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Down with the Embargo

University of Florida Institutional Repository
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019440/00001

Material Information

Title: Down with the Embargo Social Movements, Contentious Politics and U.S. Cuba Policy (1960-2006)
Physical Description: 1 online resource (252 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Rampersad, Indira
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: american, anti, contentious, cuba, embargo, movements, organizations, policy, politics, social
Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Ever since the imposition of a partial embargo on Cuba by the Eisenhower administration in 1960, more than one hundred organizations in the United States have been challenging the state on U.S. Cuba policy. Collectively, these organizations constitute a dynamic social movement which represents the crucible of a new contentious ferment triggered by an intriguing blend of international, national and sub-national impulses, ironically sparking intensified relations between the two nations, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Over time, the movement has invariably re-energized, reinvented, redefined and reconstituted itself to persistently reject and attempt to reform this state policy which restricts tourist, family, cultural and academic travel, limits remittances and prohibits free trade with Cuba. This dissertation presents the first comprehensive analysis of the anti-embargo movement. It seeks to address the central research puzzle of why the movement has persisted in attempting to change U.S. Cuba policy when it has met with such limited success over time. Undertaking the analysis from the levels of both a single social movement and multiple interest groups, it describes and analyzes the network of organizations which constitute the movement. First, it recounts the story of the organizations from birth to the present: their history, goals, organizational structure, resources, size, leadership, strategies, tactics and activism. Second, it employs a social movements theoretical framework to explain the impulses prompting individuals to join the movement and the impetus accounting for its sustained activism over the last three decades. Drawing on the popular resource mobilization literature, it contends that the rational, utilitarian model is inadequate to understand the multifarious attributes of the movement. Hence, it turns to alternative views on tactical frames, solidarity networks, co-option, social capital, commitment theory, moral incentives and psychological benefits for possible answers. However, the resource mobilization perspective fails to capture the political impetus and the new contentious ferment sparked by the end of the Cold War in 1989. This necessitates encapsulating the discourse within the theoretical framework of political opportunity structures prompting an analysis of the systemic, national and sub-national impulses propelling increased collective action in the post-Cold War era.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Indira Rampersad.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: McCoy, Terry L.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0019440:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019440/00001

Material Information

Title: Down with the Embargo Social Movements, Contentious Politics and U.S. Cuba Policy (1960-2006)
Physical Description: 1 online resource (252 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Rampersad, Indira
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: american, anti, contentious, cuba, embargo, movements, organizations, policy, politics, social
Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Ever since the imposition of a partial embargo on Cuba by the Eisenhower administration in 1960, more than one hundred organizations in the United States have been challenging the state on U.S. Cuba policy. Collectively, these organizations constitute a dynamic social movement which represents the crucible of a new contentious ferment triggered by an intriguing blend of international, national and sub-national impulses, ironically sparking intensified relations between the two nations, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Over time, the movement has invariably re-energized, reinvented, redefined and reconstituted itself to persistently reject and attempt to reform this state policy which restricts tourist, family, cultural and academic travel, limits remittances and prohibits free trade with Cuba. This dissertation presents the first comprehensive analysis of the anti-embargo movement. It seeks to address the central research puzzle of why the movement has persisted in attempting to change U.S. Cuba policy when it has met with such limited success over time. Undertaking the analysis from the levels of both a single social movement and multiple interest groups, it describes and analyzes the network of organizations which constitute the movement. First, it recounts the story of the organizations from birth to the present: their history, goals, organizational structure, resources, size, leadership, strategies, tactics and activism. Second, it employs a social movements theoretical framework to explain the impulses prompting individuals to join the movement and the impetus accounting for its sustained activism over the last three decades. Drawing on the popular resource mobilization literature, it contends that the rational, utilitarian model is inadequate to understand the multifarious attributes of the movement. Hence, it turns to alternative views on tactical frames, solidarity networks, co-option, social capital, commitment theory, moral incentives and psychological benefits for possible answers. However, the resource mobilization perspective fails to capture the political impetus and the new contentious ferment sparked by the end of the Cold War in 1989. This necessitates encapsulating the discourse within the theoretical framework of political opportunity structures prompting an analysis of the systemic, national and sub-national impulses propelling increased collective action in the post-Cold War era.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Indira Rampersad.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local: Adviser: McCoy, Terry L.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2007
System ID: UFE0019440:00001


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DOWN WITH THE EMBARGO: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND
U.S. CUBA POLICY (1960-2006)




















By

INDIRA RAMPERSAD


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007

































O 2007 Indira Rampersad



































For Ma
whose unconditional love, boundless energy, unrelenting support, profound faith and calm
patience made this proj ect possible









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my adviser, Dr. Terry McCoy whose

boundless patience, calm tolerance and careful advice over the years have made this dissertation

an enj oyable and worthwhile experience. Special thank gos to Dr. Leslie Anderson for her

diligence and unrelenting support throughout the course of this proj ect especially during the

writing stage. Thanks also to the other members of my committee, Dr. Oren and Dr. Dodd, who

were always willing to provide a listening ear to my issues and ideas and to Dr. Reynaldo

Jiminez, my external examiner, for his contribution in the examining process. Heartfelt

appreciation to Dr. Leann Brown, Dr. Peggy Kohn and especially Dr. Dennis Jett on whose

shoulders I could always lean for trustworthy advice. To Sue, Debbie and Brisha, I extend

warmest gratitude. Thanks also go to my extended family at UF's International Center, Debra

and Maud, who took great care of me during my stay at UF. Sincerest gratitude goes to the

extended Caribbean posse for all the fun times and for making Gainesville a comfortable home

away from home.

Thanks go to the Laspau Fulbright Commission for funding my first 2 years of the Ph.D

program. Heartfelt appreciation goes to the Ruth McQuown Grant Committee which supported

my field research in D.C., New York and Miami. Deepest gratitude also goes to the Department

of Political Science for funding the last 3 years of my education at UF. Kind appreciation to

Sandra Levinson, Wayne Smith, Kirby Jones, Claire Rodriguez, Silvia Wilhelm, Alvaro

Fernandez and all the other unrelenting anti-embargo activists throughout the United States.

Many, many thanks go to my loving family and friends in Trinidad, New York and

Toronto who have been a bulwark of support throughout the years. And last but not least, thanks

go to my dear mum whose love, patience, wisdom, loyalty and devotion have been unfathomable

and unsurpassed in the course of this proj ect.












TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

ACKNOWLEDGMENT S .............. ...............4.....


LI ST OF T ABLE S ....___ ................ ...............8.......


LI ST OF FIGURE S .............. ...............9.....


LI ST OF AB BREVIAT IONS ................. ............... 10......... ...


AB S TRAC T ............._. .......... ..............._ 1 1..


CHAPTER


1 INTRODUCTION ................. ...............13.......... ......


History of the U. S. Embargo on Cuba ................. ...............13..............
Curiosity, Contributions and Challenges ................. ...............20................
Dissertation Structure .............. ...............22....


2 TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.......24


Limitations of International Relations Theory ........._... ......_........._. ........._......24
The Conceptual Dilemma ........._..... ...._... ...............27....
Theories of Social Movements .............. ...............3 3....
Resource Mobilization Perspectives.............. ... ..... ................3
The Political Process Model and Political Opportunity Structures ................ .. .............46
The Anti-Embargo Movement and U. S./Cuba Policy: A Framework for Analysis ...............50
Hypothesis ........._.. ..... ._ ...............50...
M obilizing Resources ............ ..... ._ ...............51....
The Enabling Environment............... ..............5
M ethodology ............ ..... ._ ...............53....

3 TAXONOMY OF ANTI-EMBARGO ORGANIZATIONS .............. ....................5


History and Goals .............. ...............58....
Financial Resources ............... ... ... ........ .... ........ ............6
Leadership, Human Resources and Organizational Structure .............. .....................7
Conclusion ....__ ................ .......__ .........84


4 STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF THE ANTI-EMBARGO MOVEMENT ......................89


Conventional Strategies and Tactics............... ...............89
Confrontational Strategies and Tactics ........._.___.......... ...............104..
Solidarity Networks and Co-option ........._.___........... ...............108...
Conclusion ......__................ ......__ .........11











5 SPEAKING TRUTHS TO POWER: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND
CHALLENGING THE STATE............... ...............116.


Rallying Against the Embargo: From Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush ................... ......117
Reaction to the Torricelli Bill ................ ...............123........... ...
Rejecting the Helms-Burton Law ............... ... .. ......... ...... ....... ...... .........2
Clamoring for the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act .........................129
Protesting the Reports of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba ................... ........132
The Elian Gonzalez Affair and the Rise of Moderate Cuban Americans. ................... .........139
Frustrations, Succes ses and Future Aspirati ons ................. ...............145........... ..

6 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: A RATIONAL DEPARTURE ................... ...............14

01son' s Rational M odel ................. ...............150......... .....
Salisbury' s Exchange Theory .................. .......... ...............153.....
Tactical Framing and the New Social Movements ................. ...............155........... ..
Solidarity Networks and Co-option ................. ...............160...............
Social Capital ................. .. ......... .. ........ .. .. .. .... ........6
Commitment, Moral Incentives and Psychological Benefits .............. .....................6
Conclusion ................ ...............176................

7 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: SYSTEMIC, NATIONAL AND SUB-
NATIONAL IMPULSES TO ANTI-EMBARGO ACTIVISM............... ...............18


Systemic Forces and Expanding Opportunity Structures ......... ................ ...............182
The End of the Cold War and the Onslaught of Globalization ............ ...................183
Pope John Paul's Visit to Cuba ................. ...............186.____ ..
State-level Impetus to Anti-Embargo Activities............... ..............18
Cuba's Liberal Economic Reforms .............. ...............189....
Type of Government. ............ _...... ._ ...............192...
Policy-Specific Opportunities ............... ...............196...
Societal Facilitators to Anti-Embargo Activism............... ...............20
The Countermovement and Power Alignment ............... ......__ .........._......200
Shifting Dynamics within the Cuban American Community ............... ............._..206
The Countervailing Force ............ _...... ._ ...............209...
Conclusion ............ _...... ._ ...............209...

8 CONCLUSIONS .............. ...............216....


Thawing of the Glacier .............. ................ ........_ ...........21
The Anti-Embargo Movement and a Post-Castro Cuba ................. ......... ................21 9

APPENDIX

A ARTICLES SEARCHED FOR LIBERAL NORMS IN WEB SITES OF PROMINENT
ANT I-E MBARGO ORGANIZ AT IONS ................. ......... ......... ............. 2


Center for International Policy (CIP) .............. ...............222....












Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) ................. ...............222..............
Latin American Working Group (LAWG) .................._._._ ......... ...........23
Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAEF) .............. ...............223....

B LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES INTERVIEWED .............. ......................2


C LIST OF WEB SITES ................. ...............227_ ....


LIST OF REFERENCES ............ ...... .._ ...............229.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............. ...............252....










LIST OF TABLES


Table page

3-1 Classification of anti-embargo organizations, dates founded and obj ectives...................87

3-2 Organizations, leaders and funding sources. .......__ ......... ___ ............... 88. ...

6-1 Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent
anti-embargo organizations. ................. ...............179.............

7-1 ABC/ Washington Post poll showing pre- and post-Cold War responses to Cuba as a
threat to the U.S. ........... ..... ._ ...............211.

7-2 Yankelovich tracking poll showing responses to Cuba as a threat to the U.S ........._.......21 1

7-3 Hit Counts of ati-embargo ativism of twenty-five organizations (labeled 1-25) from
Cold War to post-Cold War Era in the Christian Science Monitor, Miami Herald,
New York Times, USA Today and Washington Post ......... ................. ...............212

7-4 Comparison of frequency of "Cuban Democracy Act/Torricelli Bill" and "Helms
Burton Law" in five U.S. newspapers. ............. ...............214....

7-5 Lobby Groups' Contributions to Political Action Committees in the 1980s and
1990s ................. ...............215................

7-6 Contributions to Candidates and Political Action Committees in the 1980s and
1990s ............... ...............215...

7-7 Cuban American Contributions to Political Parties in the 1980s and 1990s. ..................2 15










LIST OF FIGURES


Figure page

6-1 Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent
anti-embargo organizations as reflected in Table 6-1. The X-axis represents the
number of hit counts in the websites and the Y-axis represents the maj or
organizations. .............. ...............179....

7-1 Comparison of anti-Embargo activism from Cold War to post- Cold War as reflected
in Table 7-3. The X-axis represents 25 anti-embargo organizations and the Y-axis
represents their frequency in the Christian Science M~onitor, M~iami Herald, the New
York Times, USA Todaly and the Wa~shington Post. .............. ...............213....

7-2 Comparison of Appearances of "Cuban Democracy Act/Torricelli Bill" and "Helms
Burton Law" in five U.S. Newspapers as reflected in Table 7-4 above. The X-axis
represents and the Y-axis represents the number of hit counts in the 5 maj or U. S
newspapers listed in Table 7-4............... ...............214..









LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


AHTC Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba

CAAEF Cuban American Alliance Education Fund

CANF Cuban American National Foundation

CCD Cuban Commission for Democracy

CIP Center for International Policy

ECDET Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel

ENCASA Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists

HRW Human Rights Watch

IFCO Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization

LAWG Latin American Working Group

PBS Public Broadcasting Service

SMO Social Movement Organization

USCTA U.S.-Cuba Trade Association

VB Venceremos Brigade

WOLA Washington Office on Latin America









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DOWN WITH THE EMBARGO: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND
U.S. CUBA POLICY (1960-2006)

By

Indira Rampersad

August 2007

Chair: Terry McCoy
Major: Political Science

Ever since the imposition of a partial embargo on Cuba by the Eisenhower administration

in 1960, more than one hundred organizations in the United States have been challenging the

state on U.S. Cuba policy. Collectively, these organizations constitute a dynamic social

movement which represents the crucible of a new contentious ferment triggered by an intriguing

blend of international, national and sub-national impulses, ironically sparking intensified

relations between the two nations, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Over time, the

movement has invariably re-energized, reinvented, redefined and reconstituted itself to

persistently rej ect and attempt to reform this state policy which restricts tourist, family, cultural

and academic travel, limits remittances and prohibits free trade with Cuba.

This dissertation presents the first comprehensive analysis of the anti-embargo movement.

It seeks to address the central research puzzle of why the movement has persisted in attempting

to change U.S. Cuba policy when it has met with such limited success over time. Undertaking

the analysis from the levels of both a single social movement and multiple interest groups, it

describes and analyzes the network of organizations which constitute the movement. First, it

recounts the story of the organizations from birth to the present: their history, goals,

organizational structure, resources, size, leadership, strategies, tactics and activism. Second, it










employs a social movements theoretical framework to explain the impulses prompting

individuals to j oin the movement and the impetus accounting for its sustained activism over the

last three decades.

Drawing on the popular resource mobilization literature, it contends that the rational,

utilitarian model is inadequate to understand the multifarious attributes of the movement. Hence,

it turns to alternative views on tactical frames, solidarity networks, co-option, social capital,

commitment theory, moral incentives and psychological benefits for possible answers.

However, the resource mobilization perspective fails to capture the political impetus and

the new contentious ferment sparked by the end of the Cold War in 1989. This necessitates

encapsulating the discourse within the theoretical framework of political opportunity structures

prompting an analysis of the systemic, national and sub-national impulses propelling increased

collective action in the post-Cold War era.









CHAPTER 1
INTTRODUCTION

History of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba

Since the 1960s, United States foreign policy to Cuba has been defined, redefined, shaped

and debated in the context of the economic embargo. The history of the embargo is as turbulent

as the choppy waters of the Florida Straits. No other issue in U. S. Caribbean relations has

prompted such continued heated discourse and none has grabbed such widespread media

attention as the contentious American embargo policy which prevents tourist travel, imposes

sanctions on trade, limits remittances to Cuban relatives and restricts academic, family and

cultural exchanges with the island.

The embargo has survived ten American presidents, some of whom have either relaxed or

tightened it in accordance with their own ideological beliefs or the political demands of the time.

The initial policy was a response to the triumph of Castro' s revolution 1959, his prompt

ideological alignment with the Soviet Union and his adoption of an anti-American stance. In

October 1960, President Eisenhower imposed a partial embargo in response to Castro's

nationalization of $2 billion in American property and an additional $1.5 billion in assets.

The disastrous outcome of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and Castro's subsequent

capture of 1122 Cuban exiles, resulted in President Kennedy's expanding the embargo in 1962 to

include all goods that was made with Cuban materials, even if they were manufactured in other

countries. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when it was discovered that Cuba was harboring

medium-range missiles aimed at the U.S., Americans viewed the embargo more as a vital

national security measure and less as an economic and social necessity. Kennedy continued to



SSee J.A. Sierra, J. "Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2."
bli w\ il ithistorrofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl5bhm 30 April, 2005.










tighten the embargo as a Cold War tactic when Castro showed his determination to act as the

Soviet proxy in the Western Hemisphere. As an overt Soviet satellite receiving $4 billion

annually from the U.S.S.R., even Castro's South American neighbors began supporting the

embargo and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba through resolutions of the Organization of

American States (OAS).

The 1970s witnessed periodic initiatives toward improving relations between the two

countries. Secret talks between the United States and Cuba over normalization of relations

occurred occurred during the Ford administration in 1974. In 1975, the OAS voted to end all

political and economic sanctions on Cuba and several of its members opted to resume diplomatic

relations.2 In 1977 under President Carter, diplomatic ties were partially restored through the

establishment of "Interests Sections" in each country, though the U.S. embargo remained. Carter

dropped the travel ban and allowed subsidiaries of U. S. companies to sell products to Cuba. He

also allowed Cuban exiles to send money to relatives in the island.3 In 1979 alone, 150,000

Americans visited Cuba under Carter' s relaxed policies. But Cold War ideological and political

battles impeded progress toward normalization between Cuba and the U.S. Cuban support of

leftist insurgents in Angola ended U. S. interest in detente with Cuba in the 1970s.4

In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration initially pondered rapprochement with Cuba, but

the possibility ended when Cuba supported Marxist groups in Central American civil wars.

Events such as the Mariel boatlift of 1980, in which 125,000 Cubans left Cuba for the U.S. and

the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 crafted in part to thwart Cuban-aided development



SSee J.A. Sierra, J. "Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2."
b1lip w\ il \t .historrofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl5bhm 30 April, 2005.
3Ibid.

4Ibid.









of a military airfield intensified friction between the U.S. and Cuba. Under Reagan, sanctions

were resumed resulting in one of the most hostile policies against Cuba since the Bay of Pigs.

Reagan reinstituted the travel ban and prohibited Americans from spending money in Cuba. He

also banned travel to the U.S. by Cuban government or Communist party officials or their

representatives and barred most Cuban students, scholars and artists from entering the U.S. New

Treasury regulations in 1989 restricted U. S. citizens spending in Cuba to a maximum of $100.5

The U. S. began to broadcast via Radio Marti to Cuba in 1985, and TV Marti in 1990, and the

Cuban government j ammed the television broadcasts soon after they went on the air.

The end of the Cold War did not bring the kind of changes in U. S Cuba policy that was

expected in a unipolar international system in which Cuba no longer poses an ideological or

security threat to the U. S. Instead, the 1990s saw a tightening of the embargo. Under President

George H. Bush, the Mack Amendment was passed prohibiting all trade with Cuba by

subsidiaries of U. S. companies even if located outside the U. S. The Torricelli Bill, or Cuban

Democracy Act of 1992, was also passed under Bush to "wreak havoc on the island," according

to its sponsor, Robert Toricelli, with the senior Bush proposing that he would impose sanctions

on any nation buying products from Cuba. The law prohibits foreign-based subsidiaries of U. S.

companies from trading with Cuba, but creates loopholes for travel to Cuba by a select group of

U.S. citizens to deliver food and medicine to Cuba. Thus, there was a simultaneous increase in

people-to-people initiatives at a time when Cuba was undergoing a severe economic crisis called

the "special period," due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Castro was taking

concrete steps to enact social and economic reforms involving job creation and employment

opportunities.


5Ibid.










President Clinton's Cuba policy initially took a moderate course. The 1994 rafter crisis

sent 30,000 Cubans toward U.S. shores. Subsequent U. S.-Cuban negotiations led to a series of

migration accords in which the two countries made commitments to promote safe, legal and

orderly migration. This balsero exodus resulted in Clinton suspending the decade old policy of

granting asylum to refugees and reaching a pact with Castro. In 1995, he also allowed American

media organizations to establish permanent headquarters in Cuba. In October 1995, Clinton also

announced measures to allow nongovernmental organizations in the U.S. to fund projects in

Cuba, and to allow U. S. AID funding to NGOs in the U. S. for Cuba-related proj ects. 6

U. S.-Cuba relations took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1996, when Cuban MIG

jetfighters shot down two U.S.-based civilian aircraft belonging to the Miami-based group,

Brothers to the Rescue, killing three U. S. citizens and one Cuban resident of the United States.

Clinton used the incident to endorse the Helms-Burton Law in the heat of the 1996 election

campaign in a bid to court vital Cuban American votes in South Florida. Helms-Burton enacts

penalties on foreign companies doing business in Cuba; permits lawsuits (even by individuals

who were Cuban citizens at the time) against foreign investors who make use of expropriated

property seized by the Cuban government; and denies entry into the U.S. to such foreign

investors and their family members. Acting under a waiver provision in the law known as Title

III, Presidents Clinton and Bush have suspended implementation of the lawsuit measure at six-

month intervals.'

In anticipation of Pope John Paul's II visit to Cuba in January 1998, Clinton approved

licenses for religious groups and the media to use charter aircraft and a cruise ship to travel to the

6 Cuba Policy Foundation. "Lifting Cuba Travel Band Benefits Americas Farmers." 5 February, 2003.
htt \\ \\ llcubafoundation.org/CPF%20Travel-Ag%20 SuyRlaeCb-rvlA-320.tm

7 J.A. Sierra, J. "Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2."
htt un \\ historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl5bhm 30 April, 2005.









island. In 1998, the U.S. government also took steps to expedite the sales and donations of

medicines to Cuba, including the licensing of direct cargo flights. In January 1999, Clinton

expanded the categories and streamlined the issuance of licenses for those who seek to travel to

Cuba; allowed Americans to send up to $1200 per year in remittances to Cuba; broadened the

categories of groups to whom sale of food and medical products could be made; and authorized

direct charter passenger flights to Cuba from U.S. cities other than Miami. Charter flights then

departed from Los Angeles and New York bound for Havana and other Cuban cities.8

In the meantime, the U.S. Congress sharply diverged on U.S. Cuba policy. The 106th

Congress (1999-2000), passed legislation to both reduce and increase sanctions against Cuba.

The Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA), signed into law by President Clinton in October 2000,

allowed the export of food and medicine to Cuba, but prohibited any U.S. financing, either

public or private, of such exports. The legislation also codified the ban on travel to Cuba for

tourism, which throughout its history had been mandated only by Executive Order. In the first

session of the 107th Congress (2001), bills were again introduced to both ease and tighten the

embargo. Several key votes indicate growing support for ending the embargo. In July 2001, the

House of Representatives voted by overwhelming maj ority to end funding of enforcement of the

travel ban, and a December 2001 vote in the Senate indicated strong support for lifting

restrictions on the finance of sales of U. S. agricultural products to Cuba. 9 Described as the

harshest pro-embargo president, President George W. Bush demonstrates strong support for the

embargo. In May 2001, he announced that, "my administration will oppose any attempt to

weaken sanctions against Cuba's government." Later, in July, he reaffirmed his position and


"Cuba Policy Foundation. "Lifting Cuba Travel Band Benefits Americas Farmers." 5 February, 2003.
\li \n \\ cubafoundation.org/CPF%20Travel-Ag%20Stud/ees-uaTae-g00.4hm
9 Ibid.










announced that he would enhance and expand capabilities of the U. S. government to enforce the

embargo. In addition, he expanded people-to-people initiatives by increasing support for human

rights activists in Cuba and instructing the use of "all available means to overcome the jamming

of Radio and TV Marti". 10

With his brother, Jeb Bush, as Governor of Florida with Jeb's rather close alliance with the

hardline, right-winged Cuban American community in South Florida, and with the increasingly

hotly contested electoral constituency of South Florida, President Bush was true to his word. In

December 2003, he established a Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba that presented a

500-page report in May 2004, with some of the most severe recommendations for tightening the

embargo that was ever witnessed. The report proposed $45 million dollars to the budget for

"hastening change" in Cuba. The new provisions restrict family and academic travels,

remittances and parcel deliveries to Cuban relatives. Cuban Americans can only visit Cuba once

every three years for a maximum of 14 days with a special license. Before, they could have

visited once per year with a general license. Only "immediate family" mother, father, brother,

sister and grandparents can visit. Remittances are limited to $300 per Cuban household in a

three-month period, according to rules listed on the U. S. State Department' s website. 11The

money must be sent through State Department-certified institutions. Visitors can only spend $50

a day in Cuba as opposed to $164 before. Luggage is now limited to 44 pounds with no

overweight whereas overweight was allowed at a charge of $2 per extra pound previously. The


'o Ibid.

11 For the complete 2004 Report see Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs. "Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba." Washington D.C. 6 May 2004. http://www.cafc.gov/cafc/rpt/2004/67850.ht










new restrictions grant academic travelers permission for one year at a time for one semester.

Previously, permission was granted for two years at a time for varying durations. Academic

institutions wanting to send students or scholars to Cuba must obtain a license from the Treasury

Department' s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Under the tightening of regulations, licenses for

study in Cuba are now issued only for programs lasting a minimum of ten weeks. To participate,

students must be enrolled in a full-time degree program at the institution holding the license, and

only full-time tenured faculty members from the same institution may teach in such programs.

Before 2004, imports of Cuban goods such as cigars and coffee valued up to $100 were allowed.

Such imports from Cuba have now been banned altogether. 12

The second 93-page report of the Commission, issued in July 2006, attempted to

counteract perceptions that the first report was nothing but an "American occupation plan". 13

The latest recommendations included a budget of $80 million for the next two years to ensure a

"transition" rather than a "succession" of Cuban leadership. Claiming that the 2004 measures

restricting travel and curtailing remittances and parcel deliveries have had great success, the

2006 report called for their strengthened implementation. 14

Supporting the Cuban embargo are early Cuban exiles who have played a pivotal role in

maintaining this hostile policy to Cuba. These hardliners forged a well-organized and effective

interest group that lobbies Congress and the administration, contributes heavily to political

campaigns, and forms a key voting group in two states (Florida and New Jersey), critical to


12 Ibid.

13 Wayne Smith. Counterpunch. "Bushes New Cuba Plan." July 11, 2006.
httpl un\\ t.counterpunch.org/smith07 112006.html.
14 For the complete 2006 Report see U.S. Department of State. Washington D.C. July 2006. "Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .cafc .gov/cafc/rpt/2006/68097 .htm.









winning the Presidency. They have developed political power, and have exercised this power

effectively .

The story of these powerful, hardline, pro-embargo Cuban Americans; their role in

domestic politics; their influence on successive American administrations since the seventies;

and their success in shaping U.S. Cuba policy through the Cuban American National Foundation

(CANF), has been told and retold countless times (Molyneux in Bulmer Thomas and Dunkerly,

1999, Dominguez 1997, Roy 1997). It has dominated media and academic discourse to such an

extent that the alternative narrative of the anti-embargo movement has hardly been recounted.

This dissertation takes up the challenge of relating this story.

Curiosity, Contributions and Challenges

As a Caribbean student in the United States, the economic embargo on Cuba holds a

particular fascination for me. Since the seventies, when it resumed diplomatic relations with

Cuba, the Anglo-Caribbean has demonstrated widespread sympathy for the island. On arrival in

the United States, it was evident to me that, although the harsh embargo policy was alive and

kicking, relations between the two countries have never really stalled. Further probing revealed

that beneath the iceberg of the cold, hostile embargo policy of hardliners in the sunshine state,

there is significant thawing of the glacier. There exists the untold story of organizations scattered

throughout the U.S., vigorously working to change American Cuba policy. Preliminary research

uncovered more than a hundred organizations committed to repealing the embargo since 1969.

Yet no comprehensive study of these organizations could be found. Overcome with an

overwhelming curiosity to learn and understand more about these organizations, I was inundated

with a flood of questions. Who are these organizations? When were they formed? Where are they

located? Which are the most active? What are their goals? How are they structured? Who are

their leaders and members? Who funds them? How successful are they? What are their









similarities and differences? What are their aspirations and frustrations? What tactics and

strategies do they employ to achieve their goals? What is their relationship with each other and

with the state? What are their plans for a post-Castro Cuba?

These questions are subsumed by the overriding puzzle as to why have these organizations

persist in attempting to change this embargo policy, some for more than thirty years, even though

they have met with such limited success. This would become the central research question of my

proj ect. Since they relentlessly challenge the embargo policy, these groups are identified

collectively as the anti-embargo movement in the U.S.

A maj or challenge in this research was the quest for an appropriate theoretical model. The

grand contending paradigms of International Relations fail to provide an adequate framework for

this study. Moreover, traditional perspectives on the role of powerful, hardline Cuban exiles and

domestic politics on foreign policy have also proven inadequate. The problem emerges because

the subj ects are marginalized domestic organizations, which are not very successful in

influencing foreign policy outcomes. Scholars focusing on domestic actors generally tend to

underscore the role of affluent ethnic or business interests that have been successful in forging

policy. This is not surprising since their focus has been on the policy outcome itself rather than

on the organizations which attempt to shape it. Thus, it has become necessary to turn to

Comparative Politics to find an appropriate model to analyze these groups. In recognizing that

the behavior of most domestic groups is similar, irrespective of the type of policy they attempt to

change domestic or foreign a comparative theoretical framework seems most applicable.

Moreover, in as much as the groups operate at the margins of the political system and have

achieved limited success in changing policy, they collectively constitute what has come to be

popularly known as "social movements" in Comparative Politics. As such, social movements









theory provides the most appropriate framework for analyzing the anti-embargo movement in the

United States.

This dissertation takes up the challenge of analyzing this sorely neglected and unexplored

dimension of U. S. Cuba policy with the goal of presenting the first comprehensive study of the

anti-embargo movement in the United States. It diverges sharply from the traditional approach

which explores U. S. Cuba policy in the context of U. S. domestic politics and the role of

powerful, hardline, right-winged Cuban Americans in South Florida. The model employed is

also unique since U.S. Cuba policy has traditionally been analyzed as intermestic policy, from

the perspective of powerful ethnic interest groups and domestic politics. This project opens

avenues for bridging the Comparative Politics/International Relations divide within the discipline

of Political Science. It does this firstly, by employing social movements perspectives to analyze

groups attempting to influence foreign policy, and secondly, by introducing an exogenous or

systemic dynamic as a dimension of "political opportunity structures" discussed in chapter VI.

The chapters are therefore designed to recount this untold story of the anti-embargo movement,

first descriptively, then analytically.

Dissertation Structure

This Chapter, (chapter 1), presents an overview of the Cuban problematique including a

brief history of the U. S. embargo on Cuba. It also details the curiosity, contributions and

challenges of this dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on social movements theory

which is the perspective used to analyze the movement in subsequent chapters. It then outlines

the theoretical concerns addressed in the other chapters and the methodology employed to

investigate the organizations. Since there is no comprehensive academic study of any of the

groups under study, nor of the collective anti-embargo movement, and documented archival

material about them is virtually non-existent, the next three chapters provide a detailed overview









of the maj or organizations comprising the core of the anti-embargo movement. These chapters

are primarily descriptive reflecting a heavy reliance on information from the organizations'

websites and from unstructured and semi-structured interviews. The bulk of the primary

research undertaken in the field is reflected in these three chapters. Hence, chapter 3 recounts the

history of the organizations, their location, primary and underlying goals, their organizational

structure, funding sources and membership. Chapter 4 examines the strategies and tactics which

they have employed and the similarities and differences of these across groups. Chapter 5

undertakes an assessment of the interplay between contentious politics and the organizations'

challenge to the state in the post-Cold War era. This includes a traj ectory of their relationship

with specific American presidents and state policies and with the countermovement of hard-line

Cuban Americans based in South Florida. It also assesses their successes and failures, future

aspirations, frustrations and hopes for a post-Castro Cuba.

The three descriptive chapters inform the other two which aim to analyze the groups within

the framework of social movements theory geared toward unraveling the central research

question of why do the organizations persist in attempting to change U. S. policy despite such

limited success over time. Chapter 6 draws on the "resource mobilization" approach to assess

which model best explains the impulses prompting individuals to j oin the movement and what

sustains its continued operations. Chapter 7 explores perspectives on "political opportunity

structures" geared toward exploring the international, national and sub-national or local setting

facilitating the movement' s activism. The concluding Chapter 8, attempts a brief assessment of

the possible scenario in a post-Castro Cuba.









CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Limitations of International Relations Theory

The grand contending paradigms which characterize the field of International Relations

have failed to provide an adequate model for explaining the role of marginalized domestic

groups within the U.S. which seek to change American Cuba policy. This limitation becomes

glaring when the policy they attempt to repeal is clearly foreign policy, the study of which is a

maj or sub-field of International Relations. The study of foreign policy has been the subj ect of

much controversy following Kenneth Waltz's forceful claims that a "systemic (and neorealist)

theory of international politics is not and cannot be a theory of foreign policy, that it is an

"error...to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy (Waltz 1979:

121).

The limitations of the maj or paradigms of International Relations such as Waltz' s

neorealism for explaining the role of domestic actors in foreign policy are related to some of

their basic assumptions. One is that states are the primary, unitary, rational and purposive actors

in the international system. Another is that systemic forces such as the distribution of power and

anarchy determine how states assess other states before deciding on a foreign policy.

Neoliberalism takes the same systemic approach even though it recognizes the role of other

actors in the system such as international organizations and international regimes (Keohane and

Nye 1977, Krasner 1983).

During the sixties and seventies, there was no shortage of literature on the role of domestic

politics in the American foreign policy process (Roseneau 1967, Allison 1971, Gourevitch

1978). However Waltz' s (1979) ground-breaking study on structural realism emphasizing the

impact of systemic forces, served to drive domestic variables out of foreign policy analyses









during the eighties. The popularity and wave of criticisms of the "Democratic Peace" at the end

of the decade and beyond (Russet and Oneal, 2001, Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1996, Oren

1995, Layne 1994), led to a revival of academic interest on domestic factors. By the nineties,

another variation of realism had emerged in the form of "state-centered" or "postclassical

realism" as theories of foreign policy surged along with existing theories of international politics.

Neoclassical or postclassical realism deviates from Waltz's structural realism. It contends

that "there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign

policy behavior. Foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be

translated through intervening variables at the unit level.... Foreign policy choices are made by

"actual political leaders and elites, so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter" (Rose

1998: 147). Rose introduces the term "Innenpolitik" contending that internal factors such as

"political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socioeconomic

structure determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their borders" (Rose 1998).

Fareed Zakaria prefers the concept of "state-centered" realism which takes a similar view that

"statesmen not states are the primary actors in international affairs" (Zakaria 1998: 42).

These responses to Waltz's structural model provoked reaction from several scholars

spawning a burgeoning literary oeuvre on the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy

(Moravcsic 1997, Russett 1993, Snyder 1991, Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno 1988). Some

even attempt to reconcile a "systemic theory of international politics" and a "theory of foreign

policy" (Fearon 1998). Yet, the dichotomy identified by Waltz (1979) highlights the very

problems that arise in employing systemic theories to analyze the role of domestic actors in

foreign policy as in the U.S. Cuba context.










Recognizing that domestic politics is the driving force behind U.S. Cuba policy, the

traditional tendency has been to analyze this policy from the perspective of powerful ethnic

interest groups and domestic politics (Dominguez 1997, Haney et al. 1999, Haney 2005). Some

scholars have described it as "intermestic policy" underscoring the confluence of domestic and

international politics or as a two-level game (Putnam 1988, LeoGrande 1998, Brenner, Haney

and Vanderbush in Wittkopf and McCormick 2004).

However, even this traditional ethnic interest group and domestic politics approach does

not adequately capture the role of other domestic marginalized groups attempting to change and

reshape foreign policy but are not very successful. This is partly because the emphasis would

now shift from the actual foreign policy outcome to process the operations of the groups

attempting to shape it. Foreign policy theory tends to underscore the role of powerful business

and ethnic groups which succeed in persuading governments to formulate and implement policy

to suit their own group interest. It does not consider groups which have little or no influence on

policy outcome.

The field of Americans Government focusing on interest group theory also underscores the

role of groups which are influential in shaping "public" policy. Following the publication of

David Truman' s The Government Process (1951), four streams of political theories emerged

identified as the elitist, pluralist, rationalist and hyperpluralist, which underscore the influence of

both affluent and non-affluent groups in society. The 1950's became known as "the Golden Age

of Interest Group Theory" as Truman' s footsteps were quickly followed by others (Latham 1952,

Mills 1956, Shattschneider 1960). However, like foreign policy theory, they generally emphasize

groups which have some influence on public policy neglecting those which are unsuccessful and

those which focus on foreign policy. This may be due to their limited impact on foreign policy.









As Bernard Cohen contends, interest groups have less effect on foreign than on domestic policy

(in Ogene 1983: 5).

The academic lacunae will be partially filled by Comparative Politics with the migration of

protest movements from the periphery of society to the mainstream and the subsequent salience

of movement organizations to the political process. This has contributed significantly to the

expansion of academic studies on what is now popularly known as "social movements" (Jenkins

and Klandermans 1995; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). During the "Cycle of Contention" of the

1960's and 1970" social movements expanded in both visibility and purpose underscoring the

role of marginalized groups which are generally unsuccessful in shaping policy (Tarrow 1998).

Although social movements theory is generally employed for public policy analyses, it

serves as the most suitable framework for marginalized domestic groups attempting to shape

foreign policy. It can safely be assumed that the behavior of domestic groups would be similar

whether they are attempting to change public policy or foreign policy. As such, although we

draw on interest group theory where necessary, social movements theory provides the best model

for understanding the myriad of organizations within the U.S. attempting to change American

policy to Cuba.

The Conceptual Dilemma

The distinction between social movements and interest groups are at times indiscernible

presenting an unsolvable conceptual dilemma. Definitions of social movements are varied and

many and at times overlapping and confusing, at best. McCarthy and Zald (1977), define a social

movement "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for

changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society (McCarthy

and Zald 1977: 1217-18). For Charles Tilly (1984), a social movement consists of "a sustained

interaction between a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge









to those authorities" (Tilly 1984: 305). According to Ibarra (2002), social movements share some

performances with industrial conflict, electoral campaigns, and interest group politics.

Social movements were historically formed with a standard cluster of organized
performances, formation of associations, public meetings, demonstrations, marches,
petition drives, pamphleteering, lobbying, and display of symbols representing shared
commitment to a cause. They overlap in some of these functions with electoral campaigns,
interest-group agitation, and management-labor interaction" (Ibarra 2003: 23).

Sidney Tarrow (1994) initially made a clear distinction between social movements and

interest groups insisting that "social movements are not interest groups because they are not

formally organized, with well-defined leadership, goal hierarchies, and decision-making entities"

(Tarrow 1994: 15-16). However, the distinction is not clear-cut especially with the emergence of

the conceptualization of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) in the seventies. Charles Tilly

(1984), identifies SMOs as an essential part of any social movement which is "a sustained series

of interaction between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a

constituency lacking formal representation in the course of which those persons make publicly

visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands

with public demonstrations of support" (Tilly 1984: 306).

This raises the question of what is formal representation. In the United States, this is

accorded only to geographical areas at the federal level, to states and congressional districts.

Since all other constituencies lack formal representation, the definition would embrace all

interest groups which repeatedly and publicly demand change in the distribution and exercise of

power. This would include the minority party as well.

Recognizing the risk of being over-inclusive, McCarthy and Zald ask "Is a SMO an

interest group?" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). The response provides what has come to be

seen as the key distinction between social movements and SMOs, on the one hand, and other

forms of political organizations, on the other. Social movements operate at the margins of the










political system and SMOs are less institutionalized than interest group and have fewer routine

ties with government (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999: 6). Though other scholars focus on

different attributes of SMOs, they all emphasize their marginality which distinguishes them from

other political organizations. For Gamson (1990: 16), they represent constituencies not

previously mobilized, and for Tilly, they "speak on behalf of constituencies lacking formal

representation" (Tilly 1984: 306) or employ unconventional disruptive tactics (McAdam 1982:

25).

Definitions of interest groups tend to be broad and vague. For Wilson (1980), interest

groups are organizations "which have some autonomy from government or political parties and

that...try to influence public policy" (Wilson 1980: 8). Walker (1991) focuses on organizations

"that can reasonably be described as voluntary associations... seeking in one way or another to

petition the government on behalf of some organized interest or cause" (Walker (1991: 4).

However, these definitions can also encompass SMOs, making distinction difficult.

Tactics have been another criteria used to distinguish between interest groups and social

movements. Interest groups are often thought of as highly conventional and their members as

averse to disruptive behavior and confrontational tactics unlike social movements. This raises the

question as to what is disruptive behavior. For example, business threats to reduce or shift

investments spell the possibility of disrupting the economy (Lindblom 1977). Through repeated

court challenge, American interest groups often prevent the implementation of laws and

regulations for years.

Paul Burstein (1998) questions whether it is the non-institutional aspect of tactics that is

crucial but is not certain what noninstitutionall" means. He rejects the notion that it connotes

"not regulated by law" since much political activity not thought of as noninstitutionall" such as









"letter-writing campaigns, visiting legislators' offices, and placing political advertisements in

newspapers" (Burstein in Costain and McFarland 1998: 43) are considered interest group

activity. The level of orderliness and structure of the tactics has also been considered as a

distinguishing feature. Tilly (1984), contends that social movements' tactics are chosen from a

set of well-known and understood possibilities, sometimes planned and rehearsed. Burstein

concludes that "the tactics of SMOs often are orderly and predictable while those of "interest

groups" often are arguably non-institutionalized and are intended to be disruptive" (Burstein in

Costain and McFarland 1998: 43). This contradicts Tarrow's (1994) definition described above.

In their path-breaking article on social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1977), attempt to

make a dubious distinction between social movement organizations (SMOs) and interest groups.

Though they affirmed that social movements are not interest groups (in a footnote), they

admitted that they themselves are "not fully satisfied" with the answer. They considered the view

that interest groups are more institutionalized than SMOs and not just in terms of tactics.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) relies on Lowi's formulation that "a SMO which becomes highly

institutionalized and routinizes stable ties with a government agency is an interest group"

(McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). For Wilson (1990), "a social movement may or may not

become an interest group depending on whether or not it develops the appropriate degree of

institutionalization (Wilson 1990: 9). However, there is no consensus on how institutionalized an

organization should be to qualify as an interest group. Paul Burstein (1998), asserts that

I am not aware of anyone having provided a theoretical rationale for dividing a continuum
of institutionalization at one place- interest groups on one side, social movement
organizations on the other rather than another. It would be very difficult to do so in any
case, since institutionalization itself is not defined with any precision; indeed, often is not
defined at all (Burstein in Costain and McFarland 1998: 43-44).

Burstein identifies a study by Heinz et al (1993) and Walker (1991), which attempted to

identify interest groups by drawing from lists of organizations identified by publishers as trying









to influence federal policy. The list was supplemented by screening media reports of

organizational activity and by interviewing government officials. Though this approach does not

distinguish between interest groups and SMO's, it distinguishes amongst groups solely on the

basis of visibility rather than goals, membership, tactics or level of institutionalization. If a

conventionally defined social movement had entered their sample and had achieved the required

level of visibility, it would be labeled an interest group (Burstein in Costain and McFarland

1998: 43-44).

The difficulties of distinguishing between social movements and interest groups have led

some leading social movement theorists to abandon their earlier criterion of distinction.

McAdam (1982) no longer views tactics as a distinguishing criteria and together with Tarrow

and Tilly (1996), have subsequently claimed that groups choose what tactics to use by

considering how best to use the resources they have to deal with the opportunities and constraints

they face in any particular situation. Hence they affirm:

There are no inherently social-movement oriented actors or groups. The same groups that
pour into the streets and mount the barricades may be found in lobbies, newspapers offices,
and political party branches ...these various types of activities may be combined in the
repertoire of the same group and may even be employed simultaneously."... there is no
fundamental discontinuity between social movements and institutional politics...
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996: 27).

This intensifies the dilemma of what exactly is the difference between social movements

and interest groups if there is no "fundamental discontinuity". We may attempt a distinction by

focusing on degree of influence. Social movements tend to have limited success in influencing

policy. Traditional interest groups boast of powerful constituents, with interests strategically

placed in a number of key congressional districts and abundant economic resources to invest in

lobbying such as the right-wing Cuban-American organization and the Jewish-American lobby.

Social movements on the other hand, are seen as efforts by "excluded groups to mobilize









sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through non-institutionalized means"

(McAdam 1982: 37).

Anne Costain (1992), categorizes the Black civil rights groups of the sixties as both social

movements and interest groups. As social movements, they engaged in boycotts of segregated

transportation systems, sit-ins at white lunch counters in the South, mass marches and freedom

rise to draw public attention and support for their cause. But in addition to these

noninstitutionalized actions, these civil rights groups were also involved in activities which

interest group literature emphasize. They were involved in voter registration drives, court

challenges and legislative lobbying in their efforts to change public policy. Costain (1992)

attempts to bridge the gap between social movements and interest group theory in her study of

the women's movement with the provocative title "Social Movements as Interest Groups: The

Case of the Women' s Movement". She develops two data sets, one tracing congressional action

on legislation addressing women as an interest group; the other showing up the movement's

activities as a social movement assessing the degree of agitation on behalf of women' s rights in

the United States based on New York Times coverage (Costain in Petracca 1992: 285-307).

We conclude that both social movements and interest groups are representative

intermediaries between the citizens and the state. What seems to emerge here is a kind of hybrid

between interest groups and social movements. In as much as we are not dealing with a single

organization but with a network of different actors, our subject is a social movement. Its

identification as a social movement is reinforced by the fact that this collective operates at "the

margins of the political system and has fewer routine ties with government" (McCarthy and Zald

1977: 1218). In as much as the organizations of this collective are groups of "outsiders" who

seem powerless and tend to resort to desperate measures to win even recognition, much less









substantial concessions from the powers that be, they constitute a social movement. In as much

as they are often not very successful in achieving their goals, they are also social movements.

At the same time, the interest group characteristics of the organizations that constitute the

social movement should not be neglected. In as much as they want change and challenge the

powerbrokers for policy reform, they are interest groups. Moreover, in as much as some clamor

for change for the public good and others seek change for themselves, they can be identified as

public interest groups and self-oriented interest groups respectively (Hrebenar 1997: 11-12).

Also, in as much as they demonstrate strong institutional structures, they are interest groups

(Tarrow 1994). Finally, in as much as they interact with Congress and lobby for their cause with

which business interest at least have attained some success, they are also interest groups.

We recognize the conceptual dilemma inherent in the proj ect and opt to use the concept of

"social movement" as a network of interactions of "interest groups" which we define here as

"organized, institutionalized groups with well-defined goals and organizational structure whose

members share specific normative beliefs which guide their primary goal of changing policy".

We launch our analysis from the level of both the individual interest group and the collective

social movement. However, social movement theory presents the dominant framework for this

proj ect. It seems a more appropriate model for this network of domestic actors which has

consistently failed to influence U.S. Cuba policy, has few routine ties with government, has not

received wide-scale media attention and remains at the periphery of the U. S. political system

despite decades of continuously attempting to effect change.

Theories of Social Movements

Various approaches to analyzing social movements have been advanced. Currently there

are four dominant perspectives some of which are relevant to this study. They include the

classical approach on collective behavior; theories of resource mobilization which embraces









Mancur Olson's (1965) rational choice model; perspectives on political process focusing on

expanding political opportunities; and the New Social Movement perspectives which include

analyses on framing.

The classical models (Kornhauser 1959, Smelser 1962, Turner and Killian 1962, Ted Gurr

1970 and Davies 1979), emphasize collective individual behavior as disruptive leading to

revolution, mass rebellion, violent upheavals and aggressive action. They ignored the process by

which such individual feelings at the micro level resulted in such macro phenomenon as mass

rebellion or revolution, and are generally not applicable to this study. Resource mobilization and

expanding political opportunities provide the basic framework for this proj ect. The New Social

Movements perspective addressing framing as a mobilization tactic is also applicable and will be

absorbed in the resource mobilization discourse.

Resource Mobilization Perspectives

Between the 1960s and 1970s, a new generation of sociologists emerged preoccupied with

the issues of the times which included civil rights, decolonization and peace. The intellectual

currents and societal attitudes created an atmosphere of legitimacy for social movements. The

emphasis shifted from the individual unit of analysis to social structures and macro processes.

Structure became a key concept in social movement analysis with new theories challenging the

classical collective behavior approaches. The argument was made that social movements should

not be subsumed under collective behavior since they were different enough to warrant their own

mode of analysis. Rather than irrational individuals, social movements were seen as exhibiting

enduring, patterned and institutionalized elements. Moreover, these patterns were as rational as

those who study them. It was then that the link between social movements and interest groups

were established since the latter emphasized the political rather than the psychological and the

notion of social movements organizations (SMOs) emerged with increasing emphasis on









institutionalization and structure. The actions of social movements are conceptualized as rooted

in the collective understanding of group interests. These actions were seen as taking place within

structures that limit but do not completely or mechanically determine them. The theoretical

strands that constituted these challenges came to be known as "resource mobilization theory".

The central premise of the traditional resource mobilization theory is that the emergence

and persistence of social movement activity is contingent upon the availability of resources that

can be channeled into movement mobilization and activity (Edwards and McCarthy 2004,

McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988, McCarthy and Zald 1977). The availability, aggregation

and deployment of resources are regarded as amongst the most crucial factors determining

movement emergence. McCarthy and Zald (1977) contends that not only is the absolute and

relative amount of resources available to social movements contingent on the amount of

discretionary resources of mass and elite publics, but the greater the amount of resources

available to the social movement sector within a society, the greater the likelihood that new

social movement organizations and social movement industries will emerge (McCarthy and Zald

1977: 1224-25). Thus, McCarthy and Zald (1977) propose a "market managerial" economic

model which operates as "business firms" or "movement industries", with "movement sectors"

and "movement entrepreneurs" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1230). The members act as

consumers who make individual consumer choices based on costs and benefits and "selective

incentives" based on individual interests and preferences. Movement leaders act as managers,

selling a product in competition with other interest groups.

The movement's capacity to mobilize depends upon both material and non-material

resources. The former constitute work, money, concrete benefits and services. The latter include

authority, moral engagement, faith and friendship. A rational calculation is undertaken through









which these resources are distributed across multiple obj ectives. The level of mobilization

depends on the ability of the social movement to "organize discontent, reduce the costs of action,

utilize and create solidarity, share incentives among members and achieve external consensus.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) include several other dimensions in their (partial) resource

mobilization theory. In contrast to the traditional classical model which relies on an aggrieved

population for the necessary resources and labor, resource mobilization theory contends that

social movements may or may not be based on the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries.

Individuals, organizations and constituents may be a prime source of support while supporters

who actually provide money, facilities, and even labor, may have little or no commitment to the

values or norms that guide specific movements.

One of the principal elements of the resource mobilization perspective is the adoption of

the problems of Mancur Olson' s (1965) rational choice model in the Logic of Collective Action.

Della Porta and Diani (2004) affirm that "one of the most important innovations of the resource

mobilization approach is the definition of social movements as conscious actors making rational

choices". Olson's logic is if such movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will bear

the cost of working for them on their own. Applying the theory to interest groups, Olson flatly

discounts the core pluralist belief that interest groups arise on the basis of common interests,

demonstrating that "if the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal

welfare, they will not act to advance their common good or group obj ectives unless there is

coercion to force them to do so or, unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement

of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the

condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group

objectives" (Olson 1965: 2). Olson's rational modeling approach is characteristically an









economic mode of analysis and argues that political goals will not be sufficient to induce

members to support interest group or social movement activity. Hence, the problem of free-

riding will arise. What actually facilitate the group formation are not collective goods but

"selective incentives". Thus, according to Olson, a truly "rational man" in an economic sense

would not j oin an interest group unless some very specific conditions were present. Firstly, the

organization should be small enough so that the addition of one or more member will

appreciably increase the group's power. Secondly, the benefits are available to members and are

of equal or greater value than the dues or other costs paid by a member. Thirdly, the individual is

a powerful person and his contribution or addition to any organization would make a difference

in the group's power. Fourthly, the organization employs coercion (Olson 1965).

Olson's basic arguments are consistent in many respects with the exchange theory

proposed by Salisbury (1969/1970). Like Olson, Salisbury explicitly rej ected Truman' s (195 1)

pluralist views that interest groups naturally arise out of the interaction of people with common

interests responding to societal disruptions. The formation of an interest group was extremely

problematic for both writers. It called for someone to be willing to bear the costs of organizing

such groups by locating members, organizing meetings and convincing them to contribute time

and money to the new group. Salisbury (/1969/1970) did not emphasize free-riding as much as

Olson but started with the premise that most individuals are concerned with their own self-

interest and would be reluctant to contribute much to provide a collective good.

Salisbury's (1969/1970) exchange theory is an expansion of Olson' s in his assertion that

individual entrepreneurs tend to be willing to bear the initial organizational costs not for

collective benefits but for a staff job with the new organization. In this way, he accounted for

consumer, farm, labor and environmental groups unaccounted for by Olson. Though he









acknowledged that organizations of some purposive interest groups might be skilled at

articulating some common interest, Salisbury insisted that group organizations were small-

business entrepreneurs offering benefits for the price of membership in order to finance their jobs

(Salisbury 1969: 11-13, 17-18, 25). Thus, according to Salisbury, most group activity has little to

do with efforts to affect public policy decision but is concerned rather with "the internal

exchange of benefits by which the group is organized and sustained" (Salisbury 1969: 20). These

benefits can be selective material, solidary, or expressive but selective material predominates in

most organizations. Salisbury's theory was supported by research undertaken of eighty-three

national public interest groups by Jeffrey Berry (1977, 1978). Berry found that a maj ority of

fifty-five groups were explained by exchange theory (Berry 1977: 24, 1978).

The Olson and Salisbury models seem more appropriate to explain economic interest

groups. However, the view of the individual as exceedingly self-interested and group leaders as

preoccupied with running a viable business does not explain the operations of non-economic or

public interest groups. Even some of those in Berry's study such as Ralph Nader, John Gardner

of Common Cause and Cleaveland Amory of the Fund for Animals do not seem to quite fit the

image of a salesperson seeking a staff job. Rather, they seem deeply committed to their cause

(Petracca 1992: 107).

Another facet of resource mobilization theory is tactics. In classical approaches, social

movement leaders employ bargaining, persuasion or violence to influence authorities to change.

The choice of tactics depended upon previous history of relations with authorities, the relative

success of previous encounters and ideology. Resource mobilization theory is also concerned

with the interaction between movements and authorities but acknowledges a number of other

strategic tasks such as "mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite









publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). The

choice of tactics may present a dilemma since what one tactic achieves may conflict with

behavior aimed at achieving another. Interorganizational competition and cooperation also

influence tactics. According to Della Porta and Diani (2004c), the type and nature of the

resources available explain the tactical choices made by movements and the consequences of

collective action on the social and political action" (Della Porta and Diani 2004c: 8).

The New Social Movements approach also treats with some relevant strategic and tactical

repertoires. Framing is one of the most widely discussed tactics of this school. There has been

growing consensus since the mid-1980's amongst social movement scholars that social

movements and social change cannot be fully explained by structural models. Drawing from

social psychology, several social movements scholars called for attention to be paid to cognitive

and ideational factors such as interpretation, symbolization, and meaning (Cohen 1985; Ferree

and Miller 1985; Gamson, Fireman and Rytina 1982; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1989). The

notion of strategic framing of grievances has been particularly influential (Snow and Benford

1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986). This approach redirected attention to subjective aspects in the

analysis of social movements. In this perspective, grievances are perceived to be interpreted in

different ways by individuals and social movement organizations. The concept of framing is

especially useful because it facilitates an empirical examination of the process by which a given

obj ective situation is defined and experienced (Johnston and Noakes 2005: 70). According to

Snow and Benford (1992), framing denotes "an active process derived phenomenon that implies

agency and contention at the level of reality contention" (Snow and Benford 1992: 136). They

continue that "mobilization therefore depends not only on the availability and deployment of

tangible resources, the opening or closing of political opportunities, or a favorable cost-benefit









calculus, but also on the way these variables are framed, and the degree to which they resonate

with targets of mobilization" (Snow and Benford 1988: 213). Snow and Benford (1988) identify

three types of framing as necessary for successful recruitment. The first is diagnostic in which a

movement convinces potential converts that a problem needs to be addressed; the second is

prognostic in which the movement convinces converts of appropriate strategies, tactics and

targets. The third is motivational in which movements exhort converts to get involved in these

activities (Snow and Benford 1988).

Also deviating from the traditional structural focus, Marc Steinberg (1998), cogently

argues a case for the role of discourse in the framing process. He contends that "repertoires are

not ideational elements carried about in individual's heads, but are fundamentally collective

diagnoses of injustice and prognoses for change. They are the products of speech communication

between actors (both individual and collective) that are produced, sustained, and transformed in

the course of contention" (Steinberg 1998: 857). Introducing the notion of "multivocality" in his

dialogical model of framing, he explains how a social movement consisting of various groups

can assume a homogenous voice facilitating the mobilization process. Thus, he asserts that "the

multivocality of discourse could facilitate the mobilization of heterogeneous groups to the extent

that it permits multiple and even divergent productions of meanings through a discursive

repertoire. The multi-voiced word in this sense can allow for a misrecognition of heterogeneity

as unity, as groups with potentially divergent interests and identities articulate through what they

perceive as shared claims and understandings" (Steinberg 1998: 860). Steinberg continues that

this tactic is frequently used in mobilizing grassroots and local actions in building a discursive

repertoire and in the production of meanings within a repertoire. However, for mobilizing wider










populations to build ties and networks, tactics of mass communication is more effective

(Steinberg 1998: 860).

The use of frames as a conscious "tactic" has been explored by McAdam (1996). For him,

tactics are consciously designed to frame action, attract media attention, shape public opinion in

favorable ways to the movement, and signify the degree of threat embodied in the movement and

its ability to disrupt public order (McAdam 1996: 348). Employing the sophisticated

conceptualization of "strategic dramaturgy", McAdam (1996) describes those framing efforts

that consider the messages and symbols encoded in movement actions and demands. For him,

one strategy that movements employ is the staging of actions with the obj ective of framing

situations in a manner that appeals to the public. He affirms that since movement have moral and

cultural dimensions that involve insurgents' and publics' consciousness, beliefs and practices,

the notion of strategic dramaturgy facilitates a moving away from the cognitive bias of framing

and considers that movement often invoke values and basic moral principles to frame grievances

and legitimate action.

This dimension of strategic framing is directly linked to emotions, a somewhat ignored

aspect of framing. Emotions are important for their mediating role in the communication and

interpretation between movements and their publics (Benford 1997). Because contemporary

social movement theory reacted to the "disruptive" behavior of the "maddening crowd", of the

sixties and seventies, attempts to emphasize the "rationality" of moves and goals, the role of

emotions was not given salience until the New Social Movements approaches emerged.

However, in this perspective, emotions are not seen as blind, irrational reactions. Johnston and

Noakes (2005), contend that emotions "do not prevent us from seeing the world obj ectively, nor

are they necessarily in conflict with cool reason and logic (Johnson and Noakes 2005: 72).









Flam (1990a, 1990b) contends that emotions are important to the growth and unfolding of

social movements and political protests (In Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). Potential

members experience "moral shock", which is the first step toward recruitment into social

movements. It arises when an unprecedented event or piece of information provokes such an

outrage in an individual that he/she becomes inclined toward political action whether or not

he/she has acquaintances in that movement or not (Luker 1984, Jasper and Poulsen 1995, Jasper

1997 in Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). One aspect of emotions as they relate to the actions

of social movements that have been explored in the literature is that of "injustice frames".

Gamson (1992) identifies injustice frames as "a way of viewing a situation or condition that

expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice and which identifies those

blameworthy people responsible for it" (Gamson 1992: 32). This moral compulsion to respond to

injustice, albeit framed, may be explained by Emergent Norm Theory (ENT). According to ENT,

the sense of injustice is heightened by an event or a perceived crisis such as the end of the Cold

War when the perception of Cuba as a security threat is reduced but the embargo continues to be

tightened. This is elaborated upon in chapter 6.

In response to the rational model, other studies emphasize forms of organization and

mobilization of resources such as moral engagement (Tillock and Morrison 1979). Fireman and

Gamson (in Zald and McCarthy 1979), argue for an alternative approach to mobilization

critiquing Olson's utilitarian, self-interested, rational model by emphasizing the role of

solidarity, principle and solidary groups. They define solidarity as "rooted in the configuration of

relationships linking the members of a group to one another" (Fireman and Gamson in Zald and

McCarthy 1979: 21). They contend that these relationships may foster common identity, shared

faith and general commitment to defend the group (not the cause). Accordingly, a person's









solidarity with a group is based on five factors: friends and relatives, participation in

organizations, design for living, subordinate and superordinate relations, and no exit. A lack of

solidarity will result in failed mobilization efforts (Fireman and Gamson in Zald and McCarthy

1979: 22).

Social movement scholars are now forging a link between resource mobilization and social

capital. Connections, knowledge, time, skill and expertise are crucial to a movement' s ability to

survive. Social capital approaches offer a relatively new perspective for understanding resource

mobilization through its focus on social relationships as resources that can facilitate access to

other resources (Bebbington 2002). Viewed as a sociological construct rooted in social theory,

social capital defined as "the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to

possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual

acquaintance and recognition--or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each

of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them

to credit, in the various senses of the word" (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249). Robert Putnam (1993),

drawing from the ideas of Tocqueville, perceives social capital as a community marked by

active participation in public affairs through activities which are virtuous a steady recognition

and pursuit of the public good at the expense of all purely individual and private ends." Self-

interest is not totally absent but it is self-interest properly understood, i.e self-interest defined in

the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is "enlightened" rather than "myopic", self-

interest that is alive to the interest of others. For Putnam (1993), citizenships entail equal rights

and obligations for all, a community bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and

cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority, exploitation and dependency. The citizens of

the civic community are helpful, respectful and trustful towards each other. Indeed,









"interpersonal trust" is probably the moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the

people if republican society is to be maintained. The values of this civic community are

embodied in, and reinforced by distinctive social structures and practices (Putnam 1993).

The idea of solidary and purposive or public interests groups like the women's,

environmental or civil rights organization is taken up by Terry Moe (1980) in a scathing attack of

the rational model. Moe (1980) contends that psychological benefits are the prime incentives for

group membership. These psychological benefits assume different forms such as the pursuit of

ideological obj ectives, the desire to make a difference in the political process, a strong sense of

political efficacy, the satisfaction of a personal feeling of obligation, and the need to obtain

political information (Moe 1980: 113-144). The importance of political motivations is supported

by Hansen (1977) who investigated the decisions of members to j oin the American Farm

Federation, the National Association of Farm Builders, and the League of Women Voters.

Hansen concluded that political motivations do matter, especially when the group is threatened

(Hansen 1977: 24, 1978).

The rewards or benefits criteria advanced by Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961), have

been later adopted by virtually all interest group scholars. They identify three types of benefits

which can accrue to an individual. The first is material which includes tangible rewards which

can usually be translated into monetary terms. The second is solidary, which are social rewards

that derive from associating in group activities. The third is purposive which are rewards

associated with ideological or issue-oriented goals that offer no significant tangible or benefits to

members (Petracca 1992: 102). The latter two are considered non-material incentives.

Mark Petracca (1992) forges a nexus between non-economic benefits and what he calls

"commitment theory" which argues that "the high degree of time, energy, and resources needed









to be involved in group activities stems from "beliefs about good policy" (Sabatier and

McLaughlin 1990). Critical to participation are expected collective benefits arising from a

group's political activities. The benefits may be material or ideological/purposive, or both. Thus,

even if goals were initially self-interested, such behavior typically becomes intertwined with

congruent conceptions of improving social welfare, either out of self-respect or concerns of

political efficacy (Tesser 1978; Margolis 1982: 100). Material self-interest may have created the

initial incentives to j oin an interest group, then to become leaders. However, this benefit has to

be quite large and must be buttressed by ideological/purposive incentives for individuals to be

sufficiently committed to j oin, then become leaders, to encourage others to j oin and stay in the

organization (Sabbatier and McCubin 1990 in Petracca 1992: 109-110).

Such purposive incentives may be the promotion and preservation of what has come to be

know as "norms" in both the domestic and international arenas. Unlike economic incentives

which imply material rewards, norms are more closely identified with "social rewards" or

"psychological benefits" as espoused by Moe (1980). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define

norms as "standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity". They continue that

"norms by nature embody a quality of "oughtness" and shared moral assessment, norms prompt

justification for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can

study" (Finnnmore and Sikkink 1998: 892). In attempting to explain the origins of norms, they

allude to the "logic of appropriateness" which relates to the emergence of new norms which

compete with existing norms for "appropriateness". Referring to activists in the women's

suffrage movement as "norm entrepreneurs", they affirm that "suffragettes chained themselves to

fences, went on hunger strikes, broke windows of government buildings and refused to pay taxes

as ways of protesting their exclusion from political participation. More relevant to this study,









however, is their explanation of what motivates norm entrepreneurs (activists). They insist that

"it is very difficult to explain the motivations of norm entrepreneurs without reference to

empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898) In their

1998 text, they describe activists as "enactors", "people who seek to amplify the generative

power of norms, broaden the scope of practices these norms engender, and sometimes even

renegotiate or transform the norms themselves" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35).

Although the anti-embargo groups do not quite conform to Keck and Sikkink' s notion of

"transnational advocacy networks" since they are not exactly "actors working internationally on

an issue who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of

information and services" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 89, italics, mine), their motivations are

similar. Like transnational advocacy networks they also seek to persuade, pressure and gain

leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. We agree with Keck and

Sikkink (1998), that "they are not always successful in their efforts, but they are increasingly

relevant players in policy debates" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2).

The Political Process Model and Political Opportunity Structures

The resource mobilization perspective neglects the important political dynamic which

propels contentious action. This limitation is addressed in the political process model. The

critical element of this model is the role of expanding political opportunities within the broader

social and political environment in stimulating the rise of social movements. This "enabling

environment" gave rise to the notion of"political opportunity structure" which was first

introduced by Eisinger (1973) and elaborated by Tarrow (1983, 1989b). Tarrow (1983, 1989b)

perceives the concept as three dimensional: the degree of openness or closure of formal political

access; the degree of stability or instability of political alignments; and the availability and

strategic posture of potential alliance partners (Tarrow 1983: 28). Later, he adds a fourth









element: political conflicts within and among elites (Tarrow 1989b: 35). Kriesi (in Jenkins and

Klandermans 1995) specifies these fundamental premises of Tarrow' s model indicating that the

political opportunity structure is not constant since it may shift over time due to factors beyond

the control of the actors involved. Since actors cannot anticipate such shifts when they decide to

engage in collective action, they take the political opportunity structure as a given at the time of

engagement making it independent of their purposive action (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans

1995: 167-197).

The link between social movements/revolutions and institutionalized politics was made by

several political process theorists including Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and

Sidney Tarrow (1983). These analyses are not confined to opportunity structures alone but also

include constraints. The myriad of empirical work inspired by the political process model has

stimulated a growing awareness amongst social movement scholars of the range of collective

settings in which movements emerge and the organizational forms to which they gave rise.

Commenting on the political process model, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996)

observes that Tilly (1978) and some of his colleagues examined the role of several grassroots

settings work and neighborhood which facilitate the structuring of collective action. They

note that other scholars took up the challenge offered by Tilly (1978), applying his insights to

more contemporary movements. Aldon Morris (1981, 1984) and Doug McAdam(1982),

analyzed the role of local Black institutions particularly churches and colleges, in the emergence

of the American Civil Rights Movement. Sara Evans (1980), investigated the Women' s

Liberation Movement, locating it within informal friendship networks which were forged by

women who were active in the Civil Rights Movement and in the American New Left. The

political process model focusing on informal, grassroots mobilizing structures has attracted the









attention of several scholars in more recent network studies of movement recruitment (Gould,

1991; Kriesi 1988; McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-

Olson 1980 in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 2004c: 4).

McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (2004c), insist that changes in the structures of political

opportunities can contribute to shifting fortunes of social movements. With reference to the

decline of the American Civil Rights Movement, they cited the "redemocratization of voting

rights in the South, the development of significant Republican strength in the region, and

President Nixon' s recognition and exploitation of this development in his successful 1968

campaign" as significant changes impacting on the movement' s decline. Nixon' s "Southern

strategy" dealt a severe blow to the Black struggle by illustrating the irrelevance of the Black

vote to the political success of the Republican Party. Subsequently, the Movement had little

relevance on Nixon and his Republican successors (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 2004c: 12).

Kreisi (in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995) also perceives three broad sets of properties of

a political system which he identifies as "its informal institutional structure, its informal

procedures and prevailing strategies with regards to challengers, and the configuration of power

relevant for the confrontation with the challengers" (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995:

169). An interesting dynamic is brought into the debate by Kriesi's inclusion of the

configurations of power in the system which together with the general setting for the

mobilization of collective action, can specify the authorities' strategies and those of the members

of the system. These strategies will determine the degree of facilitation or repression by the

members of the system which the challengers would face. It will also determine the possibility of

success of the challengers actions and the possibility of success in the absence of such actions.

This possibility will be high if the government is reform-oriented or low if the government in









power is hostile to the movement (Koopmans 1990a) (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995:

167-197).

According to McAdam (in McAdam in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 23-40), a

"window of opportunity" may be brought on by a political upheaval prompting a "cycle of

protest" as described by Tarrow (1993). In his discussion of political opportunity structures, Tilly

(1978) did not specifically mention a structural change in the international system. We contend

that systemic events can trigger a "wave of protest" of the type Tarrow (1993) alludes to. Tarrow

asserts that "protest cycles are often touched off by unpredictable events...they are crucibles

within which new weapons of social protests are fashioned" (Tarrow 1993: 285- 286). He also

links cycles of protest and social movement organizations asserting that "a maj or reason for the

acceleration in the appearance of protest cycles in the past 150 years is the invention of these

organized actors with their stake in contentious collective action" (Tarrow 1993: 286).

Finally, for some time now, attention has been paid to the role of the state in collective

action. Several scholars have been arguing that type of state, type of government and specific

state policies can either facilitate or constrain contentious activities (Kreisi 1995, Kreisi et al

1995, Goodwin 1995, Jenkins 1995; Amenta and Young 1999). Embedded in this discourse are

contending debates on the impact of federalism versus centralism and democracy versus

authoritarianism (Marshall 1963; Bright and Harper 1984; Lipsky and Olson 1976; Tarrow 1994,

1998). These have complimented studies on facilitators (Tarrow 1998) and constrainers such as

countermovements and power configurations at the national and societal levels (Schwartz 1976;

Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).









The Anti-Embargo Movement and U.S./Cuba Policy: A Framework for Analysis

Hypothesis

The central research puzzle we are attempting to unravel is why do the anti-enabargo

movement persists in attempting to change U.S. Cuba policy given its repeated lack ofsuccess?

In response to this question we develop two maj or hypotheses. The first is that the movement' s

sustained activism is not based on rational self-interest but on non-material, collective incentives

such as commitment, psychological benefits and normative values that hinge upon notions of

right and wrong. The second is that international, national and sub-national forces have

facilitated the movement resulting in increased and sustained anti-embargo activism in the post-

Cold War era. A social movement theoretical framework incorporating facets of the resource

mobilization approach and political opportunity structures will be employed to analyze the

persistence of the movement and to explain its continued activism in the post-Cold War era.

In this regard, we address a number of concerns. Is there a supply and willingness of

foundations to sponsor anti-embargo organizations which have facilitated their activities over

time? Is anti-embargo activism driven by the availability of resources and selective material

incentives or are challengers also guided by non-material collective incentives? Has the

innovative framing of grievances heightened public awareness and attracted new members to the

movement? If the movement is employing new frames in its tactical repertoire due to innovations

in information technology, are they resonating sufficiently with targets of mobilization to spur

increasing and continued activism as Snow and Bendford (1988) suggest? Have political

opportunities structures spawned anti-embargo activities in the nineties and beyond? Is the post-

Cold War era punctuated by specific events in the international, national and sub-national

settings which precipitate a "wave of protests" against U.S. Cuba policy?









Mobilizing Resources

In chapter 6, we examine the validity of the rational model to contribute to understanding

the ability of the anti-embargo movement to persist despite its limited success over time. In

short, is the movement' s survival contingent upon the availability of material resources and do

they operate as "business firms" or "movement industries", with "movement sectors" and

"movement entrepreneurs" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1230)? Or are members guided to j oin and

stay in the movement by selective material incentives such as a staff job as affirmed by Salisbury

(1969)? Addressing the first question would entail an examination of the type of resources

available to the movement and determining whether these are limited to financial resources or

whether they also include human resources and strategies and tactics employed in the

mobilization process. The second question merits an investigation of the motivations driving

leaders, staff and members to j oin the movement and remain active.

The notion of solidarity networks as espoused by Fireman and Gamson (1979) will also be

useful for analyzing the movement' s networking practices. This analysis will be geared toward

understanding whether the networks can be considered part of the movement' s stock of material

resources and the ease or difficulty of co-opting them. How relevant is Freeman' s (1973)

assertion that co-option of pre-existing networks facilitate the operations of new groups? This

chapter will also embrace the burgeoning literature on social capital introduced by Pierre

Bordieu (1984), popularized by Robert Putnam (2000) and adopted by some social movement

scholars. Here, we hope to determine whether the network connections (Bordieu 1986),

effectively mobilized by the anti-embargo movement through associationalism in pursuit of a

common goal (Oberschall 1973, Gamson 1975, Tilly 1978, Skocpol 1992), contribute to its

continued activism. We also explore the extent to which the groups cooperate to jointly air their

grievance and the role that trust plays in their operations.









The second major concern to be addressed in chapter 6 is the extent to which the rational

model's focus on the availability of material resources suffices to explain the survival of the anti-

embargo movement or whether this approach can be complemented with other theoretical

perspectives from the interest group literature. In this vein, we conj ecture whether the movement

has been able to persist merely because of the availability of material resources or because of

other non-material factors. Is the movement' s persistence attributable to a deep and abiding

commitment to the cause and "belief about good policy" (Petracca 1992), "values other than

economic-self interest", moral incentives and "psychological benefits" (Moe 1980) or that of

"solidary and purposive benefits" (Clark and Wilson (1961) empathy, altruism and ideational

commitment (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 898)?

The Enabling Environment

The limitations of the resource mobilization perspective in its neglect of the polity and the

state necessitate a complementary model which accommodates the political dynamic. A maj or

concern of Chapter 7 is whether the "enabling environment" or "political opportunity structures"

are indeed relevant to the existence and sustenance of anti-embargo organizations and activism.

McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (2004c) suggest that changes in the structure of political

opportunities could impact on the fortunes of the anti-embargo movement. We hope to extend

this "expanding opportunities" model by utilizing a kind of Waltzian approach to analyze the

anti-embargo movement. Three levels of analysis will be employed to determine whether there

has been an increase both in anti-embargo organizations and in their activism over time. We

identify these levels as systemic, national and sub-national.

Firstly, we examine structural forces like the end of the Cold War in 1989; the special

period endured by Cubans and Castro' s liberal reforms of the mid-nineties; and the papal visit to

Cuba in 1998. This analysis constitutes a maj or academic contribution of this work since the









"enabling environment" in social movements theory has traditionally been the domestic context.

Secondly, we assess the national setting including the type of government and specific state

policies. Thirdly, we review the societal impetus such as shifting dynamics within the

countermovement comprised of powerful right-wing extremist exiles in Miami represented by

the Cuban American National Foundation and state officials. The Elian Gonzalez affair and the

rise of moderate pro-engagement factions within the Cuban American community will also be

examined as local impulses propelling anti-embargo activism. Kriesi's (in Jenkins and

Klandermans 1995) perspective on the "configuration of power relevant for the confrontation"

will be utilized to explore this local or societal setting and the power structure which challengers

confront in South Florida because of the authorities' alliance with pro-embargo activists. A

significant question to be addressed here is whether this configuration of power or

countermovement which emerges due to the authorities' alliance with exile hardliners, hinders or

spawns anti-embargo activism.

Methodology

Diversity characterizes the research tools of this dissertation. They ranges from content

analysis of maj or American newspapers to archival research on onfcial documents, books,

journals, newspapers, magazines and websites to unstructured and semi-structured elite

interviews with scholars, group leaders and staff members and congressional staff. The

information collected for this proj ect is therefore overwhelmingly qualitative.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 which are the three chapters following this theory chapter are primarily

descriptive. They describe the history, goals, leadership, organizational structuree and resources;

strategies and tactics; and a traj ectory of anti-embargo activism, respectively. The information

for these chapters was obtained initially from a series of unstructuredd and semi-structured

interviews undertaken between May 2005 and December 2006. The initial unstructuredd









interviews were conducted personally with academics, leaders and staff members of the groups

located primarily in Washington D.C, New York and Miami. These were followed by semi-

structured phone interviews consisting of questions tailored to suit the information required on

the history, goals, structure, resources, strategies, tactics and activism of the groups under study.

In addition, the Internet proves an invaluable resource for information about the

organizations. Most of them have well-developed websites containing information ranging from

their history and funding sources and structure to names, phone numbers and email addresses of

leaders and staff members and the groups' strategies and tactics. The websites were particularly

useful for conducting content analysis on norms that guide the operations of the organizations.

Information for Chapter 5 which treats with contentious politics and challenge to the state was

also obtained from archival research on American newspapers.

The analytical chapters, 6 and 7, reflect a heavy reliance on texts on social movements and

scholarly publications in j ournals. Content analysis was also undertaken for Chapter 6 to

understand the extent to which some organizations are guided by certain liberal norms, namely

human rights, peace, justice, freedom and democracy. The Center for International Policy, the

Latin American Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America and the Cuban

American Education Alliance Fund were selected because they all focus specifically on the

embargo and because of the range and extent of their activism. Their websites are also much

better developed than most of the others which facilitated an electronic search. A separate

electronic search for the appearance of each these concepts "human rights", "peace", "justice",

"freedom" and "democracy"- in each of the organizations' website publications and links, were

undertaken and the frequency of hit counts recorded. The problem with this effort is that it is not

certain whether all the publications of these organizations were searched since only those on the









Internet where they are mainly found were accessed. Nonetheless, together with the websites,

those researched give a good indication as to whether the organizations are indeed motivated by

these liberal norms and which organization gives most priority to which norm.

In order to understand whether exogenous factors, specifically, the collapse of communism

in the Eastern bloc (resulting in attitudinal changes to Cuba and attempts at liberal reforms in

Cuba), prompted an increase in anti-embargo activities in the post-Cold War era, it was

necessary to undertake a comparative content analysis in chapter 7. A simple and uncomplicated

method for this aspect of the investigation was adopted which was facilitated to a large extent by

the Internet through relevant websites and the University of Florida library databases. Firstly, an

extensive Internet search was undertaken to identify organizations opposed to U.S. Cuba policy

and the date of their formation. The websites of some popular organizations like CIP and WOLA

proved useful in providing an extensive list of these other organizations.

Secondly, twenty-Hyve of the more prominent organizations which were formed before the

end of the Cold War were selected and a comprehensive electronic search of the Lexis Nexis

database of periodicals was conducted to compare the extent of their activities from nine years

before the Cold War (1980-1989) to the current post-Cold War period (1990-2006). This

involved a "full-text" search of the mention of these organizations names with respect to Cuba in

maj or American newspapers. The search was conducted under "General News" of the Christian~it~i~it~itit~it

Science M~onitor, the New York Times, the M~iamni Herald, USA Todaly and the Wa~shington Post.

Since the database allowed Hyve newspapers to be searched at the same time, all Eive were

searched simultaneously. The search term used was the name of the organization such as,

"Center for International Policy" and "Cuba" and then the number of hit counts recorded.










Finally, the case study in this work is both an analysis of a single phenomenon (the social

movement) and of multiple cases (the interest groups). The multiple cases share some common

attributes and are variants of the larger, encompassing category of the social movement, herein

dubbed "the anti-embargo movement". The analysis is launched from the level of both the single

social movement and the multiple interest groups. The latter facilitates an understanding of

particular organizational dynamics such as history, goals, resources, structure, size, leadership,

strategies and tactics. Apart from its connotation here as a collective of interest groups, the term

"social movement" is often employed as a mode of generalization and as a means of

appropriately locating the study in the sub-field of Comparative Politics in the discipline of

Political Science.









CHAPTER 3
TAXONOMY OF ANTI-EMBARGO ORGANIZATIONS

The anti-embargo movement comprises more than a hundred organizations which seek to

change U.S. policy to Cuba. They are led by both Americans and Cuban Americans located

mainly in Washington D.C., New York and Miami, though few have been traced to other states

like Califomnia and New Jersey. They fall into three main categories.

First, there are older and larger organizations, some of which are international activists

which do not have Cuba as a special proj ect but have taken up the Cuban cause. These include

the American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Madre (an international human rights

organization), Global Exchange, Oxfam America and faith-based groups like the World Council

of Churches, Church World Service, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and the

Episcopal Church.

Second, there are organizations dealing with other Latin American/Caribbean issues but

have a specific Cuba proj ect. These include the Center for International Policy (CIP), the

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Latin American Working Group (LAWG),

World Policy Institute and the Lexington Institute.

The third group consists of organizations concerned only with U.S. Cuba policy such as

Venceremos Brigade, the Center for Cuban Studies, the Emergency Coalition to Defend

Education Travel (ECDET), Pastors for Peace, the Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy, U.S.

Women and Cuba Collaboration; and the business interests including USA Engage and the U.S-

Cuba Trade Association. It also includes a host of moderate Cuban American organization. The

most prominent are the Cuban Committee for Democracy, Cambio Cubano, the Emergency

Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists (ENCASA), the Cuban American Alliance









Education Fund (CAAEF), the Cuba Study Group, and the Cuban American Commission for

Family Rights.

The dissertation focuses primarily on organizations in the second and third categories

which either have a specific Cuba proj ect, or treat with U. S. Cuba policy as the sole agenda.

These include the D.C. groups of which primary emphasis is placed on the Center for Cuban

Studies, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Latin American Working Group, the New

York based Center for Cuban Studies and Pastors for Peace, Venceremos Brigade, the recently

formed Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel, the business coalitions, USA Engage

and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association; The Cuban American organizations include the

longstanding Cuban Committee for Democracy; the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund;

Puentes Cubanos; the Cuba Study Group, the Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars

and Artists and the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights. They are selected because

they are the most active on the contentious embargo issues treating with tourist, academic and

family travel, remittances, trade and cultural exchanges to the island. In this respect, these

organizations are identified as the core of the anti-embargo movement in the U. S. These 15

groups are represented in Table 1. They are categorized into two groups: those with Cuba as its

sole concern, fall under category "A" and those with a broader regional or international focus but

have Cuba as a special project, fall under category "B".

History and Goals

The first anti-embargo organization emerged in 1969 with the formation of Venceremos

Brigade (VB), even before the hardline pro-embargo faction had been consolidated in Miami.

Based in New Jersey, the Brigade was originally comprised of a coalition of young people. Its



SSee Table 3-1 on page 87 for a list of organizations under study.










goal was, and still is, to show solidarity to the Cuban Revolution and to challenge U.S. policy to

Cuba, particularly the ban on travel. It continues to openly defy the law to take brigades to Cuba

annually. The organization has taken more than 8000 brigadista~s to Cuba over the years where

they had the opportunity to participate in the sugar harvests and to work in agricultural and

construction in various parts of the island. Describing itself as the oldest Cuba solidarity group in

the world, Venceremos Brigade boasts that "the VB has never requested permission from the

U. S. government to go to Cuba and we never will! We believe it is our right as U. S. citizens to

travel free of U. S. government obstacles. We also believe that we have much to learn from Cuba

and the best way to do that is to travel there and see for ourselves".2

The Center for Cuban Studies opened its doors to the public in New York in 1972 with the

same primary obj ective as Venceremos Brigade to counteract the effects of U. S. policy to

Cuba. Founded by Sandra Levinson in collaboration with a group of scholars, writers, artists and

other professionals, the Center aims to provide a vital communication link between the U.S. and

the island. This is achieved through publications, organized tours, library services, exchange

programs and art proj ects. The Center also seeks to provide accurate and up-to-date information

about Cuba which it does through its well-stocked Lourdes Casals library and organized trips to

Cuba undertaken within the legal exemption to the travel ban. These include professional

research, news-gathering, educational and religious shtdy.3

The Center for International Policy (CIP) was formed in 1975 in the aftermath of the

Vietnam War by former diplomat and peace activists. Its central concern then was to ensure that

a government' s human rights record was a prime consideration in allocating foreign aid. Today,


SVenceremos Brigade. New Jersey. "Who We Are and What We Do."
http://www.venceremo sbrigade. org/aboutVB .htm
SCenter for Cuban Studies. New York. "About Us." http://www. cubaupdate. org/more.htm









U.S. Cuba policy is a priority issue in CIP's agenda but it is also concerned with post-conflict

resolution in Central America and limiting military assistance to the Western Hemisphere,

especially Columbia. Changing U. S. Cuba policy became a maj or dimension of CIP's mission

when Wayne Smith j oined the organization in 1992 after resigning as Chief of Mission at the

U.S. Interest Section in Havana over fundamental disagreements with the Reagan

Administration's foreign policy. Smith's numerous publications in several newspapers and CIP's

website,4 Strongly condemning U.S. policy to Cuba, contribute to making the Center a leading

anti-embargo organization in D.C. Smith is perceived by many groups as a leading icon in the

anti-embargo movement. He defines CIP as a "small Washington think tank which advocates a

more sensible policy to Cuba". CIP has taken Congresspersons to Cuba in an effort to promote

dialogue and allow them to see the Cuban reality for themselves "since the U.S. public is fed a

lot of anti-Castro propaganda".5

In that same year, 1975, the Washington Office on Latin American (WOLA) was

established. Like CIP, WOLA is also concerned with human rights in Latin America having

worked at the outset to write the first maj or legislation conditioning U. S. military aid abroad on

human rights practices. It parallels CIP's interest in other countries including the Andes,

Columbia, Cuba and Central America particularly Mexico, with the set goal of defining policy

options and developing strategies for the expanding community of development, environmental,

and human rights organizations engaged with U.S. policy on Latin America. It criticizes the

Cuban embargo as misguided and counter-productive and its Cuba proj ect is geared toward




SCenter for International Policy. Washington, D.C. "Wayne Smith in the News: Articles by Wayne Smith."
http://ciponline. org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%20 Smith. htm

5 Interview with Smith, 9 h August 2006.










normalizing relations with the island which it perceives as a "more sensible, more effective, and

more humane strategy for promoting human rights and social justice".6

The year 1983 saw the formation of the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) in D.C.

Unlike CIP and WOLA, it is a coalition representing the interests of over sixty maj or religious,

humanitarian, grassroots and policy organizations. Its general mission is similar to that of CIP

and WOLA, geared toward encouraging U.S. policies towards Latin America that promote

human rights, justice, peace and sustainable development. Like the other two D.C. organizations,

it also has a Cuba program driven by the policy positions of its coalition partners, which "has

been and continues to be to end the U.S. embargo on Cuba for the benefit of both our peoples".

The LAWG believes "that the history of hostility between our two countries is obsolete and

should be changed" because "the embargo has failed to enact a change in its 43-year history".'

The LAWG priorities religious, academic, educational and family travel. According to staff

member, Claire Rodriguez, the pursuit of free trade is not part of its agenda". Neither is the

organization concerned with regime change in Cuba. Rather, it underscores the issues of peace

and justice.

Pastors for Peace is a special ministry of an umbrella faith-based organization called the

Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO), which was founded in 1967 by

progressive church leaders and activists to assist the poor and disenfranchised in developing

community organizations to fight human and civil rights injustices. Founded in 1992 by

Reverend Lucius Walker in New York, Pastors for Peace engages in similar activities as

6 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Washington DC. "Cuba."
b1lip w\ il \t .wola.org/?&option=com~content&task=blogsetoid6Imd=&pc=Cb

SLatin America Working Group. Washington DC, 2003. "House Backs Away from Engagement." July, 2006.
hip'' w i\\l t.awg. org/countries/cuba/backs_away .htm

8 Interview with Rodriguez, 11Ith August 2006.










Venceremos Brigade, discussed above. Its objective is "to bring an end to the immoral and unjust

U. S. economic blockade of Cuba".9 Since its inception, it has been taking annual Friendship

Caravans with humanitarian aid to Cuba without the required treasury license. This is in protest

of the "unjust regulation" because it believes that applying for a license would suggest a defacto

recognition of the embargo' s restriction on travel to the island. According to staff member,

Shane Gastever, "Pastors for Peace have been j oined by Canadian, Mexicans and even

Europeans in its 2006 Caravan to Cuba".10 The organization has had several confrontations with

the state for undertaking this "illegal" activity, even having some of the equipment which it was

taking to Cuba confiscated by Treasury officials. In the summer of 2003, Pastors for Peace

j oined Venceremos Brigade in its 34th anniversary contingent to Cuba in protest of the

restrictions proposed that year. Like CIP, Pastors for Peace is bent on presenting the reality of

Cuba to the American Public who are fed false information by the media and American

admini strati ons.

In response to academic travel restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, an

academic freedom focus group met in D.C. in November, 2004. The Emergency Coalition to

Defend Education Travel (ECDET) was formed in December that year in organized opposition

to the restrictions and to protect the rights of academics to define and execute educational

programs as they see fit. Although it is based in D.C., membership of ECDET is drawn from

people affiliated with accredited colleges, universities and academic associations across the U.S.





9Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO). New York. The US/Cuba Friendshipment Caravan
Campaign: A Brief History." b1lip w\ int .\ifconews.org/Cuba/caravan~history.htm.
'0 Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.
11 Ibid.










and comes from 45 American states. 12 The organization is chaired by CIP's senior fellow,

Wayne Smith who coordinates the efforts of the coalition. "Wayne Smith is the lifeblood of

ECDET", affirms Carmen Diana Deere, Director of the University of Florida' s Center for Latin

American Studies. He solicited my membership to lend solidarity to the coalition as former

president of the Latin American Studies Association. We've tried in vain to have Cuban

academics participate in the LASA conference generally held in the United States. But the U.S.

administration repeatedly rej ects their entry into this country". 13

Two D.C. based business coalitions are important organizations in the anti-embargo

movement. These are USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Both advocate

changing the embargo policy with regards to trade with Cuba. USA Engage is part of the

National Foreign Trade Council, the oldest trade Organization in the U.S. It was formed in 1997

and is primarily concerned with the removal of unilateral sanctions as it "promotes responsible

alternatives to sanctions that actually advance U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy goals, such

as intensified U.S. diplomacy and multilateral cooperation".14 Currently under the directorship of

Jake Colvin, it believes that, as a large coalition, it provides a voice to ensure that American

policy makers listen to all interested parties especially those opposed to and affected by sanctions

such as American companies, farmers and workers. Colvin explained that the coalition "also

opposed unilateral trade sanctions on Iran and Libya in the mid-nineties and naturally seeks




'2Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET). Washington, DC. "About Us."
b1lip u \\\l.ecdet.org/about.htm.
'3 Interview with Deere, 13th June 2006.

14 USAEngage. Washington, D.C. "About Us." http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-
USAEngage/default.asp?id= 110.










normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba"." USA Engage considers itself "the

leading business organization supporting reform of U. S. policy toward Cuba, as well as the most

important outside group supporting the work of the Cuba Working Groups in both the House and

Senate". 16

The U. S.-Cuba Trade association emerged out of the disintegration of the group of

businessmen and statesmen who called themselves Americans for Humanitarian Trade with

Cuba, which had successfully lobbied the Congress in 1999 for removal of sanctions on the sale

of food and medicine to Cuba. Formerly established in 2005, the coalition works on behalf of its

U.S. business members to protect current trade and to expand and increase the potential for

future business between the United States and Cuba. The president, Kirby Jones, is also president

of Alamar Associates which he established in 1974, to offer a full range of consulting services

for clients preparing to enter the Cuban market. 1 He brings a wealth of experience to the U.S.-

Cuba Trade Association having first-hand knowledge and personal contacts in Cuba. He has

been taking clients to Cuba for thirty years and is described by Newsweek as "the man who

knows about Cuba than any other American".ls The newly formed Trade Association seeks full

normalization of commercial relations between the U.S. and Cuba. It also assists business

interests interested in trading with Cuba by providing information and teaching them how to

undertake business with Cuba. 19 "The only way to impact change is to engage it" declares Jones.


'5 Interview with Colvin, 19th August 2006.

16 USAEngage. Washington, D.C. "About Us." http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-
USAEngage/default.asp?id= 110.

17 Alamar Associates: Consultants on Trade and Business with Cuba since 1974. Washington, DC. "About Kirby
Jones." b1lip w\ il \t .alamarcuba.com/kirbyjones.html. Accessed December 24, 2006.
's Ibid.

19 U.S. Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. "Mission." http://www.uscuba.org/index.htm.









"Cuba is not an anomaly. The U.S. has disagreements with several other countries, yet it has

healthy trade relations with them".20

The decade of the nineties also saw a proliferation of moderate Cuban American

organizations mostly in Miami but also in D.C. Several of these are pro-engagement and pro-

dialogue, but they are also anti-Castro. They display a more passionate and nationalistic response

to the embargo, not surprisingly, since it deals with matters close to their hearts such as food,

medicine, family relations and patria or the Fatherland.

The Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD) considers itself the largest Cuban American

organization and the antithesis of the hardline Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).21

The CCD was founded in 1993 by wealthy Miami Lawyer, Alfredo Duran, who left Cuba for

Miami after Castro rose to power. Duran joined the anti-Castro exile movement in Miami and

participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion as a member of Brigade 2506. He was captured in

the invasion and was held prisoner until the American government agreed to pay the ransom

requested by Castro. He retuned to Miami as an active anti-Castroite and became President of the

Veterans Association of Brigade 2506. But in the early 1990s, Duran promoted negotiations with

the Cuban government, and in 1993 he was expelled from the Veteran's Association of Brigade

2506 for "reasons associated with his public statements indicating his willingness to go to

Havana to discuss the history of the Bay of Pigs invasion." Branded by hardliners as a

dialoguero, Duran established the CCD as a national organization of Cuban Americans and

citizens of all other nationalities seeking to promote a comprehensive U.S.-Cuba engagement

policy resulting in a transition to democracy in Cuba. It is dedicated to a diplomatic resolution of



20 Interview with Jones, 16th August 2006.

21 Cuban Conunittee for Democracy. Miami, Florida. www.ccdusa.org.









the longstanding conflict between Cuba and the United States. It priorities dialogue and mutual

respect, and applied these principles to its work with Cuba as well as with the Cuban American

community in the United States. Although the organization promotes itself as non-partisan,

Duran admits that he himself is an active member of the Democratic Party and the maj ority of

CCD's members are democrats. For Duran, the term dialoguero is only considered derogatory in

Miami. "It is unwise to cast aspersions on anyone here", explains Duran "I myself was part of

the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Who was more rabidly anti-Castro than myself'?22

Several other moderate Cuban American organizations attempting to promote a policy of

rapproachment and dialogue with Cuba also emerged in the nineties. However, this moderate

stance does not translate into support for the Castro regime. Amongst these are the Cuban

American Coalition, the Cuban American Defense League, Cuban American Professionals and

Entrepreneurs, the Cuban Reunification Operation (led by prominent member of Cambio

Cubano, Bernardo Benes, also viewed as a dialoguero by right-hardline exiles), the Cuban

Democratic Platform, the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF) and Puentes

Cubanos. Apart from the last two, these organizations have not been very active and very little is

know about them. Hence, they are not considered part of the core of the anti-embargo movement

in this study.

CAAEF perceives itself as a national network of Cuban Americans seeking to educate the

public at large on issues related to hardships resulting from current U.S.-Cuban relations. It acts

"as a vehicle for the development of mutually beneficial engagements which promote

understanding and human compassion".23 Founded in 1995, its leaders operate from both D.C.



22Interview with Durin, 19th December 2006.

23Cuban American Alliance. Washington, DC. 1995. "About Us." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .cubamer. org/about~us.asp










and California. According to its President, Delvis Fernandez Levy, "the coalition was formed at

a time when the embargo was strengthening instead of weakening as we expected". Our network

has membership in several locations including New York, New Jersey and Maryland".24 In the

wake of the 2004 restrictions on family travel to Cuba the issue became the main bone of

contention of the network which took it to the UN Convention on Human Rights in March,

2005.25

The current decade also saw the emergence of some Cuban American groups opposed to

the embargo, several in response to the tightening of the embargo through the Helms-Burton

Law of 1996 and renewed restrictions imposed in 2004. Amongst these, the Cuba Study Group

stands out as unique given the circumstances which led to its formation. It was founded in 2000

in the aftermath of the Elian Gonzalez affair in an attempt to change the negative national image

of the Cuban American community that emerged after the incident. The group is committed to

"more practical, proactive and consensual approaches towards Cuba policy" and "favors

pragmatic and effective approaches based on deliberate fact-finding, careful analysis, strategic

orientation, and a strong ethical foundation"26. The organization makes for an interesting study

comprised as it is of wealthy Miami businessmen and professionals. Its goals diverge from the

other Cuban American organizations in its preoccupation with change within Cuba. Hence, it is

geared toward the formulation of "effective, multilateral policy recommendations through

thoughtful discussion and critical analysis of ideas that promote and facilitate a peaceful regime



24Interview with Femindez, 23rd October 2006.

25Delvis Femindez Levy. Cuban American Alliance. "CAAEF Questions Violations of Human and Civil Rights.
Statement at the 61s~t Session of the Commission on Human Rights." 3 1 March, 2005. Cuban American Alliance
Education Fund. CA. 1995. http://www.cubamer.org/item.asp?id=16.

26 Cuba Study Group. Washington, DC. "About Us".
hop u\ \\ cubastudygroup. org/index.cfm?FuseAction=About.Home&Categrid.










change in Cuba and lead to democracy, a free and open society, a market-based economic

system, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the reunification of the Cuban nation".27

Carlos Saladrigas, co-Chairman of the Group, explains that the Group has friends even in the

rabidly anti-Castro, Cuban Liberty Council, although some there would not speak to him and are

as irrational as the hardliners in Cuba".28

The Cuban American Commission for Family Rights is a broad coalition of Cuban

Americans established in May 2004 to denounce the new government restrictions on travel and

remittances. Their mission is "to preserve the integrity of the Cuban family and work to defeat

those who want to divide it".29According to its President, Alvaro Fernandez, "our reason for

being was unwavering opposition to the harsh and extremely cruel measures imposed by the

Bush Administration that year, making it much tougher to travel to Cuba, even for people with

family members on the island. Along with restricting family travel to once every three years -

with no exceptions, not even to visit sick family members the new regulations also made it

more difficult to help loved ones on the island with one's own hard-eamned dollars".30 Silvia

Wilhelm, founder and Executive Director of the organization, describes the measures as "anti-

family, un-American and anti-Cuban".31 The Commission is particularly incensed with the

definition of family, insisting that family rights should not be determined. "Human rights are

being trampled upon by this administration" affirms Wilhelm.32An irate Femandez noted that


27Ibid.

28Interview with Saladrigas, 6t June 2006.

29 Cuban American Commis sion for Family Rights. 2007. http://www. cubanfamilyrights. org

3Alvaro Fern~ndez. Progreso Weekly. 2007. "Welcome All Against the Anti-Cuban Family Measures." Dec 7-13,
2006. hopll w\ int .progresoweekly. com/index.php?progreso=1upalvaro&otherweek1165644000

31Interview with Wilhelm, 21"t August 2006.
32Ibid.










"the Bush Administration was the first in U. S. history that deemed itself ft to define what

comprised a family. A Cuban family at that. I can assure you that the measures made every

Commission member's blood boil over".33

Financial Resources

Both the unstructured and semi-structured interviews reveal that the groups which

constitute the anti-embargo movement are relatively homogenous in mobilizing resources. Most

obtain funding from external sources: foundations and private donations from members, and

supporters and some from business interests though the latter were not identified for the sake of

privacy. Some of the organizations were also unwilling to divulge the other sources and most

refused to give Eigures. The figures presented in the following paragraphs were sourced from

either the website of the foundations or that of the organizations under study.

The Center for International Policy (CIP), the Washington Office of Latin America

(WOLA), the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) and the Cuban American Commission

for Family Rights, report to receiving funding from both foundations and private individuals.

The bulk of CIP's funding are derived from external sources. These include the Arca Foundation,

the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, the Compton Foundation, the Educational Foundation of

America, the Ford Foundation, the General Service Foundation, the National Lawyers' Guild, the

Samuel Rubin Foundation, the Schooner Foundation and the Stewart R. Mill Charitable Trust.34

They provide one fifth of the organization' s income with a small percentage also coming

from fees and the sale of publications and the rest derived from thousands of individual donors

via mail or online. Neither CIP's website nor the interviews provide information on the business

33 Interview with Femindez, 7th July 2005. Fern~ndez also expressed these statements in the online magazine,
Progreso Weekly. 2007. "Welcome All Against the Anti-Cuban Family Measures." Dec 7-13, 2006.
hli w\ il itprogresoweekly.com/index.php?progreso=1uavr lohrek 1165644000
34 Center for International Policy. Washington DC. http://ciponline.org/aboutus.htm#funding.










interests which fund the Cuban cause. The interviewee, Wayne Smith, prefer to keep them

anonymous.35 However, it should be noted that because CIP engages in other Asian and Latin

American proj ects which concern countries like Columbia, Nicaragua, Honduras, North Korea,

China and Bangladesh, not all the foundations mentioned above support the specific Cuban

cause.3

Of the foundations mentioned, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation is specifically

committed to the U.S./Cuba cause. Its website emphasizes that "since 1995, the Foundation has

been steadily increasing its support of work that focuses on U. S. relations with Cuba and needs

in Cuba as defined by Cubans themselves".37 Indeed, in March 2001, the directors of this

foundation agreed to "phase out all other domestic grant-making and concentrate the resources of

the Foundation solely on our Cuba effort".38

The Christopher Reynolds Foundation also funds several other anti-embargo groups such

as the Center for Cuban Studies, WOLA, LAWG and the Interreligious Foundation for

Community Organization (IFCO) of which Pastors for Peace is a sub-group. Other anti-embargo

organizations funded by this foundation include the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund

(CAAEF), the Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD), the Cuba Policy Foundation and the

Lexington Institute.39







35Interview with Smith 9th Aug, 2006, 11Ith May 2005.

36Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. http://ciponline.org

37The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. "Our Grant-making Program." http://www.creynolds .org/guide.htm
38Ibid.

39 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. "Grants." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .creynolds.org/grants.htm










WOLA' s funding also comes from foundations, donations, religious organizations and

individuals. Donations are payable through the mail or online.40 WOLA describes itself as a 501

(c) 3 tax exempt non-profit organization.41 In 2004, the organization received a grant in the sum

of $50, 000 from the Public Welfare Foundation42 and in 2006 it was granted $350, 000 by the

Ford Foundation.43 The Christopher Reynolds Foundations granted $160,000 to CIP, WOLA and

LAWG combined in 2005.44

The LAWG also receives funding from the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Institute

Development Foundation, The Moriah Fund, the General Service Foundation, The Arca

Foundation, the Stewart Mott Education Charitable Trust and the Lawson Valentine Fund.

Contributions to LAWG' s Education Fund are also made by the Presbyterian Church (USA),

Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam America. According to LAWG' s website, "LAWG is

funded primarily through donations by coalition members and other non-governmental and

religious organizations'".4 This is supported by information received in an interview with staff

member, Claire Rodriguez, who also affirms that the organization enj oys the status of both a c

(3) organization through which it receives funding from foundations and a c (4) organization





"0 Washington Office on Latin America. Washington
D C.2007.http:.//www.wola. org/index.php?option=com~content&task-vie d=5 &Itemid=24

41 Interview with Geoff Thale and Rachel Farley, 20th May 2005.

42Public Welfare Foundation. Washington, DC.
I1lipll u ll publicwelfare.org/grants/human~rights_gloa euri ~lr i 1_grants.asp
43Ford Foundation. 2007. "Grant Information."
http:.//www.fordfound. org/grants_db/view_grant~detail .cfm?grant~id= 3 320 1
44The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. "Grants." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .creynolds.org/grants.htm

45Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Annual Report 2006."
Ilipll u ll .1awg.org/docs/lawg_annual~report06.pdf.










which allows it to receive donations from grassroots organizations which are members of its

coalition.46

Pastors for Peace receives funding from the Massachusetts-based Careth Foundation which

supports organizations working toward international peace.47 It is also funded via tax deductible

donations and receives non-monetary donations from the public in the form of laptop computers,

cameras, printers, cartridges, copiers and software which it takes to Cuba in its annual caravan

campaign. Unlike the other organizations discussed above, Pastors for Peace solicits both

monetary and non-monetary donations via its website.48

The Center for Cuban Studies is a non-profit corporation with tax exempt status. Part of it

funding is derived from annual membership fees.49 Funds are also raised from sales of certain

Cuban cultural artifacts such as t-shirts, videos, notecards, postcards, CDs and other gift items.

The Center has also set up a Lifeline Fund which enables contributors to donate materials to

Cuban institutions. These materials include medicines and medical supplies, religious artifacts,

artists' supplies and educational materials.'o In addition, the Center receives funding from








46 Interview with Rodriguez, 11Ith August 2006.

47Discoverthenetworks.org. A Guide to the Political Left. 2003-2006. "Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization. h1lip un ts\discoverthenetworks .org/groupProfile. asp?grpid=6262

48Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006.
https://secure.groundspring.org/dn/indexphai=30

49 These are $60 (regular), $100 (supporting) and $150/$250 (sustaining). The fee for institutional and foreign
membership is $70. Students and senior citizens from the U. S. join at the special rate of $40. Center for Cuban
Studies. New York. "About Us." http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm

"0 Center for Cuban Studies. New York. "About Us." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .cubaupdate.org/more.htm#Lifeline%/20Fun










organizations such as the Christopher Reynolds Foundation which donated $25,000 in 2005.5

The Center also receives donations from several prominent individuals.52

The D.C. based Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD) has also been funded by grants

from foundations including the Christopher Reynolds, Arca, McArthur and Ford Foundations.

Its 150 members also pay an annual membership fee of $100. In addition, each of the fifteen

members of the Board of Directors is expected to either personally donate or raise $1000 dollars

annually. In the past, the CCD had sponsored a radio program called "transici6n" which was

funded by the McArthur Foundation. 53

Although ECDET claims to have no funding, some of the newer organizations founded in

the nineties and the current decade also receive funding from foundations and donations from

individual members. These include the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights headed

by Silvia Wilhelm who also heads Puentes Cubanos, a Cuban American organization funded by

the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.54 The Cuban American Alliance Education Fund

(CAAEF) is not sponsored by foundations and only receives donations from private individuals

who are predominantly financially stable Cuban American members of the organization. 5

Similarly, neither the Cuba Study Group comprising of wealthy Miami businessmen nor USA

Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association which are coalitions representing business



51 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. "Grants." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .creynolds.org/grants.htm

52They include Harry Belafonte, Julie Belafonte, Jean Carey Bond, Noam Chomsky, Johnnetta B. Cole, Francis
Coppola, Jules Feiffer, Timothy Harding, Max Kozloff, Saul Landau, William LeoGrande, Lee Lockwood, Grace
Paley, Sydney Pollack, Gregory Rabassa, Karen Ranucci, Michael Ratner, Toshi and Pete Seeger, Stanley
Sheinbaum, Michael Tigar, Rip Torn, Nelson Vald~s, Paula Weinstein, and John Womack, Jr. Center for Cuban
Studies. New York. "About Us." http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm#Center2Soss
53Interview with Durin, 19th December 2006.

54Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006.

55Interview with Femindez, 23rd October 2006.










interests, depend on foundation grants since their members are resourceful enough to sponsor

them. Jake Colvin, Director of USA Engage, affirms that "all funding comes from members".56

The U.S.- Cuba Trade Association describes itself as "a 501C(6) membership-based non-profit

organization"." Kirby Jones, founder and President of the Association, reports that all funding

for the coalition are derived from members.'

Leadership, Human Resources and Organizational Structure

Certain individuals whose commitment to the Cuban cause has been unrelenting for more

than thirty years, emerge as icons of the anti-embargo movement. They include Wayne Smith of

the Center for International Policy, Sandra Levinson of the Center for Cuban Studies and Kirby

Jones of the U. S.-Cuba Trade Association. These three names are well-known by all groups

involved in changing U.S. Cuba policy, whether based in D.C., New York or Miami. A closer

look at the work of each of these individuals will serve to explain their significance as invaluable

human resources in the anti-embargo movement.

Wayne Smith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Cuba program at the Center for

International Policy. He is also a significant contributor to the National Security Program and a

visiting professor of Latin American Studies and Director of the University of Havana Exchange

Program at Johns Hopkins University. Moreover, Smith is a former Senior Associate at the

Camegie Endowment for Intemnational Peace. He has served as Executive Secretary of President

Kennedy's Latin American Task Force and Chief of Mission at the U. S. Interests Section in





56 Interview with Colvin, 19th August 2006.

57 U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. "Structure, Staffing and Management."
hopl1 u s\\l uscuba.org/manager.htm
58 Interview with Jones, 16th August 2006.










Havana during his twenty-five year stint with the State Department (1957-82). He has also

served in Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.S.R. 59

Smith's work in the anti-embargo movement is reflected in his prolific publication lists as

head of the Cuba program at the CIP. An ardent advocate for the removal of the embargo,

Smith' s articles published in several U. S. newspapers and j ournals such as The New York Times,

Los Angeles Times, Baltimore Sun, Christian~it~i~it~itit~it Science M~onitor, M~iamni Herald and Foreign

Policy. These are embellished with provocative headlines like "Our Cuba Policy will get us

Nada"; "A Continuing Perfect Failure"; and "A Bankrupt Cuba Policy". Relentless in his pursuit

of changing the policy toward Cuba, Smith has launched scathing attacks on Cuba being placed

on the U.S. terrorist list, the "senseless embargo", the Elian Gonzalez debacle and the U.S.

determination to prevent Cubans playing baseball in the United States.60 In Smith's words, his

lifelong goal has been to "bring about a more sensible U.S. policy to Cuba." To this end, Smith

has struggled for more than thirty years.61

Sandra Levinson is currently based at the Center for Cuba Studies in New York which she

started in 1972 in a loft in Greenwich Village. She had then taken a year off from her j ob as

teacher of politics at Brooklyn Polytechnic and New York editor of Ramparts. She collected

books, magazines and artwork from friends who had visited Cuba and launched a travel program

to Cuba. This was the first of many groups to establish trips to Cuba for academics, j journalists

and other researchers.





59 Interview with Smith, 11Ith May 2005.

"0 For a list of Smith's articles, see the Center for International Policy's Cuba Program Wayne Smith in the News.
Washington, DC. "Articles by Wayne Smith." http ://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%2Smith.htm

61 Interview with Smith, 11Ith May 2005, 9th August 2006.









Levinson escaped a bomb attack at the Center on 28th March, 1973, where she was

working at the time. "The rabid Cuban exiles who planted the bomb were never caught", she

explained. "Everything was destroyed except the area around my desk" (Interview with

Levinson, 26th May 2005). The Center moved to East 23rd Street and later to its current address

on West 23rd Street. Levinson announced then that she was willing to stay at the Center "until we

have normal diplomatic relations with Cuba" thinking that it would be four years at most until

Nixon was ousted as President. Today, she expresses shock that "our policy has remained

basically unchanged throughout the years and through multiple Presidents"62. She energetically

continues her work at the Center, sponsoring conferences and seminars on U.S. Cuba policy and

importing books and magazines to stock the Center' s Lourdes Casals library. She also publishes

a magazine called Cuba Upd'ate, and when President Carter lifted the travel ban, she began

sponsoring trips to Havana taking large delegations to the Havana Film Festival every year. In

1991, with the support of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, Levinson won a

suit against the Treasury Department for legalizing the importation of original art work from

Cuba. She spearheads one of the most popular programs of the Center which is the Cuban Art

Space Gallery opened in 1999, exhibiting Cuba Art. Through the Abeja Obrera (Worker Bee)

proj ect, she has been taking brigadistas to Cuba to work in construction. The new restrictions

imposed by the current Bush administration has thwarted her efforts to make it possible for

artists and writers of both countries to travel to Cuba and the U.S. through the Artists and Writers

Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba which she has established as another of

the Center's programs.63


62 Interview with Levinson, 26th May 2005.

63 All information on Levinson here was obtained in a lengthy interview with her at her New York office on 26th
May 2005.










Kirby Jones has been promoting relations between the United States and Cuba since the

seventies. Newsweek describes him as "having better contacts with Cuba than any other

American" and he is viewed by the New York Times as the "man to see about business in

Cuba".64 His first trip to Cuba was as a special correspondent for CB S in 1974. For the past

thirty years he has traveled regularly to Cuba and engaged in numerous interviews with Fidel

Castro for both television and print. He is also consultant of Alamar Associates, a private, profit-

oriented consulting firm based in D.C. It offers a range of services to companies interested in

doing business with Cuba. Jones has contributed significantly to the book entitled Subj ect to

Solution: Problems in Cuban-U. S. Relations, and wrote an influential study published in 1988

entitled Opportunities for U. S.-Cuban Trade, commissioned by the School of Advanced

International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.65

Between 1998 and 2000, Jones has chaired several U.S.-Cuba business summits bringing

together more than 400 U.S. executives as well as Congresspersons and Cuban politicians,

officials and potential business partners. He frequently speaks at business conferences such as

the U.S.-Cuba Agricultural conferences in Cancun in 2002 and 2003 and the U.S.-Cuba Travel

conference in 2003. Jones is now President of the coalition of the U. S.-Cuba Trade Association

formed in 2005. He believes that U. S. policy to Cuba is wrong since it curtails invaluable

business opportunities for both countries. He affirms "that the U.S. should treat Cuba as it treats

other communist countries which have diplomatic relations with the United States. The U.S. has

been pretending for forty seven years that the Cuban government does not exist. The way to




64 Alamar Associates. Consultants on Trade and Business with Cuba since 1974. Washington, DC. "About Kirby
Jones." blllp w il i .alamarcuba.com/kirbyjones.html
65 Ibid.










impact change with Cuba is to engage the Cubans in talks. Free trade is the right and normal

thing to do".66

What is striking about the commitment of these outstanding anti-embargo activists is that

they are all American with no familial ties to Cuba. However, they are not the only outstanding

advocates of change in U.S. Cuba policy. Several individuals including William Leogrande from

American University, Cynthia McClintock of George Washington University, Saul Landau of

the Institute for Policy Studies, Silvia Wilhelm and Alvaro Fernandez of the Cuba American

Commission for Family Rights, Mavis Anderson who heads the Cuba proj ect at the Latin

American Working Group, Sarah Stephens of the Center for International Policy, Geoff Thale of

the Washington Office on Latin America, Phillip Peters from the Lexington Institute, Delvis

Fernandez Levy of the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund, Lucius Walker of Pastors for

Peace and Lissa Weinmann of the World Policy Institute, have been vigorously challenging the

embargo on humanitarian, business, and familial grounds. Space does not allow a full analysis of

their roles and contributions here, but they also constitute the stock of human resources at the

forefront of the anti-embargo movement in its drive to change U. S. Cuba policy.

The organizations' human resources also include staff members which are deeply

committed to the Cuban cause. The D.C. organizations, CIP, WOLA and LAWG, not only treat

with Cuba, but other international issues which concern other countries. They have a Cuba

proj ect which is run by certain individuals.67 These three D.C. groups have a small staff and a

much more expanded Board of Directors. CIP boasts of both a President and an Executive


66 Interview with Jones, May 2005, 16th August, 2006.

67 Wayne Smith is at CIP. He was assisted by Sarah Stevens until 2005 with Smith heading the project overall and
Stephens charged with the Freedom to Travel Campaign. A new, intern, Vincent Pascandolo, is also now assisting in
the proj ect. See http://ciponline. org/staff htm fo r a list of CIP's board members. Geoff Thale heads the Cuba proj ect
at WOLA and Mavis Anderson at the LAWG.










Director with considerable experience in foreign affairs.68 There are also a number of Senior

Fellows focusing on particular areas all of whom bring a diverse array of skills and experience to

the organization. CIP's staff acts as assistants to these Senior Fellows. In addition, there is a

Board of Directors with members from a diverse range of institutions and organizations. Some of

these are consultants while others are Foreign Service officers and academics.69

WOLA' s structure is somewhat different, comprising a staff which constitutes a Senior

Director, some Program Directors, a number of Senior Associates and Senior Fellows. Two of

these are assigned to the Cuba program.'0 Like CIP, WOLA also has a Board of Directors some

of whom are members of other anti-embargo groups like Martin Coria of Church World Service

and Silvia Wilhelm from Puentes Cubanos. Cynthia McClintock also sits amongst WOLA' s

Board of Directors.7

The staff of LAWG is also quite small, consisting of an Executive Director, two Senior

Associates and two Program Assistants. 72 The LAWG' s Board of Directors also benefits from a

range of experiences and skills from several organizations. Indeed, two prominent members from




68 The President, Robert White, served in the Foreign Service for twenty five years. The Executive Director, Bill
Goodfellow, who founded the organization, has extensive experience as an analyst of U.S. aid policies and is known
for advocating greater transparency and accountability

69 Such as Cynthia McClintock from George Washington University and William LeoGrande from American
University. For a list of board members and their respective backgrounds see Center for International Policy.
Washington, DC. http://ciponline.org/staff.htm

"0 These are Geoff Thale who is the Program Director and Senior Associate for Cuba and Central America and Elsa
Falkenburger, the Program Officer for Cuba and Central American Youth Gang.

71For a list of WOLA's Board of Directors see Washington Office on Latin America. Washington, DC. 2007.
"Board of Directors."
hli wilit wola. org/index.php?option=com content&task-viewid15&Itemid=13 &Itemid= 13

72 The Executive Director, Lisa Haugaard, brings with her a wealth of experience from her previous post as
Executive Director of the Central American Historical Institute in Washington. Maris Anderson who is charged
with the Cuba project at the LAWG, has actually worked in Central America during her term at the Center for
Global Education at Augsberg College.










WOLA hold the positions of Executive Director and board member respectively in the Latin

American Working Group's Education Fund, a maj or facet of the LAWG. 73

According to staff member, Shane Gastever, Pastors for Peace has an Executive Director

who is the Reverend Lucius Walker.74 It also has an Assistant Director and a very small staff. Its

structure is somewhat similar to the Center for Cuban Studies which has a Board of Directors

and Sandra Levinson as Executive Director. In addition, the Center has a paid, full time librarian

and one staff member who handles mail orders. Like Pastors for Peace, the Center "frequently

receives voluntary assistance from interested parties whenever it schedules a big event such as an

art exposition"."

The Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET) is centered in D.C.

although its members hail from all over the U. S. Its structure is unlike any of the other groups. It

comprises a co-Chair who is Wayne Smith in his capacity as adjunct professor at John Hopkins

University. There are also fifteen steering committee members and four task force members. The

latter include Phillip Brenner from American University, Cynthia McClintock from George

Washington University, Robert Muse from Muse and Associates and Wayne Smith from CIP.76

The human resources of the business coalitions, USA Engage and the U. S.-Cuba Trade

Association are vital assets of the anti-embargo movement. Both organizations draw support

from its broad membership base which consists of business interests in the U. S. seeking to do

business with Cuba. USA Engage perceives itself as the "leading organization supporting reform

73These are William Goodfellow and Jov Olson. For a list of the LAWG's Board of Directors see Latin American
Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Latin American Working Group Board of Directors".
h llp w il it .1awg.org/about/BoardofDirectors.htm
74Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.

75Interview with Levinson, 21"t December 2006.

76For a list of ECDET members see Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. "ECDET Membership List."
I1lllp u sal\ ecdet.org/members.htm










of U. S. policy toward Cuba as well as the most important outside group supporting the work of

the Cuba Working Groups in both the House and the Senate"." It enjoys the support of several

prominent organizations including the National Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U. S. Council on International

Business and the American Petroleum Institute. However, Cuba is not the only concern of USA

Engage since it is committed to removing unilateral sanctions against any country and priorities

other issues such as "protecting U.S. trademarks" and "working for "intelligent export controls

and temporary entry policies." The organization' s staff involved in the Cuba proj ect is Director,

Jake Colvin, and its co-chair, William Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade

Council.'

The U.S.-Cuba Trade Association has formed strategic partnerships with USA Engage

and the National Foreign Trade Council. Kirby Jones is the Association's President, William

Reinsch (mentioned above) serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors while William Rogers

is Chairman of the Advisory Board. Rogers is former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin

America. He is also a member of the National Foreign Trade Council and Vice Chairman of

Kissinger Associates. The organization's extensive membership boasts of a number of

prestigious former government officials and prominent American citizens such as Frank

Carlucci, Former Secretary of Defence (under Reagan), David Rockefeller of the Rockefeller

Center Properties, Sam Gibbons, Former Florida Congressman and Colonel Lawrence

Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State, Collin Powell.79 Silvia Wilhelm,



77USAEngage. 2004. "Priority Issues." b1lip w\ il \\ usaengage.org/MBROO88-U SAEngage/default.asp?id= 11 1

78USA Engage. 2004. "About Us." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .usaengage .org/MBROO88-USAEngage/default.asp?id= 110

79 For a full list of Board of Advisors see U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. "Structure, Staffing and
Management." blipl u sal\ uscuba.org/manager.htm










Executive Director of the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights, is also a member of

the U.S.- Cuba Trade Association.so

The structure of the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund is slightly different from

the others with a Board of Directors consisting of an Executive Committee of three members and

two Members at Large. The Fund is really a coalition representing most if not all of the

organizations under study. The President, Delvis Fernandez Levy, is also acting Executive

Director of the organization. In addition, there is an expanded Advisory Council consisting of

prominent members of the Cuban American community. Several of these are professionals in

their own rights with occupations ranging from business entrepreneurs, to psychologists,

physicians and medical advisors.8 Fernandez explained that "the leadership of CAAEF is almost

exclusively Cuban American".82

The Cuba Study Group consists of two co-Chairmen, Luis J. Perez, partner in the Miami

office of Hogan and Harston L.L.P. and Carlos A. Saladrigas, Chairman of Premier American

Bank. It also has an Executive Director, Tomas Bilbao, who has worked in the campaign of Mel

Martinez and in the administration of George W. Bush. There are also seventeen board members

drawn primarily from the business sectors of the Cuban American community. Amongst these

prestigious board members are Carlos de la Cruz, member of the Board of Coca Cola Puerto

Rico Bottlers and Eagle Brands; former U. S. Ambassador to Belgium, Ambassador Paul Cejas

who has also been a business and civic leader in South Florida; and Enrique Sosa, named





"0 Interview with Wilhelm, 21"t August, 2006.

st Cuban American Alliance. 1995. "Board of Directors." hopll nu \\ \ cubamer.org/about~us.asp for a list of
CAAEF's Board of Directors.

82Interview with Femindez, 23rd October, 2006.










Executive Vice President of Amoco Corporation in 1995 and President of BP Amoco Chemicals

in 1999.83

The Cuban American Commission for Family Rights is run by an Executive Director, a

President, a Vice President and a Secretary. As mentioned, the Executive Director, Sylvia

Wilhelm, also works with several other organizations including the LAWG, the U.S.-Cuba Trade

Association and Human Rights Watch which produced a lengthy report on the 2004 restrictions.

In 1999, Wilhelm had formed Puentes Cubanos which were funded by several foundations and

from which she acquired a wealth of experience which she brings to the organization. The

Commission itself does not receive grants from foundations but are funded by its 300 members

who donate voluntarily "to counteract the unjust embargo policy".84

Membership also constitutes an invaluable asset of the organizations' human resources.

CIP and WOLA do not have a membership base as such. The LAWG boasts of 6000 grassroots

members which are not the same as its coalition partners consisting of religious, humanitarian,

grassroots, policy and educational organizations."' The Center for Cuban Studies has a paid

membership base from the public generally comprising students, artists, writers and scholars.86

Pastors for Peace claims that it has no fixed membership since members are voluntary and vary

from year to year. s7The members of the Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel is

mainly drawn from the academic community and numbered 462 in 2006. They are


83Cuba Study Group. Washington, DC. "Board of Directors."
http\\ t lcubastudygroup. org/index. cfm?FuseAction=Board.Home

84Interview with Wilhelm, 21"t August 2006.

85The Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. hopl w\ int .1 awg.org/partners/intro.htm
"bCenter for Cuban Studies. New York. "About Us."
\p u\ \\ cubaupdate.org/more.htm#Historv%20and%20ups
87Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.










predominantly professors from accredited Universities and Colleges in the U.S. Amongst these

institutions are Howard University, UC-Berkeley, Florida International, Michigan State,

Harvard, Stanford and Princeton.8

Some of the moderate Cuban American organizations also have a membership base. The

Cuban Committee for Democracy has 150 members.89 while the Cuban Commission for Family

Rights boasts of 300 members.90 The Cuban American Alliance Education Fund has a network

of members some of which are other organizations like the Cuban American Commission for

Family Rights.91 The Cuba Study Group does not have any members except those who comprise

its Board of Directors, discussed above.

Conclusion

All the above organizations are pursuing the same goal of changing U.S. Cuba policy even

though they may prioritize different aspects of it or have other sub-focus. Venceremos Brigade is

the only organization which expresses solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. Like the Center for

Cuban Studies it is also concerned with information and cultural exchanges while the D.C.

groups, CIP, WOLA, LAWG and the New York based Pastors for Peace are more interested in

the promotion of human rights and justice in the United States. The annual caravanistas of

Pastors for Peace mirror the brigadistas of Venceremos Brigade, both working quite closely

together to take contingents to Cuba. CIP, WOLA and LAWG also have a broad regional

agenda. The moderate Cuban American organizations generally hope to foster a process of

dialogue and rapproachment with Cuba and to ensure its smooth transition to democracy

88Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. "ECDET Membership List."
b1lipll u ll\ .ecdet.org/members.htm
89 Interview with Durin, 19t December 2006.

9n Interview with Wilhelm, 21"t August 2006.

91 Cuban American Alliance. 1995. "Links." b1lip u\ \\ l\cubamer.org/item list. asp?Item=Link










although the Cuba Study Group has an additional agenda of changing the image of Cuban

Americans in the aftermath of the Elian Gonzalez debacle and of ensuring regime change in

Cuba. The two D.C. based business coalitions seek to address the issue of trade with Cuba and

represent a number of corporate and farming interests such as Cargill Inc., Caterpillar Americas

and U.S Wheat Associates. Newer organizations formed in response to the 2004 restriction are

geared toward changing policies on remittances, family and academic travel to the island.

Most of the organizations draw on the same funding sources. Several receive funding from

foundations though the foundation donors may vary from year to year. The Christopher Reynolds

Foundation funds several organizations which are also be funded by the Ford, Careth, Arca and

several other foundations mentioned above. The D.C. groups report to also receiving funding

from wealthy private supporter. Both CIP and the Center for Cuban Studies engage in fund-

raising activities through the sale of publications and cultural artifacts. The latter also receive

Financial resources from a host of individual donors. As a coalition, the ECDET has no specific

funding though some of its members have considerable resources of their own.

The organizations' human resources are varied and many, reflecting a ready stock of well-

trained and experienced personnel from all works of life. These external resources are invaluable

as members of the groups' Boards of Directors. Some organizations even share board members

and draw from each other for specific expertise as will be seen in the case of the business

coalitions. The immediate staff of most organizations is relatively small though some of these are

crucial to the very sustenance of the anti-embargo movement. As identified, these include

longstanding activists like Wayne Smith, Sandra Levinson and Kirby Jones. All the groups

reflect a hierarchical structure with either President, Chairman, Director or Executive Director at

the top and a skeletal staff below, if they employ a full time staff at all. In this regard, the Cuba










Study Group and the ECDET stands out, since the executive members comprise the core of the

organizations which do not have paid full-time employees like CIP, LAWG and WOLA.

Finally, membership constitutes a vital asset for the organizations especially those that are

coalitions such as LAWG, ECDET, CAAEF, USA ENGAGE and the U.S.-Cuba Trade

Association. Some of these members are grassroots groups but others are drawn from the

academic and business sectors. Still others find a membership base amongst the wider public

such as the Cuban Committee for Democracy and the Center for Cuban Studies.

All in all, the groups are relatively homogenous in terms of goals and funding sources but

reflect a fair degree of heterogeneity in terms of human resources, organizational structure, size

and membership.92 Whether these have impacted on the ability of the anti-embargo movement to

sustain itself and whether these contribute to its continued activism over time, will be subj ect of

a subsequent chapter.

























92 See Table 3-2 on page 88 for a list of leadership and funding sources of the 25 major organizations under study.










Table 3-1. Classification of anti-embargo organizations, dates founded and obj ectives
Organizations Date Founded Category* Objective
Center for Cuban 1972 A Information,
Studies Cultural Exchanges
Center for 1975 B Human Rights
International Policy


Cuba Study Group

Cuban American
Alliance
Education Fund
Cuban American
Commission
for Family Rights
Cuban Committee for
Democracy
Emergency Coalition
to Defend Education
Travel
Emergency Network
of Cuban American
Scholars and Artists
Latin American
Working Group
IFCO/Pastors for
Peace
Puentes Cubanos

USA Engage

US-Cuba Trade
Association


Changing image of
Cubans Americans
Family Travel


Family Travel


Engagement with
Cuba
Academic/
Education Travel

Family Travel,
Cultural Exchange

Human Rights and
Justice
Human Rights,
Justice, Aid to Cuba
Family Travel,
Remittances
Free Trade and
Removal of Sanctions
Free Trade


2000

1995


2004


1993

2004


2006


1983

1988

1999

1997

2005


Venceremos Brigade 1969 A Education, Cultural
Exchanges, Aid to
Cuba
Washington Office on 1975 B Human rights, peace,
Latin America justice, sustainable
development
* Category A represents organizations only concerned with Cuba. Category B represents
organizations with a broad regional or international focus which has Cuba as a special proj ect.










Table 3-2. Organizations, leaders and funding sources


Organizations
Center for Cuban Studies


Center for International
Policy
Cuba Study Group

Cuban American Alliance
Education Fund
Cuban American
Commission
for Family Rights
Cuban Committee for
Democracy
Emergency Coalition to
Defend Education Travel
Emergency Network of
Cuban American Scholars
and Artists
Latin American Working
Group

Pastors for Peace

Puentes Cubanos
USA Engage
US-Cuba Trade Association
Venceremos Brigade
Washington Office on Latin
America


Leaders
Sandra Levinson



Wayne Smith

Carlos Saladrigas,
Luis J. Perez
Delvis Fernandez Levy

Silvia Wilhelm,
Alvaro Fernandez

Alfredo Duran

Wayne Smith

Ruben Rumbaut


Mavis Anderson


Lucius Walker

Silvia Wilhelm
Jake Colvin
Kirby Jones
Bob
Geoff Thale


Sources of Funding
Foundations, annual membership fees,
prominent private citizens, sale of
cultural artifacts (usually from Cuba)
Foundations, membership fees,
business interests
Self-funded by members

Foundations, Primarily self-funded by
Members
Foundations, donations from members


Foundations, membership fees, Board
of Directors
No funding (Members are mostly
academic institutions)
Self-funded by members


Foundations, private donors, grassroots
organizations, members, public
donations
Foundations, public and private
Donations
Foundations, donations from members
Self-funded by members
Self-funded by members
Foundations
Foundations, public donations, private
Interests









CHAPTER 4
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF THE ANTI-EMBARGO MOVEMENT

The strategies and tactics of the organizations reflect a fair degree of heterogeneity

although they are similar in several instances. Most of the tactics employed are conventional and

are carried out within the confines of the law. These include mailing lists, publications,

conferences, summits and seminars. Some groups take delegations to Cuba and engage in

lobbying on the Hill. Others employ litigation and use of the courts. Only Venceremos Brigade

and Pastors for Peace have demonstrated a more confrontational approach openly breaking the

law to take brigadistas and caravanista~s to the island. None of the groups admitted to courting

the media as a strategy although Pastors for Peace confesses that it employs tactics which will

attract media attention. However, they all claim to have an amicable relationship with the media

which occasionally covers their activities. Solidarity networks and co-option are also significant

strategies of most groups. During the interviews, they all admitted that their interaction is very

intense and consider themselves a dense network of organizations attempting to change U.S.

policy to Cuba. Indeed, while undertaking interviews in D.C., other potential interviewees in

New York and Miami were recommended.

Conventional Strategies and Tactics

The anti-embargo groups employ a range of conventional tactics. They have all taken

advantage of the advancement in information technology and have established websites through

which they publicize their goals, underscore the "unjust" embargo policy, solicit support and

contributions from potential members and donors, highlight their specific grievances, advertise

their activities and generally mobilize members of the public interested in participating in their

contentious action.









The Center for International Policy (CIP) takes fact-finding delegations to Cuba,

organizes conferences on specific issues, invites Cubans to express their views in the U.S., and

publish opinion pieces which take issue with the current U.S. policy to Cuba. These are geared

toward shaping public opinion about this policy and initiating dialogue with the Cuban

government so that travel restrictions can be lifted and an eventual dismantling of the embargo

achieved.

CIP took delegations to Cuba in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005. In February, March, April

and June of 2001, it led four delegations including religious leaders, American sugar refiners, a

Congressional delegation with the Michigan Farm Bureau and African-American j journalists. In

2002, it took eight delegations to the island including the Travel Agent Fact-finding Mission on

Sustainable Tourism in January; the Kentucky Agribusiness Fact-finding Mission in March; the

Kentucky Women in Agriculture Fact-finding Mission in May; the Kentucky Fact-finding

Mission on Banking, Transportation and Aquaculture and the Georgia Ports Authority and

Fishing Industry Fact-Finding Mission in June; and the Kentucky Fact Finding Mission on

Seafood Purchase and Transportation Infrastr-ucture in July. In November, it led three missions

including the Delegation of Former U.S. Senators, Dale Bumpers and John Culver; the Houston

World Affairs Council Fact-finding Mission and the Fact-finding Mission of Architects and

Urban Planners. Five missions were taken in 2003. These include the Senate Staff Fact-Finding

Mission; Urbanists International Fact-Finding Mission and the Georgia Business Fact-Finding

Mission in February; Senator Baucus and Montana Farm Delegation in September and the






SThe Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "Cuba Program."
http://ciponline. org/cuba/cubaproj ect/cubaproj ect.htm#mission.










Kansas Wheat Farmers Delegation in November.2 According to Smith, "these trips are important

so that Americans can witness the Cuban reality for themselves especially in the light of the

propaganda they are being fed in the U.S.".3 In 2005, Wayne Smith visited Cuba to interview

Ricardo Alarc6n, president of the Cuban National Assembly.4 Smith, who heads CIP's Cuba

proj ect, believes that "publishing is most important".' He has published in several maj or

newspapers and in CIP's website since 1993.6

In addition to these delegations, CIP also sponsors a number of conferences on Cuba. In

October, 2001 it sponsored an agricultural conference, and in November that year, it organized a

"conference on the inconsistencies in the U.S. "terrorism list". In September 2002, it worked

with a number of other organizations to hold the Washington D.C. National Summit on Cuba. A

Freedom to Travel Forum was held in July, 2003 and three conferences were organized in 2004.

These were entitled the "Federal Sugar Subsidy Program", "Commission for a Free Cuba" and

"To Examine Evidence of Keeping Cuba on the U. S. List of Terrorist States" held in April, May

and October, respectively. Two conferences were carded for 2005. The first, "U. S. Abuse at






22 The Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "Cuba Program."
http://ciponline. org/cuba/cubaproj ect/cubaproj ect.htm#conferences

3 Interview with Smith, 9" August 2006.

4 For a summary of that visit see the Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "Cuba
Program." http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaandterrorismitriw2wt%0lro~t

5 Interview with Smith, 9" August 2006.

6 Some of Smith's more controversial articles are "Cuba after the Cold War" (1993); "Our Cuba Diplomacy" (1994),
"The U.S.-Cuba Imbroglio" (1996); "Helms-Burton: A Loose Canon" (1997), "Wanted, a Logical Cuba Policy"
(1998); "End the Travel Ban to Cuba" (2001); "Cuba on the Terrorist List: In Defense of the Nation or Domestic
Political Calculation?" (2002); "Freedom to Travel to Cuba" (2003); "Cuba Should not be on the Terrorist List
(I II 4); and Guantanamo: Our own Devil's Island" (2005). For a list of Smith's publications, see the Center for
International Policy's Cuba Program. Wayne Smith in the News. Washington, DC. "Articles by Wayne Smith."
http://ciponline. org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%20 Smith. htm










Guantanamo", was held in April and the other, "A History of Terrorism in Miami, Florida, was

organized in October.'

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has also sponsored a number of

Congressional trips to Cuba. Amongst the recipients are Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) and Michael

McNulty (D-NY) who visited Cuba on a fact-finding mission in February 2000, "to evaluate the

impact of the U. S. embargo on the people of Cuba"." James P. McGovern (D-Mass) was also

sponsored by WOLA to visit Cuba in April 2000 on a fact-finding mission "to facilitate

education and cultural exchanges between Massachusetts universities and Cuban counterparts".

Joe Moakley (D-Mass) also received funding from WOLA for that trip. However, his purpose

was "to create dialogue and exchanges between education leaders in Massachusetts and Cuba."

WOLA later sponsored McGovern on a subsequent fact-finding mission in February, 2004.9

WOLA also engage in educational outreach to the U.S. public on Cuba policy issues. In

the firm belief that educated and organized citizen groups can make a change, WOLA advocates

a number of strategies. These include reaching out to church groups; universities (faculty and

students); local business groups; chambers of commerce; farm groups; agricultural associations

and Cuba Americans. WOLA also offers detailed tips for citizens to work with these groups to

undertake an educational event together such as a talk hosted by a university; to write a letter to a

local newspaper or to visit a member of Congress or Congressional candidate together. In

addition, WOLA works with CIP and the LAWG to organize seminars and conferences treating



SThe Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "Cuba Program."
http://ciponline. org/cuba/cubaproj ect/cubaproj ect. htm#conferences.
SFor a list of congresspersons sponsored by WOLA for trips to Cuba, see Steve Henn, American Public Media.
American Radio Works. 2007. Polic1l Trips."
" http ://americanradioworks .publicradio. org/feature s/congtravel/sponsor~report. php? sponsor-3 129 1
9 Ibid.










with anti-embargo issues. Its website publishes articles from these D.C. groups and they have

cooperated to publicly applaud the efforts of Senators and Congresspersons attempting to repeal

the embargo. 10 Although WOLA does not support the embargo on trade, according to

coordinator of the Cuba proj ect, Geoff Thale, "the organization has no official position on

sanctions". Moreover, though WOLA' s relationship with the state is not exactly friendly, they do

hold meetings and civilized discussions".l

The Latin American Working Group (LAWG) has posted numerous publications in its

website through which it hopes to educate the public on U.S.-Cuba policy. Some of these are

authored or co-authored by the head of the Cuba program, Mavis Andersonl2. The LAWG also

posts several articles written by Philip Peters of the Lexington Institutel13. Other articles by the

Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET), the Emergency Network of Cuban

American Scholars and Artists (ENCASA) and CIP also appear in LAWG' s website. 14 In 2006,

LAWG posted an extensive document entitled "Retreat from Reason: U.S.-Cuba Academic

Relations and the Bush Administration" written by Kimberly Stanton (2006).15 The coalition

also works with WOLA and CIP, its partner organizations, to issue press releases lending support


'o Washington Office on Latin America. Washington, DC. 2007. "Welcome to wola.org." www.wola.org.

11 Interview with Thale, 20th May 2005.

12 Anderson's publications include "The United States and Cuba Strands of a Failed Policy" (July, 2006) and
Cracking Down on Cuba Travel" (2003). For more of Anderson' s publications, see Latin American Working Group.
Washington, DC. 2003. "Explore the Issue: U.S.-Cuba Relations."
Illlp w\ il \t .1awg.org/countries/cuba/explore~us_cuba.ht

13 Peters' publications in the LAWG's website include "Dieting for Democracy" (6th May, 2004) and "The Value of
Engagement with Cuba" (4t September, 2003). An ardent anti-embargo advocate, Peters is actually a Cuba expert
who is employed with the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia. See Lexington Institute.
www.1exingtoninstitute.org for more of his publications.

14 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Links for More Information on U. S./Cuba Policy."
I1lllp w il it .1awg.org/countries/cuba/1inks-cuba.htm

1s For a pdf copy of the publication see Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003.
I1lllp w il it .1awg.org/misc/Publications.htm










to congressional voting against the embargo policy such as the Senate Travel Bill. Its "Congress

Watch" section keeps readers informed of the U. S. Cuba debate in the House. 16 Its website also

contains articles condemning the embargo published by prominent newspapers such as the

M~iami Herald, the Chicago Tribune, the Wa~shington Post and the Sun Sentinel. 1

Via a flier, the LAWG offers readers the opportunity to sign up for its email network

which will allow them to receive timely updates on U.S. Cuba policy. It also solicits signatures

for petitions to various officials at a website where information on the plight of those who have

traveled to Cuba and the U.S.-Cuba policy debate can be found. In addition, the coalition

provides tips for members of the public to contact their senators and representatives and to write

a letter to the editor or an Op-Ed for the local newspaper. I However, former staff member, Phil

Schmidt, affirms that a maj or strategy of the LAWG is working with grassroots organization

such as Witness for Peace, Catholic Relief Services, Global Exchange, Oxfam America, the

Alliance of Baptists and the International Labor Rights Fund. 19

Like CIP and WOLA, the New York-based Center for Cuban Studies also aims to educate

and inform the public about U. S. Cuba policy. However, it diverges in its emphasis on the

internal dynamics of the island, specifically, art and culture. Under the directorship of the

energetic Sandra Levinson, the Center has been organizing trips to Cuba since 1973 for both

groups and individuals that falls within the legal exemptions to the U.S. ban on travel. These

trips are geared towards professional research, news-gathering, educational study and religious

16 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Congress Watch."
I1ll1p w il \ it .1awg. org/countries/cub a/congre ss~watch. htm.
'7 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Explore the Issue: Cuba in the News."
Illip w\ il t.awg.org/countries/cuba/explore_cuba~newshm

1s Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Take Action."
I1llp w il it .1awg.org/countries/cuba/takeACTION.htm
19 Interview with Schmidt, 18" May 2005.










study. Some of these are custom-planned research trips. The Center has also offered Spanish

language classes in the past. In addition, the Center has set up a Lifeline Fund which facilitates

contributions and donations to Cuban institutions. These include medicines and medical supplies,

religious artifacts, artists' supplies and educational materials.20

The Center' s Lourdes Casal Library holds thousands of post-1 959 books on Cuba. The

library is open to the public by appointment on Friday afternoons where visitors can review the

numerous magazines, newspapers and special collection of study materials and extensive

clippings file, housed there. Its magazine, Cuba Upd'ate, treats with issues such as migration,

sexual politics, sustainable development, women, travel and the embargo. The printed magazine

is no longer available and has been substituted by an online version, Cuba Upd'ate Online, and a

soon to be published short monthly newsletter. In addition, the Center hosts numerous seminars

which focus on issues such as "the African roots of Cuban culture, Cuba's economic crisis,

architecture and urban planning, health care, film, the performing and visual arts, religion law

and justice, education, day care and the environment".21

The Center's "Cuban Art Space", advertised through its website, www. cubanartspace.net,

seeks to promote the work of Cuban artists. The Center is committed to this feat to the extent that

it is prepared to take legal action against the American government if necessary. In 1991, the

Center spearheaded a successful lawsuit against the Treasury Department. Since then, the

importation and sale of original art from Cuba has been legal in the United States. The Center

has a collection of several thousand art works, posters, hand-made books and photographs by

Cuban artists. Director of the Center, Sandra Levinson, frequently hosts and curates art and



20 Center for Cuban Studies. New York. "About Us." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .cubaupdate.org/more.htm
21 Ibid.










poster exhibitions and offers Cuban artifacts for rent or sale to the American public.22 According

to Levinson, one of the strategies employed by the Center is working with j ournalist to present

an accurate picture of the Cuban reality. Another strategy is an attempt to depart from the

political image of the D.C. groups. "The Center does not engage in politicking although we do

not deny that the Center is political since the Cuba issue can never be apolitical".23 In this regard,

the Center does not engage in lobbying on the Hill but focuses on cultural activities.

Like the Center for Cuban Studies, the recently formed Emergency Coalition to Defend

Education Travel (ECDET), has also employed litigation. However, its goal is specifically to

Eight against the violations of academic freedoms. On 13th June, 2006, Dr. Wayne S. Smith of

Johns Hopkins University; Dr. John Cotman of Howard University; Jessica Kamen and Adnan

Ahmad, both undergraduate students at Johns Hopkins University, legally challenged the state on

the academic travel ban. The suits were Hiled against the U.S. Treasury Department over

restrictions on educational travel issued on June 16 of 2004. According to the group, these

restrictions clearly violate academic freedom as defined by the Supreme Court.24 ECDET has

been assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida which also filed a lawsuit in

June, 2006 in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, "challenging the

constitutionality of the recently signed state law banning Florida' s public universities from using

private, state, or federal funds for travel to Cuba and certain other countries" (Burton 2006). To

lend solidarity to its cause the ECDET has employed the strategy of reaching out to hundreds of





22Center for Cuban Studie s. New York. Cuban Art Space." http://www. cubanartspace.net

23Interview with Levinson, 26th May 2005.

24Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. 2006. "Press Release."
\li \l u\ llecdet. org/ECDET%20press%20release .htm.









colleges and universities in the U. S. some of which have become active members in the

coalition.25

The two business coalitions work in close collaboration and employ similar tactics and

strategies. In collaboration with the National Foreign Trade Council, USA Engage has issued

numerous press releases and posted several articles in its website on developments regarding the

U. S embargo on Cuba. Some of these have been published by other institutions such as the

American Association for World Health, Human Rights Watch and the Cato Institute. The

publications include "The impact of the U. S. Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba";

"Human Rights Watch Opposes the Embargo on Cuba"; and "Cato Institute Study Urges U.S. to

Lift Cuba Sanctions".26 Director of USA Engage, Jake Colvin, admitted that the organization has

been involved in lobbying Congress. Indeed, this organization seems to be the only one under

study which enj oys a cordial relationship with the state, even occasionally holding meetings with

state officials. This, according to Colvin, is due to the fact that Cuba is not the only issue in their

agenda since it addresses sanctions imposed on other countries such as Iran (Interview with

Colvin, 19th August, 2006).

The U.S.-Cuba Trade Association (USCTA) has forged strategic partnerships with both the

National Foreign Trade Council and USA Engage. These organizations not only support the

USCTA but also facilitate its activities. The USCTA has organized conferences on Trade issues,

two of which was held in 2006. The first entitled "Doing Business in Cuba", was organized with



25Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. 2006. "ECDET Membership List."
b1lip u \\\l.ecdet.org/members.htm.
26 USAEngage. 2004. www.usaengage.org










the Florida Citrus Club and was held in Orlando, Florida in April. The second called the "U.S.-

Cuba Energy Summit, was held in Mexico City, Mexico in February.27 Both conferences

attracted a host of business interests including Caterpillar, Exxon Mobil Exploration, the Lewis

Energy Group, Hemingway Preservation Foundation and Purity Foods. Jake Colvin, Director of

USA-Engage, attended and participated in both conferences.28

Lobbying is also a maj or tactic of USCTA. Both the National Foreign Trade Council

(NFTC) and USA Engage provide extensive professional lobbying personnel and experience to

support Congressional initiatives of direct concern to companies which trade with Cuba. USCTA

call on these lobbyists as well as coordinate and work closely with both these organizations to

protect the current business with Cuba from interference and to support and realize new

measures to ease the procedures and build new business opportunities.29 Like CIP and WOLA,

USCTA also takes trade delegations to Cuba. For Kirby Jones, President of USCTA, "taking

business people to Cuba is important because they need to get educated and understand the

potential for trade with Cuba. The level of lack of information about Cuba in the United States is

astounding".30

The Cuban American organizations also engage in conventional tactics. The Cuban

Committee for Democracy (CCD), one of the oldest Cuban American organizations, has been

vociferous in highlighting the changing dynamics of the community and the rise of moderate

Cuban Americans. Former Director, Sean Garcia, was vocal about the stance taken by the


27US-Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. "Doing Business in Cuba."
http1 \\ \\ \\.uscuba.org/floridaconference.htm and Alamar Associates. Washington, DC. "US-Cuba Energy
Summit." blpl w il it .uscubasummit.org
28 Ibid.

29 US-Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. "Mission." http1 nu \\ \ uscuba.org/index.htm

30 Interview with Jones, 7" June 2005, 16t August 2006.










Committee and moderate Cuban Americans in the Elian Gonzalez debacle.31 In 2003, the

Committee had also j ointly sponsored a conference with other anti-embargo organizations such

as World Policy Institute, Puentes Cubanos, Fundaci6n Amistad, The Time is Now Coalition,

Cambio Cubano and Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba.32 According to Alfredo

Duran, founder of CCD, the Committee has reached out overseas to countries like Venezuela and

Spain which have lent support to the CCD in the past. In addition, the CCD had a radio program

called "Transici6n" which transmitted anti-embargo programs daily via the 1450 am station

which attempted to counteract the hardline transmissions of Radio Marti.33

The Miami based Cuba Study Group has set up a "news center" in its website to allow

visitors to read the latest news from and about Cuba. With articles from leading newspapers such

as the M~iamni Herald, Financial Times, New York Times, El Pais and El Universal, visitors can

be updated on the latest developments from the island. The Group's website also has a "research

section" providing visitors with a wide variety of research papers written by some of the world' s

leading Cubanists. They treat with issues like democracy and transition; economy and

development; labor rights and U.S. policy. The "Research Section" also has a comprehensive list

of Cuba Experts, allowing visitors to search and contact experts in areas ranging from society

and culture to the military. In addition, this section provides a list of "suggested books"

regarding Cuba ranging from fiction to issue-specific publications. Through a proj ect called

consenso cubano (discussed below), the Cuba Study Group collaborates with other groups

comprising political parties, academic and cultural institutions and other institutions which share


31 Cable News Network. CNNinternational.com. www.edition.cnn.com

32World Policy Institute. "National Summit on Cuba, October 4, 2003. A Compendium of Commentary."
\li \\ ll worldpolicy .org/proj ects/uscuba/2003 %20 Summit%/20Transcript%/207 .pdf.
33Interview with Durin, 19th December, 2006.










similar goals.34 According to co-Chairman, Carlos Saladrigas, "our strategy is to challenge the

status quo by reframing the issue so that the image of Cuban Americans in South Florida will be

changed while at the same time initiating the process of transition to democracy in Cuba".35

The Cuban American Commission for Family Rights has been vigorously protesting the

2004 restrictions on family travel via press conferences and peaceful street demonstrations in

Miami and Washington D.C. in which hundreds of Cuban Americans participated.36 The

Commission has also worked with the William C. Velazquez Institute (WCVI) to conduct a poll

on Cuban American attitudes to the new restrictions and support amongst them for the George

W. Bush administration.37 In addition, the Commission has participated in several national

summits in Cuba in Mobil, Alabama in 2005 and at Rutgers University School of Law in

Newark, New Jersey in October, 2006. Silvia Wilhelm, Executive Director of the Commission,

claims that the organization has commissioned a documentary entitled "Those I left Behind". She

also admits to a close relationship with certain members of Congress, to having testified against

the travel ban in Congress and to working closely with other organizations such as CIP, WOLA

and LAWG.38

The California based Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF), collaborates

closely with the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights to promote humanitarian travel


34 Cuba Study Group. Washington, DC. "Our Projects."
htt \\ \\ lcubastudygroup.org/index.cfm?FuseAction=AotPoects
35 Interview with Saladrigas, 6th June 2006.

36 For example, the Commission participated in a Cuba Action Day in April 2005 in Washington D.C. in which
more than 700 gathered to call for an end to the travel ban on Cuba. For details, see CommonDreams.org
Newscenter. 1997-2007. "Cuba Action Day April 27: Over 700 to Call for End to Travel Ban; Leaders Coming to
Washington." http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0426-6hm

37Al Neuhart. USA Today. News. "Young Cuban exiles crack pro-Bush Wall."
Illi u\ \\ usatoday. com/news/opinion/columnist/neuharth/2004-0715-neuharth~x. htm.

38Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006.










to Cuba. It establishes direct links of support and friendship with the Cuban Association for the

Disabled. Amongst its many strategies are relief efforts undertaken with other national-based

organizations to assist victims of natural disasters in Cuba; social work projects designed to

compare efforts to meet basic human needs and to enhance human well-being; collaboration with

the U.S.-Cuba Sister-City to promote and facilitate people-to-people engagements of mutual

benefit; cultural exchanges, art exhibits, music, dance, cinema, and festival events to promote

Cuban culture and raise funds for humanitarian proj ects. CAAEF also engages in forums and

debates at schools and universities, the National Press Club, and in U.S. and foreign conference

sites; press outreach, Op-Ed pieces, radio and newspaper interviews through U.S. and foreign

media outlets, congressional visits and distribution of educational material on perspectives of

Cuban Americans on U. S.-Cuba Relations. Furthermore, it participates in j oint action and

advocacy work with business, religious, human rights, cultural, and humanitarian groups to

monitor legislation that may adversely impact on the well-being of both Cubans and

Americans.39

CAAEF works very closely with other organizations which are willing to lend their

resources for j oint programs. According to Fernandez, "the organizations have a ready stock of

resources amongst each other. We are having a meeting this Saturday in Miami and CAAEF will

pay for accommodation for some visiting participants from other groups. Silvia Wilhelm will

also facilitate us in finding accommodation for participants within the Cuban American

community. Some of our resources are located in Cuba. Sister Cities, an organization which







39 Cuban American Alliance. Washington, DC. 1995. http://www.cubamer.org/help~us.asp










focuses on the twinning of U. S. and Cuban cities, receive support from mayors in the U. S. which

are twinned with mayors in Cuba".40

CAAEF has been engaged in a proj ect know as "La Familia" for over seven years. It is a

humanitarian proj ect which has secured licenses from both the United States Department of

Commerce and the Office of Foreign Assets Control for the delivery and exportation of

donations to the Cuban Association for the Physically Disabled. The proj ect is unique in two

respects. Firstly, deliveries are made on a regular basis to meet current needs and secondly,

assessments are made with each delivery for future assistance. Participants in the La FamFFFFFFFF~~~~~~~~~ilia

mission strive to assist the physically impaired to reach new levels of independent living and

empowerment. 41

CAEF also issues press releases on the embargo issue which it openly condemns,

specifically the 2004 restrictions on travel. The organization also posts news articles on

developments on Cuba in its website42 and on upcoming events hosted by itself and other anti-

embargo organizations. It also publishes articles in maj or newspapers such as the M~iamni Herald'

and Granma International; and offers legislative updates on the embargo debate in the U.S.

Congress.43





40 Interview with Fern~ndez, 25t October 2006.

41Interview with Femindez, 23rd October 2006.

42 Amongst CAAEF's many releases are "Support for Congressional Delegation to Cuba and End of All Travel
Restrictions in 2007" (19t December, 2006): "Cuban Americans Denounce Bush's Plan on Cuba" (11t July, 2006);
Cuba's Report to UN on Why USA's Blockade Must End" (11t October, 2005): "CAEF Questions Violations of
Human and Civil Rights" (31s~t March, 2005); and Cuban Americans Denounce White House Plan on Cuba" (7"
May, 2004). See Cuban American Alliance. Washington, DC. 1995. "Press Release."
Ili \l \\ llcubamer.org/item list.asp?Item=Press%20Relae

43Cuban American Alliance. Washington, DC. 1995. Ne\ w Articles."
Ili \l \\ llcubamer. org/item list. asp?Item=News%20Article.









A unique and outstanding strategy of CAAEF was taking the Cuba issue to the 61st Session

of the UN Commission on Human Rights on 31s~t March, 2005, following the 2004 restrictions on

family and academic travel. There, President Delvis Fern~ndez addressed "Questions of the

Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of People of Cuban Origin Living in the

United States of America and in Territories Under its Jurisdiction". As a Cuban American,

Fern~ndez treated with a grievance close to his heart and the hearts of his compatriots in the

United States by taking the issue to the UN. He related the story of a 103 year-old grandmother

of Cuban origin who resides in the United States who was anxious to see her son, a resident of

Cuba in a grave life-threatening situation, suffering from lung-cancer. The family contacted their

United States Congressional representatives but was told she could not obtain an exception to

travel with an accompanying family member. Similarly, he expounded the sorry plight of

CAAEF's La FamFFFFFFFF~~~~~~~~~ilia proj ect which "is held hostage waiting for a license placed on hold since

August 15, 2004. Neither aid nor assistance has been sent for seven months while officials of the

United States Government deliberate on granting a humanitarian travel permit to deliver

donations already licensed by the United States Commerce Department".44 The historic event

was reported in the Cuban newspaper, Granma International:

Cuban-American groups at the Human Rights Commission (HRC) have condemned the
measures which they described as "criminal" adopted by President George W. Bush to
restrict their contact with relatives on the island, reported PL. Delvis Fern~ndez Levy,
president of the Cuban-American Alliance Education Fund, took part in this Thursday's
session in which Item 10, relating to economic, social and cultural rights, was debated. He
explained that in July last year, the White House implemented certain regulations which
contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions adopted by
the United Nations. He called on the HRC "to consider these violations to fundamental
human rights and freedoms" and urged "the government of George W. Bush to put an end
to the suffering caused by such policies. "Fern~ndez Levy told Prensa Latina that it is the
first time that Cuban-American citizens have attended this UN forum in order to make a

44 Fern~ndez Levy, Delvis. Cuban American Alliance. "CAEF Questions Violations of Human and Civil Rights
Statement at the 61s~t Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 31s~t March, 2005. Cuban American Alliance.
Washington, DC. 1995. "Press Release." http://www.ccubamer org/item. asp?id=16










complaint about the U.S. "cruel anti-Cuban regulations." "This is an historic moment. We
have delegations from at least four organizations from California, Orlando and Miami.
Now is the time for more people to take to the streets and add weight to this demand," he
affirmed (Granma International, April 1"t, 2005).

Another strategy used by most of the organizations is the skillful framing of their

grievances to evoke public empathy and sympathy for Cuban Americans and Cuba and to portray

the administration as "immoral" and "unjust" for tightening the embargo. Americans for

Humanitarian Trade with Cuba, for example, has couched its grievance in humanitarian terms

even though many of its members are profit-seeking business interests. The LAWG, CIP, WOLA

and CAAEF have been promoting a photo exhibit depicting graphic representations of Cuban

Americans who are affected by the travel ban entitled "Love Loss and Longing: The Impact of

U.S. Travel Policy on Cuban American Families." Gripping titles of articles such as, "Families

Torn Apart", "Strict U.S. Policies on Cuba Tears Families Apart", "A Bankrupt Cuba Policy",

"U. S. Still Wrongheaded in its Approach to Cuba", "The United States and Cuba Strands of a

Failed Policy" and UN Says no to US Blockade of Cuba", pervade the websites of the anti-

embargo orgamizations.45

Confrontational Strategies and Tactics

Only two of the organizations under study have employed confrontational tactics, openly

breaking the law and defying state officials by making illegal trips to Cuba. The refusal to apply

for a license is a tactic they employ to directly challenge the travel ban. As the oldest anti-

embargo organization, Venceremos Brigade has been involved in educational activities since

1969. However, its more popular and controversial activity has been taking brigadistas to Cuba.

Determined not to legitimize the embargo travel policy, the organization continues to take



45The most popular websites are 1nny.ciponline.org, 1nny.wola.org, inny.1awg.org, inny.cubamer.org and
www.progre soweekly. com.










brigadista~s of all races, socio-economic class and sexual orientations to Cuba. In order to show

solidarity for the Cuban Revolution in the past, the group has taken brigadista~s to work in the

sugar harvests and do agricultural and construction work in the island such as painting buildings

and hauling construction materials.46

While there, they sleep in camps designed to host solidarity groups on bunk beds in rooms

accommodating six to ten people. They have several meetings with Cuban organizations such as

the Federation of Cuban Women; the Union of Communist Youth; and Municipal, Regional and

National Assemblies. They also visit social and economic institutions such as health clinics,

senior centers and orphanages, dropping off material aid in the process. Cultural activities in the

island involve visits to museums, musical and dance performances and special events.47 In 2003,

the brigadista~s painted a neighborhood health clinic and celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the

attack on the Moncada Barracks. In 2004, the Brigade celebrated its 35th anniversary by

organizing a large and visible travel challenge because "Bush was increasing harassment of both

"licensed" and "non-licensed" travelers".48

The other confrontational group, Pastors for Peace, sometimes collaborates with

Venceremos Brigade in its activities on Cuba. A joint effort was undertaken in 2003 when the

34th Brigade "met with the members of the Pastors for Peace/IFCO Caravan and participated in

several education workshops, such as Cuban Legal System and Hip Hop in Cuba. The Brigade

also participated in a historic meeting with former Agents of the Cuban government that

infiltrated Counter-Revolutionary organizations based in Cuba, that are supported by the



46 Veneceremos Brigade. "An Overview of the Brigade Experience."
http://www.venceremo sbrigade. org/tripoverview. htm.
47Venceremos Brigade. "Who We Are and What We do." http://www.venceremosbrigade.org/backgroudhm
48Ibid.










American Interest Section in Cuba". They also participated in a historic meeting with former

agents of the Cuban government that infiltrated counter-revolutionary organizations based in

Cuba.49

The direct confrontational tactics of the New York based Pastors for Peace are quite

similar to that of Venceremos Brigade but are different from the conventional tactics of the other

groups. Pastors for Peace has been challenging the embargo policy for the last fourteen years by

delivering humanitarian aid to Cuba without a Treasury Department license through its

friendship caravans. Since 1992, the annual Caravans have traveled in school buses, trucks and

cars to Cuba via Texas and Mexico taking medical and educational supplies, computers, school

buses, milk, Bibles and bicycles collected from groups across the U.S. and Canada. Caravanista~s

hail from the U.S., Mexico and Europe. On the way to Texas, they stay with local community

activists across the U.S.5o

The annual Caravans are dedicated to different sectors of Cuban society. The seventh

caravan was dedicated to the children of Cuba and Pastors for Peace delivered 500 tons of aid.

This included a mobile library equipped with a Pentium computer, a pediatric ambulance, four

school buses, and educational and medical aid. The Caravan left from both the East and West

Coast of the U. S. The eighth caravan included 165 volunteers from across the U. S., Canada,

Mexico and six European countries. It was dedicated to the children and elders of Cuba and

deliveries included book mobiles, ambulances, computers, pediatric and geriatric medicines and

raw materials to facilitate Cuba' s production of 385,000 tons worth of life-saving antibiotics. 5



49 Veneceremos Brigade. "About Venceremos Brigade." http://www.venceremosbrigade.org/aboutVB3.t

so Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.

st Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. "The US/Cuba Friendshipment
Caravan Campaign: A Brief History." b1lip w\ int\\ifconews.org/Cuba/caravan~history.htm









Subsequent caravans were dedicated to Cuba's doctors and nurses; students and athletes;

Cuba's innovation in alternative energy and transportation; its progress in health and healing and

the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. The organization provided

millions of dollars worth of sophisticated medical aid, solar panels and equipment; a fifty-three

foot trailer filled with medical supplies; a bike mobile fully equipped for repairing bicycles. The

13th Caravan of July, 2002, visited the Latin American School of Medical Sciences to meet the

dozens of American students who are recruited by Pastors for Peace and are studying on full

Cuban scholarships to serve as doctors in medically under-served areas of the U. S.52

Staff member Shane Gastever admits that Pastors for Peace has engaged in some lobbying

but not to any large extent. They have also taken congressional delegations to Cuba like CIP and

WOLA. He relates that Reverend Lucius Walker, who heads the organization, employs well-

calculated tactics and strategies in order to irritate state officials while at the same time, evoke

public sympathy for Cuba.53 This involves breaking the law and taking humanitarian aid to

Cuba, respectively. In this regard, the organization has ensured that efforts by the state to

confiscate aid materials at the U.S. border received ample attention from the American media.

Indeed, the strategy worked well in 1996 when computers were seized by state officials and

cravanista~s engaged in a thirty two days Fast for Life at the San Diego border. The event

attracted such widescale media attention that international organizations from Africa, Europe and

Latin America, further pledged 1400 computers in solidarity with Cuba and the Fast for Life.

Seventy members of Congress joined the effort and the state was eventually forced to release the

computers which now comprise forty percent of the INFO1VED network in Cuba, providing life-



52 Ibid.

53 Interview with Gastever, 10t August, 2006.










giving medical information for Cuban doctors.54 Like Venceremos Brigade who believes that it

is our "duty to disobey unjust laws, the refusal of Pastors for Peace to apply for a license under

the terms of the embargo is based on the principle: "to do so would be a defacto recognition of

an immoral policy".5 In response, the state has issued veiled threats via letters requesting

information on where the caravanistas stayed in Cuba and how much money they spent in the

island, but no legal action has been taken against the group.56

Solidarity Networks and Co-option

Information provided by the organizations' websites and the structured and semi-str-uctured

interviews, reveals that the organizations work very closely with each other, lending solidarity

when necessary as in the case of Venceremos Brigade and Pastors for Peace. There is also a high

level of cooperation amongst the three maj or D.C. groups. CIP and the LAWG, for example,

j ointly produce a program called "Just the Facts", which is a database of U. S. security assistance

to Latin America and the Caribbean. 57Seventeen organizations have also collaborated to j ointly

produce a website called cubacentral.com advocating an end to the travel ban on Cuba.

Perhaps the most vivid example of the movement' s networking and collaboration was in

the organization of a "Cuban Action Day" held on 27th April, 2005. The event had 700

participants from more than thirty five states who traveled to Washington D.C. for this day of

advocacy against the embargo on Cuba held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel. Amongst the

participants were CIP, WOLA, LAWG and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. The attendees and


54Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. "The US/Cuba Friendshipment
Caravan Campaign: A Brief History." hopll w\ int .ifconews.org/Cuba/caravan~history.htm
55 Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. "IFCO Pastors for Peace and
Cuba: Why we Go". http://www.ifconews.org/Cuba/main.htm

56 Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.

57 Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. "Joint Programs." http://ciponline .org/j ointproj ects.htm










speakers included Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA), Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA), Rep. Howard

Berman (D-CA), Rep Jim Davis (D-FL), Kirby Jones from the U.S. Cuba Trade Association, Dr.

Lillian Manzor from the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights and Tom Quigley,

Latin American Advisor to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishop.5

Dense networking is also evident in the close collaboration and cooperation amongst the

D.C. organizations and intense interaction with other organizations in Miami and New York. The

CIP website for example, carries articles published by LAWG. WOLA's former intern, Claire

Rodriguez, is now a staff member at the LAWG and the intern, Vincent Pascandolo, who

interned initially at the World Policy Institute, later j oined CIP in the same capacity. Alfredo

Duran from the CCD sits on CIP's Board. Two prestigious members of WOLA, William

Goodfellow and Joy Olson, are amongst the distinguished members of the Board of Directors at

the LAWG. Silvia Wilhelm sits amongst the Board of Directors of the US-Cuba Trade

Association which follows the example of USA-Engage and establishes close ties with the

National Foreign Trade Council. Even though both are coalitions representing business interests,

there is no sense of competition between them. Indeed, the President of the National Foreign

Trade Council, William Reinsch, is both Chairman of the Board of Directors of the US-Cuba

Trade Association and Co-Chair of USA-Engage.

Solidarity amongst groups is also quite visible in the 2003 American Farm Bureau

Federation Convention where the members of the organizations worked together to present a

booth which allowed them to share their message with the general public. As CIP's website

describes it, "the longest lines were at the End the Embargo on Cuba booth, sponsored by CIP,

LAWG, WOLA and the Cuban American Alliance...over and over again, convention attendees

58 Geoff Thale. Washington Office on Latin America. Washington DC. "700 Participate on Cuba Action Day on
capitol Hill." http://www.woola org/media/cc~finalj uly_ 5 .pdf










told LAWG' s Mavis Anderson, WOLA's Rachel Farley, CIP's Anya Landau and the Cuban

American Alliance's Delvis Fernandez, that the embargo "doesn't make any sense and "should

have ended a long time ago".59

Several other activities including meeting and conferences have been j ointly sponsored by

a number of organizations. The 2002 National Summit on Cuba was sponsored by the National

Farm Bureau Federation, USA Engage, the World Policy Institute and Americans for

Humanitarian trade with Cuba. It was chaired by CIP's Anya Landau. The summit incorporated a

Cuba Lobby Day launched by younger-generation Cuban Americans who networked with other

Cuban American advocacy groups. It demonstrated for the first time, "the remarkable breadth of

support that exists throughout the United States for creating a more sensible policy toward

Cuba".60

Over the years, the anti-embargo organizations have networked with a number of

academics, business, and grassroots groups. In addition, several politicians and ex-politicians

have demonstrated solidarity with the movement. In 2000, CIP hosted a conference on the

prospects of agricultural trade between the United States and Cuba. Amongst the active

participants at the conference were the United States Rice Producers Association and the

American Farm Bureau Federation. The latter' s convention in 2003 in Tampa was actively

supported by CIP, WOLA, LAWG and the Cuban American Education Alliance.61 The 2002

Summit in Washington D.C. was sponsored by the American Farm Bureau Federation, USA



59 Center for International Policy Cuba Program. Washington, DC. May, 2003. 21 ri American Farm Bureau
Federation Convention." http://www.ciponline.org/cuba/trade/farmbura~t

61) Center for Intemnational Policy Cuba Program. Washington, DC. May, 2003. "National Summit on Cuba.
hli w\ il itciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/nationalsmiht

61 Center for International Policy Cuba Program. Washington, DC. May, 2003. 21 ri American Farm Bureau
Federation Convention." http://www.ciponline.org/cuba/trade/farmbura~t










Engage, World Policy Institute and Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba. The latter

comprised prominent business interests such as Hills and Company and Archer Daniels Midlands

Company.62

In April 2005, the Cuba Study Group networked with twenty other organizations founded a

proj ect called "Consenso Cubano" which aims to unite the Cuban diaspora along a series of basic

principles. Consenso Cubano is viewed as an open and dynamic process where these groups

which are primarily "Cuban political, social, labor, cultural, intellectual, religious and human

rights organizations, committed to reconciliation and to a non-violent transition in Cuba to a

sovereign state under the rule of law". It is a plural gathering space for reflection, conciliation

and concord among Cuban organizations.63

Religious organizations have also expressed solidarity with the anti-embargo movement.

These include the Alliance of Baptists, Church World Service, the Cuban Jewish Community,

the Cuban American Jewish Commission, the United Methodist Church and Witness for Peace.

Church World Service has issued a petition on the implications of the 2006 Commission for

Assistance to a Free Cuba report which ends humanitarian aid provided through the Cuban

Council of Churches. The petition is posted on LAWG' s website via an electronic link soliciting

signatures from the public. Also posted on LAWG's website is a link directing readers to a letter

issued by the National Council of Churches to then Secretary of State, Collin Powell, pleading








62 World Policy Institute. New York. "National Sununit on Cuba."
Illi \\ ll worldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/Nationalumtokpf
63 Cuba Study Group. Washington DC. "Our Projects."
Illi u\ \\ cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm?FuseAction= bu.rjc&rjcD8










with the Bush administration to reverse the Cuba policy which will "only strengthen the failed

policy of the last forty years". 64

Co-option is also heavily practiced by the anti-embargo movement where it takes place at

two levels. Older organizations reach out to other co-optable sectors of the society such as the

academy, the business sector and the Congress while newer organizations co-opt older

organizations which help facilitate their development. The academic community represents one

such group which was uncoordinated until the Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel

(ECDET) was formed in 2004 when the Bush administration imposed stringent restrictions on

academic travel to Cuba. Bill Leogrande, Dean of Public Affairs at American University and

Cynthia McClintock, Professor of Political Science at George Washington University, were

already involved with CIP, WOLA and the Center for Cuban Studies before they became part of

the ECDET.65 Wayne Smith who heads the Cuba proj ect at CIP, also co-chairs the ECDET

coalition and is himself an adjunct professor at the John Hopkins University. Carmen Diana

Deere, Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida, affirms

that ECDET had contacted her to be part of the organization because they wanted to get as many

names as possible to strengthen the opposition against academic travel. It was her role as former

President of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), which made her an invaluable

asset to ECDET because "LASA had been against the embargo since the sixties and more so in

recent times because of the American ban on Cuban academics attending the conference in the

U. S."66 The ECDET has networked with hundreds of professors at universities throughout the



64 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Take Action."
h1llp w il it .1awg.org/countries/cuba/takeACTION.htm
65 Interviews with Leogrande, 11Ith may, 2005 and McClintock, 9th May 2005.

66 Interview with Deere, 2"d NOvember 2006.










U. S. who it lists as members in its webpage. 67 Such moral support is crucial to the survival of the

ECDET which does not receive funding from foundations nor from members.

A similar kind of networking is found amongst a group of scholars calling itself the

Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists (ENCASA), consisting of more

than one hundred Cuban American scholars and writers. They hail from twenty six states and

sixty different cities and more than eighty percent are affiliated with universities. Other members

include full professors, curators, playwrights, poets, novelists, attorneys and editors. ENCASA is

particularly concerned with "the anti-family measures spawned by the 2004 Commission for

Assistance to a Free Cuba, its provisions undermining the free exchange of ideas, and restrictions

on travel by U. S. citizens".68

The more recently formed business coalitions have also co-opted the older organizations in

their drive for free trade with Cuba as seen in the 2003 American Farm Bureau Federation

Convention and the 2002 National Summit on Cuba (mentioned above) in which CIP, WOLA

and LAWG were actively involved. Conversely, the older organizations have also co-opted the

business community especially those interested in fostering trade with Cuba. Thus, the 2004

National Summit on Cuba hosted by the World Policy Institute engaged both the recently formed

U. S-Cuba Trade Association and the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights.69 Several

other new organizations which emerged in the nineties and after the 2004 restrictions were

imposed have drawn on the experience, skill and expertise of the older and popular organizations

like CIP, LAWG and WOLA.


67 Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. www.ecdet.org

68 Cuban American Alliance. 1995. "La Alborada." http://www.cubamer.org/item.asp?id=23 for further details about
ENCASA.

69 World Poliev Institute. New York. "National Summit on Cuba."
bli w\ il itworldpolicy.org/projects/uscuba/archireht










Another group which has been co-opted by the movement is that of politicians, ex-

politicians and statesmen. Both the unstructured and semi-structured interviews repeatedly reveal

the same names of Congresspersons who have been active in the movement over time'o. They

have all supported Amendments to lift the embargo at some time the other. Some of these have

even visited Cuba as part of delegations seeking to promote trade.n

On 23rd February, 1999, some members from the Association of Former Members of

Congress networked an organization called Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba

(AHTC), which sought the removal of restrictions on the sale of food and medicine to the island.

Several prominent business interests were involved such as Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill,

Caterpillar, the Louisiana Department of Economic Development and the National Foreign Trade

Council. Amongst the prominent members are Craig L. Fuller, Former Chief of Staff for Vice

President, George Bush; Sam Gibbons, Former Florida Congressman and Frank Carlucci,

Chairman of the Carlyle Group and former NSC Chief under President Reagan.72

A number of grassroots organizations have also been courted, co-opted and recruited by

the anti-embargo movement and vice-versa. As with some of the other organizations mentioned

above, there is a reciprocal relationship with each networking with the other. The LAWG and

Pastors for Peace are amongst those working most closely with grassroots groups. Some

grassroots groups working with LAWG include Network, which is a national Catholic lobby for

social justice and peace; Oxfam America, committed to alleviating hunger and promoting social

justice and equality; Peace Brigades International, which supports justice for justice and human

70 Amongst the prominent are Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Sen. Max Bacchus (D-MT), Sen. Michael Enzi (R-WY),
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-lowa), Rep. Bill Delahunt D-Mass), Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA), Rep.
Charles Rangel (D-NY), Rep. Jo-Ann Emerson (MO-08), Rep. James McGovern (D-MA), Rep. Jim Davis (D-FL).

n1 Interviews with Rodriguez, 26th August, 2006 and Peters, 16 May, 2005.

72Americans for Humanitarians with Cuba. www.ahtc.org










rights through non-violent action and Witness for Peace which is dedicated to promoting peace,

justice and sustainable economies in the Americas.73 The latter also works with Pastors for Peace

whose annual caravans to Cuba are facilitated by numerous community organizations including

church groups, labor unions and the volunteer caravanista~s themselves who fund their own trip

to Cuba with the caravans.74

Conclusion

In conclusion, one notes that the strategies and tactics employed by the organizations are

both conventional and confrontational and are fairly heterogeneous across groups. Though most

have websites with extensive self-publications and postings of articles and press releases and

organize or participate in conventions, seminars and conferences; some take delegations to Cuba

while others engage in lobbying and still others in litigation, petitions, demonstrations or illegal

visits to Cuba. A particularly unique and outstanding strategy has been CAAEF's taking the

cause to the 61" Session of the UN Convention on Human Rights on behalf of its members. Yet,

irrespective of their location, whether in D.C., New York, Miami or California, the anti-embargo

movement is ultimately a dense network of organizations which co-opt or have been co-opted by

other groups in the movement, collaborate and cooperate extensively, and lend strong solidarity

and support for each other's activities.

These strategies and tactics are the means or instruments employed by the organizations to

challenge the state in the hope of realizing their primary goal of changing U. S. Cuba policy.

They will be translated into direct activism as they confront several pro-embargo state policies

which will be the subj ect of the next chapter.


73Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "Grassroots Organizations."
h lp w il it .1awg.org/partners/grassroots.htm
74Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.









CHAPTER 5
SPEAKING TRUTHS TO POWER: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND CHALLENGING THE
STATE

On 27th April, 2005, more than 700 Americans traveled from thirty five states to participate

in what they called a "Cuba Action Day" in Washington D.C. It was a day of advocacy on

Capitol Hill organized to demand that Congress end the Cuba travel ban that "divides families,

denies Americans their fundamental right to travel and free access to humanitarian support,

harms Cubans, restricts a market important to American farmers and impedes the creation of

American jobs". The participants also included over 100 Cuban-Americans who are angered by

restrictions on family visits. The activists were joined by several Congressmen and Senators

including Senators Bacchus and Enzi and Representatives Flake and Delahunt. The Day's

activities was sponsored by the Center for International Policy, the Latin American Working

Group, The Washington Office on Latin America and fifteen other organizational co-sponsors.

The strategies and tactics discussed in the previous chapter were translated into direct

action as the anti-embargo organizations openly challenged the state resulting in activities such

as the Cuban Acton Day described above. This Day signaled a single event in the history of anti-

embargo activism which began since 1969 with the formation of Venceremos Brigade. The

decade of the seventies saw the emergence of numerous pro-peace and antiwar movements.

Organizations seeking to challenge the state on the Cuban embargo also emerged in that decade.

They include the Center for International Policy; the Center for Cuban Studies; the Washington

Office on Latin America and Alamar Associates.

This chapter attempts to trace anti-embargo activism as the groups relentlessly challenge

the states on several official pro-embargo policies. First, it attempts a brief overview of the anti-


SCommonDreams.org. Newscenter. 1997-2007. "UPDATED: Cuba Action Day April 27: Over 700 to Call for End
to Travel B an; Leaders Co ming to Washington." http://www. commondreams. org/news200 5/0426 -06.htm










embargo challenge under successive American presidents. Second, it examines the reaction to

various state policies including the Torricelli Bill, The Helms-Burton Law, the ban on food and

medicine and the Reports of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. Third, it outlines the

contours of the traditional Cuban American community and the Cuban American National

Foundation and explores the rise of the moderate maj ority of Cuban Americans in South Florida

as they became more vociferous and organized against the embargo in the post-Cold War era.

Rallying Against the Embargo: From Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush

The pro-engagement policy pursued by President Carter (1977-1981) was welcomed by the

anti-embargo groups. While in Office, President Carter attempted to soften the U.S. embargo

policy to Cuba. Diplomatic ties were partially restored through the establishment of "Interests

Sections" in both counties. Carter also dropped the travel ban and allowed subsidiaries of U. S.

companies to sell products to Cuba. In addition, he allowed Cuban exiles to send remittances to

relatives in the island.2 In 1979 alone, 150,000 Americans visited Cuba under Carter' s relaxed

policies. He would continue his harsh criticism of the embargo even after demitting office. In

2002, he was the first former President of the U. S. to visit the island where he called for an end

to the embargo which "freezes the existing impasse, induces anger and resentment, restricts the

freedoms of U. S. citizens and makes it difficult for us to exchange ideas and respect".3

The opposite was true of the presidencies of Reagan (1981-1989) and Bush (1989-1993).

During these years, exile politics were dominated by the Cuban American National Foundation

(CANF) and its leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, a multi-millionaire contractor with a penchant for

questioning the patriotism of his opponents. With generous donations to Republican presidential


2 J.A. Sierra. "Timetable. History of Cuba." http://www. historrofcuba. com/history/time/timetbl5b .htm

3 Jacob G. Hornberger. The Future of Freedom Foundation: 2001-2007. "Jimmy Carter's Freedom." May 2002.
h1llp w il it .fff.org/comment/com0205j .asp









candidates and key members of Congress from both parties, the Foundation, founded in 1981,

gained entry to the White House and came to exercise a virtual veto power over American policy

toward Cuba.4 Thus, Reagan tightened currency controls on Cuba. Under George H. Bush, the

1992 Torricelli Bill, which restricted trade, served to consolidate hard-line exile power in both

Washington and Miami.s

The end of the Cold War resulted in an increase in anti-embargo activism as perceptions of

Cuba changed in the United States. First, the island was no longer perceived as an ideological or

security threat to the U.S. nor as a Soviet satellite with the end of communism in the socialist

bloc. Moreover, Cuba no longer supported revolutionary activity in the Third World. Second, the

hardships endured by the Cuban people during the "special period" in the absence of the

subvention from the USSR, evoked considerable sympathy amongst Americans and Cuban

Americans alike. Thirdly, during the early to mid-nineties, Castro's communist regime

implemented a series of market reforms in the Cuban economy making the island more attractive

to American business interests and potential American tourists.

The presidency of Bill Clinton marked a change in exile politics and concomitantly, on

contentious politics with regards to the Cuban embargo. This change was ushered in with the

formation of moderate Cuban American organizations like Cambio Cubano in 1992 and the

Cuban Committee for Democracy in 1993. Indeed, one website lists the names of thirty-seven

moderate Cuban American organizations, mostly based in Miami in 1993 (www.cuban-

exile.com). Larry Rohter captures this changing dynamic which brought increasing opposition to

the hardline embargo policy:


4 OpenSecrets.org. "The Major Players." b1lip w\ int .\opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/players~ap

SWayne Smith. Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. "The Travel ban to Cuba."
blip1 w il it .ciponline.org/ban.htm









With the advent of the Clinton Administration, the foundation' s stock dropped sharply.
Hoping to capitalize on the opening, a coalition of business executives, academics and
other professionals who say they represent "the moderate or progressive sector of the
Cuban-American population" in August formed the Cuban Committee for Democracy to
provide an alternative to the foundation. The new coalition brings together several groups
that have emerged here in recent months, including Cambio Cubano, led by a former
guerrilla commander and political prisoner, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. The coalition also has
ties to exile leaders in Spain and with dissidents still in Cuba. There are a whole bunch of
people disturbed by the fact that a small group of Cubans here have been able to convince
Washington that their views represent the totality of Cuban-American opinion," said
Alfredo Duran, a Miami lawyer who is a founder of the coalition and a former state
chairman of the Democratic Party. A year ago, Mr. Duran said, it would have been
pointless to form such a group. "But now there is a willingness to listen to new views" in
Washington, he said, while at the same time "Cuba is in a position to be easily influenced
to bring about change." For years, the foundation and its allies have pushed the United
States to tighten the screws on Mr. Castro, mainly through the economic embargo in effect
since the Kennedy Administration. The apparent obj ective is to provoke a popular uprising
or military revolt that would enable exile leaders like Mr. Mas to return to Cuba and
perhaps even succeed Mr. Castro. But the newly invigorated moderate groups oppose
punitive economic steps, arguing in the Cuban Committee for Democracy manifesto that
"such measures harm the living conditions of Cubans without affecting the present
Communist leadership." In addition, the manifesto expresses a "willingness to meet with
representatives of the present Cuban Government" as a step toward negotiating Mr.
Castro' s departure from power (Rohter 1996).

Thus, anti-embargo activists began speaking truths to the power of both the state and the

Cuban American National Foundation. Clinton's 1996 Helms-Burton Law spurred a wave of

criticisms after a six-member delegation of the U. S. Congressional Black Caucus visited Cuba on

18th February 1999 to evaluate the embargo. Among the visitors were Maxine Waters and

Barbara Lee of California, Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas and Julia Carson of Indiana. A flurry of

protests also erupted from religious groups, human rights organizations, the UN, the European

Union and the OAS as well countries like Canada and Mexico which never broke diplomatic

relations with Cuba.6

The challenge to the state would intensify when in January 1998, Pope John Paul II visited

Cuba and denounced the Cuban embargo. He drew worldwide attention to the question of

6 J.A. Sierra. "Timetable. History of Cuba." http://www. historyofcuba. com/history/time/timetbl5b .htm










whether American sanctions on the island should continue, especially on food and medicine. In

voicing disapproval of the embargo, the Pope himself became part of the anti-embargo

movement. Just before the he landed in Cuba, CNN reported that "The Pope is among the

embargo's critics. According to chief Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls, "for the Holy

Father this is a moral problem, not a political one. (Those) who suffer the most are the weakest:

the poor, the women, the children".' It spawned hope even amongst Cubans that the U.S. would

at least revisit the embargo policy. At the same time, anti-embargo activists and faith-based

organizations saw the Pope's visit as an opportunity to step up their protest activity. Clinton

heeded some of these calls and in March 1998, announced a relaxation of the embargo including

a resumption of direct charter flights and cash remittances and the streamlining of the licensing

for the sale of medicine to Cuba. The first of a series of shipments of medical supplies left the

U. S. for Cuba on March 23, 1998. These policy changes were expanded upon in January 1999.

Catholic leaders and some Cuban Americans praised Clinton's decision, claiming that the 35-

year old embargo had caused civilians to suffer (Moakley 1999).

Despite these strides in U.S. Cuban Relations, the protests continued under Clinton when

in February, 1999, the coalition called Americans for Humanitarian Trade With Cuba (AHTC),

j oined the United States Association of Former Members of Congress to call on the

administration to end the embargo on food and medicines to Cuba. Its Executive Director,

George Fernandez, declared that "the U.S. embargo on Cuba is the single most restrictive policy

of its kind. Even Iraq is able to buy food and medicine from U. S. sources... As a Cuban




SCNN Interactive. 1998. "The Papal Visit to Cuba: After 35 Years Debate Rages over U.S. Trade Embargo."
hli w\ il itcnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/cuba.pope/embargo/










American, I speak for the vast maj ority of us who do not think the U. S. should be in the business

of denying basic sustenance to families and children in Cuba"."

In 2000 a 23-member task force comprising both liberals and conservatives, called for an

end to the embargo in order to "help the island's transition to a post-Castro era and reduce the

chances of U. S. military intervention".9 This attitude transferred to the Elian Gonzalez affair in

early 2000 when the polls showed most Americans in agreement with the decision to reunite

Elian Gonzalez with his father in Cuba (discussed below). The Clinton administration faced

mounting pressure in April, 2001 when the Cuba Policy Foundation in Washington released a

poll in which a maj ority of Americans are said to support the idea of doing business with Cuba

and allowing travel to the island. 10

President George W. Bush assumed power in 2001 even as condemnation of the embargo

persisted at an unprecedented and accelerated pace. On July 23rd, 2002 the U.S. House of

Representatives voted 262 to 167 to end the travel ban and allow the sale of American goods to

Cuba. Seventy-three Republicans voted against the embargo. An editorial in the New York

Daily News reported that "...slowly but surely, the tide is turning in favor of lifting travel and

trade sanctions against Cuba. More and more Republicans are not willing to let the larger

interests of the U. S. and their own constituents be sacrificed to the gods of electoral politics".12

Representative Jeff Flake, the Arizona Republican who led the effort to repeal the travel ban,

said that "This is all about freedom. Our government shouldn't tell us where to travel and where

SJ.A. Sierra. "Timetable. History of Cuba." hilll) un \\ .\historrofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl5b~t
9 Ibid.

'0 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Cuba Travel USA. "The Economic Embargo A Time Line."
hill u \\ cubatravelusa. com/history of cuban~embargo .htm










not to travel.13 The Boston Herald towed a similar line in an editorial the next day contending

that "The more travelers there are (to Cuba) the more the tnrth will spread, and that can only help

the transition of Cuba out of tyranny when the tyrant dies".14 House Maj ority Leader, Dick

Armey (R-Texas), supported this view in early August that year in a statement that the U.S.

should open trade with Cuba. 1. On the same day, The Boston Globe concurred in an editorial:

"As for human rights, opening travel and trade to the island would improve the monitoring of

human rights abuses and expose more Cubans to American values. Bush ought to put the

interests of both Cubans and Americans before his domestic political needs". 16

These condemnations seemed to have fallen on deaf ears when in 2003, President Bush

established the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (discussed below). 1 He followed with

renewed restrictions on family, academic and cultural travel in 2004. Several anti-embargo

organizations including CIP, LAWG, WOLA CAAEF and the Center for Cuban Studies, view

these measures as amongst the most "draconian" and "inhumane" in the history of the embargo.

It spurred widespread anti-embargo activism and spawned new organizations concerned with

restrictions in family and academic travel, parcel deliveries and remittances to the island. The

significance attached to U.S. Cuba policy by the Bush administration is reflected in the cabinet

reshuffle in 2005 when some of the embargo' s firm supporters were appointed such as Carlos





13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

's J.A. Sierra. "Timetable. History of Cuba." b1lip w\ il \t .historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl5c~t

16 Cuba Travel USA. "The Economic Embargo A Time Line."
Illi u\ \\ cubatravelusa. com/history_of~cuban embargo .htm
17 Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs. "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba."
I'lllp u sal\ cafc.gov/cafc/rpt/2004/67850.htm.










Gutierrez and Dan Fisk. Is In July, 2006, a second 93-page report from the Commission prompted

further reaction and criticisms from the anti-embargo movement. 19

With each post-Cold War President, came a tightening embargo policy. Under George H.

Bush came the Torricelli Bill, Under Clinton it was the Helms-Burton Law and George W. Bush

endorsed the reports of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. These policies were all

legislated in election years 1992, 1996 and 2004 respectively. Protests against these policies;

demands for removal of sanctions on food and medicine; and criticisms of the recent 2006

Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, is evidence of increased anti-embargo

activism in the post-Cold War era. This is analyzed in more depth in Chapter 7.

Reaction to the Torricelli Bill

The Torricelli Bill also known as the Cuban Democracy Act, was formulated in early 1992

by Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). It triggered a barrage of protests from both the

domestic and international community including the United Nations. On November 24, 1992, the

U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly voted against the United States in approving a

resolution calling for the lifting of the U. S. embargo. The year before, a similar resolution had

not even made it to the floor. The United States was isolated, with only Israel and Romania

voting with the U. S. The Torricelli Bill was rej ected on the grounds that it violates international

law, that food and medicine cannot be used as weapons (Franklin 1993).20 COngressional aides

ridiculed the bill privately as a "dog" and a throw back to the 1960's (Robbins 1992: 165). Some

officials were concerned that it would play into Castro's hands and would have a negative effect


1s Pablo Bachelet. Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. "Cuba in the
News: U.S.-Cuba Diplomatic Team Reshuffled: Some See Tighter Sanctions."
hli w\ il itifconews.org/Cuba/noticias/helmstoantiCubta~t
19 USA.gov. "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba." b1lip nu \\ \ cafc.gov/cafc/rpt/2006/68097.htm

20 Jane Franklyn. "The Cuba Obsession." http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/canf.ht









on American subsidiaries abroad (Robbins 1992: 166). In April 1992, Robert Gelbard, principal

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, testified for the Bush administration

against the bill. For these reasons, it was not initially endorsed by the Bush administration. It is

only after Clinton declared in Little Havana that "I like it" and raised $125, 000 for his 1992

election campaign amongst Cuban Americans, that Bush signed it into law (Robbins 1992).

Academics and newspaper editorials were also concerned about the implication of the bill for

American diplomatic relations. In an editorial entitled "Making Poor Cubans Suffer More" the

New York Times declared that "this misnamed act is dubious in theory, cruel in its potential

practice and ignoble in its election-year expediency".21 The M~iamni Herald ran a headline stating

"European Commission upset over U. S. Law".22 In an article entitled "Cuban Embargo: Off the

Mark", Elise Ackerman contends that "the measure's extra-territoriality has US allies fuming...;

that crippling Cuba' s economy will not produce democratic reforms" (Ackerman 1992). William

LeoGrande of American University asserts that "the bill's sanctions on U.S. companies operating

abroad promised to cause diplomatic headaches with such major trade partners and allies as

Mexico, Canada and Great Britain" (Leogrande 1998: 75). Prominent anti-embargo

organizations also opposed the Bill. Wayne Smith of CIP effectively summarized the arguments

put forward against the Bill:

There will be far more serious problems if the U. S. government tries to implement the
legislation in an aggressive manner. They may indeed not sympathize with Fidel Castro,
but Canada, Great Britain, Mexico and some of our other maj or trading partners do see
provisions of the act as violations of their sovereignty and have passed blocking legislation
of their own. Legal complications, disruptions in our economic relationships, and even
damage to our political relations could follow. Proponents of the act have led us into
exactly the kind of situation that it should be our primary obj ective to avoid, i.e., putting



21 J.A. Sierra. "Timetable. History of Cuba." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .historrofcuba.com/historv/time/timetbl5.t

2 European Commission Upset Over U.S. Law". Miami Herald, 28 October 1992.










important relationships at risk over an issue that is no longer even a significant foreign
policy problem. In so doing, they have done the country a disservice (Smith 1993).2

The concern expressed by CIP with the Torricelli Bill was reflected in a health mission to

Cuba which it undertook j ointly with the American Public Health Association in June, 1993. As

U. S. citizens, the members of the delegation "felt a special responsibility regarding Cuba since

our government alone in the world has maintained a 33-year old economic embargo against

Cuba. This embargo was recently tightened to include trade- mostly in food and medicines- by

subsidiaries of U. S. companies in other countries". One of the delegation' s goals was to gain an

understanding of the embargo's influence on the health of the Cuban people" (Kuntz 1993). The

harsh impact of systemic forces buttressed by the national embargo policy was also noted at that

time: "Today, Cuba's advances in health are in danger of being reversed, due in large part to the

current crisis resulting from drastic changes in trade relations with the former Soviet Union and

Eastern European countries. The 33-year U. S. trade embargo, and the recent tightening of the

embargo through the passage of"The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, "contribute to the

economic difficulties. The economic crisis known in Cuba as the "special period in peacetime",

has severely strained the nation's health system and threatens the health of its people" (Kuntz

1993).

As a result, the American Public Health Association joined the increasing dissenting voices

against the Cuban Democracy Act. It presented testimony on August 5th, 1992, before the

Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the Unites States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,







23 Wayne Smith. Center For International Policy. Washington, DC. "Cuba After the Cold War."
http:.//ciponline .org/ColdWar.htm










urging the Congress to rej ect this bill, as "an attempted attack on the health and well-being of an

entire population .2

Not only did some anti-embargo groups denounce the bill, they also openly defied it as

reported in an article headlined "Church Groups Seek to Defy Cuban Embargo". The article

continued that "Church groups in the U.S. are collecting relief goods for donation to Cuba and

bringing goods to Mexico in defiance of the U. S. trade embargo; Reverend Lucius Walker of

Pastors for Peace says groups are refusing to apply for licenses that allow exemptions to

embargo because they believe the embargo, under the Cuban Democracy Act, is immoral".25

Rejecting the Helms-Burton Law

The Helms-Burton Law or the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,

further sought to tighten the embargo. The 1994 Congressional elections saw a Republican

victory with the installation of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) as Chairman of the House Foreign

Relations Committee and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) as Chairman of the House

Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs. Torricelli had chaired the Subcommittee in the

previous Congress and the three Cuban Americans in Congress served on it. A provision called

Title III sought to tighten sanctions on Cuba by empowering those whose property had been

expropriated by the Castro regime to bring litigation against firms that "trafficked" in such

property. The hope was to turn international firms away from investing in Cuba thereby toppling

the Castro regime.

The outcry against the Helms-Burton Law was even more widespread than that of the

Torricelli Bill. This was partly due to the Title III provision which seemed so damaging to U.S.



24 Report #9310, American Public Health Association, 1 January, 1993.

25 Miami Herald, 10 November, 1992.










international interests that President Clinton decided to waive it. Even organizations which

supported U.S. intervention for change in Cuba, opposed the Helms-Burton Law.

Communications Director of the Cuban Movement for Human Rights, Ariel Hidalgo, described

it as a "political mistake" (Hidalgo 1996). Caribbean companies and governments believed that

the newly-signed Helms-Burton law represents "extraterrestrial" interference in their trade and

other economic relations with Cuba (Canute 1996). At the same time, as Cesar Chelala notes, "in

disregard of the Helms-Burton law, Cuba' s Caribbean neighbors have decided to increase their

trade with Havana" (Chelala 1996). Led by Mexico and Canada, the Organization of American

States ordered an investigation into the legality of the Helms-Burton Act aimed at stifling foreign

investment (Rohter 1996). A M~iamni Herald headline read "European Union Announced that it

will ask the World Trade Organization to intervene after the U.S. passes the Helms-Burton Law

calling for Punishment of Foreign Companies that do Business with Cuba"26

Anti-embargo organizations within the U.S. also condemned the law. Global Exchange

made a call to the public to use the media and organize their community against the Act because

"(for numerous reasons, Helms-Burton has lit a fire under communities that will prove important

in the str-uggle to move U.S. policy toward Cuba in a new direction. In the interests of democracy

in this country and justice for the people of Cuba, we urge you to become involved in the

struggle yourself'.27 WOLA declared that "rather than isolate Cuba, Helms-Burton has increased

U.S. isolation on the issue" (Spencer 2001). On 10-11 February, 1997, CIP co-hosted a

conference with the Canadian Foundation for the Americas and the Institute for European-Latin


26 European Union Announced that it will ask the World Trade Organization to intervene after the U.S. passes the
Helms-Burton Law calling for Punishment of Foreign Companies that do Business with Cuba. Miami Herald, May
2nd 1996.

27 Michael O'Heaney. Global Exchange. Programs in the Americas. 2005. "A Closer look at the Helms-Burton
Law." http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/amrcscb/suaHlsutnhm









American Relations to discuss the pros and cons of the Helms-Burton Act. Amongst its many

findings, the conference noted the international outrage to the "blatant violation of international

law" and the U.S. trend toward unilateralism. Moreover, conference participants observed that

opposition to the bill was "deeply and broadly bipartisan". The opponents included Democrats

such as Jimmy Carter, Jesse Jackson and George McGovern and Republicans such as James

Baker, Michael Wallop and Lawrence Engelburger, the latter calling it not only mistaken but an

"imperial policy" (Smith 1997).28 The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization

(IFCO) and Pastors for Peace called for protests at federal buildings and courthouses across the

U. S. on March 22, 1996. The actions were called to support a liquid-diet hunger strike by seven

members and supporters of the group and to condemn recent measures by Washington -

including the Helms-Burton legislation tightening the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba

and Washington's ban on travel to the island.29. Pastors for Peace announced that "our future

work must include a concerted campaign to support legislation which will exempt food and

medicine from the blockade. And from there we will keep working until Helms/Burton, and

Torricelli, and the whole blockade are overturned. Our maj or obj ective is to do everything

possible to awaken the conscience of this nation to the need to end this policy of death".30 CIP's

Wayne Smith notes the varying opposition to the Helms-Burton Law:

The Helms-Burton Act provoked a storm of international protests and retaliatory actions.
Proponents of Helms-Burton claim that this simply shows the other governments are not
interested in advancing the cause of human rights and a more democratic system in Cuba,
but this is by no means the case. The European, Canadian, and most Latin American
governments have long expressed their hope of seeing Cuba move toward a more open


28 Wayne Smith. The Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "The Helms-Burton Act. A
Loose Canon." http://ciponline. org/cuba/ipr/loosecannon. htm

29 Valerie Johnson. The Militant, vol 60 (13). April 1st, 1996. http://www.themilitant.com/1996/60 13/6013_14.html

30 Eileen, Reardon. Communist Party USA. "Seventh US/Cuba Friendshipment Breaks the Blockade." May 24th
1997. hopll w\ int .pww.org/archives97/97-05-24-2.html










political system with respect for the civil rights of the Cuban people. They disagree
entirely with the United States, however, as to how best to advance that cause and hold that
more can be accomplished through engagement, trade, and dialogue. During his visit to
Cuba in January 1998, Pope John Paul II unequivocally supported that position, as have
Cuba's religious leaders of all faiths, the Jewish community, the National Council of
Churches, and the Council of Cuban Bishops (Smith 1997).31

Clamoring for the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act

The biggest breakthrough in U.S. Cuban relations in the post-Cold War era came with the

removal of sanctions on food and medicine. Anti-embargo activists found "influential allies"

with the coalition called Americans for Humanitarian Trade With Cuba (AHTC), which joined

the United States Association of Former Members of Congress to call on the Clinton

administration to end the embargo on food and medicines to Cuba. Amongst the "influential

allies" were David Rockefeller, A.W. Clausen, former president of the World Bank and G. Allen

Andreas, Chairman and CEO of Archer Daniels Midland company.32

This clarion call combined with increasing pressure from the agricultural and business

sectors led to the passage of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act in 2000.

In conjunction with business interests, state officials continued to clamor for changes in U.S.

Cuba policy even after the Act was passed since there were still restrictions attached to

regulations on advance payments for goods imported by Cuba and payments through third

countries. In November, 2005, for example, Nebraska' s Governor, Dave Heineman, embarked

on a trade mission to Cuba to lay the groundwork for panhandle farmers to sell dry, edible beans

to the island. The Nebraska delegation included representatives of several bean cooperatives and

companies, Nebraska Farm Bureau and the Nebraska Corn Board. They were also interested in



31 Wayne Smith. The Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "The Helm's-Burton Act:
A Loose Canon." http://ciponline.org/cuba/ipr/loosecannon~t

32 See www.ahtc.org










selling corn and soya beans to Cuba. 33 This was one of three delegations that j ourneyed to Cuba

for trade purposes. Indeed, according to top officials from Alimport, Cuba's food import

company, Pedro Alvarez, Cuba has contracted to buy more than $1.4 billion in U.S. farm goods,

including shipping and hefty bank fees to send payments through third nations.34

A press release from the Cuba Policy Foundation on 5 February 2003, headlined "Lifting

Cuba Ban Benefits America' s Farmers" was prepared by one of America' s leading agricultural

economists, Parr Rosson, of Texas A&M University. It stated that "An end to the ban on

American travel to Cuba would provide a boost for America' s farmers... Lifting the travel ban

would produce between $126 million and $252 million in annual U.S. agricultural exports to

Cuba, above current levels of farm sales to the island, .... and such sales would create between

3,490 and 6,980 jobs for Americans. 35

The business cause has been taken up by several organizations including WOLA which

declares that the embargo is bad for U. S. businesses and farmers because it greatly inhibits U. S.

businesses from exporting goods to Cuba. A February 2001 report by the International Trade

Commission found that "the U.S. loses up to $1 billion a year due to lost trade opportunities with

Cuba. With the downturn in the U.S. economy and a suffering agriculture industry, restrictions









33 Madison Daily Leader. The Associated Press. AG officials Prepare for Trade Mission to Cuba." November 8 h,
2005. hopl \ \ \ int~zire.com/site/ news.cfm?BRD=1302&depti=898nwi=5241PG41ri=9

34 6 News. 2002. "Courting Cuba." http://www.wowt.com/news/headlines/2375401hm and
httpl \ \\ l cubanet.org/CNews/y06/marO6/01le5.htm

35 Cuba Policy Foundation. Washington, DC. Lifting Cuba's Travel Band Benefits America's Farmers." 5 ,
February, 2003. http://www.cubafoundation.org/CPF%20TravelA%0td/ees-uaTae-g
0302.04.htm










on trade with Cuba limit the growth of U. S. industries"36. In 2003, Nancy San Martin reported on

the lucrative trade opportunities in Cuba for U.S. business interests:

One year after an unprecedented trade show attracted 288 American exhibitors to Cuba,
experts say the United States has become the island's largest source of imported food and
agricultural products, with sales totaling more than $250 million since last
September. During that five-day U.S. Food and Agribusiness Exhibition in Havana, the
exhibitors from 33 U.S. states set up booths overflowing with food samples as negotiators
worked behind the scenes to snag business deals in a market that had been closed for
decades. U.S. executives walked away with signed deals worth some $92 million. Since
then, at least another $159 million worth of American products have made their way to
Cuba, said John Kavulich, president of U. S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council in New
York, which monitors U.S. Department of Commerce reports"...The thing that makes Cuba
an attractive proposition is that it is literally 90 miles from our shores," said Tony DeLio,
vice president of marketing for Archer Daniels Midland Co., a food giant based in Decatur,
Ill." It' s very easy for us to do business there. We sell hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of products throughout the Caribbean. Cuba is another stop" (San Martin 2003).

The harsh "special period" in the nineties endured by Cuba also fomented humanitarian

concern for the needs of the Cuban citizens. In response to the allegations that the food would

end up on the buffet tables of Cuban hotels, John Kavulich, president of U.S.-Cuba Trade and

Economic Council in New York (which monitors U.S. Department of Commerce reports),

replied that "Well over 90 percent is going into the channels for distribution for the 11.2 million

citizens" referring to Cuba's food-rationing program. "We check it, we track it, we see it ..

Most of the products are being used for the ration distribution system." This was reinforced by

the fact that imports from the U. S. mainly consisted of wheat and soy-related products, "not the

kind of food that would end up in hotels".37





36 (COnunu1InitY Outreach.: Changing U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: An Organizing Manual."
b1lip w\ il \t .colombiainternacional.org/Doc%20PDF/SR-Couuivurahhnigoiyoad~b%0
%202006.pdf

37Nancy San Martin. "U.S. Exports Accounts for Largest Chunk of Food Product Purchases". Miami Herald, 1
October, 2003.










If these business interests are not genuine in their purported concern for economic

hardships endured by the Cuban people at the end of the Cold War, the concern of a number of

humanitarian organizations which have come to form part of the anti-embargo movement, can

hardly be questioned. Several charities, educational institutions, and religious groups have been

complaining that the sanctions interfere with their missions by limiting their ability to meet, help,

and learn from Cubans. They insist that the embargo has failed to achieve its goal, hurts the

Cuban people more than the government, and diminishes American influence on the island.

Brian Goonan who oversees aid to Cuba at Catholic Relief Services affirms that "The embargo is

a big wall of prohibition. It affects the poor in Cuba; it also affects Americans. You can't travel,

you can't visit. It's all about what you can't do. In other countries, it' s what we can do" Catholic

Relief Services, has since 1993 provided more than $26-million in food, medicines, and other

humanitarian aid to Caritas Cubana, a Catholic social-services group in Havana" (Perry 2006).38

Protesting the Reports of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba

In December, 2003, a Commission for Assistance was established by the Bush

administration. The Commission's first report was published in May 2004, proposing new

restrictions on family, academic and cultural travel to Cuba. Described as a "blueprint for

invasion"39 and "the dumbest policy in the face of the earth"40, the report met with a barrage of

protests from both American and Cuban American citizens especially with regards to its

proposals for renewed restrictions on family and academic travel and remittances. The members



38Suzanne Perry. "Charity's Barrier Island.: U. S. Restrictions Hamper Non-Profit Efforts in Cuba." The Chronicle
ofPhilanthropy. 18 May, 2006. hopll w\ int .philanthropy.com/free/articles/v18 /il5/1071.t

39 Wayne Smith. The Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "The Danger of Doing as
Bush Does." http:.//www.ciponline. org/cuba/Op-eds/1 203 06_guardian. htm

40 NOW American Foundation. Washington, DC. "U.S.-Cuba Policy."
htt un \\ newamerica. net/events/2007/us_cuba_policy_reflectionsofalr









of the Commission included leading Cuban Americans in the Bush Administration including Dan

Fisk, fellow staff member of former staff member Jesse Helms, and Jose Cardenas, ex-employee

of the Cuban American National Foundation (Crossen 2006). The Commission did not receive

the kind of media attention as the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Law. However,

several new groups proliferated to protest the measures and together with existing groups, do not

hesitate to voice their displeasure with the new measures.

The new restrictions have resulted in a tense relationship between civil society and the

state. Amongst those most affected are charities. Although they can still get licenses to work in

Cuba, many have been forced to curtail their activities. Through the U.S-Cuba Sister Cities

Association, the St. Augustine-Baracoa Friendship Association, in Florida was set up in 1999 to

promote ties between the oldest cities in the United States and Cuba, had to transform itself into

a humanitarian-aid organization in 2003 to continue operating in Cuba. During its early years,

the group sponsored cultural and professional exchanges with Cuban and American doctors,

photographers, historians, and others traveling between St. Augustine and Baracoa, on Cuba's

eastern tip. After the restrictions made such exchanges impossible, the association reorganized

and now sends delegations to Baracoa three times a year to bring supplies to local groups that

help handicapped, blind, and older people and ships donated goods such as wheelchairs and

bicycles to those organizations (Perry 2006).41

Similarly, an organization called It's Just the Kids, in Washington, was notified by the

Treasury Department that its license to build playgrounds in Cuba had been modified. It is now

permitted to bring only three volunteers per playground site instead of 25 and must complete its



41Suzanne Perry. "Charity's Barrier Island.: U. S. Restrictions Hamper Non-Profit Efforts in Cuba." The Chronicle
of Philanthropy. 18 May, 2006. http://www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/18/il5/15000701.htm










proj ects within four days, instead of two weeks. Moreover, the group's license would expire that

month, instead of in April 2007. The changes forced the charity to cancel a trip planned for June

that had attracted 67 volunteers. Bill Hauf, the group's founder, calls the restrictions "ridiculous"

and says he is mobilizing supporters to protest them. "This proj ect is so good, it can't be allowed

to fade away," asserts Hauf. "No matter what [U.S.] officials do, I will not give up sending

letters" (Perry 2006).

Another group known as Operation USA, in Los Angeles, has been shipping medical

supplies to Cuba for ten years. When the Treasury Department renewed its license in January

2006, it added a new restriction: The charity could no longer send teams of doctors to Cuba to

train their Cuban counterparts. "It wasn't a big part of what we did, but it was important to us

because it was a way to develop partnerships between Cuban and American hospitals," says

Richard Walden, the Chief Executive (Perry 2006).

Since 2004, the Cuba AIDS Proj ect, in Mount Freedom, N.J., has had to limit who can be

sent to Cuba to bring medical supplies for HIV/AIDS patients, restricting the trips to trained

health professionals. According to Costa Mavraganis, a board member who coordinates the trips,

this has resulted in reduced participation by about half, drastically decreasing the revenue the

group earns from registration fees. Raising money elsewhere is not easy, he adds. "The minute

they hear Cuba, they run. They don't want anything to do with Cuba because of restrictions from

the embargo" (Perry 2006).

Madre, an international women's human-rights group in New York, was turned away when

it tried to renew its license to send delegations to Cuba to do research on issues affecting women

and children. Vivian Stromberg, the groups Executive Director, asserts that Madre is exploring

ways to challenge the decision. "Just the fact that you need to apply for a license to go to Cuba










and you don't need to apply for a license to go to Paris is a violation of our rights," she says.

"The refusal is a further violation of our rights" (Perry 2006).

The Cuba-America Jewish Mission, in Berkeley, California, can no longer send youth

groups to Cuba as part of its program to strengthen ties between American and Cuban Jews. June

Safran, Executive Director, says that the young people who traveled to Cuba before the Treasury

Department changed the rules in 2004 learned valuable lessons. "The children were more serious

about their education and more tolerant of people because in Cuba they learned that what you

owned did not indicate what your class was. Rather, your position in society was determined by

what you could achieve" (Perry 2006).

Oxfam America, in Boston, now works exclusively on agricultural proj ects in Cuba,

according to Susan Bird, who oversees the charity's Caribbean programs. The charity can no

longer get licenses for proj ects to help Cubans recover from hurricanes, something it did in the

past. "We're seeing the space grow smaller of what we are able to support," (Perry 2006)

The first report in 2004 ushered in new travel restrictions that, among other things, slashed

the number of academic programs that could operate in Cuba by requiring them to last at least

ten weeks and to exclude students not registered for degrees at the sponsoring university. The

Treasury Department says it awarded 69 licenses to colleges or universities in 2005, down from

181 in 2003. But CIP's Wayne Smith insists that only a handful of programs are still functioning.

Many educational institutes including universities and colleges have joined in the fight against

academic restrictions. Through ECDET, Wayne Smith prepared a lawsuit to challenge the new

ru es.4




42 Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. "Press Release." June 13th 2006.
\li \l u\ llecdet. org/ECDET%20press%20release .htm










The most contentious issue, however, seems to be restrictions imposed on family travel

remittances and parcels to Cuba which many challengers, both American and Cuban American,

view as a flagrant abuse of fundamental human rights. With the new restrictions, relatives can

only visit once every three years and visits are limited to immediate family parents, children,

siblings, and grandparents. Cousins, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces are excluded. On

these grounds, Human Rights Watch became a fervent anti-embargo activist and interviewed a

number of Cuban Americans who expressed their outrage at the "inhumane" regulations:

But this option is entirely inadequate for people with relatives in poor health, and even
worse for those with multiple family members who are ailing. Saray G6mez, for example,
visited her family before her father died in January 2004, and as a result is now restricted
from visiting her mother who is also seriously ill. Nor is it an option for many of the
people we interviewed who have traveled last year and therefore must wait until 2007.
"Nelson Espinoza," for example, said, "I can't wait three years to see my sister, who is in a
very delicate condition, because I don't know what' s going to happen." Similarly, "Lorena
Vasquez," who visited Cuba in 2004, is anxious about her sister who has cancer. "It' s
likely I won't see her again," Lorena Vasquez said. "She won't last three years."
Moreover, the issue for many is not so much saying goodbye to a family member as
helping that person to live. One central purpose of the family visits, as we saw in the case
of Marisela Romero, is to bring money and medical supplies. While individuals can still
send remittances and supplies through couriers, a collateral effect of the travel restrictions,
according to several people, is that it is now more difficult to do so. "Sandra Sanchez," has
been sending medicine to her father, who has cancer, every month, but she finds that it
takes longer to arrive because the number of people traveling has decreased.43

The restrictions have aroused more than indignation amongst the Cuban American

community prompting angry outbursts amongst them, incensed that the American government

should decide who their immediate family is. Human rights watch relates the sad story of

Marisela Romero and her ailing father:

Romero had left Cuba in 1992, and after her mother and sister both died in 2002, the only
remaining relatives who could take care of her ailing father were her nephew and his wife.
Romero hired two people to help them and began making frequent trips to Cuba so that she
could pay these helpers, bring money and supplies, and, perhaps most importantly, provide


43 Human Rights Watch. New York. 2006. "Families Torn Apart: The High Cost of U.S. and Cuban Travel
Restrictions." http://hrw.org/reports/2005/cubal005/indeht









her father with filial affection. "Whenever she came he became very contented," Marisol
Claraco, her nephew' s wife, told Human Rights Watch. "Because even though he had
Alzheimer, he knew who she was. ... She would lie next to him and talk to him, and he
would feel her love and get better." The new restrictions put a halt to her visits. Since her
last trip had been in May 2004, she would not be eligible to visit her father again until
2007. The regulations also effectively prevented her from sending money for his medical
care and other expenses. While she was still allowed to send remittances to members of her
"immediate family," the only relative in Cuba who fit that definition was her father, and he
was incapable of cashing checks or even signing them over to someone else. (Under the
regulations, her nephew did not qualify as a member of her "family.") It also became much
more difficult and expensive to send supplies as it became harder to Eind other people
traveling to Cuba and willing to carry goods for her. Ms. Romero's absence was felt by her
nephew and his wife. "After the restrictions," Claraco told Human Rights Watch, "I was
alone with the old man and my husband was in charge of going and finding what
medicines he could." We were waiting for Mari to come. But she couldn't come and she
couldn't send the pampers and the medicines. So we had to endure rough times." After
several months, they began to run out of diapers and basic medical supplies, such as iodine
and hydrogen peroxide, which they needed to clean his bed sores.44

A report compiled by WOLA' s Geoff Thale and Rachel Farley, reflects the sentiments of

the ant-embargo movement on the new recommendations:.

There are significant problems with the measures recommended by the Commission,
which are laid out here. The measures have been conceived to respond to U.S. domestic
political concerns, rather than as serious foreign policy steps. The measures will hurt
Cuban-Americans, Cuban families, U.S. students, Cuban dissidents and others, but won't
succeed in bringing down the Castro government. The policy proposals are expensive and
a misuse of government resources. Some of them are provocative and dangerous. The
policy overall is misguided and unlikely to bring change to Cuba (Farley and Thale 2004:


In May, 2006, the Center for International Policy, with the participation of the Latin

American Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America, Church World Service and

the National Council of the Churches of Christ, invited the media to a press conference "to

discuss the counterproductive nature of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which is

based on the assumption that the Castro regime is on its last legs and that the U.S. will play a role





44 Ibid.










in overseeing Cuba' s transition to democracy in the post-Castro period".45

(www.commondreams. org) Referring to President Bush, Wayne Smith launches a scathing

attack on the Commission:

The president is determined to see the end of the Castro regime, and the dismantling of the
apparatus that has kept it in power." To bring that about, the administration appointed a
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which, in May 2004, produced a 500-page
action plan for the removal of the Castro government and for what sounded worryingly
like the US occupation of Cuba: how to make their trains run on time, how to reorganize
their schools, and so on. Shortly thereafter, it even appointed a US "transition coordinator".
As Jose Miguel Insulza, the Chilean secretary general of the Organisation of American
States remarked, "But there is no transition and it isn't your country (Smith, 2006).

In July 2006, the Commission issued a 93-page second report which attempts to counteract

perceptions that the first report was nothing but an "American occupation plan". The

recommendations include a budget of $80 million for the next two years to ensure a "transition"

rather than a "succession" of Cuban leadership. Yet, the report has been provoking intense

criticism from several sources including humanitarian organizations concerned with restrictions

on humanitarian aid.

Since 2004, the renewed restrictions on family, academic religious and cultural travel saw

the formation of a number of organizations such as the Cuban American Commission for Family

Travel, the Emergency Network to Defend Education Travel and the Emergency Network of

Cuban American Scholars and Artists. Anti-embargo activism amongst both new and existing

organizations also increased in protest of the new restrictions. Wayne Smith encapsulates the

sentiments expressed by the anti-embargo movement on the Commission's latest proposals:

The Bush administration's Cuba policy has reached a dead end, with no hope of success.
Its obj ective is nothing less than to bring down the Castro regime. Or, as then-Assistant
Secretary of State Roger Noriega put it on October 2, 2003: "The President is determined
to see the end of the Castro regime and the dismantling of the apparatus that has kept him


45 Commondreams.org. Newscenter. 1997-2007. "The Continuing Failure of Bush's Cuba Policy."
hli w\ il itcommondreams.org/news2006/0522-05.htm









in office for so long." President George W. Bush then appointed a Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba with the goals of bringing about "an expeditious end of the
dictatorship," and developing a plan to achieve that goal" (Smith 2006).46

The Elitin Gonztilez Affair and the Rise of Moderate Cuban Americans

The responses to the Elian Gonzalez affair signaled a significant landmark in U.S. Cuba

relations particularly with the ensuing rise of moderate Cuban Americans who began to organize

themselves to challenge both the state and exile hardliners on U.S. Cuba policy. The saga of

Elian Gonzalez was the most popular story in the U.S. media in 2000. He came to be el niffo

milagro, the miracle child, plucked from the waters, like Moses from the bulrushes, by a

Eisherman. Elian Gonzalez was actually a six-year-old Cuban boy who is the sole survivor of a

refugee boat that sunk in a storm on its way to the U.S. His mother, the ex-wife of his father, was

attempting to escape with the boy from Cuba without his father's knowledge. Elian was found by

Hisherman, clinging to a rubber tube off the coast of Miami after being adrift for two days. He

was then rushed to a U. S. hospital and was soon identified as the only son of Juan Gonzalez, a

loyal Cuban who had no clue of the risky defection plan of his ex-wife. Elian was placed in

temporary custody of his great-uncle Lazaro in Miami, who vowed never to return the boy to

Cuba. He soon became the center of an international media and political frenzy as his relatives in

Miami, supported by attorneys and activists, fought to seek permanent custody of him.47

On the other side of the Florida Straits, Elian' s father, backed by the Cuban nation,

demanded the return of his son to Cuba. The Miami relatives and Cuban exile groups suffered a

crushing blow when they lost the long, Hierce legal battle to keep Elian in the U.S. Amidst angry

outbursts by his relatives and exile hardliners and with the intervention of then Attomney General,


46 Wayne Smith. The Center for International Policy's Cuba Program. Washington, DC. "Bush;'s Dysfunctional
Cuba Policy."6th November, 2006. hopll w\ int\\ciponline.org/cuba/Op-eds/ 110606_Dysfunctional.htm

47 Eli~n Gonz~lez Story: 1999-2000. hopll w\ int .hellocuba.ca/itineraries/3 14Elian gonzalez.html










Janet Reno, Elian was finally seized by armed U.S. immigration officers and reunited with his

father in Cuba.

The Elian Gonzalez affair has been disastrous for the Cuban American community on

several levels. One of its worse repercussions has been the image of Cuban Americans which

ensued. Once perceived as golden exiles, that image became tarnished because of the media

portrayal of a handful of seemingly irrational Cuban Americans who fought to the bitter end to

have the boy remain with relatives in Miami. Damian Fernandez, professor at Florida

International University, describes the debacle as "very, very sad and has led to another level of

frustration for this community".48 He forges a nexus between the event and the anti-embargo

movement. "Elian was a catalyst for the opposition to the U.S. embargo. It allowed people who

had been waiting to attack the embargo policy to come out in full force and wage this policy

battle in Washington. Elian served as a lightening rod, and that is why the frustration is running

deeper in Cuban Miami'".49 The Cuba Study Group is one organization which emerged as a result

of the volatile event.

Although moderate Cuban American organizations such as Cambio Cubano and the Cuban

Committee for Democracy existed since 1992 and 1993, respectively, the Elian Gonzalez

debacle underscores the schism that is growing within the exile community in South Florida. The

community is by no means homogenous, and the "ignored maj ority" is becoming more and more

vociferous as seen in the many organizations which have proliferated in the last decade. The

divide is reflected in the diverse crowds at two restaurants on Calle Ocho: the moderate, La Tinta

y Cafe and the hardline, Versailles.


48Frontline. 1995-2005. Interview: Damian Femindez.
hli w\ il itpbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/elian/viewseinlgc.html
49 Ibid.










This is also attributable to changing dynamics within the community itself through later

immigration waves and younger American-born Cubans. Cuban Americans who arrived in the

U.S. in the eighties and nineties are poorer, darker and migrated for economic rather political

reasons like most other Latino immigrants in the U.S. As such, they are concerned more with

economic survival than political ideology. Even some of the children of the early wave find it

difficult to identify with the hardline attitude of their forebears. Recent surveys undertaken by

both the FIU/Cuba Poll and the William C. Velasquez Institute suggest changing attitudes to

Cuba amongst the maj ority of Cubans and a growing tendency toward rapproachment and

engagement with the island (Lush and Adams 2004, FIU/Cuba Poll).5o

The 2004 restrictions on family travel, parcel deliveries and remittances have further

angered the community to the extent that even former hardliners vociferously rej ect them.

Amongst these is Joe Garcia from the once rabidly extremist Cuban American National

Foundation, now increasingly being described as a moderate organization. Joe Garcia outlines

the new contours of Calle Ocho's realpolitik: "We're not single-issue anymore, and we care

about much more than just the embargo." He affirms that "some Cuban Americans are stuck in

Cold War politics as reflected in the Elian drama but the American public had moved past the

Cold War".s

The 2004 restrictions on family travel resulted in a heated confrontation between an angry

protesting Cuban American mob and Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart at the Miami

International airport on June 29th, the day before the new travel restrictions to Cuba kicked in.


50 Guillermo Grenier J. and Hugh Gladwin. Florida International University. "FIU/Cuba Poll, 1991-2006." Institute
for Public Opinion Research. "Cuba Poll Final Results." http://www.flu.edu/orgs/ipor/cubapoll/indehtl Tamara
Lush and David Adams. "Bush's Cuban-American Supports Slips." 27th August, 2004.
hli w\ il t .sptimes.com/2004/08/27/Decision2004/Bush suamrcnshtml for more on the Veldsquez poll.
51 Interview with Garcia, 5th June 2006.









Kirk Nielsen reports that "when they caught sight of Diaz-Balart, they pursued him to the

parking lot and unleashed their fury as he stood beside his car. "You're dividing families!" one

person yelled amid a frenzy of shouts and intense finger-pointing" (Nielsen, 2004). The actions

of the then Executive Director of CANF, Joe Garcia, are further evidence of a softening in

attitudes within CANF toward U.S. Cuba policy and increasing antagonism toward hardliners.

Using the vigilant media to full advantage on that fateful June afternoon, Garcia blamed Diaz-

Balart for giving bad consul to President Bush on the 2004 restrictions on family travel, as Kirk

Nielsen reports:

After MSNBC was done with Garcia, he repeated his catchy putdown,one-by-one, to three
local television reporters and again on numerous television talk shows and radio interviews
over the next few weeks. He also came up with another zinger: The restrictions were the
White House's way of "throwing some red meat to the right." Another swipe at Diaz-
Balart and el exilio' s hardliners -- Republican loyalists, generous with their political
donations, and hungry for a return on the money: if not a military overthrow or criminal
indictment of Castro and his cronies, then at least a complete cutoff of travel and monetary
remittances to the island...Garcia was at it again. A year earlier he'd created an uproar
when he ridiculed Diaz-Balart as being "politically impotent" for his supposed inability to
influence the Bush White House on Cuba issues (Nielson 2004).52

The formation of the Cuban Liberty Council, the breakaway faction of CANF, was in

direct response to the actions of members like Joe Garcia, who resigned as Executive Director of

CANF and opted to campaign for the Democratic Party in the 2004 elections. The move was

perceived by the New York Times as a signal of political diversification of Cuba-Americans"

(Aguayo 2004). Garcia admits that CANF is not monolithic and the members have varying views

on U.S. Cuba policy. He himself supports the sanctions on trade to Cuba to pressure the Castro

regime but does not advocate restrictions on family travel.53 Today, CANF's website contains



52Kirk Nielsen Miami New Times. "Politics and Policy." 29 July, 2004. hopll w\ int\\miaminewtimes.com/2004-07-
2 9/news/politics-and-policy/

53Interview with Garcia, 5" June 2006.










links to articles by strong anti-embargo academics and activists such as Paolo Spadoni and Phil

Peters. The apparent shift in attitude is also reflected in articles in the CANF website entitled,

"Polls show shift among Cuban exiles", and "Lifting embargo still on table, U.S. officials

", 54
says.

This "softening", however, was counteracted by the rise of Jeb Bush as Governor of

Florida in 1998. Several analysts and anti-embargo activists attribute the recent tightening of the

embargo to the fact that Jeb is the brother of President George Bush and a close ally of the

hardline Cuban American community. Max Castro, referring to the handful of powerful

hardliners, asserts that a "tiny dog is wagging a very big tail in Miami".55 The Elian saga was

only the most public scene in a political drama that will climax when U. S. born Cubans and

those who migrated after 1980 come to full political maturity as they register and vote in the next

decade. The cracks within the community are widening as former Republican supporters slowly

turn away. "I have not the slightest doubt that the issue of the family will supersede the issue of

the embargo," says Silvia Wilhelm of the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights.

Wilhelm and her organization have even launched frontal attacks against the once-invincible

crown prince of the Cuban American dynasty, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, "who aspires to fill the giant

shoes of his father, Don Rafael, the revered founder of the South Florida old guard dynasty that

thrived for decades on anti-Castro and pro-embargo passions" (Lovato 2004). 56 Incidentally,

Don Rafael was married to Fidel Castro's sister, making the rabidly right-winged congressional

brothers, Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balart, the nephews of el Comandante, Fidel, himself.



54Cuban American National Foundation. Washington, DC. www.canf.org.

55Interview with Castro, 12th July 2005.

56 Roberto Lovato. Agence Global. 2004. "Rocking the Cuban Vote."
bli w\ il itagenceglobal. com/article .asp?id=283









According to Lovato (2004), an SVREP survey found that 76 percent of Cubans arriving

in Miami before 1980 support Bush. Support for him is strongest among older, less-educated

voters, who make up the base of the Diaz-Balart embargo-backers; "but as one moves down the

age and departure-from-Cuba ladder, the SVREP survey corroborates one of Karl Rove' s worst

nightmare: Cubans today are less inclined to support Bush" (Lovato 2004).

When in 2004 President Bush arrived at Miami Arena to deliver a speech aimed at shoring

up support among older, more conservative Cuban Americans, greeting him outside were a

group of younger, highly educated twenty-, thirty- and forty-something Cuban American

protesters who came to speak truths to power. Waving American and Cuban flags and placards

saying "Bush: Don't Divide the Cuban Family" were members of groups such as Cuban

Americans for Change and the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights, which oppose

the travel and remittance restrictions with the same single-mindedness that has long defined the

political culture centered in the faux Spanish Colonial streets of Little Havana. For them, the

family crisis has supplanted the embargo. The result is that the forty-plus-year embargo-based

unity cemented by aging exile patriarchs and ex-CIA operatives is beginning to unglue; the once

monolithic wall of Cuban American politics is cracking. 57

The protest was an act of defiance without precedent in the hallowed political history of

Little Havana. Lustily waving the Cuban and American flags and chanting "Rep. Lincoln Diaz-

Balart, tear down this wall that separates families," several hundred protesters, also bore placards

shouting "The Family Is Sacred" and stormed Diaz-Balart' s ounces. As Lovato (2004) asserts,

"such contentious action marks a radical change in a country where only weeks ago, an elated

crowd of about fifty Cuban American hardliners, greeted three men convicted of terrorist


57 Interview with Garcia, 5th June 2006.










activities, including a plot to assassinate Castro in Panama in 2000. The men had been pardoned,

with no apparent justification, by the outgoing Panamanian president. The White House did not

protest the decision. Their supporters included politicians affiliated with Don Rafael's dynasty"

(Lovato 2004).

Frustrations, Successes and Future Aspirations

Despite these varied and many attempts at speaking truths to power, the anti-embargo

movement has not achieved tremendous success in changing U.S. policy, to date. The close

alliance between the U.S. administration and the hardline Cuban American community makes

policy change an arduous, if not impossible feat. Some anti-embargo groups have made a clear

link between political ideology and the embargo policy. Despite their bitter disappointment with

the Helms-Burton law passed under Clinton, they insist that the Republican administrations have

been more inclined to tighten the policy, and "George W. Bush has been worse than any other

U.S. President".'" ENCASA declares that "by any measure, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been an

abj ect failure for almost half a century. That policy has become even harsher and more

counterproductive under the Bush administration".59 Some activists attribute this to the blood

relation between the brothers, George and Jeb Bush, who enj oy a cushy relationship with exile

hardliners in Miami. These challengers look forward to a change in U.S. administration in 2008.

However, the general consensus that the current Bush administration is more stringent than

others in its policy to Cuba, has been refuted by two older anti-embargo activists, Saul Landau







58 Interview with Smith and Rodriguez, 9" and 11It August 2006.

59 ENCASA/U.S.-Cuba. November 2006. "U. S. Police Toward Cuba: Forty-Six Years of Failure.
hli w\ il itencasa-us-cuba.org/ENCASA%20White%20Pape%0Neme/292206.d









and Delvis Fernandez Levy. They believed that the Kennedy administration was stricter than that

of George W. Bush.60

Despite their deep frustrations to which they openly admit, the organizations do not

perceive themselves as abj ect failures. They cite the strides made under Carter in currency

exchange and tourist travel, and those under Clinton with the Pope's visit to Cuba in 1998

especially with regard to trade in food and medicine. These combined with the biggest breath-

through achieved with the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, are

viewed by the groups as examples of anti-embargo successes. They claim that these are partly

attributable to their unrelenting struggle, some for almost four decades. Kirby Jones affirms that

their work is not futile since they are the ones with real connections to Cuba. He notes that the

false news of Castro' s death in July, 2006, fed to the U.S. media by rabid hard-line exiles which

had them prematurely dancing in the streets of Miami, led the media and the administration to

realize how little these extremists really knew about the Cuban reality. The media resorted to

calling on him for more accurate information on Castro's health.61 Though continuing

restrictions have dampened their hopes for change under President George W. Bush, they see a

glimmer of hope in the recent Democratic control of the House and the Senate. This is buttressed

by the very recent ten-member delegation of congresspersons which arrived in Cuba on 16th

December, 2006. It was the largest congressional trip ever to visit the island. Led by Reps.

Delahunt (D-Mass) and Flake (R-Ariz.), they met with Cuban government officials and foreign

diplomats in an effort to normalize relations with Cuba. The trip came just two weeks after Raul

Castro made new overtures for dialogue as Fidel lies sick in a Cuban hospital (Hemlock 2006).


61) Interviews with Landau and Fern~ndez, 16th August and 23rd October 2006.

61 Interview with Jones, 16th August 2006.










None of the organizations foresee a Miami invasion of Cuba in the wake of Castro' s

demise. Socialism is very much alive and kicking with the vibrant cadre of young communist

officials in the Cuban government. Nor do they believe that there will be a sudden transition to

capitalism and American-style democracy in a post-Castro Cuba. For them, whatever Cubans

may think of the Castro government, most are not eager to see exiles who left over forty years

ago return to take over the country. The Cuban government and the Cuban military would see

any large scale attempt to return as a political challenge and a national security threat. They also

agree that the embargo has not worked in forty-six years and that the "economy is in better shape

than it has been in years" (Spadoni 2006). WOLA' s Geoff Thale, encapsulates this view:

Most serious observers, whether sympathetic or hostile to the Castro government, argue
that, in the immediate period after Castro's retirement or death, a relatively stable
succession will take place. Popular discontent will not boil over; internal differences
among elites will not explode. Continuity, not change, will be the hallmark of the new
government. For example, Mark Falcoff, a conservative political analyst and scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute has written "What follows Castro is not likely to be a free-
market democracy, but rather a blander and more bureaucratic version of the system they
have now"(Thale 2006).

In the context of discussions about the post-Castro future, Thale insists that the U.S.

"should be taking measures now to increase contact between Cubans on the island, and increase

contact between academic, religious and other sectors likely to be in touch with those who will

actually shape the post-Castro future in Cuba". He envisions a vital role for moderate Cuban

Americans:

We should recognize that the Cuban American community is going to be a maj or force in
shaping U. S. relations with Cuba in the post-Castro future, and a maj or force in relation to
Cuba itself. In the long run, the grievances that many Cuban-Americans feel will have to
be addressed, as part of some process of reconciliation. (Such a process will also have to
recognize the grievances that many Cubans harbor against the exile community.) The U.S.
ought to begin now to take measures that encourage contact between the Cuban American
community and Cubans on the island, both because it will make future relations easier, and
because contact encourages and strengthens the moderate sectors of the community and
tends to isolate the hardliners. Family, business, cultural, and religious contact between









Cuban Americans and Cubans can only reduce tension at the moment of transition (Thale
2006).

Some scholars believe that the post-Castro era is already here and that the moment of an

exile take over is long gone. Just as the anti-embargo activists predicted, Julia E. Sweig argues

that the smooth transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his successors is exposing the willful

ignorance and wishful thinking of U. S. policy toward Cuba and the abj ect failure of the embargo

policy:

...none of what Washington and the exiles anticipated has come to pass. Even as Cuba-
watchers speculate about how much longer the ailing Fidel will survive, the post-Fidel
transition is already well under way. Power has been successfully transferred to a new set
of leaders, whose priority is to preserve the system while permitting only very gradual
reform. Cubans have not revolted, and their national identity remains tied to the defense of
the homeland against U.S. attacks on its sovereignty. As the post-Fidel regime responds to
pent-up demands for more democratic participation and economic opportunity, Cuba will
undoubtedly change but the pace and nature of that change will be mostly imperceptible
to the naked American eye (Sweig 2007).









CHAPTER 6
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: A RATIONAL DEPARTURE

"Beware of economists bearing gifts" (Fireman and Gamson in Zald and McCarthy 1979:

8).

This chapter calls on the burgeoning literary oeuvre challenging the rational model, that

Troj an horse in social movement theory which brings with it a radical individualism and pre-

supposes a "pseudo-universal human actor without either a personal history or a gender, race, or

class position within a societal history" (Ferree in Morris and Mueller 1992: 7). The premise of

single obj ective reality at the core of the rational choice model, which is skeptical about

collective action due to "free-riders", is contradictory to the very notion of social movements.

The operations of the anti-embargo movement challenge the core premise of Olson' s (1965)

Logic of Collective Action, used as the gospel to analyze groups' "rational" behavior both in

social movement and interest group theory.

In this chapter we first assess the applicability of the rational market managerial model to

the anti-embargo movement which includes discussions on both Olson's rational model and

Salisbury's exchange theory. Secondly, we apply the framing and discourse facets of the New

Social Movement to anti-embargo activities. Thirdly, we explore the relevance of solidarity

networks and co-option to anti-embargo activism. We then extend this analysis in an attempt to

establish a nexus between anti-embargo activities and social capital. Finally, we draw from both

interest group and social movements theories to argue that commitment, moral incentives and

psychological benefits seem more appropriate to answer our central research puzzle as to why

the anti-embargo movement persists despite limited success over time.









Olson's Rational Model

Drawing from the economic rational model, the traditional resource mobilization

perspective accounts for protest activity by focusing on the availability of resources required for

organizing and coordinating political actions. It underscores the significance of organizational

bases, resource accumulation and costs and benefits for popular political actors bringing to the

fore the convergence between social movements and interest group politics (McCarthy and Zald

1977). Resources are not just viewed as monetary, but are also human and embrace social

capital, moral engagement and solidarity networks (Tillock and Morrison 1979, Fireman and

Gamson 1979 in Della Porta and Diani 2004c: 8). It also involves tactics since "the type and

nature of the resources available explain the tactical choices made by movements and the

consequences of collective action on the social and political action" (Della Porta and Diani

2004c: 8).

The rational model partially explains the operations of the anti-embargo movement

because the activities of the groups are partly contingent upon the availability of material and

non-material resources. In Chapter 3, we detail the range of foundations which have been willing

to fund the movement over time. We note that the organizations in the movement demonstrate

relative heterogeneity with regard to organizational structure, although several boast of an

experienced and professional Board of Directors. We also note the human resources and

organizational structure of the anti-embargo groups. In Chapter 4, we continued with a

discussion on solidarity networks and co-option as part of the strategies and tactics employed by

the movement. We now draw on those discussions to support our test of the rational model as

applied to the anti-embargo movement.

We cannot completely disagree that the anti-embargo movement has persisted and that its

activities have increased in the post-Cold War era, partly because of the availability of resources









for the sustenance of groups and group activities (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1224-25). The

groups have been able to maintain a professional staff, offices in metropolitan American cities

and to continue their activities of organizing seminars, conferences, exhibitions, protests and

trips to Cuba. These have undoubtedly been possible because of the availability of both material

and non-material resources. As Della Porta and Diani observe, the level of mobilization depends

on the ability of the social movement to "organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, utilize

and create solidarity, share incentives among members and achieve external consensus" (Della

Porta and Diani 2004c: 8).

Yet, the rational market managerial model presented by McCarthy and Zald (1977) does

not fully explain the persistence of these organizations. McCarthy and Zald describe "a

professional cadre" as the individuals who receive compensation and are involved in the

decision-making process and a "professional staff" those who devote full time to the

organization, but are not involved in central decision making (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1227).

Their analysis neglects the hard-working underpaid staff, the many volunteers and the "external

professional cadre," who does not receive monetary compensation and are not involved full-time,

but are still an important contributor to the decision-making process in the anti-embargo

movement. Amongst these are also included the numerous prominent members of the various

Boards of Directors we have identified in the organizations in Chapter 3. Moreover, the staff and

the maj ority of members of the groups have not been receiving adequate monetary

compensation. Also, the non-Cuban American members do not directly reap the benefits of a

change in U.S. Cuba policy since they have no family in Cuba and are not personally interested

in travel, remittances or trade with the island.









Drawing from interest group theory, we can attempt an explanation of this dissonance

between the rational model and the operation of the anti-embargo movement. It may be related to

the dichotomy between what Hrebrenar (1997) identifies as "self-oriented groups" on the one

hand, and "public interest groups" on the other (Hrebrenar 1997: 11-12). For him, "the self-

interested groups seek to achieve some policy goal that will directly benefit their own members"

and "the public-interest groups (PIGs) seek benefits that will not benefit their membership

directly but will be enjoyed by the general public" (Hrebrenar 1997:12). In this respect, the

goals of the Cuban American groups, such as the Cuban American Commission for Family

Rights and CAAEF, to have restrictions on family travel and remittances removed, suggest that

they are self-oriented. The business interests such as USA-Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade

Association would also be labeled self-oriented since trade with Cuba would bring direct

financial benefits to their members. On the other hand, the other organizations like CIP, WOLA,

LAWG, Pastors for Peace and the Center for Cuban Studies would be categorized as public-

interest groups because the achievements of their collective action will benefit the general public.

There is, however, another dimension to this dichotomy that is explored but not adequately

explained by the rational approach. We may recall the basic premise of Mancur Olson' s rational

model as outlined in Chapter 2. We note that this approach is characteristically an economic

mode of analysis arguing that political goals will not be sufficient to induce members to support

interest group or social movement activity and hence the problem of free-riding will arise. For

Olson, what actually facilitate the group formation are not collective goods but "selective

incentives" (Olson 1965). Olson' s "selective incentives" flies against Hrebrenar' s (1997) "public

interest groups" which pursue goals that will benefit the general public. Such groups abound in

the anti-embargo movement.










Terry Moe (1980), another interest group scholar, aptly points out that Olson's model is

not very comprehensive, even as an economic theory since it focuses on the "formative stages of

group activity prior to formal organization". According to Moe, "he (Olson) makes no effort to

move toward a more elaborate examination of organizational structures and processes" (Moe

1980: 5, brackets mine). So even if Olson' s perspectives facilitate an understanding of why self-

oriented groups emerge, it does not account for the operations of public interest groups.

Moreover, it fails to capture the dynamic of altruistic sustained group activism. Hence, it would

be inadequate to help us unravel our central research puzzle as to why has the anti-enabargo

movement persisted despite limited success in achieving its printary objective of changing U.S.

Cuba policy. As seen, the movement has been operational for decades and some groups like

Venceremos Brigade, the Center for International Policy, the Center for Cuban Studies and the

Washington Office on Latin America, for some thirty years.

Salisbury's Exchange Theory

Expanding upon Olson' s rational model, Robert Salisbury (1970) proposes an "Exchange

Theory" contending that members j oin such groups for the sake of a staff job. This contradicts

our Eindings which reveal firstly that staff members of the anti-embargo movement are not highly

paid, some are volunteers and some very highly qualified personnel such as Wayne Smith and

Sandra Levinson, have remained at the Center for International Policy and the Center for Cuban

Studies, respectively, for more than thirty years, when they could have obtained gainful

employment elsewhere.

Similarly, several of these staff members such as Claire Rodriguez from LAWG, Sarah

Stephens and Vincent Pascandolo from CIP started off as unpaid interns and claim that they have

not become involved for monetary gains nor for advancing their careers. Pascandolo, an

enthusiastic, young college graduate explains that he first became involved with the World









Policy Institute in New York, which also has a Cuba proj ect. There he learned more about

Wayne Smith' s work with which he was already familiar and was inspired to j oin CIP because

he feels that "there is a need for more dialogue with Cuba and I want to make a contribution in

changing the current policy". Claire Rodriguez is now a paid staff member at the LAWG where

she assists Mavis Anderson with the Cuba program. Having personally witnessed the adverse

effects of U. S. policy in Central America, she was resolved to do something about it. She had

also worked at WOLA as an unpaid intern before j oining the LAWG. 2 Similarly, Shane

Gastever, a staff member at Pastors for Peace, affirms that much of the work of Pastors for Peace

is conducted not by a paid staff but by volunteers who come forward from the general public to

assist the organization when it is planning a big event like a convention or conference or even the

annual caravans".3 The many volunteers who support the movement via free labor, are part of the

human resource stock of the organizations. Gastever continues that this network of volunteers

transcends the boundaries of the U. S. state extending to Canada and Mexico. They join the

annual caravans to Cuba and are assisted along the way by another source of human resource -

numerous community organizations such as peace groups, local churches, labor organizations

and college students. Not only do these volunteers offer free labor but also provide physical

assets for accommodation and transportation for caravan members on their way to Cuba via

Mexico. Even those who hold full-time positions at organizations in the anti-embargo movement

are not handsomely paid despite the eminent qualifications which some hold. "This job can never

get me rich" declares Claire Rodriguez.4


1 Interview with Pascandolo, 25" October 2006

2 Interview with Rodriguez, 26t August 2006.

3 Interview with Gastever, 10t August 2006.

4 Interview with Rodriguez, 25" October 2006.










Thus, neither Olson's (1965) rational model nor its expansion into exchange theory by

Salisbury (1970), can explain why the anti-embargo movement persists despite limited success

over time. The presence of public interest groups seeking collective rather than selective

incentives and the altruistic, almost unselfish dedication of staff and members, deny their

relevance for explaining the ant-embargo movement. How then do we explain the persistence of

the anti-embargo movement given the limitations of Olson' s (1965) and Salisbury's (1969/1970)

rational models based on selective incentives? It may be useful to seek answers from other non-

material factors such as tactical frames, solidarity networks and co-option, social capital,

commitment, moral incentives and psychological benefits.

Tactical Framing and the New Social Movements

Departing from the rational model, we now examine the role of framing, which is one of

the most widely discussed tactics of the New Social Movements School. The argument espoused

here is that the success of the organizations in mobilizing new members and support is

contingent upon its ability to construct and reconstruct images about itself and its grievances.

Snow and Bendford (1988) agree that "mobilization depends not only on the availability and

deployment of tangible resources, the opening or closing of political opportunities, or a favorable

cost-benefit calculus, but also on the way these variables are framed, and the degree to which

they resonate with targets of mobilization (Snow and Benford 1988: 213). The three types of

framing which they identify diagnostic, prognostic and motivation as outlined in Chapter 2, are

evident in the operations of the anti-embargo movement.

McAdam (1996) observes that the social movements consciously design tactics in order to

frame action, attract media attention and sway public opinion (McAdam 1996: 348). His notion

of "strategic dramaturgy" is linked to the frequently used strategy of the movement to frame its

grievances around the moral principles and values of the challengers and the public, embedded in









broader cultural and ethical beliefs and practices (McAdam 1996). The fundamental norms

guiding these values and principles will be elaborated upon in a subsequent section of this

chapter.

These norms relate to the "injustice frames" identified by Gamson (1992), producing

expressions of indignation or outrage (Gamson 1992: 32). They can explain the moral outrage

that was the driving force of the Central American Peace Movement in the 1980s. Responding to

the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, thousands of North American organized

to curtail U.S. political involvement in these countries and to stand in solidarity with the Central

American poor in their struggle for a just social order (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). The

same can be said for the anti-war movement in the U. S. in the perception of the war in Iraq being

unjust against the Iraqi people and American soldiers. The injustice frame is also widely used in

the websites of the anti-embargo organizations, so much so that we identify "justice" as one of

the norms guiding anti-embargo activism.

Framing is also linked to Emergent Norm Theory (ENT) which contends that

nontraditional, collective behavior emerges from the crucible of a normative crisis (Turner 1964,

Turner and Killian 1972/1982). The occurrence of an event precipitates a normative crisis,

depending on how the crisis is interpreted and reinterpreted to spawn collective action. The

traditional normative guidelines are then collectively perceived as inappropriate because the

crisis destroys or prompts a dissipation of the interpretation of these norms as relevant guides for

action. Through meanings created through symbolic interaction, members of a society are forced

to act in response to the urgency and uncertainty spawned by the crisis. As a result, they interact

conveying these meanings to each other and creates a new emergent normative structure that

guides their behavior. As the members attempt to define the situation, they undergo a process of









"milling and keynoting, develop cues for appropriate action and experiment with alternative

schemes of social action. The crisis produces an "extraordinary" perception of the situation by

members who comes to believe that their impending action is not only feasible, timely and

permissible, but also necessary and duty-bound. Hence, their collective behavior is seen as

appropriate" (Turner and Killian 1987: 9-11, Turner 1996). A useful analogy is that identified by

Jutta Weldes who elaborates on the careful construction or framing of the Cuban Missile Crisis

as a "crisis" and a "threat", prompting the United States into action in 1962 (Weldes 1999).

Applying Emergent Norm Theory to U.S. Cuba policy, we can surmise that increasing

anti-embargo collective action has emerged from the crucible of a normative crisis precipitated

by the end of the Cold War. The traditional normative guidelines of Cuba being a security threat

are collectively perceived as inappropriate because the end of the Cold War prompts a

dissipation of the interpretation of these traditional norms as justification for anti-embargo

policy. The September 11Ith terrorist attack was another crisis which redirected the security threat

to the Middle East providing another "window of opportunities" for anti-embargo activists.

Through shared meanings created from symbolic interaction, the activists act in response to the

changes ushered in by the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 crisis. Conveying these meanings to

each other, they create a new emergent normative structure that guides their behavior. This new

structure reverses the U.S. criticism of Cuba back unto itself as an "undemocratic", "inhumane"

and "unjust" Goliath stifling a tiny Cuban David in a unipolar international system threatened by

terrorists in the Middle East but not by a tiny communist Caribbean island in a post-Cold War

era. The emergent norms prompt the activists to perceive their collective action as just, timely,

permissible, appropriate and duty-bound (Turner and Killian 1987: 9-11), spawning new groups

such as CAAEF and ENCASA and attracting new members thereby prompting a "cycle of









protest" in the nineties touched off by an unpredictable (systemic) event (Tarrow 1993: 285-

286). Tarrow' s (1993, 1998) arguments about the correlation between cycles of contention and

tactical repertoires is also relevant to the anti-embargo movement, which was more vocal in the

nineties and in the current decade due in part to the domestic and international setting and to

renewed restrictions imposed by the Bush regime in 2004 as discussed in Chapter 7. Thus, new

frames have emerged depicting the embargo policy as "draconian", "inhumane" and "anti-

democratic" in keeping with the Emergent Norm Theory discussed above.

This relates directly to the "injustice frame" as espoused by Gamson (1992), which has

become a significant factor in the strategies of anti-embargo groups as they employ diagnostic,

prognostic and motivational frames (Snow and Benford 1988) to potential challenges,

convincing them of the legitimacy of the grievance and the urgency to address it by becoming

part of the movement. The Internet is the most widely used medium through which the anti-

embargo movement attempts to convince members of the public of the legitimacy of their

grievance (diagnostic), assures them of the merits of their tactics (prognostic), and induces them

to get involved in these activities (motivational) (Snow and Benford 1988).

This brings us to Flam's (1990a, 1990b) contentions that emotions are important to the

growth and unfolding of social movements and political protests (In Goodwin, Jasper and

Polletta 2001). The new restrictions on remittances and family travel to Cuba produce a "moral

shock" (Luker 1984, Jasper and Poulsen 1995, Jasper 1997) creating rational emotions amongst

indignant activists but more so amongst moderate Cuban-Americans, because of

personal/familial ties to Cuba. In keeping with Steinberg's (1998) arguments, though they speak

with multiple voices, they misrepresent this mutivocality as heterogeneous by creating a

common discursive repertoire which embraces the activities of the other groups. The website of









the LAWG is a classic example of an attempt to misrepresent the heterogeneity of the groups by

framing the movement as homogenous through having links to other organizations, which

champion the same cause. The tactic is useful for the LAWG whose members come from several

walks of life but which also specifically seeks to attract grassroots support as Steinberg affirms:

The multi-voiced word in this sense can allow for a misrecognition of heterogeneity as
unity, as groups with potentially divergent interests and identities articulate through what
they perceive as shared claims and understandings". This tactic is frequently used in
mobilizing grassroots and local actions in building a discursive repertoire and in the
production of meanings within a repertoire. However, for mobilizing wider populations to
build ties and networks, tactics of mass communication is more effective (Steinberg 1998:
860).

As part of its mobilization drive, new frames are constantly being produced and

reproduced by the anti-embargo groups in an effort to educate and sensitize the public to their

grievance. Although Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba was clamoring for free trade,

they couched their grievance in "humanitarian" terms to evoke sympathy for their cause.

Similarly, the "rancor" with which the U.S. treats the American and Cuban people especially

with the document detailing the 2004 restrictions, is frequently underscored. Since then, the

groups have framed the "draconian" document as a "blueprint for invasion a la Iraq" as they

deliberately employ symbolic representations in the hope of transferring the unpopular

sentiments of the Iraqi War to the Cuba cause. The disastrous consequences for Cuban American

family life, American freedom, human rights, justice and democracy are detailed as articles after

articles conveying images of "Families Torn Apart", "Love, Loss and Longing", and "suffering

caused by family separations" appear in the websites and publications produced by the

organizations. In this regard, the skillful framing and reframing of the embargo and its

consequences provide one plausible explanation for the ability of the movement to persist over

time. As we have seen, these constructions are indeed resonating sufficiently with targets of

mobilization to spur increasing and continued activism in the post Cold War era.









Solidarity Networks and Co-option

As discussed in Chapter 4, solidarity networks and co-option are recognized as a

movement' s mobilization strategies. They provide a useful departure from the rational model to

understand the ability of a movement to sustain itself over time especially when analyzed from a

socio-cultural perspective. Fireman and Gamson (in Zald and McCarthy 1979) perceives the role

of solidarity, principle and solidary groups as an alternative approach to mobilization in their

critique of Olson' s utilitarian, self-interested, rational model. They insist that "solidarity is rooted

in the configuration of relationships linking the members of a group to one another". For them,

"people may be linked together in a number of ways that generate a sense of common identity".

They assert that a person's solidarity with a group is based on five factors: friends and relatives,

participation in organizations, design for living, subordinate and superordinate relations, and no

exit. A lack of solidarity will result in failed mobilization efforts (Fireman and Gamson in Zald

and McCarthy 1979: 22).

According to Gamson (1992), "there is both a social and cultural level involved in loyalty

and commitment to a social movement". Solidarity processes focus on how people relate to

social movement carriers that is, to the various collective actors who claim to represent the

movement" (Gamson in Morris and Mueller (1992: 61). Collective identity and solidarity are

closely intertwined, but one is possible without the other. Friedman and McAdam (1992) define

the collective identity of a social movement organization as "shorthand designation announcing a

status a set of attitudes, commitments and rules for behavior that those who assume the

identity are expected to subscribe to (Friedman and McAdam in Morris and Mueller 1992: 157).

Some members of the anti-embargo movement are in strong solidarity because of their

shared obj ectives and shared historical and cultural background. The latter is particularly true of

Cuban Americans who are bonded by common history, ethnicity, family, background,










experiences and grievances against the embargo. The joint grievances compel them to rally

together to protest the restrictions on family travel and remittances more stringently imposed in

the 2004 Report of the Commission for Assistance for a New Cuba. The Cuban American,

Delvis Fernandez Levy, of the Cuban American Education Alliance (CAAEF) as well as Silivia

Wilhelm and Alvaro Fernandez, of the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights, express

a strong sense of Cuban nationalism. This is reinforced by an American legislation which they

say "is telling us who our family should be and when we should visit them".' Common ethnic

bonds combined with shared grievances and goals provide the impetus for tenacious solidarity

links amongst Cuban Americans. Though the anti-embargo movement is also comprised of

numerous non-Cuban Americans, even at the leadership level, their commons goals produce

organizational forms that support and sustain the personal needs of Cuban American participants

and "embody the movement's collective identity" (Gamson in Morris and Mueller 1992: 61).

We can surmise that this identity extends to the public sphere and is also a product of

political consciousness when it is analyzed in the context of social structural locations. We just

identified the ethnicity of Cuban Americans as one such structure. It can also be linked to class,

since generally Cuban Americans who oppose the embargo belong to a lower socio-economic

class than those who support it. In keeping with the constructivist thesis of Morris (1992), we

affirm that this consciousness and the grievances it produces, are constructed and shaped by the

combination of specific group experiences of domination and inequality and of competition with

the more hegemonic culture of the affluent, hard-line Cuban American culture and the wider

American political power structure. This power configuration will be elaborated upon in Chapter

7 which specifically treats with "political opportunity structures".


SInterviews with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006; Fern~ndez, 7th July 2005; Fern~ndez Levy, 23rd October 2006.









In discussing communication networks amongst groups, Freeman (1973) affirms that "the

network must be co-optable to the ideas of the movement. To be co-optable, the network must be

"composed of like-minded people whose background, experience or location in the social

structure makes them receptive to the ideas of a specific new movement" (Freeman 1973: 794).

Moreover, according to Freeman, in the formation of new groups, firstly, a crisis galvanizes the

network into spontaneous action in a new direction. Secondly, if there are no such networks, the

emergent spontaneous groups must be acutely attuned to the issue, albeit, uncoordinated"

(Freeman 1973: 794-795).

In keeping with Freeman's (1973), argument, one notes that the academic community

represents one such group which was uncoordinated until the Emergency Coalition to Defend

Education Travel (ECDET) was formed in 2004 when the Bush administration imposed stringent

restrictions on academic travel to Cuba. It was fairly easy to organize such a network since

academics were already keenly aware of the embargo and some already had strong ties with the

anti-embargo movement. They were "acutely attuned to the issue, albeit, uncoordinated"

(Freeman 1973: 794-795). The new Cuban American groups which emerged in the nineties such

as Puentes Cubanos, CAAEF, ENCASA and the Cuba Study Group, easily co-opted the older

groups like CIP, LAWG and WOLA which are co-optable because as Freeman (1973) affirms,

they are "pre-existing communication networks" and are comprised of "like-minded people

whose background, experiences or location in the social structure make them receptive to the

ideas of these new movements" (Freeman 1973: 794).

The same theory of "background, experience or location in the social structure" (Freeman

1973), applies to the co-optability of politicians by the anti-embargo movement. Emile Milne,

Congressional staff of Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), explains that Rangel had been an









admirer of Castro since the latter' s visit to Harlem and his stay at the Theresa Hotel in the early

sixties. Rangel himself was born and raised in Harlem. He was a law student when he witnessed

Castro's embrace of the American Civil Rights Movement and the great admiration of African

Americans for Castro's revolution. According to Milne, "Rangel has been introducing legislation

in Congress to lift the embargo since 1994 but has been unsuccessful because lifting the embargo

is not a real priority. The affluent does not have a sufficient stake in it for it to succeed".6

Similarly, Lance Walker, Legislative Assistant to Congressman, Jeff Flake (R-AZ),

explains that "Flake had been in South Africa during the time of apartheid and saw the negative

effects of sanctions which had a lot to do with framing his perceptions on the embargo. As such,

"Flake is more concerned with the issue of free trade which he believes can promote economic

interaction and ultimately build political ideas and spawn an educated middle-class".'

This is somewhat different from the admissions of ex-representative, George Nethercutt

(R-Wash), who championed the Bill to lift the embargo on the sale of food and medicine to Cuba

in 2000. According to Nethercutt, "I was being pressured by my agricultural constituents in

Washington who felt they were being undercut by Canadian farmers for a lucrative market for

their peas and wheat". Nonetheless, Nethercutt claims to be "passionate about democracy" and

believes that it was "just not fair for a handful of extremist Floridians to determine the fate of

farmers in Washington." He agrees with Flake, that sanctions should not be used as a weapon in

foreign policy".8

Frank Carlucci's motives seem to coincide with that of Wayne Smith. As former NSC

Chief under Reagan, Carlucci observed that "the embargo was not achieving its goals". He

6 Interview with Milne, 6th June 2005.

SInterview with Walker, 17" May 2005.

SInterview with Nethercutt, 8th June 2005.









believes that the embargo is propping up the Castro regime and has thus failed miserably, hence

his decision to j oin the AHTC. For Carlucci, normalizing relations with Cuba is in the U. S.

national interest and would bring better results than the current embargo". Carlucci claims that

he had no financial interest in the removal of the embargo but supported the move for

humanitarian reasons. His experience as NSC Chief during the Cold War, allowed him "to gain

an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union and this led to his firm

belief that Castro' s regime can fall under its own weight".9

It is important to emphasize here that although Carlucci supported a business coalition, he

never once mentioned financial benefits for the business interests seeking change. Rather,

humanitarian gains seemed to guide his motives. This is quite consistent with the name of the

organization he belonged to (albeit framed as such) "Americans for Humanitarian Trade with

Cuba" again adding credence to our argument that the rational model cannot suffice to

understand the anti-embargo movement.

The anti-embargo movement also co-opts grassroots organizations. As mentioned, the

LAWG works closely with Witness for Peace, Oxfam America and other faith-based

organizations. Viewed here as resources in themselves, grassroots movements present an ideal

case of non-market-managerial mobilization. Here, the movement draws not on consumer

markets and managers of the advanced capitalist model propounded by McCarty and Zald

(1977), but on community organization and patterns of social relations embedded in the moral

traditions of such communities. In her stimulating study of peasant society and politics in Costa

Rica and Nicaragua during the 1970s and 1980s, Leslie Anderson (1994), underscores the

somewhat reflexive impulse of the peasants to react to threats to their community, lending


9 Interview with Carlucci, 6 June 2005.









credence to our argument that the focus of the rational approach on individualistic self-interest

alone is contrary, if not detrimental, to collective action:

Such action is both individualistic and communitarian. A complex and holistic
understanding of self in the context of community leads the individual to see that
community norms may have to change as the external world changes, in order to facilitate
individual and group survival. Because non-violent collective action is reformist activism,
the incremental modifications that result from it are the best way for communities to
facilitate survival and participation in a changing world. The ecological perception of self
within community thus encourages collective action and individual participation out of
personal self-interest. If the individual pursues only short-term self-interest, acting as a
free-rider in the rational actor self, the limited rationality of this action will undermine
community and endanger the individual. At the same time, if the individual adheres blindly
to tradition and fails to update community norms, community will also be undermined,
endangering the individual (Anderson 1994: 15-16).

Anderson's thesis on peasant understanding of "ecological interdependence" and the need

for "mutual support" and "community cohesion" (Anderson 1994: 14), mirrors the anti-embargo

movement' s dependence on solidarity networks for sustenance. Moreover, her study is congruent

with the burgeoning literary oeuvre in the mid-nineties on social capital which is the topic of the

next section.

Social Capital

Social movements literature perceives associations as special interest groups mobilized

around the particularistic goals of their members. These associations or interest groups are not

formed to replace the functions of state or market but to coerce the state into adopting policies

favorable to members' interests (Oberschall 1973, Gamson 1975, Tilly 1978, Skocpol 1992). The

anti-embargo movement, while representing members' specific goals of removing restrictions on

travel and trade to Cuba, also functions in the neo-Tocquevillian fashion, perceiving

associationalism as a beneficent commitment to collective goals. This section asserts that

although there is an available supply of tangible financial and human resources facilitating

groups' activities, this is not enough to explain their persistence. Lin (2001) notes that "access to










and use of these resources is temporary and borrowed in the sense that the actor does not possess

them (Lin 2001: 56) so individuals must persistently build and sustain relationships if they wish

to (continue to) access resources (Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). This may be the situation with

the anti-embargo movement since in several instances, the same foundations do not continue to

support the same organizations for the same cause over the years. Claire Rodriguez of the

LAWG affirms that "we are no longer funded by the Ford Foundations as we were some time

", 10
ago.

As seen, connections, knowledge, time, skill and expertise are crucial to a movement's

ability to survive. Moreover as Putnam (1993) affirms, "the citizens of the civic community are

helpful, respectful and trustful towards each other". Indeed, "interpersonal trust" is probably the

moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be

maintained. The norms and values of this civic community are embodied in, and reinforced by

distinctive social structures and practices (Putnam 1993). In some respects, the anti-embargo

movement is itself a civic community displaying a high level of interpersonal trust which is

reflected in the amazingly dense solidarity networks amongst the organizations. While

conducting interviews for this study, it was obvious that the groups work very closely with each

other. Indeed, several interviewees were sourced on the recommendations of others. These

solidarity networks amongst the organizations are established through social relations, which,

according to Coleman (1988), are developed via processes such as establishing obligations,

creating trustworthiness and creating channels for information (Coleman 1988). Here, we can

further include "reliability" where members know that they can count on others for support in





"' Interview with Rodriguez, 25th October 2006.









any given area of activity, with regards to changing U.S. policy to Cuba. The high level of

cooperation amongst anti-embargo groups bears testimony to this contention.

Like other forms of capital, social capital is premised upon the notion that an investment in

social relations will result in a return which is some benefit or profit to the individual or the

social unit (Lin 2001). By drawing on the social capital in their relationships, individuals can

further their own goals (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988, 1990; Lin 2001) and the goals of their

networks or social structures (Putnam 2000; Putnam and Feldstein 2003). Because the groups in

the ant-embargo movement share the common goal of changing U.S. policy to Cuba, they are

confident that investment in social relations and solidarity networks with other groups will bear

fruit. Thus, in keeping with Putnam's (2000) contention, social capital makes it possible for them

to achieve certain aims that cannot be achieved by individuals alone in its absence (Putnam,

2000).

Putnam (1995, 2000), popularized the concept of social capital and can be credited for its

entry into mainstream political discourse. Employing the effective metaphor of an American

"Bowling Alone" he captured the decline of social capital in American society (Putnam 1995).

Following his popular Eindings on the decline of social capital in "Bowling Alone", a number of

counter-arguments have emerged (Fukuyama, Skocpol and Putnam in Ray (2002). Francis

Fukuyama (1997), insists that American individualism has seldom involved hostility to

community life altogether". Later, Fukuyama (2002) would affirm that September 11Ith WaS

"sufficient to reverse some of the most important aspects of the negative trends that he (Putnam)

chronicled (Fukuyama in Ray, 2002: xii, brackets mine). Indeed, Putnam himself would change

his tune in a later article entitled "Bowling Together" (Putnam 2002), agreeing with Fukuyama

that "the images of shared suffering that followed the terrorist attacks on New York and










Washington D.C., suggested a powerful idea of cross-class, cross-ethnic solidarity (Putnam in

Dionne Jr. Drogosz and Litan 2003: 17).

Given that social capital is obtained by virtue of membership in social structures

(Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998), its maintenance and reproduction are made possible only through

the social interactions of members and their continued investment in social relationships.

Naturally, individuals have limited resources themselves (human and economic capital), so they

must access other resources through their social ties, which they use (as social capital) for

purposive actions. For this reason, Bourdieu (1986) argues that "the volume of social capital

possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he or she can

effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed

in his or her own right by each of those to whom he or she is connected" (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

Social capital, therefore, grows by bringing together resources from disparate sources. As a

result, networks and network structures represent dimensions of social capital that influences the

range of resources that may be accessed. For Tarrow (1998), these "connective structures"

constitute a valuable resource as channels or conduits for resource mobilization. We have seen

such "connective structures" in the many collaborative efforts amongst anti-embargo

organizations discussed in Chapter 4. These include publications in each other' s websites, joint

seminars, conferences and protest action and even shared Executive and Board members.

The common goal of fostering trade with Cuba through removal of unilateral sanctions,

has spawned sufficient camaraderie to promote cooperation rather than competition even

amongst business interests vying for a share of the limited Cuban market. Also, even though the

goal of "free-trade" is a collective good, Olson' s (1965) free-rider issue never emerges as a

problem, even amongst profit-seekers in USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association,









which actually share executive leadership, as we have seen. The organizations recognize the

value of solidarity and of collective action of "bowling together" as Putnam (2003) aptly

describes it.

Thus, solidarity networks, co-option and social capital provide better explanations for the

sustenance of group activism in the anti-embargo case. Olson (1965) underscores the logic of

collective action in contending that individuals are driven to j oin groups by selective incentives

rather than collective benefits because of the free-rider problem. However, he fails to consider

the non-material benefits which may prompt members to mobilize. Similarly, in arguing that

individuals j oin groups not for collective benefits but for a staff job, Salisbury (1969) also

ignores other non-material benefits which they pursue. None of these models suffice to explain

the deep sense of commitment and the underlying ideological, psychological or moral obj ectives

of the movement' s participants. This will be the subj ect of the next section as we continue our

"rational departure".

Commitment, Moral Incentives and Psychological Benefits

Departing from the economic models propounded by Olson (1965) and Salisbury 1969),

Terry Moe (1980), contends that individuals mobilize for psychological benefits. These include

the pursuit of ideological obj ectives, the desire to make a difference in the political process, a

strong sense of political efficacy, the satisfaction of a personal feeling of obligation, and the need

to obtain political information (Moe 1980: 113-144). For Moe (1980), a number of

considerations are relevant incentives for action: "altruism, belief in a cause or ideology, loyalty,

beliefs about right and wrong, camaraderie, friendship, love, acceptance, security, status,

prestige, power, religious beliefs and racial prejudice" (Moe 1980: 113).

Indeed, even before Olson's (1965), path-breaking Logic of Collective Action, interest

group scholars, Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961), had identified three types of benefits









which can accrue to an individual. The first is material, which includes tangible rewards that can

usually be translated into monetary terms. The second is solidaryd~~~~dddd~~~~ddd which are social rewards that

derive from associating in group activities. The third is purposive, which are rewards associated

with ideological or issue-oriented goals that offer no significant tangible or benefits to members

(Petracca 1992: 102). In establishing a dichotomy between material and non-material resources,

we argue that the groups in the anti-embargo movement are motivated to mobilize not by

individual, selective material incentives but by collective moral incentives and also for the

solidary and purposive benefits which ensue.

This notion of solidary and purposive benefits offered by Clark and Wilson (1961), which

somewhat relates to Moe's (1980) psychological rewards thesis, also serves to explain the ability

of the anti-embargo movement to survive and be active in the face of an extremely powerful

countermovement. This is reinforced by what Petracca (1992) identifies as "commitment

theory". Its basic premise is that the high degree of time, energy and resources required for

involvement in group activities is derived from "belief about good policy" (Sabatier and

McLauglin 1990). A mixture of material and ideological/purposive incentives drive individuals

to become members of groups and ultimately, leaders, when those benefits are perceived to be

large enough. More importantly, however, self-interested behavior becomes intertwined with

congruent notions of improving social welfare, either out of self-respect or concern for political

efficacy (Tesser 1978, Margolis 1982: 100). As one moves from potential members to actual

members and then to leaders, the level of commitment is expected to increase (Sabatier and

McCubbin, 1990). This is quite evident in the long-standing moral commitment of some leaders

like Wayne Smith, Sandra Levinson and Kirby Jones, discussed at length in Chapter 3. Even if









there was a self-interested motive in benefiting from a job or a career, their commitment to the

cause has increased with leadership roles.

It is this "moral commitment," which perhaps best explains the decision of so many

academics, business interests, politicians, ex-politicians and grassroots groups to participate in

the anti-embargo movement. The interviews reveal that there is a common thread binding their

motives. They are guided not by material self-interests but by broad notions of right and wrong.

In viewing the existing Cuba policy as wrong, they hold firmly to liberal norms, which form part

of their value-based ideological beliefs rooted in notions of peace, human rights, freedom, justice

and democracy. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) forge a nexus between such norms and framing

(discussed above). Viewing challengers as "norm entrepreneurs", they contend:

Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or
even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets and even dramatizes them.
Social movement theorists refer to this reinterpretation or renaming process as "framing."
The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs'
political strategies since when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader
public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding
issues (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), suggest that norm entrepreneurs or challengers are

motivated by empathy, altruism or ideational commitment. For them, "empathy exists when

actors have the capacity for participating in another' s feelings or ideas". They continue that

"such empathy may lead to "empathetic interdependence", where "actors are interested in the

welfare of others for its own sake" even if this has no effect on their own material well-being or

security". Altruism exists when actors take "action designed to benefit another even at risk to

significant harm to the actor's own well-being". They define ideational commitment as the "main

motivation when entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and

values embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their

well-being" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898).










We see all these components in the actions of anti-embargo groups. Mainstream American

activists in WOLA, LAWG, CIP and the Center for Cuban Studies, empathize with the plight of

Cuban Americans even though the embargo has no direct effect on their own well-being.

Venceremos Brigade and Pastors for Peace have displayed altruism in rislang imprisonment by

breaking the law for those affected by the embargo. All the groups display ideational

commitment in their determination to promote one or more of the norms of human rights, peace

democracy, justice and freedom in which they firmly believe.

In examining the mission statements of the organizations, one or more of these norms

almost always arise as a primary obj ective. The principal mission of CIP involves promoting a

U.S. foreign policy based on "international cooperation, demilitarization and a respect for basic

human rights"." The LAWG and its sister organization, the Latin American Working Group

Education Fund, seek to encourage U.S. policies towards Latin America that "promote human

rights, justice, peace and sustainable development".12 WOLA aims to "promote human rights,

democracy and social justice in Latin America".13 Viewing U.S. Cuba policy as a complete

violation of human rights, Pastors for Peace also seek to "foster peace, human rights and

justice".14 Freedom of information is a maj or obj ective of the Center for Cuban Studies. 1





11 Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. "The Center's Mission."
http:.//ciponline. org/aboutus.htm#mis sion

12 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "About the Latin American Working Group."
I1llip w il it .1awg.org/about/AboutLAWG.htm

13 Washington Office on Latin America. Washington, DC. "Welcome to WOLA.ORG"
I1lllp w\ il \t .wola.org/index.php?option=com frontpage&Itmd 1
14 Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. 'About Us."
I1lllp w il it .ifconews.org/about/about~us.htm

1s Center for Cuban Studies. "About Us." b1lip w\ \\ \\ .cubaupdate.org/more.htm









Freedom of academic travel is motivating force of the ECDET16 and freedom to family is the

primary goal of the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights and CAAEF. 1

The salience of liberal norms in the discourse of politicians, academics and the leaders and

staff of the organizations is evident from publications in their websites. Again, the notion that the

organizations are propelled by liberal norms undermines the rational model and underscores the

non-material, ideological, moral, psychological and ethical motivations which sustain the

movement. Such moral commitments have been defined as sources of value other than being

"better off', no matter how "better of' is defined (Etzioni 1988, Hirschmann 1986). For

Hirschmann (1986), such values act as meta-preferences the choice of ends rather than means

of achieving a specified end. He identifies democracy as a collective good both as a given set of

rules and as informed participation in public choice as a process of individual and collective

striving (Hirschmann 1986: 149-55). Etzioni (1988) identifies such moral commitments as "often

explicitly based on the desire for pleasure in the name of the principles) involved" (Etzioni

1988: 45). Ferree (1992), affirms that "many social movements are committed to such moral

principles and attempt to realize them in the process of collective mobilization itself as much as

in the stated outcome of such endeavors" (Ferree in Morris and Mueller, 1992: 33).

An electronic content analysis undertaken of forty documents in the websites of CIP,

WOLA, LAWG and CAAEF for the frequency of liberal norms (human rights, peace, justice,

freedom and democracy) as espoused in their mission statements, both confirms the presence of

normative goals of the organizations and underscores which norms the organizations prioritize.

A search was made for these terms and hit counts recorded. Table 6-1 shows the number of hit



16 Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. http://www.ecdet. org/about. htm

17 Cuban American Alliance. 1995. "Board of Directors." hopll nu \\ \ cubamer. org/about~us.asp









counts of each liberal norm emerging from documents in the websites of some of these more

popular organizations of the anti-embargo movement. The bar-chart in Figure 6-1 of graphically

illustrates the frequency of electronic hit counts of certain liberal norms in publications in the

web sites of maj or organizations. I

Though all the groups do not attribute the same significance to each norm, human rights

seems critically important to CIP, WOLA and LAWG. CIP claims that human rights is of

primary importance because it is fundamental to the existence of the individual (Interview with

Smith, 9th August, 2006). Table 6-1 of (and the interviews), suggest that the preservation of

human rights are salient in the agenda of the three maj or D.C. policy groups, CIP, WOLA and

LAWG. The term "human rights" appear 515 times in the forty documents searched (see

Appendix I for list of articles searched). The LAWG shares the Cuban American CAAEF's

concern for "freedom" especially since the 2004 restrictions hamper their freedom to travel and

to family. However, as Claire Rodriguez asserts, the LAWG is reluctant to tout the concept of

"democracy" since it also applies to the Cuban system and the LAWG prefers to avoid

allegations of infringement on Cuba' s sovereignty. 19 Hence, the relatively low hit count for

"democracy" for the LAWG. "Peace" and "justice" do not appear as frequently in the

publications though they are identified as primary goals in some groups' mission statements.

Nonetheless, the numerous appearances of these norms in the publications of the organizations

suggest they are significant motivation for the movement' s continued operations, thereby

justifying our case for a "rational departure" in this chapter.





1s See Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1 on page 179.

19Interview with Rodriguez, 26th October 2006.










Underlying these non-material motivations embracing the core values of human rights,

freedom, peace and justice, is a frantic effort by both mainstream and Cuban Americans to

preserve the highly-prized institution and norm of democracy in the United States. Democracy

provides the pillar upon which these core American values rest. The demands made by social

movements have been challenging both democratic deviants and pseudo claims to democracy in

as much as they call for re-adjustments in the decision-making processes. In employing the

foundational components of Robert Dahl's theory (1956, 1971), to explain democracy in

Nicaragua, Anderson and Dodd (2005) note the role of contestation. In agreement with Dahl

(1956, 1971), they affirm that "politics is not just a struggle for personal and factional power

among contending elites who are in essential agreement over ideas and issues, but rather a

conflict over alternative political visions that citizens care about" (Anderson and Dodd 2005:

41). Thus, we contend that social movements as a whole act as challengers and maintainerss" of

democracy. Democracy is the underlying motivational force propelling the anti-embargo

movement.

This is buttressed by our findings from the content analysis. The term "democracy"

emerges 147 times in our electronic search, closely paralleling the hit count for "freedom" which

occurs 148 times. "Freedom" and "democracy" are coterminous and are frequently used

interchangeably in the U. S. This is seen in the harsh condemnation of the Report of the

Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba by the Emergency Network of Cuban American

Scholars and Artists (ENCASA) based on its view that "these recommendations ultimately

undermine both the national interests of the U. S. and the values and ideals that we claim to stand

for" :

While the report professes that its goal is the spread of democracy in Cuba, the
Commission's past recommendations (strengthened by the new report) have added further










restrictions on travel to Cuba by Cuban-Americans, scholars, students, and humanitarians -
a foreign policy which not only belies American commitment to basic freedoms but also
runs completely counter to that conducted with respect to other communist countries, for
which the prevailing assumption has always been that democracy is spread through
American travel and the dissemination of democratic ideals.20

The irony is not lost. On the one hand, the United States imposes and continues to tighten a

forty-six year old embargo on Cuba on the grounds of Castro' s flagrant disregard for human

rights and democracy. On the other hand, organizations and individuals within the United States

strongly criticize and condemn the embargo on the grounds of the U. S. "inhumane" restrictions

on citizen's fundamental "freedoms" often viewed as synonymous with human rights and

democracy .

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted a "rational departure", from traditional resource

mobilization perspectives. In all fairness to Olson (1965), we should acknowledge that his was

not a model designed to explain unsuccessful social movements. Rather, it was an approach

geared toward an understanding of mobilization in powerful labor unions, lobby and interest

groups. It happened to catch the fancy of a number of social movements scholars and so became

popularized as a resource mobilization perspective. Although we have discounted it for the most

part in this chapter, it has nonetheless serves as a useful platform from which to launch our

analysis on a "rational departure".

We have argued that material incentives are not the primary motivations behind the

continued efforts of the anti-embargo movement to change U. S./Cuba policy. We agree with

McCarthy and Zald (1977) that the availability of financial resources has facilitated the

organizations' operations but disagree that this movement resembles any kind of "movement


20ENCASA- U.S./Cuba. "Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists
for Change in U.S.-Cuba Policy." http://www.1awg.org/docs/encasa~topl0.pdf










industry", "movement sector" or even "social movement organization" (SMO) which operates

like a competitive market-oriented business firm.

Moreover, Olson's model proves particularly misleading when we examine mobilization

tactics (primarily framing), solidarity networks, co-option and social capital as facilitators to the

movement' s sustenance and continued activism in the post-Cold War era. While the notion of

selective incentives is applicable to self-oriented groups, it fails to explain the motivations of

public interest groups which constitute the bulk of the anti-embargo movement. We contend that

other non-material motivations such as moral commitment, solidary and purposive benefits and

belief about good policy, serve to better explain the persistence of the anti-embargo movement

despite its limited success over time. Hence, we depart from the rational model in affirming that

the anti-embargo movement could not be sustained without a deep and abiding normative

commitment from its members and leaders.

This is evident in the long-standing commitments of icons of the movement such as Wayne

Smith, Sandra Levinson and Kirby Jones as detailed in Chapter 3. The dedication of unpaid

interns and professional members of the Board of Directors as well as the personal experiences

and unrelenting commitment of underpaid staff members, serve to strengthen our argument. This

is buttressed by the role of social capital and the dense solidarity networks within the movements

and with politicians, ex-politicians, academics and grassroots organizations. Moreover, the non-

material impulse is illustrated by the overwhelming presence of normative concepts in the

organizations' publications.

Although "human rights" appears as the most salient liberal norm guiding the movement' s

operations, underlying this is a deep-seated quest to preserve the very bedrock of democracy

upon which certain core American values rest. The many fundamental "freedoms" for which









anti-embargo challengers struggle such as freedom of information, freedom to travel, freedom to

trade and freedom to family, are perceived as vital facets of, if not identical to the "democracy"

norm which Americans hold in such high regard. It is no surprise that the hit counts for

"freedom' and "democracy" are almost equal in a search of documents in the organizations'

websites. In the next chapter on "political opportunity structures", we will analyze how

democratic systems actually facilitate collective action.

The superficial economic lure of the rational model in the quest for empirically testable

formulations, fail to adequately capture what the anti-embargo movement really is, who its

members actually are and what they do. For indeed, social movements are ultimately about

human beings and their collective behavior. As Perrow (1986) asserts, "in the rational model,

human forms are retained but all that we value about human behavior its spontaneity,

unpredictability, selflessness, plurality of values, reciprocal influence, and resentment of

domination- has disappeared" (Perrow 1986: 41).









Table 6-1. Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent
anti-embargo organizations.

Organizations Human Rights Peace Justice Freedom Democracy
CIP 98 31 18 17 64
LAWG 274 8 7 88 22
WOLA 136 21 26 31 58
CAAEF 7 1 7 12 3
CIP, LAWG,
WOLA, CAEF 515 61 58 148 147
(TOTAL)


300


250


200


150


100


50


0


Figure 6-1. Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent
anti-embargo organizations as reflected in Table 6-1. The X-axis represents the number
of hit counts in the websites and the Y-axis represents the maj or organizations.


m CIP H LAWG 8 WOLA 0 CAAEF









CHAPTER 7
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: SYSTEMIC, NATIONAL AND SUB-
NATIONAL IMPULSES TO ANTI-EMBARGO ACTIVISM

In his 1978 classic text, From M~obilization to Revohition, Charles Tilly introduced a

"polity model" for the analysis of collective action. He elaborated a set of conditions necessary

for mobilization underscoring the opportunity-threat to challengers and facilitation-repression by

authorities (Tilly 1978). More popularly known as "political opportunity structures", the dual

dimensions of Tilly's polity model link collective action to the state, which was completely

ignored by previous studies focusing on resource mobilization. For Tilly, politics and collective

action are intricately intertwined though movements vary in their strategy, structure and success

in different kinds of states. Tilly's (1984b) assertions found resonance with students of social

revolution like Theda Skocpol, in his argument that the development of the national social

movement was "concomitant and mutually interdependent with the rise of consolidated national

states" (Tarrow 1998).

Tilly's (1984b) model was later taken up by McAdam McCarthy and Zald (2004c) who

emphasize that changes in the structures of political opportunities can contribute to shifting

fortunes in social movements. Sidney Tarrow, inspired by Tilly (1978), defines the political

opportunity structure as "consistent ...dimensions of the political environment which either

encourage or discourage people from using political action. In particular, the opening up of

political power, the shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of potential allies, and the

emergence of cleavages within and among elites are considered the external resources that

trigger contentious action" (Tarrow 1998: 18). For Tarrow, there is no formula to predict exactly

when contentious politics will emerge since the specifications of opportunities and constraints

varies in different historical and political contexts and because different factors may vary in

opposing directions. Hence, "the term "political opportunity structure" should not be understood









as an invariant model inevitably producing social movements, but as a set of clues for when

contentious politics will emerge, setting in motion a chain of causation that may ultimately lead

to sustained interaction with authorities and thence to social movements" (Tarrow 1998: 20).

Particularly applicable to this study is the dimension of collective action embraced by

political opportunity structures which Tarrow calls "cycles of contention" or "waves of protest".

Tarrow (1998) defines these as periods of turbulence and realignment. The historical period

under study is the post-Cold War era. In attempting to determine whether the perspectives of

Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998) speak to this investigation in any way, we seek answers to a

number of questions. Is this period characterized by a wave of anti-embargo protests? Have

systemic, national and societal forces led to an increase in anti-embargo organizations?

Moreover, have they facilitated or constrained anti-embargo activism?

Though Tilly's (1978) model is resolutely structural, grounded in conditions that are

apparently outside the control of actors or agents, he completely ignores the international system

as part of this structure. Even Tilly's disciples fail to capture the international dynamic, hardly

employing systemic factors to explain collective action. This is not surprising since social

movement research is predominantly Comparative and rarely accommodates the field of

International Relations.

In this chapter, we hope to fill the academic lacunae of the Tillian tradition by exploring

the opportunity-constraints structures facilitating-inhibiting group activities in the anti-embargo

movement. This entails an understanding of the systemic, national and sub-national forces

impacting on the anti-embargo movement. The systemic underscores external factors such as the

end of the Cold War, neoliberalism and globalization, and the Pope' s visit to the island. The state

level dynamics focus on the national setting in the U.S. and Cuba such as Cuba's liberal reforms,









the various American post-Cold War state policies including the Torricelli Bill, the Helms-

Burton Law, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act and the Reports of the

Commission to a Free Cuba. It also includes the domestic environment in Cuba. The sub-

national, local or societal forces emphasizes the Cuban American community in Miami including

its power alignment with the state; the Elian Gonzalez affair; recent changes within the Cuban

American National Foundation (CANF); and increasing challenges to the embargo from the

moderate maj ority of Cuban Americans in South Florida. There are significant overlaps between

these so they should not be viewed as entirely independent of each other.

Systemic Forces and Expanding Opportunity Structures

The notion that the level of civic engagement in a society is related to external events may

prove useful in explaining the rise of social movements at the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama

(2002), contends that "the high level of civic engagement and trust that characterized the United

States in the 1950's was not some kind of "normal" baseline for society, but was itself a

somewhat abnormal period shaped by external events. The Great Depression, World War II, and

emerging Cold War were traumatic events that reinforced an American sense of community and

identity" (in Ray, 2002: xii). Putnam corroborates this with data he gathered after September 11Ith

concluding that "as 2001 ended, Americans were more united, readier for collective sacrifice,

and more attuned to public purpose than we have been for several decades... Indeed, we have a

more capacious sense of "we" than we have had in the adult experience of most Americans now

alive" (in Dionne Jr. Drogosz and Litan 2003: 17). There seems to be some correlation between

the existence and activities of social movements and structural factors. Speaking generally,

Smith (2000) asserts that after the Cold War, "a host of independent forces including the media,

the universities, private foundations, gender, ethnic, and racial communities, and citizens action










groups have proliferated, giving new form and strength to society relative to the state (Smith

2000: 92).

This becomes even more pertinent when one considers the proliferation of organizations in

the United States attempting to change U. S. Cuba policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus,

we argue that a "window of political opportunities," as espoused by McAdam (in McAdam,

McCarthy and Zald 1996: 23-40), has been provided by several international events. These

include the end of the Cold War; the wave of globalization and concomitantly, neoliberalism and

free-trade which stands in opposition to sanctions like the Cuban embargo; and the Pope's visit

to Cuba in 1998.

The End of the Cold War and the Onslaught of Globalization

The increasing number of anti-embargo organizations in the United States in the aftermath

of the Cold War can be attributable to changing attitudes to Cuba due to the collapse of

communism in the Eastern bloc and the end of bipolar conflict in the international system. In the

early nineties, international and American outrage against the embargo was intensified. The

literature and surveys show changing attitudes of both mainstream and Cuban Americans to U.S.

Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era (Mayer 2001, Grenier and Gladwin, FIU/Cuba Poll-1991-

2006). This is largely because Cuba was no longer perceived as an ideological threat to the U. S

or the world for that matter as reflected in Mayer' s (2001) report of the ABC/Wa~shington Post

(1993-1998) and YankelovichYY~~YY~~~YY~~YY (1983-2000) polls in Tables 7-1 and 7-2.1

Some U.S. citizens even defy the embargo on the grounds that Cuba is no longer a security

threat to the U. S. In 1993, for example, the San Francisco-based Global Exchange, a non-profit,

educational travel organization, undertook a trip to Cuba risking ten years imprisonment and



SSee Tables 7-1 and 7-2 on page 211.









fines of up to $250,000. The group of 175 U. S. citizens consisted of doctors, business people,

and an Alabama mother of six. Medea Benj amin, Executive Director of the organization, claimed

that their aim was to expose what they call an "archaic" and "unconstitutional" U.S. policy

limiting travel to Cuba. She insisted that

The United States is the only Western democracy that treats travel as a crime. It makes no
sense that we can travel almost anywhere in the world, but our own government prevents
us from visiting Cuba... Since the demise of the Soviet Union, our government can no
longer say that Cuba threatens our national security (Scott 1993).

This argument has been taken up by several academics who perceive the embargo as

senseless in a post-Cold War era. Moreover, they contend that it is not achieving its goal of

toppling the Castro regime. Rather, they believe it is conveniently used by the Cuban leader to

bolster domestic support for himself and his regime which defeats the very purpose for which it

was implemented (Smith 1998, Buckley 1998).

Increasing sympathy for the Cuban people (if not the Castro regime), also emerged because

of the grueling "special period" the island endured in the nineties and economic and social

hardships suffered by the Cuban people after the Soviet Union withdrew its five billion dollars

annual subvention and ceased propping up the Cuban economy. The drastic restructuring of the

international system at the end of the Cold War and the new priorities of the Soviet Union led to

an economic crisis in Cuba in the early to mid-nineties as affirmed by Perez LC~pez:

The principal cause behind the island' s economic crisis during the 1990s has undoubtedly
been the shift in trade and economic relations with the former socialist countries, a shift
that began in 1989 as those economic partners abandoned central planning and began a
transition designed to lead to market economies. In the latter part of the 1980s, the former
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe purchased 85% of Cuba' s exports,
provided a like share of the country's imports, and were the main source of the islands
development financing. The disappearance of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, and their subsequent demand that trade relations be conducted via
convertible currencies and following normal commercial practices, meant that Cuba lost
the very favorable economic treatment to which it had become accustomed and on which
its economy had depended (Perez LC~pez 1997).









We can therefore surmise that the changing international dynamics due to the collapse of

Communism in the Eastern bloc in 1989 led to increased anti-embargo activism for several

reasons. First, it dispelled images of Cuba as a Soviet satellite. Silvia Wilhelm of the Cuban

American Commission for Family Rights admits that this was certainly a motivating force

behind the establishment of the organization, Puentes Cubanos, of which she is President. 2

Second, the economic crisis and the resulting suffering endured by the Cuban people aroused the

sympathy of the American public and hence spawned anti-embargo activities. This prompted

some Americans to engage in anti-embargo activities such as j oining the annual caravans that

take much-needed aid to Cuba organized by Pastors for Peace. In 1997, Pastors for Peace took

over 150 tons of food and medical supplies across US-Mexican border at Laredo (Texas) to Cuba

(Hall 1994.) The sentiments expressed by Ian Williams cogently demonstrate how such

sympathy can be evoked:

The effects of the economic crisis demonstrate that neither the U. S. government nor the
Cuban American National Foundation nor their supporters in Congress have the welfare of
the Cuban people at heart when they try to exacerbate the situation. In Old Havana,
families of eight live in two rooms, and the water supply is turned on only five hours a day.
While food is adequate, soap is rationed to one bar a month for two people, and shampoos,
detergents and similar items are available only in the hard-currency shops. A teacher
showed me how she made nail polish with acetone, varnish and old house paint. In a
suburb of Havana, I found that the local clinic's ambulance was out of commission for lack
of tires (Williams 1992).

In addition to Cuba's economic crisis, the continued sanctions on Cuba in the age of

globalization and neoliberal economic policies, evoked the ire of anti-sanctions organizations

such as USA Engage, which works in collaboration with the National Foreign Trade Council.

Jake Colvin, Director of USA Engage, asserts that "USA Engage was formed in 1997 to

counteract U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran and Libya in the mid-nineties. Moreover, there



SInterview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006.










was a need to change the course of the conversation on Cuba after the Helms-Burn law was

passed in 1996. Colvin insists that sanctions are contrary to the goals and interests of the United

States in an era of globalization. 3 This position is reiterated in the organization' s website: "In an

integrated, globalized economy, positive U.S. economic engagement including the ability of

American farmers, workers and businesses to compete in emerging markets is central to our

own economic prosperity and to the worldwide growth of democracy, freedom, and human

rights".4

That there were increased activities of the anti-embargo movement from the Cold War to

the post-Cold War era is evident from data collected via an electronic content analysis of five

maj or U. S. newspapers The Christian Science M~onitor, the M~iamni Herald, the New York

Times, USA Todaly and the Wa~shington Post. A search for the word "Cuba" and the name of

prominent organizations involved in anti-embargo activities reveal an overwhelming increase in

frequency for the later period in every case. This suggests that anti-embargo activities spiraled in

the post-Cold War era confirming our contention that political opportunity structures had an

impact on the movement's activities. Table 7-3 and Figure 7-3 show the increasing hit counts of

twenty-five prominent anti-embargo organizations in the U.S. from the Cold War (1980-1989) to

the post-Cold War era (1990-2006).5

Pope John Paul's Visit to Cuba

The increase in anti-embargo activism may also be linked to the visit of Pope John Paul II

to Cuba in January, 1998. The visit resulted in a change in U.S. policy as a result of perceived

changes in Cuba. According to John Joseph Moakly (ex-D-Mass), who visited Cuba while the

SInterview with Colvin, 19" August 2006.

SUSA Engage. "About Us." http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-USAEngagedfutapi=1

SSee Table 7-3 and Figure 7-1 on pages 212 and 213 respectively.










Pope was there, "the Pope's visit created a change in atmosphere in Cuba that hasn't been seen

since the revolution... we need to be part of Cuba' s changing political and social situation by

engaging in a dialogue of thoughts and ideas" (Moakley 1999). Another source noted that

Protestant groups have been involved in the effort (Swarns 1998).

Anti-embargo activists and faith-based organizations saw the Pope's visit as a "window of

opportunity" (McAdam in McAdam in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 23-40), to step up

their protest activity. Catholic leaders and some Cuban Americans praised Clinton's decision to

reduce restrictions on travel and humanitarian aid, claiming that the embargo had caused

civilians to suffer. Archbishop Theodore E. McCarrick of Newark, N.J., chairman of the U. S.

Bishop's International Policy Committee, issued a statement praising Clinton's action, saying he

and others who visited Cuba during the Pope's visit "cannot forget the outpouring of joy and

enthusiasm of the Cuban people ... and neither can we forget so many signs of a general

deterioration: the pitiful condition of state-run health clinics or the empty shelves of food stores."

He added, "We welcome the willingness of our government to facilitate the more adequate

response to the needs of the people of Cuba at this time." According to Executive Director,

Kenneth F. Hackett, Catholic Relief Services also shipped medical supplies to Cuba of more than

$5 million worth, On March 23, 1998, Catholic Medical Missions Board in New York City

shipped supplies to Cuba as part of $6 million in stockpiled medical aid, including $1 million

worth of insulin collected from American pharmaceutical companies. Cardinal Anthony

Bevilacqua of Philadelphia said that Clinton' s action "slowly opens the door of hope" for Cuban

people and will help to strengthen them "not only physically but emotionally and spiritually."

During a March 20 mass for Cuban Americans and other Hispanics, Cardinal John O'Connor of

New York, who led a delegation to Cuba during the Pope's visit, urged that restrictions on travel










to Cuba be lifted. Similarly, the Rev. Rodney Page, Executive Director of Church World Service,

the relief arm of the National Council of Churches declared that "We are pleased to know that

President Clinton has been listening to the growing clamor of the churches".6

Charles Krause, reporting for the Jim Lehreh News Hour, interviewed Ricardo Alarcon,

President of the Cuban National Assembly after the Pope's visit, asking him: "Do you think that

this trip and his statements about the embargo will change the political climate in the United

States?" Alarcon responded:

I would like to hope that his message, particularly his appeal for an ending of the embargo
would have some response that would be listened to and in the same manner that we take
every other comment that he made. I think he is a person that deserves to be listened. His
views have to be considered, and perhaps his visit will contribute not to change
immediately not drastically adopt a particular attitude by the U. S. authorities, but let's
hope that it will contribute to promote a necessary reassessment of a policy that His
Holiness has said is unjust and morally unacceptable. I think that those are two concepts
that should have persons of goodwill, whatever their political persuasions, think a little bit
ab out.

Thus, a "window of opportunities," as described by McAdam (In McAdam in McAdam,

McCarthy and Zald 1996: 23-40), opened up triggering a wave of protests by anti-embargo

challengers in the aftermath of the Cold War. The event marks a maj or political watershed

creating political opportunity structures which was facilitated by the wave of protests by the anti-

embargo movement. Activists seized the opportunities ushered in by the public perception of

Cuba as no longer posing a security threat to the U.S. This was buttressed the winds of

globalization blowing through the international system. All this led to the formation of new

groups like USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association as well as increased activism by



6 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Washington, DC. "Catholic Bishops' Leaders on International
Issues Applauds Clinton Action on Cuba." b1lip nu \\ \ usccb.org/comm/archives/1998/98-066.shtm

SOnline Newshour with Jim Lehrer. "The Papal Impact." 4th February 1998.
hli w\ il itpbs.org/newshour/bb/latin~america/jan-jun9/ua24hm









non-business organizations like WOLA and CIP and humanitarian groups and faith-based

organizations which have taken up the business and Cuban cause as part of their agenda.

State-level Impetus to Anti-Embargo Activities

Social movement scholars have been focusing a great deal of attention to the state because

they generally target the state and it is through state action that challengers can realize their goals

(Kreisi 1995, Kreisi et al 1995, Goodwin 1995, Jenkins 1995). Amenta and Young (1999)

contend that states systematically influence social action by influencing the return to their

collective action. Thus, when states repay challengers' actions generously, social mobilization

would be greater than when such returns are small (Amenta and Young 1999: 155).

This hypothesis does not hold true for the anti-embargo movement, which has

demonstrated higher levels of collective action even when their goals are counteracted by state

polices resulting in a virtual negative rate of return from the state. Indeed, this forms the basis of

the central research puzzle addressed in this proj ect: why does the movement persists in collective

action when the returns fiom the state are consistently negative? We have identified the external

dynamic or systemic forces as one precipitator of anti-embargo activism. Here we continue this

argument at the domestic level contending that state level facilitators or national forces spawn

both a proliferation of groups and anti-embargo activism in the post-Cold War Era. We attribute

this to three factors, namely the liberalizing economic reforms which the Cuban economy itself

has been undergoing since the mid-nineties, type of government and specific state policies.

Cuba's Liberal Economic Reforms

At the end of the Cold War, Cuba was also perceived as more inclined toward adopting the

American capitalist policies. Thus, attempts at liberal reforms by Castro in the nineties have

made the island seem less "evil" to the American people. Wayne Smith observes that "Havana

initiated a number of reform measures in 1993, permitting farmers markets and small private









enterprises including private restaurants and repair shops, use of the U. S. dollar as legal daily

tender and more favorable terms for foreign investment. These all led toward a more open

economy..."(Smith 1998).

During the "special period" in the mid-nineties when Castro undertook market reforms to

prop up the fledgling Cuban economy, the island became an attractive prospect for potential

business investors. This became more of an imperative for American interests when European,

Canadian and Mexican investors began to take advantage of investment opportunities in the

Cuban economy. It led to the creation of Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba in 1999

and prompted American business interests to coalesce under the banner of USA Engage and the

U. S.-Cuba Trade Association formed in 1997 and 2005 respectively. The fear expressed by U. S.

corporations of European competition and of losing a lucrative market of eleven million Cuban

citizens just ninety miles off the shores of Florida, is encapsulated in the words of Thomas J.

Donohue, president of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce:

We're saying on behalf of the American business community that it' s time to look at this
another way," said Thomas J. Donohue, president of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce after
a three-day visit to Cuba in 1999. "Who does well there?...It's the Canadians, the Germans,
the French, the Italians. All of our friends....Ask Bill Marriott or the guys at the Hilton, do
they want to let everybody else in the world buy up those beaches? We need a new
approach" (DeYoung 1999).

This may seem as more of an "economic" than a "political" opportunity. Social movement

scholars have recognized that the earliest formulation of the concept "political opportunities"

was vague because "any environmental factor that facilitated movement activity was apt to be

conceptualized as a political opportunity" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 25). Indeed,

Gamson and Meyer recognize the problem affirming that "the concept of political opportunity

structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the

social movement argument political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political









alliances, and policy shifts...Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing it all"

(in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 24). We defend our insistence in viewing the economic

reforms in Cuba as a "political opportunity structure" because it was triggered by changes in the

political climate of the international system the collapse of the Soviet Union. As for

globalization, it has both economic and political dimensions. Moreover, while Gamson and

Meyer (1996) are cognizant of the danger of overstretching the concept, they themselves fail to

account for "economic opportunities" and its role in the opportunity structure debates in social

movement literature. At the same time, we must recognize the gap in the literary oeuvre on

political opportunities in its failure to capture systemic or international dynamics to explain

collective action.

There was also a groundswell of sympathy for the Cuban people from relatives in Miami,

even those opposed to Castro and his socialist policies. Larry Rohter explains that the support

offered by exiles in Miami for their relatives in Cuba in the face of the deepening economic

crisis surpassed humanitarian aid to include visits to Cuba:

As Cuba's economic and political crisis deepens, exiles here are reaching out to their kin
on the island as never before by sending aid, exchanging visits and seeking their advice on
how to ease Fidel Castro from power. Thousands of exiles, responding to the pleas of
family members still in Cuba, have defied calls to starve the island into submission and are
sending money and supplies through the scores of shipping agencies that have sprung up
here. Still others have responded to Mr. Castro's recent invitation to exiles, whom he once
spurned as "worms" and "scum," and are visiting their families in Cuba. New flights
making the Miami-Havana run are booked weeks in advance, and relatives of top Cuban
officials have also come to seek out moderates here to discuss ways the two groups can
cooperate (Rohter 1993).

Between 1991 and 1993, the Cuban economy shrunk by over 50%. Electrical power

outages became the norm rather than the exception. Robert Gelbard, Deputy Assistant for Inter-

American Affairs reports that "across the island, maj or factories stand idle for want of fuel and

spare parts. Public transportation between and within maj or cities was drastically reduced. The










diet of the Cuban population suffered dramatically. Basic foods were severely rationed and

supplies were often so low that people could not redeem their ration cards. There is a growing

black market for food and even reports of clandestine restaurants where Cubans go for meals"..

(Gelbard 1993)." Ruben Berrios presents his case for lifting the embargo

At present the Cuban government is struggling to keep its fragile economy afloat. The
rationing of basic staples and other consumer goods has been intensified and the lack of
spare parts and fuel, previously imported from the socialist bloc, has to a large extent
paralyzed economic activity. The consequences for employment are obviously adverse.9

Thus, anti-embargo activism was spawned by increasing sympathy for suffering Cuban

citizens and the possibilities of lucrative trade opportunities due to liberal reforms undertaken by

Castro after the collapse of Communism in the Eastern bloc.

Type of Government

Tarrow (1983, 1989b) perceives the concept of political opportunity structure as three

dimensional: the degree of openness or closure of formal political access; the degree of stability

or instability of political alignments; and the availability and strategic posture of potential

alliance partners (Tarrow 1983: 28). Later, he adds a fourth element: political conflicts within

and among elites (Tarrow 1989b: 35).

Type of government is directly related to Tarrow' s "degree of openness or closure of

formal political access". There has been a substantial body of literature dedicated to the

argument that democracy fosters social action and therefore democratic states are more open to

social movements (Marshall 1963, Tarrow 1994, Amenta and Young 1999). By reducing the

level of legal restrictions on institutional participation, democratic states allows for an increase in


SFind Articles. "Cuba: Crrent Asessment and U.S. Picy Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
bert S. Gelbard speech Transcript." 16th August, 1993.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi~ml 584/is n3 3v4/ai_13276697
9 Ruben Berrios. Find Articles. "Why America Should Lift its Cuban Embargo."
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m224/sn55V6/i1437









collective action by everyday people. Social movements take advantage of such rights to hold

meetings, conferences and seminars, issue press releases, mobilize in mass protests and now use

the internet as a medium to criticize state policies and solicit support from the public. As seen,

several of these have been employed by the anti-embargo movement including the rather

democratic procedure of asking citizens to write to their representatives. Interestingly, the

struggle to preserve the very institution of democracy perceived as a norm, even a fundamental

human right, has spurred anti-embargo activism. Some groups become emboldened in the belief

that democracy is a right and are prepared to break the law to preserve it.

The degree of state centralization may also impact on the level of mobilization.

Commenting on the relations between type of state and collective action, Tarrow (1998)

contends that "Federalism is a particular invitation to movements to shift their venues into

institutions, because it provides so many alternative pockets for participation (Tarrow 1998).

From one perspective, the state is perceived as "an autonomous, irreducible set of institutions

which shape political conflict in the interest of its own survival and aggrandizement" This gave

way to the view of the state as "the arena of routinized political competition in which class,

status and political conflicts...are played out (Bright and Harper 1984: 3). Lipsky and Olson

(1976) assert that decentralized systems frequently "process" the most challenging elements out

of popular politics, as the United States did following the race riots of the 1960s. (Lipsky and

Olson 1976). In agreement with Tilly (1986) and Kreisi (1995), we contend that federal or

decentralized states tend to foster political mobilization because they multiply the targets for

action. Federalism produces several polities with power and varying degrees of susceptibility to

the goals of challengers providing a variety of incentives to mobilize around them (Amenta and

Young 1999: 156). Although this mobilization may be more fragmented because the polity










operates at varying levels as Kreisi (1995) observes, such a decentralized polity invites a wider

variety of challengers and a diversity of forms of collective action. The horizontal division of

power across the national government embracing the executive, legislature and judiciary also

facilitates contentious action. For example, the autonomous powers of the legislature and the

courts, make them more susceptible and open as targets for challengers.

Federalism has encouraged anti-embargo activism amongst several interest groups in the

United States. These include farming, business and Cuban American interests. Faced with a

tough re-election bid in the swing district of Washington, Republican representative, George

Nethercutt, was forced to accommodate the demands of farming and agribusiness challengers in

2000. 10 Decentralization also facilitated the many fact-finding missions to Cuba taken by CIP,

WOLA and the U.S-Cuba Trade Association which included interests from Kentucky, Georgia,

Texas, Montana, Kansas and Massachusetts, amongst others, as discussed in chapter II.

Moreover, the horizontal division of power of the national government facilitates lobbying

in Congress by organizations such as USA Engage. It also allows for the many members of

Congress to lend solidarity to the ant-embargo movement. 11They have all supported

Congressional amendments to lift the embargo at some point in time. Their support has been

organized through the bipartisan fifty-member Cuba Working Group of the House formed in

April, 2002 and the twenty-one Senate Working Group on Cuba established in March, 2003. The

Working Groups were established to examine U.S. policies toward Cuba, including trade and

travel restrictions, focusing on Americans' right to travel and Cuba's potential as a U.S. export


"' Interview with Nethercutt, 8th June 2005.

" These include including Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Sen. Max Bacchus (D-MT), Sen. Michael Enzi (R-WY),
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-lowa), Rep. Bill Delahunt D-Mass), Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA), Rep.
Charles Rangel (D-NY), Rep. Jo-Ann Emerson (MO-08), Rep. James McGovern (D-MA) and Rep. Jim Davis (D-
FL).










market. 12 They accommodate a strategic alliance with the anti-embargo movement which is

consistent with Tarrow' s third element of political opportunity structure "the availability and

strategic posture of potential alliance partners" (Tarrow 1983: 28). Furthermore, the autonomous

judiciary system accommodates use of the courts as evidenced by the litigation undertaken by the

Center for Cuban Studies and the Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET).

This autonomy is seen in the decision of Attorney General, Janet Reno to send Elian Gonzalez

back to Cuba in 2000, even though powerful members of the Executive were against it.

One can safely conclude that divisions of powers foster different kinds of collective action

or multi-front strategies designed to suit the various aspects of the central state (Amenta and

Young 1999: 157-158). However, it should be noted that while Federalism may have facilitated

contentious action in the United States, successive administrations have not repressed the anti-

embargo movement. Rather, it seems that anti-embargo activism has been "tolerated" for the

most part. Tilly (1978), defines "toleration" as the space between repression and facilitation. He

also underscores a dichotomy between "facilitation" and "repression", defining the latter as "any

action by another group which raises the contender' s cost of collective action" (Tilly 1978:100).

He adds that "For some combinations of groups and collective actions, a given government does

not react at all...the governments neither impedes them nor helps them...the police studiously

ignore them" (Tilly 1978: 107).

The role of threat is of particular significance to this state level analysis. Most of the

organizations interviewed admit to adhering to the law and therefore not threatened by the state.

However, as seen, Venceremos Brigade and Pastors for Peace have openly broken the law and

been issued with threatening letters by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. This has simply


12 Cubanet Cubanews. Washington, DC. "U.S. Senate Announces Cuba Working Group."
hop11 u s\\l.cubanet.org/CNews/v03/marO3/24e3 .htm









intensified their resolve to continue their activities producing outrage amongst insiders and

outsiders and prompting more members to join. Thus, rather than repress contentious action, the

threat issued by the state and its inability to carry out them out has the effect of spurring activism

amongst other groups who seek similar outcomes (Tarrow 1998: 24).

Policy-Specific Opportunities

Amenta and Young (1999) argue that "state policies and programs can encourage,

discourage, shape or transform challengers because policies themselves affect the future flow of

collective benefits to the constituencies of challengers" (Amenta and Young 1999: 162). This is

consistent with what Tarrow (1996) calls "policy-specific opportunities" (in McAdam, McCarthy

and Zald 1996: 42). Some state policies produce a kind of activism paradox, provoking rather

than repressing contentious action by the anti-embargo movement. This is seen in all maj or

policies implemented by several post-Cold War American administrations including the 1992

Torricelli Bill, the 1996 Helms-Burton Law, the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export

Enhancement Act and the 2004 Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.

The 1992 Torricelli Bill saw the formation of Cambio Cubano in that year; the leading

anti-embargo organization, the Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD) in 1993 and the Cuban

American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF) in 1995. CAAEF's president, Delvis Fernandez

Levy, explained that given that the embargo was being tightened at a time when it should be

relaxed with the end of the Cold War and Cuba' s domestic crisis, it was imperative for anti-

embargo groups to organize under the banner of CAAEF's coalition. 13 The widespread criticism

of the Bill has been discussed in a previous chapter but it paled in comparison to the reaction to

the Helms Burton Law which spurred confrontational strategies by groups such as Pastors for



"3 Interview with Femindez, 23rd October 2006.









Peace formed in 1998. Seeming incomprehensible in the much touted "unipolar world", Jorge I.

Dominguez affirms that "the U.S. hostility toward the Cuban government heightened as the Cold

War came to an end and precisely when Cuba ceased to pose a security threat to most US

interests. Neither realism nor neorealism can explain this temper tantrum in US policy toward

Cuba, or why US-Cuban relations went from a Cold War to a Colder War" (Dominguez 1997:

55).

Table 7-4 and Figure 7-2 underscore the increased media attention and dissenting voices of

the Helms-Burton Law compared to that of the Torricelli Bill in five U. S newspapers. 14 This

increase can be attributed to Title III, the extraterritorial provision of Helms-Burton that resulted

in heightened protests and hence increased media attention. The international outrage of the

Helms-Burton Law was also more intense than that provoked by the Torricelli Bill which may

account for the increased media attention. In addition, domestic protest of the Helms-Burton Law

by the anti-embargo movement from business, policy, humanitarian and faith-based

organizations found their way into the media, particularly the M~iamni Herald where the hit counts

for both Bills were highest and the hits counts for the Helms-Burton Law increased more than

three-fold compared to the Torricelli Bill.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act was the single maj or

breakthrough in U.S. Cuba policy in the post-Cold War era. Its passage was the result of

collective action by high-profile members of the American society. In making a case for the role

of "influential allies" as facilitators of collective action, Tarrow (1998), contends that

"challengers are encouraged to take collective action when they have allies who can act as

friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf"


14 See Table 7-4 and Figure 7-2 on page 214.










(Tarrow 1998: 79). Anti-embargo activists found "influential allies" with the coalition called

Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba (AHTC) which j oined the United States

Association of Former Members of Congress to call on the Clinton administration to end the

embargo on food and medicines to Cuba. In keeping with Tarrow's (1996) thesis, they acted both

as "negotiators" on behalf of challengers and as "guarantors against repression" as is evident in

their mission statement:

We call upon the President of the United States and the U. S. Congress to lift all restrictions
on the sale of agricultural products and medicines to Cuba including restrictions on travel
to Cuba, which hinder the ability to meet with Cuban counterparts, block efforts to achieve
humanitarian trade and violate Americans' fundamental right to freedom of movement.
These changes would be totally consistent with current U.S. policy as expressed by the
Department of State and spelled-out in the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton
laws to "support the Cuban people""

Tarrow also emphasizes a third element of political opportunity structure "the degree of

stability or instability of political alignments" (Tarrow 1983). Shortly after the Trade Sanctions

Reform and Export Enhancement Act was passed, Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba

disintegrated. In a similar vein, support from congresspersons is not always guaranteed. Some

are actually given money by the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC to vote against amendments which

aim to relax the embargo in any way. 16

None of the above state policies seems to have spawned as much anti-embargo groups or

activism as the Report of the Commission for Assistance to a New Cuba implemented by the

Bush administration in 2004. As seen in Chapter 5, it led to the formation of the Cuban

American Commission for Family Rights, the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association, the Emergency

Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET) and the Emergency Coalition of Cuban


15 Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba. www.ahtc.org

16 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. "House Backs Away from Engagement." July 2006.
h1lip il it .1awg. org/countries/cuba/backs_away .htm










American Scholars and Artists (ENCASA). The new restrictions on academic travel have also

spawned a barrage of protests from educational institutes including colleges and universities and

led to the formation of the Emergency Coalition to Defend Academic Travel (ECDET) as well as

those mentioned above. With these new groups came an increase in protest action such as the

confrontation in Miami with Diaz Balart discussed in Chapter 5, CAAEF's taking the cause to

the 61s~t Session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission on 31s~t March 2005, the

jointly sponsored Cuban Action Day of 27th April 2005 and the nationwide photo exhibition tour

entitled "Love Loss and Longing: The Impact of U.S. Travel Policy on Cuban-American

Families", sponsored by the LAWG and WOLA and unveiled in D.C. in May, 2006. The

exhibition garnered support even from organizations like Oxfam America and the Philadelphia-

Cardenas Sister Cities Association, amongst others. 1

That state policies can trigger collective action is evident in the actions of humanitarian

groups, including faith-based organizations which also joined the movement in opposing the

second 2006 Report of the Commission. Church groups affirm that one of the Commission' s

proposals, which would no longer allow the Commerce Department to grant licenses for

humanitarian aid through the Cuban Council of Churches, violates religious freedom. Church

World Service has a long history of providing humanitarian aid to the Cuban people through the

Cuban Council of Churches, which represents many of Cubans Protestant churches (Wa~shington

Post, July 15th, 2006). On 31 July, 2006, members of concerned groups met over new restrictions

on the Churches' aid distribution to Cuba. I


17 Oxfam America. "Love, Loss and Longing: The Impact of US Travel Policy on Cuban-American Families. 5t
May, 2006.
hli w\ il itoxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/wherewwework/camxanw~ulctosfauesoy20-5
05.9234881586

1s They included Reverend. John L. McCullough, Church World Service's (CWS), Executive Director and CEO:
Donna Derr, Director of CWS Emergency Response Network: Maris Anderson, head of the Cuba project at CWS










In conclusion, we reaffirm that while the state policies geared toward tightening the

embargo curtailed the anti-embargo movement' s ability to legally continue relations with Cuba,

this has not translated into a higher cost of collective action, and according to Tilly (1978),

would not be perceived as repression. Indeed, we are inclined to argue that these measures

facilitated rather than repressed collective action producing the "enabling environment" or the

political opportunity structure necessary for anti-embargo activism.

Societal Facilitators to Anti-Embargo Activism

In this section, we examine the sub-national, local or societal forces as part of the

political process model that impact on the operations of the anti-embargo movement. It cites the

changing structure of the hardline community identified here as a countermovement embodied in

the Cuban American National Foundation, the Elian Gonzalez affair and the rise of the moderate

maj ority in South Florida as crucial to the rising activities of the anti-embargo movement.

The Countermovement and Power Alignment

Schwartz (1976) presents a general formulation of the relationship between movements

and countermovements. He contends that "When a protest organization challenges social

structures, they act to defend themselves in a variety of ways which evolve from and respond to

protest activities" (Schwartz 1976: 150). This implies a dynamic model of political interaction in

which mass action forecloses choices for other groups (especially elite groups) a complex

process of social change can ensue" (Schwartz 1976, 1988). Such other groups form a

countermovement which Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) define as "a movement that makes





partner organization, the Latin America Working Group: and Martin Shupack, CWS Associate Director for Public
Policy, met at the U.S. Department of State with Caleb McCarry, Cuba Transition Coordinator, and his deputy,
Christopher Robinson. See Lesley Crosson. Worldwide Faith News Archives. "Church World Service Concerned
Over U.S.'s Cuba Humanitarian Aid Proposals." 4th August, 2006. hopll w\ int\.wfn.org/2006/08/msg00052.html









contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement" (Meyer and Staggenborg

1996: 1630).

The anti-embargo movement faces a formidable countermovement in the hardline Cuban

American community in South Florida. This small but powerful community represented by the

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) has for decades been able to persuade U.S. state

officials to enact anti-Castro, pro-embargo legislation purportedly geared toward toppling the

Castro regime. The 1992 Torricelli Bill, 1996 Helms-Burton Law and 2004 Report of the

Commission for Assistance for a Free Cuba, were all legislated in election years to court

invaluable Cuban American votes in the marginal constituency of South Florida. The

countermovement mainly comprises right-winged, conservative factions of the community which

are fairer, richer, and dominate both the political and socio-economics of Miami. It has a hold on

U.S. domestic politics which the anti-embargo movement has had little success in breaking.

The confrontation between the anti-embargo movement and the countermovement plays

out at three levels: the community in South Florida, the American Congress, and the Executive

branch. These are all so intricately intertwined that it is sometimes difficult to separate them.

Unlike the anti-embargo movement which does not have the ear of the government, the

countermovement has powerful connections in the Executive, in the Congress and in the

community which ironically provide the enabling environment or the political opportunity

structure for anti-embargo activism. Indeed, some community members are themselves

Congresspersons including Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; Senator Mel Martinez and the

brothers, Mario and Lincoln Diaz-Balart, both Republican congressmen. Their ties with the

executive are realized through close association with ex-Florida Governor, Jeb Bush, the elder

brother of current President, George W. Bush, as William Finnegan reports in the New Yorker:









The elder Bush' s standing in the exile community has always been ambiguous; his
patrician style never played that well in Little Havana. This is not to say that the Bush
family as a whole hasn't become extremely popular among Cuban exiles. ("They consider
them dlieir family," a Miami Democratic Party leader told me ruefully.) But Jeb Bush's
constituency among the exiles is mainly the product of his own hard political work. From
early on, he carefully learned the elaborate, sorrowing, furious culture of el exilio.

Indeed, Jeb Bush is largely responsible for the fact that most Miami Cubans are
Republicans. Though perennially described as "right-wing Cuban exiles," most of them
started out as Democrats. They were (and are) liberal on the social issues that tend to
divide Americans, and they share a historic belief in the welfare state--a belief that the
Cuban Refugee Program, the most generous immigrant-assistance effort in the history of
the United States, only encouraged. President Kennedy, who was initially adored, was
blamed by many exiles for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, in 1961. And yet their
bitterness did not drive them into the Republican Party, which in Miami was weak and
uninterested, in any case, in Latino immigrants. Ronald Reagan stirred Cuban-Americans
with his messianic anti-Communism. But even he was mistrusted by the exiles, who had
been forced to learn, repeatedly, that the interests of any American President only
periodically coincided with their own.

Jeb Bush, however, they trusted. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Republican congressman from
South Florida, described Jeb to me as "a soul mate." Diaz-Balart, who comes from a
prominent political family--his aunt was Fidel Castro's first wife--recalls that his
grandparents were admirers of Franklin Roosevelt. Diaz-Balart himself was a Democrat
until the nineteen-eighties, although the local party didn't take much notice. Diaz-Balart
and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen-another scion of a prominent family, who is also now a
Republican representative in Washington--couldn't get through the Democratic primaries
in Miami.

Both Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen credit Jeb Bush with persuading them to switch
parties. When Jeb became chairman of the Dade County Republican Party, in 1984, he
simply looked at South Florida' s demographics, saw the opportunity, and went to work
making the Republican Party the natural home for Cuban exiles. In 1979, registered
Democrats still outnumbered Republicans among Cuban-Americans by forty-nine per cent
to thirty-nine per cent. By 1988, only twenty-four per cent were Democrats, and sixty-eight
per cent were Republicans.

While Ileana Ros-Lehtinen' s politics would seem to put her at odds with Jeb's radical anti-
statism, their bonds, too, go deeper than the issues. He managed her first successful
campaign for Congress, in 1989. "Jeb took a lot of bullets for me," she told me. What she
meant, I gathered, was that Jeb had let himself be identified with causes that, outside the
exile community, are seen as dubious at best. For instance, Ros-Lehtinen was one of the
leading voices calling for pardons for anti-Castro activists accused or convicted of using
violence. One of the more notorious was Dr. Orlando Bosch, who spent eleven years in
prison in Venezuela for his alleged role in blowing up a Cuban airliner with seventy-three
people on board. (Bosch has never admitted the crime, but he has sought to justify it.)
After leaving prison, Bosch was arrested for illegally entering the United States, and the









Justice Department, which believed that he had been involved in dozens of acts of
terrorism, recommended that he be deported. But Bosch was so popular among Cuban
exiles that the Miami City Commission once declared a Dr. Orlando Bosch Day, and when
President George H. W. Bush ordered Bosch to be set free in 1990, most observers
regarded Jeb Bush as the essential intermediary in the case (Finnegan 2004). 19

This not only explains the countermovement' s ties with the Congress, but also with the

Executive. However, these are not the only alliances which the community has forged with state

officials. Other politicians have vigorously courted the Cuban American community in the past.

Amongst these are Former House Maj ority Leader, Tom DeLay, and Connecticut Senator,

Joseph Lieberman.

DeLay's rabid anti-Castroism dates back to when he was twelve. An airplane carrying his

family had stopped for refueling in Havana soon after Fidel Castro took assumed power. Delay

was marched out on the tarmac "between these stinking soldiers with big German shepherds," as

he recalled on NBC's "Meet the Press" on April 23, 2000. The family was held for three hours

without explanation. The result is that DeLay has long been a leading congressional critic of

Castro' s Cuba. At a May 1999 Appropriations Committee markup, he pointed to a group of

former Cuban political prisoners at the back of the room to illustrate his obj sections to lifting

sanctions, a move that might have allowed U.S. firms to send food and medicine to Cuba. In

2005, as House Maj ority Leader and Texas representative, DeLay supported Florida

Representatives, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart and his brother, Mario Diaz-Balart, in

blocking the Flake Amendment to ease restrictions on trade to Cuba. This strong opposition to

communist Cuba has won DeLay considerable financial support from the Cuban community in

Miami. His leadership PAC, the ARMPAC, received a total of eight contributions from Miami,

all on 13 Dececember 1999 (shortly after Elian reached Florida), for a total of $10,750. All eight


19 William Finnegan. The New Yorker. "The Cuban Strategy."
hli w\ il itnewyorker.com/archive/2004/03/1 5/040315Sfa~fact?currentPage=2









donations came from first-time contributors to DeLay's PAC. Two of them, Domingo R. Moreira

and Delfin Pernas, have also contributed more than $15,000 to the Free Cuba PAC since 1997.

"I'm 53 years old, and I can still smell those soldiers," DeLay told NBC (Greenblat, Foerstel and

Willis 2000).

Similarly, Senator Joseph Lieberman has supported legislation to tighten the U.S. embargo

against Cuba, including the Torricelli Bill and the Helms-Burton Act during his twelve years in

Congress. He has also consistently backed funding for Radio and TV Marti, controversial

government-financed stations that broadcast anti-Castro, pro-democracy, programming into

Cuba. Lieberman's Cuba connection dates to his 1988 Senate campaign when he challenged

incumbent Republican, Lowell Weicker, former Governor of Connecticut. Weicker was targeted

by Cuban exiles after he met twice with Fidel Castro in Cuba and publicly advocated warming

relations with the communist-run island. After one meeting, Weicker returned from Havana with

a box of Cuban cigars, a present from Castro (Boadle 2000).20

That year, (1988), Lieberman was introduced to the late Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), by supporters within Miami's Jewish

community. Lieberman affirms that "Jorge Mas Canosa and I really just struck it of. To me, part

of the coming together was natural. I agreed with their position on Castro" (Boadle 2000).

However, the Einancial reasons for his sympathy for the Cuban cause should not be overlooked.

Lieberman's campaign received considerable Einancial backing from CANF that helped him

defeat Weicker by just 10,000 votes. Lieberman has since become a popular senator, and in 1994

he was re-elected in a landslide. Hard-line Cuban Americans have continued to put their faith

and their money in Lieberman's stand on Cuban issues. Like, DeLay, he strongly opposed the


20 Anthony Boadle. Reuters. "Liberman a Close Ally of Miami's Cuban Exiles." 11It August 2000.
h1llp w il it .hartford-hwp.com/archives/45c/237.html









decision of the Clinton Administration to send Elian Gonzalez back to Cuba. In 2000, Floridians

donated more than $100,000 to his Senate re-election campaign, including major donations from

the leaders of CANF (Adams 2000). In 2000, Lieberman was the top recipient among three

senatorial candidates of campaign contributions by the Free Cuba PAC, the political action

committee of CANF. Free Cuba PAC contributed the maximum $10,000 to the senator' s

reelection campaign, according to the Centre for Responsive Politics, which tracks campaign

funding (Boadle 2000).

The countermovement's alliance with the Congress is therefore strongly linked to its

campaign financing which is only surpassed by the Jewish-American lobby as reflected in Tables

7-5, 7-6 and 7-7. The data covers the entire 1979-2000 period, and include contributions to

federal candidates and political parties. The solid tilt toward the Democratic party is due in no

small part to the contributions of the two top Cuban American donors, Florida businessmen

Alfred Estrada and Paul Cej as, who together account for approximately 26% of all Democratic

donations. Without those two donors, the party split is more even, with 53% of the Cuban-

American money going to Democrats and 47% to Republicans. 21 Table 7-5 reflects the maj or

contributions of ethnic minorities in the United States. Table 7-6 shows to whom the

contributions are made and Table 7-7 illustrates the party distribution of the contributions.22

This configuration of power of state and countermovement relevant for the confrontation

with the challengers" as espoused by Kriesi (in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 169) accounts

for the limited success of the anti-embargo movement in changing policy. The post-Cold

American governments have not been very reform-oriented where U.S. Cuba policy is


21 Opensecrets.org. "The Cuban Connection: Cuban-American Money in U.S.-Elections, 1979-2000.
]llip \\\ llopensecrets. org/pub s/cubareport/
22See Tables 7-5, 7-6 and 7-7 on page 215.










concerned. This lack of success, however, has not thwarted anti-embargo activism. Rather the

power alignment between the state and the countermovement has combined with shifts in the

internal dynamics within the Cuban American community, to further spur collective action.

Shifting Dynamics within the Cuban American Community

As McAdam McCarthy and Zald (2004c) insist, changes in the structures of political

opportunities can contribute to shifting fortunes in social movements. Such changes have been

visible within the Cuban American community in South Florida in the post-Cold War era. In

November, 1997, CANF's leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, died. During the Reagan administration,

Mas Canosa had assisted Republicans in solidifying their political base amongst anti-Castro

Cubans, forging an alliance that catapulted him to national prominence. He was uncompromising

in his strong opposition to easing American sanctions on Cuba's communist regime. Upon his

death, Wayne Smith of CIP declared that "had it not been for Jorge Mas Canosa, we probably

would have had normal relations with Cuba... He has almost single-handedly blocked all that".23

Mas Canosa' s leadership of CANF contributed to making it the most powerful countermovement

constraining the ability of the anti-embargo movement to change U. S. Cuba policy. His death led

to expectations that some change in policy would be imminent. Indeed, now in 2006, CANF is

perceived by many as a moderate Cuban American organization since the views of its members

are not monolithic as Joe Garcia affirms.24 CANF's break with hardliners which formed the

Cuban Liberty Council and the presence of the Democrat Garcia in CANF, conforms to Tarrow' s

fourth element of the political opportunity structure "political conflicts within and among

elites" which precipitates increased anti-embargo activism (Tarrow 1989b: 35).


23CNN Interactive: U.S. News. 1997. "Cuban Exile Leader Dies: Jorge Mas Canosa Built South Florida Power
Base." 23rd NOvember 1997. http://www.cnn.com/US/97 11/23/mas.canosa.obit/

24Interview with Garcia, 5" June 2006.









The Cuban American community is divided along class and ethnic lines due to differences

between the early and later waves of Cuban migrants to the U.S. The first wave was

predominantly white, rich and constitutes the hardline, anti-Castro right-winged community.

The later waves are poorer and darker and comprise the moderate majority who claims

discrimination in the political and socio-economic arenas particularly in the employment sector

of South Florida. According to Alvaro Fernandez, "Cuban Americans are not openly up in arms

against the pro-embargo policies because there is a real fear of reprisals in Miami'".25 Similarly

Max Castro, a vocal anti-embargo activist and former M~iamni Herald columnist, claims

discrimination in the academic arena at the University of Miami and points to similar

discriminatory trends at Florida International University.26

The Elian Gonzalez affair places in stark relief the ideological schism in the impassioned

Cuban American community. It sparked the beginning of a catharsis as angry Cuban Americans

began not only to debate but to contest the status-quo. Following the debacle, some Cuban

Americans admitted to being angrier than they have been in years. This outpouring of emotion

saw the formation of Puentes Cubanos in 1999 and the Cuba Study Group in 2000. Other

existing moderate Cuban Americans became more organized and vocal against U. S. Cuba policy.

The Elian debacle also underscores the social division within the community as the early wave of

powerful, affluent anti-Castro exiles pitted themselves against the moderate maj ority which

arrived in Cuba after 1980 or were born in the U.S. These later waves are more inclined toward

rapproachment and dialogue with Cuba. According to the online magazine, Progreso Weekly,

"These are the people whose views are reflected in polls that show a majority of the Cuban

American community in favor of dialogue between the two nations, in favor of easing travel


25 Interview with Fern~ndez, 7t July 2005.

26 Interview with Castro, 12t July 2005.










restrictions, and in favor of rethinking the failed strategy of the embargo".27 According to a very

recent poll, seventy-two percent of Cuban Americans agree that the U.S. should negotiate with

the island.28

Even so, the division is not only about relations with Cuba. It is also reflected in partisan

politics in the United States as poll after poll reveal generational differences in political ideology.

Younger Cuban Americans are less inclined to vote Republican, are increasingly registering to

vote and are more vocal about Bush' s new pro-embargo policies.29 The Carpetbagger Report

notes that "Cuban-Americans are wondering why Bush, who says bringing democracy to Iraq is

a paramount international priority, won't offer a similar benefit to people suffering under a

communist regime just 90 miles from the U.S. border".30 Current President, George W. Bush, is

the target of much anti-embargo sentiments since moderate Cuban Americans forge the nexus

between him and his brother Jeb who is close to the hardline community. They blame him for the

"draconian" policies of 2004 which impose restrictions on family travel, remittances and parcel

delivery to their relatives in Cuba. These issues touch the very hearts and souls of Cuban

Americans.





27 Global Exchange. Programs in the Americas. San Francisco, California. 2005. Progreso Weekly. "Ignored
Majority: The Moderate Cuban American Community." 22nd April 2004.
Illi w\ il itglobalexchange.org/countries/americas/cub/75hm

28Bendixen and Associates. "Survey of Cuban and Cuban American resident Adults in Miami-Dade and Broward."
September 2006.
I1lllp u \ \\ l.bendixenandassociates .com/studie s/Survey_of Cuban and Cuban AmericanRe sidentAdults in Mia
mi-Dade and BrowardCounties.pdf

29 Global Exchange. Programs in the Americas. San Francisco, California. 2005. Progreso Weekly. "Ignored
Majority: The Moderate Cuban American Community." 22nd April 2004.
Illi w\ il itglobalexchange.org/countries/americas/cua17.tl The same results were reflected in the finings of
the Hamilton, Beattie and Associates Poll, June 2003.

30 Steve Benen. The Carpetbagger Report. "The Cuban American Political Split." 8" June, 2004.
litt un \\ thecarpetbaggerreport.com/archives/1905.hm










The Countervailing Force

The systemic, national and sub-national impulses all converge in a peculiar setting

produced by the end of the Cold War which has resulted in an increasingly divided Congress, no

longer united against the Soviet Union. This partisanship is out in U.S. electoral politics,

particularly in the marginal constituency of the state of Florida which became hotly contested.

The electoral catastrophe resulting in a near tie between Democrats and Republicans in 2000

intensified the division between the parties. This was buttressed by the strong Cuban American

lobby in the Congress who has been wielding powerful leverage on the Executive because of the

bid to court invaluable Cuban American votes.

There was therefore, a confluence of international, national and local forces which

triggered a countervailing force leading to a tightening of the embargo in a post-Cold War Era.

Though it may seem illogical that the embargo would be tightened at a time when Cuba no

longer poses an ideological threat, this countervailing force of a divided Congress and hotly

contested state of Florida provides a ready and logical explanation for the "draconian" policies in

a post-Cold War era.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show that the anti-embargo movement has been able to

persist despite limited success in changing policy because of the political opportunity structures

produced by systemic, national and societal forces. These include external factors such as the end

of the Cold War, globalization and neoliberalism, and the Pope' s visit to Cuba in January, 1998.

At the national level, Cuba' s special period, reform of the Cuban economy in the mid-nineties,

type of government and state policies such as the Torricelli Bill, the Helms Burton Law and the

Reports of the Commission for Assistance to a New Cuba have spurred challengers into action.

Local or societal dynamics within the Cuban American community including the formidable









configuration of power posed by the alliance between the countermovement and the state; the

Elian Gonzalez debacle; changes within CANF itself; and the meteoric rise of moderate Cuban

American voices due to the pro-engagement stance of later migration waves, have both spawned

new anti-embargo groups and triggered post-Cold War activism. Finally, the countervailing force

produced by the growing divisions in the Congress and played out in the hotly contested

constituency of South Florida, provides a logical explanation for post-Cold War tightening of the

embargo.





































Very Serious 29 13 12 10 15
Moderately Serious 39 25 24 23 26
Slight 23 30 32 25 25
None at All 0 29 24 38 26
Don't Know ...* 3 9 4 8
N 1,007 800 1,018 1,017 1,218


Table 7-1. ABC/ Washington Post poll showing pre- and post-Cold War responses to Cuba as a
threat to the U.S.
Source and Question 1983 1998
ABC/Washington Post: As things now stand, would
you say that Cuba is a threat to the national security of
the United States, or not? [If yes], would that be a
maj or threat or a minor threat?


Yes
Maj or Threat
Minor Threat
Not a Threat
Don't Know


56 29
33 13
23 16
38 60
7 11
1501 1000


Table 7-2. Yankelovich tracking poll showing responses to Cuba as a threat to the U.S.


Source and Question
Yankelovich: Would you say that Cuba represents a
very serious threat to this country, a moderately
serious threat, just a slight threat, or no threat to our
country at all


1983 1994 1997 1999 2000









Table 7-3. Hit Counts of ati-embargo ativism of twenty-five organizations (labeled 1-25) from
Cold War to post-Cold War Era in the Christian Science Monitor, Miami Herald,
New York Times, USA Today and Washington Post.
Anti-Embargo Organization Year Total Count Total Count
Founded 1980-1989 1990-2006

1. Alamar Associates (A) 1974 0 35
2. American Civil Liberties Union (B) 1920 90 644
3. American Farm Bureau Federation (C) 1919 2 45
4. American Friends Service Committee, Latin 1917 8 24
America and Caribbean Programs (D)
5. American Jewish Congress (E) 10 22
6. Catholic Relief Services (F) 1943 5 105
7. Center for International Policy (G) 1975 2 139
8. Church World Service (H) 1946 10 49
9. Episcopal Church, Office of Government 1789 34 290
Relations (I)
10. Latin American Working Group (J) 1983 0 10
11. Global Exchange (K) 1988 1 79
12. Grey Panthers (L) 1970 2 10
13. Human Rights Watch (M) 1978 11 688
14. Madre (N) 1983 12 82
15. Marazul Charters (0) 1979 2 92
16. National Foreign Trade Council (P) 1914 0 46
17. Presbyterian Church (USA) (Q) 1706 19 258
18. United States Chamber of Commerce (R) 1912 5 240
19. United Church of Christ (S) 1957 6 40
20. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 1966 1 37
(T)
21. Venceremos Brigade (U) 1969 0 18
22. Washington Office on Latin America (V) 1975 5 50
23. Women' s International League for Peace and 1915 0 36
Freedom (W)
24. World Council of Churches (X) 1948 10 14
25. United States Catholic Conference (Y) 1966 42 70












700

600

500

400

300

200

100

-


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
0 1980-1989 1 1990-2006

Figure 7-1. Comparison of anti-Embargo activism from Cold War to post- Cold War as reflected
in Table 7-3. The X-axis represents 25 anti-embargo organizations and the Y-axis
represents their frequency in the Christian Science M~onitor, M~iami Herald, the New
York Times, USA Todaly and the Wa~shington Post.


r~ ,19 nFW


,,, ~I.,


_ w ~ _w ~ 19 J










Table 7-4. Comparison of frequency of "Cuban Democracy Act/Torricelli Bill" and "Helms
Burton Law" in fiye U.S. newspapers.
Maj or Newspaper Cuban Democracy Act Helms Burton Law
Number of Hits Number of Hits
Christian Science Monitor 22 78
Miami Herald 125 428
New York Times 45 200
USA Today 4 56
Washington Post 48 192
All (total) 244 954
Source: Lexis Nexis Academic



1000


800


600


400




200



5 Cuban Democracy Act 5 Helms Burton Act

Figure 7-2. Comparison of Appearances of "Cuban Democracy Act/Torricelli Bill" and "Helms
Burton Law" in fiye U.S. Newspapers as reflected in Table 7-4 above. The X-axis
represents and the Y-axis represents the number of hit counts in the 5 maj or U. S
newspapers listed in Table 7-4.









Table 7-5. Lobby Groups' Contributions to Political Action Committees in the 1980s and 1990s.
Lobby Groups Contributions
Jewi sh-Am eri can $16.8 million
Cuban-Americans $754,000 (Free Cuba PACs)
Albanian-American $292,000
Armenian, Greek, Lebanese, < $200,000 each
Italian American
S ource: http://www. opensecrets. org/pub s/cub report/


Table 7-6. Contributions to Candidates and Political Action Committees in the 1980s and 1990s.
Candidates $3,890,854
Party Committees $3,190,435
Leadership PACS $168,500
Cuban-American PCS $1,346,658
Other PAC S $201,085
S ource: http://www. opensecrets. org/pub s/cub report/

Table 7-7. Cuban American Contributions to Political Parties in the 1980s and 1990s.

Democrats $4, 317,148
Republicans $2,904,391
Third Parties $25,750
S ource: http://www. opensecrets. org/pub s/cub report/









CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

Thawing of the Glacier

And so, we conclude our voyage of inquiry into an era of anti-embargo activism. This

academic expedition began descriptively and ended analytically as we recounted the story of the

anti-embargo movement from 1960 to 2006. Though an under-explored dimension of U. S. Cuba

policy, we have demonstrated that traditional analyses have failed to capture the intriguing

organizational dynamics of anti-embargo activism which for decades, have been fermenting

beneath the cold, hostile hard-line policies of right-winged Cuban American exiles in South

Florida. The operations of the anti-embargo movement suggest significant thawing of the glacier,

not only in the Sunshine State, but throughout the United States. These activities are invariably

collective, collaborative and cooperative, but at once normative and ultimately contentious even

as the movement continually redefines, reconstitutes, reproduces, reframes and reconstructs

itself.

Descriptively, we have detailed the history, goals, resources, organizational structure,

strategies, tactics and challenge to the state as the organizations mobilize to speak truths to

power. We have observed that in their drive to change U. S. Cuba policy, the primary goal of the

organizations is predominantly the same, though this may vary in sub-focus. We have also

stressed that the groups are funded mainly by private foundations though several embark on their

own fund-raising drives and few are financed by private individuals. Moreover, we have

demonstrated that the groups reflect a fair degree of heterogeneity in terms of organizational

structure, even while they generally tend to employ a small staff and draw on external Boards of

Directors and members for voluntary support. Though they vary in size, some even quite small,









this does not detract from the depth of the commitment from certain outstanding leaders who

have now become popular icons of the movement.

With respect to strategies and tactics, we have observed that the groups reveal an

overwhelming preference for conventional measures. These include organizing conferences,

seminars, conventions, non-violent protests, lobbying, litigation, leading delegations to Cuba and

taking advantage of strides in information technology to advertise their grievances and exhort

support from the general public via their well-developed websites. However, we have pointed

out that a couple of the groups choose to deviate and employ more confrontational strategies and

tactics in their avowed refusal to legitimize the embargo by adhering to the law. We have also

shown that the organizations have been challenging the state for decades in response to policies

adopted by successive American administrations. As noted, this has fermented an intriguing

contestation between challengers and state as the movement persistently engages in speaking

truths to power at both the national and sub-national levels.

Analytically, we have sought answers to our research question as to why has the anti-

embargo movement persisted despite such limited success over time. To unravel this puzzle, we

have opted to employ a social movements theoretical framework given the limitations of

International Relations for capturing domestic group dynamics with little influence on foreign

policy outcomes. Since the field of Comparative Politics does not generally accommodate

foreign policy analysis, employing a social movements perspective to treat with groups seeking

to influence foreign policy and introducing the international setting as a facet of political

opportunity structures, serve to bridge the Comparative/ International Relations divide in

Political Science.









Drawing firstly on perspectives on resource mobilization, we have argued that the rational

model partially explains but does not suffice to facilitate a full understanding of the altruistic and

philanthropic thrust of the movement. As such, we have sought answers in alternative

perspectives treating with tactical frames, solidarity networks, co-option, social capital,

commitment, moral incentives and psychological benefits. Recognizing that the resource

mobilization approach neglects the interplay between state and challengers, thereby ignoring the

vital political element, we turned to the political process model to complement this approach.

More popularly know as "political opportunity structures", we have applied this perspective to

support our argument that anti-embargo activism is embedded in the "enabling environment"

produced by the international, national and sub-national settings. Moreover, we have

underscored that anti-embargo groups and activism have been facilitated by "windows of

opportunities" triggered by a myriad of factors. Introducing systemic structure to social

movement discourse, we have identified elements of the international political opportunity

structures as the end of the Cold War; the crisis in Cuba during the "special period" of the mid-

nineties; and the Pope's visit to Cuba in 1998. At the national level, we have cited successive

anti-embargo state policies; the nature of the American state and its particular system of

government, as impetus to group formation and group activism. The configuration of power

created by the countermovement of exile hardliners and elements of the state; the Elian Gonzalez

debacle; shifting dynamics within the Cuban American community, and the counterveiling force

of a divided Congress and intense political contestation of Florida, provide the basis for our

discussion on sub-national or societal impulses to anti-embargo activism.

In concluding that both non-rational explanations such as commitment theory and political

opportunity structures complement each other to explain why the movement persists despite










limited success over time, we recognize that this work speaks to the larger picture of the role of

civil society in policy reform. Moreover, it addresses the fundamental question of why human

beings act collectively. After all social movements are generally the seedbeds of the great

revolutions of our time. They have been able to overturn entire regimes when they are

successful. The Cuban, Chinese and Mexican revolutions are fine examples.

The Anti-Embargo Movement and a Post-Castro Cuba

So what does the future hold for the anti-embargo movement given the imminent departure

of Fidel Castro from the scene?

Our crystal ball reflects a complex tapestry of intricately woven strands drawn from

elements of the American and Cuban governments, hard-line and moderate Cuban Americans

and anti-embargo activists. Realistically speaking, it is hardly likely that anti-embargo activism

will be reduced, much less disappear unless there is a radical reformulation of American policy

to Cuba. As such, we can surmise that the movement will remain alive and kicking unless its

primary goal of changing U.S. Cuba policy is realized. While challengers remain hopeful that the

recent Democrat control of the House and the Senate will result in a removal of restrictions at

least on the ban on family travel, this may remain a dream given that even Democratic President,

Bill Clinton, supported a tightening of the embargo through the infamous Helms-Burton Law in

an electoral bid to capture critical Florida votes in the 1996 general elections. So we remain

skeptical, if not cynical, as to whether a Democrat administration in 2008 will result in reform of

U. S. Cuba policy in light of the existing and sustained alliance between state entities and hard-

line exiles in South Florida. As long as these exiles maintain a lock on U.S. domestic politics, a

radical reformulation of American Cuba policy may not be forthcoming. If policy change is to

come at all, it will most likely be initiated at this very sub-national or societal level. But it will

emanate from the now more vociferous and organized moderate maj ority in South Florida. As









discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, shifting dynamics within the community is now evident through a

perceived moderation of the Cuban American National Foundation and the generational schism

produce by successive migration waves.

Nonetheless, a minority of exile hardliners continue to vigorously and aggressively pursue

their almost half-a-century-old obj ective of toppling the Castro regime, even as the almost

eighty-year-old Comandante,~~~dddd~~~~ddd Fidel, lies ailing in a Cuban hospital. This singular obsession

consuming and feeding their passions since the 1960's, has only grown more passionate as

Castro ages, tending toward crescendo at the tiniest hint of vulnerability in the Cuban system.

But from all indications, these exiles seem to have completely missed the boat which is firmly

anchored across the Florida Straits. As we have illustrated, some believe that the post-Castro era

has already arrived in Cuba and the transition has already taken place, albeit from Fidel's

socialism to Raul's socialism a virtual imperceptible difference. Though Raul Castro has

already been making overtures to the United States for a policy of engagement, and the largest

American Congressional delegation ever to visit Cuba was undertaken in December 2006,

Cubans are only prepared to change the Cuban way. Cuba's healthy and educated population is

not yet about to start paying for health care, rent, or tuition. Socialism is very much intact in the

island and recent statistics indicate that the Cuban economy is stronger than it has been for a long

time. This is a severe blow to the rallying cry of some American statesmen and a few seemingly

irrational Cuban American hardliners who still dream of returning to Cuba to recover

expropriated property and control the political and economic destiny of the island. Thus, after

Raul's departure, it is highly likely that he will be replaced by a socialist successor government

which will decide whether, where, and how fast to reform the policies it inherits. If such reform

ever materializes, it will be the anti-embargo organizations, not the hard-line Cuban exiles who










will be playing a pivotal role in Cuba's future and in U.S. Cuba relations. They are the ones who

really understand the imperative for dialogue, engagement and rapproachment with their socialist

neighbor. After all, these have been the obj ectives of their activism for over thirty years as

encapsulated in the words of Phil Peters of the Lexington Institute:

It is not necessary to invent new theories and paradigms for this socialist country that
happens to be a Caribbean neighbor. Rather, we should look to the mainstream of
American foreign policy. We should continue our principled defense of human rights. We
should cooperate with our allies rather than castigate them for having the same trade
relations with Cuba that we have with other communist countries. ... And rather than hold
our eleven million Cuban neighbors at arms length, we should respectfully and confidently
open every avenue of contact with them at a time when history is leading them toward a
new world, and they are looking for answers (Peters 2003).1

































SPhilip Peters. Lexington Institute. Arlington VA. "Cuba U.S. Policy: The Value of Engagement with Cuba." 4t
September 2003. http://lexingtoninstitute.org/936.shtml









APPENDIX A
ARTICLES SEARCHED FOR LIBERAL NORMS INT WEB SITES OF PROMINENT ANTI-
EMBARGO ORGANIZATIONS

Center for International Policy (CIP)


Landau, Anya K. and Wayne S. Smith. "Cuba On the Terrorist list- in Defense of the Nation or
Domestic Political Calculation." November, 2002.

Smith, Wayne S. "End the Travel Ban to Cuba". November, 2001

S"The Helms-Burton Act: A Loose Canon?" June, 1997.

S"The U.S.-Cuba Imbroglio". May, 1996.

S"Human Rights in Cuba: Initiating the Dialogue". September, 1995.

S"Our Cuban Diplomacy". October, 1994.

S"Cuba after the Cold War: What Should U.S. Policy Be?" March, 1993

Smith, Wayne S., Robert Muse and Glenn Baker. "Cuba should not be on the Terrorist List."
November, 2004.

Smith, Wayne S. and Seema Patel. "Commission for a Free Cuba Set Restrictions on
Americans". June, 2004.

Waldner, Kimberly L. and Waynes S. Smith. "Conference Probes Potential for U. S.-Cuba Farm
Trade". February, 2001.


Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

"Community Outreach: Changing U.S. Policy toward Cuba: An Organizing Manual by WOLA
and LAWG".

Cuba (Homepage).

"Encasa/US/Cuba Emergency Scholars of Cuban American Scholars and Artists for Change in
U.S./Cuba Policy".

"Families Torn Apart: The High Cost of U. S. and Cuban Travel Restrictions". Human Rights
Watch, Oct 2005, Vol. 17 no. V (b).

Farley, Rachel and Geoff Thale. Summary of New Bush Policy Toward Cuba". May 2004.










S"A Critical Analysis of Bush' s New Cuba Policy." May 2004.
S"Community Outreach: What Caused Cuba to Crack Down". April 25, 2003.
Marus, Robert. "Bush latest Cuba plans prompts outcry from NCC, Alliance of Baptists." July,
2006.

Rosenblum, Lilah "A Time for Change: Rethinking U.S.-Cuba Policy" May, 2002.

Youngers. Coletta A. "Thirty Years of Advocacy for Human Rights, Democracy and Social
Justice". WOLA, 2006.


Latin American Working Group (LAWG)

Anderson, Mavis. "The United States and Cuba- Strands of a Failed Cuba Policy". July 7, 2006.

Stanton, Kimberly (compiler). "Retreat from Reason: U.S.-Cuban Academic Relations and the
Bush Administration". September, 2006.

"New Cuba Restrictions go into effect". June 30, 2004.

Capriccioso, Rob. "Suing for Access to Cuba". Inside Higher Ed May 26, 2006.

Perry, Suzanne. "Charity's Barrier Island: U. S. Restrictions Hamper Nonprofit Efforts in Cuba".
May 18, 2006.

Banks, Adelle M. "Restrictions on Religious Travel to Cuba Questioned". Religion News
Service. March 6, 2006.

"U. S. and Cuban Policies Forcibly Separate Families. Both Governments Impose Inhumane
Travel Restrictions". Human Rights Watch, Miami, October 19, 2005.

"Families Torn Apart. The High Cost of U.S. and Cuban Travel Restrictions Report". Oct 19,
2005. Human Rights Watch.

Marus, Robert. "Congressmen Ask Treasury officials to Explain New Cuba Travel". February
23, 2006.

Peters Phil. "La Voz de Miami: Radio Marti's Skewed Coverage". Lexington Institute. May 3,
2005.

Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAEF)

"An Open Letter: In anticipation of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba' s new
recommendations slated to become public in May 2006". Emergency Network of Cuban
American Scholars and Artists for Change in U.S.-Cuba Policy. April 26, 2006

"ENCASA Rej ects Bush Adminsitration's Cuba Commission Report". July 12, 2006










Fernandez, Delvis Levy. "A Crime to Denounce." February 6, 2006.

S"CAEF Questions Violations of Human and Civil Rights". March 31, 2005.

S"CAEF Report for the Year 2005". January 11, 2006.

S"Reality Check for U. S./Cuba Policy". January 5, 2006.

Gonzalez, Ricardo. "U. S./Cuba Policy Works Against U. S". Oct 21, 2006.

"Recreate a bipartisan, even veto proof maj ority for our fundamental right to travel to Cuba".
Fund for Reconciliation and Development. November 9, 2006.

Smith, Wayne. "Cuban Five: Another Injustice". October 13, 2006

"Who gets to Judge Human Rights?" La Alborad'a.









APPENDIX B
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES INTERVIEWED

Carlucci, Frank. Former NSC Chief under Reagan, Americans for Humanitarian Trade with
Cuba. June 2005.

Castro, Max. Ex-Columnist, Miami Herald, ex-Research Scholar, University of Miami, 12th July
2006.

Colvin, Jake. Director, USA Engage, 19th August, 2006.

Deere, Carmen Diana. Director, Center for Latin American Studies, Unziversity of Florida. 2nd
November, 2006.

Duran, Alfredo. President, Cuban Committee for Democracy. 19th December, 2006.

Farley, Rachel. Assistant Program Director (Cuba). Washington Office on Latin America. 20th
May, 2005.

Fernandez, Alvaro. President, Cuban American Commission for Family Rights. 7th July, 2005.

Fernandez Levy, Delvis. President, Cuban American Alliance Education Fund. 23rd October,
2006.

Garcia, Joe. Director, Cuban American National Foundation. 5th June, 2006.

Gastever, Shane. Staff, Pastors for Peace. 10th August, 2006.

Jones, Kirby. Alamar Associates, U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. 7th June, 2005, 16th August,
2006.

Landau, Saul. Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies. 16th August, 2006.

Levinson, Sandra. Director, Center for Cuban Studies. 26th May, 2005.

Milne, Emile. Congressional Staff to Rep Charles Rangel (D-NY). 6th June, 2005.

Nethercutt, George. Ex-Representative, (R-Wash.). 8th June, 2005.

Pascandolo Vincent. Intern, Center for International Policy. 25th, October, 2006.

Peters, Philip. Vice President, Lexington Institute. 12th May, 2005.

Rodriguez, Claire. Program Assistant, Latin American Work~ing Group. 11Ith August, 2006, 26th
October, 2006.

Saladrigas, Carlos. Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group. 6th June 2006.










Schmidt, Philip. Former Staff Member, Latin American Workinzg Group. 18th May, 2005.

Smith, Wayine. Senior Fellow and Director of Cuba Program, Center for Inzternatihonal Policy.
11h May, 2005, 9th August, 2006.

Thale, Geoff. Program Director and Senior Associate for Cuba and Central America,
Washington Office on latin America. 20th May, 2005.

Walker, Lance. Legislative Assistant to Rep Jeff Flake (R-AZ). 17th May, 2005.

Wilhelm, Sylvia. Executive Director, Cuban American Conanission for Family Rights. 21st
August, 2006.










APPENDIX C
LIST OF WEBSITES

www.ahtc.org Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba
www.alamarcuba.com Alamar Associates

www.americanradioworks.publicradio.org American RadioWorks: Power Trips

www.angelfire.com Economic Embargo Against Cuba History
www.BendixenandAssociates.com Bendixen and Associates

www.cafc.gov Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba

www.canf~org Cuban American National Foundation

www.thecarpetbaggerreport.com The Carpetbagger Report

www.ccdusa.org. Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD)

www.ciponline.org Center for International Policy (CIP)
www. CNN. com CNN World News

www. commondreams.org Breaking News and Views for the Progressive Community

www. creynolds.org Christopher Reynolds Foundation

www. cubafoundation.org Cuba Policy Foundation

www.cubamer.org Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF)

www. cubanartspace.net Center for Cuban Studies Art Space

www.cubanet.org Cubanet
www. cuban-exile.com Cuba Information Archives

www. cubanfamilyrights.org Cuban American Commission for Family Rights

cubanlibrariessolidaritygroup .org Cuban Libraries Solidarity Group

www. cubasolidarity.net USA-Cuba INFOMED Proj ect

www. cuba-solidarity.org Cuba Solidarity Campaign

www. cubastudygroup.org Cuba Study Group

www.cubaupdate.org Center for Cuban Studies

www. cubanfamilyrights.org Cuban American Commission for Family Rights

www.discoverthenetworks.org Careth Foundation

www.ecdet.org Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET)

www. edition.cnn.com CNN International: Transcripts

www. findarticles.com Look Smart, Find Articles










www.fordfound.org Ford Foundation

www.globalexchange.com Global Exchange
www.hi storyofcuba.com Economic Embargo Timeline

www.hrw.org Human Rights Watch

www.ifconews.org Pastors for Peace

www.1awg.org Latin American Working Group (LAWG)

www. opensecrets. org

www.pbs.org Public Broadcasting Service

www.philanthropy. org The Chronicle of Philanthropy

www.progresoweekly. com Progreso Weekly

www.publicwelfare.org Public Welfare Foundation
www.themilitant.com Socialist Newsweekly

www. state.gov U. S. Department of State










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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Indira Rampersad was born in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. She holds a bachelors

degree in language and literature, a Master of Philosophy in Latin American Literature, a

graduate diploma in international relations and a Master of Philosophy in International

Relations, all from the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad. She has been a

political columnist for the Trinidaddddddddddddddddd Guardian2 and Express newspapers and has been awarded

two Fulbright scholarships for study in the U.S. In addition, she has completed a Doctor of

Philosophy in Political Science from the University of Florida, Gainesville.





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1 DOWN WITH THE EMBARGO: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND U.S. CUBA POLICY (1960-2006) By INDIRA RAMPERSAD A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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2 2007 Indira Rampersad

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3 For Ma whose unconditional love, boundless energy, unrelenting support, profound faith and calm patience made this project possible

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my deepest appreciati on to my adviser, Dr. Terry McCoy whose boundless patience, calm tolerance a nd careful advice over the years have made this dissertation an enjoyable and worthwhile experience. Speci al thank gos to Dr. Leslie Anderson for her diligence and unrelenting support throughout the cour se of this project especially during the writing stage. Thanks also to the other member s of my committee, Dr. Oren and Dr. Dodd, who were always willing to provide a listening ear to my issues and ideas and to Dr. Reynaldo Jiminez, my external examiner, for his contri bution in the examining process. Heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Leann Brown, Dr. Peggy K ohn and especially Dr. Dennis Jett on whose shoulders I could always lean for trustworthy advice. To Su e, Debbie and Brisha, I extend warmest gratitude. Thanks also go to my extended family at UFs International Center, Debra and Maud, who took great care of me during my st ay at UF. Sincerest gratitude goes to the extended Caribbean posse for all the fun times and for making Gainesville a comfortable home away from home. Thanks go to the Laspau Fulbright Commissi on for funding my first 2 years of the Ph.D program. Heartfelt appreciation goes to the Ruth McQuown Grant Committee which supported my field research in D.C., New York and Miami. Deepest gratitude also goes to the Department of Political Science for funding the last 3 years of my education at UF. Kind appreciation to Sandra Levinson, Wayne Smith, Kirby Jones, Clai re Rodrguez, Silvia Wilhelm, Alvaro Fernndez and all the other unrelenting anti-e mbargo activists throughout the United States. Many, many thanks go to my loving family and friends in Trinidad, New York and Toronto who have been a bulwark of support throughout the years. A nd last but not least, thanks go to my dear mum whose love, patience, wisdom loyalty and devotion have been unfathomable and unsurpassed in the cour se of this project.

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5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........8 LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................ .........9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................10 ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ............11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................13 History of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba....................................................................................13 Curiosity, Contributions and Challenges................................................................................20 Dissertation Structure......................................................................................................... ....22 2 TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.......24 Limitations of Interna tional Relations Theory.......................................................................24 The Conceptual Dilemma.......................................................................................................27 Theories of Social Movements...............................................................................................33 Resource Mobilization Perspectives................................................................................34 The Political Process Model and Po litical Opportun ity Structures.................................46 The Anti-Embargo Movement and U.S./Cuba Policy: A Framework for Analysis...............50 Hypothesis..................................................................................................................... ..50 Mobilizing Resources......................................................................................................51 The Enabling Environment..............................................................................................52 Methodology....................................................................................................................53 3 TAXONOMY OF ANTI-EMBA RGO ORGANIZATIONS.................................................57 History and Goals.............................................................................................................. .....58 Financial Resources............................................................................................................ ....69 Leadership, Human Resources a nd Organizational Structure................................................74 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .........84 4 STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF THE ANTI-EMBARGO MOVEMENT......................89 Conventional Strategies and Tactics.......................................................................................89 Confrontational Strategies and Tactics.................................................................................104 Solidarity Networks and Co-option......................................................................................108 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .......115

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6 5 SPEAKING TRUTHS TO POWER: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND CHALLENGING THE STATE............................................................................................116 Rallying Against the Embargo: From R onald Reagan to George W. Bush.........................117 Reaction to the Torricelli Bill...............................................................................................123 Rejecting the Helms-Burton Law.........................................................................................126 Clamoring for the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act.........................129 Protesting the Reports of the Commis sion for Assistance to a Free Cuba...........................132 The Elin Gonzlez Affair and the Ri se of Moderate Cuban Americans.............................139 Frustrations, Successes and Future Aspirations....................................................................145 6 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: A RATIONAL DEPARTURE.......................................149 Olsons Rational Model........................................................................................................150 Salisburys Exchange Theory...............................................................................................153 Tactical Framing and the New Social Movements...............................................................155 Solidarity Networks and Co-option......................................................................................160 Social Capital................................................................................................................. .......165 Commitment, Moral Incentives and Psychological Benefits...............................................169 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .......176 7 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES : SYSTEMIC, NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL IMPULSES TO AN TI-EMBARGO ACTIVISM...........................................180 Systemic Forces and Expanding Opportunity Structures.....................................................182 The End of the Cold War and the Onslaught of Globalization.....................................183 Pope John Pauls Visit to Cuba.....................................................................................186 State-level Impetus to Anti-Embargo Activities...................................................................189 Cubas Liberal Economic Reforms...............................................................................189 Type of Government......................................................................................................192 Policy-Specific Opportunities.......................................................................................196 Societal Facilitators to Anti-Embargo Activism...................................................................200 The Countermovement and Power Alignment..............................................................200 Shifting Dynamics within the Cuban American Community........................................206 The Countervailing Force.....................................................................................................209 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... .......209 8 CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................216 Thawing of the Glacier.........................................................................................................216 The Anti-Embargo Movement and a Post-Castro Cuba.......................................................219 APPENDIX A ARTICLES SEARCHED FOR LIBERAL NOR MS IN WEBSITES OF PROMINENT ANTI-EMBARGO ORGANIZATIONS..............................................................................222 Center for International Policy (CIP)...................................................................................222

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7 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)...................................................................222 Latin American Working Group (LAWG)...........................................................................223 Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAEF)............................................................223 B LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES INTERVIEWED.............................................225 C LIST OF WEBSITES...........................................................................................................227 LIST OF REFERENCES.............................................................................................................229 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................252

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8 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3-1 Classification of anti-embargo orga nizations, dates founded and objectives....................87 3-2 Organizations, leaders and funding sources.......................................................................88 6-1 Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent anti-embargo organizations..............................................................................................179 7-1 ABC/ Washington Post poll showing preand post-Cold War responses to Cuba as a threat to the U.S.............................................................................................................. .211 7-2 Yankelovich tracking poll showing respons es to Cuba as a threat to the U.S.................211 7-3 Hit Counts of ati-embargo ativism of twenty-f ive organizations (labeled 1-25) from Cold War to post-Cold War Era in the Ch ristian Science Monitor, Miami Herald, New York Times, USA T oday and Washington Post......................................................212 7-4 Comparison of frequency of Cuban De mocracy Act/Torricelli Bill and Helms Burton Law in five U.S. newspapers.............................................................................214 7-5 Lobby Groups Contributions to Politi cal Action Committees in the 1980s and 1990s.......................................................................................................................... ......215 7-6 Contributions to Candidates and Poli tical Action Committees in the 1980s and 1990s.......................................................................................................................... ......215 7-7 Cuban American Contributions to Po litical Parties in the 1980s and 1990s...................215

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9 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 6-1 Frequency of 5 liberal norms in 40 documents published in websites of prominent anti-embargo organizations as reflected in Table 6-1. The X-axis represents the number of hit counts in the websites and the Y-axis represents the major organizations.................................................................................................................. ..179 7-1 Comparison of anti-Embargo activism from Cold War to postCold War as reflected in Table 7-3. The X-axis represents 25 anti-embargo organizations and the Y-axis represents their frequency in the Christian Science Monitor Miami Herald the New York Times USA Today and the Washington Post ..........................................................213 7-2 Comparison of Appearances of Cuban De mocracy Act/Torricelli Bill and Helms Burton Law in five U.S. Newspapers as reflected in Table 7-4 above. The X-axis represents and the Y-axis represents th e number of hit counts in the 5 major U.S newspapers listed in Table 7-4.........................................................................................214

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10 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AHTC Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba CAAEF Cuban American Alliance Education Fund CANF Cuban American National Foundation CCD Cuban Commission for Democracy CIP Center for International Policy ECDET Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel ENCASA Emergency Network of Cuba n American Scholars and Artists HRW Human Rights Watch IFCO Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization LAWG Latin American Working Group PBS Public Broadcasting Service SMO Social Movement Organization USCTA U.S.-Cuba Trade Association VB Venceremos Brigade WOLA Washington Office on Latin America

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11 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DOWN WITH THE EMBARGO: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND U.S. CUBA POLICY (1960-2006) By Indira Rampersad August 2007 Chair: Terry McCoy Major: Political Science Ever since the imposition of a partial embar go on Cuba by the Eisenhower administration in 1960, more than one hundred orga nizations in the United States have been challenging the state on U.S. Cuba policy. Collectively, thes e organizations constitute a dynamic social movement which represents the crucible of a ne w contentious ferment triggered by an intriguing blend of international, nationa l and sub-national impulses, ir onically sparking intensified relations between the two nations, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Over time, the movement has invariably re-energized, reinvented, redefined and reconstituted itself to persistently reject and attempt to reform this st ate policy which restricts tourist, family, cultural and academic travel, limits remittances and prohibits free trade with Cuba. This dissertation presents the first comprehensive analysis of the anti-embargo movement. It seeks to address the central research puzzle of why the movement has persisted in attempting to change U.S. Cuba policy when it has met with such limited success over time. Undertaking the analysis from the levels of both a single social movement and multiple interest groups, it describes and analyzes the network of organiza tions which constitute the movement. First, it recounts the story of the organizations from birth to the present: their history, goals, organizational structure, resource s, size, leadership, strategies, tactics and activism. Second, it

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12 employs a social movements theoretical fram ework to explain the impulses prompting individuals to join the movement and the impe tus accounting for its sustained activism over the last three decades. Drawing on the popular resource mobilization lite rature, it contends that the rational, utilitarian model is inadequate to understand the multifarious attributes of the movement. Hence, it turns to alternative views on t actical frames, solidarity networ ks, co-option, social capital, commitment theory, moral incentives and ps ychological benefits for possible answers. However, the resource mobilization perspective fails to capture the political impetus and the new contentious ferment sparked by the e nd of the Cold War in 1989. This necessitates encapsulating the discourse within the theoretical framework of political opportunity structures prompting an analysis of the systemic, nationa l and sub-national impulses propelling increased collective action in th e post-Cold War era.

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13 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION History of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba Since the 1960s, United States foreign policy to Cuba has b een defined, redefined, shaped and debated in the context of the economic embar go. The history of the embargo is as turbulent as the choppy waters of the Florida Straits. No other issue in U.S. Caribbean relations has prompted such continued heated discourse a nd none has grabbed such widespread media attention as the contentious Am erican embargo policy which prev ents tourist travel, imposes sanctions on trade, limits remittances to Cuba n relatives and restricts academic, family and cultural exchanges with the island. The embargo has survived ten American presiden ts, some of whom have either relaxed or tightened it in accordance with their own ideologi cal beliefs or the political demands of the time. The initial policy was a response to the triu mph of Castros revolution 1959, his prompt ideological alignment with the Soviet Union a nd his adoption of an anti-American stance. In October 1960, President Eisenhower imposed a partial embargo in response to Castros nationalization of $2 billion in American prope rty and an additional $1.5 billion in assets.1 The disastrous outcome of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and Castros subsequent capture of 1122 Cuban exiles, resulted in Pres ident Kennedys expanding the embargo in 1962 to include all goods that was made w ith Cuban materials, even if th ey were manufactured in other countries. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis wh en it was discovered that Cuba was harboring medium-range missiles aimed at the U.S., Amer icans viewed the embargo more as a vital national security measure and less as an econom ic and social necessity. Kennedy continued to 1 See J.A. Sierra, J. Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2. http://www.historyofcuba.com /history/time/timetbl5b.htm 30 April, 2005.

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14 tighten the embargo as a Cold War tactic when Castro showed his determination to act as the Soviet proxy in the Western Hemisphere. As an overt Soviet satelli te receiving $4 billion annually from the U.S.S.R., even Castros South American neighbors began supporting the embargo and broke diplomatic relations with C uba through resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). The 1970s witnessed periodic initiatives toward improving relations between the two countries. Secret talks between the United Stat es and Cuba over normalization of relations occurred occurred during the Ford administra tion in 1974. In 1975, the OAS voted to end all political and economic sanctions on Cuba and severa l of its members opted to resume diplomatic relations.2 In 1977 under President Carter, diplomatic ties were partially re stored through the establishment of Interests Sections in each co untry, though the U.S. embargo remained. Carter dropped the travel ban and allowed subsidiaries of U.S. companies to sell products to Cuba. He also allowed Cuban exiles to send money to relatives in the island.3 In 1979 alone, 150,000 Americans visited Cuba under Carters relaxed po licies. But Cold War id eological and political battles impeded progress toward normalization between Cuba and the U.S. Cuban support of leftist insurgents in Angola ended U.S. interest in dtente with Cuba in the 1970s.4 In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration ini tially pondered rapprochement with Cuba, but the possibility ended when Cuba supported Marxis t groups in Central Am erican civil wars. Events such as the Mariel boa tlift of 1980, in which 125,000 Cubans left Cuba for the U.S. and the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 crafte d in part to thwart Cuban-aided development 2 See J.A. Sierra, J. Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2. http://www.historyofcuba.com /history/time/timetbl5b.htm 30 April, 2005. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

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15 of a military airfield intensified friction between the U.S. and Cuba. Under Reagan, sanctions were resumed resulting in one of the most hosti le policies against Cuba since the Bay of Pigs. Reagan reinstituted the travel ban and prohibite d Americans from spending money in Cuba. He also banned travel to the U.S. by Cuban govern ment or Communist part y officials or their representatives and barred most Cuban students, scholars and artists from entering the U.S. New Treasury regulations in 1989 restricted U.S. citizens spending in Cuba to a maximum of $100.5 The U.S. began to broadcast via Radio Mart to Cuba in 1985, and TV Mart in 1990, and the Cuban government jammed the television broa dcasts soon after they went on the air. The end of the Cold War did not bring the ki nd of changes in U.S Cuba policy that was expected in a unipolar interna tional system in which Cuba no longer poses an ideological or security threat to the U.S. Instead, the 1990s saw a tightening of the embargo. Under President George H. Bush, the Mack Amendment was passed prohibiting all trade with Cuba by subsidiaries of U.S. companies even if located outside the U.S. The Torricelli Bill, or Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, was also passed under Bush to wreak havoc on the island, according to its sponsor, Robert Toricelli, with the senior Bush proposing that he would impose sanctions on any nation buying products from Cuba. The law pr ohibits foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, but creates l oopholes for travel to Cuba by a select group of U.S. citizens to deliver food and medicine to C uba. Thus, there was a simultaneous increase in people-to-people initiativ es at a time when Cuba was undergoi ng a severe economic crisis called the special period, due to the co llapse of the Soviet Union. At th e same time, Castro was taking concrete steps to enact social and economi c reforms involving job creation and employment opportunities. 5 Ibid.

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16 President Clintons Cuba policy initially took a moderate course. Th e 1994 rafter crisis sent 30,000 Cubans toward U.S. shores. Subsequent U.S.-Cuban negotiations led to a series of migration accords in which the two countries made commitments to promote safe, legal and orderly migration. This balsero exodus resulted in Clinton suspending the decade old policy of granting asylum to refugees and reaching a pact with Castro. In 1995, he also allowed American media organizations to establish permanent hea dquarters in Cuba. In October 1995, Clinton also announced measures to allow nongovernmental orga nizations in the U.S. to fund projects in Cuba, and to allow U.S. AID funding to NGOs in the U.S. for Cuba-related projects.6 U.S.-Cuba relations took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1996, when Cuban MIG jetfighters shot down two U.S.-based civilian aircrafts belonging to the Miami-based group, Brothers to the Rescue, killing three U.S. citizens and one Cuban resident of the United States. Clinton used the incident to endorse the He lms-Burton Law in the heat of the 1996 election campaign in a bid to court vital Cuban American votes in South Florid a. Helms-Burton enacts penalties on foreign companies doing business in Cuba; permits lawsuits (even by individuals who were Cuban citizens at the time) against fo reign investors who make use of expropriated property seized by the Cuban government; and deni es entry into the U.S. to such foreign investors and their family members. Acting unde r a waiver provision in the law known as Title III, Presidents Clinton and Bush have suspended implementation of the lawsuit measure at sixmonth intervals.7 In anticipation of Pope John Pauls II vi sit to Cuba in Janua ry 1998, Clinton approved licenses for religious groups and the media to use charter aircraft and a cruise ship to travel to the 6 Cuba Policy Foundation. Lifting Cuba Travel Band Benefits Americas Farmers. 5 February, 2003. http://www.cubafoundation.org/CP F%20Travel-Ag%20Study/Releas e-Cuba-Travel-Ag-0302.04.htm 7 J.A. Sierra, J. Timetable History of Cuba: 1980-1999-2. http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time /timetbl5b.htm. 30 April, 2005.

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17 island. In 1998, the U.S. government also took st eps to expedite the sales and donations of medicines to Cuba, including the licensing of direct cargo flights. In January 1999, Clinton expanded the categories and streamlin ed the issuance of licenses for those who seek to travel to Cuba; allowed Americans to send up to $1200 per year in remittances to Cuba; broadened the categories of groups to whom sale of food and medical products could be made; and authorized direct charter passenger flights to Cuba from U.S. cities other than Miami. Charter flights then departed from Los Angeles and New York bound for Havana and other Cuban cities.8 In the meantime, the U.S. Congress sharply diverged on U.S. Cuba policy. The 106th Congress (1999-2000), passed legisla tion to both reduce and increa se sanctions against Cuba. The Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA), signed into law by President Clinton in October 2000, allowed the export of food and medicine to C uba, but prohibited any U.S. financing, either public or private, of such exports The legislation also codified the ban on travel to Cuba for tourism, which throughout its history had been mandated only by Executive Order. In the first session of the 107th Congress (2001), bills were again introduced to both ease and tighten the embargo. Several key votes indicate growing su pport for ending the embargo. In July 2001, the House of Representatives voted by overwhelming ma jority to end funding of enforcement of the travel ban, and a December 2001 vote in the Se nate indicated strong support for lifting restrictions on the finance of sales of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba.9 Described as the harshest pro-embargo president, President George W. Bush demonstrates strong support for the embargo. In May 2001, he announced that, my administration will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against Cubas government. La ter, in July, he reaffirmed his position and 8Cuba Policy Foundation. Lifting Cuba Travel Band Benefits Americas Farmers. 5 February, 2003. http://www.cubafoundation.org/CP F%20Travel-Ag%20Study/Releas e-Cuba-Travel-Ag-0302.04.htm 9 Ibid.

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18 announced that he would enhance and expand capabili ties of the U.S. government to enforce the embargo. In addition, he expanded people-to-peopl e initiatives by increasing support for human rights activists in Cuba and inst ructing the use of all available means to overcome the jamming of Radio and TV Mart.10 With his brother, Jeb Bush, as Governor of Fl orida with Jebs rather close alliance with the hardline, right-winged Cuban American community in South Florida, and with the increasingly hotly contested electoral constituency of South Fl orida, President Bush was true to his word. In December 2003, he established a Commission for A ssistance to a Free Cuba that presented a 500-page report in May 2004, with some of the mo st severe recommendations for tightening the embargo that was ever witnessed. The report pr oposed $45 million dolla rs to the budget for hastening change in Cuba. The new provisions restrict family and academic travels, remittances and parcel deliveries to Cuban rela tives. Cuban Americans can only visit Cuba once every three years for a maximum of 14 days with a special licen se. Before, they could have visited once per year with a general license. Only immediate family mother, father, brother, sister and grandparents can visit. Remittances are limited to $300 per Cuban household in a three-month period, according to rules liste d on the U.S. State Departments website.11 The money must be sent through State De partment-certified institutions. Visitors can only spend $50 a day in Cuba as opposed to $164 before. L uggage is now limited to 44 pounds with no overweight whereas overweight was allowed at a charge of $2 per extra pound previously. The 10 Ibid. 11 For the complete 2004 Report see Bu reau of Western Hemispheric Affairs. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. Washington D.C. 6 May 2004. http://www.cafc.gov/cafc/rpt/2004/67850.htm

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19 new restrictions grant academic travelers permi ssion for one year at a time for one semester. Previously, permission was granted for two year s at a time for varying durations. Academic institutions wanting to send stude nts or scholars to Cuba must obt ain a license from the Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control. Under the tightening of regulations, licenses for study in Cuba are now issued only for programs las ting a minimum of ten weeks. To participate, students must be enrolled in a full-time degree program at the instituti on holding the license, and only full-time tenured faculty members from the same institution may teach in such programs. Before 2004, imports of Cuban goods such as ciga rs and coffee valued up to $100 were allowed. Such imports from Cuba have now been banned altogether.12 The second 93-page report of the Commi ssion, issued in July 2006, attempted to counteract perceptions that the first report was nothing but an American occupation plan.13 The latest recommendations included a budget of $80 million for the next two years to ensure a transition rather than a succession of C uban leadership. Claiming that the 2004 measures restricting travel and curtailing remittances and parcel deliveries have had great success, the 2006 report called for their strengthened implementation.14 Supporting the Cuban embargo are early Cuban ex iles who have played a pivotal role in maintaining this hostile policy to Cuba. These hardliners forged a well-organized and effective interest group that lobbies Congress and the administration, contribute s heavily to political campaigns, and forms a key voting group in two stat es (Florida and New Jersey), critical to 12 Ibid. 13 Wayne Smith. Counterpunch. Bushes New Cuba Plan. July 11, 2006. http://www.counterpunch.o rg/smith07112006.html 14 For the complete 2006 Report see U.S. Department of State. Washington D.C. July 2006. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Repo rt to the President. http://www.cafc.gov/cafc/rpt/2006/68097.htm.

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20 winning the Presidency. They have developed po litical power, and have exercised this power effectively. The story of these powerful, hardline, proembargo Cuban Americans; their role in domestic politics; their influence on successive American administrations since the seventies; and their success in shaping U.S. Cuba polic y through the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), has been told and reto ld countless times (Molyneux in Bulmer Thomas and Dunkerly, 1999, Domnguez 1997, Roy 1997). It has dominated media and academic discourse to such an extent that the alternative narr ative of the anti-embargo movement has hardly been recounted. This dissertation takes up the ch allenge of relating this story. Curiosity, Contributions and Challenges As a Caribbean student in the United Stat es, the economic embargo on Cuba holds a particular fascination for me. Since the seventie s, when it resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Anglo-Caribbean has demonstrated wide spread sympathy for the island. On arrival in the United States, it was evident to me that, although the harsh embargo policy was alive and kicking, relations betwee n the two countries have never real ly stalled. Further probing revealed that beneath the iceberg of the cold, hostile embargo policy of hard liners in the sunshine state, there is significant thawing of the glacier. There exists the untold story of organizations scattered throughout the U.S., vigorously working to change American Cuba policy. Preliminary research uncovered more than a hundred organizations committed to repealing the embargo since 1969. Yet no comprehensive study of these organiza tions could be found. Overcome with an overwhelming curiosity to learn and understand mo re about these organi zations, I was inundated with a flood of questions. Who are these organiza tions? When were they formed? Where are they located? Which are the most active? What are their goals? How are they structured? Who are their leaders and members? Who funds them ? How successful are they? What are their

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21 similarities and differences? What are their as pirations and frustrati ons? What tactics and strategies do they employ to ach ieve their goals? What is their relationship with each other and with the state? What are their plans for a post-Castro Cuba? These questions are subsumed by the overriding puzzle as to why have these organizations persist in attempting to change this embargo polic y, some for more than th irty years, even though they have met with such limited success. This wo uld become the central research question of my project. Since they relentle ssly challenge the embargo polic y, these groups are identified collectively as the anti-emb argo movement in the U.S. A major challenge in this research was the quest for an appropriate theoretical model. The grand contending paradigms of International Relati ons fail to provide an adequate framework for this study. Moreover, traditional pe rspectives on the role of pow erful, hardline Cuban exiles and domestic politics on foreign policy have also proven inadequate. The problem emerges because the subjects are marginalized domestic organi zations, which are not very successful in influencing foreign policy outcomes. Scholars focusing on domestic act ors generally tend to underscore the role of affluent ethnic or business interests that have been successful in forging policy. This is not surprising si nce their focus has been on the policy outcome itself rather than on the organizations which attempt to shape it. Thus, it has become necessary to turn to Comparative Politics to find an appropriate model to analyze these groups. In recognizing that the behavior of most domestic groups is similar, irrespective of the type of policy they attempt to change domestic or foreign a comparativ e theoretical framework seems most applicable. Moreover, in as much as the groups operate at the margins of the pol itical system and have achieved limited success in changi ng policy, they collectively const itute what has come to be popularly known as social movements in Comp arative Politics. As such, social movements

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22 theory provides the most appropriate framework for analyzing the anti-embargo movement in the United States. This dissertation takes up the challenge of analyzing this so rely neglected and unexplored dimension of U.S. Cuba policy with the goal of presenting the first comprehensive study of the anti-embargo movement in the United States. It diverges sharply from the traditional approach which explores U.S. Cuba policy in the contex t of U.S. domestic politics and the role of powerful, hardline, right-winged Cuban American s in South Florida. The model employed is also unique since U.S. Cuba polic y has traditionally been analyzed as intermestic policy, from the perspective of powerful ethn ic interest groups and domestic politics. This project opens avenues for bridging the Comparative Politics/Intern ational Relations divide within the discipline of Political Science. It does this firstly, by em ploying social movements perspectives to analyze groups attempting to influence foreign policy, and secondly, by introducing an exogenous or systemic dynamic as a dimension of political op portunity structures discussed in chapter VI. The chapters are therefore designed to recount this untold story of the anti-embargo movement, first descriptively, then analytically. Dissertation Structure This Chapter, (chapter 1), presents an ove rview of the Cuban probl ematique including a brief history of the U.S. emba rgo on Cuba. It also details th e curiosity, contributions and challenges of this dissertation. Chapter 2 review s the literature on social movements theory which is the perspective used to analyze the move ment in subsequent chapters. It then outlines the theoretical concerns addressed in the other chapters and the methodology employed to investigate the organizations. Since there is no comprehensive academic study of any of the groups under study, nor of the co llective anti-embargo movement, and documented archival material about them is virtually non-existent, the next three chapters provide a detailed overview

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23 of the major organizations comprising the core of the anti-embargo movement. These chapters are primarily descriptive reflecting a heavy re liance on information from the organizations websites and from unstructured and semi-struc tured interviews. Th e bulk of the primary research undertaken in the field is reflected in these three chapte rs. Hence, chapter 3 recounts the history of the organizations, th eir location, primary and underly ing goals, their organizational structure, funding sources and membership. Chapte r 4 examines the strategies and tactics which they have employed and the similarities and differences of these across groups. Chapter 5 undertakes an assessment of the interplay betw een contentious politics and the organizations challenge to the state in the post-Cold War era. This includes a trajectory of their relationship with specific American presiden ts and state policies and with th e countermovement of hard-line Cuban Americans based in South Florida. It also assesses their successes and failures, future aspirations, frustrations and hopes for a post-Castro Cuba. The three descriptive chapters inform the other two which aim to analyze the groups within the framework of social movements theory ge ared toward unraveling the central research question of why do the organizations persist in attempting to change U.S. policy despite such limited success over time. Chapter 6 draws on th e resource mobilization approach to assess which model best explains the impulses prompti ng individuals to join the movement and what sustains its continued operati ons. Chapter 7 explores perspe ctives on politi cal opportunity structures geared toward exploring the internat ional, national and sub-national or local setting facilitating the movements activ ism. The concluding Chapter 8, a ttempts a brief assessment of the possible scenario in a post-Castro Cuba.

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24 CHAPTER 2 TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWOR K: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Limitations of International Relations Theory The grand contending paradigms which character ize the field of International Relations have failed to provide an adequate model for explaining the role of marginalized domestic groups within the U.S. which seek to change American Cuba policy. This limitation becomes glaring when the policy they atte mpt to repeal is clearly forei gn policy, the study of which is a major sub-field of Internationa l Relations. The study of foreign policy has been the subject of much controversy following Kenneth Waltzs forcef ul claims that a systemic (and neorealist) theory of international politics is not and cannot be a theory of forei gn policy, that it is an errorto mistake a theory of international politics for a th eory of foreign policy (Waltz 1979: 121). The limitations of the major paradigms of International Relations such as Waltzs neorealism for explaining the role of domestic ac tors in foreign policy are related to some of their basic assumptions. One is that states ar e the primary, unitary, ra tional and purposive actors in the international system. Another is that system ic forces such as the distribution of power and anarchy determine how states assess other states before decidi ng on a foreign policy. Neoliberalism takes the same sy stemic approach even though it recognizes the role of other actors in the system such as international orga nizations and internationa l regimes (Keohane and Nye 1977, Krasner 1983). During the sixties and seventies, there was no s hortage of literature on the role of domestic politics in the American foreign policy process (Roseneau 1967, Allison 1971, Gourevitch 1978). However Waltzs (1979) ground-breaking study on structural realism emphasizing the impact of systemic forces, served to drive dom estic variables out of foreign policy analyses

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25 during the eighties. The popularity and wave of criticisms of th e Democratic Peace at the end of the decade and beyond (Russet and Oneal, 2001, Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1996, Oren 1995, Layne 1994), led to a revival of academic interest on domestic factors. By the nineties, another variation of realism had emerged in the form of state-centered or postclassical realism as theories of foreign policy surged alon g with existing theories of international politics. Neoclassical or postclassical rea lism deviates from Waltzs struct ural realism. It contends that there is no immediate or perfect transmi ssion belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior. Foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. Foreign po licy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter (Rose 1998: 147). Rose introduces the term Innenpolitik contending that internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national charac ter, partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave to ward the world beyond their borders (Rose 1998). Fareed Zakaria prefers the concep t of state-centered realism which takes a similar view that statesmen not states are the primary actors in international affairs (Zakaria 1998: 42). These responses to Waltzs structural m odel provoked reaction from several scholars spawning a burgeoning literary oe uvre on the impact of domes tic factors on foreign policy (Moravcsic 1997, Russett 1993, Snyder 1991, Ike nberry, Lake and Mastanduno 1988). Some even attempt to reconcile a systemic theory of international politics an d a theory of foreign policy (Fearon 1998). Yet, the dichotomy id entified by Waltz (1979) highlights the very problems that arise in employing systemic theories to analyze the role of domestic actors in foreign policy as in the U.S. Cuba context.

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26 Recognizing that domestic politics is the driving force behind U.S. Cuba policy, the traditional tendency has been to analyze this policy from the perspective of powerful ethnic interest groups and domestic politics (Dominguez 1997, Haney et al. 1999, Haney 2005). Some scholars have described it as intermestic po licy underscoring the c onfluence of domestic and international politics or as a two-level ga me (Putnam 1988, LeoGrande 1998, Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush in Wittkopf and McCormick 2004). However, even this traditional ethnic intere st group and domestic politics approach does not adequately capture the role of other domestic marginalized groups attempting to change and reshape foreign policy but are not very successful This is partly because the emphasis would now shift from the actual foreign policy outcome to process the opera tions of the groups attempting to shape it. Foreign policy theory te nds to underscore the role of powerful business and ethnic groups which succeed in persuading gove rnments to formulate and implement policy to suit their own group interest. It does not cons ider groups which have l ittle or no influence on policy outcome. The field of Americans Government focusing on interest group theory also underscores the role of groups which are influential in shap ing public policy. Followi ng the publication of David Trumans The Government Process (1951), four streams of political theories emerged identified as the elitist, plura list, rationalist a nd hyperpluralist, which underscore the influence of both affluent and non-affluent groups in societ y. The 1950s became known as the Golden Age of Interest Group Theory as Trumans footst eps were quickly followed by others (Latham 1952, Mills 1956, Shattschneider 1960). Ho wever, like foreign policy theo ry, they generally emphasize groups which have some influence on public poli cy neglecting those which are unsuccessful and those which focus on foreign policy. This may be due to their limited impact on foreign policy.

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27 As Bernard Cohen contends, intere st groups have less effect on foreign than on domestic policy (in Ogene 1983: 5). The academic lacunae will be partially filled by Comparative Politics with the migration of protest movements from the periphery of society to the mainstream and the subsequent salience of movement organizations to th e political process. This has contributed significantly to the expansion of academic studies on what is now popularly known as social movements (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Du ring the Cycle of Contention of the 1960s and 1970 social movements expanded in both visibility and purpose underscoring the role of marginalized groups which are genera lly unsuccessful in shaping policy (Tarrow 1998). Although social movements theory is genera lly employed for public policy analyses, it serves as the most suitable framework for ma rginalized domestic groups attempting to shape foreign policy. It can safely be assumed that th e behavior of domestic groups would be similar whether they are attempting to change public policy or forei gn policy. As such, although we draw on interest group theory where necessary, so cial movements theory provides the best model for understanding the myriad of organizations with in the U.S. attempting to change American policy to Cuba. The Conceptual Dilemma The distinction between social movements and interest groups are at times indiscernible presenting an unsolvable conceptual dilemma. De finitions of social movements are varied and many and at times overlapping and confusing, at be st. McCarthy and Zald (1977), define a social movement a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which repres ents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure a nd/or reward distribution of a society (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217-18). For Charles Tilly (1984) a social movement consists of a sustained interaction between a specific set of authoritie s and various spokespersons for a given challenge

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28 to those authorities (Tilly 1984: 305). According to Ibarra (2002) social movements share some performances with industrial conflict, electoral campaigns, and intere st group politics. Social movements were historically formed with a standard cluster of organized performances, formation of associations, public meetings, demonstrations, marches, petition drives, pamphleteeri ng, lobbying, and display of sy mbols representing shared commitment to a cause. They overlap in some of these functions with electoral campaigns, interest-group agitation, and management-l abor interaction (Ibarra 2003: 23). Sidney Tarrow (1994) initially made a clear distinction between social movements and interest groups insisting that social movements are not intere st groups because they are not formally organized, with well-defi ned leadership, goal hierarchies, and decision-making entities (Tarrow 1994: 15-16). However, the distinction is not clear-cut especially with the emergence of the conceptualization of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) in the seventies. Charles Tilly (1984), identifies SMOs as an essential part of a ny social movement which is a sustained series of interaction between power holders and person s successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation in th e course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support (Tilly 1984: 306). This raises the question of what is formal representation. In the United States, this is accorded only to geographical areas at the federal level, to stat es and congressional districts. Since all other constituencies lack formal representation, the definition would embrace all interest groups which repeatedly and publicly demand change in th e distribution and exercise of power. This would include the minority party as well. Recognizing the risk of being over-inclus ive, McCarthy and Zald ask Is a SMO an interest group? (McCarthy a nd Zald 1977: 1218). The response provides what has come to be seen as the key distinction between social movements and SMOs, on the one hand, and other forms of political organizations, on the other. So cial movements operate at the margins of the

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29 political system and SMOs are less institutionali zed than interest group and have fewer routine ties with government (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999: 6). Though other scholars focus on different attributes of SMOs, they all emphasize their marginality which distinguishes them from other political organizations. For Gamson ( 1990: 16), they represent constituencies not previously mobilized, and for T illy, they speak on behalf of constituencies lacking formal representation (Tilly 1984: 306) or employ unconventiona l disruptive tactics (McAdam 1982: 25). Definitions of interest groups tend to be broad and vague. For Wilson (1980), interest groups are organizations which have some aut onomy from government or political parties and thattry to influence public policy (Wilson 1980: 8). Walker (1991) focuses on organizations that can reasonably be describe d as voluntary associationsseeki ng in one way or another to petition the government on behalf of some orga nized interest or cause (Walker (1991: 4). However, these definitions can also enco mpass SMOs, making distinction difficult. Tactics have been another criteria used to di stinguish between intere st groups and social movements. Interest groups are often thought of as highly conventional and their members as averse to disruptive behavior and confrontational tactics unlike social movements. This raises the question as to what is disruptive behavior. Fo r example, business threats to reduce or shift investments spell the possibil ity of disrupting the economy (L indblom 1977). Through repeated court challenge, American interest groups of ten prevent the implementation of laws and regulations for years. Paul Burstein (1998) questions wh ether it is the noninstitutional aspect of tactics that is crucial but is not certain what noninstitutional means. He rejects the notion that it connotes not regulated by law since much political activity not thought of as noninstitutional such as

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30 letter-writing campaigns, visiti ng legislators offices, and placi ng political advertisements in newspapers (Burstein in Costain and McFarl and 1998: 43) are consid ered interest group activity. The level of orderliness and structure of the tactics has also been considered as a distinguishing feature. Tilly (1984), contends that social movements tactics are chosen from a set of well-known and understood possibilities, sometimes planned and rehearsed. Burstein concludes that the tactics of SMOs often are orderly and predic table while those of interest groups often are arguably non-institu tionalized and are intended to be disruptive (Burstein in Costain and McFarland 1998: 43). This contradict s Tarrows (1994) definition described above. In their path-breaking article on social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1977), attempt to make a dubious distinction between social moveme nt organizations (SMOs) and interest groups. Though they affirmed that social movements ar e not interest groups (in a footnote), they admitted that they themselves are not fully satis fied with the answer. They considered the view that interest groups are more institutionalized th an SMOs and not just in terms of tactics. McCarthy and Zald (1977) relies on Lowis formulation that a SMO which becomes highly institutionalized and routinizes stable ties with a government agency is an interest group (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). For Wilson (1990), a social movement may or may not become an interest group depending on whether or not it develops th e appropriate degree of institutionalization (Wilson 1990: 9). However, th ere is no consensus on how institutionalized an organization should be to qualify as an interest group. Paul Burstein ( 1998), asserts that I am not aware of anyone having provided a th eoretical rationale fo r dividing a continuum of institutionalization at one placeinterest groups on one side, social movement organizations on the other rather than another. It would be very difficult to do so in any case, since institutionalization itself is not defi ned with any precision; indeed, often is not defined at all (Burstein in Cost ain and McFarland 1998: 43-44). Burstein identifies a study by Heinz et al (1993) and Walker (1991), which attempted to identify interest groups by drawing from lists of organizations identified by publishers as trying

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31 to influence federal policy. The list was s upplemented by screening media reports of organizational activity and by interviewing governme nt officials. Though this approach does not distinguish between interest gr oups and SMOs, it distinguishes amongst groups solely on the basis of visibility rather than goals, membership, tactics or level of institutionalization. If a conventionally defined social movement had ente red their sample and had achieved the required level of visibility, it would be labeled an in terest group (Burstein in Costain and McFarland 1998: 43-44). The difficulties of distinguishing between soci al movements and inte rest groups have led some leading social movement theorists to abandon their earlier cr iterion of distinction. McAdam (1982) no longer views tactics as a di stinguishing criteria and together with Tarrow and Tilly (1996), have subsequently claimed th at groups choose what tactics to use by considering how best to use the re sources they have to deal with the opportunities and constraints they face in any particular si tuation. Hence they affirm: There are no inherently social-movement orie nted actors or groups. The same groups that pour into the streets and mount the barricades may be found in lobbies, newspapers offices, and political party branches t hese various types of activi ties may be combined in the repertoire of the same group and may even be employed simultaneously.there is no fundamental discontinuity between social movements and institutional politics (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996: 27). This intensifies the dilemma of what exactly is the difference between social movements and interest groups if there is no fundamental discontinuity. We may attempt a distinction by focusing on degree of influence. Social movement s tend to have limited success in influencing policy. Traditional interest groups boast of powerfu l constituents, with interests strategically placed in a number of key congressional district s and abundant economic resources to invest in lobbying such as the right-wing Cuban-American organization and the Jewish-American lobby. Social movements on the other hand, are seen as efforts by excluded groups to mobilize

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32 sufficient political leverage to advance collect ive interests through non-in stitutionalized means (McAdam 1982: 37). Anne Costain (1992), categorizes the Black civ il rights groups of the sixties as both social movements and interest groups. As social movement s, they engaged in boycotts of segregated transportation systems, sit-ins at white lunch counters in the South, mass marches and freedom rise to draw public attenti on and support for their cause. But in addition to these noninstitutionalized actions, these civil rights gr oups were also involve d in activities which interest group literature emphasize. They were involved in voter regi stration drives, court challenges and legislative lobbying in their e fforts to change public policy. Costain (1992) attempts to bridge the gap betw een social movements and intere st group theory in her study of the womens movement with the provocative titl e Social Movements as Interest Groups: The Case of the Womens Movement. She develops two data sets, one tracing congressional action on legislation addressing women as an intere st group; the other showing up the movements activities as a social movement assessing the degr ee of agitation on behalf of womens rights in the United States based on New York Times coverage (Costain in Petracca 1992: 285-307). We conclude that both social movement s and interest groups are representative intermediaries between the citizen s and the state. What seems to emerge here is a kind of hybrid between interest groups and social movements. In as much as we are not dealing with a single organization but with a network of different act ors, our subject is a social movement. Its identification as a social movement is reinforced by the fact that this collective operates at the margins of the political system and has fewer routine ties with government (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). In as much as the organizations of this collective are groups of outsiders who seem powerless and tend to resort to desperat e measures to win even recognition, much less

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33 substantial concessions from the powers that be, th ey constitute a social movement. In as much as they are often not very successful in achieving their goals, they are also social movements. At the same time, the interest group characteri stics of the organizations that constitute the social movement should not be neglected. In as much as they want change and challenge the powerbrokers for policy reform, they are interest groups. Moreover, in as much as some clamor for change for the public good and ot hers seek change for themselves, they can be identified as public interest groups and self -oriented interest groups respectively (Hrebenar 1997: 11-12). Also, in as much as they demonstrate strong in stitutional structures, they are interest groups (Tarrow 1994). Finally, in as much as they inte ract with Congress and lobby for their cause with which business interest at least have attained some success, they are also interest groups. We recognize the conceptual dilemma inherent in the project and opt to use the concept of social movement as a network of interactions of interest groups which we define here as organized, institutionalized gr oups with well-defined goals a nd organizational structure whose members share specific normative beliefs which guide their primary goal of changing policy. We launch our analysis from the level of both the individual interest group and the collective social movement. However, social movement th eory presents the dominant framework for this project. It seems a more appr opriate model for this network of domestic actors which has consistently failed to influence U.S. Cuba polic y, has few routine ties with government, has not received wide-scale media attention and remains at the periphery of the U.S. political system despite decades of continuously at tempting to effect change. Theories of Social Movements Various approaches to analyz ing social movements have b een advanced. Currently there are four dominant perspectives some of which are relevant to this study. They include the classical approach on collective behavior; theo ries of resource mobilization which embraces

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34 Mancur Olsons (1965) rational choice model; pe rspectives on political process focusing on expanding political opportunities; and the New So cial Movement perspectives which include analyses on framing. The classical models (Kornhauser 1959, Smelser 1962, Turner and Killian 1962, Ted Gurr 1970 and Davies 1979), emphasize collective indi vidual behavior as disruptive leading to revolution, mass rebellion, violent u pheavals and aggressive action. They ignored the process by which such individual feelings at the micro level resulted in such macro phenomenon as mass rebellion or revolution, and are generally not a pplicable to this study. Resource mobilization and expanding political opportunities provide the basic framework for this project. The New Social Movements perspective addressing framing as a mob ilization tactic is also applicable and will be absorbed in the resource mobilization discourse. Resource Mobilization Perspectives Between the 1960s and 1970s, a new generation of sociologists emerged preoccupied with the issues of the times which included civil ri ghts, decolonization and peace. The intellectual currents and societal attitudes created an atmos phere of legitimacy for social movements. The emphasis shifted from the individua l unit of analysis to social st ructures and macro processes. Structure became a key concept in social moveme nt analysis with new theories challenging the classical collective behavior approaches. The ar gument was made that social movements should not be subsumed under collective behavior since they were different enough to warrant their own mode of analysis. Rather than irrational individuals, social m ovements were seen as exhibiting enduring, patterned and institutionalized elements. Moreover, these patterns were as rational as those who study them. It was then that the link between social movement s and interest groups were established since the latter emphasized the political rather than the psychological and the notion of social movements organizations (SMOs) emerged with increasing emphasis on

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35 institutionalization and structure. The actions of social movements are conceptualized as rooted in the collective understanding of group interests. These actions were seen as taking place within structures that limit but do not completely or mechanically determine them. The theoretical strands that constituted these challenges came to be known as resource mobilization theory. The central premise of the trad itional resource mobilization th eory is that the emergence and persistence of social movement activity is contingent upon the availability of resources that can be channeled into move ment mobilization an d activity (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988, McCarthy and Zald 1977). The ava ilability, aggregation and deployment of resources are regarded as amongst the most crucia l factors determining movement emergence. McCarthy and Zald (1977) contends that not only is the absolute and relative amount of resources available to social movements contingent on the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite public s, but the greater the amount of resources available to the social movement sector with in a society, the greater the likelihood that new social movement organizations and social moveme nt industries will emerge (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1224-25). Thus, McCarthy and Zald (1977) propose a market managerial economic model which operates as business firms or m ovement industries, with movement sectors and movement entrepreneurs (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1230). The members act as consumers who make individual consumer choices based on costs and benefits and selective incentives based on individual in terests and preferences. Movement leaders act as managers, selling a product in competiti on with other in terest groups. The movements capacity to mobilize depe nds upon both material and non-material resources. The former constitute work, money, conc rete benefits and services. The latter include authority, moral engagement, faith and friends hip. A rational calculation is undertaken through

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36 which these resources are distributed across multiple objectives. The level of mobilization depends on the ability of the social movement to organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, utilize and create solidarity, sh are incentives among members and ach ieve external consensus. McCarthy and Zald (1977) include several ot her dimensions in their (partial) resource mobilization theory. In contrast to the traditional classical model which relies on an aggrieved population for the necessary resour ces and labor, resource mobili zation theory contends that social movements may or may not be based on th e grievances of the presumed beneficiaries. Individuals, organizations and constituents may be a prime source of support while supporters who actually provide money, facilities, and even la bor, may have little or no commitment to the values or norms that guide specific movements. One of the principal elements of the resource mobilization perspectiv e is the adoption of the problems of Mancur Olson s (1965) rational choice model in the Logic of Collective Action. Della Porta and Diani (2004) affirm that one of the most important innovations of the resource mobilization approach is the definition of soci al movements as conscious actors making rational choices. Olsons logic is if such movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will bear the cost of working for them on their own. Applyi ng the theory to interest groups, Olson flatly discounts the core pluralist belief that interest groups arise on the basis of common interests, demonstrating that if the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common good or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so or, unless some se parate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or bur dens involved in the ach ievement of the group objectives (Olson 1965: 2). Olsons rational mode ling approach is characteristically an

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37 economic mode of analysis and argues that polit ical goals will not be sufficient to induce members to support interest group or social m ovement activity. Hence, the problem of freeriding will arise. What actually facilitate th e group formation are not collective goods but selective incentives. Thus, according to Olson, a truly rational man in an economic sense would not join an interest group unless some very specific conditions were present. Firstly, the organization should be small enough so that th e addition of one or more member will appreciably increase the groups power. Secondly, the benefits are available to members and are of equal or greater value than th e dues or other costs paid by a member. Thirdly, the individual is a powerful person and his contribution or additio n to any organization would make a difference in the groups power. Fourthly, the or ganization employs coercion (Olson 1965). Olsons basic arguments are consistent in many respects with the exchange theory proposed by Salisbury (1969/1970). Like Olson, Salisbury explicitly rejected Trumans (1951) pluralist views that interest groups naturally ar ise out of the interacti on of people with common interests responding to societal disruptions. The formation of an interest group was extremely problematic for both writers. It called for someone to be willing to bear the costs of organizing such groups by locating members, organizing mee tings and convincing them to contribute time and money to the new group. Salisbury (/1969/19 70) did not emphasize fre e-riding as much as Olson but started with the premise that most individuals are concerne d with their own selfinterest and would be relu ctant to contribute much to provide a collective good. Salisburys (1969/1970) exchange theory is an ex pansion of Olsons in his assertion that individual entrepreneurs tend to be willing to bear the initial organizational costs not for collective benefits but for a staff job with th e new organization. In this way, he accounted for consumer, farm, labor and environmental groups unaccounted for by Olson. Though he

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38 acknowledged that organizations of some pur posive interest groups might be skilled at articulating some common interest, Salisbury in sisted that group orga nizations were smallbusiness entrepreneurs offering benefits for the pri ce of membership in order to finance their jobs (Salisbury 1969: 11-13, 17-18, 25). Thus, according to Salisbury, most group activity has little to do with efforts to affect public policy decision but is concerned rather with the internal exchange of benefits by which the group is orga nized and sustained (S alisbury 1969: 20). These benefits can be selective material solidary, or expressi ve but selective material predominates in most organizations. Salisburys theory was s upported by research undert aken of eighty-three national public interest groups by Jeffrey Berry (1977, 1978). Berry found that a majority of fifty-five groups were explained by exchange theory (Berry 1977: 24, 1978). The Olson and Salisbury models seem more appropriate to explain economic interest groups. However, the view of the individual as ex ceedingly self-interested and group leaders as preoccupied with running a viable business doe s not explain the operatio ns of non-economic or public interest groups. Even some of those in Berrys study such as Ra lph Nader, John Gardner of Common Cause and Cleaveland Amory of the Fund for Animals do not seem to quite fit the image of a salesperson seeking a staff job. Rather, they seem deeply committed to their cause (Petracca 1992: 107). Another facet of resource mobilization theory is tactics. In classi cal approaches, social movement leaders employ bargaining, persuasion or violence to influence authorities to change. The choice of tactics depended upon previous histor y of relations with au thorities, the relative success of previous encounters and ideology. Res ource mobilization theory is also concerned with the interaction between movements and authorities but acknowle dges a number of other strategic tasks such as mobilizing supporters, ne utralizing and/or transf orming mass and elite

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39 publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). The choice of tactics may present a dilemma since what one tactic achie ves may conflict with behavior aimed at achieving another. Intero rganizational competition and cooperation also influence tactics. According to Della Porta a nd Diani (2004c), the type and nature of the resources available explain the tactical choice s made by movements and the consequences of collective action on the social and political action (Della Porta and Diani 2004c: 8). The New Social Movement s approach also treats with some relevant strategic and tactical repertoires. Framing is one of the most widely discussed tactics of this school. There has been growing consensus since the mid-1980s amongst social movement scholars that social movements and social change cannot be fully explained by structural models. Drawing from social psychology, several social movements scholars called for attention to be paid to cognitive and ideational factors such as interpretation, symbolization, and meaning (Cohen 1985; Ferree and Miller 1985; Gamson, Fireman and Rytin a 1982; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1989). The notion of strategic framing of grievances has b een particularly influe ntial (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986). This a pproach redirected attention to subjective aspects in the analysis of social movements. In this perspectiv e, grievances are perceived to be interpreted in different ways by individuals a nd social movement organizations. The concept of framing is especially useful because it faci litates an empirical examination of the process by which a given objective situation is defined and experienced (Johnston and Noakes 2005: 70). According to Snow and Benford (1992), framing denotes an ac tive process derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality contention (Snow and Be nford 1992: 136). They continue that mobilization therefore depends not only on the availability and deployment of tangible resources, the opening or closing of poli tical opportunities, or a favorable cost-benefit

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40 calculus, but also on the way these variables are framed, and the degree to which they resonate with targets of mobili zation (Snow and Benford 1988: 213). Snow and Benford (1988) identify three types of framing as necessary for successful recruitment. The first is diagnostic in which a movement convinces potential c onverts that a problem needs to be addressed; the second is prognostic in which the movement convinces conve rts of appropriate strategies, tactics and targets. The third is motivational in which move ments exhort converts to get involved in these activities (Snow and Benford 1988). Also deviating from the traditional structural focus, Marc Steinberg (1998), cogently argues a case for the role of discourse in the fram ing process. He contends that repertoires are not ideational elements carried about in individu als heads, but are fundamentally collective diagnoses of injustice and prognoses for change They are the products of speech communication between actors (both individual a nd collective) that are produce d, sustained, and transformed in the course of contention (Steinberg 1998: 857). Introducing the notion of multivocality in his dialogical model of framing, he explains how a social movement consisting of various groups can assume a homogenous voice facilitating the mob ilization process. Thus, he asserts that the multivocality of discourse could f acilitate the mobilizati on of heterogeneous groups to the extent that it permits multiple and even divergent productions of meanings through a discursive repertoire. The multi-voiced word in this sense can allow for a misrecognition of heterogeneity as unity, as groups with potential ly divergent interests and identities articulate through what they perceive as shared claims and understandings (S teinberg 1998: 860). Steinberg continues that this tactic is frequently used in mobilizing gr assroots and local actions in building a discursive repertoire and in the production of meanings within a repertoire. However, for mobilizing wider

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41 populations to build ties and ne tworks, tactics of mass comm unication is more effective (Steinberg 1998: 860). The use of frames as a conscious tactic has been explored by McAdam (1996). For him, tactics are consciously designed to frame action, attract media attention, shape public opinion in favorable ways to the movement, and signify the degree of threat embodied in the movement and its ability to disrupt pub lic order (McAdam 1996: 348). Employing the sophisticated conceptualization of strategic dramaturgy, McAdam (1996) describes those framing efforts that consider the messages and symbols encoded in movement actions and demands. For him, one strategy that movements employ is the stagin g of actions with the objective of framing situations in a manner that appe als to the public. He affirms that since movement have moral and cultural dimensions that involve insurgents and publics consci ousness, beliefs and practices, the notion of strategic dramaturgy facilitates a moving away from the cognitive bias of framing and considers that movement often invoke values and basic moral principles to frame grievances and legitimate action. This dimension of strategic framing is dir ectly linked to emotions, a somewhat ignored aspect of framing. Emotions are important for their mediating role in the communication and interpretation between movements and thei r publics (Benford 1997). Because contemporary social movement theory reacted to the disrup tive behavior of the maddening crowd, of the sixties and seventies, attempts to emphasize the rationality of moves and goals, the role of emotions was not given salience until the Ne w Social Movements a pproaches emerged. However, in this perspective, emotions are not seen as blind, irrationa l reactions. Johnston and Noakes (2005), contend that emotions do not prevent us from seeing the world objectively, nor are they necessarily in conf lict with cool reason and logi c (Johnson and Noakes 2005: 72).

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42 Flam (1990a, 1990b) contends that emotions are important to the growth and unfolding of social movements and political protests (I n Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). Potential members experience moral shock, which is the first step toward recruitment into social movements. It arises when an unprecedented ev ent or piece of information provokes such an outrage in an individual that he/she becomes inclined toward political action whether or not he/she has acquaintances in that movement or not (Luker 1984, Jasper and Poulsen 1995, Jasper 1997 in Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). One aspect of emotions as they relate to the actions of social movements that have been explored in the literature is that of injustice frames. Gamson (1992) identifies in justice frames as a way of view ing a situation or condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice and which identifies those blameworthy people responsible for it (Gamson 1992: 32). This moral compulsion to respond to injustice, albeit framed, may be explained by Emer gent Norm Theory (ENT). According to ENT, the sense of injustice is heightened by an event or a perceived crisis such as the end of the Cold War when the perception of Cuba as a security th reat is reduced but the embargo continues to be tightened. This is elaborated upon in chapter 6. In response to the rational model, other studies emphasize forms of organization and mobilization of resources such as moral enga gement (Tillock and Morrison 1979). Fireman and Gamson (in Zald and McCarthy 1979), argue for an alternative approach to mobilization critiquing Olsons utilitarian, self-interested, rational mode l by emphasizing the role of solidarity, principle and solidary groups. They define solidarity as rooted in the configuration of relationships linking the members of a group to one another (Fireman and Gamson in Zald and McCarthy 1979: 21). They contend that these re lationships may foster common identity, shared faith and general commitment to defend the gr oup (not the cause). Accordingly, a persons

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43 solidarity with a group is based on five factor s: friends and relatives, participation in organizations, design for living, subordinate and s uperordinate relations, a nd no exit. A lack of solidarity will result in failed mobilization effo rts (Fireman and Gamson in Zald and McCarthy 1979: 22). Social movement scholars are now forging a link between resource mobilization and social capital. Connections, knowledge, time, skill and expe rtise are crucial to a movements ability to survive. Social capital approaches offer a rela tively new perspective fo r understanding resource mobilization through its focus on soci al relationships as resources that can facilitate access to other resources (Bebbington 2002). Viewed as a soci ological construct root ed in social theory, social capital defined as the aggregate of actual or potentia l resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or le ss institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognitionor in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of collectivelyowned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249). Robert Putnam (1993), drawing from the ideas of Tocqueville, perceives social capital as a community marked by active participation in public affairs through act ivities which are virtuous a steady recognition and pursuit of the public good at the expense of all purely individual and private ends. Selfinterest is not totally absent but it is self-interest properly understood, i.e self-interest defined in the context of broader pub lic needs, self-interest that is enlig htened rather than myopic, selfinterest that is alive to the interest of others For Putnam (1993), citi zenships entail equal rights and obligations for all, a community bound togeth er by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relati ons of authority, exploitation and dependency. The citizens of the civic community are helpful, respectful and trustful towards each other. Indeed,

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44 interpersonal trust is probably the moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be maintained. The values of this civic community are embodied in, and reinforced by distinctive soci al structures and pr actices (Putnam 1993). The idea of solidary and purposive or publ ic interests groups like the womens, environmental or civil rights orga nization is taken up by Terry Moe ( 1980) in a scathing attack of the rational model. Moe (1980) c ontends that psychological benefits are the prime incentives for group membership. These psychological benefits a ssume different forms such as the pursuit of ideological objectives, the desire to make a differ ence in the political process, a strong sense of political efficacy, the satisfacti on of a personal feeling of oblig ation, and the need to obtain political information (Moe 1980: 113-144). The im portance of political mo tivations is supported by Hansen (1977) who investigated the decisions of members to join the American Farm Federation, the National Association of Farm Builders, and the League of Women Voters. Hansen concluded that political motivations do ma tter, especially when the group is threatened (Hansen 1977: 24, 1978). The rewards or benefits criteria advanced by Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961), have been later adopted by virtually a ll interest group scholars. They id entify three types of benefits which can accrue to an individua l. The first is material whic h includes tangible rewards which can usually be translated into monetary terms. The second is solidary, which are social rewards that derive from associating in group activities. The third is purposive which are rewards associated with ideological or issue-oriented goals that offer no significant tangible or benefits to members (Petracca 1992: 102). The latter two are considered non-material incentives. Mark Petracca (1992) forges a nexus between non-economic benefits and what he calls commitment theory which argues that the hi gh degree of time, energy, and resources needed

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45 to be involved in group activ ities stems from beliefs a bout good policy (Sabatier and McLaughlin 1990). Critical to participation are expected collective be nefits arising from a groups political activities. The bene fits may be material or ideo logical/purposive, or both. Thus, even if goals were initially self-interested, su ch behavior typically b ecomes intertwined with congruent conceptions of improving social welfare, either out of self-respect or concerns of political efficacy (Tesser 1978; Margolis 1982: 100) Material self-interest may have created the initial incentives to join an inte rest group, then to become leaders. However, this benefit has to be quite large and must be buttressed by ideolo gical/purposive incentives for individuals to be sufficiently committed to join, then become leaders, to encourage others to join and stay in the organization (Sabbatier and Mc Cubin 1990 in Petracca 1992: 109-110). Such purposive incentives may be the promoti on and preservation of what has come to be know as norms in both the domestic and inte rnational arenas. Unlike economic incentives which imply material rewards, norms are more closely identified with social rewards or psychological benefits as espoused by Moe (1980). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define norms as standards of appropriate behavior for acto rs with a given identity They continue that norms by nature embody a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justification for action and leav e an extensive trail of communi cation among actors that we can study (Finnnmore and Sikkink 1998: 892). In attemp ting to explain the origins of norms, they allude to the logic of appropr iateness which relates to the emergence of new norms which compete with existing norms for appropriateness. Referring to activists in the womens suffrage movement as norm entrepreneurs, they a ffirm that suffragettes chained themselves to fences, went on hunger strikes, broke windows of government buildings and refused to pay taxes as ways of protesting their exclusion from politic al participation. More relevant to this study,

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46 however, is their explanation of what motivates norm entrepreneurs (activists). They insist that it is very difficult to explain the motivations of norm entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898) In their 1998 text, they describe activists as enactors, people who seek to amplify the generative power of norms, broaden the scope of practices these norms engender, and sometimes even renegotiate or transform the norms themselves (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35). Although the anti-embargo groups do not quite conform to Keck and Sikkinks notion of transnational advocacy networks since they are not exactly actors working in ternationally on an issue who are bound together by shared values a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 89, italics, mine), their motivations are similar. Like transnational advocacy networks th ey also seek to persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. We agree with Keck and Sikkink (1998), that they are not always successful in their efforts, but they are increasingly relevant players in policy deba tes (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). The Political Process Model and Po litical Opportunity Structures The resource mobilization perspective neglec ts the important political dynamic which propels contentious action. This limitation is a ddressed in the political process model. The critical element of this model is the role of expanding political opportuni ties within the broader social and political environment in stimulating the rise of social movements. This enabling environment gave rise to the notion of political opportunity structure which was first introduced by Eisinger (1973) and elaborat ed by Tarrow (1983, 1989b). Tarrow (1983, 1989b) perceives the concept as three dimensional: the degree of openness or closure of formal political access; the degree of stability or instability of political alignm ents; and the availability and strategic posture of pot ential alliance partners (Tarrow 1983: 28). La ter, he adds a fourth

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47 element: political conflicts within and among e lites (Tarrow 1989b: 35). Kriesi (in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995) specifies these fundamental prem ises of Tarrows model indicating that the political opportunity structure is not constant since it may shift over time due to factors beyond the control of the actors involved. Since actors cannot anticipate such shifts when they decide to engage in collective action, they ta ke the political opportuni ty structure as a given at the time of engagement making it independent of their purposi ve action (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 167-197). The link between social movements/revolutions and institutionalized politics was made by several political process theo rists including Charles Tilly ( 1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1983). These analyses are not confin ed to opportunity structures alone but also include constraints. The myriad of empirical work inspired by the political process model has stimulated a growing awareness amongst social movement scholars of the range of collective settings in which movements emerge and the or ganizational forms to which they gave rise. Commenting on the political process m odel, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) observes that Tilly (1978) and some of his coll eagues examined the role of several grassroots settings work and neighborhood which facilitate the structuring of co llective action. They note that other scholars took up the challenge of fered by Tilly (1978), ap plying his insights to more contemporary movements. Aldon Morris (1981, 1984) and Doug McAdam(1982), analyzed the role of local Black institutions part icularly churches and colleges, in the emergence of the American Civil Rights Movement. Sa ra Evans (1980), inves tigated the Womens Liberation Movement, locating it within informal friendship networks which were forged by women who were active in the Civil Rights Mo vement and in the American New Left. The political process model focusing on informal, gra ssroots mobilizing structures has attracted the

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48 attention of several scholars in more recent network studies of movement recruitment (Gould, 1991; Kriesi 1988; McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow, Zurcher and EklandOlson 1980 in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 2004c: 4). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (2004c), insist th at changes in the structures of political opportunities can contribute to sh ifting fortunes of social moveme nts. With reference to the decline of the American Civil Rights Movement, they cited th e redemocratization of voting rights in the South, the development of signi ficant Republican streng th in the region, and President Nixons recognition and exploitation of this development in his successful 1968 campaign as significant changes impacting on the movements decline. Nixons Southern strategy dealt a severe blow to the Black struggle by illustrati ng the irrelevance of the Black vote to the political success of the Republican Party. Subsequently, th e Movement had little relevance on Nixon and his Republican successors (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 2004c: 12). Kreisi (in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995) also pe rceives three broad sets of properties of a political system which he identifies as its informal institutional structure, its informal procedures and prevailing strategi es with regards to challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 169). An interesting dynamic is brought into the debate by Kriesis inclusion of the configurations of power in the system whic h together with the ge neral setting for the mobilization of collective action, can specify the authorities strate gies and those of the members of the system. These strategies will determine the degree of facilitati on or repression by the members of the system which the challengers would face. It will also determ ine the possibility of success of the challengers actions and the possibility of success in the absence of such actions. This possibility will be high if the government is reform-oriented or low if the government in

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49 power is hostile to the movement (Koopmans 1990a) (Kriesi in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 167-197). According to McAdam (in McAdam in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 23-40), a window of opportunity may be brought on by a political upheaval prompting a cycle of protest as described by Tarrow (1993). In his di scussion of political opportunity structures, Tilly (1978) did not specifically mention a structural change in the international system. We contend that systemic events can trigger a wave of prot est of the type Tarrow (1993) alludes to. Tarrow asserts that protest cycles are often touched off by unpredic table eventsthey are crucibles within which new weapons of social protests are fashioned (Tarrow 1993: 285286). He also links cycles of protest and soci al movement organizations asser ting that a major reason for the acceleration in the appearance of pr otest cycles in the past 150 y ears is the invention of these organized actors with their stake in cont entious collective acti on (Tarrow 1993: 286). Finally, for some time now, attention has been paid to the role of the state in collective action. Several scholars have been arguing that type of state, type of government and specific state policies can either facilitate or constrain contentious activities (Kreisi 1995, Kreisi et al 1995, Goodwin 1995, Jenkins 1995; Amenta and Young 1999). Embedded in this discourse are contending debates on the impact of federali sm versus centralism and democracy versus authoritarianism (Marshall 1963; Bright and Harper 1984; Lipsky and Olson 1976; Tarrow 1994, 1998). These have complimented studies on facilita tors (Tarrow 1998) and constrainers such as countermovements and power confi gurations at the national and so cietal levels (Schwartz 1976; Kriesi in Jenkins and Klanderman s 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

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50 The Anti-Embargo Movement and U.S./Cuba Policy: A Framework for Analysis Hypothesis The central research puzzle we are attempting to unravel is why do the anti-embargo movement persists in attempting to change U.S. Cuba policy given its repeated lack of success ? In response to this question we develop two majo r hypotheses. The first is that the movements sustained activism is not based on rational self-i nterest but on non-material collective incentives such as commitment, psychological benefits a nd normative values that hinge upon notions of right and wrong. The second is that internationa l, national and sub-national forces have facilitated the movement resul ting in increased and sustained anti-embargo activism in the postCold War era. A social movement theoretical framework incorporating facets of the resource mobilization approach and political opportunity structures will be employed to analyze the persistence of the movement and to explain its continued activism in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, we address a number of c oncerns. Is there a supply and willingness of foundations to sponsor anti-embargo organizations which have facilitated their activities over time? Is anti-embargo activism driven by the ava ilability of resources and selective material incentives or are challengers also guided by non-material collective incentives? Has the innovative framing of grievances heightened pub lic awareness and attracted new members to the movement? If the movement is employing new frames in its tactical repert oire due to innovations in information technology, are they resonating suffi ciently with targets of mobilization to spur increasing and continued activism as Snow and Bendford (1988) suggest? Have political opportunities structures spawned anti-embargo activ ities in the nineties and beyond? Is the postCold War era punctuated by specifi c events in the internationa l, national and sub-national settings which precipitate a wave of protests against U.S. Cuba policy?

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51 Mobilizing Resources In chapter 6, we examine the validity of th e rational model to c ontribute to understanding the ability of the anti-embargo movement to pe rsist despite its limited success over time. In short, is the movements survival contingent upo n the availability of ma terial resources and do they operate as business firms or moveme nt industries, with movement sectors and movement entrepreneurs (McCar thy and Zald 1977: 1230)? Or ar e members guided to join and stay in the movement by selective material incentiv es such as a staff job as affirmed by Salisbury (1969)? Addressing the first questi on would entail an examination of the type of resources available to the movement and determining whet her these are limited to financial resources or whether they also include human resources and strategies and tactics employed in the mobilization process. The second question merits an investigation of the motivations driving leaders, staff and members to join the movement and remain active. The notion of solidarity networks as espoused by Fireman and Gamson (1979) will also be useful for analyzing the movement s networking practices. This analysis will be geared toward understanding whether the networks can be consider ed part of the movements stock of material resources and the ease or difficulty of co-opt ing them. How relevant is Freemans (1973) assertion that co-option of preexisting networks faci litate the operations of new groups? This chapter will also embrace the burgeoning literatu re on social capital introduced by Pierre Bordieu (1984), popularized by Robert Putnam (2000) and adopted by some social movement scholars. Here, we hope to determine whethe r the network connections (Bordieu 1986), effectively mobilized by the anti-embargo move ment through associationalism in pursuit of a common goal (Oberschall 1973, Gamson 1975, T illy 1978, Skocpol 1992), contribute to its continued activism. We also explore the extent to which the groups coopera te to jointly air their grievance and the role that tr ust plays in their operations.

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52 The second major concern to be addressed in ch apter 6 is the extent to which the rational models focus on the availabil ity of material resources suffices to explain the survival of the antiembargo movement or whether this approach can be complemented w ith other theoretical perspectives from the interest gr oup literature. In this vein, we conjecture whether the movement has been able to persist merely because of the av ailability of material resources or because of other non-material factors. Is the movements pe rsistence attributable to a deep and abiding commitment to the cause and belief about good policy (Petracca 1992), values other than economic-self interest, moral incentives and psy chological benefits (Moe 1980) or that of solidary and purposive benefits (Clark and Wilson (1961) empathy, altruism and ideational commitment (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 898)? The Enabling Environment The limitations of the resource mobilization perspective in its neglect of the polity and the state necessitate a complement ary model which accommodates th e political dynamic. A major concern of Chapter 7 is whether the enabling en vironment or political opportunity structures are indeed relevant to the existence and susten ance of anti-embargo organi zations and activism. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (2004c) suggest that changes in the structure of political opportunities could impact on the fortunes of th e anti-embargo movement. We hope to extend this expanding opportunities m odel by utilizing a kind of Waltz ian approach to analyze the anti-embargo movement. Three levels of analysis will be employed to determine whether there has been an increase both in anti-embargo orga nizations and in their activism over time. We identify these levels as systemic, national and sub-national. Firstly, we examine structural forces like th e end of the Cold War in 1989; the special period endured by Cubans and Castros liberal refo rms of the mid-nineties; and the papal visit to Cuba in 1998. This analysis constitutes a major academic contribution of this work since the

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53 enabling environment in social movements theory has traditionally been the domestic context. Secondly, we assess the national setting including the type of government and specific state policies. Thirdly, we review the societal im petus such as shifting dynamics within the countermovement comprised of powerful right-wi ng extremist exiles in Miami represented by the Cuban American National Foundation and state officials. The Elin G onzlez affair and the rise of moderate pro-engagement factions with in the Cuban American community will also be examined as local impulses propelling anti-e mbargo activism. Kriesis (in Jenkins and Klandermans 1995) perspective on the configurati on of power relevant for the confrontation will be utilized to explore this local or societal setting and the power structure which challengers confront in South Florida because of the auth orities alliance with pro-embargo activists. A significant question to be addressed here is whether this configuration of power or countermovement which emerges due to the authoritie s alliance with exile hardliners, hinders or spawns anti-embargo activism. Methodology Diversity characterizes the rese arch tools of this disserta tion. They ranges from content analysis of major American newspapers to ar chival research on official documents, books, journals, newspapers, magazines and websites to unstructured and semi-structured elite interviews with scholars, group leaders and staff members and congressional staff. The information collected for this project is therefore overwhelmingly qualitative. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 which are the three chapters following this theory chapter are primarily descriptive. They describe the history, goals, leadership, organiza tional structure and resources; strategies and tactics; and a trajectory of an ti-embargo activism, respectively. The information for these chapters was obtained initially from a series of unstructured and semi-structured interviews undertaken between May 2005 and December 2006. The initial unstructured

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54 interviews were conducted person ally with academics, leaders and staff members of the groups located primarily in Washington D.C, New Yo rk and Miami. These were followed by semistructured phone interviews consisting of questi ons tailored to suit th e information required on the history, goals, structure, reso urces, strategies, tactics and activism of the groups under study. In addition, the Internet pr oves an invaluable resource for information about the organizations. Most of them have well-devel oped websites containing information ranging from their history and funding sources and structure to names, phone num bers and email addresses of leaders and staff members and the groups strategies and tactics. The websites were particularly useful for conducting content analysis on norms th at guide the operations of the organizations. Information for Chapter 5 which treats with cont entious politics and challenge to the state was also obtained from archival re search on American newspapers. The analytical chapters, 6 and 7, reflect a he avy reliance on texts on social movements and scholarly publications in journals. Content analysis was also undertaken for Chapter 6 to understand the extent to which so me organizations are guided by cer tain liberal norms, namely human rights, peace, justice, freedom and democr acy. The Center for International Policy, the Latin American Working Group, the Washingt on Office on Latin America and the Cuban American Education Alliance Fund were selected because they all focus specifically on the embargo and because of the range and extent of their activism. Their websites are also much better developed than most of the others whic h facilitated an electr onic search. A separate electronic search for the appearan ce of each these concepts human rights, peace, justice, freedom and democracyin each of the orga nizations website publications and links, were undertaken and the frequency of hit counts recorded. The problem with th is effort is that it is not certain whether all the publications of these orga nizations were searched since only those on the

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55 Internet where they are mainly found were access ed. Nonetheless, together with the websites, those researched give a good indication as to wh ether the organizations are indeed motivated by these liberal norms and which organization gives most priority to which norm. In order to understand whether exogenous factors, specificall y, the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc (resulting in attitudinal changes to Cuba and attempts at liberal reforms in Cuba), prompted an increase in anti-embargo activities in the post-Cold War era, it was necessary to undertake a compara tive content analysis in chapte r 7. A simple and uncomplicated method for this aspect of the investigation was ad opted which was facilitated to a large extent by the Internet through relevant websites and the Univ ersity of Florida library databases. Firstly, an extensive Internet search was undertaken to iden tify organizations opposed to U.S. Cuba policy and the date of their formation. The websites of some popular organizations like CIP and WOLA proved useful in providing an extensiv e list of these other organizations. Secondly, twenty-five of the more prominent or ganizations which were formed before the end of the Cold War were selected and a comp rehensive electronic sear ch of the Lexis Nexis database of periodicals was conducted to compare th e extent of their activ ities from nine years before the Cold War (1980-1989) to the curr ent post-Cold War period (1990-2006). This involved a full-text search of th e mention of these organizations names with respect to Cuba in major American newspapers. The search wa s conducted under Gen eral News of the Christian Science Monitor the New York Times the Miami Herald USA Today and the Washington Post Since the database allowed five newspapers to be searched at the same time, all five were searched simultaneously. The search term used was the name of the organization such as, Center for International Policy and Cuba and then the numb er of hit counts recorded.

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56 Finally, the case study in this work is both an analysis of a single phenomenon (the social movement) and of multiple cases (the interest groups). The multiple cases share some common attributes and are variants of the larger, encomp assing category of the social movement, herein dubbed the anti-embargo movement. The analysis is launched from the level of both the single social movement and the multiple interest group s. The latter facilitates an understanding of particular organizational dynamics such as histor y, goals, resources, struct ure, size, leadership, strategies and tactics. Apart from its connotation here as a co llective of interest groups, the term social movement is often employed as a m ode of generalization and as a means of appropriately locating the study in the sub-field of Co mparative Politics in the discipline of Political Science.

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57 CHAPTER 3 TAXONOMY OF ANTI-EM BARGO ORGANIZATIONS The anti-embargo movement comprises more th an a hundred organizations which seek to change U.S. policy to Cuba. They are led by both Americans and Cuban Americans located mainly in Washington D.C., New York and Miami, though few have been traced to other states like California and New Jersey. They fall into three main categories. First, there are older and larg er organizations, some of whic h are international activists which do not have Cuba as a special project but have taken up the Cuban cause. These include the American Civil Liberties Union, Human Righ ts Watch, Madre (an international human rights organization), Global Exchange, Oxfam America and faith-based groups like the World Council of Churches, Church World Service, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Episcopal Church. Second, there are organizations dealing with other Latin American/Caribbean issues but have a specific Cuba project. These include th e Center for International Policy (CIP), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Latin American Working Group (LAWG), World Policy Institute and the Lexington Institute. The third group consists of organizations conc erned only with U.S. Cuba policy such as Venceremos Brigade, the Center for Cuba n Studies, the Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET), Pastors for Peace, th e Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy, U.S. Women and Cuba Collaboration; and the busine ss interests including USA Engage and the U.SCuba Trade Association. It also includes a hos t of moderate Cuban American organization. The most prominent are the Cuban Committee fo r Democracy, Cambio Cubano, the Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Ar tists (ENCASA), the Cuban American Alliance

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58 Education Fund (CAAEF), the Cuba Study Gr oup, and the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights. The dissertation focuses primarily on organi zations in the second and third categories which either have a specific Cuba project, or tr eat with U.S. Cuba policy as the sole agenda. These include the D.C. groups of which primar y emphasis is placed on the Center for Cuban Studies, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Latin American Working Group, the New York based Center for Cuban Studies and Pastor s for Peace, Venceremos Brigade, the recently formed Emergency Coalition to Defend Educati on Travel, the business coalitions, USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association; The Cuban American organizations include the longstanding Cuban Committee for Democracy; th e Cuban American Alli ance Education Fund; Puentes Cubanos; the Cuba Study Group, the Emer gency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists and the Cuban American Commission fo r Family Rights. They are selected because they are the most active on the contentious emba rgo issues treating with tourist, academic and family travel, remittances, trade and cultural ex changes to the island. In this respect, these organizations are identified as the core of the anti-embargo movement in the U.S. These 15 groups are represented in Table 1. They are categor ized into two groups: those with Cuba as its sole concern, fall under category A and those with a broader regional or international focus but have Cuba as a special proj ect, fall under category B. 1 History and Goals The first anti-embargo organization emerged in 1969 with the formation of Venceremos Brigade (VB), even before the hardline pro-emba rgo faction had been consolidated in Miami. Based in New Jersey, the Brigade was original ly comprised of a coa lition of young people. Its 1 See Table 3-1 on page 87 for a list of organizations under study.

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59 goal was, and still is, to show solidarity to the Cuban Revolution and to challenge U.S. policy to Cuba, particularly the ban on travel. It continues to openly defy the law to take brigades to Cuba annually. The organization has taken more than 8000 brigadistas to Cuba over the years where they had the opportunity to partic ipate in the sugar harvests an d to work in agricultural and construction in various parts of the island. Descri bing itself as the oldest Cuba solidarity group in the world, Venceremos Brigade boasts that the VB has never requested permission from the U.S. government to go to Cuba and we never will! We believe it is our right as U.S. citizens to travel free of U.S. government obstacles. We also believe that we have much to learn from Cuba and the best way to do that is to travel there and see for ourselves.2 The Center for Cuban Studies opened its doors to the public in New York in 1972 with the same primary objective as Venceremos Brigade to counteract the effects of U.S. policy to Cuba. Founded by Sandra Levinson in collaboration with a group of sc holars, writers, artists and other professionals, the Center ai ms to provide a vital communicat ion link between the U.S. and the island. This is achieved th rough publications, organized tour s, library services, exchange programs and art projects. The Center also seeks to provide accurate a nd up-to-date information about Cuba which it does through it s well-stocked Lourdes Casals lib rary and organized trips to Cuba undertaken within the legal exemption to the travel ban. These include professional research, news-gathering, e ducational and religious study.3 The Center for International Policy (CIP) wa s formed in 1975 in the aftermath of the Vietnam War by former diplomat and peace activists. Its central concern then was to ensure that a governments human rights record was a prime consideration in allocating foreign aid. Today, 2 Venceremos Brigade. New Jersey Who We Are and What We Do. http://www.venceremosbrig ade.org/aboutVB.htm 3 Center for Cuban Studies. New York. About Us. http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm

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60 U.S. Cuba policy is a priority issue in CIPs ag enda but it is also c oncerned with post-conflict resolution in Central America and limiting military assistance to the Western Hemisphere, especially Columbia. Changing U.S. Cuba po licy became a major dimension of CIPs mission when Wayne Smith joined the organization in 1992 after resigning as Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana over f undamental disagreements with the Reagan Administrations foreign policy. Smiths numerous publications in several newspapers and CIPs website,4 strongly condemning U.S. policy to Cuba, contribute to making the Center a leading anti-embargo organization in D.C. Smith is pe rceived by many groups as a leading icon in the anti-embargo movement. He defines CIP as a small Washington think tank which advocates a more sensible policy to Cuba. CIP has taken Congr esspersons to Cuba in an effort to promote dialogue and allow them to see th e Cuban reality for themselves since the U.S. public is fed a lot of anti-Castro propaganda.5 In that same year, 1975, the Washington Office on Latin American (WOLA) was established. Like CIP, WOLA is also concer ned with human rights in Latin America having worked at the outset to write the first major le gislation conditioning U.S. military aid abroad on human rights practices. It paralle ls CIPs interest in other countries including the Andes, Columbia, Cuba and Central America particularly Mexico, with the set goal of defining policy options and developing strategies for the expanding community of development, environmental, and human rights organizations engaged with U.S. policy on Latin America. It criticizes the Cuban embargo as misguided and counter-producti ve and its Cuba project is geared toward 4 Center for International Policy. Washington, D.C. W ayne Smith in the News: Articles by Wayne Smith. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%20Smith.htm 5 Interview with Smith, 9th August 2006.

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61 normalizing relations with the island which it percei ves as a more sensible, more effective, and more humane strategy for promoting human rights and social justice.6 The year 1983 saw the formation of the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) in D.C. Unlike CIP and WOLA, it is a coalition representi ng the interests of over sixty major religious, humanitarian, grassroots and polic y organizations. Its general missi on is similar to that of CIP and WOLA, geared toward encouraging U.S. policies towards Latin America that promote human rights, justice, peace and sustainable devel opment. Like the other two D.C. organizations, it also has a Cuba program driven by the policy positions of its coalition partners, which has been and continues to be to end the U.S. emba rgo on Cuba for the benefit of both our peoples. The LAWG believes that the history of hostility between our two countries is obsolete and should be changed because the embargo has failed to enact a ch ange in its 43-year history.7 The LAWG prioritizes religious, academic, educa tional and family travel. According to staff member, Claire Rodriguez, the pu rsuit of free trade is not part of its agenda. Neither is the organization concerned with regime change in Cuba. Rather, it underscore s the issues of peace and justice.8 Pastors for Peace is a special ministry of an umbrella faith-based organization called the Interreligious Foundation for Community Orga nization (IFCO), which was founded in 1967 by progressive church leaders and activists to assist the poor a nd disenfranchised in developing community organizations to fight human a nd civil rights injustices. Founded in 1992 by Reverend Lucius Walker in New York, Pastors for Peace engages in similar activities as 6 Washington Office on Latin Ameri ca (WOLA). Washington DC. Cuba. http://www.wola.org/?&option=com_content& task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=&topic=Cuba 7 Latin America Working Group. Washington DC, 2003. House Backs Away from Engagement. July, 2006. http://www.lawg.org/count ries/cuba/backs_away.htm 8 Interview with Rodriguez, 11th August 2006.

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62 Venceremos Brigade, discussed above. Its objectiv e is to bring an end to the immoral and unjust U.S. economic blockade of Cuba.9 Since its inception, it has been taking annual Friendship Caravans with humanitarian aid to Cuba without th e required treasury licens e. This is in protest of the unjust regulation because it believes that applying for a license would suggest a defacto recognition of the embargos restriction on travel to the island. According to staff member, Shane Gasteyer, Pastors for Peace have been joined by Canadian, Mexicans and even Europeans in its 2006 Caravan to Cuba.10 The organization has had seve ral confrontations with the state for undertaking this i llegal activity, even having some of the equipment which it was taking to Cuba confiscated by Treasury offici als. In the summer of 2003, Pastors for Peace joined Venceremos Brigade in its 34th annive rsary contingent to C uba in protest of the restrictions proposed that year. Like CIP, Pastors for Peace is be nt on presenting the reality of Cuba to the American Public who are fed false information by the media and American administrations.11 In response to academic travel restricti ons imposed by the Bush administration, an academic freedom focus group met in D.C. in November, 2004. The Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET) was formed in December that year in organized opposition to the restrictions and to pr otect the rights of academics to define and execute educational programs as they see fit. Although it is based in D.C., membership of ECDET is drawn from people affiliated with accredited colleges, universities and academi c associations across the U.S. 9Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO). New York. The US/Cuba Friendshipment Caravan Campaign: A Brief History. http://www.ifconews.org/Cuba/caravan_history.htm 10 Interview with Gasteyer, 10th August 2006. 11 Ibid.

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63 and comes from 45 American states.12 The organization is chaire d by CIPs senior fellow, Wayne Smith who coordinates the efforts of the coalition. Wayne Smith is the lifeblood of ECDET, affirms Carmen Diana Deere, Director of the University of Floridas Center for Latin American Studies. He solicited my membership to lend solidarity to the coalition as former president of the Latin American Studies Asso ciation. Weve tried in vain to have Cuban academics participate in the LASA conference generally held in the United States. But the U.S. administration repeatedly rejects their entry into this country.13 Two D.C. based business coalitions are important organizations in the anti-embargo movement. These are USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Both advocate changing the embargo policy with regards to tr ade with Cuba. USA Engage is part of the National Foreign Trade Council, th e oldest trade Organization in the U.S. It was formed in 1997 and is primarily concerned with the removal of unilateral sanctions as it promotes responsible alternatives to sanctions that actually advance U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy goals, such as intensified U.S. diplomacy and multilateral cooperation.14 Currently under the directorship of Jake Colvin, it believes that, as a large coalition, it provides a voice to ensure that American policy makers listen to all intere sted parties especially those oppos ed to and affected by sanctions such as American companies, farmers and worker s. Colvin explained th at the coalition also opposed unilateral trade sanctions on Iran and Libya in the midnineties and naturally seeks 12 Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel (ECDET). Washington, DC. About Us. http://www.ecdet.org/about.htm 13 Interview with Deere, 13th June 2006. 14 USAEngage. Washington, D.C. About Us. http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088USAEngage/default.asp?id=110

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64 normalization of relations be tween the U.S. and Cuba.15 USA Engage considers itself the leading business organization suppor ting reform of U.S. policy toward Cuba, as well as the most important outside group supporting the work of the Cuba Working Groups in both the House and Senate.16 The U.S.-Cuba Trade association emerged out of the disintegra tion of the group of businessmen and statesmen who called themselv es Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba, which had successfully lobbied the Congress in 1999 for removal of sanctions on the sale of food and medicine to Cuba. Fo rmerly established in 2005, the co alition works on behalf of its U.S. business members to protect current trad e and to expand and in crease the potential for future business between the United States and Cuba. The president, Kirby Jones, is also president of Alamar Associates which he established in 1974, to offer a full range of consulting services for clients preparing to enter the Cuban market.17 He brings a wealth of experience to the U.S.Cuba Trade Association having first-hand knowledge and personal contacts in Cuba. He has been taking clients to Cuba for th irty years and is described by Newsweek as the man who knows about Cuba than any other American.18 The newly formed Trade Association seeks full normalization of commercial relations between the U.S. and Cuba. It also assists business interests interested in trading with Cuba by providing information and teaching them how to undertake business with Cuba.19 The only way to impact change is to engage it declares Jones. 15 Interview with Colvin, 19th August 2006. 16 USAEngage. Washington, D.C. About Us. http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088USAEngage/default.asp?id=110 17 Alamar Associates: Consultants on Trade and Business with Cuba since 1974. Washington, DC. About Kirby Jones. http://www.alamarcuba.com/kirbyjones.html Accessed December 24, 2006. 18 Ibid. 19 U.S. Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. Mission. http://www.uscuba.org/index.htm

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65 Cuba is not an anomaly. The U.S. has disagree ments with several othe r countries, yet it has healthy trade relations with them.20 The decade of the nineties also saw a prol iferation of moderate Cuban American organizations mostly in Miami but also in D.C. Several of these are pro-engagement and prodialogue, but they are also anti-Castro. They disp lay a more passionate an d nationalistic response to the embargo, not surprisingly, since it deals with matters close to thei r hearts such as food, medicine, family relations and patria or the Fatherland. The Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD) cons iders itself the largest Cuban American organization and the antithesis of the hardline Cuban Amer ican National Foundation (CANF).21 The CCD was founded in 1993 by wealthy Miami La wyer, Alfredo Durn, who left Cuba for Miami after Castro rose to power. Durn joined the anti-Castro exile movement in Miami and participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion as a member of Brigade 2506. He was captured in the invasion and was held prisoner until the Amer ican government agreed to pay the ransom requested by Castro. He retuned to Miami as an active anti-Castroite and became President of the Veterans Association of Brigade 2506. But in th e early 1990s, Durn promoted negotiations with the Cuban government, and in 1993 he was expelle d from the Veterans Association of Brigade 2506 for reasons associated with his public st atements indicating his willingness to go to Havana to discuss the history of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Branded by hardliners as a dialoguero Durn established the CCD as a nationa l organization of Cuban Americans and citizens of all other nationali ties seeking to promote a comprehensive U.S.-Cuba engagement policy resulting in a transition to de mocracy in Cuba. It is dedicate d to a diplomatic resolution of 20 Interview with Jones, 16th August 2006. 21 Cuban Committee for Demo cracy. Miami, Florida. www.ccdusa.org

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66 the longstanding conflict between Cuba and the Un ited States. It prioriti zes dialogue and mutual respect, and applied these principles to its work with Cuba as well as with the Cuban American community in the United States. Although the or ganization promotes itself as non-partisan, Durn admits that he himself is an active member of the Democratic Party and the majority of CCDs members are democrats. For Durn, the term dialoguero is only considered derogatory in Miami. It is unwise to cast aspersions on anyone he re, explains Durn I myself was part of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Who was mo re rabidly anti-Castro than myself?22 Several other moderate Cuban American orga nizations attempting to promote a policy of rapproachment and dialogue with Cuba also emer ged in the nineties. However, this moderate stance does not translate into support for th e Castro regime. Amongst these are the Cuban American Coalition, the Cuban American Defens e League, Cuban American Professionals and Entrepreneurs, the Cuban Reunification Operat ion (led by prominent member of Cambio Cubano, Bernardo Benes, also viewed as a dialoguero by right-hardline exiles), the Cuban Democratic Platform, the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF) and Puentes Cubanos. Apart from the last two, these organizations have not been very active and very little is know about them. Hence, they are not considered part of the core of the anti-embargo movement in this study. CAAEF perceives itself as a na tional network of Cuban Ameri cans seeking to educate the public at large on issues related to hardships resu lting from current U.S.-Cuban relations. It acts as a vehicle for the development of mutua lly beneficial engagements which promote understanding and human compassion.23 Founded in 1995, its leaders operate from both D.C. 22 Interview with Durn, 19th December 2006. 23 Cuban American Alliance. Washington, DC. 1995. About Us. http://www.cubamer.org/about_us.asp

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67 and California. According to its President, Delvis Fernndez Levy, the coalition was formed at a time when the embargo was strengthening instead of weakening as we expected. Our network has membership in several locations including New York, New Jersey and Maryland.24 In the wake of the 2004 restrictions on family travel to Cuba the issue became the main bone of contention of the network which took it to the UN Convention on Human Rights in March, 2005.25 The current decade also saw the emergence of some Cuban American groups opposed to the embargo, several in response to the tighten ing of the embargo through the Helms-Burton Law of 1996 and renewed restrictions imposed in 2004. Amongst these, the Cuba Study Group stands out as unique given the circumstances wh ich led to its formation. It was founded in 2000 in the aftermath of the Elin Gonzlez affair in an attempt to change the negative national image of the Cuban American community that emerge d after the incident. The group is committed to more practical, proactive and consensual a pproaches towards Cuba policy and favors pragmatic and effective approaches based on deli berate fact-finding, careful analysis, strategic orientation, and a str ong ethical foundation26. The organization makes for an interesting study comprised as it is of wealthy Miami businessmen and professionals. Its goals diverge from the other Cuban American organizations in its preocc upation with change within Cuba. Hence, it is geared toward the formulation of effectiv e, multilateral policy r ecommendations through thoughtful discussion and critical an alysis of ideas that promote a nd facilitate a peaceful regime 24 Interview with Fernndez, 23rd October 2006. 25 Delvis Fernndez Levy. Cuban American Alliance. C AAEF Questions Violations of Human and Civil Rights. Statement at the 61st Session of the Commission on Human Rights. 31 March, 2005. Cuban American Alliance Education Fund. CA. 1995. http://www.cubamer.org/item.asp?id=16 26 Cuba Study Group. Washington, DC. About Us. http://www.cubastudygroup.o rg/index.cfm?FuseAction=About.Home&Category_id=5

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68 change in Cuba and lead to democracy, a free and open society, a market-based economic system, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the reunification of the Cuban nation.27 Carlos Saladrgas, co-Chairman of the Group, expl ains that the Group has friends even in the rabidly anti-Castro, Cuban Liberty Council, altho ugh some there would not speak to him and are as irrational as the hardliners in Cuba.28 The Cuban American Commission for Family Rights is a broad coalition of Cuban Americans established in May 2004 to denounce th e new government restrictions on travel and remittances. Their mission is to preserve the integrity of the Cuban family and work to defeat those who want to divide it.29According to its President, Alvaro Fernndez, our reason for being was unwavering opposition to the harsh an d extremely cruel measures imposed by the Bush Administration that year, making it much t ougher to travel to Cuba, even for people with family members on the island. Along with restrict ing family travel to once every three years with no exceptions, not even to visit sick fam ily members the new regulations also made it more difficult to help loved ones on the island with ones own hard-earned dollars.30 Silvia Wilhelm, founder and Executive Director of the or ganization, describes the measures as antifamily, un-American and anti-Cuban.31 The Commission is particularly incensed with the definition of family, insisting that family ri ghts should not be determined. Human rights are being trampled upon by this admi nistration affirms Wilhelm.32An irate Fernndez noted that 27 Ibid. 28 Interview with Saladrgas, 6th June 2006. 29 Cuban American Commission for Family Rights. 2007. http://www.cubanfamilyrights.org 30Alvaro Fernndez. Progreso Weekly 2007. Welcome All Against the AntiCuban Family Measures. Dec 7-13, 2006. http://www.progresoweekly.com/index.php?progreso=lupalvaro&otherweek=1165644000 31 Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006. 32 Ibid.

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69 the Bush Administration was the first in U.S. history that deemed itsel f fit to define what comprised a family. A Cuban family at that. I can assure you that the measures made every Commission members blood boil over.33 Financial Resources Both the unstructured and semi -structured interviews reveal that the groups which constitute the anti-embargo m ovement are relatively homogenous in mobilizing resources. Most obtain funding from external sources: foundati ons and private donations from members, and supporters and some from business interests though the latter were not identified for the sake of privacy. Some of the organizations were also unwilling to divulge the other sources and most refused to give figures. The figures presented in the following paragra phs were sourced from either the website of the foundations or that of the organizations under study. The Center for International Policy (CIP), the Washington Office of Latin America (WOLA), the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) and the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights, report to receiving funding from both founda tions and private individuals. The bulk of CIPs funding are derived from exte rnal sources. These include the Arca Foundation, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, the Compt on Foundation, the Educa tional Foundation of America, the Ford Foundation, the General Serv ice Foundation, the Nationa l Lawyers Guild, the Samuel Rubin Foundation, the Schooner Foundation and the Stewart R. Mill Charitable Trust.34 They provide one fifth of the organizations income with a small percentage also coming from fees and the sale of public ations and the rest derived fr om thousands of individual donors via mail or online. Neither CIPs website nor th e interviews provide information on the business 33 Interview with Fernndez, 7th July 2005. Fernndez also expressed these statements in the online magazine, Progreso Weekly 2007. Welcome All Against the Anti-Cuba n Family Measures. Dec 7-13, 2006. http://www.progresoweekly.com/index.php?progreso=lupalvaro&otherweek=1165644000 34 Center for International Policy. Washington DC. http://ciponline.org/aboutus.htm#funding

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70 interests which fund the Cuban cause. The interviewee, Wayne Smith, prefer to keep them anonymous.35 However, it should be noted that beca use CIP engages in other Asian and Latin American projects which concern countries like Columbia, Nicaragua, Honduras, North Korea, China and Bangladesh, not all the foundations mentioned above support the specific Cuban cause.36 Of the foundations mentioned, the Christ opher Reynolds Foundati on is specifically committed to the U.S./Cuba cause. Its website emphasizes that since 1995, the Foundation has been steadily increasing its support of work that focuses on U.S. relations with Cuba and needs in Cuba as defined by Cubans themselves.37 Indeed, in March 2001, the directors of this foundation agreed to phase out all other domestic grant-making and concentrate the resources of the Foundation solely on our Cuba effort.38 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation also funds several other anti-embargo groups such as the Center for Cuban Studies, WOLA, LA WG and the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO) of which Pastor s for Peace is a sub-group. Other anti-embargo organizations funded by this foundation include the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF), the Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD), the Cuba Policy Foundation and the Lexington Institute.39 35 Interview with Smith 9th Aug, 2006, 11th May 2005. 36Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. http://ciponline.org 37 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. Our Grant-making Program. http://www.creynolds.org/guide.htm 38 Ibid. 39 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. Grants. http://www.creynolds.org/grants.htm

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71 WOLAs funding also comes from foundations, donations, re ligious organizations and individuals. Donations are pa yable through the mail or online.40 WOLA describes itself as a 501 (c) 3 tax exempt non-profit organization.41 In 2004, the organization rece ived a grant in the sum of $50, 000 from the Public Welfare Foundation42 and in 2006 it was granted $350, 000 by the Ford Foundation.43 The Christopher Reynolds Foundations granted $160,000 to CIP, WOLA and LAWG combined in 2005.44 The LAWG also receives funding from the Fo rd Foundation, the Open Society Institute Development Foundation, The Moriah Fund, the General Service Foundation, The Arca Foundation, the Stewart Mott Education Charit able Trust and the Lawson Valentine Fund. Contributions to LAWGs Education Fund are al so made by the Presbyterian Church (USA), Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam Ameri ca. According to LAWGs website, LAWG is funded primarily through donations by coali tion members and other non-governmental and religious organizations.45 This is supported by information re ceived in an interview with staff member, Claire Rodriguez, who also affirms that the organization enjoys the status of both a c (3) organization through which it receives funding from founda tions and a c (4) organization 40 Washington Office on Latin America. Washington DC.2007. http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=24 41 Interview with Geoff Thale and Rachel Farley, 20th May 2005. 42 Public Welfare Foundation. Washington, DC. http://www.publicwelfare.org/grants/human _rights_global_security/2004_grants.asp 43 Ford Foundation. 2007. Grant Information. http://www.fordfound.org/grants_db/v iew_grant_detail.cfm?grant_id=33201 44 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. Grants. http://www.creynolds.org/grants.htm 45 Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. Annual Report 2006. http://www.lawg.org/docs/la wg_annual_report06.pdf

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72 which allows it to receive donations from grassr oots organizations which are members of its coalition.46 Pastors for Peace receives funding from the Massachusetts-based Careth Foundation which supports organizations working toward international peace.47 It is also funded via tax deductible donations and receives non-moneta ry donations from the public in the form of laptop computers, cameras, printers, cartridges, copi ers and software which it takes to Cuba in its annual caravan campaign. Unlike the other organizations discus sed above, Pastors for Peace solicits both monetary and non-monetary donations via its website.48 The Center for Cuban Studies is a non-profit co rporation with tax exem pt status. Part of it funding is derived from annual membership fees.49 Funds are also raised from sales of certain Cuban cultural artifacts such as t-shirts, videos notecards, postcards, CDs and other gift items. The Center has also set up a Li feline Fund which enables contribu tors to donate materials to Cuban institutions. These materials include medici nes and medical supplies, religious artifacts, artists supplies and educational materials.50 In addition, the Center receives funding from 46 Interview with Rodriguez, 11th August 2006. 47 Discoverthenetworks.org. A Guide to the Political Le ft. 2003-2006. Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. http://www.discoverthenetworks.o rg/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6262 48 Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization. New York. 1997-2006. https://secure.groundspring.org/dn/index.php?aid=13009 49 These are $60 (regular), $100 (supporting) and $150/$ 250 (sustaining). The fee for institutional and foreign membership is $70. Students and senior citizens from the U.S. join at the special rate of $40. Center for Cuban Studies. New York. About Us. http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm 50 Center for Cuban Studies. New York. About Us. http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm#Lifeline%20Fund

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73 organizations such as the Christopher Reynolds Foundation which donated $25,000 in 2005.51 The Center also receives donations fr om several prominent individuals.52 The D.C. based Cuban Committee for Democracy (CCD) has also been funded by grants from foundations including the Christopher Reyn olds, Arca, McArthur and Ford Foundations. Its 150 members also pay an annual membership fee of $100. In addition, each of the fifteen members of the Board of Directors is expected to either personally donate or raise $1000 dollars annually. In the past, the CCD had sponsored a radio program called transicin which was funded by the McArthur Foundation.53 Although ECDET claims to have no funding, some of the newer organizations founded in the nineties and the current decade also rece ive funding from foundations and donations from individual members. These include the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights headed by Silvia Wilhelm who also heads Puentes Cuba nos, a Cuban American organization funded by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.54 The Cuban American Alliance Education Fund (CAAEF) is not sponsored by foundations and only receives donations from private individuals who are predominantly financially stable C uban American members of the organization.55 Similarly, neither the Cuba Study Group compri sing of wealthy Miami businessmen nor USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association which are coalitions representing business 51 The Christopher Reynolds Foundation. Grants. http://www.creynolds.org/grants.htm 52 They include Harry Belafonte, Julie Belafonte, Jean Carey Bond, Noam Chomsky, Johnnetta B. Cole, Francis Coppola, Jules Feiffer, Timothy Harding, Max Kozloff, Saul Landau, William LeoGrande, Lee Lockwood, Grace Paley, Sydney Pollack, Gregory Rabassa, Karen Ranucci Michael Ratner, Toshi and Pete Seeger, Stanley Sheinbaum, Michael Tigar, Rip Torn, Nelson Valds, Pa ula Weinstein, and John Wo mack, Jr. Center for Cuban Studies. New York. About Us. http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm#Center%20Sponsors 53 Interview with Durn, 19th December 2006. 54 Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006. 55 Interview with Fernndez, 23rd October 2006.

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74 interests, depend on foundation gr ants since their members are resourceful enough to sponsor them. Jake Colvin, Director of USA Engage, affirms that all funding comes from members.56 The U.S.Cuba Trade Association describes it self as a 501C(6) memb ership-based non-profit organization.57 Kirby Jones, founder and President of the Association, reports that all funding for the coalition are derived from members.58 Leadership, Human Resources and Organizational Structure Certain individuals whose commitment to th e Cuban cause has been unrelenting for more than thirty years, emerge as icons of the an ti-embargo movement. They include Wayne Smith of the Center for International Policy, Sandra Levi nson of the Center for Cuban Studies and Kirby Jones of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Th ese three names are well-known by all groups involved in changing U.S. Cuba policy, whether based in D.C., Ne w York or Miami. A closer look at the work of each of thes e individuals will serve to explain their significance as invaluable human resources in the anti-embargo movement. Wayne Smith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Cuba program at the Center for International Policy. He is also a significant co ntributor to the National Security Program and a visiting professor of Latin Ameri can Studies and Director of the University of Havana Exchange Program at Johns Hopkins University. Moreover, Smith is a former Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He ha s served as Executive Secretary of President Kennedys Latin American Task Force and Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interests Section in 56 Interview with Colvin, 19th August 2006. 57 U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Washington, DC. Structure, Staffing and Management. http://www.uscuba.org/manager.htm 58 Interview with Jones, 16th August 2006.

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75 Havana during his twenty-five y ear stint with the State Depa rtment (1957-82). He has also served in Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.S.R.59 Smiths work in the anti-embargo movement is re flected in his prolific publication lists as head of the Cuba program at the CIP. An ar dent advocate for the removal of the embargo, Smiths articles published in several U.S. newspapers and journals such as The New York Times Los Angeles Times Baltimore Sun Christian Science Monitor Miami Herald and Foreign Policy These are embellished with provocative head lines like Our Cuba Policy will get us Nada; A Continuing Perfect Fa ilure; and A Bankrupt Cuba Po licy. Relentless in his pursuit of changing the policy toward Cuba, Smith has launched scathing attacks on Cuba being placed on the U.S. terrorist list, the senseless embar go, the Elin Gonzlez debacle and the U.S. determination to prevent Cubans play ing baseball in the United States.60 In Smiths words, his lifelong goal has been to bring about a more sensib le U.S. policy to Cuba. To this end, Smith has struggled for more than thirty years.61 Sandra Levinson is currently based at the Cent er for Cuba Studies in New York which she started in 1972 in a loft in Greenwich Village. She had then taken a year off from her job as teacher of politics at Brooklyn Poly technic and New York editor of Ramparts She collected books, magazines and artwork from friends who ha d visited Cuba and launched a travel program to Cuba. This was the first of many groups to es tablish trips to Cuba for academics, journalists and other researchers. 59 Interview with Smith, 11th May 2005. 60 For a list of Smiths articles, see the Center for Intern ational Policys Cuba Program Wayne Smith in the News. Washington, DC. Articles by Wayne Smith. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%20Smith.htm 61 Interview with Smith, 11th May 2005, 9th August 2006.

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76 Levinson escaped a bomb atta ck at the Center on 28th March, 1973, where she was working at the time. The rabid Cuban exiles who planted the bomb were never caught, she explained. Everything was destroyed except the area around my desk (Interview with Levinson, 26th May 2005). The Center moved to East 23rd Street and later to its current address on West 23rd Street. Levinson announced then that she was willing to stay at th e Center until we have normal diplomatic relations with Cuba thin king that it would be four years at most until Nixon was ousted as President. Today, she expre sses shock that our policy has remained basically unchanged throughout the years and through multiple Presidents62. She energetically continues her work at the Center, sponsoring c onferences and seminars on U.S. Cuba policy and importing books and magazines to stock the Cente rs Lourdes Casals libr ary. She also publishes a magazine called Cuba Update and when President Carter lifted the travel ban, she began sponsoring trips to Havana taking large delegations to the Havana Film Festival every year. In 1991, with the support of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, Levinson won a suit against the Treasury Department for legalizi ng the importation of original art work from Cuba. She spearheads one of the most popular pr ograms of the Center which is the Cuban Art Space Gallery opened in 1999, exhibiting Cuba Art. Through the Abeja Obrera (Worker Bee) project, she has been taking brigadistas to Cuba to work in construction. The new restrictions imposed by the current Bush administration has thwarted her efforts to make it possible for artists and writers of both countries to travel to Cuba and the U. S. through the Artists and Writers Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba which she has established as another of the Centers programs.63 62 Interview with Levinson, 26th May 2005. 63 All information on Levinson here was obtained in a le ngthy interview with her at her New York office on 26th May 2005.

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77 Kirby Jones has been promoting relations be tween the United States and Cuba since the seventies. Newsweek describes him as having better c ontacts with Cuba than any other American and he is viewed by the New York Times as the man to see about business in Cuba.64 His first trip to Cuba was as a special correspondent for CBS in 1974. For the past thirty years he has traveled re gularly to Cuba and engaged in numerous interviews with Fidel Castro for both television and print. He is also consultant of Alamar Associates, a private, profitoriented consulting firm based in D.C. It offers a range of services to companies interested in doing business with Cuba. Jones has contributed significantly to the boo k entitled Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations, an d wrote an influential study published in 1988 entitled Opportunities for U.S.-Cuban Trade, commissioned by the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.65 Between 1998 and 2000, Jones has chaired seve ral U.S.-Cuba business summits bringing together more than 400 U.S. executives as we ll as Congresspersons and Cuban politicians, officials and potential business pa rtners. He frequently speaks at business conferences such as the U.S.-Cuba Agricultural conferences in Ca ncun in 2002 and 2003 and the U.S.-Cuba Travel conference in 2003. Jones is now President of the coalition of the U.S.-C uba Trade Association formed in 2005. He believes that U.S. policy to Cuba is wrong since it curtails invaluable business opportunities for both countries. He affirm s that the U.S. should tr eat Cuba as it treats other communist countries which have diplomatic relations with the United States. The U.S. has been pretending for forty seven years that th e Cuban government does not exist. The way to 64 Alamar Associates. Consultants on Trade and Business with Cuba since 1974. Washington, DC. About Kirby Jones. http://www.alamarcuba.com/kirbyjones.html 65 Ibid.

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78 impact change with Cuba is to engage the Cuba ns in talks. Free trade is the right and normal thing to do.66 What is striking about the commitment of thes e outstanding anti-embargo activists is that they are all American with no familial ties to Cuba. However, they are not the only outstanding advocates of change in U.S. Cuba policy. Seve ral individuals including William Leogrande from American University, Cynthia McClintock of George Washington University, Saul Landau of the Institute for Policy Studies, Silvia Wilhelm and Alvaro Fernndez of the Cuba American Commission for Family Rights, Mavis Anderson who heads the Cuba project at the Latin American Working Group, Sarah Stephens of the Ce nter for International Policy, Geoff Thale of the Washington Office on Latin America, Phillip Pe ters from the Lexington Institute, Delvis Fernndez Levy of the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund, Lucius Walker of Pastors for Peace and Lissa Weinmann of the World Policy Inst itute, have been vigorously challenging the embargo on humanitarian, business, and familial grounds. Space does not allow a full analysis of their roles and contributions here, but they also constitute the stock of human resources at the forefront of the anti-embargo movement in its drive to change U.S. Cuba policy. The organizations human resources also include staff members which are deeply committed to the Cuban cause. The D.C. organi zations, CIP, WOLA and LAWG, not only treat with Cuba, but other internati onal issues which concern other countries. They have a Cuba project which is run by certain individuals.67 These three D.C. groups have a small staff and a much more expanded Board of Directors. CIP boasts of both a President and an Executive 66 Interview with Jones, May 2005, 16th August, 2006. 67 Wayne Smith is at CIP. He was assisted by Sarah Stevens until 2005 with Smith heading the project overall and Stephens charged with the Freedom to Travel Campaign. A ne w, intern, Vincent Pascandolo, is also now assisting in the project. See http://ciponline.org/staff.htm for a list of CIPs board members. Geoff Thale heads the Cuba project at WOLA and Mavis Anderson at the LAWG.

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79 Director with considerable e xperience in foreign affairs.68 There are also a number of Senior Fellows focusing on particular areas all of whom bring a diverse array of skills and experience to the organization. CIPs staff acts as assistants to these Senior Fellows. In addition, there is a Board of Directors with members from a diverse range of instituti ons and organizations. Some of these are consultants while others are Foreign Service officers and academics.69 WOLAs structure is somewhat different, co mprising a staff which constitutes a Senior Director, some Program Directors, a number of Senior Associat es and Senior Fellows. Two of these are assigned to the Cuba program.70 Like CIP, WOLA also has a Board of Directors some of whom are members of other anti-embargo groups like Martin Co ria of Church World Service and Silvia Wilhelm from Puentes Cubanos. C ynthia McClintock also sits amongst WOLAs Board of Directors.71 The staff of LAWG is also quite small, cons isting of an Executive Director, two Senior Associates and two Program Assistants.72 The LAWGs Board of Directors also benefits from a range of experiences and skills from several organizations. Inde ed, two prominent members from 68 The President, Robert White, served in the Foreign Serv ice for twenty five years. The Executive Director, Bill Goodfellow, who founded the organization, has extensive expe rience as an analyst of U.S. aid policies and is known for advocating greater transparency and accountability 69 Such as Cynthia McClintock from George Washingt on University and William LeoGrande from American University. For a list of board members and their respec tive backgrounds see Center for International Policy. Washington, DC. http://ciponline.org/staff.htm 70 These are Geoff Thale who is the Program Director and Senior Associate for Cuba and Central America and Elsa Falkenburger, the Program Officer for C uba and Central American Youth Gang. 71 For a list of WOLAs Board of Directors see Washin gton Office on Latin America. Washington, DC. 2007. Board of Directors. http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_cont ent&task=view&id=15&Itemid=13&Itemid=13 72 The Executive Director, Lisa Haugaard, brings with her a wealth of experience from her previous post as Executive Director of the Central American Historical Institute in Washington. Mavis Anderson who is charged with the Cuba project at the LAWG, ha s actually worked in Central America during her term at the Center for Global Education at Augsberg College.

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80 WOLA hold the positions of Executive Director and board member respectively in the Latin American Working Groups Education Fund, a major facet of the LAWG.73 According to staff member, Shane Gasteyer, Pastors for Peace has an Executive Director who is the Reverend Lucius Walker.74 It also has an Assistant Director and a very small staff. Its structure is somewhat similar to the Center fo r Cuban Studies which ha s a Board of Directors and Sandra Levinson as Executive Di rector. In addition, the Center has a paid, full time librarian and one staff member who handles mail orders. Li ke Pastors for Peace, the Center frequently receives voluntary assistance from interested partie s whenever it schedules a big event such as an art exposition.75 The Emergency Coalition to Defend Educati on Travel (ECDET) is centered in D.C. although its members hail from all over the U.S. Its structure is unlike any of the other groups. It comprises a co-Chair who is Wayne Smith in hi s capacity as adjunct professor at John Hopkins University. There are also fifteen steering comm ittee members and four task force members. The latter include Phillip Brenner from American University, Cynthia McClintock from George Washington University, Robert Muse from Muse and Associates and Wayne Smith from CIP.76 The human resources of the business coalitions, USA Engage and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association are vital assets of the anti-embargo movement. Both organizations draw support from its broad membership base which consists of business interests in the U.S. seeking to do business with Cuba. USA Engage perceives itself as the leading organization supporting reform 73 These are William Goodfellow and Joy Olson. For a list of the LAWGs Board of Directors see Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. Latin American Working Group Board of Directors. http://www.lawg.org/about /BoardofDirectors.htm 74 Interview with Gasteyer, 10th August 2006. 75 Interview with Levinson, 21st December 2006. 76 For a list of ECDET members see Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. E CDET Membership List. http://www.ecdet.org/members.htm

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81 of U.S. policy toward Cuba as well as the mo st important outside gr oup supporting the work of the Cuba Working Groups in both the House and the Senate.77 It enjoys the support of several prominent organizations includ ing the National Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manuf acturers, the U.S. Council on International Business and the American Petroleum Institute. Ho wever, Cuba is not the only concern of USA Engage since it is committed to removing unilatera l sanctions against any country and prioritizes other issues such as protecting U.S. trademar ks and working for int elligent export controls and temporary entry policies. The organizations staff involved in the Cuba project is Director, Jake Colvin, and its co-chair, William Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade Council.78 The U.S.-Cuba Trade Association has formed strategic partnerships with USA Engage and the National Foreign Trade Council. Kirby Jo nes is the Associati ons President, William Reinsch (mentioned above) serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors while William Rogers is Chairman of the Advisory Board. Rogers is former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. He is also a member of the Nati onal Foreign Trade Council and Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates. The organizations extensive membership boasts of a number of prestigious former government officials and prominent American citizens such as Frank Carlucci, Former Secretary of Defence (under Re agan), David Rockefeller of the Rockefeller Center Properties, Sam Gibbons Former Florida Congressman and Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State, Collin Powell.79 Silvia Wilhelm, 77 USAEngage. 2004. Priority Issues. http://www.usaengage.org/MBR008 8-USAEngage/default.asp?id=111 78 USA Engage. 2004. About Us. http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-USAEngage/default.asp?id=110 79 For a full list of Board of Advisors see U.S.-Cuba Trad e Association. Washington, DC. Structure, Staffing and Management. http://www.uscuba.org/manager.htm

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82 Executive Director of the Cuban American Commi ssion for Family Rights, is also a member of the U.S.Cuba Trade Association.80 The structure of the Cuban American Alliance Education Fund is slightly different from the others with a Board of Directors consisting of an Executive Committee of three members and two Members at Large. The Fund is really a coalition representing most if not all of the organizations under study. The President, Delv is Fernndez Levy, is also acting Executive Director of the organization. In addition, there is an expanded Advisory Council consisting of prominent members of the Cuban American comm unity. Several of these are professionals in their own rights with occupations ranging from business entrepreneurs, to psychologists, physicians and medical advisors.81 Fernndez explained that the leadership of CAAEF is almost exclusively Cuban American.82 The Cuba Study Group consists of two co-Chairmen, Luis J. Prez, partner in the Miami office of Hogan and Harston L.L.P. and Carlos A. Saladrgas, Chairman of Premier American Bank. It also has an Executive Director, Tomas Bilbao, who has worked in the campaign of Mel Martinez and in the administrati on of George W. Bush. There are also seventeen board members drawn primarily from the business sectors of the Cuban American community. Amongst these prestigious board members are Carlos de la Cr uz, member of the Board of Coca Cola Puerto Rico Bottlers and Eagle Brands; former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, Ambassador Paul Cejas who has also been a business and civic leader in South Florida; and Enrique Sosa, named 80 Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August, 2006. 81 Cuban American Alliance. 199 5. Board of Directors. http://www.cubamer.org/about_us.asp for a list of CAAEFs Board of Directors. 82 Interview with Fernndez, 23rd October, 2006.

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83 Executive Vice President of Amoc o Corporation in 1995 and Presid ent of BP Amoco Chemicals in 1999.83 The Cuban American Commission for Family Ri ghts is run by an Executive Director, a President, a Vice President and a Secretary. As mentioned, the Executive Director, Sylvia Wilhelm, also works with several other organi zations including the LA WG, the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association and Human Rights Wa tch which produced a lengthy report on the 2004 restrictions. In 1999, Wilhelm had formed Puentes Cubanos which were funded by several foundations and from which she acquired a wealth of experien ce which she brings to the organization. The Commission itself does not receive grants from foundations but are funded by its 300 members who donate voluntarily to counterac t the unjust embargo policy.84 Membership also constitutes an invaluable asset of the organizations human resources. CIP and WOLA do not have a membership base as such. The LAWG boasts of 6000 grassroots members which are not the same as its coaliti on partners consisting of religious, humanitarian, grassroots, policy and ed ucational organizations.85 The Center for Cuban Studies has a paid membership base from the public generally comp rising students, artists, writers and scholars.86 Pastors for Peace claims that it has no fixed me mbership since members are voluntary and vary from year to year.87 The members of the Emergency Coalit ion to Defend Education Travel is mainly drawn from the academic community and numbered 462 in 2006. They are 83 Cuba Study Group. Washington, DC. Board of Directors. http://www.cubastudygroup.org/in dex.cfm?FuseAction=Board.Home 84 Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006. 85 The Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. http://www.lawg.org/partners/intro.htm 86 Center for Cuban Studies. New York. About Us. http://www.cubaupdate.org/more.htm#History%20and%20Purpose 87 Interview with Gasteyer, 10th August 2006.

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84 predominantly professors from accredited Univers ities and Colleges in the U.S. Amongst these institutions are Howard Univer sity, UC-Berkeley, Fl orida International, Michigan State, Harvard, Stanford and Princeton.88 Some of the moderate Cuban American organi zations also have a membership base. The Cuban Committee for Democracy has 150 members.89 while the Cuban Commission for Family Rights boasts of 300 members.90 The Cuban American Alliance Education Fund has a network of members some of which are other organiza tions like the Cuban American Commission for Family Rights.91 The Cuba Study Group does not have a ny members except those who comprise its Board of Directors, discussed above. Conclusion All the above organizations are pursuing the sa me goal of changing U.S. Cuba policy even though they may prioritize different aspects of it or have other s ub-focus. Venceremos Brigade is the only organization which expresses solidarity w ith the Cuban Revolution. Like the Center for Cuban Studies it is also concerned with info rmation and cultural exchanges while the D.C. groups, CIP, WOLA, LAWG and the New York base d Pastors for Peace are more interested in the promotion of human rights and justice in the United States. The annual caravanistas of Pastors for Peace mirror the brigadistas of Ven ceremos Brigade, both working quite closely together to take contingents to Cuba. CIP, WOLA and LAWG also have a broad regional agenda. The moderate Cuban American organiza tions generally hope to foster a process of dialogue and rapproachment with Cuba and to ensure its smooth transition to democracy 88 Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel. ECDET Membership List. http://www.ecdet.org/members.htm 89 Interview with Durn, 19th December 2006. 90 Interview with Wilhelm, 21st August 2006. 91 Cuban American Alliance. 1995. Links. http://www.cubamer.org/item_list.asp?Item=Link

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85 although the Cuba Study Group has an additional agenda of changing the image of Cuban Americans in the aftermath of the Elin Gonzlez debacle and of ensuring regime change in Cuba. The two D.C. based business coalitions seek to address the issue of trade with Cuba and represent a number of corporate and farming intere sts such as Cargill Inc., Caterpillar Americas and U.S Wheat Associates. Newer organizations formed in response to the 2004 restriction are geared toward changing policies on remittances, family and academic travel to the island. Most of the organizations draw on the same funding sources. Several receive funding from foundations though the foundation donors may vary fr om year to year. The Christopher Reynolds Foundation funds several organizatio ns which are also be funded by the Ford, Careth, Arca and several other foundations mentioned above. The D.C. groups report to also receiving funding from wealthy private supporter. Both CIP and the Center for Cuban St udies engage in fundraising activities th rough the sale of publicati ons and cultural artifacts. The latter also receive financial resources from a host of individual donors. As a coalition, the ECDET has no specific funding though some of its members have considerable resources of their own. The organizations human resour ces are varied and many, refl ecting a ready stock of welltrained and experienced personnel fro m all works of life. These exte rnal resources are invaluable as members of the groups Boards of Directors. Some organizations ev en share board members and draw from each other for specific expertise as will be seen in the case of the business coalitions. The immediate staff of most organiza tions is relatively small though some of these are crucial to the very sustenance of the anti-e mbargo movement. As identified, these include longstanding activists like Wayne Smith, Sandra Levinson and Kirby Jones. All the groups reflect a hierarchical structure with either Presid ent, Chairman, Director or Executive Director at the top and a skeletal staff below, if they employ a full time staff at all. In this regard, the Cuba

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86 Study Group and the ECDET stands out, since the ex ecutive members comprise the core of the organizations which do not have paid full-ti me employees like CIP, LAWG and WOLA. Finally, membership constitutes a vital asset for the organizations especially those that are coalitions such as LAWG, ECDET, CAAE F, USA ENGAGE and the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association. Some of these me mbers are grassroots groups bu t others are drawn from the academic and business sectors. Still others fi nd a membership base amongst the wider public such as the Cuban Committee for Democr acy and the Center for Cuban Studies. All in all, the groups are relatively homoge nous in terms of goals and funding sources but reflect a fair degree of heteroge neity in terms of human resources organizational structure, size and membership.92 Whether these have impacted on the ab ility of the anti-embargo movement to sustain itself and whether these contribute to its continued activism over time, will be subject of a subsequent chapter. 92 See Table 3-2 on page 88 for a list of leadership and funding sources of the 25 major organizations under study.

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87 Table 3-1. Classification of anti-embargo organizations, dates founded and objectives Category A represents organizations only c oncerned with Cuba. Category B represents organizations with a broad regional or international focus which ha s Cuba as a special project. Organizations Date Founded Category* Objective Center for Cuban Studies 1972 A Information, Cultural Exchanges Center for International Policy 1975 B Human Rights Cuba Study Group 2000 A Changing image of Cubans Americans Cuban American Alliance Education Fund 1995 A Family Travel Cuban American Commission for Family Rights 2004 A Family Travel Cuban Committee for Democracy 1993 A Engagement with Cuba Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel 2004 A Academic/ Education Travel Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists 2006 A Family Travel, Cultural Exchange Latin American Working Group 1983 B Human Rights and Justice IFCO/Pastors for Peace 1988 B Human Rights, Justice, Aid to Cuba Puentes Cubanos 1999 A Family Travel, Remittances USA Engage 1997 B Free Trade and Removal of Sanctions US-Cuba Trade Association 2005 A Free Trade Venceremos Brigade 1969 A Education, Cultural Exchanges, Aid to Cuba Washington Office on Latin America 1975 B Human rights, peace, justice, sustainable development

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88 Table 3-2. Organizations, leaders and funding sources Organizations Leader/s Sources of Funding Center for Cuban Studies Sandra Levins on Foundations, annual membership fees, prominent private citizens, sale of cultural artifacts (usually from Cuba) Center for International Policy Wayne Smith Foundations, membership fees, business interests Cuba Study Group Carlos Saladrgas, Luis J. Prez Self-funded by members Cuban American Alliance Education Fund Delvis Fernndez Levy Founda tions, Primarily self-funded by Members Cuban American Commission for Family Rights Silvia Wilhelm, Alvaro Fernndez Foundations, donations from members Cuban Committee for Democracy Alfredo Durn Foundations, membership fees, Board of Directors Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Travel Wayne Smith No funding (Members are mostly academic institutions) Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists Ruben Rumbaut Self-funded by members Latin American Working Group Mavis Anderson Foundations, pr ivate donors, grassroots organizations, members, public donations Pastors for Peace Lucius Walker Foundations, public and private Donations Puentes Cubanos Silvia Wilhelm Foundations, donations from members USA Engage Jake Colvin Self-funded by members US-Cuba Trade Association Kir by Jones Self-funded by members Venceremos Brigade Bob Foundations Washington Office on Latin America Geoff Thale Foundations, pub lic donations, private Interests

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89 CHAPTER 4 STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF THE ANTI-EMBARGO MOVEMENT The strategies and tactics of the organizations reflect a fa ir degree of heterogeneity although they are similar in seve ral instances. Most of the tac tics employed are conventional and are carried out within the confines of the la w. These include mailing lists, publications, conferences, summits and seminars. Some groups take delegations to Cuba and engage in lobbying on the Hill. Others employ litigation and us e of the courts. Only Venceremos Brigade and Pastors for Peace have demonstrated a more confrontational approach openly breaking the law to take brigadistas and caravanistas to the island. None of the groups admitted to courting the media as a strategy although Pastors for Peace confesses that it employs tactics which will attract media attention. However, they all claim to have an amicable relationship with the media which occasionally covers their activities. Solidarity networks and co-option are also significant strategies of most groups. During the interviews, they all admitted that their interaction is very intense and consider themselves a dense networ k of organizations attempting to change U.S. policy to Cuba. Indeed, while unde rtaking interviews in D.C., ot her potential interviewees in New York and Miami were recommended. Conventional Strategies and Tactics The anti-embargo groups employ a range of c onventional tactics. Th ey have all taken advantage of the advancement in information technology and have established websites through which they publicize their goals, underscore the unjust emba rgo policy, solicit support and contributions from potential members and donors, hi ghlight their specific grievances, advertise their activities and generally mobilize members of the public interested in participating in their contentious action.

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90 The Center for International Policy (CIP ) takes fact-finding delegations to Cuba, organizes conferences on specific issues, invites Cubans to expre ss their views in the U.S., and publish opinion pieces which take issue with the current U.S. policy to Cuba. These are geared toward shaping public opinion about this pol icy and initiating dial ogue with the Cuban government so that travel restrictions can be li fted and an eventual dismantling of the embargo achieved.1 CIP took delegations to Cuba in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005. In February, March, April and June of 2001, it led four delegations including religious leaders, Amer ican sugar refiners, a Congressional delegation with th e Michigan Farm Bureau and Af rican-American journalists. In 2002, it took eight delegations to the island including the Trav el Agent Fact-finding Mission on Sustainable Tourism in January; the Kentucky Ag ribusiness Fact-finding Mission in March; the Kentucky Women in Agriculture Fact-finding Mi ssion in May; the Kentucky Fact-finding Mission on Banking, Transportation and Aquacultu re and the Georgia Ports Authority and Fishing Industry Fact-Finding Mission in J une; and the Kentucky F act Finding Mission on Seafood Purchase and Transportation Infrastructure in July. In November it led three missions including the Delegation of Former U.S. Senato rs, Dale Bumpers and John Culver; the Houston World Affairs Council Fact-fin ding Mission and the Fact-findi ng Mission of Architects and Urban Planners. Five missions were taken in 200 3. These include the Senate Staff Fact-Finding Mission; Urbanists Internationa l Fact-Finding Mission and the Georgia Business Fact-Finding Mission in February; Senator Baucus and Mont ana Farm Delegation in September and the 1 The Center for International Policys Cuba Program. Washington, DC. Cuba Program. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubaproject.htm#mission

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91 Kansas Wheat Farmers Delegation in November.2 According to Smith, these trips are important so that Americans can witness the Cuban reality for themselves especially in the light of the propaganda they are being fed in the U.S..3 In 2005, Wayne Smith visi ted Cuba to interview Ricardo Alarcn, president of the Cuban National Assembly.4 Smith, who heads CIPs Cuba project, believes that pub lishing is most important.5 He has published in several major newspapers and in CI Ps website since 1993.6 In addition to these delegations, CIP also sponsors a number of conferences on Cuba. In October, 2001 it sponsored an agricultural conferen ce, and in November that year, it organized a conference on the inconsistencies in the U.S. terrorism list. In September 2002, it worked with a number of other organizations to hold the Washington D.C. National Summit on Cuba. A Freedom to Travel Forum was held in July, 2003 and three conferences were organized in 2004. These were entitled the Federal Sugar Subsi dy Program, Commission for a Free Cuba and To Examine Evidence of Keeping C uba on the U.S. List of Terrorist States held in April, May and October, respectively. Two conferences we re carded for 2005. The first, U.S. Abuse at 22 The Center for International Policys Cuba Program. Washington, DC. Cuba Program. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubaproject.htm#conferences 3 Interview with Smith, 9th August 2006. 4 For a summary of that visit see th e Center for International Policys Cuba Program. Washington, DC. Cuba Program. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaandterr orism/interview%20w ith%20Alarcon.htm 5 Interview with Smith, 9th August 2006. 6 Some of Smiths more controversial articles are Cuba af ter the Cold War (1993); Our Cuba Diplomacy (1994), The U.S.-Cuba Imbroglio (1996); Helms-Burton: A Loose Canon (1997), Wanted, a Logical Cuba Policy (1998); End the Travel Ban to Cuba (2001); Cuba on the Terrorist List: In Defense of the Nation or Domestic Political Calculation? (2002); Freedom to Travel to Cuba (2003); Cuba Should not be on the Terrorist List (2004); and Guantanamo: Our own Devils Island (2005). For a list of Smiths publications, see the Center for International Policys Cuba Program. Wayne Smith in the News. Washington, DC. Articles by Wayne Smith. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/Wayne%20Smith.htm

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92 Guantanamo, was held in April and the other, A History of Terrorism in Miami, Florida, was organized in October.7 The Washington Office on Latin America (W OLA) has also spons ored a number of Congressional trips to Cuba. Am ongst the recipients are Mauric e Hinchey (D-NY) and Michael McNulty (D-NY) who visited Cuba on a fact-f inding mission in February 2000, to evaluate the impact of the U.S. embargo on the people of Cuba.8 James P. McGovern (D-Mass) was also sponsored by WOLA to visit Cuba in Apr il 2000 on a fact-finding mi ssion to facilitate education and cultural exchange s between Massachusetts univers ities and Cuban counterparts. Joe Moakley (D-Mass) also re ceived funding from WOLA for th at trip. However, his purpose was to create dialogue and exchanges between e ducation leaders in Massachusetts and Cuba. WOLA later sponsored McGovern on a subs equent fact-finding mi ssion in February, 2004.9 WOLA also engage in educa tional outreach to the U.S. pub lic on Cuba policy issues. In the firm belief that educated and organized c itizen groups can make a change, WOLA advocates a number of strategies. These include reaching out to church groups; universities (faculty and students); local business groups; ch ambers of commerce; farm gr oups; agricultural associations and Cuba Americans. WOLA also offers detailed tips for citizens to work with these groups to undertake an educational event togeth er such as a talk hosted by a uni versity; to write a letter to a local newspaper or to visit a member of C ongress or Congressional candidate together. In addition, WOLA works with CIP and the LAWG to organize seminars and conferences treating 7 The Center for International Policys Cuba Program. Washington, DC. Cuba Program. http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubaproject.htm#conferences 8 For a list of congresspersons sponsored by WOLA for trips to Cuba, see Steve Henn, American Public Media. American Radio Works. 2007. Power Trips. http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/featur es/congtravel/sponsor_r eport.php?sponsor=31291 9 Ibid.

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93 with anti-embargo issues. Its we bsite publishes articles from th ese D.C. groups and they have cooperated to publicly applaud the efforts of Senators and Congre sspersons attempting to repeal the embargo.10 Although WOLA does not support the embargo on trade, according to coordinator of the Cuba projec t, Geoff Thale, the organiza tion has no official position on sanctions. Moreover, though WOLAs relationship w ith the state is not ex actly friendly, they do hold meetings and civilized discussions.11 The Latin American Working Group (LAWG) has posted numerous publications in its website through which it hopes to educate the public on U.S.-Cuba policy. Some of these are authored or co-authored by the head of the Cuba program, Mavis Anderson12. The LAWG also posts several articles written by Philip Peters of the Lexington Institute13. Other articles by the Emergency Coalition to Defend Education Trav el (ECDET), the Emergency Network of Cuban American Scholars and Artists (ENCASA) a nd CIP also appear in LAWGs website.14 In 2006, LAWG posted an extensive document entitled Retreat from Reason: U.S.-Cuba Academic Relations and the Bush Administration written by Kimberly Stanton (2006).15 The coalition also works with WOLA and CIP, its partner orga nizations, to issue press releases lending support 10 Washington Office on Latin America. Washington, DC. 2007. Welcome to wola.org. www.wola.org 11 Interview with Thale, 20th May 2005. 12 Andersons publications include The United States and Cuba Strands of a Failed Policy (July, 2006) and Cracking Down on Cuba Travel (2003). For more of Andersons publications, see Latin American Working Group. Washington, DC. 2003. Explore the Issue: U.S.-Cuba Relations. http://www.lawg.org/countries /cuba/explore_us_cuba.htm 13 Peters p