<%BANNER%>

Barter Club Participants in Argentina: Idealogues or Pragmatists?

xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101118_AAAAEY INGEST_TIME 2010-11-19T04:06:16Z PACKAGE UFE0014303_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 23694 DFID F20101118_AACXBD ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH pond_w_Page_65.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
917055590f1ee1b5ac466651d354f5d7
SHA-1
971ba06bdc77664bec587c3e4f01b3ec1ba738bd
6118 F20101118_AACWZD pond_w_Page_38thm.jpg
ea9d1a81f3dc62a1750308f23f4179e2
1de8638f381a9bfa13b56ec2f7658f8d710cec49
1298 F20101118_AACWFO pond_w_Page_42.txt
d4b80a2a6356cd0c55e426af68632a1b
6c2b73f555e8393b8a257a6fd7f89f0ec5578a83
1053954 F20101118_AACWPI pond_w_Page_75.tif
bc1c59febbacc486c61a8e5fd221883f
5b0017e92f48379de033f138dd27b438feb11f01
98943 F20101118_AACWKL pond_w_Page_30.jp2
61005eb389290785379a0455b556b4de
b51a7cd174bba31b27c0c500a086d248e6289593
1958 F20101118_AACWUG pond_w_Page_34.txt
faeaa834703ec485087976239a9ca39d
5dbf83474ea75a0c9533688c0e500cf52809080f
6278 F20101118_AACXBE pond_w_Page_66thm.jpg
13adc561013d76068da60d7a18af7032
2628f663303d211a802fff1014063db0948d25d7
26245 F20101118_AACWZE pond_w_Page_38.QC.jpg
08c5946b3cec2f6cec93e5152e1fa748
2b248c4acf64eb2b5df691b1a6cc27d69cc2fb59
1523 F20101118_AACWFP pond_w_Page_20.txt
b9cc4334f44e498999b6aa7a695c54ba
7ab16685fa3130d400aa8f5ea62d767d785f110c
F20101118_AACWPJ pond_w_Page_76.tif
1660050a9d0faf8afbf5b47020f3186e
561a633ea0ad00a01fbf8ce52d291f211d875671
118474 F20101118_AACWKM pond_w_Page_31.jp2
a166e3647d16a034aac082551812d4f0
e7934b2bad887a63e18710149e08656a9b3c5d50
2085 F20101118_AACWUH pond_w_Page_35.txt
477de75d9ce83ad64d01169e60021238
af94de2b3073c6db3afc336554b2799d079d8ca2
27172 F20101118_AACXBF pond_w_Page_66.QC.jpg
3a59bbdcd3721041cf70dc0944aaaf92
a99f68786fb1bae6621ab122ee0629bdce692f0b
6546 F20101118_AACWZF pond_w_Page_39thm.jpg
834290727f5c33185a801a820e89c883
52f0eb706f002f1e45b71580d43214642c18dea5
2047 F20101118_AACWUI pond_w_Page_36.txt
a6a8f28652912a9b62aa0516f22868e4
7a207dcb5f81895e5fb46e2669fa91eec713776d
F20101118_AACWFQ pond_w_Page_69.tif
9cf29ee0b6b4ff760390bb1311678777
e33df6b9db943328394998b49135b0e484c9a917
F20101118_AACWPK pond_w_Page_77.tif
15c97fc28f80f8a0d955f216a3ec985a
a181774fe960a2cbe790309e2f575f855d11ec8b
101169 F20101118_AACWKN pond_w_Page_32.jp2
683a9c22dc61b2f1d93a45e28aa1857f
33f38a90af9eedc8b02a4ffa9fe2c7c9dc1ce8ae
6182 F20101118_AACXBG pond_w_Page_67thm.jpg
51e343085ca6ecb7fbece13235826220
e3c60231cecd54eed51e1e86dee41d69f77dda16
6427 F20101118_AACWZG pond_w_Page_40thm.jpg
afbd5348aca64e5fc8da67806374a983
576f6b77ea2f2936906515fcaad4b3cb49e91aa6
2014 F20101118_AACWUJ pond_w_Page_37.txt
cfbaf4afd7088b1607f2c4da88e47826
363685e5a12634a1150047b1f98c0598b2e6c2c3
48249 F20101118_AACWFR pond_w_Page_78.pro
9ed802bc82dee2c39786b7c39f60d6b0
67625d01ca1aa2538f68da67747d5dc3558534da
F20101118_AACWPL pond_w_Page_78.tif
41fb2c4be8474c518cef8f3396a23969
3a2cab5d32918bd93da9beaebf2fc205133be7b6
111673 F20101118_AACWKO pond_w_Page_33.jp2
132cb348a87feaa091ba1a0789605b83
37bc24c5ed2c8c3c18d4250e1c9f496c8143408d
25598 F20101118_AACXBH pond_w_Page_67.QC.jpg
f21daed1c08adc1241be09b0f31ec23d
da66dded03366365d158ec1b5f80c7d927b28453
26014 F20101118_AACWZH pond_w_Page_40.QC.jpg
d489d143afa0aa6bdb5eff1422d2cff9
3b0b0c0679af0ff7518f9b8f67ffbb36d2f84643
1969 F20101118_AACWUK pond_w_Page_38.txt
75aabc6e98b08a6d3e86d145d15d32b8
f4665ab0ebc783e72a74bb3b11cea9413161cc46
1882 F20101118_AACWFS pond_w_Page_74.txt
34041b3535b1b5adc1724f59b3cbb4f3
d25512b7b094eba4d8bbc9a05390174c471371a2
F20101118_AACWPM pond_w_Page_79.tif
a6d401434bc2218fa5440f352691ef01
efac3fc04f6ef8723ceaa67cff96e4c96f358920
107633 F20101118_AACWKP pond_w_Page_34.jp2
b17dd520d571d7219f38685ae63b08be
51b41a6949dd7a454cf57bee9d560479bdaa5e53
5926 F20101118_AACXBI pond_w_Page_68thm.jpg
4831109899fdf682dbad6903da284ef1
a4fc7b080a392f0cf18eda528552995fdb795173
5882 F20101118_AACWZI pond_w_Page_41thm.jpg
6c31adb1920b603b78c4b2f94991f55a
75422f0fdf705f7ed93746bd432cbff804d94467
1629 F20101118_AACWFT pond_w_Page_79.txt
171db45751ffb89069d4855fd9342e22
2ba827c05aeb28060a329d722acc3a9f28e46703
F20101118_AACWPN pond_w_Page_80.tif
6498ae2dd832def9f8b8d26d2573ce33
4d3894449eb2f13cb3c194d7b80cb7ba5ea2d6df
113382 F20101118_AACWKQ pond_w_Page_35.jp2
a42c48659a704867826a75a4c0cc3a60
3c71b1f50559758a01ab49c969c46e00b08e3928
24923 F20101118_AACXBJ pond_w_Page_68.QC.jpg
af80993f50d1b59e7a2e36d403dc2b1d
8d852004ff2ca3ebd2b881deefca48589812c315
23803 F20101118_AACWZJ pond_w_Page_41.QC.jpg
78178a6175ead683af93d664d6768582
3181f9463433f58c5b54c1124cf5563c564f7b48
2013 F20101118_AACWUL pond_w_Page_39.txt
4a30c225503e19c6f0e735568c00bb96
d7455a440ffd72ba4dd9161a3e4ecda8b8a56cda
78560 F20101118_AACWFU pond_w_Page_71.jpg
add38d8ee486e948aef15917dc3173ff
49816d84e056481f07fde5dfe06c68f024b93acb
F20101118_AACWPO pond_w_Page_81.tif
1f4bce0acaf1f6e5ee279ed30625a972
a0bc506194fd42c02a42e9eeb62d75a69239a67f
109230 F20101118_AACWKR pond_w_Page_36.jp2
57fd74285bf26225e7a0bb30af01908d
d84f51db9d08f634360b26b810653b1eb94bb85a
4684 F20101118_AACXBK pond_w_Page_69thm.jpg
71f90a34ca1fe5bbf88805e79dac51d6
f0827c4a2f84802619f6e812f4b5aed884965e0b
4177 F20101118_AACWZK pond_w_Page_42thm.jpg
3e78a0b415ba13f94544657dea449ba0
a7d992c99f7d3b693481f37ed642756304a7521c
2080 F20101118_AACWUM pond_w_Page_40.txt
3af7c6453a9736a267208d75a29a3a8f
fcad45bbff86d972bed78d7d523e39813018770c
6289 F20101118_AACWFV pond_w_Page_24thm.jpg
42d678a736ee95cfebf5304b3f5d5ab9
32b03a314829fac4f5a478506fc3af972cb54853
25271604 F20101118_AACWPP pond_w_Page_82.tif
aedbf146c71cb1fa5ec11e1e06a0e9d0
60842f911ff8f6c0839581d171bce3302974bafd
110614 F20101118_AACWKS pond_w_Page_37.jp2
66cb3aa19b7d8dc835a55ee8c4f5c5ef
727fbdefdfb72e3fe90ca20ad234be15c78d734a
5584 F20101118_AACXBL pond_w_Page_70thm.jpg
77b09554e328f5666765a96b7b71cf0d
5f4e8a4d49b23261cffcb329527890374dfaaf21
17027 F20101118_AACWZL pond_w_Page_42.QC.jpg
9efb486ba9d49c19435388383557f7ff
fdf54d24f7caa7e15147da93b46abe19267bd85d
1816 F20101118_AACWUN pond_w_Page_41.txt
9717309e3c96583bd54a80ceb566e4ca
8e2a9d9784737279a652a3fddd1b12dfcc1e32f2
12630 F20101118_AACWFW pond_w_Page_88.QC.jpg
c62957dfb74070ab51e0cdfa035e1c8a
cf1e3fef85179a158ad0eed48e8710fd4a8cd1b8
F20101118_AACWPQ pond_w_Page_83.tif
fab4a74a4dc157c75a3ffd724f4b0007
5c14400f7473607cc36c76b3c73b5402435614fa
105994 F20101118_AACWKT pond_w_Page_38.jp2
2db92892e09d8d500742c9cdf52a29bd
e05d39eb7de279647bd9d9a3d12c960a47444dad
22335 F20101118_AACXBM pond_w_Page_70.QC.jpg
cc39fd1147c62a904581af5e7a2e223a
53c35e12c8a85629280421ddbfa5b4dc40a43875
5650 F20101118_AACWZM pond_w_Page_43thm.jpg
2ed0ced067b02eeda121a47acef3913a
432aa8574d6820ae2a7d610cffcf6d201f55bb51
2070 F20101118_AACWUO pond_w_Page_43.txt
9994dac8b2ece7323a085d694135b4ae
0d384e5a4672910aa6df044f90de041d0f14399a
27267 F20101118_AACWFX pond_w_Page_86.QC.jpg
708712d509cbd2ed1f53ef545be22f19
46634fac845fd77c6a58a4b8c244b62d4114998d
F20101118_AACWPR pond_w_Page_84.tif
23f131ded5139c4cbdf828a6e7245c6c
af30be702aa8b585782e49f06b4b7c54d47fa691
111326 F20101118_AACWKU pond_w_Page_39.jp2
e4281523d6825c9507710017630c673c
a3c9453ba376ac24dd7b2aae131beb771110992d
24815 F20101118_AACXBN pond_w_Page_71.QC.jpg
750eb9a57589933af882f45134ff6ec8
4f2bb624c4c74c0f267ecbd42d3e035cb295fae0
23784 F20101118_AACWZN pond_w_Page_43.QC.jpg
1c069781cd3458503821f28e5d7f9838
cdb0da5b5307304e692e00107654ea50fb3d6497
2102 F20101118_AACWUP pond_w_Page_44.txt
dd9fe4f07f35a1aea8bb4e7127c990ec
f6c0cff3026deba414dbb56deec076d9225eb9fc
102053 F20101118_AACWFY pond_w_Page_17.jp2
733c7a997908a2fc721b960aacb454c9
664035803c69b900bf0fc3dd5735caa63df49ba8
F20101118_AACWPS pond_w_Page_85.tif
80bc0f1c3fbc96466032d4fffbc42fdd
5b5eae4c734080a622c8e819ce76b0feb5b9ea6e
111180 F20101118_AACWKV pond_w_Page_40.jp2
b3611dc31a41cd269c2f2f6919d78f8a
76bed33c3b3a9e9e3a867d7a717564f4ce4fc1d7
6454 F20101118_AACXBO pond_w_Page_72thm.jpg
0a30b48819bd74364921a6cdc94f5d2d
98f5089c9a7f5c01192412a87dad73b5e6844aae
6221 F20101118_AACWZO pond_w_Page_44thm.jpg
0ead163ac17e91db663b5c7e0b2140b2
93410a1e876131cee58cf0da624fb97d3ce1d60c
1956 F20101118_AACWUQ pond_w_Page_45.txt
8b120fabd5a91cbea34cc227c897fa7a
3a68345ff31964fbc8f25002fc284bd0ccfebf40
F20101118_AACWPT pond_w_Page_86.tif
0f0130ff7b3c46057535ca0b728b42e1
e90e532d0eacacce9c1793ff7d7e272c6370d969
101450 F20101118_AACWKW pond_w_Page_41.jp2
04e97db5e66ad5c9d5bb9d0c0221b727
de6ca9e2fc7b62d197a247d0a6108720dc2dd351
87002 F20101118_AACWFZ pond_w_Page_65.jpg
bb2cf7f1b0c7c79cc522117040def58d
7872a9ef0ff6139217d12b1ec3d3debd9c0a35d8
26839 F20101118_AACXBP pond_w_Page_72.QC.jpg
bd865a920999ec1bb56852eac24f7a07
bdcff3f42c2e5d2b27a40eb7bf106f6c8a7bc013
24722 F20101118_AACWZP pond_w_Page_44.QC.jpg
024e2569884c1137fabcab2839f51247
16bc4e392f49812aa0ae170f0e608ae9078e12fd
2017 F20101118_AACWUR pond_w_Page_46.txt
3e9b28f1811f18b5feb68f6893596d80
ed450ef1bb6955d7e7db69fc02baeb59d1782274
F20101118_AACWPU pond_w_Page_87.tif
96fe1e24443b53fbff397ccc5ac09322
b3646db2f1c3ee1ba7872c9987ebea27028329d8
71007 F20101118_AACWKX pond_w_Page_42.jp2
fd6b773bff4bea9582c7ca6d273860f7
a079997e1e5e1adc36755b6568e9acf5b8447478
6461 F20101118_AACXBQ pond_w_Page_73thm.jpg
a064bfd01b07b9b76e56f76cef84800f
d4a76840eb658d6bce97f654737c2646038bc066
2042 F20101118_AACWUS pond_w_Page_47.txt
c37015f694bb473a261ae938a817b739
1b58fe9975fa01c3cf51952e346ba14e037e1d00
F20101118_AACWPV pond_w_Page_88.tif
72fc8546f94fc5918d9bb9c88d0ba419
443783983ea5cfb1e0b62c7343fbd230385d4c9a
108220 F20101118_AACWKY pond_w_Page_43.jp2
680c2bbf999ad4750e1c77ea4aae3144
7bcdb975638132fe603ffa9359ec9ddcb35208e9
26835 F20101118_AACXBR pond_w_Page_73.QC.jpg
4fe3db1c4dd6e93b077fee5fae93e2d4
b69521ff7482df5a62cf18caedf570e0cd1aca86
6287 F20101118_AACWZQ pond_w_Page_45thm.jpg
1149fbad9baa572d7329054a5039af18
45472f82f040198a8fe03364a67c94b4e202898c
1876 F20101118_AACWUT pond_w_Page_48.txt
73116f41c0b41b0000035e4d9d0264d7
4cf2fe201d16dae0ee230d2fe411f05d3d05aac6
7475 F20101118_AACWPW pond_w_Page_01.pro
d9bd9c0b20c5584339e5f44a75a08a71
46c1a507a90f383f686aa45861c8e453916bbe2b
90173 F20101118_AACWIA pond_w_Page_51.jpg
4474cecec309b43576bb178e2da5d222
a0ecb71a035c7242f1abd8bad2b7afaa2e7681cf
108073 F20101118_AACWKZ pond_w_Page_44.jp2
b518aa59623fb03f41acc3c71ff22ddb
26001d9c582de3f301be58dba417d229085398f8
6153 F20101118_AACXBS pond_w_Page_74thm.jpg
cfe919d678ac4e921aad67c15dda560c
1739312a4df8f389d81825a288b79f76a2674ca1
25386 F20101118_AACWZR pond_w_Page_45.QC.jpg
9c0d93870341a3fa8c48042953b16211
95a598949d42c97b88ebf5c6eb5abe3270afd7e5
2030 F20101118_AACWUU pond_w_Page_49.txt
82aaa8208a4d1914ebddf8b5eff82598
087505d2a4dc5e9ad2d0a8145eab7372c24f22e2
1042 F20101118_AACWPX pond_w_Page_02.pro
1a7ef5ce906bf43b5fc7e69e2c776065
13d2fd9f97f3334386a2369a79aab07db96811e4
88177 F20101118_AACWIB pond_w_Page_52.jpg
326ddaf26ac93f9ed56923f21372d998
a730199f37331e5ef378b5fd2759ff62f0238941
6347 F20101118_AACXBT pond_w_Page_75thm.jpg
e5416425c219bbf403b696b978c8f30f
0de30f7d8ff7eab6400ce29714e063978aae50ff
6326 F20101118_AACWZS pond_w_Page_46thm.jpg
869bb1a39f9d4a72fe66ea968a1b85f7
dcbfacc3d568e4af83f067cfae0b30d738e481f5
1939 F20101118_AACWUV pond_w_Page_50.txt
ddf3bba749361a38d8f86d3fb3ec97a3
c04f731484fecaffb4208181bc2597dec3bee4df
80425 F20101118_AACWPY pond_w_Page_04.pro
976693f0ae98c25d8b5aee616bbb1051
0d3cd7296bd3d87d6a704d0e64bd40c7d4807d75
81560 F20101118_AACWIC pond_w_Page_53.jpg
59e5f8c4de0984985d1248385b3cd776
94c5f8dda62d3e7737a0d01e5c246833f67409be
F20101118_AACWNA pond_w_Page_11.tif
a04255400ea17cf5ada1e0dab215086b
a8b7cad57122320627bd64c4aa2b9f0282511438
25602 F20101118_AACXBU pond_w_Page_75.QC.jpg
9261a3be752ab92306ce354a4aa5f5bb
b3899895fab131fc1886385863db720281e47ace
26114 F20101118_AACWZT pond_w_Page_46.QC.jpg
e991ea38b754c5932010b3dcc8ec6e06
84966d7e018de6b320cc7cd30f0b4d044c17299c
2105 F20101118_AACWUW pond_w_Page_52.txt
387c15e9d3907c84d8b949d4e595c259
81eac3957a1ec88f4062c7d7e2854d451cf4fadd
40914 F20101118_AACWPZ pond_w_Page_05.pro
28d935532b431d99283010ca67fe2ccc
15f3cee92fb092e7e8ba7a20ee9a90050e1f3003
56373 F20101118_AACWID pond_w_Page_54.jpg
e58d7af73a7c3ac330e643979189230a
79de2bf23f38fb984698d7668c74313fe8325272
F20101118_AACWNB pond_w_Page_12.tif
d99acf78e76a93605cf8ec0843d6fb8f
4c9cb3d3fe44e42433591cfa2920248caf2163ef
6346 F20101118_AACXBV pond_w_Page_76thm.jpg
124dba4b19dd1360715b25ecb34d9e73
a24680d45a9f8025fc781935667314575f3bcf56
6507 F20101118_AACWZU pond_w_Page_47thm.jpg
76804293c38d26d14faeaca05434f45e
1f6070ba7e0df2fcf3d99df7df1bc02d83d55ef4
1955 F20101118_AACWUX pond_w_Page_53.txt
aa5ba03e7077e847de3efd1868dd0305
e6222d75d0d5fd0254dda8c88da19abe7104475d
75526 F20101118_AACWIE pond_w_Page_55.jpg
5eed4c69158876505b86306d0324fb53
5a70887acccda0132f98f43161d0ef86495eb403
F20101118_AACWNC pond_w_Page_13.tif
1b806f7e18c24c0d471ade6f1d13ec5d
601fe92807b2ca6ff00c6aec4ac7e91e5407c972
25733 F20101118_AACXBW pond_w_Page_76.QC.jpg
ad4f08441ce4c601725a1bb108804b26
e6df15c2967849584be154df1c132938e57f6fd3
26730 F20101118_AACWZV pond_w_Page_47.QC.jpg
458149892d409650e073e23468ad4382
90ff334f28927db151366d9e38befd7de6d973e2
1341 F20101118_AACWUY pond_w_Page_54.txt
10d841ef4caf8b252022362a61777625
20cc91284e447d67bdfa6da904a7bb22fd6b94cb
89683 F20101118_AACWIF pond_w_Page_56.jpg
4509bcb5859d0db8ea7fc2867119b326
695c12d84bebb9ce912a73472316ca329972f32e
51120 F20101118_AACWSA pond_w_Page_59.pro
aa0965339210439a0d0f1f1cd697ab86
7e83600023dd71a986f986fafc06bce52eb3bc30
F20101118_AACWND pond_w_Page_14.tif
2a7ad937ac1a77fd679aab5e11b9fa06
e9493c54d4bc6a8301982eff650749115e00c5c9
6138 F20101118_AACWZW pond_w_Page_48thm.jpg
fbea360d5a7f0f070c11302a948333e6
0e6cba123d4274fde9b9f4ed954f7c8696a885aa
1860 F20101118_AACWUZ pond_w_Page_55.txt
b6ca685b94553d3a2e98e9e6b4476dc8
1f0e9bec81330b42fa42a6e253589053542a0bd1
88855 F20101118_AACWIG pond_w_Page_57.jpg
b05921b13f720706bcac05981cf0fa36
e8bf44a1de5e1e1c7b0c197ab1cb13ae14780eb8
48529 F20101118_AACWSB pond_w_Page_60.pro
4f193ccdbf7b78c22fffa3bb198f4067
9e8fc4d9aa343e7c7a6292f465632bfbfc10b9e9
6091 F20101118_AACXBX pond_w_Page_77thm.jpg
e5d6117146b2c7ba2f0c5ee5dddc2282
daa8aff7b9abee96b0350a6d06c2e3c1398adeb7
24765 F20101118_AACWZX pond_w_Page_48.QC.jpg
307c7b87a24e584dfee6cc0a777d3188
6bc39750dde7e9a5d2b71857f9939cc76e7bfe1d
89896 F20101118_AACWIH pond_w_Page_58.jpg
1e42007e0f0571f79a490f22986804bd
b494bb59e31ee96a5f70ca96d9b8c6621cf3bc1e
48414 F20101118_AACWSC pond_w_Page_61.pro
4f41fe22480db3847a9d28aa9fdd4f72
f60557fdab7200c91006d85b5712d3207367866c
F20101118_AACWNE pond_w_Page_15.tif
8284990f90f3c9387c0023cedf71bdec
a2d1c60706f3013bb9fe74feeba893406f92dcb3
25156 F20101118_AACXBY pond_w_Page_77.QC.jpg
2d454203cf6f35b0eda9395fb51d12ee
d03b0faf24efcdec9daf39da1948e0ec065f96f1
6294 F20101118_AACWZY pond_w_Page_49thm.jpg
df70076a40ce4cd283512354c26da148
b52cda03fd0460980b871591fb1375afc68a4ed1
21087 F20101118_AACWXA pond_w_Page_07.QC.jpg
fa6b6b3e8042f5e4f16148bb0f8cc4f4
0d0396c713dcdf4006c509ba63617b7cc7bf0886
83586 F20101118_AACWII pond_w_Page_59.jpg
5bb61767f56ffe882d74ddbf722917f4
f1d502e6efd27edaa7ec1482d1535259b4f446ae
47590 F20101118_AACWSD pond_w_Page_63.pro
02b6d6b1388a0ba52afa0bcfe1227965
7e05e636add4acb0fe7285044f2776aa80659e1a
F20101118_AACWNF pond_w_Page_16.tif
865b0fbed04209dde7ae550ba97bc2d3
3d10f3f7432fe3eaf91354b0a39a01e495ad1285
6078 F20101118_AACXBZ pond_w_Page_78thm.jpg
82ba77bd66c54f04a3742e555f0ae133
f65869a9832fc4942bae33cebe0469d09ca0901e
26018 F20101118_AACWZZ pond_w_Page_49.QC.jpg
6af59305426a05306faf62eba534dedf
9bb035699a2785743be75c2502e47373953c555c
5607 F20101118_AACWXB pond_w_Page_08thm.jpg
19e5936624ba0800599c14bc9901ecfe
975f85ae8ff2536d30a0d28df0c26ef797450789
79859 F20101118_AACWIJ pond_w_Page_60.jpg
89caf3113fe6678687392d7c9843f844
afa18e02849746b60800d3927b359332efec9541
56508 F20101118_AACWSE pond_w_Page_64.pro
cb175cbae18490fe888e75d8a569bf48
bb6b3b42e2f43ac4fd7402f1648c16974b2f74b8
F20101118_AACWNG pond_w_Page_17.tif
381ebe02fc8aebeb8bc6d54662afe2fb
ffd41f2c0084681a881f1353d8fba0474c522d27
23351 F20101118_AACWXC pond_w_Page_08.QC.jpg
9660366ba4014cbaf554f99aae5e6297
e73843b51a84af7ff8363210491d33a2ae3e52dd
79429 F20101118_AACWIK pond_w_Page_61.jpg
a622d1bc1dcbe6495a0f7b73720da3f0
2cb9f54b004368d08db4166d87b3df73c8f0ca55
53670 F20101118_AACWSF pond_w_Page_65.pro
5ccaa575d7661fe6edcdf44aa0db2c28
267eb026a060191047b57543c1c50e40665100e2
F20101118_AACWNH pond_w_Page_18.tif
c2e9dde5de96d9dc109de6556e63fc80
eb4b60c1ed1e3c93adc88efc68ea08df55d3ddee
6208 F20101118_AACWXD pond_w_Page_09thm.jpg
aa5e9822395f7ec7474464d671d4a41d
69627c73c0a7450407c42a2c3b31358d1f656238
90809 F20101118_AACWIL pond_w_Page_62.jpg
1793c14c3bc187fddc6ff2508da58281
58436b0ae08f4f7a0ee405224a78d6aaf0b0def6
52732 F20101118_AACWSG pond_w_Page_66.pro
0e68c2e7f7627e23f97d800104b9ffe1
14eb82a6a9d479b13e3f4c9dfe2484ca670178ac
F20101118_AACWNI pond_w_Page_19.tif
081f25cba8e48589759f1645676013da
614b99d0d299f4f05f25d2f857ff03e735665ceb
25426 F20101118_AACWXE pond_w_Page_09.QC.jpg
64aac9f2ec02242c2c0e635680a0c8f8
ded0b4a5aca2fc7181258e021767f2985d293051
80487 F20101118_AACWIM pond_w_Page_63.jpg
3db24fed20d17767ebea009305517c1f
8130fcc79cc92095256fe1991b607bc118dc9ee0
50401 F20101118_AACWSH pond_w_Page_67.pro
fb10acca9d98588bb0da96c4dc8cf8ae
7619ab003719a6670121bd76f91dd81fa9eee4be
F20101118_AACWNJ pond_w_Page_20.tif
9076603cf28ba75ad4259d96033412d2
ca12059897bda2b4b5c8f14768c6bbd5627d0463
5992 F20101118_AACWXF pond_w_Page_10thm.jpg
c7cfda4a58b1b113221a8502bb81fae3
c00cbb47ecbbdb6532e9046e2837986f43de05c9
88907 F20101118_AACWIN pond_w_Page_64.jpg
39497a8051d768e28253969ac52523fe
bb730c9a29f2e7b04d721703d0f2e352f5d4e4c4
47775 F20101118_AACWSI pond_w_Page_68.pro
274b1ccfb8f093e7fd72c07da84ada90
de51534c7e3f989f035f2ba1756df11654a08478
F20101118_AACWNK pond_w_Page_21.tif
b8d13bea088bbd3b690dfe81766e8f87
b566e514ab2d38ab43ab7201a159d1337ee01cfa
25574 F20101118_AACWXG pond_w_Page_10.QC.jpg
bdca38fd5643aa942311d533cf93a3ca
fe6c8fc6b7bcd3545e363342ef6474ed911619cf
87338 F20101118_AACWIO pond_w_Page_66.jpg
ba17f29d4d6376b99846dfd901f61637
b2b4fd8734ba36dab093a6f3b402939a76827fea
F20101118_AACWNL pond_w_Page_22.tif
5d9995671a2b4784e71e6bd07d8c0837
a0e8c2dc44bcfa00b0c52ed0c774f728cb4bb261
5970 F20101118_AACWXH pond_w_Page_11thm.jpg
2fd0d7c9c538f192d8b1842b26a988f7
6fe01c65ac91fd61819442e773d09fa4d0883c6c
82696 F20101118_AACWIP pond_w_Page_67.jpg
194b001fce6d38a058b319f3e8d80fbe
46b05e621773d8d784d032038b0cddce646f7dad
37367 F20101118_AACWSJ pond_w_Page_69.pro
25807905a5c24f1e1cc490bcb48631c8
e72cfafd1c849a19849312eab8e86ab0a191a4dd
F20101118_AACWNM pond_w_Page_23.tif
0441c9b235ea28b9b8d973b5a138e9f5
c2ed426ab439a46549767efa700f2f387fc210bb
24908 F20101118_AACWXI pond_w_Page_11.QC.jpg
d24a63a1ac8f7be18dea909b380b8a1e
1bb736405fbf093239497d25c28255d9310094bf
79163 F20101118_AACWIQ pond_w_Page_68.jpg
6720387ef45dc31cccc68572cfdf8e90
e2717b23f292c2f7840cc06f6ffeb1e301d5fd59
42802 F20101118_AACWSK pond_w_Page_70.pro
ef19e6888248bb5e05fe04c733ee5653
cb14681fa81895c5f2d45142e8eb0055824c4e15
F20101118_AACWNN pond_w_Page_24.tif
009fb14f08ccce2ad7f7717108051873
1d14df5cef8d00517f615d1187177e08ee4ab4c8
5905 F20101118_AACWXJ pond_w_Page_12thm.jpg
8102a868c8fdb34eb006cbe201464720
c65e31ea8a4d0174876dca920a5fa2523bea2539
62714 F20101118_AACWIR pond_w_Page_69.jpg
60f2f99650251ef6b02ba24d5c1902a9
419068e46be20caee45eb7412485c9bb7c705341
47059 F20101118_AACWSL pond_w_Page_71.pro
110fbd8786fb4832da6af30e9e6da502
3f7a79dcb4cf50e8c188300e67fb77a7b9cb0ae3
F20101118_AACWNO pond_w_Page_25.tif
dd54c9e3632d67f827bc7e0ecad542fa
1f8ba98b525528dc06b2667c8669f7682478b9db
24860 F20101118_AACWXK pond_w_Page_12.QC.jpg
60810ea88754151f1b3a524533e52350
a2a6f559754f7f693ed40e33cc9b21e9698739e2
72121 F20101118_AACWIS pond_w_Page_70.jpg
5d0cf6315a433e6f2e831b9e8aebaf55
41cc314e5ea08c3df089d7f56fd66e38379d8634
51390 F20101118_AACWSM pond_w_Page_72.pro
e7b38deccb20e19fa76560ab2acb13ea
378b5999647aa65fdbc0b6fb53ae1ddd4575d1e0
F20101118_AACWNP pond_w_Page_26.tif
399c8eaadaee07b7fe95f0cb1b77a02d
92a2449c712f944ebd07e215ec44dd6a96f80c6c
5950 F20101118_AACWXL pond_w_Page_13thm.jpg
46f39c2fec7ee79ef5bb415aaf5f70c4
d7209ad594689cb8581c7d7135168b8f33b1355a
84984 F20101118_AACWIT pond_w_Page_72.jpg
81b0bde5d638f2b28616adb517b46523
954d9cf19c91ce1e015d685c524d6c3ef2a68e17
52038 F20101118_AACWSN pond_w_Page_73.pro
aa0e7ba10f5d7c2d94b89b21fca228e9
ba32623e4840bf0066a8fa56c44304bb4979bfec
F20101118_AACWNQ pond_w_Page_27.tif
9c6fd0d6ccd011a90eb7b2f0adf43eae
b971edfdb22efe8c6bc4cd0dac44b994858f0fe5
25625 F20101118_AACWXM pond_w_Page_13.QC.jpg
b29d87e9bb8ebac29916396014e30d74
5b52f163bbc2b070949aa70a061dc6a97741b005
85251 F20101118_AACWIU pond_w_Page_73.jpg
4dec23f3e7777bee808d6a648e58d67a
b2f681a4c2cae567d434eceadca3c83cdec40038
47575 F20101118_AACWSO pond_w_Page_74.pro
c28941098527e9cb531ba1491d6616b3
49f2c45c49fc75cc31d9a61fab9ea78dc791f22b
F20101118_AACWNR pond_w_Page_28.tif
460132296d88233ef6bd4d6d1cf35723
0c3b5ac65787ad166c0bee5783ebe296243958b8
6016 F20101118_AACWXN pond_w_Page_14thm.jpg
49b231c1f24b8d7f01827df334b43907
dad24f80960b1105687bcde0b941ea1196beb9a0
49727 F20101118_AACWSP pond_w_Page_75.pro
8533fd76c8a4a607f8eafcf665aa9c0e
fc1da6f0db182a40319674b20745f686bca32bb0
F20101118_AACWNS pond_w_Page_29.tif
d5350cd80a1ac185f97a3486d21e0cda
19e2e232747872953dc9d8c703e741cacfc96e36
78276 F20101118_AACWIV pond_w_Page_74.jpg
9999b7f3f459b8e4bdc8c9dceaa7b8c0
788aeb469fa7440e2ef071e35716197530f6c05c
50319 F20101118_AACWSQ pond_w_Page_76.pro
4b7ae8fdf6ab36cb5d4437531b1eda6b
59eb2dc9a02f49ac1d4d12ccce59428cc2eeeb9b
F20101118_AACWNT pond_w_Page_30.tif
08ae4d967647b2fecb8b86422ffd8ae5
1a51af89091a8c148943fd10acabc5abf069287e
82797 F20101118_AACWIW pond_w_Page_75.jpg
d30b85cb9f4d11debabd14969511712d
7e4468a275f84fc928254332bb123d63e5c0c780
24981 F20101118_AACWXO pond_w_Page_14.QC.jpg
3021f64c146e6e4bfc112ce053701a15
bcf7e895885cfed218e5b72a081a574f5ba6e52a
49873 F20101118_AACWSR pond_w_Page_77.pro
28311e101ea1d014e1dbcf66917b3dce
46e7cf99f1f3bad069d12fdcadf511e69ffed27a
F20101118_AACWNU pond_w_Page_31.tif
45014c58ba200878b0fbacc1d6041d04
4952f941b3e6a27f140c092aa268fb8918c23d9f
81958 F20101118_AACWIX pond_w_Page_77.jpg
3e3be6edd49390874746dc72a2304976
0fbcc37e62b6430a138473e2dd2380fbb84c9c30
5667 F20101118_AACWXP pond_w_Page_15thm.jpg
faaf5af3b587359264765baebde8a163
dab672179bee638c923bbd84621e61b613c0fd7c
40705 F20101118_AACWSS pond_w_Page_79.pro
a5a2b11bfbef2d9435b609e2273cc96e
c44de1540006b47e3df94d94715fe23f7a7ef86a
F20101118_AACWNV pond_w_Page_32.tif
f417d2cfffa39544899c1971f843eee3
4de34c6558899c8f12eb9f224e05b14c084d067d
79857 F20101118_AACWIY pond_w_Page_78.jpg
227d65bc60362f8900bc30922da36b82
714540ecdda4112d5448115aef508986577533ba
23929 F20101118_AACWXQ pond_w_Page_15.QC.jpg
3fe215b539c3c51278204f4cda61c38e
21d099f8675b8f9a89e53fa5b72b375c331efd1a
45941 F20101118_AACWST pond_w_Page_80.pro
5f15de9f2faee45f4f33259fb654f5c4
4190b2594c3049aca64d3ccf2418c1fafbbb58fe
F20101118_AACWNW pond_w_Page_33.tif
f9a1ba2183979abd1b8af05d0646a5e0
52dab9bf85de178fa8979b775e87a80af72e1095
101696 F20101118_AACWGA UFE0014303_00001.mets FULL
260e6716318a97beac0cfddadafbd6c2
c3cd5fd5d4ef273dba3d6d81728b17175aa09e2d
68081 F20101118_AACWIZ pond_w_Page_79.jpg
c634badcbc61a3d87bba53af36d5e0ca
f678747364b804b2f4deb01c2543f3a4d3024153
6195 F20101118_AACWXR pond_w_Page_16thm.jpg
ab87f652fa2bf97dfade8c98a683ede9
0694458049bb0cbf3c4b389015c768885111fb92
11079 F20101118_AACWSU pond_w_Page_81.pro
9dbdbe239fe3418208a2f6618842f113
fb6bfb307bf92b7ad95cb0e53fca2399c4fd64c5
F20101118_AACWNX pond_w_Page_34.tif
ac75af412165fb42e6fd3883756bdc2d
c804437423848d222bc3e1b65dfaf4f78b1bb7d7
24658 F20101118_AACWXS pond_w_Page_16.QC.jpg
80229936402998d887dea7c2f0442fc1
221a2a9c04a1d8d4703e24e68328938ebd636873
51901 F20101118_AACWSV pond_w_Page_82.pro
2f1c20398f7249ec7771b69ba379ed7e
b9f6fd6daa9e0cbb45719b785cefb08daa12caa6
107486 F20101118_AACWLA pond_w_Page_45.jp2
b936472563630acf9ab3766178b079d4
d33af197e0719b8f13f17333bfc07cbf41447486
F20101118_AACWNY pond_w_Page_35.tif
e588c7278821bd8961a62e75c5f894f2
1c5a7623ddc8cdcd467c8baa6450bde5ecd803bc
6137 F20101118_AACWXT pond_w_Page_17thm.jpg
12702e9730f6c2a107a22f7b4ff76da1
57987cd4916d11d2ed343718f1aff25da2aa6294
52657 F20101118_AACWSW pond_w_Page_83.pro
3b353ea7aecb92f3d299416e4b1d2e95
5811dd0bb695abb93e70f01fa746f5241aa0c3a8
110694 F20101118_AACWLB pond_w_Page_46.jp2
aeaad0b58f5cda273d86938a2f7c1ac9
af5c478af267d83419aa3f3e7c1bf079146dabf4
F20101118_AACWNZ pond_w_Page_37.tif
4473cf08ace4b045ca0de2afabddaba3
a6024ba541ee57a586cd807627e06cbffd4535d3
19407 F20101118_AACWGD pond_w_Page_01.jpg
cfacab2fce1c9702108ae18961bf59e6
a09d43e7e1fc99357b84d923ff8f67571d63054f
24204 F20101118_AACWXU pond_w_Page_17.QC.jpg
081abfe1b664983136c61b5c8fad01f4
63384989fdb4b834c5c142eb9b6ac833acea138e
56047 F20101118_AACWSX pond_w_Page_84.pro
3d966f967c15f3bd6b120a6ffeb3bcf1
b9f4c7730f8d54c40c58744a5c34d3600a6c9db8
4045 F20101118_AACWGE pond_w_Page_02.jpg
f905818cad6e0d3e52cd45d06a921e9a
0ace9d002cafd7c9464faa522588d5027ac124ff
F20101118_AACWXV pond_w_Page_18thm.jpg
312c466cf9328d320e749263c9b4dc1b
1e805814ff8637c613f344d4927114c3baaafea3
56814 F20101118_AACWSY pond_w_Page_85.pro
5bc388687f784c56820866343cf56be9
13c557cab2016f424ad92e580caa57e076f2ccb1
110172 F20101118_AACWLC pond_w_Page_47.jp2
6d531274bdb4f82dc065d9e18f01f2f6
b5782b9801502819708eb76107077cd327d78b25
49254 F20101118_AACWGF pond_w_Page_03.jpg
d7e6c4d39caf3e6075aafcf8e6ec1cdf
4fb41b1ea551bb35e5ce79af3d8607acbd9a42de
38756 F20101118_AACWQA pond_w_Page_06.pro
a5183e6da3c21df6b2987d7ea9d1940f
13738c46b6e57c7a63d4b7bcf4277bd6455a1a89
25774 F20101118_AACWXW pond_w_Page_18.QC.jpg
8013f4456ca4db3d9e2d34393b2b917d
24464766ea5b4c42909bbbc862dff99465a507bc
56780 F20101118_AACWSZ pond_w_Page_86.pro
dc0733c5081ca04142efbaf8fffae9dd
360f4fb1b500ba2949e9830535f0f75543012597
103513 F20101118_AACWLD pond_w_Page_48.jp2
47c1c34037f95de597690ec2b863f65c
32d0dbf5c41b51eaef053b4333a0a277540c9ed8
80804 F20101118_AACWGG pond_w_Page_04.jpg
3680e3ae6d8320cfecc81fa03ad972fe
208d023ee7b95e4a9eb288e3959a8f08821b3e61
39815 F20101118_AACWQB pond_w_Page_07.pro
322896f2aa60966366200aa9d91155c4
035996529633e59b88ba7843f46e087d41428edc
6110 F20101118_AACWXX pond_w_Page_19thm.jpg
74af78628093d7aec071f2ae8e8cddae
83af7e0db68142927b28b2a48e494fb520a046ed
111110 F20101118_AACWLE pond_w_Page_49.jp2
b60c3fcf8cbafb8e3bbad740cb901202
b80fd7c1624d203111bc6c3ee0d09b313886eb6a
43220 F20101118_AACWGH pond_w_Page_05.jpg
3589416b05f7eec86cac8be79e077e49
9a6d02b2258d1e639ffc22bd5c65e89f7874cca9
44568 F20101118_AACWQC pond_w_Page_08.pro
4754aff05654c6272e8a83b704f27276
4d81138676199772bb6d007d868ce71beea783e4
25145 F20101118_AACWXY pond_w_Page_19.QC.jpg
58b8619db3dae71d0f16b3b3c60391d5
c295e5bd583845729d569be041484116f8c999a9
2321 F20101118_AACWVA pond_w_Page_56.txt
9c514f74e562a1a5ef79ff12badfa9c7
276730d12d24ccbae1360f48a68bb6bdca5a595e
107361 F20101118_AACWLF pond_w_Page_50.jp2
f303097464b8abdf33bf10a320613d6c
a76edb24410150545d87e8ee7eeac1925ab2ecd1
66595 F20101118_AACWGI pond_w_Page_06.jpg
f58f37c82f6435d94e85b3f2b8b7e6cc
e0fc90ea651333d1291203cf8a0db3638d9b9d1e
49739 F20101118_AACWQD pond_w_Page_09.pro
010bc6c73040614be653401a28594b71
8d112bc1deff238447a1bdcf7ab741025f4d1152
5604 F20101118_AACWXZ pond_w_Page_21thm.jpg
59e3bc36624bbe4b1de89881f01a00fc
f0ca438e0a1852ac1422673039a14284ad27b656
2268 F20101118_AACWVB pond_w_Page_57.txt
bcac5b51b46b625ccab525547fc21eb5
f625a0bcdaad0dfde704aa88622d3495db9e1579
118337 F20101118_AACWLG pond_w_Page_51.jp2
4a068152b034008d9377bebaf453c7aa
40cf59dec22400fa301a67da0e481364b2ae8010
66724 F20101118_AACWGJ pond_w_Page_07.jpg
32ad16cafa24e557906605a711698e61
bf800ad0a76f2d4dd6c03381ff51ca1471ab054f
48802 F20101118_AACWQE pond_w_Page_10.pro
d39fbb638e709a1ccc94738b862e34d1
5bd4f4c8c6adae63b76545cd2b314d64e60577c9
2174 F20101118_AACWVC pond_w_Page_58.txt
4e2fb0d5c45f75d63e27541a5bea15ad
00a8683f835978a08a079892ab956186457152e5
114635 F20101118_AACWLH pond_w_Page_52.jp2
6f3972848534a3210665f463c506b02f
cd11b83943d3f1f51e7b73dd1fb5798d8bcc967c
74696 F20101118_AACWGK pond_w_Page_08.jpg
d4c70291c538934a681735ba6c711379
5ef9e5dc175a052a760f336511e83964a9592e5b
49095 F20101118_AACWQF pond_w_Page_11.pro
1bb0bfdaaf33bae5715f7065f2d552a4
071690605a09785374a800a2461491672735eba6
24457 F20101118_AACXCA pond_w_Page_78.QC.jpg
13a7eb06e3649d679b39d18e4f6da723
bb3f63725673b4fbf127d4d7070858c85fdbdc93
2008 F20101118_AACWVD pond_w_Page_59.txt
df7d7f6417422a6d1ff7d69bd57bc32e
9ac945acede3cf5c1d4aa28f09cc571f23b6acb9
107364 F20101118_AACWLI pond_w_Page_53.jp2
a5b432def10e0e135e9b1bd991a86a9b
67cfd7313f62167bcb712169ca1a9e415f27f04d
82372 F20101118_AACWGL pond_w_Page_09.jpg
a836ac849e0529724ad740206f7f244a
3be57c7304c02ae0eac539d23ce3a9cec8c782f9
48366 F20101118_AACWQG pond_w_Page_12.pro
0c5474a16f3d66b544f5ea3704c7be94
5c30d66ed9272891294fae7be7b1be444e822c0b
5110 F20101118_AACXCB pond_w_Page_79thm.jpg
b739e16dd7eb9b5e6c816b13be7f25f0
9aeafaae5ab90fc7835140a8a2d14b8af6b3a846
1916 F20101118_AACWVE pond_w_Page_60.txt
2f952626429a68eb956ea04bf956a5e6
c927865a2b7ab1f3394faff3824a4846a7317967
74606 F20101118_AACWLJ pond_w_Page_54.jp2
e1ee024d991705bbc0ea093999cbbd02
f0ab39267c730e151939cb609bb982fec73cf444
81298 F20101118_AACWGM pond_w_Page_10.jpg
54ea69993a77445383233179e67196e5
df288e0438ae6079395772853047bb2c8de95d39
21473 F20101118_AACXCC pond_w_Page_79.QC.jpg
f8c4d981d3ab43eaa0315ce0d2b4d2bb
4ff706e219259e32d7bccb592a17d08dd8282ab4
1933 F20101118_AACWVF pond_w_Page_61.txt
0dc378f47f704815643da3afe7eca103
4b0e6a4c3dda3eb5faf80652e1170d031c4cb400
97035 F20101118_AACWLK pond_w_Page_55.jp2
aa2e740775844dece7b3eb9369cc61f2
5f9d7c0dcdf654f1699443bb4eb9b647fa150989
80385 F20101118_AACWGN pond_w_Page_11.jpg
3e2eb313dd433085d569932a20bdf7ad
6faf542d50f576917e77ecf7a898254f169faebf
48834 F20101118_AACWQH pond_w_Page_13.pro
8cd1001bed24612090b2d3f19b186721
1e1f7b1983b091ef47fad60f473f46970aee2446
5205 F20101118_AACXCD pond_w_Page_80thm.jpg
58e6606eb6e6ffd475426f0667fdc36a
ee3200bc60ce8726d4885a09f090a2d134c0ce0f
2161 F20101118_AACWVG pond_w_Page_62.txt
6c5c13e47d2363951725744464f4b0cb
62af23d4d4024c3d2bc9f3737136ec7eefaf3b76
119446 F20101118_AACWLL pond_w_Page_56.jp2
b080ef649d24a2dff5fa23eda48ae9b6
4c5b6fabce30457382032ff22e3742523a0ba28c
80295 F20101118_AACWGO pond_w_Page_12.jpg
9d374ffbb52ee6110b9c145a87b3a307
465808ff150cbe775bb4f50733d46480baac2209
48837 F20101118_AACWQI pond_w_Page_14.pro
596f037d2efcabe59f0e50cc342542d7
bd55b6d703d236731a594369e3b604a13203e06d
20587 F20101118_AACXCE pond_w_Page_80.QC.jpg
af119e9ef51983beeda996e4afd99581
5bfd9af18b405676c7f6a34b16be59d0e9c41403
1886 F20101118_AACWVH pond_w_Page_63.txt
b2cb8e28cfe4f42d9fd14741e70d14c4
69476422af4a9812c4027f734d82527128dced10
119441 F20101118_AACWLM pond_w_Page_57.jp2
ffcd0fa105a55ea3be889dead61ed240
0131176dea4fa271dd434d4375b9a2d594aa21cc
81212 F20101118_AACWGP pond_w_Page_13.jpg
ae617a491bf9cb85807111b21f52c88b
b6359d3056a8469c8fe0f1a4f147902f9feccb3a
51821 F20101118_AACWQJ pond_w_Page_15.pro
914e83ee0e3625047653441499a4bd4a
b3ca7eae1de3d220e98b160661ff4a9e329860e3
1502 F20101118_AACXCF pond_w_Page_81thm.jpg
fc78fd9c0fa47e142d631fc4bfda81d7
7ed8d1dca57f1f3953038ad08b26e3d5641dfc11
2218 F20101118_AACWVI pond_w_Page_64.txt
d2ac467961a97f3dd6d54037cce63350
2fd6a0a412190a2fc9526f43846ff57b76165c7c
116978 F20101118_AACWLN pond_w_Page_58.jp2
a9502d83a2638207f833f67b53c7fe2f
7743dc072e404a83be9809c8a6cd5aa7a15f12df
80122 F20101118_AACWGQ pond_w_Page_14.jpg
20949d57532762898323cdc6666fdc60
e2c2289d3773ca176aa2646509de079438b7b204
48877 F20101118_AACWQK pond_w_Page_16.pro
e040164a2405f5e6b6d8404cbde6d600
d73e92e61bebc89e533fc6f552473a484e21fccf
5662 F20101118_AACXCG pond_w_Page_81.QC.jpg
a50f71b1972029d4e4dccadf0a9f800a
6e275f51491d7c4a030843ccef9c0d5e275267c0
2187 F20101118_AACWVJ pond_w_Page_65.txt
ded080921f7f0d3a3636bcab8c20dc01
edc651313497c2e90bc68a67e237b2f5ea5399dc
1051937 F20101118_AACWLO pond_w_Page_59.jp2
70b99f3a399b9ee77a76a132afd499bc
590f57d727e4f1ee7418a9e747404ac1078fdac2
78832 F20101118_AACWGR pond_w_Page_15.jpg
621946e77c4d9866c85d3254edbf9c9f
d3fd4f96d1dca9c92353210691ad7bb8ff2abf73
47971 F20101118_AACWQL pond_w_Page_17.pro
be16e6d2db48b022d32cbde6424382dc
2e5ac66b4e1621c9e7fe9f608aeb62928e3488f9
5814 F20101118_AACXCH pond_w_Page_82thm.jpg
19cb52214630ca5b32a1dbf6343038bb
8134af13998d1b1c328fd1d76fe91f1839b440bf
2107 F20101118_AACWVK pond_w_Page_66.txt
bc7ad7814486564e2fa6932821f07f37
6b4565205e998a3a08cca87958e845453036691e
104098 F20101118_AACWLP pond_w_Page_60.jp2
76ac1cbcfb108216771bb6b688274be7
128e32c67ce6d7e35d1ed9340f34ed82fde58d27
80006 F20101118_AACWGS pond_w_Page_16.jpg
6612c37296831e733288ad11a60b8dcc
f89c824f70eb56f0a44ca8cdb4e888bed61e2bce
50733 F20101118_AACWQM pond_w_Page_18.pro
5e09b4f16d6802b1b5b3649a0e7fc84b
6dbe9a3e2b505cf448e25393066a6f9dffc29aeb
23806 F20101118_AACXCI pond_w_Page_82.QC.jpg
989656627c2cc0e6cb25d040554db8a7
b559466bdfe6d585b2976558e557fd65eeba3568
2019 F20101118_AACWVL pond_w_Page_67.txt
1583b61fc310d2682b2c766f9674a6c6
a1700537f693254d9b4c4543e8eec1aa5440cd68
103649 F20101118_AACWLQ pond_w_Page_61.jp2
f92a729567518228966420dfcb196839
ec1b09014799403c474d43840e528c077b89713f
77811 F20101118_AACWGT pond_w_Page_17.jpg
9a74d00000c4aaffb6c828d7f5699c8e
096d68a85768a9f65aed90f2fddf9f53e100a107
53784 F20101118_AACWQN pond_w_Page_19.pro
237ae9dcd0c48a56405f62f5e7c2b8a5
50651e048068e35761af95308d87f12b11bad67a
6435 F20101118_AACXCJ pond_w_Page_83thm.jpg
32f14c7887e5d879de7621050cadcfcb
b93549175bd423723dca54d0fee479edb8c2dd85
83807 F20101118_AACWGU pond_w_Page_18.jpg
ec5e48e4df9bc8f7117ea5ac75b66a86
090ef5e58b3c25c86a5a630f465e7c490531b1cc
38703 F20101118_AACWQO pond_w_Page_20.pro
61c772062d53df25718dd431b1962cfb
0a812db18b7ca23dec287709351ef6121881b772
117534 F20101118_AACWLR pond_w_Page_62.jp2
c9ba3e7c4f7fa20abeb60f4296083c90
14a5d4ce0bd8072c5f47620a720c6b8e3b1d1a85
25830 F20101118_AACXCK pond_w_Page_83.QC.jpg
fd1af71bfaf3e6dd2743ea6616f7d527
8a1fc96a774da9051c7d05c01aefb34af4c4f613
1948 F20101118_AACWVM pond_w_Page_68.txt
1aa0f19e9485c46e0b6ef192c4a15ac8
d1f015a191529312d191cd2c9ceff6770dda5ca6
83176 F20101118_AACWGV pond_w_Page_19.jpg
0a1d1b1f44c9f7055f2373c02011e69b
6fb5eb0810ecea752be3caea0c48a1f9f463af32
43039 F20101118_AACWQP pond_w_Page_21.pro
d8f85edd3f6d4146f34a63e0908a6731
a2e6b163ad13febbe26b080452d1afb4319d86a2
105129 F20101118_AACWLS pond_w_Page_63.jp2
8554cc30359a5f1ee5d0639d3662fd42
2862e37cbd7abc62de8cd90704c5088a7a853d76
6607 F20101118_AACXCL pond_w_Page_84thm.jpg
dba1218369ec13439ea91efa8ba5e346
22ff93941e94c1028fc2a8ef3ec8205f8b2a0b34
1494 F20101118_AACWVN pond_w_Page_69.txt
245fa45f0337f992379e593a8dd6de2e
b04cf572bb72fd0deb52d645fb9a1b0065311000
64146 F20101118_AACWGW pond_w_Page_20.jpg
f72f176dff06ebdc23728e08e642a3de
c3088993c62188f61ed123a417c6452eeb6d8ef3
51679 F20101118_AACWQQ pond_w_Page_22.pro
f06de05005667fa77b008b6b294101c6
ea95f72c23ba7b3c831e4622f183782da866fb7b
112873 F20101118_AACWLT pond_w_Page_65.jp2
b3a2cb6a89e602a9c615a9245b89bbd7
611b3d11303c06fbc227143e793bcd6fecb349fe
26206 F20101118_AACXCM pond_w_Page_84.QC.jpg
ce45f3add9d0f1e6f1c9476ac17f60d2
e9cf950ac4ffb06adad1be4930d2b9e3cd915a2d
1801 F20101118_AACWVO pond_w_Page_70.txt
7f61da64435808f4f504f69fd57ff424
664b705a3bd13ad2f5e244eb089405c02d6fe4af
73753 F20101118_AACWGX pond_w_Page_21.jpg
51dda4d929a2f932adf4d52c3bce7e1c
4eb8f15158a47325021924d8292a351070ffd283
50798 F20101118_AACWQR pond_w_Page_23.pro
e6c74083234c5126df282a32dafd43b9
4474a1bf7fa6a060dc791d515bab20eaa5b77625
113684 F20101118_AACWLU pond_w_Page_66.jp2
3e1691a0d60ffbbf7b91d4e172be09e6
28260574c79d734ecda2472ef24022722718fcaa
6692 F20101118_AACXCN pond_w_Page_85thm.jpg
34b78876c69cd21357326355310a528e
47b6899857a823c10aa3d5d5511b91a5e0261217
F20101118_AACWVP pond_w_Page_71.txt
f055414eaaa5a0a4540a3f58f0111fc2
38359618093632752adf3725f218eef73fcc65f1
81916 F20101118_AACWGY pond_w_Page_22.jpg
29fcf59d84f66e4f6862e680f6020506
39e7b5a425f7f66531727cc8b30da679514dc631
51357 F20101118_AACWQS pond_w_Page_24.pro
9117c7fb57f5772e8e017c1da854ecf5
27a2feda280cc20c82a63efb462aff5cf25c94c3
106639 F20101118_AACWLV pond_w_Page_67.jp2
8df88df94b9a7905b45d8f407c1f13d2
1268121b77b5719688ea91a0ea18bd0fa69f96f2
27290 F20101118_AACXCO pond_w_Page_85.QC.jpg
4d975caaaa1a115cb776c727ff960d57
1cfce28d17c74ea901073d35ffb6d704870b3f70
2022 F20101118_AACWVQ pond_w_Page_72.txt
fc6baf541caadb3738531afb78a00857
3ab1e1fe8c06d05b122ac0dbfd1ab487fe35db13
84041 F20101118_AACWGZ pond_w_Page_23.jpg
bc693e87782b914e72f87ececdf76ee1
9d2f4e40f97909004cda56a703efee7a0772512e
53138 F20101118_AACWQT pond_w_Page_25.pro
40ec89b5f1bca26cb05834a85f3d1b4e
b283599d6eb4f6842203685501c11da2f0d34afd
104697 F20101118_AACWLW pond_w_Page_68.jp2
0e50c86905f3723a59cab263c7745e02
f44fd94511b35c760da48e3b18077087df2c112d
6965 F20101118_AACXCP pond_w_Page_86thm.jpg
05d35241a52bea783c793e3372351186
5e08a75479a20bc910e8d48cb50144525c12f444
2075 F20101118_AACWVR pond_w_Page_73.txt
9817226968064102ef55200eadafce38
23e9bcb2412591edc60abd71e7cc9a10355528d1
48872 F20101118_AACWQU pond_w_Page_26.pro
d6a32ef72fd3be972281710bde0bc5b1
c9fc95b24892adf130903f732eebdea73bfddc5f
82315 F20101118_AACWLX pond_w_Page_69.jp2
fe5bc3502ab1d2d108f667cd10c933bd
f93299da0754bf35143dbc8c216593e53b15c8c6
F20101118_AACXCQ pond_w_Page_87thm.jpg
a2789d5996f784a3ae0df7157c5bd204
61fc7a5a8fbef7bd33f843f7074ec2931c362647
1997 F20101118_AACWVS pond_w_Page_75.txt
25ad87b3f4eea4ede42c95b2872d7a48
7100c4438eae13cb1bdecfd3d528cba8905bb23e
52735 F20101118_AACWQV pond_w_Page_27.pro
625f5b4700a1b2ca12579aadc8622b77
531f1f94deab229189e2d5d61b16d1bb7193b8c2
93849 F20101118_AACWLY pond_w_Page_70.jp2
31788a1e7baabb6b964c31f01e838747
6817c758dc549e96db2221e1a492499fd4cbfa6d
4897 F20101118_AACXCR pond_w_Page_87.QC.jpg
d1c5a5ecaab4ea2c130d6169d7389fcc
370678a578dcf6f44e1847c4396e7ada7963df93
1987 F20101118_AACWVT pond_w_Page_76.txt
5389528bcc03f29dd0e59068a506781c
2fc37094ad278fac30bd74759a97014039580ed3
62065 F20101118_AACWQW pond_w_Page_28.pro
2f2ad59d3b135f1806b7f8205d24ce4d
6d2629c2f1a7c1c461896b98194922643c4bd458
74575 F20101118_AACWJA pond_w_Page_80.jpg
a7a7cc23ee642aa6cdb7d2deab86351d
b983d509d2adcf45073f3435ff59f5298a0f1247
105074 F20101118_AACWLZ pond_w_Page_71.jp2
ceee98fa07bfd7cba5fbb8d8081e7278
51b650bf04479b71af79bd962e07b0eed2c84339
3205 F20101118_AACXCS pond_w_Page_88thm.jpg
046d63f8022406b90697829e67f2c120
5c7131a61087247717ba4f707fdb3f1e88126f02
F20101118_AACWVU pond_w_Page_77.txt
de357235363a70b18cca41df710fe485
cac16173c3c72b03c45938210d38f68dd1719d7c
57691 F20101118_AACWQX pond_w_Page_29.pro
e8e107ecb92823b0e790a2647be06a32
6a0ced03024745ba73f826518a73adfbd2ae371d
22754 F20101118_AACWJB pond_w_Page_81.jpg
96554336f8919b2a80c62838b2a2ffa1
e31257e719d619d9642941fd31d14edde2115807
1903 F20101118_AACWVV pond_w_Page_78.txt
0a68f2a747955d7fe21cfd02aaf8c83a
306a9c4b0199879e203d957cf67936352b3709e4
F20101118_AACWOA pond_w_Page_38.tif
a73fccc20ad218f1edbe494dcb56b11c
a37ebaebe79d20cd6dc06626790bc3544a908f2a
56865 F20101118_AACWQY pond_w_Page_31.pro
92b1b9b70846a9e4a1d26130e462c019
c3372ae20aa810de9cc7de82e7da2a412ed920d1
86092 F20101118_AACWJC pond_w_Page_82.jpg
92fe1cdc721f23906b9c84d67ad4295e
527a05b1ff882ac4d5543af68c11563035ec4896
F20101118_AACWVW pond_w_Page_80.txt
5b73a519fcf0c3248ed0f92e9a9c8797
a8e3f246720f10e158c2b79afd77b137dcb28588
F20101118_AACWOB pond_w_Page_39.tif
6ed765313588def313ab49dd8dfaf159
f36530c155315443d9b149047ff2bfc8c2a0db32
48381 F20101118_AACWQZ pond_w_Page_32.pro
34f97a81913786e372184a9f12529f30
240da42e9a9c8b583ae938b666b8b975c5c76711
93251 F20101118_AACWJD pond_w_Page_83.jpg
c0830a68395ae59179f70f7e34cd4afb
12d687c1214dffef3f00c119e91e8ea0e666046b
494 F20101118_AACWVX pond_w_Page_81.txt
f77f25eab42f1fe3ff25b9db239021f8
48c5433409c35006d9d5bc17e45e61a6189129a2
F20101118_AACWOC pond_w_Page_40.tif
baf7d95a7fe3acba700b3a8cfcba07e5
866741ad43d9b395e44a07947504e7169511e053
95338 F20101118_AACWJE pond_w_Page_84.jpg
f84274a04cb7588392151af2c7f8ddaa
f9b218521091904c8b4ea58f81ef153f7727e40a
2152 F20101118_AACWVY pond_w_Page_82.txt
9df0ca443c6b0e96805d97ce7eea3614
a831dea0b93cef49a455b98862ccaada5ebdb898
F20101118_AACWOD pond_w_Page_41.tif
c15baaa3f8252e64270e0fe2bda717f6
fef5bb0c87095e35795fb891610e3145b1e3ab21
99259 F20101118_AACWJF pond_w_Page_85.jpg
ced75739889c95205e9a29e4fb5a7fbe
ae8cdc48014263a03516c5e95c68d2691ae268dd
6941 F20101118_AACWTA pond_w_Page_87.pro
5bd27229f8ea222f429ec5de716d182f
c69cfacaa5c3f58375ae7da9f921b0411370117b
2185 F20101118_AACWVZ pond_w_Page_83.txt
dda243d0e6b992a3590edb6857c151da
9176df316d360d2cdfdf2de48a01e701cb38b80a
F20101118_AACWOE pond_w_Page_42.tif
9a82791a7f21da3aebb3c1f46bb40536
be4e9ec65c607b10af9b41c4fb5b99ce51cd368b
98202 F20101118_AACWJG pond_w_Page_86.jpg
4c55346ba571293a9929eedd2372ea0b
f6a930ead0feb2f2d2b472c823a114d9abfd9c82
21469 F20101118_AACWTB pond_w_Page_88.pro
bbe6f46db577d6be44fe2b571480d533
33cdcedc5ce2c013f159a31407859916a2ee6e1f
15703 F20101118_AACWJH pond_w_Page_87.jpg
72d196fa66b72cd059c13217eb7a4179
636265b6e3313e80501b890a8856ca1bec95bd12
430 F20101118_AACWTC pond_w_Page_01.txt
0ca7a65bdd6a6d0ef9a2922cc73e2c09
bebd8a841e36ee6b7be411a156e74bfa8ce87a50
6299 F20101118_AACXAA pond_w_Page_50thm.jpg
2fbf3eb6abda275902a17eb697cb5fde
7e7460120e5a42f18c2ba10c83d69714014a9f08
22465 F20101118_AACWYA pond_w_Page_21.QC.jpg
14febe7b2f7866560cc80f9144ecb4ad
68e650e1f7f7b50677960b620b854fb43a197c20
F20101118_AACWOF pond_w_Page_45.tif
91fe4f5c2fc0b56cbce2bf6fd240b5b3
415dc47ee2a406a4e4761df57280ef4cfa03e46b
39719 F20101118_AACWJI pond_w_Page_88.jpg
7362e81bcbabef4e4d69eb3a0a89f647
08d0b0e3a56ae8f2912f0f814ac6689be0d00c78
105 F20101118_AACWTD pond_w_Page_02.txt
2311bb9c63f8fe5b4ee21c183360fdbd
3f5965a75fdd6bf31eb9b62c3023a935efb9d921
25505 F20101118_AACXAB pond_w_Page_50.QC.jpg
6fc0836837f040b2944ad7dd319f373b
87e1a81501a8bdea23b92afc8f29728f28590727
25645 F20101118_AACWYB pond_w_Page_22.QC.jpg
3bdeab5fa8f0f373656b22a77e72d268
156e07cd8414411ab7c94a19959879d6ffc48fc3
F20101118_AACWOG pond_w_Page_46.tif
9c4895563af2d5e4f9b9bb58c2236150
9ac83622ef86f5ba314843ed2afaf2517f99b523
22563 F20101118_AACWJJ pond_w_Page_01.jp2
34cea0feb4ff6fef1c69daa91f37c276
bb17bea6d76eaabe44cbafd9f9d69e769e0e1d9d
1154 F20101118_AACWTE pond_w_Page_03.txt
c5a1d9474db4801b98dd7ddaed32de16
33ade0c5eb7cdb889640983069331a5fb2b0effd
6043 F20101118_AACXAC pond_w_Page_51thm.jpg
9ac405093c2517529da387eea79a1a77
fd7e367fdced38bf38eb8b710be919d945256844
6353 F20101118_AACWYC pond_w_Page_23thm.jpg
b03b2fd3f52804084179ed078e21a51c
aa20e8e398e595f3a908069c398868689571dcd9
F20101118_AACWOH pond_w_Page_47.tif
5ca67a13f7876382d8810ccf57799b7e
5c52f382e33ce13b0afff042cb11de17dacf0c5f
5459 F20101118_AACWJK pond_w_Page_02.jp2
3786156b941ffe0e3ec549f85854fb43
98ffe7d9d1bd836335b94caa917805bd2538d926
3400 F20101118_AACWTF pond_w_Page_04.txt
4ff2de74e73ffd583f0980270f59838c
84d375d52fe165a2935302572a4b068cda15e9ab
25396 F20101118_AACXAD pond_w_Page_51.QC.jpg
3d0c1c1b25e1c9f5fd2a4af918c11184
f4b3c58191da62c7bca5f10f6b1b73e56a24807e
25854 F20101118_AACWYD pond_w_Page_23.QC.jpg
aee2dec16da9a49695f396ea1c472d2a
4a9df957951c4effd997fe821a922998abbbf1e9
F20101118_AACWOI pond_w_Page_48.tif
dbf31aefd5464c5a8899b1879abe59f3
1de87902d0e457b634a49f140de7df202807dc96
62662 F20101118_AACWJL pond_w_Page_03.jp2
4731e7e9446a3d44339851d85aaea8d4
053e37363514bf8d3a098bdbfd4560cf17c70454
1744 F20101118_AACWTG pond_w_Page_05.txt
bc962d2f4827bfdedf8f8ffcf3dab8dc
2aab53d00849e38fc227886f3646afeed4ed7e8b
6473 F20101118_AACXAE pond_w_Page_52thm.jpg
d4d1015882d86bf329e7150ecea20152
ece77418054a47e822ad7978efcf8441975c0244
25639 F20101118_AACWYE pond_w_Page_24.QC.jpg
93482872ab3475379323f83f33a12727
be4626e6fa94cb3a8c2cd4757f00baec50f0ee0e
F20101118_AACWOJ pond_w_Page_49.tif
6ee526fc3be3f177b3f45769954ce63b
a8b00a53db34df7786d1dcb633bbe9ae13b809f7
1051961 F20101118_AACWJM pond_w_Page_04.jp2
e8a49f8a3a7d05fafbbd860d6116061e
7e3ea813a7c2623cfd9b9e6aab49bcd82cb5a218
1735 F20101118_AACWTH pond_w_Page_06.txt
6657d7d51422ec0166ea5db73e4f7642
de97fdfc90abf07dbd029817a4a6ade2b6075836
27586 F20101118_AACXAF pond_w_Page_52.QC.jpg
9dbdadc578506704f284ff54a39783b9
950259c156cc13e2697e22e9f311c643dc857d85
6465 F20101118_AACWYF pond_w_Page_25thm.jpg
edafacd35019e6d335f824988b87b678
e486586806492fde5fccd527d65e161229a5968d
F20101118_AACWOK pond_w_Page_50.tif
2b2978f57b723cf2cb6268787528169e
713b3d2dbad41e272b5083da6248365652e4157c
978564 F20101118_AACWJN pond_w_Page_05.jp2
887052c543bb24bbd01d15867e6756bc
11dd90918c34926cde3b788d5187b7541d3b4f66
1587 F20101118_AACWTI pond_w_Page_07.txt
3999ec5875d451ccdc84776a06b0cee3
c2fe5e3e27f3bb7c5d854403fad92d4d575cc7de
6488 F20101118_AACXAG pond_w_Page_53thm.jpg
a3e4ce2d615668a2eba45f94c5e02054
2d7700a0b9ef7b235de3513fa9ed793193a1202b
26709 F20101118_AACWYG pond_w_Page_25.QC.jpg
726756677e33ade11e6694b7938e2472
a6d4e15280b629eab661babb6c88bdb707c3453f
F20101118_AACWOL pond_w_Page_51.tif
3ab08a4c14c40eabe295edbc6974c798
d6488875f7f657cc1a87099027ef397801fd068f
85423 F20101118_AACWJO pond_w_Page_06.jp2
f9dfd4a97da747c3284b7d6b614fd383
0b6b0fbdbe2a5142cea599c7f1d1e52bb32ea3b2
1836 F20101118_AACWTJ pond_w_Page_08.txt
26b11f5f93581f2fb1755aac32d0e0c5
d009b204644bf15dd90ee8472bf17b2651e6b228
25443 F20101118_AACXAH pond_w_Page_53.QC.jpg
8282b9ac07644a6d17d49ed47c715c64
9b04073e79805d627d35734bfd8f6da0b14229d9
5967 F20101118_AACWYH pond_w_Page_26thm.jpg
92c21db8801733503d424e1cbab5c246
f1f8b2677d32db733edc35a26ba839410cadcc11
F20101118_AACWOM pond_w_Page_52.tif
7ff4f554b04bfaf9243e60be31abde9e
f2b80fda797d3f9940ce33260c2d0ac356b15046
88982 F20101118_AACWJP pond_w_Page_07.jp2
e82dfd3ae34016515dd24ee840ad342e
8e4a08d16ff2dd60608dc526815f3c8cf78775a0
4488 F20101118_AACXAI pond_w_Page_54thm.jpg
919a31a55b896c27c8e63bfa82b6dc81
2fc4fefdaf206aa4a00acd7efa6197389d0695d1
25112 F20101118_AACWYI pond_w_Page_26.QC.jpg
60f4892f3ad541bdcec22f342d800c85
c12b9c488d8c2f921fe6a36a30a428b8ded40076
96767 F20101118_AACWJQ pond_w_Page_08.jp2
47bbc5b9db2eed3953d03a3d1c83a792
92c508fce32d5260dae2adb8bbc43a9bbe7f534a
F20101118_AACWTK pond_w_Page_09.txt
df01f215d42e7b555243ba8d23de6663
f9dd58eef24d8d2ce1d70689177d6fad9452d447
F20101118_AACWON pond_w_Page_53.tif
fc896923a2a3e987e6c6dc62b635b781
b444df484dff2e3e4dc9a026611a04306608e7f7
18149 F20101118_AACXAJ pond_w_Page_54.QC.jpg
fcaf5812e0293d6a8440750e45f519d6
3dca5ecc1272ff77f99e60d27734d6f1ab89c227
5854 F20101118_AACWYJ pond_w_Page_27thm.jpg
8e8003098907ea60b03b727407d44722
d38bdc010cf3070fad855df5241c6778c3efc7fc
106989 F20101118_AACWJR pond_w_Page_09.jp2
7a548ca297c5f0e2fdefbea933d44869
cf57a030c8caf238c0c70cb980238cbdd51898d6
1953 F20101118_AACWTL pond_w_Page_10.txt
477b92980d3a2658442055ed2cbb8199
91c20fe253a6a45795a664cd5580cba2cd2211eb
F20101118_AACWOO pond_w_Page_54.tif
a771b15c1c750f6de5498a680ddf0bae
ef0029e300f22671668bb22a0a7f8b890aa5a0e9
5568 F20101118_AACXAK pond_w_Page_55thm.jpg
0ec16b8e822a7ddcb471c779384b96f9
cfebce2657b026baac96f3105bd6c6bdc6856208
6232 F20101118_AACWYK pond_w_Page_28thm.jpg
8945c622383745ab18c442d2802aebdf
ff55a9c1609d38d3fd1e18bbd36b5902460066d5
106072 F20101118_AACWJS pond_w_Page_10.jp2
c77218e97e734442e828363e4b894c05
3ca635fe62f9767a3ae1681dd5ad1431db6ddd2a
1935 F20101118_AACWTM pond_w_Page_11.txt
4cb935f8974ef092e3e47cceeb87a225
23f60f6a4c3c7c15355ec56ac12330bc1c88acd7
F20101118_AACWOP pond_w_Page_55.tif
838f1209a6af90414a3ed05c42d1655c
1c373529f8c501490735fb6e8c1f12e4c8a40d71
22927 F20101118_AACXAL pond_w_Page_55.QC.jpg
a7a3b4dd40d383718d3fa73b4430c3b4
39fc9a7d7ac8064e7ed8d71034726ce6c36e9e34
27365 F20101118_AACWYL pond_w_Page_28.QC.jpg
d431d75cb2786c86bb81d0b062804be0
2c250112afc9030a625fd0f86a2b5e9183a896e4
106099 F20101118_AACWJT pond_w_Page_11.jp2
f81679dd8d557bbb8241d1f47e2e920a
8b2931d65eafe0ebe20a5f1f9dcfd89a96d8635f
1909 F20101118_AACWTN pond_w_Page_12.txt
54e719f828e5f62a93d8cbc3e2755717
75e9333339ec544a452109f3f1a5248b545fc326
1872 F20101118_AACWEW pond_w_Page_30.txt
936c1207d297a4a07af1406724a193c1
adc4ec56c6c4c70b5fd1009f07a0fb64888f8ab7
F20101118_AACWOQ pond_w_Page_56.tif
ad2a25389b4dcc11690305ca572517f1
bcce7d3654be639940c85425942ca8adc91c92f9
6262 F20101118_AACXAM pond_w_Page_56thm.jpg
29b4e3e103920ad1e7719bce7ddb44ca
ed89abd1b3eba3359e8b34b4444bc68bde61febb
6468 F20101118_AACWYM pond_w_Page_29thm.jpg
d30639f908b8a4c7b8e36f805914dc8f
a9ea1d5cd46adb96b6abf423ff2e228ad5214cd9
105191 F20101118_AACWJU pond_w_Page_12.jp2
429106fb370fb806fbc6427edd2cce97
55773133d3e4ee41b34351cc8ca15c4f3c2fad59
1932 F20101118_AACWTO pond_w_Page_13.txt
471fc44fb1414213b38ac34dc73ac79f
014838d375bff0f17b5ebfb830406ed50e0580a5
27139 F20101118_AACWEX pond_w_Page_62.QC.jpg
903d4a6c5ed66392ae21a941b8d2724e
9c150cc937bacaaa6baf1f9d7e7a178b6008a3d4
F20101118_AACWOR pond_w_Page_57.tif
2647de2503834fb8dc2dcbe838c4fe72
41cc1596823d50e6416601682c1b4088b9679300
26844 F20101118_AACXAN pond_w_Page_56.QC.jpg
6a3003e6b9c1226ccad13159e7513261
d3e31c194258d855f79d57978bc1aed0bab1aecb
27090 F20101118_AACWYN pond_w_Page_29.QC.jpg
3470e81dec477d634b3810dd17109287
9ac0052a6b3b4f583b3c5edf07c5e9af11bd729b
106689 F20101118_AACWJV pond_w_Page_13.jp2
6c081f29aedb20fffa501d91b94cc4e2
1aed74c6a25be91eae85e1d7f3bda7bb5ad23682
2040 F20101118_AACWTP pond_w_Page_15.txt
42a6c97c81c060c87e084736a1bfea0e
356f47bd7257658561eec871e0ce4a96f753b593
1930 F20101118_AACWEY pond_w_Page_14.txt
93d663d70a522fdcfa8e5516e47c1ffd
b3bc9e9f9191a4993c829f55dfb4ce6725c35df1
F20101118_AACWOS pond_w_Page_58.tif
730325787d3828f954d0b741151c0478
652dacde3fce8556a8f6e13215ee5a824e611422
6404 F20101118_AACXAO pond_w_Page_57thm.jpg
983decb4b4d5f41ff400c2e21cb03823
a670e7fedde36ff50dfba51b06d9da900f4d8e9f
5319 F20101118_AACWYO pond_w_Page_30thm.jpg
7e84ebf7cbb60539d2ecb330a2198e22
04658b13e00c443d4a8d84ba3ed086da4024075d
104474 F20101118_AACWJW pond_w_Page_14.jp2
5611f3d81caaa5081fbb42a4e6b6c61f
efcc2857c644db63eaddd0b3158a45d2c4af7a48
1940 F20101118_AACWTQ pond_w_Page_16.txt
91969bf6b7398d4265eb404e3166e4a1
001ad8091890415efff7df2a010dfcd68158e1e6
4944 F20101118_AACWEZ pond_w_Page_20thm.jpg
2bd82cb21d849cab6304ab7f35ed0591
598133cb8aa23a03dc97a5d53eb48d7754fc6d76
F20101118_AACWOT pond_w_Page_59.tif
c857ad8b56bde08a3055d5d893110820
a1ed87419522213e30c3b638d6572ab39894af62
26659 F20101118_AACXAP pond_w_Page_57.QC.jpg
adcacfac5ef8246d18d6e0d5a7b24578
f304972d428e5b2dbfe607c43ec700faa32a2b56
106497 F20101118_AACWJX pond_w_Page_15.jp2
4493db1ed7df48d40987b1cf74060c31
4fcbaa1ed3438cf00f94a9fa0c3c43cd788e8d2e
1898 F20101118_AACWTR pond_w_Page_17.txt
4a54c55cc839055625eb53f4bc10d0d9
e79abc780f0348f1bca96a3c2ca960f11f073293
F20101118_AACWOU pond_w_Page_60.tif
6ac3b1a8eec9f759ac2dad84e2ba97b9
dcd8fdbcf57af194233827d4da5958432121e1c8
6335 F20101118_AACXAQ pond_w_Page_58thm.jpg
a3b97deb43681327380bb111d89456e0
85243d65c8b79cf2b46f23bd7e05a1764c4802cc
21537 F20101118_AACWYP pond_w_Page_30.QC.jpg
0817f125a9f869adcdff7325e23b47b9
519af98cc9f95c7300d0c1d66e520c833e0ceb74
105101 F20101118_AACWJY pond_w_Page_16.jp2
a752d018987a67207cf7c4227977e86c
8cfb764486a4f5fb3ffe808da704be9ce3891648
F20101118_AACWTS pond_w_Page_18.txt
9072c8d30695247064fc9af14febd740
e87dbbc2b1337fccd045799e9f8e9dddba14b227
F20101118_AACWOV pond_w_Page_61.tif
620bfcfede2e10db0fc69e6213f8e2fb
92e759db18256df8b138eb28daae72c7681cad43
6131 F20101118_AACXAR pond_w_Page_59thm.jpg
2ea069c123c7ae3a89f7ee4a76575566
71cfc0ed47591388fbf54fdd4160ac505e662945
27008 F20101118_AACWYQ pond_w_Page_31.QC.jpg
e44f12722c879e03e6f00aac787ad747
d7878a50447f4ba8fd6f92f20f9927e2727c5685
110039 F20101118_AACWJZ pond_w_Page_18.jp2
5cb88cee6d2ffc72afb34c199a42b8b4
5331baacc8773180a6d47083153fe164c2299c6c
2135 F20101118_AACWTT pond_w_Page_19.txt
6ff1f63a6c98d6b9d37d8cef11e0a641
53f00bbf9b96875ddc131a183f351004f9f6201b
F20101118_AACWOW pond_w_Page_62.tif
8354b47f288b058f69235f28a6bf97f5
5fa4d50f3d31aed7190e156b1d5936f210f14073
84179 F20101118_AACWHA pond_w_Page_24.jpg
4c2596dee578101144b6d8835bd0b4e3
1e1d6b72f0814a5264fcdf265e1c0f74011fc0a9
25500 F20101118_AACXAS pond_w_Page_59.QC.jpg
eac9552db1caab99d4531b90ff2de18b
621f35042ed26b82b7fa6ba7b7089c8d3c198c9b
5681 F20101118_AACWYR pond_w_Page_32thm.jpg
a5d3a09d6682fb80a9d4af2ac8d9eeb4
7cd6ce6e37021e39b6ca12a170c3ffb320ddc372
1785 F20101118_AACWTU pond_w_Page_21.txt
212fad94eb2fdd27bc25630c33a008c2
df11cd116f03d78d911cd35d2a493eae17d33233
F20101118_AACWOX pond_w_Page_63.tif
cf73ff772be6c42dafbf77f68740e9f3
c4f9058bb6793239773236120347de3396f422c0
85603 F20101118_AACWHB pond_w_Page_25.jpg
9ef83b9f21ab30e9185e82d6755f09c9
d4d603855b86591f7f99b5f1375f9606ce70d45b
6095 F20101118_AACXAT pond_w_Page_60thm.jpg
93f1f7de23a37bec96ac2da9731b210a
95cb2ef464b530518f77d46295c69377b8d0a5da
22944 F20101118_AACWYS pond_w_Page_32.QC.jpg
4b9c3315a795083bfb7ad3dc6e363fc2
98793859730e5d5a0f7be1bfaf8e1ff3e63ea4dd
2025 F20101118_AACWTV pond_w_Page_22.txt
bd959b8ae5485cf17afb9b7bb24bcb58
9c665ac17180d76431174e676094d79fd78f3769
112995 F20101118_AACWMA pond_w_Page_72.jp2
dbb2cb5885f36b1df6b3bc2977017624
d058fc8d0e1b44ef817f05e8508679f1d67ea623
F20101118_AACWOY pond_w_Page_64.tif
8c1fc73412c1e26b9ffad5e7349e50b9
4ddcc4b4e6fc88a2240f18d00f94ec323ae3a26e
81744 F20101118_AACWHC pond_w_Page_26.jpg
9646892cb5855494056ad33876a72d40
a64763f3272a2dbb158daaa35cc7951a0ad4e2a7
24618 F20101118_AACXAU pond_w_Page_60.QC.jpg
0119620f5984d1003bb2d44fbbc11b22
c8321e9baaaf8d0b11e4bd6e1bb22d04898e720c
6284 F20101118_AACWYT pond_w_Page_33thm.jpg
6e8eeb72d908658edb9bcc807d0bee3f
f4ee1f622932da93750bd3db873838d68bef2bbc
1993 F20101118_AACWTW pond_w_Page_23.txt
c67939458f81c1f4e9d88113f2e7a9fb
d8cf379d9f0bc89c80ad8e29c1f7a2fba9cf0bca
112432 F20101118_AACWMB pond_w_Page_73.jp2
6b1da88f3b8743841774661dc1f96ff4
22e34cac3c16518342107b051bf4d7897f414069
F20101118_AACWOZ pond_w_Page_65.tif
4c0322c2370d04cb0b3d5eb62e365f2f
bb122cf97064e1a1886fccfae1436e88eca8e23d
79904 F20101118_AACWHD pond_w_Page_27.jpg
23c2c710aae640186f320333f7705bcf
6bbf72a3f97c1654faf678d6b0660116193fb690
5909 F20101118_AACXAV pond_w_Page_61thm.jpg
d957097bc589bd4cc58cf389abe24689
65f5a15ceaae2b41e4c55a395f7110420c916e38
24925 F20101118_AACWYU pond_w_Page_33.QC.jpg
ec73b9604acbdc759f5bc0c9800dcc1b
a114054fcdb97590d0468e1d37b1800a8afa9179
F20101118_AACWTX pond_w_Page_24.txt
355ece9ca5ecfcaeb1e61fa3104e4527
1e9e8fae4e81e09874e7777f8599f677e9715752
103325 F20101118_AACWMC pond_w_Page_74.jp2
b264a4a6db15cdc4f2db4b204b4ba398
0250548335fa3abc34fd9eb62fe6b5fcfc4d73a7
100932 F20101118_AACWHE pond_w_Page_28.jpg
6ee98759bbe7e786678095bf276bce95
0908c2a7423d5387584c42b0d7435a24025f5565
6349 F20101118_AACWYV pond_w_Page_34thm.jpg
3ec854697305b065b8881f37e7de3df8
d128d43578e9283ba7bb68e764eaf24ba8a0033d
53270 F20101118_AACWRA pond_w_Page_33.pro
9f202ab47c86489a4d6836dbfda997f9
0f69e8f80e7248db92fb1d8a6277565298f95d67
2089 F20101118_AACWTY pond_w_Page_25.txt
4fd10c336913e93afcdcde21332e2be0
efa2777aa12d1ef1869153b760fa1cbab30556c7
92008 F20101118_AACWHF pond_w_Page_29.jpg
e8c11ae980ddacb7ca7be87ee66a215f
ac7829e1f7021f1fa49c7fc873e9274af2571178
24872 F20101118_AACXAW pond_w_Page_61.QC.jpg
146cedeef57abbe8ffd42b9cc70821dd
e38d57beba9f432a0769600ddc94b5501488d315
25391 F20101118_AACWYW pond_w_Page_34.QC.jpg
25092b2781a189e13de925940e668125
bbbbdfc48e4128cdc793698e2f4d531e0e33e7cc
49702 F20101118_AACWRB pond_w_Page_34.pro
07248660c44f850f5d0fe303d30c14a3
9b8805403421a80b69a4c304a19b223686880c29
1929 F20101118_AACWTZ pond_w_Page_26.txt
cfadfcda9910e81d73c7b6572a7f7a4a
e69e9ad344bdca2c3836d1106cfb87227bd118e0
108060 F20101118_AACWMD pond_w_Page_75.jp2
b1d8fcb31db76b5b65b599c5438d56a0
48970dbc5d0aee065efd646d4532957927c4b550
75842 F20101118_AACWHG pond_w_Page_30.jpg
60cd103f45bb578a35c3deb84b5f665b
495294174bca36f5aa540f010c27c3d1155787f0
6456 F20101118_AACXAX pond_w_Page_62thm.jpg
e2d840381d8edc01c44e48cb02018187
95e84e47ef40e4fec730576f58ac1a55b14337d5
6314 F20101118_AACWYX pond_w_Page_35thm.jpg
77c81318188ad8938da731135a437f55
37444eedc092acee60fa51a7d81f3801cd53cc1e
52458 F20101118_AACWRC pond_w_Page_35.pro
58b515e39ac13361241b851f6ac3b411
5aeeda1a87c36619a58fc9199ad0214a60bf40fb
108605 F20101118_AACWME pond_w_Page_76.jp2
d3b928e7207c49a2209023a77be85544
01856856804f5f1da9bafce17575ddf55dc7690c
88482 F20101118_AACWHH pond_w_Page_31.jpg
b5f8b51dc554bf74602397528a49b65e
a73fb2cb1aeac6e7425d243be8ef5abc879b48a9
6048 F20101118_AACXAY pond_w_Page_63thm.jpg
27e0d51f75766b8d9276379b1dca9aa0
6b2c2d7887e0db02436d3015fa0bbdec79f5f756
26334 F20101118_AACWYY pond_w_Page_35.QC.jpg
1b10093dda87e39f8fda134e1d4ba333
afc47828c33dd4ad54f28999ba2218c924d9f789
2313 F20101118_AACWWA pond_w_Page_84.txt
0a104a7aadab753e11dbab4265478e6b
8ec62b697879a720fa3cc5fdb32aed2281bf2fc7
52108 F20101118_AACWRD pond_w_Page_36.pro
31e255c9747f4f707a3c3a3a72aa5482
eb2be3ae8d3da6706b2b82a07f00a4758b1c485e
107497 F20101118_AACWMF pond_w_Page_77.jp2
272f7caebca03191e6457baa791ec03c
e2b30ac45f2c9e4aac1dc607ef3f06f50a76faeb
78898 F20101118_AACWHI pond_w_Page_32.jpg
53bcb25e8cba5f8817af88d809c19a3e
3f5661d3f674639d11b65390ff5b2bb06e054eb9
24571 F20101118_AACXAZ pond_w_Page_63.QC.jpg
dc1ba27a7a1f2a2474c7336a10d0f48a
c7a0e687d2863bdd919875deccdf1b4cc82e2558
6437 F20101118_AACWYZ pond_w_Page_36thm.jpg
44e77e694c8bc02cc18957fa9203f1f7
6d9ed2373a793e29533869945d4cdc05271387fa
2356 F20101118_AACWWB pond_w_Page_85.txt
02f989935630fd60132bee30863d9674
a8479419aaa86c56cca7ed953f8c40ffe1abe9b0
51417 F20101118_AACWRE pond_w_Page_37.pro
ee03270c44c3fb255d2bf8487e8e3c77
d1753dac5e2ff83b1be057fbddacbbeeec035c41
104946 F20101118_AACWMG pond_w_Page_78.jp2
eb8809f987068e16bbde113cc7e7f8b7
e3c4e9e343710b5202994d6810a7021fe1c28b70
84539 F20101118_AACWHJ pond_w_Page_33.jpg
21f21abc76fc3cc95beae2fa8999614a
1d4e53fa305664b15e4bff8b13b4ffe53d9ad1ca
2325 F20101118_AACWWC pond_w_Page_86.txt
556650a6d68d0227ca680dcdff5905e7
446d0f23ec0ed7c09f88cb86e1535f4d5c8951c8
49122 F20101118_AACWRF pond_w_Page_38.pro
b0086131af47ea8319ef7278e0b25907
e461ceb3099a99f852d1427c7db2868d619d33bf
98992 F20101118_AACWMH pond_w_Page_80.jp2
6647dd00fc2ee3d6d7308c2318b34d6e
8c8d66e92866752e5902fcbda3adc65694078ad7
81975 F20101118_AACWHK pond_w_Page_34.jpg
5548bcef1a26aaa2171e67166fc747db
a5a66df7777ccba4e1a572a8c62f350deba705ae
326 F20101118_AACWWD pond_w_Page_87.txt
6854665c5910d9b635164f35f9487e47
bc2c3ad79f2b85671c1d40ba053e8bb3da07838a
51156 F20101118_AACWRG pond_w_Page_39.pro
0e062082ae2b144ad9e97ab5679a82b3
f3e36629da61ae13be8f81def555c37dd689ef44
26738 F20101118_AACWMI pond_w_Page_81.jp2
8c0d5cbb7987e86ed9d94718295f3114
a4730e7cfce429435f01e6e64afc1b24ec447793
85873 F20101118_AACWHL pond_w_Page_35.jpg
9aa8ba026e52bffd974b6bb335594a66
5559751fdbaf364a5ec8fdd89c18c989997083a8
900 F20101118_AACWWE pond_w_Page_88.txt
67b41af5048d766ee12249a8ed981ef8
ad883998d0f4f2895996cf60e27dd106e9dc24d5
53019 F20101118_AACWRH pond_w_Page_40.pro
8d31c5ca630286a1c7504559a4a0dcef
dfcef9d674e408f847e394c1444477581ef886d9
1051982 F20101118_AACWMJ pond_w_Page_82.jp2
3fd42f62fa58fef7b16914c90bd9cb1d
8941d0886f18345eb36821868fa9a024bc27c935
82184 F20101118_AACWHM pond_w_Page_36.jpg
55f8c7f537d5e7570b4f831f700380ad
8fcc457c27a9fef563bbd682a939d3989417d10c
1640 F20101118_AACWWF pond_w_Page_01thm.jpg
95a504a06ac4120e305e5cae7cbce190
8d6c23c3931c85426c788a37b35ab8413ce20589
1051975 F20101118_AACWMK pond_w_Page_83.jp2
ac57978cd7a25e215a5d7a2566b65869
45d5c0666e1b59edaaf48230f15618ce515c0693
82153 F20101118_AACWHN pond_w_Page_37.jpg
2c16626aca63d0d2698f28fe525b2053
596c2ae6eb440e9e6dfa9fad7170b90d3af4e481
297277 F20101118_AACWWG pond_w.pdf
98dc7cf49894b78763cdb700b73eaff5
e0f3db9b148133c342a743ae4d5b61f8435387b6
BROKEN_LINK
www.trueque.org.ar
45823 F20101118_AACWRI pond_w_Page_41.pro
dfb6cb80f007a4f1346e21f1d4fed974
cc6aadc689ad79c87dd28c783abd3879cadbb129
1051984 F20101118_AACWML pond_w_Page_84.jp2
e0811183f1ef7e58a1c6516b144e23d9
84228b8be2cec05ef19a4d4324a4047cd5a02c53
82407 F20101118_AACWHO pond_w_Page_38.jpg
2795f4eb7b58eb6e15e932a578ebc20e
1ebaf163d8a6061a299a8c0d23bb4113c0b4b023
20230 F20101118_AACWWH pond_w_Page_20.QC.jpg
e9e8cc0fece9208a0e69f1f375dc8d56
6c12549e39f4da2b7c86935c5421106cede9c0cd
1051971 F20101118_AACWMM pond_w_Page_85.jp2
db986ed6878546cc689bdb58a871036b
5f414fda9b31c02d52e6250cf329843446686ff9
83731 F20101118_AACWHP pond_w_Page_39.jpg
bb5c75d5005caac71a4a9a1c59a237e1
346f592a2d0fc0a6bbfb1389cad0c32415b62811
31474 F20101118_AACWRJ pond_w_Page_42.pro
ff0777d120dd066c5ec0f7c8ae527a77
cd7b68202f1f82cf23296cb2dde5e1979a17a672
F20101118_AACWWI pond_w_Page_22thm.jpg
11540d71528491cd6c429e8bdfd68fd4
926aa66f698dc20b79378de407714f70367b2c4c
1051972 F20101118_AACWMN pond_w_Page_86.jp2
6a17a35400dc18bcb2c903b82f3eb78b
a1af424a4e615164b613c4373dfeec9d1b0096a8
84693 F20101118_AACWHQ pond_w_Page_40.jpg
16ac123b8d2ab1307524c0adb94333c8
57a1de27be2485757b07e337c6f0fbf1fcf843f5
50378 F20101118_AACWRK pond_w_Page_43.pro
7c78e92996faa2a2c0b759b181520d13
b7b067ef187ffbbd9b258e62b7792372f2a00774
23998 F20101118_AACWWJ pond_w_Page_74.QC.jpg
3a25a5ee186f1da92bf5553b78a6d175
d91da1664e4e5b04ce5aa0e12bbd5b99f69e0a75
199031 F20101118_AACWMO pond_w_Page_87.jp2
ad9ff30800854a4dc07aba323be0663c
2dbcb56a214b0dd0d5cfe3bc591b6e8ad1be2a20
54136 F20101118_AACWHR pond_w_Page_42.jpg
06310a1c13f382a03294ab55f8100dad
174feca4946e9e697365b28bde853b4616c7085c
53458 F20101118_AACWRL pond_w_Page_44.pro
52b543c3e12daac30ff2b44ff48466c2
fc2ead360f9e06e07182b6b817fa90752446af89
24848 F20101118_AACWWK pond_w_Page_27.QC.jpg
1c361f7e7428d590785a97802453247c
384ffbf4515c6e44eb3ce4bdcabd7ba75cdc1d19
50012 F20101118_AACWMP pond_w_Page_88.jp2
47f590b2c3454daaff60ab4b2b114dae
edea119e4054d1b8e2abf2e31cf3f435bc5a75d6
82536 F20101118_AACWHS pond_w_Page_43.jpg
f9b210838413c8efd437b65797e956f1
a3b1fd6533de96345bbc3c1487a334a1033dffc2
49707 F20101118_AACWRM pond_w_Page_45.pro
1c6e1cf36e86da745325dc752a0ec830
358d8f0dd6a13dbf0ab42bbac6c0bf23537684d4
26690 F20101118_AACWWL pond_w_Page_58.QC.jpg
8f12cc99a86b73ae64d91d16fda9522c
3982ba2b3a2a87e7a23c7fbbb03a8d6c4c9a1ce9
F20101118_AACWMQ pond_w_Page_01.tif
12524b24308e03b103017625743a6603
e700613df57b69442017adcc579a2c81d119613b
81532 F20101118_AACWHT pond_w_Page_44.jpg
4a964b3e39439dbe0e554bb36683f0a6
1a4b7173e6b75406010f3eb8fd4b1faf71bca079
51055 F20101118_AACWRN pond_w_Page_46.pro
480f731c741760fbd14f0fcaded8e632
dde9d82cd00669ff1a653d1ef653d81ee61ae91b
25963 F20101118_AACWWM pond_w_Page_39.QC.jpg
ebf4512fece4f88e10a2768e3a47330b
9d2e5bdedebcc4b672d2e45093703c4b0e98b056
F20101118_AACWMR pond_w_Page_02.tif
65cd6b56bbc7e145110139794eb9f9eb
2a9b7bbe96f1f71176709430e9499796aa7e0358
82660 F20101118_AACWHU pond_w_Page_45.jpg
fb79367a416b61c2bdb57fb86d635f2e
01fbf7e9788e000b25be1a5c44f755ab332ed6ca
51327 F20101118_AACWRO pond_w_Page_47.pro
3d05e45b4823848cc73df612469fb04a
1665321f5439cd30f860c68a9617ee5ab7f8a645
F20101118_AACWMS pond_w_Page_03.tif
396e56603b02681ba45256563e5a76d9
ef0bbd750595a7fea756bcebb9f0d525ab7de356
84304 F20101118_AACWHV pond_w_Page_46.jpg
3f2e9cbf5cfef3e574c76717c984358f
7e200b73e21519cb947727897db47a82be07ab76
47484 F20101118_AACWRP pond_w_Page_48.pro
e31d51b567feea8004b97809916f894b
d3e05165438bbdf603390d1dd0853e2e27581189
131355 F20101118_AACWWN UFE0014303_00001.xml
d9b4bfa9e16b3bcd93e406467cb8e0b8
f9497b5c3953d1480547e214e0ba7e6f26d6949f
F20101118_AACWMT pond_w_Page_04.tif
37a0c88562f59f4ce403bec3e3e53977
7d8f300a68bd6d40d701ac8efd9bad0729789f3f
85868 F20101118_AACWHW pond_w_Page_47.jpg
5bff9964af051ed1658518b7813e1086
7d5262aef3948e72740f19f3796e2b034f65ee86
51665 F20101118_AACWRQ pond_w_Page_49.pro
0ebd902d0f82fc92c086e09a95260899
0d786ed218a6cc9ccabf2e78a98ff0f7b3b57719
5985 F20101118_AACWWO pond_w_Page_01.QC.jpg
344e9751760964002f3275e50b5086dd
58e55772f788db1d63975afc45ed3454ec2fe0e4
F20101118_AACWMU pond_w_Page_05.tif
631e37f878c46df34ddadbaaa024bf8b
c5349ce56f93e84d490f7e30f555e12cdb7ec4c7
78631 F20101118_AACWHX pond_w_Page_48.jpg
b1769c59a3d3cc2df84e70a82b9a66c8
19cb45ed044c0f601d41eb3a1db5c8a64c1f9fb7
49082 F20101118_AACWRR pond_w_Page_50.pro
9c2861b4f40119c6746dfe094ee2dd5d
0bdd843f25a6c23a88ee6e2b0784b4bb87fd97e1
493 F20101118_AACWWP pond_w_Page_02thm.jpg
2ca994fe5213911865b424ddd4d3736e
256e686756a914d31c5fe988401815212ed3dd6f
F20101118_AACWMV pond_w_Page_06.tif
5df7f877c34028d2933deff56a99f0a6
6e3a60f95e05e4265aebf02829bc735957c65669
85772 F20101118_AACWHY pond_w_Page_49.jpg
458bc7453ff997e913fd4bbdc5d45df5
6490c1ecf203ac039ce5346273ce89a957f3a741
57479 F20101118_AACWRS pond_w_Page_51.pro
640a3a40f853919bc051d1d21cba7a11
a5b564e1dbce95ec27d48faee7c58ff41b1fa16f
1314 F20101118_AACWWQ pond_w_Page_02.QC.jpg
6cd3c84b4c0420d4f759afd59bfeb672
57333b199a01360d34baf01712889d1e49c9cda8
F20101118_AACWMW pond_w_Page_07.tif
435519897f785b2ad0573962caaeb8c4
a1b2563fa7f1c4b0301ff3f3b99f8729f7de91a7
83529 F20101118_AACWFA pond_w_Page_76.jpg
a53b489591be1e4e8571bfc065866409
5d7e0d92647790246605213ec07a00e84ea9d34a
81340 F20101118_AACWHZ pond_w_Page_50.jpg
b224a38580d65a18d8a797a94b1a5ecf
f06ae3d666a01a8328a656012c25bc9aa9b791b3
52859 F20101118_AACWRT pond_w_Page_52.pro
a01ff356303271e8a6cf260c455bdf03
67cd1854f547ce7d90774df1be1b42b2278be766
3777 F20101118_AACWWR pond_w_Page_03thm.jpg
1faf91b4626aabb60ab3887595fc9231
e1f8babe2370c1a38afbe4ee13ce5f4bb5302be4
F20101118_AACWMX pond_w_Page_08.tif
8b2c6be4cfeef8a9fbfefaddba753c70
5b4ee3510833ad92c3749b16b567176f555ba571
F20101118_AACWFB pond_w_Page_36.tif
54fa020a3a0b2041406196a507eb6cd7
ec355a667e898271b8c4f044a2615b5797759577
49651 F20101118_AACWRU pond_w_Page_53.pro
7c94cd9c58016c9abb42428066991933
a9425e82ee957f244b0872161c66c1e3bfa96ca2
15209 F20101118_AACWWS pond_w_Page_03.QC.jpg
319c2615e307d28b05ed174dcf441929
6293ccdabd1e4a303bc33a03c672f3316d8b4d7b
F20101118_AACWMY pond_w_Page_09.tif
2ec1f0bc4a61b19c8ef9bed6b7bab23c
ccb4457a886a6326428cc11ba764f2701e2b68e8
6391 F20101118_AACWFC pond_w_Page_31thm.jpg
48165559b35a403a8aaf9af6a454f504
f40cbad7c2471dc7b20a6a2380f83b65dd71c03e
32750 F20101118_AACWRV pond_w_Page_54.pro
4fd9c2978e8a92f4595be63c4deb1407
f85b6d0cc711ee783c79185f6e8a3f065c7813a8
111993 F20101118_AACWKA pond_w_Page_19.jp2
c781a21f970de395e7a595dcf8ac9d97
4e54f8c70e52150fceab228b84e672974253b7b1
4314 F20101118_AACWWT pond_w_Page_04thm.jpg
7494da2cdaac9692200d2c2469b246c5
bec7c3b3e91f10ade53745b0c6d54d99421a70d3
F20101118_AACWMZ pond_w_Page_10.tif
d7a3d73bfb00bc4bd6fdd4b6eab7ea68
018aadf36882747ec849b7c676ed7ab6d360e0cd
20143 F20101118_AACWFD pond_w_Page_69.QC.jpg
6e9d2d46a3f9ae7b2abd1cf03a3863b0
b03509a266701315c294d04fd9aa4ff4436b322f
44802 F20101118_AACWRW pond_w_Page_55.pro
db422f72bf394942ce1408965549ccb4
fe258152fa0c8e477341d8d75564f713c04b5272
18038 F20101118_AACWWU pond_w_Page_04.QC.jpg
9e3ee8523fb49d71867ad9e06391bf6c
64477f0d2f5309d5310c8f61c98df174ba710b50
5855 F20101118_AACWFE pond_w_Page_71thm.jpg
c47253e91ac079823b683bf6aa9052ec
40c84847d13a0213390dfa513e08bd6cbb0583dd
56440 F20101118_AACWRX pond_w_Page_56.pro
2a2f88be86a57974b579f27ecd5bf317
553adcd86396c13936eb7c21a22f2468823dde62
83121 F20101118_AACWKB pond_w_Page_20.jp2
eba435a20542fd729467b09c3b9951b1
739294548b533f190c1fb23a5de45525ed311e3a
2554 F20101118_AACWWV pond_w_Page_05thm.jpg
d2891db2c6a88241d779216db07eaf5a
d8de571e1ca7fc7dd29d186ac7a545946951686d
F20101118_AACWFF pond_w_Page_43.tif
701d401fdfe538c3cbb351b7e5bf9aa5
dc974582f496b87024b23e689a74ff7b26f26796
F20101118_AACWPA pond_w_Page_66.tif
fcb3721ef0943038ac7e60374556bf1a
024a480daad24884cbfb92be29f3cbf29f46ae67
57913 F20101118_AACWRY pond_w_Page_57.pro
647eea5a47e7140c0e801381e16b171b
c25b7d82a63aae29ceb1e2493b730c9af725254c
94779 F20101118_AACWKC pond_w_Page_21.jp2
d59e4b797f091d0b8b6e7606826c4cf7
372d54cbe66e8bf1e29af7dae4f517b2b8cd2a69
10179 F20101118_AACWWW pond_w_Page_05.QC.jpg
6bf48b0bcc9443f3bbc5e2e7d7e9630c
2bdd0704c3d9617196bf3e9fe473c89d69ea2677
46944 F20101118_AACWFG pond_w_Page_30.pro
c7c8ecda0fed0bf2a072a07a02c3d089
88c829bb774c135c8311269ae6a84f8e9d801bc6
F20101118_AACWPB pond_w_Page_67.tif
61b2511ed9b054768170bf8066c1e324
cdcff8e53c6e578b1c33450f1d1e787e2022cfbd
54505 F20101118_AACWRZ pond_w_Page_58.pro
827b38fde84271fbe23f555830312ed2
4ac5aaadfe02c5236fcfba3ce7b5935be8b33cb1
107916 F20101118_AACWKD pond_w_Page_22.jp2
68435bdb5865b50fc43d526e7937ffb5
c4776fbfa6c576e2206589ae89774385e22bffc8
4942 F20101118_AACWWX pond_w_Page_06thm.jpg
bab6f63ed8c9e4759a32674b47318cee
03a950a5817af71dc2da8f6b5bbf6704cbdea7aa
54564 F20101118_AACWFH pond_w_Page_62.pro
373aec0cc358b44639bab97c25f03141
06ca08c76cf0d6a0a4235c26ab209270b7784de6
F20101118_AACWPC pond_w_Page_68.tif
a87d63cd7603fd3b71a8da2338caf3ec
c8f28d08854d5fb77e2743bf270cc98b4d46c6e6
109579 F20101118_AACWKE pond_w_Page_23.jp2
468a92d13505e8f0273e56a153f2e586
aa92fe6d5f38677bf697631edea97f0dc2b7f3a5
19986 F20101118_AACWWY pond_w_Page_06.QC.jpg
fdcbfebfee8a9d7577a82cfc41b9a07c
fda9b6f576d6078b976c284f1637260efcc6bc3e
F20101118_AACWUA pond_w_Page_27.txt
f741ee4001ca846f8b348d69949c516d
3f9d661386a145a014ee266ad34fda179463fe92
77238 F20101118_AACWFI pond_w_Page_41.jpg
6a7917347f5d1e96572a6017b4d7f49f
df1fd066fcf29f3bdc0b881a3d52cec0aa29a9e5
F20101118_AACWPD pond_w_Page_70.tif
17bc0495799921fd45073387be38cb8c
817053f719fb90ac2097714a37a731f939ef9f38
110972 F20101118_AACWKF pond_w_Page_24.jp2
aba76f6a062e0b02cc9f35a2b88cac44
e1d42514cb615db90a160a4c90b1e0cc0ce0a114
5170 F20101118_AACWWZ pond_w_Page_07thm.jpg
d3f9b1e221b1e6ecb35b375c5f06c6ef
9754cb705d630d59b00d0d6f5e5010e5ed0ba505
2543 F20101118_AACWUB pond_w_Page_28.txt
6869fd1e38d1f7e7e4d934b994cecc25
046c9a738847797853f5160ac6a61861c039cc7f
1051947 F20101118_AACWFJ pond_w_Page_64.jp2
b86c7d45ec48fa3d213664353b7665ee
b99ccd03747639ff2baf1bca732446ea36f5084f
F20101118_AACWPE pond_w_Page_71.tif
9c83675e5ccd97c6050e77187d17eef0
aeb2bd001df2b32fecff66d93e5f8bbf214e4d72
113323 F20101118_AACWKG pond_w_Page_25.jp2
94d1a1d2e5494aa726a194a971382b2e
0c0f089491bd235c8d2923c612f2e792cc4729c1
2277 F20101118_AACWUC pond_w_Page_29.txt
4adf89de7822193977db4b4a8c237f6c
c8a89332bca2f8d6e47677158d1597afbedfb368
F20101118_AACWFK pond_w_Page_44.tif
ad85b440c20864095defbb4d106041ad
f07c8eebaed7ff8f16f65ab3475596223fd7c273
F20101118_AACWPF pond_w_Page_72.tif
8f9e26621ad84e7dda0a1577d90dc58d
a9343513415437c7469f01b7093eb0a97f04f8aa
107470 F20101118_AACWKH pond_w_Page_26.jp2
213efe0e64da5a311545f45dcf0ef45d
90d5fce526c0d53dd161fdc57ae1a4ce3a6c46a9
6671 F20101118_AACXBA pond_w_Page_64thm.jpg
59b7e01d144f48353b377aafb527be82
7859724d1ceab90614b1577d35841da180450e8e
26060 F20101118_AACWZA pond_w_Page_36.QC.jpg
b732d91df3cef5b5e7e7f6fa4b7b1cb1
24c3860485f7ef245c947f335d66b36bb3304ee8
2232 F20101118_AACWUD pond_w_Page_31.txt
ffcf9a3a30ff1000cf2e6e640b926bc3
8c7d95f135fec5e7644fddf393c62ca79cf79abd
F20101118_AACWFL pond_w_Page_51.txt
b9053da6bd7aaa0811c990aba5fac6f8
9557048e9e11046d019eec5ffdeb8e86fdb39416
107267 F20101118_AACWKI pond_w_Page_27.jp2
e704c33ba8c55e25761bfa0958fd0ff8
5215de4cab1618573e3ece26d6a95fe57edc6a44
26983 F20101118_AACXBB pond_w_Page_64.QC.jpg
8cc9ce6c70ab1e24dd0d7809bdba4a94
c6668d94ccb135dff8f4492ec8de4c3be73bfd46
5968 F20101118_AACWZB pond_w_Page_37thm.jpg
685e73890bc60a084f9f113954b63764
bacbc5185fd5d902fd5c4cbe1b3024bb081dbeb5
1952 F20101118_AACWUE pond_w_Page_32.txt
6aea9fa52c1e3f8d86f3c5563ca093b1
aee52275adabdf469f37c78bdc9606b688bb9a29
90377 F20101118_AACWFM pond_w_Page_79.jp2
60037aaa745b2c56e27618d3abe03699
6cf8aaa92c3a9c87dd5cf3e2e632672def0c08b0
F20101118_AACWPG pond_w_Page_73.tif
9e4aadb809be8b1003180e2299d78a91
79ed447ba441839e5008b50f436835661ce91e27
130217 F20101118_AACWKJ pond_w_Page_28.jp2
bd0c1ee69ba560e9c5338e93f9d6d53f
735c267310f606ae347efcdac3d0499ceef8fe60
5445 F20101118_AACXBC pond_w_Page_65thm.jpg
d1881d9d78e6566e6fa8dc0f6106b8e6
2851fc18ce0f56f5bf94592e9440f1dc17b94567
25885 F20101118_AACWZC pond_w_Page_37.QC.jpg
0add2f2034bfa6bedcb3f3fc9c71c7d8
f5ff7f3416a393d9ba84b5e6df3147fa726ad5dd
2120 F20101118_AACWUF pond_w_Page_33.txt
b78279f94222e7735c3dbc0b464466aa
0e0a11b6aaaed535bdf773b241f5e18ab5e77a0b
27650 F20101118_AACWFN pond_w_Page_03.pro
40c5729df865ff4813f44810787e0fee
9efe59b49ff8b320abaa854f075103fa63b74b0f
F20101118_AACWPH pond_w_Page_74.tif
6c538d91302fdd2f007b411dcaf462ef
b5f9eb5f7ac59c30d02c003785a40cf1b00d3058
118977 F20101118_AACWKK pond_w_Page_29.jp2
87db8da43e9e0c14ebdbdce661d30406
8fff4bb22ad417f248f05b82f9e0e609d1f2482b



PAGE 1

BARTER CLUB PARTICIPANTS IN ARGENTINA: IDEALOGUES OR PRAGMATISTS? By WENDY POND A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2006

PAGE 2

Copyright 2006 by Wendy Pond

PAGE 3

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I sincerely thank all of the Argentines that I interviewed while doing field research. I deeply appreciate the time these individuals took out of their busy schedules to share their experiences with me. They oftentimes invited me into their homes, spent two or more hours with me, and were infinitely patient with my stumbling Spanish. I also thank the several graduate students who had been down this road previously and offered their valuable experience and insight. This project would have been immeasurably harder without you. I tha nk Martn Maldonado for reviewing my interview questionnaire and offering valuable suggestions on how to conduct interviews in Argentina. I thank Karina Vsquez for he lping me to write letters of introduction to perspective interviewees. Her understanding of etiquette and protocol added a missing degree of professionalism in my correspondenc e. I thank Bryan Williams for taking time to simply talk with me about my project, helping me to brainstorm and to better understand my project goals.

PAGE 4

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iii ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Literature Review.........................................................................................................3 Classical Collective Behavior Theory...................................................................3 Resource Mobilization Theory..............................................................................3 Social Constructionism..........................................................................................4 New Social Movements.........................................................................................6 Towards a Synthesis..............................................................................................8 Cycles of Contention, Master Fram es and Latin American Social Movements......................................................................................................11 Organization...............................................................................................................12 2 BIRTH OF THE BARTER CLUBS...........................................................................14 20th Century Political and Economic Context............................................................14 Argentina’s Recurring Economic Cycle..............................................................14 Menem and the Early 90s....................................................................................15 Structural Changes and the “New Poor”.............................................................18 Birth of the Trueques ..................................................................................................21 Trueque Values....................................................................................................23 Structure and Organization of the RGT...............................................................25 Participants Demographics..................................................................................26 Nodo Dynamics...................................................................................................28 Intersection with Government.............................................................................29 Problems within the Trueques ....................................................................................31 Chapter Summary.......................................................................................................35 3 AFFECT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE BARTER CLUBS........36 The Economic Crisis of 2001/2002............................................................................36 Effect of Economic Crisis on the Barter Clubs..........................................................40 Trueque Response.......................................................................................................45 Chapter Summary.......................................................................................................47

PAGE 5

v 4 TRUEQUES AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT?............................................................48 Collective Activity......................................................................................................48 Contention...................................................................................................................49 Common Purpose/Common Identity..........................................................................54 Mobilizing Structures.................................................................................................59 Sustained Activity.......................................................................................................60 Political Opportunities................................................................................................61 Chapter Summary.......................................................................................................61 5 CYCLES OF CONTENTION....................................................................................63 Onset of the Cycle......................................................................................................63 Decline of the cycle....................................................................................................66 Conclusion..................................................................................................................68 APPENDIX PRINCIPIOS DE LA RGT.........................................................................73 LIST OF REFERENCES...................................................................................................75 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.............................................................................................81

PAGE 6

vi Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts BARTER CLUB PARTICIPANTS IN ARGENTINA: IDEALOGUES OR PRAGMATISTS? By Wendy Pond May 2006 Chair: Philip Williams Major Department: Latin American Studies This thesis examines the phenomenon of barter clubs in Argentina during the 1990s and early years of 2000 through the lens of so cial movement literature. Originating in 1995, the barter clubs, or trueques evolved into a nation-wide system of clubs called the Red Global de Trueque (RGT) with more than a million participants. Although the barter clubs were used by most participants as a way to deal with the worsening national economy, particularly during the national cris is of late 2001 and early 2002, they were not originally designed as a survival mechanis m. The barter clubs were envisioned as an alternative to the dictates of the market – an antidote to consumerism, competition and greed. The founder’s strong ideological commitm ent and their effort to create a similar consciousness among barter club members suggest that the trueques be considered as a social movement. By examining the barter cl ubs in light of Sidney Tarrow’s definition of social movements I conclude that the RGT starte d out with all of the elements of a social movement but failed to consolidate as such. The barter clubs failed to maintain their

PAGE 7

vii trajectory as a social movement in part becau se of the entrance of the structurally poor into a phenomenon originally designed and us ed by the “new poor.” This sudden influx of participants motivated by need significan tly changed the orientation of the barter clubs. Although the barter clubs di d not consolidate as a social movement they are significant for several reasons. On the one hand, the barter clubs were a survival mechanism that supplied basic goods and serv ices during a time wh en money was short and unemployment was high. The trueques, however, made a deeper impact than just simply providing basic needs during economic ha rdship. At a visible level, the barter clubs influenced government by putting new issues on the political agenda, and gaining political support of an altern ative economic model. The ba rter clubs also influenced society at a more implicit level. Barter club participants, whether or not they consciously intended it, created new identities for themselves The barter clubs ar e also significant as a response to Argentina’s evolving state-soci ety relations. The economic crisis of 2001 symbolized for many the consequences of th e state’s move away from a paternalistic, hands-on economic model to a liberal market mo del. The responses to the crisis and to the underlying change varied – from asambleas barriales and piqueteros to fabricas recuperadas and barter clubs. This wave of c ontention demonstrates a broad based search for new modes of both governance and livelihood.

PAGE 8

1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In December of 2001 the economic crisis that had been slowly building in Argentina for four years finally explode d. The government instituted a limit on the amount individuals could withdraw fr om their bank accounts, precipitating demonstrations known as cacerolazos, where people took to the streets banging pots and pans in protest. President de la Ra declared a state of siege and th en was forced out of office after riots ended in the death of 27 citizens (Fue 2003). Four more presidents came and went in the space of two weeks. Mean while the government defaulted on more than $100 billion of debt, one of the largest defau lts in history (Argen tina 2001). The angry cacerolazos however, were not the only public mani festations of the crisis. Throughout Buenos Aires and the country at large, hundreds of thousands of people were getting together regularly to bart er goods and services. Although the barter clubs were touted by the Argentine media as a way to deal with the economic meltdown (Leoni and Luzzi 2003), th ey had in fact begun six years earlier, well before the dramatic crash, with a group of 20 people trading in a garage. The barter clubs, or trueques would eventually evolve into a nation-wide syst em of clubs called the Red Global de Trueque (RGT) with more than a million participants. While the barter clubs provided relief dur ing the economic turmoil, they were clearly not an overnight phenom enon. Rather, the trueque founders created the barter clubs as a way to combat a growing exclusi on from the benefits of the marketplace, exclusion engendered by a combination of gl obalization and neoliberal policies. The

PAGE 9

2 barter clubs were envisioned as an alternative to the dictates of the market – an antidote to consumerism, competition and greed.1 The RGT not only provided a venue in which to exercise this alternativ e mode of consumption and pr oduction, but the RGT founders also promoted these normative convict ions among the club participants. The founder’s strong ideological commitment and their effort to create a similar consciousness among barter club members suggest that the trueques be considered as a social movement. Yet despite these obvious signs of social movement activity, no previous research has examined the barter clubs in this framework. The most obvious reason for not making this connection is that by 2002, most people in the barter system were using it as survival stra tegy, with little regard for any d eep-seated normative beliefs. Previous research on the bart er clubs recognizes the ideological claims made by the founders (Leoni and Luzzi 2003, Bombal 2002, Powell 2002). It also recognizes a divergence between the convicti ons of the founders and the ra nk-and-file participants. This lack of affinity has been explained as a function of the structurally poor entering into a phenomenon designed and used by the “new poor .” This sudden infl ux of participants motivated by need rather than theory surely changed the orientation of the barter clubs. The unasked question, however, is why the founders were not able to build and maintain a base of members “loyal” to the cause. Two questions guide this thesis. Firs t, keeping in mind the barter club’s philosophical foundations, but also recogni zing the divergence between the founder’s intentions and the reality of participant motivation, can the barter clubs, in fact, be considered a social movement? To answer this question, I will examine the barter clubs 1 See Los doce principios in the appendix.

PAGE 10

3 in light of Sidney Tarrow’s definition of so cial movements (1998). I conclude that the RGT started out with all of the elements of a social movement but failed to consolidate as such. Second, why did the everyday particip ant fail to assume the convictions of the original project? To answer this question I will use Tarrow’s definition as a point of departure. I will draw on my research conducted in Argentina to examine the formulation and dissemination of barter club values and it s organizational methods. Literature Review Classical Collective Behavior Theory The concept of social movement is rela tively new, emerging out of classical collective behavior theory. Collective behavior theory applied a “single explanatory logic” for all collective behavi or, including crazes, panics a nd demonstrations. The civil rights movement in the 1950s and the subsequent movements of the 60s and 70s catalyzed a new school of thought (Buechler 2000). These were structured movements demonstrating overtly political and cultural agendas. Consequently, the concept of social movement emerged as a distinct domain of collective action. One of the earliest theoretical frameworks to gain wide currenc y in this developing r ealm of literature was resource mobilization theory. It was subse quently challenged by so cial constructionism and new social movement theory (Buechler 2000). Resource Mobilization Theory Resource Mobilization theorists concern themselves with explaining why people agree to join in a social m ovement, specifically in light of the “free-rider” dilemma: a rational individual would not jo in a social movement if ot her people were willing to do the work to secure goods that will then be publicly share d. To solve this dilemma, movements offer selective incentives to enc ourage and reward part icipation. Incentives

PAGE 11

4 such as outside funding, professionalization a nd increased material resources (McCarthy and Zald in Tarrow 1998). Resource mobilization theory has been cri ticized for not paying adequate attention to the role of ideas in mo tivating participati on. Myra Marx Ferree points out that resource mobilization theory does not allow that people may act hedonistically, may act for short-term benefits, or may be morally dr iven to behaviors that conflict with selfinterest. As such, resource mobilization theo ry proffers a kind of “one dimensional rationality”: “The tautologies that arise from treating all forms of behavior as strategically rational by definition exclude a realistic explan ation of when behavior may be more or less than an expression of self-i nterest” (Ferree 1992:32). Part of the problem in this onedimensional rationality is that preferences ar e a given, not up for de bate or modification. Such an assumption reduces participation motivation to incentives only. The result is to ignore a movement’s role in creating a nd shaping identity and preferences. Social Constructionism Social constructionism, like resource mobilization theory, also focuses on explaining why people participat e. Social constructionism, however, focuses principally on the role of ideational factors rather than material rewards. The work of Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986), offers key insight into the role of ideas in catalyzing participation. Drawing on the c oncept of framing orig inally introduced by Goffman (1974), these authors define framing as an interactional process that links an individual’s grievances to the work of the social movement (Snow et al. 1986: 467). “By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (Snow et al. 1986: 464).

PAGE 12

5 Framing is a necessary activity because people often do not start by buying wholesale into a social movement. “Seldom do individuals join a movement organization per se, at least initially. Rather it is far more common for individuals to agree to participate in some activity or campaign by devoting some measure of time, energy, or money” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Framing can be a slow process and it can slip out of place over time – since it is always subject to “reassessment and re negotiation” (Snow et al. 1986: 476) – but it is eventually a n ecessary condition for m ovement participation (Snow et al. 1986: 464). According to Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, there are four possible levels of framing: bridging, amplification, extensi on and transformation. In the process of frame bridging, individuals already have a pa rticular grievance and the movement taps into it, providing an “organiz ational base for expressing th eir discontents” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Most resource mobilization theory has assumed that movements simply need to do frame bridging because grievances are al ready “sufficiently generalized and salient” (468). Frame amplification appeals to valu es and beliefs that people already hold, but tries to move those values and beliefs higher up in the hierarchy. During frame amplification, values and beliefs previously “shrouded by indifference, deception or fabrication by others, and by ambiguity or uncertainty” (469) are clarified and reinvigorated. Frame extensi on appeals to values that are ancillary to potential participants. A common frame ex tension strategy is to incorp orate values auxiliary to the principal values of the movement and try to re cruit people by appeal ing to these auxiliary values. Frame transformation is the most ra dical of the frame processes. It requires a

PAGE 13

6 redefinition of an individual’s values, in which “new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or unders tandings jettisoned” (473). These framing processes are all done at th e individual, micro level. Snow and Benford (1992) also apply the framing con cept to a macro understanding of social movements, which accounts for periods of increased mobilization across different organizations. Master frames refer to “general ideological trends at the macrolevel of social order” (Buechler 2000: 42). Linked to cycles of pr otest, master frames allow several and varied groups to adopt similar la nguage and symbols. Pathfinders who create the beginning of a cycle face the most diffi culties and create an easier time for the movements that follow, but the seminal moveme nts in a cycle also set the stage and terms of debate (Buechler 2000: 42). New Social Movements The literature on new social movement s shares common ground with social constructionism; both schools of thought focus on the role of ideas in movements. The unique contribution of new social movement literature, however, is the expansion of our understanding of what constitutes a social move ment. This literature points to changes in movement activity and structure and suggests the need for new understandings (Laraa, Johnston et al. 1994). Alberto Melucci observes: “The produc tion and reappropriation of meaning seem to lie at the core of contem porary conflicts; this unde rstanding requires a careful redefinition of what a social movement is and what forms of action display its presence” (1994: 110). There are several ways in which new social movements amplify previous conceptions of social movements. New soci al movements center on the role of identitycreation rather than material or economic n eeds (Laraa 1994). As Melucci (1994) points

PAGE 14

7 out, old movements were about the excluded tryi ng to get into the system of benefits or about the redistribution of goods. New soci al movements, on the other hand, challenge the dominant discourse. They are no longer aski ng to be included in the system, they are clamoring to redefine the system. New soci al movements also tend to be acted out by individuals and are ofte n life-style based, extending to th e activities of daily life, for instance in the choice of food, dress or past ime. Furthermore, new social movements employ novel, often symbolic, modes of resistance and frequently operate in decentralized organizational forms (Laraa 1994: 6-8). Because new social movements do not chal lenge the allocation of values or goods but rather challenge what t hose values or goods should be, their importance is not so much in their material or policy gains, but in their ability to change thinking. It is the activity of the movement that is important, not so much the specific results they achieve. “Conflicts [of new social movements] do not chiefly express themselves through action designed to achieve outcomes in the political system. Rather they raise a challenge that recasts the language and cultural codes that organize information” (Melucci 1994: 102). This effort is an ongoing renegotiation and reestablishment of identity and meaning. Because of their unique role of expression and identity-creation, new social movements do not relate to the political sy stem in a traditional way. Instead the challenges they raise are often acted out in da ily life in non-institutional ways that raise questions about individual id entity. The way new social movements do affect political institutions is in their ability to influence th e rise of new elites, to put new issues on the agenda and to create new la nguages (Melucci 1994:102).

PAGE 15

8 One of the biggest criticisms of new social movement theory is that the putatively “new” movements in fact share quite a bit in common with the “old” movements. But whether or not “new” social movements are in fact new, the theory contributes in an important way to the dialogue: it moves away from a narrow political conception of social movement by recognizing non-traditional actors and unique methods of contention. Towards a Synthesis In the literature review so far it is clea r that there are various ways to understand social movements. Each school of thought fo cuses on contrasting variables and different levels of analysis. To properly understand so cial movements we need a synthesis of the three perspectives.2 Sidney Tarrow’s definition of social movements in his book, Power in Movement provides a starting point. As we will see, certain aspects of his definition consciously draw from the resource mobiliza tion theorists and the constructivists. And although Tarrow does not explicitly address th e new social movement perspective, its influence is apparent. For Tarrow, the defining aspect of a soci al movement is “contentious collective action”. The key ideas subsumed under this concept include collective activity, contention, a common purpose and/or identity, mobilizing structures, and the ability to sustain activity. All of these f actors are necessarily present, but they are not sufficient to form a movement. The last requirement is the appropriate political opportunities. Each component deserves a bit of explanation. 2 Buechler argues that a “true” synthesis is unlikely b ecause the differing theories subscribe to “different metatheoretical orientations” (Buechler 200: 55). Yet he recognizes the coherency of the “emerging synthesis in social movement theory around the concepts of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing process (54),” which we w ill see evident in Sidney Tarrow’s work.

PAGE 16

9 Collective activity Social movements by definition are phenomena of collective activity. Isolated, unrelate d individuals acting in disc rete ways, even if acting contentiously, cannot be consid ered a social movement. Contention According to Tarrow, “[c]ollective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (3). Contention can be over disc rete policies or abstract values; it can be materially motivated or ideologically genera ted, or both (5). Cont ention can be in the form of lobbying or legal channels, but the e ssential kernel of a social movement is the acting out in non-tradit ional ways. This kind of activity separates movements from groups like political part ies or lobbyists. Common purpose/Common identity “It is participants ’ recognition of their common interests that translates the potential for a movement into action” (Tarrow 1998: 6). In turn, part of the social movement’s ta sk is to help people identify grievances and generate solidarity. “[R]ather than rega rding ideology as either a superimposed intellectual category or as the automatic result of grievances…scholars agree that movements do passionate ‘framing work’: shap ing grievances into broader and more resonant claims” (21). Social movements can have heterogeneous make up (and often do), but there is some common identity that binds the members together. This is what leaders have to tap into a nd bring to the forefront. Mobilizing structures This refers to how social movements organize. Tarrow argues that the “connective structur es” that link participants with organizers need to strike a balance between being suffici ently loose to allow flexibility and autonomy at the

PAGE 17

10 bottom, but sufficiently centralized to implem ent effective collective strategies. These kinds of structures are often in the form of social networks During latent periods in a movement these networks provide “abeyance structures” which can be mobilized when needed (Tarrow 1998: 129). Sustained activity The temporal aspect of social movements also distinguishes them from one-time, discreet protests. In or der to be a social m ovement, collective action has to be able to maintain a challenge over time. Political opportunities Tarrow notes that discontent a nd structural societal strain are always present. It is onl y when the political system opens in a particular manner that provides the crucible for all of the above-des cribed dynamics to catalyze the formation of a social movement. Tarrow’s definition is useful for three reasons. One, it provides a concrete, basic definition of what constitutes a social moveme nt. It is the concep tual tool by which we will evaluate whether the barter clubs in fact were a social movement. Two, it incorporates elements of th e varying schools of social m ovement thought. The influence of new social movement literat ure is apparent in the disc ussion of contention – which includes symbolic and ideological challenges – as well as his discussion of mobilizing structures – which includes decentralized organization. Constructivist concepts are explicit in his discussions on framing and co llective identity. His definition also consciously draws from the “rationalists” or resource mobilization theorists, by discussing the opportunities and cons traints that lead to action or inaction in a movement. (Tarrow 1998: 198-199). Three, Tarrow’s de finition provides a platform on which to discuss why the barter clubs failed to continue as a social movement.

PAGE 18

11 Cycles of Contention, Master Frames and Latin American Social Movements If we telescope out from the barter clubs we can see that they were not the only form of collective action and pr otest in Argentina in the 1990 s and during the apex of the economic crisis. Other contentious phenomena included the piqueteros fbricas recuperadas asambleas bariales and cacerolazos One way we understand the trueques in light of these other forms of activit y is through Tarrow’s ideas on “cycles of contention” (1998). Tarrow poi nts out that social move ments and other forms of contentious behavior do not ha ppen in isolation from each other; successes and failures of one set of actors provide cues to other actors. Furthermore, despite variance in the forms of contentious activity and he terogeneity of actors, there is often a master frame around which all protest occurs. The cycle begins wh en there is a marked increase in activity carried out by a multiplicity of actors acting out in a variety of ways. Decline in a cycle is brought about by exhaustion on part of the actors and polarization within the movement. Decline is also prompted by th e government, which sele ctively facilitates some claims and ignores or represses others. Looking to the literature specifically on La tin American social movements brings specificity to Tarrow’s perspective. Schol ars recognize that Latin American social movements have been influenced in turn by the forces of urbanization, authoritarian governments, and now the new democratic context, one defined predominantly by neoliberal economic policies (Foweraker, 2005; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). These various forces set the axes around wh ich cycles of contention have waxed and waned in the region. Likewise, collective action in Argentina in the last twenty years has centered first around the military dictatorship and the transition to democracy and now,

PAGE 19

12 most recently, around the consolidation of democracy and the accompanying neoliberal model (DiMarco and Palomino 2004: 8). Applying the analyses of Foweraker ( 2005) and Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998) within the framework of an overall cycle of contentio n helps to explain demobilization. Alvarez, Dagnino and Escoba r point to government plans attempting to cushion the fall-out of neoliber al adjustments, suggesting th at these “social adjustment” plans reach out to the excluded. However, th ey admit adverse effects as well: not only do these plans recreate clientelistic models but they also dismantle the need for mobilization. Foweraker (2005) also r ecognizes a move towards demobilization. However, for Foweraker, the switch to neoliberal economic policies means that the state is less likely to hand out material benefits that movements ask for. Thus social movements adapt by negotiating more, mobilizing less and increasing their interaction with state agencies. “[T]here is a signifi cant change in emphasis in social movement activity that is epitomized in the change from social movement to non-governmental organization ” (126). Organization The initial question guiding this thesis is whether the barter clubs can be considered a social movement. Chapter two and chapter three provide the backgr ound to answer this question, describing the chronology of the trueques. In the process I illuminate the political opportunities giving wa y to the barter clubs. In these two chapters I draw on interviews I conducted in Oc tober and November of 20043 as well as the findings of other 3 I conducted 22 formal open-ended interviews and 23 informal interviews. Using the Red Global de Trueque website, which had a list of barter club locations and contact names, more than 100 emails were sent. A handful of people responded and agreed to be interviewed. Futher interviews were conducted based on referrals from the original group of intervie wees. Also, more informal interviews were conducted

PAGE 20

13 barter club research. More specifically, chapter two details th e economic climate of Argentina during Menem’s presidency in the 1 990s. This chapter goes on to recount the birth of the barter clubs and their rapid gr owth up until the year before the economic debacle, documenting the problems which bega n to plague the barter system. Chapter three details the national economic collapse in late 2001 and discusses its effects on the barter clubs. Chapter four is the analytical hear t of this work, taking Tarrow’s definition of social movements and demonstrating in wh at ways the barter cl ubs fit and in what ways they do not. I conclude that the RGT star ted out with all of the elements of a social movement but failed to consolidate as such. In the course of this chapter, I also answer the second question guiding this thesis: why the RGT failed to maintain its original trajectory as a social movement. Chapter five places the barter clubs within a larger cycle of protest occurring in Arge ntina in the 1990s and early years of 2000. By putting the barter clubs in the context of a larger cy cle of protest – understanding the mobilization phase, the use of a master frame and the de mobilization phase – we can understand the barter clubs as one reaction among many to the changing state-society relations in Argentina. at several currently operating barter clubs. The fou nders of the three main barter club systems in the country were also interviewed.

PAGE 21

14 CHAPTER 2 BIRTH OF THE BARTER CLUBS This chapter begins by placing the trueques into Argentina’s 20th century political and economic context, discussing Menem’s neo liberal policies of the 1990s as well as the rise of the “new poor”. The next section deta ils the barter clubs from their inception in 1995 through to 2001– focusing on trueque values, club organization and participant dynamics. The third section highlights some of the challenges faced by the trueques in during this period. 20th Century Political and Economic Context Argentina’s Recurring Economic Cycle “Argentina is a nostalgic country and why not? Its past is well worth remembering. In 1914, it was one of the five or six wealth iest countries in the world, and its living standard exceeded that of Western Europe until the late 1950s or early 1960s” (Falcoff 2003). The first half of the 20th century proved to be good times for Argentina, leading to the creation of a strong middle class. Argen tina, blessed with the pampas – a tremendous expanse of fertile land – exploited its compar ative advantage, supplying meat and grain to the industrialized world (Skidmore 2001: 70) A significant immigr ation wave coupled with modernizing agriculture, manufacturi ng and transportation sectors transformed Argentine society, developing the middle and working classes (Banko 2000: 27). Following the Depression, which it fared comp aratively well, Argentina successfully industrialized and began producing for domes tic consumption while reestablishing its meat and grain exports (Banko 2000: 28). Juan Peron’s 1940s corporatist state spread the

PAGE 22

15 benefits to the working class, increasing wa ges, and extending it new rights. In 1950, Argentina stood out as more urban, modern a nd with a more educated work force than surrounding Latin American c ountries (Tokman 1996: 49) During the second half of the century, how ever, Argentina witnessed two trends: a slow process of deindustrializ ation and the steady decline of the once-established middleclass. During his first term Juan Per on’s economic strategy of nationalizing foreignowned companies, maintaining artificially lo w agricultural prices and increasing real hourly wages held up while global commodity prices remained high. The country grew 8.6, 12.6 and 5.1 percent in the firs t three years of his presiden cy (Skidmore 2001: 86). The boom came to a halt in 1949, when world commodity prices dropped and inflation increased. In response, Peron instituted an austerity plan, one of many to come (Skidmore 2001: 87, 88). It was the beginning of what would be Argentina’s pattern to the present day: a cycle of trade deficits, inflation and low or negative growth, followed by ultimately untenable stabilization program s, implemented in varying degrees of orthodoxy and regard for foreign creditors.1 By the time Carlos Menem assumed the presidency in 1989, the pattern had been es tablished and the middle-class had lost ground. Menem and the Early 90s Carlos Saul Menem assumed the presidency in 1989. He had inherited an economy in the inflationary and low-gr owth part of the cycle. The economy had shrunk three percent in 1988 and another six percent in 1989 (Skidmore 2001: 102). Inflation was 1 Argentina is not only known for its recurring economic cycle, but also for revolving military coups. This pattern began in 1930 with the overthrow of Hiplito Yrigoyen, followed by a series of alternating military and civilian governments. The pattern seems to have ended with the return of civilian government in 1983.

PAGE 23

16 increasing at a rate of 150% per month and th e country was almost $4 billion in arrears on its external debt (Skidmor e 2001: 103). Menem, a Peronist surprisingly instituted a neoliberal reform package. His first moved to privatize state-owned companies including telephone, airlines, el ectricity, coal, natural gas, subways and shipping (Skidmore 2001: 103). His next step was selecting a hard -nosed economics minister, Domingo Cavallo, who dramatically limited government spendi ng (Skidmore 2001: 103). Price controls were eliminated. Tariffs were reduced, and sectors such as agriculture, wholesale and retail were deregulated (Bluestein 2005: 24). Under Cavallo, the government also instituted the Ley de Convertibilidad which guaranteed the peso in a one-to-one exchange with the dollar. To fully understand the role of the convert ibility law, one must look back to the circumstances of the 80’s, the so-called “los t decade”. The 80s were characterized by high inflation and a negative grow th rate – an average decreas e of about half percent per year (IMF 2003). The “lost decade” of the 80s resulted in a severe lack of confidence in the government. In their 1998 article Palermo and Collins examine Menem’s response to this “credibility gap.” Attempting to curb the hyperinflation endemic to the 80s, Argentina adopted an orthodox monetary policy, i.e., it tightened the money supply. This policy achieved the intended effect of ha lting inflation, yet it delivered the economy into recession and decreased the amount of money in the public accounts. The temptation at that point was to print more money to try to restart the economy. This option, of course, threatened to resuscitate the specter of inflation. The government needed to grow the economy yet keep inflation under wraps. Palermo and Collins argue that the creation of the conve rtibility law (combined with the appointment of a highly

PAGE 24

17 respected technocratic economic team le d by Domingo Cavallo) allowed the Menem government to not only accomplish these two go als, but also to in crease public spending at the same time. As the two authors put it, “the Menem government seemed to have successfully converted a circle into a s quare” (Palermo and Collins 1998: 43). The success of this new policy hinged on the adoption of a mechanism the authors refer to as “self-restraint.2” By virtue of being a law, the Ley de Convertibilidad signaled that the government was abrogating its option to influence the economy through monetary policy manipulations or alterations in the exchange rate. By forgoing its prerogative to moderate monetary policy and exchange rates, the government had to be able to back up expansionary borrowing by having dollars on hand. Palermo and Collins note that if the government “should require dol lars to make payments on the foreign debt, the treasury would need to buy them like any other private institution and this purchase would have to be made with the operating surplus resulting from controlling costs and improving the state’s ability to collect taxes (or, as it also happene d, by selling some of its property)” (44). The plan worked. Guarantees of the ex change rate created a stronger sense of certainty, investment grew, inflation fell, and domestic consumption increased. The subsequent increases in tax revenues combin ed with profits from government sale of public sectors allowed the government to main tain reserve levels while simultaneously increasing public spending (Palermo and Collins 1998). The early 1990s hailed substantial growth rates, and Argentina was soon the darling of the developing world. The economy grew 10% in 1991 and 1992 a nd another 5% in 1993 and 1994. Although 2 The concept of self-restraint is originally discussed by Elster (1998) and appropriated in a more general form by Palermo and Collins.

PAGE 25

18 the Mexican peso crisis reverb erated strongly in 1995 with a negative growth of 4%, the economy recovered quickly, growing 5% in 1996 and 8% in 1997 (IMF 2003).3 The reforms, however, introduced serious deficiencies. The first problem was overvaluation of the currency. The convertibil ity law led to an overvalued peso, which in turn made exports more expensive and crea ted a national trade deficit (Skidmore 2001: 103). The burgeoning deficit did not matter so long as the economy was growing and foreign investment continued to flow in, as it did throughout most of the 90s (Bluestein 2005). A second problem, not a result of the convertibility law, but one that confounded it, was the increasing government de bt. These two issues proved to be decisive factors in the economy’s debacle in 2001, but in the mid-90s the gravity of these problems was only dimly perceived. Argentina continued to be the poster child for good development. A third problem, however, was rearing its head: rising unemployment. Even though domestic policies and international invest ment trends led to a reactivation of the economy, it negatively affected the labor ma rket. Unemployment increased from 6.5 percent in 1991 to 12.2 per cent in 1994 and 14 percent in 1997 (Skidmore 2001: 103, 105) and the government payroll in 1994 d ecreased by half (Bluestein 2005: 24). Structural Changes and the “New Poor” Although unemployment became acute in the 1990s, the trend had begun earlier. The average rate of unemployment before 1980 had hovered around 2-3%, while in the 1980s it averaged about 6%, and in the firs t five years of the 90s it averaged 11% (Tokman 1996: 48). For many scholars, the 1990s was only a continuation of a development that had started in the 1970s and 80s under the military dictatorship: the 3 In 1995 there were rumblings of discontent with Menem’s economic policies. The opposition mounted a challenge to Menem’s hegemony in the presidential elections, but failed to capture the vote.

PAGE 26

19 dismantling of the welfare state in favor of a neoliberal model (Bonetto and Piero 2000, Beliz 1995). Argentina’s post-war model centered around social rights. It was characterized by state regulati on and centralized union negotia tions. The state resolved social questions and led national developm ent (Bonetto and Piero 2000: 52). In the 1970s, however, the welfare state began to unrav el. “Lo que en tiempos de Estado de bienestar se entenda con criterios de universa lidad, generosidad fiscal y paternalismo del sector pblico, troc abruptamente a partir de los sucesivos pr ocesos de ajuste y de deuda que vivi Argentina de 1975 en adelante” (Beliz 1995: 27). The debt-ridden years of the 1980s deepen ed the neoliberal inclination as the country became beholden to conditions imposed by its creditors. Between 1977 and 1982 the external debt increased by almost 500% (Banko 2000: 31). “Argentina…haba ido perdiendo progesivamente el dinamismo econmi co que haba sido caracterstico de su economa hasta 1930…Las crisis cclicas condu jeron a la bsqueda de financiamiento externo para solventar los desequilib rios externos” (Banko 2000: 30-31). The 1990s, under Menem, paved the final neo liberal inroads, particularly with regard to the labor market. From the 1970s through the 1990s Argentina implemented labor policies to make the work force more fl exible and to reduce labor costs, allowing industry to compete internati onally (Tokman 1996: 62). Stat e leaders made efforts to decentralize collective nego tiation and minimize government involvement in labor conflicts. These policies precipitated dramatic structural changes in Argentine society. Traditional institutions began to fragment, as seen in the breakdown in the traditional role and power of unions. Furthermore, employme nt became more uncertain, the work force

PAGE 27

20 became more informal and salaries decreased (Beliz 1995: 29-30).4 The end result was a loss of social mobility and the advent of the “new poor” (Beliz 1995: 27). Who are the new poor? The new poor are co mposed of two types: previously poor people who were able to achieve a certain standard of livi ng above the poverty line, but then fell back below that line; and the middle class who had never been poor, but at some point fell into poverty (Minujin and Kessler 1995: 40). The new poor, like the middle class, typically have acce ss to higher education ( educacin media y superior ) and tend to have less children per family. The new poor, however, are similar to the structurally poor in terms of job insecurity and lack of hea lth coverage (Minujin and Kessler 1995: 10). Another distinguishing feature of the new poor involves their access to social capital (47).5 Many of the new poor have a great deal of social capital to draw on, which allows them to maintain access to certain lifestyle perks, but in turn leads to their relative invisibility. For some, the improving macroeconomic situation in Argentina of the early 1990s translated into a better life. Yet a great ma ny others joined the ranks of the new poor – by finding themselves unemployed, underemployed, without a permanent job contract, or working in the informal sector. This c ontext of increasing jo b precariousness provided the crucible for much of the social uph eaval of the 1990s, incl uding the barter clubs. 4 For more information about the declining employment situation in Argentina in the 20th century see Un trabajo para todos 1997. Buenos Aires: Consejo Empresario Argentino. See also Metamorfosis del empleo en Argentina: Diagnostico, politicas y perspectives 2002. Javier Lindenboim (compilador). Cuaderno del CEPED, No. 7. 5 Minujin and Kessler define social capital as the network of friends and family who are better off and can offer cheap services, do favors offer jobs, etc. (44).

PAGE 28

21 Birth of the Trueques What became the Argentine barter clubs have their roots in an earlier program. In 1989 Anibal Rubn Ravera, Horacio Rubn Cova s and Carlos Alberto de Sanzo created a small publishing firm and NGO in the city of Bernal6 called El Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional (PAR). The PAR critiqued the global economy for engendering inequity, unemployment, social tension, degrad ation of the environment, and destruction of community ( Comenzar por Casa ). In response, the PAR promoted self-sufficiency, based on the principals of environmentally sustainable, community-based, and “human scale” production. Their website de scribes their initial beginnings: Haca 1988 la Argentina viva una crisis nueva. Comenzaba a percibirse nuevos fenmenos econmicos…Fue all cuando se nos ocurri componer un ideario que velara por quienes se quedaban sin trabajo o eran excluidos por el sistema global. Basandonos en ideas de autogestin y tecnologas socialmente apropriadas intentamos plasmar una consigna que desper tara sentimientos de supervivencia con formulas simples pero efectivas. Naci entonces el ‘Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional’… The main purpose of the PAR was to desi gn, develop and administer projects for ecological, self-reliant existe nce (Laporte 2003: 165). For instance it promoted organic food production, permaculture, solar energy a nd recycling. It advocated for a local development model in some ways similar to the idea of import substitution: La propuesta de la Autosuficiencia Re gional es afn a un cmulo de ideas vanguardistas en el campo econmico-ecol gico, entre los que se cuentan el Bioregionalismo de Peter Berger, la Perm acultura de Bill Mollison y la teora de Jane Jacobs acerca de la innovacin y tr ansformacin de las economas nacionales a partir de la sustitucin lo cal de importaciones en las regiones urbanas. En nuestra concepcin, la Autosuficiencia Region al apunta a promover la identidad e interdependencia de las regiones urba nas y rurales, poniendo en valor, con tecnologas a escala humana sus recursos ambientales, econmicos, tcnicos, culturales e histricos, sin pe rseguir una autosuficiencia total. De este modo, estas regiones no slo se encontrarn en mejo res condiciones para sobrevivir a la 6 In the partido of Quilmes in the Buenos Aires province

PAGE 29

22 exclusin provocada por la globalizacin ec onmica y la sofisticacin tecnolgica, sino que podrn mejorar la calidad de vi da de sus habitantes, mediante el intercambio con regiones similares ms all de las propias fronteras. (Primavera, Covas and De Sanzo: Ch 5). Out of the PAR initiatives came the first barter club. Luis Laporte describes the goals of the first barter club: “Nuestra me ta era crear un mercado protegido para aquellos que no podan mantenerse a flote en medi o del marco asfixiante de los efectos econmicos de la globalizacin unilateral fr ente el retroceso de Estado, desde una perspectiva micro local” (165). The first ba rter club began with a group of 20 people in 1995 in Bernal. Participants got together every Saturday for a few hours to exchange goods and services. They called it the Club de Trueque .7 A member would come with items such as prepared food, clothes, or ar tisan products. Each time an item was “sold” the seller would mark the co rresponding “credit” on a persona l tally card. Then the seller would become a buyer. For ever y product “bought” that pe rson would deduct the corresponding amount from the running tally on the card. When a group of people wanted to duplicate the system in the city of Buenos Aires paper credits were introduced and the Red Global de Trueque (RGT) was born (Laporte 2003: 167). The credits looked similar to money and acted much in th e same way. Instead of marking credits and debits on a card, people could “ buy” or “sell” using the physical credits. For the ease of pricing, it was decided that one credit shoul d be the rough equivalent of one peso.8 Soon nodos the name of the location where a barter club met, began popping up all over the region and the country. Fostered by coverage in the national television show 7 Trocar in Spanish means to trade or exchange 8 The RGT credits have been called different names. At first referred to as “ Ticketes Trueque ,” they also became knows as “ arbolitos,” which refers to the image of a tree printed on the front. I use the term “ crdito ” throughout this paper, which is the generic term for any physical credit used within the barter system.

PAGE 30

23 “ Hora Clave ” in 1996 and by other favorable media coverage, membership began to grow (Primavera, Covas and De Sa nzo 1998). In one accounting of the trueques the number of nodo s went from 17 in 1996 to 40 in 1997, more than doubling to 83 in 1998. The years 1999 and 2000 saw an increase to 400 and 500 nodo s respectively. By 2001 the number of nodo s reached 1800 (Ovalles 2002).9 The rapid increase in participants was not only due to media coverage. It spread by word of mouth and by virtue of need. One participant who joined in 2001 remarked “Cuando el trueque sale del cono urbano, que se llama aca, de la parte de los suburbios y se empieza a meter en la capital federal fue como una explosin, cada dos o tres cuadra s haba un nodo. Fue impresionante. Ibas caminando por la calle y se encontrabas con un nodo”. Trueque Values Specifically the RGT seeks to provide alternative spaces for the unemployed. These alternative spaces serve two functions. One is the practical fulfillment of basic material needs. As one researcher summarizes: Hay un reconocimiento de las capacidades que los miembros [del trueque] poseen, pero que a la vez el Mercado y las polti cas estatales deciden excluir, dejando de esta manera al margen del Mercado fo rmal a un grupo importante de la poblacin, cuyas habilidades no estn acordes a las demandada del actual modelo econmico (Arcidiacono, Nota 4, first column, 2nd page). 9 Accounting of participant numbers has not been an exac t or scientific endeavor. The study by Ovalles is referenced in the book, Trueque y Economia Solidaria (editor Susana Hintze), but the methodology of that study is not revealed. Other estimations are cited in newspaper articles, but these generally reflect estimates provided by club founders.

PAGE 31

24 The other function is a psychological one of healing and self development.10 The core value of the RGT is self-help, or autosuficiencia. The RGT encourages self-help as a means to extricate oneself from the depe ndency on a global system that consistently fails to provide. However, this self-help can on ly be carried out in solidarity with others. The RGT enjoins members to learn to “produc ir por nosotros mismos aprendiendo de lo demas integrantes, de sus experiencias y tcn icas a travs de la ayuda mutual” (Preample to Los doce principios see appendix). Another pillar of the RGT rhetoric revol ves around the evils of money. According to the RGT, in today’s world, the accumulation of money drives the individual. Yet very few people are successful in this endeavor. The vast majorities who fail to successfully play the game of money accumulation are left with few options for survival and personal development. The result is that the indi vidual becomes dependent on a system in which they have little success. Thus the RGT refu ses to deal in pesos and instead created a separate currency, the crdito The crdito however, should not be considered as currency qua currency. It is simply a mechanis m to facilitate trade. A key dictate of the RGT is to never accumulate crditos but to keep them in circulation. The RGT also insists that members be both producers and consumers, not just consumers. Members of th e club are referred to as “ prosumidor es,” a combination of the productor (producer) and consumidor (consumer).11 To be a prosumidor serves the obvious logistical function of creating both supply and demand. But there is a 10 Preceding the creation of the RGT was a self-help group formed by PAR called Emprendedores Annimos, modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous, that was aimed at “ personas que experimentaran dudas en la toma de decisiones, vulnerabilidad en lo laboral, incertidumbre ante el futuro y tuvieran la necesidad de evaluar su desempeo personal para una mejor competencia ” (Primavera, Covas and De Sanzo 1998: Ch 5). 11 The idea of the prosumidor is taken from Alvin Toffler’s work, The Third Wave (1980).

PAGE 32

25 psychological benefit to being a producer as well. The act of creating a good – combining locally available i nputs, along with one’s persona l creativity and labor – and trading it in the nodo builds self-esteem. The RGT c oncomitantly puts a strong emphasis on micro entrepreneurship – again, as a way to create supply and also build self worth. These values are described in several documents emanating from RGT headquarters in Bernal. The first four principles in Los doce principios provide perhaps the best crystallization:12 1. Nuestra realizacin como seres humanos no necesita estar condicionada por el dinero. 2. No buscamos promover artculos o servic ios, sino ayudarnos mutuamente a alcanzar un sentido de vida superior, medi ante el trabajo, la comprensin y el intercambio justo. 3. Sostenemos que es posible remplazar la competencia estril, el lucro y la especulacin por la reciprocidad entre las personas. 4. Creemos que nuestros actos, productos y servicios pueden responder a normas ticas y ecolgicas antes que a los dictados del mercado, el consumismo y la bsqueda de beneficio a corto plazo. Structure and Organization of the RGT Nodo s that used the money printed in Bernal by the PAR became loosely unified into the Red Global de Trueque (RGT)13. By 1999 the RGT had established a franquicia or franchise system. A nodo to be properly part of the RG T, had to register with the RGT and use their crditos As a new member signed up he or she would pay two pesos 12 For the full 12 principles see appendix. 13 Two other main trueque organizations evolved out of the RGT, the Zona Oeste and Red del Trueque Solidario (RTS), both with their own specific currency. In addition, there exist independent barter clubs that print their own local currency accepted only at their particular nodo

PAGE 33

26 and get a start-up amount of 50 crditos .14 The RGT nodo s franchised in this way were known as “ nodo s franquiciados ”. Each nodo although affiliated with the RGT, was autonomous. The structure of the RGT, like the nodo s, was supposed to be horizontal. The RGT gave advice on how to start a barter club, but each nodo decided upon its own particular rules of trade and entry into the club. [E]l acceso a la informacin, capacitacin, bienes y servicios estan descentralizados y la actuacin de los usuarious es libr e y voluntaria, sin ninguna exclusin donde todos se relacionan entre si de manera dire cta y horizontal, sin media intermediaries ni representantes que puedan decidir por nosotros en asambleas o comisions. Es una democracia directa ( Las Tradiciones ). To join a nodo a prospective member needed to attend a charla, or introductory meeting. The purpose of the charla was to explain how the system worked, clarify about pricing and answer any questions. Each nodo also had a coordinator. The coordinator was supposed to be a member of the bart er club who fostered participation. The coordinator was the main organizer, taking ca re of administrative details like set-up and break-down. In many cases the coordinato r would also regulate prices or handle complaints between club members. Participants Demographics Most researchers of the trueques make three observati ons about participant demographics. One is that the majority of participants tend to be women. A second observation is that most participants are middle aged or older (Leoni and Luzzi 2003, Bombal 2002, Lecaro and Altschuler 2002, Powe ll 2002). These findings are consistent with my observations during my visit to Argent ina. The third observation is that early on 14 In interviews with participants and co ordinators the amount paid for the starter creditos ranged from two to five pesos. In some cases, individuals did not pay for their first creditos, but simply “sold” their goods to obtain their first creditos.

PAGE 34

27 in their existence the barter clubs were comprised mostly of the “new poor,” but expanded to include the structur ally poor. While this conc lusion seems warranted, it has not been rigorously demonstrated. Ines Gonzalez Bombal comes closest to offering substantiation in her 2000 study.15 She found that the major ity of participants (70%) earned less than 500 pesos per month, 39% earned between 500 – 1,000 per month and 28% earned more than 1,000 per month. “Esto indica que la prctica del trueque (aunque no de un modo excluyente) se estaba focali zando en los “nuevos pobres” (Bombal 2002: 103). Furthermore as regards education, an in dicator of class, Bombal found that most participants had completed secundario while a third had terciario or universitario incompleto (104). Several other researchers state that the part icipation base was comprised initially of the new poor but grew to include the stru cturally poor. Interestingly, though, no one offers a direct link between their demogra phic findings and support for the idea that the new poor began the trueques Leoni and Luzzi (2002), Po well (2002) and Aricidiacono (2002) all cite Bombal’s work, but do not o ffer any further analysis as to why they conclude the new poor were the initial particip ants. None of these studies were done over time to see if the participant composition actually changed. Substantiating the claim that the new poor co mprised the initial pa rticipant base is difficult, particularly because measuring and identifying the new poor is complicated. As Minujin and Kessler point out, the new poor is an extremely heterogeneous group. Anecdotally, though, the claim seems valid. On e indication is to simply look at the founders. All three have higher education. Perhaps more to the point, the founders 15 Her study is based on 50 in-depth interviews conducted across five nodo s.

PAGE 35

28 themselves describe the first members of the trueque as coming from the middle-class (interview). What is cl ear, however, is that the trueques did not remain solely comprised of the new poor. Multiple people interviewe d for this study menti on that at one point there were people from all walks of life and economic class participating in the trueque And as the founders note in their account of the trueque beginnings: Segn la experiencia de los di stintos "clubes", la concurre ncia es la ms variada : clases bajas en descenso, clase media en descenso, clases bajas en ascenso, militantes desorientados, inclasificables... Creemos que el proyecto atrae a las ms diversas clases de personas (Pri mavera, Covas and De Sanzo 1998). Furthermore, as the economy worsened and unemployment grew, the trueque extended out from its original urban base to areas more densely inhabited by the structurally poor (Powell 2002: 8). Nodo Dynamics By 2001 the barter clubs were catering to both the wealthy and the poor. The nodo Galpon de Once in the city of Buenos Aires is illustrative. Galpon opened in March of 2001. It met three times a week and at its height roughly 3000 people would pass through weekly. This nodo offered middle class services su ch as hair styling, manicures, and even vacations, which could be paid for in part by crditos There was also a recycling center run by Galpon organizers. The recycling ce nter was a way to generate crditos for people who had nothing to bring to the trueque If an individual had no product to sell she or he could bring in glass bottles, cardboar d boxes or cans to trade in for crditos In addition to the space provided fo r individuals to trade their goods, the Galpon also provided free child care for the parents who came to trade. It also ran a nodo -sponsored pizzeria and vege table stand. To enter a prosumidor would have to pay one peso. Part of the money from the entran ce fee went towards payi ng rent and electric

PAGE 36

29 bills. The other part of those pesos helped to purchase inputs for the pizzeria and vegetable stand. This system worked well because food items were always in high demand in the nodos And while not all the ingred ients were available through the trueque buying them in bulk in the form al market was a cheap solution. On the one hand, the trueque was a way to maintain a certain life style. For instance items for trade in a barter club in the wealthy neighborhood of Recoleta included fur coats, art and books (Crivello 2002).16 On the other hand, the trueque also was a true alternative market. As une mployment grew in the latter part of the 1990s the trueque permitted people to obtain basic goods that were increasingly hard to come by, such as food, cleaning supplies and clothes. The trueque also provided a venue for people to sell goods they were unable to sell for pesos in the formal market. Oftentimes goods being sold in the trueque came from left over inventory of failed businesses (personal interviews, Bombal 2002: 119). Professionals also joined to provide legal services, medical treatment and music lessons In a June 2001 edition of El Trueque an RGT magazine, services and products advertis ed included event planning, catering, school supplies, car parts, massage, taxi service, contact lens prescriptions and garden care. Intersection with Government In the first two years the RGT did no t actively seek government support or sanction. However, by 1997, the RGT began interfacing with the government, both as a way to seek legitimacy and to encounter ne w forms of integration (Primavera 1999). Government support came from the national, pr ovincial and municipal level. The city of 16 This was an independent club, although it was similar to the RGT in its stated goals of creating solidarity as well as promoting production and a continual circulation of creditos They issued their own local crdito known as the “ recoleto ”.

PAGE 37

30 Buenos Aires, where the trueques flourished early on, created “El Programa de Trueque Multirrecproco” in May 1997 ( Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque ). It allowed the RGT to use offices throughout the city to host the nodos and to train members.17 The City of Buenos Aires also invited RGT founders Horacio Covas and Carlos de Sanzo, among others, to attend a roundtable discussion as part of an event called Buenos Aires Sin Fronteras The city continued its co llaboration in 2001, co-hosting a megaferia with the RGT ( Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque ). In the brochure adver tising the megaferia, the city of Buenos Aires describes how it wished to “[i]ncentivar a las personas a capacitarse en temtica no tradicionales, asociadas a nue vos mercados y sectores dinmicos de la produccin y el empleo” and “fomentar y fortal ecer la construccin de redes socials a travs de proyectos autogestionados o c ogestionados con el estado.” The program provided training to individua ls who wished to form microbusinesses within the trueque .18 In 2001 the RGT received national support when the Secretaria de la Pequea y Mediana Empresa in the Ministerio de Economia (SEPyME) signed an agreement to promote the trueques The first section of the agreem ent states that the goal of the agreement is to “promover en todo el pa s el sistema de trueque o intercambio multirecproco”. The agreement was to also mutually foment the creation of jobs and support individuals in their tr ansition from the informal to the formal market. (Convenio). I interviewed one woman who be nefited from this government support of 17 The offices used were the ‘Centros de gestion y par ticipacin social’ (CGP). There is one CGP in each of Buenos Aires’ fourteen neighborhoods. 18 In 1999 the program was still running, but had moved from the control of the Secretara de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo to the newly created office of Secretara de Desarrollo Economico

PAGE 38

31 small business initiatives. As a member of the RGT she received a small subsidy of $200 pesos a month, which was to be used to buy materials for the aprons and purses that she sewed to trade in the trueque In practice, she used the pe sos to pay her utility bills and bought the inputs for her sewn items from the trueque The subsidy lasted five months. She was later approached and received a sim ilar subsidy, but this time not tied to the trueques ; the subsidy instead was to support pro duction of goods sold in the formal market. SEPyME’s relation to the trueques was similar to that of the city of Buenos Aires: some material support in terms of co-sponsoring workshops, training and ferias, but perhaps more significant was the “moral ” support of allowing the SEPyME and City of Buenos Aires names to go out on marketi ng materials. Also in February 2001, eight diputados attempted without success to pass a bill declaring the trueques to be of national interest. At the municipal level, the trueques me t with further support. The focus on the trueques as a means of providing work and in come also motivated more than 10 municipalities and 3 provinces to officially declare the trueques to be in their interest (Leoni and Luzzi 2003). In addition to declaring the trueques to be of municipality interest, the cities would often allow the nodo s to use public buildings or space. The municipalities also sought to regulate the trueques : some required all nodo s to register with the local government, and since popular trueque items included prepared foods and homeopathic medicines, trueque members were often required to attend health workshops. Problems within the Trueques As the trueques grew so did challenges to the system. One issue that spawned several interrelated problems had to do with the crdito At the outset the RGT declared

PAGE 39

32 the value of one crdito to be equivalent to one peso. This parity was established simply as a means of convenience. It allowed prosumidor es to easily set prices. For instance, if an empanada in the formal market co st one peso, then it should cost one crdito in the trueque However, as the RGT grew it a ppeared that it was printing too many crditos A woman I interviewed explained how she registered with one nodo but was required to re-register when she went to another nodo. Even though she already had crditos from participating in the first nodo she was issued the starter 50 crditos from this second nodo. While this woman did not purposely try to get extra crditos many people did take advantage of the system in this way. A lack of effective centralized record keeping led to people registering at multiple nodos to get several disbursements of crditos After a while, the value of the credito became inflated. Inflation might have been acceptable except that it was happening at different rates at different nodo s, so that an empanada might cost 2 pesos in one nodo but cost 5 pesos in a nother. Price variation from nodo to nodo led to speculation; individua ls would buy products at one nodo for one price and resell them at another nodo for a much higher price (Primavera 1999, La Nacin Premat 2003). There were also charges of corruption on pa rt of the coordinators. Several people that I interviewed pointed out the economics of running a nodo It was common to charge one or two pesos as entry fee into a nodo This fee was supposed to cover costs such as electricity, rent, and cleanup. A busy nodo might have 500 people enter in a day. If the nodo charged one peso at the door and me t three times a week it would produce $1,500 pesos a week. That would total $6,000 pe sos a month. A sizable quantity that would more than cover basic costs of rent, utilities and clean-up. In some nodos it was

PAGE 40

33 clear that the extra inco me was being used to buy in bulk to supply the nodo but in other cases, the accounting of the peso s was not so transparent. In 1998 four zones – Capital, North, West and South – were created to try to decentralize the RGT and prevent overprinting and speculation. Each zone printed its own currency (Hintze 2003: 56) and es tablished an equivalency with the crditos from the other zones (Primavera 1999). However, differences of opinion over the transparency of credito printing led the Zone Oeste to splinter off in 2000 and cut all ties to the RGT (Sampayo 2003: 197). The Zona Oeste al so cited “incompatible” development trajectories as the reason for splitting (Sampayo 2003: 197). Another important split came in 2001, when the Red de Trueque Solidaria (RTS) formed and officially separated from the RGT (Cortesi 2003: 181). The RTS is very specific about the ways it differs from the RGT. While both organizations emphasize production on the “ human scale,” the use of “tecnologa apropiada19” and work as a means of self-realiza tion, the RTS differs over the issues of crditos and participation. With regard to crditos the RTS refuses to print a national crdito ; each zone of the RTS prints its own crdito The RTS believes that zonal credits reinforce the identity, decision-making abiliti es and development of each zone. While the RTS acknowledges the drawback in ha ving to deal with multiple kinds of crditos it reasons that printing a nationa l currency only replicates th e formal economy and all the problems therein (Cortesi 2003: 189). In c ontrast to the RGT, the RTS also does not charge a “registration” fee or “franchise” fee for new members to get their first crditos 19 The RTS defines “tecnologa apropriada” as working w ith what is available rather than what is not (Cortesi in Hintze 190). This is a similar concept to the RGT emphasis on using local talent and inputs to create goods, rather than importing them from other areas.

PAGE 41

34 With regard to participation, the RTS has pos itioned itself as being a more democratic and participatory organization than the RG T. The RTS mode of decision-making is through assembly, which it belie ves facilitates transparent, democratic, and inclusive participation. The RTS, in turn, criticizes the RGT as tending toward private, closed decision-making processes (Cortesi 2003: 184). Other problems began to plague the barter clubs. A serious issue was that of supply. A main edict of being a trueque participant was to be a prosumidor to be a producer as well as a consumer However, the production side of the equation came to suffer. People would attend the nodo s and buy goods, but either not bring goods to sell or only bring used items, such as clothes. The end result was a scarcity of goods as well as a declining quality of goods. Also, many pe ople were bringing items that were not in demand. Trinkets and arts and crafts a bounded rather than food items (Lecaro and Altschuler 2002). As the kind of goods that people actually had a demand for were offered less and less, people e nded up stuck with stacks of crditos and nothing to purchase (Bombal 2002: 125). Another issue confronting the trueques was the subutilization of skills (Bombal 2002, Lecaro and Altschuler 2002: 11). Bombal notes that the trueques are repositories of social capital and skills as well as goods and services. Yet with all these resources, and the RGT’s particular emphasis on foster ing small businesses, there was no real efforts on part of the prosumidores to create microenterprises (Bombal 2002: 111). Only 20% of those interviewed by Bombal had plan s to create a new pr oject in conjunction with other members (Bombal 2002: 110).

PAGE 42

35 Chapter Summary Argentina’s economic successes of the first part of the 20th century slowly eroded away in the second half the century. The st rong middle class that ha d developed began to fade as a recurring cycle of strong growth fo llowed by wild inflation plagued the country. The neoliberal policies of the 1990s pushed th e country into the growth phase of the cycle, but incurred dangerously high leve ls of unemployment. The middle class consequently further declined and a new class was created: the “new poor”. Out of this context the barter clubs were born. The creation of the barter clubs was a wa y to not only meet economic need, but it was a vehicle that promoted local produc tion, self-sufficiency, personal growth and solidarity. People joined the barter system both out of n eed and also to maintain a certain lifestyle, and by 2001 the barter clubs were catering to both the wealthy and the poor. As the barter clubs grew so did the problems that plagued them, including inflation, speculation and scar city of goods. Tension also mounted over issues of participation and issuance of crditos As a result Zona Oest e and the Red de Trueque Solidaria splintered off from the RGT.

PAGE 43

36 CHAPTER 3 AFFECT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE BARTER CLUBS The economic crisis that exploded in D ecember of 2001 dramatically affected the barter clubs. While membership had been in creasing at an accelerated rate the previous two years – in tandem with the worsening national economy – the corralito of late 2001 and massive joblessness of 2002 led to a tidal wave of new trueque participation. The first section of this chapter reviews the economic background leading up to Argentina’s 2001 economic debacle. The second section expl ores how the ensuing rush of new barter club participants exacerbated existing problems within the trueque The last section discusses the RGT’s effort to confront these issues and th e level of success achieved. The Economic Crisis of 2001/2002 Serious structural weaknesses combined with cyclical recession to precipitate Argentina’s economic meltdown in late 2001. In the document entitled “Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina” th e International Monetary F und (IMF) reviews Argentina’s economic development from the 90’s through the 2001 crisis. The document highlights what in hindsight were cons iderable “existing weaknesses and growing vulnerabilities” (IMF 2003: 6) in the system: Fiscal performance…was repeatedly unde rmined by off-budget expenditures and was too weak throughout the 1990s to preven t a growing reliance on private capital flows to meet the public sector’s stead ily rising borrowing needs. Exports, though growing at a solid 8 percent per year between 1990-98, did not keep pace with sharply rising import demand, which grew at an average rate of 25 percent per year over the same period. The relatively sma ll domestic financial sector fostered dependence on foreign debt-creating flow s to finance both private and public spending. Finally, despite a good start on st ructural reforms, by mid-decade these

PAGE 44

37 were petering out and were, in some cases, even reversed, leaving important rigidities (8)1. The IMF document further points out that th e fiscal debt was exacerbated by borrowing by the provinces, adding to the public-debt ration (6, 13). Th e overall debt was tenable as long as the economy was growing at 5% or greater, but in the event of lesser growth, such levels of debt were dangerous. These structural weaknesses were compounded by the constraints of the convertibility law. Palermo and Collins desc ribe the negative current-accounts balance as the convertibility plan’s Achille s’ heel. Part of the exp ected goal of th e convertibility law was that true exchange-rate parity would occur, i.e., th at the peso would equal the dollar without the government needing to prop it up drastically. Howe ver, while inflation was kept comparatively under control, the heating up of the economy did maintain a certain level of “residual” inflation, preven ting parity from being reached (Palermo and Collins 1998). Eventually, the economy star ted a cyclical recession in 1998 and the policy of public spending and propping up the peso could not last. The currency board thus became a “liability” as the govern ment accrued burgeoning foreign-currency denominated debt (IMF 2003: 4). Palermo and Collins outline three possibilities open to the government at that moment. One option was to devalue the cu rrency, but the position of self-constraint embodied by the convertibility law prevented this step.2 Furthermore, as the IMF 1 The rigidities the IMF refers to include rigidities of the labor market. In stark contrast to the views presented by the authors cited in the second chapter, the IMF thought that the country should have a more flexible workforce. 2 Recall from chapter two that self-c onstraint was the cornerstone of the convertibility plan; it entailed that the government abrogated its prerogative to moderate monetary policy and exchange rates in order to build confidence in the economy.

PAGE 45

38 document also points out, the economic and political costs of exiting the currency board regime were great: “By the late 1990s, with more than one-half of banks’ assets and liabilities and ninety percent of the public debt denominated in foreign currency (mainly US dollars), abandoning the currency board arrangement would have been extremely disruptive to the economy – as indeed it turned out to be” (37). Furthermore, there was strong political backing of th e currency board; in 1998 the problems with the system were still latent and the economy seemed to be doi ng just fine. Thus no politician was eager to suggest painful preventative medicine. The ir ony of course was that the growth of the economy masked the weakening government fi nances. The two other possibilities were to restrict the inflow of fore ign capital or to reduce public spending, but neither jibed with Menem’s political position (Palermo and Collins 1998). Advent of the crisis In 1998 the economy embarked on the fateful recession that would trigger the economy’s collapse. Seve ral factors precipitate d the recession. One was a cyclical correction following the rapid gr owth of the previous two years. Another was the political uncertainty surrounded Menem’s attempt to run for the presidency for an unconstitutional third term. Economic tr oubles in other parts of the world also reverberated in Argentina. The Russian crisis in 1998 affect ed interest rates in emerging markets and in turn reduced capital inflows into Argentina. Yet, while international lending interest rates increased the Argentin e currency board “muted” these effects, keeping the spread on Argentine bonds artificial ly low. The result was to further mask the true economic status of the country’s debt. The following year Brazil, one of Argentina’s biggest importers, devalued its currency. Argentine products became even

PAGE 46

39 more expensive resulting in a 28% decrease in Argentine exports to Brazil (Bluestein 2005: 59). Finally, exports to other countries dropped 10.5% (Bluestein 2005: 59). These external shocks combined fatally with structural weaknesses: the country was unable to generate enough exports to co ver national spending, nor could it expand monetary supply, nor could it institute an expansionary fiscal policy (IMF 2003). Crisis Argentina started off the year 2001 stru ggling to keep afloat. It turned to the IMF for an injection of mu ch-needed capital to maintain its debt financing. The IMF pledged a total of $14 billion to be disperse d throughout the year, pending the attainment of certain fiscal goals (IMF 2003). These atte mpts, however, failed “to break the cycle of rising interest rates, falli ng growth, and fiscal underperformance” (IMF 2003: 59). The situation demonstrated its fragility as the finance minister resigned and his successor was forced out in two weeks. As the year continued, the spread be tween pesoand dollardenominated interest rates skyrocketed from one to sixteen percent and the central bank modified its charter, reducing the requir ed currency on hand required by law (IMF 2003: 59). The government then offered a voluntar y debt swap. While this move bought the government time on its debt service obligations the interest rate on the new debt was 17%, an inordinately high rate, demonstra ting the desperation of the government (IMF 2003: 59). Confidence in the system continue d to erode and the run on bank deposits hit a high in November 2001 (IMF 2003: 61). The government responded by limiting withdr awals to $250 dollars a week from individual accounts (IMF 2003: 61). The reason behind such a drastic measure was simple. There were not enough dollars on hand to support the run on the banks. Additionally, devaluatio n of the peso was imminent, but there was doubt as to what the

PAGE 47

40 new value of the peso would be. With the implementation of the corralito the crisis had hit the boiling point. There were riots in th e street, culminating in the death of 27 people (Fue 2003). President Fernando de La Rua s ubsequently resigned on December 20. In January of 2002, Dualde – the 5th president in three weeks – declar ed default (IMF 2003: 62). 2002 The economic and political landscape could look no worse. In 2002 unemployment was at a record 22% (Byrnes 2005), and th ere was a 11% decline in output (Blustein 2004). Throughout the year the government st ruggled with a variety of measures to attempt to shore up the peso and stabilize the banking system. Effect of Economic Crisis on the Barter Clubs The state of emergency in late 2001 not onl y sent people to the streets clanging pots and pans in the famous cacerolazos but it sent waves of people in to the barter clubs. The news media was integral in spreading the wo rd. In January of 2001, before the national catastrophe fully unfolded, the Argentine newspaper, La Nacin, only mentioned the trueques in passing in two articles. In February 2002, however, the trueque clubs were not only mentioned in four articles, but they were the main subject of two articles. One article, “El trueque salv a una fbrica en Mendoza” (Feb 27 2002), explained how the RGT saved a Mendoza canning business by “loaning” 40,000 crditos in return for canned olives, pickles, tomatoes and dulces to supply a particular nodo The other article, “El trueque crece a la par de la crisis” (Feb 6 2002), tells of more than 500,000 families using the trueque as a palliative for the crisis. Th is article ends by providing contact information (phone, email, website) and instructions on how to join. Clarn Argentina’s other main newspaper, al so heavily covered the barter clubs. An article entitled “El club del treuque que le cambi la cara a un barrio” reported that in

PAGE 48

41 October of 2001 only 100 people we re regularly attending a nodo in the city of Lomas de Zamora,3 but in March of 2002, more than 2,000 people were going weekly (Torresi 2002). Another Clarn article from two months earlier proclaimed: “Con el trueque ya se compran campos, autos y hasta casas ” In this article Covas, one of the RGT founders, stated that there were 50 million crditos in circulation, with 250,000 crditos issued daily to new members – which means 5,000 ne w individuals were joining daily (since each new member received 50 crditos ). The article continued to report that in the previous six months 75 new nodos had opened in the city of Buenos Aires. By June of 2002 5,000 nodos were in operation, with a total of one and half million participants (Ovalles 2002). During this period, it was clear that people were joining the trueque as a means of survival. Access to money was limited, jobs were scarce and the va lue of the peso had plummeted. People used the trueques strategically in their desperation to survive. Grander values of self-sufficiency, solidar ity and local producti on and consumption did not factor in. Crditos were used to buy necessary items such as food, cleaning supplies, clothes, and school supplies fo r their children, while precious pesos were set aside to pay utilities and other bill s (interviews). One woman that I interviewed stated that in 2001 and 2002 almost all of the prepared food items that she brought into the house came from the trueque Another interviewee desc ribed how people would form a line more than an hour before the opening of a large nodo in order to get a chance at scarce goods such as food, jostling and fighting to be able to secure bread, vegetables or cooking oil before it ran out. 3 Province of Buenos Aires

PAGE 49

42 In some instances the trueque also turned into a form of protest. In May of 2002 the RGT set up a temporary nodo in downtown Buenos Aires. The protest, as one participant commented was “un acto simb lico en contra del mercado” (Un Club 2002). In a similar action two weeks later in front of the national Congress, trueque participants specifically set up a nodo to demonstrate support for a proposed law to regulate the trueques Luis Laporte, a spokesperson for the RGT, explained that a legal framework was necessary to regulate the trueques because, among other things, it would provide a means to punish people who counterfeited crditos “Queremos un marco legal porque no podemos controlar lo que pasa. Si algui n falsifica crditos, hoy no se lo puede penar” (Trueque Frente 2002). The trueques used in this way as a form of protest is not without its inconsistencies. On the one hand, the trueque members protest the market that excludes them. On th e other hand, they ask for legislation to bring the trueques under the regulating arm of that same system.4 This paradoxical stance will be discussed in the next chapter. Regulating the trueques was particularly appealing sin ce the explosion in growth in early 2002 had only exacerbated existing probl ems. Inflation was perhaps the most nefarious issue. Several fact ors played into it. First and foremost the RGT simply overprinted crditos There was an attempt to keep tr ack of who registered to prevent individuals from collecting seve ral installations of start-up crditos The registration system, however, simply broke down under the avalanche of new members – people were able to register across several nodos receiving 50 crditos each time. A woman I interviewed who was close to the RGT founders commented on how the franquicia 4 Likewise, initiatives that would allow the payment of municipal debts with crditos were also supported by the RGT ( Clarn Feb 14 2002).

PAGE 50

43 system broke down. She described the franquicia system as the replication of the trueque model, but as she noted, once the nodos began growing rapidly, “no tena muy claro cual era el modelo para repetir. Lo nico que se repeti era que a cambio de dos pesos te daban 50 crditos. Y eso genero la corrupcin.” Speculation also ran rampant. Some pe ople spent their whole week going from nodo to nodo buying goods at one price and selling them at another. Counterfeit crditos compounded the problem. In August of 2002 three different groups were arrested for counterfeiting the RGT crditos In one arrest alone, 2,250,000 fake crditos were confiscated. Considering that 50 million in true crditos were in circulation, that many false crditos constituted almost five percent of the total in circulation. The kind and quality of goods being produced in the trueque also became problematic. The August 17, 2003 edition of La Nacin One reported how for one woman making cakes for the trueque became a losing proposition: “El precio de las materias primas se fue por las nubes y me lle garon a pedir 2000 crditos por un kilo de azcar. Al final para preparar las tortas tena que invertir en pesos y a mi casa me llevaba papelitos”. Declining terms of trade resulted in a severe decrease in production. People were coming to the nodos to buy, but production was falling off. Furthermore, what remained in the trueques were items ancillary to daily need s such as arts and crafts and also things of generally lowe r quality, like used clothes. In turn, many people ended up with stacks of crditos but nothing worthwhile to buy. Inflation, specula tion, declining terms of trade and depletion of supply led to massive closing of nodos Towards the end of 2002 the nodos were closing down with the same rapidity with which they opened (Premat 2003).

PAGE 51

44 Many trueque participants place the blame squarely on the RGT founders. They believed that the founders had purposely sold crditos to make a profit, and in the process wrecked the system. The woman who ran a large nodo in the city of Buenos Aires expressed this view: Esta personas [the 3 founders] empezaron a ver el movimiento que haba detras de ellos, empezaron a pensar en pesos, en di nero, en dinero, en dinero y terminaron en hacer una gran estafa...Y gente que nosotros conocimos en su principio que no tenan ni siquiera una casa para vivir se construyeron casas en San Isidrio – San Isidrio una de las localidades mas caras que existe en Argentina...Y cuando me empez a dar cuenta de como esto, como se estaba manejando y, y las cosas que haba detras, llor muchisimo, yo sufr muchsimo porque realmente aca haba gente muy valiosa, gente que, yo conoc, ge nte que actualmente hoy la trato, gente que yo quiero mucho. Yo me senta part e de la estafa porque yo manjeaba uno de los trueques mas grandes que haba en Argentina.5 The RGT founders, for their part, believ ed that the government had purposely undermined the barter clubs. Accordi ng to the founders, the government, which originally supported the trueques turned on the barter clubs wh en it began to see them as a threat to the client elistic model. As the RGT founde rs explained, since people were suddenly able to provide for themselves the politicians were not able to buy votes by giving handouts. The founders particularly blamed Plan Jefes y Jefas a federal program that gave cash money to heads of hous eholds, for driving people away from the trueque and the principles of self-sufficiency. The f ounders even allude to more direct sabotage; they believe that polit icians in the government were re sponsible for the falsification of crditos (Sainz 2003). 5 This interviewee not only believed the founders had purposely overprinted crditos but she also insisted that they made up the story of counterfeit crditos to try to get away with their misconduct. When asked about the newspaper articles describing the capture of counterfeit crditos she said that later it was retracted.

PAGE 52

45 Trueque Response As early as May 2002 the RGT attempted to address the failing system. In an RGT pamphlet they asked the prosumidores: “Tenga paciencia. En estos momentos estamos abocados a la reforma total del sistem a de franquicia y entrega de crditos” (NotiTrueque). By December of 2002 the RGT began printing new crditos on special paper from Brazil and with multiple security measures, including a watermark. They also established an oxidation rate, so that the crdito lost valu e over time, forcing people to spend the crditos instead of amassing them (Rocha 2002). By November of 2004, when I visited Argentina, there were a handful of independent and RTS nodos still active in the city of Buenos Aires. There were no RGT nodos left in th e capital city. During my visist, however, I attended a large RGT nodo outside the capital city in Quilmes. It still meets three times a week with more than a 1,500 passing through. El Comedero, as it is called, is hosted in a la rge industrial space that previously housed a factory. Upon entering the prosumidore pays five crditos and two pesos and receives a leaflet containing PAR news and editorials. One peso goes to the PAR to help pay for the printing crditos and the leaflet. The other pe so goes toward paying security, the cleaning person and the nodo administrator, who works in the nodo office and does the bookkeeping. The crditos gathered from the entry fee go to paying the coordinator, whose job is to mediate between prosumidores be available to listen to people, and to promote creativity and production. El Comedero houses a big kitchen in the back with an industrial stove and oven, which is available for anyone’s use. For instance, one woman with whom I spoke choses to bake her goods in the kitchen rather th an transport them to the nodo The most typical item for sale is us ed clothing. Food is another big item. There are fresh vegetables and lots of prepared foods like tortas tartas galletitas There

PAGE 53

46 are also a quantity of prepackaged food items like spices, cookies and noodles, but never in huge quantities. Some of the services o ffered include hair cutt ing, tarot card reading and watch repair. Although the interviews I conducted at this nodo were mostly informal, three themes became apparent. First, people come to the trueque for the social interaction. Several people describe the trueque as “therapy,” a place to come to talk to people, interact and forget their worries for a short time. While many of the people come to the nodo in order to ameliorate a difficult economic situation, several people come merely to see friends and distract themselves. Second, people often move between the trueque and the formal market as an economic strategy. As several people mentione d to me, some things are cheaper in the trueque and some are cheaper in the market. People are constantly moving between the two to extract advantage. For instance, one woman buys spices at the supermarket and repackages them in small bags to sell individually in the trueque Another woman uses pesos to buy ingredients in the formal market to make prepizzas and pasta to sell in the trueque She says she recupera tes the pesos she spends by buying things in the trueque instead of the formal market. Many people be lieve they reap economic benefits from the trueque but how they derive the benefit is not a consciously understood or planned process. A 70-year old man I spoke to buys ne w things in the formal market (the day I spoke to him he had purchased shoe inserts) to sell along with the used items that he brings in. When asked whether it worked to his benefit to buy things with pesos and then sell them in crditos he answered that he really did not know. Third, although some participants were not there fo r economic reasons only their participation did not appear to

PAGE 54

47 be motivated by the values of self-help, lo cal production, or a philosophical aversion to pesos. For instance, I asked people whether th ey read the leaflet that was handed out to every prosumidor upon entering the nodo On the whole the answer was no. Chapter Summary Summary. The story of the trueques involves a direct relationship between a worsening economy and increasing trueque membership. A corollary relationship also obtained: as the economy worsened the reasons for joining the barter clubs had more to do with necessity and survival rather than thoughts of creating an alternative economic system. And as the trueques grew in number so did the problems plaguing them. The national explosion in late 2001 caused a huge influx of trueque participants, shaking the already fragile system to its core, exacer bating earlier problems of inflation and speculation and leading to the massive shutdown of nodos in late 2002. In response, RGT founders instituted a “reactivation” of nodos on a smaller and more controlled scale starting in 2002. However it did not appear th at ideology motivated participants even at the “reactivated” nodos, but rather desires to engage in so cial activity coupled with attempts to derive economic benefit.

PAGE 55

48 CHAPTER 4 TRUEQUES AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT? Keeping in mind the lofty goals of thei r early beginnings, but taking into account the changes wrought by unexpected and significant growth, to wh at extent can the barter clubs be considered a social movement? To consider the trueques as a social movement might be a big leap – particularly since trueque participation grew in direct relation to a worsening economy and participa tion at the height of the trueques stemmed from pragmatic considerations rather than ideologi cal conviction. Yet the original project was not designed as merely a survival mechanis m. The barter clubs were designed as an enlightened alternative to the marke t; they were based on principles of autosuficiencia solidarity and the repudiation of dependency on the formal currency. To answer whether the barter clubs can be considered a social movement, we will return to Sidney Tarrow’s definition of a social movement and analyze how the trueques match up with its several components. As mentioned in Chapter two the barter clubs began with the RGT and eventually two other smaller gr oups splintered off. For the purposes of this chapter I will apply Tarrow’s definiti on only to the RGT. Collective Activity The first prerequisite of a social movement is that it be a collec tive activity. At first glance, it appears that this criterion was met fr om the beginning. By its very nature a barter system requires more than one pers on in order to exist. Although the first nodo was not huge (it started with 20 people), the bart er system only grew. Despite the lack of hard and fast numbers, it is indisputable that up until 2002 the trueques were multiplying

PAGE 56

49 rapidly throughout the country. Even after the nodos began closing en masse in late 2002, several nodos still remain in operation to the present day. However, while the barter clubs do involve collective action by nature, there is a certain level of individualism that underlies th e activity. As one rese archer observes, the barter clubs in fact present an indivi dualistic solution to a collective problem: Si bien...la cada [en la nueva pobreza] ya no poda ser percibida como un hecho individual sino que las causas de la crisis que padecan eran globales, generabilizables y casi inevita bles, la salida de esta ex clusin se presentaba como puramente individual. Paradoja que se sostiene a partir de la persistencia de la idea de un progreso posible pero donde "es capar" de dicha situacin dependa nicamente de las capacidades personales En este sentido, la alternativa del trueque se presentaba con claros tintes individualistas -egosta, imposibilitando las creencias en acciones colectivas o de de mandas al sistema poltico...(Barbetta). The individualistic nature of the barter clubs, i.e., the emphasis on self sufficiency and personal ingenuity to overcome exclusion fr om the established market system is not necessarily problematic when considering the ba rter clubs as a social movement. First, we know from the literature on new social m ovements that movements can be carried out on an individual level, especially when ba sed around life-style c hoices (Laraa 1994). The paradox of individual action constituting a collective activity is resolved when we acknowledge that the in dividual basis of action is part of a group of like-minded people do like-minded activities, even if separate Second, as discussed in Chapter two, the RGT’s emphasis on self-sufficiency requi res learning from others and sharing knowledge, thus creating a market of solidarity. Contention Contention is the second element of so cial movements. As defined by Tarrow contention involves two aspects: people who do not have access to institutions who fundamentally challenge the system. The trueques clearly comport with the first part of

PAGE 57

50 this definition. The RGT specifically pr ides itself in creating a space those who do not have access to institutions i.e., the excluded. In fact many researchers describe the trueques ’ positive impact on women, a traditionally marginalized sector of society (Primavera 2003, Powell 2002). Furthermore, th e everyday participant does not appear to be a seasoned politician, lobbyist or other traditional actor with institutional access. The exception perhaps is the individuals who take on the role of coordinator. Some coordinators do have political experience. For instance, the woman I interviewed who ran Galpon de Once one of the largest nodos in the city of Buenos Aires, was a member of the Confederacin General de Trabajo (CGT), a national trade union.1 Even so, not all coordinators have political roots. Also worth noting is that in some cases people worked to initiate a nodo even if they were not planning to participate in it. For instance, one gentleman that I interviewed worked with an advocacy group for retired people. He began helping to set up nodos as a community service. While politically active coordinators and nodo initiators played an impor tant role in the barter clubs they were not the norm. The second part of Tarrow’s definition of contention is the making of new or unaccepted claims that fundamentally challenge the system A starting point of analysis on this point is a quotation by Jeff Powell, which highlights the inherent social and political challenge of what he refers to as community currency systems (CCS): Lying at the juncture of economics, po litical science, sociology, geography, anthropology, cultural, e nvironmental and gender studies, CCS are a concrete embodiment of key abstract debates. Firs t amongst these is over the nature of markets. CCS pose serious challenges to the standard assumptions of homo 1 I also interviewed a coordinator from an independent nodo who, during the dictatorship was a member of a leftist group and as a result was an exiliado interno. While she obviously has experience organizing this experience is as a subaltern rather than so meone with traditional access to institutions.

PAGE 58

51 oeconomicus and the way we value, exch ange and consume. By recognizing unpaid women's work, for example, CCS have the potential to restruct ure gender relations. Secondly, CCS force new discussions over the role of the state. They are only one of several new contenders in the global marketplace competing with the state's crumbling monopoly over both the provision of social services and the money supply. (2). Powell makes two points. First, that the trueques challenge ingrained ideas about consumption and production. The edict of the trueques is to consume no more than is needed and to eschew accumulation of crditos Even though Argentina’s middle class is eroding away, it still knows how to consum e. One Argentine history professor characterized the Argentines of the 90s as a “ dame dos ” culture; with money burning in their pockets the Argentines wanted two of everything (interview). The trueques counteract this tendency, trying to create a new wave of people who are willing to buck the dominant patterns of materialist cons umption. This new mode of consumption compels a new mode of production. The trueques enjoin participants to use socially appropriate technology to produce just enough to provide for reasonable needs. As Powell points out, the Twelve Principles of the RGT attempt to create “alternative behavioral norms” (9). One might argue that ideas of sustainabl e development, locally centered growth and self-sufficiency are not new or radical id eas. While these ideas may not be new, they are far from mainstream. In particular, the idea of self-sufficiency – of being personally resourceful in providing for one’s material ne eds – is unconventional in Argentina, with its history of paternalistic governance. More to the point, how those ideas are operationalized – by rejecting pesos and turning to social money instead – is conceptually quite radical. As Melucci might argue, these va lues “engage the constitutive logic of [the] system” (1994: 103). A fundamental purpose of creating the trueques was to demonstrate

PAGE 59

52 that money is neither the starting point for one’s survival nor one’s se nse of self. To use social money encourages creativity and allows a person to create va lue in terms of time and effort expended rather than in pesos. Furthermore, the crdito is not legal tender. No government backs it. Instead the good w ill and trust of the barter club members underwrites the value of the crdito The personal relationships of the barter club members guarantee its value. To the extent that participants adop ted this theoretical understanding of the crdito the barter clubs indeed embodied an unorthodox approach to collectiv e action. Yet, to the degree that the crdito was treated as a peso – commodified, bought, sold, counterfeited – the barter clubs lost the original meaning a nd impact of their approach. An essential element of most social mone y or community currency systems, like the Ithaca Hours in New York or the LETS system in Europe, is the focus on local production and consumption.2 As the RGT expanded to a national scope, the importance of locally-based development and along with it the philosophical underpinnings of the crdito was subverted over time. The bigger the RGT grew and the more national coverage the crditos got, the more the RGT moved away from this fundamental ideal. This tendency to grow should come as no surprise. A small nodo is hard pressed to provide variety of products. The ability to use the crdito in more than one setting makes the crdito more useful. Yet the more widely circulated the crdito the more it was used as if it were a peso rather than “social money”. 2 The Ithaca HOURS system has very similar ideals as the original RGT: promotion of local commerce, sustainable development and a rejection of materialism (see http://www.ith acahours.com/ and http://www.ith acahours.org/ ). The LETS system also supports local development. See http://www.letslinkuk.org/

PAGE 60

53 Powell’s second point deals with the trueques’ challenge to state hegemony. Powell sees the trueques as potentially challenging the role of the state, for instance in competing with the state’s monopoly over mone y supply. By extension, the barter clubs could also plausibly erode th e productivity of th e national economy. The activity of the formal market has the potential to decline to the degree that peopl e satisfy their needs through the trueque and not through the formal market. In other words, it could be a zero-sum relationship. This loss of activity in the formal market would have potentially devastating consequences for the tax base (although Argentina is notorious for poor collections of taxes), the GDP, and internati onal investment, which in part is based on GDP calculations. Despite the potential of this scenario, it is not a reality. A significant problem continually plagued the trueque : in order to create goods for the trueque market, primary materials almost always had to come from the formal market. The trueques specifically focused on promoting primary material-producing trueque businesses, but these microbusinesses never materialized in larger enough numbers or variet y of products to create a true alternative trueque market. It is important here to make a distinction between different conceptions of th e word “alternative”. The trueques were created as an alternative to the formal market. On the one hand, alternative could mean a complete replacement of the formal system. In this connotation the trueques have a zero-sum relationship to the formal market as desc ribed above. Alterna tive on the other hand, could also connote a part-time or complementary relationship to the formal market. It is this understanding that the RGT founders embrace. In interviews the barter club founders

PAGE 61

54 describe the role of the barter clubs as “int erstitial,” that is, extracting value where the formal market fails to. Powell’s quote highlights two le vels of contention inherent in the barter system. The first is at the level of ideas; the bart er clubs challenge accep ted ideas of production and consumption. But as the national econom y worsened the new members failed to engage the barter club at this conceptual level. The following section addresses why members failed to adopt the philosophical stance of the trueques Suffice to say at this point, however, that by late 2001 the majority of participants did not reflect the RGT ideas of consumption and production. The seco nd level of contention is the practical; the barter clubs potentially underm ined the very engine of the formal economic market. Yet, in the final analysis this is a m oot point: the relationship between the trueques and the formal market was not zero sum, nor was the intention of the RGT founders to usurp formal market share. Common Purpose/Common Identity The third element of Tarrow’s social m ovement definition is that of common purpose and/or common identity. My intervie ws revealed a variety of motivations for initially joining the barter clubs: ideology, pragmatism, altruism, curiosity and social interaction. This multiplicity of initial factors does not immediately disqualify the trueques as a social movement, however. Tw o important questions need further consideration. First, did the RGT attempt to “organize experience” and “guide action” (Snow et al. 1986: 464) in order to bring thes e three disparate groups together? In other words, did the RGT frame its key issues? S econd, was the RGT succe ssful? That is, did participant motivations change over time to eventually coalesce ar ound a more or less homogeneous core?

PAGE 62

55 Turning to the first question: did the RGT frame key issues and if so, how? There is no question that the RGT attempted to fram e central ideas. This was done at both a conceptual and practical level. At the conceptual level, the RGT tapped into an existing disenchantment with neoliberalism. Inez G onzalez Bombal asks an interesting question in her work: why it is that the ne w poor are willing to be in the trueques when a few years ago they wouldn’t have dreamed of doing it (104 )? Bombal notes that there has been a change – from the new poor viewing their status a result of poor microeconomic decisions (Minujin and Kessl er 1993) – to viewing th emselves as victims of macroeconomic problems over which they had no control (Bombal 2002: 104). She concludes that the change in subjectivity ( subjetividad ), from the rational, autonomous self, making microeconomic deci sions to the self as victim of bad macroeconomics is what allowed the new poor to participate in the trueques This change in subjectivity is precisely what the RGT builds on. Appealing to the discontent of the increased numbers of unemployed, the RGT attempted a met hod of both frame bridging and amplifying, depending on whether a person already held anti-neoliberalism as a high value (frame bridging) or whether a person moved that value up in their hierarchy as a result of coming into contact with the RGT (frame amplifying) An example of this kind of framing is demonstrated in the RGT document entitled “ Comenzar por Casa ”: La economa global no ha hecho ms que acr ecentar la inequidad, el desempleo, la tensin social y la degradacin del medi oambiente. Crece el nmero de personas disconformes que perciben que el confort no es sinnimo de calidad de vida y por todas partes surgen alternativas al mercado cuyo comn denominador es la descentralizacin, la autogestin y la produccin a escala humana. Here the RGT draws a causal connecti on between the globalized economy and the commonly perceived societal ills of unempl oyment, social tension and environmental

PAGE 63

56 degradation. In addition to drawing this connection, it goe s on to suggest action and response: self sufficiency and new modes of production. Part of the RGT conceptual framing strategy involved creating a new vocabulary to describe the trueque experience. While the word prosumidor originated in the works of Alvin Toffler, the RGT adopted it as its ow n. The RGT also adopted common words and associated them very specifically with the trueque system. For instance the words nodo (node) and trueque (which comes from the verb trocar ) have in Argentina become synonymous with the barter clubs. This ne w vocabulary was dissemi nated along with the larger trueque values during the charlas and coordinator training sessions. The barter clubs, in creating a world of prosumidores who trade in an economy of solidarity using crditos not only creates a community of like-minde d barter club partic ipants, but it also clearly challenges the dominant di scourse. As Melucci observes: [A]ntagonism lies in the ability to resist and, even more so, to overturn dominant codes. Antagonism lies in the ability to give a different name to space and time by developing new languages that ch ange or replace the words us ed by the social order to organize our daily experience (Melucci 1994: 123). At the practical level, the RGT attempted to mold participants and create an affinity of ideals through the required charlas For instance, in certain areas a prospective member would have to attend eight charlas in order to become a member. These meetings involved rigorous trai ning, replete with workbooks a nd lesson plans (interview). The RGT also used its online and publishing cap abilities to disseminate a large array of articles on trueque consciousness. A main distribu tion point for documents was the

PAGE 64

57 autosuficiencia website.3 In addition to more formal documents such as the “Los Doce Principios” there was a constant posting of articles and interviews reiterating the RGT values as well as cautioning against unethical trueque conduct. Turning to the second question: how succe ssful were these various attempts at framing? Obviously, the RGT was not successf ul enough to prevent misuse of the barter system by those who were willi ng to speculate and counterfeit crditos And clearly, the RGT failed to convince a large number of peopl e to stay in the ba rter system once the formal market got back on its feet. In fact, nodos were forced to close down due to lack of the ills of inflation, sp eculation and corruption. In spite of these apparent failures, st rong examples exist among a variety of participants that demonstrate the succe ss of the framing. Although not specifically referencing the framing categories of Snow et al., Bombal’s research offers several examples of framing taking place. One artist she interviewed supplie s a clear example of frame bridging. This artist explains how participating in the trueques was simply a continuation of the practice of values that he already held: “Yo soy artesana de oficio, hace ms de treinta aos que soy artesana. Nosotros nos iniciamos en la artesana haciendo treuques. Para m fu e descubrir algo dentro de la sociedad para rescatar...” (Bombal 2002: 114). Another in terviewee’s comment demonstr ates an example of frame transformation, i.e., the redefining of beliefs: Yo crea que estaba todo terminado, que no haba mas alternativa, porque uno se engancha en que no hay trabajo, no hay posibi lides de insertarse en la sociedad y yo vea todo como una pared adelante. Esto [el trueque] hizo una apertura...se me 3 Autosuficienica.com.ar is the hom e of the home of the Programa de Au tosuficiencia Regional (PAR). It is this website that contains the documents such as the “Los Doce Principios” and “Comenzar por Casa” of the RGT. The RGT has its own website, www. trueque .org.ar in which several of the links lead to the autosuficiencia website.

PAGE 65

58 abri la mente, se me despert algo ac ad entro. Me di cuenta de que existe otro mundo qu yo no lo conoca y que ac ad entro lo descubr (Bombal 2002: 113). In my interviews I also came across ex amples of successful framing. One woman presented a clear case of frame transformation. She transformed her ideas on the role of money: Dinero a veces no es lo mas important vos sabes. No es lo mas important. Hay muchas cosas que se pueden resolver sin diner. Con volunta d, con intercambio. Esto yo aprendi aca. O sea, antes yo pensab a el reves, que sin dinero no se podia hacer nada. Y aca me di cuenta que no era lo mas importante. De verdad te digo. Another woman’s experience exemplified frame amplification, that is, the “clarification” or “invigoration” of life ev ents (Snow et al. 1986: 469): Lo que se estaba dando [el trueque] era re cuperar la identidad de las personas, recuperar la dignidad del tr abajo y recuperar el sentido de que lo que es el solidaridad, porque esto fue lo que yo descubr en el trueque. Por eso, en mi caso, me qued en el trueque. No entr para comer. Yo no tena problemas. Yo soy profesional, soy mdica. No necestaba ir al trueque al comprarme un plato de comida...yo recuper mi propio identidad co mo persona y la dignidad del trabajo, no? la dignidad de decir lo que yo hago no es que lo regalo, no hago beneficencia y el otro lo compra con su trabajo tambin. Y fue muy fuerte para mi. This particular woman felt that the trueques had reconnected her to ideas of solidarity and dignity. She had been hearing of the trueques from friends, in the news, and had seen them in the streets. But before she actually began partic ipating in the barter system she described herself as being a “s nob”. Upon becoming a member she realized the trueques were quite different from what she anticipated. “Realmente cuando yo tom contacto y lo viv desde adentro me di cuen ta que era totalmente diferente a la idea que yo tena.” She realized that the trueques were really a way to reconnect with one’s identity.

PAGE 66

59 Mobilizing Structures The ability of the RGT to adequately fram e key issues is not the single lynchpin in the success or failure of creating a social movement. Social movements must combine their ideas with action, whic h leads to the fourth element of Tarrow’s definition: mobilizing structures. Tarrow observes that so cial movement organizations need to be sufficiently structured to permit effective action, but must also be flexible enough to encourage autonomy and creativity at the participant level (Tarrow 1998: 124). The RGT tried to strike this balance by creating a horizontal system, one where each club was autonomous and created its own best practices. Yet, in some aspects the RGT was too decentralized. Nodos were supposed to be organically formed; it was expected that each would create its own norms and methods, all the while maintaining the core values of the RGT. However, once the number of nodos began growing rapidly, the RGT could not guarantee adherence to basic requirements. The RGT could not ensure that charlas were being attended or prevent coordinators from selling crditos As one interviewee observed, the truequ e in the beginning “Era mu cho mas cuidado...se invitaba a la persona parecida a voz, era mas de bo ca a boca la invitacin.” A more moderated growth rate might have allowed for the RGT to instill the core values on the front end and allowed variety and creativity in the execution of each individual nodo Uncontrolled growth, however, led to a great degree of decentralization and little oversight. Interestingly, the RGT has also been cr iticized for being t oo centralized. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Red de Trueque Solidaria (RTS) particularly denounced the RGT for tightly holding power in the small group of RGT founders, with little regard for transparency in the decision-making process. This lack of democrat ic participation also replicated itself at the nodo level. As Leoni and Luzzi’s research reveal, there almost

PAGE 67

60 always came to be a permanent coordinator, rath er than a rotation of the post as originally intended by the RGT. In all fairness, however, the position of coordina tor, especially for the larger nodos required a dedication of time; the lack of rotation often was due to a lack of volunteers willing to take on the role, rather than any malicious greed for power and control on the part of the coordinators. It would be difficult to determine what st eps the RGT could have taken to strike a more effective balance between structure a nd flexibility. To insure that each new member was thoroughly trained a nd educated would have required a strictly monitored growth pattern. The risk of course, would be to repudiate the RGT’s goal to foment a variety of experiences. Furthermore, the RG T would not have served as a refuge during economic crisis, a fact the RGT founders were proud of. This tension between structure and flexibility ultimately was untenable and th e barter clubs failed to create a mobilizing structure to maintain the barter clubs as a social movement. Sustained Activity The fourth element of Tarrow’s social m ovement definition is sustained activity. Tarrow does not specify what exact length of time qualifies as ‘sustained’ activity, but meeting an exact temporal criterion is not nece ssary in the case of the barter clubs. In terms of overall lifespan, the trueques activity is unquestionably a lasting activity. The barter clubs have existed si nce 1995 and continue to operate albeit in significantly smaller numbers. And new people conti nue to join. While I was in the nodo El Comedero in the province of Buenos Aires, I happened to speak with a woman who was there for the first time. More interesting, t hough, is the duration of participation of each individual. The people I interviewed, ev en if no longer active, tended to have participated for at least a year.

PAGE 68

61 Political Opportunities Tarrow notes that discontent a nd structural societal strain are always present. It is only when the political system opens in a par ticular manner that provides the crucible for all of the above-described elements to cataly ze the formation of a social movement. The first parts of chapter two and chapter three outlined the specific political opportunities that the stage for the formation of the barter clubs. Creating the backdrop for the barter clubs was the rise of the new poor, disenchanted with the ec onomic model that excluded them from its benefits. The discontent d eepened with the implementation of Menem’s neoliberal model and the accompanying spike in unemployment, underemployment and increasing job precariousness. Finally, the dramatic natio nal economic crash created a major impetus for participation in the barter clubs. Chapter Summary In reviewing each of Tarrow’s categorie s a common theme emerges: the barter clubs began with all the elem ents of a social movement, but rapid participant growth, fueled by a worsening economy and eventua lly a national economic crash, severely strained the original project. This fact is particularly evident in examining the elements of contention common purpose and mobilizing structures The barter clubs began by challenging received notions of produc tion and consumption. But as the trueques reached national proportions, the elements of local production and solidarity were subverted. Participation was about surv ival, not about challenging the dominant discourse. Consequently the common purpose uniting the pioneering members quickly diluted. While some participants demonstrated a change in attitude, the RGT was largely unsuccessful in aligning the various motivati on members with the va lues of the RGT.

PAGE 69

62 One difficulty in classifying the trueques as a social movement comes into sharper focus when we consider the following question. Could the trueque be a social movement if they were designed simply to meet practic al needs and did not i nvolve any theories of self-sufficiency, local development, social money or solidarity? Or do people have to subscribe to lofty ideals for th e barter clubs to qualify as a social movement? The answer lies in a certain synergy between contention and common purpose distinct to the barter clubs. If the common purpose is solely to derive economic benefit then the element of contention disappears: simply trying to derive economi c value alone is hardly contentious. Alberto Melucci states: “What is at issue in a conflict is not the terms of the exchange, or the best way to conduct it, but the actual meaning of the exchange itself” (Melucci 1994: 125). If the m eaning of the barter clubs is reduced to a simple economic strategy then the meaning of that economic activ ity is no longer in conflict – it is simply part of the universal e ffort to survive. Finally, the barter club’s mobilizing structures also failed to hold in the face of chaotic growth. Charlas were no longer rigorously requ ired and participation at the organizing level failed to rotate as origina lly expected. By the end of 2002 the barter clubs had lost the elements necessary to be considered a social movement.

PAGE 70

63 CHAPTER 5 CYCLES OF CONTENTION The barter clubs were not the only forms of contention in Argentina in the 1990s and early years of 2000. Shortly after the ba rter clubs began, other forms of collective action came onto the scene, including the piqueteros fbricas recuperadas asambleas bariales and cacerolazos This chapter briefly examines each of these phenomena, demonstrating how they and the trueques formed a larger cycle of contention. The discussion will illuminate the master fram e common to all of these disparate groups: discontent with the neoliberal economic model. The chapter next highlights the decline of the cycle and the factors sp ecifically affecting the barter clubs. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings of this thesis with observations on the significance of the barter clubs in the Argentine society. Onset of the Cycle The rise of various forms of contention in the 1990s and early years of 2000 fit well into what Tarrow characterizes as the onset of a cycle of contention: a marked increase in conflict, heterogeneity of actors, diverse forms of contention and increased political attention (Tarrow 1998: 144-146). Furthermor e, as Tarrow also points out, despite variance in the forms of contentious activ ity and heterogeneity of actors, these phenomena share a master frame around which protest occurred. Piqueteros (1996 – present) The piquetero movement started in two separate locations, in 1996 with riots in Cutral-Co a nd Plaz Huincul in Neuquen and in 1997 with the roadblocks of General Mosconi and Tart agal in Salta (Svampa 2003: 14). In these

PAGE 71

64 two instances the riot s and roadblocks were in respons e to joblessness created by the privatization of YPF and subsequent clos ing of YPF plants, the main source of employment in those towns. These uprisings set off a wave of similar roadblocks and protests among the jobless and povert y-stricken throughout the country. Piqueteros have variously demand jobs, social plans a nd cash subsidies (Svampa 2003: 41). The government response has been both conciliato ry and violent. It has responded by granting plans such as Planes Jefes y Jefas de Hogar to the piqueteros but has also responded with police force (Once 2006). In some cases the government has also coopted piquetero leaders by appointing them to public position (De Piquetero 2006). The piqueteros exhibit a variety of organizational st yles and a varied demographic base (Germano 2005, Svampa 2003). A common unders tanding, however, is that the failed neoliberal model brought the country a state of disarray and joblessness (Germano 2005). Fbricas recuperadas (2000 – present) As factories began to fail in the 1990s workers began barricading the factories to prevent owners from removing the equipment and selling it. The workers claimed the machin ery as payment for salaries in arrears. Forming legal cooperatives, the workers took thei r case to court – and often won. A slew of provincial laws were passed allowing th e expropriation of f actory buildings and equipment by the cooperatives, declaring the e xpropriation to be of public utility. An official organization has formed, Movimiento Nacional de Fbricas Recuperadas which became an NGO in 2003.1 Presently there are more than 100 fbricas recuperadas in operation. 1 For more information see their website at http://www.fabricasr ecuperadas.org.ar/.

PAGE 72

65 Asambleas barriales (2001 – 2003) The asambleas began right after the cacerolazos of December 19th and 20th, 2001 (Calel lo). In the beginning, anywhere from 150-300 people would meet in a public spa ce – plazas, parks, local bars. Not only did people of all ages, political and cultura l backgrounds participate, but the topics addressed covered a multitude of questions, fr om national politics to local issues. The activities of the asambleas were diverse, from providi ng assistance to the unemployed, creating collection sites for the cartoneros and buying in bulk ( compras comunitarias ), to distributing medicines, crea ting libraries, hosting theatres and festivals (DiMarco and Palomino 2004: 40). The asambleas also frequently formed ties with the piqueteros and fbricas recuperadas Despite this wide range of projects and goals, the common denominator in all asamblea discussions was the failed ne oliberal economic model: “[L]o que se plantea dentro de las asambleas y cada vez con mas fuerza, es una discusin sobre el modelo econmico de la sociedad, sobre el modelo econmico social; una discusin sobre la economa del mercado” (DiMarco and Palomino 2004: 38). In March 2002 there were 272 in the whole country (Calello ), but at present the fate of the various asambleas is hard to gauge. Most reports of the asambleas in the press are those particularly associated with the piqueteros In searching on the internet, most of the neighborhood asamblea websites have not been active since 2003. Cacerolazos (December 19th and 20th, 2001) In a spontaneous protest against the unraveling economic and political situat ion, thousands of Argentines took to the streets clanging pots and pans, culminating in the resignation of Pres ident de la Ra from office. For many the protest was about the economic crisis and fo r others it was about the political crisis: "A m me llam la atencin la existencia de dos sectores en el

PAGE 73

66 cacerolazo, aparte de los vndalos y provocador es: un sector que peda la renuncia de Cavallo y el fin del modelo econmico, y otro que iba ms lejos, que quera el fin de las prebendas polticas, quera la renuncia de la Corte Suprema, un Parlamento que funcione, se avanzaba ms en el plano de la reivindi cacin institucional” (J os Nun quoted in El Cacerolazo 2001). Contentious action and social protest has always been pres ent in Argentina. But if we look at a timeline of these activities we can see in retrospect that a cycle of contention had started in the mid 1990s with the barter clubs and piqueteros and peaked during the national political and economic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 when the asambleas and cacerolazos came into being. Each of these phenomenon carried out very different agendas – demanding jobs in the case of th e piqueteros, creating spaces for direct democracy in the case of the asambleas venting a visceral frus tration with the economic and political chaos in the case of the cacerolazos and creating an alternative economic model in the case of the trueques Yet these various forms of protest constituted by a variety of actors shared a mast er frame: discontent with the neoliberal economic model. Decline of the cycle This cycle of contention does seem to be slowing. Some of the contentious behavior died out soon after it starte d. The momentary ascendance of the cacerolazos marked the peak of the cycle, a spontaneous outpouring of the masses into the street. The asambleas also coincided with the pi nnacle of the cycle, and wh ile slightly longer lasting, eventually lost steam. On the other hand, other forms of contention continue: many of the fbricas recuperadas still operate and the piqueteros continue to frequently set roadblocks and made demands on the government The barter clubs fit in somewhere in the middle of this cycle, outlas ting the transient spark of the cacerolazos and asambleas

PAGE 74

67 but struggling to maintain an existence that the piqueteros and fbricas recuperadas have steadily maintained. By examining each conceptual element of a social movement – collective activity, sustained activity, common purpose/identit y, mobilizing structures and political opportunities – I have illuminated reasons for why the barter clubs failed to maintain themselves as a social movement. But ther e are additional factors which influenced the course of the barter clubs. These factors re late directly to the dynamics of contentious cycles. According to Tarrow, the declin e of a cycle is brought on by exhaustion, polarization within th e movement, and government sel ective facilitation of claims (Tarrow 1998: 147-150). All of these factors are at play to some degr ee within the barter clubs. The first element, exhaustion applies in an indirect way – the barter clubs started closing shop because of inflation, coun terfeiting, and specula tion, not because the members grew tired of participating. Howe ver, lack of time, energy and resources prevented the RGT from assimilating the fl ood of new members and adequately framing key issues. The second element, polarizati on, also factored into the breakdown of the barter clubs. The RGT generated two competi ng barter clubs, the Zona Oeste and RTS. The RTS in particular ardently and pub licly criticized the RGT for irresponsible management of crdito printing as well as for autocratic control. The government’s role affected the trajector y of the barter clubs. Alvarez et al. suggest that government plan s cushioning the adverse eff ects of neoliberal policies undercut the need for mobilization and reinfor ce clientelism. This process is exactly what the RGT founders believed to be happe ning. The RGT founders suggest that plans

PAGE 75

68 such as Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares attracted people away from the barter clubs and toward easy money from the government. Fo weraker explains demobilization in the tendency of social movements to negotiate more and protest less. This dynamic may have also been at play with the barter clubs The umbrella organization of the RGT, the PAR ( El Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional ), in fact became a non-governmental organization. Part of the reason for formi ng an NGO was to gain credibility and legal recognition. As we have seen, the RGT speci fically worked to get government support of the barter clubs and with some degree of su ccess. But as both Tarrow and Melucci note, the greater the degree of institutionalizat ion the less the degree of contention. Conclusion In the early years, when the barter clubs we re small, they met all the criteria of a social movement. They were a collec tive, sustained activity. They behaved contentiously – challenging fundamental be liefs about the nature of production and consumption and providing an alternative to the neoliberal, market-based economy. The barter club members mobilized behind this common purpose not onl y in the act of bartering, but also through regular charlas and rotation of resp onsibilities in the nodo Even so, the barter clubs were unable to maintain their trajectory as a social movement, partly because they grew so quick ly. The huge influx of participants in the years leading up to the economic cr isis of 2001 severely taxed the trueques As people fled to into the barter system to satisfy basic material needs, their original common purpose changed, from challenging the dominant economic model to being simply another way to survive hard times. This change in motivation undermined the contentious aspect of the trueques : to barter on principle is co ntentious; to barter out of need is not.

PAGE 76

69 The mobilizing structure also broke down as the trueques grew, affecting the RGT’s ability to raise consciousness among its members. Because the clubs were organized horizontally, the RGT could not monitor the practices of each nodo Not only did illicit practices run rampant, but the RG T was unable to sufficiently imbue each new member with the core values of the trueque Despite efforts to frame the issues of selfreliance, local production and the ills of money, the RGT was unable to successfully inculcate these ideals and transfor m them into everyday practices. Creating a national system of parallel cu rrency exacerbated the RGT’s failure to frame key issues. As the RGT grew it had to decide between divergent models: preserve a small, local system adept at maintaining so lidarity, or build a larger multi-regional or national system that could more efficiently in allocate goods and se rvices. Ultimately, by choosing a national system based on a national crdito the RGT replicated the very ills of the market economy that the RGT had reject ed in the first place: inflation, greed and speculation. By going national, the RGT lost the community focus a nd personal ties that legitimize a local currency. In turn, th e sense of solidarit y between like-minded neighbors largely disappeared. Yet, the barter clubs played an important role in Argentine society. On the one hand, the barter clubs were a survival mech anism that supplied ba sic goods and services during a time when money was short and unemployment was high. The trueques, however, made a deeper impact than just simply providing basic needs during economic hardship. At a visible level, the barter clubs influenced government by putting new issues on the political agenda, and gaining political support of an alternative economic model. The barter clubs also influenced so ciety at a more implicit level. As Feijoo

PAGE 77

70 observes in her examination of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, groups can create change without intending to do so. The Madres acted out their traditi onal role of protectors and in the process unwittingly challenged the sy stem. “In practice, the Madres became another movement of women who, without trying to cha nge patriarchal ideology or abandon their femininity, produced a transf ormation of the traditional feminine conscience and its political role. As a result, a practical redefinition of the content of the private and public realms em erged” (Feijoo 1994: 113). Similarly, the barter club pa rticipants, whether or not th ey consciously intended it, created new identities for themselves. As Bombal points out, despite failure to fully extend and transform the ideas of the pr agmatic barter club participant, the trueques changed participants’ self-per ception: “En estas personas no se encuentran convicciones ideolgicas tan claras respecto del trueque como ordenador de un estilo de vida alternativo, pero sin duda la prctica misma les permite resi gnificar su existencia y alcanzar un nuevo posicionamiento” (Bombal 2002: 117). The quintessential example of this transformation is the woman I interviewe d who at first looked at the barter clubs through the eyes of a snob. After she began pa rticipating, however, she realized that the trueques provided a means to rebuild broken id entities: “Lo que se estaba dando [el trueque] era recuperar la iden tidad de las personas, recupe rar la dignidad del trabajo y recuperar el sentido de que lo que es el solidaridad, porque esto fue lo que yo descubr en el trueque.” More generally, the barter clubs are signi ficant as an indication of Argentina’s evolving state-society relations Understanding the barter clubs as a nascent social movement that eventually failed to consolidat e as such serves to highlight this changing

PAGE 78

71 relationship. To view the barter clubs as a social m ovement reminds observers to recognize the underlying values and convictions present at their creation. Bringing the trueques’ normative message to the forefront brings to bear the full significance of the barter clubs – as an inno vative and conscious reaction, one among many, to a changing state. The 1970s marked a dividing line in the hist ory of Argentine stat e-society relations. In the 1940s and 50s, Peron had set the standa rd for an active stat e, one that heavily directed economic growth and incorporat ed and provided for the working class by organizing and empowering strong unions. The military government that took power from Peron in 1973 attempted to liberalize state hold on economic activity and limit the power that unions had acquired. The advent of democracy in 1983 marked the return to an active civil society. The trend toward liberalization that st arted in the 1970’s, however, continued forward. Carlos Menem ca rried out the liberalization agenda with particular enthusiasm in the 1990s. Under Me nem, several factors coalesced to create a crisis in the new model: mass privatizations of state-owned businesses and the opening of markets to outside competition exacerbated th e process of de-industrialization that started in the 1970s and the concomitant decline in the middle class. The result was massive unemployment in the mid 1990s and the exposur e of the “new poor” as an established class in Argentina. The economic crisis of 2001 symbolized for many the consequences of the state’s move away from a paternalistic, hands-on ec onomic model to a liberal market model. The responses to the crisis and to the underlying change varied – from asambleas barriales and piqueteros to fabricas recuperadas and barter clubs. This wave of

PAGE 79

72 contention demonstrates a broad based sear ch for new modes of both governance and livelihood. At one end of the spectrum there are the piqueteros who continue to make claims on the government, but through novel forms of contention. Alternatively, the asambleas barriales place governance directly into th e hands of the citizens, while the fabricas recuperadas invest factory ownership and opera tion directly into the hands of the workers. At the far end of the spectrum are the trueques representing an even more radical response, enjoining their members not to look to the government for assistance but to look to themselves for solutions. Out of all these forms of contention the piqueteros demonstrate the greatest longevity. While the asambleas have died out almost entirely and the barter clubs are a mere shadow of what they once were, the piqueteros remain active and continue to grow. An avenue for future research would be to compare the trajectory of the piqueteros with that of the barter clubs. Do the piqueteros ’ goals and modes of contention resonate more naturally in Argentine society? Were the piqueteros able to consolidate as a movement because of better framing practices? The future of the barter clubs, however, s hould not be ignored. Despite their fall from headline news, research should stay abreast of the trueques Will their efforts to regroup generate a more effective barter organi zation? If not, what will be the path of former participants? Will they go on to participate in other forms of contentious behavior?

PAGE 80

73 APPENDIX PRINCIPIOS DE LA RGT 1. Nuestra realizacin como seres humanos no necesita estar condicionada por el dinero. 2. No buscamos promover artculos o servic ios, sino ayudarnos mutuamente a alcanzar un sentido de vida superior, medi ante el trabajo, la comprensin y el intercambio justo. 3. Sostenemos que es posible remplazar la competencia estril, el lucro y la especulacin por la reciprocidad entre las personas. 4. Creemos que nuestros actos, productos y servicios pueden responder a normas ticas y ecolgicas antes que a los dictados del mercado, el consumismo y la bsqueda de beneficio a corto plazo. 5. Los nicos requisitos para ser miembro de la Red Global de Trueque son: asistir a las reuniones grupales, ca pacitarse y ser pr oductor y consumidor de bienes, servicios y saberes, en el marco de las r ecomendaciones de los crculos de calidad y autoayuda. 6. Sostenemos que cada miembro es el nico responsable de sus actos, productos y servicios. 7. Consideramos que pertenecer a un grupo no implica ningn vnculo de dependencia, puesto que la participacin indi vidual es libre y extendida a todos los grupos de la Red. 8. Sostenemos que no es necesario que los gr upos se organicen formalmente, de modo estable, puesto que el carct er de Red implica la rotacin permanente de roles y funciones. 9. Creemos que es posible combinar la autonom a de los grupos en la gestin de sus asuntos internos con la vigencia de los principios fundamentales que dan pertenencia a la Red. 10. Consideramos recomendable que los integr antes no respaldemos, patrocinemos o apoyemos financieramente como miembros de la Red a una causa ajena a ella, para no desviarnos de los objet ivos fundamentales que nos unen.

PAGE 81

74 11. Sostenemos que el mejor ejemplo es nuestra conducta en el mbito de la Red y en nuestra vida fuera de ella. guardamos conf idencialidad sobre los asuntos privados y prudencia en el tratamiento pblico de los temas de la Red que afecten a su crecimiento. 12. Creemos profundamente en una idea de progreso como consecuencia del bienestar sustentable del mayor nmero de pers onas del conjunto de las sociedades.

PAGE 82

75 LIST OF REFERENCES Alvarez, Sonia E., Evelina Dagnino and Artu ro Esobar, editors. 1998. Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in Latin Ameri can Social Movements, pp 1-29. In Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultu res: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements Boulder: Westview Press. Arcidiacono, Pilar. 2004. Trueque y Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados: Dos Estrategias de Contencin Soci al ante la Crisis del 2002. Lavboratorio Ano 5, Numero 14, Otoo/Invierno 2004. Argentina Default Impact Limited. BBC News Dec 23, 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1726265.stm Last accessed April 2006. Banko, Catalina. 2000. El Modelo Neoliberal en Argentina y Venzuela Contrastes y Convergencias, pp 27-38. In Costos Sociales de las Reformas Neoliberales en America Latina. Edited by Anita Kon, Catalina Banko, Dorothea Melcher and Maria Cristina Cacciamali. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela. Barbetta, Pablo, and Karina Bidaseca. Pique te y Cacerola, la Lucha es una Sola: Emergencia Discursiva o Nueva Subjetiv idad? Article from the Instituto Argentino para el Desarrollo Economico. Available at http://www.iade.org.ar/index.html Last accessed April 2006. Beliz, Gustavo. 1995. El Etado del Posbienestar. In Politica Social: La Cuenta Pendiente Edited by Gustavo Belize Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. Bluestein, Paul. 2005. And the Money Kept Ro lling In (And Out). New York: Public Affairs. Bombal, Ines Gonzales. 2002. Sociabilidad en Cl ases Medias en Descenso: Experiencias en el Trueque, pp 97-130. In Sociedad y Sociabilidad en la Argentina de los 90 Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos. Bonetto, Maria Susana, and Maria Teresa Pier o. 2000. El Discurso So bre el Trabajo en Argentina. Pp 50-66. In Costos Sociales de las Reformas Neoliberales en Amrica Latina. Edited by Anita Kon, Catalina Banko, Dorothea Melcher and Maria Cristina Cacciamali. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.

PAGE 83

76 Buechler, Stephen M. 2000. Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism New York: Oxford University Press. Byrnes, Brian. 2005. Argentina Plays Chicken with Foreign Investors. The Christian Science Monitor Feb 9, 2005. Accessed at http://www.csmonitor.com/index.html Last accessed April 2006. Calello, Tomas. Asambleas Barriales: Un Balance Provisorio. Portafolio de Experiencias, Numero 6, UR BARED. Available at http://www.urbared.ungs.edu.ar/expe riencias_invitacion.php?expID=34 Last accessed April 2006. Comenzar por casa Autosuficiencia website. autosuficiencia.com.ar/shop/otraspag inas.asp?pagina=quienessomos.htm. Convenio Marco De Colaboracion Institucional between Secretaria de la Pequea y Mediana Empresa del Ministerio (SEPyM E) de Economia and la Asociacin Amigos Del Programa De Autosuficiencia Regional (AAPAR). Signed December 2000. www.geocities.com/RainForest/Canopy/5413/convenio.htm Cortesi, Javier. 2003. Red de Trueque Solidario, pp 181-196. In Trueque y Economa Solidaria Buenos Aires: Pr ometeo Libros. Crivello, Anala. 2002. El Nuevo club de Trueque Abrio sus Puertas en Recoleta. La Nacin, May 19, 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. De Piquetero a Subsecretario. La Nacin, Feb 26, 2006. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Di Marco, Graciela, and Hector Palomino (compiladores). 2004. Reflexiones Sobre los Movimientos Sociales en la Argentina Buenos Aires: Jorge Baudino Ediciones. El Cacerolazo, la Neva Forma de Fiscalizar. La Nacin, Dec 23, 2001. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. El Trueque. RGT magazine. Ano 3, Number XXVII, June 2001. El Trueque Crece a la Par de la Crisis. La Nacin Feb 6 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. El Trueque Salv a una Fbrica en Mendoza. La Nacin Feb 27 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006.

PAGE 84

77 Falcoff, M. 2003. Argentina: Kirchner's Honeymoon. Latin American Outlook, October. American Enterprise Institute. Also availabl e at www.aei.org. Feijoo, Maria del Carmen, with Marcela Maria Alejandro Nari 1994. Women and Democracy in Argentina. In The Women's Movement in Latin America 2nd edition. Edited by Jane S. Jaque tte. Oxford: Westview Press. Ferree, Myra Max. 1992. The Political Cont ext of Rationality: Ra tional Choice theory and Resource Mobilization in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory pp 29-52. Edited by Morris and Mueller. New Ha ven: Yale University Press. Foweraker, Joe. 2005. Towards a Political So ciology of Social Mobilization in Latin America, pp 115-135. In Rethinking Development in Latin America Edited by Charles. H. Wood and Bryan Roberts. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press. Fue la Peor Crisis Social Desde 1919. La Nacin December 23, 2003. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Germano, Carlos (coordinator). 2005. Piqueteros: Nueva Realidad Social Buenos Aires: ACEP. Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hintze, Susana, editor. 2003. Trueque y Economa Solidaria Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. IMF (Interational Monetary Fund). 2003. Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina Policy Development and Review Department. Laporte, Luis Nicolas. 2003. La Red de Trueque Solidaria: Una Introduccion, pp 163180. In Trueque y Economa Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Promoteo Libros. Laraa, Enrique, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield, editors. 1994. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lecaro, Patricia, and Barbara Altschuler. Po liticas Sociales y Desarrollo Local. Dos Experiencias Diversas: Club del Trueque y Union de Trabajadores Desocupados (UTD) de Mosconi. Paper presented at Congreso de Politicas Sociales: Estrategias de Articulacin de Polti cas, Programas y Proyectos Sociales en Argentina, Universidad de Quilmes, Mayo 2002. Las Tradiciones Autosuficiencia website. http://tabloide.eurofull.com/shop/otraspaginas.asp?pagina=42 Last accessed April 2006.

PAGE 85

78 Leoni, Fabiana, and Mariana Luzzi. 2003. Ras gunando la Lona: La Experiencia de un Club de Trueque en el Conurbano Bon aerense. Report produced under the Project SelfSustainable De velopment in Comparative Perspective (coordinated by the Center for Latin American Social Po licy, CLASPO), University of Texas. Available at http://www.utexas.edu/cola/llilas/centers/c laspo/networkfinalreportsargentina.htm Last accessed November 2004. Los Doce Principios. Autosuficiencia website. http://tabloide.eurofull.com/shop/otraspaginas.asp?pagina=39 Last accessed April 2006. Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque City of Buenos Aires gove rnment brochure. N.d. Melucci, Alberto. 1994. A Strange Kind of Ne wness: What's 'New' in New Social Movements? In New Social Movements pp 101-130. Edited by Laraa, Johnston and Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Minujin, Alberto, and Gabriel Kessler. 1995. La Nueva Pobreza en la Argentina Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta Argentina. NotiTrueque. Se Corto el Chorro? RGT pamphlet. May 1, 2002. Once Heridos en una Protesta de Piqueteros. La Nacin March 1, 2006. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Ovalles, Eduardo. 2002. Data in chart pages 71-77. In Trueque y Economa Solidaria Edited by Susana Hintze. Buenos Aires: Promoteo Libros, 2003. Palermo, V., and J. Collins. 1998. Moderate Populism: A Political Approach to Argentina's 1991 Convertibility Plan. Latin American Perspectives, 25(4): 36-62. Powell, Jeff. 2002. Petty Capitalism, Perfecting Capitalism or Post-Capitalism? Lessons from the Argentinian Barter Network. Working Paper No. 357, Sub-series on Money, Finance and Development, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Available at http://adlib.iss.nl/ad lib/beginner/index_gb.html Last accessed April 2006. Premat, Silvina. Trueque: Barajar y Dar de Nuevo. La Nacin July 16 2003. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Primavera, Heloisa. 1999. La Moneda Social De La Red Global De Trueque Barajar y Dar de Nuevo en el Juego Social? http://www.heloisaprimavera.c om.ar/noticias/display.php3?ID=5 Last accessed April 2006.

PAGE 86

79 Primavera, Heloisa, Horacio Covas and Ca rlos De Sanzo. 1998. Reinventando el Mercado: La Experiencia de la Red Globa l de Trueque en Argentina. Buenos Aires: PAR. Also available at http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:J WnxPn2er7YJ:www3.plala.or.jp/mig/h owtoes.doc+%22reinventando+el+mercado%22& hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&client =firefox-a Last accessed April 2006. Primavera, Heloisa. 2003. Riqueza, Dinero y Poder: El Efmero Milagro Argentino, pp 121-144. In Trueque y Economa Solidaria Buenos Aires: Pr ometeo Libros. Rocha, Laura. Renace el Fenomeno del Trueque. La Nacin Dec 16, 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Sainz, Alfredo. La Hper le Gan la Pulseada al Trueque. La Nacin Aug, 17, 2003. Also available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Sampayo, Fernando. 2003. Club de Trueque Zona Oeste, pp197-206. In Trueque y Economa Solidaria Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 2001. Modern Latin America 5th edition. New York: Oxford University Press. Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. Ma ster Frames and Cycles of Protest. In Frontiers in Social Movement Theory pp 456-472. Edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg. Yale: Ya le University Press. Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Stev en K. Worden and Robert D. Benford. 1986. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobili zation, and Movement Participation. American Sociologi cal Review 51: 464-481. Svampa, Maristella, and Sebastin Pereyra. 2003. Entre la Ruta y el Barrio. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos. Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tokman, Victor E. 1996. La Especificidad y Generalidad del Problema del Empleo en el Contexto de Amrica Latina, pp 47-82. In Sin Trabajo: Las Caracteristicas del Desempleo y sus Efectos en la Sociedad Argentina. Edited by Luis Beccaria and Nestor Lopez. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada. Torresi, Leonardo. El Club del Treuque que le Cambi la Cara a un Barrio. Clarn March 3, 2002. Available at www.clarin.com Last accessed April 2006.

PAGE 87

80 Trueque Frente al Congreso. La Nacin, May 24, 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006. Un Club del Trueque se Instal en Plena City Portea. La Nacin, May 6, 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar Last accessed April 2006.

PAGE 88

81 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Wendy Pond received her Bachelor of Arts in political science from the University of Florida in May of 2000. She returned to UF in 2003 to do a Master of Arts in Latin American Studies with a specia lization in poli tical science. While school was in session Wendy worked as a graduate assistant at the Center for Latin Ameri can Studies, assisting on various projects including the Center’s annual conferences. During her first summer, Wendy participated in the Coca-Cola World C itizenship Program, working as an intern for Save the Children in Nicaragua. The following summer she had the opportunity to intern at the U.S. Mission to the Organizati on of American States through the U.S. State Department Summer Intern Program. She gr aduates in May 2006 with her MA in Latin American Studies.


Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0014303/00001

Material Information

Title: Barter Club Participants in Argentina: Idealogues or Pragmatists?
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0014303:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0014303/00001

Material Information

Title: Barter Club Participants in Argentina: Idealogues or Pragmatists?
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0014303:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text












BARTER CLUB PARTICIPANTS IN ARGENTINA: IDEALOGUES OR
PRAGMATISTS?













By

WENDY POND


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2006

































Copyright 2006

by

Wendy Pond















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I sincerely thank all of the Argentines that I interviewed while doing field research.

I deeply appreciate the time these individuals took out of their busy schedules to share

their experiences with me. They oftentimes invited me into their homes, spent two or

more hours with me, and were infinitely patient with my stumbling Spanish.

I also thank the several graduate students who had been down this road previously

and offered their valuable experience and insight. This project would have been

immeasurably harder without you. I thank Martin Maldonado for reviewing my

interview questionnaire and offering valuable suggestions on how to conduct interviews

in Argentina. I thank Karina Vasquez for helping me to write letters of introduction to

perspective interviewees. Her understanding of etiquette and protocol added a missing

degree of professionalism in my correspondence. I thank Bryan Williams for taking time

to simply talk with me about my project, helping me to brainstorm and to better

understand my project goals.















TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S .................................................................... ......... .............. iii

ABSTRACT ............... ................... ......... .............. vi

CHAPTER

1 IN TR OD U CTION ............................................... .. ......................... ..

Literature Review .......................................................... 3
Classical Collective Behavior Theory ....................................... ............... 3
Resource M mobilization Theory ................................. .................. .................... 3
Social Constructionism......... ...... .......... .. .................4
N ew Social M ovem ents............................................................................. 6
T ow ards a Synthesis ..................... ........ ........ .............. .. ...... ............... .. .. ..
Cycles of Contention, Master Frames and Latin American Social
M ov em ents ............................................................... 11
O rg a n iz atio n ............................................................................................................... 12

2 BIRTH OF THE BARTER CLUBS................................................ ...... ......... 14

20th Century Political and Economic Context .................................... ............... 14
Argentina's Recurring Economic Cycle ............................ ... ............ 14
Menem and the Early 90s ................. ............ ... ................... 15
Structural Changes and the "New Poor" .....................................................18
Birth of the Trueques ............................................. .. ...... .................. 21
Tru eq u e V alu es....................................................... .................. 2 3
Structure and Organization of the RGT.............................................................25
Participants Demographics ..................................................... ............... 26
N odo D ynam ics ................................................................ ...........................28
Intersection w ith Governm ent .................................................. ........ ....... 29
Problem s w within the Trueques ......................................................... ...............
C chapter Sum m ary ........................ .................... .. .. .... ........ ......... 35

3 AFFECT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE BARTER CLUBS ........36

The Econom ic Crisis of 2001/2002 ..................................... .....................36
Effect of Economic Crisis on the Barter Clubs ...................................................40
T ruequ e R espon se........... ...... ............................................................ .......... ....... 4 5
Chapter Sum m ary ........................ .................... .. .. .... ........ ......... 47


iv










4 TRUEQUES AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT? ......................................................48

Collective Activity .... ... .. .... ................ ............ .... .............. 48
Contention ............... ............... ............ 49
Com m on Purpose/Com m on Identity ........................................ ...................... 54
M obilizing Structures ....................................... .... .... ................59
Su stained A activity ............ ................................................................ ......... ....... 60
Political O opportunities .................. ..................................... .. ........ .... 61
C chapter Sum m ary ........................ .................... .. .. ........... ......... 61

5 CYCLES OF CONTENTION ........................................................ ............. 63

O nset of the Cycle ............ .................................. ........ .............. .. 63
D decline of the cycle .................. ...................................... .......... ....66
C conclusion ............................................................... ..... ..... ........ 68

APPENDIX PRINCIPIOS DE LA RGT ........................................ ...... ............... 73

L IST O F R E FE R E N C E S ............................................................................. ............. 75

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H ..................................................................... ..................81

































v















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

BARTER CLUB PARTICIPANTS IN ARGENTINA: IDEALOGUES OR
PRAGMATISTS?

By

Wendy Pond

May 2006

Chair: Philip Williams
Major Department: Latin American Studies

This thesis examines the phenomenon of barter clubs in Argentina during the 1990s

and early years of 2000 through the lens of social movement literature. Originating in

1995, the barter clubs, or trueques, evolved into a nation-wide system of clubs called the

Red Global de Trueque (RGT) with more than a million participants. Although the barter

clubs were used by most participants as a way to deal with the worsening national

economy, particularly during the national crisis of late 2001 and early 2002, they were

not originally designed as a survival mechanism. The barter clubs were envisioned as an

alternative to the dictates of the market an antidote to consumerism, competition and

greed. The founder's strong ideological commitment and their effort to create a similar

consciousness among barter club members suggest that the trueques be considered as a

social movement. By examining the barter clubs in light of Sidney Tarrow's definition of

social movements I conclude that the RGT started out with all of the elements of a social

movement but failed to consolidate as such. The barter clubs failed to maintain their









trajectory as a social movement in part because of the entrance of the structurally poor

into a phenomenon originally designed and used by the "new poor." This sudden influx

of participants motivated by need significantly changed the orientation of the barter

clubs.

Although the barter clubs did not consolidate as a social movement they are

significant for several reasons. On the one hand, the barter clubs were a survival

mechanism that supplied basic goods and services during a time when money was short

and unemployment was high. The trueques, however, made a deeper impact than just

simply providing basic needs during economic hardship. At a visible level, the barter

clubs influenced government by putting new issues on the political agenda, and gaining

political support of an alternative economic model. The barter clubs also influenced

society at a more implicit level. Barter club participants, whether or not they consciously

intended it, created new identities for themselves. The barter clubs are also significant as

a response to Argentina's evolving state-society relations. The economic crisis of 2001

symbolized for many the consequences of the state's move away from a paternalistic,

hands-on economic model to a liberal market model. The responses to the crisis and to

the underlying change varied from asambleas barriales andpiqueteros, tofabricas

recuperadas and barter clubs. This wave of contention demonstrates a broad based

search for new modes of both governance and livelihood.














CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In December of 2001 the economic crisis that had been slowly building in

Argentina for four years finally exploded. The government instituted a limit on the

amount individuals could withdraw from their bank accounts, precipitating

demonstrations known as cacerolazos, where people took to the streets banging pots and

pans in protest. President de la Rua declared a state of siege and then was forced out of

office after riots ended in the death of 27 citizens (Fue 2003). Four more presidents came

and went in the space of two weeks. Meanwhile the government defaulted on more than

$100 billion of debt, one of the largest defaults in history (Argentina 2001). The angry

cacerolazos, however, were not the only public manifestations of the crisis. Throughout

Buenos Aires and the country at large, hundreds of thousands of people were getting

together regularly to barter goods and services.

Although the barter clubs were touted by the Argentine media as a way to deal with

the economic meltdown (Leoni and Luzzi 2003), they had in fact begun six years earlier,

well before the dramatic crash, with a group of 20 people trading in a garage. The barter

clubs, or trueques, would eventually evolve into a nation-wide system of clubs called the

Red Global de Trueque (RGT) with more than a million participants.

While the barter clubs provided relief during the economic turmoil, they were

clearly not an overnight phenomenon. Rather, the trueque founders created the barter

clubs as a way to combat a growing exclusion from the benefits of the marketplace,

exclusion engendered by a combination of globalization and neoliberal policies. The









barter clubs were envisioned as an alternative to the dictates of the market an antidote

to consumerism, competition and greed.1 The RGT not only provided a venue in which

to exercise this alternative mode of consumption and production, but the RGT founders

also promoted these normative convictions among the club participants.

The founder's strong ideological commitment and their effort to create a similar

consciousness among barter club members suggest that the trueques be considered as a

social movement. Yet despite these obvious signs of social movement activity, no

previous research has examined the barter clubs in this framework. The most obvious

reason for not making this connection is that by 2002, most people in the barter system

were using it as survival strategy, with little regard for any deep-seated normative beliefs.

Previous research on the barter clubs recognizes the ideological claims made by the

founders (Leoni and Luzzi 2003, Bombal 2002, Powell 2002). It also recognizes a

divergence between the convictions of the founders and the rank-and-file participants.

This lack of affinity has been explained as a function of the structurally poor entering into

a phenomenon designed and used by the "new poor." This sudden influx of participants

motivated by need rather than theory surely changed the orientation of the barter clubs.

The unasked question, however, is why the founders were not able to build and maintain

a base of members "loyal" to the cause.

Two questions guide this thesis. First, keeping in mind the barter club's

philosophical foundations, but also recognizing the divergence between the founder's

intentions and the reality of participant motivation, can the barter clubs, in fact, be

considered a social movement? To answer this question, I will examine the barter clubs


1 See Los doce principios in the appendix.









in light of Sidney Tarrow's definition of social movements (1998). I conclude that the

RGT started out with all of the elements of a social movement but failed to consolidate as

such. Second, why did the everyday participant fail to assume the convictions of the

original project? To answer this question I will use Tarrow's definition as a point of

departure. I will draw on my research conducted in Argentina to examine the

formulation and dissemination of barter club values and its organizational methods.

Literature Review

Classical Collective Behavior Theory

The concept of social movement is relatively new, emerging out of classical

collective behavior theory. Collective behavior theory applied a "single explanatory

logic" for all collective behavior, including crazes, panics and demonstrations. The civil

rights movement in the 1950s and the subsequent movements of the 60s and 70s

catalyzed a new school of thought (Buechler 2000). These were structured movements

demonstrating overtly political and cultural agendas. Consequently, the concept of social

movement emerged as a distinct domain of collective action. One of the earliest

theoretical frameworks to gain wide currency in this developing realm of literature was

resource mobilization theory. It was subsequently challenged by social constructionism

and new social movement theory (Buechler 2000).

Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource Mobilization theorists concern themselves with explaining why people

agree to join in a social movement, specifically in light of the "free-rider" dilemma: a

rational individual would not join a social movement if other people were willing to do

the work to secure goods that will then be publicly shared. To solve this dilemma,

movements offer selective incentives to encourage and reward participation. Incentives









such as outside funding, professionalization and increased material resources (McCarthy

and Zald in Tarrow 1998).

Resource mobilization theory has been criticized for not paying adequate attention

to the role of ideas in motivating participation. Myra Marx Ferree points out that

resource mobilization theory does not allow that people may act hedonistically, may act

for short-term benefits, or may be morally driven to behaviors that conflict with self-

interest. As such, resource mobilization theory proffers a kind of "one dimensional

rationality": "The tautologies that arise from treating all forms of behavior as strategically

rational by definition exclude a realistic explanation of when behavior may be more or

less than an expression of self-interest" (Ferree 1992:32). Part of the problem in this one-

dimensional rationality is that preferences are a given, not up for debate or modification.

Such an assumption reduces participation motivation to incentives only. The result is to

ignore a movement's role in creating and shaping identity and preferences.

Social Constructionism

Social constructionism, like resource mobilization theory, also focuses on

explaining why people participate. Social constructionism, however, focuses principally

on the role of ideational factors rather than material rewards. The work of Snow,

Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986), offers key insight into the role of ideas in

catalyzing participation. Drawing on the concept of framing originally introduced by

Goffman (1974), these authors define framing as an interactional process that links an

individual's grievances to the work of the social movement (Snow et al. 1986: 467). "By

rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and

guide action, whether individual or collective" (Snow et al. 1986: 464).









Framing is a necessary activity because people often do not start by buying

wholesale into a social movement. "Seldom do individuals join a movement organization

per se, at least initially. Rather it is far more common for individuals to agree to

participate in some activity or campaign by devoting some measure of time, energy, or

money" (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Framing can be a slow process and it can slip out of

place over time since it is always subject to "reassessment and renegotiation" (Snow et

al. 1986: 476) but it is eventually a necessary condition for movement participation

(Snow et al. 1986: 464).

According to Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, there are four possible levels

of framing: bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. In the process of

frame bridging, individuals already have a particular grievance and the movement taps

into it, providing an "organizational base for expressing their discontents" (Snow et al.

1986: 467). Most resource mobilization theory has assumed that movements simply need

to do frame bridging because grievances are already "sufficiently generalized and salient"

(468). Frame amplification appeals to values and beliefs that people already hold, but

tries to move those values and beliefs higher up in the hierarchy. During frame

amplification, values and beliefs previously "shrouded by indifference, deception or

fabrication by others, and by ambiguity or uncertainty" (469) are clarified and

reinvigorated. Frame extension appeals to values that are ancillary to potential

participants. A common frame extension strategy is to incorporate values auxiliary to the

principal values of the movement and try to recruit people by appealing to these auxiliary

values. Frame transformation is the most radical of the frame processes. It requires a









redefinition of an individual's values, in which "new values may have to be planted and

nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned" (473).

These framing processes are all done at the individual, micro level. Snow and

Benford (1992) also apply the framing concept to a macro understanding of social

movements, which accounts for periods of increased mobilization across different

organizations. Master frames refer to "general ideological trends at the macrolevel of

social order" (Buechler 2000: 42). Linked to cycles of protest, master frames allow

several and varied groups to adopt similar language and symbols. Pathfinders who create

the beginning of a cycle face the most difficulties and create an easier time for the

movements that follow, but the seminal movements in a cycle also set the stage and terms

of debate (Buechler 2000: 42).

New Social Movements

The literature on new social movements shares common ground with social

constructionism; both schools of thought focus on the role of ideas in movements. The

unique contribution of new social movement literature, however, is the expansion of our

understanding of what constitutes a social movement. This literature points to changes in

movement activity and structure and suggests the need for new understandings (Larafia,

Johnston et al. 1994). Alberto Melucci observes: "The production and reappropriation of

meaning seem to lie at the core of contemporary conflicts; this understanding requires a

careful redefinition of what a social movement is and what forms of action display its

presence" (1994: 110).

There are several ways in which new social movements amplify previous

conceptions of social movements. New social movements center on the role of identity-

creation rather than material or economic needs (Larafia 1994). As Melucci (1994) points









out, old movements were about the excluded trying to get into the system of benefits or

about the redistribution of goods. New social movements, on the other hand, challenge

the dominant discourse. They are no longer asking to be included in the system, they are

clamoring to redefine the system. New social movements also tend to be acted out by

individuals and are often life-style based, extending to the activities of daily life, for

instance in the choice of food, dress or pastime. Furthermore, new social movements

employ novel, often symbolic, modes of resistance and frequently operate in

decentralized organizational forms (Larafia 1994: 6-8).

Because new social movements do not challenge the allocation of values or goods

but rather challenge what those values or goods should be, their importance is not so

much in their material or policy gains, but in their ability to change thinking. It is the

activity of the movement that is important, not so much the specific results they achieve.

"Conflicts [of new social movements] do not chiefly express themselves through action

designed to achieve outcomes in the political system. Rather, they raise a challenge that

recasts the language and cultural codes that organize information" (Melucci 1994: 102).

This effort is an ongoing renegotiation and reestablishment of identity and

meaning. Because of their unique role of expression and identity-creation, new social

movements do not relate to the political system in a traditional way. Instead the

challenges they raise are often acted out in daily life in non-institutional ways that raise

questions about individual identity. The way new social movements do affect political

institutions is in their ability to influence the rise of new elites, to put new issues on the

agenda and to create new languages (Melucci 1994:102).









One of the biggest criticisms of new social movement theory is that the putatively

"new" movements in fact share quite a bit in common with the "old" movements. But

whether or not "new" social movements are in fact new, the theory contributes in an

important way to the dialogue: it moves away from a narrow political conception of

social movement by recognizing non-traditional actors and unique methods of contention.

Towards a Synthesis

In the literature review so far it is clear that there are various ways to understand

social movements. Each school of thought focuses on contrasting variables and different

levels of analysis. To properly understand social movements we need a synthesis of the

three perspectives.2 Sidney Tarrow's definition of social movements in his book, Power

in Movement, provides a starting point. As we will see, certain aspects of his definition

consciously draw from the resource mobilization theorists and the constructivists. And

although Tarrow does not explicitly address the new social movement perspective, its

influence is apparent.

For Tarrow, the defining aspect of a social movement is "contentious collective

action". The key ideas subsumed under this concept include collective activity,

contention, a common purpose and/or identity, mobilizing structures, and the ability to

sustain activity. All of these factors are necessarily present, but they are not sufficient to

form a movement. The last requirement is the appropriate political opportunities. Each

component deserves a bit of explanation.




2 Buechler argues that a "true" synthesis is unlikely because the differing theories subscribe to "different
metatheoretical orientations" (Buechler 200: 55). Yet he recognizes the coherency of the "emerging
synthesis in social movement theory around the concepts of political opportunities, mobilizing structures,
and framing process (54)," which we will see evident in Sidney Tarrow's work.









Collective activity. Social movements by definition are phenomena of collective

activity. Isolated, unrelated individuals acting in discrete ways, even if acting

contentiously, cannot be considered a social movement.

Contention. According to Tarrow, collectiveie action becomes contentious when

it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or

unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or

authorities" (3). Contention can be over discrete policies or abstract values; it can be

materially motivated or ideologically generated, or both (5). Contention can be in the

form of lobbying or legal channels, but the essential kernel of a social movement is the

acting out in non-traditional ways. This kind of activity separates movements from

groups like political parties or lobbyists.

Common purpose/Common identity. "It is participants' recognition of their

common interests that translates the potential for a movement into action" (Tarrow 1998:

6). In turn, part of the social movement's task is to help people identify grievances and

generate solidarity. "[R]ather than regarding ideology as either a superimposed

intellectual category or as the automatic result of grievances... scholars agree that

movements do passionate 'framing work': shaping grievances into broader and more

resonant claims" (21). Social movements can have heterogeneous make up (and often

do), but there is some common identity that binds the members together. This is what

leaders have to tap into and bring to the forefront.

Mobilizing structures. This refers to how social movements organize. Tarrow

argues that the "connective structures" that link participants with organizers need to strike

a balance between being sufficiently loose to allow flexibility and autonomy at the









bottom, but sufficiently centralized to implement effective collective strategies. These

kinds of structures are often in the form of social networks. During latent periods in a

movement these networks provide "abeyance structures" which can be mobilized when

needed (Tarrow 1998: 129).

Sustained activity. The temporal aspect of social movements also distinguishes

them from one-time, discreet protests. In order to be a social movement, collective action

has to be able to maintain a challenge over time.

Political opportunities. Tarrow notes that discontent and structural societal strain

are always present. It is only when the political system opens in a particular manner that

provides the crucible for all of the above-described dynamics to catalyze the formation of

a social movement.

Tarrow's definition is useful for three reasons. One, it provides a concrete, basic

definition of what constitutes a social movement. It is the conceptual tool by which we

will evaluate whether the barter clubs in fact were a social movement. Two, it

incorporates elements of the varying schools of social movement thought. The influence

of new social movement literature is apparent in the discussion of contention which

includes symbolic and ideological challenges as well as his discussion of mobilizing

structures which includes decentralized organization. Constructivist concepts are

explicit in his discussions on framing and collective identity. His definition also

consciously draws from the "rationalists" or resource mobilization theorists, by

discussing the opportunities and constraints that lead to action or inaction in a movement.

(Tarrow 1998: 198-199). Three, Tarrow's definition provides a platform on which to

discuss why the barter clubs failed to continue as a social movement.









Cycles of Contention, Master Frames and Latin American Social Movements

If we telescope out from the barter clubs we can see that they were not the only

form of collective action and protest in Argentina in the 1990s and during the apex of the

economic crisis. Other contentious phenomena included the piqueteros, fdbricas

recuperadas, asambleas bariales, and cacerolazos. One way we understand the trueques

in light of these other forms of activity is through Tarrow's ideas on "cycles of

contention" (1998). Tarrow points out that social movements and other forms of

contentious behavior do not happen in isolation from each other; successes and failures of

one set of actors provide cues to other actors. Furthermore, despite variance in the forms

of contentious activity and heterogeneity of actors, there is often a master frame around

which all protest occurs. The cycle begins when there is a marked increase in activity

carried out by a multiplicity of actors acting out in a variety of ways. Decline in a cycle

is brought about by exhaustion on part of the actors and polarization within the

movement. Decline is also prompted by the government, which selectively facilitates

some claims and ignores or represses others.

Looking to the literature specifically on Latin American social movements brings

specificity to Tarrow's perspective. Scholars recognize that Latin American social

movements have been influenced in turn by the forces of urbanization, authoritarian

governments, and now the new democratic context, one defined predominantly by

neoliberal economic policies (Foweraker, 2005; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998).

These various forces set the axes around which cycles of contention have waxed and

waned in the region. Likewise, collective action in Argentina in the last twenty years has

centered first around the military dictatorship and the transition to democracy and now,









most recently, around the consolidation of democracy and the accompanying neoliberal

model (DiMarco and Palomino 2004: 8).

Applying the analyses of Foweraker (2005) and Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar

(1998) within the framework of an overall cycle of contention helps to explain

demobilization. Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar point to government plans attempting to

cushion the fall-out of neoliberal adjustments, suggesting that these "social adjustment"

plans reach out to the excluded. However, they admit adverse effects as well: not only do

these plans recreate clientelistic models, but they also dismantle the need for

mobilization. Foweraker (2005) also recognizes a move towards demobilization.

However, for Foweraker, the switch to neo-liberal economic policies means that the state

is less likely to hand out material benefits that movements ask for. Thus social

movements adapt by negotiating more, mobilizing less and increasing their interaction

with state agencies. "[T]here is a significant change in emphasis in social movement

activity that is epitomized in the change from social movement to non-governmental

organization" (126).

Organization

The initial question guiding this thesis is whether the barter clubs can be considered

a social movement. Chapter two and chapter three provide the background to answer this

question, describing the chronology of the trueques. In the process I illuminate the

political opportunities giving way to the barter clubs. In these two chapters I draw on

interviews I conducted in October and November of 20043 as well as the findings of other



3 I conducted 22 formal open-ended interviews and 23 informal interviews. Using the Red Global de
Trueque website, which had a list of barter club locations and contact names, more than 100 emails were
sent. A handful of people responded and agreed to be interviewed. Futher interviews were conducted
based on referrals from the original group of interviewees. Also, more informal interviews were conducted









barter club research. More specifically, chapter two details the economic climate of

Argentina during Menem's presidency in the 1990s. This chapter goes on to recount the

birth of the barter clubs and their rapid growth up until the year before the economic

debacle, documenting the problems which began to plague the barter system. Chapter

three details the national economic collapse in late 2001 and discusses its effects on the

barter clubs. Chapter four is the analytical heart of this work, taking Tarrow's definition

of social movements and demonstrating in what ways the barter clubs fit and in what

ways they do not. I conclude that the RGT started out with all of the elements of a social

movement but failed to consolidate as such. In the course of this chapter, I also answer

the second question guiding this thesis: why the RGT failed to maintain its original

trajectory as a social movement. Chapter five places the barter clubs within a larger cycle

of protest occurring in Argentina in the 1990s and early years of 2000. By putting the

barter clubs in the context of a larger cycle of protest understanding the mobilization

phase, the use of a master frame and the demobilization phase we can understand the

barter clubs as one reaction among many to the changing state-society relations in

Argentina.


at several currently operating barter clubs. The founders of the three main barter club systems in the
country were also interviewed.














CHAPTER 2
BIRTH OF THE BARTER CLUBS

This chapter begins by placing the trueques into Argentina's 20th century political

and economic context, discussing Menem's neoliberal policies of the 1990s as well as the

rise of the "new poor". The next section details the barter clubs from their inception in

1995 through to 2001- focusing on trueque values, club organization and participant

dynamics. The third section highlights some of the challenges faced by the trueques in

during this period.

20th Century Political and Economic Context

Argentina's Recurring Economic Cycle

"Argentina is a nostalgic country and why not? Its past is well worth remembering.

In 1914, it was one of the five or six wealthiest countries in the world, and its living

standard exceeded that of Western Europe until the late 1950s or early 1960s" (Falcoff

2003). The first half of the 20th century proved to be good times for Argentina, leading to

the creation of a strong middle class. Argentina, blessed with the pampas a tremendous

expanse of fertile land exploited its comparative advantage, supplying meat and grain to

the industrialized world (Skidmore 2001: 70). A significant immigration wave coupled

with modernizing agriculture, manufacturing and transportation sectors transformed

Argentine society, developing the middle and working classes (Banko 2000: 27).

Following the Depression, which it fared comparatively well, Argentina successfully

industrialized and began producing for domestic consumption while reestablishing its

meat and grain exports (Banko 2000: 28). Juan Peron's 1940s corporatist state spread the









benefits to the working class, increasing wages, and extending it new rights. In 1950,

Argentina stood out as more urban, modem and with a more educated work force than

surrounding Latin American countries (Tokman 1996: 49)

During the second half of the century, however, Argentina witnessed two trends: a

slow process of deindustrialization and the steady decline of the once-established middle-

class. During his first term Juan Peron's economic strategy of nationalizing foreign-

owned companies, maintaining artificially low agricultural prices and increasing real

hourly wages held up while global commodity prices remained high. The country grew

8.6, 12.6 and 5.1 percent in the first three years of his presidency (Skidmore 2001: 86).

The boom came to a halt in 1949, when world commodity prices dropped and inflation

increased. In response, Peron instituted an austerity plan, one of many to come

(Skidmore 2001: 87, 88). It was the beginning of what would be Argentina's pattern to

the present day: a cycle of trade deficits, inflation and low or negative growth, followed

by ultimately untenable stabilization programs, implemented in varying degrees of

orthodoxy and regard for foreign creditors.1 By the time Carlos Menem assumed the

presidency in 1989, the pattern had been established and the middle-class had lost

ground.

Menem and the Early 90s

Carlos Saul Menem assumed the presidency in 1989. He had inherited an economy

in the inflationary and low-growth part of the cycle. The economy had shrunk three

percent in 1988 and another six percent in 1989 (Skidmore 2001: 102). Inflation was



1 Argentina is not only known for its recurring economic cycle, but also for revolving military coups. This
pattern began in 1930 with the overthrow of Hip6lito Yrigoyen, followed by a series of alternating military
and civilian governments. The pattern seems to have ended with the return of civilian government in 1983.









increasing at a rate of 150% per month and the country was almost $4 billion in arrears

on its external debt (Skidmore 2001: 103). Menem, a Peronist, surprisingly instituted a

neoliberal reform package. His first moved to privatize state-owned companies including

telephone, airlines, electricity, coal, natural gas, subways and shipping (Skidmore 2001:

103). His next step was selecting a hard-nosed economics minister, Domingo Cavallo,

who dramatically limited government spending (Skidmore 2001: 103). Price controls

were eliminated. Tariffs were reduced, and sectors such as agriculture, wholesale and

retail were deregulated (Bluestein 2005: 24). Under Cavallo, the government also

instituted the Ley de Convertibilidad, which guaranteed the peso in a one-to-one

exchange with the dollar.

To fully understand the role of the convertibility law, one must look back to the

circumstances of the 80's, the so-called "lost decade". The 80s were characterized by

high inflation and a negative growth rate an average decrease of about half percent per

year (IMF 2003). The "lost decade" of the 80s resulted in a severe lack of confidence in

the government. In their 1998 article Palermo and Collins examine Menem's response to

this "credibility gap." Attempting to curb the hyperinflation endemic to the 80s,

Argentina adopted an orthodox monetary policy, i.e., it tightened the money supply.

This policy achieved the intended effect of halting inflation, yet it delivered the economy

into recession and decreased the amount of money in the public accounts. The

temptation at that point was to print more money to try to restart the economy. This

option, of course, threatened to resuscitate the specter of inflation. The government

needed to grow the economy yet keep inflation under wraps. Palermo and Collins argue

that the creation of the convertibility law (combined with the appointment of a highly









respected technocratic economic team led by Domingo Cavallo) allowed the Menem

government to not only accomplish these two goals, but also to increase public spending

at the same time. As the two authors put it, "the Menem government seemed to have

successfully converted a circle into a square" (Palermo and Collins 1998: 43).

The success of this new policy hinged on the adoption of a mechanism the authors

refer to as "self-restraint.2" By virtue of being a law, the Ley de Convertibilidad signaled

that the government was abrogating its option to influence the economy through

monetary policy manipulations or alterations in the exchange rate. By forgoing its

prerogative to moderate monetary policy and exchange rates, the government had to be

able to back up expansionary borrowing by having dollars on hand. Palermo and Collins

note that if the government "should require dollars to make payments on the foreign debt,

the treasury would need to buy them like any other private institution and this purchase

would have to be made with the operating surplus resulting from controlling costs and

improving the state's ability to collect taxes (or, as it also happened, by selling some of

its property)" (44).

The plan worked. Guarantees of the exchange rate created a stronger sense of

certainty, investment grew, inflation fell, and domestic consumption increased. The

subsequent increases in tax revenues combined with profits from government sale of

public sectors allowed the government to maintain reserve levels while simultaneously

increasing public spending (Palermo and Collins 1998). The early 1990s hailed

substantial growth rates, and Argentina was soon the darling of the developing world.

The economy grew 10% in 1991 and 1992 and another 5% in 1993 and 1994. Although

2 The concept of self-restraint is originally discussed by Elster (1998) and appropriated in a more general
form by Palermo and Collins.









the Mexican peso crisis reverberated strongly in 1995 with a negative growth of 4%, the

economy recovered quickly, growing 5% in 1996 and 8% in 1997 (IMF 2003).3

The reforms, however, introduced serious deficiencies. The first problem was

overvaluation of the currency. The convertibility law led to an overvalued peso, which in

turn made exports more expensive and created a national trade deficit (Skidmore 2001:

103). The burgeoning deficit did not matter so long as the economy was growing and

foreign investment continued to flow in, as it did throughout most of the 90s (Bluestein

2005). A second problem, not a result of the convertibility law, but one that confounded

it, was the increasing government debt. These two issues proved to be decisive factors in

the economy's debacle in 2001, but in the mid-90s the gravity of these problems was only

dimly perceived. Argentina continued to be the poster child for good development.

A third problem, however, was rearing its head: rising unemployment. Even

though domestic policies and international investment trends led to a reactivation of the

economy, it negatively affected the labor market. Unemployment increased from 6.5

percent in 1991 to 12.2 percent in 1994 and 14 percent in 1997 (Skidmore 2001: 103,

105) and the government payroll in 1994 decreased by half (Bluestein 2005: 24).

Structural Changes and the "New Poor"

Although unemployment became acute in the 1990s, the trend had begun earlier.

The average rate of unemployment before 1980 had hovered around 2-3%, while in the

1980s it averaged about 6%, and in the first five years of the 90s it averaged 11%

(Tokman 1996: 48). For many scholars, the 1990s was only a continuation of a

development that had started in the 1970s and 80s under the military dictatorship: the

3 In 1995 there were rumblings of discontent with Menem's economic policies. The opposition mounted a
challenge to Menem's hegemony in the presidential elections, but failed to capture the vote.









dismantling of the welfare state in favor of a neoliberal model (Bonetto and Pifiero 2000,

Beliz 1995). Argentina's post-war model centered around social rights. It was

characterized by state regulation and centralized union negotiations. The state resolved

social questions and led national development (Bonetto and Pifiero 2000: 52). In the

1970s, however, the welfare state began to unravel. "Lo que en tiempos de Estado de

bienestar se entendia con criterios de universalidad, generosidad fiscal y paternalismo del

sector public, troc6 abruptamente a partir de los sucesivos process de ajuste y de deuda

que vivi6 Argentina de 1975 en adelante" (Beliz 1995: 27).

The debt-ridden years of the 1980s deepened the neoliberal inclination as the

country became beholden to conditions imposed by its creditors. Between 1977 and 1982

the external debt increased by almost 500% (Banko 2000: 31). "Argentina... habia ido

perdiendo progesivamente el dinamismo econ6mico que habia sido caracteristico de su

economic hasta 1930...Las crisis ciclicas condujeron a la busqueda de financiamiento

externo para solventar los desequilibrios externos" (Banko 2000: 30-31).

The 1990s, under Menem, paved the final neoliberal inroads, particularly with

regard to the labor market. From the 1970s through the 1990s Argentina implemented

labor policies to make the work force more flexible and to reduce labor costs, allowing

industry to compete internationally (Tokman 1996: 62). State leaders made efforts to

decentralize collective negotiation and minimize government involvement in labor

conflicts. These policies precipitated dramatic structural changes in Argentine society.

Traditional institutions began to fragment, as seen in the breakdown in the traditional role

and power of unions. Furthermore, employment became more uncertain, the work force









became more informal and salaries decreased (Beliz 1995: 29-30).4 The end result was a

loss of social mobility and the advent of the "new poor" (Beliz 1995: 27).

Who are the new poor? The new poor are composed of two types: previously poor

people who were able to achieve a certain standard of living above the poverty line, but

then fell back below that line; and the middle class who had never been poor, but at some

point fell into poverty (Minujin and Kessler 1995: 40). The new poor, like the middle

class, typically have access to higher education (educaci6n media superior) and tend to

have less children per family. The new poor, however, are similar to the structurally poor

in terms of job insecurity and lack of health coverage (Minujin and Kessler 1995: 10).

Another distinguishing feature of the new poor involves their access to social capital

(47).5 Many of the new poor have a great deal of social capital to draw on, which allows

them to maintain access to certain lifestyle perks, but in turn leads to their relative

invisibility.

For some, the improving macroeconomic situation in Argentina of the early 1990s

translated into a better life. Yet a great many others joined the ranks of the new poor by

finding themselves unemployed, underemployed, without a permanent job contract, or

working in the informal sector. This context of increasing job precariousness provided

the crucible for much of the social upheaval of the 1990s, including the barter clubs.






4 For more information about the declining employment situation in Argentina in the 20t century see Un
trabajo para todos. 1997. Buenos Aires: Consejo Empresario Argentino. See also Metamorfosis del
empleo en i,,,i,,, 1,,,,. Driii. .... political y perspectives. 2002. Javier Lindenboim (compilador).
Cuaderno del CEPED, No. 7.

5 Minujin and Kessler define social capital as the network of friends and family who are better off and can
offer cheap services, do favors, offer jobs, etc. (44).









Birth of the Trueques

What became the Argentine barter clubs have their roots in an earlier program. In

1989 Anibal Ruben Ravera, Horacio Ruben Covas and Carlos Alberto de Sanzo created a

small publishing firm and NGO in the city of Bemal6 called El Programa de

Autosuficiencia Regional (PAR). The PAR critiqued the global economy for engendering

inequity, unemployment, social tension, degradation of the environment, and destruction

of community (Comenzarpor Casa). In response, the PAR promoted self-sufficiency,

based on the principals of environmentally sustainable, community-based, and "human

scale" production. Their website describes their initial beginnings:

Hacia 1988 la Argentina vivia una crisis nueva. Comenzaba a percibirse nuevos
fen6menos econ6micos...Fue alli cuando se nos ocurri6 componer un ideario que
velara por quienes se quedaban sin trabajo o eran excluidos por el sistema global.
Basandonos en ideas de autogesti6n y tecnologias socialmente apropriadas
intentamos plasmar una consigna que despertara sentimientos de supervivencia con
formulas simples pero efectivas. Naci6 entonces el 'Programa de Autosuficiencia
Regional'...

The main purpose of the PAR was to design, develop and administer projects for

ecological, self-reliant existence (Laporte 2003: 165). For instance it promoted organic

food production, permaculture, solar energy and recycling. It advocated for a local

development model in some ways similar to the idea of import substitution:

La propuesta de la Autosuficiencia Regional es afin a un cumulo de ideas
vanguardistas en el campo econ6mico-ecol6gico, entire los que se cuentan el
Bioregionalismo de Peter Berger, la Permacultura de Bill Mollison y la teoria de
Jane Jacobs acerca de la innovaci6n y transformaci6n de las economies nacionales
a partir de la sustituci6n local de importaciones en las regions urbanas. En nuestra
concepci6n, la Autosuficiencia Regional apunta a promover la identidad e
interdependencia de las regions urbanas y rurales, poniendo en valor, con
tecnologias a escala humana, sus recursos ambientales, econ6micos, tecnicos,
culturales e hist6ricos, sin perseguir una autosuficiencia total. De este modo, estas
regions no s6lo se encontraran en mejores condiciones para sobrevivir a la


6 In the partido of Quilmes in the Buenos Aires province









exclusion provocada por la globalizaci6n econ6mica y la sofisticaci6n tecnol6gica,
sino que podran mejorar la calidad de vida de sus habitantes, mediante el
intercambio con regions similares mas alli de las propias fronteras. (Primavera,
Covas and De Sanzo: Ch 5).

Out of the PAR initiatives came the first barter club. Luis Laporte describes the

goals of the first barter club: "Nuestra meta era crear un mercado protegido para aquellos

que no podian mantenerse a flote en medio del marco asfixiante de los efectos

econ6micos de la globalizaci6n unilateral frente el retroceso de Estado, desde una

perspective micro local" (165). The first barter club began with a group of 20 people in

1995 in Bernal. Participants got together every Saturday for a few hours to exchange

goods and services. They called it the Club de Trueque.7 A member would come with

items such as prepared food, clothes, or artisan products. Each time an item was "sold"

the seller would mark the corresponding "credit" on a personal tally card. Then the

seller would become a buyer. For every product "bought" that person would deduct the

corresponding amount from the running tally on the card. When a group of people

wanted to duplicate the system in the city of Buenos Aires paper credits were introduced

and the Red Global de Trueque (RGT) was born (Laporte 2003: 167). The credits

looked similar to money and acted much in the same way. Instead of marking credits and

debits on a card, people could "buy" or "sell" using the physical credits. For the ease of

pricing, it was decided that one credit should be the rough equivalent of one peso.8

Soon nodos, the name of the location where a barter club met, began popping up all

over the region and the country. Fostered by coverage in the national television show

STrocar in Spanish means to trade or exchange

8 The RGT credits have been called different names. At first referred to as "Ticketes Trueque," they also
became knows as "arbolitos, which refers to the image of a tree printed on the front. I use the term
creditt" throughout this paper, which is the generic term for any physical credit used within the barter
system.









"Hora Clave" in 1996 and by other favorable media coverage, membership began to

grow (Primavera, Covas and De Sanzo 1998). In one accounting of the trueques, the

number ofnodos went from 17 in 1996 to 40 in 1997, more than doubling to 83 in 1998.

The years 1999 and 2000 saw an increase to 400 and 500 nodos respectively. By 2001

the number of nodos reached 1800 (Ovalles 2002).9 The rapid increase in participants

was not only due to media coverage. It spread by word of mouth and by virtue of need.

One participant who joined in 2001 remarked "Cuando el trueque sale del cono urban,

que se llama aca, de la parte de los suburbios, y se empieza a meter en la capital federal

fue como una explosion, cada dos o tres cuadras habia un nodo. Fue impresionante. Ibas

caminando por la calle y se encontrabas con un nodo".

Trueque Values

Specifically the RGT seeks to provide alternative spaces for the unemployed.

These alternative spaces serve two functions. One is the practical fulfillment of basic

material needs. As one researcher summarizes:

Hay un reconocimiento de las capacidades que los miembros [del trueque] poseen,
pero que a la vez el Mercado y las political estatales decide excluir, dejando de
esta manera al margen del Mercado formal a un grupo important de la poblaci6n,
cuyas habilidades no estan acordes a las demandada del actual modelo econ6mico
(Arcidiacono, Nota 4, first column, 2nd page).





9 Accounting of participant numbers has not been an exact or scientific endeavor. The study by Ovalles is
referenced in the book, Trueque y Economia Solidaria (editor Susana Hintze), but the methodology of that
study is not revealed. Other estimations are cited in newspaper articles, but these generally reflect
estimates provided by club founders.









The other function is a psychological one of healing and self development.10 The

core value of the RGT is self-help, or autosuficiencia. The RGT encourages self-help as

a means to extricate oneself from the dependency on a global system that consistently

fails to provide. However, this self-help can only be carried out in solidarity with others.

The RGT enjoins members to learn to producerr por nosotros mismos aprendiendo de lo

demas integrantes, de sus experiencias y tecnicas a traves de la ayuda mutual" (Preample

to Los doce principios, see appendix).

Another pillar of the RGT rhetoric revolves around the evils of money. According

to the RGT, in today's world, the accumulation of money drives the individual. Yet very

few people are successful in this endeavor. The vast majorities who fail to successfully

play the game of money accumulation are left with few options for survival and personal

development. The result is that the individual becomes dependent on a system in which

they have little success. Thus the RGT refuses to deal in pesos and instead created a

separate currency, the credito. The cr&dito, however, should not be considered as

currency qua currency. It is simply a mechanism to facilitate trade. A key dictate of the

RGT is to never accumulate cr&ditos, but to keep them in circulation.

The RGT also insists that members be both producers and consumers, not just

consumers. Members of the club are referred to as "prosumidores," a combination of the

productor (producer) and consumidor (consumer).11 To be aprosumidor serves the

obvious logistical function of creating both supply and demand. But there is a

10 Preceding the creation of the RGT was a self-help group formed by PAR called Emprendedores
An6nimos, modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous, that was aimed at "personas que experimentaran dudas en
la toma de decisions, vulnerabilidad en lo laboral, incertidumbre ante elfuturo y tuvieran la necesidad de
evaluar su desempeio personal para una mejor competencia" (Primavera, Covas and De Sanzo 1998: Ch
5).

1 The idea of the prosumidor is taken from Alvin Toffler's work, The Third Wave (1980).









psychological benefit to being a producer as well. The act of creating a good -

combining locally available inputs, along with one's personal creativity and labor and

trading it in the nodo builds self-esteem. The RGT concomitantly puts a strong emphasis

on micro entrepreneurship again, as a way to create supply and also build self worth.

These values are described in several documents emanating from RGT

headquarters in Bemal. The first four principles in Los doce principios provide perhaps

the best crystallization:12

1. Nuestra realizaci6n como series humans no necesita estar condicionada por el
dinero.

2. No buscamos promover articulos o servicios, sino ayudarnos mutuamente a
alcanzar un sentido de vida superior, mediante el trabajo, la comprensi6n y el
intercambio just.

3. Sostenemos que es possible remplazar la competencia esteril, el lucro y la
especulaci6n por la reciprocidad entire las personas.

4. Creemos que nuestros actos, products y servicios pueden responder a normas
eticas y ecol6gicas antes que a los dictados del mercado, el consumismo y la
busqueda de beneficio a corto plazo.

Structure and Organization of the RGT

Nodos that used the money printed in Bemal by the PAR became loosely unified

into the Red Global de Trueque (RGT)13. By 1999 the RGT had established afranquicia

or franchise system. A nodo, to be properly part of the RGT, had to register with the

RGT and use their creditos. As a new member signed up he or she would pay two pesos






12 For the full 12 principles see appendix.

13 Two other main trueque organizations evolved out of the RGT, the Zona Oeste and Red del Trueque
Solidario (RTS), both with their own specific currency. In addition, there exist independent barter clubs
that print their own local currency, accepted only at their particular nodo.









and get a start-up amount of 50 creditos.14 The RGT nodos franchised in this way were

known as "i',,iIsfi qtll1ii iulh". Each nodo, although affiliated with the RGT, was

autonomous. The structure of the RGT, like the nodos, was supposed to be horizontal.

The RGT gave advice on how to start a barter club, but each nodo decided upon its own

particular rules of trade and entry into the club.

[E]l acceso a la informaci6n, capacitaci6n, bienes y servicios estan descentralizados
y la actuaci6n de los usuarious es libre y voluntaria, sin ninguna exclusion donde
todos se relacionan entire si de manera direct y horizontal, sin media intermediaries
ni representantes que puedan decidir por nosotros en asambleas o comisions. Es
una democracia direct (Las Tradiciones).

To join a nodo, a prospective member needed to attend a charla, or introductory

meeting. The purpose of the charla was to explain how the system worked, clarify about

pricing and answer any questions. Each nodo also had a coordinator. The coordinator

was supposed to be a member of the barter club who fostered participation. The

coordinator was the main organizer, taking care of administrative details like set-up and

break-down. In many cases the coordinator would also regulate prices or handle

complaints between club members.

Participants Demographics

Most researchers of the trueques make three observations about participant

demographics. One is that the majority of participants tend to be women. A second

observation is that most participants are middle aged or older (Leoni and Luzzi 2003,

Bombal 2002, Lecaro and Altschuler 2002, Powell 2002). These findings are consistent

with my observations during my visit to Argentina. The third observation is that early on



14 In interviews with participants and coordinators the amount paid for the starter creditors ranged from two
to five pesos. In some cases, individuals did not pay for their first credits, but simply "sold" their goods to
obtain their first creditors.









in their existence the barter clubs were comprised mostly of the "new poor," but

expanded to include the structurally poor. While this conclusion seems warranted, it has

not been rigorously demonstrated. Ines Gonzalez Bombal comes closest to offering

substantiation in her 2000 study.15 She found that the majority of participants (70%)

earned less than 500 pesos per month, 39% earned between 500 1,000 per month and

28% earned more than 1,000 per month. "Esto indica que la practice del trueque (aunque

no de un modo excluyente) se estaba focalizando en los "nuevos pobres" (Bombal 2002:

103). Furthermore as regards education, an indicator of class, Bombal found that most

participants had completed secundario, while a third had terciario or universitario

incomplete (104).

Several other researchers state that the participation base was comprised initially of

the new poor but grew to include the structurally poor. Interestingly, though, no one

offers a direct link between their demographic findings and support for the idea that the

new poor began the trueques. Leoni and Luzzi (2002), Powell (2002) and Aricidiacono

(2002) all cite Bombal's work, but do not offer any further analysis as to why they

conclude the new poor were the initial participants. None of these studies were done over

time to see if the participant composition actually changed.

Substantiating the claim that the new poor comprised the initial participant base is

difficult, particularly because measuring and identifying the new poor is complicated. As

Minujin and Kessler point out, the new poor is an extremely heterogeneous group.

Anecdotally, though, the claim seems valid. One indication is to simply look at the

founders. All three have higher education. Perhaps more to the point, the founders


15 Her study is based on 50 in-depth interviews conducted across five nodos.









themselves describe the first members of the trueque as coming from the middle-class

(interview). What is clear, however, is that the trueques did not remain solely comprised

of the new poor. Multiple people interviewed for this study mention that at one point

there were people from all walks of life and economic class participating in the trueque.

And as the founders note in their account of the trueque beginnings:

Segun la experiencia de los distintos "clubes", la concurrencia es la mas variada :
classes bajas en descenso, clase media en descenso, classes bajas en ascenso,
militants desorientados, inclasificables... Creemos que el proyecto atrae a las mas
diversas classes de personas (Primavera, Covas and De Sanzo 1998).

Furthermore, as the economy worsened and unemployment grew, the trueque

extended out from its original urban base to areas more densely inhabited by the

structurally poor (Powell 2002: 8).

Nodo Dynamics

By 2001 the barter clubs were catering to both the wealthy and the poor. The nodo

Galpon de Once in the city of Buenos Aires is illustrative. Galpon opened in March of

2001. It met three times a week and at its height roughly 3000 people would pass

through weekly. This nodo offered middle class services such as hair styling, manicures,

and even vacations, which could be paid for in part by creditos. There was also a

recycling center run by Galpon organizers. The recycling center was a way to generate

creditos for people who had nothing to bring to the trueque. If an individual had no

product to sell she or he could bring in glass bottles, cardboard boxes or cans to trade in

for creditos. In addition to the space provided for individuals to trade their goods, the

Galpon also provided free child care for the parents who came to trade. It also ran a

nodo-sponsored pizzeria and vegetable stand. To enter aprosumidor would have to pay

one peso. Part of the money from the entrance fee went towards paying rent and electric









bills. The other part of those pesos helped to purchase inputs for the pizzeria and

vegetable stand. This system worked well because food items were always in high

demand in the nodos. And while not all the ingredients were available through the

trueque, buying them in bulk in the formal market was a cheap solution.

On the one hand, the trueque was a way to maintain a certain life style. For

instance items for trade in a barter club in the wealthy neighborhood of Recoleta included

fur coats, art and books (Crivello 2002).16 On the other hand, the trueque also was a true

alternative market. As unemployment grew in the latter part of the 1990s the trueque

permitted people to obtain basic goods that were increasingly hard to come by, such as

food, cleaning supplies and clothes. The trueque also provided a venue for people to sell

goods they were unable to sell for pesos in the formal market. Oftentimes goods being

sold in the trueque came from left over inventory of failed businesses (personal

interviews, Bombal 2002: 119). Professionals also joined to provide legal services,

medical treatment and music lessons. In a June 2001 edition of El Trueque, an RGT

magazine, services and products advertised included event planning, catering, school

supplies, car parts, massage, taxi service, contact lens prescriptions and garden care.

Intersection with Government

In the first two years the RGT did not actively seek government support or

sanction. However, by 1997, the RGT began interfacing with the government, both as a

way to seek legitimacy and to encounter new forms of integration (Primavera 1999).

Government support came from the national, provincial and municipal level. The city of



16 This was an independent club, although it was similar to the RGT in its stated goals of creating solidarity
as well as promoting production and a continual circulation of creditors. They issued their own local
credito known as the "recoleto".









Buenos Aires, where the trueques flourished early on, created "El Programa de Trueque

Multirreciproco" in May 1997 (Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque). It allowed the RGT to

use offices throughout the city to host the nodos and to train members.17 The City of

Buenos Aires also invited RGT founders Horacio Covas and Carlos de Sanzo, among

others, to attend a roundtable discussion as part of an event called Buenos Aires Sin

Fronteras. The city continued its collaboration in 2001, co-hosting a megaferia with the

RGT (Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque). In the brochure advertising the megaferia, the

city of Buenos Aires describes how it wished to "[i]ncentivar a las personas a capacitarse

en tematica no tradicionales, asociadas a nuevos mercados y sectors dinamicos de la

producci6n y el empleo" and "fomentar y fortalecer la construcci6n de redes socials a

traves de proyectos autogestionados o cogestionados con el estado." The program

provided training to individuals who wished to form microbusinesses within the

trueque.1

In 2001 the RGT received national support when the Secretaria de la Pequenay

Mediana Empresa in the Ministerio de Economia (SEPyME) signed an agreement to

promote the trueques. The first section of the agreement states that the goal of the

agreement is to "promover en todo el pais el sistema de trueque o intercambio

multireciproco". The agreement was to also mutually foment the creation of jobs and

support individuals in their transition from the informal to the formal market.

(Convenio). I interviewed one woman who benefited from this government support of



1 The offices used were the 'Centros de gestion y participaci6n social' (CGP). There is one CGP in each
of Buenos Aires' fourteen neighborhoods.

18 In 1999 the program was still running, but had moved from the control of the Secretaria de Industria,
Comercio y Trabajo to the newly created office of Secretaria de Desarrollo Economico.









small business initiatives. As a member of the RGT she received a small subsidy of $200

pesos a month, which was to be used to buy materials for the aprons and purses that she

sewed to trade in the trueque. In practice, she used the pesos to pay her utility bills and

bought the inputs for her sewn items from the trueque. The subsidy lasted five months.

She was later approached and received a similar subsidy, but this time not tied to the

trueques; the subsidy instead was to support production of goods sold in the formal

market. SEPyME's relation to the trueques was similar to that of the city of Buenos

Aires: some material support in terms of co-sponsoring workshops, training and ferias,

but perhaps more significant was the "moral" support of allowing the SEPyME and City

of Buenos Aires names to go out on marketing materials. Also in February 2001, eight

diputados attempted without success to pass a bill declaring the trueques to be of national

interest.

At the municipal level, the trueques met with further support. The focus on the

trueques as a means of providing work and income also motivated more than 10

municipalities and 3 provinces to officially declare the trueques to be in their interest

(Leoni and Luzzi 2003). In addition to declaring the trueques to be of municipality

interest, the cities would often allow the nodos to use public buildings or space. The

municipalities also sought to regulate the trueques: some required all nodos to register

with the local government, and since popular trueque items included prepared foods and

homeopathic medicines, trueque members were often required to attend health

workshops.

Problems within the Trueques

As the trueques grew so did challenges to the system. One issue that spawned

several interrelated problems had to do with the credito. At the outset the RGT declared









the value of one credito to be equivalent to one peso. This parity was established simply

as a means of convenience. It allowed prosumidores to easily set prices. For instance, if

an empanada in the formal market cost one peso, then it should cost one credito in the

trueque. However, as the RGT grew it appeared that it was printing too many creditos.

A woman I interviewed explained how she registered with one nodo, but was required to

re-register when she went to another nodo. Even though she already had creditos from

participating in the first nodo she was issued the starter 50 creditos from this second

nodo. While this woman did not purposely try to get extra creditos, many people did take

advantage of the system in this way. A lack of effective centralized record keeping led to

people registering at multiple nodos to get several disbursements of creditos.

After a while, the value of the credit became inflated. Inflation might have been

acceptable except that it was happening at different rates at different nodos, so that an

empanada might cost 2 pesos in one nodo, but cost 5 pesos in another. Price variation

from nodo to nodo led to speculation; individuals would buy products at one nodo for one

price and resell them at another nodo for a much higher price (Primavera 1999, La

Naci6n, Premat 2003).

There were also charges of corruption on part of the coordinators. Several people

that I interviewed pointed out the economics of running a nodo. It was common to

charge one or two pesos as entry fee into a nodo. This fee was supposed to cover costs

such as electricity, rent, and cleanup. A busy nodo might have 500 people enter in a day.

If the nodo charged one peso at the door and met three times a week it would produce

$1,500 pesos a week. That would total $6,000 pesos a month. A sizable quantity that

would more than cover basic costs of rent, utilities and clean-up. In some nodos it was









clear that the extra income was being used to buy in bulk to supply the nodo, but in other

cases, the accounting of the pesos was not so transparent.

In 1998 four zones Capital, North, West and South were created to try to

decentralize the RGT and prevent overprinting and speculation. Each zone printed its

own currency (Hintze 2003: 56) and established an equivalency with the creditos from

the other zones (Primavera 1999). However, differences of opinion over the transparency

of credit printing led the Zone Oeste to splinter off in 2000 and cut all ties to the RGT

(Sampayo 2003: 197). The Zona Oeste also cited "incompatible" development

trajectories as the reason for splitting (Sampayo 2003: 197). Another important split

came in 2001, when the Redde Trueque Solidaria (RTS) formed and officially separated

from the RGT (Cortesi 2003: 181).

The RTS is very specific about the ways it differs from the RGT. While both

organizations emphasize production on the "human scale," the use of"tecnologia

apropiada19" and work as a means of self-realization, the RTS differs over the issues of

creditos and participation. With regard to creditos, the RTS refuses to print a national

credito; each zone of the RTS prints its own cr&dito. The RTS believes that zonal credits

reinforce the identity, decision-making abilities and development of each zone. While

the RTS acknowledges the drawback in having to deal with multiple kinds of creditos, it

reasons that printing a national currency only replicates the formal economy and all the

problems therein (Cortesi 2003: 189). In contrast to the RGT, the RTS also does not

charge a "registration" fee or "franchise" fee for new members to get their first creditos.



19 The RTS defines "tecnologia apropriada" as working with what is available rather than what is not
(Cortesi in Hintze 190). This is a similar concept to the RGT emphasis on using local talent and inputs to
create goods, rather than importing them from other areas.









With regard to participation, the RTS has positioned itself as being a more democratic

and participatory organization than the RGT. The RTS mode of decision-making is

through assembly, which it believes facilitates transparent, democratic, and inclusive

participation. The RTS, in turn, criticizes the RGT as tending toward private, closed

decision-making processes (Cortesi 2003: 184).

Other problems began to plague the barter clubs. A serious issue was that of

supply. A main edict of being a trueque participant was to be aprosumidor, to be a

producer as well as a consumer. However, the production side of the equation came to

suffer. People would attend the nodos and buy goods, but either not bring goods to sell

or only bring used items, such as clothes. The end result was a scarcity of goods as well

as a declining quality of goods. Also, many people were bringing items that were not in

demand. Trinkets and arts and crafts abounded rather than food items (Lecaro and

Altschuler 2002). As the kind of goods that people actually had a demand for were

offered less and less, people ended up stuck with stacks of creditos and nothing to

purchase (Bombal 2002: 125).

Another issue confronting the trueques was the subutilization of skills (Bombal

2002, Lecaro and Altschuler 2002: 11). Bombal notes that the trueques are repositories

of social capital and skills as well as goods and services. Yet with all these resources,

and the RGT's particular emphasis on fostering small businesses, there was no real

efforts on part of the prosumidores to create microenterprises (Bombal 2002: 111). Only

20% of those interviewed by Bombal had plans to create a new project in conjunction

with other members (Bombal 2002: 110).









Chapter Summary

Argentina's economic successes of the first part of the 20th century slowly eroded

away in the second half the century. The strong middle class that had developed began to

fade as a recurring cycle of strong growth followed by wild inflation plagued the country.

The neoliberal policies of the 1990s pushed the country into the growth phase of the

cycle, but incurred dangerously high levels of unemployment. The middle class

consequently further declined and a new class was created: the "new poor". Out of this

context the barter clubs were born.

The creation of the barter clubs was a way to not only meet economic need, but it

was a vehicle that promoted local production, self-sufficiency, personal growth and

solidarity. People joined the barter system both out of need and also to maintain a

certain lifestyle, and by 2001 the barter clubs were catering to both the wealthy and the

poor. As the barter clubs grew so did the problems that plagued them, including

inflation, speculation and scarcity of goods. Tension also mounted over issues of

participation and issuance of creditos. As a result Zona Oeste and the Red de Trueque

Solidaria splintered off from the RGT.














CHAPTER 3
AFFECT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE BARTER CLUBS

The economic crisis that exploded in December of 2001 dramatically affected the

barter clubs. While membership had been increasing at an accelerated rate the previous

two years in tandem with the worsening national economy the corralito of late 2001

and massive joblessness of 2002 led to a tidal wave of new trueque participation. The

first section of this chapter reviews the economic background leading up to Argentina's

2001 economic debacle. The second section explores how the ensuing rush of new barter

club participants exacerbated existing problems within the trueque. The last section

discusses the RGT's effort to confront these issues and the level of success achieved.

The Economic Crisis of 2001/2002

Serious structural weaknesses combined with cyclical recession to precipitate

Argentina's economic meltdown in late 2001. In the document entitled "Lessons from

the Crisis in Argentina" the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reviews Argentina's

economic development from the 90's through the 2001 crisis. The document highlights

what in hindsight were considerable "existing weaknesses and growing vulnerabilities"

(IMF 2003: 6) in the system:

Fiscal performance...was repeatedly undermined by off-budget expenditures and
was too weak throughout the 1990s to prevent a growing reliance on private capital
flows to meet the public sector's steadily rising borrowing needs. Exports, though
growing at a solid 8 percent per year between 1990-98, did not keep pace with
sharply rising import demand, which grew at an average rate of 25 percent per year
over the same period. The relatively small domestic financial sector fostered
dependence on foreign debt-creating flows to finance both private and public
spending. Finally, despite a good start on structural reforms, by mid-decade these









were petering out and were, in some cases, even reversed, leaving important
rigidities (8)1.

The IMF document further points out that the fiscal debt was exacerbated by borrowing

by the provinces, adding to the public-debt ration (6, 13). The overall debt was tenable as

long as the economy was growing at 5% or greater, but in the event of lesser growth,

such levels of debt were dangerous.

These structural weaknesses were compounded by the constraints of the

convertibility law. Palermo and Collins describe the negative current-accounts balance as

the convertibility plan's Achilles' heel. Part of the expected goal of the convertibility

law was that true exchange-rate parity would occur, i.e., that the peso would equal the

dollar without the government needing to prop it up drastically. However, while inflation

was kept comparatively under control, the heating up of the economy did maintain a

certain level of "residual" inflation, preventing parity from being reached (Palermo and

Collins 1998). Eventually, the economy started a cyclical recession in 1998 and the

policy of public spending and propping up the peso could not last. The currency board

thus became a "liability" as the government accrued burgeoning foreign-currency

denominated debt (IMF 2003: 4).

Palermo and Collins outline three possibilities open to the government at that

moment. One option was to devalue the currency, but the position of self-constraint

embodied by the convertibility law prevented this step.2 Furthermore, as the IMF


1 The rigidities the IMF refers to include rigidities of the labor market. In stark contrast to the views
presented by the authors cited in the second chapter, the IMF thought that the country should have a more
flexible workforce.

2 Recall from chapter two that self-constraint was the cornerstone of the convertibility plan; it entailed that
the government abrogated its prerogative to moderate monetary policy and exchange rates in order to build
confidence in the economy.









document also points out, the economic and political costs of exiting the currency board

regime were great: "By the late 1990s, with more than one-half of banks' assets and

liabilities and ninety percent of the public debt denominated in foreign currency (mainly

US dollars), abandoning the currency board arrangement would have been extremely

disruptive to the economy as indeed it turned out to be" (37). Furthermore, there was

strong political backing of the currency board; in 1998 the problems with the system were

still latent and the economy seemed to be doing just fine. Thus no politician was eager to

suggest painful preventative medicine. The irony of course was that the growth of the

economy masked the weakening government finances. The two other possibilities were

to restrict the inflow of foreign capital or to reduce public spending, but neither jibed with

Menem's political position (Palermo and Collins 1998).

Advent of the crisis. In 1998 the economy embarked on the fateful recession that

would trigger the economy's collapse. Several factors precipitated the recession. One

was a cyclical correction following the rapid growth of the previous two years. Another

was the political uncertainty surrounded Menem's attempt to run for the presidency for

an unconstitutional third term. Economic troubles in other parts of the world also

reverberated in Argentina. The Russian crisis in 1998 affected interest rates in emerging

markets and in turn reduced capital inflows into Argentina. Yet, while international

lending interest rates increased the Argentine currency board "muted" these effects,

keeping the spread on Argentine bonds artificially low. The result was to further mask

the true economic status of the country's debt. The following year Brazil, one of

Argentina's biggest importers, devalued its currency. Argentine products became even









more expensive resulting in a 28% decrease in Argentine exports to Brazil (Bluestein

2005: 59). Finally, exports to other countries dropped 10.5% (Bluestein 2005: 59).

These external shocks combined fatally with structural weaknesses: the country

was unable to generate enough exports to cover national spending, nor could it expand

monetary supply, nor could it institute an expansionary fiscal policy (IMF 2003).

Crisis. Argentina started off the year 2001 struggling to keep afloat. It turned to

the IMF for an injection of much-needed capital to maintain its debt financing. The IMF

pledged a total of $14 billion to be dispersed throughout the year, pending the attainment

of certain fiscal goals (IMF 2003). These attempts, however, failed "to break the cycle of

rising interest rates, falling growth, and fiscal underperformance" (IMF 2003: 59). The

situation demonstrated its fragility as the finance minister resigned and his successor was

forced out in two weeks. As the year continued, the spread between peso- and dollar-

denominated interest rates skyrocketed from one to sixteen percent and the central bank

modified its charter, reducing the required currency on hand required by law (IMF 2003:

59). The government then offered a voluntary debt swap. While this move bought the

government time on its debt service obligations, the interest rate on the new debt was

17%, an inordinately high rate, demonstrating the desperation of the government (IMF

2003: 59). Confidence in the system continued to erode and the run on bank deposits hit

a high in November 2001 (IMF 2003: 61).

The government responded by limiting withdrawals to $250 dollars a week from

individual accounts (IMF 2003: 61). The reason behind such a drastic measure was

simple. There were not enough dollars on hand to support the run on the banks.

Additionally, devaluation of the peso was imminent, but there was doubt as to what the









new value of the peso would be. With the implementation of the corralito the crisis had

hit the boiling point. There were riots in the street, culminating in the death of 27 people

(Fue 2003). President Fernando de La Rua subsequently resigned on December 20. In

January of 2002, Dualde the 5th president in three weeks declared default (IMF 2003:

62).

2002. The economic and political landscape could look no worse. In 2002

unemployment was at a record 22% (Byrnes 2005), and there was a 11% decline in

output (Blustein 2004). Throughout the year the government struggled with a variety of

measures to attempt to shore up the peso and stabilize the banking system.

Effect of Economic Crisis on the Barter Clubs

The state of emergency in late 2001 not only sent people to the streets clanging pots

and pans in the famous cacerolazos, but it sent waves of people into the barter clubs. The

news media was integral in spreading the word. In January of 2001, before the national

catastrophe fully unfolded, the Argentine newspaper, La Naci6n, only mentioned the

trueques in passing in two articles. In February 2002, however, the trueque clubs were

not only mentioned in four articles, but they were the main subject of two articles. One

article, "El trueque salv6 a una fabrica en Mendoza" (Feb 27 2002), explained how the

RGT saved a Mendoza canning business by "loaning" 40,000 cr&ditos in return for

canned olives, pickles, tomatoes and dulces to supply a particular nodo. The other article,

"El trueque crece a la par de la crisis" (Feb 6 2002), tells of more than 500,000 families

using the trueque as a palliative for the crisis. This article ends by providing contact

information (phone, email, website) and instructions on how to join.

Clarin, Argentina's other main newspaper, also heavily covered the barter clubs.

An article entitled "El club del treuque que le cambi6 la cara a un barrio" reported that in









October of 2001 only 100 people were regularly attending a nodo in the city of Lomas de

Zamora,3 but in March of 2002, more than 2,000 people were going weekly (Torresi

2002). Another Clarin article from two months earlier proclaimed: "Con el trueque ya se

compran campos, autos y hasta casas." In this article Covas, one of the RGT founders,

stated that there were 50 million creditos in circulation, with 250,000 creditos issued

daily to new members which means 5,000 new individuals were joining daily (since

each new member received 50 creditos). The article continued to report that in the

previous six months 75 new nodos had opened in the city of Buenos Aires. By June of

2002 5,000 nodos were in operation, with a total of one and half million participants

(Ovalles 2002).

During this period, it was clear that people were joining the trueque as a means of

survival. Access to money was limited, jobs were scarce and the value of the peso had

plummeted. People used the trueques strategically in their desperation to survive.

Grander values of self-sufficiency, solidarity and local production and consumption did

not factor in. Creditos were used to buy necessary items such as food, cleaning supplies,

clothes, and school supplies for their children, while precious pesos were set aside to pay

utilities and other bills (interviews). One woman that I interviewed stated that in 2001

and 2002 almost all of the prepared food items that she brought into the house came from

the trueque. Another interviewee described how people would form a line more than an

hour before the opening of a large nodo in order to get a chance at scarce goods such as

food, jostling and fighting to be able to secure bread, vegetables or cooking oil before it

ran out.


3 Province of Buenos Aires









In some instances the trueque also turned into a form of protest. In May of 2002

the RGT set up a temporary nodo in downtown Buenos Aires. The protest, as one

participant commented was "un acto simb6lico en contra del mercado" (Un Club 2002).

In a similar action two weeks later in front of the national Congress, trueque participants

specifically set up a nodo to demonstrate support for a proposed law to regulate the

trueques. Luis Laporte, a spokesperson for the RGT, explained that a legal framework

was necessary to regulate the trueques because, among other things, it would provide a

means to punish people who counterfeited creditos. "Queremos un marco legal porque

no podemos controlar lo que pasa. Si alguien falsifica creditos, hoy no se lo puede

penar" (Trueque Frente 2002). The trueques used in this way as a form of protest is not

without its inconsistencies. On the one hand, the trueque members protest the market

that excludes them. On the other hand, they ask for legislation to bring the trueques

under the regulating arm of that same system.4 This paradoxical stance will be discussed

in the next chapter.

Regulating the trueques was particularly appealing since the explosion in growth in

early 2002 had only exacerbated existing problems. Inflation was perhaps the most

nefarious issue. Several factors played into it. First and foremost the RGT simply

overprinted creditos. There was an attempt to keep track of who registered to prevent

individuals from collecting several installations of start-up creditos. The registration

system, however, simply broke down under the avalanche of new members people were

able to register across several nodos, receiving 50 creditos each time. A woman I

interviewed who was close to the RGT founders commented on how the franquicia

4 Likewise, initiatives that would allow the payment of municipal debts with creditos were also supported
by the RGT (Clarin Feb 14 2002).









system broke down. She described thefranquicia system as the replication of the trueque

model, but as she noted, once the nodos began growing rapidly, "no tenia muy claro cual

era el modelo para repetir. Lo unico que se repeti6 era que a cambio de dos pesos te

daban 50 creditos. Y eso genero la corrupci6n."

Speculation also ran rampant. Some people spent their whole week going from

nodo to nodo, buying goods at one price and selling them at another. Counterfeit creditos

compounded the problem. In August of 2002 three different groups were arrested for

counterfeiting the RGT creditos. In one arrest alone, 2,250,000 fake creditos were

confiscated. Considering that 50 million in true creditos were in circulation, that many

false creditos constituted almost five percent of the total in circulation.

The kind and quality of goods being produced in the trueque also became

problematic. The August 17, 2003 edition of La Naci6n One reported how for one

woman making cakes for the trueque became a losing proposition: "El precio de las

materials primas se fue por las nubes y me llegaron a pedir 2000 creditos por un kilo de

azucar. Al final para preparar las tortas tenia que invertir en pesos y a mi casa me llevaba

papelitos". Declining terms of trade resulted in a severe decrease in production. People

were coming to the nodos to buy, but production was falling off. Furthermore, what

remained in the trueques were items ancillary to daily needs such as arts and crafts and

also things of generally lower quality, like used clothes. In turn, many people ended up

with stacks of creditos but nothing worthwhile to buy. Inflation, speculation, declining

terms of trade and depletion of supply led to massive closing of nodos. Towards the end

of 2002 the nodos were closing down with the same rapidity with which they opened

(Premat 2003).









Many trueque participants place the blame squarely on the RGT founders. They

believed that the founders had purposely sold creditos to make a profit, and in the process

wrecked the system. The woman who ran a large nodo in the city of Buenos Aires

expressed this view:

Esta personas [the 3 founders] empezaron a ver el movimiento que habia detras de
ellos, empezaron a pensar en pesos, en dinero, en dinero, en dinero y terminaron en
hacer una gran estafa...Y gente que nosotros conocimos en su principio que no
tenian ni siquiera una casa para vivir se construyeron casas en San Isidrio San
Isidrio una de las localidades mas caras que existe en Argentina...Y cuando me
empeze a dar cuenta de como esto, como se estaba manejando y, y las cosas que
habia detras, llore muchisimo, yo sufri muchisimo porque realmente aca habia
gente muy valiosa, gente que, yo conoci, gente que actualmente hoy la trato, gente
que yo quiero much. Yo me sentia parte de la estafa porque yo manjeaba uno de
los trueques mas grandes que habia en Argentina.5

The RGT founders, for their part, believed that the government had purposely

undermined the barter clubs. According to the founders, the government, which

originally supported the trueques, turned on the barter clubs when it began to see them as

a threat to the clientelistic model. As the RGT founders explained, since people were

suddenly able to provide for themselves the politicians were not able to buy votes by

giving handouts. The founders particularly blamed Plan Jefesy Jefas, a federal program

that gave cash money to heads of households, for driving people away from the trueque

and the principles of self-sufficiency. The founders even allude to more direct sabotage;

they believe that politicians in the government were responsible for the falsification of

creditos (Sainz 2003).





5 This interviewee not only believed the founders had purposely overprinted creditos, but she also insisted
that they made up the story of counterfeit creditos to try to get away with their misconduct. When asked
about the newspaper articles describing the capture of counterfeit creditos she said that later it was
retracted.









Trueque Response

As early as May 2002 the RGT attempted to address the failing system. In an RGT

pamphlet they asked the prosumidores: "Tenga paciencia. En estos moments estamos

abocados a la reform total del sistema de franquicia y entrega de creditos"

(NotiTrueque). By December of 2002 the RGT began printing new creditos on special

paper from Brazil and with multiple security measures, including a watermark. They also

established an oxidation rate, so that the credit lost value over time, forcing people to

spend the creditos instead of amassing them (Rocha 2002). By November of 2004, when

I visited Argentina, there were a handful of independent and RTS nodos still active in the

city of Buenos Aires. There were no RGT nodos left in the capital city.

During my visit, however, I attended a large RGT nodo outside the capital city in

Quilmes. It still meets three times a week with more than a 1,500 passing through. El

Comedero, as it is called, is hosted in a large industrial space that previously housed a

factory. Upon entering the prosumidore pays five creditos and two pesos and receives a

leaflet containing PAR news and editorials. One peso goes to the PAR to help pay for the

printing creditos and the leaflet. The other peso goes toward paying security, the

cleaning person and the nodo administrator, who works in the nodo office and does the

bookkeeping. The creditos gathered from the entry fee go to paying the coordinator,

whose job is to mediate between prosumidores, be available to listen to people, and to

promote creativity and production. El Comedero houses a big kitchen in the back with an

industrial stove and oven, which is available for anyone's use. For instance, one woman

with whom I spoke choses to bake her goods in the kitchen rather than transport them to

the nodo. The most typical item for sale is used clothing. Food is another big item.

There are fresh vegetables and lots of prepared foods like tortas, tartas, galletitas. There









are also a quantity of prepackaged food items like spices, cookies and noodles, but never

in huge quantities. Some of the services offered include hair cutting, tarot card reading

and watch repair.

Although the interviews I conducted at this nodo were mostly informal, three

themes became apparent. First, people come to the trueque for the social interaction.

Several people describe the trueque as "therapy," a place to come to talk to people,

interact and forget their worries for a short time. While many of the people come to the

nodo in order to ameliorate a difficult economic situation, several people come merely to

see friends and distract themselves.

Second, people often move between the trueque and the formal market as an

economic strategy. As several people mentioned to me, some things are cheaper in the

trueque and some are cheaper in the market. People are constantly moving between the

two to extract advantage. For instance, one woman buys spices at the supermarket and

repackages them in small bags to sell individually in the trueque. Another woman uses

pesos to buy ingredients in the formal market to make prepizzas and pasta to sell in the

trueque. She says she recuperates the pesos she spends by buying things in the trueque

instead of the formal market. Many people believe they reap economic benefits from the

trueque, but how they derive the benefit is not a consciously understood or planned

process. A 70-year old man I spoke to buys new things in the formal market (the day I

spoke to him he had purchased shoe inserts) to sell along with the used items that he

brings in. When asked whether it worked to his benefit to buy things with pesos and then

sell them in creditos he answered that he really did not know. Third, although some

participants were not there for economic reasons only their participation did not appear to









be motivated by the values of self-help, local production, or a philosophical aversion to

pesos. For instance, I asked people whether they read the leaflet that was handed out to

every prosumidor upon entering the nodo. On the whole the answer was no.

Chapter Summary

Summary. The story of the trueques involves a direct relationship between a

worsening economy and increasing trueque membership. A corollary relationship also

obtained: as the economy worsened the reasons for joining the barter clubs had more to

do with necessity and survival rather than thoughts of creating an alternative economic

system. And as the trueques grew in number so did the problems plaguing them. The

national explosion in late 2001 caused a huge influx of trueque participants, shaking the

already fragile system to its core, exacerbating earlier problems of inflation and

speculation and leading to the massive shutdown ofnodos in late 2002. In response,

RGT founders instituted a "reactivation" of nodos on a smaller and more controlled scale

starting in 2002. However it did not appear that ideology motivated participants even at

the "reactivated" nodos, but rather desires to engage in social activity coupled with

attempts to derive economic benefit.














CHAPTER 4
TRUEQUES AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT?

Keeping in mind the lofty goals of their early beginnings, but taking into account

the changes wrought by unexpected and significant growth, to what extent can the barter

clubs be considered a social movement? To consider the trueques as a social movement

might be a big leap particularly since trueque participation grew in direct relation to a

worsening economy and participation at the height of the trueques stemmed from

pragmatic considerations rather than ideological conviction. Yet the original project was

not designed as merely a survival mechanism. The barter clubs were designed as an

enlightened alternative to the market; they were based on principles of autosuficiencia,

solidarity and the repudiation of dependency on the formal currency. To answer whether

the barter clubs can be considered a social movement, we will return to Sidney Tarrow's

definition of a social movement and analyze how the trueques match up with its several

components. As mentioned in Chapter two the barter clubs began with the RGT and

eventually two other smaller groups splintered off. For the purposes of this chapter I will

apply Tarrow's definition only to the RGT.

Collective Activity

The first prerequisite of a social movement is that it be a collective activity. At first

glance, it appears that this criterion was met from the beginning. By its very nature a

barter system requires more than one person in order to exist. Although the first nodo

was not huge (it started with 20 people), the barter system only grew. Despite the lack of

hard and fast numbers, it is indisputable that up until 2002 the trueques were multiplying









rapidly throughout the country. Even after the nodos began closing en masse in late 2002,

several nodos still remain in operation to the present day.

However, while the barter clubs do involve collective action by nature, there is a

certain level of individualism that underlies the activity. As one researcher observes, the

barter clubs in fact present an individualistic solution to a collective problem:

Si bien...la caida [en la nueva pobreza] ya no podia ser percibida como un hecho
individual sino que las causes de la crisis que padecian eran globales,
generabilizables y casi inevitable, la salida de esta exclusion se presentaba como
puramente individual. Paradoja que se sostiene a partir de la persistencia de la idea
de un progress possible pero donde "escapar" de dicha situaci6n dependia
unicamente de las capacidades personales. En este sentido, la altemativa del
trueque se presentaba con claros tintes individualistas -egoista, imposibilitando las
creencias en acciones colectivas o de demands al sistema politico...(Barbetta).

The individualistic nature of the barter clubs, i.e., the emphasis on self sufficiency

and personal ingenuity to overcome exclusion from the established market system is not

necessarily problematic when considering the barter clubs as a social movement. First,

we know from the literature on new social movements that movements can be carried out

on an individual level, especially when based around life-style choices (Larafia 1994).

The paradox of individual action constituting a collective activity is resolved when we

acknowledge that the individual basis of action is part of a group of like-minded people

do like-minded activities, even if separate. Second, as discussed in Chapter two, the

RGT's emphasis on self-sufficiency requires learning from others and sharing

knowledge, thus creating a market of solidarity.

Contention

Contention is the second element of social movements. As defined by Tarrow

contention involves two aspects: people who do not have access to institutions who

fundamentally challenge the system. The trueques clearly comport with the first part of









this definition. The RGT specifically prides itself in creating a space those who do not

have access to institutions, i.e., the excluded. In fact many researchers describe the

trueques' positive impact on women, a traditionally marginalized sector of society

(Primavera 2003, Powell 2002). Furthermore, the everyday participant does not appear

to be a seasoned politician, lobbyist or other traditional actor with institutional access.

The exception perhaps is the individuals who take on the role of coordinator. Some

coordinators do have political experience. For instance, the woman I interviewed who

ran Galpon de Once, one of the largest nodos in the city of Buenos Aires, was a member

of the Confederaci6n General de Trabajo (CGT), a national trade union.1 Even so, not

all coordinators have political roots. Also worth noting is that in some cases people

worked to initiate a nodo, even if they were not planning to participate in it. For instance,

one gentleman that I interviewed worked with an advocacy group for retired people. He

began helping to set up nodos as a community service. While politically active

coordinators and nodo initiators played an important role in the barter clubs they were not

the norm.

The second part of Tarrow's definition of contention is the making of new or

unaccepted claims thatfundamentally challenge the system. A starting point of analysis

on this point is a quotation by Jeff Powell, which highlights the inherent social and

political challenge of what he refers to as community currency systems (CCS):

Lying at the juncture of economics, political science, sociology, geography,
anthropology, cultural, environmental and gender studies, CCS are a concrete
embodiment of key abstract debates. First amongst these is over the nature of
markets. CCS pose serious challenges to the standard assumptions of homo

I also interviewed a coordinator from an independent nodo who, during the dictatorship was a member of
a leftist group and as a result was an exiliado interno. While she obviously has experience organizing this
experience is as a subaltern rather than someone with traditional access to institutions.









oeconomicus and the way we value, exchange and consume. By recognizing unpaid
women's work, for example, CCS have the potential to restructure gender relations.
Secondly, CCS force new discussions over the role of the state. They are only one
of several new contenders in the global marketplace competing with the state's
crumbling monopoly over both the provision of social services and the money
supply. (2).

Powell makes two points. First, that the trueques challenge ingrained ideas about

consumption and production. The edict of the trueques is to consume no more than is

needed and to eschew accumulation of creditos. Even though Argentina's middle class is

eroding away, it still knows how to consume. One Argentine history professor

characterized the Argentines of the 90s as a "dame dos" culture; with money burning in

their pockets the Argentines wanted two of everything (interview). The trueques

counteract this tendency, trying to create a new wave of people who are willing to buck

the dominant patterns of materialist consumption. This new mode of consumption

compels a new mode of production. The trueques enjoin participants to use socially

appropriate technology to produce just enough to provide for reasonable needs. As

Powell points out, the Twelve Principles of the RGT attempt to create "alternative

behavioral norms" (9).

One might argue that ideas of sustainable development, locally centered growth

and self-sufficiency are not new or radical ideas. While these ideas may not be new, they

are far from mainstream. In particular, the idea of self-sufficiency of being personally

resourceful in providing for one's material needs is unconventional in Argentina, with

its history of paternalistic governance. More to the point, how those ideas are

operationalized by rejecting pesos and turning to social money instead is conceptually

quite radical. As Melucci might argue, these values "engage the constitutive logic of [the]

system" (1994: 103). A fundamental purpose of creating the trueques was to demonstrate









that money is neither the starting point for one's survival nor one's sense of self. To use

social money encourages creativity and allows a person to create value in terms of time

and effort expended rather than in pesos. Furthermore, the credito is not legal tender. No

government backs it. Instead the good will and trust of the barter club members

underwrites the value of the credito. The personal relationships of the barter club

members guarantee its value.

To the extent that participants adopted this theoretical understanding of the credito,

the barter clubs indeed embodied an unorthodox approach to collective action. Yet, to

the degree that the credito was treated as a peso commodified, bought, sold,

counterfeited the barter clubs lost the original meaning and impact of their approach.

An essential element of most social money or community currency systems, like the

Ithaca Hours in New York or the LETS system in Europe, is the focus on local

production and consumption.2 As the RGT expanded to a national scope, the importance

of locally-based development and along with it the philosophical underpinnings of the

credito was subverted over time. The bigger the RGT grew and the more national

coverage the cr&ditos got, the more the RGT moved away from this fundamental ideal.

This tendency to grow should come as no surprise. A small nodo is hard pressed to

provide variety of products. The ability to use the credito in more than one setting makes

the credito more useful. Yet the more widely circulated the credito the more it was used

as if it were a peso rather than "social money".




2 The Ithaca HOURS system has very similar ideals as the original RGT: promotion of local commerce,
sustainable development and a rejection of materialism (see Ihp "\ %\ \ .ithacahours.com/ and
http://www.ithacahours.org/). The LETS system also supports local development. See
hup \ \l\ \\ .letslinkuk.org/.









Powell's second point deals with the trueques' challenge to state hegemony.

Powell sees the trueques as potentially challenging the role of the state, for instance in

competing with the state's monopoly over money supply. By extension, the barter clubs

could also plausibly erode the productivity of the national economy. The activity of the

formal market has the potential to decline to the degree that people satisfy their needs

through the trueque and not through the formal market. In other words, it could be a

zero-sum relationship. This loss of activity in the formal market would have potentially

devastating consequences for the tax base (although Argentina is notorious for poor

collections of taxes), the GDP, and international investment, which in part is based on

GDP calculations.

Despite the potential of this scenario, it is not a reality. A significant problem

continually plagued the trueque: in order to create goods for the trueque market, primary

materials almost always had to come from the formal market. The trueques specifically

focused on promoting primary material-producing trueque businesses, but these micro-

businesses never materialized in larger enough numbers or variety of products to create a

true alternative trueque market. It is important here to make a distinction between

different conceptions of the word "alternative". The trueques were created as an

alternative to the formal market. On the one hand, alternative could mean a complete

replacement of the formal system. In this connotation the trueques have a zero-sum

relationship to the formal market as described above. Alternative on the other hand,

could also connote a part-time or complementary relationship to the formal market. It is

this understanding that the RGT founders embrace. In interviews the barter club founders









describe the role of the barter clubs as "interstitial," that is, extracting value where the

formal market fails to.

Powell's quote highlights two levels of contention inherent in the barter system.

The first is at the level of ideas; the barter clubs challenge accepted ideas of production

and consumption. But as the national economy worsened the new members failed to

engage the barter club at this conceptual level. The following section addresses why

members failed to adopt the philosophical stance of the trueques. Suffice to say at this

point, however, that by late 2001 the majority of participants did not reflect the RGT

ideas of consumption and production. The second level of contention is the practical; the

barter clubs potentially undermined the very engine of the formal economic market. Yet,

in the final analysis this is a moot point: the relationship between the trueques and the

formal market was not zero sum, nor was the intention of the RGT founders to usurp

formal market share.

Common Purpose/Common Identity

The third element of Tarrow's social movement definition is that of common

purpose and/or common identity. My interviews revealed a variety of motivations for

initially joining the barter clubs: ideology, pragmatism, altruism, curiosity and social

interaction. This multiplicity of initial factors does not immediately disqualify the

trueques as a social movement, however. Two important questions need further

consideration. First, did the RGT attempt to "organize experience" and "guide action"

(Snow et al. 1986: 464) in order to bring these three disparate groups together? In other

words, did the RGT frame its key issues? Second, was the RGT successful? That is, did

participant motivations change over time to eventually coalesce around a more or less

homogeneous core?









Turning to the first question: did the RGT frame key issues and if so, how? There

is no question that the RGT attempted to frame central ideas. This was done at both a

conceptual and practical level. At the conceptual level, the RGT tapped into an existing

disenchantment with neoliberalism. Inez Gonzalez Bombal asks an interesting question

in her work: why it is that the new poor are willing to be in the trueques when a few years

ago they wouldn't have dreamed of doing it (104)? Bombal notes that there has been a

change from the new poor viewing their status a result of poor microeconomic

decisions (Minujin and Kessler 1993) to viewing themselves as victims of

macroeconomic problems over which they had no control (Bombal 2002: 104). She

concludes that the change in subjectivity (subjetividad), from the rational, autonomous

self, making microeconomic decisions to the self as victim of bad macroeconomics is

what allowed the new poor to participate in the trueques. This change in subjectivity is

precisely what the RGT builds on. Appealing to the discontent of the increased numbers

of unemployed, the RGT attempted a method of both frame bridging and amplifying,

depending on whether a person already held anti-neoliberalism as a high value (frame

bridging) or whether a person moved that value up in their hierarchy as a result of coming

into contact with the RGT (frame amplifying). An example of this kind of framing is

demonstrated in the RGT document entitled "Comenzarpor Casa":

La economic global no ha hecho mas que acrecentar la inequidad, el desempleo, la
tension social y la degradaci6n del medioambiente. Crece el numero de personas
disconformes que perciben que el confort no es sin6nimo de calidad de vida y por
todas parties surgeon alternatives al mercado cuyo comun denominador es la
descentralizaci6n, la autogesti6n y la producci6n a escala humana.

Here the RGT draws a causal connection between the globalized economy and the

commonly perceived societal ills of unemployment, social tension and environmental









degradation. In addition to drawing this connection, it goes on to suggest action and

response: self sufficiency and new modes of production.

Part of the RGT conceptual framing strategy involved creating a new vocabulary to

describe the trueque experience. While the word prosumidor originated in the works of

Alvin Toffler, the RGT adopted it as its own. The RGT also adopted common words and

associated them very specifically with the trueque system. For instance the words nodo

(node) and trueque (which comes from the verb trocar) have in Argentina become

synonymous with the barter clubs. This new vocabulary was disseminated along with the

larger trueque values during the charlas and coordinator training sessions. The barter

clubs, in creating a world ofprosumidores who trade in an economy of solidarity using

creditos, not only creates a community of like-minded barter club participants, but it also

clearly challenges the dominant discourse. As Melucci observes:

[A]ntagonism lies in the ability to resist and, even more so, to overturn dominant

codes. Antagonism lies in the ability to give a different name to space and time by

developing new languages that change or replace the words used by the social order to

organize our daily experience (Melucci 1994: 123).

At the practical level, the RGT attempted to mold participants and create an affinity

of ideals through the required charlas. For instance, in certain areas a prospective

member would have to attend eight charlas in order to become a member. These

meetings involved rigorous training, replete with workbooks and lesson plans (interview).

The RGT also used its online and publishing capabilities to disseminate a large array of

articles on trueque consciousness. A main distribution point for documents was the









autosuficiencia website.3 In addition to more formal documents such as the "Los Doce

Principios" there was a constant posting of articles and interviews reiterating the RGT

values as well as cautioning against unethical trueque conduct.

Turning to the second question: how successful were these various attempts at

framing? Obviously, the RGT was not successful enough to prevent misuse of the barter

system by those who were willing to speculate and counterfeit creditos. And clearly, the

RGT failed to convince a large number of people to stay in the barter system once the

formal market got back on its feet. In fact, nodos were forced to close down due to lack

of the ills of inflation, speculation and corruption.

In spite of these apparent failures, strong examples exist among a variety of

participants that demonstrate the success of the framing. Although not specifically

referencing the framing categories of Snow et al., Bombal's research offers several

examples of framing taking place. One artist she interviewed supplies a clear example of

frame bridging. This artist explains how participating in the trueques was simply a

continuation of the practice of values that he already held: "Yo soy artesana de oficio,

hace mas de treinta afios que soy artesana. Nosotros nos iniciamos en la artesania

haciendo treuques. Para mi fue descubrir algo dentro de la sociedad para rescatar..."

(Bombal 2002: 114). Another interviewee's comment demonstrates an example of frame

transformation, i.e., the redefining of beliefs:

Yo creia que estaba todo terminado, que no habia mas alternative, porque uno se
engancha en que no hay trabajo, no hay posibilides de insertarse en la sociedad y
yo veia todo como una pared adelante. Esto [el trueque] hizo una apertura...se me


3 Autosuficienica.com.ar is the home of the home of the Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional (PAR). It
is this website that contains the documents such as the "Los Doce Principios" and "Comenzar por Casa" of
the RGT. The RGT has its own website, www.trueque.org.ar, in which several of the links lead to the
autosuficiencia website.









abri6 la mente, se me despert6 algo aca adentro. Me di cuenta de que existe otro
mundo qu yo no lo conocia y que aca adentro lo descubri (Bombal 2002: 113).

In my interviews I also came across examples of successful framing. One woman

presented a clear case of frame transformation. She transformed her ideas on the role of

money:

Dinero a veces no es lo mas important vos sabes. No es lo mas important. Hay
muchas cosas que se pueden resolver sin diner. Con voluntad, con intercambio.
Esto yo aprendi aca. O sea, antes yo pensaba el reves, que sin dinero no se podia
hacer nada. Y aca me di cuenta que no era lo mas important. De verdad te digo.

Another woman's experience exemplified frame amplification, that is, the "clarification"

or invigorationn" of life events (Snow et al. 1986: 469):

Lo que se estaba dando [el trueque] era recuperar la identidad de las personas,
recuperar la dignidad del trabajo y recuperar el sentido de que lo que es el
solidaridad, porque esto fue lo que yo descubri en el trueque. Por eso, en mi caso,
me quede en el trueque. No entree para comer. Yo no tenia problems. Yo soy
professional, soy medical. No necestaba ir al trueque al comprarme un plato de
comida...yo recupere mi propio identidad como persona y la dignidad del trabajo,
no? la dignidad de decir lo que yo hago no es que lo regalo, no hago beneficencia y
el otro lo compra con su trabajo tambien. Y fue muy fuerte para mi.

This particular woman felt that the trueques had reconnected her to ideas of

solidarity and dignity. She had been hearing of the trueques from friends, in the news,

and had seen them in the streets. But before she actually began participating in the barter

system she described herself as being a "snob". Upon becoming a member she realized

the trueques were quite different from what she anticipated. "Realmente cuando yo tome

contact y lo vivi desde adentro me di cuenta que era totalmente diferente a la idea que

yo tenia." She realized that the trueques were really a way to reconnect with one's

identity.









Mobilizing Structures

The ability of the RGT to adequately frame key issues is not the single lynchpin in

the success or failure of creating a social movement. Social movements must combine

their ideas with action, which leads to the fourth element of Tarrow's definition:

mobilizing structures. Tarrow observes that social movement organizations need to be

sufficiently structured to permit effective action, but must also be flexible enough to

encourage autonomy and creativity at the participant level (Tarrow 1998: 124).

The RGT tried to strike this balance by creating a horizontal system, one where

each club was autonomous and created its own best practices. Yet, in some aspects the

RGT was too decentralized. Nodos were supposed to be organically formed; it was

expected that each would create its own norms and methods, all the while maintaining the

core values of the RGT. However, once the number of nodos began growing rapidly, the

RGT could not guarantee adherence to basic requirements. The RGT could not ensure

that charlas were being attended or prevent coordinators from selling creditos. As one

interviewee observed, the trueque in the beginning "Era much mas cuidado...se invitaba

a la persona parecida a voz, era mas de boca a boca la invitaci6n." A more moderated

growth rate might have allowed for the RGT to instill the core values on the front end and

allowed variety and creativity in the execution of each individual nodo. Uncontrolled

growth, however, led to a great degree of decentralization and little oversight.

Interestingly, the RGT has also been criticized for being too centralized. As

discussed in Chapter 2, the Red de Trueque Solidaria (RTS) particularly denounced the

RGT for tightly holding power in the small group of RGT founders, with little regard for

transparency in the decision-making process. This lack of democratic participation also

replicated itself at the nodo level. As Leoni and Luzzi's research reveal, there almost









always came to be a permanent coordinator, rather than a rotation of the post as originally

intended by the RGT. In all fairness, however, the position of coordinator, especially for

the larger nodos, required a dedication of time; the lack of rotation often was due to a

lack of volunteers willing to take on the role, rather than any malicious greed for power

and control on the part of the coordinators.

It would be difficult to determine what steps the RGT could have taken to strike a

more effective balance between structure and flexibility. To insure that each new

member was thoroughly trained and educated would have required a strictly monitored

growth pattern. The risk of course, would be to repudiate the RGT's goal to foment a

variety of experiences. Furthermore, the RGT would not have served as a refuge during

economic crisis, a fact the RGT founders were proud of. This tension between structure

and flexibility ultimately was untenable and the barter clubs failed to create a mobilizing

structure to maintain the barter clubs as a social movement.

Sustained Activity

The fourth element of Tarrow's social movement definition is sustained activity.

Tarrow does not specify what exact length of time qualifies as 'sustained' activity, but

meeting an exact temporal criterion is not necessary in the case of the barter clubs. In

terms of overall lifespan, the trueques activity is unquestionably a lasting activity. The

barter clubs have existed since 1995 and continue to operate, albeit in significantly

smaller numbers. And new people continue to join. While I was in the nodo El

Comedero in the province of Buenos Aires, I happened to speak with a woman who was

there for the first time. More interesting, though, is the duration of participation of each

individual. The people I interviewed, even if no longer active, tended to have

participated for at least a year.









Political Opportunities

Tarrow notes that discontent and structural societal strain are always present. It is

only when the political system opens in a particular manner that provides the crucible for

all of the above-described elements to catalyze the formation of a social movement. The

first parts of chapter two and chapter three outlined the specific political opportunities

that the stage for the formation of the barter clubs. Creating the backdrop for the barter

clubs was the rise of the new poor, disenchanted with the economic model that excluded

them from its benefits. The discontent deepened with the implementation of Menem's

neoliberal model and the accompanying spike in unemployment, underemployment and

increasing job precariousness. Finally, the dramatic national economic crash created a

major impetus for participation in the barter clubs.

Chapter Summary

In reviewing each of Tarrow's categories a common theme emerges: the barter

clubs began with all the elements of a social movement, but rapid participant growth,

fueled by a worsening economy and eventually a national economic crash, severely

strained the original project. This fact is particularly evident in examining the elements

of contention, common purpose and mobilizing structures. The barter clubs began by

challenging received notions of production and consumption. But as the trueques

reached national proportions, the elements of local production and solidarity were

subverted. Participation was about survival, not about challenging the dominant

discourse. Consequently the common purpose uniting the pioneering members quickly

diluted. While some participants demonstrated a change in attitude, the RGT was largely

unsuccessful in aligning the various motivation members with the values of the RGT.









One difficulty in classifying the trueques as a social movement comes into sharper

focus when we consider the following question. Could the trueque be a social movement

if they were designed simply to meet practical needs and did not involve any theories of

self-sufficiency, local development, social money or solidarity? Or do people have to

subscribe to lofty ideals for the barter clubs to qualify as a social movement? The answer

lies in a certain synergy between contention and common purpose distinct to the barter

clubs. If the common purpose is solely to derive economic benefit then the element of

contention disappears: simply trying to derive economic value alone is hardly

contentious. Alberto Melucci states: "What is at issue in a conflict is not the terms of the

exchange, or the best way to conduct it, but the actual meaning of the exchange itself'

(Melucci 1994: 125). If the meaning of the barter clubs is reduced to a simple economic

strategy then the meaning of that economic activity is no longer in conflict it is simply

part of the universal effort to survive.

Finally, the barter club's mobilizing structures also failed to hold in the face of

chaotic growth. Charlas were no longer rigorously required and participation at the

organizing level failed to rotate as originally expected. By the end of 2002 the barter

clubs had lost the elements necessary to be considered a social movement.














CHAPTER 5
CYCLES OF CONTENTION

The barter clubs were not the only forms of contention in Argentina in the 1990s

and early years of 2000. Shortly after the barter clubs began, other forms of collective

action came onto the scene, including the piqueteros, fdbricas recuperadas, asambleas

bariales, and cacerolazos. This chapter briefly examines each of these phenomena,

demonstrating how they and the trueques formed a larger cycle of contention. The

discussion will illuminate the master frame common to all of these disparate groups:

discontent with the neoliberal economic model. The chapter next highlights the decline

of the cycle and the factors specifically affecting the barter clubs. The chapter concludes

with a summary of the findings of this thesis with observations on the significance of the

barter clubs in the Argentine society.

Onset of the Cycle

The rise of various forms of contention in the 1990s and early years of 2000 fit well

into what Tarrow characterizes as the onset of a cycle of contention: a marked increase in

conflict, heterogeneity of actors, diverse forms of contention and increased political

attention (Tarrow 1998: 144-146). Furthermore, as Tarrow also points out, despite

variance in the forms of contentious activity and heterogeneity of actors, these

phenomena share a master frame around which protest occurred.

Piqueteros (1996 present). The piquetero movement started in two separate

locations, in 1996 with riots in Cutral-Co and Plaz Huincul in Neuquen and in 1997 with

the roadblocks of General Mosconi and Tartagal in Salta (Svampa 2003: 14). In these









two instances the riots and roadblocks were in response to joblessness created by the

privatization of YPF and subsequent closing of YPF plants, the main source of

employment in those towns. These uprisings set off a wave of similar roadblocks and

protests among the jobless and poverty-stricken throughout the country. Piqueteros have

variously demand jobs, social plans and cash subsidies (Svampa 2003: 41). The

government response has been both conciliatory and violent. It has responded by

granting plans such as Planes Jefes y Jefas de Hogar to thepiqueteros, but has also

responded with police force (Once 2006). In some cases the government has also

cooptedpiquetero leaders by appointing them to public position (De Piquetero 2006).

Thepiqueteros exhibit a variety of organizational styles and a varied demographic base

(Germano 2005, Svampa 2003). A common understanding, however, is that the failed

neoliberal model brought the country a state of disarray and joblessness (Germano 2005).

Fabricas recuperadas (2000 present). As factories began to fail in the 1990s

workers began barricading the factories to prevent owners from removing the equipment

and selling it. The workers claimed the machinery as payment for salaries in arrears.

Forming legal cooperatives, the workers took their case to court and often won. A slew

of provincial laws were passed allowing the expropriation of factory buildings and

equipment by the cooperatives, declaring the expropriation to be of public utility. An

official organization has formed, Movimiento Nacional de Fabricas Recuperadas which

became an NGO in 2003.1 Presently there are more than 100lfbricas recuperadas in

operation.


1 For more information see their website at Ihip \ "\ \ .fabricasrecuperadas.org.ar/.









Asambleas barriales (2001 2003). The asambleas began right after the

cacerolazos of December 19th and 20th, 2001 (Calello). In the beginning, anywhere

from 150-300 people would meet in a public space plazas, parks, local bars. Not only

did people of all ages, political and cultural backgrounds participate, but the topics

addressed covered a multitude of questions, from national politics to local issues. The

activities of the asambleas were diverse, from providing assistance to the unemployed,

creating collection sites for the cartoneros, and buying in bulk (compras comunitarias),

to distributing medicines, creating libraries, hosting theatres and festivals (DiMarco and

Palomino 2004: 40). The asambleas also frequently formed ties with the piqueteros and

fdbricas recuperadas. Despite this wide range of projects and goals, the common

denominator in all asamblea discussions was the failed neoliberal economic model:

"[L]o que se plantea dentro de las asambleas y cada vez con mas fuerza, es una discusi6n

sobre el modelo econ6mico de la sociedad, sobre el modelo econ6mico social; una

discusi6n sobre la economic del mercado" (DiMarco and Palomino 2004: 38). In March

2002 there were 272 in the whole country (Calello), but at present the fate of the various

asambleas is hard to gauge. Most reports of the asambleas in the press are those

particularly associated with thepiqueteros. In searching on the internet, most of the

neighborhood asamblea websites have not been active since 2003.

Cacerolazos (December 19th and 20th, 2001). In a spontaneous protest against

the unraveling economic and political situation, thousands of Argentines took to the

streets clanging pots and pans, culminating in the resignation of President de la Rua from

office. For many the protest was about the economic crisis and for others it was about

the political crisis: "A mi me llam6 la atenci6n la existencia de dos sectors en el









cacerolazo, aparte de los vandalos y provocadores: un sector que pedia la renuncia de

Cavallo y el fin del modelo economic, y otro que iba mas lejos, que queria el fin de las

prebendas political, queria la renuncia de la Corte Suprema, un Parlamento que funcione,

se avanzaba mas en el piano de la reivindicaci6n institutional" (Jose Nun quoted in El

Cacerolazo 2001).

Contentious action and social protest has always been present in Argentina. But if

we look at a timeline of these activities we can see in retrospect that a cycle of contention

had started in the mid 1990s with the barter clubs andpiqueteros and peaked during the

national political and economic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 when the asambleas

and cacerolazos came into being. Each of these phenomenon carried out very different

agendas demanding jobs in the case of the piqueteros, creating spaces for direct

democracy in the case of the asambleas, venting a visceral frustration with the economic

and political chaos in the case of the cacerolazos, and creating an alternative economic

model in the case of the trueques. Yet these various forms of protest constituted by a

variety of actors shared a master frame: discontent with the neoliberal economic model.

Decline of the cycle

This cycle of contention does seem to be slowing. Some of the contentious

behavior died out soon after it started. The momentary ascendance of the cacerolazos

marked the peak of the cycle, a spontaneous outpouring of the masses into the street. The

asambleas also coincided with the pinnacle of the cycle, and while slightly longer lasting,

eventually lost steam. On the other hand, other forms of contention continue: many of

thefabricas recuperadas still operate and the piqueteros continue to frequently set

roadblocks and made demands on the government. The barter clubs fit in somewhere in

the middle of this cycle, outlasting the transient spark of the cacerolazos and asambleas









but struggling to maintain an existence that the piqueteros and fdbricas recuperadas have

steadily maintained.

By examining each conceptual element of a social movement collective activity,

sustained activity, common purpose/identity, mobilizing structures and political

opportunities I have illuminated reasons for why the barter clubs failed to maintain

themselves as a social movement. But there are additional factors which influenced the

course of the barter clubs. These factors relate directly to the dynamics of contentious

cycles. According to Tarrow, the decline of a cycle is brought on by exhaustion,

polarization within the movement, and government selective facilitation of claims

(Tarrow 1998: 147-150). All of these factors are at play to some degree within the barter

clubs.

The first element, exhaustion applies in an indirect way the barter clubs started

closing shop because of inflation, counterfeiting, and speculation, not because the

members grew tired of participating. However, lack of time, energy and resources

prevented the RGT from assimilating the flood of new members and adequately framing

key issues. The second element, polarization, also factored into the breakdown of the

barter clubs. The RGT generated two competing barter clubs, the Zona Oeste and RTS.

The RTS in particular ardently and publicly criticized the RGT for irresponsible

management of cr&dito printing as well as for autocratic control.

The government's role affected the trajectory of the barter clubs. Alvarez et al.

suggest that government plans cushioning the adverse effects of neoliberal policies

undercut the need for mobilization and reinforce clientelism. This process is exactly

what the RGT founders believed to be happening. The RGT founders suggest that plans









such as Plan Jefesy Jefas de Hogares attracted people away from the barter clubs and

toward easy money from the government. Foweraker explains demobilization in the

tendency of social movements to negotiate more and protest less. This dynamic may

have also been at play with the barter clubs. The umbrella organization of the RGT, the

PAR (El Programa de Autosuficiencia Regional), in fact became a non-governmental

organization. Part of the reason for forming an NGO was to gain credibility and legal

recognition. As we have seen, the RGT specifically worked to get government support of

the barter clubs and with some degree of success. But as both Tarrow and Melucci note,

the greater the degree of institutionalization the less the degree of contention.

Conclusion

In the early years, when the barter clubs were small, they met all the criteria of a

social movement. They were a collective, sustained activity. They behaved

contentiously challenging fundamental beliefs about the nature of production and

consumption and providing an alternative to the neoliberal, market-based economy. The

barter club members mobilized behind this common purpose not only in the act of

bartering, but also through regular charlas and rotation of responsibilities in the nodo.

Even so, the barter clubs were unable to maintain their trajectory as a social

movement, partly because they grew so quickly. The huge influx of participants in the

years leading up to the economic crisis of 2001 severely taxed the trueques. As people

fled to into the barter system to satisfy basic material needs, their original common

purpose changed, from challenging the dominant economic model to being simply

another way to survive hard times. This change in motivation undermined the

contentious aspect of the trueques: to barter on principle is contentious; to barter out of

need is not.









The mobilizing structure also broke down as the trueques grew, affecting the

RGT's ability to raise consciousness among its members. Because the clubs were

organized horizontally, the RGT could not monitor the practices of each nodo. Not only

did illicit practices run rampant, but the RGT was unable to sufficiently imbue each new

member with the core values of the trueque. Despite efforts to frame the issues of self-

reliance, local production and the ills of money, the RGT was unable to successfully

inculcate these ideals and transform them into everyday practices.

Creating a national system of parallel currency exacerbated the RGT's failure to

frame key issues. As the RGT grew it had to decide between divergent models: preserve a

small, local system adept at maintaining solidarity, or build a larger multi-regional or

national system that could more efficiently in allocate goods and services. Ultimately, by

choosing a national system based on a national credito, the RGT replicated the very ills

of the market economy that the RGT had rejected in the first place: inflation, greed and

speculation. By going national, the RGT lost the community focus and personal ties that

legitimize a local currency. In turn, the sense of solidarity between like-minded

neighbors largely disappeared.

Yet, the barter clubs played an important role in Argentine society. On the one

hand, the barter clubs were a survival mechanism that supplied basic goods and services

during a time when money was short and unemployment was high. The trueques,

however, made a deeper impact than just simply providing basic needs during economic

hardship. At a visible level, the barter clubs influenced government by putting new

issues on the political agenda, and gaining political support of an alternative economic

model. The barter clubs also influenced society at a more implicit level. As Feijoo









observes in her examination of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, groups can create change

without intending to do so. The Madres acted out their traditional role of protectors and

in the process unwittingly challenged the system. "In practice, the Madres became

another movement of women who, without trying to change patriarchal ideology or

abandon their femininity, produced a transformation of the traditional feminine

conscience and its political role. As a result, a practical redefinition of the content of the

private and public realms emerged" (Feijoo 1994: 113).

Similarly, the barter club participants, whether or not they consciously intended it,

created new identities for themselves. As Bombal points out, despite failure to fully

extend and transform the ideas of the pragmatic barter club participant, the trueques

changed participants' self-perception: "En estas personas no se encuentran convicciones

ideol6gicas tan claras respect del trueque como ordenador de un estilo de vida

alternative, pero sin duda la practice misma les permit resignificar su existencia y

alcanzar un nuevo posicionamiento" (Bombal 2002: 117). The quintessential example of

this transformation is the woman I interviewed who at first looked at the barter clubs

through the eyes of a snob. After she began participating, however, she realized that the

trueques provided a means to rebuild broken identities: "Lo que se estaba dando [el

trueque] era recuperar la identidad de las personas, recuperar la dignidad del trabajo y

recuperar el sentido de que lo que es el solidaridad, porque esto fue lo que yo descubri en

el trueque."

More generally, the barter clubs are significant as an indication of Argentina's

evolving state-society relations. Understanding the barter clubs as a nascent social

movement that eventually failed to consolidate as such serves to highlight this changing









relationship. To view the barter clubs as a social movement reminds observers to

recognize the underlying values and convictions present at their creation. Bringing the

trueques' normative message to the forefront brings to bear the full significance of the

barter clubs as an innovative and conscious reaction, one among many, to a changing

state.

The 1970s marked a dividing line in the history of Argentine state-society relations.

In the 1940s and 50s, Peron had set the standard for an active state, one that heavily

directed economic growth and incorporated and provided for the working class by

organizing and empowering strong unions. The military government that took power

from Peron in 1973 attempted to liberalize state hold on economic activity and limit the

power that unions had acquired. The advent of democracy in 1983 marked the return to

an active civil society. The trend toward liberalization that started in the 1970's,

however, continued forward. Carlos Menem carried out the liberalization agenda with

particular enthusiasm in the 1990s. Under Menem, several factors coalesced to create a

crisis in the new model: mass privatizations of state-owned businesses and the opening of

markets to outside competition exacerbated the process of de-industrialization that started

in the 1970s and the concomitant decline in the middle class. The result was massive

unemployment in the mid 1990s and the exposure of the "new poor" as an established

class in Argentina.

The economic crisis of 2001 symbolized for many the consequences of the state's

move away from a paternalistic, hands-on economic model to a liberal market model.

The responses to the crisis and to the underlying change varied from asambleas

barriales and piqueteros, tofabricas recuperadas and barter clubs. This wave of









contention demonstrates a broad based search for new modes of both governance and

livelihood. At one end of the spectrum there are the piqueteros who continue to make

claims on the government, but through novel forms of contention. Alternatively, the

asambleas barriales place governance directly into the hands of the citizens, while the

fabrics recuperadas invest factory ownership and operation directly into the hands of

the workers. At the far end of the spectrum are the trueques, representing an even more

radical response, enjoining their members not to look to the government for assistance

but to look to themselves for solutions.

Out of all these forms of contention the piqueteros demonstrate the greatest

longevity. While the asambleas have died out almost entirely and the barter clubs are a

mere shadow of what they once were, the piqueteros remain active and continue to grow.

An avenue for future research would be to compare the trajectory of the piqueteros with

that of the barter clubs. Do the piqueteros' goals and modes of contention resonate more

naturally in Argentine society? Were the piqueteros able to consolidate as a movement

because of better framing practices?

The future of the barter clubs, however, should not be ignored. Despite their fall

from headline news, research should stay abreast of the trueques. Will their efforts to

regroup generate a more effective barter organization? If not, what will be the path of

former participants? Will they go on to participate in other forms of contentious

behavior?















APPENDIX
PRINCIPIOS DE LA RGT

1. Nuestra realizaci6n como series humans no necesita estar condicionada por el
dinero.

2. No buscamos promover articulos o servicios, sino ayudarnos mutuamente a
alcanzar un sentido de vida superior, mediante el trabajo, la comprensi6n y el
intercambio just.

3. Sostenemos que es possible remplazar la competencia esteril, el lucro y la
especulaci6n por la reciprocidad entire las personas.

4. Creemos que nuestros actos, products y servicios pueden responder a normas
eticas y ecol6gicas antes que a los dictados del mercado, el consumismo y la
busqueda de beneficio a corto plazo.

5. Los unicos requisitos para ser miembro de la Red Global de Trueque son: asistir a
las reuniones grupales, capacitarse y ser productor y consumidor de bienes,
servicios y saberes, en el marco de las recomendaciones de los circulos de calidad y
autoayuda.

6. Sostenemos que cada miembro es el unico responsible de sus actos, products y
servicios.

7. Consideramos que pertenecer a un grupo no implica ningun vinculo de
dependencia, puesto que la participaci6n individual es libre y extendida a todos los
grupos de la Red.

8. Sostenemos que no es necesario que los grupos se organicen formalmente, de modo
stable, puesto que el character de Red implica la rotaci6n permanent de roles y
funciones.

9. Creemos que es possible combinar la autonomia de los grupos en la gesti6n de sus
asuntos interns con la vigencia de los principios fundamentals que dan
pertenencia a la Red.

10. Consideramos recomendable que los integrantes no respaldemos, patrocinemos o
apoyemos financieramente como miembros de la Red a una causa ajena a ella,
para no desviamos de los objetivos fundamentals que nos unen.






74


11. Sostenemos que el mejor ejemplo es nuestra conduct en el ambito de la Red y en
nuestra vida fuera de ella. guardamos confidencialidad sobre los asuntos privados y
prudencia en el tratamiento public de los temas de la Red que afecten a su
crecimiento.

12. Creemos profundamente en una idea de progress como consecuencia del bienestar
sustentable del mayor nimero de personas del conjunto de las sociedades.















LIST OF REFERENCES


Alvarez, Sonia E., Evelina Dagnino and Arturo Esobar, editors. 1998. Introduction: The
Cultural and the Political in Latin American Social Movements, pp 1-29. In
Cultures ofPolitics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social
Movements. Boulder: Westview Press.

Arcidiacono, Pilar. 2004. Trueque y Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados: Dos
Estrategias de Contenci6n Social ante la Crisis del 2002. Lavboratorio. Ano 5,
Numero 14, Otofio/Inviemo 2004.

Argentina Default Impact Limited. BBC News, Dec 23, 2001. Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1726265.stm. Last accessed April 2006.

Banko, Catalina. 2000. El Modelo Neoliberal en Argentina y Venzuela Contrastes y
Convergencias, pp 27-38. In Costos Sociales de las Reformas Neoliberales en
America Latina. Edited by Anita Kon, Catalina Banko, Dorothea Melcher and
Maria Cristina Cacciamali. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.

Barbetta, Pablo, and Karina Bidaseca. Piquete y Cacerola, la Lucha es una Sola:
iEmergencia Discursiva o Nueva Subjetividad? Article from the Instituto
Argentino para el Desarrollo Economico. Available at
http://www.iade.org.ar/index.html. Last accessed April 2006.

Beliz, Gustavo. 1995. El Etado del Posbienestar. In Politica Social: La Cuenta
Pendiente. Edited by Gustavo Belize. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.

Bluestein, Paul. 2005. And the Money Kept Rolling In (And Out). New York: Public
Affairs.

Bombal, Ines Gonzales. 2002. Sociabilidad en Clases Medias en Descenso: Experiencias
en el Trueque, pp 97-130. In Sociedady Sociabilidad en la Argentina de los 90.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.

Bonetto, Maria Susana, and Maria Teresa Pifiero. 2000. El Discurso Sobre el Trabajo en
Argentina. Pp 50-66. In Costos Sociales de las Reformas Neoliberales en
America Latina. Edited by Anita Kon, Catalina Banko, Dorothea Melcher and
Maria Cristina Cacciamali. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.









Buechler, Stephen M. 2000. Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political
Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Byrnes, Brian. 2005. Argentina Plays Chicken with Foreign Investors. The Christian
Science Monitor, Feb 9, 2005. Accessed at
http://www.csmonitor.com/index.html. Last accessed April 2006.

Calello, Tomas. Asambleas Barriales: Un Balance Provisorio. Portafolio de
Experiencias, Numero 6, URBARED. Available at
http://www.urbared.ungs.edu.ar/experienciasinvitacion.php?expID=34. Last
accessed April 2006.

Comenzarpor casa. Autosuficiencia website.
autosuficiencia.com.ar/shop/otraspaginas.asp?pagina=quienessomos.htm.

Convenio Marco De Colaboracion Institucional between Secretaria de la Pequefia y
Mediana Empresa del Ministerio (SEPyME) de Economia and la Asociaci6n
Amigos Del Programa De Autosuficiencia Regional (AAPAR). Signed
December 2000.
www.geocities.com/RainForest/Canopy/5413/convenio.htm.

Cortesi, Javier. 2003. Red de Trueque Solidario, pp 181-196. In Trueque y Economia
Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Crivello, Analia. 2002. El Nuevo club de Trueque Abrio sus Puertas en Recoleta. La
Naci6n, May 19, 2002. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April
2006.

De Piquetero a Subsecretario. La Naci6n, Feb 26, 2006. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Di Marco, Graciela, and Hector Palomino (compiladores). 2004. Reflexiones Sobre los
Movimientos Sociales en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Jorge Baudino Ediciones.

El Cacerolazo, la Neva Forma de Fiscalizar. La Naci6n, Dec 23, 2001. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

El Trueque. RGT magazine. Ano 3, Number XXVII, June 2001.

El Trueque Crece a la Par de la Crisis. La Naci6n, Feb 6 2002. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

El Trueque Salv6 a una Fabrica en Mendoza. La Naci6n, Feb 27 2002. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.









Falcoff, M. 2003. Argentina: Kirchner's Honeymoon. Latin American Outlook, October.
American Enterprise Institute. Also available at www.aei.org.

Feijoo, Maria del Carmen, with Marcela Maria Alejandro Nari. 1994. Women and
Democracy in Argentina. In The Women's Movement in Latin America, 2nd
edition. Edited by Jane S. Jaquette. Oxford: Westview Press.

Ferree, Myra Max. 1992. The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice theory
and Resource Mobilization in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, pp 29-52.
Edited by Morris and Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Foweraker, Joe. 2005. Towards a Political Sociology of Social Mobilization in Latin
America, pp 115-135. In Rethinking Development in Latin America. Edited by
Charles. H. Wood and Bryan Roberts. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press.

Fue la Peor Crisis Social Desde 1919. LaNaci6n, December 23, 2003. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Germano, Carlos (coordinator). 2005. Piqueteros: Nueva Realidad Social. Buenos
Aires: ACEP.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hintze, Susana, editor. 2003. Trueque y Economia Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Prometeo
Libros.

IMF (Interational Monetary Fund). 2003. Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina. Policy
Development and Review Department.

Laporte, Luis Nicolas. 2003. La Red de Trueque Solidaria: Una Introduccion, pp 163-
180. In Trueque y Economia Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Promoteo Libros.

Larafia, Enrique, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield, editors. 1994. New Social
Movements: From Ideology to Identity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lecaro, Patricia, and Barbara Altschuler. Politicas Sociales y Desarrollo Local. Dos
Experiencias Diversas: Club del Trueque y Union de Trabaj adores Desocupados
(UTD) de Mosconi. Paper presented at Congreso de Politicas Sociales:
"Estrategias de Articulaci6n de Politicas, Programas y Proyectos Sociales en
Argentina", Universidad de Quilmes, Mayo 2002.

Las Tradiciones. Autosuficiencia website.
http://tabloide.eurofull.com/shop/otraspaginas.asp?pagina=42. Last accessed
April 2006.









Leoni, Fabiana, and Mariana Luzzi. 2003. Rasgunando la Lona: La Experiencia de un
Club de Trueque en el Conurbano Bonaerense. Report produced under the
Project Self- Sustainable Development in Comparative Perspective (coordinated
by the Center for Latin American Social Policy, CLASPO), University of Texas.
Available at
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/llilas/centers/claspo/networkfinalreportsargentina.htm
Last accessed November 2004.

Los Doce Principios. Autosuficiencia website.
http://tabloide.eurofull.com/shop/otraspaginas.asp?pagina=39. Last accessed
April 2006.

Megaferia: Tiempo de Trueque. City of Buenos Aires government brochure. N.d.

Melucci, Alberto. 1994. A Strange Kind of Newness: What's 'New' in New Social
Movements? In New Social Movements, pp 101-130. Edited by Larafia, Johnston
and Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Minujin, Alberto, and Gabriel Kessler. 1995. La Nueva Pobreza en la Argentina.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta Argentina.

NotiTrueque. Se Corto el Chorro? RGT pamphlet. May 1, 2002.

Once Heridos en una Protesta de Piqueteros. La Naci6n, March 1, 2006. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Ovalles, Eduardo. 2002. Data in chart pages 71-77. In Trueque y Economia Solidaria.
Edited by Susana Hintze. Buenos Aires: Promoteo Libros, 2003.

Palermo, V., and J. Collins. 1998. Moderate Populism: A Political Approach to
Argentina's 1991 Convertibility Plan. Latin American Perspectives, 25(4): 36-62.

Powell, Jeff. 2002. Petty Capitalism, Perfecting Capitalism or Post-Capitalism? Lessons
from the Argentinian Barter Network. Working Paper No. 357, Sub-series on
Money, Finance and Development, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
Available at http://adlib.iss.nl/adlib/beginner/index_gb.html. Last accessed April
2006.

Premat, Silvina. Trueque: Barajar y Dar de Nuevo. La Naci6n, July 16 2003. Available
at www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Primavera, Heloisa. 1999. La Moneda Social De La Red Global De Trueque. ,Barajar
y Dar de Nuevo en el Juego Social?"
http://www.heloisaprimavera.com.ar/noticias/display.php3?ID=5. Last accessed
April 2006.










Primavera, Heloisa, Horacio Covas and Carlos De Sanzo. 1998. Reinventando el
Mercado: La Experiencia de la Red Global de Trueque en Argentina. Buenos
Aires: PAR. Also available at
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:JWnxPn2er7YJ:www3.plala.or.jp/mig/h
owto-
es.doc+%22reinventando+el+mercado%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&client
=firefox-a. Last accessed April 2006.

Primavera, Heloisa. 2003. Riqueza, Dinero y Poder: El Efimero "Milagro Argentino,"
pp 121-144. In Truequey Economia Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Rocha, Laura. Renace el Fenomeno del Trueque. La Naci6n, Dec 16, 2002.
Available at www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Sainz, Alfredo. La Hiper le Gan6 la Pulseada al Trueque. LaNaci6n, Aug, 17, 2003.
Also available at www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Sampayo, Fernando. 2003. Club de Trueque Zona Oeste, pp197-206. In Truequey
Economia Solidaria. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 2001. Modern Latin America, 5th edition.
New York: Oxford University Press.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, pp 456-472. Edited by Aldon D. Morris
and Carol McClurg. Yale: Yale University Press.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford. 1986.
Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.
American Sociological Review 51: 464-481.

Svampa, Maristella, and Sebastian Pereyra. 2003. Entre laRutay el Barrio. Buenos
Aires: Editorial Biblos.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tokman, Victor E. 1996. La Especificidad y Generalidad del Problema del Empleo en el
Contexto de America Latina, pp 47-82. In Sin Trabajo: Las Caracteristicas del
Desempleo y sus Efectos en la Sociedad Argentina. Edited by Luis Beccaria and
Nestor Lopez. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada.

Torresi, Leonardo. El Club del Treuque que le Cambi6 la Cara a un Barrio. Clarin,
March 3, 2002. Available at www.clarin.com. Last accessed April 2006.






80


Trueque Frente al Congreso. La Naci6n, May 24, 2002. Available at
www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.

Un Club del Trueque se Instal6 en Plena City Portefia. La Naci6n, May 6, 2002.
Available at www.lanacion.com.ar. Last accessed April 2006.















BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Wendy Pond received her Bachelor of Arts in political science from the University

of Florida in May of 2000. She returned to UF in 2003 to do a Master of Arts in Latin

American Studies with a specialization in political science. While school was in session

Wendy worked as a graduate assistant at the Center for Latin American Studies, assisting

on various projects including the Center's annual conferences. During her first summer,

Wendy participated in the Coca-Cola World Citizenship Program, working as an intern

for Save the Children in Nicaragua. The following summer she had the opportunity to

intern at the U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States through the U.S. State

Department Summer Intern Program. She graduates in May 2006 with her MA in Latin

American Studies.