<%BANNER%>

Microfinance non-governmental organizations evolution to commercial banks: South American case study

xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101220_AAAAAS INGEST_TIME 2010-12-20T10:30:01Z PACKAGE UFE0015408_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 17835 DFID F20101220_AAAULM ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH parajon_a_Page_05.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
d3c763c1c0895b6439304a6fbb97916d
SHA-1
a26f72894c45ebe6c9ca160c50c3b8f1e5dbd3b5
39596 F20101220_AAAUGP parajon_a_Page_13.pro
5b44662d145bd5c7156e47927d5565f4
97469363c6a1f0a273d157f1e334f8ecf6fb94ac
87422 F20101220_AAATZR parajon_a_Page_06.jpg
cebd622db14bbaa51a84d9b1a0e0c3a9
5b3f9b364ae56b9c759e73971c01fc93b405f209
103982 F20101220_AAAUBR parajon_a_Page_66.jpg
9c4c771acce0433e79007d36dad03bcb
384a0806b8810d6c5d45323fe6e51542b530a5ee
4317 F20101220_AAAULN parajon_a_Page_05thm.jpg
a9b5ed1f432ff50ff797691734ecc0dc
538393652ef042801e20a02dd8590b14955214ad
43267 F20101220_AAAUGQ parajon_a_Page_14.pro
9834b61175570266336b07bdcbdfd05f
0ec6d684fcdc997520503bc00aff7d8384c6943d
35334 F20101220_AAATZS parajon_a_Page_07.jpg
56f988a8e5c15495261950a55003a536
90f47441353bdb710e642b994ffb6547586e1f75
40344 F20101220_AAAUBS parajon_a_Page_67.jpg
f9f3517123373b97d09c3855fac814dd
752e7facc7a236d770a1c617c52d0268bd4eb9dd
19734 F20101220_AAAULO parajon_a_Page_06.QC.jpg
7f3796fce0102fed28ef6c831cec1c77
6cb261a124e5f5a7f301a64c35ce99f8cee1370b
40805 F20101220_AAAUGR parajon_a_Page_15.pro
fa9d73b39ad1e32aabfabb42d80956f2
f66a439649ebda3a01eccb6aa326809a8a0b2d02
67685 F20101220_AAATZT parajon_a_Page_09.jpg
449dd37946792363e890fd6d712b5a68
be568efb167cfd7755031f36039dff08b0c762d6
25065 F20101220_AAAUBT parajon_a_Page_01.jp2
0589189c59c36938db93b9c05a9d2e9e
0c16431a2621c8bcb200b9ed42db94b7ad5f9f60
4840 F20101220_AAAULP parajon_a_Page_06thm.jpg
9b4de92719f2bbefca35826c18648369
4bf3655a9944603862559afbc392e8c0ea6c6fdc
39809 F20101220_AAAUGS parajon_a_Page_17.pro
efed02c37889169270d5072c68628a62
227e071c90dac38617d80b874a7ca0ab04e89dfb
22794 F20101220_AAATZU parajon_a_Page_10.jpg
ecb495a49b4002c120b07622ac0c47ec
1bd70e0efbda25658318fc079262fa366ef10049
5429 F20101220_AAAUBU parajon_a_Page_02.jp2
186ccf06aacdb4169be8a04992e6aa3f
818b2174a060b6d52021b224c24dd0d2d528798b
10336 F20101220_AAAULQ parajon_a_Page_07.QC.jpg
7f1c08013d7488f80f0b0bfdf3212652
9b7f5b8d9f3c7ddcdf98b3cfbf60f6a28a0943ab
41776 F20101220_AAAUGT parajon_a_Page_18.pro
60b2b798a0783384d7fef3d6ff6cf320
c0845f98fcaba28604b22c0f8d5f01bde1615fe7
70616 F20101220_AAATZV parajon_a_Page_11.jpg
0aa4c1fef34971c47a5c824197b9c907
cf2920c2b8935da3bd828e84c3f21fd9c042fc35
5937 F20101220_AAAUBV parajon_a_Page_03.jp2
e18911b870b415fa63308cede601f92e
110b40c36371f1516f421174732e084b13074551
9663 F20101220_AAAULR parajon_a_Page_08.QC.jpg
273b303864398dcb8891c04c751d8753
dd0d512e222dad799a21996c0e1a709a8935ffe4
38265 F20101220_AAAUGU parajon_a_Page_19.pro
614d5e892617d41ed54778354323d0bb
5cb16c7c5a45d2ace160fea472acc19bba194805
65864 F20101220_AAATZW parajon_a_Page_12.jpg
cf0965e68e49d3f178f42689f1d54074
ebe7be1a2adda3a20c4fc52c8e23835eff738883
1051984 F20101220_AAAUBW parajon_a_Page_05.jp2
1286bcd6685859504a13ea0587086bdb
a4340b47be487e8460a70b0f453ad0ab6d114e87
5073 F20101220_AAAULS parajon_a_Page_09thm.jpg
40e012b6f7e3f381f10d34be80b6313e
1f4cb003f078451d608dadc899573c607ba61dec
67472 F20101220_AAATZX parajon_a_Page_13.jpg
81d493e6a45194d123ee82cbccec740a
b2c68155570ba9d92571380603ba860be20e5d35
1051952 F20101220_AAAUBX parajon_a_Page_06.jp2
24f82efc569d2a5435694a6bb174b30f
1e9ecd371f004448183a29aeab0ba3c8c69fd67e
7406 F20101220_AAAULT parajon_a_Page_10.QC.jpg
ca3b6f4d1f85ab513c755225c7aaaeaf
1f17fae416d5328a01d641e45d252819593c84b2
44523 F20101220_AAAUGV parajon_a_Page_20.pro
8a67864bced20ffadee2919f9b956bee
d71d44b1462399068c03bf0686ed09d43e7570f8
67515 F20101220_AAATZY parajon_a_Page_15.jpg
dab574e468206da9f17a840ce74be020
d42c56824b68119006b43738d0ef853e3d033799
811631 F20101220_AAAUBY parajon_a_Page_07.jp2
4a6ca12475ab555c5d2968b30006f2f4
0ed539b21012a0fee1790f16fa0dddba6eaf6ff8
1789 F20101220_AAAULU parajon_a_Page_10thm.jpg
f92b345e816edbc1da2fa4cc1517cbda
12b88bb60fc862159da934c0b9e4b87e5cf8f8bb
49915 F20101220_AAAUGW parajon_a_Page_21.pro
f5fdab21f70fe0e58b0589af609cb294
d4d8799078fc90ba271c0d6a76c7756f111eeb0f
66222 F20101220_AAATZZ parajon_a_Page_16.jpg
e4213098e8f162fc14beff80cfb9380f
b4d1d1aae216e6dc7a3a0f073d35799631de1398
86781 F20101220_AAAUBZ parajon_a_Page_09.jp2
3e9dc9428e0ca99e1d6593bf25825cd3
99f444a4234c2cc51bb1f45ecd9c5930b76f227c
21614 F20101220_AAAULV parajon_a_Page_11.QC.jpg
88ef401fb6f154d987903db4e267daad
030786db94994eac3366bf7ff17cd6723d6cdda3
38317 F20101220_AAAUGX parajon_a_Page_22.pro
59f91a0de34cc681e6604af6040575cd
1e51fcd8c99f9b741f5d09781891e8550760e75f
5302 F20101220_AAAULW parajon_a_Page_11thm.jpg
4e24eed5e47a4162cad921617413b0bd
1f3d3db01320ca357a8d7264251a1ac38d9c7465
45507 F20101220_AAAUEA parajon_a_Page_68.jp2
7875e9492eed2ec3945dd2a8b7889aba
d3c5a92b0c26aa25eb31b1b519822a2618adf5ae
48608 F20101220_AAAUGY parajon_a_Page_23.pro
fa921fe086ae50d53df2b094ff8ca421
fe22a854ab6c8b6083503349b9261278c967de27
21255 F20101220_AAAULX parajon_a_Page_12.QC.jpg
471c7992db7a83059e72148f5aff7856
5f6c91fa32f58fcb9e9feef120eef58d435822bc
1053954 F20101220_AAAUEB parajon_a_Page_02.tif
5bf987d5134c024d072c8a9d3ad3585b
c376354841a51320bbda22faeee13f475e2432c6
42339 F20101220_AAAUGZ parajon_a_Page_24.pro
081d22b96c2126c9a8c605ba16db732e
a38382c8b92d1a73aa9c2e4c79f296258a967611
5019 F20101220_AAAULY parajon_a_Page_12thm.jpg
cc82693d253d4fc9f2d46563b35c36b1
a680819b2487800ad7d8a4cf03e28a5ad9605f16
F20101220_AAAUEC parajon_a_Page_03.tif
433f4a05136bb2d9cd8f5d96bc734be9
468e5fe0c083b9b60fd8bda44262931b3bd5c9a6
21134 F20101220_AAAULZ parajon_a_Page_13.QC.jpg
0b9d474b2a941af9b8e283bbbe4c3814
922ef327d6246b66be613040a0d921edcfec06dc
F20101220_AAAUED parajon_a_Page_04.tif
0fc909e98c1fc4dcbd05c2fec8cb6c94
437b91204c5c46d8183983474c46ceefae27a3bb
502 F20101220_AAAUJA parajon_a_Page_10.txt
e97771ca78d5528a043328b8b420f8ce
6ef33d1fd8ef5af8b8d5b2298748b5b887f59931
25271604 F20101220_AAAUEE parajon_a_Page_05.tif
a8c6f7edbc72fb947deda5bf12c2d51c
d79e5039edd5c713b8d159c990b9472cbf4db63d
1707 F20101220_AAAUJB parajon_a_Page_11.txt
d8e3a21c608e0c32cc1fa4588df0cc35
db179b9a9c0328dbfbf9eee70e46b03ee0cb7a1a
F20101220_AAAUEF parajon_a_Page_06.tif
f12ecb6be76c2664c79710d2874e6f62
ed174c273c209e6c65295b0671aac13e48a21e87
F20101220_AAATXH parajon_a_Page_20.tif
f50c8ef871290ebdc3846b882f1b55cd
930bb3613c5154364965c29315c2144b670224c1
1580 F20101220_AAAUJC parajon_a_Page_12.txt
d85203934f03eaf0ab0f132f28518887
d9852630d99cd4d3da2e3cfa01b30e47e7d65b96
5142 F20101220_AAAUOA parajon_a_Page_43thm.jpg
f54e608b62f6ebcf33946d5697f86d29
6f02fb7e15f4ed5b4d4452cb7d6e5ae26d182927
F20101220_AAAUEG parajon_a_Page_08.tif
873e3465acbe2ebbcc0f324b53c7f915
1f3f16592b0d60414a4d88fc13b76f7f7a3ff589
F20101220_AAATXI parajon_a_Page_09.tif
af1816f64653bcb959b3aa9f1b8487be
7d79fd819f097a4ce08d432055ef072651a32c61
1605 F20101220_AAAUJD parajon_a_Page_13.txt
3e8af0819d44d092d8dfa5768d0a58ac
2a9ae143978e8fff2e97d0de86022555b987bf8d
19658 F20101220_AAAUOB parajon_a_Page_44.QC.jpg
618f95145b7cd05adf4b5c2cf117f901
784e4c2c9dad6c0d6a1b623635dfa60268257f6d
F20101220_AAAUEH parajon_a_Page_10.tif
fc8fcfeab8c67d40cb88eb8fe16f6317
40719023090627f20d59fe0a980a3c090b4e9e22
3423 F20101220_AAATXJ parajon_a_Page_31.txt
9da85902cb2822e9ffac044ac2a023f6
fcf4ca9004890cbb65498bb7134166a72438fa75
1734 F20101220_AAAUJE parajon_a_Page_14.txt
0833dec9d7507339fb72727a7dfe5f32
aa654685a2cf07881d7c710f85dee639c1fe0dd5
4904 F20101220_AAAUOC parajon_a_Page_44thm.jpg
0c58cad75c242d744f082029435dfaa2
50f70a0f2d341584c742d8abce8c23ad72ee5fb0
F20101220_AAAUEI parajon_a_Page_11.tif
f742cc8ca2c9f340aa29f49f655bd0da
181b23414abe36f38e882a7bd5b2d8fecb565830
83592 F20101220_AAATXK parajon_a_Page_34.jpg
75877b6bcc16dcc224c359cc4ff3fb6e
f1a0f06aa7dca332c361b60b84768648c7a13842
1554 F20101220_AAAUJF parajon_a_Page_16.txt
6fac599a55086c9fa046fb4f8721ef8f
d3a30dcd56b5427251cc3301b893f562872bb5e8
17611 F20101220_AAAUOD parajon_a_Page_45.QC.jpg
471ab4f13688f896389396516b3a4cfe
5f80b8241b01497a765bd0bb0f3fadd7d1aa2e42
F20101220_AAAUEJ parajon_a_Page_12.tif
468747d21c93d2a948589e5766842fe0
40bd16530a01b344507f5599a4e9ec912cac3236
5949 F20101220_AAATXL parajon_a_Page_26thm.jpg
2511d73ecc7839bd96077b11ab1c5895
63278d8e7fe1762ec780e712de3032ad3560e1c9
1601 F20101220_AAAUJG parajon_a_Page_17.txt
a484f01e922744574f751d32c7bf4cc9
63288c7133931350be9abd9a413d398cff1677c2
4829 F20101220_AAAUOE parajon_a_Page_45thm.jpg
5a78a465ede32a9227aeab80a72e459b
541e983c9758fa15ba067b7d1f0e35977337d5a3
F20101220_AAAUEK parajon_a_Page_13.tif
60067879e0e685c3e5b0ee5916daef49
80d92d2e48f06bcd2e61087ac994a8ab8e7042bc
1644 F20101220_AAATXM parajon_a_Page_50.txt
a119e507ab3e7d0eb3387cb1d6461a35
1c8873d8bf4cf5207a70ab1b241b52a6ed5cb56f
1682 F20101220_AAAUJH parajon_a_Page_18.txt
73938b85451c54be8dc53c2dbae57735
5cd985d90005b91bb91eba57547d5e978409f021
20029 F20101220_AAAUOF parajon_a_Page_46.QC.jpg
1bd6a0c4c73c672e0785dfa16294ae67
a93986f9aa2d52d9ea757aa5ed226863f0724fc0
F20101220_AAAUEL parajon_a_Page_14.tif
26936d7ac956567147c2b68ddc91e0f6
a30d7c8641031e76b5b1128bd30e0d25e2e9d412
38616 F20101220_AAATXN parajon_a_Page_08.jpg
740fae4b69ca89a99c4e679054f31c3e
051a339cd71f7ae46fa38cab7f9f22a4cea03574
1546 F20101220_AAAUJI parajon_a_Page_19.txt
1df8d0272e92ef2e6c1b933f10c2a8ee
6297f20997086556a58e98e95a2d84063df8ad70
5133 F20101220_AAAUOG parajon_a_Page_46thm.jpg
9144bc75385e7a9f7cda6eb99ab3d8aa
00a3251bd0d93da57c8fce804344162f522db08f
F20101220_AAAUEM parajon_a_Page_15.tif
c6f900c2e764a547da32e1f29e670191
4779d4a30b5ce9e8b0b947cdd8e2d7937441651d
5452 F20101220_AAATXO parajon_a_Page_30thm.jpg
ef306cb53dabc64f8c4ae03fb93de6e3
7d2e68972302a09ad9aaf7058852fa7f0a1e651c
1786 F20101220_AAAUJJ parajon_a_Page_20.txt
e3e6e13e1fb880a02ae343b4f130bd8b
59eec7d4ec747b6d2c8f14f8794db546daeb25bc
21474 F20101220_AAAUOH parajon_a_Page_47.QC.jpg
022929792c5b97eb5fe661737fad4805
32f3e81a8fc8d722d0db553174ad5b52a17b294d
F20101220_AAAUEN parajon_a_Page_16.tif
b2787889c282069305a7cfbda4a202a2
6366897d35c38e80d2e6ff4bfd08a7112df90a99
79834 F20101220_AAATXP parajon_a_Page_05.jpg
e771042c427fbb41535450bca340214f
1d16bdc0bf1afd3d7278ae3446549173306a92e6
1977 F20101220_AAAUJK parajon_a_Page_21.txt
94eea9deab7d63f0e04fe7362cbfdbfe
984bec336a452a94c7030047e3e35e24a7344b4d
26994 F20101220_AAAUOI parajon_a_Page_48.QC.jpg
76a705022bd24f1ef2bd1d482242a7cd
f50ce45ca59777137c91b3799bfd06f7fe6d475c
5165 F20101220_AAATXQ parajon_a_Page_32thm.jpg
c138eeafaf45e21cc01facb13260a4c8
513e4faee8e8d467948278828ac8a20fe5f8a70e
1557 F20101220_AAAUJL parajon_a_Page_22.txt
a30c3ec20d90d5b890808c47aa894c4e
0e75debadbe7f3cca13c8bd153b1f1e6a6c33835
F20101220_AAAUEO parajon_a_Page_18.tif
afbe7e3a81195bcbfb511bef7204e328
b775eea74e8538a7497262c4fe614f61ff0ef04a
6370 F20101220_AAAUOJ parajon_a_Page_48thm.jpg
b767916982363d835ac72e186980931f
059ba680c0d23cc4092277ed1bf641a7e5908f54
78949 F20101220_AAATXR parajon_a_Page_23.jpg
27f1237d83301b5f96706330f35d3435
3b12f2a4132043140d7021975feaa23ebe8640ba
1730 F20101220_AAAUJM parajon_a_Page_24.txt
faa1d02e5a096e59f3f0bf744ccf3dac
4ae5b1c884fbc4f32f6064bd12bf6171e0143e0b
F20101220_AAAUEP parajon_a_Page_21.tif
cfb5d2bfe64207da546717d0c808490d
c697c8d111e2bcd76d71b9bdc61e3ae302947252
19893 F20101220_AAAUOK parajon_a_Page_49.QC.jpg
a9dd525e70c9a0bb1d43d71de7eaaa77
5ba9374ef9c8c1d894e17a471e2c4eadeb2daf41
2782 F20101220_AAATXS parajon_a_Page_08thm.jpg
459cf641327f7f87cb210082739ee9a6
4d00a713d5841b448722e406a879c20cdfb97a31
1964 F20101220_AAAUJN parajon_a_Page_26.txt
3fe229e4dc03218d92fc50f6e72e2071
73b8edccd350138999a01c0c950ba08acf9ad7f7
F20101220_AAAUEQ parajon_a_Page_22.tif
af974e3232a838fe53de6fcd052c7100
ab2d794b4d29a0b4f931bd83f7ad4d7bbf0ec1b9
5348 F20101220_AAAUOL parajon_a_Page_49thm.jpg
d0e1dbc02e1bc261b5a688765bf65b3c
8029bb690020f06857e2a9be9c0e2aaeaee7b66c
1828 F20101220_AAATXT parajon_a_Page_28.txt
5460c41e1dac358c483374b0d6290c7d
ead9facbd3164f2662f9035266266b54de42bb4a
962 F20101220_AAAUJO parajon_a_Page_27.txt
6df99649bcac942ed9bae7066bef4a30
3e2572e4a5538c4481aeb26f5d4c8104469fc422
F20101220_AAAUER parajon_a_Page_23.tif
3be3e3fafd4d6595899a846be4f54aab
b2a0854c2eb67059228a910a6273bb6a5fc58bbd
23251 F20101220_AAAUOM parajon_a_Page_50.QC.jpg
d361bd7df69d9ee73be8fd9e8cff23b9
818633364547298802d62ff2a07f1c774bdf1734
23335 F20101220_AAATXU parajon_a_Page_30.QC.jpg
59c2536e9e148138520f0ce439f688ce
5b444b82344876afe6be5045f86dc2ae3ea9fb5d
1948 F20101220_AAAUJP parajon_a_Page_30.txt
0f43ca056bf4461fbeaa00e20dbdfee1
9e06754e4b2740868397dcab700f10c9d5a7e393
F20101220_AAAUES parajon_a_Page_24.tif
49eaf25cbbb037c8808ae2a6c1033064
88425ca4877ef8ea713026fa5a34aabc5c8911ff
6002 F20101220_AAAUON parajon_a_Page_50thm.jpg
a9e7995c7489be858ea14d985b0ed40a
f225f65944aecca30baca66fc90d9b0e3846603e
746468 F20101220_AAATXV parajon_a_Page_46.jp2
95243958b67380ea439ab0d100866b95
df1b3cea39df3ada19ab5d83c4a57f6c8ac343c9
1654 F20101220_AAAUJQ parajon_a_Page_32.txt
ccb9876ebaa95cfffe45221f57e3dcdb
740e888f447f405cb6890d26d13da3a73f735e70
25761 F20101220_AAAUOO parajon_a_Page_51.QC.jpg
ca17d45d6f278aefbc99c80f632f45b4
98d97fb007a854f1d7fb94686a71d633ac5a96b3
35586 F20101220_AAATXW parajon_a_Page_68.jpg
f485c9ef42ac58e10a48f96f47172de3
ab7e43605e8875ff96e2c5008fe6d08d75907b87
2175 F20101220_AAAUJR parajon_a_Page_33.txt
fb895da54a46d7c9bb95ed435e424943
5ee57312e4d2de28281ac81810a526e1cc676052
F20101220_AAAUET parajon_a_Page_25.tif
1d1ea81fb7e9b5203a34c3506e370d06
e7b158ae64a42401c344deb5d7d41c87ec97a865
6292 F20101220_AAAUOP parajon_a_Page_51thm.jpg
55b4a46578f9b07e003149d83bd30ecc
b90c31bb7e69219ab0d6394b4cc2568696939d9d
53511 F20101220_AAATXX parajon_a_Page_27.jp2
72becde53aed9c7b8c024fb9ad672e72
81a6a205215106a6ef910b724cd1488d85794502
2915 F20101220_AAAUJS parajon_a_Page_34.txt
73c63acfde132aae692a904fb51ecb79
49cc029a866b6af58edf37fc83c8fc3adfab0b01
F20101220_AAAUEU parajon_a_Page_26.tif
1016e9bc7cf45b49264d1f204d41d105
0648f6abc11d9c79853d7bfb8522059803b17215
21077 F20101220_AAAUOQ parajon_a_Page_52.QC.jpg
ead8510361090d48afb43500ad1aa699
14fbb9b6e30822e5333d0e3e9e3a72c7c6bf2182
77033 F20101220_AAATXY parajon_a_Page_41.jpg
d8b378e66d37b7e314d39274b0285593
bd412b07a9ddbacc98c124198d8779bf47c8d7ea
2259 F20101220_AAAUJT parajon_a_Page_35.txt
5b82f9d8e62dce45c867da1c2769615d
e09176d4b15f7e3c2a7cfc1f60c168c921a7c838
F20101220_AAAUEV parajon_a_Page_27.tif
8249c7e0053b5ae70a30a2f73ee15249
82a4f2aea773a14a000d7c42f2449c3cfc4e9d05
5758 F20101220_AAAUOR parajon_a_Page_52thm.jpg
9d0fa5a93b66431e1b62072efbc9c7ef
f3da7eb36d6a245c6cc0b07b34c0b49e47a8a5d3
874041 F20101220_AAATXZ parajon_a_Page_08.jp2
e4c013158c16f362f5d733dc6801e8bf
0f5fb4eda0cf174b0fc8804383771915186eb694
F20101220_AAAUJU parajon_a_Page_36.txt
c501b9cddee02bef1ccfe222bcfdcf5b
fedab31801493427ce35ab0caa02076900c7a984
F20101220_AAAUEW parajon_a_Page_28.tif
f3a64786ba4791ad937d3afe5314d0cc
f94fe21565d3382696233fe70b8c98b0c3668cc6
22805 F20101220_AAAUOS parajon_a_Page_53.QC.jpg
6ec0adcb5a44add0b7bca5e5a36978ba
95f1aa67a2cbf44a3b1980e24a59332c30a5570f
2445 F20101220_AAAUJV parajon_a_Page_37.txt
1ad328dab5924d2c4f974b70b1a569c2
d89b6308a712930f1333dc4fdfad0ba4fd583d9c
F20101220_AAAUEX parajon_a_Page_29.tif
06821c92062056ff2c8002ea1a013c8d
31fc14405fe3203a4439a7e09c4fd8a03a733844
5970 F20101220_AAAUOT parajon_a_Page_53thm.jpg
2e622c49c2a5eb850eb64783451a2f70
79b6cb42236d259d2471cb0835d9e4554f3475cb
1552 F20101220_AAAUJW parajon_a_Page_38.txt
20dc086228ca4771d59fb66a32ed3847
9f3ba55423f7628249f6dea3718e1793462686a9
30127 F20101220_AAAUCA parajon_a_Page_10.jp2
a7a6af2f52b29eccbda971e72f9cea42
167f96b298e047d3482ebb3380a2bd4f34aad8ec
F20101220_AAAUEY parajon_a_Page_30.tif
f053943d68721dc9b39ccbd34b01323d
bdd3540821c2243d781a3790fdc9b1d8edb50365
6109 F20101220_AAAUOU parajon_a_Page_54thm.jpg
2520c1a51f307f6882dcc00f31af878f
b07fb26c0224445a09b8c17635e43101a584de55
1756 F20101220_AAAUJX parajon_a_Page_39.txt
6b0dc20826bcfb1978efb641fee70990
5b6f2cf51687fba39f224852e772ff8306ee248c
917940 F20101220_AAAUCB parajon_a_Page_11.jp2
19073202799d0e2550ca1cd72d1ab923
154b32babaf180c803e57b2f43aa24df866045b9
F20101220_AAAUEZ parajon_a_Page_32.tif
8aa6fb9d212ee1900bd74c78574e5baa
a64256f5065d0f43c77f7c9366082c5ff04b5b63
22441 F20101220_AAAUOV parajon_a_Page_55.QC.jpg
8eb3a5c24c23de34b733500945dc2de0
09c47e9aeab2bd18fb25ba6187e94d2cd6538066
85442 F20101220_AAAUCC parajon_a_Page_12.jp2
93494ec7e5fbb7e738e506794e27bea1
43118edbf9494a114d1d569b4d1d18a9fc4f4ee1
5798 F20101220_AAAUOW parajon_a_Page_55thm.jpg
494f1e8a014be1d517000aa1613d476f
dd342aaadff5bf27089a27cafdf417bc42ebabd9
41970 F20101220_AAAUHA parajon_a_Page_25.pro
a584ed9b14781b6198184df3a531c51e
c5d9a886e9145134df04fb0ecfc32b7188e12a22
1082 F20101220_AAAUJY parajon_a_Page_40.txt
4e048ece4260da846858ade16d2283b3
348a8944e46e50f805acc761a49bbeb425374e3d
87713 F20101220_AAAUCD parajon_a_Page_13.jp2
d95e8bb6bb61f63f91d8f3ca19cc88e9
c5fde0bcba1d565c9a797ca99579cf50aff103a7
26218 F20101220_AAAUOX parajon_a_Page_56.QC.jpg
e21b54bee8932ca04fb9042d5ce0b0f6
2c453e1cce71502d487ee5837a31db5a669613aa
49097 F20101220_AAAUHB parajon_a_Page_26.pro
b6e388aea3a64267cd427925dd3beb29
ba7ef123169c8619daf817caf8064fab3d20cc90
1905 F20101220_AAAUJZ parajon_a_Page_41.txt
324c28785ffa7df04002103489ca4a08
85d924f5d0d9efd65e4f425993b20440127f5f19
92386 F20101220_AAAUCE parajon_a_Page_14.jp2
a616b1cbf00a8350a4e23e0e2926dea3
0b6f9a5c234e2470e546bfeadd125d908ff9f73d
6325 F20101220_AAAUOY parajon_a_Page_56thm.jpg
82c0d7925b9481b31395c6d43b77a956
9ae1d909255a42caa763fd707e4ae08be3571838
24071 F20101220_AAAUHC parajon_a_Page_27.pro
1c48b951563ce2ca1207aea1a5c513c6
70452e9d420fc8d0b88e406f1c97c921c0eea715
89007 F20101220_AAAUCF parajon_a_Page_15.jp2
7e7dba64ed4158da5a39177d4bd0c45e
c5b6a62d8d548da01224c75200d0989495f7bdbe
19323 F20101220_AAAUOZ parajon_a_Page_57.QC.jpg
5cc68ac7c46137ee08419510b0d5c9d7
463c4de342af45ce9896f128e10b54b1e0da84b3
38231 F20101220_AAAUHD parajon_a_Page_28.pro
1660d4495adb132dea8c06555619bf87
a05a3347268b8c8a4b9c172efac898d438d68367
85768 F20101220_AAAUCG parajon_a_Page_16.jp2
84854f8fd1775a59e3354e6cb477debd
4346653ad0144c844e2974f1e342aaea063d37de
5242 F20101220_AAAUMA parajon_a_Page_13thm.jpg
ee7b670291c03ad3904d54a38f2f1f38
c2393a5a37dbe3e297af6b45f24236f5a6b7a01d
45095 F20101220_AAAUHE parajon_a_Page_29.pro
6c46d24be0c5aaadb0cb3c5630ef86ae
78d0c69e8b47de14772e56946a25486bed8cd3eb
87998 F20101220_AAAUCH parajon_a_Page_17.jp2
369b6359ec0ab6ac532a4262770d4190
156d948f03a9838848d1fbd29fe97a7caf8d2b90
22300 F20101220_AAAUMB parajon_a_Page_14.QC.jpg
577c9fce82ee8ddf0597ee582a9baa17
50999c7faa847aabecea02497135b8f6b08c86a2
48047 F20101220_AAAUHF parajon_a_Page_30.pro
fc6adc26a1c2fd4ed6f524078d5e69d9
46d33921649c7518c849a500f609704f34006813
91677 F20101220_AAAUCI parajon_a_Page_18.jp2
05620a3ecd2545a7f27adf3c64db3b6d
6b6efceb12ea02d0d03ad3b200d379cf759a71b2
5415 F20101220_AAAUMC parajon_a_Page_14thm.jpg
a3160e99cdd872c48afa70c168a1abdb
26f58e60795562f27836d1de188be55eeff86204
71180 F20101220_AAAUHG parajon_a_Page_31.pro
791ea6ad55e27c72ffc82bea09c5d790
9d3f3ecccd18a18ce668b2c4ac64db9076b31c13
85220 F20101220_AAAUCJ parajon_a_Page_19.jp2
dd436c9f9662e77a90d516e562c8ad77
e58d31298ee32d4cf7896f0421e86401f3b857de
20955 F20101220_AAAUMD parajon_a_Page_15.QC.jpg
02439662d29a60172805dcadc5f3b1da
737e68ab307526560fef6a88542119f3f4b69b86
41172 F20101220_AAAUHH parajon_a_Page_32.pro
71cccf023a8fb6ea4a0905196c4adf16
6f2445006949e6478c4536b1b6ba4c6de0cdaadf
94774 F20101220_AAAUCK parajon_a_Page_20.jp2
65a3f351e5ffd21e72a57942db11b60f
f2a7ade6708b2e8e700ae442df0e71af2b0f5b40
5356 F20101220_AAAUME parajon_a_Page_15thm.jpg
f61e48806ebcc4a2392ac7f06a682442
8934528cd275d5ca8112fd629402f41fa7896fb3
45090 F20101220_AAAUHI parajon_a_Page_33.pro
80fd2123b828e40cf646184dcb946330
cbd4e9756b9932536f9a43604f26a43c8f272b83
1051961 F20101220_AAAUCL parajon_a_Page_21.jp2
576b1f97115a5ecab23c11f4ecc69a4b
2cddf44e268be527b72c2a8e9fd785ddae7f8186
20688 F20101220_AAAUMF parajon_a_Page_16.QC.jpg
06502f57f089ecd5c1f089bef2d45c31
6c6f00dad58507122e0eb15c9de78013f64a1bb9
58995 F20101220_AAAUHJ parajon_a_Page_34.pro
0e7d7cc70bca942c252049aee1387dca
fc2535fadddc9f08fc9260287e1e41af2ccd7cb4
84628 F20101220_AAAUCM parajon_a_Page_22.jp2
b118320f888ffe993b2e147fdb2a5dfc
16e71c1a7ec32ea6cfaee81d50568e893442651b
5257 F20101220_AAAUMG parajon_a_Page_16thm.jpg
00a0b9cf139faba3ad29b9bb8ab5a4e7
a9f18d67eb2ebeda57f5a9caa225b14251729ef6
F20101220_AAAUCN parajon_a_Page_23.jp2
fdf756c9e7bb3e8da39c112547e956dd
8bd5b7041b12d246255c507a01fac41495ef331f
20830 F20101220_AAAUMH parajon_a_Page_17.QC.jpg
294db853c5da419d12cb373fd286bc47
8e045ca51a4ca6b45ec53f7ce3d2c9900597e0a4
51322 F20101220_AAAUHK parajon_a_Page_35.pro
d871a2ec842e1a21f5f0f52a7e0297b4
d8b6c7c9e03917639591b5ef0def780595da449d
91251 F20101220_AAAUCO parajon_a_Page_24.jp2
c3c8f7a4f1389b26479ea081baf4bf8b
4ea08495f50fb6134c2e31a5a3a14d7e5bd03658
5161 F20101220_AAAUMI parajon_a_Page_17thm.jpg
83347af2f97e178d6757bd9dd3fcafe4
fd0ed9d5979b97cef6e71996337804c2e6bfab50
41870 F20101220_AAAUHL parajon_a_Page_36.pro
aa2a982019d7bd34eeec027b791a38ea
0bf3dbd6f7d5cffc10aee2a52fde4c69ce93511a
104076 F20101220_AAAUCP parajon_a_Page_26.jp2
8026b438f1d776bd185e957c38085d2d
aa3782fc602a2b0bb6077a780d2bf02ffe5bf56c
21605 F20101220_AAAUMJ parajon_a_Page_18.QC.jpg
5812d003fc4511db46da73fb1b0330c6
dbef3e1d4719f122a77d3cc793c142e5c34d22e3
48476 F20101220_AAAUHM parajon_a_Page_37.pro
5461c36c96603ef95b67c3d1a7b65c1f
f14368ccd42c44cac4ff0e5a41cc9d581726623f
78197 F20101220_AAAUCQ parajon_a_Page_28.jp2
2a0f164a4ac199c8a9fc270680c12d56
ca9ff25a772ebac6fa8d7591164b966b812b7b4d
5395 F20101220_AAAUMK parajon_a_Page_18thm.jpg
80ad59aa72569e8e5afdb5bd3a376c0d
1c71a062354f48d02915b0ad98af9a51fdc714f4
38313 F20101220_AAAUHN parajon_a_Page_38.pro
6ec66cf64d4a8ec96daf0211d79a8f60
050cc319ff9e87223d17f0bbb93d2e904a842d7b
20286 F20101220_AAAUML parajon_a_Page_19.QC.jpg
b302c9cd04aeb474c05e4c96baebf8bc
c213f2f030fc27d7ff45916322e996cef8070dce
43286 F20101220_AAAUHO parajon_a_Page_39.pro
3cd509093e0d37d168c8911841da8cf9
d9d4defd10848b93c15eb9b3272c961b9bef33bc
1015290 F20101220_AAAUCR parajon_a_Page_29.jp2
1af273656541d01fbd6e290c5b50f212
1df317f9f4a24ab968c04ac1874c0c11a079270e
5008 F20101220_AAAUMM parajon_a_Page_19thm.jpg
a4c9fa07e4edfb7ea3cf3f31b57d9e99
5d7e5f55340946566ec1ab69a163fe8932972c1c
25872 F20101220_AAAUHP parajon_a_Page_40.pro
609050bbaf400b8404026dcaf03b66c7
b2b4771f416f0193f3aec532e54ed280963c5125
102631 F20101220_AAAUCS parajon_a_Page_30.jp2
9b06fd2a515ebff97c64877319b38e54
237135b7784309565932def8fb98592d1e0cb8f2
22654 F20101220_AAAUMN parajon_a_Page_20.QC.jpg
a60a9d91ef32acf289b35879e3a31c07
e5ca6e5a4cec7e58f728091dfe8f15e40ddcffca
46356 F20101220_AAAUHQ parajon_a_Page_41.pro
a7417361c62016ee7470a97a53bc5f88
830f375e6bd9c0ff3bedd178c327bc40c3244a1f
916488 F20101220_AAAUCT parajon_a_Page_32.jp2
4a5801806e0042faa158fcc7215e2706
6535d0074adfdfcf025dcd840c800de1a294a857
5616 F20101220_AAAUMO parajon_a_Page_20thm.jpg
4a60f5ea5d72cadad61e6cac2620052f
eacc2149c294b22e8956c9db3555bd0dd2b5df8c
46954 F20101220_AAAUHR parajon_a_Page_42.pro
ac458c3ddf4974e13f296ecc45c78be6
45e11dba7cc865a936558e482b7d93f6f17672f4
79531 F20101220_AAAUCU parajon_a_Page_33.jp2
836ce2e3d1a9d6f76a812450c2a14592
615f53c3c4cd577c62627988e9ef53c5cb3657be
25125 F20101220_AAAUMP parajon_a_Page_21.QC.jpg
5d11d29d67b14759be009e3e61a3dff5
de71479ddadc594b21d617c10f8d07c6c37704c2
29855 F20101220_AAAUHS parajon_a_Page_43.pro
7100fd12a490ebc3f1718c452b31542e
ae8863c6baae2e01ca5edaabdd3fdb048b9bde58
107975 F20101220_AAAUCV parajon_a_Page_34.jp2
d7aa4e7817f0910d5d09d27a712520e9
68541d4130c540e5ee2a32749050f8c16ca96807
F20101220_AAAUMQ parajon_a_Page_21thm.jpg
a32f22b08687c962e55abd9e3b2b9ed2
fda85f27e649d0b0e3a1b76951ac98425e9d09ae
31555 F20101220_AAAUHT parajon_a_Page_44.pro
112548acc77e229210ba207db9b0eba0
3a698bb470d3ac513bda779a0d5232dc4ac921dd
102191 F20101220_AAAUCW parajon_a_Page_35.jp2
2f6cee5635f2f576b69154ae14632c5d
48118dcd115489df6bccdb4a6de036d1e764145c
19814 F20101220_AAAUMR parajon_a_Page_22.QC.jpg
981aceac63ea6c1ece83721f337de9a5
8f6fd6c407ec86edee2e9377f149ac8cc7e3017c
27903 F20101220_AAAUHU parajon_a_Page_45.pro
3b0d0c6090bd8efdf1e32f8faaaf2a82
6fc7acc179ec0cb8bf872e49f1b760ad04621548
90837 F20101220_AAAUCX parajon_a_Page_36.jp2
e7890d3bc36a0f1dd0080ed0a0f9ee5e
7956c2512570430d0fa85dd0b35ac41d1a7a5f90
4927 F20101220_AAAUMS parajon_a_Page_22thm.jpg
1c6e10144c9ff7c7832356e22260473d
b9262897733290eab7e945548df401fd8770639c
31704 F20101220_AAAUHV parajon_a_Page_46.pro
2ea3d4104196e1ff603c6e568f431a6b
17a7c27f4cd242d6d6fe2438ff04f3cd8f8c435e
24383 F20101220_AAAUMT parajon_a_Page_23.QC.jpg
715b3e39386706738149a524ac4bef58
150c981ebffe30c2704145006823dff52d565224
81714 F20101220_AAAUCY parajon_a_Page_37.jp2
6d48c71d35a448becddd0b77de32538c
86725c874f10957507b3a8807191a4fe1bd12413
59621 F20101220_AAATYA parajon_a_Page_04.jp2
1c9d3467fee74439274482b5f3422283
c0ccff2f24170b1f705c6b4d1ad4a2ff4bd36e6e
69804 F20101220_AAAUAA parajon_a_Page_18.jpg
520556253d3912fac322e9aa33380b74
ce44da5bb0c5990ae539d6c1f5fdf0df9b60ebad
5996 F20101220_AAAUMU parajon_a_Page_23thm.jpg
25271d2f6d00b67c734f7ba91915ad47
2ac44d0e8e077bd6768a8f819cf01e45be74c4e5
84648 F20101220_AAAUCZ parajon_a_Page_38.jp2
a4592c8e9738f27299069f0c2095d8cb
217c6a6783ec4beebbdb2051fb57a53ae43bcaee
39148 F20101220_AAAUHW parajon_a_Page_47.pro
e5c765b79b9a6552cb0dfc2b87b8a34f
23d3d00a5511465d092901800443071c4e0d89d9
19683 F20101220_AAATYB parajon_a_Page_09.QC.jpg
fd9c1a65c0f8b3d2012404abcb0d76e5
23ff538dadc045308382084eec4c1c8d0e489d50
64990 F20101220_AAAUAB parajon_a_Page_19.jpg
7ab535a41e99f898ede9ced1446ef5c8
ca1831a53014197dde0e6252a9b89f57d97de491
22162 F20101220_AAAUMV parajon_a_Page_24.QC.jpg
41cdaa40f68efe042ffbb7950f17aba3
1cfe31de2ea24ca9d62d346d0bd40d517796df87
53184 F20101220_AAAUHX parajon_a_Page_48.pro
4c544e63d82117b3ba3697504d6c87c3
97efe2542c2d7b7eb252d6e4044d008aec9d3949
1674 F20101220_AAATYC parajon_a_Page_47.txt
f1dcecdfaf3cfa8b9601200ed8543687
02c32f94aa3ad26addbd47bcd6150ec8bf98dc19
72762 F20101220_AAAUAC parajon_a_Page_20.jpg
d9e0a6a2c53b4e1e61974f0bd71f874f
b9841a53852a9f8688d9fd54e13df5ae3ef169ba
5322 F20101220_AAAUMW parajon_a_Page_24thm.jpg
4a1c5d066e804a3aabe94e0b70e3a75d
b4daf0edbd1f22f1a99beeaab7267bc4dc55054c
F20101220_AAAUFA parajon_a_Page_33.tif
47c2a6ccbcd016abf7cf1ea4d8251239
9fec4322e9f2700e6de26e051b52e68d38b066c6
31433 F20101220_AAAUHY parajon_a_Page_49.pro
f664c18dbf858548007b3a6d580379c2
b6ede06e2be19aa3e644924c6f12c4315640be22
F20101220_AAATYD parajon_a_Page_01.tif
6602e4e28202d3ea64c7f904abad9057
692e2c27991166e0b90c4c63d238cd50314c0e31
81291 F20101220_AAAUAD parajon_a_Page_21.jpg
0ea937e4664502f3fc87322e6cc3b1db
2aa21a9b52b4137ac8256ac655e293625c6054f5
21612 F20101220_AAAUMX parajon_a_Page_25.QC.jpg
87daa5a73e11a295d77f21b5989f1bfb
f244ea178b777704e232cdea40756e0c2a201b50
F20101220_AAAUFB parajon_a_Page_34.tif
a52100402716b2f39e138f28a4ac2618
4c7b5bd2e74da6455291da76dc75e8add555a11c
38930 F20101220_AAAUHZ parajon_a_Page_50.pro
43dd1c8caa28b2cce16c9ceda5f9a872
0318464651e73ef1b78998dac88d00f2eaea45f7
63245 F20101220_AAATYE parajon_a_Page_37.jpg
8b9c413eb0845cc33f9786fabb517e84
3e247412391f5bbd1682a12de3043a0db14a8470
65062 F20101220_AAAUAE parajon_a_Page_22.jpg
a48557ca21b9aa1204edd07ff26c42ea
f33e39cc726710203fe052b3a41ce75c102e3472
24275 F20101220_AAAUMY parajon_a_Page_26.QC.jpg
8362e80ac7db975a268b223af26dcfcd
47bafdd2173bb95fd26ba8861dfee764646ce1a1
F20101220_AAAUFC parajon_a_Page_35.tif
f16d9d464f740c30d87fd343b7b49eaa
91b032b1b9be0060f2c44be6e19bb78530dfa22e
54904 F20101220_AAATYF parajon_a_Page_65.pro
c2595fa83e648d7e7cb7fd061f3fedb2
ca565454c41e8cc1a2d510a483f2591599e0cd46
69691 F20101220_AAAUAF parajon_a_Page_24.jpg
52a56b91e385fc433fa86682d42a1ebf
9c6d486eee3f4f49b86ad8cd35416a65d7c9b9c0
13170 F20101220_AAAUMZ parajon_a_Page_27.QC.jpg
8382ad9b68b6d512c818fc75a65785dd
8c44dcae0284d0a66cec5274ef9322d0f688ce2d
1870 F20101220_AAAUKA parajon_a_Page_42.txt
f519bbfec0b1197d9cda1fa6b835be02
a5b235874a61334f2f0dc37fff0c524b9337fdeb
F20101220_AAAUFD parajon_a_Page_36.tif
1df4dc6049b5319b5337ef6e0e619447
557ff21a45c2afa373545acce726f2112f7a9a51
F20101220_AAATYG parajon_a_Page_31.tif
c29933cc1cac00ee1f98a6477ddd12ef
fe1df58f252cd46e36a4f09c36f211788d769d1e
71043 F20101220_AAAUAG parajon_a_Page_25.jpg
1168b5b1dbafb15191e789932de0cfc9
7072c9173dbe1e26e32155d034f0f6b940ab4eec
1351 F20101220_AAAUKB parajon_a_Page_43.txt
71688ed6150a8b3df4bf97f3b1659b99
bbfae8460e634a5fb488e7636b6d2292bce64476
F20101220_AAAUFE parajon_a_Page_37.tif
b6392371ec0049846068496144dd32e8
4d498921e79d3a45a53da65c10a85ac65ce1f2ee
F20101220_AAATYH parajon_a_Page_48.tif
36ab9fe53e03e71b3018312c4008a542
25f9ca9c11e1a58027664b17a80ef187a7a78942
79938 F20101220_AAAUAH parajon_a_Page_26.jpg
c6cc7c1d329e3883cffbec0ed8a5322d
8e672ffbca0e18924baa11b862d27ae91e10a029
1399 F20101220_AAAUKC parajon_a_Page_44.txt
22ca7a28d05add430a4fc4fc26ae4cbc
41489ad67c18d5d7939f0955e65bd56a7bed879f
F20101220_AAAUFF parajon_a_Page_39.tif
2bb8e5e49025b39acd5fed29e7affd87
0eb1dbc914858ec2f70c5db09e6a9a25b57807ba
42144 F20101220_AAAUAI parajon_a_Page_27.jpg
15dcd6be46ffc19adbba28243e0d1ac9
e282f9da2c4226634cbe133902d07f818c131869
5071 F20101220_AAAUPA parajon_a_Page_57thm.jpg
b16ecea17c411cc23c0f8b70184ccf77
80ac1b6bd3aad881120d34663f4947636361884e
1210 F20101220_AAAUKD parajon_a_Page_45.txt
7d1a2d19769e6cc7aa9033b3edb05532
8f8c3b924e9c588690920aca9c55044dfda9c6c0
F20101220_AAAUFG parajon_a_Page_40.tif
1c05c15aec80b415b66d2532e087cd5b
822ffa161a8e8d2b6430e0854bdb04c4a1e33569
F20101220_AAATYI parajon_a_Page_38.tif
01da1e493d2dff4ff0145548ad04ce5d
46b860955ac58d78294686f993b8af0fee900063
62861 F20101220_AAAUAJ parajon_a_Page_28.jpg
933a3716c252bba13039de0205522def
56ccde4e34c764e3d59401fe90392767c3f97f5e
22373 F20101220_AAAUPB parajon_a_Page_58.QC.jpg
996d5cc74ff446c40648219cc924ac9a
6564d95787c816b013b3caf682ded0b9e9d5d9e4
1404 F20101220_AAAUKE parajon_a_Page_46.txt
a8d462461f303e427c5357f61946cce8
b8cd6f6f141fb954bde08e655fcb145cfe458573
F20101220_AAAUFH parajon_a_Page_43.tif
75bb492fa2b076436af311f723e32d90
18a47338975d9f3dee33a649e892e3adb962aa9f
70034 F20101220_AAATYJ parajon_a_Page_14.jpg
f83f3eb192aa4784daa558f7ffe028ae
e191ee02e888eaf1aa4e817f06d733a44b912e8f
77062 F20101220_AAAUAK parajon_a_Page_29.jpg
40fe7cd500050f9596e22e6fcb8e3182
e5bcf2e82cdb06978bc6b71bfc2b063585bbbda2
5859 F20101220_AAAUPC parajon_a_Page_58thm.jpg
622caa2e80fb267b37243e8222193cca
2a8df30d654f08ae44fed9f4bd0e0c6588ccd16e
2088 F20101220_AAAUKF parajon_a_Page_48.txt
a26d4d3ddbfea5d34f71a29f0865c815
a45d055f1ec38954eba2e46c279d944bb0b92301
F20101220_AAAUFI parajon_a_Page_44.tif
d08f390f2b29d87c97ea05431d988761
9bcb660585f784d064371746cb7716ed660260ed
38396 F20101220_AAATYK parajon_a_Page_16.pro
6809a97b604f5623a69ce91b73f5ed95
5c9b9dee327c18656703cbcf9155df553abe6b2d
78389 F20101220_AAAUAL parajon_a_Page_30.jpg
f868b9c3f091644a9d6f9582b357f677
c6197e19cf5bce4d8be27e52f15c09d2ff886218
22904 F20101220_AAAUPD parajon_a_Page_59.QC.jpg
18c9b93014cfabb4056f3afe92c25e79
aa06101ae89b530d7ade5865e03c498723d5e42f
F20101220_AAAUFJ parajon_a_Page_45.tif
796e8676287225d390f0c82b315f3c6d
6793c4b7547e44acf3605f64b26a2193e2d648d8
25006 F20101220_AAATYL parajon_a_Page_62.QC.jpg
1135053ed032efc4cef6d149e10cd867
60a6b474a5d6685742ea2897b556a9f63b0a9344
85111 F20101220_AAAUAM parajon_a_Page_31.jpg
54532fb4712ece06e89c1d4189cb3578
c13cd4b7c4491f92c243f56b533fe4d118157548
1391 F20101220_AAAUKG parajon_a_Page_49.txt
bd2f28434c1953685102b1dca22b47f9
63343df44e6f5821cc63721bbf29faaab70ff197
6106 F20101220_AAAUPE parajon_a_Page_59thm.jpg
1ad04ba71714c00ca50efe7b7cfe2e8e
8bf38e8f53ad327adfe8ebc95d06364b3a43bc16
F20101220_AAAUFK parajon_a_Page_46.tif
aeaae93a67feb2b683d9b168c9a73753
b7953ffa43651d44db423e280af9d667b17f95a2
14263 F20101220_AAATYM parajon_a_Page_40.QC.jpg
2f526b6d611f579aaf1ecbd6122e47b5
91ef9aa2d55c0e5678914b88d5559f01600d2556
68985 F20101220_AAAUAN parajon_a_Page_32.jpg
0077e694f0b9755d2dc8b89d6686a752
14537213eaa1bdc5a717397a8c8e35a37baac244
1996 F20101220_AAAUKH parajon_a_Page_51.txt
49e320805d6fe15fa61c03280ac0a0fc
89a8d183dd5a40ae6cf646527f9e0ad294576130
14027 F20101220_AAAUPF parajon_a_Page_60.QC.jpg
f3947a5eac0e8828ee7835823062f0c3
58e0c8322bde7ea80c92869f7ed309f60646c493
F20101220_AAAUFL parajon_a_Page_47.tif
4ea54cfe092e9623cc5cd83229b827c5
b0c75b6021d9bfb7d168bf2c339175c7d8e4e4f5
F20101220_AAATYN parajon_a_Page_41.tif
8cd22b610d777065c555448ae4e244bb
4e56faa61b17b7adac34bb473c460401d4f1c9e0
61184 F20101220_AAAUAO parajon_a_Page_33.jpg
a6fa65b8856d14f328e9b04ced1f1a57
f3b2b5e38f531edb9cf4619d9337aa979e4cb40c
1526 F20101220_AAAUKI parajon_a_Page_52.txt
cd59940bd9df4391c4cd8129edbb47c5
71d3673d7db8c55db7eaa46d0f56070ac884ffca
3322 F20101220_AAAUPG parajon_a_Page_60thm.jpg
6daf477daa8fca3747236535b5646ac7
8fcd2a6a786237bd6e263bb48f292b9443806af3
F20101220_AAAUFM parajon_a_Page_49.tif
f66b71142c5c23ed8250b52fe8798ffb
6db6583f305aee9a4ed5e48532de9cd3288ef9a5
11323 F20101220_AAATYO parajon_a_Page_68.QC.jpg
63256e7134bb47c914581fe2a315305b
ed6fffdb4d2567e1ab500674a40594da431138b8
1672 F20101220_AAAUKJ parajon_a_Page_53.txt
b8f141c15cce4bf0cc9c8bcea5cb6b90
06ba9771d122b6f8b3eb5373cef0673d2084d4da
22201 F20101220_AAAUPH parajon_a_Page_61.QC.jpg
5670e1b9da932b3d57864dc79f4b4a25
7a2dfea6f853bf869279149d2cdcd13051057508
F20101220_AAAUFN parajon_a_Page_50.tif
c5ed66d3e38fde15bbf5d04e0dcd936f
b842db25369e8986194b07cfac8bf000b11885fb
94011 F20101220_AAATYP parajon_a_Page_25.jp2
5ad3ad14a6d39d6e41937378cf574198
cdf8537bdd4ff8254df1a6dff1c725b9ac4cd878
76146 F20101220_AAAUAP parajon_a_Page_35.jpg
bd1d64d814ff217da0ec0f48416a2f1e
468524110c3a7535378835b8a39a6aca23cec04e
1901 F20101220_AAAUKK parajon_a_Page_54.txt
2a77dd568eaf84d88b306415db55fe21
294b8af42a0aef0594a24a7aedb279987e57e333
5329 F20101220_AAAUPI parajon_a_Page_61thm.jpg
d3e519bceed26361010627e7d4b47533
9bcfdf5a0974a77af62f1ebfacbf13d128dafcd8
F20101220_AAAUFO parajon_a_Page_51.tif
027387fdd0ff1c05c2c146701914a4c7
7c43800b0bca8a59e86c1056ef500fd467792a77
828247 F20101220_AAATYQ parajon_a_Page_52.jp2
4b2628846ff865c3f01beb4161a26350
61b8029db2beb4ffe79b60247fa2fec66f4ab293
69191 F20101220_AAAUAQ parajon_a_Page_36.jpg
dacf974fc30848b5ba1445535eeb31e3
e483071a40190723db5f41541ea8e4047d1db08f
1725 F20101220_AAAUKL parajon_a_Page_55.txt
259ae762b410e4b8a56be8ee881326f4
a11920b4922a1dc3eafcefaaef6acea047b7c75d
6048 F20101220_AAAUPJ parajon_a_Page_62thm.jpg
f59296be18f44e09526a7e75881b2107
5f1cefc977c7c4d1db2c39213eae02f401672dfc
F20101220_AAAUFP parajon_a_Page_52.tif
78f0dc75bcca0c91f1a7ef510933e6a7
282d274407a3f5c952e8ff0c927356472c6e917f
66967 F20101220_AAATYR parajon_a_Page_17.jpg
8841b382d0ca3393b3c6f97e613dc8f7
67b92392036db95c7654cfe189e21439a0e74ba1
65418 F20101220_AAAUAR parajon_a_Page_38.jpg
b8238301db0e0ad9a611428e55ccb2f3
539993e5bc681b96127e1160dba9f29326179d05
2010 F20101220_AAAUKM parajon_a_Page_56.txt
6d9576d6441a42d367043fcaf476dd36
a99adea3e61e40310bccf569d11fc2a8cc91a660
20191 F20101220_AAAUPK parajon_a_Page_63.QC.jpg
a8e91c0ce43f0955e68c1d67e414e73d
a16b342db11ce30744e58bcbdbb4671e363efb3c
F20101220_AAAUFQ parajon_a_Page_53.tif
13cdeafed63e1957991ffbeb4634f77a
c1ea3f27d3d2603b850efe37842186d6dd82cde6
F20101220_AAATYS parajon_a_Page_07.tif
b035d51b2bc05c57df4fa9388f99ae7a
1b3c527e28ca27565198cffebdbd0eb5bcb96d67
72466 F20101220_AAAUAS parajon_a_Page_39.jpg
85868a800bd73ab99663d101713b2df8
c4743e13a8fe5403d3c84982d9960d778ca7f398
1490 F20101220_AAAUKN parajon_a_Page_57.txt
f364834a7c79f192c32a9f5f53be6fce
480b1a0c36f9a58c10188b0431cbd415e42c8e21
4908 F20101220_AAAUPL parajon_a_Page_63thm.jpg
5fb5dc6d4ee4deacdc231da5ebdf51f2
a3e4cfaf0e5b5c00db492cae72c2a9083804e84a
F20101220_AAAUFR parajon_a_Page_54.tif
11a45fe1e319850277d750071a8e37cc
44b2233e7824396dd5b28a053572f1ad8559749d
F20101220_AAATYT parajon_a_Page_17.tif
726b42696593f7bc2a6f9a00c4d75303
9c8afc206a3c4c095c5d8064d500c7228e6a9835
44338 F20101220_AAAUAT parajon_a_Page_40.jpg
827d1edb409a5f7cb676ba536f074a63
763fe4a7bb30475329f0deb66cdc6731bc98dbaa
1816 F20101220_AAAUKO parajon_a_Page_58.txt
6b3331bde2d41c82162505c1e6d00541
c26427993dd0072899c31accd958ab448f354a58
22208 F20101220_AAAUPM parajon_a_Page_64.QC.jpg
2c40eda4464944019b18953547fcc995
ad2352752df82a8afd7d375a862f569e704d967f
F20101220_AAAUFS parajon_a_Page_55.tif
daac28946833e5c9bf1378904a9888d2
3de44188de1acc27bfaa182e14b41ba16846e8be
5472 F20101220_AAATYU parajon_a_Page_64thm.jpg
385e77ff54b5d445ddedc0ee11eeeae3
426290bfff2e96fd6c170620e5daac6586c44c0d
74955 F20101220_AAAUAU parajon_a_Page_42.jpg
24ed85fcd66cdb2b763eac67181f127a
55f622d5b0bd85376402381fe909680c154ff045
1634 F20101220_AAAUKP parajon_a_Page_59.txt
71aacbbcff0ae67af316e415d47aa7d7
1c982561754a40ea66cbc61647fccbab8311b278
26942 F20101220_AAAUPN parajon_a_Page_65.QC.jpg
2849c52620a0d6a292dd91a57b93a734
bf211f3f2f2ccd0e975a0a85afc1851c6a2ccb75
F20101220_AAAUFT parajon_a_Page_56.tif
af73de8233fe7a536eb66fcbdebe5914
ca0209c227df72154483674ae6d564ff22d40766
F20101220_AAATYV parajon_a_Page_19.tif
a7f927faeef7f2863de8d59f58e26208
50743f546c9b8cbe2429ab2c26fd6d54370c5e9d
58966 F20101220_AAAUAV parajon_a_Page_43.jpg
8204e34528e8e2b6fcca0f120de80712
fa603324ad67fa4355729fa4a46b51d5cc8eb421
1026 F20101220_AAAUKQ parajon_a_Page_60.txt
01fd0e49c55dc6ba747b7a41543ff088
542cf3267c127067adcebb997a310990f96e709e
6407 F20101220_AAAUPO parajon_a_Page_65thm.jpg
1b1fe10ae40224bca47c471c36f11a8e
a060de1564c9d045f30236ae2f3a8bbedd142e49
1922 F20101220_AAATYW parajon_a_Page_23.txt
1ddf5f6e1e4feabb17a1b8f7e4a60383
c51a7e042c22e28525838480ea2ffe019263017b
59455 F20101220_AAAUAW parajon_a_Page_44.jpg
037193d842b6b6679670baf28324e3ea
5916f354a7993923ffad272c517ca43831acf8d3
1803 F20101220_AAAUKR parajon_a_Page_61.txt
39f083b252de6baf5237279ea529a4f6
56992100c587a295c16e7dedce834909fc0ee2ba
28246 F20101220_AAAUPP parajon_a_Page_66.QC.jpg
a71b7c457365475433486d32ab583bfd
2d6be0a015a3548c0af146529c22188b801bb86d
F20101220_AAAUFU parajon_a_Page_57.tif
18efe61e64914546a4c2f2333f7e7120
393d589b11377a4eeabb4db8ddc60725019b8bf3
668003 F20101220_AAATYX parajon_a_Page_45.jp2
a337da6c6c425572db2533f01fae1aa4
e2f4324f30a6812d4e04d6436a206337bd32e3fd
54937 F20101220_AAAUAX parajon_a_Page_45.jpg
aed550cf906a8a521bfee921c60e73c4
4deb14b2402597ed0ecc51823f9806b1c618a4ba
1970 F20101220_AAAUKS parajon_a_Page_62.txt
6dc0c3b6f6eeb41a70af58aa149708b1
cca35fdf6a97605827dd28d33f75c8bce4876d2d
6782 F20101220_AAAUPQ parajon_a_Page_66thm.jpg
32725859cd499de95a664d94d31702b2
ab2d0c3162bd01da66d9c66f996b592d290d1c2a
F20101220_AAAUFV parajon_a_Page_58.tif
060238b2194e268fc2a2e2928dc16884
c9e046b2f04e480fda53ca034454743f78e9cf89
F20101220_AAATYY parajon_a_Page_42.tif
2995bb81d9ddb3d210c5cb60c4fb625e
22d2eb5b46418bd69c4c574c4b8abb5d48315874
61636 F20101220_AAAUAY parajon_a_Page_46.jpg
8c515a313184d6aac5799889674cae2d
e4bd43d08853d203c7b3695c691d54ee19abdaca
1602 F20101220_AAAUKT parajon_a_Page_63.txt
6f3a92d2272980c0a81b8cdf5bf94c29
38d4d95e78dad35b224cf8dba0bae16f7b72dba4
11503 F20101220_AAAUPR parajon_a_Page_67.QC.jpg
71ead4e1110fbc638f12613300fb5f8c
cd23110590dfcdaf0a1e77e3ef59d64c4de354c3
F20101220_AAAUFW parajon_a_Page_59.tif
0397ea6449b71e6ff8ee17034b2c36c1
23a6cd4b050cde17b1fe8055f1eb48ff8dbe9873
5785 F20101220_AAATYZ parajon_a_Page_47thm.jpg
9d8c4ac4cf7dea6afdbd7373f536b598
e6eb2ccf84232f255189bdd7f9adb58f9a6f4d13
66494 F20101220_AAAUAZ parajon_a_Page_47.jpg
d4d9501b4ee83c206caf203543c29098
2fc93f0e1f36dad6bb4bb897f97960e2a9133f55
1909 F20101220_AAAUKU parajon_a_Page_64.txt
edc428f136c6bc1149fb8b5d8b06b2ec
c845c6e98c068ab18283bc6656f2f40ff27a0fa6
2669 F20101220_AAAUPS parajon_a_Page_67thm.jpg
6481392e524bcf3ba5889bc9ae3163ac
9448c754da742f2524639353666bd921e3bf2281
F20101220_AAAUFX parajon_a_Page_60.tif
971e582fa41e6679b6c0e8e141ec55c7
0109388228bfbbc28f5ad811da53ebacd54a1a8f
2238 F20101220_AAAUKV parajon_a_Page_65.txt
67c10c624d4983bfe44cf2f7e0c5e121
8d6b95750fdf5615bb657dd0671b923654edaa52
2909 F20101220_AAAUPT parajon_a_Page_68thm.jpg
f96ae84f4db5043a033af64cf92fab28
39f519cc7bb07e43695092b23666ce33cdb0915c
F20101220_AAAUFY parajon_a_Page_61.tif
aa092cb7567ae7436df3b1267745613d
8deec1cadc613cab7e04ed391fc7714b800648dd
2386 F20101220_AAAUKW parajon_a_Page_66.txt
b3b1f0c209fa8d6a9009aa64e5cbd3f1
1842ee0a2d9ae384aad5d74da423adeb3e0397b9
94584 F20101220_AAAUDA parajon_a_Page_39.jp2
79e70a982917cbece0d25de7ec70dc52
82f6ce0f06d346dd5efeb9453626b37ab6490916
F20101220_AAAUFZ parajon_a_Page_62.tif
c06861ded6802c6617c1edc1b3f4aba0
2c57fc4c9b4b1ebe31ae1f2d3ac6860715f04ad4
900 F20101220_AAAUKX parajon_a_Page_67.txt
15d8f2ec5dc485c5ee0306261215ec05
679d71e339e658ede97981d4fa1d59e44fdffe40
59335 F20101220_AAAUDB parajon_a_Page_40.jp2
5de6347dbc33758fe5e3a3d7c006217b
6247cc078ae9b51a197080461f93b8666c7f7fd9
814 F20101220_AAAUKY parajon_a_Page_68.txt
cad6fb6e4de2ea35c93508922846ae74
3bb04c92a427161a7a1ca3d57bb52808395af261
98718 F20101220_AAAUDC parajon_a_Page_41.jp2
69e75f4cc41fd7077fd32779450e2975
78987eee99791d5d6b7b28b807dca521e1e13e95
50619 F20101220_AAAUIA parajon_a_Page_51.pro
49fd58c00aed647eb0cc957bd06bc0dd
b4ff7d294d22e8534e62925755c3bb27538ca23e
98068 F20101220_AAAUDD parajon_a_Page_42.jp2
66b7c351ac530ca7c62946fd79e09ab8
f70bc687d57645c1f6e27ea0c9aebb6ba5a4abe7
35587 F20101220_AAAUIB parajon_a_Page_52.pro
431422ac58ff58a2bdf8e28c9ff1ee05
476e57e5dfcda06d06c3607c04b913debb5dd8ba
230075 F20101220_AAAUKZ parajon_a.pdf
23a2bc498b303a178e779747b57f7eb1
a9f36e332a545570eb8bbf6ab4f36661bf114eb6
715980 F20101220_AAAUDE parajon_a_Page_43.jp2
f417420e04917cb7a2f91a5826efad75
069ce0c168577042629eb5a470512e78abdc1eac
38442 F20101220_AAAUIC parajon_a_Page_53.pro
53155383464ed61409a58f86d4b213ff
cb1587ad813be4badc476f597e85df977ca32b76
728575 F20101220_AAAUDF parajon_a_Page_44.jp2
dd3555325cb82ed97656322264f8f8e2
793a9e2bd0e53993e3afb372f95d9a2ea712b021
3278 F20101220_AAAUNA parajon_a_Page_27thm.jpg
f4ea293b8749938c6cba452d75675254
155f27ef686ea860af3ad915abeb87d5e2b9994c
48019 F20101220_AAAUID parajon_a_Page_54.pro
811dbcbc347a34ca8fc908c749b3cd73
2fc5efda4da476d1a43c0207a15064f8068b34ef
807477 F20101220_AAAUDG parajon_a_Page_47.jp2
ca62c40c69a44ef8d8106429e164d805
341067b4f6dbe0345f8010982ad60a9e64b8d554
19305 F20101220_AAAUNB parajon_a_Page_28.QC.jpg
68a53cce10afdb9f0d36ef845f736ffe
9aa54c33cded809a77a67fa43376dfc4f7998947
38211 F20101220_AAAUIE parajon_a_Page_55.pro
1ec0e56dcbf807b6c6e04a97dceb8f3a
80fbdf4b8c6fc7165a3ce0ab37ea54b6d334c231
111815 F20101220_AAAUDH parajon_a_Page_48.jp2
d743d5e6bc94f2f0d563073730252500
3cdcca81b32a3076333118f63c983760e915ba74
4824 F20101220_AAAUNC parajon_a_Page_28thm.jpg
bad17ea876cdec99946c03b110024b52
fa7c9c7d2e6057abfa32dcef54b9c0a32847b959
50872 F20101220_AAAUIF parajon_a_Page_56.pro
0912725ec80abf1ade8a917e57123562
6a18609802a9b34502f068a7f883ad2126ac9a8d
733386 F20101220_AAAUDI parajon_a_Page_49.jp2
857f44dff0b44976affe21f1f1ab6331
1508e12bf090ef8c6d3010e0ae259fe624e06e07
24068 F20101220_AAAUND parajon_a_Page_29.QC.jpg
3c1dab91f714f95338fc75092f2804e3
4c469c0c420b870bcd0242b424944039a0ab694f
31557 F20101220_AAAUIG parajon_a_Page_57.pro
1b5da8bfbf322a918402cd58fb19df5b
ee123ce49fdf2643897a971841b1d071a228b49d
921572 F20101220_AAAUDJ parajon_a_Page_50.jp2
e43a79245bf2536a66f262dc5ebecd67
92663f5d5d5c2f4773a44eb54a574fdc0c5acbed
5946 F20101220_AAAUNE parajon_a_Page_29thm.jpg
29f5a30301127b8517970a118af643e1
a789c0ad8c40d1d6a170a1d670dae3ad9fe979c6
42221 F20101220_AAAUIH parajon_a_Page_58.pro
27eefc571d41e0c411262eee0126d959
e58c879bb1ba4100e2b1a055dca886e3f67779b9
106501 F20101220_AAAUDK parajon_a_Page_51.jp2
2b239beb1af663f361b81e1823a4f890
b3f35ad8264f039a6c3af649570ca1dfc633b8dd
23986 F20101220_AAAUNF parajon_a_Page_31.QC.jpg
b69a442bf4ad50b94c9587826d820bf5
eeadc0d34c6ea38446f6d9b906aacd9e56c70aa0
37848 F20101220_AAAUII parajon_a_Page_59.pro
4d3daefef9d691e29c238bbd4ea19fe1
6dc67595da903f7a4c38e664fe24bf04659f4e87
871828 F20101220_AAAUDL parajon_a_Page_53.jp2
5d8d73cf75d829adc15f97879ef767b0
5e8141679169f5ddd2b684ac4f0549abc6652063
F20101220_AAAUNG parajon_a_Page_31thm.jpg
563ab10db2a4b045512a9d5b8019a701
7e985a13d88d1e2697a3c95e48cd1002bef946ec
25735 F20101220_AAAUIJ parajon_a_Page_60.pro
de9154f8574ce63a252106fca45487d7
cd00d1c5e4ec6450a076c6f4a420a302bede6e33
100469 F20101220_AAAUDM parajon_a_Page_54.jp2
e9e879881756e3d406edd7e946d65ae9
98ebd61ae9161265e1a41e2c8ca8e92057ff67de
21551 F20101220_AAAUNH parajon_a_Page_32.QC.jpg
38764e3bbece38bdc2e0c3cdb2bd890a
34a3a59c25b1579b45c9c78aa422914746ae3104
43702 F20101220_AAAUIK parajon_a_Page_61.pro
1f0b17cc84ca63e84ad562e1de035be6
bcd9e66232ae4887f6a984693f36e4c7658994e0
832786 F20101220_AAAUDN parajon_a_Page_55.jp2
0b1224aee7be9c0bb3eecdafaca178a5
af47400a59d9d07d63147f51b727b04ebaadb260
18767 F20101220_AAAUNI parajon_a_Page_33.QC.jpg
bd1fefd7611f81a02fd299917f768cce
e33dc5dbff2b445e6f0af80ee51e4d8b0ac4ea18
49948 F20101220_AAAUIL parajon_a_Page_62.pro
185ee8c104d75dd8fad149571f2ef19b
2fefddd8ac0dffa8b6e687590b1a639acffa33d8
106297 F20101220_AAAUDO parajon_a_Page_56.jp2
c846d0b259c62a0b458b664738388d7a
a7938622ddbb7ff6ea21916d024b3cd7784bf06e
4828 F20101220_AAAUNJ parajon_a_Page_33thm.jpg
3c6ba092dfcbdf7921dcb0db404e5218
f7f926104db15487dbb6e79b1f71a09086e07007
40206 F20101220_AAAUIM parajon_a_Page_63.pro
a902018bd60596d7b5fc367120c7c8e1
e641df212499beca6d22f5e46b1a9a6316be68f1
712868 F20101220_AAAUDP parajon_a_Page_57.jp2
6502a113a65310179f917e86f70f2d8f
2596448282caf085638ea12fa99c9327a8319726
23842 F20101220_AAAUNK parajon_a_Page_34.QC.jpg
5c5152240e171a359a454a54a304e2e3
bb972c75e7b167a0b3f123912c78f6481f0edf75
46647 F20101220_AAAUIN parajon_a_Page_64.pro
d99ffe00a01d9034125d8bbc7837af4a
c9003ce5bb6e5c4211931961dc4d83e8c83080a1
886772 F20101220_AAAUDQ parajon_a_Page_58.jp2
a6b8cc3574178444f08cae1fddc5dea2
330d05e5fd6d8759c57d8a00601f04ea6f1eaa98
5799 F20101220_AAAUNL parajon_a_Page_34thm.jpg
a400ef6529558d16024498397774b410
4540ea4442e042e71987fadb970124749650254f
58910 F20101220_AAAUIO parajon_a_Page_66.pro
6e0fa1c096dbd248abf04eeb5b1c00a4
0600c8bf5ba49f4b9ac3e64c5618764b9a5e639a
886493 F20101220_AAAUDR parajon_a_Page_59.jp2
fd1de6861c7c0e27841550cc21489d00
6fdff6042355bd9656788af4e0744e6aeed6edb6
6089 F20101220_AAAUNM parajon_a_Page_35thm.jpg
3036d5ff25ef2b84b31e5da0115d94da
4f96bef44079f459ca02f6c79121a8902f06a685
22006 F20101220_AAAUIP parajon_a_Page_67.pro
fe39c92f2add08825370932701477da0
c4da00015481e5cf62dbf220e07d7954dc7872cb
5468 F20101220_AAAUNN parajon_a_Page_36thm.jpg
cbcb4b24648364d88bc25cf89a920654
211bd4b56c1dd4fc317334cc4995e7c1d726e8fe
19298 F20101220_AAAUIQ parajon_a_Page_68.pro
ad7f28efcfc20bfec6cbb4d4870fb999
8aeb768121ffccd66bcdcdbb5790913dc9e8cbab
56673 F20101220_AAAUDS parajon_a_Page_60.jp2
23afaf2b40c66b3efe4875fe3512338a
7d06b489ae6b3d83e0b456da393c405c86431276
18957 F20101220_AAAUNO parajon_a_Page_37.QC.jpg
54c6a2869a1891fd10eab7085671e09a
782a6148eac27609746ae9e248b2b77dde62c225
466 F20101220_AAAUIR parajon_a_Page_01.txt
4dc334ea46cc98202f84cd32bb3723ef
8e531cc9dcfad76259ee1bf38ec633129646975f
92751 F20101220_AAAUDT parajon_a_Page_61.jp2
3b96e79ae67b07ba344be09ceb562848
343cc08ee59cb0e88a8c4565c3302bbd7b83a34a
4873 F20101220_AAAUNP parajon_a_Page_37thm.jpg
bd70e0472ba13850fae756f21cbd48a7
4077ee12259004fadb0ad99e12a9c7af4a7d8a16
110 F20101220_AAAUIS parajon_a_Page_02.txt
13ab255411de0de6bbca7c016d5b1239
eaaa32b8aa35595509f65fdbf2d8a3463789c3c2
104990 F20101220_AAAUDU parajon_a_Page_62.jp2
27af8f274bb92df2c0387a9caaa8b94c
84677d97533867a09032d5bdd866954d25b9b4cb
19813 F20101220_AAAUNQ parajon_a_Page_38.QC.jpg
b10ee6fdd7d96d4bea542744339bb285
24483a46e3ab9842fd0d70e72c7514344800484f
106 F20101220_AAAUIT parajon_a_Page_03.txt
2992f66f1053fb720b4c17b4f60ac0ad
d4d4b124f2a3d78b42e589ebc45a795b65e764e0
86540 F20101220_AAAUDV parajon_a_Page_63.jp2
181e69b97d082adce6cf01834e126b22
e4e50242887a394931c86774b2e3ea4c1f1a0772
4887 F20101220_AAAUNR parajon_a_Page_38thm.jpg
e4ca3b264948d59125756365f1ead6be
dbb3421fe193ff3cdc6918cdc967799963b86cb7
1107 F20101220_AAAUIU parajon_a_Page_04.txt
e56929f0b5166dd955c7ea250e7a56c7
c041a5c436b42d0c50b10732e708e75c6c71ed70
102562 F20101220_AAAUDW parajon_a_Page_64.jp2
646e2eeb7b8251454f50e2c849ed1526
cea334a8846920f9451f49c0f7b34fc5d618e9cf
23035 F20101220_AAAUNS parajon_a_Page_39.QC.jpg
5726c7f45d09e73d7ba768cdf821aabc
826c2a985f593714bf3e486c3891d87a72d9aac7
2902 F20101220_AAAUIV parajon_a_Page_05.txt
027a507f28ddc9ffb63fde050b5250d3
1598270f857f738a8853fe0b498b7b3ca7e3bf95
1051953 F20101220_AAAUDX parajon_a_Page_65.jp2
7b79748aa4badceedb1eb88ba082e903
aab2d5be738af4665c33d46a6ffc2a97619702c7
5848 F20101220_AAAUNT parajon_a_Page_39thm.jpg
e0c1f203fbef5b3b153152dd7a0e961c
47001c6b1432442659178016694fbc91a332d7bb
2846 F20101220_AAAUIW parajon_a_Page_06.txt
33485192ef163d9335ec632dca0fdac0
6044e961a60724c5170bf663151e14cdadaba62d
24335 F20101220_AAATZA parajon_a_Page_54.QC.jpg
d8aae04887f3d9c28d46ad876d041430
5fd469334541d69579aaab11f03826d356c53cc7
86632 F20101220_AAAUBA parajon_a_Page_48.jpg
f4c11e67f7c6dff44feb934060515a25
6a7cc28b61434b51ad034eb53c068dd0c240449e
1051963 F20101220_AAAUDY parajon_a_Page_66.jp2
9e130f1e05190836bed996e925ed6d1d
edc3414ce6953ab785b1ca31db8fdc0ef009ade9
3507 F20101220_AAAUNU parajon_a_Page_40thm.jpg
474a8e421bc3ead3d6650fe9f9f14337
6cd9672b075e7c4dbd44afe8408cf494b3ab5f41
38566 F20101220_AAATZB parajon_a_Page_12.pro
4de90fde846a7bb874eaab909c6f2af1
f029188a6988ff4b234390333c83d5a03f6edef1
59401 F20101220_AAAUBB parajon_a_Page_49.jpg
696062aeacea8a04cbe5a88c2e6e2d8b
bf505762d5a7538c253192c0983f45aa69c3f4aa
50431 F20101220_AAAUDZ parajon_a_Page_67.jp2
89aa27cf95d34874353421ce045dc675
4abe9349c1b6f3e69ca749ed1277a43ac11bf249
23498 F20101220_AAAUNV parajon_a_Page_41.QC.jpg
664e8242d9b17ee77b95526f4064db85
c6bdd0272432d8540ba562e16aa30729743b3058
893 F20101220_AAAUIX parajon_a_Page_07.txt
6718359083d60c351474259be31659ec
5846192b16647a82eff9a4d354af53184c31d224
1718 F20101220_AAATZC parajon_a_Page_25.txt
837257f76b6b6c67956706cba422dc51
caf5724d5b089bb04b90e026ecc6900435217b15
73702 F20101220_AAAUBC parajon_a_Page_50.jpg
89b0c634cf0aee1bbafe25553656d804
707f53e2591176509ae134166d5da8a755c61cec
5675 F20101220_AAAUNW parajon_a_Page_41thm.jpg
7e0397bc8ae44ce6efe1e768f226a817
829836ea0bf7a53b638d05bf963b5fb5619aac92
1264 F20101220_AAAUIY parajon_a_Page_08.txt
de4c1a0177638b89686965a2eadbb2dd
95b748fc215c9d6fa8c253fdbe61a2c5d66a1abc
5477 F20101220_AAATZD parajon_a_Page_25thm.jpg
80d8e940491c6141d27ebf150adc0ea6
8ec3272ca7f2809b7162317e1d44b76bc0ce136e
82466 F20101220_AAAUBD parajon_a_Page_51.jpg
534a5a617f922f6eb01c54dbb637d378
322c357a25d19f5472eb61ecefc13b6e678b65d0
F20101220_AAAUGA parajon_a_Page_63.tif
26c650bd9db99e50fdd0f351db68460d
6878c61987ce2dd4b8a1b61c8437f53dd394a961
24113 F20101220_AAAUNX parajon_a_Page_42.QC.jpg
1e902933bee66bcdb3ec4cdbab13ba6d
0baeb3a66cee1c51549d4fb46dc262534bb77e8d
1745 F20101220_AAAUIZ parajon_a_Page_09.txt
38a404924308cf701274cbcba3904ceb
8cf349c0a76f99e85058ad1d60d7d4ef9c405278
F20101220_AAATZE parajon_a_Page_15.txt
dcdcd5206cb068e668b8cdbfe7078d85
f74d155d0f541d86d6c555c3116e30390d621504
68396 F20101220_AAAUBE parajon_a_Page_52.jpg
a548cc3107418ea409f9a19f2c00f2a0
81ac97bbcfec5e259037a19da5bcdd7bae513dc0
F20101220_AAAUGB parajon_a_Page_64.tif
97072c4e1cdf9d0a7d67534a7dc76061
e6ec9ed34baf460147986e4b302000c8b49abf9d
5687 F20101220_AAAUNY parajon_a_Page_42thm.jpg
3c071e5457403939817a422bfe06f363
c5ff1fb0e74209f30942666cc7f541fad62e1fd2
1794 F20101220_AAATZF parajon_a_Page_29.txt
033d6be41d5206b8f9a84ab0ea6361a3
7fd116ee045a256aca4efd4e24d02b6fedd2ed9d
71270 F20101220_AAAUBF parajon_a_Page_53.jpg
cda8f060d8a3aa7ba87bfcdb89c35a87
5c4c9194ecfd8e5a24f5d686d00c8342c1f39f55
F20101220_AAAUGC parajon_a_Page_65.tif
4afec4aae3b8cd4f75a7123d0ed7a8f1
34ac8125f0e22b3fad68149e6e99f7501c8a71ca
19403 F20101220_AAAUNZ parajon_a_Page_43.QC.jpg
f9b381c5e70955b2cb4d32fcdf20447d
81785b250983490b30e918ba546135b03f6fb8e0
12581 F20101220_AAATZG parajon_a_Page_10.pro
5d8ec88f26eac2df4ab0499ed03e0cf0
343f97a6cbf41778f372092d016309a846707141
79681 F20101220_AAAUBG parajon_a_Page_54.jpg
39dfdab011de5eb90709c827b8a2b29f
883fdb8ade0908cf08e7bbb490e6165e760a845c
1810 F20101220_AAAULA parajon_a_Page_01thm.jpg
a67634392f37250124662cac85dbd1c2
24cb26b99428beb853dd961c5cab3916b18b94cf
F20101220_AAAUGD parajon_a_Page_66.tif
e0b4b73e4dc9cfa449547bb46a34ea22
0ce4fbbf89dec7943d76dc21282ff4e462d4483f
69842 F20101220_AAATZH parajon_a_Page_55.jpg
a4aee71abeb345e20a482b3f593b2b73
d3d7f9a188b19dec7f2c98970967e6d1d60f20fb
81229 F20101220_AAAUBH parajon_a_Page_56.jpg
50cc0a8df098f5ca1f70e20858c5ba78
dcb24b0af00ac661ad3f4313e5fe33ee620bfb94
2861 F20101220_AAAULB parajon_a_Page_07thm.jpg
7ef4ee75b010294bd37225fab3273f71
f54468b88262f6282080fc3e9c79f02702297581
F20101220_AAAUGE parajon_a_Page_67.tif
5b1b4c9d4219203f1cbfa8e223a7bd9a
e3193dde4df08e16040e0e4b1a92d8e1473df907
26701 F20101220_AAATZI parajon_a_Page_04.pro
b87debe0725f7d7f0bbff689c0bfe671
eb84ef5bee7582718f4be5f89eb0d9b9259c50af
59921 F20101220_AAAUBI parajon_a_Page_57.jpg
d3d80fe19436eccf4a05f01e83297565
9b0a1d40c33ec7ac84ff2de9f4e6963611fb0862
22027 F20101220_AAAULC parajon_a_Page_36.QC.jpg
564f71dda1017bd61a4900a7b4e69a54
4773986c336c27ac13aa67232455d0d981e79d3b
F20101220_AAAUGF parajon_a_Page_68.tif
2b9b7f02683c1bff2a8186a5c9d6d71a
acf6cad18bd67b3d06036006ae624a0395f1e614
71367 F20101220_AAAUBJ parajon_a_Page_58.jpg
305308cdea98c47c0be48c05b914f806
7bed48f16d8036b4c50e92dc0476f0871ed8c81a
1202 F20101220_AAAULD parajon_a_Page_03.QC.jpg
645ac20257d85079176441bdc740e186
f4d1301f623c82db8cc3bcf5fcca125ede41da42
8397 F20101220_AAAUGG parajon_a_Page_01.pro
3c732ff5632453cc5ab1076b13fbbc4e
033cb2d7cf799f9e94188165c4b0a09d41d805f1
118807 F20101220_AAATZJ parajon_a_Page_31.jp2
326d9d77581aa65bae25a9183da00ba8
c5b431729104e682784d53fa0ac5c07fcae336c4
72848 F20101220_AAAUBK parajon_a_Page_59.jpg
b9add4d94ea62d2fad28ef210d3a1fdc
fd6d4f9d944e9083b6a3f4b993dc005bcfeeda70
23833 F20101220_AAAULE parajon_a_Page_35.QC.jpg
f09f0f3838bedc493f30f2f76233ad00
27ab9f2f08acbc4fa0330ae33d995afd425d1796
1096 F20101220_AAAUGH parajon_a_Page_02.pro
d5a606ff14f7c08b71eda6d3943a0967
8e8b1e9b76687f7f3175b2438ac4beef7ac5b3f0
44347 F20101220_AAAUBL parajon_a_Page_60.jpg
5cc2ef5104462fa515f15fcb0b6c0a33
0d1995b143bb3edc5f8417ff10994bfeb37e89f9
104265 F20101220_AAAULF UFE0015408_00001.xml FULL
5cd21db7b988b08fa022c0f27314471f
598213787fb3b02e55e52c440470520f55ff5e60
1352 F20101220_AAAUGI parajon_a_Page_03.pro
ed535a3065fd8faaca91aef0a962f354
d87b917fecc47be2d34a7f1bea12a966c5cecc52
80827 F20101220_AAATZK UFE0015408_00001.mets
e5df2942a43a537bdc290539f58549da
2565d0948bc8ee88e86a5f0391fa2775f4a5a010
71742 F20101220_AAAUBM parajon_a_Page_61.jpg
78ce779118eee2c1eb480405692fd7f8
be4609bb863d33198bbc014f98072df656cd32f5
6994 F20101220_AAAULG parajon_a_Page_01.QC.jpg
64996c1225f9ebfe1036eb1fd2fc5fe4
cec586a9e102a28f06c9852f8a51a34fc2396419
67882 F20101220_AAAUGJ parajon_a_Page_05.pro
4a7b02f2c26006f3d2017c4221a00d74
c05e2736ace04aed97aae57710d5fc2aabd047c3
81793 F20101220_AAAUBN parajon_a_Page_62.jpg
bf0f940047f2c15dad6d0fc538af5b7e
5a69b4bc2d480f6f6db595a6f5a9e2cd26f27a49
1313 F20101220_AAAULH parajon_a_Page_02.QC.jpg
fbb0acae93ed2918f3a9eb3e834a1006
25266d17aa2b8a97880e89ac39df06e11af45345
65463 F20101220_AAAUGK parajon_a_Page_06.pro
9dce97a57f4690433b7d65edbc286442
70cdedfd18b25baf31950c48652a86273f19e381
65785 F20101220_AAAUBO parajon_a_Page_63.jpg
f09cf9bbb8941a3805c4c577418983ad
d61e1f4f0dadcc100b702f70530c9c3368dd9074
F20101220_AAAULI parajon_a_Page_02thm.jpg
c6fb36489f7bf4fe024ba2e43bc42914
d98fa90ee6ed774f66564d1215c9ff711d6240ce
22102 F20101220_AAAUGL parajon_a_Page_07.pro
01899e495f5af93fe51fe760b7206cad
7b8fcc6ea0866554132497c6511865b6d0e8178a
23049 F20101220_AAATZN parajon_a_Page_01.jpg
cd2eb6ad92b9e790200495cd081139c4
1772aae6f231dd519ea69510cf5b8a3b36e7e835
76850 F20101220_AAAUBP parajon_a_Page_64.jpg
ad5eed4b99361796a51dd6e45ac6f35d
5f986d46598ba7b15243f9bb759cf9a90f8e0dff
503 F20101220_AAAULJ parajon_a_Page_03thm.jpg
9730d07a6ee0a29ff678c677538e87e0
55ca5e26a6ff71c3d81e30cc26e0f08421f04c33
29101 F20101220_AAAUGM parajon_a_Page_08.pro
6a621af935dd6045778de06813920199
9d970afca1e744ea760ca2ffa909f2c983ad02d3
4069 F20101220_AAATZO parajon_a_Page_02.jpg
3ef279c6acb7d7ad670e24477be48016
828cbb3c0a237b9f4676e863ac6d060cc38ee888
14767 F20101220_AAAULK parajon_a_Page_04.QC.jpg
2dd3395323b3c48fe96f0e8c67b936eb
b4d0b166f04ee525faefaafdc2b0c4b2b6aa9b48
39553 F20101220_AAAUGN parajon_a_Page_09.pro
aef113050805884023b3bceb6a1fa835
1a733da7e4f0ab80abe0b49bb0254c6ee58cba0c
4509 F20101220_AAATZP parajon_a_Page_03.jpg
381e34ce72778092c95337459bd80399
4414dbf9de1cc4887a2c1fb87e7f13082b93c307
99577 F20101220_AAAUBQ parajon_a_Page_65.jpg
488b4a831dffe76a244a96db14142e6e
53b4c083f98a416ad6df235dac93a22221353717
3736 F20101220_AAAULL parajon_a_Page_04thm.jpg
17d22af052a1db3d8960e46bed4f29de
1d1bc8ab573e7778be8c29d9187de03e39a80650
40687 F20101220_AAAUGO parajon_a_Page_11.pro
e25ab28ba1105f4da9787fa16353a4ca
b73e08c2d60b9dcd78a9e8585e03bb0150a4e75d
47656 F20101220_AAATZQ parajon_a_Page_04.jpg
2750953512dbb89c3a38faee76abe102
7936e5c4d721bebae5608100c7d074a4817ae57a


xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20110410_AAAAAM INGEST_TIME 2011-04-10T06:44:31Z PACKAGE UFE0015408_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 4887 DFID F20110410_AAAJYZ ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH parajon_a_Page_38thm.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
e4ca3b264948d59125756365f1ead6be
SHA-1
dbb3421fe193ff3cdc6918cdc967799963b86cb7
20688 F20110410_AAAJWB parajon_a_Page_16.QC.jpg
06502f57f089ecd5c1f089bef2d45c31
6c6f00dad58507122e0eb15c9de78013f64a1bb9
49915 F20110410_AAAJRE parajon_a_Page_21.pro
f5fdab21f70fe0e58b0589af609cb294
d4d8799078fc90ba271c0d6a76c7756f111eeb0f
86781 F20110410_AAAJMH parajon_a_Page_09.jp2
3e9dc9428e0ca99e1d6593bf25825cd3
99f444a4234c2cc51bb1f45ecd9c5930b76f227c
20830 F20110410_AAAJWC parajon_a_Page_17.QC.jpg
294db853c5da419d12cb373fd286bc47
8e045ca51a4ca6b45ec53f7ce3d2c9900597e0a4
38317 F20110410_AAAJRF parajon_a_Page_22.pro
59f91a0de34cc681e6604af6040575cd
1e51fcd8c99f9b741f5d09781891e8550760e75f
30127 F20110410_AAAJMI parajon_a_Page_10.jp2
a7a6af2f52b29eccbda971e72f9cea42
167f96b298e047d3482ebb3380a2bd4f34aad8ec
21605 F20110410_AAAJWD parajon_a_Page_18.QC.jpg
5812d003fc4511db46da73fb1b0330c6
dbef3e1d4719f122a77d3cc793c142e5c34d22e3
48608 F20110410_AAAJRG parajon_a_Page_23.pro
fa921fe086ae50d53df2b094ff8ca421
fe22a854ab6c8b6083503349b9261278c967de27
917940 F20110410_AAAJMJ parajon_a_Page_11.jp2
19073202799d0e2550ca1cd72d1ab923
154b32babaf180c803e57b2f43aa24df866045b9
20286 F20110410_AAAJWE parajon_a_Page_19.QC.jpg
b302c9cd04aeb474c05e4c96baebf8bc
c213f2f030fc27d7ff45916322e996cef8070dce
42339 F20110410_AAAJRH parajon_a_Page_24.pro
081d22b96c2126c9a8c605ba16db732e
a38382c8b92d1a73aa9c2e4c79f296258a967611
85442 F20110410_AAAJMK parajon_a_Page_12.jp2
93494ec7e5fbb7e738e506794e27bea1
43118edbf9494a114d1d569b4d1d18a9fc4f4ee1
22654 F20110410_AAAJWF parajon_a_Page_20.QC.jpg
a60a9d91ef32acf289b35879e3a31c07
e5ca6e5a4cec7e58f728091dfe8f15e40ddcffca
41970 F20110410_AAAJRI parajon_a_Page_25.pro
a584ed9b14781b6198184df3a531c51e
c5d9a886e9145134df04fb0ecfc32b7188e12a22
25125 F20110410_AAAJWG parajon_a_Page_21.QC.jpg
5d11d29d67b14759be009e3e61a3dff5
de71479ddadc594b21d617c10f8d07c6c37704c2
49097 F20110410_AAAJRJ parajon_a_Page_26.pro
b6e388aea3a64267cd427925dd3beb29
ba7ef123169c8619daf817caf8064fab3d20cc90
87713 F20110410_AAAJML parajon_a_Page_13.jp2
d95e8bb6bb61f63f91d8f3ca19cc88e9
c5fde0bcba1d565c9a797ca99579cf50aff103a7
19814 F20110410_AAAJWH parajon_a_Page_22.QC.jpg
981aceac63ea6c1ece83721f337de9a5
8f6fd6c407ec86edee2e9377f149ac8cc7e3017c
1053954 F20110410_AAAJHP parajon_a_Page_20.tif
f50c8ef871290ebdc3846b882f1b55cd
930bb3613c5154364965c29315c2144b670224c1
24071 F20110410_AAAJRK parajon_a_Page_27.pro
1c48b951563ce2ca1207aea1a5c513c6
70452e9d420fc8d0b88e406f1c97c921c0eea715
92386 F20110410_AAAJMM parajon_a_Page_14.jp2
a616b1cbf00a8350a4e23e0e2926dea3
0b6f9a5c234e2470e546bfeadd125d908ff9f73d
24383 F20110410_AAAJWI parajon_a_Page_23.QC.jpg
715b3e39386706738149a524ac4bef58
150c981ebffe30c2704145006823dff52d565224
F20110410_AAAJHQ parajon_a_Page_09.tif
af1816f64653bcb959b3aa9f1b8487be
7d79fd819f097a4ce08d432055ef072651a32c61
38231 F20110410_AAAJRL parajon_a_Page_28.pro
1660d4495adb132dea8c06555619bf87
a05a3347268b8c8a4b9c172efac898d438d68367
89007 F20110410_AAAJMN parajon_a_Page_15.jp2
7e7dba64ed4158da5a39177d4bd0c45e
c5b6a62d8d548da01224c75200d0989495f7bdbe
22162 F20110410_AAAJWJ parajon_a_Page_24.QC.jpg
41cdaa40f68efe042ffbb7950f17aba3
1cfe31de2ea24ca9d62d346d0bd40d517796df87
3423 F20110410_AAAJHR parajon_a_Page_31.txt
9da85902cb2822e9ffac044ac2a023f6
fcf4ca9004890cbb65498bb7134166a72438fa75
45095 F20110410_AAAJRM parajon_a_Page_29.pro
6c46d24be0c5aaadb0cb3c5630ef86ae
78d0c69e8b47de14772e56946a25486bed8cd3eb
85768 F20110410_AAAJMO parajon_a_Page_16.jp2
84854f8fd1775a59e3354e6cb477debd
4346653ad0144c844e2974f1e342aaea063d37de
21612 F20110410_AAAJWK parajon_a_Page_25.QC.jpg
87daa5a73e11a295d77f21b5989f1bfb
f244ea178b777704e232cdea40756e0c2a201b50
83592 F20110410_AAAJHS parajon_a_Page_34.jpg
75877b6bcc16dcc224c359cc4ff3fb6e
f1a0f06aa7dca332c361b60b84768648c7a13842
48047 F20110410_AAAJRN parajon_a_Page_30.pro
fc6adc26a1c2fd4ed6f524078d5e69d9
46d33921649c7518c849a500f609704f34006813
87998 F20110410_AAAJMP parajon_a_Page_17.jp2
369b6359ec0ab6ac532a4262770d4190
156d948f03a9838848d1fbd29fe97a7caf8d2b90
24275 F20110410_AAAJWL parajon_a_Page_26.QC.jpg
8362e80ac7db975a268b223af26dcfcd
47bafdd2173bb95fd26ba8861dfee764646ce1a1
5949 F20110410_AAAJHT parajon_a_Page_26thm.jpg
2511d73ecc7839bd96077b11ab1c5895
63278d8e7fe1762ec780e712de3032ad3560e1c9
71180 F20110410_AAAJRO parajon_a_Page_31.pro
791ea6ad55e27c72ffc82bea09c5d790
9d3f3ecccd18a18ce668b2c4ac64db9076b31c13
91677 F20110410_AAAJMQ parajon_a_Page_18.jp2
05620a3ecd2545a7f27adf3c64db3b6d
6b6efceb12ea02d0d03ad3b200d379cf759a71b2
13170 F20110410_AAAJWM parajon_a_Page_27.QC.jpg
8382ad9b68b6d512c818fc75a65785dd
8c44dcae0284d0a66cec5274ef9322d0f688ce2d
1644 F20110410_AAAJHU parajon_a_Page_50.txt
a119e507ab3e7d0eb3387cb1d6461a35
1c8873d8bf4cf5207a70ab1b241b52a6ed5cb56f
41172 F20110410_AAAJRP parajon_a_Page_32.pro
71cccf023a8fb6ea4a0905196c4adf16
6f2445006949e6478c4536b1b6ba4c6de0cdaadf
85220 F20110410_AAAJMR parajon_a_Page_19.jp2
dd436c9f9662e77a90d516e562c8ad77
e58d31298ee32d4cf7896f0421e86401f3b857de
38616 F20110410_AAAJHV parajon_a_Page_08.jpg
740fae4b69ca89a99c4e679054f31c3e
051a339cd71f7ae46fa38cab7f9f22a4cea03574
94774 F20110410_AAAJMS parajon_a_Page_20.jp2
65a3f351e5ffd21e72a57942db11b60f
f2a7ade6708b2e8e700ae442df0e71af2b0f5b40
19305 F20110410_AAAJWN parajon_a_Page_28.QC.jpg
68a53cce10afdb9f0d36ef845f736ffe
9aa54c33cded809a77a67fa43376dfc4f7998947
5452 F20110410_AAAJHW parajon_a_Page_30thm.jpg
ef306cb53dabc64f8c4ae03fb93de6e3
7d2e68972302a09ad9aaf7058852fa7f0a1e651c
45090 F20110410_AAAJRQ parajon_a_Page_33.pro
80fd2123b828e40cf646184dcb946330
cbd4e9756b9932536f9a43604f26a43c8f272b83
1051961 F20110410_AAAJMT parajon_a_Page_21.jp2
576b1f97115a5ecab23c11f4ecc69a4b
2cddf44e268be527b72c2a8e9fd785ddae7f8186
24068 F20110410_AAAJWO parajon_a_Page_29.QC.jpg
3c1dab91f714f95338fc75092f2804e3
4c469c0c420b870bcd0242b424944039a0ab694f
79834 F20110410_AAAJHX parajon_a_Page_05.jpg
e771042c427fbb41535450bca340214f
1d16bdc0bf1afd3d7278ae3446549173306a92e6
58995 F20110410_AAAJRR parajon_a_Page_34.pro
0e7d7cc70bca942c252049aee1387dca
fc2535fadddc9f08fc9260287e1e41af2ccd7cb4
84628 F20110410_AAAJMU parajon_a_Page_22.jp2
b118320f888ffe993b2e147fdb2a5dfc
16e71c1a7ec32ea6cfaee81d50568e893442651b
23986 F20110410_AAAJWP parajon_a_Page_31.QC.jpg
b69a442bf4ad50b94c9587826d820bf5
eeadc0d34c6ea38446f6d9b906aacd9e56c70aa0
5165 F20110410_AAAJHY parajon_a_Page_32thm.jpg
c138eeafaf45e21cc01facb13260a4c8
513e4faee8e8d467948278828ac8a20fe5f8a70e
51322 F20110410_AAAJRS parajon_a_Page_35.pro
d871a2ec842e1a21f5f0f52a7e0297b4
d8b6c7c9e03917639591b5ef0def780595da449d
1051984 F20110410_AAAJMV parajon_a_Page_23.jp2
fdf756c9e7bb3e8da39c112547e956dd
8bd5b7041b12d246255c507a01fac41495ef331f
21551 F20110410_AAAJWQ parajon_a_Page_32.QC.jpg
38764e3bbece38bdc2e0c3cdb2bd890a
34a3a59c25b1579b45c9c78aa422914746ae3104
78949 F20110410_AAAJHZ parajon_a_Page_23.jpg
27f1237d83301b5f96706330f35d3435
3b12f2a4132043140d7021975feaa23ebe8640ba
41870 F20110410_AAAJRT parajon_a_Page_36.pro
aa2a982019d7bd34eeec027b791a38ea
0bf3dbd6f7d5cffc10aee2a52fde4c69ce93511a
91251 F20110410_AAAJMW parajon_a_Page_24.jp2
c3c8f7a4f1389b26479ea081baf4bf8b
4ea08495f50fb6134c2e31a5a3a14d7e5bd03658
18767 F20110410_AAAJWR parajon_a_Page_33.QC.jpg
bd1fefd7611f81a02fd299917f768cce
e33dc5dbff2b445e6f0af80ee51e4d8b0ac4ea18
48476 F20110410_AAAJRU parajon_a_Page_37.pro
5461c36c96603ef95b67c3d1a7b65c1f
f14368ccd42c44cac4ff0e5a41cc9d581726623f
104076 F20110410_AAAJMX parajon_a_Page_26.jp2
8026b438f1d776bd185e957c38085d2d
aa3782fc602a2b0bb6077a780d2bf02ffe5bf56c
23842 F20110410_AAAJWS parajon_a_Page_34.QC.jpg
5c5152240e171a359a454a54a304e2e3
bb972c75e7b167a0b3f123912c78f6481f0edf75
38313 F20110410_AAAJRV parajon_a_Page_38.pro
6ec66cf64d4a8ec96daf0211d79a8f60
050cc319ff9e87223d17f0bbb93d2e904a842d7b
35334 F20110410_AAAJKA parajon_a_Page_07.jpg
56f988a8e5c15495261950a55003a536
90f47441353bdb710e642b994ffb6547586e1f75
78197 F20110410_AAAJMY parajon_a_Page_28.jp2
2a0f164a4ac199c8a9fc270680c12d56
ca9ff25a772ebac6fa8d7591164b966b812b7b4d
18957 F20110410_AAAJWT parajon_a_Page_37.QC.jpg
54c6a2869a1891fd10eab7085671e09a
782a6148eac27609746ae9e248b2b77dde62c225
43286 F20110410_AAAJRW parajon_a_Page_39.pro
3cd509093e0d37d168c8911841da8cf9
d9d4defd10848b93c15eb9b3272c961b9bef33bc
67685 F20110410_AAAJKB parajon_a_Page_09.jpg
449dd37946792363e890fd6d712b5a68
be568efb167cfd7755031f36039dff08b0c762d6
1015290 F20110410_AAAJMZ parajon_a_Page_29.jp2
1af273656541d01fbd6e290c5b50f212
1df317f9f4a24ab968c04ac1874c0c11a079270e
19813 F20110410_AAAJWU parajon_a_Page_38.QC.jpg
b10ee6fdd7d96d4bea542744339bb285
24483a46e3ab9842fd0d70e72c7514344800484f
25872 F20110410_AAAJRX parajon_a_Page_40.pro
609050bbaf400b8404026dcaf03b66c7
b2b4771f416f0193f3aec532e54ed280963c5125
22794 F20110410_AAAJKC parajon_a_Page_10.jpg
ecb495a49b4002c120b07622ac0c47ec
1bd70e0efbda25658318fc079262fa366ef10049
46356 F20110410_AAAJRY parajon_a_Page_41.pro
a7417361c62016ee7470a97a53bc5f88
830f375e6bd9c0ff3bedd178c327bc40c3244a1f
70616 F20110410_AAAJKD parajon_a_Page_11.jpg
0aa4c1fef34971c47a5c824197b9c907
cf2920c2b8935da3bd828e84c3f21fd9c042fc35
23035 F20110410_AAAJWV parajon_a_Page_39.QC.jpg
5726c7f45d09e73d7ba768cdf821aabc
826c2a985f593714bf3e486c3891d87a72d9aac7
F20110410_AAAJPA parajon_a_Page_24.tif
49eaf25cbbb037c8808ae2a6c1033064
88425ca4877ef8ea713026fa5a34aabc5c8911ff
46954 F20110410_AAAJRZ parajon_a_Page_42.pro
ac458c3ddf4974e13f296ecc45c78be6
45e11dba7cc865a936558e482b7d93f6f17672f4
65864 F20110410_AAAJKE parajon_a_Page_12.jpg
cf0965e68e49d3f178f42689f1d54074
ebe7be1a2adda3a20c4fc52c8e23835eff738883
23498 F20110410_AAAJWW parajon_a_Page_41.QC.jpg
664e8242d9b17ee77b95526f4064db85
c6bdd0272432d8540ba562e16aa30729743b3058
F20110410_AAAJPB parajon_a_Page_25.tif
1d1ea81fb7e9b5203a34c3506e370d06
e7b158ae64a42401c344deb5d7d41c87ec97a865
67472 F20110410_AAAJKF parajon_a_Page_13.jpg
81d493e6a45194d123ee82cbccec740a
b2c68155570ba9d92571380603ba860be20e5d35
24113 F20110410_AAAJWX parajon_a_Page_42.QC.jpg
1e902933bee66bcdb3ec4cdbab13ba6d
0baeb3a66cee1c51549d4fb46dc262534bb77e8d
F20110410_AAAJPC parajon_a_Page_26.tif
1016e9bc7cf45b49264d1f204d41d105
0648f6abc11d9c79853d7bfb8522059803b17215
67515 F20110410_AAAJKG parajon_a_Page_15.jpg
dab574e468206da9f17a840ce74be020
d42c56824b68119006b43738d0ef853e3d033799
2915 F20110410_AAAJUA parajon_a_Page_34.txt
73c63acfde132aae692a904fb51ecb79
49cc029a866b6af58edf37fc83c8fc3adfab0b01
19403 F20110410_AAAJWY parajon_a_Page_43.QC.jpg
f9b381c5e70955b2cb4d32fcdf20447d
81785b250983490b30e918ba546135b03f6fb8e0
F20110410_AAAJPD parajon_a_Page_27.tif
8249c7e0053b5ae70a30a2f73ee15249
82a4f2aea773a14a000d7c42f2449c3cfc4e9d05
66222 F20110410_AAAJKH parajon_a_Page_16.jpg
e4213098e8f162fc14beff80cfb9380f
b4d1d1aae216e6dc7a3a0f073d35799631de1398
2259 F20110410_AAAJUB parajon_a_Page_35.txt
5b82f9d8e62dce45c867da1c2769615d
e09176d4b15f7e3c2a7cfc1f60c168c921a7c838
19658 F20110410_AAAJWZ parajon_a_Page_44.QC.jpg
618f95145b7cd05adf4b5c2cf117f901
784e4c2c9dad6c0d6a1b623635dfa60268257f6d
F20110410_AAAJPE parajon_a_Page_28.tif
f3a64786ba4791ad937d3afe5314d0cc
f94fe21565d3382696233fe70b8c98b0c3668cc6
69804 F20110410_AAAJKI parajon_a_Page_18.jpg
520556253d3912fac322e9aa33380b74
ce44da5bb0c5990ae539d6c1f5fdf0df9b60ebad
1682 F20110410_AAAJUC parajon_a_Page_36.txt
c501b9cddee02bef1ccfe222bcfdcf5b
fedab31801493427ce35ab0caa02076900c7a984
25271604 F20110410_AAAJPF parajon_a_Page_29.tif
06821c92062056ff2c8002ea1a013c8d
31fc14405fe3203a4439a7e09c4fd8a03a733844
5848 F20110410_AAAJZA parajon_a_Page_39thm.jpg
e0c1f203fbef5b3b153152dd7a0e961c
47001c6b1432442659178016694fbc91a332d7bb
2445 F20110410_AAAJUD parajon_a_Page_37.txt
1ad328dab5924d2c4f974b70b1a569c2
d89b6308a712930f1333dc4fdfad0ba4fd583d9c
F20110410_AAAJPG parajon_a_Page_30.tif
f053943d68721dc9b39ccbd34b01323d
bdd3540821c2243d781a3790fdc9b1d8edb50365
3507 F20110410_AAAJZB parajon_a_Page_40thm.jpg
474a8e421bc3ead3d6650fe9f9f14337
6cd9672b075e7c4dbd44afe8408cf494b3ab5f41
64990 F20110410_AAAJKJ parajon_a_Page_19.jpg
7ab535a41e99f898ede9ced1446ef5c8
ca1831a53014197dde0e6252a9b89f57d97de491
1552 F20110410_AAAJUE parajon_a_Page_38.txt
20dc086228ca4771d59fb66a32ed3847
9f3ba55423f7628249f6dea3718e1793462686a9
F20110410_AAAJPH parajon_a_Page_32.tif
8aa6fb9d212ee1900bd74c78574e5baa
a64256f5065d0f43c77f7c9366082c5ff04b5b63
5675 F20110410_AAAJZC parajon_a_Page_41thm.jpg
7e0397bc8ae44ce6efe1e768f226a817
829836ea0bf7a53b638d05bf963b5fb5619aac92
72762 F20110410_AAAJKK parajon_a_Page_20.jpg
d9e0a6a2c53b4e1e61974f0bd71f874f
b9841a53852a9f8688d9fd54e13df5ae3ef169ba
1756 F20110410_AAAJUF parajon_a_Page_39.txt
6b0dc20826bcfb1978efb641fee70990
5b6f2cf51687fba39f224852e772ff8306ee248c
F20110410_AAAJPI parajon_a_Page_33.tif
47c2a6ccbcd016abf7cf1ea4d8251239
9fec4322e9f2700e6de26e051b52e68d38b066c6
5687 F20110410_AAAJZD parajon_a_Page_42thm.jpg
3c071e5457403939817a422bfe06f363
c5ff1fb0e74209f30942666cc7f541fad62e1fd2
81291 F20110410_AAAJKL parajon_a_Page_21.jpg
0ea937e4664502f3fc87322e6cc3b1db
2aa21a9b52b4137ac8256ac655e293625c6054f5
1082 F20110410_AAAJUG parajon_a_Page_40.txt
4e048ece4260da846858ade16d2283b3
348a8944e46e50f805acc761a49bbeb425374e3d
F20110410_AAAJPJ parajon_a_Page_34.tif
a52100402716b2f39e138f28a4ac2618
4c7b5bd2e74da6455291da76dc75e8add555a11c
5142 F20110410_AAAJZE parajon_a_Page_43thm.jpg
f54e608b62f6ebcf33946d5697f86d29
6f02fb7e15f4ed5b4d4452cb7d6e5ae26d182927
65062 F20110410_AAAJKM parajon_a_Page_22.jpg
a48557ca21b9aa1204edd07ff26c42ea
f33e39cc726710203fe052b3a41ce75c102e3472
1905 F20110410_AAAJUH parajon_a_Page_41.txt
324c28785ffa7df04002103489ca4a08
85d924f5d0d9efd65e4f425993b20440127f5f19
F20110410_AAAJPK parajon_a_Page_35.tif
f16d9d464f740c30d87fd343b7b49eaa
91b032b1b9be0060f2c44be6e19bb78530dfa22e
4904 F20110410_AAAJZF parajon_a_Page_44thm.jpg
0c58cad75c242d744f082029435dfaa2
50f70a0f2d341584c742d8abce8c23ad72ee5fb0
69691 F20110410_AAAJKN parajon_a_Page_24.jpg
52a56b91e385fc433fa86682d42a1ebf
9c6d486eee3f4f49b86ad8cd35416a65d7c9b9c0
1870 F20110410_AAAJUI parajon_a_Page_42.txt
f519bbfec0b1197d9cda1fa6b835be02
a5b235874a61334f2f0dc37fff0c524b9337fdeb
F20110410_AAAJPL parajon_a_Page_36.tif
1df4dc6049b5319b5337ef6e0e619447
557ff21a45c2afa373545acce726f2112f7a9a51
4829 F20110410_AAAJZG parajon_a_Page_45thm.jpg
5a78a465ede32a9227aeab80a72e459b
541e983c9758fa15ba067b7d1f0e35977337d5a3
71043 F20110410_AAAJKO parajon_a_Page_25.jpg
1168b5b1dbafb15191e789932de0cfc9
7072c9173dbe1e26e32155d034f0f6b940ab4eec
1351 F20110410_AAAJUJ parajon_a_Page_43.txt
71688ed6150a8b3df4bf97f3b1659b99
bbfae8460e634a5fb488e7636b6d2292bce64476
F20110410_AAAJPM parajon_a_Page_37.tif
b6392371ec0049846068496144dd32e8
4d498921e79d3a45a53da65c10a85ac65ce1f2ee
5133 F20110410_AAAJZH parajon_a_Page_46thm.jpg
9144bc75385e7a9f7cda6eb99ab3d8aa
00a3251bd0d93da57c8fce804344162f522db08f
79938 F20110410_AAAJKP parajon_a_Page_26.jpg
c6cc7c1d329e3883cffbec0ed8a5322d
8e672ffbca0e18924baa11b862d27ae91e10a029
1399 F20110410_AAAJUK parajon_a_Page_44.txt
22ca7a28d05add430a4fc4fc26ae4cbc
41489ad67c18d5d7939f0955e65bd56a7bed879f
F20110410_AAAJPN parajon_a_Page_39.tif
2bb8e5e49025b39acd5fed29e7affd87
0eb1dbc914858ec2f70c5db09e6a9a25b57807ba
6370 F20110410_AAAJZI parajon_a_Page_48thm.jpg
b767916982363d835ac72e186980931f
059ba680c0d23cc4092277ed1bf641a7e5908f54
42144 F20110410_AAAJKQ parajon_a_Page_27.jpg
15dcd6be46ffc19adbba28243e0d1ac9
e282f9da2c4226634cbe133902d07f818c131869
1210 F20110410_AAAJUL parajon_a_Page_45.txt
7d1a2d19769e6cc7aa9033b3edb05532
8f8c3b924e9c588690920aca9c55044dfda9c6c0
5348 F20110410_AAAJZJ parajon_a_Page_49thm.jpg
d0e1dbc02e1bc261b5a688765bf65b3c
8029bb690020f06857e2a9be9c0e2aaeaee7b66c
62861 F20110410_AAAJKR parajon_a_Page_28.jpg
933a3716c252bba13039de0205522def
56ccde4e34c764e3d59401fe90392767c3f97f5e
1404 F20110410_AAAJUM parajon_a_Page_46.txt
a8d462461f303e427c5357f61946cce8
b8cd6f6f141fb954bde08e655fcb145cfe458573
F20110410_AAAJPO parajon_a_Page_40.tif
1c05c15aec80b415b66d2532e087cd5b
822ffa161a8e8d2b6430e0854bdb04c4a1e33569
6002 F20110410_AAAJZK parajon_a_Page_50thm.jpg
a9e7995c7489be858ea14d985b0ed40a
f225f65944aecca30baca66fc90d9b0e3846603e
77062 F20110410_AAAJKS parajon_a_Page_29.jpg
40fe7cd500050f9596e22e6fcb8e3182
e5bcf2e82cdb06978bc6b71bfc2b063585bbbda2
2088 F20110410_AAAJUN parajon_a_Page_48.txt
a26d4d3ddbfea5d34f71a29f0865c815
a45d055f1ec38954eba2e46c279d944bb0b92301
F20110410_AAAJPP parajon_a_Page_43.tif
75bb492fa2b076436af311f723e32d90
18a47338975d9f3dee33a649e892e3adb962aa9f
6292 F20110410_AAAJZL parajon_a_Page_51thm.jpg
55b4a46578f9b07e003149d83bd30ecc
b90c31bb7e69219ab0d6394b4cc2568696939d9d
78389 F20110410_AAAJKT parajon_a_Page_30.jpg
f868b9c3f091644a9d6f9582b357f677
c6197e19cf5bce4d8be27e52f15c09d2ff886218
1391 F20110410_AAAJUO parajon_a_Page_49.txt
bd2f28434c1953685102b1dca22b47f9
63343df44e6f5821cc63721bbf29faaab70ff197
F20110410_AAAJPQ parajon_a_Page_44.tif
d08f390f2b29d87c97ea05431d988761
9bcb660585f784d064371746cb7716ed660260ed
5758 F20110410_AAAJZM parajon_a_Page_52thm.jpg
9d0fa5a93b66431e1b62072efbc9c7ef
f3da7eb36d6a245c6cc0b07b34c0b49e47a8a5d3
85111 F20110410_AAAJKU parajon_a_Page_31.jpg
54532fb4712ece06e89c1d4189cb3578
c13cd4b7c4491f92c243f56b533fe4d118157548
1996 F20110410_AAAJUP parajon_a_Page_51.txt
49e320805d6fe15fa61c03280ac0a0fc
89a8d183dd5a40ae6cf646527f9e0ad294576130
F20110410_AAAJPR parajon_a_Page_45.tif
796e8676287225d390f0c82b315f3c6d
6793c4b7547e44acf3605f64b26a2193e2d648d8
5970 F20110410_AAAJZN parajon_a_Page_53thm.jpg
2e622c49c2a5eb850eb64783451a2f70
79b6cb42236d259d2471cb0835d9e4554f3475cb
68985 F20110410_AAAJKV parajon_a_Page_32.jpg
0077e694f0b9755d2dc8b89d6686a752
14537213eaa1bdc5a717397a8c8e35a37baac244
1526 F20110410_AAAJUQ parajon_a_Page_52.txt
cd59940bd9df4391c4cd8129edbb47c5
71d3673d7db8c55db7eaa46d0f56070ac884ffca
F20110410_AAAJPS parajon_a_Page_46.tif
aeaae93a67feb2b683d9b168c9a73753
b7953ffa43651d44db423e280af9d667b17f95a2
6109 F20110410_AAAJZO parajon_a_Page_54thm.jpg
2520c1a51f307f6882dcc00f31af878f
b07fb26c0224445a09b8c17635e43101a584de55
61184 F20110410_AAAJKW parajon_a_Page_33.jpg
a6fa65b8856d14f328e9b04ced1f1a57
f3b2b5e38f531edb9cf4619d9337aa979e4cb40c
1672 F20110410_AAAJUR parajon_a_Page_53.txt
b8f141c15cce4bf0cc9c8bcea5cb6b90
06ba9771d122b6f8b3eb5373cef0673d2084d4da
F20110410_AAAJPT parajon_a_Page_47.tif
4ea54cfe092e9623cc5cd83229b827c5
b0c75b6021d9bfb7d168bf2c339175c7d8e4e4f5
5798 F20110410_AAAJZP parajon_a_Page_55thm.jpg
494f1e8a014be1d517000aa1613d476f
dd342aaadff5bf27089a27cafdf417bc42ebabd9
76146 F20110410_AAAJKX parajon_a_Page_35.jpg
bd1d64d814ff217da0ec0f48416a2f1e
468524110c3a7535378835b8a39a6aca23cec04e
1901 F20110410_AAAJUS parajon_a_Page_54.txt
2a77dd568eaf84d88b306415db55fe21
294b8af42a0aef0594a24a7aedb279987e57e333
F20110410_AAAJPU parajon_a_Page_49.tif
f66b71142c5c23ed8250b52fe8798ffb
6db6583f305aee9a4ed5e48532de9cd3288ef9a5
6325 F20110410_AAAJZQ parajon_a_Page_56thm.jpg
82c0d7925b9481b31395c6d43b77a956
9ae1d909255a42caa763fd707e4ae08be3571838
69191 F20110410_AAAJKY parajon_a_Page_36.jpg
dacf974fc30848b5ba1445535eeb31e3
e483071a40190723db5f41541ea8e4047d1db08f
F20110410_AAAJPV parajon_a_Page_50.tif
c5ed66d3e38fde15bbf5d04e0dcd936f
b842db25369e8986194b07cfac8bf000b11885fb
2782 F20110410_AAAJIA parajon_a_Page_08thm.jpg
459cf641327f7f87cb210082739ee9a6
4d00a713d5841b448722e406a879c20cdfb97a31
5071 F20110410_AAAJZR parajon_a_Page_57thm.jpg
b16ecea17c411cc23c0f8b70184ccf77
80ac1b6bd3aad881120d34663f4947636361884e
65418 F20110410_AAAJKZ parajon_a_Page_38.jpg
b8238301db0e0ad9a611428e55ccb2f3
539993e5bc681b96127e1160dba9f29326179d05
1725 F20110410_AAAJUT parajon_a_Page_55.txt
259ae762b410e4b8a56be8ee881326f4
a11920b4922a1dc3eafcefaaef6acea047b7c75d
F20110410_AAAJPW parajon_a_Page_51.tif
027387fdd0ff1c05c2c146701914a4c7
7c43800b0bca8a59e86c1056ef500fd467792a77
1828 F20110410_AAAJIB parajon_a_Page_28.txt
5460c41e1dac358c483374b0d6290c7d
ead9facbd3164f2662f9035266266b54de42bb4a
5859 F20110410_AAAJZS parajon_a_Page_58thm.jpg
622caa2e80fb267b37243e8222193cca
2a8df30d654f08ae44fed9f4bd0e0c6588ccd16e
2010 F20110410_AAAJUU parajon_a_Page_56.txt
6d9576d6441a42d367043fcaf476dd36
a99adea3e61e40310bccf569d11fc2a8cc91a660
F20110410_AAAJPX parajon_a_Page_52.tif
78f0dc75bcca0c91f1a7ef510933e6a7
282d274407a3f5c952e8ff0c927356472c6e917f
23335 F20110410_AAAJIC parajon_a_Page_30.QC.jpg
59c2536e9e148138520f0ce439f688ce
5b444b82344876afe6be5045f86dc2ae3ea9fb5d
6106 F20110410_AAAJZT parajon_a_Page_59thm.jpg
1ad04ba71714c00ca50efe7b7cfe2e8e
8bf38e8f53ad327adfe8ebc95d06364b3a43bc16
1490 F20110410_AAAJUV parajon_a_Page_57.txt
f364834a7c79f192c32a9f5f53be6fce
480b1a0c36f9a58c10188b0431cbd415e42c8e21
102631 F20110410_AAAJNA parajon_a_Page_30.jp2
9b06fd2a515ebff97c64877319b38e54
237135b7784309565932def8fb98592d1e0cb8f2
F20110410_AAAJPY parajon_a_Page_53.tif
13cdeafed63e1957991ffbeb4634f77a
c1ea3f27d3d2603b850efe37842186d6dd82cde6
746468 F20110410_AAAJID parajon_a_Page_46.jp2
95243958b67380ea439ab0d100866b95
df1b3cea39df3ada19ab5d83c4a57f6c8ac343c9
3322 F20110410_AAAJZU parajon_a_Page_60thm.jpg
6daf477daa8fca3747236535b5646ac7
8fcd2a6a786237bd6e263bb48f292b9443806af3
1816 F20110410_AAAJUW parajon_a_Page_58.txt
6b3331bde2d41c82162505c1e6d00541
c26427993dd0072899c31accd958ab448f354a58
916488 F20110410_AAAJNB parajon_a_Page_32.jp2
4a5801806e0042faa158fcc7215e2706
6535d0074adfdfcf025dcd840c800de1a294a857
F20110410_AAAJPZ parajon_a_Page_54.tif
11a45fe1e319850277d750071a8e37cc
44b2233e7824396dd5b28a053572f1ad8559749d
35586 F20110410_AAAJIE parajon_a_Page_68.jpg
f485c9ef42ac58e10a48f96f47172de3
ab7e43605e8875ff96e2c5008fe6d08d75907b87
5329 F20110410_AAAJZV parajon_a_Page_61thm.jpg
d3e519bceed26361010627e7d4b47533
9bcfdf5a0974a77af62f1ebfacbf13d128dafcd8
1634 F20110410_AAAJUX parajon_a_Page_59.txt
71aacbbcff0ae67af316e415d47aa7d7
1c982561754a40ea66cbc61647fccbab8311b278
79531 F20110410_AAAJNC parajon_a_Page_33.jp2
836ce2e3d1a9d6f76a812450c2a14592
615f53c3c4cd577c62627988e9ef53c5cb3657be
53511 F20110410_AAAJIF parajon_a_Page_27.jp2
72becde53aed9c7b8c024fb9ad672e72
81a6a205215106a6ef910b724cd1488d85794502
6048 F20110410_AAAJZW parajon_a_Page_62thm.jpg
f59296be18f44e09526a7e75881b2107
5f1cefc977c7c4d1db2c39213eae02f401672dfc
1026 F20110410_AAAJUY parajon_a_Page_60.txt
01fd0e49c55dc6ba747b7a41543ff088
542cf3267c127067adcebb997a310990f96e709e
107975 F20110410_AAAJND parajon_a_Page_34.jp2
d7aa4e7817f0910d5d09d27a712520e9
68541d4130c540e5ee2a32749050f8c16ca96807
77033 F20110410_AAAJIG parajon_a_Page_41.jpg
d8b378e66d37b7e314d39274b0285593
bd412b07a9ddbacc98c124198d8779bf47c8d7ea
29855 F20110410_AAAJSA parajon_a_Page_43.pro
7100fd12a490ebc3f1718c452b31542e
ae8863c6baae2e01ca5edaabdd3fdb048b9bde58
4908 F20110410_AAAJZX parajon_a_Page_63thm.jpg
5fb5dc6d4ee4deacdc231da5ebdf51f2
a3e4cfaf0e5b5c00db492cae72c2a9083804e84a
1803 F20110410_AAAJUZ parajon_a_Page_61.txt
39f083b252de6baf5237279ea529a4f6
56992100c587a295c16e7dedce834909fc0ee2ba
102191 F20110410_AAAJNE parajon_a_Page_35.jp2
2f6cee5635f2f576b69154ae14632c5d
48118dcd115489df6bccdb4a6de036d1e764145c
31555 F20110410_AAAJSB parajon_a_Page_44.pro
112548acc77e229210ba207db9b0eba0
3a698bb470d3ac513bda779a0d5232dc4ac921dd
90837 F20110410_AAAJNF parajon_a_Page_36.jp2
e7890d3bc36a0f1dd0080ed0a0f9ee5e
7956c2512570430d0fa85dd0b35ac41d1a7a5f90
874041 F20110410_AAAJIH parajon_a_Page_08.jp2
e4c013158c16f362f5d733dc6801e8bf
0f5fb4eda0cf174b0fc8804383771915186eb694
27903 F20110410_AAAJSC parajon_a_Page_45.pro
3b0d0c6090bd8efdf1e32f8faaaf2a82
6fc7acc179ec0cb8bf872e49f1b760ad04621548
6407 F20110410_AAAJZY parajon_a_Page_65thm.jpg
1b1fe10ae40224bca47c471c36f11a8e
a060de1564c9d045f30236ae2f3a8bbedd142e49
81714 F20110410_AAAJNG parajon_a_Page_37.jp2
6d48c71d35a448becddd0b77de32538c
86725c874f10957507b3a8807191a4fe1bd12413
17611 F20110410_AAAJXA parajon_a_Page_45.QC.jpg
471ab4f13688f896389396516b3a4cfe
5f80b8241b01497a765bd0bb0f3fadd7d1aa2e42
59621 F20110410_AAAJII parajon_a_Page_04.jp2
1c9d3467fee74439274482b5f3422283
c0ccff2f24170b1f705c6b4d1ad4a2ff4bd36e6e
31704 F20110410_AAAJSD parajon_a_Page_46.pro
2ea3d4104196e1ff603c6e568f431a6b
17a7c27f4cd242d6d6fe2438ff04f3cd8f8c435e
6782 F20110410_AAAJZZ parajon_a_Page_66thm.jpg
32725859cd499de95a664d94d31702b2
ab2d0c3162bd01da66d9c66f996b592d290d1c2a
20029 F20110410_AAAJXB parajon_a_Page_46.QC.jpg
1bd6a0c4c73c672e0785dfa16294ae67
a93986f9aa2d52d9ea757aa5ed226863f0724fc0
84648 F20110410_AAAJNH parajon_a_Page_38.jp2
a4592c8e9738f27299069f0c2095d8cb
217c6a6783ec4beebbdb2051fb57a53ae43bcaee
19683 F20110410_AAAJIJ parajon_a_Page_09.QC.jpg
fd9c1a65c0f8b3d2012404abcb0d76e5
23ff538dadc045308382084eec4c1c8d0e489d50
39148 F20110410_AAAJSE parajon_a_Page_47.pro
e5c765b79b9a6552cb0dfc2b87b8a34f
23d3d00a5511465d092901800443071c4e0d89d9
21474 F20110410_AAAJXC parajon_a_Page_47.QC.jpg
022929792c5b97eb5fe661737fad4805
32f3e81a8fc8d722d0db553174ad5b52a17b294d
94584 F20110410_AAAJNI parajon_a_Page_39.jp2
79e70a982917cbece0d25de7ec70dc52
82f6ce0f06d346dd5efeb9453626b37ab6490916
1674 F20110410_AAAJIK parajon_a_Page_47.txt
f1dcecdfaf3cfa8b9601200ed8543687
02c32f94aa3ad26addbd47bcd6150ec8bf98dc19
53184 F20110410_AAAJSF parajon_a_Page_48.pro
4c544e63d82117b3ba3697504d6c87c3
97efe2542c2d7b7eb252d6e4044d008aec9d3949
26994 F20110410_AAAJXD parajon_a_Page_48.QC.jpg
76a705022bd24f1ef2bd1d482242a7cd
f50ce45ca59777137c91b3799bfd06f7fe6d475c
59335 F20110410_AAAJNJ parajon_a_Page_40.jp2
5de6347dbc33758fe5e3a3d7c006217b
6247cc078ae9b51a197080461f93b8666c7f7fd9
F20110410_AAAJIL parajon_a_Page_01.tif
6602e4e28202d3ea64c7f904abad9057
692e2c27991166e0b90c4c63d238cd50314c0e31
31433 F20110410_AAAJSG parajon_a_Page_49.pro
f664c18dbf858548007b3a6d580379c2
b6ede06e2be19aa3e644924c6f12c4315640be22
19893 F20110410_AAAJXE parajon_a_Page_49.QC.jpg
a9dd525e70c9a0bb1d43d71de7eaaa77
5ba9374ef9c8c1d894e17a471e2c4eadeb2daf41
98718 F20110410_AAAJNK parajon_a_Page_41.jp2
69e75f4cc41fd7077fd32779450e2975
78987eee99791d5d6b7b28b807dca521e1e13e95
63245 F20110410_AAAJIM parajon_a_Page_37.jpg
8b9c413eb0845cc33f9786fabb517e84
3e247412391f5bbd1682a12de3043a0db14a8470
38930 F20110410_AAAJSH parajon_a_Page_50.pro
43dd1c8caa28b2cce16c9ceda5f9a872
0318464651e73ef1b78998dac88d00f2eaea45f7
23251 F20110410_AAAJXF parajon_a_Page_50.QC.jpg
d361bd7df69d9ee73be8fd9e8cff23b9
818633364547298802d62ff2a07f1c774bdf1734
98068 F20110410_AAAJNL parajon_a_Page_42.jp2
66b7c351ac530ca7c62946fd79e09ab8
f70bc687d57645c1f6e27ea0c9aebb6ba5a4abe7
54904 F20110410_AAAJIN parajon_a_Page_65.pro
c2595fa83e648d7e7cb7fd061f3fedb2
ca565454c41e8cc1a2d510a483f2591599e0cd46
50619 F20110410_AAAJSI parajon_a_Page_51.pro
49fd58c00aed647eb0cc957bd06bc0dd
b4ff7d294d22e8534e62925755c3bb27538ca23e
25761 F20110410_AAAJXG parajon_a_Page_51.QC.jpg
ca17d45d6f278aefbc99c80f632f45b4
98d97fb007a854f1d7fb94686a71d633ac5a96b3
F20110410_AAAJIO parajon_a_Page_31.tif
c29933cc1cac00ee1f98a6477ddd12ef
fe1df58f252cd46e36a4f09c36f211788d769d1e
35587 F20110410_AAAJSJ parajon_a_Page_52.pro
431422ac58ff58a2bdf8e28c9ff1ee05
476e57e5dfcda06d06c3607c04b913debb5dd8ba
21077 F20110410_AAAJXH parajon_a_Page_52.QC.jpg
ead8510361090d48afb43500ad1aa699
14fbb9b6e30822e5333d0e3e9e3a72c7c6bf2182
715980 F20110410_AAAJNM parajon_a_Page_43.jp2
f417420e04917cb7a2f91a5826efad75
069ce0c168577042629eb5a470512e78abdc1eac
F20110410_AAAJIP parajon_a_Page_48.tif
36ab9fe53e03e71b3018312c4008a542
25f9ca9c11e1a58027664b17a80ef187a7a78942
38442 F20110410_AAAJSK parajon_a_Page_53.pro
53155383464ed61409a58f86d4b213ff
cb1587ad813be4badc476f597e85df977ca32b76
22805 F20110410_AAAJXI parajon_a_Page_53.QC.jpg
6ec0adcb5a44add0b7bca5e5a36978ba
95f1aa67a2cbf44a3b1980e24a59332c30a5570f
728575 F20110410_AAAJNN parajon_a_Page_44.jp2
dd3555325cb82ed97656322264f8f8e2
793a9e2bd0e53993e3afb372f95d9a2ea712b021
F20110410_AAAJIQ parajon_a_Page_38.tif
01da1e493d2dff4ff0145548ad04ce5d
46b860955ac58d78294686f993b8af0fee900063
48019 F20110410_AAAJSL parajon_a_Page_54.pro
811dbcbc347a34ca8fc908c749b3cd73
2fc5efda4da476d1a43c0207a15064f8068b34ef
22441 F20110410_AAAJXJ parajon_a_Page_55.QC.jpg
8eb3a5c24c23de34b733500945dc2de0
09c47e9aeab2bd18fb25ba6187e94d2cd6538066
807477 F20110410_AAAJNO parajon_a_Page_47.jp2
ca62c40c69a44ef8d8106429e164d805
341067b4f6dbe0345f8010982ad60a9e64b8d554
70034 F20110410_AAAJIR parajon_a_Page_14.jpg
f83f3eb192aa4784daa558f7ffe028ae
e191ee02e888eaf1aa4e817f06d733a44b912e8f
38211 F20110410_AAAJSM parajon_a_Page_55.pro
1ec0e56dcbf807b6c6e04a97dceb8f3a
80fbdf4b8c6fc7165a3ce0ab37ea54b6d334c231
26218 F20110410_AAAJXK parajon_a_Page_56.QC.jpg
e21b54bee8932ca04fb9042d5ce0b0f6
2c453e1cce71502d487ee5837a31db5a669613aa
111815 F20110410_AAAJNP parajon_a_Page_48.jp2
d743d5e6bc94f2f0d563073730252500
3cdcca81b32a3076333118f63c983760e915ba74
38396 F20110410_AAAJIS parajon_a_Page_16.pro
6809a97b604f5623a69ce91b73f5ed95
5c9b9dee327c18656703cbcf9155df553abe6b2d
50872 F20110410_AAAJSN parajon_a_Page_56.pro
0912725ec80abf1ade8a917e57123562
6a18609802a9b34502f068a7f883ad2126ac9a8d
19323 F20110410_AAAJXL parajon_a_Page_57.QC.jpg
5cc68ac7c46137ee08419510b0d5c9d7
463c4de342af45ce9896f128e10b54b1e0da84b3
733386 F20110410_AAAJNQ parajon_a_Page_49.jp2
857f44dff0b44976affe21f1f1ab6331
1508e12bf090ef8c6d3010e0ae259fe624e06e07
25006 F20110410_AAAJIT parajon_a_Page_62.QC.jpg
1135053ed032efc4cef6d149e10cd867
60a6b474a5d6685742ea2897b556a9f63b0a9344
31557 F20110410_AAAJSO parajon_a_Page_57.pro
1b5da8bfbf322a918402cd58fb19df5b
ee123ce49fdf2643897a971841b1d071a228b49d
22373 F20110410_AAAJXM parajon_a_Page_58.QC.jpg
996d5cc74ff446c40648219cc924ac9a
6564d95787c816b013b3caf682ded0b9e9d5d9e4
921572 F20110410_AAAJNR parajon_a_Page_50.jp2
e43a79245bf2536a66f262dc5ebecd67
92663f5d5d5c2f4773a44eb54a574fdc0c5acbed
14263 F20110410_AAAJIU parajon_a_Page_40.QC.jpg
2f526b6d611f579aaf1ecbd6122e47b5
91ef9aa2d55c0e5678914b88d5559f01600d2556
42221 F20110410_AAAJSP parajon_a_Page_58.pro
27eefc571d41e0c411262eee0126d959
e58c879bb1ba4100e2b1a055dca886e3f67779b9
22904 F20110410_AAAJXN parajon_a_Page_59.QC.jpg
18c9b93014cfabb4056f3afe92c25e79
aa06101ae89b530d7ade5865e03c498723d5e42f
106501 F20110410_AAAJNS parajon_a_Page_51.jp2
2b239beb1af663f361b81e1823a4f890
b3f35ad8264f039a6c3af649570ca1dfc633b8dd
F20110410_AAAJIV parajon_a_Page_41.tif
8cd22b610d777065c555448ae4e244bb
4e56faa61b17b7adac34bb473c460401d4f1c9e0
37848 F20110410_AAAJSQ parajon_a_Page_59.pro
4d3daefef9d691e29c238bbd4ea19fe1
6dc67595da903f7a4c38e664fe24bf04659f4e87
14027 F20110410_AAAJXO parajon_a_Page_60.QC.jpg
f3947a5eac0e8828ee7835823062f0c3
58e0c8322bde7ea80c92869f7ed309f60646c493
871828 F20110410_AAAJNT parajon_a_Page_53.jp2
5d8d73cf75d829adc15f97879ef767b0
5e8141679169f5ddd2b684ac4f0549abc6652063
11323 F20110410_AAAJIW parajon_a_Page_68.QC.jpg
63256e7134bb47c914581fe2a315305b
ed6fffdb4d2567e1ab500674a40594da431138b8
22201 F20110410_AAAJXP parajon_a_Page_61.QC.jpg
5670e1b9da932b3d57864dc79f4b4a25
7a2dfea6f853bf869279149d2cdcd13051057508
100469 F20110410_AAAJNU parajon_a_Page_54.jp2
e9e879881756e3d406edd7e946d65ae9
98ebd61ae9161265e1a41e2c8ca8e92057ff67de
94011 F20110410_AAAJIX parajon_a_Page_25.jp2
5ad3ad14a6d39d6e41937378cf574198
cdf8537bdd4ff8254df1a6dff1c725b9ac4cd878
25735 F20110410_AAAJSR parajon_a_Page_60.pro
de9154f8574ce63a252106fca45487d7
cd00d1c5e4ec6450a076c6f4a420a302bede6e33
20191 F20110410_AAAJXQ parajon_a_Page_63.QC.jpg
a8e91c0ce43f0955e68c1d67e414e73d
a16b342db11ce30744e58bcbdbb4671e363efb3c
832786 F20110410_AAAJNV parajon_a_Page_55.jp2
0b1224aee7be9c0bb3eecdafaca178a5
af47400a59d9d07d63147f51b727b04ebaadb260
828247 F20110410_AAAJIY parajon_a_Page_52.jp2
4b2628846ff865c3f01beb4161a26350
61b8029db2beb4ffe79b60247fa2fec66f4ab293
43702 F20110410_AAAJSS parajon_a_Page_61.pro
1f0b17cc84ca63e84ad562e1de035be6
bcd9e66232ae4887f6a984693f36e4c7658994e0
22208 F20110410_AAAJXR parajon_a_Page_64.QC.jpg
2c40eda4464944019b18953547fcc995
ad2352752df82a8afd7d375a862f569e704d967f
106297 F20110410_AAAJNW parajon_a_Page_56.jp2
c846d0b259c62a0b458b664738388d7a
a7938622ddbb7ff6ea21916d024b3cd7784bf06e
66967 F20110410_AAAJIZ parajon_a_Page_17.jpg
8841b382d0ca3393b3c6f97e613dc8f7
67b92392036db95c7654cfe189e21439a0e74ba1
49948 F20110410_AAAJST parajon_a_Page_62.pro
185ee8c104d75dd8fad149571f2ef19b
2fefddd8ac0dffa8b6e687590b1a639acffa33d8
26942 F20110410_AAAJXS parajon_a_Page_65.QC.jpg
2849c52620a0d6a292dd91a57b93a734
bf211f3f2f2ccd0e975a0a85afc1851c6a2ccb75
712868 F20110410_AAAJNX parajon_a_Page_57.jp2
6502a113a65310179f917e86f70f2d8f
2596448282caf085638ea12fa99c9327a8319726
40206 F20110410_AAAJSU parajon_a_Page_63.pro
a902018bd60596d7b5fc367120c7c8e1
e641df212499beca6d22f5e46b1a9a6316be68f1
28246 F20110410_AAAJXT parajon_a_Page_66.QC.jpg
a71b7c457365475433486d32ab583bfd
2d6be0a015a3548c0af146529c22188b801bb86d
46647 F20110410_AAAJSV parajon_a_Page_64.pro
d99ffe00a01d9034125d8bbc7837af4a
c9003ce5bb6e5c4211931961dc4d83e8c83080a1
72466 F20110410_AAAJLA parajon_a_Page_39.jpg
85868a800bd73ab99663d101713b2df8
c4743e13a8fe5403d3c84982d9960d778ca7f398
886772 F20110410_AAAJNY parajon_a_Page_58.jp2
a6b8cc3574178444f08cae1fddc5dea2
330d05e5fd6d8759c57d8a00601f04ea6f1eaa98
11503 F20110410_AAAJXU parajon_a_Page_67.QC.jpg
71ead4e1110fbc638f12613300fb5f8c
cd23110590dfcdaf0a1e77e3ef59d64c4de354c3
58910 F20110410_AAAJSW parajon_a_Page_66.pro
6e0fa1c096dbd248abf04eeb5b1c00a4
0600c8bf5ba49f4b9ac3e64c5618764b9a5e639a
44338 F20110410_AAAJLB parajon_a_Page_40.jpg
827d1edb409a5f7cb676ba536f074a63
763fe4a7bb30475329f0deb66cdc6731bc98dbaa
886493 F20110410_AAAJNZ parajon_a_Page_59.jp2
fd1de6861c7c0e27841550cc21489d00
6fdff6042355bd9656788af4e0744e6aeed6edb6
502 F20110410_AAAJXV parajon_a_Page_02thm.jpg
c6fb36489f7bf4fe024ba2e43bc42914
d98fa90ee6ed774f66564d1215c9ff711d6240ce
22006 F20110410_AAAJSX parajon_a_Page_67.pro
fe39c92f2add08825370932701477da0
c4da00015481e5cf62dbf220e07d7954dc7872cb
74955 F20110410_AAAJLC parajon_a_Page_42.jpg
24ed85fcd66cdb2b763eac67181f127a
55f622d5b0bd85376402381fe909680c154ff045
F20110410_AAAJQA parajon_a_Page_55.tif
daac28946833e5c9bf1378904a9888d2
3de44188de1acc27bfaa182e14b41ba16846e8be
19298 F20110410_AAAJSY parajon_a_Page_68.pro
ad7f28efcfc20bfec6cbb4d4870fb999
8aeb768121ffccd66bcdcdbb5790913dc9e8cbab
58966 F20110410_AAAJLD parajon_a_Page_43.jpg
8204e34528e8e2b6fcca0f120de80712
fa603324ad67fa4355729fa4a46b51d5cc8eb421
503 F20110410_AAAJXW parajon_a_Page_03thm.jpg
9730d07a6ee0a29ff678c677538e87e0
55ca5e26a6ff71c3d81e30cc26e0f08421f04c33
F20110410_AAAJQB parajon_a_Page_56.tif
af73de8233fe7a536eb66fcbdebe5914
ca0209c227df72154483674ae6d564ff22d40766
466 F20110410_AAAJSZ parajon_a_Page_01.txt
4dc334ea46cc98202f84cd32bb3723ef
8e531cc9dcfad76259ee1bf38ec633129646975f
59455 F20110410_AAAJLE parajon_a_Page_44.jpg
037193d842b6b6679670baf28324e3ea
5916f354a7993923ffad272c517ca43831acf8d3
3736 F20110410_AAAJXX parajon_a_Page_04thm.jpg
17d22af052a1db3d8960e46bed4f29de
1d1bc8ab573e7778be8c29d9187de03e39a80650
F20110410_AAAJQC parajon_a_Page_57.tif
18efe61e64914546a4c2f2333f7e7120
393d589b11377a4eeabb4db8ddc60725019b8bf3
54937 F20110410_AAAJLF parajon_a_Page_45.jpg
aed550cf906a8a521bfee921c60e73c4
4deb14b2402597ed0ecc51823f9806b1c618a4ba
4317 F20110410_AAAJXY parajon_a_Page_05thm.jpg
a9b5ed1f432ff50ff797691734ecc0dc
538393652ef042801e20a02dd8590b14955214ad
F20110410_AAAJQD parajon_a_Page_58.tif
060238b2194e268fc2a2e2928dc16884
c9e046b2f04e480fda53ca034454743f78e9cf89
61636 F20110410_AAAJLG parajon_a_Page_46.jpg
8c515a313184d6aac5799889674cae2d
e4bd43d08853d203c7b3695c691d54ee19abdaca
1970 F20110410_AAAJVA parajon_a_Page_62.txt
6dc0c3b6f6eeb41a70af58aa149708b1
cca35fdf6a97605827dd28d33f75c8bce4876d2d
4840 F20110410_AAAJXZ parajon_a_Page_06thm.jpg
9b4de92719f2bbefca35826c18648369
4bf3655a9944603862559afbc392e8c0ea6c6fdc
F20110410_AAAJQE parajon_a_Page_59.tif
0397ea6449b71e6ff8ee17034b2c36c1
23a6cd4b050cde17b1fe8055f1eb48ff8dbe9873
66494 F20110410_AAAJLH parajon_a_Page_47.jpg
d4d9501b4ee83c206caf203543c29098
2fc93f0e1f36dad6bb4bb897f97960e2a9133f55
1602 F20110410_AAAJVB parajon_a_Page_63.txt
6f3a92d2272980c0a81b8cdf5bf94c29
38d4d95e78dad35b224cf8dba0bae16f7b72dba4
F20110410_AAAJQF parajon_a_Page_60.tif
971e582fa41e6679b6c0e8e141ec55c7
0109388228bfbbc28f5ad811da53ebacd54a1a8f
86632 F20110410_AAAJLI parajon_a_Page_48.jpg
f4c11e67f7c6dff44feb934060515a25
6a7cc28b61434b51ad034eb53c068dd0c240449e
1909 F20110410_AAAJVC parajon_a_Page_64.txt
edc428f136c6bc1149fb8b5d8b06b2ec
c845c6e98c068ab18283bc6656f2f40ff27a0fa6
F20110410_AAAJQG parajon_a_Page_61.tif
aa092cb7567ae7436df3b1267745613d
8deec1cadc613cab7e04ed391fc7714b800648dd
59401 F20110410_AAAJLJ parajon_a_Page_49.jpg
696062aeacea8a04cbe5a88c2e6e2d8b
bf505762d5a7538c253192c0983f45aa69c3f4aa
2238 F20110410_AAAJVD parajon_a_Page_65.txt
67c10c624d4983bfe44cf2f7e0c5e121
8d6b95750fdf5615bb657dd0671b923654edaa52
F20110410_AAAJQH parajon_a_Page_62.tif
c06861ded6802c6617c1edc1b3f4aba0
2c57fc4c9b4b1ebe31ae1f2d3ac6860715f04ad4
2386 F20110410_AAAJVE parajon_a_Page_66.txt
b3b1f0c209fa8d6a9009aa64e5cbd3f1
1842ee0a2d9ae384aad5d74da423adeb3e0397b9
F20110410_AAAJQI parajon_a_Page_63.tif
26c650bd9db99e50fdd0f351db68460d
6878c61987ce2dd4b8a1b61c8437f53dd394a961
73702 F20110410_AAAJLK parajon_a_Page_50.jpg
89b0c634cf0aee1bbafe25553656d804
707f53e2591176509ae134166d5da8a755c61cec
900 F20110410_AAAJVF parajon_a_Page_67.txt
15d8f2ec5dc485c5ee0306261215ec05
679d71e339e658ede97981d4fa1d59e44fdffe40
F20110410_AAAJQJ parajon_a_Page_64.tif
97072c4e1cdf9d0a7d67534a7dc76061
e6ec9ed34baf460147986e4b302000c8b49abf9d
82466 F20110410_AAAJLL parajon_a_Page_51.jpg
534a5a617f922f6eb01c54dbb637d378
322c357a25d19f5472eb61ecefc13b6e678b65d0
814 F20110410_AAAJVG parajon_a_Page_68.txt
cad6fb6e4de2ea35c93508922846ae74
3bb04c92a427161a7a1ca3d57bb52808395af261
F20110410_AAAJQK parajon_a_Page_65.tif
4afec4aae3b8cd4f75a7123d0ed7a8f1
34ac8125f0e22b3fad68149e6e99f7501c8a71ca
68396 F20110410_AAAJLM parajon_a_Page_52.jpg
a548cc3107418ea409f9a19f2c00f2a0
81ac97bbcfec5e259037a19da5bcdd7bae513dc0
230075 F20110410_AAAJVH parajon_a.pdf
23a2bc498b303a178e779747b57f7eb1
a9f36e332a545570eb8bbf6ab4f36661bf114eb6
F20110410_AAAJQL parajon_a_Page_66.tif
e0b4b73e4dc9cfa449547bb46a34ea22
0ce4fbbf89dec7943d76dc21282ff4e462d4483f
71270 F20110410_AAAJLN parajon_a_Page_53.jpg
cda8f060d8a3aa7ba87bfcdb89c35a87
5c4c9194ecfd8e5a24f5d686d00c8342c1f39f55
1810 F20110410_AAAJVI parajon_a_Page_01thm.jpg
a67634392f37250124662cac85dbd1c2
24cb26b99428beb853dd961c5cab3916b18b94cf
F20110410_AAAJQM parajon_a_Page_67.tif
5b1b4c9d4219203f1cbfa8e223a7bd9a
e3193dde4df08e16040e0e4b1a92d8e1473df907
79681 F20110410_AAAJLO parajon_a_Page_54.jpg
39dfdab011de5eb90709c827b8a2b29f
883fdb8ade0908cf08e7bbb490e6165e760a845c
2861 F20110410_AAAJVJ parajon_a_Page_07thm.jpg
7ef4ee75b010294bd37225fab3273f71
f54468b88262f6282080fc3e9c79f02702297581
F20110410_AAAJQN parajon_a_Page_68.tif
2b9b7f02683c1bff2a8186a5c9d6d71a
acf6cad18bd67b3d06036006ae624a0395f1e614
81229 F20110410_AAAJLP parajon_a_Page_56.jpg
50cc0a8df098f5ca1f70e20858c5ba78
dcb24b0af00ac661ad3f4313e5fe33ee620bfb94
22027 F20110410_AAAJVK parajon_a_Page_36.QC.jpg
564f71dda1017bd61a4900a7b4e69a54
4773986c336c27ac13aa67232455d0d981e79d3b
8397 F20110410_AAAJQO parajon_a_Page_01.pro
3c732ff5632453cc5ab1076b13fbbc4e
033cb2d7cf799f9e94188165c4b0a09d41d805f1
59921 F20110410_AAAJLQ parajon_a_Page_57.jpg
d3d80fe19436eccf4a05f01e83297565
9b0a1d40c33ec7ac84ff2de9f4e6963611fb0862
1202 F20110410_AAAJVL parajon_a_Page_03.QC.jpg
645ac20257d85079176441bdc740e186
f4d1301f623c82db8cc3bcf5fcca125ede41da42
71367 F20110410_AAAJLR parajon_a_Page_58.jpg
305308cdea98c47c0be48c05b914f806
7bed48f16d8036b4c50e92dc0476f0871ed8c81a
23833 F20110410_AAAJVM parajon_a_Page_35.QC.jpg
f09f0f3838bedc493f30f2f76233ad00
27ab9f2f08acbc4fa0330ae33d995afd425d1796
1096 F20110410_AAAJQP parajon_a_Page_02.pro
d5a606ff14f7c08b71eda6d3943a0967
8e8b1e9b76687f7f3175b2438ac4beef7ac5b3f0
72848 F20110410_AAAJLS parajon_a_Page_59.jpg
b9add4d94ea62d2fad28ef210d3a1fdc
fd6d4f9d944e9083b6a3f4b993dc005bcfeeda70
111790 F20110410_AAAJVN UFE0015408_00001.xml FULL
9437888fac257f784d053d049ca5d23b
8985da692d3f8804103fcf0d24f6c598d35cb7a9
1352 F20110410_AAAJQQ parajon_a_Page_03.pro
ed535a3065fd8faaca91aef0a962f354
d87b917fecc47be2d34a7f1bea12a966c5cecc52
44347 F20110410_AAAJLT parajon_a_Page_60.jpg
5cc2ef5104462fa515f15fcb0b6c0a33
0d1995b143bb3edc5f8417ff10994bfeb37e89f9
6994 F20110410_AAAJVO parajon_a_Page_01.QC.jpg
64996c1225f9ebfe1036eb1fd2fc5fe4
cec586a9e102a28f06c9852f8a51a34fc2396419
67882 F20110410_AAAJQR parajon_a_Page_05.pro
4a7b02f2c26006f3d2017c4221a00d74
c05e2736ace04aed97aae57710d5fc2aabd047c3
71742 F20110410_AAAJLU parajon_a_Page_61.jpg
78ce779118eee2c1eb480405692fd7f8
be4609bb863d33198bbc014f98072df656cd32f5
1313 F20110410_AAAJVP parajon_a_Page_02.QC.jpg
fbb0acae93ed2918f3a9eb3e834a1006
25266d17aa2b8a97880e89ac39df06e11af45345
65463 F20110410_AAAJQS parajon_a_Page_06.pro
9dce97a57f4690433b7d65edbc286442
70cdedfd18b25baf31950c48652a86273f19e381
81793 F20110410_AAAJLV parajon_a_Page_62.jpg
bf0f940047f2c15dad6d0fc538af5b7e
5a69b4bc2d480f6f6db595a6f5a9e2cd26f27a49
14767 F20110410_AAAJVQ parajon_a_Page_04.QC.jpg
2dd3395323b3c48fe96f0e8c67b936eb
b4d0b166f04ee525faefaafdc2b0c4b2b6aa9b48
22102 F20110410_AAAJQT parajon_a_Page_07.pro
01899e495f5af93fe51fe760b7206cad
7b8fcc6ea0866554132497c6511865b6d0e8178a
65785 F20110410_AAAJLW parajon_a_Page_63.jpg
f09cf9bbb8941a3805c4c577418983ad
d61e1f4f0dadcc100b702f70530c9c3368dd9074
17835 F20110410_AAAJVR parajon_a_Page_05.QC.jpg
d3c763c1c0895b6439304a6fbb97916d
a26f72894c45ebe6c9ca160c50c3b8f1e5dbd3b5
76850 F20110410_AAAJLX parajon_a_Page_64.jpg
ad5eed4b99361796a51dd6e45ac6f35d
5f986d46598ba7b15243f9bb759cf9a90f8e0dff
19734 F20110410_AAAJVS parajon_a_Page_06.QC.jpg
7f3796fce0102fed28ef6c831cec1c77
6cb261a124e5f5a7f301a64c35ce99f8cee1370b
29101 F20110410_AAAJQU parajon_a_Page_08.pro
6a621af935dd6045778de06813920199
9d970afca1e744ea760ca2ffa909f2c983ad02d3
F20110410_AAAJJA parajon_a_Page_07.tif
b035d51b2bc05c57df4fa9388f99ae7a
1b3c527e28ca27565198cffebdbd0eb5bcb96d67
99577 F20110410_AAAJLY parajon_a_Page_65.jpg
488b4a831dffe76a244a96db14142e6e
53b4c083f98a416ad6df235dac93a22221353717
10336 F20110410_AAAJVT parajon_a_Page_07.QC.jpg
7f1c08013d7488f80f0b0bfdf3212652
9b7f5b8d9f3c7ddcdf98b3cfbf60f6a28a0943ab
39553 F20110410_AAAJQV parajon_a_Page_09.pro
aef113050805884023b3bceb6a1fa835
1a733da7e4f0ab80abe0b49bb0254c6ee58cba0c
F20110410_AAAJJB parajon_a_Page_17.tif
726b42696593f7bc2a6f9a00c4d75303
9c8afc206a3c4c095c5d8064d500c7228e6a9835
103982 F20110410_AAAJLZ parajon_a_Page_66.jpg
9c4c771acce0433e79007d36dad03bcb
384a0806b8810d6c5d45323fe6e51542b530a5ee
40687 F20110410_AAAJQW parajon_a_Page_11.pro
e25ab28ba1105f4da9787fa16353a4ca
b73e08c2d60b9dcd78a9e8585e03bb0150a4e75d
5472 F20110410_AAAJJC parajon_a_Page_64thm.jpg
385e77ff54b5d445ddedc0ee11eeeae3
426290bfff2e96fd6c170620e5daac6586c44c0d
9663 F20110410_AAAJVU parajon_a_Page_08.QC.jpg
273b303864398dcb8891c04c751d8753
dd0d512e222dad799a21996c0e1a709a8935ffe4
39596 F20110410_AAAJQX parajon_a_Page_13.pro
5b44662d145bd5c7156e47927d5565f4
97469363c6a1f0a273d157f1e334f8ecf6fb94ac
F20110410_AAAJJD parajon_a_Page_19.tif
a7f927faeef7f2863de8d59f58e26208
50743f546c9b8cbe2429ab2c26fd6d54370c5e9d
7406 F20110410_AAAJVV parajon_a_Page_10.QC.jpg
ca3b6f4d1f85ab513c755225c7aaaeaf
1f17fae416d5328a01d641e45d252819593c84b2
56673 F20110410_AAAJOA parajon_a_Page_60.jp2
23afaf2b40c66b3efe4875fe3512338a
7d06b489ae6b3d83e0b456da393c405c86431276
43267 F20110410_AAAJQY parajon_a_Page_14.pro
9834b61175570266336b07bdcbdfd05f
0ec6d684fcdc997520503bc00aff7d8384c6943d
1922 F20110410_AAAJJE parajon_a_Page_23.txt
1ddf5f6e1e4feabb17a1b8f7e4a60383
c51a7e042c22e28525838480ea2ffe019263017b
21614 F20110410_AAAJVW parajon_a_Page_11.QC.jpg
88ef401fb6f154d987903db4e267daad
030786db94994eac3366bf7ff17cd6723d6cdda3
92751 F20110410_AAAJOB parajon_a_Page_61.jp2
3b96e79ae67b07ba344be09ceb562848
343cc08ee59cb0e88a8c4565c3302bbd7b83a34a
40805 F20110410_AAAJQZ parajon_a_Page_15.pro
fa9d73b39ad1e32aabfabb42d80956f2
f66a439649ebda3a01eccb6aa326809a8a0b2d02
668003 F20110410_AAAJJF parajon_a_Page_45.jp2
a337da6c6c425572db2533f01fae1aa4
e2f4324f30a6812d4e04d6436a206337bd32e3fd
21255 F20110410_AAAJVX parajon_a_Page_12.QC.jpg
471c7992db7a83059e72148f5aff7856
5f6c91fa32f58fcb9e9feef120eef58d435822bc
104990 F20110410_AAAJOC parajon_a_Page_62.jp2
27af8f274bb92df2c0387a9caaa8b94c
84677d97533867a09032d5bdd866954d25b9b4cb
F20110410_AAAJJG parajon_a_Page_42.tif
2995bb81d9ddb3d210c5cb60c4fb625e
22d2eb5b46418bd69c4c574c4b8abb5d48315874
110 F20110410_AAAJTA parajon_a_Page_02.txt
13ab255411de0de6bbca7c016d5b1239
eaaa32b8aa35595509f65fdbf2d8a3463789c3c2
21134 F20110410_AAAJVY parajon_a_Page_13.QC.jpg
0b9d474b2a941af9b8e283bbbe4c3814
922ef327d6246b66be613040a0d921edcfec06dc
86540 F20110410_AAAJOD parajon_a_Page_63.jp2
181e69b97d082adce6cf01834e126b22
e4e50242887a394931c86774b2e3ea4c1f1a0772
5785 F20110410_AAAJJH parajon_a_Page_47thm.jpg
9d8c4ac4cf7dea6afdbd7373f536b598
e6eb2ccf84232f255189bdd7f9adb58f9a6f4d13
106 F20110410_AAAJTB parajon_a_Page_03.txt
2992f66f1053fb720b4c17b4f60ac0ad
d4d4b124f2a3d78b42e589ebc45a795b65e764e0
22300 F20110410_AAAJVZ parajon_a_Page_14.QC.jpg
577c9fce82ee8ddf0597ee582a9baa17
50999c7faa847aabecea02497135b8f6b08c86a2
102562 F20110410_AAAJOE parajon_a_Page_64.jp2
646e2eeb7b8251454f50e2c849ed1526
cea334a8846920f9451f49c0f7b34fc5d618e9cf
1107 F20110410_AAAJTC parajon_a_Page_04.txt
e56929f0b5166dd955c7ea250e7a56c7
c041a5c436b42d0c50b10732e708e75c6c71ed70
1051953 F20110410_AAAJOF parajon_a_Page_65.jp2
7b79748aa4badceedb1eb88ba082e903
aab2d5be738af4665c33d46a6ffc2a97619702c7
2669 F20110410_AAAKAA parajon_a_Page_67thm.jpg
6481392e524bcf3ba5889bc9ae3163ac
9448c754da742f2524639353666bd921e3bf2281
5073 F20110410_AAAJYA parajon_a_Page_09thm.jpg
40e012b6f7e3f381f10d34be80b6313e
1f4cb003f078451d608dadc899573c607ba61dec
2902 F20110410_AAAJTD parajon_a_Page_05.txt
027a507f28ddc9ffb63fde050b5250d3
1598270f857f738a8853fe0b498b7b3ca7e3bf95
1051963 F20110410_AAAJOG parajon_a_Page_66.jp2
9e130f1e05190836bed996e925ed6d1d
edc3414ce6953ab785b1ca31db8fdc0ef009ade9
24335 F20110410_AAAJJI parajon_a_Page_54.QC.jpg
d8aae04887f3d9c28d46ad876d041430
5fd469334541d69579aaab11f03826d356c53cc7
2909 F20110410_AAAKAB parajon_a_Page_68thm.jpg
f96ae84f4db5043a033af64cf92fab28
39f519cc7bb07e43695092b23666ce33cdb0915c
1789 F20110410_AAAJYB parajon_a_Page_10thm.jpg
f92b345e816edbc1da2fa4cc1517cbda
12b88bb60fc862159da934c0b9e4b87e5cf8f8bb
2846 F20110410_AAAJTE parajon_a_Page_06.txt
33485192ef163d9335ec632dca0fdac0
6044e961a60724c5170bf663151e14cdadaba62d
50431 F20110410_AAAJOH parajon_a_Page_67.jp2
89aa27cf95d34874353421ce045dc675
4abe9349c1b6f3e69ca749ed1277a43ac11bf249
38566 F20110410_AAAJJJ parajon_a_Page_12.pro
4de90fde846a7bb874eaab909c6f2af1
f029188a6988ff4b234390333c83d5a03f6edef1
5302 F20110410_AAAJYC parajon_a_Page_11thm.jpg
4e24eed5e47a4162cad921617413b0bd
1f3d3db01320ca357a8d7264251a1ac38d9c7465
893 F20110410_AAAJTF parajon_a_Page_07.txt
6718359083d60c351474259be31659ec
5846192b16647a82eff9a4d354af53184c31d224
45507 F20110410_AAAJOI parajon_a_Page_68.jp2
7875e9492eed2ec3945dd2a8b7889aba
d3c5a92b0c26aa25eb31b1b519822a2618adf5ae
1718 F20110410_AAAJJK parajon_a_Page_25.txt
837257f76b6b6c67956706cba422dc51
caf5724d5b089bb04b90e026ecc6900435217b15
5019 F20110410_AAAJYD parajon_a_Page_12thm.jpg
cc82693d253d4fc9f2d46563b35c36b1
a680819b2487800ad7d8a4cf03e28a5ad9605f16
1264 F20110410_AAAJTG parajon_a_Page_08.txt
de4c1a0177638b89686965a2eadbb2dd
95b748fc215c9d6fa8c253fdbe61a2c5d66a1abc
F20110410_AAAJOJ parajon_a_Page_02.tif
5bf987d5134c024d072c8a9d3ad3585b
c376354841a51320bbda22faeee13f475e2432c6
5477 F20110410_AAAJJL parajon_a_Page_25thm.jpg
80d8e940491c6141d27ebf150adc0ea6
8ec3272ca7f2809b7162317e1d44b76bc0ce136e
5242 F20110410_AAAJYE parajon_a_Page_13thm.jpg
ee7b670291c03ad3904d54a38f2f1f38
c2393a5a37dbe3e297af6b45f24236f5a6b7a01d
1745 F20110410_AAAJTH parajon_a_Page_09.txt
38a404924308cf701274cbcba3904ceb
8cf349c0a76f99e85058ad1d60d7d4ef9c405278
F20110410_AAAJOK parajon_a_Page_03.tif
433f4a05136bb2d9cd8f5d96bc734be9
468e5fe0c083b9b60fd8bda44262931b3bd5c9a6
F20110410_AAAJJM parajon_a_Page_15.txt
dcdcd5206cb068e668b8cdbfe7078d85
f74d155d0f541d86d6c555c3116e30390d621504
5415 F20110410_AAAJYF parajon_a_Page_14thm.jpg
a3160e99cdd872c48afa70c168a1abdb
26f58e60795562f27836d1de188be55eeff86204
F20110410_AAAJTI parajon_a_Page_10.txt
e97771ca78d5528a043328b8b420f8ce
6ef33d1fd8ef5af8b8d5b2298748b5b887f59931
F20110410_AAAJOL parajon_a_Page_04.tif
0fc909e98c1fc4dcbd05c2fec8cb6c94
437b91204c5c46d8183983474c46ceefae27a3bb
1794 F20110410_AAAJJN parajon_a_Page_29.txt
033d6be41d5206b8f9a84ab0ea6361a3
7fd116ee045a256aca4efd4e24d02b6fedd2ed9d
5356 F20110410_AAAJYG parajon_a_Page_15thm.jpg
f61e48806ebcc4a2392ac7f06a682442
8934528cd275d5ca8112fd629402f41fa7896fb3
1707 F20110410_AAAJTJ parajon_a_Page_11.txt
d8e3a21c608e0c32cc1fa4588df0cc35
db179b9a9c0328dbfbf9eee70e46b03ee0cb7a1a
F20110410_AAAJOM parajon_a_Page_05.tif
a8c6f7edbc72fb947deda5bf12c2d51c
d79e5039edd5c713b8d159c990b9472cbf4db63d
12581 F20110410_AAAJJO parajon_a_Page_10.pro
5d8ec88f26eac2df4ab0499ed03e0cf0
343f97a6cbf41778f372092d016309a846707141
5257 F20110410_AAAJYH parajon_a_Page_16thm.jpg
00a0b9cf139faba3ad29b9bb8ab5a4e7
a9f18d67eb2ebeda57f5a9caa225b14251729ef6
1580 F20110410_AAAJTK parajon_a_Page_12.txt
d85203934f03eaf0ab0f132f28518887
d9852630d99cd4d3da2e3cfa01b30e47e7d65b96
69842 F20110410_AAAJJP parajon_a_Page_55.jpg
a4aee71abeb345e20a482b3f593b2b73
d3d7f9a188b19dec7f2c98970967e6d1d60f20fb
5161 F20110410_AAAJYI parajon_a_Page_17thm.jpg
83347af2f97e178d6757bd9dd3fcafe4
fd0ed9d5979b97cef6e71996337804c2e6bfab50
1605 F20110410_AAAJTL parajon_a_Page_13.txt
3e8af0819d44d092d8dfa5768d0a58ac
2a9ae143978e8fff2e97d0de86022555b987bf8d
F20110410_AAAJON parajon_a_Page_06.tif
f12ecb6be76c2664c79710d2874e6f62
ed174c273c209e6c65295b0671aac13e48a21e87
26701 F20110410_AAAJJQ parajon_a_Page_04.pro
b87debe0725f7d7f0bbff689c0bfe671
eb84ef5bee7582718f4be5f89eb0d9b9259c50af
5395 F20110410_AAAJYJ parajon_a_Page_18thm.jpg
80ad59aa72569e8e5afdb5bd3a376c0d
1c71a062354f48d02915b0ad98af9a51fdc714f4
1734 F20110410_AAAJTM parajon_a_Page_14.txt
0833dec9d7507339fb72727a7dfe5f32
aa654685a2cf07881d7c710f85dee639c1fe0dd5
F20110410_AAAJOO parajon_a_Page_08.tif
873e3465acbe2ebbcc0f324b53c7f915
1f3f16592b0d60414a4d88fc13b76f7f7a3ff589
118807 F20110410_AAAJJR parajon_a_Page_31.jp2
326d9d77581aa65bae25a9183da00ba8
c5b431729104e682784d53fa0ac5c07fcae336c4
5008 F20110410_AAAJYK parajon_a_Page_19thm.jpg
a4c9fa07e4edfb7ea3cf3f31b57d9e99
5d7e5f55340946566ec1ab69a163fe8932972c1c
1554 F20110410_AAAJTN parajon_a_Page_16.txt
6fac599a55086c9fa046fb4f8721ef8f
d3a30dcd56b5427251cc3301b893f562872bb5e8
F20110410_AAAJOP parajon_a_Page_10.tif
fc8fcfeab8c67d40cb88eb8fe16f6317
40719023090627f20d59fe0a980a3c090b4e9e22
80827 F20110410_AAAJJS UFE0015408_00001.mets
e5df2942a43a537bdc290539f58549da
2565d0948bc8ee88e86a5f0391fa2775f4a5a010
5616 F20110410_AAAJYL parajon_a_Page_20thm.jpg
4a60f5ea5d72cadad61e6cac2620052f
eacc2149c294b22e8956c9db3555bd0dd2b5df8c
1601 F20110410_AAAJTO parajon_a_Page_17.txt
a484f01e922744574f751d32c7bf4cc9
63288c7133931350be9abd9a413d398cff1677c2
F20110410_AAAJOQ parajon_a_Page_11.tif
f742cc8ca2c9f340aa29f49f655bd0da
181b23414abe36f38e882a7bd5b2d8fecb565830
F20110410_AAAJYM parajon_a_Page_21thm.jpg
a32f22b08687c962e55abd9e3b2b9ed2
fda85f27e649d0b0e3a1b76951ac98425e9d09ae
F20110410_AAAJTP parajon_a_Page_18.txt
73938b85451c54be8dc53c2dbae57735
5cd985d90005b91bb91eba57547d5e978409f021
F20110410_AAAJOR parajon_a_Page_12.tif
468747d21c93d2a948589e5766842fe0
40bd16530a01b344507f5599a4e9ec912cac3236
4927 F20110410_AAAJYN parajon_a_Page_22thm.jpg
1c6e10144c9ff7c7832356e22260473d
b9262897733290eab7e945548df401fd8770639c
1546 F20110410_AAAJTQ parajon_a_Page_19.txt
1df8d0272e92ef2e6c1b933f10c2a8ee
6297f20997086556a58e98e95a2d84063df8ad70
F20110410_AAAJOS parajon_a_Page_13.tif
60067879e0e685c3e5b0ee5916daef49
80d92d2e48f06bcd2e61087ac994a8ab8e7042bc
23049 F20110410_AAAJJV parajon_a_Page_01.jpg
cd2eb6ad92b9e790200495cd081139c4
1772aae6f231dd519ea69510cf5b8a3b36e7e835
5996 F20110410_AAAJYO parajon_a_Page_23thm.jpg
25271d2f6d00b67c734f7ba91915ad47
2ac44d0e8e077bd6768a8f819cf01e45be74c4e5
F20110410_AAAJOT parajon_a_Page_14.tif
26936d7ac956567147c2b68ddc91e0f6
a30d7c8641031e76b5b1128bd30e0d25e2e9d412
4069 F20110410_AAAJJW parajon_a_Page_02.jpg
3ef279c6acb7d7ad670e24477be48016
828cbb3c0a237b9f4676e863ac6d060cc38ee888
1786 F20110410_AAAJTR parajon_a_Page_20.txt
e3e6e13e1fb880a02ae343b4f130bd8b
59eec7d4ec747b6d2c8f14f8794db546daeb25bc
5322 F20110410_AAAJYP parajon_a_Page_24thm.jpg
4a1c5d066e804a3aabe94e0b70e3a75d
b4daf0edbd1f22f1a99beeaab7267bc4dc55054c
F20110410_AAAJOU parajon_a_Page_15.tif
c6f900c2e764a547da32e1f29e670191
4779d4a30b5ce9e8b0b947cdd8e2d7937441651d
4509 F20110410_AAAJJX parajon_a_Page_03.jpg
381e34ce72778092c95337459bd80399
4414dbf9de1cc4887a2c1fb87e7f13082b93c307
3278 F20110410_AAAJYQ parajon_a_Page_27thm.jpg
f4ea293b8749938c6cba452d75675254
155f27ef686ea860af3ad915abeb87d5e2b9994c
F20110410_AAAJOV parajon_a_Page_16.tif
b2787889c282069305a7cfbda4a202a2
6366897d35c38e80d2e6ff4bfd08a7112df90a99
47656 F20110410_AAAJJY parajon_a_Page_04.jpg
2750953512dbb89c3a38faee76abe102
7936e5c4d721bebae5608100c7d074a4817ae57a
1977 F20110410_AAAJTS parajon_a_Page_21.txt
94eea9deab7d63f0e04fe7362cbfdbfe
984bec336a452a94c7030047e3e35e24a7344b4d
4824 F20110410_AAAJYR parajon_a_Page_28thm.jpg
bad17ea876cdec99946c03b110024b52
fa7c9c7d2e6057abfa32dcef54b9c0a32847b959
F20110410_AAAJOW parajon_a_Page_18.tif
afbe7e3a81195bcbfb511bef7204e328
b775eea74e8538a7497262c4fe614f61ff0ef04a
87422 F20110410_AAAJJZ parajon_a_Page_06.jpg
cebd622db14bbaa51a84d9b1a0e0c3a9
5b3f9b364ae56b9c759e73971c01fc93b405f209
1557 F20110410_AAAJTT parajon_a_Page_22.txt
a30c3ec20d90d5b890808c47aa894c4e
0e75debadbe7f3cca13c8bd153b1f1e6a6c33835
5946 F20110410_AAAJYS parajon_a_Page_29thm.jpg
29f5a30301127b8517970a118af643e1
a789c0ad8c40d1d6a170a1d670dae3ad9fe979c6
F20110410_AAAJOX parajon_a_Page_21.tif
cfb5d2bfe64207da546717d0c808490d
c697c8d111e2bcd76d71b9bdc61e3ae302947252
1730 F20110410_AAAJTU parajon_a_Page_24.txt
faa1d02e5a096e59f3f0bf744ccf3dac
4ae5b1c884fbc4f32f6064bd12bf6171e0143e0b
F20110410_AAAJYT parajon_a_Page_31thm.jpg
563ab10db2a4b045512a9d5b8019a701
7e985a13d88d1e2697a3c95e48cd1002bef946ec
40344 F20110410_AAAJMA parajon_a_Page_67.jpg
f9f3517123373b97d09c3855fac814dd
752e7facc7a236d770a1c617c52d0268bd4eb9dd
F20110410_AAAJOY parajon_a_Page_22.tif
af974e3232a838fe53de6fcd052c7100
ab2d794b4d29a0b4f931bd83f7ad4d7bbf0ec1b9
1964 F20110410_AAAJTV parajon_a_Page_26.txt
3fe229e4dc03218d92fc50f6e72e2071
73b8edccd350138999a01c0c950ba08acf9ad7f7
4828 F20110410_AAAJYU parajon_a_Page_33thm.jpg
3c6ba092dfcbdf7921dcb0db404e5218
f7f926104db15487dbb6e79b1f71a09086e07007
25065 F20110410_AAAJMB parajon_a_Page_01.jp2
0589189c59c36938db93b9c05a9d2e9e
0c16431a2621c8bcb200b9ed42db94b7ad5f9f60
F20110410_AAAJOZ parajon_a_Page_23.tif
3be3e3fafd4d6595899a846be4f54aab
b2a0854c2eb67059228a910a6273bb6a5fc58bbd
962 F20110410_AAAJTW parajon_a_Page_27.txt
6df99649bcac942ed9bae7066bef4a30
3e2572e4a5538c4481aeb26f5d4c8104469fc422
5799 F20110410_AAAJYV parajon_a_Page_34thm.jpg
a400ef6529558d16024498397774b410
4540ea4442e042e71987fadb970124749650254f
5429 F20110410_AAAJMC parajon_a_Page_02.jp2
186ccf06aacdb4169be8a04992e6aa3f
818b2174a060b6d52021b224c24dd0d2d528798b
1948 F20110410_AAAJTX parajon_a_Page_30.txt
0f43ca056bf4461fbeaa00e20dbdfee1
9e06754e4b2740868397dcab700f10c9d5a7e393
6089 F20110410_AAAJYW parajon_a_Page_35thm.jpg
3036d5ff25ef2b84b31e5da0115d94da
4f96bef44079f459ca02f6c79121a8902f06a685
5937 F20110410_AAAJMD parajon_a_Page_03.jp2
e18911b870b415fa63308cede601f92e
110b40c36371f1516f421174732e084b13074551
39809 F20110410_AAAJRA parajon_a_Page_17.pro
efed02c37889169270d5072c68628a62
227e071c90dac38617d80b874a7ca0ab04e89dfb
1654 F20110410_AAAJTY parajon_a_Page_32.txt
ccb9876ebaa95cfffe45221f57e3dcdb
740e888f447f405cb6890d26d13da3a73f735e70
41776 F20110410_AAAJRB parajon_a_Page_18.pro
60b2b798a0783384d7fef3d6ff6cf320
c0845f98fcaba28604b22c0f8d5f01bde1615fe7
2175 F20110410_AAAJTZ parajon_a_Page_33.txt
fb895da54a46d7c9bb95ed435e424943
5ee57312e4d2de28281ac81810a526e1cc676052
F20110410_AAAJME parajon_a_Page_05.jp2
1286bcd6685859504a13ea0587086bdb
a4340b47be487e8460a70b0f453ad0ab6d114e87
5468 F20110410_AAAJYX parajon_a_Page_36thm.jpg
cbcb4b24648364d88bc25cf89a920654
211bd4b56c1dd4fc317334cc4995e7c1d726e8fe
38265 F20110410_AAAJRC parajon_a_Page_19.pro
614d5e892617d41ed54778354323d0bb
5cb16c7c5a45d2ace160fea472acc19bba194805
1051952 F20110410_AAAJMF parajon_a_Page_06.jp2
24f82efc569d2a5435694a6bb174b30f
1e9ecd371f004448183a29aeab0ba3c8c69fd67e
4873 F20110410_AAAJYY parajon_a_Page_37thm.jpg
bd70e0472ba13850fae756f21cbd48a7
4077ee12259004fadb0ad99e12a9c7af4a7d8a16
20955 F20110410_AAAJWA parajon_a_Page_15.QC.jpg
02439662d29a60172805dcadc5f3b1da
737e68ab307526560fef6a88542119f3f4b69b86
44523 F20110410_AAAJRD parajon_a_Page_20.pro
8a67864bced20ffadee2919f9b956bee
d71d44b1462399068c03bf0686ed09d43e7570f8
811631 F20110410_AAAJMG parajon_a_Page_07.jp2
4a6ca12475ab555c5d2968b30006f2f4
0ed539b21012a0fee1790f16fa0dddba6eaf6ff8



PAGE 1

MICROFINANCE NON-GOVERN MENTAL OR GANIZATIONS EVOLUTION TO COMMERCIAL BANKS: SOUTH AMERICAN CASE STUDY By LEVY PARAJON A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2006

PAGE 2

Copyright 2006 by Levy Parajon

PAGE 3

To my parents, Olivia and Lorenzo Parajon

PAGE 4

iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my parents for the self less act of moving to the United States to ensure a great education for their son. I l ove them both. I would al so like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Andy Naranjo. His dedica tion to my academic and career development is boundless, and I could not have complete d this document without his help. I would also like to thank Dr. McCoy for admitting me into the Latin American Studies program. The knowledge that I acquired through his c ourses will forever help me to understand Latin American political and economic devel opments. I would also like to thank Dr. Brown for admitting me to the Masters of Finance program. His belief in my abilities to complete the program allowed me to pursue my passion in finance. I would also like to thank Debbie Himes for working with me e ndlessly and helping me to maneuver the waters of graduate school. Finally, I w ould like to thank Rosalind Asuncion for her continuous support and for walking beside me in life.

PAGE 5

v TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................vii LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................viii ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Microfinance NGOs Evoluti on to Commercial Banks................................................1 Synthesis of Related Literature.....................................................................................2 Products and Services of Microfinance Institutions..............................................2 Microfinance Institutions Management.................................................................4 Clientele Targeting................................................................................................6 Gender targeting.............................................................................................6 Very poor versus marginally poor targeting..................................................7 Policy and Microfinance Institutions.....................................................................8 Microfinance Institutions Impact Assessment.......................................................9 Microfinance Institution Sustaina bility and Commercialization.........................10 Research Design.........................................................................................................14 Data Collection...........................................................................................................15 Hypotheses, Assumptions, and Limitations................................................................16 2 BUSINESS ENVIROMENT......................................................................................18 Industry....................................................................................................................... 18 Uneven Distribution of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) across Latin America............................................................................................................19 Credit Unions.......................................................................................................19 Increased Competition.........................................................................................22 Performance of Latin American MFIs Versus Asian MFIs........................................25 Overall Financial Performance............................................................................26 Outreach..............................................................................................................26 Funding................................................................................................................27 Savings Outreach.................................................................................................28

PAGE 6

vi Efficiency............................................................................................................28 Loans Rates Changed..........................................................................................29 Capital Markets...........................................................................................................29 Peru: Capital Markets..........................................................................................29 Bolivia: Capital Markets......................................................................................30 3 TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS.................................................................................31 Are NGOs That Transition into Regulated MFIs Profitable and Self-Sustainable?...31 Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/Equity...................................................32 Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income/ Assets..................................................34 Portfolio Yield= Interest and Fee Income/ Gross Portfolio.................................35 Will the Transition to a Regulated Bank Improve Efficiency of Resources and Administration?.......................................................................................................36 Efficiency and Productivity.................................................................................36 Financial Management........................................................................................38 Financial expense ratio = interest and fee expenses/gross portfolio............38 Cost of funds ratio = intere st and fee expenses on funding liabilities/fundi ng liabilities......................................................................40 Liquidity ratio = cash and bank curr ent accounts + readily marketable investments/total assets.............................................................................41 Debt/equity ratio = total liabilities/total equity............................................42 Portfolio Quality..................................................................................................44 Portfolio at risk = (outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + all refinanced loans)/ total outstanding gross portfolio.................................44 Write-off ratio = write-offs for the period/gross portfolio...........................46 Loan loss reserve ratio = loan lo ss reserves/ total outstanding gross portfolio....................................................................................................48 Risk coverage ratio = loan loss re serve/(outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + refinance loans)................................................................49 4 CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................51 LIST OF REFERENCES...................................................................................................54 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.............................................................................................58

PAGE 7

vii LIST OF TABLES Table page 2-1 Rapid rate of commercia lization in Latin America..................................................18 2-2 Share of microenterprise in Latin America with MFI credit....................................21 2-3 Rapid growth of MFIs..............................................................................................23 2-4 Slower credit union growth......................................................................................23 2-5 Returns of microfinance in Latin America: 1996 versus 2001 (%).........24 2-6 MFI lending by loan mythology and location of client............................................24 2-7 Deposits in nine microfinance markets (US$ millions, end-of-year values)...........25 2-8 Profile of the average MFI reporting to the Microba nking Bulletin (July 2003).....27

PAGE 8

viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 3-1 Return on equity.......................................................................................................33 3-2 Return on assets........................................................................................................34 3-3 Return on assets........................................................................................................35 3-4 Portfolio yield...........................................................................................................3 6 3-5 Operating expense ratio............................................................................................37 3-6 Financial expense ratio.............................................................................................39 3-7 Cost of funds ratio....................................................................................................40 3-8 Liquidity ratio...........................................................................................................4 2 3-9 Debt/equity ratio.......................................................................................................43 3-10 Portfolio at risk......................................................................................................... 45 3-11 Write-off ratio..........................................................................................................4 7 3-12 Loan loss reserve ratio..............................................................................................48 3-13 Risk coverage ratio...................................................................................................49

PAGE 9

ix Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Arts MICROFINANCE NON-GOVERN MENTAL OR GANIZATIONS EVOLUTION TO COMMERCIAL BANKS: SOUTH AMERICAN CASE STUDY By Levy Parajon August 2006 Chair: Andy Naranjo Major Department: Latin American Studies This study measures the transition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to commercial financial institutions from the inst itutionalist perspective, while the clientele effects as discussed in the welfare perspective remains an open question. I use financial ratios to analyze whether microfinance non-governmental organizations that have transitioned to commercial ba nks are profitable, sustainabl e, and more efficient with resources and administration. Profitability ratios demonstrate that microfinance institutions (MFIs) are profitable despite advers e conditions in the market place. As far as efficiency is concerned, the following year afte r privatization appears to be more efficient than the prior year of pr ivatization, signaling that MF Is who transition to lending institutions are more effici ent per unit of input to output. Financial management, on the other hand, takes a downturn in the transi tion from NGO to co mmercial financial institution. Finally, portfolio quality seems to be a positive and strong indicator of the transitioning process. However, portfolio quality benefits are not as strong as they appear.

PAGE 10

x Write offs suggest that portfolio at risk (PaR ) results were weaker. Loan loss reserves and risk coverage (a function of loan reserves) both tended to increase, a sign that either managers are being conservative, losses are e xpected, or the state is requiring higher loan reserves. Nonetheless, portfolio quality doe s show considerable improvement, further reinforcing that the transitioning process is beneficial to improving efficiency in the microfinance institution.

PAGE 11

1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Microfinance NGOs’ Evolution to Commercial Banks The birth of the microfinance industry in Latin America began in the early 1980s, when socially-minded NGOs began lending f unds to lenders of low economic resources in Latin America. The bulk of these loans we re funded primarily by soft loans and grants, governments, and large institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. By the outset of the early 1990s, there were a few microfinance institutions (MFIs) that became financiall y independent from soft loans and grants and began to transition to becoming commercial banks.1 The reason for this transition was simp le: if the microfinance NGOs did not develop into sustainable instit utions, they would be running th e risk of insolvency when donor interest changed.2 To prosper, MFIs would need to leverage their funds with savings that could be turned into loans in stead of relying on gran ts. In so doing, banks would minimize the risk that donors would dive rt funds at a future date and endanger the operations of the firm. In addition, by s eeking profitable operations, banks would open the door of opportunity for inve stor funds and growth of th e banks, along with depth of coverage in the industry. A further benefit from the commercialization of NGOs was better governance of financial institutions. NGOs have poor governance due to the lack of ownership and accountability. There are, in many cases, few accountability concerns 1 Stauffenberg, 2003 2 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 12

2 because of a lack of true ownership by other institutions or parties. By making the MFIs publicly owned by investors, the financial institutions would have more incentive to monitor operations adequately.3 Prodem, one of the banks stud ied in this research, led the way in transition and opened the door to many other banks that would soon come. Bancosol, Caja Municipales, Corposol, and the now bankrupt Finansol followed Prodem in this change to commercial banking. Th is transition, though, woul d not come without a cost, as NGOs began losing certain benefits they previously enjoyed, such as tax exemptions.4 Synthesis of Related Literature I will touch briefly on five of the six majo r topics in available literature, followed by an in-depth analysis of the sixth to pic, sustainability and commercialization. Products and Services of Microfinance Institutions MFIs provide comparable products and serv ices to traditional financial institutions. However, micro-credit loans are over whelmingly the most common product.5 Other products are now being offered by some MFIs as literature and dema nd have highlighted the need for products like savings, insurance, educa tion, and equity services.6 Eyiah (2001) develops Nourse’s idea into a mi crofinance application in construction management. Eyiah develops a model for a relationship between small contractors and MFIs.7, 8 3Stauffenberg, 2003 4 Stauffenberg, 2003 5 Nourse, 2001 6 Nourse, 2001 7 Eyiah, 2001

PAGE 13

3 The need for financial services worldwide is obvious in the ubiquitous dubious loan and collection practices often offered by “loan sharks.” Perry (2002) examines this issue by studying women in Senegal who use villag e bank money to become moneylenders profitably.9 Ismail and Ahmad (1997) also study the issue of demand by focusing on pawnshops in Malaysia.10 They conclude that pawnshops have increased in the role of financial services and will conti nue to grow in the future. Collateral for most MFIs is often not requi red, as most customers, due to extreme poverty, do not have any to provide. Instea d, MFIs use “social collateral.” Group members must pay back their loans in order to maintain their standing in the community. Woolcock (2001) demonstrates how MFIs use this form of collate ral by studying MFIs in Bangladesh and India.11 Goldmark (2001) goes a step further by suggesting methods to build social collateral.12 The demand for savings also exists in many areas of the world. Grosh and Somolekae (1996) touch on this topic while discussing whether microfinance can be a catalyst for industrialization in Botswana.13 They conclude savings are a key factor in the system required for industrialization. Micro-insurance is in its infant stages. Small Enterprise Development (Volume 12, Number 1, 2001) dedicated an en tire issue to this topic, concerning threats to and 8 Brau, 2004 9 Perry, 2002 10 Ismail & Ahmad, 1997 11 Woolcock, 2001 12 Goldmark, 2001 13 Grosh & Somolekae, 1996

PAGE 14

4 opportunities in the micro-insurance industr y (micro-insurance, funeral insurance, agricultural micro-insurance, agricultural micro-insurance). 14 A final product of important discussion is e quity as a form of MF service. Pretes (2002) discusses equity grants as a legitimate option.15 Pretes says that startup grants and equity are useful. Equity investors, he points out, receive their return intrinsically instead of financially as a form of a startup firm. Microfinance Institutions Management In this section we will discuss best pract ices for the MF industry. Before delving into this topic, it is important to note that as more literature becomes available, best practices will change to adapt to the new information on hand. Best practices should be pertinent to the specific geographic location in which the MFI resides. Bhatt and Tang (2001) discuss vehicles, technologi es, and performance assessment.16 They conclude that MFIs’ future success is highly dependant on th e tailoring of MFI products to specific products. Relevant factors include the optimal interest rate to charge customers; the structuring of loans to group le nders or individuals; the commer cialization of MFIs (to be discussed later); loan size, gr owth, and credit scoring; a nd the lending relationship with customers.17 Microfinance institutions face an intere sting predicament in determining what interest rates they will charge customers. Traditionally, financial institutions will charge the interest that maximizes wealth for the shareh older. However, if this is to be applied to 14 Brau, 2004 15 Pretes, 2002 16 Bhatt and Tang, 2001 17 Brau, 2004

PAGE 15

5 MFIs, firms risk drifting away from their initial poverty alleviation goals while also pushing customers to delinquency. On the other hand, smaller loans require equal administration cost while yielding smaller revenues to the firm. 18 Conning (1999) studies this problem of MF Is looking to simultaneously maximize impact, target the poor, and remain financially solvent.19 Looking at 72 MFIs, Conning states that sustainable MFIs that target the poor must charge higher interest rates, have higher staff costs, and are less leveraged than MFIs that are not sustainable. In contrast, Hollis and Sweetman (1998) study Irish loan funds in the mid-19th century and conclude that financial institutions were able to loan funds to the very poor at competitive rates, for a profit, and without subsidies.20 Another topic is group lending versus le nding to individuals. Gomez and Santor (2001) study determinants of self-employment success for micro-credit borrowers, and they stress that group lending has a pos itive correlation with this success.21 Woolcock (1999) also touches on this topic, stating that performance is contingent upon the structure of cost, the depth of the social relationship among borrowers and program staff, and lending policies.22 Armenariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) discuss the system required for MFIs to penetrate new markets.23 They focus on Eastern Europe, Russia, and 18 Brau, 2004 19 Conning 1999 20 Hollis and Sweetman, 1998 21 Gomez and Santor, 2001 22 Woolcock, 1999 23 Armenariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000

PAGE 16

6 China and state that direct monitoring and the use of non-refi nancing threats are successful mechanisms for penetration.24 Clientele Targeting The primary issues of discussion in MFI clientele targeting ar e lending to women versus men and lending to the marginally poor versus the very poor. Gender targeting Overwhelmingly, the bulk of MFI borrowers are women. It is commonly stated that women will use the funds in a wiser fashion then their husbands, leading to greater poverty alleviation. Pitt and Khandker (1998) test this notion in a thorough study.25 They examine household expenditures, male and female labor divisions, the schooling of children, and non-land assets held by women as outcomes. Their conclusion states that all six of these areas are affected when women are the borrowers and that only one in six are affected when men borrow money. Kevane and Wydick (2001) follow Pitt and Khandker by testing the notion that women produce gr eater poverty alleviation while men produce greater economic growth.26 They find no statistical di fference in men vs. women generating sales. However, they do find a difference in employment generation, which they attribute to child bearing. Mallick (2002) questions the efficacy of MF, suggesting that it can lead to gender conflict.27 Hossain (2002) touches on each point of Mallick’s assertions, rebuting his 24 Brau, 2004 25 Pitt and Khandker, 1998 26 Kevane and Wydick, 2001 27 Mallick, 2002

PAGE 17

7 points by stating that Mallick’s conclusions are premature.28 Hossain’s assertions are worthy of mention, as equity investors who receive returns intrinsically are likely to refuse funding if they perceive that their intrinsic return is diminished.29 Very poor versus marginally poor targeting At the heart of targeting th e very poor vs. the marginal ly poor is the debate of sustainability and self-sufficiency. Marginally poor clients are ab le to borrow larger amounts of money, which yiel d larger returns to the MFI and require the same administrative costs as the smaller loans common to very poor borrowers. Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-V ega, and Rodriguez-Meza (2000) analyze cost to users, breadth, length and scope of out put, along with worth to users.30 They conclude that the majority of the households reached were households near the poverty line, that group lenders had a greater degree of depth in re aching the very poor in comparison to individual lenders, and finall y, that urban borrowers were more likely to be borrowers— though rural borrowers were the poorest. Servon (1997)31 is consistent with the result of Navajas, et al. Servon studied three MFIs in the U.S. a nd concludes that the MFIs concerned were serving the borderline of the mainstream economy, not the very poor. Servon states that MFI programs help change the mindset of clients by providing hope. 28 Hossain, 2002 29 Brau, 2004 30 Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gon zalez-Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza, 2000 31 Servon 1997

PAGE 18

8 Policy and Microfina nce Institutions The pivotal question in addr essing microfinance is whether this is an effective option in comparison to other poverty alleviat ion tools and programs. In addressing this question there tends to be a split, as many macroeconomist dismiss the notion of a bottom-up approach as not viable and a top-dow n approach as preferable (if not the only approach). In the other camp of economists, there is greater optimism about the success of a bottom-up approach to povert y alleviation and microfinance. 32 Adams and Pischke (1992) compare micr o-credit programs to earlier finance programs targeting the poor.33 Adams and Pischke believe that, because of the similarities between micro-credit programs and previous small farmer debt programs, micro-credit is destined for failure and that therefore debt is not the solution for the poor. Buckley (1997) concludes that fundamental structural changes, along w ith a deeper understanding of informal sector behavior, are needed before the MF industry can succeed.34 Schreiner (1999) also makes this point in his study of U.S. microenterprises. He concludes that borrowers were able to move from welfare to self-employment in only one in 100 cases.35 On the other camp of this argument are researchers like Woller and Woodworth (2001).36 They argue that macro-economic approa ches have suffered repeated failures. Woller and Woodworth do not reject macroeconomic policies, but do strongly support 32 Brau, 2004 33 Adams and Pischke, 1992 34 Buckley, 1997 35 Schreiner, 1999b 36 Woller and Woodworth, 2001

PAGE 19

9 microfinance as a viable option that has pr oven successful in many parts of the world. Weijland (1999) studies the effects of clus tering groups and industrial development.37 He concludes that clustering policies have experienced some success in Indonesia. Microfinance Institutions Impact Assessment There is no agreed upon optimal impact assessment method. Nonetheless, many researchers have made an effort to measur e MF impact based on a variety of outcomes. Mosely (2001) uses income, assets, and vulnerability as measures of success.38 He determines that assets and income level in creased proportionate to initial poverty levels. MFI programs can lead to increased vulnerabi lity as some borrowers reach high debt levels. McKerman (2002) also le nds support to the MFI industry.39 He finds positive and wide-reaching effects of partic ipation and self-employment profits. Afrane (2002), in a study in Ghana and South Africa that uses case methods, concludes that there are definite improvements to the li ves of participants.40, 41 On the other side of articles not suppor ting the MF industry are Sanders (2002) and Bhatt (1999).42, 43 Sanders bring into question the effi ciency of microenterprise as an antipoverty strategy. Bhatt (1999) finds mixed results, pointing out that some programs have worked while others have failed. 37 Weijland, 1999 38 Mosely, 2001 39 McKerman, 2002 40 Afrane, 2002 41 Brau, 2004 42 Sanders, 2002 43 Bhatt, 1999

PAGE 20

10 Microfinance Institution Sustain ability and Commercialization On the topic of self-sufficiency there are mainly two competing ideologies, the Welfarist and the Institutionalist. I will brie fly discuss these two ideologies and move on to discuss several articles that study sust ainability as defined by the institutionalist. The welfarist contends that subsidies are a form of equity investment. The investor in this case is not seeking m onetary return, but instead r eceiving his return through an intrinsic fashion. The equity investors who inve st in socially respons ible firms are willing to accept a lower return in comparison to inde x funds that the investor may not consider socially responsible.44, 45 The institutionalist, on the other hand, believes that the firm ought to have the ability to cover its cost through its reve nue. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) make this argument as they point out that subsidized MFIs are less stable and tend to suffer more mission drift in comparison to their p eers who receive funds from depositors.46 Hollis and Sweetman (1998) also point out in a previous article that Irish MFIs in the 1700s were resilient. They only succumbed after legislat ion, bank competition, and the potato famine colluded to create an infeas ible environment. Patten, Rosenguard, and Johnston (2001), in a more recent article, discuss th e resiliency of MFIs as th ey analyze the BRI during the East Asian financial crisis.47 They conclude that the BRI performed well while large financial institutions performed poorly by measures of savings rates and repayments. 44 Woodworth, 2000 45 Brau, 2004 46 Hollis and Sweetman, 1998 47 Patten, Rosenguard, and Johnston, 2001

PAGE 21

11 The topic of the institutionalist versus the welfarist is not tested in this study, but rather this study test sustai nability as defined by the institutionalist. In other words, this study will measure the transition of NGO’s to commercial financial institutions from the perspective of the In stitutionalist. The follo wing are a group of ar ticles pertaining to commercialization and sustainability as defined by the institutionalist. The CGAP Occasional Paper “Commercializ ation and Mission Drift: The Transformation of Microfinance in Latin America,” from January 2005, measures the impact of commercialization on MFIs.48 The authors measure commercialization impact by the changing strategy and financial performa nce of various institutions in the late 1990s. Financial performance of MFIs in Lati n America is measured against their peers in other regions of the world and commercia l banks. This study demonstrates that not only were Latin American MFIs profitable when compared to their peers, but that in many cases they were outperforming commercial banks. Even low-end customer microfinance institutions, which tend to be le ss profitable, were f ound to be on their way to sustainability. Of the fifty-one Latin American MFIs that report to the Microbanking Bulletin forty-one were self-sustainable.49 This growth in commercialization is lead ing to strong competition and what at first may appear to be a mission drift to larger lo ans. Larger loans provide a higher level of profitability in comparison to small size lo ans. However, Christen and Cook’s study was unable to identify whether the increasing loan sizes were due to a mission drift or a natural growth of the financing needs of repeat customers. 48 Christen & Cook, 2001 49 List of Participants in the MBB. Retrieved February 8, 2004 from http://www.mixmbb.org/en/membership/participating_mfisMBB10.html

PAGE 22

12 In December 1996, CGAP published another arti cle titled “Financial Sustainability, Targeting the Poorest, and Income Impac t: Are There Trade-offs for Microfinance Institutions?” 50 This paper studied the findings of David Hulme and Paul Mosley, who asked in their book, “Can microfinance instituti ons achieve financial sustainability and reach the poorest of the poor? What are th e tradeoffs in pursuing these two goals simultaneously?” David Hulme and Paul Mosley studied thir teen MFI institutions in seven countries to comprehend “the impact of the institutions’ design, management and policy environments on financial sustainability a nd on various measures of impact, including poverty.”51 Hulme and Mosley compared the change in each impact variable from 1989–2003 in a random sample of 150 loan borrowers in a control group of 150 non-borrowers whose incomes, asset holdings, and access to infrastructure were comparable to the borrowers’.52 What Hulme and Mosley discovered was that institutions with high financial sustainability have lower leve ls of loans in arrears a nd dependence on subsidies in comparison to MFIs with low levels of fi nancial sustainability. In addition, Hulme and Mosley discovered that high leve ls of sustainability are found in institutions that instill “best practices” policies such as higher interest rates, voluntary savings facilities, 50 Christen & Cook, 2001 51 Christen & Cook, 2001 52 Christen & Cook, 2001

PAGE 23

13 frequent loan collection, and financial ince ntives to borrowers and staff to maximize repayment. In March 1997, CGAP FOCUS Se ries 2 published an article titled “The Challenge of Growth for Microfinance Institu tions: The Bancosol Experience.” 53 Bancosol is the name that Prodem, one of the banks I w ill follow through transition, took after becoming a commercial MFI. This points to ma ny problems and opportunities that Prodem experienced through transformation, among th em a higher cost of funds. BancoSol switched from donor funds to more expensiv e commercial loans and savings deposits. The result of this was a sharp rise on the aver age cost of funds from 4% per year at time of transformation to 12% two y ears later. Also, the number of larger loans which have a lower interest rate, grew, thus lowering the profit yields by 13%. In addition to all this, the explosive growth from four branches prior to transformation to thirty-two branches in the following four years lowered productivity.54 While BancoSol’s costs were growing rapidly due to expansion, its expanded capaci ty was not immediately yielding sufficient loans in order to cover the higher cost of operation. This thesis will attempt to answer whether banks that were formerly NGOs are profitable and sustainable, and whether this, the transition to regulated banks, improved the efficiency of resources, management a nd administration. This study will measure the transition of NGOs to commercial financial in stitutions from the perspective of the Institutionalist. In answering th ese questions, I contribute to the literature in the following ways: I will measure changes in portfolio quality, efficiency and productivity, financial 53 Chen, 1997 54 Productivity is measured by portfolio outstanding per unit of inputs, such as branches or loan officers.

PAGE 24

14 management, and profitability in specific ba nks that have transitioned from NGOs to commercial institutions. Research Design In measuring the profitability, sustainabil ity, and efficiency of NGOs that have transitioned into regulated banks I foll owed the “Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions: Technical Guide.” 55 I gauge four different sets of indicators: portfolio quality, efficiency and productivit y, financial management, and profitability. Portfolio quality is the largest source of risk for any finance in stitution. The biggest asset for an MFI is its portfolio of loans. Furthermore, many of these loans are not collateralized, and thus the quality of portfolio is crucial for the survival of any MFI or bank. In particular, portfolio at risk, or PaR, has emerged as a useful ratio. PaR measures the quality of the portfolio tainted by doubt ful accounts. PaR is easily measured and comparable throughout the industry w ith other finance institutions. The second set of indicators I am using i nvolves efficiency and productivity ratios. These ratios measure the efficiency pe r unit of production of the bank and the management of assets. These ratios are not ea sily altered in compar ison to profitability ratios, which are more susceptible to “crea tive accounting.” The third set of indicators involves the performance of the financial ma nagers. Even though financial management is a “back office function,” the impact fina ncial managers have directly affects the sustainability of the institution. As stated by the Inter Developm ent Bank, “Errors in 55 Janson & Abate, 2003.

PAGE 25

15 liquidity or foreign exchange management can compromise an institution’s credit operation and otherwise sound management.”56 The final set of indicators measured is the profitability. This set of ratios tends to “summarize” all operations of the company in to dollars and cents. Any record of poor management, use of resources, and portfolio qual ity will be reflected in the profitability of the bank. Also, records of growth and profita bility indicate market penetration; if we assume penetration indicates serving the mi crofinance industry in ways that improve poverty alleviation, profita bility is directly linked to th e overriding goal of any MFI to strive for poverty allevi ation through operations. Data Collection The samples in this study were gathered from the archives of The Mixmarket: The Global information exchange for the microfinance industry The four banks Arequipa, Tacna, Prodem and Mibanco were chosen becau se of their geographical location in South America, along with the availability of their financial statements and mission statements. Controlling for macro-economic fluctuat ions was a major concern. To minimize changes in financial data due to this factor, banks were chosen in the same economic region during the late 1990s. The specific sa mple dates for each bank are: Arequipa 1997, 1998, and 1999; Tacna 1996, 1997, and 1998; Prodem 1998, 1999, and 2000; and, Mibanco in 1998, 1999, and 2000. South America was chosen due to its larg e number of MFIs. Peru and Bolivia were specifically targeted due to their geographical proximity. 56 Janson, 2003.

PAGE 26

16 Many banks, unfortunately, do not provide financial statements while they are private. Thus, finding banks with this comple te information in the same economic region was a difficult task. The financial statements that were sought were the year prior to commercialization, the year during comm ercialization and the year after commercialization. Mibanco, though used in th is study, did not provide its financial statements for the year prior to privatization. However, the other two years were available and I chose to use the firm regardless. A final factor in gathering the data samp le was mission statement. All of the banks used in this study had 91%–100% of their operations in co mprised by microfinance. In addition, the customer bases were similar, with an average loan per borrower ranging from Tacna’s $994 to Prodem’s $1,550.57 Hypotheses, Assumptions, and Limitations The size of the microfinance industry is larg e, and given a lack of supply to meet the demand, microfinance banks can be self-s ustainable in a commercial environment. The transition to a commercial environment will yield greater efficiency of administrative resources over the long run, due to the pres ence of ownership of the bank. In the short run, profitability will be affect ed negatively as banks transition from the safety of not-forprofit institutions to regulated banks. I will like to note a few assumptions and limitations in this study. In comparing financial statements, and in the absence of strong regulation for uniformity in accounting standards, it is likely that some figures were accounted for differently. I will make a good faith effort were accounting figures were comp uted differently to recalculate figures in 57 MixMarket (2005) Demand MFIs. Retrieved March 8, 2005, from http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.quick.search.asp

PAGE 27

17 accordance with CGAP accounting practices for mi crofinance institutions. Given that this study covers banks in Peru and Bolivia, it is limited in controlling for different maturity levels of markets and the effects on the differe nt indicators. Bolivia is a more competitive environment and banks in Bolivia are less likel y to exert profitability simply by raising interest rates on loans. A second critical limitation of this study is the length of time banks are followed post transition. During the time of this study, the sample bank financial statements were unavailable for years beyond the year following the transition. Because of this data limitation, measuring longer run bank sustainabili ty effects is problematic. However, the thesis provides evidence on shorter run sustaina bility and profitability effects in the year after transition, which may shed some a dditional light on long er term effects.

PAGE 28

18 CHAPTER 2 BUSINESS ENVIROMENT Industry As mentioned before, Bancosol, Caja Muni cipales, Corposol and the now bankrupt Finansol followed Prodem into th is transition to commercial banking.1 The microfinance industry’s success has also brought downscalin g to the larger commercial banks. These other banks, like Banco Solidario of Ecua dor, Banco de Trabajo of Peru, and the behemoth Banco de Credito of Peru, have all taken on micro-lending ventures in a widespread fashion. Table 2-1 shows the rapid commercialization of microfinance.2 Table 2-1. Rapid rate of commercialization in Latin America: A snap shot of mid-2001 Number Number of Portfolio Average Loan Size Type of MFI of MFIs Clients (Thousands) (US$ Millions) (US$ Millions) Upgrade 40 572 538 976 Downscale 22 365 343 940 Total Regulated 62 937 902 962 Unregulated 114 870 288 332 Total 176 1806 1190 659 These data were taken from the most compre hensive survey of microfinance institutions in Latin America available. The survey was done by the Inter-Development Bank (IDB) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and covers 176 MFIs in seventeen Latin American countries. The data refer to mid-2001 and clearly show the evolution from an non-governmental-organization-dominat ed industry ten years earlier to one in 1 Janson, 2003. 2 Christen & Cook, 2001.

PAGE 29

19 which 62 regulated MFIs provide 76% of the cr edit flowing to microenterprises from all MFIs (regulated and unregulated) and reach 52 % of the total clients served by all MFIs. Uneven Distribution of Microfinance Inst itutions (MFIs) across Latin America The level of microfinance penetration acro ss Latin America is disproportionate and ranges from less than 1% to 28%. On average the level of penetrati on is 2.6%. Ironically, to the Inter-American Development Bank it is the small and medium-sized countries in Central America and South America that lead in the level of penetration; Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, the largest c ountries in Latin Americ a, have penetration rates below 1%. There are a plethora of reas ons for this low penetration rate, but the primary cause is that no large NGOs have matu red in these markets. Furthermore, large commercial banks have not shown any intere st in entering this market, where large development banks dominate in providing as sistance to low-income micro-businesses. Nevertheless, there are two large MFIs w ith promising hope: Compartamos in Mexico and Banco do Nordeste in Brazil. Table 2-2 sh ows the share of microenterprise in Latin America with MFI credit.3 Credit Unions In order to discuss the microfinance indus try in Latin America it is important to take credit unions and their role in the microlending industry into account by examining the growth, decline, and current state of credit unions. Credit unions were established in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s by Catholic priests, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) workers, and Peace Corps volunteers4. Management was often 3 Stauffenberg, 2003 4 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 30

20 poor, loans were frequently lost, and earnings profit retention, and reserves were weak.5 However, due to the continuous sums of soft loans and grants, credit unions grew until the 1980s.6 In the 1980s, the soft loans and grants began to dry up in exchange for technical assistance money, as a push began to make the industry more responsible and self-sufficient. According to a top recent IDB CGAP survey of credit unions in seventeen countries in Latin America: These financial intermediaries prov ided loans to about 1.5 million microentrepreneurs at the end of 2001, almost as many as the 1.8 million served by the MFIs in the same year. Average loan size was US$ 1,044 for the credit unions, not too different from the $659 shown in Tabl e 1 for the MFIs. Small and fragmentary survey evidence on the income levels of the CU and MFI clientele indicates that about 20-50% of each group is below th e widely-used $2 per day per person poverty line.7 Even though the loan amount s are similar and the clientele are comparable in income level, between microfinance inst itutions and credit uni ons, the microfinance industry is currently growing on averag e by 18% versus 7% for credit unions.8 Credit unions have many weaknesses in comparison to microfinance institutions. Two factors— the free rider problem and a lenient atti tude toward delinquency— are prominent weaknesses of credit unions in comparison to MFIs. Give n there is no ownership stake in credit unions (CUs) and they function as cooperatives, no one feels obliged to take the helm of these institutions since they will not reap any additional rewards.9 A lenient attitude toward loan delinque ncy and rooted in the organi zation culture drives many CUs 5 Stauffenberg, 2003 6Stauffenberg, 2003 7 Stauffenberg, 2003 8 Stauffenberg, 2003 9 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 31

21 to insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy.10 Currently, there is a strong drive to clean up the credit union industry in La tin America, and significant progress has been made in Guatemala, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In th ese countries, 15–25 credit unions were reorganized and strengthene d, leading to double digit grow th (20% instead of 7%).11 Table 2-2. Share of microenterpris e in Latin America with MFI credit Country Date of Household Survey Number of Singleperson Firms Number of Firms with 1–5 Employees Total Number of Microenterprises Number of Microenterprises with MFI Credit Share of Microenterprises with MFI Credit Bolivia 1998 1300313 62008 13623231 379117 27.83% Nicaragua 1998 377148 40422 417,570 84285 20.18% El Salvador 1998 606569 60617 667186 93808 14.06% Honduras 1999 832941 58239 891180 107054 12.01% Chile 1998 1069139 138045 1207184 82825 6.86% Guatemala 1998 1328476 93238 1421714 71187 5.01% Costa Rica 1998 232328 78891 311219 12794 4.11% Ecuador 1998 1396139 298524 1694663 65719 3.88% Dominican Republic 1998 1315016 77172 1392188 49437 3.55% Colombia 1999 5726653 77152 6501805 219240 3.37% Paraguay 1998 319113 668213 987326 30203 3.06% Peru 1997 4102561 2763632 6866193 185431 2.70% Panama 1999 267854 21150 289004 6390 2.21% Mexico 1998 8503552 1770393 10273945 67249 0.65% Uruguay 1998 314891 27018 341909 1600 0.47% Brazil 1999 16567943 2421810 18989753 62485 0.33% Argentina 1998 1807615 103555 1911170 4940 0.26% Venezuela 1999 2906975 340296 3247271 2364 0.07% Latin America Total Firms 48,975,375 9798375 58773600 2E+06 Latin America -Weighted Average Share 2.60% Latin America-Un-weighted Average Share 6.15% Sources: Household surveys for number of microenterprises, Christen (2000) for number of microenterprises with MFI credit, except for Panama. Christen’s data go to the second half of 1999 and cover most of the larger regulated financial institutions and NGOs lending to microenterprises, but not credit unions. Data for the number of microenter prises with MFI credit for Panama are obtained from the IDB loan file s, refer to December 1999, and are as follows: Multi-credit Bank 3881, Credit Fundes 1549, and Mi Banco 960. 10 Stauffenberg, 2003 11Stauffenberg, 2003.

PAGE 32

22 Tables 2-3 and 2-4 highlight th e rapid growth of MFIs in Latin America and the smaller growth of credit unions. By the late 1990s, the microfinance and credit union industries in Latin America were leading the world in the critical area of sustainability. Table 2-5 highlights the return to microfinance in Latin America. Un fortunately, microfinance in Latin America went from outpacing the world in 1996–1999 to lagging behind the world average in 2001–2002.12 During the previous years, microfin ance exploded in growth, leading to increased competition and decreased profit. Oddly enough, the increased competition is affecting smaller MFIs more than their competing larger peers. The reason for this is simple: economies of scale. Larger MFIs can reduce their cost per loan and administrative cost.13 The additional cost of one more customer loan, once an MFI is well established, is minimal in comparison to the profits it can earn.14 Thus, the MFIs who have managed to grow are reaping the rewards of larger portfolios. Increased Competition As competition has increased, the drive to customize products has also increased. MFIs have switched from group loans to indi vidual loans to meet the needs of their clients more efficiently.15 In addition, group loans te nd to perform poorly during economic downturns, as was the case betw een 1998–2002. In hard economic times, loan recipients feel they have a difficult enough tim e paying off their loans, much less trying 12 Ramirez, 2004. 13 Stauffenberg, 2003. 14 Stauffenberg, 2003. 15 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 33

23 to pay for someone else’s loan. When one or two people default on a group loan everyone tends to default on it, as well, expone ntially increasing th e cost to MFIs.16 Table 2-6 demonstrates the continuing pr eference of indivi dual loans over group loans, as the number of individual loans hovers around 1 million and the number of group loans is about 350,000. Another interesting char acteristic is an incr easing preference on poverty lending using village bank loans. Th e use of village bank loans increased to 410,000 in the late 1990s versus 350,000 for group loans.17 The focus on poverty is evident by the much smaller amount of loans and by the rural locati on of these loans. Village banking also is changing due to competition as the maximum loan size has increased from about $300 to $1,000.18 In addition, loan maturities have been Table 2-3. Rapid growth of MFIs Year N umber of Microenterprises Dec-98 1,520,000 Dec-00 1914000 3-Jun 3241000 Total Growth (19982003) 113% Average annual growth 18.30% Source: IDB and CGAP surveys of 17 L.A. countries Table 2-4. Slower credit union growth Year Microlending Portfolio is US$ and Growth Dec-99 $2.41 Billion 3-Dec $3.13 Billion Total Growth (19992003) 29.90% Average annual growth 6.75% Source: DGRB and IDB surveys of eight Latin American countries 16 Stauffenberg, 2003 17 Stauffenberg, 2003 18 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 34

24 Table 2-5. Returns of microfinance in Latin America: 1996–99 versus 2001–2002 (%) Adjusted ROA in 1996–99 Adjusted ROA in 2001–02 All MFIs and CUs, Worldwide -4.5 0.1 All MFIs and CUs, Latin America 2.4 -0.1 5 Latin American Sub Groups Credit Unions (CUs) 4.2 -0.5 MFIs: large, broad based 3.1 5.3 MFIs: medium-sized, broad based 1.3 3.6 MFIs: medium-sized, low-end 2.3 -2.9 MFIs: small, low-end -9.4 -12.8 Sources: Second column from Christen 2000, second column from Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003) Table 2-6. MFI lending by loan mythology and location of client Type of Loan Number of MFIs Making These Loans Total Number of Borrowers Total Loan Portfolio ($Million) Average Loan Balance Share of Clients in Rural Areas Individual Loans 155984,167964980 8% Group Loans 75350,607115329 17 Village Bank Loans 47410,35261150 29 All Loans (All MFIs) 1761,745,1261140653 14 Sources: All data from the IDB/CGAP inventory of 176 MFIs in seven Latin American Countries lengthened; payments made less frequently a nd saving requirements have been reduced.19 Some village banks have even offered group and individual loans to retain clients.20 There are also a number of changes to produc ts and loan making techniques that have come about due to the competition in microf inance. Alvaro Ramirez details the following in his paper The Microfinance Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean : As noted in an IDB paper done two y ears ago on equipment finance in Latin America (Westley, 2003), 23 of the 25 l eading MFIs and CUs surveyed offered equipment loans or leases with at least 2-year maturities. We’ve come a long way from those early days when a common complaint was that short-term working capital loans were the only kind of loan one could find at many MFIs. Lines of credit are offered by a number of the regulated Bolivian (and other) MFIs to their preferred customers, this elimina ting the need for a client to reapply for a loan when their old one expires. 19 Stauffenberg, 2003 20 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 35

25 Some MFIs, such as Banco ADEMI in the Dominican Republic, even offer credit cards to qualified clients. A number of Accion International affili ates and others are developing creditscoring models and are also utilizing PDAs such as Palm Pilot. Both are designed to cut costs and reduce client delay in accessing a loan. Some IPC affiliates, such as Financiera Ca lpia in El Salvador and Caja Los Andes in Bolivia, are offering agricultural production loans. Other MFIs, such as Financiera Confia in Nicaragua and Banco Ademi in the Dominican Republic, are branch ing out into housing loans. In addition to these changes MFIs are st arting to develop more traditional banking services. Based on nine major markets of MFIs,21 savings deposits have increased from $500 million in 2000 to $1.3 billion in 2003.22 Although checking services are in an infancy stage, MFIs are increasingly pr oviding the one-stop shopping that clients demand.23 This fast pace of growth is also forcing NGOs to become commercial institutions, as the need for funds outgrows donations. Table 2-7 shows the fast increase in MFI savings and checking accounts. Table 2-7. Deposits in nine microfinance markets (US$ millions, end-of-year values) 200020012002 2003 Checking Accounts 45.61.4 1.7 Savings Accounts 118165254 321 Certificates of Deposit 395513619 867 Total 517683874 1190 Performance of Latin American MFIs Versus Asian MFIs In order to measure the performance and vitality of the Latin American microfinance industry, it is important to comp are it to another region of the world; I arbitrarily chose the Asian microfinance indus try. The following set of information is 21 Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colomb ia, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru 22 Stauffenberg, 2003 23 Stauffenberg, 2003

PAGE 36

26 taken from the July 2003 Microbanking Bulletin The Microbanking Bulletin covers fifty Latin American MFIs and twenty-two Asia n MFIs. Although microfinance got a head start in Asia before Latin America, th e average age of MFIs reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin is twelve years in Latin America and nine years in Asia. Overall Financial Performance The two most important indicators that gi ve a picture of a microfinance institutions are the portfolio at risk and retu rn on assets. The portfolio at risk, as previously stated in the synthesis of related literature, tells how mu ch the institution is getting back from the money it loaned out. The return on assets rati o lets the analyst learn the efficiency at which the institution is using its resources. In both cases, Asia is beating out Latin America, though it is important to note that in neither case is the welfare of the institutions at stake, given delinquency rates ar e 2% and 4%, respectively.24 Outreach The number of total clients is much larger in Asia than in Latin America. This is not so extraordinary, given the large populat ion differences between Asian and Latin American countries. The size of th e loans is also larger in Latin America. This is also not so surprising, because of the extremely poor nature of the microentrepreneur in Asia. In effect, the larger loan size compensates for the smaller number of clients in Latin America. Table 2-8 gives us a snapshot of the average MFI reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin in July 2003, both in Latin America and Asia.25 24 Ramirez, 2004 25 Ramirez, 2004

PAGE 37

27 Table 2-8. Profile of the average MFI reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003) ALL MFIs Financially Sustainable MFIs Asia Latin America Asia Latin America Adjusted ROA (%) 2.1-0.15.5 4.4 Adjusted ROE (%) 10.31.116.9 16 Portfolio at risk (%> 30 days) 2.54.92.4 3.7 No. of active borrowers 3291513755183,171 31010 Total loan portfolio (US$ million) 4.98.616.5 20.8 Average loan balance (US$) 195816277 900 Deposits/Loans (%) 152927 36 Debt/Equity (leverage ratio) 1.62.72.4 3.4 No. of voluntary savers 183742422186,289 2961 Total voluntary savings (US$ 1000) 81631852400 9658 Average savings balance (US$) 3974161 809 Operating expense/Loan portfolio (%) 222716 21 Borrowers/ Loan officers (%) 307353465 398 Borrowers/Staff members (%) 149128148 140 Adjusted cost per borrower (US$) 3519536 171 Yield on gross loan portfolio-nominal (%) 364435 41 Yield on gross loan portfolio—real (%) 303529 33 Sources: Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003) Funding Latin America is further ahead than Asia in terms of the amount of loans financed from savings. This is likely due to the furthe r development and age of the average MFI in that region. The natural course of an MFI is to st art out as an NGO, with some type of grant base money, and as it matures, to tap into the more expensive but more abundant savings deposits for capital. In this case, t oo, Latin America is leading with a leverage ratio of 2.7, versus 1.6 for MFIs in Asia.26 26 Ramirez, 2004

PAGE 38

28 Savings Outreach Savings deposits are both necessary for MFIs to leverage their loan portfolio and an importantsource of savings accounts for the community. Although there are fewer clients in Latin America, their accounts are larger. A typical MFI in Latin America in total has larger savings deposits than one in Asia.27 Efficiency Average cost in Asian MFIs is lower in Asia than in Latin America: 22% versus 27%, respectively. This is likely due to the ec onomies of scale factors that affect MFIs— the more clients there are, the more cost is distributed. Thus, the sm aller client base of Latin America MFIs works against them when it comes to average cost.28 Another way of disseminating this economy of scale factor is by looking at the numbers of borrowers per loan officer. Here, Latin America seems to be slightly edging out Asia. On the other hand, if you look at the ratio of borrowers to staff members, which includes all MFI personnel, Asian MFIs are more efficient despite having a larger clientele to service. As Alvaro Ramirez of the Inter-American Development Bank put it, “This greater Asian efficiency may reflect ec onomies of scale in delivering both loan and deposit services. Or it could simply be due to the Asian MFI’s more productive use of its non-lending personnel for reasons other than economies of scale (better management, systems, etc.).29 30 27 Ramirez, 2004 28 Ramirez, 2004 29 Stauffenberg, 2003 30 Ramirez, 2004

PAGE 39

29 Loans Rates Changed Latin American MFIs charge 5%–8% mo re for their loans than their Asian counterparts, even when inflation is accounted for. These higher interest charges are the outcome of the higher operating cost of Latin American MFIs. This indicates that the higher ROA in Asia is not due to Asian MFIs charging more for their products or being much more efficient. Instead, it may be that Latin American MFIs have higher delinquency rates and are increasingly relying on more expensive comm ercial capital like savings.31 Capital Markets The following is a short summary of the capita l markets in Peru and Bolivia. In any future scenario it seems intuitive to think of mature financial institutions issuing bonds for capital use in microfinance operations. N onetheless, as evidenced by this brief description of the capital mark ets, this phenomenon is probabl y not likely to develop in the near future—especially in Bolivia, where th e stock exchange is in an infant stage. Peru: Capital Markets There is only one stock exchange in Per u, the Lima Stock Exchange (LSE). Before the 1990s, much of the capital th at was raised in Peru was done in the form of corporate bonds. The reason for this is simple: the Per uvian government subsidized interest and thus bonds were a cheaper form of capital than equity. During the 1990s, that began to change. In the 1980s, the proportion of GD P in the LSE was hovering around 5%; by the late 1990s, it was more like 27%. Unfortunate ly, the late 1990s saw the disaster of President Fujimori, who along with his top intelligence chief, M ontesinos, is said to have 31 Ramirez, 2004

PAGE 40

30 pillaged the treasury coffers of $2 billion. Sin ce that time the LSE has recovered, growing to $10.5 billion in 2000, $10.9 billion in 2001, and $12.6 billion in 2002.32 The most important sectors in the LSE ar e industrials (38%), mining (16%), banks and financial institutions (12 %), and utilities (5.5%). In the beginning of 2003, the 230 companies listed with the LSE and 21 had lis ted debt instruments. The volume traded was $2.9 billion in 2002.33 Bolivia: Capital Markets In 1976 the initial plans for the Bolivian Stock Exchange, Bolsa Boliviana de Valores S.A., were formulated, and in 1979 th e first shareholder meetings took place. However, it was not until 1989 that trading offi cially began to take place. Today there are eighteen companies listed on th e Bolsa Boliviana de Valores. As of December 2004, the Bolivia Stock Market Capitalization was $1.35 billion, or 5.74% of the Bolivian GDP.34 32 Olaechea 2004 33 Olaechea 2004 34 Origenes de la Bolsa (n.d.)

PAGE 41

31 CHAPTER 3 TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS Chapter 3 tests the hypothesis and is divi ded into two main sections. The first section asks whether non-governmental orga nizations (NGOs) that transition into regulated microfinance institutions (MFIs) are profitable and self-sustainable. This section measures profitability and sustaina bility by using return on equity, return on assets, and portfolio yield. The second section asks, “Will the transition to a regulated bank improve efficiency of resources and administration?” Efficiency is measured through operating expense, financial expense, cost of funds, liquidity, debt/equity, portfolio-at-risk, write-offs, lo an loss reserve, and risk cove rage. Before the analysis of each ratio I will include a brief description of the ratio, the importance of its usage, and any complications I experienced in gathering this information. Are NGOs That Transition into Regulate d MFIs Profitable and Self-Sustainable? This part of the research will attempt to answer the question of profitability and sustainability. However, no study of profitabi lity ratios for microfinance institutions should be taken independently of efficien cy, productivity, financial management, and portfolio quality ratios. These ratios will be discussed when analyzing whether transitioned MFIs are more efficient. This s econd part of the res earch completes the study of profitability by shedding light on profitabili ty information that is not given by the profitability ratios, while al so answering the questions of efficiency after transition. In studying the profitability of the MFIs, I us ed a set of profitability ratios to gauge the profitability of the banks. Efficiency and productivity indicators had to be taken into

PAGE 42

32 consideration along with portfolio at risk (PaR) ratios, si nce many profitabili ty indicators can be strongly manipulated. These manipul ations include adjusting the loan loss reserves, changing the amount of write-offs and other creative techniques. Financial management is another factor that needs to be taken into account. Today, most MFIs work in a sellers’ market where inefficien t operations can stil l run highly profitable enterprises. However, as the industry mature s, more competitors enter into the market, and subsidies run out, financial management will become an essential skill MFIs need if they want to be profitable.1 Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/Equity ROE is a measure of the return on equ ity calculated by dividing net income by period average equity. In this case, I was fo rced to use period equity versus period average equity because of my inability to ga ther the additional information needed to calculate period average equity.2 Return on equity is especially important fo r private, for-profit institutions with real non-corporate owners; to these individuals, ROE measures the return on their investment. Figure 3-1 is a chart of the sample corporat ions used in this study and their ROEs during three critical years of operation: the year prior to b ecoming for-profit, the year of the transition (strike year), and the year following the transiti on. In two of the four cases, the year preceding the transition tended to be the most profitable year. The reason for this may lie in the added cost of becoming a private bank. Not-for-profit MFIs do not pay 1 In analyzing profitability, I looked at return on equity, return on assets, and portfolio yield 2 Period average equity is the average of the current and previous years’ equity.

PAGE 43

33 taxes and have a lower reporting cost asso ciated with governing bodies overseeing the industry. 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4Arequipa Tacna Prodem MibancoBanks Prior Year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-1. Return on equity Return on equity has been a surprising number for the industry. In 2000 only one out of twenty leading MFIs showed a lo ss. Despite the economic recessions in the Andean region during the time,3 Mibanco, Tacna, Arequipa, a nd Prodem, which reside in this region, all showed positive returns. In most cases, MFIs outperformed conventional banks by wide margins. Nonetheless, as noted by Abate and Jansson in their 2001 article “Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions,” “NGOs have achieved higher returns on equity than formalized MFIs even though the NGOs ope rate in significantly lower debt-equity ratios…Supervised institutions tend to opera te in more competitive markets, where portfolio yields are lower.”4 3 The data used in this study was from 1996–2000. 4 Jansson & Abate, 2003

PAGE 44

34 Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income/ Assets Return on assets, like return on equity, measures profitability by looking at the efficiency of the assets used. It incorporat es not just profitability but also how well management is using its th e institution’s assets. Surpri singly, NGOs have generally outperformed commercial MFIs in their use of a ssets. The reason for this is their inability to access capital and assets, thus forcing the institutions to maximize the funds and resources available. 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35Arequipa Tacna Prodem MibancoBanks Prior Year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-2. Return on assets Figure 3-2 demonstrates the return on asse ts for the sample used. A striking and apparent feature in this graph is Prodem’s pe rformance for the year prior to privatization, when Prodem’s ROA is exponentially larger than during other y ears and has a higher performance than any of the other banks’ best years. The reason is simply that Prodem used a much lower reserve to estimate losses. Provision for doubtful accounts reflects negatively toward the bank’s net income and is a fast way to show profitability at the bank’s discretion.

PAGE 45

35 Even if we remove Prodem’s first-year pe rformance, it is still difficult to recognize a pattern in the bank’s operation. We can c onclude one important fact: all banks are returning positive ROAs for all the years measured. Figure 3-3 shows the ROA minus Prodem’s first-year performance. 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07Arequipa Tacna Prodem MibancoBanks Prior Year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-3. Return on assets Portfolio Yield= Interest and Fee Income/ Gross Portfolio. The portfolio yield is a measure of inte rest payments received from clients during a specific period. Unlike return on equity and assets, which rely on net income to measure profitability, portfolio yield derives pr ofitability from interest and fees earned from operations. This indicator is less sus ceptible to accounting discrepancies and other creative accounting practices. In addition, it is measured pr ior to taxes and is thus exclusive of tax changes and regulatory e xpenses due to privatization. Figure 3-4 demonstrates the result of the sample portfolio yield.

PAGE 46

36 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5Arequipa Tacna Prodem MibancoBanks Prior Year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-4. Portfolio yield With the exception of Arequipa, the rest of the banks’ highest year of portfolio yield was either the year of privatizati on or the following year. As these banks are maturing, efficiency is improving, which in turn has generated increasing profits. What portfolio yield, ROA, and ROE dem onstrate is that MFIs are profitable despite adverse conditions in the marketplace. Will the Transition to a Regulated Bank Improve Efficiency of Resources and Administration? Efficiency and Productivity Efficiency and Productivity measure how streamlined the operations of an MFI are set up. This section will measure the amount of output per unit of i nput, while taking into account the cost of the units. These ratios ar e less easily manipulated and thus more transparent than profitability. MFIs in ge neral have less efficient operations than commercial banks. The reason for this is th at a loan of $200 takes nearly the same amount of labor as a loan of $200,000. Many MFIs have an administra tive cost of 15 to

PAGE 47

37 30%, whereas banks average 1.5%–3%.5 This section takes in to account the operating expense ratio. Operating expense ratio= operating expenses/gross portfolio. The operating expense ratio is an efficiency indicator of the MFI. It measures the firm’s cost of delivering the lending product to the custom er. The lower the indicator, the more efficiently the firm is running. The ratio is ca lculated by dividing all expenses related to the operation of the firm, including salaries depreciation, and board fees, by the gross portfolio. Provision expenses, interest and ex traordinary expenses are excluded. Figure 35 shows the operating expens e ratio for this study. 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 ArequipaTacnaProdemMibancoBanks Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-5. Operating expense ratio In three out of the four cas es, the operating expense rati o was lower in the year of operation following privatization than the first year. Due to an absence of information it was impossible to evaluate Mibanco’s prior year of operation. It is even more important to note the lower operation ratio by Are quipa and Tacna over Prodem and Mibanco. 5 Economies of scale are a factor to a certain extent. In loan portfolios less than about $2 to $3 million, larger operations tend gain from economies of scale.

PAGE 48

38 Arequipa and Tacna have portfolios of $3–4 million in comparison to Mibanco’s $6 million and Prodem’s $146 million. Microfinance institutions with smaller portfolios tend to have less efficient operations due to economie s of scale. Conversely, in these particular cases, economies of scale did not translate in to more efficient operations by Mibanco and Prodem. One possibility may lay in the size of the loans given by the other operations: lending institutions with higher loans tend to have higher efficienc y. It may be possible that Prodem is simply lending in smaller in crements of cash than Arequipa and Tacna. Nevertheless, despite economies of scale, the year after privatization appears to be more efficient than the year just prior to privati zation, signaling that MFIs that transition into lending institutions are more efficient than those that do are not private. Financial Management Financial management assures a firm has enough liquidity to meet its liabilities and issue loans to clients. The ability or inability to maintain adequate liquidity can impact a firm’s growth or demise. These functions beco me more important as MFIs transition into regulated banks and begin to take in savi ngs deposits. Prodem, for example, had no savings in 1999, the year of transition, and $112 million in 2000, the year after transition. Financial management incorporates the mana ging of foreign exchange risk and dollar duration incompatibilities of assets to liab ilities. Four ratios are analyzed: financial expense, cost of funds, liquid ity, and the debt/equity ratio. Financial expense ratio = interest and fee expenses/gross portfolio The financial expense ratio is calculated by taking interest and fee expenses and dividing them by the gross portf olio. This ratio accounts for the total interest expense incurred by the financial institution to f und its loan portfolio. This ratio, unlike the portfolio yield (which measures income gene rated by the portfolio), measures the lending

PAGE 49

39 rate an MFI has to charge in order to cove r its cost. This ratio says little about the financial condition of the firm; the firm may have a high financial expense ratio but still be quite profitable, as in Mi banco’s case. Mibanco has a hi gh financial expense ratio in the year following transition, but also has th e highest portfolio yield out of any of the years measured for all the institutions in th is study. Figure 3-6 shows the result of the financial expense ratio of the banks studied. 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12ArequipaTacnaProdemMibanco BanksInterest & fee exp. as a % of gross portfolio Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-6. Financial expense ratio The amount an institutio n has to charge was highest in three out of the four banks in the year following transition. The year oftran sition was also higher than the year before the transition three out of four times. Though it was not possible to gather this information for the year prior to transition fo r Arequipa and Mibanco, this chart does hint that the amount an institution has to charge in creases as the institution transitions from an NGO to a formalized lending institution.

PAGE 50

40 Cost of funds ratio = interest and fee expenses on funding liabilities/funding liabilities The cost of funds ratio is calculated by taking the interest and fee expenses on funding liabilities and dividi ng it by funding liabilities. The funding liabilities denominator includes deposits, commercial funds subsidized funds, and quasi-capital. The cost of funds ratio calculates the co st of the institution’s borrowed funds. This measures whether the institution has gained ac cess to low-cost sources of funds, such as savings. The mobilization of funds such as sa vings with low interest can be much more lucrative than using high-inter est loans and is a major benef it of becoming a formalized financial institution and bank. Although this ratio can be largely useful, many of the institutions involved in the study received subsidized loans, and thus the re al market value of th eir funds is shielded and the cost of funds is driven down. Figure 3-7 illustrates the cost of funds ratio results. 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2Are qu i pa T acn a P r odem Mi ban c oBanksInterest and Fee Exp. as a Percentage of Funding Liabilities Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-7. Cost of funds ratio The cost of funds ratio appears to go up significantly in the year following the transition for all the banks, with the exception of Tacna. One reason may be that only one of the banks had gathered significant savings to drive down the cost of funds expense. However, the strongest factor lies in the significant drop in donations. Arequipa went

PAGE 51

41 from receiving $22,536 in 1996 and $22,536 in 1997 to receiving $0 in 1998 and 1999, the year of transition and the following y ear, respectively. Tacna also went from receiving $25,391 in the year before tr ansition and $25,391 the transition year to receiving $0 in the year following the transi tion. Prodem also showed a significant drop in reserves—$13.3 million—that was likely triggered by a drop in donations. It is possible that these banks have not had time to offset the loss of dona tions by the gains in savings deposits and their cost of funds will therefore decrease as they mature and savings go up. Liquidity ratio = cash and bank current accounts + readily marketable investments/total assets The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing the total cash and marketable securities of the firm by the total assets. The liquidity rati o tells us the ability of the firm to meet its short-term liabilities and unpl anned expenses. The information that can be derived from this ratio is not definitive. A low or high liquidity ratio doe sn’t indicate a positive or negative sign, so this ratio must be used in addition to other indicators. A high liquidity ratio may indicate the firm is predicting a high level of activity or it can indicate poor usage of resources. Nonetheless, low liquidity ratios should be a cause for concern, given many of these institutions have open credit lines with customers and these credit lines can quickly harm the liquidity s ituation of a firm with low liquidity. Figure 3-8 shows the liquidity results for the firms studied. The significant difference between Prodem a nd the rest of the banks in the year following the transition is that Prodem manage d to capitalize on the opportunity to gather savings. The liquidity position of Prodem is exponentially increasing. However, if Prodem does not mobilize these funds it wi ll be paying out in terest while not

PAGE 52

42 accumulating enough revenue on these assets to c over the cost of savings. From the year prior to transition until the year after tran sition the portfolio of loans of Prodem grew from $146 million to $152 million, a mere 4% increase. On the other hand, the cash taken in grew from $22 million to $31 million, an almost 50% increase. 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% ArequipaTacnaProdemMibancoBanksCash as a percentage of total assets Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-8. Liquidity ratio The rest of the banks are neither accumulating nor gathering donations. This is leading to a significant drop in the liquidity positions of Mi banco, Arequipa, and Tacna in the year following transition. A possible explan ation may lie in the qua lity of portfolios. If the rest of the banks are screening cust omers more carefully, they may not want or need to maintain higher sums of cash for rese rves. In addition, less li quidity is required for state-regulated financial institutions than for NGOs. Th e following study of debt to equity and portfolio quality ratios will examine these topics. Debt/equity ratio = total liabilities/total equity The debt to equity ratio is calculated by taking total liab ilities as a percentage of total equity. The debt to equity ratio is one of the most commonly used and simplest

PAGE 53

43 ratios as it is a measure of total capital adequ acy. This ratio is of special interest to any institution lending to an MFI because it lets them know how much of a “safety cushion” the MFI has in sustaining losses. Rapid cha nges in debt/equity in MFIs may be a signal the institution is approaching the limits of its borrowing, which will have negative impact on future growth. Figure 3-9 shows the result s of the debt/equity ratio calculations. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 ArequipaTacnaProdemMibanco BanksTotal liabilities as a percentage of equity Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-9. Debt/equity ratio The ability to borrow more assets is a major incentive for MFIs to transition into the realm of banking laws. Lending institutions might renege at 1:1 debt to equity ratio to an NGO, but may be more comfortable le nding at a much higher rate once the NGO transitions into a regulated bank. The Mi crorate 20, a benchmark of microfinance institutions, has an average debt to equity ratio of 3:8. In this case, though, transitioning to formalized lending institutions has not tran slated to higher debt/equity ratios, meaning these firms are not taking advantage of the cheaper borrowing available, reinforcing the cost of funds ratio results. An increase in th e debt/equity ratios toge ther with a decrease in cost of funds ratios would signal that firms have access to cheaper capital and are

PAGE 54

44 effectively taking advantage of the opportunity to borrow at cheaper rates; however, this is not the case. The costs of funds have rise n while the debt/equity ratio has dropped. In addition, liquidity has deteriorated in three ou t of the four cases. It appears, from this study, that the financial management of thes e banks has suffered in the transition from NGO to formal financial institution. Portfolio Quality Portfolio quality is by far one of the most important indicators of the MFI; the portfolio of the institutions is its largest and most important asset. For microfinance institutions, more than for commercial banks the quality of the por tfolio is important. The reason for this is that due to MFI c lientele poverty levels many loans are not collateralized. Portfolio at risk is the most important indi cator of portfolio qual ity, as it is easy to measure and understand. The amount of the portf olio that is compromised by arrears is divided by the total amount of the portfolio. Ar rears are determined by loans that are with thirty days or more behind in repayment. MFI institutions have managed to maintain high portfolio quality, better than those of commerc ial banks. In addition to portfolio at risk, I also used loan loss reserve ratio, risk cove rage ratio, and write off ratio to measure portfolio quality. Portfolio at risk = (outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + all refinanced loans)/ total outstanding gross portfolio Many portfolio at risk ratios are commonly used, using minimum arrears timeframes ranging from 30 to 120 days. This po rtfolio at risk (PaR) measure includes all loans over 30 days, and was calculated by divi ding the total loans in arrears over 30 days by the total gross portfolio. In this study, the financial statem ents of these firms did not

PAGE 55

45 specify the restructured-refinanced loans in the financial notes. Therefore, risk is underestimated, as customers who are in jeopar dy of defaulting may refinance their loans and thus restart the amount of time left before payment. The portfolio at risk is a firs t line measure of trouble, as in general the longer a loan is in arrears the less likely it is to be pa id. The PaR measures not only the immediate threat of loan defaults but also the threat of future loan defaults. Leading MFIs hold a portfolio risk of between 3–6%, while a smalle r group of MFIs have a portfolio risk that exceeds 10%. Figure 3-10 has the results of the portfolio at risk calculations. 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 ArequipaTacnaProdemMibancoBanksPercentage of Portfolio at Risk Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-10. Portfolio at risk Portfolio at risk is one of the most positiv e indicators in this study. For all the banks studied, portfolio at risk dr ops significantly from the ye ar prior of transition in comparison to the following year after transi tion. This would shed a positive light on the negative liquidity positi on of three out of the four banks. Portfolio quality has drastically improved, demonstrating that banks have impr oved in their ability to screen customers and thus predict cash needs for reserves.

PAGE 56

46 One important note to add to this study is that the fr equency of payment is not included and may be misleading. If, for example, payments to loans are required every week as opposed to every six months, arrears on the latter will likely be more damaging to the firm and pose a greater threat. Nonetheless, there are many things this chart does not take into account. The amount of write-offs needs to be analyzed when looking at this chart, since write-offs will show lower portfolio at risk and misrepre sent the amount of risk in the portfolio. Write-off ratio = write-offs for the period/gross portfolio The write-off ratio is calculated by dividi ng the write-offs for a given year by the total gross portfolio. It is a measure of th e amount of write-offs undertaken by a firm per year, and does not affect net income or tota l assets, since an expected sum has already been expended through the loan loss reserve ra tio. On the other hand, write-offs can be a tool to mislead investors into thinking the quality of the portfolio is better by simply removing the loans on the portfolio that will lik ely not be paid. In the case of FinAmerica in Colombia, a large impairment charge wa s taken to account for a large bulk of bad loans, a result of a restructuring-refina nce strategy gone seriously awry. Although FinAmerica would likely not use this strategy of restructuri ng defaulted loans again, the loss of assets was real and management s hould still be held accountable. The write-off ratio also shows firms that refuse to write off loans so as not to present the true assets of the firm. This other extreme is also dange rous, as it hides from potential and actual investors the true risk profile of the compa ny. The write-off ratio and the portfolio at risk ratio together are a great indi cator of the health of the firm’s portfolio. Figure 3-11 demonstrates the result of th e write-off ratio calculations.

PAGE 57

47 0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 ArequipaTacnaProdemMibanco BanksWrite offs as a Percentage of Gross Portfolio Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-11. Write-off ratio MiBanco did not state in any year what its write-offs were and Arequipa did not undertake any write-offs during the year of tran sition. This chart definitely points to some questions about Arequipa’s por trayal of 6% portfolio at risk in the year following transition. It is likely that Ar equipa’s portfolio at risk wa s downplayed bywrite-offs, and Prodem also understated its PaR during the year of transition. The rest of the years were in line with international norms of write -offs, ranging from 2.8% to 6%, with the exception of Tacna’s year of transition. This chart explains more about the inaccuracies of the PaR than whether write-offs move dow nward or upward with transition. What can be derived is that the picture of a decreasing PaR is not as accurate as these banks have portrayed. More specifically, it addresses the PaR during, Are quipa’s year post-transition and Prodem’s year of transition.

PAGE 58

48 Loan loss reserve ratio = loan loss reserves/ total outstanding gross portfolio The loan loss reserve ratio is calculated by dividing the loan loss reserve ratio by the total outstanding gross portfo lio. When used with other ratio s it is a helpful tool in gauging future loan losses. Nonetheless, some institutions may be overor underreserved. In this study, we can begin to see whether future losses are expected to decrease or increase. Figure 3-12 shows the result of the loan loss reserve ratios. The result of this analysis is bleak. The expected losses two years afte r the transition seem to be increasing. All of the firms with the exception of Tacna seem to be increasing their reserves in anticipation of future losses. This is contradictory to what I expected: instead of losses decreasing as a percentage of the portfolio, they are increasing. This also shows that low liquidity is not a function of the fact that fe wer reserves are needed (as a result of better screening), but rather of the in ability to obtain funds. This is also in contradiction to the decreasing PaR. If the PaR were in fact de creasing, these firms would not have the need to increase their reserves unless they are mandated by the state to do so. The loan loss reserves also indicate that the quality of these MFIs’ portf olios may be deteriorating. 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 ArequipaTacnaProdemMibanco BanksPercentage of loss Reserve to Gross Portfolio Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-12. Loan loss reserve ratio

PAGE 59

49 Risk coverage ratio = loan loss reserve/(outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + refinance loans) The risk coverage ratio divides loan loss reserves by the outstanding balance on arrears plus the restructured loans. This ratio measures what percentage of the arrears is covered by the loan loss reserve account, and is an indicator of how prepared the firm is for a worst-case scenario analysis. In the cas e of all the firms in the study, the amount of loans restructured or refina nced is not known, so once agai n, risk may be understated, as some of the loans may be in arrears and thus be unaccounted for in this ratio. The risk coverage ratio should be taken into account in tandem with PaR and write off ratios. A loan reserve can artificially inflate the pr ofit of the firm by assuming fewer losses are expected. Figure 3-13 shows the results of the risk coverage ratio calculation. 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8ArequipaTacnaProdemMibancoBanksReserves as a Percentage of arrears > 30 days Prior year Strike Year Following Year Figure 3-13. Risk coverage ratio The risk coverage ratio should range from 80% to 120%. Most notably among the four firms studied here, Arequipa has mainta ined extremely low reserves. This practice, along with the high write-offs, is skewing the tr ue portfolio at risk ratio, and it is likely that the risk of the firm is much higher. Tacn a has also maintained low risk coverage that

PAGE 60

50 may be under-representing the true risk of the institution, though it may also be a function of good client screening. The al arming trend to notice is that the risk coverage for every firm is highest in the year following its transition to public institution, which could indicate that managers are pr eparing the institutions for futu re downturns. It may also be that managers being conservative because they are not sure what porti on of their portfolio will default. This conservatism should be l ooked at as more positive than negative. PaR ratios appear to be a pos itive and strong indicator of the transitioning process. However, portfolio quality benefits are likely not as strong as they appear to be shown. Write-offs seem to indicate PaR results are weak er. Loan loss reserves and risk coverage (a function of loan reserves) both tended to go up, a sign either that managers are being conservative, losses are expected or the state is requiring high er loan reserves.

PAGE 61

51 CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION This paper tested commercialization a nd sustainability as defined by the institutionalist. It asked and tested tw o questions: “Are NGOs th at transition into regulated MFIs profitable and self-sustainable?” and ”Will the transition to a regulated bank improve efficiency of re sources and administration?” In answering the first ques tion, I found my results mostly consistent with CGAP (2005) and my hypothesis that MFIs can be self -sustainable in a commercial environment based on the three years of study. Banks that transitioned were profitable and sustainable. Return on equity was inconclu sive. In two of the four cases, the year precluding the transition tended to be the most profitable year. The reason for this may lie in the added cost of becoming a private ba nk. However, every year measured signaled positive ROE for all the banks. Return on assets was not indicative of a trend in any direction. Again, it is important to note the important fact that a ll banks were returning positive return on asset ratios for all the years measured. From this, we can conclude MFI resiliency as private and commercial entities. It is also important to note that posttransition long term time series data would lik ely be better suited to answer longer term questions related to sustainability and profitabi lity. However, long term time series data was unavailable at the time of this thesis. Po rtfolio yield was indicat ive of a positive trend during commercialization. With the exception of Arequipa, all of the banks’ highest year of portfolio yield was either the year of privatization or the following year. What

PAGE 62

52 Portfolio Yield, ROA and ROE demonstrate is that MFIs are profita ble despite adverse conditions in the market place. In answering the second ques tion, I found my results to be less consistent with my hypothesis. I hypothesized that the transiti on to a commercial environment will yield greater efficiency of admi nistrative resources over th e long run horizon due to the presence of ownership of the bank. On th e one hand, the operating expense ratio was lower in the following year of operation than th e first year in three out of the four cases. This signaled that MFIs that transition into commercial institutions are more efficient. On the other hand, financial expense and cost of funds was highest in th ree out of the four banks the year after tr ansition. This is most likely due to the loss of subsidies and the inability of banks to supplement this loss with an increase in savings. This last point is reinforced by the liquidity ratio. With the ex ception of Prodem, all of the banks’ liquidity position decreased in comparison to their pr ior liquidity position in years prior to commercialization. Prodem has managed to capitalize on the opport unity to gather savings. Debt to equity ratio al so reinforces that this commer cialization has not translated to higher debt/equity ratios, meaning these fi rms are not taking advantage of the cheaper borrowing. With the exception of Prodem, the banks are neither accumulating nor gathering donations. A possible explanation mi ght be that the banks are screening their customers better; they may not want or need to maintain higher sums of cash for reserves. Portfolio quality seems to support this no tion. For all the banks studied, portfolio at risk drops significantly from the year prio r to transition in comparison to the following year after transition. Portfolio quality has drastically impr oved, demonstrating that banks

PAGE 63

53 have improved in their ability to screen customers and thus predict cash needs for reserves. The validity of portfolio at ri sk (PaR) is put into questi on as we look further at the write-off, loan loss reserve, and risk coverage ratios. Analysis of write-offs demonstrates that the expected losses two y ears after the transition seem to be increasing. This poses the question, is the low liquid ity a function of fewer reserves needed as a result of better screening, or rather the inability to obtain funds? Risk coverage shows an alarming trend: for every firm, risk coverage is highest in the year following the transition, a possible indicator that managers are prep aring the institutions for futu re downturns. It may also be that managers are being conservative because they are not certain what portion of their portfolio will default. This conservatism shoul d be taken in a positive light. Portfolio at risk ratios appear to be a positive and st rong indicator of the transitioning process. Portfolio at risk reinforces the fact that the transitioning proce ss is beneficial to improving efficiency in the microfinance in stitution, yet portfolio quality benefits are likely not as strong as they appear to be shown. Micro Fi nance attempts to address poverty by providing micro-loans to poor me rchants. This study examines the privatization movement duri ng the late 1990s and focuses on bank financial affects corresponding to this transition. The clie ntele effects remain an open, interesting question for future research.

PAGE 64

54 LIST OF REFERENCES Adams, Dale W and J.D. Von Pischke, 1992, Mi croenterprise credit programs: Dj vu, World Development 20, 1463-1470. Afrane, Sam, 2002, Impact assessment of micr ofinance interventions in Ghana and South Africa: A synthesis of major impacts and lessons, Journal of Microfinance 4, 37– 58. Armendariz De Aghion, Beatriz and Jona than Morduch, 2000 Microfinance beyond group lending, Economics of Transition 8, 401–420. Bolsa Boliviana de Valores, “Conozca la Bolsa Boliviana de Valores,” Origenes de la Bolsa (8 Dec. 1997), (8, August 2005). Bhatt, Nittin,1999, Can microcredit work in the United States?. Harvard Business review Boston, 77, 26–27. Bhatt, Nittin, 2001, Delivering microfinance in developing countries : Controversies and policy perspectives, Po licy Studies Journal 29, 319–333. Brau, James, 2004, Microfinance a comprehens ive review of the existing literature. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures 9, 1–26. Buckley, Graeme, 1997 Microfinance in Africa: Is it either the probl em or the solution? World Development 25, 1081–1093. Christen, Robert Peck, 2001, Commercializatio n and mission drift: The transformation of microfinance in Latin America. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington, D.C: Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest. Christen, Robert Peck, 1996, Financial sustainability, targeting the poorest, and income impact: Are there trade offs for MFIs? CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington, D.C: Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest. Chen, Greg, 1997, The Challenge of growth fo r microfinance institutions: The Bancosol experience. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington, D.C: Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest.

PAGE 65

55 Eyiah, Alex K, 2001, An integr ated approach to financing small contractors in developing countries: A conceptual m odel, Construction Management and Economics 19, 511–518. Goldmark, Lara, 2001, Microenter prise development in Latin America: Towards a new flexibility, Journal of Socio-Economics 30, 145–149. Gomez, Rafael, and Eric Santor, 2001, Member ship has its privileges: The effect of social capital and neighborhood characteris tics on the earnings of microfinance borrowers, The Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 943–966. Grosh, Barbara and Gloria Somolakae, 1996, Mighty oaks from little acorns: Can microenterprise serve as the seedbed of industrialization? World Development 1879–1890. Hollis, Aidan, and Arthur Sweetman 1998a, Micr ocredit: What can we learn from the past? World Development 26, 1875–1891. Hollis, Aidan, and Arthur Sweetman 1998b Microcredit in pre-famine Ireland, Explorations in Economic History Madison, 35, 347–381. Hollis, Aidan, 2001, the life-cycle of a microf inance institution: The Irish loan Funds, Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization Amsterdam, 46, 291–294. Hossain, Farhad, 2002, Small loans, big claims, Foreign Policy Washington, 132, 79–82 pgs. Ismail, Abdul Ghafar, 1997, Pawnshop as an in strument of microen terprise credit in Malaysia, International J ournal of Social Economics Bradford, 24, 1343. Janson, T., & Abate, T., 2003 Performance indicators for microfinance institutions: Technical guide. Washington, D.C: Inter American Development Bank Sustainable Development. 1–50. Mallick, Ross, 2002, Implementing and evalua tion of microcredit in Bangladesh, development, Development in Practice Oxford, 12, 153–163. McKerman, T Signe-Mary, 2002 The impact of microcredit programs on selfemployment profits: Do noncredit progr am aspects matter?, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Cambridge, 84, 93. Micro-Banking Bulletin, “List of particip ants in the Micro-banking Bulletin.” Microbanking Bulletin. (Jan. 2002), < http://www.mixmbb.org/en/membership/paticipating_mfismbb10.html > (8 Feb. 2004).

PAGE 66

56 Mosley, Paul, 2001, Microfinance and poverty in Bolivia, The Journal of Development Studies 37, 101–133. Navajas, Sergio, 2000, Microcredit and the poorest of the poor: Theory and evidence from Bolivia, World Development Oxford, 28, 333. Nourse, Timothy H., Winter/Spring 2001, The mi ssing parts of the micr ofinance services for consumption and insurance, SAIS Review Washington, 21, 61. Olaechea Estudio, “Peru’s legal guide,” Publications and resources, (July 2004) (1 August 2005). Ramirez, Alvaro, 2004, The Microfinance experience in Lati n America and the Caribbean. Workshop on modalities of mi crofinance delivery in Asia Tokyo, Japan: Asian Development Bank Institute. Renso Martinez, “Demand microfinance institutions,” Search for microfinance institutions (Sept. 2002), < http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.quick.search.asp > (8 Mar. 2005). Patten, Richard H, 2001, Microfinance succe ss amidst macroeconomic failure: The experience of Bank Rakyat Indonesia dur ing the East Asian crisis, World Development, Oxford, 29, 1057. Perry, Donna, 2002, Microcredit and women mone ylenders: The shifti ng terrain of credit in rural Senegal, Human Organization Washington, 61, 30, 11. Pitt Mark M., 1998, The impact of group-base d credit programs on poor households in Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter? The Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, 106, 958–999. Pretes, Michael, 2002, Microequity and microfinance, World Development Oxford, 8, 1341. Sanders, Cynthia, 2002, The Impact of mi croenterprise assistance programs: A comparative study of program participants non-participants and other low-wage workers, The Social Service Review Chicago, 76, 321–343. Schreiner, Mark, 1999, Self-employment, mi croenterprise, and the poorest Americans, The Social Service Review, Chicago, 73, 496–524. Servon, Lisa J, May 1997, Microenterprise programs in U.S. inner cities: Economic development or social welfare?, Economic Development Quarterly Thousand Oaks, Vol. 11, Iss. 2, PG. 166, 15 pgs. Stauffenberg et al., 2003. Performance indicators for microfinance institutions.Washington, D.C: Global Microrate Africa. 1-55.

PAGE 67

57 Weijland, Hermine, 1999, Microenterprise clusters in rural Indonesia: Industrial seedbed and policy target, World Development Oxford 27, 1515. Woller, Gary M, 2001, Microcredit as a grass -roots policy for international development, Policy Studies Journal Urbana, 29, 267-283. Woodworth, Warner P, 2000, Third Worl d economic empowerment in the new millennium: Microenterprise, micro-entrepreneurship, and microfinance, Advanced Management Journal Cincinnati, 65, Pg. 19, 8. Woolcock, Michael 1999, Learni ng from failures in microfinance: What unsuccessful cases tell us about how group-based pr ograms work, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology Malden, 58, 1. Woolcock, Michael, 2001, Micr oenterprise and social capit al: A framework for theory, research, and policy, Journal of Socio–Economics Greenwich, 30, 193.

PAGE 68

58 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Amilcar Levy Parajon was born in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. He later moved to the United States with his Parents and gr aduated high school from Hialeah High in Hialeah, Florida. Levy went on to Broward Co mmunity College and then transferred to the University of Florida, where he earned an undergraduate degr ee in finance. After earning his degree, he worked in the investme nt banking industry raising capital for startup technology companies. Levy also started up a company to provi de exporting shipping services from the U.S. to Honduras. He went on to graduate school earning concurrent degrees in Finance and Latin American Studies while simult aneously working for a large fortune 500 technology firm.


Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0015408/00001

Material Information

Title: Microfinance non-governmental organizations evolution to commercial banks: South American case study
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0015408:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0015408/00001

Material Information

Title: Microfinance non-governmental organizations evolution to commercial banks: South American case study
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0015408:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text












MICROFINANCE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS EVOLUTION TO
COMMERCIAL BANKS: SOUTH AMERICAN CASE STUDY
















By

LEVY PARAJON


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2006


































Copyright 2006

by

Levy Parajon

































To my parents, Olivia and Lorenzo Parajon















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my parents for the selfless act of moving to the United States

to ensure a great education for their son. I love them both. I would also like to thank my

thesis advisor Dr. Andy Naranjo. His dedication to my academic and career development

is boundless, and I could not have completed this document without his help. I would

also like to thank Dr. McCoy for admitting me into the Latin American Studies program.

The knowledge that I acquired through his courses will forever help me to understand

Latin American political and economic developments. I would also like to thank Dr.

Brown for admitting me to the Masters of Finance program. His belief in my abilities to

complete the program allowed me to pursue my passion in finance. I would also like to

thank Debbie Himes for working with me endlessly and helping me to maneuver the

waters of graduate school. Finally, I would like to thank Rosalind Asuncion for her

continuous support and for walking beside me in life.
















TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS ........................................ iv

LIST OF TABLES ............... ............. ...................... vii

LIST OF FIGURES .......... ............................ ........... ......................viii

ABSTRACT.................. .................. ix

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ................... .................. .............. .... ......... .......

Microfinance NGOs' Evolution to Commercial Banks...............................................1
Synthesis of Related Literature.................. ......... ................... ... ...............2
Products and Services of M icrofinance Institutions............................................2
Microfinance Institutions Management......................... ...............4
Clientele Targeting .............................. ........... ... ............6
Gender targeting .................................... .................... ... .......... .. ..6
Very poor versus marginally poor targeting ...........................................7
Policy and M icrofinance Institutions............................. ...............
Microfinance Institutions Impact Assessment.................. ......9
Microfinance Institution Sustainability and Commercialization.........................10
Research Design .......................... ............... ........ 14
Data Collection .............. .............. ...... ....................... ........ 15
Hypotheses, A ssum options, and Lim itations.............................................................. 16

2 BUSINESS ENVIROMENT.......................................... ...............18

In du stry ................... ............. ........... ............ .... ............. ............... 18
Uneven Distribution of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) across Latin
A m erica ............................................... 19
Credit U nions...................................... ......................................... 19
Increased Competition.................... ... .................22
Performance of Latin American MFIs Versus Asian MFIs ...................................25
O overall Financial Perform ance .................................................. ............... 26
Outreach ........................................ .........26
Funding............... ........................ .........27
Savings Outreach............... ..... ....................28


v









Efficiency ........................................ ......... 28
Loans R ates Changed ............................................... ............... 29
Capital Markets..................... ... .................... 29
Peru: Capital Markets ....... ............ .......... .........29
Bolivia: Capital Markets............................... ...............30

3 TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS ........................................ ................. 31

Are NGOs That Transition into Regulated MFIs Profitable and Self-Sustainable?...31
Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/Equity .....................................32
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income/ Assets..................................... 34
Portfolio Yield= Interest and Fee Income/ Gross Portfolio.............................35
Will the Transition to a Regulated Bank Improve Efficiency of Resources and
Administration?............... ....... ............................ ........36
Efficiency and Productivity ............... ...............................36
Financial M anagem ent ................... .... ....... .....................38
Financial expense ratio = interest and fee expenses/gross portfolio ........38
Cost of funds ratio = interest and fee expenses on funding
liabilities/funding liabilities ............... ................ ...... .................... 40
Liquidity ratio = cash and bank current accounts + readily marketable
investments/total assets.................. ....... ...............41
Debt/equity ratio = total liabilities/total equity ........................................ 42
Portfolio Quality ............ ....... ................... .. ......... .......... 44
Portfolio at risk = (outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + all
refinanced loans)/ total outstanding gross portfolio ...............................44
Write-off ratio = write-offs for the period/gross portfolio.........................46
Loan loss reserve ratio = loan loss reserves/ total outstanding gross
portfolio ................................... .. .... .. .. ...............48
Risk coverage ratio = loan loss reserve/(outstanding balance on arrears
over 30 days + refinance loans)......................... .............49

4 CONCLUSION........................ ..... ....... .51

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................... ........... .... ................54

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .................................................. ............... 58
















LIST OF TABLES


Table page

2-1 Rapid rate of commercialization in Latin America............. .................18

2-2 Share of microenterprise in Latin America with MFI credit..............................21

2-3 R apid grow th of M F Is .............................................................................................23

2-4 Slow er credit union grow th ............................................................................... ......23

2-5 Returns of microfinance in Latin America: 1996-99 versus 2001-2002 (%) .........24

2-6 MFI lending by loan mythology and location of client............... ...............24

2-7 Deposits in nine microfinance markets (US$ millions, end-of-year values) ...........25

2-8 Profile of the average MFI reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003).....27
















LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

3-1 Return on equity .......... .............................33

3-2 Return on assets .......... ..............................34

3-3 Return on assets .......... ...................... .35

3-4 Portfolio yield................. ............................ .............. 36

3-5 Operating expense ratio..... .................. .................37

3-6 Financial expense ratio................................................ ........ 39

3-7 Cost of funds ratio ......... .................. ..40

3-8 Liquidity ratio................................... ........42

3-9 Debt/equity ratio.................... ................ 43

3-10 Portfolio at risk.................... .......................45

3-11 W rite-off ratio .............. .......................... ......... .. ......... ..................47

3-12 L oan loss reserve ratio.................................................... 48

3-13 Risk coverage ratio..................... ................ 49
















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Master of Arts

MICROFINANCE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS EVOLUTION TO
COMMERCIAL BANKS: SOUTH AMERICAN CASE STUDY
By

Levy Parajon

August 2006

Chair: Andy Naranjo
Major Department: Latin American Studies

This study measures the transition of non-governmental organizations' (NGOs') to

commercial financial institutions from the institutionalist perspective, while the clientele

effects as discussed in the welfare perspective remains an open question. I use financial

ratios to analyze whether microfinance non-governmental organizations that have

transitioned to commercial banks are profitable, sustainable, and more efficient with

resources and administration. Profitability ratios demonstrate that microfinance

institutions (MFIs) are profitable despite adverse conditions in the market place. As far as

efficiency is concerned, the following year after privatization appears to be more efficient

than the prior year of privatization, signaling that MFIs who transition to lending

institutions are more efficient per unit of input to output. Financial management, on the

other hand, takes a downturn in the transition from NGO to commercial financial

institution. Finally, portfolio quality seems to be a positive and strong indicator of the

transitioning process. However, portfolio quality benefits are not as strong as they appear.









Write offs suggest that portfolio at risk (PaR) results were weaker. Loan loss reserves and

risk coverage (a function of loan reserves) both tended to increase, a sign that either

managers are being conservative, losses are expected, or the state is requiring higher loan

reserves. Nonetheless, portfolio quality does show considerable improvement, further

reinforcing that the transitioning process is beneficial to improving efficiency in the

microfinance institution.














CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Microfinance NGOs' Evolution to Commercial Banks

The birth of the microfinance industry in Latin America began in the early 1980s,

when socially-minded NGOs began lending funds to lenders of low economic resources

in Latin America. The bulk of these loans were funded primarily by soft loans and grants,

governments, and large institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank and the

World Bank. By the outset of the early 1990s, there were a few microfinance institutions

(MFIs) that became financially independent from soft loans and grants and began to

transition to becoming commercial banks.1

The reason for this transition was simple: if the microfinance NGOs did not

develop into sustainable institutions, they would be running the risk of insolvency when

donor interest changed.2 To prosper, MFIs would need to leverage their funds with

savings that could be turned into loans instead of relying on grants. In so doing, banks

would minimize the risk that donors would divert funds at a future date and endanger the

operations of the firm. In addition, by seeking profitable operations, banks would open

the door of opportunity for investor funds and growth of the banks, along with depth of

coverage in the industry. A further benefit from the commercialization of NGOs was

better governance of financial institutions. NGOs have poor governance due to the lack of

ownership and accountability. There are, in many cases, few accountability concerns

1 Stauffenberg, 2003

2 Stauffenberg, 2003









because of a lack of true ownership by other institutions or parties. By making the MFIs

publicly owned by investors, the financial institutions would have more incentive to

monitor operations adequately.3 Prodem, one of the banks studied in this research, led the

way in transition and opened the door to many other banks that would soon come.

Bancosol, Caja Municipales, Corposol, and the now bankrupt Finansol followed Prodem

in this change to commercial banking. This transition, though, would not come without a

cost, as NGOs began losing certain benefits they previously enjoyed, such as tax

exemptions.4

Synthesis of Related Literature

I will touch briefly on five of the six major topics in available literature, followed

by an in-depth analysis of the sixth topic, sustainability and commercialization.

Products and Services of Microfinance Institutions

MFIs provide comparable products and services to traditional financial institutions.

However, micro-credit loans are overwhelmingly the most common product.5 Other

products are now being offered by some MFIs as literature and demand have highlighted

the need for products like savings, insurance, education, and equity services.6 Eyiah

(2001) develops Nourse's idea into a microfinance application in construction

management. Eyiah develops a model for a relationship between small contractors and

MFIs.7,8


3Stauffenberg, 2003

4 Stauffenberg, 2003

5 Nourse, 2001

6 Nourse, 2001

7 Eyiah, 2001









The need for financial services worldwide is obvious in the ubiquitous dubious loan

and collection practices often offered by "loan sharks." Perry (2002) examines this issue

by studying women in Senegal who use village bank money to become moneylenders

profitably.9 Ismail and Ahmad (1997) also study the issue of demand by focusing on

pawnshops in Malaysia.10 They conclude that pawnshops have increased in the role of

financial services and will continue to grow in the future.

Collateral for most MFIs is often not required, as most customers, due to extreme

poverty, do not have any to provide. Instead, MFIs use "social collateral." Group

members must pay back their loans in order to maintain their standing in the community.

Woolcock (2001) demonstrates how MFIs use this form of collateral by studying MFIs in

Bangladesh and India.1 Goldmark (2001) goes a step further by suggesting methods to

build social collateral.12

The demand for savings also exists in many areas of the world. Grosh and

Somolekae (1996) touch on this topic while discussing whether microfinance can be a

catalyst for industrialization in Botswana.13 They conclude savings are a key factor in the

system required for industrialization.

Micro-insurance is in its infant stages. Small Enterprise Development (Volume 12,

Number 1, 2001) dedicated an entire issue to this topic, concerning threats to and


8 Brau, 2004

9 Peny, 2002

10 Ismail & Ahmad, 1997

1 Woolcock, 2001

12 Goldmark, 2001

13 Grosh & Somolekae, 1996









opportunities in the micro-insurance industry (micro-insurance, funeral insurance,

agricultural micro-insurance, agricultural micro-insurance). 14

A final product of important discussion is equity as a form of MF service. Pretes

(2002) discusses equity grants as a legitimate option.15 Pretes says that startup grants and

equity are useful. Equity investors, he points out, receive their return intrinsically instead

of financially as a form of a startup firm.

Microfinance Institutions Management

In this section we will discuss best practices for the MF industry. Before delving

into this topic, it is important to note that as more literature becomes available, best

practices will change to adapt to the new information on hand. Best practices should be

pertinent to the specific geographic location in which the MFI resides. Bhatt and Tang

(2001) discuss vehicles, technologies, and performance assessment.16 They conclude that

MFIs' future success is highly dependant on the tailoring of MFI products to specific

products. Relevant factors include the optimal interest rate to charge customers; the

structuring of loans to group lenders or individuals; the commercialization of MFIs (to be

discussed later); loan size, growth, and credit scoring; and the lending relationship with

customers.17

Microfinance institutions face an interesting predicament in determining what

interest rates they will charge customers. Traditionally, financial institutions will charge

the interest that maximizes wealth for the shareholder. However, if this is to be applied to

14 Brau, 2004

15 Pretes, 2002

16 Bhatt and Tang, 2001

" Brau, 2004









MFIs, firms risk drifting away from their initial poverty alleviation goals while also

pushing customers to delinquency. On the other hand, smaller loans require equal

administration cost while yielding smaller revenues to the firm. 18

Conning (1999) studies this problem of MFIs looking to simultaneously maximize

impact, target the poor, and remain financially solvent.19 Looking at 72 MFIs, Conning

states that sustainable MFIs that target the poor must charge higher interest rates, have

higher staff costs, and are less leveraged than MFIs that are not sustainable. In contrast,

Hollis and Sweetman (1998) study Irish loan funds in the mid-19th century and conclude

that financial institutions were able to loan funds to the very poor at competitive rates, for

a profit, and without subsidies.20

Another topic is group lending versus lending to individuals. Gomez and Santor

(2001) study determinants of self-employment success for micro-credit borrowers, and

they stress that group lending has a positive correlation with this success.21 Woolcock

(1999) also touches on this topic, stating that performance is contingent upon the

structure of cost, the depth of the social relationship among borrowers and program staff,

and lending policies.22 Armenariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) discuss the system

required for MFIs to penetrate new markets.23 They focus on Eastern Europe, Russia, and





18 Brau, 2004

19 Conning, 1999

20 Hollis and Sweetman, 1998

21 Gomez and Santor, 2001

22 Woolcock, 1999

23 Armenariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000









China and state that direct monitoring and the use of non-refinancing threats are

successful mechanisms for penetration.24

Clientele Targeting

The primary issues of discussion in MFI clientele targeting are lending to women

versus men and lending to the marginally poor versus the very poor.

Gender targeting

Overwhelmingly, the bulk of MFI borrowers are women. It is commonly stated that

women will use the funds in a wiser fashion then their husbands, leading to greater

poverty alleviation. Pitt and Khandker (1998) test this notion in a thorough study.25 They

examine household expenditures, male and female labor divisions, the schooling of

children, and non-land assets held by women as outcomes. Their conclusion states that all

six of these areas are affected when women are the borrowers and that only one in six are

affected when men borrow money. Kevane and Wydick (2001) follow Pitt and Khandker

by testing the notion that women produce greater poverty alleviation while men produce

greater economic growth.26 They find no statistical difference in men vs. women

generating sales. However, they do find a difference in employment generation, which

they attribute to child bearing.

Mallick (2002) questions the efficacy of MF, suggesting that it can lead to gender

conflict.27 Hossain (2002) touches on each point of Mallick's assertions, rebuting his




24 Brau, 2004

25 Pitt and Khandker, 1998

26 Kevane and Wydick, 2001

27 Mallick, 2002









points by stating that Mallick's conclusions are premature.28 Hossain's assertions are

worthy of mention, as equity investors who receive returns intrinsically are likely to

refuse funding if they perceive that their intrinsic return is diminished.29

Very poor versus marginally poor targeting

At the heart of targeting the very poor vs. the marginally poor is the debate of

sustainability and self-sufficiency. Marginally poor clients are able to borrow larger

amounts of money, which yield larger returns to the MFI and require the same

administrative costs as the smaller loans common to very poor borrowers. Navaj as,

Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza (2000) analyze cost to users,

breadth, length and scope of output, along with worth to users.30 They conclude that the

majority of the households reached were households near the poverty line, that group

lenders had a greater degree of depth in reaching the very poor in comparison to

individual lenders, and finally, that urban borrowers were more likely to be borrowers-

though rural borrowers were the poorest. Servon (1997)31 is consistent with the result of

Navajas, et al. Servon studied three MFIs in the U.S. and concludes that the MFIs

concerned were serving the borderline of the mainstream economy, not the very poor.

Servon states that MFI programs help change the mindset of clients by providing hope.








28 Hossain, 2002

29 Brau, 2004

30 Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza, 2000

31 Servon 1997









Policy and Microfinance Institutions


The pivotal question in addressing microfinance is whether this is an effective

option in comparison to other poverty alleviation tools and programs. In addressing this

question there tends to be a split, as many macroeconomist dismiss the notion of a

bottom-up approach as not viable and a top-down approach as preferable (if not the only

approach). In the other camp of economists, there is greater optimism about the success

of a bottom-up approach to poverty alleviation and microfinance. 32

Adams and Pischke (1992) compare micro-credit programs to earlier finance

programs targeting the poor.33 Adams and Pischke believe that, because of the similarities

between micro-credit programs and previous small farmer debt programs, micro-credit is

destined for failure and that therefore debt is not the solution for the poor. Buckley (1997)

concludes that fundamental structural changes, along with a deeper understanding of

informal sector behavior, are needed before the MF industry can succeed.34 Schreiner

(1999) also makes this point in his study of U.S. microenterprises. He concludes that

borrowers were able to move from welfare to self-employment in only one in 100 cases.35

On the other camp of this argument are researchers like Woller and Woodworth

(2001).36 They argue that macro-economic approaches have suffered repeated failures.

Woller and Woodworth do not reject macro-economic policies, but do strongly support



32 Brau, 2004

33 Adams and Pischke, 1992

34 Buckley, 1997

35 Schreiner, 1999b

36 Woller and Woodworth, 2001









microfinance as a viable option that has proven successful in many parts of the world.

Weijland (1999) studies the effects of clustering groups and industrial development.37 He

concludes that clustering policies have experienced some success in Indonesia.

Microfinance Institutions Impact Assessment


There is no agreed upon optimal impact assessment method. Nonetheless, many

researchers have made an effort to measure MF impact based on a variety of outcomes.

Mosely (2001) uses income, assets, and vulnerability as measures of success.38 He

determines that assets and income level increased proportionate to initial poverty levels.

MFI programs can lead to increased vulnerability as some borrowers reach high debt

levels. McKerman (2002) also lends support to the MFI industry.39 He finds positive and

wide-reaching effects of participation and self-employment profits. Afrane (2002), in a

study in Ghana and South Africa that uses case methods, concludes that there are definite

improvements to the lives of participants.40, 41

On the other side of articles not supporting the MF industry are Sanders (2002) and

Bhatt (1999).42, 43 Sanders bring into question the efficiency of microenterprise as an

antipoverty strategy. Bhatt (1999) finds mixed results, pointing out that some programs

have worked while others have failed.


37 Weijliand, 1999

38 Mosely, 2001

39 McKerman, 2002

40 Afrane, 2002

41 Brau, 2004

42 Sanders, 2002

43 Bhatt, 1999









Microfinance Institution Sustainability and Commercialization


On the topic of self-sufficiency there are mainly two competing ideologies, the

Welfarist and the Institutionalist. I will briefly discuss these two ideologies and move on

to discuss several articles that study sustainability as defined by the institutionalist.

The welfarist contends that subsidies are a form of equity investment. The investor

in this case is not seeking monetary return, but instead receiving his return through an

intrinsic fashion. The equity investors who invest in socially responsible firms are willing

to accept a lower return in comparison to index funds that the investor may not consider

socially responsible.44' 45

The institutionalist, on the other hand, believes that the firm ought to have the

ability to cover its cost through its revenue. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) make this

argument as they point out that subsidized MFIs are less stable and tend to suffer more

mission drift in comparison to their peers who receive funds from depositors.46 Hollis and

Sweetman (1998) also point out in a previous article that Irish MFIs in the 1700s were

resilient. They only succumbed after legislation, bank competition, and the potato famine

colluded to create an infeasible environment. Patten, Rosenguard, and Johnston (2001), in

a more recent article, discuss the resiliency of MFIs as they analyze the BRI during the

East Asian financial crisis.47 They conclude that the BRI performed well while large

financial institutions performed poorly by measures of savings rates and repayments.


44 Woodworth, 2000

45 Brau, 2004

46 Hollis and Sweetman, 1998

47 Patten, Rosenguard, and Johnston, 2001









The topic of the institutionalist versus the welfarist is not tested in this study, but

rather this study test sustainability as defined by the institutionalist. In other words, this

study will measure the transition of NGO's to commercial financial institutions from the

perspective of the Institutionalist. The following are a group of articles pertaining to

commercialization and sustainability as defined by the institutionalist.

The CGAP Occasional Paper "Commercialization and Mission Drift: The

Transformation of Microfinance in Latin America," from January 2005, measures the

impact of commercialization on MFIs.48 The authors measure commercialization impact

by the changing strategy and financial performance of various institutions in the late

1990s. Financial performance of MFIs in Latin America is measured against their peers

in other regions of the world and commercial banks. This study demonstrates that not

only were Latin American MFIs profitable when compared to their peers, but that in

many cases they were outperforming commercial banks. Even low-end customer

microfinance institutions, which tend to be less profitable, were found to be on their way

to sustainability. Of the fifty-one Latin American MFIs that report to the Microbanking

Bulletin, forty-one were self-sustainable.49

This growth in commercialization is leading to strong competition and what at first

may appear to be a mission drift to larger loans. Larger loans provide a higher level of

profitability in comparison to small size loans. However, Christen and Cook's study was

unable to identify whether the increasing loan sizes were due to a mission drift or a

natural growth of the financing needs of repeat customers.


48 Christen & Cook, 2001

49 List of Participants in the MBB. Retrieved February 8, 2004 from
lp \\ \\ \\ .mixmbb.org/en/membership/participating_mfisMBB10.html









In December 1996, CGAP published another article titled "Financial Sustainability,

Targeting the Poorest, and Income Impact: Are There Trade-offs for Microfinance

Institutions?" 50 This paper studied the findings of David Hulme and Paul Mosley, who

asked in their book, "Can microfinance institutions achieve financial sustainability and

reach the poorest of the poor? What are the tradeoffs in pursuing these two goals

simultaneously?"

David Hulme and Paul Mosley studied thirteen MFI institutions in seven countries

to comprehend "the impact of the institutions' design, management and policy

environments on financial sustainability and on various measures of impact, including

poverty."5

Hulme and Mosley compared the change in each impact variable from 1989-2003

in a random sample of 150 loan borrowers in a control group of 150 non-borrowers

whose incomes, asset holdings, and access to infrastructure were comparable to the

borrowers'.52

What Hulme and Mosley discovered was that institutions with high financial

sustainability have lower levels of loans in arrears and dependence on subsidies in

comparison to MFIs with low levels of financial sustainability. In addition, Hulme and

Mosley discovered that high levels of sustainability are found in institutions that instill

"best practices" policies such as higher interest rates, voluntary savings facilities,





50 Christen & Cook, 2001

51 Christen & Cook, 2001

52 Christen & Cook, 2001









frequent loan collection, and financial incentives to borrowers and staff to maximize

repayment.

In March 1997, CGAP FOCUS Series 2 published an article titled "The Challenge

of Growth for Microfinance Institutions: The Bancosol Experience." 53 Bancosol is the

name that Prodem, one of the banks I will follow through transition, took after becoming

a commercial MFI. This points to many problems and opportunities that Prodem

experienced through transformation, among them a higher cost of funds. BancoSol

switched from donor funds to more expensive commercial loans and savings deposits.

The result of this was a sharp rise on the average cost of funds from 4% per year at time

of transformation to 12% two years later. Also, the number of larger loans which have a

lower interest rate, grew, thus lowering the profit yields by 13%. In addition to all this,

the explosive growth from four branches prior to transformation to thirty-two branches in

the following four years lowered productivity.54 While BancoSol's costs were growing

rapidly due to expansion, its expanded capacity was not immediately yielding sufficient

loans in order to cover the higher cost of operation.

This thesis will attempt to answer whether banks that were formerly NGOs are

profitable and sustainable, and whether this, the transition to regulated banks, improved

the efficiency of resources, management and administration. This study will measure the

transition of NGOs to commercial financial institutions from the perspective of the

Institutionalist. In answering these questions, I contribute to the literature in the following

ways: I will measure changes in portfolio quality, efficiency and productivity, financial



53 Chen, 1997

54 Productivity is measured by portfolio outstanding per unit of inputs, such as branches or loan officers.









management, and profitability in specific banks that have transitioned from NGOs to

commercial institutions.

Research Design

In measuring the profitability, sustainability, and efficiency of NGOs that have

transitioned into regulated banks I followed the "Performance Indicators for

Microfinance Institutions: Technical Guide." 55 I gauge four different sets of indicators:

portfolio quality, efficiency and productivity, financial management, and profitability.

Portfolio quality is the largest source of risk for any finance institution. The biggest

asset for an MFI is its portfolio of loans. Furthermore, many of these loans are not

collateralized, and thus the quality of portfolio is crucial for the survival of any MFI or

bank. In particular, portfolio at risk, or PaR, has emerged as a useful ratio. PaR measures

the quality of the portfolio tainted by doubtful accounts. PaR is easily measured and

comparable throughout the industry with other finance institutions.

The second set of indicators I am using involves efficiency and productivity ratios.

These ratios measure the efficiency per unit of production of the bank and the

management of assets. These ratios are not easily altered in comparison to profitability

ratios, which are more susceptible to "creative accounting." The third set of indicators

involves the performance of the financial managers. Even though financial management

is a "back office function," the impact financial managers have directly affects the

sustainability of the institution. As stated by the Inter Development Bank, "Errors in


55 Janson & Abate, 2003.









liquidity or foreign exchange management can compromise an institution's credit

operation and otherwise sound management."56

The final set of indicators measured is the profitability. This set of ratios tends to

"summarize" all operations of the company into dollars and cents. Any record of poor

management, use of resources, and portfolio quality will be reflected in the profitability

of the bank. Also, records of growth and profitability indicate market penetration; if we

assume penetration indicates serving the microfinance industry in ways that improve

poverty alleviation, profitability is directly linked to the overriding goal of any MFI to

strive for poverty alleviation through operations.

Data Collection

The samples in this study were gathered from the archives of The Mixmarket: The

Global information exchangefor the microfinance industry. The four banks Arequipa,

Tacna, Prodem and Mibanco were chosen because of their geographical location in South

America, along with the availability of their financial statements and mission statements.

Controlling for macro-economic fluctuations was a major concern. To minimize

changes in financial data due to this factor, banks were chosen in the same economic

region during the late 1990s. The specific sample dates for each bank are: Arequipa

1997, 1998, and 1999; Tacna 1996, 1997, and 1998; Prodem 1998, 1999, and 2000; and,

Mibanco in 1998, 1999, and 2000.

South America was chosen due to its large number of MFIs. Peru and Bolivia were

specifically targeted due to their geographical proximity.


56 Janson, 2003.









Many banks, unfortunately, do not provide financial statements while they are

private. Thus, finding banks with this complete information in the same economic region

was a difficult task. The financial statements that were sought were the year prior to

commercialization, the year during commercialization and the year after

commercialization. Mibanco, though used in this study, did not provide its financial

statements for the year prior to privatization. However, the other two years were available

and I chose to use the firm regardless.

A final factor in gathering the data sample was mission statement. All of the banks

used in this study had 91%-100% of their operations in comprised by microfinance. In

addition, the customer bases were similar, with an average loan per borrower ranging

from Tacna's $994 to Prodem's $1,550.57

Hypotheses, Assumptions, and Limitations

The size of the microfinance industry is large, and given a lack of supply to meet

the demand, microfinance banks can be self-sustainable in a commercial environment.

The transition to a commercial environment will yield greater efficiency of administrative

resources over the long run, due to the presence of ownership of the bank. In the short

run, profitability will be affected negatively as banks transition from the safety of not-for-

profit institutions to regulated banks.

I will like to note a few assumptions and limitations in this study. In comparing

financial statements, and in the absence of strong regulation for uniformity in accounting

standards, it is likely that some figures were accounted for differently. I will make a good

faith effort were accounting figures were computed differently to recalculate figures in

57 MixMarket (2005) Demand MFIs. Retrieved March 8, 2005, from
Imp %"% %" .mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.quick.search.asp









accordance with CGAP accounting practices for microfinance institutions. Given that this

study covers banks in Peru and Bolivia, it is limited in controlling for different maturity

levels of markets and the effects on the different indicators. Bolivia is a more competitive

environment and banks in Bolivia are less likely to exert profitability simply by raising

interest rates on loans.

A second critical limitation of this study is the length of time banks are followed

post transition. During the time of this study, the sample bank financial statements were

unavailable for years beyond the year following the transition. Because of this data

limitation, measuring longer run bank sustainability effects is problematic. However, the

thesis provides evidence on shorter run sustainability and profitability effects in the year

after transition, which may shed some additional light on longer term effects.















CHAPTER 2
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Industry

As mentioned before, Bancosol, Caja Municipales, Corposol and the now bankrupt

Finansol followed Prodem into this transition to commercial banking.' The microfinance

industry's success has also brought downscaling to the larger commercial banks. These

other banks, like Banco Solidario of Ecuador, Banco de Trabajo of Peru, and the

behemoth Banco de Credito of Peru, have all taken on micro-lending ventures in a

widespread fashion. Table 2-1 shows the rapid commercialization of microfinance.2

Table 2-1. Rapid rate of commercialization in Latin America: A snap shot of mid-2001
Average Loan
Number Number of Portfolio Size
Type of (US$
MFI of MFIs Clients (Thousands) Millions) (US$ Millions)

Upgrade 40 572 538 976
Downscale 22 365 343 940
Total
Regulated 62 937 902 962
Unregulated 114 870 288 332
Total 176 1806 1190 659

These data were taken from the most comprehensive survey of microfinance institutions

in Latin America available. The survey was done by the Inter-Development Bank (IDB)

and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and covers 176 MFIs in seventeen

Latin American countries. The data refer to mid-2001 and clearly show the evolution

from an non-governmental-organization-dominated industry ten years earlier to one in


1 Janson, 2003.

2 Christen & Cook, 2001.









which 62 regulated MFIs provide 76% of the credit flowing to microenterprises from all

MFIs (regulated and unregulated) and reach 52% of the total clients served by all MFIs.

Uneven Distribution of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) across Latin America

The level of microfinance penetration across Latin America is disproportionate and

ranges from less than 1% to 28%. On average the level of penetration is 2.6%. Ironically,

to the Inter-American Development Bank it is the small and medium-sized countries in

Central America and South America that lead in the level of penetration; Venezuela,

Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, the largest countries in Latin America, have penetration

rates below 1%. There are a plethora of reasons for this low penetration rate, but the

primary cause is that no large NGOs have matured in these markets. Furthermore, large

commercial banks have not shown any interest in entering this market, where large

development banks dominate in providing assistance to low-income micro-businesses.

Nevertheless, there are two large MFIs with promising hope: Compartamos in Mexico

and Banco do Nordeste in Brazil. Table 2-2 shows the share of microenterprise in Latin

America with MFI credit.3

Credit Unions

In order to discuss the microfinance industry in Latin America it is important to

take credit unions and their role in the microlending industry into account by examining

the growth, decline, and current state of credit unions. Credit unions were established in

the 1950s, '60s, and '70s by Catholic priests, United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) workers, and Peace Corps volunteers4. Management was often


3 Stauffenberg, 2003

4 Stauffenberg, 2003









poor, loans were frequently lost, and earnings, profit retention, and reserves were weak.5

However, due to the continuous sums of soft loans and grants, credit unions grew until

the 1980s.6 In the 1980s, the soft loans and grants began to dry up in exchange for

technical assistance money, as a push began to make the industry more responsible and

self-sufficient. According to a top recent IDB CGAP survey of credit unions in seventeen

countries in Latin America:

These financial intermediaries provided loans to about 1.5 million micro-
entrepreneurs at the end of 2001, almost as many as the 1.8 million served by the
MFIs in the same year. Average loan size was US$ 1,044 for the credit unions, not
too different from the $659 shown in Table 1 for the MFIs. Small and fragmentary
survey evidence on the income levels of the CU and MFI clientele indicates that
about 20-50% of each group is below the widely-used $2 per day per person
poverty line.7

Even though the loan amounts are similar and the clientele are comparable in

income level, between microfinance institutions and credit unions, the microfinance

industry is currently growing on average by 18% versus 7% for credit unions.8 Credit

unions have many weaknesses in comparison to microfinance institutions. Two factors-

the free rider problem and a lenient attitude toward delinquency- are prominent

weaknesses of credit unions in comparison to MFIs. Given there is no ownership stake

in credit unions (CUs) and they function as cooperatives, no one feels obliged to take the

helm of these institutions since they will not reap any additional rewards.9 A lenient

attitude toward loan delinquency and rooted in the organization culture drives many CUs


5 Stauffenberg, 2003

6Stauffenberg, 2003

Stauffenberg, 2003

8Stauffenberg, 2003

9 Stauffenberg, 2003










to insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy.10 Currently, there is a strong drive to clean up

the credit union industry in Latin America, and significant progress has been made in

Guatemala, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In these countries, 15-25 credit unions were

reorganized and strengthened, leading to double digit growth (20% instead of 7%).11

Table 2-2. Share of microenterprise in Latin America with MFI credit
Number of Share of
Number of Number of Total Micro- Micro-
Date of Single- Firms with Number of enterprises enterprises
Household person 1-5 Micro- with MFI with MFI
Country Survey Firmnns Employees enterprises Credit Credit

Bolivia 1998 1300313 62008 13623231 379117 27.83%
Nicaragua 1998 377148 40422 417,570 84285 20.18%
El Salvador 1998 606569 60617 667186 93808 14.06%
Honduras 1999 832941 58239 891180 107054 12.01%
Chile 1998 1069139 138045 1207184 82825 6.86%
Guatemala 1998 1328476 93238 1421714 71187 5.01%
Costa Rica 1998 232328 78891 311219 12794 4.11%
Ecuador 1998 1396139 298524 1694663 65719 3.88%
Dominican
Republic 1998 1315016 77172 1392188 49437 3.55%
Colombia 1999 5726653 77152 6501805 219240 3.37%
Paraguay 1998 319113 668213 987326 30203 3.06%
Peru 1997 4102561 2763632 6866193 185431 2.70%
Panama 1999 267854 21150 289004 6390 2.21%
Mexico 1998 8503552 1770393 10273945 67249 0.65%
Uruguay 1998 314891 27018 341909 1600 0.47%
Brazil 1999 16567943 2421810 18989753 62485 0.33%
Argentina 1998 1807615 103555 1911170 4940 0.26%
Venezuela 1999 2906975 340296 3247271 2364 0.07%
Latin America Total Firms 48,975,375 9798375 58773600 2E+06
Latin America -Weighted Average Share 2.60%
Latin America-Un-weighted Average Share 6.15%
Sources: Household surveys for number of microenterprises, Christen (2000) for number of
microenterprises with MFI credit, except for Panama. Christen's data go to the second half of
1999 and cover most of the larger regulated financial institutions and NGOs lending to
microenterprises, but not credit unions. Data for the number of microenterprises with MFI credit
for Panama are obtained from the IDB loan files, refer to December 1999, and are as follows:
Multi-credit Bank 3881, Credit Fundes 1549, and Mi Banco 960.


10 Stauffenberg, 2003

"Stauffenberg, 2003.









Tables 2-3 and 2-4 highlight the rapid growth of MFIs in Latin America and the smaller

growth of credit unions.

By the late 1990s, the microfinance and credit union industries in Latin America

were leading the world in the critical area of sustainability. Table 2-5 highlights the

return to microfinance in Latin America. Unfortunately, microfinance in Latin America

went from outpacing the world in 1996-1999 to lagging behind the world average in

2001-2002.12 During the previous years, microfinance exploded in growth, leading to

increased competition and decreased profit. Oddly enough, the increased competition is

affecting smaller MFIs more than their competing larger peers. The reason for this is

simple: economies of scale. Larger MFIs can reduce their cost per loan and

administrative cost.13 The additional cost of one more customer loan, once an MFI is well

established, is minimal in comparison to the profits it can earn.14 Thus, the MFIs who

have managed to grow are reaping the rewards of larger portfolios.

Increased Competition

As competition has increased, the drive to customize products has also increased.

MFIs have switched from group loans to individual loans to meet the needs of their

clients more efficiently.15 In addition, group loans tend to perform poorly during

economic downturns, as was the case between 1998-2002. In hard economic times, loan

recipients feel they have a difficult enough time paying off their loans, much less trying



12 Ramirez, 2004.

13 Stauffenberg, 2003.

14 Stauffenberg, 2003.

15 Stauffenberg, 2003










to pay for someone else's loan. When one or two people default on a group loan everyone

tends to default on it, as well, exponentially increasing the cost to MFIs.16

Table 2-6 demonstrates the continuing preference of individual loans over group

loans, as the number of individual loans hovers around 1 million and the number of group

loans is about 350,000. Another interesting characteristic is an increasing preference on

poverty lending using village bank loans. The use of village bank loans increased to

410,000 in the late 1990s versus 350,000 for group loans.17 The focus on poverty is

evident by the much smaller amount of loans and by the rural location of these loans.

Village banking also is changing due to competition as the maximum loan size has

increased from about $300 to $1,000.18 In addition, loan maturities have been

Table 2-3. Rapid growth of MFIs
Year Number of Microenterprises
Dec-98 1,520,000
Dec-00 1914000
3-Jun 3241000

Total Growth (1998-
2003) 113%
Average annual growth 18.30%
Source: IDB and CGAP surveys of 17 L.A. countries

Table 2-4. Slower credit union growth
Year Microlending Portfolio is US$ and Growth
Dec-99 $2.41 Billion
3-Dec $3.13 Billion


Total Growth (1999-
2003) 29.90%
Average annual growth 6.75%
Source: DGRB and IDB surveys of eight Latin American countries


16 Stauffenberg, 2003

17 Stauffenberg, 2003

18 Stauffenberg, 2003










Table 2-5. Returns of microfinance in Latin America: 1996-99 versus 2001-2002 (%)
Adjusted
ROA in Adjusted ROA in
1996-99 2001-02
All MFIs and CUs, Worldwide -4.5 0.1
All MFIs and CUs, Latin America 2.4 -0.1
5 Latin American Sub Groups Credit Unions (CUs) 4.2 -0.5
MFIs: large, broad based 3.1 5.3
MFIs: medium-sized, broad based 1.3 3.6
MFIs: medium-sized, low-end 2.3 -2.9
MFIs: small, low-end -9.4 -12.8
Sources: Second column from Christen 2000, second column from Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003).

Table 2-6. MFI lending by loan mythology and location of client
Number of Total Loan
MFIs Making Total Number Portfolio Average Loan Share of Clients in Rural
Type of Loan These Loans of Borrowers ($Million) Balance Areas
Individual Loans 155 984,167 964 980 8%
Group Loans 75 350,607 115 329 17
Village Bank Loans 47 410,352 61 150 29

All Loans (All MFIs) 176 1,745,126 1140 653 14
Sources: All data from the IDB/CGAP inventory of 176 MFIs in seven Latin American Countries

lengthened; payments made less frequently and saving requirements have been reduced.19

Some village banks have even offered group and individual loans to retain clients.20

There are also a number of changes to products and loan making techniques that have

come about due to the competition in microfinance. Alvaro Ramirez details the following

in his paper The Microfinance Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean:

* As noted in an IDB paper done two years ago on equipment finance in Latin
America (Westley, 2003), 23 of the 25 leading MFIs and CUs surveyed offered
equipment loans or leases with at least 2-year maturities. We've come a long way
from those early days when a common complaint was that short-term working
capital loans were the only kind of loan one could find at many MFIs.

* Lines of credit are offered by a number of the regulated Bolivian (and other) MFIs
to their preferred customers, this eliminating the need for a client to reapply for a
loan when their old one expires.


19 Stauffenberg, 2003

20 Stauffenberg, 2003










* Some MFIs, such as Banco ADEMI in the Dominican Republic, even offer credit
cards to qualified clients.

* A number of Accion International affiliates and others are developing credit-
scoring models and are also utilizing PDAs such as Palm Pilot. Both are designed
to cut costs and reduce client delay in accessing a loan.

* Some IPC affiliates, such as Financiera Calpia in El Salvador and Caja Los Andes
in Bolivia, are offering agricultural production loans.

* Other MFIs, such as Financiera Confia in Nicaragua and Banco Ademi in the
Dominican Republic, are branching out into housing loans.

In addition to these changes MFIs are starting to develop more traditional banking

services. Based on nine major markets of MFIs,21 savings deposits have increased from

$500 million in 2000 to $1.3 billion in 2003.22 Although checking services are in an

infancy stage, MFIs are increasingly providing the one-stop shopping that clients

demand.23 This fast pace of growth is also forcing NGOs to become commercial

institutions, as the need for funds outgrows donations. Table 2-7 shows the fast increase

in MFI savings and checking accounts.

Table 2-7. Deposits in nine microfinance markets (US$ millions, end-of-year values)
2000 2001 2002 200
Checking Accounts 4 5.6 1.4 1.
Savings Accounts 118 165 254 32
Certificates of Deposit 395 513 619 86
Total 517 683 874 119

Performance of Latin American MFIs Versus Asian MFIs

In order to measure the performance and vitality of the Latin American

microfinance industry, it is important to compare it to another region of the world; I

arbitrarily chose the Asian microfinance industry. The following set of information is


21 Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru

22 Stauffenberg, 2003

23 Stauffenberg, 2003


3
7
1
7
0









taken from the July 2003 Microbanking Bulletin. The Microbanking Bulletin covers fifty

Latin American MFIs and twenty-two Asian MFIs. Although microfinance got a head

start in Asia before Latin America, the average age of MFIs reporting to the

Microbanking Bulletin is twelve years in Latin America and nine years in Asia.

Overall Financial Performance

The two most important indicators that give a picture of a microfinance institutions

are the portfolio at risk and return on assets. The portfolio at risk, as previously stated in

the synthesis of related literature, tells how much the institution is getting back from the

money it loaned out. The return on assets ratio lets the analyst learn the efficiency at

which the institution is using its resources. In both cases, Asia is beating out Latin

America, though it is important to note that in neither case is the welfare of the

institutions at stake, given delinquency rates are 2% and 4%, respectively.24

Outreach

The number of total clients is much larger in Asia than in Latin America. This is

not so extraordinary, given the large population differences between Asian and Latin

American countries. The size of the loans is also larger in Latin America. This is also not

so surprising, because of the extremely poor nature of the microentrepreneur in Asia. In

effect, the larger loan size compensates for the smaller number of clients in Latin

America. Table 2-8 gives us a snapshot of the average MFI reporting to the

Microbanking Bulletin in July 2003, both in Latin America and Asia.25





24 Ramirez, 2004

25 Ramirez, 2004










Table 2-8. Profile of the average MFI reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003)
ALL MFIs Financially Sustainable MFIs

Asia Latin America Asia Latin America
Adjusted ROA (%) 2.1 -0.1 5.5 4.4
Adjusted ROE (%) 10.3 1.1 16.9 16
Portfolio at risk (%> 30 days) 2.5 4.9 2.4 3.7

No. of active borrowers 32915 13755 183,171 31010
Total loan portfolio (US$ million) 4.9 8.6 16.5 20.8
Average loan balance (US$) 195 816 277 900

Deposits/Loans (%/o) 15 29 27 36
Debt/Equity (leverage ratio) 1.6 2.7 2.4 3.4

No. of voluntary savers 18374 2422 186,289 2961
Total voluntary savings (US$ 1000) 816 3185 2400 9658
Average savings balance (US$) 39 741 61 809

Operating expense/Loan portfolio (%) 22 27 16 21
Borrowers/ Loan officers (%) 307 353 465 398
Borrowers/Staff members (%) 149 128 148 140
Adjusted cost per borrower (US$) 35 195 36 171

Yield on gross loan portfolio-nominal (%) 36 44 35 41
Yield on gross loan portfolio-real (%) 30 35 29 33
Sources: Microbanking Bulletin (July 2003)

Funding

Latin America is further ahead than Asia in terms of the amount of loans financed

from savings. This is likely due to the further development and age of the average MFI in

that region. The natural course of an MFI is to start out as an NGO, with some type of

grant base money, and as it matures, to tap into the more expensive but more abundant

savings deposits for capital. In this case, too, Latin America is leading with a leverage

ratio of 2.7, versus 1.6 for MFIs in Asia.26


26 Ramirez, 2004









Savings Outreach

Savings deposits are both necessary for MFIs to leverage their loan portfolio and an

importantsource of savings accounts for the community. Although there are fewer clients

in Latin America, their accounts are larger. A typical MFI in Latin America in total has

larger savings deposits than one in Asia.27

Efficiency

Average cost in Asian MFIs is lower in Asia than in Latin America: 22% versus

27%, respectively. This is likely due to the economies of scale factors that affect MFIs-

the more clients there are, the more cost is distributed. Thus, the smaller client base of

Latin America MFIs works against them when it comes to average cost.28

Another way of disseminating this economy of scale factor is by looking at the

numbers of borrowers per loan officer. Here, Latin America seems to be slightly edging

out Asia. On the other hand, if you look at the ratio of borrowers to staff members, which

includes all MFI personnel, Asian MFIs are more efficient despite having a larger

clientele to service. As Alvaro Ramirez of the Inter-American Development Bank put it,

"This greater Asian efficiency may reflect economies of scale in delivering both loan and

deposit services. Or it could simply be due to the Asian MFI's more productive use of its

non-lending personnel for reasons other than economies of scale (better management,

systems, etc.).29 30



27 Ramirez, 2004

28 Ramirez, 2004

29 Stauffenberg, 2003

30 Ramirez, 2004









Loans Rates Changed

Latin American MFIs charge 5%-8% more for their loans than their Asian

counterparts, even when inflation is accounted for. These higher interest charges are the

outcome of the higher operating cost of Latin American MFIs. This indicates that the

higher ROA in Asia is not due to Asian MFIs charging more for their products or being

much more efficient. Instead, it may be that Latin American MFIs have higher

delinquency rates and are increasingly relying on more expensive commercial capital like

savings.31

Capital Markets

The following is a short summary of the capital markets in Peru and Bolivia. In any

future scenario it seems intuitive to think of mature financial institutions issuing bonds

for capital use in microfinance operations. Nonetheless, as evidenced by this brief

description of the capital markets, this phenomenon is probably not likely to develop in

the near future-especially in Bolivia, where the stock exchange is in an infant stage.

Peru: Capital Markets

There is only one stock exchange in Peru, the Lima Stock Exchange (LSE). Before

the 1990s, much of the capital that was raised in Peru was done in the form of corporate

bonds. The reason for this is simple: the Peruvian government subsidized interest and

thus bonds were a cheaper form of capital than equity. During the 1990s, that began to

change. In the 1980s, the proportion of GDP in the LSE was hovering around 5%; by the

late 1990s, it was more like 27%. Unfortunately, the late 1990s saw the disaster of

President Fujimori, who along with his top intelligence chief, Montesinos, is said to have


31 Ramirez, 2004









pillaged the treasury coffers of $2 billion. Since that time the LSE has recovered, growing

to $10.5 billion in 2000, $10.9 billion in 2001, and $12.6 billion in 2002.32

The most important sectors in the LSE are industrials (38%), mining (16%), banks

and financial institutions (12%), and utilities (5.5%). In the beginning of 2003, the 230

companies listed with the LSE and 21 had listed debt instruments. The volume traded

was $2.9 billion in 2002.33

Bolivia: Capital Markets

In 1976 the initial plans for the Bolivian Stock Exchange, Bolsa Boliviana de

Valores S.A., were formulated, and in 1979 the first shareholder meetings took place.

However, it was not until 1989 that trading officially began to take place. Today there are

eighteen companies listed on the Bolsa Boliviana de Valores. As of December 2004, the

Bolivia Stock Market Capitalization was $1.35 billion, or 5.74% of the Bolivian GDP.34





















32 Olaechea 2004

33 Olaechea 2004

34 Origenes de la Bolsa (n.d.)














CHAPTER 3
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS

Chapter 3 tests the hypothesis and is divided into two main sections. The first

section asks whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that transition into

regulated microfinance institutions (MFIs) are profitable and self-sustainable. This

section measures profitability and sustainability by using return on equity, return on

assets, and portfolio yield. The second section asks, "Will the transition to a regulated

bank improve efficiency of resources and administration?" Efficiency is measured

through operating expense, financial expense, cost of funds, liquidity, debt/equity,

portfolio-at-risk, write-offs, loan loss reserve, and risk coverage. Before the analysis of

each ratio I will include a brief description of the ratio, the importance of its usage, and

any complications I experienced in gathering this information.

Are NGOs That Transition into Regulated MFIs Profitable and Self-Sustainable?

This part of the research will attempt to answer the question of profitability and

sustainability. However, no study of profitability ratios for microfinance institutions

should be taken independently of efficiency, productivity, financial management, and

portfolio quality ratios. These ratios will be discussed when analyzing whether

transitioned MFIs are more efficient. This second part of the research completes the study

of profitability by shedding light on profitability information that is not given by the

profitability ratios, while also answering the questions of efficiency after transition.

In studying the profitability of the MFIs, I used a set of profitability ratios to gauge

the profitability of the banks. Efficiency and productivity indicators had to be taken into









consideration along with portfolio at risk (PaR) ratios, since many profitability indicators

can be strongly manipulated. These manipulations include adjusting the loan loss

reserves, changing the amount of write-offs and other creative techniques. Financial

management is another factor that needs to be taken into account. Today, most MFIs

work in a sellers' market where inefficient operations can still run highly profitable

enterprises. However, as the industry matures, more competitors enter into the market,

and subsidies run out, financial management will become an essential skill MFIs need if

they want to be profitable.1

Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/Equity

ROE is a measure of the return on equity calculated by dividing net income by

period average equity. In this case, I was forced to use period equity versus period

average equity because of my inability to gather the additional information needed to

calculate period average equity.2

Return on equity is especially important for private, for-profit institutions with real

non-corporate owners; to these individuals, ROE measures the return on their investment.

Figure 3-1 is a chart of the sample corporations used in this study and their ROEs

during three critical years of operation: the year prior to becoming for-profit, the year of

the transition (strike year), and the year following the transition. In two of the four cases,

the year preceding the transition tended to be the most profitable year. The reason for this

may lie in the added cost of becoming a private bank. Not-for-profit MFIs do not pay





1 In analyzing profitability, I looked at return on equity, return on assets, and portfolio yield

2 Period average equity is the average of the current and previous years' equity.










taxes and have a lower reporting cost associated with governing bodies overseeing the

industry.


0.4
0.35 -
0.3 Prior Year
0.25 m Strike Year
0.2 o Following Year
0.15 -
0.1 -
0.05 -
0
O a EO 0


Banks


Figure 3-1. Return on equity

Return on equity has been a surprising number for the industry. In 2000 only one

out of twenty leading MFIs showed a loss. Despite the economic recessions in the

Andean region during the time,3 Mibanco, Tacna, Arequipa, and Prodem, which reside in

this region, all showed positive returns. In most cases, MFIs outperformed conventional

banks by wide margins.

Nonetheless, as noted by Abate and Jansson in their 2001 article "Performance

Indicators for Microfinance Institutions," "NGOs have achieved higher returns on equity

than formalized MFIs even though the NGOs operate in significantly lower debt-equity

ratios... Supervised institutions tend to operate in more competitive markets, where

portfolio yields are lower."4


3 The data used in this study was from 1996-2000.

4 Jansson & Abate, 2003










Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income/ Assets

Return on assets, like return on equity, measures profitability by looking at the

efficiency of the assets used. It incorporates not just profitability but also how well

management is using its the institution's assets. Surprisingly, NGOs have generally

outperformed commercial MFIs in their use of assets. The reason for this is their inability

to access capital and assets, thus forcing the institutions to maximize the funds and

resources available.


0.35
0.3 -
0.25 -
0.2 -
Prior Year
0.15
0 Strike Year
0.1 c Following Year
0.05


5| 0
2 n

Banks

Figure 3-2. Return on assets

Figure 3-2 demonstrates the return on assets for the sample used. A striking and

apparent feature in this graph is Prodem's performance for the year prior to privatization,

when Prodem's ROA is exponentially larger than during other years and has a higher

performance than any of the other banks' best years. The reason is simply that Prodem

used a much lower reserve to estimate losses. Provision for doubtful accounts reflects

negatively toward the bank's net income and is a fast way to show profitability at the

bank's discretion.










Even if we remove Prodem's first-year performance, it is still difficult to recognize

a pattern in the bank's operation. We can conclude one important fact: all banks are

returning positive ROAs for all the years measured. Figure 3-3 shows the ROA minus

Prodem's first-year performance.


0.07
0.06 -
0.05 -
0.04 -
Prior Year
0.03
a Strike Year
0.02 c Following Year
0.01 -
0




Banks

Figure 3-3. Return on assets

Portfolio Yield= Interest and Fee Income/ Gross Portfolio.

The portfolio yield is a measure of interest payments received from clients during

a specific period. Unlike return on equity and assets, which rely on net income to

measure profitability, portfolio yield derives profitability from interest and fees earned

from operations. This indicator is less susceptible to accounting discrepancies and other

creative accounting practices. In addition, it is measured prior to taxes and is thus

exclusive of tax changes and regulatory expenses due to privatization. Figure 3-4

demonstrates the result of the sample portfolio yield.










0.5
0.45 -
0.4 -
0.35 -
0.3 -
0.25 -
0.2 -
0.15
0.1
0.05 -
0
ro E o0
*Prior Year -
Strike Year- 2
O Following Year Banks

Figure 3-4. Portfolio yield

With the exception of Arequipa, the rest of the banks' highest year of portfolio

yield was either the year of privatization or the following year. As these banks are

maturing, efficiency is improving, which in turn has generated increasing profits.

What portfolio yield, ROA, and ROE demonstrate is that MFIs are profitable

despite adverse conditions in the marketplace.

Will the Transition to a Regulated Bank Improve Efficiency of Resources and
Administration?

Efficiency and Productivity

Efficiency and Productivity measure how streamlined the operations of an MFI are

set up. This section will measure the amount of output per unit of input, while taking into

account the cost of the units. These ratios are less easily manipulated and thus more

transparent than profitability. MFIs in general have less efficient operations than

commercial banks. The reason for this is that a loan of $200 takes nearly the same

amount of labor as a loan of $200,000. Many MFIs have an administrative cost of 15 to










30%, whereas banks average 1.5%-3%.5 This section takes into account the operating

expense ratio.

Operating expense ratio= operating expenses/gross portfolio. The operating

expense ratio is an efficiency indicator of the MFI. It measures the firm's cost of

delivering the lending product to the customer. The lower the indicator, the more

efficiently the firm is running. The ratio is calculated by dividing all expenses related to

the operation of the firm, including salaries, depreciation, and board fees, by the gross

portfolio. Provision expenses, interest and extraordinary expenses are excluded. Figure 3-

5 shows the operating expense ratio for this study.


0.6

0.5 -






Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibancor
0.4Figure 3-5. Operating expense ratio
operation follo wing privatization than the rst year. Due to an absence of information it
0.3

0.2

0.1


Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco

Banks

Figure 3-5. Operating expense ratio

In three out of the four cases, the operating expense ratio was lower in the year of

operation following privatization than the first year. Due to an absence of information it

was impossible to evaluate Mibanco's prior year of operation. It is even more important

to note the lower operation ratio by Arequipa and Tacna over Prodem and Mibanco.

5 Economies of scale are a factor to a certain extent. In loan portfolios less than about $2 to $3 million,
larger operations tend gain from economies of scale.









Arequipa and Tacna have portfolios of $3-4 million in comparison to Mibanco's $6

million and Prodem's $146 million. Microfinance institutions with smaller portfolios tend

to have less efficient operations due to economies of scale. Conversely, in these particular

cases, economies of scale did not translate into more efficient operations by Mibanco and

Prodem. One possibility may lay in the size of the loans given by the other operations:

lending institutions with higher loans tend to have higher efficiency. It may be possible

that Prodem is simply lending in smaller increments of cash than Arequipa and Tacna.

Nevertheless, despite economies of scale, the year after privatization appears to be more

efficient than the year just prior to privatization, signaling that MFIs that transition into

lending institutions are more efficient than those that do are not private.

Financial Management

Financial management assures a firm has enough liquidity to meet its liabilities and

issue loans to clients. The ability or inability to maintain adequate liquidity can impact a

firm's growth or demise. These functions become more important as MFIs transition into

regulated banks and begin to take in savings deposits. Prodem, for example, had no

savings in 1999, the year of transition, and $112 million in 2000, the year after transition.

Financial management incorporates the managing of foreign exchange risk and dollar

duration incompatibilities of assets to liabilities. Four ratios are analyzed: financial

expense, cost of funds, liquidity, and the debt/equity ratio.

Financial expense ratio = interest and fee expenses/gross portfolio

The financial expense ratio is calculated by taking interest and fee expenses and

dividing them by the gross portfolio. This ratio accounts for the total interest expense

incurred by the financial institution to fund its loan portfolio. This ratio, unlike the

portfolio yield (which measures income generated by the portfolio), measures the lending










rate an MFI has to charge in order to cover its cost. This ratio says little about the

financial condition of the firm; the firm may have a high financial expense ratio but still

be quite profitable, as in Mibanco's case. Mibanco has a high financial expense ratio in

the year following transition, but also has the highest portfolio yield out of any of the

years measured for all the institutions in this study. Figure 3-6 shows the result of the

financial expense ratio of the banks studied.


0.12
4-
0
0.1 -
o .0 Prior year
0 0.08 Strike Year
CL o Following Year
) 0 0.06 -

a 2 0.04

0.02 -

0
Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco

Banks

Figure 3-6. Financial expense ratio

The amount an institution has to charge was highest in three out of the four banks

in the year following transition. The year oftransition was also higher than the year before

the transition three out of four times. Though it was not possible to gather this

information for the year prior to transition for Arequipa and Mibanco, this chart does hint

that the amount an institution has to charge increases as the institution transitions from an

NGO to a formalized lending institution.










Cost of funds ratio = interest and fee expenses on funding liabilities/funding
liabilities

The cost of funds ratio is calculated by taking the interest and fee expenses on

funding liabilities and dividing it by funding liabilities. The funding liabilities

denominator includes deposits, commercial funds, subsidized funds, and quasi-capital.

The cost of funds ratio calculates the cost of the institution's borrowed funds. This

measures whether the institution has gained access to low-cost sources of funds, such as

savings. The mobilization of funds such as savings with low interest can be much more

lucrative than using high-interest loans and is a major benefit of becoming a formalized

financial institution and bank.

Although this ratio can be largely useful, many of the institutions involved in the

study received subsidized loans, and thus the real market value of their funds is shielded

and the cost of funds is driven down. Figure 3-7 illustrates the cost of funds ratio results.



S 0.2 .:.r
l2 0.15 -* irk ear
U = 0.1 i
W .o
m 0.05




SBanks


Figure 3-7. Cost of funds ratio

The cost of funds ratio appears to go up significantly in the year following the

transition for all the banks, with the exception of Tacna. One reason may be that only one

of the banks had gathered significant savings to drive down the cost of funds expense.

However, the strongest factor lies in the significant drop in donations. Arequipa went









from receiving $22,536 in 1996 and $22,536 in 1997 to receiving $0 in 1998 and 1999,

the year of transition and the following year, respectively. Tacna also went from

receiving $25,391 in the year before transition and $25,391 the transition year to

receiving $0 in the year following the transition. Prodem also showed a significant drop

in reserves-$13.3 million-that was likely triggered by a drop in donations. It is

possible that these banks have not had time to offset the loss of donations by the gains in

savings deposits and their cost of funds will therefore decrease as they mature and

savings go up.

Liquidity ratio = cash and bank current accounts + readily marketable
investments/total assets

The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing the total cash and marketable securities

of the firm by the total assets. The liquidity ratio tells us the ability of the firm to meet its

short-term liabilities and unplanned expenses. The information that can be derived from

this ratio is not definitive. A low or high liquidity ratio doesn't indicate a positive or

negative sign, so this ratio must be used in addition to other indicators. A high liquidity

ratio may indicate the firm is predicting a high level of activity or it can indicate poor

usage of resources. Nonetheless, low liquidity ratios should be a cause for concern, given

many of these institutions have open credit lines with customers and these credit lines can

quickly harm the liquidity situation of a firm with low liquidity. Figure 3-8 shows the

liquidity results for the firms studied.

The significant difference between Prodem and the rest of the banks in the year

following the transition is that Prodem managed to capitalize on the opportunity to gather

savings. The liquidity position of Prodem is exponentially increasing. However, if

Prodem does not mobilize these funds it will be paying out interest while not









accumulating enough revenue on these assets to cover the cost of savings. From the year

prior to transition until the year after transition the portfolio of loans of Prodem grew

from $146 million to $152 million, a mere 4% increase. On the other hand, the cash taken

in grew from $22 million to $31 million, an almost 50% increase.


120%

2 100% *rior .ear
4- U Strike ear
80%
) 80% cu Foiio ,n ,ear

0 (60%

S40%

S20%

0%
Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco

Banks

Figure 3-8. Liquidity ratio

The rest of the banks are neither accumulating nor gathering donations. This is

leading to a significant drop in the liquidity positions of Mibanco, Arequipa, and Tacna in

the year following transition. A possible explanation may lie in the quality of portfolios.

If the rest of the banks are screening customers more carefully, they may not want or

need to maintain higher sums of cash for reserves. In addition, less liquidity is required

for state-regulated financial institutions than for NGOs. The following study of debt to

equity and portfolio quality ratios will examine these topics.

Debt/equity ratio = total liabilities/total equity

The debt to equity ratio is calculated by taking total liabilities as a percentage of

total equity. The debt to equity ratio is one of the most commonly used and simplest










ratios as it is a measure of total capital adequacy. This ratio is of special interest to any

institution lending to an MFI because it lets them know how much of a "safety cushion"

the MFI has in sustaining losses. Rapid changes in debt/equity in MFIs may be a signal

the institution is approaching the limits of its borrowing, which will have negative impact

on future growth. Figure 3-9 shows the results of the debt/equity ratio calculations.


20
0 *18 rior ver
S 16 Strike ,ear
W 14
212



6-
4 -
o; 2
04-
Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco
Banks

Figure 3-9. Debt/equity ratio

The ability to borrow more assets is a major incentive for MFIs to transition into

the realm of banking laws. Lending institutions might renege at 1:1 debt to equity ratio to

an NGO, but may be more comfortable lending at a much higher rate once the NGO

transitions into a regulated bank. The Microrate 20, a benchmark of microfinance

institutions, has an average debt to equity ratio of 3:8. In this case, though, transitioning

to formalized lending institutions has not translated to higher debt/equity ratios, meaning

these firms are not taking advantage of the cheaper borrowing available, reinforcing the

cost of funds ratio results. An increase in the debt/equity ratios together with a decrease

in cost of funds ratios would signal that firms have access to cheaper capital and are









effectively taking advantage of the opportunity to borrow at cheaper rates; however, this

is not the case. The costs of funds have risen while the debt/equity ratio has dropped. In

addition, liquidity has deteriorated in three out of the four cases. It appears, from this

study, that the financial management of these banks has suffered in the transition from

NGO to formal financial institution.

Portfolio Quality

Portfolio quality is by far one of the most important indicators of the MFI; the

portfolio of the institutions is its largest and most important asset. For microfinance

institutions, more than for commercial banks, the quality of the portfolio is important.

The reason for this is that due to MFI clientele poverty levels, many loans are not

collateralized.

Portfolio at risk is the most important indicator of portfolio quality, as it is easy to

measure and understand. The amount of the portfolio that is compromised by arrears is

divided by the total amount of the portfolio. Arrears are determined by loans that are with

thirty days or more behind in repayment. MFI institutions have managed to maintain high

portfolio quality, better than those of commercial banks. In addition to portfolio at risk, I

also used loan loss reserve ratio, risk coverage ratio, and write off ratio to measure

portfolio quality.

Portfolio at risk = (outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + all refinanced
loans)/ total outstanding gross portfolio

Many portfolio at risk ratios are commonly used, using minimum arrears

timeframes ranging from 30 to 120 days. This portfolio at risk (PaR) measure includes all

loans over 30 days, and was calculated by dividing the total loans in arrears over 30 days

by the total gross portfolio. In this study, the financial statements of these firms did not










specify the restructured-refinanced loans in the financial notes. Therefore, risk is

underestimated, as customers who are in jeopardy of defaulting may refinance their loans

and thus restart the amount of time left before payment.

The portfolio at risk is a first line measure of trouble, as in general the longer a loan

is in arrears the less likely it is to be paid. The PaR measures not only the immediate

threat of loan defaults but also the threat of future loan defaults. Leading MFIs hold a

portfolio risk of between 3-6%, while a smaller group of MFIs have a portfolio risk that

exceeds 10%. Figure 3-10 has the results of the portfolio at risk calculations.

0.2
M 0.18 m Prior year
0.16 Strike Year
0.14 a Following Year
0 .12
0. 0.1
0.08 -
S 0.06 -
0.04 -
S 0.02 -

Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco
Banks

Figure 3-10. Portfolio at risk

Portfolio at risk is one of the most positive indicators in this study. For all the banks

studied, portfolio at risk drops significantly from the year prior of transition in

comparison to the following year after transition. This would shed a positive light on the

negative liquidity position of three out of the four banks. Portfolio quality has drastically

improved, demonstrating that banks have improved in their ability to screen customers

and thus predict cash needs for reserves.









One important note to add to this study is that the frequency of payment is not

included and may be misleading. If, for example, payments to loans are required every

week as opposed to every six months, arrears on the latter will likely be more damaging

to the firm and pose a greater threat.

Nonetheless, there are many things this chart does not take into account. The

amount of write-offs needs to be analyzed when looking at this chart, since write-offs

will show lower portfolio at risk and misrepresent the amount of risk in the portfolio.

Write-off ratio = write-offs for the period/gross portfolio

The write-off ratio is calculated by dividing the write-offs for a given year by the

total gross portfolio. It is a measure of the amount of write-offs undertaken by a firm per

year, and does not affect net income or total assets, since an expected sum has already

been expended through the loan loss reserve ratio. On the other hand, write-offs can be a

tool to mislead investors into thinking the quality of the portfolio is better by simply

removing the loans on the portfolio that will likely not be paid. In the case of FinAmerica

in Colombia, a large impairment charge was taken to account for a large bulk of bad

loans, a result of a restructuring-refinance strategy gone seriously awry. Although

FinAmerica would likely not use this strategy of restructuring defaulted loans again, the

loss of assets was real and management should still be held accountable. The write-off

ratio also shows firms that refuse to write off loans so as not to present the true assets of

the firm. This other extreme is also dangerous, as it hides from potential and actual

investors the true risk profile of the company. The write-off ratio and the portfolio at risk

ratio together are a great indicator of the health of the firm's portfolio. Figure 3-11

demonstrates the result of the write-off ratio calculations.










0.045

f 0.04
o a Prior year
0 0.035 Strike Year
W 0.03 o Following Year

0.025

a. o 0.02

C 0.015

o 0.01 -

0.005


Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco
Banks

Figure 3-11. Write-off ratio

MiBanco did not state in any year what its write-offs were and Arequipa did not

undertake any write-offs during the year of transition. This chart definitely points to some

questions about Arequipa's portrayal of 6% portfolio at risk in the year following

transition. It is likely that Arequipa's portfolio at risk was downplayed bywrite-offs, and

Prodem also understated its PaR during the year of transition. The rest of the years were

in line with international norms of write-offs, ranging from 2.8% to 6%, with the

exception of Tacna's year of transition. This chart explains more about the inaccuracies

of the PaR than whether write-offs move downward or upward with transition. What can

be derived is that the picture of a decreasing PaR is not as accurate as these banks have

portrayed. More specifically, it addresses the PaR during, Arequipa's year post-transition

and Prodem's year of transition.










Loan loss reserve ratio = loan loss reserves/ total outstanding gross portfolio

The loan loss reserve ratio is calculated by dividing the loan loss reserve ratio by

the total outstanding gross portfolio. When used with other ratios it is a helpful tool in

gauging future loan losses. Nonetheless, some institutions may be over- or under-

reserved.

In this study, we can begin to see whether future losses are expected to decrease or

increase. Figure 3-12 shows the result of the loan loss reserve ratios. The result of this

analysis is bleak. The expected losses two years after the transition seem to be increasing.

All of the firms with the exception of Tacna seem to be increasing their reserves in

anticipation of future losses. This is contradictory to what I expected: instead of losses

decreasing as a percentage of the portfolio, they are increasing. This also shows that low

liquidity is not a function of the fact that fewer reserves are needed (as a result of better

screening), but rather of the inability to obtain funds. This is also in contradiction to the

decreasing PaR. If the PaR were in fact decreasing, these firms would not have the need

to increase their reserves unless they are mandated by the state to do so. The loan loss

reserves also indicate that the quality of these MFIs' portfolios may be deteriorating.




.2 0.08
S 2 0 0.06 m Prior year
g 0 0 0.04 m Strike Year
S0.02 o Follow ing Year
"L 0) 0
&d Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco
Banks


Figure 3-12. Loan loss reserve ratio










Risk coverage ratio = loan loss reserve/(outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days
+ refinance loans)

The risk coverage ratio divides loan loss reserves by the outstanding balance on

arrears plus the restructured loans. This ratio measures what percentage of the arrears is

covered by the loan loss reserve account, and is an indicator of how prepared the firm is

for a worst-case scenario analysis. In the case of all the firms in the study, the amount of

loans restructured or refinanced is not known, so once again, risk may be understated, as

some of the loans may be in arrears and thus be unaccounted for in this ratio. The risk

coverage ratio should be taken into account in tandem with PaR and write off ratios. A

loan reserve can artificially inflate the profit of the firm by assuming fewer losses are

expected. Figure 3-13 shows the results of the risk coverage ratio calculation.


1.8
O-
1.6

C >% 0 ir 1 -Br
a 1.2

QC M 1

u 0.8 -
G) 0.6
0.4 -

w 0.2 -
0 A
Arequipa Tacna Prodem Mibanco
Banks

Figure 3-13. Risk coverage ratio

The risk coverage ratio should range from 80% to 120%. Most notably among the

four firms studied here, Arequipa has maintained extremely low reserves. This practice,

along with the high write-offs, is skewing the true portfolio at risk ratio, and it is likely

that the risk of the firm is much higher. Tacna has also maintained low risk coverage that









may be under-representing the true risk of the institution, though it may also be a function

of good client screening. The alarming trend to notice is that the risk coverage for every

firm is highest in the year following its transition to public institution, which could

indicate that managers are preparing the institutions for future downturns. It may also be

that managers being conservative because they are not sure what portion of their portfolio

will default. This conservatism should be looked at as more positive than negative.

PaR ratios appear to be a positive and strong indicator of the transitioning process.

However, portfolio quality benefits are likely not as strong as they appear to be shown.

Write-offs seem to indicate PaR results are weaker. Loan loss reserves and risk coverage

(a function of loan reserves) both tended to go up, a sign either that managers are being

conservative, losses are expected or the state is requiring higher loan reserves.














CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

This paper tested commercialization and sustainability as defined by the

institutionalist. It asked and tested two questions: "Are NGOs that transition into

regulated MFIs profitable and self-sustainable?" and "Will the transition to a regulated

bank improve efficiency of resources and administration?"

In answering the first question, I found my results mostly consistent with CGAP

(2005) and my hypothesis that MFIs can be self-sustainable in a commercial environment

based on the three years of study. Banks that transitioned were profitable and

sustainable. Return on equity was inconclusive. In two of the four cases, the year

precluding the transition tended to be the most profitable year. The reason for this may lie

in the added cost of becoming a private bank. However, every year measured signaled

positive ROE for all the banks. Return on assets was not indicative of a trend in any

direction. Again, it is important to note the important fact that all banks were returning

positive return on asset ratios for all the years measured. From this, we can conclude MFI

resiliency as private and commercial entities. It is also important to note that post-

transition long term time series data would likely be better suited to answer longer term

questions related to sustainability and profitability. However, long term time series data

was unavailable at the time of this thesis. Portfolio yield was indicative of a positive trend

during commercialization. With the exception of Arequipa, all of the banks' highest year

of portfolio yield was either the year of privatization or the following year. What









Portfolio Yield, ROA and ROE demonstrate is that MFIs are profitable despite adverse

conditions in the market place.

In answering the second question, I found my results to be less consistent with my

hypothesis. I hypothesized that the transition to a commercial environment will yield

greater efficiency of administrative resources over the long run horizon due to the

presence of ownership of the bank. On the one hand, the operating expense ratio was

lower in the following year of operation than the first year in three out of the four cases.

This signaled that MFIs that transition into commercial institutions are more efficient. On

the other hand, financial expense and cost of funds was highest in three out of the four

banks the year after transition. This is most likely due to the loss of subsidies and the

inability of banks to supplement this loss with an increase in savings. This last point is

reinforced by the liquidity ratio. With the exception of Prodem, all of the banks' liquidity

position decreased in comparison to their prior liquidity position in years prior to

commercialization. Prodem has managed to capitalize on the opportunity to gather

savings. Debt to equity ratio also reinforces that this commercialization has not translated

to higher debt/equity ratios, meaning these firms are not taking advantage of the cheaper

borrowing. With the exception of Prodem, the banks are neither accumulating nor

gathering donations. A possible explanation might be that the banks are screening their

customers better; they may not want or need to maintain higher sums of cash for reserves.

Portfolio quality seems to support this notion. For all the banks studied, portfolio

at risk drops significantly from the year prior to transition in comparison to the following

year after transition. Portfolio quality has drastically improved, demonstrating that banks









have improved in their ability to screen customers and thus predict cash needs for

reserves.

The validity of portfolio at risk (PaR) is put into question as we look further at the

write-off, loan loss reserve, and risk coverage ratios. Analysis of write-offs demonstrates

that the expected losses two years after the transition seem to be increasing. This poses

the question, is the low liquidity a function of fewer reserves needed as a result of better

screening, or rather the inability to obtain funds? Risk coverage shows an alarming trend:

for every firm, risk coverage is highest in the year following the transition, a possible

indicator that managers are preparing the institutions for future downturns. It may also be

that managers are being conservative because they are not certain what portion of their

portfolio will default. This conservatism should be taken in a positive light. Portfolio at

risk ratios appear to be a positive and strong indicator of the transitioning process.

Portfolio at risk reinforces the fact that the transitioning process is beneficial to

improving efficiency in the microfinance institution, yet portfolio quality benefits are

likely not as strong as they appear to be shown. Micro Finance attempts to address

poverty by providing micro-loans to poor merchants. This study examines the

privatization movement during the late 1990s and focuses on bank financial affects

corresponding to this transition. The clientele effects remain an open, interesting

question for future research.
















LIST OF REFERENCES


Adams, Dale W and J.D. Von Pischke, 1992, Microenterprise credit programs: Deja vu,
World Development 20, 1463-1470.

Afrane, Sam, 2002, Impact assessment of microfinance interventions in Ghana and South
Africa: A synthesis of major impacts and lessons, Journal of Microfinance 4, 37-
58.

Armendariz De Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch, 2000 Microfinance beyond
group lending, Economics of Transition 8, 401-420.

Bolsa Boliviana de Valores, "Conozca la Bolsa Boliviana de Valores," Origenes de la
Bolsa, (8 Dec. 1997),
(8, August 2005).

Bhatt, Nittin,1999, Can microcredit work in the United States?. Harvard Business review,
Boston, 77, 26-27.

Bhatt, Nittin, 2001, Delivering microfinance in developing countries: Controversies and
policy perspectives, Policy Studies Journal, 29, 319-333.

Brau, James, 2004, Microfinance a comprehensive review of the existing literature.
Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, 9, 1-26.

Buckley, Graeme, 1997 Microfinance in Africa: Is it either the problem or the solution?
World Development, 25, 1081-1093.

Christen, Robert Peck, 2001, Commercialization and mission drift: The transformation of
microfinance in Latin America. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington, D.C:
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest.

Christen, Robert Peck, 1996, Financial sustainability, targeting the poorest, and income
impact: Are there trade offs for MFIs? CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington,
D.C: Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest.

Chen, Greg, 1997, The Challenge of growth for microfinance institutions: The Bancosol
experience. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5 Washington, D.C: Consultative Group
to Assist the Poorest.









Eyiah, Alex K, 2001, An integrated approach to financing small contractors in
developing countries: A conceptual model, Construction Management and
Economics, 19, 511-518.

Goldmark, Lara, 2001, Microenterprise development in Latin America: Towards a new
flexibility, Journal of Socio-Economics, 30, 145-149.

Gomez, Rafael, and Eric Santor, 2001, Membership has its privileges: The effect of
social capital and neighborhood characteristics on the earnings of microfinance
borrowers, The Canadian Journal of Economics, 34, 943-966.

Grosh, Barbara and Gloria Somolakae, 1996, Mighty oaks from little acorns: Can
microenterprise serve as the seedbed of industrialization? World Development,
1879-1890.

Hollis, Aidan, and Arthur Sweetman 1998a, Microcredit: What can we learn from the
past? World Development, 26, 1875-1891.

Hollis, Aidan, and Arthur Sweetman 1998b Microcredit in pre-famine Ireland,
Explorations in Economic History, Madison, 35, 347-381.

Hollis, Aidan, 2001, the life-cycle of a microfinance institution: The Irish loan Funds,
Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam, 46, 291-294.

Hossain, Farhad, 2002, Small loans, big claims, Foreign Policy, Washington, 132, 79-82
pgs.

Ismail, Abdul Ghafar, 1997, Pawnshop as an instrument of microenterprise credit in
Malaysia, International Journal of Social Economics, Bradford, 24, 1343.

Janson, T., & Abate, T., 2003 Performance indicators for microfinance institutions:
Technical guide. Washington, D.C: Inter American Development Bank Sustainable
Development. 1-50.

Mallick, Ross, 2002, Implementing and evaluation of microcredit in Bangladesh,
development, Development in Practice, Oxford, 12, 153-163.

McKerman, T Signe-Mary, 2002 The impact of microcredit programs on self-
employment profits: Do noncredit program aspects matter?, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Cambridge, 84, 93.

Micro-Banking Bulletin, "List of participants in the Micro-banking Bulletin." Micro-
banking Bulletin. (Jan. 2002),
(8 Feb.
2004).









Mosley, Paul, 2001, Microfinance and poverty in Bolivia, The Journal of Development
Studies, 37, 101-133.

Navajas, Sergio, 2000, Microcredit and the poorest of the poor: Theory and evidence
from Bolivia, World Development, Oxford, 28, 333.

Nourse, Timothy H., Winter/Spring 2001, The missing parts of the microfinance services
for consumption and insurance, SAIS Review, Washington, 21, 61.

Olaechea Estudio, "Peru's legal guide," Publications and resources, (July 2004)
(1 August
2005).

Ramirez, Alvaro, 2004, The Microfinance experience in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Workshop on modalities of microfinance delivery in Asia Tokyo,
Japan: Asian Development Bank Institute.

Renso Martinez, "Demand microfinance institutions," Search for microfinance
institutions, (Sept. 2002),
(8 Mar. 2005).

Patten, Richard H, 2001, Microfinance success amidst macroeconomic failure: The
experience of Bank Rakyat Indonesia during the East Asian crisis, World
Development, Oxford, 29, 1057.

Perry, Donna, 2002, Microcredit and women moneylenders: The shifting terrain of credit
in rural Senegal, Human Organization, Washington, 61, 30, 11.

Pitt Mark M., 1998, The impact of group-based credit programs on poor households in
Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter? The Journal of Political
Economy, Chicago, 106, 958-999.

Pretes, Michael, 2002, Microequity and microfinance, World Development, Oxford, 8,
1341.

Sanders, Cynthia, 2002, The Impact of microenterprise assistance programs: A
comparative study of program participants, non-participants and other low-wage
workers, The Social Service Review, Chicago, 76, 321-343.

Schreiner, Mark, 1999, Self-employment, microenterprise, and the poorest Americans,
The Social Service Review, Chicago, 73, 496-524.

Servon, Lisa J, May 1997, Microenterprise programs in U.S. inner cities: Economic
development or social welfare?, Economic Development Quarterly, Thousand
Oaks, Vol. 11, Iss. 2, PG. 166, 15 pgs.

Stauffenberg et al., 2003. Performance indicators for microfinance
institutions.Washington, D.C: Global Microrate Africa. 1-55.









Weijland, Hermine, 1999, Microenterprise clusters in rural Indonesia: Industrial seedbed
and policy target, World Development, Oxford 27, 1515.

Woller, Gary M, 2001, Microcredit as a grass-roots policy for international development,
Policy Studies Journal, Urbana, 29, 267-283.

Woodworth, Warner P, 2000, Third World economic empowerment in the new
millennium: Microenterprise, micro-entrepreneurship, and microfinance, Advanced
Management Journal, Cincinnati, 65, Pg. 19, 8.

Woolcock, Michael 1999, Learning from failures in microfinance: What unsuccessful
cases tell us about how group-based programs work, The American Journal of
Economics and Sociology, Malden, 58, 1.

Woolcock, Michael, 2001, Microenterprise and social capital: A framework for theory,
research, and policy, Journal of Socio-Economics, Greenwich, 30, 193.















BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Amilcar Levy Parajon was born in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. He later moved to

the United States with his Parents and graduated high school from Hialeah High in

Hialeah, Florida. Levy went on to Broward Community College and then transferred to

the University of Florida, where he earned an undergraduate degree in finance. After

earning his degree, he worked in the investment banking industry raising capital for start-

up technology companies. Levy also started up a company to provide exporting shipping

services from the U.S. to Honduras. He went on to graduate school earning concurrent

degrees in Finance and Latin American Studies while simultaneously working for a large

fortune 500 technology firm.