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Opportunity Makes the Thief: Analysis of the Physical Cues That Influence Shoplifter Perceptions of the Retail Interior ...


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OPPORTUNITY MAKES THE THIEF: ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL CUES THAT INFLUENCE SHOPLIFTER PERCEPTIONS OF THE RETAIL IN TERIOR AND THE DECISION TO STEAL By CAROLINE A. CARDONE A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERIOR DESIGN UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2006

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Copyright 2006 by Caroline A. Cardone

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research would not have been possible without the support and contributions of many people. First, I would like to thank my parents, Margaret and David Leeco, for always championing my decisions, and my brother, Andrew Cardone, for being an ongoing source of inspiration. I would especially like to thank my husband, Dr. Stowe Burke, for his understanding and devotion, and for pushing me to do this. I wish to acknowledge the support of the University of Floridas Department of Interior Design, and of my graduate advisor, Dr. Mary Jo Hasell, who willingly accepted the challenge of learning about loss prevention during this process Very special thanks go to Dr. Read Hayes, who generously shared his time, knowledge of loss prevention, and scholarly expertise whenever called upon. I am deeply grateful to the staff of the University of Floridas Loss Prevention Research Team, including Dr. Richard Schneider, Candy Carmel-Gilfilen and Robert Blackwood. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Kristin Bell and Kristin Ranger for both their friendship and contributions to this research. Lastly, I would like to thank my academic colleagues, Lauren Anderson, Sarah Cain, Kathryn Levins, and Julianna Mitchell. This masters thesis may mark the culmination of a scholastic goal, but it will never communicate the scope of our journey. iii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iii LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................vi LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................vii ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................1 Overview of the Shoplifting Problem.....................................................................2 The Role of Interior Design.....................................................................................3 Scope of Project............................................................................................................3 Definitions....................................................................................................................5 Assumptions.................................................................................................................6 2 SIGNIFICANCE AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....................................................8 Significance..................................................................................................................8 Retail Reactions to Shoplifting..............................................................................9 Literature Review.........................................................................................................9 The Design-Security Disconnect.........................................................................10 Review of Security Coverage in Retail Design Literature..................................11 Security Coverage in Professional Practice of Retail Design.............................13 Understanding Shoplifter Perceptions.................................................................13 Research on the Crime-Environment Connection...............................................15 Place-Based Crime Prevention........................................................................16 Theoretical Background..............................................................................................21 Opportunity Theories...........................................................................................22 Rational Choice Theory.......................................................................................22 The Theft Triangle...............................................................................................23 CPTED................................................................................................................25 Situational Crime Prevention..............................................................................30 A Matrix of Opportunity-Reducing Techniques..........................................31 Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior..............................................33 iv

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Summary.....................................................................................................................47 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS...............................................48 Sample Participants....................................................................................................49 Quality of Data....................................................................................................50 Sample Demographics.........................................................................................51 Methodology...............................................................................................................51 Content Analysis.................................................................................................52 Inter-Rater Reliability..........................................................................................54 Validity................................................................................................................56 Narrative Analysis...............................................................................................57 Narrative Analysis in Interior Design Research..................................................59 Limitations..................................................................................................................60 Summary.....................................................................................................................63 4 FINDINGS......................................................................................................................64 Findings......................................................................................................................64 Content Analysis.................................................................................................64 Narrative Analysis...............................................................................................70 Categories with No Scores..................................................................................86 Summary.....................................................................................................................87 5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............................................................88 Discussion...................................................................................................................88 Design Recommendations..........................................................................................89 Optimizing Natural Surveillance Through Design..............................................92 Optimizing Target Hardening/Accessibility Through Design............................93 Optimizing CCTV Guardianship Through Design..............................................94 Optimizing Formal Surveillance Through Design..............................................94 Recommendations for Future Research......................................................................95 Conclusion..................................................................................................................96 APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW..........................................................................98 B: SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW........................................................................114 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................127 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................137 v

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LIST OF TABLES Table page 1: Review of Security Coverage in Retail Interior Design Literature ...............................12 2: Situational Crime Preventions Matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques ........32 3: Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior. ..............................................................34 4: Sample Demographics ...................................................................................................51 5: Inter-Rater Reliability Test Results ...............................................................................55 vi

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1: High Shelf Height..........................................................................................................18 2: Lowered Shelf Height....................................................................................................18 3: Blind Spot......................................................................................................................19 4: Signage...........................................................................................................................20 5: Theoretical Frameworks................................................................................................21 6: The Theft Triangle.........................................................................................................24 7: Two Retail Interiors.......................................................................................................25 8: Access Control...............................................................................................................26 9: Surveillance...................................................................................................................27 10: Territoriality.................................................................................................................27 11: Activity Support...........................................................................................................28 12: Target Hardening.........................................................................................................35 13: Restricted Access Control............................................................................................36 14: Unrestricted Access Control........................................................................................36 15: Poor CCTV positioning...............................................................................................37 16: Poor CCTV Positioning...............................................................................................38 17: Optimal CCTV positioning..........................................................................................39 18: Poor natural surveillance.............................................................................................40 19: Good natural surveillance............................................................................................41 20: Good natural surveillance............................................................................................41 vii

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21: Place Management.......................................................................................................42 22: Formal Surveillance. ...................................................................................................43 23: Visible Targets.............................................................................................................43 24: Target Concealment.....................................................................................................44 25: Reduce Frustrations.....................................................................................................44 26: Poor Maintenance........................................................................................................45 27: Excellent Maintenance.................................................................................................45 28: Set Rules......................................................................................................................46 viii

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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Interior Design OPPORTUNITY MAKES THE THIEF: ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL CUES THAT INFLUENCE SHOPLIFTER PERCEPTIONS OF THE RETAIL INTERIOR AND THE DECISION TO STEAL By Caroline A. Cardone August 2006 Chair: Mary Jo Hasell Major Department: Interior Design Shoplifting continues to be a major source of loss in the retail industry. Despite the introduction of many new and advanced technologies aimed at minimizing it, the rate and severity of shoplifting have not ebbed in the past few decades. But shoplifters are human beings; they are usually reasonable people who base their actions on perceptions of crime opportunity or apprehension risk. The action of shoplifting exists in a specific context: the retail store interior. Several studies have linked generalities of the retail interior to shoplifter perceptions and activity. This study further refines previous research on the environment-shoplifting connection by identifying the specific design elements that shoplifters cite as most influential to their perceptions and behavior. In order to identify these elements, the study applies content and narrative analyses to 20 in-depth interviews with known shoplifting offenders. These are examined through the theoretical lens of rational choice theory and situational crime prevention theory. The ix

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study uses a retail-specific adaptation of situational crime preventions model of opportunity-reducing techniques to classify and quantify shoplifter comments about perceptions of the retail interior. Findings from the content and narrative analyses reveal several patterns amongst the 20 shoplifters. Over 70 percent of their comments about cues in the retail interior fall into the categories of hardened/accessible targets (efforts to limit offender access to coveted items), extended guardianship (in the form of closed-circuit TV), natural surveillance (feeling exposed or like actions are easily monitored), and formal surveillance (the presence and attentiveness of store security staff). The studys narrative analysis bolsters these results in its inclusion of offender interview excerpts contextualizing how shoplifter perceptions and behavior result from cues in the surrounding environment. The study concludes by outlining some ways retail designers can incorporate the findings of the study into actual design practice. The process of designing retail interiors to minimize shoplifting is complex. This study provides an important first step in its identification of the elements shoplifters cite as influential to their decision to steal. Further research should aim to test these elements individually, in controlled environments, to determine which design strategies are most effective in shaping shoplifter perceptions and behavior. x

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION At times imperceptible, and at others unavoidable, visual messages abound in the retail environment. Buy, Covet, Notice, Touch, Enjoy, Relax. Implied or obvious, these messages surround us, conveyed through the smallest details of product packaging to the overall atmospheric effects of lighting and form. But to a shoplifter, messages in the retail interior are quite different. A shoplifter enters a store, scans the space, and perceives Unprotected, Understaffed, Easy Access, Quick Escape. A shoplifter views the retail store through an entirely different pair of eyes. But what does a shoplifter see? The ability to assess and understand exactly how shoplifting offenders interpret the retail environment, and judge the risks and opportunities within it, would be invaluable to retailers, retail interior designers, criminologists, and researchers alike. Purpose The purpose of this study is to determine if offenders factor characteristics of retail interiors into their decision to shoplift, and if so, to identify the physical cues offenders cite as influential to this decision. This information will allow retailers, retail interior designers, and loss prevention (LP) professionals to focus on the things that influence shoplifter perceptions and behavior most, thereby optimizing the retail interiors ability to minimize loss. At the most basic level, the purpose of the built environment is to provide shelter and protection. But beyond these basic needs, building design also encompasses two distinct yet closely related issues: safety and security (Nadel, 2004, 1). These issues often extend beyond the integrity of the building structure itself. Within the retail 1

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2 interior, safety and security also includes protection of the people and products in the store. Shoplifting jeopardizes both of these, and in order to create a safe shopping environment, retailers, designers, and security experts must work together to minimize it. Modern psychology generally acknowledges that individual behavior is influenced by environment (Gifford, 1996). However, while researchers have examined this interrelationship from a myriad of angles, few have studied the link between criminal behavior and interior environments, and even fewer have analyzed shoplifter behavior within retail interiors. The current study addresses this paucity by asking whether a shoplifters perception of the retail interior influences the decision to steal. It addresses this question via a content and narrative analysis of 20 interviews with known shoplifting offenders. Rich in descriptive, qualitative material, these interviews provide detailed first-person accounts of how offenders arrive at the decision to steal. By analyzing the data in these interviews, this study explores how the retail interior factors into a shoplifters decision-making process, identifying the physical cues shoplifters cite as deterrents to, or opportunities for, shoplifting. Furthermore, the study explains how the offenders rational, salient, decision-making process hinges on the physical design of a store and presence/position of security measures. Finally, the study suggests ways in which interior designers may affect this process in a positive way, creating retail spaces that minimize theft opportunities and enhance the shopping experience. Overview of the Shoplifting Problem Shoplifting is a specific form of larceny, defined as an act of theft from a retailer committed during the hours the store is open to the public by a person who appears to be a legitimate customer (Sennewald and Christman, 1992, 1). In the past century, as the Industrial Revolution has given way to a culture of consumption based on desire for and

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3 availability of goods, shoplifting has evolved into a complex social problem (Klemke, 1992). Retailers have tried everything to minimize it stringent apprehension policies, high-tech protection devices, and increased security measures but none of these is a proven panacea (Welsh and Farrington, 2001). Todays savvy, adaptive criminals can easily circumvent such reactive band-aids. To be effective, LP must be a comprehensive, holistic process a process that begins with store design itself. The Role of Interior Design Retail design presents a unique opportunity to help offset the threat shoplifting poses. Retail design can either help or hinder the security of a stores interior. It can enhance the effectiveness of LP technologies and facilitate safety, with aisles planned to coincide with security camera angles, and shelves designed to maximize employee visibility. Or, alternately, it can create hiding spots for criminals to conduct illicit activity with poorly-planned exit access, and dark, unprotected corners. LPs effectiveness is compromised without a retail interior that conveys a sense of risk, sanction, and vulnerability to would-be offenders. However, research is still unclear as to which specific design strategies convey this message most effectively. So how do retail designers know where to focus their efforts? In order to create safe, well-protected interiors, retail designers must have an awareness of which design elements most effectively influence shoplifter perceptions, thereby optimizing the retail interiors role in minimizing theft loss. Scope of Project This exploratory study examines 20 shoplifter interviews in an attempt to code and measure the visual cues in retail environments offenders cite as influential to their perceptions of shoplifting risk or opportunity (the specific methodology for coding and

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4 measuring is discussed in Chapter 3). The interviews, conducted over several years with a variety of known shoplifting offenders, present a wide range of information, in narrative form, about the act of shoplifting. Such detailed, informative interviews are indeed rare, and the opportunity to study their content makes this study at once unique and complex. Through a combined strategy of content and narrative analyses, this study focuses in on shoplifters perceptions of the physical environment within retail store interiors. It then examines how specific cues in that environment (like the height of display shelves, for instance) affect reported perceptions of opportunity versus risk, and subsequently, the criminal decision-making process. The scope of this study is limited to shoplifters reported perceptions of retail interiors as they affect the decision to shoplift. While it is hoped this studys findings will prompt further research on how such perceptions could generate a set of best practice guidelines for curtailing shoplifting via store design, specific recommendations can only be suggested, not proven or prescribed. The intent of this exploratory study is to improve designers and retailers understanding of how offenders perceive retail interiors an understanding which, in turn, can inform retail design in meaningful ways. The study does not, however, propose that the answer to the shoplifting problem can be reduced to a predetermined set of design practices. The issue of retail crime and loss is always a highly individualized one, and responses to it must be tailored to a given time, place, and situation: the application of standard formulae or prescriptions without careful consideration of local circumstances and the full involvement of local people in this process is much more likely to result in failure or at any rate underachievement (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 299). Therefore, the design strategies presented at the end

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5 of this study are only broad recommendations starting points for future research, and from which designers and retailers can conjointly develop a targeted, security-based design program. Definitions This study explores how offender perceptions of certain cues within the retail space affect their assessment of shoplifting opportunity or risk. For the purpose of this study, the terms environment, retail interior, and retail environment are used interchangeably, and are defined as the physical design of the stores interior including immediate situational factors such as architectural layout, territorial boundaries, lighting levels, fixture and shelf placement, product display, and users present. These are all physical attributes or design features that retailers can control, influence, or affect. (The definition of environment does not include manufacturer-based features, such as product packaging, or urban planning issues, such as a stores neighborhood location or proximity to roadways.) The studys results are based on shoplifter perceptions of such physical conditions. As such, the term perception is defined as the process of selection, organization, and interpretation of information about the world conveyed by the senses (Glassman, 2001, 5). This study is most concerned with how the retail interior, and specific cues within it (such as cameras, mirrors, or visible employees), help steer this interpretive process. Therefore, the term shoplifter perceptions refers specifically to perceptions of the physical environment, and how the inferences shoplifters draw from physical cues in retail interiors influence assessments of ease or difficulty associated with shoplifting. The study frequently addresses offender perceptions of shoplifting risk or opportunity. The term risk refers to the level of danger offenders perceive as inherent in the

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6 shoplifting act: the risk of detection, apprehension, and sanction. The term opportunity very rarely refers to a direct invitation for shoplifting. Instead, it generally refers to a lack of risk: a perception that the risk of detection, apprehension, and sanction is low. Finally, the study focuses on how shoplifters perceive certain physical cues in the retail environment. These cues can be either animate or inanimate: the term refers to anything that helps communicate to offenders how risky (or easy) the act of shoplifting might be. Cues like visible cameras, products placed in clear view of employees, and anti-shoplifting signs all impart a certain message to potential shoplifters. Ruesch and Kees (1956) described the collective meaning that physical cues convey to viewers as object language. The intent of this study is to analyze the object language of the retail interior as perceived by shoplifters, in order to determine which cues they cite most as influential to their decision to steal. Assumptions This study assumes offender perceptions will typically differ from those of legitimate users, and therefore focuses solely on shoplifter perceptions, not the perceptions of employees or shoppers. In a 1994 study on perceptions of home vulnerability to burglary, Shaw and Gifford found, contrary to previous beliefs, offenders perceptions differed from legitimate users (possibly due to the offenders first-hand experience with burglary). This study assumes the same to be true of shoplifters; that is, shoplifters perceptions of retail interiors will differ from legitimate users because the shoplifters focus, intent, and experience level is generally different. Because the offender interviews employed in this study do not address specific retail environments (like the type, size, or location of stores), this study also assumes any

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7 comments about retail interiors are general comments about store design, and not a reference to a specific location or incident (unless otherwise noted by the offender). Lastly, and most importantly, this study assumes shoplifter perceptions of many LP strategies are contingent on the physical design and layout of a stores interior. The design-perception link is in some cases more obvious than others. For instance, the link between lowered shelf heights (less than 60) and a shoplifters resulting sense of vulnerability may be implicit: lower shelf design makes it easier for employees to monitor a space, which in turn heightens a shoplifters perception of risk and sanction. But this link is not always so clear. For instance, a shoplifter may describe an experience of walking into a store and feeling uncomfortable, as if he/she is being watched. This study assumes perceptions like this are predicated on a visual assessment of the physical design of the space, as it is difficult to watch or be watched without a design that facilitates surveillance. Therefore this study assumes that, explicitly or not, offenders factor retail interior design into their assessment risk in the retail interior.

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CHAPTER 2 SIGNIFICANCE AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE Significance Accounting for over 23 million jobs, the retail industry is the second-largest employer in the United States. Along with employee theft, shoplifting is the largest source of inventory loss, with the average dollar value per incident exceeding $265. In 2004, the US retail industry suffered an estimated $10 billion in losses due to shoplifting alone (Hollinger and Langton, 2005). These numbers, however, are simply the tip of the iceberg. They account for only direct losses missing merchandise at retail pricing like multiple inventory counts, inventory replenishment, loss prevention payroll, training, and technologies. The indirect, peripheral losses retailers incur as a result of shoplifters are also high. Crime and loss decrease profits by adding expense and decreasing operating revenues. Sales decrease when theft or efforts to curtail theft (such as storing items behind a register) render popular items unavailable to legitimate consumers. Sales may also decline if customers begin to view a store as unsafe (Hayes, 1997). Consumers fear of retail crime can lead to a wide range of avoidance behaviors, including reduced shopping activity, limited nighttime shopping, shortened shopping visits, switching to competitors, or turning to alternative shopping formats, including the internet or catalogs (Warr, 2000). In addition, legal claims resulting from wrongly-accused shoplifters, or from anyone harmed during a crime incident, often result in more financial losses for retailers (Laska, 2000). On a macro level, shoplifting is an unnecessary burden on courts, jails, and police forces. It 8

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9 strains social services departments, indirectly increases cost of living, incurs tax losses, and imposes a heavy toll on society as a whole (Farrell and Ferrara, 1985). Retail Reactions to Shoplifting To mitigate the effects of shoplifting, retailers employ various LP strategies (Clarke, 1997; Hayes, 1991; Hayes 1997). Some retailers focus LP on procedures, training and customer services, while others rely on technologies like electronic article surveillance (EAS) tag systems and cameras (Hollinger & Langton, 2005). EAS gates work with corresponding tags attached to items. Unless deactivated at the point of purchase, these tags activate an alarm when passed through the gates. In theory, store employees will react to these alarms and either reconcile a faulty tag with a receipt, or apprehend a shoplifter. However, the reality is that few alarm activations actually elicit a proactive response from staff (Hayes and Blackwood, 2006b). Other retailers attack theft with store detectives who patrol the store on foot or with the assistance of CCTV (closed-circuit television) cameras (Hayes, 1993; Jones, 1998). However, despite many years of technological advances in security systems, little research exists to prove that these measures have been effective in reducing the impact of shoplifting, and thus, the problem persists today (Welsh & Farrington, 2001). Literature Review Shoplifting has been studied through a variety of lenses, including its connection to social factors (Klemke, 1992), greed and temptation (Carroll and Weaver, 1986), gender (Abelson, 1992; OBrien, 1983; Pousner, 1988), psychological problems (Katz, 1988), life history and upbringing (Snodgrass, 1982), drug use (Jarvis and Parker, 1989), mental pathologies like kleptomania (Cupchik, 1997), and the market-based culture of consumption that seems to pervade every facet of Western life (Cohen, 2003).

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10 Despite the range of studies focused on the phenomenon of shoplifting, until recently, very little research has been directed toward understanding its link to retail interior design. However, a growing body of literature exploring the relationship between criminal behavior and the environment positions this relationship as a promising one in terms of how retail interior design affects shoplifter behavior. In a 2004 review of literature, Moussatche, Hayes, Schneider, McLeod, Abbott, and Kohen found that current trends in retail design hold much promise: Innovative store design can increase convenience and excitement for the customer while simultaneously allowing for more staff efficiency and better product protection . effective retail design can both enhance sales and safeguard against shrinkage (Moussatche et al, 2004, 5). This literature review examines how security issues like shoplifting are addressed in current retail design resources and professional practice. It then reviews several studies on the crime/environment connection in architecture, interior design, and other disciplines. Finally, it presents a theoretical framework from which the current study is derived. The Design-Security Disconnect Although recommendations for designing out crime are often outlined in crime-based literature (Felson, 1996; Ekblom, 1997; Farrington, Bowen, Buckle, Biurns-Howel, Burrows & Speed, 1993; French et al 1984; Lin et al, 1994; Hollinger, 2004) and occupational health literature (Casteel, 2004; Casteel, 2000; Hendricks, 1999; Mair 2003), there is a paucity of security-based information in the existing body of retail design literature, rendering it difficult for designers or architects to implement loss prevention into design programs. This may be due to a perceived conflict of interest between merchandising and loss prevention: the paradox is intense. It is a miracle if store operations can resolve the opposing purposes of attracting buyers and thwarting the

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11 illegal removal of merchandi se (Israel, 1994, 97). Retail LP departments are often at odds with marketing, merchandising, and desi gn departments, who feel that security strategies impede their ability to stock, sell, and display items in an attractive, alluring manner. The retail industry often views me rchandising and loss prev ention as two very different (and sometimes contradictory) endeav ors. Therefore, while retail designers can choose from a wealth of resources on how to create stores that support merchandising, very little literature exists to guide designers on how to do so with security in mind. Review of Security Coverage in Retail Design Literature This study reviewed 19 books on retail desi gn and found that only seven contained information addressing crime and loss in store design. Even fewer mentioned shoplifting specifically (see Table 1). Most publications on retail design focu s on sales-based goals of merchandising and marketing and their connect ion to superficial aesthetic conceits like branding, identity, image, and overall appe arance (Cliff, 1999; Currinbhoy, 1999; Dean, 2003; Pegler, 2002; Reinwoldt, 2000). Of the se ven books that did mention incorporating security into retail design programs, four had been published over 10 years ago, suggesting that what little information on security-focused design is available to designers is fairly outdated. Most retail design literature fo cuses on how stores effect consumer behavior (Donovan, Rossiter, Marcoolyn, & Nesdale, 1994; Gilboa & Rafaeli, 2003; Ogle, Hyllegard & Dunbar, 2004; Sh erman, Mathur & Smith, 1997; Turley & Chebat, 2002), perceptions of branding (Ailawadi & Keller, 2004), or perceptions of merchandise value (Baker, Parasuraman, Grewal & Voss, year). Such research foci are not surprising considering the retail indus trys understandable preoccupation with the bottom line. However, shoplifting also has an enormous impact on the bottom line, and should thus be more of a priority than it currently is in design literature.

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12 Table 1: Review of Security Coverage in Retail Interior Design Literature 1986Designing to SellBarr & Broud y yesyesyesExplains some CPTED concepts and corresponding desi g n strate g ies.1991Design for Shopping CentresBeddingtonyesnonoSecurity section focuses mainly on safety, hazards, fire code, & emer g encies.1999Trade Secrets of Great DesignCliffnononoAbout retail atmosphere, trendiness, aesthetics.1999Designing Entrances for Retail & Restaurant S p acesCurrimbhoynononoFocus is on first impressions & overall appearance.2003The Inspired Retail SpaceDeannononoAbout branding & image.1990Retail DesignFitch & KnobelyesyesyesDiscusses surveillance (formal & natural), blind s p ots, CCTV, EAS, & em p lo y ee awareness.1986The Retail Store: Design & ConstructionGreenyesyesyesOutdated but thorough. Has specific recommendations for desi g nin g a secure store.2001The Power of Visual Presentation: Retail Stores/Kiosks/Exhibits/Environmental Design Hortonnonono1994Store Planning/Design : History, Theor y ProcessIsraelyesnonoPessimistic about reconciling merchandising & securit y g oals. Few desi g n recommendations.1995Retail Store Planning & Design ManualLopezyesnonoCovers all phases of retail planning, budgeting, schedulin g and construction.1981Shops A Manual of Planning and Desi g nMunyesyesyesOutdated but detailed: covers many specific ways to im p lement securit y into desi g n.1992Market, Supermarket, H yp ermarket Desi g n/2PeglernononoConcentrates on merchandising, mood, marketing.2002Designing the World's Best Su p ermarketsPeglernononoAbout branding & image.2002BrandscapingReinwoldtnononoMostly about creating image & identitiy via design.2000Retail DesignReinwoldtnononoFocuses on retail experience & trends, not securit y 2001Influencing Sales Through Store Desi g nSauciernonono2004New Shops and BoutiquesSerratsnonono1999Better Models for Chain DrugstoresStillmannononoSuggests ways drugstores can better fit in with communities and historic areas. 2005Retail Desire: Design Display and Visual Merchandisin g TuckernononoDefensive Desi g n ?CommentsYearTitleDiscuss Securit y ?Author S hoplifting?

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13 Security Coverage in Professional Practice of Retail Design Unfortunately, the current outlook for integration of security into the professional practice of interior design is just as bleak. In a 2001 study presented to the Fourth European Academy of Design Conference, British design professor Mike Press shared the results of his survey on crime reduction awareness amongst designers. Press conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 43 key stakeholders in the design industry, including educators and practitioners. In his study, Press noted that retail design is usually more focused on increasing sales than decreasing crime, and that despite Design Week magazines annual supplement on retail design, the issue of crime reduction has never been addressed in it. He concluded that although designers can play a vital role in ensuring that crime is embedded explicitly in design . the general picture that emerges from the professional design practice is one of little understanding of the issues, a lack of specific knowledge that can be applied in design, and an overall failure to design against crime (Press, 2001, 12). Clearly, then, the marriage of loss prevention and interior design is long overdue. Understanding Shoplifter Perceptions Research on environment and behavior indicates people prefer environments that assist them in achieving certain goals. Stephen and Rachel Kaplans theory of cognitive affordances tells us environmental preferences are based on how the functional qualities of environments help us meet important goals (Gifford, 1996, 172). For a shoplifter, that goal is to steal, and his/her perception of the retail interior is an assessment of the functional qualities it presents that will help or hinder the attainment of that goal. In their book Environmental Criminology, Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) explain that the location and characteristics of a certain place will influence a

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14 criminals perception of that place, thus influencing the likelihood of a crime occurring there. Offender perceptions can sometimes differ from reality. Consistent with the common phrase perception is reality, a store that seems well-secured or monitored to a shoplifter may suffer less crime than one that does not, despite any actual difference in security measures. Consider CCTV monitors, for example. Some retailers install inactive dummy cameras to ward off potential crime. Despite the fact that the cameras arent actually recording anything, some offenders see them and are discouraged from committing a crime because they fear they are being monitored. In this case, the dummy cameras are not actual risks; they are perceived risks. But because the offender knows no difference, the effect is the same. It therefore follows that, as Newman points out, crime prevention should be aimed at perception of a situation in addition to, or even instead of, the situation itself (1997, p. 10). In the retail setting, changing the perception of the situation involves identifying and later adjusting those physical cues that contribute to a shoplifters perceptions. This study explores the physical cues shoplifters perceive in the retail interior. These correspond to situational crime preventions more broad classification of behavioral cues: eliciting stimuli and discriminative stimuli (Wortley, 1997, 67). Eliciting stimuli consist of environmental conditions that provoke predictable behavioral responses: the sight of blood, for example, may make a person feel nauseous the blood being the eliciting stimulus, and nausea the predictable response. Conversely, discriminative stimuli are environmental conditions that signal the likely consequence of a particular action, thereby prompting appropriate behavior (Wortley, 1997, 67). Some

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15 examples of discriminative stimuli include signs on exit doors that indicate an alarm will sound if the door is opened; a yellow traffic light signaling that a driver should slow down and stop; or more symbolic signals like a hedge around a property line indicating a territorial boundary (Wortley, 1997, 67). Applying Wortleys concept to the retail interior, some physical cues may function as eliciting stimuli for shoplifters, activating certain behaviors. For example, if a shoplifter sees valuable merchandise left unguarded and unprotected in a store (an accessible target), that cue may be perceived as an invitation to shoplift because of a lower amount of perceived risk. At the same time, other physical cues are like discriminative stimuli in that they signal sanction, repercussion, and risk to the offender: an EAS gate at the entrance, for example, signals a likely consequence that an alarm will sound when stolen merchandise leaves the store. The challenge for retailers and retail designers, then, is to prompt appropriate behavior (purchasing) and prohibit inappropriate behavior (theft) by altering perceptions of the retail interior via the identification and manipulation of cues within it. Research on the Crime-Environment Connection In a lecture delivered to Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice in the late 1990s, noted criminologist Ronald V. Clarke began by revisiting a basic tenet of psychology: Behavior is a product of the interaction between person and setting (Clarke, no year). His point was simple: for a crime to occur, a motivated criminal (person) must encounter the opportunity for crime (setting). Clarke went on to explain this equation allows us to reduce crime prevention into two basic categories: Action to prevent the development of criminal dispositions and 2. Action to reduce criminal opportunities (Clarke, no year,1).

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16 These two categories represent two broad types of theory within the field of criminology: the first attempts to understand crimes such as shoplifting in terms of behavioral tendencies, the principle causes of which lie in an individuals genetic makeup, psychological conditions, upbringing, and socio-economic standing. The second category is more relevant to the current study, as it attempts to understand crime as a result of situational factors that come together to form a crime opportunity (Clarke, 1997). The idea that certain elements of the physical environment (such as dark alleys or parking lots) can be criminogenic, or crime-causing, is not new. Urban planners have been applying this mindset to their discipline for several decades (Jeffrey, 1977; Newman, 1973, 1976, 1981). Early research examining crime levels and public housing (Wood, 1961, 1967), street life (Jacobs, 1961), and personal space (Hall, 1959) came to influence an entire generation of urban planners and criminologists who recognized the inextricable link between environment and criminality how certain physical or environmental conditions can either inhibit or facilitate crime activity. Place-Based Crime Prevention More recent research on the idea of place-based crime prevention has brought the concept indoors, focusing on how it applies to interior environments, including retail interiors (Eck, 2002). Place-based crime prevention seeks to understand first why certain places attract crime or criminals while others do not, and suggests that some places are safer than others, in part, because of how they are built and how people use them (Mair, 2003, 211). Mair provides the following concise summary of environmental approaches to crime prevention:

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17 Physical design and immediate situational factors of a place may encourage or inhibit violence Physical design and immediate situational factors can create a sense of territoriality in legitimate users of a space and induce them to act on that attachment in order to protect against violence and other illegitimate use Modifications can be made to an environment to reduce opportunities for [crime] by making the commission of an [offense] appear more risky, more difficult, less rewarding, and less excusable to the potential offender (Mair, 2003, 217). In the past 20 years, research on place-based crime has begun to link crime to certain facets of retail interiors, including how they affect employee and consumer behavior (Bitner, 1992), criminal behavior (Farrell and Ferrara, 1985) and shoplifter perceptions (Carroll & Weaver, 1986; Hayes, 1998; Butler, 1994; Tonglet, 2001). Other studies have explored how certain environments and store designs seem to invite criminal behavior (Munday, 1986; Francis, 1980), but lack substantive investigation of the specific elements that contribute to this sense of invitation. Butler (1994) began to address this lack of specificity in his survey of 15 shoplifters views on security. Thirteen out of 15 respondents noticed security measures or other possible risks within the store environment of the research setting. In all, the respondents identified 29 possible risks which they felt could lead to their apprehension, the most frequently mentioned being staff, customers, store detectives, CCTV, and alarms. Similarly, respondents most frequently mentioned being followed by security and the presence of staff as measures that would actually deter them from shoplifting. Thus, Butler concluded, people exercise a very real deterrence to shoplifters (Butler, 1994, 62). It is interesting to note respondents in Butlers study did not feel items placed on a high shelf were a deterrent. Indeed, one can assume such high shelves might even negate the usefulness of actual deterrents (people) by blocking lines of sight.

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18 1 2 Figure 1: High Shelf Height. In Butlers study, shoplifters did not cite items on a high shelf as a deterrent to shoplifting. As seen in Figure 1, placement of CRAVED products on high shelves may make access a stretch, but not impossible. In fact, high shelves may actually facilitate theft acts, since they block lines of sight. Figure 2: Lowered Shelf Height. This image illustrates how items placed on lower (>60) displays help make users more visible, and thus rendering shoplifting more risky. Tonglets (2001) study of shoplifters perceptions of security found that, for recent shoplifters, the retail interior played a significant role in the decision to steal, underscoring her hypothesis that crime is often impulsive, not premeditated. In fact, 74 percent of recent shoplifters in Tonglets study said they would shoplift again even if they hadnt planned on it, suggesting that if the retail environment provides a shoplifting opportunity, then potential shoplifters may take advantage of it, even though they may not have planned to shoplift before entering the shop (Tonglet, 2001, 347). Tonglets research is important in that it presents the retail interior as a factor in the shoplifters decision-making process. However, Tonglet, like many others who have explored place-based crime prevention, was focused more on the idea of crime prevention than on place, making it difficult for designers to understand or her research or apply it in retail interior design practice.

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19 Mirrors are good security features, but this one does not reflect CRAVED items in it. CRAVED items are hidden in this blind spot Figure 3: Blind Spot. Shoplifters often take items from high-visibility areas to a dead zone (a.k.a blind spot) like this in order to hide things in bags, containers, or on their person. Therefore, even if there are no CRAVED items in them, designers must strive to eliminate blind spots from the retail interior. Tonglets findings are emphasized by Hayes (1998) comprehensive survey of over 2,000 shoplifters, 64 percent of whom admitted they decided to steal after entering a store. Furthermore, Hayes study found that 62 percent of stolen items were taken from high-visibility zones. This suggests that shoplifters were removing items from high visibility zones and taking them to dead zones, or blind spots, (see figure 3) to hide the items before exiting the store (Hayes 1998). Hayes recommends that a deterrence model could focus on altering offenders decisions by implementing and marketing cues aimed specifically at reducing theft motives and opportunities while increasing the perception of risk (Hayes, 1998, 8). For example, many stores use CCTV to monitor activity. However, few stores market this fact to shoplifters. The simple addition of a sign at a stores entry reading CCTV monitoring in use shoplifters will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law could underscore to offenders that the store means business (see figure 4).

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20 Figure 4: Signage. According to Hayes study, marketing deterrent cues like this CCTV dome can increase their effectiveness. Designers can enhance CCTVs power with the simple addition of signage. Perhaps the most relevant research in the area of how retail interiors affect shoplifter perceptions is Carroll and Weavers 1986 process-tracing study. In it, the researchers asked 17 experienced shoplifters to walk through retail environments while thinking aloud about deterrents or facilitators that might influence the theft act. Similar to the current study, the researchers coded the resulting accounts into categories in order to examine how rationality explains shoplifters decisions to steal. Carroll and Weaver found that the major deterrents to shoplifting were the presence of security devices, item inaccessibility, the possibility of being observed, and the presence of employees. Facilitators included the lack of the aforementioned deterrents, as well as a store layout conducive to shoplifting (e.g., high counters that impede observation) (Carroll & Weaver, 1986, 29). In this study, Carroll and Weaver began to address how some specific interior design conditions shape offender perceptions and resulting behavior. However, overall, their study was general they examined a wide range of factors that contribute to shoplifter perceptions of stores. The current study further refines the concept of how

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21 rationality affects the criminal perception of a retail environment by focusing solely on design-related issues. Collectively, these studies are significant in that they all attempt to classify the perceptions that come together to motivate a potential offender into shoplifting action. Several of the studies address the perception of the retail interior, and certain elements within it, as influential on a shoplifters assessment of risk, and subsequent decision to steal. However, none of these studies has been precise enough to pinpoint the specific physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to their decision-making process. Theoretical Background In order to operationalize shoplifter perceptions of the retail environment, this study draws on three major crime theories: rational choice theory, the theft triangle, and CPTED/situational crime prevention. The latter theories serve to operationalize rational choice theory. While each of these theories addresses a similar theme (environmental criminology), this studys theoretical background frames them in a consecutive order, from general to specific: Figure 5: Theoretical Frameworks Theft Triangle: Asserts that three elements are necessary for shoplifting to occur: desirable target, motivated offender, lack of g uardianshi p CPTED/Situational Crime Prevention: Presents specific design-based actions retailers can apply in order to minimize crimes such as sho p liftin g Rational Choice Theory: provides understanding of shoplifting act as result of reasonable assessment of risk vs. opportunity The relevance of each of these theories to the current study is discussed below.

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22 Opportunity Theories In order to understand how the retail environment (and specific cues within it) affects criminal perception, it is important to review some basic theories of environmental criminology. Several well-known criminology opportunity theories correlate to and legitimize the present study: rational choice theory, the theft triangle, the U.K.-born situational crime prevention, and its American cousin, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The three latter theories all serve to operationalize rational choice theory, bringing it to life in a way that allows retail designers to apply theory to practice. As explained below, these theories are by no means mutually exclusive; they overlap in some areas, and present complimentary views in others. Together, they provide a theoretical context for the present study, locating it within well-established environmental criminology theory and providing guidelines for its methodology. Rational Choice Theory Rational choice theory examines crime from the viewpoint of the offender, asserting that most criminals (like shoplifters) are normal, reasonable people who weigh the relative risks and rewards associated with a crime before deciding to commit it (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Felson and Clarke, 1993). In the case of shoplifting, a potential offender might weigh how much he/she needs, desires, or will profit from an item against the chance of being caught and the resulting punishment. To understand how rationality affects decision-making, consider the following shoplifters first-person account of the risks and rewards involved in the shoplifting act: Its very, you know, you can get in trouble, you know you can get caught, you know you can get in a lot of trouble, but you know if you can walk in and take a bag off the shelf, like a duffle bag or something like that, your duffel bag, and fill that

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23 thing up with DVDs, CDs, and Gillette razors and stuff like that that you can sell, and you can pick that thing up and get out with it, you start thinking the risk is worth it. Youve gotten away with it once or twice, the risk is worth it. Maybe you can run and take off . when you think well if I get out with this bag I got 40 DVDs, 25 CDs, 20 Gillette razors and everything, Ive got a $500 bag right here. Maybe $600. And if that pays for this bill, that bill, this bill, that bill. Then you can just relax, you know, for a couple of weeks. Joey, a known shoplifting offender The present study is particularly concerned with the role the interior environment has in this assessment process: for instance, would a rational shoplifter be more likely to steal in a hidden store aisle than in front of a cashier? Which physical cues lead a shoplifter to determine where, when, or if to steal? This study will address such questions. The Theft Triangle The theft triangle model (Hayes, 1993) takes crime theory to a more micro level than rational choice theory, focusing on the assimilation and identification of the multiple variables that contribute to a criminal act. The theft triangle assumes a potential brings background factors (such as genetic coding, personality traits, socialization, learning experiences, and perceived need) to a specific situation. These then combine with three foreground factors: 1. the perception of need or want for an item and motive for theft; 2. the perception that the item is accessible and obtainable; 3. a low perception of low personal risk associated with committing the offense. This study is most concerned with the second two elements (perception of access and perception of risk). They are listed in red in Figure 6.

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24 Figure 6: The Theft Triangle According to the theft triangle, all three components generally must be in place for a crime to occur. It is this focus on the personal and situational perceptions of offenders (Hayes, 1997) that marks the theft triangles appropriateness for the current study, as the design of a retail interior is a major determinant of a shoplifters mise en scene. In order to truly impact loss, it is not enough to prevent crime; retailers must prevent attempts at crime. An effective way to do this is to influence an offenders perception of the crime situation to increase a sense of risk, and decrease a sense of accessibility while attempting to reduce criminal motivation. The theft triangle allows this study to operationalize the study of an offenders situational decision-making (Hayes, 1998). Its methodology employs the second and third factors of the theft triangle (perceptions of accessibility and risk) as the two main classifications for analysis of physical cues in retail interiors. In order to understand how these two factors converge to influence a shoplifters behavior, consider the following offenders comment: First things first you want to know if they got what you want. The second factor is the risk involvement. The risk involvement will be security times cameras times employees times space times customers. Those are the five factors youre going to have. Why? Because all of them conflict with each other to catch you . Nolan, a known shoplifting offender

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25 In this excerpt the offender clearly spells out how two elements of the theft triangle opportunity (you want to know if they got what you want) and risk (the risk involvement) interact to determine the perceived feasibility of the shoplifting act. This offender also makes clear how risk factors can be reduced to specific LP measures: security, cameras, employees, customers. These types of cues and their effect on offender perceptions are the foci of the current study. Figure 7 below provides examples of different types of retail interiors and how their physical design clearly impacts the stores desirability as a shoplifting target: A B Figure 7: Two Retail Interiors. Note the differences in physical layout between these two images. In image A, the store interior is designed in such a way as to hinder shoplifting opportunity: shelves are less than 60 high (allowing visibility across the entire space) lighting is clear, and a long unobstructed line of sight allows visitors to be seen from many vantage points. In image B, high shelving, dim lighting, and a lack of CCTV cameras make this a potential area for a shoplifter to conduct illicit activity. CPTED CPTED is actually a group of related place-based crime prevention theories that have become increasingly popular through the last few decades. At its core, the concept

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26 of CPTED is based on the premise that the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime (Crowe, 2000, 1). Architect and urban planner Oscar Newman carried out some of the first CPTED research in the 1970s in his study of how design could inhibit crime in public housing developments (Newman, 1972). CPTED has evolved over the years, but its foundation is still based on how the interrelationship between people and environment can affect crime. Crowe (2000) describes CPTEDs most recent iteration as having evolved to include three fundamental principles: Access Control any measure that denies access to a crime target, whether through spatial definition, locks, glass cases, or guards, access control helps inhibit crime opportunity (see figure 8). Figure 8: Access Control. This electronics retailer uses cables to secure products to an interactive display. This type of access control prohibits theft while allowing customers to examine and try products. Photo courtesy of author. Surveillance this concept involves elements that enable occupants and casual observers to observe and monitor a space, thus increasing the sense of risk for offenders. Surveillance can be facilitated by employees, security guards, or CCTV, but cannot be effective without design and spatial arrangements that maximize lines of sight (see figure 9).

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27 Figure 9: Surveillance. This type of aisle configuration (sometimes called feathering) maximizes surveillance opportunities, increasing a sense of risk for potential offenders. Photo courtesy of author. Territoriality a more recent addition to CPTED, this concept refers to the formation, through physical design, of a sphere of influence in which legitimate users begin to feel a sense of responsibility or proprietorship, which in turn leads to their active protection of the space. In the retail setting, territoriality is often defined through real and symbolic space markers: a territory may be very clear, such as a jewelry counter, or more ambiguously defined through flooring pattern, color, light, ceiling condition, or displays. In either case, employees are more apt to monitor their turf if spatial features make its boundaries obvious (see figure 10). Figure 10: Territoriality. A simple yet clear change in flooring material in this grocery self-checkout area identifies it as a distinct territory, making it easier for the employee on duty to monitor activity in the space. Photo courtesy of author. Activity Support refers to any activity that increases legitimate consumers and encourages increased business, since these can have an indirect effect on crime. Facilitation of legitimate activity is one of the easiest areas for design to affect in

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28 retail interiors: adding a caf of small coffee/tea area to a store will cause legitimate consumers to spend more time in the space, which indirectly contributes to informal surveillance (see figure 11). Figure: 11: Activity Support. This clothing retailers addition of a small caf near the store entrance increases legitimate activity and users, which may in turn affect perceptions of risk and/or opportunity. Photo courtesy of author. Although some studies have questioned CPTEDs effectiveness in specific situations (Taylor, 2002; Amandus, Hunter, James & Hendricks, 1995), researchers generally concur that design plays a role, albeit often difficult to define, in making crime more or less likely to occur in the built environment (Schneider, 2005, 273). CPTED is considered a mainstream crime prevention technique, and a number of research studies have documented how its application can reduce crime, especially in convenience store and urban planning settings (Crow and Bull, 1975; Scott et al, 1985; White, 1986; Jeffery et al, 1987; Hunter, 1988; Leistner, 1999; Casteel, 2000). The urban planning discipline in particular has produced some promising research in terms of how CPTED principles can affect crime, including Minnery and Lims (2005) research on how CPTED measures reduced victimization in residential neighborhoods. Similarly, Brown and Bentleys 1993 interviews with home burglars found that territorial concerns, neighbor reactivity, and difficulty of entry all CPTED-based features affected burglars perceptions of a

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29 homes vulnerability. In addition, Shaw and Gifford (1994) found that surveillability and symbolic barriers two defensible space cues made homes seem less vulnerable to burglars. LaVigne (1997) examined how implementing CPTED techniques like maintenance, lighting, natural and employee surveillance affected crime rates in the Washington DC Metro subway system. She found they reduced crime rates, and concluded that the Metro is unusually safe considering the relatively dangerous context aboveground, and that this safety is undoubtedly correlated to the design and maintenance of the Metros physical environment. But despite its conceptual basis in design, CPTED research on interior environments is relatively scant. Therefore, the few examples we do have of how CPTED-derived environmental cues shape offender perceptions of interior spaces are of particular relevance to the current study. In one such example, Swanson (1986) interviewed 65 convenience store robbers in order to identify the environmental cues they cited as either desirable or undesirable in terms of committing a crime. Some of the desirable cues in a store robbers cited are below (their corresponding CPTED categories in parentheses): Easy access to and from the store (access control) Only one clerk and no customers (surveillance) Accessibility of safe (access control) Poor visibility (surveillance) Obstructed windows (surveillance) Some of the undesirable cues Swanson identified were: Customers at the store (surveillance) Surveillance cameras (surveillance) A raised and deep cashiers counter (access control)

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30 Although performed in a convenience store setting, Swansons study provides evidence of how offender perceptions are shaped by CPTED-based physical cues. Because this study focuses on retail interiors, not convenience stores, the cues shoplifters mention will likely differ in specifics. However, the same concepts of access control, surveillance, and territoriality will likely arise when shoplifters discuss their perceptions of retail interiors. In a more recent study, Casteel (2004) examined the effectiveness of similar CPTED techniques in liquor stores and found that those employing CPTED-based crime countermeasures such as good visibility, bright lighting, and controlled exit access saw a 33 to 87 percent decrease in crime. The implication of both of these studies is, of course, that it is possible to manipulate physical cues in retail environments in order to reduce criminal opportunities. This study will help identify which cues offenders perceive as most influential to shoplifting. Situational Crime Prevention Similar to CPTED, situational crime prevention presents way to use the larger concepts of rational choice theory in real-world applications. It is predicated on the notion that offenders assess the risks and rewards of a potential crime before deciding to commit it. However, situational crime prevention further refines this concept, locating the precise characteristics of a particular situation as pivotal in the offenders rationalization process. Situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime prevention reduces opportunities for crime by reducing rewards and increasing efforts and risks for perpetrators. It contends that, in so doing, an environment can be changed in a way that affects assessments made by potential offenders about the costs and benefits associated with committing particular crimes (Clarke, 1997, 5).

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31 A Matrix of Opportunity-Reducing Techniques Situational crime prevention is a partic ularly helpful framework due to its fundamentally tactical appro ach: its an evolving, eviden ce-based matrix of crime prevention techniques that (c urrently) cons ists of 25 1 tangible, specific strategies aimed at reducing crime (see Table 2) (Clarke, 1997; Smith and Cornish, 2004). Like the theft triangle model, this micro scale renders the matrix particularly useful for understanding the current study. The 25 strategies provide a useful starting point for categorizing shoplifter comments about risk s and opportunities within interior environments. Situational crime preventions matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques evolved out of 15 years collec tive experience in reducing crim e via control of situational elements. The techniques are categorized into five overarching groups: increasing perceived effort, increasing perceived risk s, reducing anticipated awards, reducing provocations, and removing excuses (Clark and Cornish, 2003). This study is most concerned with the first two groups: increasi ng effort and risk. The techniques in these two categories are related to rational choice theory, in that they aim to affect crime incidents by influencing offender perceptions of risk or opportunity. The strategies in third group, reducing rewards, are geared towa rd making a crime target less desirable by minimizing the potential payoff it has. The last two groups, reducing provocation and excuses, contain strategies that minimize or remove catalysts for crime: situations or elements that provoke crime or provide excu ses for it. The original matrix of all 25 Opportunity-Reducing Technique s is included in Table 2. 1 The original matrix consisted of 16 opportunity-reducing techniques, but has since evolved to 25.

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32 Table 2: Situational Crime Preventions Matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques Steering column locksOff-street parkingEfficiant queues & polite serviceRental agreementsAnti-robbery screensGender-neutral phone listingsExpanded seatingHarassment codesTamper-proof packagingNeighborhood watch programsSoothing music & lightsHotel registrationEntry phonesImproved street lightingRemovable car radioReduce crowding in pubs"No parking"Electronic card accessDefensible space designWomen's refuges"Private Property"Baggage screeningSupport whistleblowersPrepaid pay phone cards"Extinguish camp fires"Fixed cab faresTicket needed for exitProperty markingControls on violent pornography"Shoplifting is stealing" signsExport documentsTaxi driver IDsVehicle licensing, VINEnforce good behavior at sport gamesRoadside speed display signsElectronic merchandise tags"How's my driving?" decalsCattle brandingProhibit racial slursSecurity guard at doorSchool uniformsStreet closure s Two clerks at convenience store s Monitored p awn sho ps "Idiots drink and drive"Eas y librar y checkou t Separate womens' bathroomsReward employee vigilanceControls on classified ads"It's OK to say no"Public lavatoriesDisperse pubs at certain timesControls on internet auction sitesDisperse troublemakers at schoolNumerour litter binsLicensed street vendors"Smart" gunsRed light camerasInk merchandise tagsRapid repair of vandalismBreathalyzers in pubsDisablin g stolen cell p hone s Bur g lar alarmsGraffiti cleanin g V-chi p s in TVsServer intervention s Restrict s p ra yp aint sales to j uvenile s Securit y g uardsS p eed bum p sCensored details of modus o p erand i Alcohol-free event s 10. Strengthened Formal Surveillance:11. Concealed Targets: 6. Extend Guardianship: 4. Deflect Offenders: 2. Controlled Access: 12. Removed Targets9. Use Place Managers: 3. Screened ExitsRoutine precautions like going out in a group at night16. Reduced Frustrations: 25. Control Drugs & Alcohol5. Controlled Tools / Wea p ons:23. Alert Conscience: 8. Reduced Anonymity18. Reduced Emotions: 24. Assist Compliance21. Set Rules: 1. Hardened Targets: 7. Assist Natural Surveillance: 17. Avoid Disputes22. Posted Instructions: 20. Discourage Imitation: 15. Denied Benefits19. Neutralize Peer Pressure14. Disrupted Markets13. Identified PropertySeparate enclosures for rival soccer fansREMOVED EXCUSES INCREASED EFFORTINCREASED RISKREDUCED REWARDREDUCED PROVOCATION Retrieved April 22 nd 2006 from www.popcenter.org.

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33 The matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques is helpful to this study in that it provides a framework for organizing, categ orizing, and quantifying the physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to their decision to steal (this process is explained in Chapter 3). Because the matrix is so detailed, it al so helps clarify exact ly how retailers and designers can manipulate physical cues in the retail interior so as to deter crime. Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior Originally, the prevention t echniques in the matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques were geared to a wide array of circumstances from protecting cars to preventing hooliganism. Howe ver, a retail adaptation was necessary for the study, since the idea of situational crime prevention is t o change the circumstances leading up to or surrounding the situation, thus making it more difficult for the potential offender to accomplish the crime (Newman et al, 1997, 9). In order to affect the circumstances surrounding shoplifting behavior, it is necessary to have a set of strategies tailored to the retail environment. This st udy proposes a retail-based matr ix based on the original 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques, but specifically tailored to retail interiors. Following an extensive literature review and consultation with some experts in the field of loss prevention and situational crime prevention, the study determined ten categories to be either redundant when considered in the re tail context, or simply irrelevant. These categories were removed, and the result is a sp ecifically retail-based matrix consisting of 15 categories (see Table 3) 2 2 The categories removed are Reduced Anonymity, Controlled Tools/Weapons, Neutralized Peer Pressure, Controlled Drugs and Alcohol, Avoided Disputes, Disrupted Markets, Identified Property, Removed Targets, Assisted Compliance, and Denied Benefits.

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34 Table 3: Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior. Presence of g lass cases Presence of CCTV Items ke p t behind counters Q uantit y of CCTV s y stemAccessibilit y of dis p la y sWell-monitored CCTV Accessibilit y of items Q ualit y of CCTV s y stemPresence of cords locks cablesPresence of blind s p otsAccess to exitsBein g noticed/unnoticed Emer g enc y exitsNumber of customers in Number of exitsStore la y outPresence of g arden areasCrowdsStore sizeLi g htin g Item locationPresence of EAS ta g s/sensors Attentiveness of em p lo y eesPresence of EAS g ates at door Q uantit y of em p lo y eesStore g reeter at doorEm p lo y ees (g eneral ) Securit y g uard at doorSecurit y (g eneral ) Police p resence at storeAttentiveness of securit y Maintenance levelUniformed securit y staffUndercover store detectives6. Natural Surveillance11. Emotions2. Exit Access4. Offender Deflection 3. Exit Screening 7. Place Managers8. Formal Surveillance12. Imitation y PERCEIVED EXCUSE 13. Rules 1. Concealed & Hardened TargetsPERCEIVED EFFORTPERCEIVED RISK5. Extended Guardianship9. Visible Targets Antiestablishment sentimentPresence of shoplifting signage ("Shoplifters will be Prosecuted")PERCEIVED PROVOCATION15. ConsciencePresence of highly visible CRAVED itemsSigns indicating store p olicies"Ask for assistance" si g nsPresence of previous crimes10. Frustrations Quality of customer service"Shoplifting is stealin g si g ns14. Instructions

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The 15 categories in this matrix are explained and illustrated in further detail below, including how each relates to design strategies that may help retailers and designers minimize shoplifting through retail interior design. It is important to realize the duality of each of these cues. The visible presence of a cue can contribute to an offenders sense of risk, while the lack of a cue can contribute to an offenders perception of shoplifting opportunity (because of a perceived lack of risk): 1. Target Hardening & Concealment: A specific brand of opportunity reduction, target hardening involves obstructing an offenders immediate access to CRAVED 3 merchandise via locks, cases, safes, cords, cables, or reinforced materials (see figure 12). Target hardening often creates opportunities for attractive, consumer-friendly retail design; for example, an electronics display with hardened targets allows shoppers to approach and try merchandise, but prohibits theft via cables attached to products. However, if not mindfully implemented, hardened targets can be off-putting to legitimate shoppers. Figure 12: Target Hardening. At most jewelry stores, products are protected by locked glass cases that prevent illegitimate access. But hardened targets need not be unattractive: here we see how elegantly-designed cases can contribute to a pleasant store atmosphere. Photo courtesy of author. 2. Access Control: In retail design, this technique refers to restricting offender exit access and impeding speedy getaways. Several design strategies can facilitate this: for moderately crime-prone stores, the simple addition of some displays or shelving in the exit path can help. For stores with serious crime threats, installing railed 3 CRAVED stands for Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable. Products meeting all these criteria are most likely to be stolen, like batteries and premium razor blades. See http://crimeprevention.rutgers.edu/case_studies/effort/hot_products/cravedlist.htm

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36 pathways or channels leading to the exit can deter offenders, impede getaways, and contribute to apprehensions (see figure 13). Figure 13: Restricted Access Control. In this pharmacy retailers high-crime store, the retailer and designer worked together to install rails at the point of exit, making it difficult for shoplifters to make a hasty getaway. Photo courtesy of author. Figure 14: Unrestricted Access Control. This is a safer store in the same pharmacy retailers chain. Because this store suffers less theft, it is able to provide patrons unrestricted exit access: a clear path straight to the door. Photo courtesy of author. 3. Exit Screening: Exit screening provides a way for retailers to monitor activity at the point of exit. In retail design, exit screening consists of two measures: electronic article surveillance (EAS) gates, and door greeters. Greeters may reconcile receipts with items, maintain surveillance for shoplifting activity, or

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37 ensure that returns are not fraudulent. However, to be most effective, the entry/exit point must be designed to support these activities. Clear lines of sight will enable employees to monitor the space, and well-defined spatial boundaries reinforce territoriality and clearly define the space to be monitored. 4. Offender Deflection: Although not the easiest technique to accomplish via design, it is possible to deflect offenders from stores. Some retailers accomplish this by coordinating a police presence outside the store. This type of cue can dissuade offenders from entering the store at all. 5. Extended Guardianship: In terms of retail design, the concept of extended guardianship generally refers to the use of CCTV, which, when thoughtfully planned and installed, can provide clear views of various store spaces (see figure 17). This technology allows retailers and LP experts to literally extend protection of the store past the limits of their immediate view, providing eyes into hidden spaces. Store design plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of CCTV: inadequate camera coverage can contribute to blind spots. These are desolate areas of the store where offenders can go to surreptitiously stash products in bags or clothing, unseen by cameras or people. The elimination of blind spots should be a consideration for all retail designers. Design also affects the success of CCTV technology itself, as camera coverage and viewing angles are often blocked by poorly-placed monitors, shelves or displays (see figures 15 and 16) (Cardone, 2004). Video capture courtesy of IntelliVid Corp. Figure 15: Poor CCTV positioning: The performance of this stores CCTV system is limited by the large monitor blocking the cameras view. When designers and retailers dont collaborate on CCTV installation, views like this result. CCTV image capture courtesy of IntelliVid Corp.

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38 A Video captures courtesy of IntelliVid Corp. B Figure 16: Poor CCTV Positioning: These examples show how poor design and planning can hinder CCTV effectiveness. In image A, reflected glare in a stores entry/exit point limits the clarity of one camera image. This makes it difficult for security to identify theft acts on the CCTV monitor. In image B, signs and monitors block CCTV camera views, again rendering it difficult for security staff to monitor crime via the camera system. CCTV image captures courtesy of IntelliVid Corp.

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39 A Video captures courtesy of IntelliVid Corp. B Figure 17: Optimal CCTV positioning: In images A and B, we see the ideal CCTV camera placement, uninterrupted by signs or objects. Designers should keep CCTV cameras in mind when designing stores, and strive for these types of expansive views. CCTV image captures courtesy of IntelliVid Corp. 6. Natural Surveillance: The term natural simply refers to design strategies whose functions, when incorporated into the overall environment, become an inherent, or natural part of the design (Atlas, 2001, 40). Natural surveillance gives users and casual observers the ability to monitor a space, and therefore increase an offenders sense of vulnerability or risk. The visual presence of employees or the feeling of being watched can have a significant deterrent effect on would-be offenders. However, neither of these effects will work without retail design that supports surveillance (see figure 18). Although considered a single technique in the matrix, natural surveillance actually encompasses a wide range of strategies, including lowered (> 60) shelf and fixture heights; wide, clear aisles; placing CRAVED products in very visible areas; the installation of mirrors; ample lighting; and the

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40 creation of lengthy, unobstructed lines of sight. Any technique that aids in viewing or observing the retail space (and thus increasing offenders sense of risk) falls into the category of natural surveillance (see figures 19 and 20). The success of natural surveillance as a tool for actually detecting and apprehending criminals is contingent on two factors: a design that supports visual surveillance of the space, and competent and compliant observers who actively respond to crime incidents. While it is impossible to ensure that a store will always contain vigilant and observant customers ready to spot and react to shoplifting, it is possible to create an environment that allows certain observers to react to certain crime situations (some shoplifters indeed fear being seen or apprehended by a hero customer, as will be discussed later). Again, it is the potential for being seen that affects a shoplifters perception of risk, and design that facilitates natural surveillance increases that potential. CRAVED items in hidden part of store Cashiers natural surveillance blocked by aisle height and loading Figure 18: Poor natural surveillance. Here, the cashiers view of the store is blocked by high shelves and poorly-arranged aisles, making it difficult for active monitoring of the space. Also, CRAVED items are placed far from the employees line of sight. Ideally, CRAVED items would be placed in direct view of employees, as it can indirectly increase a potential offenders sense of risk. Photo courtesy of author.

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41 Pharmacists view Figure 19: Good natural surveillance. Here, thanks to mindful store design, the pharmacists have a clear line of sight down several aisles. Photo courtesy of author. Location of CRAVED items Figure 20: Good natural surveillance. This is one view from the pharmacy department. CRAVED items are on the left, plainly visible to the employees working in the pharmacy. This product placement increases a sense of risk for potential shoplifters. Photo courtesy of author.

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42 7. Place Managers: Place managers, in the retail context, refers to store employees. This strategy is dependent, in part, on the idea of territoriality: through the creation of clearly defined territories, employees are more apt to defend and protect the places they manage. Retail design can optimize place management in a couple of ways: first, designers and retailers should work together to determine where in the store employees should be located. Positioning multiple clerks in strategic areas of the store can facilitate a variety of situational crime prevention techniques. Secondly, store layout should aim to position CRAVED products as close to these place managers as possible in order to provide an extra level of protection (see figure 21). It is important to note the role management and motivation plays in LP efforts here: while retailers often cite employees as the first and best line of defense against shoplifting (Hayes and Blackwood, 2006c), even the best planned store cannot force an employee to monitor a space. Retailers must provide employees incentive and reward for vigilant surveillance of the store without it, a well-designed, security-focused interior layout may be wasted. Figure 21: Place Management: This national discount retailer uses a store-within-store design to protect CRAVED electronics. Here, we see how the Home Electronics department has its own checkout point. The entire department is surrounded by high shelves, making this point the only way to enter or exit. The department was also designed to allow the employee staffing the checkout a clear line of sight (the yellow arrow) to numerous displays of CRAVED items like DVDs and music CDs. Photo courtesy of author. 8. Formal Surveillance: Like natural surveillance, the concept of formal surveillance is based on the idea that increasing observation opportunities decreases crime. However, while natural surveillance applies to users and casual observers, formal surveillance refers specifically to retail employees and LP staff, including both uniformed security officers and undercover store detectives. The design strategies that enhance formal surveillance are the same as those for natural surveillance (see figure 22).

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43 Figure 22: Formal Surveillance: The design of this pharmacy includes a designated counter placed in the cosmetics department. The employee at this counter has a clear view of the area she manages, allowing her to assist customers and provide formal surveillance of the space. Photo courtesy of author. 9. Visible Targets: Similar to target hardening, the goal of target concealment is to prevent illegitimate access to CRAVED products. For example, some pharmacy retailers position CRAVED products like batteries, film, razor blades, or tooth whiteners behind checkout counters. Signs in the items usual aisle locations inform consumers of the items relocation, redirecting them to the checkout area (see figure 24). While this strategy works well to minimize shoplifting, legitimate consumers are often left frustrated, which can decrease sales (Moussatche et al, 2004). Retail design can mitigate this situation through the incorporation of other defensive strategies, like positioning CRAVED products in direct sight of employees or LP staff (see figure 23). Figure 23: Visible Targets. Instead of concealing targets or relocating them behind counters, a better tactic may be to locate CRAVED products (circled in yellow) in direct view of employees. Here, for example, store design has places CRAVED film and disposable cameras in an area closely monitored by store employees. Photo courtesy of author.

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44 Location of CRAVED items Figure 24: Target Concealment. In order to minimize loss, many retailers move CRAVED items to more secure locations. Razor blades, for example, may be relocated from the aisle to behind a counter. Signs in the aisle redirect consumers to the counter for products. This tactic may prevent theft but can also be off-putting to legitimate consumers. Photo courtesy of author. 10. Reduce Frustrations: Shoplifting, at times, can result from sheer frustration with the retail experience: long lines, inattentive customer service, or high prices can reduce a legitimate shopper to an enraged shoplifter (Klemke 1992). While research linking shopping frustrations with shoplifting is scant, a pleasant, well-designed interior cant hurt. Retail interiors should be planned with the consumers ease of shopping in mind; layouts should facilitate fast checkout, and designers should strive to position employees at multiple places in the store to assist with customer queries (see figure 25). Figure 25: Reduce Frustrations. The amount of clear space in front of this checkout counter prevents a frustrating queue, minimizes confusion due to crowding, and prevents consumers from becoming upset. Photo courtesy of author.

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45 11. Reduce Emotions: Some research has linked antiestablishment attitudes with shoplifting, as some offenders believe that giant corporations either deserve to be stolen from, or can easily absorb shoplifting losses (Klemke, 1992). Design can, to some extent, project an image that offsets such beliefs. Smaller-scale stores, store-within-store design, or the overall feeling of a mom-and-pop establishment may help. 12. Discourage Imitation: Research points to signs of incivility (like trash or vandalism) as possible factors conducive to crime (see figure 26) 4 (Coleman, 1990; Harcourt, 1998; Kelling, 1996). Therefore, a well-maintained store interior will contribute to decreased crime more than a shoddy, ill-kept one (see figure 27). Figure 26: Poor Maintenance. Here, CRAVED items are haphazardly positioned on shoddy, ill-kept shelves. According to broken windows theory, this may attract crime. Photo courtesy of author. Figure 27: Excellent Maintenance. This stores display shelves are in good condition, clean, and well-lit. Store design that projects this type of well-maintained atmosphere may dissuade potential offenders because it seems cared for. Photo courtesy of author. 4 Like many CPTED research, Colemans research has been disputed over the years. However, a well-maintained store environment has many benefits aside from crime prevention, so retailers should strive for it regardless of research disputes.

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46 13. Set Rules: In terms of shoplifting, the best way to set rules is to post visible signage indicating the stores shoplifting policy (see figure 28). This may help deter offenders Figure 28: Set Rules. Retail designers should always keep in mind the influence signage can have on user behavior. This store has clear signs indicating their use of CCTV, which implies a stringent shoplifter apprehension policy. Photo courtesy of author. 14. Post Instructions: Similar to #21 above, visible signage alluding to stringent store policies (such as returns, exchanges, or check-writing) can help deter offenders. 15. Alert conscience: Also similar to #21, visible signage reminding shoplifters that shoplifting is a crime has been shown to have a deterrence effect (Klemke, 1992). 16. Assist Compliance: Similar to #18 (reduce emotions), a store that is designed to make legitimate shopping as easy and pleasant as possible can contribute to minimizing crime in some cases. Each of the abovementioned techniques has design implications in the retail interior. Understanding the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior and how its techniques translate into the world of shoplifting and retail interiors is integral to the current study, as it is used to categorize and quantify the elements offenders mention in

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47 their interviews. Furthermore, the matrix forms the foundation for this studys most crucial connection: how retail design can maximize the effectiveness of these offender-influencing environmental cues. Summary This chapter provided a context for the study of how cues in the retail interior influence shoplifter perceptions. It began with an overview of the scale and scope of the shoplifting problem and a description of how the many responses to retail theft have not, to date, solved the problem. A literature review underscored a paucity of security/shoplifting information in the current body of retail interior design literature. It went on to summarize several research studies addressing the link between crime and environment and shoplifter perceptions of the environment. While none of these studies is interior-design-based, collectively they underscore the potential interior design has for influencing criminal behaviors like shoplifting. Finally, this chapter presented a theoretical framework for the current study based on three theories: rational choice, the theft triangle, and situational crime prevention. An explanation of how this study uses the framework follows in Chapter 3.

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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS In order to explore how shoplifters factor retail interiors into the decision to steal, this study employs a theory of environmental criminology: rational choice. Rational choice theory tells us that crime offenders are active decision-makers who apply reason to their assessment of criminal opportunities 5 (Clarke and Felson, 1993). For instance, a shoplifter assesses a situation, collects available information, and weighs potential risks and rewards before deciding whether or not to steal. The current study uses two frameworks derived from rational choice theory in order to operationalize shoplifter statements regarding retail interior environments: the theft triangle and situational crime prevention. Together, these frameworks help us understand how particular situations present physical elements that may shape criminal behavior, prompting it or discouraging it. The retail interior is an integral component in this process, as it is within its context that these cues manifest themselves and are processed by offenders. According to the paradigms presented by these three cited criminology frameworks, then, if retailers and designers apply strategic, security-focused designs to store interiors, it may be possible to manipulate environmental cues in such a way as to discourage theft. However, before this can occur, we need to better understand what these environmental cues are, and which ones influence shoplifter perceptions with the most frequency. Several past studies on offender behavior have used offender interviews to 5 Rational choice theory excludes from this generalization the mentally ill, kleptomaniacs, and those under the influence of drugs. 48

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49 obtain this type of data (Forrester, Chatterton & Pease, 1988; Butler, 1994). The challenge of extracting this information from shoplifter interviews forms this studys research question: using interviews with known shoplifting offenders, can we isolate and identify the physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to their perceptions of crime risk versus crime opportunity in retail interiors? Answering this question will provide a better understanding of how retail environments shape shoplifter perceptions an understanding that can, in turn, inform helpful new strategies for designing effective and secure retail spaces. Sample Participants In order to analyze shoplifter perceptions of retail interiors, it is necessary to gather data from shoplifters themselves: a difficult and time-consuming task. The easiest way to collect a sample for a study such as this is through store or court records of apprehended shoplifters. But historically, these samples have been viewed skeptically, owing to range restriction bias with apprehended (and perhaps incompetent) offenders (Decker, 2005). The 20 interviews comprising this studys sample were originally conducted by the Loss Prevention Research Council (LPRC), a multidisciplinary team of professionals based in Gainesville Florida, several of whom are affiliated with the University of Florida. In order to offset the aforementioned bias, LPRC solicited research participants via a snowball sampling method. Working in conjunction with store detectives at major retailers, LPRC obtained profiles of recently apprehended, but not jailed, shoplifters. These individuals were contacted and informed of the research project. LPRC then provided willing participants a monetary incentive for the names and contact information of other known offenders. The sampling process ensured the sample was not solely comprised of apprehended shoplifters.

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50 Quality of Data While this sample size (20 participants) may seem small, it is in fact quite substantial considering the transitory, unstructured lifestyle many experienced shoplifters live, and the inherent difficulty involved in scheduling and performing interviews with criminals. As Forrester et al point out, the particular difficulties of this approach are obvious (1988, 3). While each individual interview was only an hour or so in duration, the process of identifying, locating, and meeting with each offender often took several weeks. However, the opportunity to use data from active, repeat offenders also had its advantages, as repeat offenders can be among the most useful sources of information for strategic purposes and interviewing active offenders makes it much more likely that the information about motives, techniques, and associations will be closer to the offense, and thus more valid (Decker, 2005, no page). The resulting 20 interviews used in this study are comprehensive in nature, rich in data, and dense in content a literature review reveals that this type of data source is rare in the world of criminology, a fact that in itself marks this study as significant. LPRC conducted the interviews used in this study in Orlando, Florida, in 2000; Dania, Florida, in June of 2002; and Chicago, Illinois, in July 2002. LPRC conducted the interviews in person in a hotel room. The interviews were both videoand audio-recorded, then transcribed by an independent transcription agency. The resulting transcripts ranged in length, due primarily to the length and wordiness of the offenders; some offenders expounded on each topic with long, descriptive responses while others gave curt one-word answers. Two examples of average-length offender transcripts are included in Appendices A and B.

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51 Sample Demographics The demographics of the participants in the study are detailed in Table 2. Of the 20 interviewed participants, the majority were male (90 percent) and white (35 percent). 45 percent of the participants had been arrested for shoplifting, again indicating this sample was not biased toward incompetent offenders. Table 4: Sample Demographics n=20AGE (in years)GENDERETHNICITYINTERVIEWED IN20-29(4) 20%male(18) 90%white(7) 35%Chicago, IL, 2002(5) 25%30-39(3) 15%female(1) 5%black(1) 5%Dania Beach, FL, 2002(10) 50%40-49(6) 30%unknown(1) 5%hispanic(4) 20%Orlando, FL, 2000(5) 25%50-59(2) 10%unknown(8) 40%unknown(5) 25%EMPLOYMENTEDUCATIONyes(9) 45%<01(7) 35%full-time(8) 40%20(1) 5%4-year degree(1) 5%unknown(4) 20%unknown(5) 25%ARRESTED FOR SHOPLIFTING?TIMES ARRESTED Methodology The primary study method involves a secondary data analysis of semi-structured interviews with known and admitted shoplifting offenders. The analysis is secondary because the initial goal of the interviews was to examine a wide range of the determining factors behind shoplifting, including product type, display techniques, product packaging, potential for item resale, store location, interior design, and existing security measures. The study employs both narrative and content analyses. The content analysis provides a systematic approach to categorizing and quantifying the massive amounts of qualitative data contained in the interviews. Narrative analysis (in the form of individual excerpts

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52 from the offender interview transcripts) provides a contextual safety net that catches important tonal implications or thematic subtleties overlooked by the content analysis (Spence, 1982). Both methods are described in detail below. Content Analysis A content analysis is a technique used to extract desired information from a body of material (usually verbal) by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of the material (Smith, 2000, 314). In the current study, the body of material refers to the 20 transcribed offender interviews. The specified characteristics of the material refers to the cues the study seeks to categorize and quantify: physical cues in the retail interior shoplifters cite as influential to the decision to steal. According to Smith (2000), a content analysis consists of 11 steps. These steps, and their relevance to the current study, are: 1. State the research problem. Do certain physical cues in the retail interior influence offender perceptions ease or difficulty associated with the shoplifting act? If so, what do they notice, how do they interpret it, and how does this process affect their subsequent behavior? Moreover, do analytical tools derived from the theft triangle and situational crime prevention help us understand, categorize and practically use offender interview data? 2. Decide whether the content analysis will provide the needed information. As a research tool, the content analysis determines the existence and frequency of certain words, phrases, sentences, and concepts pertaining to physical features of a retail environment within the transcript texts. Codifying these elements allows for systematic description of the form and content of written or spoken material methodical categorization and analysis of data within various interview transcripts. It also enables the study to go beyond the immediate content of the interviews and further capture the thoughts and beliefs that fuel the offenders decision-making processes (Sommer and Sommer, 2002). 3. Decide what type of qualitative material will best provide the information. The LPRC interview instrument used in this study was well-suited for determining shoplifter perceptions because while it posed the same questions to each participant, it was also flexible (a list of the questions used in this instrument are included in Appendix C). The presentation or order of the questions varied, often in accordance with the natural flow of conversation. This is called a semi-structured

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53 interview (Bartholomew, Henderson, & Marcia, 2000); an interviewing method that allowed participants to expand on and describe thoughts and ideas. Using it gave the data a richness and complexity that frequently approached narrative form (the implications of which will be discussed later). One of the drawbacks of the semi-structured interview, however, is that relevant data was often scattered and somewhat unorganized. A content analysis was therefore appropriate for this study because the coding process identified information relevant to the current study information which was often descriptive in nature and did not lend itself to immediate quantification. 4. Decide how to select the chosen material and the amount needed. N/a the material was predetermined in the interview transcripts. 5. Decide on a content analysis coding system. In order to reduce the massive amount of text in the interviews to an organized set of quantifiable data, the content analysis employs a process called coding, in which coders classified words or phrases according to content, context, and meaning. The formation of a reliable, thorough coding system is an integral part of any successful content analysis, as it enables accurate collection, identification and operationalization of all data relevant to the research question and allows the analysis to be replicated with some amount of consistency (Stemler, 1997). The coding system in this study is informed by a combination of situational crime theory and security-minded design practice. It is derived from situational crime preventions 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques, but reduced to 15 techniques targeted toward retail interiors. The resulting Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (see Matrix 2) contains four general category headings, 15 categories, and numerous detailed subcategories. Offender statements are coded using these detailed subcategories (which can also be referred to as secondary variables, as they are subsumed by, or a constituent of, the primary constructs [categories] under investigation) (Bartholomew et al., 2000, 294). The subcategories further assist with sifting scattered data, an important step for reliable, valid data analysis, since faulty definitions of categories and non-mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories are the two fatal flaws in a content analysis (Stemler, 2001, no page). The thoroughness and expansiveness of these categories provide a classification system that facilitate accurate content analysis. 6. Obtain pilot material on which to try out the coding system. For the purpose of this study, one offender interview serves as as pilot material. 7. Train coders. This involves reviewing the entire study with a fellow coder, and explaining in detail how the coding system works. As stated previously, a very clear, well-defined coder manual is imperative for accurate results and optimal validity. However, the categories in this studys coding manual (the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix) are by no means mutually exclusive. Although situational crime preventions matrix attaches specific strategies to theoretical concepts, it is still in essence a flexible, dynamic framework. The system of categories in this studys coding manual matrix may seem rigid, but it is in fact not.

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54 Some shoplifter statements fit as easily into one category as the next. This is an important clarification to make when training coders. 8. Obtain the final material to be analyzed. n/a, since interview transcripts had already been obtained. 9. Code the material. The coding process inherent to the content analysis provides a systematic approach to categorizing and quantifying the massive amounts of qualitative data in the studys sample of 20 semi-structured interviews. This studys content analysis uses the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior to identify words, phrases or sentences about perceptions of risk versus opportunity in retail interiors. In addition to actual coding of interview transcripts, it is also important to determine the inter-rater reliability of the coding system. As Stemler (2001) explains, this tests whether coding schemes lead to the same text being coded in the same category by different people. An inter-rater reliability test applied to 15 percent of the interview transcripts measures how well two different coders agree on interpretation of the data (Batholomew et al, 2000). As Smith notes, one of the most frequently-used indices for determining this was developed by McClelland et. al. in 1953: 2 (# of agreements between coders on presence of category) / ((# coded present by Coder 1) + (# coded present by Coder 2)). Agreement of 85 percent is considered satisfactory, but for exploratory studies such as this one, a somewhat lower degree of inter-rater reliability is acceptable (Smith, 2000, 325). The results of the inter-rater reliability test are included in Table 3. 10. Analyze the data. For this study, data analysis involves a dual perspective. While a retail interiors environmental cues can be neatly categorized into the various categories of the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix, shoplifters sometimes perceive individual cues in decidedly opposing manners: again, one shoplifters risk is anothers opportunity. This phenomenon is further explained in Chapter 4s Discussion section 11. Interpret the results. Inter-Rater Reliability In order to ascertain the reliability of content analysis as a research tool, this study includes an inter-rater reliability test that measured one coders results against anothers. A fellow coder was selected based on her basic familiarity with the project. After reading the study research proposal, the primary coder explained the coding manuals (the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix) and performed a pilot analysis while the secondary coder looked on. Once the secondary coder was familiar with the content

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55 analysis process, she was given three random offender interviews to code. Both coders performed a content analysis on these same three random interviews. Again, it is important to realize here that the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix (which is also the coding manual) was not rigid, and the categories not always mutually exclusive. Table 4 shows the results of the Inter-rater Reliability test. Results show that each of the two coders who performed the test identified a total of 107 offender statements about physical cues that influence perceptions of shoplifting risk or opportunity 6 In addition, each coder found that over 80 percent of offender statements fell into the same four categories. The test shows that categorical agreement ranges from 55 percent to 98 percent, with an average percent agreement of 78 percent, suggesting a fairly reliable coding system. Table 5: Inter-Rater Reliability Test Results Hardened Targets252698%Exit Access8355%Exit Screening11884%Extended Guardianship15870%Natural Surveillance243976%Place Managers4267%Formal Surveillance202198%TOTAL107107AVG: 78%CategoryAmt. Coded Present by Coder 2Percent AgreementAmt. Coded Present by Coder 1 6 Although a similar number of identified statements between the two coders was expected, the fact that they each identified exactly 107 statements is probably due, in part, to chance.

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56 Validity This study uses a matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as the instrument to measure offender statements about cues they cite as influential to the decision to steal. Because this instrument was developed as part of the project, it is important to discuss its validity. Validity is defined as the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Carmines and Zeller, 1979, 17). In this case, the study is measuring offender perceptions of cues in the retail interior. Therefore, it is important to assess the validity of the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as a means of measuring such perceptions. As Carmines and Zeller (1979) point out, establishing a valid means of measurement in the social sciences can be complex, as abstract theoretical concepts (like perceptions of risk and opportunity) do not often have an agreed upon domain of content relevant to the phenomenon (1979, pg. 21). In such cases, face validity is often applied. Face validity concerns the extent to which [the instrument] measures what it appears to measure according to the researchers subjective assessment (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1992, 158). However, this subjectivity is an inherent limitation to face validity, as there are no replicable procedures for evaluating the measuring instrument (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1992, 158). Several components contribute to the validity of this studys measuring instrument, the Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (Table 3). First, it was specifically adapted with the researchers experience in the retail design and loss prevention field in mind, and only after an extensive review of loss prevention, retail design, and environmental criminology literature. Second, the instrument was derived from situational crime preventions 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques (Table 2), a well-known framework of crime prevention strategies developed by an expert in the field of

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57 crime prevention, Ronald Clarke (1997). As Schneider and Kitchen (2002) make clear, this group of techniques is a robust and developing means of assessing situational crime prevention, as its growing number of advocates have significantly broadened the theoretical bases on which crime prevention planning rests (pg. 104). Finally, while Clark developed the original 25 techniques to address a wide range of situational crime prevention goals (Clark, 1997), they have also been applied in strictly retail settings. Hayes (1997) research on improving deterrence and reducing loss in retail stores also employed these techniques. Hayes referred to the set of techniques as a very useful model for retail crime and loss control purposes (Hayes, 1997, 4). Therefore, the face validity of this studys matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as a measuring instrument is strengthened by both the source from which it is derived, and the researchers and industry experts who advocate its use. Narrative Analysis As mentioned earlier, the semi-structured nature of the offender interviews allowed participants to provide lengthy, descriptive responses to questions if so desired. Some of these responses are so lengthy, in fact, they resemble narrative. For example, consider this offenders response when asked what part of the store he goes to in order to hide an item: It depends, because um, it depends, it depends on how many people are in the store, how many people are on that aisle, how many cameras are around me, and how many employees are in that section. Okay, those are all factors youve got to look at, now as you get, as you see it coming you got to understand that its like when youre driving youve got to premeditate what might come like that guy right there in the next lane might just jump into your lane, but youre premeditate before it happens, you know. So youve got to worry, okay, what if that lady right there standing next you isnt, you know, a customer and yet shes an undercover employee, security, you know, so youve got to look at it like that so basically what theyre going to is youre going to go to the bathroom because in a bathroom, like I said, you pocket it, go to the bathroom make sure you know de-code it you know,

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58 make sure you get the alarm off or if theyre going to take the whole package before they even do that theyll act like theyre looking at it. You know what Im saying, like okay, but what theyre really looking at it in an upper angle, you know like, oh wow, its pretty nice da-da-da, but yet theyre balling the cameras to see where the cameras are located and thats how they know. Joey In this one response, the offender mentions several themes relevant to the current studys content analysis: Natural Surveillance (it depends how many people are in the store, how many people are on that aisle) Extended Guardianship (how many cameras are around me . see where the cameras are located) Place Managers (how many employees are in that section) Formal Surveillance (what if that lady next to isnt, you know, a customer and yet shes an undercover employee, security, you know, so youve got to look at it like that) and Target Hardening (make sure you got the tag off) among others. However, while the passage can be reduced to these individual themes, it is also worthwhile to examine the response holistically, as a recollection of past events, since, in essence, what the offenders are doing as they answer these questions is providing a summarized oral history of their shoplifting history. When Joeys response is considered from a narrative angle, thematic subtexts arise: paranoia, worry, vulnerability, and nervousness could all characterize the tone implicit in his account. Such nuances are too vague to be accounted for by a strictly code-based content analysis, which is why the flexible, subjective nature of narrative analysis is so helpful to this study. As Smith (2000) explains, a narrative is an oral, written, or filmed account of events told to others or to oneself . used to refer to accounts of personal experiences, or the experiences of others, or to fictional accounts. Smith also makes the important distinction between narrative and impersonal explanation: narratives are not purely descriptive, expository (e.g., an explanation of how to assemble furniture), disconnected, or abstract (pg. 328).

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59 It is in this context that the relevance of narrative analysis methodology to the current study becomes evident. Because so many of the offender responses are narrative in nature, it is impossible to capture the embedded context and layers of meaning using content analysis alone. Narrative analysis is more appropriate when primacy of context is an issue, and is thus better equipped to convey the expressive breadth of an offenders response (Smith, 2000, 327). Narrative Analysis in Interior Design Research Narrative analysis is also particularly well-suited for this study because of its growing popularity in interior design research. A number of recent studies in the design field have employed narrative analysis to explore various issues (Danko, Meneely, Portillo, 2006; Miller, 2005; McDonnell, Lloyd & Valkenburg, 2004; Portillo and Dorr, 2000; Zeisle, 2000; Ganoe, 1999) including an entire issue of the Journal of Interior Design (Portillo, 2000) devoted to the subject. Why the pairing of narrative analysis and interior design? Some cite a similarity in theme between narrative inquiry and the design process itself: Narrative, like design, is context-dependent. Both are a creative outgrowth of the details and situational events that characterize a particular time and place (Danko et al, 2006, 12). Others propose that it is the inherently interdisciplinary, multifaceted quality of narrative analysis that warrants its suitability to design research. The characteristics of the narrative that help to organize the complex world of people, entities, and events through the language of stories provides a flexible framework for understanding and expanding the meanings of design (Ganoe, 1999, 2). In essence, narrative analysis provides a way to understand perceptions of retail interiors in context, in perspective, and in a holistic manner.

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60 This study incorporates various excerpts from offender interviews throughout Chapter 4. Due to the subjective and flexible nature of narrative, a formal tally of the narrative analysis findings is not feasible; however, the study uses narratives to emphasize and expand on the content analysis findings. In this way, the two forms of analysis reinforce one another and provided a means of understanding the data that is more comprehensive than if either form were used alone. Limitations Several limitations affect the outcome of this study. One is the source and validity of the transcript data. As experts in the field of loss prevention research, LPRC routinely conducts studies focusing on crime and loss techniques for the retail sector, and understands the complex nature of gathering shoplifting data. This type of data is usually based on either apprehension case reports or self-report data. LPRC understands that both of these methods are inherently limited by sampling and measurement error. Apprehension data, collected when the shoplifter is caught and in various states of mind, can be more indicative of security personnel skill, scheduling, search imaging, and workplace practices than shoplifting behavior. Self-report data are most often collected via self-administered questionnaires or surveys. This too can lead to flawed data, as results depend on shoplifters abilities, and willingness to share, past events, as well as their truthfulness (Klemke, 1992). To avoid these pitfalls, LPRC conducted the interviews via a snowball sampling method in which apprehended shoplifters were given monetary incentives to provide the names and phone numbers of other known offenders. Nevertheless, this study was still limited to the interviewed offenders ability to recollect past events and willingness to (truthfully) share them.

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61 LPRC conducted these interviews with a wide range of shoplifters from various cities and backgrounds. The interviews did not focus on any particular type of store or setting. Therefore, the data acquired from these interviews is general in nature, without reference to specific stores, times, or incidents (unless noted by offender). This study is limited by such generalization, and future follow-up studies may be improved by focusing the data on specific stores, settings, or incidents, to generate more targeted offender responses. Similarly, the data in this study is based on shoplifters recollections of store environments. Were the interviews administered in the actual retail environment, answers could have been more specific. It is important to note, however, some proponents of narrative analysis prefer experiential recollections. Spence (1982) differentiates between historical truth and narrative truth, concluding the historical, or literal, truth of an event is often less useful to research than the narrative truth, which is more indicative of an individuals subjective recollection of the experience, and thus more informative of their beliefs and intentions. For example, an offenders recollection (accurate or not) of feeling vulnerable in a space because of CCTV monitors could be just as useful if not more so as an offenders actual experience of feeling vulnerable in a space because of CCTV monitors. Another limitation to this study is the small sample size. Sample size is an integral component of successful research, as it affects the range, reliability, and accuracy of the values measured (Smith, 2000, 320). Due to the inherent costliness of conducting the interviews and the difficult nature of contacting and scheduling interviews with criminal

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62 offenders, only 20 are included in this study. Future studies, conducted with more participants, could further improve results. The content analysis process itself also has limits. This study employs just two coders, and only one reliability test is performed. Were the study to employ several coders, the reliability of the results may have been different and perhaps improved. The main limitation of narrative analysis stems from its purely subjective and interpretive nature. As a method of research, the narrative analysis is based solidly in the ability of the reader to interpret the meaning and context of the discourse. While some advocates of narrative analysis do not regard the concept of validity as directly applicable to narrative research, in reality it suffers many of the same limitations as other qualitative methods of research, like content analysis (Smith, 2000, 331). The use of secondary data presents its own limitations. As previously mentioned, the interviews in this study were originally gathered by LPRC for numerous purposes. Perceptions of retail interiors, while present in the interviews, were only one component of a larger range of questions. To further improve the validity of this studys results, it could be specifically tailored to gathering of design-based information about retail interiors. There are also some inherent limitations to the use of the semi-structured interview. Paradoxically, its main benefit flexibility is also its main drawback. While the SSI allows interviewers to steer the conversation in natural directions and participants to provide elaborate responses and detailed data, this flexibility also inhibits data analysis since lengthy, conversational data is difficult to code and categorize (Bartholomew et al, 2000).

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63 Summary This chapter described the studys research methodology, providing details about the sample of participants involved, including their demographics. After a detailed explanation of the studys methodology, the two forms of analysis used content analysis and narrative analysis were both defined discussed in terms of applicability to and appropriateness for this particular study. The reliability and validity of the content analysis were discussed, as well as the applicability of narrative analysis in the field of interior design. The chapter concluded with an overview of the various limitations impacting this studys outcomes.

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CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS Findings The purpose of this study is to determine if offenders factor retail interior design into their decision to shoplift, and if so, to identify the physical cues they cite as influential to that decision. Analyzing these cues through the lens of rational choice theory and two related frameworks (situational crime prevention and the theft triangle), this studys content analysis indicates that offenders do consider retail interiors in their decision to steal. Moreover, the content analysis shows evidence that offenders consider some features of retail interiors more frequently than others. This chapter explains these findings through a detailed account of the content and narrative analysis results. Content Analysis The Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (see Table 3) was the coding tool used in this studys content analysis. A specifically retail-oriented version of situational crime preventions matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques, this matrix categorized offender statements about cues in the retail interior on three different levels: Category Headings. The most general categories in the Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior are the four category headings: Perceived Effort, Perceived Risk, Perceived Provocation, and Perceived Excuses. The content analysis findings (see Table 6) placed over 95 percent of offender statements into the first two category headings, Perceived Effort and Perceived Risk. This presents strong support for the theories of rational choice and the theft triangle, which both assert that offender perceptions of risk are a major determinant in the decision to commit a crime. Categories. The content analysis revealed a total of 639 statements in which offenders cited a physical cue as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity (see Table 6). The analysis categorized each of these into one of the 15 64

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65 main categories in the Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior. Results show that over 70 percent of offender statements fell into four of the 15 categories: Hardened Targets, Extended Guardianship, Natural Surveillance, and Formal Surveillance. Subcategories: The content analysis fu rther refined offender statements into subcategories containing detailed descrip tions of various interior conditions found in the retail environment. Th ese descriptions include stat ements such as Presence of glass cases under the category heading of Hardened Targets, or Quantity of Employees under the category heading of P lace Managers. The content analysis placed any offender statements about such conditions in that subcategory, whether the offenders statement conveyed a percepti on that the condition was a risk or an opportunity. For instance, an offenders comm ent about the presence of a glass case being a shoplifting risk was categorized the same way as a statement about the lack of glass cases being an opportunity. In either statement, the offender cited the presence of a physical cue (or lack thereof) as influential to his/her perception of crime risk or opportunity. Table 6 shows a detailed breakdown of the c ontent analysis findings The findings are discussed below: 1. Hardened Targets 14 percent of offender stat ements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell in to this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: Glass cases (items within perceived as deterrent, lack thereof perceived as opportunity): 17 statements Cashier counter (merchandise kept behind perceived as deterrent, merchandise not kept behind perceived as opportunity): 3 statements Display racks (displays perceived as easy to access or difficult to access): 38 statements Access to items (items perceived as easy to access or difficult to access): 21 statements Locks, cables, cords and chains (locked and secured items perceived as shoplifting deterrent, or unlocked, unsecured it ems as opportunity): 10 statements

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66 Table 6: Content Analysis Findings Presence of glass cases 17Presence of CCTV 80Items kept behind counters3Quantity of CCTV system14100Accessibility of displays38Well-monitored CCTV 16Accessibility of items21Quality of CCTV system10Presence of cords, locks, cables10total89total120total10total0Presence of blind s p ots22Access to exits9Being noticed/unnoticed 72Emergency exits4Number of customers in store1300Number of exits6Store layout39Presence of garden areas9Crowds170Store size19Lighting1Item location1total28total184total0total0Presence of EAS tags/sensors 32Attentiveness of employees19Presence of EAS gates at door14Quantity of employees1320Store greeter at doo r 7Employees (general)10Security guard at door9total62total42total2total0Security (general)25Police presence at store5Attentiveness of security8Level of maintenance0Uniformed security staff240Undercover store detectives24total5total81total0Presence of previous crimesAntiestablishment sentiment15. Conscience: 0% 9. Formal Surveillance: 13%12. Imitation: 0% Quality of customer service11. Emotions: .5% 10. Frustrations: 0% Presence of highly visible CRAVED itemsPresence of shoplifting signagePresence of fitting room limit signs"Ask for assistance" signs"Shoplifting is stealing" signs14. Instructions: 0% 7. Natural Surveillance: 28% 2. Exit Access: 4%5. Extended Guardianship: 18% 4. Offender Deflection: 1% 3. Exit Screening: 10% 8. Place Managers: 7 %13. Rules: 2% 1. Concealed & Hardened Targets: 14% y PERCEIVED EFFORT: 29%PERCEIVED RISK: 65%PERCEIVED PROVOCATION: 2.5%PERCEIVED EXCUSES: 2% 9. Visible Targets: 2%

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67 2. Exit Access Four percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: Access to exits (obstructed access perceived as risk or easy, clear exit access perceived as opportunity): 9 statements Emergency exits (control of exits perceived as risk; uncontrolled exits perceived as opportunity): 4 statements Number of exits (multiple exits perceived as opportunity): 6 statements Garden areas (presence of perceived as opportunity): 9 statements 3. Exit Screening Ten percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: EAS tags, sensors (presence of perceived as shoplifting risk, absence perceived as opportunity): 32 statements EAS gates (presence of perceived as shoplifting risk, absence perceived as opportunity): 14 statements Store greeter positioned at entry/exit point (presence of perceived as shoplifting deterrent): 7 statements Security personnel positioned at entry/exit point (presence of perceived as shoplifting deterrent): 9 statements 4. Offender Deflection One percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategory (and number of statements they contain) include: Police presence at store (presence of perceived as shoplifting deterrent): 5 statements 5. Extended Guardianship Levels 19.5 percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: Presence of CCTV (presence of perceived as risk, or lack thereof (i.e., blind spots) perceived as opportunity): 80 statements

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68 Quantity of CCTV cameras (high number perceived as risk or low number perceived as opportunity): 19 statements Monitoring of CCTV (perception of well-monitored systems as deterrent or perception of poorly-monitored systems as opportunity): 16 statements Quality of CCTV (high-tech system perceived as deterrent): 10 statements 6. Natural Surveillance 28 percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: Blind spots (hidden, unmonitored areas of the store perceived as shoplifting opportunity): 22 statements Being seen (perception of being seen perceived as deterrent, or perception of going undetected perceived as opportunity): 72 statements Number of customers (high number perceived as deterrent, low number perceived as opportunity): 13 statements Store layout (possibility of being seen perceived as deterrent, or ability to scan store perceived as opportunity): 39 statements Crowds (confusion due to crowds perceived as opportunity): 17 statements Store size (large store with high-tech security perceived as risk, store too large for security to monitor perceived as opportunity): 19 statements Lighting (dimly-lit store perceived as opportunity): 1 statement Item location (CRAVED item positioned in unmonitored part of store perceived as opportunity): 1 statement 7. Place Managers Slightly more than six percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include: Employees in general (any type of employee presence perceived as shoplifting risk): 10 statements Attentiveness of employees (conscientious employees perceived as risk, apathetic employees perceived as opportunity): 19 statements Quantity of employees (high number perceived as risk, low number perceived as opportunity): 13 statements 8. Formal Surveillance 12.5 percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

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69 Security in general (security presence perceived as shoplifting deterrent, lack thereof perceived as opportunity): 25 statements Attentiveness of security (apathetic security perceived as opportunity): 8 statements Uniformed security guards (presence of perceived as deterrent): 24 statements Undercover store detectives (presence of perceived as deterrent): 24 statements 9. Target Visibility Two percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategory (and number of statements they contain) include: Visibility of CRAVED items (highly visible CRAVED items perceived as opportunity): 10 statements 10. Frustrations This category included poor customer service, long waiting lines, and minimal checkout areas as possible motivators for theft. However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this category. 11. Emotions Half of a percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategory (and number of statements it contains) include: Antiestablishment sentiments (lack of moral consequences in stealing from big corporations perceived as opportunity, guilt involved in stealing from small mom-and-pop store perceived as deterrent ): 2 statements 12. Imitation This category referred to signs of past crimes or low-maintenance (which can contribute to a perception of low guardianship or monitoring) as a possible opportunity for theft imitation, while signs of a well-maintained interior (which imply higher guardianship and monitoring) as a possible risk, thereby discouraging imitation. However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this category.

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70 13. Rules Two percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategory (and number of statements it contains) included: Signage (presence of clear signage indicating shoplifter prosecution policy perceived as deterrent): 11 statements 14. Instructions This category referred to the posting of clear instructions (such as return, fitting room, or check-writing policies) as cues that may increase offender perceptions of risk. However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring this category. 15. Conscience This category referred to the posting of conscience-raising signage (like shoplifting is stealing) as a cue that may deter potential offenders. However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this category. Narrative Analysis While the content analysis findings illustrate the number of statements in each category of the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix, they do not communicate the full depth of an offenders decision-making process. A second method of analysis, narrative analysis, complements the content analysis by lending context, tone, and emotion to the studys findings. Below, the results of the content analysis are explained in greater detail, and with the added dimension of offender narratives. These narratives serve several purposes: clarifying the connection between offender perceptions and interior design characteristics; conveying the complex, personal nature of the offenders decision-making process; and underscoring how the opportunity theories laid out by

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71 rational choice theory, the theft triangle, and situational crime prevention manifest themselves in this process. 1. Hardened Targets The studys content analysis identified the accessibility or inaccessibility of shoplifting targets (usually CRAVED items) as one of the four top-scoring categories, with 14 percent of offender statements. Overall, the narrative analysis found offenders perceive the accessibility/inaccessibility of shoplifting targets as a simple, black-and-white situation: an accessible target is perceived as a shoplifting opportunity while an inaccessible target is perceived as a deterrent. As Hayes (1997) describes, retail crime prevention exists on varying tiers, or zones of influence: the community level, the exterior of the store, the interior of the store, and the asset point, or area where the item is displayed. This asset point can be further refined to refer to the items position on/in store fixtures (behind counters or in cases), and position on/in displays (on hooks, locked vs. unlocked). Over 60 offender statements referred to item/display accessibility (or inaccessibility) as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity. Some statements referred to the asset level, as the excerpt below explains: It depends on how [the store] has [CRAVED items] set up. If they just have them on racks, you can take the whole box. Just slide them off. Paul Other offender comments about item accessibility referred to item placement within the stores layout. Offenders perceived certain locations in the store to be more conducive to shoplifting than others. The offender below presents the decision to shoplift as a logical equation, in which item location is key: Its not rocket science. [A CRAVED items has] a high resale value, its easy to take, its in a part of the store, theyre usually in a part of the store, you know you go into Walgreens or something like that and theyre in the back of the store, its easy. Its easy to work. Mike

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72 This offender discusses item location more specifically: I mean, the thing about the [items I take] is theyre also very accessible. You know what I mean? Its not like they put them behind the counter. And I always thought to myself they should probably, like . keep them back there. I mean people are going to buy them whether theyre behind the counter or out with the rest of the stuff. Its just easy access. You walk up to, you know [the product], and just take a quick look around and pull a bunch and stick them right in your pocket. Joe Twenty offender statements in the content analysis referred to physical cues that communicated hardening, or inaccessibility, as a perceived shoplifting risk. As the excerpts below suggest, offenders perceive items protected by glass cases, stored behind counters, or attached to displays as a real deterrent, sometimes impossible to steal: The only time [shoplifting] is really difficult is when you cant get [items] because they put them behind the glass and you have to ask someone to come get it. Or sometimes they have them behind counters or stuff like that . the only way to stop [shoplifting] is to keep them behind glass or behind the counter. Julian Sometimes you go into a place and you just dont have the accessibility to some of the products you want because theyre behind the counters or locked up, you know what I mean. Thats a big thing. I mean, at that point you walk out and go someplace else. Deterrents work. They do. Ian If [CRAVED merchandise] is behind a place like the register, I know its tough to put everybodys products behind a register, or you know, behind a key like they do with cigarettes . The bottom line, its the location. Because if its easy to get theyre going to take it. Cowboy As these narratives illustrate, merchandising and product placement can communicate a clear perception of shoplifting risk if planned correctly. 2. Exit Access Four percent of offender statements about perceived risk and opportunity cues referred to the idea of exit access. Most offender statements in this category (9 statements) cited uncontrolled exit access (like a clear, unobstructed path to an exit) as a perceived shoplifting opportunity. This finding suggests that cues like unobstructed exit access, multiple exits, and garden center exits all contribute to an

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73 offenders perception that he/she will get away with the shoplifting act, as the narratives below attest: [A shoplifter will] run through the emergency exit and the alarm will go off but it takes about 15 minutes, not 15 minutes, about 5 minutes, for security to actually get to that part of the building and by the time they get there were already on the next road. Joey [Walgreens is easy to steal from] cause I dont know, usually, just, I dont know, its big and its just easy to run out the door right there. . we leave through the aisle, actually its the cosmetics, so its like no walking by the [checkout] counter. Nolan One of the subcategories with the highest scores in this category (9 statements) was the presence of a garden area. Many large mass-merchant chains include garden areas for the sale of plants and garden accessories. These areas are fenced-in, and connected to (but outside of) the store interior. As such, they provide an alternate form of exit access. If the ceilings of these areas are not fenced as well, they also provide an easy way for offenders to shoplift. The offender simply brings stolen good to the garden area, tosses them over the fence, and exits the store. He/she retrieves the stolen items afterward: You get outside and theres a fenced-in garden where theres no top of the fence. Just throw the bag [of stolen items] over the fence. Joe Garden center because they always have a fence and that fenced area you could always find a nice gap-sized hole . you try to find a spot where nobodys paying attention and you get yourself little clippers and clip clip and make yourself a hole through the fence and have a friend on the other side . say hey, man go up to the garden center. Theres a bag out there, go pick it up. Gary As the following offender explains, using the garden center as a means to shoplift can allow evasion of other LP technologies, like EAS: I would just leave [products with advanced EAS tags attached] alone because its going to be a real big hassle. Unless like I said youre in a store that is very opportunistic to throw it over the fence, like you got a good store where you can fill up a bag and throw it over the fence and go back and get it. Philip

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74 3. Exit Screening Ten percent of shoplifter comments referred to the screening of exits (EAS systems, store greeters, or receipt-checkers at the door perceived as risk, or a lack of these cues perceived as opportunity). As the excerpt below conveys, some offenders perceive certain exit-screening techniques as more risky than others: I think the difference between [stores that are easy versus hard to steal from] is the electric sensors and cameras; where theyre positioned. Kind of like in the public library where they have these magnetic walls and stuff instead of just having a greeter to check your receipt. Julian However, the fact that only 10 percent of the total amount of offender statements referred to exit screening cues as contributors to perceptions of risk or opportunity suggests that other cues in the matrix are more influential to offenders decision-making. This finding might imply that shoplifters find exit screening devices like EAS easy to circumvent or evade. It might also imply that retailers should focus their efforts in areas other than exit screening. 4. Offender Deflection Offender deflection refers to measures that actually keep offenders from coming into the store. One method retailers use is positioning a police presence outside the store. However, this is not a common practice, which may explain, in part, why only one percent of offender statements referred to offender deflection as influential to the perception of risk or opportunity in the retail store. 5. Extended Guardianship The category of extended guardianship scored second-highest in terms of frequency, with 19.5 percent of shoplifter statements. In the retail context, the idea of extended guardianship involves the use of CCTV, which allows retailers and LP staff to extend their guardianship over parts of the store that they cannot see firsthand. The presence or absence of CCTV makes a difference in terms of offenders perceptions of risk or opportunity. Indeed, the presence of CCTV was the

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75 single most frequently-cited physical cue in the study, with 80 offender statements referring to it as a risk (if present) or an opportunity (if absent). These findings suggest that any CCTV use, be it poor quality, scant coverage, or poorly-monitored, helps contribute to an offenders sense of risk and sanction. The following narrative excerpts underscore this perception: I mean, the cameras gonna get you. Its just a matter if security is watching or whos watching. Thats what it comes down to is if someone sees ya. Cameras are always on. Its just if youve been seen or not. Donny I think the difference between [stores that are easy to steal from versus those that are difficult] is the electric sensors and the cameras; where theyre positioned . I mean, some places are harder, some places are easier. Greg You know, youre thinking, the cameras seeing me take off more than one, and its definitely watching. So thats definitely, that right there, that will work [to deter crime]. Phillip In some instances, offenders perceived the quality of the CCTV system as influential to their decision to steal, expressing a perception that high-tech video tracking devices could be hidden from sight or programmed to recognize faces: I believe they also have little tiny cameras like on the shelves, I aint too sure, but I always look out for those. Nolan I dont look at [CCTV monitors located above store entrances] because they have cameras on those so they can catch a picture of your face. Joey Correspondingly, offenders cited poor-quality CCTV systems (lack of cameras, or unmonitored, poorly positioned cameras) as a perceived opportunity for shoplifting. Most of these statements had to do with a lack of CCTV coverage, and the resulting blind spots: A blind spot . like where the cameras cant see you . [the local Wal-Mart] has a blind spot actually in the filing cabinets. They also have a blind spot in their hunting goods . I can see a blind spot and theres rarely anybody walking through there, and you cant detect any cameras. There might be a little tiny one somewhere . . Like, its not full coverage of the store. Cowboy

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76 In some of these statements, offenders perceived shoplifting opportunity due to CCTV systems with apparently incomplete store coverage: Like I say, everyone knows they arent much up on the security camera thing. Just the way the store is set up, theres plenty of areas to go, you know, and slip something in your pocket. Dan Wal-Mart was one of the easiest [stores to steal from] before they made the new store, which is like full of cameras. But they do have some aisles where you can pick something up from an aisle that does have a camera, walk around like youre looking for something else, go to the aisle that doesnt have a camera, and just, like, take it out of the pack, slip it in your pocket, and walk around some more. Something like that. Joe Other offenders cited the difficulty for a very large store to thoroughly cover the space with CCTV as a shoplifting opportunity, again linking the size of the store to its security capabilities: A large store is easier to steal from because] just the difference, the space, the amount of cameras there . a bigger, open area compared to a smaller enclosed space with more cameras. Circuit City is not huge like Wal-Mart, and theyve got a lot of cameras. Wal-Mart doesnt have a lot of cameras. Target doesnt have as many cameras as they should either . Those big stores are easy to steal from. Pat Still other offenders described a perception that stores simply dont monitor their CCTV systems well enough for them to be a real deterrent: A lot of companies just dont put a lot of effort into security cameras and things of that nature. Arlene Its confusing. Its just a big ball of confusion, you know? Its like, lets say youre trying to be god, youre trying to look all over the world, but you dont have the same power he does. If youre trying to watch everybody at the same time youd just be lost. So thats exactly what they got somebody in the security room just lost as hell. Nolan As a method for extending guardianship, CCTV can influence crime levels in different ways according to the level and extent of use (Spriggs and Gill, 2006). According to the statements collected in this study, offender perceptions are frequently

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77 altered by the presence of CCTV. Collectively, these narrative excerpts and content analysis findings indicate the offenders in this study perceive CCTV as a real deterrent. Retailers and retail designers, therefore, should pay particular attention to the use, set-up, and quality of CCTV when planning the retail store, as the resulting system will likely have an impact on how offenders gauge shoplifting risk and opportunity. 6. Natural Surveillance As a CPTED principle, the goal of natural surveillance is to give legitimate users and casual observers the ability to monitor a space, therefore increasing an offenders perception of vulnerability or risk (Crowe, 2000). Natural surveillance is not a result of store employees. It is provided by customers and other legitimate users of the retail space (like vendors, browsers, or passersby). The ability of these users to scan the space contributes to natural surveillance; that is, surveillance resulting from the natural design of the store, and the activity within it (Atlas, 2001). In order to avoid risk of apprehension, shoplifters attempt to avoid being seen by these users. Of course, the ability to assess whether or not anyone is looking is predicated on the built environment, and whether or not it is constructed to support this kind of surveillance (again, the paradox of surveillance). A store designed to facilitate sight and surveillance can assist both retail staff and shoplifters, allowing them both to visually canvas the space (offenders for threats and opportunities, employees for theft activity). This duality was reflected in the amount of offender statements in this category: many offenders perceived natural surveillance as a risk, while others perceived it as an opportunity. Some recognized that natural surveillance, as it exists in the built environment: is both a risk and an opportunity:

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78 Im looking for cameras. Im looking for the amount of employees. Im looking for people that are looking at me. Paul Of the 639 statements about cues perceived as shoplifting opportunities or risks, a majority of these (28 percent) fell into the category of natural surveillance. Because this category contains so many offender statements, its various subcategories will be discussed singly: 6.1 Blind Spots A blind spot is a hidden area in the store free from cameras, employee surveillance, or natural surveillance. The study identified 22 offender statements referring to blind spots as an opportunity for shoplifting. This further corroborates Hayes (1998) finding that offenders often take CRAVED items from high-visibility zones to blind spots in order to hide them on their person, in clothing, or in bags. This finding also supports the theft triangles assertion that offenders measure the risk of being caught before stealing. As the narratives below imply, the presence of blind spots gives offenders the perception that they can shoplift covertly, and thus avoid apprehension. Many shoplifters in this study expounded on the usefulness of blind spots, especially in terms of picking up a CRAVED product from one area and actually concealing it in another: Just the way the store is set up, theres plenty of areas to, you know, go and slip something into your pocket . a lot of hiding spots. And its kind of dark in there. Arlene If you have a big shopping cart maybe you throw some things into it and all you have to do is take one and throw it into your cart and go to a different section and do what you want with it. Joe I know a lot of people that will sit there and work on [products in theft-deterrent packages], you know what Im saying, theyll work on them in an aisle. Gary Ill find, like, the most unlikely place a customers going to go, like the most boring items in the store, Ill go into that aisle and try to get into the package as fast as I

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79 can . then I just keep the product with me . and just walk out the normal exit. Pat As these narratives suggest, even one blind spot in a store can provide a shoplifting opportunity. Being in a blind spot surrounded by high sight-obstructing shelves can also contribute to an offenders sense of going unnoticed, as the following narrative excerpt attests: Video stores are especially easy. Theyre small. Theres usually only one or two people working them. Theyve got these big high shelves where they cant see you. James 6.2 Being Seen Offenders frequently made statements about being seen as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity. This made being seen one of the most-cited subcategories in the content analysis, with a total of 72 statements. According to the theft triangle theory, one of the three factors offenders assess before acting on a crime is the perceived risk of being caught. Logically, an offenders perception of being seen is a determinant of this risk assessment. It therefore follows that shoplifters would frequently cite no one looking as an opportunity for theft, and conversely, being seen as a risk. The following narrative excerpts explain how the ability to scan a retail interior is important to a shoplifter, and helps shape the decision to steal, while the perception of being watched is a major deterrent: If somebodys watching if somebodys watching Ill go over and buy my popcorn or whatever and leave. James Id be kind of nervous about [large clothing retail chains]. Theres just something about them. Ive taken a couple shirts from, I think it was Dillards, and I didnt get caught. But I dont go now. I was just really uncomfortable about the whole thing. Paul If someones not watching you, you can come by and take one of them gray baskets and put 30 DVDs in it and put that inside your cart and have another gray basket and fill it up with razors and everything and a lot of times you just push that thing right out the door and a lot of times no one sees nothing that you done. Dan

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80 A thief is usually paying more attention to whats around him you know, whos looking, if theres a camera. You know hes got to have like ten eyes just to do what hes got to do. -Cowboy The worry and paranoia these statements imply is as much a goal of natural surveillance as actual apprehension, as the offenders perception and fear of being seen is often as effective a deterrent as actually being seen. 6.3 Number of Customers in Store Thirteen offender comments cited a high number of customers in the store as influential to the decision to steal. This finding supports the idea of natural surveillance in its suggestion that some offenders are wary of being spotted by legitimate shoppers in the store. Offender statements referred to the presence of customers in the store as both an opportunity for, and a deterrent to shoplifting. Some shoplifters cited a very busy store packed with customers as an effective shoplifting camouflage, while others perceived the presence of customers as a threat because of their ability to see (and potentially respond to) the shoplifting act: I never ever, like, let a customer follow me and see my concealment tactic. The customer will never see me [shoplift]. And I have to make sure I cant see the customer. I cant see no cameras. Nothing can see me . I got caught one day because of a hero customer. Took me to the ground. -Joey I dont think theres a time when Im not concerned about [being seen by customers] . You know its kind of like youll see them looking at you or like looking or talking, like telling their friends, Look that guys taking something. Or if someones kind of keeping an eye on you. -Mexico Sometimes you just take a chance that youre going to run into a Good Samaritan thats going to say something. Because if youre in between two or three people shopping for this stuff and you grab a handful of stuff and just put it n your cart, sometimes they notice that, and they look at you like, Whats this kid doing? Whats this guy doing? and sometimes they dont, so thats something to take a chance on. Joey As these excerpts illustrate, some offenders seem embarrassed by the idea of a customer seeing them (youll see them looking at you, like looking or talking, like telling their

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81 friends), while others fear more drastic ramifications (I got caught one day because of a hero customer. Took me to the ground.) In either case, many offenders perceived the ability for customers and other legitimate users to naturally monitor and survey a space as a risk, because being seen increases the level of risk associated with the shoplifting act. 6.4 Store Layout Several offenders said they perceived big stores as shoplifting opportunities. These offenders referred to a perception that it is too difficult for employees or security to monitor the whole store at once: The weak link in [big-box chain] stores is that theyre very big, so oftentimes the area you want to target is completely barren because everyone is concentrated on maybe another section of the store. Phillip However, other offenders linked the physical size of the store with a certain perceived level of security. Some shoplifters cited a large corporation, and large store, as indicative of a comprehensive security program: The problem with Target and Wal-Mart is that theyre very big stores and theyre harder [to steal from]. I mean youre an easier target. I mean, they have loss prevention guys in there . they have good security. Julian Seven shoplifter statements about crime opportunity were directly related to store size, design, and layout. Stores were cited as simply having an easy layout, which could allude to any number of design-based qualities, such as poor surveillance, poor product positioning, or lack of CCTV coverage: K-Mart [is easy to steal from]. I havent taken from K-Mart in a while, but I think from what Ive seen just being in there, you know, just normal shopping, it looks like its pretty easy to take from. Donny Offenders also said they perceived certain store layouts as conducive to shoplifting: . it depends on the layout. I mean, theres situations where I could just I could load up 50 and just walk out the front door. Dan

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82 The following offender stated a belief that his location within the store determined whether or not he was actually shoplifting: I understand they have to, they cannot arrest you in the heart of the store. Like if youre in the middle of the store they have to have probable cause . I really doubt that theyre going to come to you in the store and arrest you right there in the heart of the store . theyll probably pick you up at the exit, most likely. Joey Although not always specific, these narratives underscore the content analysis finding that design and layout are influential to the shoplifting offenders decision-making process. 6.5 Crowds Seventeen statements about shoplifting opportunity suggested that shoplifters perceive a crowded, chaotic store as an easy one from which to steal. This finding indicates some offenders perceive a busy store as a sort of camouflage, ensuring that employees are be too busy helping customers to monitor theft activity. And like I said on the weekends if theres a lot of people its a lot easier to get in and out. Mike Correspondingly, some offenders cited a lack of activity in the store as a shoplifting deterrent, since the perceived absence of people and commotion leaves the shoplifter feeling exposed and observed. Consider the following offenders explanation of a desolate versus busy store. For him, an empty store spells vulnerability, while a busy store provides opportunity: If its a weekend its more packed. If you think securitys a little tougher then, its not. They might have a few more spotters walking around, but you can go in there a little better . . During the weekdays, if you walk in the store and its pretty much desolate, theres not many people in there, you tend to come back later in the afternoon when theres more people in there . sometimes they get so packed, everyones working here and theyre working there . its easy to pick up something. Donny

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83 7. Place Managers Anecdotally, retailers consider place managers (employees) to be one of the most effective forms of shoplifting deterrence (Hayes and Blackwood, 2006c). However, only 6.5 percent of shoplifter statements referred to place managers specifically. The narrative analysis helps in explaining these findings. Some offenders in this sample did not perceive employees as a serious risk: If you look around and its younger [employees], they dont care. Ill be sneaky about it but I dont think they care. Gary [Id go to a certain store because] Id know that the employees are kind of lax, or theres not many of them . they hire like, young, skater type teens and hey really dont care. They dont give a crap. Nolan Those guys [employees] are just in La-La land half the time . generally, employees are pretty lax. Joe Others viewed employees as a deterrent, and expressed fear of being spotted or apprehended by an employee: If I actually see [an employee] looking over, then Ill leave . if I saw him kind of scoping out the area where I was in Id just kind of abort everything and get it some other time. James Thirteen shoplifter statements referred specifically to the number of employees in a store, correlating a high number of employees to a higher risk level: If theres more employees than customers Ill definitely leave a store in a heartbeat. Thats how circuit city is. They have a million employees. Paul Its been hard to steal from Target, you know . theres so many employees there you know what Im saying, and theres more employees you know like sometimes you look and if you pay attention and start counting the ratio between employees and customers youd be like, how do they make their money? Joey This studys findings indicate a wide range of offender perceptions of employees, making their presence/awareness neither a real deterrent nor their absence/apathy a real opportunity. Indeed, the deterrence effect of employees is more likely to be based on

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84 hiring practices, management policies, and reward systems than on number of employees alone. 8. Formal Surveillance The studys content analysis found 12.5 percent of offender statements fell into the category of formal surveillance. Different from natural surveillance, formal surveillance includes surveillance performed by security staff, store detectives, and LP staff. These employees can be uniformed or undercover. Over 50 offender statements cited the perceived presence and high quality of security personnel (either uniformed or undercover) as a shoplifting deterrent, and the absence/low quality of such personnel as an opportunity. This suggests offenders assess a stores apparent level of security staffing and attentiveness before deciding to steal, an assessment that relies upon a spatial layout that promotes surveillance. In the quote below, one offender illustrates how the spatial layout of the store assists in his ability to assess security threats (linking back to the duality of surveillance concept discussed previously in this chapter): A lot of [undercover security staff] will walk past you and theyll do something as dumb as to make eye contact with you . and youll see them go around the corner, and off in the distance where they can still see you but theyre not on top of you. And youll notice that theres nothing in their cart . sometimes theyre just looking and you know who they are. So youre watching them. And you go up to somewhere else and go into that aisle and just wait a few seconds and shop and look around real nonchalantly, and there he is again. And so you know right then its off; hes onto you. Mike This narrative underscores the influence design has over other, seemingly non-design-related loss prevention strategies. In the quote below, the offender explains how the mere sight of a uniformed security officer can be a deterrent: A uniform is a good deterrent. Like if I was walking in a store and have stolen stuff and I come back to an exit and ands I see like 4 uniform guys that werent there before, Ill dump the stuff instantly, cause all I know they could be there for me, you know? Pat

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85 Again, the offender perceives this security strategy (formal surveillance) as the interaction of space (I come back to an exit), surveillance (I see like four) and security (uniform guys). Some ways in which retail deign can improve the effectiveness of formal surveillance are included in Chapter 5. 9. Target Visibility Reducing the visibility of CRAVED items is one strategy for minimizing shoplifting. Some retailers replace CRAVED products with signs on shelves. The signs redirect shoppers to a counter where an employee retrieves the item. Any examples of offenders perceiving this practice as a deterrent were included in the hardened targets category. However, 10 offender statements referred to highly visible CRAVED items as a perceived opportunity for shoplifting. The design implications of this finding are similar to those for easily accessible targets and are discussed in Chapter 5. 10. Emotions A few offender statements (.5 percent) cited the perception of a large corporation unaffected by loss as a reason to shoplift. (This can also be viewed as an opportunity if its moral hesitation preventing an offender from acting.) A few other statements cited the perception of a small, family-run type of atmosphere as a moral deterrent to shoplifting: I dont [steal from flea markets] because those are owned by like family businesses and I feel really bad . you know, cause they dont have a million-dollar insurance policy or anything. I dont even know if thats true, but yeah, it makes me feel better. Julian In either case, this studys results show emotions (whether provoked or reduced) did not appear to influence many offenders perceptions of crime risk or opportunity in the retail interior.

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86 13. Rules The study identified 11 shoplifter statements pertaining to anti-shoplifting signage (like Shoplifters will Be Prosecuted) as influential to the decision to steal. However, most of these statements came from just one of the 20 offenders in the sample. Below is an example of that offenders perception of anti-shoplifting signage: Major stores like Wal-mart, Sears, theyre starting to get tougher, getting better at cracking down. I mean, they even have signs: do not try and steal something and come back with it because were going to catch you; something like that. That kind of persuades you not to try it. Signs and stuff like that. Visual types of things . I think thats the best way. Joe Although few offenders cited signage as a deterrent cue, the fact that even one did should be taken into consideration when designing retail interiors. Signage is a relatively inexpensive and easy strategy to implement. If it deters even one potential offender it could be worthwhile. Categories with No Scores Of the 15 categories in the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior, the content analysis identified four with no scores at all. These were: Frustrations (reduced vs. provoked), Imitation (discouraged vs. promoted), Instructions (unclear vs. posted), and Conscience (ignored vs. alerted). None of the offender statements in this study identified cues in these categories as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity. The implication of this finding is simple: retail designers and retailers should focus their efforts not on these categories but rather on the categories that shoplifters overwhelmingly cited as influential to their perceptions: Natural Surveillance, Guardianship, Formal Surveillance, and Target Accessibility. Some suggestions on how interior designers can enhance the effectiveness of the loss prevention techniques in these categories follows in Chapter 5.

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87 Summary Overall, the content analysis findings revealed several patterns in the types of physical cues offenders cited as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity in the retail interior. In terms of the matrix four overarching category headings (perceived effort, perceived risk, perceived provocation, and perceived excuses), 66.5 percent of offender statements referred to perceived risk, and 29 percent referred to perceived effort. A negligible amount referred to the other two category headings of perceived provocation and excuses (two and a half and two percent, respectively). The analysis placed 639 shoplifter statements into nine of the 15 categories in the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix. Although all 15 of matrix categories contain defensive design strategies for the retail interior, the content analysis revealed that over 70 percent of offender statements fell into just four categories: Hardened Targets, Natural Surveillance, Extended Guardianship, and Formal Surveillance. This finding suggests that offenders perceive the physical cues in these four categories most influential to their assessment of shoplifting risk or opportunity. The narrative excerpts reiterated the findings of the content analysis: that is, while a variety of physical cues in the retail interior influence offender perceptions of risk and opportunity, those that influence offenders most often are related to levels of risk or opportunity inherent to the shoplifting act. Indeed, the tonal and contextual implications of the narrative analyses emphasized the content analysis finding that over half (66.5 percent) of offender statements refer to perceptions of risk (which in turn affects the decision to steal). The idea that situational, environmental cues combine to affect an offenders perception of shoplifting ease or difficulty also lends support to the theories of rational choice, the theft triangle, and situational crime prevention.

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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Discussion This studys content and narrative analysis of 20 semi-structured interviews with known shoplifting offenders revealed the specific physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to perceptions of crime risk or opportunity in the retail interior. The content analysis revealed some patterns in the types of cues that influence offender perceptions most often, and the narrative analysis further emphasized these patterns. While these findings are significant in themselves, they also present a range of implications for retail design as well as opportunities for future research. One of the studys most significant findings is that over 95 percent of offender statements were categorized into two of the four matrix category headings: Perceived Effort and Perceived Risk. Within these two headings, the matrix categories of Hardened Targets, Extended Guardianship, Natural Surveillance, and Formal Surveillance contained the highest numbers of offender statements. Considered in light of rational choice theory and the theft triangle, these findings are unsurprising. Rational choice theory asserts that potential shoplifting offenders weigh the possible risk of sanction and apprehension against the possible reward of the theft in the time period leading up to their decision to shoplift. This time period can range from a fraction of a second to a few minutes (Clark & Felson, 1993). Therefore, this studys finding that cues pertaining to targets, surveillance, and guardianship scored highest in terms of perceptions of risk or opportunity supports rational choice theory. The excerpt below illustrates this connection: 88

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89 First things first you want to know if they got what you want. The second factor is the risk involvement. The risk involvement will be security times cameras times employees times space times customers. Those are the five factors youre going to have. Why? Because all of them conflict with each other to catch you. -Matt Another finding worth discussing is the pattern of categories that contained no offender statements at all. These four categories (Frustrations, Imitation, Instructions, and Conscience) all exist under the category headings of Perceived Provocation and Perceived Excuses. Together, these two category headings comprised just 4.5 percent of the overall offender statements, suggesting that cues in the retail interior that communicate shoplifting provocations or excuses do not often factor into an offenders decision to steal. Again, this finding supports rational choice and the theft triangle, since these categories bear the least relevance to risk and/or opportunity. In terms of rationality, the studys findings suggest that, in the retail interior, offenders are influenced most often by physical cues that communicate risk of detection (and consequently, apprehension and sanction). This finding supports that of Carroll and Weaver (1986) whose process-tracing study found that, once inside the store, shoplifters acted in a proactive, rational manner, actively scanning the store for information on risks and opportunities before considering items for shoplifting (p. 32). However, the current study goes one step farther in identifying some of the specific cues that comprise this information, and inform the offenders perception of risk or opportunity. Design Recommendations Through a combined content and narrative analysis of offender interviews, this study was able to isolate specific categories of physical cues in the retail environment that influence offender perceptions of risk, and decisions to shoplift. The strategies in these categories, while untested, nevertheless present an array of areas in which design-based

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90 solutions may minimize shoplifting incidents. The four categories this study identified as most influential to offenders perceptions of shoplifting risk and/or opportunity are: Natural Surveillance Extended guardianship Formal Surveillance Hardened Targets While the identification of these specific cues is helpful, retail designers should understand that incorporating design into the retail environment cannot be reduced to such a tidy list. Building a secure retail environment is a holistic process. It begins at the most preliminary stages of programming and schematic design, and should be a priority throughout installation. Todays retail designers have an advantage in that modern drafting programs usually include a three-dimensional modeling component, which allows for virtual tours of a space well before construction begins. Such programs can allow for strategic and targeted security planning, as retailer sand designers can see and address potential weak or insecure areas of the store well in advance. Even after construction is complete, secure retail design should be considered an ongoing priority, built into the stores maintenance and management procedures. In essence, to be most effective, security (and, in part, security-focused retail design) should be a priority just like merchandising or marketing: a goal that starts at the top levels of the retail corporation, is consistently carried through every department, and manifested in the everyday operations of store management. For an example consider one of the four categories this study identified as influential to shoplifters decision-making formal surveillance. To make formal surveillance as effective as possible, retailers would begin to address it at the outset of the conceptual and programming phase, assigning certain square footages and strategic placements for security staff. The stores

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91 entry, for example, would have long, clear lines of sight to other parts of the store. Fixtures and displays would be positioned so as to support security activity. Further into the process, the designer would consider materials, floor patterns, and ceiling treatments with the idea of territoriality in mind. Reflective surfaces would be installed in various parts of the store to help security staff and undercover detectives track suspicious behavior. The designer would work closely with loss prevention and merchandising to determine product placement, ensuring that CRAVED items were placed in the most secure areas of the store, where security could potentially monitor them. CCTV would be an important part of the reflected ceiling plan, and the designer would coordinate with the CCTV vendor, the retailer, and security staff to ensure optimal camera positioning. The designer would also be closely involved in the positioning of EAS gates, again coordinating with security to develop the best placement for reacting to alarm activations. After construction was complete, the designer would work with management to discuss how the stores everyday policies and procedures will affect design (Will moveable or temporary fixtures impede securitys surveillance opportunity? Will signs or carts get in their way?) Ideally, the designer would re-visit the store, talk to security staff, and perform a post-occupancy evaluation to assess how well the stores design is supporting securitys efforts, or if anything could be changed. Each of the four categories identified in this study present this kind of range for defensive design opportunities, and are the areas in which retailers and retail designers should focus if they intend to alter shoplifter perceptions and resulting behavior. While it is not in the scope of this paper to discuss the comprehensive range of applications each category presents, a few suggestions are presented. Each of these tactics may help alter a

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92 shoplifters perceptions, heightening their sense of risk associated with shoplifting, and minimizing their assessment of opportunity. Optimizing Natural Surveillance Through Design Natural surveillance received some of the highest scores in this study. The goal of optimizing natural surveillance is to present both a real and psychological deterrent to offenders. As the findings of this study suggest, when a would-be shoplifter enters a retail interior and has a gut feeling theyre being watched, they may decide against shoplifting. Natural surveillance can also be a tangible deterrent, as an offender enters the interior and, because the design promotes natural surveillance, is able to see the amount of security and employees in the store. The decision to shoplift or not, then, becomes a matter of how many deterrent cues an offender sees as a result of this enhanced capability for spatial surveillance. Below are some potential strategies for retail designers wanting to enhance natural surveillance. These strategies, while derived from the results of this study, are untested. Future research in the area of situational crime prevention in the retail interior should be aimed at testing such strategies: Minimize or eliminate blind spots: Designers should work with retailers to make sure the layout does not contain any hidden, unmonitored blind spots (see figure 3). Areas of the store containing CRAVED products should fall within the sight lines of employees (figure 19), and CCTV cameras should be installed all other areas in order to offset the theft opportunity a blind spot creates (figure 28). Offenders in the study often described blind spots as areas where customers rarely go; designers and retailers should work together to create a store layout that draws legitimate customers to all areas of the store, either through merchandising strategies or other additions (like a caf (figure 11) or customer service station). This could improve selling as well as minimize theft. Minimize perceptions of confusion and chaos: Offenders in this study cited a chaotic, bustling store interior as a conducive one for theft due to its ability to preoccupy employees and provide a camouflage for offenders. Some simple store design techniques can help minimize crowds and confusion, including wide, clear

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93 aisles (figure 7A); clear, direct store signage; a clean, well-maintained interior (figure 27); and a logical store layout. While such design tactics will not eliminate all crowds and chaos (especially during busy shopping times) they will help contribute to the perception of the store as orderly and well-monitored. Improve lines of sight: This tactic is a potentially self-contradictory one, as some offenders in the study identified the ability to scan the store as an opportunity for theft (because it allows offenders to scan for threats and targets). However, the studys findings imply that the deterrent effects of natural surveillance outweigh the theft opportunities. Stores with low (>60) shelf and fixture heights (figure 2); long, unobstructed views of aisles (figure 9); and CRAVED products positioned within eyeshot of employees (figure 23) may benefit from the psychological message such a design conveys to offenders. As mentioned previously, the goal of natural surveillance is to instill a sense of risk and vulnerability, and all of these design strategies help to contribute to that sense. Optimizing Target Hardening/Accessibility Through Design The accessibility of targets was one of the most clear findings of this study. Offenders perceived hardened (locked or otherwise rendered inaccessible) targets as a shoplifting risk, and easy, accessible targets as an opportunity. In the retail setting, target hardening exists on three levels: positioning merchandise in a secure part of the store, placing merchandise on/in a secure fixture, and attaching it to a secure display. Each of these levels has design implications: Protect on the store level: A retailer should identify which items in the store are most vulnerable, and position them in the most secure areas of the store: When designing retail interiors, designers should consider that some products need more protection than others, and focus on particular areas of the store as safe zones where CRAVED products can benefit from redundant methods of protection. These zones should be located away from the from exit access, away from desolate areas of the store, and in clear sight of employees and staff. They should be designed to facilitate surveillance (both natural and formal) and be monitored by CCTV. Protect on the fixture level: Retailers should keep CRAVED merchandise behind counters or in cases (figure 12). It is important to emphasize that these measures need not (and should not) be off-putting to legitimate customers. Retail designers should focus on how to incorporate such fixtures in engaging, attractive ways that also facilitate customer service and marketing goals (figure 8). Thoughtfully-designed fixtures have the potential to lure customers to the product, and allow them to engage with employees in a positive way, thus enhancing their shopping experience, all while protecting the product from theft.

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94 Protect on the display level: Attaching CRAVED products to fixtures with locked cords, cables, or chains will deter shoplifters (figure 8). However, as mentioned above, designers must strive to ensure that these measures will still attract customers to the area. The cords should be designed to be flexible and ergonomic, allowing a customer to touch and try the product. Fixtures with such devices should also be planned next to, or in conjunction with, customer service. This adds an element of protection for products and service for customers. Optimizing CCTV Guardianship Through Design The studys content analysis revealed that offenders commented on the presence of CCTV more than any other cue in the retail interior. While the use of CCTV is mainly an LP strategy, retail interior design can help increase its effectiveness and power. Here are some strategies designers may consider: Include CCTV coverage throughout the store: As Spriggs and Gill (2006) note, the success of CCTV systems in fighting crime is significantly affected by camera coverage (the amount of cameras per square foot in the retail space). Retail designers can help expand CCTV coverage of a retail interior by planning shelves, displays and signage that do not interfere with or obstruct CCTV views (figure 17). Designers should also consider how CCTV cameras are seen from the floor, since offenders are more likely to be deterred if they can see CCTV cameras. Include CCTV signage: the simple addition of signs near CCTV cameras may help communicate to offenders that the system is active and well-watched (figure 28). Signs saying CCTV monitoring in use can enhance the power of the CCTV system by reiterating to offenders that the cameras are watching them, contributing to a sense of vulnerability and risk of apprehension. Optimizing Formal Surveillance Through Design The studys findings suggest the presence and attentiveness of formal security measures like security guards and undercover store detectives contributed to a perception of risk for the offenders, while the lack thereof contributed to a sense of opportunity. Some of the retail design implications of these findings are very similar to those for Natural Surveillance: improving sight lines, lowering fixture heights, and designing wide, clear spaces will help security staff better monitor the retail interior. However, this

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95 category also presents opportunities for a few unique design strategies for impacting offender perceptions: Create entry/exit spaces that support security efforts: Many times, uniformed security guards are stationed at the entry/exit point of a retail store. Designers should keep this in mind when designing this particular space. Clear territory definitions (made obvious through material changes or floor/ceiling conditions) will help security staff monitor this important space. Install mirrors and reflective surfaces. These materials, when installed strategically in the retail interior, help store detectives track offenders. As the content and narrative analysis revealed, offenders are constantly scanning the store searching for security (or anyone) who might catch them. The addition of mirrors and reflective surfaces gives store detectives an advantage in this game of cat-and-mouse, as their intimate knowledge of the store layout will allow them to use such surfaces to track and apprehend shoplifters. Recommendations for Future Research The patterns revealed in this studys findings present many opportunities for future research. The study identified 70 percent of offender statements refer to just four categories of physical cues as influential to perceptions of risk, and the decision to steal. Within these four categories, the study also identified several specific subcategories of interior conditions that offenders cited as influential to their perceptions of shoplifting risk and opportunity. These included the presence of blind spots, item location, the presence of CCTV cameras, and accessibility of displays, among others. Because this study has isolated the cues offenders cite as influential to their decision-making process, future research can now test the effectiveness of these cues in more controlled environments. A logical follow-up study might involve having offenders look at and respond to photos of the different physical cues this study identified. Along the same lines, a process-tracing study in which offenders walk though a store a think aloud about these specific interior conditions would be another appropriate follow-up study. This study could also be used as a starting point for analyzing retail interiors in the field,

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96 comparing how store shoplifting levels are affected by different combinations of the cues this study identified. Because the results of such a study could directly impact retail profitability, it may behoove retailers to consider providing funding for such research. As mentioned in Chapter 3, reliable sources of shoplifter data are scarce. If retailers were to provide funding for the type of snowball sample this study used, more independent research on shoplifting could be performed, and results could be improved. Conclusion The purpose of this study was to determine if shoplifters consider retail interiors in their decision to shoplift. If so, the study also intended to determine which physical cues offenders cited as influential to their perception of risk or opportunity (and subsequent decision to steal) in the retail interior. The study approached the analysis using rational choice theory and the theft triangle as a theoretical framework. Both of these theories attest that criminals like shoplifters are rational beings who weigh various risks and rewards before deciding to commit a crime. Applying a content analysis to 20 semi-structured interviews with known offenders, this study classified shoplifter statements about physical cues in the retail interior that convey a message of either risk or opportunity. The study found that offenders do consider retail interiors when assessing the opportunity or risk inherent in shoplifting. Moreover, the cues they identified as influential to that assessment consistently fell into the same four categories: Natural Surveillance, Guardianship levels, Formal Surveillance, and Target Accessibility. The fact that offenders so often cited cues in these categories as influential to their decision to shoplift supports both rational choice theory and the theft triangle, as the cues shoplifters

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97 identified were consistent with loss prevention strategies aimed at affecting the reasoning criminals perception of risk or opportunity. This studys results are important to retail interior designers because they provide information on which loss prevention strategies influence offender perceptions most information which was previously unavailable. Retailers and retail designers can now focus loss prevention efforts on those areas that shoplifters cite as influential to their decision-making process. However, this study was just the first step. In order to create retail interiors that effectively curtail shoplifting, this studys findings must be further tested in the field. By testing the effectiveness of the cues identified in this study, retailers and designers can further develop a set of best practice techniques that will optimize the ability of retail interiors to prevent crime.

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APPENDIX A SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW Q: . As organized as I can. I realize well talk about various things. Sometimes well talk about something I may then come back and ask you a series of questions. This is Mike in Dania and its June 23 rd and were here with Joe. And were going to start through the survey. This is about the 6 th one Ive done. Have you taken any Gillette razors in the past 3 months, in the past year, Im sorry. A: It was probably August 2001 now. Q: So this is only June of 02 now, right. A: Yeah, almost a year. Q: So that was the last time you took them, was in August, what about before that? A: Before that absolutely. Yeah. I would take Gillettes. The reason being is because of the packaging itself. Its very small. Q: Well come back. Let me do a couple and just say, what type did you take? Did you take like this is the Mach III, Sensor? A: Mach III. Q: Mach III. No Venus? A: Mach III. Q: Mach III. About how many times in the past 12 or 15 months? A: Oh, how many times, the Mach IIIs, man I used to, I would say over 20. Q: A lot then. A: A lot. Q: More than once a month? A: At least 2 or 3 times a week during that particular period. Q: This you said you were doing to support. . 98

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99 A: Absolutely. Q: What kind of packs did you take, the 4s, 8s, you know a particular kind? A: 4. Q: The 4 pack always? Always took the 4 pack. Why was that? A: Smaller package. Q: Okay. And when you go into take something on average, how many would you take? A: 3. Q: Just 3 at a time? A: Reason being if you want to know specifically. . Q: No, Ill ask you more about that, if you can do it real quick. . A: The pants I would wear were very loose and you couldnt really see a bulk. You know what I mean? You couldnt really tell. Q: Right. Okay, Ill come back and ask you some more about that. A: And I never got caught. Q: Was that usually what you were taking when you were taking things? A: That amongst other things. Whatever I could get my hands on. The smaller the package and the more expensive the package is what I would go for. Q: Okay. Well come back. Again, Im just kind of getting this. Did you take any other kinds of blades, Schick or anything? Any other kinds? A: Um, Schick. Schick, Bic, I took a Bic a couple of times. They come in a bag. Q: Thats the portable? A: theyre much cheaper. Disposable, right. I would take the disposable sometimes, depending on the store itself. You know where it was and how the access was. Q: This is your main one. A: Absolutely because it was more expensive.

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100 Q: Okay. ? more than Schick? A: Yeah, I would return it. Thats what I would do. Q: Okay, Im going to ask you that. Thats actually my next question. Good. What a guy. This is great. What do you usually do with them is my next question. A: I would return them. I would come in with a shirt and tie and return 3 or 4 of them amongst other things. Q: so the other thing is you wouldnt have a receipt for them maybe? These you wouldnt have a receipt for. A: No I wouldnt have a receipt for anything. Q: And they would take it? A: See appearances, the manager pretty much has control. And they can pretty much do whatever they want to to certain amounts. So I would come with a shirt and tie, clean cut, shaven, and its psychology like everything else, you know. Appearance. Q: And of course then youre getting 100% price as opposed to half or whatever you get on the street. J; Yes. I wouldnt do it on the street. And I would also keep some to shave if I needed to. Q: You didnt fence them, you didnt sell them to a fence, you know somebody who would then go and sell them. You didnt go to a mom and pop store? A: Not me. Q: You didnt sell them to individuals? You just would return them? A: Exclusively. Q: Did you worry about people recognizing you after awhile? A: I would go to different stores. They wouldnt be the same store all the time. That would be foolish. I never got caught because of that. I own a vehicle and I would target, yeah, certain areas. Q: You could travel. A: Absolutely.

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101 Q: Were going to come back to some of those questions. You would take them back and get a refund? Never a problem. A: Well there were problems from time to time, where they would want to give me a store credit or something like that and if that was the case if I needed something, I would accept the store credit and get whatever I needed. Q: Right. A: Or not accept the store credit and go somewhere else. Q: so it was a question of what you needed. If you needed cash, store credit wouldnt help you. A: Right. Q: If you didnt you would go and get whatever you needed. A: Whatever I needed. Q: And you would still save the money to some extent in doing that. A: Right. It was free money. Q: Okay. Now tell me about why you would take them. And theres a variety of different reasons, what kinds of reasons? A: The packaging and how much its worth. Q: Okay. A: You know, its easy to take. They have them on a display, you take 3, you look around and see where the cameras are at and poof. In and out. And make your $10, $15. Whatever you need. Q: Okay. And again you didnt have any trouble getting rid of them. Okay. A: You know again, I would come back the next day. It wasnt something that I would do the same day. You know what I mean. I would come back in a tie. Q: Right. A: Brand new shoes, expensive $100 shoes. And thats the way that I would do it. So it was pretty organized. I wasnt desperate. It wasnt a desperation. It was pretty organized.

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102 Q: and you would have to go to maybe a couple of stores to resell them? What kind of stores, let me come back. A: Eckerd if you want to know. Eckerds Wal-Greens. Q: Im going to come back. I have a whole series of questions about that. A: Okay. Q: Remind me because I want to ask about, not so much where you take them but about the resale or the return I want to ask you about as well. How did you take them? What was your process of taking the blades? A: Very simple. 2 or 3. The pants that I would wear were jogging pants. And I would have the, my underwear the elastic and I would wear them pretty tight so they would be pretty secure, 1, 2, 3. I would stick to about 3 so it wouldnt be bulky. I had a shirt to go over it. Q: Just stuck them in and go out. A: And go on my way. Q: Thats the way you always did it? A: Well, yeah. Thats the way I always did it. I wouldnt just get it and leave the store. Sometimes I would buy things. Then leave. Depending on the situation, how I felt, if I was paranoid. If I wasnt paranoid. But sometimes I would buy things. Sometimes I would just walk out. I would never just get it and leave. I would either walk around, if I didnt find the item I was looking for. Q: Did you ever take them out of the packaging? A: Never. Q: Just cause you would resell and obviously. . A: Absolutely. I never did that. Q: Okay. What other kinds of items would you take? Did you take? A: Calculators if they were accessible. Because there were some stores that the calculators were out there and youre talking about a $20 item. Q: You would do the same things with these, return those? A: Return them. Absolutely.

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103 Q: Get $20 back. A: Condoms. Q: they return those? A: If its unopened, of course. Sure. Aspirin. Basically things in smaller packages. The smaller the package. To give you an example, too big. Q: Okay. Just hold that up. A: Too big. Q: anything else? CDs, DVDs, clothing? A: clothing, Ive done it, in the past. I used to have one of those, you know that they come with the little alarms, I used to have one of the things that take the alarms off. So go in the dressing room, again with the baggy pants, and put on pants and things like that and then put my pants over them. Take the thing out and go on my merry way. But that was a rarity. I didnt like to do that. Q: Was that for your own use? A: That was for my own use. Q: You didnt resell those? A: I didnt resell those cause most stores like that if you dont have a receipt they just give you a store credit. Q: They dont take clothes. . A: Right. Yeah. But items like this on smaller amounts theyll give you the cash for it. You see, but once you go up to a certain amount they wont do it. Q: Aspirin. Whats the cost for it? A: $5 or $6. But you know it adds up. Q: Yeah. Okay. You going into a store. Do you kind of know what youre going to take before you go in there? A: Yeah. Pretty much. Q: What do you think? Im going to go get the Mach IIIs, Im going to get. .

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104 A: Yeah, because these are items that I knew the store, I knew the cameras, okay. Okay. And its a small packet that I can get a good return on. Q: Okay. So you pretty much know. A: Easy access. Q: What happens if you go to someplace and theyre not there? Theyre not Gillette or something like that. A: Then I would take it if its small enough. Whatever. Q: Youd take something else. A: In other words, Im not a Mach III thief. Or I wasnt a Mach III thief. But this is a package that again is small and you know. Q: Is there a certain time of day that you work? A: No. Q: Youd go anytime? A: Yeah. Q: Do you usually work alone? A: Alone. Q: Always alone. Tell me a little about security. Let me start with this next question. Tell me about the kind of stores you take things from. A: Eckerds, Walgreens, Q: So drug stores. A: Drug stores. Small what you would call ??? Vega, which is a latin store. I would, convenience store but in Latin neighborhoods. Q: Are they a chain or individually owned? A: No. Individually owned. Mom and pops where Id say, listen I got the wrong ones. I dont have the receipt. I would say it in Spanish. They would give me my money right away. Q: Did you take from them or return to them?

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105 A: Return to them and say listen you know I got it here. As you can see, in Spanish, the product has not been opened. I got it for my father. Hes very particular. These are not the ones that he wanted. I need my money back. 9 times out of 10 they will go for it. Q: Tell me about taking and returning cause you do a lot of returning. Did you take from these stores? A: I would take from those stores as well, yeah. Q: So you wouldnt discriminate. A: No. No. Whereever I saw that there was easy access. Now the smaller mom and pop convenience stores dont have the same type of security as the Walgreens or an Eckerds, okay? So I didnt discriminate. Q: Okay. So drug stores, little neighborhood convenience stores, what else? What about big. . A: Supermarkets. Q: Supermarkets. A: Ive done supermarkets too. Q: They carry all the stuff that you would take. A: Absolutely. Publix, Winn Dixie, smaller supermarkets, theres Sudanos. Theres discount stores like Navarro. Q: What about the big like Wal-Mart, Target, K-Mart? A: Too big. Too much security. Q: As far as taking, but you may return things to them? A: Right. But those people like to give you store credit. Q: Oh, okay. A: In my experience. Q: sometimes you may, but typically theyre less likely. A: But I wouldnt take from them. Too much security. Theyve got 4, 5, 6 securities in those bigger stores. Theyre too big.

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106 Q: Okay. Do you pick ones near your home? How big of an area do you work in? A: I had Hialeah was big. Pretty much in the Hialeah area. Q: Okay. I dont know where thats at. A: Hialeah is a Latin area in Miami. Its a very big. Q: Whats the radius, diameter. A: The radius. Wow! Its at least 20 miles. Its big. I would say its the biggest city, which its not literally a city, in Miami. Q: Part of Miami. A: Its part of Miami. Theyre trying to make it a city of its own. Theyve been fighting for it for a long time. Q: Okay. So roughly in that area is where you worked. A: Absolutely. In Hialeah, all there is are businesses. You know. A lot of small convenience stores. Not convenience stores, theyre like pharmacies, and ??? where they sell everything. So theyre everything. So those are easy targets. Q: Pretty easy targets. And youre only picking up a couple of things at a time. A: Yeah. Im not, I didnt do a lot. You know. This is, the 8 is easy as well. You know its a small package. Q: Okay. And so about how many miles did you live from the stores you took merchandise from? A: I lived in Kendall where I own a home. Which is approximately 20 miles. So I would leave my area. Q: Ah, so you would not steal right around. You would go then into Hialeah. A: Right, cause it was easier because again, theres a lot of mom and pop stores. You know and those are easier because the security system. Q: and youre Hispanic. A: Right. Im Hispanic as well. Q: But you could even do it or not.

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107 A: I can speak the language and again I would go dressed in my attire. You know, so again it was organized. A system. Q: A system. Did you usually purchase something when you went there? A: Sometimes I would. Sometimes I wouldnt. Generally speaking I wouldnt. Q: No, okay. Just go in and get what you take, walk around and go. A: And go. Just depending on the situation, if I needed something I would buy it. If I felt uncomfortable for whatever reason, or being watched, sure Id buy something. Whatever it may be. Small. Q: But generally you would deal with the situation. A: Depending on the situation. Q: May be people suspicious or whatever. A: Correct. Q: Okay. Tell me about security. Now well get back to that. You go into a store. What kinds of security things are you looking for? A: Im looking for cameras. Im looking for the amount of employees. Okay. Im looking for people that are looking at me. Q: Okay, so non-uniformed. A: Non-uniformed. Absolutely. Q: What about uniformed? A: Uniformed even more so. You know. Cameras are the biggest thing. Theyve got the big ball sometimes, which can pretty much scan the whole radius of the store. So does the little cameras. The little cameras sometimes move so sometimes you have to time it. Q: Okay. A: If its moving this way, this is a very small package. I can take 3 at a time and put them in my sweats, put my shirt over it, and if I buy something I buy it and Im gone. Q: What about the cameras that you cant see where they are? In the big dome thingees.

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108 A: Well there I take my chances. Obviously because its a dome, you know. Id leave a little quicker. Q: so it wont deter you from doing it? A: Well, you need to understand that at the time you know it was more of a desperate act. You know, I havent stolen in awhile. You know, cause I havent done drugs in a long time. I went to rehab and I wasnt a drug addict. Im not a drug addict. I was abusing it. You know and I didnt get literally hooked, but I was almost there. I almost crossed that imaginary line but I never did. Q: But still it was pretty important that you get it. A: But it was important that I get it. You know, at the time. Q: So you would do it, but just. . A: I did it cause I needed the money. I wasnt working and I wanted to get high and that was an easy way to get high. Okay. Q: Okay. What about employees paying attention to you? A: Can you repeat the question again? Q: Yeah, sure. Employees paying attention to you. A: Again, you know people go by appearance a lot. You know. I was never high when I was doing it. And I was dressed fairly clean cut. I mean I didnt even have this you know? So I never really had a problem with that. Q: Okay. A: Me in particular. Q: Okay. What about security employees either in uniform or non-uniformed. A: Never had a problem, like I said before. I never got busted. Q: Okay. Ever been arrested? A: No. Appearances they really, you know were in a society where you know appearance is just normal. You see a guy with ripped up clothes, sweating, dirty, theyre going to follow them. I wasnt that type of thief. I just didnt get down to that level, so it was actually easier for me. Q: But you didnt I mean you were paying attention. .

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109 A: Well there were a couple of occasions where they were looking because it was their job, but whether they had an idea that I was stealing I couldnt tell you, but I dont think so. Q: Just because of your appearance? A: Just because of the appearance. Q: And you were kind of not doing anything. A: And I didnt do anything that would make them think that I was. And if I had any idea in my mind I would get one of those little carrying things and put a couple of items in it that I probably needed. And purchased them. Q: So you looked legit. A: Yeah. Q: So basically youve taken a couple of things and it wasnt that hard to get. A: Wasnt that hard to get, right. But it added up as far as the money is concerned. Because you know you take a couple of these, 3 or 4 stores, you know youve got $40 or $50. You know what I mean. You go to 3 or 4 stores it adds up. Q: So you can go out and do a couple and. . A: Oh yeah. Yeah. Amongst other items, not just that. Q: But where the cameras were concerned you felt like needed to get around and some employees being sensitive, but it never really deterred you. A: Never did. Q: anything else? The electronics thing or. . A: Oh, good luck. Theres a little plastic thing they put on there and I would rip it off if it had it. Q: What about if you tried to sell that back? Was that an issue? They never bothered you at all? A: Nah. Q: No. Okay. So youre a male. What year were you born?

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110 A: I was born in 1968. M; Hispanic background. A: Hispanic. Q: You say youve never been arrested for shoplifting. A: No. Q: Employed, umemployed now? J; Im starting a new job tomorrow. Q: Okay. What are you going to do? A: Mortgage broker. Q: Oh, good. That should be a good job. Education? A: I have a Bachelors degree in Business Administration. Im a finance major, business administration, branch manager for Washington Mutual Bank, Republic Bank. I have my mortgage brokers license. I have worked for a title company as a real estate closer, so my niche or my background are those. Q: Like financial. A: Right, financial, real estate. Q: If we do more of these, I dont know if they are, but would you be willing to do more if we give a call up. A: Absolutely. If I get paid for it sure. Q: Yeah. They pay. A: Well you know right now, I was working at a company and I got laid off 2 weeks ago so I havent worked for 2 weeks, and I finally landed a job which I start tomorrow and Ive got 3 kids and a mortgage so this can help me. Q: Yeah, its expensive. I guess what we want to do now is switch over to the packaging. Well kind of go from the standard stuff to go through and we have a series of questions are how easy is it to hide, well you dont open, so thats not a question, what about to resell or get rid of. And just kind of go over the deterrent effect of each of those packages as you go through. So you can take one and kind of hold it up to the camera so

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111 we know what youre talking about, just start from right here and go over that way. Thats just your regular old type. A: This is my common package that I would steal. The reason being is because its very small. I would take about 3 of these. Never any more. Okay. Put them in my sweats or other pants that are very baggy. Very simple. Q: Now thats about the same. The next one is just a little heavier. A: Just a little heavier. I would also take these, 3. These are another 4. Q: Hold that up. A: Im sorry. Q: They cant see. A: Im sorry. These were the 8s. Okay. Q: Yeah, I dont think its so much the size its the nature of the package. A: Yeah, the nature of the packaging itself, its very simple. Now this plastic here Ive never, this Ive never seen. Q: These are things that theyre thinking about. A: So I couldnt give you an answer for it. Q: Hypothetically. A: Hypothetically, I would stick it the same way. Q: Okay, not much difference. A: This either. But this is pretty simple too. Its even smaller and lighter. Q: Yeah, I guess the only thing, well see when we get some of these, just pull it off. A: Now this is tougher as far as my scenario is concerned. Why? I could probably maybe not even take this. Too thick. Too big. Absolutely not. Q: Thats pretty much what that one, ones a little heavier plastic. Now feel the other one.

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112 A: Yeah. Both of these are out of the question. Okay. Too big. I mean its so bulky, as far as my scenario is concerned, stick it in your pants and it will get a big bulge. Its not profitable. Q: Now this is a thing and you can look at it with a traditional pack but also think in other ways, the idea here is if you can hold it up, is that you kind of have to, you cant just pull a bunch off at any one time, you have to work them off a little bit. A: I dont understand your question, because I can rip this right off. Q: Okay. And that wouldnt. . J; No. Q: wouldnt effect it? A: No, just rip it right off. Q: but with some of these others with the things you cant rip right off, how would that effect it? A: Okay, bottom line, if this is what youre getting at, these are hard. The way that I would steal as far as the pants are concerned, youre speaking to a male, a male doesnt carry a purse. Okay. Now if youre talking about a purse theyre going to take it. If they can. Depending on the cameras and if they know what theyre doing, but these 2 here is or are the packages that you may want to consider. Q: What about this? This is another device that they have and the idea here is if you take it it pops up so you cant take a couple, you have to work it a little bit differently. A: Its still being ripped off. Okay. This is all great, fine and dandy but this is cardboard. Q: So it would have to be a harder top, something that you could pull them off with. A: Again, this is where its at, right here. As far as security. Q: Another thing theyre thinking of, and this may not effect you as much as sticker, kind of Wal-Mart Always, for people who are selling them to fences or neighborhoods, the idea is if youre not selling them to someplace thats not Wal-Mart people figure out well. . A: Well a sticker can be peeled off. Q: What if it was part of the pack that couldnt be removed? But before you return them you would just take it back to Wal-Mart right? It wouldnt matter the way you operate.

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113 A: Right the way I operate in particular. So why even take the sticker off? That would benefit me. Q: Right. You could sell it, actually it would make it easier for you. . A: Absolutely. Q: But Wal-Mart then, you said some of these stores are less likely to give you a refund, and more likely to give you a store credit. A: Because theyre the bigger stores which I didnt target. Generally speaking. Q: So it may be a little of a deterrent in the sense that the way you operate you cant. . A: Because of their security. And that is a security measure. Q: Lets say you wanted to take that but then you couldnt take that obviously back to. . A: Well yeah. Lets say I did steal it in Target. Take the sticker off and take it to the small convenience store in Hialeah. Q: Right. Youd have to take the sticker off. A: It doesnt matter. Q: Okay, thats pretty much what we wanted to do.

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APPENDIX B SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW Q: This is Mike, Im Mike, but this is Mike also. Were interviewing here. Hes a Braves fan apparently. A: Not really. Just a comfortable fan. Q: Just what youve got. All right, were in Dania, Florida, Hollywood, just north of Miami, and its the 23 rd of June and were going to go ahead and start the interview. Have you taken any Gillette razors, Mach IIIs, Senors. . A: Yeah I have. Q: In the past 12 months? A: Yeah. Q: Ok. What types do you usually take? A: The Mach III. Q: All right. Have you taken Sensor, Venus? A: No pretty much the Mach III. Q: Just the Mach III. How many times say in the past 12 months? A: I dont know. 10 or 12 times. Q: Ok. So roughly once a month or something like that. A: Yeah. Q: and what kinds of packs do you take as far as. . A: You know the basic pack because its easier to slide. Q: How many, cause you know theres different sizes. A: The 4s. 114

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115 Q: 4,8 A: the 4 packs because of the size wise. Q: So youll generally take the smaller pack actually. About how many would you take at a time whenever you go? A: A couple at a time. Q: So 3, 4 ,5 6, something like that? A: Yeah. Q: Ok. Do you take any other kind of blades? A: No. Q: so when you take you just take the Gillette? A: Yeah. I tried to by resale value. Q: You get something out of it, right? So when you do take it how do you get rid of them? What do you do with them? A: either take it back to another store. Q: So you resell them. So you just keep your, how do you, do you get a receipt or something? A: You dont even need a receipt. You just go back, look I got this, my wife picked it up. Q: And they dont give you a hard time? A: They dont give you a hard time about it. Q: How do you avoid being recognized? Is that a problem? A: No. No basically all you do is wrap, you know put a piece of aluminum foil over that.. Q: No I mean when youre reselling them. A: No, go to different stores, they dont give you a hard time. Q: They dont give you a hard time. When you do that you get the full value.

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116 A: Yeah, the full value. Q: So theres the benefit in that. A: right. Q: But you can only do so many at a time. A: Right. Right. Q: what other kinds of things would you do to get rid of them? Do you use them yourself? A: No I dont really use that. Q: Ok. A: Im not really a Gillette fan. Q: Ok. A: Just the high resale value on it. Q: Ok. What else? Do you sell them to a store? A: Stores, yeah, a lot of stores, you know, Ill take all of them that you can bring me and youll get like of the money, 60 cents on the dollar. Q: You can get that much? A: Yeah. Q: Thats a pretty good return. What about a fence? Do you sell them to a fence? A: No. No. Q: Just youll take them right to a store. A: Yeah. Q: Do you use the same stores? A: Yeah. Q: How do they pay you?

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117 A: Cash. Q: No I mean so much per piece? A: Yeah. Well depending on how many youre bringing in you know? Q: Flea markets or things like that? A: no. Too much work, too much involved. Take them to a corner store and say Ive got 3 or 4 of these, you know. Q: They worry about the packages being torn? P; Well you dont tear the package. Q: all right. Thats actually, let me ask you this next question, well well get to some of that. Why do you choose to take Gillette? A: Obviously it has a high resale value. Everybody knows it, its a brand name, its easy, its easy to work with. Q: Ok. What else about taking it thats easy, hard, you know? A: Its very simple, you just wrap a piece of aluminum foil around it and boom, walk out the door with it. Q: you only have a couple so it doesnt take that much. A: Right. Theres not much too it. Its not big and bulky. Q: Ok. Ok. P; Which you might want to change your packaging, you know. Q: Well I guess thats one of the questions we have here, were going to talk later. What kinds of packaging would make it a little bit more difficult? A: Yeah. Something like this. Q: Thats the big pack. A: Yeah. The big one. Q: Just hold it up real quick.

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118 A: I would say that this would be harder to take. And obviously something like that. Q: Well come back to that question at the end. A: Ok.. Q: So basically, you get a pretty good buck for them, theyre easy to take, easy to get rid of, things like that. So its not rocket science. A: Yeah, its not rocket science. Its a high resale value, its easy to take, its in a part of the store, theyre usually in a part of the store, you go into a Walgreens or something like that and theyre in the back of the store, its easy. Its easy to work. Q: Ok. How do you take them? What do you do? A: Basically you just walk up, as opposed to trying to take the label off, the labels off of it, you just wrap a piece of aluminum foil over the guard, over the pack. Q: And then what? A: Put it in your hand and just walk out. Put it in your pants, walk out the door. Q: So put them in your clothing. . A: Yeah, put it in your clothing, put it in a bag. M; so a variety of different things. A: Right. Basically what you. . Q: so like a container, like a bag youve got. . A: yeah, like a shoulder bag, or stick it in your pants pocket. You wrap it with aluminum foil its no problem. Its no big deal, walk out. Q: Ok. All right. So it could be a container, did you buy something in the store or you just bring a bag in? A: no lets say if you have a shopping bag or your shoulder bag or just a pants pocket. Q: Stick them in and walk out. P; Stick them in and walk out. Q: Ok. All right. But you always leave them in the packaging or take them out of the packaging?

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119 A: Obviously its worth more in the package. Q: all right. If its not in the package you get how much? A: less. Considerably less. Q: Ok. Let me ask you if theres other things that you may take. Kind of the same series of questions. What other kinds of items do you usually take? P; Pretty much thats it. You know Ive taken some vitamins and things like that, but pretty much this is cause its simple, its easy, everybody has it. Q: Ok. Just go in and grab them take a couple and pick up a couple of bucks. A: Right. Q: but you dont do CDs, DVDs? A: No. Q: Batteries, any electronics? A: No. Q: Ok. So whenever you go into a store you usually think you know what youre going to get before you go? Or do you just kind of go in and see it? A: Just kind of go in and see. Q: If its there youll grab some. A: Yeah. Q: If you go and say youre looking for Gillette, and none are there do you take anything, any other brands or anything like that? A: not really. Cause like I said, these are easy to get rid of. You know any store in the world has them. You get something else, how knows? Q: Ok A: You get a bag of Bic or something, who knows. Q: Never a problem with finding these?

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120 A: Never a problem with finding it, exactly. Q: Do you take things at a certain time of day, morning, evening, afternoon? P; Afternoons. Q: Not morning, or what is it about the afternoons? A: Im more free in the afternoons basically. Theres no. . Q: nothing to do with the store. A: No, nothing to do with the store, the hours that they work, Im just free in the afternoons. Q: You work on other things in the morning or something like that. A: Right. Q: Ok. Do you usually work alone? A: Yeah. Q: You just go in and do it.? A: Right. Q: Ok. What kinds of stores do you go? P; Drug stores. Q: Primarily you work drug stores? A: Drug stores, Walgreens, Eckerds, things like that. Q: but not Target or grocery stores or things like that? A: no. No. Q: And why do you take, what are some of the reasons you take, because lots of places have these. A: Because theres lots of drug stores around my neighborhood. You know basically thats it.

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121 Q: So around where you live. Let me ask you, thats another question, about how many miles do you kind of work? A: A couple of miles. Q: So relatively a small area. A: Relatively a small area. Q: And theres a lot of drug stores. A: A lot of drug stores in my area. M; Ok. A: I think in 4 block area from where I live theres like 5 drug stores. Q: Ok. Security in those stores? P; Lax. Q: Not that much. They pretty much have them. A: they have them, its lax. I mean you go through a little scanner at the front of the door and thats it. Q: And if its wrapped in tin foil thats not a big issue. A: Its not a big issue. Q: Ok. All right. You usually buy something when you go in? A: yeah. I pick up a pack of gum or whatever, a candy bar. Pay for it. Q: Grab it and go ahead and go on. A: Sure. Q: what kinds of security measures would you look for when you go into the store? A: Well most of these stores really dont, they have these little scanner at the door and thats pretty much it. Q: They dont have anything else? A: they might have the sensor, but they dont watch every aisle.

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122 M; Thats cameras. P; Security cameras thing. Q: Thats not an issue? A: Thats really not an issue. M; what about personnel, or employees? A: A lot, I dont think like, Walgreens, or big stores like that, you know like food chains would have them, but like a Walgreens or Eckerds they dont. Q: They dont have very much. Employees, anything? A: and if they do they have a security guard that stands at the front by the buzzer in case the buzzer goes off. Q: But you have the aluminum foil. A: the buzzer doesnt go off. Q: It hasnt been an issue for you. A: right. Q: Just get them, grab them and go ahead and go on out. A: Right. Q: Any other things you think of when you go in that youre looking for? A: No. Pretty casual. Its very casual really. I mean its really not a problem. Like you said its light, its easy. Q: Ok. Youre a male, white, non-Hispanic. P; Non-Hispanic, white male. Q: Have you ever been arrested for shoplifting? A: Nope. Q: Never have been. Whats your employment situation?

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123 A: Full-time. Q: Youre employed full-time. What do you do? A: In sales. Q: Sales. Sales for retail? A: Yeah, retail sales. Q: Whats your education? A: High school education. Q: and if we did more of these would you be willing to do some more? They may do some follow-up kinds of things. A: Depending on timing, sure. Q: Ok. I guess I what I would like to do now is take these packages and have you go through the current packing all the way through. Let me as you how difficult it is to hide, to open, to resell. Easy to hard. A: Okay. Again, I dont open them, so thats not. Q: Opening isnt an issue. A: Opening isnt an issue. I mean the worst thing you do is fold it like that and put a piece of aluminum foil around it. Q: Okay, and thats not hard to sell even if its bent like that? Hold it up to the camera just so they can see. A: Fold it like that and then unfold it. M; Ok. P; Its no big deal. Q: That way it doesnt take as much space. P; Right. Q: And you can wrap it up and things like that.

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124 A: Right. And again this one the same thing. This one is obviously a little bigger, a little more bulky. Q: A little harder. A: A little harder. Obviously the smaller the package the easier it is. Again just boom. Wrap it with a heavy piece of aluminum foil. Now obviously this is more difficult. The bigger it is the more bulky it is the less you want to do it. Q: Ok. A: and I guess this is your new packaging. Q: This is some new things that theyre looking at. Actually theyre a little different. Some are bigger than the others. A: Right as I say obviously the bigger it is, its kind of hard to put in your pants. Q: Ok. So you would or wouldnt take it? A: I wouldnt take it. Q: You wouldnt take it. A: I wouldht take it. I would shy away from it. Q: Of course you dont open any of the packages. You know some people open them. A: Well especially if you start opening it up that brings for people looking at ya. You pick up a package like this off of the shelf and its easy. Q: Right. A: You start opening something up obviously its more difficult. Q: Resell affects. A: Resell affects. And obviously to me this is worth more but it would be harder to get. Q: Right. And if you feel the plastic on that compared to the others its even harder. A: So I would tell you marketing wise to me this would be the hardest one that you would have to deal with.

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125 Q: To deal with. All right. Now the other thing that we want to look at are some of these display things. And you can look at them too. The thing here is you have to wiggle it. A: Right. Well again, the point of it is its not really that hard to get off. Q: Ok. A: If you push down on this it slides right off. Q: Ok. A: Thats not rocket science. To get on and off. Q: So it would slow you a little bit, but it wouldnt be a big A: Nah, thats not a major deterrent. I mean you could take 2 or 3 of these, put your finger down. . Q: And get them out of there pretty easily. A: And get them out pretty quickly. Q: Now part of the thinking is in combination with other things. A: Obviously the harder it is the less people are going to do it. Q: Ok. Now this ones a little bit different in the sense that, now Ill show you how it works, if youll hold it up, to do it you kind of have to you know hold it down and you cant take multiples. You have to pinch, so it kind of takes 2 hands. P; Right. Now that would be, again, the quicker, the simpler things are the more likely it is to do. Something like this obviously youve got to push this down, youve got to push this in. Q: And you couldnt just pop that. A: Its too involved. I would shy away from it. Q: Ok. A: When its on a single rack like this where you can just pop off 2 or 3 of them, obviously that would be easy. Q: Ok.

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126 A: Thats one of the things that makes that accessible. Q: What about, and this is one of the things that theyre looking at, which is this Wal-Mart Always sticker and the idea is if you go and resell that. . A: Well this you would have to bring back to another Wal-Mart. M; What about selling that at another store? A: Well you wouldnt sell that at another store. Youd have to bring that back to another Wal-mart. Q: To resell? A: To resell. Go hey, my wife bought a couple of packs of these. I really dont need them and return them. And they would look at them and say its a Wal-mart brand and so 9 times out of 10 you would be able to talk somebody at Wal-Mart into taking the package back even without a receipt. Q: What about if you were taking that to you know one of the corner stores? A: Well I dont think, I dont know if the corner store would take it. Because again, its labeled for a Wal-Mart. Q: Ok. So it may discourage.. A: It might discourage from another source from buying it but it wouldnt stop someone from taking it because they could always go back to a Wal-Mart or an Eckerd or whatever that label might be. Q: Ok. Do you have any other suggestions for them about packaging? A: I like this rack. Obviously the harder, well I like it not for me, but for idea, the harder it is to get the thing off, thats this clip thing, the harder it would be to get off, the more time it takes, the less likely it is for somebody to use it, take it. And again the heavier plastic and the bigger packaging, the bulkier the package the less desirable it is. Q: Ok. Well thats good. Thats kind of what we wanted to get at. I appreciate it. END OF TAPE

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136 Welsh, B.C., and Farrington, D.P. (2001) Toward an Evidence-Based Approach to Preventing Crime. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 578, pp. 158-173. Wortley, R. (1997) Reconsidering the Role of Opportunity in Situational Crime Prevention. In Newman, G., Clarke, R.V., and Shohan, S.G. (eds.) Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Group. Wood, E. (1961) Housing Design: A Social Theory. New York: Citizens Housing and Planning Council. Wood, E. (1967) Social Aspects of Housing and Urban Development. No. 67, Vol. IV, p. 2. New York: United Nations. Wilkinson, K. (1980) The Broken Home and Delinquent Behavior. In Hirschi, T., and Gottfredson, M. (eds.) Understanding Crime: Current Theory and Research. Beverly Hills: Sage. Wright, R., and Decker, S. (1994) Burglars on the Job. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Zeisle, J. (1988) Inquiry by Design. A Focus Report submitted to the Journal of Interior Design, Oct. 3, 2000.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Caroline Cardone was born in Gloucester, Massachusetts. She received her Bachelor degree in English literature from Skidmore College in 1997, cum laude, with honors. Her minor concentrations were in studio art and art history. After spending five years in the publishing industry, Caroline began graduate work in interior design at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. There, she joined the Universitys Loss Prevention Research Team as a writer, editor, and research assistant. Her work with the LPRT drove her interest in how physical spaces affect shoplifter behavior. In addition to her continued involvement with LPRT, Caroline is currently a full-time interior designer with Phinney Design Group, an architecture firm located in Saratoga Springs, New York. 137


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FILE SIZE 1642 DFID F20110404_AACGKI ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH cardone_c_Page_055.txt GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0015826/00001

Material Information

Title: Opportunity Makes the Thief: Analysis of the Physical Cues That Influence Shoplifter Perceptions of the Retail Interior and the Decision to Steal
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0015826:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0015826/00001

Material Information

Title: Opportunity Makes the Thief: Analysis of the Physical Cues That Influence Shoplifter Perceptions of the Retail Interior and the Decision to Steal
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0015826:00001


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Full Text












OPPORTUNITY MAKES THE THIEF:
ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL CUES THAT INFLUENCE SHOPLIFTER
PERCEPTIONS OF THE RETAIL INTERIOR AND THE DECISION TO STEAL















By

CAROLINE A. CARDONE


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF INTERIOR DESIGN

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2006

































Copyright 2006

by

Caroline A. Cardone















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the support and contributions

of many people. First, I would like to thank my parents, Margaret and David Leeco, for

always championing my decisions, and my brother, Andrew Cardone, for being an

ongoing source of inspiration. I would especially like to thank my husband, Dr. Stowe

Burke, for his understanding and devotion, and for pushing me to do this.

I wish to acknowledge the support of the University of Florida's Department of

Interior Design, and of my graduate advisor, Dr. Mary Jo Hasell, who willingly accepted

the challenge of learning about loss prevention during this process Very special thanks

go to Dr. Read Hayes, who generously shared his time, knowledge of loss prevention,

and scholarly expertise whenever called upon. I am deeply grateful to the staff of the

University of Florida's Loss Prevention Research Team, including Dr. Richard

Schneider, Candy Carmel-Gilfilen and Robert Blackwood. I also owe a debt of gratitude

to Kristin Bell and Kristin Ranger for both their friendship and contributions to this

research.

Lastly, I would like to thank my academic colleagues, Lauren Anderson, Sarah

Cain, Kathryn Levins, and Julianna Mitchell. This master's thesis may mark the

culmination of a scholastic goal, but it will never communicate the scope of our journey.
















TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ................................................................................................. iii

LIST OF TABLES ................................... .............................. ............ vi

L IST O F F IG U R E S .... ...... ................................................ .. .. ..... .............. vii

ABSTRACT ........ .............. ............. ...... ...................... ix

CHAPTER

1 IN TR O D U C TIO N ....................................................... ..... .......... ............ 1

Purpose .... ........................ ..........................................1
Overview of the Shoplifting Problem ........................................... ...............2
The R ole of Interior D esign.......................................................... ............. 3
Scope of Project................................................... 3
D definition s ......................................................................... . 5
A ssum options ................................................................. 6

2 SIGNIFICANCE AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................8

S ig n ifican ce ............................................................ ................ 8
R etail R actions to Shoplifting......................................... .......... ............... 9
Literature Review ...................................... .. ............... .9
The Design-Security Disconnect............... ......................................................... 10
Review of Security Coverage in Retail Design Literature .............. .................11
Security Coverage in Professional Practice of Retail Design .............................13
Understanding Shoplifter Perceptions.....................................................13
Research on the Crime-Environment Connection.............................................15
"Place-Based" Crim e Prevention ............................................. ............... 16
T h eoretical B ackgrou n d ................................................................... .....................2 1
O opportunity Theories................................................. .............................. 22
R national C choice T heory ............................................................ .....................22
T he T heft T riangle ........... ........................................................ .. .... ...... .... 23
C P TE D ............... ......................25
Situational C rim e Prevention .............. ............................... ............... .... 30
A Matrix of Opportunity-Reducing Techniques ....................................31
Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior............... ... ............ 33










S u m m ary ...................................... .................................. ................ 4 7

3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS ............................................48

S am p le P articip an ts ......................................................................... ....................4 9
Quality of Data .................................... .......................... ............50
Sam ple D em ographics.................................................................... ............... 51
M methodology ......................................................................................................5 1
C content A analysis .......................................... ................... .. ...... 52
Inter-Rater Reliability .................. ......................... ........ .... ............ 54
V a lid ity ....................................................................................................5 6
N arrative Analysis ............... ....... .... ..... .. ....................... .. .. .......... 57
Narrative Analysis in Interior Design Research...............................................59
L im station s ............. ................. .................................................................... 6 0
S u m m a ry ............. .. ............... ................. ..............................................6 3

4 F IN D IN G S ........................................................................................................6 4

F in d in g s ..............................................................................6 4
C o n ten t A n aly sis ........................................................................................... 6 4
Narrative Analysis ............................................ .......... ......70
Categories with No Scores .................................................86
S u m m a ry ......................................................................................................8 7

5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... ...............88

D discussion ..................88................................................
D design R ecom m endations ................................................ ................. 89
Optimizing Natural Surveillance Through Design .............................................92
Optimizing Target Hardening/Accessibility Through Design .........................93
Optimizing CCTV Guardianship Through Design ................... ............... 94
Optimizing Formal Surveillance Through Design ...........................................94
Recommendations for Future Research ..............................................95
Conclusion ........................................... ...... ................................ 96

APPENDIX

A: SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW ........ .......... ..............................98

B: SAMPLE OFFENDER INTERVIEW .......................................................................114

LIST OF REFEREN CES ................................. ............................ .................. 127

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ........................................................................137







v
















LIST OF TABLES


Table page

1: Review of Security Coverage in Retail Interior Design Literature ............................12

2: Situational Crime Prevention's Matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques........32

3: Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior. .............. ............................. 34

4: Sam ple D em graphics ..... ...... ....................... .......... ........ .. .. ........ .... 51

5: Inter-Rater Reliability Test Results ........................ ............. ........ ........... 55
















LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

1: High Shelf Height. ...................................... ......................... 18

2: Lowered Shelf Height..... ......... .. ... ......... ..............18

3 : B lin d S p o t.. ............................................................. ............... 19

4 : S ig n a g e ..................................................................................................................... 2 0

5: Theoretical Frameworks .......................... ........ ......... ...............21

6: The Theft Triangle ...... ........... .... ......... ...... ........24

7 : T w o R detail Interiors............................................................................................2 5

8: Access Control ......................... ............... ....... ................26

9 : Surveillance.. ................................................... .. .....27

1 0 : T e rrito ria lity ........................................................................................................... 2 7

11: A activity Support ............... .................................................................... ..... 28

12: Target H ardening. ...............................................................35

13: Restricted Access Control ................................................................... ......... .............. 36

14: Unrestricted Access Control. ........................................ ........ .........36

15: Poor CCTV positioning. .... ....... .... .. ...... .... ................ .... .............. 37

16: Poor C C TV Positioning .................................................................... ..................38

17: Optim al CCTV positioning ......................................................... .............. 39

18: Poor natural surveillance.. .............................. .. ......................................... 40

19: G ood natural surveillance. ........................................ .............................................4 1

20: G ood natural surveillance. ........................................ .............................................4 1










21: Place M management ................................ ..... .............. ..... .... 42

22: Form al Surveillance. ......................................... .. .. ........... ......... 43

23 : V visible T targets. .................................................................43

24: Target Concealment. ......................... ....... ................. ..... ..... 44

25: R educe Frustrations. .............................................. .. .. .... ............... 44

26: Poor M maintenance. ................................ .... .. ... .. ......... .........45

27: E excellent M maintenance ......... .............................................................. ............... 45

28: Set R ules............................................... 46








































viii















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Interior Design

OPPORTUNITY MAKES THE THIEF:
ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL CUES THAT INFLUENCE SHOPLIFTER
PERCEPTIONS OF THE RETAIL INTERIOR AND THE DECISION TO STEAL

By

Caroline A. Cardone

August 2006

Chair: Mary Jo Hasell
Major Department: Interior Design

Shoplifting continues to be a major source of loss in the retail industry. Despite the

introduction of many new and advanced technologies aimed at minimizing it, the rate and

severity of shoplifting have not ebbed in the past few decades. But shoplifters are human

beings; they are usually reasonable people who base their actions on perceptions of crime

opportunity or apprehension risk. The action of shoplifting exists in a specific context:

the retail store interior. Several studies have linked generalities of the retail interior to

shoplifter perceptions and activity. This study further refines previous research on the

environment-shoplifting connection by identifying the specific design elements that

shoplifters cite as most influential to their perceptions and behavior.

In order to identify these elements, the study applies content and narrative analyses

to 20 in-depth interviews with known shoplifting offenders. These are examined through

the theoretical lens of rational choice theory and situational crime prevention theory. The









study uses a retail-specific adaptation of situational crime prevention's model of

opportunity-reducing techniques to classify and quantify shoplifter comments about

perceptions of the retail interior. Findings from the content and narrative analyses reveal

several patterns amongst the 20 shoplifters. Over 70 percent of their comments about

cues in the retail interior fall into the categories of hardened/accessible targets (efforts to

limit offender access to coveted items), extended guardianship (in the form of closed-

circuit TV), natural surveillance (feeling exposed or like actions are easily monitored),

and formal surveillance (the presence and attentiveness of store security staff).

The study's narrative analysis bolsters these results in its inclusion of offender

interview excerpts contextualizing how shoplifter perceptions and behavior result from

cues in the surrounding environment. The study concludes by outlining some ways retail

designers can incorporate the findings of the study into actual design practice.

The process of designing retail interiors to minimize shoplifting is complex. This

study provides an important first step in its identification of the elements shoplifters cite

as influential to their decision to steal. Further research should aim to test these elements

individually, in controlled environments, to determine which design strategies are most

effective in shaping shoplifter perceptions and behavior.














CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

At times imperceptible, and at others unavoidable, visual messages abound in the

retail environment. Buy, Covet, Notice, Touch, Enjoy, Relax. Implied or obvious, these

messages surround us, conveyed through the smallest details of product packaging to the

overall atmospheric effects of lighting and form. But to a shoplifter, messages in the retail

interior are quite different. A shoplifter enters a store, scans the space, and perceives

Unprotected, Understaffed, Easy Access, Quick Escape. A shoplifter views the retail

store through an entirely different pair of eyes. But what does a shoplifter see? The ability

to assess and understand exactly how shoplifting offenders interpret the retail

environment, and judge the risks and opportunities within it, would be invaluable to

retailers, retail interior designers, criminologists, and researchers alike.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine if offenders factor characteristics of retail

interiors into their decision to shoplift, and if so, to identify the physical cues offenders

cite as influential to this decision. This information will allow retailers, retail interior

designers, and loss prevention (LP) professionals to focus on the things that influence

shoplifter perceptions and behavior most, thereby optimizing the retail interior's ability to

minimize loss. At the most basic level, the purpose of the built environment is to provide

shelter and protection. "But beyond these basic needs, building design also encompasses

two distinct yet closely related issues: safety and security" (Nadel, 2004, 1). These

issues often extend beyond the integrity of the building structure itself. Within the retail









interior, safety and security also includes protection of the people and products in the

store. Shoplifting jeopardizes both of these, and in order to create a safe shopping

environment, retailers, designers, and security experts must work together to minimize it.

Modem psychology generally acknowledges that individual behavior is influenced

by environment (Gifford, 1996). However, while researchers have examined this

interrelationship from a myriad of angles, few have studied the link between criminal

behavior and interior environments, and even fewer have analyzed shoplifter behavior

within retail interiors. The current study addresses this paucity by asking whether a

shoplifter's perception of the retail interior influences the decision to steal. It addresses

this question via a content and narrative analysis of 20 interviews with known shoplifting

offenders. Rich in descriptive, qualitative material, these interviews provide detailed first-

person accounts of how offenders arrive at the decision to steal. By analyzing the data in

these interviews, this study explores how the retail interior factors into a shoplifter's

decision-making process, identifying the physical cues shoplifters cite as deterrents to, or

opportunities for, shoplifting. Furthermore, the study explains how the offenders'

"rational," salient, decision-making process hinges on the physical design of a store and

presence/position of security measures. Finally, the study suggests ways in which interior

designers may affect this process in a positive way, creating retail spaces that minimize

theft opportunities and enhance the shopping experience.

Overview of the Shoplifting Problem

Shoplifting is a specific form of larceny, defined as "an act of theft from a retailer

committed during the hours the store is open to the public by a person who appears to be

a legitimate customer" (Sennewald and Christman, 1992, 1). In the past century, as the

Industrial Revolution has given way to a culture of consumption based on desire for and









availability of goods, shoplifting has evolved into a complex social problem (Klemke,

1992). Retailers have tried everything to minimize it stringent apprehension policies,

high-tech protection devices, and increased security measures but none of these is a

proven panacea (Welsh and Farrington, 2001). Today's savvy, adaptive criminals can

easily circumvent such reactive "band-aids." To be effective, LP must be a

comprehensive, holistic process a process that begins with store design itself.

The Role of Interior Design

Retail design presents a unique opportunity to help offset the threat shoplifting

poses. Retail design can either help or hinder the security of a store's interior. It can

enhance the effectiveness of LP technologies and facilitate safety, with aisles planned to

coincide with security camera angles, and shelves designed to maximize employee

visibility. Or, alternately, it can create hiding spots for criminals to conduct illicit activity

with poorly-planned exit access, and dark, unprotected covers. LP's effectiveness is

compromised without a retail interior that conveys a sense of risk, sanction, and

vulnerability to would-be offenders. However, research is still unclear as to which

specific design strategies convey this message most effectively. So how do retail

designers know where to focus their efforts? In order to create safe, well-protected

interiors, retail designers must have an awareness of which design elements most

effectively influence shoplifter perceptions, thereby optimizing the retail interior's role in

minimizing theft loss.

Scope of Project

This exploratory study examines 20 shoplifter interviews in an attempt to code and

measure the visual cues in retail environments offenders cite as influential to their

perceptions of shoplifting risk or opportunity (the specific methodology for coding and









measuring is discussed in Chapter 3). The interviews, conducted over several years with a

variety of known shoplifting offenders, present a wide range of information, in narrative

form, about the act of shoplifting. Such detailed, informative interviews are indeed rare,

and the opportunity to study their content makes this study at once unique and complex.

Through a combined strategy of content and narrative analyses, this study focuses in on

shoplifters' perceptions of the physical environment within retail store interiors. It then

examines how specific cues in that environment (like the height of display shelves, for

instance) affect reported perceptions of opportunity versus risk, and subsequently, the

criminal decision-making process.

The scope of this study is limited to shoplifters' reported perceptions of retail

interiors as they affect the decision to shoplift. While it is hoped this study's findings will

prompt further research on how such perceptions could generate a set of "best practice"

guidelines for curtailing shoplifting via store design, specific recommendations can only

be suggested, not proven or prescribed. The intent of this exploratory study is to improve

designers' and retailers' understanding of how offenders perceive retail interiors an

understanding which, in turn, can inform retail design in meaningful ways. The study

does not, however, propose that the "answer" to the shoplifting problem can be reduced

to a predetermined set of design practices. The issue of retail crime and loss is always a

highly individualized one, and responses to it must be tailored to a given time, place, and

situation: "the application of standard formulae or prescriptions without careful

consideration of local circumstances and the full involvement of local people in this

process is much more likely to result in failure or at any rate underachievement"

(Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 299). Therefore, the design strategies presented at the end









of this study are only broad recommendations starting points for future research, and

from which designers and retailers can conjointly develop a targeted, security-based

design program.

Definitions

This study explores how offender perceptions of certain cues within the retail space

affect their assessment of shoplifting opportunity or risk. For the purpose of this study,

the terms "environment," "retail interior," and "retail environment" are used

interchangeably, and are defined as the physical design of the store's interior including

immediate situational factors such as architectural layout, territorial boundaries, lighting

levels, fixture and shelf placement, product display, and users present. These are all

physical attributes or design features that retailers can control, influence, or affect. (The

definition of "environment" does not include manufacturer-based features, such as

product packaging, or urban planning issues, such as a store's neighborhood location or

proximity to roadways.)

The study's results are based on shoplifter perceptions of such physical conditions.

As such, the term "perception" is defined as "the process of selection, organization, and

interpretation of information about the world conveyed by the senses" (Glassman, 2001,

5). This study is most concerned with how the retail interior, and specific cues within it

(such as cameras, mirrors, or visible employees), help steer this interpretive process.

Therefore, the term "shoplifter perceptions" refers specifically to perceptions of the

physical environment, and how the inferences shoplifters draw from physical cues in

retail interiors influence assessments of ease or difficulty associated with shoplifting. The

study frequently addresses offender perceptions of shoplifting "risk" or "opportunity".

The term "risk" refers to the level of danger offenders perceive as inherent in the









shoplifting act: the risk of detection, apprehension, and sanction. The term "opportunity"

very rarely refers to a direct invitation for shoplifting. Instead, it generally refers to a lack

of risk: a perception that the risk of detection, apprehension, and sanction is low.

Finally, the study focuses on how shoplifters perceive certain "physical cues" in the

retail environment. These "cues" can be either animate or inanimate: the term refers to

anything that helps communicate to offenders how risky (or easy) the act of shoplifting

might be. Cues like visible cameras, products placed in clear view of employees, and

anti-shoplifting signs all impart a certain message to potential shoplifters. Ruesch and

Kees (1956) described the collective meaning that physical cues convey to viewers as

"object language". The intent of this study is to analyze the "object language" of the retail

interior as perceived by shoplifters, in order to determine which cues they cite most as

influential to their decision to steal.

Assumptions

This study assumes offender perceptions will typically differ from those of

legitimate users, and therefore focuses solely on shoplifter perceptions, not the

perceptions of employees or shoppers. In a 1994 study on perceptions of home

vulnerability to burglary, Shaw and Gifford found, contrary to previous beliefs,

offenders' perceptions differed from legitimate users' (possibly due to the offenders'

first-hand experience with burglary). This study assumes the same to be true of

shoplifters; that is, shoplifters' perceptions of retail interiors will differ from legitimate

users' because the shoplifter's focus, intent, and experience level is generally different.

Because the offender interviews employed in this study do not address specific

retail environments (like the type, size, or location of stores), this study also assumes any









comments about retail interiors are general comments about store design, and not a

reference to a specific location or incident (unless otherwise noted by the offender).

Lastly, and most importantly, this study assumes shoplifter perceptions of many LP

strategies are contingent on the physical design and layout of a store's interior. The

design-perception link is in some cases more obvious than others. For instance, the link

between lowered shelf heights (less than 60") and a shoplifter's resulting sense of

vulnerability may be implicit: lower shelf design makes it easier for employees to

monitor a space, which in turn heightens a shoplifter's perception of risk and sanction.

But this link is not always so clear. For instance, a shoplifter may describe an experience

of walking into a store and feeling uncomfortable, as if he/she is "being watched". This

study assumes perceptions like this are predicated on a visual assessment of the physical

design of the space, as it is difficult to watch or be watched without a design that

facilitates surveillance. Therefore this study assumes that, explicitly or not, offenders

factor retail interior design into their assessment risk in the retail interior.














CHAPTER 2
SIGNIFICANCE AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Significance

Accounting for over 23 million jobs, the retail industry is the second-largest

employer in the United States. Along with employee theft, shoplifting is the largest

source of inventory loss, with the average dollar value per incident exceeding $265. In

2004, the US retail industry suffered an estimated $10 billion in losses due to shoplifting

alone (Hollinger and Langton, 2005).

These numbers, however, are simply the tip of the iceberg. They account for only

direct losses missing merchandise at retail pricing like multiple inventory counts,

inventory replenishment, loss prevention payroll, training, and technologies. The indirect,

peripheral losses retailers incur as a result of shoplifters are also high. Crime and loss

decrease profits by adding expense and decreasing operating revenues. Sales decrease

when theft or efforts to curtail theft (such as storing items behind a register) render

popular items unavailable to legitimate consumers. Sales may also decline if customers

begin to view a store as unsafe (Hayes, 1997). Consumers' fear of retail crime can lead to

a wide range of avoidance behaviors, including reduced shopping activity, limited

nighttime shopping, shortened shopping visits, switching to competitors, or turning to

alternative shopping formats, including the internet or catalogs (Warr, 2000). In addition,

legal claims resulting from wrongly-accused shoplifters, or from anyone harmed during a

crime incident, often result in more financial losses for retailers (Laska, 2000). On a

macro level, shoplifting is an unnecessary burden on courts, jails, and police forces. It









strains social services departments, indirectly increases cost of living, incurs tax losses,

and imposes a heavy toll on society as a whole (Farrell and Ferrara, 1985).

Retail Reactions to Shoplifting

To mitigate the effects of shoplifting, retailers employ various LP strategies

(Clarke, 1997; Hayes, 1991; Hayes 1997). Some retailers focus LP on procedures,

training and customer services, while others rely on technologies like electronic article

surveillance (EAS) tag systems and cameras (Hollinger & Langton, 2005). EAS gates

work with corresponding tags attached to items. Unless deactivated at the point of

purchase, these tags activate an alarm when passed through the gates. In theory, store

employees will react to these alarms and either reconcile a faulty tag with a receipt, or

apprehend a shoplifter. However, the reality is that few alarm activations actually elicit a

proactive response from staff (Hayes and Blackwood, 2006b). Other retailers attack theft

with store detectives who patrol the store on foot or with the assistance of CCTV (closed-

circuit television) cameras (Hayes, 1993; Jones, 1998). However, despite many years of

technological advances in security systems, little research exists to prove that these

measures have been effective in reducing the impact of shoplifting, and thus, the problem

persists today (Welsh & Farrington, 2001).

Literature Review

Shoplifting has been studied through a variety of lenses, including its connection to

social factors (Klemke, 1992), greed and temptation (Carroll and Weaver, 1986), gender

(Abelson, 1992; O'Brien, 1983; Pousner, 1988), psychological problems (Katz, 1988),

life history and upbringing (Snodgrass, 1982), drug use (Jarvis and Parker, 1989), mental

pathologies like kleptomania (Cupchik, 1997), and the market-based "culture of

consumption" that seems to pervade every facet of Western life (Cohen, 2003).









Despite the range of studies focused on the phenomenon of shoplifting, until

recently, very little research has been directed toward understanding its link to retail

interior design. However, a growing body of literature exploring the relationship between

criminal behavior and the environment positions this relationship as a promising one in

terms of how retail interior design affects shoplifter behavior. In a 2004 review of

literature, Moussatche, Hayes, Schneider, McLeod, Abbott, and Kohen found that current

trends in retail design hold much promise: "Innovative store design can increase

convenience and excitement for the customer while simultaneously allowing for more

staff efficiency and better product protection .. effective retail design can both enhance

sales and safeguard against shrinkage" (Moussatche et al, 2004, 5). This literature review

examines how security issues like shoplifting are addressed in current retail design

resources and professional practice. It then reviews several studies on the

crime/environment connection in architecture, interior design, and other disciplines.

Finally, it presents a theoretical framework from which the current study is derived.

The Design-Security Disconnect

Although recommendations for "designing out crime" are often outlined in crime-

based literature (Felson, 1996; Ekblom, 1997; Farrington, Bowen, Buckle, Biurns-Howel,

Burrows & Speed, 1993; French et al 1984; Lin et al, 1994; Hollinger, 2004) and

occupational health literature (Casteel, 2004; Casteel, 2000; Hendricks, 1999; Mair

2003), there is a paucity of security-based information in the existing body of retail

design literature, rendering it difficult for designers or architects to implement loss

prevention into design programs. This may be due to a perceived conflict of interest

between merchandising and loss prevention: "the paradox is intense. It is a miracle if

store operations can resolve the opposing purposes of attracting buyers and thwarting the









illegal removal of merchandise" (Israel, 1994, 97). Retail LP departments are often at

odds with marketing, merchandising, and design departments, who feel that security

strategies impede their ability to stock, sell, and display items in an attractive, alluring

manner. The retail industry often views merchandising and loss prevention as two very

different (and sometimes contradictory) endeavors. Therefore, while retail designers can

choose from a wealth of resources on how to create stores that support merchandising,

very little literature exists to guide designers on how to do so with security in mind.

Review of Security Coverage in Retail Design Literature

This study reviewed 19 books on retail design and found that only seven contained

information addressing crime and loss in store design. Even fewer mentioned shoplifting

specifically (see Table 1). Most publications on retail design focus on sales-based goals

of merchandising and marketing and their connection to superficial aesthetic conceits like

branding, identity, image, and overall appearance (Cliff, 1999; Currinbhoy, 1999; Dean,

2003; Pegler, 2002; Reinwoldt, 2000). Of the seven books that did mention incorporating

security into retail design programs, four had been published over 10 years ago,

suggesting that what little information on security-focused design is available to

designers is fairly outdated. Most retail design literature focuses on how stores effect

consumer behavior (Donovan, Rossiter, Marcoolyn, & Nesdale, 1994; Gilboa & Rafaeli,

2003; Ogle, Hyllegard & Dunbar, 2004; Sherman, Mathur & Smith, 1997; Turley &

Chebat, 2002), perceptions of branding (Ailawadi & Keller, 2004), or perceptions of

merchandise value (Baker, Parasuraman, Grewal & Voss, year). Such research foci are

not surprising considering the retail industry's understandable preoccupation with the

bottom line. However, shoplifting also has an enormous impact on the bottom line, and

should thus be more of a priority than it currently is in design literature.












Table 1: Review of Security Coverage in Retail Interior Design Literature
Discuss Defensive
Year Title Author Shoplifting? D Comments
Security? Design ?


1986

1991

1999

1999

2003

1990

1986

2001

1994

1995

1981

1992

2002

2002

2000

2001

2004

1999

2005


Designing to Sell

Design for Shopping Centres

Trade Secrets of Great Design
Designing Entrances for Retail &
Restaurant Spaces
The Inspired Retail Space

Retail Design
The Retail Store: Design &
Construction
The Power of Visual Presentation: Retail
Stores/Klosks/Exhibits/Environmental Design
Store Planning/Design : History,
Theory, Process
Retail Store Planning & Design
Manual
Shops A Manual of Planning and
Design
Market, Supermarket,
Hypermarket Design/2
Designing the World's Best
Supermarkets
Brandscaping

Retail Design
Influencing Sales Through Store
Design
New Shops and Boutiques
Better Models for Chain
Drugstores
Retail Desire: Design Display and
Vis ual Merchandisinn


Barr &
Broudy
Beddington

Cliff

Currimbhoy

Dean
Fitch &
Knobel
Green

Horton

Israel

Lopez

Mun

Pegler

Pegler

Reinwoldt

Reinwoldt

Saucier

Serrats

Stillman

Tucker


Explains some CPTED concepts and corresponding
design strategies.
Security section focuses mainly on safety, hazards,
fire code, & emergencies.
About retail atmosphere, trendiness, aesthetics.

Focus is on first impressions & overall appearance.

About branding & image.
Discusses surveillance (formal & natural), blind
spots, CCTV, EAS, & employee awareness.
Outdated but thorough. Has specific
recommendations for designing a secure store.


Pessimistic about reconciling merchandising &
security goals. Few design recommendations.
Covers all phases of retail planning, budgeting,
scheduling, and construction.
Outdated but detailed: covers many specific ways
to implement security into design.
Concentrates on merchandising, mood, marketing.

About branding & image.

Mostly about creating image & identity via design.
Focuses on retail experience & trends, not
security.




Suggests ways drugstores can better fit in with
communities and historic areas.


. .. . ... .. ..









Security Coverage in Professional Practice of Retail Design

Unfortunately, the current outlook for integration of security into the professional

practice of interior design is just as bleak. In a 2001 study presented to the Fourth

European Academy of Design Conference, British design professor Mike Press shared

the results of his survey on crime reduction awareness amongst designers. Press

conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 43 "key stakeholders" in the design

industry, including educators and practitioners. In his study, Press noted that retail design

is usually more focused on increasing sales than decreasing crime, and that despite

Design Week magazine's annual supplement on retail design, the issue of crime

reduction has never been addressed in it. He concluded that although "designers can play

a vital role in ensuring that crime is embedded explicitly in design ... the general picture

that emerges from the professional design practice is one of little understanding of the

issues, a lack of specific knowledge that can be applied in design, and an overall failure

to design against crime" (Press, 2001, 12). Clearly, then, the marriage of loss prevention

and interior design is long overdue.

Understanding Shoplifter Perceptions

Research on environment and behavior indicates people prefer environments that

assist them in achieving certain goals. Stephen and Rachel Kaplan's theory of "cognitive

affordances" tells us environmental preferences are based on how the "functional

qualities of environments help us meet important goals" (Gifford, 1996, 172). For a

shoplifter, that goal is to steal, and his/her perception of the retail interior is an

assessment of the functional qualities it presents that will help or hinder the attainment of

that goal. In their book Environmental Criminology, Brantingham and Brantingham

(1981) explain that the location and characteristics of a certain place will influence a









criminal's perception of that place, thus influencing the likelihood of a crime occurring

there.

Offender perceptions can sometimes differ from reality. Consistent with the

common phrase "perception is reality," a store that seems well-secured or monitored to a

shoplifter may suffer less crime than one that does not, despite any actual difference in

security measures. Consider CCTV monitors, for example. Some retailers install inactive

dummy cameras to ward off potential crime. Despite the fact that the cameras aren't

actually recording anything, some offenders see them and are discouraged from

committing a crime because they fear they are being monitored. In this case, the dummy

cameras are not actual risks; they are perceived risks. But because the offender knows no

difference, the effect is the same. It therefore follows that, as Newman points out, crime

prevention "should be aimed at perception of a situation in addition to, or even instead of,

the situation itself' (1997, p. 10). In the retail setting, changing the perception of the

situation involves identifying and later adjusting those physical cues that contribute to

a shoplifter's perceptions.

This study explores the physical cues shoplifters perceive in the retail interior.

These correspond to situational crime prevention's more broad classification of

behavioral cues: "eliciting stimuli" and discriminativee stimuli" (Wortley, 1997, 67).

Eliciting stimuli consist of environmental conditions that provoke predictable behavioral

responses: the sight of blood, for example, may make a person feel nauseous the blood

being the eliciting stimulus, and nausea the predictable response. Conversely,

discriminative stimuli are environmental conditions that "signal the likely consequence of

a particular action," thereby prompting appropriate behavior (Wortley, 1997, 67). Some









examples of discriminative stimuli include signs on exit doors that indicate an alarm will

sound if the door is opened; a yellow traffic light signaling that a driver should slow

down and stop; or more symbolic signals like a hedge around a property line indicating a

territorial boundary (Wortley, 1997, 67). Applying Wortley's concept to the retail

interior, some physical cues may function as eliciting stimuli for shoplifters, activating

certain behaviors. For example, if a shoplifter sees valuable merchandise left unguarded

and unprotected in a store (an accessible target), that cue may be perceived as an

invitation to shoplift because of a lower amount of perceived risk. At the same time, other

physical cues are like discriminative stimuli in that they signal sanction, repercussion,

and risk to the offender: an EAS gate at the entrance, for example, signals a likely

consequence that an alarm will sound when stolen merchandise leaves the store. The

challenge for retailers and retail designers, then, is to prompt appropriate behavior

(purchasing) and prohibit inappropriate behavior (theft) by altering perceptions of the

retail interior via the identification and manipulation of cues within it.

Research on the Crime-Environment Connection

In a lecture delivered to Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice in the late

1990s, noted criminologist Ronald V. Clarke began by revisiting a basic tenet of

psychology: "Behavior is a product of the interaction between person and setting"

(Clarke, no year). His point was simple: for a crime to occur, a motivated criminal

(person) must encounter the opportunity for crime (setting). Clarke went on to explain

this equation allows us to reduce crime prevention into two basic categories: "1. Action

to prevent the development of criminal dispositions and 2. Action to reduce criminal

opportunities" (Clarke, no year, 1).









These two categories represent two broad types of theory within the field of

criminology: the first attempts to understand crimes such as shoplifting in terms of

behavioral tendencies, the principle causes of which lie in an individual's genetic

makeup, psychological conditions, upbringing, and socio-economic standing. The

second category is more relevant to the current study, as it attempts to understand crime

as a result of situational factors that come together to form a crime opportunity (Clarke,

1997). The idea that certain elements of the physical environment (such as dark alleys or

parking lots) can be "criminogenic," or crime-causing, is not new. Urban planners have

been applying this mindset to their discipline for several decades (Jeffrey, 1977;

Newman, 1973, 1976, 1981). Early research examining crime levels and public housing

(Wood, 1961, 1967), street life (Jacobs, 1961), and personal space (Hall, 1959) came to

influence an entire generation of urban planners and criminologists who recognized the

inextricable link between environment and criminality how certain physical or

environmental conditions can either inhibit or facilitate crime activity.

"Place-Based" Crime Prevention

More recent research on the idea of "place-based" crime prevention has brought the

concept indoors, focusing on how it applies to interior environments, including retail

interiors (Eck, 2002). Place-based crime prevention seeks to understand first why certain

places attract crime or criminals while others do not, and suggests that "some places are

safer than others, in part, because of how they are built and how people use them" (Mair,

2003, 211). Mair provides the following concise summary of environmental approaches

to crime prevention:









* Physical design and immediate situational factors of a place may encourage or
inhibit violence

* Physical design and immediate situational factors can create a sense of territoriality
in legitimate users of a space and induce them to act on that attachment in order to
protect against violence and other illegitimate use

* Modifications can be made to an environment to reduce opportunities for [crime]
by making the commission of an [offense] appear more risky, more difficult, less
rewarding, and less excusable to the potential offender (Mair, 2003, 217).

In the past 20 years, research on place-based crime has begun to link crime to

certain facets of retail interiors, including how they affect employee and consumer

behavior (Bitner, 1992), criminal behavior (Farrell and Ferrara, 1985) and shoplifter

perceptions (Carroll & Weaver, 1986; Hayes, 1998; Butler, 1994; Tonglet, 2001). Other

studies have explored how certain environments and store designs seem to "invite"

criminal behavior (Munday, 1986; Francis, 1980), but lack substantive investigation of

the specific elements that contribute to this sense of invitation.

Butler (1994) began to address this lack of specificity in his survey of 15

shoplifters' views on security. Thirteen out of 15 respondents noticed security measures

or other possible risks within the store environment of the research setting. In all, the

respondents identified 29 possible risks which they felt could lead to their apprehension,

the most frequently mentioned being staff, customers, store detectives, CCTV, and

alarms. Similarly, respondents most frequently mentioned being followed by security and

the presence of staff as measures that would actually deter them from shoplifting. Thus,

Butler concluded, "people exercise a very real deterrence" to shoplifters (Butler, 1994,

62). It is interesting to note respondents in Butler's study did not feel "items placed on a

high shelf' were a deterrent. Indeed, one can assume such high shelves might even negate

the usefulness of actual deterrents (people) by blocking lines of sight.






















1 2
Figure 1: High Shelf Height. In Butler's study, shoplifters did not cite "items on a high
shelf' as a deterrent to shoplifting. As seen in Figure 1, placement of
CRAVED products on high shelves may make access a stretch, but not
impossible. In fact, high shelves may actually facilitate theft acts, since they
block lines of sight.

Figure 2: Lowered Shelf Height. This image illustrates how items placed on lower (>60")
displays help make users more visible, and thus rendering shoplifting more
risky.

Tonglet's (2001) study of shoplifters' perceptions of security found that, for recent

shoplifters, the retail interior played a significant role in the decision to steal,

underscoring her hypothesis that crime is often impulsive, not premeditated. In fact, 74

percent of recent shoplifters in Tonglet's study said they would shoplift again even if they

hadn't planned on it, "suggesting that if the retail environment provides a shoplifting

opportunity, then potential shoplifters may take advantage of it, even though they may

not have planned to shoplift before entering the shop" (Tonglet, 2001, 347). Tonglet's

research is important in that it presents the retail interior as a factor in the shoplifter's

decision-making process. However, Tonglet, like many others who have explored

"place-based" crime prevention, was focused more on the idea of crime prevention than

on place, making it difficult for designers to understand or her research or apply it in

retail interior design practice.






19

Mirrors are good security
features, but this one does not
reflect CRAVED items in it.


Figure 3: Blind Spot. Shoplifters often take items from high-visibility areas to a "dead
zone" (a.k.a "blind spot") like this in order to hide things in bags, containers,
or on their person. Therefore, even if there are no CRAVED items in them,
designers must strive to eliminate "blind spots" from the retail interior.

Tonglet's findings are emphasized by Hayes' (1998) comprehensive survey of over

2,000 shoplifters, 64 percent of whom admitted they decided to steal after entering a

store. Furthermore, Hayes' study found that 62 percent of stolen items were taken from

high-visibility zones. This suggests that shoplifters were removing items from high

visibility zones and taking them to "dead" zones, or "blind spots," (see figure 3) to hide

the items before exiting the store (Hayes 1998). Hayes recommends that "a deterrence

model could focus on altering offenders' decisions by implementing and 'marketing'

cues aimed specifically at reducing theft motives and opportunities while increasing the

perception of risk" (Hayes, 1998, 8). For example, many stores use CCTV to monitor

activity. However, few stores "market" this fact to shoplifters. The simple addition of a

sign at a store's entry reading "CCTV monitoring in use shoplifters will be prosecuted

to the fullest extent of the law" could underscore to offenders that the store means

business (see figure 4).
























Figure 4: Signage. According to Hayes' study, "marketing" deterrent cues like this CCTV
dome can increase their effectiveness. Designers can enhance CCTV's power
with the simple addition of signage.

Perhaps the most relevant research in the area of how retail interiors affect

shoplifter perceptions is Carroll and Weaver's 1986 process-tracing study. In it, the

researchers asked 17 experienced shoplifters to walk through retail environments while

"thinking aloud" about deterrents or facilitators that might influence the theft act. Similar

to the current study, the researchers coded the resulting accounts into categories in order

to examine how rationality explains shoplifters' decisions to steal. Carroll and Weaver

found that the major deterrents to shoplifting were the presence of security devices, item

inaccessibility, the possibility of being observed, and the presence of employees.

Facilitators included the lack of the aforementioned deterrents, as well as "a store layout

conducive to shoplifting (e.g., high counters that impede observation)" (Carroll &

Weaver, 1986, 29). In this study, Carroll and Weaver began to address how some specific

interior design conditions shape offender perceptions and resulting behavior. However,

overall, their study was general they examined a wide range of factors that contribute to

shoplifter perceptions of stores. The current study further refines the concept of how









rationality affects the criminal perception of a retail environment by focusing solely on

design-related issues.

Collectively, these studies are significant in that they all attempt to classify the

perceptions that come together to motivate a potential offender into shoplifting action.

Several of the studies address the perception of the retail interior, and certain elements

within it, as influential on a shoplifter's assessment of risk, and subsequent decision to

steal. However, none of these studies has been precise enough to pinpoint the specific

physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to their decision-making process.

Theoretical Background

In order to operationalize shoplifter perceptions of the retail environment, this

study draws on three major crime theories: rational choice theory, the theft triangle, and

CPTED/situational crime prevention. The latter theories serve to operationalize rational

choice theory. While each of these theories addresses a similar theme (environmental

criminology), this study's theoretical background frames them in a consecutive order,

from general to specific:

Rational Choice Theft Triangle: CPTED/Situational
Theory: provides Asserts that three Crime Prevention:
understanding of elements are necessary Presents specific
shoplifting act as\ for shoplifting to design-based actions
result of reasonable ) occur: desirable retailers can apply in
assessment of risk target, motivated order to minimize
vs. opportunity offender, lack of crimes such as
guardianship. shoplifting.
Figure 5: Theoretical Frameworks

The relevance of each of these theories to the current study is discussed below.









Opportunity Theories

In order to understand how the retail environment (and specific cues within it)

affects criminal perception, it is important to review some basic theories of

environmental criminology. Several well-known criminology "opportunity" theories

correlate to and legitimize the present study: rational choice theory, the theft triangle, the

U.K.-born situational crime prevention, and its American cousin, crime prevention

through environmental design (CPTED). The three latter theories all serve to

operationalize rational choice theory, bringing it to life in a way that allows retail

designers to apply theory to practice. As explained below, these theories are by no means

mutually exclusive; they overlap in some areas, and present complimentary views in

others. Together, they provide a theoretical context for the present study, locating it

within well-established environmental criminology theory and providing guidelines for

its methodology.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory examines crime from the viewpoint of the offender,

asserting that most criminals (like shoplifters) are normal, reasonable people who weigh

the relative risks and rewards associated with a crime before deciding to commit it

(Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Felson and Clarke, 1993). In the case of shoplifting, a

potential offender might weigh how much he/she needs, desires, or will profit from an

item against the chance of being caught and the resulting punishment. To understand how

rationality affects decision-making, consider the following shoplifter's first-person

account of the risks and rewards involved in the shoplifting act:

It's very, you know, you can get in trouble, you know you can get caught, you know
you can get in a lot of trouble, but you know ifyou can walk in and take a bag off
the shelf like a duffle bag or voiiiiiiig like that, your duffel bag, and fill that









thing up i, ith DVDs, CDs, and Gillette razors and stuff like that that you can sell,
and you can pick that thing up and get oi ni ith it, you start thinking the risk is
I 1,i th it. You've gotten away in ith it once or twice, the risk is 1,ni ith it. Maybe you
can run and take off... when you ihinuk i el if I get out li ith this bag I got 40
DVDs, 25 CDs, 20 Gillette razors and e'ei il thii,. I've got a $500 bag right here.
Maybe $600. And if thatpaysfor this bill, that bill, this bill, that bill. Then you can
just relax, you know, for a couple of weeks. "Joey", a known shoplifting
offender

The present study is particularly concerned with the role the interior environment

has in this assessment process: for instance, would a rational shoplifter be more likely to

steal in a hidden store aisle than in front of a cashier? Which physical cues lead a

shoplifter to determine where, when, or if to steal? This study will address such

questions.

The Theft Triangle

The theft triangle model (Hayes, 1993) takes crime theory to a more micro level

than rational choice theory, focusing on the assimilation and identification of the multiple

variables that contribute to a criminal act. The theft triangle assumes a potential brings

"background factors" (such as genetic coding, personality traits, socialization, learning

experiences, and perceived need) to a specific situation. These then combine with three

"foreground factors":

1. the perception of need or want for an item and motive for theft;
2. the perception that the item is accessible and obtainable;
3. a low perception of low personal risk associated with committing the offense.

This study is most concerned with the second two elements (perception of access and

perception of risk). They are listed in red in Figure 6.





















3, Low Perception of Risk


Figure 6: The Theft Triangle

According to the theft triangle, all three components generally must be in place for

a crime to occur. It is this focus on the personal and situational perceptions of offenders

(Hayes, 1997) that marks the theft triangle's appropriateness for the current study, as the

design of a retail interior is a major determinant of a shoplifter's mise en scene. In order

to truly impact loss, it is not enough to prevent crime; retailers must prevent attempts at

crime. An effective way to do this is to influence an offender's perception of the crime

situation to increase a sense of risk, and decrease a sense of accessibility while

attempting to reduce criminal motivation. The theft triangle allows this study to

"operationalize the study of an offender's situational decision-making" (Hayes, 1998). Its

methodology employs the second and third factors of the theft triangle (perceptions of

accessibility and risk) as the two main classifications for analysis of physical cues in

retail interiors. In order to understand how these two factors converge to influence a

shoplifter's behavior, consider the following offender's comment:

First thing\ first you want to know if they got what you want. The second factor is
the risk involvement. The risk involvement will be security times cameras times
employees times space times customers. Those are the five factors you're going to
have. Why? Because all of them c ,/iyi i i h each other to catch you ..
"Nolan", a known shoplifting offender









In this excerpt the offender clearly spells out how two elements of the theft triangle -

opportunity ("you want to know if they got what you want") and risk ("the risk

involvement") interact to determine the perceived feasibility of the shoplifting act. This

offender also makes clear how risk factors can be reduced to specific LP measures:

security, cameras, employees, customers. These types of cues and their effect on offender

perceptions are the foci of the current study. Figure 7 below provides examples of

different types of retail interiors and how their physical design clearly impacts the store's

desirability as a shoplifting target:


















A B
Figure 7: Two Retail Interiors. Note the differences in physical layout between these two
images. In image A, the store interior is designed in such a way as to hinder
shoplifting opportunity: shelves are less than 60" high (allowing visibility
across the entire space) lighting is clear, and a long unobstructed line of sight
allows visitors to be seen from many vantage points. In image B, high
shelving, dim lighting, and a lack of CCTV cameras make this a potential area
for a shoplifter to conduct illicit activity.

CPTED

CPTED is actually a group of related place-based crime prevention theories that

have become increasingly popular through the last few decades. At its core, the concept









of CPTED is based on the premise that "the proper design and effective use of the built

environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime"

(Crowe, 2000, 1). Architect and urban planner Oscar Newman carried out some of the

first CPTED research in the 1970's in his study of how design could inhibit crime in

public housing developments (Newman, 1972). CPTED has evolved over the years, but

its foundation is still based on how the interrelationship between people and environment

can affect crime. Crowe (2000) describes CPTED's most recent iteration as having

evolved to include three fundamental principles:

* Access Control any measure that denies access to a crime target, whether through
spatial definition, locks, glass cases, or guards, access control helps inhibit crime
opportunity (see figure 8).














Figure 8: Access Control. This electronics retailer uses cables to secure products to an
interactive display. This type of access control prohibits theft while allowing
customers to examine and try products. Photo courtesy of author.

* Surveillance this concept involves elements that enable occupants and casual
observers to observe and monitor a space, thus increasing the sense of risk for
offenders. Surveillance can be facilitated by employees, security guards, or CCTV,
but cannot be effective without design and spatial arrangements that maximize lines
of sight (see figure 9).
























Figure 9: Surveillance. This type of aisle configuration (sometimes called "feathering")
maximizes surveillance opportunities, increasing a sense of risk for potential
offenders. Photo courtesy of author.

* Territoriality a more recent addition to CPTED, this concept refers to the
formation, through physical design, of a "sphere of influence" in which legitimate
users begin to feel a sense of responsibility or proprietorship, which in turn leads to
their active protection of the space. In the retail setting, territoriality is often
defined through real and symbolic space markers: a "territory" may be very clear,
such as a jewelry counter, or more ambiguously defined through flooring pattern,
color, light, ceiling condition, or displays. In either case, employees are more apt to
monitor their "turf" if spatial features make its boundaries obvious (see figure 10).
















Figure 10: Territoriality. A simple yet clear change in flooring material in this grocery
self-checkout area identifies it as a distinct territory, making it easier for the
employee on duty to monitor activity in the space. Photo courtesy of author.

* Activity Support refers to any activity that increases legitimate consumers and
encourages increased business, since these can have an indirect effect on crime.
Facilitation of legitimate activity is one of the easiest areas for design to affect in


..









retail interiors: adding a cafe of small coffee/tea area to a store will cause legitimate
consumers to spend more time in the space, which indirectly contributes to
informal surveillance (see figure 11).















Figure: 11: Activity Support. This clothing retailer's addition of a small cafe near the
store entrance increases legitimate activity and users, which may in turn affect
perceptions of risk and/or opportunity. Photo courtesy of author.

Although some studies have questioned CPTED's effectiveness in specific

situations (Taylor, 2002; Amandus, Hunter, James & Hendricks, 1995), researchers

generally concur that "design plays a role, albeit often difficult to define, in making crime

more or less likely to occur in the built environment" (Schneider, 2005, 273). CPTED is

considered a "mainstream" crime prevention technique, and a number of research studies

have documented how its application can reduce crime, especially in convenience store

and urban planning settings (Crow and Bull, 1975; Scott et al, 1985; White, 1986; Jeffery

et al, 1987; Hunter, 1988; Leistner, 1999; Casteel, 2000). The urban planning discipline

in particular has produced some promising research in terms of how CPTED principles

can affect crime, including Minnery and Lim's (2005) research on how CPTED measures

reduced victimization in residential neighborhoods. Similarly, Brown and Bentley's 1993

interviews with home burglars found that territorial concerns, neighbor reactivity, and

difficulty of entry all CPTED-based features affected burglars' perceptions of a









home's vulnerability. In addition, Shaw and Gifford (1994) found that "surveillability"

and "symbolic barriers" two defensible space cues made homes seem less vulnerable

to burglars. LaVigne (1997) examined how implementing CPTED techniques like

maintenance, lighting, natural and employee surveillance affected crime rates in the

Washington DC Metro subway system. She found they reduced crime rates, and

concluded that the Metro is "unusually safe" considering the relatively dangerous context

aboveground, and that this safety is undoubtedly correlated to the design and

maintenance of the Metro's physical environment.

But despite its conceptual basis in design, CPTED research on interior

environments is relatively scant. Therefore, the few examples we do have of how

CPTED-derived environmental cues shape offender perceptions of interior spaces are of

particular relevance to the current study. In one such example, Swanson (1986)

interviewed 65 convenience store robbers in order to identify the environmental cues they

cited as either desirable or undesirable in terms of committing a crime. Some of the

desirable cues in a store robbers cited are below (their corresponding CPTED categories

in parentheses):

* Easy access to and from the store (access control)
* Only one clerk and no customers (surveillance)
* Accessibility of safe (access control)
* Poor visibility (surveillance)
* Obstructed windows (surveillance)

Some of the "undesirable" cues Swanson identified were:

* Customers at the store (surveillance)
* Surveillance cameras (surveillance)
* A raised and deep cashier's counter (access control)









Although performed in a convenience store setting, Swanson's study provides

evidence of how offender perceptions are shaped by CPTED-based physical cues.

Because this study focuses on retail interiors, not convenience stores, the cues shoplifters

mention will likely differ in specifics. However, the same concepts of access control,

surveillance, and territoriality will likely arise when shoplifters discuss their perceptions

of retail interiors.

In a more recent study, Casteel (2004) examined the effectiveness of similar

CPTED techniques in liquor stores and found that those employing CPTED-based crime

"countermeasures" such as good visibility, bright lighting, and controlled exit access saw

a 33 to 87 percent decrease in crime. The implication of both of these studies is, of

course, that it is possible to manipulate physical cues in retail environments in order to

reduce criminal opportunities. This study will help identify which cues offenders perceive

as most influential to shoplifting.

Situational Crime Prevention

Similar to CPTED, situational crime prevention presents way to use the larger

concepts of rational choice theory in real-world applications. It is predicated on the

notion that offenders assess the risks and rewards of a potential crime before deciding to

commit it. However, situational crime prevention further refines this concept, locating the

precise characteristics of a particular situation as pivotal in the offender's rationalization

process. Situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime prevention reduces

opportunities for crime by reducing rewards and increasing efforts and risks for

perpetrators. It contends that, in so doing, an environment can be changed in a way that

"affects assessments made by potential offenders about the costs and benefits associated

with committing particular crimes" (Clarke, 1997, 5).









A Matrix of Opportunity-Reducing Techniques

Situational crime prevention is a particularly helpful framework due to its

fundamentally "tactical" approach: it's an evolving, evidence-based matrix of crime

prevention techniques that (currently) consists of 251 tangible, specific strategies aimed at

reducing crime (see Table 2) (Clarke, 1997; Smith and Cornish, 2004). Like the theft

triangle model, this micro scale renders the matrix particularly useful for understanding

the current study. The 25 strategies provide a useful starting point for categorizing

shoplifter comments about risks and opportunities within interior environments.

Situational crime prevention's matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques

evolved out of 15 years' collective experience in reducing crime via control of situational

elements. The techniques are categorized into five overarching groups: increasing

perceived effort, increasing perceived risks, reducing anticipated awards, reducing

provocations, and removing excuses (Clark and Cornish, 2003). This study is most

concerned with the first two groups: increasing effort and risk. The techniques in these

two categories are related to rational choice theory, in that they aim to affect crime

incidents by influencing offender perceptions of risk or opportunity. The strategies in

third group, reducing rewards, are geared toward making a crime target less desirable by

minimizing the potential payoff it has. The last two groups, reducing provocation and

excuses, contain strategies that minimize or remove catalysts for crime: situations or

elements that "provoke" crime or provide excuses for it. The original matrix of all 25

Opportunity-Reducing Techniques is included in Table 2.


1 The original matrix consisted of 16 opportunity-reducing techniques, but has since evolved to 25.













Table 2: Situational Crime Prevention's Matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques


INCREASED EFFORT


1. Hardened Targets:


REDUCED REWARD REDUCED PROVOCATION


6. Extend Guardianship:


11. Concealed Targets:


16. Reduced Frustrations:


21. Set Rules:


Steering column locks Routine precautions like going out Off-street parking Efficiant queues & polite service Rental agreements
Anti-robbery screens in a group at night Gender-neutral phone listings Expanded seating Harassment codes
Tamper-proof packaging Neighborhood watch programs Soothing music & lights Hotel registration


7. Assist Natural
2. Controlled Access: Assist Natural12. Removed Targets 17. Avoid Disputes 22. Posted Instructions:
Surveillance:

Entry phones Improved street lighting Removable car radio Reduce crowding in pubs "No parking"
Electronic card access Defensible space design Women's refuges Separate enclosures for rival soccer fans "Private Property"
Baggage screening Support whistleblowers Prepaid pay phone cards "Extinguish camp fires"
Fixed cab fares


3. Screened Exits 8. Reduced Anonymity 13. Identified Property 18. Reduced Emotions: 23. Alert Conscience:


Ticket needed for exit Property marking Controls on violent pornography "Shoplifting is stealing" signs
Export documents Taxi driver IDs Vehicle licensing, VIN Enforce good behavior at sport games Roadside speed display signs
Electronic merchandise tags "How's my driving?" decals Cattle branding Prohibit racial slurs
Security guard at door School uniforms

19. Neutralize Peer
4. Deflect Offenders: 9. Use Place Managers: 14. Disrupted Markets re ure 24. Assist Compliance
Pressure

Street closures Two clerks at convenience stores Monitored pawn shops "Idiots drink and drive" Easy library checkout
Separate women' bathrooms Reward employee vigilance Controls on classified ads "It's OK to say no" Public lavatories
Disperse pubs at certain times Controls on internet auction sites Disperse troublemakers at school Numerour litter bins


Licensed street vendors
5. Controlled 10. Strengthened Formal 15. Denied Benefits 20. Discourage Imitation: 25. Control Drugs &
15. Denied Benefits 20. Discourage Imitation:
Tools/Weapons: Surveillance: Alcohol

"Smart" guns Red light cameras Ink merchandise tags Rapid repair of vandalism Breathalyzers in pubs
Disabling stolen cell phones Burglar alarms Graffitl cleaning V-chips in TVs Server interventions
Restrict spraypaint sales to juveniles Security guards Speed bumps Censored details of modus operandi Alcohol-free events



Retrieved April 22nd, 2006 from www.popcenter.org.









The matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques is helpful to this study in that

it provides a framework for organizing, categorizing, and quantifying the physical cues

shoplifters cite as influential to their decision to steal (this process is explained in Chapter

3). Because the matrix is so detailed, it also helps clarify exactly how retailers and

designers can manipulate physical cues in the retail interior so as to deter crime.

Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior

Originally, the prevention techniques in the matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing

Techniques were geared to a wide array of circumstances from protecting cars to

preventing hooliganism. However, a retail adaptation was necessary for the study, since

the idea of situational crime prevention is "to change the circumstances leading up to or

surrounding the situation, thus making it more difficult for the potential offender to

accomplish the crime "(Newman et al, 1997, 9). In order to affect the circumstances

surrounding shoplifting behavior, it is necessary to have a set of strategies tailored to the

retail environment. This study proposes a retail-based matrix based on the original 25

Opportunity-Reducing Techniques, but specifically tailored to retail interiors. Following

an extensive literature review and consultation with some experts in the field of loss

prevention and situational crime prevention, the study determined ten categories to be

either redundant when considered in the retail context, or simply irrelevant. These

categories were removed, and the result is a specifically retail-based matrix consisting of

15 categories (see Table 3)2.





2 The categories removed are Reduced Anonymity, Controlled Tools/Weapons, Neutralized Peer Pressure,
Controlled Drugs and Alcohol, Avoided Disputes, Disrupted Markets, Identified Property, Removed
Targets, Assisted Compliance, and Denied Benefits.











Table 3: Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior.


PERCEIVED EFFORT

1. Concealed & Hardened Targets


PERCEIVED
PERCEIVED EXCUSE
PROVOCATION


5. Extended Guardianship


9. Visible Targets


13. Rules


Presence of glass cases Presence of CCTV Presence of highly Presence of
Items kept behind counters Quantity of CCTV system visible CRAVED items shoplifting signage
Accessibility of displays Well-monitored CCTV ("Shoplifters will be
Accessibility of items Quality of CCTV system Prosecuted")
Presence of cords, locks, cables

2. Exit Access 6. Natural Surveillance 10. Frustrations 14. Instructions
Presence of blind spots
Access to exits Being noticed/unnoticed Quality of customer Signs indicating
Emergency exits Number of customers in service store policies
Number of exits Store layout "Ask for assistance"
Presence of garden areas Crowds signs
Store size
Lighting
Item location

3. Exit Screening 7. Place Managers 11. Emotions 15. Conscience

Presence of EAS tags/sensors Attentiveness of employees Antiestablishment "Shoplifting is
Presence of EAS gates at door Quantity of employees sentiment stealing" signs
Store greeter at door Employees (general)
Security guard at door


4. Offender Deflection


8. Formal Surveillance


12. Imitation


Security (general)
Police presence at store Attentiveness of security Maintenance level
Uniformed security staff Presence of previous
Undercover store detectives crimes









The 15 categories in this matrix are explained and illustrated in further detail

below, including how each relates to design strategies that may help retailers and

designers minimize shoplifting through retail interior design. It is important to realize the

duality of each of these cues. The visible presence of a cue can contribute to an

offender's sense of risk, while the lack of a cue can contribute to an offender's perception

of shoplifting opportunity (because of a perceived lack of risk):

1. Target Hardening & Concealment: A specific brand of opportunity reduction,
target hardening involves obstructing an offender's immediate access to CRAVED3
merchandise via locks, cases, safes, cords, cables, or reinforced materials (see
figure 12). Target hardening often creates opportunities for attractive, consumer-
friendly retail design; for example, an electronics display with hardened targets
allows shoppers to approach and try merchandise, but prohibits theft via cables
attached to products. However, if not mindfully implemented, hardened targets can
be off-putting to legitimate shoppers.















Figure 12: Target Hardening. At most jewelry stores, products are protected by locked
glass cases that prevent illegitimate access. But hardened targets need not be
unattractive: here we see how elegantly-designed cases can contribute to a
pleasant store atmosphere. Photo courtesy of author.

2. Access Control: In retail design, this technique refers to restricting offender exit
access and impeding speedy getaways. Several design strategies can facilitate this:
for moderately crime-prone stores, the simple addition of some displays or shelving
in the exit path can help. For stores with serious crime threats, installing railed

3 CRAVED stands for Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable. Products
meeting all these criteria are most likely to be stolen, like batteries and premium razor blades. See
http://crimeprevention.rutgers.edu/casestudies/effort/hot_products/cravedlist.htm









pathways or channels leading to the exit can deter offenders, impede getaways, and
contribute to apprehensions (see figure 13).


Figure 13: Restricted Access Control. In this pharmacy retailer's high-crime store, the
retailer and designer worked together to install rails at the point of exit,
making it difficult for shoplifters to make a hasty getaway. Photo courtesy of
author.


open 24hours














Figure 14: Unrestricted Access Control. This is a safer store in the same pharmacy
retailer's chain. Because this store suffers less theft, it is able to provide
patrons unrestricted exit access: a clear path straight to the door. Photo
courtesy of author.

3. Exit Screening: Exit screening provides a way for retailers to monitor activity at
the point of exit. In retail design, exit screening consists of two measures:
electronic article surveillance (EAS) gates, and door "greeters". "Greeters" may
reconcile receipts with items, maintain surveillance for shoplifting activity, or









ensure that returns are not fraudulent. However, to be most effective, the entry/exit
point must be designed to support these activities. Clear lines of sight will enable
employees to monitor the space, and well-defined spatial boundaries reinforce
territoriality and clearly define the space to be monitored.

4. Offender Deflection: Although not the easiest technique to accomplish via design,
it is possible to deflect offenders from stores. Some retailers accomplish this by
coordinating a police presence outside the store. This type of cue can dissuade
offenders from entering the store at all.

5. Extended Guardianship: In terms of retail design, the concept of "extended
guardianship" generally refers to the use of CCTV, which, when thoughtfully
planned and installed, can provide clear views of various store spaces (see figure
17). This technology allows retailers and LP experts to literally extend protection of
the store past the limits of their immediate view, providing "eyes" into hidden
spaces. Store design plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of CCTV: inadequate
camera coverage can contribute to "blind spots." These are desolate areas of the
store where offenders can go to surreptitiously stash products in bags or clothing,
unseen by cameras or people. The elimination of "blind spots" should be a
consideration for all retail designers. Design also affects the success of CCTV
technology itself, as camera coverage and viewing angles are often blocked by
poorly-placed monitors, shelves or displays (see figures 15 and 16) (Cardone,
2004).
















Video capture courtesy of IntelliVid Corp.

Figure 15: Poor CCTV positioning: The performance of this store's CCTV system is
limited by the large monitor blocking the camera's view. When designers and
retailers don't collaborate on CCTV installation, views like this result. CCTV
image capture courtesy of IntelliVid Corp.
















































Video captures courtesy of Intel]


vlu LUOIp.
B


Figure 16: Poor CCTV Positioning: These examples show how poor design and planning
can hinder CCTV effectiveness. In image A, reflected glare in a store's
entry/exit point limits the clarity of one camera image. This makes it difficult
for security to identify theft acts on the CCTV monitor. In image B, signs and
monitors block CCTV camera views, again rendering it difficult for security
staff to monitor crime via the camera system. CCTV image captures courtesy
of IntelliVid Corp.










































Figure 17: Optimal CCTV positioning: In images A and B, we see the ideal CCTV
camera placement, uninterrupted by signs or objects. Designers should keep
CCTV cameras in mind when designing stores, and strive for these types of
expansive views. CCTV image captures courtesy of IntelliVid Corp.

6. Natural Surveillance: The term "natural" simply refers to design strategies whose
functions, when incorporated into the overall environment, become "an inherent, or
natural part of the design" (Atlas, 2001, 40). Natural surveillance gives users and
casual observers the ability to monitor a space, and therefore increase an offender's
sense of vulnerability or risk. The visual presence of employees or the feeling of
"being watched" can have a significant deterrent effect on would-be offenders.
However, neither of these effects will work without retail design that supports
surveillance (see figure 18). Although considered a single technique in the matrix,
"natural surveillance" actually encompasses a wide range of strategies, including
lowered (> 60") shelf and fixture heights; wide, clear aisles; placing CRAVED
products in very visible areas; the installation of mirrors; ample lighting; and the









creation of lengthy, unobstructed lines of sight. Any technique that aids in viewing
or observing the retail space (and thus increasing offenders' sense of risk) falls into
the category of natural surveillance (see figures 19 and 20).

The success of natural surveillance as a tool for actually detecting and
apprehending criminals is contingent on two factors: a design that supports visual
surveillance of the space, and competent and compliant observers who actively
respond to crime incidents. While it is impossible to ensure that a store will always
contain vigilant and observant customers ready to spot and react to shoplifting, it is
possible to create an environment that allows certain observers to react to certain
crime situations (some shoplifters indeed fear being seen or apprehended by a
"hero" customer, as will be discussed later). Again, it is the potential for being seen
that affects a shoplifter's perception of risk, and design that facilitates natural
surveillance increases that potential.


Figure 18: Poor natural surveillance. Here, the cashier's view of the store is blocked by
high shelves and poorly-arranged aisles, making it difficult for active
monitoring of the space. Also, CRAVED items are placed far from the
employee's line of sight. Ideally, CRAVED items would be placed in direct
view of employees, as it can indirectly increase a potential offender's sense of
risk. Photo courtesy of author.

















Pharmacists'
view


Figure 19: Good natural surveillance. Here, thanks to mindful store design, the
pharmacists have a clear line of sight down several aisles. Photo courtesy of
author.

Location of
CRAVED
items


Figure 20: Good natural surveillance. This is one view from the pharmacy department.
CRAVED items are on the left, plainly visible to the employees working in
the pharmacy. This product placement increases a sense of risk for potential
shoplifters. Photo courtesy of author.









7. Place Managers: "Place managers," in the retail context, refers to store employees.
This strategy is dependent, in part, on the idea of territoriality: through the creation
of clearly defined "territories," employees are more apt to defend and protect the
"places" they "manage". Retail design can optimize place management in a couple
of ways: first, designers and retailers should work together to determine where in
the store employees should be located. Positioning multiple clerks in strategic areas
of the store can facilitate a variety of situational crime prevention techniques.
Secondly, store layout should aim to position CRAVED products as close to these
place managers as possible in order to provide an extra level of protection (see
figure 21). It is important to note the role management and motivation plays in LP
efforts here: while retailers often cite employees as the first and best line of defense
against shoplifting (Hayes and Blackwood, 2006c), even the best planned store
cannot force an employee to monitor a space. Retailers must provide employees
incentive and reward for vigilant surveillance of the store without it, a well-
designed, security-focused interior layout may be wasted.

















Figure 21: Place Management: This national discount retailer uses a "store-within-store"
design to protect CRAVED electronics. Here, we see how the Home
Electronics department has its own checkout point. The entire department is
surrounded by high shelves, making this point the only way to enter or exit.
The department was also designed to allow the employee staffing the
checkout a clear line of sight (the yellow arrow) to numerous displays of
CRAVED items like DVDs and music CDs. Photo courtesy of author.

8. Formal Surveillance: Like natural surveillance, the concept of formal surveillance
is based on the idea that increasing observation opportunities decreases crime.
However, while natural surveillance applies to users and casual observers, formal
surveillance refers specifically to retail employees and LP staff, including both
uniformed security officers and undercover store detectives. The design strategies
that enhance formal surveillance are the same as those for natural surveillance (see
figure 22).






















Figure 22: Formal Surveillance: The design of this pharmacy includes a designated
counter placed in the cosmetics department. The employee at this counter has
a clear view of the area she manages, allowing her to assist customers and
provide formal surveillance of the space. Photo courtesy of author.

9. Visible Targets: Similar to target hardening, the goal of target concealment is to
prevent illegitimate access to CRAVED products. For example, some pharmacy
retailers position CRAVED products like batteries, film, razor blades, or tooth
whiteners behind checkout counters. Signs in the items' usual aisle locations
inform consumers of the items' relocation, redirecting them to the checkout area
(see figure 24). While this strategy works well to minimize shoplifting, legitimate
consumers are often left frustrated, which can decrease sales (Moussatche et al,
2004). Retail design can mitigate this situation through the incorporation of other
defensive strategies, like positioning CRAVED products in direct sight of
employees or LP staff (see figure 23).
















Figure 23: Visible Targets. Instead of concealing targets or relocating them behind
counters, a better tactic may be to locate CRAVED products (circled in
yellow) in direct view of employees. Here, for example, store design has
places CRAVED film and disposable cameras in an area closely monitored by
store employees. Photo courtesy of author.






44
Location of
CRAVED
items













Figure 24: Target Concealment. In order to minimize loss, many retailers move
CRAVED items to more secure locations. Razor blades, for example, may be
relocated from the aisle to behind a counter. Signs in the aisle redirect
consumers to the counter for products. This tactic may prevent theft but can
also be off-putting to legitimate consumers. Photo courtesy of author.

10. Reduce Frustrations: Shoplifting, at times, can result from sheer frustration with
the retail experience: long lines, inattentive customer service, or high prices can
reduce a legitimate shopper to an enraged shoplifter (Klemke 1992). While research
linking shopping frustrations with shoplifting is scant, a pleasant, well-designed
interior can't hurt. Retail interiors should be planned with the consumer's ease of
shopping in mind; layouts should facilitate fast checkout, and designers should
strive to position employees at multiple places in the store to assist with customer
queries (see figure 25).


ee -


Figure 25: Reduce Frustrations. The amount of clear space in front of this checkout
counter prevents a frustrating queue, minimizes confusion due to crowding,
and prevents consumers from becoming upset. Photo courtesy of author.









11. Reduce Emotions: Some research has linked antiestablishment attitudes with
shoplifting, as some offenders believe that giant corporations either "deserve" to be
stolen from, or can easily absorb shoplifting losses (Klemke, 1992). Design can, to
some extent, project an image that offsets such beliefs. Smaller-scale stores, "store-
within-store" design, or the overall feeling of a "mom-and-pop" establishment may
help.

12. Discourage Imitation: Research points to signs of incivility (like trash or
vandalism) as possible factors conducive to crime (see figure 26)4 (Coleman, 1990;
Harcourt, 1998; Kelling, 1996). Therefore, a well-maintained store interior will
contribute to decreased crime more than a shoddy, ill-kept one (see figure 27).












Figure 26: Poor Maintenance. Here, CRAVED items are haphazardly positioned on
shoddy, ill-kept shelves. According to "broken windows" theory, this may
attract crime. Photo courtesy of author.














Figure 27: Excellent Maintenance. This store's display shelves are in good condition,
clean, and well-lit. Store design that projects this type of well-maintained
atmosphere may dissuade potential offenders because it seems cared for.
Photo courtesy of author.


4 Like many CPTED research, Coleman's research has been disputed over the years. However, a well-
maintained store environment has many benefits aside from crime prevention, so retailers should strive for
it regardless of research disputes.









13. Set Rules: In terms of shoplifting, the best way to "set rules" is to post visible
signage indicating the store's shoplifting policy (see figure 28). This may help deter
offenders























Figure 28: Set Rules. Retail designers should always keep in mind the influence signage
can have on user behavior. This store has clear signs indicating their use of
CCTV, which implies a stringent shoplifter apprehension policy. Photo
courtesy of author.

14. Post Instructions: Similar to #21 above, visible signage alluding to stringent store
policies (such as returns, exchanges, or check-writing) can help deter offenders.

15. Alert conscience: Also similar to #21, visible signage reminding shoplifters that
"shoplifting is a crime" has been shown to have a deterrence effect (Klemke, 1992).

16. Assist Compliance: Similar to #18 (reduce emotions), a store that is designed to
make legitimate shopping as easy and pleasant as possible can contribute to
minimizing crime in some cases.

Each of the abovementioned techniques has design implications in the retail

interior. Understanding the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior and how its

techniques translate into the world of shoplifting and retail interiors is integral to the

current study, as it is used to categorize and quantify the elements offenders mention in









their interviews. Furthermore, the matrix forms the foundation for this study's most

crucial connection: how retail design can maximize the effectiveness of these offender-

influencing environmental cues.

Summary

This chapter provided a context for the study of how cues in the retail interior

influence shoplifter perceptions. It began with an overview of the scale and scope of the

shoplifting problem and a description of how the many responses to retail theft have not,

to date, solved the problem. A literature review underscored a paucity of

security/shoplifting information in the current body of retail interior design literature. It

went on to summarize several research studies addressing the link between crime and

environment and shoplifter perceptions of the environment. While none of these studies

is interior-design-based, collectively they underscore the potential interior design has for

influencing criminal behaviors like shoplifting. Finally, this chapter presented a

theoretical framework for the current study based on three theories: rational choice, the

theft triangle, and situational crime prevention. An explanation of how this study uses the

framework follows in Chapter 3.















CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

In order to explore how shoplifters factor retail interiors into the decision to steal,

this study employs a theory of environmental criminology: rational choice. Rational

choice theory tells us that crime offenders are active decision-makers who apply reason

to their assessment of criminal opportunities5 (Clarke and Felson, 1993). For instance, a

shoplifter assesses a situation, collects available information, and weighs potential risks

and rewards before deciding whether or not to steal. The current study uses two

frameworks derived from rational choice theory in order to operationalize shoplifter

statements regarding retail interior environments: the theft triangle and situational crime

prevention. Together, these frameworks help us understand how particular situations

present physical elements that may shape criminal behavior, prompting it or discouraging

it. The retail interior is an integral component in this process, as it is within its context

that these "cues" manifest themselves and are processed by offenders. According to the

paradigms presented by these three cited criminology frameworks, then, if retailers and

designers apply strategic, security-focused designs to store interiors, it may be possible to

manipulate environmental cues in such a way as to discourage theft.

However, before this can occur, we need to better understand what these

environmental cues are, and which ones influence shoplifter perceptions with the most

frequency. Several past studies on offender behavior have used offender interviews to



Rational choice theory excludes from this generalization the mentally ill, kleptomaniacs, and those under the
influence of drugs.









obtain this type of data (Forrester, Chatterton & Pease, 1988; Butler, 1994). The

challenge of extracting this information from shoplifter interviews forms this study's

research question: using interviews with known shoplifting offenders, can we isolate and

identify the physical cues shoplifters cite as influential to their perceptions of crime risk

versus crime opportunity in retail interiors? Answering this question will provide a better

understanding of how retail environments shape shoplifter perceptions an

understanding that can, in turn, inform helpful new strategies for designing effective and

secure retail spaces.

Sample Participants

In order to analyze shoplifter perceptions of retail interiors, it is necessary to gather

data from shoplifters themselves: a difficult and time-consuming task. The easiest way to

collect a sample for a study such as this is through store or court records of apprehended

shoplifters. But historically, these samples have been viewed skeptically, owing to range

restriction bias with apprehended (and perhaps incompetent) offenders (Decker, 2005).

The 20 interviews comprising this study's sample were originally conducted by the

Loss Prevention Research Council (LPRC), a multidisciplinary team of professionals

based in Gainesville Florida, several of whom are affiliated with the University of

Florida. In order to offset the aforementioned bias, LPRC solicited research participants

via a snowball sampling method. Working in conjunction with store detectives at major

retailers, LPRC obtained profiles of recently apprehended, but not jailed, shoplifters.

These individuals were contacted and informed of the research project. LPRC then

provided willing participants a monetary incentive for the names and contact information

of other known offenders. The sampling process ensured the sample was not solely

comprised of apprehended shoplifters.









Quality of Data

While this sample size (20 participants) may seem small, it is in fact quite

substantial considering the transitory, unstructured lifestyle many experienced shoplifters

live, and the inherent difficulty involved in scheduling and performing interviews with

criminals. As Forrester et al point out, the "particular difficulties of this approach are

obvious" (1988, 3). While each individual interview was only an hour or so in duration,

the process of identifying, locating, and meeting with each offender often took several

weeks. However, the opportunity to use data from active, repeat offenders also had its

advantages, as "repeat offenders can be among the most useful sources of information

for strategic purposes" and "interviewing active offenders makes it much more likely that

the information about motives, techniques, and associations will be closer to the offense,

and thus more valid" (Decker, 2005, no page). The resulting 20 interviews used in this

study are comprehensive in nature, rich in data, and dense in content a literature review

reveals that this type of data source is rare in the world of criminology, a fact that in itself

marks this study as significant.

LPRC conducted the interviews used in this study in Orlando, Florida, in 2000;

Dania, Florida, in June of 2002; and Chicago, Illinois, in July 2002. LPRC conducted the

interviews in person in a hotel room. The interviews were both video- and audio-

recorded, then transcribed by an independent transcription agency. The resulting

transcripts ranged in length, due primarily to the length and wordiness of the offenders;

some offenders expounded on each topic with long, descriptive responses while others

gave curt one-word answers. Two examples of average-length offender transcripts are

included in Appendices A and B.











Sample Demographics

The demographics of the participants in the study are detailed in Table 2. Of the 20


interviewed participants, the majority were male (90 percent) and white (35 percent). 45


percent of the participants had been arrested for shoplifting, again indicating this sample


was not biased toward incompetent offenders.


Table 4: Sample Demographics
n=20

AGE (in years) GENDER ETHNICITY INTERVIEWED IN
20-29 (4) 20% male (18) 90% white (7) 35% Chicago, IL, 2002 (5)
30-39 (3) 15% female (1) 5% black (1) 5% Dania Beach, FL, 2002 (10
40-49 (6) 30% unknown (1) 5% hispanic (4) 20% Orlando, FL, 2000 (5)
50-59 (2) 10% unknown (8) 40%
unknown (5) 25%


ARRESTED FOR
SHOPLIFTING? TIMES ARRESTED EMPLOYMENT EDUCATION


yes (9) 45%
no (7) 35%
unknown (4) 20%


<01 (7) 35%
1-5 (6) 30%
6-10 (1) 5%
11-15 (0) 0%
16-20 (1) 5%
>20 (1) 5%
unknown (4) 20%


full-time (8) 40%
part-time (1) 5%
unemployed (6) 30%
unknown (5) 25%


Methodology

The primary study method involves a secondary data analysis of semi-structured


interviews with known and admitted shoplifting offenders. The analysis is secondary


because the initial goal of the interviews was to examine a wide range of the determining


factors behind shoplifting, including product type, display techniques, product packaging,


potential for item resale, store location, interior design, and existing security measures.


The study employs both narrative and content analyses. The content analysis provides a


systematic approach to categorizing and quantifying the massive amounts of qualitative


data contained in the interviews. Narrative analysis (in the form of individual excerpts


25%
) 50%
25%


GED
H.S. degree
some college
Assoc. degree
4-year degree
unknown


(3) 15%
(4) 20%
(4) 20%
(2) 10%
(1) 5%
(1) 5%
(5) 25%









from the offender interview transcripts) provides a contextual "safety net" that catches

important tonal implications or thematic subtleties overlooked by the content analysis

(Spence, 1982). Both methods are described in detail below.

Content Analysis

A content analysis is "a technique used to extract desired information from a body

of material (usually verbal) by systematically and objectively identifying specified

characteristics of the material" (Smith, 2000, 314). In the current study, the body of

material refers to the 20 transcribed offender interviews. The specified characteristics of

the material refers to the cues the study seeks to categorize and quantify: physical cues in

the retail interior shoplifters cite as influential to the decision to steal.

According to Smith (2000), a content analysis consists of 11 steps. These steps, and

their relevance to the current study, are:

1. State the research problem. Do certain physical cues in the retail interior influence
offender perceptions ease or difficulty associated with the shoplifting act? If so,
what do they notice, how do they interpret it, and how does this process affect their
subsequent behavior? Moreover, do analytical tools derived from the theft triangle
and situational crime prevention help us understand, categorize and practically use
offender interview data?

2. Decide / whether the content analysis will provide the needed information. As a
research tool, the content analysis determines the existence and frequency of certain
words, phrases, sentences, and concepts pertaining to physical features of a retail
environment within the transcript texts. Codifying these elements allows for
systematic description of the form and content of written or spoken material
methodical categorization and analysis of data within various interview transcripts.
It also enables the study to go beyond the immediate content of the interviews and
further capture the thoughts and beliefs that fuel the offenders' decision-making
processes (Sommer and Sommer, 2002).

3. Decide what type of qualitative material will best provide the information. The
LPRC interview instrument used in this study was well-suited for determining
shoplifter perceptions because while it posed the same questions to each
participant, it was also flexible (a list of the questions used in this instrument are
included in Appendix C). The presentation or order of the questions varied, often in
accordance with the natural flow of conversation. This is called a semi-structured









interview (Bartholomew, Henderson, & Marcia, 2000); an interviewing method that
allowed participants to expand on and describe thoughts and ideas. Using it gave
the data a richness and complexity that frequently approached narrative form (the
implications of which will be discussed later). One of the drawbacks of the semi-
structured interview, however, is that relevant data was often scattered and
somewhat unorganized. A content analysis was therefore appropriate for this study
because the coding process identified information relevant to the current study -
information which was often descriptive in nature and did not lend itself to
immediate quantification.

4. Decide how to select the chosen material and the amount needed. N/a the
material was predetermined in the interview transcripts.

5. Decide on a content analysis coding system. In order to reduce the massive amount
of text in the interviews to an organized set of quantifiable data, the content
analysis employs a process called coding, in which "coders" classified words or
phrases according to content, context, and meaning. The formation of a reliable,
thorough coding system is an integral part of any successful content analysis, as it
enables accurate collection, identification and operationalization of all data relevant
to the research question and allows the analysis to be replicated with some amount
of consistency (Stemler, 1997). The coding system in this study is informed by a
combination of situational crime theory and security-minded design practice. It is
derived from situational crime prevention's 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques,
but reduced to 15 techniques targeted toward retail interiors. The resulting Matrix
of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (see Matrix 2) contains four general category
headings, 15 categories, and numerous detailed subcategories. Offender statements
are coded using these detailed subcategories (which can also be referred to as
secondary variables, as they are "subsumed by, or a constituent of, the primary
constructs [categories] under investigation") (Bartholomew et al., 2000, 294). The
subcategories further assist with sifting scattered data, an important step for
reliable, valid data analysis, since "faulty definitions of categories and non-
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories" are the two fatal flaws in a content
analysis (Stemler, 2001, no page). The thoroughness and expansiveness of these
categories provide a classification system that facilitate accurate content analysis.

6. Obtain pilot material on which to try out the coding system. For the purpose of this
study, one offender interview serves as as pilot material.

7. Train coders. This involves reviewing the entire study with a fellow coder, and
explaining in detail how the coding system works. As stated previously, a very
clear, well-defined coder manual is imperative for accurate results and optimal
validity. However, the categories in this study's coding manual (the Physical Cues
in the Retail Interior matrix) are by no means mutually exclusive. Although
situational crime prevention's matrix attaches specific strategies to theoretical
concepts, it is still in essence a flexible, dynamic framework. The system of
categories in this study's coding manual matrix may seem rigid, but it is in fact not.









Some shoplifter statements fit as easily into one category as the next. This is an
important clarification to make when training coders.

8. Obtain the final material to be analyzed, n/a, since interview transcripts had
already been obtained.

9. Code the material. The coding process inherent to the content analysis provides a
systematic approach to categorizing and quantifying the massive amounts of
qualitative data in the study's sample of 20 semi-structured interviews. This study's
content analysis uses the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior to identify
words, phrases or sentences about perceptions of risk versus opportunity in retail
interiors. In addition to actual coding of interview transcripts, it is also important to
determine the inter-rater reliability of the coding system. As Stemler (2001)
explains, this tests whether coding schemes lead to the same text being coded in the
same category by different people. An inter-rater reliability test applied to 15
percent of the interview transcripts measures how well two different coders agree
on interpretation of the data (Batholomew et al, 2000). As Smith notes, one of the
most frequently-used indices for determining this was developed by McClelland et.
al. in 1953: 2 (# of agreements between coders on presence of category) / ((# coded
present by Coder 1) + (# coded present by Coder 2)). Agreement of 85 percent is
considered satisfactory, but for exploratory studies such as this one, a "somewhat
lower degree of inter-rater reliability is acceptable" (Smith, 2000, 325). The results
of the inter-rater reliability test are included in Table 3.

10. Analyze the data. For this study, data analysis involves a dual perspective. While a
retail interior's environmental cues can be neatly categorized into the various
categories of the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix, shoplifters sometimes
perceive individual cues in decidedly opposing manners: again, one shoplifter's
risk is another's opportunity. This phenomenon is further explained in Chapter 4's
Discussion section

11. Interpret the results.

Inter-Rater Reliability

In order to ascertain the reliability of content analysis as a research tool, this study

includes an inter-rater reliability test that measured one coder's results against another's.

A fellow coder was selected based on her basic familiarity with the project. After reading

the study research proposal, the primary coder explained the coding manuals (the

Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix) and performed a pilot analysis while the

secondary coder looked on. Once the secondary coder was familiar with the content









analysis process, she was given three random offender interviews to code. Both coders

performed a content analysis on these same three random interviews. Again, it is

important to realize here that the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix (which is also

the coding manual) was not rigid, and the categories not always mutually exclusive.

Table 4 shows the results of the Inter-rater Reliability test. Results show that each

of the two coders who performed the test identified a total of 107 offender statements

about physical cues that influence perceptions of shoplifting risk or opportunity6. In

addition, each coder found that over 80 percent of offender statements fell into the same

four categories. The test shows that categorical agreement ranges from 55 percent to 98

percent, with an average percent agreement of 78 percent, suggesting a fairly reliable

coding system.

Table 5: Inter-Rater Reliability Test Results

Amt. Coded Amt. Coded Present Percent
Category Present by Coder 1 by Coder 2 Agreement

Hardened Targets 25 26 98%

Exit Access 8 3 55%

Exit Screening 11 8 84%

Extended Guardianship 15 8 70%

Natural Surveillance 24 39 76%

Place Managers 4 2 67%

Formal Surveillance 20 21 98%

TOTAL 107 107 AVG: 78%


6 Although a similar number of identified statements between the two coders was expected, the fact that
they each identified exactly 107 statements is probably due, in part, to chance.









Validity

This study uses a matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as the instrument to

measure offender statements about cues they cite as influential to the decision to steal.

Because this instrument was developed as part of the project, it is important to discuss its

validity. Validity is defined as "the extent to which any measuring instrument measures

what it is intended to measure" (Carmines and Zeller, 1979, 17). In this case, the study is

measuring offender perceptions of cues in the retail interior. Therefore, it is important to

assess the validity of the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as a means of

measuring such perceptions. As Carmines and Zeller (1979) point out, establishing a

valid means of measurement in the social sciences can be complex, as abstract theoretical

concepts (like perceptions of risk and opportunity) do not often have "an agreed upon

domain of content relevant to the phenomenon" (1979, pg. 21). In such cases, face

validity is often applied. Face validity "concerns the extent to which [the instrument]

measures what it appears to measure according to the researcher's subjective assessment"

(Frankfort-Nachmias, 1992, 158). However, this subjectivity is an inherent limitation to

face validity, as there are "no replicable procedures for evaluating the measuring

instrument" (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1992, 158).

Several components contribute to the validity of this study's measuring instrument,

the Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (Table 3). First, it was specifically

adapted with the researcher's experience in the retail design and loss prevention field in

mind, and only after an extensive review of loss prevention, retail design, and

environmental criminology literature. Second, the instrument was derived from

situational crime prevention's 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques (Table 2), a well-

known framework of crime prevention strategies developed by an expert in the field of









crime prevention, Ronald Clarke (1997). As Schneider and Kitchen (2002) make clear,

this group of techniques is a "robust and developing" means of assessing situational

crime prevention, as "its growing number of advocates have significantly broadened the

theoretical bases on which crime prevention planning rests (pg. 104). Finally, while Clark

developed the original 25 techniques to address a wide range of situational crime

prevention goals (Clark, 1997), they have also been applied in strictly retail settings.

Hayes' (1997) research on improving deterrence and reducing loss in retail stores also

employed these techniques. Hayes referred to the set of techniques as "a very useful

model for retail crime and loss control purposes" (Hayes, 1997, 4). Therefore, the face

validity of this study's matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior as a measuring

instrument is strengthened by both the source from which it is derived, and the

researchers and industry experts who advocate its use.

Narrative Analysis

As mentioned earlier, the semi-structured nature of the offender interviews allowed

participants to provide lengthy, descriptive responses to questions if so desired. Some of

these responses are so lengthy, in fact, they resemble narrative. For example, consider

this offender's response when asked what part of the store he goes to in order to hide an

item:

It depends, because ur, it depends, it depends on how many people are in the store,
how many people are on that aisle, how many cameras are around me, and how
many employees are in that section. Okay, those are all factors you've got to look
at, now as you get, as you see it coming you got to understand that it's like when
you're driving you 've got to premeditate what might come like that guy right there
in the next lane might just jump into your lane, but you 're premeditate before it
happens, you know. So you've got to worry, okay, what if that lady right there
standing next you isn't, you know, a customer and yet she's an undercover
employee, security, you know, so you've got to look at it like that so basically what
they're going to is you're going to go to the bathroom because in a bathroom, like I
said, you pocket it, go to the bathroom make sure you know de-code it you know,









make sure you get the alarm off or if they're going to take the whole package
before they even do that they 'll act like they're looking at it. You know what I'm
\,rin/-i. like okay, but what they're really looking at it in an upper angle, you know
like, "oh wow, it's pretty nice da-da-da, but yet they're balling the cameras to see
where the cameras are located and that's how they know. -"Joey"

In this one response, the offender mentions several themes relevant to the current study's

content analysis:

* Natural Surveillance (it depends how many people are in the store, how many
people are on that aisle)
* Extended Guardianship (how many cameras are around me ... see where the
cameras are located)
* Place Managers (how many employees are in that section)
* Formal Surveillance (what if that lady next to isn't, you know, a customer and yet
she's an undercover employee, security, you know, so you've got to look at it like
that)
* and Target Hardening (make sure you got the tag off) among others.


However, while the passage can be reduced to these individual themes, it is also

worthwhile to examine the response holistically, as a recollection of past events, since, in

essence, what the offenders are doing as they answer these questions is providing a

summarized oral history of their shoplifting history. When Joey's response is considered

from a narrative angle, thematic subtexts arise: paranoia, worry, vulnerability, and

nervousness could all characterize the tone implicit in his account. Such nuances are too

vague to be accounted for by a strictly code-based content analysis, which is why the

flexible, subjective nature of narrative analysis is so helpful to this study. As Smith

(2000) explains, a narrative is "an oral, written, or filmed account of events told to others

or to oneself used to refer to accounts of personal experiences, or the experiences of

others, or to fictional accounts." Smith also makes the important distinction between

narrative and impersonal explanation: narratives are not "purely descriptive, expository

(e.g., an explanation of how to assemble furniture), disconnected, or abstract" (pg. 328).









It is in this context that the relevance of narrative analysis methodology to the current

study becomes evident. Because so many of the offender responses are narrative in

nature, it is impossible to capture the embedded context and layers of meaning using

content analysis alone. Narrative analysis is more appropriate when primacy of context is

an issue, and is thus better equipped to convey the expressive breadth of an offender's

response (Smith, 2000, 327).

Narrative Analysis in Interior Design Research

Narrative analysis is also particularly well-suited for this study because of its

growing popularity in interior design research. A number of recent studies in the design

field have employed narrative analysis to explore various issues (Danko, Meneely,

Portillo, 2006; Miller, 2005; McDonnell, Lloyd & Valkenburg, 2004; Portillo and Dorr,

2000; Zeisle, 2000; Ganoe, 1999) including an entire issue of the Journal of Interior

Design (Portillo, 2000) devoted to the subject. Why the pairing of narrative analysis and

interior design? Some cite a similarity in theme between narrative inquiry and the design

process itself: "Narrative, like design, is context-dependent. Both are a creative

outgrowth of the details and situational events that characterize a particular time and

place" (Danko et al, 2006, 12). Others propose that it is the inherently interdisciplinary,

multifaceted quality of narrative analysis that warrants its suitability to design research.

"The characteristics of the narrative that help to organize the complex world of people,

entities, and events through the language of stories provides a flexible framework for

understanding and expanding the meanings of design" (Ganoe, 1999, 2). In essence,

narrative analysis provides a way to understand perceptions of retail interiors in context,

in perspective, and in a holistic manner.









This study incorporates various excerpts from offender interviews throughout

Chapter 4. Due to the subjective and flexible nature of narrative, a formal tally of the

narrative analysis' "findings" is not feasible; however, the study uses narratives to

emphasize and expand on the content analysis' findings. In this way, the two forms of

analysis reinforce one another and provided a means of understanding the data that is

more comprehensive than if either form were used alone.

Limitations

Several limitations affect the outcome of this study. One is the source and validity

of the transcript data. As experts in the field of loss prevention research, LPRC routinely

conducts studies focusing on crime and loss techniques for the retail sector, and

understands the complex nature of gathering shoplifting data. This type of data is usually

based on either apprehension case reports or self-report data. LPRC understands that both

of these methods are inherently limited by sampling and measurement error.

Apprehension data, collected when the shoplifter is caught and in various states of mind,

can be more indicative of security personnel skill, scheduling, search imaging, and

workplace practices than shoplifting behavior. Self-report data are most often collected

via self-administered questionnaires or surveys. This too can lead to flawed data, as

results depend on shoplifters' abilities, and willingness to share, past events, as well as

their truthfulness (Klemke, 1992). To avoid these pitfalls, LPRC conducted the

interviews via a snowball sampling method in which apprehended shoplifters were given

monetary incentives to provide the names and phone numbers of other known offenders.

Nevertheless, this study was still limited to the interviewed offenders' ability to recollect

past events and willingness to (truthfully) share them.









LPRC conducted these interviews with a wide range of shoplifters from various

cities and backgrounds. The interviews did not focus on any particular type of store or

setting. Therefore, the data acquired from these interviews is general in nature, without

reference to specific stores, times, or incidents (unless noted by offender). This study is

limited by such generalization, and future follow-up studies may be improved by

focusing the data on specific stores, settings, or incidents, to generate more targeted

offender responses.

Similarly, the data in this study is based on shoplifters' recollections of store

environments. Were the interviews administered in the actual retail environment, answers

could have been more specific. It is important to note, however, some proponents of

narrative analysis prefer experiential recollections. Spence (1982) differentiates between

historical truth and narrative truth, concluding the historical, or literal, truth of an event is

often less useful to research than the narrative truth, which is more indicative of an

individual's subjective recollection of the experience, and thus more informative of their

beliefs and intentions. For example, an offender's recollection (accurate or not) of feeling

vulnerable in a space because of CCTV monitors could be just as useful if not more so

- as an offender's actual experience of feeling vulnerable in a space because of CCTV

monitors.

Another limitation to this study is the small sample size. Sample size is an integral

component of successful research, as it "affects the range, reliability, and accuracy of the

values measured" (Smith, 2000, 320). Due to the inherent costliness of conducting the

interviews and the difficult nature of contacting and scheduling interviews with criminal









offenders, only 20 are included in this study. Future studies, conducted with more

participants, could further improve results.

The content analysis process itself also has limits. This study employs just two

coders, and only one reliability test is performed. Were the study to employ several

coders, the reliability of the results may have been different and perhaps improved.

The main limitation of narrative analysis stems from its purely subjective and

interpretive nature. As a method of research, the narrative analysis is based solidly in the

ability of the reader to interpret the meaning and context of the discourse. While some

advocates of narrative analysis "do not regard the concept of validity as directly

applicable to narrative research," in reality it suffers many of the same limitations as

other qualitative methods of research, like content analysis (Smith, 2000, 331).

The use of secondary data presents its own limitations. As previously mentioned,

the interviews in this study were originally gathered by LPRC for numerous purposes.

Perceptions of retail interiors, while present in the interviews, were only one component

of a larger range of questions. To further improve the validity of this study's results, it

could be specifically tailored to gathering of design-based information about retail

interiors.

There are also some inherent limitations to the use of the semi-structured interview.

Paradoxically, its main benefit flexibility is also its main drawback. While the SSI

allows interviewers to steer the conversation in natural directions and participants to

provide elaborate responses and detailed data, this flexibility also inhibits data analysis

since lengthy, conversational data is difficult to code and categorize (Bartholomew et al,

2000).









Summary

This chapter described the study's research methodology, providing details about

the sample of participants involved, including their demographics. After a detailed

explanation of the study's methodology, the two forms of analysis used content

analysis and narrative analysis were both defined discussed in terms of applicability to

and appropriateness for this particular study. The reliability and validity of the content

analysis were discussed, as well as the applicability of narrative analysis in the field of

interior design. The chapter concluded with an overview of the various limitations

impacting this study's outcomes.














CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS

Findings

The purpose of this study is to determine if offenders factor retail interior design

into their decision to shoplift, and if so, to identify the physical cues they cite as

influential to that decision. Analyzing these cues through the lens of rational choice

theory and two related frameworks (situational crime prevention and the theft triangle),

this study's content analysis indicates that offenders do consider retail interiors in their

decision to steal. Moreover, the content analysis shows evidence that offenders consider

some features of retail interiors more frequently than others. This chapter explains these

findings through a detailed account of the content and narrative analysis results.

Content Analysis

The Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior (see Table 3) was the coding tool

used in this study's content analysis. A specifically retail-oriented version of situational

crime prevention's matrix of 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques, this matrix

categorized offender statements about cues in the retail interior on three different levels:

* Category Headings. The most general categories in the Matrix of Physical Cues in
the Retail Interior are the four category headings: Perceived Effort, Perceived Risk,
Perceived Provocation, and Perceived Excuses. The content analysis findings (see
Table 6) placed over 95 percent of offender statements into the first two category
headings, Perceived Effort and Perceived Risk. This presents strong support for the
theories of rational choice and the theft triangle, which both assert that offender
perceptions of risk are a major determinant in the decision to commit a crime.

* Categories. The content analysis revealed a total of 639 statements in which
offenders cited a physical cue as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or
opportunity (see Table 6). The analysis categorized each of these into one of the 15









main categories in the Matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior. Results show
that over 70 percent of offender statements fell into four of the 15 categories:
Hardened Targets, Extended Guardianship, Natural Surveillance, and Formal
Surveillance.

S Subcategories: The content analysis further refined offender statements into
subcategories containing detailed descriptions of various interior conditions found
in the retail environment. These descriptions include statements such as "Presence
of glass cases" under the category heading of "Hardened Targets," or "Quantity of
Employees" under the category heading of "Place Managers". The content analysis
placed any offender statements about such conditions in that subcategory, whether
the offender's statement conveyed a perception that the condition was a risk or an
opportunity. For instance, an offender's comment about the presence of a glass case
being a shoplifting risk was categorized the same way as a statement about the lack
of glass cases being an opportunity. In either statement, the offender cited the
presence of a physical cue (or lack thereof) as influential to his/her perception of
crime risk or opportunity.

Table 6 shows a detailed breakdown of the content analysis findings. The findings are

discussed below:

1. Hardened Targets 14 percent of offender statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Glass cases (items within perceived as deterrent, lack thereof perceived as
opportunity): 17 statements
* Cashier counter (merchandise kept behind perceived as deterrent, merchandise not
kept behind perceived as opportunity): 3 statements
* Display racks (displays perceived as easy to access or difficult to access): 38
statements
* Access to items (items perceived as easy to access or difficult to access): 21
statements
* Locks, cables, cords and chains (locked and secured items perceived as shoplifting
deterrent, or unlocked, unsecured items as opportunity): 10 statements












Table 6: Content Analysis Findings

PERCEIVED EFFORT: 29%

1. Concealed & Hardened
Targets: 14%


Presence of glass cases
Items kept behind counters
Accessibility of displays
Accessibility of items
Presence of cords, locks, cables


17
3
38
21
10
total 89


PERCEIVED PERCEIVED
PROVOCATION: 2.5% EXCUSES: 2%


5. Extended Guardianship: 18%


Presence of CCTV
Quantity of CCTV system
Well-monitored CCTV
Quality of CCTV system


total 120


9. Visible Targets: 2%


Presence of highly
visible CRAVED items


total 10


13. Rules: 2%


Presence of
shoplifting signage


total 0


2. Exit Access: 4% 7. Natural Surveillance: 28% 10. Frustrations: 0% 14. Instructions: 0%
Presence of blind spots 22
Access to exits 9 Being noticed/unnoticed 72 Quality of customer Presence of fitting
Emergency exits 4 Number of customers in store 13 service 0 room limit signs 0
Number of exits 6 Store layout 39 "Ask for assistance"
Presence of garden areas 9 Crowds 17 signs 0
Store size 19
Lighting 1
Item location 1
total 28 total 184 total 0 total 0

3. Exit Screening: 10% 8. Place Managers: 7 /% 11. Emotions: .5% 15. Conscience: 0%

Presence of EAS tags/sensors 32 Attentiveness of employees 19 Antiestablishment "Shoplifting is
Presence of EAS gates at door 14 Quantity of employees 13 sentiment 2 stealing" signs 0
Store greeter at door 7 Employees (general) 10
Security guard at door 9
total 62 total 42 total 2 total 0


4. Offender Deflection: 1%


9. Formal Surveillance: 13%


12. Imitation: 0%


Security (general) 25
Police presence at store 5 Attentiveness of security 8 Level of maintenance 0
Uniformed security staff 24 Presence of previous 0
Undercover store detectives 24 crimes
total 5 total 81 total 0










2. Exit Access Four percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Access to exits (obstructed access perceived as risk or easy, clear exit access
perceived as opportunity): 9 statements
* Emergency exits (control of exits perceived as risk; uncontrolled exits perceived as
opportunity): 4 statements
* Number of exits (multiple exits perceived as opportunity): 6 statements
* Garden areas (presence of perceived as opportunity): 9 statements

3. Exit Screening Ten percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* EAS tags, sensors (presence of perceived as shoplifting risk, absence perceived as
opportunity): 32 statements
* EAS gates (presence of perceived as shoplifting risk, absence perceived as
opportunity): 14 statements
* Store "greeter" positioned at entry/exit point (presence of perceived as shoplifting
deterrent): 7 statements
* Security personnel positioned at entry/exit point (presence of perceived as
shoplifting deterrent): 9 statements

4. Offender Deflection One percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategory (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Police presence at store (presence of perceived as shoplifting deterrent): 5
statements

5. Extended Guardianship Levels 19.5 percent of shoplifter statements about

physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this

category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Presence of CCTV (presence of perceived as risk, or lack thereof (i.e., "blind
spots") perceived as opportunity): 80 statements









* Quantity of CCTV cameras (high number perceived as risk or low number
perceived as opportunity): 19 statements
* Monitoring of CCTV (perception of well-monitored systems as deterrent or
perception of poorly-monitored systems as opportunity): 16 statements
* Quality of CCTV (high-tech system perceived as deterrent): 10 statements


6. Natural Surveillance 28 percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* "Blind spots" (hidden, unmonitored areas of the store perceived as shoplifting
opportunity): 22 statements
* Being seen (perception of being seen perceived as deterrent, or perception of going
undetected perceived as opportunity): 72 statements
* Number of customers (high number perceived as deterrent, low number perceived
as opportunity): 13 statements
* Store layout (possibility of being seen perceived as deterrent, or ability to scan
store perceived as opportunity): 39 statements
* Crowds (confusion due to crowds perceived as opportunity): 17 statements
* Store size (large store with high-tech security perceived as risk, store too large for
security to monitor perceived as opportunity): 19 statements
* Lighting (dimly-lit store perceived as opportunity): 1 statement
* Item location (CRAVED item positioned in unmonitored part of store perceived as
opportunity): 1 statement

7. Place Managers Slightly more than six percent of shoplifter statements about

physical cues contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this

category. Its subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Employees in general (any type of employee presence perceived as shoplifting
risk): 10 statements
* Attentiveness of employees (conscientious employees perceived as risk, apathetic
employees perceived as opportunity): 19 statements
* Quantity of employees (high number perceived as risk, low number perceived as
opportunity): 13 statements

8. Formal Surveillance 12.5 percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its


subcategories (and number of statements they contain) include:









* Security in general (security presence perceived as shoplifting deterrent, lack
thereof perceived as opportunity): 25 statements
* Attentiveness of security (apathetic security perceived as opportunity): 8 statements
* Uniformed security guards (presence of perceived as deterrent): 24 statements
* Undercover store detectives (presence of perceived as deterrent): 24 statements

9. Target Visibility Two percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategory (and number of statements they contain) include:

* Visibility of CRAVED items (highly visible CRAVED items perceived as
opportunity): 10 statements

10. Frustrations This category included poor customer service, long waiting

lines, and minimal checkout areas as possible motivators for theft. However, the content

analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this category.

11. Emotions Half of a percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues

contributing to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its

subcategory (and number of statements it contains) include:

* Antiestablishment sentiments (lack of moral consequences in stealing from big
corporations perceived as opportunity, guilt involved in stealing from small "mom-
and-pop" store perceived as deterrent ): 2 statements

12. Imitation This category referred to signs of past crimes or low-maintenance

(which can contribute to a perception of low guardianship or monitoring) as a possible

opportunity for theft imitation, while signs of a well-maintained interior (which imply

higher guardianship and monitoring) as a possible risk, thereby discouraging imitation.

However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this

category.









13. Rules Two percent of shoplifter statements about physical cues contributing

to a perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity fell into this category. Its subcategory

(and number of statements it contains) included:

S Signage (presence of clear signage indicating shoplifter prosecution policy
perceived as deterrent): 11 statements

14. Instructions This category referred to the posting of clear instructions (such

as return, fitting room, or check-writing policies) as cues that may increase offender

perceptions of risk. However, the content analysis did not identify any offender

statements referring this category.

15. Conscience This category referred to the posting of conscience-raising

signage (like "shoplifting is stealing") as a cue that may deter potential offenders.

However, the content analysis did not identify any offender statements referring to this

category.

Narrative Analysis

While the content analysis findings illustrate the number of statements in each

category of the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix, they do not communicate the

full depth of an offender's decision-making process. A second method of analysis,

narrative analysis, complements the content analysis by lending context, tone, and

emotion to the study's findings. Below, the results of the content analysis are explained in

greater detail, and with the added dimension of offender narratives. These narratives

serve several purposes: clarifying the connection between offender perceptions and

interior design characteristics; conveying the complex, personal nature of the offender's

decision-making process; and underscoring how the opportunity theories laid out by









rational choice theory, the theft triangle, and situational crime prevention manifest

themselves in this process.

1. Hardened Targets The study's content analysis identified the accessibility or

inaccessibility of shoplifting "targets" (usually CRAVED items) as one of the four top-

scoring categories, with 14 percent of offender statements. Overall, the narrative analysis

found offenders perceive the accessibility/inaccessibility of shoplifting targets as a

simple, black-and-white situation: an accessible target is perceived as a shoplifting

opportunity while an inaccessible target is perceived as a deterrent. As Hayes (1997)

describes, retail crime prevention exists on varying tiers, or "zones of influence": the

community level, the exterior of the store, the interior of the store, and the "asset point,"

or area where the item is displayed. This asset point can be further refined to refer to the

item's position on/in store fixtures (behind counters or in cases), and position on/in

displays (on hooks, locked vs. unlocked). Over 60 offender statements referred to

item/display accessibility (or inaccessibility) as influential to their perception of

shoplifting risk or opportunity. Some statements referred to the "asset level", as the

excerpt below explains:

It depends on how [the store] has [CRAVED items] set up. If they just have them on
racks, you can take the whole box. Just slide them off "Paul"

Other offender comments about item accessibility referred to item placement within the

store's layout. Offenders perceived certain locations in the store to be more conducive to

shoplifting than others. The offender below presents the decision to shoplift as a logical

equation, in which item location is key:

It's not rocket science. [A CRAVED items has] a high resale value, it's easy to
take, it's in apart of the store, they're usually in apart of the store, you know you
go into Walgreen's or v,,ihilig like that and they're in the back of the store, it's
easy. It's easy to work. "Mike"









This offender discusses item location more specifically:

I mean, the thing about the [items I take] is they 're also very accessible. You know
what I mean? It's not like they put them behind the counter. And I always thought
to myself they should probably, like keep them back there. I mean people are
going to buy them 1w heather they're behind the counter or ou0 n ith the rest of the
stuff It'sjust easy access. You walk up to, you know [the product], and just take a
quick look around and pull a bunch and stick them right in your pocket.
"Joe"

Twenty offender statements in the content analysis referred to physical cues that

communicated "hardening," or inaccessibility, as a perceived shoplifting risk. As the

excerpts below suggest, offenders perceive items protected by glass cases, stored behind

counters, or attached to displays as a real deterrent, sometimes impossible to steal:

The only time [shoplifting] is really difficult is when you can't get [items] because
they put them behind the glass and you have to ask someone to come get it. Or
sometimes they have them behind counters or stuff like that... the only way to
stop [shoplifting] is to keep them behind glass or behind the counter.
-"Julian"

Sometimes you go into a place and you just don't have the accessibility to some of
the products you want because they're behind the counters or locked up, you know
what I mean. That's a big thing. I mean, at that point you walk out and go
someplace else. Deterrents work. They do. "Ian"

If [CRA VED merchandise] is behind a place like the register, I know it's tough to
put everybody 's products behind a register, or you know, behind a key like they do
11 ith cigarettes ... The bottom line, it's the location. Because if it's easy to get
they 're going to take it. "Cowboy"

As these narratives illustrate, merchandising and product placement can communicate a

clear perception of shoplifting risk if planned correctly.

2. Exit Access Four percent of offender statements about perceived risk and

opportunity cues referred to the idea of exit access. Most offender statements in this

category (9 statements) cited uncontrolled exit access (like a clear, unobstructed path to

an exit) as a perceived shoplifting opportunity. This finding suggests that cues like

unobstructed exit access, multiple exits, and garden center exits all contribute to an









offender's perception that he/she will "get away" with the shoplifting act, as the

narratives below attest:

[A shoplifter will] run through the emergency exit and the alarm will go off but it
takes about 15 minutes, not 15 minutes, about 5 minutes, for security to actually get
to that part of the building and by the time they get there we're already on the next
road. "Joey"

[Walgreens is easy to steal from] 'cause I don't know, usually, just, I don't know,
it's big and it'sjust easy to run out the door right there. .. we leave through the
aisle, actually it's the cosmetics, so it's like no walking by the [checkout] counter.
"Nolan"

One of the subcategories with the highest scores in this category (9 statements) was

the presence of a garden area. Many large mass-merchant chains include garden areas for

the sale of plants and garden accessories. These areas are fenced-in, and connected to (but

outside of) the store interior. As such, they provide an alternate form of exit access. If the

ceilings of these areas are not fenced as well, they also provide an easy way for offenders

to shoplift. The offender simply brings stolen good to the garden area, tosses them over

the fence, and exits the store. He/she retrieves the stolen items afterward:

You get outside and there 's afenced-in garden where there 's no top of the fence.
Just it ,i the bag [of stolen items] over the fence. "Joe"

Garden center because they always have a fence and that fenced area you could
always find a nice gap-sized hole ... you try to find a spot where nobody 's paying
attention and you get yourself little clippers and clip clip and make yourself a hole
through the fence and have friend on the other side ... say hey, man go up to the
garden center. There's a bag out there, go pick it up. "Gary"

As the following offender explains, using the garden center as a means to shoplift can

allow evasion of other LP technologies, like EAS:

I would just leave [products i/ ith advanced EAS tags attached] alone because it's
going to be a real big hassle. Unless like I said you 're in a store that is very
opportunistic to diu e'1i it over the fence, like you got a good store where you can fill
up a bag and ithr i,m it over the fence and go back and get it. "Philip"









3. Exit Screening Ten percent of shoplifter comments referred to the screening

of exits (EAS systems, store "greeters," or receipt-checkers at the door perceived as risk,

or a lack of these cues perceived as opportunity). As the excerpt below conveys, some

offenders perceive certain exit-screening techniques as more risky than others:

I think the difference between [stores that are easy versus hard to stealfrom] is the
electric sensors and cameras; where they're positioned. Kind of like in the public
library where they have these magnetic walls and stuff instead ofjust having a
greeter to check your receipt. "Julian"

However, the fact that only 10 percent of the total amount of offender statements referred

to exit screening cues as contributors to perceptions of risk or opportunity suggests that

other cues in the matrix are more influential to offenders' decision-making. This finding

might imply that shoplifters find exit screening devices like EAS easy to circumvent or

evade. It might also imply that retailers should focus their efforts in areas other than exit

screening.

4. Offender Deflection Offender deflection refers to measures that actually keep

offenders from coming into the store. One method retailers use is positioning a police

presence outside the store. However, this is not a common practice, which may explain,

in part, why only one percent of offender statements referred to offender deflection as

influential to the perception of risk or opportunity in the retail store.

5. Extended Guardianship The category of extended guardianship scored

second-highest in terms of frequency, with 19.5 percent of shoplifter statements. In the

retail context, the idea of "extended guardianship" involves the use of CCTV, which

allows retailers and LP staff to "extend" their guardianship over parts of the store that

they cannot see firsthand. The presence or absence of CCTV makes a difference in terms

of offenders' perceptions of risk or opportunity. Indeed, the presence of CCTV was the









single most frequently-cited physical cue in the study, with 80 offender statements

referring to it as a risk (if present) or an opportunity (if absent). These findings suggest

that any CCTV use, be it poor quality, scant coverage, or poorly-monitored, helps

contribute to an offender's sense of risk and sanction. The following narrative excerpts

underscore this perception:

I mean, the camera's gonna get you. It'sjust a matter if security is watching or
who's watching. That's what it comes down to is if someone sees ya. Cameras are
always on. It'sjust ifyou've been seen or not. "Donny"

I think the difference between [stores that are easy to steal from versus those that
are difficult] is the electric sensors and the cameras; where they 're positioned ...
I mean, some places are harder, some places are easier. "Greg"

You know, you're thinking. the camera's seeing me take off more than one, and it's
definitely watching. So that's definitely, that right there, that will work [to deter
crime]. "Phillip"

In some instances, offenders perceived the quality of the CCTV system as influential to

their decision to steal, expressing a perception that high-tech video tracking devices could

be hidden from sight or programmed to recognize faces:

I believe they also have little tiny cameras like on the shelves, I ain't too sure, but I
always look out for those. "Nolan"

I don't look at [CCTV monitors located above store entrances] because they have
cameras on those so they can catch a picture of your face. "Joey"

Correspondingly, offenders cited poor-quality CCTV systems (lack of cameras, or

unmonitored, poorly positioned cameras) as a perceived opportunity for shoplifting. Most

of these statements had to do with a lack of CCTV coverage, and the resulting "blind

spots":

A blind spot ... like where the cameras can't see you ... [the local Wal-Mart]
has a blind spot actually in the filing cabinets. They also have a blind spot in their
hunting goods ... I can see a blind spot and there's rarely anybody walking
through there, and you can't detect any cameras. There might be a little tiny one
somewhere .... Like, it's not full coverage of the store. "Cowboy"









In some of these statements, offenders perceived shoplifting opportunity due to CCTV

systems with apparently incomplete store coverage:

Like I say, everyone knows they aren't much up on the security camera thing. Just
the way the store is set up, there'splenty of areas to go, you know, and slip
\I ,I1ethlinug in your pocket. "Dan"

Wal-Mart was one of the easiest [stores to steal from] before they made the new
store, which is like full of cameras. But they do have some aisles where you can
pick ,uwieting up from an aisle that does have a camera, walk around like you're
looking for \,,uwieting else, go to the aisle that doesn't have a camera, and just,
like, take it out of the pack, slip it in your pocket, and walk around some more.
.So,,thlinfg like that. "Joe"

Other offenders cited the difficulty for a very large store to thoroughly cover the space

with CCTV as a shoplifting opportunity, again linking the size of the store to its security

capabilities:

A large store is easier to steal from because]just the difference, the space, the
amount of cameras there ... a bigger, open area compared to a smaller enclosed
space ii ith more cameras. Circuit City is not huge like Wal-Mart, and they've got a
lot of cameras. Wal-Mart doesn't have a lot of cameras. Target doesn't have as
many cameras as they should either ... Those big stores are easy to steal from.
"Pat"

Still other offenders described a perception that stores simply don't monitor their CCTV

systems well enough for them to be a real deterrent:

A lot of companies just don 'tput a lot of effort into security cameras and thing\ of
that nature. "Arlene"

It's confusing. It'sjust a big ball of confusion, you know? It's like, let's say you 're
trying to be god, you're trying to look all over the world, but you don't have the
same power he does. Ifyou 're trying to watch everybody at the same time you'd
just be lost. So that's exactly what they got -somebody in the security room just
lost as hell. "Nolan"

As a method for extending guardianship, CCTV can influence crime levels in

different ways according to the level and extent of use (Spriggs and Gill, 2006).

According to the statements collected in this study, offender perceptions are frequently









altered by the presence of CCTV. Collectively, these narrative excerpts and content

analysis findings indicate the offenders in this study perceive CCTV as a real deterrent.

Retailers and retail designers, therefore, should pay particular attention to the use, set-up,

and quality of CCTV when planning the retail store, as the resulting system will likely

have an impact on how offenders gauge shoplifting risk and opportunity.

6. Natural Surveillance As a CPTED principle, the goal of natural surveillance

is to give legitimate users and casual observers the ability to monitor a space, therefore

increasing an offender's perception of vulnerability or risk (Crowe, 2000). Natural

surveillance is not a result of store employees. It is provided by customers and other

legitimate users of the retail space (like vendors, browsers, or passersby). The ability of

these users to scan the space contributes to "natural" surveillance; that is, surveillance

resulting from the "natural" design of the store, and the activity within it (Atlas, 2001).

In order to avoid risk of apprehension, shoplifters attempt to avoid being seen by these

users.

Of course, the ability to assess whether or not anyone is looking is predicated on

the built environment, and whether or not it is constructed to support this kind of

surveillance (again, the paradox of surveillance). A store designed to facilitate sight and

surveillance can assist both retail staff and shoplifters, allowing them both to visually

canvas the space (offenders for threats and opportunities, employees for theft activity).

This duality was reflected in the amount of offender statements in this category: many

offenders perceived natural surveillance as a risk, while others perceived it as an

opportunity. Some recognized that natural surveillance, as it exists in the built

environment: is both a risk and an opportunity:









I'm lookingfor cameras. I'm lookingfor the amount of employees. I'm lookingfor
people that are looking at me. "Paul"

Of the 639 statements about cues perceived as shoplifting opportunities or risks, a

majority of these (28 percent) fell into the category of natural surveillance. Because this

category contains so many offender statements, its various subcategories will be

discussed singly:

6.1 Blind Spots A "blind spot" is a hidden area in the store free from cameras,

employee surveillance, or natural surveillance. The study identified 22 offender

statements referring to "blind spots" as an opportunity for shoplifting. This further

corroborates Hayes' (1998) finding that offenders often take CRAVED items from high-

visibility zones to "blind spots" in order to hide them on their person, in clothing, or in

bags. This finding also supports the theft triangle's assertion that offenders measure the

risk of being caught before stealing. As the narratives below imply, the presence of blind

spots gives offenders the perception that they can shoplift covertly, and thus avoid

apprehension. Many shoplifters in this study expounded on the usefulness of blind spots,

especially in terms of picking up a CRAVED product from one area and actually

concealing it in another:

Just the way the store is set up, there 's plenty of areas to, you know, go and slip
%iuethilng into your pocket... a lot of hiding spots. And it's kind of dark in there.
"Arlene"

Ifyou have a big shopping cart maybe you 1thrl some thing\ into it and allyou
have to do is take one and ithn ,i it into your cart and go to a different section and
do what you want i/th it. "Joe"

I know a lot ofpeople that will sit there and work on [products in theft-deterrent
packages], you know what I'm ,,ing-. they'II work on them in an aisle.
"Gary"

I'll find, like, the most unlikely place a customer's going to go, like the most boring
items in the store, I'll go into that aisle and try to get into the package as fast as I









can ... then I just keep the p, ,,ld/ ii i th me ... and just walk out the normal exit.
"Pat"

As these narratives suggest, even one blind spot in a store can provide a shoplifting

opportunity. Being in a "blind spot" surrounded by high sight-obstructing shelves can

also contribute to an offender's sense of going unnoticed, as the following narrative

excerpt attests:

Video stores are especially easy. They're small. There's usually only one or two
people working them. They've got these big high shelves where they can't see you.
"James"

6.2 Being Seen Offenders frequently made statements about being seen as

influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or opportunity. This made "being seen"

one of the most-cited subcategories in the content analysis, with a total of 72 statements.

According to the theft triangle theory, one of the three factors offenders assess before

acting on a crime is the perceived risk of being caught. Logically, an offender's

perception of being seen is a determinant of this risk assessment. It therefore follows that

shoplifters would frequently cite "no one looking" as an opportunity for theft, and

conversely, "being seen" as a risk. The following narrative excerpts explain how the

ability to scan a retail interior is important to a shoplifter, and helps shape the decision to

steal, while the perception of "being watched" is a major deterrent:

If somebody 's watching -if somebody's watching I'll go over and buy my popcorn
or whatever and leave. "James"

I'd be kind of nervous about [large clothing retail chains]. There'sjust voi nwtilig
about them. I've taken a couple shirts from, I think it was Dillard's, and I didn 't get
caught. But I don't go now. I was just really uncomfortable about the whole thing.
"Paul"

If someone 's not watching you, you can come by and take one of them gray baskets
andput 30 DVDs in it andput that inside your cart and have another gray basket
and fill it up i i/h razors and everything and a lot of times you just push that thing
right out the door and a lot of times no one sees nothing that you done. "Dan"









A thief is usually paying more attention to what's around him you know, who's
looking, if there's a camera. You know he's got to have like ten eyes just to do what
he 's got to do. -"Cowboy"

The worry and paranoia these statements imply is as much a goal of natural surveillance

as actual apprehension, as the offender's perception and fear of being seen is often as

effective a deterrent as actually being seen.

6.3 Number of Customers in Store Thirteen offender comments cited a high

number of customers in the store as influential to the decision to steal. This finding

supports the idea of natural surveillance in its suggestion that some offenders are wary of

being spotted by legitimate shoppers in the store. Offender statements referred to the

presence of customers in the store as both an opportunity for, and a deterrent to

shoplifting. Some shoplifters cited a very busy store packed with customers as an

effective shoplifting camouflage, while others perceived the presence of customers as a

threat because of their ability to see (and potentially respond to) the shoplifting act:

I never ever, like, let a customerfollow me and see my concealment tactic. The
customer will never see me [shoplift]. AndI have to make sure I can't see the
customer. I can't see no cameras. Nothing can see me ... Igot caught one day
because of a hero customer. Took me to the ground. -"Joey"

I don't think there's a time when I'm not concerned about [being seen by
customers] ... You know it's kind of like you 'll see them looking at you or like
looking or talking, like telling their friends, 'Look that guy's taking wi,/ethiing'. Or
if someone's kind of keeping an eye on you. -"Mexico"

Sometimes youjust take a chance that you 're going to run into a Good Samaritan
that's going to say \,vinhiiig Because ifyou 're in between two or three people
shopping for this stuff and you grab a handful of stuff adjust put it n your cart,
sometimes they notice that, and they look at you like, 'What's this kid doing?
What's this guy doing?' and sometimes they don't, so that's \,iethinig to take a
chance on. "Joey"

As these excerpts illustrate, some offenders seem embarrassed by the idea of a customer

seeing them ("you'll see them looking at you, like looking or talking, like telling their









friends"), while others fear more drastic ramifications ("I got caught one day because of a

hero customer. Took me to the ground.") In either case, many offenders perceived the

ability for customers and other legitimate users to "naturally" monitor and survey a space

as a risk, because being seen increases the level of risk associated with the shoplifting act.

6.4 Store Layout Several offenders said they perceived "big" stores as

shoplifting opportunities. These offenders referred to a perception that it is too difficult

for employees or security to monitor the whole store at once:

The weak link in [big-box chain] stores is that they 're very big, so oftentimes the
area you want to target is completely barren because everyone is concentrated on
maybe another section of the store. "Phillip"

However, other offenders linked the physical size of the store with a certain perceived

level of security. Some shoplifters cited a large corporation, and large store, as indicative

of a comprehensive security program:

The problem i/th Target and Wal-Mart is that they're very big stores and they're
harder [to steal from]. I mean you're an easier target. I mean, they have loss
prevention guys in there .. they have good security. "Julian"

Seven shoplifter statements about crime opportunity were directly related to store size,

design, and layout. Stores were cited as simply having an "easy" layout, which could

allude to any number of design-based qualities, such as poor surveillance, poor product

positioning, or lack of CCTV coverage:

K-Mart [is easy to steal from]. I haven't taken from K-Mart in a while, but I think
from what I've seen just being in there, you know, just normal shopping, it looks
like it's pretty easy to take from. "Donny"

Offenders also said they perceived certain store layouts as conducive to shoplifting:

... it depends on the layout. I mean, there's situations where I could just I could
load up 50 and just walk out the front door. "Dan"









The following offender stated a belief that his location within the store determined

whether or not he was actually shoplifting:

I understand they have to, they cannot arrest you in the heart of the store. Like if
you're in the middle of the store they have to have probable cause ... I really
doubt that they're going to come to you in the store and arrest you right there in
the heart of the store ... they 'll probably pick you up at the exit, most likely.
"Joey"

Although not always specific, these narratives underscore the content analysis' finding

that design and layout are influential to the shoplifting offender's decision-making

process.

6.5 Crowds Seventeen statements about shoplifting opportunity suggested that

shoplifters perceive a crowded, chaotic store as an easy one from which to steal. This

finding indicates some offenders perceive a busy store as a sort of camouflage, ensuring

that employees are be too busy helping customers to monitor theft activity.

And like I said on the weekends if there's a lot ofpeople it's a lot easier to get in
and out. "Mike"

Correspondingly, some offenders cited a lack of activity in the store as a shoplifting

deterrent, since the perceived absence of people and commotion leaves the shoplifter

feeling exposed and observed. Consider the following offender's explanation of a

desolate versus busy store. For him, an empty store spells vulnerability, while a busy

store provides opportunity:

If it's a weekend it's more packed. Ifyou think security's a little tougher then, it's
not. They might have afew more spotters walking around, but you can go in there a
little better .... During the weekdays, ifyou walk in the store and it's pretty much
desolate, there 's not many people in there, you tend to come back later in the
afternoon when there 's more people in there ... sometimes they get so packed,
everyone's working here and they're working there ... it's easy to pick up
Imethi/iiug "Donny"









7. Place Managers Anecdotally, retailers consider place managers (employees)

to be one of the most effective forms of shoplifting deterrence (Hayes and Blackwood,

2006c). However, only 6.5 percent of shoplifter statements referred to place managers

specifically. The narrative analysis helps in explaining these findings. Some offenders in

this sample did not perceive employees as a serious risk:

Ifyou look around and it's younger [employees], they don't care. I'll be sneaky
about it but I don't think they care. "Gary"

[I'd go to a certain store because] I'd know that the employees are kind of lax, or
there's not many of them .. they hire like, young, skater type teens and hey really
don't care. They don't give a crap. "Nolan"

Those guys [employees] are just in La-La land half the time ... generally,
employees are pretty lax. "Joe"

Others viewed employees as a deterrent, and expressed fear of being spotted or

apprehended by an employee:

If I actually see [an employee] looking over, then I'll leave .. if I saw him kind of
scoping out the area where I was in I'd just kind of abort everything and get it
some other time. "James"

Thirteen shoplifter statements referred specifically to the number of employees in a store,

correlating a high number of employees to a higher risk level:

If there's more employees than customers I'll definitely leave a store in a
heartbeat. That's how circuit city is. They have a million employees.
"Paul"

It's been hard to stealfrom Target, you know ... there's so many employees there
you know what I'm ,ying. and there's more employees -you know like sometimes
you look and ifyou pay attention and start counting the ratio between employees
and customers you'd be like, how do they make their money?
"Joey"

This study's findings indicate a wide range of offender perceptions of employees,

making their presence/awareness neither a real deterrent nor their absence/apathy a real

opportunity. Indeed, the deterrence effect of employees is more likely to be based on









hiring practices, management policies, and reward systems than on number of employees

alone.

8. Formal Surveillance The study's content analysis found 12.5 percent of

offender statements fell into the category of formal surveillance. Different from natural

surveillance, formal surveillance includes surveillance performed by security staff, store

detectives, and LP staff. These employees can be uniformed or undercover. Over 50

offender statements cited the perceived presence and high quality of security personnel

(either uniformed or undercover) as a shoplifting deterrent, and the absence/low quality

of such personnel as an opportunity. This suggests offenders assess a store's apparent

level of security staffing and attentiveness before deciding to steal, an assessment that

relies upon a spatial layout that promotes surveillance. In the quote below, one offender

illustrates how the spatial layout of the store assists in his ability to assess security threats

(linking back to the "duality of surveillance" concept discussed previously in this

chapter):

A lot of [undercover security staff] will walkpast you and they 'll do %,iethii/g as
dumb as to make eye contact i iih you ... and you 'll see them go around the
corner, and off in the distance where they can still see you but they 're not on top of
you. And you 'll notice that there's nothing in their cart ... sometimes they're just
looking and you know who they are. So you're watching them. And you go up to
somewhere else and go into that aisle and just wait afew seconds and shop and
look around real nonchalantly, and there he is again. And so you know right then
it's off; he's onto you. "Mike"

This narrative underscores the influence design has over other, seemingly non-design-

related loss prevention strategies. In the quote below, the offender explains how the mere

sight of a uniformed security officer can be a deterrent:

A uniform is a good deterrent. Like ifI was walking in a store and have stolen stuff
and I come back to an exit and ands I see like 4 uniform guys that weren 't there
before, I'll dump the stuff instantly, 'cause all I know they could be therefore me,
you know? "Pat"









Again, the offender perceives this security strategy (formal surveillance) as the

interaction of space ("I come back to an exit"), surveillance ("I see like four") and

security ("uniform guys"). Some ways in which retail deign can improve the

effectiveness of formal surveillance are included in Chapter 5.

9. Target Visibility Reducing the visibility of CRAVED items is one strategy for

minimizing shoplifting. Some retailers replace CRAVED products with signs on shelves.

The signs redirect shoppers to a counter where an employee retrieves the item. Any

examples of offenders perceiving this practice as a deterrent were included in the

hardened targets category. However, 10 offender statements referred to highly visible

CRAVED items as a perceived opportunity for shoplifting. The design implications of

this finding are similar to those for "easily accessible targets" and are discussed in

Chapter 5.

10. Emotions A few offender statements (.5 percent) cited the perception of a

large corporation unaffected by loss as a reason to shoplift. (This can also be viewed as

an opportunity if it's moral hesitation preventing an offender from acting.) A few other

statements cited the perception of a small, family-run type of atmosphere as a moral

deterrent to shoplifting:

I don't [stealfromflea markets] because those are owned by likefamily businesses
and I feel really bad... you know, 'cause they don't have a million-dollar
insurance policy or anything. I don't even know if that's true, but yeah, it makes me
feel better. "Julian"

In either case, this study's results show emotions (whether provoked or reduced) did not

appear to influence many offenders' perceptions of crime risk or opportunity in the retail

interior.









13. Rules The study identified 11 shoplifter statements pertaining to anti-

shoplifting signage (like "Shoplifters will Be Prosecuted") as influential to the decision to

steal. However, most of these statements came from just one of the 20 offenders in the

sample. Below is an example of that offender's perception of anti-shoplifting signage:

Major stores like Wal-mart, Sears, they 're starting to get tougher, getting better at
cracking down. I mean, they even have signs: do not try and steal ,,iinehiiig and
come b,/Ik IA ii h it because we're going to catch you; \, inlhiiig like that. That kind
of persuades you not to try it. Signs and stuff like that. Visual types of thiig I
think that's the best way. "Joe"

Although few offenders cited signage as a deterrent cue, the fact that even one did should

be taken into consideration when designing retail interiors. Signage is a relatively

inexpensive and easy strategy to implement. If it deters even one potential offender it

could be worthwhile.

Categories with No Scores

Of the 15 categories in the matrix of Physical Cues in the Retail Interior, the

content analysis identified four with no scores at all. These were: Frustrations (reduced

vs. provoked), Imitation (discouraged vs. promoted), Instructions (unclear vs. posted),

and Conscience (ignored vs. alerted). None of the offender statements in this study

identified cues in these categories as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or

opportunity. The implication of this finding is simple: retail designers and retailers should

focus their efforts not on these categories but rather on the categories that shoplifters

overwhelmingly cited as influential to their perceptions: Natural Surveillance,

Guardianship, Formal Surveillance, and Target Accessibility. Some suggestions on how

interior designers can enhance the effectiveness of the loss prevention techniques in these

categories follows in Chapter 5.









Summary

Overall, the content analysis findings revealed several patterns in the types of

physical cues offenders cited as influential to their perception of shoplifting risk or

opportunity in the retail interior. In terms of the matrix' four overarching category

headings (perceived effort, perceived risk, perceived provocation, and perceived

excuses), 66.5 percent of offender statements referred to perceived risk, and 29 percent

referred to perceived effort. A negligible amount referred to the other two category

headings of perceived provocation and excuses (two and a half and two percent,

respectively). The analysis placed 639 shoplifter statements into nine of the 15 categories

in the Physical Cues in the Retail Interior matrix. Although all 15 of matrix categories

contain defensive design strategies for the retail interior, the content analysis revealed

that over 70 percent of offender statements fell into just four categories: Hardened

Targets, Natural Surveillance, Extended Guardianship, and Formal Surveillance. This

finding suggests that offenders perceive the physical cues in these four categories most

influential to their assessment of shoplifting risk or opportunity.

The narrative excerpts reiterated the findings of the content analysis: that is, while a

variety of physical cues in the retail interior influence offender perceptions of risk and

opportunity, those that influence offenders most often are related to levels of risk or

opportunity inherent to the shoplifting act. Indeed, the tonal and contextual implications

of the narrative analyses emphasized the content analysis' finding that over half (66.5

percent) of offender statements refer to perceptions of risk (which in turn affects the

decision to steal). The idea that situational, environmental cues combine to affect an

offender's perception of shoplifting ease or difficulty also lends support to the theories of

rational choice, the theft triangle, and situational crime prevention.














CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussion

This study's content and narrative analysis of 20 semi-structured interviews with

known shoplifting offenders revealed the specific physical cues shoplifters cite as

influential to perceptions of crime risk or opportunity in the retail interior. The content

analysis revealed some patterns in the types of cues that influence offender perceptions

most often, and the narrative analysis further emphasized these patterns. While these

findings are significant in themselves, they also present a range of implications for retail

design as well as opportunities for future research.

One of the study's most significant findings is that over 95 percent of offender

statements were categorized into two of the four matrix category headings: Perceived

Effort and Perceived Risk. Within these two headings, the matrix categories of Hardened

Targets, Extended Guardianship, Natural Surveillance, and Formal Surveillance

contained the highest numbers of offender statements. Considered in light of rational

choice theory and the theft triangle, these findings are unsurprising. Rational choice

theory asserts that potential shoplifting offenders weigh the possible risk of sanction and

apprehension against the possible reward of the theft in the time period leading up to their

decision to shoplift. This time period can range from a fraction of a second to a few

minutes (Clark & Felson, 1993). Therefore, this study's finding that cues pertaining to

targets, surveillance, and guardianship scored highest in terms of perceptions of risk or

opportunity supports rational choice theory. The excerpt below illustrates this connection:









First things first you want to know if they got what you want. The second factor is
the risk involvement. The risk involvement will be security times cameras times
employees times space times customers. Those are the five factors you're going to
have. Why? Because all of them conflict i ith each other to catch you. -"Matt"

Another finding worth discussing is the pattern of categories that contained no

offender statements at all. These four categories (Frustrations, Imitation, Instructions, and

Conscience) all exist under the category headings of Perceived Provocation and

Perceived Excuses. Together, these two category headings comprised just 4.5 percent of

the overall offender statements, suggesting that cues in the retail interior that

communicate shoplifting provocations or excuses do not often factor into an offender's

decision to steal. Again, this finding supports rational choice and the theft triangle, since

these categories bear the least relevance to risk and/or opportunity.

In terms of rationality, the study's findings suggest that, in the retail interior,

offenders are influenced most often by physical cues that communicate risk of detection

(and consequently, apprehension and sanction). This finding supports that of Carroll and

Weaver (1986) whose process-tracing study found that, once inside the store, shoplifters

acted in a proactive, rational manner, "actively scanning the store for information on

risks and opportunities before considering items for shoplifting" (p. 32). However, the

current study goes one step farther in identifying some of the specific cues that comprise

this information, and inform the offender's perception of risk or opportunity.

Design Recommendations

Through a combined content and narrative analysis of offender interviews, this

study was able to isolate specific categories of physical cues in the retail environment that

influence offender perceptions of risk, and decisions to shoplift. The strategies in these

categories, while untested, nevertheless present an array of areas in which design-based









solutions may minimize shoplifting incidents. The four categories this study identified as

most influential to offenders' perceptions of shoplifting risk and/or opportunity are:

* Natural Surveillance
* Extended guardianship
* Formal Surveillance
* Hardened Targets
While the identification of these specific cues is helpful, retail designers should

understand that incorporating design into the retail environment cannot be reduced to

such a tidy list. Building a secure retail environment is a holistic process. It begins at the

most preliminary stages of programming and schematic design, and should be a priority

throughout installation. Today's retail designers have an advantage in that modern

drafting programs usually include a three-dimensional modeling component, which

allows for virtual "tours" of a space well before construction begins. Such programs can

allow for strategic and targeted security planning, as retailer sand designers can see and

address potential weak or insecure areas of the store well in advance. Even after

construction is complete, secure retail design should be considered an ongoing priority,

built into the store's maintenance and management procedures.

In essence, to be most effective, security (and, in part, security-focused retail

design) should be a priority just like merchandising or marketing: a goal that starts at the

top levels of the retail corporation, is consistently carried through every department, and

manifested in the everyday operations of store management. For an example consider

one of the four categories this study identified as influential to shoplifters' decision-

making formal surveillance. To make formal surveillance as effective as possible,

retailers would begin to address it at the outset of the conceptual and programming phase,

assigning certain square footages and strategic placements for security staff. The store's