 41 133 30.1% 2004 92 41 133 30.1% Source: USDA 2004

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81 Conclusion Chapter 4 laid out the history of tobacco control in Brazil. More importantly, this chapter examined the economics of tobacco control in Braz il over the past decade. Brazils efforts to fight the tobacco epidemic yielded important results early on: annual per capita cigarette consumption decreased 35% between 1989 and 2004. These outcomes are unprecedented for a developing country with strong economic interests in tobacco. This chapter exposed the realities of a developing countrys struggle to fight the tobacco epidemic while trying to lessen the burden that a decrease in tobacco consump tion may have over its citizens. The concept that there is nothing as profita ble as tobacco no longer makes any sense. There are several examples in th e South of Brazil where local soci ety initiatives got organized to search for economically feasible alternatives a nd were successful. Vargas and Campos detailed the practices of tobacco growi ng municipalities that were suc cessful in finding economically viable alternatives to tobacco farming. Although Brazils tobacco tax polic ies are not those prescribed by the FCTC, Brazils case does serve two important lessons: Decreasing to bacco taxes seems to promote smuggling, but does not guarantee stability in government revenue Iglesias and Nicolaus study points out the opposite: government revenues from tobacco ta xes have decreased since the government decreased IPI taxes in 1999. Before 1999, governme nt revenues from tobacco taxes had been increasing as a result of the IPI tax increases in the early 1990s. The most difficult barrier to achieving a succe ssful tobacco control agenda are the realities of cigarette smuggling. There is an overwhe lming consensus among scholars that tobacco control policies in Brazil have proven to be e ffective in reducing cigarette consumption. The illegal cigarette market severely undermines tob acco control efforts because there is no way to

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82 control the market. Iglesias et al (2006) says that the main w eakness in Brazils tobacco control policies to date is the lack of effective measures to address and control the cigarette smuggling.

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83 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION The questions posed at the beginning of this study dealing with wh ether and how tobacco products should be regulated internationally have been studied in depth by scholars and international organizations. Consensus among thes e parties that tobacco is dangerous and should be regulated, coupled with the f act that developing countries are increasingly carrying the burden of the tobacco epidemic shaped a new ques tion for this study: What are the economic consequences of implementing tobacco control policies in a developi ng country? This study found that, although trade advocat es and the tobacco industry have argued that regulating tobacco internationally through the World H ealth Organizations Framework Convention on Tobacco Control would be detr imental to the economies of developing countries, improved public health and economic stability can be ach ieved simultaneously. This study used Brazils experiences implementing the WHOs FCTC to provide a lens through which the politics and economics of implementing tobacco control polic ies in a developing c ountry could be better understood. Main Findings The main finding of this study was that impl ementing tobacco contro l policies such as those proposed by the FCTC woul d not hurt the economies of count ries that became Parties to and enforced those measures. This study is in tended as a starting point for countries to understand the positive outcomes that can resu lt from becoming a Party of the FCTC. The Brazilian case, while unique and only in its s econd year of officially implementing the Treaty, offers positive results for both health advocat es and those concerned with the countrys economic well being. Each chapter of this study contributed to laying out the path to which international tobacco regulation has become a reality.

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84 Development of International Tobacco Control The main finding concerning the history of the development of tobacco control was that, at present, the trade regime is perhaps not the appr opriate realm that should be used to regulate tobacco internationally. The inherent principl es behind free trade, the conflict between public health advocates and trade advocates and an analys is of the outcome for Thailands tobacco trade dispute cited in Chapter 2 were indicative of the international attitude to wards tobacco regulation to date. Despite inaction within the trade re gime, this study identifies the World Bank and the World Heath Organization as bei ng the leading international orga nizations regulating tobacco. The World Bank has contributed to global tobacco policy by provi ding an economic rationale for regulation in their landmark report Tobacco Cont rol in Developing Countri es and adjusted their lending policies to discourage tobacco production and processing. FCTC and the Economy The World Health Organizations Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first international public health treaty was the first of its kind to offer countries a transn ational path to regulating tobacco in order to impr ove overall public health. Despite the fact that some countries have their own set of tobacco policies, this Treaty made a bold statement against the transnational tobacco corporati ons that had been shifting thei r marketing and production efforts to developing countries during the 1990s. This st udy concluded that regulating tobacco seems to be a global goal, as evidenced by the speed wi th which countries signed and are ratifying the treaty, many having already met several of its recommendations. After reviewing FCTC policies in Chapter 3, led to several findings: (1) im plementation of the FC TC measures is not compulsory (2) The text of the treaty impos es no constraints to production, subsidies to production, tobacco consumption or trade, and (3) the wording of the text provides flexibility that allows countries to adopt the proposed measures and, at the same time, respects their

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85 constitutional limitations. Although these finding are clear from the wording of the treaty itself, it is important to emphasize them because they refu te tobacco industry claims that the FCTC is a rigid, compulsory document. The economic impact of specific FCTC provisi ons in this report were assessed using the World Banks 1999 report Curbing the Epidemic: Governmen ts and the Economics of Tobacco Control. This report reviewed a large body of evidence and concluded strongly that in most countries, tobacco control would not negativel y impact the economy. The World Banks team recommended strongly that governments not forego the benefits of tobacco tax increases because they feared the possible impact on smuggling, but rather act to deter, detect and punish smuggling. This study found that, still, many gove rnments hesitate to act decisively to implement FCTC provisions because they fear that tax increa ses and other tobacco control measures might harm the economy by reducing th e economic benefits their country gains from growing, processing manufacturi ng and taxing tobacco (Jha et al., 2000; Mackay et al., 2006, Mitka, 2000). Impact of Tobacco Regulation: Brazilian case Implementation of FCTC measures have pr oven positive for the Brazilian economy overall and will continue to be beneficial. Despite tobacco's importance in Brazil's economy, recognition of tobacco's health consequences by Brazilian authorities led to some important tobacco control measures. Banned practices incl ude sales of cigarettes to minors, radio and television advertising, sale of tobacco products in health centers and schools, and smoking in public places, libraries and public transportation. More stringent advertising regulations became effective in January 2002, requiring graphic anti-smoking images on cigarette packs and prohibiting the use of deceptive de scriptive terms such as "light and "mild". In addition, the Brazilian government had already be en adjusting cigarette taxes and prices in an effort to reduce

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86 consumption. When Brazil became a Party to the FCTC in 2005, after strong opposition from the tobacco lobby, more provisions were added to Br azil's already broad set of tobacco policies. In addition to the advertising restrictions and publ ic smoking laws that were in place, the FCTC required that the government promote economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers and growers. A major finding of this study wa s that Brazils expe riences restricting advertising, raising tobacco taxes, and finding alternatives to growing reduced tobacco consumption, were not detrimental to the economy This is important because a bulk of the FC TCs prescriptions are related to these types of non-pr ice measures. The Brazilian case strongly suggests that finding alternative, economically viable livelihoods for tobacco farmers that have been historically dependent on tobacco is promising. Several muni cipalities in the South of Brazil, all dependent on tobacco on some level worked with local government and organizations to find alternative crops. If present national agrarian po licies adopt FCTC proposals, th e future scenario may show employment instead of unemployment, and farmi ng activities that would be beneficial to the Brazilian population. Brazils tax policies toward tobacco have not been uniform over the past decade because of the country's cigarette smuggli ng problem. Brazil's tax policies in the early 1990s were in sync with the World Bank and the FCTC's prescription for reducing tobacco demand without losing, and possi ble increasing government revenue. When taxes were high, consumption fell, and government revenue incr eased. Cigarette smuggling activity increased around the same time. This caused the government to keep cigarette prices the same and reduce taxes. Today, smuggling rates in Brazil are high er than ever, accounting for an average 35% of the market. Despite the high smuggling rates, one significant finding of this study was that

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87 cigarette smuggling is caused at least as much by general corr uption as by high tobacco product tax increases. One significant policy suggestion w ould be that governments take stricter action against illegal cigarette smuggling in order to balance out the positive gains that result from FCTC policies. Another major finding of this study was that adve rtising bans and strict health warnings are economically sound tobacco control policies and strong reasons for countries to support the FCTC. Most international organizations credit adve rtising bans and strict health warnings for the astonishing 35% decrease in ciga rette consumption documented in Brazil over the past 14 years (Cavalcante). Despite a decrease in consump tion during these years, government revenue did not fall. This study also suggested that price measures were also responsible for Brazils success in reducing consumption during that time. Significance and Future Research It was clear that there was a great need for c ountry-specific analysis in order to provide a basis for policy making on tobacco control within a sound economic framework. Examining the recent progress of tobacco control policies in a developing country is the best way to lend support to the analysis of the ec onomics of tobacco control. Brazi l served as an excellent case for this study because it is a developing country that had enacted tobacco control policies for over a decade before the FCTC came into force. Since health is a central issue for sustaina ble development, tobacco control is being increasingly viewed by governments as an im portant component of a strong development agenda. This study suggests that the FCTC is not something to be feared because its main objective is to promote human welfare. As poi nted out in this study, the consensus between societies that health gains are desirable is refl ected in the tobacco polic ies and actions of the

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88 World Health Organization and in other internati onal organizations. This study takes a first step by looking at actual outcomes in a country that has hist orically been a leader in tobacco control. Also, this study can be beneficial for other t ypes of international re gulatory agendas that countries are hesitant to adopt It introduces the idea that national governments should defend global public health in the same way that they have gradually embraced environmental protection policies that have made a signifi cant impact on the interaction between global commerce and the well being of the environment. The study is limited because of time, informati on available and because of the difficulty in defining direct versus indirect effects of tob acco control policies on the economy. The FCTC is only in its second year in Brazil, and, although to bacco control policies had been in effect for several years prior to the FCTC, specific info rmation about the success or failure of tobacco regulations and the economy ar e not clear. As scholars a nd economists point out, clearly separating outcomes from FCTC po licies can be difficult, especially when illegal cigarette trade is taking place on a large scale. While this study found that tobacco control policies could be enact ed without reducing tobacco tax revenue for governments and eliminati ng tobacco farming and jobs in the short term, more research and time is needed in order to quan tify results for countries who remain hesitant to regulate tobacco. Also, future research shoul d focus on specific countries with different interests in tobacco in order to understand if the effects of tobacco control policies are general or country-specific. Additionally, a more close examination of the inne r working of illegal cigarette trade are paramount in achieving accurate data on the e ffects of tobacco regulations in developing countries.

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89 LIST OF REFERENCES Action on Smoking and Health (2002) Fourth round of FCTC negotiations in Geneva, Washington: Action on Smoking and H ealth. Retrieved March 5, 2007, from (http://nosmoking.ws/news/n ewsinb4dealthclock.htm ). Altria Group (2007), Altria at a Glance, Phillip Morris USA. Retrieved on June 1, 2007, from (http://www.altria.com/about_alt ria/1_1_altriaataglance.asp). American Heart Association (n.d) Tobacco, fede ral regulation of, Te xas: American Heart Association. Retrieved on January 27, 2007, from (http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=11223 ). ANVISA (n.d), Brazilian National Health Vi gilance Agency: Tobacco Products, Brazil ANVISA. Retrieved on March 31, 2007, from (http://anvisa.gov.br/eng/le gis/resol/15_03rdc.htm). AFUBRA (n.d.), Brazilian Tobacco Growers Association, ITGA, Santa Cruz do Sul: AFUBRA. Bayer, R., L. Gostin, O., G. Javitt, and A. Brandt (2002), Tobacco advertising in the United States: A proposal for a constitutiona lly acceptable form of regulation, Journal of the American Medical Association 287: 2990-2995. Bettcher, D., D. Yach, and E. Guindon (2001A), Global trade and health: key linkages and future challenges, Bulletin of the World Health Organization Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved on January 27, 2007, from (http://www.who.int/entity/ macrohealth/en/CMH-overview.Summary.pdf ). Bettcher, D., C. Subramanian, E. Guindon, and A. Perucic, (2001B), C onfronting the tobacco epidemic in an era of trade liberaliza tion, Working Paper of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Geneva: Co mmission on Macroeconomics and Health. Retrieved on March 1, 2007, from (http://www.icrier.org/pdf/Chitratext.pdf ). Better Business Bureau (n.d.), About the Better Business Bureau System, Virginia: Better Business Bureau. Retrieved on April 15, 2007, from (http://www.bbb.org/about/index.asp ). Bialous, S.A. (2004), 'Brazil gr ower's lobby stalls FCTC, Tobacco Control 13:323-324. Bialous, S. A. and S. Shatenst ein, (2002), Profits over people: Tobacco industry activities to market cigarettes and undermine public health in Latin America, Washington D.C.: Pan American Health Organization. Blanke D., and Silva, V.C.L ( 2004), Tobacco control legislation: An introductory guide, Geneva: World Health Organization.

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90 Bloom J. (2001), Public health, international trade and the FCTC, Washington: Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids. Retrieved on April 1, 2007, from (http://tobaccofreekids.org/campai gn/global/framework/docs/Policy.pdf). British American Tobacco (2000), Public Hearings FCTC, in J. Mackay, M. Eriksen, and O. Shafey (eds), The Tobacco Atlas Atlanta: American Cancer Society. California Office of the Attorney General (n.d) Tobacco litigation and enforcement: Master Settlement Agreement, California: Office of the Attorney General. Retrieved on June 4, 2007, from (http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa.php). Callard C., N. Collishaw, and M. Swenarchuk (2001), An introduction to international trade agreements and their impact on public measur es to reduce tobacco use, Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved on February 2, 2007, from http://www.ash.org.uk/ html/international/pdfs/freetrade-canada.pdf. Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (2001A), The Supreme Court FDA ruling that Congress has not yet provided FDA with authority over t obacco products, Washington: Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids. Retrieved on February 2, 2007, from (http://tobaccofreekids.org/ research/factsheets/pdf/0028.pdf ). Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (TFK) (2001B), I llegal Pathways to Illegal Profits: The Big Cigarette Companies and International Sm uggling, Washington DC: Tobacco Free Kids. Retrieved on June 12, 2007, from (http://tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/ framework/docs/Smuggling.pdf ). Cavalcante, T.M. (2003), Labeling and pack aging in Brazil, Geneva: World Health Organization Tobacco free Initiative. Center for Disease Control, (n.d), History of the Surgeon General's report on smoking and health, Atlanta: Center for Disease Cont rol and Prevention. Retrieved on March 1, 2007, from (http://www.cdc. gov/tobacco/ data_ statistics/sgr/history.htm). Center for Disease Control (2000), 000 Surg eon Generals report-reducing tobacco use, Atlanta: Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved on January 2, 2007, from (http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_ statistics/sgr/sgr_ 2000 highlights /highlight_labels.htm ). Center for Disease Control (2006) Current cigarette smoking am ong adults 18 years of age and over, by sex, race, and age: United States, selected years 1965, Atlanta: Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved on March 15, 2007, from (http://www.cdc.gov/nc hs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#063 ). Chaloupka, F. J. and A. Laixuthai, (1996), US trade policy and cigarette smoking in Asia, National Bureau of Economic Research Work ing Paper. Retrieved on March 2, 2007, from (http://nber15.nber.org/papers/w5543.pdf ).

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91 Etges, V.E., M. Ferreira, and M. Camargo ( 2002), O impacto da Cultura do Tabaco no Ecossitema e na Sade Humana na Regio de Santa Cruz do Sul/RS, International Development Research Centre. Euromonitor (2007), 'Tobacco in Brazil, Chicago: Euromonitor International Inc. Retrieved on May 27, 2007, from (http://www.Euromonitor.com/Tobacco_in_Brazil ). Federal Trade Commission (n.d), About the Fe deral Trade Commission, Washington D.C.: Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved on May 30, 2007, from (http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm ). Food and Drug Administration ( n.d), About the Food and Drug Administration, Maryland: Food and Drug Administration. Retrieved on June 4, 2007, from (http://www.fda.gov/opacom/hpview.html ). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2003), Issues in the Global Tobacco Economy: Selected Case Studies, Rome: United Nations. Framework Convention Alliance (n .dA), Press statements and re leases, Framework Convention Alliance. Retrieved on June 9, 2007, from (http://fctc.org/index.php?item=mediareleases ). Framework Convention Alliance (n .dB), About the Treaty, Fr amework Convention Alliance. Retrieved on May 24, 2007, from (http://fctc.org /index. php?item=treatyfaq). Framework Convention Alliance (n.dC), T he WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: A public health movement, Framew ork Convention Alliance. Retrieved on June 8, 2007, from (http://www.fctc.org/ ). Framework Convention Alliance (2001a), Advertising and the FCTC: Recommended text, Framework Convention Alliance Briefing Paper. Retrieved on May 27, 2007, from (http://fcatc.org /x/iwg_cops/INB3/INB3brief_advert.doc). Framework Convention Alliance (2001), Pack aging & Labeling: Recommended Text, Framework Convention Alliance Briefing Paper. Retrieved on June5, 2007, from (http://www.fctc.org/x/iwg_c ops/INB3/INB3brief_label.pdf ). Geyelin, M. (1998), Forty-Six States Agr ee to Accept $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement, Wall Street Journal November 23, 1998. Iglesias R. (2006), 'A economia do controle do tabaco nos paises do Mercosul e associados: Brasil, Washington D.C.: Pan Am erican Health Organization. International Law Commission (2005 ), Fragmentation of internati onal law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of in ternational law, New York: International Law Commission. Retrieved on June 9, 2007, from http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm

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92 Jha, P., F Chaloupka, and P.Brown (2000), Tobacco Control in Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University Press. Lerner, D. (2003), NGOs call on government official s to ratify global tobacco control treaty as thousands gather for World Conference on Tobacco or Health, Boston: Corporate Accountability International. Retrieved on April 14, 2007, from (http://www.commondreams.org/news2003/0804-06.htm). LSU Law Center (2000), The S upreme Court rules that the F DA has no authority to regulate tobacco: DA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Medical and Public Health Law Site, Baton Rouge: LSU Law Center. Retrieved on April 14, 2007, from (http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/ fda_v_brown-Williamson_Tobacco_brief.htm ). Mackay, J., M. Eriksen, and O. Shafey (2006), The Tobacco Atlas, Atlanta: American Cancer Society. Mitka, M. (2000), Anti-tobacco forces seek first intern ational treaty, Journal of the American Medical Association 284:1502-1503. Monteiro, C., T. Cavalcante, E. Moura, R. Cl aro, and C. Szwarcwald (2007), Population based evidence of a strong decline in the prevalence of smoke rs in Brazil (1989-2003), Bulletin of the World Health Organization Geneva: World Health Organization. Nathan R. (2004), Model legislation for tobacc o control: A policy development and legislative drafting manual, Paris: International Un ion for Health Promotion and Education. National Cancer Institute of Brazil (2002), Glo bal action towards tobacco control, Rio de janeiro: National Cancer Institute of Brazil. Retrieved on May 15, 2007, from (http://www.inca.gov.br/english /tobacco/globalaction.pdf). National Cancer Institute of Brazil (2004), Braz ils ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Rio de Janeiro: Nacional Ca ncer Institute of Brazil. Retrieved on June 9, 2007, from (http://www.inca.gov.br/english/tobacco/myths_and_truths.pdf ). Phillip Morris International ( n.d), The WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Switzerland: Phillip Morris International. Retrieved in June 8, 2007, from (http://www .philipmorrisinternational.com/P MINTL/pages/eng/busenv/Global_ t_control.asp). Ranson K., P. Jha, F. Chaloupka, and S.N guyen (1999), The effectiveness and costeffectiveness of price increases and other t obacco control policies, in P. Jha and F. Chaloupka (eds), Tobacco Control in Developing Countries New York, Oxford University Press. Schoenbaum, T. J. (1997), International trade and the protection of the environment: the continuing search for reconciliation, American Journal of International Law 91: 268.

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93 Sebrei, E. (2006), Mexico backroom deal blunts health warnings, Tobacco Control 15: 348 349. Shafey O., V. Cokkinides, T. Cavalcante, M. Teixeira, C. Vianna and M. Thun (2002), Case studies in international tobacco surveilla nce: Cigarette smuggling in Brazil, Tobacco Control 11: 215-219. Shapiro, I. (2002), Treating Cigarettes as an Exception to Trade Rules, SAIS Review 22:87-96. Silva, V.L.C., S. Goldfarb, M. Moraes, and S.R.B. Turci (1999), Brazilian Cigarettes: Analysis and proposals to reduce consumption, Rio de Ja neiro: National Cancer Institute of Brazil. Silva,V.L.C. (2003), Government leadership in tobacco control: Brazils experience, in J. De Beyer, and L. Brigden (eds), Tobacco Control Policy: Strategies, Successes and Setbacks Washington D.C: World Bank. Stewart, M. (1993). The effect of advertising bans on tobacco c onsumption in OECD countries, International Journal of Advertising 12: 155-180. Sunley E., A. Yurekli, and F. Chaloupka ( 1999), The design, administration and potential revenue of tobacco excises, in P. Jha and F. Chaloupka (eds), Tobacco Control in Developing Countries New York, Oxford University Press. Szasz P. (1997), General law maki ng processes, in Joyner C. (ed), The United Nations and International Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tax Policy Center. (2007), Cigarette Rate s 2001-2007, Retrieved on June 8, 2007, from (http://www.taxpolicycen ter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/TFTemplate.cfm?Docid=433 ). Taylor A., F. Chaloupka, E. Guindon, and M. Corbe tt (1999), The impact of trade liberalization on tobacco consumption, in P. Jha and F. Chaloupka (eds), Tobacco Control in Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University Press. Thun M.J., and V.C.L. Silva (2003), Introduction and Overview of global tobacco surveillance in tobacco country profiles, Atla nta: American Cancer Society. Truth Campaign (n.d.), See the Truth For Your self, Washington D.C.: American Legacy Foundation. Retrieved on June 2, 2007, from (http://www.protectthetruth .org/truthcampaign.htm). Twombly, R. (2004), United States Si gns International Tobacco Treaty, Journal of the National Cancer Institute 96: 730-732. United Nations (2005), Vienna Convention on th e Law of Treaties, Retrieved on June 13, 2007, from (http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instru ments /english/conventions/1_1_ 1969 .pdf ). United States Department of Agriculture (2007) USDA, Brazil, Bras ilia: USDA Office of Agricultural Affairs. Retrieved on June 4, 2007, from (http://www.usdabrazil.org.br/).

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94 United States Department on Hea lth and Human Services (n.d), Office of the Surgeon General, Washington: United States Department of H ealth and Human Servi ces. Retrieved on June 1, 2007, from (http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/index.html ). United States Department of Health and Human Services (1994), Preventing tobacco use among young people: A report of the Surgeon Genera l, Washington: US Government Printing Office. United Nations (1963), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, New York: United Nations. Retrieved on June 1, 2007, from (http://untreaty.un.org/il c/texts/instruments /english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf ). Vargas, M.A., and R.R. Campos (2005), Crop Substitution and Diversif ication Strategies: Empirical Evidence from Selected Brazilian Municipalities, World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Discussion Paper, No. 28. Weissman, R., C. Callard, and H. Chitanondh (20 01), Why trade and investment liberalization may threaten effective tobacco control efforts, Tobacco Control 10: 68-70. Woo, A. (2002), Health versus trade: The future of the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Vanderbuilt Journal of Transnational Law. 35: 1731-1767. World Bank (1999), Operational Policies: Tobacc o Procedures, Washington D.C.: World Bank. World Health Organization (WHO) (n.d), An inte rnational treaty for tobacco control, Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved on June 5, 2007, from (http://www.who.int/f eatures/2003/08/en/ ). World Health Organization (2000), Tobacco Co mpany Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health, Ge neva: World Health Organization, Retrieved on June 3, 2007, from (http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf ). World Health Organization (2005), Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved on June 1, 2007, from (http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/ WHO_FCTC_english.pdf). World Trade Organization (W TO) (n.d), Understanding the Organization: Members and Observers, Geneva: World Trade Organi zation. Retrieved January 2, 2007, from (http://www.wto.org/english/th ewtoe/whatise/tife/org6e.htm ). World Trade Organization and Wo rld Health Organization (2002), WTO agreements and public health: A joint study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat Geneva: World Health Organization.

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95 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Lourdes Catal was born and raised in West Palm Beach, Florida. She graduated with honors from the University of Florida in 2004 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a minor in Latin American studies. In 2005, she retu rned to the University of Florida to pursue a master of arts degree with a concentration in Latin American Business Environment Program and a graduate certificate in translation studies During her time in gr aduate school, Lourdes studied abroad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil wher e she learned Portuguese and became familiarized with the Brazilian business cultu re. Lourdes also studied abro ad in Santiago, Chile where she was also exposed to the Chilean business environment. The idea for her thesis on international regulation of tobacco products grew out of her experiences with and interest in American businesses operating in Latin America.


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