<%BANNER%>

A Moderate calm? Florida's struggle over school desegregation after Brown, 1955-1961

University of Florida Institutional Repository
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101112_AAAAEY INGEST_TIME 2010-11-12T23:12:59Z PACKAGE UFE0020155_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 33496 DFID F20101112_AACZBP ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH martinelli_a_Page_53.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
67949b74f639f7972690c58bb5c039f7
SHA-1
160c71d64742d7a6bc1dadbee9ebc30f4125ec58
7724 F20101112_AACYZP martinelli_a_Page_05thm.jpg
c983143a4b5400589caab28ea45a52f2
9577cf0758a542ff2434af36901ac03c73b4c8b7
2276 F20101112_AACYKY martinelli_a_Page_63.txt
0fcf40ffcd0fa816dac68b734174d581
deacca2662d562a4d503b405e4f55373dc002087
59070 F20101112_AACYUS martinelli_a_Page_15.pro
17a635d1755cadd4906cdc4ecfa2c671
2efaa9867a2db55867a8527149b71e0db81ecf05
22740 F20101112_AACYPV martinelli_a_Page_56.jpg
25699a0b69cf6f2e95d77f9181dec7f8
3102750252355b5449869b1a0a439f7e8b1be9ee
35964 F20101112_AACZBQ martinelli_a_Page_55.QC.jpg
52d5f14da97fcfefa23d16f188d1390b
20435620b066de88f1d847971f3a69f83dbf3728
105705 F20101112_AACYZQ UFE0020155_00001.xml FULL
195d5e35eed4c6513fb0c2d5aa10b7e4
fc407daca6e39e8c119b7c7568a87787951e123f
56875 F20101112_AACYUT martinelli_a_Page_16.pro
6cdff6004c2ff1c32fb8b19723f6797f
60638c10333997c4a8d880769bb91b16dc822b7f
98222 F20101112_AACYPW martinelli_a_Page_57.jpg
ea7eb165a4770b3b35bcae7454375af4
cca9c1817a4882699c088c915067c6c9fb889156
7453 F20101112_AACZBR martinelli_a_Page_56.QC.jpg
59639ca4a87244423e54755a09611b8c
e69d706d0b097c48f7b9f2fb6cdb28afbbe979a9
8306 F20101112_AACYZR martinelli_a_Page_01.QC.jpg
5057ce0907c7c123a585e14de8c9e3ee
e5f27a77ab2f2260f42e5e9c115e9dbc499eace3
51429 F20101112_AACYKZ martinelli_a_Page_44.pro
8870422d305ef5675f9dcde49c86e07b
c25b1c3b2cb215a90f1d1c973e934b83f58fbb9a
46321 F20101112_AACYUU martinelli_a_Page_17.pro
3fd60bf56dfdb830e164b982e08126b9
324767a787efa119d567751c39ce323933922ece
110927 F20101112_AACYPX martinelli_a_Page_58.jpg
bf272308f1cc21caa74f10482fb60127
d8f36b6c988869d49b7c063a22b5c9e70c2f07c3
30991 F20101112_AACZBS martinelli_a_Page_57.QC.jpg
fa6d973401f8a18e3c14eeb03a3c0f86
c7567e3bbb6e0993f60d7fb76d18ca419f52864a
1567 F20101112_AACYZS martinelli_a_Page_02.QC.jpg
6a96ab7bc3fcde7421cd1027d1f471e8
cb81514e56554cac3d7ebf260071480dc676ea33
57427 F20101112_AACYUV martinelli_a_Page_18.pro
ed2285c62f557ef84b7395a8e5a21a4b
e810835753027a45995ed5fbc3d3a0f11bac93f9
111029 F20101112_AACYPY martinelli_a_Page_59.jpg
b55e4743d92e0ef4bba06bf4c5e1c0fa
511447f75d1e67733a585f1b17cef4b4d1fe60ee
7774 F20101112_AACZBT martinelli_a_Page_57thm.jpg
0a0133d8d93a43523fde2524c83fe86f
6473314ae445b93cb06eba260bea5e4d64e290f3
625 F20101112_AACYZT martinelli_a_Page_02thm.jpg
c9afdfe243c8237038edff614a512751
94c01c663184cc97289b3853f04424bb303eae8c
62238 F20101112_AACYUW martinelli_a_Page_20.pro
b7295d40aec2e253a56379867592e244
613126061cf398a64393a75e7a10bc569abb11fe
2450 F20101112_AACYNA martinelli_a_Page_40.txt
ae4650a66fc7bd8b8cacc42e60f97127
1d972d808868567b835c7b9a01e0c3e3289df372
114390 F20101112_AACYPZ martinelli_a_Page_60.jpg
8b794b25ce68581786cbe6a8c93143af
1ddeccd3087925a7b0165b69dc36149b475dcf99
8792 F20101112_AACZBU martinelli_a_Page_59thm.jpg
c5d74f23922125bdf9e64b200f97e75e
9d760e4805e979787b33152218d6bcc31f5596ee
13240 F20101112_AACYZU martinelli_a_Page_04.QC.jpg
597852094d50fd940ca484b155aea4be
48d3bc9c5e7533d8449a07cd0ee18583083d22cb
57118 F20101112_AACYUX martinelli_a_Page_21.pro
a2caf394febf155d16a942b22ba6e868
d82be6839237ecd98a90b5dd1bb497f36dd54daf
1766 F20101112_AACYNB martinelli_a_Page_65.txt
e098ff3cab0437cd9608c70e7b978c89
5d9dad2e3a0685ac6d979af39274b16344ec176e
37139 F20101112_AACZBV martinelli_a_Page_60.QC.jpg
f04ea3ea233a5a2dd822f49f01dfa1d9
38fdc6746b05cd2ae1cf9624fbc367f3935b5d09
3587 F20101112_AACYZV martinelli_a_Page_04thm.jpg
d0556dc920b84b3edf39878e9ba37648
beb17bfe954f595a0e2cf06c13c3e26eebcd06dd
120836 F20101112_AACYSA martinelli_a_Page_58.jp2
066f89237812b8ab56df3e02992a9076
6da65730b8ec13626cb7ed2bde740df1017738dc
81983 F20101112_AACYUY martinelli_a_Page_22.pro
27cbea7999ddb083bab18494c392687a
5d304bd976bacb2fd0ae5c163a33e91e4b5191a7
36721 F20101112_AACYNC martinelli_a_Page_32.QC.jpg
a1c95e696c6e1849ede6bc7f9b8a859b
c3e0a5708c891101204868551774bb3ca36c78ec
8928 F20101112_AACZBW martinelli_a_Page_60thm.jpg
a935564d7ddc82de54104246f692daf0
e617e149e36725d177747bbb7fff130cb8703a4f
30088 F20101112_AACYZW martinelli_a_Page_05.QC.jpg
15568402de5cd8a2cb97ed24705a2b82
cbe77f5eb4fdf770a0ce0973b5bd0ff550d1fec1
59989 F20101112_AACYUZ martinelli_a_Page_24.pro
18ff2ca81b6c912d8767c61f353dd3f9
5c45d9edfae11bf9656e3888f9d0d335059f5f1b
1972 F20101112_AACYND martinelli_a_Page_57.txt
c375f7743b78fd9bb381b5e88dba9d48
5bf14b45bbf5c068907dd269bb1a6f25949c2e06
8920 F20101112_AACZBX martinelli_a_Page_62thm.jpg
7e31d3cd86725159ebd01653abc6790b
a33bf3269b950bde7d6a34b83640dd75fc2b21d0
21397 F20101112_AACYZX martinelli_a_Page_06.QC.jpg
7abc7288de5ec05a1a0019a520f4c421
30f7d4e3de46e6b5702ed445486d42e5ebae6dc8
36767 F20101112_AACYNE martinelli_a_Page_11.QC.jpg
043599ac7c1cbf42f2dbcaf2de210c61
e62a1a17a99e4ef4f06c6f8d604e04b022774d6a
118183 F20101112_AACYSB martinelli_a_Page_59.jp2
03b84e5af926c7870ae584cc2785e503
1e3f5794853d5363604df3cc25c96ed10339952b
9029 F20101112_AACZBY martinelli_a_Page_63thm.jpg
50d8b20d9019fb0f6b163d14b65c7174
a966d8f468d6fd890cd107f39ec614104f7f1810
33745 F20101112_AACYZY martinelli_a_Page_07.QC.jpg
35496f4179a4fa9c4cd7d3bf302017ee
2bbc93c703b678a27812ed83935820776d234515
2278 F20101112_AACYNF martinelli_a_Page_32.txt
a6dbd1b84a22b2243f655dc0d815982d
7ea92fde776c6ef62020921497a6c4cdf2ebe21a
3070 F20101112_AACYXA martinelli_a_Page_27.txt
af5feb1dccd9331baf116480e9110605
bd1bbe3d6be8f2422af67a9cc270c51d39dfb64e
122764 F20101112_AACYSC martinelli_a_Page_60.jp2
30a18ee10b00e337544bfcbf538db124
1f3eedc4527dfa5dda4813ef4dabf407f3d1c5e5
35301 F20101112_AACZBZ martinelli_a_Page_64.QC.jpg
b6ddf03baa8af198d0eb02b8756936cd
205956d08e517162accc0e982da3d3a69c44c8c2
8518 F20101112_AACYZZ martinelli_a_Page_07thm.jpg
bf8aad2f1f45c1d4bb4b34406dac1961
20c35a33129a52d9ac5cc18b01a00b3acfbf8a13
34449 F20101112_AACYNG martinelli_a_Page_47.QC.jpg
ad811d88e86747c34c5015010e7d91df
a576a22aa57e0a2b9018c231dbfd06b03ed0c0fa
2279 F20101112_AACYXB martinelli_a_Page_29.txt
9d6de64671ce9504e2225003745cce4c
3b5d343dfd784045f3341d2b9adb777431a55641
125243 F20101112_AACYSD martinelli_a_Page_61.jp2
073c3ed09bba79035d7fb702c20068f8
8ae56bb0009b3a17ee82f02a1129ae37702b70ed
59655 F20101112_AACYNH martinelli_a_Page_19.pro
3e92bc95ec266905b2c9fd71ec2a9b8a
129ccb57a382b43ed78a9890ecd08165bf1a6d3f
2280 F20101112_AACYXC martinelli_a_Page_31.txt
dea7977587afd0715351d1fddf7ed553
b0781c33affbdb7ee61769555a4558a491b81e55
117435 F20101112_AACYSE martinelli_a_Page_62.jp2
10724396a2171006063d7faa6d275d93
a50bb6aa3f88960155cd580d4583c1095fed6eb0
2471 F20101112_AACYNI martinelli_a_Page_45.txt
9d06c00922c2325e9258eb0ddea469f1
c2ad5504e8d951cb5cbca1dca71749754ab5233d
2366 F20101112_AACYXD martinelli_a_Page_34.txt
4ba05f3132878039df1c249210590714
a88c964f159282971c87ea51a0f9c91bbc5b6ab8
121034 F20101112_AACYSF martinelli_a_Page_63.jp2
9341a8afd9e41b6e419b04821f66906a
454059f8c976e40b6b761cff5bd7675c109a578a
2120 F20101112_AACYNJ martinelli_a_Page_23.txt
6299f1eb8ac7a268873fcf57e49dc5c6
0f22057f3ec7e4bc5ee96de86bb1d52cbb25bd3b
2391 F20101112_AACYXE martinelli_a_Page_35.txt
42f878dac684448f06f573e354b7bd31
f02790812dfd90f3622196ca3171946aefb47300
114428 F20101112_AACYSG martinelli_a_Page_64.jp2
a2e922d872a5587140453a273e4f5e87
d04c10fea330eaab49028d5d65343ba4e5e296e2
122670 F20101112_AACYNK martinelli_a_Page_19.jp2
5744dd4e0d78715fce6440e8ea0d053b
e641f1dfd276ffebe342cb300a9794736729a011
2445 F20101112_AACYXF martinelli_a_Page_36.txt
97c01ff98db9e596962b7e5302ae8c5d
8f11b89c2bd6bf3941d20d703fc975262ea706f0
92971 F20101112_AACYSH martinelli_a_Page_65.jp2
44775d3c9c893f5a41c5ea877630754d
74c3844e61e361dc98670a65c12db757f72cb7ef
124596 F20101112_AACYNL martinelli_a_Page_45.jp2
775ef2f451ec19f69c664daa2d4a79e0
4d9d0879c725d71419da5229b302bf85b7c10a61
1051963 F20101112_AACYSI martinelli_a_Page_66.jp2
b5247024e997921678181d40eb794240
983b754ff8156b4673094763c15b2fb696ec5cd8
8588 F20101112_AACYNM martinelli_a_Page_61thm.jpg
ec91fca30168fd171a28ff538266f14d
dddf0c14dc5e6e71a2d9c49189b34fbe862bac97
2090 F20101112_AACYXG martinelli_a_Page_37.txt
a566e855aef23146187852d7aa5ddecf
b895a7e78e9808a1edd8e52f1d1c9f68400847dd
88450 F20101112_AACYSJ martinelli_a_Page_67.jp2
623782e853ce4887f63b247d24c0bbc0
af6eba11af6510bbc389e08a881a09d5b16ba125
101530 F20101112_AACYNN martinelli_a_Page_49.jpg
e485f0452ac376252a4a8759d984313c
fc8eed7692ab3a7abae35e041ec7b22a1d72c17a
2208 F20101112_AACYXH martinelli_a_Page_38.txt
d4e631cb4c0777ce4c30599863361808
543029669bb4d3d003130e134de96086094d41ce
30805 F20101112_AACYSK martinelli_a_Page_68.jp2
6c0148aaa42fd1c95a9e7bcf6d28568d
347d661c6446f27c1d11fe0d5e25576859926705
108807 F20101112_AACYNO martinelli_a_Page_38.jpg
1e2c168c01e9e020c2a0828d93c90e03
8f4bef00c68a304a388ba1194994819464e9bead
2115 F20101112_AACYXI martinelli_a_Page_41.txt
4358cbb7ad6ffbb9f98b83913c1828f9
074ff349315595cf7aaf0e3053d4eea3d5680fc8
1053954 F20101112_AACYSL martinelli_a_Page_01.tif
c55881bbdae172bf1e4ac6b926ebdb18
e7ceb8a3050aee594f208dcd9d2ab0f4f5c46cff
61574 F20101112_AACYNP martinelli_a_Page_14.pro
6390918099574b1da05a93c7a02b606f
172e2f068dc9979eaa2a1c034587589a60785048
2612 F20101112_AACYXJ martinelli_a_Page_42.txt
f0c628d11de5766c32d4f5f3c79999c9
0448c64a4d181f00b484e72ad63da03018916717
F20101112_AACYSM martinelli_a_Page_02.tif
1c7a2bef42faeaf835dce77e13996275
02244c262b39a369660e7271f24948f470e2ebcc
113339 F20101112_AACYNQ martinelli_a_Page_61.jpg
3fc2bd8a85f45397f70e1381fe0e5589
ee43a47a48c6b6f14913b839c6c096ca4a412676
2639 F20101112_AACYXK martinelli_a_Page_43.txt
d7fb91f59b0fed825724b699bfaaaa07
1d310ccda42ada2f123d3b29644dfded108a7034
F20101112_AACYSN martinelli_a_Page_03.tif
d43b29321014e46ef9fed8dd841814ed
97c583b55641d754a7aad5e96a52a64515272202
33837 F20101112_AACYNR martinelli_a_Page_54.QC.jpg
77ec08b550699e52a995013048ccdbfb
6d3e4025fffc913debc5d9ec4316fa95d58768b5
2043 F20101112_AACYXL martinelli_a_Page_44.txt
7ed7455ba51ad6057c7456d497dc5832
4424d25b281ba2ffea22b06db3cbc4922e1dedd6
25271604 F20101112_AACYSO martinelli_a_Page_04.tif
93da2bc6332ffddec45f75727a10bd8b
35a9925eb426fe0b57649d78dc906f8346f71639
F20101112_AACYNS martinelli_a_Page_26.tif
30b25edfbcaac555eb9c3da39080a5b7
8df4f2aeaa11f95327e097374396fa11a308ddf7
2052 F20101112_AACYXM martinelli_a_Page_46.txt
54720b550ca3ae20fd3b766add60ea5b
88ff91f2bb54c0714e6da586a818ab279eb291d7
F20101112_AACYSP martinelli_a_Page_05.tif
20b0173a45a028a844d94e445c848208
0e9f7eeb874e45dc616a1b0c5de1578f2d94bdc5
F20101112_AACYNT martinelli_a_Page_42.tif
477b3ad1cb1e7eb0bca8cc2b899b6a62
c448ae266e2dba041f9b76dda839f0a30c4dca7c
2589 F20101112_AACYXN martinelli_a_Page_48.txt
84b5f298e03ffd75eeb565c78bef9d0b
1912d87ab91922cd325f64837675c4e7e30736a5
F20101112_AACYSQ martinelli_a_Page_06.tif
94b3e4abebc8dcbb2b6439fed3827d4b
b3277f0366d7e05d0444dc61314e50906eca01ed
118706 F20101112_AACYNU martinelli_a_Page_11.jpg
6981d812debb799f66b855236bee50a8
06046a274b57e7ec520acd4efdc27210f4b912b8
2030 F20101112_AACYXO martinelli_a_Page_49.txt
af37fcba1bdabde2718c1e40d2aa51cd
8fdbef1727dc3d921a651ad2fb1aeb74cf26ebc6
F20101112_AACYSR martinelli_a_Page_07.tif
aaed58e43fe5e861b984b16f1b9c50ea
8f0695878b2ce2520d2ee99fc70ded336c07ad6f
F20101112_AACYNV martinelli_a_Page_67.tif
23f2b9c4cdd73e12d30fcf53f96d98aa
2ac5ef747b809a265c4091fad0d07669675ca170
1966 F20101112_AACYXP martinelli_a_Page_51.txt
893b3661d8529062d8bc9bae925caacc
6290442a407080681965afc2b6c782840adc25d2
F20101112_AACYSS martinelli_a_Page_08.tif
f8bf1536c3828746577a36fc7ee1ce50
fdaf4762c535e6a09d7e2d1ea5eeb4063996c434
F20101112_AACYNW martinelli_a_Page_10.tif
b557ccbb0a1cf510cc20a7abe039e49e
4ab3e140f68fa90645b76f2945b2b1d7f613665d
2266 F20101112_AACYXQ martinelli_a_Page_52.txt
8f134c27422be16714d268665d3a0d5e
b9ea2fd37e64d74b44cbb55ae58de534ace5d4f1
F20101112_AACYST martinelli_a_Page_11.tif
ab2b29c8f6f9e18ee90d9f5352e3c141
b47f3c7d6084711cad9ac96e70217afb57e47acf
3165 F20101112_AACYNX martinelli_a_Page_22.txt
c879e43353cab8223ef6d050aedac3d5
c266a12485532f2b4915c9721549fe002b7e9537
2164 F20101112_AACYXR martinelli_a_Page_53.txt
02082d6abe1bc424159e06d91250c9c8
69b5e4285089b4e4beb8657b4a07a7aa2d5f93b8
F20101112_AACYSU martinelli_a_Page_12.tif
515a8b098c521b777f250be60480edad
2590557e9b0d36a2941c24d758cadecfbbe4b183
52858 F20101112_AACYNY martinelli_a_Page_37.pro
e7c4b4a08281c2dd434e43b679812b1f
73364b041b18d17549fe59fc7495eae7ac671b38
2143 F20101112_AACYXS martinelli_a_Page_54.txt
0397c2a30c9bcfc6ab1c3afadb1ae328
fbe3b16490f7d9a3009eba804c038c64ebd7e18e
F20101112_AACYSV martinelli_a_Page_13.tif
7eb7a184fa5c65697e865ec6165e87de
f022b7208ba10ac30592772dba4fe1f133084d10
8861 F20101112_AACYNZ martinelli_a_Page_55thm.jpg
ee19d72a0dc199bf37b5802b13159f11
a0fd65c1d1717d38457c7441f56db8f3b94a3adc
2151 F20101112_AACYXT martinelli_a_Page_55.txt
887187342cf55e73513eabe981d4ead5
1cec04fe296a702bfd00c83d10b989e30507eba0
F20101112_AACYSW martinelli_a_Page_14.tif
a538ba1642489d98c23d05fce969b61d
174a67cb7dff8e26530c58f039f4a59a69c2fae2
2665 F20101112_AACYLA martinelli_a_Page_66.txt
c1497f89ae31d083f34161e64fe65e94
c5fa4b90e1c42947491ee057c86109d6307f74be
374 F20101112_AACYXU martinelli_a_Page_56.txt
2ce833a0543a8feb561d5e312bfd811d
e65d7e4a8351cf89f32b9c20303f05b38a7840d8
F20101112_AACYSX martinelli_a_Page_17.tif
34f3a64f827c2e0b98233b83b95f4c5e
517128524594a9628eef2645f239d30b4ada3b5b
F20101112_AACYLB martinelli_a_Page_25.tif
9043817c88cbf51149811cd53b8dd6d2
a47e41bfc029c10f5051fe6b6b66170cd1a87277
F20101112_AACYXV martinelli_a_Page_58.txt
6d8b9e0bc47493415a07e832e5ab1ffe
9594f37f519fe72513657237469c5f7bb86ca9a3
F20101112_AACYSY martinelli_a_Page_18.tif
57aa26b30873676a3cf7ad5c7e02e781
e423863ebcfb43c8a6a79cb39cbad7385296c59d
35401 F20101112_AACYLC martinelli_a_Page_52.QC.jpg
8e0cc66839e44e676c6ae6af81c99b47
0961ce13d3cf030852b7f309c07a90b4d847304b
2201 F20101112_AACYXW martinelli_a_Page_59.txt
5d5867927ffc71c709af25609e86f22f
9e982601b3f361d2cbcb71782942b398e5a775ed
109988 F20101112_AACYQA martinelli_a_Page_62.jpg
1ea8ce944c42e3f93c1be7d341e130b0
c1c7a18f3cfb208da2395ba413224b34605ad4ec
F20101112_AACYSZ martinelli_a_Page_19.tif
4cd4a35788abed1c1d8e26e5ebd8e681
f4a59d0a34f494748edb73ffc62e6a4eb7423053
35390 F20101112_AACYLD martinelli_a_Page_59.QC.jpg
fca48103c04b9ead39482c96a8549515
8f5d1020fe3cba44ea2c75ca2b2a2f93e478e8b2
2371 F20101112_AACYXX martinelli_a_Page_61.txt
527236afb832a8f1631791db4e192b62
5850d691ed6b5397ea8dee7f76f99df55b26c526
111799 F20101112_AACYQB martinelli_a_Page_63.jpg
a467cfd7658d2033dc2fd8c368a5cf16
a3a9790d814b3341c9778cced1868477b051496e
8513 F20101112_AACYLE martinelli_a_Page_54thm.jpg
11412b840bdf2f3d267239786c8a9f8b
0d92f499d579313e349c2388e4a5c1741fefc40c
2130 F20101112_AACYXY martinelli_a_Page_62.txt
bb9696a580220218c63b2afed71b5bff
f95702a51fee49cf3d060368f082187deb71d17b
108408 F20101112_AACYQC martinelli_a_Page_64.jpg
0578942b381148d669927692481b6703
fa90e11c2e7b3c62ed5d65ad3736e3b8bea79dc1
2182 F20101112_AACYLF martinelli_a_Page_07.txt
116ce1ea23dc9b21b1a9d353d97a91af
52ea972361ce3b04e6acfc0e86f625331919e186
55604 F20101112_AACYVA martinelli_a_Page_26.pro
86aa8aad0f5353eab5f672dffff0143d
dd59041f1597b150ea99eaf1eb24f16a308988aa
2125 F20101112_AACYXZ martinelli_a_Page_64.txt
67f2454df5c7184f162de67ac0c77688
db082f932259b4d37973411ef6c202f85e22a3f9
132765 F20101112_AACYQD martinelli_a_Page_66.jpg
8556b95e379d1318488c943323401b8e
179f0b98d9447f307f384c088a0637ee18d41897
3768 F20101112_AACYLG martinelli_a_Page_03.jpg
371d91aa4cc4be135b9e9621b73de48c
bbd73b6d17e6c6e862cdfbf739988e8755dd7850
80026 F20101112_AACYVB martinelli_a_Page_27.pro
3ea6b6f00ffbac69e906aadac86c55ca
8eb63faa3d8506b6a32a0c4f1a8fde27edbd2d8f
79711 F20101112_AACYQE martinelli_a_Page_67.jpg
b9125b9f3726728b477ed8570116cada
7d57fe103c227989480a6aed4957b3dc64dfe6ff
114745 F20101112_AACYLH martinelli_a_Page_10.jpg
398e0dec5e483ff48767f722a1499175
4c6e6f280ced35bb4e72592c2a971945170212b0
62031 F20101112_AACYVC martinelli_a_Page_28.pro
c04aa5ab211f44a613aee30232901cbb
60a23656632b57e16c53e1ed06076ab26300e5cc
7057 F20101112_AACZCA martinelli_a_Page_65thm.jpg
90c1f862972499f3a1ef7c697070eaa0
165ffbcb916d3a4bb629dc676ff84bb9c02fd862
30301 F20101112_AACYQF martinelli_a_Page_68.jpg
05da111dffba1c5833dadc12a27552dc
5cb4707a3882552c8364860b20b071e4b60f07d7
113120 F20101112_AACYLI martinelli_a_Page_19.jpg
2ef714da7f46a1ad7df5ac7016458ba2
74175c3aaaf7760903b4156aaea4c46e36f0a7d0
58262 F20101112_AACYVD martinelli_a_Page_29.pro
454d8f53e9f2d84df86343b9714cf3b8
f3fbbca1fbba1bfc524009041215071db21483d5
2351 F20101112_AACZCB martinelli_a_Page_68thm.jpg
a86d039294356eeecbfb31b6eed38f87
814ed5486a24a8ab24dbb2293aee359b85f492c8
5743 F20101112_AACYQG martinelli_a_Page_02.jp2
8aef0cafed7c9696b3d11b67fcd351ac
de4acac27dc2061a495037ae28d5318ba27c4caf
57995 F20101112_AACYLJ martinelli_a_Page_31.pro
dcc0c3c1f5ca5c43ee08a79d2015f5ff
5a8948387a7d4519d486e9d743bc4c2f8592fca9
942231 F20101112_AACYQH martinelli_a_Page_04.jp2
c51a8f63fa6c29b2b5e9bcf90f10869f
410f013702c47aaa7a0a8fbcb5a393987f9eb383
4744 F20101112_AACYLK martinelli_a_Page_03.jp2
ab5d5fcd7e919f902e8e9916414a3720
ccc088d1c85260c3572067ded5cd73504ccc5315
59566 F20101112_AACYVE martinelli_a_Page_30.pro
4a74fc12e2bbe8d5aadf644f4625bad2
4818977dc585430185990ee1dd48f16638a54185
100318 F20101112_AACYQI martinelli_a_Page_05.jp2
a8d055101815f1ef4de40d737c15ee46
55f7807fc9dbbef47b02f2d9261c4e516f44572f
F20101112_AACYLL martinelli_a_Page_16.tif
59ef4ae677f2f7f51664ea0ed3eb7668
8c8098546656d24eca047908482899e25242d85c
58058 F20101112_AACYVF martinelli_a_Page_32.pro
9329d85ffcbd9ff41457dd5c12c42241
e8a0185e1776cb144f58a68bfa2e3cfc02b360a5
68939 F20101112_AACYQJ martinelli_a_Page_06.jp2
11949f83992c092f8331eac20f81a91e
1afff936afefc3b9f6050a31bbd8831c6d5f04be
28201 F20101112_AACYLM martinelli_a_Page_17.QC.jpg
61a8a788c466d52f8a37fb9a494a61d7
f7214417730feb6c6637730b5c879fb63da204f2
70991 F20101112_AACYVG martinelli_a_Page_33.pro
cb44ea91e4aa2be61b9454096ec69a76
486fffa8d8c463078fad75b5b23e799f97190631
112731 F20101112_AACYQK martinelli_a_Page_07.jp2
1f7204beceab1678c757f4e8cab4f84b
7adc113649dc2b09891e0246f4b3213a7313027b
9262 F20101112_AACYLN martinelli_a_Page_22thm.jpg
6f8624c0d877cecc8a62cc35a0553b08
088c4dbbd55041bba5016379533e27f5e844157d
60814 F20101112_AACYVH martinelli_a_Page_34.pro
eff430a77188e1f7b446d2241f4784a5
6db2232c31b73fa52056be539d31bd812c7ee37d
115767 F20101112_AACYQL martinelli_a_Page_09.jp2
21765b8fb4d2ab4b86e3c8acbbe432ed
a657189d87517dec5460e0138c35bf624da98def
38071 F20101112_AACYLO martinelli_a_Page_66.QC.jpg
0503b4d12175aed77975aa5deb9c9801
db38eef5095672b31e6a7cad66a0b5b5002357a5
60648 F20101112_AACYVI martinelli_a_Page_35.pro
b2e0708a8e65e280ca3c0c008aa7744f
f33d784a4aa33fd0667cb98844ad80b2247ff085
124307 F20101112_AACYQM martinelli_a_Page_10.jp2
586bbd3d9ec026046fcc1d9bcd4d70e0
f834e48d329cf0888003c038198d0d9985b7de70
84708 F20101112_AACYLP martinelli_a_Page_65.jpg
1b96132327836f1aa095aa568c4d085e
3ba6faf9684520e26d92b48cb6020da9dba7daa1
62303 F20101112_AACYVJ martinelli_a_Page_36.pro
e3885d35d7534be04f9600a5a9a85039
08d5d0c19f8159861cb39919b2a1494c14ae562b
129230 F20101112_AACYQN martinelli_a_Page_11.jp2
ad1c11c9144822c1baaa928bcc74303c
da584990c526e174ea72c12208563632b0a3776d
118968 F20101112_AACYLQ martinelli_a_Page_26.jp2
9efd34297e666ef23a10334f67b6772e
d95de9642344ae7f719fbdb61f87dc9ed8f77e76
56503 F20101112_AACYVK martinelli_a_Page_38.pro
b69299b47cbdbfc6072742b185c481ae
5a73fdf87a595614b0e71bf58c71d075af74814b
130677 F20101112_AACYQO martinelli_a_Page_13.jp2
584f83f43f550a5e6ed23860195107b8
db6998cd0437eea1bddb9dd3b2a58a607ac51609
2133 F20101112_AACYLR martinelli_a_Page_09.txt
5599fd7b884ab4700e71bbfa9cea482c
f604f63dd8e6e43cdd538f48d1ad0178301b0eb8
71724 F20101112_AACYVL martinelli_a_Page_39.pro
d909285423a7a8968f04167baed37746
f2c692af7806e98d94d33826baa847918161cf94
1051970 F20101112_AACYQP martinelli_a_Page_14.jp2
0621a4d66fa905f52936b44d12e746a6
7abddf8ea1f0a67ded82a0f41830439c9fc7c542
2178 F20101112_AACYLS martinelli_a_Page_50.txt
685efd7f1374478a97e05c4814f538d5
ac84dd03d7ddfd1d542c0b23628a121704490e0e
63148 F20101112_AACYVM martinelli_a_Page_40.pro
d2731c7b32684ef16e25e3b03de1cb9e
523566206dbdcbfebc77d79522170aaa60d828a2
124571 F20101112_AACYQQ martinelli_a_Page_15.jp2
52430e697715268632231e8b5a67ae8c
832184bc3d2ffe7fe466da0c5f3d1bbbdeef10b4
6972 F20101112_AACYLT martinelli_a_Page_17thm.jpg
05af0907c345e79943c4001cc92f9382
dbdaba573c14508860912b48bf05ebd655f10939
53809 F20101112_AACYVN martinelli_a_Page_41.pro
708b286ed2d261fa127b43ef005baa3c
3c020976da8413af4a30fd3f9ed76ae3dc5b6fbd
121593 F20101112_AACYQR martinelli_a_Page_16.jp2
2ea26c7694ad5b7ded823bf4ee4dbaa0
9af22bbbd95abd688e9e22a0078a03cea2130a72
F20101112_AACYLU martinelli_a_Page_48.tif
ada16f79c9d1c3516f01f8eff4c548fa
eb81122c5d3ffcb84f7d45127f9acddbd846dc76
67463 F20101112_AACYVO martinelli_a_Page_42.pro
12ab5861fb9ffaa8efb9c673903c776f
c178a61663901d76a9acde7b3ae7c4379f1e2a47
115725 F20101112_AACYQS martinelli_a_Page_18.jp2
d4135f3a29e0f8fce8a72ecffc3d902e
144c36a2d884e3aeb704292016421d70af2913f4
F20101112_AACYLV martinelli_a_Page_66.tif
508d917311a3e066b83d949044a2b743
d3b19c04a801f294f26c75ed5dcddae58a5eac25
68841 F20101112_AACYVP martinelli_a_Page_43.pro
f33367307c8a20c360b45d5d97c4a464
17356604a7bc326852dc0f70092753a3562a703d
116585 F20101112_AACYQT martinelli_a_Page_21.jp2
4825d4ebd106ba1081ef6f6c79448f78
aac1392df4c368b553818b2e69f80258a16edc7c
2181 F20101112_AACYLW martinelli_a_Page_26.txt
a2f4ab48ea1b10bfd92573c8e287d257
67506dc94985b40295c773bcfd940f1f5a7ff614
63805 F20101112_AACYVQ martinelli_a_Page_45.pro
444c869702c6846d01be5cab40704ad1
7da6c5cd2ab5e5f7a70445fbe087b1bf27f746b2
150634 F20101112_AACYQU martinelli_a_Page_22.jp2
b892088106c79649cdd67c3a6b4d3090
4f4d5fe72a784021c2c83ed0b9e5ca0e09e7580d
8784 F20101112_AACYLX martinelli_a_Page_45thm.jpg
120ddc7f6928f535259d169ccb48ac6f
dbf941e9433676640be3e857e9e10fce4e865c8f
51938 F20101112_AACYVR martinelli_a_Page_46.pro
8be23af9367717782b37d095ab234236
860b655e12d556c74d5754840c2550403a1f2f62
114154 F20101112_AACYQV martinelli_a_Page_23.jp2
0aa6843063aca5e746ee599dc88fe714
011e96d1090cc9c2ff8761d2cf6ca6f3e8c65776
85 F20101112_AACYLY martinelli_a_Page_03.txt
84fdadba2acb955c651c4cd81dbeb75b
ca7604355d329fd79829aaaac188b01a7cc45873
60014 F20101112_AACYVS martinelli_a_Page_47.pro
5bb5ebfc55a339de28de98e333f7cf0a
800ab7077e4957058b54b3eee4a5d0e67c06a296
131876 F20101112_AACYQW martinelli_a_Page_25.jp2
794df76da1f0e540e23d288496c7e874
85218ab89ece33940641ac1e973890907bfd75a0
144993 F20101112_AACYLZ martinelli_a_Page_08.jp2
36274f6b4bca66b267eb72f8253fb984
9ed41b544e112a044da387a9ac4d645653a5eb4d
66612 F20101112_AACYVT martinelli_a_Page_48.pro
cf592faf6d11176c568c79d276b1bfcf
276ba130a6698687132345f302fa6e6cbb2d65f1
145139 F20101112_AACYQX martinelli_a_Page_27.jp2
1ec2ea0ed46ced5509b9fa3f675d4320
4ac5edb0492ba5d3e2a6120cc3858728160dfd7b
51312 F20101112_AACYVU martinelli_a_Page_49.pro
4a3edb1893b916c97e7e22d1b2b7a94a
2636a4fce8b0872586622682c4b6a06f6693078d
123517 F20101112_AACYQY martinelli_a_Page_28.jp2
328de37ef9dd0cf6138f266201b69168
8d26c99f7a4332c2d3fc6cdec31bd5122d3a4d3a
55367 F20101112_AACYVV martinelli_a_Page_50.pro
7232fc64e90fea5f89ddd7707b5c0864
7660c1afa7382580da3e87765ecbf204577d3403
49661 F20101112_AACYVW martinelli_a_Page_51.pro
09c09e74e53afa4ba67068f9c9a4ca73
4ad64f181174663c426228f4fce1a617c6470196
8990 F20101112_AACYOA martinelli_a_Page_48thm.jpg
4c63308f2a11899f43bf89d3c4b78296
b11fa723a5b21164c3a408c021ec7b220854972e
117331 F20101112_AACYQZ martinelli_a_Page_29.jp2
07c686d7e5451be86bf399c9307f7f1f
f2396132eecbc9c4c7590b37a0fd5b0a70bd5f39
58056 F20101112_AACYVX martinelli_a_Page_52.pro
51fa50b15e6ac640e4ea84b2b7cd2f6c
064a7fe6c3d5a20b64fbbccb07ce2c090f2391a9
53715 F20101112_AACYOB martinelli_a_Page_23.pro
4c0b7fb0f978431a89d374a8d7ecf3b6
59ac2d37486771921a6199f5ace728e56f08d699
F20101112_AACYTA martinelli_a_Page_21.tif
884d47df345dea6e592baaf5017fae92
93605c0a182a808fb0514201b780279ed3cf01ca
54730 F20101112_AACYVY martinelli_a_Page_55.pro
768128c756ccb0d8d916dd7fbc42ae66
56957e2803f17ca3f452711ba84116cc69a6dc09
F20101112_AACYOC martinelli_a_Page_29.tif
f7a39f5c7be5384463dba7a85cc04964
25ce0742c8798a9e4f4d83a9880c9d5690e8817b
F20101112_AACYTB martinelli_a_Page_22.tif
adb725de9a6c72663a12a597c08510e0
98f07ad2f8056e97aed61e6837f06591af9189d3
9383 F20101112_AACYVZ martinelli_a_Page_56.pro
aea324e5d7178cee45395867827617ae
fed3328a4569a6a773be5bf648c3fbc4e6d4edca
81688 F20101112_AACYOD UFE0020155_00001.mets
0fbaf7899b0ef993e0d49fcd58cb2c56
1e23de98e6e56e6c4d04ab675ccd6286abdde328
37878 F20101112_AACZAA martinelli_a_Page_08.QC.jpg
5287d4eb8763d31523450924af697496
1a088abd9fd64ccc25e395b035cb896df87c059b
F20101112_AACYTC martinelli_a_Page_23.tif
9c8474e21f488e3f5bbea7239d4952a4
9ab2fb62a077285dcc71fee09009ea335f78a010
1555 F20101112_AACYYA martinelli_a_Page_67.txt
f42a2bff199409a438f34b249bb26cdc
2ce780b17770a48e5b5d37d446ec052a26cb8d4b
8937 F20101112_AACZAB martinelli_a_Page_08thm.jpg
a5cd437ac69e2e5884493520ef373380
3e151d786da8dc59e9ad8dcd09a61e754748ef0d
F20101112_AACYTD martinelli_a_Page_27.tif
82772eb5b6b0f73dbf930f87be4aa21e
7bd2828a89d1825f6e831d2be61011cf170af148
26115 F20101112_AACYOG martinelli_a_Page_01.jpg
8de7788d8c99dddbfe063a44e8fc9042
d41965d1cb62d30b18ba5c2c30cd05c5f4711af0
536 F20101112_AACYYB martinelli_a_Page_68.txt
4655c81ba7a0fcb7f20fa532471340a7
eec11c5a4a9acb7091bf4240abd3c95bdef32389
36198 F20101112_AACZAC martinelli_a_Page_10.QC.jpg
7758851f0709f3fdceac3c0a339e76f9
5be8d71670fe3d305776b5426a78dde4d7f1d5bb
F20101112_AACYTE martinelli_a_Page_28.tif
ca7b371ca093e1e9bed719b9f4fdbf89
015340c51e8c6f1256f024476cb46b210d6d0b1e
4192 F20101112_AACYOH martinelli_a_Page_02.jpg
1b242063d6b536b91b42482f5296daa0
2a5d0bba73f16f6f471bfd2f677cd6599accc1b7
290807 F20101112_AACYYC martinelli_a.pdf
1dfdf4e7c496d57e3dde93a914f53dfa
1b86f4c88ece1336eecaac0d637e86c7a805cf3f
8858 F20101112_AACZAD martinelli_a_Page_13thm.jpg
bc98ca9fba43c23fd01553746d46b306
fcbb9d3fcfa462191197d774a1a09493ccb6f18b
F20101112_AACYTF martinelli_a_Page_30.tif
f121f456f5008a516c2daa2c48bf3412
e6a12710c88db3905b70644a8341eec9bf23da27
52574 F20101112_AACYOI martinelli_a_Page_04.jpg
9e75e304ded3fbe51a28c5301aaefafb
9f89de1a51ea973809da263f6f2b955bde748e68
33422 F20101112_AACYYD martinelli_a_Page_51.QC.jpg
a43d4250ee8ac96c2503895e6086c2f6
0be53d5494ca3a16823e5c20a2288ef671bb763a
36987 F20101112_AACZAE martinelli_a_Page_15.QC.jpg
2fd0ce450a874c9813a0bcc988c3e6d6
9274a42716b62ba6ab394d11f37db0e9e1697050
F20101112_AACYTG martinelli_a_Page_31.tif
032a44d29a363442554363f90c99da85
f24ffcc5d9443744588700a83d7de016db67cc88
95632 F20101112_AACYOJ martinelli_a_Page_05.jpg
c38301e0a3eb53382922501f1fdb776a
a05691004cc4c49a341e4cb81077ce8d3ad85172
9968 F20101112_AACYYE martinelli_a_Page_68.QC.jpg
0c440223b85e9bd36eceedea074d048e
58931dc9286498a607d8a6344953b80555d0864a
8917 F20101112_AACZAF martinelli_a_Page_15thm.jpg
8b4156195d14391b81a1a9bdfb92a818
9b6dc27ef85f26acfb9c59bfe2043e4b4d923004
F20101112_AACYTH martinelli_a_Page_33.tif
9ef3762ae9d6743dce34f26b0c87fb12
b385c88c06487f7b8582847d84b95039030d804a
107855 F20101112_AACYOK martinelli_a_Page_07.jpg
5e734b4daf7258b8e0e6d902d9cf79ec
43d01e1ae7d21d0f4e3efdf20c9c1f09f1d42b40
8873 F20101112_AACYYF martinelli_a_Page_14thm.jpg
54453eba2ada454236923fcdc4861535
f27bfc4f265f2c1ae0e2ee739c5c2dd1bd2014d5
9058 F20101112_AACZAG martinelli_a_Page_16thm.jpg
c6ef895b60b9d2fa36a6d81d8c64588f
18139de21f8c9ff71063cc33fc0f8b232bbb6adb
F20101112_AACYTI martinelli_a_Page_34.tif
0205b42dd7bb73b1f02d749e3e0db7ab
870547ac4594d496bfcbf950e3daa8db21098727
107227 F20101112_AACYOL martinelli_a_Page_09.jpg
bc421b1f71bd2aadfa0bd25bff3377ef
5a6b5821c2efbb4f2873aaa58a22cb8e1798f6d4
37166 F20101112_AACYYG martinelli_a_Page_13.QC.jpg
d80cfc097f7b9adb0fe6fd938de2d01e
cdeac9cda8f3dff5481ddcad4d13639edb7e3884
34009 F20101112_AACZAH martinelli_a_Page_18.QC.jpg
b3b0a8f7ab02d4b7d28a0054e3b4d098
fdc38b5e8cd15ae8b8a5a7b6dc028eb137bf55a4
F20101112_AACYTJ martinelli_a_Page_35.tif
5319d8c2b8a30820499a945fe270f3c5
393d619d0801efe17e59b9c71d1bf7fdffcf9a90
126123 F20101112_AACYOM martinelli_a_Page_12.jpg
5f3aa94789e5d08700930f173d7ea77d
f8d9009684b45424f6300fcd6af357dd7b74f176
2418 F20101112_AACYJP martinelli_a_Page_28.txt
9d803ea621e2b72a17ae6f60394f30eb
8057f85747d975d8fe07b8f15e4091151b7ca6b0
F20101112_AACZAI martinelli_a_Page_19thm.jpg
3e67dcaa80bc4f86460ed9b2390bb746
9fe7893460e3c970f0cf245c10193cca38470d05
F20101112_AACYTK martinelli_a_Page_36.tif
dcdd9a424f7fe456df51494ba8c6435b
9fb3f03d76154d61e4394b73fee35e7308845d97
117787 F20101112_AACYON martinelli_a_Page_13.jpg
837c319f3f8b558a0ade987182a1a14b
07c8b040bc8a30ae1945d4b43847406844549462
8576 F20101112_AACYYH martinelli_a_Page_36thm.jpg
2fb6152590abbc5634d1056393175719
33684c80aad42bdb9f435a1b01ee92124b855312
8429 F20101112_AACYJQ martinelli_a_Page_21thm.jpg
892d6f0a6fdb86773de7c5a8025807c1
22fa2a90ebf4e9a7371d45ea87cca08d2f1cbcc9
36845 F20101112_AACZAJ martinelli_a_Page_25.QC.jpg
12541a606fe847ad40a9e9ab56c4a746
35360ddbbcde2293d7535e07ef540e62074ec885
F20101112_AACYTL martinelli_a_Page_38.tif
c82a0145c93681d8c177564c5d082ab1
bfc6999060876a5ca1e52af7bdee6d689f5c841b
114112 F20101112_AACYOO martinelli_a_Page_16.jpg
84e6ea854add1f6b76e903f9479478de
cc715fc892956145a9ca67f81ce293b7e0626aec
8609 F20101112_AACYYI martinelli_a_Page_24thm.jpg
ffe1d52865b308013982d3c756052869
236e639c6944abdd654b7bac85e35d607c99cf7a
120192 F20101112_AACYJR martinelli_a_Page_25.jpg
7fa76dd71317f86ae9c38b954215bf92
5bbff50d1702c4c7b8e00405bef460c8818aed2a
9026 F20101112_AACZAK martinelli_a_Page_26thm.jpg
9dc0058369e9cfd5ba61b70e3923b010
0a6851b1a6cfbbf5c9e60635a24036eb913d2254
F20101112_AACYTM martinelli_a_Page_39.tif
9a9fc6cdcdadd068eac9934e25f31425
57d4940e033a13e77ba72d690cb8074f36eb24b3
88508 F20101112_AACYOP martinelli_a_Page_17.jpg
ba4f7a1ff1aa9bfac20df9bf150dd80c
e3a3283249981bdfa6c105da3df16fdf87395524
8472 F20101112_AACYYJ martinelli_a_Page_30thm.jpg
f7740fb935685339fd9978e92e551b62
1e6a136d8f950ea4f90cf793f1fdf642d043d10e
129277 F20101112_AACYJS martinelli_a_Page_08.jpg
514ca76f9f17abc651d7353479040c59
4ae3e499823b84f645278b222a37799b6a215027
39228 F20101112_AACZAL martinelli_a_Page_27.QC.jpg
d85206a38786a4f4fa7551b1018370cf
4fff24d7bd08172064ae4e841011e7545ceaa01e
F20101112_AACYTN martinelli_a_Page_40.tif
9c5448662157d135effc1e281adc2b6b
cb7d1c70d49b7c0823b564c6cab8248726d0b7de
107716 F20101112_AACYOQ martinelli_a_Page_18.jpg
c9242f65ab6214e3689066de45c27c7d
6cc92d773a7d65842c521da64c87924bf42860f7
35400 F20101112_AACYYK martinelli_a_Page_34.QC.jpg
6bbdd9e59dc0b72d76c5276b4649db25
0b71eb81673ec4481fe063d1593fde6307f8ee66
F20101112_AACYJT martinelli_a_Page_24.tif
3e327ba6a3459300c77d256c02cb8e82
fb7dba09a19c98bd6a45ef4bb1498eb23d385970
9277 F20101112_AACZAM martinelli_a_Page_27thm.jpg
6ed202b6a4dae05f6cb29d6836f9945e
a700ed37961c24d01d4baebb8ce49c4f5663f154
F20101112_AACYTO martinelli_a_Page_41.tif
18c8ceb0d8a25415dccd8d6cdc164af9
bd089dbc50f21e28213442a4292df0052d2cc45b
119629 F20101112_AACYOR martinelli_a_Page_20.jpg
56bceea0598b19c241af80633499f147
981069f772880287d5a28cf202661f775b813900
37507 F20101112_AACYYL martinelli_a_Page_48.QC.jpg
881c92ab3b58c594fc4e499157aa3a3a
ede4c3e116fb061438d3e98772cf1b0a55d660b3
53395 F20101112_AACYJU martinelli_a_Page_54.pro
f8e9754147a0eedbcb43864cc499c5fa
0236badb5c47749ba595a7e0a7b34969a5c7d7be
34005 F20101112_AACZAN martinelli_a_Page_29.QC.jpg
c21ead9c1122ef2d37a2850d7d0f7bb7
8a364a4ec726d03732dc101d35c6e93de1719ff6
F20101112_AACYTP martinelli_a_Page_43.tif
4a9b767e160a5d069708d4bf67c87141
b7f57f8d096812ad7535b5a3fb39840f945cb9f4
108122 F20101112_AACYOS martinelli_a_Page_21.jpg
02a9e6667f06e2de398551048d326012
027e84fc8b26430ed60b1cd162bd6b3486428926
36155 F20101112_AACYYM martinelli_a_Page_28.QC.jpg
9e186822f28ad547e61c231eb665b481
bac982dfdb01ec7f8bb1f6e97576beef3cc5ba1e
F20101112_AACYJV martinelli_a_Page_62.tif
6dd952d114ca586f7c97233eedc0e2cb
ecbe7836d9a3a9911808dace9437e00ed4e56a9a
F20101112_AACYTQ martinelli_a_Page_46.tif
6719a96e9f01464bdf12e87c6e5b106d
a116124e20aceb130f56b6fddbea4aa14c1b0902
134838 F20101112_AACYOT martinelli_a_Page_22.jpg
7c9cb1af7413f5e6503fab5240fb7236
e49be170c2fe5b94d32266c5c2abbac87c0c2142
36277 F20101112_AACYYN martinelli_a_Page_63.QC.jpg
837c49b19b2557df6c18bc7350862159
ecf009b802c47896a3a9cf51a749315b71ab89a1
2500 F20101112_AACYJW martinelli_a_Page_13.txt
fa0feb7236a4742417c30ada40c78dab
1b9246acc4f2fdbdc6f087d9ed0a807c35a08684
8621 F20101112_AACZAO martinelli_a_Page_29thm.jpg
ef56d0cd92e613ccf159f5789adb8e2b
67166f307e14804aebe97d09863f176de0b596fb
F20101112_AACYTR martinelli_a_Page_47.tif
63a07557755b820faf3dab546986a2b5
639f47f308cb64c70730bc9aa09ba2c639859791
105521 F20101112_AACYOU martinelli_a_Page_23.jpg
412a7e19e477e73a9e03355e18b6b460
5ab9dc2f96eae0ac0904ca293659994d77aae212
36981 F20101112_AACYYO martinelli_a_Page_24.QC.jpg
cf370049f3c63001da36ad65aa511084
8de741293a5190ac07336a380d246fe7951c5790
8630 F20101112_AACYJX martinelli_a_Page_64thm.jpg
7bdbc8ae9090021695b87879098fc265
e45592f53ef44b24f10f27f86bb2c0e68f247d32
35174 F20101112_AACZAP martinelli_a_Page_30.QC.jpg
558b35c5415230938c04a4a2ad536fca
d433b57d6bb378b817dd49a2b78a28350da2d458
F20101112_AACYTS martinelli_a_Page_49.tif
1faf572ab9349ac3314a47bf77635c38
473ccf566e024c2fa27e94486d67124db53de52a
114176 F20101112_AACYOV martinelli_a_Page_24.jpg
156c78aa537d9f5cf5dae01a495f2066
207b66104fe6e42987c10ecefa3e9d4622a7d2a3
9429 F20101112_AACYYP martinelli_a_Page_12thm.jpg
4f3ffc8451d7ff41dfd657acbaa5d623
b181f58b2a14f2c6f13ded31b6fd49648e2e0258
35355 F20101112_AACZAQ martinelli_a_Page_31.QC.jpg
f58d0b04e234b8d80f5f4a0c06bc4243
b803e5cb7d0aad8581294e8bc71b329e09c974f4
F20101112_AACYTT martinelli_a_Page_50.tif
848bf19638e6ec43cd628af42a690a62
6ad1564e622ef7b7bd7e0b0cdef36b7864b87964
112986 F20101112_AACYOW martinelli_a_Page_26.jpg
977680fa73ab2c89c6428ed4b2a7e4c7
58a13cb4784f97af01a58d399b251b468166c404
8470 F20101112_AACYYQ martinelli_a_Page_43thm.jpg
72b92f9505a7babb6e42ae359bc9d0c9
bf9ffb4b01fa87d858e39b6f66bf75d75ac47225
F20101112_AACYJY martinelli_a_Page_45.tif
818cb48460681e3e59e240af4b6c25ea
a5a4d7a20d4938fff519eb77ae1d29893c01bcd2
8836 F20101112_AACZAR martinelli_a_Page_31thm.jpg
d382a6893c61cf5064eeb8241194de6d
4f25fc3086c1c90767c8a3e37b694b3f794a8b5c
F20101112_AACYTU martinelli_a_Page_51.tif
2057f5fdaf0cb81602fc88635c60e216
4025e940cba6dbb823da0b829f7674680cf4b89d
131957 F20101112_AACYOX martinelli_a_Page_27.jpg
e7dfaf6d98ed44648eab0d114cc0d1ff
0b74c33c308852d3dca990f69ef85b4c33b6a77a
36382 F20101112_AACYYR martinelli_a_Page_16.QC.jpg
70931c99175075623cd4cf42b728dbf5
1cc229bc87564c0033cb3a4cc818ed7c39c385a1
F20101112_AACYJZ martinelli_a_Page_54.tif
cf1fe4641856a24578d7a2015d83400c
86de2ffda7ce79df368a133373fa577d79861975
38016 F20101112_AACZAS martinelli_a_Page_33.QC.jpg
03b81653592b26889c776b7c2d2c5419
a5584057ebfd56b9ab662c7f55a750d86a7cd010
116484 F20101112_AACYOY martinelli_a_Page_28.jpg
016b0d126119bd819c014a1328612d40
f8220f5e663191b90fd3f981dd7cc5104625ad80
25465 F20101112_AACYYS martinelli_a_Page_65.QC.jpg
8890ae2ed1f0c2c2868410f4bf3701fd
9754d23a642a80430a4b7fa55a408d7fbcf107fa
F20101112_AACYTV martinelli_a_Page_53.tif
9c0b21516c880fdc409c413c9e13d06f
4392c8b892281950c8fd6b8ba43a45ede47f7a21
9114 F20101112_AACZAT martinelli_a_Page_33thm.jpg
4c225b2fa81a9c3c24bec80c0fed46da
d5f94d1fffbfdf5bde21cf2e355cfe14cb25142b
F20101112_AACYMA martinelli_a_Page_56thm.jpg
da39d91eda22f195ec6b344caeade277
7544f1f7077d251c1311896eddc72be88f4bc137
109153 F20101112_AACYOZ martinelli_a_Page_29.jpg
4aea2604147177290f0d760943ba5c00
0fd0fce1027ad76e616cd1a9d6135c8f294c41ee
8895 F20101112_AACYYT martinelli_a_Page_25thm.jpg
e34ec00bce3072ae1dd71acb0e7036a4
4ee1e0dc831dc57aba3c8312d7bcefeded3e195a
F20101112_AACYTW martinelli_a_Page_56.tif
cab69e08836e839e378d95d75b1d9a24
8d5e100c32bb218e4d512e8c79645a2912efa287
34149 F20101112_AACZAU martinelli_a_Page_35.QC.jpg
fcaabc0633ccd71e79a745b48a47234a
9d485f29a2d33fe9d7135badab082019be559da4
9287 F20101112_AACYMB martinelli_a_Page_11thm.jpg
ffdbba0c7ba657af290a368e1b30afc9
d9abdc911c27010bedaeda756351f83866396469
9037 F20101112_AACYYU martinelli_a_Page_28thm.jpg
e7cc86b5b90087d68ce3c9c7e2b618a2
3c02a14c7c572ad30c1bbd348fea2c8d01bf2c4a
F20101112_AACYTX martinelli_a_Page_57.tif
6bb01d6dc46169a64248b47ebce1cab8
39b442172fc38092bebe21eef6bf1cb9ee67a2b3
8367 F20101112_AACZAV martinelli_a_Page_35thm.jpg
dee6db8250134a24f71d9c0796eae28f
ee8f1a980ebf0f36bfc4c1a7adb309c709bf77ae
2312 F20101112_AACYMC martinelli_a_Page_15.txt
577f061d0bea5a36d9fac9cf90aead54
6bae1db6b8c5962ae9375544223d2e69fe4bf7e7
38557 F20101112_AACYYV martinelli_a_Page_22.QC.jpg
ce923131fde55f858bb3f33dd2e0c6f1
3cb260171492a3104e7224628b6b279be5c7ea2c
F20101112_AACYTY martinelli_a_Page_58.tif
495bf47d52c4a0fb083e105f4ce4f56b
a49ffef4a3f3393a74f3eab075ed504d8c5f4457
36071 F20101112_AACZAW martinelli_a_Page_36.QC.jpg
27df15796f2e9ebcf650c32da878a699
edc9bf699ea1e1a9709929e3f14ca43f1d7d39d1
F20101112_AACYMD martinelli_a_Page_32.tif
119c8c82242ed68a92172b06dffb9027
9363769732231d4c001e1f9295711a497e861c7d
34526 F20101112_AACYYW martinelli_a_Page_23.QC.jpg
21c1e6599a78dd19a85eac5bc8b92e8b
b43f79895884b8e8096e01ea87805255bee23423
121787 F20101112_AACYRA martinelli_a_Page_30.jp2
5f5eb32f865ba01926ca5b7b8cdf7565
8eb173b6e89270124c9c9be6a1795de4d5cfc65a
F20101112_AACYTZ martinelli_a_Page_59.tif
9ac51c6c37a15ae9ab95fed6d60e188f
ff7b6653195f056bbd5627d2a21fe5454e4807d1
35450 F20101112_AACZAX martinelli_a_Page_37.QC.jpg
2aa3099d1ce956b5706791d58b636d77
c88c5c56b9dfddc2447faed7b8e605db4cb8ba57
2341 F20101112_AACYME martinelli_a_Page_47.txt
064ba5119270bca795ca70ea1375a104
ec10b922ff1b7020534f9a76d3b2fd92170983ee
35188 F20101112_AACYYX martinelli_a_Page_62.QC.jpg
b0e842308c5b8d98b8b423798ac85698
3dfbd1f95e2005106137d0c615a8058d7fa95f8c
118913 F20101112_AACYRB martinelli_a_Page_31.jp2
655babb0efc6ca92a07911c678bc5e55
e1db09659e56c25c2d15c18b91d8d669bf9212b3
34427 F20101112_AACZAY martinelli_a_Page_38.QC.jpg
c2ea2e5f14177663bab4be4da8ba65ab
bfd2f1ed7d20c8a7ee52c52ce3c987b88d5ec4b5
8502 F20101112_AACYMF martinelli_a_Page_23thm.jpg
ddaf2067de7f949ef91cc7759beb9dc5
4e08afdd90cf2c6d08a4ffb24d97d488ea282615
55978 F20101112_AACYWA martinelli_a_Page_59.pro
d262616810f2b8d291d6d7ef3fef6dc5
65092771feccff6ce5ab28910e46ce2aa1eb8b41
32380 F20101112_AACYYY martinelli_a_Page_46.QC.jpg
ecc02b6c697ba1aa00f8a174359a0a49
4dd480688916d10366d31214247b26b3e306c53b
118890 F20101112_AACYRC martinelli_a_Page_32.jp2
a5326d0a1c7d516288ccbf6e964cb86b
01a804897549a4063a7fb717d120b62f362f7ba6
36174 F20101112_AACZAZ martinelli_a_Page_39.QC.jpg
cbe71f04be456a49f32ab55bdbdbdff0
db1c9eafcc0ef59899be65b23f0b0c2030ccbba8
26396 F20101112_AACYMG martinelli_a_Page_01.jp2
823eb1d94c5b70c6592893858e0157d9
b9fb2348f74de6fe94ef7fa20a181a087135c51f
60827 F20101112_AACYWB martinelli_a_Page_61.pro
cbd22bc4bdf3d1b3512b6ec3c91b5ff4
ba36e9ab9eae6407ee1982a30275123305136e07
2053 F20101112_AACYYZ martinelli_a_Page_01thm.jpg
2864a109a16a8903a93546d5a6ec7ae8
1b752f174a3d6ae90c64bde1ce607915f6b834b0
136048 F20101112_AACYRD martinelli_a_Page_33.jp2
da445c65c6b6ab7a35b5d4762b27b7af
7ff829dd78c1423b1af8cb7eb44659e14e9689d0
65410 F20101112_AACYMH martinelli_a_Page_06.jpg
8918729ee96b01a0409d5569a15ebbcd
48a9306d909ba09a7d4485f06ae1010445e9dd55
54224 F20101112_AACYWC martinelli_a_Page_62.pro
4a5d29defdbdff9f760334cbafe58f6f
360507f410dcaf92079f3d61d1cc6addef401a6c
123823 F20101112_AACYRE martinelli_a_Page_34.jp2
cd0084fabb2030d77350c2cbb4341710
8af3376827c55bea6f881888d16ae400de019c06
58055 F20101112_AACYWD martinelli_a_Page_63.pro
58d7950f722b91aa8a1ef555e9a1c2bb
19275d9ac5dbd4d19c4c4a0e08cf6595fcb84bdb
120530 F20101112_AACYRF martinelli_a_Page_35.jp2
fa7d0cc4c238e7bda093a57281495695
0bf1ac879dda02fc1528b4b4ccdf7bd03d3e2097
F20101112_AACYMI martinelli_a_Page_44.tif
fd5351b60670b0d04f492134ed73d20f
e9fa2816d91db064cab9f340e51d29d645f1e381
53917 F20101112_AACYWE martinelli_a_Page_64.pro
895c92e614c9906192efda7746a3125a
d7385111997b9ddc286c1e0c01d53fcc0028d4f9
118355 F20101112_AACYRG martinelli_a_Page_36.jp2
5945195affe0830af407cc83682f144f
95bebbd53d05d295459e2aa09c40a7d77f0a4b81
F20101112_AACYMJ martinelli_a_Page_55.tif
5f6f1f29e534e90f3d2d38ddf28be0f7
9c1f0aa31d04901108b59f12c0419c61f537ca8e
113539 F20101112_AACYRH martinelli_a_Page_37.jp2
41ff6f48faa66253f78ecb7085165386
ded0a87fc9324c8a9d6f08df9c9bd0ce022cf929
F20101112_AACYMK martinelli_a_Page_09.tif
b5dc0e2a7c225ef55cefa5ff4e851228
94d8631d7aa98fe76a0570a76557f637f39b2a34
40704 F20101112_AACYWF martinelli_a_Page_65.pro
db817dd5a849dbdbd8c8ddac22e38cfd
d85ee9d1726864f91c3dbbffe5a8874d0f4f8e52
116521 F20101112_AACYRI martinelli_a_Page_38.jp2
0ba31f869a33373f1d60d7e388943c2d
a49a06316d3e8b90764b163dbe7826cd3a115949
F20101112_AACYML martinelli_a_Page_37.tif
986007e461e5105b99e8bfe316e42d6f
569c7f1e472e8443f5d86e4ea93e838bbcb04084
65233 F20101112_AACYWG martinelli_a_Page_66.pro
103328dd163d9ad44ec3e346f6e9a057
8c4034f40bc19251d707b2bce9ab901475315207
133513 F20101112_AACYRJ martinelli_a_Page_39.jp2
0c32ee8f425a69ae3eede5464519484f
e8b115caa8cc64baf504841b9c2e12682c302e35
2330 F20101112_AACYMM martinelli_a_Page_30.txt
38dd59a8c85d542908b2bd7e24df45ce
a61c062cbc667963cb88c3c1cd367e7b42cdbc23
37656 F20101112_AACYWH martinelli_a_Page_67.pro
026fc28d1dbd91eb1dd35c2c1c46464e
2d06bdabfdeba43dd5b664d79baa5c3ba9e8cf5a
125116 F20101112_AACYRK martinelli_a_Page_40.jp2
59723ed5a129d00e6135643c5b3f2cb3
b9dd1dc921e249c12e2bf4b923660db7c8a91cb4
139622 F20101112_AACYMN martinelli_a_Page_12.jp2
8deca3df922c803833bc9e93d37bb154
164697ba85551d9399e9ade72afb3a2181be7c72
12507 F20101112_AACYWI martinelli_a_Page_68.pro
aea903c461e566dd1886ae4436cd68e9
74ece7e7c1b20a79b09cdcfb4ca569720f51b144
113678 F20101112_AACYRL martinelli_a_Page_41.jp2
159643f1b8ccb8ea9190ed281982ff0b
8fbc4ae1f2e99f7e92c293c6e8b349d154a88563
58857 F20101112_AACYMO martinelli_a_Page_60.pro
9db48cdde1076b0450e4ec7cc775d24a
771bf8ec1dbe69f3e636c6d76b064f250ce98c8b
492 F20101112_AACYWJ martinelli_a_Page_01.txt
7bd8cb068469d9a9d4c7662aedc1e774
9fb2bff853794a540847b408e21084d27ed87c6d
135158 F20101112_AACYRM martinelli_a_Page_42.jp2
b39182f3367af62ec356fdc4b82cb253
fc6fdf5e62ea321c8da50057edf349037eeafd5e
489 F20101112_AACYMP martinelli_a_Page_03thm.jpg
6b19bb8916ae7039f5aee3c8f49b909e
a435e3e1fe942592a33a54a6991744b50abd35d5
87 F20101112_AACYWK martinelli_a_Page_02.txt
89f2b0f3fb26b7c0254c6dcf720c9737
aa4cbaededbb0ac24410e4aa5f0ead21b3a92238
110328 F20101112_AACYRN martinelli_a_Page_44.jp2
8104d067795132274fdf74272c0516d9
fae93ea9ec155ef1eda8b9d38dd2b77e5c2d1366
47878 F20101112_AACYMQ martinelli_a_Page_57.pro
96152d79690af8c84f369414d55e4467
e5c845f0bb42254ee4ed0d75bccb27837218c312
1805 F20101112_AACYWL martinelli_a_Page_04.txt
43da267cc3d1482c0739d1b725bee35d
74007991dc9fe189d9f583d69ce7422b4b968639
108185 F20101112_AACYRO martinelli_a_Page_46.jp2
4e9e89c84f4c7f49553d968edb942163
4c3a08d18f92d12663712d9063b1071f29ded572
58240 F20101112_AACYMR martinelli_a_Page_58.pro
4ad35f6971b995dfd0d69c969f53540d
4df98dd6634471c03143886ba71475f9e02024a6
1996 F20101112_AACYWM martinelli_a_Page_05.txt
a66fa9c0b20ebb7a486ebc1ff004407e
389c5f332ba4bff3ad2e471f3ef596eddbd77250
119812 F20101112_AACYRP martinelli_a_Page_47.jp2
53bb4953c4ee0c8033b1f49f7f9c0319
c443a55387789f64a473c9a8e81987e56b7cd2d2
35862 F20101112_AACYMS martinelli_a_Page_45.QC.jpg
a8f70e578a0cd0b807f46836022c721e
bd6a7709c88e35d58c990b85e29d7f98f14b4c86
1237 F20101112_AACYWN martinelli_a_Page_06.txt
743297c1dfdc62bb29a4fbc7887f320d
c8cae1e8ee6ca793af5837e94a63cdf7e2fb3222
128505 F20101112_AACYRQ martinelli_a_Page_48.jp2
ccd0e455aaffefa306c7bad93e342ffe
b91ecf268750db3d9f5a88a266647343f800ac39
39225 F20101112_AACYMT martinelli_a_Page_12.QC.jpg
90a664180ef71e9025380e421713aa94
61083609a80152a0eda3e605c8d1acaa642cbcfc
2964 F20101112_AACYWO martinelli_a_Page_08.txt
eaa429f0af505c19e73fda42c3f3247c
4254a8be0164f4c8005e03756d998df33ced00c8
109140 F20101112_AACYRR martinelli_a_Page_49.jp2
e9cd75be7fdad9606c38210e18b0f535
5a622075fdd3f5597076fc03b09e57a342035e03
F20101112_AACYMU martinelli_a_Page_20.tif
4b7139dd69360f9b84b38511f2ea1d22
a2a3e27d51f5b8f37996556a04a14f35d590ef28
2326 F20101112_AACYWP martinelli_a_Page_10.txt
c5bd9bf61a913aab3697b6ffd1d91465
c9cd6e1e18f84eec5f2734ab814343737c6aa359
114307 F20101112_AACYRS martinelli_a_Page_50.jp2
c4bf928182319ab2e3a19126c0fb7a2b
54a87dce218281b2c1e34630e17ffd23afece8a5
5163 F20101112_AACYMV martinelli_a_Page_06thm.jpg
c886b7d239da7eff77414b085b92967a
4a5f139063d81d300a6d487a64f04c90d4f62525
2498 F20101112_AACYWQ martinelli_a_Page_11.txt
20275287604cf719594efcc4524acc7d
c545e8bb43e085f71556e3871361080dfa36186d
108082 F20101112_AACYRT martinelli_a_Page_51.jp2
2e91d4583d9b22e680ceae64ed189ca3
ab0954f00f6b2546f9a8c5a73c565a04f3ee1128
8803 F20101112_AACYMW martinelli_a_Page_32thm.jpg
c25d0f42f05a0039afdbb5287f9b02ad
a045660d838dbff5c784ee47ccbc19cb07ff69c2
118209 F20101112_AACYRU martinelli_a_Page_52.jp2
12a3970dd9889e89c76e747a0c11e5b1
84bc34fa1d1e117a59d0c13b3c26ad94ff80cf45
55083 F20101112_AACYMX martinelli_a_Page_53.pro
a40665d1ca074376f91abd82b4e92374
bf0a66e61abbe4d4b80e5182ce9900187f1f9596
2410 F20101112_AACYWR martinelli_a_Page_14.txt
f3e316f370df5c90e26ece2a0db006f1
10f5e45f421cdb9b7760be1bd97e8c85ec594256
114269 F20101112_AACYRV martinelli_a_Page_53.jp2
517be53cfcdffd4a011a89571eaf155d
5a9dcb3cd78de28796dddae0392ed8e1f51dc0f2
8564 F20101112_AACYMY martinelli_a_Page_18thm.jpg
ecd24c2d537845c4fbbc102ab75d72d0
63937334475f70578343ea71c6daaf44b683d868
2230 F20101112_AACYWS martinelli_a_Page_16.txt
4738212d1e756f2d15705bd95b6fc424
b9f4273b39abb24825a20776625192d0cdce7e30
115169 F20101112_AACYRW martinelli_a_Page_54.jp2
29491948f57ab40bb503b1a490477bdb
bb4ba0970041d280e1074aec620cd56d29a103a9
121575 F20101112_AACYKA martinelli_a_Page_24.jp2
fd375a45953e26254ea7faeeffae0be7
adafc918763485b5ef5a5babda001b2bcaae5875
131205 F20101112_AACYMZ martinelli_a_Page_43.jp2
316756b37c8fbcd96c07bf75815b3757
ec0eac0de04349d386a160e0974d2ce5f39f3fe0
1842 F20101112_AACYWT martinelli_a_Page_17.txt
819598255e2e07d459055c78acfd9e3c
3dab58bc854d5bfaf64ceb92c3851592406447fc
120224 F20101112_AACYRX martinelli_a_Page_55.jp2
26f6b419e93876a2a3b1d2bc554019c6
2b97f8263df6fc2a25acce74c10872f1468d0027
98389 F20101112_AACYKB martinelli_a_Page_17.jp2
d92a535f00c93aab25c984dffd22d7c8
445ada3cd05abbfa4eb12b3d780033a292a718aa
2342 F20101112_AACYWU martinelli_a_Page_18.txt
18bf6b4f39b7c59050290c44ebdf3093
e5bed6a16c1364cefac40696c07d839a9a206284
24306 F20101112_AACYRY martinelli_a_Page_56.jp2
9da3789aad232b9a462857398726bafc
fb394824d60236d4499692112d7f745ae2f3999a
105970 F20101112_AACYKC martinelli_a_Page_53.jpg
0fd3f5e4640da0936e9d833be9913406
4e839b0706ceaf994962945dac8333f4b10b5399
2329 F20101112_AACYWV martinelli_a_Page_19.txt
c4ea790a6bbbbc80cb578a66401834e0
0f549f7aa96316bfb26f23e4bb6562f4c61c94fd
112204 F20101112_AACYPA martinelli_a_Page_30.jpg
bd8662a85952715b9e7053106e2c7cb8
65beddacfcb6e99c3243de5360cc27e1ff8fa353
105556 F20101112_AACYRZ martinelli_a_Page_57.jp2
4ee9bbf7ee6fe8b6bc46ea7ced796371
e1ff1e166342c276618c7785b25759924920a0d3
41825 F20101112_AACYKD martinelli_a_Page_04.pro
df49e2d215ed58491024b11d7ca1a4f9
fc0cf8ccfcd42644c8b9049e9af22a78038d93ef
2420 F20101112_AACYWW martinelli_a_Page_20.txt
ba04c7354f0263c152da65daf45ff700
1a099f109875302f2261e9f53791cecdb71fb84b
110013 F20101112_AACYPB martinelli_a_Page_31.jpg
a4bdf851086ea4937e99fc87baa1e1ee
b6b9e2bde5747bd4a992204bc96c9505fea01f07
8069 F20101112_AACYKE martinelli_a_Page_46thm.jpg
7f5aa3e7799422e7eac3c5da38263d4f
73876a9b8b737eacf414c3ac435c9b44db4cd439
2244 F20101112_AACYWX martinelli_a_Page_21.txt
19dd43687de5d1e3a5804d76f47d55b9
e2041060f2460349954fc276b3c7e944de1271d5
125577 F20101112_AACYPC martinelli_a_Page_33.jpg
f414c88b73a1133ac2710cc17437652c
435f82156b9b96e1c7692090ee5dcd7f8014fc6a
8650 F20101112_AACYKF martinelli_a_Page_34thm.jpg
2762f037aa8630411d6f0dfda18c0790
07cba7241071cf0d81ee78f48c317af2288b9227
F20101112_AACYUA martinelli_a_Page_60.tif
08aee65d707936a0e4071bf8be3c4097
e0158df5b1773436dff712d48e21eb06193cd939
2337 F20101112_AACYWY martinelli_a_Page_24.txt
53bc7f58eb717162b4ab3a038bff1c13
5f8aad09cf19bc2031de15ce474a8984b957d948
110395 F20101112_AACYPD martinelli_a_Page_35.jpg
0530af00032577ffe25e5aadeede6a21
6f4b9103ae3d5cb0908dec2d54820fe1981433af
66664 F20101112_AACYKG martinelli_a_Page_25.pro
12a97999f9a225fde7db1401fef7d5f9
06ad45d07322e23d846f88ed7f45d59a93925637
F20101112_AACYUB martinelli_a_Page_61.tif
87f395c11582c2c13ea0227794e1780f
73a74d58939d2aef0652162e0cab125d5fe904ec
2592 F20101112_AACYWZ martinelli_a_Page_25.txt
d16ccd5d12136dd768b294cfd3bb5ace
1017d258bc1398d100e46c55658f8dbf5e420d14
33165 F20101112_AACYKH martinelli_a_Page_21.QC.jpg
76bc7386484978f8f23a2e573633a786
c57720cb446a48d6c82e1a2b1b3dd7c736a17606
F20101112_AACYUC martinelli_a_Page_63.tif
0e7745a20a36b0758d268e01e98d9d48
3736f1061e72fe1426062fff5ccd84ce7ae5a81f
112374 F20101112_AACYPE martinelli_a_Page_36.jpg
8f1b143f526adfdf82a3fe0cc26ff191
ba43be5f77f4f085b8f50f0d3bb92da053c242c8
8751 F20101112_AACZBA martinelli_a_Page_39thm.jpg
60421fdbf6346c4fc6c51740ab0c7479
986a89ebb04c4c11f232d895e605ff323f89a684
9146 F20101112_AACYZA martinelli_a_Page_66thm.jpg
4377ccb468f94f1ae056fb927487a7aa
a654a76fdd52995b90454eba77b6888c5dd7aa8f
111218 F20101112_AACYKI martinelli_a_Page_32.jpg
9eb3ddb3199a72093c802e5513ff997c
71f63ab37e8f8b0013679712856ff585308a4d6e
108765 F20101112_AACYPF martinelli_a_Page_37.jpg
f68363c8b4d9836512d5088a89856a8a
2a7ee9b9182f5f6af7ce8f8f2017416e8c68800d
35780 F20101112_AACZBB martinelli_a_Page_40.QC.jpg
6dbbd29190d8a4877a6021345bc283d7
1ad8ecda2388debfaa4f9d9fb4ab721c4642615b
35409 F20101112_AACYZB martinelli_a_Page_09.QC.jpg
886537897451fa93a24b863cc5e061d6
2015b0033f9cfcafd32b0a970073fdf15c90087c
F20101112_AACYKJ martinelli_a_Page_15.tif
307743247e9f9cb6a98f7fe8106c00cc
cf02862f6536fa829bcc182201eec4907e5bd560
F20101112_AACYUD martinelli_a_Page_64.tif
e9d4867360e0fffbc11b3620be9f8b81
153732ca84fce89d99c1842f5d493a1a8715711f
123286 F20101112_AACYPG martinelli_a_Page_39.jpg
2ac0fe9117840ddfd52e8509f4c9f130
471e3461107c34154b315f37cb10560265241e77
9117 F20101112_AACZBC martinelli_a_Page_40thm.jpg
5a12c9c4bd9f476539c424e2148eba41
84003950073e40093ed4e01203ec53c510b27f56
8447 F20101112_AACYZC martinelli_a_Page_38thm.jpg
52a67298c0b664bef73236e3049b1409
687619db672665438b4457aac907cc879b3e291f
F20101112_AACYKK martinelli_a_Page_52.tif
ccf4c88501daf1f46fc7d52beb9332f7
7fad67bcf23862b6d875393e998cf7373c19260f
F20101112_AACYUE martinelli_a_Page_65.tif
d73238ed81677b31ddbdc42739c6f645
17b0de6901d2517e2ec6f1d76feb96f1202317a3
115002 F20101112_AACYPH martinelli_a_Page_40.jpg
ab51056db2f2c3a51a868589660d16f7
68c75928be84351c459421737c0fe7b6d07ad2ed
33820 F20101112_AACZBD martinelli_a_Page_41.QC.jpg
a3a17c9b31dcc45d08d8172a8bbe80b2
d990f3579018da942cfb3ad69546dadd93a609e9
33021 F20101112_AACYZD martinelli_a_Page_44.QC.jpg
25171790b0c458ce3532b5634bff03bb
6739d91164b9bb3d8b162f32f195b3d131ba8b41
114074 F20101112_AACYKL martinelli_a_Page_34.jpg
1d60dbc6a14df73396712d4bc3dd18a4
b181b92e492a33bb323f1b3f981d5164bf2f8c9a
F20101112_AACYUF martinelli_a_Page_68.tif
a565f39d42ead769197a0686dc2f3cf4
d4db4648c441bde77c866ed5b89fadafdb3585b9
104648 F20101112_AACYPI martinelli_a_Page_41.jpg
6d5aa85c22ce23a6cddc54d408b671bb
2c44123dabdadd0ddfa42236493a068f87160952
8475 F20101112_AACZBE martinelli_a_Page_41thm.jpg
632ed25c8ce6b2d3493975dd87a03ca4
fa90492a153576e28abddde8b395c22b4ab3f620
35682 F20101112_AACYZE martinelli_a_Page_61.QC.jpg
894a6fcc45ef1be5047ec3d6e6f83c90
b2028ffd43a16290f297f75dde11536ea282601f
8672 F20101112_AACYKM martinelli_a_Page_37thm.jpg
97c5e562a528524cf5c4eb95ebe4d37d
e43f806bb6377eabcf3430bd0f19492e7ae2b946
8500 F20101112_AACYUG martinelli_a_Page_01.pro
fb7f93672e021aafd718b24f1041f2c9
f714ff06f8e618110af063d11571e777744aa82c
123575 F20101112_AACYPJ martinelli_a_Page_42.jpg
780049312a7fc9ae159bcbf526e648dd
e14d83e3ef1b2092cc660f8e4d1a68c357813a8d
37266 F20101112_AACZBF martinelli_a_Page_42.QC.jpg
0aa6f6bbad9372a21cf88b39aca9ca7e
69ef0e7911d1f9c33d03dc703b5d9fa1da5b3cf0
1097 F20101112_AACYZF martinelli_a_Page_03.QC.jpg
8d4f2fe58568a346fa5c2acfbbf7ae56
3bc7402cbf433bde849d85269cfcc45104a39d9d
129266 F20101112_AACYKN martinelli_a_Page_20.jp2
748638cc8ac0fd5b359a39df340c9669
121245f80f67d70a62ee77521ff0151fdf4fafe4
1020 F20101112_AACYUH martinelli_a_Page_02.pro
0fc852f7fdbfcc45d5935e74b58573c2
178e0ab6572f48abba6e8695295e1d1d0d8e7074
118546 F20101112_AACYPK martinelli_a_Page_43.jpg
f7dc833c0bfd69a9c981ea934991384e
81c43b906d5eb62d83790784d4cbd28f775e7f0a
9297 F20101112_AACZBG martinelli_a_Page_42thm.jpg
f0c0fe28161d973910acb1e522ec90ad
16bee67f6ddbaeddcec49cb4b489cc70e69110ce
35313 F20101112_AACYZG martinelli_a_Page_19.QC.jpg
d2fd21aa99e3f2afeeb81aac6e8f904c
cb34817db9fdc1b3c0a3b7413fa8fba61f80f61c
114437 F20101112_AACYKO martinelli_a_Page_15.jpg
aa8c26fb5913ac9a39df96b8c31a88f1
a4ec88988fb9b3400e9d10f7ca7302106e7887aa
758 F20101112_AACYUI martinelli_a_Page_03.pro
1dce585cafde93a6a643695e0882502e
20be8fc85804035eb2cee3f9c55ce24ecf70959a
103365 F20101112_AACYPL martinelli_a_Page_44.jpg
6f67350b70d1971020a8b808b5f2c5f1
65653d9dad6ef19d80c72b4b814bbfb8122bc865
35136 F20101112_AACZBH martinelli_a_Page_43.QC.jpg
4926de20db0a30b13823ba411a28fe18
27c65d0d43ea8872772b2d021b123254a59f9c1d
8138 F20101112_AACYZH martinelli_a_Page_53thm.jpg
00cc44c5586fd50fc749e88d6a9a8144
2e077b8c153c29e84022ede9aef2dfa4b1a020d5
2739 F20101112_AACYKP martinelli_a_Page_33.txt
132f5ffb5ff9b1be084415b1d3dfeb11
a85e75eaaf98fd94a9ca7a2851daae16266ef371
45258 F20101112_AACYUJ martinelli_a_Page_05.pro
97d8ca1aebd145f1c17460d2ff864a06
30aacb19ce2c85e3c77464d7b43fffba92e83c6d
116539 F20101112_AACYPM martinelli_a_Page_45.jpg
d9836918a0fab6d6e3c6e4892939cb13
32dfd38f2bf97b1ab9784e850312b62ef1a65eab
8208 F20101112_AACZBI martinelli_a_Page_44thm.jpg
fb2f81d6608e22b8ba2a94d0861d734e
fc48e111efeb8a2a9865160d68b3d3db43699b41
8898 F20101112_AACYKQ martinelli_a_Page_09thm.jpg
4aa2ad66e2bf6a9c9ffd94b4f6e31325
69afd7e5572606fe5b3b34bdb1d4afa6d290013c
30891 F20101112_AACYUK martinelli_a_Page_06.pro
aac78d44aa507efaf2c48ced8a519ad3
6de23e24242491f3642c098802c1e8127120ce3f
101566 F20101112_AACYPN martinelli_a_Page_46.jpg
722561271004276e9c5550c9b6d93c8e
99338d8af686395a46ffe24a196b7ea0ddc2bd3b
F20101112_AACZBJ martinelli_a_Page_47thm.jpg
51f3cf8e87cc56f18db4759d3a2f6f49
ec803c52a74df4889f7ffbaaf858bd550199f8a2
8391 F20101112_AACYZI martinelli_a_Page_51thm.jpg
a973d943755dd636b580f9918f1fe768
46aba64ae593a83aed6fa353f65bc40157bba79c
6260 F20101112_AACYKR martinelli_a_Page_67thm.jpg
39eff681470d83e362dbe82db56d20d2
d04b8021dfe08f9d3db64d8d19ce73f5cb9c83fb
53525 F20101112_AACYUL martinelli_a_Page_07.pro
44d59acc7d93513b4e0212da0ba795c5
9def3e3936f85deed4742701833026bda6ff5476
108991 F20101112_AACYPO martinelli_a_Page_47.jpg
86d56d471658a5a9ae8bb0f47be80887
878bec0ff8c512a1ae340e9f78e5365ad0608658
32887 F20101112_AACZBK martinelli_a_Page_49.QC.jpg
e96ee8aef988690faf3c586c951b0e4c
9f768ae083db0bd1314d517f522ce7e8c9dc0c41
8476 F20101112_AACYZJ martinelli_a_Page_58thm.jpg
95418a9bb00b1a12485a21987e1a08e9
9240d23264cd4486989e6474b0f0fb3430ede22a
24491 F20101112_AACYKS martinelli_a_Page_67.QC.jpg
2b9daf8a1849cf524157137431fd92bf
b2c84c9ccf27bfe7f2709a3f7b0c1a92db0fe6fb
77268 F20101112_AACYUM martinelli_a_Page_08.pro
3af373879ad38a849382a96913601309
3f7b047d7e76bbdefb453feba301223503a958f1
120914 F20101112_AACYPP martinelli_a_Page_48.jpg
3cec1c822f268a21b8e2096f57d15b98
a1099f2e663cf9d00283456f232bdf9eb7838123
8035 F20101112_AACZBL martinelli_a_Page_49thm.jpg
82a403f5fbe9f5d3ffa0c2f97f4d4ff5
89cf0daa0b75f51a6da52c3c13a7fbdd5ba92c20
35667 F20101112_AACYZK martinelli_a_Page_26.QC.jpg
28b2b1991519d9893bd6198d4f268671
892c58bf1ada17a6aba766d6ec6d25fa60754eb7
116667 F20101112_AACYKT martinelli_a_Page_14.jpg
a0d154c82127c49101f1d48fc91d79ef
0020c9a1b4bf82d51d1c894ea4d4d3a3bc58359f
53427 F20101112_AACYUN martinelli_a_Page_09.pro
7544f278abc6524d9b5fd695cdb8e033
d3801a3a97287d6297bb2052cb723c77b81b8203
108307 F20101112_AACYPQ martinelli_a_Page_50.jpg
8d6488e2702f726b227c6a3bbbbb2335
ce72e98f3ee2c56a2480259b835b59501bfea036
34961 F20101112_AACZBM martinelli_a_Page_50.QC.jpg
485722ea01c64f3168fc01528d6d4f08
5bd7f8c3eee31ca0928206148243c25f00b2a417
9305 F20101112_AACYZL martinelli_a_Page_20thm.jpg
b1e4d82875cd7d90ecf5b551c52ea52d
e412ca850edc183fc566157baa388cf93d4221f2
38720 F20101112_AACYKU martinelli_a_Page_20.QC.jpg
227d02ba1ae40b8789b3a2e311cb81e6
7e585f0c4c3c540c3b0a10be5602b8fc40c578e0
59276 F20101112_AACYUO martinelli_a_Page_10.pro
e1cdc8f50d2579ef178f645baeef1d09
5acd06dc887708b33775dd68cac9a6432e42249c
101681 F20101112_AACYPR martinelli_a_Page_51.jpg
02dcd8031c724d2e1a102e4647baccb7
3ee21b21be17d8953c6da6c25c6aed920b78ec99
8619 F20101112_AACZBN martinelli_a_Page_50thm.jpg
1cea115c37023fe556ea23c243f40fe1
c92010bc8e1baa4a73a527e49fc25f2fcc7bd83b
8948 F20101112_AACYZM martinelli_a_Page_10thm.jpg
e277e0e627b2aa576dbf837c22cb9233
af4061cfbfe42d67cd365aa8f6fd988f7234c5c2
2673 F20101112_AACYKV martinelli_a_Page_12.txt
4bf9317d47eaaee3236bd437cfaaf3a6
d10b75b8375b5474b8362d90ac5423dfc5c86e88
64248 F20101112_AACYUP martinelli_a_Page_11.pro
c729ab9b4a3418e2f4af6ad1d17b55b4
4f626939b2cc60051aa49f0de1567d42dbd6028c
112764 F20101112_AACYPS martinelli_a_Page_52.jpg
61e35358b0eb9e6551ce63e5b3437e1e
ac93c217ce1290408e7296e83cd582d2c02a515f
8896 F20101112_AACZBO martinelli_a_Page_52thm.jpg
cd66170e2df2c5f5a38eb0a81b6bdd8a
146841cda8a2aa33cb276a0f7e5af5af05fbbde7
35558 F20101112_AACYZN martinelli_a_Page_58.QC.jpg
0df8f23550f435bee958ca3e37e47da2
b4d497c17541b36ad6a26e36d19ad0e372fa5ab4
2305 F20101112_AACYKW martinelli_a_Page_60.txt
3bb8ad88f91f0ab8f92255ffc1babb7b
7038abe641d496b21434a10b23c62e786196d446
68749 F20101112_AACYUQ martinelli_a_Page_12.pro
9978b3b9a84c9279fd18f9fc39c55504
8d519709f649052f04352cbab09af8866de6c63f
106717 F20101112_AACYPT martinelli_a_Page_54.jpg
1596d7674ae7152eef7204b9d49b3b9d
3d69e3f7c549bf4a8958dd6372f0fbec19401061
36592 F20101112_AACYZO martinelli_a_Page_14.QC.jpg
c9bccd3c953eabd81cef92e2510408d1
6e40f4be1f067e90d131e96eb9314a12032ba3ae
2773 F20101112_AACYKX martinelli_a_Page_39.txt
1499c100cb9ef6d46e662a6c11cb85eb
d7cd1e96bc725795870ad1903ff2f00f3ffe7ff0
64440 F20101112_AACYUR martinelli_a_Page_13.pro
f5c576b609854df320b872401572f3c2
b9c2f93d706b6017b542e91113ddacd1b2074795
111884 F20101112_AACYPU martinelli_a_Page_55.jpg
1924bf1c0b670360bc5c82ac3af7e115
555807cb31a2e92900f1739b64ec121dedb23515



PAGE 1

A MODERATE CALM? FLORIDAS STRU GGLE OVER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AFTER BROWN 1955-1961 By AMY CAMILE MARTINELLI A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007 1

PAGE 2

2007 Amy Camile Martinelli 2

PAGE 3

To my Mom and Dad. 3

PAGE 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS page ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. ...1 Historical Framework ...............................................................................................................3 2 NARRATIVE.................................................................................................................... .....12 Part I: Florida Reacts to Brown, 1955-1957 ...........................................................................12 Part II: Two Years of Change, 1957-1958 ..............................................................................29 Part III: The Disinteg ration of Moderation, 1958-1960........................................................33 Part IV: Summary ...................................................................................................................48 3 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... ....51 LIST OF REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................59 Primary Sources ......................................................................................................................59 Secondary Sources ..................................................................................................................59 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .........................................................................................................62 4

PAGE 5

Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ma ster of Arts in Education A MODERATE CALM? FLORIDAS STRU GGLE OVER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AFTER BROWN 1955-1961 By Amy Camile Martinelli May 2007 Chair: Sevan Terzian Major: Foundations of Education The purpose of this study was to examine the influences that various constituents in Florida had on the decisions of a moderate southern governor, LeRoy Collins, from 1955-1961. After the landmark Brown decisions of the U.S. Supr eme Court in 1954 and 1955, most historians tended to cate gorize Florida as distinct from other southern states because the state produced little violence and attracted little media attention. This study sought to reevaluate that claim and to consider how strict segregationi sts and avid integrati onists, mostly African Americans, influenced the moderate governors decisions. Between 1955 and 1957, the governor relied upon a bi-racial committee to advise him on how to deal with segregation in the state. The group recommended a moderate plan that utilized a Pupil Assignment Law used in many ot her southern states in response to Brown. During this time, segregationist legislators generally supported the governors plan, but some questioned its ability to sustain segregation. Segregationist legislators and th e moderate governor conflicted on many issues, most importantly, reapportionment of the legislature. So, when the moderate governor vetoed segregation laws other than his own and blocked Interposition, segregationists began to lose faith in the moderate governor. Integrationists also questioned the governors vi

PAGE 6

plans. The NAACP brought lawsuits into court to test the Pupil Assi gnment law with little success. Generally, the state favored the m oderate stance in the first two years after Brown. However, in 1958 two events changed the racial atmosphere in Florida. In Jacksonville, a Jewish synagogue and an African American sc hool were bombed by self-proclaimed members of the Confederate Underground. Further so uth, in Miami, the first school in Florida desegregated peacefully. At once, the events hei ghtened fears of violence and of desegregation. Thus, in this fateful year, segregationists and in tegrationists lost faith in the governor and his plans for segregation. Segregationists brought unp recedented numbers of segregation legislation to the floor, and integrationists un ited to fight for desegregation more than ever before in Florida. The inability for moderates, segregationists, a nd integrationists to unite in Florida in the period immediately follo wing the historical Brown decision prevented much of the racial furor seen in most southern states, but did not avoi d it completely. Racial segregation was hotly contested in the historica lly named moderate state. vii

PAGE 7

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On Saturday, March 19, 1960, Florida Governor Le Roy Collinss driver (a highway patrol officer) reported that a buslo ad of Negroes had arrived at Florida A&M University with baseball bats in hand. The driver reported that the young men came from Alabama to augment local forces in Tallahassee lunch counter sit-in s and had planned a demonstration. Collins called the president of the university who offered conf irmation: It is true, Governor, weve got a busload...For a year now we have had abaseball game, scheduled with the institution up there in Alabama and the boys are here with their bats to play the game. 1 The next night, Governor Collins addressed the situation in a speech broadcasted statewide over television and radio. Collins announced that if some Alabama boys came to promote violence, he would certainly quell the situation through poli ce control as he had a year earlier before a Ku Klux Klan demonstration. But, the mere presence of African Americans from another state should not elicit any kind of action. The Florida governors resp onse statement exemplified his abhorrence of violence either in support of the preser vation or elimination of segregation. LeRoy Collins attempted to maintain peace and order in his state during a tumultuous period in the Souths history. Hi storians note that through Collin ss efforts to maintain peace, Florida fared better after the Supreme Courts historic Brown vs. Board decision of 1954 than most southern states. Although the Sunshine State produced almost no desegregation immediately after Brown, it also suffered relatively little violence. Some contend that Floridas calm reaction to Brown resulted from its relatively small African American population and the states financial reliance on tourism. Others credit the governor and his moderate leadership for 1 Transcript of Statewide TV-Radio Talk by Governor LeRoy Collins, 20 March 1960, Series 226 Box 2 File 15, Collins Papers, Florida State Archives. 1

PAGE 8

Floridas seemingly harmonious response to the Supreme Court decision. Whatever the cause, Florida did not receive widespr ead national attention for racial tension even though the state remained entrenched in segregation well after Brown. Historians Joseph Tomberlin, Richard Scher, David Colburn, Tom Wagy and Earl Black have interpre ted Governor Collinss stance toward segregation as moderate and have tended to downplay Floridas long history of racial segregation. Instead, their moderate interpreta tions of Collinss perspective overshadowed and oversimplified Floridas explos ive atmosphere following the Brown decision. 2 To provide new insight into Fl oridas own history and its pla ce in southern history, this thesis examines Floridas varied reactions to the Brown decision from 1955-1961. Historians have tended either to overlook Floridas history of racial segregation, or focus solely on Collinss moderation. This study seeks to reev aluate Floridas history of raci al segregation as well as the states position in the south. Th e governors moderate stance ha s dominated historical accounts of Florida and is credited for the pe aceful atmosphere in the state after Brown. Additionally, this study adds to a larger perspective of southern hi story as a whole, and re veals that contrary to many historians interpretations, Floridas history was not distinct from other southern states. Reexamining Floridas moderate stance and including constituents who influenced the 2 For discussion of Collins as a moderate see David C. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision, The Florida Historical Quarterly (Autumn 1975): 154-170; Joseph Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959, The Journal of Negro Education (Autumn 1974):457-467. For a thorough biography of LeRoy Collins see Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980). For a definition of moderate segregationist see Earl Black, Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-1969, The Journal of Politics (Summer 1971): 703-734. This paper is informed by Blacks definition of a moderate segregationist candidate as one who 1) favors racial segregation, but these preferences are usually qualified by other values and commitments, 2) does not make the defense of racial segregation a leading campaign issue, 3) avoids appealing to racial prejudice to discredit his opponent. For discussion of Floridas lack of violence see: R.W. Puryear, Desegregation of Public Education in FloridaOne Year Afterward, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1955): 219-227; Joseph A. Tomberlin, Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954, Florida Historical Quarterly (Autumn 1972): 22-36. 2

PAGE 9

governors decisions allows for the possibility to conclude that race relations in the state were no better or worse than in other southern stat es, and were nothing short of explosive. In order to contribute not only to Floridas history but to the hist ory of the south, this study focuses on the governors response to the historic Brown case, and those of prominent segregationists and integrationists as well. LeRoy Collinss correspondence suggest that he was indeed concerned about segregati on, but was more interested in the economic and social welfare of his state. Articles and editorials from three ma instream newspapers, the Miami Herald (Miami), the Florida Times Union (Jacksonville), and the Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee) provided white (and often se gregationist) perspectives from diffe rent parts of the state. African American newspapers, the Miami Times (Miami) the Florida Sentinel (Tampa), and the Florida Star (Jacksonville), revealed African American and inte grationist perspectives both for and against Collins. For additional information on integr ationist groups in Florid a, the Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP) reveal how the leaders of this group responded to Collins and how he responded to them. These resources are underutilized and add to a new pers pective about Floridas racial history. They reveal that after Brown, Floridas atmosphere was explosive a nd tense; it was not distinctive in its implementation of the Supreme Courts historic decision. Historical Framework Because my study focuses on legislation and education politics in Florida, it depends primarily on Florida sources. However, the historical framework of the preBrown and postBrown years, in the Southern United States and Fl orida in particular, provides an important background. The U.S. Supreme Courts decision did not occur in a vacuum. Accordingly, Floridas story of segregation ex ists within the cons truct of the South and the entire nation. 3

PAGE 10

Therefore it is important to begin by first accounting for the years before Brown both within the state and national contexts. Before Thurgood Marshall and the National Asso ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) ever conceived th eir attack on segregation, the st atus of African Americans in the South underwent tremendous changes. Before the Civil War, slaves and slave owners in Florida generally coexisted. The plantation lifes tyle was arranged in such a way that made it necessary for blacks and whites to live close to one another; segregating races was an inconvenience. Jim Crow became the rule of th e land in the southern United States only after the Civil War and Reconstruction. In Northern cities like Boston, however, slaves freed well before the Civil War were constantly remi nded of their inferior position through racial segregation laws. Racial segregation developed in the South after the Reconstruction period. 3 In The Strange Career of Jim Crow C. Vann Woodward explained that during Reconstruction former slaves found freedoms prev iously denied to them. Woodward contended that because the Federal government stepped in to protect freed slaves from discrimination during Reconstruction, African Am erican citizens did not need to fight for their rights. Therefore, without a vigorous attitude, freed slaves eventually faced conditions similar to slavery shortly after Reconstruction. Patr icia L. Kenneys depiction of the African American community in LaVilla, Florida near Jack sonville, provided an illustration of how whites maintained power over freed slaves even after emancipation. LaVilla was separate from the mass conglomeration of whites and was built to house freed slaves. However, the community was close enough to Jacksonville for freed slaves to continue to work for whitesoftentimes their former masters. 3 David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, The African American Heritage of Florida (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1995); Ronald P. Formisano Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. (New York: Oxford Press, 1974). 4

PAGE 11

Already segregated from whites, small Recons truction villages eventually fed into the establishment of Jim Crow. Wh ile Reconstruction presented a pe riod of opportunity for African Americans, Woodward ultimately blames Jim Cr ow and the continuance of discrimination on Reconstructions demise. 4 After Reconstruction, many African Americans found themselves in conditions not unlike slavery for decades. According to recent historians, the status of southern African Americans did not begin to change until the 1940s, when a period of new hope arrived. In Floridas Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida David L. Colburn and Lance De-Haven Smith reported that in the 1940s, the southeastern regi on of the United States was the poorest in the nation. However, after World War II newfound wealth brought Northerners, and their money, to the economically deprived region. Florida ha d experienced a population boom once before in the 1920s, which quickly fizzled during the Great Depression. Native Floridians understood the importance of encouraging economic growth. But as the political atmosphere became more diverse, the locus of control remained solidly wi th the traditional crackers who resided in the northernmost parts of Florida. Even with d eep south roots, Flor idas new population did influence the traditional views of natives. 5 While population diversity changed in parts of the South, courts began to scrutinize the equal part of the separate but equal doctrine established by Plessy vs. Ferguson. After World War II, the unfairness of racial discriminati on in the United States became more evident 4 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1974): 71-78; Patricia L. Kenney. LaVilla, Florida, 1866-1887: Reconstruction Dreams and the Formation of a Black Community, in The African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, 185-206 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1995). 5 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven Smith, Floridas Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2002); David L. Colburn and Richard S. Scher, Floridas Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century (Tallahassee, University Press of Florida, 1980), Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980: The Story of the Souths Modernization (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Stat e University Press, 1995). 5

PAGE 12

throughout the world. African American men fought along with white soldiers in segregated unitsand their children attended segregated schools. American forces fought for freedom overseas, but the nation failed to provide it for all of its sold iers and citizens at home. Accordingly, many southern states attempted to comply with both the separate and equal parts of the separate but equal doctrine. Florida legislators tried this through increasing standards for African American schools, increasing salaries fo r African American teachers, and equalizing the length of the school year for African American sc hools. But even with the eyes of the world upon the United States, the traditi on of racial discrimination perm eated southern institutions. 6 In Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality Richard Kluger describes the road to Brown as calculated and timeconsuming. After the NAACP claimed victory in the U.S. Supreme Court, segregation remained in the hands of white segregationists. Th e South was still predominantly run by white segregationists. Instances like Alabamas S cottsboro Boys and Flor idas Groveland case highlighted the absolute power of white authorities in most sout hern towns. In the wake of World War II and the economic boom that followe d, most Americans enjoyed their reprieve from the Great Depression, but for most Sout hern African Americans little had changed. 7 However, C. Vann Woodward suggested in The Strange Career of Jim Crow that the South is a tumultuous and ever-changing regi on. When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown, responses were therefore not predictable. In The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics 6 Bartley, The New South; Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997); R.W. Puryear, Desegregation of Public Education in FloridaOne Year After, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1955): 219-227; Joseph A. Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959: A Summary View, The Journal of Negro Education (Autumn 1974): 457-467. 7 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage Books 2004); Stephen F. Lawson, David L. Colburn, and Darryl Paulson, Groveland: Floridas Little Scottsboro, in The African American Heritage of Florida Edited by David L. Colburn and Jane L. Landers (Gainesville: Univ ersity Presses of Florida, 1995). 6

PAGE 13

in the South During the 1950s, Numan V. Bartley described the Souths response to Brown as a period of calm followed by massive resistance, which manifested itself in physical and symbolic ways. Massive resistance to de segregation rested on the idea th at the Negros place in the world was determined by tradition, by nature by law, at the bottom. Common massive resistance tactics included propaganda and enacti ng a doctrine of interpos ition. Interposition is an asserted right of a state to protect sovereignty. It was first used during the Civil War to oppose the abolition of slavery. The fear of miscegen ation even sparked battles in the textbook industry. Essentially, massive resistance took many forms which included, but was not limited to, violence. 8 Resistance also took the form of segregation le gislation. As of 1956, most southern states either had not responded to the Brown decrees or reported the use of legal means to maintain segregation. According to a statistical summ ary of desegregation published by the Southern Education Reporting Service, Florida was among seven of the eightee n states in the South that passed pupil assignment laws. These provisions allowed local school boards to place students in schools based on nebulous criteria; gene rally the laws promoted segregation over desegregation. Furthermore, Florida was among six of the eighteen southern states that passed Interposition resolutions that de emed the U.S. Supreme Courts Brown decisions null and void. These examples indicate that, le gislatively, Florida reacted to Brown in ways similar to deep south states. 9 8 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance ; Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow ; Jonathan Zimmerman, Browning the American Textbook: History, Psychology, and the Origins of Modern Multiculturalism, History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 45-69. 9 William A Bender, The Status of Educational Desegregation in Mississippi, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1956):285-288; Lewis W. Jones, Two Years of Desegregation in Alabama, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1956): 205-211; W.E. Solomon, The Problem of Desegregation in South Carolina, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1956): 315-323; Stephen A. Stephen, The Status of Integration and Segregation in Arkansas, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1956): 212-220; Gilbert Porter, The Status of 7

PAGE 14

However, in Florida, segregation was not the only subject of contention. The U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision in the midst of the states own embittered battle for reapportionment of its legislat ure. This period represents a time when a handful of legislators from small districts scattered throughout the st ate controlled Floridas houses of congress even though their constituents did not represent the growing population. Tom Wagy and David Colburn and Lance deHaven-Smith, contend that G overnor Collins wanted to focus most of his energy toward altering the apportionment of the le gislature so that the government would reflect proportionately the growing population. Furthermore, the so-called Pork Chop Gang, a faction of small district legislators led by Senator Ch arley Johns, (Dem. Bradford), sought not only to continue the misrepresentative apportionment, but also the traditions of the old south. Therefore, these politicians not only oppos ed reapportionment but integration as well. Throughout his tenure as governor, Collins attempted to pa ss reapportionment legisl ation, but the Pork Choppers consistently blocked him. 10 Although historians accounts of the aftermath of Brown tended to focus on negative implications for whites, African Americans felt the brunt of the ruling as well. In The Displacement of Black Educators PostBrown, Michael Fultz describe s the firings of African American teachers. He conclude s that it was easier to integrat e students than school staffs. Tenure laws in six southern stat es, including Florida, changed to discriminate against African American teachers. Some southern states revise d contracts for African American teachers to an Educational Desegregation in Florida, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1956): 246-253; Status of Segregation-Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, Published by Southern Education Reporting Service, Nashville, Tennessee 1960: 1-20. 10 Michael Maggioto, The Impact of Reapportionment in Public Policy, American Politics Quarterly 13 (January 1985); Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South, 46-58; Colburn and deHavenSmith, Floridas Megatrends 44-49; The pork choppers were broken up in 1962 as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court case Baker vs. Carr. 8

PAGE 15

annual basis. In Georgia, teachers who were members of the NAACP could have their licenses revoked permanently. Threats of desegregation cl osed African American schools before white schools, and as a result many teachers lost thei r jobs. According to Arthur O. White in One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida African American educators feared similar consequences. In a survey which included 4,000 questionnaires and personal interviews in nine counties, many respondents cl aimed that African American teachers would have difficulty finding employment in a desegregated system. 11 Marybeth Gasman explained in Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision, how Brown threatened African American ins titutions of higher education. If schools desegregated, then African American colleges could have been in jeopardy. The institutions suddenly needed to justify their existence. The United Negro College Fund did this by encouraging white students to enroll, arguing that financial constraints stil l limited many in the pursuit of education, and attempting to enter into the mainstream of e ducation. Desegregation was a high priority for African Americans, but it did not come without a cost. Both Fultz and Gasman indicated that even if Brown created new problems, African American educators were willing to accommodate those problems. For the most part, African Am erican educators continued to struggle for professionalism and equality. 12 Vanessa Siddle Walker presents African American teachers as highly motivated and dedicated to professionalism in African Am erican Teaching in the South: 1940-1960. She 11 Michael Fultz, The Displaceme nt of Black Educators PostBrown : An Overview and Analysis , History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004):11-45; Arthur O. White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1979), 135. 12 Marybeth Gasman, Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The Fundrais ing Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision, History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 70-92. 9

PAGE 16

explains that although most histor ians characterize African Amer ican teachers as victims of oppression or as caring role models, they were really professionals who used many tactics to teach their students. African American teachers in Georgia generally received more formal education than their white counterparts. These educators worked in dismal and unequal facilities to white educators but did not become victims of their environment. Through African American teachers associations, they were able to maintain high standards for themselves, their communities, and their students. Walkers article suggests that even under oppressive conditions, African American educ ators prioritized education, a nd strove for their equality. 13 Historians have examined many aspects of s outhern educational history, but have largely neglected Floridas role. To ascertain a new perspective of how Florida responded to Brown, this thesis examines the priorities of key cons tituents. As historians have already indicated, Governor Collins played an integral role in Floridas immediate response to Brown. Collins represented the moderate position in Floridaopposed to segregat ion and violence. What, then, constituted Governor Collinss legislative prio rities? What did Collins say about school desegregation? How did Collins respond to Brown? Did his stance change over time? Who in the state agreed with Collins and who disagreed? Missing from Floridas historic al account of the period after Brown are the perspectives of multiple constituents who influe nced the governor. This thesis seeks to provide new insight for Floridas history as well as history of the south, and to de cipher why segregation lasted so long after Brown in a state with a self-pro claimed moderate governor. Therefore, it is imperative to ask questions about the key constituents in Fl orida. Historians have categorized Collins as a moderate segregationist. Those historians have evaluated the states reaction to Brown through 13 Vanessa Siddle Walker, African Amer ican Teaching in the South: 1940-1960, American Educational Research Journal (Winter 2001): 751-779. 10

PAGE 17

his viewpoint but have neglected ot her actors that played a role in the state at the time. Their attention to Collins has placed an inordinate em phasis on the absence of violence and has hidden Floridas volatile legislative and social atmosphere. Collins was a moderate governor who placed a high priority on reapportioning th e states legislature. He faile d to preserve ra ce relations and his focus on reapportionment and peaceful order even tually led many Florida residents to distrust his stance on segregation. 14 Historians credit Collins for maintaining p eace in his state, but the governors approach displeased many powerful constituents. His goals differed from rural segregationists whose absolute power was threatened by reapportionm ent. Integrationist leaders, meanwhile, eventually lost faith that Co llinss moderation supported their ne eds. In the end, he was too integrationist for some and too segregationist for others. As Collinss terms as governor diminished, so did support from both segregationist and integrationist groups because his singleminded aspiration for peace discredited groups who want ed to fight for their beliefs. This thesis therefore argues that Floridas se gregation was typical of most s outhern states with respect to education and race, but there are exceptions. The moderate governor and the economic climate in Florida occasionally affected the states segregation practices. 14 Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South 46-58; Colburn and deHaven-Smith: Floridas Megatrends, 35-61; Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959, 459; Black, Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 19501969, 711. 11

PAGE 18

CHAPTER 2 NARRATIVE Part I: Florida Reacts to Brown, 1955-1957 After World War II and before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Plessy vs. Ferguson unconstitutional, Florida launched efforts to e qualize African American and white schools. Floridas schools lived up to the separate aspect separate but equal doctrine, but not the equal part. Florida leaders re alized inequities in schools existed and attempted to remedy the situation, if not for philanthropi c reasons, then to preserve segregation. Between 1940 and 1952, expenditures on African American students and t eacher salaries nearly tripled. In 1947, the legislature passed the Minimu m Foundation Act to improve, overall, the public education system. LeRoy Collins, then a State Senator from Leon County, was a major proponent of the Minimum Foundation Program. 1 With the Minimum Foundation Program in pl ace, Florida leaders believed they might adhere to the separate but equal doctrine and th ereby allow segregation to continue. But when the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its first ruling on Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka Kansas on May 17, 1954, leaders in Florida had to re spond somehow. Under Governor Daniel McCarty, the Florida legislature enacted Senate Bill 124, known as the Pupil Placement Law. This law allowed local school boards to admit or deny pupils from public schools for virtually any reason. Segregationist-domin ated districts could sustain se gregation. The Pupil Placement Law did not explicitly prohibit desegregation; thus, it allowed local communities to control 1 In 1940, the state expended $23.67 per African American student. By 1952, the state expended $153.24 per African American Student. African Amer ican teachers earned $583 per year in 1940, but by 1953 they earned $2,922. The state also equalized the school year so that every child attended school during the 180 day cycle. Joseph Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959, The Journal of Negro Education (Autumn 1974):457-467; R.W. Puryear, Desegregation of Public Education in FloridaOne Year Afterward, The Journal of Negro Education (Summer 1955): 219-227. 12

PAGE 19

segregation policies. Furthermore, local groups held responsibility for conflicts that arose due to desegregation. 2 In 1955, Governor McCarty died while in offi ce. Senator LeRoy Collins, (Dem., Leon) a friend of the governors ran to take McCartys place and carry out his predecessors plan to reapportion Floridas legislature. Reapportionment of the legislature was Collinss main focus while in office. According to Tom Wagys bi ographical account of the governors life, the historical Brown decision altered Collinss priorities. The moderate governor gained most of his voter support from constituents who would attain more political power through reapportionment. On the other hand, the small Pork Chop Gang pr esented a dominant voice of opposition toward the governor and his initiatives. William C. Harvar d and Loren P. Beth explained, however, that reapportionment would only succeed if forced from the outside. The current legislative body would not approve the change because it would strip it of power. Furthermore, in the 1955 legislative session, Collins first introduced reap portionment as a key issue of contention and continued to do so in every session as governor. Harvard and Beth i ndicated that his strong stance on reapportionment isolated some legislators, who resolved to fight every measure the governor backed. 3 When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown for the second time, racial segregation threatened to overshadow Collinss goal for reapportionment. 4 A Tallahassee native, Collins served as a Democratic Representative for Leon County from 1934 to 1940. He then acted as a state Senator until 1941 when he served in the U.S. Navy 2 General Acts and Resolutions Adopted by the Legislature of Florida at its Thirty-fifth Regular Session, Volume 1 Part One, 1955: 302-305; Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 457. 3 William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1962), 58. 4 Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 53; Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 21. 13

PAGE 20

during World War II. Upon his return Collins was elected to the Senate for eight years and was hailed a champion of progressive educational legi slation. Segregation, however, was not high on Collinss to-do list. In his campaign speeches, Collin s promised the citizens of Florida that he would preserve segregation. Mostly, he focu sed on enhancing state economic and industrial growth. Collins emphasized his opposition to the courts ruling but understood that any legislative plan for desegregation needed careful crafting. The new governor faced Brown, and all the problems associated with it, by advocatin g a moderate approach to preserve segregation. 5 Floridas First Legislation: Th e Pupil Assignment Law, 1955-1957 The Pupil Placement Law was a provisionary ac tion taken to fend off desegregation and endured the year between the two Brown rulings. In fact, in 1955 Floridas news writers essentially ignored Brown The editor of the Tallahassee Democrat cautioned the legislature not to produce sweeping segregation measures until the U.S. Supreme Court released its second Brown ruling. The court revealed its Brown II directive to desegregate with all deliberate speed, and Governor LeRoy Collins told the Tallahassee Democrat that the state could move calmly. The vagueness of the condition allowed time to consider a proper course of action. 6 Collins may have cared little for segregation po litics, but he understood the necessity of a plan for segregation. Brown could generate a potentially viru lent atmosphere, so he sought assistance. In 1956, Governor Collins and Gene ral Richard Ervin formed a committee of legal experts to devise segregation legislation. This group, known as the Fabisinski Committee, attempted to solve the conundrum of legally maintaining segrega tion. If the governor ascertained 5 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven Smith, Floridas Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida (Gainesville, University Presses of Florida, 2002), 127. 6 John Tapers, Whats Being Done About Segregation? The Tallahassee Democrat 22 April 1955, 2; John Tapers, The Governors Program The Tallahassee Democrat 6 April 1955, 6; John Tapers, End of Segregation The Tallahassee Democrat 14 May 1955, 2; Floridians Relieved: Collins Says State Can Move Calmly, The Florida Times Union 1 June 1955, 6. 14

PAGE 21

some lawful and practical proposal to handle integration from the committees report, he would call a special session of legislature to act upon it. 7 On July 16, 1956 the Fabisinski Committee released its report. It concluded that in the days after the Brown decision, Florida and the nation were bound to experience difficult times. The report cautioned legislators against acting on emotion. To determine segregation policies based on tradition and emotion alone could amplif y unnecessary tension. The committee shared similar goals with the governor. They wanted to preserve the public school system in Florida so that every child had the opportuni ty to succeed through educati on. Educated children produced educated workers. They wanted to prevent hostile feelings between different classes and groups to maintain harmony. Finally, they wanted to maintain segregation but also comply with the United States Constitution. The committee suggested a plan that strengthened the existing Pupil Placement Law to attain these goals. This new Pupil Assignment Law, allowed districts to determine student school assignments on psychological and socio-economic factors. Implementation of pupil assignment relied on tests to account for socio-cu ltural and psychological considerations to determine a students welfare in a school. Essentially, th e tests utilized vague justifications for school placement decisions. However, pupil assignment did not de mand segregation. Collins hoped the Pupil Assignment Law would retain se gregation without suffering immediate judicial peril. So, on July 20, 1956, he sent a proclamatio n to the Florida State Legislature calling for a 7 The members of the committee included Judge L.L. Fabisinski, chairman Judge Rivers Buford, vice chairman, Judge Millard Smith, Cody Fowler, Luther Mershon, J. Le wis Hall and John T. Wigginton (only one of these men was African American: Lewis Ha ll.); Herbert Cameron, Collins to Curb Session Agenda, The Florida Times Union 3 July 1956, 12; Night PressCollect, 10 May 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. 15

PAGE 22

special session of legislature to consider th e Fabisinski Committees four-point segregation program. 8 Legislators reacted favorably and decidedl y approved the measure with only one dissenting vote. Newspapers sanctioned pupil assi gnment as well. For instance, the editor of the Miami Herald called the program the opinion of a competent committee who studied the matter thoroughly. The segregation plan equally pleased the editor of the Tallahassee Democrat He reminded his readers that the U.S. Supreme Court did not mandate integration, but declared racial segregation unconstitutional. So, if pupil assignment did not intentionally segregate schools then the law was constitutional. Als o, pupil assignment provided time to plan for desegregation. Supporters believed the committee found temperate and sound efforts to maintain segregation in Florida. Others in the state did not agree. 9 Superintendent of Public In struction Thomas D. Bailey believed the Pupil Assignment Law would suffice to avoid segregation problems in public schools; he did not advise any further legislation. However, Bailey did have some reservations because only one member of the Fabisinski Committee approached him and no legi slators had consulted him about this law. Bailey believed pupil assignment presented Herculean and puzzling planning for 8 Acts and Regulations Adopted by the Legislature of Florida at its Extraordinary Sessions: June 6, 1955 to June 11, 1956 and July 23, 1956 to August 1, 1956, Published by Authority of Law, 1956: 30-35. The Fabisinski Committee based its recommendations on laws that succeeded in the State courts of North Carolin a. Report of the Special Committee, 2-3. A Proclamation by the Governor, State of Florida, Executive Department, Tallahassee, 20 July 1956, file unmarked, box 25, series 776 A, Procla mations, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey opposed the use of tests so broadly. The four-point program included the Pupil Assignment Law, regulating assignment s of teachers, vesting power in the governor to use necessary means to protect peace and tranquility, and allow the governor to call forth all law enforcement agencies in the state in case of an emergency. This paper focu ses on the Pupil Assignment Law because it is the major piece of legislation utilized in Florida after Brown to avoid desegregation. 9 What others Think, Tallahassee Democrat 17 July 1956, 6. The one dissenting vote was cast by House Representative John D. Orr from Dade County who felt that the bill was an attempt to circumvent the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and that it would be deemed in effective. Student Assignment Bill Voted By House and Sent to Collins, The Florida Times Union, 25 July 1956, 8; John S. Knight, Will Special Session Set a New Pattern? The Miami Herald 25 July 1956, 6A; John Tapers, An Effective Measure, The Tallahassee Democrat 27 July 1956, 4; John Tapers, Odd Man in the Legislature, The Tallahassee Democrat 2 August 1956, 4. 16

PAGE 23

implementation. The law did not consider Flor idas geography and demographics. In large urban areas, school attendance zones would maintain segregation. In rural or small districts where high schools drew students from all parts of the county, school attendance zones would actually facilitate desegregation. 10 Additionally, Bailey believed th e law relied too much upon th e creation of standardized tests to determine a students school eligibility; pupil assignment presented a major headache for county boards. Every child entering a school for the first time needed testing, including six-yearold first grade students. School districts could not deny pupil a ssignments because of race, so local boards needed to establish sound reasons for their admissions and denials. The committee considered segregation from a legal standpoint, but neglected the administrative level. Local school districts were responsible for maintain ing segregation, so legi slators and executives needed to reflect on what impact pupil assignment would make. 11 The Fabisinski Committees proposals also dr ew negative reactions from segregationist leaders because pupil assignment allowed segrega tion or desegregation. Segregationists feared the law could not sustain Floridas custom and law. Attorney General Richard Ervin told the Miami Herald : I dont believe it [the Pupil Assignme nt Law] goes far enough to satisfy the people of Florida. 12 Strict segregationists would not bear gradual dese gregation any more than immediate desegregation. The Attorney General believed that the people of Florida were not represented adequately under the Pupil Assignment Law. 10 Speech to Special Session, 18 May 1956, series 1127, file 2, box 15, Speeches and Press Releases Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files, Florida State Archives. 11 School Head Pledges Help in Administering New Law, The Florida Times Union, 3 August 1956, 12. 12 Floridas Segregation Efforts Doomed to Failure, Says Ervin, The Miami Herald 11 August 1956, 12. 17

PAGE 24

Former National Guardsman and prominent businessman from Tampa Sumter Lowry (Dem., Tampa) agreed. Lowry, a strict segreg ationist candidate in the 1957 gubernatorial election who forced segregation rhetoric into campaign strategies, believed that gradual integration is race suicide. 13 Because the four-point plan recommended by the governors committee stalled integration, but would not prevent it completel y, strict segregationists like Lowry desired more extreme measures. Lowry criticized the governor for not doing enough to preserve segregation and violating his campaign promise to do so. Lowry found Collinss behavior in the special session of legislature a bhorrent. According to Lowry, the governors call for the session limited legislators to do only one th ing: approve his four-point program. Collins requested legislators not consider any other segregation laws, and this left the people and their representatives little power. Le gislators, who feared the gover nors stance on a restrictive policy of reapportionment, may have feared that the groups plan was another ploy to eliminate rural districts power. 14 Opposition to the Fabisinski Committee was no t limited to strict segregationists. Integrationists found problems with pupil assignment and the committee, alike. First, the one state representative who voted against the laws proposed by the Fabisinski Committee, Rep. John D. Orr (Dem., Dade), believed pupil assignment s ubverted the U.S. Supreme Courts decision. Orr, a member of the National Association fo r the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), delivered a ten minute speech in defense of hi s decision, denouncing any practices that would defy Supreme Court rulings. He favored gradua l integration because Florida did not provide 13 Sumter L. Lowry to Governor LeRoy Collins, 23 July 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 19551961, Collins Collection, Flor ida State Archives. Lowry ran, unsuccessf ully for governor once against Collins in 1957 and then against Farris Bryant in 1960. In 1960, Lowry, the man who brought segregation into the political arena as a campaign issue, lost to Bryant, but gained a large percentage of the vote. 14 Lowry to Collins, 23 July 1956, Collins Collection. 18

PAGE 25

separate and equal schools for African Ameri can and white students. Therefore, gradual desegregation could solve inequity in Floridas public schools. Orrs fellow legislators did not agree and essentially froze him out of the le gislature until the next legislative session. Legislators kept Orr out of co mmittees, and no one would consid er his legislative proposals. 15 Representative Orrs experience in the legi slature exemplified a common fear held by integrationists in Florida: those who openly opposed segregation were not welcome. A 1956 special report of state activi ties in Florida regarding branch work of the NAACP, extolled concerns about the growing opposition to the fight against segregation. The report claimed that a conspiracy existed to s upport the fear that if de segregation occurred, there would be significant strife. Segregationists groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, white Citizens Councils, and the National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP) formed in Florida with the intent to preserve segreg ation. Those who expressed their hopes for integration might feel frightened to do so because thes e groups posed a legitimate threat. 16 Integrationists also questioned the governor s use of a bi-racial committee to sustain segregation. Robert W. Saunders Field Secretary for the NAACP, asserted that the one African American in the committee, Lewis Hall, had b een hoodwinked. After all, Saunders argued, the purpose of the committee was to preserve segregati on. Halls seat existe d to prove that some African Americans were content with the status quo, not because the committee was inclusive. 15 Rep. Orr Defends Integration Stand" The Miami Times 28 July 1956, 1; Gov. Collins Halts Freeze on Rep. Orr The Florida Sentinel 26 January, 1957, 1; Commend Rep. Orrs Stand in Legislature, The Miami Times 11 Aug 1956, 1; Congratulations Rep. Orr The Miami Times 28 July 1956, 4. Representative Orr was not completely hated by all in the state; the National Association of Colored Womens Clubs and the editor of The Miami Times congratulated the congressman on his courageous stand in th e legislature. However, none of his colleagues shared this opinion, and he lost a lot of his effectiveness in his work for almost an entire year. 16 Special Report of Activities in Florida Regarding Branch Work, etc., 11 June 1956, reel 4, frame 164, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 19

PAGE 26

Halls position on the committee also drew ne gative attention from African American newspapers. The editor of the Miami Times viewed the committee as a useful tool in improving race relations in the state because it advocated peace. However, the editor reminded his readers that the committee included merely one African Am erican and therefore could not serve the best interests of Af rican Americans. 17 The Pupil Assignment Law and the Fabisi nski Committee drew both negative and positive attention from groups of all ideologies. In spite of any misgivings, pupil assignment was the cornerstone of Floridas segregation policy. Most politicians supported the law, but wanted more segregation laws to augment it. Leader s in the African Ameri can and integrationist communities felt the law was a subve rsion of the Supreme Courts ruling. While integrationist leaders abhorred pupil assignment and the Fabisinski Committee, members of the African American community were hesitant to blame the governor because he seemed more tolerant of desegregation than other southern politicians. So, satisfied with pupil assignment, Collins asked legislators not to offer any othe r proposals for segregation. Florida Needs Protection: Th e Local Option Plan, 1956-1957 When he called for a special session of th e legislature in 1956, Governor Collins asked members not to produce any other bills regarding segregation. Controvers y came from Attorney General Richard Ervin who helped Governor Co llins create the Fabisinski Committee. Ervin honored Collinss request not to propose any new legislation during the sp ecial session of 1956. However, Ervin indicated that a private schoo l system might be a necessary precaution to preserve segregation. He was not alone. In 1956, House Representative Prentice Pruitt (Dem., Monticello) introduced two segregation bills know n as the Local Option Plan. The first allowed 17 Robert Saunders, Sound Off NAACP Secretary Raps Lee Appointment The Florida Sentinel, 15 September 1956, 4; Eric O. Simpson, Gov. Collins Bi-Racial Committee, 15 September 1956, 4. 20

PAGE 27

for emergency suspension of public schools, a nd the second allowed students from suspended schools either to attend another public institution or receive a subsidy for a private school. Governor Collins did not favor either because they allowed for the possibility to close public schools. As promised, Collins vetoed the Local Opti on Plan. This use of veto is an example of the exceptions in Floridas status as a typical southern state. A typical southern governor would welcome a plan to close schools in order to avoid desegregation. 18 Even after Collinss first veto of the Local Op tion Plan, the attorney general still believed in private school subsidies. Pupil assignmen t simply did not go far enough to preserve segregation. But before the 1957 session of legisl ature, Collins again vowed to utilize veto power, this time only on bills that threatened to close public schools. Despite Collinss decree, Ervin sponsored House Bill 671, a local option plan known as the las t resort. The plan called for closings of integrated schools and providing state-funded private school subsidies for students displaced by closed schools. Because the bill came from the attorney general, the governor needed support against the bill from anothe r legitimate source in the state. A member of the Fabisinski committee convinced Thomas D. Bailey, Superintendent of Public Instruction, to take a stand against last reso rt from an educators perspective. 19 18 News From the Legislature, The Florida Times Union, 23 July 1956. Florida Legislative Service: Summary of House Bills, 27, July, 1956, file 14, box, 25, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. The attorney general did not submit any bills into legislative committee during the 1956 special session, Pruitt asserted that he had borrowed his idea fr om Attorney General Ervin. Furthermore, Ervin admitted that he had drafted a bill and would be willing to show it to any legislator who would be interested, but because the general consensus as the time favored the Fabisinski Committees legislation, he would not push the proposal at that time. The bill did not survive in the special session, but Attorney General Ervins admission that he had had plans to propose laws that would stray from the Pupil Assignment Law foreshadowed what would become a legislative battle that permeated into the Executive Bran ch of Florida. As Segregation Barr ier: Solon to Offer Measure to Halt School System, The Florida Times Union, 20 July 1956, 6. 19 John L. Boyles, Collins to Veto Segregation Bill to Shut Down Schools, The Miami Herald, 21 April 1957; Confidential Memorandum from Joe Grotegut to Judge Fabisinski, 4 March 1957, file 1, box 117, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. An important note to consider is that Bailey did not oppose the principle behind last resort but its implementation. Bailey believed that private school 21

PAGE 28

On April 26, 1957, Thomas D. Bailey made a statement before the House Committee on Education against last resort. Bailey discusse d each section of the bill and its invalidity. Bailey indicated that while dedicated to a segreg ated school system, he disagreed with Ervin on the means. He reacted to the bill from an e ducational point of view. The aspects that Bailey opposed most regarded closing integrated schools placing displaced students into open schools, and providing state subsidies for private schools. 20 Section two of House Bill 671 dictated that an area might petit ion to hold a special election to determine whether its schools should close. Bailey argued that elections like this could start a propaganda campaign that would unn ecessarily cause racial tension and disorder. Bailey deemed that the most diabolical of a ll sanctions mandated school boards to provide education for students in closed schools in one of two ways. First, the students could be transferred to another school in the county. According to Bailey, transfers were administratively undesirable because schools were already overcrowded and could lead to a chain reaction of school closings. Second, students could be sent to schools in other c ounties or in another state. Bailey viewed both of these options as impractical and impossible; hence, the plan would thrust the third option onto school boards: funding private schools. 21 Last resort stated that counties could assist displaced students by giving parents financial assistance to attend an accredited pr ivate school. This provisi on concerned Bailey the most because [it] could place the county boards in a position of finding it necessary not only subsidies could be a good solution for the maintenance of segregation, but it could not rely on methods that subverted the Constitution of the United States. 20 Judge Fabisinski did denounce Attorney General Ervin in a statement he made to the Pensacola Journal which prompted Ervin to write him a surprised letter that stated his opinion that Fabisinski had used the issue to attack his character and not the bill that he proposed. 21 Bailey Addresses the Legislature, 26 April 1957, seri es 1127, file 2, box 15, Speeches and Press Releases Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subj ect Files, Florida State Archives. 22

PAGE 29

to condone but actually promote the establishment and operation of private schools in order for children to attend school. 22 First, it required tax funds to pay for parochial schools and therefore infringed upon separation of church and state. Second, the amount of money allotted to each parent did not provide enough funds to ensure that every student would have a sound education. The program would only benefit studen ts whose parents could afford the difference. Therefore, Bailey asked that the education comm ittee not allow last resort to go into either house of legislation. 23 The Superintendent of Public Instruction di d not oppose last resort because it preserved segregation but because of its impractical and unconstitutional implementation. African American integrationists, however, cited another reason to oppose last resort: taxation without representation. There were no African Am erican legislators in Florida postBrown thus African Americans had little political re presentation. Last re sort used tax money from all citizens, regardless of race, to support racial segregation that would not benefit African Americans in any way. Asserting the principle of taxation withou t representation in the name of desegregation represented a bold move for integrationists. It illustrated the importance of economic considerations in Florida. 24 However, not all African Americans consider ed the legislation a serious threat. The Miami Times suggested that African Americans took segr egationist politicians promises with a grain of salt acknowledging that the nasty ga me of politics required them to appear strong 22 Bailey Addresses the Legislature, 26 April 1957, Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files. 23 Ibid. The amount of money that parents would receive to send their child to a private school if there were no other options would equal the amount that the county would spend on a child in public school. The state average per student in 1955-56 was $242.69. This amount was not enough to cover tuition for an entire year at most private schools. 24 Eric O. Simpson, Has Independence Day Lost its Significance" The Florida Star, 6 July 1956, 4 23

PAGE 30

against desegregation for white constituents. Gove rnor Collins previously praised the legislature and the citizens of Florida for avoiding race furor. Also, he promised to veto extreme segregation bills. If integrationists trusted the governor, then there was no reason to fear. The editor of the Miami Times suggested that its reader s not succumb to hysteria, but encouraged that desegregation would come fast er and without disorder if it were not forced upon anyone. 25 Leaders from all ideological backgrounds held various opini ons about last resort. Collins wanted to avoid last resort and other legislation that could close schools because he believed the South should not wrap itself in the c onfederate flag and consume itself with racial furor. 26 Instead, it should find fair means to prot ect segregation where necessary. Thomas D. Bailey certainly favored maintaini ng segregation in Florida but not laws that could invalidate the states constitution. Inte grationists found the plan morally wr ong but believed that it did not pose an immediate threat to desegregation. Afte r all the argumentation, the bill was debated and passed in both houses, but as promised, Governor Collins utilized his veto power. 27 Interposition, 1956 According to a host of historians, Interpos ition was an integral aspect of massive resistance to segregation. As in most southern states, Florida le gislators adopted an Interposition resolution. Arthur S. Miller, professor of law from Emory University, explained that Interposition had no legal standing but represented a deep south political opinion against desegregation. Governor Collins be lieved that Interposition served to not only undermine efforts 25 H.E. Sigmund Reeves, Supreme Court Ruling Upsets State Politicians, The Miami Times 17 March 1956, 1; Collins Says Hes Proud: No Race Furor in Florida, The Florida Sentinel 4 February 1956, 12; Desegregation Would Come Faster and Work Better if Not Forced, Forum Hears, The Miami Times 11 February 1956, 3. 26 Wagy, LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South, 63. 27 Ibid. 67: Gary R. Mormino, Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 315. 24

PAGE 31

to maintain legal aversion of segregation but wo uld implant false hope: Not only is Interposition ineffective as a legal defense against integrat ion, butit would be a mean, wicked, cruel and inhumane attempt to deceive the people. Thus Collins asserted his opposition to Interposition and distinguished himself from other southern governors. 28 Collinss opinion of Interposition mattered little to legislators; Interposition was a resolutionthe governor could not use his veto power against it. Attorney General Richard Ervin drew up the Interpositi on resolution and spoke on its behalf during the 1956 special legislative session. Support for Interposition garnered momentum quickly. But before the debate concluded, Governor Collins used his powe r to end the special session early, declaring the legislature in a deadlock. By closing the se ssion early, Collins avoided Interposition during the first year of response to Brown. Most legislators were unaware that the governor possessed authority to end a session early. This action drew more opposition from Sumter Lowry, who believed Collins used his power unnecessarily to serve his own interests and not the best interest of the state. He cited the 1955 Legislative session when for days on end Collins allowed the legislature to debate reapportionment issues and did not end the sess ion prematurely. This action, Lowry believed, was an example of how Collins set out to avoid Interposition and not to protect the wishes of the people in the state. As a political hopefu l for governor, Lowry presented significant opposition to Collins. That the governor avoided debate on Interposition and encouraged it on reapportionment indicated Collinss priorities. 29 28 For more information on Interposition see: Bartley, The New South; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Kluger, Simple Justice; Colburn and Sanders, The African American Heritage of Florida; John Temple Graves, This Morning: The Naked Will Against the Naked Usurption, The Florida Times Union 27 July 1956, 6. 29 LeRoy Collins to Sumter Lowry, 25 July 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. 25

PAGE 32

But the editor of the Miami Herald indicated otherwise: Peo ple are glad Governor Collins invoked the power. He cut short the special session before it degenerated into the squabble which had been developing almost from the start. This action, approved by the people, indicated that Governor Collins was not willi ng to go so far as some of the legislators to preserve segregation, but he would preserve calm in his own state. Interposition sent a message of defiance toward the Supreme Court but would also provoke integrationists. It would serve only to accelerate racial tensions rather than eliminate them. 30 Integrationists React: Taking it to the Courts The Pupil Assignment Law effectively pr evented desegregation in Florida after Brown. Thurgood Marshall, the chief lawyer for the NAACP, listed Florida among eight states that had done nothing at all to move toward integration since Brown. In 1956, Marshall declared the city of Miami ready to integrate through legal action. But legal action took more than courage because court cases were expensive. 31 With an understanding that all the white man respected we re dollar bills, lead bullets, and ballots, members of the NAACP knew they n eeded money to begin desegregation. Most individuals did not have the reso urces to pay for lawsuits, but together their money could amass to quite a lot. Reverend C. Kenzie Steele, pr esident of the Tallahassee branch of the NAACP, explained to integrationist s upporters: We must put our mone y together anduse it to the advancement of our raceby doing so, [we will] b ecome the most powerful force within all the confines of our government. Therefore, in 1957, the Florida branches of the NAACP initiated 30 John S. Knight, Collins Averts Pointless Fuss, The Miami Herald 3 August 1956, 6A Lowry accused Collins of serving only his own interests and not those of the people in Florida. 31 Dom Bonafede, Miami is Ready for Integration, Says Marshall Miami Daily News 17 June 1956, School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida. 26

PAGE 33

the Fighting Fund for Freedom campaign. It s ought to raise $50,000 in Florida for court cases to contest segregation. Membership drives throughout the state helped to raise funds. 32 The Fighting Fund for Freedom campaign was not simply an attempt to raise money to bring integration cases into the courts. It also symbolized a change w ithin the integrationist mindset in Florida. Integrati onist rhetoric previously focuse d on gradual steps, whereas this campaign encouraged immediate desegregation. Along with the announcement of the campaign came a new slogan for the NAACP: Free by 63. The NAACP wanted all public schools in Florida to be integrated by 1963. In order to achie ve this, it needed to strengthen its approach by treating segregation laws as unconstituti onal and attacking them in court. With the Fighting Fund For Freedom in place to raise money, the NAACP began its venture into the courts. In 1956, two test cases went to local c ourts in Palm Beach and Dade Counties. The first suit for African American admission into a white elementary school was filed in Miami. The local head of th e NAACP in Dade County, Theodore Gibson, filed Gibson et al vs. Dade County Board of Public Instruction. The NAACP based its claim on a petition filed on behalf of six African American parents th at claimed that the Boar d of Public Instruction refused to desegregate as soon as was practicable. Three months later, the case was thrown out by Judge Emmet C. Choate because there was no t enough evidence for him to take any action. 32 The Tallahassee Bus Protest Story, Papers of the NAACP, 201; Bishop Nichols and Dr. Steele to Head NAACP $50,000 Drive in Florida, The Miami Times 23 March1957, 1; Rev. Byrd, Mrs. Muldrow Head NAACP Drive, The Miami Times 13 April 1957, 1; NAACP Drive for 5000 Members, 11 May 1957, 2; Bob Saunders to Gloster B. Currant, Papers of the NAACP, 226. The Fightin g Fund for Freedom campaign was not an easy task to manage. In Miami, the goal for the campaign was for five thousand new members. Marion Muldrow, a leader in the Miami branch of the NAACP campaig n, told her workers that the driv e for new members would not be easy because it was difficult to convince people that the sacrifice of money in exchange for a fair fight for freedom was worthwhile, especially if those people did not have much to begin with. In Miami, the NAACP said that money must be given in exchange for freedom. Despite the diff iculty, in 1957, Miami NAACP membership was reported at an all-time high, and for the first time, the NAACP had nearly one hundred percent backing from the African Americans in Miami. 27

PAGE 34

Judge Choate allowed the plainti ffs ten days to file an amended complaint. G.E. Graves, the attorney for the NAACP working on the case, file d the amendment. Graves also encouraged African American children in Dade County to apply for admission to white primary and secondary schools. The case was thrown out of th e court once again in 1957, this time on the grounds that it failed to establis h that African American students were prohibited from attending white schools. 33 As a result of the Fabisinski Committee s recommended laws, a second test case came before the courts in 1956. Holland, et al vs. Palm Beach County Board of Instruction, contended that the Holland child, son of a local attorney, was denied admittance to a white school even though he lived in a predominantly white neigh borhood. Instead he had to attend a racially segregated and substandard school outside of his district. This lawsuit directly challenged the Pupil Assignment Law. The case was dismissed because it failed to prove that Pupil assignment directly prevented the Holland child from attending a white school. Then the NAACP adopted the case and appealed. Judge Choa te again dismissed the case b ecause it argued constitutionality and therefore required a three judge bench. However, the court of appeals ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled on the Brown case, and therefore, constitutionality was already decided. Finally, Judge Choate decided to hear testimony in June of 1957. In the Holland case, the appellate court reversed the federal cour ts ruling and required that Palm Beach County School Board to proceed with good faith complia nce and desegregate schools. To this, the 33 School Suit Hits New Delays, Miami Herald 17 November 1956, School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida; Dom Bonafede, Attorney Says Negr oes To Try at White School: Tells Plan as Racial Suite Fizzles, School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, box 14, Education in Florida Subj ect Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, Univ ersity of Florida; School Segregation Suit Dismissed Here, Miami Times, 25 August 1956, 1. 28

PAGE 35

school board replied that the courts mandate did not set a time limit on compliance. Even with success in courts, the local district chose to delay dese gregation legally. 34 In 1956, Governor Collins boasted that there were no integrated schools and no court cases dealing with desegregation or segregation laws in Florida. However, Collins failed to mention the two dismissed court cases filed agai nst segregation. Collins insisted that Florida was free from racial strife after Brown. Successful court cases th at fought segregation would threaten segregationists. Because the cases were not settled by 1957, the NAACP knew that it needed to continue to attack pupil assignment in order to desegregate the state s schools. Part II: Two Years of Change, 1957-1958 During the first two years after Brown, Florida reacted similarly to most states in the south. Numan V. Bartley contended that when the first Brown decision was handed down it was met with calm, and not the massive resistance th at would come later. Floridas governor and legislature met the problem of se gregation with moderation at the outset. They passed no laws to close schools, and they prevented violence and fury from taking over in the state. Soon after the second Brown ruling, some moderate governors like Orva l Faubus of Arkansas quickly altered from moderate to strictly segreg ationist in order to win over the people in his state. However, Collins did not stray from moderation, and as the fight to maintain segregation gained momentum in other southern states he struggled to maintain peace and order. Other, more 34 Second School Integration Suit Dismissed, The Miami Times ,1; School Desegregation Test Case Challenged The Miami Times 29 September 1956, 1; Holland to Appeal Judge Choates School Ruling, The Miami Times 20 July 1957, 7; Richard Foster, A Brief Historical Outline of Desegregation in Florida Public Schools and Universities According to the U.S. Supreme Court Decision of May, 1954 (Paper presen ted to Professor Arthur O. White as partial fulfillment of EDF 600, History of Edu cation, University of Florida, 1971), 21. Much of my understanding of these cases was aided by this document. However, the document was used merely for data, and not for analysis. 29

PAGE 36

notorious states engaged in violence. Between 1957 and 1958 Florida experi enced the first signs that violence and mayhem could defeat moderation. 35 First, in the 1957 legislative session, Interpos ition again appeared on the agenda. Collins had previously blocked the resolution by closing the special session early. But regular sessions had strict time limits, so he could not utilize the same tactic to block Inte rposition again. So the resolution passed through both houses. When Collin s received the resolution he could not veto it, but he reaffirmed his disappoi ntment in the legislature: Not only will I not condone 'interposition' as so many have sought me to do, I decry it as an evil thing, whipped up by the demagogues and carried on the hot and erratic winds of passion, prejudice, and hysteria. If history judges me right this day, I want it known that I did my best to avert this blot. If I am judged wrong, then here in my own handwriting and over my signature is the proof of guilt to support my conviction. 36 Collinss opinion on Interposition conflicted with the majority of the legislature. Their approval of this tool of massive resistan ce struck fear in the governor that his state might be caught in the violence that had afflicted other southern states. Collins held a meeting with school superintendents from several counties, and relayed that some token integration w ould strengthen the Pupil Assignment Law, but no one was willing to allow it in their district. He gave up on the belief that some voluntary integration would occur anywhere in the state. Collins feared that racial tensions would only grow worse. 37 35 Bartley, The New South; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistanc; Colburn and DeHaven-Smith, Floridas Megatrends. 36 Memorandum Re: Interposition, 2 May 1957, file 1, box 117, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. 37 Governor Gloomy on Racial Issue, Tallahassee Democrat, 19 December 1958, 7; Guest Editorial from the St. Petersburg Times School Integration, Hillsborough County 1955-1972, box 16, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Li braries, University of Florida. Governor Collins met with Superintendents from Dade Duval, Hillsborough, Pinella s, and Palm Beach County. 30

PAGE 37

Also during the 1957 legislative session, reapportionment rema ined a major issue in the legislature that implicated a new solidarity ag ainst Collins. The governors Legislative Council submitted a proposition to reapportion the legislature by the 1959 legislative session. The legislature responded with a proposal that William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth described as sharply different to the governors. The so -called Pork Chop Gang seemed strengthened by its victory in 1955, and they continued to soli dly oppose Collinss plan for segregation and reapportionment. 38 In 1957, nine African American students enrollment into Little Rock, Arkansass Central High School and sparked violent ra cial tension that gained na tionwide attention. The conflict precipitated Arkansass Governor Orval Faubuss decision to clos e public schools in Little Rock for the 1958-59 school year. The Little Rock conflict exemplified the problems Collins sought to avoid in Florida. But Florida could not aver t violence forever. On April 27, 1958 just after midnight, a reporter from the Florida Times Union received a phone call from a segregationist who defined himself as a member of the Confed erate Underground. The caller proclaimed that he had bombed James Weldon Johnson Junior Hi gh School (an African American school) and a Jewish synagogue, both in Jacksonville. He wa rned the reporter that the bombings could continue until segregation was restored to the south. The stick bombs reportedly warped the doors of the synagogue and broke all the windows of the schools. The bombs went off in the middle of the night, so no on was harmed. 39 The bombers were not caught, but Floridians held a widespread belief that the Ku Klux Klan was res ponsible. In response, the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance and NAACP conjoined to express their belief that Florida could not afford 38 Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 60. 39 The Outrage of Decent Men, Time 12 May 1958, 14. 31

PAGE 38

such violence. Collins issued a statement denounc ing the crimes, something that most southern governors would not do. But leader s of the NAACP also viewed the bombings as an outlet to strengthen their struggli ng presence in Florida. 40 Roy Wilkins, a national leader in the NAACP released a statement to the Jacksonville branch and blamed the bombings on segregation: The continued separation of citizens on the basis of race and the separate and unequal e ducation of their childre n form the basis of misunderstanding and tension. 41 In July of 1958, the NAACP began a statewide campaign for membership. In an editorial, Eric O. Simpson of the Florida Star, a weekly African American newspaper in Jacksonville, explained that although the bombing incidents were tragic, they served a purpose for integrati onists: Those dynamiters should be a rude awakening to those principals and teachers who ha ve frowned on aiding or cooperating with the NAACP which has stood on the forefront of the fight for equal rights all these years. 42 According to Simpson, the bombings united the African American popul ation of Florida and increased NAACP membership. 43 Collins attempted to appease the NAACP and said that desegregation would come but Florida still needed time for a clim ate of racial tolerance to develop. 44 G.E. Graves, attorney for the NAACP in Miami, stated that Collins was whistling in the cemetery. There was no chance for racial tolerance in a state where se gregationists bombed African American schools. 40 Annual Report of the Florida Branch es of the NAACP, 1958, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 541, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 41 Telegram from Roy Wilkins, 2 May 1958, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 303, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 42 Eric O. Simpson, Politics as Usual, The Florida Star 10 May 1958, 2. 43 NAACP Begins Statewide Campaign, The Florida Star 12 July 1958, 2. 44 NAACP Attorney Says Collins Whistling in the Cemetery, The Florida Star 17 May 1958, 1. 32

PAGE 39

Additionally, the legislature passed a resolution of Interposition, ensuring Floridas place in the Deep South. Integrationists grew impatie nt with Collinss plea for more time. 45 The events of 1957-1958 sparked new ener gy in Floridas fight against and for desegregation. Segregationists asserted defiance toward the U.S. Supreme Court by passing a concurrent resolution of Interposition and asse rted their dissatisfaction for Collins by again blocking reapportionment. Bombings in Jacksonv ille enhanced Collinss fear of violence as a means of resistance to segregation. At the same time, the bombings served as a wakeup call to integrationists. If integrationists wanted real change, they had to do the work for themselves. So, in his last years as governor, LeRoy Collins faced growing opposition from both integrationists and segrega tionists towards his moderate plan for segregation. Part III: The Disintegration of Moderation, 1958-1960 After a period waiting to act on segregation, integrationist s and segregationists emerged poised to take new, stronger stan ds to fight for their sides. In tegrationists continued to rely on the courts as their main source of change. In 1956 integrationists filed tw o lawsuits in contention with pupil assignment, one in Dade County the other in West Palm Beach. In 1957, both were dismissed and appealed. But a new case eventua lly brought some semblance of desegregation. 45 NAACP Attorney Says Collins Whistling in the Cemetery, The Florida Star, 1; Annual Report 1958, Papers of the NAACP. Graves was also th e attorney in charge of the desegregation cases in Dade County. Additionally, more African American parents began to test the Pupil Assignment Law on their own during 1958 and 1959. According to The Miami Times on September 7, 1959, a white school rejected the daughter of the Reverend Ivory W. Mizell who attempted to place his daughter in th e school. Though he said he did not wi sh to make a court test of his case his action shows that African Americans were less fearful of testing the laws even without the assistance of the NAACP. In Tampa, a suit filed in the U.S. District Court by Fransisco Rode riguez was the first suit in Hillsborough County to bring about desegregation. Although the attorney came from the NAACP, the suit was not started by the NAACP, rather local families seeking to enter their ch ildren into white schools. Then, as reported by The Florida Star on September 19, 1959, a group of African American mothers in Tampa picketed outside a shabby school provided by Hillsborough County for weeks. Only a handful of parents allowed their children to attend the school. 33

PAGE 40

The NAACP brought old cases back to court and found new ways to engage the African American community to participate in the struggle for desegregation. 46 Segregationists continued to use legislativ e power to fend off desegregation, and listened to Collins less. Attorney General Richard Ervin tinkered with last resort and presented a new version that was easier for legi slators and his former adversar y Thomas Bailey to accept. Finally, Collins, with no vocal advocates for mode ration, tried another tact ic to avoid racial conflict and maintain most of segregation. At the end of his governorship, Collins asserted a new form of moderation that implied the inev itability of desegregation. Each group found new methods to assert its power. Integrationists Head Ba ck to the Courts, 1958 After two years of waiting, courts retried Gibson et al vs. Dade County Board of Instruction on August 18, 1958. The Dade County Boar d of Instruction claimed it did not operate under the segregation provisions of th e State Constitution, but the Pupil Assignment Law. The NAACP had not proved that the cons titution prevented African American admittance to white schools, so the case failed. Then, a Dade County school denied two African American boys admittance to a white school, and the lawsuit came back. 47 This case brought the states eyes on Miami, as the fate of dese gregation in all of Florida. Integrationists viewed the case as an opportunity to invalida te pupil assignment. African American citizens in Miami attended the court hearings, and were keenly interested in 46 The case of Holland vs. The Palm Beach County Board of Public Instruction went to court again in 1958, and seemed hopeful, because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal s accused the school board of fostering segregation in the county. However, in 1959, the suit was finally dismissed, and the court ruled that a violation of the Pupil Assignment Law was never proved. 47 Assignment of Pupils Law Faces Attack, The Florida Star 20 June 1959, 1; School Board is Rebuffed: School Integration Suit Set for April, The Miami Times 20 March 1958, 6. The case was originally set for April of 1958, but was delayed until August to give both sides time to adjust to the change in the case, since it had not included the two boys who were not admitted to the white school previously. 34

PAGE 41

their proceedings. The NAACP planned to call in all African American prin cipals as witnesses, and most importantly, Joe Hall, Superintendent of Dade County Schools. Then, an interruption cut the trial short in Septem ber of 1958. A new case developed and set a new tone for desegregation. 48 On September 29, 1958, the Dade County Board of Instruction denied fourteen African American students admittance to the all-white Orchard Villa Elementary School. African American families increasingly populated th e schools surrounding neighborhood, yet no African American children attended the school. Th e population misrepresentation provoked the NAACP to bring forth a massive frontal attack to br eak down segregation in that school. Fourteen families blamed the Pupil Assignment Law for discrimination in Orchard Villa. 49 Concomitantly, Rep. John D. Orr (Dem., Dade), an advocate for gradual desegregation, proposed a plan to desegregate Dade County sc hools through a student legislative board. The students on this board would decide which schoo ls should desegregate and when. If the school board endorsed Orrs plan, the NAACP agreed to drop all pending lawsuits regarding admissions to white schools. The school board also endorsed a plan to make Orchard Villa Elementary School a pilot school for desegregation. Integr ationists, who wanted to desegregate some school somewhere, and Governor Collins, who be lieved a study of integration in one community would serve to strengthen the Pupil Assignment Law, supported the plan. African Americans 48 Garth C. Reeves, School Battle Monday in Dade County to Determine Fate of Segregation, The Miami Times 16 August 1958, 1; Elliot J. Pieze, Sch ool Integration Deci sion Delayed Here, The Miami Times 23 August 1958, 1. 49 Fourteen Miami Students Denied Transfer to Wh ite School: Showdown Set on Pupil Assignment Law, The Miami Times 20 September 1958, 1; Louise Blanchard, Attack Launched on School Laws by NAACP Here, Miami Daily News 19 September 1958, 1. 35

PAGE 42

however, were not sure a pilot sc hool solved segregation problems in the state, but viewed it as a good first step. 50 Still, skeptics feared white flight would prevent actual desegregation at Orchard Villa. African Americans would dominate th e schools population. A writer for the Miami Times noted that as African Americans moved into the neighborhood, white families sold their homes near Orchard Villa quickly, and African American parents hungrily ey ed the well-buil t school. If the school board adopted a plan to desegregat e the school the following year, white parents would leave before the next term. The Dade County School Board adopted the pilot school plan and both Governor Collins and the editor of the Miami Times deemed it a wise decision. 51 After the Dade County School Board desegr egated Orchard Villa Elementary School, more school boards granted African American requests to attend white schools. However, integrationists viewed the admissions as token and not the widespread desegregation they wanted. During the 1960 State Conference of th e NAACP, the president of Floridas branches, Reverend Leon Lowry declared spurts of token in tegration in Ft. Lauderd ale and Daytona proof that for too long school administrators used the Pupil Assignment Law to discriminate against African Americans: In each instance, school officials hurriedly admitted a few Negroes after court suits had been filed. 52 Desegregation in Florida was stil l a myth and not a way of life. Members of the NAACP recognized that pupil assignment successfully prevented African 50 Orrs Integration Plan Gets Backing: NAACP Would Drop All Suits, The Miami Times 20 September 1958, 1; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, Integrate Dade Schools? The Miami Times 27 September 1958, 2. 51 Orchard Villa May Be Ne gro School In February, The Miami Times 15 October 1958, 1; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, A Wise Decision, The Miami Times 21 February 1959, 4. These predictions were essentially correct. In September of 1959, a total of twelve students entered Orchard Villa Elementary, four of whom were African American. An October 13, 1959 edition of The Miami Times reported that the School Board of Dade County assigned 379 African American students to attend Orchard V illa, essentially segregating the school once again, and soon drawing heat from the NAACP. 52 Conference Statement, 1960, 13 May 1960, Part 27: Select ed Branch Files, 1956-1965, Se ries A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 639-641, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 36

PAGE 43

American children from attending white schools. According to Robert Saunders, a Florida NAACP leader, African American parents needed more informa tion about the Pupil Assignment Law, and needed to change their attitude towa rd defeating it. The NAA CP encouraged African American parents to ignore the assign ment law, because it was unconstitutional. 53 Public Money for Private Institutions, 1959 Integrationists deemed pupil assignment a fa ilure because it did not yield widespread desegregation. But segregationist legislators disdained the law because some desegregation occurred while it was in place. Governor Collinss Pupil Assignment Law was not enough to avoid desegregation, and even a little bit of integration was unacceptable. Desegregation in Dade County spread to other districts, so pupil assignment could not maintain segregation. Segregationists questioned pupil assi gnment as the only means to pr eserve segregation. In the 1959 legislative session, reapportionment and segregation again dominated the floor discussion. According to Harvard and Beth, the Pork C hop Gang, was not as powerful as it had once appeared. The attacking forces against reapport ionment seemed to have exhausted themselves in the long struggle, and cam e to an initial agreement. 54 This change indicated the beginning of 53 In a statement by Robert Saunders on October 23, 1960, the NAACP advised parents of African American children not to bypass requests for school placement because of race. They provided three rules: 1. Do not bypass a school in asking your choice of reassignment of a child ren because you think that school is all white and that your race is a barrier in his a ttendance. 2. Choose the school at which your child is to atte nd on the basis of skills that are being taught and which are deemed by modern industry. 3. By asking to have a child reassigned to a school that is considered adequate, the Negro parent is not breaking the la w, as is the implication. Conference Statement 1959, 23 October 1959, Part 27:Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Seri es A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 603-606, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. Statement by Leon Lowry Re: Desegregation in Florida, 1959, Part 27:Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 757, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 54 Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 62-64. This was not the end of the reapportionment issue. Reapportionment was not completely settled until 1962 by the U.S. Supreme Court case, Baker vs. Carr. 37

PAGE 44

the end of the small district control over Floridas legislature. Those who opposed reapportionment asserted their power in the only other way they could: segregation legislation. 55 During the 1959 legislative session, lawmakers de bated a record thirty-seven segregation bills. In previous years, Collinss warnings motivated legislators to avoid many segregationist bills. In the special session of 1956, the legislatur e debated only five segregation bills, four of which were part of the Fabisins ki Committees plan. In the 1957 session, the legislature debated only nine, including both House and Senate Bills. Between 1956 and 1959, segregationist legislators became less willing to trust in pupil assi gnment, and appeared stronger in their efforts to maintain segregation at any cost. This change may have come about because of small district legislators perceived loss of power in Floridas legislative futu re. The most contested bill came from the Attorney General and the Superintende nt of Public instruction: the Parent Option Plan. 56 In 1957, Superintendent of Public Instru ction Thomas Bailey had publicly denounced Attorney General Ervins last re sort. However, Bailey wanted to keep segregation alive in Floridas public schools, and pr ivate school subsidies provided a viable option to preserve education and segregation. Upon admittance of African Americans in to two state funded learning institutions in 1958, Bailey and Ervin released a statement unveiling their proposal to the state legislature. They emphasized their dedi cation to segregation and maintenance of free public schools. But Florida had no preparation fo r the possibility of widespread desegregation. 55 Hendrix Chandler and Chris MacGill, Harsh Race Bills Killed; Taxes Up, Tallahassee Democrat 5 June 1959, 1. 56 White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida, 135; Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 18-19. 38

PAGE 45

The Parent Option Plan augmented pupil assignment but did not replace it. Parent option was a safety valve, used once integrationist lawsuits exhausted pupil assignment. 57 Bailey and Ervin explained that Parent Opti on would not allow parent s to withdraw their children from public schools on a whim, but because of their own personal objection to integration. Furthermore, Bailey asserted parents right for protection from segregation: If the Federal government recognizes conscientious object ions to serving in wa r, it should recognize some parents conscientious objections to sending [their children] to [segregated] schools. 58 The law would provide parents the personal option to take their children out of public schools and place them into non-sectarian or non-parochial sc hools with some financial assistance. To Bailey and Ervin, parent option was the best possible choice. The Miami Herald reported in favor of this bill because it gave citizens more pr eference in their childrens education. 59 On February 11, 1959, only days after Ervin and Bailey released their statement, Governor Collins stated that he had still not determined whether he would support the Parent Option Plan. He saw some problems with the plan, but did not necessarily deem it as open defiance of federal law or the courts. However, when the 1959 legislative session began in April, Collins changed his stance. In an hour and fifteen-minute speech delivered to the House of Representatives of Florida, Collins pleaded with legislators not to consider any new racial legislation because it would only serve to weaken th eir chances of maintaining segregation at all. 57 Statement by Thomas D. Bailey, State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General, 2 February, 1959, file 2, box 14, series 1127, Speeches and Press Releases Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files, Flor ida State Archives. 58 Associated Press, Tuition Program Backed, The Florida Times Union 17 April 1959, 8. 59 John L. Boyles., School Mingling Up to Voters? Miami Herald, 3 February 1959,1. Bailey and Ervin also supported a local option bill, also known as the Moody act. This bill would allow individual parents to remove their child from an integrated school without penalty. Co llins was not as opposed to this provision, because it did not involve an entire community. 39

PAGE 46

After the speech was over, it was evident that many legislators did not agree and neither did some Florida newspaper editors. 60 Caleb J. King Jr., editor of the Florida Times Union expressed that Collinss plan to maintain the status quo would only survive if legislators could convi nce themselves that it would not lead to just a little bit of integration. If not, then King believed that they would be right to fight for their great Southern heritage. Inte grationists already proved that token integration could occur and King doubted Coll inss dedication to segregation. The gover nors rejection of parent option surprised the editor of the St. Petersburg Times because he considered it a moderate proposal. The governor was too soft on segregation and was no longer serving the people of Florida. These newspaper editors were shocked and alarmed that Collins did not support the Parent Option Plan. This move made them skeptical of his commitment to segregation. 61 Legislators were not all certain that parent option presented the best route to maintain segregation. To ensure that the Parent Option Plan could not be construed as unconstitutional, the House committee in charge of race bills cr eated a subcommittee of three lawyers. The lawyers studied parent option and recommende d that the general committee forward the provision. On April 17, 1959, the parent option bill was sent from the subcommittee to the Committee hearings, hailed as the mildest of al l integration plans proposed. Despite its mild reputation, the Parent Option Plan eventually di ed because lawmakers could not condone the use 60 Most Solons Support Tougher Racial Laws, Tampa Tribune Tampa, 8 April 1959, 6. 61 Caleb King Jr., Calmness and Coolness Become a Watchword, Florida Times Union 8 April 1959, 6; Collins Takes Low Road on Integration Legislation, St. Petersburg Times editorial, 8 April 1959, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida. 40

PAGE 47

of state funds to finance private institutions. Segregationists feared the integrationist use of the court system to undermine segregation laws. 62 In 1959, the Florida Legislature introduced so many anti-integration bills in both chambers of the House, that integrationists could not ignore them. The NAACP monitored the session before it began and held an emergenc y session of its state Conference in order to determine what to do in the event that one or all of the drastic bills were passed. In the meantime, the NAACP considered drafting a report on what Florida was doing to defy the Constitution and sending the report to the appr opriate Congressional Committees. Thus, the NAACP viewed the 1959 legislative se ssion as an opportunity for protest. 63 African American newspapers expressed thei r distrust and disappointment in the Florida Legislature for fostering an atmosphere of s egregation hysteria during the historic session. The editor of the Miami Times discussed his distaste toward strong anti-integration bills, but maintained hope that the legislature would not vote to close the schools in the case of any integration. Viewing extreme segr egationist legislation as a way for legislators to appease the folks back home, this editor hoped officials could use the session to prove that they fought for segregation. In Miami, the road to desegreg ation was closer in view than in many other communities, because of local court cases. 64 62 Calm Rules on Racial Bills so Far, Tampa Tribune, 12 April 1950, 7; Last Resort School Bill is Introduced, Tampa Tribune, 18 April 1959,4; House Approval Given First Bill on Racial Issue, Tallahassee Democrat, Tallahassee, May 12 1959, 6. 63 From Leon Lowry and Robert Saunders to All Officers and Executive 8 Members, 30 March 1959, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 581, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 64 Eric O. Simpson, Segregation Hysteria, The Florida Star 13 June 1959, 2; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, Opening of the Legislature, The Miami Times 11 April 1959, 4; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, Our Schools, The Miami Times, 25 April, 1959, 4; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, 959 Legislature is History, The Miami Times 20 June 1959, 4. 41

PAGE 48

If the attitude toward the 1959 session of the legislature was cool in Miami, in Jacksonville it was burning hot. J acksonville bore the brunt of segr egationist violence in the 1958 bombings. Its African American newspaper the Florida Star condemned the legislatures actions during two-month long session. Eric O. Simpson, the newspapers editor, called the race bills offered drastic and unconstituti onal. Moreover, the editor of the Star vehemently opposed all of the anti-integra tion bills, and pegged the legislature the Pro-Segregation Factory. Simpson wondered if Florida legisl ators believed the Afri can American population was stupid, foolish, or without hope or leadership Proposals like Parent Option imposed taxation upon African Americans ultimately to assist in their demise, and only foolish people would support that. Finally, Simpson called for new blood in the legislature. It was time for African Americans to take positions of power in their co mmunities and in the state. They could not trust white representation to work on their behalf. 65 A Bold New Approach: The Collins Plan, 1960 On March 20, 1960, Collins delivered an impromptu, statewide TV-Radio speech to the people of Florida. It illustrated his disdain for th e sit-ins and other demonstrations that had taken place in Tallahassee during the month. If the st ate of Florida was to overcome these racial tensions, it needed to act morally. According to Collins, segregationists did not act morally or democratically when they hindered any citize ns who struggled for freedom. This speech indicated a drastic change from the rhetoric Co llins had previously employed. He addressed the 65 Drastic Race Bills Offered, The Florida Star 25 April 1959, 1; Eric O. Simp son, School Segregation Bills Are Seen as Unconstitutional, The Florida Star 23 May 1959, 1; Eric O. Simpson, Bailey-Ervin Plan An Unconstitutional Tax Trap, The Florida Star 30 May 1959, 2. The editorials al so placed Florida in the ranks of seven other states that proposed and passed bills to allocate money to start a campaign to sell segregation to the North. These states could not be trusted by the integrationist community. This belief was shared by the leaders in the NAACP. However, the Governor of Florida vetoed the bill. Eric O. Simpson, Politics as Usual, The Florida Star 16 August 1958, 2; Eric. O Simpson, Politics as Usual: New Blood Needed in the House of Representatives, The Florida Star 3 May 1958, 2. 42

PAGE 49

people directly through mass media. The governor declared that something new must be done in order to combat what could become a very hazardous situation for all of the residents. Instead of relying on extremist positions, Floridians ought to take a stand for the middle, and work in a moderate fashion to desegregate slowly. 66 Collins then announced his plan to appoint a bi-racial group to succeed the Fabisinski Committee: to spawn local bi-racial committees to solve local problems that arose due to race. The committees goals included, but were not limite d to, desegregating schools. The goal of the Fabisinski Committee had been to preserve segr egation by legal means, whereas the goal of the new bi-racial committee was to assess local situations and determine where and when desegregation should occur. The committee did no t advocate total integration at one time, but believed that desegregation would inevita bly occur naturally through cooperation. 67 Collinss bi-racial committee, known hist orically as the Fowler Commission, subsequently released a statement to Florida newspapers. Chairman Cody Fowler, former president of the Florida Bar Association, recognized that neither segregationists nor integrationists wholeheartedly embraced the group. Fowler explained that whites who joined the committees work were labeled as integrationist s by other whites and th at African Americans who supported the group were labele d Uncle Toms by avid integrationists. In the statement, Fowler reminded the citizens of Florida that the committees purpose was not to segregate or desegregate, but to enhance understanding and cooperation throughout the states local 66 Transcript of Statewide TV-Radio Ta lk to the People of Florida on Race Relations by Governor LeRoy Collins, 20, March, 1960, file 15, box 2, seri es 226, Governors Advisory Commis sion on Race Relations, Records, 19571961, Florida State Archives. 67 Ibid. 43

PAGE 50

communities. The committee focused on two issues that held deep interest in the minds and hearts of most in the state: morality and business. 68 Those who viewed racial tensions as mere ly political doubted th e Fowler Commissions preoccupation with morality. The commission considered the number of African Americans who served in American wars, and that a duty ex isted to maintain a peaceful, ethical, and cultural growth for children, the leaders of the future. Morally, the African American community needed inclusion in discussions regarding race; they were an integral pa rt of the solution. The Fowler Commission called upon religious leaders from around the entire st ate who confirmed the moral basis of race issues anywhere, not just in Florida. Those members of the clergy committed themselves to the undertakings of the committee. 69 But business concerns proved to be the main focus for efforts to bring about cooperation in the state. Florida was part of the Deep Sout h based on its legislative and desegregation record, but not in its up and coming economic status. The Fowler Commission indi cated that this was changing, and so Floridians needed to reeval uate their positions on open policies against desegregation. If the pol icies continued, violence and demonstr ations would increase. Florida, distinct from other southern states because overt racial conflicts the states industrial development, reliance upon tourism, and expandi ng population. All of these were more extreme and pressing, the commission contended, th an in any other state in the south. 70 In order to keep up with the industrial revolution taking pl ace in Florida, the Fowler Commission believed that the lin es of differences between the North and South needed to 68 Statement by Cody Fowler, 27 May 1960, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. The Fowler Commission on Race Relations Reports to the People of Florida, 2 July 1960, box 117, file 1, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Coll ins Collection, Florida State Archives. 44

PAGE 51

steadily disappear. Most of the difference, Fo wler contended, lay between rural and urban economies. He argued that tourism placed a burden on Florida to mend its segregationist ways because visitors condemned segregation practices: Florida then has a kind of economic vulnerability that is incomp rehensible to Mississippi. 71 The rapidly changing atmosphere in Florida indicated that some part s of the state prized segregati on, but in many others, segregation no longer worked due to desegregated neighborh oods. Thus, Florida was in a unique position as opposed to its southern neighbors, and it should no t resort to the same tactics. The booming economy could only last if the state stay ed out of southern racial problems. According to Fowler, members of both ra ces had met the aims of the commission with quiet respect. Underneath thei r respect, however, was more of th e wait-and-see attitude that had permeated the previous five years. The grou p found that many agreed with the principles of the committee, but few were willing to take a ny action toward creating good relations between the races in Florida. Ultimately, the commission discovered that resistance to integration existed throughout Florida. However, the growing i ndustrial force was a mitigating factor to segregationists. The future would fare better, if those needs were considered before large-scale problems arose. 72 Integrationists found resonance in one of the Fowler Commis sions arguments: the need to preserve industry and touris m. Florida in the 1950s was in a financially promising but precarious position. After World War II, touris m and industry that abandoned union strongholds in the north migrated to the state. Consequent ly, the population not only grew in numbers, but in diversity. However, Florida had already experienced a deafening blow to its economy once 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 45

PAGE 52

before, when the land boom in the 1920s and 1930s ended in a bust. There was substantial fear that racial problems could upset the harmonious atmosphere so appeal ing to tourists and newcomers to the state. Therefore, even in the midst of a bitter fight for desegregation, leaders of the NAACP asked members to abstain from hurting tourism in Dade C ounty. They would not protest or boycott duri ng peak tourist season. 73 There was an inherent understanding that a blow to the tourism industry would hurt segregationists and integrationists alike. But inte grationists used tourists Northern ideals for their own best interests. An unidentified Af rican American leader from Miami told the Wall Street Journal that when tourists arrived, racial tension eased, naturally: Weve got them (segregationists) over a barrel a nd dont think they dont know it. They dont dare get uppity when all those Northern visitors are here. 74 The tourism industry, therefore, gave integrationists and African Americans a bit of protection. While African Americans were asked to bear in mind the presence of tour ists in their protests, they also realized that whites would act differently around tourists. However, the Fowler Commission did not entire ly satisfy integrationists. The NAACP and African American newspapers admired Colli ns for his bravery and applauded him for his support of democracy. They commended him for his effort to set up a state bi-racial committee. They supported all of his great efforts towards br inging racial harmony to the state. But despite their acclamations, integrationists still believed that they needed to fight if they were to get what they desired. In a written statement to Collin s, Rev. Leon Lowry, president of the Florida 73 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven-Smith, Floridas Megatrends; Bob Saunders to Gloster B. Currant, 19 January 1957, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 74 School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, file 6, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special Collections and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smat hers Libraries, University of Florida. 46

PAGE 53

NAACP stated: We will work with bi-racial committees to relieve the state of racial segregation, but do not expect us to sit idly by while other groups seek to solve our problems for us. 75 Integrationists in Florida were not willing to give up their power to a state mandated group. They had fought, and would continue to fi ght for the creation of racial equality in Florida. This reaction highlight ed integrationists distrust of the state government who yielded little to no desegregation after Brown. More than anything, the Fowl er Commission produced a star k contrast between state constituents. To segregationi sts, the commission represented the governors ever increasing integrationist tendencies. On the other hand, integrationists distrusted the commission as a means for integration. Thus, the commission fostered distrust in Collinss moderate approach to segregation among both segrega tionists and integrationists. 76 It is no wonder, then, that segregation was a key issue in the 1960 gubernatorial race. All Democratic candidates claimed segregation as a top priority in their platforms, and no African Americans entered the race. However, Floridians did not choose the strictest of the segregationist candidates, and instead elected Farris Bryant as their next governor. Bryant vowed to keep Florida segregated and although he announced his intention to reappoint the committees chairman and reinstate the committee, Cody Fowler refused to work for a strict segregationist. Bryant claimed he had chosen a successor, but never named him. Thus, by 1961 the state-wide bi-racial adviso ry committee dissolved along with Collinss hope for the people 75 Statement from Leon Lowry to Governor Collins, 21 March 1960, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 626-627, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 76 Robert Saunders to State Conference Officials Re: Fowler Commission, 1 960, Part 27:Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 628-630, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress. 47

PAGE 54

in the middle. Collinss push toward gradual desegregation was lost on the new leaders in government. 77 Part IV: Summary During the half decade following Brown the governor of Florida distinguished himself as one of the only southern governors who refused to resort to violence or disorder to maintain segregation. In fact, as Gove rnor LeRoy Collinss tenure progressed, his commitment toward segregation waned and he eventually favored gradual desegregation. Throughout his time as governor, Collins remained more committed to issues such as increased industry and reapportionment of the legislature, than efforts to maintain segregation. But a states governor is not its sole representative. Ma ny groups impacted Floridas soci al and political atmosphere, and influenced the states reception of Brown. Within Florida, segregat ionists sought to preserve their heritage, while integrationists attempte d to claim their court mandated freedom. Between 1955 and 1957, Collins asserted his preference to maintain segregation legally through the Fabisinski Committees proposals. While the governor placed his faith in the Pupil Assignment Law, segregationist legislators and the attorney ge neral doubted their ability to preserve their southern heritage. Segregationist leaders, threatened by plans for reapportionment that would thwart their power within the legi slature, continuously opposed Collinss plans for segregation. To ensure zero desegregati on, segregationists preferred to augment pupil assignment with two provisions: private school subsidies and Interposition. Governor Collins used his power to combat these prov isions in these first years. At the same time, integrationists, most of whom were African Americans, struggled to accept pupil assignment and the Fabisinski Committ ee as well. African Americans understood 77 David L.Colburn and Richard K. Scher, Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision, Florida Historical Quarterly 55 (October 1977), 154-170. 48

PAGE 55

that legislators and even the governor needed to express commitment to segregation to please white segregationist voters. Th erefore, some African Americans received the first legislative responses to Brown calmly. However, integrationists expr essed skepticism over the Fabisinski Committees ability to serve them well when the committee set out to preserve segregation. By 1956, African Americans began to bring their grieva nces into courts. But despite their best efforts, two years after Brown, segregation in Florida thrived. Between 1957 and 1958, Floridas atmosphere changed. In 1957, the governor of Arkansas closed schools rather th an integrate, and Florida legisl ators proposed and passed an Interposition Resolution. Then, in 1958 hate groups bombed an African American school and Jewish Synagogue. Tension mounted in the state and Governor Collinss fear of deep south politics and violence surfaced. The bombings spurned a sense of urgency to desegregate among African American integrationists. In 1958, formerly dismissed c ourt cases went back to court and eventually resulted in the first instance of voluntary desegregation. Minimal desegregation caused segregationist legislators to fight for more segregation protection. In the 1959 session of legislature, lawmakers proposed more than twenty segregation bills. The Attorney General and the Superintende nt of Public Instruction joined and created a new provision for private school subsidies. Th e Jacksonville bombings actually emboldened integrationist leaders who believed the threat of violence indicated a need for unity among African Americans. But Collins altered his ap proach to segregation. The governor then appointed a Bi-Racial Advisory Commission (the Fowler Commissi on) to replace the Fabisinski Committee. The group set out to create bi-ra cial committees throughout the state who could work through racial tension. The Fowler Comm ission drew criticism from both segregationists and integrationists. To segregationists, the approach favored desegreg ation. Integrationists 49

PAGE 56

simply lacked faith that the government represente d African American citizens best interests. Thus, the potential for advancement toward dese gregation fizzled after Collinss governorship. Farris Bryant replaced Collins as governor in 1961 and almost immediately discharged the Fowler Commission, and diminished hope for cooperative desegregation. 50

PAGE 57

CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSION From 1955-1961, Floridas atmosphere was tumultuous and explosive. But unlike other southern states, Florida had con cerns in addition to segregation. The governor prioritized state issues concerning reapportionment and industrial ties for the stat e, and attempted to gloss over segregation policy. However, the governors agenda did not correspond with Floridas prominent segregationist or inte grationist leaders. Segregat ionist pork choppers, fearing reapportionment, united in opposition against Collinss moderate propositions. Once the Pork Chop Gang sensed its impending loss of power with in the legislature, its members exerted last efforts to preserve their southe rn heritage. Thus, in their last gasps of life, the antireapportionment group attempted to defeat Collinss moderation with overt segregationist policy proposals. Integrationists also reached a turning point during Collinss years as governor. Initially, African American newspaper editors appeared in favor of the governor and his reactions to Brown. Integrationists subsequently found flaws with Collinss plans, because laws that preserved segregation inherent ly negated their goal to desegregate public schools. Some challenged the laws and groups that the governor created. However, when segregationists pressed for segregation at all costs in the le gislature, African Americans questioned Collinss ability to provide for their needs. When th e Florida legislature adopted a resolution of Interposition in 1957, and after 1958 segregationi sts bombed two buildings in Jacksonville in 1958, integrationists gained more support from th e African American community. As a result, integrationists brought cases of discrimination into the courts and through their own actions produced some desegregation. 51

PAGE 58

As in most southern states, Fl oridas response to the historic Brown case was highly contested. Integrationist and segregationist leaders challenged Collinss moderate tactics to maintain segregation in Florid as public schools. As a result Florida did not enjoy a smooth transition into desegregation, but suffered through the tense atmosphere that desegregation brought to its neighboring states. Additionally, the states desegregation was minimal at best. Although historians credit the governor for maintaining peace and averting the massive resistance of deep south states, he could not prevent strife over segregation in his state. As his years in the governors mansion dwindled, Collins lost support from his segregationist and integrationist constituents. 1 Collins enjoyed two terms as governor of Florida. Though he won both elections with a clear majority, Florida residents did not fully support the moderate gov ernors policies. To understand this discrepancy, it is important to revisit the criteria for moderate governors. Historian Earl Black categorized Collins as a moderate segregationist, which placed him alongside Orval Faubus, the governor of Arkansas. As time progressed, historians no longer linked these two governors because of their seemingl y contrasting reaction to the people of their states. However, the governors distinguished themselves through the constituents they chose to support. In the years following the U.S. Supr eme Courts landmark decisions of 1954 and 1955, Faubus altered his stance from moderate to segr egationist to maintain his seat as governor. Collins, however, did not become more segregationist over time. Instead, he continued a moderate course until his last year in office, when his actions seemed to advocate some 1 David C. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, R ace Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision, The Florida Historical Quarterly (Autumn 1975): 154-170; Joseph A. Tomberlin, Florida and the Desegregation Issue, The Journal of Negro Education( Autumn 1974): 457-467; Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980). 52

PAGE 59

desegregation. Collins placed the new, industrial businessmen in Florida in higher esteem than the segregationists who controlled the legislature. 2 Both Collins and Faubus chose to support the constituents they deemed important, and their decisions resulted in vastly different ou tcomes. Because of Floridas rapidly changing economics and demographics, Collins viewed his ma jor constituents as ne w leaders in industry and tourism. Collins planned to reapportion the legislature, which would ultimately change the legislative body in favor of the larger, more afflue nt counties in the state. Collins did not appear to lose faith in his goal of reapportionment, even in the face of a legisl ature that blocked his every measure. The governors actions indicated that he valued the newly arrived population of industrial leaders instead of small district segregationists or integrationists. Even though Collinss actions distinguished him from other southern governors of the time, his states overall actions did not. Florid as reaction to Brown mirrors Numan V. Bartleys notion that southern states initial reaction to Brown calmly, and then moved toward massive resistance. Collinss moderate plans for segr egation ultimately passed through the legislature over more segregationist policies. In many cases, this resulted from Collinss own use of his veto power. However, Floridas hi story of racial segregation was highly contested. Members of the Pork Chop Gang and other leading segrega tionists like Attorney General Richard Ervin, found Collinss approach too moderate and restrictiv e. The policies did not satisfy segregationist hopes for absolute protection from desegregation. At the same time, pork choppers perceived Collinss crusade for reapportionment as an outright confrontation toward their ability to control the state. According to William C. Harvard an d Loren P. Beth, Collinss overt tactics toward 2 Earl Black, Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-1969, The Journal of Politics (Summer 1971): 703-734. 53

PAGE 60

reapportionment brought the governor and the pork choppers into a sort of tren ch warfare. 3 As a result, Florida legislators proposed strict segregationist bills and even passed a resolution of Interposition. Even if the governor did not ag ree with these efforts, Floridas legislators attempted to use common tools of massive resistance. 4 David Colburn and Lance deHaven-Smith propo sed that the changing demographics in Florida influenced the traditional views of native Floridians. Th rough this study, it is apparent that Collins believed Floridas general trend toward modernization hinged on its ability to distinguish itself from other southern states in the region. For Collins, prioritizing segregation was a foolish task because economic growth in Florida depended on the ab ility of the state to extricate itself from southern ne ighbors. However, segregationists from small rural districts did not alter their traditional stance toward segregation or reapporti onment. In fact, Collins could not afford to lose segregationist legislat ors completely. Because the legislation was misrepresentative of the populat ion, segregationists dominated Floridas congress, and Collins was bound to the ill-apportioned legislature. He could not hope to achieve his ultimate goal of reapportionment if he attacked segr egationist legislators outright. Segregatio nists asserted their control through the use of antiintegration bills and blocking apportionment reform movements. 5 Though bound to a segregationist le gislature, Collins was not totally isolated from the African American population in his state. For example, he was th e first governor to address the Florida State Teachers Associat ion, (FSTA), the African American teachers union. The governor supported pupil assignment legislation because it placed the burden of desegregation or 3 Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 54-58. 4 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1997), 123. 5 David L. Colburn and Lance De-Haven Smith, Floridas Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida (Gainesville:University Presses of Florida, 2002), 56. 54

PAGE 61

segregation on local communities. Under th is system, Collins attempted to satisfy segregationists and integrationists. Perhaps beca use his policies seemed the least reprehensible, African American newspapers in Florida generally tended to support Collins. 6 However, to assume that all of Floridas integrationists, mostly African Americans, supported Collins is incorrect. Vanessa Siddle Walker, Michael Fultz, and Marybeth Gasman concluded that African Americans reacted to Brown proactively in much of the south. This thesis indicates how African Americans in Fl orida acted under oppressi ve conditions in the struggle toward equality. Florida members of the NAACP criticized Collinss leadership as early as 1956. When the governor creat ed a bi-racial group to determ ine a proper course of action after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown, Florida members of the NAACP viewed the measure as a trick. The Fabisinski Committees goal was explicit: to create methods of preserving segregation without legal recourse. Therefore, the groups purpose inherently conflicted with integrationists. 7 Although the governor created the tools to preserve some mani festations of segregation, and no African Americans held positions in the st ates government, Florida integrationists still managed to have some effect. African American integrationists challe nged pupil assignment by bringing cases of discrimination to the courts by way of the NAACP. The cases struggled toward resolution, but integrationists continued to fight persistently for desegregation. Collins certainly paid attention to the cases, because in 1958, when two court cases threatened to 6 Arthur O. White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1979) 127. 7 Vanessa Siddle Walker, African Amer ican Teaching in the South: 1940-1960, American Educational Research Journal (Winter 2001): 751-779; Michael Fultz, T he Displacement of Black Educators PostBrown: An Overview and Analysis , History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004):11-45; Marybeth Gasman, Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision, History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 70-92. 55

PAGE 62

jeopardize the validity of pupil assignment, he quickly advocated a program of voluntary, token integration in Dade C ounty. The governors segregation law survived even after some desegregation began, but the efforts of the NAACP questioned the effectiveness of pupil assignment. Integrationists in Florida used th eir own measures to comb at segregation and did not rely on others to fight their battle. The evidence found in the Florida State Arch ives, the University of Florida Smathers Library Education in Florida Subject Files, the Florida Bran ch Papers of the NAACP, and editorials from mainstream and African American newspapers depicts Floridas segregation history as disputed. This understanding break s from the dominant perspective that Floridas reaction to Brown was distinct from most other southern states. Florida did not benefit from a smooth and peaceful transition into desegregatio n. Rather, the process involved many distinct groups who prioritized contrasting objectives. Powerful segregationist constituents fought the governors attempts toward a moderate appro ach to racial segregation, and hardworking integrationists challenged the governor to advocate equality in Florida. This discovery leads to several important conclusions for sout hern history and Florida scholars. This study calls for a reevaluation of what massive resistance actually constitutes. Historians who study southe rn history have neglected Floridas reaction to Brown because relatively little violence occurred as a result of efforts to maintain or thwart desegregation. Southern states such as Alabam a and Arkansas stand out sites of as massive resistance because their reactions resulted in violence and mayhem which attracted national media attention. When describing qualities of massive resistance, Nu man V. Bartley included indicators such as adopting an Interposition Resolution, employing racist propaganda, and violence. All were present in Florida to some extent, yet historians have characterized the state as moderate, which 56

PAGE 63

has inaccurately portrayed the state as distinct from others in the south. Southern historians must broaden their criteria to ascertain fuller depictions of southern reactions to Brown. Calm resistance is still resistance. 8 Additionally, this study implies that a gove rnors attitude and response toward Brown does not produce an accurate historical account of a states overall reaction to the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling. In Florida, the governor was mo derate throughout his te nure, and in his later years worked as a civil rights activist. Ho wever, most Florida public schools remained segregated until the U.S. Supreme Court manda te ordered desegregation in 1969. In fact, remnants of resistance to segreg ation still exist in Floridas pu blic schools in its International Baccalaureate and magnet school programs. If the states response mirrored the governors, it should have voluntarily desegregat ed much sooner. Instead, th e state continued to struggle against forced desegregation. Historians can only judge a governor, or any leader, for his or her actions, but not as the spokesperson for an entire group, and especially not an entire state. Doing so unduly diminishes the experiences and e fforts of all the remaining constituents. 9 Finally, this study informs aspects of Florida and southern history because it recognizes African American actors in the period after Brown. Historians must recognize the actions of African Americans after Reconstr uction and through the period after Brown. Otherwise, African Americans will not receive credit for the wo rk they did during this volatile time. Richard Kluger presented the road to Brown as calculated and time consumi ng. But after the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decisions, African Americans and integrationists still faced the arduous task of desegregating schools. These activists worked toward compliance with that historic decision. 8 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance. 9 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). Regan Garner, A School Without a Name: Desegregation of Eastside High School, 1970-1987. University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy (August 2005): 233-266. 57

PAGE 64

In Florida, African Americans faced difficultie s that limited their power within mainstream politics. After Reconstruction, no African Americans held public office until several years after U.S. Supreme Courts historic decisions in 1954 and 1955. This study contends that African American integrationists struggled in Florida, an d because of their efforts, the governor actually considered their voices. Through persistence, they ultimately assisted in shaping Floridas winding path toward racial dese gregation in the public schools. If the NAACP had not fought against pupil assignment, segregatio n may have lasted even longer. This thesis represents only a small indication of how Afri can Americans struggled for equality in public schools Historians have yet to explore fully African American stories in Florida and elsewhere in the southeast portion of the United States. In Florida, desegregation came about because of integrationist actions. Scholars cannot overlook their importa nt role in shaping southern history. Finally, this thesis includes two implications for educators. First, Florida educators, especially in the fields of histor y and social studies, could reconsider how the history of the state is taught. In Florida schools, teachers gloss over the history of segregation just as historians have, so the myth that Florida has escaped racial disturbances has promulgated. Also, this thesis reveals that even in the midst of an embittered ba ttle over racial segregat ion, executives and state legislators still prioritized the maintenance of a free public system of education. Though debated, no provisions were made to give subsidie s to private education in Florida. However, more than fifty years later, Florida utilizes st ate-funded vouchers for stud ents to attend private school. Has the state of Florida given up on a free system of public education? This discovery prompts current parents, educators and lawmakers to discern what value public education has, and why Florida seems to have lost interest in it. 58

PAGE 65

LIST OF REFERENCES Primary Sources Manuscripts Correspondence of LeRoy Collins, 1955-1961, series 776, Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State Archives. Education in Florida Subject Files, Special a nd Area Studies Collections George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida. Florida Governors Advisory Commi ssion on Race Relations, 1957-1961, series 226, Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State Archives. Papers of the NAACP, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Se ries A: The South, Reel 4, Library of Congress. Superintendent of Public In struction Thomas D. Bailey S ubject Files, 1949-1965, series 1127, Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State Arvhives. Florida Newspapers Florida Sentinel (Tampa, Florida) Florida Times Union (Jacksonville, Florida) Miami Herald (Miami, Florida) Miami Times (Miami, Florida) Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee, Florida) Tampa Tribune (Tampa, Florida) Secondary Sources Bartley, Numan V., The New South, 1945-1980: The Story of the Souths Modernization. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995. Bartley, Numan V., The Rise of Massive Resistance: Ra ce and Politics in the South During the 1950s Baton Rouge: Louisiana Stat e University Press, 1997. Bender, William A,The Status of Educa tional Desegregation in Mississippi, The Journal of Negro Education, Summer (1956):285-288. Black, Earl, Southern Governors and Polit ical Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-1969, The Journal of Politics, Summer (1971): 703-734. 59

PAGE 66

Colburn, David R. and Jane L. Landers, The African American Heritage of Florida. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1995. Colburn, David R. and Lance DeHaven Smith, Floridas Megatrends: Cri tical Issues in Florida. Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 2002. Colburn, David R.and Richard S. Scher, Floridas Gubernatorial Po litics in the Twentieth Century. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1980. Colburn, David R. and Richard K. Scher, Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision, The Florida Historical Quarterly Autumn (1975): 154-170. Formisano, Ronald P., Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004 Fultz, Michael, The Displacement of Black Educators PostBrown: An Overview and Analysis , History of Education Quarterly Spring (2004):1-45. Garner, Regan, A School Without a Name: Desegregation of Ea stside High School, 19701987. University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy August (2005): 233-266. Gasman, Marybeth, Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision, History of Education Quarterly Spring (2004): 70-92. Harvard, William C. and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Stat e University Press, 1962. Jones, Lewis W, Two Years of Desegregation in Alabama, The Journal of Negro Education Summer (1956): 205-211. Kenney, Patricia L., LaVilla, Florida, 1866-1887: Reconstruction Dreams and the Formation of a Black Community, In The African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, 185-206. Gain esville: University Presses of Florida, 1995. Kluger, Richard Simple Justice: The History of Br own vs. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality. New York: Vintage Books, 2004. Lawson, Stephen F., David L. Colburn, and Da rryl Paulson, Grovela nd: Floridas Little Scottsboro, in The African American Heritage of Florida Edited by David L. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1995. Maggioto, Michael, The Impact of Reapportionment in Public Policy, American Politics Quarterly January (1985). Mormino, Gary R., Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. 60

PAGE 67

Porter, Gilbert, The Status of E ducational Desegregation in Florida, The Journal of Negro Education Summer (1956): 246-253. Puryear, R.W., Desegregation of Public E ducation in FloridaOne Year Afterward, The Journal of Negro Education Summer (1955): 219-227. Solomon, W.E., The Problem of De segregation in South Carolina, The Journal of Negro Education Summer (1956): 315-323. Stephen, Stephen A., The Status of Inte gration and Segregation in Arkansas, The Journal of Negro Education, Summer (1956): 212-220 Tomberlin, Joseph A., Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954, Florida Historical Quarterly Autumn (1974): 122-145. Tomberlin, Joseph A., Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959, The Journal of Negro Education Autumn (1974):457-467. Wagy, Tom R., Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980. Walker, Vanessa Siddle, African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960, American Educational Research Journal Winter (2001): 751-779. White, Arthur O., One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1979. Woodward, C. Vann, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1974. Zimmerman, Jonathan, Browning the American Textbook: History, Psychology, and the Origins of Modern Multiculturalism, History of Education Quarterly Spring (2004): 4569. 61

PAGE 68

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Amy Martinelli received a Master of Arts in Education, in social foundations, from the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. She received a Bachelor of Arts in English from the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. She worked as a Graduate Assistant in the William and Grace Center for Written and Oral Communication, where she coached the speech and debate team and taught various courses, featuring Introduction to Public Speaking. 62


Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0020155/00001

Material Information

Title: A Moderate calm? Florida's struggle over school desegregation after Brown, 1955-1961
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Creator: Martinelli, Amy Camile ( Dissertant )
Terzian, Sevan ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007
Copyright Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Dissertations, Academic -- Foundations of Education -- UF
Foundations of Education thesis, M.A.
School integration -- United States -- Florida
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: United States -- Florida

Notes

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the influences that various constituents in Florida had on the decisions of a moderate southern governor, LeRoy Collins, from 1955-1961. After the landmark Brown decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 and 1955, most historians tended to categorize Florida as distinct from other southern states because the state produced little violence and attracted little media attention. This study sought to reevaluate that claim and to consider how strict segregationists and avid integrationists, mostly African Americans, influenced the moderate governor’s decisions. Between 1955 and 1957, the governor relied upon a bi-racial committee to advise him on how to deal with segregation in the state. The group recommended a moderate plan that utilized a Pupil Assignment Law used in many other southern states in response to Brown. During this time, segregationist legislators generally supported the governor’s plan, but some questioned its ability to sustain segregation. Segregationist legislators and the moderate governor conflicted on many issues, most importantly, reapportionment of the legislature. So, when the moderate governor vetoed segregation laws other than his own and blocked Interposition, segregationists began to lose faith in the moderate governor. Integrationists also questioned the governor’s plans. The NAACP brought lawsuits into court to test the Pupil Assignment law with little success. Generally, the state favored the moderate stance in the first two years after Brown. However, in 1958 two events changed the racial atmosphere in Florida. In Jacksonville, a Jewish synagogue and an African American school were bombed by self-proclaimed members of “the Confederate Underground.” Further south, in Miami, the first school in Florida desegregated peacefully. At once, the events heightened fears of violence and of desegregation. Thus, in this fateful year, segregationists and integrationists lost faith in the governor and his plans for segregation. Segregationists brought unprecedented numbers of segregation legislation to the floor, and integrationists united to fight for desegregation more than ever before in Florida. The inability for moderates, segregationists, and integrationists to unite in Florida in the period immediately following the historical Brown decision prevented much of the racial furor seen in most southern states, but did not avoid it completely. Racial segregation was hotly contested in the historically named moderate state.
General Note: Thesis (M. A.)--University of Florida, 2007
General Note: Includes bibliographic references (leaves 65-67)
General Note: Vita.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0020155:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0020155/00001

Material Information

Title: A Moderate calm? Florida's struggle over school desegregation after Brown, 1955-1961
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Creator: Martinelli, Amy Camile ( Dissertant )
Terzian, Sevan ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007
Copyright Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Dissertations, Academic -- Foundations of Education -- UF
Foundations of Education thesis, M.A.
School integration -- United States -- Florida
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: United States -- Florida

Notes

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the influences that various constituents in Florida had on the decisions of a moderate southern governor, LeRoy Collins, from 1955-1961. After the landmark Brown decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 and 1955, most historians tended to categorize Florida as distinct from other southern states because the state produced little violence and attracted little media attention. This study sought to reevaluate that claim and to consider how strict segregationists and avid integrationists, mostly African Americans, influenced the moderate governor’s decisions. Between 1955 and 1957, the governor relied upon a bi-racial committee to advise him on how to deal with segregation in the state. The group recommended a moderate plan that utilized a Pupil Assignment Law used in many other southern states in response to Brown. During this time, segregationist legislators generally supported the governor’s plan, but some questioned its ability to sustain segregation. Segregationist legislators and the moderate governor conflicted on many issues, most importantly, reapportionment of the legislature. So, when the moderate governor vetoed segregation laws other than his own and blocked Interposition, segregationists began to lose faith in the moderate governor. Integrationists also questioned the governor’s plans. The NAACP brought lawsuits into court to test the Pupil Assignment law with little success. Generally, the state favored the moderate stance in the first two years after Brown. However, in 1958 two events changed the racial atmosphere in Florida. In Jacksonville, a Jewish synagogue and an African American school were bombed by self-proclaimed members of “the Confederate Underground.” Further south, in Miami, the first school in Florida desegregated peacefully. At once, the events heightened fears of violence and of desegregation. Thus, in this fateful year, segregationists and integrationists lost faith in the governor and his plans for segregation. Segregationists brought unprecedented numbers of segregation legislation to the floor, and integrationists united to fight for desegregation more than ever before in Florida. The inability for moderates, segregationists, and integrationists to unite in Florida in the period immediately following the historical Brown decision prevented much of the racial furor seen in most southern states, but did not avoid it completely. Racial segregation was hotly contested in the historically named moderate state.
General Note: Thesis (M. A.)--University of Florida, 2007
General Note: Includes bibliographic references (leaves 65-67)
General Note: Vita.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0020155:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text





A MODERATE CALM? FLORIDA'S STRUGGLE OVER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AFTERBROWN, 1955-1961



















By

AMY CAMILE MARTINELLI


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2007





























2007 Amy Camile Martinelli


































To my Mom and Dad.









TABLE OF CONTENTS



A B S T R A C T ................................................................................................................................... v i

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ...................................... ........... ........ ............... 1

Historical Framework ..................................... .. ......... ............ ...............3

2 N A R R A T IV E .........................................................................................................................12

Part I: Florida R eacts to Brown, 1955-1957 ...................................................... ............... 12
Part II: Tw o Y ears of Change, 1957-1958......................................................... ................ 29
Part III: The Disintegration of M operation, 1958-1960 .............. .................................... 33
Part IV: Summary ..................... .................... .. ......... ............ ............... 48

3 CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 51

L IST O F R E F E R E N C E S .............. ........................................................................59

Prim ary Sources .............................................................................................. 59
S e c o n d a ry S o u rc e s ..................................................................................................................5 9

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H .............. ...................................................................... 62


























4









Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education

A MODERATE CALM? FLORIDA'S STRUGGLE OVER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AFTERBROWN, 1955-1961

By

Amy Camile Martinelli

May 2007

Chair: Sevan Terzian
Major: Foundations of Education

The purpose of this study was to examine the influences that various constituents in

Florida had on the decisions of a moderate southern governor, LeRoy Collins, from 1955-1961.

After the landmark Brown decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 and 1955, most

historians tended to categorize Florida as distinct from other southern states because the state

produced little violence and attracted little media attention. This study sought to reevaluate that

claim and to consider how strict segregationists and avid integrationists, mostly African

Americans, influenced the moderate governor's decisions.

Between 1955 and 1957, the governor relied upon a bi-racial committee to advise him on

how to deal with segregation in the state. The group recommended a moderate plan that utilized

a Pupil Assignment Law used in many other southern states in response to Brown. During this

time, segregationist legislators generally supported the governor's plan, but some questioned its

ability to sustain segregation. Segregationist legislators and the moderate governor conflicted on

many issues, most importantly, reapportionment of the legislature. So, when the moderate

governor vetoed segregation laws other than his own and blocked Interposition, segregationists

began to lose faith in the moderate governor. Integrationists also questioned the governor's









plans. The NAACP brought lawsuits into court to test the Pupil Assignment law with little

success. Generally, the state favored the moderate stance in the first two years after Brown.

However, in 1958 two events changed the racial atmosphere in Florida. In Jacksonville,

a Jewish synagogue and an African American school were bombed by self-proclaimed members

of "the Confederate Underground." Further south, in Miami, the first school in Florida

desegregated peacefully. At once, the events heightened fears of violence and of desegregation.

Thus, in this fateful year, segregationists and integrationists lost faith in the governor and his

plans for segregation. Segregationists brought unprecedented numbers of segregation legislation

to the floor, and integrationists united to fight for desegregation more than ever before in Florida.

The inability for moderates, segregationists, and integrationists to unite in Florida in the

period immediately following the historical Brown decision prevented much of the racial furor

seen in most southern states, but did not avoid it completely. Racial segregation was hotly

contested in the historically named moderate state.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, March 19, 1960, Florida Governor LeRoy Collins's driver (a highway patrol

officer) reported that a "busload of Negroes" had arrived at Florida A&M University with

baseball bats in hand. The driver reported that the young men came from Alabama to augment

local forces in Tallahassee lunch counter sit-ins and had planned a demonstration. Collins called

the president of the university who offered confirmation: "It is true, Governor, we've got a

busload...For a year now we have had a... baseball game, scheduled with the institution up there

in Alabama and the boys are here with their bats to play the game."1 The next night, Governor

Collins addressed the situation in a speech broadcasted statewide over television and radio.

Collins announced that if "some Alabama boys" came to promote violence, he would certainly

quell the situation through police control as he had a year earlier before a Ku Klux Klan

demonstration. But, the mere presence of African Americans from another state should not elicit

any kind of action. The Florida governor's response statement exemplified his abhorrence of

violence either in support of the preservation or elimination of segregation.

LeRoy Collins attempted to maintain peace and order in his state during a tumultuous

period in the South's history. Historians note that through Collins's efforts to maintain peace,

Florida fared better after the Supreme Court's historic Brown vs. Board decision of 1954 than

most southern states. Although the Sunshine State produced almost no desegregation

immediately after Brown, it also suffered relatively little violence. Some contend that Florida's

calm reaction to Brown resulted from its relatively small African American population and the

state's financial reliance on tourism. Others credit the governor and his moderate leadership for



1 Transcript of Statewide TV-Radio Talk by Governor LeRoy Collins, 20 March 1960, Series 226 Box 2 File 15,
Collins Papers, Florida State Archives.









Florida's seemingly harmonious response to the Supreme Court decision. Whatever the cause,

Florida did not receive widespread national attention for racial tension even though the state

remained entrenched in segregation well after Brown. Historians Joseph Tomberlin, Richard

Scher, David Colburn, Tom Wagy and Earl Black have interpreted Governor Collins's stance

toward segregation as moderate and have tended to downplay Florida's long history of racial

segregation. Instead, their moderate interpretations of Collins's perspective overshadowed and

oversimplified Florida's explosive atmosphere following the Brown decision.2

To provide new insight into Florida's own history and its place in southern history, this

thesis examines Florida's varied reactions to the Brown decision from 1955-1961. Historians

have tended either to overlook Florida's history of racial segregation, or focus solely on Collins's

moderation. This study seeks to reevaluate Florida's history of racial segregation as well as the

state's position in the south. The governor's moderate stance has dominated historical accounts

of Florida and is credited for the peaceful atmosphere in the state after Brown. Additionally, this

study adds to a larger perspective of southern history as a whole, and reveals that contrary to

many historians' interpretations, Florida's history was not distinct from other southern states.

Reexamining Florida's moderate stance and including constituents who influenced the





2 For discussion of Collins as a moderate see David C. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, "Race Relations and
Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision," The Florida Historical Quarterly (Autumn 1975): 154-170;
Joseph Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959," The Journal oJ ., .-, Education (Autumn
1974):457-467. For a thorough biography of LeRoy Collins see Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida:
Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980). For a definition of "moderate
segregationist" see Earl Black, "Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation
and Economic Development, 1950-1969," The Journal of Politics (Summer 1971): 703-734. This paper is informed
by Black's definition of a moderate segregationist candidate as one who 1) favors racial segregation, but these
preferences are usually qualified by other values and commitments, 2) does not make the defense of racial
segregation a leading campaign issue, 3) avoids appealing to racial prejudice to discredit his opponent. For
discussion of Florida's lack of violence see: R.W. Puryear, "Desegregation of Public Education in Florida-One
Year Afterward," The Journal oJ. ', .., Education (Summer 1955): 219-227; Joseph A. Tomberlin, "Florida Whites
and the Brown Decision of 1954," Florida Historical Quarterly (Autumn 1972): 22-36.









governor's decisions allows for the possibility to conclude that race relations in the state were no

better or worse than in other southern states, and were nothing short of explosive.

In order to contribute not only to Florida's history but to the history of the south, this

study focuses on the governor's response to the historic Brown case, and those of prominent

segregationists and integrationists as well. LeRoy Collins's correspondence suggest that he was

indeed concerned about segregation, but was more interested in the economic and social welfare

of his state. Articles and editorials from three mainstream newspapers, the Miami Herald

(Miami), the Florida Times Union (Jacksonville), and the Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee)

provided white (and often segregationist) perspectives from different parts of the state. African

American newspapers, the Miami Times (Miami), the Florida Sentinel (Tampa), and the Florida

Star (Jacksonville), revealed African American and integrationist perspectives both for and

against Collins. For additional information on integrationist groups in Florida, the Papers of the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) reveal how the leaders

of this group responded to Collins and how he responded to them. These resources are

underutilized and add to a new perspective about Florida's racial history. They reveal that after

Brown, Florida's atmosphere was explosive and tense; it was not distinctive in its

implementation of the Supreme Court's historic decision.

Historical Framework

Because my study focuses on legislation and education politics in Florida, it depends

primarily on Florida sources. However, the historical framework of the pre-Brown and post-

Brown years, in the Southern United States and Florida in particular, provides an important

background. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision did not occur in a vacuum. Accordingly,

Florida's story of segregation exists within the construct of the South and the entire nation.









Therefore it is important to begin by first accounting for the years before Brown, both within the

state and national contexts.

Before Thurgood Marshall and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP) ever conceived their attack on segregation, the status of African Americans in

the South underwent tremendous changes. Before the Civil War, slaves and slave owners in

Florida generally coexisted. The plantation lifestyle was arranged in such a way that made it

necessary for blacks and whites to live close to one another; segregating races was "an

inconvenience." Jim Crow became the rule of the land in the southern United States only after

the Civil War and Reconstruction. In Northern cities like Boston, however, slaves freed well

before the Civil War were constantly reminded of their inferior position through racial

segregation laws. Racial segregation developed in the South after the Reconstruction period.3

In The Strange Career of Jim Crow, C. Vann Woodward explained that during

Reconstruction former slaves found freedoms previously denied to them. Woodward contended

that because the Federal government stepped in to protect freed slaves from discrimination

during Reconstruction, African American citizens did not need to fight for their rights.

Therefore, without a vigorous attitude, freed slaves eventually faced conditions similar to slavery

shortly after Reconstruction. Patricia L. Kenney's depiction of the African American community

in LaVilla, Florida near Jacksonville, provided an illustration of how whites maintained power

over freed slaves even after emancipation. LaVilla was separate from the mass conglomeration

of whites and was built to house freed slaves. However, the community was close enough to

Jacksonville for freed slaves to continue to work for whites-oftentimes their former masters.


3 David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, The African American Heritage of Florida (Gainesville: University Presses
of Florida, 1995); Ronald P. Formisano Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s.
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim
Crow. (New York: Oxford Press, 1974).









Already segregated from whites, small Reconstruction villages eventually fed into the

establishment of Jim Crow. While Reconstruction presented a period of opportunity for African

Americans, Woodward ultimately blames Jim Crow and the continuance of discrimination on

Reconstruction's demise.4

After Reconstruction, many African Americans found themselves in conditions not

unlike slavery for decades. According to recent historians, the status of southern African

Americans did not begin to change until the 1940s, when a period of new hope arrived. In

Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida, David L. Colburn and Lance De-Haven Smith

reported that in the 1940s, the southeastern region of the United States was the poorest in the

nation. However, after World War II newfound wealth brought Northerners, and their money, to

the economically deprived region. Florida had experienced a population boom once before in

the 1920s, which quickly fizzled during the Great Depression. Native Floridians understood the

importance of encouraging economic growth. But as the political atmosphere became more

diverse, the locus of control remained solidly with the traditional "crackers" who resided in the

northernmost parts of Florida. Even with "deep south" roots, Florida's new population did

influence the traditional views of natives.

While population diversity changed in parts of the South, courts began to scrutinize the

equal part of the "separate but equal" doctrine established by Plessy vs. Ferguson. After World

War II, the unfairness of racial discrimination in the United States became more evident


4 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1974): 71-78; Patricia L.
Kenney. "LaVilla, Florida, 1866-1887: Reconstruction Dreams and the Formation of a Black Community," in The
African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, 185-206 (Gainesville:
University Presses of Florida, 1995).
5 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven Smith, Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida (Gainesville,
University Press of Florida, 2002); David L. Colburn and Richard S. Scher, Florida's Gubernatorial Politics in the
Twentieth Century (Tallahassee, University Press of Florida, 1980), Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980:
The Story of the South's Modernization (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1995).









throughout the world. African American men fought along with white soldiers in segregated

units-and their children attended segregated schools. American forces fought for freedom

overseas, but the nation failed to provide it for all of its soldiers and citizens at home.

Accordingly, many southern states attempted to comply with both the separate and equal parts of

the "separate but equal" doctrine. Florida legislators tried this through increasing standards for

African American schools, increasing salaries for African American teachers, and equalizing the

length of the school year for African American schools. But even with the eyes of the world

upon the United States, the tradition of racial discrimination permeated southern institutions.6

In Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black America's

Strug/lefor Equality, Richard Kluger describes the road to Brown as calculated and time-

consuming. After the NAACP claimed victory in the U.S. Supreme Court, segregation remained

in the hands of white segregationists. The South was still predominantly run by white

segregationists. Instances like Alabama's "Scottsboro Boys" and Florida's "Groveland case"

highlighted the absolute power of white authorities in most southern towns. In the wake of

World War II and the economic boom that followed, most Americans enjoyed their reprieve

from the Great Depression, but for most Southern African Americans little had changed.7

However, C. Vann Woodward suggested in The Strange Career of Jim Crow that the

South is a tumultuous and ever-changing region. When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown,

responses were therefore not predictable. In The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics

6 Bartley, The New South; Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South
During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997); R.W. Puryear, "Desegregation of Public
Education in Florida-One Year After," The Journal oJ ., .,. Education (Summer 1955): 219-227; Joseph A.
Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959: A Summary View," The Journal oJ .,., Education
(Autumn 1974): 457-467.

7 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for
Equality (New York: Vintage Books 2004); Stephen F. Lawson, David L. Colburn, and Darryl Paulson,
"Groveland: Florida's Little Scottsboro," in The African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David L. Colburn
and Jane L. Landers (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1995).









in the .Sn,,lh During the 1950s, Numan V. Bartley described the South's response to Brown as a

period of calm followed by massive resistance, which manifested itself in physical and symbolic

ways. Massive resistance to desegregation rested on the idea that the "Negro's place" in the

world was determined "by tradition, by nature, by law," at the bottom. Common massive

resistance tactics included propaganda and enacting a doctrine of interposition. Interposition is

an asserted right of a state to protect sovereignty. It was first used during the Civil War to

oppose the abolition of slavery. The fear of miscegenation even sparked battles in the textbook

industry. Essentially, massive resistance took many forms which included, but was not limited

to, violence.8

Resistance also took the form of segregation legislation. As of 1956, most southern states

either had not responded to the Brown decrees or reported the use of "legal means" to maintain

segregation. According to a statistical summary of desegregation published by the Southern

Education Reporting Service, Florida was among seven of the eighteen states in the South that

passed "pupil assignment" laws. These provisions allowed local school boards to place students

in schools based on nebulous criteria; generally the laws promoted segregation over

desegregation. Furthermore, Florida was among six of the eighteen southern states that passed

Interposition resolutions that deemed the U.S. Supreme Court's Brown decisions null and void.

These examples indicate that, legislatively, Florida reacted to Brown in ways similar to "deep

south" states.9



8 Bartley, The Rise ofMassive Resistance; Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow; Jonathan Zimmerman,
"Brown-ing the American Textbook: History, Psychology, and the Origins of Modem Multiculturalism," History of
Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 45-69.

9 William A Bender, "The Status of Educational Desegregation in Mississippi," The Journal oj .. .., Education
(Summer 1956):285-288; Lewis W. Jones, "Two Years of Desegregation in Alabama," The Journal oj .., ..-,
Education (Summer 1956): 205-211; W.E. Solomon, "The Problem of Desegregation in South Carolina," The
Journal oj .'... -, Education (Summer 1956): 315-323; Stephen A. Stephen, "The Status of Integration and
Segregation in Arkansas," The Journal oj. .. Education (Summer 1956): 212-220; Gilbert Porter, "The Status of









However, in Florida, segregation was not the only subject of contention. The U.S.

Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision in the midst of the state's own embittered battle

for reapportionment of its legislature. This period represents a time when a handful of legislators

from small districts scattered throughout the state controlled Florida's houses of congress even

though their constituents did not represent the growing population. Tom Wagy and David

Colburn and Lance deHaven-Smith, contend that Governor Collins wanted to focus most of his

energy toward altering the apportionment of the legislature so that the government would reflect

proportionately the growing population. Furthermore, the so-called "Pork Chop Gang," a faction

of small district legislators led by Senator Charley Johns, (Dem. Bradford), sought not only to

continue the misrepresentative apportionment, but also the traditions of the old south. Therefore,

these politicians not only opposed reapportionment but integration as well. Throughout his

tenure as governor, Collins attempted to pass reapportionment legislation, but the "Pork

Choppers" consistently blocked him. 10

Although historians' accounts of the aftermath of Brown tended to focus on negative

implications for whites, African Americans felt the brunt of the ruling as well. In "The

Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown," Michael Fultz describes the firings of African

American teachers. He concludes that it was easier to integrate students than school staffs.

Tenure laws in six southern states, including Florida, changed to discriminate against African

American teachers. Some southern states revised contracts for African American teachers to an



Educational Desegregation in Florida," The Journal o ..;,.. E. ...M.* Siiiiticr 1956): 246-253; "Status of
Segregation-Desegregation in the Southern and Border States," Published by Southern Education Reporting Service,
Nashville, Tennessee 1960: 1-20.

1"Michael Maggioto, "The Impact of Reapportionment in Public Policy," American Politics Quarterly 13 (January
1985); Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South, 46-58; Colburn and deHaven-
Smith, Florida 's Megatrends, 44-49; The "pork choppers" were broken up in 1962 as a result of the U.S. Supreme
Court case Baker vs. Carr.









annual basis. In Georgia, teachers who were members of the NAACP could have their licenses

revoked permanently. Threats of desegregation closed African American schools before white

schools, and as a result many teachers lost their jobs. According to Arthur 0. White in One

Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida, African American educators

feared similar consequences. In a survey which included 4,000 questionnaires and personal

interviews in nine counties, many respondents claimed that African American teachers would

have difficulty finding employment in a desegregated system.1

Marybeth Gasman explained in "Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the

United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision," how Brown

threatened African American institutions of higher education. If schools desegregated, then

African American colleges could have been in jeopardy. The institutions suddenly needed to

justify their existence. The United Negro College Fund did this by encouraging white students to

enroll, arguing that financial constraints still limited many in the pursuit of education, and

attempting to enter into the mainstream of education. Desegregation was a high priority for

African Americans, but it did not come without a cost. Both Fultz and Gasman indicated that

even if Brown created new problems, African American educators were willing to accommodate

those problems. For the most part, African American educators continued to struggle for

professionalism and equality.12

Vanessa Siddle Walker presents African American teachers as highly motivated and

dedicated to professionalism in "African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960." She


11 Michael Fultz, "The Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown: An Overview and Analysis, History of
Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 11-45; Arthur 0. White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public
Education in Florida (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1979), 135.
12 Marybeth Gasman, "Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the
Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision," History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 70-92.









explains that although most historians characterize African American teachers as victims of

oppression or as caring role models, they were really professionals who used many tactics to

teach their students. African American teachers in Georgia generally received more formal

education than their white counterparts. These educators worked in dismal and unequal facilities

to white educators but did not become victims of their environment. Through African American

teachers' associations, they were able to maintain high standards for themselves, their

communities, and their students. Walker's article suggests that even under oppressive

conditions, African American educators prioritized education, and strove for their equality. 13

Historians have examined many aspects of southern educational history, but have largely

neglected Florida's role. To ascertain a new perspective of how Florida responded to Brown,

this thesis examines the priorities of key constituents. As historians have already indicated,

Governor Collins played an integral role in Florida's immediate response to Brown. Collins

represented the moderate position in Florida-opposed to segregation and violence. What, then,

constituted Governor Collins's legislative priorities? What did Collins say about school

desegregation? How did Collins respond to Brown? Did his stance change over time? Who in

the state agreed with Collins and who disagreed?

Missing from Florida's historical account of the period after Brown are the perspectives

of multiple constituents who influenced the governor. This thesis seeks to provide new insight

for Florida's history as well as history of the south, and to decipher why segregation lasted so

long after Brown in a state with a self-proclaimed moderate governor. Therefore, it is imperative

to ask questions about the key constituents in Florida. Historians have categorized Collins as a

moderate segregationist. Those historians have evaluated the state's reaction to Brown through

13 Vanessa Siddle Walker, "African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960, American Educational Research
Journal (Winter 2001): 751-779.









his viewpoint but have neglected other actors that played a role in the state at the time. Their

attention to Collins has placed an inordinate emphasis on the absence of violence and has hidden

Florida's volatile legislative and social atmosphere. Collins was a moderate governor who placed

a high priority on reapportioning the state's legislature. He failed to preserve race relations and

his focus on reapportionment and peaceful order eventually led many Florida residents to distrust

his stance on segregation. 14

Historians credit Collins for maintaining peace in his state, but the governor's approach

displeased many powerful constituents. His goals differed from rural segregationists whose

absolute power was threatened by reapportionment. Integrationist leaders, meanwhile,

eventually lost faith that Collins's moderation supported their needs. In the end, he was too

integrationist for some and too segregationist for others. As Collins's terms as governor

diminished, so did support from both segregationist and integrationist groups because his single-

minded aspiration for peace discredited groups who wanted to fight for their beliefs. This thesis

therefore argues that Florida's segregation was typical of most southern states with respect to

education and race, but there are exceptions. The moderate governor and the economic climate

in Florida occasionally affected the state's segregation practices.













14 Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South, 46-58; Colburn and deHaven-Smith: Florida's
Megatrends, 35-61; Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959," 459; Black, "Southern
Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-
1969," 711.









CHAPTER 2
NARRATIVE

Part I: Florida Reacts to Brown, 1955-1957

After World War II and before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Plessy vs. Ferguson

unconstitutional, Florida launched efforts to equalize African American and white schools.

Florida's schools lived up to the "separate" aspect "separate but equal" doctrine, but not the

"equal" part. Florida leaders realized inequities in schools existed and attempted to remedy the

situation, if not for philanthropic reasons, then to preserve segregation. Between 1940 and 1952,

expenditures on African American students and teacher salaries nearly tripled. In 1947, the

legislature passed the Minimum Foundation Act to improve, overall, the public education

system. LeRoy Collins, then a State Senator from Leon County, was a major proponent of the

Minimum Foundation Program.'

With the Minimum Foundation Program in place, Florida leaders believed they might

adhere to the "separate but equal doctrine" and thereby allow segregation to continue. But when

the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its first ruling on Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka

Kansas on May 17, 1954, leaders in Florida had to respond somehow. Under Governor Daniel

McCarty, the Florida legislature enacted Senate Bill 124, known as the Pupil Placement Law.

This law allowed local school boards to admit or deny pupils from public schools for virtually

any reason. Segregationist-dominated districts could sustain segregation. The Pupil Placement

Law did not explicitly prohibit desegregation; thus, it allowed local communities to control




1 In 1940, the state expended $23.67 per African American student. By 1952, the state expended $153.24 per
African American Student. African American teachers earned $583 per year in 1940, but by 1953 they earned
$2,922. The state also equalized the school year so that every child attended school during the 180 day cycle.
Joseph Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959," The Journal oJ ._ .;., Education (Autumn
1974):457-467; R.W. Puryear, "Desegregation of Public Education in Florida-One Year Afterward," The Journal
of ._,.,., Education (Summer 1955): 219-227.









segregation policies. Furthermore, local groups held responsibility for conflicts that arose due to

desegregation.2

In 1955, Governor McCarty died while in office. Senator LeRoy Collins, (Dem., Leon) a

friend of the governor's ran to take McCarty's place and carry out his predecessor's plan to

reapportion Florida's legislature. Reapportionment of the legislature was Collins's main focus

while in office. According to Tom Wagy's biographical account of the governor's life, the

historical Brown decision altered Collins's priorities. The moderate governor gained most of his

voter support from constituents who would attain more political power through reapportionment.

On the other hand, the small "Pork Chop Gang" presented a dominant voice of opposition toward

the governor and his initiatives. William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth explained, however, that

reapportionment would only succeed if forced from the outside. The current legislative body

would not approve the change because it would strip it of power. Furthermore, in the 1955

legislative session, Collins first introduced reapportionment as a key issue of contention and

continued to do so in every session as governor. Harvard and Beth indicated that his strong

stance on reapportionment isolated some legislators, who "resolved to fight every measure the

governor backed."3 When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Brown for the second time, racial

segregation threatened to overshadow Collins's goal for reapportionment.4

A Tallahassee native, Collins served as a Democratic Representative for Leon County

from 1934 to 1940. He then acted as a state Senator until 1941 when he served in the U.S. Navy


2 General Acts and Resolutions Adopted by the Legislature of Florida at its Thirty-fifth Regular Session, Volume 1
Part One, 1955: 302-305; Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation Issue," 457.
3 William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural Urban Conflict in the Florida
Legislature (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 58.
4 Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 1980), 53; Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 21.









during World War II. Upon his return Collins was elected to the Senate for eight years and was

hailed a champion of progressive educational legislation. Segregation, however, was not high on

Collins's to-do list. In his campaign speeches, Collins promised the citizens of Florida that he

would preserve segregation. Mostly, he focused on enhancing state economic and industrial

growth. Collins emphasized his opposition to the court's ruling but understood that any

legislative plan for desegregation needed careful crafting. The new governor faced Brown, and

all the problems associated with it, by advocating a moderate approach to preserve segregation.5

Florida's First Legislation: The Pupil Assignment Law, 1955-1957

The Pupil Placement Law was a provisionary action taken to fend off desegregation and

endured the year between the two Brown rulings. In fact, in 1955 Florida's news writers

essentially ignored Brown. The editor of the Tallahassee Democrat cautioned the legislature not

to produce sweeping segregation measures until the U.S. Supreme Court released its second

Brown ruling. The court revealed its Brown II directive to desegregate "with all deliberate

speed," and Governor LeRoy Collins told the Tallahassee Democrat that the state could move

calmly. The vagueness of the condition allowed time to consider a proper course of action.6

Collins may have cared little for segregation politics, but he understood the necessity of a

plan for segregation. Brown could generate a potentially virulent atmosphere, so he sought

assistance. In 1956, Governor Collins and General Richard Ervin formed a committee of legal

experts to devise segregation legislation. This group, known as the Fabisinski Committee,

attempted to solve the conundrum of legally maintaining segregation. If the governor ascertained

5 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven Smith, Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida (Gainesville,
University Presses of Florida, 2002), 127.
6 John Tapers, "What's Being Done About Segregation?" The Tallahassee Democrat, 22 April 1955, 2; John
Tapers, "The Governor's Program" The Tallahassee Democrat, 6 April 1955, 6; John Tapers, "End of Segregation"
The Tallahassee Democrat, 14 May 1955, 2; "Floridians Relieved: Collins Says State Can Move Calmly," The
Florida Times Union, 1 June 1955, 6.









some "lawful and practical proposal" to handle integration from the committee's report, he

would call a special session of legislature to act upon it.7

On July 16, 1956 the Fabisinski Committee released its report. It concluded that in the

days after the Brown decision, Florida and the nation were bound to experience difficult times.

The report cautioned legislators against acting on emotion. To determine segregation policies

based on tradition and emotion alone could amplify unnecessary tension. The committee shared

similar goals with the governor. They wanted to preserve the public school system in Florida so

that every child had the opportunity to succeed through education. Educated children produced

educated workers. They wanted to prevent "hostile feelings" between different classes and

groups to maintain harmony. Finally, they wanted to maintain segregation but also comply with

the United States Constitution.

The committee suggested a plan that strengthened the existing Pupil Placement Law to

attain these goals. This new Pupil Assignment Law, allowed districts to determine student

school assignments on psychological and socio-economic factors. Implementation of pupil

assignment relied on tests to account for socio-cultural and psychological considerations to

determine a student's welfare in a school. Essentially, the tests utilized vague justifications for

school placement decisions. However, pupil assignment did not demand segregation. Collins

hoped the Pupil Assignment Law would retain segregation without suffering immediate judicial

peril. So, on July 20, 1956, he sent a proclamation to the Florida State Legislature calling for a





7The members of the committee included Judge L.L. Fabisinski, chairman, Judge Rivers Buford, vice chairman,
Judge Millard Smith, Cody Fowler, Luther Mershon, J. Lewis Hall and John T. Wigginton (only one of these men
was African American: Lewis Hall.); Herbert Cameron, "Collins to Curb Session Agenda,"The Florida Times
Union, 3 July 1956, 12; Night Press- Collect, 10 May 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961,
Collins Collection, Florida State Archives.










special session of legislature to consider the Fabisinski Committee's four-point segregation

8
program.

Legislators reacted favorably and decidedly approved the measure with only one

dissenting vote. Newspapers sanctioned pupil assignment as well. For instance, the editor of the

Miami Herald called the program "the opinion of a competent committee" who studied the

matter thoroughly. The segregation plan equally pleased the editor of the Tallahassee Democrat.

He reminded his readers that the U.S. Supreme Court did not mandate integration, but declared

racial segregation unconstitutional. So, if pupil assignment did not intentionally segregate

schools then the law was constitutional. Also, pupil assignment provided time to plan for

desegregation. Supporters believed the committee found temperate and sound efforts to maintain

segregation in Florida. Others in the state did not agree.9

Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey believed the Pupil Assignment

Law would suffice to avoid segregation problems in public schools; he did not advise any further

legislation. However, Bailey did have some reservations because only one member of the

Fabisinski Committee approached him and no legislators had consulted him about this law.

Bailey believed pupil assignment presented "Herculean and puzzling" planning for

8 Acts and Regulations Adopted by the Legislature of Florida at its Extraordinary Sessions: June 6, 1955 to June 11,
1956 and July 23, 1956 to August 1, 1956, Published by Authority of Law, 1956: 30-35. The Fabisinski Committee
based its recommendations on laws that succeeded in the State courts of North Carolina. Report of the Special
Committee, 2-3. "A Proclamation by the Governor, State of Florida," Executive Department, Tallahassee, 20 July
1956, file unmarked, box 25, series 776 A, Proclamations, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives.
Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey opposed the use of tests so broadly. The four-point program
included the Pupil Assignment Law, regulating assignments of teachers, vesting power in the governor to use
necessary means to protect peace and tranquility, and allow the governor to call forth all law enforcement agencies
in the state in case of an emergency. This paper focuses on the Pupil Assignment Law because it is the major piece
of legislation utilized in Florida after Brown to avoid desegregation.

\\ liw others Think," Tallahassee Democrat, 17 July 1956, 6. The one dissenting vote was cast by House
Representative John D. Orr from Dade County who felt that the bill was an attempt to circumvent the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and that it would be deemed ineffective. "Student Assignment Bill Voted By House and
Sent to Collins," The Florida Times Union, 25 July 1956, 8; John S. Knight, "Will Special Session Set a New
Pattern?" The Miami Herald, 25 July 1956, 6A; John Tapers, "An Effective Measure," The Tallahassee Democrat,
27 July 1956, 4; John Tapers, "Odd Man in the Legislature," The Tallahassee Democrat, 2 August 1956, 4.









implementation. The law did not consider Florida's geography and demographics. In large

urban areas, school attendance zones would maintain segregation. In rural or small districts

where high schools drew students from all parts of the county, school attendance zones would

actually facilitate desegregation. 10

Additionally, Bailey believed the law relied too much upon the creation of standardized

tests to determine a student's school eligibility; pupil assignment presented a major headache for

county boards. Every child entering a school for the first time needed testing, including six-year-

old first grade students. School districts could not deny pupil assignments because of race, so

local boards needed to establish sound reasons for their admissions and denials. The committee

considered segregation from a legal standpoint, but neglected the administrative level. Local

school districts were responsible for maintaining segregation, so legislators and executives

needed to reflect on what impact pupil assignment would make.11

The Fabisinski Committee's proposals also drew negative reactions from segregationist

leaders because pupil assignment allowed segregation or desegregation. Segregationists feared

the law could not sustain Florida's "custom and law." Attorney General Richard Ervin told the

Miami Herald: "I don't believe it [the Pupil Assignment Law] goes far enough to satisfy the

people of Florida."12 Strict segregationists would not bear gradual desegregation any more than

immediate desegregation. The Attorney General believed that the people of Florida were not

represented adequately under the Pupil Assignment Law.





'"Speech to Special Session, 18 May 1956, series 1127, file 2, box 15, Speeches and Press Releases Superintendent
Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files, Florida State Archives.
1 "School Head Pledges Help in Administering New Law," The Florida Times Union, 3 August 1956, 12.
12 "Florida's Segregation Efforts Doomed to Failure, Says Ervin," The Miami Herald, 11 August 1956, 12.









Former National Guardsman and prominent businessman from Tampa Sumter Lowry

(Dem., Tampa) agreed. Lowry, a strict segregationist candidate in the 1957 gubernatorial

election who forced segregation rhetoric into campaign strategies, believed that "gradual

integration is race suicide."13 Because the four-point plan recommended by the governor's

committee stalled integration, but would not prevent it completely, strict segregationists like

Lowry desired more extreme measures. Lowry criticized the governor for not doing enough to

preserve segregation and violating his campaign promise to do so. Lowry found Collins's

behavior in the special session of legislature abhorrent. According to Lowry, the governor's call

for the session limited legislators to do only one thing: approve his four-point program. Collins

requested legislators not consider any other segregation laws, and this left the people and their

representatives little power. Legislators, who feared the governor's stance on a restrictive policy

of reapportionment, may have feared that the group's plan was another ploy to eliminate rural

districts' power.14

Opposition to the Fabisinski Committee was not limited to strict segregationists.

Integrationists found problems with pupil assignment and the committee, alike. First, the one

state representative who voted against the laws proposed by the Fabisinski Committee, Rep. John

D. Orr (Dem., Dade), believed pupil assignment subverted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision.

Orr, a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),

delivered a ten minute speech in defense of his decision, denouncing any practices that would

defy Supreme Court rulings. He favored gradual integration because Florida did not provide


13 Sumter L. Lowry to Governor LeRoy Collins, 23 July 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 1955-
1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. Lowry ran, unsuccessfully for governor once against Collins in
1957 and then against Farris Bryant in 1960. In 1960, Lowry, the man who brought segregation into the political
arena as a campaign issue, lost to Bryant, but gained a large percentage of the vote.
14 Lowry to Collins, 23 July 1956, Collins Collection.









separate and equal schools for African American and white students. Therefore, gradual

desegregation could solve inequity in Florida's public schools. Orr's fellow legislators did not

agree and essentially "froze" him out of the legislature until the next legislative session.

Legislators kept Orr out of committees, and no one would consider his legislative proposals. 15

Representative Orr's experience in the legislature exemplified a common fear held by

integrationists in Florida: those who openly opposed segregation were not welcome. A 1956

special report of state activities in Florida regarding branch work of the NAACP, extolled

concerns about the growing opposition to the fight against segregation. The report claimed that a

"conspiracy" existed to support the fear that if desegregation occurred, there would be significant

"strife." Segregationists groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, white Citizens Councils, and the

National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP) formed in Florida with

the intent to preserve segregation. Those who expressed their hopes for integration might feel

frightened to do so because these groups posed a legitimate threat. 16

Integrationists also questioned the governor's use of a bi-racial committee to sustain

segregation. Robert W. Saunders, Field Secretary for the NAACP, asserted that the one African

American in the committee, Lewis Hall, had been hoodwinked. After all, Saunders argued, the

purpose of the committee was to preserve segregation. Hall's seat existed to prove that some

African Americans were content with the status quo, not because the committee was inclusive.

15 "Rep. Orr Defends Integration Stand" The Miami Times, 28 July 1956, 1; "Gov. Collins Halts Freeze on Rep.
Orr" The Florida Sentinel, 26 January, 1957, 1; "Commend Rep. Orr's Stand in Legislature," The Miami Times, 11
Aug 1956, 1; "Congratulations Rep. Orr" The Miami Times, 28 July 1956, 4. Representative Orr was not completely
hated by all in the state; the National Association of Colored Women's Clubs and the editor of The Miami Times
congratulated the congressman on his courageous stand in the legislature. However, none of his colleagues shared
this opinion, and he lost a lot of his effectiveness in his work for almost an entire year.

16 Special Report of Activities in Florida Regarding Branch Work, etc., 11 June 1956, reel 4, frame 164, Part 27:
Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.









Hall's position on the committee also drew negative attention from African American

newspapers. The editor of the Miami Times viewed the committee as a useful tool in improving

race relations in the state because it advocated peace. However, the editor reminded his readers

that the committee included merely one African American and therefore could not serve the best

interests of African Americans.17

The Pupil Assignment Law and the Fabisinski Committee drew both negative and

positive attention from groups of all ideologies. In spite of any misgivings, pupil assignment was

the cornerstone of Florida's segregation policy. Most politicians supported the law, but wanted

more segregation laws to augment it. Leaders in the African American and integrationist

communities felt the law was a subversion of the Supreme Court's ruling. While integrationist

leaders abhorred pupil assignment and the Fabisinski Committee, members of the African

American community were hesitant to blame the governor because he seemed more tolerant of

desegregation than other southern politicians. So, satisfied with pupil assignment, Collins asked

legislators not to offer any other proposals for segregation.

Florida Needs Protection: The Local Option Plan, 1956-1957

When he called for a special session of the legislature in 1956, Governor Collins asked

members not to produce any other bills regarding segregation. Controversy came from Attorney

General Richard Ervin who helped Governor Collins create the Fabisinski Committee. Ervin

honored Collins's request not to propose any new legislation during the special session of 1956.

However, Ervin indicated that a private school system might be a necessary precaution to

preserve segregation. He was not alone. In 1956, House Representative Prentice Pruitt (Dem.,

Monticello) introduced two segregation bills known as the Local Option Plan. The first allowed

1 Robert Saunders, "Sound Off NAACP Secretary Raps Lee Appointment" The Florida Sentinel, 15 September
1956, 4; Eric 0. Simpson, "Gov. Collins Bi-Racial Committee," 15 September 1956, 4.










for emergency suspension of public schools, and the second allowed students from suspended

schools either to attend another public institution or receive a subsidy for a private school.

Governor Collins did not favor either because they allowed for the possibility to close public

schools. As promised, Collins vetoed the 'Local Option Plan.' This use of veto is an example of

the exceptions in Florida's status as a typical southern state. A typical southern governor would

welcome a plan to close schools in order to avoid desegregation. 18

Even after Collins's first veto of the Local Option Plan, the attorney general still believed

in private school subsidies. Pupil assignment simply did not go far enough to preserve

segregation. But before the 1957 session of legislature, Collins again vowed to utilize veto

power, this time only on bills that threatened to close public schools. Despite Collins's decree,

Ervin sponsored House Bill 671, a local option plan known as the "last resort." The plan called

for closings of integrated schools and providing state-funded private school subsidies for

students displaced by closed schools. Because the bill came from the attorney general, the

governor needed support against the bill from another legitimate source in the state. A member

of the Fabisinski committee convinced Thomas D. Bailey, Superintendent of Public Instruction,

to take a stand against "last resort" from an educator's perspective. 19




Nc\ s From the Legislature," The Florida Times Union, 23 July 1956. Florida Legislative Service: Summary of
House Bills, 27, July, 1956, file 14, box, 25, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida
State Archives. The attorney general did not submit any bills into legislative committee during the 1956 special
session, Pruitt asserted that he had borrowed his idea from Attorney General Ervin. Furthermore, Ervin admitted
that he had drafted a bill and would be willing to show it to any legislator who would be interested, but because the
general consensus as the time favored the Fabisinski Committee's legislation, he would not push the proposal at that
time. The bill did not survive in the special session, but Attorney General Ervin's admission that he had had plans to
propose laws that would stray from the Pupil Assignment Law foreshadowed what would become a legislative battle
that permeated into the Executive Branch of Florida. "As Segregation Barrier: Solon to Offer Measure to Halt
School System," The Florida Times Union, 20 July 1956, 6.

19John L. Boyles, "Collins to Veto Segregation Bill to Shut Down Schools," The Miami Herald, 21 April 1957;
Confidential Memorandum from Joe Grotegut to Judge Fabisinski, 4 March 1957, file 1, box 117, series 776,
Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives. An important note to consider is that Bailey
did not oppose the principle behind "last resort" but its implementation. Bailey believed that private school









On April 26, 1957, Thomas D. Bailey made a statement before the House Committee on

Education against "last resort." Bailey discussed each section of the bill and its invalidity.

Bailey indicated that while dedicated to a segregated school system, he disagreed with Ervin on

the means. He reacted to the bill from an educational point of view. The aspects that Bailey

opposed most regarded closing integrated schools, placing displaced students into open schools,

and providing state subsidies for private schools.20

Section two of House Bill 671 dictated that an area might petition to hold a special

election to determine whether its schools should close. Bailey argued that elections like this

could start a propaganda campaign that would unnecessarily cause racial tension and disorder.

Bailey deemed that the "most diabolical of all sanctions" mandated school boards to provide

education for students in closed schools in one of two ways. First, the students could be

transferred to another school in the county. According to Bailey, transfers were administratively

undesirable because schools were already overcrowded and could lead to a chain reaction of

school closings. Second, students could be sent to schools in other counties or in another state.

Bailey viewed both of these options as impractical and impossible; hence, the plan would thrust

the third option onto school boards: funding private schools.21

"Last resort" stated that counties could assist displaced students by giving parents

financial assistance to attend an accredited private school. This provision concerned Bailey the

most because "[it] could place the county boards.. .in a position of finding it necessary not only


subsidies could be a good solution for the maintenance of segregation, but it could not rely on methods that
subverted the Constitution of the United States.
20 Judge Fabisinski did denounce Attorney General Ervin in a statement he made to the Pensacola Journal, which
prompted Ervin to write him a surprised letter that stated his opinion that Fabisinski had used the issue to attack his
character and not the bill that he proposed.
21 Bailey Addresses the Legislature, 26 April 1957, series 1127, file 2, box 15, Speeches and Press Releases
Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files, Florida State Archives.









to condone but actually promote the establishment and operation of private schools in order for

children to attend school."22 First, it required tax funds to pay for parochial schools and

therefore infringed upon separation of church and state. Second, the amount of money allotted to

each parent did not provide enough funds to ensure that every student would have a sound

education. The program would only benefit students whose parents could afford the difference.

Therefore, Bailey asked that the education committee not allow "last resort" to go into either

house of legislation.23

The Superintendent of Public Instruction did not oppose "last resort" because it preserved

segregation but because of its impractical and unconstitutional implementation. African

American integrationists, however, cited another reason to oppose "last resort:" taxation without

representation. There were no African American legislators in Florida post-Brown thus African

Americans had little political representation. "Last resort" used tax money from all citizens,

regardless of race, to support racial segregation that would not benefit African Americans in any

way. Asserting the principle of "taxation without representation" in the name of desegregation

represented a bold move for integrationists. It illustrated the importance of economic

considerations in Florida. 24

However, not all African Americans considered the legislation a serious threat. The

Miami Times suggested that African Americans took segregationist politicians' promises "with a

grain of salt" acknowledging that the "nasty game" of politics required them to appear strong



22Bailey Addresses the Legislature, 26 April 1957, Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files.

23Ibid. The amount of money that parents would receive to send their child to a private school if there were no other
options would equal the amount that the county would spend on a child in public school. The state average per
student in 1955-56 was $242.69. This amount was not enough to cover tuition for an entire year at most private
schools.
24Eric 0. Simpson, "Has Independence Day Lost its Significance" The Florida Star, 6 July 1956, 4









against desegregation for white constituents. Governor Collins previously praised the legislature

and the citizens of Florida for avoiding "race furor." Also, he promised to veto extreme

segregation bills. If integrationists trusted the governor, then there was no reason to fear. The

editor of the Miami Times suggested that its readers not succumb to hysteria, but encouraged that

desegregation would come faster and without disorder if it were not forced upon anyone.25

Leaders from all ideological backgrounds held various opinions about "last resort."

Collins wanted to avoid "last resort" and other legislation that could close schools because he

believed the South should not "wrap itself in the confederate flag and consume itself with racial

furor."26 Instead, it should find fair means to protect segregation where necessary. Thomas D.

Bailey certainly favored maintaining segregation in Florida but not laws that could invalidate the

state's constitution. Integrationists found the plan morally wrong but believed that it did not pose

an immediate threat to desegregation. After all the argumentation, the bill was debated and

passed in both houses, but as promised, Governor Collins utilized his veto power. 27

Interposition, 1956

According to a host of historians, Interposition was an integral aspect of massive

resistance to segregation. As in most southern states, Florida legislators adopted an Interposition

resolution. Arthur S. Miller, professor of law from Emory University, explained that

Interposition had no legal standing but represented a "deep south" political opinion against

desegregation. Governor Collins believed that Interposition served to not only undermine efforts



25 H.E. Sigmund Reeves, "Supreme Court Ruling Upsets State Politicians," The Miami Times, 17 March 1956, 1;
"Collins Says He's Proud: No Race 'Furor' in Florida," The Florida Sentinel, 4 February 1956, 12; "Desegregation
Would Come Faster and Work Better if Not Forced, Forum Hears," The Miami Times, 11 February 1956, 3.
26 Wagy, LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South, 63.
27Ibid., 67: Gary R. Mormino, Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2005), 315.









to maintain legal aversion of segregation but would implant false hope: "Not only is Interposition

ineffective as a legal defense against integration, but...it would be a mean, wicked, cruel and

inhumane attempt to deceive the people." Thus, Collins asserted his opposition to Interposition

and distinguished himself from other southern governors.28

Collins's opinion of Interposition mattered little to legislators; Interposition was a

resolution-the governor could not use his veto power against it. Attorney General Richard

Ervin drew up the Interposition resolution and spoke on its behalf during the 1956 special

legislative session. Support for Interposition garnered momentum quickly. But before the

debate concluded, Governor Collins used his power to end the special session early, declaring the

legislature in a "deadlock." By closing the session early, Collins avoided Interposition during

the first year of response to Brown.

Most legislators were unaware that the governor possessed authority to end a session

early. This action drew more opposition from Sumter Lowry, who believed Collins used his

power unnecessarily to serve his own interests and not the best interest of the state. He cited the

1955 Legislative session when for days on end Collins allowed the legislature to debate

reapportionment issues and did not end the session prematurely. This action, Lowry believed,

was an example of how Collins set out to avoid Interposition and not to protect the wishes of the

people in the state. As a political hopeful for governor, Lowry presented significant opposition

to Collins. That the governor avoided debate on Interposition and encouraged it on

reapportionment indicated Collins's priorities.29


2For more information on Interposition see: Bartley, The New South; Bartley, The Rise ofMassive Resistance:
Kluger, Simple Justice; Colburn and Sanders, The African American Heritage of Florida; John Temple Graves,
"This Morning: The Naked Will Against the Naked Usurption," The Florida Times Union, 27 July 1956, 6.
29 LeRoy Collins to Sumter Lowry, 25 July 1956, file 1, box 33, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins
Collection, Florida State Archives.









But the editor of the Miami Herald indicated otherwise: "People are glad Governor

Collins invoked the power. He cut short the special session before it degenerated into the

squabble which had been developing almost from the start." This action, approved by "the

people," indicated that Governor Collins was not willing to go so far as some of the legislators to

preserve segregation, but he would preserve calm in his own state. Interposition sent a message

of defiance toward the Supreme Court but would also provoke integrationists. It would serve

only to accelerate racial tensions rather than eliminate them.30

Integrationists React: Taking it to the Courts

The Pupil Assignment Law effectively prevented desegregation in Florida after Brown.

Thurgood Marshall, the chief lawyer for the NAACP, listed Florida among eight states that had

done nothing at all to move toward integration since Brown. In 1956, Marshall declared the city

of Miami ready to integrate through legal action. But legal action took more than courage

because court cases were expensive.31

With an understanding that all the "white man" respected were "dollar bills, lead bullets,

and ballots," members of the NAACP knew they needed money to begin desegregation. Most

individuals did not have the resources to pay for lawsuits, but together their money could amass

to quite a lot. Reverend C. Kenzie Steele, president of the Tallahassee branch of the NAACP,

explained to integrationist supporters: "We must put our money together and...use it to the

advancement of our race...by doing so, [we will] become the most powerful force within all the

confines of our government." Therefore, in 1957, the Florida branches of the NAACP initiated


30 John S. Knight, "Collins Averts Pointless Fuss," The Miami Herald, 3 August 1956, 6A. Lowry accused Collins
of serving only his own interests and not those of the people in Florida.

31 Dom Bonafede, "Miami is Ready for Integration, Says Marshall" Miami Daily News, 17 June 1956, School
Integration Dade County 1955-1972, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.









the "Fighting Fund for Freedom" campaign. It sought to raise $50,000 in Florida for court cases

to contest segregation. Membership drives throughout the state helped to raise funds.32

The "Fighting Fund for Freedom" campaign was not simply an attempt to raise money to

bring integration cases into the courts. It also symbolized a change within the integrationist

mindset in Florida. Integrationist rhetoric previously focused on gradual steps, whereas this

campaign encouraged immediate desegregation. Along with the announcement of the campaign

came a new slogan for the NAACP: "Free by 63." The NAACP wanted all public schools in

Florida to be integrated by 1963. In order to achieve this, it needed to strengthen its approach by

treating segregation laws as unconstitutional and attacking them in court.

With the "Fighting Fund For Freedom" in place to raise money, the NAACP began its

venture into the courts. In 1956, two 'test cases' went to local courts in Palm Beach and Dade

Counties. The first suit for African American admission into a white elementary school was

filed in Miami. The local head of the NAACP in Dade County, Theodore Gibson, filed Gibson

et al vs. Dade County Board of Public Instruction. The NAACP based its claim on a petition

filed on behalf of six African American parents that claimed that the Board of Public Instruction

refused to desegregate "as soon as was practicable." Three months later, the case was thrown out

by Judge Emmet C. Choate because there was not enough evidence for him to take any action.


32 The Tallahassee Bus Protest Story, Papers of the NAACP, 201; "Bishop Nichols and Dr. Steele to Head NAACP
$50,000 Drive in Florida," The Miami Times, 23 March1957, 1; "Rev. Byrd, Mrs. Muldrow Head NAACP Drive,"
The Miami Times, 13 April 1957, 1; "NAACP Drive for 5000 Members," 11 May 1957, 2; Bob Saunders to Gloster
B. Currant, Papers of the NAACP, 226. The "Fighting Fund for Freedom" campaign was not an easy task to
manage. In Miami, the goal for the campaign was for five thousand new members. Marion Muldrow, a leader in
the Miami branch of the NAACP campaign, told her workers that the drive for new members would not be easy
because it was difficult to convince people that the sacrifice of money in exchange for a fair fight for freedom was
worthwhile, especially if those people did not have much to begin with. In Miami, the NAACP said that money
must be given in exchange for freedom. Despite the difficulty, in 1957, Miami NAACP membership was reported at
an "all-time high," and for the first time, the NAACP had nearly one hundred percent backing from the African
Americans in Miami.









Judge Choate allowed the plaintiffs ten days to file an amended complaint. G.E. Graves, the

attorney for the NAACP working on the case, filed the amendment. Graves also encouraged

African American children in Dade County to apply for admission to white primary and

secondary schools. The case was thrown out of the court once again in 1957, this time on the

grounds that it failed to establish that African American students were prohibited from attending

white schools.33

As a result of the Fabisinski Committee's recommended laws, a second test case came

before the courts in 1956. Holland, et al vs. Palm Beach County Board of Instruction, contended

that the Holland child, son of a local attorney, was denied admittance to a white school even

though he lived in a predominantly white neighborhood. Instead he had to attend a racially

segregated and substandard school outside of his district. This lawsuit directly challenged the

Pupil Assignment Law. The case was dismissed because it failed to prove that Pupil assignment

directly prevented the Holland child from attending a white school. Then the NAACP adopted

the case and appealed. Judge Choate again dismissed the case because it argued constitutionality

and therefore required a three judge bench. However, the court of appeals ruled that the U.S.

Supreme Court had already ruled on the Brown case, and therefore, constitutionality was already

decided. Finally, Judge Choate decided to hear testimony in June of 1957. In the Holland case,

the appellate court reversed the federal court's ruling and required that Palm Beach County

School Board to proceed with "good faith compliance" and desegregate schools. To this, the




3 "School Suit Hits New Delays," Miami Herald, 17 November 1956, School Integration Dade County 1955-1972,
box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University of Florida; Dom Bonafede, "Attorney Says Negroes To Try at White School: Tells Plan as Racial Suite
Fizzles," School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area
Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida; "School Segregation Suit Dismissed
Here," Miami Times, 25 August 1956, 1.









school board replied that the court's mandate did not set a time limit on compliance. Even with

success in courts, the local district chose to delay desegregation legally.34

In 1956, Governor Collins boasted that there were no integrated schools and no court

cases dealing with desegregation or segregation laws in Florida. However, Collins failed to

mention the two dismissed court cases filed against segregation. Collins insisted that Florida

was free from racial strife after Brown. Successful court cases that fought segregation would

threaten segregationists. Because the cases were not settled by 1957, the NAACP knew that it

needed to continue to attack pupil assignment in order to desegregate the state's schools.

Part II: Two Years of Change, 1957-1958

During the first two years after Brown, Florida reacted similarly to most states in the

south. Numan V. Bartley contended that when the first Brown decision was handed down it was

met with calm, and not the massive resistance that would come later. Florida's governor and

legislature met the problem of segregation with moderation at the outset. They passed no laws to

close schools, and they prevented violence and fury from taking over in the state. Soon after the

second Brown ruling, some moderate governors like Orval Faubus of Arkansas quickly altered

from moderate to strictly segregationist in order to win over the people in his state. However,

Collins did not stray from moderation, and as the fight to maintain segregation gained

momentum in other southern states he struggled to maintain peace and order. Other, more






34 "Second School Integration Suit Dismissed," The Miami Times, 1; "School Desegregation Test Case Challenged"
The Miami Times, 29 September 1956, 1; "Holland to Appeal Judge Choate's School Ruling," The Miami Times, 20
July 1957, 7; Richard Foster, "A Brief Historical Outline of Desegregation in Florida Public Schools and
Universities According to the U.S. Supreme Court Decision of May, 1954" (Paper presented to Professor Arthur 0.
White as partial fulfillment of EDF 600, History of Education, University of Florida, 1971), 21. Much of my
understanding of these cases was aided by this document. However, the document was used merely for data, and
not for analysis.










notorious states engaged in violence. Between 1957 and 1958 Florida experienced the first signs

that violence and mayhem could defeat moderation.35

First, in the 1957 legislative session, Interposition again appeared on the agenda. Collins

had previously blocked the resolution by closing the special session early. But regular sessions

had strict time limits, so he could not utilize the same tactic to block Interposition again. So the

resolution passed through both houses. When Collins received the resolution he could not veto

it, but he reaffirmed his disappointment in the legislature:

Not only will I not condone 'interposition' as so many have sought me to do, I decry it as an evil

thing, whipped up by the demagogues and carried on the hot and erratic winds of passion, prejudice,

and hysteria. If history judges me right this day, I want it known that I did my best to avert this blot.

If I am judged wrong, then here in my own handwriting and over my signature is the proof of guilt to

support my conviction. 36

Collins's opinion on Interposition conflicted with the majority of the legislature. Their approval

of this tool of massive resistance struck fear in the governor that his state might be caught in the

violence that had afflicted other southern states. Collins held a meeting with school

superintendents from several counties, and relayed that some token integration would strengthen

the Pupil Assignment Law, but no one was willing to allow it in their district. He gave up on the

belief that some voluntary integration would occur anywhere in the state. Collins feared that

racial tensions would only grow worse.37



35 Bartley, The New South; Bartley, The Rise ofMassive Resistanc; Colburn and DeHaven-Smith, Florida's
Megatrends.
36 Memorandum Re: Interposition, 2 May 1957, file 1, box 117, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins
Collection, Florida State Archives.

3 "Governor Gloomy on Racial Issue," Tallahassee Democrat, 19 December 1958, 7; Guest Editorial from the St.
Petersburg Times, School Integration, Hillsborough County 1955-1972, box 16, Education in Florida Subject Files,
Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida. Governor Collins met
with Superintendents from Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Palm Beach County.









Also during the 1957 legislative session, reapportionment remained a major issue in the

legislature that implicated a new solidarity against Collins. The governor's Legislative Council

submitted a proposition to reapportion the legislature by the 1959 legislative session. The

legislature responded with a proposal that William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth described as

"sharply different" to the governor's. The so-called "Pork Chop Gang" seemed strengthened by

its victory in 1955, and they continued to solidly oppose Collins's plan for segregation and

reapportionment.38

In 1957, nine African American students' enrollment into Little Rock, Arkansas's Central

High School and sparked violent racial tension that gained nationwide attention. The conflict

precipitated Arkansas's Governor Orval Faubus's decision to close public schools in Little Rock

for the 1958-59 school year. The Little Rock conflict exemplified the problems Collins sought to

avoid in Florida. But Florida could not avert violence forever. On April 27, 1958 just after

midnight, a reporter from the Florida Times Union received a phone call from a segregationist

who defined himself as a member of the "Confederate Underground." The caller proclaimed that

he had bombed James Weldon Johnson Junior High School (an African American school) and a

Jewish synagogue, both in Jacksonville. He warned the reporter that the bombings could

continue until segregation was restored to the south. The "stick bombs" reportedly warped the

doors of the synagogue and broke all the windows of the schools. The bombs went off in the

middle of the night, so no on was harmed.39 The bombers were not caught, but Floridians held a

widespread belief that the Ku Klux Klan was responsible. In response, the Interdenominational

Ministerial Alliance and NAACP conjoined to express their belief that Florida could not afford



38 Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 60.
39 "The Outrage of Decent Men," Time, 12 May 1958, 14.









such violence. Collins issued a statement denouncing the crimes, something that most southern

governors would not do. But leaders of the NAACP also viewed the bombings as an outlet to

strengthen their struggling presence in Florida.40

Roy Wilkins, a national leader in the NAACP, released a statement to the Jacksonville

branch and blamed the bombings on segregation: "The continued separation of citizens on the

basis of race and the separate and unequal education of their children form the basis of

misunderstanding and tension.",41 In July of 1958, the NAACP began a statewide campaign for

membership. In an editorial, Eric 0. Simpson of the Florida Star, a weekly African American

newspaper in Jacksonville, explained that although the bombing incidents were tragic, they

served a purpose for integrationists: "Those dynamiters should be a rude awakening to those

principals and teachers who have frowned on aiding or cooperating with the NAACP which has

stood on the forefront of the fight for equal rights all these years."42 According to Simpson, the

bombings united the African American population of Florida and increased NAACP

membership.43

Collins attempted to appease the NAACP and said that desegregation would come but

Florida still needed "time for a climate of racial tolerance to develop."44 G.E. Graves, attorney

for the NAACP in Miami, stated that Collins was "whistling in the cemetery." There was no

chance for racial tolerance in a state where segregationists bombed African American schools.


40 Annual Report of the Florida Branches of the NAACP, 1958, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series
A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 541, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.
41 Telegram from Roy Wilkins, 2 May 1958, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel
4, Frame 303, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.
42 Eric 0. Simpson, "Politics as Usual," The Florida Star, 10 May 1958, 2.

43 "NAACP Begins Statewide Campaign," The Florida Star, 12 July 1958, 2.

44 "NAACP Attorney Says Collins "Whistling in the Cemetery," The Florida Star, 17 May 1958, 1.









Additionally, the legislature passed a resolution of Interposition, ensuring Florida's place in the

Deep South. Integrationists grew impatient with Collins's plea for more time.45

The events of 1957-1958 sparked new energy in Florida's fight against and for

desegregation. Segregationists asserted defiance toward the U.S. Supreme Court by passing a

concurrent resolution of Interposition and asserted their dissatisfaction for Collins by again

blocking reapportionment. Bombings in Jacksonville enhanced Collins's fear of violence as a

means of resistance to segregation. At the same time, the bombings served as a wakeup call to

integrationists. If integrationists wanted real change, they had to do the work for themselves.

So, in his last years as governor, LeRoy Collins faced growing opposition from both

integrationists and segregationists towards his moderate plan for segregation.

Part III: The Disintegration of Moderation, 1958-1960

After a period waiting to act on segregation, integrationists and segregationists emerged

poised to take new, stronger stands to fight for their sides. Integrationists continued to rely on

the courts as their main source of change. In 1956, integrationists filed two lawsuits in contention

with pupil assignment, one in Dade County the other in West Palm Beach. In 1957, both were

dismissed and appealed. But a new case eventually brought some semblance of desegregation.







45 "NAACP Attorney Says Collins "Whistling in the Cemetery," The Florida Star, 1; Annual Report 1958, Papers of
the NAACP. Graves was also the attorney in charge of the desegregation cases in Dade County. Additionally, more
African American parents began to test the Pupil Assignment Law on their own during 1958 and 1959. According
to The Miami Times on September 7, 1959, a white school rejected the daughter of the Reverend Ivory W. Mizell
who attempted to place his daughter in the school. Though he said he did not wish to make a court test of his case
his action shows that African Americans were less fearful of testing the laws even without the assistance of the
NAACP. In Tampa, a suit filed in the U.S. District Court by Fransisco Roderiguez was the first suit in Hillsborough
County to bring about desegregation. Although the attorney came from the NAACP, the suit was not started by the
NAACP, rather local families seeking to enter their children into white schools. Then, as reported by The Florida
Star on September 19, 1959, a group of African American mothers in Tampa picketed outside a shaIbb school
provided by Hillsborough County for weeks. Only a handful of parents allowed their children to attend the school.









The NAACP brought old cases back to court and found new ways to engage the African

American community to participate in the struggle for desegregation.46

Segregationists continued to use legislative power to fend off desegregation, and listened

to Collins less. Attorney General Richard Ervin tinkered with "last resort" and presented a new

version that was easier for legislators and his former adversary Thomas Bailey to accept.

Finally, Collins, with no vocal advocates for moderation, tried another tactic to avoid racial

conflict and maintain most of segregation. At the end of his governorship, Collins asserted a

new form of moderation that implied the inevitability of desegregation. Each group found new

methods to assert its power.

Integrationists Head Back to the Courts, 1958

After two years of waiting, courts retried Gibson et al vs. Dade County Board of

Instruction on August 18, 1958. The Dade County Board of Instruction claimed it did not

operate under the segregation provisions of the State Constitution, but the Pupil Assignment

Law. The NAACP had not proved that the constitution prevented African American admittance

to white schools, so the case failed. Then, a Dade County school denied two African American

boys admittance to a white school, and the lawsuit came back.47

This case brought the "state's eyes on Miami," as the fate of desegregation in all of

Florida. Integrationists viewed the case as an opportunity to invalidate pupil assignment.

African American citizens in Miami attended the court hearings, and were "keenly interested" in

46 The case of Holland vs. The Palm Beach County Board of Public Instruction went to court again in 1958, and
seemed hopeful, because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accused the school board of fostering segregation in the
county. However, in 1959, the suit was finally dismissed, and the court ruled that a violation of the Pupil
Assignment Law was never proved.
47 "Assignment of Pupils Law Faces Attack," The Florida Star, 20 June 1959, 1; "School Board is Rebuffed:
School Integration Suit Set for April," The Miami Times, 20 March 1958, 6. The case was originally set for April of
1958, but was delayed until August to give both sides time to adjust to the change in the case, since it had not
included the two boys who were not admitted to the white school previously.









their proceedings. The NAACP planned to call in all African American principals as witnesses,

and most importantly, Joe Hall, Superintendent of Dade County Schools. Then, an interruption

cut the trial short in September of 1958. A new case developed and set a new tone for

desegregation.48

On September 29, 1958, the Dade County Board of Instruction denied fourteen African

American students admittance to the all-white Orchard Villa Elementary School. African

American families increasingly populated the school's surrounding neighborhood, yet no African

American children attended the school. The population misrepresentation provoked the NAACP

to bring forth a "massive frontal attack" to break down segregation in that school. Fourteen

families blamed the Pupil Assignment Law for discrimination in Orchard Villa.49

Concomitantly, Rep. John D. Orr (Dem., Dade), an advocate for gradual desegregation,

proposed a plan to desegregate Dade County schools through a student legislative board. The

students on this board would decide which schools should desegregate and when. If the school

board endorsed Orr's plan, the NAACP agreed to drop all pending lawsuits regarding admissions

to white schools. The school board also endorsed a plan to make Orchard Villa Elementary

School a "pilot" school for desegregation. Integrationists, who wanted to desegregate some

school somewhere, and Governor Collins, who believed a study of integration in one community

would serve to strengthen the Pupil Assignment Law, supported the plan. African Americans






48 Garth C. Reeves, "School Battle Monday in Dade County to Determine Fate of Segregation," The Miami Times,
16 August 1958, 1; Elliot J. Pieze, "School Integration Decision Delayed Here," The Miami Times, 23 August 1958,
1.
49"Fourteen Miami Students Denied Transfer to White School: Showdown Set on Pupil Assignment Law," The
Miami Times, 20 September 1958, 1; Louise Blanchard, "Attack Launched on School Laws by NAACP Here,"
Miami Daily News, 19 September 1958, 1.









however, were not sure a "pilot school" solved segregation problems in the state, but viewed it as

a good first step.50

Still, skeptics feared white flight would prevent actual desegregation at Orchard Villa.

African Americans would dominate the school's population. A writer for the Miami Times noted

that as African Americans moved into the neighborhood, white families sold their homes near

Orchard Villa quickly, and African American parents "hungrily" eyed the well-built school. If

the school board adopted a plan to desegregate the school the following year, white parents

would leave before the next term. The Dade County School Board adopted the "pilot school"

plan and both Governor Collins and the editor of the Miami Times deemed it "a wise decision."51

After the Dade County School Board desegregated Orchard Villa Elementary School,

more school boards granted African American requests to attend white schools. However,

integrationists viewed the admissions as "token" and not the widespread desegregation they

wanted. During the 1960 State Conference of the NAACP, the president of Florida's branches,

Reverend Leon Lowry declared spurts of token integration in Ft. Lauderdale and Daytona proof

that for too long school administrators used the Pupil Assignment Law to discriminate against

African Americans: "In each instance, school officials hurriedly admitted a few Negroes after

court suits had been filed."52 Desegregation in Florida was still a myth and not a way of life.

Members of the NAACP recognized that pupil assignment successfully prevented African

50 "Orr's Integration Plan Gets Backing: NAACP Would Drop All Suits," The Miami Times, 20 September 1958, 1;
H.E. Sigmund Reeves, "Integrate Dade Schools?" The Miami Times, 27 September 1958, 2.
51 "Orchard Villa May Be Negro School In February," The Miami Times, 15 October 1958, 1; H.E. Sigmund
Reeves, "A Wise Decision," The Miami Times, 21 February 1959, 4. These predictions were essentially correct. In
September of 1959, a total of twelve students entered Orchard Villa Elementary, four of whom were African
American. An October 13, 1959 edition of The Miami Times reported that the School Board of Dade County
assigned 379 African American students to attend Orchard Villa, essentially segregating the school once again, and
soon drawing heat from the NAACP.
52 Conference Statement, 1960, 13 May 1960, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel
4, Frame 639-641, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.









American children from attending white schools. According to Robert Saunders, a Florida

NAACP leader, African American parents needed more information about the Pupil Assignment

Law, and needed to change their attitude toward defeating it. The NAACP encouraged African

American parents to ignore the assignment law, because it was unconstitutional.53

Public Money for Private Institutions, 1959

Integrationists deemed pupil assignment a failure because it did not yield widespread

desegregation. But segregationist legislators disdained the law because some desegregation

occurred while it was in place. Governor Collins's Pupil Assignment Law was not enough to

avoid desegregation, and even a little bit of integration was unacceptable. Desegregation in

Dade County spread to other districts, so pupil assignment could not maintain segregation.

Segregationists questioned pupil assignment as the only means to preserve segregation. In the

1959 legislative session, reapportionment and segregation again dominated the floor discussion.

According to Harvard and Beth, the "Pork Chop Gang," was not as powerful as it had once

appeared. The attacking forces against reapportionment seemed to have "exhausted themselves

in the long struggle," and came to an initial agreement.54 This change indicated the beginning of








53 In a statement by Robert Saunders on October 23, 1960, the NAACP advised parents of African American
children not to bypass requests for school placement because of race. They provided three rules: 1. Do not bypass a
school in asking your choice of reassignment of a children because you think that school is "all white" and that your
race is a barrier in his attendance. 2. Choose the school at which your child is to attend on the basis of skills that are
being taught and which are deemed by modem industry. 3. By asking to have a child reassigned to a school that is
considered adequate, the Negro parent is not breaking the law, as is the implication. Conference Statement 1959, 23
October 1959, Part 27:Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 603-606, Papers of
the NAACP, Library of Congress. Statement by Leon Lowry Re: Desegregation in Florida, 1959, Part 27:Selected
Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 757, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.
54 Harvard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, 62-64. This was not the end of the reapportionment issue.
Reapportionment was not completely settled until 1962 by the U.S. Supreme Court case, Baker vs. Carr.









the end of the small district control over Florida's legislature. Those who opposed

reapportionment asserted their power in the only other way they could: segregation legislation.55

During the 1959 legislative session, lawmakers debated a record thirty-seven segregation

bills. In previous years, Collins's warnings motivated legislators to avoid many segregationist

bills. In the special session of 1956, the legislature debated only five segregation bills, four of

which were part of the Fabisinski Committee's plan. In the 1957 session, the legislature debated

only nine, including both House and Senate Bills. Between 1956 and 1959, segregationist

legislators became less willing to trust in pupil assignment, and appeared stronger in their efforts

to maintain segregation at any cost. This change may have come about because of small district

legislators' perceived loss of power in Florida's legislative future. The most contested bill came

from the Attorney General and the Superintendent of Public instruction: the Parent Option

Plan.56

In 1957, Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas Bailey had publicly denounced

Attorney General Ervin's "last resort." However, Bailey wanted to keep segregation alive in

Florida's public schools, and private school subsidies provided a viable option to preserve

education and segregation. Upon admittance of African Americans into two state funded

learning institutions in 1958, Bailey and Ervin released a statement unveiling their proposal to

the state legislature. They emphasized their dedication to segregation and maintenance of free

public schools. But Florida had no preparation for the possibility of widespread desegregation.





55 Hendrix Chandler and Chris MacGill, "Harsh Race Bills Killed; Taxes Up," Tallahassee Democrat, 5 June 1959,
1.
56 White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida, 135; Harvard and Beth, The
Politics ofMis-Representation, 18-19.









The Parent Option Plan augmented pupil assignment but did not replace it. Parent option was a

safety valve, used once integrationist lawsuits exhausted pupil assignment. 7

Bailey and Ervin explained that Parent Option would not allow parents to withdraw their

children from public schools on a whim, but because of their own personal objection to

integration. Furthermore, Bailey asserted parents' right for protection from segregation: "If the

Federal government recognizes conscientious objections to serving in war, it should recognize

some parents conscientious objections to sending [their children] to [segregated] schools."58 The

law would provide parents the personal option to take their children out of public schools and

place them into non-sectarian or non-parochial schools with some financial assistance. To Bailey

and Ervin, parent option was the best possible choice. The Miami Herald reported in favor of

this bill because it gave citizens more preference in their children's education. 59

On February 11, 1959, only days after Ervin and Bailey released their statement,

Governor Collins stated that he had "still not determined" whether he would support the Parent

Option Plan. He saw some problems with the plan, but did not necessarily deem it as open

defiance of federal law or the courts. However, when the 1959 legislative session began in April,

Collins changed his stance. In an hour and fifteen-minute speech delivered to the House of

Representatives of Florida, Collins pleaded with legislators not to consider any new racial

legislation because it would only serve to weaken their chances of maintaining segregation at all.



57 Statement by Thomas D. Bailey, State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Richard W. Ervin, Attorney
General, 2 February, 1959, file 2, box 14, series 1127, Speeches and Press Releases Superintendent Thomas D.
Bailey Subject Files, Florida State Archives.
58 Associated Press, "Tuition Program Backed," The Florida Times Union, 17 April 1959, 8.

59 John L. Boyles., "School Mingling Up to Voters?" Miami Herald, 3 February 1959,1. Bailey and Ervin also
supported a local option bill, also known as the "Moody act." This bill would allow individual parents to remove
their child from an integrated school without penalty. Collins was not as opposed to this provision, because it did
not involve an entire community.









After the speech was over, it was evident that many legislators did not agree and neither did

some Florida newspaper editors.60

Caleb J. King Jr., editor of the Florida Times Union, expressed that Collins's plan to

maintain the status quo would only survive if legislators could convince themselves that it would

not lead to "just a little bit of integration." If not, then King believed that they would be right to

fight for their "great Southern heritage." Integrationists already proved that token integration

could occur and King doubted Collins's dedication to segregation. The governor's rejection of

parent option surprised the editor of the St. Petersburg Times because he considered it a

moderate proposal. The governor was too "soft" on segregation and was no longer serving the

people of Florida. These newspaper editors were shocked and alarmed that Collins did not

support the Parent Option Plan. This move made them skeptical of his commitment to

segregation.61

Legislators were not all certain that parent option presented the best route to maintain

segregation. To ensure that the Parent Option Plan could not be construed as unconstitutional,

the House committee in charge of race bills created a subcommittee of three lawyers. The

lawyers studied parent option and recommended that the general committee forward the

provision. On April 17, 1959, the parent option bill was sent from the subcommittee to the

Committee hearings, hailed as the mildest of all integration plans proposed. Despite its mild

reputation, the Parent Option Plan eventually died because lawmakers could not condone the use





60 "Most Solons Support Tougher Racial Laws," Tampa Tribune, Tampa, 8 April 1959, 6.

61 Caleb King Jr., "Calmness and Coolness Become a Watchword," Florida Times Union, 8 April 1959, 6; "Collins
Takes Low Road on Integration Legislation," St. Petersburg Times editorial, 8 April 1959, George A. Smathers
Libraries, University of Florida.










of state funds to finance private institutions. Segregationists feared the integrationist use of the

court system to undermine segregation laws.62

In 1959, the Florida Legislature introduced so many anti-integration bills in both

chambers of the House, that integrationists could not ignore them. The NAACP monitored the

session before it began and held an emergency session of its state Conference in order to

determine what to do in the event that one or all of the drastic bills were passed. In the

meantime, the NAACP considered drafting a report on what Florida was doing to defy the

Constitution and sending the report to the "appropriate Congressional Committees." Thus, the

NAACP viewed the 1959 legislative session as an opportunity for protest.63

African American newspapers expressed their distrust and disappointment in the Florida

Legislature for fostering an atmosphere of "segregation hysteria" during the historic session.

The editor of the Miami Times discussed his distaste toward strong anti-integration bills, but

maintained hope that the legislature would not vote to close the schools in the case of any

integration. Viewing extreme segregationist legislation as a way for legislators to appease the

"folks back home," this editor hoped officials could use the session to prove that they fought for

segregation. In Miami, the road to desegregation was closer in view than in many other

communities, because of local court cases.64




62 "Calm Rules on Racial Bills so Far," Tampa Tribune, 12 April 1950, 7; "Last Resort School Bill is Introduced,"
Tampa Tribune, 18 April 1959,4; "House Approval Given First Bill on Racial Issue," Tallahassee Democrat,
Tallahassee, May 12 1959, 6.
63 From Leon Lowry and Robert Saunders to All Officers and Executive 8 Members, 30 March 1959, Part 27:
Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 581, Papers of the NAACP, Library of
Congress.
64 Eric 0. Simpson, "Segregation Hysteria," The Florida Star, 13 June 1959, 2; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, "Opening of
the Legislature," The Miami Times, 11 April 1959, 4; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, "Our Schools," The Miami Times, 25
April, 1959, 4; H.E. Sigmund Reeves, "1959 Legislature is History," The Miami Times, 20 June 1959, 4.









If the attitude toward the 1959 session of the legislature was cool in Miami, in

Jacksonville it was burning hot. Jacksonville bore the brunt of segregationist violence in the

1958 bombings. Its African American newspaper the Florida Star condemned the legislature's

actions during two-month long session. Eric 0. Simpson, the newspaper's editor, called the race

bills offered "drastic" and unconstitutional. Moreover, the editor of the Star vehemently

opposed all of the anti-integration bills, and pegged the legislature the "Pro-Segregation

Factory." Simpson wondered if Florida legislators believed the African American population

was stupid, foolish, or without hope or leadership. Proposals like Parent Option imposed taxation

upon African Americans ultimately to assist in their demise, and only foolish people would

support that. Finally, Simpson called for "new blood" in the legislature. It was time for African

Americans to take positions of power in their communities and in the state. They could not trust

white representation to work on their behalf.65

A Bold New Approach: The Collins Plan, 1960

On March 20, 1960, Collins delivered an impromptu, statewide TV-Radio speech to the

people of Florida. It illustrated his disdain for the sit-ins and other demonstrations that had taken

place in Tallahassee during the month. If the state of Florida was to overcome these racial

tensions, it needed to act morally. According to Collins, segregationists did not act morally or

democratically when they hindered any citizens who struggled for freedom. This speech

indicated a drastic change from the rhetoric Collins had previously employed. He addressed the


65 "Drastic Race Bills Offered," The Florida Star, 25 April 1959, 1; Eric 0. Simpson, "School Segregation Bills Are
Seen as Unconstitutional," The Florida Star, 23 May 1959, 1; Eric 0. Simpson, "Bailey-Ervin Plan An
Unconstitutional Tax Trap," The Florida Star, 30 May 1959, 2. The editorials also placed Florida in the ranks of
seven other states that proposed and passed bills to allocate money to start a campaign to sell segregation to the
North. These states could not be trusted by the integrationist community. This belief was shared by the leaders in
the NAACP. However, the Governor of Florida vetoed the bill. Eric 0. Simpson, "Politics as Usual," The Florida
Star, 16 August 1958, 2; Eric. 0 Simpson, "Politics as Usual: New Blood Needed in the House of Representatives,"
The Florida Star, 3 May 1958, 2.









people directly through mass media. The governor declared that something new must be done in

order to combat what could become a very hazardous situation for all of the residents. Instead of

relying on extremist positions, Floridians ought to take a stand for the middle, and work in a

moderate fashion to desegregate slowly. 66

Collins then announced his plan to appoint a bi-racial group to succeed the Fabisinski

Committee: to spawn local bi-racial committees to solve local problems that arose due to race.

The committee's goals included, but were not limited to, desegregating schools. The goal of the

Fabisinski Committee had been to preserve segregation by legal means, whereas the goal of the

new bi-racial committee was to assess local situations and determine where and when

desegregation should occur. The committee did not advocate total integration at one time, but

believed that desegregation would inevitably occur naturally through cooperation. 67

Collins's bi-racial committee, known historically as the Fowler Commission,

subsequently released a statement to Florida newspapers. Chairman Cody Fowler, former

president of the Florida Bar Association, recognized that neither segregationists nor

integrationists wholeheartedly embraced the group. Fowler explained that whites who joined the

committee's work were labeled as integrationists by other whites and that African Americans

who supported the group were labeled 'Uncle Toms' by avid integrationists. In the statement,

Fowler reminded the citizens of Florida that the committee's purpose was not to segregate or

desegregate, but to enhance understanding and cooperation throughout the state's local





66 Transcript of Statewide TV-Radio Talk to the People of Florida on Race Relations by Governor LeRoy Collins,
20, March, 1960, file 15, box 2, series 226, Governor's Advisory Commission on Race Relations, Records, 1957-
1961, Florida State Archives.
67 Ibid.









communities. The committee focused on two issues that held deep interest in the minds and

hearts of most in the state: morality and business.68

Those who viewed racial tensions as merely political doubted the Fowler Commission's

preoccupation with morality. The commission considered the number of African Americans

who served in American wars, and that a duty existed to maintain a peaceful, ethical, and cultural

growth for children, the leaders of the future. Morally, the African American community needed

inclusion in discussions regarding race; they were an integral part of the solution. The Fowler

Commission called upon religious leaders from around the entire state who confirmed the moral

basis of race issues anywhere, not just in Florida. Those members of the clergy committed

themselves to the undertakings of the committee. 69

But business concerns proved to be the main focus for efforts to bring about cooperation

in the state. Florida was part of the Deep South based on its legislative and desegregation record,

but not in its up and coming economic status. The Fowler Commission indicated that this was

changing, and so Floridians needed to reevaluate their positions on open policies against

desegregation. If the policies continued, violence and demonstrations would increase. Florida,

distinct from other southern states because overt racial conflicts the state's industrial

development, reliance upon tourism, and expanding population. All of these were more extreme

and pressing, the commission contended, than in any other state in the south.70

In order to keep up with the "industrial revolution" taking place in Florida, the Fowler

Commission believed that the lines of differences between the North and South needed to

68 Statement by Cody Fowler, 27 May 1960, series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida
State Archives.
691bid.

70 Ibid. The Fowler Commission on Race Relations Reports to the People of Florida, 2 July 1960, box 117, file 1,
series 776, Correspondence 1955-1961, Collins Collection, Florida State Archives.









steadily disappear. Most of the difference, Fowler contended, lay between rural and urban

economies. He argued that tourism placed a burden on Florida to mend its segregationist ways

because visitors condemned segregation practices: "Florida then has a kind of economic

vulnerability that is incomprehensible to Mississippi." 71 The rapidly changing atmosphere in

Florida indicated that some parts of the state prized segregation, but in many others, segregation

no longer worked due to desegregated neighborhoods. Thus, Florida was in a unique position as

opposed to its southern neighbors, and it should not resort to the same tactics. The booming

economy could only last if the state stayed out of southern racial problems.

According to Fowler, members of both races had met the aims of the commission with

"quiet respect." Underneath their respect, however, was more of the "wait-and-see" attitude that

had permeated the previous five years. The group found that many agreed with the principles of

the committee, but few were willing to take any action toward creating good relations between

the races in Florida. Ultimately, the commission discovered that resistance to integration existed

throughout Florida. However, the growing industrial force was a mitigating factor to

segregationists. The future would fare better, if those needs were considered before large-scale

problems arose.72

Integrationists found resonance in one of the Fowler Commission's arguments: the need

to preserve industry and tourism. Florida in the 1950s was in a financially promising but

precarious position. After World War II, tourism and industry that abandoned union strongholds

in the north migrated to the state. Consequently, the population not only grew in numbers, but in

diversity. However, Florida had already experienced a deafening blow to its economy once


1 Ibid.
72 Ibid.









before, when the land boom in the 1920s and 1930s ended in a bust. There was substantial fear

that racial problems could upset the harmonious atmosphere so appealing to tourists and

newcomers to the state. Therefore, even in the midst of a bitter fight for desegregation, leaders

of the NAACP asked members to abstain from hurting tourism in Dade County. They would not

protest or boycott during peak tourist season.73

There was an inherent understanding that a blow to the tourism industry would hurt

segregationists and integrationists alike. But integrationists used tourists' Northern ideals for

their own best interests. An unidentified African American leader from Miami told the Wall

Street Journal that when tourists arrived, racial tension eased, naturally: "We've got them

(segregationists) over a barrel and don't think they don't know it. They don't dare get uppity

when all those Northern visitors are here."74 The tourism industry, therefore, gave

integrationists and African Americans a bit of protection. While African Americans were asked

to bear in mind the presence of tourists in their protests, they also realized that whites would act

differently around tourists.

However, the Fowler Commission did not entirely satisfy integrationists. The NAACP

and African American newspapers admired Collins for his bravery and applauded him for his

support of democracy. They commended him for his effort to set up a state bi-racial committee.

They supported all of his great efforts towards bringing racial harmony to the state. But despite

their acclamations, integrationists still believed that they needed to fight if they were to get what

they desired. In a written statement to Collins, Rev. Leon Lowry, president of the Florida


3 David L. Colburn and Lance DeHaven-Smith, Florida's Megatrends; Bob Saunders to Gloster B. Currant, 19
January 1957, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Papers of the NAACP, Library of
Congress.
74 School Integration Dade County 1955-1972, file 6, box 14, Education in Florida Subject Files, Special Collections
and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.









NAACP stated: "We will work with bi-racial committees to relieve the state of racial

segregation, but do not expect us to sit idly by while other groups seek to solve our problems for

us." 75 Integrationists in Florida were not willing to give up their power to a state mandated

group. They had fought, and would continue to fight for the creation of racial equality in

Florida. This reaction highlighted integrationists' distrust of the state government who yielded

little to no desegregation after Brown.

More than anything, the Fowler Commission produced a stark contrast between state

constituents. To segregationists, the commission represented the governor's ever increasing

integrationist tendencies. On the other hand, integrationists distrusted the commission as a

means for integration. Thus, the commission fostered distrust in Collins's moderate approach to

segregation among both segregationists and integrationists.76

It is no wonder, then, that segregation was a key issue in the 1960 gubernatorial race.

All Democratic candidates claimed segregation as a top priority in their platforms, and no

African Americans entered the race. However, Floridians did not choose the strictest of the

segregationist candidates, and instead elected Farris Bryant as their next governor. Bryant

vowed to keep Florida segregated and although he announced his intention to reappoint the

committee's chairman and reinstate the committee, Cody Fowler refused to work for a strict

segregationist. Bryant claimed he had chosen a successor, but never named him. Thus, by 1961

the state-wide bi-racial advisory committee dissolved along with Collins's hope for "the people





75 Statement from Leon Lowry to Governor Collins, 21 March 1960, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965,
Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 626-627, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.
76 Robert Saunders to State Conference Officials Re: Fowler Commission, 1960, Part 27:Selected Branch Files,
1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4, Frame 628-630, Papers of the NAACP, Library of Congress.









in the middle." Collins's push toward gradual desegregation was lost on the new leaders in

government.77

Part IV: Summary

During the half decade following Brown, the governor of Florida distinguished himself as

one of the only southern governors who refused to resort to violence or disorder to maintain

segregation. In fact, as Governor LeRoy Collins's tenure progressed, his commitment toward

segregation waned and he eventually favored gradual desegregation. Throughout his time as

governor, Collins remained more committed to issues such as increased industry and

reapportionment of the legislature, than efforts to maintain segregation. But a state's governor is

not its sole representative. Many groups impacted Florida's social and political atmosphere, and

influenced the state's reception of Brown. Within Florida, segregationists sought to preserve

their heritage, while integrationists attempted to claim their court mandated freedom.

Between 1955 and 1957, Collins asserted his preference to maintain segregation legally

through the Fabisinski Committee's proposals. While the governor placed his faith in the Pupil

Assignment Law, segregationist legislators and the attorney general doubted their ability to

preserve their southern heritage. Segregationist leaders, threatened by plans for reapportionment

that would thwart their power within the legislature, continuously opposed Collins's plans for

segregation. To ensure zero desegregation, segregationists preferred to augment pupil

assignment with two provisions: private school subsidies and Interposition. Governor Collins

used his power to combat these provisions in these first years.

At the same time, integrationists, most of whom were African Americans, struggled to

accept pupil assignment and the Fabisinski Committee as well. African Americans understood


7 David L.Colburn and Richard K. Scher, "Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 55 (October 1977), 154-170.









that legislators and even the governor needed to express commitment to segregation to please

white segregationist voters. Therefore, some African Americans received the first legislative

responses to Brown calmly. However, integrationists expressed skepticism over the Fabisinski

Committee's ability to serve them well when the committee set out to preserve segregation. By

1956, African Americans began to bring their grievances into courts. But despite their best

efforts, two years after Brown, segregation in Florida thrived.

Between 1957 and 1958, Florida's atmosphere changed. In 1957, the governor of

Arkansas closed schools rather than integrate, and Florida legislators proposed and passed an

Interposition Resolution. Then, in 1958 hate groups bombed an African American school and

Jewish Synagogue. Tension mounted in the state and Governor Collins's fear of "deep south"

politics and violence surfaced. The bombings spurned a sense of urgency to desegregate among

African American integrationists. In 1958, formerly dismissed court cases went back to court

and eventually resulted in the first instance of voluntary desegregation.

Minimal desegregation caused segregationist legislators to fight for more segregation

protection. In the 1959 session of legislature, lawmakers proposed more than twenty segregation

bills. The Attorney General and the Superintendent of Public Instruction joined and created a

new provision for private school subsidies. The Jacksonville bombings actually emboldened

integrationist leaders who believed the threat of violence indicated a need for unity among

African Americans. But Collins altered his approach to segregation. The governor then

appointed a Bi-Racial Advisory Commission (the Fowler Commission) to replace the Fabisinski

Committee. The group set out to create bi-racial committees throughout the state who could

work through racial tension. The Fowler Commission drew criticism from both segregationists

and integrationists. To segregationists, the approach favored desegregation. Integrationists









simply lacked faith that the government represented African American citizens' best interests.

Thus, the potential for advancement toward desegregation fizzled after Collins's governorship.

Farris Bryant replaced Collins as governor in 1961 and almost immediately discharged the

Fowler Commission, and diminished hope for cooperative desegregation.









CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION

From 1955-1961, Florida's atmosphere was tumultuous and explosive. But unlike other

southern states, Florida had concerns in addition to segregation. The governor prioritized state

issues concerning reapportionment and industrial ties for the state, and attempted to gloss over

segregation policy. However, the governor's agenda did not correspond with Florida's

prominent segregationist or integrationist leaders. Segregationist "pork choppers," fearing

reapportionment, united in opposition against Collins's moderate propositions. Once the "Pork

Chop Gang" sensed its impending loss of power within the legislature, its members exerted last

efforts to preserve their southern heritage. Thus, in their last gasps of life, the anti-

reapportionment group attempted to defeat Collins's moderation with overt segregationist policy

proposals.

Integrationists also reached a turning point during Collins's years as governor. Initially,

African American newspaper editors appeared in favor of the governor and his reactions to

Brown. Integrationists subsequently found flaws with Collins's plans, because laws that

preserved segregation inherently negated their goal to desegregate public schools. Some

challenged the laws and groups that the governor created. However, when segregationists

pressed for segregation at all costs in the legislature, African Americans questioned Collins's

ability to provide for their needs. When the Florida legislature adopted a resolution of

Interposition in 1957, and after 1958 segregationists bombed two buildings in Jacksonville in

1958, integrationists gained more support from the African American community. As a result,

integrationists brought cases of discrimination into the courts and through their own actions

produced some desegregation.









As in most southern states, Florida's response to the historic Brown case was highly

contested. Integrationist and segregationist leaders challenged Collins's moderate tactics to

maintain segregation in Florida's public schools. As a result, Florida did not enjoy a smooth

transition into desegregation, but suffered through the tense atmosphere that desegregation

brought to its neighboring states. Additionally, the state's desegregation was minimal at best.

Although historians credit the governor for maintaining peace and averting the massive

resistance of "deep south" states, he could not prevent strife over segregation in his state. As his

years in the governor's mansion dwindled, Collins lost support from his segregationist and

integrationist constituents.1

Collins enjoyed two terms as governor of Florida. Though he won both elections with a

clear majority, Florida residents did not fully support the moderate governor's policies. To

understand this discrepancy, it is important to revisit the criteria for moderate governors.

Historian Earl Black categorized Collins as a moderate segregationist, which placed him

alongside Orval Faubus, the governor of Arkansas. As time progressed, historians no longer

linked these two governors because of their seemingly contrasting reaction to the people of their

states. However, the governors distinguished themselves through the constituents they chose to

support. In the years following the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decisions of 1954 and 1955,

Faubus altered his stance from moderate to segregationist to maintain his seat as governor.

Collins, however, did not become more segregationist over time. Instead, he continued a

moderate course until his last year in office, when his actions seemed to advocate some




1 David C. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, "Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision,"
The Florida Historical Quarterly(Autumn 1975): 154-170; Joseph A. Tomberlin, "Florida and the Desegregation
Issue," The Journal oJ ,. Education (Autumn 1974): 457-467; Tom R. Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of
Florida: Spokesman of the New South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980).









desegregation. Collins placed the new, industrial businessmen in Florida in higher esteem than

the segregationists who controlled the legislature.2

Both Collins and Faubus chose to support the constituents they deemed important, and

their decisions resulted in vastly different outcomes. Because of Florida's rapidly changing

economics and demographics, Collins viewed his major constituents as new leaders in industry

and tourism. Collins planned to reapportion the legislature, which would ultimately change the

legislative body in favor of the larger, more affluent counties in the state. Collins did not appear

to lose faith in his goal of reapportionment, even in the face of a legislature that blocked his

every measure. The governor's actions indicated that he valued the newly arrived population of

industrial leaders instead of small district segregationists or integrationists.

Even though Collins's actions distinguished him from other southern governors of the

time, his state's overall actions did not. Florida's reaction to Brown mirrors Numan V. Bartley's

notion that southern states' initial reaction to Brown calmly, and then moved toward massive

resistance. Collins's moderate plans for segregation ultimately passed through the legislature

over more segregationist policies. In many cases, this resulted from Collins's own use of his

veto power. However, Florida's history of racial segregation was highly contested. Members of

the "Pork Chop Gang" and other leading segregationists like Attorney General Richard Ervin,

found Collins's approach too moderate and restrictive. The policies did not satisfy segregationist

hopes for absolute protection from desegregation. At the same time, "pork choppers" perceived

Collins's crusade for reapportionment as an outright confrontation toward their ability to control

the state. According to William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth, Collins's overt tactics toward



2 Earl Black, "Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial Segregation and Economic
Development, 1950-1969," The Journal of Politics (Summer 1971): 703-734.









reapportionment brought the governor and the "pork choppers" into a "sort of trench warfare."3

As a result, Florida legislators proposed strict segregationist bills and even passed a resolution of

Interposition. Even if the governor did not agree with these efforts, Florida's legislators

attempted to use common tools of massive resistance.4

David Colburn and Lance deHaven-Smith proposed that the changing demographics in

Florida influenced the traditional views of native Floridians. Through this study, it is apparent

that Collins believed Florida's general trend toward modernization hinged on its ability to

distinguish itself from other southern states in the region. For Collins, prioritizing segregation

was a foolish task because economic growth in Florida depended on the ability of the state to

extricate itself from southern neighbors. However, segregationists from small rural districts did

not alter their traditional stance toward segregation or reapportionment. In fact, Collins could

not afford to lose segregationist legislators completely. Because the legislation was

misrepresentative of the population, segregationists dominated Florida's congress, and Collins

was bound to the ill-apportioned legislature. He could not hope to achieve his ultimate goal of

reapportionment if he attacked segregationist legislators outright. Segregationists asserted their

control through the use of anti-integration bills and blocking apportionment reform movements.

Though bound to a segregationist legislature, Collins was not totally isolated from the

African American population in his state. For example, he was the first governor to address the

Florida State Teachers Association, (FSTA), the African American teachers' union. The

governor supported pupil assignment legislation because it placed the burden of desegregation or


3 Harvard and Beth, The Politics ofMis-Representation, 54-58.
4 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise ofMassive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s. (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 123.
5 David L. Colburn and Lance De-Haven Smith, Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida
(Gainesville:University Presses of Florida, 2002), 56.









segregation on local communities. Under this system, Collins attempted to satisfy

segregationists and integrationists. Perhaps because his policies seemed the least reprehensible,

African American newspapers in Florida generally tended to support Collins.6

However, to assume that all of Florida's integrationists, mostly African Americans,

supported Collins is incorrect. Vanessa Siddle Walker, Michael Fultz, and Marybeth Gasman

concluded that African Americans reacted to Brown proactively in much of the south. This

thesis indicates how African Americans in Florida acted under oppressive conditions in the

struggle toward equality. Florida members of the NAACP criticized Collins's leadership as early

as 1956. When the governor created a bi-racial group to determine a proper course of action

after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown, Florida members of the NAACP viewed the

measure as a trick. The Fabisinski Committee's goal was explicit: to create methods of

preserving segregation without legal recourse. Therefore, the group's purpose inherently

conflicted with integrationists'.

Although the governor created the tools to preserve some manifestations of segregation,

and no African Americans held positions in the state's government, Florida integrationists still

managed to have some effect. African American integrationists challenged pupil assignment by

bringing cases of discrimination to the courts by way of the NAACP. The cases struggled

toward resolution, but integrationists continued to fight persistently for desegregation. Collins

certainly paid attention to the cases, because in 1958, when two court cases threatened to


6 Arthur 0. White, One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 1979), 127.
7 Vanessa Siddle Walker, "African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960, American Educational Research
Journal (Winter 2001): 751-779; Michael Fultz, "The Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown: An Overview
and Analysis, History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 11-45; Marybeth Gasman, "Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The
Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision,"
History of Education Quarterly (Spring 2004): 70-92.









jeopardize the validity of pupil assignment, he quickly advocated a program of voluntary,

"token" integration in Dade County. The governor's segregation law survived even after some

desegregation began, but the efforts of the NAACP questioned the effectiveness of pupil

assignment. Integrationists in Florida used their own measures to combat segregation and did

not rely on others to fight their battle.

The evidence found in the Florida State Archives, the University of Florida Smathers

Library Education in Florida Subject Files, the Florida Branch Papers of the NAACP, and

editorials from mainstream and African American newspapers depicts Florida's segregation

history as disputed. This understanding breaks from the dominant perspective that Florida's

reaction to Brown was distinct from most other southern states. Florida did not benefit from a

smooth and peaceful transition into desegregation. Rather, the process involved many distinct

groups who prioritized contrasting objectives. Powerful segregationist constituents fought the

governor's attempts toward a moderate approach to racial segregation, and hardworking

integrationists challenged the governor to advocate equality in Florida. This discovery leads to

several important conclusions for southern history and Florida scholars.

This study calls for a reevaluation of what massive resistance actually constitutes.

Historians who study southern history have neglected Florida's reaction to Brown because

relatively little violence occurred as a result of efforts to maintain or thwart desegregation.

Southern states such as Alabama and Arkansas stand out sites of as massive resistance because

their reactions resulted in violence and mayhem which attracted national media attention. When

describing qualities of massive resistance, Numan V. Bartley included indicators such as

adopting an Interposition Resolution, employing racist propaganda, and violence. All were

present in Florida to some extent, yet historians have characterized the state as moderate, which









has inaccurately portrayed the state as distinct from others in the south. Southern historians must

broaden their criteria to ascertain fuller depictions of southern reactions to Brown. Calm

resistance is still resistance. 8

Additionally, this study implies that a governor's attitude and response toward Brown does

not produce an accurate historical account of a state's overall reaction to the U.S. Supreme

Court's ruling. In Florida, the governor was moderate throughout his tenure, and in his later

years worked as a civil rights activist. However, most Florida public schools remained

segregated until the U.S. Supreme Court mandate ordered desegregation in 1969. In fact,

remnants of resistance to segregation still exist in Florida's public schools in its International

Baccalaureate and magnet school programs. If the state's response mirrored the governor's, it

should have voluntarily desegregated much sooner. Instead, the state continued to struggle

against forced desegregation. Historians can only judge a governor, or any leader, for his or her

actions, but not as the spokesperson for an entire group, and especially not an entire state. Doing

so unduly diminishes the experiences and efforts of all the remaining constituents.9

Finally, this study informs aspects of Florida and southern history because it recognizes

African American actors in the period after Brown. Historians must recognize the actions of

African Americans after Reconstruction and through the period after Brown. Otherwise, African

Americans will not receive credit for the work they did during this volatile time. Richard Kluger

presented the road to Brown as calculated and time consuming. But after the U.S. Supreme

Court rendered its decisions, African Americans and integrationists still faced the arduous task of

desegregating schools. These activists worked toward compliance with that historic decision.

8 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance.

9 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). Regan Garner, "A School Without a Name:
Desegregation of Eastside High School, 1970-1987." University ofFlorida Journal of Law and Public Policy
(August 2005): 233-266.









In Florida, African Americans faced difficulties that limited their power within mainstream

politics. After Reconstruction, no African Americans held public office until several years after

U.S. Supreme Court's historic decisions in 1954 and 1955. This study contends that African

American integrationists struggled in Florida, and because of their efforts, the governor actually

considered their voices. Through persistence, they ultimately assisted in shaping Florida's

winding path toward racial desegregation in the public schools. If the NAACP had not fought

against pupil assignment, segregation may have lasted even longer. This thesis represents only a

small indication of how African Americans struggled for equality in public schools. Historians

have yet to explore fully African American stories in Florida and elsewhere in the southeast

portion of the United States. In Florida, desegregation came about because of integrationist

actions. Scholars cannot overlook their important role in shaping southern history.

Finally, this thesis includes two implications for educators. First, Florida educators,

especially in the fields of history and social studies, could reconsider how the history of the state

is taught. In Florida schools, teachers gloss over the history of segregation just as historians

have, so the myth that Florida has escaped racial disturbances has promulgated. Also, this thesis

reveals that even in the midst of an embittered battle over racial segregation, executives and state

legislators still prioritized the maintenance of a free public system of education. Though

debated, no provisions were made to give subsidies to private education in Florida. However,

more than fifty years later, Florida utilizes state-funded vouchers for students to attend private

school. Has the state of Florida given up on a free system of public education? This discovery

prompts current parents, educators and lawmakers to discern what value public education has,

and why Florida seems to have lost interest in it.









LIST OF REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Manuscripts

Correspondence of LeRoy Collins, 1955-1961, series 776, Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State
Archives.

Education in Florida Subject Files, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers
Libraries, University of Florida.

Florida Governor's Advisory Commission on Race Relations, 1957-1961, series 226,
Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State Archives.

Papers of the NAACP, Part 27: Selected Branch Files, 1956-1965, Series A: The South, Reel 4,
Library of Congress.

Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey Subject Files, 1949-1965, series 1127,
Tallahassee, Florida, Florida State Arvhives.

Florida Newspapers

Florida Sentinel (Tampa, Florida)

Florida Times Union (Jacksonville, Florida)

Miami Herald (Miami, Florida)

Miami Times (Miami, Florida)

Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee, Florida)

Tampa Tribune (Tampa, Florida)

Secondary Sources

Bartley, Numan V., The New Sniuth, 1945-1980: The Story of the .NSiuth's Modernization. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995.

Bartley, Numan V., The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the .Sih,, During the
1950s. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

Bender, William A,"The Status of Educational Desegregation in Mississippi," The Journal of
Negro Education, Summer (1956):285-288.

Black, Earl, "Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on Racial
Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-1969," The Journal of Politics, Summer
(1971): 703-734.









Colburn, David R. and Jane L. Landers, The African American Heritage of Florida. Gainesville:
University Presses of Florida, 1995.

Colburn, David R. and Lance DeHaven Smith, Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida.
Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 2002.

Colburn, David R.and Richard S. Scher, Florida's Gubernatorial Politics in the Tii ecmieth
Century. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1980.

Colburn, David R. and Richard K. Scher, "Race Relations and Gubernatorial Politics Since the
Brown Decision," The Florida Historical Quarterly, Autumn (1975): 154-170.

Formisano, Ronald P., Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and
1970s. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004

Fultz, Michael, "The Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown: An Overview and
Analysis, "History of Education Quarterly Spring (2004):1-45.

Garner, Regan, "A School Without a Name: Desegregation of Eastside High School, 1970-
1987." University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy August (2005): 233-266.

Gasman, Marybeth, "Rhetoric Vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro
College Fund in the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision," History of Education
Quarterly Spring (2004): 70-92.

Harvard, William C. and Loren P. Beth, The Politics ofMis-Representation: Rural Urban
Conflict in the Florida Legislature. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.

Jones, Lewis W, "Two Years of Desegregation in Alabama," The Journal of Negro Education
Summer (1956): 205-211.

Kenney, Patricia L., "LaVilla, Florida, 1866-1887: Reconstruction Dreams and the Formation
of a Black Community," In The African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David
R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, 185-206. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida,
1995.

Kluger, Richard, Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black
America's Struggle for Equality. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.

Lawson, Stephen F., David L. Colburn, and Darryl Paulson, "Groveland: Florida's Little
Scottsboro," in The African American Heritage of Florida, Edited by David L. Colburn
and Jane L. Landers, Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1995.

Maggioto, Michael, "The Impact of Reapportionment in Public Policy," American Politics
Quarterly, January (1985).

Mormino, Gary R., Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida,
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005.









Porter, Gilbert, "The Status of Educational Desegregation in Florida," The Journal of Negro
Education, Summer (1956): 246-253.

Puryear, R.W., "Desegregation of Public Education in Florida-One Year Afterward," The
Journal of Negro Education, Summer (1955): 219-227.

Solomon, W.E., "The Problem of Desegregation in South Carolina," The Journal ofNegro
Education Summer (1956): 315-323.

Stephen, Stephen A., "The Status of Integration and Segregation in Arkansas," The Journal of
Negro Education, Summer (1956): 212-220

Tomberlin, Joseph A., "Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954," Florida Historical
Quarterly, Autumn (1974): 122-145.

Tomberlin, Joseph A., "Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954-1959," The Journal of Negro
Education Autumn (1974):457-467.

Wagy, Tom R., Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New Sniih Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1980.

Walker, Vanessa Siddle, "African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960," American
Educational Research Journal Winter (2001): 751-779.

White, Arthur 0., One Hundred Years of State Leadership of Public Education in Florida.
Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1979.

Woodward, C. Vann, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1974.

Zimmerman, Jonathan, "Brown-ing the American Textbook: History, Psychology, and the
Origins of Modern Multiculturalism," History of Education Quarterly Spring (2004): 45-
69.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Amy Martinelli received a Master of Arts in Education, in social foundations, from the

University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. She received a Bachelor of Arts in English from the

University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. She worked as a Graduate Assistant in the William

and Grace Center for Written and Oral Communication, where she coached the speech and

debate team and taught various courses, featuring Introduction to Public Speaking.