<%BANNER%>

The Reagan Administration's Communication Response to the Iran Arms Crisis

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021094/00001

Material Information

Title: The Reagan Administration's Communication Response to the Iran Arms Crisis
Physical Description: 1 online resource (192 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Rigby, Jesse D
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: communication, crisis, defensive, discourse, image, iran, presidential, reagan, restoration, stakeholder, theory
Journalism and Communications -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Mass Communication thesis, M.A.M.C.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: This study investigates the root causes of one of the most damaging presidential crises in modern American history and identifies potential linkages between crisis communication theory and the healthy functioning of presidential administrations. The primary research question probes a key consideration regarding the functioning of executive governance: When managing crises, should executive leadership place priority on its symbolic resources or its stakeholder relationships? The priorities which guided the Reagan Administration's defensive discourse in the midst of the Iran arms crisis were explored. Specifically, image restoration discourse theory and a stakeholder theory-based typology were used to categorize the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration in the midst of the Iran arms crisis of 1986. The statements offered in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages were analyzed by administrative source and over time. The Reagan Administration initially prioritized the continued viability of the operation involving the exchange of arms for hostages. However, once threats to the Administration?s credibility reached a critical threshold, the Administration's priority became the protection of its symbolic assets. Throughout the crisis period, the Administration attempted to resolve the disparity between public expectations of its actions and stated foreign policy regarding Iran by explaining the Iran initiative using ambiguous discourse. Image restoration discourse theory accounted for most of the statements which emerged from the data, but several defensive discourse strategies fell outside the theoretical typology. When added to the existing typology, these previously unidentified discourse categories accounted for most of statements analyzed in this case. Implications for further political communication and crisis communication were considered. Specifically, how do communication decisions impact the ability of a president to govern and public faith in government? When choosing operational considerations over the symbolic reputation and image of the administration, how will that impact the effectiveness of an administration? Such considerations are highly relevant to communication scholarship and society at large given the numerous presidential crises which have occurred in recent history.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Jesse D Rigby.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.M.C.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Robinson, Jennifer.
Local: Co-adviser: Kiousis, Spiro K.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021094:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021094/00001

Material Information

Title: The Reagan Administration's Communication Response to the Iran Arms Crisis
Physical Description: 1 online resource (192 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Rigby, Jesse D
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: communication, crisis, defensive, discourse, image, iran, presidential, reagan, restoration, stakeholder, theory
Journalism and Communications -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Mass Communication thesis, M.A.M.C.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: This study investigates the root causes of one of the most damaging presidential crises in modern American history and identifies potential linkages between crisis communication theory and the healthy functioning of presidential administrations. The primary research question probes a key consideration regarding the functioning of executive governance: When managing crises, should executive leadership place priority on its symbolic resources or its stakeholder relationships? The priorities which guided the Reagan Administration's defensive discourse in the midst of the Iran arms crisis were explored. Specifically, image restoration discourse theory and a stakeholder theory-based typology were used to categorize the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration in the midst of the Iran arms crisis of 1986. The statements offered in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages were analyzed by administrative source and over time. The Reagan Administration initially prioritized the continued viability of the operation involving the exchange of arms for hostages. However, once threats to the Administration?s credibility reached a critical threshold, the Administration's priority became the protection of its symbolic assets. Throughout the crisis period, the Administration attempted to resolve the disparity between public expectations of its actions and stated foreign policy regarding Iran by explaining the Iran initiative using ambiguous discourse. Image restoration discourse theory accounted for most of the statements which emerged from the data, but several defensive discourse strategies fell outside the theoretical typology. When added to the existing typology, these previously unidentified discourse categories accounted for most of statements analyzed in this case. Implications for further political communication and crisis communication were considered. Specifically, how do communication decisions impact the ability of a president to govern and public faith in government? When choosing operational considerations over the symbolic reputation and image of the administration, how will that impact the effectiveness of an administration? Such considerations are highly relevant to communication scholarship and society at large given the numerous presidential crises which have occurred in recent history.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Jesse D Rigby.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.M.C.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: Robinson, Jennifer.
Local: Co-adviser: Kiousis, Spiro K.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0021094:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101114_AAAABH INGEST_TIME 2010-11-14T07:30:29Z PACKAGE UFE0021094_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 57198 DFID F20101114_AAAMZI ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH rigby_j_Page_023.pro GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
08a756ac4777943beebeb1e1618390e0
SHA-1
0247e4f8601eee288ae9c5f6c575685632a3720f
1053954 F20101114_AAAMYT rigby_j_Page_150.tif
303cf64606a6413b007e11caad4b9a92
fcb37ba96bebc74f9801d252cc932407b98ca4ae
117710 F20101114_AAANFC rigby_j_Page_031.jp2
061c6dc4bf15b097d5c3c00261bffe9a
6ca8bdab3e28d0e836c09e387cb85b20309786f8
F20101114_AAANEO rigby_j_Page_164.tif
f6f46e1e0a33d38d6e0525d343d1bbef
85afb30665b896d1a2730dffa30992ca74102a60
53426 F20101114_AAAMZJ rigby_j_Page_040.pro
b8af2141379d64211e36d213771afff0
c8d472435d23f0c5bacbe2d466e5ae7ae401d69e
25776 F20101114_AAAMYU rigby_j_Page_118.QC.jpg
d3c8fc89a1d9cd03c70b9690d903f76e
65c3cb3dc380b21f71743d680dedcd878d140d48
F20101114_AAANFD rigby_j_Page_157.tif
4e45ea16e9e45152be4b2726dfc71020
7110ef6a9c591f621b3e2e6c63a0a6cb97d6ef7a
28035 F20101114_AAANEP rigby_j_Page_004.jpg
cd7014720da21a05e2a62fae0058b3c1
1852a1f3c904789d3b11efee00fe51ee35acd4c4
25257 F20101114_AAAMZK rigby_j_Page_163.QC.jpg
4dabd78f2fe240743a058b4b055e7121
f85c75acc8f75b77d8c1628695943b7e717d2cb2
23219 F20101114_AAAMYV rigby_j_Page_045.QC.jpg
fcd375bd2b68b3f8085f136dc9849825
404cdd3d8e173e1ac91a99ccc248bcccf0c689eb
F20101114_AAANFE rigby_j_Page_102.tif
c561ae13f2931b2d8d91c2915655e20d
cd46e64480c107bb5461f7d57ee91dfa17e742b8
7180 F20101114_AAANEQ rigby_j_Page_065thm.jpg
59b7c29715a4bfb630060679f5ee2425
d18abda88b78fe0b2ca2f85c7e54db1443034ce6
118058 F20101114_AAAMZL rigby_j_Page_166.jp2
2e98c2c052026a089d734b7da5edf044
a692af2ffbd66f1b18137f3ad3e7e8c19ac4e7d7
F20101114_AAAMYW rigby_j_Page_024.tif
bb5bade511c576631d2b4e4da1639be6
696218b465f3538fbf462f628fc3a28f1e889c3a
F20101114_AAANFF rigby_j_Page_094.tif
7690b9b230045670f048437e032478b0
a4b01792c11676e38551ba5086476ee7cf263c9a
7136 F20101114_AAANER rigby_j_Page_080thm.jpg
97a8119db93afe2f8606bc9807521aa8
fe83559261422ca7a17c1b4e39061b39ef6862c2
6968 F20101114_AAAMZM rigby_j_Page_053thm.jpg
352f2b274354a88bd6bf246c9b14f768
c521a61329fcb5f9ca2058e7aefa5d17b319a18a
116338 F20101114_AAAMYX rigby_j_Page_072.jp2
ff19682b050a70405d897d76f75ed7be
302ca2aecb8b52d8989c2b8792e372d8997ca17f
8177 F20101114_AAANFG rigby_j_Page_001.pro
b5569214d325cdd73efd84fc505d363d
b5bac27481fbeee40c911abb83d950b03426aae1
7669 F20101114_AAANES rigby_j_Page_003.QC.jpg
c814b606b764e684b6e5cf82c71940bd
996639b5d92edd859d2f3d79cf2140d2b2bff1fd
6828 F20101114_AAAMZN rigby_j_Page_054thm.jpg
2fd93b9e5bcc67b3099ef8cddce16354
661a69c425b524d0f4786f0ebbda6fd89ac604e5
F20101114_AAAMYY rigby_j_Page_023.tif
cb07066611333050473ee173eb39f38a
41273fca3c8df118cdc6739f2056c93a976ebd62
6912 F20101114_AAANFH rigby_j_Page_041thm.jpg
3db617bce422e721934135c5022541d2
f6aa653f2dd8f405d3f01aa0ae7834da222a549c
25588 F20101114_AAANET rigby_j_Page_169.QC.jpg
0650ebf5a7da660c2034f9d27ff052fb
13356755aaffc8a9651665d61fa50c741864aa85
53672 F20101114_AAAMZO rigby_j_Page_151.pro
d0d9990aa5c0a79e8969a4bd482911c4
e634f4915d074d1707f9a1e4fa42eb3bd958a1e4
24757 F20101114_AAAMYZ rigby_j_Page_017.QC.jpg
6901982e0008a3c90806d223d6171d49
6472bb5c4308b19eeb49378a53555dade529b4e0
2079 F20101114_AAANFI rigby_j_Page_037.txt
89073cdc1b0f516763a32d026bccb27a
009531f0524b94a8eab884f06133f01617eccc05
55063 F20101114_AAANEU rigby_j_Page_074.pro
e57131b8f4fa656937879869fd4d6595
0cf19374ae14f40339e198566d076ce3d8224efc
F20101114_AAAMZP rigby_j_Page_148.tif
c453a5fc630aab7b2c2e97cdcfadb0bc
722a8ac806a13a1a332bc2705a098327e7c44947
6080 F20101114_AAANFJ rigby_j_Page_149thm.jpg
0b392e879e19f5d5e503491f16bed40d
32e10a775d20c283c93192c7dd4c575881ff7cb0
2184 F20101114_AAANEV rigby_j_Page_129.txt
a0337b32197d081828701b8d8e252fea
59f7021bef281e00df5e1b596e601142ea34b15d
116386 F20101114_AAAMZQ rigby_j_Page_067.jp2
c8a99c059f6fb8ea37d87449403df98b
58ab799fed730148a868573cdd4ae9887d70cd81
F20101114_AAANFK rigby_j_Page_036.tif
365fef28f959cd45f25d45d19c5a4744
0f3c0db0f7e00cbd9ae0fd202fa4cc76e603a841
54619 F20101114_AAANEW rigby_j_Page_100.pro
3784d92e9b272f311c62e33a914779bd
268da116c0fde4113b57b6bb12d12e8547db9291
77987 F20101114_AAAMZR rigby_j_Page_026.jpg
be4fb8a3982201c619d36fded27a35d3
fbeeec4f86dad20c5ac8350759895e2736603128
F20101114_AAANFL rigby_j_Page_032.tif
c34b1bb6fbeb41d7bccea7a6ca17ccc3
6c513ab005500625a7b5e4ab213174d3800022a6
2118 F20101114_AAANEX rigby_j_Page_167.txt
717a9b341be0887be1c918bb1be509a1
13d0aa3b75095a50c06a50aade1b1c8463ae58f6
76965 F20101114_AAAMZS rigby_j_Page_037.jpg
772782c63c78a6c9ba061afa6e37f978
49c37d67d521cf597df5f56ef1aae75b0fa24223
6716 F20101114_AAANGA rigby_j_Page_067thm.jpg
5d67a78f42d2b7c41f441d742c06df96
52d78a691323f64d467cf25ec59618d9d9650981
27265 F20101114_AAANFM rigby_j_Page_130.QC.jpg
545d868b51cc3c7d18e75674c69591ec
90724a0d89597a098bf5c5d445246eeffba054c2
111730 F20101114_AAANEY rigby_j_Page_048.jp2
a17e989c34b06949619c62e686694209
59a112314e4fb75d8fb7eb45765d9cc72413bb31
F20101114_AAAMZT rigby_j_Page_018.tif
5e92c248fb5cc023d7681f7476998939
2ce1d00a6a7f45e7d05e94ed228d56f1c945948f
F20101114_AAANGB rigby_j_Page_089.tif
a042760034fc613d8a011fdf08d5a738
a82dea6dcc57c0534d2bc6c9152a576471bd159c
54918 F20101114_AAANFN rigby_j_Page_016.pro
d861f923fe4e9ac57779d1694b669f39
176773f8becda4a52de1a19ce461e3bac59a49d7
2258 F20101114_AAANEZ rigby_j_Page_023.txt
92e820ae26923903c27061766cd0a9ed
b28f9d2e95e801bf0fdf9ac42ca3e50f9eb8dbc0
24898 F20101114_AAANGC rigby_j_Page_123.QC.jpg
676128b1ffb4eb165890df1e526f7009
046149bb725349276bdeaca9c091b5acebd31843
7148 F20101114_AAANFO rigby_j_Page_059thm.jpg
43017de7bb7109e1d3dd49e9689d2910
246693b0bed67340b9fa7279671ccf8c01697948
116282 F20101114_AAANGD rigby_j_Page_100.jp2
38d758051cd1f5f6b0462887c026dd54
d11b5f8f141a7fba3bce90602d676fdd2de34fad
F20101114_AAANFP rigby_j_Page_192.tif
e2aa94a6f4600ec2f3cfabef44ec1425
3a4d32dd037a44c6a8695dbe535d5714d2f706cf
50942 F20101114_AAAMZU rigby_j_Page_168.pro
a2b5066bc1d85ed5b63ec84dfc293e49
d98954093d73f2273cc242e1516817713c0ded55
5716 F20101114_AAANGE rigby_j_Page_084thm.jpg
f4136f8b2d9027614068bb2ee3e60dcf
4a49fd2dc4c2a0e529ad21dfe5a11df77800c567
24545 F20101114_AAANFQ rigby_j_Page_049.QC.jpg
50b5822315c592cf1e5ef1d0fd1fc6f7
65370cc0a3281166089f476bc7455f7b333d41dd
65859 F20101114_AAAMZV rigby_j_Page_011.jp2
7d5b3b74dcd40556287e4724dac1ed5f
c916d34958cdccf61261b9ee5bc269a0635e3f83
25271604 F20101114_AAANGF rigby_j_Page_172.tif
dd3fc86e115667caf9466da10f2e1f87
1d00d1a3ac4f8e67e86def87ea38928877072378
52922 F20101114_AAANFR rigby_j_Page_057.pro
0f879eb72bfa15cef7b8fae303fba350
93fc25c9c5a2c13bace09a291d8b105fa8b88937
7123 F20101114_AAAMZW rigby_j_Page_185thm.jpg
b7e2f275e070b9eef483965f521ea63f
31ea5443ab42982212a0b3ef291dd7d75145a10e
51995 F20101114_AAANGG rigby_j_Page_029.pro
0c2c44d176afc373bb3f5467bcac864c
f1c1c1fd6ef1070c503a90fa207a6e628ce32378
27056 F20101114_AAANFS rigby_j_Page_116.QC.jpg
f743d9109b4072a7a9fcf0b31bf25746
7e162e787e6f87a0971f8949c08fc76bb9943576
F20101114_AAAMZX rigby_j_Page_104.tif
eb24fa8d246fd692e97002cdf2d2b9c2
baea5083dad03339c5ab78943aa26f84e0e7e068
50232 F20101114_AAANGH rigby_j_Page_078.pro
dd557adee55e9d7547e58165dab72943
d25660d2a1b85f26500ccf0040df63f4c382f2d8
53237 F20101114_AAANFT rigby_j_Page_094.pro
a03697ba290453cd60b04c47f4f06a69
5e1c11e619e288e9b168a2c4165e045dd48ca72d
F20101114_AAAMZY rigby_j_Page_161.tif
dfed7533e9f82a908475c37953149c71
144a9c74b3a190d1a153a33c3778f6f26f527a23
96888 F20101114_AAANGI rigby_j_Page_010.jp2
c9708c46f12600826a9c132ec723390a
1a37654b6df4ac86faeaf69b9bed5017b3fecfe6
F20101114_AAANFU rigby_j_Page_138.tif
3787371c7bd8b08481b2c0b6153faecb
b34665cecaf8b16d05d147733e7ab37e56beb982
24639 F20101114_AAAMZZ rigby_j_Page_167.QC.jpg
5f148fceabbe99baf725e841f5408420
3beb2096fd3431902a366fc0605299528c2c3e18
26331 F20101114_AAANGJ rigby_j_Page_178.pro
84126082d1a6c41c7ff18d9a6261543a
3c5d70a2501d615723c0018fa5e93cc095ce4d79
7003 F20101114_AAANFV rigby_j_Page_170thm.jpg
abf69773c2329c642944f4b4c5aeb60a
440f01ae77803368bd6bf023a164581eefa7a50c
118878 F20101114_AAANGK rigby_j_Page_041.jp2
e4f754315751055e9e2056b5bd7953d5
bf300c4b49ad428b497e18e2bf89f3df7f82e40f
F20101114_AAANFW rigby_j_Page_106.tif
5490d9fb86f7b3f93495db51386f8dcd
138a7aa5bbbb069d7072c1bfe9e0b488dc8cb495
F20101114_AAANGL rigby_j_Page_177.tif
6e576f09eaa77b20c234e3afdfc4c1e7
93ee0bcf8a3276eac3e56bc3562fe4cf76f6c0be
1957 F20101114_AAANFX rigby_j_Page_077.txt
36a06414bb253f3ab20d563f1a2ce478
80cfa04afa599c4480b929aa781bce888c6126ec
80017 F20101114_AAANHA rigby_j_Page_132.jpg
bfb643367bdbfa9dc1c8abfb0ccaed20
9d74210b82a51e536614d8adf6a3971f8ab32fc0
2129 F20101114_AAANGM rigby_j_Page_061.txt
ca173a002d7c873715bb59a949a9e847
700d8e5e20fd72e9054413eff48f75ade07ae0cd
17861 F20101114_AAANFY rigby_j_Page_055.QC.jpg
571a7cbfcf05e246ad50cf4c07bcf0d9
5e36f3f73e5dbb067488332f3a2a68fac1d89986
4691 F20101114_AAANGN rigby_j_Page_018thm.jpg
669aaddda14797b25be95debd3423a45
558609c7d1829bac48d01dfe3e9fb03132d16ef8
25017 F20101114_AAANFZ rigby_j_Page_015.QC.jpg
e2d922fb41b2a48f5e49ace09cad9e09
16eb0f3d9b97041d54eab6966ec93252e6fd5283
6893 F20101114_AAANHB rigby_j_Page_106thm.jpg
6fb819bb30a680f8dc1bd5e4255d0526
0fc445cec81ed3811c5cc89a731c6aee1d3c4e4e
7244 F20101114_AAANGO rigby_j_Page_116thm.jpg
61513e2531f27c7d7df66c1ee43a0ca9
bb7539dd5dc4b1226df8a5af3d32656842896102
114791 F20101114_AAANHC rigby_j_Page_101.jp2
ead45c424dc3a0ea3a305ac1291bdceb
e44fc2439cabb1c78668bbb01b21941e06157e4c
F20101114_AAANGP rigby_j_Page_140.tif
f327c359bc5ffa69219adb7edeab9802
b65b451ecf441bdbcfbf8f82453cde5dcaee3ff5
F20101114_AAANHD rigby_j_Page_048.tif
b424250ebe059cfd0516f92b45a4b6f9
def451222c2e8475521e7d493634b3585b362324
6826 F20101114_AAANGQ rigby_j_Page_087thm.jpg
2999a4fa95ec9294cbc8fc92ba6483b0
cdf67c35c4adac1fbaa9bb27a9954ae90deb375e
2105 F20101114_AAANHE rigby_j_Page_040.txt
afcf66d57ae5907de01c06bbacf2899e
1e7d5028dc373f62e3dea903894116e33f9c99d2
116507 F20101114_AAANHF rigby_j_Page_061.jp2
1e1e06fae3a859c1dc4d3e0fa5b149ac
1f194342a8acaccb6389ee64fd23f097cdc050e9
2102 F20101114_AAANGR rigby_j_Page_072.txt
b29bd3d7d194b28e68186b24c071d334
d7a81d63125b6ed89755e08aa8f880144da158e7
56105 F20101114_AAANHG rigby_j_Page_140.pro
30d1d2334a8a33e2902220fcd495a421
7037c9e0babffdbbc4458e4f8f7570e99a25a4e4
26521 F20101114_AAANGS rigby_j_Page_132.QC.jpg
4e870361d8c68de82942640d6677317d
a40a2330207deb5e49637fb6344a2a663f4a36b4
110540 F20101114_AAANHH rigby_j_Page_085.jp2
596f523d9e86ad304a85b18c6092d4ed
831fb820e5a9f9f37db616730ec4590d8c894458
6785 F20101114_AAANGT rigby_j_Page_066thm.jpg
8a840e998639a430c78d26cf92a32ca3
e413685d34fe084c9f4084edf2a79efa88e63f79
6600 F20101114_AAANHI rigby_j_Page_094thm.jpg
998bed97fc2ff33183faec2f4d3fa3e5
a02cef24ec6140112fcbb544796abcd257c113e3
6871 F20101114_AAANGU rigby_j_Page_119thm.jpg
7fcf09fbf1f82fa48abc46a1bfeed822
4d69e97e38ecb5f072dbf85c221ce2c4c596f659
F20101114_AAANHJ rigby_j_Page_152.tif
4f4a17ec4a2841051d8bf067613672fd
9d2d7421302c6f2b407e61e087331b1e93ae58e8
F20101114_AAANGV rigby_j_Page_054.tif
59f10b17744c59c00a9bef563615950f
824db2f71283a42578f00b5707fd5e423b7726d7
72114 F20101114_AAANHK rigby_j_Page_097.jpg
a456ad40d376352f25a12de9ca5e1671
bc375eea174a22f658a07dd92697543b30fcd0ff
26834 F20101114_AAANGW rigby_j_Page_047.QC.jpg
7e6eea9e05e937f9e129618cd57f06ad
6b907aa08e64854d224fdc64351b6a5af5d418fe
F20101114_AAANIA rigby_j_Page_045.tif
e5ad1987471c23a1ded0ac817a0205b6
2c8247f106929e1acd9afb587dc3b9ab226ded76
121155 F20101114_AAANHL rigby_j_Page_119.jp2
dde9b708c4a35b906e63f5456c6430a5
4f4056decef9de0915ce2da1f77eab16f5133b58
119362 F20101114_AAANGX rigby_j_Page_032.jp2
a4f293bba48c3285aaa2a1d88c998e62
f3dc036394bd234a2fa9f5e34d41e17730fa53bc
56243 F20101114_AAANIB rigby_j_Page_027.pro
3f22c9c9dd9d26e50d53afb7d90a614d
3a05826e59c7ddc15a22f092ad9c1a7074d3919e
6911 F20101114_AAAMEK rigby_j_Page_076thm.jpg
88181507866934c8b2b06d4d1a109c63
e77b54dec1046c72ced906fb943dff213412aacf
23939 F20101114_AAANHM rigby_j_Page_012.QC.jpg
317cc1420c505f82d25d24d375696129
f7a4a18e247acd39d16b2d361d8a56b603bd827f
146487 F20101114_AAANGY rigby_j_Page_009.jp2
7f781bf4b003d9e199d73dbca567f1a6
61209ea4c97806e433085731ef3e2f9b87a71891
F20101114_AAAMEL rigby_j_Page_033.tif
09b67af9e0567dc01096ec9b14838e4e
76bbe05294b8020b1e64b976d36a7f70932c2a2e
6928 F20101114_AAANHN rigby_j_Page_181thm.jpg
2fb3ceaf1503cdfaf80c5b8d8e4f01d3
785986434cacdc4f6b7d7e0db51be3ac263d5335
24816 F20101114_AAANGZ rigby_j_Page_157.QC.jpg
25b1d105a786213b24751e251fb4e5fd
d2ad9044f374d15af4130a7bcadb645707938142
73671 F20101114_AAAMFA rigby_j_Page_022.jpg
a7c369f52a24edde2a93eac6e539a529
3c6c743e500efa05028183964c0abcf3439b352d
F20101114_AAANIC rigby_j_Page_118.tif
8dbd027bea1c04755b0caa648db33900
60799c03524a073f380dd32babed681236584655
6934 F20101114_AAAMEM rigby_j_Page_167thm.jpg
ff0c1823cdfb3af33a4b63886ba49836
46100c994a48c05b23202ed361bc1ebacec9ac87
28440 F20101114_AAANHO rigby_j_Page_189.QC.jpg
dfa3d0c8a869e4b886f19da74c0f9a4d
8be561928f3df05077758dd2a49dfdea43c09a68
2104 F20101114_AAAMFB rigby_j_Page_157.txt
3a607e9810a8a42b8da95cb1a69cd1fc
c4237269e4fd125ff233ad7eec0dceb054fd892a
5674 F20101114_AAANID rigby_j_Page_174thm.jpg
4f5927183baabb58b2754efb3da010c3
6e9d0834fc5d2ab4b132316ffeb8e104d23bc7f1
79744 F20101114_AAAMEN rigby_j_Page_036.jpg
92471930db366a34e15bf83558faf4d9
5e4ca79081ff95b5235c22f4b1fd812fcb1e6c79
7073 F20101114_AAANHP rigby_j_Page_089thm.jpg
a465a66205b40006845d4b1a46487f09
d4f991f9d9757f30d3c0227035663c38e96778f2
2142 F20101114_AAAMFC rigby_j_Page_071.txt
6065aed3bccce6418ae1377f87884f4c
2fe379d8da5440b12e1a7e51251c56746cf77e47
7006 F20101114_AAANIE rigby_j_Page_062thm.jpg
bfec98ce8529c5b5dc98d4edd47caf8f
eab312ace8fcd73ef57767a50f64cc0f02934839
78999 F20101114_AAAMEO rigby_j_Page_166.jpg
084a9c5d5650092bd8e8fd05a1fc4cd5
f465870b2d0f84e26beb6f98d757d9e2c653ecc1
52662 F20101114_AAANHQ rigby_j_Page_043.pro
02d7f1c8cfc16ecb066c88b56432f395
e99ec3a7af658ba88141f2b1f5d4f4fc2931e517
25014 F20101114_AAAMFD rigby_j_Page_021.QC.jpg
64fd1b19f7be8de5a56dc8c986ff7879
0e009ef658a6a665d6d078a16776cdc23e62860b
F20101114_AAANIF rigby_j_Page_147.tif
3fdefd7e939abb5980f61783fe3b7b70
43c517a4d331985e6a87cf7cbc5455473d809986
51867 F20101114_AAAMEP rigby_j_Page_095.pro
6d43da7ee014d3407bcadcbfd9e79afb
f5a7312f394369446f4fcf547a20be4052d0929d
48975 F20101114_AAANHR rigby_j_Page_056.pro
35ed33aee4b1f86c3f3f9ded7b46a0b9
ad6f0f9e9900403d775f9d605141112fa8f77d9d
88578 F20101114_AAAMFE rigby_j_Page_143.jpg
f10a3d38bcdb8fca507c30ed7f1d2554
50adf8d2b1b38965e0a647e131cbb173b45249e8
74729 F20101114_AAANIG rigby_j_Page_123.jpg
32a17d4badc68754f88f00a155006e21
3bfb6091b0fb6f402d5105955496f9d81a908ccb
43108 F20101114_AAAMEQ rigby_j_Page_177.jpg
7b372156a91dcecc4bb55ce39c0af2d2
c268572538594d094d26795b11b9265e2effb456
80939 F20101114_AAANHS rigby_j_Page_065.jpg
fbe0f1eb49c5f0d8b72e11e4a0badba8
762796884b689055e009745b7b1ab54b9b591e25
F20101114_AAAMFF rigby_j_Page_026.tif
a87e2ef3c86c9a5d216fda8c28a580b2
97680d32706823e84e2a72f7c1aba9f41ea08b71
114569 F20101114_AAANIH rigby_j_Page_043.jp2
153d5d97d46ece66f7e2f2679f20d941
7afae2eddd5a31a6cd077d8f538aa93152f92f02
F20101114_AAAMER rigby_j_Page_174.tif
4d1099489f90a467f03046c965873215
11b94a9e8806b5ce18d5cda07aba371f7cab0328
22956 F20101114_AAANHT rigby_j_Page_173.QC.jpg
750a979fe46b872efb2b39575148fbf1
93264d940cb3d0c3f761767bf0e7a6a0a9d97beb
120864 F20101114_AAAMFG rigby_j_Page_111.jp2
817f7f930285c35c28406b9577964c33
5670ffb5c8890ea56a1beeac1ceb3884785c93f2
733056 F20101114_AAANII rigby_j_Page_174.jp2
e9552d73939eb633b8302c65ec6f41cd
cab73f97c7509d18e1eb30ae82d349da5d77f7ff
1051971 F20101114_AAAMES rigby_j_Page_006.jp2
513d07122d8be45c2c3cf5a0c6581fa2
88b295cf5a704a671c2d9cf74635344a65f000b3
119884 F20101114_AAANHU rigby_j_Page_121.jp2
29a6dfa2c512dea04f6495408d6a160e
546ee02ad2728b3424b8e6a65d14b401b65b72a0
77012 F20101114_AAAMFH rigby_j_Page_071.jpg
3739fbbdb80e10ae3ea3741b188ccc81
e66c13dc9d5df9a37e78da6d1e18735b7580c90d
F20101114_AAANIJ rigby_j_Page_007.tif
4a608bbf5373631129542afc7a6699dc
7d2c2fbb08cd43b6d438877c408b9c6f556c37ff
2083 F20101114_AAAMET rigby_j_Page_019.txt
8e8bcc1f634c0746c79e85556cfdde82
f22783e2333e4a5dbe2d8d39980db65480052ea0
2331 F20101114_AAANHV rigby_j_Page_001thm.jpg
958a80d9adb03c2653892023141e0bda
1385a71aed5cbc0a74a260fe90843389cd053119
1051977 F20101114_AAAMFI rigby_j_Page_182.jp2
5ca383a7f9b9a9d7f595f3f2ccbc38a7
66abab2b1b848c401764893bf5675a7bcd66fb8e
50660 F20101114_AAANIK rigby_j_Page_108.pro
0671e5fde903dc33d0ab7f15d91ddb41
37f96b2d5cf670b9a0b0437bdfbb8df64768d53b
89961 F20101114_AAAMEU rigby_j_Page_181.jpg
ed0394eafff53a551e3f44c66a1bbf4b
263aa4d050e26254c0c19d1d359135fb631381e2
6906 F20101114_AAANHW rigby_j_Page_071thm.jpg
962cd7b8e12724918f859e7cdad03b1e
cfeda85e1e34be2ac740c82d57792ffcdbf577b4
60919 F20101114_AAANJA rigby_j_Page_135.pro
ce3cc265839c6702fb33cfa1ae03ff0d
83dc255f777da99b68c251313bbf7187c6059e8c
55953 F20101114_AAAMFJ rigby_j_Page_186.pro
861019f4c0c2db328fecf9279c18a8e5
d9e1960d1e5a8b31faa2fd4b621a1a87d7b04ba8
6956 F20101114_AAANIL rigby_j_Page_152thm.jpg
c2b71a73534981352dd3860bd5953812
577d24249a53455f1603ffc4f84dc5e67417979e
78315 F20101114_AAAMEV rigby_j_Page_126.jpg
76dc70bc46392b3f54ea09fea63baee8
f39eda4e6fec4655a920d2d3eefd2b9264d01d13
120785 F20101114_AAANHX rigby_j_Page_129.jp2
2d7f1c7eb6a731981afa085384e59709
b2711a62a272330875a5992f0590e4db1b5381db
117156 F20101114_AAANJB rigby_j_Page_110.jp2
ca59cc24a890240e1c4dbf0f3b2c11d9
0bef8aae487e89619978e777331499bd9139035f
24130 F20101114_AAAMFK rigby_j_Page_168.QC.jpg
6ce4cc8b3e615f39585b4e7382365e5c
95f32349cd9c1e7988c92f423c60c084f62b486d
F20101114_AAANIM rigby_j_Page_190.tif
8b42e874f24165a7036b91077f9c2f43
41edae7acf9f8ad3b6766040fc0844b514f694be
133892 F20101114_AAAMEW rigby_j_Page_143.jp2
ebff09e43db4250bbdc1a9229783f272
9358a1a69a9f1d52b79efd23e69a905f84da1d77
F20101114_AAANHY rigby_j_Page_035.tif
56ea12b84dcdea8742efce1a30b692d4
3767ea8d9353b09b98f616fe09668b98c7dce49a
166 F20101114_AAANJC rigby_j_Page_009.txt
e687b5623c1426b43724f7b8e853d8aa
f98250ec9feed65ac65347db3f5a2a271da30d3c
26212 F20101114_AAAMFL rigby_j_Page_044.QC.jpg
a39382f91ddb8693a45b77dfb33227e2
0f5a2615b30e5d638e1d297371626dc2788adaf2
F20101114_AAANIN rigby_j_Page_116.tif
1d0c273e2502546b1de5b6f5dfb4a234
e02585dddc35cff3bb07fca70145c51ec183e114
75933 F20101114_AAAMEX rigby_j_Page_017.jpg
ea5e944d17eee7d4fa685a07081e0c66
515392a18c004b436f0b6ba981a60b1fba8379d3
35195 F20101114_AAANHZ rigby_j_Page_004.jp2
f9626cc65b23788c26c27a3dcf290296
92a267b6ae96755b4f031256f52ffca003d627a1
6944 F20101114_AAAMGA rigby_j_Page_184thm.jpg
be878eb872fec14fae9c0f6ecec0b9dd
bf6f35f77716f0f2f064131d74fdd7d695d94e94
56079 F20101114_AAAMFM rigby_j_Page_035.pro
3a229185756a4ab9d8e41437117720db
680949b57e0d062d46411a0c2fac68e3d59f6ffb
F20101114_AAANIO rigby_j_Page_119.tif
d2a5bb6e6e9b0dbf1125c87210db5323
93997b39313dced62a1b2beacde939dba6aa23df
2421 F20101114_AAAMEY rigby_j_Page_183.txt
0b635707340b0bf65da3efbab7d942b1
78130a02141d92a0edc46b6fa6320b5e7e0955be
2224 F20101114_AAANJD rigby_j_Page_169.txt
a7513870cc6a95f02f441688bc8752cb
04e5a88b30ac42f80dd30d104827f0f76c97205b
2130 F20101114_AAAMFN rigby_j_Page_039.txt
1881e1c9dd72dd952df96574e6a7f0da
ccebe1d12b492ab79adc9dfa0f0e8f87e905c07f
61700 F20101114_AAANIP rigby_j_Page_181.pro
530961d2e64db57fa9c70babada62bbd
1edbe3f01a2c94b532a7d5a022e79fedba1dcba9
7001 F20101114_AAAMEZ rigby_j_Page_118thm.jpg
c360bfba98fed66aa935ba3f1e1b5910
45c919836cf83e8fdc2506d951ea7e9e94024358
29026 F20101114_AAAMGB rigby_j_Page_011.pro
a27b4da6fa0201d1f6a97513c954c6df
636340b80eb95a95e9f4fb7e9227f9b880e549c4
7468 F20101114_AAANJE rigby_j_Page_189thm.jpg
5e18e276b576e176040da894cce33df2
bc7dfba18e2798cde8a7cee51c0c4a9ee4746fcd
54931 F20101114_AAANIQ rigby_j_Page_086.pro
c9adf269ef0365fb871915c67b032fdd
fabc382b928fb4ec9515b9c07d5642ea52242dbc
54441 F20101114_AAAMFO rigby_j_Page_059.pro
550b52bbc987fd14417fa3ed98c2b45e
9684d6ed5b55acbe1d7614dccd052787cd3a8639
F20101114_AAAMGC rigby_j_Page_002.tif
e501678dd2afb69c562bc040ba1618ac
b3ac9d4ac08387b6dd2a5a64640a6b7f5b0af99f
33245 F20101114_AAANJF rigby_j_Page_003.jp2
c408b5ce68300061ae4c24e03a2f8389
c06565a570e7cadaeec64015bf779b9167d630e1
25556 F20101114_AAANIR rigby_j_Page_030.QC.jpg
76d5f27a38fec26976fa85e2123bb0e6
66ef49f07f78b76618503dadf196599ef072e80e
6766 F20101114_AAAMFP rigby_j_Page_022thm.jpg
73e4a700e74fb4b911eb3c1e2902d4f4
37f8e622cbacaf244e9aa669beeca1ee8f02da15
120804 F20101114_AAAMGD rigby_j_Page_163.jp2
7dc9f74c10bdb14a36636d489bb46a32
d2ad5a939ff4222a27538da3d7fa2a7b9896a089
80794 F20101114_AAANJG rigby_j_Page_142.jpg
8de63e938530a6f174f61173dcc45412
c26b4232ea885bea491c5df6287fad5b8a160f09
115612 F20101114_AAANIS rigby_j_Page_021.jp2
086db02acab44425a4fdc1d3e01ba687
aafd411c8a7993e086ca913f148188edad758442
52864 F20101114_AAAMFQ rigby_j_Page_037.pro
94a8afdfb58162f25d8a85449cac2d4b
7883993f0e6848aabd625f52c66a0acd94b72d22
1996 F20101114_AAAMGE rigby_j_Page_091.txt
53324300ded272aa07c6270997dc56b0
b87cbe9036907d4fda1f1015c29f48abf82b90e7
118391 F20101114_AAANJH rigby_j_Page_034.jp2
6814c246d2cbb5ab6e16a6f7173d4b38
3473d16d28a0d69d281fbd97951ee00a736e1db9
F20101114_AAANIT rigby_j_Page_052.tif
842817d9867608efdca10db34d821c50
dea88adf84ba1ee6c361f15eba02a7d5bb5e0652
6625 F20101114_AAAMFR rigby_j_Page_122thm.jpg
9e212d377779413d8ada305da130feeb
04610ca0435a659707c922d59befa097c7c3a3e3
6898 F20101114_AAAMGF rigby_j_Page_037thm.jpg
09267b4d969bcda55a021603d128e434
600bde87f7faa14e22a32d66a0865e3240edbf5f
3916 F20101114_AAANJI rigby_j_Page_009.pro
c95700ba8afc6d598a497fd604af5998
88d7793badb0b94c4ad40929674dd7e457342bbf
1417 F20101114_AAANIU rigby_j_Page_055.txt
a0c1497f490f8938650e6dbb425903c7
c9ac6ebe683db2e31a442c2fd9ea95cda0097ee1
F20101114_AAAMFS rigby_j_Page_127.tif
f4d1839d9ba5889e1176dc6948d18e67
5d5a24939b6394a0e07f91aa88dc64926a5649f3
53204 F20101114_AAAMGG rigby_j_Page_107.pro
2c050ec976e4d0b0e004542ad990ff21
794380e36ce00a924f8fb732a1e72c715a8cc8e8
54256 F20101114_AAANJJ rigby_j_Page_066.pro
988755639e336b97a5510fd55d66c225
dac144048bd3040a9f11b16c3f7fe4eb8bfd671c
77980 F20101114_AAANIV rigby_j_Page_081.jpg
c5acd7e2fd8e40e201646cd20f516608
b44ac36829ef282c4eafbdba1e7cea42d22acc64
117385 F20101114_AAAMFT rigby_j_Page_054.jp2
4f155547fa74dac40bbbfb10e684bb55
99800a0149a0539e7af19104e423011d75826d2c
78983 F20101114_AAAMGH rigby_j_Page_141.jpg
fe2d72636313a5773ace1a3857fd7925
3877827ae8e6c18d86c5bd55456eb333f52b6816
112250 F20101114_AAANJK rigby_j_Page_029.jp2
3881ce26bc7d8fb60960bf41c38d3344
9d53d954238faebc0bada1cd116aabc782263527
2096 F20101114_AAANIW rigby_j_Page_094.txt
2d0506f555efa2f48129fc5a71ab4527
41958a72604134d6f4d1abe5f7d0814a9528d9b3
59245 F20101114_AAAMFU rigby_j_Page_148.jp2
3b609f541ef9b9d2989afa3f3904e76e
890fc2cb06db117f67cc603c1452a9e5500e8e06
2745 F20101114_AAAMGI rigby_j_Page_004thm.jpg
6424f26ecdd86abc8aa1b73b45162cdf
c883c47b34a03baea1958d4b60fb0be5cc51bffb
79256 F20101114_AAANKA rigby_j_Page_109.jpg
be6953260cc02295281ef7f2114c9c64
e3117ff71060f0e69f6aad15b8afc5cad770cccf
25129 F20101114_AAANJL rigby_j_Page_050.QC.jpg
3e3a18071457953e74bb80728e25ffbf
d810f7a0c1d4efe7cf569335608a1c6c3a63442a
111198 F20101114_AAANIX rigby_j_Page_045.jp2
102a32774af83d638d6fa0001e7e5374
de5a9af680e67fd3b874dab5f18eac627a0293d4
75700 F20101114_AAAMFV rigby_j_Page_100.jpg
ae9a94614f54e1138d4f457fbbd7deab
faa36ebfeaad79d9f9b59948351ceb2c01c8f115
55461 F20101114_AAAMGJ rigby_j_Page_153.pro
bd6b136b61b512f173cc1c99f42bbad6
ae643490bd92e0b52413bc8c928d580333903bae
F20101114_AAANKB rigby_j_Page_029.tif
1025d982016508d1afc4c7d5524f295e
87e09998bdfb5d9ad590002c029602deee1c56f1
7015 F20101114_AAANJM rigby_j_Page_025thm.jpg
f928f4e206092ccea71eb5f8d2c7142d
7e4f13fcfb7d503bcfe5254cfc08fd507c40e49e
83799 F20101114_AAANIY rigby_j_Page_187.jpg
fcaa1abc45809176d74e892fb22ce864
5b24a02d3ad7def4423ee4ddfc329432cac4aafd
49376 F20101114_AAAMFW rigby_j_Page_018.jpg
351c730929b2c9213c36a35fd6c44fe7
bbde2068a62a4dfdbc5705104bd1a5c5d5972bd1
1279 F20101114_AAAMGK rigby_j_Page_018.txt
df46972dbd8b2b9a4fbafc6ee2d047c6
17442c2e21cf4d3b99f7d596918f095ebbb0a7c1
25742 F20101114_AAANKC rigby_j_Page_075.QC.jpg
41e0ec1a8727d192905ccc6e6bc55002
815e1598192f533ced41949bf6bf7824ab827d97
54182 F20101114_AAANJN rigby_j_Page_031.pro
25552abb5447bed86f2e5406893b0bd0
ceee2d131b82de5ceb5e6ab08010e05389c5cae9
2207 F20101114_AAANIZ rigby_j_Page_109.txt
c55e84adabf25df781008a5f33de86d8
4c691d0fe9f51f1c6d33fcb309ecbc6fec171e71
F20101114_AAAMFX rigby_j_Page_092.tif
6624b271070da42cdd0fbf6b47d79f2d
79fe6efefc98ccd9d30e1dd60bbe4a84ea9123f4
71881 F20101114_AAAMHA rigby_j_Page_125.jpg
ac98570a9f12acb17dd55d3bd081bfca
ffe342add02446b1f394fae4270f64ed7b23e556
25702 F20101114_AAAMGL rigby_j_Page_128.QC.jpg
b908bca40e33b0ab6729ba45c8f9e34f
0d3029be516fd50e4ff57585faaa56b6516ccb67
121379 F20101114_AAANKD rigby_j_Page_042.jp2
c7060c5ba7b827817d8f46f0c19de60c
6c342777e24a1f5c007ea9cad554f5329af86f1f
75339 F20101114_AAANJO rigby_j_Page_057.jpg
75700ab4003e8711b8926a3df458b8f8
08e7184c95e1e7836fc3fa0c421def80406f6ab2
F20101114_AAAMFY rigby_j_Page_017.tif
cb036e7618c5273ac865c30554c4abed
60a2d137172c028f5b6814cb4324aff382b767e0
55317 F20101114_AAAMHB rigby_j_Page_065.pro
59e3841f21cabed701575f7b8402dc17
0287ce877e9e7334b2a256c4be650cd7de8841d7
6781 F20101114_AAAMGM rigby_j_Page_068thm.jpg
13411ebd65f0b830a63047e3eaf9ac6e
0e020ccea1feaab5144d4221e11c14af41851fb5
25660 F20101114_AAANJP rigby_j_Page_079.QC.jpg
41c8031eaeb6f42517d44d99855bd8ed
ade8dbebd00efafa462bf39b41abf441535c7b53
76094 F20101114_AAAMFZ rigby_j_Page_105.jpg
01e4d979ed51eb93e62ab364d7930cf2
15fa7be86463dde6b0e164b0bd406dcf1c7a4489
55762 F20101114_AAAMGN rigby_j_Page_098.pro
476c3353c8813052aea5227df9c242f2
80ad8ffa4557cdb071e6a7dfc197fdb77aa161e8
26164 F20101114_AAANKE rigby_j_Page_180.QC.jpg
d2fb71319842aa162db44a709f2b7646
e547055f4868ee1f27960c9062de2c586efefbfe
53298 F20101114_AAANJQ rigby_j_Page_134.pro
6f03328a7106c16a5be2d9a444e594d0
42dbd5284192fece58e5aa80346e1392e6774227
F20101114_AAAMHC rigby_j_Page_080.tif
2b8e6a3584db8c94987925ada79f879a
ceaed35f5f82be52be00d121ee776bf38fe7d2e1
13384 F20101114_AAAMGO rigby_j_Page_177.QC.jpg
5f1593faf589d0da12016e6cbae83825
1f7f7e31b02d7d37ef5597f069dee894bbe3353f
25870 F20101114_AAANKF rigby_j_Page_058.QC.jpg
81aeca332be333db69a7c1b0b5e096a6
ba6fcbfa6ce523d423547571fe893634711c0fd7
F20101114_AAANJR rigby_j_Page_091.tif
2892fe8ff2642deeb5660ce6944a1041
b727ae5bfc617899b72a0630c9bedf68775814ee
13857 F20101114_AAAMHD rigby_j_Page_148.QC.jpg
94b353c2432d0b8534b537470dc7402b
a6b3e8c4af43bc39315dac9d1060afd5eccf1445
54023 F20101114_AAAMGP rigby_j_Page_162.pro
bd1c07a7bffc6a6c3e9b98859a4b80af
ac7dacb0a2e8b0885b2114d456a9f8f7638981ba
59730 F20101114_AAANKG rigby_j_Page_172.pro
a55c9266b28f62d73597ee3d00cae13e
c9ddec6632a2d0e8bb338dc95868e2cbf7e856ed
7011 F20101114_AAANJS rigby_j_Page_186thm.jpg
c9d7a1f3c9292ede580a07f6cbf428b7
84541ce27783a9c23322c13f805fd0282302d431
1981 F20101114_AAAMHE rigby_j_Page_060.txt
267d1346bf2b3d5126a3dc6b153291d3
b5f8cfc441cf92371212e94c12d5afd34986fd8e
118685 F20101114_AAAMGQ rigby_j_Page_131.jp2
2a89e2d43446ff3c1b24279805e8d61f
724053e045a26d87040e4675132009af9c58e040
54396 F20101114_AAANKH rigby_j_Page_041.pro
c47dcbe7e5a09a9a5f27252bf7dfc46f
2d6cec534940d68d7b5697f0af18ced07d8c827d
112738 F20101114_AAANJT rigby_j_Page_151.jp2
12a2dfa71b6ac84d314577c4eaa403a5
e3a2bec7b7fa584b1d2c96bb67ca6e9a7750828a
2514 F20101114_AAAMHF rigby_j_Page_143.txt
0d497d00aca8339585e25d6ed180732b
c677f1cba9e2df212098fdcc17eed07d68e0839d
2134 F20101114_AAAMGR rigby_j_Page_113.txt
31b9ef1617f8bfbc8851edc8e1a95ce9
e191b750a927fc21fd9a87e6ee5c4a7fd03749a2
F20101114_AAANKI rigby_j_Page_084.tif
7a2e227a9b6334faa43d26b96c68662d
e1aa733e851d087588916f8cbc0a1c7e9140f7a0
25015 F20101114_AAANJU rigby_j_Page_134.QC.jpg
1d17f6fb8329d4bcef57f9bd820bd2dc
02f9230dca8aac0514eae29ac01cea81ab9d8b4c
118030 F20101114_AAAMHG rigby_j_Page_126.jp2
0fbc74198e7b1895b018ce9079abc55e
da5da420085be7968dde2b46f2e11c9e64d5c466
2371 F20101114_AAAMGS rigby_j_Page_154.txt
0b11d52986cb45d485ac883a064320bd
9cf2ac3c63ede90615d2b6d4e4fe7a079e064416
77449 F20101114_AAANKJ rigby_j_Page_016.jpg
ed2c8ccb97b5709075519cfd83587377
452363145e0c14c18c0782cfcc471b0104843536
7211 F20101114_AAANJV rigby_j_Page_127thm.jpg
52f004d07f9e0b749abfd467e22aa01e
df28908751088e5ff6b33301b2d8383885ca0d8c
F20101114_AAAMHH rigby_j_Page_030.tif
e4dd83cd67ff9cee9d9cbde9598dda77
588f49f8c87e78e8bb581e391da14a1acb1bf296
63069 F20101114_AAAMGT rigby_j_Page_145.pro
a2f267def7539ec2ae0d8ac55348f949
34dcf34c52c897a0245e5f59fa1c8437977a5dda
6907 F20101114_AAANKK rigby_j_Page_123thm.jpg
14c35e94f2122fdbbc15e9266a95fe7a
1360a969a4a292289b5f6a74cfb43eb45aa7531c
97519 F20101114_AAANJW rigby_j_Page_171.jp2
fbd88f9cdbc928535afe3acea2df4168
1b5cbdd95cf2a3b62e574fa60cb7cd063950b0c8
25225 F20101114_AAAMHI rigby_j_Page_064.QC.jpg
a814f8be4d35fd2ddb79dbd0a3fa1b3f
5f3fae0dda4689ef2859754873e3de22e6976ad6
79719 F20101114_AAAMGU rigby_j_Page_044.jpg
123a443e45787d87ffe30e6bf1ab93fb
ed97bb4dc37ab4d0263f1a1bc58a67bc34af29e9
121121 F20101114_AAANLA rigby_j_Page_074.jp2
e4e39bcac3ccf07121ec5c8a25612baf
dc890f9eb60a5a143c4d19a8359e477eaa8b3177
25212 F20101114_AAANKL rigby_j_Page_066.QC.jpg
1e174e9a9a561c9659b89b2d3bfefcb1
14ba074e137f73c0574ee294593c39f26faccb46
F20101114_AAANJX rigby_j_Page_179.tif
fcd127df59fe719bf7408fe087b060b9
fde4cb095077c735ec38296263063b32467ef931
2086 F20101114_AAAMHJ rigby_j_Page_057.txt
6d228c6d3a6837cfe59a4148c473aacb
469cda2b4af84555346d633e560695e9f867fc20
119042 F20101114_AAAMGV rigby_j_Page_059.jp2
844561bb16607b4616d95c57e6b67155
cad394350e1b3f4854f44d70b0c229505876433e
6705 F20101114_AAANLB rigby_j_Page_039thm.jpg
db2b2cd4b6ea6bf2fdd8ced369546cf1
fe2918944e64993b89ef9783b935822ba31c8cf9
76850 F20101114_AAANKM rigby_j_Page_067.jpg
6156d072547dc289dd8149107715c365
f7d6ca17274984bd6542034152fca3ffe30611d3
F20101114_AAANJY rigby_j_Page_001.tif
08bf419323bbeddb35cbe35d083572b4
cf6d9f6de0550d351ea33dda2751e345a0ac5956
53859 F20101114_AAAMHK rigby_j_Page_118.pro
688edbcfb383b9dbd3a3c7ee36558757
29585d81f053b624fb70f604698214b3a7b5bceb
25050 F20101114_AAAMGW rigby_j_Page_013.QC.jpg
d5d3a954398906d83b6c9e7a35c60a15
7b117851ddbf7981e1609bc03cbb8dbbac89d467
71851 F20101114_AAANLC rigby_j_Page_056.jpg
26c61e736c8942c06d1b752f8b6ea94d
f65153634547286d6b5a2e78f24eef6fa9a9aa6c
116411 F20101114_AAANKN rigby_j_Page_153.jp2
28b33b3ab0eaa6a2317f5da903c55329
51150a064305cac581a4ec258cb5924cac8aa4f1
77965 F20101114_AAANJZ rigby_j_Page_138.jpg
3d02e62de8640609e2313bd9a7b3e094
0787e35e0ddef3f21ab40bb0f97db49c50f75ce6
114108 F20101114_AAAMIA rigby_j_Page_022.jp2
c5ced447ee40ed06153a461cb74a9ece
fd9641cedebb8428f2cd07938e05bcc41a427509
F20101114_AAAMHL rigby_j_Page_076.tif
7da2b38b87c52d83b361972e0fb63a07
83c679a5666a66a1b756d61c3bec40eb2d2ff9ff
F20101114_AAAMGX rigby_j_Page_043.tif
0346f59d90e65f928a599ce574ce5a3d
73864b27331edd2c72f44a252e9064c8600ea382
2170 F20101114_AAANLD rigby_j_Page_032.txt
ca3a12ac09f5cb9f3795e7722acfdcec
b25436098ace6b1a303785493421c674a31c682d
78423 F20101114_AAANKO rigby_j_Page_129.jpg
41c728f12526c362b6694514a2b3eecb
0b9764c606b8fb2063730119d9f5ea2a28b38fee
2111 F20101114_AAAMIB rigby_j_Page_151.txt
752667ce4f0d9d9391a6dd7ddf68450d
eaf808b9f17acd25a9e2b7d7475e722fd065b953
80878 F20101114_AAAMHM rigby_j_Page_116.jpg
06909faad5dfd0a39ca3a67d9cd482a3
513f7eb89234456753b8275b5814d88b5e2a958c
F20101114_AAAMGY rigby_j_Page_103.tif
dbb4b44dc2e1e3a89f5a36ffa89bf6a3
034864a8e6e4f7e89934d0e53572cd96364a02bf
F20101114_AAANLE rigby_j_Page_113.tif
af596eeea779e3581e782cbc6afad17f
f8d6fff0a8fb830332f9685f180a450010dc5d62
F20101114_AAANKP rigby_j_Page_046.txt
82189578207e1d8459d914554f8e3888
ea2872c7ef5bd1d47c9de9783c5e73d9c43a60f7
F20101114_AAAMIC rigby_j_Page_156.tif
f5d6c5fee2ad5ccdd11ce05e1df94ede
8e1b9fa0d5e845f109e145362f36734d94bc53a1
55901 F20101114_AAAMHN rigby_j_Page_158.pro
5d51b617aee834af35aaef60b11ac5b3
7f11cdfc878c3b7f8f4b13736724bf7ffccaf1a7
F20101114_AAAMGZ rigby_j_Page_095.tif
46d6576a58ccfb873282a091fc3be4e5
67e4790a1693ca2ebb41f7b41833a3d9b0459d73
F20101114_AAANKQ rigby_j_Page_143.tif
fd9185a04f401c8f5f38672e04d37deb
aec51e682e424c9197f0d966194e1afbc89a9126
81247 F20101114_AAAMHO rigby_j_Page_047.jpg
fa8112418af977c0ae41cab1ae3e7e84
33c74518661383a6573f00e76b52ee8df773308b
25274 F20101114_AAANLF rigby_j_Page_086.QC.jpg
d6293cfa7ac7e351f5fb4c9feb59c05c
6c113bb3bfa5c3080df6f68400fff75ebb1c18f7
38851 F20101114_AAANKR rigby_j_Page_084.pro
d1c8d12f32b8596fad595bfb49e3bbcd
e8d3812cc53e18066f7602b6b3aba8ad780998c3
3897 F20101114_AAAMHP rigby_j_Page_102thm.jpg
3d58a5f9f093334f0009677913402c27
c73654b9e94abc0b4e80d82ade0f5466617cbab2
F20101114_AAAMID rigby_j_Page_037.tif
c8e881bd0d96cf7629576e6472c95968
8769701ed392ee9e74fedfd792962dd5b55795b9
53749 F20101114_AAANLG rigby_j_Page_161.pro
832ce715338d7601ebfc7a5858a92b4a
317f88c3c0ed980a97755bf964bcb42fd82a4bc0
26238 F20101114_AAANKS rigby_j_Page_140.QC.jpg
91ed266fc5171a0feff7a831750fa04f
60d5f5eb31e78b7a087adab3f20030fe562c7972
6699 F20101114_AAAMHQ rigby_j_Page_157thm.jpg
cdc032db159fb60a39c4b7dc3adf76d1
56a35cd583f9864ef48b917800aa57a0455ad719
116028 F20101114_AAAMIE rigby_j_Page_014.jp2
46595eb5b676842aebea4418d54bddec
f9a1f7e310b6765b943325feaba5565bdc61e716
25324 F20101114_AAANLH rigby_j_Page_081.QC.jpg
5454d3fd62442a558770ecaeac07d597
fed1edc12966cd8e5524d1e68533969eefaccba3
76943 F20101114_AAANKT rigby_j_Page_169.jpg
4eabd91b3cfb68096592ec1b9de06cd6
001db6f4428d38f438f95c42fbc754d6d329264d
6918 F20101114_AAAMHR rigby_j_Page_052thm.jpg
1fe2e57a34e3128d34103682e50505f7
97773fa682f836dee1ec5788f1878a0b69f1f4bb
7311 F20101114_AAAMIF rigby_j_Page_130thm.jpg
c7be8981670bd2181cbc68243cbcd087
89023fe8a4ec3b6ba476fce3ba476ec5ab1a2f2a
2231 F20101114_AAANLI rigby_j_Page_116.txt
e3c585c43e1ab79e1a2b1be124e89799
ee9c3f98e6e62921fc5c90a4d4436923b98dc689
76225 F20101114_AAANKU rigby_j_Page_164.jpg
fbba8d9b4d2aaad2090450a6128678e3
ee39ec8f4431cabc1fbb36d20a418137f745c5ea
2155 F20101114_AAAMHS rigby_j_Page_139.txt
0aa71c89ec71961544950923016105d7
edfe33f03148f2035f798e9a769cd5ad60e5a2a5
26028 F20101114_AAAMIG rigby_j_Page_073.QC.jpg
d0afe8457dc22185aec43b7bb00c93f5
b9d7373d3f8c7362685ef15be56de4043a937b53
114246 F20101114_AAANLJ rigby_j_Page_050.jp2
8a58300c076fb9e84bcf1c0393e2fa05
12addf22b772939fec0671e906ae55619194552f
F20101114_AAANKV rigby_j_Page_123.tif
9447e1230f31aca847848e4ddfff8945
546b57982c66722e9b10f2244dc6ce4145aae217
F20101114_AAAMHT rigby_j_Page_067.tif
ec7d2b004bf77014431a4f4deb151040
8dd7c2a71b8d896e3b866db22b4188b05f861afe
6916 F20101114_AAAMIH rigby_j_Page_079thm.jpg
0d9eb45a9c46314a2eaaed2d365c587e
431fabd00e894888604c5bf3d7bb135209058b07
26122 F20101114_AAANLK rigby_j_Page_089.QC.jpg
783abae765a7bce9ac1e03a7867d04da
398396ad62b3635973b36f9a26fe6d6f3be5d99e
2136 F20101114_AAANKW rigby_j_Page_041.txt
68105f86cb505898273a2df936e838e1
f80e54de87bb9396169a7f6d4e0ff0a92e981832
F20101114_AAAMHU rigby_j_Page_184.tif
27d94e482f096c6bbed4a4b0ac7534a7
aeac2fe7edeb5d1b060a80f970671987c16c1b25
F20101114_AAAMII rigby_j_Page_115.tif
75302f0e249d399e86dc1c3640cd4ebe
7c51438a58a79305390bcdaead821488956943d3
118834 F20101114_AAANMA rigby_j_Page_146.jp2
b56eac4495dbb822bc3f375693f76bb7
9262f077e7c3f66a25c6b727244da97182ae14bc
110834 F20101114_AAANLL rigby_j_Page_078.jp2
d1d6e583d9f5ff893836b9de13a1b21e
4f8b2376f6215e196469ea3a15918184b97326dd
24695 F20101114_AAANKX rigby_j_Page_102.pro
de1905d8fa3355d1c533560a17b1047c
6b5e35868200f7e0f14eb021326fd1800c3891f4
2076 F20101114_AAAMHV rigby_j_Page_099.txt
9eb119b929421ff3287cceb5cf313d69
e7bcb57f52d113dbb67aab846b3e3e376f032dad
73421 F20101114_AAAMIJ rigby_j_Page_095.jpg
b02e38abd0d509bdf39aff38b2ea942a
1bdf7b43455d1707ab13edcc5a1546227545c394
F20101114_AAANMB rigby_j_Page_162.txt
f0136f407c55cf900a9335b177a81c39
87e1c663d0d25f22de6aee378394985b4b662574
F20101114_AAANLM rigby_j_Page_153.tif
0a0301d3e52c2eba3ab0918faa51f259
7af5149103d98e177cc523b0edb3cd5dd4073c63
79175 F20101114_AAANKY rigby_j_Page_024.jpg
f7a95afd22ec56e7f3d8159a71b32dd8
d2545014a71b181bd94dab5a2a3830ed4ca61b9b
52492 F20101114_AAAMHW rigby_j_Page_072.pro
b2a8fbde2f2458a67f1e50ebd1cb8e8f
3a1c79a02b1bf4a009c6c2e55468d69399228699
79142 F20101114_AAAMIK rigby_j_Page_176.jpg
9e61b057345e12750e10c5ed6e5f126d
6abcc08b4a46b89df234d25d67c321c900a1b83c
57777 F20101114_AAANMC rigby_j_Page_104.pro
3aa9edd14e3b430c9f13af89e3da35df
60f45860d8275dbc31d1c6a04805e6c2700d478f
55359 F20101114_AAANLN rigby_j_Page_053.pro
fe575cbdde5bda289e46928185e54eb0
7974194c2ae0f45ba9aae166e8f4019bdcc0c0c7
76238 F20101114_AAANKZ rigby_j_Page_128.jpg
082610a86c6c311d7c628d0df36ec17d
eedb7b74bae89b834ab44d39e913136e6d4f11d7
71423 F20101114_AAAMHX rigby_j_Page_046.jpg
efd0cb86ddc8199d08c3af3964ffc19c
f9f58c4925ac4bdff35cd82cc7c631d810fd4101
F20101114_AAAMJA rigby_j_Page_008.tif
da21e4dd429c4af6a9bfc2813c78fb74
a1db94d658de00ba8b0de43b50aaed3c0b6a8a50
26312 F20101114_AAAMIL rigby_j_Page_092.QC.jpg
8ba66e49cefce734373b6264e3f5608b
fb08b021790717ca99f494975de28379e2af2459
55837 F20101114_AAANMD rigby_j_Page_089.pro
903b62b4476e10d94e3da8977fb95761
430468c9e673d41edcbcda108a3b1a827f46976d
130256 F20101114_AAANLO rigby_j_Page_183.jp2
323ed9b8c22742edb356ebeba617e579
f94f8a738942459f73de1c4f2412a52438185c68
28068 F20101114_AAAMHY rigby_j_Page_192.pro
c172c885b2c5b586bc7171ecaf8b5fa7
0a2e51c29fcb0a844790a4024e404e796a255367
77780 F20101114_AAAMJB rigby_j_Page_051.jpg
591bb0fb8032f751d5161c441635bfcd
a2d8fea66a445ee88c70de9645b1e28f20160ba2
5868 F20101114_AAAMIM rigby_j_Page_010thm.jpg
858f0c9ac66fde284e6c6018896cfb22
9f781ef72cee84648772af2fc8459d03c5b21d7b
6750 F20101114_AAANME rigby_j_Page_161thm.jpg
eab72fe24c3495d57c65b5524d601173
4b24c3afd92ab40fd04ec437911bde246a6a7b58
F20101114_AAANLP rigby_j_Page_010.tif
db22ced4535581b083810f9953ec1611
596df5d112f95e2a06323049d0b7b9409c5f884c
F20101114_AAAMHZ rigby_j_Page_112.tif
91630898dee1cacc76b2ade32631e25f
defc5662b845de337da18ab7c9d2dcd326bd6afe
F20101114_AAAMJC rigby_j_Page_111.tif
5fa98a277959900020ed9f82d8571ba5
0d3248042273d394d4eb50ef71de89fd65f7e614
122499 F20101114_AAAMIN rigby_j_Page_027.jp2
e4663635cd76eea081f6f16ed0bcee90
2a2d278ccd2fe005138653af9463fd749800900a
124934 F20101114_AAANMF rigby_j_Page_130.jp2
f56d3858df2a5484c8bc81dae99872b0
ff658ccac4c7e273f0e287a8a1e16c85ee394985
23141 F20101114_AAANLQ rigby_j_Page_122.QC.jpg
f757703bcc2d5716d1297269670298c4
4538705e77287842edc60fd404fe7d84131e9b89
118534 F20101114_AAAMJD rigby_j_Page_016.jp2
f1d4de9c162c20c038343110b83b2f80
9fe1134da8899096863e384d07c6b599fd1a2a90
F20101114_AAAMIO rigby_j_Page_015.tif
8eea3f107088a456a98c2e086f582034
ee659254c47a4e6a5f18d2396c5672268a8e69b7
50109 F20101114_AAANLR rigby_j_Page_060.pro
02d16766549cb6b6cdfdf07d664c916b
142d7dad1e9c6525893e21e69149bef894338595
116654 F20101114_AAAMIP rigby_j_Page_049.jp2
57c6f5ff791c3206fe938c579533beca
1111917fb733d6381ed6bf5161e0bbfc84462809
25709 F20101114_AAANMG rigby_j_Page_129.QC.jpg
5ddbb65d61349837fb8800f044749af8
2cdeb473cd415044c1d7d1ce9a8e28dc08403ac1
23637 F20101114_AAANLS rigby_j_Page_029.QC.jpg
1e5acf64101bafd0be0b220998ad1a97
6837e449df26324162dce9e42e6a0d39e1100060
26766 F20101114_AAAMJE rigby_j_Page_065.QC.jpg
9989ce077e1ae179ea136e86d2a67d31
2e4e164da1fe09060fdd67cb67ccf29bbc3179ce
54283 F20101114_AAAMIQ rigby_j_Page_055.jpg
2ad9312d710549de03bbd6b9ea77c72d
17cc963010b2aa6aad549bc2675f17ea1ec91390
66514 F20101114_AAANMH rigby_j_Page_010.jpg
42447e80bc931f7ca2853bcb4dabf3d6
4baf6cbba04d81ef526561f4ad2dcab9df82d842
2056 F20101114_AAANLT rigby_j_Page_120.txt
25c9523b12aab9b8e97c369bd094d836
699bf88111506a96d77d70bc6feb6e6296cb0d5b
51767 F20101114_AAAMJF rigby_j_Page_064.pro
5454685f845f3399aaf28f0aeb4d8fba
ef36c299073275c1cdd58e159ed499339dd8b493
24076 F20101114_AAAMIR rigby_j_Page_077.QC.jpg
edbaf8dc82dd7eae6183d59e57d2b19b
fc4d0a7fca7c34e57731ea165ba38be7ab122ba9
54582 F20101114_AAANMI rigby_j_Page_159.pro
a90b3f3cc3f1f4ef8bebed05a62e386b
3e731ff4b3f89a1e8cb4d5f7bb242d4efa59b5fb
24447 F20101114_AAANLU rigby_j_Page_001.jpg
d409d56d11e7904cec7ff57755aed443
8c70537e6cfdedad61dba6136231b4e5d15cc9fa
6672 F20101114_AAAMJG rigby_j_Page_156thm.jpg
76919db88720debf3f52d9f86219bda5
ad4d7cb01dcc97c6b7acd7bbe170998dc5027f06
54195 F20101114_AAAMIS rigby_j_Page_110.pro
2eb3453f7b4ecee566f7a380f9bed97b
55824eed04419d8b354b129abd1d9c3b4acf4d51
22549 F20101114_AAANMJ rigby_j_Page_155.QC.jpg
e4991ee85a46124615fbc1ba734a7327
32a29bce896ad778a968fc062452d3e216c81227
49988 F20101114_AAANLV rigby_j_Page_082.pro
ff59b86b003a008c1997e0361acde12c
e4f47fe97adbe76d27c46f13b5945c48ad91a0c1
115061 F20101114_AAAMJH rigby_j_Page_123.jp2
682ffb9c69e643b20438979c948f9810
4576ec0a5e4bdcd97eb285f732e08e0b9dd43509
F20101114_AAAMIT rigby_j_Page_171.tif
d33f2a86498a4b258a1bde5c5cb3ac42
f2a57333804e7d0487877b74ca8436dd4e642841
77930 F20101114_AAANMK rigby_j_Page_114.jpg
73b0311b232b1d0bac49524ef5f843c7
9de02a36da1857d9e06bfa06fa79edb2cf9ac73c
2259 F20101114_AAANLW rigby_j_Page_190.txt
cd3a87c6bf08814a5bfedaa94233d11f
98e36071a22eb6ec554d1e08e201a83ff221d091
2095 F20101114_AAAMJI rigby_j_Page_133.txt
108f6f93c6380c1aacaf8b44c6e9b9d2
cdc591d25e2fc0e57a60f573b0a2b80df6e58aa0
F20101114_AAAMIU rigby_j_Page_110.tif
8b03eef14404d5b410f451c681bf1a10
12ae618e8726647182d66ceb8450259c15cdd712
53710 F20101114_AAANNA rigby_j_Page_021.pro
2ccda35beacb5bcaaf542725a25bc433
f222c6890e58f6f8b958551042e7aa929dc97382
53553 F20101114_AAANML rigby_j_Page_157.pro
4bd1970e89b985613a876ccd79a472a4
72e4b1ad7815a4cad981a31e06bf284ba2df6d01
54288 F20101114_AAANLX rigby_j_Page_030.pro
f90ff069affd6c2053b230c54fcacc5d
e6371c419739fb9965d5788c92d9d8384b75bcb2
57158 F20101114_AAAMJJ rigby_j_Page_044.pro
e32885ce537061e3df3aab805c7f630e
a0cdb374715c8f2072d95339dcb493df6b9b93da
52499 F20101114_AAAMIV rigby_j_Page_106.pro
4b00c14f2449a5aab565b825e5100e36
ff0a8b23d73dbcf11e73eb04883dc955b6d9a0d2
75435 F20101114_AAANNB rigby_j_Page_133.jpg
de47bf122c91f8ed2fa5ea1d4647d2de
9db793ce4e7c74cd0744ca61102dbcdae40f3057
75372 F20101114_AAANMM rigby_j_Page_068.jpg
fce5333f04022404660e7e1a53d73ba0
4d4a16afc20f1bb46c1ddda227107e8fb7b4b3a0
24400 F20101114_AAANLY rigby_j_Page_101.QC.jpg
a241cffde12255dddfa4343326600fa1
1fa9d5bf0a1081519823d35e506fa823fcf85b61
2171 F20101114_AAAMJK rigby_j_Page_137.txt
e9e716c26fa8a7d869d4e6770b295cdd
2de80328d8e646a2e3f28ec64e5b79ab85c5cf2e
77223 F20101114_AAAMIW rigby_j_Page_032.jpg
c3e51b30127f9d7dd81919c5f3892aa0
36b88b402f25296de3be59c4c79de960fb9b2d40
78507 F20101114_AAANNC rigby_j_Page_139.jpg
4474aabdb3c217c89287e062129c26bd
26cc1e8a2e599f8f2666c336f1de53c23307f6c5
24909 F20101114_AAANMN rigby_j_Page_190.QC.jpg
12b1071df2ff7b50acf5c02fbc4c7eee
68f7c69cfd56be6d896017d6ed2cb38625021b21
F20101114_AAANLZ rigby_j_Page_016.tif
c5b07a2fccd9145a8f70c5a9bb7451e0
1922820961c36c8b0d2dd22cff7036189d77ce3f
2267 F20101114_AAAMKA rigby_j_Page_163.txt
b237387a78c0bbd09693b6ab93766a13
54f8a55c3be011e23347efa104fae6a02d2348d7
26123 F20101114_AAAMJL rigby_j_Page_131.QC.jpg
67982132d3d14174f581c3933e7624f0
99aecdec02ee075850e81516999ddb6a24e89630
25450 F20101114_AAAMIX rigby_j_Page_170.QC.jpg
dbbcfdcdb9dfb0477dee32774cfd2e7d
b52e63cd377a660a2e13bc47b880b0d96d38e836
73935 F20101114_AAANND rigby_j_Page_168.jpg
0518ec1bd495e3899165bde59c5f4452
d11958c3e9455978e220215b78f9ee1cf2e83596
F20101114_AAANMO rigby_j_Page_155.tif
0fb29ea93444d3fdd1baae8d3c0342d3
a231b6fb7a9fd9c3b28c08ea719205015993f067
112584 F20101114_AAAMKB rigby_j_Page_103.jp2
8e77bae1e71b724742924a911c9b79a1
c151654b89e3d307a8c37da0f3e6b6e6ec1b1250
78097 F20101114_AAAMJM rigby_j_Page_098.jpg
7e921444f057c331ddd35a802437cbfa
46a43b232974380a7c1d7468f490ff6b32d48e91
116162 F20101114_AAAMIY rigby_j_Page_039.jp2
3d7b702a6bc31cfa865326b19a20c806
99aed10129d11b845a0e431f58c3ab9dfd9d5463
F20101114_AAANNE rigby_j_Page_014.tif
0354a1b1082fff5ac0482d14b8f18a2b
6f11f4e82c1fce01de9e4e7a5731233d1ba0e6a3
80854 F20101114_AAANMP rigby_j_Page_104.jpg
ba512da6732d49857e95649414196ce9
dc27108fd91505017e29fcf38036ea014fce57d4
6636 F20101114_AAAMKC rigby_j_Page_096thm.jpg
57ee8bf30bf1531ba5a0dce2b94ebd12
81c71797a9230c73bad530080d1858b33c5fd966
23465 F20101114_AAAMJN rigby_j_Page_091.QC.jpg
266479d686191a6c106ba31764a047b5
8594a3ce73b360309d16e41e54c413bf966df60d
56620 F20101114_AAAMIZ rigby_j_Page_170.pro
c9c988318dce366bb3fd818520085728
9216439d2b77dc0463d24eda4aee74fe7f65e970
24658 F20101114_AAANNF rigby_j_Page_186.QC.jpg
3a1cbf25a000af54b5db69d7d45dddc1
c8356ebb8d153851176db2e45f32541b1f8d24df
6595 F20101114_AAANMQ rigby_j_Page_056thm.jpg
1c21b902bc4455587de86ed342f53f86
c08183038d5c15f8e16f52542166d3c652743834
114563 F20101114_AAAMKD rigby_j_Page_107.jp2
0db7458b2d3334a15d3a43328b3bf047
495c7d3424a60590e278f5e39f9bfaf1dfe0e184
5007 F20101114_AAAMJO rigby_j_Page_055thm.jpg
f0467d340167ce9bbfccb8020a7e80c0
f46fb223c5e448a2a87162875bbb9c2d34dc2303
2168 F20101114_AAANNG rigby_j_Page_127.txt
00cb9754d0c143fc11607ecadd5f5293
9c975f87b2961dedfed4c2215bc00ef829428056
76565 F20101114_AAANMR rigby_j_Page_094.jpg
4116c384cb5adaae14cfbfc3ca983b20
ab6966a7df98fcb05967608caa663b0c3ecc3720
F20101114_AAAMKE rigby_j_Page_105thm.jpg
a383a31044b7b592bf71560016802a0c
7721a7b201e6dccb94ad7d192066ee0e959f196b
56238 F20101114_AAAMJP rigby_j_Page_190.pro
6991474b60f328cdbed3654016fea338
b0cb9c8de0112c9a0c84fe123e39c7dc0c86be63
7085 F20101114_AAANMS rigby_j_Page_111thm.jpg
cbf581e808523564a4214c745a453643
5a668dea8fbb03d48fc251ce38a6918d4b08c35e
829561 F20101114_AAAMJQ rigby_j_Page_173.jp2
21d697d497fcc1d1c4cc5edae7ae0d52
d3fb324381ce1bb7ef07fa3f115288808142831e
F20101114_AAANNH rigby_j_Page_040.tif
615b8dc4fdeafc8a7b3530bc37cc729f
5af19ce7a7274b1cf7e3dd76222312776b7a67ef
2205 F20101114_AAANMT rigby_j_Page_153.txt
fc1daf029db432cf5a5ef9c6227e240c
43264f5129ccdfb0d5563e22602500c5691e9ce2
15004 F20101114_AAAMKF rigby_j_Page_011.QC.jpg
637edd969e46f673da227b942fd156fd
defa2ee5e0056e9fd1f2b150ec0652b4a45f8d17
6585 F20101114_AAAMJR rigby_j_Page_021thm.jpg
c13d4db5674b6fea2237ded6de1f9584
b24c0e31f9f0c48f54df70a079fa887086462f94
26339 F20101114_AAANNI rigby_j_Page_117.QC.jpg
b126da83bccf7f00228cdba0f39af12b
533693d12354d90b4b7afa305dd49c841addf068
2097 F20101114_AAANMU rigby_j_Page_022.txt
8e15113946b6f964fe5194777cd0ed10
dd1b76ad6e1d4320886d313afc84ff070d89a085
F20101114_AAAMKG rigby_j_Page_129.tif
98efb13ff68a575c2dab17eb30b7a394
d1b9f9517a51588e8ff0f38451fb66ddb211ac25
2114 F20101114_AAAMJS rigby_j_Page_118.txt
b009c80122b8ccad300db189a14a299b
9b7fbac5521dd09123a2de013e7a3c76d12498e3
87156 F20101114_AAANNJ rigby_j_Page_185.jpg
550d232cc943df5d40e4b97b98274545
137e175abae241b28bb7e0b8237f30e0a6105ccb
2072 F20101114_AAANMV rigby_j_Page_043.txt
294174ae4009242b7730fc19efd0aa4d
337a51356f2ba7c31435b0d94c54a6892322cee4
6491 F20101114_AAAMKH rigby_j_Page_155thm.jpg
8642445848a814e9c4cffabd45d7d62a
7f638fd9adf39af7a22c48170b28f87b47bf6c09
56259 F20101114_AAAMJT rigby_j_Page_109.pro
8e006e00a3f3f32aa208d49ecea466fc
c62dbaa4f455e4dfdd1e9e6bc0149e9bd3fb9c3e
1308 F20101114_AAANNK rigby_j_Page_178.txt
1b21e7ca9baf3e480c43ccc71ce044df
5bc65ea983a6344b6266633e01c3a803eac548db
53840 F20101114_AAANMW rigby_j_Page_017.pro
a00415b150c7e7cb7055e31520a07275
2550903f990f0c06e2d90bbbfd9bc4818808b99e
1792 F20101114_AAAMKI rigby_j_Page_009thm.jpg
8f90f29ab26539408beddb60eda0efb3
ee0b30add9a83e405f5a71b3404e161d16d9df12
6221 F20101114_AAAMJU rigby_j_Page_029thm.jpg
4e054547976cba046cf2e3f37cb4676c
78d92c17d7239d1cdce1116422c5b4d2f18f93b7
6915 F20101114_AAANOA rigby_j_Page_187thm.jpg
1bfd8f9776c0f0337ee53c2ffad49d53
369ca9db83695d2d721b2db96c29fb558c3a0490
26285 F20101114_AAANNL rigby_j_Page_027.QC.jpg
52cc5c69c7b94041da01d45daab765bf
d87acc20ab116f32ae708007cba4cb5ec98939da
1991 F20101114_AAANMX rigby_j_Page_078.txt
10a6a575f35b6f3dd1b928c791652dda
941cf123062d2660590d1658c663c85ff9b70130
1458 F20101114_AAAMKJ rigby_j_Page_008.txt
ea6fb4c09e3d735ade0cf086932dabb4
6c71093c8b435c9bc11696c2f5155fa35bf191b5
114944 F20101114_AAAMJV rigby_j_Page_112.jp2
d37d4296d18d83c91005bbe83c888b87
d300e2150d35c5244c10fa4f98db1f0173defaf9
2093 F20101114_AAANOB rigby_j_Page_134.txt
65f83c16e85adcdb2aa779f0c3510a96
c77920a2d8c3b45cfe9be90358bff8114096fdee
52429 F20101114_AAANNM rigby_j_Page_079.pro
a1a31d4358964957434b90bbdd352a2c
e42cfb8684d0c6e12fb1f2900f00a14499406859
78489 F20101114_AAANMY rigby_j_Page_121.jpg
20cb8ef366835e3edfc75a75fa5fcaad
4e37d34ab6641a4cfeb170229e1898a3b8891f13
73638 F20101114_AAAMKK rigby_j_Page_091.jpg
f1bef6955c5ee64b6c47c767ed14866b
27688aaa8478b24cd86463daf82693a89028a465
107103 F20101114_AAAMJW rigby_j_Page_056.jp2
116d26ce223b343ed4dc58ce3f3d40aa
d545644325cd11227cf033a18cb2546a347c26d8
62803 F20101114_AAANOC rigby_j_Page_180.pro
5601baaa3b1496b2dcf493590a952094
d3e817a0dc01858931fbab83582fecf2d5a7c756
2024 F20101114_AAANNN rigby_j_Page_028.txt
07353e54ba6d54f2cbdb19d58d581036
c9b3b82b204a0c241f56b33b256e754eb1d6cca9
407841 F20101114_AAANMZ rigby_j_Page_175.jp2
55aadf215e3f8485f12c3c386e39c39d
e02ea76f8a20b6f44e32fa4a9edd3eb270151d98
2073 F20101114_AAAMKL rigby_j_Page_050.txt
bd057198a977903e191a6aede660d8cc
5eeb4cccdb02f32af3594b50b6f250c9e0cdf5cb
31232 F20101114_AAAMJX rigby_j_Page_173.pro
4f8b192885a98f6190ca9c7d5c124b71
de68123d1a50011b2295533656a03656a63fc113
1937 F20101114_AAAMLA rigby_j_Page_155.txt
92e1b2e0013abb51fb4d345bf74df38c
43b78644e30c7c50bf5036d766775e507043d6b1
54249 F20101114_AAANOD rigby_j_Page_039.pro
d2788b6c71fc8c31675f28222a9eed4f
f5395570882c7c46d21aa15c344248438ca4f909
4072 F20101114_AAANNO rigby_j_Page_005.txt
98350de8b885f27c432a9913fc723a84
50d4c074dd4f0c2cd62cc894c080306e1ed2cbdf
116643 F20101114_AAAMKM rigby_j_Page_128.jp2
c9f3e3c286be029ca940c59021818b79
0adf88050f5c6a141d6983ac4493b5acac2766ca
2197 F20101114_AAAMJY rigby_j_Page_152.txt
1c6a8b9373c66520fc2f990a786a071b
cab24ff568a00b290ec4bef6c89965d8f382efc8
55223 F20101114_AAAMLB rigby_j_Page_166.pro
b2d31c589c25c71d38425785c4e855a8
1ac7a60f148969c6d753df0599cabf7372c7a789
7125 F20101114_AAANOE rigby_j_Page_131thm.jpg
c4ad24ebe2cf0c86d0c7c88d7cbe379a
02a1ae5778d068e59c76513c36a8fdb2b276f837
16154 F20101114_AAANNP rigby_j_Page_018.QC.jpg
92d3afb37321bc21fab90636a6eff32f
4512916793511b7f6770ba3edfb1e911ad680499
53813 F20101114_AAAMKN rigby_j_Page_038.pro
fe81f8193a4e3d1920d6f30bdb38e16f
77e92960f94927997daa1fa14910adf9759dd389
75943 F20101114_AAAMJZ rigby_j_Page_159.jpg
08cb2ea6d5a7129938c1c349e34cfcb6
ebc9128cd3592097ba8efdd30d002177722c7b4e
25291 F20101114_AAAMLC rigby_j_Page_162.QC.jpg
d6023a307bfe3897d4b31c5c307a109f
0e69c9ccc5589c523c3d2c5c6463e7610f240277
2479 F20101114_AAANOF rigby_j_Page_182.txt
f6e7d7a2efe6fd33a3e393f017128d7b
fa8b7d495fbcd355adca7db8b8b4862d439ff7b9
76151 F20101114_AAANNQ rigby_j_Page_156.jpg
dfe6808408a3aac79bfc7c3ba810c8ac
3b6e0ce84cf4ef94cf276dbf705ac5f83963326f
27618 F20101114_AAAMKO rigby_j_Page_145.QC.jpg
ec69fd4d97f66e05a0ba7ab0a1e8c70a
9c804b1a3675fb3ef742e1cf81b1b6738b56881a
24619 F20101114_AAAMLD rigby_j_Page_068.QC.jpg
802ea02e861e751741fbaa76b10ff834
27dff0a6db54cf1ae5e1c4ebd782bb31fd9a572b
119213 F20101114_AAANOG rigby_j_Page_127.jp2
33fc0497d6f98172e2d9f6772c5a207d
4f28799900c1bd61a8e8bbfa028c720b41726aa3
6621 F20101114_AAANNR rigby_j_Page_038thm.jpg
8b2b03ebacf7d40fbe57b48a6138acfa
67710a9d6036153bfe3ecb90a5cf620b4e74796a
127450 F20101114_AAAMKP rigby_j_Page_187.jp2
de8bf16be80987bfbc99cea4285dd3ec
1c057edd945e8ec1b2ae2be4836f48503a552b75
F20101114_AAAMLE rigby_j_Page_130.tif
460be7bac00cff2e45f85bbcb99a88e3
c0e6cd9ba2586467dc6c530171f579ff97b1a74a
22812 F20101114_AAANOH rigby_j_Page_160.QC.jpg
8e91e67597d1e1c0424c0cebd05b3f2d
e88a507129a78b916dbcb891a1397e5d0265b5a4
F20101114_AAANNS rigby_j_Page_126thm.jpg
8317c5bfa9dcae71a3c9b5077c503561
08898570e0bc9fa6b0ac41d1431585203df7386b
54219 F20101114_AAAMKQ rigby_j_Page_179.pro
c01481a66ea9622a79245ae20d9f69a0
0670faae08b92f1e26b58ed862058c367ee3c7a9
77311 F20101114_AAAMLF rigby_j_Page_162.jpg
4577cb5167e6e448135bb09ebba32e32
3aef335aac714e9eedd21805c1732085adb424a1
F20101114_AAANNT rigby_j_Page_062.tif
3a6885f2cf272782cea2ec473fa457c8
1470a21940c2778803a612197c10702232977ab5
2182 F20101114_AAAMKR rigby_j_Page_059.txt
07e43084aeb064218594da50b11d4db0
c4d27beca025fd7b89eddcc0c1115349107f9f76
55097 F20101114_AAANOI rigby_j_Page_024.pro
6d8f52818d730074f815625463f277bc
483d0e55ea16c703863c5dbf00bbeee549b65068
53105 F20101114_AAANNU rigby_j_Page_105.pro
ec8e7a57231affee36c825fec364d1d1
8efadef1847dc44719a45e389955eeb4d3693e68
54306 F20101114_AAAMKS rigby_j_Page_042.pro
d3877973ddedffa82bfb173fa8163b53
c97c5b5e6314549eb77f8dd4e5df491f4307cd2f
6753 F20101114_AAAMLG rigby_j_Page_098thm.jpg
768458ea966a6b46f34650badf8d1ce4
2d49d3fcd86845e3fce52955051f5f45e32a6e63
75157 F20101114_AAANOJ rigby_j_Page_093.jpg
cbbf9754bf947143fb2c14f369b9cfac
6df61c7af54dec4c7c0563ac46e0a44492621809
F20101114_AAANNV rigby_j_Page_149.tif
8d7feff8ee4a67a08676578b59a1be3e
af5cfb710006911cfcd384f5b0854e72b2fbb3dd
F20101114_AAAMKT rigby_j_Page_044.tif
ffbd1703449cc95ebbb740d953e457d2
db959221742c668a1247d50db3114b41035249f3
118603 F20101114_AAAMLH rigby_j_Page_080.jp2
f2ea6fb66d4b15ad123b6ef7d5cda060
988c70a402b23a09b7d288432af001bc748e49f2
26835 F20101114_AAANOK rigby_j_Page_158.QC.jpg
ec1f19dc02a85ec009623e59f0e60310
2fad53c13b327b5d8452e44f4f4f5f40f2676535
26292 F20101114_AAANNW rigby_j_Page_080.QC.jpg
1f5f81eb76fee1a13cb19c544ec26c38
047f26f68f294fcc0253603e107376c329dcb1eb
25973 F20101114_AAAMKU rigby_j_Page_139.QC.jpg
f1bb618675f9740f9f8f7ccfad7afdd1
04a277c1ca5c5fb606ce4a7f575db553b0ff811b
24956 F20101114_AAAMLI rigby_j_Page_113.QC.jpg
0cd0ec6b58185d6292694ae8d29a921e
426a23383f342aacde1efbe64fc97e732cdddd00
16099 F20101114_AAANPA rigby_j_Page_191.jp2
425ed9153aeb5e39ce89541b448cfcb6
572262e7acd6098b943f2e0b2f0eed7217ff9b15
6710 F20101114_AAANOL rigby_j_Page_063thm.jpg
d33a98a6d336433dc8b2217ab616ce44
7e4b51e24689587be302ccd3149185cf49cc7c8d
24983 F20101114_AAANNX rigby_j_Page_107.QC.jpg
bfe50bfaf9726122c5cccbb341cd61f3
e3245f7fe1c1a7b8a8e0b574794d9ddbd6f455a5
50546 F20101114_AAAMKV rigby_j_Page_103.pro
9907bebfdf5ae8b78f5db6ad4529653d
824d9ce1ee162c12c2faba46295dc5d43d86e82c
2370 F20101114_AAAMLJ rigby_j_Page_187.txt
a8736f6cbfa47ff7b0a640d60255a8ca
9f587f6f31915fc7a83466afea118e7b127c80a4
73946 F20101114_AAANPB rigby_j_Page_099.jpg
6bfc67c6d3afa94c0699f975a4877440
ee48f04c212b767e0c144ab59a9259d2d8f7224d
F20101114_AAANOM rigby_j_Page_022.tif
4a6a8e7279ae6b42bed7f5ad269b78e1
784a36f3141395c66d5a2af89c4e6ebf02caba27
119298 F20101114_AAANNY rigby_j_Page_025.jp2
f0304f62b4847e8ba950702cdfe4557f
deb73c612e5fedd1cc113c6818bc35da3f0e6795
87263 F20101114_AAAMKW rigby_j_Page_145.jpg
a02e598e01ac90af56d33146769d5da1
2c8cb6c3a967c4087806401c9243cd8c95f34131
F20101114_AAAMLK rigby_j_Page_056.tif
3a284ebc80061e04a87523c73e169c86
9c4689af99eaad8dfd51a16593ff4a8a89cc7dba
114413 F20101114_AAANPC rigby_j_Page_020.jp2
6dc726d56ca2089f8feeadb29d389876
e4de32145242d0e19de9b1deb76d5630dc71e0ea
78227 F20101114_AAANON rigby_j_Page_092.jpg
5d0387849d15b7bb582dafeddb5b4530
8286b68db8ecca14d4aa8acc8f34a39a3d8d2c8c
132927 F20101114_AAANNZ rigby_j_Page_185.jp2
20710babe2e953b2b4f35dd9d9f12339
1d623a0c1ba3eb31fe275dfd0e5f613948d7bffd
75091 F20101114_AAAMKX rigby_j_Page_112.jpg
9193393e431b5eda4800fa9ffc8cd6e5
3b8e33f22fd8aa3506bf0c73e120400d0a31366b
50893 F20101114_AAAMMA rigby_j_Page_045.pro
b56a2955a4fabb6807af8cd2e3de33fe
e17ad46e4b64dd02fc2d452c09765fd6da39d55d
59792 F20101114_AAAMLL rigby_j_Page_184.pro
6be4865cbd7f884ba3df687cfc10941b
0214d0707bde7a9c9ab1b11d4321c8b282ad0dec
23492 F20101114_AAANPD rigby_j_Page_175.pro
e960d15a24f4bb87e8c2590647b9927d
26a37413020ac0bd56925fad201adbbba4390090
6904 F20101114_AAANOO rigby_j_Page_040thm.jpg
8b0ca33402742c838f62b5f90ee085f8
e153042fc144d6109e53aebc258647021f14e95c
6795 F20101114_AAAMKY rigby_j_Page_024thm.jpg
c1abc002f4d452700573317c1dc4d0d6
da1ddc1d3edd686b9faee67a12223a3e1d5d0f40
24359 F20101114_AAAMMB rigby_j_Page_164.QC.jpg
127ce99685ee10920256ae665ac0e720
cf1631351d4106acd87f41504a1461f64ee11ddd
117451 F20101114_AAAMLM rigby_j_Page_169.jp2
b919463d2de78ab284e3d3b6c2548f9e
d3c46a53c3c40e467b1e36c7f008352a9dc9eb37
72406 F20101114_AAANPE rigby_j_Page_122.jpg
dc78fc821481e3dc7536ee36e6471b93
913ef76c50e87773d2e70acab3bd9e91031adfb1
54007 F20101114_AAANOP rigby_j_Page_081.pro
012279e58abcbbb74826a33e23aed5db
6251fe71a09ee6bff309759b45fcfcf51b6a128c
74956 F20101114_AAAMKZ rigby_j_Page_157.jpg
f3ecd79d43f2edf2fa4c944ea06dcd13
ea115cbbdd25e5690b720eddf66d62168dc3e6be
F20101114_AAAMMC rigby_j_Page_120.tif
f109b867696c4b53bda37aa843e5ff3e
5a817b5f5044266316d9ee819415af608086d97b
25270 F20101114_AAAMLN rigby_j_Page_094.QC.jpg
29bac536314485670a71a0361014daf2
48f310f28eb32c89ae5d1cb90daecfb2b624de70
24902 F20101114_AAANPF rigby_j_Page_179.QC.jpg
ffa4e0fc09142c41f4b853fc25ebea1a
6ccbafe4b0ebefb309bd3b9950776842bc314af9
109889 F20101114_AAANOQ rigby_j_Page_168.jp2
ef9b1b14c80806367efbfd626f9f3b30
7e191bacd0eeeab387ca92323ec534105f179ba6
59195 F20101114_AAAMMD rigby_j_Page_154.pro
f5b9b73597725bbcdd6d72844d850625
03c4c8b25c80e7dbba0c90f835343dfba05c5cf7
134184 F20101114_AAAMLO rigby_j_Page_181.jp2
eea4084ec05a6507e0aca21d2d49bc00
41253fc973e9675193d9945048a03baa89d91e5b
76067 F20101114_AAANPG rigby_j_Page_050.jpg
7a959999742f34f466f10548707d45b9
997b6db08865d195848554b18ffcf6869ddb933b
24496 F20101114_AAANOR rigby_j_Page_151.QC.jpg
7a47ded2b0496c8b5195f85ef500cee7
655e8fb084e85cb4c0c94c1bc8eeb4b122fb458d
78663 F20101114_AAAMME rigby_j_Page_127.jpg
ef4631113bff8792a44f0c9ddba2e165
c8f801ed682f58e7aebd6d0f41e09191c7bb8204
25746 F20101114_AAAMLP rigby_j_Page_098.QC.jpg
85a287a6d4ef6feb31d8bd3300a7830b
3d7e16823a2d322290b582fa61806cd8b784826c
24858 F20101114_AAANPH rigby_j_Page_061.QC.jpg
4013868655e6853cb62ebd5ab5095eda
6511404fd7cd7940848d56634dddf94f8840fe5c
74083 F20101114_AAANOS rigby_j_Page_070.jpg
2ebc3feb1cb70e62c69219f7d653bfbc
2aa02ada482532862aeae6ed6e9e08dfdacb5459
82337 F20101114_AAAMMF rigby_j_Page_130.jpg
49b0a7e433ddce41d711d3fe17743600
a34043693fdeaf13d130bf99c9a76c6b232ffe72
52991 F20101114_AAAMLQ rigby_j_Page_020.pro
d381283ebdeb9c632dc60aa1b5e7a802
50e6810474c338581c81c4871c0d91ee9cbdb90f
23929 F20101114_AAANPI rigby_j_Page_095.QC.jpg
8053de9f3ebcaff217d589b5f869e6d7
96e7b315819dcbe4f1b80d8acf67061bc89d6545
76986 F20101114_AAANOT rigby_j_Page_015.jpg
a0132cd03f838bbbeed2cdcbf8ea2c6e
3c1abaf7f16983efcfaa98243482d131b648a9ed
81203 F20101114_AAAMMG rigby_j_Page_023.jpg
554c3a85c31e6698099ee4a25b81c21e
1f247e3ed2913090022207b769a4c91f25903976
24845 F20101114_AAAMLR rigby_j_Page_159.QC.jpg
82d51456b39e8a819d577391924ed8a7
7da8a23719f91bfda5b8050f524a6b95278d7fa8
77160 F20101114_AAANOU rigby_j_Page_186.jpg
5434775cf8de2b3e750e6f13df5b05c5
8e5365a7523c792c29a7b87da7741f26a9d55b99
23474 F20101114_AAAMLS rigby_j_Page_046.QC.jpg
173a4611011412c60cd48994ce07973d
6371704c193366fdff5597a7edc68a5d685811fb
F20101114_AAANPJ rigby_j_Page_006.tif
336e4756b8a38d5bbffa184e27b80eae
5318042c28cb8cb30fc6c8f59df2a720ac62fe2d
2190 F20101114_AAANOV rigby_j_Page_035.txt
5395c8d66fc126df83c83ef24cba24af
ea92bf3d57aeb36ca6b3d31696563fa9d73e231f
58857 F20101114_AAAMMH rigby_j_Page_187.pro
76c73375d49e5f93b18ded0d40ee93ce
c4b4c65cce9aec92de2a9f081c43c2f204f29ed8
5305 F20101114_AAAMLT rigby_j_Page_005thm.jpg
06bdbdf3ef406136ad570942802f7c3d
ac1566b8ef746d0128bf32576bf8f28ac5e74707
24014 F20101114_AAANPK rigby_j_Page_033.QC.jpg
9eaf3034b02815588dab6ddf05812667
b4fb9b635d16b63cdb0973c45d99b941d17edb2e
F20101114_AAANOW rigby_j_Page_049.tif
0824d70242059efd2a66b84262cd2164
50aa079c90109f88d68392cae90cdf82431f7ebe
117408 F20101114_AAAMMI rigby_j_Page_139.jp2
55cb5401ecdb2f2d8fcbb767eceb0545
74b35c82a27f2519f67fc4ea7e2cf7b89c1d2a8c
25497 F20101114_AAAMLU rigby_j_Page_187.QC.jpg
45972930b8b6a527b4ecef6a08dc3059
cc1dc1c4c144871d47e6262f57839bad5769d5c4
6662 F20101114_AAANQA rigby_j_Page_012thm.jpg
35fcc837d98836066b3aae4d7e3ebc9c
1a3cadb394b95ef31bc662d343c7e03b09efbeae
7319 F20101114_AAANPL rigby_j_Page_136thm.jpg
00f1e8ae0c1fe1554d5228af7f4e37fc
d2dbac4951ef679ff03d2f275234111b57c7087f
23387 F20101114_AAANOX rigby_j_Page_056.QC.jpg
443ef084546ada3596e7d4eed507c4b4
18c9ddd4ac924a3e5091888e3a9c0934f0bf9ce8
25816 F20101114_AAAMMJ rigby_j_Page_126.QC.jpg
29dc32626c4052c828de62be09e4f045
0bb3d8ef66c61520e00aa0af556ac52ae0cb8f4e
2012 F20101114_AAAMLV rigby_j_Page_168.txt
28237d8e41beb67e4bfa9c7fef53b732
c585610bb7df30b82864f35562ad44c892e579b5
1787 F20101114_AAANQB rigby_j_Page_191thm.jpg
f5bf30ac9a7c7a0127371783016ad6dd
a000f956701be15c8162f497d4ffaf6f9aed222b
77753 F20101114_AAANPM rigby_j_Page_183.jpg
4b10fe39f7daccdd8bf439bc66a0e885
ba6f40fc5609e21d3f955de251712c3c35ff0d5e
F20101114_AAANOY rigby_j_Page_144.tif
207c4ee5f85068d9a47a6441739b4b5f
863b3c8db07ec3117299c954cc0bd25f95afe219
53989 F20101114_AAAMMK rigby_j_Page_080.pro
3480a2c4a4a71ce540fddb20f95f6333
1dc3e8b99ff7176d8bf700436f9b4880e108e7a6
F20101114_AAAMLW rigby_j_Page_122.tif
c669e6724c2ba8cd2afa1d49e700f57a
9a12dcc8d9ab8819ca0376366ff15fd4e0686c3f
F20101114_AAANQC rigby_j_Page_086.tif
058f9a21594cb916d9181d9dd62d1715
263349a9bcef7a9dd4a35b7aa48d82837295b1aa
49260 F20101114_AAANPN rigby_j_Page_090.pro
93e9095810edd05596558f6d757b273b
e9167fc78c1a0591d0e093611a1e1b08201d5c74
23061 F20101114_AAANOZ rigby_j_Page_090.QC.jpg
b5b490e46ee959429f8de7a72d2a3534
a8f3e6c193e08ef0b3b37e69556d76895da9ebdd
77470 F20101114_AAAMNA rigby_j_Page_025.jpg
73944b48dd35750fb53480acc890c028
234c1ddcb796556fd088143735efb0c66842070b
4322 F20101114_AAAMML rigby_j_Page_007thm.jpg
2bff2ac6e1ec5a598e0558e5f954d04d
46d2230c6aa0d7e7a97d7cc9e4178ac68fb61829
2074 F20101114_AAAMLX rigby_j_Page_106.txt
d9b1735d9adf54bd22be807e1ab75399
c95f3b2a9d2686e4712e113a53fac52fbad4a71a
F20101114_AAANQD rigby_j_Page_085.txt
51065e35d745741f5f1d3dbd7bc14732
7a16b7fc56d1e5d68103f0ff277ffe415384fd4d
6761 F20101114_AAANPO rigby_j_Page_050thm.jpg
c5fac4117ee439a25a5ebbe4e4998b86
b7698d027fc8658ab71224efe3b54b5ac08c4574
6756 F20101114_AAAMMM rigby_j_Page_183thm.jpg
65a01926eb4d84d73c18d5d27c59c9c9
6097f1cb08d43b0b189972b4ffbba237aae9df71
25408 F20101114_AAAMLY rigby_j_Page_041.QC.jpg
331acdabb36bb68f326509aa6a5fd940
5215d0f9415e31f4894cb03e479e84f08ed4dab3
F20101114_AAAMNB rigby_j_Page_189.tif
42655c81a813b4857694e832ca0efa79
75e3b408361c4aeccd2e467cc7b309624836cc0b
123420 F20101114_AAANQE rigby_j_Page_116.jp2
aecd2ca629a64c10823c6797183574ea
585d969e69be5c6e44d9136c8affad316a1d32d6
2219 F20101114_AAANPP rigby_j_Page_158.txt
384d93760c18ca7b5195c13183e868db
77b31c9ca76a44daf17e35b0003031c70d65e7d2
51423 F20101114_AAAMMN rigby_j_Page_068.pro
b9c39159e6ec0f440abd2d109978705c
e89a57390a54cda941ddf473ecaa11cd638d4281
52361 F20101114_AAAMLZ rigby_j_Page_083.pro
9c306981503efebc3ff271a9e6cd84d7
a5e75836f66bec98e36c08e24281bdbf4e83857f
119000 F20101114_AAAMNC rigby_j_Page_152.jp2
aea4abd83ec71bfa705124f889278bb2
0cf24c3c50687157382c32958d7bc3501593614f
77947 F20101114_AAANQF rigby_j_Page_066.jpg
ad4eb4b4357506840773593f9332e709
c025f5aac8ba081cdee1e375cda01352a4dcb926
52739 F20101114_AAANPQ rigby_j_Page_099.pro
116fff245f244b02b9b5da8ed6b9544a
9457b48c077102134bd77372ac5086eea2b4d745
F20101114_AAAMMO rigby_j_Page_063.tif
b9b44f357e25aa83a9bb300c6f16ea9b
44df89dc73d115f3be64218d33a1eb177d2514e0
55745 F20101114_AAAMND rigby_j_Page_102.jp2
644a9483a5d65f8332e84e200497acb5
eccf16476e67a957009d4603f05beb28727dd82c
55405 F20101114_AAANQG rigby_j_Page_146.pro
a8c5bc6cfd6cc8b3886a9291c30a07b7
fcf108115762f1a227af4dc5c8c2de75af3c339c
F20101114_AAANPR rigby_j_Page_097.txt
932d2bbd99ad8b95c3415354da2595d8
e9797b6d27973d8939fc9ca6efeb6ae010e39b6e
2126 F20101114_AAAMMP rigby_j_Page_034.txt
aca8ed254502e324fa026f503b2489c9
ca09f04067e5a4f3981496c747dcaa1fd6553380
23500 F20101114_AAAMNE rigby_j_Page_078.QC.jpg
0f23fa1f282c48d62c14422328ae1d59
aad13506e5db645a89a4c8c508a92d95f470a818
118400 F20101114_AAANQH rigby_j_Page_073.jp2
e6201768a21157963ae047dc0168fee2
e93294c73411a30d387e18921bdc1e38acc0632a
50088 F20101114_AAANPS rigby_j_Page_097.pro
9958bcc792a46e80feb2297575e5ebb9
32ba67e80e68eb39b5008c2178bf26de41fc1d1d
F20101114_AAAMMQ rigby_j_Page_165.tif
f304b7bbf304a86dad7d7aeb53e9b3ef
cf27c0e7aa8585db854e3241fa3d3c6af01ee63d
24133 F20101114_AAAMNF rigby_j_Page_087.QC.jpg
4b5576b965dc7da91e9d0fd806813b56
29e48b757b3e5422849a194d6d689bfa058b1ff5
6655 F20101114_AAANQI rigby_j_Page_028thm.jpg
8c8042eec8c77f303fede5ae5d7ad081
212c289f83fa8e6d0306b9f68f7504fecbf1a675
9698 F20101114_AAANPT rigby_j_Page_002.jpg
2c070406d6d92b2b55d12c7839076605
62d24a3151c57b136c9dffa37e90f060352c6b50
53201 F20101114_AAAMMR rigby_j_Page_073.pro
0220923855e2eebbe6858b67e7705262
8f373f7291483fe28a2d2db6234947a53ae0fc20
25173 F20101114_AAAMNG rigby_j_Page_150.QC.jpg
3f45d5a867837168d42155c151688ca6
2a8f719036408ef607fd35d2b99054469071702b
6709 F20101114_AAANQJ rigby_j_Page_070thm.jpg
e0b2152c298c58349e7d583b6414d743
4c7b476b1aeffe947f71054c04de4337196bfc21
1931 F20101114_AAANPU rigby_j_Page_010.txt
02b4b424cb341a70ba6ab12d3aa23f5c
07e7c7e15968f8a08db3e8c3916105975938d7b3
F20101114_AAAMMS rigby_j_Page_117.tif
4da31652b3fb5bfa2a9f0bf3ee73adc1
bea5f4cbae39d8e16ce4cc16d810de69b105b5fa
F20101114_AAAMNH rigby_j_Page_051.txt
906f0bd92faf97e0446ebab4ed6f0a7b
bd7217fb8de24534d3739153bc5f768ff159a728
22192 F20101114_AAANPV rigby_j_Page_005.QC.jpg
2a34b5d239035b4ca3de14f30c1c2003
a29d35c62d2e989db98c4b3e5c1f3097c7bc10d3
1051983 F20101114_AAAMMT rigby_j_Page_179.jp2
86fd29fc551e071a8d3ede3c07a90354
3a5e50eb101e4fef447a2b99cb898e97e4c5a1d0
52110 F20101114_AAANQK rigby_j_Page_088.pro
c8828cdc95c134fd68e5bcbe18880c7c
02b8ef747f0e43f383018f7b0027c92899031099
117777 F20101114_AAANPW rigby_j_Page_081.jp2
703b0aec8df57a03865bcc8ada4d9161
99caaf22974ca2c86d5d3b71cfb349e11ae66998
26205 F20101114_AAAMMU rigby_j_Page_152.QC.jpg
02ddcebbd93ed58bbe8bf9819b09b1a1
a78c852e60d129d33d8d08c0f966a8d9dcd6a8e9
3839 F20101114_AAAMNI rigby_j_Page_177thm.jpg
4a69325164c6ac52f76505b2727f5371
6aae88042906f8ec4a7c08c4e8aab5be8d00cded
2484 F20101114_AAANRA rigby_j_Page_181.txt
7eee48f64cfdc191687c81f794e9f8eb
10d6fec52e5d07cd7f6e17f830b49daef13b983c
13974 F20101114_AAANQL rigby_j_Page_003.pro
1f8d8229aba2d9cc88a86f7e99021204
3f4dcd4731bdeaa50e1f9b824ee9b9593b0557d7
86326 F20101114_AAANPX rigby_j_Page_179.jpg
b06445535ab0002bb01e0dd0ea0b46ef
efb6aeb8f86c3cfffa447a9579862c3d5582d53a
111432 F20101114_AAAMMV rigby_j_Page_012.jp2
35f1c32b219967e4a0b30e960e27c007
983fd0cfbc8714b085425e5b356e83fb5b781b31
2138 F20101114_AAAMNJ rigby_j_Page_042.txt
8d60e2a13ea691ed2950300a9a2d336d
5d5c918fa2bcfef29a68b61f1c9272a7ea77415d
24353 F20101114_AAANRB rigby_j_Page_133.QC.jpg
e182a450ecc86b82eaa196be0aaa4a34
7781c0c6b22c2d3954af19da469386d33f6c748a
112700 F20101114_AAANQM rigby_j_Page_099.jp2
bdd438274cb66f94ca0391c0b43afd45
3a01f9941c743c797db80c325ca4e5619af028b6
F20101114_AAANPY rigby_j_Page_105.tif
bc89b19e4f1b608c7d09e33fa852f8ea
79af9adf0f95ba7ddfb0748279b3f773d917c25c
9551 F20101114_AAAMMW rigby_j_Page_178.QC.jpg
bf27eba6bd6ec6cc8ca994498b9bb119
39702d36ce87504dbcb76e611db437ba16ff2efc
55377 F20101114_AAAMNK rigby_j_Page_127.pro
13b421df427a36b778300ffee0e4e051
5d415d7e918a8527aacdaf1695b847371586c16d
78872 F20101114_AAANRC rigby_j_Page_165.jpg
a516716e797f5cccb0c527a9255a40fd
2b40e6f283fca5a366172d6bf396e37b7d991f76
F20101114_AAANQN rigby_j_Page_066.txt
fcee6147e9ccfc136b42ccf4424d2fff
d17dc12e3f6ba5757642e8b7fadc303c283f08dd
6895 F20101114_AAANPZ rigby_j_Page_124thm.jpg
cd7a41b3d70e83b8676f4727667b5a32
e892302bf424153a64405758e677f910272946b8
F20101114_AAAMMX rigby_j_Page_163.tif
30f41fa83b1ca6d8a3d172709359c360
a1f6095a6a954d2ee08426ad76cabf4c714c3036
2070 F20101114_AAAMOA rigby_j_Page_029.txt
e5c520c3228e12fc02c7d0bd7eabfaa7
65333f3580a43d94e769c6f9a3753a0b40688fcc
116480 F20101114_AAAMNL rigby_j_Page_037.jp2
b92d7510a1d3de33aa690ae783b6be05
ed79c4b095724b3bec90d2aa04a1845676a5bc87
113119 F20101114_AAANRD rigby_j_Page_091.jp2
156157ed98f4193c29c6cdb06e090154
0600e6b116b6a899b954582f6f48864230413ab9
24727 F20101114_AAANQO rigby_j_Page_040.QC.jpg
8f27ef47a100f9b139b29bfffb09bf7f
4cbb073df59eaccba1a1be0e37f05227372b4808
65148 F20101114_AAAMMY rigby_j_Page_007.jpg
a77d29843e03f731e6f723cbf7b0c366
80b38cd3a28fcee6871674bae99ebeb2ad142351
26302 F20101114_AAAMOB rigby_j_Page_146.QC.jpg
98212f274f83f65716d61aefe5007f6c
a80c21399bc4e5795b7cec52747a212e5004302f
5042 F20101114_AAAMNM rigby_j_Page_191.QC.jpg
7d694762a20ff5bed5f0bdd91770075b
9572305d5ddbf6a8182b40c8fc0705bc1790590e
78469 F20101114_AAANRE rigby_j_Page_170.jpg
64f6df3a420b60df6a3767e9a02de5e3
85d40b98454a2682f18a845cee980a030fe88c0b
124828 F20101114_AAANQP rigby_j_Page_047.jp2
4b9ddb798c217dfe4cdc912bb4f88908
e4dd53f3f4ba1107c4cb736e256a2297651b593b
24170 F20101114_AAAMMZ rigby_j_Page_048.QC.jpg
7dca5ab2d35f4efe09d7dc4ffb55471a
49111e615958814b9a25b664f5528152956d7208
56391 F20101114_AAAMOC rigby_j_Page_121.pro
f4ca74c16e0df202932720a3175de299
58cc4d3b48e411ebf36cd4dd6a161ba6a2934238
1980 F20101114_AAAMNN rigby_j_Page_125.txt
1337461893ecd683bfbca8b887fc8551
3fd420e498f681839225512c55edc28edf2daffb
25618 F20101114_AAANRF rigby_j_Page_110.QC.jpg
2fdbc2a84b2ca178e5a85329a2c3725e
db45f836bd803f6effdf7c6374c5bea10f09f28d
F20101114_AAANQQ rigby_j_Page_050.tif
1553ec304ac99d8b8f09111c7b6f631b
85cd9e7947fd82a29a841a64a3f553fc1983408e
6860 F20101114_AAAMOD rigby_j_Page_016thm.jpg
8ce4f784552ad9411af70e0eb0d68df2
2fadc2e3949e754a242d8e9fe4827040af1cf17d
6576 F20101114_AAAMNO rigby_j_Page_095thm.jpg
2fde762d41b2bd347da7506dc569cb06
862eaa45b2b813b4f72bebc7ea8c1436a065b52c
2169 F20101114_AAANRG rigby_j_Page_166.txt
ce54c9dad749383653449344a8d7a635
bce05d7e5f512ebf24e09cba2f1f1c5ce6adf4b8
2110 F20101114_AAANQR rigby_j_Page_049.txt
609b27ac48aa4036c193b1224e6ee59e
62cd2bf6b3b2e96becfa92446bd146849874cb9c
6741 F20101114_AAAMOE rigby_j_Page_049thm.jpg
64b8494ef3211a021924fd88b8a0184b
c20e3faef635f83b800a75aae77f66fae9b61fb9
6776 F20101114_AAAMNP rigby_j_Page_077thm.jpg
64cabaf8408c4a4ec119503a2ff3ee7e
b115ff9ecdddec7329a40e4405525d6c80bd48fd
56049 F20101114_AAANRH rigby_j_Page_141.pro
a60b76a1ad9346470777811683b25673
9aa1c76ba5bda1598c523d64d5338fc1bd53befe
6922 F20101114_AAANQS rigby_j_Page_032thm.jpg
26ea7b3168c9764bf0d3e10e9cdaa274
8eb59cab10d29a45de363d76a969947a58a98bb3
F20101114_AAAMOF rigby_j_Page_046.tif
ffc759469fa2f4308129344f1ee4736a
44065df7db3cad21f0803238eca5d85883f674e7
77334 F20101114_AAAMNQ rigby_j_Page_131.jpg
eaf1cf0d22670a55a77b2c6ee37ebcf3
fbd24bb2fa8d5989763bdc66aab4c081e2dd620a
F20101114_AAANRI rigby_j_Page_077.tif
467b6d138ce01ddf54dadbac6a7aa664
b0118d567a8fe898f562904d0f1c5b6d6215272b
117977 F20101114_AAANQT rigby_j_Page_071.jp2
0dc8c1e63a0ddf58e64fa9dd0aec826b
be003c81760082f20e4286710f0c827885f2a5f6
2359 F20101114_AAAMOG rigby_j_Page_003thm.jpg
448e0f5d91d865cf8cb3e01ed50fdaf2
39778f66abad694e6b533e777b63374e0c0d08c1
54764 F20101114_AAAMNR rigby_j_Page_054.pro
8ed80a87ec694fbddea431a3ebf0b64e
5fc18aba7eedd228f87d6064125b4479f09c945f
F20101114_AAANRJ rigby_j_Page_124.tif
5324864a15a4258786509b24369eb4ea
dc46df6484c0d244efb87188de689d9b87465bac
72390 F20101114_AAANQU rigby_j_Page_045.jpg
d5bd6a893f5d5770574f444622e8fe22
9f16faa278871df324eb823c609b97c16900b25a
F20101114_AAAMOH rigby_j_Page_129thm.jpg
6d6e27e9ea852a2f9b448448ff636f0b
96c4c9ab5e2fd3331786ec7756e9422f78eb021c
25840 F20101114_AAAMNS rigby_j_Page_185.QC.jpg
597340b8d45e80bebdfcea9d56b833b8
a42677509a76912ee43f09e59464774a6a8cd346
116892 F20101114_AAANRK rigby_j_Page_150.jp2
e65a936157dca501366f0ca718122f61
6a1405ce016a8260ad44721d2cdfceba4b14cba8
55667 F20101114_AAANQV rigby_j_Page_129.pro
0a8f5c3421694be4fca49a92d3a79968
cded4ccfbab5294ebfa90a4f842b00c619ec02be
6858 F20101114_AAAMOI rigby_j_Page_151thm.jpg
81e1e4e106ef68215b95f28206e060b9
6b7eb3337dc811d26fcd7a74469518b594274c9b
117077 F20101114_AAAMNT rigby_j_Page_038.jp2
4be8c5d19417a643ece87c445e37a434
c3fde80a9df63291dc1eaf3cfd8722e7d7b0da00
26268 F20101114_AAANQW rigby_j_Page_036.QC.jpg
aaeccd757251c3f7d39b58199ac27947
1d4a6d9ab60ccb60a3f72fe153ac8365483bc6ba
2254 F20101114_AAAMNU rigby_j_Page_186.txt
67803fcb9490f86c325a1a756f056194
fa61e7c8869b973946b36ffe5b6200b053073048
118783 F20101114_AAANSA rigby_j_Page_188.jp2
7d8e6b3f9a9c0156597e273d622638fe
11aff48b7280a0eb089b37c3cfa54059472bf0dd
2203 F20101114_AAANRL rigby_j_Page_027.txt
6aa2a0ee1cbf2b82ca3f906e8beda518
cb62a0dadd4a6b935856a924f7aa258068453512
78296 F20101114_AAANQX rigby_j_Page_173.jpg
a5ad9d0e41916bd67776ef57b8127005
26647843fb26cd11104ef69de173e190a4828eb8
1051963 F20101114_AAAMOJ rigby_j_Page_189.jp2
46c4c4c4d2cb6a060e84586dadc1f2fd
154b3902ddf528265c8c3e0540dc4b2cc96ea34d
F20101114_AAAMNV rigby_j_Page_160.txt
b1202aa8169706561c3b95472a631a30
c3e7d9e1cafd908adfe7c5bd22076b821bce3d82
64901 F20101114_AAANSB rigby_j_Page_192.jp2
e1cb30cd03ff8af9f61eeffe1bcdc0d0
8daec04b87c32be707df6807567c25dc10f5b6e0
26345 F20101114_AAANRM rigby_j_Page_111.QC.jpg
fa620e1968b9df59a1feae8f955f7e26
52d2f405af85ba482e5d4ff07b71a9ef8e64a24f
113083 F20101114_AAANQY rigby_j_Page_088.jp2
4f4198bf92ef9a077154a57f72a30752
199404d0fe13fcacc54cfc5ebb5054f55ec37bde
7068 F20101114_AAAMOK rigby_j_Page_026thm.jpg
d7507b9c4d9dcd99bc2db4d83c97e62d
097a6c6a998e2c94c7657948768900a61d9d8a50
60456 F20101114_AAAMNW rigby_j_Page_136.pro
244834acc0c091bb1d13a1c9f10e14dc
0f3de25b420228810afd6c862ea3bb0e8a3c2d70
113883 F20101114_AAANSC rigby_j_Page_093.jp2
ef0efcf7176676fefe88622bd3585edc
e204af867336c106cf79eed1ad16e1842e85141f
6547 F20101114_AAANRN rigby_j_Page_097thm.jpg
e302c7790918e807771942057cce3004
e76b6ccd709852be89d3f7925d0d0035a16a63ad
7268 F20101114_AAANQZ rigby_j_Page_001.QC.jpg
a2223fb6502de557295ffcd1372a64b3
98e501e861e7a7de129f6b8434aeb1f94fb9d5c8
56125 F20101114_AAAMPA rigby_j_Page_152.pro
db2e17f000b53ccff0b516ea698e554d
d555e783316c78f025e07750777641ad70b34c4c
67472 F20101114_AAAMOL rigby_j_Page_174.jpg
6b4d41bf9fbaebce8ad63e55811abcba
657d978db839341a58c2c3258a8da366294c9441
2191 F20101114_AAAMNX rigby_j_Page_142.txt
76ccff488d6670004f60b7482e2be216
f59c9a2074653455640724933ee3326810294585
52230 F20101114_AAANSD rigby_j_Page_096.pro
fb96237dbed4f1f64c168e8252469f6e
1a11b289e0929ebf7b86876602e10c45b678cd2c
115938 F20101114_AAANRO rigby_j_Page_159.jp2
938c45c1bfa245928800826e03c814e6
4b906815472e081ad8b3e2f049bfc831cfeae5e7
26607 F20101114_AAAMPB rigby_j_Page_166.QC.jpg
f236a896f356809a86353c99e9b1c847
4f40f7451865f96a0f8ee4717bceb3b6f3835829
2533 F20101114_AAAMOM rigby_j_Page_180.txt
432528914abd677ca76a64c58814782d
afc9ec9714165d2daaa8c3cec7524d695df27fcb
2196 F20101114_AAAMNY rigby_j_Page_144.txt
71b07e23e67fa71e97640f16ad9cca23
b77d64e365678055002fc767a0b0a2af1868dc2b
24461 F20101114_AAANSE rigby_j_Page_093.QC.jpg
1f2907823f07d817a3d004b0e0c275ee
697625db2953f06f7a5af06af908417f5712991d
2040 F20101114_AAANRP rigby_j_Page_069.txt
402e3f37fb3e74065e4040601125a501
e21f419eff7fee196c21e4a79f2a311403074e8c
119337 F20101114_AAAMPC rigby_j_Page_124.jp2
c7ee9cc9eaa5056d2a3ab793b88490c7
3f4078d58dffb47a1fa5c76b140984143abb97de
236 F20101114_AAAMON rigby_j_Page_191.txt
20f25fda6b8b53dc89c62778ced017da
d505cb5a4c0a643da265f39b15d8c1b3a03ca01c
116918 F20101114_AAAMNZ rigby_j_Page_118.jp2
b53d61ea5e18c73f477fc9694a3edfec
5a3d015a58a290f366fc588613616f3303e501f7
938 F20101114_AAANSF rigby_j_Page_002.pro
e096167ca56a18a0bd40a378dc1c0f56
ff561a39ac95d8fd7b3157ecb17e8cde65ed3858
F20101114_AAANRQ rigby_j_Page_162thm.jpg
acb286509c73b1beb124b8ad7dcb7b18
82d90a2aae410e6dd80fe578b169decd13d04af9
113975 F20101114_AAAMPD rigby_j_Page_069.jp2
42797fee570046f08b50c7eff3a526fc
e95c17c8227078298e669b4c9abeae2e0d3d7158
24615 F20101114_AAAMOO rigby_j_Page_001.jp2
e6da922ccf99e9f1a31216604b06b1e4
57f3696c3c8c79a9f18d5e2e7e4e2ac141d9c238
2176 F20101114_AAANSG rigby_j_Page_053.txt
3852069cae5b20e818760897d98a15df
1c1ffae3ae10535149106a486ce8c2724a6fef22
25096 F20101114_AAANRR rigby_j_Page_026.QC.jpg
176fabf3c556b65566f5fa10cc5a7999
6c4916019939286d687ee082ffa6e4a7f9b87dfd
25721 F20101114_AAAMPE rigby_j_Page_016.QC.jpg
4b3a74f4cfe868d479865f8a02b5a8d7
5d83091b8c3374a94a4138e7d8593186ae7e3644
F20101114_AAAMOP rigby_j_Page_028.tif
87a304def82927bee189b83007590249
a3785bb89455d3100b7c7d6da7f9e6fa0dc062f0
120544 F20101114_AAANSH rigby_j_Page_140.jp2
08b0a1ab6e33f38c5601261322321ecd
d1398fbe010efc623f6447cd41ac3436be518040
2144 F20101114_AAANRS rigby_j_Page_128.txt
975f7a2870c6d56be2d0d3c1d3eb89a8
05389909bbcbeee2a5883691ec7100dc675cd4f0
1545 F20101114_AAAMPF rigby_j_Page_084.txt
6240734985017ddc175a66aa2325fc35
805e5969352159b919cf32a317a27554a877bf27
53444 F20101114_AAAMOQ rigby_j_Page_067.pro
a0f79790d0d457fd4b36b0720b8863ab
3d109c19e968ddf5db2dad961cbbd0c4a7f3e4c5
82 F20101114_AAANSI rigby_j_Page_002.txt
feea1113d8b554f7e6d02feb72e2ffad
a07c8aa9b57e602ce8207d05f53d8e6f81dafb2d
2158 F20101114_AAANRT rigby_j_Page_138.txt
df1722e61a7bd6ba25a421c5522f3798
af42730a8a8e01c5beb6f14430829ac2f22cbcdd
6940 F20101114_AAAMPG rigby_j_Page_179thm.jpg
8d664cfb3f77681d9086313ad0e2a415
a6b5fdf09610aa21511ab28a0b9f3fff42d79137
80738 F20101114_AAAMOR rigby_j_Page_027.jpg
0cb7bb32b0223a8853fcf2b921f2b4f0
358bddabacce15e7ef7ff5f621a53b755cf2e53e
6876 F20101114_AAANSJ rigby_j_Page_114thm.jpg
781f30aac28bb69f8e5ecc069a02c596
250fc001006c717c46a9296340e747ce0fb880b4
20126 F20101114_AAANRU rigby_j_Page_174.QC.jpg
9a0ec918636dceeb6a27917138c7296d
37008387c53c792877c64cba92ad16df796b0d70
57665 F20101114_AAAMPH rigby_j_Page_130.pro
f766c095a4a7a27b754fb601d69e8088
0e03c821db7f750395818ed38c59b21764be5bae
F20101114_AAAMOS rigby_j_Page_174.txt
4152a0a316a65bf9f04735f4624a40fe
eeb551602e2edc438d3da580424594eb8e19dab4
118828 F20101114_AAANSK rigby_j_Page_094.jp2
ae2ff9f85b6d4053b81f971f963a4331
f4f97952abc9e458e33016b86cf6aa81b20c1a45
F20101114_AAANRV rigby_j_Page_096.tif
6a53969af1a8a4592f29a91cb0af6c4c
ecdd6f8146ee4854b274cc2b8982a09a68f8e480
2088 F20101114_AAAMPI rigby_j_Page_107.txt
d7c7d452af4122d9ef2a190aac695758
2454b1a854b835d0769617764a8110a1a74c37ae
16679 F20101114_AAAMOT rigby_j_Page_007.QC.jpg
0739312d711cd59fcf2f75c7abbbbaab
d265c7cb96ad4d2aae35abab9e82d6fa0691c3b9
F20101114_AAANSL rigby_j_Page_132.tif
d7945785b3b11888445be319d60860b4
2c5c32b0d5df3be60670c2336965437361271610
120980 F20101114_AAANRW rigby_j_Page_024.jp2
ef2332361d3406cb1a88fd3765dadc27
3bb83dd917150f3993f2596f370f780ee90ef967
26304 F20101114_AAAMPJ rigby_j_Page_137.QC.jpg
a20d3b500ef74a68489b1e6a0621c005
72f8e7a1ff08badeec056800c17f089172d6b1c7
24101 F20101114_AAAMOU rigby_j_Page_183.QC.jpg
8bd22f8c6e91fe40d83933bd8cebe0fa
3cffa38131f4448a8fd611bf78eeff25e48429d3
117990 F20101114_AAANTA rigby_j_Page_066.jp2
9e0fbac49c37947b4aef64f71a10b72f
cb78d3cc0d811fa15c8327353c2aaeb5f093debf
F20101114_AAANRX rigby_j_Page_136.tif
2b6493e00ad05adaa273a67e04165917
b37ba7359352545bb5af47769ce2f1de1e3dd4da
72975 F20101114_AAAMOV rigby_j_Page_019.jpg
c033b413caf69cdb770608feefed970e
078f8842993965bcac616c14ab12192ef35ba383
F20101114_AAANTB rigby_j_Page_021.tif
2e2a4862b49e52bb4c59bc29be8f96a2
0bb4505a77f429cc8ad08c302cbae994fd69856f
119649 F20101114_AAANSM rigby_j_Page_144.jp2
721894a0cce3620ab602e928075ce651
db845b90ef6907caddfa98920c4b4b0bfefb52cd
2257 F20101114_AAANRY rigby_j_Page_170.txt
7a3d3114c557a9dcfaa6627f4a30bf88
a3013c322a07b331587e315576c680c7ae268841
7042 F20101114_AAAMPK rigby_j_Page_141thm.jpg
1ded55fcf1061b589df20c11fbc45a6c
896d1257b0c3772fd1f007af9a0612a700749218
6885 F20101114_AAAMOW rigby_j_Page_048thm.jpg
6bc75e7d3dcea0eaa4d2cca3239ec430
d21b4c229bfe562a4dee44d8a929627253da7be4
F20101114_AAANTC rigby_j_Page_012.tif
4240a513bdebeb6fb4e75b93b4509d64
7e2c400ae67c72e11dbc3b5efc1d4549fa542f4b
25873 F20101114_AAANSN rigby_j_Page_121.QC.jpg
c774a860113b7d89e359be0aadfd852f
849d7eacfdd18fbf7234753af4d28b4d21b1d408
F20101114_AAANRZ rigby_j_Page_158thm.jpg
748f410e39f51e3fc847bbd105931765
b72888cc6ab3cd5314e3d4f259f5fda1a4d47f53
54656 F20101114_AAAMPL rigby_j_Page_131.pro
04e423cb048128dd063d4d354aa7dee7
1599ae99aecbdd8a3d319a71e43f09eeb5bf446a
1338 F20101114_AAAMOX rigby_j_Page_177.txt
01fc4981eaf740627195bf3b051c2dff
4c2d7505a6217a796fbeacc4cdf17cd52e2f015d
7193 F20101114_AAAMQA rigby_j_Page_145thm.jpg
55331022d7148fff6f49d2de8fb55c2f
22dd43c12e44b7da3e2eae749f82a7d2926c563e
2123 F20101114_AAANTD rigby_j_Page_014.txt
b422896641cd51c63c84a7362e9d936b
0017296febdd245ccc245622f8225d500ec9129a
2239 F20101114_AAANSO rigby_j_Page_111.txt
7af764ccc50572c03ab82a44f6f305f9
d32b4adf16989b7a9ff8fd496f514f8b0e560c96
113476 F20101114_AAAMPM rigby_j_Page_068.jp2
e2d90ddc2c677a46fc57e9c97d870d4d
fedf00f9c63624cc56df7f37f3d8d02aaacccf32
119637 F20101114_AAAMOY rigby_j_Page_170.jp2
bd6eed00d4ca49916d90f256665ab894
75fd297df78aec4076c79650b3a5aa8b60fce41c
79499 F20101114_AAAMQB rigby_j_Page_111.jpg
f3b3decf89b332da16baad6864dc9428
70798857475cc5939f7ab73a8712147716c35332
318506 F20101114_AAANTE rigby_j_Page_178.jp2
51cbf1878f6789950773905aa185fae3
b3005d6554da910e65adfd21f6811d9b848b7ff9
6277 F20101114_AAANSP rigby_j_Page_090thm.jpg
b974c58dc623909184df0b54c11a9a04
c994ee9b20e76514435260a966f9c624bb6c434c
51284 F20101114_AAAMPN rigby_j_Page_093.pro
bbfe25966d7bbc80ca9d9bc2c4f31b11
6afc9bf17e14ca00d72547ef9b9b0600aa50790b
118897 F20101114_AAAMOZ rigby_j_Page_142.jp2
a035b8758417cea8f5f5479e6462a00b
53a14cc698b2486acda773f81db01b434bdf7d5d
35649 F20101114_AAAMQC rigby_j_Page_055.pro
1cd24473c7ced1fbf74a31f00ed999c6
54d2ad3a2626c73045d9a347bb63d762f8df46e6
6473 F20101114_AAANTF rigby_j_Page_103thm.jpg
5b614729d2079e7c8e88bc4fdcb64370
4af4a25902854996a0dc87040adef14e3ef4117d
6777 F20101114_AAANSQ rigby_j_Page_057thm.jpg
449b06e6998ca9c05172a29606db35eb
23e4b10a9100b451d81153d5b306ddaae4aba52a
2062 F20101114_AAAMPO rigby_j_Page_093.txt
dce1e227ea29785b42618a1acc050b88
2c7190714fe706c16fadf6faa7d94a2ca96486ce
54282 F20101114_AAAMQD rigby_j_Page_058.pro
8342c7ec1a5548b67ddd26546e621a61
ce5cbfae71d26092b5d18aca6ee54d276bd34d1b
122600 F20101114_AAANTG rigby_j_Page_044.jp2
20c4bffbc2d7307a4740b9f0b2d0c2c0
d63c6c167480ba1593c5cbb4ca7ffbd5db752f2e
75104 F20101114_AAANSR rigby_j_Page_151.jpg
22d88f0818cd48b569e0ed0c61e5f947
f2b5854659eb203553aa3e876e690fb9ead3cfdd
23663 F20101114_AAAMPP rigby_j_Page_028.QC.jpg
a94f0ac563e21d76dae7adba46f0b9b6
d9e1dd20f638033947686be27b3f940d27a9b5cc
F20101114_AAAMQE rigby_j_Page_183.tif
874b4587614e42a8799bd66ea9ea885f
1ad8f891890b38ed6e20e0ce6f0857ae75377ea5
2128 F20101114_AAANTH rigby_j_Page_150.txt
fcc6801b1095367dac0af3b0c158269f
c590920dd4be87903ef3169df57f653ae127ddf5
2066 F20101114_AAANSS rigby_j_Page_096.txt
9805f994ce60188ce47ce56757437748
e892c9ef836ad002959537a380fb38b7c8555190
6765 F20101114_AAAMPQ rigby_j_Page_168thm.jpg
fb9939085b5b871c002042bca7d53b28
175375f4e74a966a95c2981523ad4c63d6d79c4b
F20101114_AAAMQF rigby_j_Page_175.tif
718f0220ca3f9d33f25dea2c4e5e471c
106caf4e456a2b5173a38ee8d636ac5c1ec996ca
2398 F20101114_AAANTI rigby_j_Page_135.txt
a206a87ea3b883f6bf60e3c9f1bda14e
d6229c4faf939a3e5d9c122697d0cb0b0cb19c9d
70873 F20101114_AAANST rigby_j_Page_090.jpg
e2e3ac5d4430263d5b3a8099c3b713f0
2c96fc7a8061b025f3bbcad7f35cd2a6a73286ff
76856 F20101114_AAAMPR rigby_j_Page_083.jpg
f022e2cf69b978231b7ea13b79004ecf
52575b68356da2ff39e914bddd6579b1a1631820
119214 F20101114_AAAMQG rigby_j_Page_086.jp2
11afb51e8221df70390023c7c27c497b
3d97af0958c6905fa38accf7827c6d8fb68b5656
71863 F20101114_AAANTJ rigby_j_Page_077.jpg
38814579a1a12165d8ddb4960e01c4ed
46996773d330625a8f693af8aa0a83c2acdad84e
6870 F20101114_AAANSU rigby_j_Page_058thm.jpg
7f626e1b6e0ff1cf0ffc360905cb637a
77783b617a95986e6f35c42b3d6431418345a8be
25984 F20101114_AAAMPS rigby_j_Page_141.QC.jpg
d961151ec0157b488f33252cc890e552
f58f2015f7b40c5913125bfd0e6c5b45c73bebf7
50251 F20101114_AAAMQH rigby_j_Page_076.pro
39590bc4d6a89d735a7ac6cc51f308e5
26b0549cb9fb908e962adbca9bf0e4d4fb19279b
2131 F20101114_AAANTK rigby_j_Page_058.txt
46dddd8bd9154ea958191916c6d99f3b
39c8e7297e278f5cc5344794352ec0ab1017c35d
2186 F20101114_AAANSV rigby_j_Page_124.txt
c7112936adebdefe2998162610e79893
680dca4fc1101ace3aa33fcca86a3398e87015d3
121732 F20101114_AAAMPT rigby_j_Page_065.jp2
fd9217544b02a4c68b6caace7827b36f
2d033915d7e03d3a22649d22b612d62cd1d6d0e2
7077 F20101114_AAAMQI rigby_j_Page_132thm.jpg
8ef20ce84b110991ce5db281db011f68
66f01f931b924aaa3f2b02afd48441c3c766f6fe
2046 F20101114_AAANTL rigby_j_Page_056.txt
ef7c943406f06293879e7ba232f5d9b0
6958d5f2c046fc64c05f7b3acd8d0014f88601d1
1051962 F20101114_AAANSW rigby_j_Page_008.jp2
1058548d7c3f6f8282a426294e503a9d
876e4737a82c1b1d792886808f8cf916472f7603
51595 F20101114_AAAMPU rigby_j_Page_069.pro
99485a0c6dad662435127bb1a5f3963e
dba76a8ac352a924e250b605d95182c88e3f256a
77193 F20101114_AAAMQJ rigby_j_Page_031.jpg
eaef60d03a10142ae18cbafa174044ed
17753865d1ace9357f65ba90fe6f21d837b87ea3
106432 F20101114_AAANUA rigby_j_Page_155.jp2
0a77ccb10c628eda97ebf9a2348a844b
4e278e26be680e4a1ceb4f8ff29cd1a7602d8340
25969 F20101114_AAANTM rigby_j_Page_154.QC.jpg
0d169a17ad8665d70e9bbe36b4898b17
94862cae429640ae52199d2dc12c40eaccc379d7
2153 F20101114_AAANSX rigby_j_Page_156.txt
bf3448cba5471e9e83dd4281f90474ca
3a4ee5a5dc568588615b020d8046b15665a59374
2199 F20101114_AAAMPV rigby_j_Page_141.txt
993a879c47e2cb5c64563f46042d7906
9b16804404ac0f21b76b8ef97fa716094e9cc770
53242 F20101114_AAAMQK rigby_j_Page_133.pro
158c98d2ccd40e1ab7f86b1fa12ec903
e437286bf640af2ceb11b189bb459967c434002d
6675 F20101114_AAANUB rigby_j_Page_006thm.jpg
46ded0c9a9f531f0fc8b5cdaa6d1b811
13b8be0d26165c8431d6fc7af696a8ac1365ef68
74360 F20101114_AAANSY rigby_j_Page_012.jpg
0f5b1c89c507c4c1c3e1a5288ef5d2fa
79f176ceca4c92dbcece8047f52f538f0f410523
108599 F20101114_AAAMPW rigby_j_Page_019.jp2
e72de5c0931c669cdad14bd6d3ec6f8a
390801a0b6d8125eb4756badd251b7bc320b1a24
76456 F20101114_AAANUC rigby_j_Page_039.jpg
c8e56dd2ecaba50a2f29ce814d25e2b0
b18079987d800f2352de4757e840e5947d895a4c
14858 F20101114_AAANTN rigby_j_Page_004.pro
01235f7cf85eb86154d6aef9f88bb003
3791976e85be7f780ec72bd95d5be09a7fbb8da7
55104 F20101114_AAANSZ rigby_j_Page_114.pro
46c4594193161e9c21f8ae6aec18e1d3
7f062c266a8862a88ae1b49809c05713a5f16d04
54100 F20101114_AAAMPX rigby_j_Page_015.pro
5bd206599d8483542b0897612a6790a8
8af83de17ee271938052ceed32de1acbacb5040b
27394 F20101114_AAAMRA rigby_j_Page_006.QC.jpg
e011e58b33915d4e6679cc1193985007
c87930801861914f4a785e74a77f452c346b1842
116064 F20101114_AAAMQL rigby_j_Page_083.jp2
666b0031bb962dde1479ca92ac50ff63
e4302bfcfa84d0deeeb2f75741ae421b4f391c9a
1051985 F20101114_AAANUD rigby_j_Page_005.jp2
e618a9f464994e3556e2d0290a5af3cc
15fb76301cb174c00626ebfd48df774d4e9a30cf
2206 F20101114_AAANTO rigby_j_Page_121.txt
9c3f4a72b7b00308d4c4b03d732a9866
6ecf4080de342da10893f97494d23b1bd5f6e5bb
6823 F20101114_AAAMPY rigby_j_Page_154thm.jpg
6aa53f001b96b7ff82861b1272a0f4aa
c5919d15e98834a6ead04c56e38d4bd287041c91
7054 F20101114_AAAMRB rigby_j_Page_081thm.jpg
defa5e05fefd7b2859ff3bdc10155b39
ff46d1cc461a7c4df7529ef8625a3a11bdc4da7a
25331 F20101114_AAAMQM rigby_j_Page_062.QC.jpg
0ce62779ccac217ed6d2fa05fbc889d3
eff31695e8ee67e4752bbe76aa1dfe23b5b45a8e
23583 F20101114_AAANUE rigby_j_Page_177.pro
5da43fa645c4047d7ae18b16dae80277
18f0544ecce5fa2371993ee339115f7c876e0c63
21306 F20101114_AAANTP rigby_j_Page_171.QC.jpg
58a7cd322af94574e3ef3499d44ab25a
50ee30a4c6f2e91dd48f96f1868171f5be9b5733
F20101114_AAAMRC rigby_j_Page_097.tif
3e976411be49103f90abafb46a7d8a89
f749bab21c47e43427cc65a24e7edc0c2f46d66c
48216 F20101114_AAAMQN rigby_j_Page_160.pro
06538bd57cc26db2899266a9600a8738
75a8b420769d4e2e339353b5ee0c1f84f7f47f6f
6909 F20101114_AAAMPZ rigby_j_Page_092thm.jpg
92ae31a5103830330a8ee59a5b2abe3e
ead942c1ddd70747b965fd47c05b47eeb222d615
933299 F20101114_AAANUF rigby_j_Page_084.jp2
41489f2d418ed291acd45393d81aee76
6e4d167e3ee512415a330704971453e930d34d24
24833 F20101114_AAANTQ rigby_j_Page_153.QC.jpg
f54b34d5503df8ccaef8b7932bbf38a5
a249e0f5e561cce0dd1d33c08e14afe3f5d602ce
55136 F20101114_AAAMRD rigby_j_Page_138.pro
caf3616a6e956268108270b9b130b790
4748a72c5840ac40b6dc04f52736cb5c4297f0f4
54068 F20101114_AAAMQO rigby_j_Page_026.pro
8096877762f16050fa17f5b90f92ad6b
87a7f46bb4b4b40e88dbac21a9a991b61e2a3d59
F20101114_AAAOAA rigby_j_Page_060.tif
cbf3f97f60d8c9703c743a5c1cb4b4d4
cb097b965808800a20584c135062cbec59cd4af5
115074 F20101114_AAANUG rigby_j_Page_106.jp2
fbe440d1eb7a5fb345f1f09774c51696
ceab30f8fd09b167883a7f412d0831527097dae5
F20101114_AAANTR rigby_j_Page_020.tif
1e62727780c12e2fefc0f522a30df87c
c532b39bbfe0a663dc36e09e9fc0285dae9964f8
6987 F20101114_AAAMRE rigby_j_Page_072thm.jpg
7ca9b3f4c068450212fc5303c699b970
b4363d67457e0231ebb486a34fc17c2b5b9d2d29
6836 F20101114_AAAMQP rigby_j_Page_015thm.jpg
c2acd3e9b27b6a9e42800784d6b59b83
feb7680336718c5e65b289d082c82508c1820c02
F20101114_AAAOAB rigby_j_Page_066.tif
d852abe8bf3e58b22f974b6353b7ca12
873c7d9dbc6957e5ee90c537466b1decab62034b
71665 F20101114_AAANUH rigby_j_Page_018.jp2
a3a284659253cb6fb601d7acbb3157be
36e7a012fb16c08135dc8f895387a7e895baf234
116653 F20101114_AAANTS rigby_j_Page_079.jp2
3e7deff51dd0ab9c331bcfa6fbfc84fc
876aeb183e2c42a919f04295cd19e6df29935230
22416 F20101114_AAAMRF rigby_j_Page_149.QC.jpg
51a3fc992d13d5140a20e636641afcd3
9e8cad0441f80060676adb28c5001fc3c0cef108
11792 F20101114_AAAMQQ rigby_j_Page_175.QC.jpg
a02e92e3cefde734627ed486af6d2931
a70d1b0f2affe19044535b891fb7370aea595887
F20101114_AAAOAC rigby_j_Page_069.tif
160a076c478b562452d046c849be3571
6bc8f0dc15c0b157901a4a5f714c428bfcfd3e8e
73322 F20101114_AAANUI rigby_j_Page_188.jpg
2980a657e866a13f81b9fe3356a2f8c2
be81055b8b688e190d4de498afe0fc0d0adfe86a
60553 F20101114_AAANTT rigby_j_Page_007.pro
acf0664d7502b7b1fc2861a08dd8cff4
5e63369da8606474744edd994d1ea6410644e310
115238 F20101114_AAAMRG rigby_j_Page_105.jp2
e831add37bceb765fd9603452b60e5c2
7fd2a27d679da50052ad79d196a8ec6fcb972a16
2198 F20101114_AAAMQR rigby_j_Page_132.txt
e8b4a5a69a189a28b7538de65a081102
8ebcf463a6e2ffc4ca2e98a5cd3e4febddbefe72
F20101114_AAAOAD rigby_j_Page_075.tif
795e141e36bf2e25a8893a1cf4ea5489
c06ef19f9450c6d2120405cad9efffb96d91fffe
64912 F20101114_AAANUJ rigby_j_Page_171.jpg
338ae906d6c28997c45d2a2169f821b0
98dbced1853d0891a69232af890e137f8f813e6a
24080 F20101114_AAANTU rigby_j_Page_125.QC.jpg
60372a74f71ba9d0cf587dccdaf588af
30c44f37039a8a9a48b8517b3cd36f4d2c4cd182
2229 F20101114_AAAMRH rigby_j_Page_089.txt
3b2bca37ae5c08589d66b9491589ce66
32ed17b1c79a795cc2ad925873f1cf4cf153e9ec
2235 F20101114_AAAMQS rigby_j_Page_044.txt
645cff9fd23dc44d76162987da559bea
9bb4f7cc415cb4b05ca957839e7e1cb7c1ac1d04
F20101114_AAAOAE rigby_j_Page_082.tif
d4942dd901fd3fc205dbd1d4f819908f
62bf935a4d476808857022436534b43ae2ca4f00
7234 F20101114_AAANUK rigby_j_Page_143thm.jpg
22daa23aeeb836707c6f03152c15012b
37d96fef427bf0688cfb5bdb2d296aded719a3f3
F20101114_AAANTV rigby_j_Page_176.tif
fbf695e2e79aeb945a166f493b9e0f8a
2bf9dec2d899d931f0bea1e2c28cc6d4d13486c9
F20101114_AAAMRI rigby_j_Page_167.tif
ec47dcb29036eace7a52958a78218be9
afcdbfa37f3efb813fa23af087ea51535d47eff8
F20101114_AAAMQT rigby_j_Page_075.txt
df0c81bf6cfb2f7d46a508b285236dec
bdbf4e861028ce1541c5fa908e3fc8de6f2e1f21
F20101114_AAAOAF rigby_j_Page_087.tif
badc8196fdd20a73c0f4fe231ca0f5ec
6cd0b2110f013ce728b15c67f4ee41cb82f25288
74230 F20101114_AAANUL rigby_j_Page_106.jpg
cde167680494d7216b6cdc3e0113d7da
07163d6a701ff06316ea83574672af2194aa4c5e
75249 F20101114_AAANTW rigby_j_Page_040.jpg
72c5412eae8cd56a11d6af84526131e6
13b0a733eda532784ad9cdfb2d5fd6ce1be9b567
24244 F20101114_AAAMRJ rigby_j_Page_099.QC.jpg
9f30cbc92b6652327e8e0668377912c6
68ca0f1151f7a471b86c659753f7b6e35f57b3f7
7053 F20101114_AAAMQU rigby_j_Page_146thm.jpg
da13c49534ff5d2e0811eb3e99cc1d03
7bcbf25d5d548dbe48b29d953ad8191bc6cf7d85
F20101114_AAAOAG rigby_j_Page_093.tif
f96c4beeeac429eb68cb08bd6865486d
aff19cdb91867b8d53598f7fabf3372fef8abfdb
2022 F20101114_AAANVA rigby_j_Page_048.txt
6f1e910a8742b322a8761112a1f8744f
8f5d68d847df2d37507a82243e576e8e13087f7f
54390 F20101114_AAANUM rigby_j_Page_025.pro
320ffc5c466d3971303cd0f8d6d3a6e7
c4d61251c8cd2ee323c3a838a091ba57c4149029
72958 F20101114_AAANTX rigby_j_Page_060.jpg
43d3688a75a84a528e8af692e278072e
c5983e05cb9c0bb56c91e81c8586a5a14ab49065
112568 F20101114_AAAMRK rigby_j_Page_095.jp2
81149b2473ec857e2eb993bba41228e7
f63abef52b3ad0a2fc21da57fbfcda8564e78378
F20101114_AAAMQV rigby_j_Page_078.tif
2dbb982b4c3dd06956480fe12d70d5a6
50af140c34ed75d16e6f72fc4095c3c649f2a2e5
F20101114_AAAOAH rigby_j_Page_100.tif
90d5624d92c8ec693c71a96b915c23c5
8a9c7f53131a6706471cea791330a61ad95f11cc
2177 F20101114_AAANVB rigby_j_Page_146.txt
5d3117a7641c24c8e02f944202378625
71a6a9b7ecb4578d3faeebdaef973789c1d08837
F20101114_AAANUN rigby_j_Page_031.tif
2bf9dcaa63b377b40797167165911f4e
400f7f4665955074c21961b5c930327ed8a5313b
26721 F20101114_AAANTY rigby_j_Page_023.QC.jpg
04fb8e75277a69e6eaf1a252929ebbd1
3ee3180ce9e854ae7b5350650dad059fffa8536d
76503 F20101114_AAAMRL rigby_j_Page_061.jpg
aaf635fb6cd026e81861e1bd159e62f0
e9a3982c8ee4c0803f0aa6e78e0b048495c67d14
F20101114_AAAMQW rigby_j_Page_161.txt
400ef338eedb954709c1a287da102c45
9f54c0a58533b4a3fa5e4d6f12a3eae7944962ba
F20101114_AAAOAI rigby_j_Page_101.tif
8cfba19b520b3e0d7a73e5d025457197
fc9b3228c1aa8e8f2fd7f2680e961c7f595fb63b
2194 F20101114_AAANVC rigby_j_Page_036.txt
f1d97f707bb00f0716b881862e3c02f1
402b19c3b52a41c93d39d3100db7f75cb4eb2333
112447 F20101114_AAANTZ rigby_j_Page_028.jp2
23dc8c16ff350e60995d1e2abdc040c7
9255e92e3655d1cf2be6087c95364049e7ec9649
F20101114_AAAMQX rigby_j_Page_123.txt
2e9dee9cc2c028714674bc76a863b3e5
f82aaaf6a52b7d9bbcdbf9ffba86f72a2b5a66fb
50022 F20101114_AAAMSA rigby_j_Page_019.pro
1aad3a3c8112536e3532d0ee6adda0b8
ede2f227baffe4cf26e686e33175be671d5080e9
F20101114_AAAOAJ rigby_j_Page_108.tif
c7fead8e290a56404410762e148355e1
ab975943e607bf800cbf1dc7fdd2fa09f8476132
48675 F20101114_AAANVD rigby_j_Page_155.pro
d162bf568d445b396d52c4355260bb94
63134e5db2152b51f4a8dfa695509a581d6a4a2c
2085 F20101114_AAANUO rigby_j_Page_105.txt
2cbffe7c33329d5708ba7fb64ee8da84
706f404263e90c7c8d8ff3a1663151437b2ac687
118817 F20101114_AAAMRM rigby_j_Page_030.jp2
4df3f4c598639c37471bf0e75b0983b4
7d5c88da7ac608abe375a5cf5d6210fe94304ab3
F20101114_AAAMQY rigby_j_Page_126.txt
ada37ddbc04a9df122fbe4241427f4bf
71e9ff2bf67b1ee8501aaea9ec642664e3737552
119059 F20101114_AAAMSB rigby_j_Page_051.jp2
07bfad3cb6535aa8bf6fa43e1c46335a
51544cad430ecaf36880551b6de479ec95787851
F20101114_AAAOAK rigby_j_Page_121.tif
d72f3607e1aa08ef7faacfa98499168e
88ee523906b3a5fb44c80b13c7632820320a3ca5
73019 F20101114_AAANVE rigby_j_Page_033.jpg
366b05b739f809a0e8daf75a1423b938
632c8a7ee419598ea51b9fa29f983ab470d85216
115732 F20101114_AAANUP rigby_j_Page_134.jp2
f4f532b77720614c6c59665f42af8d3c
1b21b01baa90b60b294938537aa24652ecc4613a
F20101114_AAAMRN rigby_j_Page_081.txt
25805edd6402141acd111bb740779829
28aa54736323ba830b3404715fac68f00c61b927
116098 F20101114_AAAMQZ rigby_j_Page_015.jp2
c214767bedd80a605ae53d017c068da8
37097e40fde0a45bce2008fb3ffc33e2425321f3
25003 F20101114_AAAMSC rigby_j_Page_032.QC.jpg
ada6aecab245d154d84fb517acd9222f
ef6ede9459dbc16762151dbcaa63bf5b249c527a
F20101114_AAAOAL rigby_j_Page_125.tif
2dbb9ad434fcedccf9b508ec3f356b38
c542769ae6dcc9be91fda17aa9bae010d276e957
53420 F20101114_AAANVF rigby_j_Page_188.pro
40770419cef3b73535c56cd1c744eff7
e2f7ff041141a6d6c3af16c503a7b52bbaddcbf6
26007 F20101114_AAANUQ rigby_j_Page_138.QC.jpg
1094ae1cbbf9fdad8810d2cde4951aa2
e1e722967daa262b23acec31d70d2b00fe0940cb
120621 F20101114_AAAMRO rigby_j_Page_092.jp2
e059b935ba26db4a6e2e1b37e94ae06b
5c1be08c9ef81b127d2a0a5111fe94ba1a469d52
5578 F20101114_AAAMSD rigby_j_Page_002.jp2
0d85e1b130bfd7de743951c560211531
19393436865ce8c7be74bb9faca36566a389eb26
31968 F20101114_AAAOBA rigby_j_Page_018.pro
5cb5c6350e3935228ae53a36f293e8d2
95ba84fa728dd3077cafd8d284c623be3016881c
F20101114_AAAOAM rigby_j_Page_126.tif
68ae049665fe9b1c3ea3c8c57fa45f6f
5fdab75858baeba51062323ded37b0f2db02e088
55895 F20101114_AAANVG rigby_j_Page_119.pro
314bd83b428578a4c63fd075dea38985
a20e54e770f846e8ed4ae841a355bbb2cc2cfe67
25717 F20101114_AAANUR rigby_j_Page_059.QC.jpg
25500dd8b03784e308e847e030762984
a78fe4927860ef5c8241d7236ea245e6f59c5075
113433 F20101114_AAAMRP rigby_j_Page_120.jp2
e9e1f81727a564bd5cd65d94d150079e
96f05d3f5da4693229657a09365d2174bd7675ea
116170 F20101114_AAAMSE rigby_j_Page_013.jp2
dcb031746a4b48d3dbe97e0b55c8be0c
043a70f3ff5dc7a8e16b6723c592fbee999c4a70
52170 F20101114_AAAOBB rigby_j_Page_022.pro
b5da02f31021b047e5a2e03ce4391201
9808c95cf1783c174d72444086b2d1f3b9722b4f
F20101114_AAAOAN rigby_j_Page_128.tif
5ac0f9a04090ba67b6da2bb8f9d16110
8fb4be8752b6561a6935b289015ca65c617eb7b7
F20101114_AAANVH rigby_j_Page_083thm.jpg
de297e5662a27a1dfd2320cc7fb34f11
47fa7f6123d11c29fbc06e512ff00088cd56205a
60682 F20101114_AAANUS rigby_j_Page_185.pro
df450c46d4f13a7b9161c24ff13eeb5f
c08f60d093e1d8b90b81cc28bbe48c99295c0eda
79324 F20101114_AAAMRQ rigby_j_Page_190.jpg
ae53a1f56dd21478dc45915e169b50b8
e0d55140208d6b5e1ff99af93cf981b6bd0a210a
F20101114_AAAMSF rigby_j_Page_064.txt
6ed756fbb029baf1fff4db7193e1f192
dc8a56afead487a4de8732086a6efdf174674ba4
55229 F20101114_AAAOBC rigby_j_Page_032.pro
2fa0a47cb169fdf427d0a6091b997d7f
7ae8d4e9399a522d3eaf011acad28b634dbcd14e
F20101114_AAAOAO rigby_j_Page_135.tif
fe2bb7a0a835db1f715bb33e4dd2a22b
dbbdf297ff6e0eba19503d14bd845970291508c4
7060 F20101114_AAANVI rigby_j_Page_115thm.jpg
5859e5554b7743d707c9e6b3b6b5f43a
46a21c30098a597e03520248d1ae8928d2c968c6
1051980 F20101114_AAANUT rigby_j_Page_007.jp2
da756ffd0f33cd031c1a0083a29123b3
4cd82f9fcdb0adcd526b34408c7ac59279c58a67
1997 F20101114_AAAMRR rigby_j_Page_033.txt
7286166bc885a45b005d3820905c03dc
ad9230af5a1505ee13698eeb507d4338496a79d0
7159 F20101114_AAAMSG rigby_j_Page_104thm.jpg
d243225283777bc64d8d5609881cff20
5711bc6098095b4f64905ce7bbf17b48b59e4617
55974 F20101114_AAAOBD rigby_j_Page_051.pro
f289218c48be403a07ecfcd1e9b9cb8e
40df1d50aa16c93548b5b610a754ea53f5341385
F20101114_AAAOAP rigby_j_Page_137.tif
b14f392ed7dc32114b2cb3df9356556b
5f9d158895439ec1a6aa6f6aed24457070be3590
56757 F20101114_AAANVJ rigby_j_Page_163.pro
647e3f59bf28a19e597754e897658d70
4d58b07b336d665e57fb5f0f13a07abd6ef6eaa4
5399 F20101114_AAANUU rigby_j_Page_172thm.jpg
d3700ac34cd321359d775be67da562c9
8bc0b4812fc0cc2529a63cce3178542dfaa8a770
78377 F20101114_AAAMRS rigby_j_Page_137.jpg
8200be20a980e7f0f4099faf67cdd4f0
284f6e1729beb3007ce6a12981f81d9c243e9ae9
23372 F20101114_AAAMSH rigby_j_Page_188.QC.jpg
f87c69ab252aad640c68b6c62e762fa2
9b20c7a9934116997098446394e14664dae77f10
49187 F20101114_AAAOBE rigby_j_Page_077.pro
90436dc7c525943c0f7280b3169b02f0
b7e04313bcbff7dd676df3d1cc00c2cad9b8131d
F20101114_AAAOAQ rigby_j_Page_139.tif
200f0af0901e10e15d554729864f921f
a9a7159be3c3cf9f0434116d43f63885ca82cdac
F20101114_AAANVK rigby_j_Page_142.tif
36cf63293de70c4366e56746d5600f00
0eda4225bb270a50bdd29c3f12410132df56fd44
2164 F20101114_AAANUV rigby_j_Page_159.txt
5136e8c08bad9ec6ecf32441d30a5c1e
a823138dcf77c84efeab2fe9b9f61874507ea955
7334 F20101114_AAAMRT rigby_j_Page_135thm.jpg
8b4e3066d8d5d83bef0d90ec9d6554c2
ae2a4867b55e58cc3f779d234d9268311d0de5d1
25636 F20101114_AAAMSI rigby_j_Page_037.QC.jpg
5aa500055f8902587f0c9319ed5718cf
5294a75b6c84e2e22c9f5bad6e571eda89a317ed
51791 F20101114_AAAOBF rigby_j_Page_087.pro
6f00ade96c2b7384bf6796b2571e64aa
71de5236ac1f171264173864effec0fd0a7f32c5
F20101114_AAAOAR rigby_j_Page_141.tif
2a3ace4d65ca0de8b5af3cb092dae0f7
8ac011f873cc4c09a091f7b638f38d62c2898c23
110849 F20101114_AAANVL rigby_j_Page_108.jp2
76669e90a0e0514b8cc2373b9b197968
23c78ae2fc3dcebc682d58dfdce4757e739e5ec6
5852 F20101114_AAANUW rigby_j_Page_171thm.jpg
4da30425604e56ac0af22d5394801b32
846de9a50d23c03f8332feacb6d445b6ca01be5a
32184 F20101114_AAAMRU rigby_j_Page_176.pro
7ba22e71a69622341aa4e3b51b897fcb
c9c7e40dbebacea6ff5d83168410bfc243daeff8
54419 F20101114_AAAMSJ rigby_j_Page_071.pro
892662d61df1fc9e513301506f7cdd70
ff3f2d78ad9bb374d060a0c1c65804c771d0b566
50128 F20101114_AAAOBG rigby_j_Page_091.pro
387871ff8b7338ec58257a1fdd40b222
55f0414af00e22a6a1034d0b22b92b31c05e3cf3
F20101114_AAAOAS rigby_j_Page_146.tif
920d54f23c5afa5f808fd3a312fec81a
171bb4fc259c851c1ff6f525561d4f18e753b036
6715 F20101114_AAANWA rigby_j_Page_101thm.jpg
06610e82528c5b06b64a68fe7533273b
9ef1b0f0e200d4fe639a3856cbcbd6adce762fe2
F20101114_AAANVM rigby_j_Page_071.tif
0463aee7c5968656980ccc41cb06a97b
eee546f8dbe3ba79c5dd86a3ffb99ca360a699c9
25053 F20101114_AAANUX rigby_j_Page_039.QC.jpg
e41f0f69f654d6408d9779f32154d052
ae7397b0a1b29c7a727116933ae9da3bd4bd704f
76994 F20101114_AAAMRV rigby_j_Page_062.jpg
677308f51a072fd741bb5771646cb5e5
67ab197e4b1254067cc1ac551ae72ddcfac6f537
74330 F20101114_AAAMSK rigby_j_Page_088.jpg
1bfa411c13d9777c402f5f4f9cee0972
44cc09c485602df019f9082d5492643c2d629141
53842 F20101114_AAAOBH rigby_j_Page_092.pro
ff50a7ad197738268c53b5396c961856
60c890a866ce8142e635f04c2dc0b30d07abcbab
F20101114_AAAOAT rigby_j_Page_160.tif
5c5b16242ceec126861802670c50a65c
3ac8ff350d2bc8d4b3cc67da6acf1952087609af
6609 F20101114_AAANWB rigby_j_Page_085thm.jpg
e3e019f0c35abafbe7deac87cee0a5f9
3fb7e45d563987f9ee4edf33e0b32ab962a17de2
F20101114_AAANVN rigby_j_Page_156.QC.jpg
fa61a685a0ddb7e921251086406bc02b
913b89822cdab642e81ccc48f50c5709f88192a4
53739 F20101114_AAANUY rigby_j_Page_034.pro
4413c1a63fb7ec028dadb99cdbea1d92
64991de20fa08dcb588d4fb36a7fbd352e236ef7
F20101114_AAAMRW rigby_j_Page_041.tif
f48cd836e8167ddd2c538f92c01d8cc4
628b10e6cdba52608e3c90a371e26ef6bdaefd91
F20101114_AAAMSL rigby_j_Page_074.tif
613ccb318da47b09181f3d527ab73459
73def98600611a30784bb679f9e33d3ce3f55229
53493 F20101114_AAAOBI rigby_j_Page_101.pro
bd16e03618260bcab60c66bca96478a8
c3933480b406bb5b38592c555dfe67e9668a3870
F20101114_AAAOAU rigby_j_Page_173.tif
d123b68a54b0d07d401ca71d79a2ca8c
b2e9a1ea55df4f2e962b791e3f1854b0879eb75c
F20101114_AAANWC rigby_j_Page_086.txt
1ad0776106682011dd0c23d36fdac825
0f3db2d869fd41cb99e759914fc68763b237096c
3329 F20101114_AAANVO rigby_j_Page_175thm.jpg
ec2709ca9c2369cf717a2b900b76b8ad
85022632ef46fd24923c4ec2cc2d732289554a63
F20101114_AAANUZ rigby_j_Page_065.tif
92b876c29580edc3ba0f796202996b55
45fb96e5a6d25ceb808bd4ea645f33ce853a92c8
120722 F20101114_AAAMRX rigby_j_Page_053.jp2
e1763c8322874a43bbbb1cccd7cc80f8
a6e7e636aec2dc9470ba259d5e4b45ff1c840794
78687 F20101114_AAAMTA rigby_j_Page_119.jpg
9f0fad82d66322683a1d3af3db7f4591
374be39a6fa9aecf84eb0672ab9998703c8f4f55
25405 F20101114_AAAMSM rigby_j_Page_071.QC.jpg
7abde8c33dddba9648f68d93b8a1de4a
97e97ee5d1e4daf7fa11afc1aa1b5cb831a8c4a9
50085 F20101114_AAAOBJ rigby_j_Page_125.pro
267ddf9aa7e87087a20e0de1631c9b62
4f506a3d4cbc6b9cdc8105a32e6158b0c9732695
F20101114_AAAOAV rigby_j_Page_185.tif
2c6e14705c9a701800ff8357c5b04b3b
944476b7ca5d5a3344d09bbcd328ee4b47402c1f
F20101114_AAANWD rigby_j_Page_090.tif
9c6ead9c1a5702a3dc2a63b1fdbcaaac
10f0aba715cdee1d6149fc366224b8707102bb8d
56913 F20101114_AAAMRY rigby_j_Page_115.pro
055a32693f99ebdcac2a270199cb5629
e7835c936b66c3276360771cdeffc03b9434c705
6982 F20101114_AAAMTB rigby_j_Page_139thm.jpg
c29a39fe48c5318719f1a58962eeb876
cc23fc1912849ea0fb8f495183694e8c005aa3f3
55668 F20101114_AAAOBK rigby_j_Page_126.pro
82e7cee41b271e21159d610de71f9cda
9789009c12d1e1bfd9f18c02680f83650e62a2ef
F20101114_AAAOAW rigby_j_Page_186.tif
edcac116dbdb7f830d701e175796a98f
086b07a88d0e408e08062b560df8d138d2f7380d
2120 F20101114_AAANWE rigby_j_Page_017.txt
2b81ac6dcdda9e656f32f7e46adcab6b
3366dc0e282e6b65b4af5f8c4495afc5973772c1
78970 F20101114_AAANVP rigby_j_Page_035.jpg
095d89d592c0ce817c455a5b90c1b930
39b162215ff23cc51133f8f17056d850246e2bc8
F20101114_AAAMRZ rigby_j_Page_170.tif
831114bdaf88664cc9b5bf8a35be789e
e1ab8b597e41a277f36d1547415bec5dabba2720
78829 F20101114_AAAMTC rigby_j_Page_146.jpg
b54893494778c50884f2bd38023f0883
2dcbbafe26d04ea3fe7ad4aa0e34857292908e7f
24471 F20101114_AAAMSN rigby_j_Page_020.QC.jpg
8ab801ae54ca4d8a8ac4e82fcf857781
62757cb8057c7872aa12953619972ad88b1ea855
54627 F20101114_AAAOBL rigby_j_Page_128.pro
99ee37069ff619bca60dd79bf01650fb
0a241dc42a186064f9ae47324438381bf0b60118
114195 F20101114_AAAOAX rigby_j_Page_006.pro
6d1c492b7c212e7e2d46fdf4971cd81e
02457b01da7d902ec906d11dcebc9aa8a2a51a3b
23342 F20101114_AAANWF rigby_j_Page_097.QC.jpg
8d5601ba5c9bc9dab78d01f8570d87ed
35aed07e518df6c6b5ce4f50647732cef75f7437
107232 F20101114_AAANVQ rigby_j_Page_046.jp2
2a23b88c0b410eea7e0ee2fd9b7709ae
801a4644a58824ac9e1c443ba205f50d14a4dbf0
F20101114_AAAMTD rigby_j_Page_019.tif
b3bf8b8e679530d7065729e90b9d9641
1033dc9f9442f9856cedfa0e55e825e61efae871
F20101114_AAAMSO rigby_j_Page_159.tif
c36186b6e84417a1e2c70d6c535a76a2
558114c69607f8dc0bb1e0f8e7c4ce7ac2013111
F20101114_AAAOCA rigby_j_Page_079.txt
c80717d32274eae2081ee0885fb628ee
b33c469c8567934d8d4a899c1ab13c8f994f6b1c
54869 F20101114_AAAOBM rigby_j_Page_142.pro
007693aa2360702a8127753560a3c586
0ae9f03be5517055c03d26f54063e1b5c183656f
35032 F20101114_AAAOAY rigby_j_Page_008.pro
27f03fa1ab54948a4471e39afec9b051
b4a573f671f6c70f5803b65063315b2aaa47c5bd
F20101114_AAANWG rigby_j_Page_180.tif
8436874a78972d25225133954bad4b71
6b2113b2be879eccdaee9f45b2dadcdfac67bcea
F20101114_AAANVR rigby_j_Page_012.txt
16018b1ffab16b96d527c549af716c75
eee97761e1dc55b5e78c6b77839b82a2c3c76264
78813 F20101114_AAAMTE rigby_j_Page_052.jpg
213ec6d1587f016ac7f63d53b7b917cf
e5543035ca17c085bd1d18191d8c021ae6dd3709
115093 F20101114_AAAMSP rigby_j_Page_040.jp2
a247c12ee1c8e8937514c8715702e42c
d2abf61179b3b6bfb5b1ed40e57ce878e7e7173d
2116 F20101114_AAAOCB rigby_j_Page_092.txt
1cf189aae3eba040e4d9ec671bdaa3ef
8bec61e80376dce1f15fbc0f8b73605e53cfb32e
55789 F20101114_AAAOBN rigby_j_Page_144.pro
df83bc6c5e1218a4596a2d09cae77570
8ac801436a134aa54aac711d902d2444399bd4a5
24674 F20101114_AAANWH rigby_j_Page_120.QC.jpg
edbdb84c178a5a4f5eea3445302b6d0b
de05c59eb557f78963c096f0f34956fe81d9090d
54603 F20101114_AAANVS rigby_j_Page_164.pro
ee050eee73bcfe7ba721382a048b37ce
5b2e01de5d90f08343a47442507e9071bf7f0a0c
117179 F20101114_AAAMTF rigby_j_Page_138.jp2
9ce362b5cde2b088330bc00f5f491a87
740647459329112fac6a59ffcd815208aba2ba92
F20101114_AAAMSQ rigby_j_Page_013.tif
cc78b49128b4a5a3f9a0e10494a2e033
35437eaf2199e13af78fe832be74eb409ce0ec5f
2109 F20101114_AAAOCC rigby_j_Page_101.txt
8686a10837f620ab2c7978ac77aef0d9
d111e9e90463d19921f300bf1483491ec8e3157c
56684 F20101114_AAAOBO rigby_j_Page_147.pro
31a2de718fb120e5568eff0e98fd23ce
df0645b241518c9fe5640fe15246daaa41a8b7bc
43591 F20101114_AAAOAZ rigby_j_Page_010.pro
c3c4eb3a0992075c01d8ff59d0069203
4293789f698dbc58ab8decb35ff35c2d75324792
40375 F20101114_AAANWI rigby_j_Page_175.jpg
1b0985b58e1c014d8754d762a03e6b13
c60d128f9b5ca8b0a0e0f7e5894304da466e4696
F20101114_AAANVT rigby_j_Page_073.tif
214f0ebd25371e69ad08c20d92a517bb
7f3e48cd9e653aa695bdfbdc841017c765e3770a
F20101114_AAAMTG rigby_j_Page_038.txt
9e3b11f4f1e8792e87e20517ddf89fb4
56a8f2af8ce94ec730ea5e7fc967755c460e39c7
6729 F20101114_AAAMSR rigby_j_Page_108thm.jpg
4230a17cad671034551fa3c53bb7a321
93d597538cf55f75da3838f6c9f453be3ba1924c
2000 F20101114_AAAOCD rigby_j_Page_108.txt
90d8d35f9e1bf48e4c97297b3fe83811
21f9c0e19b8260c6b679b19786f265e5209cc8a5
54853 F20101114_AAAOBP rigby_j_Page_156.pro
424795aeaceb6cfdc079134bfb40201e
a4cc25989394d0af0e2efdf98ac3d1f018e7665b
F20101114_AAANWJ rigby_j_Page_053.tif
a9522f4757ac1d1cdcfdc6012eae7ecb
c7a2a652053f9f5fa5313c20916771e6458842ea
123582 F20101114_AAANVU rigby_j_Page_109.jp2
385a4bcd64a48872fccfb4fd17cfd7d8
1085a30379b6353330024a70fc8050a03b74fbe0
F20101114_AAAMTH rigby_j_Page_162.tif
949eb7cc8c51cef3869723e2cfeee6b6
e14b966a96137d5acdb37b75b83cfd5f12b9690b
127016 F20101114_AAAMSS rigby_j_Page_154.jp2
86b56b687390d43ace80288d94361f57
17794abcbb9fd159cc8b5d15af074f528781182d
F20101114_AAAOCE rigby_j_Page_117.txt
9e302dfb9288e08336e5a39af553c012
1d4aa092a9bfd76c55960b2651df48d83ab49d56
44471 F20101114_AAAOBQ rigby_j_Page_171.pro
e7e39c6519a2dbf1bef9f3f8fc5cd061
d4a7cd76cd60ba342871728efe378054950d98f4
F20101114_AAANWK rigby_j_Page_039.tif
cf526a1aa85a13e2f483682aad6b8571
6fcf65923a74c0b750c68851343549c15ad92071
82964 F20101114_AAANVV rigby_j_Page_154.jpg
673be0f181dae656de7f38a192d9fb9c
7fedb8887f06d1426af8b809ff52afd12eb18517
F20101114_AAAMTI rigby_j_Page_168.tif
16f3c4efe6e28be9e08eec1833e3a2cd
9029267518951f26949f64fa55c91afeef71b8b9
50751 F20101114_AAAMST rigby_j_Page_033.pro
b560251511d2ed5663d6f3fb8f80da61
d1750bfe2464091025cb9bd1eb2061cc15197cbb
1989 F20101114_AAAOCF rigby_j_Page_122.txt
d358f613e798f6131bf0a6efc27c35c5
21cbb4991dce4a136f0774fc09c548fe1e2cb738
61391 F20101114_AAAOBR rigby_j_Page_182.pro
e8fedf2d3531eb259ea8c029a5f6afc4
32ad61ce17af6465d3e984ddfe1ac69d6ed12f6e
1158 F20101114_AAANWL rigby_j_Page_192.txt
1edb9adeacb22e50adc389b6f7332ab9
206c80c1a7f193bfeb12da26fb4eb3690a070a30
57273 F20101114_AAANVW rigby_j_Page_111.pro
30e3b4fb51faa2e8afc2fd1ee0903038
ba977a3dd3720f7e8e49411fd3abd9c76f58e29c
F20101114_AAAMTJ rigby_j_Page_052.txt
1b9f4ce69ef3693c3dc5795d979e9684
062f92785316d192782a804d6938f54a201ec444
58607 F20101114_AAAMSU rigby_j_Page_047.pro
aeaf76b478e5a5b1082545ac931588a2
1445158659e854bb60f1dc79bb11d99c5a1300c4
F20101114_AAAOCG rigby_j_Page_136.txt
20dce48ba31beebe58a95945ddb15ee9
fdc5a3f470b291df51969c44704543dab9ee576d
630 F20101114_AAAOBS rigby_j_Page_004.txt
a60879a214dc8ed56fd063e938b86ecf
cfd5e6618ad090481ead22d169f36a5c5e47ab3e
6833 F20101114_AAANXA rigby_j_Page_142thm.jpg
8dba73b422ff564a879ee290b6bb57bb
5323205613b735e602adb2e159fb97fbd9758d5a
5820 F20101114_AAANWM rigby_j_Page_173thm.jpg
5d81e924ba26d422b03f9dc3ff330628
8c707b46c38e774c38bb8e72828d92e7b336c354
F20101114_AAANVX rigby_j_Page_180thm.jpg
e825f77bfc0748f0f675e58eb7c6383b
81a7ad4d3b175918a0ad366f15233a9eb288efc4
51617 F20101114_AAAMTK rigby_j_Page_012.pro
fefc4492cad38ea73875cdef5ae5d59a
4440a4ba798c8fe541c1936e7f89dfa6c2cfa7e4
112678 F20101114_AAAMSV rigby_j_Page_070.jp2
773cfc3a6fe289c0a31ba55ab181231d
cb9e5c3e7a44cee49d15f61c8436999059a13e59
F20101114_AAAOCH rigby_j_Page_164.txt
3e2d25e3864ebd18988d52c77eea8296
6bfe0ae92a55b4132fc2671c12b2b337882f7634
2068 F20101114_AAAOBT rigby_j_Page_013.txt
4afff13c1db4e18ca6cebb084f243a2c
ff287f1692f40eaf6a56aa8e513c05bdb50d9d31
25350 F20101114_AAANXB rigby_j_Page_003.jpg
83c4321f502bea44b7efc7e81531f0f7
8f35862a94ebae5dd9cfa129125afb0176d8ab1f
2230 F20101114_AAANWN rigby_j_Page_179.txt
6d9fbefbba50be0bace9eb7f5e7d5d8d
e64f39cf00fd9a1edb645e1164f2daf264c8b10b
2519 F20101114_AAANVY rigby_j_Page_145.txt
32b8e315ac28029956829e748d0da3f6
84203e45bdeda4861d801e6161094983201a9fae
F20101114_AAAMTL rigby_j_Page_030.txt
ba92e64b5a37a79a63cd50652ce6e14d
5503ecdb02479c4a8f41efe42565fd3951a3a6fc
112561 F20101114_AAAMSW rigby_j_Page_087.jp2
f20d17b669ea89d0c0bb76a6cc6bae7b
849f7eef0895ab9cc3f3135c3e53e81c4019ad0f
2769 F20101114_AAAOCI rigby_j_Page_172.txt
2340501ccc81946084264afec050d51a
f0f9545ff40cf1f7f5d5c1b0bd89f7b7ef11e9aa
2162 F20101114_AAAOBU rigby_j_Page_016.txt
3fba57b40793330a5cb0ee038b6f5c63
3f13d18cd32cd8865fdff3ab42be2598f8c8407b
6808 F20101114_AAANXC rigby_j_Page_082thm.jpg
ec2dd6653792c1c25e2c6d5f9be0aac1
ec4d7cefe325ffc2700335a36751113403852ced
23695 F20101114_AAANWO rigby_j_Page_103.QC.jpg
ffbf484f1faeca5b847dea264205c871
f3dd02628cf5364bb5976062a3c8f3fb1b34906c
25481 F20101114_AAANVZ rigby_j_Page_165.QC.jpg
02e1382d47d078c2561b8e7d6473cea3
f87b44596cd4a743c4cca79f7fd477e26f70db76
78341 F20101114_AAAMUA rigby_j_Page_124.jpg
3892a00fb54941e3e2fb0cb8a6e4684d
7cbc24535c8adfe6bb7824eb8358c0614dc6b7f9
399014 F20101114_AAAMTM rigby_j_Page_177.jp2
c10303edbd99b1b8ab003cb9424fd166
c31ff99388379825edf775937992446f575c851b
42020 F20101114_AAAMSX rigby_j_Page_148.jpg
9d5c061861b9a80f16d3ec07b4413848
cc7f3787ea7f6aecc3e8a3ca5c327e3fe539e7b3
1712 F20101114_AAAOCJ rigby_j_Page_173.txt
aa17aea5b028017a8264c7aa973a05cd
a3eaf7e44a34cc98936d6a6ee1a20adcbc4f0aad
F20101114_AAAOBV rigby_j_Page_024.txt
f7c451e006e293ec8f33b931c862f1d7
6b83c56a6a40873345c7fa89206d74ec4eac6ba7
7301 F20101114_AAANXD rigby_j_Page_047thm.jpg
ee3041ff6d84bfd0e6b10a21767d0f6c
bd3729a8d183abb3aa0ae3583484e2d3cbc7a7bc
121394 F20101114_AAANWP rigby_j_Page_115.jp2
8bd70bc4a8cf30ff7e97c92dc56c20b6
b3c644c0985bd47ed828fe74a4e5eea553c86eac
25907 F20101114_AAAMUB rigby_j_Page_054.QC.jpg
029bc01b50d5dd3fe6c775c1495d682e
b2bb8bfeb5099c6b8ba36122884af32a03f9b0a3
26417 F20101114_AAAMTN rigby_j_Page_181.QC.jpg
ce42dcd4ba5c6bcbb52de1bc02ac329d
ce2fe70b9671eb11dae1d1743581f5a943a9d540
491 F20101114_AAAMSY rigby_j_Page_001.txt
c26c40c94bb3f165e20f6979e8922aa6
7742bb6e82d96c56cdfe19ee5d0cf369840f6b76
2425 F20101114_AAAOCK rigby_j_Page_184.txt
cc18ed8dab540758af6657f6e0f7b7bc
1abcda8634419547a6a236e138d50dcec7124a71
2161 F20101114_AAAOBW rigby_j_Page_025.txt
a9de862974c133b38bf73336c9b98955
50a5d8601cb0601a8010f6af4550b5bed0394de5
2052 F20101114_AAANXE rigby_j_Page_088.txt
45bead5c92f572ed9fbdcc90f445f453
0a185428014292785ec1f64370f6bcfd7ed88f46
24025 F20101114_AAAMUC rigby_j_Page_085.QC.jpg
5c828789daf6aa8f182a36ded5f6956c
c6a497f47c7c056b2814013f6402c1580b4a2a5c
F20101114_AAAMSZ rigby_j_Page_104.txt
75e73917bce5ec24ef5b92b07ac3ae38
d966d3b8ea6afdfa664d80649fbc2b76c85c017c
2160 F20101114_AAAOCL rigby_j_Page_188.txt
d617588f717fb12e684a0fa34eed06be
183e6ca0b530847673ccbcbe2be9cd66eecfd67d
2132 F20101114_AAAOBX rigby_j_Page_062.txt
87df01d3d6f59afe9ee86453ae6bfb07
81d8fbbd5b8dca667cbbc6566aa24de1e6df7c4f
F20101114_AAANXF rigby_j_Page_178.tif
38616cf874a1cdca3768b1acfb01a8c1
e24279b7eaad1b655dd0bac8f487e88e27704d69
115731 F20101114_AAANWQ rigby_j_Page_064.jp2
2e6c40b765ef8cb9a6b5247fbdc25b31
6db774c1b593e7d1344e24988276636a1d98e114
77128 F20101114_AAAMUD rigby_j_Page_054.jpg
09d382149be5d56530c7c3a3aea5723f
7ea6d802b97aedffb8f62e8028c0ec8609711893
F20101114_AAAMTO rigby_j_Page_154.tif
2fccdd5619a86e2b1285a442dff83f65
2c8e991f541084c520a5bcc880eb9bf715be6a9d
6725 F20101114_AAAODA rigby_j_Page_045thm.jpg
8040bdab1156bf6f16095b8848641c60
e52395dd21a1bf962eec5fa6cbd80861783b16dd
7474 F20101114_AAAOCM rigby_j_Page_182thm.jpg
8a3bb837ee948e2d6eb574211ecc25c1
9083ad225a53dca79e1bf186d9546815a425a20d
F20101114_AAAOBY rigby_j_Page_065.txt
24d657e4cffbbca3828c8a3df093b193
298664752a5c1674a3069cedcef99acd734533fd
115506 F20101114_AAANXG rigby_j_Page_164.jp2
d5b0334a89eb8cf8e7fc663e7684c84a
2260ac09c6fd30bd0ed25a625a5178490b9a02c1
1048 F20101114_AAANWR rigby_j_Page_148.txt
00601b04c2fce299756a833a47fe57ed
25bd2c22a13c14a648b2621de894805c96d1a04d
50471 F20101114_AAAMUE rigby_j_Page_122.pro
cb39886d2cc69ffea755296c5a275ac6
c1d79ae1a1e3c051be020943a7697d01335b2765
F20101114_AAAMTP rigby_j_Page_114.tif
cd9ed5802a4789d405ddf2e835ab7e11
7a60c0489f034d8b1d4505d0ffab1be6d05ec102
6386 F20101114_AAAODB rigby_j_Page_046thm.jpg
134cf42f40cf16d98f61b0204d557b3d
6b18ce5103bc66fe050f7155fa0b09860e132c73
6855 F20101114_AAAOCN rigby_j_Page_112thm.jpg
486634a875c94a61857779e4b650a769
30bb118f43e0ccd8c38a2dafae2b29ab50e07e27
F20101114_AAAOBZ rigby_j_Page_074.txt
1793286e10743be3f2b1d6b18120be17
83502ebcc50ec3b54bcbca103395a37227a2c561
1161 F20101114_AAANXH rigby_j_Page_011.txt
0f8454cf0006e471b0d09352a4e57a07
2e27ba30c24e6e869255a7b8f9ccb082b446ba1f
25144 F20101114_AAANWS rigby_j_Page_034.QC.jpg
0af61acbc90c1ff80b4e65be282af75b
a903d86a63e43bff06da684c038d6de25ae135c8
121695 F20101114_AAAMUF rigby_j_Page_165.jp2
e65a0ffd77096b59a601466eacb54985
257ce61155bd495b04d926efa01188a76d920d22
6698 F20101114_AAAMTQ rigby_j_Page_088thm.jpg
22575b13468082dc64625746ae782e54
c894042468c857432179efe1a8a71cdf6642f75e
6875 F20101114_AAAODC rigby_j_Page_051thm.jpg
36b7a5c2ebbd452d94e64ca5bf3539c6
b82acad395f48e41e8cfbbc05a1745d9382c33a7
6549 F20101114_AAAOCO rigby_j_Page_033thm.jpg
9144d5254127a8ce78b3dc6d1bbe51f6
4fd98938eb895aedbfd712ffbe03dfab923f0243
61183 F20101114_AAANXI rigby_j_Page_189.pro
7853d1e3b3f8eaaea48212ec66938c8d
982afaffc976587a779e9514a565f23a934ff907
54579 F20101114_AAANWT rigby_j_Page_139.pro
a626099089abce176c2e5734c2d7e6ca
b651c76ca9605ec9f97d5b727abfde0ac9382b59
6867 F20101114_AAAMUG rigby_j_Page_120thm.jpg
04d1173adf207585904eaa7e59f87a70
c3e0cd98a3c168099fa371700c6914cef88fab10
F20101114_AAAMTR rigby_j_Page_058.tif
d5f3ed2a30b1bbe9408ba0520a1fa788
31fcf16963ff665f963c41fa18cfe9bc06b88790
F20101114_AAANAA rigby_j_Page_005.tif
6e90d550868fef7d645c04261712680e
485656160299d1f26ee487840728dc889abe50f6
24890 F20101114_AAAODD rigby_j_Page_057.QC.jpg
ecf93260a6b51760d630553ef0a1aa06
ea369e29324db5988db45617a97fcd9f5da4903d
24683 F20101114_AAAOCP rigby_j_Page_022.QC.jpg
b8888e963c1ca2444b2dd4b8051f0e4c
b19c5071ba34dad128e015dbc5714596bdd0761a
F20101114_AAANXJ rigby_j_Page_191.tif
c217d8e14979de85cb54631a332325ec
7617107319cb0f7c5d30008af194dc6f6c96da52
51450 F20101114_AAANWU rigby_j_Page_070.pro
33005e0df96df30b6ca6571122851348
530dd6c477a52698e519daf00dc3f9118dd3b7f7
F20101114_AAAMUH rigby_j_Page_130.txt
0c3ac69cbbc9a516a290e129efd7a79d
813ce0c17ee51f0189629079781de26823a621fe
52643 F20101114_AAAMTS rigby_j_Page_013.pro
ecb77ec70de624dcb5b99c7c18c039d4
d4e31695975192fe41b3e6f3246458b0f84e6347
118292 F20101114_AAANAB rigby_j_Page_114.jp2
119f0d288651542a317e3c5b9a413b86
3767509b35728958b06b037256631defb209c083
24886 F20101114_AAAODE rigby_j_Page_070.QC.jpg
91d0fbc7e4a4a31aad5e0fb00355a027
10b1401c0f4eda47bec4f320f8df04225263e593
284579 F20101114_AAAOCQ UFE0021094_00001.xml FULL
ba0d6b6d6579380513acbd6593cdc2be
d816904d6b2c6366eba3e58cfecee63ac16b8181
2098 F20101114_AAANXK rigby_j_Page_083.txt
885fb007992c8f5764eec7ae5a1cdb20
bcc6bbb2fd5f499b838f0a16a16ff0e4ad6b7d93
6890 F20101114_AAANWV rigby_j_Page_013thm.jpg
afe4b1dd0b8612ea0d768d1016ac2585
5afec710d67fde1f688bb0204e2715495c9517b9
118455 F20101114_AAAMUI rigby_j_Page_058.jp2
734670bb1b53f9021151a822390db939
ffb00892bfab2022101f48e49538c3c2c7658d48
75926 F20101114_AAAMTT rigby_j_Page_013.jpg
f27792497150e2ae44b9889d4768cab5
cb2b4966416879f8eaac8aead96e0a610f41a7e5
118529 F20101114_AAANAC rigby_j_Page_162.jp2
e8e7c34a6f264a4cdc91ad1484f43b22
63e85a1df5d85cd6aca6c6c38131bf1e43cb4806
25995 F20101114_AAAODF rigby_j_Page_074.QC.jpg
d23563c9aea26a106128b694d8796795
2dcbcc41ff6752d22a54a691940a3d79dc461a8c
4299 F20101114_AAAOCR rigby_j_Page_009.QC.jpg
89f3951da42fc224c20966bcc6d1e974
5b90216b46b84731b8bd2027007adc7dff903c60
F20101114_AAANXL rigby_j_Page_158.tif
45de5a2c8476c795a220ae6976ef265a
9346710bf8bff01afcb8a42f9415caffaa1bce76
1062 F20101114_AAANWW rigby_j_Page_175.txt
5741312474ca6901f205163797e57f0d
a7ab7acb567c1e018621194a49ed998b78b48973
53240 F20101114_AAAMUJ rigby_j_Page_061.pro
7ab5c340ef55f0e31e58a8da910b3862
3eabbada2e039ac0fdf9b184ff147df9e5235b88
25105 F20101114_AAAMTU rigby_j_Page_072.QC.jpg
b49ff15cee99ac43f0b66b5501391c22
9d7f5812db219d79fd40a69241cccd0114b21489
F20101114_AAANAD rigby_j_Page_121thm.jpg
baf879f24255f87b122491f3516f58f0
fbedcb0e26bf9b3696139d36da8f269a97bb7c86
6953 F20101114_AAAODG rigby_j_Page_074thm.jpg
b8ea87b395f26955881535d3ca3207bc
6c2e4cce4c35abd6fc7bdb474db116a4edad6faf
6685 F20101114_AAAOCS rigby_j_Page_014thm.jpg
fd22eb8bc31169ac85db34c4c8fa947b
cc04a661e663ae799e3e68f37b4827177bb0de9b
77593 F20101114_AAANYA rigby_j_Page_072.jpg
1a3805507a5b3edbcb35fb0af35f430e
d5a3533fe6b9f667a630c5de774002288a718e0f
6787 F20101114_AAANXM rigby_j_Page_133thm.jpg
60da48db6641781fb43a18a86c7db07d
8d40f5e8d9926b1fb070e811ca0f070f9525cc0e
F20101114_AAANWX rigby_j_Page_182.tif
1c18350922d355e1b0d03408b24f39a8
39a539e1a78e1c800787e09804d40abd12b49d5b
27065 F20101114_AAAMUK rigby_j_Page_135.QC.jpg
9aaddb46e987e306cc0f424445980070
aca470ad0e355db0e104f68b56a813786f8e9357
F20101114_AAAMTV rigby_j_Page_043.QC.jpg
96dfdff9fd5fc150f82324bd8ff83efe
34c1fc44780e1074f71e0675d2f5bdf5f1837562
24087 F20101114_AAANAE rigby_j_Page_108.QC.jpg
9546d4301425e469574000573d699484
d93020107669b2df3cd1e115758cf15c542c4254
6838 F20101114_AAAODH rigby_j_Page_086thm.jpg
2c4c16bc7b2fe15aa30f7e90494fa200
f697bc95c74dfb2f639ba88232c1052c257e5e6f
23677 F20101114_AAAOCT rigby_j_Page_019.QC.jpg
b85c2248e7ce6b5c9509fa17cd23361a
a79314d22ee15b399f7ac3bf7c3c8e26380c430a
77971 F20101114_AAANYB rigby_j_Page_073.jpg
96b50f84d3215ee6bc4362327e37e3ab
90884d8cf9cd11849279634c55b5662e0dfb85b0
219565 F20101114_AAANXN UFE0021094_00001.mets
9fabfd66eb9e20e30662b78dbde51956
89947364699988d167f6855d716b8e998390dbd7
28750 F20101114_AAANWY rigby_j_Page_178.jpg
c7090809fabf3716b549ed9c98aca44a
b88f0cbcbbd44701d348afbc0afb222ea91a1d64
F20101114_AAAMUL rigby_j_Page_145.tif
f2178836589f4c9455034e88ff9d8057
263429c19b1350b7ba19b78b78c7e631552d6bdb
59918 F20101114_AAAMTW rigby_j_Page_183.pro
b914766b12169d5972b47d270cadc63c
905c24bfedb492b25be1ff1de360a3c0327bc1fa
F20101114_AAANAF rigby_j_Page_115.txt
bae102e30ed085478b1d1c77aed6088a
dfe3d040c31ca20aacbef6b02627ab18ae511874
24361 F20101114_AAAODI rigby_j_Page_088.QC.jpg
eff7b708648c563023e2fca88227320c
4e48ab02dbab264e89f4857c68d2d004f7f98a49
25435 F20101114_AAAOCU rigby_j_Page_024.QC.jpg
4f86e95cdcd3029ca3eeb22d7195178c
22c04158aca15e064faf4bc3428d6a41e997eed2
F20101114_AAANYC rigby_j_Page_079.jpg
bc81bc054fec589d44cb3961d0449951
bda78e526ce08a14c1194d3045ad54d4f3dddc96
123606 F20101114_AAANWZ rigby_j_Page_023.jp2
f1083d260761734591bb3f099256a2bb
92c0e6a30d88105ed37faa4aaa4c657e47966f42
6946 F20101114_AAAMUM rigby_j_Page_073thm.jpg
3271729c5453969913b4894009c47c46
12bb05d16d46bdd34c93c54f1f356b46cd17e85a
7105 F20101114_AAAMTX rigby_j_Page_166thm.jpg
da3a2c185a91040a5e9a8405b60607c7
9da5b4a001cd6efe6ef9c4d6610bc1d703f883bb
6887 F20101114_AAANAG rigby_j_Page_061thm.jpg
5fb412b37a244d7bae34a356311a29c2
b5ad4c55acb6ed71c3de6226d23e0fe1269cf45f
74879 F20101114_AAAMVA rigby_j_Page_043.jpg
d3366ad21c50be508c5e520179164069
00eef7696a7f1c32f879d09f1c83ae59b5620363
6553 F20101114_AAAODJ rigby_j_Page_091thm.jpg
4064efdf775ed32413b8b3e8a5b72202
77c37c270477e142ae96eefdb49385c03c3dd745
7100 F20101114_AAAOCV rigby_j_Page_027thm.jpg
a06e7c0cd08b2d36a57c8ee2aab9a8b7
0c425538fd3ff9860578ec7537e14792772b5fca
78932 F20101114_AAANYD rigby_j_Page_080.jpg
e1004bf3c213ad8dcd01ca0485de875a
d759ddadbb762462315a77792687373299798777
F20101114_AAAMUN rigby_j_Page_140.txt
200760c11ad91e0b3a8bd8252b3f6c9a
17707ae90b44ae666c12b5b6177d82697472388a
103546 F20101114_AAAMTY rigby_j_Page_189.jpg
eae73300a3fe1a31d6bdca60cda8ab23
ec2885f5062c576fd1242a2b6ed87150080bda44
77178 F20101114_AAANAH rigby_j_Page_041.jpg
f4a631d24d5529e6df30d3e0358d8aac
ccca3ad7bc54d5eece2e7b193dddb2535363746b
54334 F20101114_AAAMVB rigby_j_Page_113.pro
57aad73ead60e66bbe2a863aac179801
581b7e94c02cea2938c2313f80a1380c4a886382
23842 F20101114_AAAODK rigby_j_Page_096.QC.jpg
7fe0f63d5f93c22b52b0af9cd9e722dd
8762cee413ae7bbec9baf72a37ae7e6155037eba
F20101114_AAAOCW rigby_j_Page_035.QC.jpg
3febfaa186e7f2b793ff7297d232320a
adbfe4c34a6b28cd024b6a78eebe2959f963b627
77443 F20101114_AAANYE rigby_j_Page_086.jpg
676dbdc57f26167e77b145328cd66602
9f46d7f53e7a444677b5962975d6e997f1eea2c8
108834 F20101114_AAANXQ rigby_j_Page_006.jpg
5c3bb57abd78e63f47d1f3932ddce729
283b188f04cdaa68ae219102209729751c963e84
16450 F20101114_AAAMUO rigby_j_Page_191.jpg
18ddc0d6aec01c2a13e8c61d36a4a83b
cd224c23cdd5f9ab541eaa181be56055ee3ecb67
55814 F20101114_AAAMTZ rigby_j_Page_169.pro
47d07f9a4ff82dd65375dba9a02dcc11
0538b1f2dc960f1a8c803538b2f098ece730bc6b
24539 F20101114_AAANAI rigby_j_Page_069.QC.jpg
f490bb02635b81b92ca6db909be6c80c
f8a73c79b3140ddd2fa854f2ac4ee13c36501dc5
109728 F20101114_AAAMVC rigby_j_Page_060.jp2
711e0a3671a9cc792356be4d71177340
6bb8512817a94bcc63ee31e02e9895a3341897ee
6472 F20101114_AAAODL rigby_j_Page_100thm.jpg
59dab436da2b8764cb8041bfb0057dbc
55b6ddc6cdb7653c8e933a512964973c11721870
25747 F20101114_AAAOCX rigby_j_Page_042.QC.jpg
5544a132d02b98b2f25e9c90b5a699d4
039f4424164f9ba00e8cb6ba9bab1f714fbb20b5
72699 F20101114_AAANYF rigby_j_Page_108.jpg
5b98bbdb31757d39a193f56f5405d0bb
0b9ae451a0f632d76d646a5bccb7fbaacd956688
F20101114_AAANAJ rigby_j_Page_169.tif
76d844cbf457740af72f51d08f9d544b
b2e56403c350ddbb77cd57f3d8189dd3fceee673
F20101114_AAAMVD rigby_j_Page_188.tif
a7640ca94d16b3419faf2539f1ffecb9
bc00aa519e1a92baeeccc56f266d7169b64d6f7e
23987 F20101114_AAAOEA rigby_j_Page_176.QC.jpg
1a880a3b279a52b6bd0e8084ea6ccd0f
61c4caba8cfc5facd0a44c96eb5b1aa30aba515d
26902 F20101114_AAAODM rigby_j_Page_104.QC.jpg
79693d73ae954ec02cafe8c565a8d98a
41209501160a287bb2f0f18182e44e56b45e6776
F20101114_AAAOCY rigby_j_Page_042thm.jpg
5ff8e7adc3f0c4aea59106add05cf5ea
5c9494640e860b63bddae6b29194fb01b25fb8a2
76935 F20101114_AAANYG rigby_j_Page_113.jpg
3f42e87a736a3153bb83dbe80a13911b
abf89a517ccc68fd0ab3992cde1b0267806b097b
51008 F20101114_AAANXR rigby_j_Page_008.jpg
906c5a1f92d3c513c3a527d633d00a31
15661c11210ef3057c8e686be697269e8646b6ed
F20101114_AAAMUP rigby_j_Page_085.tif
36b615f39513d12909b9598e7498e25f
4e52ae054a896165a4e9e29a96e098e518045e1e
119778 F20101114_AAANAK rigby_j_Page_098.jp2
7f09aae2d41e4c7f785fcdb4d28d2d80
83863103f5f07b9a752f7819a87e7b084d3fd04b
53783 F20101114_AAAMVE rigby_j_Page_167.pro
00e32fb500de759da8e3028b0ef42733
349c8985a6a5dcc24adb6e01c9977133c938747d
6430 F20101114_AAAOEB rigby_j_Page_176thm.jpg
4c3178fd2063ef157937ac36793758e1
f1979e465a6826cc0a702a7449ad0fbd97cb748d
7017 F20101114_AAAODN rigby_j_Page_109thm.jpg
32636d79a406f458e21b35ac93f24bd1
6c77163510b99ca4ec5414da90e0e355889d8608
F20101114_AAAOCZ rigby_j_Page_044thm.jpg
c84675b89b788cb1bd8d0a7113887eba
843535b283d4e1587098ba52ef8cf91893482ad3
78553 F20101114_AAANYH rigby_j_Page_117.jpg
0a332430d9423805394d661b37efadd1
7fb5d8fc4ca7876ac066f8357ce1faa372c8c189
14154 F20101114_AAANXS rigby_j_Page_009.jpg
f3e861f2080f6f7d25279e2777d29dc7
714a03b8e4aa3d31200869b370316ee89c768a64
2125 F20101114_AAAMUQ rigby_j_Page_015.txt
6f5e880dc895f1c2386dff346e413dc1
bae6e326fd49004c6de62a82ca9a136880db45f4
6734 F20101114_AAANAL rigby_j_Page_093thm.jpg
4b028e296821033e1f121e4bc6c4a7bb
a839779381d3bcfe8e5c5423d586e7f1c9eabb80
F20101114_AAAMVF rigby_j_Page_088.tif
edff7aba1711e2752bb99ec2bf964dea
f7005cff97878f2562d3bd653735a0d598fc42e8
26954 F20101114_AAAOEC rigby_j_Page_182.QC.jpg
864163311be5eeb374d33f67dbd73a4d
96b96be12dfa6768b1f3371f767e0f224a4ee44c
24725 F20101114_AAAODO rigby_j_Page_112.QC.jpg
ee862d2ef9bdf19a438a35f6b9817c45
688738d950d22132a62cf2c813f158bb36e7926d
74404 F20101114_AAANYI rigby_j_Page_120.jpg
ee6d2230786b844500ce3bfe4c753145
4af0e9ffce6738be14825945bceae2e56b7cb5f8
77556 F20101114_AAANXT rigby_j_Page_030.jpg
34b02136da8455d273cb6db81671d615
c956d89c7387a5b24fe2bcba1592c373c58542c7
40404 F20101114_AAAMUR rigby_j_Page_102.jpg
7bea307bc7a30d1bc44fa2bbd645179d
6e4c86ae72fc5eb75bbc5baa9427f7fa0db15a87
56176 F20101114_AAANBA rigby_j_Page_132.pro
a85017066862c1849ffca6ae1a2e8471
a21bc48d26813c55106163985696e5ceeded8c5b
4630 F20101114_AAANAM rigby_j_Page_006.txt
75a0667a80f196cae8c454b4d3c42d9c
7fabb9df97150770d9841e9fe90e0cf69d210ca2
7033 F20101114_AAAMVG rigby_j_Page_035thm.jpg
fb160aede6ecfb058903bfcce92fff78
13a34b289dad2c525fbd7705178795cf349a6d15
25126 F20101114_AAAOED rigby_j_Page_184.QC.jpg
23b0b121a71d427af93bd534b89906f9
5ccd064a6979df3c1bf4dff658b95ca65afc65b1
26449 F20101114_AAAODP rigby_j_Page_115.QC.jpg
e1140ec07de3203f0d6f3d4335f065e1
d7467d37a4835469ed1c5b3df5ac2cae0d8f8d7a
75583 F20101114_AAANYJ rigby_j_Page_134.jpg
4b2318c9aa62c12f5184d8ca18f2d72b
85d34378964b5e61fb63f3029610658cbc0e6736
78590 F20101114_AAANXU rigby_j_Page_042.jpg
cafb09da0bf1dd2c8627c1e834e00043
2dd6a7c96de70ceb6a7be87d69817bc06c2fe313
7043 F20101114_AAAMUS rigby_j_Page_110thm.jpg
123bb7551a8d287a2987bfb8fe1a457d
bf2545fdbe0ff87d303b75befa29a7c547f07a80
2029 F20101114_AAANBB rigby_j_Page_176.txt
d10046260a531f676d9b2decc80aacc9
708e7c8d26ac116d2717438adbc2b210acfee2be
23760 F20101114_AAANAN rigby_j_Page_060.QC.jpg
8b59ce5a9c28246fe28345888fe4faeb
8699d5f605a5374110f6d997ce7986d023118256
F20101114_AAAMVH rigby_j_Page_042.tif
95cee5dcbfe069e8055f8f93a6e53646
00c06a366021970c877c8a33e72d8b584316af4a
6677 F20101114_AAAOEE rigby_j_Page_188thm.jpg
a339cc58f1c2551c2aa9e70d2b21075e
77566ec674ae21cbcfe9fc32acbc368cd26f6772
26138 F20101114_AAAODQ rigby_j_Page_119.QC.jpg
2182b9bc7589a062c0213563ee527df0
a8f9d30fa2dfc606c2bad02fcf6bf359258ce7e5
83897 F20101114_AAANYK rigby_j_Page_135.jpg
be001a31682c2bae632c11a8b95a44f2
c39ca33daebb9f99f7fabce43f9fc76937563017
73781 F20101114_AAANXV rigby_j_Page_048.jpg
051ed4d598ad99d7b3b7225c81da2f31
6fa96434e0836d46493523af86442374dac1c57c
53100 F20101114_AAAMUT rigby_j_Page_123.pro
bb2376c7aa478f758c6d1be93974a775
3bebe32b3b9b256decfe09dded48672dbcc2881b
130447 F20101114_AAANBC rigby_j_Page_136.jp2
93e91af4aa7048e8f5a0f5a67ac2c906
ca59e06bfc5a4dd69a36d91d12d000e880d1de70
2320 F20101114_AAANAO rigby_j_Page_047.txt
66ccc16450753c4fb6fd72dc53713176
d7545c51a410937089b208281543d043382a7bd5
2443 F20101114_AAAMVI rigby_j_Page_185.txt
50e6c8d453366c34f88a656d6838a48f
3e887912a100e3b6f7a860e5589f5181c09ce4e9
6954 F20101114_AAAOEF rigby_j_Page_190thm.jpg
db2693b47271dfab16adf820d4883369
8e422cfd1e77e0d5c9ca9a5a0baff910d1234208
26064 F20101114_AAAODR rigby_j_Page_124.QC.jpg
55424fcaf79f35a52e9b70ae33836531
9d57efb08deb1a361f53ea187179121f52e47469
78958 F20101114_AAANYL rigby_j_Page_144.jpg
ca7b30c0f66095662ae5304c9ac938cd
b7775d361a2f109f19f1dd6488fc811ede61ba3b
76996 F20101114_AAANXW rigby_j_Page_049.jpg
b3bef2a7728b185758f001b009fc4d99
abfb7ec4e7dcb32df2b2cc00d5be85b1eabe4cd2
2087 F20101114_AAAMUU rigby_j_Page_112.txt
10da455a38fb4e6a457750ba8b5e3c41
0417e6185e69c8e6726e5aa6cdc87bdcc576bc6d
1979 F20101114_AAANBD rigby_j_Page_082.txt
fed6a4ab6d1fe262641b3f66d599f783
dd0397f19c494825ad9fb3813681dfaeff7a3a14
F20101114_AAANAP rigby_j_Page_064.tif
8824e77d6fd264b54f41c0069e050329
cfe2d4a584db8ee994f3cd40d3f8a8cfd68ad366
2041 F20101114_AAAMVJ rigby_j_Page_095.txt
bcdd136ac749d48418ff25ad47dcf42c
7871f33d708cefb2a33177b92ba57dab5a421408
15100 F20101114_AAAOEG rigby_j_Page_192.QC.jpg
59f77d280de6114a80ef4adf52e7a07c
f038a09ec76fbffa5eee685699467b5571a75603
6969 F20101114_AAAODS rigby_j_Page_125thm.jpg
85c494e72d9c22235929042a407b6ee0
5a772967e340a387d937aa4ee65a53bfe83b3400
F20101114_AAANZA rigby_j_Page_052.jp2
42958e2661b1f581196322a56794adbd
ae653cbcbf763139f8ff186acb7401770e9106cb
82379 F20101114_AAANYM rigby_j_Page_147.jpg
f9b5a816119467b37e9c192890d7c1ed
048088b9c49b55fb60c5d562c6463e41c3b68824
79133 F20101114_AAANXX rigby_j_Page_053.jpg
d4388b971b84a7d4e3b7178f209b8f09
15bd70b83b5bc5c8b3e89a79ac6bc65a5d0ead70
101575 F20101114_AAAMUV rigby_j_Page_149.jp2
6af8d775ff65afa0f16c409d0daca2ed
1b7b0f01619423712551b996b2c4a91151d92bd3
F20101114_AAANBE rigby_j_Page_134.tif
41d26555a22e1cd72d6176da76159f11
4288bc03c56daf1b5b813c964d33ddee241c0f22
116900 F20101114_AAANAQ rigby_j_Page_157.jp2
b368c8a1fed6cfe7c99e1ba6fc9dc66f
5bdd92f02910864121d20f7ba12be7d71d153fc8
76293 F20101114_AAAMVK rigby_j_Page_021.jpg
5a254141e02058523afd3739906216b4
bcd5e32684fb412f74c5d8fcaac9cf02af6dea74
6935 F20101114_AAAODT rigby_j_Page_134thm.jpg
37104ff842e0a1fffc022124a93806a9
ca4901322aed49640526981f45826a04d452f52e
114532 F20101114_AAANZB rigby_j_Page_057.jp2
3585fb900783c865f51db0ca63458f95
b94e3be76ad39dbaec4f60325338b61821bea715
68898 F20101114_AAANYN rigby_j_Page_149.jpg
619d1ab8dab0cc8311f3f1a58e02721c
f185cb34e57af2e362452f51bb25e34a96b605e7
75917 F20101114_AAANXY rigby_j_Page_064.jpg
d76f9cc632cd38a41872c815e4ada7eb
9f8d7042a8938a85e40d0ba35153268c690e38fa
F20101114_AAANBF rigby_j_Page_026.txt
c8f7054c41a81ce3d8b46220df0d8ccd
3ff9964873421471d30adc940ed351ac6c00097c
122345 F20101114_AAANAR rigby_j_Page_089.jp2
2886264c6dd9bfddeda0590e600b334f
64fdefc1307343c9bd91488ba2894ff5ea0c4e07
2150 F20101114_AAAMVL rigby_j_Page_080.txt
940c42d0f00df37bb751bf6728bbf019
232fd2081e3f61e80069e3a85e749fd5c853fe38
7083 F20101114_AAAMUW rigby_j_Page_128thm.jpg
8c352d348574eba05e3c71e49a0b8abc
10f34ff00b51300681e794febdfb27f061995132
27437 F20101114_AAAODU rigby_j_Page_136.QC.jpg
b831d41233d0eb58416c1f54cde9c945
7a7c3235dfacb41563eb8a66412c06bb95408a9c
111276 F20101114_AAANZC rigby_j_Page_063.jp2
2e826050cc7a10b81dea816c3d2784e4
3aee8acc7e2e6c19e00f87e19b8fd908272f9945
76282 F20101114_AAANYO rigby_j_Page_150.jpg
f24a1c4f73a4cc07881fc91efacdebcd
27e2d642ec2dc318baee389093a364d40a1c5c83
74936 F20101114_AAANXZ rigby_j_Page_069.jpg
7375bc3c3c70eaf74c21202908953b72
b86de0b4d84eb7ff1b3a516f80be681220805466
F20101114_AAANBG rigby_j_Page_076.txt
dd486b17369db3afe72762a0beb9189a
eafa641c433e92f3053ceab6fa264d20ac2d8dd4
F20101114_AAAMWA rigby_j_Page_107.tif
1efb880bed12759e6da5673a3b2f277e
a7d6f9b7bbee06cfa61e6b3e2e21f4fd3f09539c
74494 F20101114_AAANAS rigby_j_Page_020.jpg
fd747c7679ee68a7bfb12cfbaad142e1
c9c9ff0a52c5982a9807ab577f8a9327c3723015
109107 F20101114_AAAMVM rigby_j_Page_122.jp2
58eb7aac0b92146b23fd4a8aa12d1ac5
891bde158e3aa476d0bfd37491f50eb3de7eeaa6
88288 F20101114_AAAMUX rigby_j_Page_136.jpg
0f0f3cb748a1607d24b6487b23619c0a
9b1672ba89b67822c67cf5dd602fba5bbefdf516
7072 F20101114_AAAODV rigby_j_Page_138thm.jpg
98f61286c389dea8063c9631275c29b3
054534ea580c7e0d1917e1a36ff820b4a5786b98
116853 F20101114_AAANZD rigby_j_Page_075.jp2
ca78dcc919c5a4bd7c68c60161141cd0
517aacdea176e87edf6b334914e37d01afbada88
78986 F20101114_AAANYP rigby_j_Page_152.jpg
a40a0e84918ab6acc596e0ef65689ce2
af8fcd83f0fb6506db739610bb0ef454551f8710
4247 F20101114_AAANBH rigby_j_Page_192thm.jpg
9c16f53fa1c3c26a99f6eb2878c26e9a
ec87dc0b8d17697aa085f13180b65d1686f794de
21042 F20101114_AAAMWB rigby_j_Page_084.QC.jpg
0359929f922dc2978138abc7c4d5222c
a190911dda0dc0474c8587b8c3cacc292de338af
56005 F20101114_AAANAT rigby_j_Page_036.pro
0c70ba8a1e039ef7a7d320bb593e4528
2c36ebdc1fc7bcb37625e284b1128e16bf60f93c
2077 F20101114_AAAMVN rigby_j_Page_103.txt
5b234bff0ae4cacfc91d2393bcebe61e
24269c5b548b4ee3d458376a3985ce0ef699b09a
2195 F20101114_AAAMUY rigby_j_Page_119.txt
37ab574d315d1c32b684ed38d6aa42c9
855ab19153fc9ba89dc68fa149fba9b915b26f85
7247 F20101114_AAAODW rigby_j_Page_147thm.jpg
98850aeb01040a4d2a51d9f917fbff7a
5c31914146a3a297e11f8fee314cb7968aab8498
109809 F20101114_AAANZE rigby_j_Page_077.jp2
27976bb1f30d7900e096a097daadcecf
fc0b62bb00f28191623e25fae2a3a77114e576e3
78417 F20101114_AAANYQ rigby_j_Page_153.jpg
74ae66dbf24ee4192cd1a423d78c007d
a16a2ae2f28122b47bbb64e28570104397b62281
118909 F20101114_AAANBI rigby_j_Page_026.jp2
aa684b725a766ee093c5e8d1dbea95ab
eb32c5ba3fed5697e64d0ed817b15486b4159899
109392 F20101114_AAAMWC rigby_j_Page_125.jp2
801a761c3159d910c2b03d66f600f3ee
66f761e7359e0b9ab41acfdc075ee4b8d2bffa18
75580 F20101114_AAANAU rigby_j_Page_101.jpg
a341eb4b4e447108c468d12d6de41212
441751bcfd36cdf6b929056f84f12dfbac7143a7
3185 F20101114_AAAMVO rigby_j_Page_178thm.jpg
41e60f3ea2e72df798edbd14754dbd43
8342d209f9196b8f083ce93ecd82e3233b360f0e
2091 F20101114_AAAMUZ rigby_j_Page_020.txt
80800c4947509e9aa5d974df80ecec48
6c8b788a2616bc681495f87071360271fefd118f
3865 F20101114_AAAODX rigby_j_Page_148thm.jpg
13c69b285def7978efc054cba64ca00a
3082f930690a84db424b07092060bbc185c6c60d
110042 F20101114_AAANZF rigby_j_Page_082.jp2
40a07c2305b22d24babb616f798451f0
1e9a8f10da02d791f0e5cf0cc6212f89d8eaba2d
69312 F20101114_AAANYR rigby_j_Page_155.jpg
9bb9d7266629d6b62c3474c2d2680bbb
bf684a51e8bf8180689c6712dd32a049e4bd5860
6687 F20101114_AAANBJ rigby_j_Page_078thm.jpg
ce736844835169901d4bd0ad9c958137
9585e7b242eb61d0b96575db9655a6d8e451d984
53886 F20101114_AAAMWD rigby_j_Page_014.pro
797504cce8fec4003f1b49c79f5025f5
94d8719e43fcb8847b5dbe4c7fafecb25393a71f
6711 F20101114_AAANAV rigby_j_Page_020thm.jpg
c832f3e7f58b6ee2b702e4f464507351
56a318a88f7f06aa6c9ee56d51590593570eb869
52629 F20101114_AAAMVP rigby_j_Page_050.pro
ec51d4c5bacf03182a50b082c6d30c26
2857906fbdd843db79715600c20c72e192c60177
F20101114_AAAODY rigby_j_Page_150thm.jpg
275d8cdfd99bf60c3d7292a0dde5e004
e928e007fc4383b2fc11c5eb0236e99041f6af45
109939 F20101114_AAANZG rigby_j_Page_090.jp2
a787c9342678cb7d4a2732ba7b476f89
772ac99177194a691d84ca17ce297b8bb7e9eba7
F20101114_AAANBK rigby_j_Page_025.tif
766bbc56b43fbe05de1131a2f29cb845
5dc259bb2cf907cbef778cbd76ef599cf0313d15
65457 F20101114_AAAMWE rigby_j_Page_084.jpg
10a64a3f106b25c0560ea23ad0d078e2
2ddd9213b0bb06a36e1dea6c4dcc1e3673cb881f
F20101114_AAANAW rigby_j_Page_031.txt
71f35ff4fe97dcd1087d175d4b39bc98
874c233ccca5e38ed7498bcb209b662f7d09c93f
6638 F20101114_AAAODZ rigby_j_Page_153thm.jpg
164a5d8c0e756c2fe551de6bda8e677e
e3ee578278f1b47997040eb3e19e4e1d3ae61a19
110091 F20101114_AAANZH rigby_j_Page_097.jp2
dd99ac41d9e9d2febc4c109a9e8fcb20
1d23ca2da1dad638accd0c49251f8f6435573f82
80151 F20101114_AAANYS rigby_j_Page_158.jpg
49eb8c4f831fb087161fcdac3872d1f0
db83ade052b228be76637bc9a744481cf3709aec
26307 F20101114_AAANBL rigby_j_Page_148.pro
5d54e4698d527f6577d6189d63b734a5
c363b491b5a2855d1fbcf8c7a651c8f0a8dd7261
7047 F20101114_AAAMWF rigby_j_Page_107thm.jpg
939310c351441ae42cb6385c7d16b6fc
2ed01dc79c501aefb683eddc37bd24652b92aa87
57083 F20101114_AAANAX rigby_j_Page_165.pro
7263f6d64aefc90ec6f1d0150f3a905b
63b3bdd3523e94f143f3e33b50c15b5514dad94f
24049 F20101114_AAAMVQ rigby_j_Page_082.QC.jpg
2073c4ed77c432c296f091cdd29584f4
7edf0e92226d00507e3645c8ba496b2d19989333
122963 F20101114_AAANZI rigby_j_Page_132.jp2
4464d800eee2be72a380ef054db8ba29
ef510f8240ba787d48447b3b359726a39ba4b2ec
75087 F20101114_AAANYT rigby_j_Page_167.jpg
9bcaea1e8702255c3fd58362d3a38f72
3c22d80068300b2715eadb756ad9493de6df63cf
115039 F20101114_AAANBM rigby_j_Page_167.jp2
b941984f0afe9d1ed8b23dfec33c62b6
510129a61761376ae02b5490b7eb9ee0303984f5
F20101114_AAAMWG rigby_j_Page_147.txt
589a92911aff5bf54d7d1284edbe4a39
f1738b4929d1bfa7b84e6b876fe86eb33e083c19
F20101114_AAANAY rigby_j_Page_081.tif
1531ebe22a0f96e932647c8f85133d27
1727782430f3c1b945e3f2c5bfde4bbe59642d8c
2466 F20101114_AAAMVR rigby_j_Page_189.txt
1cd38b41f3d65795f725c22d1a1ed302
57a03f9c41fb706331c57133dcefa72cf7d4c515
45417 F20101114_AAANCA rigby_j_Page_011.jpg
9fa3712cd593e9e32f497148606f5da1
33bb37e40214f67e2767c9b00a190168299b5a69
115204 F20101114_AAANZJ rigby_j_Page_133.jp2
cc63012ffb5f33f790e902d23557258b
560b0758e9102d50e4f86dfb69f88448a32b44ed
84063 F20101114_AAANYU rigby_j_Page_180.jpg
f94c7c7ef4ad47965a9fd95395ca7e6a
19a647a50e5552d571ac8d01226a638c3e8fd145
F20101114_AAANBN rigby_j_Page_054.txt
633ad70e7849d7b3cdf627d781b0105e
dc3b44f071b336ca8d463750be5f450806c554a1
F20101114_AAAMWH rigby_j_Page_181.tif
0897897878e6dda7959d5ad8e2ed656c
9f43839dfcdc934b33ff5d753c20e38e58e46fab
78211 F20101114_AAANAZ rigby_j_Page_059.jpg
a3256f0e3ac3f1f032e1251c1a27b92d
6da943e23806992b01ec0543803c4503c591fa1c
6718 F20101114_AAAMVS rigby_j_Page_031thm.jpg
7b7b1f8982c64f06c570e264f4f393ad
13feb6858350bb9e0788bf56b64cc499ae5c47fb
7129 F20101114_AAANCB rigby_j_Page_023thm.jpg
789e281cbc7cf7338f73d199e840b7ea
658fdf491bcfbd3e7c729c77ecfd33cdc72b745e
119355 F20101114_AAANZK rigby_j_Page_137.jp2
acd1be43b9ffc7f1a8c87042d0961935
942506e153008fd9563d0897965573a5bbbae2c0
91824 F20101114_AAANYV rigby_j_Page_182.jpg
284536ccf86fac2b28505e25f1ce9ec4
b24c4fd5a8c146fa5919d9e8a2068f78ed67e3a0
25116 F20101114_AAANBO rigby_j_Page_083.QC.jpg
dac819c25be91ea3ecac4a5efb815d62
4265492e3ab0ceececb8356b6243d461bc340aa5
F20101114_AAAMWI rigby_j_Page_098.tif
06a33f4f0186cb4cb5319f524997e640
19726aaff824b8af0d30c05fda357e499b33ea09
23638 F20101114_AAAMVT rigby_j_Page_100.QC.jpg
ec5589e146be528ce0453a5c800243c5
c7479ebdf77cc3dd890185aabe7ada5e6fdde2d0
F20101114_AAANCC rigby_j_Page_133.tif
6bb558b09fe30c04c996fabc332ef67f
49d6711621b48c4d3aed68cd1cd584ae8f306c5a
118938 F20101114_AAANZL rigby_j_Page_141.jp2
03167e31a17746b17a1b9db1daccba34
dab854789b78daa1f2f1841a8cedffe16b11329e
82569 F20101114_AAANYW rigby_j_Page_184.jpg
a999a42c7389771757b508d0107dc3c0
641884f0a0a05850d3c2a8097cb0b56be847391d
27922 F20101114_AAANBP rigby_j_Page_143.QC.jpg
47c387d8ba592420971a217abb06a492
b852dca9386f91881bacc98d2b03d382272d2505
25675 F20101114_AAAMWJ rigby_j_Page_114.QC.jpg
2d23f32f8c46724718f8a43ee6f68500
674a976cc101c4260a8ab1b3ffc8db21a799ff90
6941 F20101114_AAAMVU rigby_j_Page_165thm.jpg
49694a63f776410d32b502223bc329d8
6f0f5d800cf651842d9b66ea772feae92d76b092
73047 F20101114_AAANCD rigby_j_Page_085.jpg
c12167b2c01caa867c9b2fc1b5670694
2d626a6e65c1d2f0b6e67c6a3081ba1d27a5544a
132884 F20101114_AAANZM rigby_j_Page_145.jp2
7ca249a67a4cb90fec47678c77a30165
bdd36c3311dfaaeaf5237ef900f92fd9cfcc6166
115391 F20101114_AAANYX rigby_j_Page_017.jp2
1b93a39eb1f48e229f6a24e910f73482
3ba2c3271568d513ec8c321339adb674aacc2106
79368 F20101114_AAANBQ rigby_j_Page_074.jpg
7880680ae2c535143cb06e02ba984edd
3b9da426993ee70eb1c1018e629924084f19aba3
25880 F20101114_AAAMWK rigby_j_Page_052.QC.jpg
f16cf471d51fbdbdf006dcb8e9408f55
2308e2338591284aec56fe70d01fde945d0bda21
F20101114_AAAMVV rigby_j_Page_099.tif
32426bb23f3495f0ac8f84b7bf36fdd9
feea0c56ab2a836c1c9bdba8577481ea60f990a1
6663 F20101114_AAANCE rigby_j_Page_159thm.jpg
3ea57c607b425e26f29676f32203443c
3f5ade892fcf5afeab83e658e98d6fb5f3de9200
122221 F20101114_AAANZN rigby_j_Page_147.jp2
5697290035fefdc0ddc57be6ff3bfe14
ef2f9ef700789994018113e887c7a5d0382ebf32
111536 F20101114_AAANYY rigby_j_Page_033.jp2
132630f29dda117aa210fad8c3c56c00
0e12ddb9146670497e040cea4c64a30883cf861b
F20101114_AAANBR rigby_j_Page_079.tif
a27bbcb660b0d9f3376328b8b046cce1
9586d8ee555715d56683577c03ca83e87b1a0cc6
66995 F20101114_AAAMWL rigby_j_Page_172.jpg
e3bcaf52515f74d25014748a2012d8b7
dadcb4e72d206bd824ce4cc48e88764eeccf7e30
24514 F20101114_AAAMVW rigby_j_Page_106.QC.jpg
4055a342635c7b263b31080b017bcc30
4a82290085ab738a6f667ddcbd163948513b3437
F20101114_AAANCF rigby_j_Page_034.tif
b1746cc7052e0e61db87266596b49444
46d2c693df11d3be0c0b69e5f1ceff7d17ec4b4c
122013 F20101114_AAANZO rigby_j_Page_158.jp2
920cc561bee2b4886a24aae3dba597e6
52fd4efab436a002ca56167b032450591971d499
123276 F20101114_AAANYZ rigby_j_Page_036.jp2
66d318178a82d513336ba8eae40613aa
ccde0cd7d7e017cf1d566546c8809859ce0181b6
F20101114_AAANBS rigby_j_Page_075thm.jpg
175bc18664bec361a1b28eced13d7bbf
06327eb1c74aed564969a314f872589afc4ba425
25639 F20101114_AAAMWM rigby_j_Page_067.QC.jpg
7a5181969aec5fddfb5a1f6aec3d90dd
bc1e8473de97fe3ae7b7ac365b6cebe896928c48
F20101114_AAAMVX rigby_j_Page_059.tif
7bcc1546d2350277b17e7e0da0abc42b
bfd39524829983b22d218ba73161f2366a0513f3
76214 F20101114_AAANCG rigby_j_Page_107.jpg
25d165fe164a7c61d8320570d298bda0
af69891027f47e7b845f9e988fd1bd7257e27418
77869 F20101114_AAAMXA rigby_j_Page_118.jpg
5219e77224717561ba8866a9a474e8c0
5630a4ffdc49c50dad3e292d92d818d89bbee140
116009 F20101114_AAANZP rigby_j_Page_161.jp2
24b1dc56edb777a24f78b137727108a7
4fd9be408829e82a2403d37bf2f18efdb73612ae
2253 F20101114_AAANBT rigby_j_Page_165.txt
07424efce66da5a59df7c1e877548b24
61a59bcfeaebb255683d262d4a51a3c5e07aeaa5
78496 F20101114_AAAMWN rigby_j_Page_058.jpg
1815e5e00c6b501b480c875d6c8e72fc
e4a4ff6c47d5ba7d20f00f8e1a337524bc0e5d35
9102 F20101114_AAAMVY rigby_j_Page_004.QC.jpg
bb22d8d701f5482a512b3aa22eb98500
9d39dcc3011184dd4278cb1426ebfdf4c9dba5bb
79412 F20101114_AAANCH rigby_j_Page_140.jpg
1b4447db73ea7ecabbfe6f629b8b4743
24db82b085356b29acc88ae8fe3063c97b3acc2f
76352 F20101114_AAAMXB rigby_j_Page_110.jpg
1345e5c905da4ff6aeeb973f134e724d
58e4d7ace1e43441d946d0a7c4459696fa623b15
830164 F20101114_AAANZQ rigby_j_Page_176.jp2
fa0bace51419a83204b3a007113b972d
c2479e46b9c5b51a6c0d6644bf80d99147d48225
1129143 F20101114_AAAMWO rigby_j.pdf
84ee803a3e9c3da53246abd23bea756d
cff5f09e868f365e3e5df06d94224808999e3f57
F20101114_AAAMVZ rigby_j_Page_072.tif
9d9d15172d79cb1d5e98ce7172e6a104
605d31e1e6e9bb41446bfb3563636e4fde437ab0
6215 F20101114_AAANCI rigby_j_Page_160thm.jpg
244b5cc6067ef20eb8d211b9b9a7b14d
b72b34e603c541b50e4739a6376976a215c04cc5
7099 F20101114_AAAMXC rigby_j_Page_117thm.jpg
01a7d1adc58a3e65af5ff1666b2ff413
4e221a713684d1a34d1db51ea6484d5d8e40d018
2054 F20101114_AAANBU rigby_j_Page_070.txt
b28847bf1517f69e107840ccc6251874
fc002a3577975904be33a4715db324daeafb0219
137268 F20101114_AAANZR rigby_j_Page_180.jp2
7570f27ebb1c0382d0380a7f397bb96b
a8730611c7993a1241aed8b66fb0d92f70b67cbd
636 F20101114_AAAMWP rigby_j_Page_003.txt
ece87f8cbf5654a5bc2f8ea8618c9a1e
66437111597f0bade90c1401e36b22b34c74dd6a
6846 F20101114_AAANCJ rigby_j_Page_169thm.jpg
a315662cd8d4e0d80ab0948c2e797edd
fa6025c522f8f322b7e158dedca2fac6070c83d9
F20101114_AAAMXD rigby_j_Page_047.tif
bf67b90ea724b2e469e0d628c29e777a
833b0de7c75a821ac6136f3eda54bad9f56d2e6a
134167 F20101114_AAANBV rigby_j_Page_184.jp2
9a71db00b19e28d3f5e4ac2246bb9931
9dbb9fd7a6f6ceff34193675d30dc9b655d9ad38
123362 F20101114_AAANZS rigby_j_Page_186.jp2
c265a540c3e1d0b50b70f78c7c9fdae8
1264dab3488aaf0a41422fd45d8d74212eabe791
3120 F20101114_AAAMWQ rigby_j_Page_002.QC.jpg
c057529815f79759b162f009ede652c5
bafa7a97142482f312d3ce8d71378e088ffa8afa
2156 F20101114_AAANCK rigby_j_Page_114.txt
03c817370868d9a63beccf6d358a3a97
d6f8be9659d046198ea6c16fc4b073071d30e1c8
52166 F20101114_AAAMXE rigby_j_Page_120.pro
f500eabe01ca495d7539814fd31e1504
3f251baff35fbbf6f42f0ce4218c3c05cd68aa0e
F20101114_AAANBW rigby_j_Page_131.txt
5061bc097ba6532c0fbdd9119517e3cd
75de2f9e722a8449bc8b70eb67196c7409073821
117394 F20101114_AAANCL rigby_j_Page_062.jp2
bb2577e0a3d8806af3ad8dc0c5b4f4ee
21b0db8820ab582c3ebcf8d4ca6390e1c77a2dee
25623 F20101114_AAAMXF rigby_j_Page_025.QC.jpg
652fa8816cb5de4aad0bea5ec7d1bdec
cbae0a24da883ae881ce2799bfa40edc752c3d89
F20101114_AAANBX rigby_j_Page_068.tif
72cc8189598bf3753cee96d4ef03e6d1
68036dc2ffee64eedab703342f99c786fbe75cf2
F20101114_AAANZT rigby_j_Page_003.tif
3e39a19ed76be0234ba15ce6a4d1543b
37495bd3dcfc8e8429ef7acee3d04e4f4e63f566
125282 F20101114_AAAMWR rigby_j_Page_104.jp2
451d53e344ed5322bef1f81484a68066
34ad4b608e487cf194b64239926b7470ed0f3230
76538 F20101114_AAANDA rigby_j_Page_161.jpg
b8e6fe56b77a2c76a9159868f49f2fef
41fb0b5dd42f0cf27fef76c1c67a3e676fe1adec
119916 F20101114_AAANCM rigby_j_Page_117.jp2
0a3c1f46c0f45d9795d3b26be512358e
349f89e946d1de59aad50bc80f0dfd5b74c40c6a
788071 F20101114_AAAMXG rigby_j_Page_172.jp2
54a2ab0eb37af3c16f8bdbbe5ba8f5d9
4e9de308ba9a1079b601b0b816f6b1ee7b7942b5
6923 F20101114_AAANBY rigby_j_Page_163thm.jpg
e07595409848b451b2d128acd4af7e17
e1958bcc352881280d5ac1eed03b280b66606c0b
F20101114_AAANZU rigby_j_Page_009.tif
1546a138d680ddb62fac52ef70014c77
c4ee9d304b59760ebe932f58b3fb9eab04d1ffc2
6442 F20101114_AAAMWS rigby_j_Page_019thm.jpg
05bf2f5329cec06e33a4cb256a422c40
8fba4402f03a25ab57d37a694191381b8e09ad6e
77257 F20101114_AAANDB rigby_j_Page_075.jpg
87521d0d1b3e59464761c0ca9c17cb8a
5fb4f5297405918b3451c4013617baf9d9e9a0df
128802 F20101114_AAANCN rigby_j_Page_135.jp2
4c5167380187fcb84211be1133c391bb
6ac15604ba14093dd5606d4e4330849989c35906
2261 F20101114_AAAMXH rigby_j_Page_100.txt
bdb8d4941b26f88426aa144b8ac10690
0036583c7a7f2028a3934891341199816bdbaac5
54218 F20101114_AAANBZ rigby_j_Page_052.pro
1dcb75d7937e2455d49ecce0582f78ae
8067bb705c5ae7f998eaaf230cfe9b5ea86ae7de
F20101114_AAANZV rigby_j_Page_011.tif
6360f13c19a71b03dda93c8bdc2f19c3
339e458da3a9041c48b2d7a82cd591acbd514bd7
87439 F20101114_AAAMWT rigby_j_Page_005.jpg
0d1f048b183493715d5c2bb2206d7d75
54902be9cc10b291ef198eba198a2fa4fc18e0a0
121683 F20101114_AAANDC rigby_j_Page_190.jp2
cba49891a4dffab76c744e47e23a9f74
33240b4cdf99e9e2bbf5e5e5432c67fb97364d38
1985 F20101114_AAANCO rigby_j_Page_090.txt
5a71e5b5da5a31a4b68f08ed0eede63c
3e5b33a90411d742997d737b790c3d2e03ef0a6e
72955 F20101114_AAAMXI rigby_j_Page_063.jpg
48571fc3ef2795f0cd76719cf5f69784
101adad75e51ced218c3d8d84ea31ef198607405
F20101114_AAANZW rigby_j_Page_038.tif
302bb00084f15f239f21fdbadc62c006
431483fe2235c9c658cc87074554b06ceb50cc88
53176 F20101114_AAAMWU rigby_j_Page_112.pro
31ae8d63e1c483a90dbec5f591a97834
bc90065be05fb8949d93a7d3f2025dcf40c76289
6760 F20101114_AAANDD rigby_j_Page_043thm.jpg
a219f145761041879e7924d970c1d5a1
461ced604ce69df56eda7985a52eac6b07518677
116504 F20101114_AAANCP rigby_j_Page_113.jp2
c0911118e590285dcd986bef1be6659a
601d1bd22115c44c6dc64a4d05b68ddb25f01e33
2115 F20101114_AAAMXJ rigby_j_Page_067.txt
1fe0caa40a460f6dbea37fa675bc4e36
000f807b40aaf8eef7a2c0d9336c68fc3a1418be
F20101114_AAANZX rigby_j_Page_051.tif
2f06712ba6368de1299b9e29f57261c0
18295e8ed23d6ef747f26249b1ae5dd21954ac06
6678 F20101114_AAAMWV rigby_j_Page_113thm.jpg
85a498ac8e06b25e94d475648b361153
446ed0d83f5cc852ee71c7a1ad69cc6b8fc38946
F20101114_AAANDE rigby_j_Page_151.tif
ab6bc80553963ec69c5533e802226055
46dcb19b9c453abfac9815f03fdb011d68f5725a
79162 F20101114_AAANCQ rigby_j_Page_055.jp2
9bf8ccf681440d03ca140f2a9e47b897
b11dde12f818528211491cf9cbe521266f3b4179
13287 F20101114_AAAMXK rigby_j_Page_102.QC.jpg
b22e03a089a34d6d5294f55b59d7fd99
70811dfada66ed9743010dedcd9b9fd82742a2eb
F20101114_AAANZY rigby_j_Page_055.tif
918d4f0e54673202313d15cc45bcb576
fa011eea74900b090371cf07b2dbb416072dc475
54468 F20101114_AAAMWW rigby_j_Page_117.pro
0defacc68d55f5d86bb9e29e8f3881eb
ea2c13e0827dc6994930597a1b90f96306a1222d
2475 F20101114_AAANDF rigby_j_Page_007.txt
7b9619c096194d7134082fd0c62191ce
c4b898e8263949ac1179dd09dffe68ddb6a36376
7049 F20101114_AAANCR rigby_j_Page_030thm.jpg
5eed019ce875af02da23d1e050b3c194
7e41bf1a6ee08e1b64caafa6dd74e1cee77c61e0
1969 F20101114_AAAMXL rigby_j_Page_063.txt
bcc87f9bd33d85925575945d5b644f63
97e90bd72140b4246d6bd041c39b62b340001303
F20101114_AAANZZ rigby_j_Page_057.tif
2b4904791ae0e4e67d8fe6247f4a82c2
acbc50842fa1f51aadf2635cc63cef7399344f08
39006 F20101114_AAAMWX rigby_j_Page_174.pro
9b90f3a3172fbc3f99cc07834a03c993
7c1801bb3ae596699d1c9ff4ba1b0c8ecb3dc51a
F20101114_AAANDG rigby_j_Page_109.tif
b2a585727a66df7dec1d68342b5507c8
0991240de8aa7b5535a01f3667859231bbb6d9e0
73000 F20101114_AAAMYA rigby_j_Page_029.jpg
70ad8a7fe709b07e81160ba55e405bae
5f0f65df609c2af5088c96e7567203322883d972
62956 F20101114_AAANCS rigby_j_Page_143.pro
d8511bd27d7e5b5544d70cf504ec9d15
3bff6352a7e4b816596e135d36394969d8c6f9cd
F20101114_AAAMXM rigby_j_Page_027.tif
486af8d981a844dd3efad803fba99fd1
ffbcbced3af26278acd15ad9a93b040a57418126
56815 F20101114_AAAMWY rigby_j_Page_116.pro
0217dfa8dec29b4c6c266840c9c5abf1
e8e0862bdce67bfac21945e50cf6c3cd5f84d18e
6723 F20101114_AAANDH rigby_j_Page_060thm.jpg
1eaef77b099b306ec18f9cd5003e5edd
835f1bfcb1977ee1633fbd6d9c9b0baead45b048
2127 F20101114_AAAMYB rigby_j_Page_110.txt
05dc30b8c322a2dbc830ca70f0f98726
6715616091faa115e13cb273d304d27d7daff225
6937 F20101114_AAANCT rigby_j_Page_069thm.jpg
3311dc8a3a184038381341366586d51d
1202cd0f1810386de1c21cba8e33cbf68bf2c05c
47739 F20101114_AAAMXN rigby_j_Page_149.pro
f1630da51a33210f10c2b8b9daa54a09
5de51ff5e12f2a3a21f36d3e8b5ae4e0b10c958a
24942 F20101114_AAAMWZ rigby_j_Page_105.QC.jpg
47a1bf1e46e268d1947fd328781f18c9
157825c69ad393147c1adb53672f6bc28d524ed7
5698 F20101114_AAANDI rigby_j_Page_191.pro
161ef477968e5a8588d81b24b8bca761
29723ebb379aef2a9b23ebb2cb1b714029af961d
73731 F20101114_AAAMYC rigby_j_Page_028.jpg
d98adfdce2d4dad1a1092de363d54194
fd657594982b23a40ca942a363905e31b50ca830
69397 F20101114_AAANCU rigby_j_Page_160.jpg
c564db5d883d9053d7ecf63c0d4a0198
f46a9073f7dfdbced291b9039300fd4673f5d55f
23579 F20101114_AAAMXO rigby_j_Page_076.QC.jpg
2e2f8870db79a88e8bcbe576814384e7
2bf1eb330ab4f850387b15ba1ea7247ea2012b63
110654 F20101114_AAANDJ rigby_j_Page_076.jp2
c9c51a91d719dfa2278877482b2ceda7
23dd256d87273cb7802ad45231747d13ab3fccf2
6945 F20101114_AAAMYD rigby_j_Page_034thm.jpg
6104647f259d50e74cb0f7a8c36f1ce6
860b3cb85748e6a2aa66e15b959e8535ce1fc950
45932 F20101114_AAANCV rigby_j_Page_192.jpg
6436863500281ce059d2fece9718f18e
7231a4b62802af370a47984eba379cd13ed49b3f
1345 F20101114_AAAMXP rigby_j_Page_002thm.jpg
9737cb08e341192c3c185ac5c271f6da
58136aa41e9cd4644d15b42f794cfb4335488055
25674 F20101114_AAANDK rigby_j_Page_031.QC.jpg
1ac7f89c29b412f461909b9df45c1cfd
72ac39269596f4d2108c160c75291e8594510a3d
2089 F20101114_AAAMYE rigby_j_Page_073.txt
24e96e1278d824fb8b9377b523606106
0fd6a427a613f7c04b565c8486f942728c11953f
7171 F20101114_AAANCW rigby_j_Page_140thm.jpg
c3a5ce87a4250c4e944519127e014b20
c150bf45bcc6ecdbf35e399c9b95e58f34df0dc9
F20101114_AAAMXQ rigby_j_Page_038.jpg
b7542bb27a1df5059256a1bfb021d46f
12ee71a2f920414e62d272d4f7903a533c8b1659
26093 F20101114_AAANDL rigby_j_Page_142.QC.jpg
bd289b0d5752a0421acfa6b40d8bebef
d9889851f8f02c04d845d9b885f2a101109ea59c
76078 F20101114_AAAMYF rigby_j_Page_014.jpg
81b0adeebfe3293101521151db378c0c
519f8d72dc178ebbaca6640ef6bab63191a12765
20919 F20101114_AAANCX rigby_j_Page_010.QC.jpg
d46aa9a23deb2a76f19b750d09f9d8ba
96aad6fa795d486f053f08d1a8d5bdee6fda9cfd
73432 F20101114_AAAMXR rigby_j_Page_076.jpg
fec44f95caeb9d1086e6063694a8ef7b
baee4410e75a044b6e09b7930babb8eef8cf5507
118015 F20101114_AAANDM rigby_j_Page_156.jp2
5aa3149871e3201798b4c7d6aca671b5
bb1b533c48e5d6941e203fcf1bfc3007fda0e94a
F20101114_AAAMYG rigby_j_Page_004.tif
103ec2dd8146d666dc9fe9795f247249
6bbcbfb9a0fa69cd79b07076729c7332b34e4462
25172 F20101114_AAANCY rigby_j_Page_014.QC.jpg
db798ca4af0fb73a1e579e85a9341096
03ff7a9c29c20ca6526badd7455f8f437fe557a2
26163 F20101114_AAANEA rigby_j_Page_127.QC.jpg
86dab55afde19e444c713f32a3a2b38d
9d1f7fb0c8fc93f93fb8cc2a731e829e0070be1c
F20101114_AAANDN rigby_j_Page_021.txt
e5f7f7c85d4b855d5a3a35d205fd72a9
c12c9919e62c14cfafefb2fbf6e5f0f7d072c668
2032 F20101114_AAAMYH rigby_j_Page_068.txt
11a779cad5504a4779c47114bb495346
072b051d25dde23a2a27aa2c0cbb00862ddec0cc
6695 F20101114_AAANCZ rigby_j_Page_017thm.jpg
b65bf3685b689f18e7995f71459da865
d7cf9d764a287d172250784a5484e523edd98b03
50077 F20101114_AAAMXS rigby_j_Page_046.pro
a917835662d1f95b640d4945772b4eee
ea7972d186b20ef070e4657e5be7f6dd1c923694
49839 F20101114_AAANEB rigby_j_Page_063.pro
28254bdb74148719faed57d27c78fbaa
7d5c1b44033e124e2cfd2f0a335bce4e6304bd36
4182 F20101114_AAANDO rigby_j_Page_011thm.jpg
e1c6960ef271ea00d25e53a08bd8ae4b
bbd90764b60851427c62505f46fba1dafbd88243
55773 F20101114_AAAMYI rigby_j_Page_124.pro
869f3bcc632d0b7bb5d4b065990f8a50
ff412da88f2fc737a1fa06ede93b53e5671d0ee6
113783 F20101114_AAAMXT rigby_j_Page_096.jp2
62408349acb2b77065bfedfe4e100788
84fe34210b7e58ea37b7039447ab583c2b437c09
F20101114_AAANEC rigby_j_Page_083.tif
6d2063f0956f3a3b5604e99444dff321
0040998585dc24367fe0e3e075cfb4588dc90d38
F20101114_AAANDP rigby_j_Page_187.tif
e31a731173f6a8e5bbc77f703a04cd72
4414a7ae9e26b5588fefaea8a5940540446afa7e
80280 F20101114_AAAMYJ rigby_j_Page_163.jpg
e1461c3d331f2920c33c153352966d07
4ba45cca5bee79a5be084d40edbb19085c00ff73
F20101114_AAAMXU rigby_j_Page_061.tif
4a9b8cd30b0baf10f3d89441855d962f
7f6da9eb915aac6f1961f9bf78223405f28de076
19040 F20101114_AAANED rigby_j_Page_172.QC.jpg
a93082294ff512eefbcabcbb221e03b9
f5b337163551b6d8cfa09a80ea84e31ae5a209a6
51325 F20101114_AAANDQ rigby_j_Page_048.pro
876e4a5758824089bf6587048d00fbc3
6b11baa07c5c21acc1f4d852a9d3b5c868167287
14426 F20101114_AAAMYK rigby_j_Page_008.QC.jpg
89b501d55bae12904f678fabaf123484
caee41cedd284b00fde95a62e3c18ea84ef263be
7090 F20101114_AAAMXV rigby_j_Page_137thm.jpg
636d3bfd7066e510879c380959ce42b2
570281402cd68a2668939fc5f229649c9515cb5d
51231 F20101114_AAANEE rigby_j_Page_085.pro
f010f7092b40235afce5586af4986d23
c3d1983fb727f86f65c56171577d5d26a76dded9
2100 F20101114_AAANDR rigby_j_Page_087.txt
dae42aed6444d795cc95e74b8b32310a
1dde212f44ce1fca00de39a063b4ce1abeab857f
24828 F20101114_AAAMYL rigby_j_Page_038.QC.jpg
de89051530a370e47ad848868329e981
a1dea1a2174264872d29b36e257afb0bdb679524
1772 F20101114_AAAMXW rigby_j_Page_171.txt
2b8765864ed8bfbc4dad9aa957b1f2e3
b0ad2f2339a8a9ce9cc7b326252f1a3854f2a195
4058 F20101114_AAANEF rigby_j_Page_008thm.jpg
4731d33e17b17af0b0eec55aaa3ada8f
92d44ca4574f0aad7ea0d465c05c8651beae4efa
26257 F20101114_AAAMZA rigby_j_Page_053.QC.jpg
cc1df865806c9cfb255f681132422c3c
a54b228e592932edd2176716e300069521d29357
53639 F20101114_AAANDS rigby_j_Page_062.pro
02c65d0fe75c9cd4c7efd11e1c2ba8d4
f6c88f87db03cb0e130e8352c883d23dfc58fb88
2006 F20101114_AAAMYM rigby_j_Page_045.txt
3363a5c9a0338b45c28a3304b516fda8
f97c5f9895cd85a4452cb19f1b19d3f844d38524
2019 F20101114_AAAMXX rigby_j_Page_149.txt
27520f6196c0a83447787c04da86a4f1
7a7cd9c5ea9095ac196ebcdceaac77c403fee6e8
6794 F20101114_AAANEG rigby_j_Page_164thm.jpg
ec4c1e3dd49c67549a352cdc529bc9c3
4191dd04dc8d35a74ee42250a5599530951a002e
50725 F20101114_AAAMZB rigby_j_Page_028.pro
ad6f94723ab507b26248cfe770c3f614
a53e907f9781c754fde046172383c1be89af5a8c
F20101114_AAANDT rigby_j_Page_131.tif
0ef7bbb069e7b398b4c61c857392cfb8
c432da7a77c30029395811a1bc42f7fecbbf3542
73379 F20101114_AAAMYN rigby_j_Page_103.jpg
de1f42382c49980b30a8b6d3178f91ea
8c6e6b9a6b770758cfb5b74d8c3b15500d88b65d
25005 F20101114_AAAMXY rigby_j_Page_161.QC.jpg
c0c283901cde68570004d29167a8cf08
09d8fbbbc7cc7c69805521f341dec312eeacf3a0
73184 F20101114_AAANEH rigby_j_Page_082.jpg
8c7fc17501422dc2d5df2fd7e0963732
e9997bb0d0704ab54a999d5e63ea9dd7e8f8adf8
F20101114_AAAMZC rigby_j_Page_166.tif
9d9c64e69b8b305f257b74bbfe526e75
f5733e7cd4d27020eb4326b7a948a743b63a9011
2189 F20101114_AAANDU rigby_j_Page_098.txt
740c06a792321750acf602d6e57ea1a7
31f3e8019cc46f8f9b4e714e7c02c496e78c0df0
54127 F20101114_AAAMYO rigby_j_Page_150.pro
23fd6ea82c8707d85fa703e964b44627
1b498d193487ef38dd4317c5c0c3a2ecabb3111c
F20101114_AAAMXZ rigby_j_Page_070.tif
7cef67ee913e6cfb448df6398a670d07
992d32fb0fe948d4316506058e65039c1fb80051
7030 F20101114_AAANEI rigby_j_Page_036thm.jpg
e8da8fc973746abd1d9d1d630a8ad0cc
3f611b90f716acd8dbdeead2d7b9e8d3f19c9dec
53703 F20101114_AAAMZD rigby_j_Page_049.pro
deeed0d7934d8490eafa998e54e6e644
298c3b8132cd333a028a99557611b5ca6e10edee
77053 F20101114_AAANDV rigby_j_Page_034.jpg
db03d1acdfb41c5ff3e761ebea32b84e
92a2f57779b16ba407f760d6e37ad45c43074164
99925 F20101114_AAAMYP rigby_j_Page_005.pro
6d224f37f5a544d5513fedca6aec4b82
c1fda5c9eb49c4d95becae84cad97f0a8e9c3d8e
72965 F20101114_AAANEJ rigby_j_Page_078.jpg
ed60740f3e01a58aeb1e9566100817c0
5e48e462db72d7b07eebbaba07d1ffc1e58cb48c
26224 F20101114_AAAMZE rigby_j_Page_144.QC.jpg
b48cb2f4f1ad565dd012db57573836e9
fb112d9f0201fca724432193900b6d86b095adb8
52594 F20101114_AAANDW rigby_j_Page_075.pro
56f1f6aaffae36ff427c684bede72f5e
a91fdf2c3acd7ee1697eeb4bd3c48a21d964d469
F20101114_AAAMYQ rigby_j_Page_064thm.jpg
3df79ceb334289d3dd9794fca4d9b7d8
781ffd53e4d84cb0498be820b194b3d48d8352b6
80183 F20101114_AAANEK rigby_j_Page_115.jpg
4afca9b3a9a483a47dc4ad93af1a74ef
597c9a61a9bf10b71a53b2906731f9b85f3c7b21
74556 F20101114_AAAMZF rigby_j_Page_087.jpg
6baec695ffcbf702243424b781b31593
b11b0eedc5c032521e2d97159ed724bea5258af0
79124 F20101114_AAANDX rigby_j_Page_089.jpg
6fb4ad0ea7f1ec1a3598b26a1a564fe3
550cb66b2d075ce52af71d04a6fad06f6b33ffa7
26210 F20101114_AAAMYR rigby_j_Page_109.QC.jpg
250467d5f2cfa5eb96e77ad489bf79b4
a46a6b75b172ff6660a35463a9b1c945a4535c72
120909 F20101114_AAANEL rigby_j_Page_035.jp2
7ff82064f72fcdd7e811a7af03f69edf
a1440c7ef974d2fa9d4ac391076e3b27541b71dd
24258 F20101114_AAAMZG rigby_j_Page_063.QC.jpg
c6c3bf2198cda2d836f2e5e298fb10d6
9429faaac4b438ef7f357eb70e3a8096de88b951
992 F20101114_AAANDY rigby_j_Page_102.txt
b2275d168b136207dd30c6bcc039e5aa
bb09b3f06c929b506cf0dd576ad298ef3c972342
104840 F20101114_AAAMYS rigby_j_Page_160.jp2
70ced6e5b212ffe643e4d77ba3b34762
bdef06567653b7f8fecb56f74895ff469d9eb307
F20101114_AAANFA rigby_j_Page_144thm.jpg
d0db59fbb0324a411e5ac34864445eab
1e2e8b99e6b41bd369f98ef258efe40b6482d485
73314 F20101114_AAANEM rigby_j_Page_096.jpg
5561068da6fa6ea90f501f72178a51e1
d30dbfc7e38df1d393e3424b0d392f10931c017a
6919 F20101114_AAAMZH rigby_j_Page_099thm.jpg
d62e8b191f065a05ab4fee4240f40fe7
70bdf616171e2e2ea83b0579f010058c3bde4450
26617 F20101114_AAANDZ rigby_j_Page_147.QC.jpg
4949688e84b03d00f6824e24f82fd698
c650c18073e74ee8b7ab4a67e17b805b82f35981
25805 F20101114_AAANFB rigby_j_Page_051.QC.jpg
4af0b458c8f6f181420cc1f7c2d5f555
c9822249864a34cb374105f334168fb8efd7716e
55485 F20101114_AAANEN rigby_j_Page_137.pro
b655f128ee2c4e29442e277548796082
97a18afe083500d3ea04a24084e3ff3a172c14cc







THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S COMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO THE IRAN
ARMS CRISIS




















By

JESSE DANIEL RIGBY


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007




























2007 Jesse Daniel Rigby






















To Jean, my parents-Rita, Jesse, and Margo-and my grandparents J.D. and Erma. Their
support made this research project possible.

This paper is also dedicated to the memory of Captain Michael Gibbs. Captain Mike, a former
Army Seabee engineer, passed away the evening before this thesis was defended. At the time the
Iran arms crisis occurred, Mr. Gibbs was busy taming tigers, quelling uprisings, and emptying
bars. A true adventurer, he would have most likely attempted to free the hostages himself had
someone only asked.









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I extend my heartfelt gratitude to my thesis committee: Dr. Jennifer A. Robinson, Dr. Spiro

Kiousis, and Dr. Bemell Tripp, for participating in this project. Without their guidance, support,

and encouragement, this research project would not have been possible. I also would like express

gratitude to the various professors who helped to shape this research project over the last two

years. Lastly, I would like to thank the principal players in the Iran arms crisis of 1986 for

providing the raw material for such an interesting case study.









TABLE OF CONTENTS



A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ..............................................................................................................4

L IST O F T A B L E S .................................... .......................................................... ..................... 8

LIST OF FIGU RE S ................................................................. 9

ABSTRAC T ............................ ......................... 10

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ................. .............. ........................................ 12

2 L ITE R A TU R E R E V IE W .......................................................................... .. .. ............. 19

C crisis D definitions .................. ............... ................................. ........ .............. 19
C crisis T y p e s .........................................................................2 1
C rises as O pp ortu nities .............. ................................................................ .. ...............22
Staged Conceptualizations of Crisis Development...................................... ...............23
Crisis Management and Communication..................... ...... ........................... 24
C risis M anagem ent A approaches ..................................................................... ..................25
Traditional Guidance and Linear Approaches..................................................26
Linear approaches: staged models.............................................. 27
Linear approaches: Penrose's five major models................. ............................28
C critical P perspectives ............. ..... ............................ ...... ........ ................. 30
Postm odern perspectives .......................................................... ............... 31
Chaos theory ..................................... ................................ ..........32
O organizational culture ............................................. .... .... .. .. ........ .... 33
O organizational history ............... ........ ....... ..................................... .............. 35
Relational and Symbolic Management Approaches............................. ...............36
Relational m anagem ent approaches ........................................ ...... ............... 37
Sym bolic m anagem ent approaches ........................................ ....... ............... 40
Political Science Perspectives of Crisis Management.........................................................47
D am age Control, Crisis, Scandal, and Affair .............................................................. 47
O organizational Structure ......................................................................... ...................49
The R ally R ound the Flag E ffect.............................................................. ............... .... 50
Comparisons of the Iran Arms Crisis with Preceding Presidential Crises ...................52
Previous Analyses of the Reagan Administration's Crisis Response .............................53

3 C A SE S T U D Y ...................................... .................................................... 56

C crisis R oots.............. ..................... .................................... .......... ...... 56
T he C crisis E m erges .............................................. .................... .... ...... ............... 59
Internal Conflicts Em erge ........................ ............................ ...... .... .............. 61
White House Staff Gains Interest, Stonewall Emerges .................................. ...............62









The Situation W orsens ............................... .. ..... ... .......... ..... .... 64
T he W hite H ou se R esponds.......................................................................... ....................65
The President's Address to the N action .......................................................... ................... 70
M meeting the P ress .............................. .......................................72
The President's N ew s Conference......... ................. ................... ................. ............... 75
M etam orphosis: The Iran-Contra Scandal........................................................................ 80
E pilogue ............................................. .................................. .........................83

4 METHODOLOGY ................................. .. ... .... ................... 85

Research Questions.......... ...... ........... .. .... .... ...............85
Study M methodology ................................................................87
T h e C a se S tu d y ................................................................................................... ........... 8 9
D ata C o lle ctio n ................................................................................................................. 9 0
U nit of A n aly sis ............................................................................... 90
S o u rc e M ate ria l ............................................................................................................... 9 1
Qualitative Coding Categories ................................. ........................... ... ...... 93
Im age-Restoration D iscourse Theory .................................................................... 93
Stak eh older T h eory .................................................................................. .. .. ..9 5
D ata C ateg o riz atio n ................................................................. ................................9 8
D ata A analysis .............................................. 100
S tu d y S o u n d n e ss .......................................................................................................10 0

5 R E S U L T S .......................................................................................................1 0 3

RQ2: What Insight Does Image Restoration Discourse Theory Yield Regarding the
Defensive Discourse Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Crisis
Period? .......................................... ....... .................103
Discourse Strategies Not Identified by IRDT ..................................... ....... 103
Chronological Evolution of the Administration's Defensive Discourse via Image
R restoration D discourse Theory.......................................... .... .................... .....108
Analysis of Defensive Discourse Offered by the Various Administration Units.......... 116
President Reagan and the White House staff ............ .............................. 117
The State D epartm ent ......... .......... ........ ..... ..................... ............... 125
National Security Council staff ............. ........ ....... .... ............127
Image Restoration Strategies Appearing in the Administration's Internal
D ocum entation ......... ..... ............. .... ...... .... .. .. .... .. ... .... ............... ........130
RQ3: What Insight Does Stakeholder Theory Yield Regarding the Defensive Discourse
Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Crisis Period? .....................136
Stakeholder Theory-Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the Public
R record ...... ............ ... . ............ .. ........ ................................... .... 136
Stakeholder Theory-Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the
Adm inistration's Internal Docum entation ..................... ................................. ... 139
RQ4: Did Administration Officials, Publicly or Privately, Make Any Additional
Statements that Indicate an Emphasis on the Maintenance of Either Symbolic
Resources or Organization- Stakeholder Relationships? .............................. ... ................ 142









RQ1: Did the Reagan Administration Prioritize its Symbolic Resources,Its Stakeholder
Relationships, or Some Other Concern when Communicating a Response to the Iran
A rm s C risis of N ovem ber 1986? ........................................................... .....................147

6 D IS C U S S IO N .....................................................................................14 9

S u m m ary ................... ...................1...................4.........9
F findings ................................................................15 1
The A dm inistration's Priorities ............................................................................. 151
Significance of a Lack of Prioritization of Relational Concerns ................................153
Previously Unidentified Defensive Discourse Strategies.............................154
Criteria for Crisis M anagem ent Success ............................................ ............... 156
Implications and Future Research Questions ........................................ ...................158
The Potential Applicability of Image Restoration Discourse Theory to Other Crises..158
Possible Theoretical Shortcom ings ........................................ .......................... 159
A m biguous D discourse .................................. .... .. ........ ....... ...............161
The Potential for Managing Presidential Crises from the Relational Perspective ........163
The Perils of Ignoring Crisis Threats ................................. 165
Additional Questions Raised by this Case.................................... ...... ............... 166
C onclu sion ......... .... .............. ...................................... ..............................170

APPENDIX

A T A B L E S ........................................................................................... 172

B F IG U R E S ............. ............ ...................................... ............................ 178

L IST O F R E FE R E N C E S ......... ................. ............................................................................179

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H ......... ................. ............................................. .......................... 192









LIST OF TABLES


Table page

A-i Typology of im age restoration strategies....................................................................... 172

A-2 Typology of stakeholder theory-based rhetorical strategies ................. ... ............ 172

A-3 The Evolution of the Reagan Administration's Defensive Discourse from November
3 to N ovem ber 24, 1986 ............ ............................................................ .......... ...... 173

A-4 Defensive Discourse Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration.... 174

A-5 Evolution of Stakeholder Theory-Based Rhetorical Strategies from November 3 to
November 24, 1986............. ............................................ 175

A-6 Stakeholder Theory-Based Rhetorical Strategies Offered by Individual Members of
the R eagan A dm inistration ...................................................................... ..................176

A-7 Evolution of Statements Made by the Reagan Administration Indicating a
Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns From November 3 to November 24, 1986............176

A-8 Statements Made by the Individual Members of the Reagan Administration
Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns ............................... ..................... 177










LIST OF FIGURES


B-l Timeline of events in the Reagan Administration's crisis response.............................178


Figure


page









Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communication

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S COMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO THE IRAN
ARMS CRISIS

By

Jesse Daniel Rigby

August 2007

Chair: Jennifer A. Robinson
Cochair: Spiro Kiousis
Major: Mass Communication

This study investigates the root causes of one of the most damaging presidential crises in

modern American history and identifies potential linkages between crisis communication theory

and the healthy functioning of presidential administrations. The primary research question probes

a key consideration regarding the functioning of executive governance: When managing crises,

should executive leadership place priority on its symbolic resources or its stakeholder

relationships?

The priorities which guided the Reagan Administration's defensive discourse in the midst

of the Iran arms crisis were explored. Specifically, image restoration discourse theory and a

stakeholder theory-based typology were used to categorize the defensive discourse offered by the

Reagan Administration in the midst of the Iran arms crisis of 1986. The statements offered in

response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages were analyzed by administrative source

and over time. The Reagan Administration initially prioritized the continued viability of the

operation involving the exchange of arms for hostages. However, once threats to the

Administration's credibility reached a critical threshold, the Administration's priority became the

protection of its symbolic assets.









Throughout the crisis period, the Administration attempted to resolve the disparity between

public expectations of its actions and stated foreign policy regarding Iran by explaining the Iran

initiative using ambiguous discourse. Image restoration discourse theory accounted for most of

the statements which emerged from the data, but several defensive discourse strategies fell

outside the theoretical typology. When added to the existing typology, these previously

unidentified discourse categories accounted for most of statements analyzed in this case.

Implications for further political communication and crisis communication were

considered. Specifically, how do communication decisions impact the ability of a president to

govern and public faith in government? When choosing operational considerations over the

symbolic reputation and image of the administration, how will that impact the effectiveness of an

administration? Such considerations are highly relevant to communication scholarship and

society at large given the numerous presidential crises which have occurred in recent history.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Numerous United States presidential administrations have faced crises which threatened

their ability to govern, their legitimacy, and the confidence of their constituents. Modern

presidential administrations embroiled in crisis must navigate a complex media environment in

which news about a crisis travels instantly. Therefore, the communication component of an

administration's crisis management efforts is crucial to preserving a president's ability to govern.

The Reagan Administration was acutely aware of this fact. According to former White House

Chief of Staff Donald Regan, "No government in history can have been more sensitive to the

media, or more driven by the printed word and the television image, than the Reagan

Administration" (Regan, 1988, p. 6).

Communication technologies which emerged in the latter part of the 20th century, have

enabled the emergence of an immediate and global media environment. In this environment,

when crisis hits, information is communicated to mass audiences instantly. A presidential

administration's stakeholders have ready access to information that allows them to scrutinize

every action taken, and every message disseminated. When embroiled in crisis not only the

outcome of the crisis, but how presidential administrations communicate during the crisis has a

major impact on their credibility and future effectiveness.

Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the Iran hostage crisis, are examples of modem presidential

crises which have occurred in complex media environments. In 1972, the Watergate crisis

erupted after members of the Nixon Administration broke into the Democratic National

Headquarters. Nixon eventually resigned, and his name and administration were indelibly fused

with scandal in the public memory (Schudson, 1992, 2004). From late 1979, until January 20,

1981, President Carter unsuccessfully tried to negotiate the Iran hostage crisis. The crisis









culminated in Carter's failed attempt to free the hostages militarily in the spring of 1980 (Busby,

1999). The hostages were freed on the day President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, but

Reagan would soon be mired in crisis after he attempted to free Americans held hostage in the

Middle East. The efforts of the Reagan Administration to free the hostages would eventually lead

to the Iran-Contra scandal, one of the most damaging presidential scandals in United States

history (Busby, 1999).

According to Busby (1999) and Schudson (1994), the Reagan Administration was plagued

by corruption and scandal, yet until Iran-Contra, crisis did not stick to the Reagan

Administration. Busby argues, "The Reagan Administration experienced corruption on a scale

never before recorded or exposed" (p. 17). He backed up this assertion by citing a 1988 report

which found that over 225 Reagan appointees were alleged to be involved in criminal

wrongdoing (Busby, 1999). Schudson (1994), discussing housing and urban development, and

savings and loan scandals, claims Reagan, "presided for eight years over an administration that

combined the old-fashioned graft of the Grant and Harding eras with an undisguised grab for

power that would have done credit to Richard Nixon" (p. 341). Despite these claims, Schudson

acknowledges Reagan left office with "a higher public approval rating than any modern

American Chief Executive" (p. 341).

Prior to revelations about the Reagan Administration's involvement with Iran, Reagan had

been labeled the "Teflon president" due to his ability to shake off crisis. Before Iran-Contra,

Reagan weathered several minor crises which had minimal effect on his public approval rating.

He angered Jewish groups in the United States when he attended a memorial service honoring

German SS troops in Bitburg, Germany, but this had no real effect on his public standing

(Busby, 1999). His Administration faced further criticism for engaging in a disinformation









campaign in Libya, and for the so-called "Daniloff affair," but neither of these transgressions

caused lasting damage to his Administration. In October 1986, Reagan's staff turned the

President's failures during the United States-Soviet summit in Reykjavik into public perceptions

of success (Busby, 1999). Until Iran-Contra, no crisis caused major damage to Reagan's

relationship with the electorate, and the majority of Americans approved of the President's job

performance (Gallup poll data, 2006).

The Iran-Contra scandal changed the public's view of President Reagan and his

Administration. The last poll taken before the Iran-Contra affair was made public indicated

Reagan's public approval rating was 63%. By the time the next poll was taken in early

December, his public approval rating and dropped 16%. Reagan's public approval ratings

remained below pre-Iran-Contra levels until the last poll of his presidency (Gallup poll data,

2006). The Iran-Contra scandal threatened Reagan's ability to govern, his legitimacy, and his

ability to enact his policy agenda (Wallison, 2003).

The crises faced by Nixon in 1972 and Carter throughout the last year of his presidency

constrained Reagan's ability to reach a favorable outcome to the Iran-Contra scandal. As Reagan

tried to negotiate the treacherous waters of the Iran-Contra affair, his actions were understood in

the context of Watergate and the previous Iran hostage crisis. Reagan was also constrained by his

previous tough-talk against terrorist regimes, specifically Iran. Reagan was under a tremendous

amount of public pressure to free the hostages, but his ability to do so was limited by his own

public policy and public memory of past crises (Busby, 1999; Schudson, 1994).

Historian Theodore Draper has pointed out that the term "Iran-Contra affair" is actually a

misnomer. The terms "Iran" and "Contra" refer to different sets of covert operations undertaken

by the Reagan Administration. Initially, these operations were entirely unrelated except for the









fact that they were both implemented and overseen by the same members of the National

Security Council staff out of the White House. The Iran initiative involved efforts to negotiate

for the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon by selling American-made armaments to

moderate factions in Iran. The Contra component of the scandal involved efforts to provide

financial and military support to paramilitary rebel forces in Nicaragua, who were attempting to

overthrow the Nicaraguan government. These two operations were linked when National

Security Council staffers began to divert funds from the arms sales to the Contra rebels. The

operations were publicly fused together when the Reagan Administration announced the funds

transfers in late November 1986 (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Walsh, 1994).

While seemingly trivial, understanding the distinction between the Iran and Contra

operations is crucial if one seeks to understand the Iran-Contra scandal. It was the Iran

component of the affair which set-off the Iran-Contra scandal. The Reagan Administration's

initial attempts to explain its involvement with Iran set the context in which Reagan would

attempt to address public anger over Iran-Contra.

Through a complicated chain of events, the funds diversion was discovered due to the

confusion that arose when the Administration attempted to explain the details of the Iran

initiative (Draper, 1991;Walsh, 1994). The crescendo of press criticism which resulted from the

original news reports of the arms sales prompted the National Security Council staff to develop a

chronology of the details of the Iran initiative. Because the Iran initiative was highly

compartmentalized, the majority of the Administration's representatives did not know exactly

what had transpired. The chronology was developed so that members of the Administration

would have a common bank of information to communicate consistently to the public and media

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 108, 144). When National Security









Council staffers were unable to piece together a coherent recounting of their actions, a Justice

Department staff member suspected a major impropriety may have occurred (Joint Hearings,

100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 110). Attorney General Edwin Meese received the

President's approval to investigate the details of the National Security Council staff s actions.

The investigation uncovered the funds diversion and the scandal erupted. While one may assume

that the funds diversion would have been discovered regardless of the Administration's actions,

the failure of the Administration's crisis communications efforts were at least indirectly related

to the discovery. From the time of crisis emergence, the Administration's myopic crisis response

escalated press criticism, increasing public, and the Congress', ire over the transgression. It was

this pressure from the news media that necessitated the investigation which uncovered the

diversion (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 144.

Therefore, the subject of this study is the crisis communication offered by the Reagan

Administration in response to the Iran arms crisis of November 1986. This crisis preceded, and

ignited, the Iran-Contra scandal. Not only did communication efforts regarding the Iran arms

deals play a role in the discovery of the diversion of funds from the arms sales to the Contras, but

evidence suggests that the Administration's crisis management efforts were more damaging than

the transgressions which spawned the crisis (Walsh, 1993; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). This is

evidenced by the fact that the National Security Council staff members involved in the Iran

initiative, were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, crimes related to efforts to conceal their

actions (Walsh, 1994).

This study probes the evolution of the Reagan Administration's communications from

November 3 through November 24, 1986, regarding the Iran arms deals from a crisis

communication perspective. To gain insight into the complexity of the rhetorical environment in









which the Administration attempted to explain its actions, the individual defensive discourse

offered by various representatives within the organization is scrutinized. Furthermore, the

discussions which took place within the Administration during staff meetings, in inter-office

memoranda, in press guidance documents, and in other internal documentation was analyzed to

gain further understanding of the priorities which guided the Administration's crisis

communication response.

The objective of this study is to identify, to the greatest degree possible, the priorities

which guided the Administration as it attempted to calm the crisis which resulted due to the arms

sales to Iran. Specifically, this study probes the degree to which the Administration's crisis

communication was enacted to protect its symbolic assets (i.e., image, credibility, and

reputation), its relationships with various stakeholder groups, or some other concerns.

This study is significant for several reasons. As noted above, the Iran arms crisis was the

antecedent to the Iran-contra scandal, one of the most damaging presidential scandals in United

States history. Understanding the priorities underlying this particular crisis management process

may provide insight that can minimize the likelihood of a crisis in American government of this

magnitude from recurring. Evidence suggests the primary damage caused to the Administration,

and thus the public's faith in government, was caused by the Administration's crisis

communication response, not the transgression itself.

The Reagan Administration's crisis communication requires analysis from a modem public

relations perspective. It has been argued that until November 25, 1986, the Iran arms crisis was

essentially a public relations problem (Wallison, 2003). Analysis of the situation from a public

relations perspective yields insight into the success and failure outcomes of the crisis

management efforts. A previous study analyzed President Reagan's defensive discourse offered









during Iran-Contra from a public relations perspective, but that study is outdated, and substantial

insight about this case from other perspectives have been yielded since the study's publication

(Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991).

Communications scholars develop theory regarding crisis communication to provide

guidelines which may improve an organization's chances of surviving a crisis. The primary

research question proposed in this text may serve as the first step in the application of public

relations-based crisis communication theory to presidential crises.

More broadly, the primary research question cuts to core considerations regarding the

functioning of government. When managing crises, should executive leadership place priority on

its symbolic resources or its stakeholder relationships? Furthermore, how do such decisions

impact the functioning of our government and the lives of our fellow citizens? Such

considerations are highly relevant to communication scholarship and society at large given the

numerous presidential crises which have occurred in recent history. The purpose of this study is

to contribute one analysis and provide insights into Reagan's handling of the Iran arms crisis.









CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Crisis Definitions

Penrose (2000) states "a crisis occurs when an event increases in intensity, falls under

close scrutiny of the news media or government, interferes with normal business operations,

devalues a positive public image, and has an adverse effect on a business' bottom line" (p. 157).

Ziaukas (2001) defines an organizational crisis as a situation which threatens to damage an

organization's ability to carry out its goals. Hale, Dulek and Hale (2005) refer to organizational

crises as "events characterized by high consequence, low probability, ambiguity, and decision-

making time pressure" (p. 115). Venette, Sellnow and Lang (2003), Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer

(2001), Horsley and Barker (2002), Fishman (1999), Pearson and Clair (1998), and Egelhoff and

Sen (1992) also describe crises as relatively unlikely, potentially damaging and ambiguous

events often requiring swift organizational response.

Several authors describe crises in terms of effects on publics and their relationship with the

entity undergoing crisis. Pearson and Clair (1998) study crises from a cognitive perspective. The

authors refer to crises as "emotional events that can play multiple parties' interests against one

another" and further state that "all crises share in common a breakdown in the social construction

of reality" (p. 62, 64). In a similar vein, Horsley and Barker emphasize the importance of

stakeholder perception and note that crises are often "subjectively experienced by these

individuals as personally and socially threatening" (2002, p.408). Egelhoff and Sen (1992)

indicate crises are often rooted in a "major incongruence" between public expectations of an

organization and "what happens in the environment" (p.444). Thus crises often rupture

stakeholders' individual and shared assumptions of reality leading to feelings of vulnerability









and impaired rationality. The more severe the rupture, the more difficult the crisis management

process is for the organization (Pearson & Clair, 1998).

Crisis situations are often analyzed in terms of impacts to an entity's image. Coombs

defines crises as events that threaten an organization's image and disrupt operations (1999,

2002). While Coombs' definition is rooted in the symbolic approach to crisis management, he

also invokes a slightly more relational approach describing a crisis as "an unpredictable, major

threat that can have a negative effect on the organization, industry, or stakeholders if handled

improperly" (p. 2). Coombs' (1999) definition may be limited in its applicability due to its

qualification of a crisis event as unpredictable. Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) characterize crises

as "threats to an image" (p. 39). Likewise, Benoit and Brinson (1999) refer to crises as image

attacks.

Crisis has been defined in terms of organizational legitimacy. Hearit (1994) claims "crises

occur when an event or series of events threaten a corporate actor's legitimacy and therefore,

ultimately, its survival" (p.46). Hearit (1994) defines legitimacy as "a global or summary belief

among stakeholders that an organization is good or has a right to continue operating" (p. 45).

Similarly, Suchman (1995) defines organizational legitimacy as "a generalized perception or

assumption that the actions of an entity are...appropriate within some socially constructed

system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (p.574). Sellnow, Ulmer and Snider (1998)

maintain that legitimacy is derived from behavioral compliance with environmental values.

According to Christen (2005), political systems theory defines legitimacy in terms of power,

with little emphasis on stakeholder perception.

Tyler (2005) defines crisis from a postmodern perspective. The author views a crisis as a

disruption in the dominant narrative an organization communicates about itself. Tyler refers to an









organization's dominant narrative as "an organizational fiction" (p. 567). Venette, Sellnow and

Lang (2003) refer to such a narrative as a metanarrative.

For the purposes of this project, a definition based on an integration of the relational and

symbolic perspectives is proposed. A crisis is a situation or event that threatens to damage an

organization's operations, its reputation, and the relationships between the organization and its

stakeholders. Such an event is often of high-consequence and low-probability. Additionally, such

an event is often of an ambiguous nature, and requires immediate organizational action due to

potential outcomes facing the organization and its stakeholders, as well as the high level of

media and public interest that may result (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1999;

Coombs, 1999; Coombs, 2002; Egelhoff & Sen, 1992; Fishman, 1999; Horsley & Barker, 2002;

Pearson & Clair, 1998; Penrose, 2000; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001; Venette, Sellnow &

Lang, 2003; Ziaukas, 2001).

Crisis Types

There are many varieties of crisis. Penrose (2000) lists an array of organizational crises

including natural disasters, extortion, hostile takeovers, plant explosions, and product recalls.

Citing the works Egelhoff and Sen (1992), and Marcus and Goodman (1991), Coombs (1995)

identifies the following crisis dimensions that characterize various types of crises: internal or

external, violent or nonviolent, intentional or unintentional, severe or normal damage, technical

or sociopolitical failure, remote or relevant environment, high or low deniability, and concrete or

diffuse victims.

Coombs argues that identifying the crisis type is essential to determining appropriate crisis

response strategies (1995). The author developed a crisis type matrix based on dimensions of

intentionality (unintentional-intentional) and control (external-internal). The matrix yields the

following four crisis types: faux pas (unintentional-external), accidents (unintentional-internal),









terrorism (intentional-external) and transgressions (intentional-internal). Coombs (1999)

provides a "master list" of crisis typologies (p. 61). The crisis types included are natural

disasters, malevolence, technical breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, megadamage,

organizational misdeeds, workplace violence and rumors.

In Contrast to Coombs (1995), Hearit and Courtright (2003) warn against a mechanistic

approach to crisis management based on identification of crisis type. "It does not follow that a

particular type of crisis situation invariably necessitates the same strategies every time that it

occurs" (Hearit & Courtright, 2003, p. 86).

DeVries and Fitzpatrick (2006) describe four types of crises: natural crises, crises of

malevolence, crises of deception, and crises of management misconduct. Natural crises are

uncontrollable natural disasters. Crises of malevolence involve the use of "criminal or other

extreme means to express hostility toward companies, organizations or countries" (p. 161).

Crises of deception arise from "the deliberate practice of deceiving stakeholders or concealing

unfavorable information" (p. 162). Crises of management misconduct result from illegal acts,

amoral behavior and behavior rooted in questionable values.

Crises as Opportunities

Crises are generally characterized in terms of their negative impacts, but several scholars

have discussed the potential for positive outcomes of crisis (Fink, 1986; Penrose, 2000; Seeger

2002; Sturges 1994; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow 2002; Ziaukas, 2001). Sturges (1994)

contends crises "may portend either positive or negative potential outcomes and may create

problems and opportunities" (p. 298). "Opportunities exist within any crisis situation," asserts

Penrose (2000, p. 156).

Ziaukas (2001) contends that a prompt and appropriate response to a crisis may engender a

positive perception among stakeholders. Ulmer (2001) insists that crises can "be resolved









positively" with appropriate communication responses (p. 592). In Contrast, Penrose (2000)

views the opportunity as arising from organizational perception. He posits that the situation is

self-fulfilling. If an organization views a crisis situation as containing opportunities, crisis

managers are likely to perceive a wider range of options due to increased perceptions of control

over the situation. In Penrose's words, "Recognizing that crises can provide opportunities is

crucial to balancing an organization's external communication practices. Furthermore, by

communicating a balanced perception of a crisis, the organization is more likely to sway public

opinion and dispel false rumors about the severity and ultimate consequences of the crisis"

(2000, p. 167). While discussing the applicability of chaos theory to the study and practice of

crisis communication, Seeger (2002) asserts that the "disorder," "decline" and "collapse" often

associated with crisis may lead to "renewal," "growth," and "rebuilding" (p. 332).

Staged Conceptualizations of Crisis Development

Various crisis communication scholars conceptualize the development of crisis situations

in terms of sequential stages. The crisis management models presented by Coombs (1999), Fink

(1986), Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005), provide

theoretical insight into crisis development. Fink's (1986) four-stage model of crisis management

indicates four corresponding stages of crisis development: 1) the prodromal phase (or early-

warning phase), 2) the acute phase, the point at which the crisis breaks, 3) the chronic phase, at

which time the crisis is underway, and 4) the crisis resolution phase. Crisis communication

models presented by Coombs (1999), Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and

Hale (2005) indicate a slightly simplified conceptualization of crisis development: 1) pre-crisis,

2) crisis and 3) post-crisis. While Fink (1986) differentiates between the acute and chronic

stages, Coombs (1999), Gonazalez-Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005)

collapse these stages into one "crisis" stage.









Crisis Management and Communication

The distinction between the terms "crisis management" and "crisis communication" must

be delineated with adequate clarity. Crisis communication is a mere subset of the more

comprehensive crisis management process-crisis communication is a tool available to crisis

managers. The term "crisis communication" regards the use of communication tactics in

response to crisis. "Crisis management," instead, describes the use of all varieties of public

relations strategies and tactics, including issues management and environmental scanning, to

minimize the damage threatening an organization during crisis. Crisis management processes

may be enacted on an ongoing basis, during all phases of a crisis including the pre-crisis phase.

Such processes are often pro-active with the objective of thwarting potential crises before they

arise (Fink, 1986; Hua-Hsin & Pfau 2004; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek & Hale,

2005; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Lauzen & Dozer 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow

& Ulmer, 2001; Ziaukas, 2001).

According to Ziaukas (2001) crisis management is a subgenre of public relations that

developed in the 1980s and 1990s after the emergence of several high-profile crises, including

the Three Mile Island accident and Johnson & Johnson's cyanide-laced Tylenol scare. Ziaukas

defines crisis management as the implementation of public relations strategies and tactics to

minimize damage threatening an organization during crisis (2001). Pearson and Clair (1998)

describe crisis management as "a systematic attempt by organizational members with external

stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that occur" (p. 61).

For the purposes of this project, crisis management is defined as the comprehensive and

on-going implementation of public relations strategies and tactics to address threats to an

organization's operations, its symbolic resources, and/or the relationships between the

organization and its stakeholders. Crisis communication is defined as the process of using









communication tactics in response to crisis to address threats to an organization's operations, its

symbolic resources, and/or the relationships between the organization and its stakeholders (Fink,

1986; Hua-Hsin & Pfau 2004; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek & Hale, 2005;

Horsley & Barker, 2002; Lauzen & Dozer 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow &

Ulmer, 2001; Ziaukas, 2001).

Defining crisis management effectiveness is difficult due to the complexity and

subjectivity inherent in most crisis situations. Evaluation of the success of crisis management

efforts will vary depending on many factors, including the time scale of evaluation, the

evaluator's perspective, and the specific objectives for enacting the crisis management efforts.

Indeed, what may appear to be a management success to one stakeholder group (i.e.,

stockholders) may prove to be a failure from the perspective of stakeholder group (i.e.,

employees). An inherent difficulty arises from the fact that, by its very nature, crisis management

success is often invisible while failures are often highly visible (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Pearson

and Clair deemed crisis management efforts effective "when potential crises are averted or when

key stakeholders believe that the success outcomes of short- and long-range impacts of crises

outweigh the failure outcomes" (1998, p. 61).

Crisis Management Approaches

A review of scholarly literature revealed that crisis management can be segmented into

considerations of crisis management implementation (traditional perspectives and critical

perspectives) and considerations of the objectives of management efforts relationallyy motivated

and symbolically motivated). Traditional perspectives generally recommend the use of crisis

communication plans and broad guidelines calling for openness, quick response, candor and

consistency. Critical perspectives question the utility of such approaches and acknowledge the

environmental complexity of most crisis situations. Symbolically motivated management









approaches focus on the protection of symbolic resources (i.e., image and reputation), while

relationally motivated approaches place priority on maintaining favorable relationships with

stakeholders (for example, see Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2002; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Gorski,

1998; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Martin & Boynton, 2005; Susskind & Field, 1996; Ulmer 2001;

Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

Traditional guidance regarding the implementation of crisis management efforts tends to

advocate for the enactment of linear approaches, conceptualized as cause-and-effect processes.

Premiums are placed on crisis communication plans and broad guidelines calling for openness,

quick response, candor and consistency. Various staged models of crisis management and the

five models identified by Penrose (2000) (to be discussed) exemplify a traditional, linear

approach to crisis management. Critical perspectives question the utility of such methods, which

are viewed as serving powerful organizations at the expense of stakeholders. Other perspectives

hold that factors such as organizational culture and history are more accurate predictors of crisis

management success than the existence of crisis communication plans and adherence to other

traditional recommendations.

Crisis management efforts differ not only in their implementation, but in their objectives as

well. Most notably, the literature review revealed relational approaches (which seek to maintain

mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and its stakeholders) and symbolic

approaches (those which seek to protect an organization's symbolic resources) to crisis

management. The following section will first discuss traditional and critical perspectives to crisis

management, and then will discuss symbolic and relational approaches.

Traditional Guidance and Linear Approaches

Although specific management approaches vary, the literature review revealed four broad

guidelines that serve as the foundation for many scholarly and practitioner-oriented crisis









management recommendations. Those involved in a crisis should remain open to inquiry,

respond communicatively to the crisis situation with minimal delay, respond honestly, and

maintain consistency of message throughout the crisis period (Fink, 1986; Horsley & Barker,

2002; Maier, 2005; Venette, Sellnow & Lang, 2003; Ziaukas, 2001).

Traditional approaches often recommend pre-crisis planning in anticipation of future crisis

events. Benoit's (1997) image repair discourse theory recommends the preparation of crisis

contingency plans. Horsely and Barker (2002), Burnett (1998), Gorski (1998), and Pearson and

Clair (1998) also emphasize benefits of developing crisis management plans to address future

events. Taking a somewhat extreme stance, Gorski argues "regardless of the emergency, the

planning process for crisis management is the same" (1998, p. 78).

Linear approaches: staged models

Some scholars conceptualize the crisis management process as a staged process. Such

staged approaches tend to address crisis situations from a linear perspective. Gonzalez-Herrero &

Pratt (1996) propose a four-stage model of crisis management of issues management, planning

and prevention, crisis and post crisis, argue that "every crisis has a life cycle, which can be

influenced" (p. 81). The four steps of the model are 1) issues management 2) planning and

prevention 3) crisis period and 4) post-crisis period. A foundational tenet of the model is "that

every crisis has a life cycle" and the most effective strategy "for avoiding a negative media

coverage .is to engage in symmetrical, reputation-enhancing, socially responsible activities" (.

Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996, p. 81).Though the crisis may unfold in stages, the authors

contend that the crisis management process should be continual and ongoing (Gonzalez-Herrero

& Pratt, 1996). Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) refer to a three-stage model of crisis prevention,

response and recovery. To reflect the complexity of the crisis response stage Hale, Dulek, and

Dale posit a spiral crisis response model. This model involves "a series of sequential









communication activities [which] occurs iteratively throughout the crisis response phase" (2005,

p. 122). While Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) stress the response stage, Fink (1986) emphasizes

the prevention stage, which is sub-divided into mitigation, planning and warning. Similarly,

Penrose (2000) depicts crisis management as occurring in five stages: mitigation, planning,

response, recovery, and renewal.

The three-staged conceptualization of prevention, response, and recovery corresponds to

Coombs' (1999) division of the crisis event into three stages-pre-crisis, crisis event and post

crisis. Despite this division, Coombs (1999) contends crisis management should be viewed as an

ongoing process without a discrete beginning or end. These seemingly Contradictory concepts

are reconciled by the fact that actual crises are complex events in which the various crisis stages

may overlap and cycle, in agreement with Horsley and Barker's (2002) concentric model

(Coombs, 1999). The concentric model is "united by an ongoing awareness of public relations"

for crisis management, which like Coombs' (1999) conceptualization of crisis management as an

ongoing process (Horsley &Barker, 2002).

Linear approaches: Penrose's five major models

Penrose (2000) summarized several "major" models of crisis management (p. 158). The

major models as identified by Penrose (2000) are Littlejohn's six-step crisis model, Fink's

comprehensive audit, Mitroff's portfolio planning approach, crisis/strategic management

integration and Burnett's crisis classification matrix. These models indicate crises can be

addressed in a linear, cause-and-effect fashion.

Littlejohn's six-step model is described by Penrose (2000) as a linear procedure composed

of the following steps:

1. Develop an organizational structure in preparation for future crises.
2. Select a crisis management team.
3. Train the team via simulations.









4. Conduct an audit of potential crisis situations.
5. Draft a crisis contingency plan.
6. Actively manage crises as they arise (Penrose, 2000).

Fink's comprehensive audit emphasizes crisis preparedness via information gathering and

planning. The model calls for a complete audit of potential crises that may arise in each of an

organization's functional areas and the subsequent development of a crisis management plan.

The plan describes the situation and states desired and acceptable outcomes. The management

team then develops appropriate strategic options (Fink, 1986, Penrose, 2000).

Mitroff s portfolio planning approach first groups crises based on their "underlying

structural similarities" (Mitroff, 1988, p. 16). The crisis groups are then analyzed and

organizations prepare for the worst-case scenario in each group. Preparation for each worst-case

scenario is also preparation for similar scenarios. The goal of this approach is to "teach an

organization to confront, in advance, the stress that will arise when a crisis happens" (Mitroff,

1988, p. 17; Penrose, 2000).

Crisis/strategic management integration described by Penrose (2000) argues for the

integration of crisis management perspectives "into the strategic management process" (p. 159).

The process of crisis management is described as primarily defensive, while the strategic

management process is portrayed as being primarily an offensive act of marketplace competition

(Penrose, 2000).

Burnett's (1998) crisis classification matrix is based on the premise that generic responses

to crises are not appropriate; the wrong response can be as damaging as the crisis itself. The

model classifies crisis situations using a 16-cell matrix based on crisis threat level, response

options, time pressure and degree of control. The matrix is the basis for a crisis continuum that

serves as a tool to reveal, and prioritize potential crises and thus determine the most appropriate









management response (Burnett, 1998; Penrose, 2000). Burnett's (1998) matrix is similar to

Coombs' (1995) crisis type matrix that will be discussed in more detail later.

Critical Perspectives

Some scholars question the effectiveness of traditional crisis communication

recommendations. Coombs (1999, 1998), Marra (1998), and Murphy (1996) de-emphasize the

value of pre-made crisis plans. Egelhoff and Sen (1992), and Penrose (2000), portray crisis

management plans as fallible and potentially dangerous to an organization. Egelhoff and Sen

(1992) argue that crisis management plans have the potential to exacerbate a crisis situation. Pre-

formulated plans may deliver a false sense of control to crisis managers and may limit an

organization's response options. If the plan is overly rigid, it may be inappropriate to deal with

the specifics of the crisis situation.

Several scholars have voiced opposition to traditional recommendations regarding candor

and openness (Eisenberg & Witten 1987; Lyon & Cameron 2004; Tyler, 1997, 2005). Writing

from a postmodern perspective, Tyler portrays guidance for candor as being self-serving to the

interests of the powerful and exclusionary to stakeholders. She argues that approaches

advocating openness fail to acknowledge the subjective nature of truth and an organization's

motivations for disclosure (2005). Tyler's view receives some support from Eisenberg and

Witten (1987) who maintain that openness does little to equalize the power differential intrinsic

to the relationship between an organization and its stakeholders.

In some cases, open communication may place the organization, or individuals, in

jeopardy, legal or otherwise (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Tyler, 1997).

Eisenberg and Witten (1987) assert that open communication may unduly harm an organization

during crisis. The authors criticize the tendency of theoreticians to uncritically accept the

"efficacy of open communication" (p. 418). The authors, instead, advocate the utility of strategic









ambiguity. Lyon and Cameron (2004) also advocate for the use of strategic ambiguity (in

Contrast to candor) to address difficulties faced by organizations who must communicate with

multiple stakeholder groups. Tyler (1997) admonishes crisis communication scholars "to

acknowledge that candor and openness are sometimes impossible and that when the legal

consequences of candor have the potential to destroy the company financially, equivocation or

strategic ambiguity is more appropriate" (p. 67).

Regardless, Horsley and Barker (2002) argue that the threat of legal penalty does not

justify stonewalling. Instead, public relations practitioners and legal counsel "should work

together to develop a response that satisfies the public's need to know yet avoids self-implication

of legal wrongdoing" (Horsley & Barker, 2002, p. 410). Though phrased normatively, this

guideline is ambiguous. Somewhat less so, Ziaukus (2001) argues that the "fear of litigation is

not an ethically valid excuse for avoiding responsibility and blame" (p. 246).

Postmodern perspectives

Holtzhausen (2000) and Tyler (2005) discuss the application of postmodernist theory to the

practice of public relations. As described by Tyler (2005), postmodernist theory applied to crisis

communication is highly critical of traditional, linear approaches to crisis communication.

Postmodernist thought questions the use of organizational narratives, presented as truth, which

serve to maintain power differentials between an organization and its stakeholders (Tyler, 2005;

Venette, Sellnow & Lang, 2003). According to Holtzhausen (2000), "where modernism

maintains that it has found the real truth, the postmodern holds that this truth is merely the

viewpoint of some dominant groups in society and should not be privileged over another

viewpoint" (p. 96). Thus, Tyler (2005) writes, "from a postmodernist perspective it is possible to

see crisis as a disruption in the dominant narrative that members of an organization's power elite

wish to perpetuate" (p. 566).









Tyler's (2005) view is supported by Venette, Sellnow and Lang's (2003) discussion of

metanarrative as a crisis response option. Holtzhausen (2000) defines metanarratives as "single,

dominant ideologies and theories" (p. 96). Thus, organizations in crisis often reconstruct the

original narrative of the crisis situation ("as portrayed in the media") as their own metanarrative,

making the story more favorable to the organization's interests (Venette, Sellnow & Lang, 2003,

p. 220).

Postmodernist theory applied to crisis communication questions the value of much

traditional guidance due to the complexity of the narrative environment. While an organization's

metanarrative may hold privileged status due to power differentials and its presentation in the

media, the "impossibility of predicting all of the possible narratives that may be publicly told by

various stakeholders. .further calls into question the value of the much-lauded crisis

communication plan" (Tyler, 2005, p. 579). Furthermore, Tyler (2005) is skeptical of the value

of organizational attempts to respond to crises openly and quickly, to respond to crisis with a

unified voice often via a single spokesperson, and to establish a crisis response headquarters.

Chaos theory

Chaos theory attempts to provide insight into "the behavior of complex non-linear

systems" (Seeger, 2002, p. 329). The application of chaos theory to crisis management by

Murphy (1996) and Seeger (2002) questions the effectiveness of traditional, linear approaches to

crisis management due to the "environmental complexity, interdependence and instability" of

crisis systems involving organizations and stakeholders (Seeger, 2002, p. 332). Seeger asserts

chaos theory "hints at a broad conceptualization of both organization and crisis that moves

beyond the traditional crisis communications and public relations frameworks of strategic

responses, image restoration and apologia" (p. 329-330). Chaos theory does not support the

application of crisis communication plans, precise objectives and scientific prediction. The









theory implies that the most appropriate action may be to evaluate the crisis after it has occurred

because outcomes are not predictable and the situational structure may not be initially apparent

(Murphy, 1996).

Chaos theory further implies that the public relations function may be unable to predict or

control crises, and instead should focus on monitoring and interpreting change. An understanding

of key aspects of chaos theory such as bifurcation points (points in time at which system changes

are likely to occur) and strange attractors (underlying, unifying features of a system) may

empower the public relations practitioner to manage the change that often accompanies crisis

(Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002). Chaos theory supports the use of two-way symmetrical

communication-the adjustment of organizational behavior to accommodate publics based on

system feedback-in response to a crisis. In this regard, the application of chaos theory to crisis

management supports, at least to some degree, a relational approach to crisis management

(Murphy, 1996).

Organizational culture

Several scholars overtly contend, or in some cases imply, that organizational culture and

structure are more important indicators of an organization's ability to withstand a crisis than the

existence of crisis communication plans or an organization's reliance on other traditional

management approaches (Belcher, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005;

Kauffman; 2005; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Marra, 1998; Mitroff, 1988; Penrose, 2000; Wise,

2003). Organizational culture has been defined as "the dominant values of an organization, the

shared understanding of employees, the shared synthesis of basic assumptions regarding the

organization and its environment, and the philosophy determining organizational policy toward

an organization's internal and external publics" (Lauzen & Dozier 1994, p. 171).









Lauzen and Dozier (1994) assert that an organization's culture affects its ability to manage

crisis situations. The authors define and Contrast authoritarian and participative organizational

cultures. Authoritarian cultures are characterized by "centralized decision making, individualistic

goals, rigid chains of command, tight supervision of subordinates" and an unwillingness to

gather information outside of organizational confines (p. 172). Participative cultures instead

"emphasize teamwork and shared mission, humanistic concern for organizational members away

from work, horizontal organizational structure, shared power, innovativeness" and are open to

ideas originating outside of organizational confines (p. 172). The authors conclude that

organizations characterized by participative cultures are better equipped to manage crisis (Lauren

& Dozier, 1994).

Penrose (2000) asserts organizational culture is often the "main factor in affecting crisis

outcomes" (2000, p. 160). To illustrate this point, Penrose (2000) presents the case of NASA's

crisis management failure in the aftermath of the 1986 explosion of the space shuttle Challenger

(Penrose, 2000). Prior to the disaster, NASA developed an "extensive" crisis management plan

in anticipation of future crises. Despite planning efforts, NASA's "closed communication

culture" negated any benefit the "comprehensive crisis plan" engendered (Penrose, 2000).

Kauffman (2005) studied NASA's handling of the crisis catalyzed by the 2003 explosion

of the space shuttle Columbia. The author found that though NASA's crisis management efforts

were generally successful (in large part due to a comprehensive crisis communication plan), the

space agency's organizational culture led to crucial management missteps which negatively

impacted its crisis management efforts (Kauffman, 2005).

Assertions regarding the importance of organizational culture are supported by other

communications scholars (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1988; Marra, 1998; Coombs, 1999; Hale, Dulek









& Hale, 2005; Wise, 2003). Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) indicate that an organization's culture

is often critical to its ability to withstand crisis. In a study of Connecticut-based Griffin

Hospital's handling of a bioterror crisis, Wise (2003) found organizational culture to be "the

most important factor in the organization's successful handling of the case" (p. 461). Marra

(1998) contends an organization's communication culture has a profound impact on its ability to

effectively respond to a crisis, more so than the existence of crisis communication plans. Coombs

(1999) argues organizational culture needs to facilitate information flow for crisis management

to be effective. Fink (1986) contends that the crisis manager's access to authority, as well as the

amount of authority they are entrusted with, is a critical factor in effective crisis management.

Mitroff (1986) argues that organizations should "have a permanent, trained crisis management

team" (p. 19). Coombs' (1999) stresses the importance of collecting environmental information

while illustrating the importance of the ability for this information to be shared within the

organization, in agreement with Marra (1998) and Penrose (2000). Thus the public relations

practitioner should reside in a management position with an advisory role in strategic planning

(Marra, 1998).

Organizational history

According to Murphy (1996), Coombs (1998), Penrose (2000), Coombs and Holladay

(1996), Coombs and Holladay (2001), and Martin and Boynton (2005), an organization's history

should be understood to determine the appropriate response to a crisis. Murphy (1996) argues

crisis events are unpredictable and thus the most appropriate crisis response is to analyze the

"events after the fact" to improve understanding of future crises when they arise (p. 12).

Murphy's (1996) analysis is supported by Coombs' (1998, 1999) who argues that an

understanding of an organization's history is necessary in order to assess and address the crisis

situation. Coombs (1998) further maintains that the history of an organization's performance is









positively related to stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility and thus the damage that a

crisis may inflict on an organization's image. Martin and Boynton's (2005) paper Contrasting

NASA's handling of the space shuttle Challenger and space shuttle Columbia disasters illustrates

the benefit organizations may reap by learning from past crises.

Coombs and Holladay (2001) acknowledge the importance of the relationship history

between an organization and its stakeholders when formulating a response to a crisis. The

authors found that an organization with positive stakeholder perceptions of its history is less

likely to be adversely impacted by a crisis than is an organization perceived to have a negative

relationship history. Thus, crisis managers should gain an understanding of the history of their

organization's relationships with its stakeholders and use this information to develop the crisis

response (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Similarly, Penrose (2000) argues that an organization's

"history of open communication is more crucial in handling a crisis successfully than its crisis

management plan" (p. 410).

Relational and Symbolic Management Approaches

Crises can be managed via symbolic and relational approaches. Relational management

approaches acknowledge the role an organization's relationships with its stakeholders play in the

development of, and response to, a crisis. Relational perspectives focus on maintaining favorable

relationships between an organization and its stakeholders, and are thus grounded in stakeholder

theory. According to this approach, crisis management efforts should be implemented on an

ongoing basis, both before and after the onset of a crisis (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, 2002a;

Ledingham, 2001; Ledingham, 2003; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Susskind & Field, 1996; Ulmer,

2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). In Contrast, symbolic management approaches focus on the

maintenance, protection, and repair of an organization's image. Despite a lack of focus on long-

term relationships, the symbolic approach to crisis management may be enacted on an ongoing









basis, not just in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1998; Coombs, 1999; Marra, 1998).

Relational and symbolic crisis management approaches are discussed in detail in the sections that

follow.

Relational management approaches

Crisis management recommendations proposed by some scholars are rooted in the

relationship management approach to the practice of public relations. The focus of the relational

perspective is the maintenance of mutually beneficial organization-stakeholder relationships

(Ledingham, 2001; Ledingham, 2003). According to Ledingham (2003), "the relationship

management perspective holds that public relations balances the interests of the organizations

and publics through the management of organization-public relationships" (p. 181). The author's

use of the term "publics" appears to be synonymous with "stakeholders." The author proposes

the adoption of the relationship management perspective as a general theory for public relations

due to the fact that "the relationship perspective is applicable throughout the public relations

process and with regard to all public relations techniques" (Ledingham, 2003, p. 195). As crisis

management is a subgenre of public relations, it is reasonable to assume that the relational

management perspective is applicable to crisis management (Ziaukas, 2001).

Relational approaches to crisis management place intrinsic value on organization-

stakeholder relationships. Relational maintenance is the highest priority (Marra, 1998). The

relational approach implies a high likelihood of crisis management failure outcomes if an

organization projects an image that does not match its behavior (Ledingham, 2003). Relational

approaches view "crises as an episode in a larger relationship, between an organization and its

stakeholders" (Lyon & Cameron, 2004, p.214). Thus, the crisis management process should be

ongoing and proactive, both before and after crisis (Ledingham, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004;

Ulmer, 2001).









Stakeholders are individuals, or groups of persons, that can impact, or be impacted by, an

organization's operations. Stakeholder groups are generally non-monolithic, and highly

heterogenous. Due to their varying needs, as well as the various contexts in which they

experience crisis, communicating consistent, and favorable, messages to varied stakeholder

groups is often a difficult task. The term "stakeholder" is often used interchangeably with

"publics" (Phillips, 1997).

Because the relational approach to crisis management attempts to maintain mutually-

beneficial organization-stakeholder relationships amidst crisis, relational crisis management is

rooted in stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory was introduced as an approach to organizational

strategic management. A goal of stakeholder theory is to allow organizations to operate in such a

way as to minimize "the potential ethical problems created by capitalism" (Phillips, 1997, p. 63).

Stakeholder theory is integral to a relational approach to crisis management. According to

stakeholder theory, an organization's survival is dependent on the maintenance of positive

relationships with its stakeholders (Martin & Boynton, 2005; Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow,

2000). The theory emphasizes the need to recognize the "multiplicity of groups having a stake in

the operation of the firm" and to factor the needs of these groups into "managerial decision

making" (Phillips, 1997, p. 52). Stakeholder theory emphasizes the broad interests of the

organization, and the potential for the organization and its stakeholders to affect each other, both

positively and negatively (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

Proponents of stakeholder theory indicate that an organization's dependence on positive

stakeholder relationships is amplified during crisis situations (Martin & Boynton 2005; Ulmer

2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). Stakeholders often "represent a network of support during

crises" (Ulmer, 2001, p. 594). If organization-stakeholder relationships are unfavorable,









stakeholders "may withdraw support during a crisis, prolong the effects of a crisis, or intensify

the threat associated with the event" (Ulmer, 2001, p. 594). Ulmer (2001) further warns that

neglected stakeholder groups are likely to exacerbate the crisis in question. Therefore,

organizations hoping to survive crises should ideally "maintain positive relationships with their

stakeholders" because "an organization's viability depends on its ability to maintain a positive

relationship with its stakeholders" (Martin & Boynton, 2005, p. 254 ;Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000, p.

144).

Maintaining relations with stakeholder groups amidst crisis is often difficult due to the fact

that a crisis can impact multiple and disparate stakeholder groups (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

Fully identifying these groups, their unique needs, a firm's potential to impact their lives, and

their potential to impact a firm's operations, is often a complex, and sometimes unachievable,

task (Phillips, 1997). The result is that messages disseminated during crisis may be ambiguous,

and are subject to differing interpretation by various stakeholder groups (Ulmer & Sellnow,

2000). The utility and ethical grounding of stakeholder theory has therefore been called into

question (Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

According to stakeholder theory, identifying stakeholder groups impacted by crisis is

critical to an effective crisis response (Horsely & Barker, 2002; Ulmer, 2001). Ulmer (2001)

recommends proactively identifying stakeholders prior to the onset of crisis, but Ulmer and

Sellnow (2000) caution that "the criteria for determining stakeholders after a crisis is likely to be

considerably different from normal operations" (p. 144). Therefore, organizations should be

willing to broaden their view of stakeholders after a crisis begins (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). Due

to the multiplicity of organization-stakeholder relationships arising in most crisis systems,

organizations wishing to respond to crisis ethically should prioritize their obligations to









stakeholder groups based on stakeholders' needs "rather than a bottom line or shareholder

orientation" (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

Symbolic management approaches

Symbolic approaches to crisis management emphasize the protection of an entity's

symbolic assets. An organization's symbolic assets include its credibility, reputation and image.

Though these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, their meanings differ. Organizational

and individual credibility has been asserted to be essential for effective crisis management. An

organization's credibility is a symbolic asset assigned by stakeholders. Ziaukas (2001) called

credibility "the overriding element" to effective crisis management and argued that it must be

maintained "throughout the crisis and into the post-crisis phase" (p. 246). In discussing the role

of metanarration in crisis response, Venette, Sellnow and Lang (2003) relate the importance of

the rhetor's believability when attempting to restructure public understanding of a crisis. Thus,

for the purpose of this study, credibility refers specifically to an audience's perceptions of an

entity's believability, whether an administration representative, the administration or government

as a whole.

Reputation refers to the general perception an audience holds about an entity. Both

credibility and reputation are assigned to an entity by its stakeholders based on stakeholders'

perceptions of the entities' actions. In Contrast, image refers to the perceptions a firm projects

about itself to its stakeholders. For the purpose of this study, image will refer to statements or

attributes about the entity that it projects through its actions or discourse; whereas, reputation

reflects the attributes perceived by the stakeholders. Plainly stated, credibility and reputation are

earned, image is contrived.

Coombs (2002) identified three dominant research streams advocating for a symbolic

approach to crisis communication: apologia, Benoit's image restoration discourse theory, and









Coombs' situational crisis communication theory. These three concepts will be discussed below.

A comprehensive discussion of image restoration discourse theory will follow.

The oldest symbolic approach to crisis management appears to be apologia, "the speech of

self-defense" which Ware and Linkugel (1973) link to well-known rhetors such as Socrates and

Martin Luther (p. 273). Ware and Linkugel (1973) describe four rhetorical strategies commonly

invoked in apologetic speech-denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Denial

negates the existence of the crisis while bolstering involves a speaker's attempt to "identify

himself with something viewed favorably by the audience" (p. 277). These two strategies are

informative, "they do not alter the audience's meaning for the cognitive elements involved" (p.

278). On the other hand, differentiation and transcendence are transformative-they alter

meanings held by the audience. Differentiation involves attempts to change audience meanings

by "separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within

which the audience presently views that attribute" (p. 278). Transcendence alters meaning by

taking the audience from "the particulars of the charge at hand in a direction of some more

abstract, general view" (p. 280).

Image restoration discourse theory bears similarity to Ware and Linkugel's (1973)

discussion of apologia, as well as by later works authored by Caillouet and Allen (1994),

Caillouet and Allen (1996) and Hearit (1994). Caillouet and Allen (1994), Caillouet and Allen

(1996) and Hearit (1994) discuss impression management strategies enacted in crisis response.

Image restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to develop, or evaluate, rhetorical

discourse options available to, or offered by, an organization in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997;

Benoit, & Brinson, 1999; Benoit, & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991; Blaney,

Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson, & Benoit, 1996; Zhang, and Benoit, 2004).









While proponents of image restoration discourse theory contend the theory offers guidance

in crisis response development, Coombs and Schmidt (2000) criticize the theory's lack of

predictive power. According to Coombs and Schmidt (2000), "image restoration theory is

actually a taxonomy and not a true theory in the sense of making predictions" (Coombs &

Schmidt, 2000, p. 175). Additionally, Coombs (2002) criticizes image restoration discourse

theory for ignoring an organization's operational concerns in crisis response formulation.

Coombs (2002) instead advocates situational crisis communication theory as an approach which

factors operational realities into an organization's crisis response.

Coombs and Schmidt's (2000) critique of image restoration discourse theory was directed

specifically at Benoit and Brinson's (1999) findings regarding a case study of Texaco's efforts to

repair its image in the aftermath of a crisis involving charges of institutional racism. Coombs and

Schmidt (2000), speaking of Benoit and Brinson's (1999) methodology, argue that "many

conclusions drawn from image restoration case studies should be taken only as tentative" (p.

163). This critique illustrates a difference in the two approaches headed by the two scholars.

Benoit's studies utilize case study methodology while Coombs' relies primarily on experimental

designs (Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Blaney,

Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Coombs, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000;

Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Zhang & Benoit, 2004).

A fundamental premise of Coombs' (1996, 1998, 2002) conceptualization of a symbolic

approach to crisis management is that such an approach ties the selection of crisis response

strategies to a synthesis of attribution theory and neoinstitutionalism. In other words, an

organization's choice of crisis response (denial, distancing, ingratiation, mortification, or

suffering) should be guided by an understanding of stakeholder perceptions of organizational









responsibility for the crisis (attribution theory) as well as stakeholder perceptions of an

organization's legitimacy (neoinstitutionalism; Coombs, 1996, 1998, 2002). Attribution theory

implies that stakeholder perception of organizational responsibility for the crisis is strongest if

the organization has a history of crises, if the organization controls the factors that led to the

crisis, and if the crisis was caused by intentional organizational action. Coombs and Holladay

contend "the more publics attribute crisis responsibility to an organization, the stronger the

likelihood is of publics developing and acting on negative images of the organization" (1996, p.

282). As discussed previously, Coombs (1995) argues that identifying the crisis type is essential

to determining appropriate crisis response strategies.

Image restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to develop, or evaluate, rhetorical

discourse options available to, or offered by, an organization in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997;

Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; & Benoit

& Brinson, 1999; Zhang & Benoit, 2004). The theory is based on two key assumptions: (a)

"communication is a goal oriented activity" and (b) "the maintenance of a favorable image is a

primary goal of communication" (Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002, p. 380-381). Benoit (1997)

contends that audience perceptions of crisis responsibility and crisis offensiveness must be

understood to formulate an effective rhetorical response. Additionally, the response strategy

must be appropriate to the threat facing the rhetor's image (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). Thus,

the theory states that three criteria will ideally be met for the response to be effective: (a) the

rhetorical strategies employed are appropriate to the crisis threat, (b) the message strategies are

subsequently embedded in discourse regarding the crisis, and (c) the response is persuasive

(Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997).









Image restoration discourse theory presents five rhetorical strategies-denial of

responsibility, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and

mortification (asking forgiveness)-to be used individually or in any combination in response to

a crisis (Benoit, 1997). These five broad rhetorical strategies are sub-divided to allow for more

detailed understanding of crisis response options (Zhang & Benoit, 2004). According to Benoit

(1997), denial may take two forms: straightforward denial or shifting of the blame.

Straightforward denial occurs when a firm repudiates charges that the offending act actually

happened, that the firm actually carried out the act, or that the act had any negative impacts.

Shifting the blame occurs when the accused claims the offensive act was caused by someone else

or another firm. There are four varieties of the evasion strategy: provocation, defeasibility,

accident, and good intentions. When invoking the provocation strategy, the rhetor may claim the

offending act was a response to provocative actions taken by another actor. Defeasibility

involves a rhetor's claims that the offending act was the result of a lack of information. The

accused may also evade responsibility, and therefore be held less accountable, by claiming the

act was the result of an accident. Lastly, responsibility may be evaded by claiming the act was

undertaken with good intentions. Organizations attempting to protect their symbolic assets via

image restoration discourse theory may also attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the act in

question. Benoit (1997) describes six versions of this strategy: bolstering, minimization,

differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, and compensation. Bolstering involves

attempts to strengthen an audience's positive perceptions of the accused to "offset negative

feelings connected with the wrongful act" (p. 180). Rhetor's using this strategy may "describe

positive characteristics they have or positive acts they have done in the past." (Benoit, 1997, p.

180). The accused may also attempt to "to minimize the negative feelings associated with the









wrongful act" (Benoit, 1997, p. 180). Rhetors may similarly attempt to differentiate the act from

"other similar but more offensive actions" (Benoit, 1997, p. 180). Rhetors may also attempt to

reframe audience understandings of the offending act by attempting to "place the act in a more

favorable context" via the transcendence strategy. The accused may also reduce the

offensiveness of the act by attacking the accusers (i.e., negative statements regarding the

credibility of the press) or by compensating those harmed by the act. Lastly, the accused may

simply take corrective action for the offensive act or express mortification. The corrective action

strategy involves "restoring the state of affairs existing before the offensive action, and/or

promising to prevent the recurrence of the offensive act" (Benoit, 1997, p. 181). The

mortification strategy involves issuing an apology, and possibly begging forgiveness, for the act

in question.

Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici (1991) developed an early version of image restoration

discourse theory by synthesizing the theory of dramatism, apologia, the study of accounts. The

outcome is "a synthetic typology of image restoration strategies that includes four general

strategies (denial, evasion of responsibility, minimization, and mortification-reduction of

offensiveness added in later works) as well as specific variants of each" (p. 276). The

categorization scheme underlying this early version of image restoration discourse theory was

updated in Benoit's later research in defensive discourse.

Benoit, Gullifor and Panici's (1991) study analyzes the defensive discourse offered by

President Reagan as the Iran-Contra scandal progressed from late 1986 through the summer of

1987. Specifically the authors review numerous speeches and news conferences during which

Reagan discussed the Iran-Contra scandal. The authors found that Reagan's defensive rhetoric









progressed through three distinct phases throughout the duration of Iran-Contra: denial,

justification, and, finally, corrective action (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991).

This study is the genesis for the currently accepted incarnation of image restoration

discourse theory, and therefore, the work provides background necessary for maximum

understanding of the theory. For example, the authors explicitly list the "crucial assumptions"

underlying image restoration discourse theory-"the susceptibility of reputation or 'face' to

attack, the availability of verbal means of redress, and the importance of image purification" (p.

275). Additionally, the authors relate a key insight that implies a certain degree of flexibility to

image restoration discourse theory's categorization theme: "...the general strategies for image

restoration are useful for focusing the critic's attention, for guiding critical analysis of the

discourse. Yet the strategies as actually embodied in the discourse remain more important than

the abstract categories themselves." (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991, p. 291).

Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici's (1991) study provides insight into the Reagan

Administration's defensive discourse, but the study suffers from several shortcomings. The main

shortcoming is that the study oversimplifies the environmental complexity in which the Reagan

Administration attempted to respond to the crisis. The authors' analysis is limited to speeches

and news conferences led by the President, though a multitude of Administration officials

offered a wide variety of defensive rhetoric, in various settings, and over various media. By

failing to acknowledge the role other voices played in communicating the Administration's

response to the crisis, the authors fail to acknowledge the complexity of the Reagan

Administration's crisis communication efforts and operating environment.









Political Science Perspectives of Crisis Management

Damage Control, Crisis, Scandal, and Affair

Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) describe crises as threats to organizational values and

goals, and/or social system norms. The authors contend crisis situations are characterized by time

pressure, uncertainty and a need for leaders to make critical decisions. Governmental crises may

present political opportunities for opposition parties and critics. Crises may constitute threats to

governmental legitimacy and "occasions for a restructuring of power relations" (p. 287). Busby

defines crises as "political situations where tension rises to [the] breaking point, and political and

public attention is focused on episodes which have significant political implications" (p. 12).

The words "damage control," "scandal," and "affair" are often associated with crisis.

Symbolically-motivated crisis response efforts are often referred to as "damage control" (Busby,

1999, p. 24). Busby defines damage control as "the often frantic effort to play down and suppress

information which could have an adverse effect upon the credibility of an Administration" (1999,

p. 24). Busby (1999) defines a scandal as a crisis event characterized by corruption or purposeful

deception which is often self-induced. Tumber and Waisbord (2004) contend that scandals arise

as much from media coverage of corruption as from the corrupt act itself. This argument is

supported by McQuail (2005) who asserts that the course of political scandals "is often

determined by the mass media" (p. 529). Tumber and Waisbord note the public response to

revelations of scandal is often apathetic and argue "it is important to investigate the reasons why

some secret official wrongdoing turns into a public event. .the proliferation of scandals requires

the study of conditions of publicity rather than the conditions for corruption" (2004, p. 1034).

Busby defines an affair as "a term with a collective property. .employed to group together

a wide array of events which produced a political scandal" (1999, p. 12). The collection of events

and covert operations related to negotiations with Iran and the funding of the Nicaraguan Contra









rebels by the Reagan Administration is often referred to as the Iran-Contra affair. Busby (1999)

states that scandals generally progress in two phases: the substantive phase and the procedural

phase. The substantive phase involves the "initial exposure of wrongdoing" while the procedural

phase regards efforts to minimize the negative effects wrought by the substantive phase (Busby,

1999, p. 24). According to Busby, the procedural phase "is potentially more hazardous for an

Administration than the substantive phase" (1999, p. 24). Busby (1999) relates that in the case of

the Iran arms crisis, the emergence of the procedural phase of the Iran-Contra scandal was

precipitated by the Reagan Administration's failure to manage the substantive phase of the

scandal.

Busby (1999) argues that scandals can be viewed from two perspectives: the aberrationist

perspective and the legalist perspective. The aberrationist perspective views scandals as arising

from the actions of individuals which lead to wrongdoing. According to Busby (1999) this

perspective ignores dynamics within political systems that may be the root of the wrongdoing

and facilitates the use of damage control measures to obscure wrongdoing. In Contrast, the

legalist perspective focuses on the structure of a political system as the root of scandal in the

political realm (Busby, 1999).

To aid in crisis identification, Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) propose a crisis typology

based on two variables: those related to the crisis situation itself and "those pertaining to the

perceptions of solutions held by crisis participants" (p. 283). The variables related to the crisis

itself include "the object of the basic threat" (either physical or involving "crucial norms and

values"), "the domain of threat" (geographical considerations and the extent of crisis damage),

and "the origins of threat" ("either endogenous or exogenous to the system affected") (p. 284-









285). The variables related to participants' perceptions include the perceived necessity of

organizational response and differences regarding response strategies.

In agreement with crisis communication scholars who advocate for the use of crisis

communication plans, Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) contend that crisis impacts are often

compounded "because policy makers have prepared neither themselves nor the public for

appropriate responses once tragedy strikes" (p. 277). Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997)

acknowledge that not all crises require immediate action and that government action may

exacerbate crisis situations. In such cases "decisional restraint, providence, media consciousness,

open communication and a long-term policy perspective may be more effective" than immediate

crisis responses (p. 300).

Organizational Structure

Haney (1998) investigates the role of organizational structure in crisis situations,

specifically "how presidents organize and manage decision-making groups during international

crisis" (p. 939). The author argues that the quality and attributes of a president's advisory

structure impacts an Administration's ability to manage crises. Of specific relevance to the case

being studied, Haney (1998) contends "the decision-making structure that a president puts in

place must be able to operate in an atmosphere of divided presidential attention and perhaps the

lack of presidential attention" (p. 954).

Haney (1998) identifies three presidential advisory group structures enacted amidst crisis:

formalistic, competitive, and collegial models. Formalistic structures are characterized by an

adherence to organizational hierarchies. The formalistic model allows for thorough analysis and

vetting of information before it reaches the president. The accreditation and filtering process may

distort crucial information as it flows up the hierarchy. The formalistic model is associated with

the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations. Competitive structures, as exemplified by the









Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration, may stimulate the development of creative solutions

to crisis problems but often lead to staff friction. Additionally, competitive models place large

demands on a president's time. In Contrast to competitive models, collegial models stress

teamwork. Such a model, theoretically, discourages Administration infighting, and decreases

demands on decision-makers. Unfortunately, such a structure tends to breed groupthink. The

Reagan Administration's organizational structure conformed to the collegial model (Heith,

1998).

Heith (1998) examines presidential Administration organizational structure in regards to

the use of public opinion data. Consistent with the collegial model described above, Heith (1998)

found the organizational structure of the Reagan Administration to be relatively open, the author

found that poll data was shared among its top staff members, including President Reagan.

According to Heith (1998), the Reagan Administration staff was particularly adept at analyzing

public opinion data.

The Rally Round the Flag Effect

According to the rally round the flag theory, foreign policy crises will often inspire a surge

of public support for a president (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993;

Norrander & Wilcox, 1993; Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson & Sullivan, 1994; Busby, 1999). The

rally round the flag theory attempts to account for boosts in public support for a president amidst

crisis (Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson & Sullivan, 1994). Busby (1999) defines the rally effect as

short-term changes in public opinion following foreign affairs crises that may be either positive

or negative. This prediction did not hold true for the Reagan Administration during the crisis of

November 1986 (Brody & Shapiro, 1989).

Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson and Sullivan (1994) describe the process by which the rally

phenomenon develops. In the initial stages of the crisis, the White House controls important









information related to the crisis. Without their own information, opposition elites tend to squelch

their expression of public disagreement with the President, thus creating the appearance of elite

consensus with, and support for, the President. In the absence of elite criticism, news media have

difficulty finding alternate viewpoints to report and journalists risk appearing to seek out

negative sources if they zealously search for critical perspectives. Thus journalists "become

conduits of one-sided, supporting messages" for the Administration (p. 261). As the public is

presented with only favorable views of the Administration, public support for the President tends

to increase.

Brody and Shapiro (1989), Callaghan and Virtanen (1993), and Allen, O'Loughlin,

Jasperson and Sullivan (1994) see the absence of elite criticism of a president as the key factor

leading to the enactment of the rally phenomenon. Brody and Shapiro (1989) identify the opinion

leadership hypothesis as affecting support for a president in the midst of a crisis. According to

this view, the rally effect occurs when elites offer no criticism. If elite discourse criticizes the

president, such criticism may override and negate the predicted rally effect (Brody & Shapiro,

1989). Though Callaghan and Virtanen (1993) found support for such views, the discussion

indicates that the rally effect may be prompted instead by the emergence of nationalistic feelings

among the public in the face of external threats to the nation. Krosnick and Kinder (1990)

present priming theory as an alternate explanation for the drop in public support for President

Reagan during the crisis. They contend the volume of media attention devoted to a particular

issue is directly correlated to public assessment of the issue in question. The authors found that

"changes in the media's agenda provoked by the Iran-Contra revelations" led citizens to hold

President Reagan "to an altered set of standards" after the November 1986 disclosure that funds

from the sale of armaments to Iran had been diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras (p. 509).









Comparisons of the Iran Arms Crisis with Preceding Presidential Crises

Schudson (1992; 2004), Busby (1999), and Wallison (2003) argue that American public

memories of past crises played a role in the development of the Iran-Contra scandal and guided

the Reagan Administration's response to the initial crisis. This topic is dealt with most

completely by Schudson (1992), who contends that the public memory of Watergate affected

perceptions held by the general public, Congress and the media of the Reagan Administration as

the Iran arms crisis developed. The author shows that this is in part due to the fact that in 1986

some members of the legislature, the Reagan Administration, and the media had some form of

direct involvement in the Watergate scandal. This, he contends, influenced their actions in

regards to the Iran-Contra scandal (Schudson, 1992). Wallison (2003), the White House legal

counsel at the time, relates that within the Administration comparisons were made between

Watergate and the emerging Iran arms crisis in November 1986. Miller (1992) compares the

Reagan Administration to that of Nixon in terms of the corruption that he argues characterized

both Administrations.

Busby (1999) compares the crisis communication responses of the Nixon and Reagan

Administrations. The author argues that in both the Watergate scandal and Iran-Contra scandal

"damage control strategies simply would not alleviate the problem, indeed they often seemed to

compound it" (Busby, 1999, p. 43). Busby (1999) credits the Reagan Administration for

abstaining from character assassination attempts used by the Nixon Administration to the counter

criticisms it faced.

In addition to Watergate, the Iran hostage crisis which occurred during the Carter

presidency also impacted the Reagan Administration. Busby (1999) argues that the hostage

situation faced by the Carter Administration precipitated the controversial actions undertaken on

Reagan's behalf by some of his aides. This is in part because the public memory of the hostage









crisis of 1979-80 placed a tremendous amount of pressure on President Reagan to free the

hostages held in Beirut, Lebanon in 1986. According to Busby (1999) the American public's

experience with the hostage crisis of the Carter Administration made it impossible for Reagan

"to frame the debate on its own terms" (p. 52).

Previous Analyses of the Reagan Administration's Crisis Response

In general, the attempts of the Reagan Administration to control the crisis that emerged on

November 4, 1986, have been categorized as a failure. This contention is supported by Brody

and Shapiro's (1989) finding that Reagan's public approval rating saw record declines as the

crisis progressed. Brody and Shapiro (1989) posited that the drop in public approval was

explained by the opinion leadership hypothesis. The authors concluded that in times of crisis, if

opinion leader elites openly criticize the President, even in circumstances in which the rally

effect is predicted, public approval of the President and the Administration is likely to decline

(Brody & Shapiro, 1989).

In a similar study, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) reach a different conclusion as to the source

of, or lack thereof, support for President Reagan after the initial disclosures regarding the Iran

arms crisis. Instead of the opinion leader hypothesis, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) argue that the

priming theory explains why support for President Reagan declined. Brody and Shapiro's (1989)

conclusion discounted the priming effect though their content analysis of The New York Times

and CBS News' coverage during the crisis time period indicated the amount of critical

information presented by the media increased from November 3 through November 30, 1986.

Several authors contend that the Reagan Administration's failures were due to internal

issues. Busby's (1999) analysis indicates a major issue was Reagan's tendency to delegate

responsibility and thus to remain disengaged from events unfolding around him. Wallison

(2003), who was directly involved in Reagan's crisis response, provides ample evidence in









support of Busby's claim. He wrote, "Reagan's refusal to become involved in the details of his

Administration-indeed his apparent disinterest in these details-is not a matter of dispute" (p.

5). Because of this disengagement Reagan was dependent on his aides to account for their

actions, and unable to discern whether the information they provided him was true. The result

was that Reagan consistently disseminated false and misleading information which undermined

his credibility (Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). This contention seems to support Marra's (1998)

suggestion that internal structure is a strong predictor of the ability of an organization to respond

to a crisis effectively.

Another problem issue appears to have been the amount of time it took for the

Administration to respond to the crisis. Busby (1999), Draper (1991) and Wallison (2003) show

that the first official Administration response was not released until almost a week after the crisis

emerged. According to Busby, "the longer a problematic or scandalous event lingers, and the

higher its long-term prominence, the more inept a President may appear in his attempts to deal

with [the event]" (1999, p.22). He further argued that not only is public support affected by the

length of time it takes for an Administration to explain its actions, but by the length of time it

takes to do so to the public's satisfaction (Busby, 1999). Several analyses have shown that the

public was not satisfied with the Administration's response at any time during the crisis (Shapiro

& Brody, 1989; Draper, 1991; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003).

The public's dissatisfaction with the Reagan Administration's response appears to have

resulted from the mixed messages emanating from the White House. According to Busby, "a key

aspect of damage and information control is the uniformity of the Administration's approach to

an issue" (1999, p. 83). During the crisis, major internal rivalries surfaced within the

Administration and many of these rivalries became apparent in the media. The result of these









rivalries was an abundance of Contradictory information emanating from the White House which

confused message recipients and alerted them to the fact that they were being misled (Draper,

1991; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). Every effort made by the Administration to explain its

actions only exacerbated its problems as it continually Contradicted itself (Busby, 1999).

Dickinson (1994) discusses Reagan's failure to calm the crisis from a rhetorical

perspective. Reagan, a particularly well-known rhetor, developed a signature rhetorical style

based on three master themes: "heroism, the individual/the people, and traditional values"

(Dickinson, 1994, p. 157-158). By 1986, Reagan's audience expected his rhetoric to follow this

familiar rhetorical line; Dickinson (1994) labels this expectation a signature constraint. Reagan's

signature constraint was especially powerful because much of the success he had enjoyed as

president was forged via use of the three master themes of his rhetorical signature. But these

themes were of little utility as a response to the criticisms Reagan faced. Reagan's rhetorical

signature, "based on relentless optimism, simple answers and appeals to American values," was

incompatible with the crisis situation (Dickinson, 1994, p. 157). His early rhetorical stance was

one of denial, which the public did not believe.









CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY

Crisis Roots

On Thursday, July 18, 1985 President Ronald Reagan lay in his Bethesda Naval Hospital

bed recuperating from abdominal surgery. His doctor had just removed the metal clips from his

incision, and his feeding tubes would be out before lunch. Reagan seemed content to simply be

recovering (Morris, 1999). At 10:22 A.M., having been awake since 5:15 and still groggy, the

President was about to lend his approval to a covert operation that soon threatened his presidency

(Draper, 1991).

On that morning Robert McFarlane, Reagan's National Security Advisor, needed the

President's approval to undertake an emerging national security initiative. First he needed Nancy

Reagan's approval to see her husband. McFarlane knew Mrs. Reagan was not to be trifled with,

so he sought White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan's help. After much persuasive effort on

the part of the Chief of Staff, Reagan let "Bud" McFarlane into her husband's room. McFarlane

and Ronald Reagan spoke for 23 minutes (Regan, 1988). McFarlane told the President he had

recently been approached by David Kimche, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Kimche claimed he could help the United States establish a strategic relationship with Iran

Kimche believed the sale of armaments to Iran would facilitate such a relationship (Draper,

1991; Walsh, 1994).

The Reagan Administration sought such an opening due to Iran's considerable geostrategic

importance, primarily related to the Persian Gulf region's abundant oil reserves. The Persian

Gulf region houses vast supplies of oil. The Administration feared Soviet encroachment into the

region, leading to increased Soviet influence over Iran, and culminating in Soviet control over

the flow of oil from the Middle East. It was believed a strategic relationship with Iran could









thwart such potentialities (Joint Hearings, 100-2, 1987, exhibit 51; Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987,

Poindexter testimony, p. 213; "Shultz urges," 1984; Weinraub, 1985). The Reagan

Administration needed Kimche's opening because the United States officially broke relations

with Iran in 1980 (Atkinson, 1984, December 9).

Developing a relationship with Iran via the provision of American-made arms contradicted

stated U.S. policy, specifically the U.S.-led arms embargo imposed on Iran via Operation

Staunch. Operation Staunch expressly forbade the sale of arms to terrorist nations (Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 71). Reagan publicly labeled Iran a terrorist nation,

part of "'a new, international version of Murder, Inc.,'" guilty of "'actively supporting a

campaign of international terrorism against the United States, her allies and moderate third world

states'" (Cannon, 1985, July 9; "Excerpts," 1985, July 9, section A, p. 12; "Major news," 1985,

July 14, section 4, p. 1; "Shultz Urges," 1984, June 25; Weinraub, 1985, July 9).

In November 1986, seven United States citizens were being held hostage in Beirut by the

terrorist organization Hezbollah. While Iran's culpability for Hezbollah's actions was unknown,

Iran was believed to hold relatively strong influence over the group (Draper, 1991). Based on

Reagan's assertions and Iran's association with Hezbollah, the proposed Iranian initiative was in

potential violation of Operation Staunch. Contradictions to U.S. policy not withstanding,

President Reagan was under by intense domestic, public pressure to bring the hostages home

(Busby, 1999).

On June 17, 1985, one month before visiting the president in Bethesda Naval Hospital,

McFarlane issued a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to the secretaries of Defense

and State "to stimulate our thinking on U.S. policy toward Iran" (Joint Hearings, 100-10,1987,

CWW-4, p. 512). The NSDD addressed the threat of Soviet intervention in Iran which was









undergoing "dynamic political evolution" and was thus vulnerable to Soviet influence (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-4, p. 513). McFarlane advocated for, among other things, "the

provision of selected military equipment" to Iran (Joint Hearings, 100-10,1987, CWW-4, p.

517). To reiterate, such a course of action, the so-called "Iran initiative" amounted to a reversal

of Operation Staunch, a policy that was being actively promoted by the U.S. State Department

worldwide (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 71).

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz strongly

disapproved of McFarlane's recommendations (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Weinberger

testimony, p. 135). Weinberger forwarded the document to his Senior Military Assistant, Major

General Colin Powell with the attached note, "this is almost too absurd to comment on" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-4, p. 511). Weinberger felt the "public-policy reversal"

advocated by McFarlane "would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent" and doubted that the

"assumptions on which the proposed NSDD were based were in any way valid" (Joint Hearings,

100-10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 134).

Despite the concerns voiced by other Presidential advisors, and despite expressly stated

U.S. policy to the contrary, McFarlane sought Reagan's approval to undertake the Iran initiative.

Lying in his hospital bed recovering from surgery, barely more than a week after publicly

labeling Iran's leadership "the strangest collection of misfits, Looney Tunes and squalid

criminals since the advent of the Third Reich," President Reagan gave McFarlane permission to

begin negotiations with Iranian representatives (Draper, 1991; "Major news in summary," 1985,

p.1; Morris, 1999). The President summarized his meeting with McFarlane in his diary: "Bud

came by-it seems 2 [sic] members of the Iranian govt. [sic] want to establish talks with us. I'm

sending Bud to meet them in a neutral country" (Morris, 1999, p. 605). McFarlane took no notes









at this meeting but Chief of Staff Regan, who was present for the entire conversation, did:

"Middle East/Hostage Release/problem" (Draper, 1991; Morris, 1999; Regan, 1988). Regan

later wrote that "the hostages were discussed in a general way" but "swapping arms for hostages

was not mentioned by either man" (Regan, 1988, p. 20-21)

One outcome of this meeting, and the ensuing negotiations between U.S. and Iranian

representatives, was that American-made armaments were transferred to Iran via a complex

chain of middlemen, including a retired Air Force Major General and an Iranian expatriate, on

multiple occasions. The first arms were delivered to Iran in August 1985; additional transfers

occurred in February, May, and October 1986 (Draper, 1991; Regan, 1988). When reports of the

negotiations and transfers surfaced, the Reagan Administration found itself engulfed in a

presidential crisis reminiscent of Watergate (Schudson, 1992).

The first newspaper reports related to the Iran initiative regarded negotiations which

occurred in the spring of 1986. In May 1986, roughly six months after resigning his official

Administration post, Robert McFarlane led a group of unofficial United States representatives to

Tehran to negotiate with equally unofficial Iranian representatives for the release of American

hostages held by Hezbollah It was believed that if Iran was offered weapons, the country's

leadership would exert influence over Hezbollah (Draper, 1991). McFarlane and crew failed to

win the release of any hostages, but the meeting was highly significant because it was the subject

of an article which appeared on November 3, 1986 in the Lebanese weekly publication Al-

. /utt. This article catalyzed the crisis which imperiled the Reagan Administration in the fall of

1986 (Draper, 1991; Hijazi, 1986, November 4; Wallison, 2003).

The Crisis Emerges

The crisis emerged on election-day. On Tuesday, 4 November 1986, The Washington Post

reported that "the U.S. government may have conducted secret talks with Iran," as described by









Al-.\ltitu the previous day (McCartney, 1986, November 4, first section, p. Al). Former White

House legal counsel Peter Wallison later wrote of the event: "Thus began. .the greatest crisis of

Ronald Reagan's presidency. .During the four months it continued the Reagan Administration

was essentially brought to a standstill" (Wallison, 2003, p. 168).

Regardless of its significance the report aroused little interest during the White House daily

operations meeting that morning. Instead, discussion concerned the day's mid-term elections. To

the extent the Iran arms sales story was discussed, Alton Keel, the National Security Director's

deputy, labeled the story nonsense and advised White House spokesperson Larry Speakes to

refuse comment (Wallison, 2003).

Secretary of State George Shultz was forced to acknowledge the story earlier than most of

the White House staff. On November 4, 1986 while airborne en route to Vienna, the press

questioned him about the emerging story during his routine in-flight press conference (Ottaway

& Hoffman, 1986, November 8). Shultz wrote to Vice Adm. John Poindexter, the President's

National Security Advisor to warn "the big story the press is after is to establish that the U.S.

violated its own policy by cutting a big secret arms deal with Iran in order to get our hostages

released" and thus had bargained with terrorists (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-35, p. 563).

He assured Poindexter that he refused to comment on the story (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987,

GPS-35).

The story placed the Secretary of State in a difficult position. On November 4, he was

traveling to Vienna to encourage international adherence to U.S.-led arms embargo against Iran.

The State Department expressed opposition to providing military supplies to Iran in an article

appearing in The New York Times the day prior (Gwertzman, 1986, November 4). Despite such









statements, Shultz was aware that his government, via the National Security Council (NSC) staff,

had initiated arms sales to Iran (Walsh, 1994).

Shultz understood the potential damage inherent in this story and immediately argued that

the Administration fully disclose its activities and "give the key facts to the public" (Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-35, p. 564). Several Reagan Administration staffers including

Donald Regan agreed with Shultz's assessment of the situation, but several key persons did not.

Internal debates regarding public disclosure continued throughout the crisis (Joint Hearings,

100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 217, 244; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan testimony,

p. 21, 37, 57).

Internal Conflicts Emerge

National Security Advisor Poindexter argued for continued non-disclosure. He wrote to

Shultz to express his disagreement with recommendations for full public disclosure of the Iran

initiative. Poindexter told the Shultz, "we must remain absolutely close-mouthed" because

"speculation about our efforts to secure the hostages [sic] release only increases the danger to the

hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-36, p. 566). Poindexter contended that

Congressional intelligence committees should be briefed "before the Administration speaks

publicly on the matter" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-36, p. 566). He further argued that

public disclosure of the negotiations could intensify Iranian political power struggles, possibly

inspiring additional Iranian disclosures which were likely to contradict information provided by

the Administration (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-36).

Poindexter had established a command role for himself in coordinating the messages the

Administration would communicate in response to the burgeoning crisis. Vice President George

Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Central Intelligence Agency Director

William Casey supported Poindexter's recommendations. As the crisis developed, it became









apparent that Reagan placed a great deal of faith in Poindexter's guidance (Joint Hearings, 100-

8, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 57;

Wallison, 2003).

Poindexter attempted to insure a unified response to the crisis, to no avail. The arms deals

with Iran directly contradicted stated public policy and thus undermined the Administration's

credibility. There was little motivation for the Secretary of State or others within the

Administration who disagreed with Poindexter to adhere to guidance which protected the NSC

staff at their expense. The communication of between these two officials staked out the sides that

would characterize the internal conflict soon to become publicly apparent (Draper, 1991; Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41). Meanwhile, on November 5, the White House

staff members present at the daily operations meeting were preoccupied with "analyzing the

implications of the Republicans' loss of the Senate," though press coverage of the secret mission

was beginning to snowball (Wallison, 2003, p. 173).

White House Staff Gains Interest, Stonewall Emerges

On Thursday, November 6, the White House staff began to pay more attention to the Iran

story. At the daily operations meeting, White House spokesperson Larry Speakes said the

number of press inquiries regarding former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane's visit

to Tehran was increasing. John Poindexter argued for continued non-disclosure to protect the

remaining hostages. White House legal counsel Peter Wallison suspected that Poindexter was

using the welfare of the hostages to protect himself. Despite the interest displayed during the

morning meeting, the Iran story received minimal attention in the cabinet meeting Wallison

attended later that afternoon (Wallison, 2003).

Poindexter's argument for non-disclosure was supported by statements made by hostage

mediator Terry Waite appearing in The Washington Post. Waite blamed press speculation for









complicating the hostage release efforts (McCartney, 1986, November 6). Contrarily, additional

coverage of the Iran initiative in The Post on Thursday, November 6 challenged the Reagan

Administration to provide full public disclosure of its activities ("The Iranian Connection," 1986,

November 6). Both The Washington Post and The New York Times presented information, some

of which was attributed to Chief of Staff Regan, that undermined contentions that the

negotiations were strategic in nature (Pincus, 1986, November 6; Boyd, 1986, November 6).

The following day's newspaper coverage continued to be highly critical of the Administration

(Pincus, 1986, November 7; Krauthammer, 1986, November 7).

On the morning of November 7, White House legal counsel Peter Wallison received an

indication of how problematic the Iran initiative really was when Larry Speakes asked him if the

President could violate his own executive order. In the executive order referred to, the President

had labeled Iran a terrorist state, thus arms sales to Iran were possibly in violation of the Arms

Export Control Act (AECA) of 1986. The AECA prohibited all sales of arms to terrorist states

unless Congress was notified in advance (Wallison, 2003). Unsure of the answer, and unaware

of the details of the secret operation, Wallison convened with Chief of Staff Regan. Regan

imparted his knowledge of the operation, and recommended Wallison speak with National

Security Advisor Poindexter (Wallison, 2003).

When Wallison found Poindexter he inquired about the arms sales to Iran. The White

House legal counsel was "stonewalled" by the President's National Security Advisor whose

answers were "not forthcoming" and false (Wallison, 2003, p. 176). Wallison concluded

Poindexter was engaged in a cover-up operation, focused on self-preservation, which threatened

Reagan's presidency (Wallison, 2003).









Wallison's conclusion was supported by an exchange which occurred later that evening

and illustrated the tensions brewing between the President's closest advisors (Joint Hearings,

100-10, 1987, DTR-36, p. 37). At 8:30 on Friday evening Robert McFarlane sent a desperate

memo to Poindexter in which he threatened to sue Chief of Staff Regan for libel over recent

statements appearing in the press (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-36). Poindexter

recommended that McFarlane remain calm and reminded him that "right now would be an

absolutely stupid time for the Administration to say anything" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987,

DTR-37, p. 366).

The Situation Worsens

Press coverage of the Iran story over the weekend indicated that the issue was moving

beyond crisis to scandal (Busby, 1999). On Saturday, November 8, The Washington Post

reported that White House officials bypassed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to avoid

disclosing information about the Iran initiative to Congress (Pincus, 1986, November 8). Several

reports indicated that the Reagan Administration was losing credibility both abroad and

domestically due to the mixed messages it was disseminating (Smothers, 1986, November 8;

Ottaway, 1986, November 8; Gwertzman, 1986, November 8). In one article, Secretary of State

Shultz directly criticized the hostage negotiations while President Reagan argued that the

negotiations (which were occurring in Geneva on that very day) had to "happen again and again

until we get them all back" (Draper, 1991; Ottaway, 1986, November 8). In the same article -

and others the President claimed Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger

supported the negotiations that Shultz himself was criticizing (Ottaway, 1986, November 8). On

Sunday, November 9, The New York Times asked, "Is there in fact a guiding intelligence behind

all the seeming contradictions?" while William Drozdiak wrote, "The first casualty of the U.S.-









Iranian connection appears to be U.S. leadership" ("Arms for Iran," 1986, November 9, section

4, p. 22; Drozdiak, 1986, November 9, first section, p. Al).

The White House Responds

The damaging press coverage of the weekend carried over through Monday. On November

10, The Washington Post reported that the House and Senate planned to "investigate allegations

that the National Security Council has been used to circumvent Congress" (Pincus, 1986,

November 10, first section, p. Al). The Administration finally responded.

That morning, President Reagan led a meeting to draft an official response to the avalanche

of press coverage regarding the Iran arms sales. At 11:30, the President, Vice President Bush,

Shultz, Regan, CIA Director William Casey, Attorney General Edwin Meese, and Poindexter

(with his deputy Alton Keel in tow) convened in the White House Oval Office to draft a

statement for press distribution (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A). The meeting was

contentious. Poindexter described operational details of the arms deals, leading some in the

group to feel they had been misled. After hearing the National Security Advisor's description of

what had transpired, Shultz referred to the arms deals as "ransom" and Weinberger complained

that "we have given the Israelis and the Iranians the opportunity to blackmail us" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10,1987, DTR-41A, p. 386-388, CWW-28, 578-579, Weinberger testimony, p.

154). Both Shultz and Weinberger argued that the negotiations with Iran encouraged further

acts of terrorism despite Poindexter's claims to the contrary. Regan and Weinberger pointed out

the damage that was being done to the Administration's credibility (Joint Hearings, 100-10,

1987, DTR-41A, CWW-28). Throughout the meeting, Poindexter argued that the Administration

should adhere to the "no comment" policy (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 388-

389). He complained of leaks originating from the White House and contended that public

disclosure endangered the hostages. Disclosure was also unnecessary, he argued, because news









coverage of the negotiations had peaked and the public would soon lose interest in the story.

These views were not shared by Weinberger, Shultz, and Regan who advocated for immediate

disclosure of NSC staff activities (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A). The President

appeared to fall somewhere in the middle of the argument. He said the Administration should

"say something" but should not answer press inquiries, out of concern for the hostages' safety

(Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 389). The meeting ended on a note of hopeful, yet

false, consensus. Chief of Staff Regan's notes indicated that all present agreed the statement

should "face as many facts as possible" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 390).

Following the meeting, a statement was drafted by Poindexter. It was approved that

afternoon by most of those present in the morning's meeting. Shultz was en route to an

Organization of American States meeting in Guatemala, so the press statement was "cabled" to

him "on the plane" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41, GPS-39A). The draft

statement said that, among the President's "senior advisors. .there was unanimous support for

the President's decisions" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-38A, p. 569). Shultz disapproved

of the statement; he supported the President, but not the decision to violate Operation Staunch.

He marked his edits on his printed copy, and "responded from the plane" (Joint Hearings, 100-9,

1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41. The correction was made, and Chief of Staff Regan directed

Poindexter to "proceed for evening news release" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p.

393).

The statement stressed that press speculation was endangering the hostages, no laws had

been broken, the initiative was strategic in nature, and the Administration's terrorism policy

remained intact. To address speculation about internal conflicts within the White House, the

statement claimed President Reagan had the "unanimous support" of his senior advisors and that









he supported his staff (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-40, p. 584). Despite this claim, official

statements appearing in the press provided ample evidence to the contrary.

Secretary of State Shultz did not support the messages being communicated by the

Administration. In an internal memo dated "November 1986," apparently written to the

President soon after the official statement was drafted, Shultz directly refuted Administration

claims regarding the wisdom of strategically engaging Iran via a series of arms deals. He

continued to argue for full public disclosure (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-40):

There is a real danger of spinning a web of misleading if not incorrect statements that

won't stand up to press and Congressional investigation. If there is not full and swift disclosure

-to the public and to the intelligence committees, as appropriate-this affair is going to go on

and on in an agonizing and terribly corrosive way. .every achievement of this Administration

[sic] will be at risk (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-40, p. 584)

The White House statement had little positive affect on the news coverage of Tuesday,

November 11. The Washington Post portrayed the Administration as being operationally inept

and reported complaints that the White House provided more information to Iranian mullahs than

the Senate (Pincus & Hoffman, 1986, November 11). An editorial written by Mary McGrory

claimed President Reagan "made tapioca of his own credibility" and then criticized the

Administration's "feeble" response to the story (McGrory, 1986, November 11, first section, p.

A2). The New York Times further questioned the Administration's credibility (Weinraub, 1986

November 11; Lewis, F., 1986, November 11).

White House legal counsel Peter Wallison was concerned with the Administration's public

stance, particularly by claims that no laws had been violated. On Veteran's Day, November 11,

Wallison recommended that Reagan waive executive privilege if the issue came up because he









"believed that the President would be hurt far more by an appearance that he was covering up

wrongdoing than by disclosure of any lapses that occurred" (Wallison, 2003, p. 181) Wallison's

analysis of the situation would eventually be proven correct (Walsh, 1994).

The next day, Wallison met with the Chief of Staff in hopes of scheduling a meeting with

Poindexter. Regan told Wallison he did not have the authority to require Poindexter to speak

with him nor to get the President "to commit to more complete disclosure" (Wallison, 2003, p.

182). At this time Regan acknowledged that Poindexter was the major influence on President

Reagan's communication decisions (Wallison, 2003).

President Reagan's public stance and the intense press coverage of the story was causing

concern among other Administration officials (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-42; Wallison,

2003). White House communications director Patrick Buchanan wrote to the Chief of Staff on

November 12 and urged full and immediate disclosure of Administration involvement with Iran.

He argued that Iran issue posed "a grave communications problem" that threatened to cause

"deep and permanent damage to the President's standing" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-

42, p. 394). Buchanan, echoing Shultz's recent claims, predicted "the story will not die, until

some much fuller explanation. .is provided" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-42, p. 394).

Regan replied that he agreed and "we are going to do something on Thurs(tmrw)[sic]" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-42, p. 395)

The Administration acted. On Wednesday, November 12, the President, Poindexter and

Regan met to decide how the Administration should respond to the crisis. It was decided that

President Reagan would brief Congressional leadership that afternoon. He would then make his

case to the nation via television and radio address the following evening (Joint Hearings, 100-10,

1987, DTR-43).









Before meeting with members of Congress, Reagan had lunch with three well-known

journalists-James Lehrer of PBS, Bernard Shaw of CNN and syndicated columnist Roland

Evans Jr. Prior to the luncheon, Lehrer, Shaw, and Evans agreed that the President's statements

were to be made "off the record" (Molotsky & Weaver, 1986 November 13, first section, p. Al).

At 2:00, Reagan and his senior advisors provided a detailed, if not entirely forthright, briefing to

Congressional leadership in the White House Situation Room. The briefing lasted two hours

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244; Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-

21; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 13). Work began on the address the following day

(Wallison, 2003).

That evening, McFarlane sent Poindexter a draft of his recounting of the Iran initiative

which emphasized the strategic elements of the operation. One statement about "Iran's critical

geography" would show up verbatim in the President's address the next night (Joint Hearings,

100-2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 51, p. 632). The main significance of this document is that it

would soon be massaged into a controversial chronology detailing NSC staff actions during the

Iran initiative (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings, 100-2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 58).

The next morning, an editorial written by Robert McFarlane appeared in The Washington

Post. McFarlane's editorial compared the initiative he led to "secret diplomacy" efforts

undertaken by the Nixon Administration (McFarlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p. A21).

While other editorials appearing in The Washington Post that day were highly critical of

Administration actions, only McFarlane chose to associate the Reagan Administration with the

most scandal-ridden presidency to come before it. Ironically, one of the most damning editorials

appearing that day was written by former Nixon speechwriter William Safire (Safire, 1986

November 13).









News reports appearing in The Washington Post and The New York Times on Thursday,

November 13 expressed continued criticism of the Administration. The reports indicated the

Congressional briefing held the day before failed quiet Congressional criticism of the White

House (Weinraub, 1986, November 13; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 13). It was against

this backdrop of skepticism and distrust that Reagan would attempt to present his case to the

American people.

The President's Address to the Nation

On November 13 Chief of Staff Regan directed several White House staffers, including

White House communications director Patrick Buchanan and White House legal counsel Peter

Wallison, to draft a speech for the President to deliver to the nation that evening. Lieutenant

Colonel Oliver North, an active duty Marine Corps officer and NSC staffer who had been

involved in negotiations with the Iranians only three days prior, injected himself into the process.

This was an unusual occurrence (Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003; Walsh, 1994). The President

himself wrote the opening paragraph in which he questioned the credibility of various press

reports and promised to give the American people "the facts" ("Iran-United States Relations:

Address," 1986, p. 1559; Wallison, 2003).

Portions of the draft distressed Wallison, particularly a line which claimed that no laws had

been broken. To Wallison this statement "represented the first major step by the President down

the path to a cover-up" (Wallison, 2003, p. 185). The legal counsel later noted the speech

contained "at least one other false statement"- that a recent shipment of arms to Iran was small

enough to fit inside one cargo plane-and concluded that Reagan "was again used for the

protection of the NSC staff" ("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559; Wallison,

2003, p. 185). The inclusion of statements which had previously appeared verbatim in NSC









internal memorandum support Wallison's analysis (Joint Hearings, 100-2, McFarlane, 1987,

exhibit 51; "Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986).

Nevertheless, that evening at 8:01, President Reagan spoke to the American people from

his seat in the Oval Office. He opened the national address by promising to provide his audience

with "the facts" and then proceeded to disseminate a series of partial truths and

misrepresentations ("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986, p, 1559). As Wallison had

feared, the President claimed the amount of weapons shipped to Iran was negligible and that no

laws had been violated. Perhaps unwisely, Reagan antagonized the press for covering the story

and thus endangering the hostages ("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986).

During the course of the speech, Reagan forcefully denied exchanging arms for hostages,

related some positive outcomes of the initiative, and described the underlying good intentions of

the project. The President explained the amount of arms shipped to Iran was minimal, having

negligible effect on Iran's efforts in the Persian Gulf war. He related the necessity of U.S.

involvement in the region due to Iran's access to oil and Soviet ambitions in the region. He

argued that past foreign policy initiatives set the precedent for the Iran initiative. Reagan

repeatedly criticized the press for unduly risking harm to the hostages by covering the story

("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986).

The main message concerned the strategic motivation for the initiative. Reagan argued the

negotiations transcended hostage release efforts, and instead had the much broader goal of

developing favorable relations with Iran. Because Reagan drew a distinction between selling

arms to Iran for strategic purposes and selling arms to free the hostages, he may have believed

his claim that "we did not-repeat-did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages nor will

we" ("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561; Wallison, 2003). Reagan closed the









speech optimistically, saying "given the facts, the American people will make the right decision"

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, Poindexter, 1987, p. 643).

Though Reagan hoped to extinguish the blaze of criticism, the speech only added fuel to

the fire (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991). On Friday, November 14, The Washington Post reported

bipartisan Congressional criticism of the speech. Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), who was

present at the November 12 Congressional briefing, called the address "a public relations game"

while Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) was "particularly discouraged by the President's

attempt to blame the media and those who question his action for the unsuccessful outcome"

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244-245; Hoffman, 1986, November 14,

first section, p. A23).

Meeting the Press

Saturday yielded more bad news for the Reagan Administration. On November 15, The

Post reported the results of an ABC News poll that found a majority of respondents disapproved

of the arms-for-hostage deals whether or not they were strategic in motivation (Pincus, 1986,

November 15; "Survey by ABC News," 1986, November 13; "White House Fails," 1986). The

editorial desk of The New York Times continued to criticize Reagan and his efforts to manage the

crisis (Baker, 1986, November 15; "Europe faults," 1986, November 15). The President of Iran,

Hojatolislam Khamenei, further complicated the Administration's predicament by denying

Reagan's description of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. (Sciolino, 1986, November

15; "Iran's president," 1986, November 15)

By that afternoon, Robert McFarlane had apparently changed his views regarding the

Administration's "communications game plan" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-46, p. 404).

At 2:33, he wrote to Poindexter to advocate for a more candid, "pro-active" and "conciliatory"

communication strategy to engage journalists and senators (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-









46, p. 404). Invoking the memory of Watergate, he warned against dishonesty: "I lived through

Watergate John. Well-meaning people who were in on the early planning of the communications

strategy didn't intend to lie but ultimately came around to it" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987,

DTR-46, p. 405). Poindexter responded that he agreed with the approach proposed by McFarlane

(Joint Hearings, 100-2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 54). The next day, however, he would appear

on NBC's "Meet the Press" and would continue to disseminate the kind of information

McFarlane advocated against (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-65).

Reports pouring out of the Sunday editions of The Washington Post and The New York

Times continued to be highly critical of the Administration (Ajami, 1986, November, 16;

"Dealing With Iran," 1986, November, 16; Engleberg, 1986, November, 16; Hijazi, 1986,

November, 16; Ignatius & Getler, 1986, November, 16; "Making It Worse," 1986, November,

16; Miller, 1986, November, 16; McGrory, 1986, November, 16; Reston, 1986, November, 16;

"What's Wrong," 1986, November, 16). To counter this flood of condemnation, Shultz,

Poindexter, and McFarlane were dispatched to appear on the major television networks' Sunday

morning interview shows to present the Administration's side of the story. Unfortunately, these

three Administration officials did not agree on the details of the Administration's official story.

The result was calamity (Draper, 1991).

On 16 November Shultz appeared on the CBS program "Face the Nation," Poindexter

appeared on the NBC program "Meet the Press," and McFarlane appeared on the ABC program

"This Week With David Brinkley" (Molotsky & Weaver, 1986, November 17). Poindexter and

McFarlane both made statements contradicting earlier remarks made by Chief of Staff Regan;

both men suffered the humiliation of having this pointed out to them on national television.

Secretary of State Shultz suffered even greater humiliation when he was forced to admit that









Administration actions regarding Iran directly contradicted his previous public statements and

that he had no authority to say that the United States government would not continue to deal

arms to Iran (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-65; Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-42).

Shultz's appearance led to speculation of his resignation and at least one recommendation that

President Reagan fire him. The television appearances and the ensuing press coverage further

eroded the Administration's credibility (Draper, 1991).

Press criticism of the Reagan Administration persisted. Coverage of the Iran issue in the

Monday morning Post focused on questions regarding the wisdom (and reality) of attempting to

engage Iranian moderates, as well as the mixed messages continuing to leak from the White

House. The Administration received a bit of public support for Reagan's stated policy claims

from the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Said Raj aie Khorassani, but this bit of good

news was countered by strong criticism from Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi

(Homan, 1986, November 17; Ottaway, 1986, November 17; "The Moderate Fantasy," 1986,

November 17). The New York Times provided a voice to the Reagan Administration that day-

the effect was that of giving a man enough rope to hang himself. Reporter Stephen Engelberg

listed Administration answers to persistent questions that at times conflicted with themselves as

well as information provided by outside sources (Engelberg, 1986, November 17). Additional

coverage in The Times that day was primarily negative as exemplified by William Safire's

editorial which questioned Robert McFarlane's personal character (Safire, 1986, November 17).

The most notable aspect of the press coverage of the Iran story on Tuesday, November 18

was that Reagan publicly denounced further arms sales to Iran on both the part of the United

States and its allies, though negotiations with Iran continued until late December 1986

(Weinraub, 1986, November 18; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 158).









The Washington Post associated Reagan's statement with Shultz's appearance on CBS News'

"Face the Nation" where he was unable to make the same claim with any authority (Cannon &

Pincus, 1986, November 18). Despite this apparent show of support for the Secretary of State,

Poindexter still was the major influence on the President's response to the ballooning crisis

(Wallison, 2003).

On November 18, White House legal counsel Peter Wallison called a meeting of the

general counsels representing the State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence

Agency, Justice Department, and the National Security Council to determine how to legally

support the President's stance once Congressional hearings and briefings began (Wallison,

2003). NSC legal representative Paul Thompson was asked to provide the group with a

chronology of the key events of the Iran initiative but he refused. State Department legal counsel

Abe Sofaer and the White House legal counsel concluded the NSC staff s stonewalling tactics

were placing the President in legal jeopardy (Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003).

At this point, the controversial chronology of events was being massaged by Poindexter,

McFarlane, and North. Poindexter had directed Lt. Col. North to prepare the document soon after

the Iran story broke on November 4, 1986. Factual accuracy of information was not a

requirement for inclusion. The document would be distributed on November 20, 1986 (Draper,

1991; Joint Hearings, 100-7,OLN-18, OLN-19, OLN-20; Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-72,

JMP-73, JMP-74, JMP-75, JMP-76, JMP-77).

The President's News Conference

On November, 18 a staff meeting was held in the White House Situation Room to develop

a strategy to deal with the growing crisis (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-28). It was decided

that the President would give a press conference the following day. An afternoon briefing,

including a question-and-answer session, was held in preparation (Wallison, 2003).









Both Shultz and Poindexter provided the President with highly self-serving information in

preparation for the question-and-answer session (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-66; Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-44; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 25, 87-89).

Guidance provided by Poindexter was not only self-serving, but also evasive, misleading, and

antagonistic. One piece of advice was to suggest that to the press "rumor and fiction seem to be

more important than fact" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-66, p. 657). Reagan's

performance in the question-and-answer session was "close to disastrous" (Wallison, 2003,

p.189). Upon completing the briefing, the President jokingly asked if he actually had to "go

through with this press conference" (Wallison, 2003, p.189). Somehow his sense of humor was

still intact.

After the briefing, a small group of staffers met in presidential assistant Dennis Thomas'

office. Someone suggested that the President should "simply say he made a mistake in selling

arms to Iran" (Wallison, 2003, p.189). Wallison concluded "this strategy would have worked for

Reagan" due to the history of his relationship with the American people (Wallison, 2003, p. 189).

Unfortunately, the President had already painted himself into a corer via his previous statements

(Wallison, 2003).

At 9:02 P.M. on November 18, Poindexter sent an electronic message to McFarlane which

indicated the control Poindexter was attempting to assert over the President. Poindexter asked

McFarlane to stress a message regarding the strategic motivation for the arms deals to Reagan

during Wednesday's "pre-press conference brief so that he has it in his head to use as a Q&A.

Just as long as it comes out on the record that any fool can well imagine a number of reasons

why Iranians would want to change the status quo" (Joint Hearings, 100-7, 1987, OLN-22, p.

127).









On Wednesday, November 19, Reagan was briefed twice by his legal counsel and Attorney

General Meese regarding the legal aspects of the Iran initiative (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987,

EM-31). As the final briefing progressed, Wallison concluded the President was not prepared to

answer questions about the Iran initiative. Wallison was still uneasy about Reagan's legal stance

(Wallison, 2003).

Shultz also expressed distress about the evening's press conference. Prior to the event,

Shultz told Donald Regan and the President that Poindexter's press guidance was misleading.

Shultz implored Reagan not to claim that arms had not been traded for hostages (Joint Hearings,

100-9. 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 44-45, GPS-44).

Reports in The New York Times and The Washington Post on November 19 indicate the

importance of the press conference to Reagan's presidency. The New York Times' Bernard

Weinraub indicated that "the continued effectiveness of Mr. Reagan's leadership" may be

determined by his performance during that evening's press conference. (Weinraub, 1986

November 19, section A, p. 10). The Washington Post asked various American opinion leaders

to submit questions they wanted the President to answer and published the results. One

respondent asked Reagan "How do you expect to lie and have us trust you again?" ("Some

questions," 1986, November 19, first section, p. A17).

At 8:00 P.M., the President's news conference began. The event intensified the

Administration's troubles (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991). Much of the information Reagan

presented would be rebutted by one of the President's closest advisors, the American public, the

press, and Congress.

The President's opening statements went well enough. He provided background to the

Iran initiative, addressed the internal debate over the issue, and assumed full responsibility for









the decision to engage in the operation. After the opening statements, Reagan again criticized the

press for covering the story, denied the primary charges, minimized the impact of the arms trade,

related positive outcomes of the initiative, and reiterated that the initiative's objectives

transcended hostage rescue efforts ("The President's News Conference," 1986).

When the question and answer session began, Reagan's control of the situation evaporated.

His responses were confusing, occasionally contradictory, and generally evasive. The President

seemed flustered and defensive ("The President's News Conference," 1986). As Wallison had

concluded earlier that day, Reagan was not prepared for the relentless barrage of critical

questions of the White House press corps. In Reagan's defense, he had been ill-served by those

few individuals with enough knowledge of these events to adequately prepare him for the

onslaught ("The President's News Conference," 1986; Wallison, 2003).

The President was offered a chance to bite the bullet. After correcting Reagan's

description of a TOW missile, Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Times, asked "What could

be wrong with saying that a mistake was made on a very high-risk gamble so that you can get on

with the next two years?" "Because I don't think a mistake was made," answered the President

("The President's News Conference," 1986, p. 1590).

Thus concluded the portion of the press conference focused on the Iran initiative, and in

the larger context, the Administration's attempts to affect the outcome of the crisis using

communication tactics. Due to a misstatement of fact, the Administration issued a correction to

one of the President's claims minutes after the conference ended ("Iran-United States relations:

Statement," 1986). Many more mistakes would be identified soon after, both in the press and by

Secretary of State Shultz.









Shultz recognized multiple factual errors in the President's rhetoric and was duly upset (in

Donald Regan's words "the Secretary of State was boiling") (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987,

Regan, testimony, p. 27). After the press conference concluded, Shultz called Reagan to discuss

the many statements "that were wrong or misleading" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz

testimony, p. 44). The next day he met with President Reagan and Chief of Staff Regan armed

with a document which specifically identified and refuted 11 misleading or false statements

made by the President the previous night (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 45,

GPS-CHRONOLOGY-C, GPS-45).

The press, for the most part, portrayed the news conference as a failure in improving

perceptions of the Administration's credibility, though Reagan did receive statements of public

support from his Secretary of Defense and from Washington Post staff writer Tom Shales.

Shales predicted the public would soon lose interest in the Iran story and wrote, "Reagan won it

on points"(Hoffman, & Pincus, 1986, November 20; Gwertzman, 1986, November 20; Lewis,,

1986, November 20; Shales, 1986, November 20, style, p. cl). Conversely, strong, bipartisan

Congressional criticism of the President's performance was reported in elsewhere in The

Washington Post, and in The New York Times (Walsh & Dewar, 1986, November 20;

Fuerbringer, 1986, November 20).

During the next morning's White House staff daily operations meeting, there was much

speculation about the root of the persistent public interest in the Iran initiative. Speakes argued

that most Americans simply didn't approve of the Administration's dealings with Iran. Wallison

disagreed: he felt the problem was that the American public did not believe the President

(Wallison, 2003). An ABC News poll reached the same conclusion ("ABC Poll Says," 1986,

November 20; Survey by ABC News, 1986, November 19). Wallison later recorded his thoughts









in his diary: "This controversy will not end until the Pres.[sic] admits he made a mistake. .or he

fires Poindexter and others, or both" (Wallison, 2003, p. 193). In less than, a week Poindexter's

continued obfuscation would lead to his dismissal.

Metamorphosis: The Iran-Contra Scandal

From November 20 to November 24, the Administration's actions were guided primarily

by events which occurred within the White House, much more so than by the press coverage,

which had in no way subsided. The press continued to focus on the problematic aspects of the

Iran initiative, but the most important new information was developing within the White House

to which the press was not privy. The Iran-Contra scandal was set to emerge.

The chronology contrived by the NSC staff was released on November 20, 1986 in order to

quiet criticism of NSC staff actions (Joint Hearings, 100-2, 1987, exhibit 58). Paradoxically, the

document only served to create a new set of problems for its authors, who later testified they

knowingly included multiple inaccuracies (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings, 100-7, 1987, North

testimony, p. 36, 233-234; Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 302-303). The

document falsely represented armaments shipped to Iran as oil drilling equipment and made

several other misleading claims, which alerted State Department legal advisor Abraham Sofaer

to the possibility of a cover-up. Sofaer's concerns led to the involvement of Attorney General

Edwin Meese, who received the President's permission to investigate the issue on Friday,

November 21. Meese planned to present his findings at a meeting of the National Security

Planning Group (NSPG) on Monday, November 24 (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-49).

On the same day, Regan gave Wallison a copy of Poindexter's chronology. Poindexter was

directed to review it before the upcoming NSPG meeting. Wallison read the document and was

troubled. After review, he recommended that Poindexter and North should resign from the NSC

staff (Wallison, 2003).









On November 24 Wallison and Dennis Thomas, an assistant to the President, met with

Regan in his office. Wallison noticed that, for the first time since the initial Iran initiative

disclosures, the White House Chief of Staff was visibly shaken. He soon found out why. Regan

told the pair that "a situation is developing that looks like Watergate" (Wallison, 2003, 196).

Attorney General Meese's weekend fact-finding investigation had uncovered evidence that

NSC staff member Lt. Col. Oliver North had been diverting profits from the Iranian arms deals

to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration, via the NSC staff, had been

providing support to the contras in apparent violation of the Boland Amendment of 1983. The

amendment banned aid to military activities in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1994). Thus the Iran arms

crisis was now officially a scandal (Busby, 1999). Wallison concluded, "We were now dealing

with facts or events that went well beyond managing a political or public-relations problem"

(Wallison, 2003, p. 196) Wallison, with Thomas' support, reiterated his recommendation that

Poindexter and North should resign. Regan directed Wallison and Thomas to draft a statement

for the President explaining the justification for Poindexter and North's dismissal (Joint Hearing,

100-10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 31; Wallison, 2003).

According to later testimony offered by Poindexter, and corroborated by other senior

advisors, information about the diversion had been withheld from Reagan to allow him to claim

plausible deniability. Upon learning of the diversion, President Reagan was extremely distressed.

Reagan and Regan decided to provide full, immediate public disclosure of their limited

knowledge of the diversion. A press conference and briefings were scheduled for the following

day, November 25 (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 209, 250; Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 65; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan testimony,

p. 30, Weinberger testimony, p. 156-157).









Early on the morning of November 25, Chief of Staff Regan personally directed

Poindexter to resign (Wallison, 2003). North would learn of his dismissal at the same time the

rest of the country did-when it was announced by Attorney General Edwin Meese in the

afternoon's press conference (Draper, 1991). After dismissing the President's National Security

Advisor, Regan "drew up a rather lengthy plan of action" to guide the Administration as it

attempted to navigate the treacherous waters ahead (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan

testimony, p. 33, DTR-52). Though Regan was taking a command role at this time, he too would

soon be dismissed (Walsh, 1994).

Congressional leaders and the National Security Council (a separate entity than the NSC

staff) were briefed about the diversion before the press conference. At noon, the press conference

began (Draper, 1991). President Reagan took only five minutes to announce the discovery of the

diversion, the appointment of a special review board, and the introduction of the Department of

Justice into the matter ("National Security Council," 1986). He then left the press briefing room

and turned the conference over to the Attorney General, who did his best to answer the deluge of

questions based on his incomplete understanding of the situation (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987,

EM-54; Wallison, 2003).

The announcement of the diversion of funds to the Contras at the press conference merged

the Iran initiative and Contra support operations into the Iran-Contra scandal (Wallison, 2003;

Walsh, 1994). Though Reagan's rhetoric appeared to imply the dissolution of both sets of covert

operations, such was not the case. The Reagan Administration's negotiations with Iran continued

through December 1986, much to the chagrin of Secretary of Defense Weinberger (Draper,

1991; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 157).









After leaving the chaotic press conference, President Reagan walked a short distance to the

East Wing family dining room where the Justices of the Supreme Court were waiting. In stark

contrast to the events which had just occurred, the Justices were waiting for the President to have

lunch with them. Those present were apparently more concerned with exchanging humorous

stories about childhood and baseball than with the disturbing details of the newly emerged Iran-

Contra scandal (Wallison, 2003). Wallison watched with respect and amazement as Reagan

carried on as if he had not been through the traumatic events of the past three weeks. The

President exuded warmth that melted the ideological barriers between himself and liberal

Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan seated at the table. The lunch continued,

nostalgic anecdotes flowed, and despite what he had just endured, Reagan appeared to have "a

wonderful time" (Wallison, 2003).

Epilogue

The emergence of the Iran-Contra scandal on November signaled the failure of the Reagan

Administration to manage the Iran arms crisis via communication means. After November 25,

the issue became a matter of Justice Department involvement and legal proceedings commenced

(Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003). Thus, November 25, 1986, represents the end of

the opportunity for the Reagan Administration to use communication techniques to manage the

initial crisis.

The Iran-Contra scandal constrained Reagan's actions and degraded his approval ratings

throughout the remainder of his presidency (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003).

Though Reagan faced considerable challenges over the next two years, he never faced

impeachment (Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). In the aftermath of the diversion disclosure, public

approval of Reagan fell precipitously. Polls taken directly after the November 25 news

conference show a drop in public approval of 16%. A Gallup poll conducted November 24









through November 27, 1986 showed 63% of the respondents approved of Reagan's job

performance. By the next Gallup poll, only 47% of those surveyed approved of the President's

job performance (Gallup poll data, www.Ropercenter.uconn.edu). Though the Reagan

Administration's communication response to the Iran arms story failed to quell the crisis and

arguably led to the eruption of the Iran-Contra scandal, Ronald Reagan eventually managed to

regain the favor of the American people. Reagan's public approval ratings did not return to pre-

Iran-Contra levels until the last Gallup poll taken during his presidency (Gallup poll data,

www.Ropercenter.uconn.edu).

Eventually, 14 persons were charged with criminal violations for their involvement in Iran-

Contra, both for operational crimes and for what Walsh (1994) labeled "'cover-up"' crimes (p.

xiv). Eleven of these persons were convicted. Reagan Administration officials who faced legal

retribution for their involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal were not charged with crimes related

to the operational aspects of the secret initiatives, but for their attempts to cover-up the scandal.

Two convictions were overturned on appeal, two persons were pardoned pre-trial, and one case

was dismissed after "the Bush Administration declined to declassify information necessary for

trial" (Walsh, 1994, p. xxiii). Six other individuals received presidential pardons from President

G.H.W. Bush on Christmas Eve 1992 (Walsh, 1994).









CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

Research Questions

The literature review illustrates that a multitude of crisis communication concepts,

developed by both communication and political science scholars, are relevant to this case. This

study investigates the Administration's priorities which guided the crisis communication

response This approach will yield insight into a fundamental question of governance: in crisis

situations, should executive leadership prioritize the protection of its symbolic assets, its

relationships with stakeholders, or other concerns? Thus, the first research question (RQ1) is:

RQ1: Did the Reagan Administration prioritize its symbolic resources, its stakeholder

relationships, or some other concern when communicating a response to the Iran arms crisis of

November 1986?

The goal of this research project is to investigate the degree to which the Reagan

Administration prioritized its symbolic assets, stakeholder relationships, or other concerns. This

question is significant for several reasons. The Iran arms crisis damaged the Administration's

ability to govern, and decreased public faith in government (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Busby,

1999). Evidence suggests the Administration's crisis management efforts caused more harm than

the transgressions themselves (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003; Walsh, 1993). As

such, it is worthwhile to investigate the priorities of the Administration's crisis communication

efforts to gain insight into the causes of the Administration's failure to calm this crisis. This

investigation will also provide insight into the potential applicability of crisis management

theories to the realm of executive governance, thus broadening the field's relevance. If crisis

management theories promoted by communications scholars provide adequate explanation of the

Reagan Administration's crisis communication response in this case, the theories may be applied









to other cases of political crisis. This consideration's importance is evident when one considers

the numerous presidential crises that have occurred over the last four decades. If the priorities

guiding the management process of this particular crisis are ascertained, this study could serve as

a benchmark for future studies. Consequently, this investigation may be a valuable step in the

development of theory regarding presidential crisis communication.

Three subsidiary research questions to collect evidence necessary to answer RQ 1 are

proposed. These questions will probe the degree to which the administration's crisis management

efforts were symbolic and/or relational in nature. One of the questions will regard image

restoration discourse theory, one will regard stakeholder theory, and the final question will

regard discourse offered by the Administration, not covered by the first two questions.

Crises often threaten an organization's symbolic resources. These resources are directly

linked to external perceptions of legitimacy and credibility. Public perceptions of legitimacy

affect the ability of an organization to operate within a given environment. Damage to an

administration's symbolic resources may have direct negative affects on its ability to govern, as

well as to influence public understanding of the crisis in question (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1998;

Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998, Venette, Sellnow and Lang, 2003;

Ziaukas, 2001). As such, the protection of a presidential administration's symbolic resources is

often a key concern when crises surface. The second research question is:

RQ2: What insight does image-restoration discourse theory yield regarding the defensive

discourse disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the crisis period?

The fundamental assumption underlying image-restoration discourse theory is that

communication is enacted in crisis to protect an organization's symbolic assets (Blaney, Benoit

& Brazeal, 2002). Therefore, if image-restoration discourse theory describes the









Administration's use of defensive discourse, such a finding will support the contention that the

Administration prioritized its symbolic assets over other concerns.

Stakeholder theory contends that an organization's survival is dependent on the

maintenance of positive relationships with its stakeholders. It has been argued that an

organization's dependence on stakeholder relationships is intensified during crisis (Martin &

Boynton 2005; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). A crisis-management approach rooted in

stakeholder theory is relational. Therefore, the third research question is as follows:

RQ3: What insight does stakeholder theory yield regarding the defensive discourse

disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the crisis period?

While stakeholder theory is a broad management theory, the author maintains that the

theory may be modified for discourse analysis. The specific means by which the theory will be

modified is discussed in the Methodology section. If stakeholder theory, modified for rhetorical

analysis, describes the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration during this

crisis, such a finding will support the contention that the Administration prioritized its

relationships with stakeholders.

RQ2 and RQ3 will provide some indication as to the priorities underlying the

Administration's crisis response, but these results will not provide conclusive evidence needed to

answer RQ1. To answer RQ1, the results obtained from RQ2 and RQ3 will be cross-referenced

to the results yielded when answering the fourth research question:

RQ4: Did Administration officials, publicly or privately, make any additional statements

that indicated the priorities guiding their communication response?

Study Methodology

This study is a qualitative analysis of content based on an historical case. As such, the

defensive discourse offered by Administration representatives was analyzed and cross-referenced









with general public discourse according to categories drawn from crisis communication theory.

In summary, the first step in this process was the development of a case study of the crisis. Then,

appropriate theoretical frameworks were identified and, when necessary, modified for this

analysis. The next step was to collect and categorize raw data. The units of analysis are

statements made by Administration officials. Once categorized, the data was sorted

chronologically and by rhetor. After being sorted, the data was analyzed and trends identified.

The specific theories selected to analyze this case study are image restoration discourse

theory and stakeholder theory. These two theories were chosen because they are exemplars of the

symbolic and relational approaches to crisis management. By considering the degree to which

image-restoration discourse theory and stakeholder theory describe the crisis rhetoric offered by

the Administration, the author gained insight into Administration's priorities. Detailed

justification of the decision to analyze this case through the lens of these two theories will be

provided.

Time frame of the study: This study investigates the crisis-communication efforts

undertaken by the Reagan Administration from November 3 through November 24, 1986. This

time period is identified as the crisis period based on a three-stage model of crisis development,

pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis (Coombs, 1999; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek,

& Hale, 2005). This three-stage model describes the development of this crisis. The period from

the date of the first arms-for-hostage deal, August 1985, until November 2, 1986, may be

considered the pre-crisis phase. During this time period, the release of the hostages themselves

was a prodrome, as this event was the first public indication that the transgression had occurred.

The period from November 3 through November 24 is indeed the crisis period. November 25,









1986, is the date of crisis resolution for this case, as well as the date of crisis emergence for the

larger Iran-Contra scandal.

The Case Study

The first step in this research project was the development of the case study based on

multiple sources of evidence, including historical and documentary evidence. This methodology

is especially appropriate when the researcher has scant opportunity to interact with the subject of

the study. The method allows the researcher to portray the situation in detail that is usually not

possible with other research methods. Due to the complexity of the case methodology, modes of

data collection and analysis may vary from case to case (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Yin, 2003).

The time period of analysis was November 3 through November 24, 1986, but relevant

events leading up to, and following, the crisis were investigated as well. This phase of the

research relied on primary sources, specifically internal documents generated by key

Administration officials and transcripts of testimony given by these officials before House and

Senate committees during the summer of 1987. This information is compiled in the 12-volume

series Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms

Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and

the Nicaraguan Opposition published by the U.S. Government Printing Office. Examples of the

type of documentation referenced include internal memoranda, meeting notes, planning

calendars, and transcripts of speeches and television appearances. The case study also relied on

secondary sources such as newspaper reports, historical texts, biographies, and autobiographies.

Public opinion polls have been consulted to augment this phase of the research. Brody and

Shapiro's (1989) content analysis of news coverage of the crisis during November 1986 has been

consulted as well. This data will be revisited during the analysis section of the thesis. Secondary

sources were consulted to fill in background information and to act as cross-references to the









primary sources. These include autobiographical accounts of the events written by former White

House officials involved in the crisis response (Regan, 1988; Speakes, 1988; Reagan, 1989;

Reagan, 1990; Wallison, 2003); the independent counsel's final report (Walsh, 1993); and

biographies as appropriate. Additional secondary sources, several of which are referred to in the

literature review, were also consulted.

Data Collection

Unit of Analysis

The datapoints for this qualitative analysis are documented statements made by

Administration officials such as those recorded in newspaper reports, press statements, and in

transcripts of appearances on mass media broadcasts (including speeches and news conferences).

Sources consulted during the study are relevant documents released in the Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents (including press statements, transcripts of the President's national

broadcast address and two press conferences), newspaper reports appearing in the Washington

Post and the New York Times, and transcripts of television broadcasts on which various

Administration officials appeared. A total of 202 statements were analyzed.

Statements analyzed were sentence fragments, single sentences, and multiple sentences.

When necessary, the surrounding paragraphs were considered to appropriately place the

statement in context.

Statements were limited to discourse offered in response to the primary charge leveled at

the Administration that arms were traded for hostages. The need for this limitation arises from

a careful read ofBenoit, Gullifor and Panici (1991), who indicated in their discussion that they

confounded Reagan's responses to different accusations with a shifting rhetorical strategy. The

analysis in this thesis is, therefore, limited to defensive discourse offered in response to a single

charge.









In addition, this study was limited to statements and documentation generated by officials

involved in the crisis-communication process. These individuals worked within the White

House, State Department, Department of Defense, and the CIA. These were the departments

directly involved in the crisis-response process. It should be noted that the heads of these

departments-President Ronald Reagan, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, National

Security Director John Poindexter, National Security Director Robert McFarlane, Secretary of

State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Central Intelligence Agency

Director William Casey-helped to develop the Administration's crisis- management efforts.

The majority of statements appearing publicly and in the internal documentation, and thus

analyzed, originated with these officials.

Source Material

Data was collected from the following sources:

* The New York Times

* The Washington Post

* Volumes 100-2, 100-7, 100-8, 100-9, and 100-10 of the 12-volume series Joint Hearings
Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Opposition published by the U.S. Government Printing Office

* Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents

Analysis of press coverage was limited to the The Washington Post and The New York

Times published between November 3 and November 24, 1986. Articles were retrieved via a

LexisNexis search. Keywords used were "Reagan" (in the "Headline, Lead Paragraph[s], Terms"

field) and "Iran" (in the "Headline, Lead Paragraph[s], Terms" field). These papers were chosen

for analysis due to their roles as national agenda-setters, their prominence, and their impact on

the executive office (Bartels, 1996; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; McCombs,1994; McCombs,









2002; Messner & DiStaso, 2006; Schraeder & Endless, 1998; Wilkins, 1993; Yanovitzky &

Bennett, 1999). A comparison of coverage of the Iran arms story in several other newspapers

indicated strong similarity to the coverage provided by The Washington Post and The New York

Times. Additionally, former White House legal counsel Peter Wallison wrote that The

Washington Post and The New York Times set coverage trends for the evening television news

programs and were regularly monitored by White House staff (Wallison, 2003). Additionally, the

crisis emerged after The Washington Post relayed a report originating in Lebanon (Busby, 1999;

Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003).

The Joint Hearings volumes contain testimony and evidentiary exhibits from hearings held

in the summer of 1987 to investigate the Iran initiative. The types of documents from which

statements were pulled include interoffice memoranda, meeting notes, transcripts of television

appearances, press guidance documents, and speech drafts. The volumes also contain full

transcripts of testimony provided by John Poindexter, Donald Regan, Caspar Weinberger, Robert

McFarlane, George Shultz, and Edwin Meese. These transcripts were reviewed to provide

context and cross-reference for the discussion section of this paper, but specific statements to be

analyzed were not collected from the testimony transcripts. This is due to the fact that these

statements were offered well after the crisis had occurred, and that the veracity of much of the

testimony has been strongly criticized (Draper, 1991; Morris, 1999). Analysis of the Joint

Hearings exhibits was limited to those exhibits generated between November 3 and November

24, 1986. All exhibits generated during this time period were reviewed.

The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents contains various documents issued by

the Executive office. Volumes 45, 46, 47, and 48 were consulted-these were the volumes which

contained documentation from November 3 through November 24, 1986. All documents within









these volumes were reviewed. Statements were pulled from transcripts of Presidential news

conferences and broadcast addresses, and press statements.

Qualitative Coding Categories

The categories into which the statements were sorted and analyzed primarily came from

the variables and structure found in crisis communication theory. Representative theories were

selected and then broken down into critical elements for coding purposes.

Image-Restoration Discourse Theory

The focus of this paper is the Reagan Administration's crisis communication enacted in

response to the Iran arms crisis. Of the symbolically-oriented crisis communication theories

reviewed, Benoit's (1997) image-restoration discourse theory is the most likely theory to yield

insight into the extent to which the Reagan Administration's crisis communication efforts were

enacted to protect symbolic resources. Image-restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to

evaluate rhetorical discourse options offered by an organization in response to crisis (Benoit,

1997; Benoit, & Brinson, 1996; Benoit, & Czerwinski, 1997; Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002;

Brinson, & Benoit, 1999; Zhang, and Benoit, 2004).

Image-restoration discourse theory embodies the symbolic approach to crisis

communication. Benoit, the theory's main advocate, explicitly defines crisis in terms of threats to

an organization's image (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996). Likewise, the

two primary assumptions underlying the theory ("communication is a goal-oriented activity" and

"the maintenance of a favorable image is a primary goal of communication") indicate the

theory's emphasis on the protection of an organization's symbolic assets (Blaney, Benoit &

Brazeal, 2002, pp. 380-381).

Image-restoration discourse theory has been identified by Coombs (2002) as one of three

dominant symbolically-oriented crisis management research streams: Ware and Linkugel's









(1973) apologia; Benoit's (1997) image restoration discourse theory; and Coombs' (2002)

situational crisis communication theory. Of these theories, image-restoration discourse theory is

the most appropriate for this analysis. While Ware and Linkugel's (1973) apologia may be useful

for evaluating messages communicated in response to crisis, significant theoretical advances

have been made since the concept was introduced. Some of these advances have been

incorporated into image-restoration discourse theory.

Like Ware and Linkugel's (1973) apologia, Coombs' (2002) situational crisis

communication theory is highly cited in scholarly crisis communication literature, but the focus

of this theory is not appropriate for this analysis. Situational crisis communication theory is

proposed as a predictive tool to help crisis managers develop effective responses to a crisis

(Coombs, 2002). Because Benoit's (1997) image restoration discourse theory is a typologyy,"

and not a predictive theory, it is more appropriate for evaluating discourse offered in response to

a past crisis, such as this case study, than situational crisis communication theory (Coombs &

Schmidt, 2000, p. 175). Additionally, various case studies developed by Benoit have

demonstrated the appropriateness of image restoration discourse theory's use in conjunction with

the case study method (Benoit & Brinson, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit, Gullifor &

Panici, 1991; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Zhang and Benoit,

2004). Situational crisis communication theory has tended to be used in conjunction with an

experimental methodology (Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002; Coombs &

Schmidt, 2000).

Image-restoration discourse theory predicts that organizations will respond to crisis by

enacting one (or more) of five image restoration discourse strategies identified by the theory:

denial, evasion of responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification









(Appendix A, Table A-i). Based on this prediction, it may be assumed that symbolically

motivated defensive

discourse offered by an organization in response to crisis will invoke one (or more) of these five

image-restoration discourse strategies when communicating a response to a crisis.

Analyzing the Reagan Administration's crisis communication response via this theory is

expected to provide insight into the evolution of the use of image restoration strategies, the

complexity of the discursive environment, and the extent to which crisis response efforts were

symbolically motivated. If analysis indicates that the Reagan Administration did indeed enact

multiple image-restoration discourse strategies, such findings will be considered to be evidence

in support of the contention that protecting the Administration's symbolic assets was a

communication priority.

Stakeholder Theory

Of the relationally-oriented crisis management theories covered in the literature review,

stakeholder theory is the most likely theory to yield insight into the extent to which the Reagan

Administration's crisis communication efforts were enacted to protect its relationships with

stakeholders. This is because stakeholder theory is the foundation for the relational approach to

crisis management (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Ledingham, 2001; Ledingham, 2003; Lyon

& Cameron, 2004; Martin & Boynton 2005; Phillips, 1997; Susskind & Field, 1996; Ulmer

2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

It must be acknowledged that relationally-motivated crisis response strategies generally

refer to broad management processes, not more narrowly defined communication efforts.

Additionally, there is no relational counterpart to image restoration discourse theory. That is,

there is no rhetorical discourse typology based on stakeholder theory. As such, for this analysis,

stakeholder theory must be specifically operationalized in regards to crisis communication. A









stakeholder theory-based rhetorical discourse typology is proposed and used to evaluate crisis

communication offered in this case.

Without a foundation in stakeholder theory, crisis management cannot be relational, hence,

relationally-oriented crisis management programs are developed based on a consideration of

stakeholder needs. In order to determine the extent to which the Administration's discourse

responding to the Iran arms crisis was enacted to protect organization-stakeholder relationships,

the Administration's rhetoric will be analyzed in regard to stakeholder theory. Evidence of

conformity to the principle tenets of stakeholder theory will provide an indication of the degree

to which the Administration placed a communications priority on relational concerns.

Based on the discussion above, some qualifications need to be stated. Stakeholder theory

refers to a management approach, not a specific communication approach. Unlike image

restoration discourse theory, stakeholder theory is not a typology used to analyze defensive

discourse. Therefore, stakeholder theory must be modified for application to an analysis of

defensive discourse by creating a typology based operationalizing the basic tenets of stakeholder

theory.

The foundation of stakeholder theory is concern for organization-stakeholder relationships.

Favorable organization-stakeholder relationships are critical for an organization's survival

amidst crisis (Marra, 1996; Martin & Boynton, 2005; Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).

Therefore, the author predicts that relationally motivated defensive discourse rooted in

stakeholder theory will exhibit concern for organization-stakeholder relationships.

Underlying a concern for organization-stakeholder relationships is a concern for

stakeholder groups themselves. Stakeholder theory implies the necessity of factoring stakeholder

needs and interests into a crisis response (Ledingham, 2003; Phillips, 1997). Therefore,









relationally motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit concern for

stakeholder groups.

Stakeholder theory emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholder groups impacted

by a crisis for effective crisis response (Horsely & Barker, 2002; Ulmer, 2001). Identifying the

various stakeholder groups affected by a crisis is important because of the complexity of an

organization's operating environment, often composed of multiple, disparate stakeholder groups

with differing needs and priorities (Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). As such, relationally

motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit an identification of

stakeholder groups affected by its crisis.

Lastly, because organizations often operate in complex environments occupied by a

multiplicity of stakeholder groups, stakeholder theory predicts organizations improve their

chances of survival by prioritizing stakeholder groups. The theory further predicts that

organizations will prioritize stakeholder groups based on stakeholder, not organizational, needs.

Therefore, relationally-motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit

prioritization of stakeholder groups affected by its crisis, based on stakeholder, not

organizational, needs.

Based on the literature review of stakeholder theory, relationally-motivated discourse

rooted in stakeholder theory is predicted to fall into four categories: statements of concern for

organization-stakeholder relationships, statements of concern for stakeholder groups, statements

prioritizing stakeholder groups, and statements identifying stakeholder groups. If analysis

indicates that the Reagan Administration's defensive discourse is described by the proposed

typology, said analysis will support the contention that these efforts were relationally-oriented

(Appendix A, Table A-2).









If the proposed typology fails to explain the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan

Administration, such a finding either indicates relational concerns were not a priority or that the

proposed stakeholder theory-based typology is flawed. Evidence of conformity to this

stakeholder theory-based categorization scheme will not prove the Administration placed highest

priority on relationship protection or that this was a motivation for the type of discourse.

However, absence of evidence of conformance with stakeholder theory may provide strong

indication that the efforts were not relationally oriented.

Data Categorization

When the source material was reviewed, the author noted statements that appeared to fit

either into the taxonomies provided by image restoration discourse theory and the stakeholder

theory-based typology. Statements which provided an indication of the Administration's

underlying priorities, but which did not fit into either typology, were also noted. Whereas the two

theoretical categorization schemes were strictly delineated, the last categorization scheme was

open-ended to allow results to emerge from the data.

The data was entered into tables which captured information used to cite and sort the data.

The information collected differed slightly for each categorization scheme. For image restoration

discourse theory, the following information was captured: the broad image restoration discourse

strategy; the specific strategy; the individual to whom the statement was attributed; the

publication the statement appeared in; the date the statement was made; and the type of

document (public or internal). For stakeholder theory, the following information was captured:

the rhetorical component of stakeholder theory; the stakeholder group referred to; the statement;

the individual to which the statement was attributed; the publication the statement appeared in;

the date the statement was made; and the type of document (public or internal). The following

information was captured for statements collected but not addressed by the two theoretical









frameworks as defensive discourse: the category (e.g., concern for a symbolic resource); the sub-

category (e.g., concern for credibility); the statement; the individual to which the statement was

attributed; the publication in which the statement appeared; the date the statement was made; and

the document type (public or internal).

The method of categorization was slightly different depending on whether the source

material was a primary or secondary source. When the source document was a primary source,

each instance a statement was uttered was noted separately and entered into an individual cell.

When the document was a secondary source which repeated statements originally found in a

primary source, statements which fit into the same category were entered into the same cell. For

example, when Reagan repeatedly denied that arms were traded for hostages, each individual

statement was noted in its own cell. When The New York Times or The Washington Post reported

these statements, all of the denial statements quoted were included in the same cell. The

rationale for this decision is to most accurately reflect the discourse as it was offered by the

rhetor, not the media outlet. Because this study is qualitative, this decision is does not affect the

findings, but this distinction must still be noted. It also must be noted that in this study, all of the

documents used were considered primary sources, except for newspaper articles which repeated

statements made in other primary source documents.

Some statements collected in the research fit into more than one category outlined by the

categorization schemes used. In these cases, if the statement could be segmented without losing

adequate context, it was entered in segments into two different cells. In other cases, the full

statement was kept intact to provide adequate context. In these cases the statements were entered

into each category in which they fit. For example, in the following text, President Reagan









invokes both the evasion of responsibility via good intentions strategy, and the reduction of

offensiveness via transcendence strategies:

That [the Iran] initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a
relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war
between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect
the safe return of all hostages. Without Iran's cooperation we cannot bring an end to the
Persian Gulf war; without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the
Middle East ("Iran-United States Relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559).

Because the meaning of the statement is most apparent when the full context is provided,

the statement was kept intact. It was categorized in one cell as an example of the evasion of

responsibility via good intentions strategy, and in a separate cell as an example of the reduction

of offensiveness via transcendence strategy.

Data Analysis

Once the data was categorized, the analysis began. To analyze the data, multiple data sorts

were conducted. The data in all three tables were first sorted chronologically. Based on these

sorts, the tables displayed in the Results section of this paper were developed to provide visual

representation of the evolution of the Administration's crisis rhetoric. The data was then

analyzed. The data in all three tables was then sorted by the individual who made the statements.

This data was used to develop a table providing a visual representation of the individual sources

of the statements and analyzed to identify trends based on the sources of the Administration's

crisis rhetoric.

Study Soundness

Care was taken to insure that this study was conducted soundly. As a qualitative study, it is

possible that author bias may affect decisions regarding the categorization of the statements

analyzed and judgments regarding the implications of the findings. To protect against this, care

was taken to conduct the study with as much objectivity as possible.









The reliability of the source material was ensured by including only verified source

material original to the time of the crisis itself. Statements were pulled from documents

generated during the crisis period. These documents were authored by Administration officials,

or contained direct quotes of statements made by Administration officials. Documents written by

commentators were included as primary sources. Transcripts of testimony provided by

Administration officials in the summer of 1987 were not used a primary source material for this

study. These transcripts were not considered to be primary materials due to the amount of time

that had elapsed between the hearings and the crisis and the fact that much of the testimony was

contradictory. It may be assumed that the motivations guiding the Administration officials during

the joint hearings differed from that underlying the crisis response.

Several steps were taken to establish the validity of categorization scheme. The author

diligently reviewed the original theorists' defensive discourse typologies so that those used in the

study were derived in a manner true to the original authors' intent. Additionally, categorization

decisions were compared to Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici's (1991) previous study of President

Reagan's defensive discourse in Iran-Contra. No apparent instances of author bias were

identified; however, because this study is qualitative, the author acknowledges that future

researchers may in fact choose to categorize the statements collected in this research project

differently.

The author limited analysis of defensive discourse to that offered in response to the charge

that arms were traded for hostages. This decision was made to insure that responses to different

charges were not misinterpreted as changes in rhetorical strategy. This decision was made after

reviewing the study authored by Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici (1991) which attempted to

categorize statements offered in response to multiple charges.









To maximize the validity of the judgments made in the analysis section, the data obtained

in answer to RQ2 and RQ3 was triangulated with data obtained in answer to RQ4 and with later

testimony provided by the major players in this case. In this way judgments informed by an

analysis of the defensive discourse were compared to the actual documents guiding the discourse

well as the recollection of the major players in this case.

Though qualitative studies are not generally considered to be replicable, future researchers

should be able to replicate this study if they follow the methodological steps outlined in this

chapter. The author does acknowledge that understanding derived from qualitative inquiry is

relative. Different authors may in fact interpret the results of this study differently. The analysis

offered by this author represents one interpretation of these results based on the most

comprehensive data set possible.









CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

The results of the study are discussed below. The specific results associated with RQ2,

RQ3, and RQ4 are discussed first, then the summary results ofRQ1 are presented at the end of

this chapter. The results are presented in this order because the results from RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4

are necessary to answer RQ1. When relating specific results for RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4, the

discussion first concerns the chronological evolution of the defensive discourse to provide an

overview of the Administration's communication. Then, the defensive discourse offered by the

various Administration units is discussed to provide a detailed look at the complexity of the

response.

While answering RQ2, several defensive discourse strategies emerged from the data which

are not described by image restoration discourse theory's typology (Zhang & Benoit, 2004). Like

the image restoration strategies, these discourse strategies were offered in response to the

specific charge that arms were traded for hostages. Therefore, the strategies are discussed in

regards to image restoration discourse theory, in the section regarding RQ2. The emergence of

these strategies is described first in the section discussing RQ2 so the reader will have been

introduced to these strategies when they are described elsewhere in the Results section.

RQ2: What Insight Does Image Restoration Discourse Theory Yield Regarding the
Defensive Discourse Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Crisis Period?

Discourse Strategies Not Identified by IRDT

Several defensive discourse strategies ignored by IRDT emerged from the data. The

Reagan Administration employed four broad defensive discourse strategies that have not been

identified by IRDT (Zhang & Benoit, 1997). These have been labeled no comment, speaking out,

acknowledgement, and accepting responsibility. Three previously unidentified varieties of the









reduction of offensiveness strategy were also employed during the crisis response: self defense,

precedent, and justification. The previously unidentified strategies are discussed below.

The no comment strategy was used frequently in the early phase of the crisis. Three

varieties of the no comment strategy were identified in the data analysis: simple no comment,

disclosure is dangerous, and superior order. The use of the no comment strategy generally took

one of the first two forms: a simple no comment and a refusal to comment on the grounds that

public disclosure of the Administration's actions would endanger the safety of the hostages and

those negotiating on their behalf (disclosure is dangerous). For example, on November 5, The

Washington Post reported that President Reagan "was asked about McFarlane's reported mission

and replied: 'No comment'" (Drozdiak & Pincus, 1986, November 5, first section, p. Al). In the

same article, the disclosure is dangerous strategy also appears when White House press secretary

Larry Speakes refused to comment on "'stories of this type from the Middle East, stories

involving hostages. .We just don't think it serves the interests or the safety of the hostages'"

(Drozdiak & Pincus, 1986, November 5, first section, p. Al). Another example of the disclosure

is dangerous strategy is the following statement attributed to White House Chief of Staff Donald

Regan, "'I don't want to talk anything about the Iran situation or go into any details of how

we're negotiating in order to get these hostages out. .There are lives at stake here,' he said.

'Opportunities can be lost by premature disclosure'" (Pincus, 1986, November 6, first section, p.

Al). The simple no comment and disclosure is dangerous strategies were used with much greater

frequency than the superior order strategy, which was exclusively by the State Department in an

apparent attempt to evade responsibility for its inability to comment on the case. For example, on

November 7, The New York Times reported that "He [Shultz] said he had been ordered by the

White House not to comment on reports that Robert C. McFarlane, the former national security









adviser, had secretly negotiated with Iranian officials...'The White House is in charge of the

executive branch, and they have issued a statement that all questions shall be answered by the

White House...I don't particularly enjoy it. I like to say what I think about something'"

(Gwertzman, 1986, November 8, section 1, p. 1).

Such statements made by the Secretary of State bear similarity to the speaking out strategy

which appeared in the data. The speaking out category captures discourse offered by

Administration officials in which they condemned Administration actions-the disapproval

strategy and contradicted previous Administration claims-the contradiction strategy. For

example, Shultz's early disapproval of the arms sales to Iran was reported by The New York

Times thusly: "Secretary of State George P. Shultz, signaling indirectly his disagreement with the

White House, said yesterday the declared the U.S. policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists

for the release of American hostages is 'the right policy.'...Nonetheless, he made clear that he

disagrees with a reported White House decision to undertake secret negotiations with Iran to gain

the release of American hostages in Lebanon by offering arms as an inducement" (Ottaway &

Hoffman, 1986, November 8, first section, p. Al). An example of the contradiction strategy can

be seen in the following statement made by Poindexter on November 14, which directly

contradicts Reagan's earlier claims that reports of the negotiations was endangering hostages, as

well as similar claims made by the Chief of Staff. On November 14, Chief of Staff Regan

claimed, "'this story has received so much publicity that this avenue to [sic] trying to establish

relationships with them may have been blocked for a while and unfortunately, that will also have

some repercussions in our efforts to get the hostages out'" (Gwertzman, 1986, November 15,

section 1, p. 5). On the same day Poindexter said, "the unexpected revelation of U.S. arms









deliveries to Iran might now 'expedite' the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations and win

release of more hostages" (Pincus, 1986, November 15, first section, p. Al).

The broad acknowledgement category of defensive discourse refers to discourse in which

Administration officials at least partially acknowledged that the transgression did indeed occur.

For example, two days after denying that arms were exchanged for hostages on November 3,

"the Reagan Administration said. .it was pursuing the release of the remaining American

hostages in Lebanon through many channels" and that "the United States was working with other

countries to try to free the hostages and refused to rule out that Iran might be one of them"

(Boyd, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 10). Likewise, during the President's address to the

nation on November 13, Reagan acknowledged that "For 18 months now we have had underway

a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559).

The use of the acknowledgement strategy was often highly nuanced, as in the following

statement made by an unnamed "senior official" in response to a question about the arms

shipments: "'We have never said that we weren't shipping arms to Iran" (Hoffman, 1986,

November 14, first section, p. Al).

The last broad defensive discourse strategy to emerge from the data analysis is the

accepting responsibility strategy. This category of discourse captures statements made by the

accused in which culpability was admitted. This rhetorical strategy was used by Reagan during

the November 19 news conference. The President stated in regards to the decision to ship arms to

Iran, "...the responsibility for the decision is mine and mine alone ("The President's news

conference," 1986, p. 1583).

Three variants of the reduction of offensiveness strategy emerged from the data: self

defense, precedent, and justification. The self defense category captures statements in which the









rhetor rejected claims that the Administration's actions were incorrect and/or exclaimed the

inherent correctness of the actions in question. For example, The Washington Post attributed the

following statement to Larry Speakes: "'What we have done and what we will do is right and is

in the best interest of this country'" (Johnson, 1986, November 12, first section, p. A2).

Similarly, during the November 19 news conference, President Reagan proclaimed, "I deeply

believe in the correctness of my decision" and when asked "What would be wrong in saying that

a mistake was made on a very high-risk gamble?" stated "Because I don't think a mistake was

made. .. .And I don't see that it has been a fiasco or a great failure of any kind" ("The President's

news conference," 1986, p. 1590).

President Reagan and former National Security Director McFarlane, appealed to precedent

to reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales. When using this strategy, the rhetor compared the

Iran initiative to past, more favorable, foreign policy initiatives. For example, during the

November 13 address, after acknowledging secret negotiations with Iran, Reagan claimed,

"There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy" and then proceeded to

compare the Iran initiative to President Nixon's secret negotiations with China in 1971 ("Iran-

United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560). During the November 19 news conference

Reagan compared the Iran initiative to several other foreign policy initiatives: "There were risks

when we liberated Grenada, when we went into Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines, and

when we acted against Libya" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583). McFarlane

went so far as to author an editorial in The Washington Post in which he wrote, "My point here is

not to assert the China experience as a perfect analogue to recent efforts toward Iran. But the

basic issue was the same. Nurturing a strategic reorientation in a country's policy requires









discretion, judgment and patience. And it is never risk-free" (McFarlane, 1986, November 13,

editorial, p. A21).

The last new variant of the reduction of offensiveness strategy is the justification strategy.

When invoking this strategy, the rhetor claimed the Administration's actions were justified on

the basis of necessity or for a foreign policy gain. For example, during the November 19 news

conference President Reagan said of the Iran initiative, "and this particular thing was, we felt,

necessary" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1585). Soon after, Secretary of Defense

Weinberger backed Reagan up saying, "'What we've been talking [about] right along is an

attempt to change the policies of Iran, which we are all agreed have been extremely destructive

in every way. Any attempt to try to change those policies, I think, can be well justified" (Moore,

1986, November 20, first section, p. A28).

Chronological Evolution of the Administration's Defensive Discourse via Image
Restoration Discourse Theory

Considered chronologically, the Administration's crisis communication can be seen to

have progressed in three phases (Appendix A, Table A-3; Appendix B, Figure B-l). These

phases are delineated by the onset of the crisis on November 3, the President's address to the

nation on November 13, the President's news conference on November 19, and the news

conference on November 25. Therefore, phase 1 of the crisis response was November 3 through

November 12, phase 2 was November 13 through November 18, and phase 3 was from

November 19 through November 24. It must be noted that these phases emerged from the data

analysis; they were not referenced by any member of the Administration. There is no indication

that those involved in the crisis communication process conceptualized the response in terms of

phases, but the data indicate that the response did in fact progress as such.









The Administration's crisis rhetoric shifted focus throughout the period of study, though

certain themes remained constant. The denial, acknowledgement, and speaking out strategies

were utilized throughout the entire crisis period. The crisis communication during phase 1 was

characterized by a refusal to comment and attempts to reduce the transgression's offensiveness

via the attack the accuser and transcendence strategies. Phase 2, was characterized by increased

attempts to reduce the offensiveness of, and evade responsibility for, the arms sales. During this

phase, the Administration abandoned the no comment strategy, though Reagan used the strategy

during his November 19 news conference. In the third and final phase, increased attempts were

made to reduce the offensiveness of the Iran initiative, while efforts to evade responsibility were

decreased. Most notably, the President himself declared personal responsibility for the crisis and

took corrective action to remedy the situation.

Both variants of the denial strategy identified by Zhang and Benoit (2004)-simple denial

and shift the blame-were enacted throughout the crisis. The shift the blame strategy did not

emerge until phase 3, on November 19 when Reagan blamed other countries for "major

shipments" to Iran, and past presidential administrations for "the first ideas about the need to

restore relations between Iran and the United States" ("The President's news conference," 1986,

p. 1584-1585). Initially the use of simple denial was relatively straightforward-Administration

officials and the State Department denied reports that the recent release of American hostage

David Jacobsen were tied to arms shipments (Hijazi, 1986, November 4; Gwertzman, 1986,

November 4) As the crisis progressed, denials became more strictly qualified, and were often

tied to the use of the minimization, differentiation, and transcendence strategies. These denials

were highly nuanced and hinged on qualifications regarding the amount of arms sold, who the

arms were sold to, and the motivation for the arms sales. For example, on November 13, Reagan









invoked a combination of the simple denial, minimization, and differentiation strategies in the

following text: "The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as

ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States

undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those

charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our

people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or

planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages and we will not" ("Iran-

United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559.).

At the same time Administration representatives denied the charge that arms were traded

for hostages, they began to provide limited and qualified acknowledgement that the U.S. had

negotiated with Iran. Thus, throughout the crisis, the Administration denied that it traded arms

for hostages, while acknowledging that it had entered covert negotiations with Iran, shipped arms

to Iran, and that hostage release efforts were ongoing. For example, Reagan claimed "we did

not-repeat-did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages nor will we" a week after

claiming the hostage release efforts had to "happen again and again and again until we have them

all back" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561; "David Jacobsen," 1986, p.

1546).

Various Administration officials spoke out against the Administration throughout the crisis

period. As described above, such speech either expressed explicit disapproval of the arms sales

or contradicted previous Administration claims. For example, The Washington Post reported that

former National Security Director McFarlane, the person who initiated the arms sales to Iran

stated "'it was a mistake to introduce any element of arms transfers' into dealings with Iran" and

the Secretary of State said "'it's a mistake for governments to get into the business of trading









something of genuine importance for hostages. All you do is encourage the taking of more

hostages and put more Americans at risk'" (Hoffman & Ifill, 1986, November 21, first section, p.

Al; Cannon & Pincus, 1986, November 18, first section, p. Al).

In phase 1, the primary strategy was to refuse comment. During this phase Administration

representatives began to utilize the attack the accuser and transcendence strategies to reduce the

offensiveness of the charge. The attack the accuser strategy was used to blame the press for

damaging the Administration's credibility, and to criticize the credibility of those who

questioned the Administration's credibility. For example, Administration representatives claimed

press reports of the Iran initiative "had caused serious credibility problems for the United States

with key countries around the world" (Gwertzman, 1986, November 9, section 1, p. 1). One

exchange between a reporter and the President's press secretary exemplified the use of the attack

the accuser to undercut the credibility of the Administration's critics: "'Q. Even when the

administration's credibility is called into question. .. A. Called into question by those who don't

know what they're talking about'" (Johnson, 1986, November 12, first section, p. A2). The

Administration further blamed the press for endangering the hostages, thus integrating the

disclosure is dangerous and the attack the accuser strategies. For example, on November 6 The

New York Times reported that "President Reagan refused comment but said, 'I suggest and

appeal to all of you with regard to this, that the speculation, the commenting and all. .to us has

no foundation, that all of that is making it more difficult for us in our effort to get the other

hostages free'" (Sciolino, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 1). Shortly thereafter, Press Secretary

Speakes stated "'Any and all reporting on this subject is very, very harmful. The reporting on

this subject, which is uninformed and speculative, is running the danger of affecting the safety of

the hostages and being detrimental to the long-term interests of the United States'" (Weinraub,









1986, November 8, section A, p. 1). Furthermore, the Administration's press statement issued on

November 10 claimed the "the spate of speculative stories which have arisen since the release of

David Jacobsen may put them and others at risk" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-40, p.

369).

In the second phase of the crisis, the Administration enacted a wide range of reduction of

offensiveness strategies in conjunction with a limited set of evasion of responsibility strategies.

Phase 2 began with the President's November 13 address to the nation; most of the defensive

discourse offered during phase 2 was influenced by the national address. Reagan's November 13

address contained variations of the bolstering, minimization, transcendence, attack the accuser,

self defense, and precedent strategies, as well as various attempts to evade responsibility. In this

speech Reagan repeated the transcendence and attack the accuser strategies most frequently.

During this speech he used the transcendence strategy five times and the attack the accuser

strategy 3 times. Reagan repeatedly claimed that the arms negotiations transcended hostage

release efforts and instead had much broader objectives. As one example, Reagan stated, "It's

because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to

probe for a better relationship between our countries. Our goals have been, and remain, to

restore a relationship with Iran; to bring an honorable end to the war in the Gulf; to bring a halt

to state-supported terror in the Middle East; and finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages

from Lebanon" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560-1561). The President

repeatedly attacked the press' credibility and blamed the press for endangering the hostages. For

example, he contended, "the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors

about this initiative and these objectives" and "due to the publicity of the past week, the entire









initiative is very much at risk today ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559-

1560).

Reagan attempted to bolster the Administration's image by reminding the nation that

"some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there's

been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United

States. Hostages have come home" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560). He

differentiated the Iranian negotiators from the terrorist group Hezbollah: "The United States has

not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon" ("Iran-United States

relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559). He minimized the negative impact of the arms sales: "I

authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive

systems... These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane"

("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559). He also appealed to precedent to reduce

the offensiveness of the Iran initiative: "There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of

secret diplomacy" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560). Reagan's attempts to

evade responsibility were limited to one statement describing the good intentions of the

negotiations ("That [the Iran] initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons"),

and one statement justifying the initiative due to Soviet provocation in the region ("the Soviet

Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and

Pakistan") ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559-1560).

The crisis communication offered by Administration representatives during the remainder

of phase 2 buttressed Reagan's claims as continued attempts were made to reduce the

offensiveness of the initiative, though several staffers and officials continued to speak out. One

White House aide undermined Reagan's claims of transcendence by telling The New York Times









that the President "was so anxious to free the American hostages in Lebanon that he spent 50

percent of his morning briefings discussing the hostages and was willing secretly to reverse

American law and supply Iran with American military equipment" (Gwertzman, 1986,

November 14, section A, p. 1). Another "White House official" publicly expressed disapproval

of the operation: "'I've been sick about this [the Iran initiative] for days. It was a policy run by

cowboys who had no effective policy guidance'" (Gwertzman, 1986, November 14, section A, p.

1).

Almost all of the defensive discourse offered in phase 3 occurred during the November 19

news conference. Early in the news conference Reagan announced he was taking corrective

action, and that he "directed that no further sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran." ("The

President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583). During the news conference, the primary

strategies invoked were the denial and the reduction of offensiveness strategies. The President

reiterated his denials that arms were traded for hostages, and enacted the full range of reduction

of offensiveness strategies. The use of the denial and reduction of offensiveness strategies was

consistent with the November 13 address, though as stated above, it was on November 19 that

Reagan first attempted to shift the blame for the transgression, and to justify the Iran initiative as

necessary. Reagan reminded the audience of positive outcomes of the initiative via the bolstering

strategy: "We got our hostages back -three of them" ("The President's news conference," 1986,

p. 1583). He minimized the number of arms sold, the violation of the arms embargo, and the

impact of the arms sales: "The mission was served that made us waive temporarily that for that

really miniscule amount of spare parts and defensive weapons. the modest deliveries ...could

easily fit into a single cargo plane. .They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the

six-year war between Iran and Iraq-nor could they affect in any way the military balance









between the two countries" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1584). Reagan

differentiated between official negotiations with Iran, and the negotiations that actually took

place: "We were not negotiating government. We were negotiating with certain individuals

within that country" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1584). He repeatedly blamed

the press for endangering the hostages: "As a matter of fact, if there had not been so much

publicity, we would have had two more [hostages released] that we were expecting. we would

have had all five of them by this last weekend, had it not been for the attendant confusion that

arose here in the reporting room" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1584). The

President again claimed the objectives of the Iran initiative transcended hostage release efforts:

"Our purposes were fourfold: to replace a relationship of total hostility with something better, to

bring a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war, and to effect the release of our hostages. ... it was

absolutely vital for the Western World and to the hopes for peace in the Middle East and all for

us to be trying to establish this relationship" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583-

1586). He appealed to precedent by comparing the Iran initiative to other initiatives undertaken

in Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, and the Philippines: "There were risks when we liberated Grenada,

when we went into Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines, and when we acted against Libya"

("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583). Invoking the self defense and accepting

responsibility strategies, Reagan stated "I deeply believe in the correctness of my decision" and

accepted responsibility for the initiative-"the responsibility for the decision is mine and mine

alone" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583)

After November 19 the Administration offered very little defensive discourse regarding the

arms sales to Iran. Former National Security Director McFarlane expressed public disapproval of

the arms sales he initiated, while Secretary of State Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan claimed









personal defeasibility in the case. The Chief of Staff buttressed his claims of defeasibility by

reiterating the President's statement of responsibility: "'The president, however, as a very manly

CEO [chief executive officer] said the ultimate decision was mine to make; I'll take the

responsibility for that decision" (Cannon & Hoffman, 1986, November 22, first section, p. Al).

Analysis of Defensive Discourse Offered by the Various Administration Units

When considered as a single entity, the Reagan Administration's defensive discourse

encompassed all of the broad image restoration strategies contained within IRDT, as well as all

four of the defensive strategies previously not identified by IRDT: no comment, speaking out,

acknowledgment, and accepting responsibility (Appendix A, Table A-4). Considered separately,

and compared to the discourse offered by President Reagan himself, the response was varied.

Although White House representatives offered essentially the same range of discourse as did the

Administration as a whole, the National Security Council staff, State Department, Defense

Department, and Central Intelligence Agency each offered a more limited variety of defensive

discourse strategies in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages. The National

Security Council staff attempted to reduce the offensiveness of its actions and refused comment.

The State Department denied the charges, attempted to evade responsibility on the grounds of

defeasibility, refused comment, spoke out against the Administration, and made a minimal

attempt to bolster the Administration's image. The State Department, National Security Council

staff, and anonymous White House sources all spoke out against the Administration. Response

on the part of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency was extremely

limited.

The distinctions made between the various Administration units emerged from the data.

These distinctions reflect the different roles the units played in the Iran initiative itself, and not

officially delineated distinctions made by the Administration itself. For example, while the









National Security Council staff reports directly to the President, the National Security Council

staff was the Administration unit primarily responsible for the development and implementation

of the Iran operation. Therefore, the discourse offered by the National Security Council staff is

considered separately from that of the White House.

President Reagan and the White House staff

The use of image restoration strategies by the Administration as a whole, the White House

staff, and President Reagan was similar. The White House staff members who responded on

behalf of the Administration were Chief of Staff Regan, Press Secretary Speakes, and various

unnamed officials and staff members. For the most part, the communication originating from

these staff members mirrored that offered by Reagan, though unnamed staff spoke out against

Reagan on limited occasion (Gwertzman, 1986, November 14). The only strategies which

appeared in the total discourse offered by the Administration which were not also used

specifically by Reagan or the White House staff were the State Department's claims that it had

been ordered not to comment by the White House (Gwertzman, 1986, November 8; Ottaway, &

Hoffman, 1986, November 8).

Reagan denied the charge that arms were traded for hostages on multiple occasions. For

example, Reagan contended "reports have surfaced alleging U.S. involvement. .as far as we're

concerned, not one of them is true" and "we did not-repeat-did not trade weapons or anything

else for hostages nor will we" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1559,1561).

These denials were supported publicly by previous statements made by anonymous White House

officials and from Chief of Staff Regan. Anonymous officials stressed "that there had been no

concessions by Washington to secure the freedom of David P. Jacobsen, the hostage freed on

Sunday" (Gwertzman, 1986, November 4, section A, p. 11). The White House Chief of Staff

claimed "'We have never authorized, never allowed, never condoned large shipments by









anyone" (Engelberg, 1986, November 15, section 1, p. 1.). While the President's simple denials

were repeated by other staff members, his attempts to shift the blame were not. No one else in

the Administration claimed that other countries were supplying major shipments of arms to Iran

or implied that the initiative originated with previous administrations ("The President's news

conference," 1986, p.1584-1585).

Though Reagan and several members of his staff denied that arms were traded for

hostages, they also acknowledged that negotiations in fact occurred. These acknowledgements

took place on multiple occasions. Reagan himself acknowledged that "for 18 months now we

have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran" ("Iran-United States relations:

Address," 1986, p. 1559). Press Secretary Speakes indirectly acknowledged the arms sales when

he discussed Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the initiative (Engelberg, 1986,

November 15). The New York Times reported that "a senior Administration official confirmed

that the United States was working with other countries to try to free the hostages and refused to

rule out that Iran might be one of them. .. .Donald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff,

said that the United States was 'using many different channels' to gain the hostages' release"

(Boyd, 1986, November 6).

Both President Reagan and Chief of Staff Regan attempted to evade responsibility via the

defeasibility and good intentions strategies. Reagan claimed defeasibility in regards to charges

that arms were shipped via foreign intermediaries: "Now, I've seen the stories about a Danish

tramp steamer and a Danish sailors [sic] union officials talking about their ships taking various

supplies to Iran. I didn't know anything about that until I saw the press on it" ("The President's

news conference," 1986, p. 1585). Chief of Staff Regan claimed defeasibility in regards to the

entire initiative. The Washington Post reported that "Regan said questions about details of the









Iran operation should be directed to Poindexter. The Chief of Staff said he did not know whether

the Central Intelligence Agency had taken over control of the operation in January but said he

had 'the impression' that it had been directed throughout by the National Security Council staff

under Poindexter" (Cannon & Hoffman, 1986, November 22, first section, p. Al). Both men

described the good intentions guiding the Iran initiative, but in different manners. The President

plainly stated "[the Iran] initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons," and then

listed reasons that transcended hostage release efforts ("Iran-United States relations: Address,"

1986, p. 1559). In contrast, the Chief of Staff used the good intentions strategy to relate the

President's concern for the hostages. According to The Washington Post, "Regan indicated

yesterday how powerfully the President was influenced by his concern for the fate of the

hostages" (Pincus, 1986, November 15, first section, p. Al). President Reagan also attempted to

evade responsibility via claims of Soviet provocation; no one else in the Administration repeated

this claim ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560).

The President and the White House staff offered a wide range of defensive discourse

strategies in an apparent attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the transgression. The bolstering,

minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack accuser, self defense, precedent, and

justification strategies appeared in the White House's crisis communication. The use of these

strategies will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

Reagan and unnamed White House sources invoked the bolstering strategy by claiming

that the initiative decreased Iran's tendencies to support and engage in terrorist acts, and freed

some hostages. Reagan said, "Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government

contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of

terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home" ("Iran-United States relations:









Address," 1986, p.1560). Anonymous White House sources also claimed that "Islamic Jihad has

not captured any Americans since the mid-1985 discussions began." (Pincus, 1986, November

12).

The President, the Chief of Staff, and unnamed White House sources minimized the

amount of arms shipped. Reagan said, "I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive

weapons and spare parts for defensive systems. .These modest deliveries, taken together, could

easily fit into a single cargo plane." During a breakfast meeting with reporters, Chief of Staff

Regan said the President "agreed to send 'a minimum amount' of arms" to Iran (Gwertzman,

1986, November 15, section 1, p. 5). An anonymous "senior official" told The Washington Post

"'the amount of material that was shipped was minuscule'" (Hoffman, 1986, November 14, first

section, p. Al).

Reagan attempted to reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales to Iran via the

differentiation strategy. He stated, "We weren't giving them [arms] to the Ayatollah Khomeini. .

.it was not a meeting officially of the United States head of state and the Iranian head of state"

("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1588). While Reagan differentiated official

negotiations between heads of state from unofficial negotiations between intermediaries,

National Security Director Poindexter differentiated negotiations with Iran from negotiations

with terrorists: "We have not had any direct contact with the captors. I think that's a very

important point to keep in mind throughout this discussion of this project. Iran did not take the

hostages; they are not holding the hostages. They do not have total control over the Hezbollah

faction that apparently has the hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1986, JMP-65, p. 646).

As described previously, the President repeatedly emphasized the fact that the negotiations

transcended hostage release efforts. For example, during the November 13 address Reagan said,









"Our interests are clearly served by opening a dialog with Iran and thereby helping to end the

Iran-Iraq war. .. .It's because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world

that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries" ("Iran-United States

relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560). White House Press Secretary Speakes also invoked the

transcendence strategy by explaining, "'the ultimate objective of the President's policy is to

establish a normal relationship with Iran'" (Cannon & Pincus, 1986, November 18, first section,

p. Al). Likewise, The New York Times reported that, "The Administration, in justifying the

opening to Iran, has said it was undertaken not to free hostages but to put the United States in a

position to influence that country once Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini passes from the scene"

(Gwertzman,1986, November 12, section A, p.1).

The attack the accuser strategy was also utilized by Reagan and the White House staff to

reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales. Such attacks portrayed the press as lacking in

credibility, and bearing culpability for the fate of the hostages and the damage to the

Administration's credibility. For example, the President asserted, "there has been unprecedented

speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially

dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous

people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and

erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now exceed the risks of speaking out" ("Iran-

United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561). The Washington Post reported that Chief of

Staff Regan said, "because of the disclosures, 'I don't think ... we'll be able to pursue this

avenue for any reason for quite some time to come'" (Pincus, 1986, November 15, first section,

p. Al). Similarly, The New York Times reported that White House Press Secretary "Speakes said

there was 'no doubt" that press coverage the last week had been a factor in the inability to free









other Americans" (Boyd, 1986, November 11, section A, p. 1). Blaming the press for the

Administration's credibility damage, "Administration officials" contended "the reports about

Washington's secret involvement in arms shipments to Iran had caused serious credibility

problems for the United States with key countries around the world" (Gwertzman, 1986,

November section 1, p. 1.).

Reagan, Regan, and Speakes invoked the self defense strategy as a means of reducing the

offensiveness of the transgression by asserting the inherent correctness of the decision to ship

arms to Iran. For example, Reagan plainly stated, "I deeply believe in the correctness of my

decision" and "I don't think a mistake was made. It was a high-risk gamble that I believe the

circumstances warranted, and I don't see that it has been a fiasco or a great failure of any kind"

("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583, 1590). He also said of the Iran initiative,

"'What we were aiming for I think made it worthwhile'" (Weinraub, 1986, November 20,

section A, p. 1). As noted previously, the White House Press Secretary argued, "'What we have

done and what we will do is right and is in the best interest of this country'" (Johnson, 1986,

November 12, first section, p. A2). Also invoking the self defense strategy, but betraying

Reagan's claims of transcendence, Chief of Staff Regan contended the American people would

approve of the sales: "'when we can tell the story, the American public will appreciate the efforts

of this president to get American hostages released'"(Pincus, 1986, November 10, first section,

p. A34).

Reagan also appealed to precedent to reduce the arms sales offensiveness. He claimed,

"there is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy" ("Iran-United States

relations: Address," 1986, p. 1560). He later compared the Iran initiative to past foreign policy









initiatives undertaken in Grenada, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Libya ("The President's news

conference," 1986).

The only other official within the Administration to invoke the precedent strategy was

former National Security Director McFarlane who compared the Iran initiative to China, and

Reagan to Nixon in an editorial appearing in The Washington Post: "My point here is not to

assert the China experience as a perfect analogue to recent efforts toward Iran. But the basic

issue was the same. Nurturing a strategic reorientation in a country's policy requires discretion,

judgment and patience. And it is never risk-free" (McFarlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p.

A21).

President Reagan also used the justification strategy to engender a more favorable public

perception of the arms sales. He argued the initiative was justified as necessary to improve

relations with Iran: "This particular thing was, we felt, necessary in order to make contacts...that

could lead to better relations with us" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1585). While

the statement was not repeated by White House staff members, Secretary of Defense Weinberger

provided public support for this claim. As noted previously in this text, Weinberger said, "'What

we've been talking [about] right along is an attempt to change the policies of Iran, which we are

all agreed have been extremely destructive in every way. Any attempt to try to change those

policies, I think, can be well justified'" (Moore, 1986, November 20, first section, p. A28).

Reagan, and other members of the White House staff refused to comment about the reports

o arms sales on a number of occasions (Weinraub, 1986, November 5, section A, p. 1). As noted

previously, two varieties of the no comment strategy were utilized: simple no comment, and

disclosure is dangerous. Early in the crisis, Reagan, the White House Press Secretary, and

unnamed spokesmen simply refused to comment on the story, without providing explanation. For









example, The New York Times reported that "President Reagan. .rejected demands that he

disclose details of Administration dealings with Iran" (Boyd, 1986, November 11, section A, p.

1). Similarly, Speakes explicitly stated, "'We will provide a strict 'no comment' to all

questions'" (Johnson, 1986, November 12, first section, p. A2). On other occasions, Reagan,

Regan, Speakes, and anonymous officials claimed their refusal to comment was based on the

assertion that public discussion of the hostage release efforts would endanger the hostages'

safety. For example, early in the crisis, Speakes explained the Administration would refuse to

comment on 'stories of this type from the Middle East, stories involving hostages. .We just

don't think it serves the interests or the safety of the hostages'" (Drozdiak & Pincus, 1986,

November 5, first section, p. Al). Reiterating the point, Speakes related a Presidential request to

"his advisers to insure that their departments refrain from making comments or speculating on

these matters" (Boyd, 1986, November 11, section A, p. 1.) Chief of Staff Regan said, "'I don't

want to talk anything about the Iran situation or go into any details of how we're negotiating in

order to get these hostages out... There are lives at stake here... Opportunities can be lost by

premature disclosure'" (Pincus, 1986, November 6, first section, p. Al). At the November 19

news conference Reagan stated, "There may be some questions which for reasons of national

security or to protect the safety of the hostages I will be unable to answer publicly" ("The

President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583). An anonymous "senior White House official"

supported the contention: "anything said at this stage runs the risk of affecting the hostages"

(Boyd, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 10).

Reagan stood alone when accepting responsibility for the transgression and announcing

corrective action to be taken. He explicitly accepted responsibility by stating, "the responsibility

for the decision is mine and mine alone" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583).









Reagan was also the only person to announce corrective action would be taken. As noted

previously, at the November 19 news conference he announced "I have directed that no further

sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1583).

The State Department

The State Department utilized a narrower range of defensive discourse strategies than did

the White House when responding to charges that arms were traded for hostages. The State

Department denied the charges, claimed individual defeasibility, made a limited attempt at

bolstering, refused comment, and spoke out against the Administration. Only Secretary of State

Shultz and anonymous State Department officials offered any public response to the charges that

arms were traded for hostages.

The State Department simply denied the first reports of negotiations with Iran. The New

York Times reported, "There was also a report today. .that said the United States had sent spare

parts and ammunition for American-built fighter planes and tanks that Iran bought from the

United States. .This report was denied by the State Department in Washington" (Hijazi, 1986,

November 4, section A, p. 1). The State Department did not repeat the White House's disclosure

is dangerous strategy.

The Secretary of State and anonymous State Department officials evaded responsibility for

the arms sales by claiming personal defeasibility in the case. The Washington Post reported

Shultz's claim that "there was 'a lot of what transpired that I don't know about'" (Cannon, L. &

Pincus, W. (1986, November 18). Reagan has 'no plans' to ship Iran more arms, but order still in

effect. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al). The New York Times reported that "several top

officials in the State Department said they were still in the dark on details" (Gwertzman, 1986,

November 14, section A, p. 1).









The State Department's only attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the act occurred when

Shultz enacted the bolstering strategy on national television. While on CBS' "Face the Nation"

Shultz claimed the initiative had improved relations with Iran and decreased terrorism. Shultz

claimed, "There is a certain amount of evidence that our ability to talk to Iran in a sensible

fashion has improved, and a certain amount of evidence that their terrorist acts against

Americans at least has improved" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-42, p. 597).

Like the White House, the State Department refused comment. Not only did the State

Department simply refuse to comment, Shultz and his aides claimed they were directed not to

comment by the White House, thus invoking the no comment as per superior order strategy. As

noted previously, Shultz claimed that "'The White House is in charge of the executive branch,

and they have issued a statement that all questions shall be answered by the White House. .I

don't particularly enjoy it. I like to say what I think about something'" (Gwertzman, 1986,

November 8, section 1, p. 1). This contention was repeated by Shultz's aides, and denied by the

White House staff: "The aides also confirmed that he [Shultz] had been told not to discuss the

Iran operation publicly. The White House, in turn, denied on Friday that it had instructed Mr.

Shultz to remain silent. Today however, a State Department official countered by saying the

White House had sent written instructions limiting all comment on the subject to the White

House" (Gwertzman, 1986, November 9, section 1, p. 1).

The State Department and the Secretary of State spoke out against the Administration on

several occasions. Explicitly expressing disapproval of the Administration's actions, Shultz

asserted on national television, "it isn't the right [illegible] to trade arms or anything else for

hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-42, p. 598). Anonymous State Department officials

also expressed disapproval of the arms sales. The Washington Post reported, "State Department









officials who opposed the Iran arms-for-hostages program said privately yesterday that the White

House has the responsibility not only to handle public questions about the program but to find a

way to explain it to U.S. allies and Arab nations that have cooperated with Washington's public

antiterrorism policies: (Pincus, W. (1986, November 9). Ex-captive Weir regrets 'arms for

hostages' deal. The Washington Post, first section, p. A34). Shultz also contradicted the White

House's claims that press coverage of the Iran initiative was dangerous to the hostages. On

national television he stated, "all of the public discussion probably helped somewhat" (Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-42, p. 598).

National Security Council staff

As did the State Department, the National Security Council staff responded to the crisis

with a more limited set of defensive discourse strategies than did the White House. While the

State Department primarily attempted to evade responsibility for the transgression, the National

Security Council staff attempted to reduce the offensiveness of its actions. The only members of

the National Security Council staff to publicly respond to the crisis on the Administration's

behalf were National Security Director Poindexter, and his former boss, former National Security

Director McFarlane.

Unlike the White House and the State Department, the National Security Council staff did

not publicly deny the charges. Instead, Poindexter and McFarlane attempted to reduce the

offensiveness of the initiative they implemented. In doing so, they utilized the minimization,

differentiation, transcendence, attack the accuser, and precedent strategies. Like Reagan,

Poindexter minimized the amount of arms shipped and their potential military impact. He argued

"the amount [of armaments] that was shipped, as the President said the other night in his speech,

was extremely small, has no military significance in terms of the war along the border with Iraq"

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-65, p. 647). As noted earlier in this text, Poindexter also









reduced the offensiveness of the transgression by differentiating between Iran, and the hostage

takers: "Iran did not take the hostages; they are not holding the hostages. They do not have total

control over the Hezbollah faction that apparently has the hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-8,

1987, JMP-65, p. 646).

Like Reagan, Poindexter and McFarlane argued that the Iran initiative transcended hostage

release efforts. Poindexter argued that arms were shipped to improve relations with Iran: "the

items [arms] we felt would be the most significant in terms of demonstrating that they were

indeed dealing with the U.S. government, and that we had not only our interests in mind, but we

also had Iranian interests in terms of stopping the war. For example, we firmly believe that it's

not only in our interests and the rest of the Persian Gulf area, but it's also in Iran's interest to stop

the war" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-65, p. 647). McFarlane also invoked the

transcendence strategy. The New York Times reported, "in what appeared to be an attempt to

justify contacts with Iran, Robert C. McFarlane, Mr. Reagan's former national security adviser,

said today that it was of 'enormous importance' for the United States 'to engender a stable

relationship with the Iranian Government'. In his statement today, Mr. McFarlane said secret

diplomacy was crucial in preparing for a new relationship with Iran if the leadership there was

ready for it" (Boyd, 1986, November 11, section A, p. 1).

Also in agreement with the White House and President Reagan, McFarlane attacked the

press' credibility and appealed to precedent. The New York Times reported "Robert C.

McFarlane, the former national security adviser to President Reagan, last night branded as fiction

many of the bizarre details in Iranian accounts of his secret four-day mission to Iran last spring"

("Reagan Envoy Describes Trip." 1986, section A, p. 9.). As noted previously, McFarlane

invoked the precedent strategy when he authored an editorial in The Washington Post in which









he compared the Iran initiative to Nixon's secret initiative to China in the early 1970s

(McFarlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p. A21).

Like the State Department, and some of Reagan's staff, Poindexter and McFarlane spoke

out against the Administration. The Washington Post reported McFarlane's disapproval of the

arms sales thusly: "McFarlane said that 'it was a mistake to introduce any element of arms

transfers' into dealings with Iran" (Hoffman. & Ifill, 1986, November 21, first section, p. Al).

Poindexter, like Shultz, directly contradicted Reagan's use of the attack the accuser strategy. He

claimed recent press revelations may improve the chance of freeing the hostages. The

Washington Post reported a meeting between Poindexter and The Post's staff: "in an interview

with reporters and editors of The Washington Post, Poindexter said. .the unexpected revelation

of U.S. arms deliveries to Iran might now 'expedite' the process of improving U.S.-Iranian

relations and win release of more hostages" (Pincus, 1986, November 15, first section, p. Al).

Of the Administration units which publicly responded to the crisis, the Department of

Defense offered the most limited range of defensive discourse strategies. The only strategies

invoked by the Defense Department were the no comment and reduction of offensiveness

strategies. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, was the only official from the Department

of Defense to respond publicly to charges of arms for hostage trades, and he did so on only two

occasions. Weinberger's first public response was a combination of the no comment and attack

the accuser strategies. Early in the crisis, while refusing comment, Weinberger implied the

reports of the Administration's negotiations with Iran lacked credibility. The Washington Post

reported, "Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger also declined comment in a meeting with

reporters, except to say, 'I warn you to check with sources on some of this stuff" (Pincus, 1986,

November 7, first section, p. Al). As noted previously in this text, Weinberger also invoked the









reduction of offensiveness justification strategy to illustrate the importance of the Iran initiative

to the achievement of foreign policy goals (Moore, M. 1986, November 20, first section, p. A28)

Image Restoration Strategies Appearing in the Administration's Internal Documentation

A wide range of image restoration strategies appeared in the Administration's internal

documentation. Image restoration strategies appearing in the internal record include denial,

evasion of responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, no comment, and

accepting responsibility (Appendix A, Table A-3, Table A-4). This discourse originated from

multiple Administration sources: President Reagan, Chief of Staff Regan, National Security

Director Poindexter, former National Security Director McFarlane, Secretary of State Shultz,

Central Intelligence Agency Director Casey, and anonymous White House and National Security

Council staff members.

The first of the image restoration strategies appearing internally did so in an exchange of

memoranda between Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Director Poindexter in

which the no comment strategy is referenced. Shultz wrote Poindexter to alert him of press

inquiries into the arms for hostage trades. He assured Poindexter that, "in accordance with the

agreed guidance I totally refused to engage with their questions saying that they will have to

direct all their questions to the White House" but also argued "the best way to proceed is to give

the key facts to the public" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-35, p. 563-564). Poindexter

responded, "I do not believe that now is the time to give the facts to the public. .. .I therefore

remain convinced that we must remain absolutely close-mouthed" because "speculation about

our efforts to secure the hostages [sic] release only increases the danger to the hostages" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-27, p. 576). At the end of his response to Shultz, Poindexter

attached the following press guidance for Shultz's reference: "Q: About McFarlane or spare parts

or arms to Iran? A: We have no comment on these reports. As long as there are American









hostages being held in the Middle East we will not be responding to questions like this. A simple

no comment will be made to all questions about talks or actions that might or might not be taking

place. You should infer nothing to these responses" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-27, p.

576).

In two separate memos, McFarlane states he has refused to comment, and he invokes the

attack the accuser strategy. In the first memo, to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "Having been out

of town for two days and maintaining the no comment line, I returned today to find that Don

Regan has backgrounded the weeklies and laid the entire problem at my feet. I have made no

comment (other than the 'fanciful and fictitious' line on my Cleveland Q&A) and will not" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-36, p. 363-364). In the second memo, to National Security

Council staff member Oliver North, McFarlane wrote: "I replied that I could not comment but

would welcome the chance to do so at the appropriate time in order to correct what have been

'fanciful and largely fictitious' stories" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-39, p. 368).

During a meeting held on November 10 to develop the communication strategy to address

the burgeoning crisis, the simple denial, disclosure is dangerous, transcendence, and

differentiation strategies were invoked. Defense Secretary Weinberger noted the President's

simple denial of the charge that arms were traded for hostages: "the President said we did not do

any trading with the enemy for our hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, 578).

Reagan then invoked the disclosure is dangerous strategy. Weinberger noted that Reagan said,

"we can't discuss the details of this publicly without endangering the people we are working

through and with in Iran" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, 578). Chief of Staff Regan

took slightly different notes: "No further speculation or answers so as not to endanger hostages. .

. .Pres Support Pres' policy but say nothing else due to danger to hostages" (Joint Hearings,









100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 387, 391). The transcendence strategy was invoked by Reagan,

Shultz, and CIA Director Casey. According to the Chief of Staff s notes, Director Casey "read a

prepared statement putting emphasis on long range relationship with Iran as reason for contacts"

(Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 387). Shultz indicated he supported "Iran long

range policy of contact Know [sic] support for weapons for hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-10,

1987, DTR-41A, p. 391). Reagan said, "We should put out statement show we do want to get

hostages back, but Iranian contacts were for long range" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-

41A, p. 387). Similarly, Weinberger noted Reagan invoked a combination of the transcendence

and differentiation strategies: "We must make it plain that we are not doing business with

terrorists. We aren't paying them or dealing with them. We are trying to get better relations with

Iran, and we can't discuss the details of this publicly without endangering the people we are

working through and with in Iran" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, p. 578).

The reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, no comment, and accepting

responsibility strategies appeared in three documents generated in preparation for the President's

news conference of November 19. One document, titled "Draft of Presidential Opening

Statement, Dated November 18," contains examples of the transcendence, solve the problem,

disclosure is dangerous, and accepting responsibility strategies. The document argues that the

initiative transcended hostage release efforts: "Our purposes were fourfold: To replace a

relationship of total hostility, with something better. To bring a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq

war that would protect Western interests in the Persian Gulf. To effect the release of our

hostages; and to bring an end to terrorism and the taking of hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-10,

1987, DTR-47, p. 408). It then outlines the rationale for the Administration's no comment

policy, thus invoking the disclosure is dangerous strategy: "We knew this undertaking involved









great risks especially for the hostages and for the Iranian officials with whom we were in

contact. That is why information was restricted to Cabinet officers and officials with an absolute

need to know" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-47, p. 408). Next, the corrective action and

accepting responsibility strategies were invoked when Reagan directs that no more arms will be

shipped to Iran and the President accepts personal responsibility for the decision to undertake the

initiative (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-47, p. 409).

In preparation for the November 19 news conference the National Security Council staff

provided Reagan with a list of anticipated questions and suggested answers. This document

contains examples of three variations of the reduction of offensiveness strategies, bolstering,

minimization, and attack the accuser. An example of the bolstering strategy is: "Q: Has this

initiative with Iran had any positive effect? A: Yes, there have been a number of positive effects.

S.we have seen a marked reduction in Iranian sponsored terrorism over the last 18 months" (Joint

Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-66, p. 652). An example of the minimization strategy is: "Although

we do have an arms embargo in place against Iran, as President, I made a limited exception to

that policy and authorized a small amount of defensive arms" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987,

JMP-66, p. 6526). An example of the attack the accuser strategy is: "The longer I'm here in

Washington, the more I realize that in this room rumor and fiction seem to be more important

than fact." (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-66, p. 657).

Also in preparation for the news conference, an example of the transcendence strategy

appeared in a memo from McFarlane to Poindexter. McFarlane wrote, "But I guess I do believe

that it is a point that you should stress in your pre-press conference brief so that he has it in his

head to use as a Q&A. Just as long as it comes out on the record that any fool can well imagine a









number of reasons why Iranians would want to change the status quo" (Joint Hearings, 100-87,

1987, OLN-22, p. 127).

The transcendence strategy appeared in a memo written by Chief of Staff Regan on

November 20. "Of even greater significance is the need to marshal bureaucratic resources-

notably the State Department to explain the rational for our initiative and to dispatch a special

emissary to key posts. The mission of the emissary (perhaps the Vice President with the Under

Secretary Armacost) would be to explain not only the strategic rationale for our action, but also

to place the initiative in the context of our broader regional objectives" (Joint Hearings, 100-8,

1987, DTR-51, 425).

On November 21, CIA Director Casey appeared before Congress to relate his knowledge

of the Iran initiative. During his testimony he made multiple attempts to reduce the offensiveness

of the arms sales using the transcendence, minimization, and bolstering strategies. His testimony

contained several examples of the transcendence strategy. He recalled "McFarlane emphasizing

that the purpose of such discussions would be the future relationships with Iran and Iran's great

importance in the East-West and Middle East-Persian Gulf equation" (Joint Hearings, 100-9,

1987, EM-35, 1327). He then described a December 1985 meeting between McFarlane and an

Iranian intermediary: "At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane stated our goals of pursuing the

relationship with Iran were these: -Devising a formula for reestablishing a strategic relationship

with Tehran. -Ending the Iran-Iraq war on honorable terms. -Convincing Iran to cease its

support for terrorism. -Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways to

counter Soviet activities in the region" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-35, 1329). He also

described McFarlane's meetings "with high-level Iranian officials" during which "McFarlane

emphasized that our interests in Iran transcended the hostages" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987,









EM-35, 1334). Casey minimized the amount and impact of the arms shipped to Iran: "The

judgment was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction

some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with

the West" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-35, 1337). Casey described the positive outcomes

of the Iran initiative, thus invoking the bolstering strategy: "McFarlane and his team were able to

establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns,

and intentions. The group was also able to assess first-hand the internal political dynamic in

Tehran and the effect of the war on Iran" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-35, 1334).

During the course of the testimony, Casey made one attempt to evade responsibility via the

defeasibility strategy. Casey testified that the CIA was unaware it had actually shipped arms to

Iran. Casey explained, "CIA's involvement began when the Agency was asked to recommend a

reliable airline that could transport bulky oil-drilling parts to an unspecified destination in the

Middle East...Neither the airline nor the CIA knew the cargo consisted of 18 Hawk missiles.

When the plane got to Tel Aviv, the pilots were told the cargo was spare parts for the oil fields

and was to go into Tabriz" (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, EM-35, 1328).

Poindexter also testified before Congress on the 21st. In his testimony, he invokes the

bolstering and attack the accuser strategies. An example of the attack the accuser strategy is:

Because of disclosures the President now wants to tell the full story. However, he is concerned

that these disclosures have intentionally jeopardized hostages [sic]. The President is also

concerned about press speculation with respect to the Israeli connection" (Joint Hearings, 100-8,

1987, JMP-80, 782). The following text illustrates Poindexter's attempts at bolstering:

Poindexter then went on to list what he believed to be accomplishments from these
overtures to Iran: We now have a meaningful dialogue with key Iranian officials which,
among other things, is yielding intelligence as to what's happening within Iran, (2) A
channel has been opened by these discussions with pragmatists who may be in the









assendency [sic] within Iran...Poindexter in commenting further on positive benefits from
the Iranian initiative indicated that we have succeeded in getting some of our hostages out,
radical elements in Iran are being quieted and the Iranians are no longer thinking about a
total victory in their war with Iraq (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, JMP-80, 788).

RQ3: What Insight Does Stakeholder Theory Yield Regarding the Defensive Discourse
Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Crisis Period?

Stakeholder Theory-Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the Public Record

Numerous statements were categorized as expressions concern for organization-

stakeholder relationships, and expressions of concern for stakeholder groups (Appendix A, Table

A-5, Table A-6). However, no Administration statements were categorized as expressions

specifically identifying stakeholder groups affected by the crisis, or prioritizing stakeholder

groups by stakeholder needs. The only stakeholder group the Administration explicitly expressed

concern for was the hostages and those negotiating for their release. These concerns were offered

consistently throughout the crisis. Such statements were made by President Reagan, White

House Chief of Staff Regan, Press Secretary Speakes, and anonymous White House officials.

Expressions of concern for organization-stakeholder relationships did not surface until

November 13. These statements almost exclusively concerned the relationship between the

United States and Iran. Such statements were offered by President Reagan on numerous

occasions, and former National Security Director McFarlane once. On one occasion an

anonymous official expressed concern for the Administration's relationships with Congress, the

State Department, and oversees allies.

Throughout the crisis period, President Reagan and several members of the White House

staff expressed concern for the well-being of the hostages and those negotiating on their behalf.

Expressions of concern for the hostages emanated from White House Press Secretary Speakes,

Chief of Staff Regan, and anonymous White House officials. For example, on November 5, the

Chief of Staff said, "'I don't want to talk anything about the Iran situation or go into any details









of how we're negotiating in order to get these hostages out. .. .There are lives at stake here'"

(Pincus, 1986, November 6, first section, p. Al.). On the same day, a "senior White House

official" reiterated Regan's claim: "'Our feeling is that anything said at this stage runs the risk of

affecting the hostages'" (Boyd, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 10). Shortly thereafter, on

November 7 at a news conference with recently-released hostage David Jacobsen, the President

said, "There's no way we can answer questions having anything to do with this without

endangering the people we're trying to rescue" ("David Jacobsen," 1986, p. 1545.). On the same

day, Press Secretary Speakes echoed Reagan's concerns: "'Where we say anything and whatever

you report. .. in doing this, we all run the risk of endangering the process that could lead to the

freedom for American hostages'" (Johnson, 1986, November 12, first section, p. A2). The

content of these expressions remained consistent throughout the latest phases of the crisis. For

example, on November 12, The New York Times reported, "Regan said they were worried about

the other hostages 'that's why we couldn't say anything; it would endanger their lives,'"

(Weinraub, 1986, November 13, section A, p. 1). During the November 19 news conference, the

President said, "There may be some questions which for reasons of national security or to protect

the safety of the hostages I will be unable to answer publicly" ("The President's news

conference," 1986, p. 1583).

On occasion, these concerns were broadened to include not only the hostages, but also the

persons negotiating for their freedom. On November 10, Speakes told reporters, "The President

today met with his senior national security advisers regarding the status of the American

hostages in Lebanon. The meeting was prompted by the President's concern for the safety of the

remaining hostages and his fear that the spate of speculative stories which have arisen since the

release of David Jacobsen may put them [the remaining hostages] and others at risk" ("American









hostages," 1986, 1552). On November 13, Reagan more explicitly expressed concern for hostage

negotiator Terry Waite and other persons attempting to free the hostages. He said, "there has

been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have

been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The

efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized" ("Iran-United States

relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561). On November 19, Reagan reiterated this concern: "there are

still some parts of this that we cannot go public with because it will bring risk and danger [sic]

people that are held and people that we have been negotiating with" ("The President's news

conference," 1986, p. 1584).

Expressions of concern for the Administration's relationships with stakeholders did not

emerge until November 10. All but one these public statements (all but one) expressed concern

for the relationship between the United States and Iran. Former National Security Director

McFarlane offered the first public expression of concern for the relationship between Iran and

the United States. The New York Times reported that McFarlane said, "it was of 'enormous

importance' for the United States 'to engender a stable relationship with the Iranian

Government'.... In his statement today, Mr. McFarlane said secret diplomacy was crucial in

preparing for a new relationship with Iran if the leadership there was ready for it" (Boyd, 1986,

November 11, section A, p. 1). Reagan invoked this theme four times during the November 13

address to the nation. For example, he claimed the goal of the initiative was to restore a

relationship with Iran" and then posed the following rhetorical question: "But why, you might

ask, is any relationship with Iran important to the United States?" He then responded, "it is in our

national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved

relationship" ("Iran-United States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561). Reagan repeated this









theme three times during the November 19 news conference. He restated his contention that the

desire to stabilize relations with Iran was the goal of the arms deals and emphasized the

importance of such goals: "It was absolutely vital for the Western World and to the hopes for

peace in the Middle East and all for us to be trying to establish this relationship" ("Iran-United

States relations: Address," 1986, p. 1561).

On only one occasion did any Administration official express concern for a relationship

other than that between the United States and Iran. This anonymous official expressed concern

for the Administration's relationships with Congress, the State Department, and its foreign allies.

On November 19, The New York Times reported, "A senior White House official said what was

politically 'dangerous' about the Iranian situation was that it struck at the heart of the various

relationships on which White House depends-relationships with Congress, with the State

Department, with overseas allies" (Weinraub, 1986, November 19, section A, p. 10.).

Stakeholder Theory-Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the
Administration's Internal Documentation

Several stakeholder theory-based defensive discourse strategies appeared in the

Administration's internal documentation. In various memoranda, press guidance documents,

meeting notes, and a speech draft, Administration officials express concern for the welfare of the

hostages, and the Administration's relationships with Iran, Congress, and the American public

(Appendix A, Table A-5, Table A-6). As with the analysis of the public record, no expressions

specifically identifying stakeholder groups affected by the crisis, or prioritizing stakeholder

groups by stakeholder needs, were identified.

In a memo dated November 5, 1986, to Secretary of State Shultz, Poindexter expressed

concern for the welfare of the hostages as well as the Administration's relationship with Iran.

The memo begins with an expression of concern for the United States' relationship with Iran: "I









share your desire to find a way to prevent further speculation and leaks about U.S. policy on Iran.

Not only will such complicate our efforts to secure the release of other hostages, but may also

undermine opportunities for eventually establishing a correct relationship with Iran and

possibilities for an active U.S. role in ending the Iran-Iraq war" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987,

CWW-27, p. 575). In response to Shultz's recommendations for full disclosure of details of the

Iran initiative, Poindexter said, "I do not believe that now is the time to give the facts to the

public. There are several factors to consider in addition to the need to get the other hostages out"

(Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-27, p. 576). In the press guidance attached to the memo,

Poindexter suggests the following response to a request about the arms sales: "As long as there

are American hostages being held in the Middle East we will not be responding to questions like

this" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-27, p. 576).

Notes taken during the November 10 staff meeting contain expressions of concern for the

Administration's relationship with Iran, and the safety of the hostages. Regan and Weinberger

both noted statements of concern for the relationship with Iran made by Poindexter. Regan noted,

"[Poindexter] indicated Iranians [sic] happy with our no comment" (100th Congress, 1st Session

(1987). Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms

Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and

the Nicaraguan Opposition. (U.S. Government Printing Office) Washington, D.C., 100-10,

Donald T. Regan, 383. DTR-41A. Regan Notes, Dated Nov. 10, 1986). Similarly, Weinberger

noted, "Admiral Poindexter pointed out that we do want a better relationship with Iran" (Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, p. 578). Weinberger's notes indicate the President was

concerned with both the relationship with Iran, as well as the welfare of the hostages and

negotiators. For example, Weinberger noted Reagan said, "We can discuss that publicly, but no









way could we ever disclose it all without getting our hostages executed. .We are trying to get

better relations with Iran, and we can't discuss the details of this publicly without endangering

the people we are working through and with in Iran. The President said we need to point out

any discussion endangers our source in Iran and our plan, because we do want to get additional

hostages released" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, p. 578).

A memo written by McFarlane to Lieutenant Colonel North indicated concern for the

Administration's relationship with Congress. McFarlane wrote, "I think the President's tone

toward the Hill generally ought to be to reach out and seek cooperation. Any other approach will

be suicidal. They control both houses. If he is serious about trying to accomplish something, he

will need to try to build a core of Demos who will support. .So one point is the President's

public remarks toward the Hill ought to be conciliatory, not confrontational on all issues, not just

this one" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-46, p. 394).

The draft of the President's opening statement for the news conference of November 19

contained an expression of concern for the safety of the hostages, and an expression of concern

regarding the relationships between the Administration and Congress, and the Administration

and the American public. The expression of concern for the hostages and negotiators was stated

thusly: "We knew this undertaking involved great risks-especially for the hostages and for the

Iranian officials with whom we were in contact. That is why information was restricted to

Cabinet officers and officials with an absolute need to know" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987,

DTR -47, p. 408). The expression of concern for the Administration's relationships with the

American public and Congress was stated as follows: "If we are to be successful in this and other

foreign policy initiatives, it will require the support of the American people and the Congress -

Democrats and Republicans...Well, Mr. Wright, we can work together. The Congress will have









my full cooperation in pursuing this and other foreign policy initiatives. Toward that end I have

directed that all [original emphasis] information relating to our initiative be provided to the

appropriate Members of Congress" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR -47, p. 410).

A statement of concern for the United States' relationship with Iran appeared in a press

guidance memo prepared by the State Department on November 18. The State Department

wrote: "It is still in America's long-term interests to seek better relations with Iran" (Joint

Hearings, 100-9, 1987, GPS-44, p. 603).

RQ4: Did Administration Officials, Publicly or Privately, Make Any Additional Statements
that Indicate an Emphasis on the Maintenance of Either Symbolic Resources or
Organization-Stakeholder Relationships?

Analysis of the data indicates that on several occasions, various Administration officials

expressed concern for the Administration's credibility and acknowledged their attempts at

damage control (Appendix A, Table A-7, Table A-8). Such statements were made publicly and

privately. Expressions of concern about the crisis' effect on the Administration's credibility

surfaced on limited occasions throughout all three phases of the crisis response described

previously in this paper. Acknowledgement of damage control efforts emerged during phase 2 of

the crisis communication effort, and continued through phase 3. To reiterate, Busby (1999)

defines damage control as "the often frantic effort to play down and suppress information which

could have an adverse effect upon the credibility of an administration" (1999, p. 24).

Administration officials and staff made numerous statements of concern for the

Administration's and (the President's) credibility, both publicly and privately. While Reagan

and anonymous White House sources were the only Administration representatives to express

public concern about the Administration's credibility, several White House staff members, the

Secretary of State, the National Security Director joined Reagan in doing so privately.









The first expression of concern for the Administration's credibility appeared on November

8. According to The New York Times, "Administration officials said today that the reports about

Washington's secret involvement in arms shipments to Iran had caused serious credibility

problems for the United States with key countries around the world" (Gwertzman, 1986,

November 9, section 1, p. 1). Two days later, White House Communications Director Patrick

Buchanan appealed to the Chief of Staff to disclose appropriate details of the Iran initiative to

avoid damage to the President's credibility-in Buchanan's words, his "reputation for principle":

We face a grave communications problem over this Iranian/Hostage Issue. The appearance
[original emphasis] of things is that we have negotiated with a terrorist regime more
detested by the American people than the Soviet Union...Not since I came here has there
appeared such an issue which could do such deep and permanent damage to the President's
standing...we have already witnessed some jubilant assaults upon Ronald Reagan's
reputation for principle...the best response on this, I should think, would be earliest and
fullest disclosure of what we did, what we attempted, why, etc. (Joint Hearings, 100-10,
1987, DTR-42, 394-395).

The Chief of Staff responded, "I agree, and have so advocated for a week, [sic] we are

going to do something on Thurs (tmrw)" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-42, 394).

Concerns of credibility surfaced during the November 10 staff meeting held to determine

the Administration's response to the crisis. Notes taken by Chief of Staff Regan and Defense

Secretary Weinberger relate some of the concerns voiced during this meeting. According to

Regan's notes, the President said, "Must say something because I'm being held out to dry", and

Regan agreed: "DTR Must get a statement out now, we are being attacked, and we are being

hurt. Losing credibility" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, 389). Weinberger's notes

also relate the concern voiced over the Administration's credibility at the meeting, with a slight

disagreement: he attributed the statement about being hung out to dry to the Chief of Staff, not

the President. He wrote, "Mr. Regan said we are begin hung out to dry, our credibility is at stake,

and we have to say enough" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, CWW-28, 580).









The next concerns about the Administration's credibility appeared on November 13, and

were voiced by anonymous Administration sources. The Washington Post reported,

"Administration officials said the Iran operation has created a large credibility problem for the

White House. The Administration also is concerned that it faces a severe credibility problem

with other allies and a host of moderate Arab nations" (Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 13,

first section, p. Al). Similar concerns appeared in The New York Times on the same day: "Earlier

in the day, Mr. Regan met privately with several White House officials and was told that the

Administration faced 'a serious perceptual problem' because of revelations about United States

dealings with Iran" (Weinraub, 1986, November 13, section A, p. 1.).

In preparation for the November 19 news conference, Poindexter developed a list of

questions and answers to prepare Reagan for the questioning he was likely to face. The following

sample question refers to concerns over the Administration's credibility: "Q: What are you going

to do about the credibility gap that this episode has created for you and your administration? A: I

can only do what I am doing now and what we have always done and that is to give the

American people the facts and let their good judgment and trust in the Presidency guide our

actions" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, JMP-66, p. 657). The following night during the news

conference Reagan was in fact questioned about his Administration's credibility by ABC

television news reporter Sam Donaldson. In his answer, Reagan indicates he is in fact concerned

with protecting his credibility: "Q. .your credibility has been severely damaged. Can you repair

it? The President. Well, I imagine I'm the only one around who wants to repair it, and I didn't

have anything to do with damaging it" ("The President's news conference," 1986, p. 1585).

On the 19t, prior to the news conference, several statements attributed to anonymous

Administration sources indicated the Administration's concern over damage to its credibility. A









"senior White House official" told The Washington Post the Iran initiative, "'weakens our

credibility, really for the first time, and puts us on the defensive"' (Weinraub, 1986, November

19, section A, p. 10). The same article also reported that, "White House officials and

Republicans close to the President concede that what is largely at stake is the continued

effectiveness of Mr. Reagan's leadership. They have been particularly shaken by the realization

that the hallmarks of Mr. Reagan's personal popularity over the last six years-his adherence to

certain fixed principles in foreign and domestic policy, his shrewdness in dealing with Congress

and his credibility with the nation-appear to have been undermined" (Weinraub, 1986,

November 19, section A, p. 10). On the same day, The New York Times reported, "White House

officials have acknowledged during the past week that disclosure of the secret dealings with Iran

was the latest and most serious in a number of issues that have raised broad questions about the

administration's credibility" (Cannon, 1986, November 20, first section, p. Al).

A memo dated "November 1986," apparently authored by Secretary of State Shultz,

indicates the degree to which the author was concerned about damage to the Administration's

credibility. Shultz wrote:

Credibility. .. .This leads to the third-and maybe the most important-part of the
problem. .. .There is a real danger of spinning a web of misleading if not incorrect
statements that won't stand up to press and Congressional investigation. In the eyes of
the American people the most important achievement of the Reagan Administration has
been the restoration of the stature and dignity and credibility to the Presidency. Ronald
Reagan is a guy who stands by his statements and doesn't mislead. He has reestablished the
people's confidence in the office of the Presidency. That has to be maintained, or every
achievement of this Administration will be at risk (Joint Hearings, 100-9, GPS-40, 583-
584).

Beginning on November 14, Administration officials began to acknowledge the

Administration's focus on damage control. The first such indication appeared when the Chief of

Staff boasted of past damage control successes to The New York Times. Regan said, "'Some of us

are like a shovel brigade that follow a parade down Main Street cleaning up. We took Reykjavik









and turned what was really a sour situation into something that turned out pretty well. .Who

was it that took this disinformation thing and managed to turn it? Who was it took on this loss in

the Senate and pointed out a few facts and managed to pull that? I don't say we'll be able to do it

four times in a row. But here we go again, and we're trying'" (Weinraub, 1986, November 16,

section 1, p. 16). The author of the article then wrote, "The remarks point up [sic] one aspect of

the Reagan team that has been compared unfavorably by some current and former officials to the

group led by James A. Baker 3d, the chief of staff in the first term. In this view, the present team

is seen as having spent a lot of time on "damage control,' while Mr. Baker and his staff seemed

better able to avoid damaging situations." (Weinraub, 1986, November 16, section 1, p. 16).

Soon after, Poindexter disputed, yet simultaneously acknowledged a focus on damage

control. Poindexter made the comment on NBC News' "Meet the Press" on November 16. At

first Poindexter disputes the view that the response to the disclosures of arms sales was damage

control: "MR. KALB: Okay, but on the area of foreign policy, there is certainly the impression

that you were involved primarily in damage control, not in bold initiatives. ADMIRAL

POINDEXTER: No, I don't think that's true at all" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, JMP-65, 649-650).

But then when asked if the Administration's damage control efforts have been effective, he

claims they have: "MR. WOODWARD: Okay, in terms of damage control. Do you think you've

done an effective job in explaining what's going on on this and disinformation, what happened in

Iceland? ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I think so. We try very hard to get all the facts out"

(Joint Hearings, 100-8, JMP-65, 649-650).

On November 17, a White House aide referred to efforts to address the crisis as damage

control. The New York Times reported, "Continuing with what one White House aide termed

'major damage control,' Mr. Reagan and his spokesman, Larry Speakes, insisted today that there









were no further plans to ship weapons to Teheran and that speculation that Mr. Shultz might

resign was unfounded" (Weinraub, 1986, November 18, section A, p. 16). Also on November 17,

a statement made by President Reagan implied that he approved of Regan's use of the term

"shovel brigade." The Washington Post reported, "At the picture-taking session yesterday,

reporters mentioned Regan's remark and asked the president how 'the shovel brigade' was

doing. 'I'll be trying to do that on Wednesday night when I meet with you,' Reagan replied."

(Cannon. & Pincus, 1986, November 18, first section, p. Al).

RQ1: Did the Reagan Administration Prioritize its Symbolic Resources,Its Stakeholder
Relationships, or Some Other Concern when Communicating a Response to the Iran Arms
Crisis of November 1986?

In response to the over-arching charge that arms were traded for hostages, the Reagan

Administration invoked all of the broad defensive discourse strategies identified by image

restoration discourse theory (IRDT) except mortification. The variety of defensive discourse

strategies was much more limited for the various sub-charges leveled at the Administration (e.g.,

the staff was divided over the arms policy, the Administration's terror policy had been violated,

the Administration's actions violated U.S. law, information was withheld from Congress, and the

Administration's actions benefited Iran in the Persian Gulf war),. Similarly, most of the officials

involved in the crisis communication process invoked at least one of the image restoration

strategies in response to the primary charge. When the subsidiary charges are considered, staff

participation in the crisis response was limited. Furthermore, analysis of the data led to an

identification of several broad defensive discourse strategies not identified by image restoration

discourse theory, and three varieties of the reduction of offensiveness strategy not previously

identified by IRDT.

Rhetorical components of stakeholder theory were invoked by Administration

representatives on a limited basis. Use of these discourse strategies was relatively consistent









throughout the crisis period. Of the four components of stakeholder theory operationalized for

this analysis, only concerns for organization-stakeholder relationships and concerns for

stakeholder groups were verbalized. At no time did any Administration official verbally identify

or explicitly prioritize the stakeholder groups affected by this crisis. The only indications of

stakeholder group identification or prioritization are those that may be implied by statements of

concern for the stakeholder groups and organization-stakeholder relationships.

On numerous occasions the President and other Administration officials made statements

in which they expressed concern for the Administration's credibility. Similarly, on several

occasions, the President and other Administration officials made statements that indicated a

focus on damage control in the crisis communication process. The analysis did not reveal any

analogous statements related to a relational approach to crisis management.









CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION

Summary

Image restoration discourse theory provided a wealth of valuable insight into this case. The

theory categorized much of the Administration's rhetoric. Throughout the crisis period all of the

broad strategies of image restoration discourse theory were invoked except the mortification

strategy. The theory described the evolution of the Administration's crisis communication

throughout the period of study, and illustrated the degree to which the Administration's response

lacked coherence. Based on this study, it appears image restoration discourse theory may be

applicable to other cases of presidential crisis, though, as will be discussed, modification may be

required.

The stakeholder theory-based typology provided insight into this case as well. The theory

served primarily as a cross-reference to image restoration discourse theory, though it did

illuminate the fact that the Administration's overriding concern, at least initially, was the

initiative itself. Though useful in this case, further testing will be required if this typology is to

be applied to other crisis cases.

The author found that dual priorities underlay the Administration's actions amidst the Iran

arms crisis, concern for the viability of the Iran initiative and concern for the Administration's

credibility. Though the crisis occurred in a complex environment with multiple stakeholder

groups, there is no indication that the Administration was concerned with any stakeholders other

than the hostages, or with any of its stakeholder relationships other than that with the government

of Iran.

The Administration's crisis rhetoric evolved throughout the crisis period, from an initial

refusal to comment to the provision of partial disclosure of the details of the Iran operation.









Despite this fact, the response remained consistently ambiguous throughout the crisis period. Not

only did the Administration intentionally withhold information, and provide only partial

disclosure of its interaction with Iran, various Administration officials offered differing accounts

of the transgression, leading to a highly disjointed and contradictory response.

This analysis indicates image restoration discourse theory may need to be extended to

account for the defensive discourse offered by the accused in this case. During the course of the

analysis, several defensive discourse strategies not identified by image restoration discourse

theory appeared in the data. Some of these statements are variants of the reduction of

offensiveness strategy described by image restoration discourse theory. Others are examples of

Administration representatives speaking out against other representatives claims in apparent

shows of self-interest. Still others appear to be varieties of ambiguous discourse. The theory does

not currently account for ambiguous discourse, though the strategy may be argued to be a valid

form of defensive discourse depending on the context of the crisis (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987;

Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Tyler, 1997). Given the complexity of the environment in which

presidential crises occur, with diverse stakeholder group affected worldwide, ambiguity may be

assumed to be a reasonable, though potentially damaging, crisis response in the realm of national

executive governance.

Image restoration discourse theory provides insight into the reasons for the failure of the

Administration to manage this crisis. The theory outlines three criteria which must be met in

order to effectively guard against image threats. Two of the criteria for crisis communication

effectiveness outlined by the theory were not met, and thus the theory accurately predicts a

failure outcome. Despite this fact, at least one of the criteria is ripe with ambiguity and the theory

should be modified to correct for this fact.









Findings


The Administration's Priorities

Two priorities guided the Reagan Administration throughout the Iran arms crisis: the

protection of the continued viability of the Iran initiative and the protection of the

Administration's symbolic assets. There is no indication that relational concerns guided the crisis

communication response, despite the fact that concern was expressed for the hostages and the

United States' relationship with Iran. Instead of indicators of relational concerns, these

statements were indications of the degree to which the Administration prioritized the Iran

initiative itself.

When the Administration is considered as a single unit, the dual priorities emerged in two

phases. Early in the crisis the continued viability of the Iran initiative itself was the

Administration's highest priority. Once threats to the Administrations' credibility reached a

critical threshold, the Administration attempted to address these threats, and concerns for

credibility became paramount. Despite the fact that these dual priorities shifted during the time

period, both were issues of concern throughout. Statements of concern for the Administration's

credibility emerged early in the crisis, and the operation itself was maintained beyond the crisis

period (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 157).

Testimony offered in the wake of Iran-Contra corroborates the assertion that two priorities

guided the Administration's crisis response. During the Joint Hearings in the summer of 1987,

National Security Director Poindexter testified that he and the President intentionally withheld

"as much information as possible about the project because we still felt at that point that we

could salvage something out of it" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p.

244).The Chief of Staff also testified that the President and Poindexter explicitly stated the need

to withhold comment out of concern for the hostages (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan









testimony, p. 21-22). According to the analysis and Poindexter's testimony, the critical point

when priorities shifted was November 13, 1986. Poindexter testified that by the 13th, "[i]t

became obvious that the President needed to go before the American public and explain in broad,

general terms what it was we were trying to do" (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, Poindexter

testimony, p. 244). Throughout the remainder of the crisis, the Administration's communication

response continued along this trajectory. Ambiguous explanations were offered which served to

anger and confuse the public, Congress, and the press.

The situation is more complex when the various Administration units and individual

representatives are considered separately, due in part to the fact that different units had disparate

priorities. The National Security Council staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency prioritized the success of the Iran initiative itself and only begrudgingly acknowledged

the threats to the Administration's credibility as the crisis wore on. The National Security

Council staff was carrying out the Iran initiative when the crisis broke, and thus sought to

maintain operational secrecy well into the crisis. Conversely, Secretary of State Shultz and the

White House Chief of Staff Regan prioritized the Administration's credibility at the outset of the

crisis. Although aware of at least some of the details of the operation, neither of these parties

were involved in the operation. Thus, the crisis adversely impacted their credibility, though

neither man was directly involved in the operation. Regan, who likened his role in the

Administration to a custodian following a parade shoveling horse excrement, sought to quickly

contain the damage caused by the crisis (Canon & Pincus, 1986, November 18; Joint Hearings,

100-10, 1987, DTR-42). Shultz had a personal interest in protecting the Administration's

credibility. As soon as the crisis hit, he lost credibility with foreign governments worldwide

because the initiative violated the arms embargo for which he was directly responsible.









Significance of a Lack of Prioritization of Relational Concerns

The fact that relational concerns were ignored in the crisis response may help to explain

the causes of the Administration's failure to manage this crisis. The Administration responded to

the crisis in order to protect its credibility. Though credibility is a perception formed in the minds

of stakeholders, and thus a symbolic asset, it is informed in large part by an organization's

actions. Therefore, to the extent stakeholders have access to information about an organization's

actions, perceptions of credibility will be based, in part, on these actions. The image an

organization projects only informs perceptions of credibility to the extent that contradictory

information regarding these actions is unavailable.

The Administration ignored the fact that its behavior affected stakeholders' perceptions of

its credibility. Its representatives attempted to restore its credibility by projecting an image which

contradicted information readily available to stakeholders. No honest attempt was made to

address stakeholder concerns or to modify the Administration's actions to prevent further

damage to the Administration's stakeholder relationships. Even after the President declared that

no more arms would be sold to Iran, the negotiations continued (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings,

100-10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 157; "The President's news conference," 1986).

At least one member of the Administration understood the hazards of neglecting

stakeholder relationships during crisis. The statement also illustrates the link between credibility

and relationship maintenance. The New York Times reported

"a senior White House official said what was politically 'dangerous' about the Iranian
situation was that it struck at the heart of the various relationships on which White House
depends-relationships with Congress, with the State Department, with overseas allies. ..
.It weakens our credibility, really for the first time, and puts us on the defensive,' the
official said" (Weinraub, 1986, November 19).









An Administration official from Reagan's first term also acknowledged the importance of

maintaining stakeholder relationships throughout crisis in The New York Times. The official also

provided insight in the Administration's crisis management approach:

"A member of the White House team during the first term said, 'There seems to be little
understanding now of the fact that in Washington it is important to have allies, and your
most critical allies need to be brought into the process as early as possible'. ..A White
House official who has long worked for Mr. Reagan said, 'One of the advantages they saw
in Don Regan's style at the beginning was a kind of strong, fighting confrontational
approach that everyone expected to be healthy in terms of promoting the second-term
agenda and preventing lame-duck status'" (Weinraub, 1986, November 16).

Previously Unidentified Defensive Discourse Strategies

Image restoration discourse theory as measured in this study did not account for all of the

defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration, particularly statements that appeared

to reflect strategic ambiguity. The fact that image restoration discourse theory proved useful in

categorizing the defensive discourse offered by the Administration after November 13, indicates

such discourse aimed to protect the Administration's credibility, or symbolic assets. However,

categories derived from image restoration discourse theory did not account for instances in

which Administration officials spoke out against the official messages being disseminated,

statements in which the accused accepted responsibility for the transgression, and for additional

variants of the reduction of offensiveness strategy. The author proposed two categories to extend

the theory to fully capture all of the discourse offered in this case study.

Statements reflecting ambiguity that were not covered by the image restoration discourse

theory categories included refusals to comment and statements in which partial

acknowledgement of the details of the transgression was provided. Refusals to comment were

left unexplained, or justified in terms of protecting the safety of the hostages, or justified as being

directed by superior order.









Image restoration discourse theory fails to account for instances in which members of the

Administration spoke out against the official party line. On several occasions these

representatives expressed explicit disapproval of the Iran initiative. At other times these people

directly contradicted previous statements made by the President, and placed responsibility for the

no comment stance on the White House.

Image restoration discourse theory also fails to account for instances in which the accused

accepts responsibility for a transgression. In this case, the President accepted responsibility for

the decision to ship arms to Iran, and for the resulting crisis.

The author contends that all of the unidentified strategies described in the preceding

paragraphs represent potential shortcomings to image restoration discourse theory. The use of

such strategies is not likely to be anomalous to presidential crisis and instead may represent

common responses to more general crises. If this is the case, image restoration discourse theory

requires modification. It has been established that strategic ambiguity is a response option for

entities faced with a crisis, presidential or otherwise (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987; Lyon &

Cameron, 2004; Tyler, 1997).

In summary, image restoration discourse theory did not account for ambiguous discourse,

statements which spoke out against the Administration's official messages, or statements in

which the President accepted responsibility for the transgression. Ambiguous statements

included refusals to comment and partial acknowledgements of the Administration's actions..

Statements in which Administration representatives spoke out against the Administration

included statements of disapproval of the arms deals, and statements which contradicted

previously issued Administration claims.









The emergence of the three previously unidentified varieties of the reduction of

offensiveness strategy represents less of a threat to the validity of the theory. Image restoration

discourse theory's categorization scheme appears to allow for modification (Benoit, Gullifor, &

Panici, 1991). The authors relate a key insight that implies a certain degree of flexibility to image

restoration discourse theory: "The general strategies for image restoration are useful for

focusing the critic's attention, for guiding critical analysis of the discourse. Yet the strategies as

actually embodied in the discourse remain more important than the abstract categories

themselves" (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991, p. 291). Therefore, the three previously

unidentified variants of the reduction of offensiveness identified in this study may be tentatively

considered part of the suite of image restoration strategies described by image restoration

discourse theory. If this is the case, only minor modification of the theory may be necessary.

Further testing is required to determine if the appearance of these strategies was an anomaly, or

if these strategies are commonly enacted in response to crisis and should be included in the

image restoration discourse theory typology.

Criteria for Crisis Management Success

Image restoration discourse theory provides insight into some of the possible reasons for

the Administration's failure to calm the crisis using defensive discourse. Image restoration

discourse theory states three criteria will ideally be met for crisis communication efforts to repair

damage to an organization's symbolic assets: (a) the rhetorical strategies employed are

appropriate to the crisis threat, (b) the message strategies are subsequently embedded in

discourse regarding the crisis, and (c) the response is persuasive (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997).

The Reagan Administration's use of rhetorical strategies was generally not appropriate and not

persuasive. The Administration offered multiple discourse strategies which often conflicted with









each other. Indeed, several of the individual strategies employed were inappropriate response

choices on their own terms.

The Administration's use of the reduction of offensiveness strategy appears appropriate

given that Reagan and various members of his staff frequently acknowledged that the

negotiations had taken place. Use of the denial strategy in conjunction with the evasion of

responsibility, strategy may be considered an appropriate rhetorical strategy as well. However,

the Administration's simultaneous use of these four strategies is not appropriate to this crisis. By

offering all of these strategies at once, the Administration was asking its stakeholders to accept

its claims that the transgression did not occur, while providing fragmented acknowledgement

that it did. By the end of the crisis period, the Administration's choice of image restoration

strategies was slightly more coherent-attempts to evade responsibility were discontinued while

acknowledgement of the transgression increased-but Reagan still denied arms were traded for

hostages, thus undermining his credibility.

In addition, several of the individual strategies offered were not appropriate on their own

terms. The Reagan Administration's repeated attempts to illustrate that the initiative transcended

hostage release efforts did not sway audiences. This fact is supported by an ABC poll which

indicted the American public disapproved of the Iran initiative regardless of the strategic

motivations ("Survey by ABC News," 1986, November 13; Taylor, 1986, November 21).

Additionally, the Administration's claims of transcendence were refuted by foreign policy

experts (Sciolino, 1986, November 20). Likewise, the use of the attack the accuser strategy

directed at the press did not do anything to squelch press criticism. The enactment of the

speaking out strategies, though perhaps appropriate for individual self-preservation, were not

appropriate organizational responses if the goal was to present a coherent response.









The Administration's crisis communication response was not persuasive, neither to the

public, Congress, or foreign governments. Attempts to minimize the quantity of arms shipped

were quickly proven false (Joint Hearings, 100-9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 45, GPS-

CHRONOLOGY-C, GPS-45; Wallison, 2003). ABC news polls taken after the President's

national address and the President's news conference indicated that the American public did not

believe his claims ("Survey by ABC News," 1986, November 13; "Survey by ABC News,"

1986, November 19). News reports following both events indicated Congress did not believe

Reagan either (Fuerbringer, 1986, November 14; Fuerbringer, 1986, November 20; Hoffman,

1986, November 14; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 20; Weinraub, 1986, November 14).

Although many of the rhetorical strategies offered by the Administration were embedded

in the public discourse, these messages were often contradictory. The fact that the

Administration's messages were embedded in the discourse actually appeared to have

exacerbated the crisis. This is due to the fact that these messages often contradicted each other

and alerted stakeholders to the fact that they were being provided with incomplete and, at times,

false information. In addition, multiple, conflicting messages that criticized the President and his

Administration were reported in the press reports. Therefore, it is not likely that the fact that

messages were embedded was of any aid to the Administration.

Implications and Future Research Questions

The Potential Applicability of Image Restoration Discourse Theory to Other Crises

Based on this analysis, image restoration discourse theory appears to be applicable to other

cases of presidential crisis, though theoretical shortcomings may need to be addressed. Despite

the fact that image restoration discourse theory does not account for all of the discourse

strategies invoked in this case, the theory did categorize much of the Reagan Administration's

defensive discourse. The theory helps to explain the priorities underlying the crisis response









efforts, the evolution of the Administration's defensive discourse over time, the complexity of

the response offered by various units within the Administration, and the reasons for the failure

outcome. As such, it seems likely that the theory may yield insight into the defensive discourse

offered by other presidents in cases of crisis. Additional research will be required to make this

assertion with validity.

At this time the author does not contend that image restoration discourse theory may be

applied to more general political crises, though such a scenario may be likely. More general

political crises, such as those related to political campaigns, political party malfeasance, or

lower-level political crisis, may involve fundamentally different dynamics than this particular

crisis. If future research addresses these issues though, image restoration discourse theory may

prove to be applicable to a much wider-range of crises than has been the case so far.

To address the issues discussed above, the following research questions are posed for

future consideration:

* Is image restoration discourse theory applicable to other cases of presidential crisis?

* Is image restoration discourse theory applicable to a wide-range of political crises?

* In what ways do presidential crises differ from more general political crises, and what
effect do these differences have on the potential application of image restoration discourse
theory?

Possible Theoretical Shortcomings

This analysis illustrates several theoretical shortcomings to image restoration discourse

theory. The theory does not acknowledge the role of factual veracity in crisis communication

effectiveness but simply claims an organization's crisis response must be believable to be

effective. The theory does not differentiate between discourse offered honestly as a reflection of

fact or operational concerns and discourse contrived simply to restore an image. This fact

illustrates that the assumptions underlying image restoration discourse theory may be flawed.









The theory assumes communication is a goal-oriented activity utilized to address image threats.

The fundamental finding of this case is that communication was utilized with the goal of

preserving the operation, not image threats. Thus, not all crisis communication seeks to address

image threats, and it is plausible that not all communication is goal-oriented.

To address these issues, the following research questions are posed for future

consideration:

* What impact does factual veracity play on crisis communication outcomes?

* Are the assumptions underlying image restoration discourse theory flawed?

Image restoration discourse theory also suffers the shortcoming of not being exhaustive.

The theory may require extension to fully categorize all defensive discourse offered in response

to charges leveled at an organization in crisis. Although image restoration discourse theory as

currently conceptualized did yield a great deal of insight into this case, it did not capture all of

the discourse offered by the Administration in response to the charge that arms were traded for

hostages. Future research is needed to determine whether the unidentified discourse strategies

were endemic to this particular crisis, or whether these strategies are commonly offered in

response to crises--presidential, political, or otherwise.

To address these issues, the following research questions are posed for future

consideration:

* Are the unidentified strategies which appeared in the data anomalies, or are they common
to other cases of presidential crisis?

* Are these strategies commonly offered responses to crises in general?

* Can the unidentified individual strategies be grouped into broader response categories?

* Are the no comment and acknowledgement strategies variants of strategic ambiguity?









Ambiguous Discourse

The Administration's crisis response was characterized by ambiguous discourse

throughout the entire crisis. Even after the Administration began to enact various image

restoration strategies, the response remained ambiguous. This is evidenced by the multiple

refusals to comment, the repeated provisions of partial acknowledgement of their actions, the

dissemination of half-truths, and the multiple contradictions voiced. This contention is supported

by notes taken during the critical November 10 staff meeting which record President Reagan's

views regarding disclosure thusly: "We should put out statement. .but cannot get into q&a re

hostages so as not to endanger them. .we must say something but not much" (Joint Hearings,

100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, p. 387-388).

In the realm of executive governance and foreign policy, presidents may be forced into

engaging in ambiguous communications out of concern for national security or, as in this case,

the continued viability of an unfavorable foreign policy operation. In describing a fundamental

cause of foreign policy crises, Busby (1991) claims foreign crises will continue to occur as long

as the disparity between national security concerns and public expectations is not resolved. In

this case, the American public expected Reagan to both free the hostages and to act in

accordance with his stated public policy, previous rhetoric, and legal constraints. Thus the

public's expectation that Reagan free the hostages of Reagan were not compatible with his stated

foreign policy of not negotiating with terrorists. Furthermore, the operation was not compatible

with attempts to maintain credibility. The initiative violated stated public policy, and potentially,

U.S. law. In attempting to meet all of these expectations, Reagan was forced to explain his

actions ambiguously. There appears to have been no way for Reagan to free the hostages and

simultaneously engage in behavior that would not violate other expectations placed on him. This









case illustrates both the necessity of engaging in strategic ambiguity and the dangers of basing a

crisis communication response on such a strategy.

The environment in which President Reagan attempted to communicate a response to this

crisis was complex. Because of a president's role as executive officer of the United States, a

nation whose actions impact the entire globe, a presidential administration's actions impact and

are impacted by, a diverse group of stakeholders. This was the case with Reagan and the Iran

arms crisis. A comprehensive review of data generated during the crisis period indicated the

Administration's stakeholders included the government of Iran, the hostages and negotiators,

foreign governments around the globe, the American electorate, Congress, the domestic and

foreign news media, and various departments and individuals within the Administration. These

stakeholder groups can be sub-divided to greater levels of specificity. For example, Congress

may be further sub-divided into Democrats and Republicans, and these groups could be divided

into pro- and anti-Administration stakeholders. Iran could be further sub-divided into groups

friendly, antagonistic, and ambivalent towards the United States.

Some scholars have challenged traditional recommendations regarding candor and

openness. Eisenberg and Witten (1987) and Lyon and Cameron (2004) argue that in complex

crisis environments open communication may harm an organization as they attempt to address

the potentially disparate needs and values of a wide range of stakeholders. These authors

advocate for the use of strategic ambiguity when responding to crisis in a complex environment

in which different stakeholders have differing information needs .

Though the context and environment in which the Administration attempted to respond to

the crisis may have required the use of ambiguous discourse, the strategy exacerbated the crisis.

Throughout the crisis period the Administration was criticized by the press, the American public,









and Congress for its inability to provide an honest account of what had actually transpired. The

ambiguous nature of the Administration's claims led many to doubt the explanations offered,

thus damaging the Administration's credibility. Though the Administration blamed the press for

threatening its credibility, all indications are that its representatives' inability to provide a

coherent, believable account of their actions was the fundamental cause for the degradation of

the Administration's credibility.

Future investigation of this case may determine the degree to which Administration

representatives used ambiguity and candor in the crisis response. Once this is determined,

researchers may gain insight into the causes of success or failure outcomes of this case.

This case raises several issues about the use of ambiguous discourse:

* In what other cases has the tension between public expectations regarding presidential
behavior and national security concerns led other administrations to respond to crisis with
ambiguity?

* How can a president reconcile the disparity between public expectations and national
security concerns without relying on ambiguity?

* How may a president, or other crisis managers, determine whether it is in their best
interests to engage in ambiguous discourse or to fully disclose their actions?

* Can unfavorable foreign policy operations be explained in unambiguous terms without
jeopardizing the operations themselves?

The Potential for Managing Presidential Crises from the Relational Perspective

This case illustrates the danger of wholly ignoring relational concerns when managing

crisis. It also raises questions about the potential applicability of the relational crisis management

perspective to presidential crises. It is impossible to know whether the Reagan Administration

would have managed the crisis more effectively if stakeholder relationships were prioritized over

symbolic or operational concerns. Given national security considerations, it is uncertain whether

the relational perspective is an appropriate management tool for presidential crises. However, the









crisis impacted multiple stakeholder groups which in turn negatively impacted the ability of the

Administration to govern and carry out its political agenda in the remaining years of the Reagan

presidency. Broadly delineated, these stakeholder groups included foreign allies, Congress, the

press, and the American public. These groups exerted considerable pressure on the

Administration and were highly critical of its actions. Though at least one member of the

Administration publicly proclaimed the importance of maintaining relationships with Congress,

the press, allies abroad, there is no indication that this mindset influenced the crisis management

process.

The first set of questions raised regards the possibility of applying a relational management

approach to presidential crisis:

Have president's prioritized stakeholder relationships in crisis in other cases?

What barriers inherent in presidential politics may inhibit the prioritization of stakeholder
relationships amidst crisis?

Given national security concerns inherent in presidential crisis, is the relational
management perspective applicable to presidential crisis?

In cases where ambiguity is required, can a president and his Administration actually
attend to stakeholders' informational needs?

This case also raises questions regarding the potential impact of the relational management

approach on American politics and the electorate:

* What would be the impact on American politics if the relational management perspective
was a widely adopted crisis response measure?

* Does the adoption of the relational management approach to presidential crisis hold the
potential to repair the American electorate's loss of faith in government which has resulted
from the numerous presidential crises which have occurred since Watergate?

* Can the relational crisis management approach potentially ease friction between the
executive and legislative branches of government?

* Can this approach improve relations between the press and the president in crisis?









* Can the adoption of a relational management approach improve a president's ability to
enact his or her agenda after the crisis subsides?

* By enacting a relational crisis management approach, is it possible that a president may
actually turn a crisis into an opportunity?

The Perils of Ignoring Crisis Threats

This case illustrates the potential perils of prioritizing operational concerns and ignoring

the onset of crisis. The Administration prioritized the viability of the Iran initiative over crisis

management strategies well after the crisis surfaced. Initially the crisis was all but ignored.

Administration representatives failed to recognize the potential damage the crisis could cause the

administration and instead attempted to maintain the initiative. Criticism of the Administration's

actions increased exponentially throughout the crisis, yet at the November 10 staff meeting

Poindexter incorrectly assessed that press interest had peaked and that interest in the story would

soon die (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-41A, CWW-28). He was proven wrong as press

interest in the story continued to increase throughout the crisis period and on through the

progression of the Iran-Contra scandal.

When assessing actions taken in historical context, one must be careful not to impose

present understandings of the situation on past contexts. From the author's current vantage point

with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that the crisis threatened substantial damage to the

Reagan presidency. It cannot be assumed that Administration officials should have recognized

the severity of the threat. But, the documentary record indicates the threat was recognized by at

least two members of the Administration. Soon after the crisis emerged, Reagan's Secretary of

State and Communications Director warned the President of the grave danger the crisis

presented. They urged the President to acknowledge the extremity of the crisis, and to fully

disclose the details of the Administration's actions (Joint Hearings, 100-8, 1987, GPS-35; Joint

Hearings, 100-10, 1987, DTR-42. Yet these concerns went unheeded. By the time the









Administration attempted to formally respond to the crisis, the crisis had grown. Its

representatives were forced to do so in a hostile environment in which their critics had

substantial amounts of time to state their case against the Administration.

Additional Questions Raised by this Case

This case is especially rich and may offer insight into a wide variety of crisis

communication concepts. Although some of these questions are related to the current study, it is

beyond the scope of this research project to address them. It is hoped that future communications

scholars will revisit this case to explore these questions.

Which staged models of crisis development best describe this case in the broader

context of the Iran-Contra scandal? Various crisis communication scholars conceptualize the

development of crisis situations in terms of sequential stages (Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986;

Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). An analysis of this case indicates

it was the initial crisis which spawned a much larger crisis. It would be interesting to see how

this progression is explained, or defies explanation, under the three- and four-stage models

presented in the literature. Such an analysis may determine whether the crisis period analyzed by

this study when considered in the context of Iran-Contra is actually part of the pre-crisis

phase described by a three-stage model, if the period is better explained by Fink's (1986) four-

stage model, or if a new model must be proposed.

What role did the Reagan Administration's organizational culture play in failure to

manage this crisis effectively? An organization's culture has been argued to be a critical factor

in effective crisis communication response (Belcher, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986; Hale,

Dulek, & Hale, 2005; Haney, 1998; Kauffman; 2005; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Marra, 1998;

Mitroff, 1988; Penrose, 2000; Wise, 2003). Some authors characterize organizational culture as

either authoritarian or participative (Lauzen & Dozier, 1994), whereas others discuss culture in









terms of either facilitating or inhibiting the transfer of information in an organization (Coombs,

1999; Marra, 1998; Penrose, 2000). Haney (1998) described organizational culture in the specific

context of presidential administrations and outlined three types of models of group structures:

formalistic, competitive, and collegial. The author characterizes the Reagan Administration

structure as collegial, and therefore prone to group think.

Busby (1999) and Wallison (2003) both argued that the Reagan Administration's

organizational culture contributed to its inability to calm the Iran arms crisis. Wallison (2003)

portrayed Reagan as disengaged from his staff and uninterested in the specifics of their activities.

The results in this case show that the infighting and internal rivalries led to public contradiction

and undermining of the President.

Future research could provide detailed analysis of the Administration's organizational

culture and the effect this culture had in this particular case. Once established, understanding

about the role of organizational culture in the outcome of this crisis could be compared to past

crises managed by the Reagan Administration to hone in on the factors that contributed to the

failure outcome in this case. Then, similar cases involving a President, a crisis, and his

Administration's organizational culture could be compared to this one to see if any patterns in

success or failure outcomes emerge.

Did this crisis present opportunities for the Reagan Administration? Although crises

are generally characterized as threats, several authors discuss the potential for positive outcomes

from crisis (Fink, 1986; Penrose, 2000; Seeger 2002; Sturges 1994; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer &

Sellnow 2002; Ziaukas, 2001). Penrose (2000) contends that if crisis managers view the situation

as presenting opportunities, they will have a greater likelihood of effectively managing the crisis.

This crisis has been discussed primarily as a threat to the Administration, but there is some









indication that members of the Administration viewed the situation as an opportunity. For

example, Chief of Staff Regan wrote, "when we can tell the story, the American public will

appreciate the efforts of this president to get American hostages released" (Pincus, 1986,

November 10). Later testimony indicates the optimism with which Regan viewed the crisis, "I

thought all we had to do was get out the facts" (Joint Hearings, 100-10, 1987, Regan testimony,

p. 57). As such, it may be worthwhile to investigate the potential for positive outcome and

opportunity inherent in this case, as well as what role the optimism held by the Administration

played in the failure outcomes of the Administration's crisis communication efforts.

Additionally, if crises can be viewed as opportunities, and given that the relational approach to

public relations entails relationship development, and does crisis present opportunities for

forging new organization-stakeholder relationships?

What role did crisis communication plans, or the lack thereof, play in this case?

Would planning have increased the chances of crisis management success? Draper (1991)

noted that there were no plans in place to deal with disclosures of the Administration's

negotiations with Iran. Authors proposing traditional approaches to crisis management often

recommend the development of crisis management plans. Future research could investigate the

role the lack of planning played in the failure of the Administration to manage this crisis.

Did the Administration's defensive discourse squash the rally round the flag effect?

The rally round the flag effect predicts foreign policy crises will often inspire a surge of public

support for a president (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Busby, 1999; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993;

Norrander & Wilcox, 1993; Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson & Sullivan, 1994). The Iran arms

crisis produced no such (Brody & Shapiro, 1989).









As described by Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson and Sullivan (1994) the rally phenomenon

generally develops as follows. Initially, the White House controls relevant information about the

crisis. Lacking their own information, opposition elites tend to abstain from publicly disagreeing

with the President. Due to a lack of elite criticism the general public perceives that elites support

the President. In the absence of elite criticism, journalists tend to convey the Administration's

messages. The public then consumes only favorable information the Administration, and public

support for the President increases.

Some authors see the absence of elite criticism of a president as the key factor leading to

the enactment of the rally phenomenon.( Brody & Shapiro,1989; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993;

Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson & Sullivan, 1994). Some see the emergence of public nationalism

another driver of the rally effect (Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993). None of these authors explicitly

discuss the role of the Administration's crisis communication on the rally effect, though it seems

intuitive that the rhetoric offered in crisis will be directly related to elite criticism of the

Administration.

Future research should investigate the interplay between the Reagan Administration's

defensive discourse and the rally effect.

* What role did the Administration's choice of image restoration strategies play in the failure
of the Administration to inspire a rally of support?

* In what ways did the Administration's choice of discourse inspire elite criticism, thus
negating the rally effect?

* Does it appear that different discourse decisions could have decreased elite criticism, thus
inspiring the rally? Does the potential for a rally indicate a potential for positive outcome
during a political crisis?

Several authors contend American public memories of the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, and

Watergate constrained the Reagan Administration's ability to respond to the Iran arms crisis

(Schudson, 1992, 2004; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). As such, a comparative analysis of the









use of image restoration strategies in by the Reagan, Carter, and Nixon administrations is

suggested as a future research project. This analysis should focus specifically on the Iran arms

crisis of 1986, the crisis resulting from Carter's failed attempt free the hostages militarily in

1980, and Watergate. Because of the constraints the crises occurring during the Nixon and Carter

presidencies placed on the Reagan Administration, it will be worthwhile to compare and contrast

the three crises to see if broad insights regarding Presidential crisis communication emerge. The

following question is thus posed: what insights about Presidential crisis communication will

comparative analyses of the use of image restoration strategies by the Reagan, Carter, and Nixon

Administrations yield?

Conclusion

Two priorities guided the Reagan Administration's response to the Iran arms crisis. The

initial priority was the continued viability of the Iran initiative, the root of the crisis. Once threats

to the Administration's credibility reached a critical level, the Administration's priority became

the restoration of its credibility. Instead of restoring its credibility by modifying its actions,

attending to the needs of its stakeholders, or honestly explaining its actions, the Administration

sought to use multiple image restoration strategies to restore its credibility. Thus, the

Administration sought to address threats to its credibility by projecting an image.

The current study illustrates that crisis communication theory developed by

communication scholars may provide insight into presidential crises. Such insight can augment

political science theory, providing richer understanding of presidential crisis than would be

possible if these cases were analyzed solely from the perspective of political science. Thus, this

study illustrates that communication scholarship has relevance outside the bounds of the field of

communications studies. Further testing of image restoration discourse theory is necessary to

account for the potential theoretical shortcomings identified during the course of this study. If









image restoration discourse theory is to be applied to presidential crisis, the theory must account

for ambiguous discourse and the other unidentified discourse strategies encountered in this case.

This study illustrates the role of ambiguous discourse in presidential crisis. In crisis,

presidents may be forced to use ambiguous discourse strategies in order to both address national

security concerns and the public's desire that a president honestly, and completely, explain the

actions of his or her Administration. Because "the public" is not a homogenous group of persons,

but a highly diverse group of stakeholders with differing interests and values, presidents may

also be forced into an ambiguous rhetorical stance as they attempt to navigate the complex

environments in which presidential crises occur. Further complicating the situation is the fact

that the global impact of the United States means presidential crises may affect an even larger,

more diverse collection of stakeholders worldwide.

As the United States' global impact increases, as the worldwide media environment

becomes increasingly connected, and as information more easily crosses international and

ideological boundaries, political communicators must understand the factors that affect the

success of presidential crisis communication. These communicators must understand the

difficulties inherent in attempting to balancing national security considerations with

stakeholders' demands for transparency. Though crisis communication cannot prevent the

transgressions themselves that spawn crises, skilled communicators should be able to prevent

crisis communication itself from exacerbating crisis situations.











APPENDIX A
TABLES


Table A-1. Typology of image restoration strategies
Strategy Key Characteristics Example
Denial Simple denial Did not perform act Did not trade arms for hostages
Shift the blame Another performed act Other countries shipped large quantities of arms, not U.S.
Provocation Responded to act of another Arms shipped to Iran in response to Soviet encroachment in the region
Evasion of
espo ility Defeasibility Lack of informationrability State Department was unaware of details of the Iran initiative
Accident Mishap Arms shipped to Iran by accident
Good intentions Meant well Administration actions guidedby good intentions
Bolstering stress good traits Arms negotiations had favorable outcomes
Miimization Act is not serious A miniscule amount of ams was shipped
Reducing Differentiation Act is less offensive We were not negotiating with the hostage takers
offensiveness of The goal of the initiative was developing a strategic relationship with Iran, not
event Transcendence More important values arms for hostages trade
Attack accuser Reduce accuser's credibility Press reports of the Iran initiative are based on rumor and speculation
Compensation Reimburse victim Persons hrmed by the initiative will be compensated
Plan to solvelprevent secunence
Corrective Actiono ole No more arms willbe shipped to Iran; the responsible parties have resigned
of problem
Mortification Apologze The Administration apologizes forviolating foreign policy
Source: Zhang, J. & Benoit, W.L. (2004). Message strategies of Saudi Arabia's image restoration
campaign after 9/11. Public Relations Review, 30, 161-167.

Table A-2. Typology of stakeholder theory-based rhetorical strategies
Strategy Example


Statement of concern for organization-
stakeholder relation ship




Stateaernt of mrocenli bfr STIK groip



Identification of stakeholder groups



Pnontizaton stakeholder groups


The United States' relationship with Iran is important




F'ubhr r.Lsclkisionr may iarmn hostages



orgress is one of the Adimnistzati:n'sstakeholder groups



Out pnonty is meeting the information needs of Congress










Table A-3. The Evolution of the Reagan Administration's Defensive Discourse from November
3 to November 24, 1986



%.01 .0 % ,0 %-0 %O %-0 0 %0
IMAGE RESTORATION Q 7 1 I e- Q
DISCOURSE STRATEGIES ......................

dea simple denial X X X
shift the blame


provocation
evasion of
defeasibilit -
responsibility
good intentions
bolstering
mminmzation
differentiation
reduction of tzrabcezvdece
offensiveness attack the accuser
self defense
precedent
justification
corrective
solve the problem
action
OTHER DISCOURSE
STRATEGIES
simple no
comment
no comment disclosure is
dangerous
superior order
disapproval
speaking out
contradiction
acknowledgement


X X B


x
X X BB


X
XX
x x
x
x
B XX X
BX X
X
X


OX


XBX
X B X
OX
X


M


XBXX BO


X B X BX


X XX


x
x x x
XXXX


accepting responsibility


OX


XX X X
x



O0 '


strategy invoked publicly
strategy invoked in internal documentation
strategy invoked both publicly and internally
strategy invokedby Admnnistration staff
strategy invoked by Reagan and Administration staff
strategy invoked by Reagan only


C=



F-=













Table A-4. Defensive Discourse Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration
image restoration discourse theory strategies other discourse strategies
Evasion of correctve speaking
denial on of reduction of offensiveness cono conuent
responsibility action out t i

STATEMENT |I
ATTRIBUTED TO B




Su I n c- -
.r ,J t .: : ,. r. r .


REAG3AII
ADMINISTRATION IN B B X E
TOTAL

PRESIDENT REAGAN B X: X

:rtHITE HOULE STAFF ': B X: X
,-r.hTi" .-T"iT R. -in : I, r'
Pr.-" ..'.:r:,T ir; .,-, 31 :.
:Th;r '"i r1 H-L= :r TlY '"'


NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCILIL STAFF


Director Poindexter
former National Security
Director McFarlane
other National Security
j-..uL:I J .IiT

'TATE
DEPARTMENT

other State Department X
staff


: B B X B E




o : X B E
-- X X- B X







0 X X B E


0 X X OX

B B


A .. X B



A A /. A


S ,. B


B B X X X X B


: B





:: B


B ,) TX X


0 0


X I: 3



X


B X X


X X X


DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
.'-*:' i.Aii" :1 'DI -r t .-,
Weinberger

CENTRAL
IITTELLIGENICE
AGENCY
EL'u.ci': r I '." 1 -


"" = :I't -,I r LI'": 0.i ,.i h LI ,: ["
0 = strategy invoked in internal documentation
B = strategy invokedbothpublicly and internally


X X


* V V B
:.:& -


,:. 0 0 3

.: : ,: :











Table A-5. Evolution of Stakeholder Theory-Based Rhetorical Strategies from November 3 to
November 24, 1986


STATE.AMENTT


sttement -ti
i-: [ii Ci III r: I
c ?mimuziton-
.;1 Aiw.. l. H-.


stitement ot
C l-hE' lL Ie
5T i-.? h Id.'1
F4 .-z.


'0 '0 %0 0 %0 %0 %D D %D %0 'O '%0 %'0 %0 0
o c O O O O %0 cO cp q q q qop q o oC ( CO CO CO CO CO
4i- i, 4 tj A0 r-, -r c X7 *t 7 -I C-1 rr
L Q V > > I-I


AlL- n I L Up'.b~ L




C sts r*+ utiiiiill


l, t-t .- in 1 -,.- ,n1 c. i t .- ..


X :.


.. Y B ": I


.- IiL -g./ ilL 'CIkc tJi clL U.LL i L :. L '.iLkILtaL.i-l
SI t i.y uL-":i' : 1: : til 1 bi:1ly uit. uilt ii.IUy
-trite ur -ckeil -y Ainnmuw-t-itnn tfaif
:tlllper; rrc'I-CE' y eF.a4ai il AidntLLtL. tlatn stailfnd
. Lit ct/ iLa -cL t.X y k F.eI.ani nL)ly


F








-I


L
E











Table A-6. Stakeholder Theory-Based Rhetorical Strategies Offered by Individual Members of
the Reagan Administration
statement of concern for
statement of concern for
organization-stakeholder sal older gr
stakeholder group
relationship


STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO













Clef of Staff Regn
Communications Director Buchanan
other Wuhte House staff 0 B X X X B


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF O O O
National Security Diectoi Pomdexter O O
former National Security Dnectoi McFarlane O X


STATE DEPARTMENT
Secretary of State Shnltz


X = strategy invoked publily
O = strategy invoked in internal documentation
B = strategy iwvoed both publicly and internally


Table A-7. Evolution of Statements Made by the Reagan Administration Indicating a
Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns From November 3 to November 24, 1986

-, Ft c. r-. -: 1 r : r. ( c ..1 r r, -
-TATEI*.EI C.. -. -.1 r-. -.


:redblty public
mntenia X X -

dAnage contcl
internal

= ;traten mn-ol:edb rAdnunmLtiLtzon .ta
X = ;trater m-ol:edbir eagan 0ndAdmnum tziatin :t aTi
S.nrate-y inr-oel:dbyr ve agan :nl










Table A-8. Statements Made by the Individual Members of the Reagan Administration
Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns

STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED statements of concern for statements indicating a symbolic
STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO
Administration credibility management approach

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN TOTAL B X

WHITE HOUSE B X
President Reagan B X
Chief of Staff Regan 0 X
Conuumications Director Buchanan 0
anonymous White House sources X X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF B
National Security Director Poindexter B

STATE DEPARTMENT O
Secretary of State Shultz O



X = strategy invoked publicly
0 = strategy invoked in internal documentation
B = strategy invoked both publicly and internally












APPENDIX B
FIGURES


I PHASE 1


PHASE 2 PHASE 3


11/3/86 11/4/86 11/7/86 11/10/86


11/13/86 11/14/86 11/16/86


11/19/86 11/25/86


original first domestic Reagan press
report report speaks statement
of arms appears to press released
negotiations in The with
appears in Washington freed
AI-Shiraa Post hostage


Reagan's Poindexter Poindexter Reagan's Reagan's
broadcast has on NBC news news
address lunch "Meet the conference conference
re: "Iran- with The Press"; re: "Iran- re: discovery
United Washington Shultz U.S. of
States Post on CBS Relations" diversion
Relations"; editorial "Face the of funds
Poindexter board Nation"; from arms
briefs McFarlane sales to
congressional on ABC contra rebels
leaders "The Week
with David
Brinkley"


Figure B-1. Timeline of events in the Reagan Administration's crisis response









LIST OF REFERENCES

ABC Poll Says. (1986, November 20). Most think Reagan deceptive on Iran. The Associated
Press.

Ajami, F. (1986, November 16). The opening to Iran: Part burden, part responsibility," The New
York Times, section 4, p. 23.

Allen, B., O'Loughlin, P., Jasperson, A., & Sullivan, J. (1994). The media and the Gulf war:
Framing, priming, and the spiral of silence. Polity, 27(2), 255-284.

Arms for Iran. What? For whom? (1986, November 9). The New York Times, section 4, p. 22.

Atkinson, R. (1984, December 9). Swiss relay U.S. views to Tehran. The New York Times,
section A, p.1

Baker, R. (1986, November 15). Observer; not brave like Jimmy. The New York Times, section 1,
p. 31.

Bartels, L.M. (1996). Politicians and the Press: Who Leads, Who Follows? Prepared for
presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San
Francisco, September 1996, Draft: 22 August 1996, Available electronically from the
Political Methodology Archive:
http://wizard.ucr.edu/polmeth/working_papers96/barte96.html

Belcher, C. (1995). Looking beyond the immediate crisis response: Analyzing the organizational
culture to understand the crisis. Journalfor the Association of Communication
Administration. 1, 1-17.

Benoit, W.L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations Review,
23(2), 177-187.

Brinson, S.L. & Benoit, W.L. (1996). Dow Corning's image repair strategies in the breast
implant crisis. Communication Quarterly, 44(1), 29-41.

Benoit, W.L., & Czerwinski, A. (1997). A critical analysis of USAir's image repair discourse.
Business Communication Quarterly, 60(3), 38-57.

Benoit, W.L., Gullifor, P & Panici, D.A. (1991). President Reagan's defensive discourse on the
Iran-Contra affair. Communication Studies, 42(3), 272-294.

Blaney, J.R., Benoit, W.L., & Brazeal, L.M. (2002). Blowout!: Firestone's image restoration
campaign. Public Relations Review, 28(4), 379-392.

Boyd, G.M. (1986, November 6). U.S. looks at ways to free hostages. The New York Times,
section A, p. 10.









Benoit, W.L. & Brinson, S.L. (1999). The Tarnished Star: Restoring Texaco's Damaged Public
Image. Management Communications Quarterly, 12(4), 483-510.

Brody, R. & Shapiro, C. (1989). Policy failure and public support: The Iran-Contra affair and
public assessment of President Reagan. Political Behavior, 11(4), 353-369.

Burnett, J.J. (1998). A strategic approach to managing crises. Public Relations Review, 24(4),
475-488.

Busby, R. (1999). Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair: The politics ofpresidential recovery. New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.Cannon, L. (1985, July 9). President assails "terrorist"
nations; unspecified action is threatened. The Washington Post, first section, Al.

Caillouet, R.H., & Allen, M.W. (1994). Legitimation endeavors: impression management
strategies used by an organization in crisis. Communication Monographs, 61(1), 44-62.

Caillouet, R.H., & Allen, M.W. (1996). Impression management strategies employees use when
discussing their organization's public image. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4),
211-227.

Callaghan, K.J., & Virtanen, S. (1993). Revised models of the "Rally Phenomenon": The case of
the Carter presidency. The Journal ofPolitics, 55(3), 756-764.

Cannon, L. (1986, November 20). Sending weapons to Iran a "mistake," McFarlane says;
Reagan emissary favors talks as "sensible policy." The Washington Post, first section, p.
Al.

Cannon, L. & Pincus, W. (1986, November 18). Reagan has "no plans" to ship Iran more arms,
but order still in effect. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Christen, C.T. (2005). The restructuring and reengineering of AT&T: Analysis of a public
relations crisis using organizational theory. Public Relations Review, 31(2), 239-251.

Coombs, W.T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for the
selection of the "appropriate" crisis-response strategies. Management Communication
Quarterly, 8(4), 447-476

Coombs, W.T. (1998). An analytic framework for crisis situations: Better responses from a better
understanding of the situation. Journal of Public Relations Research, 10(3), 177-191.

Coombs, W.T. (1999). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing and responding.
London: SAGE Publications.

Coombs, W.T. (2002). Deep and surface threats: Conceptual and practical implications for
"crisis" vs. "problem." Public Relations Review, 28(4), 339-345.









Coombs, W.T. & Holladay, S.J. (1996). Communication and attribution in a crisis: An
experimental study in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4),
279-295.

Coombs, W.T. & Holladay, S.J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis situation: A
fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 13(4), 321-340.

Coombs, T. & Schmidt, L. (2000). An empirical analysis of image restoration: Texaco's racism
crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(2), 163-178.

"David Jacobsen: Remarks and an Informal Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting.
November 7, 1986," (1986). Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday,
November 10, Volume 22, Number 45, 1545.

Dealing with Iran: How experts see it. The New York Times, 16 November 1986, section 1, p. 14.

DeVries, D.S. & Fitzpatrick, K.R. (2006). Defining the characteristics of a lingering crisis:
Lessons from the National Zoo. Public Relations Review, 32(2), 160-167.

Dickinson, G. (1994). Creating his own constraint: Ronald Reagan and the Iran-Contra crisis. In
A. Kiewe (Ed.), The modern presidency and crisis rhetoric (pp. 155-177). Westport:
Praeger Publishers.

Dobbs, M. (1986, November 6). Tehran visit may hurt U.S.-Iraqi ties; Reported effort to help
Iran get spare parts seen as "naive.". The Washington Post, first section, p. A38.

Draper, T. (1991). A very thin line: The Iran-Contra affairs. New York: Hill and Wang.

Drozdiak, W. (1986, November 9). Secret contacts with iran seen hurting U.S. credibility; Arms-
for-hostages deal has wide impact. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Egelhoff, W.G. & Sen, F. (1992). An information processing model of crisis management.
Management Communication Quarterly, 5(4), 443-484.

Eisenberg, E.M. & Witten, M.G. (1987). Reconsidering openness in organizational
communication. The Academy ofManagement Review, 12(3), 418-426.

Engelberg, S. (1986, November 15). White House says C.I.A. had a role in Iran operation. The
New York Times, section 1, p. 1.

Engleberg, S. (1986, November 16). Lawmakers to press Reagan aides to explain the Iran arms
deals," The New York Times, section 1, p. 14.

Engleberg, S. (1986, November 17). Uproar over Iran: What is known and what remains to te
seen. The New York Times, section A, p. 10.









Europe faults Reagan talk; A Briton calls it "incredible." (1986, November 15). The New York
Times, section 1, p. 5.

Excerpts from the President's address accusing nations of "acts of war." The New York Times, 9
July 1985, section A, p. 1.

Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: planning for the inevitable. New York: American
Management Association.

Fishman, D. (1999). ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended.
Communication Quarterly, 47(4), 345-375.

Fuerbringer, J. (1986, November 20). Lawmakers find Reagan misleading. The New York Times,
section A, p. 13.

Gallup poll data. Retrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.

Gonzalez-Herrero, A. & Pratt, C.B. (1996). An integrated symmetrical model for crisis-
communication management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(2), 79-105.

Gorski, T.A. (1998). A blueprint for crisis management. Association Management, 50(1), 78-79.

Grunig, L., Grunig, J., & Dozier, D. (2002a). Activisim. In J.E.Grunig (Ed.), Excellentpublic
relations and effective organizations (pp. 442-479). Mahwah: Erlbaum.

Grunig, L., Grunig, J., & Dozier, D. (2002b). Excellence in public relations and communication
management: A review of the theory and results; methodology of the Excellence study,
Isolating the Excellence factor. In J.E.Grunig (Ed.), Excellentpublic relations and effective
organizations (pp. 1-89). Mahwah: Erlbaum.

Hale, J.E., Dulek, R.E. & Hale, D.P. (2005). Crisis response and communication challenges.
Journal of Business Communication, 42(2), 112-134.

Haney, P.J. (2004). The Nixon administration and Middle East crises: Theory and evidence of
presidential management of foreign policy decision making. Political Research Quarterly,
47(4), 939-959.

Hearit, K.M. (1994). Apologies and public relations crises at Chrysler, Toshiba, and Volvo.
Public Relations Review, 20(2), 113-125.

Heith, D.J. (1998). Staffing the White House public opinion apparatus 1969-1988. The Public
Opinion Quarterly, 62(2), 165-189.

Hearit, K.M. & Courtright, J.I. (2003). A social constructionist approach to crisis management:
Allegations of sudden acceleration in the Audi 5000. Communication Studies, 54(1), 79-
95.









Hijazi, I.A. (1986, November 4). Hostage's release is linked to shift in Iranian policy. The New
York Times, section A, p. 1.

Hijazi, I.A. (1986, November 16). Beirut group urges U.S. to take "wider steps" to free the
hostages. The New York Times, section 1, p. 14.

Hoffman, D. (1986, November 14). Congress aims bipartisan criticism at Reagan for dealing
with Iran. The Washington Post, first section, p. A23.

Hoffman & Pincus (1986, November 13). Meant to aid Iran factions, Reagan says. The
Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Hoffman, D. & Pincus, W. (1986, November 20). President's statements raise new
contradictions; Questions remain for Hill hearings Friday. The Washington Post, first
section, p. A22.

Holtzhausen, D.R. (2000). Postmodern values in public relations. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 12(1), 93-114.

Homan, H. (1986, November 17). Shultz sees no benefit for U.S. in further Iran arms shipments;
Tehran officials differ on U.S. role," The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Horsley, J.S. & Barker, R.T. (2002). Toward a synthesis model for crisis communication in the
public sector. Journal of Business and Technical Communication, 16(4), 406-440.

Hua-Hsin, W. & Pfau, M. (2004). The relative effectiveness of inoculation, bolstering, and
combined approaches in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research,
16(3), 301-328.

Ignatius, D. & Getler, M. (1986, November 16). Reagan's foreign policy: Where's the rest of it?
The Washington Post, p. K1.

Iran's president rebuts Reagan, denying there were contracts. (1986, November 15). The New
York Times, section 1, p. 5.

"Iran-United States Relations: Address to the Nation. November 13, 1986," (1986). Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, November 17, 1986, Volume 22,
Number 46, 1559

Jenkins, L. (1986, November 15). Rome opponents accuse Craxi of arms dealings with Iran; No
proof found; Government denies Talamone port shipments. The Washington Post, first
section, p. A2.

Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100-2, Robert McFarlane. 100th Cong., 1st Session, 1 (1987).









Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100-7, Part I. Oliver L. North, Part II. Oliver L. North and Robert
McFarlane, Part III. Appendixes to Parts I and I. 100th Cong., 1st Session, 1 (1987).

Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100-8, John M Poindexter. 100th Cong., 1st Session, 1 (1987).

Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100-9, George P. .l/nh/i, Edwin Meese III. 100th Cong., 1st
Session, 1 (1987).

Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With
Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100-10, Donald T Regan, Caspar W Weinberger. 100th Cong., 1st
Session, 1 (1987).

Kaufman, J. (2005). Lost in space: A critique of NASA's crisis communications in the Columbia
disaster. Public Relations Review, 31(2), 263-275.

Kifner, J. (1986, November 23). Arabs bitter over shipment to Iran. The New York Times, section
1, p. 18.

Getler, M. (1986, November 16). Beirut captors urge expanded U.S. efforts. The Washington
Post, first section, p. Al.

Gwertzman, B. (1986, November 4). U.S. looks for sign in captors' move. The New York Times,
section A, p. 11.

Gwertzman, B. (1986, November 8). Shultz reaffirms his opposition to negotiations with
terrorists. The New York Times, section 1, p. 1.

Gwertzman, B. (1986, November 20). Confusion over Iran. The Washington Post, section A, p.
13.

Kornbluh, P. & Byrne, M. (Eds.). (1993). The Iran-contra scandal: The declassified history.
New York: The New Press.

Krauthammer, C. (1986, November 7). Government as rescue squad. The Washington Post,
editorial, p. A27.

Krosnick, J.A. & Kinder, D.R. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president
through priming. American Political Science Review, 84(2), 497-512.









Lauzen, M.M. & Dozier, D.M. (1994). Issues management mediation of linkages between
environmental complexity and management of the public relations function. Journal of
Public Relations Research, 6(3), 163-184.

Ledingham, J.A. (2001). Government-community relationships: Extending the relational theory
of public relations. Public Relations Review, 71, 285-295.

Ledingham, J.A. (2003). Explicating relationship management as a general theory of public
relations. Journal of Public Relations Research, 181-198.

Lewis, A. (1986, November 20). Abroad at home; Illusion and reality. The New York Times, 20
November 1986, section A, p. 31.

Lewis, F. (1986, November 11). Foreign affairs: Statesmen and satire," The New York Times,
section A, p. 25.

Lyon, L. & Cameron, G. (2004). A relational approach examining the interplay of prior
reputation and immediate response to a crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 16(3),
213-241.

Maier, C.T. (2005). Weathering the storm: Hauser's Vernacular Voices, public relations and the
Roman Catholic Church's sexual abuse scandal. Public Relations Review, 31(2), 219-227.

Major news in summary; fighting words on terrorism. (1985, July 14). The New York Times,
section 4, p. 1.

Making it worse. (1986, November 16). The Washington Post, p. K6.

Marcus, A.A. & Goodman, R.S. (1991). Victims and shareholders: The dilemmas of presenting
corporate policy during a crisis. Academy ofManagement Journal, 34(2), 281-305.

Marra, F.J. (1998). Crisis communication plans: poor predictors of excellent crisis public
relations. Public Relations Review, 24(4), 461-473.

Marshall, C. & Rossman, G.B. (2006). Designing qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE
Publications.

Martin, R.M. & Boynton, L.A. (2005). From liftoff to landing: NASA's crisis communications
and resulting media coverage following the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. Public
Relations Review, 31(2), 253-261.

McCartney, R. (1986, November, 4). Iran says McFarlane, others came on secret mission to
Tehran; Waite: Release prospects "reasonably strong." The Washington Post, first section,
p. Al.

McCartney, R.J. (1986, November 6). Waite postpones return to Beirut; Envoy suggests reports
of U.S.-Iran talks complicate his mission. The Washington Post, first section, p. A36.









McCombs, M. (1994). In Bryant, J. and Zillman, D. (eds). Media effects: advances in theory and
research. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.

McCombs, M. (2002). In Bryant, J. and Zillman, D. (eds). Media effects: advances in theory and
research. 2nd Edition. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.

McFarlane, R. (1986, November 13). McFarlane on why. The Washington Post, editorial, p.
A21.

McGrory, M. (1986, November 11). Shaking hands with the devil. The Washington Post, first
section, p. A2.

McGrory, M. (1986, November 16). "The great hypocrite": A way out. The Washington Post, p,
Kl.

McQuail, D. (2005). McQuail's mass communication theory. 5th edition. London: Sage
Publications.

Messner, M. & DiStaso, M.W. (2006). The Source Cycle: Intermedia Agenda-Setting Between
the Traditional Media and Weblogs. Research paper presented at the 89th Annual
Convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in
San Francisco, CA, August 2-5, 2006.

Miller, J. (1986, November 16). NATO legislators assail Iran deals. The New York Times,
section 1, p. 14.

Miller, N. (1992). Stealing from America: A history of corruption from Jamestown to Reagan.
New York: Paragon House.

Mitroff, I.I. (1988). Crisis management: cutting through the confusion. Sloan Management
Review 29(2), 15-21.

Molotsky, I. & Weaver, W. (1986, November 13). Washington talk: Briefing; Reagan discusses
Iran, The New York Times, first section, p. Al.

Molotsky, I. & Weaver, W. (1986, November 17). Washington talk: Briefing; The White House
network," The New York Times, section A, p. 18.

Morris, E. (1999). Dutch: A memoir ofRonald Reagan. New York: Random House.

Murphy, P. (1996). Chaos theory as a model for managing issues and crises. Public Relations
Review, 22(2), 95-104.

Norrander, B. & Wilcox, C. (1993). Rallying around the flag and partisan change: The case of
the Persian Gulf war. Political Research Quarterly, 46(4), 759-770.

Ottaway, D.B. (1986, November 17). Iran sought U.S. contact; Overture not from moderates,
experts say," The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.









Ottaway, D.B. & Hoffman, D. (1986, November 8). Shultz signals discord; Disagreement hinted
over reported deals with Iran on hostages. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Pearson, C.M. & Clair, J.A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy ofManagement
Review, 23(1), 59-76.

Penrose, J.M. (2000). The role of perception in crisis planning. Public Relations Review, 26(2),
155-171.

Phillips, R.A. (1997). Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness. Business Ethics Quarterly,
7(1), 51-66.

Pincus, W. (1986, November 6). Secret talks with Iran described; 3 hostages freed over 14
months of negotiations. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Pincus, W. (1986, November 7). Shultz protested Iran deal; U.S. reassured Iraq of neutrality in
Persian Gulf War. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Pincus, W. (1986, November 8). CIA bypassed in Iran arms supply; White House sought to
avoid disclosure to Congress. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Pincus, W. (1986, November 10). Hill probes of NSC planned; Arms deal with Iran seen as
attempt to Circumvent Congress. The Washington Post, first section, p. A34.

Pincus, W. (1986, November 15). Reagan ordered Casey to keep Iran mission from Congress;
White House fails to calm concerns on secret deals. The Washington Post, first section, p.
Al.

Pincus, W. & Hoffman, D. (1986, November 11). White House briefs Hill on Iran contacts;
Poindexter concedes "a miscalculation." The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Regan, D. (1988). For the record: From Wall Street to Washington. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Publishers.

Reston, J. (1986, November 16). The issue: Reagan's judgment," The New York Times, section
4, p. 23.

Rosenthal, U., & Kouzmin, A. (1997). Crises and crisis management: Toward comprehensive
government decision making. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-
PART, 7(2), 277-304.

Safire, W. (1986, November 13). Tar baby strikes again. The New York Times, section A, p. 31.

Safire, W. (1986, November 17). The secret agent. The New York Times, section A, p. 21.

Sciolino, E. (1986, November 6). Internal strife stirs Iran to rethink foreign policy. The New
York Times, section A, p. 1.









Sciolino, E. (1986, November 15). Speech called political ploy. The New York Times, section 1,
p. 5.

Sciolino, E. (1986, November 20). Some of the top people in Iran. The New York Times, section
A, p. 14.

Schudson, M. (1992). Watergate in American memory: How we remember, forget, and
reconstruct the past. New York: Basic Books.

Schudson, M. (2004). Notes on scandal and the Watergate legacy. The American Behavioral
Scientist, 47(9), 1231-1238.

Schraeder, P.J., and Endless, B. (1998). The Media and Africa: The Portrayal of Africa in the
"New York Times" (1955-1995). Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 26, No. 2, The Clinton
Administration and Africa (1993-1999). (1998), pp. 29-35.

Seeger, M.W. (2002). Chaos and crisis: propositions for a general theory of crisis
communication. Public Relations Review, 28(4), 329-337.

Sellnow, T.L., Ulmer, R.R., & Snider, M. (1998). The compatibility of corrective action in
organizational crisis communication. Communication Quarterly, 46(1), 60-74.

Seeger, M.W., Sellnow, T.L., & Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Public relations and crisis communication:
Organizing and chaos. In R. Heath (Ed.), Handbook ofpublic relations (pp. 155-165).
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Shales, T. (1986, November 20). Tough rounds for Reagan; The President holds off the press.
The Washington Post, 20 November 1986, style, p. Cl.

Shultz Urges "Active" Drive On Terrorism. (1984, June 25). The New York Times, section A, p.
3.

Shovels in the White House. (1986, November 21). The New York Times, section A, p. 34.

Smothers, R. (1986, November 8). Reaction in Europe is mixed. The New York Times, section 1,
p. 4.

Some questions for the President. (1986, November 19). The Washington Post, first section, p.
A17.

Sturges, D.L. (1994). Communicating through a crisis: A strategy for organizational survival.
Management Communication Quarterly, 7(3), 297-316

Suchman, M.C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The
Academy ofManagement Review, 20(3), 571-610.









Survey by ABC News. (1986, November 13). Retrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.

Survey by ABC News. (1986, November 19). Retrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

Susskind, L. & Field, P. (1996). The mutual gains approach. Dealing ni ith an angry public (pp.
37-59). New York: Free Press.

Taylor, P. (1986, November 21). President's viewers express skepticism and forgiveness. The
Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

"The President's News Conference of November 19, 1986: Iran-U.S. Relations," (1986). Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, November 24, 1986, Volume 22,
Number 47, 1583.

Tumber, H. & Waisbord, S.R. (2004). Introduction: Political scandals and media across
democracies, volume I. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47(8), 1031-1039.

Tyler, L. (1997). Liability means never being able to say you're sorry. Management
Communications Quarterly, 11(1), 51-73.

Tyler, L. (2005). Towards a postmodern understanding of crisis communication. Public
Relations Review, 31, 566-571.

Tyler, P.E. (1986, November 15). U.S.-Arab relations strained by news of arms shipments. The
Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

The Iranian Connection. (1986, November 6). The Washington Post, editorial, p. A18.

The Moderate Fantasy. (1986, November 17). The Washington Post, editorial, p. A12.

Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Effective crisis management through established stakeholder relationships.
Management Communication Quarterly, 14(4), 590-615.

Ulmer, R.R. & Sellnow, T.I. (2000). Consistent questions of ambiguity in organizational crisis
communication: Jack in the Box as a case study. Journal of Business Ethics, 25(2), 143-
155.

Ulmer, R.R. & Sellnow, T.L. (2002). Crisis management and the discourse of renewal:
Understanding the potential for positive outcomes of crisis. Public Relations Review, 28,
361-365.

Venette, S.J., Sellnow, T.L. & Lang, P.A. (2003). Metanarration's role in restructuring
perceptions of crisis: NHTSA's failure in the Ford-Firestone crisis. Journal of Business
Communication, 40(3), 219-236.









Wallison, P. (2003). Reagan: The power of conviction and the success of his presidency.
Boulder: Westview Press.

Walsh, E. & Dewar, H. (1986, November 20). Reagan defends Iran arms deal, says mission no
"fiasco"; Critics in Congress appear unsatisfied. The Washington Post, first section, p. Al.

Ware, B.L. & Linkugel, W.A. (1973). They spoke in defense of themselves: On the general
criticism of apologia. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59(3), 273-283.

Weinraub, B. (1985, July 9). President accuses 5 "outlaw states" of world terror. The New York
Times, section A, p. 1.

Weinraub, B. (1986, November 11). U.S. policy on terror. The New York Times, section A, p. 10.

Weinraub, B. (1986, November 13). Reagan confirms Iran got arms aid; Calss deals vital; He
tells Congress. The New York Times, section A, p. 1.

Weinraub, B. (1986, November 14). President defends Iranian contacts; Arms not "ransom". The
New York Times, section A, p. 1.

Weinraub, B. (1986, November 16). Criticism on Iran and other issues put Reagan's aides on
defensive. The New York Times, section 1, p. 16.

Weinraub, B. (1986, November 18). Reagan says Iran won't get more arms. The New York
Times, section A, p. 16.

Weinraub, (1986, November 19). Reagan's last years: How effective can they be? The New York
Times, section A, p. 10.

What's wrong in the White House? (1986, November 16). The New York Times, section 4, p. 22.

Wicker, T. (1986, November 23). In the nation; The shovel brigade. The New York Times,
section 4, p. 25.

Wilkins, L. (1993). Between facts and values: Print media coverage of the greenhouse effect,
1987-1990. Public Understanding of Science 2(1), 71-84.

Wise, K. (2003). The Oxford incident: organizational culture's role in an anthrax crisis.

Public Relations Review, 29, 461-472.

Yanovitzky, I. and Bennett, C. (1999). Media attention, institutional response, and health
behavior change: The case of Drunk Driving, 1978-1996. Communication Research, 26(4),
429-453.

Zhang, J. & Benoit, W.L. (2004). Message strategies of Saudi Arabia's image restoration
campaign after 9/11. Public Relations Review, 30, 161-167.









Ziaukas, T. (2001). Environmental public relations: Two paradigmatic cases Bhopal and
Exxon. In A. Farazmond (Ed.), Handbook of crisis and emergency management (pp. 245-
257). New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jesse Daniel Rigby earned a Bachelor of Arts in Public Relations from the University of

Florida College of Journalism and Communications in 1994. In 2001 he was awarded a Bachelor

of Science in Environmental Sciences from the University of Florida College of Natural

Resources and Environment in 2001. This thesis projects marks the completion of the author's

graduate studies in mass communications. He was awarded a Master of Arts in Mass

Communication from the University of Florida College of Journalism and Communications in

August 2007.

The author's interest in this case originated shortly after Iran-Contra erupted. One evening

while watching the network news, his mother pointed at the television and said, "Ollie's in

trouble." Rigby's father, a retired United States Marine Corps officer, attended basic officer

training with Oliver North in 1968. The two Marines were awarded with leadership roles while

in training, and left for Viet Nam a month apart. They remained acquaintances and colleagues

throughout the following decade.





PAGE 1

1 ARMS CRISIS By JESSE DANIEL RIGBY A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTE R OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

PAGE 2

2 2007 Jesse Daniel Rigby

PAGE 3

3 To Jean, my parents Rita, Jesse, and Margo and my grandparents J.D. and Erma Their support made this research project possible. This paper is al so dedicated to the memory of Captain Michael Gibbs. Captain Mike, a former Army Seabee engineer, passed away the evening before this thesis was defended. At the time the Iran arms crisis occurred, Mr. Gibbs was busy taming tigers, quelling uprisings, and emptying bars. A true adventurer, he would have most likely attempted to free the hostages himself had someone only asked.

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I extend my heartfelt gratitude to my thesis committee: Dr. Jennifer A. Robinson, Dr. Spiro Kiousis, and Dr. Be rnell Tripp, for participating in this project. Without their guidance, support, and encouragement, this research project would not have been possible. I also would like express gratitude to the various professors who helped to shape this research project over the last two years. Lastly, I would like to thank the principal players in the Iran arms crisis of 1986 for providing the raw material for such an interesting case study.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 8 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 9 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 10 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 12 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 19 Crisis Definitions ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 19 Crisis Types ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 21 C rises as Opportunities ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 22 Staged Conceptualizations of Crisis Development ................................ ................................ 23 Crisis Management and Communication ................................ ................................ ................ 24 Crisis Management Approaches ................................ ................................ ............................. 25 Traditional Guidance and Linear Approaches ................................ ................................ 26 Linear approaches: staged models ................................ ................................ ............ 27 ................................ ..................... 28 Critica l Perspectives ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 30 Postmodern perspectives ................................ ................................ .......................... 31 Chaos theory ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 32 Organizational culture ................................ ................................ .............................. 33 Organizational history ................................ ................................ .............................. 35 Relational and Symbolic Management Approaches ................................ ........................ 36 Relational management approaches ................................ ................................ ......... 37 Symbolic management approaches ................................ ................................ .......... 40 Political Science Perspectives of Crisis Management ................................ ............................ 47 Damage Control, Crisis, Scandal, and Affair ................................ ................................ .. 47 Organizational Structure ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 49 The Rally Round the Flag Effect ................................ ................................ ..................... 50 Comparisons of the Iran Arms Crisis with Preceding Presidential Crises ...................... 52 ............................. 53 3 CASE STUDY ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 56 Crisis Roots ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 56 The Crisis Emerges ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 59 Internal Conflicts Emerge ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 61 White House Staff Gains Interest, Stonewall Emerges ................................ .......................... 62

PAGE 6

6 The Situation Worsens ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 64 The White House Responds ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 65 ................................ ................................ ................... 70 Meeting the Press ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 72 ................................ ................................ .......................... 75 Metamorphosis: The Iran Contra Scandal ................................ ................................ .............. 80 Epilogue ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 83 4 METHODOLOGY ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 85 Research Questions ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 85 Study Metho dology ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 87 The Case Study ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 89 Data Collection ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 90 Unit of Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 90 Sou rce Material ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 91 Qualitative Coding Categories ................................ ................................ ................................ 93 Image Restoration Discourse Theory ................................ ................................ .............. 93 Stakeholder Theory ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 95 Data Categorization ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 98 Data Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 100 Study Soundness ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 100 5 RESULTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 103 RQ2: What Insight Does Image Restoration Discourse Theory Yield Regarding the Defensive Discourse Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Cris is Period? ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 103 Discourse Strategies Not Identified by IRDT ................................ ............................... 103 Restoration Discourse Theory ................................ ................................ .................... 108 Analysis of Defensive Discourse Offered by the Various Administration Units .......... 116 President Reagan and the White House staff ................................ ......................... 117 The State Department ................................ ................................ ............................. 125 National Security Council staff ................................ ................................ .............. 127 Documentation ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 130 RQ3: What Insight Does Stakeholder Theory Yield Regarding the Defensive Discourse Disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the Crisis Period? ........................... 136 Stakeholder Theory Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the Public Record ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 136 Stakeholder Theory Based Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the ................................ ................................ 139 RQ4: Did Administration Officials, Publicly or Privately, Make Any Additional Statements that Indicate an Emphasis on the Maintenance of Either Symbolic Resources or Organization Stak eholder Relationships? ................................ ................... 142

PAGE 7

7 RQ1: Did the Reagan Administration Prioritize its Symbolic Resources,Its Stakeholder Relationships, or Some Other Concern when Communicating a Response to the Iran Arms Crisis of November 1986? ................................ ................................ ...................... 147 6 DISCUSSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 149 Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 149 Findings ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 151 ................................ ................................ ..................... 151 Significance of a Lack of Prioritization of Relational Concerns ................................ ... 153 Previously Unidentified Defensive Discourse Strategies ................................ .............. 154 Criteria for Crisis Management Success ................................ ................................ ....... 156 Implications and Future Research Questions ................................ ................................ ....... 158 The Potential Applicability of Image Restoration Discourse Theory to Other Crises .. 158 Possible Theoretical Shortcomings ................................ ................................ ............... 159 Ambiguous Discourse ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 161 The Potential for Managing Presidential Crises from the Relational Perspective ........ 163 The Perils of Ignoring Crisis Threats ................................ ................................ ............ 1 65 Additional Questions Raised by this Case ................................ ................................ ..... 166 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 170 APPENDIX A TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 172 B FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 178 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 179 BIOGRAPHICAL SKET CH ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 192

PAGE 8

8 LIST OF TABLES Table page A 1 Typology of image restoration strategies ................................ ................................ ......... 172 A 2 Typology of stakeholder theory based rhetorical strategies ................................ ............ 172 A 3 3 to November 24, 1986 ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 173 A 4 Defensive Discourse Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration .... 174 A 5 Evolution of Stakeholder Theory Based Rhetorical St rategies from November 3 to November 24, 1986 ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 175 A 6 Stakeholder Theory Based Rhetorical Strategies Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration ................................ ................................ .............................. 176 A 7 Evolution of Statements Made by the Reagan Administration Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns From November 3 to November 24, 1986 ............ 176 A 8 Statements Made by the Individual Members of the Reagan Administration Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns ................................ ............................ 177

PAGE 9

9 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page B 1 ................................ 178

PAGE 10

10 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communication ARMS CRISIS By Jesse Daniel Rigby August 2007 Chair: Jennifer A. Robinson Cochair: Spiro Kiousis Major: Mass Communication This study investigates th e root causes of one of the most damaging presidential crises in modern American history and identifies potential linkages between crisis communication theory and the healthy functioning of presidential administrations. T he primary research question probes a key consideration regarding the functioning of executive govern ance: When managing crises, should executive leadership place priority on its symbolic resources or its stakeholder relationships? fensive discourse in the midst of the Iran arms crisis were explored. Specifically, image restoration discourse theory and a stakeholder theory based typology were used to categorize the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration in the midst of the Iran arms crisis of 1986. The statements offered in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages were analyzed by administrative source and over time. The Reagan Administration initially prioritized the continued viability of the opera tion involving the exchange of arms for hostages. However, once threats to the protection of its symbolic assets.

PAGE 11

11 Throughout the crisis period, the Adminis tration attempted to resolve the disparity between public expectations of its actions and stated foreign policy regarding Iran by explaining the Iran initiative using ambiguous discourse. Image restoration discourse theory accounted for most of the stateme nts which emerged from the data, but several defensive discourse strategies fell outside the theoretical typology. When added to the existing typology, these previously unidentified discourse categories accounted for most of statements analyzed in this cas e. Implications for further political communication and crisis communication were considered. Specifically, how do communication decisions impact the ability of a president to govern and public faith in government? When choosing operational considerations over the symbolic reputation and image of the administration, how will that impact the effectiveness of an administration? Such considerations are highly relevant to communication scholarship and society at large given the numerous presidential crises whic h have occurred in recent history.

PAGE 12

12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Numerous United States presidential administrations have faced crises which threatened their ability to govern, their legitimacy, and the confidence of their constituents. Modern presidential administrations embroiled in crisis must navigate a complex media environment in which news about a crisis travels instantly. Therefore, the communication component of an lity to govern. The Reagan Administration was acutely aware of this fact. According to former White House media, or more driven by the printed word and the televisio n image, than the Reagan Communication technologies which emerged in the latter part of the 20 th c entury, have enabled the emergence of an immediate and global media environment. In this environment, when crisis hits, i nformation is communicated to mass audiences instantly. A presidential every action taken, and every message disseminated. When embroiled in crisis not only the o utcome of the crisis, but how presidential administrations communicate during the crisis has a major impact on their credibility and future effectiveness. Watergate, Iran Contra, and the Iran hostage crisis, are examples of modern presidential crises whic h have occurred in complex media environments. In 1972, the Watergate crisis erupted after members of the Nixon Administration broke into the Democratic National Headquarters. Nixon eventually resigned, and his name and administration were indelibly fused with scandal in the public memory (Schudson, 1992, 2004). From late 1979, until January 20, 1981, President Carter unsuccessfully tried to negotiate the Iran hostage crisis. The crisis

PAGE 13

13 n the spring of 1980 (Busby, 1999). The hostages were freed on the day President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, but Reagan would soon be mired in crisis after he attempted to free Americans held hostage in the Middle East. The efforts of the Reagan Adminis tration to free the hostages would eventually lead to the Iran Contra scandal, one of the most damaging presidential scandals in United States history (Busby, 1999). According to Busby (1999) and Schudson (1994), the Reagan Administration was plagued by co rruption and scandal, yet until Iran Contra, crisis did not stick to the Reagan 88 report which found that over 225 Reagan appointees were alleged to be involved in criminal wrongdoing (Busby, 1999). Schudson (1994), discussing housing and urban development, and an administration that combined the old fashioned graft of the Grant and Harding eras with an undisguised grab for ublic approval rating than any modern Contr a, Reagan weathered several minor crises which had minimal effect on his public approval rating. He angered Jewish groups in the United States when he attended a memorial service honoring German SS troops in Bitburg, Germany, but this had no real effect on his public standing (Busby, 1999). His Administration faced further criticism for engaging in a disinformation

PAGE 14

14 campaign in Libya, and for the so caused lasting damage to his Administration. In Soviet summit in Reykjavik into public perceptions of success (Busby, 1999). Until Iran relationship with the electorate performance (Gallup poll data, 2006). The Iran Administration. The last poll taken before the Iran Contra affair was made public indicated remained below pre Iran Contra levels until the last poll of his p residency (Gallup poll data, 2006). The Iran ability to enact his policy agenda (Wallison, 2003). The crises faced by Nixon in 1972 and Carter throughout the last year of his pre sidency Contra scandal. As Reagan tried to negotiate the treacherous waters of the Iran Contra affair, his actions were understood in the context of Watergate and the previous Iran hosta ge crisis. Reagan was also constrained by his previous tough talk against terrorist regimes, specifically Iran. Reagan was under a tremendous amount of public pressure to free the hostages, but his ability to do so was limited by his own public policy and public memory of past crises (Busby, 1999; Schudson, 1994). by the R eagan Administration. Initially, these operations were entirely unrelated except for the

PAGE 15

15 fact that they were both implemented and overseen by the same members of the National Security Council staff out of the White House. The Iran initiative involved effor ts to negotiate for the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon by selling American made armaments to moderate factions in Iran. The Contra component of the scandal involved efforts to provide financial and military support to paramilitary rebel force s in Nicaragua, who were attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. These two operations were linked when National Security Council staffers began to divert funds from the arms sales to the Contra rebels. The operations were publicly fused together when the Reagan Administration announced the funds transfers in late November 1986 (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Walsh, 1994). While seemingly trivial, understanding the distinction between the Iran and Contra operations is crucial if one seeks to understan d the Iran Contra scandal. It was the Iran component of the affair which set off the Iran initial attempts to explain its involvement with Iran set the context in which Reagan would attempt to address public ange r over Iran Contra. Through a complicated chain of events, the funds diversion was discovered due to the confusion that arose when the Administration attempted to explain the details of the Iran initiative (Draper, 1991;Walsh, 1994). The crescendo of pres s criticism which resulted from the original news reports of the arms sales prompted the National Security Council staff to develop a chronology of the details of the Iran initiative. Because the Iran initiative was highly compartmentalized, the majority o what had transpired. The chronology was developed so that members of the Administration would have a common bank of information to communicate consistently to the public and media ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 108, 144). When National Security

PAGE 16

16 Council staffers were unable to piece together a coherent recounting of their actions, a Justice Department staff member suspected a major impropriety may have occurred ( Joint Hearing s 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 110). Attorney General Edwin Meese received the The investigation uncovered the funds diversion and the scandal erupt ed. While one may assume to the discovery. From the time of c escalated press cr iticism, increasing public this pressure from the news media that necessitated the investigation which uncovered the diver sion (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 144. Therefore, the subject of this study is the crisis communication offered by the Reagan Administration in response to the Iran arms crisis of November 1986. This crisis preceded, and ignited, the Iran Contra scandal. Not only did communication efforts regarding the Iran arms deals play a role in the discovery of the diversion of funds from the arms sales to the Contras, but ment efforts were more damaging than the transgressions which spawned the crisis (Walsh, 1993; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). This is evidenced by the fact that the National Security Council staff members involved in the Iran initiative, were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, crimes related to efforts to conceal their actions (Walsh, 1994). November 3 through November 24, 1986, regarding the Iran arms deals from a crisis com munication perspective. To gain insight into the complexity of the rhetorical environment in

PAGE 17

17 which the Administration attempted to explain its actions, the individual defensive discourse offered by various representatives within the organization is scrutin ized. Furthermore, the discussions which took place within the Administration during staff meetings, in inter office memoranda, in press guidance documents, and in other internal documentation was analyzed to gain further understanding of the priorities wh communication response. The objective of this study is to identify, to the greatest degree possible, the priorities which guided the Administration as it attempted to calm the crisis which resulted due to the arms sal communication was enacted to protect its symbolic assets (i.e., image, credibility, and reputation), its relationships with various stakeholder groups, or some othe r concerns. This study is significant for several reasons. As noted above, the Iran arms crisis was the antecedent to the Iran contra scandal, one of the most damaging presidential scandals in United States history. Understanding the priorities underlying this particular crisis management process may provide insight that can minimize the likelihood of a crisis in American government of this magnitude from recurring. Evidence suggests the primary damage caused to the Administration, communication response, not the transgression itself. relations perspective. It has been argued that until N ovember 25, 1986, the Iran arms crisis was essentially a public relations problem (Wallison, 2003). Analysis of the situation from a public relations perspective yields insight into the success and failure outcomes of the crisis management efforts. A previ

PAGE 18

18 during Iran Contra from a public relations perspective, but that study is outdated, and substantial ation (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991). Communications scholars develop theory regarding crisis communication to provide research question proposed in this text may serve as the first step in the application of public relations based crisis communication theory to presidential crises. More broadly, the primary research question cuts to core considerations regarding the functioning of government. When managing crises, should executive leadership place priority on its symbolic resources or its stakeholder relationships? Furthermore, how do such decisions impact the functioning of our government and the lives of our fellow citizens? Such considerations are highly relevan t to communication scholarship and society at large given the numerous presidential crises which have occurred in recent history. The purpose of this study is

PAGE 19

19 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW Crisis Definitions close scrutiny of the news media or government, interferes with normal business operations, devalues a positive publ Ziaukas (2001) defines an organizational crisis as a situation which threatens to damage an zational (2001), Horsley and Barker (2002), Fishman (1999), Pearson an d Clair (1998), and Egelhoff and Sen (1992) also describe crises as relatively unlikely, potentially damaging and ambiguous events often requiring swift organizational response. Several authors describe crises in terms of effects on publics and their rela tionship with the entity undergoing crisis. Pearson and Clair (1998) study crises from a cognitive perspective. The es share in common a breakdown in the social construction individuals as per stak

PAGE 20

20 and impaired rationality. The more severe the rupture, the more difficult the crisis management process is for the organization (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Crisis s nt, he threat that can have a negative effect on the organization, industry, or stakeholders if handled imited in its applicability due to its qualification of a crisis event as unpredictable. Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) characterize crises attacks. Crisis has bee summary belief te within some socially constructed maintain that legitimacy is derived from behavioral compliance with environmental values. According to Christen (2005), politic al systems theory defines legitimacy in terms of power, with little emphasis on stakeholder perception. Tyler (2005) defines crisis from a postmodern perspective. The author views a crisis as a disruption in the dominant narrative an organization communica tes about itself. Tyler refers to an

PAGE 21

21 Lang (2003) refer to such a narrative as a metanarrative. For the purposes of this project, a definition based on an integr ation of the relational and symbolic perspectives is proposed. A crisis is a situation or event that threatens to damage an stakeholders. Such an event is oft en of high consequence and low probability. Additionally, such an event is often of an ambiguous nature, and requires immediate organizational action due to potential outcomes facing the organization and its stakeholders, as well as the high level of media and public interest that may result (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Coombs, 1999; Coombs, 2002; Egelhoff & Sen, 1992; Fishman, 1999; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Penrose, 2000; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001; Venette, Sellnow & Lang, 2003; Ziaukas, 2001). Crisis Types There are many varieties of crisis. Penrose (2000) lists an array of organizational crises including natural disasters, extortion, hostile takeovers, plant explosions, and product recalls. Citing the works Egelhoff and Sen (1992), and Marcus and Goodman (1991), Coombs (1995) identifies the following crisis dimensions that characterize various types of crises: internal or external, violent or nonviolent, intentional or unintentional, severe or normal damage, technical or sociopolitical failure, remote or relevant environment, high or low deniability, and concrete or diffuse victims. Coombs argues that identifying the crisis type is essential to determining appropriate crisis response strategies (1995). The author developed a crisis type matrix based on dimensions of intentionality (unintentional intentional) and control (external internal). The matrix yields the following four crisis types: faux pas (unintentional external), accidents (unintentional internal ),

PAGE 22

22 terrorism (intentional external) and transgressions (intentional internal). Coombs (1999) disasters, malevolence, technical breakdowns, human breakdowns, chall enges, megadamage, organizational misdeeds, workplace violence and rumors. In Contra st to Coombs (1995), Hearit and Courtright (2003) warn against a mechanistic t a particular type of crisis situation invariably necessitates the same strategies every time that it DeVries and Fitzpatrick (2006) describe four types of crises: natural crises, crises of malevolence, crises of deception, and crises of management misconduct. Natural crises are C amoral behavior and behavior rooted in questionable values. Crises as Opportunities Crises are generally characterized in terms of their negative impacts, but several scholars have discussed the potential for positive outcomes of crisis (Fink, 1986; Penrose, 2000; Seeger 2002; Sturges 1994; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow 200 2; Ziaukas, 2001). Sturges (1994) Penrose (2000, p. 156). Ziaukas ( 2001) contends that a prompt and appropriate response to a crisis may engender a

PAGE 23

23 Contra st, Penrose ( 2000) views the opportunity as arising from organizational perception. He posits that the situation is self fulfilling. If an organization views a crisis situation as containing opportunities, crisis managers are likely to perceive a wider range of options due to increased perceptions of control communicating a balanced percept ion of a crisis, the organization is more likely to sway public (2000, p. 167). While discussing the applicability of chaos theory to the study and practice of cris Staged Conceptualizations of Crisis Development Various crisis communication sch olars conceptualize the development of crisis situations in terms of sequential stages. The crisis management models presented by Coombs (1999), Fink (1986), Gonzalez Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005), provide theoretical insight i stage model of crisis management indicates four corresponding stages of crisis development: 1) the prodromal phase (or early warning phase), 2) the acute phase, the point at which the crisis breaks, 3) the chronic phase, at which time the crisis is underway, and 4) the crisis resolution phase. Crisis communication models presented by Coombs (1999), Gonzalez Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) indicate a slightly simplified conceptualization o f crisis development: 1) pre crisis, 2) crisis and 3) post crisis. While Fink (1986) differentiates between the acute and chronic stages, Coombs (1999), Gonazalez Herrero and Pratt (1996), and Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005)

PAGE 24

24 Crisis Management and Communication be delineated with adequate clarity. Crisis communication is a mere subset of the more comprehensive crisis management pr ocess crisis communication is a tool available to crisis relations strategi es and tactics, including issues management and environmental scanning, to minimize the damage threatening an organization during crisis. Crisis management processes may be enacted on an ongoing basis, during all phases of a crisis including the pre crisis phase. Such processes are often pro active with the objective of thwarting potential crises before they arise (Fink, 1986; Hua Hsin & Pfau 2004; Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek & Hale, 2005; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Lauzen & Dozer 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001; Ziaukas, 2001). According to Ziaukas (2001) crisis management is a subgenre of public relations that developed in the 1980s and 1990s after the emergence of several high profile crises, including the Three Mi laced Tylenol scare. Ziaukas defines crisis management as the implementation of public relations strategies and tactics to minimize damage threatening an organization during crisis (2001). Pearson and Clai r (1998) For the purposes of this project, crisis management is defined as the comp rehensive and on going implementation of public relations strategies and tactics to address threats to an organization and its stakeholders. Crisis communication is def ined as the process of using

PAGE 25

25 symbolic resources, and/or the relationships between the organization and its stakeholders (Fink, 1986; Hua Hsin & Pfau 2004; G onzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek & Hale, 2005; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Lauzen & Dozer 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2001; Ziaukas, 2001). Defining crisis management effectiveness is difficult due to the complexity and sub jectivity inherent in most crisis situations. Evaluation of the success of crisis management efforts will vary depending on many factors, including the time scale of evaluation, the is management efforts. Indeed, what may appear to be a management success to one stakeholder group (i.e., stockholders) may prove to be a failure from the perspective of stakeholder group (i.e., employees). An inherent difficulty arises from the fact that, by its very nature, crisis management success is often invisible while failures are often highly visible (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Pearson key stakeholders beli eve that the success outcomes of short and long range impacts of crises Crisis Management Approaches A review of scholarly literature revealed that crisis management can be segmented into considerations of cr isis management implementation (traditional perspectives and critical perspectives) and considerations of the objectives of management efforts (relationally motivated and symbolically motivated). Traditional perspectives generally recommend the use of cris is communication plans and broad guidelines calling for openness, quick response, candor and consistency. Critical perspectives question the utility of such approaches and acknowledge the environmental complexity of most crisis situations. Symbolically mot ivated management

PAGE 26

26 approaches focus on the protection of symbolic resources (i.e., image and reputation), while relationally motivated approaches place priority on maintaining favorable relationships with stakeholders (for example, see Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2002; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Gorski, 1998; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Martin & Boynton, 2005; Susskind & Field, 1996; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). Traditional guidance regarding the implementation of crisis management efforts tends to advocate for th e enactment of linear approaches, conceptualized as cause and effect processes. Premiums are placed on crisis communication plans and broad guidelines calling for openness, quick response, candor and consistency. Various staged models of crisis management and the five models identified by Penrose (2000) (to be discussed) exemplify a traditional, linear approach to crisis management. Critical perspectives question the utility of such methods, which are viewed as serving powerful organizations at the expense of stakeholders. Other perspectives hold that factors such as organizational culture and history are more accurate predictors of crisis management success than the existence of crisis communication plans and adherence to other traditional recommendations. Crisis management efforts differ not only in their implementation, but in their objectives as well. Most notably, the literature review revealed relational approaches (which seek to maintain mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and its stakeholders) and symbolic management. The following section will first discuss traditional and critical perspectives to crisis management, and then will discuss symbo lic and relational approaches. Traditional Guidance and Linear Approaches Although specific management approaches vary, the literature review revealed four broad guidelines that serve as the foundation for many scholarly and practitioner oriented crisis

PAGE 27

27 ma nagement recommendations. Those involved in a crisis should remain open to inquiry, respond communicatively to the crisis situation with minimal delay, respond honestly, and maintain consistency of message throughout the crisis period (Fink, 1986; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Maier, 2005; Venette, Sellnow & Lang, 2003; Ziaukas, 2001). Traditional approaches often recommend pre crisis planning in anticipation of future crisis sis contingency plans. Horsely and Barker (2002), Burnett (1998), Gorski (1998), and Pearson and Clair (1998) also emphasize benefits of developing crisis management plans to address future s of the emergency, the Linear approaches: staged m odels Some scholars conceptualize the crisis management process as a staged process. Such staged approaches tend to address crisis situa tions from a linear perspective. Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt (1996) propose a four stage model of crisis management of issues management, planning 81). The four steps of the model are 1) issues management 2) planning and prevention 3) crisis period and 4) post tive media cov erage. is to engage in symmetrical, reputation Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996, p. 81).Though the crisis may unfold in stages, the authors contend that the crisis management process should be c ontinual and ongoing (Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996). Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) refer to a three stage model of crisis prevention, response and recovery. To reflect the complexity of the crisis response stage Hale, Dulek, and Dale posit a spiral crisis

PAGE 28

28 p. 122). While Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) stress the response stage, Fink (1986) emphasizes the prevention stage, which is sub divided into mitigation, planning and warning. Similarly, Penrose (2000) depicts crisis management as occurring in five stages: mitigation, planning, response, recovery, and renewal. The three staged conceptualization of prev ention, response, and recovery corresponds to crisis event into three stages pre crisis, crisis event and post crisis. Despite this division, Coombs (1999) contends crisis management should be viewed as an ongoing process wit hout a discrete beginning or end. These seemingly Contra dictory concepts are reconciled by the fact that actual crises are complex events in which the various crisis stages el ongoing process (Horsley &Barker, 2002). Linear a pproaches : Penros f ive m ajor m odels crisis/strategic management addressed in a linear, cause and effect fashion. step model is described by Penrose (2000) as a linear procedure com posed of the following steps: 1. Develop an organizational structure in preparation for future crises. 2. Select a crisis management team. 3. Train the team via simulations.

PAGE 29

29 4. Conduct an audit of potential crisis situations. 5. Draft a crisis contin gency plan. 6. Actively manage crises as they arise (Penrose, 2000). planning. The model calls for a complete audit of potential crises that may arise in each of an The plan describes the situation and states desired and acceptable outcomes. The management team then develops appropriate strategic options (Fink, 1986, Penrose, 2 000). organizations prepare for the worst case scenario in each group. Preparation for each worst case 1988, p. 17; Penrose, 2000). Crisis/strateg ic management integration described by Penrose (2000) argues for the The process of crisis management is described as primarily defensive, while the strategic m anagement process is portrayed as being primarily an offensive act of marketplace competition (Penrose, 2000). to crises are not appropriate; the wrong response ca n be as damaging as the crisis itself. The model classifies crisis situations using a 16 cell matrix based on crisis threat level, response options, time pressure and degree of control. The matrix is the basis for a crisis continuum that serves as a tool t o reveal, and prioritize potential crises and thus determine the most appropriate

PAGE 30

30 Criti cal Perspectives Some scholars question the effectiveness of traditional crisis communication recommendations. Coombs (1999, 1998), Marra (1998), and Murphy (1996) de emphasize the value of pre made crisis plans. Egelhoff and Sen (1992), and Penrose (2000) portray crisis management plans as fallible and potentially dangerous to an organization. Egelhoff and Sen (1992) argue that crisis management plans have the potential to exacerbate a crisis situation. Pre formulated plans may deliver a false sense of co ntrol to crisis managers and may limit an the specifics of the crisis situation. Several scholars have voiced opposition to traditional recommendations rega rding candor and openness (Eisenberg & Witten 1987; Lyon & Cameron 2004; Tyler, 1997, 2005). Writing from a postmodern perspective, Tyler portrays guidance for candor as being self serving to the interests of the powerful and exclusionary to stakeholders. She argues that approaches Witten (1987) who maintain that openness does l ittle to equalize the power differential intrinsic to the relationship between an organization and its stakeholders. In some cases, open communication may place the organization, or individuals, in jeopardy, legal or otherwise (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987; H orsley & Barker, 2002; Tyler, 1997). Eisenberg and Witten (1987) assert that open communication may unduly harm an organization during crisis. The authors criticize the tendency of theoreticians to uncritically accept the p. 418). The authors, instead, advocate the utility of strategic

PAGE 31

31 ambiguity. Lyon and Cameron (2004) also advocate for the use of strategic ambiguity (in Contra st to candor) to address difficulties faced by organizations who must communicate with multiple acknowledge that candor and openness are sometimes impossible and that when the legal consequences of candor have the potential to destroy the company financially, equivocation o r Regardless, Horsley and Barker (2002) argue that the threat of legal penalty does not together to develop a re implication is Postmodern p erspectives Holtzhausen (2000) and Tyler (2005) discuss the application of postmodernist theory to the practice of public relations. As described by Tyler (20 05), postmodernist theory applied to crisis communication is highly critical of traditional, linear approaches to crisis communication. Postmodernist thought questions the use of organizational narratives, presented as truth, which serve to maintain power differentials between an organization and its stakeholders (Tyler, 2005; maintains that it has found the real truth, the postmodern holds that this truth is merely the viewpo int of some dominant groups in society and should not be privileged over another see crisis as a disruption in the dominant narrative that members of an orga

PAGE 32

32 dominant ideologies w & Lang, 2003, p. 220). Postmodernist theory applied to crisis communication questions the value of much metanarrative may hold privileged status due to power differentials and its presentation in the ly told by various stakeholders. further calls into question the value of the much lauded crisis er, 2005, p. 579). Furthermore, Tyler (2005) is skeptical of the value of organizational attempts to respond to crises openly and quickly, to respond to crisis with a unified voice often via a single spokesperson, and to establish a crisis response headqua rters. Chaos t heory linear Murphy (1996) and Seeger (2002) questions the effectiveness of t raditional, linear approaches to crisis systems involving organizations and stakeholders (Seeger, 2002, p. 332). Seeger asserts ptualization of both organization and crisis that moves beyond the traditional crisis communications and public relations frameworks of strategic 330). Chaos theory does not support the application of cris is communication plans, precise objectives and scientific prediction. The

PAGE 33

33 theory implies that the most appropriate action may be to evaluate the crisis after it has occurred because outcomes are not predictable and the situational structure may not be init ially apparent (Murphy, 1996). Chaos theory further implies that the public relations function may be unable to predict or control crises, and instead should focus on monitoring and interpreting change. An understanding of key aspects of chaos theory such as bifurcation points (points in time at which system changes are likely to occur) and strange attractors (underlying, unifying features of a system) may empower the public relations practitioner to manage the change that often accompanies crisis (Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002). Chaos theory supports the use of two way symmetrical communication the adjustment of organizational behavior to accommodate p ublics based on system feedback in response to a crisis. In this regard, the application of chaos theory to c risis management supports, at least to some degree, a relational approach to crisis management (Murphy, 1996). Organizational c ulture Several scholars overtly contend, or in some cases imply, that organizational culture and structure are more important ind management approaches (Belcher, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005; Kauffm an; 2005; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Marra, 1998; Mitroff, 1988; Penrose, 2000; Wise, shared understanding of employees, the shared synthesis of basic assumptions reg arding the organization and its environment, and the philosophy determining organizational policy toward

PAGE 34

34 its ability to manage crisis situations. The authors define and Contra st authoritarian and participative organizational goals, rigid chains of command, tig gather information outside of organizational confines (p. 172). Participative cultures instead from work, hor ideas originating outside of organizational confines (p. 172). The authors conclude that organizations characterized by participative cultures are better equipped to manage cri sis (Lauren & Dozier, 1994). crisis management failure in the afterm ath of the 1986 explosion of the space shuttle Challenger of the space shuttle Columbia wer e generally successful (in large part due to a comprehensive crisis communication plan), the impacted its crisis management efforts (Kauffman, 2005). Assertions regar ding the importance of organizational culture are supported by other communications scholars (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1988; Marra, 1998; Coombs, 1999; Hale, Dulek

PAGE 35

35 is often critical to its ability to withstand crisis. In a study of Connecticut based Griffin effectively respond to a crisis, more so than the existence of crisis communication plans. Coombs (1999) argues organizational culture needs to facilitate information flow for crisis management amount of authority they are entrusted with, is a critical factor in effective crisis management while illustrating the importance of the ability for this informati on to be shared within the organization, in agreement with Marra (1998) and Penrose (2000). Thus the public relations practitioner should reside in a management position with an advisory role in strategic planning (Marra, 1998). Organizational h istory Acco rding to Murphy (1996), Coombs (1998), Penrose (2000), Coombs and Holladay should be understood to determine the appropriate response to a crisis. Murphy (1996) ar gues crisis events are unpredictable and thus the most appropriate crisis response is to analyze the o argues that an

PAGE 36

36 positively related to stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility and thus the damage that a Contra sting Challenger and space shuttle Columbia disasters illustrates the benefit organizations may reap by learning from past crises. Coombs and Holladay (2001) acknowledge the importance of the relationship history between an organization and its stakeholders when formulating a response to a crisis. The authors found that an organiz ation with positive stakeholder perceptions of its history is less likely to be adversely impacted by a crisis than is an organization perceived to have a negative relationship history. Thus, crisis managers should gain an understanding of the history of t heir crisis successfully than its crisis Relational and Symbolic Management Approaches Crises can be managed via symbolic and relational approaches. Relational management with its stakeholders play in the development of, and response to, a crisis. Relational perspectives focus on maintaining favorable relationships between an organization and its stakeholders, and are thus grounded in stakeholder theory. According to this approach, crisis management efforts should be implemented on an ongoing basis, both before and after the onset of a crisis (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, 2002a; Ledingham, 2001; Ledingham, 2003; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Susskind & Field, 1996; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). In Contra st, symbolic management approaches focus on the term relationships, the symbolic approach to crisis management may be enacted on an on going

PAGE 37

37 basis, not just in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1998; Coombs, 1999; Marra, 1998). Relational and symbolic crisis management approaches are discussed in detail in the sections that follow. Relational management a pproaches Crisis managemen t recommendations proposed by some scholars are rooted in the relationship management approach to the practice of public relations. The focus of the relational perspective is the maintenance of mutually beneficial organization stakeholder relationships (Le management perspective holds that public relations balances the interests of the organizations and publics through the management of organization the adoption of the relationship management perspective as a general theory for public relations is applicable throughout the public relations management is a subgenre of public relations, it is reasonable to assume that the relational management perspect ive is applicable to crisis management (Ziaukas, 2001). Relational approaches to crisis management place intrinsic value on organization stakeholder relationships. Relational maintenance is the highest priority (Marra, 1998). The relational approach implie s a high likelihood of crisis management failure outcomes if an organization projects an image that does not match its behavior (Ledingham, 2003). Relational st ongoing and proactive, both before and after crisis (Ledingham, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Ulmer, 2001).

PAGE 38

38 Stakeholders are individuals, or groups of persons, that can impact, or be impacted by, an monolithic, and highly heterogenous. Due to their varying needs, as well as the various contexts in which they experience crisis, communicating consistent, and fa vorable, messages to varied stakeholder Because the relational approach to crisis management attempts to maintain mutually beneficial or ganization stakeholder relationships amidst crisis, relational crisis management is rooted in stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory was introduced as an approach to organizational strategic management. A goal of stakeholder theory is to allow organization s to operate in such a Stakeholder theory is integral to a relational approach to crisis management. According to ival is dependent on the maintenance of positive relationships with its stakeholders (Martin & Boynton, 2005; Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, the operation of organization, and the potential for the organization and its stakeholders to affect each other, both positively and negatively (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). stakeholder relationships is amplified during crisis situations (Martin & Boynton 2005; Ulmer 2001; Ulme stakeholder relationships are unfavorable,

PAGE 39

39 intensify neglected stakeholder groups are likely to exacerbate the crisis in question. Therefore, positive relationships with their 144). Maintaining relations w ith stakeholder groups amidst crisis is often difficult due to the fact that a crisis can impact multiple and disparate stakeholder groups (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). and task (Phillips, 1997). The result is that messages disseminated during crisis may be ambiguous, and are subject to differing interpretation by various stak eholder groups (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). The utility and ethical grounding of stakeholder theory has therefore been called into question (Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). According to stakeholder theory, identifying stakeholder groups impacted by cri sis is critical to an effective crisis response (Horsely & Barker, 2002; Ulmer, 2001). Ulmer (2001) recommends proactively identifying stakeholders prior to the onset of crisis, but Ulmer and olders after a crisis is likely to be willing to broaden their view of stakeholders after a crisis begins (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). Due to the multiplicity of organi zation stakeholder relationships arising in most crisis sy s tems, organizations wishing to respond to crisis ethically should prioritize their obligations to

PAGE 40

40 orientati Symbolic management a pproaches Though these ter ms are sometimes used interchangeably, their meanings differ. Organizational and individual credibility has been asserted to be essential for effective crisis management. An redibility is a symbolic as set assigned by stakeholders. Ziaukas ( 2001) called In discussing the role of metanarration in crisis response, Venette, Sel lnow and Lang (2003) relate the importance of Thus, vability, whether an administration representative, the administration or government as a whole. Reputation refers to the general perception an audience holds about an entity. Both credibility and reputation are assigned to an entity by its stakeholders b about itself to its stakeholders. For the purpose of this study, image will refer to statements or attributes about the entity that it projects through its actions or discourse; whereas, reputation reflects the attributes perceived by the stakeholders. Plainly stated, credibility and reputation are earned, image is contrived. Coombs (2002) identified three dominant research streams advoc ating for a symbolic

PAGE 41

41 A comprehensive discussion of image restoration discourse theory will follow. self known rhetors such as Socrates and Martin Luther (p. 273). Ware and Linkugel ( 1973) describe four rhetorical strategies commonly invoked in apologetic speech denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Denial himself with somet 278). On the other hand, differentiation and tra nscendence are transformative they al ter meanings held by the audience. Differentiation involves attempts to change audience meanings cendence alters meaning by discussion of apologi a, as well as by later works authored by Caillouet and Allen (1994), Caillouet and Allen (1996) and Hearit (1994). Caillouet and Allen (1994), Caillouet and Allen (1996) and Hearit (1994) discuss impression management strategies enacted in crisis response. Image restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to develop, or evaluate, rhetorical discourse options available to, or offered by, an organization in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997; Benoit, & Brinson, 1999; Benoit, & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit, G ullifor, & Panici, 1991; Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson, & Benoit, 1996; Zhang, and Benoit, 2004).

PAGE 42

42 While proponents of image restoration discourse theory contend the theory offers guidance in crisis response development, Coombs and Schmidt (2000 Schmidt, 2000, p. 175). Additionally, Coombs (20 02) criticizes image restoration discourse Coombs (2002) instead advocates situational crisis communication theory as an approach which factors operational realities repair its image in the afte rmath of a crisis involving charges of institutional racism. Coombs and 163). This critique illustrates a difference in the two approaches headed by the two scholars. designs (Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Br inson, 1999; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Coombs, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Zhang & Benoit, 2004). approach to cri sis management is that such an approach ties the selection of crisis response strategies to a synthesis of attribution theory and neoinstitutionalism. In other words, an ion, or suffering) should be guided by an understanding of stakeholder perceptions of organizational

PAGE 43

43 responsibility for the crisis (attribution theory) as well as stakeholder perceptions of an ; Coombs, 1996, 1 998, 2002). Attribution theory implies that stakeholder perception of organizational responsibility for the crisis is strongest if the organization has a history of crises, if the organization controls the factors that led to the crisis, and if the crisis was caused by intentional organizational action. Coombs and Holladay p. 282). As discussed previously, Coombs (1995) argues that identifying the crisis type is essential to determining appropriate crisis response strategies. Image restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to develop, or evaluate, rhetorical disc ourse options available to, or offered by, an organization in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; & Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Zhang & Benoit, 2004). The theory is based on two k ey assumptions: (a) 381). Benoit (1997) contends that audience perceptions of crisis respo nsibility and crisis offensiveness must be understood to formulate an effective rhetorical response. Additionally, the response strategy the theory states that t hree criteria will ideally be met for the response to be effective: (a) the rhetorical strategies employed are appropriate to the crisis threat, (b) the message strategies are subsequently embedded in discourse regarding the crisis, and (c) the response is persuasive (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997).

PAGE 44

44 Image restoration discourse theory presents five rhetorical strategies denial of responsibility, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and morti fication (asking forgiveness) to be use d individually or in any combination in response to a crisis (Benoit, 1997). These five broad rhetorical strategies are sub divided to allow for more detailed understanding of crisis response options (Zhang & Benoit, 2004). According to Benoit (1997), den ial may take two forms: straightforward denial or shifting of the blame. Straightforward denial occurs when a firm repudiates charges that the offending act actually happened, that the firm actually carried out the act, or that the act had any negative imp acts. Shifting the blame occurs when the accused claims the offensive act was caused by someone else or another firm. There are four varieties of the evasion strategy: provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. When invoking the provocation strategy, the rhetor may claim the offending act was a response to provocative actions taken by another actor. Defeasibility accused may also evade responsibili ty, and therefore be held less accountable, by claiming the act was the result of an accident. Lastly, responsibility may be evaded by claiming the act was undertaken with good intentions. Organizations attempting to protect their symbolic assets via image restoration discourse theory may also attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the act in question. Benoit (1997) describes six versions of this strategy: bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, and compensation. Bol stering involves positive characteristics they have or positive acts

PAGE 45

45 offensiveness of the act by attacking the accusers (i.e., negative statements regarding the credibility of the press) or by compensating those harmed by the act. Lastly, the accused may simply take corrective action for the offensive act or express mortif ication. The corrective action mortification strategy involves issuing an apology, and possibly begging forgiveness, for the act in question. Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici (1991) developed an early version of image restoration discourse theory by synthesizing the theory of dramatism, apologia, the study of accounts. The outcome strategies (denial, evasion of responsibility, minimization, and mortification reduction of 6). The categorization scheme underlying this early version of image restoration discourse theory was Presiden t Reaga n as the Iran C ontra scandal progressed from late 1986 through the summer of 1987. Specifically the authors review numerous speeches and news conferences during w hich Reagan discussed the Iran C e rhetoric

PAGE 46

46 progressed through three distinct phases throughout the duration of Iran Contra : denial, justification, and, finally, corrective action (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991). This study is the genesis for the currently accepted incarnation of image restoration discourse theory, and therefore, the work provides background necessary for maximum underlying image restoration discourse theory 275). Additionally, the authors relate a key insight that implies a certain degree of flexibility to image restoration discours discourse. Yet the strategies as actually embodied in the discourse remain more important than n shortcoming is that the study oversimplifies the environmental complexity in which the Reagan and news conferences led by the President, though a multitude o f Administration officials offered a wide variety of defensive rhetoric, in various settings, and over various media. By response to the crisis, the authors fail to a cknowledge the complexity of the Reagan

PAGE 47

47 Political Science Perspectives of Crisis Management Damage Control, Crisis, Scandal, and Affair Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) describe crises a s threats to organizational values and goals, and/or social system norms. The authors contend crisis situations are characterized by time pressure, uncertainty and a need for leaders to make critical decisions. Governmental crises may present political opp ortunities for opposition parties and critics. Crises may constitute threats to nt, and political and Symbolically motivated crisis response efforts are p. 24). Busby ( 1999) defines a scandal as a crisis event characterized by corruption or purposeful deception which is often self induced. Tumber and Waisbord (2004) contend that scandals arise as much from media coverage of corruption as from the corrupt act itself. This argument is t to investigate the reasons why some secret official wrong doing turns into a public event. the proliferation of scandals requires Busby defines an affair employed to group together and covert operations related to negotiations with Iran and the funding of the Nicaragu an Contra

PAGE 48

48 rebels by the Reagan Administration is often referred to as the Iran Contra affair. Busby (1999) states that scandals generally progress in two phases: the substantive phase and the procedural phase regards efforts to minimize the negative effects wrought by the substantive phase (Busby, Administration than the the Iran arms crisis, the emergence of the procedural phase of the Iran Contra scandal was e scandal. Busby (1999) argues that scandals can be viewed from two perspectives: the aberrationist perspective and the legalist perspective. The aberrationist perspective views scandals as arising from the actions of individuals which lead to wrongdoing According to Busby (1999) this perspective ignores dynamics within political systems that may be the root of the wrongdoing and facilitates the use of damage control measures to obscure wrongdoing. In Contra st, the legalist perspective focuses on the str ucture of a political system as the root of scandal in the political realm (Busby, 1999). To aid in crisis identification, Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) propose a crisis typology e pertaining to the aphical considerations and the extent of crisis damage),

PAGE 49

49 organization al response and differences regarding response strategies. In agreement with crisis communication scholars who advocate for the use of crisis communication plans, Rozenthal and Kouzman (1997) contend that crisis impacts are often y makers have prepared neither themselves nor the public for acknowledge that not all crises require immediate action and that government action may exacerbate crisis situat open communication and a long crisis responses (p. 300). Organizational Structure Haney (1998) investigates the role o f organizational structure in crisis situations, making groups during international structure impacts an making structure that a president puts in place must be able to operate in an atmosphere of divided presidential attention and perhaps the Haney (1998) identifies three presidential advisory group structures enacted amidst crisis: formalistic, competitive, and collegial models. Formalistic structures are characterized by an adherence to o rganizational hierarchies. The formalistic model allows for thorough analysis and vetting of information before it reaches the president. The accreditation and filtering process may distort crucial information as it flows up the hierarchy. The formalistic model is associated with the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations. Competitive structures, as exemplified by the

PAGE 50

50 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration, may stimulate the development of creative solutions to crisis problems but often lead to staff fricti on. Additionally, competitive models place large Contra st to competitive models, collegial models stress teamwork. Such a model, theoretically, discourages Administration infighting, and decreases demands on decision maker s. Unfortunately, such a structure tends to breed groupthink. The 1998). Heith (1998) examines presidential Administration organizational structure in regards to the use of public opinion data. Consistent with the collegial model described above, Heith (1998) found the organizational structure of the Reagan Adminis tration to be relatively open, t he author found that poll data was shared among its top staff members, inc luding President Reagan. According to Heith (1998), the Reagan Administration staff was particularly adept at analyzing public opinion data. The Rally Round the Flag Effect According to the rally round the flag theory, foreign policy crises will often insp ire a surge of public support for a president (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993; rally round the flag theory attempts to account for boosts in publi c support for a president amidst short term changes in public opinion following foreign affairs crises that may be either positive or negative. This prediction did not hold true for the Reagan Administration during the crisis of November 1986 (Brody & Shapiro, 1989). phenomenon develops. In the initial stages of the crisis, the White House controls important

PAGE 51

51 information related to the crisis. Without their own information, opposition elites tend to squelch their expression of public disagreement with the President, thus creating the appearance of elite consensus with, and sup port for, the President. In the absence of elite criticism, news media have difficulty finding alternate viewpoints to report and journalists risk appearing to seek out become conduits of one presented with only favorable views of the Administration, public support for the President tends to increase. Brody and Shapiro (1989), Callaghan and Virt Jasperson and Sullivan (1994) see the absence of elite criticism of a president as the key factor leading to the enactment of the rally phenomenon. Brody and Shapiro (1989) identify the opinion leadership hypothesis as a ffecting support for a president in the midst of a crisis. According to this view, the rally effect occurs when elites offer no criticism. If elite discourse criticizes the president, such criticism may override and negate the predicted rally effect (Brody & Shapiro, 1989). Though Callaghan and Virtanen (1993) found support for such views, the discussion indicates that the rally effect may be prompted instead by the emergence of nationalistic feelings among the public in the face of external threats to the nation. Krosnick and Kinder (1990) present priming theory as an alternate explanation for the drop in public support for President Reagan during the crisis. They contend the volume of media attention devoted to a particular issue is directly correlated to public assessment of the issue in question. The authors found that from the sale of armaments to Iran had been diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras (p. 509).

PAGE 52

52 Comparisons of the Iran Arms Crisis with Preceding Presidential Crises Schudson (1992; 2004), Busby (1999), and Wallison (2003) argue that American public memories of past crises played a role in the development of the Iran Contra scandal and guided completely by Schudson (1992) who contends that the public memory of Watergate aff ected perceptions held by the general public, Congress and the media of the Reagan Administration as the Iran arms crisis developed. The author shows that this is in part due to the fact that in 1986 some members of the legislature, the Reagan Administrati on, and the media had some form of direct involvement in the Watergate scandal. This, he contends, influenced their actions in regards to the Iran Contra scandal (Schudson, 1992). Wallison (2003), the White House legal counsel at the time, relates that wit hin the Administration comparisons were made between Watergate and the emerging Iran arms crisis in November 1986. Miller (1992) compares the Reagan Administration to that of Nixon in terms of the corruption that he argues characterized both Administration s. Busby (1999) compares the crisis communication responses of the Nixon and Reagan Administrations. The author argues that in both the Watergate scandal and Iran Contra scandal often seemed to abstaining from character assassination attempts used by the Nixon Administration to the counter criticisms it faced. In addition to Watergate, the Iran hostage crisis which occurred during the Carter presidency also impacted the Reagan Administration. Busby (1999) argues that the hostage situation faced by the Carter Administration precipitated the controversial actions undertaken on ome of his aides. This is in part because the public memory of the hostage

PAGE 53

53 crisis of 1979 80 placed a tremendous amount of pressure on President Reagan to free the ex perience with the hostage crisis of the Carter Administration made it impossible for Reagan In general, the attempts of the Reagan Administrati on to control the crisis that emerged on November 4, 1986, have been categorized as a failure. This contention is supported by Brody crisis progressed. Brody and Shapiro (1989) posited that the drop in public approval was explained by the opinion leadership hypothesis. The authors concluded that in times of crisis, if opinion leader elites openly criticize the President, even in circumstances in which the rally eff ect is predicted, public approval of the President and the Administration is likely to decline (Brody & Shapiro, 1989). In a similar study, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) reach a different conclusion as to the source of, or lack thereof, support for President Reagan after the initial disclosures regarding the Iran arms crisis. Instead of the opinion leader hypothesis, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) argue that the conclusi on discounted the priming effect though their content analysis of The New York Times information presented by the media increased from November 3 through November 30, 198 6. responsibility and thus to remain disengaged from events unfolding around him. Wallison

PAGE 54

54 e details of his Administration indeed his apparent disinterest in these details 5). Because of this disengagement Reagan was dependent on his aides to account for their actions, and unable to discern whether the information they provided him was true. The result was that Reagan consistently diss eminated false and misleading information which undermined suggestion that internal structure is a strong predictor of the ability of an organization to respond to a crisis effectively. Another problem issue appears to have been the amount of time it took for the Administration to respond to the crisis. Busby (1999), Draper (1991) and Wallison (2003) show that the first official Administration response was not rel eased until almost a week after the crisis higher its long term prominence, the more inept a President may appear in his attempts to deal .22). He further argued that not only is public support affected by the length of time it takes for an Administration to explain its actions, but by the length of time it n that the & Brody, 1989; Draper, 1991; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). surfaced within the Administration and many of these rivalries became apparent in the media. The result of these

PAGE 55

55 rivalries was an abundance of Contra dictory information emanating from the White House which confused message recipients and alerted them to th e fact that they were being misled (Draper, 1991; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). Every effort made by the Administration to explain its actions only exacerbated its problems as it continually Contra dicted itself (Busby, 1999). Dickinson (1994) discusses Rea perspective. Reagan, a particularly well known rhetor, developed a signature rhetorical style (Dickinson, 1994, p. 157 1 signature constraint was especially powerful because much of the success he had enjoyed as president was forged via use of the three master themes of his rhetorical signature. But these incompatible with the crisis situation (Dickinson, 1994, p. 157). His early rhetorical stance was one of denial, which the public did not believe.

PAGE 56

56 CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY Crisis Roots On Thursday, July 18, 1985 Pres ident Ronald Reagan lay in his Bethesda Naval Hospital bed recuperating from abdominal surgery. His doctor had just removed the metal clips from his incision, and his feeding tubes would be out before lunch. Reagan seemed content to simply be recovering (M orris, 1999). At 10:22 A.M., having been awake since 5:15 and still groggy, the President was about to lend his approval to a covert operation that soon threatened his presidency (Draper, 1991). Advisor, needed the so he sought White House Chief of Staff Donal McFarlane and Ronald Reagan spoke for 23 minutes (Regan, 1988). McFarlane told the President he had recently been approached by David Kimche, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Kimche claimed he could help the United States establish a strategic relationship with Iran Kimche believed the sale of armaments to Iran would facilitate such a relationship (Draper, 1991 ; Walsh, 1994). Gulf region houses vast supplies of oil. The Administra tion feared Soviet encroachment into the region, leading to increased Soviet influence over Iran, and culminating in Soviet control over the flow of oil from the Middle East. It was believed a strategic relationship with Iran could

PAGE 57

57 thwart such potentialiti es ( Joint Hearings 100 2, 1987, exhibit 51; Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, with Iran in 1980 (Atkinson, 1984, December 9). Developing a relationship with Iran via the provision of American made arms contradicted stated U.S. policy, specifically the U.S. led arms embargo imposed on Iran via Operation Staunch. Operation Staunch expressly for bade the sale of arms to terrorist nations ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 71). Reagan publicly labeled Iran a terrorist nation, campaign of inte rnational terrorism against the United States, her allies and moderate third world 9). In November 1986, seven United States citizens were being held hostage in Beirut by the Iran was believed to hold relatively strong influence over the gro up (Draper, 1991). Based on potential violation of Operation Staunch. Contradictions to U.S. policy not withstanding, President Reagan was under by intense d omestic, public pressure to bring the hostages home (Busby, 1999). On June 17, 1985, one month before visiting the president in Bethesda Naval Hospital, McFarlane issued a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to the secretaries of Defense and State Joint Hearings 100 10,1987, CWW 4, p. 512). The NSDD addressed the threat of Soviet intervention in Iran which was

PAGE 58

58 ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW Joint Hearings 100 10,1987, CWW 4, p. 517). To reiterate, such a course of action, the so of Operation Staunch, a policy that was being actively promoted by the U.S. State Department worldwide ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 71). Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Ge orge Shultz strongly Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 135). Weinberger forwarded the document to his Senior Military Assistant, Major Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 134). Despite the concerns voiced by other Presidential advisors, and despite expressly stated ke the Iran initiative. Lying in his hospital bed recovering from surgery, barely more than a week after publicly sident Reagan gave McFarlane permission to came by it seems 2 [sic] mem

PAGE 59

59 at this meeting but Chief of Staff Regan, who was present for the entire conversation, did: 21) One outcome o f this meeting, and the ensuing negotiations between U.S. and Iranian representatives, was that American made armaments were transferred to Iran via a complex chain of middlemen, including a retired Air Force Major General and an Iranian expatriate, on mul tiple occasions. The first arms were delivered to Iran in August 1985; additional transfers occurred in February, May, and October 1986 (Draper, 1991; Regan, 1988). When reports of the negotiations and transfers surfaced, the Reagan Administration found i tself engulfed in a presidential crisis reminiscent of Watergate (Schudson, 1992). The first newspaper reports related to the Iran initiative regarded negotiations which occurred in the spring of 1986. In May 1986, roughly six months after resigning hi s official Administration post, Robert McFarlane led a group of unofficial United States representatives to Tehran to negotiate with equally unofficial Iranian representatives for the release of American hostages held by Hezbollah It was believed that if leadership would exert influence over Hezbollah (Draper, 1991). McFarlane and crew failed to win the release of any hostages, but the meeting was highly significant because it was the subject of an article which app eared on November 3, 1986 in the Lebanese weekly publication Al Shiraa This article catalyzed the crisis which imperiled the Reagan Administration in the fall of 1986 (Draper, 1991; Hijazi, 1986, November 4; Wallison, 2003). The Crisis Emerges The crisis emerged on election day. On Tuesday, 4 November 1986, The Washington Post

PAGE 60

60 Al Shiraa the previous day (McCartney, 1986, November 4, first section, p. A1). Former White House legal counsel Peter Wallison later the greatest crisi s of During the four months it continued the Reagan Administration p.168). Regardless of its significance the report aroused little interest during the White House daily term elections. To the extent the Iran arms sales story was discussed, A deputy, labeled the story nonsense and advised White House spokesperson Larry Speakes to refuse comment (Wallison, 2003). Secretary of State George Shultz was forced to acknowledge the story earlier than most o f the White House staff. On November 4, 1986 while airborne en route to Vienna, the press questioned him about the emerging story during his routine in flight press conference (Ottaway & Hoffman, 1986, November 8). Shultz wrote to Vice Adm. John Poindexte violated its own policy by cutting a big secret arms deal with Iran in order to get our hostages orists ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 35, p. 563). He assured Poindexter that he refused to comment on the story ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 35). The story placed the Secretary of State in a difficult position. On November 4, he was traveling to Vienna to encourage international adherence to U.S. led arms embargo against Iran. The State Department expressed opposition to providing military supplies to Iran in an article appearing in The New York Times the day prior (Gwertzman, 1986, November 4). Despite such

PAGE 61

61 statements, Shultz was aware that his government, via the National Security Council (NSC) staff, had initiated arms sales to Iran (Walsh, 1994). Shultz understood the potential damage inherent in this story and immediately argued that the Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 35, p. 564). Several Reagan Administration staffers including ey persons did not. Internal debates regarding public disclosure continued throughout the crisis ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 217, 244; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 21, 37, 57). Internal Conflicts Emerge Natio nal Security Advisor Poindexter argued for continued non disclosure. He wrote to Shultz to express his disagreement with recommendations for full public disclosure of the Iran mouthe Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 36, p. 566). Poindexter contended that fore the Administration speaks Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 36, p. 566). He further argued that public disclosure of the negotiations could intensify Iranian political power struggles, possibly inspiring additional Iranian dis closures which were likely to contradict information provided by the Administration ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 36). Poindexter had established a command role for himself in coordinating the messages the Administration would communicate in response to the burgeoning crisis. Vice President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Central Intelligence Agency Director

PAGE 62

62 apparent that Reagan placed a g Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 57; Wallison, 2003). Poindexter attempted to insure a unified response to the crisis, to no avail. The arm s deals credibility. There was little motivation for the Secretary of State or others within the Administration who disagreed with Poindexter to adhere to guidanc e which protected the NSC staff at their expense. The communication of between these two officials staked out the sides that would characterize the internal conflict soon to become publicly apparent (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testim ony, p. 41). Meanwhile, on November 5, the White House was beginnin g to snowball (Wallison, 2003, p. 173). White House Staff Gains Interest, Stonewall Emerges On Thursday, November 6, the White House staff began to pay more attention to the Iran story. At the daily operations meeting, White House spokesperson Larry Spea kes said the to Tehran was increasing. John Poindexter argued for continued non disclosure to protect the remaining hostages. White House legal counsel Peter Wall ison suspected that Poindexter was using the welfare of the hostages to protect himself. Despite the interest displayed during the morning meeting, the Iran story received minimal attention in the cabinet meeting Wallison attended later that afternoon (Wa llison, 2003). disclosure was supported by statements made by hostage mediator Terry Waite appearing in The Washington Post. Waite blamed press speculation for

PAGE 63

63 complicating the hostage release efforts (McCartney, 1986, Novembe r 6). Contrarily, additional coverage of the Iran initiative in The Post on Thursday, November 6 challenged the Reagan November 6). Both The Washington Po st and The New York Times presented information, some of which was attributed to Chief of Staff Regan, that undermined contentions that the negotiations were strategic in nature (Pincus, 1986, November 6; Boyd, 1986, November 6). paper coverage continued to be highly critical of the Administration (Pincus, 1986, November 7; Krauthammer, 1986, November 7). On the morning of November 7, White House legal counsel Peter Wallison received an indication of how problematic the Iran initia tive really was when Larry Speakes asked him if the President could violate his own executive order. In the executive order referred to, the President had labeled Iran a terrorist state, thus arms sales to Iran were possibly in violation of the Arms Expor t Control Act (AECA) of 1986. The AECA prohibited all sales of arms to terrorist states unless Congress was notified in advance (Wallison, 2003). Unsure of the answer, and unaware of the details of the secret operation, Wallison convened with Chief of St aff Regan. Regan imparted his knowledge of the operation, and recommended Wallison speak with National Security Advisor Poindexter (Wallison, 2003). When Wallison found Poindexter he inquired about the arms sales to Iran. The White House legal counsel wa Poindexter was engaged in a cover up operation, focused on self preservation, which threatened s presidency (Wallison, 2003).

PAGE 64

64 Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 36, p. 37). At 8:30 on Friday evening Robert McFarlane sent a desperate memo to Poindexter in which he threatened to sue Chief of Staff Regan for libel over recent statements appearing in the press ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 36). Poindexter recommended that McFarlane re Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 37, p. 366). The Situation Worsens Press coverage of the Iran story over the weekend indicated that the issue was moving beyond crisis to scandal (Busby, 1999). On Saturday, November 8, The Washington Post reported that White House officials bypassed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to avoid disclosing information about the Iran initiative to Congress (Pincus, 1986, November 8). Several reports indicated that the Reagan Administration was losing credibility both abroad and domestically due to the mixed messages it was disseminating (Smothers, 1986, November 8; Ottaway, 1986, November 8; Gwertzman, 1986, November 8). In one article, Secretary of State Shultz directly criticized the hostage negotiations while President Reagan argued that the until we get them all and others the President claimed Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger supported the negotiations that Shultz himself was criticizing (Ottaway, 1986, November 8). On Su nday, November 9, The New York Times

PAGE 65

65 986, November 9, section 4, p. 22; Drozdiak, 1986, November 9, first section, p. A1). The White House Responds The damaging press coverage of the weekend carried over through Monday. On November 10, The Washington Post reported that the House and Senate p November 10, first section, p. A1). The Administration finally responded. That morning, President Reagan led a meeting to draft an o fficial response to the avalanche of press coverage regarding the Iran arms sales. At 11:30, the President, Vice President Bush, Shultz, Regan, CIA Director William Casey, Attorney General Edwin Meese, and Poindexter (with his deputy Alton Keel in tow) co nvened in the White House Oval Office to draft a statement for press distribution ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A). The meeting was contentious. Poindexter described operational details of the arms deals, leading some in the group to feel they had Joi nt Hearings 100 10,1987, DTR 41A, p. 386 388, CWW 28, 578 579, Weinberger testimony, p. 154). Both Shultz and Weinberger argued that the negotiations with Iran encouraged further Weinberger pointed out Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, CWW 28). Throughout the meeting, Poindexter argued that the Administration Joint He arings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 388 389). He complained of leaks originating from the White House and contended that public disclosure endangered the hostages. Disclosure was also unnecessary, he argued, because news

PAGE 66

66 coverage of the negotiations had pe aked and the public would soon lose interest in the story. These views were not shared by Weinberger, Shultz, and Regan who advocated for immediate disclosure of NSC staff activities ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A). The President appeared to fall somewhere in the middle of the argument. He said the Administration should ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 389). The meeting ended on a note of hopef ul, yet Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 390). Following the meeting, a statement was drafted by Poindexter. It was approved that Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41, GPS 39A). The draft statement said that, among t there was unanimous support for Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 38A, p. 569). Shultz disapproved of the statement; he suppor ted the President, but not the decision to violate Operation Staunch. Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 41. The correction was made, and Chief of Staff Regan directed Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 393). The statement stressed that press speculation was endangering the hostages, no laws had been broken, the initiative was strategic in nature, and the Administr remained intact. To address speculation about internal conflicts within the White House, the

PAGE 67

67 he supported his staff ( Joint Hearings 10 0 9, 1987, GPS 40, p. 584). Despite this claim, official statements appearing in the press provided ample evidence to the contrary. Secretary of State Shultz did not support the messages being communicated by the Administration. In an internal memo dated President soon after the official statement was drafted, Shultz directly refuted Administration claims regarding the wisdom of strategically engaging Iran via a series of arms deals. He continued to argue for fu ll public disclosure ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 40): There is a real danger of spinning a web of misleading if not incorrect statements that to th e public and to the intellig ence committees, as appropriate this affair is going to go on and on in an agoni zing and terribly corrosive way. every achievement of this Administration [sic] will be at risk ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 40, p. 584) T he White House statement had little positive affect on the news coverage of Tuesday, November 11. The Washington Post portrayed the Administration as being operationally inept and reported complaints that the White House provided more information to Irania n mullahs than the Senate (Pincus & Hoffman, 1986, November 11). An editorial written by Mary McGrory ember 11, first section, p. A2). The New York Times November 11; Lewis, F., 1986, November 11). sta Wallison recommended that Reagan waive executive privilege if the issue came up because he

PAGE 68

68 he was covering up analysis of the situation would eventually be proven correct (Walsh, 1994). The next day, Wallison met with the Chief of Staff in hopes of sc heduling a meeting with Poindexter. Regan told Wallison he did not have the authority to require Poindexter to speak 182). At this time Regan acknowledged that P oindexter was the major influence on President concern among other Administration officials ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42; Wallison, 2003). White House communications director Patrick Buchanan wrote to the Chief of Staff on November 12 and urged full and immediate disclosure of Administration involvement with Iran. Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR some much fuller explan ation Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42, p. 394). Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42, p. 395) The Administration acted. On Wednesday, November 12, the President, Poindexter and Regan met to decide how the Administration should respond to the crisis. It was decided that President Reagan would brief Congressional leadership that afternoon. He would then make his case to the nation via television and radio address the following evening ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 43).

PAGE 69

69 Before meeting with members of Congress, Reagan had lunch with three well known journalists James Lehrer of PBS, Bernard Shaw of CNN and syndicated columnist Roland Evans Jr. Prio At 2:00, Reagan and his senior advisors provided a detailed, if not entirely fo rthright, briefing to Congressional leadership in the White House Situation Room. The briefing lasted two hours ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244; Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 21; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 13). Work bega n on the address the following day (Wallison, 2003). That evening, McFarlane sent Poindexter a draft of his recounting of the Iran initiative Joint Hearings 100 2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 51, p. 632). The main significance of this document is that it would soon be massaged into a controversial chronology detailing NSC staff actions du ring the Iran initiative (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 58). The next morning, an editorial written by Robert McFarlane appeared in The Washington Post. undertaken by the Nixon Administration (McFarlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p. A21). While other editorials appearing in The Washington Post that day were highly critical of Administration actions, only McFarlane chose to associate the Reagan Administration with the most scandal ridden presidency to come before it. Ironically, one of the most damning editorials appearing that day was written by former Nixon speechwriter William Safire (Safire, 1986 November 13).

PAGE 70

70 News reports appearing in The Washington Post and The New York Times on Thursday, November 13 expressed continued criticism of the Administration. The reports indicated the Congressional briefing held the day before failed quiet Congressional criticism of the White House (Weinra ub, 1986, November 13; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 13). It was against this backdrop of skepticism and distrust that Reagan would attempt to present his case to the American people. On November 13 Chief of Staff Regan directed several White House staffers, including White House communications director Patrick Buchanan and White House legal counsel Peter Wallison, to draft a speech for the President to deliver to the nation that evening. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver N orth, an active duty Marine Corps officer and NSC staffer who had been involved in negotiations with the Iranians only three days prior, injected himself into the process. This was an unusual occurrence (Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003; Walsh, 1994). The Pre sident himself wrote the opening paragraph in which he questioned the credibility of various press United States Relations: Portions of the draft distressed Wallison, particularly a line which claimed that no laws had the path to a cover ech that a recent shipment of arms to Iran was small enough to fit inside one cargo plane United States Relations: Address 2003, p. 185). The inclusion of statements which had previously appeared verbatim in NSC

PAGE 71

71 Joint Hearings 100 2, McFarlane, 1987, United States Relations: Addres Nevertheless, that evening at 8:01, President Reagan spoke to the American people from his seat in the Oval Office. He opened the national address by promising to provide his audience of partial truths and feared, the President claimed the amount of weapons shipped to Iran was negligible and that no laws had been violated. Perhaps unwisely, Re agan antagonized the press for covering the story During the course of the speech, Reagan forcefully denied exchanging arms for hostages, related some positive outcomes of t he initiative, and described the underlying good intentions of the project. The President explained the amount of arms shipped to Iran was minimal, having involve argued that past foreign policy initiatives set the precedent for the Iran initiative. Reagan repeatedly criticized the press for unduly risking harm to the hostages by c overing the story The main message concerned the strategic motivation for the initiative. Reagan argued the negotiations transcended hostage release efforts, and instead had the much broader goal of developi ng favorable relations with Iran. Because Reagan drew a distinction between selling arms to Iran for strategic purposes and selling arms to free the hostages, he may have believed repeat did not trade weapons or anything else fo r hostages nor will

PAGE 72

72 ( Joint Hearings 100 8, Poindexter, 1987, p. 643). Though Reagan hoped to extinguish the blaze of criticism, the speech only added fuel to the fire (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991). On Friday, November 14, The Washington Post reported bipartisan Congressional criticism of the speech. Senator Robert By rd (D W.Va.), who was while Senator David Durenberger (R attempt to blame the media and those who questi ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244 245; Hoffman, 1986, November 14, first section, p. A23). Meeting the Press Saturday yielded more bad news for the Reagan Administration. On Novembe r 15, The Post reported the results of an ABC News poll that found a majority of respondents disapproved of the arms for hostage deals whether or not they were strategic in motivation (Pincus, 1986, editorial desk of The New York Times continued to criticize Reagan and his efforts to manage the Hojatolislam Khamenei, further compl By that afternoon, Robert McFarlane had apparently changed his views regarding the Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 46, p. 404). communication strategy to engage journalists and sena tors ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR

PAGE 73

73 Watergate John. Well meaning people who were in on the early planning of the communications Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 46, p. 405). Poindexter responded that he agreed with the approach proposed by McFarlane ( Joint Hearings 100 2, McFarlane, 1987, exhibit 54). The next day, however, he would appear on N McFarlane advocated against ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 65). Reports pouring out of the Sunday editions of The Washington Post and The New York Times continued to be high ly critical of the Administration (Ajami, 1986, November, 16; 16; Miller, 1986, No vember, 16; McGrory, 1986, November, 16; Reston, 1986, November, 16; morning i The result was calamity (Draper, 1991). On 16 November Shultz app (Molotsky & Weaver, 1986, November 17). Poindexter and McFarlane both made state ments contradicting earlier remarks made by Chief of Staff Regan; both men suffered the humiliation of having this pointed out to them on national television. Secretary of State Shultz suffered even greater humiliation when he was forced to admit that

PAGE 74

74 Adm inistration actions regarding Iran directly contradicted his previous public statements and that he had no authority to say that the United States government would not continue to deal arms to Iran ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 65; Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 42). President Reagan fire him. The television appearances and the ensuing press coverage further 1991). Press criticism of the Reagan Administration persisted. Coverage of the Iran issue in the Monday morning Post focused on questions regarding the wisdom (and reality) of attempting to engage Iranian moderates, as well as the mixed messages continuing to leak from the White from the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Said Rajaie Khorassani, but this bit of good news was countered by strong criticism from Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi November 17). The New York Times provided a voice to the Reagan Administration that day the effect was that of giving a man eno ugh rope to hang himself. Reporter Stephen Engelberg listed Administration answers to persistent questions that at times conflicted with themselves as well as information provided by outside sources (Engelberg, 1986, November 17). Additional coverage in T he Times The most notable aspect of the press coverage of the Iran story on Tuesday, November 1 8 was that Reagan publicly denounced further arms sales to Iran on both the part of the United States and its allies, though negotiations with Iran continued until late December 1986 (Weinraub, 1986, November 18; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Weinberger te stimony, p. 158).

PAGE 75

75 The Washington Post Pincus, 1986, November 18). Despite this apparent show of s upport for the Secretary of State, (Wallison, 2003). On November 18, White House legal counsel Peter Wallison called a meeting of the general counsels represent ing the State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Justice Department, and the National Security Council to determine how to legally 2003). NSC legal representative Paul Thompson was asked to provide the group with a chronology of the key events of the Iran initiative but he refused. State Department legal counsel alling tactics were placing the President in legal jeopardy (Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003). At this point, the controversial chronology of events was being massaged by Poindexter, McFarlane, and North. Poindexter had directed Lt. Col. North to prepare the document soon after the Iran story broke on November 4, 1986. Factual accuracy of information was not a requirement for inclusion. The document would be distributed on November 20, 1986 (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 7,OLN 18, OLN 19, OLN 20; Joint He arings 100 8, 1987, JMP 72, JMP 73, JMP 74, JMP 75, JMP 76, JMP 77). On November, 18 a staff meeting was held in the White House Situation Room to develop a strategy to deal with the growing crisis ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 28). It was decided that the President would give a press conference the following day. An afternoon briefing, including a question and answer session, was held in preparation (Wallison, 2003).

PAGE 76

76 Both Shultz and Poindexter provided the President wi th highly self serving information in preparation for the question and answer session ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 66; Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 44; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 25, 87 89). Guidance provided by Poindexter was not only self serving, but also evasive, misleading, and Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP performance in the question and or was still intact. Unfortunately, the President had already painted himself into a corner via his previous statements (Wallison, 200 3). At 9:02 P.M. on November 18, Poindexter sent an electronic message to McFarlane which indicated the control Poindexter was attempting to assert over the President. Poindexter asked McFarlane to stress a message regarding the strategic motivation for t he arms deals to Reagan press conference brief so that he has it in his head to use as a Q&A. Just as long as it comes out on the record that any fool can well imagine a number of reasons why Iranians would want to change the status Joint Hearings 100 7, 1987, OLN 22, p. 127).

PAGE 77

77 On Wednesday, November 19, Reagan was briefed twice by his legal counsel and Attorney General Meese regarding the legal aspects of the Iran initiative ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 31). As the final briefing progressed, Wallison concluded the President was not prepared to (Wallison, 2003). nce. Prior to the event, Shultz implored Reagan not to claim that arms had not been traded for hostages ( Joint Hearings 100 9. 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 44 45, G PS 44). Reports in The New York Times and The Washington Post on November 19 indicate the The New York Times November 19, section A, p. 10). The Washington Post asked various American opinion leaders to submit questions they wanted the President to answer and publish ed the results. One November 19, first section, p. A17). Administrati n presented would be rebutted press, and Congress. d background to the Iran initiative, addressed the internal debate over the issue, and assumed full responsibility for

PAGE 78

78 the decision to engage in the operation. After the opening statements, Reagan again criticized the press for covering the story, denied t he primary charges, minimized the impact of the arms trade, When the question and an His responses were confusing, occasionally contradictory, and generally evasive. The President As Wallison had co ncluded earlier that day, Reagan was not prepared for the relentless barrage of critical served by those few individuals with enough knowledge of these events to adequately pre pare him for the ; Wallison, 2003). Washington Times d be wrong with saying that a mistake was made on a very high risk gamble so that you can get on Thus conclud ed the portion of the press conference focused on the Iran initiative, and in communication tactics. Due to a misstatement of fact, the Administration issued a corr ection to Iran United States relations: ). Many more mistakes would be identified soon after, both in the press and by Secretary of State Shultz.

PAGE 79

79 Shultz recognized multiple Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan, testimony, p. 27). After the press conference concluded, Shultz called Reagan to discuss the Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 44). The next day he met with President Reagan and Chief of Staff Regan armed with a document which specifically identified and refuted 11 misleading or fa lse statements made by the President the previous night ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 45, GPS CHRONOLOGY C, GPS 45). The press, for the most part, portrayed the news conference as a failure in improving perceptions of the Administrat support from his Secretary of Defense and from Washington Post staff writer Tom Shales. on p 1986, November 20; Shales, 1986, November 20, style, p. c1). Conversely, strong, bipartisan e in The Washington Post, and in The New York Times (Walsh & Dewar, 1986, November 20; Fuerbringer, 1986, November 20). speculation about the root of the persistent public interest in the Iran initiative. Speakes argued disagreed: he felt the problem was that the American public did not believe the President (Wallison, 2003). An November 20; Survey by ABC News, 1986, November 19 ). Wallison later recorded his thoughts

PAGE 80

80 .[sic] admits he made a mistake. or h e continued obfuscation would lead to his dismissal. Metamorphosis: The Iran Contra Scandal re guided primarily by events which occurred within the White House, much more so than by the press coverage, which had in no way subsided. The press continued to focus on the problematic aspects of the Iran initiative, but the most important new informat ion was developing within the White House to which the press was not privy. The Iran Contra scandal was set to emerge. The chronology contrived by the NSC staff was released on November 20, 1986 in order to quiet criticism of NSC staff actions ( Joint Hear ings 100 2, 1987, exhibit 58). Paradoxically, the document only served to create a new set of problems for its authors, who later testified they knowingly included multiple inaccuracies (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 7, 1987, North testimony, p. 36, 233 234; Joint Hearings 100 8, 198 7, Poindexter testimony, p. 302 303). The document falsely represented armaments shipped to Iran as oil drilling equipment and made several other misleading claims, which alerted State Department legal advisor Abraham Sof aer to the possibility of a cover November 21. Meese planned to present his findings at a meeting of t he National Security Planning Group (NSPG) on Monday, November 24 ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 49). directed to review it before the upcoming NSPG meeting. Wallison read the document and was troubled. After review, he recommended that Poindexter and North should resign from the NSC staff (Wallison, 2003).

PAGE 81

81 On November 24 Wallison and Dennis Thomas, an assistant to the President, met with Regan in his office. Wallison noticed that, for the first time since the initial Iran initiative disclosures, the White House Chief of Staff was visibly shaken. He soon found out why. Regan ). finding investigation had uncovered evidence that NSC staff member Lt. Col. Oliver North had been diverting profits from the Iranian arms deals to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration, via the NSC staff, had been providing support to the contras in apparent violation of the Boland Amendment of 1983. The amendment banned aid to military activities in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1994). Thus the Iran arms crisis was now officially a scandal (Busby, 1999). W with facts or events that went well beyond managing a political or public Poindexter and North should res ign. Regan directed Wallison and Thomas to draft a statement Joint Hearing 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 31; Wallison, 2003). According to later testimony offered by Poindexter, and corroborated by other senior advisors, information about the diversion had been withheld from Reagan to allow him to claim plausible deniability. Upon learning of the diversion, President Reagan was extremely distressed. Reagan and Regan d ecided to provide full, immediate public disclosure of their limited knowledge of the diversion. A press conference and briefings were scheduled for the following day, November 25 ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 209, 250; Joint Heari ngs 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 65; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 30, Weinberger testimony, p. 156 157).

PAGE 82

82 Early on the morning of November 25, Chief of Staff Regan personally directed Poindexter to resign (Wallison, 2003). North would learn of his dismissal at the same time the rest of the country did when it was announced by Attorney General Edwin Meese in the attempted to navigate the treacherous waters ahead ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 33, DTR 52). Though Regan was taking a command role at this time, he too would soon be dismissed (Walsh, 1994). Congressional leaders and the National Security Council (a separate entity than the NSC staff) were briefed about the diversion before the press conference. At noon, the press conference began (Draper, 1991). President Reagan to ok only five minutes to announce the discovery of the diversion, the appointment of a special review board, and the introduction of the Department of ). He then left the press briefing room and turn ed the conference over to the Attorney General, who did his best to answer the deluge of questions based on his incomplete understanding of the situation ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 54; Wallison, 2003). The announcement of the diversion of funds to the Contras at the press conference merged the Iran initiative and Contra support operations into the Iran Contra scandal (Wallison, 2003; operations, such was through December 1986, much to the chagrin of Secretary of Defense Weinberger (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 157).

PAGE 83

83 After leaving the chaotic press conference, President Reagan walked a short distance to the East Wing family dining room where the Justices of the Supreme Court were waiting. In stark contrast to the events which had just occurred, the Justices were waiting for the President to h ave lunch with them. Those present were apparently more concerned with exchanging humorous stories about childhood and baseball than with the disturbing details of the newly emerged Iran Contra scandal (Wallison, 2003). Wallison watched with respect and amazement as Reagan carried on as if he had not been through the traumatic events of the past three weeks. The President exuded warmth that melted the ideological barriers between himself and liberal Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan seated a t the table. The lunch continued, Epilogue The emergence of the Iran Contra scandal on November signaled the failure of the Reag an Administration to manage the Iran arms crisis via communication means. After November 25, the issue became a matter of Justice Department involvement and legal proceedings commenced (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003). Thus, November 25, 1986, r epresents the end of the opportunity for the Reagan Administration to use communication techniques to manage the initial crisis. The Iran throughout the remainder of his presid ency (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003). Though Reagan faced considerable challenges over the next two years, he never faced impeachment (Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). In the aftermath of the diversion disclosure, public approval of Reagan fell pr ecipitously. Polls taken directly after the November 25 news conference show a drop in public approval of 16%. A Gallup poll conducted November 24

PAGE 84

84 performance. By the next Gal job performance (Gallup poll data, www.Ropercenter.uconn.edu ). Though the Reagan ry failed to quell the crisis and arguably led to the eruption of the Iran Contra scandal, Ronald Reagan eventually managed to Iran Contra levels until the last Gallup poll taken during his presidency (Gallup poll data, www.Ropercenter.uconn.edu ). Eventually, 14 persons were charged with criminal violations for their involvement in Iran Contra, both for operation xiv). Eleven of these persons were convicted. Reagan Administration officials who faced legal retribution for their involvement in the Iran Contra scandal were not charged with crimes rela ted to the operational aspects of the secret initiatives, but for their attempts to cover up the scandal. Two convictions were overturned on appeal, two persons were pardoned pre trial, and one case declassify information necessary for G.H.W. Bush on Christmas Eve 1992 (Walsh, 1994).

PAGE 85

85 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY Research Questions The literature review illus trates that a multitude of crisis communication concepts, developed by both communication and political science scholars, are relevant to this case. This response This approach will yield insight into a fundamental question of governance: in crisis situations, should executive leadership prioritize the protection of its symbolic assets, its relationships with stakeholders, or other concerns? Thus, the first research que stion (RQ1) is: RQ1 : Did the Reagan Administration prioritize its symbolic resources, its stakeholder relationships, or some other concern when communicating a response to the Iran arms crisis of November 1986? The goal of this research project is to inve stigate the degree to which the Reagan Administration prioritized its symbolic assets, stakeholder relationships, or other concerns. This ability to govern, and decreased public faith in government (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Busby, the transgressions themselves (Busby, 1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003; Walsh, 1993). As suc investigation will also provide insight into the potential appl icability of crisis management management theories promoted by communications scholars provide adequate explanation of the ication response in this case, the theories may be applied

PAGE 86

86 the numerous presidential crises that have occurred over the last four decades. If the priorities g uiding the management process of this particular crisis are ascertained, this study could serve as a benchmark for future studies. Consequently, this investigation may be a valuable step in the development of theory regarding presidential crisis communicat ion. Three subsidiary research questions to collect evidence necessary to answer RQ1 are efforts were symbolic and/or relational in nature. One of the questions will regard image restoration discourse theory, one will regard stakeholder theory, and the final question will regard discourse offered by the Administration, not covered by the first two questions. rces. These resources are directly linked to external perceptions of legitimacy and credibility. Public perceptions of legitimacy affect the ability of an organization to operate within a given environment. Damage to an may have direct negative affects on its ability to govern, as well as to influence public understanding of the crisis in question (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998, Venette, Sellnow and Lang, 2003 ; Ziaukas often a key concern when crises surface. The second research question is: RQ2 : What insight does image restoration discourse theory yield regarding the defensive disc ourse disseminated by the Reagan Administration during the crisis period? The fundamental assumption underlying image restoration discourse theory is that Blaney, Benoit & Bra zeal, 2002 ). Therefore, if image restoration discourse theory describes the

PAGE 87

87 Administration prioritized its symbolic assets over other concerns. Stakeholder th maintenance of positive relationships with its stakeholders. It has been argued that an Martin & Boynton 2005 ; Ulmer 2001 ; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000 ). A crisis management approach rooted in stakeholder theory is relational. Therefore, the third research question is as follows: RQ3 : What insight does stakeholder theory yield regarding the defensive discourse disse minated by the Reagan Administration during the crisis period? While stakeholder theory is a broad management theory, the author maintains that the theory may be modified for discourse analysis. The specific means by which the theory will be modified is di scussed in the Methodology section. If stakeholder theory, modified for rhetorical analysis, describes the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration during this crisis, such a finding will support the contention that the Administration prior itized its relationships with stakeholders. RQ2 and RQ3 will provide some indication as to the priorities underlying the answer RQ1. To answer RQ1, the resul ts obtained from RQ2 and RQ3 will be cross referenced to the results yielded when answering the fourth research question: RQ4: Did Administration officials, publicly or privately, make any additional statements that indicated the priorities guiding their c ommunication response? Study Methodology This study is a qualitative analysis of content based on an historical case. As such, the defensive discourse offered by Administration representatives was analyzed and cross referenced

PAGE 88

88 with general public discours e according to categories drawn from crisis communication theory. In summary, the first step in this process was the development of a case study of the crisis. Then, appropriate theoretical frameworks were identified and, when necessary, modified for this analysis. The next step was to collect and categorize raw data. The units of analysis are statements made by Administration officials. Once categorized, the data was sorted chronologically and by rhetor. After being sorted, the data was analyzed and trends identified. The specific theories selected to analyze this case study are image restoration discourse theory and stakeholder theory. These two theories were chosen because they are exemplars of the symbolic and relational approaches to crisis management. By considering the degree to which image restoration discourse theory and stakeholder theory describe the crisis rhetoric offered by justification of the decision to analyze this case through the lens of these two theories will be provided. Time frame of the study: This study investigates the crisis communication efforts undertaken by the Reagan Administration from November 3 through November 24, 1986. This time perio d is identified as the crisis period based on a three stage model of crisis development, pre crisis, crisis, and post crisis (Coombs, 1999; Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). This three stage model describes the development of this crisis. The period from the date of the first arms for hostage deal, August 1985, until November 2, 1986, may be considered the pre crisis phase. During this time period, the release of the hostages themselves was a prodrome, as this event was the first p ublic indication that the transgression had occurred. The period from November 3 through November 24 is indeed the crisis period. November 25,

PAGE 89

89 1986, is the date of crisis resolution for this case, as well as the date of crisis emergence for the larger Iran Contra scandal. The Case Study The first step in this research project was the development of the case study based on multiple sources of evidence, including historical and documentary evidence. This methodology is especially appropriate when the researc her has scant opportunity to interact with the subject of the study. The method allows the researcher to portray the situation in detail that is usually not possible with other research methods. Due to the complexity of the case methodology, modes of data collection and analysis may vary from case to case (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Yin, 2003). The time period of analysis was November 3 through November 24, 1986, but relevant events leading up to, and following, the crisis were investigated as well. This pha se of the research relied on primary sources, specifically internal documents generated by key Administration officials and transcripts of testimony given by these officials before House and Senate committees during the summer of 1987. This information is compiled in the 12 volume series Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition published by the U.S. Govern ment Printing Office. Examples of the type of documentation referenced include internal memoranda, meeting notes, planning calendars, and transcripts of speeches and television appearances. The case study also relied on secondary sources such as newspaper reports, historical texts, biographies, and autobiographies. Public opinion polls have been consulted to augment this phase of the research. Brody and consulted as well. This data will be revisited during the analysis section of the thesis. Secondary sources were consulted to fill in background information and to act as cross references to the

PAGE 90

90 primary sources. These include autobiographical accounts of the events written by former White House officials involved in the crisis response (Regan, 1988; Speakes, 1988; Reagan, 1989; biographies as appropriate. Additional secondary so urces, several of which are referred to in the literature review, were also consulted. Data Collection Unit of Analysis The datapoints for this qualitative analysis are documented statements made by A dministration officials such as those recorded in news paper reports, press statements, and in transcripts of appearances on mass media broadcasts (including speeches and news conferences). Sources consulted during the study are relevant documents released in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (i broadcast address and two press conferences), newspaper reports appearing in the Washington Post and the New York Times and transcripts of television broadcasts on which various A dministra tion officials appeared. A total of 202 statements were analyzed. Statements analyzed were sentence fragments, single sentences, and multiple sentences. When necessary, the surrounding paragraphs were considered to appropriately place the statement in cont ext. Statements were limited to discourse offered in response to the primary charge leveled at the A dministration that arms were traded for hostages. The need for this limitation arises from a careful read of Benoit, Gullifor and Panici (1991) who indic ated in their discussion that they e analysis i n this thesis is, therefore limited to defensive discourse offered in response to a single charge.

PAGE 91

91 In addition, th is study was limited to statements and documentation generated by officials involved in the crisis communication process. These individuals worked within the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and the CIA. These were the departments dire ctly involved in the crisis response process. It should be noted that the heads of these departments President Ronald Reagan, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, National Security Director John Poindexter, National Security Director Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Central Intelligenc e Agency Director William Casey helped to develop t he A management efforts. The majority of statements appearing publicly and in the int ernal documentation, and thus analyzed, originated with these officials. Source Material Data was collected from the following sources: The New York Times The Washington Post Volumes 100 2, 100 7, 100 8, 100 9, and 100 10 of the 12 volume series Joint Hear ings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition published by the U.S. Government Printing Office Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Analysis of press coverage was limited to the The Washington Post and The New York Times published between November 3 and November 24, 1986. Articles were retrieved via a for analysis due to their roles as national agenda setters, their prominence, and their impact on the executive office (Bartels, 1996; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; McCombs,1994; McCombs,

PAGE 92

92 2002; Messner & DiStaso, 2006; Schraeder & Endless, 1998; Wilkins, 1993; Yanovitzky & Bennett, 1999). A comparison of coverage of the Iran arms story in several other newspapers indicated strong simila rity to the coverage provided by The Washington Post and The New York Times Additionally, former White House legal counsel Peter Wallison wrote that The Washington Post and The New York Times set coverage trends for the evening television news programs an d were regularly monitored by White House staff (Wallison, 2003). Additionally, the crisis emerged after The Washington Post relayed a report originating in Lebanon (Busby,1999; Draper, 1991; Wallison, 2003). The Joint Hearings volumes contain testimony a nd evidentiary exhibits from hearings held in the summer of 1987 to investigate the Iran initiative. The types of documents from which statements were pulled include interoffice memoranda, meeting notes, transcripts of television appearances, press guidanc e documents, and speech drafts. The volumes also contain full transcripts of testimony provided by John Poindexter, Donald Regan, Caspar Weinberger, Robert McFarlane, George Shultz, and Edwin Meese. These transcripts were reviewed to provide context and cr oss reference for the discussion section of this paper, but specific statements to be analyzed were not collected from the testimony transcripts. This is due to the fact that these statements were offered well after the crisis had occurred, and that the ve racity of much of the testimony has been strongly criticized (Draper, 1991; Morris, 1999). Analysis of the Joint Hearings exhibits was limited to those exhibits generated between November 3 and November 24, 1986. All exhibits generated during this time per iod were reviewed. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential D ocuments contains various documents issued by the Executive office. Volumes 45, 46, 47, and 48 were consulted these were the volumes which contained documentation from November 3 through November 2 4, 1986. All documents within

PAGE 93

93 these volumes were reviewed. Statements were pulled from transcripts of Presidential news conferences and broadcast addresses, and press statements. Qualitative Coding Categories The cate g or i es into which the statements were s orted and analyzed primarily c a me from the variables and structure found in crisis communication theory. Representative theories were selected and then broken down into critical elements for coding purposes. Ima ge Restoration Discourse Theory The focus of response to the Iran arms crisis. Of the symbolically oriented crisis communication theories restoration discourse theory is the most likely theory t o yield enacted to protect symbolic resources. Image restoration discourse theory is proposed as a tool to evaluate rhetorical discourse options offered by an or ganization in response to crisis (Benoit, 1997; Benoit, & Brinson, 1996; Benoit, & Czerwinski, 1997; Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson, & Benoit, 1999; Zhang, and Benoit, 2004). Image restoration discourse theory embodies the symbolic approach to c risis on is a goal & Brazeal 2002 pp. 380 381). Image restor ation discourse theory has been identified by Coombs (2002) as one of three dominant symbolically

PAGE 94

94 situa tional crisis communication theory. Of these theories, image restoration discourse theory is for evaluating messages communicated in response to crisis, signifi cant theoretical advances have been made since the concept was introduced. Some of these advances have been incorporated into image restoration discourse theory. communication the ory is highly cited in scholarly crisis communication literature, but the focus of this theory is not appropriate for this analysis. Situational crisis communication theory is proposed as a predictive tool to help crisis managers develop effective response s to a crisis and not a predictive theory, it is more appropriate for evaluating discourse offered in response to a past crisis, such as this case study, than situa tional crisis communication theory (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000, p. 175). Additionally, various case studies developed by Benoit have the case study method (Benoit & Brinson, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991; Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Zhang and Benoit, 2004). Situational crisis communication theory has tended to be used in conjunction with an experimental methodology (Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). Image restoration discourse theory predicts that organizations will respond to crisis by enacting one (or more) of five image restoration discourse strategies identif ied by the theory: denial evasion of responsibility reduction of offensiveness corrective action and mortification

PAGE 95

95 ( Appendix A, Table A 1 ). Based on this prediction, it may be assumed that symbolically motivated defensive discourse offered by an o rgan ization in response to crisis will invoke one ( or more ) of these five image re storation discourse strategies when communicating a response to a crisis. expected to provi de insight into the evolution of the use of image restoration strategies, the complexity of the discursive environment, and the extent to which crisis response efforts were symbolically motivated. If analysis indicates that the Reagan Administration did in deed enact multiple image restoration discourse strategies, such findings will be considered to be evidence communication priority. Stakeholder Theory Of the relational ly oriented crisis management theories covered in the literature review, stakeholder theory is the most likely theory to yield insight into the extent to which the Reagan ps with stakeholders. This is because stakeholder theory is the foundation for the relational approach to crisis management (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Ledingham, 2001; Ledingham, 2003; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Martin & Boynton 2005 ; Phillips, 1997; Suss kind & Field, 1996; Ulmer 2001 ; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000 ). It must be acknowledged that relationally motivated crisis response strategies generally refer to broad management processes, not more narrowly defined communication efforts. Additionally, there is n o relational counterpart to image restoration discourse theory. That is, there is no rhetorical discourse typology based on stakeholder theory. As such, for this analysis, stakeholder theory must be specifically operationalized in regards to crisis communi cation. A

PAGE 96

96 stakeholder theory based rhetorical discourse typology is proposed and used to evaluate crisis communication offered in this case. Without a foundation in stakeholder theory, crisis management cannot be relational, hence, relationally oriented cr isis management programs are developed based on a consideration of responding to the Iran arms crisis was enacted to protect organization stakeholder relationships, conformity to the principle tenets of stakeholder theory will provide an indication of the degree to which the Administration placed a communications priority on r elational concerns. Based on the discussion above, some qualifications need to be stated. Stakeholder theory refers to a management approach, not a specific communication approach. Unlike image restoration discourse theory, stakeholder theory is not a typo logy used to analyze defensive discourse. Therefore, stakeholder theory must be modified for application to an analysis of defensive discourse by creating a typology based operationalizing the basic tenets of stakeholder theory. The foundation of stakehol der theory is concern for organization stakeholder relationships. Favorable organization amidst crisis (Marra, 1996; Martin & Boynton, 2005; Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). There fore, the author predicts that relationally motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit concern for organization stakeholder relationships. Underlying a concern for organization stakeholder relationships is a concern for stakeh older groups themselves. Stakeholder theory implies the necessity of factoring stakeholder needs and interests into a crisis response (Ledingham, 2003; Phillips, 1997). Therefore,

PAGE 97

97 relationally motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit concern for stakeholder groups. Stakeholder theory emphasizes the importance of identifying stakeholder groups impacted by a crisis for effective crisis response (Horsely & Barker, 2002; Ulmer, 2001). Identifying the various stakeholder groups af fected by a crisis is important because of the complexity of an with differing needs and priorities (Phillips, 1997; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). As such, relationall y motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit an identification of stakeholder groups affected by its crisis. Lastly, because organizations often operate in complex environments occupied by a multiplicity of stakeholder groups, stakeholder theory predicts organizations improve their chances of survival by prioritizing stakeholder groups. The theory further predicts that organizations will prioritize stakeholder groups based on stakeholder, not organizational, needs. Therefore, re lationally motivated defensive discourse rooted in stakeholder theory will exhibit prioritization of stakeholder groups affected by its crisis, based on stakeholder, not organizational, needs. Based on the literature review of stakeholder theory, relationa lly motivated discourse rooted in stakeholder theory is predicted to fall into four categories: statements of concern for organization stakeholder relationships, statements of concern for stakeholder groups, statements prioritizing stakeholder groups, and statements identifying stakeholder groups. If analysis typology, said analysis will support the contention that these efforts were relationally oriented (Appendix A Table A 2)

PAGE 98

98 If the proposed typology fails to explain the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration, such a finding either indicates relational concerns were not a priority or that the proposed stakeholder theory based typology is flawed. Evidence of conformity to this stakeholder theory based categorization scheme will not prove the Administration placed highest priority on relationship protection or that this was a motivation for the type of discourse. However, absence of evidence of con formance with stakeholder theory may provide strong indication that the efforts were not relationally oriented. Data Categorization When the source material was reviewed, the author noted statements that appeared to fit either into the taxonomies provided by image restoration discourse theory and the stakeholder theory underlying priorities, but which did not fit into either typology, were also noted. Whereas the two theoretica l categorization schemes were strictly delineated, the last categorization scheme was open ended to allow results to emerge from the data. The data was entered into tables which captured information used to cite and sort the data. The information collecte d differed slightly for each categorization scheme. For image restoration discourse theory, the following information was captured: the broad image restoration discourse strategy; the specific strategy; the individual to whom the statement was attributed; the publication the statement appeared in; the date the statement was made; and the type of document (public or internal). For stakeholder theory, the following information was captured: the rhetorical component of stakeholder theory; the stakeholder group referred to; the statement; the individual to which the statement was attributed; the publication the statement appeared in; the date the statement was made; and the type of document (public or internal). The following information was captured for stateme nts collected but not addressed by the two theoretical

PAGE 99

99 frameworks as defensive discourse: the category (e.g., concern for a symbolic resource); the sub category (e.g., concern for credibility); the statement; the individual to which the statement was attri buted; the publication in which the statement appeared; the date the statement was made; and the document type (public or internal). The method of categorization was slightly different depending on whether the source material was a primary or secondary so urce. When the source document was a primary source, each instance a statement was uttered was noted separately and entered into an individual cell. When the document was a secondary source which repeated statements originally found in a primary source, st atements which fit into the same category were entered into the same cell. For example, when Reagan repeatedly denied that arms were traded for hostages, each individual statement was noted in its own cell. When The New York Times or The Washington Post re ported these statements, all of the denial statements quoted were included in the same cell. The rationale for this decision is to most accurately reflect the discourse as it was offered by the rhetor, not the media outlet. Because this study is qualitati ve, this decision is does not affect the findings, but this distinction must still be noted. It also must be noted that in this study, all of the documents used were considered primary sources, except for newspaper articles which repeated statements made i n other primary source documents. Some statements collected in the research fit into more than one category outlined by the categorization schemes used. In these cases, if the statement could be segmented without losing adequate context, it was entered in segments into two different cells. In other cases, the full statement was kept intact to provide adequate context. In these cases the statements were entered into each category in which they fit. For example, in the following text, President Reagan

PAGE 100

100 invoke s both the evasion of responsibility via good intentions strategy, and the reduction of offensiveness via transcendence strategies: That [the Iran] initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of I ran, to bring an hon o rable end to the bloody 6 year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages. Without Iran s cooperation we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war; without Iran s concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East Iran United States Relations: Address 1986 p. 1559 ) Because the meaning of the statement is most apparent when the full context is provided, the statement was kept intact. It was categorized in one cell as an example of the evasion of responsibility via good intentions strategy, and in a separate cell as an example of the reduction of offensiveness via transcendence strategy. Data Analysis Once the data was categorized, the analysis began. To analyze the data, multiple data sorts were conducted. The data in all three tables were first sorted chronologically. Based on these sorts, the tables displayed in the Results section of this paper were developed to provide visual repres analyzed. The data in all three tables was then sorted by the individual who made the statements. This data was used to develop a table providing a visual representation o f the individual sources crisis rhetoric. Study Soundness Care was taken to insure that this study was conducted soundly. As a qualitative study, it is possible that author bias may affect decisions regarding the categorization of the statements analyzed and judgments regarding the implications of the findings. To protect against this, care was taken to conduct the study with as much objectivity as possible.

PAGE 101

101 The reliability of the source material was ensured by including only verified source material original to the time of the crisis itself. Statements were pulled from documents generated during the crisis period. These documents were authored by Administration o fficials, or contained direct quotes of statements made by Administration officials. Documents written by commentators were included as primary sources. Transcripts of testimony provided by Administration officials in the summer of 1987 were not used a pri mary source material for this study. These transcripts were not considered to be primary materials due to the amount of time that had elapsed between the hearings and the crisis and the fact that much of the testimony was contradictory. It may be assumed t hat the motivations guiding the Administration officials during the joint hearings differed from that underlying the crisis response. Several steps were taken to establish the validity of categorization scheme. The author diligently reviewed the original t t Contra. No apparent instances of author bias were identified; however, because this study is qualitative, the author acknowledges that future researchers may in fact choose to categorize the statements collected in th is research project differently. The author limited analysis of defensive discourse to that offered in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages. This decision was made to insure that responses to different charges were not misinterpreted as changes in rhetorical strategy. This decision was made after reviewing the study authored by Benoit, Gullifor, and Panici (1991) which attempted to categorize statements offered in response to multiple charges.

PAGE 102

102 To maximize the validity of the judgments made in the analysis section, the data obtained in answer to RQ2 and RQ3 was triangulated with data obtained in answer to RQ4 and with later testimony provided by the major players in this case. In this way judgments informed by an analysis of the defensi ve discourse were compared to the actual documents guiding the discourse well as the recollection of the major players in this case. Though qualitative studies are not generally considered to be replicable, future researchers should be able to replicate th is study if they follow the methodological steps outlined in this chapter. The author does acknowledge that understanding derived from qualitative inquiry is relative. Different authors may in fact interpret the results of this study differently. The analy sis offered by this author represents one interpretation of these results based on the most comprehensive data set possible.

PAGE 103

103 CHAPTER 5 RESULTS The results of the study are discussed below. The specific results associated with RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 are discu ssed first, then the summary results of RQ1 are presented at the end of this chapter. The results are presented in this order because the results from RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 are necessary to answer RQ1. When relating specific results for RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4, the discussion first concerns the chronological evolution of the defensive discourse to provide an the defensive discourse offered by the various Administration units is discussed to provide a detailed look at the complexity of the response. While answering RQ2, several defensive discourse strategies emerged from the data which the image restoration strategies, t hese discourse strategies were offered in response to the specific charge that arms were traded for hostages. Therefore, the strategies are discussed in regards to image restoration discourse theory, in the section regarding RQ2. The emergence of these str ategies is described first in the section discussing RQ2 so the reader will have been introduced to these strategies when they are described elsewhere in the Results section. RQ2: What Insight Does Image Restoration Discourse Theory Yield Regarding the De fensive Discourse Disseminated by the Reagan Administration d uring the Crisis Period? Discourse Strategies Not Identified by IRDT Several defensive discourse strategies ignored by IRDT emerged from the data. The Reagan Administration employed four broad de fensive discourse strategies that have not been identified by IRDT (Zhang & Benoit, 1997). These have been labeled no comment speaking out acknowledgement and accepting responsibility Three previously unidentified varieties of the

PAGE 104

104 reduction of offensiv eness strategy were also employed during the crisis response: self defense precedent and justification The previously unidentified strategies are discussed below. The no comment strategy was used frequently in the early phase of the crisis. Three variet ies of the no comment strategy were identified in the data analysis: simple no comment disclosure is dangerous and superior order The use of the no comment strategy generally took one of the first two forms: a simple no comment and a refusal to comment on the grounds that those negotiating on their behalf ( disclosure is dangerous ). For example, on November 5, The Washington Post reported that President Reagan same article, the disclosure is dangerous strategy also appears when White House press secretary Larry Speakes refu ories involving hostages. (Drozdiak & Pincus, 1986, November 5, first section, p. A1). Another example of the di sclosure is dangerous strategy is the following statement attributed to White House Chief of Staff Donald der to get these hostages out. A1). The simple no comment and disclosure is dangerous strategies were used with much greater frequency than the s uperior order strategy, which was exclusively by the State Department in an apparent attempt to evade responsibility for its inability to comment on the case. For example, on November 7, The New York Times d by the White House not to comment on reports that Robert C. McFarlane, the former national security

PAGE 105

105 executive branch, and they have issued a statement that all q uestions shall be answered by the (Gwertzman, 1986, November 8, section 1, p. 1). Such statements made by the Secretary of State bear similarity to the speaking out strategy which appeared in the data. The speaking out category captures discourse offered by Administration officials in which they condemned Administration actions the disapproval strategy and contradicted previous Administration claims the contradictio n strategy. For The New York Times White House, said yesterday the declared the U.S. policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists disagrees with a reported White House decision to undertake secret negotiations with Iran to gain the release o Hoffman, 1986, November 8, first section, p. A1). An example of the contradiction strategy can be seen in the following statement made by Poindexter on November 14, which directly well as similar claims made by the Chief of Staff. On November 14, C hief of Staff Regan this story has received so much publicity that this avenue to [sic] trying to establish relationships with them may have been blocked for a while and unfortunately, that will also have section 1, p. 5). On the same day Poin he unexpected revelation of U.S. arms

PAGE 106

106 Iranian relations and win The broad acknowledgement cat egory of defensive discourse refers to discourse in which Administration officials at least partially acknowledged that the transgression did indeed occur. For example, two days after denying that arms were exchanged for hostages on November 3, Administration said. it was pursuing the release of the remaining American countries to try to free the hostages and refused to rule out that Iran might be on United States rela The use of the acknowledgement strategy was often highly nuanced, as in the following November 14, first section, p. A1). The last broad defensive discourse strategy to emerge from the data analysis is the accepting responsibility strategy. This category of discourse captures statements made by the acc used in which culpability was admitted. This rhetorical strategy was used by Reagan during the November 19 news conference. The President stated in regards to the decision to ship arms to 1583). Three variants of the reduction of offensiveness strategy emerged from the data: self defense precedent and justification The self defense category captures statements in which the

PAGE 107

107 rhetor rejected claim inherent correctness of the actions in question. For example, The Washington Post attributed the and is d be wrong in saying that a mistake was made on a very high don't think a mistake was made. 1590). P resident Reagan and former National Security Director McFarlane, appealed to precedent to reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales. When using this strategy, the rhetor compared the Iran initiative to past, more favorable, foreign policy initiatives. For example, during the November 13 address, after acknowledging secret negotiations with Iran, Reagan claimed, when we liberated Gre nada, when we went into Lebanon, when we aided the Philippines, and 1583). McFarlane went so far as to author an editorial in The Washington Post not to assert the China experience as a perfect analogue to recent efforts toward Iran. But the basic issue was the same. Nurturing a strategic reorientation in a country's policy requires

PAGE 108

108 discretion, judgment and patience. And it is never risk arlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p. A21). The last new variant of the reduction of offensiveness strategy is the justification strategy. the basis of necess ity or for a foreign policy gain. For example, during the November 19 news conference President Reagan said of the Iran and this particular thing was, we felt, 1585). Soon after, Secretar y of Defense attempt to change the policies of Iran, which we are all agreed have been extremely destructive in every way. Any attempt to try to change those policies, 1986, November 20, first section, p. A28). Restoration Discourse Theory ion can be seen to have progressed in three phases ( Appendix A, Table A 3; Appendix B Figure B 1). These on November 19, and the news conference on November 25. Therefore, phase 1 of the crisis response was November 3 through November 12, phase 2 was November 13 through November 18, and phase 3 was from November 19 through November 24. It must be noted that t hese phases emerged from the data analysis; they were not referenced by any member of the Administration. There is no indication that those involved in the crisis communication process conceptualized the response in terms of phases, but the data indicate t hat the response did in fact progress as such.

PAGE 109

109 certain themes remained constant. The denial acknowledgement and speaking out strategies were utilized throughout th e entire crisis period. The crisis communication during phase 1 was via the attack the accuser and transcendence strategies. Phase 2, was characterized by increa sed attempts to reduce the offensiveness of, and evade responsibility for, the arms sales. During this phase, the Administration abandoned the no comment strategy, though Reagan used the strategy during his November 19 news conference. In the third and fin al phase, increased attempts were made to reduce the offensiveness of the Iran initiative, while efforts to evade responsibility were decreased. Most notably, the President himself declared personal responsibility for the crisis and took corrective action to remedy the situation. Both variants of the denial strategy identified by Zhang and Benoit (2004) simple denial and shift the blame were enacted throughout the crisis. The shift the blame strategy did not emerge until phase 3, on November 19 when Reagan p. 1584 1585). Initially the use of simple denial was relatively straightforward Administration officials and the State Department denied reports that the recent release of American hostage David Jacobsen were tied to arms shipments (Hijazi, 1986, November 4; Gwertzman, 1986, November 4) As the crisis progressed, denials became more strictly qualified, and were often tied to the use of the minimization, differentiation, and transcendence strategies. These denials were highly nuanced and hinged on qualifications regarding the amount of arms sold, who the arms were sold to, and the motivation for the arms sales. For example, on November 13, Reagan

PAGE 110

110 invoked a combination of the simple denial minimization and differentiation strategies in the the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterl y false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or At the same time Administration representatives denied the charge that arms were traded for hostages, they began to provide limited and qualified acknowledgement that the U.S. had negotiated with Iran. T hus, throughout the crisis, the Administration denied that it traded arms for hostages, while acknowledging that it had entered covert negotiations with Iran, shipped arms to Iran, and that hostage release efforts were ongoing. For exampl e, Reagan claimed not repeat 1546). Various Administration officials spoke out against the Administration throughout the crisis period. As described above, such speech either expressed explicit disapproval of the arms sales or contradicted previous Ad ministration claims. For example, The Washington Post reported that former National Security Director McFarlane, the person who initiated the arms sales to Iran and

PAGE 111

111 something of g enuine importance for hostages. All you do is encourage the taking of more 986, November 21, first section, p. A1; Cannon & Pincus, 1986, November 18, first section, p. A1). In phase 1, the primary strategy was to refuse comment. During this phase Administration representatives began to utilize the attack the accuser and transce ndence strategies to reduce the offensiveness of the charge. The attack the accuser strategy was used to blame the press for y. For example, Administration representatives claimed with key countries around the world exchange bet administration's cred ibility is called into question. A. Called into quest ion by those who don't Administration further blamed the press for endangering the hostages, thus integrating the disclosure is dangerous and the attack the accuser s trategies. For example, on November 6 The New York Times appeal to all of you with regard to this, that the spec ulation, the commenting and all. to us has no foundation, that all o f that is making it more difficult for us in our effort to get the other porting on this subject, which is uninformed and speculative, is running the danger of affecting the safety of the hostages and being detrimental to the long

PAGE 112

112 1986, November 8, section A, p. 1). Furthermore, 10, 1987, DTR 40, p. 369). In the second ph ase of the crisis, the Administration enacted a wide range of reduction of offensiveness strategies in conjunction with a limited set of evasion of responsibility strategies. defensive address contained variations of the bolstering minimization transcendence attack the accuser, self defense and precedent strategies as well as var ious attempts to evade responsibility. In this speech Reagan repeated the transcendence and attack the accuser strategies most frequently. During this speech he used the transcendence strategy five times and the attack the accuser strategy 3 times. Reagan repeatedly claimed that the arms negotiations transcended hostage because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to p robe for a better rel ationship between our countries. Our goals have been, and remain, to restore a relationship with Iran; to bring an honorable end to the war in the Gulf; to bring a halt to state supported terror in the Middle East; and finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages 1561). The President s. For the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors

PAGE 113

113 1 560). been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States Hostages have come home not made concessions to those who hold our pe United States authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive kind of evade responsibility were limited to one statement describing the good intentions of the t he simplest and best of reasons and one statement justifying the initiative due to Soviet the Soviet Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and United Stat es rel 1560). The crisis communication offered by Administration representatives during the remainder offensiveness of the initiative, thoug h several staffers and officials continued to speak out. One The New York Times

PAGE 114

114 percent of his morning briefings discussing the hostages and was willing secretly to reverse 1). Almost all of the defensive discourse offered in phase 3 oc curred during the November 19 news conference. Early in the news conference Reagan announced he was taking corrective The 15 83). During the news conference, the primary strategies invoked were the denial and the reduction of offensiveness strategies. The President reiterated his denials that arms were traded for hostages, and enacted the full range of reduction of offensiveness strategies. The use of the denial and reduction of offensiveness strategies was consistent with the November 13 address, though as stated above, it was on November 19 that Reagan first attempted to shift the blame for the transgression, and to justify the Iran initiative as necessary. Reagan reminded the audience of positive outcomes of the initiative via the bolstering p. 1583). He minimized the number of arms so ld, the violation of the arms embargo, and the really miniscule amount of sp are parts and defensive weapons. the modest deliveries. could easil y fit int o a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the six year war b etween Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military ba lance

PAGE 115

115 between the two countries 1584). R eagan differentiated between official negotiations with Iran, and the negotiations that actually t ook e were not negotiating government. We were negotiating with certain individuals 1584). He repeatedly blamed publicity, we would have had two more [hostages re leased] that we were expecting. we would have had all five of them by this last weekend, had it not been for the attendant confusion that 1584). The President again claimed the objectives of the Iran initiative transcended hostage release efforts: oses were fourfold: to replace a relationship of total hostility with something better, to bring a negotiated end to the Iran Iraq war, and to eff ect the release of our hostages. it was absolutely vital for the Western World and to the hopes for peac e in the Middle East and all for 1583 1 586). He appealed to precedent by comparing the Iran initiative to other initiatives undertaken in Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, 1583). Invoking the self defense and accepting respon sibility accepted responsibility for the initiative 1583) After Nov ember 19 the Administration offered very little defensive discourse regarding the arms sales to Iran. Former National Security Director McFarlane expressed public disapproval of the arms sales he initiated, while Secretary of State Shultz and Chief of Staf f Regan claimed

PAGE 116

116 personal defeasibility in the case. The Chief of Staff buttressed his claims of defeasibility by CEO [chief executive officer] said the ultim ate decision was mine to make; I'll take the Analysis of Defensive Discourse Offered by the Various Administration Units When considered as a single entity, the encompassed all of the broad image restoration strategies contained within IRDT, as well as all four of the defensive strategies previously not identified by IRDT: no comment speaking out acknowledgment and ac cepting responsibility ( Appendix A Table A 4) Considered separately, and compared to the discourse offered by President Reagan himself, the response was varied. Although White House representatives offered essentially the same range of discourse as did t he Administration as a whole, the National Security Council staff, State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency each offered a more limited variety of defensive discourse strategies in response to the charge that arms were traded f or hostages. The National Security Council staff attempted to reduce the offensiveness of its actions and refused comment. The State Department denied the charges, attempted to evade responsibility on the grounds of defeasibility, refused comment, spoke ou t against the Administration, and made a minimal staff, and anonymous White House sources all spoke out against the Administration. Response on the part of the D epartment of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency was extremely limited. The distinctions made between the various Administration units emerged from the data. These distinctions reflect the different roles the units played in the Iran initiative itself, and not officially delineated distinctions made by the Administration itself. For example, while the

PAGE 117

117 National Security Council staff reports directly to the President, the National Security Council staff was the Administration unit primarily responsible f or the development and implementation of the Iran operation. Therefore, the discourse offered by the National Security Council staff is considered separately from that of the White House. President R eagan and the White House s taff The use of image restora tion strategies by the Administration as a whole, the White House staff, and President Reagan was similar. The White House staff members who responded on behalf of the Administration were Chief of Staff Regan, Press Secretary Speakes, and various unnamed o fficials and staff members. For the most part, the communication originating from these staff members mirrored that offered by Reagan, though unnamed staff spoke out against Reagan on limited occasion (Gwertzman, 1986, November 14). The only strategies whi ch appeared in the total discourse offered by the Administration which were not also used been ordered not to comment by the White House (Gwertzman, 1986, Novemb er 8; Ottaway, & Hoffman, 1986, November 8). Reagan denied the charge that arms were traded for hostages on multiple occasions. For ging U.S. involvement. as far as we're concerned, not one of them is repeat did not trade weapons or anything These denials were supported publicly by previous statements made by anonymous White House officia concessions by Washington to secure the freedom of David P. Jacobsen, the hostage freed on of Staff

PAGE 118

118 were repeated by other staff members, his attempts to shift the bl ame were not. No one else in the Administration claimed that other countries were supplying major shipments of arms to Iran 1584 1585). Thou gh Reagan and several members of his staff denied that arms were traded for hostages, they also acknowledged that negotiations in fact occurred. These acknowledgements United States relations: he discussed Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the initiative (Engelberg, 1986, November 15). The New York Times that the United States was working with other countries to try to free the hostages and refused to rule out t hat Iran might be one of them. Do nald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, (Boyd, 1986, November 6). Both President Reagan and Chief of Staff Regan attempted to evade responsibility via th e defeasibility and good intentions strategies. Reagan claimed defeasibility in regards to charges tramp steamer and a Danish sailors [sic] union officials talkin g about their ships taking various supplies to Iran. I didn't know anything about t hat until I saw the press on it 1585). Chief of Staff Regan claimed defeasibility in regards to the entire initiative. The Wash ington Post

PAGE 119

119 Iran operation should be directed to Poindexter. The Chief of Staff said he did not know whether the Central Intelligence Agency had taken over control of the operation in January but sai d he described the good intentions guiding the Iran initiative, but i n different manners. The President 1986, p. 1559). In con trast, the Chief of Staff used the good intentions strategy to relate the The Washington Post yesterday how powerfully the President was influenced by his concern for the fate of the host evade responsibility via claims of Soviet provocation; no one else in the Administration repeated ). The President and the White House staff offered a wide range of defensive discourse strategies in an apparent attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the transgression. The bolstering minimization differentiation transcendence attack accuser self de fense precedent and justification strategies will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Reagan and unnamed White House sources invoked the bolstering strategy by claimi ng contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Gover nment complicity in acts of United States relations:

PAGE 120

1 20 Islamic Jihad has not captured any Americans since the mid 1 985 discussions began." (Pincus, 1986, November 12). The President, the Chief of Staff, and unnamed White House sources minimized the weapons and sp are parts for defensive systems. These modest deliveries, taken together, could The Washington Post section, p. A1). Reagan attempted to reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales to Iran via the differentiation arms] to the Ayatollah Khomeini. 1588). While Reagan differentiated official negotiations between heads of state from unofficial negotiations between intermediaries, National Security Director Poindexter differentiated negotiations with Iran from negotiations with terrorists: important point to keep in mind throughout this discussion of this project. Iran did not take the hostages; they are not holding the hostages. They do not have total control over the Hezbollah Joint Hearings 100 8, 1986, JMP 65, p. 646). As described previously, the President repeatedly emphasized the fact that the negotiations transcended hostage release efforts. For example, during the November 13 address Reagan said,

PAGE 121

121 elping to end the Iran Iraq war. It's because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to probe fo United States transcendence est p. A1). Likewise, The New York Times opening to Iran, has said it was undertaken not to free hostages but to put the United States in a (Gwertzman,1986, November 12, section A, p.1). The attack the accuser strategy was also utilized by Reagan and the White House staff to re duce the offensiveness of the arms sales. Such attacks portrayed the press as lacking in credibility, and bearing culpability for the fate of the hostages and the damage to the een unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and The Washington Post reported that Chief of p. A1). Similarly, The New York Times s said

PAGE 122

122 November 9section 1, p. 1.). Reagan, Regan, and Spe akes invoked the self defense strategy as a means of reducing the offensiveness of the transgression by asserting the inherent correctness of the decision to ship risk gamble that I believe the 1583, 1590). He also said of the Iran initiative, done and what we will do is right and i November 12, first section, p. A2). Also invoking the self defense strategy, but betraying transcendence Chief of Staff Regan contended the American people would approve of the sa p. A34). Reagan also appealed to precedent to reduce the arms sales offensiv eness. He claimed, United States

PAGE 123

123 initiatives undertaken in Grenada, Lebanon ). The only other official within the Administration to invoke the precedent strategy was former National Security Director McFarlane who compared the Iran initiative to China, and Reag an to Nixon in an editorial appearing in The Washington Post assert the China experience as a perfect analogue to recent efforts toward Iran. But the basic issue was the same. Nurturing a strategic reorientation in a country's pol icy requires discretion, judgment and patience. And it is never risk A21). President Reagan also used the justification strategy to engender a more favorable public perception of the arms sales. He argued the initiative was justified as necessary to improve p. 1585). While the statement was not repeated by White House staff members, Secretary of Defense Weinberger olicies of Iran, which we are all agreed have been extremely destructive in every way. Any attempt to try to change those Reagan, and other members of the White House staff refused to comment about the reports o arms sales on a number of occasions (Weinraub, 1986, November 5, section A, p. 1). As noted previously, two varieties of the no comment strategy were utilized: simple no comment and disclosure is dangerou s Early in the crisis, Reagan, the White House Press Secretary, and unnamed spokesmen simply refused to comment on the story, without providing explanation. For

PAGE 124

124 example, The New York Times reported tha rejected demands that he discl sions, Reagan, Regan, Speakes, and anonymous officials claimed their refusal to comment was based on the safety. For example, early in the crisis, Speakes explaine d the Administration would refuse to ories involving hostages. We just November 5, first section, p. A 1 ). Reiterating the point, Speakes related a Presidential request to .) Chief of Staff Regan said, want to talk anything about the Iran situation or go into any details of how we're negotiating in p. A1). At the November 19 The 1583) (Boyd, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 10). Reagan stood alone when accepting responsibility for the transgression and announcing 1583).

PAGE 125

125 Reagan was also the only person to announce cor rective action would be taken. As noted 1583). The State Department The Sta te Department utilized a narrower range of defensive discourse strategies than did the White House when responding to charges that arms were traded for hostages. The State Department denied the charges, claimed individual defeasibility, made a limited atte mpt at bolstering, refused comment, and spoke out against the Administration. Only Secretary of State Shultz and anonymous State Department officials offered any public response to the charges that arms were traded for hostages. The State Department simpl y denied the first reports of negotiations with Iran. The New York Times reported, that said the United States had sent spare parts and ammunition for American built fighter planes and tanks that Iran bought from the Unit ed States. disclosure is dangerous strategy. The Secretary of State and anonymous State De partment officials evaded responsibility for the arms sales by claiming personal defeasibility in the case. The Washington Post reported Pincus, W. (1986, Nov ember 18). Reagan has 'no plans' to ship Iran more arms, but order still in effect. The Washington Post, first section, p. A1). The New York Times ertzman, 1986, November 14, section A, p. 1).

PAGE 126

126 Shultz enacted the bolstering Shultz claimed the initiat ive had improved relations with Iran and decreased terrorism. Shultz fashion has improved, and a certain amount of evidence that their terrorist acts against Ame Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 42, p. 597). Like the White House, the State Department refused comment. Not only did the State Department simply refuse to comment, Shultz and his aides claimed they were directed not to comm ent by the White House, thus invoking the no comment as per superior order strategy. As and they have issued a statement that all questions shall be answered by t he White House. I that he [Shultz] had been told not to discus s the Iran operation publicly. The White House, in turn, denied on Friday that it had instructed Mr. Shultz to remain silent. Today however, a State Department official countered by saying the White House ha d sent written instructions limiting all comment on the subject to the White The State Department and the Secretary of State spoke out against the Administration on several occasions. Explicitly expre Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 42, p. 598). Anonymous State Department officials also expressed disapproval of the arms sales. The Washington Post

PAGE 127

127 officials who opposed the Iran arms for hostages program said privately yesterday that the White House has the responsibility not only to handle public questions abou t the program but to find a way to explain it to U.S. allies and Arab nations that have cooperated with Washington's public antiterrorism policies: (Pincus, W. (1986, November 9). Ex t section, p. A34). Shultz also contradicted the White Joint Hearings 100 9 1987, GPS 42, p. 598). National Security Council staff As did the State Department, the National Security Council staff responded to the crisis with a more limited set of defensive discourse strategies than did the White House. While the State Departme nt primarily attempted to evade responsibility for the transgression, the National Security Council staff attempted to reduce the offensiveness of its actions. The only members of the National Security Council staff to publicly respond to the crisis on the behalf were National Security Director Poindexter, and his former boss, former National Security Director McFarlane. Unlike the White House and the State Department, the National Security Council staff did not publicly deny the charges. Instead, Poindexter and McFarlane attempted to reduce the offensiveness of the initiative they implemented. In doing so, they utilized the minimization differentiation transcendence attack the accuser and precedent strategies. Like Reagan, Poindexter minimized the amount of arms shipped and their potential military impact. He argued was extremely small, has no military significance in terms of the war alon ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 65, p. 647). As noted earlier in this text, Poindexter also

PAGE 128

128 reduced the offensiveness of the transgression by differentiating between Iran, and the hostage hey are not holding the hostages. They do not have total Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 65, p. 646). Like Reagan, Poindexter and McFarlane argued that the Iran initiative transcended hostage items [arms] we felt would be the most significant in terms of demonstrating that they were indeed dealing with the U.S. government, and that we had not only our interests in mind, but we also had Iranian interests in terms of stopping the war. For example, we firmly believe that it's not only in our interests and the rest of the Persian Gulf area, but it's also in Iran's interest to stop Joint H earings 100 8, 1987, JMP 65, p. 647). McFarlane also invoked the transcendence strategy. The New York Times justify contacts with Iran, Robert C. McFarlane, Mr. Reagan's former national security adviser, sai relationship In his statement today, Mr. McFarlane said secret diplomacy was crucial in preparing for a new relationship with Iran i f the leadership there was Also in agreement with the White House and President Reagan, McFarlane attacked the The New York Times M cFarlane, the former national security adviser to President Reagan, last night branded as fiction many of the bizarre details in Iranian accounts of his secret four s noted previously, McFarlane invoked the precedent strategy when he authored an editorial in The Washington Post in which

PAGE 129

129 (McFarlane, 1986, November 13, editorial, p. A21). out against the Administration. The Washington Post any element of arms claimed recent press revelations may imp rove the chance of freeing the hostages. The Washington Post reported a meeting between Poindexter and The Post with reporters and editors of The Washington Post Poindexter said. the unexpected revelation of U.S. arms deliveri Iranian Of the Administration units which publicly responded to the crisis, the Department of Defen se offered the most limited range of defensive discourse strategies. The only strategies invoked by the Defense Department were the no comment and reduction of offensiveness strategies. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, was the only official from th e Department of Defense to respond publicly to charges of arms for hostage trades, and he did so on only two no comment and attack the accuser strategies. Early in the crisis, while ref using comment, Weinberger implied the The Washington Post November 7, first section, p. A1). As noted previously in this text, Weinberger also invoked the

PAGE 130

130 reduction of offensiveness justification strategy to illustrate the importance of the Iran initiative to the achievement of foreign policy goals (Moore, M. 1986, November 20, first section, p. A28) A wide range of image restoration strategies appeared in the A documentation. Image restoration strategies appearing in the internal record include denial evasion of responsibility reduction of offensiveness corrective action no comment and accepting responsibility (Appendix A, Table A 3, Table A 4) This discourse originated from multiple Administration sources: President Reagan, Chief of Staff Regan, National Security Director Poindexter, former National Security Director McFarlane, Secretary of State Shultz, Central Intelligence Agency Director Casey, and anonymous White House and National Security Council staff members. The first of the image restoration strategies appearing internally did so in an exchange of memoranda between Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Director P oindexter in which the no comment strategy is referenced. Shultz wrote Poindexter to alert him of press agreed guidance I totally refused to engage with their q uestions saying that they will have to Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 35, p. 563 564). Poindexter e that now is the time to give the facts to the public. I therefore remain convinced that we must remain absolutely close Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 27, p. 576). At the end of his response to Shultz, Poindexter or arms to Iran? A: We have no comment on these reports. As lon g as there are American

PAGE 131

131 hostages being held in the Middle East we will not be responding to questions like this. A simple no comment will be made to all questions about talks or actions that might or might not be taking place. You should infer nothing to t Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 27, p. 576). In two separate memos, McFarlane states he has refused to comment, and he invokes the attack the accuser of town f or two days and maintaining the no comment line, I returned today to find that Don Regan has backgrounded the weeklies and lai d the entire problem at my feet. I have made no comment (other than the 'fanciful and fictitious' line on my Cleveland Q&A) a Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 36, p. 363 364). In the second memo, to National Security would welcome the chance to do so at the appropriate time in order to correct what have been Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 39, p. 368). During a meeting held on November 10 to develop the communication strategy to address the burgeoning crisis, the simple denial di sclosure is dangerous, transcendence and differentiation any trading with the en Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 28, 578). Reagan then invoked the disclosure is dangerous strategy. Weinberger noted that Reagan said, th Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 28, 578). Chief of Staff Regan so as not to endanger hostages. Pres Support Pres' policy but say nothing else due to danger Joint Hearings

PAGE 132

132 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 387, 391). The transcendence strategy was invoked by Reagan, prepared statement putting emphasis on long ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 387). Similarly, Weinberger noted Reagan invoked a combination of the transcendence a nd differentiation strat We must make it plain that we are not doing business with angering the people we are Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 28, p. 578). The reduction of offensiveness corrective action no comment and accepting responsibility strategies appeared in three documents generated in pre transcendence solve the problem disclosure is dangerous and accepting responsibility strategies. The document argues that the relationship of total hostility, with something better. To bring a negotiated end to the Iran Iraq war that would protect We stern interests in the Persian Gulf. To effect the release of our Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR poli cy, thus invoking the disclosure is dangerous

PAGE 133

133 great risks especially for the hostages and for the Iranian officials with whom we were in contact. That is why information was restricted to Cabinet officers and officials with an absolute Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 47, p. 408). Next, the corrective action and accepting responsibility strategies were invoked when Reagan directs that no more arms will be shipped to Iran and the President accept s personal responsibility for the decision to undertake the initiative ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 47, p. 409). In preparation for the November 19 news conference the National Security Council staff provided Reagan with a list of anticipated questio ns and suggested answers. This document contains examples of three variations of the reduction of offensiveness strategies, bolstering minimization and attack the accuser An example of the bolstering Has this initiative with Iran had an y positive effect? A: Yes, there have be en a number of positive effects. we have seen a marked reduction in Iranian sponsored terrorism over the last 18 months ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 66, p. 652). An example of the minimization Although we do have an arms embargo in place against Iran, as President, I made a limited exception to that policy and authorized a small amount of defensive arms Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 66, p. 6526). An example of the attack the accuser strateg Washington, the more I realize that in this room rumor and fiction seem to be more important than fact ." ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 66, p. 657). Also in preparation for the news conference, an example of the transcenden ce strategy I do believe that it is a point that you should stress in your pre press conference brief so that he has it in his head to use as a Q&A. Just as long as it comes out on the record that any fool can well imagine a

PAGE 134

134 number of reasons why Iranians would want to change the status quo Joint Hearings 100 87, 1987, OLN 22, p. 127). The transcendence strategy appeared in a memo written by Chief of Staff Regan on November 2 Of even greater significance is the need to marshal bureaucratic resources notably the State Department to explain the rational for our initiative and to dispatch a special emissary to key posts. The mission of the emissary (perhaps the Vice Presiden t with the Under Secretary Armacost) would be to explain not only the strategic rationale for our action, but also to place the initiative in the context of our broader regional objectives Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, DTR 51, 425). On November 21, CIA Di rector Casey appeared before Congress to relate his knowledge of the Iran initiative. During his testimony he made multiple attempts to reduce the offensiveness of the arms sales using the transcendence minimization and bolstering strategies. His testimo ny contained several examples of the transcendence strategy. He recalled that the purpose of such discussions would be the future relationships with Iran and Iran's great importance in the East West and Middle East Persian Gulf equa tion Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 35, 1327). He then described a December 1985 meeting between McFarlane and an Mr. McFarlane stated our goals of pursuing the relationship with Iran were these: Devising a formu la for reestablishing a strategic relationship with Tehran. Ending the Iran Iraq war on honorable terms. Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism. Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways to counter Soviet activit ies in the region Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 35, 1329). He also level Iranian officials McFarlane emphasized that our interests in Iran transcended the hostages Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987,

PAGE 135

135 EM judgment was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantag es in contacts with Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 35, 1337). Casey described the positive outcomes of the Iran initiative, thus invoking the bolstering McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relatio nship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the war on Iran Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 35, 1334). During the course of the testimony, Casey made one attempt to evade responsibility via the defeasibility strategy. Casey testified that the CIA was unaware it had actually shipped arms to reliable airline that could transport bulky oil drilling parts to an unspecified destination in the Neither the airline nor the CIA knew the cargo consisted of 18 Hawk missiles When the plane got to Tel Aviv, the pilots were told the cargo wa s spare parts for the oil fields Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, EM 35, 1328). Poindexter also testified before Congress on the 21 st In his testimony, he invokes the bolstering and attack the accuser strategies. An example of the attack the accuser strategy is: Because of disclosures the President now wants to tell the full story. However, he is concerned that these disclosures have intentionally jeopardized hostages [sic]. The President is also concerned about press speculation w ith respect to the Israeli connection Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP Poindexter then went on to list what he believed to be accomplishments from these overtures to Iran : We now have a meaningful dialogue with key Iranian officials which, among other things, is yielding intelligence as to what's happening within Iran, (2) A channel has been opened by these discussions with pragmatists who may be in the

PAGE 136

136 assendency [sic] within Iran...Poindexter in commenting further on positive benefits from the Iranian initiative indicated that we have succeeded in getting some of our hostages out, radical elements in Iran are being quieted and the Iranians are no longer thinking about a total victory in their war with Iraq ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, JMP 80, 788). RQ3: What Insight Does Stakeholder Theory Yield Regarding the Defensive Discourse Disseminate d by the Reagan Administration d uring the Crisis Period? Stakeholder Theory B ased Defens ive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the Public Record Numerous statements were categorized as expressions concern for organization stakeholder relationships, and expressions of concern for stakeholder groups (Appendix A, Table A 5, Table A 6) However, n o Administration statements were categorized as expressions specifically identifying stakeholder groups affected by the crisis, or prioritizing stakeholder groups by stakeholder needs. The only stakeholder group the Administration explicitly expressed conc ern for was the hostages and those negotiating for their release. These concerns were offered consistently throughout the crisis. Such statements were made by President Reagan, White House Chief of Staff Regan, Press Secretary Speakes, and anonymous White House officials. Expressions of concern for organization stakeholder relationships did not surface until November 13. These statements almost exclusively concerned the relationship between the United States and Iran. Such statements were offered by Preside nt Reagan on numerous occasions, and former National Security Director McFarlane once. On one occasion an State Department, and oversees allies. Throughout the c risis period, President Reagan and several members of the White House staff expressed concern for the well being of the hostages and those negotiating on their behalf. Expressions of concern for the hostages emanated from White House Press Secretary Speak es, Chief of Staff Regan, and anonymous White House officials. For example, on November 5, the

PAGE 137

137 of how we're negotiating in order to get these hostages out. (Boyd, 1986, November 6, section A, p. 10). Shortly thereafter, on November 7 at a news conference with recently released hostage David Jacobsen, the President endangeri g and whatever you report. in doing this, we all run the risk of endangering the process that could lead to the content of these expressions remained consistent throughout the latest phases of the crisis. For example, on November 12, The New York Times repo the other hostages (Weinraub, 1986, November 13, section A, p. 1). During the November 19 news conference, the some questions which for reasons of national security or to protect 15 83). On occasion, these concerns were broadened to include not only the hosta ges, but also the The President today met with his senior national security advisers regarding the status of the American hostages in Lebanon. The meeting was prompted by the P resident's concern for the safety of the remaining hostages and his fear that the spate of speculative stories which have arisen since the

PAGE 138

138 On November 13, Reagan more explicitly expressed concern for hostage been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The United States On November 19, Reagan reiterated t still some parts of this that we cannot go public with because it will bring risk and danger [sic] 1584). Expressions o emerge until November 10. All but one these public statements (all but one) expressed concern for the relationship between the United States and Iran. Former National Security Direc tor McFarlane offered the first public expression of concern for the relationship between Iran and the United States. The New York Times p with the Iranian In his statement today, Mr. McFarlane said secret diplomacy was crucial in November 11, section A, p. 1). Reagan invoked t his theme four times during the November 13 ask, is any relationship national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved Reagan repeated thi s

PAGE 139

139 theme three times during the November 19 news conference. He restated his contention that the desire to stabilize relations with Iran was the goal of the arms deals and emphasized the ld and to the hopes for United On only one occasion did any Administration official express concern for a relationship other than that between the United States and Iran. This anonymous official expressed concern On November 19, The New York Times ouse official said what was relationships on which White House depends relationships with Congress, with the State b, 1986, November 19, section A, p. 10.). Stakeholder Theory B ased Defensive Discourse Strategies Appearing in the Several stakeholder theory based defensive discourse strategies appeared in the rnal documentation. In various memoranda, press guidance documents, meeting notes, and a speech draft, Administration officials express concern for the welfare of the blic (Appendix A, Table A 5, Table A 6) As with the analysis of the public record, no expressions specifically identifying stakeholder groups affected by the crisis, or prioritizing stakeholder groups by stakeholder needs, were identified. In a memo dated November 5, 1986, to Secretary of State Shultz, Poindexter expressed

PAGE 140

140 share your desire to find a way to prevent further speculation and leaks about U.S. policy on Iran. Not only will such complicate our efforts to secure the release of other hostages, but may also undermine opportunities for eventually establishing a correct relationship with Iran and possibilities for an active U.S. role in ending the Iran Iraq war Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW Iran initiative, Poindexter public. There are several factors to consider in addition to the need to get the other hostages out ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 27, p. 576). In the press guidance attached to th e memo, As long as there are American hostages being held in the Middle East we will not be responding to questions like this Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 27, p. 576). N otes taken during the November 10 staff meeting contain expressions of concern for the both noted statements of concern for the relationship with Iran made by Poi ndexter. Regan noted, 100th Congress, 1st Session (1987). Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. (U.S. Government Printing Office) Washington, D.C., 100 10, Donald T. Regan, 383. DTR 41A. Regan Notes, Dated Nov. 10, 1986). Similarly, Weinberger Admiral Poindexter pointed out th at we do want a better relationship with Iran Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW concerned with both the relationship with Iran, as well as the welfare of the hostages and negotiators. For example no

PAGE 141

141 way could we ever disclose it all without getting our hostages executed . We are trying to get better relations with Iran, and we can't discuss the details of this publicly without e ndangering the people we are w orking through and with in Iran. The President said we need to point out any discussion endangers our source in Iran and our plan, because we do want to get additional Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 28, p. 578). A memo written by McFarlane to Lieutenant Colonel North indicated concern for the the President's tone toward the Hill generally ought to be to reach out and seek cooperat ion. Any other approach will be suicidal. They control both houses. If he is serious about trying to accomplish something, he will need to try to build a co re of Demos who will support. So one point is the President's public remarks toward the Hill ou ght to be conciliatory, not confrontational on all issues, not just this one Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 46, p. 394). contained an expression of concern for the s afety of the hostages, and an expression of concern regarding the relationships between the Administration and Congress, and the Administration and the American public. The expression of concern for the hostages and negotiators was stated e knew this undertaking involved great risks especially for the hostages and for the Iranian officials with whom we were in contact That is why information was restricted to Joint Hearings 100 10, 1 987, DTR If we are to be successful in this and other foreign policy initiatives, it will require the support of th e American people and the Congress Democrats and Republicans

PAGE 142

142 my full cooperation in pursuing this and other foreign policy initiatives. Toward that end I have directed that all [original emph asis] information relating to our initiative be provided to the Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 47, p. 410). guidance memo prepare d by the State Department on November 18. The State Department It is still in America's long term interests to seek better relations with Iran Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, GPS 44, p. 603). RQ4: Did Administration Officials, Publicly or Privately, Make Any Additional Statements t hat Indicate an Emphasis on the Maintenance of Either Symbolic Resourc es or Organization Stakeholder Re lationships? Analysis of the data indicates that on several occasions, various Administration officials expressed concer damage control (Appendix A, Table A 7, Table A 8) Such statements were made publicly and ty surfaced on limited occasions throughout all three phases of the crisis response described previously in this paper. Acknowledgement of damage control efforts emerged during phase 2 of the crisis communication effort, and continued through phase 3. To r eiterate, Busby (1999) Administration officials and staff made numerous s tatements of concern for the and anonymous White House sources were the only Administration representatives to express credibility, several White House staff members, the Secretary of State, the National Security Director joined Reagan in doing so privately.

PAGE 143

143 8. According to The New Yo rk Times Washington's secret involvement in arms shipments to Iran had caused serious credibility November 9, section 1, p. 1). Two days later, White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan appealed to the Chief of Staff to disclose appropriate details of the Iran initiative to avoid damage t We face a grave communications problem over this Iranian/Hostage Issue. The appearance [original emphasis] of things is that we have negotiated with a terrorist regime more came here has there appeared such an issue which could do such deep and permanent damage to the President's would be earliest and fullest disclosure of what we did, what we attempted, why, etc. ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42, 394 395). going to do something on Thurs (tm Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42, 394). Concerns of credibility surfaced during the November 10 staff meeting held to determine Secretary Weinberger rela te some of the concerns voiced during this meeting. According to Must get a statement out now, we are being attacked, and we are being hurt Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR disagreement: he attributed the statement about being hung out to dry to the Chief of Staff, not Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, CWW 28, 580).

PAGE 144

144 appeared on November 13, and were voiced by anonymous Administration sources. The Washington Post reported, roblem for the White House. .The A dministration also is conc erned that it faces a severe credibility problem first section, p. A1). Similar concerns appeared in The New York Times in the day, Mr. R egan met privately with several White House officials and was told that the In preparation for the November 19 news conference, Poindexter developed a list of questions and answers to prepare Reagan for the questioning he was likely to face. The following going to do about the credibility gap that this episode has created for you and your administration? A: I can only do what I am doing now and what we have always done and that is to give the American people the facts and let their good judgment and trust i n the Presidency guide our Joint Hearings 100 8, JMP 66, p. 657). The following night during the news television news reporter Sam Donaldson. In his answer, R eagan indicates he is in fact concerned with p your credibility has been severely damaged. Can you repair it? The President. Well, I imagine I'm the only one around who wants to repair it, and I didn't have anything to do w 1585). On the 19 th prior to the news conference, several statements attributed to anonymous

PAGE 145

145 The Washington Post fficials and Republicans close to the President concede that what is largely at stake is the continued effectiveness of Mr. Reagan's leadership. They have been particularly shaken by the realization that the hallmarks of Mr. Reagan's personal popul arity ov er the last six years his adherence to certain fixed principles in foreign and domestic policy, his shrewdness in dealing with Congress and his credibility with the nation November 19, section A, p. 10). On the same day, The New York Times officials have acknowledged during the past week that disclosure of the secret dealings with Iran was the latest and most serious in a number of issues that have raised broad questions about the admin credibil ity. Shultz wrote: Credibility .This leads to the third and maybe the most important part of the problem. There is a real danger of spinning a web of misleading if not incorrect statements that won't stand up to press and Congressional investiga tion. In the eyes of the American people the most important achievement of the Reagan Administration has been the restoration of the stature and dignity and credibility to the Presidency. Ronald Reagan is a guy who stands by his statements and doesn't mislead. He has reestablished the people's confidence in the office of the Presidency. That has to be maintained, or every achievement of this Administration will be at risk ( Joint Hearings 100 9, GPS 40, 583 584). Beginning on November 14, Administratio n officials began to acknowledge the Staff boasted of past damage control successes to The New York Times are like a shovel brigade tha t follow a parade down Main Street cleaning up. We took Reykjavik

PAGE 146

146 and turned what was really a sour situation into someth ing that turned out pretty well. Who was it that took this disinformation thing and managed to turn it? Who was it took on this lo ss in the Senate and pointed out a few facts and managed to pull that? I don't say we'll be able to do it The remarks point up [sic] one aspect of the Reagan team that has been compared unfavorably by some current and former officials to the group led by James A. Baker 3d, the chief of staff in the first term. In this view, the present team is seen as having s better able to avoid damaging situations." (Weinraub, 1986, November 16, section 1, p. 16). Soon after, Poindexter disputed, yet simultaneously acknowledged a focus on damage con first Poindexter disputes the view that the response to the disclosures of arms sales was damage nly the impression that you were involved primarily in damage control, not in bold initiatives. ADMIRAL Joint Hearings 100 8, JMP 65, 649 650). fforts have been effective, he done an effective job in explaining what's going on on this and disinformation, what happened in Iceland? ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I think ( Joint Hearings 100 8, JMP 65, 649 650). On November 17, a White House aide referred to efforts to address the crisis as damage control. The New York Times de termed

PAGE 147

147 were no further plans to ship weapons to Teheran and that speculation that Mr. Shultz might A, p. 16). Also on November 17, The Washington Post taking session yesterday, (Cannon. & Pincus, 1986, November 18, first section, p. A1). RQ1: Did the Reagan Administration Prioritize its Symbolic Resources,Its Stakeholder Relati onships, or Some Other Concern w hen Communicating a Response to the Iran Arms Crisis of November 1986? In response to the over arching charge that arms were traded for hostages, the Reagan Administration invoked all of the broad defensive discourse strategies identified by image restoration discourse theory (IRDT) except mortification. The variety of defensive discourse strategies was much more limited for the various sub charges leveled at the Administration (e.g., the staf ilarly, most of the officials involved in the crisis communication process invoked at least one of the image restoration strategies in response to the primary charge. When the subsidiary charges are considered, staff participation in the crisis response wa s limited. Furthermore, analysis of the data led to an identification of several broad defensive discourse strategies not identified by image restoration discourse theory, and three varieties of the reduction of offensiveness strategy not previously identi fied by IRDT. Rhetorical components of stakeholder theory were invoked by Administration representatives on a limited basis. Use of these discourse strategies was relatively consistent

PAGE 148

148 throughout the crisis period. Of the four components of stakeholder th eory operationalized for this analysis, only concerns for organization stakeholder relationships and concerns for stakeholder groups were verbalized. At no time did any Administration official verbally identify or explicitly prioritize the stakeholder grou ps affected by this crisis. The only indications of stakeholder group identification or prioritization are those that may be implied by statements of concern for the stakeholder groups and organization stakeholder relationships. On numerous occasions the President and other Administration officials made statements occasions, the President and other Administration officials made statements that indicated a focus on d amage control in the crisis communication process. The analysis did not reveal any analogous statements related to a relational approach to crisis management.

PAGE 149

149 CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION Summary Image restoration discourse theory provided a wealth of valuable insight into this case. The broad strategies of image restoration discourse theory were invoked except the mortification strategy. The theory described the ev lacked coherence. Based on this study, it appears image restoration discourse theory may be applicable to other cases of presidential crisis, though, as will be discussed, modification may be required. The stakeholder theory based typology provided insight into this case as well. The theory served primarily as a cross reference to image restoration discourse theory, though it did initiative itself. Though useful in this case, further testing will be required if this typology is to be applied to other crisis cases. The credibility. Though the crisis occurred in a complex environment wit h multiple stakeholder groups, there is no indication that the Administration was concerned with any stakeholders other than the hostages, or with any of its stakeholder relationships other than that with the government of Iran. is rhetoric evolved throughout the crisis period, from an initial refusal to comment to the provision of partial disclosure of the details of the Iran operation.

PAGE 150

150 Despite this fact, the response remained consistently ambiguous throughout the crisis period. Not only did the Administration intentionally withhold information, and provide only partial disclosure of its interaction with Iran, various Administration officials offered differing accounts of the transgression, leading to a highly disjointed and contr adictory response. This analysis indicates image restoration discourse theory may need to be extended to account for the defensive discourse offered by the accused in this case. During the course of the analysis, several defensive discourse strategies not identified by image restoration discourse theory appeared in the data. Some of these statements are variants of the reduction of offensiveness strategy described by image restoration discourse theory. Others are examples of Administration representatives s peaking out against other representatives claims in apparent shows of self interest. Still others appear to be varieties of ambiguous discourse. The theory does not currently account for ambiguous discourse, though the strategy may be argued to be a valid form of defensive discourse depending on the context of the crisis (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987; Lyon & Cameron, 2004 ; Tyler, 1997). Given the complexity of the environment in which presidential crises occur, with diverse stakeholder group affected worldwide, ambiguity may be assumed to be a reasonable, though potentially damaging, crisis response in the realm of national executive governance. Image restoration discourse theory provides insight into the reasons for the failure of the Administration to manage this crisis. The theory outlines three criteria which must be met in order to effectively guard against image threats. Two of the criteria for crisis communication effectiveness outlined by the theory were not met, and thus the theory accurately predicts a failure outcome. Despite this fact, at least one of the criteria is ripe with ambiguity and the theory should be modified to correct for this fact.

PAGE 151

151 Findings The Administr riorities Two priorities guided the Reagan Administration throughout the Ir an arms crisis: the protection of the continued viability of the Iran initiative and the protection of the communication response, despite the fact that con cern was expressed for the hostages and the statements were indications of the degree to which the Administration prioritized the Iran initiative itself. When the Ad ministration i s considered as a single unit, the dual priorities emerged in two phases. Early in the crisis the continued viability of the Iran initiative itself was the ached a critical threshold, the Administration attempted to address these threats, and concerns for credibility became paramount. Despite the fact that these dual priorities shifted during the time period, both were issues of concern throughout. Statements credibility emerged early in the crisis, and the operation itself was maintained beyond the crisis period (Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Weinberger testimony, p. 157). Testimony offered in the wake of Ira n Contra corroborates the assertion that two priorities n the summer of 1987 National Security Director Poindexter testified that he and the President intentionally withheld as much information as possible about the project because we still felt at that point that we could salvage something out of it ( Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244 ). The Chief of Staff also testified that the President and Poindexter explic itly stated the need to withhold comment out of concern for the hostages ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan

PAGE 152

152 testimony, p. 21 22 ). when priorities shifted was November 13, 1986. Poin dexter testified that by the 13 th [i] t became obvious that the President needed to go before the American public and explain in broad, Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, Poindexter testimony, p. 244). Throughout response continued along this trajectory. Ambiguous explanations were offered which served to anger and confuse the public, Congress, and the press. The situation is more complex when the va rious Administration units and individual representatives are considered separately, due in part to the fact that different units had disparate priorities. T he National Security Council staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency prioritized the success of the Iran initiative itself and only begrudgingly acknowledged The National Security Council staff was carrying out the Iran initiative when the crisis broke, and thus sou ght to maintain operational secrecy well into the crisis. Conversely, Secretary of State Shultz and the White House Chief of Staff Regan at the outset of the crisis Although aware of at least some of the detail s of the operation, neither of these parties were involved in the operation. Thus, the crisis adversely impacted their credibility, though neither man was directly involved in the operation. Regan, who likened his role in the Administration to a custodian following a parade shoveling horse excrement, sought to quickly contain the damage caused by the crisis (Canon & Pincus, 1986, November 18; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR credibility As soon as the crisis hit, he lost credibility with foreign governments worldwide because the initiative violated the arms embargo for which he was directly responsible.

PAGE 153

153 Significance of a L ack of P rioritization of Relational C oncerns The fact that relat ional concerns were ignored in the crisis response may help to explain the crisis in order to protect its credibility. Though credibility is a perception form ed in the minds actions, perceptions of credibility will be base d, in part, on these actions. The image an organization projects only informs perceptions of credibility to the extent that contradictory information regarding these actions is unavailable. The Administration ignored the fact that its behavior affected sta its credibility. Its representatives attempted to restore its credibility by projecting an image which contradicted information readily available to stakeholders. No honest attempt was made to address stakeholder concerns or to mo no more arms would be sold to Iran, the negotiations continued ( Draper, 1991; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987 Weinberger testimony, p. 157 ) At least one member of the Administration understood the hazards of neglecting stakeholder relationships during crisis. The statement also illustrates the link between credibility an d relationship maintenance. The New York Times reported a senior White House offi about the Iranian situation was that it struck at the heart of the various relationships on which White House depends relationships with Congress, with the State Dep artment, with overseas allies. It weakens our credibility, really for the first time the (Weinraub, 1986, November 19).

PAGE 154

154 m also acknowledged the importance of maintaining stakeholder relationships throughout crisis in The New York Times The official also A member of the White House te am during the first term said, There seems to be little understanding now of the fact that in Washington it is important to have allies, and your most critical allies need to be brought into t he process as early as A White House official who has long worked for Mr. Reagan said One of the a dvantages they saw s style at the beginning was a kind of strong, fighting confrontational approach that everyone expected to be healthy in terms of promoting the second term agenda an d preventing lame duck st Previously Unidentified Defensive Discourse S trategies Image restoration discourse theory as measured in this study did not account for all of the defensive discourse offered by the Reagan Administration, particularly statements that appeared to reflect strategic ambiguity. The fact that image restoration discourse theory proved useful in categorizing the defensive discourse offered by the Administration after November 13, indicates such discourse aimed to protect the A categories derived from image restoration discourse theory did not account for instances in which Administration officials spoke out against the official messages being disseminated, statements in w hich the accused accepted responsibility for the transgression, and for additional variants of the reduction of offensiveness strategy. The author proposed two categories to extend the theory to fully capture all of the discourse offered in this case study Statements reflecting ambiguity that were not covered by the image restoration discourse theory categories included refusals to comment and statements in which partial acknowledgement of the details of the transgression was provided. Refusals to comment were left unexplained, or justified in terms of protecting the safety of the hostages, or justified as being directed by superior order.

PAGE 155

155 Image restoration discourse theory fails to account for instances in which members of the Administration spoke out aga inst the official party line. On several occasions these representatives expressed explicit disapproval of the Iran initiative. At other times these people directly contradicted previous statements made by the President, and placed responsibility for the n o comment stance on the White House. Image restoration discourse theory also fails to account for instances in which the accused accepts responsibility for a transgression. In this case, the President accepted responsibility for the decision to ship arms to Iran, and for the resulting crisis. The author contends that all of the unidentified strategies described in the preceding paragraphs represent potential shortcomings to image restoration discourse theory. The use of such strategies is not likely to be anomalous to presidential crisis and instead may represent common responses to more general crises. If this is the case, image restoration discourse theory requires modification. It has been established that strategic ambiguity is a response option for en tities faced with a crisis, presidential or otherwise (Eisenberg & Witten, 1987; Lyon & Cameron, 2004 ; Tyler, 1997). In summary, image restoration discourse theory did not account for ambiguous discourse, statements which spoke out against the Administrat which the President accepted responsibility for the transgression. Ambiguous statements Statements in which Administration representatives spoke out against the Administration included statements of disapproval of the arms deals, and statements which contradicted previously issued Administration claims.

PAGE 156

156 The emergence of the three previously unidentified varieties of the reduc tion of offensiveness strategy represents less of a threat to the validity of the theory. I mage restoration ( Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici 1 991) The authors relate a key insight that implies a certain degree of flexibility to image actually em bodied in the discourse remain more important than the abstract categories previously unidentifiied variants of the reduction of offensiveness identified in this study may be tenta tively considered part of the suite of image restoration strategies described by image restoration discourse theory. If this is the case, only minor modification of the theory may be necessary. Further testing is required to determine if the appearance of these strategies was an anomaly, or if these strategies are commonly enacted in response to crisis and should be included in the image restoration discourse theory typology. Criteria for Crisis M anageme nt S uccess Image restoration discourse theory provide s insight into some of the possible reasons for Image restoration discourse theory states three criteria will ideally be met for crisis communication efforts to repair damage to an appropriate to the crisis threat, (b) the message strategies are subsequently embedded in discourse regarding the crisis, and (c) the response is persuasive (Benoit & Czerwinski, 19 97). persuasive. The Administration offered multiple discourse strategies which often conflicted with

PAGE 157

157 each other. Indeed, s everal of the individual strategies em ployed were inappropriate response choices on their own terms reduction of offensiveness strategy appears appropriate given that Reagan and various members of his staff frequently acknowledged that the negotiations had take n place. Use of the denial strategy in conjunction with the evasion of responsibility, strategy may be considered an appropriate rhetorical strategy as well. However, crisis. By offering all of these strategies at once, the Administration was asking its stakeholders to accept its claims that the transgression did not occur, while providing fragmented acknowledgement that it did. By the end of the crisis period, the Adm strategi es was slightly more coherent attempts to evade responsibility were discontinued while acknowledgement o f the transgression increased but Reagan still denied arms were traded for hostages thus undermining his credibility. In addition, s everal of the individual strategies offered were not appropriate on their own hostage release efforts did not sway audiences. This fact is supported by an ABC poll which indicted the American public disapproved of the Iran initiative regardless of the strategic aims of transcendence were refuted by foreign policy experts (Sciolino, 1986, November 20). Likewise, the use of the attack the accuser strategy directed at the press did not do anything to squelch press criticism. The enactment of the speaking out strateg ies, though perhaps appropriate for individual self preservation, were not appropriate organizational responses if the goal w as to present a coherent response.

PAGE 158

158 public, Co ngress, or foreign governments. Attempts to minimize the quantity of arms shipped were quickly proven false ( Joint Hearings 100 9, 1987, Shultz testimony, p. 45, GPS CHRONOLOGY C, GPS nationa 1986, November 19). News reports following both events indicated Congress did not be lieve Reagan either (Fuerbringer, 1986, November 14; Fuerbringer, 1986, November 20; Hoffman, 1986, November 14; Hoffman & Pincus, 1986, November 20; Weinraub, 1986, November 14 ). Although many of the rhetorical strategies offered by the Administration wer e embedded in the public discourse, these messages were often contradictory. The fact that the to have exacerbated the crisis. This is due to the fact that these messages often cont radicted each other and alerted stakeholders to the fact that they were being provided with incomplete and, at times, false information. I n addition, multiple, conflicting messages that criticized the President and his Administration were reported in the p ress reports. Therefore, it is not likely that the fact that messages were embedded was of any aid to the Administration. Implications and Future Research Questions The P otential Applicability of Image Restoration Discourse Theory to Other C rises Based on this analysis, image restoration discourse theory appears to be applicable to other cases of presidential crisis, though theoretical shortcomings may need to be addressed. Despite the fact that image restoration discourse theory does not account for all of the discourse defensive discourse. The theory helps to explain the priorities underlying the crisis response

PAGE 159

159 nsive discourse over time, the complexity of the response offered by various units within the Administration, and the reasons for the failure outcome. As such, it seems likely that the theory may yield insight into the defensive discourse offered by other presidents in cases of crisis. Additional research will be required to make this assertion with validity. At this time the author does not contend that image restoration discourse theory may be applied to more general political crises, though such a scenar io may be likely. More general political crises, such as those related to political campaigns, political party malfeasance, or lower level political crisis, may involve fundamentally different dynamics than this particular crisis. If future research addres ses these issues though, image restoration discourse theory may prove to be applicable to a much wider range of crises than has been the case so far. To address the issues discussed above, the following research questions are posed for future consideration : Is image restoration discourse theory applicable to other cases of presidential crisis? Is image restoration discourse theory applicable to a wide range of political crises? In what ways do presidential crises differ from more general politi cal crises, a nd what effect do these differences have on the potential application of image restoration discourse theory? Possible Theoretical S hortcomings This analysis illustrates several theoretical shortcomings to image restoration discourse theory. The theory does not acknowledge the role of factual veracity in crisis communication effective. The theory does not differentiate between discourse offered honestly as a reflection of fact or operational concerns and discourse contrived simply to restore an image. This fact illustrates that the assumptions underlying image restoration discourse theory may be flawed.

PAGE 160

160 The theory assumes communication is a goal oriented activity utiliz ed to address image threats. The fundamental finding of this case is that communication was utilized with the goal of preserving the operation, not image threats. Thus, not all crisis communication seeks to address image threats, and it is plausible that n ot all communication is goal oriented. To address these issues, the following research questions are posed for future consideration: What impact does factual veracity play on crisis communication outcomes? Are the assumptions underlying image restoration d iscourse theory flawed? I mage restoration discourse theory also suffers the shortcoming of not being exhaustive. The theory may require extension to fully categorize all defensive discourse offered in response to charges leveled at an organization in crisi s. Although image restoration discourse theory as currently conceptualized did yield a great deal of insight into this case, it did not capture all of the discourse offered by the Administration in response to the charge that arms were traded for hostages. Future research is needed to determine whether the unidentified discourse strategies were endemic to this particular crisis, or whether these strategies are commonly offered in response to crises -presidential, political, or otherwise. To address these is sues, the following research questions are posed for future consideration: Are the unidentified strategies which appeared in the data anomalies, or are they common to other cases of presidential crisis? Are these strategies commonly offered responses to cr ises in general? Can the unidentified individual strategies be grouped into broader response categories? Are the no comment and acknowledgement strategies variants of strategic ambiguity?

PAGE 161

161 Ambiguous D iscourse erized by ambiguous discourse throughout the entire crisis. Even after the Administration began to enact various image restoration strategies, the response remained ambiguous. This is evidenced by the multiple refusals to comment, the repeated provisions o f partial acknowledgement of their actions, the dissemination of half truths, and the multiple contradictions voiced. This contention is supported views regarding disclosure thusl but cannot get into q&a re hostages so as no t to endanger them. Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, p. 387 388). In the realm of executive governance and forei gn policy, presidents may be forced into engaging in ambiguous communications out of concern for national security or, as in this case, the continued viability of an unfavorable foreign policy operation. In describing a fundamental cause of foreign policy crises, Busby (1991) claims foreign crises will continue to occur as long as the disparity between national security concerns and public expectations is not resolved. In this case, the American public expected Reagan to both free the hostages and to act in accordance with his stated public policy, previous rhetoric, and legal constraints. Thus the foreign policy of not negotiating with terrorists. Furthermore, the operation was not compatible with attempts to maintain credibility. The initiative violated stated public policy, and potentially, U.S. law. In attempting to meet all of these expectations, Reagan was forced to explain his actions ambiguously. There ap pears to have been no way for Reagan to free the hostages and simultaneously engage in behavior that would not violate other expectations placed on him. This

PAGE 162

162 case illustrates both the necessity of engaging in strategic ambiguity and the dangers of basing a crisis communication response on such a strategy. The environment in which President Reagan attempted to communicate a response to this crisis was complex. Because of a p a nation whose actions imp act the entire globe, a presidential a dministration are impacted by, a diverse group of stakeholders. This was the case with Reagan and the Iran arms crisis. A comprehensive review of data generated during the crisis period indicated the foreign governments around the globe, the American electorate, Congress, the domestic and foreign news media, and various departments and individuals within th e Administration. These stakeholder groups can be sub divided to greater levels of specificity. For example, Congress may be further sub divided into Democrats and Republicans, and these groups could be divided into pro and anti Administration stakeholder s. Iran could be further sub divided into groups friendly, antagonistic, and ambivalent towards the United States. Some scholars have challenged traditional recommendations regarding candor and openness Eisenberg and Witten (1987) and Lyon and Cameron (2 004) argue that in complex crisis environments open communication may harm an organization as they attempt to address the potentially disparate needs and values of a wide range of stakeholders. These authors advocate for the use of strategic ambiguity when responding to crisis in a complex environment in which different stakeholders have differing information needs Though the context and environment in which the Administration attempted to respond to the crisis may have required the use of ambiguous disco urse, the strategy exacerbated the crisis. Throughout the crisis period the Administration was criticized by the press, the American public,

PAGE 163

163 and Congress for its inability to provide an honest account of what had actually transpired. The ambiguous nature o provide a coherent, believable account of their actions was the fundamental cause for the degradation of Future investigation of this case may determine the degree to which Administration representatives used ambiguity and candor in the crisis response. Once this is determined, researchers may gain insight into the causes of success or failure outcomes of this case. This case raises several issues about the use of ambiguous discourse: In what other cases has the tension between public expectations regarding presidential behavior and national security concerns led other administrations to respond to crisis with ambiguity? How can a president reconcile the disparity between public expectations and national security concern s without relying on ambiguity? How may a president, or other crisis managers, determine whether it is in their best interests to engage in ambiguous discourse or to fully disclose their actions? Can unfavorable foreign policy operations be explained in un ambiguous terms without jeopardizing the operations themselves? The Potential for Managing P residential Crises from the Relational P erspective This case illustrates the danger of wholly ignoring relational concerns when managing crisis. It also raises ques tions about the potential applicability of the relational crisis management perspective to presidential crises. It is impossible to know whether the Reagan Administration would have managed the crisis more effectively if stakeholder relationships were prio ritized over symbolic or operational concerns. Given national security considerations, it is uncertain whether the relational perspective is an appropriate management tool for presidential crises. However, the

PAGE 164

164 crisis impacted multiple stakeholder groups wh ich in turn negatively impacted the ability of the Administration to govern and carry out its political agenda in the remaining years of the Reagan presidency. Broadly delineated, these stakeholder groups included foreign allies, Congress, the press, and t he American public. These groups exerted considerable pressure on the Administration and were highly critical of its actions. Though at least one member of the Administration publicly proclaimed the importance of maintaining relationships with Congress, th e press, allies abroad, there is no indication that this mindset influenced the crisis management process. The first set of questions raised regards the possibility of applying a relational management approach to presidential crisis: ritized stakeholder relationships in crisis in other cases? What barriers inherent in presidential politics may inhibit the prioritization of stakeholder relationships amidst crisis? Given national security concerns inherent in presidential crisis, is the relational management perspective applicable to presidential crisis? In cases where ambiguity is required, can a president and his Administration actually This case also raises questions regarding the potential impact of the relational management approach on American politics and the electorate: What would be the impact on American politics if the relational management perspective was a widely adopted crisis response measure? Does the adoption of the relational m anagement approach to presidential crisis hold the from the numerous presidential crises which have occurred since Watergate? Can the relational crisis management approach potentially ease friction between the executive and legislative branches of government? Can this approach improve relations between the press and the president in crisis?

PAGE 165

165 bility to enact his or her agenda after the crisis subsides? By enacting a relational crisis management approach, is it possible that a president may actually turn a crisis into an opportunity? The Perils of Ignoring Crisis T hreats This case illustrates th e potential perils of prioritizing operational concerns and ignoring the onset of crisis. The Administration prioritized the viability of the Iran initiative over crisis management strategies well after the crisis surfaced. Initially the crisis was all but ignored. Administration representatives failed to recognize the potential damage the crisis could cause the actions increased exponentially throughout the c risis, yet at the November 10 staff meeting Poindexter incorrectly assessed that press interest had peaked and that interest in the story would soon die ( Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 41A, CWW 28). He was proven wrong as press interest in the story con tinued to increase throughout the crisis period and on through the progression of the Iran Contra scandal. When assessing actions taken in historical context, one must be careful not to impose present understandings of the situation on past contexts. From with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that the crisis threatened substantial damage to the Reagan presidency. It cannot be assumed that Administration officials should have recognized the severity of the threat. B ut, the documentary record indicates the threat was recognized by at State and Communications Director warned the President of the grave danger the crisis present ed. They urged the President to acknowledge the extremity of the crisis, and to fully Joint Hearings 100 8, 1987, GPS 35; Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, DTR 42. Yet these concerns went unheeded. By the time the

PAGE 166

166 Administration attempted to formally respond to the crisis, the crisis had grown. Its representatives were forced to do so in a hostile environment in which their critics had substantial amounts of time to state their case against the Administrati on. Additional Questions Raised by this C ase This case is especially rich and may offer insight into a wide variety of crisis communication concepts. Although some of these questions are related to the current study, it is beyond the scope of this researc h project to address them. It is hoped that future communications scholars will revisit this case to explore these questions. Which staged models of crisis development best describe this case in the broader context of the Iran Contra scandal? Various crisi s communication scholars conceptualize the development of crisis situations in terms of sequential stages (Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986; Gonzalez Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). An analysis of this case indicates it was the initial crisis wh ich spawned a much larger crisis. It would be interesting to see how this progression is explained, or defies explanation, under the three and four stage models presented in the literature. Such an analysis may determine whether the crisis period analyze d by this study when considered in the context of Iran Contra is actually part of the pre crisis phase described by a three stage model, or if a new model must be proposed. What role manage this crisis effectively? in effective crisis communication response (Belcher, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Fink, 1986 ; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005; Haney, 1998; Kauffman; 2005; Lauzen & Dozier 1994; Marra, 1998; Mitroff, 1988; Penrose, 2000; Wise, 2003). Some authors characterize organizational culture as either authoritarian or participative (Lauzen & Dozier, 1994) where as o thers discuss culture in

PAGE 167

167 terms of either facilitating or inhibiting the transfer of information in an organization (Coombs, 1999; Marra, 1998; Penrose, 2000). Haney (1998) described organizational culture in the specific context of presidential adminis trations and outlined three types of models of group structures: formalistic, competitive, and collegial. The author characterizes the Reagan Administration structure as collegial, and therefore prone to group think. Busby (1999) and Wallison (2003) both a organizational culture contributed to its inability to calm the Iran arms crisis Wallison (2003) portrayed Reagan as disengaged from his staff and uninterested in the specifics of their activities. The results in thi s case show that the infighting and internal rivalries led to public contradiction and undermining of the President. culture and the effect this culture had in this par ticular case. Once established, understanding about the role of organizational culture in the outcome of this crisis could be compared to past crises managed by the Reagan Administration to hone in on the factors that contributed to the failure outcome in this case. Then, similar cases involving a President, a crisis, and his success or failure outcomes emerge. Did this crisis present opportunities for the Reagan Administration? Although crises are generally characterized as threats, several authors discuss the potential for positive outcomes from crisis (Fink, 1986; Penrose, 2000; Seeger 2002; Sturges 1994; Ulmer 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow 2002; Ziaukas, 2001). Penros e (2000) contends that if crisis managers view the situation as presenting opportunities, they will have a greater likelihood of effectively managing the crisis. This crisis has been discussed primarily as a threat to the Administration, but there is some

PAGE 168

168 indication that members of the Administration viewed the situation as an opportunity. For (Pincus, 1986, Joint Hearings 100 10, 1987, Regan testimony, p. 57). As such it may be worthwhile to investigate the potential for positive outcome and opportunity inherent in this case, as well as what role the optimism held by the Administration Additionally, if crises can be view ed as opportunities, and given that the relational approach to public relations entails relationship development, and does crisis present opportunities for forging new organization stakeholder relationships? What role did crisis communication plans, or th e lack thereof, play in this case? Would planning have increased the chances of crisis management success? Draper (1991) negotiations with Iran. Authors proposing trad itional approaches to crisis management often recommend the development of crisis management plans. Future research could investigate the role the lack of planning played in the failure of the Administration to manage this crisis. defensive discourse squash the rally round the flag effect ? The rally round the flag effect predicts foreign policy crises will often inspire a surge of public support for a president (Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Busby, 1999; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993; Norrand crisis produced no such (Brody & Shapiro, 1989).

PAGE 169

169 generally develops as follows. Initially the White House controls relevant information about the crisis. Lacking their own information, opposition elites tend to abstain from publicly disagreeing with the President. Due to a lack of elite criticism the general public perceives that elites suppo rt messages. The public then consumes only favorable information the Administration, and public support for the President increases. Some authors see the abse nce of elite criticism of a president as the key factor leading to the enactment of the rally phenomenon.( Brody & Shapiro,1989; Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993; anothe r driver of the rally effect (Callaghan & Virtanen, 1993). None of these authors explicitly intuitive that the rhetoric offered in crisis will be directly re lated to elite criticism of the Administration. defensive discourse and the rally effect. n the failure of the Administration to inspire a rally of support? negating the rally effect? Does it appear that different discourse decisions could have decreased el ite criticism, thus inspiring the rally? Does the potential for a rally indicate a potential for positive outcome during a political crisis? Several authors contend American public memories of the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, and Watergate constrained the (Schudson, 1992, 2004; Busby, 1999; Wallison, 2003). As such, a comparative analysis of the

PAGE 170

170 use of image restoration strategies in by the Reagan, Carter, and Nixon administrations is sugges ted as a future research project. This analysis should focus specifically on the Iran arms 1980, and Watergate. Because of the constraints the crises occurrin g during the Nixon and Carter presidencies placed on the Reagan Administration, it will be worthwhile to compare and contrast the three crises to see if broad insights regarding Presidential crisis communication emerge. The following question is thus posed : w hat insights about Presidential crisis communication will comparative analyses of the use of image restoration strategies by the Reagan, Carter, and Nixon Administrations yield? Conclusion e Iran arms crisis. The initial priority was the continued viability of the Iran initiative, the root of the crisis. Once threats the restoration of its cred ibility. Instead of restoring its credibility by modifying its actions, attending to the needs of its stakeholders, or honestly explaining its actions, the Administration sought to use multiple image restoration strategies to restore its credibility. Thus, the Administration sought to address threats to its credibility by projecting an image. The current study illustrates that crisis communication theory developed by communication scholars may provide insight into presidential crises. Such insight can augm ent political science theory, providing richer understanding of presidential crisis than would be possible if these cases were analyzed solely from the perspective of political science. Thus, this study illustrates that communication scholarship has releva nce outside the bounds of the field of communications studies. Further testing of image restoration discourse theory is necessary to account for the potential theoretical shortcomings identified during the course of this study. If

PAGE 171

171 image restoration discour se theory is to be applied to presidential crisis, the theory must account for ambiguous discourse and the other unidentified discourse strategies encountered in this case. This study illustrates the role of ambiguous discourse in presidential crisis. In c risis, presidents may be forced to use ambiguous discourse strategies in order to both address national but a highly diverse group of stakeholders with differing interests and values, presidents may also be forced into an ambiguous rhetorical stance as they attempt to navigate the complex environments in which presi dential crises occur. Further complicating the situation is the fact that the global impact of the United States means presidential crises may affect an even larger, more diverse collection of stakeholders worldwide. creases, as the worldwide media environment becomes increasingly connected, and as information more easily crosses international and ideological boundaries, political communicators must understand the factors that affect the success of presidential crisis communication. These communicators must understand the difficulties inherent in attempting to balancing national security considerations with transgressions themselves t hat spawn crises, skilled communicators should be able to prevent crisis communication itself from exacerbating crisis situations.

PAGE 172

172 APPENDIX A TABLES Table A 1. Typology of image restoration strategies Source: Zhang, J. & Benoit, W.L. (2004). Messa campaign after 9/11. Public Relations Review, 30 161 167. Table A 2. Typology of stakeholder theory based rhetorical strategies

PAGE 173

173 Table A 3. urse from November 3 to November 24, 1986

PAGE 174

174 Table A 4. Defensive Discourse Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration

PAGE 175

175 Table A 5 E volution of Stakeholder Theory B ased Rhetorical Strategies from November 3 to November 24, 1986

PAGE 176

176 Table A 6 Stakeholder Theory B ased Rhetorical Strategies Offered by Individual Members of the Reagan Administration Table A 7 Evolution of Statements Made by the Reagan Administration Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns From November 3 to Nove mber 24, 1986

PAGE 177

177 Table A 8 Statements Made by the Individual Members of the Reagan Administration Indicating a Prioritization of Symbolic Concerns

PAGE 178

178 APPENDIX B FIGURES Figure B \

PAGE 179

179 LI ST OF REFERENCES ABC Poll Says. (1986, November 20). Most think Reagan deceptive on Iran. The Associated Press The New York Times section 4, p. 23. lin, P., Jasperson, A., & Sullivan, J. (1994). The media and the Gulf war: Framing, priming, and the spiral of silence. Polity, 27 (2), 255 284. Arms for Iran. What? For whom? (1986, November 9). The New York Times section 4, p. 22. Atkinson, R. (1984, Dec ember 9). Swiss relay U.S. views to Tehran. The New York Times section A, p.1 Baker, R. (1986, November 15). Observer; not brave like Jimmy. The New York Times section 1, p. 31. Bartels, L.M. (1996). Politicians and the Press: Who Leads, Who Follows? Pre pared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1996, Draft: 22 August 1996, Available electronically from the Political Methodology Archive: http://wizard.ucr.edu/polmeth/working_papers96/barte96.html Belcher, C. (1995). Looking beyond the immediate crisis response: Analyzing the organizational culture to understand the crisis. Journal for the Association of Co mmunication Administration 1, 1 17. Benoit, W.L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations Review 23 (2), 177 187. implant crisis. Com munication Quarterly, 44 (1), 29 41. Business Communication Quarterly, 60 (3), 38 57. discourse on the Iran Contra affair Communication Studies, 42 (3), 272 294. campaign Public Relations Review, 28 (4) 379 392. Boyd, G.M. (1986, November 6). U.S. l ooks at ways to free hostages. The New York Times section A, p. 10.

PAGE 180

180 Image. Management Communications Quarterly, 12 (4), 483 510. Brody, R. & Shapiro, C. (1989). Poli cy failure and public support: The Iran Contra affair and public assessment of President Reagan. Political Behavior, 11 (4), 353 369. Burnett, J.J. (1998). A strategic approach to managing crises. Public Relations Review, 24 (4), 475 488. Busby, R. (1999). Reagan and the Iran Contra Affair: The politics of presidential recovery New nations; unspecified action is threatened. The Washington Post first section, A1. Cailloue t, R.H., & Allen, M.W. (1994). Legitimation endeavors: impression management strategies used by an organization in crisis. Communication Monographs, 61 (1), 44 62. Caillouet, R.H., & Allen, M.W. (1996). Impression management strategies employees use when di Journal of Public Relations Research, 8 (4), 211 227. the Carter presidency. The Journal of Politics, 55 (3), 756 764. C The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Ira n more arms, but order still in effect. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Christen, C.T. (2005). The restructuring and reengineering of AT&T: Analysis of a public relations crisis using organizational theory. Public Relations Review, 31 (2), 239 25 1. Coombs, W.T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for the response strategies. Management Communication Quarterly, 8 (4), 447 476 Coombs, W.T. (1998). An analytic framework for crisis situa tions: Better responses from a better understanding of the situation. Journal of Public Relations Research, 10 (3), 177 191. Coombs, W.T. (1999). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing and responding London: SAGE Publications. Coombs, W.T. (2002) Deep and surface threats: Conceptual and practical implications for Public Relations Review, 28 (4), 339 345.

PAGE 181

181 Coombs, W.T. & Holladay, S.J. (1996). Communication and attribution in a crisis: An experimental study in crisis communic ation. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8 (4), 279 295. Coombs, W.T. & Holladay, S.J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis situation: A fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. Journal of Public Relations Research, 13 (4), 321 340. crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12 (2), 163 178. Novembe Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Monday, November 10, Volume 22, Number 45, 1545. Dealing with Iran: How experts see it. The New York Times 16 November 1986, section 1, p. 14. DeVries, D.S. & Fitzpatrick, K.R. (2006). Defi ning the characteristics of a lingering crisis: Lessons from the National Zoo. Public Relations Review, 32 (2) 160 167. Dickinson, G. (1994). Creating his own constraint: Ronald Reagan and the Iran Contra crisis. In A. Kiewe (Ed.), The modern presidency an d crisis rhetoric (pp. 155 177). Westport: Praeger Publishers. Dobbs, M. (1986, November 6). Tehran visit may hurt U.S. Iraqi ties; Reported effort to help The Washington Post first section, p. A38. Draper, T. (1991 ). A very thin line: The Iran Contra affairs New York: Hill and Wang. Drozdiak, W. (1986, November 9). Secret contacts with iran seen hurting U.S. credibility; Arms for hostages deal has wide impact. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Egelhoff, W. G. & Sen, F. (1992). An information processing model of crisis management. Management Communication Quarterly, 5 (4), 443 484. Eisenberg, E.M. & Witten, M.G. (1987). Reconsidering openness in organizational communication. The Academy of Management Review, 1 2 (3), 418 426. Engelberg, S. (1986, November 15). White House says C.I.A. had a role in Iran operation. The New York Times section 1, p. 1. Engleberg, S. (1986, November 16). Lawmakers to press Reagan aides to explain the Iran arms The New York Times section 1, p. 14. Engleberg, S. (1986, November 17). Uproar over Iran: What is known and what remains to te seen. The New York Times section A, p. 10.

PAGE 182

182 The New York Time s section 1, p. 5. The New York Times 9 July 1985, section A, p. 1. Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: planning for the inevitable. New York: American Management Association. Fis hman, D. (1999). ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended. Communication Quarterly, 47(4), 345 375. Fuerbringer, J. (1986, November 20). Lawmakers find Reagan misleading. The New York Times section A, p. 13. Gallup poll data. R etrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html Gonzalez Herrero, A. & P ratt, C.B. (1996). An integrated symmetrical model for crisis communication management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8 (2), 79 105. Gorski, T.A. (1998). A blueprint for crisis management. Association Management, 50 (1), 78 79. Grunig, L., Grunig, J ., & Dozier, D. (2002a). Activisim. In J.E.Grunig (Ed.), Excellent public relations and effective organizations (pp. 442 479). Mahwah: Erlbaum. Grunig, L., Grunig, J., & Dozier, D. (2002b). Excellence in public relations and communication management: A rev iew of the theory and results; methodology of the Excellence study, Isolating the Excellence factor. In J.E.Grunig (Ed.), Excellent public relations and effective organizations (pp. 1 89). Mahwah: Erlbaum. Hale, J.E., Dulek, R.E. & Hale, D.P. (2005). Crisi s response and communication challenges. Journal of Business Communication, 42 (2), 112 134. Haney, P.J. (2004). The Nixon administration and Middle East crises: Theory and evidence of presidential management of foreign policy decision making. Political Re search Quarterly, 47 (4), 939 959. Hearit, K.M. (1994). Apologies and public relations crises at Chrysler, Toshiba, and Volvo. Public Relations Review, 20 (2), 113 125. Heith, D.J. (1998). Staffing the White House public opinion apparatus 1969 1988. The Publ ic Opinion Quarterly, 62 (2), 165 189. Hearit, K.M. & Courtright, J.I. (2003). A social constructionist approach to crisis management: Allegations of sudden acceleration in the Audi 5000. Communication Studies 54(1), 79 95.

PAGE 183

183 Hijazi, I.A. (1986, November 4). The New York Times section A, p. 1. hostages. The New York Times section 1, p. 14. Hoffman, D. (1986, No vember 14). Congress aims bipartisan criticism at Reagan for dealing with Iran. The Washington Post first section, p. A23. Hoffman & Pincus (1986, November 13). Meant to aid Iran factions, Reagan says. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Hoffman, D. & Pincus, W. (1986, November 20). President's statements raise new contradictions; Questions remain for Hill hearings Friday. The Washington Post first section, p. A22. Holtzhausen, D.R. (2000). Postmodern values in public relations. Journal of Publ ic Relations Research 12 (1), 93 114. Homan, H. (1986, November 17). Shultz sees no benefit for U.S. in further Iran arms shipments; The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Horsley, J.S. & Barker, R.T. (2002). Towa rd a synthesis model for crisis communication in the public sector. Journal of Business and Technical Communication, 16 (4), 406 440. Hua Hsin, W. & Pfau, M. (2004). The relative effectiveness of inoculation, bolstering, and combined approaches in crisis c ommunication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 16 (3), 301 328. The Washington Post p. K1. (1986, November 15). The New York Times section 1, p. 5. (1986). Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Monday, November 17, 1986, Volume 22, Number 46, 1559 Jenkins, L. (19 86, November 15). Rome opponents accuse Craxi of arms dealings with Iran; No proof found; Government denies Talamone port shipments. The Washington Post first section, p. A2. Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Tra nsactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100 2, Robert McFarlane. 100 th Cong., 1 st Session, 1 (1987).

PAGE 184

184 Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100 7, Part I. Oliver L. North, Part II. Oliver L. North and Robert McFarlane, Part III. Appendixes to Parts I and II. 100 th Cong., 1 st Session, 1 (1987). Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100 8, John M. Poindexter. 100 th Cong., 1 st Session, 1 (1987). Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 100 9, George P. Shultz, Edwin Mee se III 100 th Cong., 1 st Session, 1 (1987). Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions With Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 100 10, Donald T. Regan, Caspar W. Weinberger 100 th Cong., 1 st Session, 1 (1987). disaster. Public Relations Review, 31 (2), 263 275. Kifner, J. (1986, November 23). Arabs bi tter over shipment to Iran. The New York Times section 1, p. 18. Getler, M. (1986, November 16). Beirut captors urge expanded U.S. efforts. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. The New York Times section A, p. 11. Gwertzman, B. (1986, November 8). Shultz reaffirms his opposition to negotiations with terrorists. The New York Times, section 1, p. 1. Gwertzman, B. (1986, November 20). Confusion over Iran. The Washington Post sect ion A, p. 13. Kornbluh, P. & Byrne, M. (Eds.). (1993). The Iran contra scandal: The declassified history New York: The New Press. Krauthammer, C. (1986, November 7). Government as rescue squad. The Washington Post editorial, p. A27. Krosnick, J.A. & Kind er, D.R. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president through priming. American Political Science Review, 84 (2), 497 512.

PAGE 185

185 Lauzen, M.M. & Dozier, D.M. (1994). Issues management mediation of linkages between environmental complexity and mana gement of the public relations function. Journal of Public Relations Research, 6 (3), 163 184. Ledingham, J.A. (2001). Government community relationships: Extending the relational theory of public relations. Public Relations Review 71, 285 295. Ledingham, J.A. (2003). Explicating relationship management as a general theory of public relations. Journal of Public Relations Research 181 198. Lewis, A. (1986, November 20). Abroad at home; Illusion and reality. The New York Times 20 November 1986, section A, p 31. The New York Times section A, p. 25. Lyon, L. & Cameron, G. (2004). A relational approach examining the interplay of prior reputation and immediate response to a crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 16 (3), 213 241. Vernacular Voices public relations and the Public Relations Review, 31 (2), 219 227. Major news in summary; fight ing words on terrorism. (1985, July 14). The New York Times section 4, p. 1. Making it worse. (1986, November 16). The Washington Post p. K6. Marcus, A.A. & Goodman, R.S. (1991). Victims and shareholders: The dilemmas of presenting corporate policy duri ng a crisis. Academy of Management Journal, 34 (2), 281 305. Marra, F.J. (1998). Crisis communication plans: poor predictors of excellent crisis public relations. Public Relations Review, 24 (4), 461 473. Marshall, C. & Rossman, G.B. (2006). Designing quali tative research Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. and resulting media coverage following the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. Public Relations Review, 31 (2), 253 261. McCartney, R. (1986, November, 4). Iran says McFarlane, others came on secret mission to The Washington Post first section, p. A1. McCartney, R.J. (1986, November 6). Waite postpones return to Be irut; Envoy suggests reports of U.S. Iran talks complicate his mission. The Washington Post first section, p. A36.

PAGE 186

186 McCombs, M. (1994). In Bryant, J. and Zillman, D. (eds). Media effects: advances in theory and research Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associ ates. McCombs, M. (2002). In Bryant, J. and Zillman, D. (eds). Media effects: advances in theory and research 2 nd Edition. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates. McFarlane, R. (1986, November 13). McFarlane on why. The Washington Post editorial, p. A2 1. McGrory, M. (1986, November 11). Shaking hands with the devil. The Washington Post first section, p. A2. K1. McQuail, D. (2005). eory 5 th edition. London: Sage Publications. Messner, M. & DiStaso, M.W. (2006). The Source Cycle: Intermedia Agenda Setting Between the Traditional Media and Weblogs. Research paper presented at the 89th Annual Convention of the Association for Educatio n in Journalism and Mass Communication in San Francisco, CA, August 2 5, 2006. Miller, J. (1986, November 16). NATO legislators assail Iran deals. The New York Times section 1, p. 14. Miller, N. (1992). Stealing from America: A history of corruption fr om Jamestown to Reagan New York: Paragon House. Mitroff, I.I. (1988). Crisis management: cutting through the confusion. Sloan Management Review 29 (2), 15 21. Molotsky, I. & Weaver, W. (1986, November 13). Washington talk: Briefing; Reagan discusses Iran, The New York Times first section, p. A1. Molotsky, I. & Weaver, W. (1986, November 17). Washington talk: Briefing; The White House The New York Times section A, p. 18. Morris, E. (1999). Dutch: A memoir of Ronald Reagan New York: Random House Murphy, P. (1996). Chaos theory as a model for managing issues and crises. Public Relations Review, 22 (2), 95 104. Norrander, B. & Wilcox, C. (1993). Rallying around the flag and partisan change: The case of the Persian Gulf war. Political Research Quart erly, 46 (4), 759 770. Ottaway, D.B. (1986, November 17). Iran sought U.S. contact; Overture not from moderates, The Washington Post first section, p. A1.

PAGE 187

187 Ottaway, D.B. & Hoffman, D. (1986, November 8). Shultz signals discord; Disagreement hi nted over reported deals with Iran on hostages. The Washington Post, first section, p. A1. Pearson, C.M. & Clair, J.A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of Management Review, 23 (1), 59 76. Penrose, J.M. (2000). The role of perception in crisis planning. Public Relations Review, 26 (2), 155 171. Phillips, R.A. (1997). Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness. Business Ethics Quarterly 7(1), 51 66. Pincus, W. (1986, November 6). Secret talks with Iran described; 3 hostages freed over 14 mo nths of negotiations. The Washington Post, first section, p. A1. Pincus, W. (1986, November 7). Shultz protested Iran deal; U.S. reassured Iraq of neutrality in Persian Gulf War. The Washington Post, first section, p. A1. Pincus, W. (1986, November 8). CI A bypassed in Iran arms supply; White House sought to avoid disclosure to Congress The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Pincus, W. (1986, November 10). Hill probes of NSC planned; Arms deal with Iran seen as attempt to Circumvent Congress. The Wash ington Post, first section, p. A34. Pincus, W. (1986, November 15). Reagan ordered Casey to keep Iran mission from Congress; White House fails to calm concerns on secret deals. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Pincus, W. & Hoffman, D. (1986, Nove mber 11). White House briefs Hill on Iran contacts; The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Regan, D. (1988). For the record: From Wall Street to Washington. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers. Resto The New York Times section 4, p. 23. Rosenthal, U., & Kouzmin, A. (1997). Crises and crisis management: Toward comprehensive government decision making. Journal of Public Administration Research a nd Theory: J PART, 7 (2), 277 304. Safire, W. (1986, November 13). Tar baby strikes again. The New York Times section A, p. 31. Safire, W. (1986, November 17). The secret agent. The New York Times section A, p. 21. Sciolino, E. (1986, November 6). Interna l strife stirs Iran to rethink foreign policy. The New York Times, section A, p. 1.

PAGE 188

188 Sciolino, E. (1986, November 15). Speech called political ploy. The New York Times section 1, p. 5. Sciolino, E. (1986, November 20). Some of the top people in Iran. The N ew York Times section A, p. 14. Schudson, M. (1992). Watergate in American memory: How we remember, forget, and reconstruct the past New York: Basic Books. Schudson, M. (2004). Notes on scandal and the Watergate legacy. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47 (9), 1231 1238. Schraeder, P.J., and Endless, B. (1998). The Media and Africa: The Portrayal of Africa in the "New York Times" (1955 1995). Issue: A Journal of Opinion Vol. 26, No. 2, The Clinton Administration and Africa (1993 1999). (1998), pp. 29 3 5. Seeger, M.W. (2002). Chaos and crisis: propositions for a general theory of crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 28 (4), 329 337. Sellnow, T.L., Ulmer, R.R., & Snider, M. (1998). The compatibility of corrective action in organizational crisis c ommunication. Communication Quarterly, 46 (1), 60 74. Seeger, M.W., Sellnow, T.L., & Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Public relations and crisis communication: Organizing and chaos. In R. Heath (Ed.), Handbook of public relations (pp. 155 165). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publ ications. Shales, T. (1986, November 20). Tough rounds for Reagan; The President holds off the press. The Washington Post 20 November 1986, style, p. C1. The New York Times section A, p. 3. Shove ls in the White House. (1986, November 21). The New York Times section A, p. 34. Smothers, R. (1986, November 8). Reaction in Europe is mixed. The New York Times section 1, p. 4. Some questions for the President. (1986, November 19). The Washington Post first section, p. A17. Sturges, D.L. (1994). Communicating through a crisis: A strategy for organizational survival. Management Communication Quarterly, 7 (3), 297 316 Suchman, M.C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 571 610.

PAGE 189

189 Survey by ABC News. (1986, November 13) Retrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html Survey by ABC News. (1986, November 19). Retrieved September 29, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html Susskind, L. & Field, P. (1996). The mutual gains approach. Dealing with an angry public (pp. 37 59). New York: Free Press. s express skepticism and forgiveness. The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Monday, November 24, 1986, Volume 22, Number 47, 1583. Tumber, H. & Waisbord, S.R. (2004). Introduction: Political scandals and media across democracies, volume I. The American Behavioral Scientist, 47 (8), 1031 1039. Management Communications Quarterly 11(1), 51 73. Tyler, L. (2005). Towards a postmodern understanding of crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 31, 566 571. Tyler, P.E. (1986, November 15). U.S. Arab relations strained by news of arms shipments. The Washin gton Post first section, p. A1. The Iranian Connection. (1986, November 6). The Washington Post editorial, p. A18. The Moderate Fantasy. (1986, November 17). The Washington Post editorial, p. A12. Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Effective crisis management through established stakeholder relationships. Management Communication Quarterly, 14 (4), 590 615. Ulmer, R.R. & Sellnow, T.I. (2000). Consistent questions of ambiguity in organizational crisis communication: Jack in the Box as a case study. Journal of Business E thics, 25 (2), 143 155. Ulmer, R.R. & Sellnow, T.L. (2002). Crisis management and the discourse of renewal: Understanding the potential for positive outcomes of crisis. Public Relations Review 28, 361 365. Venette, S.J., Sellnow, T.L. & Lang, P.A. (2003). Firestone crisis Journal of Business Communication, 40 (3), 219 236.

PAGE 190

190 Wallison, P. (2003). Reagan: The power of conviction and the success of his presidency Boulder: Westview Press. Walsh, E. & Dewar, H. (1986, November 20). Reagan defends Iran arms deal, says mission no The Washington Post first section, p. A1. Ware, B.L. & Linkugel, W.A. (1973). They spoke in defense of themselves: On the general criticism of apologia Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (3), 273 283. The New York Times section A, p. 1. Weinraub, B. (1986, November 11). U.S policy on terror. The New York Times section A, p. 10. Weinraub, B. (1986, November 13). Reagan confirms Iran got arms aid; Calss deals vital; He tells Congress. The New York Times section A, p. 1. Weinraub, B. (1986, November 14). President defends Ir The New York Times section A, p. 1. defensive. The New York Times section 1, p. 16. Weinraub, B. (1986, November 18). Reagan say The New York Times, section A, p. 16. The New York Times section A, p. 10. The New York Times section 4, p. 22. Wicker, T. (1986, November 23). In the nation; The shovel brigade. The New York Times section 4, p. 25. Wilkins, L. (1993). Between facts and values: Print media coverage of the greenhouse effect, 1987 1990 Public Understanding of Sci ence 2(1), 71 84. Public Relations Review, 29, 461 472. Yanovitzky, I. and Bennett, C. (1999). Media attention, institutional response, and health behavior change: T he case of Drunk Driving, 1978 1996. Communication Research, 26(4), 429 453. campaign after 9/11. Public Relations Review, 30 161 167.

PAGE 191

191 Ziaukas, T. (2001). Environmenta l public relations: Two paradigmatic cases Bhopal and Exxon. In A. Farazmond (Ed.), Handbook of crisis and emergency management (pp. 245 257). New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

PAGE 192

192 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Jesse Daniel Rigby earned a Bachelor of Arts in Public Rel ations from the University of Florida College of Journalism and Communications in 1994. In 2001 he was awarded a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Sciences from the University of Florida College of Natural Resources and Environment in 2001. This thesis graduate studies in mass communications. He was awarded a Master of Arts in Mass Communication from the University of Florida College of Journalism and Communications in August 2007. this case originated shortly after Iran Contra erupted. One evening training with Oliver North in 1968. The two Marines were awarded with leadership roles while in training, and left for Viet Nam a month apart. They remained acquaintances and colleagues throughout the following decade.