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'We Only Vote but Do Not Know'


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1 "WE ONLY VOTE BU T DO NOT KNOW": THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN GHANA By KEVIN S. FRIDY A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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2 2007 Kevin S. Fridy

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3 To Sarah

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Though the process of writing a disse rtation can feel like a solitary affair at three oclock in the morning with a deadline fast approaching and several pages still to be written before dawn, the process of retrospection that accompanies the writing of an acknowledgments section brings with it valuable persp ective. In hindsight I can see that the ac tual writing of my dissertation only seemed so tedi ous and mind-numbing at times because it kept me away from the people who brought so much joy to the prac tice of discovery which surrounded all those solitary hours behind the computer. These individu als bear no responsibility for the mistakes I have made in cobbling together a social story of Ghanaian party politics, but they deserve much of the credit for whatever the dissertations redeeming qualities. During my field work in Ghana I simultaneousl y incurred so many debts of gratitude and was such a poor record keeper that there ar e many people who deserve thanks but will not receive it individually. To all the random Ghanaians in Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam constituencies who took time out of their busy sche dules to answer a survey questionnaire I give thanks. To all the secretaries who turned the wa iting room television away from Nigerian movies and to BBC for my sake and made sure I left their office building with both the name and personal cell phone number of the in dividual I needed to speak with I give thanks. To all the bureaucrats, taxicab drivers, socc er fans, corner loiterers, and barflies who I interrogated with silly questions about party polit ics to pass the time I give thanks. To all the staff at Champs Sports Bar in Kokomlemle, Ashfood Hotel in Bantama, and Sand Gardens in Bolgatanga who kept me company in my down time I give thanks. A Fulbright-Hays dissertation fellowship f unded my fieldwork during the 2004/5 academic year. Ghanas Center for Democratic Devel opment (CDD-G) provided me with office space during this period of time. While there I was surrounded by engaging indi viduals ranging from

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5 Professor Gyimah-Boadi, the CDD-Gs Executive Director, who was e qually happy encouraging me to participate in democracy promotion pr ojects he thought I would find interesting and allowing me to go off on my own research when I needed the time, to Davis Tettey, the security guard, who would never let me pay too much fo r a cab and was always willing to teach me a useful line of Twi or Ga. Though I met too many wonderful people working or affiliated with CDD-G to mention them all, Dr. Baffour Agyema n-Duah, Daniel Armah-Attoh, Dela Avle, Professor Cyril Daddieh, John Larvie, Abdul Wahab Musah, Franklin Oduro, Elvis Otoo, and Nansata Yakubu were instrumental in pointing me in the right direction to find arguments and data that found their way into the completed dissertation. When one is dealing with political matters such as those presented in this dissertation the question of whether or not to reveal public so urces is one worth ponderi ng. There is a tension between a simultaneous desire to both recognize and protect that has prompted me to divide these sources into two groups. The first group co nsists of party functionaries, members of government, and/or Members of Parliament who shared with me their personal opinions about Ghanaian party politics. These i ndividuals are owed thanks but are not identified by name here. My firsthand experience working with CDD-G has taught me that the Ghanaian media and party machines can use social scientif ic analysis to bludgeon opponents regardless of the findings and I want no part of that process. The second group consists of public s ector bureaucrats and university employees who went above and beyond th e call of duty to ensure that I found various public records. Included in this group are Dr. Kofi Agyekum and Alhaji Mohammed Dauda Sulley (University of Ghana); Samuel Yorke Aidoo, Kwame Damoah-Agyeman, Edward K. Dorgbor, Idrissu Mahama, and Nat Quaye (Elector al Commission); Francis the librarian and

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6 Stephen Tetteh Narh (Ghana Statistical Services ); Charles Brown (Parliamentary Library); and Robert Kuma (Attorney Generals Library). Those that helped me with my constituency research and surveys include Jacqueline Allotey, Juliet Allote y, Reginald Allotey, Zelma Allote y, and Addy Hussein (Odododiodio); Charles Agyapong and Regina Agyemang (Bantama); and Maxwell Kparib and Pastor Isaac Yen (Nabdam). Though the contract I ha d these individuals sign listed th eir title as r esearcher for the month they were in my employ, in reality th ey were much more. As I taught them about the survey they were to administer and the merits of a random selection of respondents, I learned more about the collection of data through the interaction. As we ca nvassed the neighborhoods and villages in teams of three, my assistants w ould make sure that I kne w the history of the area and met personally with anyone they deemed i mportant. Several year s after the fieldwork portion of my project concluded, I hear from seve ral of my research assistants by telephone on a regular basis and hope that they know their value to me as friends has already outweighed their value to me as researchers. My stay in Accra would not ha ve been nearly so comfortable had it not been for Kwabena Twum-Barimah, better known as TwumB, and his wife Afia. During my undergraduate years I studied abroad at the Univers ity of Ghana-Legon for a semester. My American roommate John and I decided our dormitory room was too bi g for only two students when our Ghanaian neighbors had been assigned six to eight so we invited two bedless students to join us. One of those students was TwumB. When I called him to notify him that I was returning to visit Ghana in 2000 he made sure I had a bed and did the same thing when I returned again for my dissertation research. Though my sc hedule kept me out of town fo r months at a time and away from the apartment most evenings and weeke nds, the occasional home cooking and beers on the

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7 stoop were a welcome relief and I hope TwumB and Afia know that I appreciate all their generosity and consider the room John and I let TwumB borrow in the Fall of 1997 more than paid off in full. In Gainesville my dissertation committee is c hocked full of not only top notch scholars, but top notch individuals who have actively helped me along the jour ney to first conceive of my dissertation topic and then comp lete it. It was in Bryon Morask is class on Post-Communist Politics that the idea of a project on the rela tionship between social cleavages and political parties was hatched. He not only introduced me to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), but allowed me to make Ghana the focal point in my paper despit e the fact that as a case it did not fall even tenuously within the courses boundaries. Leonar do Villaln and the staff of the Center for African Studies (most notably Corinna Greene and Todd Leedy) held my hand throughout the Fulbright-Hays application process. Without their help I could not have won the fellowship and without the fellowship I could not have afforded the research project. Professor Villalns various house parties also served as a nice divers ion from the daily grind for me and my wife throughout our years in Gainesville Brenda Chalfin and Daniel A. Smith made it possible for me to show up in Ghana and hit the ground running. Over the course of her extensive field work in Ghanas Northeast and his Fulbright year at the University of Ghana and CDD-G, they developed many contacts and without hesitation ope ned their Rolodexes up to me. They also let me borrow their Accra-based Nissa n Patrol which I would like to say I left in better condition than I found it but am not certain I can. Professor Goran Hyden is th e type of dissertation chair I wish every graduate student could have. He is a library unto himself, extremely well respected in the discipline, and willing to open up all the doors he can fo r his students. Perhaps more importantly, he is not afraid to let his students ro am when they need the intellectual space. When

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8 I needed him he was there at every turn. When I needed to pretend I did not have a deadline fast approaching he was willing to play along. Others who have read various manifestations of this dissertation and its chapters and offered helpful comments include Victor Br obbey, James Essegbey, Parakh Hoon, Peter Lewis, Staffan Lindberg, Scott Mainwari ng, Richard Marcus, Peter V on Doepp, and Kenneth Wald. African Affairs provided two anonymous reviewers for an article that overl aps heavily with Chapter Four. When I was scratching my head tr ying to find election resu lts from Ghanas past, Jon Kraus came to the rescue with his exce llent personal archive. Dan Reboussin deserves recognition for the miracles he worked from the University of Florida library. No matter what obscure text I dreamed up, he made sure I co uld get a copy. Paul F.A. Kotey never read a sentence of this dissertation but he sat with me for hours talking about Ghanaian politics and shaped my views immensely. He is missed. Though I probably do not say it often enough in ev eryday life, it is nice to have a formal space such as this to thank ones family. My fa ther, Robert L. Fridy, Jr., and mother, Karen K. Hager, did not always understand what on earth their child was doing in school at the age of thirty but without their help a PhD would not have been possible. Afia, also known as my naughty dog, only cost twenty-six dollars at the animal shelter five years ago but has since proven herself priceless. No matter the time of da y or night I worked sh e volunteered selflessly to be the muse by my side so that I would never feel too alone. Last but no t least this dissertation is dedicated to my wife Sarah. She is my ro ck! Without her I would have given up on this dissertation long ago and probabl y wound up in an asylum along th e way. This dedication is but a small reward for all of the patience, forgiven ess, and love she has shown me over the years.

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9 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ........12 LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................ .......14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................15 ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ............17 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................20 Entering a Conversation on the Stu ff of Democratic Politics.............................................22 Structure of the Argument......................................................................................................26 2 CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYST EMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS A REDUX.......................................................................................................................... .........30 Studying Political Parties in Africa: An Overview.................................................................33 Sankofas Siren Call: A New L ook at an Old Literature.................................................36 Reevaluating the Substance of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction...................38 Reevaluating the Sequencing of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction.................42 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .........44 3 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS TO GHANAIAN PARTISANSHIP............47 Ideological Cleavages.......................................................................................................... ...50 Nkrumahism v. Danquah-Busiaism.................................................................................50 The formative years (1949-1966).............................................................................52 The UGCC and CPP progeny (1966-present)..........................................................57 The Advent of a Third Way: Rawlingsism?................................................................60 Sectional Cleavages............................................................................................................ ....63 Ethnicity...................................................................................................................... ....64 Asante.......................................................................................................................65 Ewe...........................................................................................................................66 The rest.....................................................................................................................67 Region......................................................................................................................... .....70 Religion....................................................................................................................... ....72 4 THE ELEPHANT, UMBRELLA, AND QUARRELLING COCKS: DISAGGREGATING PARTISANSHIP IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC............................78

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10 Elections in the Fourth Republic............................................................................................80 Mapping the Votes..........................................................................................................80 Analyzing the Votes with the Help of Census Data........................................................84 The Meaning of Electoral Choice in Ghana: Cognitive Shortcuts.........................................90 Cognitive Shortcut Survey...........................................................................................91 Cognitive Mapping..........................................................................................................92 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .........96 5 THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CON TEMPORARY GHANAIAN PARTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGE S AND PARTISANSHIP PRIOR TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC..........................................................................................................105 Methodological Options fo r Historical Analysis..................................................................107 Isolating Freezing Moments: Elections in the Gold Coast and Ghana.............................110 Pre-Independence Elections (1951, 1954, and 1956)....................................................110 Post-Independence Elections before the Fourth Republic (1969 and 1979).................113 The Freezing Process: Cleavages Pol iticized and Cleavages Left Fallow...........................117 Creating the Asante v. Ewe Dichotomy........................................................................119 Becoming politically salient groups...................................................................120 Becoming political opposites and fostering this relationship.................................126 Alternative Cleavage Structures and their Fates...........................................................133 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......137 6 MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: A STUDY IN THREE CONSTITUENCIES (ODO DODIODIO, NABDAM, BANTAMA)....................145 Odododiodio.................................................................................................................... .....150 Socio-Political Background of a Highly Comp etitive Constituency in Old Accra...150 Exploring Contemporary Politiciz ed Cleavages in Odododiodio.................................153 Nabdam......................................................................................................................... ........157 Socio-Political Background of a Poor Ru ral Constituency in Ghanas Far North........157 Exploring Contemporary Politic ized Cleavages in Nabdam.........................................161 Bantama........................................................................................................................ ........165 Socio-Political Background of the NPPs World Bank of Votes..............................165 Exploring Contemporary Politiciz ed Cleavages in Bantama........................................169 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......173 7 CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................185 Ghanaian Perspectives..........................................................................................................186 Comparative Perspectives.....................................................................................................189 Theoretical Perspectives.......................................................................................................191 APPENDIX A COGNITIVE SHORTCUT SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION).......................................196 B SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY........................................................201

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11 Survey Methodology............................................................................................................201 Focus Group Methodology...................................................................................................203 LIST OF REFERENCES.............................................................................................................204 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................224

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12 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3-1 Elections in Ghana a historical overview........................................................................74 3-2 Genealogy of the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist traditions........................................74 4-1 NPP districts (linear regression)......................................................................................100 4-2 NDC districts (linear regression).....................................................................................100 4-3 Cognitive perceptions of class for N PP and NDC supporters (survey results)................100 4-4 Cognitive perceptions of population de nsity where NPP and NDC supporters live (survey results)............................................................................................................... ..100 4-5 Cognitive perceptions of education-le vel for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results)....................................................................................................................... .......101 4-6 Cognitive perceptions of ethnic identity for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results)....................................................................................................................... .......101 4-7 Cognitive perceptions of region for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results).............102 4-8 Cognitive perceptions of religion for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results)...........102 5-1 1954 Legislative Assembly election resu lts by region and eth no-cultural group............140 5-2 1956 Legislative Assembly election resu lts by region and eth no-cultural group............140 5-3 1969 Parliamentary election result s by region and ethno-cultural group........................141 5-4 1979 Parliamentary and presidential (2nd round) election results by region and ethnocultural group................................................................................................................. ..141 6-1 Three constituencies (Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama) at a glance.......................176 6-2 Gas voting compared to non-Ga s in Odododiodio (survey results)...............................177 6-3 Odododiodio election results (1996 Parl iament) broken down by polling station..........178 6-4 Party preference by Odododiodio sub-const ituency electoral area (survey results)........178 6-5 Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-cons tituency electoral ar ea (survey results)..178 6-6 Non-Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-constituency electoral area (survey results)....................................................................................................................... .......178

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13 6-7 Votes in Nabdam by chieftaincy area (2004 election results).........................................179 6-8 Namnam party preference by acceptance of campaign gifts (survey results).................179 6-9 Namnam gender by acceptance of campaign gifts (survey results).................................179 6-10 Bantama party preference by gender (survey results)......................................................179 6-11 Bantama party preference by et hnic identity (survey results).........................................180

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14 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 3-1 Ethno-linguistic map of Ghana..........................................................................................76 3-2 Contemporary regions of Ghana (color-coded by colonial regions).................................77 4-1 NDC percentage of pr esidential votes mapped................................................................103 4-2 NPP percentage of presidential votes mapped.................................................................104 5-1 Constant geographical units for el ections (1954-1979) and census (1960).....................142 5-2 CPP percentage of the vote mapped for pre-independence elections..............................143 5-3 Danquah-Busiaists and Nkrumahists percen tage of the vote mapped for pre-Fourth Republic elections............................................................................................................144 6-1 Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama located on Ghanaian map....................................181 6-2 Odododiodio map with survey areas highlighted............................................................182 6-3 Nabdam map with survey areas highlighted....................................................................183 6-4 Bantama map with survey areas highlighted...................................................................184 7-1 Pre-election Tolerance posters.....................................................................................194 7-2 Mapping selected West Af rican political cleavages........................................................195

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15 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACP Action Congress Party AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council APRP All Peoples Republican Party AYO Anlo Youth Organization CDD-G Center for Democratic Development Ghana CPP Convention Peoples Party CYO Committee on Youth Organization ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EGLE Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere FYO Federation of Youth Organizations GCP Ghana Congress Party KVIP Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine MAP Moslem Association Party NAL National Alliance of Liberals NDC National Democratic Congress NIP National Independence Party NLC National Liberation Council NLM National Liberation Movement NOPP Northern Peoples Party NPP New Patriotic Party NRC National Redemption Council PAP Peoples Action Party PCP Peoples Convention Party

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16 PFP Popular Front Party PHP Peoples Heritage Party PNC Peoples National Convention PNDC Provisional National Defense Council PNP Peoples National Party PP Progress Party SDF Social Democratic Front SMC Supreme Military Council TC Togoland Congress UGCC United Gold Coast Convention UNC United National Convention UNIGOV Union Government UNP United National Party UP United Party

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17 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy "WE ONLY VOTE BU T DO NOT KNOW": THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN GHANA By Kevin S. Fridy May 2007 Chair: Goran Hyden Major: Political Science We Only Vote but Do Not Know: The Soci al Foundations of Partisanship in Ghana focuses on the relationship between social cleavage s and political parties in Ghana. In the decade following independence Africanist sc holars, influenced by moderniza tion theories, were keen to characterize the fledgling party systems they fo und as prone to secti onal political cleavages given electorates comprised primarily of illitera te peasants. The popular prescription of the day was urban-dominated nationalizing parties at the cost of competition. When the third wave washed over African shores more than a quarter century later scholars bega n to look at the role political parties play in politic s but have done so without much recognition of the past debate. Instead there is a tendency to focus on party or ganizations as merely players within formal electoral institutions. My study trie s to capture the nuanced social analysis that marks the earlier Africanist discourse in political science while simultaneously acknowle dging and learning from contemporary scholarship. Rather than assuming that parties organized along Gemeinschaft social cleavage lines are bad and those organized along Gesellschaft lines are good or that politi cally-mobilized identities are fixed social realities as did so many of the early Africanist scholars, my study allows for flexible hypothesis generation. Two research questi ons guide this exercise. First, what types of

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18 social cleavages undergird the Ghanaian party sy stem? To answer this question election results are mapped and several regressions are run usi ng district-level socioeconomic and sectional indicators from the 2000 census to predict electo ral outcomes. The results of this analysis suggest that ethnicity is the dr iving force behind Ghanaian partis anship, but not in the zero-sum way that the early Africanist sc holars studying parties predicted. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) tends to dominate in Asante regions and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in Ewe areas regardless of socio-economic characteristics but these two ethnic groups make up slightly less than 30% of the total Ghanaian population. In or der to determine how the more than 70% of Ghanas population not self-identif ied as Asante or Ewe view the two dominant political parties, a complementary cognitive shortcut survey was ad ministered in three disparate constituencies. Results from this survey suggest that voters not self-identifying as either Asante or Ewe still view Ghanas party system as cleaved along the described ethnic lines, but vote for either the Asante party or the Ewe pa rty based largely on specific localized political disputes. As a follow-up question, my study asks what actor s, events, and/or soci al structures led to these particular cleavages being mobilized in lie u of other potential cleavage structures? Unlike the generators of party systems in Europe descri bed by Lipset and Rokkan as revolutions, the Asante/Ewe political cleavage was created throu gh a number of fits and st arts. These identities became politically salient independently as reacti ons to Nkrumahs nationalizing government. The Asante identity, presented by the Nati onal Liberation Movement (NLM), drew upon symbols of Asante defiance from their drawnout war with the British. The Ewe identity, presented by the Togoland Congress (TC), was fome nted by Ewe-speakers peculiar position in a UN-mandated territory ceded to the British after Germanys defeat in World War I, and more importantly the colonial and Nkrumah government s reactions to their claims. When Nkrumah

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19 was deposed, these two formerly aligned political groups had th e cultural and organizational tools to fill the political void and present voters with oppositional forces across the subsequent three republics.

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20 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Over the course of the field work that would ev entually lead to this dissertation I did a lot of sitting. In the cities it w ould usually be in a molded plastic chair, most often at a drinking spot. In the countryside an exposed tree root or precarious wooden bench outside of someones compound would substitute. Though this sitti ng could be categorized as participant observation along the lines of Fenno (1990) had I b een pressed to document the use of my time in Ghana, connotatively partici pant observation seems to desc ribe something far more grand and systematic than I was up to. My research de sign called for a modest survey (N=600) to be conducted in three disparate electoral constituencies.1 To administer these surveys I hired two assistants for each constituency. These assistants not only possessed the language skills in local dialects that I lacked, but I fe lt it would be less intimidating fo r respondents to receive a visit from someone local than from someone purporting to be from an American university. Despite this help I gave myself a month in each cons tituency which I used to train and retrain my assistants in the art of randomization, survey administration, and In stitutional Review Board forms. Once in the field to collect data, I saw the demands on my time dwindle dramatically. I had to be on the ground in the constituency to do oc casional quality control checks, the reason I hired so few assistants and gave myself so much time on location in the first place, but for the most part I found myself wandering th rough neighborhoods and villages left out of the travel guides, looking for a nice place to sit. Sitting, at least in this oburonis experi ence, tended to attract conversation.2 My favorite icebreaker was the Ghanaian football league. As an avid follower of 1 A copy of the English version of this survey is provided in Appendix A. 2 Oburoni is the Twi word for foreigner. Connotativ ely the word is used to describe non-Africans.

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21 Accra Hearts of Oak I would re live the past weeks glories, and occasional calamities, with fellow admirers and exchange friendly barbs with supporters of other team s. When I was not the conversation initiator, the tendency was for questions a bout my nationality, followed by questions about how wonderful America really is, followed by questions about the visa process. Though I never forced the issue, partly because I was looking for distrac tion and partly because politics can be a sensitive topic of conversation, if a lull entered into these conversations I would often turn to my dissertation re search. The recent elec tion facilitated this process. What do you think about Ghanaian politics? I would ask. After hearing a litany of complaints about Ghanaian politics in general, and how all politicians are scoundrels in part icular, I would query about the party affiliation of my conversat ion partner. An answer would al most always come quickly to which I would challenge Why do you like your part y? With very few exceptions the answer received after a considerable moment of pause resembled the words uttered by an anonymous respondent from Kumasi who suggested We only vote but do not know. This response, which provides the title of th is dissertation, was neither wholly unexpected nor bereft of data. Campaigns in Ghana, not unlike campaigns around much of the world, offer citizens very few tools with which to understa nd the impact of thei r vote through thoughtful rational calculations. All parties promis e some ill-defined, but no doubt covetable, development and express their utter disdai n for the debilitating condition of corruption. Candidates describe their opponents as those wh o will stand in the way of this amorphous development by engaging in the politics of the belly. They will chop plenty of state resources, the narrative goes, and lavish both th emselves and friends w ith gifts while watching the poor man and woman on the street and in the bush suffer (Bayart 1993; Lindberg 2003). Individuals I conversed with fre quently expressed embarrassment or shame at their inability to

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22 explain the rationale undergirding their partisan identification or provide a cultivated description of the substantive difference between cherishe d and despised parties. An individual in Jamestown gave a typical response when he noted that We in Ghana are new with our democratic dispensation. Our polit ics are not like in the US. Embedded in this statement of supposed inferior ity there is an assumption being made that the researcher expected some rote answer any true democrat would know. I read these honest admissions of ignorance not as a sign of Ghan as democratic failings, however, but as an indicator of the unchallenged ar eas of cognition where many im portant political decisions, including that of which party to champion, take place. Many voters in Ghana feel passionately about one party or another but do not know on a conscious-level why they vote the way they do because these decisions are made in an environment of imperfect information where rhetoric and policy are disassociated and the cues voters receiv e from parties and thei r candidates are heavily veiled and fit uncomfortably into a discussion of formal policy positions. Entering a Conversation on the Stuff of Democratic Politics These impromptu conversations, as anecdotal as they may be, suggested a way of situating this modest survey of Ghanaian political partie s into a grander conversat ion in political science on the stuff of democratic politics. American ist scholars took an early role in defining the parameters of the exchange by dividing the study of partisan identification into two camps. One camp understands partisan attachments as derived from the conscious rational choices voters make based on party platforms (Downs 1957) or perception of party performance in office (Fiorina 1981). Voters, though they may not al ways be well-informed, are cognizant of the rationale, as imperfectly constructed as it may be behind the choices they make. They can either identify which party agrees with them more of ten than not on the important social and/or economic issues or evaluate the various costs and benefits of a particular governments rule in

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23 hindsight and forecast forward. One would anticipat e, when asked why they support one party or another, voters of this il k have a thoughtful answer. Yet my conversations with the chance Ghanaian voter, as well as the more systematic collection of evidence presented in later chapters, suggests this is not the case at all. It is my experience that most voters feel a strong attachment to one party or anothe r but are not quite sure how to verbalize the causal mechanism behind this attachment. In their analysis of the American electorate, another group of scholars (Campbell et al. 1960; Gr een et al. 2002) has noted a similar phenomenon. Finding rational choices unsatis fying explanatory variables for partisan identification, these scholars turn instead to social-psychological attachments. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002, 23) explain this relationship as follows: People know who they are and where they fit in the matrix of prominent social groups. Citizens group attachments sh ape the way they evaluate political candidates and the policies they espouse. These ev aluations change as new information becomes available, but seldom does the political environment cha nge in ways that alte r how people think of themselves or their relationship to signifi cant social groups. For this reason, voters attachments may remain firm even as thei r voting preferences shift. Thus, the basic structure of electoral competition remains int act even as the personae and policies that dominate politics change. This understanding of politics turns the basi c assumptions of rational choice partisan identification on its head. Political preferences go from being something arrived at largely through individual contemplation to something larg ely determined by how ones social group fits into the larger national society. A rejection of Homo economicus utility is not new to those working with African politics. The uneven and incomplete prog ress of modernity on the contin ent prompted Hyden (1980) to call for a reevaluation of this parsimonious conc ept reliant on individual istic and well-informed rationality even in the realm of microeconomics where Homo economicus was born. Though this embrace of alternative c onceptualizations of human natur e is not consensual amongst scholars

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24 working on the continent, Bates (1981; 1988) in pa rticular has been an influential champion of rational choice explanations of African politic al phenomena, an acceptance of group politics has been well within the mainstream of Africanist po litical science since its early days. As a major threat to nationalist integration in the fledgling African republic s of the early 1960s Coleman and Rosberg (1964, 687) list as a major problem territorial integrati on which they propose stems from the persistence-indeed, th e paramountcy-of primordial a ttachments or ties; that is, individuals identify themselves much more strong ly with historic groups defined in terms of kinship, religion, language, or culture than w ith the civil order of the new states. To answer the question Why do you like your party? for all of those Ghanaians who could not, this dissertation utili zes analysis of the archival reco rd, census data, survey results, and mass and elite interviews. It does so with an open assumption that for voters abstract ideologies and interpretations of government performance more often than not do not lead directly to partisan identifications. Rather po licy preferences and perf ormance evaluations are given as something akin to talking points from the top-down by the political party, or perhaps more precisely the partys leadership aided by the partys historical legacy, deemed most credible because of its known asso ciation with a valued ethnic, re ligious, gender, class, or other politically salient group. Voters in essence have a Rolodex of identities which are shaped and given political salience through soci al interaction. The process of politics ties some of these social identity categories to specific political pa rties and this process of tying identity to party occurs prior to the adoption of evaluations for policy and/or ideology. Given this understanding of partisan politics, the question Why do you like your party? can be broken down into its many layers. What identity markers cognitivel y paint the party you support? What identity

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25 markers cognitively paint their opposition? How do you see your identity in relation to the party you support and their opposition? The adoption of this social-psychological appr oach not only explains the inability of most Ghanaians to elucidate their partisan preference s and does so in a way that is not completely foreign to preceding Africanist scholarship, but it accomplishes this task in a manner that is not so incompatible with competing conceptualizatio ns of multi-partisanship in Africa. For scholars who concentrate on the very rational-materialistic way in which patron-client networks influence voter preferences, analysis of social cleavage/ political party interactio ns helps explain the patterning effects of patronage networks. No matte r how wide a leader casts the spoils of state resources, there are indefinitely locales where thes e resources are easily tr anslated into votes and locales where this translation fa ils to register, often despite th e cooptation of leaders from the region and expensive outlays of government assistance (Kasara 2007). For those wedded to an understanding of partis an politics that follo ws the aforementioned rational choice model, while this approach doe s down-play the individuals role in creating macro-partisan patterns it does not foreclose on the possi bility of class grou ps, even class groups wedded to regional economic interests, as viable poles around which a party system can form. Though finding that a class identity is the best predictor of partisan identity would not ipso facto refute social-psychological explanations of par tisanship since a sense of class conscience could override a desire for personal material gain, such a finding would make it difficult to disentangle rational choice and social-psychological explanations in ways other identities would not. In other words, class could be understood as the expression of individual rational calculations or a sense of common culture (Inglehart 1997).

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26 Structure of the Argument In its exploration of the soci al-psychological foundations of pa rtisanship in Ghana, this dissertation begins with a review of the literature (Chapter Two) on the interaction between groups and political parties in the comparativ ist and Africanist contexts. As its point of embarkation Lipset and Rokkans (1967) classic text on party systems and social cleavage patterns is adopted. While subsequent scholarship has challenged and updated much of what is written in Party Systems and Voter Alignments Lipset and Rokkan frame the big questions namely what groups are important in a given pa rty system? and how did these groups gain their political salience? to which this disser tation ventures an answer Having fleshed out the types of groups that have in various multi-party c ontexts gained political salience the dissertation moves on to an exploration of the key social gro ups in Ghanaian society, both past and present, that could, under the right circ umstances, be mobilized to form the support bases for competing national party coalitions (Chapter Three). These social identitie s represent the potential building blocks Ghanaian parties over the four republics c ould use to cobble together the necessary votes to take over the statehouse. It is with this background that the subsequent three chapters present descriptions of how these building blocks have been organized and explanations for w hy partisanship took the form it did over all other possib ilities. Chapter Four does this on th e macro-level in Ghanas Fourth Republic. It first asks what soci al cleavages the dominant partie s in the Fourth Republic, namely the NDC and NPP, rely upon to differentiate them selves from their oppone nts. This exploration relies upon census data and election results. The chap ter then presses further with survey data to comb the minds of Ghanaian voters in search of the particular pieces of information regarding party identities they use to di fferentiate between competing pa rties when presented with an election. Evidence presented in Chapter Four indi cates that the NPP does significantly better than

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27 the NDC in Asante-speaking areas and the NDC does significantly better than the NPP in Ewespeaking areas. Voters associate the parties above all other potential iden tities with these two ethnic groups and this association holds true whether or not said voters identify with the Asante ethnic group, Ewe ethnic group, or one of Ghanas many other ethnic groups. Chapter Five explores the roots of this Asante /Ewe political cleavage. In the colonial and post-colonial period Ghana held four national elections prior to the Fourth Republics first election in 1992. The historical r ecord does not support any claims of Asante or Ewe primordial political attachments. Election results indicate that the competition between Asante-dominant areas and Ewe-dominant areas da tes back only to the election of 1969 and the politicization of these two areas as identifiable elect oral blocs dates back to the co lonial era. This chapter culls through the various arguments pur porting to explain the Asante/E we political rivalry to see which of these arguments makes the most sens e given the timing of bloc-voting onset and commencement of an antagonistic electoral relati onship. The chapter also explores competing identities that expressed themselves as poten tial challengers to the Asante and Ewe ethnic identities on the national political scene to understand why their sa lience ultimately ebbs. The final substantive chapter (Chapter Six) is a very cl ose exploration of partisan cleavages in three disparate constituencies. Th is chapter has two primary functions. First it illuminates at a relatively micro-level what is go ing on with politico-social conflicts in specific localities. At this level the anal ysis should be of inte rest to scholars whose work focuses on the Jamestown and Usshertown sections of Old Accra, the Bantama neighborhood of Kumasi, and Nabit-speaking communities in the Upper East Region, as these are the three areas given meticulous attention. For a broader audience, this chapte r presents some insights into how social cleavages might be mobilized in the vast areas of Ghana that are neither Asantenor Ewe-

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28 dominant with the cases of Odododiodio and Nabda m. These areas tend to be far more contested than their counterparts and in f act serve as home to more than half of the Ghanaian voting population. Bantama, in contrast, o ffers insights into the interwor kings of a constituency where the dominance of one ethnic group (Asantes) go es unquestioned and one party (the NPP) considers it a bad day when they regi ster less than nine out of ten votes. The dissertations conclusion (Chapter Seven) summarizes the findings of previous chapters and revisits the theori es that guided this research. It accomplishes this task at three levels: countrywide, comparative, and theore tical. For students of Gh anaian politics this dissertation offers both confirma tions of conventional wisdom (e .g., the popularity of the NPP in Asante areas and the popularity of the NDC in Ewe areas) an d refutations of conventional wisdom (e.g., the NPP is more popular amongs t the upper classes and the NDC more popular amongst the poor). In pushing beyond mere desc riptions of voter te ndencies and into the cognitive shortcuts used to make electoral deci sions, the dissertation char ts a new course in the study of Ghanaian politics. For students of compar ative politics these findings suggest some new interpretations of party systems defined in larg e party by ethnic politics. In the case of Ghana ethnicity matters a lot for politic al parties trying to cobble together winning social coalitions. Ghanaian elections do not, however, take the form of zero-sum ethnic censuses. Rather ethnicity is used to provide context to political choices but most voters must use a socially ill-defined evaluation of the dominant partie s ethnic identities to identify themselves with a party or candidate. Theoretically Ghana provides a novel cas e for an exploration of social-psychological partisan attachments and the role of group heuristic s in partisan identification. Most of the work done with these concepts has been conducted in the United States and Western democracies. These theoretical constructs, howev er, appear to have traveled qu ite well and the Ghanaian case

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29 offers something that democracies longer in the tooth do not. It o ffers the opportunity to evaluate the process of cognitive shortcut creation at a re latively early point which will be very useful in studying the evolution of cognitive shortcuts.

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30 CHAPTER 2 CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS A REDUX The seminal work on political cleavages appears as an essay titled Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments written by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) to serve as the introduction to their edited volume on Party Systems and Voter Alignments In the tripartite arrangement of the pol itical parties body of literature introduced into the discipline by Key (1964, 163-165) and reified a few years later by So rauf (1968), this work falls squarely into the party-in-the-electorate category. When mentioned at all, parties as organizations and parties in government are tangential components of the story Lipset a nd Rokkan convey about the interactions between politi cal parties and society-writ-large. By the time parties as organizations and in government begin to matter in their anal ysis, society has already cleaved and presented purveyors of party politics with a fairly well-define d path, or paths as the case may be, of least resistance. Within society, Lipset and Rokkan note a Janus-fa ced role for political parties (p.3). On the one hand parties serve as agents of social conflic t. Parties make for institutionalized rivalry Lipset (2001, 4) points out in a later work, and [s]uch competiti on for Schumpeter is the essence of democracy in macro politics. On the other ha nd, parties can serve as instruments of social integration. Satrori (1988) desc ribes this party function as the part-of-a-whole. Although a party only represents a part, he explains with regard to pluralisti c societies, this part must take a non-partial approach to the whole (p. 252). In their focus on the sociological aspects of political parties the way they can simultaneously dissect society into groups and construct a sense of the whole Lipset and Rokkan follow in the footsteps of political soci ologists the likes of Andr Siegfried, Herbert Tingsten, and Rudolf Heberle whose works led th e way in bringing the social background of

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31 politics into the foreground (A llardt 2001, 15). Where Lipset and Rokkan break new ground is in their systematic comparative appl ication of political sociology. Wh ile Lipset and Rokkan provide a framework for studying the inte raction between political partie s and social cleavages based on their reading primarily of Wester n European political history, thei r volume contains eleven case studies: eight from the Western World (America New Zealand, England, Italy, Spain, Germany, Finland, and Norway) and three from emerging na tions (Japan, Brazil, a nd West Africa). To bridge the geographic, historical, cultural, and ins titutional gaps inherent to any project with such a broad scope, Lipset and Rokka n offer three sets of centraliz ing questions. These questions loosely structure not only their introductory analysis, but the case studies provided by the volumes contributors. The first set of questions Lipset and Rokkan put forward concern the genesis of the system of contrasts and cleavages within the national community. Qu estions of this variety include: Which conflicts came first and which later? Which ones proved temporary and secondary? Which proved obdurate and pervasive? Which cut across each other and produced overlaps between allies and enemies, and which reinforc ed each other and tended to polarize the national citizenry? (1967, 1). The second set focuses on the conditions for the development of a stable system of cleavage and oppositions in national political life. Qu estions addressing this issue include: Why did some early conflicts establish party oppositions and others not? Which of the many conflicting interests a nd outlooks in the national community produced direct opposition between competing parties, and which of them could be aggregated within the broad party fronts? Which conditions favor ed extensive aggregations of oppositional groups, and which offered greater incentive to fr agmented articulation of single interests or narrowly defined causes? To what extent were these developments affected by changes in the legal and the administrative conditions of political activity, though the extension of the rights of participation, through the introduction of secret vot ing and the development of strict controls of electoral co rruption, and through th e retention of plurality decisions or the introduction of some variety of Pr oportional Representation? (p. 1-2).

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32 A third and final set of questions addresses the behavior of the mass of rank-and-file citizens within the resultant party systems. Included in this set are: How quickly were the parties able to recruit support among the new masses of enfranchised citizens and what were the co re characteristics of the groups of voters mobilized by each party? Which conditions helped and which conditions hindered the mobilization efforts of each party within th e different groups of the mass citizenry? How quickly did the changes in economic, social, and cultural conditions brought about through economic growth or stagnation tr anslate themselves into chan ges in the strengths and the strategies of the parties? How did political su ccess affect the rates of mobilization and the inflow of new support to each party? Did the parties tend to recruit new clienteles and change their followings as they established their viability as useful channels of influence in the decision-making processes? (p. 2). Having outlined these research questions, Lipset and Rokkan begin the process of providing some possible answers through the merger of a detaile d historical understanding of Western European politics and a conceptual tool developed by Talcott Parsons (1953) known as the A-G-I-L paradigm.1 Cleavages, they argue, can be mapped out across a four quadrant matrix. Along one axis of this matrix are territorial cleavage structures. These range from (L) localized oppositions seeking some form of autonomy from the central government to (G) competing territorial units each seeking control of the whole. The other axis of Lipset and Rokkans rendition of the A-G-I-L matrix represents functional cleavage structures. Cleavages that occur on this axis cut across regions and range from (A) conflicts over the short and long-term distribution of economic benefits to (I) conflicts over moral rights and wrongs as represented often by religious, ideological, a nd ethnic societies (p. 10-11). Though a complete recounting of Lipset a nd Rokkans application of this taxonomic matrix is beyond the scope of this chapter, the br eadth of their explanation is worth noting. When combined with a time dimension and the notion of fr ozen cleavage structures (the idea that over time cleavage structures cease to ap pear afresh at each new conflict and rather reappear more or 1 For a further exploration of this framework see Gerhardt (2002).

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33 less intact even for dissimilar conflicts), Lipset and Rokkan use their matrix to document party systems across Europe whose politically m obilized cleavages were generated in the Reformation/Counter-Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries (Center-Periphery), National Revolutions in the mold of the French Revolu tion (State-Church), the Industrial Revolution (Land-Industry), and the Russian Re volution (Owner-Worker) (p. 47). Studying Political Parties in Africa: An Overview At the dawn of African independence, schol ars interested in studying African politics turned in large-part to the study of political parties along th e lines suggested by Lipset and Rokkan (Apter 1965; Coleman and Rosberg 1964 ; Hodgkin 1961; Morgenthau 1964; Wallerstein 1967; Zolberg 1966). Perhaps this sel ection of topic and approach is a sign of scholarly trends. Lipsets (1960) Political Man is a milestone in the history of political sociology. The work did not, however, represent an intellectual island. Political Man was published during the disciplinary apex of modernization theory a nd with its reliance on Parsonian theory and structural-functionalism fits well into the then prevailing trend (Kohli and Shue 1994, 298). While much of the aforementioned early work on African political partie s does not cite Lipset and Rokkans work directly, it consistently pays homage to political sociology and modernization theory. There is a practical explanation for this tend ency as well. In the new states of Tropical Africa with which we are concerned, write Co leman and Rosberg (1964, 1-2), there is an almost complete institutional vacuum at the cen tral, national level. Gi ven a context devoid of valued national structures, a focus on societal political groups has natural appeal. Scholars translated this focus into a near univer sal recommendation, or perhaps more accurately justification, for single-party states. Fear th at opposition will produce factionalism, corruption, and separatism, explains Apter (1965, 193), is pe rvasive in modernizing nations. To unite the

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34 multitude of ethnic groups and get both th e rural masses and urban elites onboard the modernization bandwagon, a party of solidarity was thought to be if not sufficient, at least necessary. This highly-centralized power, the th eory goes, has the best chance of dragging the unwashed masses kicking and screaming towards development. As a rule, Africas one-party states, and de fact o one-party states, took very little time to prove themselves fundamentally ineffectual, corrupt, and anti-democratic (Pinkney 1988, 51-53). One response to these unappealing manifestations of single-party politics was empirical. Across the continent supposedly apolitical militaries inse rted themselves into politics on a grand scale. Though a few soldiers changed their stance as th e third wave of democracy approached, the initial preference of generals, and men of a lowe r rank alike, was the junta as a mechanism for creating coherent government policy over the political party (Bienen 1978, 122-145; Decalo 1990, 1-32; 1976, 231-254). A second response to the unmet expectations of Africas single party governments was scholarly in nature. Over the course of the 1970s, Africanist political scientists oversaw a massive shift in the s ubstance of their discourse. Those parties not overthrown by coup dtat began to fade into the background as pe rsonalistic rule rs and their support networks filled the intellectual void. Whereas Carl Rosberg co-edited a volume on political parties to catalog African regimes in the 1960s (Coleman and Rosberg 1964), scholarly trends dictated a similar categorization focus on personalities of African leaders in the 1980s (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). The personal rule and related clientelism literature that flourished during this period did not all sever its ties completely with the precedin g parties literatures substantive roots. Formal institutions of governance were s till considered too weak to me rit a great deal of scholarly attention, but instead of focusing on social gr oups and their prevailing cleavage equilibrium,

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35 these scholars were interested primarily in prag matic political attachments. The extent to which this altered focus took scholars aw ay from their predecessors concerns varies greatly from those like Jackson and Rosberg (1982, 19) who note a fundamental difference between social politics and palace politics to those who see socia l politics as a funda mental and necessary lubricant for patronage (Lemarchand 1972; Joseph 1983). With the third waves arrival on African shores, legalization of a political opposition brought parties back on the scholarly agenda (Huntington 1991). In many countries the provincial literature on decades -long autocracies and recurring juntas was no longer convenient and a burgeoning body of literature on comparativ e democratization beckoned (Diamond et al. 1988; Diamond and Plattner 1999). Despite no longer be ing ignored completely in discussions of African politics, coverage of African parties during the early democratic transition period is uneven and largely superficial. Many texts fo cusing specifically on democratic transitions mention constitutional provisions allowing for the legalization of parties only as a portion of grander political liberalization projects (B ratton and van de Walle 1997, 143-147; Joseph 1991, 20; Widner 1997). These works treat pa rties essentially as a residual effect of democratization or as potential indicators of demo cratic development and not as key independent variables contributing to democracys character as well as the democratic processs eventual consolidation, stagnation, or decay. Of the select few works focusing directly on African parties most do little more than recognize parties as competitors in national elections. What once wa s a sure bet is now conceptualized as a two, three, and even four horse race (e.g., Olukoshi 1998; Salih 2003). A few texts (Clapham 1997; LumumbaKasongo 1998; Kuenzi and Lambri ght 2001) instead of looking at a single country look theoretical ly at party systems across the c ontinent but do so largely with

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36 an institutional focus asking why multiple parties thrive in some instances and pale in comparison to a single dominant party in othe rs. While many of these works offer excellent electoral play-by-plays and party sy stem analyses, virtually no effo rt is directed at empirically testing theoretical assumptions about the ties between political parties and the societies within which they interact. There have been a few singl e-case studies that vent ure onto this territory,2 essentially under the guise of analysis of par tisan identification, but even these works largely ignore the processes that were so important to earl ier scholars. Social cleavages and their interactions with political partie s are examined for the most part ahistorically as if they are natural occurrences whose al ternatives are either uni mportant or unfathomable. Sankofas Siren Call: A New Look at an Old Literature There is a saying in the Akan language of Twi S wo wer fi na wosan k fa a yenkyi. Loosely translated, this saying known popularly in its anglicized form as sankofa, warns one not to neglect the past while moving forward into the future. In many ways this work represents a sankofa-like return to the past with regards to th e study of political parties in the African context. The mass wave of democratizations that swept across the continent in th e early 1990s did little to fundamentally strengthen the institutions of governance (Hyden 1992). Civil society too failed to experience a massive and sustainable invigora tion accompanying the inauguration of formal democratic institutions (Lewis 1992). Given thes e structural deficits, a focus on the nexus between social groups and political parties, al ong the lines proposed by Lipset and Rokkan and the early scholars of African pol itical parties, makes a great deal of sense. Sankofa is not, however, a call for credulous traditionalism. The concept treats the past as a mechanism for educating the present and future. When scholars fi rst applied the constructs of political sociology 2 Nugent (1999) and Lindberg and Morrison (2005) are two examples of such work s that focus on Ghana.

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37 in their analysis of African political parties th e nearly consensual prediction was that multi-party democracy was unsustainable in circumstances where there is a feeble sense of nationhood and relatively cohesive esse ntialized sectional groups. Moderniz ation and nation-building at the hands of a single charismatic leader or unified elite party was the near universal prescription. Though many a state indicated movement down this path, the outcomes overwhelmingly underwhelmed. In an interim balance sheet on the successe s and failures of African third wave democracies, Crawford Young (1996) remarks th at slow, halting, uneven, yet continuing movement toward polyarchy is possible. Despite this mixed bag of results, he continues, [t]here is no plausible and preferab le alternative on the horizon (p. 67).3 Youngs cautious endorsement of democracy is driven by a number of factors including the poor track-record of one-party and military regimes in Africa, an international environment that is more insistent on multi-party democracy than it was in the 1960s, and a great deal of comparative scholarly literature suggesting that democracies are at least as well equipped for the trek towards modernization as their undemocratic counterpa rts (Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). To salvage Lipset and Rokkans ability to address foundational ques tions about political conflicts in situations bereft of credible na tional institutions, yet operate in a context where single parties have tried to cons olidate the legitimate use of fo rce and failed to win the masses over or even maintain co ntrol of the state apparatus, two problematic aspects of Lipset and Rokkans analysis the substance and the sequencing of social cleavage a nd party interaction must be reevaluated. 3 A few works have argued for a return to the no-party models of government prescribed by earlier scholars (Wiredu 1996, 182-190; Osei-Hwedie 1998) though these are outliers.

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38 As any reevaluation of analyti cal constructs perpetrates at least a modicum of conceptual violence against the object being co nsidered, it is best to document potential biases up front. This work attempts to stay true to the comparative en deavor that serves as the impetus for Lipset and Rokkans core questions but in order to do so in a context far removed spatially, culturally, and temporally from those explicitly addressed in their work relaxes the debilitating hold modernization theory, or perhaps more accurately some of the unspoken pre(mis)conceptions of modernization theory, imposes on their analysis of Western Eur ope. Modernization theory, as Mazrui (1968, 82) points out is riddled with the self-confid ence of ethno-centric achievement and the assumption that contemporary African stat es are struggling with the same issues and circumstances of their European counterparts of yore has very little foundation in empirical world (Tipps 1973). Reevaluating the Substance of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction At a conference reviewing Lipset and Rokkan s work thirty years after its original publication Allardt (2001) argues that the scholars use Pars onian formulations mainly as a classificatory and taxonomic device fitting in par ticular Western societies during the post-World War II period. Allardt continue s his evaluation noting that the Lipset-Rokkan application of Parsons never led to a substantial following among political sociologists (p. 18). The strictures of their A-G-I-L paradigm are largely ignored even by contributors to Lipset and Rokkans own edited volume; Wallerstein (1967) makes nary a mention of the taxonomy. What ear ly Africanist scholars were interested in instead of placing party systems within the A-G-I-L matrix was distinguishing between parties organized along Gemeinschaft (Community) social cleavage lines and those organized along Gesellschaft (Society) social cleavage lines (Duverger 1954, 124-

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39 125).4 Describing the nexus of community-based so cial cleavages and political parties as a general politization of primordial ties, Zolber g (1966, 22) lists ethnic ity and region as the primary concern for Africanist scholars and politi cal practitioners alike. In anticipation of Biafran-like consequenc es resulting from these Gemeinschaft parties, scholars accepted as the lesser of two evils the fact that most political roads carried the polity to an authoritarian destination (Young 1976, 520). Gesellschaft parties, Sklar (1963, 474) di fferentiates, instead of being based on neighborhood, geographical proxim ity, or blood relationship[are] based on interest. The assumption many of the early sc holars of African parties work under is that competition along the lines of class interests, es pecially when institutionalized into a party system, represents valued modernity (Apter 19, 1 24). To justify their pr eferences for nationalistoriented single party states, scholars conceptual ized the colonial metropo le and the colony as two sides of a centre-periphery clea vage structure and viewed the lack of competition in postindependence Africa as a residual effect of this earlier confli ct (Randall 2001, 247).5 Though the aforementioned distinctions between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft political parties has not disappeared completely from the discourse on African politics6hence the proliferation of constitutional provisions resembli ng Ghanas Article 55 that proscribes political parties based on ethnic, religi ous, regional or other sectional divisionsconceptual variables 4 The Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft distinction resembles Lipset and Rokkans functional axis in that disputes along the former lines are conceptualized as nego tiable and those along the latter lines as zero-sum. 5 One could imagine an alternative conceptualization being one of Africans versus Europeans but this would not fit into the optimistic model of modernization. 6 Some have added charisma as a third type of party ap peal (Weber 1968, 241-248) and much has been written on the topic with regard to African politics. The problem with placing charisma alongside Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as a political party type is that the appeal of a particular candidates charisma is almost never distributed evenly throughout a given society. If multiple parties are allowed and elections are credible, the draw of charisma undoubtedly falls short for a number of constitu encies. The characteristics that make these constituencies different from those that find a given candidates char isma compelling are the mark ers of underlying cleavage structures.

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40 like ethnicity and class are in creasingly unmoored by scholars a nd studied not as independent variables that can be used to pi geonhole a party, social organizati on, or individual, but rather as dependent variables that are so cially constructed and can be studied as such. For those essentializing ethnicity, elections can be viewed as an ethni c census with voters receiving psychological (Horowitz 1985) and/or policy (R abushka and Shepsle 1972) benefits, the existence of which are based almost exclusively on whether or not their particular ethnic groups party wins or loses. Class-based cleavages can be defined objectively by ones relationship to high-status occupation, high in come, superior education, and the ownership or control of business enterprise (Sklar 1979, 543) or ones pos ition within a system rooted in custom and sustained by its mediation with and sometimes control of the supern atural (Rathbone 2000, 4; Mamdani 1996, 41; Rey 1973). But what happens when, as Posner (2005, 1) challenges, ethnicity is a complex concocti on comprised of religion, region, la nguage, and tribe? Politics, he answers, can and does revolve ar ound some of these ingredients rather than others depending on the political agents and context. And what happens when, as Ek eh (1975, 111) describes, civic class identities and primordial class identitie s exist side-by-side in a single individual? Contestation happens continually, he explains, wi th cost-benefit analysis determining the winner sometimes on a case-by-case basis. When Lipset and Rokkans A-G-I-L schematic di d not seem to explain African realities in the 1960s Africanist scholars tu rned to other conceptual ca tegories in the modernization lexicon, namely the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft dichotomy that had been used to differentiate between traditional modes of organization and m odern modes of organization. With subsequent scholarship demonstrating the vagaries of these vestiges of moderniza tion theory, this work moves a little further still from Lipset and Rokka ns original nomenclature. This movement is

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41 not without its difficulties. In re ality, Nugent (2001, 2) explains, the landscape of identity is characterized by overlap and considerable fluidit y, which makes the entire subject very difficult to discuss without committing verbal atrocities . Identities like ethnic ity and class matter in politics in Africa as elsewhere and it would be im possible to discuss important social cleavages underlying political party disputes without resorting to th e use of these concep tual placeholders. To diminish the effects of these inherent ver bal atrocities, the present work aims at the lofty goal of definitional precision. With regard to ethnicity for instance, when those who speak a particular language are being discussed as opposed to those who identify with a particular ethnic group this choice of topic is made explicit. In addition, the relati onship between identifiers like language and ethnic group are frequently expl ored. Though there is often significant overlap between these two identities in particular, these categories are not coextensive and if one is amplified as opposed to the other with regards to a specific political debate something worth investigating further has happened.7 Pushing beyond essentialized identities and towards a more nuanced instrumental interpretation of the eff ects of cleavage structures on political party systems requires, in addition to ackno wledging greater variance within the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft party typologies, an acknowledgment that the border separating these two longreified categories is permeable and flexible. One can no longer assume that just because a cleavage is recognized as ethnic th at primordial communities are at the root of political disputes or just because a cleavage is recognized as classbased that rationally self -selected societies are facing off at the ballot box. Most often the mo tives behind the patterni ng of votes are more complex. 7 One cannot hope to capture the interactions of every possi ble personal identity in a country, politicized or not, in a single lifetime let alone a single monograph so undoubtedly some will be given short shrift and others completely ignored. The goal is to spend time addressing those identities which have been politicized on a grand scale in Ghana as well as those identities which have received a great deal of scholarly attention in other contexts but appear to be largely unutilized by social mobilizers or political parties throughout Ghanaian electoral history.

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42 Reevaluating the Sequencing of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction There is a quite lively debate revolving around the conceptual construct that has come to be known as Lipset and Rokkans freezing hypothesis. On the to pic, the scholars themselves suggest that decisive events in a nations history push constellations of conflict lines to the fore (1967, 14). Having demonstrated their effectiv eness as tools of political mobilization, these constellations become frozen and reveal themselv es as recurring themes that are worked into political disputes far removed from their origins. Parties, Lipset and Rokkan suggest the primary way in which these conflict lines are preserved, do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizen at each electio n; they each have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate (p. 2). Though this notion of freezing has a revered place in the comparative politics discourse, Lipset and Rokkan themselves are quite nebulous in their usage of the concept leaving their successors to make fundamental assumptions wi thout significant guidanc e. Those making these assumptions can be placed into two general camps (Mair 2001). One camp sets as the unit of analysis social cleavages (Ros e 1974; Franklin et al. 1992). The freezing moment is interpreted as that point when society divides itself into fair ly reliable sides for the purposes of political contestation. Over time, those in this camp contend, when parties are laid over these bases they will gradually become more catch-all and less re liant on their original social foundations. The other camp is more concerned with electoral stability (Rose and Urwi n 1970). Freezing implies for this camp the same types of voters aligning w ith the same parties over relatively long periods of time. When realignmen t occurs, they view it as a dramatic reconfiguring of the frozen status quo. In the case of Western European states, one s position in the freezing hypothesis debate can greatly impact the chronology of a freezing point. Especially in the case of Center-

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43 Periphery disputes, the proposed freezing moment for social cleavages occurs centuries before anything resembling a national multi-party democr atic system can be considered. While there were certainly social cleavages and a heteroge neous bunch of state-like structures in Africa during the period of time Lipset and Rokkan obser ve the dramatic cleavage freezing revolutions in Europe, in Africa colonialism profoundly disr upted the potential path from these cleavage structures to some variant of multi-party democracy. In addition to creating the immediate predecessors to todays states, Herbst (2000, 58) explains this socio-po litical rupture, the Europeans brought about a host of other changes in Africa that have reverberated to our own time: they created a system of boundaries and fr ontiers new to Africa; they established novel economic systems based on mines and cash crops; th ey built infrastructure systems that still determine patterns of trade; and they left their religions, languages, and cultural practices. This dramatic sea-change threw pre-existing cleavage st ructures and the colonial incentives for new cleavage structures into a tumultuous flux. In ad dition to the colonial authorities civilizing mission and its multiple applications there was an active reimagining of the traditional (Mamdani 1996, 286). Given this background social cl eavages and party systems must have been forming, or at least significantly reformula ting, at approximately the same time. This simultaneity not only makes the freezing hypothesi s debate largely a moot point in these circumstances, but it highlights the potential fo r interaction between political parties and their agents and the social cleava ges they hope to mobilize. Discussion of instrumentalized identities both in terms of th e substance and sequencing of social cleavage and political pa rty interactions would seem on th e surface antithetical to an investigation that aims to pinpoi nt the events that led to ce rtain social identities becoming politically mobilized in a predictable fashion over the course of time. Such would be the case if

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44 one were talking about an absolute freezing th at makes either election results a foregone conclusion or the social group blocs necessary for a winning coalition obvious. Yet Lipset and Rokkan mention no such party syst em in Western Europe and it is unfair to assume, even given their ambiguity on the topic, such an exacting forecast. Voters, Lipset and Rokkan stake out a much more modest position, are typically f aced with choices among historically given packages of programs, commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, Weltanschauungen and their current behavior cannot be unders tood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and the combinations of forces that pr oduced these packages (p. 2-3). Instead of being conceptualized as solid immu table political blocs, th e effects of freezing are far more accurately described as partisan stickiness or path depe ndence (North 1990). Once voters and parties are effectively painted with so cial characteristics, an outcome Downs (1957) and Popkin (1991) have labeled cognitive shortcuts, default positions are formed. In an environment of free and fair multi-party competition individual voters can, and most certainly do, buck the trends. There are also voters pulle d in multiple directions resulting from their multiple identities and whole groups that are mo st notable for being politically uncaptured and unpredictable. These anomalies should be acknowle dged as important aspects of a party system and can be studied both in their own right and as potential components of a larger realignment or dealignment (Manza 1995). They do not, however, make the study of persistent patterns in the relationship between politi cal parties and social groups with in the electorate uninteresting or trivial. Conclusions Discussion of Africas third wa ve political parties has been largely ahistorical. Those works that touch on the nexus between societ y and parties by-and-large operate within a snapshot; the winning party gathered these segmen ts of society and the losing party gathered

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45 those. But how did society come to be segmente d in such a manner and not another? What does this segmentation mean for party politics in rela tion to other potential segmentations? How much of this relationship was initiated by society and how much was initia ted by party agents? Answers to these questions are not forthcoming w ithout a historical appro ach. Africanist scholars studying political parties in the immediate aftermath of independe nce had ambitions to answer such questions. They used concep ts and theoretical formulations from existing literature, much fitting into the political sociology subcategory, to guide their studies and produced texts rich not only in their documentation of what were at the ti me Africas fledgling part y systems but also in historical analysis of the social cleavages that underlaid these pa rty systems. There is a problem, however, with applying these past approaches whole-cloth in the study of contemporary party systems. The tools of comparative politic s, explains Ekeh ( 1975, 111), inhere in the traditional conception of politics in the West. That by itself seems appropriate. But the tools sometimes appear dull from overuse and cry out for sharpening. Updating these tools by recognizi ng that the identities comprisi ng social cleavages are far more nuanced and malleable than previously ack nowledged comes at a price. One loses the clean typologies that allow for relatively easy comparis ons between countries and the ability to readily distinguish desirable party system configurations from undesirabl e party system configurations. Trading in parsimonious analytical constructs th at yield conclusions rife with the biases of modernization theory, however, for analyses that recognizes complex identity constructions and feedback loops running between political parties and the soci eties they represent seems imminently fair; far better to study something comp lex with little hope of definitive theoretical conclusions than to construct an economical but thin argument just for the sake of doing so. Justifying the study of s ticky identities and political asso ciations in a co ntext populated by

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46 instrumentalized identities is a much tougher pros pect. Yet in most, if not all, political systems with free and fair elections patter ns of support appear in the elector ate that linger from election to election. Though one may hope to explain why one pa rty wins a particular election over another without exploring the genesis of these patterns, it would be impossible to explain why the competing parties define their opposition to each other in a part icular way given the infinite choices without giving the historic al relationship between social cl eavages and political parties a very close look. The argument put forth here is that one can venture answers to Lipset and Rokkans three sets of questions without accepting the flawed assumptions that either cleavage structures or party systems are completely static.

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47 CHAPTER 3 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROU NDS TO GHANAIAN PARTISANSHIP Though the February 1951 Gold Coast elections we re far from an exercise in unadulterated universal adult suffrage, the contest won handily by the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) marks the first multi-party election in what would slightly more th an six years later become the independent state of Ghana.1 Election exercises conducted under the watchful eye of the British in 1954 and 1956 not only reconfirmed the CPPs popularity, but extended the voting franchise to the masses, rural and urban alike, through the popular ballot. Inde pendence on 6 March 1957 brought quickly on its heels what then Pr ime Minister Kwame Nkrumah described euphemistically as emergency measures of a totalitarian kind (1957, xvi). The independent CPP government was quick to clamp down on opposition through such measures as the Deportation Act (August 1957), Emergency Powe rs Act (December 1957) and Preventive Detention Act (July 1958) so that there would be no remotely credible multi-party elections in independent Ghana until 1969, three years after a military coup overthrew Nkrumah and the First Republic (Austin 1976, 90-101).2 This Second Republic, and the Third Republic which would be inaugurated ten years later, can claim only th eir founding elections. Neither ephemeral republic made it past its initial term before the military returned to power (Baynham 1985). When 1 This Legislative Assembly election was multi-formatted. Four municipal districts (Accra, Cape Coast, SekondiTakoradi, and Kumasi) elected their representatives through popular vote. Thirty-one rural constituencies in the Colony and Ashanti elected th eir representatives through a two-tiered proc ess. First electoral college participants were selected through universal adu lt suffrage and then the elected el ectoral college voted for partisan representatives to the Legislative Assembly. CPP candida tes won every municipal seat and 28 out of the 33 contestable rural seats. The Northern Territories only re presentation was selected on a non-partisan basis by an unelected electoral college selected by the regions various district councils. In addition to these representatives of the people, the 1951 Legislative Assemb ly awarded a set number of seats to mining and commercial interests (2) and traditional leaders in the Colony (11), Ashanti (6), and Southern Togoland (1) (Legislative Council of the Gold Coast 1950). 2 There was a presidential contest held in 1960 that pitte d Nkrumah (CPP) against J.B. Danquah (UP) but the result of this election, which Nkrumah won by a margin of seven to one, was a foregone conclusion influenced greatly by the governments application of public resources, harassment of opposition, and control of the polling process. In only two constituencies, South Anlo and Ho West, both in the Volta Region, did Danquah secure a majority of the vote (Seven to One for Nkrumah 1960).

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48 President Limann and the Third Republic were overthrown on New Years Eve 1980 by Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings and his Provisi onal National Defense Council (PNDC ), it would be nearly a dozen years before another multi-party experiment would be attempted. Then in late 1992 Ghana joined a growing number of African nations in what became known as the third wave to again test democratic waters. Though this first electi on was of dubious quality (Jeffries and Thomas 1993; Oquaye 1995), three competitive nationa l elections later 1996, 2000, and 2004 and a peaceful turnover of power in 2000 mark Ghana s Fourth Republic as a genuine continental success story (Gyimah-Boadi 2001). This concise history of multi-party Ghanaian el ections (see also Table 3-1) serves as a backdrop to the subsequent discussion because it is at these elections that very explicit political censuses occur. Though politics happens with or without elections (Goodwin and Jasper 2004), the act of entering a secret booth with the unamb iguous purpose of regist ering ones political preferences alongside those of fe llow citizens gives the researcher an unusually parsimonious and well-documented glimpse at the underlying po litically mobilized divisions within a given society. Where free and fair elec tion results and aggregated polit ical choices exist the study of political cleavages is more straightforward than in contexts where these sources of data are absent.3 Optimal conditions for research do not, however, lead to easily decipherable conclusions. Politics, even politics with elect ions, is a complicated subject of study. When election results display discernable patterns, scholars interested in explaining these patterns must disaggregate the impact of multiple and often overlapping variables, many of which are socially constructed and as remarkable for their areas of conceptual ambiguity as they are for their 3 This notion of aggregation is illustrative of the role po litical institutions can play in social cleavage formation. Duvergers law (1972, 23-32) suggests th at certain electoral systems are much more likely than others to yield two dominant parties. Forcing societys varied interests into tw o, three, or more categories has an impact on how these interests perceive their position within the democratic political system in relation to other interests.

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49 hermetically-sealed cate gories. When one moves beyond a static view of political cleavages and takes into account the history of social cleavage formation and party/society interactions, the situation becomes even more complex as the mean ing of variable categor ies can, and often are, transformed over time. This chapter looks at the variables that populate the mainstream discourse on Ghanaian political/electoral cleavages and the nuanced social categories undergirding these cleavages. It takes as a point of demarcation the Gemeinschaft (Community) and Gesellschaft (Society) distinction discussed at some length in Chapter Two. From the time of the first Gold Coast multiparty elections in 1951 through the most recent el ection in Ghanas Fourth Republic, the stuff of politics and elections has variousl y been described as ideological ( Gesellschaft ) or sectional ( Gemeinschaft ).4 The chronicles of Ghanaian politics ar e full of manifestos and speeches packed with the high-minded vocabulary of ideology descri bing this party as socia list or that party as neoliberal. Yet before and after elections, re gardless of the republic, politicians and other notables are seen stepping over each other to gi ve reporters a quote about how certain voters, usually those supporting an opposi tion, cannot seem to disregard pr imordial affinities and vote for the best candidate. Over the course of the remainder of this chapter the various formulations of ideological a nd sectional cleavages in the Gh anaian political discourse are explored and problematized. For those readers no t enmeshed in Ghanaian politics, terms like Nkrumahist and Asante that pepper remaining chap ters are explicated. For those readers with a fairly comprehensive understandi ng of Ghanaian society and politic s, this chapter serves as both a review and as a challenge to deconstruct some of the variables that history has made appear fixed. Though these well-worn cleavage categories come with much conceptual baggage, this 4 Chazan (1983, 24-38) has used the terms Horizontal and Vertical almost synonymously with Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

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50 investigation avoids the assumption that ideological cleavages are ipso facto negotiable and sectional cleavages are ipso facto zero-sum. The project at ha nd is one of understanding the various conceptualizations of these variables in Ghana and not one of determining when and where they are politicized. This latter project is taken up in some detail in the following three chapters where the interaction between these cleavage variants and multi-party democratic elections are queried. Ideological Cleavages Nkrumahism v. Danquah-Busiaism Even a cursory knowledge of Ghanaian politics requires a perfunctory familiarity with the uniquely Ghanaian ideological categorie s of Nkrumahism and Danquah-Busiaism.5 Founded in 1947 as a response to traditional leaders strang lehold on the Colony Legisl ative Council and in anticipation of independence in India, Burma, and Ceylon, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) served as the incubator for both ide ological camps (Austin 1964, 51-52). There had been prior to the UGCC ethnic factions (e.g., Fanti Confeder acy), pressure groups (e.g., Aborigines Rights Protection Soci ety), and even proto-political parties (e.g., Dr. Nanka-Bruces National Democratic Party) that petitioned the colonial govern ment on behalf of indigenous populations. By 1947, however, these groups had e ither dissolved, taken a back-seat on the national political scene, or, as was often the case, had their agendas and best and brightest advocates absorbed into the UGCC (Apter 1966, 265-272). The leading members of the UGCC at its founding were George Paa Grant (timber merchant and UGCC chairman/benefactor), R.S. Blay (lawyer), J.B. Danquah (lawyer), Francis Awoonor-Williams (lawyer), William Ofori-Atta (graduate teacher), Edward Akuffo-Addo 5 The moniker Danquah-Busiaism is sometimes shortened to Danquahism. For the purposes of this work the labels should be understood as synonymous.

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51 (lawyer), Joseph W.S. de Graft Johnson (lawye r), and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey (lawyer) (Martinson 2001, 25). Burdened with their day-to-day work, this founding cohort looked first to Ebenezer Ako Adjei, a young lawyer recently return ed from England, and then based largely on Ako Adjeis recommendation to one Francis Kwa me Nkrumah to run th e Conventions routine affairs (Austin 1964, 53). Nkrumah had distinguished himself as a skilled organizer while working with the African Student s Association of America in Canada and the West African National Secretariat in London duri ng his student days and was hire d as the first full-time UGCC General Secretary (Nkrumah 1957). The origin of the Danquah-Busiaist/Nkrum ahist ideological cleavage is Nkrumahs eventual break from the UGCC in June 1949. Nkrumah took with him activists from the UGCCs Committee on Youth Organization (C YO) and many of the local pa rty representatives Nkrumah was instrumental in recruiting for the UGCC to form a new party he called the CPP. The founding members of the UGCC, including Danquah, who constituted the Conventions Working Committee were left to stew, in the words of P aa Grant, over the young man who filched our name, our S.G. [Sel f Government] policy, our branch es, and even our coloursto establish a separatist gr oupthe Convention Peoples Partywhic h, as he falsely claimed at the time, was formed within the Conve ntion in the name of George Grant, of Ghana and of God (Austin 1961, 296). The story of this dramatic split, though it explains how the monikers Nkrumahism and Danquah-Busiaism came to repr esent oppositional forces in Ghanaian politics, does little to illuminate the ideological constr ucts undergirding these categories. Applying the labels moderate, liberal, [and] western-oriented to the UGCC and left-wing, socialist, and populist to the CPP, as is the common practice in most concise an alyses, is a step in the right direction but even these descri ptions suffer from conceptual haziness and are most often

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52 overworked (Morrison 2004, 423). In addition to their bluntness, these labels imply an ideological fixity which is inconsistent with the historical record. What it meant to be a Nkrumahist and what it meant to be a DanquahBusiaist was not immediately apparent in 1949. It took years of coexisting and contestation for th ese terms to develop the connotations they carry in contemporary Ghanaian politics. The formative years (1949-1966) Nkrumahs break with the UGCC unfolded ove r the course of nearly a year and was precipitated by disputes concerni ng both style and substance. Sty listically the UGCC represented the old guard intelligentsia Paa Grant, the Conventions f ounding father and president, was approaching seventy years of age when the UGCC was launched. He was a wealthy timber merchant nominated by the colonial government to take a seat as member of the 1926 Legislative Council for the town of Sekondi (Kimble 1963, 448).6 Danquah, who would come to serve as Nkrumahs political counterbalance for the UGCC, was in his early fifties when the Convention was inaugurated. Though Danquah produced severa l texts on Akan cultural practices and dabbled in the publishing business, his training at the University of London was in law and it is the practice of law and the pursuit of politics that consumed the majority of his professional life (Danquah 1968, vii). Nkrumah on the other hand wa s a mere thirty-seven years old when the UGCC was formed and still younger than forty wh en the CPP broke away. He was formally educated in the United States, fi rst at Lincoln University (BA) and then at the University of Pennsylvania (MS, Education; MA, Philosophy), and informally educated in London through his interactions with the Pan-African Congress a nd employment at the West African National Secretariat (Nkrumah 1957). His CPP colleagues, who were often described by the media as 6 Grant served against the wishes of th e Aborigines Rights Protection Society a nd despite the fact that many of the Chiefs and people of Sekondi did not know of him.

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53 tramps in N.T. [Northern Territory] Smocks, tended to share Nkrumahs relative youth and inexperience with the formal institutions of colonial politics (Austin 1964, 212).7 These biographical differences at the top, Danquah-Busiaists having captured the patrician elites who would become the next generati on of middle-class urban professionals and Nkrumahists casting wider net, had significant trickle down eff ects (Apter 1966, 272). Stalwarts in the UGCC had a historical record of negotia ting with the colonial government. Though these negotiations did not always follow formal political channels the UGCC leaderships first reaction to a perceived injustice was always debate and of ten reliant on learned legal interpretations. The Accra riots of February 1948 and their aftermath are a dramatic example of this tendency. Upon hearing of violence in the capital, the UGCC leader ship who were meeting in Saltpond rushed to Accra to observe the fallout. By all accounts the UGCC leadership was not in the business of fomenting riots (Danquah 1970b; Nkrumah 1957, 7478), though the Big Six were briefly jailed for such an offense.8 Danquah was keen to take advantage of that da ys tragic events and use that advantage as a fulcrum or lever for the liber ation of Ghana (Austin 1964, 75). He and his fellow travelers in the Convention accepted the colonial governme nts Watson Commission and its corollary, the Coussey Committee on constitutional reform, as the proper arenas in which to apply this newfound leverage. In both forums Danquah took a leading role in proposing constitutional changes that would indigenize and democratize po litical decision making in the colony and lead 7 Terms like tramps and verandah boys were often used pejoratively by opponents but ultimately were embraced by the CPP as signifiers of the partys grassroots. For a brief biography of Nkrumahs first batch of ministers see Ministry of Defence and External Affairs (1951) 8 The Big Six consists of Kwame Nkrumah, E. Obtsebi Lamptey, Ebenezer Ako Adjei, William Ofori Atta (a.k.a. Paa Willie), J.B. Danquah, and Edward Akuffo-Addo. It was these six UGCC leaders that the colonial administration rounded up and sent to prison following the Accra riots. A famous picture in the discourse of Ghanaian patriotism was taken of the six men at Saltpond pr ior to Nkrumahs defection. An artists rendition of this picture adorns the front of the 10,000 cedi bank note.

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54 towards dominion status and eventual i ndependence (see Danquah 1970a, 1970c). Nkrumah, whose position within the UGCC deteriorat ed quickly following the Accra riots,9 set a very different tack for the soon-to-be supporters of the CPP. Not a lawyer himself and lacking the experience and gravitas of his UGCC competitors, Nkrumah relied on his skills as an organizer to develop a mass following. Unlike his UGCC co lleagues who had made a living bargaining with the British, he was happy to confront the British thr ough extra-legal populist means. Nkrumahs use of the Accra Evening News and CYO to criticize not only the Colonial government but also the act of negotiating for anything short of immediate independence in a very public manner drew sharp criticism fr om Danquah and his supporters (Nkrumah 1957, 93101). [Y]ou have published your ultimatum without first having yourself sought to make cogent representations to the Government in person Danquah complained, advising that [d]istant speeches and cold print do not make a statesman (Akyeampong and Danquah 1956, 12). The ideological substance of Nkrumahs dispute with the UGCC was far less explicit initially and took several years to come to the fore. In the CPP s first pre-election manifesto the party program reads as follows: As stated elsewhere in this Manifesto, our entry into the Assembly in full strength will open up better opportunities to struggle fo r immediate Self-Government. Whilst that struggle is proceeding the C.P.P. will do all in its power to better the condition of the people of this country; it must be pointed out however that the implementation of this development programme can only be possible when S.G. has been attained, and we are in full control of our own affairs (Natio nal Executive of the C.P.P. 1951, x) The CPPs 1954 Manifesto maintained this dominan t theme but the confid ence gained during its three years as the majority part y in the Legislative Assembly had an eff ect (Convention Peoples 9 According to both Nkrumah and the UGCC Working Committee the split was precipitated by the discovery of Nkrumahs past dealings with the Communist Party of Britain and with Nkrumahs involvement in the CYO and other mass mobilization campaigns. Nkrumah claims that this latter point of contention was a function of UGCCs elitist history. The UGCC working committee claims that it was Nkrumahs secrecy and cult of personality that ruffled their feathers with regard to the CYO (Austin 1961; Nkrumah 1957).

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55 Party 1954). Nkrumahs name, likeness, and word s are all over the 1954 document whereas in 1951 only a passport size photo of Nkrumah in a su it is on the cover and the only mention of his name in the entire manifesto is in small type below the photo. The 1954 document also, in addition to trumpeting Nkrumahs personal role in nudging the Gold Coast towards independence and urging voters to give the CPP a complete mandate of 104 out of 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, offers an early clue into the ideology Nkrumahism would eventually come to describe. When self-government is attained, the manifesto promises a state-led developmental panacea for the Gold Coasts economic and social ills and lays the seeds for Nkrumahs pan-Africanist agenda by proposing West African Unity and Freedom for Africans and peoples of African Descent everywhere ( p. 10). Over the next decade Nkrumah would develop these ancillary themes in his writi ngs (Nkrumah 1962, 1963, 1964a) to the point where Nkrumahism came to represent not the struggle for political inde pendence in the past tense but an eternal revolt against colonialism, imperi alism and capitalism that requires a peoples parliamentary democracy with a one-party systemto express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, [rather] than a multi-party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, th e inherent struggle betw een the haves and the have-nots (Nkrumah 1964b, 51, 54). In many ways Danquah-Busiaism was playi ng catch-up to Nkrumahism from its very beginning. Is it not a well known part of the histor y of Ghana that the older politicians had to wait till 1949 for Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Cr eech Jones (Secretary of State, in Colonial No.250), Danquah (1957) chastised both the British a nd his domestic opposition on the pages of The Times in the immediate wake of independence, t o teach them how good and pleasant it was for brethren to dwell together apart? Both Nkruma h and those who remained in the UGCC after the

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56 break-up were in the business of portraying themselves as would-be national liberators who were above the petty fray of party po litics. Nkrumahs aforementioned ab ility to excite the masses in ways the UGCC was both unwilling and unable put him in a position to win the 1951 polls after which time he successfully used the pulpit grante d him by this victory to position himself and the CPP as the Self Government Now candidates to the UGCCs Self Government in the Shortest Possible Time. From this disadvantageous position Danquah, and to a significant but lesser extent Busia,10 cobbled together a loose coalition of gr oups that had little more in common than an extreme dislike of Nkrumah. Under the umbrella of the NLM, and later th e United Party (UP), a number of provincial groups including the Asanteman Council, Nort hern Peoples Party (NOPP), Akim Abuakwa State, Moslem Association Party (MAP), TC, Northern Territories Council, and Aborigines Rights Protection Society came together with Danquahs Ghana Congress Party (GCP) to petition the colonial government for a federal system with great er regional autonomy and less power vested in the Legislative Assembly c ontrolled by Nkrumah and the CPP (Busia 1956, 3).11 When this plea was met by silence from the Br itish and pigeonholed as mere tribalism by Nkrumah, Danquah and Busia had li ttle recourse but to positi on themselves as the vocal opposition. This is not to suggest that the pair a nd their followers did not believe wholeheartedly in the principles of liberalism and constitutionali sm that they preached, sometimes in the case of Danquah under the awkward label of Ghanaism, but rather that they were largely unable to 10 Busia came into the UGCC-fold after the UGCC/CPP split. In the elections of 1951 Busia, who was a university lecturer at the time, ran for the Wenchi seat under the flag of the Asante Ko toko Society. He lost the election but was later recruited by the Asanteman Council to serve as their representative in the Legislative Assembly. When the UGCC old guard was preparing to unseat Nkrumah in 1 954, Busias oppositional stance and youth made him an attractive candidate for the newl y formed GCP (Bing 1968, 155). 11 These demands for federalism as they came from Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and Trans-Volta Togoland are documented in Allman (1990), Ladouceur (1979), and Amenumey (1989) respectively.

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57 define themselves without reference to Nkrumah (Danquah 1997, 167-176). The CPP had failed to deliver the economic welfare it promised, Da nquah and Busia were willing to tell anyone who would listen, but more importantly they are a dangerous and dictatoria l party (Danso-Boafo 1996, 49). The UGCC and CPP progeny (1966-present) As a participant in the formal political di scourse the line connecting the UGCC, GCP, NLM, and UP,12 namely J.B. Danquahs active invol vement, was severed years before Danquahs death in 1965 or the official ban on opposition parties put in place in 1964. By the time the First Republics consti tution was enacted into law on 29 June 1960, Nkrumah and the CPP had turned Ghana into a de facto single party state (Cohen 1970). The era of Nkrumahs rule met its end far more abruptly than either Danquah or Busia were pushed out of national politics. On 24 February 1966, as Nkrumah was on a state visit to China, the National Liberation Council (NLC) took to the airwaves to announce that Nkrumah and his CPP regime had been overthrown by the military because of their os tensibly draconian treatment of opposition and general bungling of the econom y (National Liberation Council 1966). The categories DanquahBusiaism and Nkrumahism did not, however, di sappear with the trampling of opposition under Nkrumah or the overthrow of the CPP regime. Over the succeeding decades these shorthand ideological labels have characterized each and ev ery Ghanaian election (for a brief genealogy of these two groups see Table 3-2). Busia, who had fled Ghana during Nkrumah s tenure to avoid political harassment and take up the cause of Ghanas opposition in Europe returned to Ghana in 1966 to serve on the NLCs Political Committee (Busia 1967). He woul d eventually be elected Prime Minister and 12 The tendency in the literature is to treat the regional parties that aligned with the UGCC, GCP, NLM, and UP as allies to the Danquah-Busia tradition but not full-fledged members.

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58 leader of the Progress Party ( PP) in the NLC-administered 1 969 elections. Historians have labeled the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Komla Gb edemah, the PPs Nkrumahist challenger in this election, though Gbedemah himsel f did not embrace this label. He had served as Nkrumahs Finance Minister but was nudged out of government and into exile by the younger and more radical wing of the CPP in 1961 (Gbe demah 1962) and the NLC expressly proscribed Nkrumahist parties from contes ting elections in the Second Re public (National Alliance of Liberals 1969; Gbedemah 1969). In 1979 identify ing the Nkrumahists was not so much of a problem. I do not think that I shal l be far from the truth if I say that all those of use here who belong to the Peoples National Party, the PNP s General Secretary explained to a gathering celebrating the partys second anniversary, are bound together by just one single unifying-bond our unalloyed dedication to Osagyefo Dr. Kwa me Nkrumah and all the good things he did for Ghana and Africa (Addae-Mensah 1981, 1). Identif ying the Danquah-Busiaists of 1979 is not as easy. Both William Ofori-Atta, who led the Un ited National Convention (UNC), and Victor Owusu, who led the Popular Front Party (PFP), had served as ministers in Busias PP cabinet. The PFP is clear in its desire to anoint itself successor to Bu sias liberalism (Chazan 1983, 288). The UNCs lineage is more nuanced. To begin with Ofori-Atta was very much a colleague of Danquahs and not so much a follower. The f act that the UNC did not label itself DanquahBusiaist and aligned with the Li manns PNP in the post-election administration instead of joining Owusus PFP in the opposition is another dist inguishing factor (United National Convention 1980). In the Fourth Republic the NPP has from the beginning embraced the Danquah-Busia tradition. Its immediate origin is in the Danquah-Busia Club that existed prior to the legalization of political parties, it s top ranks are filled with Danquah-Busiaists from past regimes, or in some cases their children, and each of th eir manifestos begins with a quote from J.B.

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59 Danquah (Jonah 1998, 92; New Patriotic Party 2000, 2004). The Nkrumahist tradition in the Fourth Republic has been a jumble of unpopular a nd disorganized parties. With the exception of the CPP, which draws directly on the teachings of Nkrumah for its insp iration, and the Peoples National Convention (PNC), which draws on the teachings of Nkrumah through Limann, no explicitly Nkrumahist party has managed to capture a single seat in Par liament and even the CPP and PNC can claim only a handful of seats comb ined in each election, which were eventually pooled with the NPPs in parliament, and have ha d virtually no impact on the presidential races (Nugent 1999, 291-293). Commenting on these latter-day Nkrumahists and Danquah-Busiaists, Pinkney (1988, 48) notes that in the vague sense of folk memories of the early nationalist movement, [ideology] appears to have been important in welding th e party together as a vote-winning and activistwinning machine, but as a guide to policy it had little to offer. In evaluating the aforementioned parties manifestos and legisl ative performance it appears th at Pinkney is on to something. Harkening back to the original political di scourse between Nkrumah and Danquah, Nkrumahist parties in the Second, Third, and Fourth Republics have adopted as their own issues of economic independence and distribution. Though they have a penchant for labeling their Danquah-Busiaist challengers tools of the wealthy and prone to sectionalism, hen ce the PNP advert describing the PFP as the Popular Fronts for Plunder and Trib alism (Kane 1979), the recommendations for a single-party state have yet to r eappear. For their part Danquah-Busi aists have held themselves up as the democratic and pro-West alternative to Nkrumahism. An open le tter Victor Owusu ran in the Daily Graphic purportedly penned by the seven year old granddaughter of ObetsebiLamptey, a member of the opposition in the Fi rst Republic who died in one of Nkrumahs political prisons, hints at the t one of these appeals. I never knew my grandfather because he

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60 died in detention under the C.P.P, the young child explains adding [w]hat I want is to grow up in a country where there is real freedom wher e friends can visit each other and talk to each other freely (Please Give Me a Chance 1979). The NPP has added a wrinkle in the Fourth Republic by highlighting in addition to its pro-demo cratic credentials the power of a free market and wealth accumulation.13 Pinkneys assertion does not ne gate the impact these campaign discourses may hold for would-be voters, but it does highlight th e limited scope the ideological constructs of Nkrumahism a nd Danquah-Busiaism hold. Despite the often heated rhetoric revolving around what it means to be a Nkrumahist and what it means to be a Danquah-Busiaist, Limann did not try to transform Ghana into a soci alist state anymore than Busia or Kufuor tried to transform Ghanas centralized state apparatus into a federation. The Advent of a Third Way: Rawlingsism? When a charismatic young Flight-Lieutenant by th e name of Jerry Rawlings overthrew the civilian Third Republic and embarked upon what would be tagged the December Revolution the seeds were sewn for what would be the Ghanaian political discourses first new ideological tinged ism since the pre-independe nce split within the UGCC. At first this construction that would come to be known as Rawlingsism bore a striking similarity to Nkrumahism. Like Nkrumah in his early days, Rawlings commi ngled personal charisma with populist appeals. During his first tour as head of state after th e 4 June 1979 coup, Rawlings was rather fond of having his picture taken digging a ditch or planting crops with the peasants (Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989). When he took over the government radio stations on New Years Eve 1981 to inaugurate his second coup dtat in less than three year s he implied more of the same. [T]he people, the farmers, the pol ice, the soldiers, the workers, Rawlings 13 Danquah (1961) had trotted out this position in the past but it was more to signal to the West that DanquahBusiaists were their friends in Ghana than to imply that trickle-down econ omics would float all boats domestically.

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61 rationalized, you, the guardians rich and poor, s hould be a part of the decision-making process of this country (Shillington 1992, 80). In practi ce this populism often ma nifested itself in ad hoc policies aimed at rooting out the ever-present corruption; goods were seized from anyone labeled a hoarder in the market, prices were set well below market values on foodstuffs, and towns and villages alike were ordered here and there to tidy up or else face the wrath of the government.14 Events of 1983 caused a significant shift in both the make-up of Rawlings PNDC government and its policy positions. On top of an already struggling economy, in January 1983 more than a million Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria to be absorbed into the Ghanaian economy and the country experienced its wors t drought since indepe ndence (Boahen 1989, 45). During this period the role of th e PNDCs radical left, represented most notably by Chris Atim and Alolga Akata-Pore, was dimi nished and the more moderate wing of the organization gained ascendancy (Shillington 1992, 104-106).15 Though the technocrats that Rawlings relied on to run the government post-1983 were of diverse occ upational and ideological backgrounds P.V. Obeng was an engineer and businessman; At o Ahwoi was working with the Aluminum Commission; Kwamena Ahwoi, Tsatsu Tsikata, and Kwesi Botchwey were left-leaning faculty of law at Legon; and Obed Asamoah was a parl iamentary candidate for both the NAL and UNC they were all at least pragmatically on boa rd the Bretton Woods sponsored structural adjustment program (Nugent 1995, 127). Rawlings ju stified this change in course with the following words: Idleness and parasitism have become more rewarded in this economy than productive workThis is the time to reverse th is process (Herbst 1993, 30). Between 1983 and 14 Whether or not these ad hoc policies were effective depends, not surprisingly, on ones political leanings. For two sides of the story see Oquaye (2004, 122-125) and Awoonor (1984, 14-20). 15 Atim and Akata-Pore did not leave without a fight. They purportedly planned a coup in October 1983. By the end of the year Atim had fled the co untry and Akata-Pore was in jail for his role in the failed coup.

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62 1992 Ghana entered into six IMF-sponsored Stru ctural Adjustment Programs and after being applauded for the political will shown in th eir implementation of neoliberal reforms were showered with more than $200 million in Bretton Woods loans (Martin 1993). When it came time for Flt.-Lt. Rawlings a nd the PNDC to transition into President Rawlings and the NDC, the exact position of Rawlingsism on the line drawn between Nkrumahism on the left and Danquah-Busiaism on the right became no more clear. As a presidential candidate and later as president, Ra wlings, like Nkrumah befo re him, demonstrated a penchant for dressing in the No rthern smock. This look is so pervasive amongst NDC candidates running for office that it is almost as synonymous with the party as its official umbrella symbol. The populist rhetoric that seems to naturally accompany the austere Northern smocks is also ever-present. Though the post-Rawlings generation of NDC politicians have not demonstrated similar talents, Rawlings remains a charismatic sp eaker prone to launching into tirades about the plight of the little man and the sins of the rich and powerful.16 Yet despite these airs, the NDC remained remarkably conservative in its fiscal policy, relaxing a bit only in the run-up to the 2000 elections causing the value of the cedi to erode by appr oximately 300% between 1998 and 2000. Under NDC rule there would be no dramatic re duction in the fees associated with schools or hospitals, but the party managed to implemen t in 1998, albeit after a failed attempt in 1995, a very controversial Value Added Tax (Osei 2000; Coulombe and McKay 2003). In 2002 these somewhat inconsistent ideological tendencie s that made Rawlingsism more economically conservative than Nkrumahist so cialism and more populist in t one than the Danquah-Busiaism was given the formal title Social Democr acy (National Democratic Congress 2002). 16 In a page directly out of Nkrumah s book, in its 2004 manifesto the NDC accused the NPP of being the party that sought to frustrate the peoples aspiration for early liberation from colonial domination and believes that Ghana should seek ye first the macro-economic kingdom a nd all other things shall be added unto thee (National Democratic Congress 2004, ix, 3).

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63 Sectional Cleavages Article 55 in Ghanas 1992 Constitution proscribes in general any political party based on sectional divisions but gives explic it attention to three types of sectional parties, specifically those built upon ethnic, religious, and regional identities. These proscriptions are not unique to Ghanas contemporary constitution. They have roots in the pre-independence era and have been included in every republi can constitution since.17 By now the reason given for the inclusion of this prohibition is to guarantee parties of a n ational character though th e initial impetus behind the ban was less conjectural and more pragma tic. Nkrumahs early challengers in the NLM claimed as its allies organizations and parties with monikers suggesti ng an ethnic (Asanteman Council, Akim Abuakwa State, a nd Ga Shifimo Kpee), religious (M AP), or regional character (NOPP, Northern Territori es Council, and TC). While these groups rejected the implication that they did not have th e best interests of Ghana in mind, hence MAPs (19 54, 1) assertion that they ar e a party made up of Muslins [ sic ] and non Muslins [ sic ] or the NOPPs (1954, 1) declara tion that the Northern Peoples Party does not seek the interests of the Nort h alone, Nkrumah and the CPP managed quite successfully to categorize them and their federali st ambitions as sectional detractors from the common cause of self government (Legislativ e Council of the Gold Coast 1950). Though Nkrumah is a notable example, he is certainly no t the first or the last Ghanaian politician to suggest his opposition speaks for parts of the country while he speaks for the whole. Following is an exploration of what some of these parts are and how they are socially constructed in Ghana. More concise than comprehensive, this explor ation touches upon the se ctional cleavages that 17 As the NLM begin to cause problems for the governme nt in 1954, the CPP proposed a bill restricting the titles and membership of religious, regional and tribal organiza tions represented in the Legislative Assembly (Rathbone 2000, 67).

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64 most often arise in the Ghanaian political discour se and gives readers a sense of how the various sectional variables relate to one another. Ethnicity [T]he idea of tribe, Crawford Young (1976, 35) tongue-and-cheekily describes ethnic essentialism as it is commonly practiced, conveyed the image of a world neatly dissected into a series of tribal compartments; a tribal map c ould be drawn, with firm black lines demarcating boundaries. As a tool for understanding where people live in contemporary Ghana, the map Young derides is fatally flawed. Urban centers a nd trading markets are melting pots for Ghanas diverse array of ethnic and language groups (Dakubu 1997). Mode rn transportation and the governments national service requirements dating back more than half a century have sent strangers throughout the Ghanaian hinterlands most for short stin ts but many of whom relocate permanently (Hodge 1964, 116). These point s, while they complicate the cartographers task, do little to dissuade the essentialism agains t which Young rails. They also fail to address ambiguous or contested identities and allow for an imaginary past when ethnic groups were homogenous and had well-defined territories. To study ethnicity in particular, and social cleavages in general, in an honest manner one must acknowledge that some categorization goes on in ones own work and do ones best to concede the point up front and go as far as possible to minimize the conceptual violence done to social realities. It is with this sensitivity th at Figure 3-1 is presented depi cting, in the words of the 1960 census, the Tribes of Ghana (Survey of Ghan a 1966). This map should not be interpreted as a completely accurate depiction of ethnicity in Gh ana but rather a good faith effort by scholars to illustrate a general process-sanitized understa nding of what ethnicity looks like to many Ghanaians. A complete description of each a nd every ethnic group that calls Ghana home, or every ethnic group depicted in Figure 3-1 fo r that matter, is beyond the scope of this

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65 dissertation.18 To begin to understand the way politic s works in Ghana on a national scale, however, it is necessary to have at least a pass ing understanding of what and whom the Asante and Ewe are and why they hold such a central po sition in the Ghanaian political discourse. Asante According to Fage (1969, 108), the origins of the Asante nation lie in the dramatic summoning of the Golden Stool from the heavens by k mfo An kye in the last decade of the seventeenth century. This event marked the conf ederation of eight kinship-related clans under the leadership of the Kumasihene now known as the Asantehene with the express purpose of escaping their collective tributary relationship with the ne ighboring state of Denkyira. This united Asante front managed to defeat Denkyira, but they did not stop there. By the end of the eighteenth century the Asante kingdom conquered the majority of modern-day Ghana and their area of tribute, either in goods or services, stretched from Wasa in the Southwest to Dagomba in the Northeast. For distant areas, both spatially and culturally, this re lationship was generally considered mutually beneficial with small tribut es going to the Asante but large amounts of trade going in both directions. On areas closer to Kumasi (Akan, Kwahu, Akyem, Akuapem, Asen, Denkyira, Akwamu, Fante Wasa, Bron and Ahafo in Figure 3-1) harsher demands were put in place both in terms of military service and the introduction of Asan te political institutions. As a result of these more strenuous demands, it was thes e latter areas that were most prone to unrest and revolt (Arhin 1967). After nearly a century of intermittent fighti ng with the British, the Asante Empire was attached to Britains Gold Coast Colony as a protectorate in 1900. The area allowed the protectorate consisted of Asan te populated territories and thos e of the Bron and Ahafo ethnic 18 For a good recent discussion of ethnicity in Ghana see Lentz and Nugent (2000). For older colonial-era ethnographies see Rattray (1923; 1932), Ellis (1965), Field (1940), and Hayford (1903) as oft-cited examples.

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66 groups who paid tribute directly to the Asante. In 1959, after much cajoling from Bron and Ahafo political groups, these latte r two areas were excised from what is known today as the Ashanti Region (Bening 1999). In Ghana in general, but in the Ashanti Region in particular, the Asantehene and his subordinates re main to this day revered figures with a great deal of informal political sway. During the build up to independence the NLM cam paign for regional autonomy and formal governmental recognition of the Asante s unique place in Ghanaian history was for a time run out of the Asantehenes Palace at Manhyia (Allman 1990, 267-277). More recently for his personal Otumfuo Educational Fund, in 2004 Asantehene Osei Tutu II secured an unprecedented five million dollar loan from the World Bank prompting many non-Asante politicians and pundits to question the government as to whether or not the Republic of Ghana had been assigned a king without their knowledge (Nugent 2005, 138). Ewe To the east of the Volta River, in an area that presently straddles the Ghana-Togo border lies a region occupied primarily by Ewe-speaking people. Unlike the Asante, historical records indicate that there has never b een any centralized Ewe state, bu t rather a loose association of groups sharing a similar language who occasionally and in an improvised fashion would ally for purposes of war (Manoukian 1952, 4). These gro ups would just as often, however, war amongst themselves and it was not unusual for some Ewe-sp eaking states to ally with non-Ewe-speaking states against a common Ewe-speaking en emy (Amenumey 1989, 3). Nugent (2002, 147) surmises that during this pre-co lonial period it was not immediat ely obvious to all Ewes that this [ethnic] identification should override othe r relationships of affi nity. When Europeans arrived in Ewe-speaking territories in large numbe rs they saw little incentive to keep the area whole given the lack of centralized authority. Th e British took the states of Anlo, Some, Likor, Peki and Tongu along the coast by 1884 while the Germans captured the territory further inland

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67 and to the east. After World War I the German terri tories were divided by the British and French and to this day Ewe-speakers predominate in Southeastern Ghana and Southern Togo (Amenumey 1989, 3-8). Over the decades separating colonization and the present there have been a number of movements agitating for Ewe nationalism and unificat ion of Ewe-speakers across this artificial colonial border. None of these movements was successful in achieving its ultimate goals and neither were they particularly popular amongs t the masses of Ewe-speakers (Nugent 1992). Despite this disunity, throughout independent Ghanas political hi story Ewe-speakers have been time and again labeled tribalisti c and subversive to national uni ty by national leaders. In an interesting analysis of this phenomenon, Brown ( 1982) comes to the conclusion that these labels are mere scapegoating done by politicians unable to deliver on development promises and keen to place the blame for these failures elsewhere. Because of the lively and public debate that played out during the decade immediately pr eceding independence in both the national legislature and the halls of the United Nations over whether the status quo regarding the partition of German Togoland should be maintained or whether a United Eweland, a United Togoland excluding the Gold Coast Ewes, [or] a Unite d Togoland including the latter would be preferable, Ewe-speakers were easy ta rgets (The Ewe Question (1) 1951). The rest Ethnicity being perceived as bot h a politically volatile subject and notoriously difficult to categorize has not often been measured in Ghana. The first attempt in the post-independence period was part of the 1960 populat ion census. So controversial we re the findings documented in a report identified as Special Report E: Tribes in Ghana (Gil et al. 1964) that census respondents were not asked their tribe or ethnicity again, de spite a census conducted in both 1970 and 1984, until the 2000 national population and hous ing census (Ghana Statistical Service

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68 2002). In both 1960 and 2000 self-identified Asante ra nked first in percenta ge of total population in Ghana (13.3% in 1960 and 14.8% in 2000) and self-identified Ewe ranked second (13.0% in 1960 and 12.7% in 2000). These results indicate that a likely 70 to 75% of the Ghanaian population identifies, and has at least since independence, with one of Ghanas less populous ethnic categories. Some of these groups Ga, Fanti, and Dagomba for example have significant populations, ranging from approximately 3 to 9%. Most, however, comprise less than 1% of Ghanas population. These linguistically, culturally, and institut ionally diverse ethnic groups, many of which have extremely fluid borders can play an essential role in local politics but have failed to capture the political spotlight individually on the nation al scene as have the Asante and Ewe. The real innovation of the census-takers of the 1870s, notes Anderson (1991, 168), was...not in the construction of ethnic-racial classifications, but rather in their systematic quantification . In answering the question How many Ghanaian languages are there? Dakubu (1988, 10) estimates somewhere between 45 a nd 50. To quantify and depict such a large number of groups in what is today a country with a population of less than 20 million, censustakers have often resorted to identity categories above the ethnic group. In Ghana this alternative categorization often takes the form of language groups which in the 2000 census included Akan, Ga-Dangme, Ewe, Guan, Gurma, Mole-Dagbon, Grusi, Mande-Busanga, and the ubiquitous all others.19 Figure 3-1 is color-coded to depict Ghana Statistical Services cl assification of ethnic groups under the grander language categories. 19 These categories, depicted in Figure 3-1, are not unanimously held. In her influential text on Ghanaian languages, Dakubu (1988) uses a different set of language categories. Though her categories overlap considerably with that of Ghana Statistical Services, there are important distinctions. She, for instance, classifies the Ahanta, Nzema, Aowin, and Sehwi groups in Southwestern Ghana as related but non-Akan languages and does not include the Central Togo languages in the Guan group.

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69 For the time being a discussion of Gua n, Gurma, Mole-Dagbon, Grusi, and MandeBusanga categories is tabled. In the mainstream political discourse these labels have little saliency and tend to be subsumed into the regi onal category Northern as discussed in the following subsection. The language category Ewe is more or less synonymous with the ethnic identity Ewe given the lack of historical pol itical institutions. Language categories that are regularly understood and used by the general public as shortha nd to describe certain unique group identities are Ga-Dangme and Akan. Individua ls speaking languages that fit into the GaDangme group make up roughly 8% of contemporary Ghanas popul ation and tend to congregate around the Accra plains.20 The Akan language group is by fa r the largest in Ghana populationwise with nearly 50% of Ghanaians identifying an Akan language as their mother tongue. There is no reliable historical record suggesting that there was ever a coherent political unit in precolonial West Africa known as the Akan (K iyaga-Mulindwa 1980) though there is a plethora of evidence in the more recent record to suggest a complex relationship marked as much by war and turmoil as by any sense of cultural similarities. When the British arrived to colonize the Gold Coast they met an Asante empire that had subjug ated most of the Akan-world through violence and coercion and were demanding tribute and soldiers from leader s and populations often expressively unhappy with the arrangement. They we re engaged in battle with the second largest group of speakers of an Akan language, the Fant e, who were fighting for their independent survival (Sanders 1979). 20 Languages fitting into this group include Ga and Dang me with its six dialects Ada, Ningo, Prampram, Shai, Krobo, and Osudoku (Dakubu 1988, 105-106). Ga-Dangme languages are generally mutually intelligible but the groups within the Ga-Dangme language family were never a coherent political unit. It may be surmised that GaDangme, sometimes shortened to simply Ga, holds a salient place in the Ghanaian politi cal discourse because it is the traditional language of the capital city and it does not fit into either the Akan or Ewe group and unlike the various languages of Northern Ghana cannot be lumped into a larger regional grouping.

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70 Region There are 10 regional administ rative units in contemporary Gh ana (see Figure 3-2). Each of these regions has a Regional Minister and De puty Regional Minister and their staffs whose purpose it is to handle government business in the given region. The system is not federal in that the Ministers are appointed by the President and have as their sole responsi bility the execution of the national governments agenda. Below the regional level, Ghana is divide d into 138 districts, 110 before 2004 and 100 before 2000, each with a partially elected and partially appointed nonpartisan District Assembly ostensibly re sponsible for local development projects (Ayee 1997). As social cleavages, these existing formal boundaries have been left largely immobilized. There are identities bo th above (e.g., ethnicity) a nd below (e.g., village) th ese levels that social movements and political entrepreneurs have found riper, and as a result have avoided agitation along these lines. The same cannot be said fo r the pre-independence regional divisions. In addition to depicting contemporary Ghanaian regional boundaries, Figu re 3-2 depicts the regional boundaries as they dema rcated the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti Protectorate, Northern Territories, and Trans-Volta Togol and during the colonial period.21 These units have played a role in defining Ghanaian so cial groups since their in ception through the present. The Gold Coast Colony contained present-da y Western, Central, Eastern and Greater Accra Regions and represents the area the Bri tish were able to capture, principally through treaty, prior to reaching an agreement with the Asante and issuing them protectorate status. European education and religion we re well established in these areas prior to the dawn of the twentieth century (Kimble 1963, 61-124) and traditional authorities used the British influence to remove themselves from their inferior and tr ibutary relationship with Asante (Bening 1999, 6521 For a thorough history of the regional boundaries in Ghana see Bening (1999).

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71 76). The Ashanti Protectorate was treated as conquered territory early in its existence. In 1896 the Asantehene along with his mother, father, br other, two other close re latives, two linguistics, the Chiefs of Bantama and Asafu, and the Kings of Mampong, Offinsu, and Ejisu were taken prisoner by the British and their peoples were denied easy access to colonial education. The differences in treatment between the Protectorate and the Colony dissolved over time such that barristers began to be allowed in Ashanti cour ts in 1933 and in 1946 the Ashanti Protectorate was deemed worthy of representation on the Le gislative Council; both rights gained in the Colony decades earlier (Kimble 1963, 532-533). Trans-Vo lta Togoland is interesting in that it is not, as has often been assumed, a strictly Ewespeaking entity. The land i nherited by the British in the wake of World War I was soon thereafter divided administ ratively into a Northern sector and a Southern sector. It was only the Southern sector plus the Anlo areas that were part of the Colony that would eventually become the Volta Re gion and it is only the southern half of the Southern sector plus Anlo and its environs th at were, and are, inha bited primarily by Ewespeakers (Nugent 2002, 189). Of all the pre-independence regional division s that have had carry over effects, the cleavage separating the Northern Territories, and the Northern sector of British Togoland, from Southern Ghana is likely the most dramatic. Duri ng the colonial period the Northern Territories were described by Crook (1981, 565) as a culturally protected backwate r and labour reservoir for the south. Residents of the region were pur posively kept uneducated. By 1935 the vast area comprising the Northern Territories could claim only five government and three mission primary schools and not a single post-prim ary institution (Bening 1999, 235) Despite the fact that the territory formerly known as the No rthern Territories covers over a third of Ghanas land and is home to nearly a fifth of Ghanas present-day population, the region continues to be viewed by

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72 many Southerners as a distant a nd exotic hinterland. When violen ce broke out in the city of Bawku during the 2000 elections even well-meaning and generally well-respe cted reporters from the South mislabeled the region Upper West, when it is in fact in Upper East, and could not fathom a cause other than primor dial tribal violence (Smith 2001). Religion Ghana, especially when compared to Nigeria where religion has oft been characterized as the major politically-mobilized social cleavage (Hunwick 1992), has not e xperienced religion as a reoccurring theme in national politics. There are regional differences in religious make-up (see Table 3-3) with residents in the Southern regions identifying themselves overwhelmingly as Christian, Islam having a more pronounced foothold in the North especially in the Northern Region, and Traditionalists in greater percentages in the Vo lta Region and three Northern regions. No region, however, is religiously monolithic.22 In Southern cities and market centers the phenomenon of the zongo is widespread. Zongos are disti nguished from neighboring areas by the use of Hausa as a lingua franca by the adherence of most immigrants to Islam, by residential clustering in neighbor hoods predominately inhabited by Northerners, by the similar Muslim dress and behavior of many migrants and by their common involvement in trading activities and unskilled jobs (Shildkrout 1978, 86). Christian churches, though they were discouraged from setting up missions in the Nort hern Territories by th e colonial government, have also established themselves in predominan tly Muslim areas. The White Fathers of the Catholic Church have a histor y in the North going back nearly a century and Pentecostal churches, so popular as of late in the South, have made their ma rk in the North and are not shy about proselytizing to Muslims (Der 1974; Gifford 1994, 249-252). Traditional religions, and 22 Even the use of Christian, Muslim, and Traditionalist is problematic in that each of these categories has multiple sub-categories some of which have major theological conflicts.

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73 their syncretic forms, which ar e certainly underrepresented in th e Ghanaian census, are highly varied and ubiquitous acro ss the country (Meyer 2005). The sundry nature of religion in Ghana has not prevented certain groups from claiming to speak for one religious group or another on the na tional political scene. MAP made Islam its rallying cry but failed to win even a Muslim audience outside of Southern Zongos. Those Muslims in the North identified much more st rongly with the NOPP in 1954 (Ahmed-Rufai 2002, 108-109). More recently many of the charisma tic communities in Southern Ghana have gone to great lengths to describe Ghana as a Christian country (Owusu 1996, 322). None of these groups, however, have yet be en able to concretize a politi cal cleavage based on religious variable categories. Regional Minister for Great er Accra Sheikh I.C. Qu ayes (2003) description of inter-religious relationships in Ghana as characterized by a rela tionship of mutuality, understanding, tolerance and coex istence between Muslims, Christians and other religions seems to have won the day. This inability to m obilize on a national scale is partly due to the dispersed nature of the various religions in Ghana described above but it also likely has something to do with the fluidity with which reli gions have traditionally been practiced in this environment. There are Ghanaian Muslims who turn to the east five times a day, Ghanaian Christians who refuse to work on Sunday, and Ghan aian practitioners of tr aditional religions who have never entered either a chur ch or a mosque. But there are ma ny Ghanaians, likely a majority, who have a far more complex relationship w ith the countrys plethora of religions.

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74 Table 3-1. Elections in Ghana a historical overview Year P.M./President (Party) Majority Party (Seats/Total) Minority Parties (Seats) 1951 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP) CPP (33/38) UGCC (3), Tongu Confederacy (1), independents (1) 1954 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP) CPP (71/104) NPP (12), TC (2), GCP (1), MAP (1), AYO (1), independents (16) 1956 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP) CPP (71/104) NPP (15), NLM (12), TC (2), MAP (1), FYO (1), independents (2) 1969 Kofi Busia (PP) PP (105/140) NAL (29), UNP (2), PAP (2), APRP (1), independents (1) 1979 Hilla Limann (PNP) PNP (71/140) PFP (42), UNC (13), ACP (10), SDF (3), independents (1) 1992 Jerry Rawlings (NDC) NDC (189/200) NCP (8), EGLE (1), independents (2) 1996 Jerry Rawlings (NDC) NDC (133/200) NPP (61), PCP (5), PNC (1) 2000 John Kufuor (NPP) NPP (100/200) NDC (92), PNC (3), CPP (1), independents (4) 2004 John Kufuor (NPP) NPP (128/230) NDC (94), PNC (4), CPP (3), independents (1) Note: Election results obtained from Larvie and Badu (1996), Ephson (2003), and Electoral Commission of Ghana (2004). Table 3-2. Genealogy of the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist traditions Year Nkrumahist Parties Danquah-Busiaist Parties 1951 CPP UGCC 1954 CPP GCP 1956 CPP NLM 1969 NAL PP 1979 PNP PFP, UNC 1992 NIP, PHP, PNC NPP 1996 PCP, PNC NPP 2000 CPP, PNC NPP 2004 CPP, PNC NPP Note: Guidance in categorizing the parties as either Nkrumahist or Danquah-Busiaist was provided by Austin (1964), Chazan (1983), Ephson (1992; 2003), and Pinkney (1988) as well as various party manifestos. This cat egorization is not an exact science. The parties listed above were categorized based on two criteria: 1) They either self-identify in their manifestos as a Nkrumahist party or a Danquah-Busiaist party or explicitly trace their ideo logical heritages through the CPP or UGCC and 2) they were signif icant enough to win seat s in the legislature. Criteria two is relaxed in 1992 to include parties that participat ed in the presiden tial contest since all self-identified Nkrumahist partie s boycotted the parlia mentary elections.

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75 Table 3-3. Religious breakdown by region of Ghana Christian Muslim Traditional Other None Western 81.0% 0 8.5% 0 1.5% 0.8% 8.2% Central 81.4% 0 9.2% 0 1.2% 0.8% 7.4% Gt. Accra 83.0% 10.2% 0 1.4% 0.9% 4.6% Volta 67.2% 0 5.1% 21.8% 0.7% 5.3% Eastern 82.8% 0 6.1% 0 2.4% 0.7% 8.1% Ashanti 77.5% 13.2% 0 1.2% 0.7% 5.3% Brong-Ahafo 70.8% 16.1% 0 4.6% 0.6% 7.8% Northern 19.3% 56.1% 21.3% 0.5% 2.8% Upper East 28.3% 22.5% 46.4% 0.8% 1.9% Upper West 35.5% 32.2% 29.3% 0.6% 2.3% Total Country 68.8% 15.9% 0 8.5% 0.7% 6.1% Note: Data obtained from Ghana Statistical Services (2002)

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76 Akan Ga-Dangme Ewe Guan Gurma Mole-Dagbon Grusi Mande-Busanga Figure 3-1. Ethno-linguistic map of Ghana [Sour ce: Author created map with approximate borders of ethnic groups adapted from Survey of Ghana (1966) and language groupings and spellings from Ghan a Statistical Se rvice (2002).]

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77 Gold Coast Colony Ashanti Protectorate Northern Territories Togoland Colony prior to 1952 Trans-Volta Togoland after Togoland prior to 1952 Northern Territories after Figure 3-2. Contemporary regions of Ghana (col or-coded by colonial regions) [Source: Author created composite map from informa tion provided in Bening (1999).]

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78 CHAPTER 4 THE ELEPHANT, UMBRELLA, AND QUAR RELLING COCKS: DISAGGREGATING PARTISANSHIP IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC That there was a pattern to Ghanas 2004 pres idential and parliamentary elections surprised no one. As expected the ruling NPP picked up the majority of votes in the Ashanti Region and the NDC won in the Volta, Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions. The swing regions (Eastern, Greater Accra, Central, Western, and Brong-Ahafo) went to th e elections eventual winner (Ephson 2003, 14). The familiar rural/urban divide was also pa lpable. If one isolates the 20 largest urban centers in Ghana from the rest of the country, one finds that the NPP polled on average around 7% higher in these large urba n constituencies than they did in less urban constituencies.1 The relationship is reversed for the NDC. Nkrumahist parties won a few parliamentary seats in the Southw est and far North but did predicta bly little to dispel the notion of Ghana being a de facto two-party state. Despite a different party in the Castle2 and controlling parliament, Nugents (1999) urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in Ghana continue virtually untouched. Recognizing the practical importance of recurring electoral cleavages, when asked about strategic campai gning a member of the NPP executive committee commented some [constituencies] we just ignore completely because whatever we do well lose.3 1 Ghanas 20 most populous urban centers are described by the 2000 Census as Accra Metropolis, Kumasi Metropolis, Tamale, Takoradi Sub-Metro, Ashaiman, Tema, Obuasi, Sekondi Sub-Metro, Koforidua, Cape Coast, Madina, Wa, Sunyani, Ho, Tema Newtown, Techiman, Bawku, Bolgatanga, Agona Swedru, and Nkawkaw. The constituency and/or district election results of these ar eas was compared with the constituency and/or district election results of the areas outside of these 20 most populous urban centers to derive these percentages (Ghana Statistical Service 2002a, 1). 2 The Castle is what most Ghanaians call Christiansborg Castle in Osu. The stone fort was originally constructed by the Danes in the 17th Century but today serves as th e office space for the President. 3 Interview conducted at NPP party headquarters in Kokomlemle, Accra on 12 July 2005. Similar responses were given by other members of the NPP and NDC party establishments when queried.

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79 Baring a dramatic electoral realignment, scho lars, politicians, and pund its alike anticipate similar voting patterns, though not necessarily si milar electoral outcomes, to carry on for the foreseeable future. But why, after four elections and a turnover in power, do these predictable voting blocs persist and what cau sal variables explain them? Answ ers to these questions tend to fall into one of two categories. On e answer points to ideological ( Gesellschaft ) cleavages as the driving force behind Ghanaian electoral alignments Rhetorically at least the NPP positions itself as a center-right party and the NDC has claimed th e center-left as its ideological territory. In a recent study of core and swing voters Lindberg and Morrison (2005, 19) present evidence that Ghanaian parties are separated by socio-economic f actors regularly tied to ideological cleavages including the aforementioned urban-rural divide, le vel of education, occupa tion status and sector, and income levels. The alternativ e answer points to sectional ( Gemeinschaft ) cleavages, most often conceptualized ethnically in the Ghanaian case, as the driving force behind electoral alignments. Though Lentz and Nugent (2000) prude ntly caution against assuming ethnicities in Ghana are fixed social realitie s, voting patterns indi cate at least some schism along perceived ethnic lines. In his analysis of Ghanas 2000 el ections, Gyimah-Boadi (2001, 115) summarizes the popular sentiment that has followed each of th e Fourth Republics national elections when he notes that the country is pol arized along ethnic and regional lines and suggests sustained efforts at national rec onciliation and unity. This chapter begins with a two-tiered examination of politically mobilized cleavages in Ghanas Fourth Republic. First all four nationa l elections in the Fourth Republic are placed under the analytical microscope Using electoral maps, census data, and election results the social bases of the NDC and NPP are illuminated graphically on a macro-level. In some ways this depiction of electoral clea vages is just another point fo r triangulating the anecdotal and

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80 survey evidence which has already been report ed both in the popular Gh anaian press and in academic journals. That some Ghanaian pol itical parties are more popular amongst some members of one ethnic group or a nother will not seem earth sha ttering to even a casual observer of Ghanaian politics. Neither will the revelation that some parties do better in areas with specific class indicators. In other ways, however, this method offers a systematic approach to evaluating Ghanaian social cleavages that can be applied comparatively both across time and borders. This flexibility is unprecedented. The second level of analysis deals with the sociopsychological textures of Ghanaian parties (Heberle 1955). In other words, what cognitive shortcuts do Ghanaian voters take with them into the ballot bo x? With the help of surv ey results collected in the wake of the 2004 elections this section presents a new kind of analysis that goes directly at answering this question. Instead of asking regi stered voters to disti nguish between political parties in an open-ended abstract way, this cognitive shortcut mapping approach asks respondents to differentiate on a number of specifi c variables. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of what the election and cognitive shortcut analys is mean, and conversely do not mean, for the future of Ghanas Fourth Republic. Elections in the Fourth Republic Mapping the Votes As soon as it became clear that Kufuor and the NPP had won the December 2004 polls hawkers took to the streets of Accra selling commemorative electoral maps. Cartoon elephants were positioned over constituencies won by the NPP, cartoon umbrellas over those won by the NDC, and cartoon cocks and palm trees over those few constituencies won by the CPP and PNC respectively. These decorative souvenirs were an attempt to duplicate on a popular level what Nugent (1999, 2001b) has done on the pages of academic journals. Maps of this variety give their readers a rough understanding of where one pa rty is strong and anothe r is weak. The areas

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81 of the map with a lot of elephant s, for instance, are chalked up as NPP territory whereas the areas heavily shaded by umbrellas are where the NDC reigns. The parsimonious presentation points to a number of straightforward hypothe ses: the NPP is an Asante party and the NDC is an Ewe party; the NPP is a Southern party and the NDC is a Northern party; the NPP is an urban party and the NDC is a rural party. While these electoral depictions are useful when it co mes to hypothesis generation, they present partisan social cleavages as unrealistica lly sharp lines when in actuality they are much more nuanced. NDC support does not stop at the Ja man North constituency border only to be replaced by NPP support on the Jaman South si de of the boundary. Though the NDC claimed the parliamentary seat for Jaman North and the N PP claimed the seat for Jaman South in 2004, in both constituencies opposition candidates took in mo re than 40% of the vote. Figures 4-1 (NDC) and 4-2 (NPP) illustrate some of this grad ation using presidential results for the 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections.4 When a particular constituencys support for a given party is nearing 100%, that constituency is shaded nearly black. Wh en a particular constituencys support for a given party is nearing 0%, that constituency is le ft virtually white. Most constituencies, however, appear as shades of gray, sometimes darker and sometimes lighter depending on the level of support a given partys presidential candidate received in the area. It is clear from the maps that the epicenter of NPP support is Kumasi and the epicenter of NDC support is the Southern portion of the Volta Region. These two areas are nearly black in the 4 Presidential elections are used because they yield one more data point than parliamentary elections, as a result of the 1992 parliamentary election boyco tt, and since split-ticket voting is a relatively rare phenomenon presidential results and parliamentary results roughly mimic each othe r. Since 1996, the average difference between a major parties (i.e., NPP and NDC) presidential and parliamentary totals across constituencies has never been greater than 6.4% (NPP in 1996) or lower than 2.8% (NPP in 2000) of the total vote. For the 2000 elections, where there was a run-off, only first round results are reported.

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82 NPP and NDC maps respectively for each of the F ourth Republics four presidential elections.5 This gives at least tentative s upport to a rather modest version of the ethnicity hypothesis. Even if one assumes that Asantes form the core of NPP support because their tr aditional capital is in Kumasi and Ewes form the core of NDC support b ecause their traditional ar ea is in the Southern portion of Volta Region, however, one must still account for the more than 70% of Ghanaians who did not self-identify themselves with either ethnic group in the last census (Gha na Statistical Service 2002b, 22). The more ambitious ethnic hypothesis, that pitting the linguistic group Akans6 versus non-Akans, does not fare nearly so we ll. Whereas winner-take-all maps depict the entire Volta Region and the three Northern re gions (Northern, Upper Ea st, Upper West) as a relatively solid and stable NDC bloc, the proporti onal maps show increasing parity between the two major parties in the three Northern region s and what are perhaps the signs of a growing parity in Northern parts of the Volta Region as well. Similarly, the so-called Akan regions (Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern, and Wester n), with Kumasi and its environs being the notable exception, are a mixed bag of grays in elections won by both the NDC and NPP. One can witness the sea-change in the Akan-speaking region s that led to the turnov er of power from the NDC to the NPP in 2000, but neither before nor afte r can the area be character ized as an absolute runaway for either party. Additiona lly this sea-change cannot be differentiated from the growing popularity of NPP presidential candidates in pr edominately non-Akan areas of the country. 5 The fact that these two sets of maps are near negative images of each other is the result of poor showings by Nkrumahists and other minor party candidates. A similar set of maps could have been made for the Nkrumahists and minor parties but the maps would have looked very clos e to blank because of their candidates relatively poor showings. 6 Robert Price (1973, 472) noted the category Akan is becoming more and more widely recognized and may begin to be considered a product of what Jean Rouch (1956, 163-4) has called super-tribalization. Evidence presented here does not support this supposition.

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83 Ideology-via-socio-economic indi cators hypotheses run into sim ilarly vast areas of gray. This result is not completely une xpected as class and privilege i ndicators are not as apt as ethnolinguistic cleavages to be geographically centere d. It is not uncommon, fo r instance, to witness destitute panhandlers in a c ity like Accra walking alongsid e the Mercedes of wealthy entrepreneurs on their way to work or to see burger mansions in various states of construction all across the countryside. 7 Most Ghanaians can, nonetheless, poin t easily to regions of the country which are more or less economically marginal ized and undeveloped. Despite the deleterious effects of economic reform programs on urban work ers in the late 1980s a nd early 1990s (Herbst 1993, 61-64), Ghanaian cities continue to lure rural dwellers with their relatively easier access to the fruits of development and prosperity. Cities in Ghana continue to grow in relation to rural areas because countless rural dwellers act on the belie f that their earning potential, even with the risks of high unemployment, is greater in the ci ties than in the countrysi de (Harris and Todaro 1970). In addition to the urban and ru ral distinction, ther e is a perceived and actual gap between the countrys North and South dating back to the colonial period when the British purposively kept the Northern population uneducated so that they would remain a cheap source of labor in the South (Bening 1999, 232-237). Today the percentage of i ndividuals achieving a level of education above primar y school hovers in the low teens in the three regions that once constituted the Gold Coasts Northern Territori es (Northern, Upper East and Upper West). In none of the other seven regions does this percen tage drop below thirty. A cursory glance at the maps depicting election results, however, does not provide clear evidence that either of these 7 Burger is a term used to describe wealthy Ghanaians living abroad who commission large and often ostentatious mansions that are commonly left unfinished for years. Th e assumption is that these individuals will have completed their houses by the time they return to Ghana and wanted to get some structure in the works so that claims to the land would be solidified.

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84 ideologically tinged socio-economic cleavages are politicized. T hough Sekondi-Takoradi and Cape Coast do look in the maps to be more inclined to vote NPP than the surrounding areas, Accra and Kumasi do not appear noticeably different than surrounding constituencies and Tamale appears to be working against the grai n of the Northern Region by becoming more and more an NDC base of support with each elec tion. As far as a Nort h/South difference, no distinction readily presents itself es pecially in the most recent election. Analyzing the Votes with the Help of Census Data The nuanced election maps reveal the NDCs dominance in Southern Volta Region and the NPPs dominance around Kumasi. Though this findi ng is far from unexpected, the magnitude of support, or lack thereof, in these areas when j uxtaposed against the remainder of the country is striking. For the remaining political cleavage hypot heses the maps are more equivocal. What the naked eye cannot pick-up, however, may be detected with the help of re gression analysis that teases out the effects of demographic characteri stics on each partys vote totals. Published data from the 2000 national census was released publicly at the regional level (N=10) which offers relatively few cases to test a hypothesis. Given the limitations of this presentation of the data, for this project several potentially interesting demogr aphic variables were obta ined at the district level (N=110) from the Ghana Statistical Services Since this census data is presented at the district-level, in order to perform the followi ng regressions constituency-level election results were first merged into district-level electi on results. In both the 200 and 230 constituency configurations this is a fairly simple operation as no constituency falls into more than a single district.8 8 The 2000 Census recorded data using the 110 district configuration. These districts range in size from Kadjebi in the Volta Region with a recorded population just shy of 50,000 to Accra Metropolitan District with a recorded population of over 1.6 million. The median district population is approximately 130,000.

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85 Table 4-1 represents a regression model using the NPPs percentage of the presidential vote in 2004 in a given district as the dependent variable. Independent variables in the model include percentage of Akan-speakers9 (to test the ethnicity cleavag e hypothesis); Christians (to test an alternative Gemeinschaft cleavage hypothesis); and percenta ge of residents in a given district who live in urban areas, have obtained at least a middle sc hool (JSS) education, and have ready access to a water closet, pit latrine, a nd/or a Kumasi Ventilat ed Improved Pit Latrine (KVIP) (all class indicators to test the ideology cleavage hypothe sis). Only the percentage of Akan-speakers in a district is statistically si gnificant at the 99% confidence level. Holding the three aforementioned socio-economic indicators constant and controlling for a districts percentage of Christians, for every 1% increase in Akan-speakers in a district the NPPs presidential candidate gained on average more than half a percen t of the vote in 2004. When the percentage of Akan-speakers in a district is he ld constant none of the socio-economic indicators in the model are significant at even the 90% conf idence level and the percen tage of Christians in a district is unexpectedly inve rsely related to NPP success. Because of the potential for interaction betw een the three socio-ec onomic indicators, six more regressions were run: three with each of the socio-economic indicators predicting the NPP presidential candidates share of the vote and three regression s predicting the NPP vote with Akan-speakers included and one of the socio-economic indicators each. Alone each of the socioeconomic indicators was highly significant (99% confidence level) in predicting the NPP presidential candidates percentage of the vote. The regressions also yield positive coefficients as 9 Ideally two regressions could have been run, one with Akan-speakers and one with ethnic Asantes as potential explanatory variables. Unfortunately, at the district level the available data only reports language families and not individual languages. Given the previously described electoral maps, one could reasonably expect that the effect of Asante-speakers in a district (who are concentrated in th e Ashanti Region) is greater than that of Akan-speakers (who predominate in Brong-Ahafo Region, Western Region, Central Region, and western portions of Eastern Region as well).

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86 the ideological hypothesis would predict. When pair ed with the percentage of Akan-speakers in a district, however, only developed to ilet facilities appear s significant and that with a very small negative coefficient (-.092) and a confidence level of only 90%. In all thr ee of these latter cases the effect of Akan-speakers hovered around .5 with a 99% confidence level. Adding Akan to a bivariate regression with a distri cts percentage of Christians as the independent variable and NPP percentage of the vote the dependent variab le turns a significant position correlation into a significant negative correlation. These findings sugge st strongly that it is the presence of members of an ethno-linguistic gr oup, namely Akans, that is dr iving NPP vote totals upwards and not the existence of the aforementioned ideological proxies or competing sectional affiliations. Table 4-2 depicts a regression using the NDCs percentage of the presidentia l vote in 2004 in a given district as the dependent variable and hypothesized NDC-leani ng ethnic identities and socio-economic indicators as the independent vari ables. Since it has been hypothesized that the NDC is an Ewe and/or a Northern party two ethno-linguistic identif iers are included in the model instead of one. While Ewe-speakers is a census cat egory like Akan-speakers, Northerners is not an officially recognized language category but rather a shorthand identity category used widely in Ghana to convey Northern-ness with its as sociated denotation (bel onging to one of many ethno-linguistic groups originating from one of Ghanas three Northern regions) and connotations (backwardness and a residual cultu re difference from the South) (Dickson 1968).10 As there is a common perception that the NDC is more popular amongst Muslims, this 10 Census categories merged to create th e variable Speakers of Northern Languages include Gurma, Mole-Dagbon, Grusi, and Mande-Busanga. The regression was run once with the Guan language category included and once with it excluded because the language family is divided nearly in half with Gonja spoken mainly in the North but also a diverse array of languages spoken across the South (Awutu and Efutu near Winneba; Abir iw, Okere, Larteh in the Eastern Region; and Siwu, Sele, Avatim e, Nyangbo, and Likpe in the Volta Re gion to name a few) (Guan Congress 1991). The results of these two regressions were similar in all areas save Speakers of Northern Languages. The regression appearing in Table 4-2 depi cts the results with Guan-speakers incl uded in the Speakers of Northern

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87 alternative Gemeinschaft cleavage is integrated into the mode l. Since the perceptions are that the NDC is most popular amongst the lo wer classes, the socio-economic indicators included in this model are the mirror image of those included in the NPP model: percentage of residents in a given district who live in rural areas; have not obtai ned at least a middle school education; and have no regular access to a water closet, pit latrine, and/or a KVIP. In this model, only the percentage of Ewe-speakers in a district app ears significant at the 99% confidence level. The model suggests that for every percen tage increase in Ewe-speakers, the NDC presidential candidate gains a pproximately two-thirds a percen tage of the vote. Additional regression analysis reveals that, as with the NPP regression, the two insignificant socio-economic variables, percentage of rural dwellers and thos e without access to develo ped toilet facilities, become significant with coefficients in the exp ected direction when et hnic variables are left uncontrolled. Speakers of Northern languages and Muslims are not reliable predictors of NDC success at the 99% confidence interval even wh en other variables are left uncontrolled. The percentage of those with less than a middle school education is only significant at the 90% confidence interval but its coefficient is positive as the ideological hypothes es predict. This result for the speakers of Northern languages variable is somewhat problematic due to the categorys inherent definitional difficulties and relatively sm all coefficient. The results for lesser education cannot be so easily dismissed and deserves closer inspection. Are we looki ng at the fruits of the NDCs relatively recent efforts to define itsel f strongly with the international movement for social democracy (National Demo cratic Congress n.d., 1)? Or is th is effect the result of the Languages group. Results for the regression with Guan-sp eakers withheld from this group are as follows: Constant .047(.121); Ewe-Speakers .674***(.058); Speakers of Northern Languages .095(.075); Muslims -.005(.083); Rural Dwellers -.064(.084); Less Educated 484*(.254); and Undeveloped Toilet F acilities .058(.084). The adjusted R2 for this model is .620. When compared with the Table 4-2, thes e results suggest that districts with large percentages of Guan-speakers lean heavily towards the NDC. The results also suggest a lot of Northern (non-Gonja) language speakers in a district yields an NDC surplus of less than 10 percent, when all the other mentioned variables are controlled.

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88 uneducated masses hanging on to the political party w ith direct ties to the previous authoritarian regime as Lipset (1959, 79-80) would predict? An swers to these questions are not forthcoming without access to longe r time-series data. Since there have been four presidential electi ons in the Fourth Repub lic and there is no reason to suspect the 2000 census data is grossly off target wi th regard to the years 1992, 1996, and especially 2000, comparisons of this sort are possible.11 The models represented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 were run for each of the elections in the Fourth Republic. Across elections there were few dissimilarities. For the NPP, the percen tage of Akan-speakers in a district remains highly significant across time. Like in 2004, for ever y 1% increase in Akan-speakers in a district the NPPs presidential candidate gained on average slightly more than half a percent of the vote in 1996 and 2000. In the 1992 election a 1% increase in Akan-speakers gave the NPP on average closer to a third of a percentage point increase. The percentage of Ewe-speakers was a similarly consistent predictor of NDC success. In 1992, 1996, and 2000, when all other variables in the model were held constant, a 1% increase in Ewe-speakers led on average to between two-thirds and half a percent increase in the NDC vote tall y. For every other variable in the NPP and NDC models, there was at least one year of statisti cal insignificance and most were insignificant over the course of all four elections. Low educati on continued to show pr omise as a potential predictor of NDC support for the 1992 and 2000 elec tions but was statistica lly insignificant in 1996 giving no indications as to whet her the correlation is the result of authoritarian leanings of the uneducated, demonstrative of the appeal of th e NDCs social democratic message, or simply spurious. The variable for speakers of Northern languages varied widely from election to election as a predictor of NDC support suggesting that the ethno-linguistic groups that make up this 11 There was a census conducted in 1984 but the census did not collect data on indigenous languages or ethnicity.

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89 category are often at cross-purposes and very much politically in pl ay. An interesting result not anticipated with the 2004 regression s is the impact of a districts percentage of urban dwellers on NPP support. In 2004 the relationship between the NPP and percentage of urban dwellers was not significant when controlling for Akan-sp eakers. In 1992, 1996, and 2000 the relationship is significant to the tune of between one-fifth and on e-fourth a percentage po int rise in NPP support for every 1% increase in the percentage of urban dwellers in a district. Though this analysis does not foreclose on th e possibility of ideological class-based cleavages forming in Ghana, it certainly does not advance the ideological hypothesis in any clear and consistent sense. The ethnic hypothesis, on the other hand, fi nds a great deal of support in the regression analysis and cannot be rejected.12 Election maps illustrate high levels or support for the NPP in traditional Asante areas and high levels of support for the NDC in traditional Ewe areas. The regression analysis s uggests that a districts Akanness or Ewe-ness matters a whole lot even when the socio-economic characteristi cs of a district are co ntrolled for. Knowing absolutely nothing about which partys presidentia l candidate receives the most votes nationally or the socio-economic characteristics of particular districts, one can reas onably predict based on the evidence presented here that the NPP presidential candidate would win a hypothetical district populated only by Akan-speakers and the NDC pres idential candidate would win a hypothetical district populated only by Ewe-sp eakers. Given the fact that the NDC ran candidates of different ethno-linguistic backgrounds in 1992 and 1996 (Jerry Rawlings is half Ewe and half Scottish) and in 2000 and 2004 (John E.A. Mills is a Fante-sp eaker), one can concl ude that the partys 12 There was sufficient data to test another sectional hypothesis that has received some attention in the public discourse but not nearly so much as the ethnicity hypothesis. There is some talk that the NPP is the Christian party and the NDC is the Muslim party. At an aggregate district-level this hypothesis is not born out. Christianity is signficiantly and positively correlated with NPP success until a districts percentage of Akan-speakers is controlled for. Then it remains significantly associated but with a nega tive correlation. The number of Muslims in a district has no significant impact on NDC success at the polls.

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90 appeal amongst Ewe-speakers is not dependent on its flag bearers ethnic-identity. The NPP will have to run a non-Akan flag bearer before there will be evidence either for or against a similar conclusion. It is interesting, howev er, that the election where the pe rcentage of Akan-speakers in a district mattered the least for the NPP was in the only election in which their flag bearer was Akan but not a self-identified Asante.13 The Meaning of Electoral Choice in Ghana: Cognitive Shortcuts Maps and census data allow one to determine the constituencies that Ghanas two dominant parties draw upon to form their respective bases. Th e above analysis suggests that despite politicians ideological appeals to th e masses in widely-covered public speeches and glossy manifestos, it is ethnic identities that better predict the popularity of one party over another. Though these findings will be interes ting for those seeking to better describe the politically-mobilized cleavages in Ghanaian society, there is an a pproach that allows one to get at the way citizens understand their election-day choices mo re directly by studying the cognitive shortcuts Ghanaians use to differentiate between th eir party options (Popkin 1991). Whereas the preceding picture of political cleavages is presented as static manifestations of electoral choice, with each map and regressi on capturing a single election, these cognitive shortcut maps can be used to better understa nd the weight given to thoughts that precede a choice and drive fluctuations in the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 election results (Lupia et al. 2000, 1). Greater knowledge about the cognitive shortc ut maps of Ghanaian voters can also be used by politicians, pundits, and media commentators in Ghana who have a vested interest in altering or preserving the status quo in favor of one party or anot her in future elections. Such a 13 Professor A. Adu Boahen, who ran for president under the NPP flag in 1992, would be classified ethnolinguistically as an Akyem.

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91 map demonstrates not necessarily the empirical so cial bases of political parties but rather the perceptions that must be maintained or manipulated to effect electoral outcomes. Cognitive Shortcut Survey The survey administered between Janua ry and May 2005 in three of Ghanas 230 constituencies was designed to capture the character of Ghanaian political parties as understood by the voters. It does so not by asking respondent s to stake out a mutually exclusive position on whether Ghanaian parties are separated along ideo logical or ethnic lines, but rather by allowing respondents to map out their understanding of political cleavages in their country in a formal and specific manner. In each of the three select ed constituencies 200 surveys were randomly administered to registered voters.14 Respondents were asked several batteries of questions that followed the same general formula. Do you think N PP support is stronger in some regions than in others? reads a prototypical question. If the respondent answered this question yes they were asked Which region of the country do you think supports the NPP the most? Following this question set, the same two questions were aske d again with NDC substituting for NPP. A similar format was used to query registered voters on other potential cleavage lin es including ethnicity, religion, population density, class, and education. So that this relatively small-N survey would have some validity on a national scale, a most different system design was selected (Przewor ski and Teune 1970, 31-46). The selection of these three constituencies (Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam) was intended to give the sample as diverse a population as possible.15 Odododiodio encompasses the Jamestown and Usshertown sections of Accra also known as Old Accra. Traditionall y the area is Ga though Accras 14 For a detailed description of the survey methodology see Appendic C. 15 Chapter Six provides a more thorough summary of the three constituencies histories and demographics. The descriptions that follow are just intended to provide a brief overview.

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92 booming population has diversified the area ethnically to the point that non-Ga-speakers now make up about a third of the constituencys popula tion. Fishing and petty trade are the dominant industries in the economically marginalized urban constituen cy (Bremer 2002). Elections are usually very close in Odododiodio and bot h the NPP and NDC have won the areas parliamentary seat in contested races. Bantam a is located in the Ashanti Regions capital, Kumasi. The constituency is home to the Asante royal mausoleum and includes the spot where k mfo An kye summoned the golden stool from the heavens (Rattray 1923, 288-289). Economically the constituency can best be desc ribed as a middle-class mixed use urban area. Bantama, in both its preand post-redistricting forms has voted massively for the NPP in each of the Fourth Republics contested elections winning it a reputation as the NPPs World Bank of votes. On the road connecting Bolgatanga to Ba wku in Ghanas far Northeast one finds Nabdam constituency. The constituency has been de scribed as ethnically homogenous, extremely impoverished and entirely rural (Smith 2001, 18 1). Nabit is the dialect spoken by virtually every one of the constituencys voters who o ccupy themselves economically primarily with millet farming during the short rainy season and illicit game hunting and gold mining during the long dry season. Nabdam constituency has regula rly voted NDC though both the NPP and third party candidates, most notably t hose representing the PNC, have made respectable showings in past elections. If responses to the survey que stions are similar in these three disparate constituencies, it is a fairly safe assumption th at one can say something about Ghanaian voterswrit-large. Cognitive Mapping Some of the results of this three constituen cy survey are displayed in Tables 4-3 4-8. These cross-tabulations map respondents abil ity to differentiate be tween the NPP and NDC when it comes to several socio-economic and sec tional indicators. If vot ers see the significant

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93 differences between the two parties as primarily socioeconomic, one would expect ideological cleavages to predominate and a purposive-rational Gesellschaft understanding of the connections between parties and society in Ghana to have taken hold. Conversely, if voters see the significant differences between the two parties as primarily s ectional, one would expect ethnic cleavages to predominate and Gemeinschaft communities to be the best explan ation for partisan identification. To determine where individual respondents are positioned on this scale, they were asked whether the NPP and NDC were more popular amongst certain class groups, rural or urban voters, welleducated or uneducated, certain ethnic and relig ious groups, and regions of the country. When respondents identified a difference in support on a variable, that difference was recorded. When they did not identify a difference, their respons e was marked no difference. Since the point of the survey is to draw distincti ons responses that iden tified the same categorical variable for both the NPP and NDC, for instance labeling both part ies most popular amongst low income voters, were reclassified as no difference for purposes of analysis. Surveys that ask respondents more directly to identify the differen ces between the parties in Ghana have been inundated with no difference or the perhaps less illuminating my party stands for development and honesty responses.16 The abstract and multi-faceted nature of these types of questions provides researchers with observations most notable fo r their dearth of content. By challenging respondents to label a single party on a single va riable, this survey el icits more thoughtful answers which provide the basis fo r a rough picture of the bundle of information voters take into polling stations and draw upon when deci ding where to place their thumbprint. 16 The exact format and wording of this type of question varies. In the 2000 University of Ghana pre-election survey (Ayee 2001) respondents were asked if it mattered to them what party is in power (2.18) and then asked why they like their preferred party (2.38-2.41). Afrobarometer (2006) addresses the question more tangentially by asking respondents to evaluate their president and parliamentarian on a number of specific criteria.

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94 If one isolates the modal categories in thes e cross-tabulation tables, the results are as predicted by the competing hypotheses. Across thr ee disparate constituencies the NPP appears to be pegged the party of upper class well-educated urban Chri stian Akan-speakers from the Ashanti Region and the NDC appears to be the party of lower class une ducated rural Muslim Ewe-speakers from the Volta Region. Though few Ghanaians fit either of these stereotypes exactly, they provide a point of reference for voter s. If one identifies more closely with the NPP stereotype, for instance, one would more likely be identified as an individual who supports the NPP than the NDC. Ideology is important by every party, a post-survey focus group participant in Nabdam constituency complained, but most of the electorate are illiterates and even those who are literate, th ey are not literate enough to know the differences between these ideologies. In a context where the ideological co nstructs of political discourse have not worked their way down to the masses (fewer than 3% of survey respondents could accurately identify the NPP as the market-oriented party and the NDC as the social democratic pa rty), it is these party stereotypes that serve as alternative delimiters separating Party A from Party B. These are the cognitive shortcuts of Ghanaian politics. Stopping at this point of th e analysis, however, does not allow one to rank cognitive shortcuts. In order to accomplish this task one has to look at the magnitude of these modal categories in relation to each othe r. Analysis of this sort reve als a real divergence between the Gesellschaft hypotheses and the Gemeinschaft hypotheses of voting behavior. Whereas no difference responses proliferate in Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-8 they are relatively rare in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. The average no difference response ra te across constituencies for these first three tables was just shy of two-thirds while the aver age for the last two tables was around one-fourth. Additionally the second most popular category choices in Tables 43, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-8 are much

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95 closer to the most popular cate gory choices than those represen ted in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. On average the second most popular categorical response for Tables 4-3 4-5 is less than 20 percentage points less popular th an the modal category. This number increases to more than 50% for Tables 4-6 and 4-7. Table 4-8, which depicts religious perceptio ns, is the most inconsistent across constituencies with Bantama being an out lier perhaps because of its relative religious homogeneity. As tools for distinguishing between the two dominant parties, ethnicity and region appear to be both much more widespread and mu ch more universally understood than any of the tested socio-economic demographic indicators or religion. More than three-fourths of respondents identified the NPP as most popular amongst Akan-speakers and nearly two-thirds identified the NDC as most popular amongst Ew e-speakers. Across the three constituencies surveyed far more voters are taking this ethnocen tric information about the parties behind the polling station security screens than anyt hing resembling ideological distinctions. Before concluding a note on the differences be tween constituencies is in order because there are a few and some of these differences could significantly affect ones analysis of the data. As one moves literally away from Accra, the percentage of no difference responses goes up. Though the data does not yield a ready explanati on for this discrepancy the results are not completely unexpected. Moving from Odododiodio to Bantama to Nabdam one is not only moving from Accra northwards. One is also movi ng from a relatively well-educated area to a relatively uneducated area and from an area wher e political information is easily accessible to a region where the flow of mass media is more re stricted. Just because there are so many no difference responses in Nabdam does not mean that the differences between parties do not play a role at election time.

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96 Of the 160 respondents from Nabdam who liste d their education level as none, 94 claimed not to know whether or not one ethnic group supported the NPP more than others. Of the 28 respondents who had at least made it to middl e school, only 3 claimed not to know and the remaining 25 identified the NPP as a party most popular amongst Akan-speakers. Whether or not these well-educated respondents wi ll spread their cognitive shortc uts to their relatively less educated neighbors over time is uncertain. What does seem to be evident in these findings, however, is that the cues for the presented cogn itive shortcuts are contained in the national political discourse and those with greater access to this discourse are likely to be more in tune to the modal perceptions of political parties. Though Ghanaian politicians have for the most part stayed away from blatant ethnic appeals and ha mmered home instead illu strious ideologies, or more frequently positions on local development, somehow they are subtly, and perhaps deftly, conveying a different message to voters. Conclusions During a focus group in Bantama participants we re asked if they think tribalism is a problem in Ghanaian politics. The immediat e answer was a resounding No. An older gentleman explained that he had lived in Nige ria for seven years and tribalism was a problem there. He told a story about the markets there where sellers from the count rys North would give lower prices to buyers from the North than thos e from the South. This, he explained, was not a problem in Ghana. Then he paused for a moment and said he did not really want to mention it but felt it was important to the discussion. Ewes, he argued, do tend to vote as a bloc and when they are in positions of power they like to promote fellow Ewes. From the gentlemans preface and the crowds tacit approval it was apparent that this opinion was widely held but a little embarrassing, at least when pres ented to an outsider. Akans, he continued, are so dispersed around Ghana that they do not act li ke that. About half an hour la ter the focus group participants

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97 were asked why residents of Bantama vote for th e NPP in such high numbers even in comparison to other constituencies in Kumasi and the Asha nti Region. The pure Asantes, the same older gentleman responded without hesitati on this time, that is Bantama. So what is one to make of Ghana with its a pparently thriving democr atic institutions and its apparently equally thriving ethnic divisions? The aforementi oned gentleman from Bantama is far from an outlier. Conversation after conversat ion on the topic of ethni city and politics in Ghana reveal that not only are et hno-linguistic divisions an important factor in Ghanaian politics but almost everyone understands this social fact as a dirty little secret to be suppressed. The electoral maps, regression an alysis, and survey data pres ented above are really only confirmations of what most participants and ob servers of Ghanaian elections have long believed anecdotally. And Ghanaians do not need to read Horowitzs (1993) warnings about democracy in divided societies to know the existent so cial cleavages are poten tially dangerous to democracy. Ghana is book-ended by Cte dIvoire a country embroiled in an on again off again sectarian civil war, and Togo, a country whose mo st recent elections were marred by violence perpetrated along regional lines. Rarely a week goes by that the Daily Graphic does not run a story about a priest, politician, businessman, footballer, movie star, or traditional authority urging the public to steer clear of tribalism. Sometimes the implication of these statements is that some opponent has been misusing ethnic sentiments for personal gain but often times the speeches appear to be rolling off a conveyer belt of speeches influential Ghanaians must make in their lifetime.17 But just as the data presented here can be read as a tentatively cautiona ry tale, so too can it be read as a real success story. Ethnicity matters a lot at election time in Ghana. The maps and 17 Kufuors post-2004 victory sp eech to this effect is report ed on by Boadu (2005) in the Daily Graphic

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98 regression analysis presented above suggest that ethnicity is an extremely significant, though not ultimately deciding factor in Ghanaian elections. Unless dramatic political events cause a complete realignment, it is hard to imagine a s cenario where the NPP will capture the majority of votes in Ewe-dominant constituencies of the Southern Volta Region or the NDC will capture the majority of votes in Asante-dominant const ituencies around Kumasi. Even acknowledging this ethno-political status quo, however, there is room for alterati on in power. Combined ethnic Ewes and ethnic Asantes make up less than 30% of the Ghanaian electorate. Evidence presented here suggests that much of the remaining 70% of the el ectorate are more varied and flexible in their support. Both the maps and regression analysis de monstrate that the majority of constituencies and districts move in relative unison slightly towards the NDC in the elections they won and slightly towards the NPP in elections they w on. Much has been made of Akan voters moving towards the NPP in 2000 and remaining there in 2 004. Yet there are several constituencies not in the Brong-Ahafo, Western, Central, or Eastern Regions in these el ections that are shown in the constituency maps to have lurched towards the N PP just as much. And the fact that the variable Akan-speaking did not show more explanatory po wer in 2000 than it did in 1996 triangulates with the maps. The NPP won in 2000 because the vast majority of constituencies moved in their direction and not because they successfully pulled more non-Asante Akan-speakers into a broader ethnic coalition. So why has not Ghana been engulfed in a sec tional dispute along the lines of its neighbors in Cte dIvoire? Such a fate was certainly on the minds of all the churches who held prayer vigils on the eve of Election Day 2004 and all the local celebrities who to ok to the airwaves in the weeks before the election to urge their count rymen to abide peacefully by the election results no matter what the outcome. Nugent offers as a potential explanation the fact that at a time

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99 when ethnicity was being used as a cudgel across the border in Cte dIvoire, it is to the credit of Ghanaian politicians that they did not resort to ethnic smears although they sometimes accused their opponents of playing dirty (2001a, 4). When taken togeth er the election analysis and cognitive shortcuts survey point to a more st ructurally-oriented solu tion. In a country where the vast majority of the voting population does no t ethnically se lf-define themselves in a way similar to the two dominant political parties, going tribalistic c ould very well stir up the base while simultaneously costing one an election. Th ough the majority of voter s view the NPP as an Asante party and the NDC as an Ewe party it is in both of these parties interests to run as far away from these labels as possible. Then wh en it comes time to vote the non-Asante and nonEwe who will ultimately decide an election will not be able to vote against those Asante or those Ewe tribalists. If, as is suggested here, most Ghanaian voters will go to the polls in 2008 and decide whether or not they like the job the Asan te party did over the past eight years, this is a far cry from understanding the electi ons as a zero-sum ethnic census. In the vast gray areas of the Ghanaian election maps voters see Ghanas two do minant parties as ethnically-tinged but they vote, not necessarily out of a sense of Gemeinschaft but perhaps based on personal evaluations that very closely resemble those traditionally reserved for societies cleaved along Gesellschaft lines.

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100 Table 4-1. NPP districts (linear regression) Table 4-2. NDC district s (linear regression) Coefficient Coefficient (Std. Error) (Std. Error) Constant .336*** Constant .055 (.033) (.118) Akan-Speakers .575*** Ewe-Speakers .675*** (.046) (.056) Christians -.308** Speakers of .132* (.124) Northern Languages (.075) Urban Dwellers .029 Muslims -.021 (.082) (.084) Highly Educated .400 Rural Dwellers -.063 (.269) (.083) Developed -.033 Less Educated .462* Toilet Facilities (.080) (.249) Undeveloped .032 Toilet Facilities (.085) Significance: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Note: The model presented in Table 4-1 has an adjusted R2 of .704 and Table 4-2 has an adjusted R2 of .625.Election results are take n from Electoral Commission of Ghana (2004) and districtlevel demographic characteristics (N=110) were obtained from Ghana St atistical Services. Table 4-3. Cognitive perceptions of class for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Low Income 0 8.0% 0 1.0% 0 6.0% Middle Income 10.5% 0 1.5% 10.0% High Income 0 7.5% 10.5% 48.5% NPP no difference 74.0% 87.0% 35.5% Low Income 12.0% 11.0% 35.0% Middle Income 0 6.5% 0 1.0% 15.5% High Income 0 9.5% 0 1.5% 0 7.5% NDC no difference 72.0% 86.5% 42.0% Significance: NPP Chi2 162.4 (df 6), p =.000; NDC Chi2 108.2 (df 6), p =.000 Table 4-4. Cognitive perceptions of population density where NPP and NDC supporters live (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Urban 20.5% 25.5% 27.0% Rural 0 5.5% 0 2.5% 25.0% NPP no difference 74.0% 72.0% 48.0% Urban 0 3.5% 0 2.0% 22.5% Rural 13.5% 34.5% 28.5% NDC no difference 83.0% 63.5% 49.0% Significance: NPP Chi2 69.1 (df 4), p =.000; NDC Chi2 92.2 (df 4), p =.000

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101 Table 4-5. Cognitive perceptions of education-level for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Well-educated 36.5% 16.5% 48.5% Uneducated 0 9.5% 0 1.5% 12.0% NPP no difference 54.0% 82.0% 39.5% Well-educated 0 5.5% 0 1.5% 10.5% Uneducated 27.0% 20.0% 46.0% NDC no difference 67.5% 78.5% 43.5% Significance: NPP Chi2 78.5 (df 4), p =.000; NDC Chi2 57.6 (df 4), p =.000 Table 4-6. Cognitive perceptions of ethnic identity for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Akan 89.0% 45.5% 95.0% Ewe 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Ga 0 0.5% 0 0.0% 0 1.5% Northern 0 0.0% 0 0.5% 0 0.5% NPP no difference 10.5% 54.0% 0 3.0% Akan 0 1.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Ewe 70.0% 33.0% 71.5% Ga 0 0.5% 0 0.5% 22.0% Northern 19.0% 11.0% 0 1.0% NDC no difference 0 9.5% 55.5% 0 5.5% Significance: NPP Chi2 177.5 (df 6), p =.000; NDC Chi2 310.3 (df 10), p =.000

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102 Table 4-7. Cognitive perceptions of region for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Ashanti 89.5% 30.5% 77.0% Brong-Ahafo 0 1.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Central 0 2.5% 0 0.0% 0 2.0% Eastern 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 1.5% Greater Accra 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.5% Northern 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Upper East 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Upper West 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Volta 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Western 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.5% The South 0 0.0% 0 6.5% 0 7.0% The North 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% NPP no difference 0 7.0% 63.0% 11.5% Ashanti 0 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Brong-Ahafo 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Central 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.5% Eastern 0 0.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Greater Accra 0 1.5% 0 1.0% 17.5% Northern 0 4.5% 0 2.0% 0 1.5% Upper East 0 0.5% 0 2.0% 0 0.0% Upper West 0 0.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Volta 62.5% 15.0% 61.0% Western 0 0.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% The South 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 1.0% The North 18.0% 19.0% 0 9.5% NDC no difference 10.0% 61.0% 0 9.0% Significance: NPP Chi2 233.6 (df 14), p =.000; NDC Chi2 282.8 (df 22), p =.000 Table 4-8. Cognitive perceptions of religion for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio Christian 57.5% 0 5.0% 21.0% Muslim 0 1.0% 0 1.0% 0 2.0% Traditionalist 0 0.5% 0 1.0% 0 1.0% NPP no difference 41.0% 93.0% 76.0% Christian 0 1.0% 0 3.0% 0 6.0% Muslim 65.5% 0 4.0% 20.0% Traditionalist 0 2.5% 0 1.0% 0 1.5% NDC no difference 31.0% 92.0% 72.5% Significance: NPP Chi2 145.6 (df 6), p =.000; NDC Chi2 205.1 (df 6), p =.000

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103 1992 1996 2000 2004 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Figure 4-1. NDC percentage of presidential votes mapped [Source: Author created maps using constituency maps from the Electoral Co mmission of Ghana as outlines and inputting election results data from Electoral Commission of Ghana (1992), Ephson (2003), and Electoral Commissi on of Ghana (2004).]

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104 1992 1996 2000 2004 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Figure 4-2. NPP percentage of presidential votes mapped [Source: Author created maps using constituency maps from the Electoral Co mmission of Ghana as outlines and inputting election results data from Electoral Commission of Ghana (1992), Ephson (2003), and Electoral Commissi on of Ghana (2004).]

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105 CHAPTER 5 THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CON TEMPORARY GHANAIAN PARTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGE S AND PARTISANSHIP PRIOR TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC The relationship between social cleavages and political parties is not immutable. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), though they have often been criticized as reifiers of the status quo must implicitly recognize that time and events can caus e the associations between social groups and party systems to be reestablished and reconfigur ed. [I]f the freezing hypot hesis is to carry any weight, either now or in the past, then it must refer to something other than, or, at least, to something more than, the immediate linkage be tween social strata and party preference, explains Mair (2001, 30) in his in terpretation of Lipset and Rokkans work, because [b]oth ends of this equation the social structure, on the one hand, and the party orga nizational and electoral identity, on the other are simply too vulnerable a nd too contingent to sust ain such a potentially powerful hypothesis on their own. Neither, it should be noted, are the constellations of conflict in any given state at any given time natural or inherent (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 14). In their application of Lipset and Rokkan, Leff and Mikula (2002, 293) observe that the freezing hypothe sis is not a deterministic argument that anticipated the transl ation of all available cleavages into parties, but rather one that recognized that specific historic al experiences mediated the e xpression of social cleavages. While the nature of Lipset and Rokkans work and its broadly comparative perspective make a focus on the entire universe of potential cleavag es in a given country, not just those having gained ascendancy in the mainstream contemporary political discourse, difficult, a study with a single country focus can, and in fact should, sp end some time looking at the various nuanced formulations of this paramount politicized social divide and also at thos e social cleavages which have been left immobilized by the party system. Th e histories social cleavage analyses rely upon,

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106 Lustick (1996, 47) warns, cannot be legitimat ely treated as an unpr oblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data ca n be elicited for the framing of problems and the testing of theories. Though one can never completely eliminat e the problems associated with the selection bias highlighted by Lustick, expl oring multiple cleavage structures in a single state, both those that have come to govern the contemporary discourse on party politics and those that have for the time being fallen by the waysid e, is a sincere step in the right direction. This chapter looks at the social and politic al processes that brought about the cleavage structures thus far dominating pa rty politics in Ghanas Fourth Republic. In elections held in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 the social democratic NDC won overwhelmingly in constituencies in the Southern half of the Volta Region. The focal point of support for the center-right NPP converges on Kumasi and its environs in the Asha nti Region. The rest of Ghana has proven itself far more competitive. When holding a number of ideologically-tinged socio-economic and ethno-linguistic variables constant in Chapter Four, it is only ethnolinguistic variables, Akan in the case of the NPP and Ewe in the case of th e NDC, that are highly significant with large positive coefficients. Combined with a thre e constituency survey of voters cognitive shortcuts, these results are refined further to reveal the Asante/Ewe ethnic split to be the dominant cleavage in contemporary Ghanaian na tional politics with th e roughly 70% of voters who do not self-identify as a member of one of these ethno-linguistic categories interpreting national politics through their ch anging relationship with these two politicized ethnic groups. In focusing on the history of this particul ar Asante/Ewe politically-mobilized social cleavage, the chapter se eks an answer to two foundational re search questions. When were the freezing moments in Ghanaian pa rty history and what political pr ocesses and social structures precipitated and shaped the characteristics of this particular frozen party system instead of one

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107 built upon the countless other potentia lly politicized social cleavages existing in Ghana? By way of a conclusion the lessons lear ned in answering these two ques tions are redirected at the literature that guides this study w ith an eye for informing theories of party systems developed largely in reference to non-Afri can contexts, most often in West ern Europe, with a novel case. Methodological Options for Historical Analysis The nature of these questions and the availa ble historical data foreclose on a number of powerful methodological options. Surveys admini stered across time aski ng questions about partisanship would be a good place to start. One c ould forthrightly track th e changing attitudes of voters towards parties and social groups to isolate freezing moments. On a national scale the Afrobarometer1 and University of Ghana2 have recently administered large-N surveys asking respondents to provide both partisan identificat ion and demographic char acteristics. While even such a basic approach would be useful in an ex ploration of politically mobilized cleavages, the tools of the behaviorist revoluti on were relatively late to arrive on African soil and even then were often applied in suboptim al conditions. Many authoritarian governments have allowed the citizenrys voice to be measured only when safe guards were firmly in pl ace to prevent critical responses. Those few single country researchers finding a political climate amenable to mass surveys were confronted with serious randomizat ion problems. In countries where most people do not possess a telephone, roads are bad and at times impenetrable, and even the government does not know who or where all of its citizens are, scholars were often forced to turn pragmatically to elite populations for a cl ue to mass opinion (Bra tton et al. 2004, 50-53). 1 Afrobarometer conducted national surveys in Ghana in 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2005. 2 University of Ghana Department of Political Science c onducted national surveys coinciding with the 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections (Ayee 1998, 2001). The volume reporting the results of the Universitys 2004 survey is forthcoming.

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108 Regular and systematic interviews could serve a different but related purpose. Once freezing moments are isolated, well-administered interviews could shed light on the processes behind this freezing. Like a time machine, these interviews would allow one to query voters motives for reconfirming the status quo or conversely sparking alte rations without the illusory effect of time and politics of the day. Though ove r the years several scholars have produced interesting descriptive texts well-informed by inte rviews, these works have tended to address the social foundations of party politics in Ghana only tangentially. Austin (1964) and Apters (1963) works cover the immediate period prior to inde pendence through most of Nkrumahs tenure with rich detail but are very broad in its focus. Ch azan (1983) fills in the periods of the Second and Third Republics with a similar ma stery of Ghanaian political history, but she too discusses political parties and their social strongholds only as part of a gr ander narrative and not with an eye focused on their interactions In between these isolated ex amples, driven both by events on the ground and trends in continenta l literature, scholarsh ip of Ghanaian polit ics has veered away from political parties all together choosing instead to focus on the pragmatic politics of personal rule and patronage (LeVine 1975; Nugent 1995) or the effects of the countrys multiple military regimes (Pinkney 1972; Rothchild 1980; Gyimah-Boadi 1993). In lieu of these precluded paths of inquir y, this chapter turns to existing data to approximate answers to its founda tional research questions. To is olate the freezing moment in the Asante/Ewe cleavage and reveal alternative social cleavages that have in the past been politically mobilized, pre-Fourth Republic el ection results are mined in two complementary formats.3 Utilizing constituency maps shaded with el ectoral data, areas of strong, moderate, and 3 Partisan elections were held in the Gold Coast in 1951, 1954, and 1956. Though these latter two elections were based on the idea of universal suffrage, the 1951 elec tion was multi-tiered. In Colony and Ashanti Protectorate municipalities this election took the form of a direct popu lar vote. In rural constituenci es an electoral college was added to the process. Northern Territorys representatives were selected on a non-partisan basis from a council of

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109 weak support for the pre-Fourth Republican partie s are depicted. This presentation of the data allows one to visually highlight social blocs that str ongly support the various historical parties dotting the Ghanaian political la ndscape in a relatively concise arrangement. The second display of election results presents re gional results along with some elemental regression analysis utilizing census data to predict voting behavior.4 Though this approach lacks the ability of a multivariate regression analysis to hold a num ber of cross-cutting cleavages constant, like a survey the election maps and limited census data provide an efficient mechanism for pinpointing periods of stasis and change in the relationship between polit ical parties and geographicallybased social cleavages. With these periods of freezing identified, th e burden of reading history remains heavy. Having an idea about what cleavages are importa nt and when they revealed themselves as politically viable is only the star t of a project meant to identify th e social and political ingredients that generated a party systems freezing mome nt. Once one has a good idea of the relevant traditional leaders. Prior to the Four th Republics inauguration in 1992 there were only two partisan national elections deemed generally free and fair These were held in 1969 and 1979. There was a partisan election held in 1960 for the presidency but by this time Nkrumah and his CPP had managed to lock out competition. The result was Nkrumah receiving nearly 90 percent of the national vote. So urce material for the electio n results is as follows: 1951 (General Election Results: C.P.P. Scrubs the Polls in Ghanas First General Election 1951; Government of the Gold Coast 1951); 1954 (Government of the Gold Coast 1954; Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive 1954); 1956 (Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive 1956; Victory for the C. P.P. 1956); 1969 (Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive 1969; Government of Ghana 1969); and 1979 (Addae-Mensah 1979). Results depicted in the maps are only for legislative elections. 4 Censuses during this period present some significant methodological issues for the researcher. Prior to the Fourth Republic national censuses were conducted in 1948, 1960, 1970, and 1984. While it would be convenient to merge this information into a dataset alongside election results, unfortunately the census data is sparse and inconsistent. The question of ethnicity, for instance, was broached in so me detail in 1960s Special Report E Tribes in Ghana (Gil et al. 1964) but disappeared from future censuses until 2000 b ecause of the controversy the report stirred and though 1948, 1960, and 1970 all ask questions about school attendance, a useful abstraction for social class, reports from 1984 are little more than a head count. Additionally these censuses use different units of analysis, many of whose boundaries are inconsistent with electoral constituencies or have been lost to time. Since 1960 was the most complete census and was accompanied with a thor ough unit of analysis map, all of the census data presented in this chapter comes from that census. In order to make these census units of analysis compatible with electoral constituencies some of each had to be merged. The end result was 50 units varying sign ificantly in size from 32,680 residents to 491,820 residents. Results are reported in these units, a map of which appears in Figure 52.

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110 periods, the task turns to a s earch through the historical r ecord for changes in social demographics and/or party systems that could somehow change the quality of their relationship and lead to the patterns a pparent in the electoral maps Combing through the available scholarship on Ghanaian politics one finds a number of anecdotal hypo theses regarding the genesis of the Asante/Ewe poli tically-mobilized cleavage. Though fewer, there are also a number of anecdotal hypotheses regarding so cial cleavages that contemporar y Ghanaian politics have left fallow. Given the time sequence and characteris tics highlighted through the use of constituency maps, election results, and census data, the most credible explanations are culled from the pack. Isolating Freezing Moments: Electi ons in the Gold Coast and Ghana Pre-Independence Elections (1951, 1954, and 1956) Nkrumah took his case to the masses through the Ghana College, CYO, and especially Accra Evening News We had succeeded, Nkrumah (1957, 109) recollects in his autobiography, because we had talked with the people and by so doing knew their feelings and grievances. Danquah and the ol d-guard within the UGCC were more cautious. While they too made claims to speak for the people, th e UGCC Working Committee was of the mind that Britain would never give power to any group of irresponsible pe ople anywhere in the Colonial Empire, with irresponsible meant to c onvey Nkrumahs known tendency to rabble-rouse (Austin 1961, 292). In the end the CPPs message, or perhaps more accurately its populist tactics, helped the party capture the Self Government Now pos ition and ride this position to massive victories in each of the Gold Coasts elected Legislative Assemblies. Nkrumah and the CPP averaged 71%, 56%, and 64% of the vote ac ross constituencies in the pre-independence parliamentary elections (1951, 1954, and 1956 respectiv ely) taking a plurality of seats in the 1951 Legislative Assembly due to the large proporti on of nonpartisan appointed members and

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111 an easy majority in the Gold Coasts popular ly elected Legislativ e Assemblies of 1954 and 1956.5 If one looks geographically at the CPPs electoral strongholds across these three preindependence elections (see Figure 5-2 and Tables 5-1 and 5-2), one finds, not surprisingly given electoral outcomes, a party that did well across the colonys varied terr itories and regions. Despite this widespread success, there are dispar ities both within and across elections. With few exceptions, CPP parliamentary candidates sailed to their easiest victories along the coast. Given the party vanguards reputation as tramps in N.T. [Northern Territory] Smocks and its supporters reputation as Standa rd VII leavers these results seem on the surface a bit counterintuitive (Austin 1964, 212). As a rule of thumb, both before independence and after, the closer one gets to the coast in Ghana the more developed the area.6 According to Ghanas 1960 census, the regions that made up Gold Coast Colony, where the CPP consistently gained its best results, had 27% of their adult populations w ho could claim some formal schooling. In TransVolta Togoland, Ashanti Protectorate, and Northe rn Territories, where the CPP did relatively worse, this number was 26%, 20%, and 3% resp ectively (Ghana Census Office 1962, xvi-xvii).7 The maps depicted in Figure 5-2 treat DanquahBusiaist parties as a residual category. This representation is not accidental. Danquah-Busi aist parties and thei r allies did not do well 5 Two caveats must be attached to thes e results. In 1951 the Northern Territories were not allowed a partisan vote (Was Secrecy a Mistake 1951) and in 1954 there were 64 rebels expelled from the CPP in the run-up to elections, many of whom ran as independents and averaged on their own 12 percent of the vote per seat (Addo 1954). 6 Using the Wroclow Taxonomic Technique, Ewusi (1976), ranks each of the regions that made up the Gold Coast Colony (Western, Central, Eastern, and Greater Accra) as more developed than any of the countrys other regions. 7 A bivariate regression using the CPPs percentage of the vote as the dependent variable and the percentage of people in the territorial units depicted in Figure 5-2 who are over the age of 6 and have attended at least some school as the independent variable substantiates this reading of the maps. In 1954 this regression yields a coefficient (standard error) of .701 (.218) with a significance of .002. In 1956 the results are .459 (.252) with a significance of .074.

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112 nationally at the pre-independence polls scoring no greater than a third of the parliamentary seats in any of these elections. A more important reas on for this depiction, however, is the difficulty associated with identifying the Danquah-Busiaist s during this period of time. Danquah himself ran for office under the flags of the UGCC, GCP, and NLM. These parties, especially the NLM in 1956, found their strongest suppor t in the area presently kn own as Ashanti Region. Having averaged barely 5% of the vote across constituen cies in 1951 and scorin g victories in only two seats, the UGCC settled into an anti-CPP coa lition of regional partners for the 1954 and 1956 elections. To the parties of Da nquah were joined most notably a party focusing its campaign on the North, the NOPP, a party pur portedly speaking for Ghanas Muslim population, MAP, and a party focusing its campaign on the Togoland regi on, the TC. These diverse groups rallied around a proposed federal constitution and were universally decried by Nkrumahists as factions with an eye to destroy national unity (Select Comm ittee of the Legislat ive Council 1955, 378). Blunt observations of this variety, though they are technically accurate and have come to be a mainstay in the historical discourse, do vi olence to the actual results of these sectional parties. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 de pict election results for 1954 and 1956 by region. In addition to the raw percentages, these results are color-coded based on the ma jor ethno-cultural groups that yield a significant positive coefficient when aske d to predict the outcome of party votes in a bivariate regression. While the re gional parties, save for the GCP in 1954, show an expected relationship with the ethnic and/or cultural groups they are unders tood to represent, a look at the percentages of these parties s upport in regions populated larg ely by these same ethic and/or cultural groups forces a reinterpretation of the results. The NLM, NOPP and TCs supremacy amongst specified sectional groups should not be overstated. In the Ashanti Protectorate the NLM captured just over 50% of the vote while the CPP managed more than 40%. Even

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113 acknowledging the regions ethnic diversity (the 1960 census reports that a third of Ashantis inhabitants are non-Asante), one can not credibly interp ret these results as representative of a politically homogeneous ethnic bloc. The NLMs percentage of the votes positive correlation with Asante-speakers is just as much an effect of the partys lack of suppor t outside of Ashanti as it is an effect of their popul arity amongst Asante-speakers. A similar declaration is easily applied to the NOPP and TC. In areas comprising the Northern Territories (Northern, Upper West, a nd Upper East Regions at present) the NOPP averaged fewer votes than the CPP in both 1954 and 1956. The TC earned its best results in Ewe-speaking areas of Trans-Volt a Togoland (Volta Region today) but did not run candidates in the Ewe-predominant areas along the coast, ced ing these constituencies to the Anlo Youth Organization (AYO) and its successor the Fede ration of Youth Organizations (FYO), and won only two of the four seats in Kpandu and Ho in both 1954 and 1956 (the CPP and an independent candidate picked up the remaining two seats). Post-Independence Elections before the Fourth Republic (1969 and 1979) After independence Nkrumah and the CPP quick ly took steps to consolidate power and turned Ghana first into a de facto one-party state and eventually into a de jure one-party state. The military overthrew the First Republic in February 1966 and held elections for the Second Republic in August 1969. Twenty-eight months later the Second Republic was overthrown and after a period of seven years of military rule the Third Republic was inaugurated in September 1979, itself to be overthrown after only twenty-ei ght months. For each of these elections the Nkrumahist/Danquah-Busiaist split was revived. Taking up the standard of Danquah-Busiaism in 1969 was eventual Prime Minister Kofi Busia and his PP. Busia was an obvious successor to Danquah, who had died in prison during Nkrumahs reign, possessing all the credentials one would expect of a Danquah-Busiaist flag

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114 bearer. He held a doctorate in Social Anthr opology from Oxford and had risen through the political ranks thanks in no small part to the favor he curried with traditional authorities in the Asanteman Council (Danso-Boafo 1996, 27). For th e 1979 elections the Danquah-Busiaist camp was split with Victor Owusus PFP and William Ofori-Attas UNC both laying claim to the Danquah-Busiaist mantle, OforiAtta through his family ties with Danquah and involvement in the UGCC and Owusu through Busias PP (1979). Nkrumahist parties include the NAL which t ook up the post of Busias principle opposition after the 1969 elections and Dr. Hilla Lima nns PNP which won both the presidency and legislature in 1979. Limann, an unknown civil servant before his well-established uncle and old guard Nkrumahist Imoru Egala advanced his name as a presidential candidate, and his party ran openly as the Nkrumahist candidates (Addae-Mensah 1981; Kraus 1988, 479). The NAL had to don the label more delicately. With the NLC gove rnment outwardly hostile to remnants of the old regime, one of Nkrumahs di smissed ministers in exile, Komla Gbedemah, returned to Ghana to lead the party but avoided plastering campaign adverts and ma nifestos with Nkrumahs name and image as the CPP and later Nkrumahist parties were prone.8 In both the 1969 and 1979 elections Danquah-Busi aist parties maintained their relative dominance in the Ashanti Region at levels greater, in the case of the PP, or equal, in the case of the PFP, to that of the NLM. The PP swept the regions 22 parliamentary seats in 1969 and the PFP took 19 of these 22 seats in 1979.9 Apart from this similarity, the Danquah-Busiaist party 8 For more on the dispute between Gbedemah and Nkrumah see (The Trut h about Komla Gbedemah n.d.) for Nkrumahs case and (Gbedemah 1962) for Gbedemahs side of the story. Both documents are available in IvorWilks collected material on Ghana. 9 Today Ghana has 10 regions. In 1954 Ghana had four. The only two contemporary regions that can not be drawn out of the 1954 data are Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions. Unlike the other 8 contemporary regions, the lines dividing Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo did not run along existin g constituency lines. Therefore, in this chapter Ashanti refers to the Ashanti/Brong-Ahafo conglomerate when spea king of pre-independence elections and Ashanti Region only when speaking of post-independence elections.

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115 maps and election results for 1969 and 1979 diverg e in a number of significant ways. The 1969 map, which depicts a Danquah-Bu siaist victory, shows strong support across Ghana and in Akan-speaking regions in particular. Brong-Ahaf o, Busias birth region, rivals Ashanti Region with its strength of support a nd the Central Region and west ern portion of Eastern Region demonstrate high levels of support as well. The 1979 map, which depicts a Danquah-Busiaist loss, contrasts with the 1969 ma p in diminished support across almost every region of the country. What this map does not show, however, is th e discrepancy between the bases of support for 1979s two Danquah-Busiaist parties. The UNC sc ored its best results in the Volta, Greater Accra, and non-Akan porti ons of the Eastern Region.10 The PFP had a better showing in general across the country but demonstrated true mast ery in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo. When a run-off election proved necessary pitting the Nkrumahist candidate for president against Victor Owusu a very telling result was produced. Despite th e UNCs pre-election flirtation with a DanquahBusiaist merger between themselves and the PFP (Sutton-Jones 1979, 15), election results suggest that the vast majority of UNC voters pr eferred the Nkrumahist party candidate to the candidate of a Danquah-Busiaist party associ ated principally with the Ashanti Region. The maps of Nkrumahist support in 1969 and 1979 ar e more inconsistent still. In neither of these two elections did the Nkrumahists do remarkab ly well in Ashanti as a result of a DanquahBusiaist stranglehold on the region. Additionally there appears to be two trends amidst the sea of ambiguously gray areas on these Nkrumahist maps First, Nzima-speakin g constituencies in 10 With the exception of the area around Aflao where the UNC had its best results, this support manifested itself as a second place finish to the CPP in these ar eas with around a third of the vote.

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116 Ghanas Southwest corner remain l oyal to Nkrumah, a son of their soil.11 This relationship is not obvious in 1969 when an NLC anti-CPP bias resulte d in no self-identified Nkrumahist parties. Because of Gbedemah and the NALs successes nationally most scholars have unequivocally pinned the label on them, but the Peoples Action Party (PAP), which made its only significant showing in Nzima-speaking constituencies, sto od in opposition to the Danquah-Busiaist PP as well. The second noticeable trend is the Nkrumahist s success in their flag bearers home region. Gbedemah was able to shake the Volta Regions relationship with the Danquah-allied TC and move past a lingering resentment towards Nkruma h for his role in the 1956 Ghanaian Togoland referendum to achieve overwhelming success in the area. Limann, who hailed from Sisaalaland in Ghanas far North, united the Upper Regions in an unprecedented way leading his party to 15 of the areas available 16 seats. Looking at these post-independence elections with the help of regression analysis reveals the lack of politically mobili zed cleavages along socio-economic lines. Unlike Nkrumahs CPP, none of the major parties register s a significant correlation between the percentage of individuals with some formal education in a unit of analysis and the percentage of the votes garnered in same unit of analysis. Looking at th ese elections with an eye for th e perceived ethnic identities of the major parties is more revealing (see Tables 53 and 5-4). The perceived Asante parties (PP in 1969 and PFP in 1979), Ewe parties (NAL in 1969 a nd UNC in 1979), and Northern party (PNP in 1979) all show better than expect ed nil results in units of analys is with large numbers of their supposed ethnic, and in the case of Northerners cultural, cores. In both 1969 and 1979 the Asante pa rty seems to have settled into a fairly regular pattern following the NLMs focused success in Asante-dominant constituencies. To win, the PP 11 This loyalty has been carried into the Fourth Republic wi th the CPP scoring its greatest victories, modest as they may be, in Nzima-speaking constituencies in the Western Region.

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117 managed to add to this base of voters a significa nt percentage of non-Asante Akan voters. This feat is unique in pre-Fourth Republic Ghanaian history. The Ewe party and its relationship with its perceived base was far less consistent. In the elections of 1969 the NAL managed to add to its fairly solid Ewe base a relatively large pe rcentage of the vote in Ga-speaking areas. In the parliamentary and first round of presidential vo tes in 1979 it is impossible to label the UNCs success in Ewe areas a landslide but the second round reinvigorated the notion of a coherent voting bloc. The one perceived Northern party to run in these elections was the PNP who did significantly better in the North th an it did in the South in 1979 but was certainly not a single region party having done well enough in the South, where the vast majority of the parliaments seats were situated, to take a majority in the Third Republics legislature. The Freezing Process: Cleavages Po liticized and Cleavages Left Fallow In Lipset and Rokkans typology of party systems, the notion of revolution is of the utmost consequence. The case studies Lipset and Rokkan us e to illustrate the process of freezing are separated into categories based on the type of revolution that cleaved the given society in a politically meaningful way. If the relationship between parties and society was forged through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation the pa rty system would reflect a center-periphery dispute, national revolutions along the lines of the French Revolution would solicit clashes between supporters of the state and supporters of the church, the industrial revolution begets a row between land owners and i ndustrialists, and the Russian Revolution produced a conflict between owners and workers (Lip set and Rokkan 1967, 47). To fit West Africa into the Lipset and Rokkan mold, Wallerstein (1967) argues that the regions party system s were generated out of nationalist movements seeking independence. On one side of the resultant cleavage were the dominant nationalist parties and on the other were the colonial metropoles. Independence shed these cleavage structures of one of their poles and one-party st ates were the natural outcome.

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118 Wallerstein is uncertain as to what dichotomous cleavage structure would eventually replace this monopoly. He hopes that better deve loped class interests would even tually rise to the fore but fears that tribal differences will beat classes to the punch (p. 511). What happened to the Ghanaian party system across republics is not so dramatic as the revolutions covered by Lipset and Rokkan, a nd as the above described maps suggest, Wallersteins characterization of fledgling party systems in West Africa as monolithic forces uniformly opposing colonial rule misses some significant areas of opposition evident in Gold Coast elections. His pr ediction that class ( Gesellschaft ) and ethnic ( Gemeinschaft ) cleavages would compete for pre-eminence once the inde pendence honeymoon was over is very much in line with the contemporary understanding of the competing poles of potentiality in African politics in general and Ghanaian politics in pa rticular. As discussed below, each of these cleavage types has, at one time or another and to varying degrees, defined the opposing forces in Ghanaian politics. In the following section the Asante/Ewe cleavag e which has come to largely define politics in Ghanas Fourth Republic is explored historically. The events which together produce this cleavage dialogue, reveal themselves not as a re velatory moment where what was one day fluid is another day frozen. Rather, the politicization of this cleavage reveals itself as a series of significant events in relation to the colonial and national governments in both Ashanti and Eweland that construct and reconstr uct, frequently completely independent of each other, these, at least in recent years, oppositio nal political identities. After exploring this particular ethnopolitical cleavage in some detail, two alternat ives are briefly considered. These include the North/South cleavage that can best be understood as a division along class and cultural lines as well as the ethno-linguistic cleavage understood as pitting Akans versus everyone else.

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119 Creating the Asante v. Ewe Dichotomy The Asante/Ewe ethnic dispute that has come to define the oppositions in contemporary Ghanaian politics is far from primordial. Pr e-independence elections saw areas inhabited primarily by members of these two ethnic groups often allied. President Kufuor, who is held up as the epitome of the Danquah-Bu siaist/Asante admixture, has gone so far as to incorporate leaders of the early Togoland unification movement into his list of good Ghanaian nationalists of the Danquah-Busiaist mold (Nugent 2002, 230).12 This understanding of the nascent period of Gold Coast politics stands in stark contrast to politics of Ghanas Fourth Republic where journalists sympathetic to either side of the aisle are keen to poi nt out the triba listic tendencies of their opponents, with the NDC ostensibly serving Ewe interests and the NPP serving Asante or Akan interests.13 The maps and census data mined above he lp to describe the nature of this transformation and highlight electio ns of significance but they do so in such a way that avoids identifying the actors, structures, and/or events that drove the process. Without a spectacular revolution on which to pin the blame, three ques tions are asked of the historical record to supplement the preceding election analysis. What precipitated the formation of the unified political identities known today as Ewe and Asante? How did these identities become oppositional forces? And what actors, structures, and/ or events have helped sustain, redefine, and reinterpret this competition? 12 Being a leader of the Togoland Congress, as Nugent (2002, 189) points out, is not synonymous with being Ewe. Even if one focuses only on the Southern section of the Volta Region one finds a number of small ethnic groups known collectively as the Central Togo minorities. Though these groups have tended to insist on their cultural uniqueness, in matters of national politics they have co nsistently adopted the approach of ethnicity by approximation aligning themselves with their more numerous and more powerful Ewe neighbors (Nugent 2000, 163). 13 The debate between Bebli (2005) and Adjei (2005) is a good example of this tendency though it is far from unique.

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120 Becoming politically salient groups Paying attention to the contem porary political discourse in Ghana gives one the impression that Danquah-Busiaism has, from its very incept ion, been intimately entangled with the Asante ethnic identity. This misreading of Ghanaian hi story ignores election re sults from 1951 and 1954 where Danquahs parties, the UGCC and GCP, were beaten rather sound ly on their supposed home turf by the CPP. In 1951 the UGCC manage d less than 1% of the vote in the Ashanti Protectorate while collecting nearly 6% of the vot e in the rest of the Gold Coast. The GCP in 1954 did a little better in the Ashanti Protectorate capturing nearly 9% of the vote there compared to just over 3% elsewhere. It was the NLM in 1956 that altered this status quo of lackluster results by both galvanizing Asante-spe aking voters as they had not been galvanized before and tying them to the Danquah-Busiaist ideology in the minds of the politicians and pundits who would comment on future elections. Austin (1964, 253-4) identifies the spark of this realignm ent very specifically as Gbedemahs introduction of the Cocoa Duty a nd Development Funds Bill to the Legislative Assembly on 10 August 1954 in the immediate wake of the Gold Coasts first fully national elections. The bill proposed to fi x the price given to cocoa farmer s for a period of four years in the midst of a worldwide boom in the price of cocoa.14 Like an innocent match flame, reads an editorial on the bill published in the Ashanti Pioneer on 4 September 1954, the strange attitude of the all African CPP Government to the simple demand of farmers for a higher local price of cocoa has gone a long way to threaten to set ablaze the petrol dump of Ashanti nationalism (quoted in Allman 1990, 266). It was in this contentious environment that a number of young 14 The CPP government argued that this policy would curb inflationary pressures and aid development. In practice much of the funds gained through the Cocoa Marketing Board were funneled into loans and other favors for loyal party members (Omari 1970, 59-60).

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121 men who had once been members of the CPP or its affiliate Asante Youth Association broke away from the governing party to launch the NLM. Though the movementcum -party would eventually come to be associated with the Asante nation writ-larg e, Rathbone (1973) and Allman (1990) argue compellingly that these ea rly organizers were those young men well-versed in CPP populism who felt their potential for priv ate wealth accumulation had been adversely affected by the CPPs cocoa policy and saw th emselves as too distant from the nodes of government power in Accra to hope for ready access to the public coffers.15 Once inaugurated this movement quickly became too big for its founders to control and they were soon joined by farmers affected directly by cocoa prices the Asantehene and Asanteman Council whose traditional power wa s being challenged by Nkrumahs centralizing tendencies, and leaders of the po litical opposition in search of so me traction that would increase their narrow base of support and allow them an entre into real power (Austin 1964, 265). Though there was a great disparity in these varied intere sts ultimate goals, there were two areas of general agreement: the CPP government was not providing the instant economic gratification its manifestos had promised and some version of Ashanti nationalism was the most promising counterweight to the CPP govern ments national appeal on the grounds of Self Government Now. The young men who sparked the movement we re adept at marshalling symbols of Asante power from a bygone empire usi ng the well recognized Asante Kotoko as their rallying cry from the day of the NLMs inception.16 Emboldened by this sense of rebellion a number of groups, many only loosely affiliated with the NLM, embarked on a serious campaign of 15 On other points relating to the NLM Rathbone and Allman are not of the same mind. For a fleshing out of their disputes see Rathbone (1991). 16 Kotoko is the Asante Twi word for porcupine. Like the quills from a porcupine, the Asante proverb goes, if you kill a thousand, a thousand more will come (Allman 1990, 264).

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122 harassment and sporadic violence aimed at C PP members and sympathizers within the Ashanti Protectorate.17 It was not even a year before this outburst of large-scale anti-CPP Asante nationalism would be wrangled by traditiona l authorities in the Asanteman Council who well-placed to serve as symbols of opposition via their predecessors l eadership of the Asante Empires lengthy and bloody campaign against the British barely a half century prio r (Edgerton 1995). Working with these traditional authorities, members of the oppos ition in legislature made a formal demand of both the British and the CPP for a change in the constitution that would diminish CPP power outside of the Colony proper where their s upport was the greates t. The recommended mechanisms for adjusting the colonys distribu tion of power were twofold: a weak federal system giving the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti Protectorate, Northern Territories, and TransVolta Togoland a great deal of autonomy in handling their local affairs and a bicameral legislature adding to the presen t unicameral Legislative Assemb ly an upper house composed of all Chiefsnot subordinate to any other Chie f (Proposals for a Federal Constitution 1955). In defense of these dema nds Busia (1956) writes that: The strength of nationa l feeling in Ashanti is well known. It was given historic expression during the last century in seven battles against the British. National sentiment in Ashanti is based on a history of which the Ashantis are proud, and on loyalty to the Golden Stool, the symbol of the nations identity. Any constitu tion which fails to rec ognize the identity of the Ashanti nation will arouse vi olent feelings against it. Despite the Asante-centric essence of this rationale, and its oft-argued crasser version,18 the logic reverberated positively with the rest of the Gold Coasts regional opposition parties.19 17 A British colonial officer reported during this period that there might be organized in Ashanti a strong-arm group using firearms who would be prepared, if the need arose, to take to the forest. He adds that [t]he country is such that it would not be difficult for 200/300 young men suitably armed to stage a Mau Mau of their own (quoted by Allman 1990, 274).

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123 In Ewe-speaking areas of Southeastern Ghana, the party that championed this cause to the greatest success was the TC. Thoug h their aversion to CPP rule and desire for greater regional autonomy is shared with the NLM, the TC had to rely on a very different set of historical and cultural ingredients. The concep t of Togoland, unlike Ashanti, does not rely on a perceived historical ethnic identity. Rather Togoland is understood explicitly as a residual of the colonial experiment in West Africa. Carved out by Germ any during Europes scramble for Africa, Togos first colonization was brief and relatively shallow. Though the colony would receive some attention for attaining economic se lf-sufficiency, in stark contra st to Germanys other African possessions and much of British and French We st Africa, in 1890 there were only twelve German officials in Togo and by World War I ther e were still no more than 400 Europeans in the entire colony (Amenumey 1969). With Germanys de feat in World War I, the League of Nations set about the task of divvying up the responsibilit ies for administering th e conquereds territories. In Togoland the French were gi ven responsibility for 60% of th e territory inhabited by 80% of the Togolese population. The British accepted the remainder of German Togos western flank (Louis 1966, 886).20 Like political parties in the Gold Coast Col ony, the forces that would come to define the colonial period in Togoland came to the fore in the late 1940s with desi gns of leading the area towards independence. These proto-parties can be placed into two categories based on the form 18 This version of the argument for greater Asante power resembles Owusus (1975, 259) quote taken from an Asante kente weaver during the campaign for the Second Republic. If the British had not come, the weaver complains, the Ashanti would have taken over the whole country. 19 The NLMs constitutional demands were co-signed by representatives of the Asanteman Council but also representatives of the NOPP, TC, AYO, MAP, GCP, and GNP. 20 The British were willing to accept bit portions of Togo and Cameroon in We st Africa in exchange for the lion share of what they viewed as more valuable property in East Africa.

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124 of Togoland they desired.21 The first type of party wanted to unite traditional Ewe-speaking territories. Prior to colonization, the notion of a unified Ewe ethni c political identity had been unimagined. Ewe was a linguistic and cultural iden tity that described a number of semiautonomous localities along the coast and Togo hills but there was never an Ewe state (Austin 1963, 141). Despite these historical facts, a num ber of well-educated and wealthy merchants from Anlo in the Gold Coast Colony and Lom in French Togoland pitched the idea of a panEwe independent country stretching from areas constituting the Gold Coast Colonys southeastern corner through Fonspeaking areas in Dahomey and nor th all the way to the border shared with Buem District in Togoland (Nugent 2002, 168-169). The second type of party sought the reunificat ion of the territory once constituting German Togo. This definition of the project excluded Pe ki, Anlo, Some, Tongu, and Klikor Ewes in the Gold Coast Colony and Fon-speakers in Dahome y, but added to the remaining Ewe-speakers, their non-Ewe neighbors who had es tablished residence in Southe rn Togoland and Central Togo minorities, a host of ethnic groups residing from Buem northward. By jettisoning Gold Coast Colony Ewes, and to a lesser exte nt Dahomian Fons, this concep tualization of Togoland cleared two significant hurdles. It assu aged the fears of many inland Ewes of being dominated by the wealthier and better educated Ewes from the Gold Coast Colony and brought the regions demands into the purview of the United Natio ns who bore responsibility for overseeing the British and French administration of the mandate territories (The Ewe Question (2) 1951, 103; The Ewe Question (3) 1951, 127). The desire fo r a reunification of German Togoland brought with it a major stumbling block as well, namely areas in Togolands North. The Dagomba and 21 Some have argued that there were in fact three unders tandings of Togoland. In addition to the two categories described here, there were a few people early on in the imagining process that desired a Togoland merging both British and French Togoland as well as Ewe-speaking areas of the Gold Co ast Colony (The Ewe Question (1) 1951, 80).

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125 Mamprusi ethnic communities that predominated in these areas of Northern Togoland would be separated from numerically larg er Dagomba and Mamprusi ethnic communities in the Gold Coasts Northern Territories by any partition (Ame numey 1989, 172-3). This latter course, with all its associated strengths and weaknesses, was the course championed by TC in their opposition to Nkrumah and the CPP.22 Election results from 1951 and 1954 go some way in explaining why the TC, which was after all not explicitly an Ewe unification party, would come by many to be as cl osely associated with the Ewe as the NLM was with Asante. The region known presently as Volta Region contains the majority of Ghanas Ewespeakers and Ewe-speakers make up a majority of the Volta Regi ons population. The TC ran its only candidates in this region though it steered clear of the former Gold Coast Colony Ewe areas leaving them to the AYO in 1954 and FYO in 1956.23 When a plebiscite was put to the residents of British Togoland this by now familiar pattern was replicated. When asked if they favored integration with the Gold Coast Colony or se paration, Ho and Kpandu, the only two districts with a majority of Ewe-speakers (87% and 85% respectively according to the 1960 census), voted 62% in favor of separa tion whereas Buem-Krachi, Gonja, Dagomba, and Mamprusi Districts each had a majority vo ting for integration with only 29% of voters on average favoring separation (figures cite d in Nugent 2002, 190). Though the limits of the Asantes rapid awaken ing and the Ewes gra dual realizat ion of a common political identity are touched upon in th e preceding section on Freezing Moments, the topic warrants further discussion with an eye for how these limitations fit into the process of 22 The All Ewe Conference had made the case for Ewe unification but never submitted candidates for the Legislative Assembly. The movement was undercut both by the Un ited Nations reluctance to consider tampering with international boundaries and the CPPs merging of Southe rn British Togoland and the Ewe-speaking areas in the Gold Coast Colony into a single region, Trans-Volta Togoland, in 1952 (Amenumey 1989, 136). 23 These Ewe areas that were never in German Togoland were opposed to a unification of the two Togos as it would leave them an isolated group (A sante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 24)

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126 developing an Asante/Ewe political dichotomy. In thinking nationalizing parties were the key to avoiding a reliance on tribal cleav ages in Africas independence era, Wallerstein is not alone. As mentioned in Chapter Two, early literature on African political parties is rife with such conclusions (Apter 1965; Coleman and Ro sberg 1964; Hodgkin 1961; Morgenthau 1964; Zolberg 1966). Given this inte llectual environment, Nkrumahs castigation of the NLM and TC for being forces of outdated primordial sentim ents standing in opposition to his modernizing and nationalizing democratic forces was well within the mainstream discourse on political parties. Yet the real threat these regional parties pos ed to Nkrumah and hi s CPP based on election results was localized and modest at best. When one speaks of the NLMs use of Asantes unique historical relationship with the British or the TCs use of Togolands un ique legal position in relation to the Gold Coast Co lony and Ewe-speaking communities geographic relationship to the resultant uncertain boundary, one is not speaking of a proce ss resulting in the successful creation of uncontested ethnic blocs of voters; the CPP either came close to, or in some cases bested, the vote totals of thes e regional parties amongst Asante and Ewe voters. Rather, one is speaking of a process resulting in the successful cr eation of parties that became identifiable to the electorate based on the ethnic groups that dare d challenge CPP authority to a greater degree than average in an environment where political parties were understood by most as either nationalizing or sectionalist. Becoming political opposites a nd fostering this relationship These circumstances changed drastically in the independence era when Nkrumahs specter no longer loomed large over Ghanaian politics. Much as the early Africanist scholars of political parties had predicted, ethnicity would take a di fferent and more focal role in the political discourse once the most notable pro-independe nce party was no longer around to serve as a centralizing force. Ghanaians would not have to wait until campaigni ng season for the Second

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127 Republic heated up for charges of tribalism to be leveled. The combined military and police forces that would overthrow Nkrumah were led by three Ewe officers (Kotoka, Harlley, and Deku) and two Akans (Afrifa an Asante and Ok ran a Fante). Within a month of the NLCs formation, to these coup-makers would be adde d two Gas (Ankrah and Nunoo) and a Northerner (Yakubu) with Ankrah taking up the post as Head of the C ouncil (Kraus 1966). Before long, however, the ethnic make-up of the NLC would be altered significantly. Kotoka was killed in April 1967 when an Army Reconnaissance Squadron from Ho drove to Accra with the goal of overthrow ing the military government. Talking to press after Kotokas death, Lt.-Gen. Ankrah felt compelled to clear the record. [R]umours th at the attempted coup was an insurrection planned by Ashantis and Fan tis against Ewes and Gas, the NLC chairman warned the assembled press, were wicked and absolutely untrue (cited in Bossman 1967, 2021). This public appeal stemmed from well-worn, albeit largely unsubstantiated, claims that the NLC was a tool for filling the public sector wi th Ga and Ewe-speakers (Austin 1976, 125). Then in April 1969 Ankrah was asked to step down as Chairman of the NLC by his colleagues who accused him of prepping a campaign for himself a nd fellow Ga politicians in the run-up to anticipated national elections.24 Nunoo vehemently denied these allegations against Ankrah and was himself removed from the NL C shortly thereafter (Dowse 1975, 31). With Afrifa now at the helm of state, and civilians the likes of Busia a nd Owusu serving as high profile advisors to the military regime, what was once characterized as an Ewe and Ga coup looked remarkably like an Akan dominant regime (Brown 1982, 56). This reconstituted ethnic arithmetic did not go unnoticed by would-be politicians or the voting public and figured into the 1969 campaign in some very explicit ways. Ethnic rivalry 24 Ankrah and the politicians he was accused of accepting money for would ev entually join Joe Appiahs United Nationalist Party (UNP).

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128 was never openly proclaimed as a good thing, notes Brown (p. 57), b ut condemnations of tribalism gave way to benign neglect and there was widespread public knowledge of Afrifas campaign against the Ewe, Gbedemah, and his support for his fellow Ashanti, Busia; of Harlleys support for Gbedemah; and of Ankrahs support, until his dismissal, of Alex HuttonMills and other Ga politicians. The election resu lts reflect these divisions with Busia and the Danquah-Busiaist PP establishing what Chazan ( 1982, 476) has called the grand Akan alliance of 1969 and Gbedemah and the NAL cobbling toge ther a coalition of Ewe and Ga voters, many of whom saw the power shift within the NLC as a thinly veiled ethnic power grab. Minor players too had their strongholds with the United National Party (UNP), PAP, and All Peoples Republican Party (APRP) polling best in Ga, Nz ima, and Fante-speaking areas respectively. Of all Ghanas disparate regions it is only in the No rth where the electorate can be characterized as relatively evenly divided between th e Danquah-Busiaists and Nkrumahists. To the victors went the spoils and Busia made little effort to reach out to the areas of Ghana that had shunned him. Though Busia made cer tain to condemn tribalism in the wake of his victory and promised a fair deal for all regions (Quarcoo 1969), his cabinet selections showed disgruntled voters just how far his genero sity reached. In a cabinet of nineteen, Busia tapped fourteen Akans (5 Asante, 2 Brong, 3 Akim 1 Fanti, and 3 other Akan), one Ga, three Northerners, and one Guan (Danso-Boafo 1996, 100).25 This cabinet stood in the way of Ewe appointments and promotions in the higher echelons of the po lice, armed forces, and civil service; removed Gbedemah from Parliament under dubious circumstances; implemented the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order wh ich was directed largely at Ewe communities along the 25 According to the 1960 census Akans made up approximately 45 percent of the Ghanaian population. In 2000 this number was approaching 50 percent. Either way, by making his cabinet 74 percent Akan Busia was throwing the idea of an ethnic balance out the door.

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129 border; dismissed Ewes dispropor tionately from the civil servi ce in operation Apollo 568; and treated the Volta Region as R egion number nine when it came to development projects (Brown 1982, 59). So instead of a nationalizing party dominating several parochial parties, this first postindependence multi-party election was defined by a competition between ethnic blocs. [O]f all the highly significant cleavages of modern Ghana (sub-region, age, class, income, education, and so forth), Rothchild (1978, 1) writes in referenc e to this period of Ghanaian history, none is more salient than that of et hnicity (cited in Chazan 1982, 461). Into this volatile context of ethnic distrust stepped the National Redemption Council (NRC) military regime. Though the flagging economy was the problem with the Busi a regime most oft-cited by the NRC as the reason for their interjection, Ach eampong justified his military coup in part as a response to Busias handling of Ghanas pluralistic society. [ W]ith the blood of the millions of our Nigerian brothers to warn us, Acheampong remarked, I acted to nip the threat in the bud (cited by Smock and Smock 1975, 249). Political parties of both the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist molds were banned under the NRC and the word tribe was expunged from official documents as a step to eliminate divisive and tribal forces which militate against national unity and progress (cited in Chazan 1982, 464). The NRC, and its centralizing military repl acement the Supreme Military Council (SMC), complemented these policies with an ethno-re gional balance roughly re presentative of the Ghanaian population.26 There was a brief and largely unpopul ar flirtation with the idea of reinvigorating the cause of the TC during the NRC/SMC rule that allowed the government, led by Acheampong who is an Asante, to spread co ncern about Ewe secessionists as a reason to 26 The NRC was comprised of seven Akans, four Ewes, two Northerners, and one Ga. The SMC was comprised of four Akans, three Ewes, and one Ga with a notable absence of Northerner s (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 74).

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130 maintain military rule (Brown 1980), but wh en it came to Acheampongs pet project, a government arrangement comprised of both milit ary and civilian components (UNIGOV), it was in allied Asante and Ewe-speaking areas that the regime received its staunchest opposition (Chazan and Le Vine 1979, 189). After this brief and imperfect respite fr om the post-independen ce political conflict understood as pitting Asantes ve rsus Ewes, the election campa ign of 1979 reinvigorated the animosity fostered in the run-up to the Sec ond Republic and fomented under the Busia regime. The magazine Africa characterized the 1979 elections as pitt ing Yesterdays Men against the Day Before Yesterdays Men (Sutton-Jones 1979). When one focuses on social cleavages instead of ideological monikers this description is only half right. Owusu and the PFP certainly have the bona fides to trace their social lineage thr ough the Danquah-Busiaist PP and NLM. Owusu is an Asante who had been a cabinet member in Busias PP government and J.H. Mensah, Owusus primary challenger for the pres idential candidacy, held similar credentials while hailing from Brong-Ahafo (p. 13). The PFPe rs were keen on reminding the electorate of the same ills Busia had railed against ten years prior. For them Nkrumahs reign meant shortages of goods in the market and political detentions without trial. Its no good saying it will never happen again, reads an add run for the party cr iticizing these purported Nkrumahist tendencies, adding that some of it did under Acheampong, and that it even might happen again should be sufficient cause for us not to risk it at all (Before You Vote 1979). Limann and the PNP had the personalities to lay claim to the Nkrumahist mantle, the partys founders Imoru Egala and Kojo Botsio were members of CPP cabinets, and talked the talk when it came to Nkrumahist rhetoric T he Party believes that the ideas and ideals for which the late President Kwame Nkrumah stood, provide the best guidelines, the pursuit of

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131 which will enable it to achieve its aims and obj ectives for the good of all Ghanaians (Peoples National Party 1979, 3). Unlike either the CPP government or the NAL opposition, however, the PNP had a distinctively Northern character. Though the partys ranks were filled with an ethnically heterogeneous group comprised mostly of individuals from groups outside of the Asante/Ewe constellation, Egala, a Northerner from Tumu, was known to be the money-man behind the PNP, and his selected candidate fo r president had run for public office only once before and that was as a candidate not for the CPP but for the NOPP.27 The UNC, which would align with the PNP in government and for the pur poses of the presidential run-off, has been pigeon-holed ideologically as the second DanquahBusiaist party due in large part to William Ofori-Attas past political involvement with the UGCC as representati ve alongside Danquah for Akim Abuakwa and with the Busia regime as a cabin et minister. Yet its soci al base in terms of ethnicity resembles that of a watered down NAL, which contributed Obed Asamoah and Sam Okudzeto to the UNCs leadership (Chazan 1983, 287). When the confusion of having three major par ties had settled into a two horse race pitting Owusu against Limann, the Danquah-Busiaist candida te was similar to both the PP and NLM in relying on Asante-speaking areas for the bulk of his support. The PNP had deftly beat Owusu to the punch in the Western and Central Regions with its selection early on of high-profile representatives from the areas precluding an Ak an coalition the likes of which propelled the PP into government.28 In calling Ewes inward looking when an NAL Member of Parliament from the Volta Region called Busia a tribal Prim e Minister and his government a tribal government, Owusu sealed his fate in areas that would have been difficult going anyway 27 Limann, who is Egalas nephew, ran against his uncle in 1954 for the Tumu s eat. Egala won the s eat for the CPP. 28 Limann continued this inclusion in his cabinet selecting eight Akan-speakers for 14 seats (Asante and GyimahBoadi 2004, 73).

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132 (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 73). This comme nt which reverberates even today in Ewespeaking areas of the country made it easy for th e PNP to pin the label Popular Fronts for Plunder and Tribalism on Owusu and make it stick in areas where UNC-via-NAL voters found the ideological barrier separa ting Danquah-Busiaists from Nkrumahists very permeable (Kane 1979). When Jerry Rawlings and the PNDC stepped in to politics to again re move political power from civilians and place it into the hands of military men, the action was described by those looking favorably on the PNDC as a redress for the men in uniform harassed by the PNP government or as a corrective measure for the corruption ( kalabule ) that was rampant in Ghanaian society and if not encourage d, at least accepted by Limann (Yankah 1986).29 Those looking at the PNDC regime with distaste saw th e extra-parliamentary actions as an unjustified power grab spawned by soldiers who had not gotte n their fill of state re sources under previous military regimes (Boahen 1989). Neither the Third Republics friends nor its foes characterized the coup dtat as ethnically mo tivated. Limann had assembled a fair ly representative cabinet and had an economic record not marked by regiona l favoritism, but by a general countrywide malaise. The early PNDC regime too was qu ite representative of the Ghanaian populace.30 Over time the volume and frequency of allega tions of ethnic favoritism increased. In his critique of the PNDC regime, Boahen (1989, 53) accuses Rawlings of wittingly or unwittingly, 29 Acheampong was overthrown by his own men in July 1978. They accused Acheampong of running a one man show and quickly implemented plans to turn over power to a civilian government by the summer of 1979 under a new constitution. Rawlings and a group of junior offi cers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the SMC II government on 4 June 1979 to conduct what they called a house cleaning exercise. Before they would hand over power to a civilian government in September, all living former military Heads of State (Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo) were executed along with a number of the militarys top brass at the firing range in Teshie in full public view (Shillington 1992). 30 Nugent notes that although Ewe speakers were over-represented in the various PNDC cabinets given Ewes percentage of Ghanas total population, at no time was Rawlings PNDC cabinet comprised of more than 28.6 percent Ewes (cited in Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 77).

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133 consciously or unconsciouslyfa nning ethnicity, or as it is more popularly though wrongly termed, tribalism for giving a few high profile positions to individuals from the Volta Region. K. Ansa Asamoa, a PNDC ideologue from the Univ ersity of Cape Coast, fired back at these accusations with a complaint that previous re gimes, both military and civilian, had been dominated by Akan-speakers (cited in Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 76). This familiar dialogue gave way to the by now familiar ideological divisions in the Fourth Republics inaugural elections. The Danquah-Busia Club ex isted prior to the lega lization of political parties, its top ranks filled with Danquah-Busiaist s from past regimes or in some cases their children, eventually to be transformed into the NPP (Jonah 1998, 92). Rawlings, who has often been characterized as blazing a third path because of his popu list rhetoric and embrace of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, has not shied away from comparisons with Nkrumah (Oelbaum 2004, 262-264). The NDCs tremendous strength in the Volta Region does not hearken back to Nkrumah, however, but rather to the NAL and UNC. Alternative Cleavage Stru ctures and their Fates Cleavage structures that could c onceivably have risen to the polit ical fore instead of, or as a replacement for, the Asante/Ewe cleavage ar e innumerable. Not having undergone a similar modernization experience as the European states Lipset and Rokkan examine, cleavages along the lines of those explored in Europe are not likely to gain po litical parties much traction. The existence of classes in African society and thei r form has been the subject of much scholarly debate (Ekeh 1975; Markovitz 1977; Sklar 1979) but there is something of a consensus within this debate over the ill-fit of Euro-centric labe ls the likes of aristocrat bourgeoisie, proletariat and peasant. It does not take mu ch creativity, however, to come up with potential alternatives that could describe a dichotomous cleavage struct ure in Ghanaian society. Any number of these cleavages could be conceptualized in such a wa y as to divide Ghanaian society down the middle

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134 and provide two dominant political parties with poles from which to pick off the median voter.31 There are two potential cleavages, however, that both fit this bill and have shown signs in the past of political mobilization. One of these cl eavages, that pitting the North versus the South, involves a number of cross-cut ting identities including income, et hnicity, and religion. The other, that pitting Akans versus non-Akans, relies on a particular ethno-linguis tic identity and its residual category. Following is a br ief exploration of these two cleavages with an eye for when they were mobilized and when they were not. The North/South cleavage is one that is quite palpable in West African countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea. Though both social and envi ronmental borders are permeable and nuanced, in general the North in these countries is co mprised of dry savannah whereas the South is comprised predominately of coastal plains and tropical forests. Because of a much longer and deeper involvement with colonial authorities, the South tends as we ll to have much greater levels of western education, a larger per centage of Christians, and better infrastructure than areas in the North. Ethnic make-ups vary by country but tend to be categorized by th eir broader geographical context as Northern and Southern (Brown 1983, 433-6). The civil war in Cte dIvoire, preelection violence in Togo in 2005, and Nigerias ongoing Sharia debates have all in recent years been characterized as co nflicts occurring along North/South line s. While these tensions are most often included by mainstream press in the ca tegory of zero-sum ethno -regional or religious disputes, Ladouceurs (1979, 254) de scription of Ghanas North as burdened by economic (lack of development and industriali zation), educational (relative l ack of schools and graduates), 31 Each of Ghanas elections has been decided with Single Member District elections save for a handful of the wellpopulated areas in pre-independence elections which were awarded two seats. With the exception of the presidential races, both in the Third and Fourth Republics, these races do not in volve run-off elections. Under these circumstances one would expect a party system to develop concentrating on Downs (1957) median voter.

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135 natural resources (poor agricultural conditions), and histor ical (colonial neglect and policy isolation) deficits hold s true across the region. In Ghana the NOPP tried explicitly to functiona lize this cleavage and was to some extent counterbalanced by the CPP. Af ter arguing that the party wa s not anti-Southern, the NOPP manifesto of 1954 makes a case for its focus. We c onsider that the Northern Territories deserves [ sic ] a special treatment, reads the manifesto, becau se it has been the most neglected areas in the Gold Coast (Northern Peoples Party 1954, 3). The CPP, though it did quite well in the North and bested the NOPP in several constituencies, wa s unlike major parties in the Second and Third Republics in its ability to disproportionately draw voters from the relatively well-educated areas primarily in the South. Post-Nkrumah this cleav age, which was always tempered by the CPPs ability to compete with the NOPP on its home tu rf, became largely irrelevant. In 1969 neither of the two major parties was able to turn the re gions comprising the North uncompetitive in their favor; the real inconsistency in results was in tra-South. In 1979 the PNP managed significantly better results amongst Northern et hnic groups, but when the presid ential election was focused in a second round to a two-party race this correla tion was erased thanks not to a diminished cohesion in the North but rather to an exacerbate d split within the South. T he primary effect of national politics coming into th e north, notes Austin (1976, 142) from outside is to sharpen ambition, and to breed [local intra-north] faction. The potential Akan/non-Akan cleavage is diffe rent from the North/ South division both in terms of being unique to Ghana and in terms of being sectional withou t clear socio-economic overtones. Historically the various ethnic groups that fit within the Akan category have been at odds politically at least as often as they have been allies. Brong areas that contri buted Busia to the Danquah-Busiaist camp not to mention votes to the NLM, PP, and PFP parties along similar

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136 lines to Asante areas, have a tumultuous history with the Asante Confederacy. Not only did they fight initial conquests in the early eighteenth century but ha ve over the course of the ensuing decades several times fought both militarily and polit ically to be detached from Kumasi (Maier 1981). The relationship between the Asante Empire and its Akan neighbors to the south is even more contentious. Among the Fante, Aowin, Wasa, Denkyira, and Akyem the British were deemed preferable allies to the Asante who were on the march in search of tributary states throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteen th centuries (Sanders 1979). Despite the historical absence of a coherent Akan state incorporating the va ried ethnic groups that speak an Akan language (Kiyaga-Mulindwa 1980), there has been a recurring desire by many pundits, politicians, and much of the gene ral public to designa te one party or another the Akan party since 1969 (Adjei 1969; Goka 1969). If one looks at the results fr om the 1969 elections, this concept of an Akan party makes some intuitive sense. The PP not only did well in Ashanti Region but won the majority of the votes in Western, Central, Eastern, and Brong-Ah afo Regions. In areas without a majority of Akan-speakers (the North, Volta Region, and Accra) the PP was unable to secure a majority of the vote. Interpreting the 1969 electi ons with such a blunt ethno-lingu istic tool is not without its problems. Principle amongst these problems is the PPs ability to collect nearly 40% of the vote across the aforementioned non-Akan areas. While it is likely that some of these votes came from Akan-speakers living outside of their traditi onal areas, especial ly in the relatively cosmopolitan cities, such an explanation in no wa y accounts for such a larg e percentage of the vote. An even bigger problem with the Akan vers us non-Akan dichotomy is its utter inability to shed light on elections other than that held in 1969. In pre-independence elections it was the CPP

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137 that dominated non-Asante Akan areas of the c ountry. In 1979 the Northern PNP outperformed the Asante PFP in Western, Central, and Easter n Regions by a factor of nearly two to one. Conclusions Answers to the two guiding questions of this research chapter have not been parsimonious. The Ghanaian party systems freezing moment could better be described as a series of fits and starts, many which only became significant and re lated in hindsight. Asante, as a modern political identity, was first mobilized through the NLM but this mobilization was far from total. It was the PP that solidified this ethnic bloc in 1969. The Ewe modern poli tical identity arose as a common knowledge stereotype before it became a reality. Ewes living outside of the area known as Togoland, who make up more than half of what would become Ghanaian Ewes, were in general antithetical to the TCs aims of secession.32 With the highly tribalized atmosphere that followed Nkrumahs overthrow, however, goa ls of the TC were used to scapegoat33 Ghanaian Ewes and Ghanaian Ewes returned the favor by heavily backing an Ewe party against an Akan party in the 1969 election. The 1979 elections would again demonstrate the Asante ethnic groups relationshi p with Danquah-Busiaist parties but showed Ewe voters not to be particularly enamored with Nkrumahism, as they were not during pr e-independence elections, but antithetical to the cause of Asante politicians who many felt would not treat the region fairly. This reading of Ghanaian socio-political hist ory stands in stark contrast to a recurring assumption in the contemporary political discourse that Asante voters and Ewe voters have been at odds since time immemorial. 32 The actual numbers of Ewes residing in the former Gold Coast Colony, British Togoland, and French Togoland is contested. For various estimates see Hodder (1968). 33 This line of reasoning is suggested by Brown (1982; 1983).

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138 Those free agents in Ghanaian politics who fit out side of this convenient dichotomy are much harder to compartmentalize into an elector al pattern. Northern regions are consistently heterogeneous both ethnically and politically throughout the pre-Fourth Republican period. Though regions populated by large numbers of Ga voters and non-Asante Akan voters have toyed with the idea of voting as a bloc in some elections, there has been no apparent carryover effects and in the election maps de picted in Figures 5-2 and 5-3 th ese areas are just as likely to appear as shades of gray as they are to be shad ed either white or black. For observers of elections in the Fourth Republic, these tra its are well known even if they are not understood as historical legacies of past elections. Notions of a socioeconomic cleavage dividing Ghanas North from its South or an all-encompassing ethno-linguistic cleavage divi ding Akans and non-Akans depend on these free agents lining up in one political bloc or another. While Nkrumahs CPP and Busias PP were able to more or less unite on e side of these potentially grand cleavages, welleducated South in the case of the former and Akan s in the case of the latt er, the other side never congealed thanks in large part to non-Asante and non-Ewe voters inabilit y and/or unwillingness to conform to the politics behind these cleavages. So what does this nuanced story mean for the literature on the relationship between social cleavages and political parties in general? In many ways the story is uniquely Ghanaian. Though Asantes and Ewes inhabit areas outside of Ghana, in no other country do they both exist in great enough quantities to constitute the pol es of a national political cleav age structure. The fact that Asantes are Ghanas largest re cognized ethnic group (with ar ound 15% of the population) and Ewes are the second largest (with approximately 13% of the population) is not unimportant and could provide fodder for comparisons with ot her countries similarly divided, Asantes antagonistic relationship with the British and the Ewes divi sion by the German/British then

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139 French/British then Ghana/Togo border are importan t factors unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. How the Ghanaian case can inform the greater body of scholarship on th e relationship between social cleavages and political parties is in the wa y it addresses the formation of a historically and socially understood party system without a bifu rcating revolution. Wallers tein predicted that ethnicity would likely follow inde pendence, save some divine in tervention by national leaders and a relatively rapid project of modernization, and rued the day. Yet in Ghana there has been no Biafra. Unique historical circumstances and social structures contributed to two politicized ethnic identities but the rest of Ghana, which serves as home to the vast majority of electors, has worked within this dichotomy instead of ra tcheting it up to the levels Akan/non-Akan and North/South cleavages denote.

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140 Table 5-1. 1954 Legislative Assembly election re sults by region and ethno-cultural group Note: Only parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote in at least one region are displayed. Wassaw Central in the Western Region, Denkyira in the Central Region, and South Tongu in the Volta Region were won by the CPP candidate unc ontested. Uncontested races were scored as a victory of 1-0 for the uncontested candidate. As it is impossible to separate Ashanti Region from Brong-Ahafo Region along constituency lines in 1954, the results for th ese two regions are reported as a single Ashanti Re gion. Election results are taken from Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1954), Election Re sults (1954), and Addo (1954). Table 5-2. 1956 Legislative Assembly election resu lts by region and ethno-cultural group Note: Only parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote in at least one region are displayed. Amenfi-Aowin in the Western Region, North Birim and Kwahu South both in the Eastern Region, and Gonja West and Dagomba North both in the Northern Region were won by the CPP candidate uncontested. Uncontested races were scored as a victory of 1-0 for the uncontested candidate. As it is impossible to separate Ashanti Region from Br ong-Ahafo Region along constituency lines in 1956, the results for thes e two regions are reported as a single Ashanti Region. Election results are take n from Jon Kraus Ghana Electi on Archive (1956) and Victory for the C.P.P. (1956).

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141 Table 5-3. 1969 Parliamentary election re sults by region and ethno-cultural group Note: Only parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote in at least one region are displayed. Agona Kwabre in Ashanti Region was won uncont ested by the PP candidate and South Tongu in the Volta Region was won uncontested by the NAL ca ndidate. Uncontested races were scored as a victory of 1-0 for the uncontested candidate. Election results are taken from Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1969) and G overnment of Ghana (1969). Table 5-4. 1979 Parliament ary and presidential (2nd round) election resu lts by region and ethnocultural group Note: Only parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote in at least one region are displayed. Election results are taken from Addae-Mensah (1979). Ethno-Cultural Color Key Non-Asante Akan Asante Ewe Ga Northern Note: Northern is a constructed cultural cate gory comprised of Grusi, Mole-Dagbon, Mande, Bimoba, Kokomba, Gonja, and Chokosi speakers. Non-Asante Akan is a variable derived by separating the total number of Asante-speakers from the total number of non-Asante Akanspeakers. Asante, Ewe, and Ga are categories used in the 1960 census (Gil et al. 1964). To determine which parties received significantly more support am ongst these ethno-cultural groups than others a bivariate regre ssion was constructed using the af orementioned ethnic and cultural variables as the independent vari able and party percentage of the vote in the geographic units depicted in Figure 5-1 as the de pendent variable. The shaded resu lts denote a significant (p<0.1) positive correlation for the indicate d party and ethno-cultural group.

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142 Figure 5-1. Constant geographical units for el ections (1954-1979) and census (1960) [Source: Author created map using the 1960 local au thorities census map (Gil et al. 1964, IIa) and the constituency maps presented below to find the smallest like units.]

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143 1951 1954 1956 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Figure 5-2. CPP percentage of the vote mapped for pre-independence elections [Source: Author created maps using constituency maps from the Electoral Commission of Ghana as outlines and inputting election results data from General Election Results (1951), Government of the Gold Coast (1951), G overnment of the Gold Coast (1954), Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1954), J on Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1956), and Victory for the C.P.P. (1956).]

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144 Danquah-Busiaists (1969 ) Nkrumahists (1969) Danquah-Busiaists (1979) Nkrumahists (1979) 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Figure 5-3. Danquah-Busiaists and Nkrumahists percen tage of the vote mapped for pre-Fourth Republic elections [Source: Au thor created maps using constituency maps from the Electoral Commission of Ghana as outlines and inputting election results data from Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1969), Government of Ghan a (1969), and AddaeMensah (1979).]

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145 CHAPTER 6 MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN SOCIAL CLEAVAGE S: A STUDY IN THREE CONSTITUENCIES (ODODODIOD IO, NABDAM, BANTAMA) The preceding chapters on party politics in Gh ana deal predominantly with macro-level voting patterns. This chapter a lters course by focusing on partis anship in Ghana at the microlevel. A redirection of this sort is not a careless app lication of Tip ONeill s well-trodden maxim suggesting that all politics is loca l. If all politics occurred in a localized vacuum immune from the national discourses, one woul d not expect to see the distinctive national voting patterns marked by areas of consistent and extreme lack of competition described in previous chapters. On Election Day in 2004 when NPP candidate Cecili a Dapaah made several visits to the polling station I was monitoring for the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers at Bantamahenes Palace to see how the vote was proceeding, I joked with the NPP and NDC representatives assigned to the station. What is she so worried about, I quipped, the NPP could run a dead goat in Bantama and still win by a landslide? After polite smiles both gentlemen shook their heads in agreement. As has been fleshed out in preceding pages, in this regard Bantama is not a unique case. The voting public often fits into, or cases respond to, the roles assigned by the play of national politics. Kufuor won the majority of the vote in every constituency save three Ejura Sekyedumase and Asawase (two Zongo communities), and New E dubiase (an Ayigbe area) in the Ashanti Region in 2004.1 The Ashanti Regions remaining 36 const ituencies saw Kufuor collect slightly more than 77% of the vote and NPP parliamentaria ns pick up every seat. In the Volta Region in 2004 the tables were reversed. Mi lls took a majority of the vote in each of the regions 22 1 Zongos are urban communities in the South (coastal and fo rest regions extending in West Africa from the Gulf of Guinea inland) populated predominately by strangers from the North (who are often understood as Muslim and Hausa though in reality they are far more diverse). Ayigbe towns are similar to Zongos in that they are strangers quarters but unlike Zongos they are populated principally by Ewe-speakers.

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146 constituencies and averaged nearly 83% of the vote across the region. NDC parliamentarians took each of these seats by comfortable margins sa ve for the seat in Nkwanta North which was picked up by an NPP candidate with barely 30% of the vote thanks in no small part to several popular independent candidates splitting the electorate. Fo r results from the 1996 and 2000 elections one barely has to tamp er with these numbers as these two regions in particular have demonstrated themselves durable bastions of electoral support for th eir respective parties. Results of the cognitive shortcut survey presented in Chapter Four strongly suggest that voters in the rest of Ghana, the much more politically heterogeneous real ms of the country, evaluate the parties through the same group he uristics as voters in the Ashan ti and Volta Regions though their position in relation to the opposi ng sides is less well-defined. The variables explaining these results and thei r persistence from election to election are discussed in great length elsewher e in this dissertation. Ghanas two dominant parties draw their greatest magnitude of support from specific ethnic areas Asante-dominant areas in the case of the NPP and Ewe-dominant areas in the case of the NDC and are understood even by voters self-identifying outside of these sp ecific ethnic areas as politically representative of a particular ethnic group; hence survey responde nts proclivity for viewing the N PP as an Asante party and the NDC as the Ewe party. What is left out of these analyses is a compelling explanation for what is driving divisions in local areas with less pronounced party preferences. These vast stretches of relatively competitive elections tend to ebb and flow slightly toward whichever party does best nationally but in the Four th Republic have failed to form into stable partisan blocs for one party or another to reliabl y draw upon. With macro-level anal ysis of national politics unable to adequately address these immense anomalie s the dissertation turns to local politics.

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147 This change of focus is not without it s methodological difficulties. Between 1996 and 2004 in the 1260 regular constituency-lev el elections (both presidential and parliamentary) less than a third of the winning candidates were able to ca pture more than two-thirds of the vote. While this two-thirds cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, the poi nt is illustrative of a widespread pluralism in Ghanaian politics at the constituency-level. These competitive areas are a mixed bag of demographic characteristics with little more in common than tending not to be overwhelmingly inhabited by Asantes or Ewes. They are urban an d rural; ethnically heterogeneous and ethnically homogeneous; relatively poor and relatively rich; and located in Ghanas North, South, East, and West. To get at the roots of the politicized so cial divisions in these disparate and dispersed communities a massive national survey reporting detailed demographic and voting characteristics of electors and the constituencies or distri cts in which they reside would be useful.2 Afrobarometer (2006) does not provide much service in this regard as it aims for breadth instead of depth. While a few urban distri cts contribute more than a hundr ed surveys to Afrobarometers sample, most contribute less than twenty. The Un iversity of Ghanas pre-election surveys (Ayee 1998, 2001), with their coverage of forty constituencies and collec tion of a hundred surveys per, comes closer to fitting this bill. In addition to not being publicly available, however, these surveys record information in blunt nationa l terms (e.g., Akan is a category under mother tongue but Asante, Fante, and Akuapem are not) th at may be useful in politically dissecting cosmopolitan cities but are unlikely to prove illu minating in rural constituencies which would likely appear homogeneous when forced into such imprecise categories. With this best course foreclosed, this chapte r steps back a level in the process of theory formulation. Since the data does not exist to test a number of far-reaching hypotheses with 2 The survey need not be quantitative but a detailed qualitative survey of 230 localized cleavage structures is quite cost prohibitive.

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148 regards to localized political cleavages in competitive areas, this chapter turns to three constituencies and treats each as a unique but potentially hypothesis-generating case study. Tentative conclusions drawn from these three cases are not immediately generalizable. It is possible that each of the citizenries in each of these three cases is fundamentally different in the way it divides itself at the polls in some significan t way from every other constituency in Ghana. What a thick analysis of these three cases can do, however, is point to plausible interactions between social cleavages and pol itical parties on the local-le vel that are potentially more widespread than can be claimed with any confid ence in the work at hand. With a little effort, these insights can inform future survey questi ons and point to a coll ection of partisanship predictors that deserve furthe r attention in the many constitu encies ignored by this study. Cases selected for this close examinati on include Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama. These cases were selected purposively for their abili ty to serve two distinct functions (Table 6-1 offers a brief synopsis of many of these constitu encies important charac teristics and Figure 6-1 shows where the constituencies are situated geog raphically within Ghana). First they had to be reasonably different on a number of socio-economic, sectional, and partisan characteristics so that similarities in responses to the administered cognitive sh ortcut survey could best be explained by the constituencies most glaring similarity, namely being situated within Ghana. The results of parts of this survey depend on the most different system design and are summarized in Chapter Four. Second, and more important to the task of this chapter, the selected constituencies had to be suitable for an explor ation of localized cleavag e structures and their interaction with party politics, particularly in competitive areas. Ones reading of this rather vague se cond criterion hinges upon the meaning of suitability. Since the reason for this chapter is hypothesis-generation and not theory testing, as

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149 wide a net as resources would allow was cast. Two of the three cases Odododiodio and Nabdam under investigation can be classified as generally competitive (i.e., the winning candidate typically garners less than two-th irds of the vote). Of these two cases, Odododiodio is completely urban whereas Nabdam is completely rural; Odododiodio rests on Ghanas southern border whereas Nabdam rests on the northern border; and Odododiodio is ethnically heterogeneous whereas Nabdam is ethnically homogenous. The third case Bantama which is decidedly uncompetitive lies somewhere between Odododiodio and Nabdam both geographically and in terms of ethnic homogeneity. As a case study Bantam a offers a peek into the ideational/sectional forces strong enough to pull a very small percentage of voters away from th e centripetal force of a very dominant party. A month was spent in each of these three constituencies during which time 200 surveys were administered to randomly-selected regist ered voters; interviews were conducted; and a focus group was held.3 Each of these methodological appro aches was applied with the purpose of finding out which identities tend to push people in a given constituency towards one party or another and which identities are inconsequentia l when it comes to predicting an individuals partisan identification. The survey approaches this task by asking randomly-selected voters in each constituency for their partisan leanings (t he dependent variable) and their demographic characteristics (the independent variables). The interviews and focus groups are meant to flesh out the processes behind correlations uncovered in the survey and to extract hypotheses, both those that are supported by the survey data and those that are not, that comprise the common knowledge assumptions people make about the us who they agree with politically and the them who are viewed as the opposition. Complemen ting these formal methods is a fair bit of 3 Appendix B outlines the methodologies for these surveys and focus groups.

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150 what Fenno (1978) dubbed soaking and poking. A continuous month spent in a single constituency gives one the opportuni ty not only to see the nooks and crannies of the area with ones own eyes, but it also gives one the opportunity to talk with a lot of people from all walks of life and to not only hear what they say but see how they interact with one another. Insights gained from these experiences influence, albe it often in implicit ways, the analysis offered below. Odododiodio Socio-Political Background of a Highly Co mpetitive Constituen cy in Old Accra When people refer to Old Accra they ar e speaking of Odododiodio constituency. The area is today populated predominately by Ga-speak ers and has been since the sixteenth century when Ga-speaking migrants from the east settled alongside Korle Lagoon and absorbed the Guan-speaking Kpeshi whom they found in re sidence (Acquah 1958, 16; Field 1940). Much like Accra today, this early settlemen t, understood by some historians as a solitary unit (Ga Mantse) and others as two distinct communities (Ngleshi e and Kinka), served as a cultural crossroads.4 After a failed attempt to establish a presence in the area by the Portuguese in the late sixteenth century, the Dutch successfully ne gotiated rights to establish Fo rt Crvecoeur (later dubbed Ussher Fort) in Kinka in 1649 and the British, un der the auspices of th e Royal African Company, erected James Fort in 1673 le ss than a half mile away in Ngleshie (Parker 2000, 9-10). In hopes of profiting from overseas trade with the Europeans many non-Ga Africans sought footholds in the area and were granted se ttler quarters within Ga Mantse. Ga-speakers predominated in Asere, Gbese, Sempe, and A kumadze quarters and outsiders were given access 4 If Ngleshie and Kinka were ever a unified political unit during pre-colonial times they were divided by colonial rule between the British and Dutch and later by internal conf licts marking the return of Takie Tawiah from his exile in Elmina in 1883 (Parker 2000, 62-63, 130).

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151 to Otublohum (Akwamu), Abola (Fanti), and Alata (Nigerians) quarters where, like the Kpeshi before them, they were often subsumed into an accommodating Ga cultural and linguistic identity (Kilson 1974, 6-7; Dakubu 1997, 100-117). Ko rle Wonkon (formerly Riponsville) is the name given to areas of Odododiodio to the nort h of Asafoatse Nettey Road (formerly Horse Road). The area is newer than Ngleshie or Kinka and was at least partially financed by the colonial government as a response to British West Africas first outbreak of the plague in Accra in 1908. There was a stated desire to cut down on population densities in Ng leshie and Kinka to avoid future outbreaks and Korle Wonkon represente d space to grow the community in what was deemed a healthier manner (Parker 2000, 198). For many of the residents of the expanded ( both in square kilome ters and population) twenty-first century version of Accra,5 the appellation Old Accra has less complementary connotations. Though most acknowledge the Ga as Accras traditional inhabitants and know a primary school version of James and Ussher Fort s histories, Odododiodio constituency is at least as well known for its reputation as something of an unsavory neighborhood. The designation Odododiodio comes from the areas rough and tumble past. Still the Mecca of Ghanaian boxing, Jamestown, Ussher Town, and thei r environs have for the better part of a century been known for their legendary brawls. When in the 1930s neighborhood asafo atwele associations would take first to the beaches and then to Bukom square to engage in hand to hand combat, challenges were posed by a clenched fist raised skywards and yelling of the phrase odododiodioo (Akyeampong 2002, 51). 5 Accra is an anglicized version of the Akan word ( nkran ) for the Ga language. As presently constituted the Accra Metropolitan area stretches just past Nungua to the west an d up to Awoshie in the east. Its southern border remains the Gulf of Guinea but it now stretches northward all the wa y past Achimoto and Legon. The 2000 census lists this expanded areas population at more than 1.6 million.

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152 Descendents of these fishermen-turned-pugilis ts and those who have migrated to their neighborhoods over the ensuing years live in what the Accra Metropo litan Assembly has euphemistically labeled a Fourth Class Residential area (Minis try of Local Government and Rural Development 2006). Old Accra is often unde rstood by the residents of newer Accra as not only one of the most economical ly marginalized areas in Ghan as capital city but also as a backward place where life is lived outdoors, where most homes are scarcely more than shacks, where most people resort to public toilet s, [and] where children bathe on the streets (Akyeampong 2002, 58-59). No where is this per ception on fuller display than in the NPP government and national medias public char acterization of, and hos tility towards, the unplanned, and according to the government illega l, settlement along the banks of Korle Lagoon known to most residents of Accra simply as Sodom and Gomorrah (Ogbamey 2002).6 As arenas for partisan competition th e areas presently constituting Odododiodio constituency are difficult to discuss with any certainty during the colonial period. Subconstituency election results for Gold Coast elections, and most of the independence era elections for that matter, have been lost to history. For the 1951, 1954, and 1956 Legislative Assembly elections the areas of Ngleshie, Kinka and Korle Wonkon were pa rt of larger Accrabased constituencies that voted fairly overwhelm ingly for the CPP. Inquiries into the areas colonial era voting record submitted to a non-random sampling of Odododiodios elderly population revealed a general proclivity for the CPP but these results are far from overwhelming. What is known for certain of the areas pre-inde pendence politics is that it was instrumental in 6 As I was driving through the area one morning with a frien d from a more affluent section of Accra he commented matter of factly, this is where the real Africans live. When I asked him what that meant he mentioned the elaborate funeral and naming ceremonies of Odododiodio. People in Ododod iodio, he complained, will borrow money they do not have to throw these parties while they live in a house without a working toilet. Informally I relayed this anecdote to a half dozen other residents of Accra, some from Odododiodio and others not, and it did not strike any as odd and played into well-known, though only anecdotally substantiated, stereotypes of the area in particular and Gas in general (see for instance Adjei 1994, 263).

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153 Nii Kwabena Bonnes boycott campaign agains t imported goods in early 1948 and the related Accra riots that followed when ex-servicemen ma rched upon Christiansborg Castle to protest the colonial governments economic policies and were fired upon. These events led to the imprisonment of Ghanas Big Six and their in terpretation of these events proved a significant wedge between Nkrumah and the rest of the UGCCs working committee (Austin 1964, 78). Nkrumahs championing of the masses cause at the expense of unpopular tr aditional authorities who condemned the riots made him particularly popular in the downtrodd en areas of central Accra. Austin (p. 142) contends that this popularity diminished with time, however, as resentment over an increasingly cosmopolitan Accra and a lack of legislative representation pushed many non-elite Ga residents towards th e Ga Shifimo Kpee (Ga Standfast Association), which had been fundamentally an elite organization up to that point, following the 1956 elections. For similar reasons it is reasonable to assume the area s presently constituti ng Odododiodio supported Ga Shifimo Kpees 1969 resurrection, Joe Appiahs UNP, and the party observers dubbed a Ga-Ewe alliance, the UNC, in 1979 (Austin 1976, 118; Ch azan 1982, 476). Election results, however, tell another story. Though the UNP candidate for As hiedu Keteke constituency, a constituency whose boundaries are identical to contemporary Odododiodios, pi cked up the seat in 1969 he did so with less than 40% of th e vote. The UNC candidate in As hiedu Keteke did only slightly worse percentage-wise in 1979 but lost to a candi date for the PFP, who hi mself could not score a simple majority of the vote. Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Odododiodio The electoral heterogeneity of Ashiedu Keteke carried over to Odododiodio in the Fourth Republic. No presidential candidate has carried more than 53.2% of the vote and Rawlings (NDC), Kufuor (NPP), and Mills (NDC) have each received a majority of the constituencys

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154 votes in one election or another. In regularly scheduled parlia mentary elections, excluding the boycotted 1992 elections, no candidate has register ed more than 52.4% of the vote and both an NDC candidate (1996 and 2004) and NPP candidate (2000) have w on the seat. The by-election of 2005 with the NDC parliamentary candidate pick ing up nearly 58% of the vote is an outlier but it occurred under unique circumstances less th an six months after a regular election and pitted the deceased parliamentarians s on, an NPP candidate, against the deceased parliamentarians party, the NDC. The sons decision to contest on behalf of the ruling party is said to have angered the se nsibilities of many voters. Using answers to ideological tests focusing on the desirability of government involvement in various sectors of the economy to identify NPP or NDC supporters is fruitless in Odododiodio. As was anticipated by earlier Afrobaromete r findings which draw upon similar questions, partisans of all stripes prefer the government to take an active role in the economy (everything from providing schools and clinics to creating jobs) but simultaneous ly do not want to deal with negative effects that often accomp any planned economic experiments in the past (e.g., shortages at the markets or cheap but low quality educati on and health care). Socio-economic explanations for the bisecting political divisions within Odododiodiobii society are similarly unsatisfying.7 Cross-tabulations performed on th e collected survey data for O dododiodio using party preference as the dependent variable and occupation as the independent variable yiel d no significance with a Chi2 test. This lack of statisti cally significant difference between supporters of the NPP and supporters of the NDC holds true when occ upations are divided along blue/white collar, 7 There is no established convention on what to call peop le residing in, or hailing from, the three constituencies under consideration. The rules of the major local language (Ga in Odododiodio, Nabit in Nabdam, and Asante Twi in Bantama) for turning a proper noun describing a locality into a proper noun describing said localitys people are used here. This means that people from Odododiodio are referred to as Odododiodiobii, people from Nabdam as Namnam, and people from Bantama as Bantamafo

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155 public/private, and employed/unemployed cleavag e lines. Some significant differences (Chi2 Sig. = .053) between the NPP and NDC do reveal them selves when respondents level of formal education is considered. Responde nts who identified their educatio n-level as primary school or less (N=49) identified with the NDC over the NPP at a rate of more than two to one. Respondents who identified their education-level as at least middle sc hool (N=151) identified with the NDC more often than the NPP but the di fference is relatively minor with 66 respondents identifying with the NDC and 61 respondents identifying with the NPP. When presented with these educational diffe rences between party supporters, several Odododiodiobii focus group participants suggest that the NDC does be tter with the lessereducated in the constituency because the NDC government gave out small gifts to average people on a regular basis whereas the NPP show ers only its most well-connected supporters with largesse. Survey results suggest this assumption is faulty on two accounts. First, the relatively uneducated (primary education or less ) and the relatively educated (middle school or more) are nearly identical in that one in four respondents from each group admits to accepting gifts from a political party or candidate. Second, in Odododiodio ther e is no statistically significant difference between the NPP and NDC wh en it comes to the percentage of supporters who have accepted gifts from a political party or candidate. The sectional cleavages discussed at length in Chapters Four and Five are more promising predictors of partisan identific ation. As is the case on the na tional level, religion is a poor predictor of partisanship in Odododiodio. Ethno-linguistic identit ies, on the other hand, are prescient. In Odododiodio it is not the Asante/Ewe cleavage which is most pronounced, however, but rather the Ga/non-Ga cleavag e. Table 6-2 displays a crosstabulation comparing respondents who identify themselves as Ga versus those w ho do not identify themselves as Ga. There is a

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156 marked and statistically significant difference between the two groups with Ga respondents tending towards the NDC and non-Ga respondents tend ing towards the NPP. There seems to be a general consensus in Ga-speaking areas of Accra that their support for the NDC is a response to the NPPs assumed Asante nature. In line with th e complaints of the Ga Shifimo Kpee, there are regular demonstrations against the national government whenever it makes a decision concerning Ga lands, even those lands which have been leas ed to the government, without what is deemed to be proper consultation. Protests and a grum bling discontent over the naming of Accra Sports Stadium after Ohene Djan, a non-Ga who was Ghanas first director of Sports, is a well reported, though far from isolated, example of th is phenomenon (Ghanaian Chronicle 2005b). Just as often, however, this Ga/non-Ga po litical dichotomy is understood in Odododiodio not as an ethnic conflict but as the residual of a neighborhood conflict. For the purpose of district-level representation O dododiodio is divided into three el ectoral areas: Kinka, Ngleshie, and Korle Wonkon. A common perception in Odododi odiobii politics is th at Kinka is NDC territory and Korle Wonkon is NPP territory wi th Ngleshie falling somewhere in between. Election results obtained at the sub-consti tuency level confirm these suppositions.8 In the parliamentary race of 1996 and the presidential and parliamentary races of 2004, Kinka gave the majority of its vote to NDC candidates (on av erage 62%) and Korle Wonkon gave the majority of its vote to NPP candidates ( on average 52%). Ngleshie fell somewhere between the two subconstituency electora l areas siding with the NPP in 1996 and the NDC in 2004. Though these sub-constituency areas are far from electoral ly homogenous, as Table 6-3 highlights, their partisan breakdown is relatively consistent. Even in the outlier by-electi on of 2005, the pattern of 8 Unfortunately for scholars much of the sub-constituency data for the Fourth Republic has been destroyed. According to a representative of the El ectoral Commission there was an attempt to preserve this data in 1996 but it did not always match exactly constituency-level results and much of it never made it to Accra from the regions. The experience of 1996 led the Electoral Commission to not even try to collect and maintain this data in 2000. Data for the 2004 elections was available in hard copy at the regional Electoral Commission headquarters as of Spring 2005.

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157 Kinka supporting the NDC the most strongly and Korle Wonkon supporting the NPP most strongly holds. To see how the effects of these neighborhoods interact with ethnicity three crosstabulations were run (Tables 6-4 6-6): th e first depicting partisan identification by neighborhood, the second partisan identification by neighborhood for self-identified Ga-speakers only, and the third partisan identification by neighborhood for self-ident ified non-Ga only. That the partisan relationships known to exist based on election re sults hold in th e all respondents table but are disrupted when Gas are sepa rated from non-Gas suggests that the noted neighborhood effects are largely a residual of the aforementioned Odododiodiobii ethnic voting patterns. Interesting in the collected data is the part isan proclivities of As ante and Ewe voters. Though their numbers are small in Odododiodio, both et hno-linguistic groups identify politically as predicted by national pattern s. Of the thirteen self-ide ntified Ewe respondents, seven expressed a preference for the NDC. Only two iden tified themselves as supporters of the NPP. The relationship is reversed for self-identified As antes with fourteen of the nineteen respondents identifying themselves as NPP partisans and only one acknowledging support for the NDC. Though the numbers are too few to make sweep ing conclusions, the Odododiodio constituency survey allows for some disaggregat ion of the Akan linguistic identity as well. Joining the Asante respondents in supporting the NPP were self-iden tified Akan (four out of four), Akuapem (two out of two), Akyem (two out of three), and Kwawu (three out of three). Fante-speakers stood out from this group with eight respondents pr eferring the NPP and seven the NDC. Nabdam Socio-Political Background of a Poor Ru ral Constituency in Ghanas Far North Nabdam constituency is both extremely poor and extremely rural. When compared to the rest of Ghana, the Upper East Region in which Nabdam is situated fares quite poorly with regard

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158 to the percentage of residents having access to potable water, health facilities, food markets, public transport, and schooling (Ghana Statisti cal Service 2001, 79). These regional numbers, however, fail to adequately capture life in Na bdam. Within a poverty-stricken region, Nabdam is a poverty-stricken constituency. The one paved road in the constituency owes its existence to the two metropolitan areas outside of Nabdam which it connects. Though public transportation does travel on this road on its way either to or from Bawku (the regions economic capital) or Bolgatanga (the regions political capital), it rarely stops in Nabdam constituency.9 Most people cannot afford the fare and those who can are face d with a long wait for a vacant seat. There are no automobiles in the entire constituency which is convenient given the fact that the closest filling station is nearly half an hour journey away in Bolgatanga. Along the paved road there is electricity in Nangodi and Kongo but away from the paved road, where most Namnam live, there are only occas ional electric poles and a promise that wires will be run to them in the future. Though home to nine primary schools, five junior secondary schools, and one senior secondary school these educational facili ties are largely underutilized. Many parents are reluctant to send their children to school be cause they lack even basic instructional resources. For those who manage to excel in these difficult circumstances there are paltry few jobs in the area for educated individua ls and most move on to the greener pastures of Bolgatanga or farther a field. Give n this stark reality it is not su rprising therefore that of the 200 survey respondents in Nabdam, 80% repor t never having attended school at all. The vast majority of Namnam are farmers w ith sorghum and millet being the areas most important crops and livestock serving as source of manure, supplemental income, and occasional nutrition (Veihe 2000, 394-395). Duri ng the long dry season in be tween crops, which stretches 9 This road is a major supply line in the often illicit tr ade of goods across borders with Bawku being a border town and Bolgatanga being an outlet into Ghanas more lucrative southern markets (Chalfin 2001).

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159 from October through May, many Namnam use their o ff time to engage in illicit small-scale gold mining, the collection of firewood for char coal production, and bush meat hunting for consumption and sale. Most of these supplementa l activities occur in th e supposedly protected Red Volta Forest Reserve where river blindne ss has been a persistent problem (Hunter 1966). Only 20% of survey respondents listed their prim ary occupation as something other than farmer or housewife and only 1% of respondents identifie d themselves with occu pations that can, even with an extremely liberal interpretation of the category, be labeled white collar. A well documented trend of out migration combined with anecdotal evidence suggests that these income generating activities rare ly allow Namnam to achieve a stan dard of living above subsistence (Hunter 1968b). The abject poverty that pervades Nabdam is very much a historical legacy. In his anthropological history of the area, Rattray ( 1932, 366-373) describes the origins of Namnam as part of the larger Mamprusi group. Nabit is a di stinct language spoken by Namnam but it is more or less mutually intelligible with Kusasi, Gur unsi, and Talensi which are spoken in neighboring areas. According to a traditional authority inte rviewed by Rattray, chiefs in Nabdam trace their genealogy through the Mamprusi royal family. After a quarrel over the chieftainship of Nalerigu, ancestors of Namnam chiefs migrated and se ttled amongst a preexisting community of Nabitspeakers who had owners of the land ( Tendanam ) but no owners of the people. Descendants of these early Mamprusi migrants, the story goes, accepted the position of chief of the Nabitspeaking people and formed two Nabdam states Nangodi and Sekoti, each of which owes allegiance and tribute to Nalerigu.10 10 For a thorough discussion of this chiefly lineage see Hunter (1968a).

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160 When British authorities entered the region, prob ably first in the late nineteenth century, they embraced the people owners as the true aut horities in the area and diminished the prestige of the owners of the land. In exchange for th is formal state recognition colonial bureaucrats expected these newly inflated ch iefs to go along with British Nort hern Territories policies. This meant, as Kimble (1963, 554) concisely notes, en during a deliberate attempt to isolate the Northern Territories from the twentieth century. Only basic educational in stitutions that would extol the dignity of manual labour were permitt ed in the region and the built infrastructure was kept to that which would allow colonial author ities to occasionally visit their traditional representatives for the purpose of collecting cheap labor for pr ojects in the South (Ladouceur 1979, 49-53; Dickson 1968, 693). In contrast to Odododiodio, partisan politics in Nabdam has been both more temperamental and less heterogeneous. Despite th e fact that Nabdam is the second smallest constituency in contemporary Ghana and has less than a third of the average constituencies registered voters, Nabdam has long been a coherent and independent un it in national politics. It s existence is due in no small part to the British constitution-makers sensitivity toward the grouping together of contiguous states, not antipathetic towards each ot her, and where possible, speaking the same or a similar language and having common interests (Legislative Council of the Gold Coast 1950, 6). Though the Nangodi and Sekoti chieftaincies were merged with Talensi to form a slightly larger constituency in the S econd and Third Republics, tradit ional authorities have deftly challenged all attempts to absorb the area, de signated Frafra East for the 1954 legislative elections, into a larger territorial unit for purposes of representation.11 This fact makes it relatively easy to discuss the areas el ectoral history with some precision. 11 When Nabdam was connected to Talensi for District Assemb ly purposes in 2005, after both areas were broken off from the Bolgatanga District Assembly, opinion leaders in Nabdam fought for the districts headquarters to be

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161 In the 1951 Legislative Assembly elections th ere was no vote in the Northern Territories, Nabdam included. Among the nineteen Northern ers selected to serve as the regions representatives by an electoral college comprised primarily of traditional elites and educated teachers and bureaucrats agreeable to the traditio nal elites, none hailed from areas presently comprising Nabdam (The Results 1951; Was S ecrecy a Mistake 1951). When allowed a popular vote for the first time in 1954 Nabdam voted solidly for the NOPP. Over ensuing elections the constituencys proc livity for parties in the DanquahBusiaist tradition diminished as its aggregate preference for Nkrumahist parties, and the NDC in the Fourth Republic, tended to increase. In search of a cause for this partisan realignment a number of current Nabdam residents were queried. Most were too young to have firs thand knowledge of pre-independence elections and did not have an explanati on at the ready. Two members of the focus group held in Nangodi Area Council Hall in the spring of 2005, however, ventured a guess based on discussions they had heard from elders. In early el ections, their theory goes, tradit ional authorities had a lot more clout than they did in later elections when citizens had learned Accra was becoming more powerful than Nangodi or Sekoti in its ability to impact everyday lives. This realization caused a gradual transition from a party arguing for fede ral institutions with lots of local power, something the chiefs coveted, to a populist pa rty promising all the goods and services that Namnam found woefully lacking, an appeal which struck a cord with am bitious youth of little economic or social status (Austin 1976, 142). Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Nabdam Nabdam constituency has supported the NDC in terms of both presidential and parliamentary contests in each of the Fourth Re publics elections. The magnitude of this support placed in Nangodi and when they lost this battle fought fo r the appointed District Chie f Executive to be a Namnam. When Kufuor tapped a Talensi for the position Nabdam threatened to secede (Ghanaian Chronicle 2005a).

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162 in unboycotted elections has ranged from a high in 1996, when the NDCs presidential candidates picked up 77% and 75% of the vote resp ectively, to a low in 2000, when they picked up 51% and 54% of the vote. When asked to expl ain this constituency-wide proclivity for the NDC an informal poll of Namnam, both pro-NDC and con-, point to an unpaved road connecting Sekoti to Pelungu, two villages situated off th e main Bolgatanga-Bawku road, as an aweinspiring accomplishment of J.J. [the former NDC president] and Asaga [the current NDC Member of Parliament]. Even with this gra nd offering, the modesty of which demonstrates how desperate Namnam are for infrastructura l development as much as it does the NDCs accountability, with the excepti on of 1996, parties other than the NDC scored a sizable percentage (40% plus) of the vote in Nabdam. Initially this oppositional admixtures primary component was the PNC, Ghanas Northern Nk rumahist party. Running as candidates for the PNC Limann received 42% of Nabdams votes in 1992 and Edward Mahama earned 18% and 29% of the vote in 1996 and 2000 respectively making him, like Limann, the constituencys second most popular presidential candidate. Nich olas Nayembil, a popular retired educator who would later serve as Presiding Member of th e Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, was the PNC runner-up to Asaga in 1996 and 2000 with 19% and 32% of the vote respectively. The Election of 2004 saw the fortunes of the N PP, a party that had never before been anything but the third most popular party in Nabdam, change dr amatically. Boniface Adagbila, the NPP candidate for Nabdams parliamentary seat, and John Kufuor each picked up just shy of a third of the vote. Given the fact that both Adagbila and Kufuor were retreads from a 2000 campaign in which Namnam rather overwhelmingl y rejected the NPP, this about face was surprising to most observers Explanations on the ground s uggest the NPPs 2004 success had something to do with the spoils of incumben cy. Years after the elec tion Adagbila campaign

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163 shirts are a regular sight in the constituency a nd the foreign parachutist the NPP hired to fly over neighboring Bolgatanga constituency with a red, white, and blue canopy dropping NPP campaign literature is an event even those who did not witness it with their own eyes will not soon forget. An explanation for who the NPP candi dates took votes from is not so easily coaxed out of respondents. Aggregate num bers would suggest that NPP su ccesses were a direct result of PNC failures but nearly all of th e PNC supporters spoken to in the process of collecting data on Nabdam listed the NDC as their second choice. Run-off results from the 2000 Mills/Kufuor election seem on the surface, however to belie this point as Kuf uor picked up every percentage of non-NDC participants votes and th en some in Nabdams second round. Given this state of partisan fl ux, the survey administered in Nabdam is likely to be more time-bound than the surveys administered in O dododiodio or Bantama whose proclivities have been fairly consistent both in the Fourth Republ ic and in its predecessors. Having offered this caveat, the most remarkable quality of Nabdam partisanship in the spring of 2005 was its lack of a readily categorized pattern. Compared to betw een a third and a quarter of Odododiodiobii and Bantamafo respondents who believe there is a member of their immediate family who votes for another party, more than 40% of Namnam res pondents identified a member of their immediate family that votes differently from themselves. This relative lack of familial homogeneity is born out in actual election results. If one considers aggregate votes in eleven sub-constituency units (Nangodis ten chiefdoms and Sekoti) for the 2004 elections, every sub-cons tituency unit gave at least a plurality of the vote to the NDC candidates for presiden t and parliamentarian (see Table 6-7). Going a level further to the individual pollin g station, NDC candidates gained a plurality in twenty-seven out of thirty-three. Nabdams lack of variability with regards to education and occupation make those variables ill -suited for describing partisanship in a society as politically

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164 pluralistic as Nabdam. Neither responses to ideo logical questions nor relig ious identities yield statistically significant or even discernable differences between s upporters of the various parties. A cross-tabulation of gender and party preferen ce offers some substantively interesting, though not statistically significant, results. In a formal intervie w a leading member of the NDC in the Upper East Region suggested that wome n supported the NPP in Nabdam more than men because they are easily lured with material goods. This view was quite prevalent amongst Namnam men and surprisingly so given the fact th at men in my survey were nearly 50% more likely than women to identify themselves as NP P supporters, a finding similar to that uncovered by Smith (2001, 186) just prior to the 2000 elections. The logic be hind these faulty assumptions is not completely unsound. As Table 6-8 suggest s, NPP supporters were more likely than NDC supporters to acknowledge receiving gifts from po litical parties or candidates. As Table 6-9 indicates, however, it is mos tly men who are accepting these gi fts and not women. Whether or not these gifts influenced voting is not establ ished in the available data as none of the 86 Namnam who acknowledge receiving gifts admitte d being influenced by these gifts. By now enough candidates have urged their supporters to accept whatever gifts come their way that many wear t-shirts of a candidate th ey did not vote for as a badge of honor having received not only a valuable item of clothing but having deprived an opponent the opportunity to pass along gifts to someone else who might have been swayed. Beyond these statistically insignificant di fferences the administered survey was unsuccessful in picking up a social difference between NDC and NPP supporters in Nabdam. It did, however, yield a partial explanation fo r the NPPs newfound success. Part of this explanation rests on the demise of the PNC as a viable force in Nabdam. Though 17% of survey respondents identify with the Norths Nkrumahi st party, 6.5% of respondents now identify

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165 with the NPP that once labeled themselves PN C supporters. A few ex-P NC sympathizers have switched loyalties to the NDC but they have b een matched by an equal number of respondents who went in the opposite direction. The other part of this explanation is past supporters of the NDC. A full 14% of respondents w ho currently identify with the NPP at some time supported the NDC. This finding is in stark contrast to the zero respondent s claiming to have made a movement to the NDC from the NPP. Before one takes these results as sacrosanct, how ever, a note is in order about the disparity between Nabdams election results and the survey respondents self-identified partisan identification. This disparity is unique amongst th e three constituencies cons idered in-depth here and though its causes cannot be teased out of the survey data, anecdotal evidence offers some modest clarification. As mentione d previously Nabdam has a track r ecord of partis an flexibility. Add to this general tendency the fact that the su rvey was administered in the wake of Kufuors appointment of a native son (Boniface Gambila)12 to the post of Minister of the Upper East Region and during the NPP government s selection process for District Chief Executive of the newly formed Talensi-Nabdam district, a post many Namnam coveted. This context may very well have pushed NPP support upwards only ephemerally. Bantama Socio-Political Background of th e NPPs World Bank of Votes Though the exact date on the Gregorian cale ndar is not known, some time in the late seventeenth century a fe tish priest known as k mfo An kye united a loose association of Akan-speaking peoples under Osei Tutu. This event sparked the campaign that would ultimately lead to the overthrow of their overlords in Denkyira and ignited an imperialistic Asante 12 Boniface Gambila and Boniface Adagbila are the same pers on. As a Minister he goes by the former and as a parliamentary candidate he went by the latter.

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166 expansion that would last thr oughout the eighteenth a nd nineteenth centuries. The story behind this unification is legendary. An kye invited heads of the rela ted, but independent, Asante families to a single location. Once assembled he summoned the golden stool from the heavens that landed in Osei Tutus lap and has henceforwa rd been recognized as th e soul of the Asante nation. This spectacular episode took place on what are presently the grounds of Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital in a neighborhood of Kuma si known as Bantama (Rattray 1923, 287-293). Though the Asantehenes palace in Manhyia just a few miles away is the focal point of contemporary Asante politics, Bantama, as site of the golden stools initial appearance and resting place of every deceased Asantehene sinc e Osei Tutu, is the nations most revered and sacred ground (Busia 1968, 96). Beyond Bantamas sacred sites the royal maus oleum, the shrine marking the spot where An kye summoned of the famous golden stool, and Bantamahenes palace13 the neighborhood of Bantama is a typical colonial-era high densit y and mixed use quarter with storied buildings containing shops on lower floors and residential quarters on upper levels (Sinai 2001). Bantama is situated about a mile to the northwest of Kumasis sprawling Keje tia Market up a gentle incline and in comparison to Kejetia and its e nvirons in downtown Kumasi is both quiet and uncongested. During the day one can expect activi ties typical to urban areas throughout Ghana: street hawkers and sidewalk ve ndors sell their wares alongside mo re established shops selling everything from foodstuffs to mobile phone equi pment (Clark 1994, 53-54). After dark the area is known throughout Kumasi for its lively drinki ng establishments though the nightlife is quite tame in comparison to Accras hotspots. St rolling along Bantama High Street on an average 13 The position of Bantamahene, which also serves as Krontih ene of Kumasi, finds its roots in Osei Tutus reign and specifically in the Asante campaign against Domaa. Amankw atia, a servant and stool carrier for Osei Tutu, was the first Bantamahene and earned the title through his military service and not his birthright (Kallinen 2004, 140-146).

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167 night one finds loud speakers blasting Ghanaian ra p tunes known locally as hip life and plenty of plastic chairs that serve as suitable drinking spots but the reve lry rarely carries into the early hours of the morning. In addition to Bantama proper, Bantama constituency contains North Suntreso (a neighborhood that abuts Bantama) and Ampabame and Bohyen (two settlements along the road to Ohwim) as well as a few isolated houses ar ound Owabi Waterworks. As one moves northward and westward in the constituency one moves from a solidly middle class urban area, by Ghanaian standards at least, to areas w ith many more peri-urban charact eristics (Browder et al. 1995; Mbiba and Huchzermeyer 2002). North Suntreso, though still relatively de nsely populated, lacks much of Bantamas built colonial-era infras tructure. Many streets are unpaved and without gutters and one can find small crops of vegetables growing outside structures and in vacant lots. The area represents a natural outle t for population pressures in Bantam a. It is a place where those in search of a piece of empty land to call thei r own can find one for a price. Further out in villages like Ampabame, Bohyen, and other smal ler settlements along the road to the beadmaking village of Ohwim one finds a slightly more rural admixture of rural and urban life. These areas are still within the borders of Kumasi Municipality and se veral city dwellers call these places home so that they can afford a large c oncrete mansion with a strong fence. Alongside these suburban symbols of wealth inhabited primarily by stra ngers from other parts of Kumasi exist many families of more modest means, some members of which commute to the city center every day and others whose daily chores may in clude such rural tasks as fetching water and tending to small crops and livestock. The version of Bantama constituency describe d above was carved out of a much larger Bantama constituency in anticipation of the 2004 na tional elections. Prior to these elections the

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168 constituency had been a Golia th. Its roughly 110,000 votes in 2000 was most in all of Ghana with the second most populous constituency ha ving slightly more than 80,000 votes and the average being around 30,000. With a wink and nod residents of the pre-2004 Bantama constituency dubbed themselves the Florida of Ghana in the weeks preceding the 2000 run-off election pitting the NDCs Mills ag ainst the NPPs Kufuor. They had seen the disputed nature of the Bush versus Gore presidential contest in the United States and knew the importance the state of Florida played in this drama. At its mo st benign this moniker was a statement of the constituencys importance in deciding Ghanas next president; in a country comprised of 200 constituencies, Bantama constituency had contributed nearly 2% of the votes in the first round of voting. A less forgiving interpretation of the se lf-imposed label suggests something untoward. Though there has yet been no demonstrable proo f of any wrongdoing in Bantama, perceptions that votes in the area bearing thumbprints in th e box designated for NPP candidates miraculously appear late in the ballot c ounting process are not uncommon (G hana Center for Democratic Development 2001). Lopping off Nh yiaeso and Kwadaso constituenci es cut the vote total in Bantama to just shy of 50,000 in 2004 and gave old Bantama three seats in the Fourth Republics Fourth Parliament. Electorally-speaking Bantama has been a gauge, al beit in an exaggerated form, of trends in Kumasi in particular and Asante -speaking regions in general. As part of larger Kumasi-based constituencies Bantama served as what Osei -Kwame and Taylor (1984, 588) identify as the nerve center of the anti-centra list forces in Ghana. Though this blunt summation deserves some qualification (see Chapter Five), it describes quite well the wate rshed election of 1956. Prior to this date Bantama, and the rest of Ghana for that matter, had more or less fallen in line with the centralizing ambitions of Nkrumah and the CPP. In the elections of 1956 Bantama, as part of

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169 Kumasi South constituency, sent an NLM partis an to the Legislative Assembly. In neighboring Kumasi North constituency, despite a relative dearth of Muslims, the MAP candidate was selected. MAP was a member in the anti-CPP coalition, along with the NLM which generally took responsibility for the Ashanti Region, that agr eed to run candidates as separate parties with specific sectional interests but not compete with each other for individual seats. After 1956 the constituencies which have contained modern-day Bantama have lined up rather solidly behind the party deemed by popular perception the Asante party. These parties PP (1969), PFP (1979), NPP (1992/1996/2000/2004) so thoroug hly captured the Bantamafo partisan proclivities that with the ex ception of the PFP, each party outpaced its opponents by a ratio of better than two to one.14 Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Bantama At Bantamas 59 polling stations, Kufuor sc ored no less than 55% of the vote (at the Catholic Primary School of Bantama) and no mo re than 96% (at a tem porary polling booth in Ampabame) in 2004. Across polling stations Kufuors mean percentage of the vote was 86% and his median 88%. NPP parliamentary candidate Cecilia Abena Dapaah performed similarly though she performed a couple of percentage poin ts worse than Kufuor and the NDC and CPP candidates, Alhassan Napoh and Yaw Owusu Boaf o respectively, performe d marginally better than their parties flag bearers.15 These figures paint a mental picture anyone scarcely familiar with Ghanaian politics already ha s regarding Bantama. That the constituency is solidly in the NPP camp is a widely known fact and has been for quite some time. Amongst survey 14 Owusu and the PFP managed very close to a two to one margin of victory in the elections first round but this margin narrowed in the two candidate run-off pitting Owusu against Limann. For every five votes Owusu picked up in Bantama Limann picked up nearly four. 15 Results at the polling station level were provided by Samuel Yorke Aidoo, Ashanti Regional Director for the Electoral Commission.

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170 respondents in Bantama, 70.5% identify themselv es as members or regular supporters of the NPP. This majority is compared to 8.5% of re spondents who identify themselves as members or regular supporters of the NDC and 1.5% who identify with a minor party. The remaining 19.5% of respondents were either unable or unwilling to provide their part isan identification. Attaching demographic data to known partisan leanings one can construct a description of the archetypal NPP supporter in Ba ntama and compare this descrip tion with a description of the archetypal supporter of other, non-NPP political parties. Given Bantamas known electoral proclivities, this comparison is very much a comparison between those who buy into the constituencys hegemonic political culture and those who do not. Accordi ng to the administered survey, the average NPP supporter in Bantama is a fe male Asante. She is in her thirties and is a Christian. Her schooling ended at the JSS/Middle school level and sh e works a blue collar job in the private sector. Polic ies she prefers rely heavily on government involvement in the economy. The average supporter of a non-NPP party, a cat egory with only an N=17 in the survey population, is a male whose ethnicity is not self-identified as Asante. He is in his thirties and is a Christian. His schooling ended at the JSS/Middle school level and he works a blue collar job in the private sector. Polic ies he prefers rely heavily on government involvement in the economy. These descriptions point to many similariti es and a few notable dissimilarities. When partisan identification is cross-tabulated with ag e, occupation, education, and policy positions the relationship (Chi2) between the dependent and independent va riables is statistically insignificant. What demonstrate significance are the relationshi ps between partisan id entification and gender (Table 6-10) and partisan identi fication and ethnicity (Table 6-11). In Bantama male respondents were slightly less likely to iden tify with the NPP than their female counterparts. An even greater difference is found when comparing self-identif ied Asante with respondents who self-identify

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171 with an ethnic label other than Asante. Switching a respondents ethnic identity from Asante to non-Asante makes them approximately 25% less lik ely to support the NPP and 25% more likely to support another party. Delvi ng further into these numbers, however, one finds the former relationship is predominatel y a function of the latter. Kumasi, despite Bantamas rela tive lack of ethnic diversity, is a cosmopolitan commercial center. For centuries Northerners have traveled to Kumasi to sell their goods (e.g., livestock and tobacco) and buy items originating in the South (e.g., kola, palm oil, and timber) for their return trip (Shildkrout 1978, 57). Colonial authorities and their voracious desire for cocoa provided even further incentives for this pattern of migration. Southerners from less economically advantaged areas joined this in-migration later when the formation of a Gold Coast Colony, and later Ghanaian state, amplified regional disparities ( Migration Research Study in Ghana 1995, 128-129). Some of this internal migration involved entire family units but much of it involved only young single males. If one isolates stran gers and Asantes from one another in the Bantama sample the relationship between gende r and party preference disappears for both groups. It seems likely that the dissimilar gende r blends of the Asante and non-Asante groups and the dissimilar partisan proclivities of thes e two groups are driving a spurious relationship between gender and party identification. Examining the ethnic variable in Bantama furthe r, two interesting findi ngs rise to the fore. The first concerns the culmination of beliefs, ev ents, and identities requ ired to break a selfidentified Asante in Bantama away from the political party that seems so fundamentally connected to the Asante ethnic identity. Out of the 146 Asantes interviewed in Bantama, only 6 members of this population identify themselves w ith a party other than th e NPP. All 6 of these respondents identify themselves presently as sup porters of the NDC. Half have always supported

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172 the NDC and half supported one of the Nkrumahist parties at some earlier poi nt in their lives. In this group there is an electric ian, tailor, and two traders with two identifying themselves as unemployed. Five of the six have completed sc hooling at the JSS level. The sixth has had no schooling. They all identify as Christians and va ry in age from 29 to 50 years. Two are women and four are men. Given their small number th ere is no way to compare the NDC Asante group of respondents with the NPP Asante group of re spondents on these demographic characteristics in a statistically meaningful way. On the surface however, there appear no glaring dissimilarities outside of partisan identificati on, past and present. Examining their beliefs the situation becomes no clearer. Both groups are ideo logically similar in wanting th e government to provide a large social safety net. Both groups also use simila r cognitive shortcuts to differentiate between Ghanas political parties. The rogue Asante vot ers who side with the NDC in Bantama know they are siding against the Asante party as well as NPP supporters know they are siding with the Asante party. The second interesting finding that comes from exploring Asantes in Bantama is the utter vitriol they hold for the NDC. Survey respondents we re asked whether or not they felt the parties wanted peace and free and fair elections in 2004. If they answered in the negative they were asked which parties did not want peace or free and fair elections. Across the three constituencies polled most respondents gave all parties the benef it of the doubt and respo nded that none of the parties was against peace or free and fair elec tions. Self described NPP supporting Asantes in Bantama, however, are an anomaly. Amongst this group 47% said the NDC did not want peace and 30% said the NDC did not want free and fair elections. These significant minorities assigning ill-will to the chief oppos ition party are far larger percentage-wise than any other group surveyed. If one removes this group from the three constituency samp le, less than 10% of

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173 respondents said the NDC wanted violence and/ or unfair elections and more than 80% of respondents said all parties wanted peace and free and fair elections. Conclusions For those interested in understanding the local political dynamics in Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama the political histories and su rvey results will be informative in that the political histories are unique compilations of di sparate writings and the survey results provide new data. This modest survey of partisan cleav ages in three constituen cies is not, however, comprehensive. In the North in particular over tly politicized local cleavages have resulted in violent conflict. In Dagomba-sp eaking areas the Abudu and Andani gates have clashed numerous times over issues of succession. Th e climax of this dispute was th e beheading of the sitting chief of Dogamba, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, a nd 40 of his attendants in March of 2002.16 A widely held assumption which finds a great deal of suppor t in election results is that the deceased YaNas gate, the Andanis, have long had an associ ation with Nkrumahist pa rties and then the NDC in the Fourth Republic. The Abudu gate, some of whose members were responsible for murdering the Ya-Na, has been associated with the Danquah-Busiaist tradition and its modernday manifestation, the NPP (MacGaffey 2006). In Bawku 68 people were killed and more than 200 homes burned as ballots were counted for the 2000 elections. Members of the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups had disagr eed over the rightful heir to th e Bawkunaba chieftaincy skin since Ghana gained its independence from Br itain and power dynamics in the region were rewritten. Since 1957 the Kusasi have tended to support, and in re turn be supported by, Nkrumahist parties and later the NDC. Mamprusi s have found Danquah-Busiaist parties more amenable to their cause. The parliamentary el ection of 2000 pitting Hawa Yakubu (NPP) against 16 The word gate refers to a line of succession to the Ya-Na. The two gates developed out of a succession crisis following Ya-Na Yakubu Is death in 1839.

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174 Hajia Seidu (NDC) was hotly contes ted, very close, and proved a sufficient spark for the existent ethno-political anim osities (Lund 2003). These high profile instances of localized political conflict coul d not have been anticipated directly by the cases under inte nse investigation here Though a few Dagomba (N=4) and Kusasi (N=2) were picked up in the cosmopolitan c onstituencies of Odododiodio and Bantama their numbers are too small to draw serious conclusi ons from and they are situated in contexts distinctly different from those where the aforem entioned politicized conflicts have occurred in the past. If one interprets ethnic ity in general terms, however, as a broader spectrum of sectional divisions the two ethnically homogenous constituenci es under consideration can shed some light on these conflicts. Despite the fact that the politic al parties tout their id eological positions to mass media outlets, socio-economic categories ofte n associated with neo-liberal and social democratic parties are not helpful in distingu ishing NPP supporters from NDC supporters in Odododiodio and Bantama. Yet in both of these consti tuencies sectional ident ities matter a lot. In Odododiodio the cleavage that has the greatest imp act on partisanship occurs outside of the Asante/Ewe national rivalry much like the af orementioned Abudu/Andani and Kusasi/Mamprusi conflicts. In Bantama the partisan cleavage cont ributes to the story of the Asante/Ewe national rivalry. Though more work would ha ve to be done in the Volta Region to confirm the hypothesis, it is interesting to note that ethnic Asantes in the heart of NPP electoral territory understand their political opposition in the most negative of terms. That conventional socio-economic variables were poor predictors of partisanship across all three constituencies under close consideration c onfirms some of the su spicions raised by the preceding chapter on cleavage structures in Ghan as Fourth Republic. There are two directions one can take with these results. One can simply chal k this lack of a statisti cal relationship up to a

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175 lack of an empirical relations hip. Perhaps the modernization sc holars who were so critical of African societies faculties to sustain durable multi-partisan competition were right about there being no class distinctions of note on much of the continent. A nother possibility is that we just have not been successful at constructing categories of Gesellschaft cleavages that capture what is going on in countries like Ghan a. In both Odododiodio and Bantam a there are voters for whom ethnic variables fail to accurate ly forecast partisanship. In Na bdam, where there is nearly complete ethnic homogeneity and no well-es tablished social cleavages revolving around chieftaincy disputes, there is a di versity of partisan leanings that can not be explained with the data collected by conventional demographic surv eys. Explaining better these gray areas of Ghanaian politics and the forces, ideational or id entity, that compel voter s toward one party as opposed to another is something that should be strived for.

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176 Table 6-1. Three constituencies (Odododiodi o, Nabdam, and Bantama) at a glance Odododiodio Nabdam Bantama Registered Voters (2004) 81643 13521 56551 Party Breakdown (2004 Actual Vote Pres.) (51.9%) NDC (46.8%) NPP ( 0 1.3%) Other (59.5%) NDC (29.2%) NPP (11.3%) Other (13.6%) NDC (85.5%) NPP ( 0 1.0%) Other Party Breakdown (2004 Actual Vote Parl.) (52.4%) NDC (46.4%) NPP ( 0 1.2%) Other (59.8%) NDC (29.9%) NPP (10.3%) Other (14.8%) NDC (83.5%) NPP ( 0 1.7%) Other Party ID (Survey) (47.5%) NDC (37.0%) NPP ( 0 1.5%) Other ( 0 7.5%) Indep. ( 0 6.5%) n/a (43.5%) NDC (37.0%) NPP (17.5%) Other ( 0 1.5%) Indep. ( 0 0.5%) n/a ( 0 8.5%) NDC (70.5%) NPP ( 0 1.5%) Other ( 0 7.0%) Indep. (12.5%) n/a Age (Survey Median) 34 years 38 years 34 years Education (Survey) (18.0%) None ( 0 6.5%) Primary (31.5%) Middle (30.0%) Secondary (10.0%) Vocational ( 0 4.0%) Tertiary (80.0%) None ( 0 6.0%) Primary ( 0 8.0%) Middle ( 0 5.0%) Secondary ( 0 0.5%) Vocational ( 0 0.5%) Tertiary (13.5%) None ( 0 0.5%) Primary (52.5%) Middle (23.0%) Secondary ( 0 4.0%) Vocational ( 0 5.5%) Tertiary Ethnicity (Survey More than 5%) (63.0%) Ga ( 0 9.5%) Asante ( 0 9.0%) Fante ( 0 6.5%) Ewe (98.0%) Nabit (73.0%) Asante ( 0 6.5%) Fante Occupation (Survey Mode) (32.0%) Petty Trade (54.0%) Farming (34.0%) Petty Trade Religion (Survey More than 5%) (88.5%) Christian ( 0 8.0%) Muslim (66.0%) Traditional (30.5%) Christian (91.5%) Christian ( 0 7.5%) Muslim Gender (Survey) (49.5%) Male (50.5%) Female (54.0%) Male (46.0%) Female (43.5%) Male (56.5%) Female Urban/Rural (Survey) (100%) Urban (100%) Rural (100%) Urban Historical Voting Record 1951 Accra 0000 CPP (90.0%) 1954 Accra Central 0000 CPP (79.6%) 1956 Accra Central 0000 CPP (85.6%) 1969 Ash. Keteke 0000 UNP (38.1%) 1951 Northern Terr. 0000 no vote 1954 Frafra East 0000 NOPP (79.8%) 1956 Frafra East 0000 NOPP (54.2%) 1969 Talensi-Nab. 0000 PP (29.4%) 1951 Kumasi 0000 CPP (93.6%) 1954 Kumasi South 0000 CPP (83.2%) 1956 Kumasi South 0000 NLM (60.6%) 1969 Bantama 0000 PP (72.0%)

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177 Table 6-1. Continued Odododiodio Nabdam Bantama 1979 Ash. Keteke 0000 PFP (35.5%) 1992 Odododiodio 0000 NDC (49.5%) 1996 Odododiodio 0000 NDC (53.2%) 2000 Odododiodio 0000 NPP (50.6%) 2004 Odododiodio 0000 NDC (51.9%) 1979 Talensi-Nab. 0000 PNP (62.6%) 1992 Nabdam 0000 NDC (42.0%) 1996 Nabdam 0000 NDC (76.5%) 2000 Nabdam 0000 NDC (51.3%) 2004 Nabdam 0000 NDC (59.5%) 1979 Bantama 0000 PFP (52.3%) 1992 Bantama 0000 NPP (70.1%) 1996 Bantama 0000 NPP (80.7%) 2000 Bantama 0000 NPP (87.5%) 2004 Bantama 0000 NPP (85.5%) Note: The Historical Voting Record row of data reports the elec tion year, name of constituency, winning party, and percentage of the vote earned by the winning party. Election results reported from 1951-1979 are for pa rliamentary elections and from 1992-2004 for presidential elections. The constituencies repor ted included the constituencies presently known as Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama but are not necessarily synonymous with contemporary constituencies. Prior to 1969 Odododiodio/Ashiedu Keteke was pa rt of geographically larger constituencies in Accra. Nabdam of today is id entical to the Frafra East constituency from the 1954-1956 period but it was merged with Talensi constituency in 1969 and 1979. Bantama, prior to 1992, was part of geographically larger cons tituencies in Kumasi. In 2004 the constituency known as Bantama for the purposes of this chapte r was dissected from a constituency formerly known as Bantama along with Nhyiaeso and Kwadaso constituencies. Election results were obtained from Government of the Gold Coast (1951, 1954, 1969), Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive (1956), Addae-Mensah (1979), El ectoral Commission of Ghana (1992, 2004), and Ephson (2003). Table 6-2. Gas voting compared to non-Gas in Odododiodio (survey results) Ga non-Ga Total no answer 00 5.5% ( 00 7) 00 8.7% ( 0 6) 00 6.5% ( 0 15) NPP 0 29.7% ( 0 38) 0 52.2% (36) 0 37.0% ( 0 74) NDC 0 57.8% ( 0 74) 0 29.0% (20) 0 47.5% ( 0 95) other party 00 1.6% ( 00 2) 00 1.4% ( 0 1) 00 1.5% ( 00 3) independent 00 5.5% ( 00 7) 00 8.7% ( 0 6) 00 6.5% ( 0 13) Total 100.0% (128) 100.0% (69) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 15.261 (df 4), p =.004 Note: Respondents self-identif ying as either Ga or Dangme are included in the Ga group. Respondents self-identifying as an ethnic group ot her than Ga or Dangme are included in the non-Ga group. Respondents who provided no respons e, or an ambiguous response, to the ethnicity question are exclude d from this latter group.

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178 Table 6-3. Odododiodio election results (1996 Pa rliament) broken down by polling station Kinka (40 stations) Ngleshie (26 stations) Korle Wonkon (49 stations) NDC (65% and up) 18 0 0 0 NDC (55% 65%) 0 9 5 0 7 NDC (50% 55%) 0 3 2 0 8 no party had majority 0 2 7 0 8 NPP (50% 55%) 0 3 2 0 9 NPP (55% 65%) 0 3 7 13 NPP (65% and up) 0 2 3 0 4 Note: Election results were obtained from Nat Qu aye, the Electoral Commissions district-level electoral officer for Odo dodiodio. They are unpublished. Table 6-4. Party preference by Odododiodio sub-c onstituency electoral area (survey results) Kinka Ngleshie Korle Wonkon Total no answer 00 5.0% ( 0 4) 0 14.0% ( 0 7) 00 5.7% ( 0 4) 00 7.5% ( 0 15) NPP 0 26.3% (21) 0 36.0% (18) 0 50.0% (35) 0 37.0% ( 0 74) NDC 0 63.8% (51) 0 36.0% (18) 0 37.1% (26) 0 47.5% ( 0 95) other party 00 2.5% ( 0 2) 00 0.0% ( 0 0) 00 1.4% ( 0 1) 00 1.5% ( 00 3) independent 00 2.5% ( 0 2) 0 14.0% ( 0 7) 00 5.7% ( 0 4) 00 6.5% ( 0 13) Total 100.0% (80) 100.0% (50) 100.0% (70) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 24.559 (df 8), p =.002 Table 6-5. Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-c onstituency electoral area (survey results) Kinka Ngleshie Korle Wonkon Total no answer 00 4.6% ( 0 3) 0 10.7% ( 0 3) 00 2.9% ( 0 1) 00 5.5% ( 00 7) NPP 0 21.5% (14) 0 35.7% (10) 0 40.0% (14) 0 29.7% ( 0 38) NDC 0 70.8% (46) 0 39.3% (11) 0 48.6% (17) 0 57.8% ( 0 74) other party 00 1.5% ( 0 1) 00 0.0% ( 0 0) 00 2.9% ( 0 1) 00 1.6% ( 00 2) independent 00 1.5% ( 0 1) 0 14.3% ( 0 4) 00 5.7% ( 0 2) 00 5.5% ( 00 7) Total 100.0% (65) 100.0% (28) 100.0% (35) 100.0% (128) Significance: Chi2 15.682 (df 8), p =.047 Table 6-6. Non-Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-constituency electoral area (survey results) Kinka Ngleshie Korle Wonkon Total no answer 00 6.7% ( 0 1) 0 14.3% ( 0 3) 00 6.1% ( 0 2) 00 8.7% ( 0 6) NPP 0 46.7% ( 0 7) 0 38.1% ( 0 8) 0 63.6% (21) 0 52.2% (36) NDC 0 33.3% ( 0 5) 0 33.3% ( 0 7) 0 24.2% ( 0 8) 0 29.0% (20) other party 0v 6.7% ( 0 1) 00 0.0% ( 0 0) 00 0.0% ( 0 0) 00 1.4% ( 0 1) independent 00 6.7% ( 0 1) 0 14.3% ( 0 3) 00 6.1% ( 0 2) 00 8.7% ( 0 6) Total 100.0% (15) 100.0% (21) 100.0% (33) 100.0% (69) Significance: Chi2 7.985 (df 8), p =.435

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179 Table 6-7. Votes in Nabdam by chieftaincy area (2004 election results) President Member of Parliament PNC NPP NDC CPP PNC NPP NDC CPP Dagliga 12% 38% 48% 1% 10% 42% 47% 1% Damologo 0 7% 26% 67% 1% 0 5% 26% 68% 1% Dusobilogo 0 6% 12% 80% 1% 0 7% 12% 81% 0% Kongo 10% 27% 62% 2% 10% 29% 60% 1% Logri 0 7% 31% 60% 1% 0 2% 36% 61% 0% Nangodi 13% 18% 68% 1% 13% 16% 70% 1% Pelungu 0 7% 24% 69% 1% 0 5% 25% 69% 1% Tindongo 0 7% 40% 51% 1% 0 4% 44% 50% 1% Zanlerigu 0 7% 33% 57% 3% 0 4% 38% 56% 2% Zoa 12% 14% 72% 2% 11% 13% 75% 1% Sekoti 13% 40% 46% 1% 12% 41% 46% 1% Note: These numbers were pr ovided by Idrissu Mahama of the Bolgatanga Electoral Commission office. They are unpublished. Table 6-8. Namnam party preference by accepta nce of campaign gifts (survey results) no answer Yes Gifts No Gifts Total no answer 00 0.0% (0) 00 1.2% ( 0 1) 00 0.0% ( 00 0) 00 0.5% ( 00 1) NPP 100.0% (1) 0 45.3% (39) 0 30.1% ( 0 34) 0 37.0% ( 0 74) NDC 00 0.0% (0) 0 36.0% (31) 0 49.6% ( 0 56) 0 43.5% ( 0 87) other party 00 0.0% (0) 0 17.4% (15) 0 17.7% ( 0 20) 0 17.5% ( 0 35) independent 00 0.0% (0) 00 0.0% ( 0 0) 00 2.7% ( 00 3) 00 1.5% ( 00 3) Total 100.0% (1) 100.0% (86) 100.0% (113) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 10.451 (df 8), p =.235 Table 6-9. Namnam gender by acceptance of campaign gifts (survey results) no answer Yes Gifts No Gifts Total Male 100.0% (1) 0 58.1% (50) 0 50.4% ( 0 57) 0 54.0% (108) Female 00 0.0% (0) 0 41.9% (36) 0 49.6% ( 0 56) 0 46.0% ( 0 92) Total 100.0% (1) 100.0% (86) 100.0% (113) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 2.021 (df 2), p =.364 Table 6-10. Bantama party prefer ence by gender (survey results) Male Female Total no answer 00 8.0% ( 0 7) 0 15.9% ( 0 18) 0 12.5% ( 0 25) NPP 0 66.7% (58) 0 73.5% ( 0 83) 0 70.5% (141) other party (NDC inclusive) 0 18.4% (16) 0v 3.5% ( 00 4) 0 10.0% ( 0 20) independent 00 6.9% ( 0 6) 00 7.1% ( 00 8) 00 7.0% ( 0 14) Total 100.0% (87) 100.0% (113) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 13.608 (df 3), p =.003

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180 Table 6-11. Bantama party preference by ethnic identity (survey results) Asante Non-Asante Total no answer 0 13.7% ( 0 20) 0 10.6% ( 0 5) 0 12.5% ( 0 25) NPP 0 77.4% (113) 0 51.1% (24) 0 70.5% (141) other party (NDC inclusive) 00 4.1% ( 00 6) 0 27.7% (13) 0 10.0% ( 0 20) independent 00 4.8% ( 00 7) 0 10.6% ( 0 5) 00 7.0% ( 0 14) Total 100.0% (146) 100.0% (47) 100.0% (200) Significance: Chi2 25.713 (df 3), p =.000 Note: The category Asante includes all respon dents identifying themselves explicitly as Asante. The category Non-Asante includes all respondents who self-ide ntify with an ethnic group other than Asante. It excludes ambiguous an swers (such as mixed and Akan) as well as non-answers.

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181 Figure 6-1. Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama loca ted on Ghanaian map (Source: Map created by author.)

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182 Figure 6-2. Odododiodio map with survey areas highlighted (Source: The uncopywritten source map was supplied to the author by Edward K. Dorgbor of the Electoral Commission of Ghana. Colored enhancements were made by the author.)

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183 Chieftaincy Areas Nangodi Zoa Kongo Logri Zanleri gu Tindongo Damologo Pelungu Sekoti Figure 6-3. Nabdam map with survey areas highl ighted (Source: The unc opywritten source map was supplied to the author by Edward K. Dorgbor of the Electoral Commission of Ghana. Colored enhancements were made by the author.)

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184 Figure 6-4. Bantama map with survey areas hi ghlighted (Source: The uncopywritten source map was supplied to the author by Edward K. Dorgbor of the Electoral Commission of Ghana. Colored enhancements were made by the author.)

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185 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS This dissertation takes one of the most fundamental questions in the field of comparative politics Why do citizens in a democracy vote th e way they do? and as ks it specifically of voters in Ghanas Fourth Republic. To answer th is question, preceding chapters adopt as their focus the nexus between social groups and political parties. A focus of this nature brings into the purview of analysis not only the formal organiza tions E.E. Schattschneider (1942, 1) credits with creating democracy but the aggregated masses who are both definitionally necessary for democracy and the subject of much consternation for democratic constitution-makers.1 This admixture allows a scholar to utilize multi-part y elections not as a barometer of democratic success, which has been criticized by some as committing the electoral fallacy (Karl 1986), but as a snapshot of societys macro-contestations and more accurately the socio-political lines along which these fundamental contestations take place. Some of the answers provided to this broad research question in preceding chapters are recapitulated in this conclusion. Along with a summa ry of already presented data and results, an attempt is made as well to tentatively push fo rward an agenda for future research. Combing through the contemporary and histori cal political record in search of the lines of conflict along which Ghanaian politics occur, a number of tentative hypotheses ri se to the fore. These generated hypotheses cannot be demonstrated with the data presented but the data presented indicates smoke where future studies may, or may not, discove r fire. There are three distinct realms into which these hypotheses are categorized below: those that point to a potential fulle r understanding of Ghanaian politics, those that point to a pot ential fuller understanding of politics in countries 1 Dahls (1971) participation is most commonly understood as universal adult suffrage . The problems associated with bringing the masses on board are well documented in the early writings of US constitution-makers, see for instance Federalist Paper No. 10, and the tendencies to is olate government from the unwashed masses does not always die with time (see Crenson and Ginsberg 2002).

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186 outside of Ghana, and those that point to a potential fuller understanding of the theoretical foundations of political party studies.2 Ghanaian Perspectives Ethnicity matters a lot in Ghanaian po litics. The National Commission for Civic Educations pre-election Be Tolerant campaign is but one explicit recognition of th is attribute. In anticipation of the 2004 elections, posters wi th slogans like Toler ance leads to National Unity, Tolerance Strengthens our Demo cracy, and Everybody has an OpinionBe Tolerant were plastered on nearly every public building in Ghana and on the outer walls of many private compounds, electric polls, trees, busses, bicycles, and boa ts (see Figure 7-1). Politicians, preachers, musicians, television persona lities, and even regular callers to radio talk shows took many an opportunity in the weeks pr eceding election 2004 to join the pro-tolerance chorus. Each set of national elect ions of the Fourth Republic has been met with some electoral violence. Most of this violence has taken the form of small scale a nd localized thuggery, though in 2000 an ethno-partisan conflict cost dozens of lives in the Upper Easts Bawku constituency. These localized outbursts of politicized violence ar e of great concern to citizens in affected areas and national leaders mindfu l of the countrys reputation. They are often, however, fluffed off by those outside of affected areas as the expression of primordial animosities of backwards people. A reporter from Accra typified this te ndency when he explained away the conflict in Bawku by writing that Bawku is a place where a mere argument or fight between two people can result in an uncontro llable inferno (cited in Smith 2001, 179). Not so easy to dismiss is the civil war next door in Cte dIvoire where a po liticized conflict with ethnic, regional, and religious undertones has engulfed the nation. On the West Coast of Africa, writes one author 2 This categorization is suggested in Chazan (1983).

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187 comparing Ghana with its westerly neighbor, nestl ed in the Gulf of Guin ea, are two states as alike as one might hope to find on this vast a nd variegated continent (Woronoff 1972, 1). From the moment of independence Nkrumah and HouphoutBoigny pitted their respective models of development, and by association countries, against each other and for quite some time Ghanaians looked enviously at the relative succ esses achieved in Cte dIvoire. The sectional conflict that has caught the nati onal attention in Ghana pits Asantes versus Ewes. Though there are exceptions, on aggregate voter s self-identifying with one of these ethnic identity categories are politically captu red by the NPP and NDC respectively. Looking historically at the periods prio r to the Fourth Republic, this st atus quo has more or less been maintained since the two ethnic groups came out of the First Republic as the recognizable bastions of government opposition that would ulti mately fill the political void left by Nkrumahs overthrow. Evidence presented in preceding chapters suggests that not only do Asante-voters and Ewe-voters exhibit strong opposition al tendencies at the ballot box, but that voters who do not identify with either of these two ethnic groups view and evaluate the political parties based largely on the ethnic groups the pa rty choices are associated with. Given that the vast majority of Ghanaian constituencies are neither Asantenor Ewedominated and relatively competitive electorally, more work needs to be done in these areas that ultimately decide who governs Ghana. A larger-N and more refined cognitive shortcut survey could begin to get at the quality of the ident ity glue that binds these more ambiguous voters to particular parties. A quick comparison of the ethnic map presented as Figure 3-1 (Chapter Three) and the electoral maps presented in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 (Chapter Four) underscores traditional ethnic areas that are more or less prone to identify with the Asante or the Ewe party. Akyem areas, for instance, have been pr etty solid bases of NPP support whereas Ga-

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188 Dangme areas, especially those that have remained relatively undisturbed by Accras massive inmigration, have been reliable bases of NDC suppor t. Other areas, principally those located in the regions formerly known as the Northern Territories, are not at all easy to categorize. With a few exceptions, most notably the Tamale and Yendi ar eas, they are relatively competitive and fluid from election to election. With a more refined surv ey instrument it may be possible to fill in the details of what is thus far a ra ther blunt characterization. It may in fact be possible with more research to create cognitive shortcut maps th at draw linkages between different identity categories to expose not only th e relationship between identi ty categories and partisan identification but between different identity cat egories on their way to influencing partisan identification. Another interesting area for future research focuses on the mechanism of distribution for political cues. Voters in Ghana are not making up ethnic identities for their political parties out of whole cloth and political parties are not merely responding to innate social cleavages. There is a process of learning going on that takes place both with in society, within political parties, and between the two. The work at hand highlights the results of this learning with the regression analysis and a cognitive shortcut survey presente d in Chapter Four and w ith historical election data explores the residual voting patterns created by this learning to surmise likely events that led to the prevailing status quo in Chapter Five. It does not, however, delv e into the process of learning itself. To explicate this process, two different strands of political science research show potential for promise. Network analysis seems well-equipped to build on the explanations of partisan cleavages detailed here with its ability to trace in formation from its terminus towards its root, but a rigorous test of social and polit ical networks in Ghana would re quire non-existent survey data

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189 and better yet non-existent paneled survey data that would highlight not only respondents answers to a question on how they learn about polit ical parties but how they learn in their social context from those they deal with every day an d not just once every fo ur years around election time (Zuckerman et al. 1994). To get more directly at the political partys role in this process an accompanying campaign content analysis would be insightful. Given the complex nature of campaigns in a political setting where the electro nic media is not king, th is is no easy task. A focus group considering the impact of campaign c ontent would not only have to be subjected to television, radio, and print advertis ements, but also to mass rallies and visits by politicians and their emissaries to neighbor hoods and villages. A daunting ta sk, no doubt, but one that might shed more light on something as basic as how the grand narrative of politics is transmitted. Comparative Perspectives In the West African region Ghana is, for the moment at least, a success story. The average Ghanaian earns nearly twice as much a year in terms of GDP per capita ($2928) as the average West African ($1506).3 Only the small island nation of Cape Verde can boast a higher GDP per capita in the region. In a region where experien ces with democracy have been few and far between, Ghana receives a Freedom House rating of Free scoring a perfect score (1) in terms of political rights and a near perf ect score (2) in terms of civil liberties (Freedom House 2007). The average combined political rights and civil liberties score for West African countries is a shoddy 7 out of a possible 14 with lower numbers indicating greater levels of democracy. Only Cape Verde again, scores better as a country on this scale than Ghana. 3 This information is taken from the World Economic Outlook (April 2006) estimation for 2007 (International Monetary Fund 2006). West Africa is defined here by membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Members include Benin, Burkina Faso Cape Verde, Cte dIvoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

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190 This relative exceptionality makes Ghana an interesting case to compare with its neighbors. What are the characteri stics, the question be gs, that allow Ghana to do relatively well in the present context and prevent countries like Nigeria, Cte dIvoire, and Burkina Faso from achieving similar accomplishments? An answer cannot be found in the all too convenient explanation of ethnic pluralism (Chandra 2005, 235; Mill 1991; Ru stow 1970; Dahl 1971; Geertz 1973; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Lijphart 1977; Ho rowitz 1985; Ake 1993; Sisk 1995; Reilly 2001). Ethnically divided societie s, notes Horowitz (1993, 19), h ave a special version of the usual democratic problem of assuring decent treatment of the opposition. As a continent Africas ethnic heterogeneity is well documented, yet as the preceding analysis suggests, ethnic politics plays a major role in one of West Africas healthiest democracies. The presence of ethnic pluralism in Ghana suggest s that scholars need to, if not completely reevaluate their assumptions about multi-ethnic societies, at least r eevaluate the varied nature of the democratic experiences with in the category of ethnically pluralistic states. Though not definitive, the depiction of Ghanaian ethnic cl eavages in comparison to its immediate neighbors points to some ways in which the Ghanaian et hnicized party system might be significantly different from those party systems which are not doing as well. When visually comparing the electoral maps in Figure 7-2, one difference is striking. In Ghana the ethnic poles of partisan competition are located in Asante-speaking areas, in the center of the country, and Ewe-speaking areas, in the countrys far Southeastern corner In Nigeria, Togo, and Benin the ethno-partisan divisions run along North/South lines. In Cte dIvoire, which has not held a recent election, a civil war runs in fits and starts along the fam iliar North/South division with Yamoussoukro as a rough delimiter of the frontlines.

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191 These limited cases are too few to build anyt hing more than tentat ive hypotheses upon. To begin with Benins democratic experiment is slightly older than Ghanas and only doing marginally worse by Freedom House estimations w ith a political rights score of 2 and a civil liberties score of 2. Additionally Ghanaians, wi th similar ethno-partisan alignments, have endured several ephemeral democratic experi ments in the pre-Fourth Republican past. Nevertheless there might be something to the inconvenient nature of Ghanas ethno-partisan cleavages for those wishing to drum up extra-pa rliamentary discontent in a post-Cold War era known in Africa for its democratic fertil ity (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Along the West African coast fr om Nigeria to Cte dIvoire the division between North and South runs along not only regi onal cleavage lines, but also religious (with the South being more Christian and the North being more Musl im), socio-economic (with the South being relatively richer and the North be ing relatively poorer), and clima tic (with the South being in the forest belt and the North being savannah). In the Ghanaian case, the dominant ethno-political cleavage is not nearly so tightly packed with other potentially salient pol itical cleavages. This cultural reality makes it difficult for those Ghanaian s who do not identify as Asante or Ewe to be pulled towards one pole or the other in some stable zero-sum way. If Ghanas democracy continues to outshine its neighbors this particular vari ant of ethno-partisansh ip might very well be the countrys saving grace. If so, some compar ative explanation for its exceptionality is in order. Theoretical Perspectives Most of the scholarly work on party systems and social cleavages has been conducted in areas of the world relatively long in the demo cratic tooth (Lipset a nd Rokkan 1967; Dahl 1966; Eckstein 1966; Rae and Taylor 1970). Influe nced by the aforementioned works, Sklar (1963, 479) describes with a note of optimism the [r]isi ng classes in Nigerian society that herald the

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192 decline of old orders. Though he does not come out explicitly and suggest these old (i.e., ethnic, regional, or religious) orders ar e hindering early Nigeri an attempts at democracy, the implication is there and puts Sklar very much in the mainstre am. As a democratic experiment not yet fifteen years old, the Ghanaian case cannot speak to th is earlier literature about what makes a democracy thrive. Though the fact that a third wave democracy is doing quite well without the support of obvious Gesellschaft partisan cleavages is interesting in and of itself, this one case is no where near disconfirming earlier theories of party/social cleavage interaction. The Ghanaian case does, however, point to an area where Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and their intellectual followers left a lacunae. For them, the proce ss of freezing the relationship between social cleavages and pol itical parties requires some cat aclysmic event. In Ghana the closest thing to a revolution along the lines of Reformation/Counter-Reformation, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, or Russian Revol ution was the push for, and attainment of, independence. Events that led to the lowering of the Union Jack and its replacement with the Black Star of Africa on 6 March 1957 did not, however, divide Gh anaian society into social factions that could be mobilized by political parties operating w ithin a democratic party system. Rather the movement towards i ndependence created a mass party in the CPP with tiny isolated blocs of resentment towards Nkrumahs centra lizing tendencies having little more in common than displeasure over who was residing in the State House. When the specter of Nkrumah and his CPP we re removed by coup dtat, the two segments of this ragtag opposition with the greatest ability to organize became the poles that would define Ghanaian multi-party politics ever since. In Asante-speaking ar eas political entrepreneurs took advantage of the Asante traditional authorities historical struggle for independence from the colonial authorities to drum up an oppositional movement. In Ewe-speaking areas the precarious

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193 demarcation dispute that resulted in Britains seizure of Togola nd from Germany in the wake of World War I provided an opportunity to mobilize a following and Nkrumahs vilification of this mobilization for political gain further solidified a voting bloc. Given the fact that Africas age of democratic openings has come at a time in world affairs when revolutio ns are largely frowned upon, it is quite possible that events which seem ed insignificant at the time will form the foundation on which these third wave democracies will be built. Perhaps these country specific events will defy pattern, but only more research in more newly democratic areas will tell.

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194 Figure 7-1. Pre-election Tolerance posters (Source: Photographs taken by author in November/December 2004.)

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195 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Figure 7-2. Mapping selected West African political cleavages [Dep icted from left to right are Cte dIvoires frontlines (United Na tions Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA 2006), Ku fuors 2004 election results in Ghana, Faures 2005 election results in Togo, Yayis first round election results in 2006 in Benin, and Obasanjos 2003 election results in Nigeria. The electi on results depicted were obtained from the respective countries electoral commissions and like the maps depicted in Chapter Four and Five the darker the electoral area the better the identified candidate did and th e lighter the area the worse.]

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196 APPENDIX A COGNITIVE SHORTCUT SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION)

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201 APPENDIX B SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY Survey Methodology To choose the 200 survey respondents in each selected constituency (Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam) a multi-tiered randomiza tion approach was followed. First, Ghana Statistical Services provided 20 randomly generated enumeration area maps situated in each constituency. These maps were used to c onduct the 2000 national censu s and include between 100 and 500 households each. Both a sketch of the block or village enumerated and a written description of its boundaries were provided. When a survey team, comprised of two inte rviewers conversant in local languages and myself, arrived at a particular enumeration area ten households were selected for survey. To choose these households the survey team first walked through the entire enumeration area and estimated the total number of households; a hous ehold was defined loosely as a group of individuals who share a cooking pot which allowed for large structures and compounds to accommodate more than one household. We would then divide the number of estimated households by 10 and round to the n earest whole number (n). One in terviewer would start at the enumeration areas northernmost border and th e other at the southernmost border. These interviewers would select every nth household for interview in a zigzag pattern working towards the enumeration areas center dividing line until they had each identified five households for interview. Once at a selected household an adult was aske d for the first names of all the registered voters in the household. Each of these individuals was assigned a number. Then someone in the household would select a number out of a bag to determine the in terviewee. If that person was available immediately and agreed to be interviewed the interview would follow. If the selected

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202 person was unavailable one return trip would be made to the household at a more convenient time, as suggested by a household member. If eith er the potential interv iewee refused to be interviewed or was absent on the follow-up visit, the household imme diately to the east of his/her house would be substituted and the househol d-level randomization procedures would be revisited. Before an individual consented to be interviewed, the interv iewer would inform him/her of his/her rights as an interviewee, give him/her a copy of the Internal Review Board (IRB) consent form, and collect a signed copy of the IRB cons ent form. Surveys were available in English, Asante Twi, Ga, and Nabit. Translations from English were obtained from the Language Center at the University of Ghana, Legon (Asante Twi and Ga) and Pastor Isaac Yen (Nabit). After the initial translation all of the survey instruments were subjected to a reverse translation by a native speaker of the language with no association to, or knowledge of, the original translator. With the preferred language chosen, the in terviewer would read each que stion to the interviewee and record the answers. The survey experience typically lasted between 20 and 25 minutes. To diminish the instances requiring a return visit, we took into account each enumeration areas typical weekly schedule. Times when inte rviewees were most likely to be away from home (e.g., market day) or too busy to talk (e.g., dinner time) were avoided. When return visits and household substitutions were ne cessary, the fact that interviewe rs lived in the constituencies where interviews took place made these return visits and household substitutions only a modest extra effort. My role in the interviewing pro cess was as a quality control check. Unannounced I would attend interview sessions to offer constr uctive feedback afterwar ds and would regularly return to households where inte rviews took place to i nquire as to whether or not protocol had been followed.

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203 Focus Group Methodology After the survey data for the selected c onstituencies (Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam) was collected and input into SPSS, a focus group wa s held. Ten registered voters were invited to each constituency-level focus gr oup. The ability to converse fluently in English was required. Beyond this prerequisite, invitees were selected based on the loca tion of their residence within the constituency, gender, age, ethnicity, and partis an proclivities. An attempt was made to have an equal number of males and fe males participate; representatives from different age and ethnic groups living in different parts of the cons tituency; and representatives of the NPP, NDC, and Nkrumahist parties in roughly the same ratio as the voting public. Focus group meetings lasted for 90 minutes and were audio taped. Before the discussion began all attendees were given a promise that th eir identities would be kept secret by me, the focus group conductor, and asked to sign a document guaranteeing each other that the proceedings would be kept private. Discussants we re then informed of selected aggregate results from their constituencys survey. They were asked to help interpret those results to provide contemporary and historical cont ext to the raw data. For their assistance, discussants were provided with refreshments and a small monetary token of appreciation.

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204 LIST OF REFERENCES Acquah, Ion. 1958. Accra Survey: A social survey of the capital of Ghana, formerly called the Gold Coast, undertaken for the West Afric an Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1953-1956 London, UK: University of London Press. Addae-Mensah, Ivan. 1979. Election 1979. The Legon Observer 27 July, 245-74. . 1981. Limann and Ghana: The ideological question Accra, Ghana: The Peoples National Party. Addo, S.N. 1954. C.P.P. Rebels are Expelled. Daily Graphic 7 July, 1. Adjei, Mike. 1969. Tribes and Politics. Daily Graphic 2 September, 5. . 1994. Death and Pain: Rawlings Ghana, the inside story London, UK: Black Line. . 2005. Ethnicity and appointments in Ghana. Daily Graphic 1 February, 9. Afrobarometer. 2006. Afrobarometer.org accessed 11 November 2006, available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org. Ahmed-Rufai, Misbahudeen. 2002. The Muslim Associ ation Party: A Test of Religious Politics in Ghana. Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 6: 99-114. Ake, Claude. 1993. Rethinking African Democracy. In The Global Resurgence of Democracy ed. L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner. Baltimor e, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Akyeampong, Emmanuel. 2002. Bukom and the Social History of Boxing in Accra: Warfare and citizenship in precolonial Ga society. International Journal of African Historical Studies 35 (1): 39-60. Akyeampong, H.K., and Moses Danquah, eds. 1956. The Doyen Speaks: Some of the historic speeches by Dr. J.B. Danquah Accra, Ghana: West African Graphic. Allardt, Erik. 2001. Party Systems and Voter Alignments in the Tradition of Political Sociology. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited ed. L. Karvonen and S. Kuhnle. New York, NY: Routledge. Allman, Jean Marie. 1990. The Youngmen and th e Porcupine: Class, nationalism and Asantes struggle for self-determination, 1954-57. Journal of African History 31 (2): 263-79. Amenumey, D.E.K. 1969. German Ad ministration in Southern Togo. Journal of African History 10 (4): 623-39. . 1989. The Ewe Unification Movement: A political history Accra, Ghana: Ghana Universities Press.

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207 Burkhart, Ross E., and Michael S. Lewis-B eck. 1994. Comparative Democracy: The economic development thesis. American Political Science Review 88 (4): 903-10. Busia, Kofi Abrefa. 1956a. Gold Coast s Future: Securing a happy independence. The Times (London), 14 September, 9. . 1956b. Judge for Yourself. Accra, Gold Coast: West African Graphic Company. . 1967. One Year After the Coup. The Legon Observer 2 (7): II-III. . 1968. The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti: A study of the influence of contemporary social changes on Ashanti political institutions London, UK: Cass. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warre n E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. Chalfin, Brenda. 2001. Border Zone Trade and th e Economic Boundaries of the State in NorthEast Ghana. Africa 71 (2): 202-224. Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. Ethnic Part ies and Democratic Stability. Perspectives on Politics 3 (2): 235-52. Chazan, Naomi. 1982. Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana. Political Science Quarterly 97 (3): 461-85. . 1983. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing political recession, 1969-1982 Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chazan, Naomi, and Victor T. Le Vine. 1979. Po litics in a Non-Politic al System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana. African Studies Review 22 (1): 177-207. Clapham, Christopher. 1997. Oppos ition in Tropical Africa. Government and Opposition 32 (4): 541-56. Clark, Gracia. 1994. Onions are my Husband: Survival and accumulation by West African market women Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cohen, Dennis L. 1970. The Convention People s Party of Ghana: Representational or solidarity party? Canadian Journal of African Studies 4 (2): 173-94. Coleman, James S., and Carl G. Rosberg, eds. 1964. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Convention Peoples Party. 1954. Vote CPP: Vote 104-Freedom. London, UK: New Labour Press.

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208 Coulombe, Harold, and Andrew McKay. 2003. Sel ective Poverty Reduction in a Slow Growth Environment: Ghana in the 1990s. Pape r prepared for the World Bank, Human Development Network, accessed 19 Oct ober 2006, available online at http:// www.isser.org/Selective% 20Poverty%20Reduction.pdf. Crenson, Matthew A., and Benjamin Ginsberg. 2002. Downsizing Democracy: How America sidelined its citizens and privatized its public Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Crook, Richard C. 1981. Politics in Northern Ghana. Journal of African History 22 (4): 565-6. Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dahl, Robert A., ed. 1966. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dakubu, M.E. Kropp. 1988. The Languages of Ghana New York, NY: Kegan Paul International. . 1997. Korle Meets the Sea: A sociol inguistic history of Accra New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Danquah, Joseph Boakye. 1957. Divisions in Ghana. The Times (London), 6 November, 11. . 1961. Plough and the Stars: Dealing with an ideology. The Times (London), 20 May, 9. . 1968. The Akan Doctrine of God: A fragmen t of Gold Coast ethics and religion London, UK: Cass. . 1970a. A Basic Constitution for Ghanaland. In Journey to Independence and After (J.B. Danquahs Letters) ed. H. K. Akyeampong. Accra, Ghana: Waterville Publishing House. . 1970b. Brief Narrative of Events February 28th & 29th. In Journey to Independence and After (J.B. Danquahs Letters) ed. H. K. Akyeampong. Accra, Ghana: Waterville Publishing House. . 1970c. Self-Government is Coming Soon. In Journey to Independence and After (J.B. Danquahs Letters) ed. H. K. Akyeampong. Accra, Ghana: Waterville Publishing House. . 1997. The Ghanaian Establishment: Its constitution, its detentions, its traditions, its justice and statecraft, and its heritage of Ghanaism Accra, Ghana: Ghana Universities Press. Danso-Boafo, Alex Kwaku. 1996. The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia Accra, Ghana: Ghana Universities Press.

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213 . 1993. Democracy in Divided Societies: The challenge of ethnic conflict. Journal of Democracy 4 (4): 18-38. Hunter, John M. 1966. River Blindness in Nan godi, Northern Ghana: A hypothesis of cyclical advance and retreat. Geographical Review 56 (3): 398-416. . 1968a. The Clans of Nangodi. A geographical study of the terr itorial basis of authority in a traditional state of the West African savanna. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 38 (4): 377-412. . 1968b. Population Pressure in a Part of th e West African Savanna: A study of Nangodi, Northeast Ghana. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 57 (1): 101-14. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Hunwick, John. 1992. An African Case Study of Political Islam: Nigeria. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 524: 143-55. Hyden, Goran. 1980. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Unde rdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. . 1992. Governance and the Study of Politics. In Governance and Politics in Africa ed. G. Hyden and M. Bratton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. International Monetary Fund. 2006. World Economic Outlook Database (April 2006). IMF.org accessed 15 January 2007, available online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ ft/weo/2006/01/data/index.htm. Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Af rica: Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Jeffries, Richard, and Clare Thomas. 1993. The Ghanaian Elections of 1992. African Affairs 92 (368): 331-66. Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive. 1954. Re port on the Gold Coast General Election 1954. . 1956. Report on the Gold Coast General Election 1956. . 1969. General Election Results August, 1969. Jonah, Kwesi. 1998. Political Parties and the Trans ition to Multi-Party Po litics in Ghana. In Ghana: Transition to democracy ed. K. A. Ninsin. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA. Joseph, Richard. 1983. Class, State, a nd Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21 (3): 31-8.

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214 . 1991. Africa: The rebirt h of political freedom. Journal of Democracy 2 (4): 11-24. Kallinen, Timo. 2004. Some Chiefs are More Under than others. PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland. Kane, Sylvester. 1979. Ghanas Politi cal Scene: Here is the truth. Daily Graphic 7 July, 6. Karl, Terry Lynn. 1986. Imposing Consent: Electoral ism and democratization in El Salvador. In Elections and Democratizati on in Latin America, 1980-1985 ed. P. W. Drake and E. Silva. La Jolla, CA: University of California-San Diego Press. Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. Tax Me If You Can: Et hnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of agriculture in Africa. American Political Science Review 101 (1): 159-72. Key, V. O., Jr. 1964. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 5th ed. New York, NY: Thomas Crowell. Kilson, Marion. 1974. African Urban Kinsmen: The Ga of central Accra London, UK: C. Hurst and Company. Kimble, David. 1963. A Political History of Ghana: The rise of Gold Coast nationalism, 18501928 Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Kiyaga-Mulindwa, D. 1980. The Akan Problem. Current Anthropology 21 (4): 503-6. Kohli, Atul, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. State Po wer and Social Forces: On political contention and accommodation in the Third World. In State Power and Social Forces: Domination and transformation in the Third World ed. J. S. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Kraus, Jon. 1966. The Men in Charge. Africa Report 11 (4): 16-20. . 1988. Responses to Party Failures in Ghana. In When Parties Fail: Emerging alternative organizations ed. K. Lawson and P. H. Merkl. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright. 2001. Party System Institutiona lization in 30 African Countries. Party Politics 7 (4): 437-68. Ladouceur, Paul A. 1979. Chiefs and Politicians: The politics of regionalism in Northern Ghana New York, NY: Longman. Larvie, John, and Kwasi Afriyie Badu. 1996. Elections in Ghana 1996: Part I Accra, Ghana: Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Leff, Carol Skalnik, and Susan B. Mikula. 2002. Institutionalizing Part y Systems Multiethnic States: Integration and ethnic segm entation in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992. Slavic Review 61 (2): 292-314.

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223 . 1996. Africa: An interim balance sheet. Journal of Democracy 7 (3): 53-68. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1966. Creating Political Order: The party-states of West Africa Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Zuckerman, Alan S., Nicholas A. Valentino, and Ezra W Zuckerman. 1994. A Structural Theory of Vote Choice: Social and political ne tworks and electoral flows in Britain and the United States. Journal of Politics 56 (4): 1008-33.

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224 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Kevin S. Fridy was born in Palatka, Florida in 1976 to Karen K. Hager and Robert L. Fridy, Jr. He is a graduate of Palatka High Sc hool, The George Washington University (BA), American University (MA), and the University of Florida (PhD). He is married to Sarah E. Fridy. In the fall of 2007 he will take up the positi on of Assistant Professor of Government and World Affairs at the University of Tampa.


Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019758/00001

Material Information

Title: 'We Only Vote but Do Not Know' : the social foundations of partisanship in Ghana
Physical Description: 224 p.
Language: English
Creator: Fridy, Kevin S. ( Dissertant )
Hyden, Goran ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007
Copyright Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Political Science thesis, Ph. D   ( local )
Dissertations, Academic -- UF -- Political Science   ( local )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Ghana

Notes

Abstract: “‘We Only Vote but Do Not Know:’ The Social Foundations of Partisanship in Ghana” focuses on the relationship between social cleavages and political parties in Ghana. In the decade following independence Africanist scholars, influenced by modernization theories, were keen to characterize the fledgling party systems they found as prone to sectional political cleavages given electorates comprised primarily of illiterate peasants. The popular prescription of the day was urban-dominated nationalizing parties at the cost of competition. When the “third wave” washed over African shores more than a quarter century later scholars began to look at the role political parties’ play in politics but have done so without much recognition of the past debate. Instead there is a tendency to focus on party organizations as merely players within formal electoral institutions. My study tries to capture the nuanced social analysis that marks the earlier Africanist discourse in political science while simultaneously acknowledging and learning from contemporary scholarship. Rather than assuming that parties organized along Gemeinschaft social cleavage lines are bad and those organized along Gesellschaft lines are good or that politically-mobilized identities are fixed social realities as did so many of the early Africanist scholars, my study allows for flexible hypothesis generation. Two research questions guide this exercise. First, what types of social cleavages undergird the Ghanaian party system? To answer this question election results are mapped and several regressions are run using district-level socioeconomic and sectional indicators from the 2000 census to predict electoral outcomes. The results of this analysis suggest that ethnicity is the driving force behind Ghanaian partisanship, but not in the zero-sum way that the early Africanist scholars studying parties predicted. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) tends to dominate in Asante regions and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in Ewe areas regardless of socio-economic characteristics but these two ethnic groups make up slightly less than 30% of the total Ghanaian population. In order to determine how the more than 70% of Ghana’s population not self-identified as Asante or Ewe view the two dominant political parties, a complementary “cognitive shortcut” survey was administered in three disparate constituencies. Results from this survey suggest that voters not self-identifying as either Asante or Ewe still view Ghana’s party system as cleaved along the described ethnic lines, but vote for either the “Asante” party or the “Ewe” party based largely on specific localized political disputes. As a follow-up question, my study asks what actors, events, and/or social structures led to these particular cleavages being mobilized in lieu of other potential cleavage structures? Unlike the generators of party systems in Europe described by Lipset and Rokkan as “revolutions,” the Asante/Ewe political cleavage was created through a number of fits and starts. These identities became politically salient independently as reactions to Nkrumah’s “nationalizing” government. The Asante identity, presented by the National Liberation Movement (NLM), drew upon symbols of Asante defiance from their drawn-out war with the British. The Ewe identity, presented by the Togoland Congress (TC), was fomented by Ewe-speakers’ peculiar position in a UN-mandated territory ceded to the British after Germany’s defeat in World War I, and more importantly the colonial and Nkrumah governments’ reactions to their claims. When Nkrumah was deposed, these two formerly aligned political groups had the cultural and organizational tools to fill the political void and present voters with oppositional forces across the subsequent three republics.
General Note: Title from title page of source document.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 224 pages.
General Note: Includes vita.
Thesis: Thesis (M.S.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
General Note: Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0019758:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019758/00001

Material Information

Title: 'We Only Vote but Do Not Know' : the social foundations of partisanship in Ghana
Physical Description: 224 p.
Language: English
Creator: Fridy, Kevin S. ( Dissertant )
Hyden, Goran ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007
Copyright Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Political Science thesis, Ph. D   ( local )
Dissertations, Academic -- UF -- Political Science   ( local )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Ghana

Notes

Abstract: “‘We Only Vote but Do Not Know:’ The Social Foundations of Partisanship in Ghana” focuses on the relationship between social cleavages and political parties in Ghana. In the decade following independence Africanist scholars, influenced by modernization theories, were keen to characterize the fledgling party systems they found as prone to sectional political cleavages given electorates comprised primarily of illiterate peasants. The popular prescription of the day was urban-dominated nationalizing parties at the cost of competition. When the “third wave” washed over African shores more than a quarter century later scholars began to look at the role political parties’ play in politics but have done so without much recognition of the past debate. Instead there is a tendency to focus on party organizations as merely players within formal electoral institutions. My study tries to capture the nuanced social analysis that marks the earlier Africanist discourse in political science while simultaneously acknowledging and learning from contemporary scholarship. Rather than assuming that parties organized along Gemeinschaft social cleavage lines are bad and those organized along Gesellschaft lines are good or that politically-mobilized identities are fixed social realities as did so many of the early Africanist scholars, my study allows for flexible hypothesis generation. Two research questions guide this exercise. First, what types of social cleavages undergird the Ghanaian party system? To answer this question election results are mapped and several regressions are run using district-level socioeconomic and sectional indicators from the 2000 census to predict electoral outcomes. The results of this analysis suggest that ethnicity is the driving force behind Ghanaian partisanship, but not in the zero-sum way that the early Africanist scholars studying parties predicted. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) tends to dominate in Asante regions and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in Ewe areas regardless of socio-economic characteristics but these two ethnic groups make up slightly less than 30% of the total Ghanaian population. In order to determine how the more than 70% of Ghana’s population not self-identified as Asante or Ewe view the two dominant political parties, a complementary “cognitive shortcut” survey was administered in three disparate constituencies. Results from this survey suggest that voters not self-identifying as either Asante or Ewe still view Ghana’s party system as cleaved along the described ethnic lines, but vote for either the “Asante” party or the “Ewe” party based largely on specific localized political disputes. As a follow-up question, my study asks what actors, events, and/or social structures led to these particular cleavages being mobilized in lieu of other potential cleavage structures? Unlike the generators of party systems in Europe described by Lipset and Rokkan as “revolutions,” the Asante/Ewe political cleavage was created through a number of fits and starts. These identities became politically salient independently as reactions to Nkrumah’s “nationalizing” government. The Asante identity, presented by the National Liberation Movement (NLM), drew upon symbols of Asante defiance from their drawn-out war with the British. The Ewe identity, presented by the Togoland Congress (TC), was fomented by Ewe-speakers’ peculiar position in a UN-mandated territory ceded to the British after Germany’s defeat in World War I, and more importantly the colonial and Nkrumah governments’ reactions to their claims. When Nkrumah was deposed, these two formerly aligned political groups had the cultural and organizational tools to fill the political void and present voters with oppositional forces across the subsequent three republics.
General Note: Title from title page of source document.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 224 pages.
General Note: Includes vita.
Thesis: Thesis (M.S.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
General Note: Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
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"WE ONLY VOTE BUT DO NOT KNOW":
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN GHANA




















By

KEVIN S. FRIDY


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007

































O 2007 Kevin S. Friday





































To Sarah









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Though the process of writing a dissertation can feel like a solitary affair at three o'clock in

the morning with a deadline fast approaching and several pages still to be written before dawn,

the process of retrospection that accompanies the writing of an "acknowledgments" section

brings with it valuable perspective. In hindsight I can see that the actual writing of my

dissertation only seemed so tedious and mind-numbing at times because it kept me away from

the people who brought so much joy to the practice of discovery which surrounded all those

solitary hours behind the computer. These individuals bear no responsibility for the mistakes I

have made in cobbling together a social story of Ghanaian party politics, but they deserve much

of the credit for whatever the dissertation' s redeeming qualities.

During my field work in Ghana I simultaneously incurred so many debts of gratitude and

was such a poor record keeper that there are many people who deserve thanks but will not

receive it individually. To all the random Ghanaians in Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam

constituencies who took time out of their busy schedules to answer a survey questionnaire I give

thanks. To all the secretaries who turned the waiting room television away from Nigerian movies

and to BBC for my sake and made sure I left their office building with both the name and

personal cell phone number of the individual I needed to speak with I give thanks. To all the

bureaucrats, taxicab drivers, soccer fans, corner loiterers, and barflies who I interrogated with

"silly" questions about party politics to pass the time I give thanks. To all the staff at Champs

Sports Bar in Kokomlemle, Ashfood Hotel in Bantama, and Sand Gardens in Bolgatanga who

kept me company in my down time I give thanks.

A Fulbright-Hays dissertation fellowship funded my fieldwork during the 2004/5 academic

year. Ghana's Center for Democratic Development (CDD-G) provided me with office space

during this period of time. While there I was surrounded by engaging individuals ranging from









Professor Gyimah-Boadi, the CDD-G's Executive Director, who was equally happy encouraging

me to participate in democracy promotion proj ects he thought I would Eind interesting and

allowing me to go off on my own research when I needed the time, to Davis Tettey, the security

guard, who would never let me pay too much for a cab and was always willing to teach me a

useful line of Twi or Ga. Though I met too many wonderful people working or affiliated with

CDD-G to mention them all, Dr. Baffour Agyeman-Duah, Daniel Armah-Attoh, Dela Avle,

Professor Cyril Daddieh, John Larvie, Abdul Wahab Musah, Franklin Oduro, Elvis Otoo, and

Nansata Yakubu were instrumental in pointing me in the right direction to Eind arguments and

data that found their way into the completed dissertation.

When one is dealing with political matters such as those presented in this dissertation the

question of whether or not to reveal public sources is one worth pondering. There is a tension

between a simultaneous desire to both recognize and protect that has prompted me to divide

these sources into two groups. The first group consists of party functionaries, members of

government, and/or Members of Parliament who shared with me their personal opinions about

Ghanaian party politics. These individuals are owed thanks but are not identified by name here.

My firsthand experience working with CDD-G has taught me that the Ghanaian media and party

machines can use social scientific analysis to bludgeon opponents regardless of the Eindings and I

want no part of that process. The second group consists of public sector bureaucrats and

university employees who went above and beyond the call of duty to ensure that I found various

public records. Included in this group are Dr. KoHi Agyekum and Alhaji Mohammed Dauda

Sulley (University of Ghana); Samuel Yorke Aidoo, Kwame Damoah-Agyeman, Edward K.

Dorgbor, Idrissu Mahama, and Nat Quaye (Electoral Commission); Francis "the librarian" and










Stephen Tetteh Narh (Ghana Statistical Services); Charles Brown (Parliamentary Library); and

Robert Kuma (Attorney General's Library).

Those that helped me with my constituency research and surveys include Jacqueline

Allotey, Juliet Allotey, Reginald Allotey, Zelma Allotey, and Addy Hussein (Odododiodio);

Charles Agyapong and Regina Agyemang (Bantama); and Maxwell Kparib and Pastor Isaac Yen

(Nabdam). Though the contract I had these individuals sign listed their title as "researcher" for

the month they were in my employ, in reality they were much more. As I taught them about the

survey they were to administer and the merits of a random selection of respondents, I learned

more about the collection of data through the interaction. As we canvassed the neighborhoods

and villages in teams of three, my assistants would make sure that I knew the history of the area

and met personally with anyone they deemed "important." Several years after the fieldwork

portion of my proj ect concluded, I hear from several of my research assistants by telephone on a

regular basis and hope that they know their value to me as friends has already outweighed their

value to me as "researchers."

My stay in Accra would not have been nearly so comfortable had it not been for Kwabena

Twum-Barimah, better known as TwumB, and his wife Afia. During my undergraduate years I

studied abroad at the University of Ghana-Legon for a semester. My American roommate John

and I decided our dormitory room was too big for only two students when our Ghanaian

neighbors had been assigned six to eight so we invited two "bedless" students to j oin us. One of

those students was TwumB. When I called him to notify him that I was returning to visit Ghana

in 2000 he made sure I had a bed and did the same thing when I returned again for my

dissertation research. Though my schedule kept me out of town for months at a time and away

from the apartment most evenings and weekends, the occasional home cooking and beers on the










stoop were a welcome relief and I hope TwumB and Afla know that I appreciate all their

generosity and consider the room John and I let TwumB borrow in the Fall of 1997 more than

paid off in full.

In Gainesville my dissertation committee is chocked full of not only top notch scholars, but

top notch individuals who have actively helped me along the j ourney to first conceive of my

dissertation topic and then complete it. It was in Bryon Moraski's class on "Post-Communist

Politics" that the idea of a proj ect on the relationship between social cleavages and political

parties was hatched. He not only introduced me to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), but allowed me to

make Ghana the focal point in my paper despite the fact that as a case it did not fall even

tenuously within the course' s boundaries. Leonardo Villal6n and the staff of the Center for

African Studies (most notably Corinna Greene and Todd Leedy) held my hand throughout the

Fulbright-Hays application process. Without their help I could not have won the fellowship and

without the fellowship I could not have afforded the research proj ect. Professor Villal6n' s

various house parties also served as a nice diversion from the daily grind for me and my wife

throughout our years in Gainesville. Brenda Chalfin and Daniel A. Smith made it possible for me

to show up in Ghana and hit the ground running. Over the course of her extensive field work in

Ghana's Northeast and his Fulbright year at the University of Ghana and CDD-G, they

developed many contacts and without hesitation opened their Rolodexes up to me. They also let

me borrow their Accra-based Nissan Patrol which I would like to say I left in better condition

than I found it but am not certain I can. Professor Goran Hyden is the type of dissertation chair I

wish every graduate student could have. He is a library unto himself, extremely well respected in

the discipline, and willing to open up all the doors he can for his students. Perhaps more

importantly, he is not afraid to let his students roam when they need the intellectual space. When









I needed him he was there at every turn. When I needed to pretend I did not have a deadline fast

approaching he was willing to play along.

Others who have read various manifestations of this dissertation and its chapters and

offered helpful comments include Victor Brobbey, James Essegbey, Parakh Hoon, Peter Lewis,

Staffan Lindberg, Scott Mainwaring, Richard Marcus, Peter Von Doepp, and Kenneth Wald.

Afcrican Affairs provided two anonymous reviewers for an article that overlaps heavily with

Chapter Four. When I was scratching my head trying to find election results from Ghana's past,

Jon Kraus came to the rescue with his excellent personal archive. Dan Reboussin deserves

recognition for the miracles he worked from the University of Florida library. No matter what

obscure text I dreamed up, he made sure I could get a copy. Paul F.A. Kotey never read a

sentence of this dissertation but he sat with me for hours talking about Ghanaian politics and

shaped my views immensely. He is missed.

Though I probably do not say it often enough in everyday life, it is nice to have a formal

space such as this to thank one's family. My father, Robert L. Friday, Jr., and mother, Karen K.

Hager, did not always understand what on earth their child was doing in school at the age of

thirty but without their help a PhD would not have been possible. Afla, also known as my

naughty dog, only cost twenty-six dollars at the animal shelter five years ago but has since

proven herself priceless. No matter the time of day or night I worked she volunteered selflessly

to be the muse by my side so that I would never feel too alone. Last but not least this dissertation

is dedicated to my wife Sarah. She is my rock! Without her I would have given up on this

dissertation long ago and probably wound up in an asylum along the way. This dedication is but

a small reward for all of the patience, forgiveness, and love she has shown me over the years.












TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............. ...............4.....


LIST OF TABLES ............ ..... .__ ...............12...


LIST OF FIGURES .............. ...............14....


LI ST OF AB BREVIAT IONS ............ ..... ._ .............. 15....


AB S TRAC T ............._. .......... ..............._ 17...


CHAPTER


1 INTRODUCTION ................. ...............20.......... ......


Entering a Conversation on the Stuff" of Democratic Politics ................ ............. .......22
Structure of the Argument ................. ...............26.......... ....


2 CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS A
REDUX ................. ...............30.................


Studying Political Parties in Africa: An Overview ................. ...............33........... ..
Sankofa' s Siren Call: A "New" Look at an "Old" Literature ........._...... ..... ._._.............36
Reevaluating the Substance of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction ...................38
Reevaluating the Sequencing of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction .................42
Conclusions............... ..............4


3 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND S TO GHANAIAN PARTISANSHIP..........._.47


Ideological Cleavages ................. ...._. ................50 .....
Nkrumahism v. Danquah-Busiaism............... ............5
The formative years (1949-1966) ................ ......... ...............52...
The UGCC and CPP progeny (1966-present) ................ ................ ......... .57
The Advent of a "Third Way:" Rawlingsism? ............ ...............60.....
Sectional Cleavages ........._... ...... ..... ...............63....
Ethnicity .............. ...............64....
A sante ........._... ...... ..... ...............65....
Ew e ........._...... ...............66.._ _. .........
The rest ........._...... ...............67..__..........

Region............... ...............70.
Religion .............. ...............72....

4 THE ELEPHANT, UMBRELLA, AND QUARRELLING COCKS:
DISAGGREGATING PARTISANSHIP IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC ............................78











Elections in the Fourth Republic .............. ...............80....
M apping the Votes ............... ...... ....... ................8
Analyzing the Votes with the Help of Census Data ................. ................. ........ 84
The Meaning of Electoral Choice in Ghana: Cognitive Shortcuts ..........._._ ........._.._. ...90
Cognitive S hortcut" Survey ........._.. .. ...._.. ...............9 1...
Cognitive Mapping ........._.. .. ...._.. ...............92....
Conclusions............... ..............9

5 THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY GHANAIAN PARTIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTISANSHIP PRIOR TO THE
FOURTH REPUBLIC ................. ...............105......... ......


Methodological Options for Historical Analysis............... ... ....... .........0
Isolating "Freezing Moments": Elections in the Gold Coast and Ghana ........._..................110
Pre-Independence Elections (1951, 1954, and 1956) .................. .. ............ ...............110
Post-Independence Elections before the Fourth Republic (1969 and 1979) .................11 3
The Freezing Process: Cleavages Politicized and Cleavages Left Fallow ................... ........117
Creating the Asante v. Ewe Dichotomy ................ ......... ....___ ..........19
Becoming politically salient "groups" ............ ........ ..... ............12
B becoming politi cal opposites and fostering thi s rel ati onship ................. ...............126
Alternative Cleavage Structures and their Fates .............. ...............133....
Conclusions............... ..............13

6 MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: A STUDY IN
THREE CONSTITUENCIES (ODODODIODIO, NABDAM, BANTAMA) ....................145

O dododiodio ................... ... .. ........ ........... ..... ..... .. .. ... .... ........
Socio-Political Background of a Highly Competitive Constituency in "Old Accra" ...150
Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Odododiodio ................. ...............153
N abdam ............... .. ......... ...... ...... .... ..... .. ... ... .. ... ......... 5
Socio-Political Background of a Poor Rural Constituency in Ghana' s Far North........157
Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Nabdam ................. ........._.._.. ...161
B antam a ................. ......... ...... ......... ........ ................ .. ........... 6
Socio-Political Background of the NPP's "World Bank" of Votes .............. ..... .........._165
Exploring Contemporary Politicized Cleavages in Bantama .............. ............._..169
Conclusions............... ..............17

7 CONCLUSIONS .............. ...............185....


Ghanaian Perspectives ........._.. .. ...._.. ...............186....
Comparative Perspectives ........._.. .. ...._.. ...............189....
Theoretical Perspectives ............_. ...._... ...............191....

APPENDIX


A "COGNITIVE SHORTCUT" SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION)............._ ............_ 196

B SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY ........._._.._......_.. ........._.....201












Survey Methodology .............. ...............201....
Focus Group Methodology ................. ...............203................


LIST OF REFERENCES ................. ...............204................


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............. ...............224....










LIST OF TABLES


Table page

3-1 Elections in Ghana a historical overview .........__._ .... .___ ...............74.

3-2 Genealogy of the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist traditions ................. ................ ..74

4-1 NPP districts (linear regression) .............. ...............100....

4-2 NDC districts (linear regression) .............. ...............100....

4-3 Cognitive perceptions of class for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) ................100

4-4 Cognitive perceptions of population density where NPP and NDC supporters live
(survey results) ................. ...............100................

4-5 Cognitive perceptions of education-level for NPP and NDC supporters (survey
results) ................. ...............101................

4-6 Cognitive perceptions of ethnic identity for NPP and NDC supporters (survey
results) ................. ...............101................

4-7 Cognitive perceptions of region for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) .............102

4-8 Cognitive perceptions of religion for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results) ...........102

5-1 1954 Legislative Assembly election results by region and ethno-cultural group ............140

5-2 1956 Legislative Assembly election results by region and ethno-cultural group ............140

5-3 1969 Parliamentary election results by region and ethno-cultural group ................... .....141

5-4 1979 Parliamentary and presidential (2nd round) election results by region and ethno-
cultural group ................. ...............141._.._._ ......

6-1 Three constituencies (Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama) at a glance ................... ....176

6-2 Gas' voting compared to non-Gas in Odododiodio (survey results) .............. ................177

6-3 Odododiodio election results (1996 Parliament) broken down by polling station ..........1 78

6-4 Party preference by Odododiodio sub-constituency electoral area (survey results)........178

6-5 Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-constituency electoral area (survey results) ..178

6-6 Non-Ga party preference by Odododiodio sub-constituency electoral area (survey
results) ................. ...............178....._ .....










6-7 Votes in Nabdam by chieftaincy area (2004 election results) .............. ....................17

6-8 Namnam party preference by acceptance of campaign gifts (survey results) ................. 179

6-9 Namnam gender by acceptance of campaign gifts (survey results)............... ............... 179

6-10 Bantama party preference by gender (survey results) ................. .......... ...............179

6-11 Bantama party preference by ethnic identity (survey results) .............. ....................18










LIST OF FIGURES


Figure page

3-1 Ethno-linguistic map of Ghana .........__._..... .._.. ...............76...

3-2 Contemporary regions of Ghana (color-coded by colonial regions) .............. .................77

4-1 NDC percentage of presidential votes mapped. ......___ ... .....__ ......__..........103

4-2 NPP percentage of presidential votes mapped ................. ...............104........... ..

5-1 Constant geographical units for elections (1954-1979) and census (1960) ................... ..142

5-2 CPP percentage of the vote mapped for pre-independence elections .............. ..... ..........143

5-3 Danquah-Busiaists and Nkrumahists percentage of the vote mapped for pre-Fourth
Republic elections ................. ...............144................

6-1 Odododiodio, Nabdam, and Bantama located on Ghanaian map .............. ..............18 1

6-2 Odododiodio map with survey areas highlighted .............. ...............182....

6-3 Nabdam map with survey areas highlighted ................. ...............183........... ..

6-4 Bantama map with survey areas highlighted ................. ...............184........... ..

7-1 Pre-election "Tolerance" posters .............. ...............194....

7-2 Mapping selected West African political cleavages ................. .......... ................1 95









LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Action Congress Party

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

All People's Republican Party

Anlo Youth Organization

Center for Democratic Development Ghana

Convention People's Party

Committee on Youth Organization

Economic Community of West African States

Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere

Federation of Youth Organizations

Ghana Congress Party

Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine

Moslem Association Party

National Alliance of Liberals

National Democratic Congress

National Independence Party

National Liberation Council

National Liberation Movement

Northern People's Party

New Patriotic Party

National Redemption Council

People's Action Party

People's Convention Party


ACP

AFRC

APRP

AYO

CDD-G

CPP

CYO

ECOWAS

EGLE

FYO

GCP

KVIP

MAP

NAL

NDC

NIP

NLC

NLM

NOPP

NPP

NRC

PAP

PCP











PFP Popular Front Party

PHP People's Heritage Party

PNC People's National Convention

PNDC Provisional National Defense Council

PNP People's National Party

PP Progress Party

SDF Social Democratic Front

SMC Supreme Military Council

TC Togoland Congress

UGCC United Gold Coast Convention

UNC United National Convention

UNIGOV Union Government

UNP United National Party

UJP United Party









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

"WE ONLY VOTE BUT DO NOT KNOW":
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN GHANA

By

Kevin S. Friday

May 2007

Chair: Goran Hyden
Major: Political Science

"'We Only Vote but Do Not Know:' The Social Foundations of Partisanship in Ghana"

focuses on the relationship between social cleavages and political parties in Ghana. In the decade

following independence Africanist scholars, influenced by modernization theories, were keen to

characterize the fledgling party systems they found as prone to sectional political cleavages

given electorates comprised primarily of illiterate peasants. The popular prescription of the day

was urban-dominated nationalizing parties at the cost of competition. When the "third wave"

washed over African shores more than a quarter century later scholars began to look at the role

political parties' play in politics but have done so without much recognition of the past debate.

Instead there is a tendency to focus on party organizations as merely players within formal

electoral institutions. My study tries to capture the nuanced social analysis that marks the earlier

Africanist discourse in political science while simultaneously acknowledging and learning from

contemporary scholarship.

Rather than assuming that parties organized along Gemeinscha-ft social cleavage lines are

bad and those organized along Gesellschaft lines are good or that politically-mobilized identities

are fixed social realities as did so many of the early Africanist scholars, my study allows for

flexible hypothesis generation. Two research questions guide this exercise. First, what types of









social cleavages undergird the Ghanaian party system? To answer this question election results

are mapped and several regressions are run using district-level socioeconomic and sectional

indicators from the 2000 census to predict electoral outcomes. The results of this analysis

suggest that ethnicity is the driving force behind Ghanaian partisanship, but not in the zero-sum

way that the early Africanist scholars studying parties predicted. The New Patriotic Party (NPP)

tends to dominate in Asante regions and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in Ewe areas

regardless of socio-economic characteristics but these two ethnic groups make up slightly less

than 30% of the total Ghanaian population. In order to determine how the more than 70% of

Ghana's population not self-identified as Asante or Ewe view the two dominant political parties,

a complementary "cognitive shortcut" survey was administered in three disparate constituencies.

Results from this survey suggest that voters not self-identifying as either Asante or Ewe still

view Ghana' s party system as cleaved along the described ethnic lines, but vote for either the

"Asante" party or the "Ewe" party based largely on specific localized political disputes.

As a follow-up question, my study asks what actors, events, and/or social structures led to

these particular cleavages being mobilized in lieu of other potential cleavage structures? Unlike

the generators of party systems in Europe described by Lipset and Rokkan as "revolutions," the

Asante/Ewe political cleavage was created through a number of fits and starts. These identities

became politically salient independently as reactions to Nkrumah's "nationalizing" government.

The Asante identity, presented by the National Liberation Movement (NLM), drew upon

symbols of Asante defiance from their drawn-out war with the British. The Ewe identity,

presented by the Togoland Congress (TC), was fomented by Ewe-speakers' peculiar position in a

UN-mandated territory ceded to the British after Germany's defeat in World War I, and more

importantly the colonial and Nkrumah governments' reactions to their claims. When Nkrumah









was deposed, these two formerly aligned political groups had the cultural and organizational

tools to fill the political void and present voters with oppositional forces across the subsequent

three republics.









CHAPTER 1
INTTRODUCTION

Over the course of the Hield work that would eventually lead to this dissertation I did a lot

of sitting. In the cities it would usually be in a molded plastic chair, most often at a drinking spot.

In the countryside an exposed tree root or precarious wooden bench outside of someone's

compound would substitute. Though this sitting could be categorized as "participant

observation" along the lines of Fenno (1990) had I been pressed to document the use of my time

in Ghana, connotatively "participant observation" seems to describe something far more grand

and systematic than I was up to. My research design called for a modest survey (N=600) to be

conducted in three disparate electoral constituencies.l To administer these surveys I hired two

assistants for each constituency. These assistants not only possessed the language skills in local

dialects that I lacked, but I felt it would be less intimidating for respondents to receive a visit

from someone local than from someone purporting to be from an American university. Despite

this help I gave myself a month in each constituency which I used to train and retrain my

assistants in the art of randomization, survey administration, and Institutional Review Board

forms.

Once in the Hield to collect data, I saw the demands on my time dwindle dramatically. I had

to be on the ground in the constituency to do occasional quality control checks, the reason I hired

so few assistants and gave myself so much time on location in the first place, but for the most

part I found myself wandering through neighborhoods and villages left out of the travel guides,

looking for a nice place to sit. Sitting, at least in this oburoni's experience, tended to attract

conversation.2 My favorite icebreaker was the Ghanaian football league. As an avid follower of


i A copy of the English version of this survey is provided in Appendix A.

2 Oburoni is the Twi word for foreigner. Connotatively the word is used to describe non-Africans.









Accra Hearts of Oak I would relive the past week' s glories, and occasional calamities, with

fellow admirers and exchange friendly barbs with supporters of other teams. When I was not the

conversation initiator, the tendency was for questions about my nationality, followed by

questions about how wonderful America really is, followed by questions about the visa process.

Though I never forced the issue, partly because I was looking for distraction and partly because

politics can be a sensitive topic of conversation, if a lull entered into these conversations I would

often turn to my dissertation research. The recent election facilitated this process. "What do you

think about Ghanaian politics?" I would ask. After hearing a litany of complaints about Ghanaian

politics in general, and how all politicians are scoundrels in particular, I would query about the

party affiliation of my conversation partner. An answer would almost always come quickly to

which I would challenge "Why do you like your party?" With very few exceptions the answer

received after a considerable moment of pause resembled the words uttered by an anonymous

respondent from Kumasi who suggested "We only vote but do not know."

This response, which provides the title of this dissertation, was neither wholly unexpected

nor bereft of data. Campaigns in Ghana, not unlike campaigns around much of the world, offer

citizens very few tools with which to understand the impact of their vote through thoughtful

rational calculations. All parties promise some ill-defined, but no doubt covetable,

"development" and express their utter disdain for the debilitating condition of corruption.

Candidates describe their opponents as those who will stand in the way of this amorphous

"development" by engaging in the "politics of the belly." They will chop plenty of state

resources, the narrative goes, and lavish both themselves and friends with gifts while watching

the poor man and woman on the street and in the bush suffer (Bayart 1993; Lindberg 2003).

Individuals I conversed with frequently expressed embarrassment or shame at their inability to










explain the rationale undergirding their partisan identification or provide a cultivated description

of the substantive difference between cherished and despised parties. An individual in

Jamestown gave a typical response when he noted that "We in Ghana are new with our

democratic dispensation. Our politics are not like in the US."

Embedded in this statement of supposed inferiority there is an assumption being made that

the researcher expected some rote answer any true democrat would know. I read these honest

admissions of ignorance not as a sign of Ghana' s democratic failings, however, but as an

indicator of the unchallenged areas of cognition where many important political decisions,

including that of which party to champion, take place. Many voters in Ghana feel passionately

about one party or another but do not know on a conscious-level why they vote the way they do

because these decisions are made in an environment of imperfect information where rhetoric and

policy are disassociated and the cues voters receive from parties and their candidates are heavily

veiled and fit uncomfortably into a discussion of formal policy positions.

Entering a Conversation on the "Stuff"' of Democratic Politics

These impromptu conversations, as anecdotal as they may be, suggested a way of situating

this modest survey of Ghanaian political parties into a grander conversation in political science

on the "stuff" of democratic politics. Americanist scholars took an early role in defining the

parameters of the exchange by dividing the study of partisan identification into two camps. One

camp understands partisan attachments as derived from the conscious rational choices voters

make based on party platforms (Downs 1957) or perception of party performance in office

(Fiorina 1981). Voters, though they may not always be well-informed, are cognizant of the

rationale, as imperfectly constructed as it may be, behind the choices they make. They can either

identify which party agrees with them more often than not on the important social and/or

economic issues or evaluate the various costs and benefits of a particular government' s rule in









hindsight and forecast forward. One would anticipate, when asked why they support one party or

another, voters of this ilk have a thoughtful answer.

Yet my conversations with the chance Ghanaian voter, as well as the more systematic

collection of evidence presented in later chapters, suggests this is not the case at all. It is my

experience that most voters feel a strong attachment to one party or another but are not quite sure

how to verbalize the causal mechanism behind this attachment. In their analysis of the American

electorate, another group of scholars (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002) has noted a

similar phenomenon. Finding rational choices unsatisfying explanatory variables for partisan

identification, these scholars turn instead to social-psychological attachments. Green, Palmquist,

and Schickler (2002, 23) explain this relationship as follows:

People know who they are and where they fit in the matrix of prominent social groups.
Citizens' group attachments shape the way they evaluate political candidates and the
policies they espouse. These evaluations change as new information becomes available,
but seldom does the political environment change in ways that alter how people think of
themselves or their relationship to significant social groups. For this reason, voters'
attachments may remain firm even as their voting preferences shift. Thus, the basic
structure of electoral competition remains intact even as the personae and policies that
dominate politics change.

This understanding of politics turns the basic assumptions of rational choice partisan

identification on its head. Political preferences go from being something arrived at largely

through individual contemplation to something largely determined by how ones' social group fits

into the larger national society.

A rej section of Honto econonticus' utility is not new to those working with African politics.

The uneven and incomplete progress of modernity on the continent prompted Hyden (1980) to

call for a reevaluation of this parsimonious concept reliant on individualistic and well-informed

rationality even in the realm of microeconomics where Homo econonticus was born. Though this

embrace of alternative conceptualizations of "human nature" is not consensual amongst scholars









working on the continent, Bates (1981; 1988) in particular has been an influential champion of

rational choice explanations of African political phenomena, an acceptance of group politics has

been well within the mainstream of Africanist political science since its early days. As a maj or

threat to nationalist integration in the fledgling African republics of the early 1960s Coleman and

Rosberg (1964, 687) list as a maj or problem "territorial integration" which they propose "stems

from the persistence-indeed, the paramountcy-of 'primordial' attachments or ties; that is,

individuals identify themselves much more strongly with historic groups defined in terms of

kinship, religion, language, or culture than with the civil order of the new states."

To answer the question "Why do you like your party?" for all of those Ghanaians who

could not, this dissertation utilizes analysis of the archival record, census data, survey results,

and mass and elite interviews. It does so with an open assumption that for voters abstract

ideologies and interpretations of government performance more often than not do not lead

directly to partisan identifications. Rather policy preferences and performance evaluations are

given as something akin to talking points from the top-down by the political party, or perhaps

more precisely the party's leadership aided by the party's historical legacy, deemed most

credible because of its known association with a valued ethnic, religious, gender, class, or other

politically salient group. Voters in essence have a Rolodex of identities which are shaped and

given political salience through social interaction. The process of politics ties some of these

social identity categories to specific political parties and this process of tying identity to party

occurs prior to the adoption of evaluations for policy and/or ideology. Given this understanding

of partisan politics, the question "Why do you like your party?" can be broken down into its

many layers. What identity markers cognitively paint the party you support? What identity









markers cognitively paint their opposition? How do you see your identity in relation to the party

you support and their opposition?

The adoption of this social-psychological approach not only explains the inability of most

Ghanaians to elucidate their partisan preferences and does so in a way that is not completely

foreign to preceding Africanist scholarship, but it accomplishes this task in a manner that is not

so incompatible with competing conceptualizations of multi-partisanship in Africa. For scholars

who concentrate on the very rational-materialistic way in which patron-client networks influence

voter preferences, analysis of social cleavage/political party interactions helps explain the

patterning effects of patronage networks. No matter how wide a leader casts the spoils of state

resources, there are indefinitely locales where these resources are easily translated into votes and

locales where this translation fails to register, often despite the cooptation of leaders from the

region and expensive outlays of government assistance (Kasara 2007).

For those wedded to an understanding of partisan politics that follows the aforementioned

"rational choice" model, while this approach does down-play the individual's role in creating

macro-partisan patterns it does not foreclose on the possibility of class groups, even class groups

wedded to regional economic interests, as viable poles around which a party system can form.

Though finding that a class identity is the best predictor of partisan identity would not ipso facto

refute social-psychological explanations of partisanship since a sense of class conscience could

override a desire for personal material gain, such a finding would make it difficult to disentangle

rational choice and social-psychological explanations in ways other identities would not. In other

words, class could be understood as the expression of individual rational calculations or a sense

of common culture (Inglehart 1997).









Structure of the Argument

In its exploration of the soci al-psychological foundations of parti sanship in Ghana, thi s

dissertation begins with a review of the literature (Chapter Two) on the interaction between

groups and political parties in the comparativist and Africanist contexts. As its point of

embarkation Lipset and Rokkan' s (1967) classic text on party systems and social cleavage

patterns is adopted. While subsequent scholarship has challenged and updated much of what is

written in PartyP~~~~PPPPP~~~~PPPP Systems and Voter Alignments, Lipset and Rokkan frame the big questions -

namely "what groups are important in a given party system?" and "how did these groups gain

their political salience?" to which this dissertation ventures an answer. Having fleshed out the

types of groups that have in various multi-party contexts gained political salience the dissertation

moves on to an exploration of the key social groups in Ghanaian society, both past and present,

that could, under the right circumstances, be mobilized to form the support bases for competing

national party coalitions (Chapter Three). These social identities represent the potential building

blocks Ghanaian parties over the four republics could use to cobble together the necessary votes

to take over the statehouse.

It is with this background that the subsequent three chapters present descriptions of how

these building blocks have been organized and explanations for why partisanship took the form it

did over all other possibilities. Chapter Four does this on the macro-level in Ghana' s Fourth

Republic. It first asks what social cleavages the dominant parties in the Fourth Republic, namely

the NDC and NPP, rely upon to differentiate themselves from their opponents. This exploration

relies upon census data and election results. The chapter then presses further with survey data to

comb the minds of Ghanaian voters in search of the particular pieces of information regarding

party identities they use to differentiate between competing parties when presented with an

election. Evidence presented in Chapter Four indicates that the NPP does significantly better than









the NDC in Asante-speaking areas and the NDC does significantly better than the NPP in Ewe-

speaking areas. Voters associate the parties above all other potential identities with these two

ethnic groups and this association holds true whether or not said voters identify with the Asante

ethnic group, Ewe ethnic group, or one of Ghana' s many other ethnic groups.

Chapter Five explores the roots of this Asante/Ewe political cleavage. In the colonial and

post-colonial period Ghana held four national elections prior to the Fourth Republic's first

election in 1992. The historical record does not support any claims of Asante or Ewe primordial

political attachments. Election results indicate that the competition between Asante-dominant

areas and Ewe-dominant areas dates back only to the election of 1969 and the politicization of

these two areas as identifiable electoral blocs dates back to the colonial era. This chapter culls

through the various arguments purporting to explain the Asante/Ewe political rivalry to see

which of these arguments makes the most sense given the timing of bloc-voting onset and

commencement of an antagonistic electoral relationship. The chapter also explores competing

identities that expressed themselves as potential challengers to the Asante and Ewe ethnic

identities on the national political scene to understand why their salience ultimately ebbs.

The final substantive chapter (Chapter Six) is a very close exploration of partisan

cleavages in three disparate constituencies. This chapter has two primary functions. First it

illuminates at a relatively micro-level what is going on with politico-social conflicts in specific

localities. At this level the analysis should be of interest to scholars whose work focuses on the

Jamestown and Usshertown sections of Old Accra, the Bantama neighborhood of Kumasi, and

Nabit-speaking communities in the Upper East Region, as these are the three areas given

meticulous attention. For a broader audience, this chapter presents some insights into how social

cleavages might be mobilized in the vast areas of Ghana that are neither Asante- nor Ewe-









dominant with the cases of Odododiodio and Nabdam. These areas tend to be far more contested

than their counterparts and in fact serve as home to more than half of the Ghanaian voting

population. Bantama, in contrast, offers insights into the interworkings of a constituency where

the dominance of one ethnic group (Asantes) goes unquestioned and one party (the NPP)

considers it a bad day when they regi ster less than nine out of ten votes.

The dissertation' s conclusion (Chapter Seven) summarizes the findings of previous

chapters and revisits the theories that guided this research. It accomplishes this task at three

levels: countrywide, comparative, and theoretical. For students of Ghanaian politics this

dissertation offers both confirmations of conventional wisdom (e.g., the popularity of the NPP in

Asante areas and the popularity of the NDC in Ewe areas) and refutations of conventional

wisdom (e.g., the NPP is more popular amongst the upper classes and the NDC more popular

amongst the poor). In pushing beyond mere descriptions of voter tendencies and into the

"cognitive shortcuts" used to make electoral decisions, the dissertation charts a new course in the

study of Ghanaian politics. For students of comparative politics these findings suggest some new

interpretations of party systems defined in large party by ethnic politics. In the case of Ghana

ethnicity matters a lot for political parties trying to cobble together winning social coalitions.

Ghanaian elections do not, however, take the form of zero-sum ethnic censuses. Rather ethnicity

is used to provide context to political choices but most voters must use a socially ill-defined

evaluation of the dominant parties' ethnic identities to identify themselves with a party or

candi date. Theoreti cally Ghana provi de s a novel case for an expl orati on of soci al -psychol ogi cal

partisan attachments and the role of group heuristics in partisan identification. Most of the work

done with these concepts has been conducted in the United States and Western democracies.

These theoretical constructs, however, appear to have traveled quite well and the Ghanaian case









offers something that democracies longer in the tooth do not. It offers the opportunity to evaluate

the process of "cognitive shortcut" creation at a relatively early point which will be very useful

in studying the evolution of "cognitive shortcuts."









CHAPTER 2
CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS A REDUX

The seminal work on political cleavages appears as an essay titled "Cleavage Structures,

Party Systems, and Voter Alignments" written by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967)

to serve as the introduction to their edited volume on Party Systems and Voter Alignments. In the

tripartite arrangement of the political parties' body of literature introduced into the discipline by

Key (1964, 163-165) and reified a few years later by Sorauf (1968), this work falls squarely into

the party-in-the-electorate category. When mentioned at all, parties a~s organizations and parties

in government are tangential components of the story Lipset and Rokkan convey about the

interactions between political parties and society-writ-large. By the time parties as organizations

and in government begin to matter in their analysis, society has already cleaved and presented

purveyors of party politics with a fairly well-defined path, or paths as the case may be, of least

resistance.

Within society, Lipset and Rokkan note a Janus-faced role for political parties (p.3). On the

one hand parties serve as agents of social conflict. "Parties make for institutionalized rivalry"

Lipset (2001, 4) points out in a later work, and suchuh competition for Schumpeter is the essence

of democracy in macro politics." On the other hand, parties can serve as instruments of social

integration. Satrori (1988) describes this party function as the "part-of-a-whole." "Although a

party only represents a part," he explains with regard to pluralistic societies, "this part must take

a non-partial approach to the whole" (p. 252).

In their focus on the sociological aspects of political parties the way they can

simultaneously dissect society into groups and construct a sense of the whole Lipset and

Rokkan follow in the footsteps of political sociologists the likes of Andre Siegfried, Herbert

Tingsten, and Rudolf Heberle whose works led the way in bringing the social background of










politics into the foreground (Allardt 2001, 15). Where Lipset and Rokkan break new ground is in

their systematic comparative application of political sociology. While Lipset and Rokkan provide

a framework for studying the interaction between political parties and social cleavages based on

their reading primarily of Western European political history, their volume contains eleven case

studies: eight from the Western World (America, New Zealand, England, Italy, Spain, Germany,

Finland, and Norway) and three from "emerging nations" (Japan, Brazil, and "West Africa"). To

bridge the geographic, historical, cultural, and institutional gaps inherent to any proj ect with such

a broad scope, Lipset and Rokkan offer three sets of centralizing questions. These questions

loosely structure not only their introductory analysis, but the case studies provided by the

volume's contributors.

The first set of questions Lipset and Rokkan put forward concern "the genesis of the system

of contrasts and cleavages within the national community." Questions of this variety include:

"Which conflicts came first and which later? Which ones proved temporary and secondary?

Which proved obdurate and pervasive? Which cut across each other and produced overlaps

between allies and enemies, and which reinforced each other and tended to polarize the national

citizenry?" (1967, 1). The second set focuses on "the conditions for the development ofa stable

system of cleavage and opposition in national political life." Questions addressing this issue

include :

Why did some early conflicts establish party opposition and others not? Which of the
many conflicting interests and outlooks in the national community produced direct
opposition between competing parties, and which of them could be aggregated aI ithrin the
broad party fronts? Which conditions favored extensive aggregations of oppositional
groups, and which offered greater incentive to fragmented articulation of single interests or
narrowly defined causes? To what extent were these developments affected by changes in
the legal and the administrative conditions of political activity, though the extension of the
rights of participation, through the introduction of secret voting and the development of
strict controls of electoral corruption, and through the retention of plurality decisions or the
introduction of some variety of Proportional Representation? (p. 1-2).









A third and final set of questions addresses "the behavior of the mass of rank-and-file citizens

within the resultant party systems." Included in this set are:

How quickly were the parties able to recruit support among the new masses of
enfranchised citizens and what were the core characteristics of the groups of voters
mobilized by each party? Which conditions helped and which conditions hindered the
mobilization efforts of each party within the different groups of the mass citizenry? How
quickly did the changes in economic, social, and cultural conditions brought about through
economic growth or stagnation translate themselves into changes in the strengths and the
strategies of the parties? How did political success affect the rates of mobilization and the
inflow of new support to each party? Did the parties tend to recruit new clienteles and
change their followings as they established their viability as useful channels of influence in
the decision-making processes? (p. 2).

Having outlined these research questions, Lipset and Rokkan begin the process of

providing some possible answers through the merger of a detailed historical understanding of

Western European politics and a conceptual tool developed by Talcott Parsons (1953) known as

the A-G-I-L paradigm. Cleavages, they argue, can be mapped out across a four quadrant matrix.

Along one axis of this matrix are territorial cleavage structures. These range from (L) localized

opposition seeking some form of autonomy from the central government to (G) competing

territorial units each seeking control of the whole. The other axis of Lipset and Rokkan' s

rendition of the A-G-I-L matrix represents functional cleavage structures. Cleavages that occur

on this axis cut across regions and range from (A) conflicts over the short and long-term

distribution of economic benefits to (I) conflicts over moral rights and wrongs as represented

often by religious, ideological, and ethnic societies (p. 10-11).

Though a complete recounting of Lipset and Rokkan' s application of this taxonomic

matrix is beyond the scope of this chapter, the breadth of their explanation is worth noting. When

combined with a time dimension and the notion of frozen cleavage structures (the idea that over

time cleavage structures cease to appear afresh at each new conflict and rather reappear more or

SFor a further exploration of this framework see Gerhardt (2002).









less intact even for dissimilar conflicts), Lipset and Rokkan use their matrix to document party

systems across Europe whose politically mobilized cleavages were generated in the

Reformation/Counter-Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries (Center-Periphery), National

Revolutions in the mold of the French Revolution (State-Church), the Industrial Revolution

(Land-Industry), and the Russian Revolution (Owner-Worker) (p. 47).

Studying Political Parties in Africa: An Overview

At the dawn of African independence, scholars interested in studying African politics

turned in large-part to the study of political parties along the lines suggested by Lipset and

Rokkan (Apter 1965; Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Hodgkin 1961; Morgenthau 1964; Wallerstein

1967; Zolberg 1966). Perhaps this selection of topic and approach is a sign of scholarly trends.

Lipset' s (1960) Political2an is a milestone in the history of political sociology. The work did

not, however, represent an intellectual island. Political Man was published during the

disciplinary apex of modernization theory and with its reliance on Parsonian theory and

structural-functionalism fits well into the then prevailing trend (Kohli and Shue 1994, 298).

While much of the aforementioned early work on African political parties does not cite Lipset

and Rokkan's work directly, it consistently pays homage to political sociology and

modernization theory.

There is a practical explanation for this tendency as well. "In the new states of Tropical

Africa with which we are concerned," write Coleman and Rosberg (1964, 1-2), "there is an

almost complete institutional vacuum at the central, national level." Given a context devoid of

valued national structures, a focus on societal "political groups" has natural appeal. Scholars

translated this focus into a near universal recommendation, or perhaps more accurately

justification, for single-party states. "Fear that opposition will produce factionalism, corruption,

and separatism," explains Apter (1965, 193), "is pervasive in modernizing nations." To unite the









multitude of ethnic groups and get both the rural masses and urban elites onboard the

modernization bandwagon, a "party of solidarity" was thought to be, if not sufficient, at least

necessary. This highly-centralized power, the theory goes, has the best chance of dragging the

unwashed masses kicking and screaming towards development.

As a rule, Africa's one-party states, and de facto one-party states, took very little time to

prove themselves fundamentally ineffectual, corrupt, and anti-democratic (Pinkney 1988, 51-53).

One response to these unappealing manifestations of single-party politics was empirical. Across

the continent supposedly "apolitical" militaries inserted themselves into politics on a grand scale.

Though a few soldiers changed their stance as the "third wave" of democracy approached, the

initial preference of generals, and men of a lower rank alike, was the junta as a mechanism for

creating coherent government policy over the political party (Bienen 1978, 122-145; Decalo

1990, 1-32; 1976, 23 1-254). A second response to the unmet expectations of Africa' s single

party governments was scholarly in nature. Over the course of the 1970s, Africanist political

scientists oversaw a massive shift in the substance of their discourse. Those parties not

overthrown by coup d'etat began to fade into the background as personalistic rulers and their

support networks filled the intellectual void. Whereas Carl Rosberg co-edited a volume on

political parties to catalog African regimes in the 1960s (Coleman and Rosberg 1964), scholarly

trends dictated a similar categorization focus on personalities of African leaders in the 1980s

(Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

The personal rule and related clientelism literature that flourished during this period did

not all sever its ties completely with the preceding parties literature's substantive roots. Formal

institutions of governance were still considered too weak to merit a great deal of scholarly

attention, but instead of focusing on social groups and their prevailing cleavage equilibrium,









these scholars were interested primarily in pragmatic political attachments. The extent to which

this altered focus took scholars away from their predecessors' concerns varies greatly from those

like Jackson and Rosberg (1982, 19) who note a fundamental difference between "social

politics" and "palace politics" to those who see "social politics" as a fundamental and necessary

lubricant for patronage (Lemarchand 1972; Joseph 1983).

With the "third wave' s" arrival on African shores, legalization of a political opposition

brought parties back on the scholarly agenda (Huntington 1991). In many countries the

provincial literature on decades-long autocracies and recurring juntas was no longer convenient

and a burgeoning body of literature on comparative democratization beckoned (Diamond et al.

1988; Diamond and Plattner 1999). Despite no longer being ignored completely in discussions of

African politics, coverage of African parties during the early democratic transition period is

uneven and largely superficial. Many texts focusing specifically on democratic transitions

mention constitutional provisions allowing for the legalization of parties only as a portion of

grander political liberalization projects (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 143-147; Joseph 1991,

20; Widner 1997). These works treat parties essentially as a residual effect of democratization or

as potential indicators of democratic development and not as key independent variables

contributing to democracy's character as well as the democratic process's eventual consolidation,

stagnation, or decay.

Of the select few works focusing directly on African parties most do little more than

recognize parties as competitors in national elections. What once was a sure bet is now

conceptualized as a two, three, and even four horse race (e.g., Olukoshi 1998; Salih 2003). A few

texts (Clapham 1997; Lumumba-Kasongo 1998; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) instead of looking

at a single country look theoretically at party systems across the continent but do so largely with









an institutional focus asking why multiple parties thrive in some instances and pale in

comparison to a single dominant party in others. While many of these works offer excellent

electoral play-by-plays and party system analyses, virtually no effort is directed at empirically

testing theoretical assumptions about the ties between political parties and the societies within

which they interact. There have been a few single-case studies that venture onto this territory,2

essentially under the guise of analysis of partisan identification, but even these works largely

ignore the processes that were so important to earlier scholars. Social cleavages and their

interactions with political parties are examined for the most part historically as if they are

natural occurrences whose alternatives are either unimportant or unfathomable.

Sankofa's Siren Call: A "New" Look at an "Old" Literature

There is a saying in the Akan language of Twi Sti wo werfi fi na wosan kdfa a yenkyi.

Loosely translated, this saying known popularly in its anglicized form as "sankofa," warns one

not to neglect the past while moving forward into the future. In many ways this work represents a

sankofa-like return to the past with regards to the study of political parties in the African context.

The mass wave of democratizations that swept across the continent in the early 1990s did little to

fundamentally strengthen the institutions of governance (Hyden 1992). Civil society too failed to

experience a massive and sustainable invigoration accompanying the inauguration of formal

democratic institutions (Lewis 1992). Given these structural deficits, a focus on the nexus

between social groups and political parties, along the lines proposed by Lipset and Rokkan and

the early scholars of African political parties, makes a great deal of sense. Sankofa is not,

however, a call for credulous traditionalism. The concept treats the past as a mechanism for

educating the present and future. When scholars first applied the constructs of political sociology



2 Nugent (1999) and Lindberg and Morrison (2005) are two examples of such works that focus on Ghana.










in their analysis of African political parties the nearly consensual prediction was that multi-party

democracy was unsustainable in circumstances where there is a feeble sense of nationhood and

relatively cohesive essentialized sectional groups. Modernization and nation-building at the

hands of a single charismatic leader or unified elite party was the near universal prescription.

Though many a state indicated movement down this path, the outcomes overwhelmingly

underwhelmed.

In an interim balance sheet on the successes and failures of African "third wave"

democracies, Crawford Young (1996) remarks that "slow, halting, uneven, yet continuing

movement toward polyarchy is possible." Despite this mixed bag of results, he continues,

thereee is no plausible and preferable alternative on the horizon" (p. 67).3 YOung's cautious

endorsement of democracy is driven by a number of factors including the poor track-record of

one-party and military regimes in Africa, an international environment that is more insistent on

multi-party democracy than it was in the 1960s, and a great deal of comparative scholarly

literature suggesting that democracies are at least as well equipped for the trek towards

modernization as their undemocratic counterparts (Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck

1994). To salvage Lipset and Rokkan's ability to address foundational questions about political

conflicts in situations bereft of credible national institutions, yet operate in a context where

single parties have tried to consolidate the legitimate use of force and failed to win the masses

over or even maintain control of the state apparatus, two problematic aspects of Lipset and

Rokkan's analysis the substance and the sequencing of social cleavage and party interaction -

must be reevaluated.




3 A few works have argued for a return to the no-party models of government prescribed by earlier scholars (Wiredu
1996, 182-190; Osei-Hwedie 1998) though these are outliers.









As any reevaluation of analytical constructs perpetrates at least a modicum of conceptual

violence against the obj ect being considered, it is best to document potential biases up front. This

work attempts to stay true to the comparative endeavor that serves as the impetus for Lipset and

Rokkan's core questions but in order to do so in a context far removed spatially, culturally, and

temporally from those explicitly addressed in their work relaxes the debilitating hold

modernization theory, or perhaps more accurately some of the unspoken pre(mis)conceptions of

modernization theory, imposes on their analysis of Western Europe. Modernization theory, as

Mazrui (1968, 82) points out, is riddled with the "self-confidence of ethno-centric achievement"

and the assumption that contemporary African states are struggling with the same issues and

circumstances of their European counterparts of yore has very little foundation in empirical

world (Tipps 1973).

Reevaluating the Substance of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction

At a conference reviewing Lipset and Rokkan's work thirty years after its original

publication Allardt (2001) argues that the scholars use Parsonian formulations mainly as "a

classificatory and taxonomic device fitting in particular Western societies during the post-World

War II period." Allardt continues his evaluation noting that "the Lipset-Rokkan application of

Parsons never led to a substantial following among political sociologists" (p. 18). The strictures

of their A-G-I-L paradigm are largely ignored even by contributors to Lipset and Rokkan' s own

edited volume; Wallerstein (1967) makes nary a mention of the taxonomy. What early Africanist

scholars were interested in instead of placing party systems within the A-G-I-L matrix was

distinguishing between parties organized along Gemeinschaft (Community) social cleavage lines

and those organized along Gesellschaft (Society) social cleavage lines (Duverger 1954, 124-










125).4 Describing the nexus of community-based social cleavages and political parties as "a

general politization of primordial ties," Zolberg (1966, 22) lists ethnicity and region as the

primary concern for Africanist scholars and political practitioners alike. In anticipation of

Biafran-like consequences resulting from these Gemeinschaft parties, scholars accepted as the

lesser of two evils the fact that "most political roads carried the polity to an authoritarian

destination" (Young 1976, 520). Gesellschaft parties, Sklar (1963, 474) differentiates, "instead of

being based on neighborhood, geographical proximity, or blood relationship... [are] based on

interest." The assumption many of the early scholars of African parties work under is that

competition along the lines of class interests, especially when institutionalized into a party

system, represents valued modernity (Apter 19, 124). To justify their preferences for nationalist-

oriented single party states, scholars conceptualized the colonial metropole and the colony as two

sides of a centre-periphery cleavage structure and viewed the lack of competition in post-

independence Africa as a residual effect of this earlier conflict (Randall 2001, 247).

Though the aforementioned distinctions between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft political

parties has not disappeared completely from the discourse on African politics6--hence the

proliferation of constitutional provisions resembling Ghana' s Article 55 that proscribes political

parties "based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divi sions"--conceptual variables



SThe Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft distinction resembles Lipset and Rokkan's functional axis in that disputes
along the former lines are conceptualized as negotiable and those along the latter lines as zero-sum.

SOne could imagine an alternative conceptualization being one of Africans versus Europeans but this would not fit
into the optimistic model of modernization.

6 Some have added charisma as a third type of party appeal (Weber 1968, 241-248) and much has been written on
the topic with regard to African politics. The problem with placing "charisma" alongside Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft as a political party type is that the appeal of a particular candidate's charisma is almost never
distributed evenly throughout a given society. If multiple parties are allowed and elections are credible, the draw of
charisma undoubtedly falls short for a number of constituencies. The characteristics that make these constituencies
different from those that find a given candidate's charisma compelling are the markers of underlying cleavage
structures.









like ethnicity and class are increasingly unmoored by scholars and studied not as independent

variables that can be used to pigeonhole a party, social organization, or individual, but rather as

dependent variables that are socially constructed and can be studied as such. For those

essentializing ethnicity, elections can be viewed as an "ethnic census" with voters receiving

psychological (Horowitz 1985) and/or policy (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) benefits, the

existence of which are based almost exclusively on whether or not their particular ethnic group's

party wins or loses. Class-based cleavages can be defined obj ectively by one' s relationship to

"high-status occupation, high income, superior education, and the ownership or control of

business enterprise" (Sklar 1979, 543) or one' s position within a system "rooted in custom and

sustained by its mediation with and sometimes control of the supernatural" (Rathbone 2000, 4;

Mamdani 1996, 41; Rey 1973). But what happens when, as Posner (2005, 1) challenges,

ethnicity is a complex concoction comprised of religion, region, language, and tribe? Politics, he

answers, can and does revolve around some of these ingredients rather than others depending on

the political agents and context. And what happens when, as Ekeh (1975, 111) describes, civic

class identities and primordial class identities exist side-by-side in a single individual?

Contestation happens continually, he explains, with cost-benefit analysis determining the winner

sometimes on a case-by-case basis.

When Lipset and Rokkan's A-G-I-L schematic did not seem to explain African "realities"

in the 1960s Africanist scholars turned to other conceptual categories in the modernization

lexicon, namely the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft dichotomy that had been used to differentiate

between traditional modes of organization and modern modes of organization. With subsequent

scholarship demonstrating the vagaries of these vestiges of modernization theory, this work

moves a little further still from Lipset and Rokkan's original nomenclature. This movement is










not without its difficulties. "In reality," Nugent (2001, 2) explains, "the landscape of identity is

characterized by overlap and considerable fluidity, which makes the entire subj ect very difficult

to discuss without committing verbal atrocities." Identities like ethnicity and class matter in

politics in Africa as elsewhere and it would be impossible to discuss important social cleavages

underlying political party disputes without resorting to the use of these conceptual placeholders.

To diminish the effects of these inherent "verbal atrocities," the present work aims at the

lofty goal of definitional precision. With regard to ethnicity for instance, when those who speak a

particular language are being discussed as opposed to those who identify with a particular ethnic

group this choice of topic is made explicit. In addition, the relationship between identifiers like

language and ethnic group are frequently explored. Though there is often significant overlap

between these two identities in particular, these categories are not coextensive and if one is

amplified as opposed to the other with regards to a specific political debate something worth

investigating further has happened.' Pushing beyond essentialized identities and towards a more

nuanced instrumental interpretation of the effects of cleavage structures on political party

systems requires, in addition to acknowledging greater variance within the Gemeinschaft and

Gesellschaft party typologies, an acknowledgment that the border separating these two long-

reified categories is permeable and flexible. One can no longer assume that just because a

cleavage is recognized as ethnic that primordial communities are at the root of political disputes

or just because a cleavage is recognized as class-based that rationally self-selected societies are

facing off at the ballot box. Most often the motives behind the patterning of votes are more

complex.

SOne cannot hope to capture the interactions of every possible personal identity in a country, politicized or not, in a
single lifetime let alone a single monograph so undoubtedly some will be given short shrift and others completely
ignored. The goal is to spend time addressing those identities which have been politicized on a grand scale in Ghana
as well as those identities which have received a great deal of scholarly attention in other contexts but appear to be
largely unutilized by social mobilizers or political parties throughout Ghanaian electoral history.









Reevaluating the Sequencing of Social Cleavage/Political Party Interaction

There is a quite lively debate revolving around the conceptual construct that has come to

be known as Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing hypothesis." On the topic, the scholars themselves

suggest that decisive events in a nation's history push "constellations of conflict lines" to the

fore (1967, 14). Having demonstrated their effectiveness as tools of political mobilization, these

constellations become frozen and reveal themselves as recurring themes that are worked into

political disputes far removed from their origins. "Parties," Lipset and Rokkan suggest the

primary way in which these conflict lines are preserved, "do not simply present themselves de

novo to the citizen at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of

alternatives they present to the electorate" (p. 2).

Though this notion of freezing has a revered place in the comparative politics discourse,

Lipset and Rokkan themselves are quite nebulous in their usage of the concept leaving their

successors to make fundamental assumptions without significant guidance. Those making these

assumptions can be placed into two general camps (Mair 2001). One camp sets as the unit of

analysis social cleavages (Rose 1974; Franklin et al. 1992). The freezing moment is interpreted

as that point when society divides itself into fairly reliable sides for the purposes of political

contestation. Over time, those in this camp contend, when parties are laid over these bases they

will gradually become more catch-all and less reliant on their original social foundations. The

other camp is more concerned with electoral stability (Rose and Urwin 1970). Freezing implies

for this camp the same types of voters aligning with the same parties over relatively long periods

of time. When realignment occurs, they view it as a dramatic reconfiguring of the frozen status

quo.

In the case of Western European states, one' s position in the freezing hypothesis debate

can greatly impact the chronology of a "freezing point." Especially in the case of Center-










Periphery disputes, the proposed freezing moment for social cleavages occurs centuries before

anything resembling a national multi-party democratic system can be considered. While there

were certainly social cleavages and a heterogeneous bunch of state-like structures in Africa

during the period of time Lipset and Rokkan observe the dramatic cleavage freezing revolutions

in Europe, in Africa colonialism profoundly disrupted the potential path from these cleavage

structures to some variant of multi-party democracy. "In addition to creating the immediate

predecessors to today's states," Herbst (2000, 58) explains this socio-political rupture, "the

Europeans brought about a host of other changes in Africa that have reverberated to our own

time: they created a system of boundaries and frontiers new to Africa; they established novel

economic systems based on mines and cash crops; they built infrastructure systems that still

determine patterns of trade; and they left their religions, languages, and cultural practices." This

dramatic sea-change threw pre-existing cleavage structures and the colonial incentives for new

cleavage structures into a tumultuous flux. In addition to the colonial authorities' "civilizing

mission" and its multiple applications there was an active reimagining of the "traditional"

(Mamdani 1996, 286). Given this background social cleavages and party systems must have been

forming, or at least significantly reformulating, at approximately the same time. This

simultaneity not only makes the "freezing hypothesis" debate largely a moot point in these

circumstances, but it highlights the potential for interaction between political parties and their

agents and the social cleavages they hope to mobilize.

Discussion of instrumentalized identities both in terms of the substance and sequencing of

social cleavage and political party interactions would seem on the surface antithetical to an

investigation that aims to pinpoint the events that led to certain social identities becoming

politically mobilized in a predictable fashion over the course of time. Such would be the case if










one were talking about an absolute freezing that makes either election results a foregone

conclusion or the social group blocs necessary for a winning coalition obvious. Yet Lipset and

Rokkan mention no such party system in Western Europe and it is unfair to assume, even given

their ambiguity on the topic, such an exacting forecast. Voters, Lipset and Rokkan stake out a

much more modest position, "are typically faced with choices among historically given

'packages' of programs, commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, Weltanschauungen,~~tt~tt~~tt~ and their

current behavior cannot be understood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and

the combinations of forces that produced these 'packages'" (p. 2-3).

Instead of being conceptualized as solid immutable political blocs, the effects of freezing

are far more accurately described as partisan stickiness or "path dependence" (North 1990). Once

voters and parties are effectively painted with social characteristics, an outcome Downs (1957)

and Popkin (1991) have labeled "cognitive shortcuts," default positions are formed. In an

environment of free and fair multi-party competition individual voters can, and most certainly

do, buck the trends. There are also voters pulled in multiple directions resulting from their

multiple identities and whole groups that are most notable for being politically uncaptured and

unpredictable. These anomalies should be acknowledged as important aspects of a party system

and can be studied both in their own right and as potential components of a larger realignment or

dealignment (Manza 1995). They do not, however, make the study of persistent patterns in the

relationship between political parties and social groups within the electorate uninteresting or

trivial.

Conclusions

Discussion of Africa' s "third wave" political parties has been largely ahistorical. Those

works that touch on the nexus between society and parties by-and-large operate within a

snapshot; the winning party gathered these segments of society and the losing party gathered









those. But how did society come to be segmented in such a manner and not another? What does

this segmentation mean for party politics in relation to other potential segmentations? How much

of this relationship was initiated by society and how much was initiated by party agents?

Answers to these questions are not forthcoming without a historical approach. Africanist scholars

studying political parties in the immediate aftermath of independence had ambitions to answer

such questions. They used concepts and theoretical formulations from existing literature, much

fitting into the political sociology subcategory, to guide their studies and produced texts rich not

only in their documentation of what were at the time Africa' s fledgling party systems but also in

historical analysis of the social cleavages that underlaid these party systems. There is a problem,

however, with applying these past approaches whole-cloth in the study of contemporary party

systems. "The tools of comparative politics," explains Ekeh (1975, 1 11), "inhere in the

traditional conception of politics in the West. That by itself seems appropriate. But the tools

sometimes appear dull from overuse and cry out for sharpening."

Updating these tools by recognizing that the identities comprising social cleavages are far

more nuanced and malleable than previously acknowledged comes at a price. One loses the clean

typologies that allow for relatively easy comparisons between countries and the ability to readily

distinguish desirable party system configurations from undesirable party system configurations.

Trading in parsimonious analytical constructs that yield conclusions rife with the biases of

modernization theory, however, for analyses that recognizes complex identity constructions and

feedback loops running between political parties and the societies they represent seems

imminently fair; far better to study something complex with little hope of definitive "theoretical"

conclusions than to construct an economical but thin argument just for the sake of doing so.

Justifying the study of "sticky" identities and political associations in a context populated by









instrumentalized identities is a much tougher prospect. Yet in most, if not all, political systems

with free and fair elections patterns of support appear in the electorate that linger from election to

election. Though one may hope to explain why one party wins a particular election over another

without exploring the genesis of these patterns, it would be impossible to explain why the

competing parties define their opposition to each other in a particular way given the infinite

choices without giving the historical relationship between social cleavages and political parties a

very close look. The argument put forth here is that one can venture answers to Lipset and

Rokkan's three sets of questions without accepting the flawed assumptions that either cleavage

structures or party systems are completely static.










CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS TO GHANAIAN PARTISANSHIP

Though the February 1951 Gold Coast elections were far from an exercise in unadulterated

universal adult suffrage, the contest won handily by the Convention People's Party (CPP) marks

the first multi-party election in what would slightly more than six years later become the

independent state of Ghana. Election exercises conducted under the watchful eye of the British

in 1954 and 1956 not only reconfirmed the CPP's popularity, but extended the voting franchise

to the masses, rural and urban alike, through the popular ballot. Independence on 6 March 1957

brought quickly on its heels what then Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah described

euphemistically as "emergency measures of a totalitarian kind" (1957, xvi). The independent

CPP government was quick to clamp down on opposition through such measures as the

Deportation Act (August 1957), Emergency Powers Act (December 1957) and Preventive

Detention Act (July 1958) so that there would be no remotely credible multi-party elections in

independent Ghana until 1969, three years after a military coup overthrew Nkrumah and the First

Republic (Austin 1976, 90-101).2 This Second Republic, and the Third Republic which would be

inaugurated ten years later, can claim only their founding elections. Neither ephemeral republic

made it past its initial term before the military returned to power (Baynham 1985). When

SThis Legislative Assembly election was multi-formatted. Four municipal districts (Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi-
Takoradi, and Kumasi) elected their representatives through popular vote. Thirty-one rural constituencies in the
Colony and Ashanti elected their representatives through a two-tiered process. First electoral college participants
were selected through universal adult suffrage and then the elected electoral college voted for partisan
representatives to the Legislative Assembly. CPP candidates won every municipal seat and 28 out of the 33
contestable rural seats. The Northern Territories only representation was selected on a non-partisan basis by an
unelected electoral college selected by the region's various district councils. In addition to these representatives of
the people, the 1951 Legislative Assembly awarded a set number of seats to mining and commercial interests (2) and
traditional leaders in the Colony (11), Ashanti (6), and Southern Togoland (1) (Legislative Council of the Gold
Coast 1950).

2 There was a presidential contest held in 1960 that pitted Nkrumah (CPP) against J.B. Danquah (UP) but the result
of this election, which Nkrumah won by a margin of seven to one, was a foregone conclusion influenced greatly by
the government's application of public resources, harassment of opposition, and control of the polling process. In
only two constituencies, South Anlo and Ho West, both in the Volta Region, did Danquah secure a majority of the
vote ("Seven to One for Nkrumah" 1960).










President Limann and the Third Republic were overthrown on New Year's Eve 1980 by Flt.-Lt.

Jerry Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), it would be nearly a

dozen years before another multi-party experiment would be attempted. Then in late 1992 Ghana

joined a growing number of African nations in what became known as the "third wave" to again

test democratic waters. Though this first election was of dubious quality (Jeffries and Thomas

1993; Oquaye 1995), three competitive national elections later 1996, 2000, and 2004 and a

peaceful turnover of power in 2000 mark Ghana' s Fourth Republic as a genuine continental

success story (Gyimah-Boadi 2001).

This concise history of multi-party Ghanaian elections (see also Table 3-1) serves as a

backdrop to the subsequent discussion because it is at these elections that very explicit political

censuses occur. Though politics happens with or without elections (Goodwin and Jasper 2004),

the act of entering a secret booth with the unambiguous purpose of registering one' s political

preferences alongside those of fellow citizens gives the researcher an unusually parsimonious

and well-documented glimpse at the underlying politically mobilized divisions within a given

society. Where free and fair election results and aggregated political choices exist the study of

political cleavages is more straightforward than in contexts where these sources of data are

absent.3 Optimal conditions for research do not, however, lead to easily decipherable

conclusions. Politics, even politics with elections, is a complicated subj ect of study. When

election results display discernable patterns, scholars interested in explaining these patterns must

disaggregate the impact of multiple and often overlapping variables, many of which are socially

constructed and as remarkable for their areas of conceptual ambiguity as they are for their


3 This notion of aggregation is illustrative of the role political institutions can play in social cleavage formation.
Duverger' s law (1972, 23-32) suggests that certain electoral systems are much more likely than others to yield two
dominant parties. Forcing society's varied interests into two, three, or more categories has an impact on how these
interests perceive their position within the democratic political system in relation to other interests.










hermetically-sealed categories. When one moves beyond a static view of political cleavages and

takes into account the history of social cleavage formation and party/society interactions, the

situation becomes even more complex as the meaning of variable categories can, and often are,

transformed over time.

This chapter looks at the variables that populate the mainstream discourse on Ghanaian

political/electoral cleavages and the nuanced social categories undergirding these cleavages. It

takes as a point of demarcation the Gemeinschaft (Community) and Gesellschaft (Society)

distinction discussed at some length in Chapter Two. From the time of the first Gold Coast multi-

party elections in 1951 through the most recent election in Ghana' s Fourth Republic, the "stuff'

of politics and elections has variously been described as ideological (GI)\I/Achay~lf) or sectional

(GetinscIII\ hlIJ).4 The chronicles of Ghanaian politics are full of manifestos and speeches packed

with the high-minded vocabulary of ideology describing this party as socialist or that party as

neoliberal. Yet before and after elections, regardless of the republic, politicians and other

notables are seen stepping over each other to give reporters a quote about how certain voters,

usually those supporting an opposition, cannot seem to disregard primordial affinities and vote

for the "best" candidate. Over the course of the remainder of this chapter the various

formulations of ideological and sectional cleavages in the Ghanaian political discourse are

explored and problematized. For those readers not enmeshed in Ghanaian politics, terms like

Nkrumahist and Asante that pepper remaining chapters are explicated. For those readers with a

fairly comprehensive understanding of Ghanaian society and politics, this chapter serves as both

a review and as a challenge to deconstruct some of the variables that history has made appear

fixed. Though these well-worn cleavage categories come with much conceptual baggage, this


SChazan (1983, 24-38) has used the terms Horizontal and Vertical almost synonymously with Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft.









investigation avoids the assumption that ideological cleavages are ipso facto negotiable and

sectional cleavages are ipso facto zero-sum. The proj ect at hand is one of understanding the

various conceptualizations of these variables in Ghana and not one of determining when and

where they are politicized. This latter proj ect is taken up in some detail in the following three

chapters where the interaction between these cleavage variants and multi-party democratic

elections are queried.

Ideological Cleavages

Nkrumahism v. Danqunh-Busiaism

Even a cursory knowledge of Ghanaian politics requires a perfunctory familiarity with the

uniquely Ghanaian ideological categories of Nkrumahism and Danquah-Busiaism.S Founded in

1947 as a response to traditional leaders' stranglehold on the Colony Legislative Council and in

anticipation of independence in India, Burma, and Ceylon, the United Gold Coast Convention

(UGCC) served as the incubator for both "ideological" camps (Austin 1964, 51-52). There had

been prior to the UGCC ethnic factions (e.g., Fanti Confederacy), pressure groups (e.g.,

Aborigines' Rights Protection Society), and even proto-political parties (e.g., Dr. Nanka-Bruce's

National Democratic Party) that petitioned the colonial government on behalf of indigenous

populations. By 1947, however, these groups had either dissolved, taken a back-seat on the

national political scene, or, as was often the case, had their agendas and best and brightest

advocates absorbed into the UGCC (Apter 1966, 265-272).

The leading members of the UGCC at its founding were George "Paa" Grant (timber

merchant and UGCC chairman/benefactor), R.S. Blay (lawyer), J.B. Danquah (lawyer), Francis

Awoonor-Williams (lawyer), William Ofori-Atta (graduate teacher), Edward Akuffo-Addo


5 The moniker Danquah-Busiaism is sometimes shortened to Danquahism. For the purposes of this work the labels
should be understood as synonymous.










(lawyer), Joseph W.S. de Graft Johnson (lawyer), and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey (lawyer)

(Martinson 2001, 25). Burdened with their day-to-day work, this founding cohort looked first to

Ebenezer Ako Adj ei, a young lawyer recently returned from England, and then based largely on

Ako Adj ei's recommendation to one Francis Kwame Nkrumah to run the Convention' s routine

affairs (Austin 1964, 53). Nkrumah had distinguished himself as a skilled organizer while

working with the African Students' Association of America in Canada and the West African

National Secretariat in London during his student days and was hired as the first full-time UGCC

General Secretary (Nkrumah 1957).

The origin of the Danquah-Busiai st/Nkrumahist ideological cleavage is Nkrumah' s

eventual break from the UGCC in June 1949. Nkrumah took with him activists from the UGCC's

Committee on Youth Organization (CYO) and many of the local party representatives Nkrumah

was instrumental in recruiting for the UGCC to form a new party he called the CPP. The

founding members of the UGCC, including Danquah, who constituted the Convention' s

"Working Committee" were left to stew, in the words of Paa Grant, over the young man who

"filched our name, our 'S.G. [Self Government]' policy, our branches, and even our colours--to

establish a separatist group--the Convention People's Party--which, as he falsely claimed at the

time, was formed 'within the Convention in the name of George Grant, of Ghana and of God'"

(Austin 1961, 296). The story of this dramatic split, though it explains how the monikers

Nkrumahism and Danquah-Busiaism came to represent oppositional forces in Ghanaian politics,

does little to illuminate the ideological constructs undergirding these categories. Applying the

labels "moderate, liberal, [and] western-oriented" to the UGCC and "left-wing," "socialist," and

"populist" to the CPP, as is the common practice in most concise analyses, is a step in the right

direction but even these descriptions suffer from conceptual haziness and are most often









overworked (Morrison 2004, 423). In addition to their bluntness, these labels imply an

ideological fixity which is inconsistent with the historical record. What it meant to be a

Nkrumahist and what it meant to be a Danquah-Busiaist was not immediately apparent in 1949.

It took years of coexisting and contestation for these terms to develop the connotations they carry

in contemporary Ghanaian politics.

The formative years (1949-1966)

Nkrumah's break with the UGCC unfolded over the course of nearly a year and was

precipitated by disputes concerning both style and substance. Stylistically the UGCC represented

the old guard intelligentsia. Paa Grant, the Convention's founding father and president, was

approaching seventy years of age when the UGCC was launched. He was a wealthy timber

merchant nominated by the colonial government to take a seat as member of the 1926 Legislative

Council for the town of Sekondi (Kimble 1963, 448).6 Danquah, who would come to serve as

Nkrumah's political counterbalance for the UGCC, was in his early fifties when the Convention

was inaugurated. Though Danquah produced several texts on Akan cultural practices and

dabbled in the publishing business, his training at the University of London was in law and it is

the practice of law and the pursuit of politics that consumed the maj ority of his professional life

(Danquah 1968, vii). Nkrumah on the other hand was a mere thirty-seven years old when the

UGCC was formed and still younger than forty when the CPP broke away. He was formally

educated in the United States, first at Lincoln University (BA) and then at the University of

Pennsylvania (MS, Education; MA, Philosophy), and informally educated in London through his

interactions with the Pan-African Congress and employment at the West African National

Secretariat (Nkrumah 1957). His CPP colleagues, who were often described by the media as


6 Grant served against the wishes of the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society and despite the fact that many of the
Chiefs and people of Sekondi did not know of him.










"tramps in N.T. [Northemn Territory] Smocks," tended to share Nkrumah' s relative youth and

inexperience with the formal institutions of colonial politics (Austin 1964, 212).7

These biographical differences at the top, Danquah-Busiaists having captured the patrician

elites who would become the next generation of middle-class urban professionals and

Nkrumahists casting wider net, had significant trickle down effects (Apter 1966, 272). Stalwarts

in the UGCC had a historical record of negotiating with the colonial government. Though these

negotiations did not always follow formal political channels the UGCC leadership's first reaction

to a perceived injustice was always debate and often reliant on learned legal interpretations. The

Accra riots of February 1948 and their aftermath are a dramatic example of this tendency. Upon

hearing of violence in the capital, the UGCC leadership who were meeting in Saltpond rushed to

Accra to observe the fallout. By all accounts the UGCC leadership was not in the business of

fomenting riots (Danquah 1970b; Nkrumah 1957, 74-78), though the "Big Six" were briefly

jailed for such an offense.8

Danquah was keen "to take advantage of that day's tragic events and use that advantage as

a fulcrum or lever for the liberation of Ghana" (Austin 1964, 75). He and his fellow travelers in

"the Convention" accepted the colonial government' s Watson Commission and its corollary, the

Coussey Committee on constitutional reform, as the proper arenas in which to apply this

newfound leverage. In both forums Danquah took a leading role in proposing constitutional

changes that would indigenize and democratize political decision making in the colony and lead


STerms like "tramps" and "Yerandah boys" were often used pejoratively by opponents but ultimately were embraced
by the CPP as signifiers of the party's grassroots. For a brief biography of Nkrumah' s first batch of ministers see
Ministry of Defence and External Affairs (1951)

SThe "Big Six" consists of Kwame Nkrumah, E. Obtsebi Lamptey, Ebenezer Ako Adjei, William Ofori Atta (a.k.a.
Paa Willie), J.B. Danquah, and Edward Akuffo-Addo. It was these six UGCC leaders that the colonial
administration rounded up and sent to prison following the Accra riots. A famous picture in the discourse of
Ghanaian patriotism was taken of the six men at Saltpond prior to Nkrumah' s defection. An artist' s rendition of this
picture adorns the front of the 10,000 cedi bank note.










towards dominion status and eventual independence (see Danquah 1970a, 1970c). Nkrumah,

whose position within the UGCC deteriorated quickly following the Accra riots,9 Set a very

different tack for the soon-to-be supporters of the CPP. Not a lawyer himself and lacking the

experience and gravitas of his UGCC competitors, Nkrumah relied on his skills as an organizer

to develop a mass following. Unlike his UGCC colleagues who had made a living bargaining

with the British, he was happy to confront the British through extra-legal populist means.

Nkrumah' s use of the Accra Evening News and CYO to criticize not only the Colonial

government but also the act of negotiating for anything short of immediate independence in a

very public manner drew sharp criticism from Danquah and his supporters (Nkrumah 1957, 93-

101). "[Y]ou have published your ultimatum without first having yourself sought to make cogent

representations to the Government in person" Danquah complained, advising that "[d]istant

speeches and cold print do not make a statesman" (Akyeampong and Danquah 1956, 12).

The "ideological" substance of Nkrumah's dispute with the UGCC was far less explicit

initially and took several years to come to the fore. In the CPP's first pre-election manifesto the

party program reads as follows:

As stated elsewhere in this Manifesto, our entry into the Assembly in full strength will
open up better opportunities to struggle for immediate Self-Government. Whilst that
struggle is proceeding the C.P.P. will do all in its power to better the condition of the
people of this country; it must be pointed out however that the implementation of this
development programme can only be possible when S.G. has been attained, and we are in
full control of our own affairs (National Executive of the C.P.P. 195 1, x)

The CPP's 1954 Manifesto maintained this dominant theme but the confidence gained during its

three years as the maj ority party in the Legislative Assembly had an effect (Convention People' s


9 According to both Nkrumah and the UGCC Working Committee the split was precipitated by the discovery of
Nkrumah' s past dealings with the Communist Party of Britain and with Nkrumah' s involvement in the CYO and
other mass mobilization campaigns. Nkrumah claims that this latter point of contention was a function of UGCC's
elitist history. The UGCC working committee claims that it was Nkrumah' s secrecy and cult of personality that
ruffled their feathers with regard to the CYO (Austin 1961; Nkrumah 1957).










Party 1954). Nkrumah's name, likeness, and words are all over the 1954 document whereas in

195 1 only a passport size photo of Nkrumah in a suit is on the cover and the only mention of his

name in the entire manifesto is in small type below the photo. The 1954 document also, in

addition to trumpeting Nkrumah's personal role in nudging the Gold Coast towards

independence and urging voters to give the CPP a complete mandate of 104 out of 104 seats in

the Legislative Assembly, offers an early clue into the ideology "Nkrumahism" would eventually

come to describe. When self-government is attained, the manifesto promises a state-led

developmental panacea for the Gold Coast' s economic and social ills and lays the seeds for

Nkrumah's pan-Africanist agenda by proposing "West African Unity and Freedom for Africans

and peoples of African Descent everywhere" (p. 10). Over the next decade Nkrumah would

develop these ancillary themes in his writings (Nkrumah 1962, 1963, 1964a) to the point where

Nkrumahism came to represent not the struggle for political independence in the past tense but

an eternal "revolt against colonialism, imperialism and capitalism" that requires "a people's

parliamentary democracy with a one-party system...to express and satisfy the common

aspirations of a nation as a whole, [rather] than a multi-party parliamentary system, which is in

fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the 'haves' and the

'have-nots'" (Nkrumah 1964b, 51, 54).

In many ways Danquah-Busiaism was playing catch-up to Nkrumahism from its very

beginning. "Is it not a well known part of the history of Ghana that the older politicians had to

wait till 1949 for Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Creech Jones (Secretary of State, in Colonial, No.250),"

Danquah (1957) chastised both the British and his domestic opposition on the pages of The

Times in the immediate wake of independence, "to teach them how good and pleasant it was for

brethren to dwell together apart?" Both Nkrumah and those who remained in the UGCC after the










break-up were in the business of portraying themselves as would-be national liberators who were

above the petty fray of party politics. Nkrumah's aforementioned ability to excite the masses in

ways the UGCC was both unwilling and unable put him in a position to win the 1951 polls after

which time he successfully used the pulpit granted him by this victory to position himself and the

CPP as the "Self Government Now" candidates to the UGCC's "Self Government in the Shortest

Possible Time." From this disadvantageous position Danquah, and to a significant but lesser

extent Busia, 1o cobbled together a loose coalition of groups that had little more in common than

an extreme dislike of Nkrumah.

Under the umbrella of the NLM, and later the United Party (UP), a number of provincial

groups including the Asanteman Council, Northern People's Party (NOPP), Akim Abuakwa

State, Moslem Association Party (MAP), TC, Northern Territories Council, and Aborigines'

Rights Protection Society came together with Danquah's Ghana Congress Party (GCP) to

petition the colonial government for a federal system with greater regional autonomy and less

power vested in the Legislative Assembly controlled by Nkrumah and the CPP (Busia 1956, 3). 1

When this plea was met by silence from the British and pigeonholed as mere tribalism by

Nkrumah, Danquah and Busia had little recourse but to position themselves as the vocal

opposition. This is not to suggest that the pair and their followers did not believe wholeheartedly

in the principles of liberalism and constitutionalism that they preached, sometimes in the case of

Danquah under the awkward label of Ghanaism, but rather that they were largely unable to



'o Busia came into the UGCC-fold after the UGCC/CPP split. In the elections of 1951 Busia, who was a university
lecturer at the time, ran for the Wenchi seat under the flag of the Asante Kotoko Society. He lost the election but
was later recruited by the Asanteman Council to serve as their representative in the Legislative Assembly. When the
UGCC old guard was preparing to unseat Nkrumah in 1954, Busia's oppositional stance and youth made him an
attractive candidate for the newly formed GCP (Bing 1968, 155).

11 These demands for federalism as they came from Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and Trans-Volta Togoland are
documented in Allman (1990), Ladouceur (1979), and Amenumey (1989) respectively.









define themselves without reference to Nkrumah (Danquah 1997, 167-176). The CPP had failed

to deliver the economic welfare it promised, Danquah and Busia were willing to tell anyone who

would listen, but more importantly they are "a dangerous and dictatorial party" (Danso-Boafo

1996, 49).

The UGCC and CPP progeny (1966-present)

As a participant in the formal political discourse the line connecting the UGCC, GCP,

NLM, and UP,12 namely J.B. Danquah's active involvement, was severed years before

Danquah' s death in 1965 or the official ban on opposition parties put in place in 1964. By the

time the First Republic' s constitution was enacted into law on 29 June 1960, Nkrumah and the

CPP had turned Ghana into a de facto single party state (Cohen 1970). The era of Nkrumah' s

rule met its end far more abruptly than either Danquah or Busia were pushed out of national

politics. On 24 February 1966, as Nkrumah was on a state visit to China, the National Liberation

Council (NLC) took to the airwaves to announce that Nkrumah and his CPP regime had been

overthrown by the military because of their ostensibly draconian treatment of opposition and

general bungling of the economy (National Liberation Council 1966). The categories Danquah-

Busiaism and Nkrumahism did not, however, disappear with the trampling of opposition under

Nkrumah or the overthrow of the CPP regime. Over the succeeding decades these shorthand

ideological labels have characterized each and every Ghanaian election (for a brief genealogy of

these two groups see Table 3-2).

Busia, who had fled Ghana during Nkrumah's tenure to avoid political harassment and

take up the cause of Ghana' s opposition in Europe, returned to Ghana in 1966 to serve on the

NLC's "Political Committee" (Busia 1967). He would eventually be elected Prime Minister and


12 The tendency in the literature is to treat the regional parties that aligned with the UGCC, GCP, NLM, and UP as
allies to the Danquah-Busia tradition but not full-fledged members.









leader of the Progress Party (PP) in the NLC-administered 1969 elections. Historians have

labeled the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Komla Gbedemah, the PP's Nkrumahist

challenger in this election, though Gbedemah himself did not embrace this label. He had served

as Nkrumah's Finance Minister but was nudged out of government and into exile by the younger

and more radical wing of the CPP in 1961 (Gbedemah 1962) and the NLC expressly proscribed

Nkrumahist parties from contesting elections in the Second Republic (National Alliance of

Liberals 1969; Gbedemah 1969). In 1979 identifying the Nkrumahists was not so much of a

problem. "I do not think that I shall be far from the truth if I say that all those of use here who

belong to the People's National Party," the PNP's General Secretary explained to a gathering

celebrating the party's second anniversary, "are bound together by just one single unifying-bond

- our unalloyed dedication to Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and all the good things he did for

Ghana and Africa" (Addae-Mensah 1981, 1). Identifying the Danquah-Busiaists of 1979 is not as

easy. Both William Ofori-Atta, who led the United National Convention (UNC), and Victor

Owusu, who led the Popular Front Party (PFP), had served as ministers in Busia's PP cabinet.

The PFP is clear in its desire to anoint itself successor to Busia's "liberalism" (Chazan 1983,

288). The UNC's lineage is more nuanced. To begin with Ofori-Atta was very much a colleague

of Danquah' s and not so much a follower. The fact that the UNC did not label itself Danquah-

Busiaist and aligned with the Limann's PNP in the post-election administration instead of joining

Owusu's PFP in the opposition is another distinguishing factor (United National Convention

1980). In the Fourth Republic the NPP has from the beginning embraced the Danquah-Busia

tradition. Its immediate origin is in the "Danquah-Busia Club" that existed prior to the

legalization of political parties, its top ranks are filled with Danquah-Busiaists from past regimes,

or in some cases their children, and each of their manifestos begins with a quote from J.B.









Danquah (Jonah 1998, 92; New Patriotic Party 2000, 2004). The Nkrumahist tradition in the

Fourth Republic has been a jumble of unpopular and disorganized parties. With the exception of

the CPP, which draws directly on the teachings of Nkrumah for its inspiration, and the People's

National Convention (PNC), which draws on the teachings of Nkrumah through Limann, no

explicitly Nkrumahist party has managed to capture a single seat in Parliament and even the CPP

and PNC can claim only a handful of seats combined in each election, which were eventually

pooled with the NPP's in parliament, and have had virtually no impact on the presidential races

(Nugent 1999, 291-293).

Commenting on these latter-day Nkrumahists and Danquah-Busiaists, Pinkney (1988, 48)

notes that "in the vague sense of folk memories of the early nationalist movement, ['ideology']

appears to have been important in welding the party together as a vote-winning and activist-

winning machine, but as a guide to policy it had little to offer." In evaluating the aforementioned

parties' manifestos and legislative performance it appears that Pinkney is on to something.

Harkening back to the original political discourse between Nkrumah and Danquah, Nkrumahist

parties in the Second, Third, and Fourth Republics have adopted as their own issues of economic

independence and distribution. Though they have a penchant for labeling their Danquah-Busiaist

challengers tools of the wealthy and prone to sectionalism, hence the PNP advert describing the

PFP as the "Popular Fronts for Plunder and Tribalism" (Kane 1979), the recommendations for a

single-party state have yet to reappear. For their part Danquah-Busiaists have held themselves up

as the "democratic" and pro-West alternative to Nkrumahism. An open letter Victor Owusu ran

in the Daily Graphic purportedly penned by the seven year old granddaughter of Obetsebi-

Lamptey, a member of the opposition in the First Republic who died in one of Nkrumah' s

political prisons, hints at the tone of these appeals. "I never knew my grandfather because he









died in detention under the C.P.P," the young child explains adding whatht I want is to grow up

in a country where there is real freedom where friends can visit each other and talk to each

other freely" ("Please Give Me a Chance..." 1979). The NPP has added a wrinkle in the Fourth

Republic by highlighting in addition to its pro-democratic credentials the power of a free market

and wealth accumulation. 13 Pinkney's assertion does not negate the impact these campaign

discourses may hold for would-be voters, but it does highlight the limited scope the ideological

constructs of Nkrumahism and Danquah-Busiaism hold. Despite the often heated rhetoric

revolving around what it means to be a Nkrumahist and what it means to be a Danquah-Busiaist,

Limann did not try to transform Ghana into a socialist state anymore than Busia or Kufuor tried

to transform Ghana's centralized state apparatus into a federation.

The Advent of a "Third Way:" Rawlingsism?

When a charismatic young Flight-Lieutenant by the name of Jerry Rawlings overthrew the

civilian Third Republic and embarked upon what would be tagged the "31 December

Revolution" the seeds were sewn for what would be the Ghanaian political discourses first new

ideological tinged -ism since the pre-independence split within the UGCC. At first this

construction that would come to be known as Rawlingsism bore a striking similarity to

Nkrumahism. Like Nkrumah in his early days, Rawlings commingled personal charisma with

populist appeals. During his first tour as head of state after the 4 June 1979 coup, Rawlings was

rather fond of having his picture taken digging a ditch or planting crops with the peasants

(Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989). When he took over the government radio stations on New

Year' s Eve 1981 to inaugurate his second coup d'etat in less than three years he implied more of

the same. "[T]he people, the farmers, the police, the soldiers, the workers," Rawlings


13 Danquah (1961) had trotted out this position in the past but it was more to signal to the West that Danquah-
Busiaists were their friends in Ghana than to imply that trickle-down economics would float all boats domestically.










rationalized, "you, the guardians rich and poor, should be a part of the decision-making process

of this country" (Shillington 1992, 80). In practice this populism often manifested itself in ad hoc

policies aimed at rooting out the ever-present "corruption;" goods were seized from anyone

labeled a hoarder in the market, prices were set well below market values on foodstuffs, and

towns and villages alike were ordered here and there to tidy up or else face the wrath of the

government. 14

Events of 1983 caused a significant shift in both the make-up of Rawlings' PNDC

government and its policy positions. On top of an already struggling economy, in January 1983

more than a million Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria to be absorbed into the Ghanaian

economy and the country experienced its worst drought since independence (Boahen 1989, 45).

During this period the role of the PNDC's radical left, represented most notably by Chris Atim

and Alolga Akata-Pore, was diminished and the more moderate wing of the organization gained

ascendancy (Shillington 1992, 104-106). 1 Though the "technocrats" that Rawlings relied on to

run the government post-1983 were of diverse occupational and ideological backgrounds P.V.

Obeng was an engineer and businessman; Ato Ahwoi was working with the Aluminum

Commission; Kwamena Ahwoi, Tsatsu Tsikata, and Kwesi Botchwey were left-leaning faculty

of law at Legon; and Obed Asamoah was a parliamentary candidate for both the NAL and UNC

- they were all at least pragmatically on board the Bretton Woods' sponsored str-uctural

adjustment program (Nugent 1995, 127). Rawlings justified this change in course with the

following words: "Idleness and parasitism have become more rewarded in this economy than

productive work... This is the time to reverse this process" (Herbst 1993, 30). Between 1983 and

14 Whether or not these ad hoc policies were effective depends, not surprisingly, on one's political leanings. For two
sides of the story see Oquaye (GI r 1, 122-125) and Awoonor (1984, 14-20).

1s Atim and Akata-Pore did not leave without a fight. They purportedly planned a coup in October 1983. By the end
of the year Atim had fled the country and Akata-Pore was in jail for his role in the failed coup.










1992 Ghana entered into six IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programs and after being

applauded for the "political will" shown in their implementation of neoliberal reforms were

showered with more than $200 million in Bretton Woods' loans (Martin 1993).

When it came time for Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and the PNDC to transition into President

Rawlings and the NDC, the exact position of Rawlingsism on the line drawn between

Nkrumahism on the left and Danquah-Busiaism on the right became no more clear. As a

presidential candidate and later as president, Rawlings, like Nkrumah before him, demonstrated a

penchant for dressing in the Northern smock. This look is so pervasive amongst NDC candidates

running for office that it is almost as synonymous with the party as its official umbrella symbol.

The populist rhetoric that seems to naturally accompany the austere Northern smocks is also

ever-present. Though the post-Rawlings' generation of NDC politicians have not demonstrated

similar talents, Rawlings remains a charismatic speaker prone to launching into tirades about the

plight of the little man and the sins of the rich and powerful.16 Yet despite these airs, the NDC

remained remarkably conservative in its fiscal policy, relaxing a bit only in the run-up to the

2000 elections causing the value of the cedi to erode by approximately 300% between 1998 and

2000. Under NDC rule there would be no dramatic reduction in the fees associated with schools

or hospitals, but the party managed to implement in 1998, albeit after a failed attempt in 1995, a

very controversial Value Added Tax (Osei 2000; Coulombe and McKay 2003). In 2002 these

somewhat inconsistent ideological tendencies that made Rawlingsism more economically

conservative than Nkrumahist socialism and more populist in tone than the Danquah-Busiaism

was given the formal title "Social Democracy" (National Democratic Congress 2002).


16 In a page directly out of Nkrumah' s book, in its 2004 manifesto the NDC accused the NPP of being the party that
sought to "frustrate the people's aspiration for early liberation from colonial domination" and believes that Ghana
should "seek ye first the macro-economic kingdom and all other things shall be added unto thee" (National
Democratic Congress 2004, ix, 3).










Sectional Cleavages

Article 55 in Ghana's 1992 Constitution proscribes in general any political party based on

sectional divisions but gives explicit attention to three types of sectional parties, specifically

those built upon ethnic, religious, and regional identities. These proscriptions are not unique to

Ghana's contemporary constitution. They have roots in the pre-independence era and have been

included in every republican constitution since. 1 By now the reason given for the inclusion of

this prohibition is to guarantee parties of a "national character" though the initial impetus behind

the ban was less conjectural and more pragmatic. Nkrumah's early challengers in the NLM

claimed as its allies organizations and parties with monikers suggesting an ethnic (Asanteman

Council, Akim Abuakwa State, and Ga Shifimo Kpee), religious (MAP), or regional character

(NOPP, Northemn Territories Council, and TC).

While these groups rej ected the implication that they did not have the best interests of

"Ghana" in mind, hence MAP's (1954, 1) assertion that they are a party "made up of Muslins

[sic] and non Muslins [sic]" or the NOPP's (1954, 1) declaration that "the Northemn Peoples

Party does not seek the interests of the North alone," Nkrumah and the CPP managed quite

successfully to categorize them and their federalist ambitions as sectional detractors from the

common cause of self government (Legislative Council of the Gold Coast 1950). Though

Nkrumah is a notable example, he is certainly not the first or the last Ghanaian politician to

suggest his opposition speaks for parts of the country while he speaks for the whole. Following is

an exploration of what some of these "parts" are and how they are socially constructed in Ghana.

More concise than comprehensive, this exploration touches upon the sectional cleavages that



17As the NLM begin to cause problems for the government in 1954, the CPP proposed a bill "restricting the titles
and membership of religious, regional and tribal organizations represented in the Legislative Assemblv" (Rathbone
2000, 67).









most often arise in the Ghanaian political discourse and gives readers a sense of how the various

sectional variables relate to one another.

Ethnicity

"[T]he idea of 'tribe,"' Crawford Young (1976, 35) tongue-and-cheekily describes ethnic

essentialism as it is commonly practiced, "conveyed the image of a world neatly dissected into a

series of tribal compartments; a tribal map could be drawn, with firm black lines demarcating

boundaries." As a tool for understanding where people live in contemporary Ghana, the map

Young derides is fatally flawed. Urban centers and trading markets are melting pots for Ghana's

diverse array of ethnic and language groups (Dakubu 1997). Modern transportation and the

government' s national service requirements dating back more than half a century have sent

"strangers" throughout the Ghanaian hinterlands, most for short stints but many of whom

relocate permanently (Hodge 1964, 116). These points, while they complicate the cartographer's

task, do little to dissuade the essentialism against which Young rails. They also fail to address

ambiguous or contested identities and allow for an imaginary past when ethnic groups were

homogenous and had well-defined territories. To study ethnicity in particular, and social

cleavages in general, in an honest manner one must acknowledge that some categorization goes

on in one's own work and do one's best to concede the point up front and go as far as possible to

minimize the conceptual violence done to social realities.

It is with this sensitivity that Figure 3-1 is presented depicting, in the words of the 1960

census, the "Tribes" of Ghana (Survey of Ghana 1966). This map should not be interpreted as a

completely accurate depiction of ethnicity in Ghana but rather a good faith effort by scholars to

illustrate a general process-sanitized understanding of what ethnicity looks like to many

Ghanaians. A complete description of each and every ethnic group that calls Ghana home, or

every ethnic group depicted in Figure 3-1 for that matter, is beyond the scope of this









dissertation. Is To begin to understand the way politics works in Ghana on a national scale,

however, it is necessary to have at least a passing understanding of what and whom the Asante

and Ewe are and why they hold such a central position in the Ghanaian political discourse.

Asante

According to Fage (1969, 108), the origins of the Asante nation lie in the dramatic

summoning of the Golden Stool from the heavens by Ikdmfo Andkye in the last decade of the

seventeenth century. This event marked the confederation of eight kinship-related clans under

the leadership of the Kuma~sihene, now known as the Asantehene, with the express purpose of

escaping their collective tributary relationship with the neighboring state of Denkyira. This

"united" Asante front managed to defeat Denkyira, but they did not stop there. By the end of the

eighteenth century the Asante kingdom conquered the maj ority of modern-day Ghana and their

area of tribute, either in goods or services, stretched from Wasa in the Southwest to Dagomba in

the Northeast. For distant areas, both spatially and culturally, this relationship was generally

considered mutually beneficial with small tributes going to the Asante but large amounts of trade

going in both directions. On areas closer to Kumasi (Akan, Kwahu, Akyem, Akuapem, Asen,

Denkyira, Akwamu, Fante Wasa, Bron and Ahafo in Figure 3-1) harsher demands were put in

place both in terms of military service and the introduction of Asante political institutions. As a

result of these more strenuous demands, it was these latter areas that were most prone to unrest

and revolt (Arhin 1967).

After nearly a century of intermittent fighting with the British, the Asante Empire was

attached to Britain' s Gold Coast Colony as a protectorate in 1900. The area allowed the

protectorate consisted of Asante populated territories and those of the Bron and Ahafo ethnic

1s For a good recent discussion of ethnicity in Ghana see Lentz and Nugent (2000). For older colonial-era
ethnographies see Rattray (1923; 1932), Ellis (1965), Field (1940), and Hayford (1903) as oft-cited examples.










groups who paid tribute directly to the Asante. In 1959, after much caj oling from Bron and

Ahafo political groups, these latter two areas were excised from what is known today as the

Ashanti Region (Bening 1999). In Ghana in general, but in the Ashanti Region in particular, the

Asantehene and his subordinates remain to this day revered figures with a great deal of informal

political sway. During the build up to independence the NLM campaign for regional autonomy

and formal governmental recognition of the Asante' s unique place in Ghanaian history was for a

time run out of the Asantehene' s Palace at Manhyia (Allman 1990, 267-277). More recently for

his personal Otumfuo Educational Fund, in 2004 Asantehene Osei Tutu II secured an

unprecedented five million dollar loan from the World Bank prompting many non-Asante

politicians and pundits to question the government as to whether or not the Republic of Ghana

had been assigned a king without their knowledge (Nugent 2005, 138).

Ewe

To the east of the Volta River, in an area that presently straddles the Ghana-Togo border

lies a region occupied primarily by Ewe-speaking people. Unlike the Asante, historical records

indicate that there has never been any centralized Ewe state, but rather a loose association of

groups sharing a similar language who occasionally and in an improvised fashion would ally for

purposes of war (Manoukian 1952, 4). These groups would just as often, however, war amongst

themselves and it was not unusual for some Ewe-speaking states to ally with non-Ewe-speaking

states against a common Ewe-speaking enemy (Amenumey 1989, 3). Nugent (2002, 147)

surmises that during this pre-colonial period "it was not immediately obvious to all 'Ewes' that

this [ethnic] identification should override other relationships of affinity." When Europeans

arrived in Ewe-speaking territories in large numbers they saw little incentive to keep the area

whole given the lack of centralized authority. The British took the states of Anlo, Some, Likor,

Peki and Tongu along the coast by 1884 while the Germans captured the territory further inland









and to the east. After World War I the German territories were divided by the British and French

and to this day Ewe-speakers predominate in Southeastern Ghana and Southern Togo

(Amenumey 1989, 3-8).

Over the decades separating colonization and the present there have been a number of

movements agitating for Ewe nationalism and unification of Ewe-speakers across this artificial

colonial border. None of these movements was successful in achieving its ultimate goals and

neither were they particularly popular amongst the masses of Ewe-speakers (Nugent 1992).

Despite this disunity, throughout independent Ghana's political history Ewe-speakers have been

time and again labeled tribalisticc" and "subversive to national unity" by national leaders. In an

interesting analysis of this phenomenon, Brown (1982) comes to the conclusion that these labels

are mere scapegoating done by politicians unable to deliver on development promises and keen

to place the blame for these failures elsewhere. Because of the lively and public debate that

played out during the decade immediately preceding independence in both the national

legislature and the halls of the United Nations over whether the status quo regarding the partition

of German Togoland should be maintained or whether "a United Eweland, a United Togoland

excluding the Gold Coast Ewes, [or] a United Togoland including the latter" would be

preferable, Ewe-speakers were easy targets ("The Ewe Question (1)" 1951).

The rest

Ethnicity being perceived as both a politically volatile subj ect and notoriously difficult to

categorize has not often been measured in Ghana. The first attempt in the post-independence

period was part of the 1960 population census. So controversial were the findings documented in

a report identified as "Special Report 'E': Tribes in Ghana" (Gil et al. 1964) that census

respondents were not asked their "tribe" or "ethnicity" again, despite a census conducted in both

1970 and 1984, until the 2000 national population and housing census (Ghana Statistical Service










2002). In both 1960 and 2000 self-identified Asante ranked first in percentage of total population

in Ghana (13.3% in 1960 and 14.8% in 2000) and self-identified Ewe ranked second (13.0% in

1960 and 12.7% in 2000). These results indicate that a likely 70 to 75% of the Ghanaian

population identifies, and has at least since independence, with one of Ghana' s less populous

ethnic categories. Some of these groups Ga, Fanti, and Dagomba for example have

significant populations, ranging from approximately 3 to 9%. Most, however, comprise less than

1% of Ghana' s population. These linguistically, culturally, and institutionally diverse ethnic

groups, many of which have extremely fluid borders, can play an essential role in local politics

but have failed to capture the political spotlight individually on the national scene as have the

Asante and Ewe.

"The real innovation of the census-takers of the 1870s," notes Anderson (1991, 168),

"was...not in the construction of ethnic-racial classifications, but rather in their systematic

quantification." In answering the question "How many Ghanaian languages are there?"-

Dakubu (1988, 10) estimates somewhere between 45 and 50. To quantify and depict such a large

number of groups in what is today a country with a population of less than 20 million, census-

takers have often resorted to identity categories above the ethnic group. In Ghana this alternative

categorization often takes the form of language groups which in the 2000 census included Akan,

Ga-Dangme, Ewe, Guan, Gurma, Mole-Dagbon, Gr-usi, Mande-Busanga, and the ubiquitous "all

others".19 Figure 3-1 is color-coded to depict Ghana Statistical Service's classification of ethnic

groups under the grander language categories.



19 These categories, depicted in Figure 3-1, are not unanimously held. In her influential text on Ghanaian languages,
Dakubu (1988) uses a different set of language categories. Though her categories overlap considerably with that of
Ghana Statistical Services, there are important distinctions. She, for instance, classifies the Ahanta, Nzema, Aowin,
and Sehwi groups in Southwestern Ghana as related but non-Akan languages and does not include the Central Togo
languages in the Guan group.










For the time being a discussion of Guan, Gurma, Mole-Dagbon, Gr-usi, and Mande-

Busanga categories is tabled. In the mainstream political discourse these labels have little

saliency and tend to be subsumed into the regional category "Northern" as discussed in the

following subsection. The language category "Ewe" is more or less synonymous with the ethnic

identity "Ewe" given the lack of historical political institutions. Language categories that are

regularly understood and used by the general public as shorthand to describe certain unique

group identities are Ga-Dangme and Akan. Individuals speaking languages that fit into the Ga-

Dangme group make up roughly 8% of contemporary Ghana' s population and tend to congregate

around the Accra plains.20 The Akan language group is by far the largest in Ghana population-

wise with nearly 50% of Ghanaians identifying an Akan language as their mother tongue. There

is no reliable historical record suggesting that there was ever a coherent political unit in pre-

colonial West Africa known as the "Akan" (Kiyaga-Mulindwa 1980) though there is a plethora

of evidence in the more recent record to suggest a complex relationship marked as much by war

and turmoil as by any sense of cultural similarities. When the British arrived to colonize the Gold

Coast they met an Asante empire that had subjugated most of the Akan-world through violence

and coercion and were demanding tribute and soldiers from leaders and populations often

expressively unhappy with the arrangement. They were engaged in battle with the second largest

group of speakers of an Akan language, the Fante, who were fighting for their independent

survival (Sanders 1979).





20 Languages fitting into this group include Ga and Dangme with its six dialects Ada, Ningo, Prampram, Shai,
Krobo, and Osudoku (Dakubu 1988, 105-106). Ga-Dangme languages are generally mutually intelligible but the
groups within the Ga-Dangme language family were never a coherent political unit. It may be surmised that Ga-
Dangme, sometimes shortened to simply Ga, holds a salient place in the Ghanaian political discourse because it is
the traditional language of the capital city and it does not fit into either the Akan or Ewe group and unlike the
various languages of Northern Ghana cannot be lumped into a larger regional grouping.









Region

There are 10 regional administrative units in contemporary Ghana (see Figure 3-2). Each

of these regions has a Regional Minister and Deputy Regional Minister and their staffs whose

purpose it is to handle government business in the given region. The system is not federal in that

the Ministers are appointed by the President and have as their sole responsibility the execution of

the national government' s agenda. Below the regional level, Ghana is divided into 138 districts,

110 before 2004 and 100 before 2000, each with a partially elected and partially appointed

"nonpartisan" District Assembly ostensibly responsible for local development projects (Ayee

1997). As social cleavages, these existing formal boundaries have been left largely immobilized.

There are identities both above (e.g., ethnicity) and below (e.g., village) these levels that social

movements and political entrepreneurs have found riper, and as a result have avoided agitation

along these lines. The same cannot be said for the pre-independence regional divisions. In

addition to depicting contemporary Ghanaian regional boundaries, Figure 3-2 depicts the

regional boundaries as they demarcated the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti Protectorate, Northern

Territories, and Trans-Volta Togoland during the colonial period.21 These units have played a

role in defining Ghanaian social groups since their inception through the present.

The Gold Coast Colony contained present-day Western, Central, Eastemn and Greater

Accra Regions and represents the area the British were able to capture, principally through

treaty, prior to reaching an agreement with the Asante and issuing them protectorate status.

European education and religion were well established in these areas prior to the dawn of the

twentieth century (Kimble 1963, 61-124) and traditional authorities used the British influence to

remove themselves from their inferior and tributary relationship with Asante (Bening 1999, 65-



21 For a thorough history of the regional boundaries in Ghana see Bening (1999).










76). The Ashanti Protectorate was treated as conquered territory early in its existence. In 1896

the Asantehene along with "his mother, father, brother, two other close relatives, two linguistics,

the Chiefs of Bantama and Asafu, and the Kings of Mampong, Offinsu, and Ejisu" were taken

prisoner by the British and "their peoples" were denied easy access to colonial education. The

differences in treatment between the Protectorate and the Colony dissolved over time such that

barristers began to be allowed in Ashanti courts in 1933 and in 1946 the Ashanti Protectorate

was deemed worthy of representation on the Legislative Council; both rights gained in the

Colony decades earlier (Kimble 1963, 532-533). Trans-Volta Togoland is interesting in that it is

not, as has often been assumed, a strictly Ewe-speaking entity. The land inherited by the British

in the wake of World War I was soon thereafter divided administratively into a Northemn sector

and a Southern sector. It was only the Southern sector plus the Anlo areas that were part of the

Colony that would eventually become the Volta Region and it is only the southern half of the

Southern sector plus Anlo and its environs that were, and are, inhabited primarily by Ewe-

speakers (Nugent 2002, 189).

Of all the pre-independence regional divisions that have had carry over effects, the

cleavage separating the Northern Territories, and the Northern sector of British Togoland, from

Southern Ghana is likely the most dramatic. During the colonial period the Northern Territories

were described by Crook (1981, 565) as a "culturally 'protected' backwater and labour reservoir

for the south." Residents of the region were purposively kept uneducated. By 193 5 the vast area

comprising the Northemn Territories could claim only five government and three mission primary

schools and not a single post-primary institution (Bening 1999, 23 5). Despite the fact that the

territory formerly known as the Northern Territories covers over a third of Ghana' s land and is

home to nearly a fifth of Ghana' s present-day population, the region continues to be viewed by










many Southerners as a distant and exotic hinterland. When violence broke out in the city of

Bawku during the 2000 elections even well-meaning and generally well-respected reporters from

the South mislabeled the region Upper West, when it is in fact in Upper East, and could not

fathom a cause other than primordial tribal violence (Smith 2001).

Religion

Ghana, especially when compared to Nigeria where religion has oft been characterized as

the major politically-mobilized social cleavage (Hunwick 1992), has not experienced religion as

a reoccurring theme in national politics. There are regional differences in religious make-up (see

Table 3-3) with residents in the Southern regions identifying themselves overwhelmingly as

Christian, Islam having a more pronounced foothold in the North especially in the Northern

Region, and Traditionalists in greater percentages in the Volta Region and three Northern

regions. No region, however, is religiously monolithic.22 In Southern cities and market centers

the phenomenon of the zongo is widespread. Zongos are distinguished from neighboring areas by

"the use of Hausa as a lingua franca, by the adherence of most immigrants to Islam, by

residential clustering in neighborhoods predominately inhabited by Northerners, by the similar

Muslim dress and behavior of many migrants, and by their common involvement in trading

activities and unskilled jobs" (Shildkrout 1978, 86). Christian churches, though they were

discouraged from setting up missions in the Northern Territories by the colonial government,

have also established themselves in predominantly Muslim areas. The "White Fathers" of the

Catholic Church have a history in the North going back nearly a century and Pentecostal

churches, so popular as of late in the South, have made their mark in the North and are not shy

about proselytizing to Muslims (Der 1974; Gifford 1994, 249-252). Traditional religions, and


22Even the use of Christian, Muslim, and Traditionalist is problematic in that each of these categories has multiple
sub-categories some of which have major theological conflicts.









their syncretic forms, which are certainly underrepresented in the Ghanaian census, are highly

varied and ubiquitous across the country (Meyer 2005).

The sundry nature of religion in Ghana has not prevented certain groups from claiming to

speak for one religious group or another on the national political scene. MAP made "Islam" its

rallying cry but failed to win even a Muslim audience outside of Southern Zongos. Those

Muslims in the North identified much more strongly with the NOPP in 1954 (Ahmed-Rufai

2002, 108-109). More recently many of the charismatic communities in Southern Ghana have

gone to great lengths to describe Ghana as a "Christian country" (Owusu 1996, 322). None of

these groups, however, have yet been able to concretize a political cleavage based on religious

variable categories. Regional Minister for Greater Accra Sheikh I.C. Quaye's (2003) description

of inter-religious relationships in Ghana as characterized by "a relationship of mutuality,

understanding, tolerance and coexistence between Muslims, Christians and other religions"

seems to have won the day. This inability to mobilize on a national scale is partly due to the

dispersed nature of the various religions in Ghana described above but it also likely has

something to do with the fluidity with which religions have traditionally been practiced in this

environment. There are Ghanaian Muslims who turn to the east five times a day, Ghanaian

Christians who refuse to work on Sunday, and Ghanaian practitioners of traditional religions who

have never entered either a church or a mosque. But there are many Ghanaians, likely a maj ority,

who have a far more complex relationship with the country's plethora of religions.









Table 3-1. Elections in Ghana a historical overview


Year P.M./President (Party)
1951 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP)

1954 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP)

1956 Kwame Nkrumah (CPP)

1969 Kofi Busia (PP)

1979 Hilla Limann (PNP)

1992 Jerry Rawlings (NDC)

1996 Jerry Rawlings (NDC)

2000 John Kufuor (NPP)

2004 John Kufuor (NPP)


Majority Party (Seats/Total)
CPP (33/38)

CPP (71/104)

CPP (71/104)

PP (105/140)

PNP (71/140)

NDC (189/200)

NDC (133/200)

NPP (100/200)

NPP (128/230)


Minority Parties (Seats)
UGCC (3), Tongu Confederacy (1),
independents (1)
NPP (12), TC (2), GCP (1), MAP (1),
AYO (1), independents (16)
NPP (15), NLM (12), TC (2), MAP
(1), FYO (1), independents (2)
NAL (29), UNP (2), PAP (2), APRP
(1), independents (1)
PFP (42), UNC (13), ACP (10), SDF
(3), independents (1)
NCP (8), EGLE (1), independents
(2)
NPP (61), PCP (5), PNC (1)

NDC (92), PNC (3), CPP (1),
independents (4)
NDC (94), PNC (4), CPP (3),
independents (1)


Note: Election results obtained from Larvie and Badu
Commission of Ghana (2004).


(1996), Ephson (2003), and Electoral


Table 3-2. Genealogy of the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist traditions
Year Nkrumahist Parties Danquah-Busiaist Parties
1951 CPP UGCC
1954 CPP GCP
1956 CPP NLM
1969 NAL PP
1979 PNP PFP, UNC
1992 NIP, PHP, PNC NPP
1996 PCP, PNC NPP
2000 CPP, PNC NPP
2004 CPP, PNC NPP
Note: Guidance in categorizing the parties as either Nkrumahist or Danquah-Busiaist was
provided by Austin (1964), Chazan (1983), Ephson (1992; 2003), and Pinkney (1988) as well as
various party manifestos. This categorization is not an exact science. The parties listed above
were categorized based on two criteria: 1) They either self-identify in their manifestos as a
Nkrumahist party or a Danquah-Busiaist party or explicitly trace their ideological heritages
through the CPP or UGCC and 2) they were significant enough to win seats in the legislature.
Criteria two is relaxed in 1992 to include parties that participated in the presidential contest since
all self-identified Nkrumahist parties boycotted the parliamentary elections.










Table 3-3. Religious breakdown by region of Ghana
Christian Muslim Traditional Other None
Western 81.0% 8.5% 1.5% 0.8% 8.2%
Central 81.4% 9.2% 1.2% 0.8% 7.4%
Gt. Accra 83.0% 10.2% 1.4% 0.9% 4.6%
Volta 67.2% 5.1% 21.8% 0.7% 5.3%
Eastern 82.8% 6.1% 2.4% 0.7% 8.1%
Ashanti 77.5% 13.2% 1.2% 0.7% 5.3%
Brong-Ahafo 70.8% 16.1% 4.6% 0.6% 7.8%
Northern 19.3% 56.1% 21.3% 0.5% 2.8%
Upper East 28.3% 22.5% 46.4% 0.8% 1.9%
Upper West 35.5% 32.2% 29.3% 0.6% 2.3%
Total Country 68.8% 15.9% 8.5% 0.7% 6.1%
Note: Data obtained from Ghana Statistical Services (2002)





















































Akan Ga-Dangme Ewe Guan
Gurma Mole-Dagbon Grusi Mande-Busanga
Figure 3-1. Ethno-linguistic map of Ghana [Source: Author created map with approximate
borders of ethnic groups adapted from Survey of Ghana (1966) and language
groupings and spellings from Ghana Statistical Service (2002).]






76























































Gold Coast Colony Ashanti Protectorate Northern Territories

Togoland Colony prior to 1952 Togoland prior to 1952
Trans-Volta Togoland after Northern Territories after
Figure 3-2. Contemporary regions of Ghana (color-coded by colonial regions) [Source: Author
created composite map from information provided in Bening (1999).]







77










CHAPTER 4
THE ELEPHANT, UMBRELLA, AND QUARRELLING COCKS: DISAGGREGATING
PARTISANSHIP IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

That there was a pattern to Ghana' s 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections surprised

no one. As expected the ruling NPP picked up the majority of votes in the Ashanti Region and

the NDC won in the Volta, Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions. The "swing" regions

(Eastern, Greater Accra, Central, Western, and Brong-Ahafo) went to the election's eventual

winner (Ephson 2003, 14). The familiar rural/urban divide was also palpable. If one isolates the

20 largest urban centers in Ghana from the rest of the country, one finds that the NPP polled on

average around 7% higher in these large urban constituencies than they did in less urban

constituencies. The relationship is reversed for the NDC. Nkrumahist parties won a few

parliamentary seats in the Southwest and far North but did predictably little to dispel the notion

of Ghana being a de facto two-party state. Despite a different party in the Castle2 and controlling

parliament, Nugent' s (1999) "urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in

Ghana" continue virtually untouched. Recognizing the practical importance of recurring electoral

cleavages, when asked about strategic campaigning a member of the NPP executive committee

commented "some [constituencies] we just ignore completely because whatever we do we'll

lose."3




i Ghana's 20 most populous urban centers are described by the 2000 Census as Accra Metropolis, Kumasi
Metropolis, Tamale, Takoradi Sub-Metro, Ashaiman, Tema, Obuasi, Sekondi Sub-Metro, Koforidua, Cape Coast,
Madina, Wa, Sunyani, Ho, Tema Newtown, Techiman, Bawku, Bolgatanga, Agona Swedru, and Nkawkaw. The
constituency and/or district election results of these areas was compared with the constituency and/or district
election results of the areas outside of these 20 most populous urban centers to derive these percentages (Ghana
Statistical Service 2002a, 1).

2 "The Castle" is what most Ghanaians call Christiansborg Castle in Osu. The stone fort was originally constructed
by the Danes in the 17 h Century but today serves as the office space for the President.

3 Interview conducted at NPP party headquarters in Kokomlemle, Accra on 12 July 2005. Similar responses were
given by other members of the NPP and NDC party establishments when queried.









Baring a dramatic electoral realignment, scholars, politicians, and pundits alike anticipate

similar voting patterns, though not necessarily similar electoral outcomes, to carry on for the

foreseeable future. But why, after four elections and a turnover in power, do these predictable

voting blocs persist and what causal variables explain them? Answers to these questions tend to

fall into one of two categories. One answer points to ideological (GI)\I//\L/ lIJ) cleavages as the

driving force behind Ghanaian electoral alignments. Rhetorically at least the NPP positions itself

as a center-right party and the NDC has claimed the center-left as its ideological territory. In a

recent study of core and swing voters Lindberg and Morrison (2005, 19) present evidence that

Ghanaian parties are separated by socio-economic factors regularly tied to ideological cleavages

including the aforementioned urban-rural divide, level of education, occupation status and sector,

and income levels. The alternative answer points to sectional (Geinci)I\ lIalJIt) cleavages, most

often conceptualized ethnically in the Ghanaian case, as the driving force behind electoral

alignments. Though Lentz and Nugent (2000) prudently caution against assuming ethnicities in

Ghana are fixed social realities, voting patterns indicate at least some schism along perceived

ethnic lines. In his analysis of Ghana's 2000 elections, Gyimah-Boadi (2001, 1 15) summarizes

the popular sentiment that has followed each of the Fourth Republic's national elections when he

notes that "the country is polarized along ethnic and regional lines" and suggests "sustained

efforts at national reconciliation and unity."

This chapter begins with a two-tiered examination of politically mobilized cleavages in

Ghana's Fourth Republic. First all four national elections in the Fourth Republic are placed

under the analytical microscope. Using electoral maps, census data, and election results the

social bases of the NDC and NPP are illuminated graphically on a macro-level. In some ways

this depiction of electoral cleavages is just another point for triangulating the anecdotal and









survey evidence which has already been reported both in the popular Ghanaian press and in

academic journals. That some Ghanaian political parties are more popular amongst some

members of one ethnic group or another will not seem earth shattering to even a casual observer

of Ghanaian politics. Neither will the revelation that some parties do better in areas with specific

class indicators. In other ways, however, this method offers a systematic approach to evaluating

Ghanaian social cleavages that can be applied comparatively both across time and borders. This

flexibility is unprecedented. The second level of analysis deals with the sociopsychological

textures of Ghanaian parties (Heberle 1955). In other words, what "cognitive shortcuts" do

Ghanaian voters take with them into the ballot box? With the help of survey results collected in

the wake of the 2004 elections this section presents a new kind of analysis that goes directly at

answering this question. Instead of asking registered voters to distinguish between political

parties in an open-ended abstract way, this "cognitive shortcut" mapping approach asks

respondents to differentiate on a number of specific variables. The chapter concludes with a brief

discussion of what the election and "cognitive shortcut" analysis mean, and conversely do not

mean, for the future of Ghana' s Fourth Republic.

Elections in the Fourth Republic

Mapping the Votes

As soon as it became clear that Kufuor and the NPP had won the December 2004 polls

hawkers took to the streets of Accra selling commemorative electoral maps. Cartoon elephants

were positioned over constituencies won by the NPP, cartoon umbrellas over those won by the

NDC, and cartoon cocks and palm trees over those few constituencies won by the CPP and PNC

respectively. These decorative souvenirs were an attempt to duplicate on a popular level what

Nugent (1999, 2001Ib) has done on the pages of academic j ournals. Maps of this variety give

their readers a rough understanding of where one party is strong and another is weak. The areas










of the map with a lot of elephants, for instance, are chalked up as NPP territory whereas the areas

heavily shaded by umbrellas are where the NDC reigns. The parsimonious presentation points to

a number of straightforward hypotheses: the NPP is an Asante party and the NDC is an Ewe

party; the NPP is a Southern party and the NDC is a Northern party; the NPP is an urban party

and the NDC is a rural party.

While these electoral depictions are useful when it comes to hypothesis generation, they

present partisan social cleavages as unrealistically sharp lines when in actuality they are much

more nuanced. NDC support does not stop at the Jaman North constituency border only to be

replaced by NPP support on the Jaman South side of the boundary. Though the NDC claimed the

parliamentary seat for Jaman North and the NPP claimed the seat for Jaman South in 2004, in

both constituencies opposition candidates took in more than 40% of the vote. Figures 4-1 (NDC)

and 4-2 (NPP) illustrate some of this gradation using presidential results for the 1992, 1996,

2000, and 2004 elections.4 When a particular constituency's support for a given party is nearing

100%, that constituency is shaded nearly black. When a particular constituency's support for a

given party is nearing 0%, that constituency is left virtually white. Most constituencies, however,

appear as shades of gray, sometimes darker and sometimes lighter depending on the level of

support a given party's presidential candidate received in the area.

It is clear from the maps that the epicenter of NPP support is Kumasi and the epicenter of

NDC support is the Southern portion of the Volta Region. These two areas are nearly black in the





4 Presidential elections are used because they yield one more data point than parliamentary elections, as a result of
the 1992 parliamentary election boycott, and since split-ticket voting is a relatively rare phenomenon presidential
results and parliamentary results roughly mimic each other. Since 1996, the average difference between a major
parties' (i.e., NPP and NDC) presidential and parliamentary totals across constituencies has never been greater than
6.4% (NPP in 1996) or lower than 2.8% (NPP in 2000) of the total vote. For the 2000 elections, where there was a
run-off, only first round results are reported.










NPP and NDC maps respectively for each of the Fourth Republic' s four presidential elections.'

This gives at least tentative support to a rather modest version of the ethnicity hypothesis. Even

if one assumes that Asantes form the core of NPP support because their traditional capital is in

Kumasi and Ewes form the core of NDC support because their traditional area is in the Southemn

portion of Volta Region, however, one must still account for the more than 70% of Ghanaians

who did not self-identify themselves with either ethnic group in the last census (Ghana Statistical

Service 2002b, 22). The more ambitious ethnic hypothesis, that pitting the linguistic group

Akans6 VeTSus non-Akans, does not fare nearly so well. Whereas winner-take-all maps depict the

entire Volta Region and the three Northern regions (Northemn, Upper East, Upper West) as a

relatively solid and stable NDC bloc, the proportional maps show increasing parity between the

two maj or parties in the three Northemn regions and what are perhaps the signs of a growing

parity in Northern parts of the Volta Region as well. Similarly, the so-called Akan regions

(Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastemn, and Westemn), with Kumasi and its environs being the

notable exception, are a mixed bag of grays in elections won by both the NDC and NPP. One can

witness the sea-change in the Akan-speaking regions that led to the turnover of power from the

NDC to the NPP in 2000, but neither before nor after can the area be characterized as an absolute

runaway for either party. Additionally this sea-change cannot be differentiated from the growing

popularity of NPP presidential candidates in predominately non-Akan areas of the country.





5 The fact that these two sets of maps are near negative images of each other is the result of poor showings by
Nkrumahists and other minor party candidates. A similar set of maps could have been made for the Nkrumahists and
minor parties but the maps would have looked very close to blank because of their candidates' relatively poor
showings.

6 Robert Price (1973, 472) noted the category "Akan" is becoming more and more widely recognized and may begin
to be considered a product of what Jean Rouch (1956, 163-4) has called "super-tribalization." Evidence presented
here does not support this supposition.










Ideology-via-socio-economic indicators' hypotheses run into similarly vast areas of gray.

This result is not completely unexpected as class and privilege indicators are not as apt as ethno-

linguistic cleavages to be geographically centered. It is not uncommon, for instance, to witness

destitute panhandlers in a city like Accra walking alongside the Mercedes of wealthy

entrepreneurs on their way to work or to see burger mansions in various states of construction all

across the countryside. Most Ghanaians can, nonetheless, point easily to regions of the country

which are more or less economically marginalized and undeveloped. Despite the deleterious

effects of economic reform programs on urban workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Herbst

1993, 61-64), Ghanaian cities continue to lure rural dwellers with their relatively easier access to

the fruits of development and prosperity. Cities in Ghana continue to grow in relation to rural

areas because countless rural dwellers act on the belief that their earning potential, even with the

risks of high unemployment, is greater in the cities than in the countryside (Harris and Todaro

1970).

In addition to the urban and rural distinction, there is a perceived and actual gap between

the country's "North" and "South" dating back to the colonial period when the British

purposively kept the Northemn population uneducated so that they would remain a cheap source

of labor in the South (Bening 1999, 232-237). Today the percentage of individuals achieving a

level of education above primary school hovers in the low teens in the three regions that once

constituted the Gold Coast' s Northemn Territories (Northemn, Upper East, and Upper West). In

none of the other seven regions does this percentage drop below thirty. A cursory glance at the

maps depicting election results, however, does not provide clear evidence that either of these


7 Burger" is a term used to describe wealthy Ghanaians living abroad who commission large and often ostentatious
mansions that are commonly left unfinished for years. The assumption is that these individuals will have completed
their houses by the time they return to Ghana and wanted to get some structure in the works so that claims to the
land would be solidified.










ideologically tinged socio-economic cleavages are politicized. Though Sekondi-Takoradi and

Cape Coast do look in the maps to be more inclined to vote NPP than the surrounding areas,

Accra and Kumasi do not appear noticeably different than surrounding constituencies and

Tamale appears to be working against the grain of the Northern Region by becoming more and

more an NDC base of support with each election. As far as a North/South difference, no

distinction readily presents itself especially in the most recent election.

Analyzing the Votes with the Help of Census Data

The nuanced election maps reveal the NDC's dominance in Southern Volta Region and the

NPP's dominance around Kumasi. Though this finding is far from unexpected, the magnitude of

support, or lack thereof, in these areas when juxtaposed against the remainder of the country is

striking. For the remaining political cleavage hypotheses the maps are more equivocal. What the

naked eye cannot pick-up, however, may be detected with the help of regression analysis that

teases out the effects of demographic characteristics on each party's vote totals. Published data

from the 2000 national census was released publicly at the regional level (N=10) which offers

relatively few cases to test a hypothesis. Given the limitations of this presentation of the data, for

this proj ect several potentially interesting demographic variables were obtained at the district

level (N=110) from the Ghana Statistical Services. Since this census data is presented at the

district-level, in order to perform the following regressions constituency-level election results

were first merged into district-level election results. In both the 200 and 230 constituency

configurations this is a fairly simple operation as no constituency falls into more than a single

district.8



SThe 2000 Census recorded data using the 110 district configuration. These districts range in size from Kadjebi in
the Volta Region with a recorded population just shy of 50,000 to Accra Metropolitan District with a recorded
population of over 1.6 million. The median district population is approximately 130,000.










Table 4-1 represents a regression model using the NPP's percentage of the presidential

vote in 2004 in a given district as the dependent variable. Independent variables in the model

include percentage of Akan-speakers9 (to test the ethnicity cleavage hypothesis); Christians (to

test an alternative Gemeinschaft cleavage hypothesis); and percentage of residents in a given

district who live in urban areas, have obtained at least a middle school (JSS) education, and have

ready access to a water closet, pit latrine, and/or a Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine

(KVIP) (all class indicators to test the ideology cleavage hypothesis). Only the percentage of

Akan-speakers in a district is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Holding the

three aforementioned socio-economic indicators constant and controlling for a district' s

percentage of Christians, for every 1% increase in Akan-speakers in a district the NPP's

presidential candidate gained on average more than half a percent of the vote in 2004. When the

percentage of Akan-speakers in a district is held constant none of the socio-economic indicators

in the model are significant at even the 90% confidence level and the percentage of Christians in

a district is unexpectedly inversely related to NPP success.

Because of the potential for interaction between the three socio-economic indicators, six

more regressions were run: three with each of the socio-economic indicators predicting the NPP

presidential candidate' s share of the vote and three regressions predicting the NPP vote with

Akan-speakers included and one of the socio-economic indicators each. Alone each of the socio-

economic indicators was highly significant (99% confidence level) in predicting the NPP

presidential candidate's percentage of the vote. The regressions also yield positive coefficients as


9 Ideally two regressions could have been run, one with Akan-speakers and one with ethnic Asantes as potential
explanatory variables. Unfortunately, at the district level the available data only reports language families and not
individual languages. Given the previously described electoral maps, one could reasonably expect that the effect of
Asante-speakers in a district (who are concentrated in the Ashanti Region) is greater than that of Akan-speakers
(who predominate in Brong-Ahafo Region, Westemn Region, Central Region, and western portions of Eastemn
Region as well).










the ideological hypothesis would predict. When paired with the percentage of Akan-speakers in a

district, however, only developed toilet facilities appears significant and that with a very small

negative coefficient (-.092) and a confidence level of only 90%. In all three of these latter cases

the effect of Akan-speakers hovered around .5 with a 99% confidence level. Adding Akan to a

bivariate regression with a district' s percentage of Christians as the independent variable and

NPP percentage of the vote the dependent variable turns a significant position correlation into a

significant negative correlation. These findings suggest strongly that it is the presence of

members of an ethno-linguistic group, namely Akans, that is driving NPP vote totals upwards

and not the existence of the aforementioned ideological proxies or competing sectional

affiliations.

Table 4-2 depicts a regression using the NDC's percentage of the presidential vote in 2004

in a given district as the dependent variable and hypothesized NDC-leaning ethnic identities and

socio-economic indicators as the independent variables. Since it has been hypothesized that the

NDC is an Ewe and/or a Northern party two ethno-linguistic identifiers are included in the model

instead of one. While Ewe-speakers is a census category like Akan-speakers, Northerners is not

an officially recognized language category but rather a shorthand identity category used widely

in Ghana to convey "Northern-ness" with its associated denotation (belonging to one of many

ethno-linguistic groups "originating" from one of Ghana' s three Northern regions) and

connotations (backwardness and a residual culture difference from "the South") (Dickson

1968). 10 As there is a common perception that the NDC is more popular amongst Muslims, this


'O Census categories merged to create the variable "Speakers of Northemn Languages" include Gurma, Mole-Dagbon,
Grusi, and Mande-Busanga. The regression was run once with the Guan language category included and once with it
excluded because the language family is divided nearly in half with Gonja spoken mainly in the North but also a
diverse array of languages spoken across the South (Awutu and Efutu near Winneba: Abiriw, Okere, Larteh in the
Eastern Region; and Siwu, Sele, Avatime, Nyangbo, and Likpe in the Volta Region to name a few) (Guan Congress
1991). The results of these two regressions were similar in all areas save "Speakers of Northemn Languages." The
regression appearing in Table 4-2 depicts the results with Guan-speakers included in the "Speakers of Northemn










alternative Gemeinschaft cleavage is integrated into the model. Since the perceptions are that the

NDC is most popular amongst the lower classes, the socio-economic indicators included in this

model are the mirror image of those included in the NPP model: percentage of residents in a

given district who live in rural areas; have not obtained at least a middle school education; and

have no regular access to a water closet, pit latrine, and/or a KVIP. In this model, only the

percentage of Ewe-speakers in a district appears significant at the 99% confidence level.

The model suggests that for every percentage increase in Ewe-speakers, the NDC

presidential candidate gains approximately two-thirds a percentage of the vote. Additional

regression analysis reveals that, as with the NPP regression, the two insignificant socio-economic

variables, percentage of rural dwellers and those without access to developed toilet facilities,

become significant with coefficients in the expected direction when ethnic variables are left

uncontrolled. Speakers of Northern languages and Muslims are not reliable predictors of NDC

success at the 99% confidence interval even when other variables are left uncontrolled. The

percentage of those with less than a middle school education is only significant at the 90%

confidence interval but its coefficient is positive as the ideological hypotheses predict. This result

for the speakers of Northern languages variable is somewhat problematic due to the category's

inherent definitional difficulties and relatively small coefficient. The results for lesser education

cannot be so easily dismissed and deserves closer inspection. Are we looking at the fruits of the

NDC's relatively recent efforts to define itself strongly with the international movement for

social democracy (National Democratic Congress n.d., 1)? Or is this effect the result of the


Languages" group. Results for the regression with Guan-speakers withheld from this group are as follows: Constant
.047(.121); Ewe-Speakers .674***(.058); Speakers of Northern Languages .095(.075); Muslims -.005(.083); Rural
Dwellers -.064(.084); Less Educated .484*(.254); and Undeveloped Toilet Facilities .058(.084). The adjusted R2 for
this model is .620. When compared with the Table 4-2, these results suggest that districts with large percentages of
Guan-speakers lean heavily towards the NDC. The results also suggest a lot of Northern (non-Gonja) language
speakers in a district yields an NDC surplus of less than 10 percent, when all the other mentioned variables are
controlled.









uneducated masses hanging on to the political party with direct ties to the previous authoritarian

regime as Lipset (1959, 79-80) would predict? Answers to these questions are not forthcoming

without access to longer time-series data.

Since there have been four presidential elections in the Fourth Republic and there is no

reason to suspect the 2000 census data is grossly off target with regard to the years 1992, 1996,

and especially 2000, comparisons of this sort are possible. 1 The models represented in Tables

4-1 and 4-2 were run for each of the elections in the Fourth Republic. Across elections there

were few dissimilarities. For the NPP, the percentage of Akan-speakers in a district remains

highly significant across time. Like in 2004, for every 1% increase in Akan-speakers in a district

the NPP's presidential candidate gained on average slightly more than half a percent of the vote

in 1996 and 2000. In the 1992 election a 1% increase in Akan-speakers gave the NPP on average

closer to a third of a percentage point increase. The percentage of Ewe-speakers was a similarly

consistent predictor of NDC success. In 1992, 1996, and 2000, when all other variables in the

model were held constant, a 1% increase in Ewe-speakers led on average to between two-thirds

and half a percent increase in the NDC vote tally. For every other variable in the NPP and NDC

models, there was at least one year of statistical insignificance and most were insignificant over

the course of all four elections. Low education continued to show promise as a potential

predictor of NDC support for the 1992 and 2000 elections but was statistically insignificant in

1996 giving no indications as to whether the correlation is the result of authoritarian leanings of

the uneducated, demonstrative of the appeal of the NDC's social democratic message, or simply

spurious. The variable for speakers of Northern languages varied widely from election to election

as a predictor of NDC support suggesting that the ethno-linguistic groups that make up this


11 There was a census conducted in 1984 but the census did not collect data on indigenous languages or ethmicity.










category are often at cross-purposes and very much politically "in play." An interesting result not

anticipated with the 2004 regressions is the impact of a district' s percentage of urban dwellers on

NPP support. In 2004 the relationship between the NPP and percentage of urban dwellers was

not significant when controlling for Akan-speakers. In 1992, 1996, and 2000 the relationship is

significant to the tune of between one-fifth and one-fourth a percentage point rise in NPP support

for every 1% increase in the percentage of urban dwellers in a district.

Though this analysis does not foreclose on the possibility of ideological class-based

cleavages forming in Ghana, it certainly does not advance the ideological hypothesis in any clear

and consistent sense. The ethnic hypothesis, on the other hand, finds a great deal of support in

the regression analysis and cannot be rej ected. 12 Election maps illustrate high levels or support

for the NPP in traditional Asante areas and high levels of support for the NDC in traditional Ewe

areas. The regression analysis suggests that a district's "Akan-ness" or "Ewe-ness" matters a

whole lot even when the socio-economic characteristics of a district are controlled for. Knowing

absolutely nothing about which party's presidential candidate receives the most votes nationally

or the socio-economic characteristics of particular districts, one can reasonably predict based on

the evidence presented here that the NPP presidential candidate would win a hypothetical district

populated only by Akan-speakers and the NDC presidential candidate would win a hypothetical

district populated only by Ewe-speakers. Given the fact that the NDC ran candidates of different

ethno-linguistic backgrounds in 1992 and 1996 (Jerry Rawlings is half Ewe and half Scottish)

and in 2000 and 2004 (John E.A. Mills is a Fante-speaker), one can conclude that the party's


12 There was sufficient data to test another sectional hypothesis that has received some attention in the public
discourse but not nearly so much as the ethnicity hypothesis. There is some talk that the NPP is the Christian party
and the NDC is the Muslim party. At an aggregate district-level this hypothesis is not born out. Christianity is
signficiantly and positively correlated with NPP success until a districts' percentage of Akan-speakers is controlled
for. Then it remains significantly associated but with a negative correlation. The number of Muslims in a district has
no significant impact on NDC success at the polls.










appeal amongst Ewe-speakers is not dependent on its flag bearer' s ethnic-identity. The NPP will

have to run a non-Akan flag bearer before there will be evidence either for or against a similar

conclusion. It is interesting, however, that the election where the percentage of Akan-speakers in

a district mattered the least for the NPP was in the only election in which their flag bearer was

Akan but not a self-identified Asante. 13

The Meaning of Electoral Choice in Ghana: Cognitive Shortcuts

Maps and census data allow one to determine the constituencies that Ghana's two

dominant parties draw upon to form their respective bases. The above analysis suggests that

despite politicians' ideological appeals to the masses in widely-covered public speeches and

glossy manifestos, it is ethnic identities that better predict the popularity of one party over

another. Though these findings will be interesting for those seeking to better describe the

politically-mobilized cleavages in Ghanaian society, there is an approach that allows one to get

at the way citizens understand their election-day choices more directly by studying the

"cognitive shortcuts" Ghanaians use to differentiate between their party options (Popkin 1991).

Whereas the preceding picture of political cleavages is presented as static manifestations of

electoral choice, with each map and regression capturing a single election, these "cognitive

shortcut" maps can be used to better understand the weight given to "thoughts that precede a

choice" and drive fluctuations in the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 election results (Lupia et al.

2000, 1). Greater knowledge about the "cognitive shortcut" maps of Ghanaian voters can also be

used by politicians, pundits, and media commentators in Ghana who have a vested interest in

altering or preserving the status quo in favor of one party or another in future elections. Such a




13 Professor A. Adu Boahen, who ran for president under the NPP flag in 1992, would be classified ethno-
linguistically as an Akyem.










map demonstrates not necessarily the empirical social bases of political parties but rather the

perceptions that must be maintained or manipulated to effect electoral outcomes.

"Cognitive Shortcut" Survey

The survey administered between January and May 2005 in three of Ghana' s 230

constituencies was designed to capture the character of Ghanaian political parties as understood

by the voters. It does so not by asking respondents to stake out a mutually exclusive position on

whether Ghanaian parties are separated along ideological or ethnic lines, but rather by allowing

respondents to map out their understanding of political cleavages in their country in a formal and

specific manner. In each of the three selected constituencies 200 surveys were randomly

administered to registered voters. 14 Respondents were asked several batteries of questions that

followed the same general formula. "Do you think NPP support is stronger in some regions than

in others?" reads a prototypical question. If the respondent answered this question yes they were

asked "Which region of the country do you think supports the NPP the most?" Following this

question set, the same two questions were asked again with NDC substituting for NPP. A similar

format was used to query registered voters on other potential cleavage lines including ethnicity,

religion, population density, class, and education.

So that this relatively small-N survey would have some validity on a national scale, a most

different system design was selected (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 31-46). The selection of these

three constituencies (Odododiodio, Bantama, and Nabdam) was intended to give the sample as

diverse a population as possible. 1 Odododiodio encompasses the Jamestown and Usshertown

sections of Accra also known as "Old Accra." Traditionally the area is Ga though Accra' s


14 For a detailed description of the survey methodology see Appendic C.

1s Chapter Six provides a more thorough summary of the three constituencies' histories and demographics. The
descriptions that follow are just intended to provide a brief overview.









booming population has diversified the area ethnically to the point that non-Ga-speakers now

make up about a third of the constituency's population. Fishing and petty trade are the dominant

industries in the economically marginalized urban constituency (Bremer 2002). Elections are

usually very close in Odododiodio and both the NPP and NDC have won the area's

parliamentary seat in contested races. Bantama is located in the Ashanti Region's capital,

Kumasi. The constituency is home to the Asante royal mausoleum and includes the spot where

Ikdmfo Andkye summoned the golden stool from the heavens (Rattray 1923, 288-289).

Economically the constituency can best be described as a middle-class mixed use urban area.

Bantama, in both its pre- and post-redistricting forms has voted massively for the NPP in each of

the Fourth Republic's contested elections winning it a reputation as the NPP's "World Bank" of

votes. On the road connecting Bolgatanga to Bawku in Ghana' s far Northeast one finds Nabdam

constituency. The constituency has been described as "ethnically homogenous, extremely

impoverished and entirely rural" (Smith 2001, 181). Nabit is the dialect spoken by virtually

every one of the constituency's voters who occupy themselves economically primarily with

millet farming during the short rainy season and illicit game hunting and gold mining during the

long dry season. Nabdam constituency has regularly voted NDC though both the NPP and third

party candidates, most notably those representing the PNC, have made respectable showings in

past elections. If responses to the survey questions are similar in these three disparate

constituencies, it is a fairly safe assumption that one can say something about Ghanaian voters-

writ-large.

Cognitive Mapping

Some of the results of this three constituency survey are displayed in Tables 4-3 4-8.

These cross-tabulations map respondent' s ability to differentiate between the NPP and NDC

when it comes to several socio-economic and sectional indicators. If voters see the significant










differences between the two parties as primarily socioeconomic, one would expect ideological

cleavages to predominate and a purposive-rational Gesellschaft understanding of the connections

between parties and society in Ghana to have taken hold. Conversely, if voters see the significant

differences between the two parties as primarily sectional, one would expect ethnic cleavages to

predominate and Gemeinschaft communities to be the best explanation for partisan identification.

To determine where individual respondents are positioned on this scale, they were asked whether

the NPP and NDC were more popular amongst certain class groups, rural or urban voters, well-

educated or uneducated, certain ethnic and religious groups, and regions of the country. When

respondents identified a difference in support on a variable, that difference was recorded. When

they did not identify a difference, their response was marked "no difference." Since the point of

the survey is to draw distinctions responses that identified the same categorical variable for both

the NPP and NDC, for instance labeling both parties most popular amongst low income voters,

were reclassified as "no difference" for purposes of analysis. Surveys that ask respondents more

directly to identify the differences between the parties in Ghana have been inundated with "no

difference" or the perhaps less illuminating "my party stands for development and honesty"

responses. 16 The abstract and multi-faceted nature of these types of questions provides

researchers with observations most notable for their dearth of content. By challenging

respondents to label a single party on a single variable, this survey elicits more thoughtful

answers which provide the basis for a rough picture of the bundle of information voters take into

polling stations and draw upon when deciding where to place their thumbprint.




16 The exact format and wording of this type of question varies. In the 2000 University of Ghana pre-election survey
(Ayee 2001) respondents were asked if it mattered to them what party is in power (2.18) and then asked why they
like their preferred party (2.38-2.41). Afrobarometer (2006) addresses the question more tangentially by asking
respondents to evaluate their president and parliamentarian on a number of specific criteria.









If one isolates the modal categories in these cross-tabulation tables, the results are as

predicted by the competing hypotheses. Across three disparate constituencies the NPP appears to

be pegged the party of upper class well-educated urban Christian Akan-speakers from the

Ashanti Region and the NDC appears to be the party of lower class uneducated rural Muslim

Ewe-speakers from the Volta Region. Though few Ghanaians fit either of these stereotypes

exactly, they provide a point of reference for voters. If one identifies more closely with the NPP

stereotype, for instance, one would more likely be identified as an individual who supports the

NPP than the NDC. "Ideology is important by every party," a post-survey focus group

participant in Nabdam constituency complained, "but most of the electorate are illiterates and

even those who are literate, they are not literate enough to know the differences between these

ideologies." In a context where the ideological constructs of political discourse have not worked

their way down to the masses (fewer than 3% of survey respondents could accurately identify the

NPP as the market-oriented party and the NDC as the social democratic party), it is these party

stereotypes that serve as alternative delimiters separating Party A from Party B. These are the

"cognitive shortcuts" of Ghanaian politics.

Stopping at this point of the analysis, however, does not allow one to rank "cognitive

shortcuts." In order to accomplish this task one has to look at the magnitude of these modal

categories in relation to each other. Analysis of this sort reveals a real divergence between the

Gesellschaft hypotheses and the Gemeinschaft hypotheses of voting behavior. Whereas "no

difference" responses proliferate in Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-8 they are relatively rare in Tables

4-6 and 4-7. The average "no difference" response rate across constituencies for these first three

tables was just shy of two-thirds while the average for the last two tables was around one-fourth.

Additionally the second most popular category choices in Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-8 are much










closer to the most popular category choices than those represented in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. On

average the second most popular categorical response for Tables 4-3 4-5 is less than 20

percentage points less popular than the modal category. This number increases to more than 50%

for Tables 4-6 and 4-7. Table 4-8, which depicts religious perceptions, is the most inconsistent

across constituencies with Bantama being an outlier perhaps because of its relative religious

homogeneity. As tools for distinguishing between the two dominant parties, ethnicity and region

appear to be both much more widespread and much more universally understood than any of the

tested socio-economic demographic indicators or religion. More than three-fourths of

respondents identified the NPP as most popular amongst Akan-speakers and nearly two-thirds

identified the NDC as most popular amongst Ewe-speakers. Across the three constituencies

surveyed far more voters are taking this ethnocentric information about the parties behind the

polling station security screens than anything resembling ideological distinctions.

Before concluding a note on the differences between constituencies is in order because

there are a few and some of these differences could significantly affect one' s analysis of the data.

As one moves literally away from Accra, the percentage of "no difference" responses goes up.

Though the data does not yield a ready explanation for this discrepancy the results are not

completely unexpected. Moving from Odododiodio to Bantama to Nabdam one is not only

moving from Accra northwards. One is also moving from a relatively well-educated area to a

relatively uneducated area and from an area where political information is easily accessible to a

region where the flow of mass media is more restricted. Just because there are so many "no

difference" responses in Nabdam does not mean that the differences between parties do not play

a role at election time.









Of the 160 respondents from Nabdam who listed their education level as "none," 94

claimed not to know whether or not one ethnic group supported the NPP more than others. Of the

28 respondents who had at least made it to middle school, only 3 claimed not to know and the

remaining 25 identified the NPP as a party most popular amongst Akan-speakers. Whether or not

these well-educated respondents will spread their "cognitive shortcuts" to their relatively less

educated neighbors over time is uncertain. What does seem to be evident in these findings,

however, is that the cues for the presented "cognitive shortcuts" are contained in the national

political discourse and those with greater access to this discourse are likely to be more in tune to

the modal perceptions of political parties. Though Ghanaian politicians have for the most part

stayed away from blatant ethnic appeals and hammered home instead illustrious ideologies, or

more frequently positions on local development, somehow they are subtly, and perhaps deftly,

conveying a different message to voters.

Conclusions

During a focus group in Bantama participants were asked if they think "tribalism" is a

problem in Ghanaian politics. The immediate answer was a resounding "No." An older

gentleman explained that he had lived in Nigeria for seven years and tribalism was a problem

there. He told a story about the markets there where sellers from the country's North would give

lower prices to buyers from the North than those from the South. This, he explained, was not a

problem in Ghana. Then he paused for a moment and said he did not really want to mention it

but felt it was important to the discussion. Ewes, he argued, do tend to vote as a bloc and when

they are in positions of power they like to promote fellow Ewes. From the gentleman' s preface

and the crowd's tacit approval it was apparent that this opinion was widely held but a little

embarrassing, at least when presented to an outsider. Akans, he continued, are so dispersed

around Ghana that they do not act like that. About half an hour later the focus group participants









were asked why residents of Bantama vote for the NPP in such high numbers even in comparison

to other constituencies in Kumasi and the Ashanti Region. "The pure Asantes," the same older

gentleman responded without hesitation this time, "that is Bantama."

So what is one to make of Ghana with its apparently thriving democratic institutions and

its apparently equally thriving ethnic divisions? The aforementioned gentleman from Bantama is

far from an outlier. Conversation after conversation on the topic of ethnicity and politics in

Ghana reveal that not only are ethno-linguistic divisions an important factor in Ghanaian politics

but almost everyone understands this social fact as a dirty little secret to be suppressed. The

electoral maps, regression analysis, and survey data presented above are really only

confirmations of what most participants and observers of Ghanaian elections have long believed

anecdotally. And Ghanaians do not need to read Horowitz' s (1993) warnings about "democracy

in divided societies" to know the existent social cleavages are potentially dangerous to

democracy. Ghana is book-ended by C8te d'Ivoire, a country embroiled in an on again off again

sectarian civil war, and Togo, a country whose most recent elections were marred by violence

perpetrated along regional lines. Rarely a week goes by that the Daily Graphic does not run a

story about a priest, politician, businessman, footballer, movie star, or traditional authority

urging the public to steer clear of tribalism. Sometimes the implication of these statements is that

some opponent has been misusing ethnic sentiments for personal gain but often times the

speeches appear to be rolling off a conveyer belt of speeches influential Ghanaians must make in

their lifetime. 1

But just as the data presented here can be read as a tentatively cautionary tale, so too can it

be read as a real success story. Ethnicity matters a lot at election time in Ghana. The maps and


17Kufuor' s post-2004 victory speech to this effect is reported on by Boadu (2005) in the Daily Graphic.










regression analysis presented above suggest that ethnicity is an extremely significant, though not

ultimately deciding factor in Ghanaian elections. Unless dramatic political events cause a

complete realignment, it is hard to imagine a scenario where the NPP will capture the maj ority of

votes in Ewe-dominant constituencies of the Southern Volta Region or the NDC will capture the

maj ority of votes in Asante-dominant constituencies around Kumasi. Even acknowledging this

ethno-political status quo, however, there is room for alteration in power. Combined ethnic Ewes

and ethnic Asantes make up less than 30% of the Ghanaian electorate. Evidence presented here

suggests that much of the remaining 70% of the electorate are more varied and flexible in their

support. Both the maps and regression analysis demonstrate that the maj ority of constituencies

and districts move in relative unison slightly towards the NDC in the elections they won and

slightly towards the NPP in elections they won. Much has been made of Akan voters moving

towards the NPP in 2000 and remaining there in 2004. Yet there are several constituencies not in

the Brong-Ahafo, Western, Central, or Eastern Regions in these elections that are shown in the

constituency maps to have lurched towards the NPP just as much. And the fact that the variable

Akan-speaking did not show more explanatory power in 2000 than it did in 1996 triangulates

with the maps. The NPP won in 2000 because the vast maj ority of constituencies moved in their

direction and not because they successfully pulled more non-Asante Akan-speakers into a

broader ethnic coalition.

So why has not Ghana been engulfed in a sectional dispute along the lines of its neighbors

in C8te d'Ivoire? Such a fate was certainly on the minds of all the churches who held prayer

vigils on the eve of Election Day 2004 and all the local celebrities who took to the airwaves in

the weeks before the election to urge their countrymen to abide peacefully by the election results

no matter what the outcome. Nugent offers as a potential explanation the fact that "at a time










when ethnicity was being used as a cudgel across the border in C8te d'Ivoire, it is to the credit of

Ghanaian politicians that they did not resort to ethnic smears although they sometimes accused

their opponents of playing dirty" (2001a, 4). When taken together the election analysis and

"cognitive shortcuts" survey point to a more structurally-oriented solution. In a country where

the vast maj ority of the voting population does not ethnically self-define themselves in a way

similar to the two dominant political parties, going tribalisticc" could very well stir up the base

while simultaneously costing one an election. Though the maj ority of voters view the NPP as an

Asante party and the NDC as an Ewe party it is in both of these parties' interests to run as far

away from these labels as possible. Then when it comes time to vote the non-Asante and non-

Ewe who will ultimately decide an election will not be able to vote against "those Asante" or

"those Ewe" tribalists. If, as is suggested here, most Ghanaian voters will go to the polls in 2008

and decide whether or not they like the job the Asante party did over the past eight years, this is a

far cry from understanding the elections as a zero-sum ethnic census. In the vast gray areas of the

Ghanaian election maps voters see Ghana' s two dominant parties as ethnically-tinged but they

vote, not necessarily out of a sense of Gemeinschaft, but perhaps based on personal evaluations

that very closely resemble those traditionally reserved for societies cleaved along Gesellscha-ft

lines.










Table 4-1. NPP districts (linear regression)
Coeffcient
(Std. Error)
Constant .336***
(.033)


Table 4-2. NDC districts (linear regression)
Coeffcient
(Std. Error)
Constant .055
(.118)>


Akan-Speakers


.575***
(.046)
-.308**
(. 124)
.029
(.082)
.400
(.269)
-.033
(.080)


Ewe-Speakers


.675***
(.056)
.132*
(.075)
-.021
(.084)
-.063
(.083)
.462*
(.249)
.032
(.085)


Chri sti ans


Speakers of
Northern Languages
Muslims


Urban Dwellers


Highly Educated

Developed
Toilet Facilities


Rural Dwellers


Less Educated


Undeveloped
Toilet Facilities


Significance: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note: The model presented in Table 4-1 has an adjusted R2 Of .704 and Table 4-2 has an adjusted
R2 Of .625.Election results are taken from Electoral Commission of Ghana (2004) and district-
level demographic characteristics (N=110) were obtained from Ghana Statistical Services.

Table 4-3. Cognitive perceptions of class for NPP and NDC supporters (survey results)
Bantama Nabdam Odododiodio
Low Income 8.0% 1.0% 6.0%
Middle Income 10.5% 1.5% 10.0%
NPP High Income 7.5% 10.5% 48.5%
no difference 74.0% 87.0% 35.5%
Low Income 12.0% 11.0% 35.0%
Middle Income 6.5% 1.0% 15.5%
NDCHigh Income 9.5% 1.5% 7.5%
no difference 72.0% 86.5% 42.0%
Significance: NPP Chi2 162.4 (df 6), p =.000; NDC Chi2 108.2 (df 6), p =.000

Table 4-4. Cognitive perceptions of population density where NPP and NDC supporters live
(survey results)


Bantama
20.5%
5.5%
74.0%
3.5%


Nabdam
25.5%
2.5%
72.0%
2.0%


Odododiodio
27.0%
25.0%
48.0%
22.5%


Urban
Rural
no difference
Urban


NPP


NDC Rural 13.5% 34.5% 28.5%
no difference 83.0% 63.5% 49.0%
Significance: NPP Chi2 69. 1 (df 4), p =.000; NDC Chi2 92.2 (df 4), p =.000