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Greeks and Barbarians in Fifth and Fourth Century Sicily


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GREEKS AND BARBARIANS IN FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURY SICILY By ANDREW T. ALWINE A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSTIY OF FLORIDA 2006

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank first of all my pa rents, my sister, and my family, who provided me with the educational, moral, and religious background to succeed at this level. I am also very grateful to Konstant inos Kapparis, Jim Mark s, and Victoria Pagn for their help and guidance. I would also like to express my appreciation to all the teachers, colleagues, and friends who have been there for me on so many occasions. Finally, I would like to thank my dear wi fe for supporting me throughout my life and education. ii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. iv CHAPTERS 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 2 POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE .................................................................................. 3 3 MERCENARY WARFARE ..................................................................................... 12 4 COSMOPOLITANISM ............................................................................................ 19 5 DIONYSIUS AND THE CARTHAGINIANS.......................................................... 28 6 THE VIEW FROM THE MAINLAND ................................................................... 36 7 BARBARIANS IN THE SOURCES ........................................................................ 43 8 THE HOSTILE TRADITION .................................................................................. 55 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 57 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... 60 iii

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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of th e University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement s for the Degree of Master of Arts GREEKS AND BARBARIANS IN FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURY SICILY By Andrew T. Alwine May 2006 Chair: Konstantinos Kapparis Major Department: Classics Ethnic interaction in Sicily has a long and rich hist ory. Indigenous peoples saw the arrival of immigrants from southern It aly, supposed refugees from Troy, Phoenician settlers, and Greek colonists. By the fifth century mercenaries from Campagnia, Iberia, Sardinia, and Libya had also settled on the island contributing to the great blend of ethnic and cultural groups which is certain ly a hallmark of the Sicilian experience. This thesis argues that Sicilian Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries, because of a long history of intermarriage, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, lacked a strong sense of Hellenic identity. Dionysius I was the first to attempt a unification of Greek Sicily behind an anti-barbarian ideol ogy, though only halfheartedly. Mainland writers and historians, who were influenced by Panhe llenic doctrine, viewed Sicilian affairs in terms of the Greek vs. barbarian motif and evaluated Dionysius I on that basis. This contributed substantially to the hostile historiographical and anecdotal tradition against him. iv

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Ethnic interaction on the isla nd of Sicily has a rich a nd long history. Evidence from the very beginnings of the historical pe riod attests to the gr eat mixture of peoples and cultural groups which would became one of the dominant features of this regions demographic makeup. Indigenous peoples saw th e arrival of immigrants from southern Italy, supposed refugees from Tr oy, Phoenician settlers, and Greek colonists. By the fifth century mercenaries from Campagnia, Iberia, Sardinia, and Libya had also settled on the island, sometimes founding their own settlement s and sometimes being absorbed into one of the many multicultural cities on the island. This blend of ethnic origins and interaction between racial and cultural gr oups is certainly a hallmark of the Sicilian experience. In this thesis I argue that Sicilian Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries, because of a long history of intermarriage, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, lacked the strong sense of Hellenic identity which began to form in the minds of mainland Greeks after the Persian Wars and crystallized in the Athenians Panhellenic doctrine of the fourth century. Chapter 1 examines the poli tical events in Sicily which reveal the weakness of ethnic consciousness and concludes that, despite th e biases of the literary sources, there is no evidence that ethnic al legiances were primary motivations in the decision-making processes of Si cilian states. Chapters 2 and 3 explore possible causes behind this state of affairs. The second chapter argues that the predominance of mercenary warfare from a relatively early time undermined ethnic perceptions, since it tended to professionalize and depersonalize armed conflict. Chapter 3 investigates 1

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2 evidence from archaeological and literary so urces which supports the conclusion that social life in Sicily was essentially multicu ltural and cosmopolitan, w ith no clear dividing lines between ethnic groups. In Chapter 4 I look specifically at the rule of Dionysius I and attempt to demonstrate that, while he portr ayed himself as an anti-Carthaginian ruler in order to maintain his power, he did not significantly change the multi-ethnic situation, since Sicily continued to be an essentiall y cosmopolitan island with many different intermingling peoples. Chapters 5 and 6 consider other Greeks perceptions of Dionysius and Sicilian affairs. Chapter 5 argues that evidence from Plato, Lysias, and Isocra tes shows that they evaluated Dionysius based on his su ccess in repelling the barbarian invade rs of Sicily, the Carthaginians. Because Dionysius failed in this respect, he was held in low esteem by Panhellenic theorists in Hellas pr oper. In Chapter 6 I further suggest that the historians who wrote about Dionysius were influen ced by Panhellenic doctrine and, like contemporary Athenians, viewed Sicilian hi story as dominated by the conflict between Greeks and barbarians. These authors theref ore assessed Dionysius rule in accordance with this Greek vs. barbarian motif. Chapter 7 offers some thoughts on the consequences of this information and conc ludes that Dionysius low reputation with regard to the Panhellenic ideal of drivi ng out the barbarian an d uniting Greek cities contributed substantially to the hostile historiographical a nd anecdotal tradition.

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CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE The complexity of the political history of Sicily, like the situation in many of the Greek colonies, stems largely from the exte nsive mixture of competing peoples in a limited geographical area. On this island ma ny cities of diverse and often mixed ethnic descent existed alongside each other, trading, allying, and warring with each other. Native Sicilians (the Sicani), early Italian immigrants (the Siceli), supposed refugees from Troy (the Elymi), Carthaginians, and Greek colonists from Dorian and Ionian origins interacted with each other on a daily basis, often inhabiting the same cities and fighting in the same armies. Mercenaries fr om Greek Italy, Campagnia, Sardinia, Iberia, and Libya who settled on the island or were gran ted territory in return for their services to Sicilian potentates added to the great medley of cultural origins. It is not surprising, then, that Sicilian history displays many twists and turns, shifting alliances, wars between ethnically similar cities, and conflicts crossing ethnic boundaries. While cultural identities certainly did exis t in Sicily, no deep-seated et hnic conflict between Greeks and non-Greeks emerges from the fact ual evidence for the fifth and early fourth century. In fact, the political events indicate that in Sicily there was a distinct lack of ethnic consciousness in the decision-making processes of the various states. In the early fifth century, when many ci ties on the Greek mainland began to band together against the common Persian foe, Sicily had no such experience which would have aided the Sicilian Greeks in the formati on of an ethnic conscious ness. According to Herodotus, when envoys from Hellas arrived at Syracuse and asked Gelon for aid against 3

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4 the barbarian, the tyrant denied their request, despite their appeals to their common Greek heritage: (7.157.2). Gelon requested the command of either the army or the navy, knowing that this was a demand unacceptable to the Athenians and Spartans. Thus, he cleverly extricated himself from any obligation, for when the emissaries refused, Gelon sent them away. 1 Furthermore, the tyrant sent three penteconters laden with gold to Delphi to bear tribute to th e Persian king in the case of a Greek defeat (7.163). Whether or not the speeches of Gel on and the envoys (if not the entire embassy to Sicily) are Herodotus invention, 2 this story may preserve the mainland Greeks correct opinion that the Siceliots care d little for the troubles of Hellas proper. Certainly Gelon was capable of sending aid to the Greek resi stance, for he controlled the greater part of the island and had become extremely wealthy (Diod. 11.26.1). Afterwards, some Greeks, probably reacting to the mainland Greeks negative evaluation of his actions, 3 excused Gelon for his absence from th e Persian Wars by asserting that he had been forced to reserve his resources in Sicily for the fight agains t the Carthaginians at Himera (Herod. 7.165.1). However, the battle of Himera was originally between Theron of Acragas and the Punic-Greek force under Hamilcar. Gelon, who was apparently still at Syracuse when the fighting began, arri ved only later when Theron was in danger of defeat (Diod. 11.20.5). 1 Asheri (1988) 772. 2 Treves (1941) argues that Herodotus has taken part s of the speeches from the embassy to Gelon from a funeral speech of Pericles and suspects that the whole mission is fictiona l. Ahseri (1988) finds no reason to reject Herodotus story (772). 3 Asheri (1988) 772.

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5 Despite later comparisons with the Persian Wars, the conflicts between the Deinomenids and the Carthaginians in Sicily did not foster the idea of the barbarian outsider who must be resisted by true Gr eeks, as the Persian resistance did on the mainland. 4 Though comparisons of the victory at Himera over the Carthaginians to the battle for Greek independence at Plataea were naturally made (Pind. Py 1.72-80; Diod. 11.23; Herod. 166.1), this war was as much an intra-Greek struggle as a war between opposing ethnicities vying for control of th e island. Herodotus states that the Carthaginian army had come at the behest of Terillus, the tyrant of Himera, who had been driven from his homeland. Teri llus had obtained friendship () with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, and the support of Anaxilaus, who was tyrant of Rhegium, an Ionian city always at odds with the Dorian s in Sicily. Furthermore, Hamilcar was a product of one of the many mixed marri ages between Greeks and foreigners, 5 for he was half-Carthaginian and half-Syracusan (7.165). Hamilcar had also obtained an alliance with another Greek city, Selinus, making th e forces opposing Ther on and Gelon truly a coalition of Greeks and Phoeni cians, initiated by a Greek leader (Terillus), not a Punic expeditionary force bent on th e subjugation of the Greek cites of Sicily (Diod. 11.21.5). 6 After the defeat of the Ca rthaginians at Himera, Gelon concluded a peace very favorable to the Carthaginians (Diod. 11.26.1) In this instance the victor was not 4 Hall (2002) 172-189. 5 Hall (2004) 41. 6 Diodorus differs from Herodotus in this account, stating that the Persians had contracted an alliance with the Carthaginians to crush the Greeks in the East and West (11.1). This, however, does not provide a firm reason to discount Herodotus version, for Diodorus has been shown to be prone to careless and insensitive abbreviation and simplification (Gray [1987]). Diodorus was also predisposed to view Carthage as the perpetual enemy of the Greeks (see below, Chapter 6) and may have been influenced by the traditional association between the Carthaginian conflict and the Persian wars (Pind. Py .1.72-80; Diod. 11.23; Herod. 166.1) and the tradition that the battle of Himera occurr ed on the same day as Thermopylae (Diod. 11.24.1) or Salamis (Herod. 7.166).

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6 vindictive or demanding; Diodorus praises Gelon for his clemency, even to the Carthaginians, whom Diodorus calls his worst enemies (, 11.26.1). Thus, these events reveal no deep-seated animosity towards the Carthaginians, for the conflict began as an intra-Greek conflict and the Ca rthaginians were simply the most powerful contingent of a Greek-Punic alliance. Fo r many Greeks, especi ally on the mainland, Gelons crushing defeat of th e Carthaginian-led army at Himera in 480 proved a fitting western parallel to the Greek de feat of the barbarian enemy in the East. In fact, however, the Carthaginian War was a dispute betw een several states with opposing political interests, not an ethnic conflict. If Diodorus portrayal of the Carthaginians as the perpetual enemies of the Greeks were correct, the Siceliots might have been expected to follow up their grand victory in 480 by liberating the island from Phoenician influence. If ever the Siceliots had opportunity to rid the island of the Carthaginians, it was when Gelon had united most of the Greek cities in Sicily unde r his rule and had defeated the Carthaginian army. Nevertheless, neither Gelon nor his successo rs ever undertook a campaign against the Phoenicians in the West. Even after the overthrow of the Deinomenids in 466/5, the democracy would have been better equipped for eliminating the Punic presence, since Carthage may have been suffering from internal discord due to revolts against the power of the Magonids, severely hampering their abi lity to deal decisively in the colonies. 7 However, the next seventy years appear to have been free from conflict with the Carthaginians. The Syracusans undert ook campaigns against Catana (Diod. 11.76.3), Ducetius and the Siceli (11.91-2) Acragas (12.8), and Leon tini (12.53-5) and continued to expand their influence, but they never resumed a war with the Carthaginians. 7 Sanders (1988).

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7 Hermocrates advice to the Syracusans in 416 to seek an alliance with the Carthaginians shows that he considered the non-Sicilian Greeks more of a threat th an the Phoenicians in the West (Thuc. 6.34.2). The Carthaginians must have also pursued a laissez-faire policy in Sicily, for when Syracuse went through a period of considerable civil strife (Diod. 11.73), Carthage made no move to detach Syracusan dependenc ies or to strengthen their presence on the island. The Punic empire during this period had secured numerous resources: gold from Guinea, silver from Spain, and tin from Galic ia, which led to a thriving bronze industry. 8 After 460 Carthage had gained considerable wealth and power from its trade in the western Mediterranean and was afforded se veral opportunities for re venge by the Greeks internal difficulties, including the revolt of Ducetius which lasted throughout the 450s, and the wars with Acragas (12.8) and Leontin i (12.53-5). The Carthaginians also refused to join Athens against Syracuse in 415 (Thuc. 6.88.6), although the Athenians had already landed a very large army in Sicil y. Had the Carthaginians been active in the western half of the island while the Atheni ans besieged Syracuse, they certainly would have made significant gains in territory and possibly effected the downfall of Syracuse, which would have been deprived of its Greek allies on the island while facing two of the most powerful states in the Mediterranean. Of course, Carthage may have feared Athenian presence on the island more than Syr acuses in 415, but their reluctance in 409 to go to war with Syracuse even when it had become the preeminent Sicilian power reveals a distinct distaste for intervention in Greek affairs on the island (Diod. 13.43.5). 9 8 Piccard (1968) 100. 9 Piccard (1968) 101.

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8 Following the failure of the Athenian e xpedition against Syracuse, Carthage began to take a more active part in Sicilian affairs once again. However, as in the time of Gelon, there is no evidence that the Cart haginian campaign was motivated by ethnic hatred of the Greeks. Diodorus reports that the Segestans, when Athens deserted them, could not make peace with Selinus and theref ore appealed to Carthage for help (Diod. 13.43). The Carthaginians at first balked at undertaking a war wh ich would potentially bring them into conflict with Syracuse, but were persuaded by Hannibal, their foremost citizen (, 13.43.5). Hannibal, the grandson of the Hamilcar who had been defeated at Himera, had his own motives for invading Sicily, as he himself later demonstrated when he tortured and slaughtered 3000 Greeks as a sacrifice to the spirit of his grandfather on the battlefiel d at Himera and then razed th e city (13.62.4). Therefore, Carthage entered the war under the influence of a suffete with a personal vendetta and, after many years of peace, only began hostilit ies at the request of a largely Hellenized Elymian city. 10 The Phoenician-Greek conflict th at began in 409 may have had the appearance of an ethnic conf lict between Carthaginians a nd Greeks, but the underlying motives belie this simplification of the events. Even with the emergence of a real Cart haginian threat to the Siceliots, the political situation in Greek Sici ly at this time continued to be very divisive. Dionysius, who took tyrannical power at Syracuse in 405, immediately encounter ed defections of Greek cities to the Carthagini an side (Diod. 14.41.1) and faced the prospect of an alliance between Carthage and the Chalci dian and Ionian cities to th e North. His fear of this coalition against Syracuse was real enough to induce him to cede to Messena a large 10 By the fifth century Segesta, along with the other main Elymi cities (Eryx and Entella), were thoroughly Hellenized. See Asheri (1988) 741-2.

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9 portion of territory, to seek a marriage alliance from Rhegium, and to promise to help the Rhegians expand their territory (14.44.4). Dionysius had not worried foolishly, since in 383 Carthage finally did secure an alliance with the Italia n Greeks against Dionysius of Syracuse (15.15.2). Dionysius concern that these Greek citi es would join with Carthage seems exceedingly ill-founded if we are to believe th e stories that Diodorus reports about the sacking of Greek cities. 11 Diodorus states that when th e Carthaginian army took Selinus, , [] (13.57.3, 5). Likewise, when Hamilcar entered Acragas, (13.90.1). Diodorus also reports that when the news of the sack of Acragas spread many Greeks left Sicily and transferred their families a nd possessions to Italy (13.91.1). If the Carthaginians had acted in such barbaric fashion and many Greeks had fled to Italy, certainly the Italian Greeks who had received refugees would have been unlikely to undertake an alliance with the Carthaginians. Since the Italian Greeks did join Carthage against Dionysius of Syracuse (15.15.2), Diodorus stories about the cr uelty and hatred of the Phoenicians should be received with skepticism. 12 It is more likely that the Carthaginians had a reputation in Sicily for even-handed dealings and fair administration. Testaments to this are the defec tion of several Greek cities from Dionysius control to Carthage (14.41.1) and the loyalty with which the Greek 11 The destruction of cities and removal of whole populations was not a new atrocity committed by the Carthaginians; Gelon had already destroyed three Gr eek cities and moved multiple peoples from their habitations, thus anticipating the first Carthaginian acts of this kind in 409 (Asheri [1988] 769-70). 12 See below, Chapter 6.

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10 citizens of Motya withstood the siege of Syracu se, even in the absence of a Carthaginian army or leader (14.53.4). Hence, when Theodorus speaks against Dionysius, he advocates dependency on the Carthaginians rather than subservience to the tyrant: , (Diod. 14.65.2). In fact, so me later authors did not consider the Carthaginians barbaric. Er atosthenes, the third century Alexandrian librarian, suggested that the Greeks should c onsider non-Greeks according to their merits, for some barbarians are ad mirable in their administra tions, as Strabo reports: , (1.4.9). The Carthaginian constitution was the only non-Greek government which Aristotle considered in his study (Pol 1272b24-1273b25) and Isocrates also praised Carthage as one of the best govern ed states in the world ( Nic 24). Cicero also lauded the Carthaginians system of administration ( De Rep 1.3). Thus, the evidence from the political histor y of Sicily does not point to any deep divisions between Greeks and barbarians, desp ite Diodorus attempts to portray Carthage as the perpetual enemy of the Sicilian Greek s. The changing alliances crossing ethnic lines, extended periods of peace, the deserti on of Greek cities to the Carthaginian side, and the fact that the Greek-Carthaginian conf licts began at the inst igation of other Greek or Hellenized cities indicate that the political situation in Sicily in the fourth and fifth century was divided and capricious, but not pr imarily ethnically defined. Certainly Greek identity was present in Sicily to some degree, but states in Sicily generally made political

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11 decisions based on their own interests rather than an allegiance to their ethnic or cultural group.

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CHAPTER 3 MERCENARY WARFARE The absence of clear ethnic dividing lines in the politic al makeup of the Sicilian states may have in part resulted from the predominance of mercenary warfare from a relatively early date. Many different peoples from all over the Mediterranean fought for hire on the sides of both the Carthaginians a nd Sicilian Greeks: Italiots, Siceli, Sicani, Elymi, Sardinians, Campanians, Iberians, Li byans, and even mainland Greeks. The great diversity in armies composed primarily of foreign soldiers tended to professionalize and depersonalize conflict in Sicily. Just as Demosthenes worried that the Athenians heavy dependence on hired soldiers had resulted in citizens apathy ( Philippic 1), the prevalence of mercenary warfare in Sicily could have led to the distancing of the common citizen from the war and the perception of the enem y. The contingent of citizens in a Greek army would usually have been small compared to the numbers of mercenaries and would rarely have encountered Phoenician soldiers, who were infrequently committed to battle. Therefore, the Carthaginian thr eat should have been much less tangible than if the battles had been drawn along these ethnic lines. Warfar e in Sicily in the fifth and early fourth centuries demonstrates that both Carthaginians and Greeks predominantly employed armies consisting of many different et hnic groups and that many mercenary groups changed sides, further obscuring ethnic bounda ries. Because of th e great diversity among the soldiers on both sides, armed conflict in Sicily probably contributed much less to cultural divergence than warfar e in Hellas proper, where citizen armies of the fifth century fought against the Pe rsians and other outsiders. 12

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13 The Carthaginians only rarely committed ci tizens or even Phoenician soldiers to combat; instead they relied heavily on forei gners to fight for them. The wealth which their trading empire had brought them allowed the Carthaginians to hire great armies for their campaigns. Diodorus mentions particul arly the mines in Iberia which yielded enough gold to bring numerous soldiers into th eir pay early in the development of their western Mediterranean thalassocracy (5.28.2-3). 1 Before each major campaign in Sicily the Carthaginian government or the general w ho oversaw the expeditionary force traveled far and wide to recruit mercenaries for the wa r. When the Carthaginians first decided to aid Segesta after the withdrawal of Athens, they did not send a Phoenician army, but gathered the Libyan and Campanian mercenar ies who had been hired by the Chalcidians in support of Athens and sent them to Se gestas aid (13.44.1). Subsequently, Diodorus refers to this army as the Carthaginians ( 13.44.4), though he has already given the numbers of Libyans and Campanians in the army and omitted any reference to Carthaginian pr esence. Diodorus readiness to call a group of mercenary recruits under Carthages aegis, Carthagin ians, warns us to be wary of Diodorus terminology. When he uses the term Carthag inian of an army, he designates only Carthaginian leadership and does not indicate the ethnic makeup of the troops. Hannibal joined the mercenary group la ter, bringing with him many (, 13.44.6) Iberians, Libyans from every city ( ), and not a few ( ) Carthaginians citizens. The Carthaginian contingent with Hannibal was probably quite small compared to the combined force of Libyans and Campanians already employed in Sicily and his new recruits from Iberia and Libya, but no doubt Hannibal knew that it was necessary to keep a body of loyal soldiers who would check the common fickleness of mercenaries. 1 Miller (1984) 157.

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14 Given their habitual absence from battle, th is was probably the ci tizen soldiers chief purpose. Again in 396 the Carthaginians summoned as many of their allies as possible and sent Himilcon along with mercenar ies from Libya and Iberia to invade the Greek cities. The numbers of mercenaries gathered are not believable (300,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, four-hundred war ships, and six-hundred othe r ships and engines of war, as Ephorus states them; 100,000 troops from Libya a nd 30,000 enrolled in Sicily, according to Timaeus), but they do indicate that Ephorus and Timaeus were aware of how heavily Carthage depended on hired soldiers (Diod. 14.54.5) In 392 the Carthaginians, probably running low on their supply mercenary recruits, supplemented their Libyan forces with Sardinians and native Italians. Notably, menti on of citizens enrolled in this army is once again absent from Diodorus account (14.95.1). Carthages difficulty in putting down the Libyan revolt following Himilcons disastrous campaign also shows its h eavy reliance on foreig n warriors. The Carthaginians apparently put up little resistance as the Libyans quickly occupied Tynes, a city not far from Carthage. The Phoenician s retreated to the c ity of Carthage and remained there, supplied by sea from Sardinia to outlast the rebels. Eventually, the manifest futility of the siege, the lack of any obvious leader, and a shortage of provisions brought the Libyans into disc ontent and a good number of th em succumbed to bribery by the Carthaginians. In this manner the Carthaginians did put down the rebellion, but they never dared to fight the insurgents. As in their military affairs in Sicily, gold from the wealthy trading city proved a better weapon than a citizen ar my recruited from merchants and sailors (14.77).

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15 Plutarch, in the account of Timoleons conflict with Carthage, states that the Carthaginians lost 3000 citizens, the most that had ever fall en in a battle. When the propensity of ancient sources to exaggerate the casualties of the opposing army is taken into account, this figure is a very small number in view of all Cartha ges military activity in its colonies and dependencie s and it indicates how infreque ntly the Carthaginians were willing to commit their citizens to battle. 2 This passage from Plutarch confirms the tendency of the Carthaginians to rely heav ily on their mercenary armies and to avoid using their own troops in battle. Contingent s of citizen soldiers probably served the purpose of overseeing the foreigners more of ten than they took part in the fighting themselves. The Siceliots likewise made frequent use of mercenaries when engaged in large wars such as the conflicts with the Carthagini ans. In 406 the Sicilian Greeks enlisted the services of the Campanians whom the Ca rthaginians had employed on their previous expedition and subsequently discarded after their withdrawal (13.85.4). The Acragantini also hired Sicilian Greeks, who deserted al ong with the Campanians when the situation began to look desperate (13.88.5). So too did Dionysius make use of mercenaries frequently, both for fighting the enemy outside the walls of Syracuse and maintaining his own power within. Indeed, the two mainstay s of Dionysius tyranny were his fortress on Ortygia and his mercenary armies. He le d an army of mercenaries against the Carthaginians at Gela in 405 and then return ed to the city while the Syracusan cavalry went ahead of him. When the Syracusan ci tizens revolted against him at the instigation of the knights who had returned beforehand, Dionysius forced his mercenary army to cover 400 stades in a day and take the city by surprise (13.109-113). This was not the 2 Warmington (1964) 123.

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16 only time Dionysius had to rely on his hired soldiers to regain his rule. The next year a group of Syracusan soldiers revolted agains t Dionysius again, even calling on the cavalry who had taken refuge at Aetna to join in the rebellion. Dionysius was shut up in his palace in a seemingly hopeless situation, but he was able to sneak out to the mainland and entice some Campanian mercenaries with the pr ospect of a great deal of gold, thereafter winning his tyranny back with the sw ords of foreigners (14.8-9). Dionysius was acutely aware of his depe ndence on his mercenaries and was quick to dispose of potentially troublesome groups. Thus, during Himilcos seige of Syracuse he gave the order to a particularly bothersome band of mercenaries to attack while he withdrew his cavalry, leaving the mercenaries to be slaugh tered (14.72.2-3). Later, when he suspected that his hired soldiers were b ecoming hostile towards him, he arrested their leader and dismissed the troops, only to recruit other mercenaries immediately afterwards. Dionysius had to maintain the loya lty of his mercenaries; they were his elite troops 3 and constituted his bodyguard. Dionysius even received criticism in later times for his dependence on foreign soldiers. Plut arch says that Dion had warned Dionysius that a good rule was formed on goodwill with the people and not his huge bodyguard of foreigners ( Dion 10.4). Likewise, in Diodorus most antiDionysian section Theodorus delivers a speech against the tyrant asserting, (14.65.3). Theodorus later accuses Dionysius of giving the citizens arms to barbarians and foreigners ( 14.66.5). However, the practice of hiring large groups of foreign soldiers was not uncommon before Dionysius, nor after him, for even Dion, the pupil of Plato and 3 The notice at Diod. 14.52.5 that an Italian Greek (Archylus of Thurii) led the elite troops of Dionysius indicates that at least in this instance he relied on foreigners for this part of his army.

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17 supposed liberator of Syracuse, found himsel f fighting against the Syracusan citizens with a hired army (Plutarch, Dion, 22). The changing allegiances of mercenar y armies further contributed to the breakdown of ethnic demarcations in warfare. Mercenary armies in Sicily, just as other groups of hired soldiers, tended to offer thei r services to the hi ghest bidder. After Athens withdrawal from Sicil y, Carthage found no reason to r ecruit soldiers from the far reaches of their colonies; they simply rehire d the soldiers who had been in the employ of the Chalcidian cities of Sicily (13.44). After the successful campaign in 409 in which Hannibal sacked Selinus and Himera, the Cart haginians left their Campanian mercenaries in Sicily, as they retired to Carthage for the winter (13.62.5-6). As the Carthaginians had suspected, when they returned to Sicily in 406, they met with the same Campanian mercenaries, disgruntled at wh at they considered unfair treat ment and now in the service of the Greeks. Despite forcing the Campanians into the arms of the enemy, Carthage would eventually reclaim their allegian ce at the siege of Acragas. Though the Phoenicians own mercenaries ha d at first threatened to leave when their provisions were slow in coming, Hamilcar was able to captu re a Syracusan provision fleet and quiet the discontent. Then, as Acragas position b ecame extremely precarious, the Campanians on Acragas side deserted to the Carthaginians (13.88.2-5). The Siceli are another good example of a group who switched sides frequently. Hannibal, having taken Selinus, received into his army a number of Siceli and Sicani, whom Diodorus insinuates were natural enemies of the Sicilian Greeks (13.59.6). However, Dionysius, after he had sacked Mo tya, left a garrison composed mostly of Siceli in charge of this strategically and morally significant city (14.53.5); clearly he had

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18 some reason to trust them. The Siceli, unmoved by Dionysius faith in them, soon revolted against him and went back over to the Carthaginians when it became expedient for them to do so (14.58.1). The prevalence of mercenary armies in Sicily and the frequent changes of allegiances led to a great permeability in th e ethnic boundaries between battling forces. The Carthaginians only rarely committe d citizens to battle, relying heavily on mercenaries, while the Greeks also enlisted th e aid of foreigners in order to match the numbers of their opponents. In battle no doubt only a small portion of the fighting was between Greek and Carthagini an and foreigners who fought on both sides played the greater role in the actual hostilities. The situation in Sicily was completely unlike that in mainland Greece during the fifth century, where citizen armies met the Pe rsian foe and brought back their war stories which stimulated fear of and disdain for the Eastern army. In Sicily the Carthaginian threat must have been much less visible, sin ce the borders between the sides were so fluid and warfare was predominantly a professiona l affair. The fluctuation of alliances confused ethnic demarcations and contributed to the depersonalizati on of warfare. No us vs. them mentality every developed and Gr eek citizens rarely came face-to-face with their actual enemy, the Carthaginians.

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CHAPTER 4 COSMOPOLITANISM The lack of ethnic demarcations in the political realm of Sicily no doubt stemmed from a long history of cultural mixing. Evidence from the early Greek colonial period to the fourth century supports the conclusion that Greeks mingled with the non-Greek inhabitants of Sicily and blu rred ethnic and cultural lines. Archaeological records and primary sources attest to intermarriage, bi lingualism, cultural sharing, trade connections, and personal interactions between Greeks a nd barbarians. The great degree of racemixture that took place in Si cily explains the divisivene ss of the political situation discussed above and provides some reasons for the lack of str ong ethnic and cultural identities in Sicily. Through the time of Dionysius, the dominant feature of the cultural scene in Sicily was cosmopolitanism. One of the primary means for cultural intermixing seems to have been mixed marriages. Although the archaeological record in the We st is highly debated, some information from the primary sources indicates th at intermarriage did in fact take place in Sicily. As to the nature of the earliest colo nial activities, scholars have mostly rejected the idea that the omission of reference in ancient sources to women in these ventures provides solid evidence for their abse nce in earlier colonial foundations. 1 However, intermarriage certainly was bei ng practiced in Sicily as ea rly as the fifth century, for Thucydides implies that residents of Selinus and Segesta married from the same groups of women when he states that one of the reasons for the conflict be tween these two cities 1 Hall (2004) 40. 19

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20 was about marriage rights ( 6.2.2). Carthaginians, even in the most upper strata of society, also married among the Greeks, for Hamilcar, one of the two Carthaginian suffetes, was in fact half-G reek (Herod. 7.165). Even if one does give credence to story in Herodotus, the instance do es at least show that such a union was not unthinkable. Archaeology has shed some light on th e cultural mingling between Greeks and barbarians in the West, but many recent scholars have highlighted the obstacles to using the archaeological record in determining ethnicity. 2 Previously, several scholars interpreted the great number of Italic fibulae found at Pith ekoussai as an indication of widespread mixed marriages in Western Greek colonies. 3 The fibulae showed no similarity to those at Euboea or anywhere in Greece, but very closely resembled the ones found at Villanovan sites in Etruria, particular ly Veii. The native Italian items unearthed were mostly for women, so Buchner concluded, m ost, if not all, of the colonists women were not Greeks but natives. 4 However, Hodos rejected this interpretation of the material evidence and stated that trade with the native inhabitants, not intermarriage, was the more likely cause of widespread Italic items. 5 Other scholars have likewise rejected the argument that these fibulae can prove inte rmarriage between Greeks and indigenous peoples. However, at the ve ry least these archaeological finds do imply a high level of cultural interaction between Western Gr eek colonists and non-Greek peoples. 2 Jones (1997); Hall (1997), (2002). 3 Buchner (1979); Coldstream (1993). 4 Buchner (1979) 135. 5 Hodos (1999).

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21 Moreover, other archaeological evidence does suggest that intermarriage was practiced in Western Greece at a much earlier date than the fifth century, as the primary sources attest. In a recent article on Western Greek identity, Jonathan Hall offers several pieces of firm evidence for cultural inte raction and possibly intermarriage and bilingualism. Some seventh-century artif acts from Etruria contain the names Rutile Hipukrates and Larth Telikles which probably resulted from marriages between Greeks and Etruscans. In Sicily a sixth century amphora found at Montagna di Marzo attests the names Tamura and Eurumakes in a non-Greek in scription and a curse-tablet of the same time records the name Pratomekes. These names apparently derived from Greek names (, ), but notably lack the aspiration from the Greek letters theta and chi Ancient grammarians noticed the ab sence of aspiration in native Sicilian dialects (Greg. Cor. De Dialecto dorica 151) and modern study of non-Greek Sicilian inscriptions has not produced any instances of the letters theta phi or chi As Hall notes, these Sicilianized Greek names could point to the results of intermarriage between Greeks and native Sicilians. 6 The use of Greek names in native Sicilia n contexts also suggests a bilingual environment. Such an atmosphere would have aided the well documented spread of the Greek alphabet to the Siceli, Sicani, and El ymi. Natives of th e West obtained their scripts from a variety of Greek cities; the Ch alcidian script, the script of Gela, and the script of Selinus are all attested in non-Greek areas. Also, the ending emi which appears in Elymi inscriptions may have been borrowed from the Greek Interestingly, Iamblichus records a story stating that Pytha goras ordered his Greek followers to speak 6 Hall (2004) 40-1.

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22 Greek, thus implying that many Greeks in the ar ea were speaking a native language or at least a hybrid language which employed words and phrases from both Greek and native tongues ( Vit Pyth 34.241). 7 In fact, several native places names, words concerning weights and measures, foods, and domestic objec ts did make their way into the Sicilian Greek dialect. 8 The possible prevalence of bilingualism and the use of native elements in the Greek language is especially important fo r the study of Greek identity in the West, since it complicates the idea that the Greeks primarily defined themselves based on their common language. 9 Trinity Jackman has recently provided further evidence for the cultural diversity of Sicily by illustrating the fragmentary nature of the Sicilian political experience. Through analysis of the burial material at th ree sites throughout Ital y, she concludes that Sicilian Greeks were much more interested in defining themselves in reference to a much smaller group than the Greeks of the Aegean region. 10 The disconnected nature of Greek settlements in Sicily and the hi gh number of native ar tifacts found alongside Hellenic ones suggests a high leve l of cultural inter action and possibly intermarriage. She also states that non-Greek indigenous centers often became a part of Greek settlements and continued their traditions th rough the fifth centur y, thus maintaining a hybrid identity with the Greek colonists. Admittedly, it is very difficult to employ archaeology to reconstruct ethnicity. However, the fluidity of the colonial experience in Sicily attested by the material record and th e fragmentary concept of political identity 7 Hall (2004) 41-3. 8 Asheri (1988) 747-8. 9 Hall (2004) 43. 10 Jackman (2005) 1.

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23 strongly suggest that Sicilian Greeks were particularly inclined to maintain relations with non-Greek inhabitants; political communities were locally defined and their ties to broader identities were weaker, while interact ion with other inhabita nts of the island was common. The sources also attest the presence of Greeks and Carthaginians in each others armies and cities, which would have encouraged bilingualism and cultural communication between the two peoples. In 409 Hannibal, depicted by Diodorus as a crude barbarian and a natural hater of the Greeks ( 13.43.6), actually had Greeks serving in his army (13.57.3). Moreov er, at the siege of Motya the inhabitant Greeks fought with the Carthaginians against Di onysius in a desperate struggle. That the Greeks of Motya remained faithful to the Carthaginians is all the more remarkable in view of that fact that Di onysius controlled the entire island except for five cities (Halicyae, Solus, Aegesta, Panormus, and Entella, 14.48.4) and that Himilco had already withdrawn the main Carthaginian force from Sicily (14.50.4). The outlook for Motya was indeed bleak and Carthage was unable to dispatch an army in time to save the city, yet the Greeks of Motya were loyal to the Phoenicians to the b itter end, eventually meriting crucifixion for their efforts (14.53.4). Just as a number of Greeks had taken up re sidence in Motya, in the heart of the Carthaginians sphere of influence on the western end of the island, some Carthaginians made their homes in Syracuse on the eastern side. These Phoenicians were evidently numerous and wealthy members of society: , (14.46.1). The presence of Carthagi nians in Syracuse and other Greek cities should come as no su rprise, since Carthage was e ssentially a timocracy and was

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24 always ready to establish trad ing connections in foreign ci ties. The emphasis on trade and wealth which dominated Carthaginian politics no doubt provided the impetus for merchants to establish themselves in the wealthie st Greek city in Sicily. In fact, Diodorus implies that Phoenician traders had also made residence in many other Greek cities, since after Dionysius expulsion of the Phoenicians from Syracuse the other Greek states ( 14.46.2) cast out the Phoenici ans living among them ( ). The city of Carthage accommodated severa l Greeks within its walls. The plague on the Carthaginian army thought to have been caused by Himilcos sacrilege against the temples of Demeter and Core (14.63.1) cause d the citizens of Carthage to choose the most prominent () Greeks and to appoint them as priests to Demeter and Core, serving the goddesses according to Greek rituals (14.77.5). The presence of Greeks in Carthage probably satisfied the citys trading interests, as they provided direct links to Western Greek cities. Carthage was in the habit of importing a grea t deal of Greek goods even in the fourth century and must have had a lively trade with other Greek states; Diodorus supplies at least one example: Ac ragas trading relati ons with Carthage, 13.81.4. Greeks and Greek culture must have been quite prevalent in the city to warrant an edict from the Carthaginians forbidding Gr eek literacy, though the da te of this law has been disputed (Justin 20.5.13). Archaeology has confirmed the cosmopolitan na ture of Phoenician cities in Sicily. Carthages three main outposts on the island, Motya, Panormus, and Soloeis, all provide examples of cultural sharing and non-native inhabitants. In Motya archaeologists have found numerous Proto-Corinthian and Corinthian pots, a Doric capital, and archaic Greek

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25 inscriptions, along with Attic black-figure and red-figure vases. This evidence led David Asheri to postulate that half of the citys population was Greek. 11 In Panormus a Punic cemetery near Corso Calatafimi which archaeologists began excavating in 1953 has revealed material of mixed Phoenician a nd Greek origin. In Soloeis two sarcophagi which resemble eastern Phoenician sarcophagi and have two female figures with Greek traits, one wearing a Doric chiton, have been found. 12 The blend of Greek and eastern elements in pottery is also well documen ted in both Sicily and Carthage itself. 13 The literary sources supplement the genera l picture of cosmopolitanism in Sicily by providing several specific instances of Greeks and Cart haginians who had personal connections or sympathies with the other side. Herodotus says that Hamilcar, a person of considerable political weight in Carthage, in addition to being half -Greek, had friendship () with Terillus of Himera (7.165). The connection was strong enough that Terillus was able to prevail upon Hamilcar to persuade Carthage to aid him in 480 against Gelon. Even if the authenticity of Herodotus Sicilian narrative in Book 7 is suspect, the story at least demonstrates that such a friendship was not unthinkable in Herodotus time. Diodorus offers an example of a Greek who ha d favored the Carthaginians at the expense of his Greek allegiances: when Hannibal sacked Selinus, he released Empedion along with his kinsmen, (13.59.3). Not only does this story show that prominent Greeks with Carthaginian sympathies could live unmolested even in cities at 11 Asheri (1988) 743-4. 12 Asheri (1988) 744-5. 13 Asheri (1988) 746; Piccard (1968) 110.

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26 war with the Carthaginians, but it also imp lies that Carthaginians were in communication with the Greek cities, since Hannibal knew th at Empedion had always favored Carthage. During his tyranny Dionysius tried to r ouse anger against the Carthaginians, 14 but interpersonal relationships be tween Greeks and Carthaginians continued even after his time. Dion had carried on some of Dionysius embassies with Carthage for many years and had evidently gained many friends. Having been exiled from Sicily, he later returned from Athens, intending to overthrow Dionysius II. Dions fleet encountered a heavy storm and was forced to land near Minoa in a region controlled by the Carthaginians. Fortunately for Dion, the expedition happened to come to anchor in a region under the control of Synalus, a guest friend ( Plutarch Dion 25.12) of Dions, whom he had no doubt met when he was carryin g on diplomatic relati ons at Carthage. Synalus entertained and supplied Dion and his troops and allowed them to leave their baggage with the Carthaginians while Dion made his expedition to Syracuse. Thus, Dion, the student of Plato who had spent seve ral years at Athens when Panhellenism had begun to foster the Greek vs. barbarian mo tif, never forsook his personal relationships with barbarians and he found his connections most useful during his time in the West. The evidence from both literary and archaeo logical sources for ethnic interaction in Sicily certainly supplements the picture of the political atmosphere as essentially diverse and divided. As Jackman argues, identity in Sicily as revealed by burial sites was very fragmented and localized in nature. 15 In conjunction with other evidence which suggests an interracial and bilingual envi ronment, Jackmans findings provide more support for a largely cosmopolitan atmosphere in Sicily, with no sharply defined ethnic 14 See below Chapter 4. 15 Jackman (2005).

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27 boundaries. Greeks, native Sicilia ns, Carthaginians, and many other peoples lived sideby-side in cities throughout th e Greek, Carthaginian, Siceli, Sicani, and Elymi spheres on the island. As the next chap ter will show, this diversity was to be threatened by Dionysius anti-Carthaginian campaign, yet th e cosmopolitan atmosphere of Sicily would endure through his reign.

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CHAPTER 5 DIONYSIUS AND TH E CARTHAGINIANS The growing tide of Panhellenism from the mainland probably began to influence the Siceliots in the late fifth and early fourth century, by the cosmopolitan atmosphere in Sicily continued well into the fourth centur y. Nevertheless, ethnic perceptions began to change significantly after the fall of the Sy racusan democracy and the rise of Dionysius. Diodorus may be criticized for his misleadi ng portrayal of hostility between Greeks and Carthaginians and depiction of the Carthagi nians as the perpetual enemy of Greece in Sicily, but the information he provides on Dionysius attempts to foment fear of the Carthaginians may be generally accepted. In the face of severe opposition to his rule from neighboring Greek cities, indigenous inhabitants, and the Syracusan citizens themselves, Dionysius needed an enemy to take the focus off his own autocratic regime. He found this rival in Carthage and was at pains to increase the Greeks fear of the Phoenicians. This chapter will consider w hy Dionysius would have profited from dislike of the Carthaginians and why the Greeks were disposed to fear and hate Carthage in 406 more than ever before. It will then consider Dionysius actions intended to create this fear and finally evaluate the succ ess of his anti-C arthaginian policy. One fact that probably encouraged Di onysius to set himself as the antiCarthaginian tyrant was that he began hi s political career and became the ruler of Syracuse based on his role in the Carthagini an conflicts of 406. Dionysius grew up as a relatively insignificant private citizen and ma de no appearance on the political scene of Syracuse until his sudden rise in 405. He fi rst became a character of importance during 28

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29 the attack of Acragas and Gela, when th e Carthaginians were relentlessly marching towards Syracuse. In this Carthagi nian campaign Dionysius, having already distinguished himself in fighting the Carthaginians (Diod. 13.92.1), came to the fore as a political player and eventually secu red his own tyranny in Syracuse. During the confusion and clamor that followed the sack of Acragas, Dionysius made an appearance in the assembly to accuse the Syracusan generals of betraying the city and accepting bribes from the Carthagini ans (13.91.3). At this po int the fears of the citizens of Syracuse were no doubt great, si nce never before had they witnessed the Carthaginians gain so many victories against Greek cities and march inexorably into the eastern half of the island, which had been dominated by the Si celiots for so many years. Here Dionysius saw his opportunity and played off the fears of the crowd in order to assure his own position. This foundationa l period of Dionysius career was very significant for his later fame. Themistocles and Pausanias provide similar examples, as both made their fame in the resistance to the Persian in 480-79 and were hailed by the Greeks as instrumental parts of the defeat of the Mede. Likewise Dionysius reputation and regime were founded on anti-Carthaginia n concepts, since he had begun with a war against Carthage. He theref ore had the perfect opportuni ty from the beginning of his career to establish himself as an anti-Carth aginian tyrant and to use the fear of the Syracusans to stay in power. Maintaining the faade of an anti-Carthaginian administration was also important for Dionysius to transfer the ci tizens focus from his own authoritarian government to the Carthaginian threat. The Sy racusan citizens adopted him to the same office as Gelon ( 13.95.1) only in the most dire em ergency of state and because of

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30 the great fear of the Phoenician campaigning in Sicily. The Sicelio ts had probably never faced a danger from the Carthaginians as real as that which followed the Athenian expedition and certainly almost no one w ho had experienced the invasion of 480 was alive to compare the situa tion in 409 and 406-5. The Ca rthaginians had pursued a relatively laissez-faire policy in Sicily since the de feat at Himera in 480 and had stayed out of Greek political affairs as much as po ssible. They had not been a threat to the Greeks for a long time and their sudden rea ppearance on the Sicilian scene in 409 was no doubt startling to most Sicilian Greeks. Hanni bal invaded Sicily, quickly sacked Selinus, and razed Himera, according to Diodorus sacr ificing three-thousand Greeks to the shade of his grandfather before retu rning to Carthage with his war booty. Hannibal began the next wave of conquests with co-general Him ilcar, continuing along th e southern shore of the island. They took Acragas and began to move on toward Gela, which was completely unable to resist an army of the magnitude of the Carthaginian force. The quick destruction of Selinus, Himera, and Acragas and the Phoenicians penetration deep into the Siceliot half of the is land was so far unprecedented. At this time, when the Syracusans could see the march of the enemy from the West along the coast from Selinus to Acragas to Gela towards their own city, Dionysius was elected general. The Syracusans, having experienced a long period of a relatively successful democracy, were probably not so willing to throw away their cons titutional government and install an autocrat. Dionysius tyranny wa s adopted in an extreme emergency of state and was not an expression of the Syracusan citizens desire to change their type of government. Thus, Dionysius, having taken adva ntage of the state of war and secured his tyranny, soon faced the discontent of the Sy racusan citizen body, which became his most

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31 significant obstacle in the firs t few years of his reign, and subsequently had to impose his rule upon his fellow citizens. Even before the Carthaginian thr eat had withdrawn, the tyrant faced internal opposition to his regime. Dionysius Italian Greek mercenaries deserted him after the battle at Gela, as did the Syracusan cavalry. These aristocrats rode ahead of the main army and entered Syracuse raped Dionysius wife, and encouraged the citizenry to revolt against him. Dionysius re sponded with a forced march to Syracuse, catching the rebels off guard and slaying all his opponents (Diod. 13.112-113). After this episode Dionysius, clearly understanding the hos tility of many of the citizens, secured for himself a personal bodyguard in the mold of Pisistratus of Athens. He then built a massive fortress for himself on Ortygia (14.7.3) and created a fortific ation on Epipolae to control the city (14.18). Cr eating a stronghold on the island pr oved to be a prudent move for Dionysius, since soon afterwards his so ldiers revolted against him and invited the cavalry who had fled to Aetna following their revolt in 405 to join in the struggle against the tyrant. Dionysius retreated to the safety of his fortre ss where he had time to plan against the insurgents. He was finally able to reestablish his rule by hiring Campanian mercenaries and advancing on the city unawares (14.8-9). Thus, Dionysius faced considerable oppositio n from his own citizens, especially in the early going of his regime. Just as he had made his start by exploiting the Syracusans fear of an outside enemy, he needed a common foe which would take the citizens focus off his own tyranny. Carthage was the obvious choice; it was certainly the greatest threat to the Sicilian Greeks and Dionysius had made his reputation in fighting the Carthaginians. Diodorus account of Dionys ius actions in propagating hatred of the Carthaginians is, therefore, believable, t hough elsewhere he may be justly censured for

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32 exaggerating the hostile feeli ng between Greeks and Phoenicians. Dionysius had much to gain from portraying the Carthaginian s as the perpetual enemy of Syracuse. Diodorus states that Dionysius began his second Punic war in 398 because he noted that many Greek cities had deserted hi m and thought that a war against Carthage would draw the Sicilian Greeks together unde r his rule (14.41.1). After his politically motivated marriages to Doris of Lo cri and Aristomache of Syracuse, 1 Dionysius gave a speech, encouraging the Greeks to take a stand against the Carthaginians: [] , (14.45.2, 4). After the meeting Dionys ius ordered the citizens to expel the Phoenicians who dwelt in Syracuse from the city and to plunder their property. Following Syracuses lead, other Sicilian Greek cities also drove out their Phoenician inhabitants and took their property, which in so me cities was evidently considerable, as the Phoenicians had become wealthy through their trade connectio ns (14.46.1-2). The policy had immediate benefits for Dionysius, si nce Greek cities under Carthaginian rule deserted to Dionysius or revolted against Punic rule soon after he declared war on Carthage (14.46.3). Furthermore, as he made his march into the Western part of the island, Dionysius received many reinforcements from Greek cities (14.47.5-6). After the sack of Motya, Dionysius crucified Gr eeks who had fought on the side of the Carthaginians, an Eastern punishment normally abhorrent to the Greeks. He thus clearly demonstrated that he intended to be the sole leader of the Sicilian Greeks and that he 1 Dionysius took led the two maidens into matrimony simultaneously. He hoped that Doris would win him an alliance with one of the foremost cities in southern Italy, while he took Aristomache in order to secure his position in Syracuse.

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33 considered those who fought for the Carthagini ans traitors, putting them to death with an appropriately Semitic punishment (14.53.4). 2 Dionysius continued throughout his rule to stir up anti-Carthaginian feeling, going to war with Carthage on numerous occasi ons and keeping the focus on the barbarian outsider. He no doubt wanted to cast himself in the mold of Gelon, as a unifier of the Greek cities in Sicily and also needed the pr esence of Carthage to provide his foil. However, Dionysius never took the war with the Carthaginians to the next level, expelling them from the island. Of course, in his expedition of 397 he penetrated deep into the heart of the Phoenici an sphere of the island, even sacking Motya and taking all but a few of the western cities. But he certa inly knew that the Carthaginians would not stand idly by; they would send an expediti onary force which, once landed in Sicily, would force him to make concessions. U nder Himilco the Carthaginian army forced Dionysius all the way back to the eastern shore to fight for the freedom of Syracuse itself. Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, pla gue struck their camp and precipitated two military defeats that wholly disheartened th e army. Dionysius now had the Carthaginians in an extremely vulnerable position. He ne gotiated with Himilco and accepted a sum of three hundred talents, only allowing th e Carthaginian citizen soldiers ( [] 14.75.2) to withdraw to Libya and forcing the mercenaries to stay behind, betrayed by their employers. Despite Diodorus censure of Dionysius for allowi ng the Carthaginians off so easily, this was actually a shrewd and clever diplomatic move. The Carthaginian army was weakened, but was not so devastated as to be at Dionysius mercy. He could not have been sure that another attack would meet with success, nor could he have dealt 2 Alexander the Great, also wanting to portray himself as the crusader for Hellas, imitated Dionysius after the battle of the Granicus by sendin g all the Greeks who had fought for the Persians as slaves to Macedonia (Hammond [1980] 76-7).

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34 with the Carthaginians in unconditional term s. Furthermore, since the Carthaginians generally sent few citizens along with their army, under the treaty only a small portion of the force was able to withdraw, while the bulk of the army was left behind without leadership, an easy target for Dionysius to anni hilate. Also, since Himilco had manifestly betrayed all his mercenaries and allies, these negotiations would hurt Carthages credibility in later wars and other soldiers would be more reluctant to join Carthage. 3 Dionysius ruse worked; he destroyed a large part of the mercenaries and took many others into his service. Carthages defeat and withdrawal also stimulated a revolt among the Libyans, who were no doubt angry at Himilcos betrayal of their brethren. This insurgence caused considerable alarm to the Carthaginian citizens, as the rebels marched all the way to the gates of the city (14.77). Thus Dionysiu s had achieved a great victory over the enemy while allowing them to continue to exist on the island. Dionysius did indeed show that he had no desire to end the Carthaginian th reat, for if Dionysius intended to expel the Carthaginians from Si cily, this was the prime opportunity for the Syracusans to finish the fight. Carthage s credibility on the island was ruined, the military forces had either been withdrawn, destroyed, or bought off by the Greeks, and the city itself was being besieged by disc ontented Libyans. Yet, Dionysius used the interlude to undertake a siege of Rhegium and extend his em pire into Italy, fighting against the Italian Greeks. Like Gelon and the other Deinomenids, Dionysius did not show the desire to wipe the Carthaginian in fluence out of Sicily. Indeed, the complete removal of the Carthaginian threat would have been against his own interests, since he needed an external enemy to distract the people from disaffection with his own rule. 3 Caven (1990) 120-1.

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35 In this examination of Dionysius policy towards the Carthaginians it becomes clear that Dionysius did succeed at least pa rtially in uniting the Greeks against the Phoenician threat. His portraya l of Carthage as the enemy of the Siceliots is especially evident in the second of his Punic Wars. A testament to his creation of an antiCarthaginian sentiment among the Syracusans is the relative tranquility of his rule after the Second Punic War. Though in the first few years of his reign Dionysius was forced to fight his fellow citizens on several occasions, no significant civil discord after the second war is recorded by Diodorus, who was always re ady to point out the supposed hatred of the citizens of Syracuse for the tyrant. Ho wever, Dionysius policies probably did not lead to a great Panhellenic feeling in Sic ily comparable to the contemporary movement that was taking place on the mainland. Though he no doubt had opportunities to prosecute the war with Carthage to the point of their expul sion from the island, he never took advantage, since he benefited from having the Carthaginian threat in the West as a prop to his own tyrannical power. Dionysius anti-Carthaginian rhetoric ultimately fell flat, since he did not support his rhetoric and propaganda wi th his actions. Indeed, even during the Second Punic War Himera and Cepha loedium allied with Carthage (14.56.2) and after the war Carthage managed to bring th e Italian Greek cities into a pact against Dionysius (15.15). No doubt he successfully portrayed Carthage as the prime political enemy to the Sicilian Greeks, but the Carthaginians did not become the decedent barbarian enemies as the Persians had for the mainland Greeks. Sicily continued to be an essentially cosmopolitan island with many different intermingling ethnicities.

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CHAPTER 6 THE VIEW FROM THE MAINLAND Dionysius may have successfully portrayed Carthage as the political enemy of the Syracusan Greeks, but he could not change the ethnically heterogeneous situation in Sicily. The island was still composed of a gr eat plethora of different cultural groups and no clear-cut differentiation between the Greek race and the barbarians or Carthaginians emerged. However, Greeks on the mainla nd had begun to develop the doctrine of Panhellenism in the late fifth and fourth centu ries and consequently began to view Greek history in those terms. The Athenian sources especially betray a view of Sicilian history as defined by the struggle of Greek a nd Carthaginian, though this idea was a simplification of the actual situation on the island. The seeds of the Hellenic conscious ness can be found in the writings of Herodotus, whose often-quoted pa ssage concerning the Athenian response to the Spartan attempt to dissuade them from allying with Pe rsia provides some of the earliest evidence for Panhellenic thought: , , (8.144.2). As Hall states, many scholars have considered this passage from Herodotus the definition of Hellenic identity. 1 Another indicator that Panhelle nic doctrine goes back to the mid fifth century is the summons of Pericles to all the Hellenes for the purpose of deciding 1 Hall (2002) 189-90. 36

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37 what they should do about the sanctuaries dest royed by the Persians, to offer sacrifices and to make peace among the Greeks (Plut. Pericles 17.1). However, Panhellenism really crystallized in the minds of some of the literati in th e late fifth and early fourth centuries with the works of Gorgias, Ly sias, and, most prominently, Isocrates. During the reign of Dionysius mainland Greeks became even more acutely aware of the contrasts between Greeks and barbarians, since after the end of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans proved themselves betrayer s of Hellas in the eyes of many. Sparta immediately began ruling the Greek cities under its control with heavy hand and paid home to the Persian king, eventually concluding the Peace of Antalcidas in 387. Thus, Isocrates attacks the Spartans in the Panegyricus for razing Mantinea after they had signed a truce, seizing Cadmea, and besiegi ng Olynthus and Phlius while they assisted enemies of Hellas: Amyntas, Dionysius, and the Persian king (126). The betrayal of Sparta no doubt also reflected badly on Syracuse in view of their Dorian kinship and alliance with Sparta. Hence, during Dionysiu s rule (405-367) Panhellenism was coming into its own on the continent, and the foremo st Athenian proponents of this doctrine were deeply conscious of the perceived Spartan treachery. The influence of Panhellenism and anti-barbarian sentiment on the mainland Greeks perception of Sicilian affairs is evid ent in contemporary writings. The Platonic Epistles addressed to the Sicilian rulers, a partia lly preserved speech of Lysias criticizing Dionysius Olympic entourage (33), and Isoc rates speeches reveal the impact of Panhellenic thought on their viewpoints. Th ey evidence the concept of definite boundaries between Greeks and ba rbarians and the idea that Greeks are naturally enemies of barbarians and should unite in the comm on cause against them. Thus, these sources

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38 view the fundamental aspect of Sicilian politics as the perpetual conflict between Greek and Carthaginian and therefore often arrive at a very nega tive picture of Dionysius, who never undertook a crusade to oust the barbarians from Sicily. In Platos second letter the author clearly understands the events in Sicily as connected with Hellas a whole. He states that under his authority he would have improved the situation in Syracuse a nd brought benefits to all the Greeks: (310c). Again in the third letter the author connects th e welfare of Syracuse and Greece, asserting that if Dionysius had recalled Dion he would have done well for both Syracuse and Greece: (317e). In accordance with Panhellenism, Plato clearly saw Sicily as a fundame ntal part of Hellas, intimately wrapped up in the welfare of the whole. 2 This view of the Greeks in Sici ly as part of the universal Greek ge/noj would naturally lead to the concept of the Cart haginians and other barb arians of Sicily as outsiders who must be repulsed. Not surprisingly, the epistles show that Plato has extended the Greek vs. barbarian theme of the mainland to his understa nding of the events in Sicily. The author accuses Dionysius of being unable to establis h loyal comrades in cities which had been destroyed by the non-Greeks (331e-332a). The tyrant should have rebu ilt these cities so that they would join him in the struggle against the barbarians: (332e). Plato expresse s the expectation that Dionysius would unite the Greeks cities into a He llenic alliance so that he might enslave 2 Plato states also that many mainland Greeks are ve ry concerned with Sicilian events (310d, 320d, 335d). This would explain the importance of the Sicilian tyrants as an icon of the Hellenic fight against barbarians.

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39 the Carthaginian enemies ( 333a), but is disapp ointed that just the opposite happened: Dionysius has paid tribute () to the barbarians. In the defense of Dion later in the seventh letter, Plato states that Dion would have done his utmost to free Sicily from barb arian influence by conquering and expelling them: , (336a). This passages shows that the author considered the removal of the Carthaginians from the island one of the primar y goals of the Greek rulers of Sicily. Plato also states that Di on would have done these things, had he come to power, thus implying that he considered Dionysiu s a failure in this respect. The idea that Dion would have liberated Syracuse from ty ranny and barbarians permeates the seventh letter, tacitly condemning the Dionysii for thei r un-Greek government and foreign policy. In the eighth letter these two threats to Greek freedom are paired again at the beginning of the letter: (353a). Plato here connects Dionysius with his pret ended anti-Carthaginia n policy, understanding that the origin of his tyranny was in the Punic Wars of 406-5. The author denounces Dionysius tyranny in Sicily, especially beca use Dionysius was either unwilling or unable to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicilian cities. Indeed, the letter shows great fear of the Carthaginian enemy and calls on all Greek s to oppose their actions in Sicily: , (353e). Plato no doubt seriously overestimates the Carthaginian threat, since th ey were not interested in embarking on a costly war to expel the Greeks completely fr om Sicily. After th e Athenian expedition

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40 Carthage felt threatened because Syracuse had emerged as a very powerful state, having repulsed the Athenian expediti on and brought most of Greek Si cily under its hegemony. The Carthaginians therefore pur sued a vigorous war against Sy racuse in order to curtail Syracuses increasing power which might have threatened Phoenician commercial supremacy. Yet, Carthage had maintained a lively trade with Greece and the complete subjugation of the Sicilian Gr eeks was probably never part of Carthaginian policy, for they desired only to continue their trade in Sic ily and not to dominate it militarily. This letter of Plato, then, shows a misunderstanding of Sicilian affairs and has generalized the threat of Carthage as that of a barbarian state seeking the dominance of Greek-speakers. The author has superimposed the doctrine of Panhellenism on Sicily and understood the events in terms of Greek vs. barbarian, t hough the actual situation in Sicily was very different. Another primary witness to mainland perceptions of Dionysius is Lysias Olympic speech which Dionysius of Halicarnassus partially quotes (Lys 33). Diodorus also attests this oration by Lysias at the Olympic games in 388, though he does not quote the speech, only stating that Lysias ur ged the Greeks not to admit Dionysius representatives (14.108.3). Like the Platonic epistles, Lysias depicts the Sicilian Greeks as intimately connected with Hellas as a whol e and also connects Dionys ius rule with the barbarian enemy. He states that many parts of Greece are under the c ontrol of barbarians and tyrants, certainly referring to Dionysius w ith the latter term and associating him with the Persian king: , (3). Lysias also specifically compares the fleet of Dionysius to the fleet of the king of Persia and seems to

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41 view them both as enemies to Greece (5). Again, he equates Dionysius and the Persian king in warning the Greeks to take action ag ainst the forces of both their enemies ( 8). He exhorts his li steners to remember th eir ancestors who fought against the barbarians and encourages them to do the same: , (6). The comparison of Dionysius and the Pers ian king has a parallel in the seventh epistle, where Plato juxtaposes Dionysius and Darius, depictin g them both in the role of the stereotypical tyrant whic h became a popular subject of fourth century literature (332a). Lysias also constantly pairs the th reat from Dionysius with that of the Persian king in the East and bemoans the subjugation of Greek cities to barbarians. Thus, both authors present the association of Dionysius with a barbarian ruler and grieve over the subjugation of Greek cities to barbarian rule. Perhaps Lysias, like Plato in the Epistles condemns Dionysius halfhearted efforts at the liberation of the Siceliots from the Carthaginian yoke. Lysias consistently mentions Dionysius in comparison with the barbarian enemy and treats him as if he hims elf were not Greek or at the very least a betrayer of Hellas. Isocrates, at first favorably disposed towards Dionysius ( Nic 23; Epistulae 1) and later antagonistic ( Paneg 126), 3 provides further evidence for the association of Dionysius and barbarians. In the Archedamus Isocrates praises Dionysius for his fortitude in fighting the Carthaginians, stating that he killed many thousands of 3 The change of Iscrates opinion may have been due to the gap between Dionysius propaganda and his actual policies. Dionysius would have been an attrac tive prospect to lead a Panhellenic crusade in the earlier part of his regime, when he was portraying himself as the champion of Greeks against Carthage, but when it became clear that the Carthaginians were si mply a means for the maintenance of his power, Panhellenic sympathizers no doubt took a decidedly more negative view of the tyrant.

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42 Carthaginians ( 45). Even this positive account of Dionysius shows that he was evaluated in relation to the slaying of barbarian enemies. Another passage from Philip reveals the associatio n of Dionysius and the Persian king once again, showing that both Di onysius and Cyrus rose from obscure birth to become rulers of entire regions (65-6). Also, Isocrates attacks the Spartans in the Panegyricus for razing Mantinea after they had signed a truce, seizing Cadmea, and besieging Olynthus and Phlius while they assisted enemies of Hellas: Amyntas, Dionysius, and the Persian king (126). The presence of Dionysius in the list of the wrongful alliances which the Spartans had c oncluded with barbarians indicates what Isocrates and others favora ble to his message thought a bout the Sicilian tyrant. These passages from mainland authors e xhibit the consequen ces of Panhellenic thought on Greeks perceptions of Sicilian ev ents. Although, as was argued in chapters 1-4, a consciousness of a specifically Greek id entity was much less developed in Sicily than in other parts of the Greek world, ne vertheless mainlanders tended to view the Siceliots actions in terms of the struggle between Greeks and barb arians. Therefore, Plato, Lysias, and Isocrates evaluated Dionysiu s based on his expulsion of the barbarians and unification of the Greeks of Sicily and s outhern Italy. His appa rent failure in both respects contributed substantially to the hos tile picture of the tyrant which has come down through the works of these authors.

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CHAPTER 7 BARBARIANS IN THE SOURCES The previous section has argued that th e contemporary literati on the mainland, especially Athenians, took a view of Sici lian affairs that reflected the Panhellenic sentiments which were gaining credence in Greece during the fourth century. The historical tradition concerning fourth century Sicily, shows some signs of emphasizing the same themes, that is, the continual portr ayal of the Greek-Carthaginian conflicts as the defining political event on the island. Though the evidence for the fragmentary histories is naturally quite sl ender, an examination of the primary fourth century writers and Diodorus Siculus provides some informa tion which suggests that these historical authors viewed the history of Sicily out of its context, overemphasizing the differences between Greeks and barbarians that were much weaker than supposed. Of the ten pre-Diodorean historians w ho wrote about Dionysius, six (Dionysius himself, Alcimus Siculus, Hermias of Methymna, Athanis of Syracuse, Polycritus of Mende, and Silenus of Caleacte) have left almost nothing by which their work might be appraised. 1 Only concerning Philistus, Ephor us, Theopompus, and Timaeus do we possess sufficient evidence to speculate on thei r writings and lives. Diodorus certainly made use of all these authors, but his primary source has remained a matter of speculation among scholars. Laqueur has argued that Di odorus relied mostly on Ephorus, while 1 For a summary of what is know about these authors, see Sanders (1987) 41 ff. 43

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44 Stroheker and Pearson reject this thesis and assert that Timaeus was his chief source. 2 Sanders disagrees that Diodorus main s ource was mostly hostile to Dionysius and instead proposes that Philistus monograph, is the foundation of Diodorus narrative. 3 However, the argument concerning whic h of these authors provided Diodorus with most of his Sicilian hist ory will become irrelevant to the present thesis, since all can be shown to have been exposed to and po ssibly influenced by Panhellenic doctrine and mainland conceptions of Sicilian affairs. Therefore, no matter which source Diodorus used for his history, we can be sure that he could have inheri ted the Greek vs. barbarian flavor from any of them. Philistus, a wealthy aristocrat who supported Dionysius regime from its inception, began composing his during Dionysius lifetim e. This historian was an inner member of Dionysiu s ruling circle, but his hist ory was probably not as proDionysius as some have supposed. Nepos states that Philistus was more of a friend to tyranny than to any pa rticular tyrant ( amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi Dion 3), thus marking him as a tyrannophile, not simply a lackey of Dionysius. 4 His history of Dionysius reign was probably more of a treatise on tyranny than a panegyric of Dionysius, as Sanders has points out, and theref ore could be expected to contain criticism of Dionysius. 5 Philistus was also exiled by Dionysius and may not have been recalled, 6 2 Laqueur (1937); Stroheker (1952); Pearson (1984). 3 Sanders (1981), (1987) 81-2. 4 Sanders (1987) 50-2; Pearson (1987) 24-5. 5 Sanders (1981) 399. 6 Diodorus states that Dionysius recalled Philistus shortly after his exile (15.7.3). Sanders (1987) believes that version of Plutarch ( Dion 11.4) and Nepos ( Dion 3.2), an exile which extended until the death of the tyrant, is more credible (44-6). Cf. Pearson (1987) 20-21.

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45 so the history of Dionysius rule could likel y have contained some material unflattering to the tyrant. Diodorus states that Philistus spent his ex ile in Thurii (15.7.4). If this is true, Philistus would have come into contact with an increased degree of Panhellenic sentiment while he continued to work on his history. The city of Thurii was actually a Panhellenic foundation with partic ipants from Sybaris and many other mainland cities (Diod. 12.10.45), while Athens claimed the leading role and therefore probably had the strongest connections with the Italian outpost. The co llaboration of many different Greek peoples in the foundation of Thurii may very well have left its mark on the inhabitants, who lived and worked together in a common Greek identity. Furthermore, if Philistus continued his work in Thurii, being part of the educated elite, he would have encountered Athenians and the writings of Athenians at the time when Panhellenism was its strongest. Thurii was essentially an Athenian colony and enj oyed connections with the mainland city by which the literati benefited. Even if Sanders is correct in argui ng that the story of Philistus exile in Thurii is erroneous and that he actually spent his exile in Epirus (Plut. De Exil. 605C), 7 the historian may well have had clos er contact with mainland literature and Panhellenism in Epirus, considering his residence in a mainland city. Though very little is known about Philistus, the sources do provide some evidence which suggests that Philistus was especially concerned with Dionys ius relations with Greeks and barbarians. Philistus political al liance with Dionysius brother, Leptines, may be the first indicator. Dionysius exiled Philistus because of a marriage alliance between the aristocrat and Leptines (Plut. Dion 11.4), since his marriage would have threatened the security of Dionysius family. That Leptines would attempt to associate 7 Sanders (1987) 44-6.

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46 himself with Philistus by family ties shows that they had developed a strong enough connection to attempt to oppose Dionysius will. Diodorus story of Leptines and Philistus parallel exile, stay at Thurii, and re turn also preserves the tradition of a political alliance between the two men, whether the account is true or invented. 8 Diodorus also states that the Italiots welcomed Leptines and Philistus, which may hint at the two Siceliots sympathies with the Gr eeks of southern Italy (15.7.4). The alliance between Leptines and Philistu s shows the historian in league with a strong pro-Italiot and enemy of Carthage. Leptines fought against the Carthaginians on numerous occasions and later became famous for his glorious death during Dionysius third war against Carthage (15.17). He also opposed Dionysius military actions against the Italiots and even interceded for an Italian Greek army against the barbarian Lucanians, shirking Dionysius express comman d, for which he was relieved of his post by Dionysius (14.102.1-3). Thus, the exile of both men at the beginning of Dionysius ventures into southern Italy may have been due to their opposition to Dionysius policies in pursuing war against his fellow Greeks. If Sanders is correct in arguing that Philistus was Diodorus chief source for Sicili an history during Dionysius rule, 9 then Diodorus narrative provides further confirmation of this idea. The account of the first and second wars against Carthage are extremely favor able to Dionysius, portraying him as the popular leader against the Carthaginians, wh ile the following accounts of his wars against Italian Greeks are very negative and include anec dotal stories, such as the Rhegians offer to Dionysius of the hand of the executione rs daughter (14.106.2-3) and Dionysius barbaric torture of Phyton and his son after the capture of Rhegium (14.112). Quite 8 Sanders (1987) 55-6. 9 Sanders (1981), (1987) 81-2.

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47 possibly Philistus backed Dionysius in 405 as a strong leader who opposed the Carthaginian invasion and s upported him in his subsequent campaigns against the Phoenician presence, but he began to critic ize Dionysius when he turned his war machine from Carthage to Italy and he thereafter included his anti-Carthaginian and pro-Greek sentiments in his writings. Ephorus, a native Italiot w ho has been widely considered the main source of Diodorus fourth century narrative, 10 also probably concerned hi mself with the interplay of Greeks and barbarians during Dionysiu s rule. He received his schooling under Isocrates, the foremost proponent of the Panhellenic movement, and according to Polybius was the first to compose a univ ersal history, connecti ng Greeks all over the world through his comprehensive approach ( 5.33.2). Ephorus has been shown to have a distinct pro-Athenian bias, which is significant considering that citys prominence in the development of Panhellenic thought. 11 His education, methodology of historical writing, and Athenian sympathies suggest that Ephrous would have been particularly predisposed to view history in the terms of Greeks vs. barbarians. In the case of Sicily, his repeated inflation of the numbers of non-Greek troops arrayed against the Si celiots (in comparison with Timaeus) may have been an attempt to stress the threat of the barbarians of the West and to connect Sicilian Greek victories over non-Greek s with the universal Greek experience. 12 Further, more negative angle on the contrast between Greeks and barbarians is apparent in his comparison of Dionysius II with the king of Persia (F 211). 10 Sacks (1990); Laqueur (1937). 11 Barber (1935). 12 Sanders (1987) 74.

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48 Theopompus, like Ephorus, flourished se veral decades afte r Dionysius death, when Panhellenism had taken hold on the mainland and Greeks had begun to view history in terms of Greeks and non-Greeks. He too was a pupil of Isocrates ( FGrH T 1, 5a), no doubt absorbing much of the great orators Panhellenic doctrine during his tutelage. Following Ephorus, Theopompus wrote a universal history which connected Greeks of the entire world within a singl e narrative and probably made the clear demarcation between Greeks and barbarians ( FGrH F 25) which was becoming the standard by his time. Though we know very little about both Ephorus and Theompompus, their association with Isocrates and position in late fourth century Greece speak for themselves ; they would have been quite conscious of the conflict between Greeks and barbarians and their histories no doubt reflected that. Whether they were hostile to Dionysius or fa vorable is a matter of debate, but it can be reasonably surmised that that they were c onscious of a demarcation between Greeks and barbarians and that their writings reflected this premise. The evidence for the last major pre-Diodor ean historian of Dionysius, Timaeus of Tauromenium, is more secure than the sour ces for the previous three. The son of Andromachus and an avid supporter of Ti moleon, Timaeus praised both Andromachus and Timoleon excessively, while in his histories he denounced the later tyrants of Sicily, Dionysius, Dionysius II, and Agathocles. Li ke Philistus, Ephorus, and Theompompus, Timaeus had a connection with the mainland, t hough he was a native of Sicily. He spent fifty years at Athens ( FGrH F 34) during which time he di d the bulk of his writing. In the course of his stay at Athens he cert ainly would have had access to other Sicilian historians with Panhellenic sentiments, most notably Philistus, from whom Timaeus drew

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49 most of his information about Dionyusius. 13 In fact, it is quite likely that Timaeus was more concerned with affairs of Greeks and ba rbarians on Sicily than any of the previous three Sicilian historians, since one of his ma in programs was to establish Sicily as the chief preserve of Hellas. Indeed, Timaeus received criticizing from Polybius for his extreme patriotism (12.26) and he probably ex aggerated the numbers of armies opposed to the Siceliots in order to show their achievement. 14 Timaeus also praised Gelon excessively, despite his dislike for tyrants, as part of his attempt to have Himera recognized as the Salamis or Plataea of the West and therefore to equate the struggle of the Sicilians against the Carthaginians with that of the mainland Greeks against the Persians (Polyb. 12.26). Timaeus desired to reveal a perpetual struggle between the Greeks and the Carthaginians in Sicily in order to demonstrate the Siceliots contribution to Hellenism in the West by keeping the Phoenician foe at bay. Other evidence suggests that Timaeus c ondemned Dionysius for his inability or unwillingness to subdue the Carthaginians during his own rule. Timaeus supplants Philistus version of a dream predicting Dionysius greatness with an ominous dream of a lady from Himera, who sees that Dionysius w ould play a part in the downfall of Greek Sicily (FGrH F 29). The choice of a Himeran is cer tainly significant, for it recalls the destruction of Himera by Hannibal and t hus the injurious expeditions of the Carthaginians through the Greek sphere of Sic ily. Timaeus suggests that the advent of Dionysius would bring to the Siceliots ruin and enslavement to the Carthaginians, echoing the sentiments of Theodorus speech in the narrative of Diodorus, which is 13 Sanders (1987) 81-2. 14 Pearson (1987) 43.

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50 certainly derived from Timaeus (14.65-69). Timaeus implied a similar idea in his account of Euripides birth and death. He equated Euripides with the greatest period of classical Greece, 15 stating that he was born on the da y the battle Salamis was fought and died on the day that Dionysius was born (FGrH F 105). Clearly the implication is that the day of Salamis, which was the eastern equivalent of Himera, brought freedom to the Greeks in both East and West from barbaria n enslavement, while Dionysius birth ended the great period of Greek freedom whic h had existed during Euripides life. The extant information concerning Philistus, Ephorus, Theopompus, and Timaeus suggests that these historians were conscious of Greek identi ty to a greater degree than the Sicilian Greeks and that they probably at tempted to portray conflict between Syracuse and Carthage in terms of the larger struggle between Greeks and barbarians. Consequently, these writers may also have de picted Dionysius as a very un-Greek ruler because of his unwillingness to subdue the barb arians. Diodorus narrative will show that his history of Dionysius times, the first fully extant account, demonstrates a tendency to exaggerate the ill will between Greeks and barb arians in Sicily. Probably drawing much of this theme from his primary sources (P hilistus, Ephorus, The opompus, and Timaeus), Diodorus portrays the Carthaginian wars and the ethnic conflict between Phoenician and Greek as a fundamental characte ristic of Sicilian history. When the Carthaginians reentered the Sicilian political s cene in 409 after a seventy year period of abstaining from inte rvention, Diodorus was prepared to describe their reemergence within the scope of th e perceived deep-seated animosity between Greeks and barbarians. Hannibal, who led th e expeditionary force against the Greeks, 15 Pearson (1987) 157.

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51 was of course a hater of Greeks by nature ( 16 13.43.6) bent on taking vengeance on the Siceliots for his grandfathers defeat. In this case the reader is surprised to find out that Hannibal in fact had Greeks in his army (13.57.3). In addition, Hannibal himself must have had at least some Greek blood in him, if he was truly descended from Hamilcar the half-Greek (Diod. 13.53.5; Herod. 7.165). Furthermore, Hannibal initially tried to avoid conflict with the Greek s, sending ambassadors to Syracuse to resolve the dispute and by Di odorus own admission tryi ng to stay away from conflict with the Syracusans (13.43.6). C ontrary to Diodorus implication, neither Hannibal nor the Carthaginians were interest ed in pursuing an ethnic war against the Greeks in Sicily or they would have alrea dy taken advantage of th e disunity and civil wars of the Greeks in the seventy years betw een the battle of Himera and the sack of Selinus. Carthage did not undertake the war in 409 because they wanted to destroy the Greek race or because Hannibal, their foremost citizen, had an obsessive desire to wipe out Hellenic influence on the island. Ca rthages trade hegemony on the island was threatened when Syracuse emerged as the dominant power after the Athenians expedition and Segesta, an Elymian ally of Carthage deep in the western sphere of Carthaginian influence, was under attack fr om the Greeks of Selinus. Therefore, Diodorus attribution of Hanniba ls hatred of Greeks as th e primary motivation for his Sicilian campaigns is probably due to the tend ency of later authors to portray historical events through the lenses of their own biases and does not reflect th e actual situation of the fourth century. Diodorus is always ready to include rh etorical passages on the hatred between Greeks and Carthaginians, making it seem as though the distinction between the two was 16 This word was probably an especially strong one, as it occurs in Diodorus only here.

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52 ancient and clear-cut. The na rrative frequently plunges into descriptions of butchery which were no doubt motivated by the false of the notion of intense hatred between Greeks and barbarians in late fifth and early fourth century Sicily. No where is this technique more apparent than in the descriptions of the sack ing of various Greek cities. When Hannibal took Selinus, Diodorus states: [] , , , [] , [] [] : (13.57.1-3, 5-6; 58.1). Diodorus describes the sack of Himera in similar terms: (13.62.3). After the Carthaginians murder of many of the remaining inhabitants of the city, Hannibal dragged the surv ivors outside the city walls and sacrificed them to the manes of Hamilcar: , (13.62.4). The inhabitants of Gela, having lear ned of the sack of Selinus, Himera, and Acragas, were quite aware of the Carthaginians savagery: , (13.111.4).

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53 In this way Diodorus describes the awful de struction of these cities as a result of the Carthaginians hatred for the Greeks. These stories, however, have more of the appearance of embellished folktale than recorded history. If the survivors of such terrible atrocities escaped to Italian Greek cities as Diodorus states (13.91.1), it seems unlikely that the Italiots would ally with Carthage against the Sicilian Greeks (15.15.2). The ruthless destruction of Himera would also make an alliance between the Carthaginians and the Himerans just a decade letter quite improbable (14.56.2). Diodorus certainly exaggerates the Carthaginians evil deeds in the sack of these Greek cities. The movement of populations and razing of cities actually had a parallel in earlier Sicilian history, as Gelon had destroyed three Greek cities and m oved numerous peoples from their lands. 17 Therefore, no ethnic hatred needs to be envisioned in Hannibals campaign in Sicily; his actions against Greek cities had a precedent with the most renowned of Sicilian tyrants. Diodorus narrative displays the same tende ncies of the mainland authors and the fragmentary historians to perceive Sicilian events in Panhellenic terms, portraying the war between Syracuse and Carthage as an et hnic conflict. However, the rhetorical passages which present the animosity between Greeks and Carthaginians are often at variance with information provided elsewhere in the text and are therefore suspect. Diodorus certainly attempted to represent Carthage as the Persia of the West, even in an alliance with the great king against the Greek race. 18 His view of the ethnic and cultural situation in Sicily is therefore tainted by his own thematic concerns since the notion that Carthaginians and Greeks in Si cily were naturally and point edly hostile to one another 17 Asheri (1988) 769-70. 18 Randall-MacIver (1970) 90.

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54 does not agree with the evidence which was presented in chapters 1-4. In fact Greek identity in fourth century Sicily was much less developed than on the mainland or during later periods of Sicilian history. The views of these authors result from superimposing Panhellenic doctrine on the essentially fragment ed and heterogeneous ethnic situation in Sicily.

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CHAPTER 8 THE HOSTILE TRADITION The situation in Sicily in the fourth century was very different from the perceptions of mainland authors and other historians. Chapters 1-4 attempted to demonstrate that ethnic identity in Sicily was quite weak and that a high degree of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism dominate d the political and social scene on the island. Chapters 5 and 6 showed that othe r Greek authors who were exposed to the doctrine of Panhellenism and the growing cons ciousness of Greeks in the East viewed the situation in Sicily as essentially domin ated by the conflict between Greeks and nonGreeks. Since all the authors who wrote about fourth century Sicily were influenced by their perception of history as a struggle between Greeks and barbarians, this view permeated the historiographi cal and anecdotal tradition. Dionysius, though certainly an outstanding ruler in many respects, appeared a very poor head of state when evaluated fo r his success in driving out the non-Greek inhabitants of Sicily. Other Greeks knew that he had clea rly portrayed himself as the defender of the Siceliots against Carthage (as had his associate Philistus) 1 and thus they found fault with him for being unwilling to fi nish the war against the Carthaginians and for at times postponing his campaigns to att ack his fellow Greeks. Dionysius clearly used the Carthaginian threat to maintain fear of the enemy among the Syracusan citizen body and to preserve his own power. His ap athy in fighting the barbarians surely frustrated Panhellenic theorists, who had on ce looked to him to lead the Panhellenic 1 Sanders (1987) 51-2. 55

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56 crusade against the barbarians. Therefore, Dionysius probably gained the reputation of being a barbarophile or at least an un-Gr eek ruler, which supplemented the hostile depiction of him as the st ereotypical paranoid tyrant. 2 Sicilian Greeks continued to have a much weaker sense of identity than the Greeks on the mainland. They still mingled with other ethnic groups throughout the island, trading and interacting with them. Dionysius, a nativ e Siceliot, probably did not understand the conflict between Syracuse and Ca rthage as an essent ially ethnic war, nor did the other inhabitants of Sicily. Dionysius portrayed himself as the defender of Syracuse against the Carthaginian state, not the Phoenician race, and did attempt to curtail its influence on the isla nd. However, he did not see th e Punic wars as a perpetual racial struggle for dominance of the isla nd as other mainland Greeks did. Thus, his actions reflect the policies of a monarch conc erned with the extension of his rule and maintenance of power, not a betrayer of Pa nhellenism, for such a concept had not fully developed in Sicily enough to decisive ly influence the political atmosphere. 2 For the hostile tradition see Stroheker (1958); Sanders (1979-80); Sanders (1987) ; Pearson (1987) 157-90; Caven (1990).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Asheri, D. 1988. Carthaginians and Gr eeks. In Lewis et al. (1988), 739-80. Aubet, M. E. 1993. The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies and Trade Cambridge. Barber, G. L. 1935. The Historian Ephorus Cambridge. Brown, T. S. 1958. Timaeus of Tauromenium Berkeley. Buchner, G. 1979. Early Orientalizing Aspect s of the Euboean Connection. In Ridgway and Ridgway (1979), 129-43. Caven, B. 1990. Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily New Haven. Coldstream, J. N. 1993. Mixed Marriages at the Frontiers of the Early Greek World. Oxford Journal of Archaeology 12: 89-107. Coleman, J. E. and Walz, C. A., eds. 1997. Greeks and Barbarians: Essays on the Interactions between Greeks and Non-Greeks in Antiquity and the Consequences for Eurocentrism Bethesda. Dunbabin, T. J. 1948. The Western Greeks: The History of Sicily and South Italy from the Foundation of the Greek Colonies to 480 B.C. Oxford. Finley, M. I. 1968. Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest New York. Gray, V. J. 1987 The Value of Diodorus Siculus for the Years 411-386 B.C. Hermes 115: 72-89. Hall, J. 1997. Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity Cambridge. ___. 2002. Hellenicity Chicago. ___. 2004. How Greek Were the Early Western Greeks. In Lomas (2004), 35-54. Harrison, T., ed. 2002. Greeks and Barbarians New York. Hodos, T. 1999. Intermarriage in the Western Greek Colonies. Oxford Journal of Archaeology 18: 61-78. 57

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Andrew Alwine was born in Sewanee, Tennessee, on September 16, 1982. In 2001 he graduated from Temple High School in Temple, Texas. He graduated from Baylor University in 2004 with a Bachelor of Arts in history and classics. He will receive his Master of Arts in classical philology from the Un iversity of Florida in 2006. 60


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Title: Greeks and Barbarians in Fifth and Fourth Century Sicily
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Copyright Date: 2008

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Title: Greeks and Barbarians in Fifth and Fourth Century Sicily
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

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GREEKS AND BARBARIANS
IN FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURY SICILY















By

ANDREW T. ALWINE


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSTIY OF FLORIDA


2006















ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank first of all my parents, my sister, and my family, who

provided me with the educational, moral, and religious background to succeed at this

level. I am also very grateful to Konstantinos Kapparis, Jim Marks, and Victoria Pagan

for their help and guidance. I would also like to express my appreciation to all the

teachers, colleagues, and friends who have been there for me on so many occasions.

Finally, I would like to thank my dear wife for supporting me throughout my life and

education.















TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S .......................................................................................... ii

ABSTRACT ................................................... iv

CHAPTERS

1 INTRODUCTION ........ ...... ........................... ................... 1

2 POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE .................................. .................................. 3

3 M ER CEN AR Y W A RFARE ....................... .......................... ..................................... 12

4 C O SM O P O L IT A N ISM ............................................................................................ 19

5 DIONYSIUS AND THE CARTHAGINIANS...................... .... ............... 28

6 THE VIEW FROM THE MAINLAND .................................................... ........ 36

7 BARBARIANS IN THE SOURCES ............................................................ 43

8 THE HOSTILE TRADITION .............. ......................................................... 55

B IBLIO G R A PH Y ........................ .. ........................ .. .... ........ ......... 57

BIO GRAPH ICAL SK ETCH .................................................. ............................ 60















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

GREEKS AND BARBARIANS
IN FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURY SICILY

By

Andrew T. Alwine

May 2006

Chair: Konstantinos Kapparis
Major Department: Classics

Ethnic interaction in Sicily has a long and rich history. Indigenous peoples saw

the arrival of immigrants from southern Italy, supposed refugees from Troy, Phoenician

settlers, and Greek colonists. By the fifth century mercenaries from Campagnia, Iberia,

Sardinia, and Libya had also settled on the island, contributing to the great blend of

ethnic and cultural groups which is certainly a hallmark of the Sicilian experience.

This thesis argues that Sicilian Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries, because of

a long history of intermarriage, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, lacked a strong

sense of Hellenic identity. Dionysius I was the first to attempt a unification of Greek

Sicily behind an anti-barbarian ideology, though only halfheartedly. Mainland writers

and historians, who were influenced by Panhellenic doctrine, viewed Sicilian affairs in

terms of the "Greek vs. barbarian" motif and evaluated Dionysius I on that basis. This

contributed substantially to the hostile historiographical and anecdotal tradition against

him.














CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Ethnic interaction on the island of Sicily has a rich and long history. Evidence

from the very beginnings of the historical period attests to the great mixture of peoples

and cultural groups which would became one of the dominant features of this region's

demographic makeup. Indigenous peoples saw the arrival of immigrants from southern

Italy, supposed refugees from Troy, Phoenician settlers, and Greek colonists. By the fifth

century mercenaries from Campagnia, Iberia, Sardinia, and Libya had also settled on the

island, sometimes founding their own settlements and sometimes being absorbed into one

of the many multicultural cities on the island. This blend of ethnic origins and interaction

between racial and cultural groups is certainly a hallmark of the Sicilian experience.

In this thesis I argue that Sicilian Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries, because

of a long history of intermarriage, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, lacked the

strong sense of Hellenic identity which began to form in the minds of mainland Greeks

after the Persian Wars and crystallized in the Athenians' Panhellenic doctrine of the

fourth century. Chapter 1 examines the political events in Sicily which reveal the

weakness of ethnic consciousness and concludes that, despite the biases of the literary

sources, there is no evidence that ethnic allegiance were primary motivations in the

decision-making processes of Sicilian states. Chapters 2 and 3 explore possible causes

behind this state of affairs. The second chapter argues that the predominance of

mercenary warfare from a relatively early time undermined ethnic perceptions, since it

tended to professionalize and depersonalize armed conflict. Chapter 3 investigates









evidence from archaeological and literary sources which supports the conclusion that

social life in Sicily was essentially multicultural and cosmopolitan, with no clear dividing

lines between ethnic groups. In Chapter 4 I look specifically at the rule ofDionysius I

and attempt to demonstrate that, while he portrayed himself as an anti-Carthaginian ruler

in order to maintain his power, he did not significantly change the multi-ethnic situation,

since Sicily continued to be an essentially cosmopolitan island with many different

intermingling peoples.

Chapters 5 and 6 consider other Greeks' perceptions of Dionysius and Sicilian

affairs. Chapter 5 argues that evidence from Plato, Lysias, and Isocrates shows that they

evaluated Dionysius based on his success in repelling the barbarian invaders of Sicily, the

Carthaginians. Because Dionysius failed in this respect, he was held in low esteem by

Panhellenic theorists in Hellas proper. In Chapter 6 I further suggest that the historians

who wrote about Dionysius were influenced by Panhellenic doctrine and, like

contemporary Athenians, viewed Sicilian history as dominated by the conflict between

Greeks and barbarians. These authors therefore assessed Dionysius' rule in accordance

with this "Greek vs. barbarian" motif. Chapter 7 offers some thoughts on the

consequences of this information and concludes that Dionysius' low reputation with

regard to the Panhellenic ideal of driving out the barbarian and uniting Greek cities

contributed substantially to the hostile historiographical and anecdotal tradition.














CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

The complexity of the political history of Sicily, like the situation in many of the

Greek colonies, stems largely from the extensive mixture of competing peoples in a

limited geographical area. On this island many cities of diverse and often mixed ethnic

descent existed alongside each other, trading, allying, and warring with each other.

Native Sicilians (the Sicani), early Italian immigrants (the Siceli), supposed refugees

from Troy (the Elymi), Carthaginians, and Greek colonists from Dorian and Ionian

origins interacted with each other on a daily basis, often inhabiting the same cities and

fighting in the same armies. Mercenaries from Greek Italy, Campagnia, Sardinia, Iberia,

and Libya who settled on the island or were granted territory in return for their services to

Sicilian potentates added to the great medley of cultural origins. It is not surprising, then,

that Sicilian history displays many twists and turns, shifting alliances, wars between

ethnically similar cities, and conflicts crossing ethnic boundaries. While cultural

identities certainly did exist in Sicily, no deep-seated ethnic conflict between Greeks and

non-Greeks emerges from the factual evidence for the fifth and early fourth century. In

fact, the political events indicate that in Sicily there was a distinct lack of ethnic

consciousness in the decision-making processes of the various states.

In the early fifth century, when many cities on the Greek mainland began to band

together against the common Persian foe, Sicily had no such experience which would

have aided the Sicilian Greeks in the formation of an ethnic consciousness. According to

Herodotus, when envoys from Hellas arrived at Syracuse and asked Gelon for aid against









the barbarian, the tyrant denied their request, despite their appeals to their common Greek

heritage: aou 5 6uv6pdi6 TE ydp iKEI\ JEY6A(cO Kai PoTp6 TOI Tfq 'EXhA6Oq OlK 6Aaxia-rn ~Tra

6PXovTi yE IKEAinq, poI0eE TE TOTOI AEUOEpouoI Tiv 'EM65a Kai oUVEAEUOepou. 6rAi pIJv ydp

YEvop&Ivrl naoa ri 'EMA6 XEiP JEy6Arl ouv6yETal (7.157.2). Gelon requested the command of

either the army or the navy, knowing that this was a demand unacceptable to the

Athenians and Spartans. Thus, he cleverly extricated himself from any obligation, for

when the emissaries refused, Gelon sent them away. Furthermore, the tyrant sent three

penteconters laden with gold to Delphi to bear tribute to the Persian king in the case of a

Greek defeat (7.163). Whether or not the speeches of Gelon and the envoys (if not the

entire embassy to Sicily) are Herodotus' invention,2 this story may preserve the mainland

Greeks' correct opinion that the Siceliots cared little for the troubles of Hellas proper.

Certainly Gelon was capable of sending aid to the Greek resistance, for he controlled the

greater part of the island and had become extremely wealthy (Diod. 11.26.1).

Afterwards, some Greeks, probably reacting to the mainland Greeks' negative evaluation

of his actions,3 excused Gelon for his absence from the Persian Wars by asserting that he

had been forced to reserve his resources in Sicily for the fight against the Carthaginians at

Himera (Herod. 7.165.1). However, the battle of Himera was originally between Theron

of Acragas and the Punic-Greek force under Hamilcar. Gelon, who was apparently still

at Syracuse when the fighting began, arrived only later when Theron was in danger of

defeat (Diod. 11.20.5).


1 Asheri (1988) 772.

2 Treves (1941) argues that Herodotus has taken parts of the speeches from the embassy to Gelon from a
funeral speech of Pericles and suspects that the whole mission is fictional. Ahseri (1988) finds "no reason
to reject Herodotus' story" (772).

3 Asheri (1988) 772.









Despite later comparisons with the Persian Wars, the conflicts between the

Deinomenids and the Carthaginians in Sicily did not foster the idea of the barbarian

outsider who must be resisted by true Greeks, as the Persian resistance did on the

mainland.4 Though comparisons of the victory at Himera over the Carthaginians to the

battle for Greek independence at Plataea were naturally made (Pind. Py. 1.72-80; Diod.

11.23; Herod. 166.1), this war was as much an intra-Greek struggle as a war between

opposing ethnicities vying for control of the island. Herodotus states that the

Carthaginian army had come at the behest of Terillus, the tyrant of Himera, who had been

driven from his homeland. Terillus had obtained friendship (xEivinv) with Hamilcar, the

Carthaginian general, and the support of Anaxilaus, who was tyrant of Rhegium, an

Ionian city always at odds with the Dorians in Sicily. Furthermore, Hamilcar was a

product of one of the many mixed marriages between Greeks and foreigners, for he was

half-Carthaginian and half-Syracusan (7.165). Hamilcar had also obtained an alliance

with another Greek city, Selinus, making the forces opposing Theron and Gelon truly a

coalition of Greeks and Phoenicians, initiated by a Greek leader (Terillus), not a Punic

expeditionary force bent on the subjugation of the Greek cites of Sicily (Diod. 11.21.5).6

After the defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera, Gelon concluded a peace very

favorable to the Carthaginians (Diod. 11.26.1). In this instance the victor was not


4 Hall (2002) 172-189.

5 Hall (21114) 41.

6 Diodorus differs from Herodotus in this account, stating that the Persians had contracted an alliance with
the Carthaginians to crush the Greeks in the East and West (11.1). This, however, does not provide a firm
reason to discount Herodotus' version, for Diodorus has been shown to be prone to careless and insensitive
abbreviation and simplification (Gray [1987]). Diodorus was also predisposed to view Carthage as the
perpetual enemy of the Greeks (see below, Chapter 6) and may have been influenced by the traditional
association between the Carthaginian conflict and the Persian wars (Pind. Py. 1.72-80; Diod. 11.23; Herod.
166.1) and the tradition that the battle of Himera occurred on the same day as Thermopylae (Diod. 11.24.1)
or Salamis (Herod. 7.166).









vindictive or demanding; Diodorus praises Gelon for his clemency, even to the

Carthaginians, whom Diodorus calls his worst enemies (noAEPIaTT-yrcv, 11.26.1). Thus,

these events reveal no deep-seated animosity towards the Carthaginians, for the conflict

began as an intra-Greek conflict and the Carthaginians were simply the most powerful

contingent of a Greek-Punic alliance. For many Greeks, especially on the mainland,

Gelon's crushing defeat of the Carthaginian-led army at Himera in 480 proved a fitting

western parallel to the Greek defeat of the barbarian enemy in the East. In fact, however,

the "Carthaginian" War was a dispute between several states with opposing political

interests, not an ethnic conflict.

If Diodorus' portrayal of the Carthaginians as the perpetual enemies of the Greeks

were correct, the Siceliots might have been expected to follow up their grand victory in

480 by liberating the island from Phoenician influence. If ever the Siceliots had

opportunity to rid the island of the Carthaginians, it was when Gelon had united most of

the Greek cities in Sicily under his rule and had defeated the Carthaginian army.

Nevertheless, neither Gelon nor his successors ever undertook a campaign against the

Phoenicians in the West. Even after the overthrow of the Deinomenids in 466/5, the

democracy would have been better equipped for eliminating the Punic presence, since

Carthage may have been suffering from internal discord due to revolts against the power

of the Magonids, severely hampering their ability to deal decisively in the colonies.7

However, the next seventy years appear to have been free from conflict with the

Carthaginians. The Syracusans undertook campaigns against Catana (Diod. 11.76.3),

Ducetius and the Siceli (11.91-2), Acragas (12.8), and Leontini (12.53-5) and continued

to expand their influence, but they never resumed a war with the Carthaginians.

7 Sanders (1988).









Hermocrates' advice to the Syracusans in 416 to seek an alliance with the Carthaginians

shows that he considered the non-Sicilian Greeks more of a threat than the Phoenicians in

the West (Thuc. 6.34.2).

The Carthaginians must have also pursued a laissez-faire policy in Sicily, for

when Syracuse went through a period of considerable civil strife (Diod. 11.73), Carthage

made no move to detach Syracusan dependencies or to strengthen their presence on the

island. The Punic empire during this period had secured numerous resources: gold from

Guinea, silver from Spain, and tin from Galicia, which led to a thriving bronze industry.8

After 460 Carthage had gained considerable wealth and power from its trade in the

western Mediterranean and was afforded several opportunities for revenge by the Greeks'

internal difficulties, including the revolt of Ducetius which lasted throughout the 450s,

and the wars with Acragas (12.8) and Leontini (12.53-5). The Carthaginians also refused

to join Athens against Syracuse in 415 (Thuc. 6.88.6), although the Athenians had

already landed a very large army in Sicily. Had the Carthaginians been active in the

western half of the island while the Athenians besieged Syracuse, they certainly would

have made significant gains in territory and possibly effected the downfall of Syracuse,

which would have been deprived of its Greek allies on the island while facing two of the

most powerful states in the Mediterranean. Of course, Carthage may have feared

Athenian presence on the island more than Syracuse's in 415, but their reluctance in 409

to go to war with Syracuse even when it had become the preeminent Sicilian power

reveals a distinct distaste for intervention in Greek affairs on the island (Diod. 13.43.5).9



8 Piccard (1968) 100.

9 Piccard (1968) 101.









Following the failure of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, Carthage

began to take a more active part in Sicilian affairs once again. However, as in the time of

Gelon, there is no evidence that the Carthaginian campaign was motivated by ethnic

hatred of the Greeks. Diodorus reports that the Segestans, when Athens deserted them,

could not make peace with Selinus and therefore appealed to Carthage for help (Diod.

13.43). The Carthaginians at first balked at undertaking a war which would potentially

bring them into conflict with Syracuse, but were persuaded by Hannibal, their foremost

citizen (npcoTE6ovroq, 13.43.5). Hannibal, the grandson of the Hamilcar who had been

defeated at Himera, had his own motives for invading Sicily, as he himself later

demonstrated when he tortured and slaughtered 3000 Greeks as a sacrifice to the spirit of

his grandfather on the battlefield at Himera and then razed the city (13.62.4). Therefore,

Carthage entered the war under the influence of a suffete with a personal vendetta and,

after many years of peace, only began hostilities at the request of a largely Hellenized

Elymian city.10 The Phoenician-Greek conflict that began in 409 may have had the

appearance of an ethnic conflict between Carthaginians and Greeks, but the underlying

motives belie this simplification of the events.

Even with the emergence of a real Carthaginian threat to the Siceliots, the

political situation in Greek Sicily at this time continued to be very divisive. Dionysius,

who took tyrannical power at Syracuse in 405, immediately encountered defections of

Greek cities to the Carthaginian side (Diod. 14.41.1) and faced the prospect of an alliance

between Carthage and the Chalcidian and Ionian cities to the North. His fear of this

coalition against Syracuse was real enough to induce him to cede to Messena a large


10 By the fifth century Segesta, along with the other main Elymi cities (Eryx and Entella), were thoroughly
Hellenized. See Asheri (1988) 741-2.









portion of territory, to seek a marriage alliance from Rhegium, and to promise to help the

Rhegians expand their territory (14.44.4). Dionysius had not worried foolishly, since in

383 Carthage finally did secure an alliance with the Italian Greeks against Dionysius of

Syracuse (15.15.2).

Dionysius' concern that these Greek cities would join with Carthage seems

exceedingly ill-founded if we are to believe the stories that Diodorus reports about the

sacking of Greek cities.11 Diodorus states that when the Carthaginian army took Selinus,

frKpWoTrpiqaov &E Kai TOUq VEKpou0 KaTC T6 n6Tplov 9Oq, Kai TiVq piv XETpaq 6dp6aq neplicpEpov

TOTS ocpaool, TIVEq & KE(paA dq 1ni TCOV Yaioov Kai TOV oauvicov dvanEipovTEq Eqcppov. [...]

TOOCOUTO Ydp C )6TrITI 5IE(PEpov oi p6ppapol TOv fAAov (13.57.3, 5). Likewise, when

Hamilcar entered Acragas, oXE56v dnavraq TOUq tyKaTaOAElcpOtVTa 6vETAEv (13.90.1).

Diodorus also reports that when the news of the sack of Acragas spread many Greeks left

Sicily and transferred their families and possessions to Italy (13.91.1). If the

Carthaginians had acted in such barbaric fashion and many Greeks had fled to Italy,

certainly the Italian Greeks who had received refugees would have been unlikely to

undertake an alliance with the Carthaginians. Since the Italian Greeks did join Carthage

against Dionysius of Syracuse (15.15.2), Diodorus' stories about the cruelty and hatred of

the Phoenicians should be received with skepticism. 12

It is more likely that the Carthaginians had a reputation in Sicily for even-handed

dealings and fair administration. Testaments to this are the defection of several Greek

cities from Dionysius' control to Carthage (14.41.1) and the loyalty with which the Greek


11 The destruction of cities and removal of whole populations was not a new atrocity committed by the
Carthaginians; Gelon had already destroyed three Greek cities and moved multiple peoples from their
habitations, thus anticipating the first Carthaginian acts of this kind in 409 (Asheri [1988] 769-70).
12 See below, Chapter 6.









citizens of Motya withstood the siege of Syracuse, even in the absence of a Carthaginian

army or leader (14.53.4). Hence, when Theodorus speaks against Dionysius, he

advocates dependency on the Carthaginians rather than subservience to the tyrant:

KapXqr6viol piv y6p, KaV noAJ(pP KpaTriocol, cp6pov 6cpicTvov Aap6dvrEq OUK 6V pidt EKcAuoav

TOTS naTpiolq v6polq SIOIKETV TIrV n6Aiv (Diod. 14.65.2). In fact, some later authors did not

consider the Carthaginians barbaric. Eratosthenes, the third century Alexandrian

librarian, suggested that the Greeks should consider non-Greeks according to their merits,

for some barbarians are admirable in their administrations, as Strabo reports: P3ATIOV ETvaI

cproiv 6peTfi Kai KaKig 5ialpETv TaiTa. noAAo6u ydp Kai TOV 'EAArv ov EivaI KaKOUC Kai TCOV

papp6pcov d6cTE(ou, Ka06nEp 'Iv(ouL; Kai Aplavouc, TI ~i 'P(pojaou; Kai KapXnroviou;, oiUTC

OauJpaoTrC noAITEuoptVOUS (1.4.9). The Carthaginian constitution was the only non-Greek

government which Aristotle considered in his study (Pol. 1272b24-1273b25) and

Isocrates also praised Carthage as one of the best governed states in the world (Tou;

dplcrra T--V AAWco noAITEuopjvouq, Nic. 24). Cicero also lauded the Carthaginians' system

of administration (De Rep. 1.3).

Thus, the evidence from the political history of Sicily does not point to any deep

divisions between Greeks and barbarians, despite Diodorus' attempts to portray Carthage

as the perpetual enemy of the Sicilian Greeks. The changing alliances crossing ethnic

lines, extended periods of peace, the desertion of Greek cities to the Carthaginian side,

and the fact that the Greek-Carthaginian conflicts began at the instigation of other Greek

or Hellenized cities indicate that the political situation in Sicily in the fourth and fifth

century was divided and capricious, but not primarily ethnically defined. Certainly Greek

identity was present in Sicily to some degree, but states in Sicily generally made political







11


decisions based on their own interests rather than an allegiance to their ethnic or cultural

group.














CHAPTER 3
MERCENARY WARFARE

The absence of clear ethnic dividing lines in the political makeup of the Sicilian

states may have in part resulted from the predominance of mercenary warfare from a

relatively early date. Many different peoples from all over the Mediterranean fought for

hire on the sides of both the Carthaginians and Sicilian Greeks: Italiots, Siceli, Sicani,

Elymi, Sardinians, Campanians, Iberians, Libyans, and even mainland Greeks. The great

diversity in armies composed primarily of foreign soldiers tended to professionalize and

depersonalize conflict in Sicily. Just as Demosthenes worried that the Athenians' heavy

dependence on hired soldiers had resulted in citizens' apathy (Philippic 1), the prevalence

of mercenary warfare in Sicily could have led to the distancing of the common citizen

from the war and the perception of the enemy. The contingent of citizens in a Greek

army would usually have been small compared to the numbers of mercenaries and would

rarely have encountered Phoenician soldiers, who were infrequently committed to battle.

Therefore, the Carthaginian threat should have been much less tangible than if the battles

had been drawn along these ethnic lines. Warfare in Sicily in the fifth and early fourth

centuries demonstrates that both Carthaginians and Greeks predominantly employed

armies consisting of many different ethnic groups and that many mercenary groups

changed sides, further obscuring ethnic boundaries. Because of the great diversity among

the soldiers on both sides, armed conflict in Sicily probably contributed much less to

cultural divergence than warfare in Hellas proper, where citizen armies of the fifth

century fought against the Persians and other outsiders.









The Carthaginians only rarely committed citizens or even Phoenician soldiers to

combat; instead they relied heavily on foreigners to fight for them. The wealth which

their trading empire had brought them allowed the Carthaginians to hire great armies for

their campaigns. Diodorus mentions particularly the mines in Iberia which yielded

enough gold to bring numerous soldiers into their pay early in the development of their

western Mediterranean thalassocracy (5.28.2-3). Before each major campaign in Sicily

the Carthaginian government or the general who oversaw the expeditionary force traveled

far and wide to recruit mercenaries for the war. When the Carthaginians first decided to

aid Segesta after the withdrawal of Athens, they did not send a Phoenician army, but

gathered the Libyan and Campanian mercenaries who had been hired by the Chalcidians

in support of Athens and sent them to Segesta's aid (13.44.1). Subsequently, Diodorus

refers to this army as "the Carthaginians" (TCov Kapxnqoviov, 13.44.4), though he has

already given the numbers of Libyans and Campanians in the army and omitted any

reference to Carthaginian presence. Diodorus' readiness to call a group of mercenary

recruits under Carthage's aegis, "Carthaginians," warns us to be wary of Diodorus'

terminology. When he uses the term "Carthaginian" of an army, he designates only

Carthaginian leadership and does not indicate the ethnic makeup of the troops. Hannibal

joined the mercenary group later, bringing with him many (noAAou, 13.44.6) Iberians,

Libyans from every city (X 6n6rcqq n6AEoq), and not a few (o0K 6Al ouq) Carthaginians

citizens. The Carthaginian contingent with Hannibal was probably quite small compared

to the combined force of Libyans and Campanians already employed in Sicily and his

new recruits from Iberia and Libya, but no doubt Hannibal knew that it was necessary to

keep a body of loyal soldiers who would check the common fickleness of mercenaries.

1 Miller (1984) 157.









Given their habitual absence from battle, this was probably the citizen soldiers' chief

purpose.

Again in 396 the Carthaginians summoned as many of their allies as possible and

sent Himilcon along with mercenaries from Libya and Iberia to invade the Greek cities.

The numbers of mercenaries gathered are not believable (300,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry,

four-hundred war ships, and six-hundred other ships and engines of war, as Ephorus

states them; 100,000 troops from Libya and 30,000 enrolled in Sicily, according to

Timaeus), but they do indicate that Ephorus and Timaeus were aware of how heavily

Carthage depended on hired soldiers (Diod. 14.54.5). In 392 the Carthaginians, probably

running low on their supply mercenary recruits, supplemented their Libyan forces with

Sardinians and native Italians. Notably, mention of citizens enrolled in this army is once

again absent from Diodorus' account (14.95.1).

Carthage's difficulty in putting down the Libyan revolt following Himilcon's

disastrous campaign also shows its heavy reliance on foreign warriors. The

Carthaginians apparently put up little resistance as the Libyans quickly occupied Tynes, a

city not far from Carthage. The Phoenicians retreated to the city of Carthage and

remained there, supplied by sea from Sardinia, to outlast the rebels. Eventually, the

manifest futility of the siege, the lack of any obvious leader, and a shortage of provisions

brought the Libyans into discontent and a good number of them succumbed to bribery by

the Carthaginians. In this manner the Carthaginians did put down the rebellion, but they

never dared to fight the insurgents. As in their military affairs in Sicily, gold from the

wealthy trading city proved a better weapon than a citizen army recruited from merchants

and sailors (14.77).









Plutarch, in the account of Timoleon's conflict with Carthage, states that the

Carthaginians lost 3000 citizens, the most that had ever fallen in a battle. When the

propensity of ancient sources to exaggerate the casualties of the opposing army is taken

into account, this figure is a very small number in view of all Carthage's military activity

in its colonies and dependencies and it indicates how infrequently the Carthaginians were

willing to commit their citizens to battle.2 This passage from Plutarch confirms the

tendency of the Carthaginians to rely heavily on their mercenary armies and to avoid

using their own troops in battle. Contingents of citizen soldiers probably served the

purpose of overseeing the foreigners more often than they took part in the fighting

themselves.

The Siceliots likewise made frequent use of mercenaries when engaged in large

wars such as the conflicts with the Carthaginians. In 406 the Sicilian Greeks enlisted the

services of the Campanians whom the Carthaginians had employed on their previous

expedition and subsequently discarded after their withdrawal (13.85.4). The Acragantini

also hired Sicilian Greeks, who deserted along with the Campanians when the situation

began to look desperate (13.88.5). So too did Dionysius make use of mercenaries

frequently, both for fighting the enemy outside the walls of Syracuse and maintaining his

own power within. Indeed, the two mainstays of Dionysius' tyranny were his fortress on

Ortygia and his mercenary armies. He led an army of mercenaries against the

Carthaginians at Gela in 405 and then returned to the city while the Syracusan cavalry

went ahead of him. When the Syracusan citizens revolted against him at the instigation

of the knights who had returned beforehand, Dionysius forced his mercenary army to

cover 400 states in a day and take the city by surprise (13.109-113). This was not the

2 Warmington (1964) 123.









only time Dionysius had to rely on his hired soldiers to regain his rule. The next year a

group of Syracusan soldiers revolted against Dionysius again, even calling on the cavalry

who had taken refuge at Aetna to join in the rebellion. Dionysius was shut up in his

palace in a seemingly hopeless situation, but he was able to sneak out to the mainland and

entice some Campanian mercenaries with the prospect of a great deal of gold, thereafter

winning his tyranny back with the swords of foreigners (14.8-9).

Dionysius was acutely aware of his dependence on his mercenaries and was quick

to dispose of potentially troublesome groups. Thus, during Himilco's seige of Syracuse

he gave the order to a particularly bothersome band of mercenaries to attack while he

withdrew his cavalry, leaving the mercenaries to be slaughtered (14.72.2-3). Later, when

he suspected that his hired soldiers were becoming hostile towards him, he arrested their

leader and dismissed the troops, only to recruit other mercenaries immediately

afterwards. Dionysius had to maintain the loyalty of his mercenaries; they were his elite

troops3 and constituted his bodyguard. Dionysius even received criticism in later times

for his dependence on foreign soldiers. Plutarch says that Dion had warned Dionysius

that a good rule was formed on goodwill with the people and not his huge bodyguard of

foreigners (papp6pWv pupiavcpov cpuAaKIv, Dion 10.4). Likewise, in Diodorus' most anti-

Dionysian section Theodorus delivers a speech against the tyrant asserting, T6O S T V

pioOocp6pov nAijOoq ni 5ouAEig TCOV lupaKOicCov iOpoiaral (14.65.3). Theodorus later

accuses Dionysius of giving the citizens' arms to barbarians and foreigners (papp6pouq Kai

vouq, 14.66.5). However, the practice of hiring large groups of foreign soldiers was not

uncommon before Dionysius, nor after him, for even Dion, the pupil of Plato and


3 The notice at Diod. 14.52.5 that an Italian Greek (Archylus of Thurii) led the elite troops of Dionysius
indicates that at least in this instance he relied on foreigners for this part of his army.









supposed liberator of Syracuse, found himself fighting against the Syracusan citizens

with a hired army (Plutarch, Dion, 22).

The changing allegiance of mercenary armies further contributed to the

breakdown of ethnic demarcations in warfare. Mercenary armies in Sicily, just as other

groups of hired soldiers, tended to offer their services to the highest bidder. After

Athens' withdrawal from Sicily, Carthage found no reason to recruit soldiers from the far

reaches of their colonies; they simply rehired the soldiers who had been in the employ of

the Chalcidian cities of Sicily (13.44). After the successful campaign in 409 in which

Hannibal sacked Selinus and Himera, the Carthaginians left their Campanian mercenaries

in Sicily, as they retired to Carthage for the winter (13.62.5-6). As the Carthaginians had

suspected, when they returned to Sicily in 406, they met with the same Campanian

mercenaries, disgruntled at what they considered unfair treatment and now in the service

of the Greeks. Despite forcing the Campanians into the arms of the enemy, Carthage

would eventually reclaim their allegiance at the siege of Acragas. Though the

Phoenicians' own mercenaries had at first threatened to leave when their provisions were

slow in coming, Hamilcar was able to capture a Syracusan provision fleet and quiet the

discontent. Then, as Acragas' position became extremely precarious, the Campanians on

Acragas' side deserted to the Carthaginians (13.88.2-5).

The Siceli are another good example of a group who switched sides frequently.

Hannibal, having taken Selinus, received into his army a number of Siceli and Sicani,

whom Diodorus insinuates were natural enemies of the Sicilian Greeks (13.59.6).

However, Dionysius, after he had sacked Motya, left a garrison composed mostly of

Siceli in charge of this strategically and morally significant city (14.53.5); clearly he had









some reason to trust them. The Siceli, unmoved by Dionysius' faith in them, soon

revolted against him and went back over to the Carthaginians when it became expedient

for them to do so (14.58.1).

The prevalence of mercenary armies in Sicily and the frequent changes of

allegiance led to a great permeability in the ethnic boundaries between battling forces.

The Carthaginians only rarely committed citizens to battle, relying heavily on

mercenaries, while the Greeks also enlisted the aid of foreigners in order to match the

numbers of their opponents. In battle no doubt only a small portion of the fighting was

between Greek and Carthaginian and foreigners who fought on both sides played the

greater role in the actual hostilities.

The situation in Sicily was completely unlike that in mainland Greece during the

fifth century, where citizen armies met the Persian foe and brought back their war stories

which stimulated fear of and disdain for the Eastern army. In Sicily the Carthaginian

threat must have been much less visible, since the borders between the sides were so fluid

and warfare was predominantly a professional affair. The fluctuation of alliances

confused ethnic demarcations and contributed to the depersonalization of warfare. No

"us vs. them" mentality every developed and Greek citizens rarely came face-to-face with

their actual enemy, the Carthaginians.














CHAPTER 4
COSMOPOLITANISM

The lack of ethnic demarcations in the political realm of Sicily no doubt stemmed

from a long history of cultural mixing. Evidence from the early Greek colonial period to

the fourth century supports the conclusion that Greeks mingled with the non-Greek

inhabitants of Sicily and blurred ethnic and cultural lines. Archaeological records and

primary sources attest to intermarriage, bilingualism, cultural sharing, trade connections,

and personal interactions between Greeks and barbarians. The great degree of race-

mixture that took place in Sicily explains the divisiveness of the political situation

discussed above and provides some reasons for the lack of strong ethnic and cultural

identities in Sicily. Through the time of Dionysius, the dominant feature of the cultural

scene in Sicily was cosmopolitanism.

One of the primary means for cultural intermixing seems to have been mixed

marriages. Although the archaeological record in the West is highly debated, some

information from the primary sources indicates that intermarriage did in fact take place in

Sicily. As to the nature of the earliest colonial activities, scholars have mostly rejected

the idea that the omission of reference in ancient sources to women in these ventures

provides solid evidence for their absence in earlier colonial foundations.1 However,

intermarriage certainly was being practiced in Sicily as early as the fifth century, for

Thucydides implies that residents of Selinus and Segesta married from the same groups

of women when he states that one of the reasons for the conflict between these two cities

1 Hall k2 "14) 40.









was about marriage rights (nEpi TE yapIKOV TIV@V, 6.2.2). Carthaginians, even in the most

upper strata of society, also married among the Greeks, for Hamilcar, one of the two

Carthaginian suffetes, was in fact half-Greek (Herod. 7.165). Even if one does give

credence to story in Herodotus, the instance does at least show that such a union was not

unthinkable.

Archaeology has shed some light on the cultural mingling between Greeks and

barbarians in the West, but many recent scholars have highlighted the obstacles to using

the archaeological record in determining ethnicity.2 Previously, several scholars

interpreted the great number of Italic fibulae found at Pithekoussai as an indication of

widespread mixed marriages in Western Greek colonies.3 The fibulae showed no

similarity to those at Euboea or anywhere in Greece, but very closely resembled the ones

found at Villanovan sites in Etruria, particularly Veii. The native Italian items unearthed

were mostly for women, so Buchner concluded, "most, if not all, of the colonists' women

were not Greeks but natives."4 However, Hodos rejected this interpretation of the

material evidence and stated that trade with the native inhabitants, not intermarriage, was

the more likely cause of widespread Italic items.5 Other scholars have likewise rejected

the argument that these fibulae can prove intermarriage between Greeks and indigenous

peoples. However, at the very least these archaeological finds do imply a high level of

cultural interaction between Western Greek colonists and non-Greek peoples.




2 Jones (1997); Hall (1997), (2002).

3 Buchner (1979); Coldstream (1993).

4 Buchner (1979) 135.

5 Hodos (1999).









Moreover, other archaeological evidence does suggest that intermarriage was

practiced in Western Greece at a much earlier date than the fifth century, as the primary

sources attest. In a recent article on Western Greek identity, Jonathan Hall offers several

pieces of firm evidence for cultural interaction and possibly intermarriage and

bilingualism. Some seventh-century artifacts from Etruria contain the names Rutile

Hipukrates and Larth Telikles, which probably resulted from marriages between Greeks

and Etruscans. In Sicily a sixth century amphora found at Montagna di Marzo attests the

names Tamura and Eurumakes in a non-Greek inscription and a curse-tablet of the same

time records the name Pratomekes. These names apparently derived from Greek names

(OapOpaq, EOp6paxoq, FlpaTO6axog), but notably lack the aspiration from the Greek letters

theta and chi. Ancient grammarians noticed the absence of aspiration in native Sicilian

dialects (Greg. Cor. De Dialecto dorica 151) and modem study of non-Greek Sicilian

inscriptions has not produced any instances of the letters theta, phi, or chi. As Hall notes,

these Sicilianized Greek names could point to the results of intermarriage between

Greeks and native Sicilians.6

The use of Greek names in native Sicilian contexts also suggests a bilingual

environment. Such an atmosphere would have aided the well documented spread of the

Greek alphabet to the Siceli, Sicani, and Elymi. Natives of the West obtained their

scripts from a variety of Greek cities; the Chalcidian script, the script of Gela, and the

script of Selinus are all attested in non-Greek areas. Also, the ending -emi which appears

in Elymi inscriptions may have been borrowed from the Greek Eipi. Interestingly,

lamblichus records a story stating that Pythagoras ordered his Greek followers to speak


6 Hall I'"' 4) 40-1.









Greek, thus implying that many Greeks in the area were speaking a native language or at

least a hybrid language which employed words and phrases from both Greek and native

tongues (Vit. Pyth. 34.241).7 In fact, several native places names, words concerning

weights and measures, foods, and domestic objects did make their way into the Sicilian

Greek dialect.8 The possible prevalence of bilingualism and the use of native elements in

the Greek language is especially important for the study of Greek identity in the West,

since it complicates the idea that the Greeks primarily defined themselves based on their

common language.9

Trinity Jackman has recently provided further evidence for the cultural diversity

of Sicily by illustrating the fragmentary nature of the Sicilian political experience.

Through analysis of the burial material at three sites throughout Italy, she concludes that

Sicilian Greeks "were much more interested in defining themselves in reference to a

much smaller group" than the Greeks of the Aegean region.10 The disconnected nature of

Greek settlements in Sicily and the high number of native artifacts found alongside

Hellenic ones suggests a high level of cultural interaction and possibly intermarriage.

She also states that non-Greek indigenous centers often became a part of Greek

settlements and continued their traditions through the fifth century, thus maintaining a

hybrid identity with the Greek colonists. Admittedly, it is very difficult to employ

archaeology to reconstruct ethnicity. However, the fluidity of the colonial experience in

Sicily attested by the material record and the fragmentary concept of political identity


7 Hall (2'"'14) 41-3.

SAsheri (1988) 747-8.

9 Hall (2k. 14) 43.

10 Jackman (2005) 1.









strongly suggest that Sicilian Greeks were particularly inclined to maintain relations with

non-Greek inhabitants; political communities were locally defined and their ties to

broader identities were weaker, while interaction with other inhabitants of the island was

common.

The sources also attest the presence of Greeks and Carthaginians in each other's

armies and cities, which would have encouraged bilingualism and cultural

communication between the two peoples. In 409 Hannibal, depicted by Diodorus as a

crude barbarian and a natural hater of the Greeks (Kai (cpQEI poiAAnv, 13.43.6), actually

had Greeks serving in his army (13.57.3). Moreover, at the siege of Motya the inhabitant

Greeks fought with the Carthaginians against Dionysius in a desperate struggle. That the

Greeks of Motya remained faithful to the Carthaginians is all the more remarkable in

view of that fact that Dionysius controlled the entire island except for five cities

(Halicyae, Solus, Aegesta, Panormus, and Entella, 14.48.4) and that Himilco had already

withdrawn the main Carthaginian force from Sicily (14.50.4). The outlook for Motya

was indeed bleak and Carthage was unable to dispatch an army in time to save the city,

yet the Greeks of Motya were loyal to the Phoenicians to the bitter end, eventually

meriting crucifixion for their efforts (14.53.4).

Just as a number of Greeks had taken up residence in Motya, in the heart of the

Carthaginians' sphere of influence on the western end of the island, some Carthaginians

made their homes in Syracuse on the eastern side. These Phoenicians were evidently

numerous and wealthy members of society: OUK 6Alyoi yap TOV KapXnrovikv OKOUV EV TaiO

lupaKoOoalq 6d5pdq EXOVTE KTFCTEIC, noMoi ~i KOi TCOV tpn6pcov EiXov Ev T)p Alptvl Tdq vaiO

yEpOUoaq (popTiWo, (14.46.1). The presence of Carthaginians in Syracuse and other Greek

cities should come as no surprise, since Carthage was essentially a timocracy and was









always ready to establish trading connections in foreign cities. The emphasis on trade

and wealth which dominated Carthaginian politics no doubt provided the impetus for

merchants to establish themselves in the wealthiest Greek city in Sicily. In fact, Diodorus

implies that Phoenician traders had also made residence in many other Greek cities, since

after Dionysius' expulsion of the Phoenicians from Syracuse, the other Greek states (oi

Ahooi IIKEAIiTalI, 14.46.2) cast out the Phoenicians living among them (Touqr nap' auToTq

oiKOOVTra TOV ()OIViKOV).

The city of Carthage accommodated several Greeks within its walls. The plague

on the Carthaginian army thought to have been caused by Himilco's sacrilege against the

temples of Demeter and Core (14.63.1) caused the citizens of Carthage to choose the

most prominent (XaplEcrr6Touq) Greeks and to appoint them as priests to Demeter and

Core, serving the goddesses according to Greek rituals (14.77.5). The presence of Greeks

in Carthage probably satisfied the city's trading interests, as they provided direct links to

Western Greek cities. Carthage was in the habit of importing a great deal of Greek goods

even in the fourth century and must have had a lively trade with other Greek states;

Diodorus supplies at least one example: Acragas' trading relations with Carthage,

13.81.4. Greeks and Greek culture must have been quite prevalent in the city to warrant

an edict from the Carthaginians forbidding Greek literacy, though the date of this law has

been disputed (Justin 20.5.13).

Archaeology has confirmed the cosmopolitan nature of Phoenician cities in Sicily.

Carthage's three main outposts on the island, Motya, Panormus, and Soloeis, all provide

examples of cultural sharing and non-native inhabitants. In Motya archaeologists have

found numerous Proto-Corinthian and Corinthian pots, a Doric capital, and archaic Greek









inscriptions, along with Attic black-figure and red-figure vases. This evidence led David

Asheri to postulate that half of the city's population was Greek.11 In Panormus a Punic

cemetery near Corso Calatafimi which archaeologists began excavating in 1953 has

revealed material of mixed Phoenician and Greek origin. In Soloeis two sarcophagi

which resemble eastern Phoenician sarcophagi and have two female figures with Greek

traits, one wearing a Doric chiton, have been found.12 The blend of Greek and eastern

elements in pottery is also well documented in both Sicily and Carthage itself. 13

The literary sources supplement the general picture of cosmopolitanism in Sicily

by providing several specific instances of Greeks and Carthaginians who had personal

connections or sympathies with the other side. Herodotus says that Hamilcar, a person of

considerable political weight in Carthage, in addition to being half-Greek, had friendship

(XEIvinv) with Terillus of Himera (7.165). The connection was strong enough that Terillus

was able to prevail upon Hamilcar to persuade Carthage to aid him in 480 against Gelon.

Even if the authenticity of Herodotus' Sicilian narrative in Book 7 is suspect, the story at

least demonstrates that such a friendship was not unthinkable in Herodotus' time.

Diodorus offers an example of a Greek who had favored the Carthaginians at the expense

of his Greek allegiance: when Hannibal sacked Selinus, he released Empedion along

with his kinsmen, d6i ydp TI KapXnSovkov rv nE(ppovQlKwq Kai npb Tr noAlopKiaq TOTD noA-Taic

GUlp3EIouAEuK6( pIr noAEpETv KapXnSoviouq (13.59.3). Not only does this story show that

prominent Greeks with Carthaginian sympathies could live unmolested even in cities at




1 Asheri (1988) 743-4.
12 Asheri (1988) 744-5.

13 Asheri (1988) 746; Piccard (1968) 110.









war with the Carthaginians, but it also implies that Carthaginians were in communication

with the Greek cities, since Hannibal knew that Empedion had always favored Carthage.

During his tyranny Dionysius tried to rouse anger against the Carthaginians,14 but

interpersonal relationships between Greeks and Carthaginians continued even after his

time. Dion had carried on some of Dionysius' embassies with Carthage for many years

and had evidently gained many friends. Having been exiled from Sicily, he later returned

from Athens, intending to overthrow Dionysius II. Dion's fleet encountered a heavy

storm and was forced to land near Minoa in a region controlled by the Carthaginians.

Fortunately for Dion, the expedition happened to come to anchor in a region under the

control of Synalus, a guest friend (voq ) KOi cpioqS, Plutarch Dion 25.12) of Dion's,

whom he had no doubt met when he was carrying on diplomatic relations at Carthage.

Synalus entertained and supplied Dion and his troops and allowed them to leave their

baggage with the Carthaginians while Dion made his expedition to Syracuse. Thus,

Dion, the student of Plato who had spent several years at Athens when Panhellenism had

begun to foster the "Greek vs. barbarian" motif, never forsook his personal relationships

with barbarians and he found his connections most useful during his time in the West.

The evidence from both literary and archaeological sources for ethnic interaction

in Sicily certainly supplements the picture of the political atmosphere as essentially

diverse and divided. As Jackman argues, identity in Sicily as revealed by burial sites was

very fragmented and localized in nature.15 In conjunction with other evidence which

suggests an interracial and bilingual environment, Jackman's findings provide more

support for a largely cosmopolitan atmosphere in Sicily, with no sharply defined ethnic

14 See below Chapter 4.

15 Jackman (2005).






27


boundaries. Greeks, native Sicilians, Carthaginians, and many other peoples lived side-

by-side in cities throughout the Greek, Carthaginian, Siceli, Sicani, and Elymi spheres on

the island. As the next chapter will show, this diversity was to be threatened by

Dionysius' anti-Carthaginian campaign, yet the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Sicily would

endure through his reign.














CHAPTER 5
DIONYSIUS AND THE CARTHAGINIANS

The growing tide of Panhellenism from the mainland probably began to influence

the Siceliots in the late fifth and early fourth century, by the cosmopolitan atmosphere in

Sicily continued well into the fourth century. Nevertheless, ethnic perceptions began to

change significantly after the fall of the Syracusan democracy and the rise of Dionysius.

Diodorus may be criticized for his misleading portrayal of hostility between Greeks and

Carthaginians and depiction of the Carthaginians as the perpetual enemy of Greece in

Sicily, but the information he provides on Dionysius' attempts to foment fear of the

Carthaginians may be generally accepted. In the face of severe opposition to his rule

from neighboring Greek cities, indigenous inhabitants, and the Syracusan citizens

themselves, Dionysius needed an enemy to take the focus off his own autocratic regime.

He found this rival in Carthage and was at pains to increase the Greeks' fear of the

Phoenicians. This chapter will consider why Dionysius would have profited from dislike

of the Carthaginians and why the Greeks were disposed to fear and hate Carthage in 406

more than ever before. It will then consider Dionysius' actions intended to create this

fear and finally evaluate the success of his anti-Carthaginian policy.

One fact that probably encouraged Dionysius to set himself as the anti-

Carthaginian tyrant was that he began his political career and became the ruler of

Syracuse based on his role in the Carthaginian conflicts of 406. Dionysius grew up as a

relatively insignificant private citizen and made no appearance on the political scene of

Syracuse until his sudden rise in 405. He first became a character of importance during









the attack of Acragas and Gela, when the Carthaginians were relentlessly marching

towards Syracuse. In this Carthaginian campaign Dionysius, having already

distinguished himself in fighting the Carthaginians (Diod. 13.92.1), came to the fore as a

political player and eventually secured his own tyranny in Syracuse.

During the confusion and clamor that followed the sack of Acragas, Dionysius

made an appearance in the assembly to accuse the Syracusan generals of betraying the

city and accepting bribes from the Carthaginians (13.91.3). At this point the fears of the

citizens of Syracuse were no doubt great, since never before had they witnessed the

Carthaginians gain so many victories against Greek cities and march inexorably into the

eastern half of the island, which had been dominated by the Siceliots for so many years.

Here Dionysius saw his opportunity and played off the fears of the crowd in order to

assure his own position. This foundational period of Dionysius' career was very

significant for his later fame. Themistocles and Pausanias provide similar examples, as

both made their fame in the resistance to the Persian in 480-79 and were hailed by the

Greeks as instrumental parts of the defeat of the Mede. Likewise, Dionysius' reputation

and regime were founded on anti-Carthaginian concepts, since he had begun with a war

against Carthage. He therefore had the perfect opportunity from the beginning of his

career to establish himself as an anti-Carthaginian tyrant and to use the fear of the

Syracusans to stay in power.

Maintaining the facade of an anti-Carthaginian administration was also important

for Dionysius to transfer the citizens' focus from his own authoritarian government to the

Carthaginian threat. The Syracusan citizens adopted him to the same office as Gelon

(orpaT-ry6b atTOKpdTWp, 13.95.1) only in the most dire emergency of state and because of









the great fear of the Phoenician campaigning in Sicily. The Siceliots had probably never

faced a danger from the Carthaginians as real as that which followed the Athenian

expedition and certainly almost no one who had experienced the invasion of 480 was

alive to compare the situation in 409 and 406-5. The Carthaginians had pursued a

relatively laissez-faire policy in Sicily since the defeat at Himera in 480 and had stayed

out of Greek political affairs as much as possible. They had not been a threat to the

Greeks for a long time and their sudden reappearance on the Sicilian scene in 409 was no

doubt startling to most Sicilian Greeks. Hannibal invaded Sicily, quickly sacked Selinus,

and razed Himera, according to Diodorus sacrificing three-thousand Greeks to the shade

of his grandfather before returning to Carthage with his war booty. Hannibal began the

next wave of conquests with co-general Himilcar, continuing along the southern shore of

the island. They took Acragas and began to move on toward Gela, which was completely

unable to resist an army of the magnitude of the Carthaginian force. The quick

destruction of Selinus, Himera, and Acragas and the Phoenicians' penetration deep into

the Siceliot half of the island was so far unprecedented. At this time, when the

Syracusans could see the march of the enemy from the West along the coast from Selinus

to Acragas to Gela towards their own city, Dionysius was elected general.

The Syracusans, having experienced a long period of a relatively successful

democracy, were probably not so willing to throw away their constitutional government

and install an autocrat. Dionysius' tyranny was adopted in an extreme emergency of state

and was not an expression of the Syracusan citizens' desire to change their type of

government. Thus, Dionysius, having taken advantage of the state of war and secured his

tyranny, soon faced the discontent of the Syracusan citizen body, which became his most









significant obstacle in the first few years of his reign, and subsequently had to impose his

rule upon his fellow citizens. Even before the Carthaginian threat had withdrawn, the

tyrant faced internal opposition to his regime. Dionysius' Italian Greek mercenaries

deserted him after the battle at Gela, as did the Syracusan cavalry. These aristocrats rode

ahead of the main army and entered Syracuse, raped Dionysius' wife, and encouraged the

citizenry to revolt against him. Dionysius responded with a forced march to Syracuse,

catching the rebels off guard and slaying all his opponents (Diod. 13.112-113). After this

episode Dionysius, clearly understanding the hostility of many of the citizens, secured for

himself a personal bodyguard in the mold of Pisistratus of Athens. He then built a

massive fortress for himself on Ortygia (14.7.3) and created a fortification on Epipolae to

control the city (14.18). Creating a stronghold on the island proved to be a prudent move

for Dionysius, since soon afterwards his soldiers revolted against him and invited the

cavalry who had fled to Aetna following their revolt in 405 to join in the struggle against

the tyrant. Dionysius retreated to the safety of his fortress where he had time to plan

against the insurgents. He was finally able to reestablish his rule by hiring Campanian

mercenaries and advancing on the city unawares (14.8-9).

Thus, Dionysius faced considerable opposition from his own citizens, especially

in the early going of his regime. Just as he had made his start by exploiting the

Syracusans' fear of an outside enemy, he needed a common foe which would take the

citizens' focus off his own tyranny. Carthage was the obvious choice; it was certainly the

greatest threat to the Sicilian Greeks and Dionysius had made his reputation in fighting

the Carthaginians. Diodorus' account of Dionysius' actions in propagating hatred of the

Carthaginians is, therefore, believable, though elsewhere he may be justly censured for









exaggerating the hostile feeling between Greeks and Phoenicians. Dionysius had much

to gain from portraying the Carthaginians as the perpetual enemy of Syracuse.

Diodorus states that Dionysius began his second Punic war in 398 because he

noted that many Greek cities had deserted him and thought that a war against Carthage

would draw the Sicilian Greeks together under his rule (14.41.1). After his politically

motivated marriages to Doris of Locri and Aristomache of Syracuse,1 Dionysius gave a

speech, encouraging the Greeks to take a stand against the Carthaginians: dnocpaivcv

auTouq KaO6Aou pJV ToTi "EAArj(ov EXOPOTCTOUq 6v-raq, p6Aho-ra 5T ToTDq IKEAICaTOil 5id navT6q

tnipouAE6ovTra [...] dpa &S ouvio-ra SEiv6v ETvaI nEplopav Tad 'EAAqvi5aq n6AEiq In6 papp6ppov

KaTaO(5ou(AWpoEva, aq Eni TOOOUTOV GuvEnlAFlPJEOOGI TOV KIV(5UVWV, Ep' OOOV TIf tAEuOEpiaq

TuXETv nliupooiuiv (14.45.2, 4). After the meeting Dionysius ordered the citizens to expel

the Phoenicians who dwelt in Syracuse from the city and to plunder their property.

Following Syracuse's lead, other Sicilian Greek cities also drove out their Phoenician

inhabitants and took their property, which in some cities was evidently considerable, as

the Phoenicians had become wealthy through their trade connections (14.46.1-2). The

policy had immediate benefits for Dionysius, since Greek cities under Carthaginian rule

deserted to Dionysius or revolted against Punic rule soon after he declared war on

Carthage (14.46.3). Furthermore, as he made his march into the Western part of the

island, Dionysius received many reinforcements from Greek cities (14.47.5-6). After the

sack of Motya, Dionysius crucified Greeks who had fought on the side of the

Carthaginians, an Eastern punishment normally abhorrent to the Greeks. He thus clearly

demonstrated that he intended to be the sole leader of the Sicilian Greeks and that he


1 Dionysius took led the two maidens into matrimony simultaneously. He hoped that Doris would win him
an alliance with one of the foremost cities in southern Italy, while he took Aristomache in order to secure
his position in Syracuse.









considered those who fought for the Carthaginians traitors, putting them to death with an

appropriately Semitic punishment (14.53.4).2

Dionysius continued throughout his rule to stir up anti-Carthaginian feeling, going

to war with Carthage on numerous occasions and keeping the focus on the barbarian

outsider. He no doubt wanted to cast himself in the mold of Gelon, as a unifier of the

Greek cities in Sicily and also needed the presence of Carthage to provide his foil.

However, Dionysius never took the war with the Carthaginians to the next level,

expelling them from the island. Of course, in his expedition of 397 he penetrated deep

into the heart of the Phoenician sphere of the island, even sacking Motya and taking all

but a few of the western cities. But he certainly knew that the Carthaginians would not

stand idly by; they would send an expeditionary force which, once landed in Sicily,

would force him to make concessions. Under Himilco the Carthaginian army forced

Dionysius all the way back to the eastern shore to fight for the freedom of Syracuse itself.

Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, plague struck their camp and precipitated two

military defeats that wholly disheartened the army. Dionysius now had the Carthaginians

in an extremely vulnerable position. He negotiated with Himilco and accepted a sum of

three hundred talents, only allowing the Carthaginian citizen soldiers (ToqJ [...] noAITIKOUq,

14.75.2) to withdraw to Libya and forcing the mercenaries to stay behind, betrayed by

their employers. Despite Diodorus' censure of Dionysius for allowing the Carthaginians

off so easily, this was actually a shrewd and clever diplomatic move. The Carthaginian

army was weakened, but was not so devastated as to be at Dionysius' mercy. He could

not have been sure that another attack would meet with success, nor could he have dealt

2 Alexander the Great, also wanting to portray himself as the crusader for Hellas, imitated Dionysius after
the battle of the Granicus by sending all the Greeks who had fought for the Persians as slaves to Macedonia
(Hammond [1980] 76-7).









with the Carthaginians in unconditional terms. Furthermore, since the Carthaginians

generally sent few citizens along with their army, under the treaty only a small portion of

the force was able to withdraw, while the bulk of the army was left behind without

leadership, an easy target for Dionysius to annihilate. Also, since Himilco had manifestly

betrayed all his mercenaries and allies, these negotiations would hurt Carthage's

credibility in later wars and other soldiers would be more reluctant to join Carthage.3

Dionysius' ruse worked; he destroyed a large part of the mercenaries and took

many others into his service. Carthage's defeat and withdrawal also stimulated a revolt

among the Libyans, who were no doubt angry at Himilco's betrayal of their brethren.

This insurgence caused considerable alarm to the Carthaginian citizens, as the rebels

marched all the way to the gates of the city (14.77). Thus Dionysius had achieved a great

victory over the enemy while allowing them to continue to exist on the island. Dionysius

did indeed show that he had no desire to end the Carthaginian threat, for if Dionysius

intended to expel the Carthaginians from Sicily, this was the prime opportunity for the

Syracusans to finish the fight. Carthage's credibility on the island was mined, the

military forces had either been withdrawn, destroyed, or bought off by the Greeks, and

the city itself was being besieged by discontented Libyans. Yet, Dionysius used the

interlude to undertake a siege of Rhegium and extend his empire into Italy, fighting

against the Italian Greeks. Like Gelon and the other Deinomenids, Dionysius did not

show the desire to wipe the Carthaginian influence out of Sicily. Indeed, the complete

removal of the Carthaginian threat would have been against his own interests, since he

needed an external enemy to distract the people from disaffection with his own rule.


3 Caven (1990) 120-1.









In this examination of Dionysius' policy towards the Carthaginians it becomes

clear that Dionysius did succeed at least partially in uniting the Greeks against the

Phoenician threat. His portrayal of Carthage as the enemy of the Siceliots is especially

evident in the second of his Punic Wars. A testament to his creation of an anti-

Carthaginian sentiment among the Syracusans is the relative tranquility of his rule after

the Second Punic War. Though in the first few years of his reign Dionysius was forced to

fight his fellow citizens on several occasions, no significant civil discord after the second

war is recorded by Diodorus, who was always ready to point out the supposed hatred of

the citizens of Syracuse for the tyrant. However, Dionysius' policies probably did not

lead to a great Panhellenic feeling in Sicily comparable to the contemporary movement

that was taking place on the mainland. Though he no doubt had opportunities to

prosecute the war with Carthage to the point of their expulsion from the island, he never

took advantage, since he benefited from having the Carthaginian threat in the West as a

prop to his own tyrannical power. Dionysius' anti-Carthaginian rhetoric ultimately fell

flat, since he did not support his rhetoric and propaganda with his actions. Indeed, even

during the Second Punic War Himera and Cephaloedium allied with Carthage (14.56.2)

and after the war Carthage managed to bring the Italian Greek cities into a pact against

Dionysius (15.15). No doubt he successfully portrayed Carthage as the prime political

enemy to the Sicilian Greeks, but the Carthaginians did not become the decedent

barbarian enemies as the Persians had for the mainland Greeks. Sicily continued to be an

essentially cosmopolitan island with many different intermingling ethnicities.














CHAPTER 6
THE VIEW FROM THE MAINLAND

Dionysius may have successfully portrayed Carthage as the political enemy of the

Syracusan Greeks, but he could not change the ethnically heterogeneous situation in

Sicily. The island was still composed of a great plethora of different cultural groups and

no clear-cut differentiation between the Greek "race" and the barbarians or Carthaginians

emerged. However, Greeks on the mainland had begun to develop the doctrine of

Panhellenism in the late fifth and fourth centuries and consequently began to view Greek

history in those terms. The Athenian sources especially betray a view of Sicilian history

as defined by the struggle of Greek and Carthaginian, though this idea was a

simplification of the actual situation on the island.

The seeds of the Hellenic consciousness can be found in the writings of

Herodotus, whose often-quoted passage concerning the Athenian response to the Spartan

attempt to dissuade them from allying with Persia provides some of the earliest evidence

for Panhellenic thought:

noAA6 TE y6p Kai pEy6Aa tOTr Tid aKwoAuoVTa TaU0Ta plr noltEIv qrl' I~v
9tUAWH Ev, np@Ta Pi V Kai p TyIoTra TOV OEjv Tb dydApIaTa Kai TQ oiK riaTa
pnEnprloCTJva TE Kai OUyKEXooP~ va, TOTolI riacq 6vayKaio0f XEi TIJCOPEIV tq TO
p ycrra JdAAov nEp 6pJoAoy~Ei TCp TaiTa pyaoatJ vpq, aUTIq 5: T 'EAAFVrIKOV
t6v 6paipj6v TE Kai 6p6yAw)OOOV Kai OEjv i6pupaT6 TE KOIV6 Kai Ouoial i E6 TE
6p6Tpona, TOv npo56Taq yEvEoTaI Aqrvaiou; OUK 6V Elj Xoi (8.144.2).

As Hall states, many scholars have considered this passage from Herodotus the definition

of Hellenic identity.1 Another indicator that Panhellenic doctrine goes back to the mid

fifth century is the summons of Pericles to all the Hellenes for the purpose of deciding

1 Hall (2002) 189-90.









what they should do about the sanctuaries destroyed by the Persians, to offer sacrifices

and to make peace among the Greeks (Plut. Pericles 17.1). However, Panhellenism

really crystallized in the minds of some of the literati in the late fifth and early fourth

centuries with the works of Gorgias, Lysias, and, most prominently, Isocrates.

During the reign of Dionysius mainland Greeks became even more acutely aware

of the contrasts between Greeks and barbarians, since after the end of the Peloponnesian

War the Spartans proved themselves betrayers of Hellas in the eyes of many. Sparta

immediately began ruling the Greek cities under its control with heavy hand and paid

home to the Persian king, eventually concluding the Peace of Antalcidas in 387. Thus,

Isocrates attacks the Spartans in the Panegyricus for razing Mantinea after they had

signed a truce, seizing Cadmea, and besieging Olynthus and Phlius while they assisted

enemies of Hellas: Amyntas, Dionysius, and the Persian king (126). The betrayal of

Sparta no doubt also reflected badly on Syracuse in view of their Dorian kinship and

alliance with Sparta. Hence, during Dionysius' rule (405-367) Panhellenism was coming

into its own on the continent, and the foremost Athenian proponents of this doctrine were

deeply conscious of the perceived Spartan treachery.

The influence of Panhellenism and anti-barbarian sentiment on the mainland

Greeks' perception of Sicilian affairs is evident in contemporary writings. The Platonic

Epistles addressed to the Sicilian rulers, a partially preserved speech of Lysias criticizing

Dionysius' Olympic entourage (33), and Isocrates' speeches reveal the impact of

Panhellenic thought on their viewpoints. They evidence the concept of definite

boundaries between Greeks and barbarians and the idea that Greeks are naturally enemies

of barbarians and should unite in the common cause against them. Thus, these sources









view the fundamental aspect of Sicilian politics as the perpetual conflict between Greek

and Carthaginian and therefore often arrive at a very negative picture of Dionysius, who

never undertook a crusade to oust the barbarians from Sicily.

In Plato's second letter the author clearly understands the events in Sicily as

connected with Hellas a whole. He states that under his authority he would have

improved the situation in Syracuse and brought benefits to all the Greeks: Ei yap ipXov

tyoo OiOT TG V TE MAAov Kai Goo Kai Aikovo, nAei co av v iTV TE ndalv 6yaO0 ToTq TE lMOI

"EMArolv (3 10c). Again in the third letter the author connects the welfare of Syracuse and

Greece, asserting that if Dionysius had recalled Dion he would have done well for both

Syracuse and Greece: iv Ei Ipoi T6TE EnEiOou, T6X' 6V PATIOV TGOV vOv YEYOV6TCOV ocXEV Kai ooi

Kai 'upaKOUoaIc Kai ToTiq Moic "EMAArov (317e). In accordance with Panhellenism, Plato

clearly saw Sicily as a fundamental part of Hellas, intimately wrapped up in the welfare

of the whole.2 This view of the Greeks in Sicily as part of the universal Greek ge/noj

would naturally lead to the concept of the Carthaginians and other barbarians of Sicily as

outsiders who must be repulsed.

Not surprisingly, the epistles show that Plato has extended the "Greek vs.

barbarian" theme of the mainland to his understanding of the events in Sicily. The author

accuses Dionysius of being unable to establish loyal comrades in cities which had been

destroyed by the non-Greeks (33le-332a). The tyrant should have rebuilt these cities so

that they would join him in the struggle against the barbarians: 6aTE alUTC TE oiKEiaO Kai

6MdAAalq EivaO np6q TCq TCOV papp6pov poqn0Laq (332e). Plato expresses the expectation that

Dionysius would unite the Greeks cities into a Hellenic alliance so that he might enslave


2 Plato states also that many mainland Greeks are very concerned with Sicilian events (310d, 320d, 335d).
This would explain the importance of the Sicilian tyrants as an icon of the Hellenic fight against barbarians.









the Carthaginian enemies (SouAcoaoeal KapXqr5oviouq, 333a), but is disappointed that just

the opposite happened: Dionysius has paid tribute (cp6pov) to the barbarians.

In the defense of Dion later in the seventh letter, Plato states that Dion would have

done his utmost to free Sicily from barbarian influence by conquering and expelling

them: naaav IIKEOav KaTOIKi EIV KIa tAEueOpav dn6 TCOV papp6pov noieTv, TOUq p v EK3P6AAWV,

TOUq ~i XEIPOUjPEVOq N(ov 'ltpcOvoq (336a). This passages shows that the author considered

the removal of the Carthaginians from the island one of the primary goals of the Greek

rulers of Sicily. Plato also states that Dion would have done these things, had he come to

power, thus implying that he considered Dionysius a failure in this respect. The idea that

Dion would have liberated Syracuse from tyranny and barbarians permeates the seventh

letter, tacitly condemning the Dionysii for their un-Greek government and foreign policy.

In the eighth letter these two threats to Greek freedom are paired again at the

beginning of the letter: T60' 6TE KiV5UVOq EyEVETO E9XaTOq IKEAhi Tfl TOV 'EAA!ivcv 6jn6

KapXrSoviov 6v6craTov 6Aqrv Kp3appapcoET1av yEvEoMal. TOTE yap E'IAovTO AIovuolov (353a).

Plato here connects Dionysius with his pretended anti-Carthaginian policy, understanding

that the origin of his tyranny was in the Punic Wars of 406-5. The author denounces

Dionysius' tyranny in Sicily, especially because Dionysius was either unwilling or unable

to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicilian cities. Indeed, the letter shows great fear of the

Carthaginian enemy and calls on all Greeks to oppose their actions in Sicily: iEI M5,

E6vnEp TCV EiK6TWOV yiyvrTOai TI Kai dnEUKTcV, oXE(oV Eiq EpqPiav Tfi 'EAA VIKfi (pWOVfilq IKEAiO

ndaa, (olviKCOV r 'OnlKV PJETapaAouoa Ei' TIVa 5uvaoTEiav Kai KpaTOq. TOUTCOV ai Xpi n6on

npoOupig n6vTaq TOU~q "EAArvaq TEJVEIV (cppJaKOv (353e). Plato no doubt seriously

overestimates the Carthaginian threat, since they were not interested in embarking on a

costly war to expel the Greeks completely from Sicily. After the Athenian expedition









Carthage felt threatened because Syracuse had emerged as a very powerful state, having

repulsed the Athenian expedition and brought most of Greek Sicily under its hegemony.

The Carthaginians therefore pursued a vigorous war against Syracuse in order to curtail

Syracuse's increasing power which might have threatened Phoenician commercial

supremacy. Yet, Carthage had maintained a lively trade with Greece and the complete

subjugation of the Sicilian Greeks was probably never part of Carthaginian policy, for

they desired only to continue their trade in Sicily and not to dominate it militarily. This

letter of Plato, then, shows a misunderstanding of Sicilian affairs and has generalized the

threat of Carthage as that of a barbarian state seeking the dominance of Greek-speakers.

The author has superimposed the doctrine of Panhellenism on Sicily and understood the

events in terms of "Greek vs. barbarian," though the actual situation in Sicily was very

different.

Another primary witness to mainland perceptions of Dionysius is Lysias'

Olympic speech which Dionysius of Halicamassus partially quotes (Lys. 33). Diodorus

also attests this oration by Lysias at the Olympic games in 388, though he does not quote

the speech, only stating that Lysias urged the Greeks not to admit Dionysius'

representatives (14.108.3). Like the Platonic epistles, Lysias depicts the Sicilian Greeks

as intimately connected with Hellas as a whole and also connects Dionysius' rule with the

barbarian enemy. He states that many parts of Greece are under the control of barbarians

and tyrants, certainly referring to Dionysius with the latter term and associating him with

the Persian king: oiTWOG aioxpjS 50aKEPlIvrlV TIjv 'EAA50a, Kai noAAbd pV auTf 6rVTa O n6 Trp

papp6dpc, noMAAdS ~ n6AElq; n6 Tup6waov vaooTTou; yEyEvrlpJvaq (3). Lysias also

specifically compares the fleet of Dionysius to the fleet of the king of Persia and seems to









view them both as enemies to Greece (5). Again, he equates Dionysius and the Persian

king in warning the Greeks to take action against the forces of both their enemies (ai

5uv6pEiC 6dppOT-pcov, 8). He exhorts his listeners to remember their ancestors who fought

against the barbarians and encourages them to do the same: npb6 TOUq npoy6vouq, oi TOUq

piv papp6pouq tnoiqroav Tfi 6AoTpiaq tniOupoOvTraq Tfq ocpETupaq aiuT@v c-.TEpEToaI, TOUq ~i

Tup6wouq EA6GOavTEc KOIVfrV dnaol TrIV tAEuGOpiav KaTEGTfoav (6).

The comparison of Dionysius and the Persian king has a parallel in the seventh

epistle, where Plato juxtaposes Dionysius and Darius, depicting them both in the role of

the stereotypical tyrant which became a popular subject of fourth century literature

(332a). Lysias also constantly pairs the threat from Dionysius with that of the Persian

king in the East and bemoans the subjugation of Greek cities to barbarians. Thus, both

authors present the association of Dionysius with a barbarian ruler and grieve over the

subjugation of Greek cities to barbarian rule. Perhaps Lysias, like Plato in the Epistles,

condemns Dionysius' halfhearted efforts at the liberation of the Siceliots from the

Carthaginian yoke. Lysias consistently mentions Dionysius in comparison with the

barbarian enemy and treats him as if he himself were not Greek or at the very least a

betrayer of Hellas.

Isocrates, at first favorably disposed towards Dionysius (Nic. 23; Epistulae 1) and

later antagonistic (Paneg. 126),3 provides further evidence for the association of

Dionysius and barbarians. In the Archedamus Isocrates praises Dionysius for his

fortitude in fighting the Carthaginians, stating that he killed many thousands of


3 The change of Iscrates' opinion may have been due to the gap between Dionysius' propaganda and his
actual policies. Dionysius would have been an attractive prospect to lead a Panhellenic crusade in the
earlier part of his regime, when he was portraying himself as the champion of Greeks against Carthage, but
when it became clear that the Carthaginians were simply a means for the maintenance of his power,
Panhellenic sympathizers no doubt took a decidedly more negative view of the tyrant.









Carthaginians (noAAd p&iv pupid6aq Kapxnrloviov S~cpOEIpEv, 45). Even this positive

account of Dionysius shows that he was evaluated in relation to the slaying of barbarian

enemies. Another passage from Philip reveals the association of Dionysius and the

Persian king once again, showing that both Dionysius and Cyrus rose from obscure birth

to become rulers of entire regions (65-6). Also, Isocrates attacks the Spartans in the

Panegyricus for razing Mantinea after they had signed a truce, seizing Cadmea, and

besieging Olynthus and Phlius while they assisted enemies of Hellas: Amyntas,

Dionysius, and the Persian king (126). The presence of Dionysius in the list of the

wrongful alliances which the Spartans had concluded with barbarians indicates what

Isocrates and others favorable to his message thought about the Sicilian tyrant.

These passages from mainland authors exhibit the consequences of Panhellenic

thought on Greeks' perceptions of Sicilian events. Although, as was argued in chapters

1-4, a consciousness of a specifically Greek identity was much less developed in Sicily

than in other parts of the Greek world, nevertheless mainlanders tended to view the

Siceliots' actions in terms of the struggle between Greeks and barbarians. Therefore,

Plato, Lysias, and Isocrates evaluated Dionysius based on his expulsion of the barbarians

and unification of the Greeks of Sicily and southern Italy. His apparent failure in both

respects contributed substantially to the hostile picture of the tyrant which has come

down through the works of these authors.














CHAPTER 7
BARBARIANS IN THE SOURCES

The previous section has argued that the contemporary literati on the mainland,

especially Athenians, took a view of Sicilian affairs that reflected the Panhellenic

sentiments which were gaining credence in Greece during the fourth century. The

historical tradition concerning fourth century Sicily, shows some signs of emphasizing

the same themes, that is, the continual portrayal of the Greek-Carthaginian conflicts as

the defining political event on the island. Though the evidence for the fragmentary

histories is naturally quite slender, an examination of the primary fourth century writers

and Diodorus Siculus provides some information which suggests that these historical

authors viewed the history of Sicily out of its context, overemphasizing the differences

between Greeks and barbarians that were much weaker than supposed.

Of the ten pre-Diodorean historians who wrote about Dionysius, six (Dionysius

himself, Alcimus Siculus, Hermias of Methymna, Athanis of Syracuse, Polycritus of

Mende, and Silenus of Caleacte) have left almost nothing by which their work might be

appraised.1 Only concerning Philistus, Ephorus, Theopompus, and Timaeus do we

possess sufficient evidence to speculate on their writings and lives. Diodorus certainly

made use of all these authors, but his primary source has remained a matter of speculation

among scholars. Laqueur has argued that Diodorus relied mostly on Ephorus, while





1 For a summary of what is know about these authors, see Sanders (1987) 41 ff.









Stroheker and Pearson reject this thesis and assert that Timaeus was his chief source.2

Sanders disagrees that Diodorus' main source was mostly hostile to Dionysius and

instead proposes that Philistus' monograph, nepi AIovuaCou, is the foundation of Diodorus'

narrative.3 However, the argument concerning which of these authors provided Diodorus

with most of his Sicilian history will become irrelevant to the present thesis, since all can

be shown to have been exposed to and possibly influenced by Panhellenic doctrine and

mainland conceptions of Sicilian affairs. Therefore, no matter which source Diodorus

used for his history, we can be sure that he could have inherited the "Greek vs. barbarian"

flavor from any of them.

Philistus, a wealthy aristocrat who supported Dionysius' regime from its

inception, began composing his nlpi Alovuaiou during Dionysius' lifetime. This historian

was an inner member of Dionysius' ruling circle, but his history was probably not as pro-

Dionysius as some have supposed. Nepos states that Philistus was more of a friend to

tyranny than to any particular tyrant (amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi, Dion

3), thus marking him as a tyrannophile, not simply a lackey of Dionysius.4 His history of

Dionysius' reign was probably more of a treatise on tyranny than a panegyric of

Dionysius, as Sanders has points out, and therefore could be expected to contain criticism

of Dionysius.5 Philistus was also exiled by Dionysius and may not have been recalled,6



2 Laqueur (1937); Stroheker (1952); Pearson (1984).

3 Sanders (1981), (1987) 81-2.

4 Sanders (1987) 50-2; Pearson (1987) 24-5.

5 Sanders (1981) 399.
6 Diodorus states that Dionysius recalled Philistus shortly after his exile (15.7.3). Sanders (1987) believes
that version of Plutarch (Dion 11.4) and Nepos (Dion 3.2), an exile which extended until the death of the
tyrant, is more credible (44-6). Cf. Pearson (1987) 20-21.









so the history of Dionysius' rule could likely have contained some material unflattering

to the tyrant.

Diodorus states that Philistus spent his exile in Thurii (15.7.4). If this is true,

Philistus would have come into contact with an increased degree of Panhellenic sentiment

while he continued to work on his history. The city of Thurii was actually a Panhellenic

foundation with participants from Sybaris and many other mainland cities (Diod. 12.10.4-

5), while Athens claimed the leading role and therefore probably had the strongest

connections with the Italian outpost. The collaboration of many different Greek peoples

in the foundation of Thurii may very well have left its mark on the inhabitants, who lived

and worked together in a common Greek identity. Furthermore, if Philistus continued his

work in Thurii, being part of the educated elite, he would have encountered Athenians

and the writings of Athenians at the time when Panhellenism was its strongest. Thurii

was essentially an Athenian colony and enjoyed connections with the mainland city by

which the literati benefited. Even if Sanders is correct in arguing that the story of

Philistus' exile in Thurii is erroneous and that he actually spent his exile in Epirus (Plut.

De Exil. 605C),7 the historian may well have had closer contact with mainland literature

and Panhellenism in Epirus, considering his residence in a mainland city.

Though very little is known about Philistus, the sources do provide some evidence

which suggests that Philistus was especially concerned with Dionysius' relations with

Greeks and barbarians. Philistus' political alliance with Dionysius' brother, Leptines,

may be the first indicator. Dionysius exiled Philistus because of a marriage alliance

between the aristocrat and Leptines (Plut. Dion 11.4), since his marriage would have

threatened the security of Dionysius' family. That Leptines would attempt to associate

7 Sanders (1987) 44-6.









himself with Philistus by family ties shows that they had developed a strong enough

connection to attempt to oppose Dionysius' will. Diodorus' story of Leptines' and

Philistus' parallel exile, stay at Thurii, and return also preserves the tradition of a political

alliance between the two men, whether the account is true or invented.8 Diodorus also

states that the Italiots welcomed Leptines and Philistus, which may hint at the two

Siceliots' sympathies with the Greeks of southern Italy (15.7.4).

The alliance between Leptines and Philistus shows the historian in league with a

strong pro-Italiot and enemy of Carthage. Leptines fought against the Carthaginians on

numerous occasions and later became famous for his glorious death during Dionysius'

third war against Carthage (15.17). He also opposed Dionysius' military actions against

the Italiots and even interceded for an Italian Greek army against the barbarian

Lucanians, shirking Dionysius' express command, for which he was relieved of his post

by Dionysius (14.102.1-3). Thus, the exile of both men at the beginning of Dionysius'

ventures into southern Italy may have been due to their opposition to Dionysius' policies

in pursuing war against his fellow Greeks. If Sanders is correct in arguing that Philistus

was Diodorus' chief source for Sicilian history during Dionysius' rule,9 then Diodorus'

narrative provides further confirmation of this idea. The account of the first and second

wars against Carthage are extremely favorable to Dionysius, portraying him as the

popular leader against the Carthaginians, while the following accounts of his wars against

Italian Greeks are very negative and include anecdotal stories, such as the Rhegians' offer

to Dionysius of the hand of the executioner's daughter (14.106.2-3) and Dionysius'

barbaric torture of Phyton and his son after the capture of Rhegium (14.112). Quite

8 Sanders (1987) 55-6.

9 Sanders (1981), (1987) 81-2.









possibly Philistus backed Dionysius in 405 as a strong leader who opposed the

Carthaginian invasion and supported him in his subsequent campaigns against the

Phoenician presence, but he began to criticize Dionysius when he turned his war machine

from Carthage to Italy and he thereafter included his anti-Carthaginian and pro-Greek

sentiments in his writings.

Ephorus, a native Italiot who has been widely considered the main source of

Diodorus' fourth century narrative,10 also probably concerned himself with the interplay

of Greeks and barbarians during Dionysius' rule. He received his schooling under

Isocrates, the foremost proponent of the Panhellenic movement, and according to

Polybius was the first to compose a universal history, connecting Greeks all over the

world through his comprehensive approach (5.33.2). Ephorus has been shown to have a

distinct pro-Athenian bias, which is significant considering that city's prominence in the

development of Panhellenic thought.11 His education, methodology of historical writing,

and Athenian sympathies suggest that Ephrous would have been particularly predisposed

to view history in the terms of "Greeks vs. barbarians." In the case of Sicily, his repeated

inflation of the numbers of non-Greek troops arrayed against the Siceliots (in comparison

with Timaeus') may have been an attempt to stress the threat of the barbarians of the

West and to connect Sicilian Greek victories over non-Greeks with the universal Greek

experience. 12 Further, more negative angle on the contrast between Greeks and

barbarians is apparent in his comparison of Dionysius II with the king of Persia (F 211).




10 Sacks (1990); Laqueur (1937).

11 Barber (1935).
12 Sanders (1987) 74.









Theopompus, like Ephorus, flourished several decades after Dionysius' death,

when Panhellenism had taken hold on the mainland and Greeks had begun to view

history in terms of Greeks and non-Greeks. He too was a pupil of Isocrates (FGrH T 1,

5a), no doubt absorbing much of the great orator's Panhellenic doctrine during his

tutelage. Following Ephorus, Theopompus wrote a universal history which connected

Greeks of the entire world within a single narrative and probably made the clear

demarcation between Greeks and barbarians (Tdq TE TOV 'EAAMrVov Kai papp6pov npdEiq,

FGrH F 25) which was becoming the standard by his time. Though we know very little

about both Ephorus and Theompompus, their association with Isocrates and position in

late fourth century Greece speak for themselves; they would have been quite conscious of

the conflict between Greeks and barbarians and their histories no doubt reflected that.

Whether they were hostile to Dionysius or favorable is a matter of debate, but it can be

reasonably surmised that that they were conscious of a demarcation between Greeks and

barbarians and that their writings reflected this premise.

The evidence for the last major pre-Diodorean historian of Dionysius, Timaeus of

Tauromenium, is more secure than the sources for the previous three. The son of

Andromachus and an avid supporter of Timoleon, Timaeus praised both Andromachus

and Timoleon excessively, while in his histories he denounced the later tyrants of Sicily,

Dionysius, Dionysius II, and Agathocles. Like Philistus, Ephorus, and Theompompus,

Timaeus had a connection with the mainland, though he was a native of Sicily. He spent

fifty years at Athens (FGrHF 34) during which time he did the bulk of his writing. In

the course of his stay at Athens he certainly would have had access to other Sicilian

historians with Panhellenic sentiments, most notably Philistus, from whom Timaeus drew









most of his information about Dionyusius.13 In fact, it is quite likely that Timaeus was

more concerned with affairs of Greeks and barbarians on Sicily than any of the previous

three Sicilian historians, since one of his main programs was to establish Sicily as the

chief preserve of Hellas. Indeed, Timaeus received criticizing from Polybius for his

extreme patriotism (12.26) and he probably exaggerated the numbers of armies opposed

to the Siceliots in order to show their achievement.14 Timaeus also praised Gelon

excessively, despite his dislike for tyrants, as part of his attempt to have Himera

recognized as the Salamis or Plataea of the West and therefore to equate the struggle of

the Sicilians against the Carthaginians with that of the mainland Greeks against the

Persians (Polyb. 12.26). Timaeus desired to reveal a perpetual struggle between the

Greeks and the Carthaginians in Sicily in order to demonstrate the Siceliots' contribution

to Hellenism in the West by keeping the Phoenician foe at bay.

Other evidence suggests that Timaeus condemned Dionysius for his inability or

unwillingness to subdue the Carthaginians during his own rule. Timaeus supplants

Philistus' version of a dream predicting Dionysius' greatness with an ominous dream of a

lady from Himera, who sees that Dionysius would play a part in the downfall of Greek

Sicily (FGrH F 29). The choice of a Himeran is certainly significant, for it recalls the

destruction of Himera by Hannibal and thus the injurious expeditions of the

Carthaginians through the Greek sphere of Sicily. Timaeus suggests that the advent of

Dionysius would bring to the Siceliots ruin and enslavement to the Carthaginians,

echoing the sentiments of Theodorus' speech in the narrative of Diodorus, which is



13 Sanders (1987) 81-2.
14 Pearson (1987) 43.









certainly derived from Timaeus (14.65-69). Timaeus implied a similar idea in his

account of Euripides' birth and death. He equated Euripides with the greatest period of

classical Greece,15 stating that he was born on the day the battle Salamis was fought and

died on the day that Dionysius was born (FGrHF 105). Clearly the implication is that

the day of Salamis, which was the eastern equivalent of Himera, brought freedom to the

Greeks in both East and West from barbarian enslavement, while Dionysius' birth ended

the great period of Greek freedom which had existed during Euripides' life.

The extant information concerning Philistus, Ephorus, Theopompus, and Timaeus

suggests that these historians were conscious of Greek identity to a greater degree than

the Sicilian Greeks and that they probably attempted to portray conflict between Syracuse

and Carthage in terms of the larger struggle between Greeks and barbarians.

Consequently, these writers may also have depicted Dionysius as a very un-Greek ruler

because of his unwillingness to subdue the barbarians. Diodorus' narrative will show that

his history of Dionysius' times, the first fully extant account, demonstrates a tendency to

exaggerate the ill will between Greeks and barbarians in Sicily. Probably drawing much

of this theme from his primary sources (Philistus, Ephorus, Theopompus, and Timaeus),

Diodorus portrays the Carthaginian wars and the ethnic conflict between Phoenician and

Greek as a fundamental characteristic of Sicilian history.

When the Carthaginians reentered the Sicilian political scene in 409 after a

seventy year period of abstaining from intervention, Diodorus was prepared to describe

their reemergence within the scope of the perceived deep-seated animosity between

Greeks and barbarians. Hannibal, who led the expeditionary force against the Greeks,


15 Pearson (1987) 157.









was of course a hater of Greeks by nature (Kai cp6OEI plotIAv, 16 13.43.6) bent on taking

vengeance on the Siceliots for his grandfather's defeat. In this case the reader is

surprised to find out that Hannibal in fact had Greeks in his army (13.57.3). In addition,

Hannibal himself must have had at least some Greek blood in him, if he was truly

descended from Hamilcar the half-Greek (Diod. 13.53.5; Herod. 7.165). Furthermore,

Hannibal initially tried to avoid conflict with the Greeks, sending ambassadors to

Syracuse to resolve the dispute and by Diodorus' own admission trying to stay away from

conflict with the Syracusans (13.43.6). Contrary to Diodorus implication, neither

Hannibal nor the Carthaginians were interested in pursuing an ethnic war against the

Greeks in Sicily or they would have already taken advantage of the disunity and civil

wars of the Greeks in the seventy years between the battle of Himera and the sack of

Selinus. Carthage did not undertake the war in 409 because they wanted to destroy the

Greek race or because Hannibal, their foremost citizen, had an obsessive desire to wipe

out Hellenic influence on the island. Carthage's trade hegemony on the island was

threatened when Syracuse emerged as the dominant power after the Athenians'

expedition and Segesta, an Elymian ally of Carthage deep in the western sphere of

Carthaginian influence, was under attack from the Greeks of Selinus. Therefore,

Diodorus' attribution of Hannibal's hatred of Greeks as the primary motivation for his

Sicilian campaigns is probably due to the tendency of later authors to portray historical

events through the lenses of their own biases and does not reflect the actual situation of

the fourth century.

Diodorus is always ready to include rhetorical passages on the hatred between

Greeks and Carthaginians, making it seem as though the distinction between the two was

16 This word was probably an especially strong one, as it occurs in Diodorus only here.









ancient and clear-cut. The narrative frequently plunges into descriptions of butchery

which were no doubt motivated by the false of the notion of intense hatred between

Greeks and barbarians in late fifth and early fourth century Sicily. No where is this

technique more apparent than in the descriptions of the sacking of various Greek cities.

When Hannibal took Selinus, Diodorus states:

oi &: ToTi EuljPEpripaoI EnqppIJvol ocp6Tr-iv napEKEAEuoVTO. [...] TCOV 5
tyKaTaArq(cp0 r( v OW(IjTWco V di p~ TaTc OiKKiaO ouyKaTtKaIov, TCOV 6' Eic TdC
65ou PI3a(oplJVCO oi 56aKpivovTEC OiTTE (P6luav oi6' r~IKiav, dAA' 6pokoc; naia
vrniouc, yuvaTKaq, npeopuTaqc; p6vveuov, ou5 EJiav oupnd6 Iav Aapp6voVTE;.
liKpCoTTpiKaov 5: Kai TOU(; VEKpOU; KaTI T6 n6Tplov 0OCq, Kai TIVEC piv XETpaq
6dp6aq nEpiEcpEpov ToiT oc 0aol, TIViS 5& KE(paAdQC ni TGOV yaioov Kai TOV
oauviov dvanEipovTEC E(pEpov. [...] TooOUTO ybp CbjO66TrnTI ~IipEpOV oi 6pp3apol
TCOV 6McOV, )(rTE TOGV AoinGv EVEKa TOO pjrlEv 6oE3ETIV Eic T6O aip6viov
iaoo(6vTcov TOU;i Eic Td iEp6 KaTanE(pEUy6Tac KaPXrn6viol TouvavTiov
d6noXovTo TOV noAEpkov, 6n(co TOU( TGV OEGv vaoOc; ouGArGEIav. [...] ndS; qv
T6no ; ai'JaTO Kai VEKpCov nAiprl. [...] ai p~v yuvaTKEd ; oGTEprlqPval Tri
ouvriOouC TpucpI; v noAE~piov iV pel IEVUKTrpEuov, unopjvouoail EIVdc
TaAancopiac: cv Evial OuyaTtpaq tnly6pouC 6pdv rIvayK6(OVTO naoxouoac OUK
oiKETa T C rAIlKiac (13.57.1-3, 5-6; 58.1).

Diodorus describes the sack of Himera in similar terms: KaTd KpdTOq oiv dAouoqq Tfi

n6AEcoc, tni noA~v Xp6vov oi P6ppapol n6vTraq cp6vEuov TU0CJ KaTaAaJpavoP iVOU 6doupnaO00

(13.62.3). After the Carthaginians' murder of many of the remaining inhabitants of the

city, Hannibal dragged the survivors outside the city walls and sacrificed them to the

manes of Hamilcar: TOv 5' aiXpaAhcbTCv yuvaTKaO Kai naiaq(5 ia5o0Sq Eiq T6 oTpaT6nd5ov

napEcpuAaTrE, TCOV 5' 6vapGv TU0~ 6A6VTraq Ei TploXyIAouc ovrTaq napr6yayEv Eni T6V Tonov, &v cp

np6TEpov ApIiKaC; 6 ndnnoc aOTOu unb r6Acovo 6dvnpprl, Kai n6vTrac aiKIoCTPEVOC KaTt(OpaEV

(13.62.4). The inhabitants of Gela, having learned of the sack of Selinus, Himera, and

Acragas, were quite aware of the Carthaginians' savagery: ou05 ia yap iv nap' aOToTq

(cpE lb TCOV 6AIKOPIJVCo, 6dA' doupnaO(c TOV ITuXqlKoTWV o0 piv 6VEoOrapouv, oTq 5'

6apopriTOuc; fnyov OppEIc (13.111.4).









In this way Diodorus describes the awful destruction of these cities as a result of

the Carthaginians' hatred for the Greeks. These stories, however, have more of the

appearance of embellished folktale than recorded history. If the survivors of such terrible

atrocities escaped to Italian Greek cities as Diodorus states (13.91.1), it seems unlikely

that the Italiots would ally with Carthage against the Sicilian Greeks (15.15.2). The

ruthless destruction of Himera would also make an alliance between the Carthaginians

and the Himerans just a decade letter quite improbable (14.56.2). Diodorus certainly

exaggerates the Carthaginians' evil deeds in the sack of these Greek cities. The

movement of populations and razing of cities actually had a parallel in earlier Sicilian

history, as Gelon had destroyed three Greek cities and moved numerous peoples from

their lands.17 Therefore, no ethnic hatred needs to be envisioned in Hannibal's campaign

in Sicily; his actions against Greek cities had a precedent with the most renowned of

Sicilian tyrants.

Diodorus' narrative displays the same tendencies of the mainland authors and the

fragmentary historians to perceive Sicilian events in Panhellenic terms, portraying the

war between Syracuse and Carthage as an ethnic conflict. However, the rhetorical

passages which present the animosity between Greeks and Carthaginians are often at

variance with information provided elsewhere in the text and are therefore suspect.

Diodorus certainly attempted to represent Carthage as the Persia of the West, even in an

alliance with the great king against the Greek race.18 His view of the ethnic and cultural

situation in Sicily is therefore tainted by his own thematic concerns, since the notion that

Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily were naturally and pointedly hostile to one another

17 Asheri (1988) 769-70.

18 Randall-Macver (1970) 90.






54


does not agree with the evidence which was presented in chapters 1-4. In fact Greek

identity in fourth century Sicily was much less developed than on the mainland or during

later periods of Sicilian history. The views of these authors result from superimposing

Panhellenic doctrine on the essentially fragmented and heterogeneous ethnic situation in

Sicily.














CHAPTER 8
THE HOSTILE TRADITION

The situation in Sicily in the fourth century was very different from the

perceptions of mainland authors and other historians. Chapters 1-4 attempted to

demonstrate that ethnic identity in Sicily was quite weak and that a high degree of

multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism dominated the political and social scene on the

island. Chapters 5 and 6 showed that other Greek authors who were exposed to the

doctrine of Panhellenism and the growing consciousness of Greeks in the East viewed the

situation in Sicily as essentially dominated by the conflict between Greeks and non-

Greeks. Since all the authors who wrote about fourth century Sicily were influenced by

their perception of history as a struggle between Greeks and barbarians, this view

permeated the historiographical and anecdotal tradition.

Dionysius, though certainly an outstanding ruler in many respects, appeared a

very poor head of state when evaluated for his success in driving out the non-Greek

inhabitants of Sicily. Other Greeks knew that he had clearly portrayed himself as the

defender of the Siceliots against Carthage (as had his associate Philistus)1 and thus they

found fault with him for being unwilling to finish the war against the Carthaginians and

for at times postponing his campaigns to attack his fellow Greeks. Dionysius clearly

used the Carthaginian threat to maintain fear of the enemy among the Syracusan citizen

body and to preserve his own power. His apathy in fighting the barbarians surely

frustrated Panhellenic theorists, who had once looked to him to lead the Panhellenic

1 Sanders (1987) 51-2.









crusade against the barbarians. Therefore, Dionysius probably gained the reputation of

being a barbarophile or at least an un-Greek ruler, which supplemented the hostile

depiction of him as the stereotypical paranoid tyrant.2

Sicilian Greeks continued to have a much weaker sense of identity than the

Greeks on the mainland. They still mingled with other ethnic groups throughout the

island, trading and interacting with them. Dionysius, a native Siceliot, probably did not

understand the conflict between Syracuse and Carthage as an essentially ethnic war, nor

did the other inhabitants of Sicily. Dionysius portrayed himself as the defender of

Syracuse against the Carthaginian state, not the Phoenician race, and did attempt to

curtail its influence on the island. However, he did not see the Punic wars as a perpetual

racial struggle for dominance of the island as other mainland Greeks did. Thus, his

actions reflect the policies of a monarch concerned with the extension of his rule and

maintenance of power, not a betrayer of Panhellenism, for such a concept had not fully

developed in Sicily enough to decisively influence the political atmosphere.




















2 For the hostile tradition see Stroheker (1958); Sanders (1979-80); Sanders (1987); Pearson (1987) 157-90;
Caven (1990).















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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Andrew Alwine was born in Sewanee, Tennessee, on September 16, 1982. In

2001 he graduated from Temple High School in Temple, Texas. He graduated from

Baylor University in 2004 with a Bachelor of Arts in history and classics. He will

receive his Master of Arts in classical philology from the University of Florida in 2006.