<%BANNER%>

Managed compliance

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PAGE 1

MANAGED COMPLIANCE: WHITE RE SISTANCE AND DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1950-1970 By JOHN W. WHITE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2006

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Copyright 2006 by John W. White

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For Anne

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iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation could not have been completed without the assistance of numerous individuals and organizations who have offered me professional and personal support over the last few years. The Addlest one Library at the Colle ge of Charleston has been my employer and base of operations during most of the research for this dissertation. During that time David Cohen has provided me a workspace, encouragement, and time for research. Also, Dale Rosengarten, Claire Fund, Bob Neville, and Gene Waddell have given me he lpful advice and Michael Phillips and the staff of the librarys interlibrary loan offi ce have been invaluable in assisting me by acquiring microfilm and other resources that were not available at my home institution. I would especially like to tha nk Marie Ferrara. No one outsi de of my immediate family has been more supportive, or more patient than Marie. This dissert ation could not have been completed without her assistance. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the archivists and librarians at the various institutions cited in this dissertation. Throughout my re search I was routinely and pleasantly surprised by the level of helpfuln ess and professionalism I encountered at Clemson University, the University of Sout h Carolina, and the many other repositories I visited during my investigations Also, some of the research for this work was partially funded by the Ellison Durant Smith Research Award at the University of South Carolina. This dissertation owes a gr eat debt to my committee ch air and graduate advisor, Brian Ward. For the past several years Brian ha s been a mentor, an editor, and a friend. I

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v am deeply grateful to him for making me a better historian. His in fluence is present on each and every page of this work. I would al so like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee: Jack Davis, George Esenwei n, Charles Montgomery, and Richard Conley. They have each contributed to my education and to the completion of this work in some way. Also, I would lik e to acknowledge Kari Frederickson and W. Scott Poole, who both read parts of this work during its earl y phases and provided constructive criticisms and encouragement. I would also be remiss if I did not acknow ledge several individuals to whom I owe personal debts. My parents, Arthur and Charlene White, made certain that I was the first member of my family to earn a bachelors degree. It is mostly due to their encouragement that I have been able to c ontinue with my education. Kevin Knott has been my friend and academic sounding board si nce our days together at Bridgewater College. I owe him a great deal for his endle ss patience and advice. I would also like to acknowledge Joseph and Nicole Meyers, Jonathan Atkins, Scott White, Steven Edwards, and Heidi Knott for their friendship and I ndiana and Keiko for reminding me that, no matter how rapidly a deadline is approaching, th ere is always time for a walk in the park. Finally, I would like to thank Anne Bennett, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. Anne is my best and closest friend and confid ant. I am indebted to her most of all.

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6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 2 MANAGING THE SEGREG ATION CRISIS: THE EA RLY WHITE BACKLASH IN SOUTH CAROLINA............................................................................................12 3 CAMPAIGNING ON RACE: THE ELECTIONS OF 1950........................................62 4 STRADDLING THE FENCE: POLI TICS AND AMBIGUITY ON THE EVE OF BROWN .......................................................................................................................99 5 AFTER BROWN : FROM MODERATION TO EXTREMISM.................................141 6 BOMBINGS, BULLETS, AND BEATI NGS: THE ZENITH OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA.................................................................201 7 FISSURES IN THE FACADE OF WHITE UNITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA..........250 8 FROM HARDCORE RESISTANCE TO MANAGED (NON)COMPLIANCE: EARLY DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA.........................................290 9 WHITE FLIGHT, MANAGED COMPLIAN CE, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE IN SOUTH CAROLINA..............................................................................341 10 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................403 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................411 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................434

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vii Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy MANAGED COMPLIANCE: WHITE RE SISTANCE AND DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1950-1970 By John W. White May 2006 Chair: Brian Ward Major Department: History This dissertation aims to reveal the co mplex history of white resistance to desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the first federal school de segregation lawsuit, Briggs v. Elliott and the final failure of overtly racist politics to ensure electoral victor y during the gubernatorial election of 1970. Generally, this work contends that historia ns have underestimated the degree to which physical, legal, and economic pressure were su ccessful in slowing the pace and extent of significant racial change in South Carolina. It also argues that the well-planned bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in th e 1950s were instrumental in delaying and minimizing desegregation in the mid-to-late 1960s. From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a multifaceted and flexible massive resistance campaign that wa s dominated by a policy of managed non-compliance with court ordered desegregation. Rather than face federal interventi on and civic unrest, whites adapted South Carolinas system of raci al control in the mid-to-late 1960s to one

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viii that is best described as managed compliance. The dissertation argues that white moderation and acceptance of token desegregat ion in South Carolina were predicated on maintaining the white economic advantage and preserving a racial balance that heavily favored whites in the states public school system. It also demonstrates that the generation that controlled th e state in the three decades after World War II did not endorse the concept of racial integration and utilized every available device to protect white privilege and advantages. The dissert ation reveals that, as late as 1970, after federal intervention and black political agency rendered the politics and practice of massive resistance impotent, whites retained many of the educational and economic advantages that had allowed white supr emacy to flourish in the first place.

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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In 1950, South Carolina was home to the fi rst federal school desegregation lawsuit, Briggs v. Elliot and yet, it holds the dubious distinction of being the last southern state to end the practice of rigid racial segregation in public education, holding out until 1963. In spite of this lengthy de lay, South Carolina is generally r ecognized for reje cting the kind of hardcore, often violent, resistance that typified white defiance in other Deep South states. According to the limited historical l iterature on the states desegregation crisis, it appears that South Carolina underwent a rapid conversion from being a rigid and inflexible paragon of white supremacy to beco me a moderate state that orchestrated the most orderly and uneventful dese gregation in the region. Howeve r, it is also clear from the growing number of dissert ations on the African American freedom struggle in South Carolina that racism and intense white resi stance to meaningful change persisted for some time after the supposedly peaceful accommodation of civil rights demands in 1963. This dissertation focuses prim arily on examining the discre pancy between the notion that South Carolina peacefully shed its Jim Crow past and the evidence suggesting that the basic structures of white priv ilege remained intact for so me time after that conversion.1 1 For the best examples of these dissertations, see Stephen Lowe, The Magnificent Fight: Civil Rights Litigation in South Carolina Federal Courts, 1940-1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University, 1999). Stephen ONeill, From the Shadow of Slaver y: The Civil Rights Years in Charleston (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1994). R. Scott Baker, Ambiguous Legacies: The NAACP Legal Campaign Against Segregation in South Carolina, (Ph. D. Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993). Millicent Brown, Civil Rights Activism in Charleston South Carolina, 1940-1970, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Florida State University, 1997). Peter F. Lau, F reedom Road Territory: The Politics of Civil Rights Struggle in South Carolina during the Jim Crow Era, (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 2002).

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2 The chronicle of how South Carolina wa s able to mount the longest and most successful battle against desegregation is complex and multifaceted. Between 1950 and the late 1960s white South Carolinians we re united by the fervor to protect white privilege and slow the ever quickening pace of racial change. That is not, however, to say that whites in the state were a monolithic group. Granted, white South Carolinians engaged in massive resistance against dese gregation, but massive re sistance was itself a diverse and intricate phenomenon. The term wa s first used by Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd in 1956 and later adopted by historians and contemporary observers to describe white defiance of anti-Jim Crow pressures. It encapsulates a range of tactics, policies, and sentiments shared by southern whites th at were at best am orphous expressions of common white anxieties. Like segregation itself the white resi stance movement was an ever changing arrangement between various fac tions and interests: a proce ss as much as a program. As J. Douglas Smith has recently argued, white southerners needed to manage Jim Crow carefully over time. It was not a fixed en tity, but a dynamic system of racial/social control that was adapted to meet the needs of the white population th at benefited from it and to counteract various challe nges to it from African Ameri cans and their allies. This dissertation demonstrates that, once those chal lenges became irresistible in the 1950s and 1960s, whites were equally determined to ma nage the dismantling and replacement of the states Jim Crow system in a manner that would also se rve white interests. To date, scholarly attempts to chronicl e this process have been few and far between. With this in mind hi storian Charles Eagles, in a 200 0 historiographical essay in the Journal of Southern History issued a call for scholars to produce new investigations

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3 of southern white resistance to desegregation. As Eagles noted, several of the key works on the topic, such as Numan V. Bartleys The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s and Neil R. McMillens The Citizens Council: Organized Resistance to th e Second Reconstruction are now more than 20 years old and lack the nuance and focus of more contem porary studies of the freedom struggle. Bartleys study, much lik e Francis Wilhoits 1973 book The Politics of Massive Resistance is too focused on elite whites and fails to recognize the extent of grass roots white participation. McMillens work, on the other hand, is narrowly focused on grass roots activism, but he drama tically underestimates the effectiveness of the White Citizens Councils in the Palmetto State by measuring them agai nst their Mississippi counterparts without fully explaining the di fferences between South Carolinas sly resistance and Mississippis mo re confrontational approach.2 Since the publication of Eagless essay several works have begun to examine the nature of white supremacy and have launched investigations of the legal and extra-legal measures adopted throughout the South to defe nd the racial caste system. Both George Lewis and Jeff Woods, for example, have studied the connection between anticommunism and the defense of segregation. Li ke Eagles, both authors recognize that the complexity of white resistance warrants the same kind of focused inspection that has characterized scholarly examinations of Af rican American community actions. Lewiss The White South and Red Menace: Segre gationists, Anticommunism, and Massive 2 J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenship in Jim Crow Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Charles W. Eagles, Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era, Journal of Southern History (November 2000) 815-848. Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race an d Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). Neil McMillen, The Citizens Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 19541964 (Urbana: University of Illi nois Press, 1971). Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: G. Braziller, 1973).

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4 Resistance, 1945-1965 and Woodss Black Struggle Red Scare: Segregation and AntiCommunism in the South, 1948-1968 are welcome additions to the study of white resistance. Nevertheless, the narrow topical focus of each work limits its ability to provide an in-depth analysis of white resist ance in South Carolina beyond the tactical use of anti-communism.3 Regarding the post-World War II freedom struggle, South Carolina has been the most understudied of all the Deep South stat es. There has not been a single monographic analysis of the civil rights era in Sout h Carolina published since Howard Quints Profile in Black and White in 1958. This is despite the fact th at South Carolina was the origin of some of the earliest and most dynamic challe nges to the Souths Jim Crow system during the 1940s and home to a vigorous and comple x massive resistance movement well into the 1960s. This dissertation offers a long ove rdue re-interpretation of white legal, political, and extra-legal resistance in the st ate, placing it in the context of a resourceful and resilient civil rights campaign by South Carolinas black communities.4 3 George Lewis, The White South and Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965 (Gainesville, University of Flor ida Press, 2004). Jeff Woods, Black Struggle Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004). For other examples of wo rks that attempt to answer Eagles call for community based studies of white resistance, see: Joseph Hard in Crespino, Strategic Accommodation: Civil Rights Opponents in Mississippi and Their Impact on American Racial Politics, 1953-1972 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Stanford University, 2003). J. Todd Moye, Let the People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945-1986 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolin a Press, 2003). Yasuhiro Katagiri, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States Rights (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001). 4 Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958). For discussions of the civil rights pressures in South Carolina during the 1940s, see: Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) especially pp. 170-220. Kari Frederickson, Dual Actions, One for Each Race: The Campaign Against th e Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950, International Social Science Review (1997) 14-25; The Slowest State and M ost Backward Community : Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil-Rights Legislation, 1946-1948, South Carolina Historical Magazine (April 1997) 177-202; and The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) especially pp. 118-216.

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5 To date, the three most noteworthy exam inations of massive resistance to desegregation in South Carolina are Quints Profile in Black and White John Sproats essay Firm Flexibility: Perspectives on De segregation in South Carolina, and Marcia Synnotts article Desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1963: Sometime Between Now and Never. Quints work, which was published five years before any public school desegregation occurred in South Carolina is pessimistic about the possibility for a peaceful resolution to the dese gregation crisis. The book, whic h is largely a summary of contemporary journalistic obser vations, chronicles the st ates reactions to black encroachments on white privilege during the 1950s and concludes th at no desegregation would occur in South Carolina without a cata strophic struggle. Sproats work, on the other hand, praises the state for adopting a policy of peaceful accommodation in the 1960s. He argues that moderate white leaders worked with a genera lly conservative and patient black population to foster slow but peacef ul racial progress in the state. Synnotts work is more nuanced. She acknowledges the influence of Quint and Sproat, but criticizes them for their narrow temporal fo cus. According to Synnott, Quints work provides valuable insight into a period when traditional patterns of race relations were breaking down in South Carolina, but, because it was written during the zenith of militant white resistance, the author did not anticip ate that the states political and business leadership would by 1963 peacefully and without federal intervention choose to integrate Clemson College. Likewise, she concludes that Sproats work is also flawed in that it fails to define how fast and how far wh ite South Carolinians would permit racial progress to go. Instead, Synnott contends that racial change in South Carolina resulted from a conservative, controlled evolution.5 5 Quint, Profile in Black and White V. John Sproat, Firm Flexibility: Perspectives on Desegregation in

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6 Synnotts work is valuable in that she rec ognizes that changes in white resistance tactics happened gradually a nd that it is impossible to understand the shift away from militant white resistance without examining th e nature and fate of the segregationist political and legal campaigns of the 1950s. However, like Sproat she overemphasizes the significance of the peaceful desegregation of Clemson College and overstresses the importance of both white and black elites in South Carolinas major cities. Moreover, both Synnott and Sproat adopt the notion, first mentioned in I.A. Newbys 1973 book Black Carolinians that the black population was ge nerally conservative, citing as evidence what they see as a significant lull in black activism in the late 1950s and the African American acceptance of only gra dual, incremental changes in racial arrangements in the mid-late 1960s. 6 As Synnott admitted in her 1989 essay, more investigations of the civil rights movement in South Carolina are necessary be fore scholars can begin to understand the complex process of desegregation in the Palm etto State. The la ck of proper study of white resistance still places limits on the abilit y of historians to understand the political and social landscape of this period of suppos ed white moderation and consistent black conservatism. Consequently, they have faile d to appreciate fully the complex social, South Carolina, in eds. Robert H. Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, New Perspectives on Race and Slavery in America: Essays in Honor of Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986) 164-184. Marcia Synnott, Desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1963: Sometime Between Now and Never, in eds. Winfred B. Moore, Jr. and Joseph F. Tripp, Looking South: Chapters in the Story of an American Region (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) 51-64. Paul Lofton generally agrees with Sproats assessment in his study on the integration of Columbia, the state capital. Likewise, Maxie Myron Cox emphasizes the states peaceful accommodation in his di ssertation, see: Paul S. Lofton, Calm and Exemplary: Desegregation in Columbia, South Carolina, in eds. David Colburn and Elizabeth Jacoway, Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Louisiana State University Pre ss, 1982) 70-81. Maxie Myron Cox, Jr. 963 The Year of Decision: Desegregation in South Carolina (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1996). 6 I.A. Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 1968 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973). Synnott, Desegregation in South Carolina, 51-64.

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7 economic, and political context within which bl ack activists had to work for meaningful racial progress. Close resear ch into the White Citizens C ouncils, for instance, reveals that the lull in civil rights activism dete cted by Newby was decepti ve, as black leaders simply shifted their priorities away from lega l challenges to segrega tion in the late 1950s in response to the specific nature of local defiance by white supremacists. For example, local blacks in Clarendon and Orangeburg C ounties may have relaxed the pressure on whites to desegregate during th is period, but black organizati ons were heavily involved in aiding African Americans who faced economic reprisals from white business leaders, employers, and landlords. This kind of aid, es pecially to blacks w hose activism made them subject to white economic pressure, wa s instrumental in creating the supportive environment in which further black mobiliza tion took place. In other words, without understanding the nature and impact of white resistance, it is di fficult to explain the agenda of South Carolinas black ac tivists and civil rights organizations.7 Thematically, this dissertation focuses on the variety of form s of resistance to desegregation and full black enfranchisement utilized by white South Carolinians, and on the manner in which whites adopted strategies to deal with the demands of both the federal courts and their own insurgent black citi zens for greater civil ri ghts. It is one of the core findings of this disse rtation that at no point did the majority of white South Carolinians admit that segregat ion was either wrong or undesira ble. The dissertation also contends that, although the stat e has routinely been praise d for its moderation during the civil rights cris es of the 1950s and 1960s (most not ably by its own political and economic leadership), the generation of white South Carolinians that controlled the state 7 Synnott, Desegregation in South Carolina, 61.

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8 in the 30 years after World War II never lost faith in white supremacy and made every effort to preserve white privilege and curt ail black advancements. Indeed, this study argues that, while the deploymen t of alternatives to viol ent resistance helped keep bloodshed in the state to a minimum, it wa s mostly through luck, poor marksmanship, and inept bomb-making that the Palmetto State enjoys its reputation for peaceful desegregation. In marshalling the evidence for this cont ention, this work utilizes a variety of primary and secondary sources. It relies heavily on manuscript collections of state politicians and activists, bl ack and white; and on contempor ary newspaper accounts and periodicals. Although hardly offering a bala nced guide to the even ts of the period, the Charleston News and Courier was especially helpful in tr acing the evolution of white resistance as its editor, Th omas R. Waring, was a devout ra cial conservative who openly endorsed many of the tenets of massive resistan ce and advocated for the state to adopt an uncompromising defense of Jim Crow on the pages of the Low Countrys largest and oldest newspaper. The dissert ation also makes use of oral history interviews and the contemporary publications of regional orga nizations, such as th e Southern Regional Council and the Southern Edu cation Reporting Service. White electoral behavior, participation in segregationist civic groups, and economic concerns are also analyzed to provide a general sense of white public opin ion and to explain the changing nature of white resistance in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970. Although this dissertation is not primarily an examination of the inner wo rkings of the South Carolina civil rights movement, it will demonstrate that the tac tics employed by African American activists and their allies shaped and were shaped by the ever changing nature of white resistance to

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9 black demands and progress. The ebb and flow of cause and effect between black activism and white responses was complex and untidy, changing over time and according to locale. Nevertheless, at all times and in all places, there was a reciprocal relationship between black protests and various forms of white power in South Carolina which this dissertation seeks to illuminate. The most significant problem in researchi ng this topic was that some relevant manuscript collections, such as the Ernest F. Hollings Papers and the Floyd Spence Papers, were not yet available for research. Others, such as the L. Marion Gressette Papers, appear to have been purged of contr oversial materials prio r to their donation to archival repositories. And, still others, such as the Burnet R. Maybank Papers and parts of the L. Mendel Rivers Papers are still uno rganized and only available with special permission. Although some of these restricted or lost materials may have been helpful, there is nonetheless a significan t archival record for the peri od in question. Moreover, much of the important correspondence from the Gressette Commission that seems to be missing from the Gressette collection at M odern Political Collections at the South Caroliniana Library can be found in other manuscript collections. These sources shed light on the comple x history of white resistance to desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the Briggs case and the final failure of overtly raci st politics to ensure electoral victory during the gubernatoria l election of 1970. Chapters 1 th rough 3 discuss the initial white reaction to the increased pace of black activism in South Ca rolina in the years before 1954. These chapters also take into acc ount the emerging political and economic concerns confronting white South Carolinians and the developing patterns of resistance to

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10 racial change apparent in the white comm unities. Chapters 4 through 6 are focused on the states reaction to the Supreme Courts decision in Brown v. Board of Education and the evolution of organized mass resistance in South Carolina between 1954 and 1961. Chapters 5 and 6 explain the reasons for the eventual dissolution of the hardcore segregationist coalition that dominated o fficial policy and the public debate on race during the late 1950s in South Carolina and it s transformation into a new segregationist plurality that was no less committed, but that pursued a more moderate brand of managed non-compliance with desegregation. The fina l two chapters discu ss the evolution of white resistance from managed non-compliance to yet more subtle and bureaucratic forms of opposition to black advance designed to preserve the maximum feasible amount of white power and privilege compatible with the law and a new era of black voting and biracial politics. These final chapters al so shed light on the po litical, cultural, and economic changes that resulted from these adjustments. In sum, this dissertation contends that hi storians have underestimated the degree to which physical, legal, and economic pressures were successful in slowing the pace and extent of significant racial cha nge in South Carolina. It is th e contention of this work that the well-planned bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in the 1950s were instrumental in delaying and minimizing desegregation in th e mid-to-late 1960s. South Carolina whites had anticipated federally enfor ced desegregation and prepared strategies to counter it as early as 1950. Only after the preservation of total segregation was no longer compatible with the maintenance of public order and ec onomic growth did white South Carolinians accept even token desegregation. From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a variety of massive resistance campaigns th at were dominated by a policy of managed

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11 non-compliance with court ordered desegregati on. Rather than face federal intervention and civic unrest, whites adapte d South Carolinas system of racial control in the mid-tolate 1960s to one that is be st described as managed compliance. Even then, the dissertation argues that white moderation and acceptance of t oken desegregation in South Carolina were predicated on maintaining white economic advantage and preserving a racial balance that heavily favored wh ites in the states public school system.

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12 CHAPTER 2 MANAGING THE SEGREGATION CRISIS: THE EARLY WHITE BACKLASH IN SOUTH CAROLINA This dissertation is primarily devoted to exploring the origins, nature and effectiveness of white respons es to the African American freedom struggle from 1950 to 1970. However, by the mid-1940s, there were already clear signs that white South Carolina was mobilizing considerable resources to combat gathering challenges to the operation of Jim Crow in the Palmetto Stat e. Those tactics would form important precedents for resistance in the 1950s and beyon d, and, therefore, warrant attention in this chapter. Comprehending these initial sk irmishes over Jim Crow is crucial for understanding the mounting desegregation crisis that would peak in the period between 1956 and 1963. In July 1943 an African American ve teran named John Wrighten and 33 other black students applied for admission to the College of Charleston. The school, which was a publicly supported municipal college, reje cted the applicants on the basis of their race. A year later, Wrighten and 32 graduate s from the Avery Normal Institute, a private African American secondary sc hool near the College of Ch arleston, sought admission to the small city college. Again, the students applications were rejected. Though the students were denied admission without serious consideration, the a ffront to Charlestons long history of segregation in education worried conservativ e white Charlestonians. In the wake of the Gaines v. Canada verdict in 1938, which required states to integrate their graduate schools or build equal facilities for African American students, whites were

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13 concerned that a new legal challenge fr om black students might result in the desegregation of the school.1 The Charleston News and Courier predicted that the white people cannot and will not take on an elaborate burden of free sc hools and colleges for the 814,000 negroes (sic) in the state. In response to Wrightens at tempt to enter the College of Charleston, the conservative Charleston newspaper went so far as to claim that the court ordered admission of African American students into white schools would lead to the replacement of the public school system in South Carolina with a network of private schools, insisting that although the negro i nvasion of [the states school s] shall by law cause its destruction, white school training will greatly im prove and cost less.2 The Charleston Evening Post similarly warned that the attempted desegregation of the College of Charleston was an organized effort to challenge the citys educational system and to break down the social, educ ational and political institutions of the South. Charlestons eveni ng newspaper also promoted pr ivatization as a potential remedy to court ordered desegregati on. Like its sister paper, the News and Courier the Evening Post blamed black activists and New Deal politics for the challenge to Charlestons racial caste system. The New D eal, claimed an editorial, has scrupled at nothing to gain the votes of Northern negroes ( sic ) and white liberals to whom the Souths way is anathema.3 1 William Peters, The Southern Temper (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959) 184185. News and Courier (June 11, 1944), (June 12, 1944) clippings from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections, College of Charlest on, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections]. 2 News and Courier (June 12, 1944) clipping from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections. 3 News and Courier (June 12, 1944), Evening Post (June 12, 1944) clippings from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections.

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14 The same year that Wrighten mounted hi s challenge to segregated education in South Carolina, the states predominately black Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) also attempted to challenge the seating of the all-white South Carolina delegation to the Democratic National Convention. PDP spoke sman and black newspaperman John H. McCray argued that, since South Carolin as Democratic Primary excluded African Americans while the PDP primary was open to all South Carolinians the PDP delegation was the only legitimate delegation to the nati onal convention. The request was denied by the convention, but the challenge, like the attempt to desegreg ate the College of Charleston, was evidence of growing African American demands for equality in South Carolina.4 This increase in black civil rights ag itation deeply concerned white South Carolinians. By the mid-1940s it was appa rent that black South Carolinians had marshaled considerable resources to combat the states separate and unequal racial hierarchy. Between 1944 and 1950 African Amer icans regularly and openly challenged unequal treatment in public schools and mounted a well-organized attack on Jim Crow politics. In addition to attempts to dese gregate the College of Charleston and the formation of the PDP, black activists also assailed unequal pay in the states school system. As elsewhere in the South at the ti me, a number of educat ors, including a civil rights pioneer from the Charleston County public school system named Septima Clark, sued the state demanding that African Ameri can teachers receive the same pay as their white counterparts. In 1945 Federa l Judge J. Waties Waring ruled, in Thompson v. 4 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) 170-220. Miles S. Richards, The Progressive Democrats in Chicago, July 1944, South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 2001) 219-237.

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15 Gibbes that the practice of paying black teache rs in South Carolina less than whites violated the separate but equal doctrine es tablished by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.5 The cumulative effect of these new challeng es to Jim Crow in South Carolina was to harden white resistance. Whites, especi ally those in majority black counties like Orangeburg and Clarendon, were fearful at th e prospect of African American political power and determined to preven t educational equality. In South Carolina white anxiety was palpable, and resistance to any black pr ogress was immediate at both the popular and official levels. For example, after the fede ral courts ruled against the white primary in Smith v. Allwright South Carolinas Governor, Olin D. Johnston, called a special session of the state legislature. Du ring that session, the state elimin ated any and all mention of political parties in the South Carolina cons titution and the Democratic Party was redefined as a private club. Johnston and l eaders in the General Assembly declared that since the political parties we re private organizations, the Texas case did not apply.6 In addition to these kinds of legislative responses, whites used a variety of formal and informal tactics to resist calls for black civil and political right s. At times, that resistance was violent. White South Carolin ians did not take kindl y to even the most minor infraction of racial custom. For ex ample, a black World War II veteran named Isaac Woodward was nearly beaten to death during the summer of 1946 while traveling through South Carolina on his way to meet his wife in North Carolina. During his trip, 5 David W. Southern, Judge Warings Fight Against Segregation, Journal of Negro History (Autumn, 1981) 212-214. Also see: Tinsley E. Yarbrough, A Passion for Justice: J. Waties Waring and Civil Rights (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1987). 6 Southern, Judge Warings Fight Against Segregation, 214-216.

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16 Woodward quarreled with a white bus driver ov er what historian John Egerton describes as a minor point of racial etiquette. Woodw ard had asked the driver to stop the bus so he could use the restroom. When he returned the bus driver berated Woodward for taking too long. After arguing with the driver, Wood ward returned to his seat. The driver, however, was furious with what he saw as W oodwards insolence and lack of deference and called ahead to authorities in Batesburg, a small town nor thwest of Columbia, to ask for assistance in dealing with the unruly African American. When he exited the bus in Batesburg, Woodward was apprehended by loca l Police Chief Linwood Shull and a white deputy. The two men took Woodward behind th e bus station and beat him severely. Woodward awoke the next day bl inded for life by the assault.7 Notwithstanding such brutal episodes, violent repression was not, however, as prevalent in South Carolina as it was in some other Deep South states. More often, whites utilized a more subtle, but no less eff ective approach to pr eserving Jim Crow and white power. For example, soon after his request for admission to the College of Charleston was denied, John Wrighten wa s summoned to Columbia for a physical examination. He had been discharged from the army with a peptic ulcer. As a result of his ailment, Wrighten drew a 10 percent disability pension from the military. After the examination, Wrighten was informed that the ulcer was completely healed. Therefore, local military administrators ordered an end to his pension payments. Despite his clean bill of health, Wrighten continued to e xperience painful symptoms. After checking 7 John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Knopf, 1994) 362-363. Herbert Shapiro, White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to Montgomery (Amherst: University of Massachuse tts Press, 1988) 373. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 19 75) 295-304. Andrew Myers, T he Blinding of Isaac Woodward, Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (2004) 63-74.

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17 himself into the Charleston Naval Hospital, Wrighten was transferred to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Columbia. Again, he was told that X-rays showed no sign of an ulcer. Only after a persistent letter writing campaign to President Harry S. Truman and South Carolina Senator Olin D. Johnst on was Wrighten correctly diagnosed and his pension restored. The incide nt epitomized the ways in which whites combined their control of government bureaucracies with fl agrant falsifications to exert economic pressure over blacks, especially activist on es who dared to challe nge the racial status quo. 8 As the Wrighten incident illustrated, even before the zenith of white resistance in the 1950s and 1960s, white South Carolinians used every tactic at thei r disposal to quell black challenges to Jim Crow. For instance, in 1949, when James Hinton, the President of the South Carolina National Associati on for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), warned that his organization was planning on testing the College of Charlestons policy of racial se gregation in federal court, th e white reaction was swift and decisive. Before the NAACP could even prep are a case, the city of Charleston sold the college and all of its property to the Board of Trustees for one dollar. If the college became a private institution, college Pres ident George Grice reasoned, the NAACP had no case against its admission policy.9 Despite these kinds of legal and extra-legal reprisals, African Americans persisted with their demands for civil and voting rights. Wrighten, for example, following his rejection from the College of Charleston had attended the segregated South Carolina 8 Peters, The Southern Temper 186-187. 9 Undated and Untitled news clippings from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections.

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18 State College in Orangeburg from where he applied for admission to the states only public law school at the Univer sity of South Carolina. Tw o weeks before his graduation from South Carolina State in July 1946, Wrightens applicat ion was rejected on the basis of his race. Though he was disappointed, Wright en was determined to continue his fight for admission to law school. With suppor t from Hinton and the South Carolina NAACP, he filed a federal lawsuit, a nd, in 1947, federal Judge Waring declared that the state had three options: it could admit Wrighten to the law school at the University of South Carolina, close any publicly funded law school in South Carolina, or build a comparable school for black students at South Carolina Stat e. Rather than close or desegregate the states only law school, the General Assembly allocated funds to construct a law college at South Carolina State.10 Wrightens limited success, as well as a seri es of legal victories against segregation throughout the South, emboldened South Caroli nas small community of civil rights activists. The South Carolina branch of the NAACP continued to chip away at du jure segregation and challenged S outh Carolinas white primary in federal court in 1947. In Rice v. Elmore and Brown v. Baskin Judge Waring ruled that the Smith v. Allwright decision effectively outlawed South Carolinas white primary, and that the privatization of political parties was an unconstitutional at tempt to avoid compliance with the federal verdict.11 Waring, however, understood that his rulings were meaningless unless the national government demanded that local white official s enforced the verdicts. Moreover, he 10 Peters, The Southern Temper 184-186. 11 Southern, Judge Warings Fight Against Segregation, 214-216.

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19 recognized that white South Carolinians we re, for the most pa rt, united in their commitment to segregation, if not necessarily in their preferred met hods of preserving the status quo. Therefore, Waring la ter told a New York audience that racial change in the South would require outside assistance. The problem, he declared, is to change the feeling, the sentiment, the creed of the grea t body of white people of the South that a Negro is not an American citizen. Wari ng understood that southern whites had a deep cultural commitment to white supremacy. M y people have one outstanding fault, he concluded, the terrible fault of prejudice. According to the judge, southerners had been born and educated to feel that a Negro is some kind of animal that ought to be well-treated and given kindness, but as a matter of favor, not right.12 Waring and South Carolinas other civ il rights advocates understood that whites were particularly concerned at the creeping th reat of federal intervention to enforce black rights. Of course, the judge and other like minded activists al so recognized that the best opportunities for rapid change would demand an active federal role. In the fall of 1947 President Harry S. Trumans civil rights commission simultaneously gave hope to African Americans and increased white anxi eties when it issued a report entitled To Secure These Rights The report called for a sweepi ng denunciation of all government and some private sanctions of race discrimina tion or segregation. It was immediately condemned by southern leaders. For exampl e, L. Mendel Rivers, who represented South Carolinas First District in the United States House of Representatives, called the report a brazen and monumental insult to the Democratic South and the southern way of life for both white and colored. He demanded that the South be left alone and freed from 12 News and Courier (October 14, 1948) 13.

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20 agitation by the northern political hitch-hikers who wanted to use the region as a guinea pig for their screwball, crackpot plans and ideo logies. Rivers insisted, for me and the people I represent, no negro ( sic ) born is on my social level.13 Southerners like Rivers, however, no longe r held the balance of power in the national Democratic Party. Before 1936 two-th irds of the delegates at the Democratic National Convention had to agree on a candidate before that candidate was eligible to represent the party as its nominee for the presidency. There was no real controversy when Franklin D. Roosevelt was nominate d in 1940 or in 1944, but the election of 1948 was the first since the death of the popular Ne w Dealer. Much to the chagrin of southern whites, northern activists within the party were determined to make civil rights an important issue at the nationa l convention. Without the vet o power of the two-thirds rule, southerners were unable to stop them. Consequently, at the Democratic Convention of 1948, the party adopted a pro-civil rights plat form. Its platform called on the party to fight racial, religious and economic discri mination and stated that the Democrats believed that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on the basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution. The convention also commended President Truman for his interests in enforcing civi l rights and urged C ongress to support the president in the call for an end to racial discrimination.14 13 To Secure These Rights quoted in: Alexander Lamis, The Two Party South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 9. News and Courier (December 9, 1947) 1. L. Mendel Rivers to Thomas R. Miller (January 12, 1948), L. Mendel Rivers Papers, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as Rivers Papers, SCHS]. 14 Democratic Party Platform, reprinted in ed. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. History of American Presidential Elections, 1940-1948 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 3154.

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21 The call for civil rights enforcement infuri ated conservative southern whites, who made no effort to mask their displeasure with Democratic Party leaders. Handy Ellis, the leader of the Alabama delegation, led his fe llow Alabamians off the convention floor. One southern delegate paid the band to pl ay Dixie as the Mississippi delegation exited the building with other southe rn whites who bolted the conve ntion twirling confederate flags and kicking over Truman for President signs. Three days after the convention ended 6000 whites gathered in Birmingham, Alabama to declare their defiance of President Truman and the national Democratic Party.15 The rebellious southern delegates in troduced a Declaration of Principles condemning Trumans infamous and iniquitous program [of] equal access to all places of public accommodation for pers ons of all races, colors, cree ds, and national origins. The declaration was followed by an announcement that the group had nominated South Carolina Governor J. Strom Thurmond and Mi ssissippi Governor Fi elding Wright as presidential and vice presidential candida tes, respectively, on th e States Rights (or Dixiecrat as it was popular ly known) Party ticket.16 The Dixiecrat revolt divided state Democra tic parties across the South and southern politicians were undecided as to which fac tion to support in the general election. In South Carolina, the loyalist wing of the pa rty was dominated by United States Senator Olin D. Johnston, State Senator Edgar Br own, and Speaker of the State House of Representatives Sol Blatt. Most of the Sout h Carolinas other leadi ng politicians, such as United States Senator Burnet R. Maybank, c hose to endorse the st ate Democratic Party 15 Time (July 26, 1948) 13. 16 Ibid

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22 but avoided either a public endorsement or ope n criticism of the na tional party. Others, such as Rivers, joined the growing chorus of Thurmond supporters. Eventually, the States Rights Party received th e official endorsement of th e Democratic Party in South Carolina, just as it did in Mi ssissippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.17 Thurmond and his Dixiecrat supporters hope d to capture all 127 of the Souths electoral votes and deny both Truman and Re publican candidate Thomas Dewey victory. In that case, the election would have been decided by the United States House of Representatives. However, this strategy fa iled and Thurmond was only able to win 39 electoral votes. The Dixiecrat won in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama overwhelmingly. He also won in Louisiana w ith 52 percent of the popular vote. In each of the states where the Thurmond-Wright tic ket was victorious, T hurmond had replaced Truman on the ballot and was listed as the official nominee of the Democratic Party.18 For many, Thurmonds inability to build a consensus across the South was an indication that white frustration with civil ri ghts victories had not yet reached a boiling point. However, in South Carolina, Mississi ppi, and Alabama Thur mond had scored a decisive victory and won the loyalty of th e party regulars at the state conventions. Moreover, his success in those states was a wa rning that the preser vation of segregation and the defense of the Souths Jim Crow system was a potent campaign issue. It was also an indication that, in the Deep South states, committed segregationists would go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the formation of a moderate biracial coalition. In sum, the election results encapsulated the intensifi cation of white anxiety that was to become 17 For a detailed analysis and history of the Stat es Rights Party, see: Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 18 News and Courier (November 3, 1948) 3. Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt 118-216.

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23 the hallmark of white southern politics during the next decade. Moreover, it was an early indication that, as South Carolinas white and black populations entered the 1950s, the debate over whether or not to preserve the legal and cultural mechanisms for enforcing racial segregation would become the dominate social issue. For many black South Carolinians, the coming decade promised an end to the indignities of southern segregat ion. Nearly a century after the end of slavery and over 50 years after the Plessy decision codified de jure segregation, civil rights leaders had finally won a series of legal battles against white supremacy that both inspired and energized black activism throughout the South. Howeve r, whites had already reacted to this progress with the kind of opposition that would come to characterize the regions massive resistance to forced desegregation. Theref ore, in spite of this newfound determination and guarded confidence that change would come, the cha llenges confronting South Carolinas civil rights advo cates in 1950 remained daunting. Years before 1956, when Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia issued hi s call for massive resistance to federally mandated desegregation, South Carolina whites began to implement a complex legislative and extra-legal agenda to main tain and manage white supremacy and limit African American political and economic power. Whites were re solute in their desire to

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24 protect the racial status quo, mounting a determined effort to forestall court ordered desegregation at the voting booths, in public spaces, and in the public school systems.19 During the late 1940s and early 1950s the most serious challenges to racial segregation in South Carolina originated in sparsely populated Cl arendon County, a rural enclave northwest of Charleston that was in the heart of the states black belt. In 1948, a group of African Americans led by Reverend Joseph DeLaine and a farmer named Levi Pearson brought a suit against the county dema nding that it provide bus transportation to black public school children. Thurgood Marshall of the NAACPs Legal Defense Fund argued that, since the local school board already provided bus transportation for white students, the county was in vi olation of the United States Supreme Courts separate but equal decision in the Plessy v. Ferguson case. The case, which was brought against Clarendon County District 26 on behalf of P earsons son James, met with immediate resistance from whites. Clarendon County S uperintendent of Schools L.B. McCord, the superintendent of District 26, and the county auditor informed Pearson that his taxes had been paid to Clarendon School District Five, and therefore, the case was invalid. Even though Pearson and several members of his fa mily living on the same property had tax receipts from District 26, Mars hall decided that his legal team could not win the case. He claimed that he could not overcome the fact th at Pearson, who was the lone plaintiff, had 19 For the best analysis of the NAACPs legal strategy a nd black aspirations during the civil rights era, see: Stephen Lowe, The Magnificent Fight: Civil Rights Litigation in South Carolina Federal Courts, 19401970 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University, 1999). R. Scott Baker, Ambiguous Legacies: The NAACPs Legal Campaign Against Segregation in Charleston, South Carolina, 1935-1975 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993). Kluger, Simple Justice David Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Lau, Freedom Road Territory: The Politics of Civil Rights Struggle in South Carolina During the Jim Crow Era (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 2002). For exampl es of how segregation was locally controlled, see, John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

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25 been gerrymandered out of the district. On June 8, 1948, only a day before the case was scheduled to be heard in fede ral court, Marshall asked for a dismissal. The presiding judge in the case, J. Waties Waring, ruled that Pearson had no standing to sue district 26 in federal court. It was not the last time that gerrymandering would serve to undermine black aspirations in South Carolina.20 Throughout the next year DeLaine, Pears on, and other black parents in Clarendon County continued to demand better treatment of their children within South Carolinas system of segregated education. For his e fforts, DeLaine was fired from his post as principal of the all-black Scotts Branch School After an unsuccessful attempt to return to his job, DeLaine and a small group of black activists filed a petition in 1949 demanding that Clarendon County provide equal facilities to black and white students. With the support of the state NAACP and Sout h Carolina civil right s pioneer Modjeska Simkins, DeLaine and the petitioners promised that, if the county did not rectify the disparity between the black and white schools in Clarendon County District 22 (Summerton), they would file a federal lawsu it demanding that the district comply with the precedent established in the Plessy case. When the district refused to address the issue, Marshall and a black Columbia attorn ey named Harold Boulware filed a federal lawsuit in May 1950. The case, Briggs v. Elliott took its name from the first two petition signers, Harry and Eliza Briggs At first it called for Clar endon County to equalize its segregated schools, but in the fall of 1950 it was amended to challenge de jure 20 Julie Magruder Lochbaum, The Word Made Flesh: The Desegregation Leadership of the Reverend J.A. DeLaine (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1993) 86-93.

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26 segregation directly. At th e behest of Waring, Marshall filed a brief alleging that segregation per se was inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional.21 In 1958, political scientist Howard Quint wrot e that whites had been slow to react to the intensification of bl ack activism in Clarendon County. He noted that it was not until January 1951 that the state legislature be gan to take measures to counteract the threat posed by DeLaine and his supporters in the county. Although the official state response in 1951 did represent an escalation of white resistance at th e statewide level, it is important to stress that at the local level resistance had been growing for several years. Even before Pearson and DeLaine petitio ned school officials to provide bus transportation for black students, whites in Clarendon County had li ttle tolerance for any kind of African American activism. By th e time the South Carolina General Assembly initiated a series of laws designed to undermine the Briggs case in 1951 and 1952 local whites had already unleashed a wave of intimidation in Clarendon County.22 White supremacy was firmly entrenched in Clarendon County in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Local whites controlled govern ment agencies, the banking and crop lien system, and black education. In fact, Clar endon County was one of the most dramatic examples of the inequity between whites a nd blacks in the nation. Many observers noted that it seemed untouched by the surge of m echanized farming that swept through the 21 Lochbaum, The Word Made Flesh, 96-115. Benjamin F. Hornsby, Jr. Stepping Stone to the Supreme Court: Clarendon County (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1992) 2-7. Barbara A. Woods, Modjeska Simkins and the South Carolina Conference on the NAACP, 1939-1957, in ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Women in the Civil Rights Movement: Trailblazers and Torchbearers, 1941-1965 (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1990) 108-110. Joseph A. DeLaine, A Summary of Incidents in the Summerton School Affair (January 1950), Joseph A. DeLaine Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Her eafter cited as DeLaine Pape rs, SCL]. Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958) 13. Kluger, Simple Justice 3-26, 327-366. Lau, Freedom Road Territory, 309-312. New York Times (June 3, 1951) 7IV. Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 141-145. 22 Quint, Profile in Black and White , 21-37.

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27 South in the post-World War II period. Inst ead, most of Clarendon County resembled the agricultural lands of the nineteenth century. The lands cape was dotted with small plots farmed by sharecroppers and its few small towns were populated by a large number of black day laborers and domestics. Much lik e black belt regions throughout the Deep South, it was closely controlled by white rural elites who did not tole rate violations of racial custom, let alone dire ct assaults on segregation.23 African Americans represented 70 percen t of the total population in Clarendon County in 1950, and yet whites owned 85 percent of the land. Over two-thirds of the black population earned less than $1000 a y ear and no African American earned more than $2000 per year. According to contempor ary author Richard Kluger, blacks lived under a system of economic slavery, an unbreakable cycle of poverty which was perpetuated by white educational and economic advantages. Even though there were over 6,000 black students in the county compar ed to just over 2,000 whites, the state allocated $100,000 more to pay for the education of whites. Due in part to that unequal distribution of resources, white schools ha d indoor plumbing; black schools did not. According to Judge Waring, African Ameri can schools were just tumbledown, dirty shacks with horrible outdoor toilet facilities. 24 It was within this context of educatio nal and economic advantage that whites exerted pressure on troublesome blacks. Even before Briggs v. Elliott was filed, two agriculture teachers were fired for simply signing the equalization petition and Harry 23 Quint, Profile in Black and White, 12-13. Kluger, Simple Justice 3-27. The Reminiscences of J. Waties Waring (New York: Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1957) 341. 24 Kluger, Simple Justice 6-10. Lau, Freedom Road Territory, 309-312. New York Times (June 3, 1951) 7IV. News and Courier (June 9, 1950) clipping from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. Reminiscences of J. Waties Waring 341-342.

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28 Briggs and fellow veteran William Stukes were denied admission to night classes held at Scotts Branch School for former GIs. Hi storian Julie Lochbaum argues that crop lien debts were called in at Christmas, credit was de nied to farmers, and cotton gins refused to purchase cotton from the petiti oners at fair market price.25 In response to his leadership role in organizing the petiti ons and encouraging lawsuits against the school system, Joseph DeLaine was threatened by the Ku Klux Klan and forced to post armed guards at his home. He was also sued for slander for his renunciations of a local school official, whic h resulted in a $2,700 judgment against him. In addition to firing DeLaine, the county sacked his wife, his niece, and his two sisters from their public school teaching jobs. In the fall of 1951, the threats and political pressure also led church authorities to tran sfer DeLaine to an A.M.E church almost 50 miles away in Lake City. Shortly after the DeLaine family moved, their home in Summerton, which still containe d most of their possessions, was burned to the ground. Local fire officials argued that the home was 20 feet outside of city limits and refused to try to contain the blaze. In addition to th e loss of most of the familys belongings, the DeLaines insurance company refused to pay a claim on the property. Instead, the money was used to settle the $2,700 judgment against the minister.26 Angry whites also singled out the other pe titioners for economic reprisals. Harry Briggs, a World War II veteran, was fired from a job at a local gas station after 14 years of employment. His wife, Eliza, was releas ed from her custodia l job at a Summerton motel. When the family attempted to make ends meet by becoming sharecroppers, they 25 Lochbaum, The Word Made Flesh, 116-125. 26 Lochbaum, The Word Made Flesh, 125-130.

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29 were denied credit and local gin operators refused to purchas e the cotton they did manage to grow. According to Kluger, the local sher iff even arrested Harry Briggss cow after it wandered off the familys land. Briggs, who remained steadfast in his support of the NAACP, eventually had to go to Sumter, Sout h Carolina and then to Florida for work. He and his family eventually ended up Ne w York, unemployed and penniless as a result of the economic reprisals. So many of the people, remembered Eliza Briggs, were living on a white mans place. So they had to move or else take their name off the petition.27 Numerous other individual s also saw their employment terminated. Maids, mechanics, service station attendants, and ev en teachers were fired for their support of the Clarendon petition. Massi e Solomon, a local maid, was fired and her sharecropping family was evicted from the land it farmed. Annie Gibson, a Clarendon domestic worker, was also fired. Like Solomon, she was forced to leave her rented home. John Edwards, who was a veteran of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, was denied credit for farm equipment and Willie Stukes was fired from his job as a mechanic. Stukes attempted to continue working from his home, but did not have the proper equipment to work safely on automobiles and was crushed to death under a car. Beyond those who signed the petition, 27 Joseph A. DeLaine, A Summary of Incidents in the Summerton School Affair (January 1950), DeLaine Papers, SCL. Affidavit of Harry Briggs (November 13, 1984), Historical Marker Files, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina. Kluger, Simple Justice 22-25. Peter Lau, Freedom Road Territory, 323-325. Intervie ws with Eliza Briggs and Billie Fleming from Will the Circle be Unbroken?: A Personal History of the Civil Rights Movement in Five Southern Communities. Episode 3: Under Color of Law, Columbia, South Carolina (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1997), Audio distributed by Public Radio International, Transcript available at www.unbrokencircle.org (January 2005). Lochbaum, The Word Made Flesh, 118.

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30 at the time simple membership in the NAACP meant the loss of home and occupation for many Clarendon blacks.28 Like his fellow activists, Levi Pearson faced the full brunt of white economic intimidation. Joseph DeLaines nephew, B illie Fleming, later recalled that Pearsons credit was completely stopped. According to Fleming, Co tton gins refused to gin his cotton. He was not able to borrow money . Fertilizer dealers refused to sell him, even for cash money, fertilizer. Oil distributors refu sed to deliver oil. When Pearson sought to supplement his income by selling the ti mber growing on his land, a group of angry whites intervened. They approached the potential buyer of P earsons lumber and threatened to ostracize him and completely cut [him] off from the white community if he followed through with the purchase. The buyer backed off and Pearsons fresh cut timber was left on the ground where it fell.29 Despite the effects of this wave of intimidation, the federal lawsuit against Clarendon County helped spark a second pe tition in Dorchester County, where the NAACP also asked for an end to discri mination against African American school children. The Dorchester suit was brought on behalf of over 200 students and their parents in District 18 of th e county. Lawyers for the ch ildren claimed they were deprived of their Constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws and to freedom from discrimination because of race or color. They were seeking educational advantages and facilities equal in all respects to that which is being provided for whites. 28 Ibid 29 Will the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Personal History of the Civil Rights Movement in Five Southern Communities. Episode 3: Under Color of Law, Columbia, South Carolina

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31 Along with the suits in Dorchester and Clar endon Counties, James M. Hinton noted that similar lawsuits were being prepared fo r Lee, Fairfield, and Orangeburg Counties.30 Many white South Carolinians were educated about the threat that these lawsuits posed to white supremacy on the pages of the st ates most conservative daily newspaper. In a series of front-page editorials co mmencing on January 2, 1950 in the Charleston News and Courier William Workman warned white r eaders that the Supreme Courts pending decision in Sweatt v. Painter could provide a precedent for desegregating the public school system in South Carolina. Although the Sweatt case involved the constitutionality of the segregated law school at the University of Texas, Workman wrote that it could have originated anywhere in the South. Like South Carolina, Texas had constructed a separate but equal law sc hool to avoid integr ating the all-white institution, but an African American mailma n named Herman Sweatt had challenged this maneuver in court. Workman pointed out that the plaintiffs attorneys contended that separation itself was discrimi natory. Furthermore, he quoted the attorney general of Texas, who cautioned all southerners that the petitioner is asking for a court decision which would apply to high schools and elementary schools as well.31 In the second editorial of the series Workman reminded his readers that John Wrightens legal challenge had led to the creation of a segregat ed law school at the South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical college for negroes. Workman pointed out that Wrightens case had not only result ed in the formation of a school of law at South Carolina State, but was enormously expensive for South Carolina taxpayers. 30 News and Courier (May 16, 1950) 1A. Lighthouse and Informer (May 20, 1950) 1, from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. 31 News and Courier (January 2, 1950) 1.

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32 Under a court order from Judge Waring, th e state appropriated $200,000 for the creation of the new school. Workman cautioned that several other challenges to the states segregated university system were in th e planning phase, and noted that a school equalization case had emerged in Clarendon County.32 Workmans editorials were a wake up call to white voters who were still coming to grips with the loss of the white primary and the liberal turn of the national Democratic Party on racial issues. The combination of black demands for voting rights and African American challenges to segregated education led to a marked increase in white racial anxieties. Rank and file whites may not have understood the partic ulars of the Clarendon County school desegregation case, but they did have a general understanding that the basic framework of the states system of Ji m Crow laws was under attack. By 1951, most white South Carolinians wanted mo re concerted action to protect de jure segregation from these assaults. For decades, racial separation had been managed locally but was legitimized by state law. Over the course of the next two years, whites intensified their efforts to preserve the racial caste system through a variety of local efforts while at the same time insisting that their actions rece ive legislative endorsements from the state capitol. The lesson of Clarendon County was that extra-legal actions, economic intimidation, and physical violence could impede black protests, but could not completely eliminate local civil rights activism. Most South Carolina whites agreed that the defense of white supremacy would require a full batt ery of official action to compliment the informal measures enacted by local whites. 32 News and Courier (January 3, 1950) 1.

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33 In an era of Cold War anxieties, anticommunism was a predictable weapon in the arsenal of white resistors. In May 1950, State Representa tive Joseph R. Wise asked United States Congressman L. Mendel Rivers to investigate whether or not state NAACP leaders were also members of communist orga nizations. I was told four days ago in Columbia, Wise informed Rivers, that [James] Hinton held a red card in 1935. Rivers took full advantage of the rising tide of anti-communism and investigated Wises claim. The congressman telephoned Louis J. Ru ssell, a senior inve stigator with the House Committee on Un-American Activitie s (HUAC), to request information on Hinton. Russell forwarded a copy of the comm ittees file on the civil rights leader. The report cited Hinton as a sponsor of the Congr ess on Civil Rights, an organization founded in 1946 when the National Federation for Cons titutional Liberties a nd the International Labor Defense merged. According to the HUAC the Congress was dedicated not to the broader issues of civil libert ies, but specifically to the de fense of individuals who are either members of the Communist Party or openly loyal to it. Furthermore, the association was cited as subversive and Co mmunist by Attorney General Tom Clark.33 Rivers forwarded a copy of the Un-American Activities Committee report to Representative Wise and South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond. The congressman 33 For a discussion of the use of anticommunism against civil rights activists, see: Jeff Woods, Black Struggle Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Pr ess, 2004). George Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965 (Gainesville, University Press of Florida 2004). Telephone message from Joseph Wise, Jr. to L. Mendel Rivers, May 5, 1950 (1:15 PM), Lighthouse and Informer (July 24, 1950), Louis J. Russell to L. Mendel Rivers (May 6, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to Louis J. Russell (May 11, 1950) all in the Rivers Papers, SCHS. For a specific discussion of communism and the Civil Rights Congress, see: Gerald Horne, Communist Front: The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956 (Rutherford: Fairleign Dickinson Univers ity Press, 1985). See also: Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 375. Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinoi s Press, 1993) 257-268. Woods, Black Struggle Red Scare 31-38.

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34 suggested Thurmond might wish to expose this negro [sic] when he starts attacking you, as he has been doing. Rivers also collect ed HUAC reports on civil rights advocates Clifford J. Durr, Lillian Smith, and Myles Ho rton as well as on the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Riverss actions were i ndicative of his ability to gather secret information about civil rights activists and we re reflective of the intricate network of segregation advocates that existed in the Sout h. Moreover, it demonstrated the ability of committed segregationists to share information and exchange advice about tactics with one another.34 Shortly after Rivers sent Hi ntons HUAC file to Wise, th e state legislator publicly charged that Hinton was affiliated with the Co mmunist Party. On the floor of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Wise read the report and asked that it be printed in the Journal of the House of Repr esentatives of South Carolina Hinton vigorously denied the charges. He claimed the Civil Right s Congress was an orga nization whose aims were to secure civil rights for all Ameri cans, and argued those goals remained a worthy cause even if the organization itself had taken a turn to the political left. Hinton decried the trend of labeling all civil rights leaders as communist. It has become fashionable to label all Negroes as Reds, or radicals if they speak out for first class citizenship, he said.35 34 L. Mendel Rivers to Joseph Wise (May 11, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to J. Strom Thurmond (May 11, 1950), Information From the Files of the Commi ttee on Un-American Activities: U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Clifford J. Dunn, L illian Smith, and Myles Horton (February 14, 1950), Report on the Southern Conference for Human Welfar e: Investigation of Un-American Activities in the United States, (United States Govern ment Printing Office: Washington, DC: 1947), all from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. 35 News and Courier (June 9, 1950) 1A. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of South Carolina (1950) 2428-2429. News and Courier (June 10, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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35 Most whites refused to take Hintons cries of innocence seriously. The HUAC report obtained by Rivers gave the charges of communism an air of respectability and seemed to validate state action against th e NAACP and other black organizations. The widespread acceptance of Wises claims meant that South Carolina segregationists were free to use charges of communism as justifi cation for further intimidation of the states African American population and against the handful of treasonous whites who supported black aspirations. Labeling an Af rican American leader a communist meant that any progressive white leader who alli ed himself/herself with the black freedom struggle risked his/her standi ng in the community. The Second Red Scare suffocated free speech throughout the nation, but the atmosphere of repression was especially disruptive to civil rights advocates in the South.36 As the character assassination of Hi nton demonstrated, powerful white South Carolinians, such as Rivers and Wise, were adept at using thei r control of state bureaucracies to intimidate and threaten bl ack leaders. Though such attacks were numerous in South Carolina, none was more significant than the campaign of intimidation directed at Progr essive Democratic Party founde r John McCray. Amidst the furor over the Clarendon school desegregati on case and the charges of a communist conspiracy within the South Carolina NAAC P, McCray was charged with libel in Greenwood County for a story that ran in the st ates largest African American newspaper, The Lighthouse and Informer McCray, who was the papers editor and publisher, was indicted in January 1950 for publishing a stor y about an African American convicted of raping a white woman. Although McCray ne ver published the young womans name, he 36 For examples, see: Lewis, The White South and Red Menace and Woods, Black Struggle Red Scare

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36 did print the claims of the accused rapist, Willie Tolbert, that the sex was consensual. In the racially charged atmosphere of South Caro lina in the 1950s the story was considered an assault on white womanhood and a violatio n of one of segregations most sacred tenets: in cases of interracial sex, black men were routinely depicted as oversexed predators victimizing chaste white women. As far as whites were concerned, consensual interracial sex involving a black man a nd a white women simply did not happen. Moreover, whites supposed that African Amer icans, such as McCray, were prohibited from commenting on any sex acts involving black men and white women and McCray paid the price for breaking that taboo even t hough a similar story appeared in the white owned Anderson Independent The womans father, a Greenwood County solicitor, charged that McCray had published false a nd libelous statements that defamed the character of the victim.37 McCray was advised in the case by Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and by local black lawyer Harold Boulware. Since McCray was unlikely to receive the benefit of any doubt from a white jury, his legal counsel advised him to enlist the aid of a white la wyer for his defense though even this would be unlikely to sway an all-white jury. He approached several white attorneys, but was turned away. One unnamed white attorney did assist with McCrays defense, but he 37 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt 209-213. Memorandum from Harold R. Boulware, n.d., John H. McCray Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Colu mbia [Hereafter cited as McCray Papers, SCL].

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37 insisted that his participation in the case be kept secret and would only meet with McCray, Greenberg, or Boulware at night.38 Despite having solid grounds for a defens e, Marshall and McCrays lawyers urged him to accept a plea agreement. The atto rneys agreed that an African American defendant who was a known agitator was unlik ely to receive a fair trial in South Carolina. Pleading guilty, they argued, would keep McCray out of jail and allow him to continue publishing the Lighthouse and Informer McCray heeded their advice and entered a guilty plea in exchange for a sent encing agreement with the Greenwood County prosecutor. As part of that agreement, McCray was fined $3,000, given three years probation, and forced to admit his guilt on the front page of the Lighthouse and Informer 39 McCrays brush with the legal system was an important indication of the degree to which whites controlled the states bureaucracy and utilized official state agencies to subdue troublesome blacks. The convicti on was an obvious attempt to discourage McCray from engaging in political activis m and a reminder to middle class African Americans that their relative prosperity wa s dependent on staying in the good graces of the white power structure. McCray, however, co ntinued to engage in the kind of political activism that had drawn the ire of whites in the first place. He campaigned for more progressive candidates in the elections of 1950 and was a vocal supporter of the plaintiffs 38 John H. McCray to T. Carl McFall (May 8, 1950). John H. McCray to Guerny E. Nelson (May 6, 1950). Richard E. Fields to John H. McCr ay (February 16, 1950), McCray Pa pers, SCL. Wim Roefs, Leading the Civil Rights Vanguard in South Carolina: John McCray and the Lighthouse and Informer ,1939-1954, in eds. Charles M. Payne and Adam Green, Time Longer than a Rope: A Century of African American Activism, 1850-1950 (New York: New York University Press, 2003) 462-491. 39 Ibid The State of South Carolina v. John H. McCray (June 20, 1950), General Sessions Court, Greenwood County, South Carolina.

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38 in Briggs v. Elliott As a consequence of his conti nued activism McCrays parole was revoked in 1951 for giving a political speech in Illinois. McCray claimed that he had been given permission to travel outside of South Carolina for the event, but the state argued that his trip was an una uthorized violation of his pa role agreement and sentenced him to serve on a chain gang from Novemb er 1951 to December 18, 1952. McCray later claimed that his arrest resulted from a dire ct order from South Carolina Governor James F. Byrnes who was outraged by the African Americans civil rights activities. 40 Although they were rarely c onfronted with the kind of intimidation directed at politically active blacks, racially progressi ve whites also faced harsh treatment for advocating better treatment of African Amer icans. For example, after Judge Waring ordered an end the white primary and became openly critical of segregation he endured a near constant stream of criticism, in timidation, and social ostracism from his segregationist neighbors. White anxiety became even more palpable after Warings involvement in the Clarendon County sc hool desegregation case became clear.41 Nonetheless, the hostility directed towa rd Waring paled in comparison to the attacks levied at his wife, Elizabeth. Afte r all, it was Elizabeth who many white elites blamed for the judges late conversion to th e cause of civil rights. Shortly before Warings judicial decisions began to dismantle de jure segregation in South Carolina, he 40 New York Times (May 30, 1951) 12. Lau, Freedom Road Territory, 309-312. Quint, Profile in Black and White 14-15. Roefs, Leading the Civil Rights Vanguard in South Carolina, 462-491. 41 See: Yarbrough, A Passion for Justice 42-67. Robert Lewis Terry, J. Waties Waring: Spokesman for Racial Justice in the New South (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utah, 1970) 21-161. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 201-245. Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day 408-409. Kari Frederickson, As a Man, I am Interested in Stat es Rights: Gender, Race, and the Family in the Dixiecrat Party, 19481950, in eds. Jane Daily, Glenda Gilmore, and Bryant Simon, Jumpin Jim Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 260-274. Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutins: The South in the 1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) 232.

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39 had divorced his Charlestonian first wife to marry Elizabeth, a native northerner. Soon after, the Warings became social outcasts in Charlestons close knit high society.42 In January 1950 Elizabeth Waring spoke at the Annual Meeting of the traditionally all-black Coming Street Young Womens Chris tian Association (YWCA) to a mixed-race audience of over 150. Aside from breaking th e social mores regarding race mixing, Mrs. Waring openly attacked the Souths racial caste system and defended her husbands attempts to break down Jim Crow in South Carolina. In doing so she challenged the notion that Jim Crow was necessary, first a nd foremost, to protect of white women. Warings participation in desegregated meeti ngs and her commitment to racial equality was contrary to white notions about how race and gender rules operated in South Carolina and the South as a whole.43 For white South Carolinians, especially Old Charleston elites, Elizabeth Warings willingness to speak out against se gregation was not only wrong-headed, but an unladylike transgression into the world of politics. In the YWCA speech, Mrs. Waring declared that segregationists were stupid and claimed that white leaders were afraid that her civil rights activism would destroy their selfish and savage white supremacy way of life. The outspoken advocate of integr ation equated southern use of the filibuster to defeat civil rights legislat ion to treason. The White S upremacists . are so selfcentered, said Waring, that they are drawi ng walls around themselves so close and high that they have become completely isolated from the rest of the world and have not considered themselves part of the country since the Civil War. She went on to call 42 Ibid 43 News and Courier (January 17, 1950) 8.

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40 segregationists decadent, pr ideful, morally weak, a nd confused. Waring even called on civil rights activists to st and up to the Dixiecrat Gestapo.44 State Representative Joseph Wise summa rized the view of most white South Carolinians regarding Elizabeth Waring when he declared that the state did not need a lecture from a Damn Yankee. The Warings received telephoned death threats and were denounced by state leaders. In February 1950, the state House of Representatives passed a resolution promising that the necessary funds be allocated to purchase a one-way ticket to any point in the United States of America or preferably a foreign country for Federal Judge J. Waties Waring and his socialite wife. . with the sole provision they leave the State of South Carolina and never ag ain set foot on her so il. The resolution also committed $800,000 to build an animal sc ience building on the campus of Clemson College, and suggested the school dedicate a st all in the mule barn for the Warings. Although the resolution was quashed in the state Senate, it re presented a sentiment shared by many angry whites in South Carolina who te nded to view all civ il rights activism as orchestrated by outsiders who threatened the virtue of white democracy in the Palmetto State.45 Even when faced with threats and ostraci sm, the Warings refused to curtail their activism. Mrs. Waring went on NBCs Meet th e Press to defend he r position. She also reiterated her denunciation of segr egation in an interview with Colliers magazine. In 44 Ibid For a discussion of the intersections of Race and Gender in the South, see: Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 18961920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19 96). For a discussion of the various networks of women in Charleston, see: Stephanie E. Yuhl, A Golden Haze of Memory: The Making of Historic Charleston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 45 News and Courier (January 18, 1950) 8. A Joint Resolution Records of the General Assembly, House Bills, Part 2, Calendar 2177, South Carolina Depart ment of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina.

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41 response to her call for immediate integra tion, Senator Burnet Maybank invoked charges of communism against the Warings and asked Peyton Ford, an Assist ant to the Attorney General of the United States to investigate Wa rings wife for advocating a revolution to bring about an end to segregat ion. Maybank told Ford that the civil rights activities of the Warings amounts to persecution of respect able people, whether they be black or white, and I think the Justice Department should look into th e matter. A month later, Maybank wrote to Attorney General J. Howard McGrath requesting an investigation of the couple.46 Maybanks demand went unanswered, but many of his constituents refused to give up on the crusade against the unpopular judge and his wife. J.C. Phillips, a retired merchant marine, launched a petition dr ive demanding the impeachment of Judge Waring. At a closed-door meeting in Ma rch 1950 in the office of First District Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Phillip s claimed to have almost 21,000 signatures demanding action from Congress. The mee ting was attended by each of the states representatives in the House except for James P. Richards and John L. McMillan, and all of the participants agreed not to share information about the proceedings with the media. However, one observer admitted that the group did not have the necessary evidence to proceed. We certainly cant impeach him fo r making pro-negro speeches, claimed the unidentified source.47 46 Burnet Maybank to Peyton Ford (February 13, 1950), Maybank to J. Howard McGrath (March 20, 1950), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections, College of Charleston, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections]. Samuel Grafton, The Lonesomest Man in Town, Colliers (April 29, 1950) 20-21, 49-50. 47 News and Courier (March 9, 1950) 1B.

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42 Phillips was joined in the meeting by Dr. Ch arles D. Leverett, a Charleston Dentist; L. Eddie Heinson, a Dorchester County magist rate; A.A. Jordan, an Aiken lumberman; W. Lee Cooper, a Pelion farmer and merc hant; and V.M. Wingard, a farmer from Lexington. Together, this economically and geographically diverse group promised to form a sort of Southern association for the advancement of white pe ople. According to Phillips, the new organization would be dedi cated to countering pressure from minority groups and protecting traditiona l southern society. Before his organization could form, however, Phillipss worst fears were realized: in Decembe r 1950 African Americans in Clarendon County amended Briggs v. Elliott to challenge the very legality of segregation in education.48 The white reaction to the case placed incr edible pressure on South Carolinas political elites to defend the basic framework of the racial hierarchy. With arguments in Briggs v. Elliott set for May 1951, South Carolinas stat e government initiated an urgent attempt to head off a court decision that threatened to er ode white power and fundamentally undermine de jure segregation. Under the le adership of newly elected governor James F. Byrnes, the state launched a concerted effort to defend the legality of its Jim Crow schools. Byrnes was South Ca rolinas most well known political leader. He had served as a United States Senator, a United States Supreme Court Justice, and as Secretary of State under Presiden ts Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. Despite his position as a leader in Roosevelts Ne w Deal government, however, he did not share the socially progressive outl ook of other leading New Dealer s, such as Henry Wallace. Instead, Byrnes was a committed racial conservative who had no intention of 48 News and Courier (March 9, 1950) 1B, (Nov ember 18, 1950) 1, (Decembe r 23, 1950) 1. Quint, Profile in Black and White 13.

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43 volunteering to dismantle South Carolinas syst em of racial separation. Moreover, he had widespread support from the states white popula tion and a reputation as an able leader. Most whites assumed that Byrnes would find a solution to the segregation problem that would not result in an end to Jim Crow in South Carolina.49 Governor Byrnes surmised that South Ca rolinas best hope for preventing or, at least, delaying a federal desegr egation order was to give th e impression that the state was in compliance with Plessy s separate but equal doctrin e. Therefore, he launched a school equalization initia tive that preceded similar program s in other southern states by almost two years. School equalizati on, according to Byrnes, would halt federal interference in South Carolinas system of de jure segregation and limit civil rights activism in the state. He outlined his plan in an address to the South Carolina House of Representatives in January 1951. In his speech Byrnes pledged to find a lawful way of educating South Carolinas children while providing separate schools for the races. He called on the state legislature to pass a th ree-cent sales tax to finance equalization and new school construction and promised that even though a large portion of the funds would be spent on educating African American s, the new tax would actually strengthen institutional segregation.50 With the equalization plan, Byrnes establis hed a blueprint for white resistance to black advancement in South Carolina that woul d last for more than a decade. He pledged his commitment to segregation, but demanded resp ect for the rule of law. Byrnes failed 49 For a discussion of Byrness politi cal career, see: David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994). 50 Quint, Profile in Black and White 16. Thomas S. Morgan, James F. Byrnes and the Politics of Segregation, The Historian (Summer 1994) 645-654. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of South Carolina (January 24, 1951) 160-166.

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44 to appreciate that, at some point, the tw o might become incompatible. The governor promised a legal remedy, but assured Sout h Carolina voters that what a carpetbag government could not do in the reconstruction period, cannot be done in this period. If the federal courts ordered dese gregation, Byrnes promised to close the schools rather than integrate them. He claimed that the major ity of colored people in the state do not want to force their children into white school s. Instead, Byrnes concluded that black Carolinians only wanted whites to see to it that innocent colored children will not be denied an education becaus e of selfish politicians and misguided agitators.51 Byrness plan was to provide better treat ment for South Carolinas black population within the Jim Crow system, but his proposal did have an important corollary. If black activists continued to press fo r desegregation or if the federal government attempted to force an end to the racial caste system, Sout h Carolina was prepared to take radical action and abandon public schooling altogether. Byrn es and other state leaders warned that any attempt to break down the barriers of racial separation was sure to incite a violence and disorder. He also advised black leaders th at continued pressure to desegregate would diminish, rather than expand, African Amer ican opportunity. The White people of South Carolina, declared Byrnes, could pay for the education of their children in a private system. Conversely, few African Amer icans had the financial resources to pay for private schooling. In such a situation, Negro citizens would suffer, alleged the governor, because of the irresponsible ac tion of representati ves of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 52 51 Ibid 52 Ibid Address of James F. Byrnes, Governor of South Carolina, to the South Carolina Education Association, (March 16, 1951) 577-583.

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45 Byrnes was aware that in order for his plan to work, he had to maintain the illusion of uncompromising white unity on how to handl e the segregation issue. In fact, while most whites were firmly committed to Jim Cr ow, the exact degree of that commitment varied. In his quest to map out a plan for preserving the racial caste system, the governor had to gain the support of these distinct, if overlapping, white cons tituencies: hardcore segregationists, mainstream whites, and wh ite business interests. The hardcore group was determined to use any and all means to fend off all civil right s progress, including the open intimidation of black ac tivists and efforts to ostrac ize and pressure sympathetic whites. Mainstream whites sought to preserve segregation, but were unwilling to tolerate lawlessness, civil unres t, or the disruption of the state s economy simply to prevent what they hoped would be a modicum of token de segregation. Most of the white business elites were in the mainstream group, but even conservative business owners and professionals who were ardent segregationi sts were unwilling to accept steep financial costs in their quest to preser ve white privilege. With rare exceptions, such as the Warings, integrationist sentiment among white South Carolinians was almost nonexistent. In many ways, Byrness most difficult ta sk was gaining the support of the most uncompromising hardcore segregationists. Ev en the term equalization was problematic for committed white supremacists, but whites tr usted the governor when he promised that the program was the only way to avoid a fe deral order to desegregate the schools. Fiscally conservative segreg ationists were also reluctan t to allocate funds to black schools, but Byrnes assured the states white voters that, if the new schools were closed as a result of court ordered desegregation, th e new buildings would not be wasted. The

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46 governor promised that, should the courts orde r South Carolina to desegregate its public education system, the state would simply hand over its public school buildings to segregated private schools. According to By rnes, however, such drastic action would not be necessary anyway. He assured the stat es segregationists that if the taxpayers properly discharge our duty, we make more di fficult the task of those who would have the Federal Government control our schools. He was also careful to note that the proposed three cent tax would al so afford whites the opportun ities to improve their own schools.53 In order to ensure support from educators and more moderate whites, Byrnes declared his desire to provide a full public ed ucation to every child in the state, white or colored. At a meeting of the South Ca rolina Educational Asso ciation in March 1951, the governor promised that the main purpose of the equalization plan was to improve, not to close, South Carolinas schools. He poi nted out that South Carolina had the highest rate of rejection for intellectual ineptitude for military service in the Korean conflict. More than 60 percent of the South Carolini ans called up for the draft were rejected as opposed to a rejection rate of 35 percent for th e rest of the South. Byrnes blamed this failure on South Carolinas poor education syst em and pointed out that on average over 80,000 of the states 494,000 students were absent from school on any given day. Byrnes also noted that at least 16 ,000 white children and more than 17,500 black children were not enrolled in school at all. His plan, Byrnes argued, woul d not only equalize, but also modernize the states failing school system.54 53 Ibid 54 Ibid

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47 School improvement was also the best way for the governor to reach out to business owners and the stat es chambers of commerce. Byrnes argued that the equalization plan would foster a positive business climate in South Carolina and pointed out that, in order to bring new jobs to the st ate, it would have to improve its dismal public school system. New Deal farm programs ha d decreased the emphasis on labor-intensive agriculture and modern jobs required skilled workers. When poor whites and African Americans poured into citie s looking for work, they were often unqualified for the new jobs. For white economic boosters, the equali zation plan promised to promote the postWorld War II industrial economy wit hout disrupting racial customs. At first, the South Carolina General Assembly balked at raising taxes to fund the construction of black schools. However, by th e end of his first legislative session, Byrnes was able to convince a handful of powerful lawmakers, including st ate Senator L. Marion Gressette and future Governor and United St ates Senator Ernest Fritz Hollings, that equalization was a worthy goal for the state. Education professionals and the states business interests overwhelmingly supported th e measure while hardcore segregationists did so more reluctantly. Before formal arguments in the Briggs case could even begin, the Education Finance Commission initiated th e process of equalizing South Carolinas segregated schools.55 After winning an important political vict ory in the sales tax debate, Byrnes pressured the state assembly to follow th rough with other important aspects of his 55 John G. Sproat, Firm Flexibility: Perspectives on Desegregation in South Carolina, in eds. Robert H. Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, New Perspectives on Race and Slavery in America: Essays in Honor of Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986) 167. New York Times (December 11, 1952) 44. Quint, Profile in Black and White 16-17. South Carolina Educational Finance Commission, South Carolinas Educational Revolution; A Report of Progress in South Carolina (Columbia: 1955). Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, 1951 Kluger, Simple Justice 419-420.

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48 equalization strategy. Since the governor had promised that the new school buildings could be privatized if necessary, Byrnes enc ouraged the legislature to pass a bill which would allow local school boards to sell or leas e school property to pr ivate groups. If the federal government forced desegregation and th e state followed through with its plan to abandon the pubic school system, the governor wa nted to ensure that local boards could create a private school system using exis ting facilities. The legislature passed the measure and took it a step further when it pa ssed a law to withhold state funds from any district that was ordered to desegregate by a federal court. The new laws would have made it all but impossible for local school o fficials to operate a desegregated public education system in South Carolina. The lack of funding would force desegregated districts to either privatize or close altoge ther. So that county governments would have time to set up a new private system, the South Carolina General Assembly also passed a measure that forbade the tran sfer of a student from one school to another without permission from the county superintendent. This law created one last bureaucratic roadblock to prevent or dela y student transfers from an African American school to a white one.56 Not content with creating this elaborat e bureaucratic and le gal bulwark against school integration, the General Assembly al so created a special committee to monitor legal challenges to segregated education a nd plan a response. The South Carolina School Committee, which was chaired by Calhoun County Senator L. Marion Gressette, included five members from the state Senate, five fr om the state House of Representatives, and 56 Ibid

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49 five members at large. It was the first le gislative committee created to deal with the desegregation issue in any s outhern public school system.57 Despite Byrness self-serving efforts to equalize the states dual school system, African Americans in Clarendon County were de termined to press on with their challenge to segregated schools. Although intimidati on had eroded membership in the NAACP and forced several individuals to remove thei r names from the desegregation petition, the NAACPs legal team was able to secure th e signatures of 20 adu lts and 46 children demanding an end to the countys segr egated school system. The case, Briggs v. Elliott, both frightened and infuriated whites when it finally went before a three-judge panel in May 1951. South Carolina whites were partic ularly upset at the presence of Waring on the panel. Though they knew that fellow ju rist Judge George Bell Timmerman would rule in favor of the defense, many whites feared that Waring would convince Judge John J. Parker, who was a political moderate, to or der an end to segregat ed schools in South Carolina.58 The plaintiffs attorney, Thurgood Marshall contended that students in the county were denied their constitutional rights in the segregated school system. Since the countys attorneys Robert McCormick Figg a nd S. Emory Rogers acknowledged that the physical facilities of the black schools were inade quate, the NAACP legal team concentrated on the inequity of segregation itself. Marshall introduc ed the testimony of a number of social scientists, who each argued that segregatio n established a psychological impediment to success and was therefore a viol ation of the rights of African American 57 Ibid 58 News and Courier (November 18, 1950) 1, (Decem ber 23, 1950) 1. Quint, Profile in Black and White 13.

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50 students. Rogers and Figg insisted that Plessy v. Ferguson allowed for segregated schools as long as they were equal. The atto rneys contended that bl ack leaders had every right to demand equal facilities and requested that the court gi ve the state time to improve black schools. Figg warned that a court or der demanding the desegregation of southern schools would lead to extensiv e conflict and violence in the region. He asked the judges to grant the state reasonable tim e to implement school equalization. 59 Briggs v. Elliott brought widespread attention to South Carolinas segregated schools and may have served to embolden black activists, but it was in itially a victory for white segregationists. When the decision of the three judge panel was handed down in the summer of 1951, Judge Parker declared that the state must afford African American students the same educational opportunities as those afforded to whites, but he and Judge George Bell Timmerman refused to outlaw st ate supported segregat ed education. The two judges ruled that Byrness equalization pl an would bring the stat e in compliance with the separate but equal doctrine established in the Plessy case. South Carolinas white leadership gave its overwhelming endorse ment to the decision. Senator Maybank declared it an honest, clear straight Constitutional ruling on behalf of public education in South Carolina. In an interview on CBS televisi on, Maybank insisted that the good colored people, of his state were not intere sted in integration, although he refused to 59 Byrnes Inaugural Address was reprinted in: South Carolina Educational Finance Commission, South Carolinas Educational Revolution; A Report of Progress in South Carolina (Columbia: 1955). New York Times (May 29, 1951) 27, (May 30, 1951) 12. Kluger, Simple Justice 710-750. Lau, Freedom Road Territory, 309-312. Quint, Profile in Black and White 14-15. Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 142-143.

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51 lend support to abandoning the public school system if the courts did order desegregation.60 Judge Waring, however, provided solid grounds for an appeal when he issued a strong dissenting opinion. He insisted that se gregation itself was inhe rently unequal. He wrote, I am of the opinion that all the legal guideposts, expert te stimony, common sense and reason point unerringly to th e conclusion that the system of segregation in education adopted and practiced in the state of S outh Carolina must go and must go now. Segregation is per se inequali ty. Therefore, African Amer icans left the courthouse with a mandate to improve black schools and, tha nks largely to Warings opinion, hopes for a more promising outcome if the case was appeal ed to the United States Supreme Court. Less than a month after the th ree-judge panel issued its de cision, Marshall appealed the verdict to the nations highest court. White leaders had hope d that the panels decision had created a viable alternat ive to desegregation and woul d silence bothersome black activists, but they fully expected an appeal.61 The delay between the case and its appeal gave white leaders an opportunity to consolidate and refine Byrness equalization plan. Under the dire ction of the governor and state legislature, local sc hool boards began to redraw di strict boundaries in an effort to create another defense against desegreg ation. The new plan reduced the number of school districts in the stat e from 1,002 to 102. Small rural schools were closed and consolidated into larger, ne wer buildings. Moreover, the newly gerrymandered districts 60 Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 145-147. Briggs et al. v. Elliot et alt ., United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951). Maybank to George Bell Timmerman (June 25, 1951), Transcript of Capital Cloak Room (May 29, 1951), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. 61 Waring quoted in Briggs v. Elliott Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 145-147.

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52 were designed to allow whites to use residentia l segregation as a means to maintain racial separation in education. Although consolidation did have an important modernizing effect on the South Carolina school system, its implementation further solidified racial separation as the official policy of the state.62 African American leaders, however, were not willing simply to allow whites to use the time consumed with the appellate proce ss to construct additional barriers to black access without opposition. Even in defeat the Briggs case had an immediate impact on black community efforts to improve African Am erican schools. Civil rights leaders from all over the state demanded that the general assembly utili ze the new equalization funds to close the educational gap between black and white children. However, for South Carolina whites school equalization was a mechanism for limiting, not encouraging, black community activism, and local whites we re determined to manage carefully the impact of the program. In many districts local school boards used the new sales tax revenues to funnel money into existing, or new white schools. 63 Perhaps the most dramatic example of a lo cal school board usi ng a disproportionate amount of the new funds to improve white schools while black schools remained underfunded occurred in Charleston. Charlestons School Board hoped to utilize its black population to convince the Finan ce Commission to allocate signi ficant funds to the citys schools. In 1952, the city implemented a plan to divide its $2.4 million dollar allocation equally between the white and black school system even though there were more black 62 South Carolinas Educational Revolution. For the best example of this see: Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 146-150. Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) 522-523. 63 Ibid

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53 students and the African American schools were in a worse state of disrepair. Statewide, less than half (40%) of the student population was black, an d the state did spend almost two-thirds of the new money on African Amer ican schools, but, as the situation in Charleston demonstrated, even the disbursement of a large portion of the funds to the black schools could do little to erase the disparities in black and white education.64 Initially, black leaders in Charleston were pleased to see any improvements in the citys African American schools. Black pa rents, however, soon became frustrated with the school boards use of the new funds. Art hur Clement, the President of the Charleston NAACP and Secretary of the PDP, and Peter Po insette, an African American member of the PTA, claimed that the citys growing black population and the poor condition of its existing educational facilities dictated that the school board should allocate even more funds to the black community and truly equa lize the dual system. Clement pointed out that the new budget called for building a new gym for an all-white school that already had one, and yet failed to pay for a gym for the citys black high school, which had no gym at all. He argued that if the school board spent the entire $2.4 million allocation on its black schools the per capita valuation of school property for the two races would be $392 for white pupils and $345 for African Americ an students. In other words, even a complete overhaul of the citys black school s using 100 percent of the new state funds would have failed, in Clements estimation, to equalize the separate but equal system. Clement promised to bring the issue to the federal courts if the school board did not carry out a legitimate e qualization program. He warned Low Country whites, You 64 Ibid

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54 established the separate but equal theory it has protected you these many years now, you are faced with the problem of paying for it.65 Clements succinct warning was a reminder to the all-white school board that the fight over segregated schools was far from over. Although they won a technical victory in the Briggs case, white segregationists were ha rdly confident that the ruling would stand on appeal. Byrnes and his supporters realized that they might have to follow through with their threats to cl ose the public school system if they wanted to maintain segregated education. However, the governors administration faced one major barrier to the abandonment of the public sc hools. If Byrnes wanted to privatize the schools, he first had to convince South Carolinians to change the states constitution. Article XI, Section 5 of the South Carolina State Constitution stipulated that The General Assembly shall provide for a liberal system of free public school s for all children between the ages of six and twenty-one years. 66 A proposed amendment to alter this pr ovision quickly passed through the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 1951 session, but the measure stalled in the state Senate. Whites supported Jim Crow, but were many apprehensive about the notion of abandoning the publicly funded education of their own children. On January 8, 1952, Byrnes addressed the General Assembly and called on state senators to submit to the electors of the General Electi on in 1952 a resolution to repe al Article XI, Section 5. According to Byrnes, the proposed amendment was the states only means of ensuring its ability to maintain a segregated school system. If this provision of our Constitution is 65 Arthur J. Clement to the Charleston School Board (January 23, 1952), Henry Hutchinson Collection, Avery Research Center, College of Charleston, Charleston, South Carolina. 66 Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina (1952) 17-18.

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55 not repealed, and if the Supreme Courts deci sion is against us, the governor declared, no legal avenue will be left open to us in South Carolina to have separate schools for children of the white and colored races. Rather than oppose th e popular governor, the state Senate heeded Byrness warning and vot ed to include the amendment on the states ballot in the 1952 general election.67 Once the measure passed, Byrnes and hi s supporters initiated a sophisticated publicity campaign to increase support for the constitutional amendment. Their efforts were a prime example of how political leaders worked to ensure a consensus among South Carolina whites over how best to deal with the impending cris is over segregation. The vast majority of white South Carolin ians were unapologetic segregationists who were determined to protect Jim Crow. Fo r them, the amendment became a political statement of their commitment to South Ca rolinas racial caste system. Byrnes understood that as long as he ke pt the question simple he coul d mask any divisions within the states white communities over how far to go to protect segregation in South Carolinas public school systems. Byrnes and his supporters portrayed the amendment vote as a referendum on Jim Crow schooling.68 In a statewide radio broadcast, Lieutena nt Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr. called on voters to cast their ballots for the change. Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education, Marion Gressette, claimed that the measure would protect the states education system. Congressman Rivers pr omised voters that the amendment was the only way to prevent the mixing of the race s in our elementary and high schools while 67 Howard G. McClain, South Carolinas School Amendment, New South (February 1953) 1-5, 8. 68 Blick, Beyond The Politics of Color, 20-30.

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56 simultaneously improving African American inst itutions. Governor Byrnes went so far as to proclaim, If you vote against the am endment, and the Supreme Court overturns the district courts decision, you will force the mixing of the races in the schools. The proposed amendment served as both a means of white resistance and as a threat to black activists who persisted in challenging S outh Carolinas segregated school system.69 Of course, the NAACP and most African Am ericans objected to the proposal, but civil rights activists were not the only ones who opposed it. Though they refused to condemn segregation per se, both the League of Women Voters and the mostly white South Carolina Educational Association publicly denounced the Byrnes plan. The League of Women Voters even purchased radi o time in Columbia to discuss the issue, but no state leader would debate the merits of the amendment on the air. 70 With few exceptions, South Carolinas elec ted officers generally preferred not to discuss the specifics of the Byrnes amendm ent, and certainly only the most hardcore segregationists declared that school closure was a good idea. South Carolinas white leadership simply called for the continuation of segregation and left the impression that voting against the amendment would hasten the erosion of white privilege. When state leaders were ask if they favored closing the schools, most of them simply responded that they hoped it would not become necessary. Th e failure of white voters to question this tactic was indicative of white confidence that the state could manage the desegregation threat if given the power to do by its white constituents. Most whites considered the 69 McClain, South Carolinas Sc hool Amendment, 1-5, 8. News and Courier (January 8, 1952) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. 70 Ibid

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57 amendment a potent resistance ta ctic whether or not they tr uly supported the idea that closing the public schools was a good idea.71 The proposals strongest support came from South Carolinas black belt, especially along the states coastal plains in the southern Low Country region and the northeast Pee Dee area. There was, however, mild opposition in the piedmont and upstate regions of South Carolina. For example, Pickens County Representative Earle Morris, Jr. declared, The purported abolition of the public school s is a calculated risk that I could not conscientiously support unless I was assured th at a satisfactory method of educating our children would replace the system of free public schools. Morris worried that the socalled private schools would re duce education to a prerogative of a privileged few. Likewise, Dr. E.C. McCants, the retired S uperintendent of Schools in Anderson County, claimed that the amendment could destroy what he had worked his life to build.72 Even one Low Country paper surmised that both options of either closing the school system or desegregating it would be a g reat sacrifice with l ittle return to the voters. Opposition also came fr om some church leaders w ho worried that they would face the financial burden of operating an e ducation system if the state abandoned its schools. The Public Affairs Committee of the Young Womens Christian Association (YWCA) issued a statement protesting the amendment, and the Christian Action Committee (CAC), which represented ten denom inations, publicly a sserted its opposition in September. The CAC declared that public education was important to democracy and chastised state leaders for using the measur e to intimidate the Supreme Court. The 71 Ibid 72 Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina (1952) 513. McClain, South Carolinas School Amendment, 1-5, 8. Blick, Beyond The Politics of Color, 20-30.

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58 council also accused South Carolina politicia ns of using education as a political football.73 Such pockets of dissent aside, widespread popular support for the amendment was unmistakable. The constitutional change passed in November 1952 with 72 percent of the voters supporting the measure. Alt hough the vote probably indicated some willingness to abandon public education, it is best interpreted as a referendum on segregation. Byrnes had warned voters that a ballot against the amendment was not a vote for preserving the public school system, but a vote for the desegregation of South Carolinas schools and the political agenda of the NAACP. His ability to shape the public debate and limit the range of options was an important reminder of the confidence that whites placed in Byrnes and his ability to properly manage the segregation issue.74 Beyond the utility of the amendment in the battle to preserve segregated schooling, the governors broader economic argument for school modernization resonated with white South Carolinians. A lthough the impetus for passing th e three cent sales tax, the equalization plan, school consolidation, a nd Governor Byrness other legislative initiatives came from the legal challenges to Jim Crow segregation, there is significant evidence to suggest that white South Carolin ians also supported these proposals because they really did promise to improve and modernize the states schools systems. Legislative reformers, such as future Governors Hollings and John West, were determined to promote educational reform. At the same time that the state assembly was debating the school amendment, it proposed a free school lunch program, a program to 73 Ibid 74 Ibid

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59 help pay for the use of school buses for sa nctioned athletic even ts, minimum standards for public high schools, and a bill to modern ize education funding. In fact, throughout 1952 the legislature instituted si gnificant changes to the states public school system that brought much needed improvements to th e antiquated and under-funded system. Although the discrepancy between black a nd white schools remained, even African American institutions were promised significant improvements under the equalization plan.75 Nonetheless, Byrnes strategy for defendi ng South Carolinas particular brand of Jim Crow was an important step toward organi zed white resistance. The drastic measures adopted by the South Carolina General Assemb ly and endorsed by Governor Byrnes in the early 1950s were the stat es first significant efforts to take over the day-to-day management of white supremacy in educati on since the state had enacted its Jim Crow laws in the late nineteenth and early twentie th centuries. Moreover, Byrnes ensured that white South Carolinians understood that any crack in the wall of separation between whites and blacks could spell disaster for th e entire institution of segregation. The governors unequivocal language and his endorsement of a zero tolerance policy toward desegregation hardened white resolve and stre ngthened white unity. Still, the widespread support for educational improvements and th e recognition that economic development depended on employing an educated and well-tr ained work force was evidence that some white South Carolinians were as interested in progress as they were in the fight to preserve segregation. 75 South Carolina House Journal (1952) 522-530. *In February of 1952 the Supreme Court was set to decide Brown v. Board of Education in the summer of 1953.

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60 In passing the school tax and the scho ol amendment, South Carolinians simultaneously prepared for two possible paths. The first promised moderate leadership and a commitment to improving th e states poor public educati on system. The other laid the groundwork for more militant resistance. By the fall of 1952, the minds of South Carolina whites were as divided and contradictory as the system of segregation they were fighting to protect. Plans to modernize a nd improve the states public schools coincided with threats to close them, and promises to abandon, rather than desegregate, public education overlapped with assurances that such action would never become necessary. Meanwhile, contemporary brick buildings with electricity and indoor plumbing replaced one-room schoolhouses with potbelly stove s and outhouses, and, by 1956, the state had spent more than $120 million on school improvements two-thirds of which was spent on African American schools.76 In 1952, few could predict which tactics S outh Carolina would adopt to combat the still rising tide of civil right s activism and the unmistakable signals of increasing federal opposition to the Souths Jim Crow laws. Stat e leaders promised moderation and respect for the law, but adopted measures for ci rcumventing federal orders and implicitly encouraged reprisals against civil rights activ ists. The most troubling, and yet predictable aspect of the white response to the Briggs case for African Americans was the fact that white Carolinians who were the most aff ected by the Clarendon case and other civil rights activism displayed the greatest propens ity to adopt extreme measures to protect segregation. Blacks and whites who voiced opposition to such actions were publicly shunned, economically isolated, and, at times, physically thre atened and attacked. White 76 South Carolina Educational Finance Commission, South Carolinas Educational Revolution

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61 South Carolinians debated a wide range of a ppropriate and possible tactics for protecting white supremacy across the state, but to the vi ctims of white reprisals in the black belt counties it was already apparent that, at midcentury, South Carolina had already teetered over the edge of massive resistance.

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62 CHAPTER 3 CAMPAIGNING ON RACE: THE ELECTIONS OF 1950 Between 1950 and 1952 South Carolina whites were nearly uniform in their opposition to black civil rights. However, reactions to the increasing encroachments on white privilege were diverse and the degr ee to which the segregation issue would radicalize state politics was unclear. Alt hough the race issue was seldom far from the surface of public consciousness and debate, many whites were equally concerned with improving the states schools, its economy, a nd its infrastructure. To address those concerns political leaders at the local and state level of ten relied on funding from the national government. In the early 1950s S outh Carolina was home to several large federally funded public works projects. Thes e projects, which included the construction of the Santee-Cooper hydroelectric plant, the Charleston Air Force Base, and the Savannah River nuclear weapons plant, funne led a considerable amount of money into the impoverished state. Furthermore, they created high paying jobs and paid for much needed internal improvements. For white voters and their elected leaders, securing funding for federal projects was both a politic al and economic necessity. Even elected officials who vilified federal intervention in civil rights i ssues vigorously lobbied for national funding for improving the state s infrastructure and its economy. In the wake of nascent signs of federal in terests in civil rights enforcement and the intensification of internal black pressure, there were some concerns about the states increasing dependence on federal funding, but th ey were minor in comparison to calls for more, not less, federal aid to South Carolina. For example, George Grice, the president

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63 of the College of Charleston, wrote to Senato r Burnet Maybank in June 1950 to ensure that the schools plan to borrow federal f unds to improve its faculty housing would not involve the College in any way in the raci al problem. Grice, who was a committed segregationist, worried that accepting the much needed funds w ould place the school under federal regulatory cont rol. Such control, he surmised, could result in a desegregation order. Despite these apprehensions, Grice and the college continued to seek federal monies whenever possible. 1 For many whites, even Grices mild worries were unwarranted. In spite of the post-World War II recession, the states econom ic outlook and the standard of living enjoyed by its citizens had vastly improved si nce the depths of th e Great Depression. Most South Carolinians felt that these impr ovements were a direct result of federal investments during the New D eal and World War II. The Second World War had saved the Charleston Navy Base and Naval Shipyar d, the Korean conflict had rescued Fort Jackson from threatened closure, and the Cold War had helped pump money into the states various other defense facilities. Th e Charleston Naval Shipyard alone employed between 10,000-15,000 workers during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and navy yard employees earned on average nearly tw ice as much as other area workers.2 1 George Grice to Burnet R. Maybank (June 17, 1950), Burnet Maybank to George Grice (July 17, 1950), College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections. 2 Fritz Hamer, A Southern City Enters the Twentieth Century: Charleston, its Navy Yard, and World War II, 1940-1948 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1998). Andrew Herbert Myers, Black, White, and Olive Drab: Military-Social Relations During the Civil Rights Movement at Fort Jackson and in Columbia, South Carolina (Ph.D. Dissertation: Un iversity of Virginia, 1998). Ivan D. Carson to Burnet R. Maybank (March 3, 1952), Earl J. McGrath to Burnet R. Maybank (February 28, May 27 and March 10, 1952), and Howard J. Sears to Burnet R. Maybank (October 6, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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64 In addition to military spending, New Deal agriculture reforms contributed farm subsidies, low interest loans to buy agricu ltural equipment, and increased funding to agricultural colleges like Clemson University in the South Carolina upstate. Furthermore, Federal Housing Authority funds helped to alleviate South Carolinas housing shortage and the rura l electrification project funde d the expansion of electric lines across the bucolic state. Indeed, even though the state had roundly rejected Roosevelts successor in 1948, New Deal progr ams remained popular as South Carolina entered the 1950s.3 African Americans in South Carolina, who ha d also been stalwart supporters of the New Deal, were also generally optimistic that the 1950s would usher in an age of prosperity. However, unlike their white ne ighbors, they hoped that new economic and educational opportunities would go hand in hand with the expansion of their civil and political rights. African Americans throughout the South yearned for rapid social change and an official endorsement of black rights from regional a nd national leaders. For the states African American population, progre ss meant more than a bigger paycheck and rural electrification. Black South Carolinians had reason to belie ve that substantial change was on its way. By the dawn of the new decade the South Carolina branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Co lored People (NAACP) had challenged educational inequality in the state, Pr esident Harry S. Truman had ordered the desegregation of the military and promised to support civil rights in the waning years of 3 Jack Irby Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001). George Calvin Waldrep, Southern Workers and the Search for Community: Spartanburg County, South Carolina (Urbana: University of Illinois Pre ss, 2000) 123-126. Dewey W. Grantham, The Life and Death of the Solid South: A Political History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988) 102-124.

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65 his administration, and northern Democrats were advocating antipoll tax legislation, anti-lynching bills, and support for African American voting rights. These national trends provided a crucial backdrop for local in itiatives in South Carolina where, in 1950 alone, Progressive Democratic Party (PDP ) leader and Charleston NAACP President Arthur Clement challenged white supremacist Congressman L. Mendel Rivers in South Carolinas First Congressional Districts Democratic primary, blacks in Clarendon County allied with NAACP Legal Defense Fund to initiate Briggs v. Elliott and civil rights leaders attempted to use black ballots to influence stat e elections in a meaningful way for the first time since Reconstruction. It was within this context of cautious, if differently c onfigured hopes for the future of the state that white and black South Carolinians confronted th e civil rights issue. Civil rights had dominated state politics in 1948 a nd the expansion of black activism since President Trumans re-election heightened an xiety among white segreg ationists. Support for segregation remained a litmus test for white office seekers in South Carolina, but it was not the only issue that concerned white voters. Politicians also had to preach economic progress and support for educati on while simultaneously cautioning against rapid social change. Elected officials faced enormous, ofte n contradicting, pressures to preserve white supremacy without jeopa rdizing white economic prosperity or surrendering local autonomy in exchange for federal funding. This chapter explains the nature of those pressures and the numerous responses to them by black and white South Carolinians during the va rious elections of 1950. The economic concerns of Charleston ex emplified the controversy over federal funds in South Carolina. Charleston was th e largest city in South Carolinas Low

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66 Country region and home to the states mo st conservative daily newspaper, the News and Courier In the post-World War II era the city wa s also a hotbed of white resistance to NAACP and PDP activism. However, Charlest on was also an important bastion of the Cold War military industries and its civi c leaders demanded that its congressional representatives direct federal funds to the region even if, as conservatives like George Grice feared, such money brought with it the specter of possible federal intervention in racial arrangements. After suffering through numerous post-World War II cutbacks, the military initiated a building boom in the region beginning in the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s, more defense dollars were spent in the Charle ston area than anywhere else in the nation except Norfolk, San Antonio, and San Di ego, and no region saw more internal improvements funded by the United States military than the South Carolina Low Country. Moreover, federal contributions to dredging and maintaining the harbor contributed to improvements in commerci al shipping. These improvements created scores of high paying jobs and provided a substantial amount of political capital for elected officials. Most of these proj ects were navigated through congress by Representative Rivers, who was a powerful me mber of the Armed Services Committee. Throughout his nearly 30 years in Congress, Rivers was notorious for steering federal defense money to his home district and lauded for his ability to increase defense spending throughout his home state.4 4 George Hopkins, From Naval Pauper to Naval Po wer: The Development of Charlestons MetropolitanIndustrial Complex, in ed. Roger W. Lotchin, The Martial Metropolis: U.S. Cities in War and Peace (New York: Praeger, 1984) 1-34.

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67 Riverss influence on the growth of military industries in South Carolina was ubiquitous, but other city leader s were also important in recruiting federal projects to the previously impoverished area. Although Charlest on area boosters prom oted the city with the zeal of many New South a dvocates, city leaders were al so happy to sell the historic districts genteel charm. In 1949, the Ca rolina Art Association published a book praising Charleston for its ability to be both a prime tourist destination and a modern industrial city. The book, entitled Charleston Grows pointed out that the hi storic peninsula was a city with a heritage, but it was not an anachronistic place sleeping through the present. According to the various contributors to the book it was not a reconstruction of the eighteenth century, preserved as a museum piece.5 Charleston Grows portrayed the city as divided in to two distinct districts. Peninsular Charleston was the epitome of southern charm and gentility and the area northwest of US 17 and southeast of Berkel ey County was a booming industrial marvel. In the book, prominent Charleston author Herbert Ravenel Sass claimed, The old historic Charleston and the new industrial Charleston are geographically separate and distinct, so that indus trial development here can be w holly helpful with none of the disastrous cultural sacrifices which progr ess . often involves. Sass and other Charleston area boosters recognized that econom ic advancement might blur the lines of racial and ethnic separation, but hoped that the city could find a way to foster development without risking the loss of white supremacy. Sass concluded that the new 5 Carolina Art Association, Charleston Grows (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co., 1949). For a discussion of role of historical memory in Charleston, see: Stephanie Yuhl, A Golden Haze of Memory: The Making of Historic Charleston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

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68 Charleston could find inspi ration and courage in the strong and masculine old Charleston.6 The convoluted mixture of historic memory and economic boosterism in Charleston Grows represented the desire of many white South Carolinians to promote economic modernization without upsetting the racial status q uo. This bifurcated mindset was evident throughout South Carolina, but it was especially influential in the Low Country region in the southeast corner of the state where Charleston was located. Nearly the entire region was part of the First Congre ssional District and ev ery county in it was part of the black belt. In the early sp ring of 1950, Low Country whites began pressuring the South Carolina Democratic Party to take immediate action to thwart various expressions of civil rights reform and activ ism. The Charleston County Democratic Convention passed a resolution commending th e Palmetto States opposition to the FEPC [Fair Employment Practic es Commission] law, the anti-lynching law, the anti-poll tax law, the anti-segregation laws, comm only known as the so-called Civil Rights program. The group also instructed its dele gates to the State Demo cratic Convention of 1950 to oppose any effort to have the Democr atic Party of South Ca rolina sacrifice or compromise its traditional principles or re verse and repudiate the State Partys opposition to the so-called Civil Rights program and those who advocate such programs. 7 Nonetheless, black activists pressed on with their calls for an end to South Carolinas restrictive election process. And, when Arthur Clement challenged Rivers in the Democratic Primary of 1950, he became both a symbol of the incr easing intensity of 6 Ibid 7 Resolution for the County Convention (c. 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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69 black political activism and a reminder of th e deeply entrenched discrimination in the states election system. His challenge is es pecially noteworthy because, other than Strom Thurmond, no politician in South Carolina embo died the Dixiecrat movement more than Rivers. Indeed, Rivers and Re presentative John L. McMillan of Florence were the only members of the South Carolina congression al delegation to campaign openly for the Thurmond-Wright ticket in 1948.8 Rivers had built his reputation as an ardent segregationist with vicious political attacks on the Truman Administration. He ca lled the president a dead chicken who did not have sense enough to lead the nation. In October 1948, Rivers went so far as to issue a public statement requesting that the st ate Democratic Party remove his name from the Truman ticket. The move was unnece ssary because in South Carolina, the Democratic ticket was headlined by Thurm ond and not Truman, but the congressmans rhetoric helped solidify suppor t from angry whites. I wouldnt be true to my convictions, he explained, if I ran also on the Truman ticke t. I want it known that Im supporting the States Rights Democrats and not the Truman Democrats. Rivers followed the Dixiecrat Party line arguing that the States Rights primary was the regular Democratic primary of South Ca rolina. He declared, I dont want to sail under false colors or to mislead you or anyone else, and cert ainly it is not my desire to give Truman any intentional or inadvertent help or assistan ce. Rivers called on every Southerner to stand up and be counted, and warned, You re on one side or the other, not both.9 8 Ibid 9 Ibid

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70 Like Rivers, Clement was a political vete ran. He was the Executive Secretary of the PDP and had campaigned for Henry Wallace during the presidential election of 1948. In a letter to the Charleston News and Courier that year, Clement wrote: The Progressive Democrats do not want to get into the Party of the White folks. We want to fully participate like any other citizen in the only ma terial and realistic election machinery in this State The Democratic Pa rty and its Primaries. The present government of South Carolina is not good enough for the Progressive Democrats. We desire no part of it. It is putrid. It s odor stenches the clear clean air of South Carolina.10 In addition to their obvious differences re garding racial politics, a host of other issues separated Rivers and Clement. The South Carolina Democratic Digest which was an official publication of the national Demo cratic Party in South Carolina, gave brief biographies of all of the candida tes. It described Clement as a statewide leader of Negro groups and as a liberal who was pro-labor and pro-National Democrat. The paper claimed that Rivers was an arch-foe of Truman and Civil Rights who was strongly conservative.11 During the election Rivers promised voters that he would continue our fight in Washington to uphold our traditi ons, our customs, and our rights to run our own business in South Carolina against outside interference. In a half-page political advertisement in the News and Courier he pledged not to sell the sout hern birthright for a mess of political patronage. The congressman also cl aimed to be one of the foremost defenders of states rights and local se lf-government. Rivers, however, refused to discuss Clement directly. Instead, he attemp ted to remain aloof. The c ongressman was contemptuous of 10 Arthur J. Clement to To the Editor of the Charlest on News & Courier, (June 1, 1948), Arthur J. Clement Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Colu mbia [Hereafter cited as Clement Papers, SCL). 11 South Carolina Democratic Digest (Columbia: May 1950), Clement Papers, SCL.

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71 black forays into politics and, rather than campaign directly against Clement, Rivers utilized the publicity surrounding the race issue to enhance his reputation as defender of white privilege. He declared, I am not ta king any notice of the candidacy of one A.J. Clement, Jr. for Congress from the First Congr essional District, as he did not wish to lend dignity to [Clements] candidacy. The congressman dismissed Clement as an unsuitable opponent who was an officer in the organization created by Henry Wallace, known as the Americans for Democratic Action, that opposed every concept and political philosophy of which the South Carolina Democratic Party is made and of which it is composed.12 In addition to provoking declarations of contempt from Rivers, Clements candidacy helped to exacerbate white fears and reinforced th e notion that the states Jim Crow voting restrictions were under siege. That anxiety was a poten t tool for mobilizing white political power. State Representative Joseph Wise of Ch arleston published a campaign leaflet that warned against the m enace of bloc voting. The advertisement quoted former North Carolina Governor Charles B. Aycock who had said in 1898: When we came to power, we desired merely the security of life, liberty and prosperity. We had seen all these menaced by 120,000 Negro votes cast as the vote of one man. Wises campaign literature pointed out th at several North Caro lina cities had been affected by bloc voting by blacks in the stat es primary. Furthermore, he contended, These same tactics are BEING ATTEMPTED in Charleston County, South Carolina. 12 Telegram from L. Mendel Rivers to Calvit N. Clarke, Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, Moncks Corner, South Carolina (July 9, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS. News and Courier (July 9, 1950) 7A. Rough Draft of Letter from L. Mendel Rivers to Dear Mr. Chairman (June 21, 1950) Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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72 He also cautioned that white must UNITE TO GETHER in order to preserve our TRUE SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY.13 Like Wise, Rivers understood that white pol itical unity was very important to his re-election, but Rivers seemed more con cerned about setting the stage for future elections. Like other white leaders in the S outh, Rivers was tasked with rallying whites to his cause without encouraging political ly ambitious moderates to recognize the prospective power of a biracial coalition. While he feigned a lack of interest in the election and assured voters of his certain victory, Rivers also reminded voters that the primary was very important, and he urged ev ery eligible white person to register to vote by June 10, 1950 so that all qualified wh ite persons could show up at the polls. According to the congressman, It is essential that we register and vote to maintain and preserve good government and prot ect our interest against the forces that are working day and night to change our wa y of life and deprive us of the freedom we cherish.14 Riverss actions in the campaign revealed a tension that perm eated white political ranks across South Carolina in the 1950s. Ji m Crow restrictions were created to limit the potential power of black ballo ts and to prevent the forma tion of a biracial political alliance that could threatened the elite white power structure. The erosion of those controls on African American vo ting rights threatened to create new political coalitions and weaken white unity on the issue of segregation. During the election Rivers worried privately that a high black turnout might en courage moderate whites to seek office in future elections. He understood, as did most white leaders, that such a combination of 13 Bloc Voting By Any Group is a Menace to Democracy (n.d.), Clement Papers, SCL. 14 L. Mendel Rivers to Y.C. Weathersbee et al. (May 25, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to James Henry Clark et al. (May 25, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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73 white and black votes could pose a serious ch allenge to more conservative candidates. Rivers proclaimed: I believe that the white people in Charleston are alert to the potentialities of the negro (sic). The election this year will de monstrate one thing that we have in our midst people of the Waring ilk who are prom oting the negro (sic) and in the future we will have white men running with their bl essings. Then they can really wield the balance of power.15 Clement recognized the same potential a nd spent most his campaign attempting to energize black voters and, as Ri vers feared, reach out to more moderate whites. He realized that in 1950 it was impossible for a bl ack candidate to win an election in South Carolina, even in the First District where blacks comprised a major ity of the population. According to the 1940 census there were approximately 170,000 blacks in the district compared to just over 120,000 whites. Howeve r, despite the legal advances for black political rights in the previous decade, the majority of the districts African Americans were still not registered for the elections of 1950 reflecting a recurring void between increasingly progressive laws and judicial rulings rega rding race and consistently conservative practices at the local level.16 Journalist and publisher John McCray also understood the potential effect of a large black voter turnout. He urged African Ameri cans to register before the June 10 deadline and called for the chairman and execu tive committee of each precinct, club and organization working under the Progressive De mocrats banner to begin at once a daily 15 L. Mendel Rivers to Ashley Halsey (June 3, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS. 16 Lighthouse and Informer (May 13, 1950) 4. Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958) 1-25. For a discussion of the political situation of Low Country African Americans see: Millicent E. Brown, Civil Rights Activism in Charleston, South Carolina, 1940-1970 (Ph.D. Disserta tion: Florida State University, 1997). L. Mendel Rivers to Y.C. Weathersbee et al.( May 25, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to James Henry Clark et al. (May 25, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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74 campaign of registration which must not be slowed up until the last minute is used. McCray instructed the Executive Committee of the Progressive Democratic Party to arrange transportation for citizens who wished to register. Mendel Rivers must not go back to Congress he proclaimed, We can k eep him out, but we must do it by registering now and following through w ith the voting until July 11th.17 Since many whites and blacks were apprehensi ve of being associated with radical leftist politics, Clement attempted to c ounter the accusation that civil rights was euphemism for communism. Instead, he clai med that black progress was an important issue for all South Carolinians. When we hear the term civil rights we immediately see color, observed Clement, but he conte nded, Civil Rights is the essence of our American Way. It is our chief weapon against all foreign isms. In South Carolina, civil rights have been a dead truth, an untouchable. We wish to bring it onto the open for its avoidance has affected all our people not just a segment. We have frittered away our glorious heritage, said Clement, and th e possibilities wrapped up in the American Dream by allowing our attitudes and amb itions to become wrapped by racism.18 Despite these efforts, Rivers easily defeat ed Clement in the primary election. The incumbent garnered over 42,000 votes compared to Clements 7,000. Most of Clements support came from the African American communities in Charleston and Beaufort Counties. The Charleston Evening Post smugly declared, We beli eve he [Rivers] would have won the election even if there ha d been any serious opposition to him.19 17 John H. McCray to Fellow Citizen (May 26, 1950), Clement Papers, SCL. 18 News and Courier (May 17, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. 19 Evening Post (July 12, 1950), Lighthouse and Informer (July 15, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. Evening Post (July 17, 1950) 4.

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75 The African American communities in South Carolina and across the South were divided over how to react to Clement s showing. In an editorial, the Atlanta Daily World claimed to have nothing but the highest es teem and commendation for South Carolinas young A.J. Clement, Jr. The paper noted that Clement had received enough financial support to pay for campaign expenses and th at he had made a remarkably good showing despite the overwhelming challenge of confr onting the white political hierarchy. The editorial stated: Although he received only 7,299 votes against his opponents 43,489, we do not think that was a poor showing for a candi date entering a campaign with so many grave and insuperable obst acles. Not only was the total atmosphere of the campaign rabidly anti-Negro but the atmosphe re and tempo of the state was hostile. Dixiecrats and the Dixiecrat spirit was th e central note, the like of which only Georgia could equal or surpass. Accordi ngly, his race, while badly beaten, served to educate white voters and to give Negr oes a keener interest and appreciation for the right of the franchise.20 Closer to home, however, some members of the black community were outraged by the limited support that Clement had receiv ed from African American voters. An editorial in the Lighthouse and Informer complained that blacks in Charleston could have done more to promote Clements candidacy a nd hinted at alleged improprieties in the election process. In the ini tial probing of the matter, the paper claimed, it seems that several [blacks] were urged to vote against Clement and for his Dixiecrat opponent. McCray and Clement each condemned conservative blacks who supported Rivers in order to gain political patronage. The Lighthouse and Informer editorial argued that the loss was a serious blow to the political rights of African Americans. The article stated, 20 It Was Worth the Try, Atlanta Daily World (July 16, 1950), from the Clement Papers, SCL.

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76 Never again soon will we have the golden opportuni ty we had in the first district. In a letter to Clement, McCray declared the black participation in the election disgraceful.21 Although McCray, Clement, and other black leaders had not expected a victory for the African American candidate, the miniscul e voter turnout in th e black communities of the First District was a serious blow. Not only was it evidence that white state leaders had minimized the effectiveness of court orders to end the lily white primary, but the low turnout also meant that it would be even harder to convince white candidates that a moderate biracial coalition could unseat cons ervative Democrats, such as Rivers. White solidarity coupled with the absence of federa l enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and rulings meant that black voters could be sa fely ignored in black belt elections for the foreseeable future. The election also demonstrated the degr ee to which white segregationists still controlled the political process. White leaders had made Clements candidacy as difficult as possible. Clements campaign received no assistance from the Democratic Party of South Carolina, and party officials actively s ought to limit his involvement in official events. For example, The County Chairman of the Democratic Party of Hampton County refused to allow Clement to speak at a party rally. When the challenger complained to state party officials, William P. Baskin, the State Chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party, responded that local officials were not requ ired to invite any candidate to speak. Baskin claimed that he had no au thority to invite a candidate to a county meeting.22 21 A Lesson to Learn Early, Lighthouse and Informer (n.d.), John H. McCray to Arthur Clement (July 21, 1950), Clement Papers, SCL. 22 William P. Baskin to Arthur J. Clement (June 1, 1950), Clement Papers, SCL.

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77 White newspapers encouraged the notion th at Clement was a fringe candidate with little or no support from whites or blacks. For example, Clement was vilified by the Charleston News and Courier On two occasions, the conservative newspaper attacked Clement for not properly answering the race question. The Charleston paper editorially condemned him for failing to oppose the comp elled mixture of the white and colored races in industries (the FEPC) and for his support of mixed race schools and colleges. It also noted that Clement was not in favor of separation of the races in railroad cars, public buses, hotels and restaurant s, or in favor of residentia l separation of races as is now customary in cotton mill villages and othe r localities. In summation, the editorial declared that Clement was undesirable becau se he did not commit himself to opposing any kind of racial mingling or as favori ng any kind of racial separation. The News and Courier insisted that its opposition to Clement wa s not based on the candidates race, but on his political beliefs. In fact, an editorial declared that African Americans should enjoy the same political rights as whites, as long as any prospective black candidate favored segregation. Of course, the ne wspapers editorial staff was we ll aware that such a caveat would eliminate any serious black candidate.23 After the election, segregationists were convi nced that their efforts had paid off. Whites were jubilant at the lack of black political participatio n in the primary, and Riverss easy victory seemed to alleviate paranoid fears of an African American takeover of the Democratic Party. The Hampton Democrat declared: Apparently the fear that many South Carolinians had that the Negroes w ould flock to the polls and vote into office candidates unpalatable to the majority of wh ite voters was without justification. The 23 News and Courier (July 8, 1950) 4A.

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78 newspaper argued that voter turnout among African American s was so low in the state that there is no real reason to believe Negroes would vote in a bloc. For many whites, Rivers triumph was an indica tion that they had stemmed th e rising tide of black activism that had characterized the pr evious year. It was also additional fodder for whites to utilize to argue that most South Carolina blacks were content with white political leadership.24 Nonetheless, any display of black politi cal activism, no matter how circumscribed, elicited a palpable degree of fear from South Carolinas white communities. For some politicians, the time seemed ripe to take adva ntage of these apprehensions in a statewide election. Governor J. Strom Thurmond, w ho had won over 70 percent of the states popular vote in the presidentia l election of 1948, hoped that wh ite distrust of President Harry Truman and the national Democratic Party would lead him to victory over the states most prominent Truman supporter, United States Senator Olin D. Johnston. Against the backdrop of the Rivers-Clement race, NAACP legal challenges to white supremacy, and the desegregation of the milita ry, Thurmond initiated his first attempt to reach the United States Senate. By the time the former Dixiecrat announ ced his candidacy, many of the states leading political observers had already envisaged a victory for Thurmond. The Charleston News and Courier forecast an overwhelming triumph for the governor. Conservative newspaperman William D. Workman predicted Thurmond would garner almost 60 percent of the popular vote, and the Sumter Daily Item declared that Johnstons support for the president would tr anslate into a sure victory for Thurmond. In fact, few 24 Hampton Democrat (July 16, 1950), from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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79 political observers felt that Johnston could defeat the popular governor. Several political prognosticators reasoned that the recent el ection losses of other southern Truman supporters and racial moderates like Claude Pepper of Flor ida and Frank Porter Graham of North Carolina were evidence of Johns tons vulnerability on the race issue.25 In each of these cases, political pundits ca lculated that a conservative backlash against the national Democratic Party would provide an election-day win for Thurmond. However, these same analysts underestimated Johnstons own reputation as an ardent white supremacist at a time when the race i ssue was especially vexing for many voters. For example, when the incumbent senator received the endorsem ent of his hometown newspaper, the Anderson Independent it defended his record on matters of race and attempted to draw a contrast between Johnston and several other southern senators who faced difficult elections in 1950. The Anders on newspaper editorialized that Johnston had little in common with the defeated lib eral senators from North Carolina and Florida. Instead, the paper asserted that Johnston was a member of a powerful block of southern senators who helped defeat civil righ ts initiatives, such as the permanent FEPC. The newspaper concluded, Both Pepper a nd Graham gave support and sympathy to FEPC legislation. Johnston never has and ne ver will. Furthermore, the Anderson daily claimed that the Senator had more in comm on with arch-segregationists Lister Hill of Alabama, Walter George of Georgia, and Clyde Hoey of North Carolina.26 25 News and Courier (June 23, 1950) 4. William D. Workman, Jr. to Judson Chapman (n.d.), William D. Workman, Jr. Papers, Modern Political Collections, Un iversity of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as Workman Papers, MPC]. Sumter Daily Item (July 10, 1950) 4. 26 Anderson Independent (July 9, 1950) 4. The State (July 1, 1950) 3. Several Thurmond campaign advertisements and clippings that deal with this st rategy are located in the 1950 Democratic Primary campaign files of the Olin D. Johnston Papers, Modern Political Collections, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as Johnston Papers, MPC].

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80 Johnston adopted much the same tactic as his hometown newspaper. He tried to reach out to popular southern conservatives and distanced himself from the moderate wing of the national Democratic Party. Th e senator even attempted to gain an endorsement from Georgia Senator Richar d Russell, who was well respected amongst segregationists for his efforts to preserve Jim Crow. Russell praised Johnston and fellow South Carolina Senator Burnet R. Maybank, but did not wish to interject himself into the South Carolina primary. Despite Ru ssells desire for neutrality, Johnstons campaign staff reprinted Russells praise of the incumbent in newspaper advertisements.27 Fortunately for Johnston, conservativ e newspaper editors and black belt segregationists did not constitute the majo rity of white voters. Convincing white Johnston supporters to abandon the senator was a difficult sell. He was a former mill worker who had a strong following in the ups tate region and appeal ed to white voters on both racial and economic grounds. Johnston co nsidered himself the political champion of the states white textile workers, and, like many of his constituents, he was a vocal supporter of Franklin Roosevelt s New Deal and white workers rights. He was the only southern senator to vote for the repeal of th e Taft-Hartley law, which limited the rights of workers to form unions and to strike. He had also led the Souths efforts to limit the effects of the Smith v. Allwright decision. As governor (1943-1945) Johnston was the architect of the South Carolina Plan, whereby the state legislature removed any 27 Richard Russell to Olin Johnston (June 27, 1950), Johnston Papers, MPC. Several of these advertisements are located in journalist William D. Workmans files on the campaign, Workman Papers, MPC. For a discussion of Russell, see: Gilbert Courtland Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr., Senator from Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell and the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996).

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81 reference to political parties from state law, and declared the Democratic Party a private club that was not subject to the court deci sion. Almost overnight, the state legislature repealed 150 state statutes governing primar y elections. Although this process was later declared unconstitutional in Elmore v. Rice it nonetheless boosted Johnston a reputation as an uncompromising segregationist.28 Thurmonds strategy was more one-dimensional. He hoped to recreate the Dixiecrat alliance that had helped him win the state in 1948. Thurmond felt that white voters would flock to his campaign and cast thei r ballots based on his stalwart defense of segregation two years earlier. Th e governor realized that, due to his stint as a Dixiecrat in 1948, he had no hope of winning the black vote. Even though he and every other white politician in South Carolina were aware of the increase in black voting rights, Thurmond felt that he could attract enough alienated white voters to offs et the modest increase in black participation. He anticipated that alienating blacks would make him a more attractive candidate to the segr egationist electorate, but also understood that his victory depended on his ability to persuade South Caro lina whites that the re-election of Johnston actually threatened the ins titution of segregation. Many political observers knew that the governors strategy was a risky one. Former South Carolina State Senator Paul Quattlebaum cautioned the governor not to miscalculate the effects of the African American vote in the primary, and United States Congressman L. Mendel Rivers contended that state NAACP leader James Hinton was openly campaigning against Thurmond. Quattlebaum expressed a common concern and 28 Tinsley Yarbrough, A Passion for Justice: J. Waties Waring and Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) 68-106. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: the History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 1975) 299.

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82 alleged that blacks were register ing to vote at a rate of twenty to one when compared to new white voters. Moreover, he repeated th e common speculation that African American voters would cast their ballots as a herd.29 When the official campaign tour co mmenced in Lexington County on May 23, 1950, neither Thurmond nor Johnston wasted any time with polite debate. Each candidate accused the other of jeopardizi ng the foundation of se gregation with his political actions in 1948. Johns ton repeatedly claimed that the only way to preserve the separation of the races was for southern poli ticians to maintain seniority within the national Democratic Party. Thurmond accused Johnston of collaborating with the very forces that sought to dismantle Jim Crow. Thurmond reminded voters that I stuck my neck out for you two years ago. Referring to the Dixiecrat revolt, he declared, Dont forget that I fought the fight for states ri ghts while my opponent ran out on the Democrats of South Carolina. Since the South Caro lina Democratic Party had endorsed Thurmond in the presidential election of 1948, the governor even claimed that Johnston had violated his loyalty oath to the state party by supporting Truman.30 Thurmonds campaign rested largely on his assertion that Johnston was trying to pose as a loyal segregationist at home, but was really a committed Trumanite. My opponent, declared Thurmond, may think he can play around in Washington with the TrumanC.I.O. crowd and then come back down here and pose as a great States Rights Democrat, but he is not going to get by with it. He gr ouped Johnston with those who 29 Paul Quattlebaum to J. Strom Thurmond (April 22, 1950), Paul Quattlebaum Papers, Special Collections, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson Univer sity, Clemson, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as Quattlebaum Papers, Thurmond Institute]. Rive rs to Thurmond (n.d.), Rivers Papers, SCHS. 30 News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 9B. The State (June 3, 1950) 3, (June 8, 1950), 8. News and Courier (June 10, 1950) 3.

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83 stabbed the Democratic Party of South Carolina in the back and repudiated its principles. . He warned that Johnston should not now try to get back in the party and seek favors from party membership, and suggested that the incumbent Senator sail under [his] true colors and offer [himself] openly on the Tr uman Party ticket. Moreover, Thurmond claimed that United States Attorney Genera l J. Howard McGrath was the driving force behind Trumans civil rights initiatives and that Johnstons support for him was a direct threat to the legal structure of segregation. In one campa ign advertisement, Thurmond labeled a photograph of Johnston and McGrath together with the cap tion: Olin Johnston Drinks Toast to the man Harry Truman Appoi nted to End Segregation in the South. Thurmond alleged that no southerner could wo rk within Trumans Democratic Party to protect segregation. Instead, he insisted that southern leaders should refuse to compromise with party members who advocat ed civil rights for African Americans.31 By contrast, Johnston urged South Carolina voters to look toward the Democratic Party to defend segregation. He claimed th at southerners could only counteract the burgeoning support for black voting and civil rights within the national party. The senator told voters that he had been fighti ng for states rights for thirty years. He cautioned South Carolinians not to isolate th emselves from the rest of the nation, and declared that the fight to save segregation should remain within the party. Johnston preached a unified front in the battle to pres erve segregated society. As long as we are split, he said, we cant hope to accomplish much.32 31 News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 1. Olin Johnston Drinks Toast to the Man Harry Truman Appointed to End Segregation in the South, Thurmond Campaign Advertisement, Workman Papers, MPC. The State (June 21, 1950) 1B. News and Courier (June 8, 1950) 11. 32 News and Courier (May 27, 1950) 1. The State (June 2, 1950) 5, (June 2, 1950) 5.

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84 Unfortunately for Johnston, South Carolina s black belt newspaper editors tended to agree with Thurmond. The Sumter Daily Item went so far as to announce that a Thurmond victory would be a defeat for Tr uman and his supporters. The editorial labeled Johnston Trumans man, and decided that he was tainted with Trumanism. The Charleston News and Courier joked that, if Johnston were to defeat Thurmond in the primary, the state should hold a run-off elec tion between the Trumanite Johnston and the anti-Truman Johnston. When Johnston labe led President Truman a political mishap and a blabbermouth, the Charleston pape r asked whether the Senator referred to Truman as Mr. President or Mr. Blabbermouth while in Washington D.C.33 The governor tapped further into white anxiety by accusing Johnston of secretly working with black leaders and pandering to black crowds. At one debate, Thurmond declared, I appreciate the fact that the applause for me came from the white people of Berkeley county, and noted that Johnst on only received cheers from the African American attendees. Thurmond was clearl y attempting to influence the medias perception of the event. Journalist Willia m Workman, whose articles appeared in the News and Courier and The State newspapers, frequently repor ted on the racial makeup of the campaign audiences. He also took deta iled notes regarding which candidate curried the most favor from white audiences and wh ich participant receive d the most applause from African Americans. Workman, who had a clear political agenda, privately warned 33 Sumter Daily Item (July 6, 1950) 4, (July 10, 1950) 4. News and Courier (July 11, 1950) 4. The State (June 10, 1950) 3. News and Courier (May 24, 1950) 1, (May 25, 1950) 4.

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85 Thurmond that the National Democratic Party and the NAACP planned to spend $250,000 to organize black voters an d rally support for Johnston.34 Despite the near constant attacks from Thurmonds campaign, Johnston did not shy away from his allegiance to the national Democratic Party in 1948 or from his record on the race issue. The incumben t senator argued that it was he, and not Thurmond, who had struggled to defend white privilege. For inst ance, Johnston attacked the former Dixiecrat for naming Dr. T.C. McFall, an African American, to a South Carolina medical advisory board in 1949. The board, which was appoi nted by the governor, was charged with working with the state board of health to evaluate hospital construction. State law stipulated that the members of the council were chosen on the recommendation of the South Carolina Medical Association. Th e Association had recommended McFall so that state policy makers could bette r understand the health need s of South Carolinas black population. Johnston characteri zed Thurmonds actions as an attempt to break down segregation, and accused Thurmond of pa ndering for black votes with the McFall appointment. According to Johnston, Thurm onds appointment of the African American doctor was directly related to the end of the white primary with the Smith v. Allwright decision.35 In the face of Johnstons audacious att ack on his segregationist credentials, Thurmond claimed that state la w had required him to appoint McFall and that he took no pleasure in the selection. He vigorously denied Johnston s accusation of pandering to 34 The State (July 7, 1950) 1. Notes on the 1950 De mocratic Primary and Untitled manuscript dated February 6, 1950 from the Workman Papers, MPC. 35 The State (June 30, 1950) 5B, (July 1, 1950) 1. News and Courier (June 30, 1950) 4. Thurmonds Appointment of a NEGRO, (n.d.) Johnston Papers, MPC. The State (June 27, 1950) 7. Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) 201-214.

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86 black voters. Thurmond was supported by the state medical association, and a number of South Carolina newspapers. The Charleston News and Courier proclaimed that the McFall nomination contributed to the health of all the people, white and colored.36 Thurmond sought to distract attentio n from the McFall nomination issue by implicating Johnston in a race scandal of hi s own. While serving as governor, Johnston had approved the parole of Dave Dunham. Upon his release, Dunham, who was an African American, murdered a white 22-year -old Chester County veteran. Thurmond blamed Johnston for the crime and declared that Johnstons pardon racket was to blame for the murder. Thurmond charged that during Johnstons gube rnatorial term, an unbridled and unbelievable pardon and parole sp ree occurred. He claimed that Johnston was responsible for the release of over 3,000 convicts from South Carolina prisons. According to Thurmond, during Johnstons admi nistration it was easie r to get out of the penitentiary than it was to get in.37 In spite of Thurmonds defense that he was simply following state law and his condemnation of the Senators gubernatorial re cord, Johnston refused to let the former Dixiecrat off the hook. Johnston presented evidence that, as governor, he had only pardoned or paroled 671 people. Furthermore, he pointed out that he had only released half as many prisoners as his predecessor, Ib ra C. Blackwood. He also noted that voters should hold Thurmond responsible for the McFall nomination. He reminded his constituents that Thurmond had signed the law in the first place. I would have suffered my right arm to be severed, claimed J ohnston, before I would have signed any 36 Ibid Sumter Daily Item (July 7, 1950) 4. News and Courier (June 28, 1950) 4. 37 News and Courier (June 9, 1950) 1. The State (June 9, 1950) 1.

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87 commission for McFall. The Senator went so far as to place a full-page advertisement in The State proclaiming: Thurmond Appoints Negro! Wade Hampton s Era of Segregation Ends in South Carolina as Thurmond replaces white Doctor with Charleston Negro in Bold bid to Capture Negro Vote of State! First Negr o Appointed to State Position Since Days of Carpetbaggers and Scalawags! On another occasion, Johnston declared, I would never have appointed the nigger physician . to displace your beloved white physician . . When a group of African Americans in the audience took offense at J ohnstons remarks, Johnston declared, make those niggers keep quiet. When the T hurmond campaign declared Johnston a closet integrationist, he proclaimed that his opponent s were low down contemptible liar[s]. 38 In addition to instigating the uproar over the McFall affair, Johnston also chastised Thurmond for inviting the black governor of the Virgin Islands, William H. Hastie, to visit South Carolina as the governors guest. Following the national governors conference in 1947, Thurmonds office sent inv itations to visit South Carolina as the official guests of the governor to each state executive who could not attend the conference. Since Hastie did not attend, he received the invitation. Apparently, Thurmonds secretary was unaware that Hast ie was black. Unfortunately for Thurmond, Hastie was also a Truman appoint ee who had participated in the Smith v. Allwright case.39 Beyond his attacks on Thurmonds commitment to racial integrity, Johnston also re-enforced his own reputation as a committed segregationist with a well-timed attack on 38 The State (June 27, 1950) 7, (June 12, 1950) 12C. News and Courier (July 7, 1950) 1. Pardons, (n.d.) Johnston Papers, MPC. The State (June 23, 1950) 1. 39 Ibid Cohodas, Strom Thurmond 206-220. For a discussion of Hasties involvement with Smith v. Allwright see: Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 153-154.

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88 the FEPC. In the months leading up to th e campaign, Johnston was a leading spokesman against the establishment of a permanent FEPC. He and 21 other southern senators used the filibuster to prevent a vote on the bill. Johnston also utilized his position as the chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service to slow down congressional committee work until the bill was ultimately def eated. Each of the 12 attempts to end the impasse and create a permanent FEPC faile d. For Johnston, the defeat of the FEPC legislation was one of his most im portant achievements. Both the Anderson Independent and The State newspaper in Columbia congratulated the senator for his stand against the FEPC, and he did not hesitate to remind voters of his victo ry over the legi slation. I have fought for you in the United States Se nate, Johnston declared, and I mean to continue. Predictably, Thurmond was less impressed with his opponents efforts to block permanent FEPC legislation, proclaim ing, I fail to see how he can claim any support from the people of South Carolina for helping to kill the pet measure of the man he helped elect on a platform calling for civil rights programs. 40 By the time the votes were tabulated in the primary, Johnston had defeated Thurmond by over 27,000 votes. The upcount ry Democrat carried 186,180 votes to Thurmonds 158,904. Thurmonds showing paled in comparison to his performance in the 1948 presidential campaign when he car ried every South Carolina county except Anderson and Spartanburg, which were domin ated by the textile industry and populated by staunch New Dealers.41 40 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance (Baton Rouge: Louisian a State University Press, 1969) 35-40. News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 1. Anderson Independent (May 13, 1950) 4. The State (June 3, 1950) 3. News and Courier (June 21, 1950) 4B. 41 The State (July 19, 1950) 1. For a discussion of the nature of the Dixiecrat movement, see: Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

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89 Thurmonds 1950 campaign failed on thr ee levels. First, the governor underestimated Johnstons reputation as a de fender of Jim Crow and overestimated the potency of his own credentials as a white supremacist. Second, he gambled that the recent challenges to the racial status quo would alienate a large number of white Democratic loyalists, but faile d to attract enough white voters to offset the effects of a growing African American electorate, wh ich voted largely for Johnston. Third, Thurmond criticized federal funding of state sponsored projects in a state that was economically dependent on such funds. Each of these tactical e rrors merits closer attention and each reveals important informati on about the tone and substance of racial politics in South Carolina in the years before the Brown decision. Although Thurmond is routinely rendered in the histori ography of massive resistance as a peerless segregationist, in fact, his reputation for supporting white supremacy was no stronger than Johnstons in 1950. Indeed, prior to his stint as a Dixiecrat, Thurmond was widely regarded a progressive governor. It was no surprise, then, that Johnston supporters refused to accept the governors claim that a vote for the incumbent senator would undermine the racial status quo.42 Ironically, Thurmonds demagoguery was more successful in driving away African American voters than in uniting whites. Black leaders had few real choices. In a state where civil rights minded public officials we re extremely scarce, African Americans were forced to choose between the lesser of two evils. Th e senator secretly met with black leaders to help drum up support for his campaign in African American 42 Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson, Ol Strom: An Unauthorized Biography of Strom Thurmond (Atlanta: Longstreet, 1998) 79-88 (Bass and Thom pson actually titled their chapter on Thurmonds gubernatorial administration The Liberal Governor). Cohodas, Strom Thurmond 93-125.

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90 neighborhoods and the nearly 73,000 regist ered black voters in South Carolina overwhelmingly supported Johnston. Though he remained steadfast in his support for segregation, he did promote economic reforms that were beneficial to black voters. Civil rights activist Modjeska Simkins, for exampl e, charged that Johnstons support of New Deal and Fair Deal programs that aided bl acks made him a more acceptable option than Thurmond. He also received th e support of the states most influential African American newspaper when the Lighthouse and Informer urged its readers to vote for Johnston. In an editorial, the weekly news paper declared that Johnstons brand of segregation was preferable to the Dixiecrat vision of Thurmond.43 The impact of black ballots on the elec tion was unmistakable. For example, Columbias Ward 9, a majority black vo ting precinct, supported Johnston with 1,249 votes compared to a paltry 72 for Thurmond. John McCray wrote that ,000 black votes carried Johnston to victory in South Carolina, and the Charleston News and Courier reported, there is little doubt that the colored vote. . went to Mr. Johnston. 44 For the most part, Thurmonds campaign st rategy only worked with white voters in the traditional black belt areas. White work ers in South Carolinas textile regions remained loyal to the New Deal coaliti on and supported Johnston. Thurmond only won five of the 23 counties where textile work ers made up at leas t 10 percent of the population, and each of those five was locate d near Edgefield, which was Thurmonds 43 Bass and Thompson, Ole Strom 119-134. Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt 200-216 Lighthouse and Informer (July 8, 1950) 4, from the Johnston Papers, MPC. Modjeska Simkins Campaign Letter (March 30, 1950), Johnston Papers, MPC. 44 Ibid News and Courier (July 13, 1950) 4. For Election data see: Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Elections: County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) 201-216, 383-402. Report on the United States Census, 1950, Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections Also see statistical analysis in : Luther Faggart, Defending the Faith: The 1950 U.S. Senate Race in South Carolina (M.A. Thesis: Univer sity of South Carolina, 1992).

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91 home county. Aside from having a home fi eld advantage, Thur mond also benefited from white anxieties over the large black popul ation in that region. For example, in Edgefield African Americans made up almost 60 percent of the population, and in nearby McCormick blacks accounted for nearly 63 percent of the tota l population. Like Edgefield and McCormick, Thurmond did best in counties where blacks were a majority of the population, but a minority on the voting rolls. Twenty of the 28 counties where African Americans accounted for at least 40 percent of the population voted for Thurmond.45 Johnston collected over half of his votes in counties where at l east 25 percent of the population was employed in th e textile industry where Ne w Deal allegiances were traditionally strong. Furthermore, Johnston defeated Thurmond in towns, cities, and suburbs. The only notable exception was Charleston. Johnston carried Columbia, Beaufort, and Greenville-Spartanburg. Un like state government representation and Electoral College voting, the malaportionment of votes that gave a greater voice to South Carolina whites in rural countie s did not tip the balance of the election to Thurmond. Senators were popularly elected; therefore, the disproportionate voice given to rural white voters in South Carolina did not help the more conservative candidate.46 Race was clearly important in this contest, but white voters did not simply jump on the bandwagon of the candidate who declared himself the most racially conservative 45 Ibid For a discussion of Johnstons relationship with Textile workers see: JoAnn Deakin Carpenter, Olin D. Johnston, the New Deal and the Politics of Class in South Carolina, 1934-1938 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Emory University, 1987). Anthony Ba rry Miller, Palmetto Politician: The Early Political Career of Olin D. Johnston, 1896-1945 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of North Carolina, 1976). John Ervin Huss, Senator for the South: A Biography of Olin D. Johnston (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961). 46 Ibid Bryant Simon, The Devaluation of the Vote: Legislative Apportionment and Inequality in South Carolina, 1890-1962, South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 1996) 227-245.

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92 choice, and did not abandon truste d political figures because they were told to do so. In 1950, voter concern for a variety of economic a nd social issues other than race had not yet been wholly eclipsed by a monolithic pub lic debate on desegregation. Urban whites and white workers in the South Carolinas textile mills trusted Johnston to defend segregation just as much as they did Thur mond, but deemed the incumbent senator more likely to promote progressive ec onomic reforms while doing so. For many voters, Thurmonds alarmism wa s unwarranted and his portrayal of Johnston as liberal integrati onist was preposterous. Many South Carolina whites were reluctant to follow Thurmonds brand of Dixi ecratic separatism because doing so could isolate the states business interests and deter federal agencies from steering much needed capital to South Carolina. Nowhere was Thurmonds post-Dixiecrat militant racism more apparent than in discussions about the issu e of education. In fact, during his run for governor, and even in his Dixiecrat ca mpaign, Thurmond had championed federal expenditures on education. In an attempt to ingratiate himself with South Carolinas segregationist electorate, he changed his vi ews on federally supporte d public education in the senatorial campaign of 1950. During his inaugural address in 1947, Thurmo nd had cautioned voters that fear of federal aid to education is without foundation. He insisted, the e ffect of federal court decisions requiring equalization between the r aces will cost the state much more money, and would lower the quality of the total sc hool program unless aid [was] received from federal sources. Three years later, in an address to state legislators, Thurmond concluded that federal aid would eventually mean federal control, and, thus, an end to segregated schools. Thurmonds comments came as congress was debating on a massive

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93 federal education bill that planned to provi de over $14 million dollars for South Carolina schools. Throughout the senate campaign, T hurmond expressed his steadfast opposition to the acceptance of federal education funds in South Carolina. We have long since learned, he said, that fe deral funds are not free. 47 Johnston, on the other hand, claimed that the state could not afford to refuse federal aid, but insisted that the stat e and local school districts woul d retain control over how the money was spent. Johnston maintained that if the federal courts insi st on this ruling of equal facilities, then I say, le t the federal government pay for it. . The only way in which we can have equal and separate school facil ities is through federal aid. According to Johnston, if South Carolina declined federal aid, it would be unable to equalize black and white schools. Such a failure would result, he claimed, in the court ordered desegregation of South Carolinas public sc hools. The plain trut h, alleged Johnston, is that state controlled federal aid is the only insurance available for continued segregation of the races.48 Johnston also pointed out that everythi ng else in the state received federal monies. Thurmond, who limited his discussion of federal f unding to education, refused to take the bait. He did not address South Carolinas grow ing reliance on the national defense budget, social welfare programs, and farm subsidies. Johnston, on the other hand, referred simply to the all-encompassi ng federal aid. . e xpended and controlled by the states. Implicit in Johnstons more general language was the notion that the 47 Strom Thurmond Inaugural Address (1947), L. Mendel Rivers Papers, Special Collections, College of Charleston, South Carolina [Her eafter cited as Rivers Papers, Special Collections]. The State (June 7, 1950) 1, (January 20, 1950) 4. Greenville News (January 19, 1950) 4. News and Courier (June 7, 1950) 11, (May 24, 1950) 1. 48 News and Courier (June 13, 1950) 4.

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94 rejection of education funds w ould lead to the refusal or withdrawal of other federal monies something which few in South Carolina were willing to consider.49 In truth, South Carolina whites found them selves simultaneously dependent on and at odds with the federal government. In 1950 white South Carolinians still hoped for a political solution to the segregation probl em. Though they were discouraged by the federal governments burgeoning interests in r acial matters, white South Carolinians were not yet convinced that fe deral authorities would ch allenge local customs beyond demanding compliance with the Plessy decision. So, the question for white South Carolinians became: Since we cannot do without federal funding, can we at least manage those monies at the state and local level so as not to jeopardize segreg ated arrangements? As Johnston had suggested, the dilemma over federal money went far beyond education funds. It was also apparent at S outh Carolinas Cold War military bases. For example, Fort Jackson in Columbia was sc heduled for closure in 1949 but the build up for the Korean War saved the facility, which became an im portant training facility for soldiers headed to Asia. Between 1949 and 1951, city and state leaders fought to keep the economically important base open. Ev en after Fort Jackson initiated token integration in 1950, local newspaper editors and city leaders conspire d to keep news of the bases desegregation out of the public eye.50 The closest that Thurmond came to menti oning the desegregation of Fort Jackson was when he harangued Johnston for allowing President Truman to desegregate the armed forces. Even though Johnston had no direct authority over military matters, the 49 News and Courier (June 10, 1950) 3. Campaign Letter to South Carolina Voters (June 26, 1950), Johnston Papers, MPC. 50 Myers, Black, White, and Olive Drab.

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95 governor charged that Johnston did nothing to counter th e presidents move. Upon hearing Thurmonds accusation, the Senator stood up from his seat and yelled, I want to tell you. . you are a liar! A visibly a ngry Thurmond responded by waiting outside the courthouse, where he attempted to attack Johnston as the senato r exited the building. After the two candidates were physically se parated, Johnston bra gged that after the campaign, he would fix up Thurmond. I was a boxer in the army and Ill knock the hell out of him in one blow, said Johnston. In the end, the exchange was remembered more for the two mens histrionics than fo r their discussion of desegregation in the military.51 Generally, Thurmond was unable to convince enough white voters to reject federal money of any kind. According to histor ian Kari Fredrickson, Thurmond and the Dixiecrats achieved so much success in 1948 precisely because the organization had persuaded southerners to unify against the me nace of federal author ity. Rural elites and business leaders had combined forces to mainta in the privileges of whiteness. Two years later it was Olin Johnston who most eff ectively called for unity. While Thurmond advocated breaking away from the national pa rty, Johnston encouraged southerners to work together in Congress to thwart civi l rights legislation, and he did so while simultaneously promising to maintain a hi gh level of federal investment in South Carolinas economy. Unlike Thurmond, who calle d for a continuation of Dixiecrat-like political separatism, Johnston insisted that it was possible to retain a large measure of local control over federal m oney. Combined with his long history of protecting 51 News and Courier (June 27, 1950) 1.

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96 segregation, the support of work ing whites, and the unlikely support of South Carolinas African American voters, this agenda ul timately carried the senator to victory.52 Still, Thurmonds ability to capture over 40 percent of the vote against an avowed segregationist like Johnston was evidence that some incendiary race-baiting was an effective campaign strategy for winning consider able numbers of white votes, especially in the states black belt. Had Thurmond faced an opponent whose reputation for white supremacy did not equal his own (such as Senator Maybank), he may have been even more successful. Nonetheless, even this limited success worried black activists who determined that the only defense against futu re race-baiting during election season was to prove that black ballots were as important in each election as they had been in the Thurmond-Johnston race. This was no easy ta sk. Though they were in strumental in the senatorial primary, black voters had almost no effect in the Rivers-Clement contest. African American leaders realized that wit hout additional electoral success they would be unable to convince many white politic ians to address black concerns. It was with this strategy in mind that African Americans in Charleston soon attempted to recreate the coali tion that helped elect Johnst on in 1950. In the Charleston mayoral election of 1951 Clement and other prominent members of Charlestons black community endorsed O.T. Wallace, a moderate white. Wallace returned the favor by openly campaigning to black voters. Voti ng machines were located in Clements insurance office and in an A.M.E church. For his efforts, Wallace received scathing rebukes from the News and Courier The Charleston daily declared that Wallace was pandering to African American bloc-vo ting, and even accused Wallace of making 52 Frederickson, Dixiecrat Revolt 200-216.

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97 backdoor promises to black community. Clem ent countered that whites had engaged in bloc-voting based on racism for 50 years an d proclaimed that whites had put men into office and statutes on the books that ma de African Americans go in side doors, sit in galleries, ride in the rear of buses. With the help of many black voters Wallace was able to force a run-off election with William Morrison. Morrison easily defeated Wallace in the run off by winning nearly all the wh ite vote, but Wallace did retain significant support in the mostly black areas of Char leston. In the wards with the highest concentration of black residents he receive d almost 4,000 votes compared to Morrisons total of just over 3,300. Wall aces strong showing was worrisome for segregationists because it demonstrated that ambitious wh ite candidates might be willing to ally themselves with African Am ericans. White South Carolinians recognized that any further extension of voting right s to African American s could create the potential for such a coalition to unseat conservative white o fficeholders and thus ensuring that South Carolinas white supremacists would seek to undermine white moderates while simultaneously limiting black political activism.53 As Mendel Rivers had suggested during hi s campaign against Clement, it was the possibility of an increase in th ese kinds of moderate biracial alliances that most worried South Carolina segregationists. White leader s understood that if th ey adopted a hard-line stance against federal intervention they risked losing the support of mainstream whites who for the time being at least were e qually concerned with economic issues. The senatorial primary election in 1950 had divi ded white voters and revealed the fragile nature of white solidarity on the segregation i ssue. Of course, it also demonstrated to 53 Bulletin entitled Pre-Election Rally (July 23, 1951), McCray Papers, SCL. News and Courier (July 11, 1951) 1, and (July 25, 1951) 1. Arthur Clement Letter to the Editor, News and Courier (July 21, 1951) 4.

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98 South Carolinas political elite that most whites wanted to maintain the status quo and forestall dramatic racial change. More important, however, the election proved that when whites were politically divided African American votes coul d turn the tide of a close election to a more moderate candidate. In the wake of those realizations, it seemed to South Carolinas mainstream segregationi sts that white unity would be the most effective tool in the fight to preserve the racial hierarchy in South Carolina.

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99 CHAPTER 4 STRADDLING THE FENCE: POLITICS AND AMBIGUITY ON THE EVE OF BROWN In the preBrown period, most white South Caro linians endorsed measures that threatened militant resistance to forced desegregation, such as public school closure, but had not given up hope that a polit ical or bureaucratic solution could halt, or at least slow the pace of, racial change before the state would actually need to carry out those threats. More moderate whites understood that, unt il the courts reached a final verdict in Briggs v. Elliott there were other less incendiary ways of forestalling significant racial change in South Carolina. Moreover, even after that cas e was settled, most white realized that the states response would depend on the federa l governments willi ngness and ability to enforce the United States Supreme Courts d ecision, and that was by no means clear. As this chapter reveals, the tensions and am biguities created by those uncertainties were exposed during the presidential election of 1952 as the debate over the relative merits of accepting federal funds and the restrictions that came with them began to take on a more anxious tone. Differing commitments to resisting desegregation, a multitude of competing economic concerns, and lingering apprehensions over the future of public education in South Carolina created an uncertain political environment for the states white elected officials. Even though hardcore segregati onists had used legislative malaportionment, white fear, and a potent propaganda campa ign to control the public debate over desegregation in the early 1950s. The 1950 prim ary elections had confirmed that whites

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100 in the upstate textile regions and urban areas were as influenced by economic concerns as they were by the emerging challenges to Jim Crow. At the forefront of white economic concerns was a determination to maintain a high level of federal spending in South Carolina. Even middl e and working class whites who demanded a militant resistance to encroachme nts on white privilege tended to demand more not less federal aid. Federal jobs, especially defense industry jobs in South Carolinas black belt, were viewed by many working class whites as a path into the middle class and toward economic security. Therefore, even as tensions over the desegregation crisis began to escalate in the mid-to-late 1950s, white elites were under enormous pressure to maintain the flow of defense dollars into South Carolina. South Carolinas segregationist leaders we re mindful of these concerns and, despite a near uniform devotion to segregation, the states most uncompromising white supremacists worried that some white b acksliders might eventually endorse a compromise on the desegregation issue if it came with desirable economic benefits. Therefore, the architects of South Carolinas strategy for preserving Jim Crow worked to find legal and legislative solutions that woul d attract hardcore se gregationists without jeopardizing support from more moderate wh ites. During the campaign for Governor James F. Byrness equalizati on plan, for example, Lieutena nt Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr., First District Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, and other equalization advocates argued that the plan would cure multiple problems. In addition to the governors pledge that equalization would help preserve segregation in education Byrnes and his supporters also promised that it would improve South Carolinas failing school systems and, therefore, promote economic improvements.

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101 Whites understood that federal monies thre atened to jeopardi ze local control, thereby complicating white desires for bot h economic advancement and less federal interference. Although a few white leaders, such as former Governor Strom Thurmond and Byrnes, had questioned whether the state could maintain both its reliance on federal funds and its autonomy to ma nage race relations, most el ected officers ignored those worries and argued that insisting on local cont rol of such monies wa s more prudent than refusing them altogether even when those demands were ignored by bureaucrats in Washington D.C. After all, the looming threat of civil rights activism was not an entirely new phenomenon. South Carolinians had ev aded federal nondiscrimination efforts before. For example, during World War II, au thorities at the Charleston Naval Yard had essentially ignored the Fair Employment Pr actices Committee (FEPC). Local officials were charged with enforcing the rules rega rding equality in the workplace and, in Charleston, they simply allowed significan t racial discrimination to continue. Encouraged by their ability to circumvent executive order 8802 in South Carolinas defense industry, state leader s were confident that, even if the courts did order the desegregation of white schools, deadlines fo r compliance could be pushed back years or even decades. Many elected officers hoped that lax federal enforcement of court-ordered desegregation would help diminish the scope of racial change and slow the pace of compliance to less than a crawl.1 Whether or not the state c ould continue to utilize such evasive tactics, however, was an unanswered question in the early to mid-1950s. Regardless, white economic leaders continued to demand an active federal ro le in the states local economies. John E. 1 Fritz Hamer, A Southern City Enters the Twentieth Century: Charleston, its Navy Yard, and World War II, 1940-1948, (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1998).

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102 Hills, the Executive Secretary of the Columb ia Merchants Association, for instance, wrote to United States Senator Burnet Mayba nk in May 1952 to express his delight at the possibility that more troops may be sent to the desegregated Fort Jackson. Hills bragged that Columbia offered the superi or advantage of having available jobs and excellent housing facilities, including an enormous project not yet completed, for the families of service men.2 Maybank, like most other South Carolina politicians, recogni zed that federal monies were one of his most important sour ces of political capital. The senator told Columbia Mayor J. Macfie Anderson that he had made repeated request for additional troops at Jackson. Maybank also promised to use whatever influence I have on the subcommittee of the Appropriations Comm ittee, to bring more money the South Carolina midlands. Still, Anderson worried that, as part of the post-World War II military downsizing, the base might be threaten ed with closure. Fort Jackson means a lot to Columbia, the mayor wrote, and we w ould hate to have this happen again if the Korean situation were settled. 3 Andersons call for an increas e in the number of troops stationed at Fort Jackson occurred shortly after the United States Congress debated a measure to allow all deployed service men and women to vote with absentee ballots. In March 1952, Truman proposed a Servicemens Bill of Rights. The propos ition declared that all military personnel 2 John E. Hills to Burnet R. Maybank (May 2, 195 2) Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. 3 J. Macfie Anderson to Burnet R. Maybank (September 26, 1952), Maybank to Anderson (October 2, 1952), Frank E. McKinney, Chairman Democratic National Committee, to Burnet Maybank (April 10, 1952) Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. Voting in the Armed Forces: Message from The President of the United States transmitting The Report of the Special Committee on Service voting, American political science association, with recommendations for the enactment of appropriate legislation, (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, March 28, 1952) from the Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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103 should be able to vote in primary and gene ral elections without paying a poll tax, without registering in person, and without unreasonable restrictions, such as literacy tests. Much to the chagrin of southern segregationi sts, the legislation w ould have extended the vote to every African American soldier on deployment.4 As the state moved closer to the elec tions of 1952, however, questions about the states ability to control congressionally allocated funds became more numerous. Though they attempted to minimize the federal overs ight that came with this revenue, South Carolinas elected representatives were not al ways successful in pr eventing the expansion of federal jurisdiction. For instance, when First District Congressman L. Mendel Rivers called for a plan of optional segregation for military trainees, the House Armed Services Committee rejected his proposal even though a fe llow southerner, Georgia Congressman Carl Vinson, chaired the committee.5 As had been the case since the Dixiecrat defection in 1948, the contradictory nature of the states relationship to the federal government created tensions within South Carolinas one-party political system. Even mo re moderate South Carolinians, such as Senator Burnet Maybank, occasionally preached opposition to the national Democratic Party even though his rank within that pa rty allowed him to secure significant investments in the South Carolina economy. Maybank had been a staunch New Dealer and was committed to most of the Democr atic Partys economic and foreign policy programs, but, in the spring of 1952 even he called on the Charleston County Democratic Committee to oppose the weird, socialistic and unsound proposals, of the national 4 Ibid. 5 Will Huntley, Mighty Rivers of Ch arleston, (Ph.D. Dissertation: Un iversity of South Carolina, 1993), 152.

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104 party. We Southern Democrats, wrote Mayb ank, have a great responsibility at this period of or National life and I hope that we will all stand together with sufficient strength to insist on the Part y adhering to its basic Jeffersoni an principles and following its historic policies.6 Despite these apprehensions and frustrations with the national party, nearly every southern Democrat shared a hope that party leaders would find a way to alleviate these acute partisan divisions before the upcoming presidential election. In the spring of 1952, many white South Carolinians placed their hopes for party reconciliation with the presidential candidacy of Georgia Senator Ri chard Russell, who was one of the regions most prominent segregationist leaders. On February 29, 1952 the South Carolina General Assembly adopted a concurrent resolution th at endorsed the senato rs candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the presidency a nd praised Russell as eminently qualified for that high honor. It claimed that he stood for constitutional Government, the American way of life, the rights of the States and la uded Russells integrity and knowledge of the workings of our Government.7 Nevertheless, even with the endorsement of the South Carolina legislature and numerous other southern political leaders, Russell had very little chance of winning the nomination. The greater like lihood of a Democratic nominee emerging with at least a modest interest in civil rights reforms worried South Carolina Democr ats. The political situation in South Carolina, warned Ma ybank is very bad for the Democrats. Moreover, he predicted that either of the top Republican candidates, Dwight D. 6 Burnet Maybank to J.P. Wilcox, Chairman of th e Charleston County Demo cratic Executive Committee (April 7, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. 7 Copy of the Resolution from the Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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105 Eisenhower and Senator Robert Taft, could carry the state. The people are very bitter about the Civil Rights Program, the Supreme Court opinions, etc., explained Maybank.8 Senator Maybanks worries took on an ev en more serious note after numerous prominent white South Carolinians endorsed Eise nhower in the presidential contest. H. Sanford Howie, Jr. of Greenville, for exam ple, wrote to Byrnes to encourage the governor to lend his support to Eisenhower unless, of course, a pro-segregation southerner was named as the Democratic nominee. Too long we have allowed the Northern wing of the party to completely ignore our interests and candidates, Howie warned. He claimed that to vote Republica n. . would not mean a divorce from the Democratic Party.9 This growing resentment of the national Democratic Party, Eisenhowers personal appeal, and increased GOP overtures to s outhern voters made the outcome of the presidential election of 1952 esp ecially hard to predict. Fu rthermore, the elimination of legal limits on participation in primary elections by Judge J. Waties Waring in Brown v. Baskin had helped to foster an increase of n early 140 percent in the number of registered voters in South Carolina between 1948 a nd 1952. According to political scientist Gregory Sampson these new, relatively inde pendent party members were less inclined to trust party elders, and more likely to take an unpredictable path at the polls. This trend was exemplified by a new grass roots citizen s club in Charleston that urged its members to capture control of local Democr atic Party machinery so its members could 8 Maybank to Wright Morrow, Democratic National Committeeman for Texas (January 11, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Pape rs, Special Collections. 9 H. Sanford Howie, Jr. to James F. Byrnes (July 11, 1952) copy in the Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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106 more effectively pressure the national party to reverse its drift toward the political left. By the spring of 1952 similar grass roots or ganizations had formed throughout the South Carolina black belt and began to function as loosely organized inte rests groups within South Carolinas Democratic Party.10 Despite this uncertain and fluid context the South Carolina Democratic Party still hoped to avoid another contentious schism like the one that blossomed during the 1948 presidential election. Nonethel ess, every indication was that the party remained divided into two distinct factions. Democratic loya lists and their political allies who had opposed the Dixiecrat revolt and supported the New Deal and its Fair D eal successor held most of the major leadership positions in the state pa rty. The loyalist fac tion was particularly popular with the states large population of wh ite textile workers a nd with some white farmers in the piedmont and upstate regi ons. The more conservative faction was personified by Governors Byrnes and Thurmond. It promoted racial conservatism and a pro-business environment. The new grass ro ots groups tended to side with the Byrnes wing of the party and served to exacerbate the existing political rift by attempting to challenge the leadership of loyalists like State Senator Edgar Brown, House Speaker Sol Blatt, and Senator Olin D. Johnston. Th e loyalist faction, however, was deeply entrenched in the Democratic Partys power structure and was able to limit the influence of the new organizations. After finding it di fficult to undermine the more entrenched 10 Gregory Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina, 1948-1974: A Case Study of Political Change in a Deep South State, (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of North Carolina, 1984) 217-219, 230. News and Courier (January 30, 1952) 2.

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107 members of the party, the citizens clubs refocused their efforts on organizing a movement to place Eisenhower on the st ates ballot as an independent. 11 Though their impact was limited within th e Democratic Party, these new groups were able to exert enormous political pressure on some Sout h Carolina politicians. For example, one group, the Grass Roots Crusade, targeted Congressman Rivers with subtle reminders of his white constituents allegiance to states rights. In many ways, Rivers was an unlikely target for any conservative political organization. He was a diehard segregationists and a strict anti-communist. N onetheless, his uncertain efforts to navigate the intersections of local and national politic s regarding racial and sectional concerns encapsulated the dilemmas facing white segregationist politicians on the eve on the Brown decision. Despite his record, the Collet on County Grass Roots Crusade wrote to Rivers in April 1952 and urged th e congressman to use his bes t efforts to protect States Rights . and to see that the Constitution is preserved. Rivers wholeheartedly agreed and bragged to the organization that he had spoken out on the issue of States Rights in 1948, and wished the Grass Roots Crusade had b een around then to take action. I shall continue to exert every effort to see that States Rights are uphel d, promised Rivers. What remained to be seen, however, was how Rivers would traverse another Dixiecratlike political schism within his own part y. Though the congressman and the newly 11 The various factions of the South Carolina Democratic Party are discussed in: Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958). Frank E. Jordan, The Primary State: A History of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, 1876-1962 (c.1965, no publication information av ailable). Paul Quattlebaum to James Lee Platt, Myrtle Beach News (March 15, 1952), Quattlebaum Papers, Thurmond Institute. 11 For information on Thurmonds sabbatical see Jack Bass and Marilyn Thompson, Ol Strom: an Unauthorized Biography of Strom Thurmond (Atlanta: Longstreet, 1998) 135-138. Jack Bass and Marilyn Thompson, Strom: The Complicated Personal and Political Life of Strom Thurmond (New York: Public Affairs, 2005) 136-152 For a discussion of Byrnes relationship with the Dixiecrats after 1948, see Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt 180-229.

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108 organized pressure group seemed to be in complete agreement, the Grass Roots Crusade was less committed to party loyalty than Ri vers, who had narrowly avoided the loss of congressional seniority for his part icipation in the Dixiecrat revolt. 12 What little unity that was left in South Carolinas Democratic Party was tested in July when both major parties held their na tional conventions. Although it was not as contentious as the 1948 convention, the De mocratic National Convention revealed continued factionalism and dissent within the party. For example, the convention members approved a measure that required dele gates to sign a loyalt y pledge promising to vote for whoever was the official nominee of the party. In anticipation of a fight over the partys civil rights plank, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Virginia declined to comply with the pledge, but, in an effort to avoid the walkouts that had plagued the convention in 1948, each of the rebellious delegations was eventually seated.13 In this environment of rancor and di vision, deciding on a nominee proved difficult for the Democratic delegates. Convention attendees made several efforts to find a candidate who could unite the fractured pa rty before nominating Adlai Stevenson. Though he was more liberal than many of th e southern delegate s would have liked, Stevenson was generally viewed as a modera te candidate who was unlikely to push for rapid change in the Souths Jim Crow system. Stevenson did, however, hold an unfavorable view of racial se gregation. To decrease the likelihood of another southern walk-out, a concession was made with the na ming of Alabama Senator John J. Sparkman 12 Alice T. Beckett, Secretary of he Colleton County Citizens Grass Roots Crusade, to L. Mendel Rivers (April 21, 1952), L. Mendel Rivers to Alice T. Beckett, April 23, 1952, Rivers Papers, SCHS. 13 Congressional Quarterlys Guide to United States Elections, Third Edition (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994) 108.

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109 as the partys vice-presidential candidate. Sparkman was a moderate, but his record confirmed that he would use his authority to su pport the maintenan ce of segregation. Commenting on his nomination, The Nation declared: If the nomination of Sparkman was a slap in the face of the Negro voters, it was given a special sting by the dishonest atte mpt to induce Negroes to accept him as something he is not and to justify his record on the grounds that, after all, a Southern liberal must hedge on civil rights measures.14 African Americans within the convention were equally outraged. Fifty black delegates led by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York bolted the convention. They can cram a candidate down our throat, but th ey cannot make us vote for him, declared Powell.15 Both parties adopted a civil rights plank in their platforms, but the Republicans seemed less inclined to disregard states right s in favor of federal intervention in racial matters. Their plank stated: We believe th at it is the primary responsibility of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions. S till, the Republicans conceded, the Federal Government should take suppl emental action within its constitutional jurisdiction to oppose discrimination against race, religion or na tional origin. The Democrats avoided any explicit discussion of states rights and adopted a much more forceful civil rights plank, calling for effort s to eradicate discri mination based on race, religion, or national origin.16 South Carolina Democratic l oyalists recognized the need to rally party members in the face of doubts about the national Democrats commitment to states rights, and were 14 The Nation (August 1952). 15 Ibid 16 Congressional Quarterlys Guide to United States Elections, 108.

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110 also faced with the unenviable task of c ountering Republican overtures to southern whites. By the fall of 1952 a growing faction within the Republican Party, led by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, had stated its support of curtailing the rapid e xpansion of the federal government. Though many southerners may not ha ve agreed wholeheartedly with Tafts particular brand of conservatism, any rhetor ic that called for limits on federal activism were appealing to diehard segregationists who feared an active federal role in the expansion of black civil and political rights. Moreover, conservative Republicans, such as Taft, openly supported states rights a nd the GOPs nominee, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was generally viewed as the more conservative candidate in the presidential election. After nearly a century of one-party rule in the South, more southern whites than ever began to question their loya lty to the Democratic Party. Greenville Mayor J. Kenneth Cass called the Democratic separatists rebel rousers, while Edgar Brown, who directed the Stevenson-Sparkman campaign in South Carolina, predicted that many good peopl e would vote for Eise nhower, and that the Republican supporters would organize a defi nite Eisenhower campaign and try to make a strong showing in the State. To counter th is challenge Brown insi sted that rallies, speakers, radio programs, and a significan t fundraising effort would be necessary to support the Stevenson campaign in South Caroli na. The Democratic Party stalwart was clearly worried about th e rising popular support for the Republican nominee.17 Brown and Cass had good reasons to be alarme d. In the late summer and early fall Governor James F. Byrnes, Mount Pleas ant Mayor Francis Coleman, and former Charleston Mayor Thomas P. Stoney all announced their su pport of Eisenhower. Stoney 17 J. Kenneth Case to Burnet R. Maybank (August 8, 1952), Edgar Brown to Burnet R. Maybank (August 8, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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111 went so far as to say, Stevenson has a loaded gun and its pointed at the heart of the South. Coleman declared, If we endorse the national party platform, it will be a mandate to the United States Supreme Court to do away with segrega tion in the South. I beg you not to endorse the nominees of the Democratic national party and thus put a straitjacket on South Carolina, and Byrnes proclaimed, I shall place loyalty to my country above loyalty to a political party a nd vote for General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The GOP nominee was also promised positive press coverage in the black belt areas when he received the endorsements of prom inent newspapermen Thomas R. Waring and William D. Workman. 18 Of course, Byrnes and other state Demo crats could support Eisenhower without the threat of losing congressional seniority in Wa shington D.C. With leading South Carolina Democrats divided over how best to respond to the nominees and platforms of the two major parties, and confronted by the formati on of a grass roots revo lt against the national party, the states congressiona l representatives were left with a difficult decision. Initially, the entire South Carolina contingent to the United States Congress decided that the threat of losing seniority was so strong that each of th e states congressmen gave his support to Stevenson.19 Like his fellow congressmen, Rivers endorsed Stevenson. However, he also signed the petition calling on the stat e party not to punish indivi duals who in good conscience voted independent. Rivers was in a particul arly precarious situati on as he attempted to strike a balance between his out raged constituents a nd the threat of losing his seniority 18 Ibid The State (September 19, 1952) 1. News and Courier (August 20, 1952) 3A. 19 L. Mendel Rivers to Paul Quattlebaum, Jr (August 20, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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112 within the national Democratic Party. Th e congressmans district had a substantial number of hardcore segregationists and his attempt to have his cake and eat it too was unpopular with the leadership of the Grass R oots Crusade. Crusade member and former State Senator Paul Quattlebaum felt Rivers decision to sign the resolution allowing Democrats to vote for Eisenhower without repercussions while formally endorsing Stevenson was hypocritical. He told the c ongressman, I have always supported you because we could tell how you stood. But this issue puts you in the same boat with [Senators] Maybank and Johnston. I did not think that I would ever see you ride the fence.20 Rivers worried that an organized attack from even a small white pressure group would undermine his credibility with segrega tionist voters. Though he was unlikely to face a serious challenge from the political right, Rivers did worry that a divided conservative vote would create an opportunity for a biracial moderate alliance to emerge in the Low Country region. Moreover, he cha ffed at the suggestion th at he was less than forthright about his commitment to states rights and was insulted by any questions about his devotion to the preservation of Jim Crow. In a letter to Quattlebaum, he wrote: I know the generous spirit which prompted your letter and I can assure you I accept it as such. I am amazed you didnt k now I was against this [Truman] administration. I believe I have been more outspoken than any other South Carolinian. I am also amazed that you thi nk I am straddling the fence. I have stated publicly I propose to vote for th e Stevenson-Sparkman Ticket unless pressure groups make it impossible for me to do so. This is still my position. If Stevenson and Sparkman should attack the institutions of the South as did Truman in I would oppose them as I did Truman and I would advocate a third party. This year things are not similar.21 20 Paul Quattlebaum, Jr. to L. Mendel Rivers (August 16, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS. 21 L. Mendel Rivers to Paul Quattlebaum, Jr (August 20, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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113 Nonetheless, Rivers understood that Eisenhower had received a groundswell of popular support in South Carolina and that mo st of those endorsements had come from the First Congressional District. Ever the po litical pragmatist, Rive rs left the door open for a political change of heart and insiste d, I have not made up my mind the part I propose to take in this campaign other than vo te. Conveniently, he arranged to be out of the country on a congressional trip for most of September so that he would have little time to take much part in the campaign. Rivers, like many southern Democrats, hoped to protect his congressional seniority without taking part in the presidential campaign.22 His attempt to juggle cont radictory agendas, however, became even more problematic in the wake of the South Caro lina Democratic Convention. Less than three weeks after the convention, members of the Grass Roots Crusade and other citizens groups banded together to form South Caro linians for Eisenhower. The organization, which was directed by Columbia attorney Ge orge Warren, circulated a petition to place an independent slate of electors on the ballo t. In less than a month it had over 50,000 signatures. Few members of South Carolinia ns for Eisenhower had previous political experience, but the group was able to mount a well-organized and well-funded campaign in a relatively short time. Its biggest supporter was Governor Byrnes, who not only endorsed the movement but also campai gned across the state for Eisenhowers candidacy.23 22 Ibid 23 Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Movement and the Origins of Massi ve Resistance: Race, Politics, and Political Culture in the Deep South States, 1932-1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1996) 454455. News and Courier (September 15, 1952) 1. Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina, 225-227. Records from the South Carolinians for Eisenh ower, Modern Political Collections, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as Records from the South Ca rolinians for Eisenhower, MPC] these papers consist mostly of a financial ledger from the organization.

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114 Still, even with the endorsement of Byrn es and a strong grass roots following in the black belt, Eisenhower had a tough row to hoe in South Carolina. He was on the ticket as an independent, but voters knew that a vi ctory for Eisenhower would place a Republican in the White House for the first time in tw o decades. Former Charleston Mayor Thomas Stoney worried that unless we can get down to th e precinct level and r eally sell the littler farmer and the textile employees on just what the National Democratic platform, if carried out, will mean to them, I am very much afraid that we are whistling in the dark. In response to such fears, the Grass Root s Crusade handed out pamphlets and collected campaign contributions on behalf of the South Carolinians for Eisenhower. The new group quickly became a large mainstream orga nization and established a headquarters at the Jefferson Hotel in Columbia. South Carolinians for Eisenhower was so successful that it quickly eclipsed the states sma ll Republican Party in both numbers and organization.24 One possible problem for the independe nt movement, however, was that Eisenhowers name appeared on the ballot twice. The printed ballot had a column for the Republican Party on the left side, the Democrats in the middle, and the independent electors for Eisenhower on the right. The or ganization spent a significant amount of time urging voters to support the independent m ovement and not split the Eisenhower vote by voting in the Republican column. Pamphlets told voters: To vote for IKE, vote on the 24 Thomas P. Stoney to Paul Quattlebaum, Jr. (September 9, 1952), Thomas P. Stoney Papers, South Carolina Historical Socieity, Char leston, South Carolina. Records from the South Carolinians for Eisenhower, MPC. For a discussion on the independent movement in South Carolina see: Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina, 225-227. Fredrickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt 224-236.

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115 right. By the end of the election, even S outh Carolinas Republican Party had called on its members to vote for their candi date in the independent column.25 The members of South Carolinians for Ei senhower and other southern Eisenhower supporters were especially encouraged when the former general made a campaign swing through the region. Before the 1952 campai gn, presidential electioneering by the GOP rarely took place in the South. Eisenhower however, exploited the white southern perception that Democratic Party leaders were taking the section for granted. The Republican candidate told a Little Rock audience, There is a mounting mass of evidence, to show that you are in no ones co lumn, that you are not in a captive precinct, and you are going to express your judgment and your decisions as you see fit. Eisenhower also made a stop in Columbia, S outh Carolina, during which he promised to uphold the constitutional principle of states right s. In the Palmetto State, his visit was not sponsored by the Republican Party, but by South Carolinians for Eisenhower and Governor Byrnes.26 Thanks to such efforts, the Republican became the candidate of choice for many black belt whites who began to pressure loca l political leaders to jump on the Eisenhower bandwagon. Rivers told Representative E. E. Cox of Georgias Second Congressional District: In my locality people are frenzied. Just about everybody who is anybody is supporting Eisenhower. It is very possibl e that I will have to make a strong statement in his behalf before the election. I have never seen such bitter opposition to Truman and Stevenson as exists in th e whole South Carolina Low country from Columbia South. I am not certain Eisenhow er can carry South Carolina, but he is 25 Ibid 26 Eisenhower quoted in: Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 178-180.

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116 going to get a whale of a vote . Jim Byrnes is really going to bat for Eisenhower. He made a fire-eating speech in my hometo wn of Charleston last night and I am waiting to get the results.27 Three days later, on October 25, Rivers caved to constituent pressure and issued a public statement endorsing Eisenhower. Ea ger to rationalize his abandonment of Stevenson, Rivers professed his loyalty to the Democratic Party of John C. Calhoun, Thomas Jefferson, and Wade Hampton, but cl aimed that the national party had been captured and was controlled by elements with ideologies foreign to democracy. He insisted the partys turn to the left was a result of dangerous outsiders with communistic ideas. In a nod to Cold War xenophobia, Rive rs declared, America has been a mecca for many people from across the seas. They have come to this country and grown rich beyond their wildest dreams, and many of them now seek to change the very type and form of Government under which they have waxed so rich. Many of these people are now charting the course of the National Democratic Part y. Although Rivers never explained who these people we re, his diatribe struck a c hord with white southerners who were similarly convinced that outsiders we re intent on wreaking havoc with their way of life.28 Rivers worked throughout the fall to convi nce voters he had not changed his basic ideological position. When Governor Steven son was nominated at Chicago, I had hopes that he would lead the party of our fathers b ack to the road of St ates Rights and local government, said Rivers, but upon my return from a harrowing trip abroad, I find that the Democratic campaign has sunk to a low typi cal of Fair Deal supporters. He claimed 27 L. Mendel Rivers to E.E. Cox (October 22, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS. 28 Statement by Congressman L. Mendel Rivers (October 25, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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117 Truman had taken over the campaign and point ed out that, in a recent speech in New York, the president proclaimed a strong Civ il Rights program. He advocated a Federal FEPC law of the strongest kind, with teeth in it. Accord ing to Rivers, Stevenson had vigorously supported these propos als. Rivers, who was no stranger to hyperbole, warned his constituents that his decision to support the independent movement could cost him his political job, but he claimed any other acti on would cost him his self-respect. It is often the practice of some Democrats, when they dont like their candidate, to go fishing come Election Day, said Rivers, I call these men cowards. The congressman argued that it was the responsib ility of every good citizen to vote.29 Once Rivers made the jump onto the Eise nhower bandwagon he was a vocal leader in the independent movement. He told his c onstituents that he was well within his rights as a South Carolina Democrat to suppor t Eisenhower. The state party had given permission for any Democrat to stand up in de fense of states rights. Rivers announced, I followed this course in 1948 . Only a fool would think that I have changed during that short span of years. He insisted, T o me, however, the responsibility of every good citizen is to vote his, or her, honest convictions, and I insist on having a similar right, and I will take it . I am not a slave and will never be pulling an oar on the galley ship of State. Come Election Day, it is my intention to cast my vote for the Democratic electors for Eisenhower.30 29 Ibid 30 Greenville News (October 26, 1952) 1. News and Courier (October 26, 1952) 1A. News and Courier (October 26, 1952) 4A. L. Mendel Rivers to Robert L. Scott (November 4, 1952), Hampton Guardian (n.d.), and the Jasper Record (October 29, 1952), from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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118 Privately, however, Rivers was less dogmatic. In his letter to Georgia Representative Cox he wrote, I have ma de it my policy to always do everything my constituents ask . I always also try to st raddle every fence on which I can conveniently stand on both sides. Rivers, like most othe r politicians in South Carolinas black belt, chose not to fight the politi cal currents sweeping through the Low Country. Despite his public pronouncements, Rivers knew that th e Stevenson campaign had not changed its message since the convention. No subsequent statement by Stevenson had called for civil rights more forcefully than did the platfo rm adopted at the pa rtys convention. If anything, Stevenson had purposely tried to di stance himself from Truman and his civil rights programs. What had changed since the convention, however, was the level of support for Eisenhower in the Low Country ; a phenomenon which reflected both the personal appeal of the Repub lican candidate and increased white anxiety about the perceived civil rights agenda of the Democratic Party. These political realities prompted Rivers decision to break ranks w ith Stevenson and support Eisenhower.31 In a very short time, South Carolini ans for Eisenhower had built a powerful campaign and altered the state election ba llots. By Election Day, over 53,000 voters had signed petitions to place Eise nhower on the ballot as an i ndependent. That support was so strong that the Republican Party had attemp ted to remove itself from the ballot so as not to confuse voters, but th e ballots had already been printed. Moreover, South 31 L. Mendel Rivers to E.E. Cox (October 22, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS. Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: th e Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994) 117-120. Fredrickson, The Dixiecrat Movement, 200-300.

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119 Carolinians for Eisenhower had raised nearly $100,000 within South Carolina and pressured politicians, like Rivers, to jump on the Eisenhower bandwagon.32 Although Rivers agonized over his decision and was a latecomer to the cause, the choice to support Eisenhower was, ultimately, not a difficult one for many South Carolina whites. The former general seemed to transcend party affiliation. He was a popular leader with widespread name recogni tion and most South Carolinians considered him the most racially conservative candidate Of course, many southerners were also impressed by Eisenhowers notable military cr edentials. For some, it was his military career that lent credence to the notion that he would also maintain high levels of federal spending at defense installations. The combin ation of these factors made Eisenhower an appealing candidate to white South Carolini ans. His perceived racial conservatism attracted hardcore segregationists and more moderate whites who feared that increased federal interests in the management of lo cal race relations would push more and more whites into the hardcore camp. Indeed, for mo st whites it appeared as if Eisenhower was the candidate most likely to slow federal involvement in civil rights matters while simultaneously maintaining a high degree of Cold War military spending in the South. It was no coincidence then that the Stevenson-Sparkman campaigns most concerted attempt to diminish Eisenhowers appeal in the black belt was targeted at defense workers. The Democrats implied th at a Republican victory would cause the loss of jobs in Low Country defense industries Stevenson campaign officials argued that Eisenhower would dole out pa tronage to Republican congressmen and limit funding to Democratic states. No South Carolinian was in a better position to refute such claims 32 Slim Suttles Viewing the South from Washington: Weekly Review of the Washington Scene As it Affects the South (October 31, 1952), from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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120 than Rivers. The congressmans position on the Armed Services Committee and his reputation for steering defense dollars to the region made him a local authority on military spending. It is an insult to the inte lligence of these fine, patriotic Americans for these self-styled leaders of th e Stevenson movement to try to pressure these employees into believing that a vote for Eisenhower would affect these installations, Rivers insisted. Congressman Rivers encouraged workers at Charleston s naval shipyard to vote as they please, and he promised if they voted for the Republican presidential candidate they would get every protection guaranteed by the Civil Service. Rivers explained that the funding for Charlestons military installations was specifically set aside by law and can be used for no other pur pose, and was not, th erefore dependent on who was elected to the presidency. 33 Despite such fierce opposition from Rivers and Byrnes, Stevenson won the state in 1952. He collected over 170,000 votes comp ared to Eisenhowers 165,000. Loyal Democratic voters in the piedm ont and upstate regions of th e state voted two to one in favor of Stevenson. The votes of white text ile workers and the strong support of African American voters helped the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket achieve one of its few victories. Republicans did, however, learn an important lesson during the el ection. Eisenhowers strong showing verified that the Sol id South was cracking. Eisenhower overwhelmingly carried the black-belt areas wh ere fears of widespread racial change were most acute. Riverss First Congression al District provided the most support for the independent ballot, casting ove r 65 percent of its vote to Eisenhower. The Republican also won the Second Congressional District which included the area around Columbia, 33 News and Courier (October 30, 1952), from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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121 with 60 percent of the combined independent and GOP vote, and the Sixth District with 50.29 percent. Eisenhower supporters te nded to be white working class voters who were not employed in the textile industry and who lived near large African American communities. Thus, it is not surprising that Eisenhower carried many of the same voters who had supported Strom Thurmonds bid for the Senate in 1950. However, the Republican also added a large number of white-collar workers in Charleston and Columbia to Thurmonds totals.34 As had been the case for Olin Johnston in the senatorial primary in 1950, the deciding factor for the overall success of the Stevenson campaign was the increased African American electorate. Though Stevenson made almost no official effort to reach out to black voters in South Carolina, African Americans were more comfortable with the Democratic candidate than they were with th e more conservative Eisenhower. In fact, African American voters were more likely to support Thurmond in 1948 than Eisenhower in 1952. In an election post-mortem, Gover nor Byrnes estimated that about 59,000 black voters had cast their ballots for the national Democrat. According to the governor, nearly all of Eisenhowers votes cam e from white voters. Thus, Eisenhower carried the states white vote by a significant margin. Polit ical correspondent Raymond Moley concluded that Stevensons total vote amongst South Carolina whites was a scant 114,000. Byrnes concluded that South Carolina whites ju mped on the Eisenhower bandwagon because they feared the socialistic policies adopted by the Trum an Administration. He also 34 These totals include the ballots cast in both the Republican and Independent columns. In the election the ballot totals were not combined. Had Eisenhower collected more total votes than Stevenson, but collected less ballots for the Independent ticket he still would have lost the state. News and Courier (November 11, 1952) 1A. Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina, 230-232.

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122 pointed out that Truman supported the FEPC, th e repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, and had bungled the situation in Korea.35 After Eisenhowers election, South Caroli nians for Eisenhower chose to remain a non-partisan advocacy group. Most of its members, however, refused to abandon the Democratic Party. In spite of strains am ong white voters in South Carolina and the national Democratic Party, at the local leve l South Carolina remained essentially a one party state in the 1950s. The past two presid ential elections had demonstrated disunity and factionalism within that party, but those divisions had not led to the growth of a viable opposition party in state elections. The Republican Party had little to no official structure, almost no ability to raise funds for candidates, and was incapable of electing anyone to a statewide office. In other word s, the road to politi cal success in South Carolina was through the state Democratic Pa rty and few whites were willing to abandon those advantages. Instead, they chose to pr ovide a local voice of dissent against the national partys interests in ci vil rights causes. Remaining in the Democratic Party also meant that the groups members could become a forceful informal advocacy group and a potent source of criticism fo r candidates across the state.36 Because of the newfound power of Eisenhow er supporters in state politics, the election had exacerbated tensions within the De mocratic Party as a w hole. State leaders may have been able to abandon Democratic candidates during nationa l elections without risking their status in the pa rty, but the loss of congressional seniority was a very real 35 Raymond Moley, A Political Perspective, Newsweek (December 15, 1952) 108. Byrnes, Ike, and the South, Newsweek (December 15, 1952) 31. 36 Sampson, The Rise of the New Republican Party in South Carolina, 230-264. Byrnes, Ike, and the South, Newsweek (December 15, 1952) 31.

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123 threat to the states representatives in Washington D.C. Even though congressional Democrats had chosen not to punish Dixiecrat defectors in 1948, there was no guarantee that their generosity would continue. Rivers, for example, was very concerned about sanctions from the national Democratic Party. He was determined to stay on the House Armed Services Committee, ev en if it meant changing his party affiliation. After the election the congressman wrote to House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin (R): I dont know what [House Ma jority Leader] Sam Rayburn and those are going to try to do when we reorganize but it may be necessary for me to have a talk with you before the convening for the new Congress. If you will be in Washington between now and then for any period of time, I hope you will let me see you. I am going to see [Governor] Byrnes this w eekend and discuss the future of our organization in South Carolina. Senators Maybank and Johnston were only able to beat us by a few votes. We had the larges t turnout in the history of South Carolina and Eisenhower received almost fifty percen t of the votes cast, with every big name in South Carolina against him with the exception of Jim Byrnes and me.37 Rivers also wrote fellow Armed Forces Committee member Congressman Dewey Short (R) of Missouri. Again, Rivers expre ssed concern at the fu ture actions of Sam Rayburn. He informed Short, It may be necessary for me to have a conversation with you before Congress is reorganized. I am de termined to stay on the Armed Services Committee. Rivers was not disciplined, and he remained on the Armed Services Committee, but the congressmans concerns about his ability to straddle the fence between his constituents and his national party lingered l ong after the new president took office.38 In the months after Eisenhowers electi on, little changed in South Carolina, but white anxieties remained high as the Briggs case continued to m ove slowly through the 37 L. Mendel Rivers to Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (November 6, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS. 38 L. Mendel Rivers to Dewey Short (November 6, 1952), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

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124 courts. Although many southern leaders expe cted the United States Supreme Court to rule against state sponsored racial separation, many segreg ationists hoped that the new president would name more c onservative judges to the judici ary and, therefore, slow the process of court ordered desegregation. Ot hers predicted that the more conservative Eisenhower administration would allow for lax en forcement of any judicial order. In any event, many of the states segregationist leaders found Eisenhowers politics more acceptable than his predecessors and were co mfortable with his record of supporting states rights. This relative calm, however, was mildly disrupted in April 1953 when the NAACP called on the administration to end segregat ion at Charlestons navy yard. Clarence Mitchell, the Washington Dir ector of the NAACP, chastised the Department of the Navy for allowing rigid racial segregation at th e facility. Mitchell poi nted out that African Americans were forced to use different restr ooms, drink from segregated water fountains, and dine in blacks-only dini ng halls. Since the navy yard was federal property, Mitchell called on new Secretary of the Navy, Robert B. Anderson, to end the discriminatory policies.39 The Eisenhower Administration and Secret ary Anderson were slow to respond to the NAACP demands. Throughout the spring and summer of 1953, the Charleston navy yard remained segregated and the presiden t continued to receive praise from South Carolina segregationists. For example, at the 54th Annual Governors Conference, Byrnes declared that southerners would not re turn to the Democratic Party in presidential elections so long as the partys platform incl uded calls for granting civil rights to African 39 News and Courier (April 2, 1953) 1.

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125 Americans. Southerners need not worry that their ancestors were turning over in their graves, according to Byrnes. I listened pretty carefully in our state last year, he claimed, and no noise was heard from the gr aveyards. The South Carolina governor praised Eisenhower for s upporting states rights.40 Byrness admiration of Eisenhower did not however, lead the governor to dismiss the danger that federal civil rights initiatives still posed to the racial caste system. The governor, much like Strom Thurmond in the 195 0 Democratic primary, insisted that the only way to limit federal authority was for stat es to reject federally funded projects. Byrnes declared that all 50 st ates had made the United Stat es Treasury a grab bag for local projects. He contended th at the lust for federal money inevitably led to the transfer of control from the states to the national gove rnment. I want to see the governors . who go to Washington, Byrnes proclaimed, k eep their hats on their heads instead of going hat in hand begging for money the people of their state have sent to Washington.41 Byrness call for reduced federal aid was contrary to the wishes of many of his constituents and came during a time when the state was relying more and more on federal defense spending. The Charleston Air Force Base was in the construction phase and other military bases in Charleston, Beaufort, and Columbia were struggling to maintain civilian employment levels equal to their Korean War peak. Likewise, work on the federally funded Santee-Cooper hydroelectric project, which began in the 1930s, was near completion, and federal authorities had also provided most of the funding for the Clarks Hill Dam project. 40 Ibid ., (August 6, 1953) 1. 41Ibid ., (August 4, 1953) 1.

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126 Despite Byrness foreboding, many whites and blacks jointly praised these large projects and declared them a positive influen ce on South Carolina. Indeed, it was not the prospect of an expansion of federal patronage or anxiety ov er Eisenhowers limited racial initiatives, but his call for greater fiscal responsibility and a reduction in federal expenditures that most worried South Carolinia ns. The rapid decline of defense industry jobs after World War II had wreaked havoc with state and local coffers. South Carolinas leaders were determined to avoid a similar economic collapse at the end of the Korean conflict. It is not difficult to apprecia te the intensity of these c oncerns about the future of federal funding in South Carolina. Even i ndustries and state reve nues that were not directly related to national defense ha d become dependent on Cold War military spending. For example, the South Carolina Cotton Manufacturers Association (SCCMA) vigorously protested changes in the way that the Departme nt of Defense contracted textile work. According to one member of the group, the federal governments decision to hand out defense orders like WPA jobs, contributed to the national debt by driving up prices and deprived South Carolina wo rkers of countless hours of employment to which they were entitled. In a telegram to Senator Maybank, a re presentative of the SCCMA warned that, in many cases, Sout h Carolina textile mills were already operating without profits.42 Furthermore, defense appropriations also funneled money into the states social welfare programs. Charleston and its surroundi ng counties were named critical defense areas, which made them eligible for larg e sums of additional federal money. This 42 Telegram from John K Cauthen to Burnet R. Mayb ank (February 6, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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127 money was intended to help limit the local impact of military expansion on public services and amenities. For example, in 1952 alone congress authorized over $600,000 dollars for school construction in North Charleston. According to correspondence between Maybank and Earl J. McGrath of th e United States Commission on Education, Charleston County only had to provide a loca l match of $20,000 in order to secure the funds. Also, the federal Housing and Ho me Finance Agency allocated $175,000 for construction of new homes in the Charleston area.43 In some cases, defense appropriations co mpletely and permanently altered South Carolinas infrastructure, its social system, a nd its economy in a very short time. No such project had a greater impact on post World War II South Ca rolina than the construction of a nuclear weapons plant in parts of Ai ken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties. The project, which was built under the directi on of the Atomic Energy Commission by the DuPont Company, transformed the rural area on South Carolinas southwestern border into a bustling Cold War suburbia. The fe derally funded project was the single largest construction project in state history and provided a much needed boost to the states economy.44 Aiken, the areas largest town had a popul ation of only 7,000 in 1950. The largest city in the region was Augus ta, across the stat e line in Georgia, and it boasted a population of only 70,000. In a matter of months the local population was dwarfed by the thousands of new residents required to build and operate the facility. The construction 43 Ivan D. Carson to Burnet R. Maybank (March 3, 1952); Earl J. McGrath to Burnet R. Maybank (February 28, May 27 and March 10, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. 44 James O. Farmer, Jr. A Collision of Cultures: Aiken, South Carolina, Meets the Nuclear Age, Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (1995) 40-49.

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128 crew alone brought almost 40,000 new people to the area and on ce the facility was operational it employed 4,000 full-time workers. The changes to the local infrastructure and economy were rapid and dramatic. Almost overnight the sleepy southern backwater known for its fertile soil and red clay mud b ecame a federal town. According to historian James Farmer, the impact of the facility on th e Aiken area was greater than that of the Civil War. Shermans army was larger, notes Farmer, but it did not have families in its train and it only passed through.45 Farmer contends that most South Carolinia ns were supportive of the plant and were willing to endure the rapid soci al changes that it brought in exchange for the economic benefits it produced. The facility appealed to the regions economic need, its staunch anti-communism, and traditional support of the military. However, the plant did come at some cost to local residents. By March 1952 construction had resulted in a government take over of land owned previously by 6,000 mo stly rural residents. Landowners were paid below market prices for their property and renters and sharecroppers received no reparations at all. Nonetheless, its po sitive economic impact was undeniable. The facilitys property and its construction cost $1 billion at a time when all of the real and personal property in the state was valued at a mere $4 billion, Aiken quickly became home to some of the highest paying jobs in the South, and the plan ts employees and their families rapidly transformed the impoverished region into a bastion of middle class homes and white collar consumerism.46 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

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129 Despite the plants clear economic benef its for many white South Carolinians, some hardcore segregationists remained appreh ensive about the potential of federal civil rights initiatives to influence local racial cu stoms. Days after the project was introduced to the public Senator Maybank received corres pondence from Thomas L. Hamilton of the States Rights Association concerning th e new factory. Hamilton asked Maybank to stop an NAACP petition demanding integrated facilities and housing at the plant. Hamilton, who Maybank identified as a memb er of the Ku Klux Klan, insisted that integration was a Marxist-Zi onist Movement. It is no table that Hamilton did not suggest abandoning plans for the factory, only that it be a segregated facility.47 Others worried that the rapid changes would undermine the local community and overwhelm its traditional infrastructure. The construction contract called for improvements to the areas tran sportation system, but did lit tle to address the projects impact on local education. The school system was already poor, even by South Carolina standards. Annually, Aiken County spent onl y $124 for every white student and $61 for every black student compared to the state average of $139 for whites and $77 for African Americans. Like the rest of the state, the county faced the dilemma of improving its schools while maintaining segreg ated facilities. Aside from the additional income from Governor Byrness sales tax, the region did not receive any new state funding to improve its overcrowded schools or its lack of proper housing until the federal government contributed over $6 million to construct 3,225 rent al units and 625 sale units to alleviate the housing shortage, and Congress allotte d funds to build new schools. As a 47 Thomas L. Hamilton to Burnet R. Maybank (December 5, 1950), Ma ybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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130 consequence of such measures the Savannah River region soon became almost entirely dependent on federal funds.48 Though no other region experienced the kind of rapid social and economic changes brought about in the area surrounding Aiken, many other parts of South Carolina also benefited from increased federal investment. For the most part, white South Carolinians welcomed these changes. White workers in South Carolina mentally separated the federal government that provided funding a nd issued paychecks from the federal government that allowed Justice Department investigations of voting rights cases and promoted a handful of civil rights reforms. At the same time that the states segregationists were lambasting the federal courts for seeking to enforce equal protection statutes, South Carolina was actively seeking more federal involvement in the states econom y. In many cases, local officials actually requested federal monies to pay for segregated facilities. For example, the Charleston County Council unanimously supported a peti tion requesting funds from the federal government to build a new hospital for African Americans. Howard J. Sears, the Charleston County Manger, noted that the ne w hospital was necessa ry because of the high number of new black residents who ha d moved into Charleston and Charleston County because of employment at the Char leston Naval Base and the Airforce ( sic ) Base. The Charleston County Development Board concluded that the impact of defense activities in the Charleston Area had led to an acute shortage of general hospital beds. According to a county re port, The expected influx of construction workers and civilian employees at the Airf orce Base, and further expansion of the 48 Farmer, A Collision of Cultures, 40-49.

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131 Charleston Naval Base, would lead to a severe shortage of hospital facilities for African American patients. There are no acceptable general hospital beds, claimed county officials, where a Negro patient may be treated by his own Negro physician. Charleston did not receive funds for a new hos pital for African Americans, but the state did receive a federal grant of nearly $6 million for the construction of a medical college in Charleston. The new fac ility was also awarded a $100,000 grant for cancer research, and applied for an additional $1.1 million from the federal government for additional construction. The federal funds for the new medical school dwarfed the $3.6 million allocated by the state.49 School and hospital construction were indicator s of local aspirations to lure federal dollars to the South Carolina, but payroll statistics offer an even better guide to the impact of defense spending on the region. Ov erall, shipyard workers were the highest paid employees in the area. With less th an 10,000 workers, the shipyards payroll hovered around $30 million in the early 1950s. The to tal payroll expended by manufacturers, wholesalers, re tail businesses, and the service industry in the Charleston metropolitan area was slightly less than $40 million. Manufacturers employed a similar number of employees for less than $20 m illion. The total payroll for manufacturers, wholesalers, retail bus iness, and the servic e industry averaged approximately $1,900 per year per employee while the navy yard worker s averaged a yearly salary of almost $3,500.50 49 George Hopkins, From Naval Pauper to Naval Po wer: The Development of Charlestons MetropolitanIndustrial Complex, in Roger W. Lotchin (ed.), The Martial Metropolis: U.S. Cities in War and Peace (New York: Praeger, 1984) 1-34. Howard J. Sears, Charleston County Manger, to S.J. Ulmer, Acting Administrator Hospital construction Section Division of Administration (September 26, 1952), Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. 50 Ibid.

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132 Although African Americans were limited to less-skilled jobs at the shipyard, the prospects for black workers at th e facility were still better than in civilian industries. In August of 1952, the facility employed approximately 2,350 non-white workers. Additionally, the $28 million Charleston Air Force Base under construction in 1952 promised to employ as many as 550 African Am erican workers. In fact, prospects for black workers were so good in Charleston County that between 1940 and 1950 almost 10,000 new non-white residents relocated to th e Charleston metro area. County Manager Howard J. Sears argued that this increase was due to defense activit ies. He pointed out that Beaufort, Colleton, Dorchester, Berkele y, and Georgetown Coun ties all had increases in their African American population of at leas t five percent in the same 10 year span due to relocations for defense related work. Furt hermore, he estimated that more than 1,500 African Americans had moved into Charlest on County since the 1950 census. Since most of those workers brought their families with them, local schools witnessed a spike in African American enrollment. The number of black students in Charleston County, for example, increased from 13,708 in 1947 to more than 17,000 in 1952.51 These demographic changes, which took place while the Briggs case was working its way through the court system amplified both black determ ination to challenge second class schools and white anxieties about pr eserving the privileges of whiteness. Nonetheless, military officials spent as muc h, if not more time, reassuring local leaders that military spending would remain high as th ey did addressing civil rights issues. For example, in Charleston, Captain T.T. Dantzl er assured local business leaders that the shipyards future role is secure. The shipyards commanding o fficer predicted that, 51 Ibid.

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133 despite moderate layoffs in 1953, the f acility would employ between 7,000 and 8,000 civilian workers throughout the 1950s. His pr edictions were a marked increase over the roughly 5,000 workers who had been employed at the navy yard in the late 1940s. Dantzler also attempted to assuage fears of de segregation at the ship yard. In response to a rumor that the Navy was planning to order th e desegregation of civilian employees in the South, Dantzler assured the Charleston News and Courier that the navy yard was following the policy of separate but equal as in the past.52 Dantzlers reassurances, however, did little to prolong Eise nhowers honeymoon with white South Carolina segregationists. Any hopes of supplementing local revenues with federal dollars while maintaining segreg ated facilities ended when the new president ordered the final desegregation of militar y installations thro ughout the region in September 1953. A direct order from Secr etary of Defense Anderson led to the elimination of segregated water fountains at the navy yard on September 14, 1953. Just over a month later, the cafeteria was desegr egated. Just as Thurmond and Byrnes had warned, federal money had led to the loss of local control ov er racial customs.53 By October 1953, criticism of the president had increased substantially in the South Carolina black belt. The News and Courier condemned Eisenhower for appointing Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Cour t. The Charleston daily claimed that Eisenhowers desire for compromise has caused him to lose an opportunity to make a substantial change in the complexion of the c ourt. The paper warned in an editorial that Warren was the Republican who was most closel y associated with the Fair Deal. The 52 News and Courier (August 11, 1953) 16. 53 Hopkins, From Naval Pauper to Naval Power, 1-34.

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134 editorial declared that Warren was pro-FEPC pro-labor, and had advocated socialized medicine. It even hinted that Warren wa s likely to rule against state sponsored segregation in education in the upcoming Brown v. Board of Education case, which was set to decide five consolidated cases, including South Carolinas Briggs v. Elliott .54 Like their hometown newspaper, white work ers at the naval shipyard took umbrage with the Eisenhower Administrations supposed interests in civil ri ghts. Following the desegregation of dining facili ties at the navy yard, white workers sporadically boycotted the cafeteria over a three-year period. According to the News and Courier the boycott was the result of an insidious NAACP plot The paper reported, as soon as the separation policy was ended at the Navy Yar d, a group of 14 or 15 Negroes entered what had been the white dining room. Instead of s itting together, each took a seat at a separate table. The paper, which considered Char leston the paragon for southern gentility and good manners, condemned the militant way in which African American workers responded to the desegregation order. The editors seemed especially appalled at the impoliteness of the whole affair. A gr oup of well-mannered persons, according to the editorial staff, would not walk into a downtown restaurant in Charleston or New York and disperse among the tables. The News and Courier affirmed that men of good manners . should recognize the social ri ghts of others. It warned that poor manners could lead to violence and frict ion at the shipyard, and encouraged both whites and blacks to resist racially mixed tables.55 54 News and Courier (October 1, 1953) 4A. 55 Ibid ., (October 21, 1953) 4A.

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135 In a letter to the editor of the News and Courier Clarence Mitchell chastised the conservative newspaper for giving the impre ssion that the only goal of the NAACP was integration at meal time. Instead, Mitc hell claimed that the groups aim was the complete and final end of all racial segrega tion. He called the e nding of segregation at the Navy Yard cafeteria. . but a small part of a very necessary program in democracys war against those forces that would destroy the rights of man. Few Charleston whites agreed with Mitchells assertion that the lunchroom incident was a small part in the worldwide fight for democracy. One letter to the editor insisted that the African American workers acted like hoodlums. It called the action rude, and declared the efforts to integrate the cafeteria an invasion of privacy.56 The controversy over the desegregation of the shipyard lunchroom did not deter the bases military commander from taking further action to comply with the federal desegregation order. Anderson also ordered the desegregation of the yards restrooms in January 1954. Unlike the cafeter ia, workers could not boycott the restrooms. They did however protest the change. Af ter the order, the base pandere d to racist stereotypes about black hygiene and installed sanitary toilet seat covers for the first time. For a short time, white workers took to wearing the seat c overs around their ne cks and dubbed them Eisenhower collars.57 The federal bureaucracys new interest in civil rights also impacted South Carolinas other defense installations, a ll of which had also undergone token desegregation by 1954. For example, the Depart ment of Defense declared Fort Jackson 56 Ibid ., (October 27, 1953), 4. 57 Hopkins, From Naval Pauper to Naval Power, 1-34.

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136 in Columbia % integrated in October of 1953. As on most military bases, black soldiers formed a sizeable portion of the popul ation at Fort Jackson. African Americans represented almost a quarter of the enlisted personnel at the base, which also housed a number of black officers who lived in desegregated housing facilities.58 Of course, the racial arrangements that ex isted on the base did not extend to offbase areas. Even though the desegregation of Fort Jackson was considered a success by federal authorities, local whites were not so quick to consider it a laudable goal or a welcome outcome. Whenever soldiers ventured off the base, they were subject to local and state laws regarding race relations. In order to comply with local laws, the USO established two clubs in the ci ty. One of the Columbia clubs was for whites and the other for African American soldiers.59 Like the USO clubs, Columbias bus system operated under strict segregation rules. African Americans were expected to ride in the back of th e bus and leave the front seats for white passengers. On Thanksgiving Day in 1953, roughly 50 black soldiers left the African American USO club on Taylor Street to return to Fort Jackson. It was nearly midnight and the bus had few passengers. Afte r moving toward the b ack of the already overcrowded bus, two African American soldiers sat in a seat that was also occupied by a young white waitress named Judy Mattox. Mattox protested and the driver of the bus demanded that the two men return to back of the vehicle. The driver, W.G. Brooks, stopped the bus and called on a city policeman to remedy the situation. While the driver 58 Andrew Myers, Black, White, and Olive Drab: Military-Social Relations During the Civil Rights Movement at Fort Jackson and in Columbia, South Carolina (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Virginia, 1998) 328-333. 59 Ibid ., 344-348.

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137 was off the bus, Mattox claimed that when sh e tried to leave the bus, one of the men grabbed her by the wrist and asked her sit back down.60 When the officer got on the bus he attempte d to arrest one of the servicemen, but was prevented from carrying out the arrest by the other African American passengers. Brooks returned to his car and called for back up. After anot her police officer arrived, an African American Lieutenant named Austell O. Sherard confronted the officers. Sherard attempted to mediate the s ituation but was rebuked by th e white policemen. When Sherard demanded to know the police officers names and badge numbers, they refused to provide the information. Mattox was removed from the bus and all but two of the black servicemen were charged with disord erly conduct and fined $25. One soldier was fined an additional $100 for contempt of court, while Sherard was fined $100 for disorderly conduct and another $100 for inte rfering with a law enforcement officer.61 James Hinton, the President of the Sout h Carolina NAACP, was outraged at the charges. He helped Sherard hire a defe nse attorney and publicized the incident. President Eisenhower received complaints from over 50 NAACP branch offices. The charges against Sherard were eventually dropped and the bus c ontroversy died down quickly. Unlike the African American boycott of the segregated bus system in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that same year, or the Montgomery Bus Boycott two years later, Columbia blacks did not seem interested in using the case against the African American officer to initiate a similar ci ty-wide protest. Either they were too unorganized to mount a successful boycott or simply did not view the incident as an offense against the local 60 Ibid ., 347-350. 61 Ibid ., 350-353.

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138 black community. The only support that the soldiers received from Columbias African American community was legal assistance from the state NAACP, which was headquartered nearby.62 The next day, Columbia whites were reassure d that base officials would work with city officers to avoid future incidents involving soldiers sta tioned at Fort Jackson. The bases information officer declared, When military personnel go off the post they become subject to local laws the same as a ny other citizen. Nonetheless, white city leaders worried that future white reprisals ag ainst black soldiers could spark an increase in local civil rights activism. In the mont hs that followed, the city worked out an agreement with the base that a llowed black soldiers who violat ed city laws to be tried by a military tribunal. Unlike civil and criminal proceedings, a court martial was carried out away from the public eye.63 The bus incident in Columbia was yet a nother reminder that th e desegregation of federal installations could easily disrupt the racial status quo in nearby communities, but it was also a signal that whites could still nego tiate with federal officials to slow racial change and maintain local cont rol over the racial caste syst em. As Olin Johnston and the loyalist wing of the Democratic Party had contended in 1948 and 1950, using white southern political power to fo restall desegregation was one of the many tactics available to segregationist whites in their fight to preserve racial se gregation. Certainly, negotiation with federal officials had helped to prevent the Columbia bus incident from escalating to a broader protest campaign involving local blacks. 62 Ibid ., 353-354. 63 Ibid ., 357-359.

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139 Nevertheless, calls for negotiation and bur eaucratic resistance were beginning to lose strength in South Carolina by 1953. The desegregation of the states military installations had given creden ce to the notion that using federal monies to speed the process of equalization and, therefore, prot ect segregation was misguided. Most white South Carolinians supported racial segreg ation and many had voted for Eisenhower primarily as a means of expressing those views. For local civilian workers, such as those at the Charleston shipyard, the concept of working toward integration conflicted with their personal, political, and social convictions. Even some of Eisenhowers most steadf ast supporters condemned the Republican president for his limited civil rights agenda Representative Rivers declared that Eisenhower had given a cold shoulder to the pe ople of South Carolina. He maintained the president had turned his back on the Republican platform and the Southerners to whom he dedicated his campaign on states ri ghts. According to Rivers, the Eisenhower Administration had needlessly bartered the Presidents popularity in the South for the pressure group assistance of th e big cities in the North. He also verbally thrashed the president for allowing the Department of Ju stice to investigate court cases involving school desegregation in Washi ngton D.C. Rivers called the executive branchs actions nothing short of arrogant effrontery, and accused the justice department of attempting to dictate to the U.S. Supreme Court.64 Eisenhowers tentative interests in enfo rcing federal civil rights rules confounded South Carolinas white segregationists who had hoped that placing a sympathetic president in the White House could avert the enforcement of any potential desegregation 64 News and Courier (December 10, 1953) 1A.

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140 court verdicts. Before the Supr eme Court could even hear the Briggs case, many worried South Carolina segregationists had give n up on finding an electoral solution for preserving segregation. Indeed, the loom ing court decision had also left many segregationist parents with li ttle confidence in public edu cation. Whites, especially in Charleston where the News and Courier constantly lauded the benefits of private education, pulled their children out of the pub lic school system at an alarming rate. Between 1950 and 1954 the number of white students enrolled in private academies in Charleston increased from just over 2,000 to well over 7,000.65 The uneasiness in Charleston at the e nd of 1953 was symptomatic of the unease engulfing the entire state. Resourceful whites who had rallied behind a supposedly sympathetic president, initiated efforts to equalize the segregated schools, and reluctantly threatened to abandon public educa tion as a last resort to avoid integration were increasingly fearful that their efforts to combat court ordered desegregation were doomed to fail. For many mainstream whites, equalization and voter participation were a means to protect segregation without giving in to the radical politics of hardcore segregationists. However, the effectiven ess of desegregation on federal property was perceived as a harbinger of future civil right s enforcement. In the months before the Brown decision, it was already apparent to educat ed observers that this middle of the road approach was, at best, a delaying tactic. 65 R. Scott Baker, Ambiguous Legacies: The NAACPs Legal Campaign Against Segregation in Charleston, South Carolina, 1935-1975, (Ph.D. Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993) 160-164.

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141 CHAPTER 5 AFTER BROWN : FROM MODERATION TO EXTREMISM In May 1954, the United States Supreme Court finally handed down its ruling in South Carolinas Briggs case, which was settled as part of Brown v. Board of Education The verdict, which declared that segregated schools were inherently unequal, ignited a firestorm of criticism from s outhern whites. White leaders in South Carolina uniformly condemned the ruling, took ever y opportunity to undermine the authority of the federal courts, and repeatedly questio ned the ability as well as the right of the national government to enforce court ordered desegregat ion. Governor James F. Byrnes, Senators Burnet R. Maybank and Olin D. Johnston, and the entire state delegation to the United States House of Representatives lambaste d the decision. Maybank called the ruling a shameful political move, rather than a judicial decision. Clarendon County School Superintendent L.B. McCord described the de cision as the single worst event to happen to the South in the twenti eth century. We positively will not mix the schools, he warned. South Carolina Attorney General T.C. Callison went so far as to refuse to acknowledge that the Supreme C ourt even had jurisdiction in the matter. It is my opinion, claimed Callison, that no action be ta ken by this office which would indicate that we consider the State of South Carolina as such, a party to the controversy. The

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142 ending action is purely a local matter so far as the parties to the suit [the Briggs case] are concerned.1 The near uniformity of these responses wa s significant, indicating that in South Carolina white solidarity was as important as white supremacy. From the beginnings of the Briggs case white South Carolinians had prea ched the importance of a united front against any challenge to segregat ed education. But following the Brown decision white resolve reached new heights as segregationist s from the states various political factions expressed their determination to evade enfor cement of the desegreg ation order. This hardening of white public opinion prompted Southern School News to report that The solidarity of official opinion was the most significant aspect of South Carolinas early response to the Brown .2 Nonetheless, this superficial unity con cealed deep divisions within the white communities over the best course of action. I ndeed, whites in South Carolina were united in their fervor to protect de jure segregation, but demographi c differences and economic divergence between the rural bl ack belt counties, the upstate region, and the three major metropolitan areas made statewide agreement on the most effective and appropriate method to preserve Jim Crow difficult. Th ese tensions and the manner in which white segregationists worked to overcome, or if that failed, camouflage them is the focus of this chapter. 1 News and Courier (September 16, 1954) 1. Idus A. Newby, South Carolina and the Desegregation Issue, (M.A. Thesis: University of South Carolina, 1957) 53. The Catholic Committee of the South, Segregation and the Catholic Schools: A Study (Rock Hill, South Carolina: The Catholic Committee of the South, 1956) 30-31. Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958) 21-23. Southern School News (October 1, 1954) 13. 2 Southern School News (September 3, 1954) 12.

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143 The early reaction to the Brown decision produced few specific plans for defending segregated education from vigorous federal en forcement of the verdict. Unsure of the degree of white anger, South Carolinas polit ical elites offered little more than vague threats and exaggerated indignation. Elected officials spoke on the illegality of the courts verdict and promised to find a legal way to circumvent it. White leaders urged calm and asked the states population to assist public officials in the maintenance of law and order. Of course, they also preach ed that law and order depended on the continuation of racial segreg ation. White organizations re warded these unrealistic but popular proposals with a ringing endorsement of the state legislature. For example, the Loris chapter of the South Carolina Farm Bureau voted unanimously to support the General Assembly in anything they see fit to do to preserve segregated education.3 In hindsight, whites should have been more prepared for the Brown decision. Governor Byrnes may have declared that he was shocked by the verdict, but political officers, legal experts, and other informed whites had generally expected the Supreme Court to declare segregated education uncons titutional. The elimination of admission restrictions in higher ed ucation (especially in Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education ) set legal precedents for future court rulings and the states newspapers did not seem surprised by the verdict. The Columbia Record for instance, acknowledged that the Brown decision was consistent with the series of court decisions from the previous decade that had gradually eroded the legal 3 Ibid

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144 tenets of de jure segregation and the Charleston News and Courier had predicted a wave of pro-integration court verdic ts as early as the mid-1940s.4 Nonetheless, up until 1954 the threat of court ordered desegregation of primary and secondary schools was an abstract fear. Once the court ruled that segregated education was inherently unequal, southern leader s understood that a s howdown with federal authority was approaching. However, neither th e intensity nor the specific terrain of that confrontation was predictable. In 19 52 South Carolina whites had overwhelmingly supported the notion of abandoning the public school system if necessary to avoid desegregation. Once the Brown decision made the enactment of that plan a real possibility, more serious di sagreements over the merits of school closure began to surface. For example, State Representative Ernest F. Hollings called the idea of closing the public schools foolish. When rural whit es and the conservative newspaper editors at the Charleston News and Courier championed the idea of replacing the schools with a private education system, Hollings pointed out th at the courts might also abolish any such private system by declaring it an unconstitutional attempt to circumvent the decree.5 The states white leaders may have promot ed the idea that a unified white response was necessary to prevent or delay cour t ordered desegregation, but, as Hollings 4 Quint, Profile in Black and White 93-97. Independent (May 26, 1954) 4, (July 25, 1954) 4. News and Courier (August 9, 1954) 4. Tony Badger has pointed out that few Southern politicians were really shocked at the Supreme Cour ts ruling. He argues that most southerners were simply resigned to notion that the courts would rule against segregation. Farley Smith, a future leader in the Citizens Council movement in South Carolina, frequently complained about the apathy of South Carolina whites regarding the desegregation order. Unlike Sm ith, most whites preached resistance, according to Badger, in hopes of delaying desegregation for years or even decades, s ee: Tony Badger, Fatalism not Gradualism, in eds. Brian Ward and Tony Badger, The Making of Martin Luther Ki ng and the Civil Rights Movement (New York: New York University Press, 1995) 67-95. For an example of Smiths comments, see: News and Courier (May 26, 1955) 14A. 5 Columbia Record ( May 18, 1954) 4A. The News and Courier s position on private schooling is discussed in the previous chapters.

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145 demonstrated, white unity was superficial at be st. White South Carolinians were actually divided into four distinct, if not wholly discreet, factions. The first and most vocal were hardcore segregationists who were willing to abandon the public school system, utilize violent intimidation of civil rights activis ts, and force a showdown with the federal government if necessary to maintain the ra cial status quo. The second group was made up of more moderate whites w ho were willing to accept minimal compliance, if it meant that the basic structure of the racial hierarchy remained in place. The third, smallest, and least influential group was made up of white racial liberals who supported desegregation, albeit with different opinions as to a timetable. Most wh ite South Carolinians, however, belonged to an ill-defined four th group that tended to opera te between the hardcore and moderate group. As the states largest white faction, these mainstream segregationists were willing to accept a modicu m of overt intimidation and ma ybe even a little violence, but preferred the use of bureau cratic and legalistic device s to thwart court ordered desegregation. Members of this group ranged from very active to ve ry apathetic and, like white moderates, were only willing to tole rate a small amount of social and economic unrest in their fight to safeguard Jim Crow.6 From 1948 to 1954 South Carolinas loose coalit ion of these segregationist factions was held together by a strategy that prepar ed paradoxically for both an uncompromising approach to court ordered dese gregation and a more flexible and legalistic alternative that downplayed the most overt forms of white resi stance. State leaders indulged each group 6 For a discussion of the division between white moderates and hardcore segregationists throughout the South, see: Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Politics and Society in Twentieth Century America (Princeton: Princeton Un iversity Press, 2005) and The Rise of the Suburban South: the Silent Majority and the Politic s of Education, 1945-1975 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Virginia, 1999).

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146 by promising to uphold the rule of law and prevent public unrest while simultaneously pledging to avoid any desegrega tion especially of the public schools. Indeed, the only real consensus among South Carolina whites was that segregation was preferable to desegregation. In the face of such a comp lex political dynamic, most of the states elected officials chose rhetorical post uring over policy making even though they recognized that the specter of a federal de segregation order would ultimately force a showdown between the partisans of each appr oach. In the meantime, white politicians simply promised the continuation of public order, economic improvement, and racial segregation. South Carolinas hardcore rhetoric co ncealed, for a short time, the difficult decisions facing the state. But, in May 1954, journalist William D. Workman summarized what he saw as the states fe w real options: it could simply accept the courts verdict and implement a desegreg ation plan, it could eliminate the public education system entirely and replace it with a private system, or it could resurrect John C. Calhouns doctrine of interposition and nullification and declar e the ruling itself unconstitutional and refuse to enforce it; or it could simply ignore the order and prepare for a legal process that could take years, or even decades, to resolve.7 In the immediate afterm ath of the original Brown ruling, few South Carolinians, save for a small number of right-wing news paper editors and rural Klan sympathizers, wanted to raise the ire of federal au thorities by reviving Calhouns treatise on nullification. White South Carolinians rec ognized that the threat of interposition and nullification would, at best, only postpone federal intervention and not overrule the 7 News and Courier (May 30, 1954) 4.

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147 Supreme Courts decision. Hard core segregationists, such as First District Congressman L. Mendel Rivers pandered to the states most outspoken critics of black activism and backed efforts to renew the nullification c ontroversy, but even he understood that such hardcore rhetoric was unlikely to provide a ny real solutions if the federal government chose to demand enforcement of Brown For many South Carolinians, especially white workers in the upstate region, such a showdow n with federal author ities was clearly not in the best interests of the state.8 Even in the rural black belt areas which tended to support the hardcore approach, white groups feared alienati ng their more moderate nei ghbors and refused to jump headlong into the most militant forms of white resistance. The South Carolina Farm Bureaus board of directors encouraged its members to protest forced desegregation peaceably and to avoid the hysteria and turmo il of shotgun thinking. The president of the organization, E. Hugh Agnew, reasoned that South Carolina whites should shift the emphasis from defeatism and resistance to one of hope for an improved educational base providing equal and better school ing while retaining the ma ximum amount of separation possible. Of course, Agnew and likeminded whites understood that this, too, was a form of resistance and remained steadfast in their determination to avoid any real desegregation for the foreseeable future.9 8 News and Courier (February 7, 1956) 1B. South Carolina tex tile workers were strong supporters of the New Deal Coalition, and tended to shy away from the histrionics of many Low Country politicians, for examples see: George Calvin Waldrep, Southern Workers and the Search for Community: Spartanburg County, South Carolina (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) and Bryant Simon, A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 9 Southern School News (November 4, 1954) 14.

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148 Agnew later told a Charleston audience that the state must admit that we can no longer prevent mixed schools for those who wa nt mixed schools but those who wish to attend separate schools should not be denied the right to do so. He argued that the farm people of South Carolina, both white and colo red, are bitterly opposed to such a program as the Supreme Court outlines. According to Agnew, forced desegregation would lead to chaos and jeopardize the social, economic, and political stability of the state. He outlined the feelings of most white South Carolinians when he insisted, They want neither abolition of public schools nor do they want a shotgun soluti on, but if worst must come they are ready for either or both. Agnew, like most white South Carolinians, recognized that, in the absence of an impl ementation order, the state still had some options. In 1954 the only choice that was absolu tely unacceptable to the vast majority of the states white communities was meaningful compliance with the Brown verdict.10 At its annual convention in November 1954, the South Carolina Farm Bureau Federation adopted a resolution in which its me mbers pledged to give their best efforts and full support in the development of any plan of operation designed to improve our public school system and to avoid such chaoti c deterrents to that e nd as would result from forced integration. The organiza tion, which represented between 15,000-20,000 members, also declared that the segregated school system was the best and most natural arrangement for the public school system.11 Like the members of the South Carolina Fa rm Bureau, private businesses were also disinclined to promote the most extreme re sistance tactics. Though less militant than 10 Ibid ., (January 6, 1955) 14. 11 Ibid ., (December 1, 1954) 13.

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149 their rural neighbors, white business inte rests endorsed legislative measures for circumventing court ordered desegregati on, but, due to economic concerns, were skeptical of calls to abandon public education. Likewise, the South Carolina Senate Committee on Education insisted that the st ate remain mindful of the close interrelationship between public edu cation and economic, social and spiritual process in South Carolina. A legislative report from Se ptember 1954 pointed out that there was still a public demand for an adequate system of public education.12 Since the majority of the states white population favored the continuation of free public schooling, it was, as Workman calle d it, the option of noncompliance that created the largest consensus in white commun ities. The states segregationists were well aware that they could not simply ignore the Brown order forever. However, rather than expose the deep divisions in South Carolinas white communities, political leaders chose to encourage the notion that th e state could preserve the public school system and keep it completely segregated for the foreseeable future Many of the states political elites later told historian John Sproat that they privately realized that the state would have to comply with the Brown verdict at some point, but also re cognized that their political careers depended on a firm commitment to pres erving the maximum amount of segregation rather than promoting meaningful compliance with the law. Likewise, members of the General Assembly sensed that tokenism mi ght be the best way to comply with the decision while still preserving the basic Jim Cr ow system. Nonetheless, not one single 12 Ibid ., (September 3, 1954) 12.

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150 elected official chose to share the opinion th at eventual compliance was inevitable with their constituents.13 While the fiery rhetoric of state demagogues drew most of the attention of the press and placated the states angry white citizenry, South Carolinas white leadership initially adopted a policy that is best de scribed as managed noncompliance. In the short term, the state and local governments took almost no offici al action to negate Brown. In the long term, they began to prepare quietly for a st rategic accommodation of the court order that minimized desegregation and maintained as much of the racial caste system as possible. The states only official response to the ve rdict was a moratorium on the construction of new segregated schools.14 Formal responsibility for placating segrega tionist whites, maintaining the rule of law, and combating court ordered desegr egation fell on the South Carolina School Commission, headed by State Senator Marion Gr essette. The Gressette Committee, as the group was popularly known, issued a report to the legislature calling for the state to continue operation of its dual school system in the 1954-1955 academic year. It insisted that, since the Supreme Court had not addressed enforcement of the Brown ruling, 13 John Sproat, Firm Flexibility, in eds. Robert H.Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, New Perspectivs on Race and Slavery in America: Essays in Honor of Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986) 164-184. 14 Southern School News (September 3, 1954) 12, (May 30, 1954) 4. Quint, Profile in Black and White 93-97. Anderson Independent (May 26, 1954) 4, (July 25, 1954) 4. News and Courier (August 9, 1954) 4. Interim Report of the South Carolina School Commi ttee (July 28, 1954), located at the South Carolina State Library, Columbia, South Carolina. Southern School News (September 3, 1954) 12. Marcia Synnott, Desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1963: Sometim e Between Now and Never, in eds. Winfred B. Moore, Jr. and Joseph E. Tripp, Looking South: Chapters in the Story of an American Region (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) 51-64. Stephen Howard Lowe, The Magnificent Fight: Civil Rights Litigation in South Carolina Federal Courts, 1940-1970, (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University, 1999) 201-203. For a defin ition of strategic accommoda tion, see: Joseph Hard in Crespino, Strategic Accommodation: Civil Rights Opponents in Mississippi and Their Impact on American Racial Politics, 1953-1972 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Stanford University, 2003).

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151 segregation in public education could con tinue indefinitely in South Carolina. Furthermore, the committee called on the govern or to resume new school construction. The Gressette Committee concl uded that, if the state ha lted improvement in black education, it would only serve as incen tive for African Americans to demand the immediate desegregation of the states sc hools. David W. Robinson, the commissions lead attorney, informed Governor Byrnes that, if the stat e withheld funds from an African American school, the local board of trustees would have no choice but to desegregate the countys school system. By August of 1954, the state sales tax was once again funding the construction of segr egated school buildings.15 The resumption of school construction and the recommencement of segregated classes in the fall of 1954 was more than a retu rn to the status quo. During the summer of 1954, state lawmakers began to devise a stra tegy for apparent compliance with the Brown ruling without actually desegregating th e states school systems. Robinson concluded that South Carolina could pr event integrated schools by adopting a complicated pupil placement law. He argued that the state should place all enrollment practices under the direction of local boards of trustees and that pupil placement should be decided on a case by case basis. Thus, any African American parent who wished to send his or her child to an all white school would have to petition the local officials individually a year in advan ce. Since the proceedings woul d involve the states judicial system, Robinson also reasoned that only attorn eys residing in the state of South Carolina should be allowed to take on such cases. He concluded that the convoluted bureaucratic procedures and the knowledge that white local officials would rule in each case would 15 Ibid

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152 discourage black parents from seeking a transfer of their children. Even if an African American did manage to hire a lawyer, navigate the complicated bureaucracy, and petition for school reassignment, the board c ould always reject the transfer on academic grounds.16 Like its lead attorney, the Gressette Comm ittee was also determined to alter state laws and school regulations in preparation for approaching legal battles. In its first postBrown report, the Commission noted that the protection of segregated education depended on clear planning and not fiery rhetor ic. In the pursuit of these ends, the report stated, your committee has moved with caution and with a minimum of publicity to avoid hasty action and public misundersta nding, which could cause inflammation and friction.17 This bureaucratic approach to forestalli ng desegregation and slowing potential legal challenges received a significant amount of support in the General Assembly. State Representative Hollings, who was a candidate for Lieutenant Governor in 1954, agreed that basing student placement on residential patterns and academic aptitude was a sound strategy for preserving Jim Crow as long as possible. He argued that since many of the newly consolidated school districts had been gerrymandered based on the race of their residents, it would be easy for many coun ties to simply group all, or most, of the black students together based on their home address. According to Hollings, in cases where residence could not limit desegregation, school administrators could claim that pupil placement was based on academic ability. Just as many educated African 16 Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 201-203. 17 Southern School News (September 3, 1954) 12.

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153 Americans were denied the vote through selec tive enforcement of literacy tests, black students could be denied opportunity thr ough the selective enforcement of academic standards.18 Robinson agreed. He claimed that there are few Negroes educationally qualified to go to schools with similarly aged white children, adding that scholastically gifted African Americans would not wish to go to a school with a large number of white children. Even if some black parents did insist on isolating their children in an all white school, insisting that those students could be legitimately disqualified by the Board of Trustees.19 Although diehard segregationists were sure to condemn any plan that allowed even the slightest integration, the no tion of token desegregation as a tool of resistance gained some support in the states urban centers, espe cially in the majority white upstate region. The Columbia Record concluded that, if th e General Assembly removed any mention of segregation in education from the stat e constitution and based pupil placement on academic ability, only a miniscule number of African American students could meet those standards. A group of wh ite teachers polled by the Charleston News and Courier seemed to re-enforce this perception. Mix Negroes and whites, said one teacher, and they are at a disadvantage intelle ctually and never able to rise to their capacity. Another educator argued that the stat es school system would become overcrowded with 17, 18 Quint, Profile in Black and White 97-98. 19 Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 201-203.

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154 18, and 19 year-old Negroes in our six and seventh grades because African American students would fail to perform at the same level as whites.20 South Carolina segregationists understood th at testing and bureau cratic resistance could be a powerful force in preserving th e basic framework of segregation following a federal court order. After all, South Caro lina had successfully maintained a system of unequal teacher pay, even though the federal co urts had ordered the state to equalize teacher salaries, and it had done so without th e support of South Carolinas most hardcore segregationists. In his investigation of S outh Carolinas response to the teacher salary equalization process, educat ion historian R. Scott Baker discovered that, following the court order to pay black teachers the same wa ges as white educators, the South Carolina legislature made changes in teacher licen sing and school administration that ensured white teachers a higher salary than black ones. The state, claims Baker, used National Teacher Exam scores and employee evaluations to deny equal pay to African Americans. Although black teachers were paid better than before, their pay was never truly equalized. Though the most diehard segregationists were appalled that a few black teachers received raises, the majority of the white population was willing to accept these changes in order to avoid further judicial scru tiny. In the process, state l eaders learned that cleverly 20 Newby, South Carolinians and the Desegregation Issue, 73-74. News and Courier (August 7, 1955) 4D.

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155 formulated minimal compliance could both sa tisfy the courts and avoid rectifying the most obvious inequalities between blacks and whites.21 Nonetheless, segregation through bureaucr atic pupil placement hearings was a more difficult problem than preserving racial differentials in teacher salaries. It was easier to manipulate the smaller number of t eachers who all taught in single race schools than it was to comply in even the most token manner with the Brown ruling. Even minimal desegregation would have had a dr amatic effect on the states educational system, especially in rural di stricts with a black majority. In 1954, more than 42 percent of the 524,000 students enrolled in South Caro linas public school system were African American. Only Mississippi had a higher percentage of bl ack pupils in its schools. Moreover, the vast majority of the 295,000 African American students lived in rural counties where residential segregation was not an effective way to ensure mostly segregated schools. In Ma nning in Clarendon County, for example, there were nearly 3,000 black students compared to less than 300 wh ites. Therefore, if only 10 percent of the 3000 African American students in Manning were able to integ rate the all-white schools, the racial make-up of the previously all-white schools would be nearly even. In 21 R. Scott Baker, Testing Equality: The Nati onal Teacher Examination and the NAACPs Legal Campgain to Equalize Teachers Salaries in the South 1936-63, History of Education Quarterly (Spring 1995) 49-64. R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of Desegregation: Race, Class, and Education 1935-1975, American Journal of Education (May 2001) 320-343. R. Scott Baker, Ambiguous Legacies: The NAACPs Legal Campaign against Segregation in Charleston, South Carolina, 1935-1975 (Ph.D. Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993) 174-177. In his dissertation, Baker asserts that the lessons learned in denying African Am erican educators equal pay were directly applied in efforts to combat forced desegregation.

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156 other words, even token school desegregation would have had a direct effect on nearly every white child in the majority or near-majority black counties. 22 These demographic differences concerned militant segregationists who worried that whites in South Carolinas urban and subur ban areas would undermine the hardcore position. Of the three major metropolitan ar eas in the state (Greenville-Spartanburg, Columbia, and Charleston), only Charle ston had a significant black population. Charleston County was more than 40 percen t African American, but its black population was highly concentrated in th e city and the rural outskirts while the post-World War II suburbs were largely white. The Columbia ar ea had a large number of black residents, but the white population in Richland County was double the size of the African American population and residential segregation was firmly in place in Columbia by the end of the 1950s. Therefore, many rural whites worried that their urban count erparts would subvert massive resistance and rely on bureaucratic meas ures that simply were not effective in majority black counties.23 Partially due to these demographic concerns the success of bureaucratic resistance in limiting black voting and maintaining the white economic advantage did not convince the states most devout segregationists to leav e the protection of segr egated education in the hands of testing administrators. Sin ce malaportionment favored the less developed counties, the rural voice was disproportionate ly represented in the statehouse. South Carolinas black belt had voted overwhelmingly in favor of the 1952 school amendment, 22 William D. Smyth, Segregation in Charleston in the 1950s: A Decade of Transition, South Carolina Historical Magazine (April 1991) 99-123. Andrew McDowd Secrest, In Black and White: Press Opinion and Race Relations in South Carolina, 1954-1964 (Ph.D. Disse rtation: Duke Univer isty, 1972) 19-21. Southern School News (November 4, 1954) 14. For a detailed analysis of changes in public school enrollment throughout the civil rights era, see: Baker, Ambiguous Legacies. 23 Ibid Report on the Census of 1950, Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.

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157 had traditionally fostered the least amount of interracial cooperation, and had been more prone to violent racial oppression. By the end of 1954, rural white segregationists began to lend increasing support to abandoning the public education system entirely and began to apply more pressure on state legislat ors to resist the call for even minimal compliance.24 Segregationist political lead ers were sharply aware of these trends and adapted their political strategies to take advantage of white anxiety. Du ring his campaign for governor in 1954, Lieutenant Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr., a Batesburg native who had built his political career as a spokesman fo r rural causes, blasted the idea of allowing even the most qualified black student to ente r a white school. If you let one child come in, he insisted, youve opene d the door. Timmerman main tained that the state could not compromise on the issue of segregation. You cant compromise right with wrong, he said. Officials in Clarendon, Orangeburg, Colleton, and other majority black counties agreed with Timmermans assessment and freque ntly rejected the idea of even minimal desegregation.25 The vigor with which rural whites in S outh Carolina defended white privilege and segregated education concealed a serious pr oblem for government officials and school administrators. Rural school districts were bur dened with the fact that they could barely afford South Carolinas dual school system ev en in its unequal incarnation. Byrness 24 Bryant Simon, The Devaluation of the Vote: Legislative Apportionment and Inequality in South Carolina, 1890-1962, South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 1996), 227-245; reprinted, South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 2000) 234-252. In The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Politics and Society in Twentieth Century America) Matthew Lassiter argues that the unequal electoral districts in the South actually gave ardent segregationists an advantage in the political fight over segregation even though they were actually a minority in the region. 25 Anderson Independent (July 29, 1955) 1.

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158 sales tax plan had aided the maintenance of se gregated schools across the state, but it did not cover the entire cost of the equalization program. The al ready struggling rural school systems were also aware that if their s uburban and urban counterparts succumbed to token desegregation, they would have no choi ce but to follow suit, mount a difficult and costly legal battle, or tackle the expens e of establishing private schools for white students. The South Carolina Association of School Administrators (SCASA) noted that, despite the implementation of the three-cen t sales tax, the state was having serious difficulty paying for its schools. The per-pupil cost to educate South Carolinas students increased by 133 percent between 1944 and 1953. During that same time period, average incomes only increased by 63 percent. The problem, according to a SCASA report, was even more pronounced in the states black be lt, which experienced a more significant increase in costs and a smaller increase in salari es than the rest of the state. In fact, by the summer of 1956 Orangeburg County could no longer afford to pay for its segregated school system and was forced to reques t a higher debt limit from the General Assembly.26 Another problem for school administra tors was that South Carolinas white citizenry refused to acknowledge the difficulty the state had in paying for its dual school system. Meanwhile, elected and civic lead ers addressed the issue with unrealistic proposals designed primarily to increase their popularity with the white electorate rather 26 Southern School News (September 1955) 7. For information on the various school funding issues addressed by the General Assembly, see: Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina (1956). For a discussion of the unequal economic develop in Sout h Carolina, see: Richard Phillip Stone II, Making a Modern State: The Politics of Economic Development in South Carolina, 1938-1962 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 2004).

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159 than offer viable plans of action. For instance, Hugh Agnew of the Farm Bureau declared: Since South Carolina owns its public school system and pays the costs of operation, it is the right and the responsibility of our General Assembly to say how public schools shall be operated. If the federal government has a right to say how the South Carolina public schools shall be ope rated, then the federal government has the right and responsibility to pay the bill. Aside from calling for federal monies, state l eaders also promised money that the South Carolina government simply did not have. State Representative Burnet R. Maybank, Jr., for example, called on the General Assembly to allow South Carolina residents a tax grant equal to 30 percent of the total cost of private school tuition as long as the school was located in South Carolina. He also proposed that the grant be increased to 100 percent if the public sch ools were desegregated.27 Faced with a mounting financial crisis, the fear of school closure, and the hardening of rhetoric from political leaders such as Timmerman, the South Ca rolina Federation of Womens Clubs, the South Caro lina Education Association (SCEA), the Association of School Administrators, and the School Boards Association all expres sed their support for public education and rejected id ea of replacing it with a priv ate system. By the end of 1955, each of these urban-based middle class organizations, which were made up of white educators, administrators, and parent s, had pledged to keep the public schools funded and open. In doing so, they essentially rejected the rural mode s of resistance, but failed to present an alternative plan for pres erving segregated education. For example, The SCEA, which represented approximately 10,000 white teachers, issued a statement in the fall of 1954 that called for an adequate system of free public schools, local control 27 Southern School News (October 1, 1954) 13, (July 6, 1955) 14.

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160 of school administration, con tinuation of the equalization pr ogram, and the continuation of segregated education. The organizati on declared, The pres ent pattern of public education in South Carolina is the best fo rm of organization for meeting the needs of children of both races.28 Other education groups and teaching professi onals also declared their support for public schools or, at the very least, downpl ayed the threat to free public schooling in South Carolina. For instance, Richard Breel and, a Columbia teacher who served in the General Assembly, warned that the state legi slature had walked backward for 25 years, in its school policy. Likewise, the Parent -Teacher Association in Columbia and the Superintendent of Schools in the city of Charleston endor sed the public school system, but, like both Hollis and Breeland, also insisted that state and local officials find a way to maintain segregated education. Indeed, even though no white educat ional organization or parents groups would publicly support the notion that the states schools should remain open even if the federal government did for ce desegregation, a sizab le number of white education professionals and suburban middle class white parents certainly made open schools a priority for the near future.29 Although the call for open schools resonate d with a large portion of the white population, it paled in comparis on to the calls to preserve the dual school system. The central weakness of the open schools moveme nt in South Carolina was its unwillingness to address the issue of complia nce. It was clear in 1954 that, at some point, the federal 28 Newby, South Carolina and the Desegregation Issue,196-198. Southern School News (November 4, 1954) 14. 29 Southern School News (November 4, 1954) 14, (September 3, 195 4) 12, (December 1, 1954) 13, (June 8, 1955) 11, (July 6, 1955) 14.

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161 courts were going to demand observance of the Brown verdict and that school boards were going to have to at leas t appear as if they were de segregating their schools. The inability of the SCEA, the local PTAs, and ot her open school advocates to promote a plan for compliance rendered the organizations impote nt in the public debate over segregation. The constant reassurances from white professi onal groups that they supported segregation only strengthened the impression of white so lidarity and made it more difficult for dissenting viewpoints, however limited they may have been, to emerge.30 Fear of rebuke from hardcore segreg ationists was a poten t obstacle, but the formation of a moderate coalition in 1954 was also hampered by the lack of an implementation order from the Supreme Court. Open school advocates were not forced to answer the single most difficult ques tion facing mainstream South Carolina segregationists: should the state maintain a free system of public schools, even if the federal government demanded im mediate compliance with the Brown decision? Had there been such an implementation ruling in place, the debate would have broadened, and the question of whether, how, and to what extent to comply would have been more pressing. In 1954, the moderate white position was to maintain the status quo. Thus, a coalition between more mode rate whites and African Americans did not develop. Many African American leaders were willing to accept tokenism and a gradual desegregation, at least in the short term, but few civil rights advocates want ed the state to simply ignore the Brown order completely. 30 Morton Sosna argues in In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) that by refusing to argue for desegregation, moderate whites effectively ceded the issue to more hardcore segregationists.

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162 South Carolinas black activists rarely advocated the immediate implementation of the Brown decree. Amidst the rhetorical firest orm surrounding the case, South Carolinas African American leadership responded c onservatively. Severa l studies of NAACP activism in South Carolina point out that the states larges t black organization was more inclined to call for calm conf lict resolution than immediate de segregation. Some of the organizations officers, such as Charleston NAACP President Arthur Clement, preferred to form interracial councils that could devel op a plan for gradual desegregation of public education. South Carolina NAACP presiden t, James Hinton, declared that African Americans would welcome the appointment of a committee composed of leaders of both races to sit down and work out plans for the best interests of all the citizens of South Carolina.31 The key problem for African American l eaders was that black South Carolinians were also divided over how best to respond to the Brown decision. African Americans certainly supported the Supreme Courts ruli ng, but did not agree on how it should best be implemented. Even though the Clarendon school case was the one that Thurgood Marshall of the NAACPs Legal Defense Fund pe rsonally argued before the court in the late 1940s and early 1950s, most of the stat es civil rights activists had focused their attention on the issue of voting rights and not school integration. The efforts to coordinate the Progressive Democratic Pa rty (PDP) in South Carolina were at the forefront of civil rights activism in the 1940s. At the beginning of the new decade, 31 For examples of the conservative response to the Brown ruling, see: Stephen ONeill, From the Shadow of Slavery: The Civil Right s Years in Charleston (Ph.D. Dissert ation: University of Virginia, 1994) 144-197. Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 94-186. For information on black activism in South Carolina, see: Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolin a Press, 1996) 170-220. Kari Frederickson, Dual Ac tions, One for Each Race : The Campaign Against the Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950, International Social Science Review (Spring 1997) 14-25. Segregation and the Catholic Schools: A Study 30.

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163 African Americans in Charleston and Columbia were some of the most politically active civil rights leaders in the South. The PDP faction within the state NAACP felt that if blacks could vote in significant numbers, they could use their electoral might to tear down segregated society and replace it with a more egalitarian system. Arthur Clement even predicted that the harsh rhetoric of white politicians would give way to compliance with the desegregation order. No one, he claimed, likes to be identified as being a gradualist but we who are realists have got to unde rstand that the custom of segregation could not be eras ed overnight. Clement believ ed that the best equalizing force was the power of black ballots. More over, black leaders, such as Modjeska Simkins felt that the voting rights issue wa s politically and bureaucratically less complicated than school integration.32 Some African Americans, especially t hose in rural areas where white oppression was more acute and blacks were less or ganized, argued that pressuring whites to desegregate the public school system w ould do more harm than good for black Carolinians. Lewis L. Butler, the principal of the Ehrhardt Negro School, sent a letter to the Bamberg Herald to express his concern over Brown s impact on race relations. Butler, who also operated a barber shop that ca tered to white clients, argued that with a few exceptions, African Americans were sa tisfied with segregated schools. He warned that the Supreme Court had placed black students and teachers in a most peculiar situation which will be beset with many perplexing problems and grave 32 Ibid Southern Schools News (September 3, 1954) 12, (January 6, 1955) 14. For information of the importance of the voting rights issue to black political coalitions in the 1950s and 1960s, see: Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Steven F. Lawson, Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in American Since 1941 (New York: McGraw -Hill, 1997).

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164 consequences. According to Butler, the Negro childrens educ ational opportunities will suffer for the next 50 years, as a result of the Brown decision. In North Augusta, 30 African Americans circulated a petition suppor ting segregated education. There is a very, very good feeling as of now between the races which the Negro parents do not want destroyed, explained Leon Penda rvis, the groups spokesperson.33 Other rural African Americans, however, di d voice their displeasure with the white reaction to the desegregati on case, and there was a growing sentiment among many South Carolina blacks that a more forceful respons e to white obstructionism was needed. The Clarendon County Civic League declared that segregation was unchristian, undemocratic, unscientific, and asinine, and James Hinton promised that local groups would begin challenging the le gality of continued segregat ed education. However, the NAACP president also promised not to take any direct action until after the Supreme Court issued its implementation order. 34 In 1954 and early 1955 the diffe rent responses to the Brown ruling among South Carolinas African American population exacer bated the divisions within the black community. For example, some members of the Charleston County NAACP began to question Arthur Clements leadership. Although he had helped to organize multiple campaigns and participated in countless voti ng drives, Clements cautious approach to non-political protests led to dwindling s upport for his presidency, especially among the 33 Southern Schools News (September 3, 1954) 12. 34 Ibid.

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165 black working class. By the end of 1954, Clements popularity in African American households was limited and local NAACP membership was stagnating.35 Clement, like most of the states black leaders, initially dismissed the harsh rhetoric of white officials as mere posturing and poli ticking. This impression began to abate as African Americans realized that the states white authorities had no intention of enacting any desegregation plan unless they were forced to do so. Unfortunately, organizational infighting failed to turn this new dissatisfa ction into a united black response. Clement resigned from the Charleston NAACP in 1955 a nd moved out of stat e; John McCray and Modjeska Simkins engaged in a malicious public feud, and efforts to elect blacks to local offices in Charleston and Columbia failed miserably. The lack of an implementation order, the commitment of whites to segregat ed education, and the absence of a united black front all contributed the failure to achieve compliance with Brown in 1954. According to Southern School News South Carolinas approach to the desegregation order was manifested more in words than d eeds. Likewise, African American reactions to those words were fragmented and produ ced no concerted campaign to integrate the schools.36 Unlike African Americans, however, white s were at least ab le to prolong the illusion of widespread unity into 1955. Whites Carolinians united behind a new group of segregationist leaders during the 1954 political season. Inde ed, for the most part, the primary and general elections of 1954 were th e least competitive in recent memory. In the fall of 1954, the state elec ted George Bell Timmerman, Jr. as Governor and Ernest F. 35 Southern School News (September 3, 1954) 12. ONeill, F rom the Shadow of Slavery, 124-127. 36 Southern School News (November 4, 1954) 14. ONeill, From the Shadow of Slavery, 124-127.

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166 Hollings as his Lieutenant Governor. Strom Thurmond also replaced the deceased incumbent, Burnet R. Maybank, as one of stat es United States Senators. Both Hollings and Timmerman had spent the entire campaign reassuring voters that they would find a way to maintain segregation in the S outh Carolina public school system. In the Democratic Primary, Timmerman easily dispatched Columbia businessman Lester Bates, taking every opportunity to blast his opponent on the race issue. The Lieutenant Governor called Bates the prefer red candidate of the NAACP and warned that if Bates won he would owe a debt to civil ri ghts leaders. Like Hollings, Timmerman also promoted a plan to legally circumvent the Brown verdict. He called for the creation of a three-tiered school system. Under his pla n, which was similar to freedom of choice plans under consideration in North Carolina and Alabama, parents would have the right to send their children to a ra cially segregated school or an integrated one. Although Bates attempted to criticize the plan because some of the schools would be integrated, he failed to provide a school pl an of his own. Instead, Bates called for the formation of a statewide committee to study the problem a nd solve it peacefully. Timmerman simply responded that James Hinton, the President of the South Carolina NAACP, had proposed the same plan, and reiterated his claim that Bates was soft on the race issue. The Lieutenant Governor won the primary with mo re than 60 percent of the vote and then the general election without serious ly addressing a single other is sue. It is especially noteworthy that Timmerman never explained how the state would finance the additional school budget during a time when education f unding was already stretched thin. Again, the official response to the desegregation th reat took place in a netherworld of unrealistic

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167 plans and promises, where white politicians told their constituents what they wanted to hear without facing up publicly to the realities of the situation.37 As was often the case during the post-World War II civil rights movement, African Americans and whites entered 1955 with starkl y different expectati ons. Black leaders expected a gradual end to Jim Crow and most whites expected the status quo to persist for the foreseeable future. African American s hoped that, once in office, Timmermans rhetorical assault on the civi l rights movement would give way to a more responsible public debate. For several months after the Brown decision, African Americans had waited patiently for white officials to announce a realistic desegregation plan. Unfortunately, Timmerman embodied black f ears of recalcitrant white politics and launched his own campaign of uncompromisi ng resistance to desegregation in South Carolina. The new governors rhetorical onslaught agai nst civil rights activism continued in his inaugural address. He called desegregation a communi stic idea and warned that gradualism was a cowardly approach, and that the idea of slow ly removing racial boundaries was a creeping evil th at has no place in the govern ment of free people. The new governor promised that segregation w ould remain the law of the land during his tenure and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the courts in the Brown case. 37 Quint, Profile in Black and White 128-129. Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1969), 70-71. Thurmonds campaign was especially interesting, in that he was elected as a write-in candidate in November to replace the departed Ma ybank. Although race played a role in the campaign, it was not the central issue. For information on this peculiar elec tion, see: Doyle W. Boggs, A Different Brand of Education: Strom Thurmond Goes to the Senate, 1954, Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (1984) 77-85.

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168 Timmerman even told the South Carolina E ducation Association that integration was contrary to the divine order of things.38 With Timmerman setting the tone for resistance, in March 1955 the South Carolina General Assembly repealed the compulsory attendance law. The following month, it passed a law to revoke funding from any school that desegregated and ended the practice of automatically rehiring teachers for the ne xt academic year. The result of these new laws was, as Governor Timmerman put it, to ensure the people of South Carolina that they will not be forced to send their childre n to mixed schools, and to place more power in the hands of local official s. Although these new directiv es were important statements of white determination, they were also effec tive in further limiting black activism. The changes in teacher employment rules gave the Boards of Trustees more control over who taught in the states classrooms and the threat to revoke funding made certain that whites would blame integration-minded African Ameri cans if their local sc hool closed because of a lack of money.39 Nevertheless, even though Timmerman promoted the new pupil placement and school funding laws as evidence that South Ca rolina whites were united in their defense of racial segregation, cracks in the faade of white solidarity began to show in the spring of 1955. When the Supreme Court s implementation order in the Brown case was handed down in May, African American calls for an end to segregation in education gained a new source of credibility. For the first ti me, it became apparent that South Carolina 38 Inaugural Address of the Honorable George Bell Timmerman, Jr. as Governor of South Carolina (January 18, 1955), South Caroliniana Library. Southern School News (April 1955) 13. Also quoted in: Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 206-207. 39 Southern School News (February 1955) 3, (May 4, 1955) 6. Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 206-207.

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169 whites would have to move beyond rhetoric a nd a plethora of impractical schemes, and decide which tools of resist ance to employ in the fight to save Jim Crow schooling. Brown II was the beginning of the end for efforts to threaten militant options, such as school closure, while simultaneously pursui ng various kinds of tokenism and managed compliance or delay. In their attempts to minimize the effects of these tensions and conflicting agendas, state lawmakers explicitly declared that the federal government was acting beyond the realm of constitutional authority rendering both Brown decisions moot. Although lawmakers frequently called on South Carolinians to obey the rule of law, they also implicitly encouraged the notion that, regard ing segregation, only state laws need be observed. For example, in August 1955 Cl arendon County officials warned Thurgood Marshall that local schools would close and bl ack teachers would be fired if the courts ordered desegregation in the county. Alt hough the threat of closure was perfectly consistent with South Carolina law, it was a direct violation of the Brown ruling. Moreover, Brown II unequivocally applied to Clare ndon County. Since the Summerton school district was specifically named in th e case, it was directly under court order to initiate a prompt and reasonable start toward compliance.40 Although unconstitutional, the actions of Clarendon County did prove effective. Rather than combat racial separation in education in areas that exhibited the most resistance, the NAACP Legal Defe nse Fund initially chose to fight for compliance in the less hostile border South. Hinton went so far as to promise not to resort to legal action until every local effort had been exhauste d. R. Scott Baker concludes that the NAACP 40 Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 170-171.

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170 basically retreated from South Carolina ra ther than challenge the combination of complex legal resistance and local intimidation.41 This NAACP retreat combined with misr epresentations of the impact of the Brown decisions to foster white hopes for the co ntinuation of the st atus quo. Throughout 1954 and early 1955 most white South Carolinian s clung to the notion that there was still a legal way to protect segregated education. The near constant assurances from state leaders that South Carolina would find a wa y of maintaining its dual system was reenforced by frequent pronouncements from th e states media outlets that the court had erred. According to Andrew McDowd Secrest, editor and publisher of The Cheraw Chronicle from 1953 to 1968, this perception was la rgely due to misreporting in the states print media. The lead ing newspapers of South Carolina, he wrote, often misled their readers and encouraged them to support policies that threatened to precipitate a dangerous confrontation between state and fede ral authority. Secrest also pointed out that the most of the states media justified calls for a composed response to the Supreme Courts order by promoting the idea that the c ourts would allow years, if not generations, for full enforcement of the ruling.42 Despite these assurances from state leader s and media outlets that South Carolinas system of segregated education was safe fo r the foreseeable future. There were obvious, if widely ignored, warning signs that this would be difficult to ensure. The Federal District Court, for example, barred Cl arendon County from denying admission to any 41 Ibid. 42 Secrest explained the press opinion in his dissertation, which is partly an autobiographical examination of the press during his tenure at The Cheraw Chronicle see: Andrew McDowd Secrest, In Black and White: Press Opinion and Race Relations in South Carolina, 1954-1964, (Ph.D. Dissertation: Duke University, 1972) xi, 73-80.

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171 qualified student from its schools in a July 1955 ruling. The court stopped short, however, of placing an exact timetable on integration and refused to demand that Clarendon officials create a nondiscriminatory se t of qualifications for pupil placement. Mainstream segregationists insisted that the vagueness of the courts ruling meant that discriminatory pupil placement rules would e ffectively block any re al desegregation of the South Carolina public school system.43 The only faction of the white population that argued that Brown II or the federal district courts ruling was a serious threat to segregated education was the hardcore group. Even though the order stopped short of insisting on immediate or even gradual integration by failing to give an explicit timetable for compliance, some diehard segregationists had grave doubts about the ability of state lawmakers to combat federally mandated integration. Hardcore segregationists called for a more determined mass effort to forestall what they saw as the inevitable enforcement of the Brown rulings. Their desperate and resourceful efforts helped to transform the tenor of white resistance in South Carolina, shifting the balance towards more militant tactics. The passion and dedication of hardcore segregationists ulti mately hardened the mood of whites across South Carolina and their fervent resolve to defend de jure segregation effectively silenced an already embattled group of moderate whites. The increasingly hostile and determin ed mood of South Carolinas white population became more apparent during the summer of 1955. Some whites sought out pro-segregation organizations to vent their frustrations with the challenges to white privilege. A meeting of the Ku Klux Klan in Sumter attracted several hundred people, 43 Newby, South Carolina and the Desegregation Issue, 45-46. Southern School News (August 1955) 6.

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172 and a cross was burned in front of an African American recreation ce nter in Anderson. However, the KKK had never enjoyed mainstre am support or official sanction in South Carolina. Horry County Sheriff John Henry, fo r instance, warned Klansmen to stay out of his jurisdiction and even the conservative Charleston News and Courier preached against of the dangers of Ku Kluxism. Nevertheless, a moderate resurgence of the KKK in South Carolina was an unwelcome si gn of intense white outrage and evidence that many whites wanted to organize protests ag ainst the threatened changes in the racial status quo. In order to provide a voice fo r that protest without succumbing to the distastefulness of Ku Kluxism, white s began to lend their support to more respectable outlets for dissent. 44 Throughout the Low Country individuals who supported mass action against civil rights advocates formed chapters of the Stat es Rights League. The largest groups were in Darlington, Charleston, and Florence. For a short time, the League enjoyed an air of respectability that other white supremacy gr oups lacked. It was able to book prominent southern leaders, such as former Georgi a Governor Herman Talmadge, for speaking engagements and succeeded in drawing member ship away from other white supremacist organizations. For example, the Florence ch apter of the National Association for the Advancement of White People regrouped as the States Rights L eague in March 1955 after national NAAWP leader Bryant Bowl es became ensnared in several public controversies.45 44 Southern School News (July 6, 1955) 14, (August 1955) 6. Time (August 1, 1955). News and Courier (February 4, 1955) 11A. Morning News (March 11, 1955) 1. 45 Ibid. Bowles was accused of nonpayment of federal income taxes. He was later convicted of the murder of his brother-in-law in 1958 and spent most of his life in the Texas prison system.

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173 Although it never attracted a la rge number of people, the League was a precursor to later white fringe groups. Initially founde d in the late 1940s by supporters of Strom Thurmonds Dixiecrat campaign, the group experi enced a growth spurt after the original Brown decision, and again following the impl ementation ruling. The organization professed a belief in the individual libertie s guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and avowed legal dissent in the opposition to socialistic platforms. The States Rights League argued that its strongest opposition was to the Supreme Court, which wrongly abrogated, modified or amended the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. It had a strong following among white members of the South Ca rolina Farm Bureau. For example, a meeting of the Sumter group at the count ys Farm Bureau office in September 1954 attracted over 700 people. At an Oct ober meeting, Georgias Commissioner of Agriculture, Tom Linder spoke to an equally large group at the facility. He charged that the NAACP was not only seeking an end to segr egation in education but to segregation in the church, and then before the marriage alter. Voicing the f ear of miscegenation that underwrote much of the rh etoric of white resisters, Li nder concluded that the battle to save segregated schools was a fight for th e very existence of the white man down here in the South.46 At an August 1955 meeting of the Sumter States Rights League, Thurmond called on an audience of more than 3000 white South Carolinians to resis t integration by every legal means and to oppose desegregation har der than the integrationists fought to end segregation. According to Thurmond, the Supreme Courts decision in the Brown case was an illegal usurpation of the right of Congress to legislate and was an unlawful 46 Quint, Profile in Black and White 43-45. News and Courier (February 4, 1955) 11A. Morning News (March 11, 1955) 1. Southern School News (October 1, 1954) 13, (November 4, 1954) 14.

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174 attack on states rights. The re are some people who advocat e and others who have been led to believe that we should submit to the co urt without resistance. I reject any such proposal, declared the former Dixiecrat.47 Like Thurmond, most League members hoped to find a legislative solution in their efforts to save de jure segregation. Edward Atkinson, the president of the Sumter chapter of the States Rights League, called on sout hern congressmen to band together and fight for a constitutional amendment or some form of legislation which will eliminate integration. Atkinson worried that if southerners allowed th eir protests to die away, the program for integration will proceed. His worri es were consistent with the fears of other massive resisters throughout the South. According to historian Tony Badger, segregationists rallied so fe rvently because they thought th at gradualists and those who supported compliance might have the uppe r hand in the segregation debate.48 The League and its supporters may have pr ofessed a belief in legal protests, but many of its members were militant segregati onists who, should legal methods fail, had no intention of meekly deferring to the federal courts. For exam ple, G.L. Ivey, a restaurant owner and member of the Florence States Ri ghts League, had fired all of his African American employees after the first Brown decision. Other members of the Florence chapter of the League attempted to force a Baptist minister to resign for preaching to black parishioners. When a member witn essed several African American children drinking from a whites only water fountain, the Florence organization condemned the 47 Southern School News (September 1955) 6-7. 48 Edward Atkinson to William Jennings Bryan Dorn (December 21, 1954), William Jennings Bryan Dorn Papers, Modern Political Collection, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as Dorn Papers, MPC]. Tony Badger, Fatalism not Gradualism, 67-95.

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175 staff of the Florence County Agricultural Bu ilding for failing to monitor the use of the buildings facilities. While the rhetoric conti nued to stress legal resi stance, the actions of many League supporters revealed a willi ngness to embrace more militant tactics to stymie black advances and racial change.49 The formation of organized, militant resistance to desegregation in South Carolina was a serious concern to the small populati on of whites actually advocating compliance with the Brown verdict. However, instead of mounting a united campaign against hardcore segregationists, even some liberal wh ites joined the chorus of their more diehard neighbors and blamed the heightened tensions on the civil rights activists who were pursuing adherence to the desegregation order. For example, Jack ODowd, the editor of the Florence Morning News worried that the pressure to integrate was pushing South Carolina down the road toward militant resistance. ODowd, who was one of the few newspapermen in the state to encourage state le aders to face up to th e fact that they had lost their battle to maintain the dual school system, worried that some districts were hellbent on closing the schools rather than dese gregating them. He blamed the NAACP and the federal courts for jeopardizing the improve ments that had been made in the education of African Americans in the pr evious five years, but his primary cause for concern was the potential white response to the freedom struggle. Outside agitators, he claimed, would push white South Carolinians into a position that would e ndanger black progress and prosperity.50 49 Morning News (July 21, 1954) 1. Morning News (August 12, 1955) 9A, (June 17, 1955) 1. 50 Morning News (April 16, 1955) 4. For more on ODowds moderate politics, see: Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) 527.

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176 Although there was a small but dedicated group of white liber als who championed black civil rights, the cause of desegregation failed to at tract a significant number of whites. When Alice Norwood Spearman took ov er the states branch of the Southern Regional Council, the South Carolina Counc il on Human Relations, she found it difficult to promote even basic interracial cooperation, let alone support for a more radical racial readjustment. According to historian Pete Daniel, white members of the SCCHR felt that the NAACP was too aggressive. The failure of the Council on Human Relations to support the legal agenda of the NAACP led prominent civil rights leader Modjeska Simkins to resign from the organization and created a schism between African American activists and the SCCHRs mostly white membership. Between 1954 and 1955, when white support might have been the most valuable, membership in the organization declined. White members blamed the rad ical agenda of th e NAACP and African American members blamed the failure of thei r white colleagues to repudiate segregation in education. Daniel concludes that ther e was a near collapse of cooperation between South Carolinas blacks and whites.51 In August 1955 at the National Governor s Conference in Chicago, Timmerman urged his fellow southerners to unite behind a third political party. That same month, state Attorney General T.C. Callison declared, it is going to be impossible, in my opinion, to operate free public schools on a se gregated basis without being in conflict with the ruling of the court. The only option, he claimed, was to abandon the public schools. Seemingly in agreement with his a ttorney general, the governor reiterated his call for political separatism at the Southern Governors Conference in October. Although 51 Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) 230-234.

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177 his remarks were not well received, Timmermans rhetoric encouraged South Carolinas radical fringe to push for a mass and resolute response against any efforts to desegregate southern society.52 Perpetually concerned that they might lose the political advantage to white backsliders on the race issue or that apathy would erode whit e commitment to resisting the Supreme Courts desegregation order, hardcore segregationists took every opportunity discredit the possibi lity of a moderate solution. For example, after a number of white ministers encouraged their white congregation to refrain from partaking in hateful or hurtful actions toward their black neighbors, they were quickly silenced by their hardcore parishioners. The Governor s father, George Be ll Timmerman, Sr., for instance, orchestrated the re signation of Reverend George Ja ckson from his position as pastor of the First Baptist Church in Batesburg by convincing the conservative congregation that Jackson was far too liberal to continue minister ing at the all-white church. A similar incident occurred in Orangeburg, where conservative worshipers forced the Methodist Church to relocat e Reverend John V. Murray for speaking out against segregation.53 With virtually no support for even token compliance amongst whites, African Americans were left with no option but to retu rn to the courts and demand that the state observe the Supreme Courts de segregation order and instigate a legitimate plan of 52 The State (August 14, 1955) 1. Southern School News (August 1955) 6. News and Courier (October 18, 1955) 1. 53 Southeastern Office of the American Friends Serv ice Committee, Department of Racial and Cultural Relations, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Southern Regional Council, Intimidation, Reprisals an d Violence in the Souths Racial Cr isis (n.d.), in the South Carolina Council on Human Relations Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as SCCHR Papers, SCL]. Lowe, The Magnificent Fight, 213-214.

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178 action. Beginning in June 1955, various chap ters of the NAACP had reorganized and renewed the black legal activism that had s purred the desegregation order in the first place. By the end of September, the NAACP had filed desegregation petitions against school boards in Greenville, Sumter, Richland, Florence, Orangeburg, Beaufort, Greenville, and Columbia.54 White South Carolinians condemned this new activism, and, again, blamed the deteriorating racial climate on the African Americans. No prominent white elected official argued in favor of answering the peti tions with a plan for gradual or even token desegregation. For hardcore segregationist s, the NAACP petitions were simply another example of why more concerted resistan ce was necessary. As in 1950 and 1951, when Clarendon County whites had attempted to quell civil rights activism through intimidation, white South Carolinians answered the petitions with a determined effort to coerce African Americans into withdrawing their requests for compliance with Brown. The names on the school desegr egation petition were made pub lic in a not-too-subtle call for white supremacists to seek out and en act retribution on black agitators. The Charleston News and Courier encouraged its white readers to study carefully the list of names in the newspaper and also advocated firing black teachers who were members of the NAACP. Membership in the NAACP or an y similar organization, it editorialized, 54 A reproduction of the Orangeburg petition is in: Cecil J. Williams, Freedom and Justice: Four Decades of the Civil Rights Struggle as Seen by a Black Photographer of the Deep South (Mercer University Press, 1995) 81. News and Courier (August 5, 1955) 1, (September 13, 1955) 3A. Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971) 73-79. Quint, Profile in Black and White 40-53. The Orangeburg Citizens Council (February 13, 1956) 1. News and Courier (August 20, 1955) 1B, (August 24, 1955) 10A, (August 27, 1955) 2B. The State (August 26, 1955) 10A. News and Courier (September 2, 1955) 16A, (September 18, 1955) 2A, (September 17, 1960) 1A. William D. Workman, Jr., The Case for the South (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960). News and Courier (July 1, 1956) 14C, (September 18, 1955) 2A. Morning News (June 30, 1955) 1. Southern School News (August 1955) 6.

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179 should be grounds for dismissal. Much of this new wave of intimidation was crafted by white supremacy organizations, such as the States Rights League. The League worked behind the scenes to ensure that white public officials would cooperate with the effort. For example, the white superint endent of Charleston Countys schools turned over a copy of a desegregation petition to the News and Courier after he was pressured to do so by James Hayes, the leader of the lo cal League. The paper printed all 47 names from the city petition.55 The publicity garnered by releasing the na mes of the petitioners helped fuel an upsurge in white community activism. Afte r the petitions were filed in Charleston County, 450 whites from the Moultrie District met to draft a reso lution opposing the operation of any school in Moultrie School Di strict No. 6 on a non-segregated basis. The group also pledged that, although it would regret to see the absolute closing down of the district schools, it would support c losing down the schools before any school in the district is permitted to be operated on a non-segregated basis. A similar meeting in the unincorporated North Char leston area attracted more th an 500 whites, and another 175 whites met at the Johns Island Ci vic Club to discuss the petitions.56 In August 1955 a group of prominent poli ticians, businessmen, and journalists joined the battle by forming an unofficial group called the Committee of 52. The 52 55 Michael Klarman, How Br own Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, Journal of American History (June 1994) 81-118. Baker, Ambiguous Legacies, 174-175. News and Courier (August 11, 1955) 3A, (July 15, 1955) 12A.. The paper did not publish the names of the 250 signers from the unincorporated area surrounding the Charleston Navy Base and Naval Shipyard or the 124 signers from the Moultrie School District in Mount Pleasant In his disse rtation on the Fort Jackson Army Base in Columbia. Andrew Myers claims that most of the signers from the north area were most likely federal employees, and therefore had civil more job protection and security th an blacks in the city, see: Black, White, and Olive Drab: Military-Social Relations During the Civil Rights Movement at Fort Jackson and in Columbia, South Carolina (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Virginia, 1998). Southern School News (September 1955) 6. 56 Southern School News (September 1955) 6.

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180 founders of the organization, which included several members of the General Assembly, journalist William Workman, College of Charle ston President George Grice, and many of the states wealthiest business leaders, ha nded over a signed proclamation to the South Carolina Schools Committee that called on the state legislature to protect state sovereignty and segregation in education. According to the document, the committee was intended to reassure the people of Sout h Carolina that many substantial citizens are standing steadfast against usurpation of the constitutional rights of the state to manage its own affairs. Within a wee k, it had received over 7,000 endo rsements of the resolution and was bombarded with thousands of requests for copies of the document.57 Other noteworthy South Carolina whites t ook it upon themselves to rebuke civil rights activists. S. Emory Rogers, an atto rney who had represented Clarendon County in the Briggs case, wrote a public letter in which he proclaimed: We are not engaged in an ordinary law suit in which legal principles will be applied and decisions founded thereon, but rather in a sociological and psychological crusade aimed at destroying our Southern bi-racial culture. We had good and sound law in our favor in the Clarendon cas e, but this was ignored by the Supreme Court in a legislative decision . 58 Rogers argued that South Carolinians should not expect the courts to rule in favor of segregation unless the Supreme Court can be convinced that psychologically and sociologically its decisions do not represent th e will of the people. According to Rogers, it did not matter if the state created a tri-school system as Timmerman had suggested, or abandoned public education altogether. The NAACP, he predicted, would challenge any system that practiced racial separati on. Therefore, it was necessary for South 57 Ibid ., Resolution of the Committee of 52, Workman Papers, M PC. The Workman Papers also contains a significant amount of correspondence that endorses the committees statement. 58 Southern School News (September 1955) 6.

PAGE 189

181 Carolinians to convince the federal courts that desegregation was not in the best interests of the states children. Implicit in his remarks was the noti on that any interracial cooperation would prove to the Supreme Court that desegrega tion was, indeed, likely to see a sociological a nd psychological success.59 At a meeting of the Virginia Bar Association, Thurmond seemed to agree with Rogers assessment. If propaganda and ps ychological evidence are effective for our opponents, Thurmond said, they can be effectiv e for us. The former Governor also insisted that whites treat Af rican Americans humanely. He urged each of the southern states to engage in a true equalization program in spite of the temptation to punish all southern blacks as retaliation for the actions of the NAACP.60 The events in South Carolina were emblem atic of racial episodes throughout the South. Vocal pro-segregation advocates a nd organized protest groups, such as the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties in Virginia and The Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., emerged in nearly every corner of the region. However, the largest mass resistance groups were the White Citi zens Councils (WCC). Each of these organizations utilized various forms of coer cion, intimidation, and political pressure to ensure the continuation of wh ite privilege, but no organiza tion could match the Councils effectiveness.61 The first Citizens Councils were form ed in Mississippi immediately after the Brown decision in 1954, but the organization swep t across the South after the Supreme 59 Ibid. 60 Southern School News (September 1955) 7. 61 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance 92-107. The Citizens Councils never referred to themselves as White Citizens Councils, but the nomenclature wa s widely used by contemporary journalists, activists, and observers as was the designation WCC to refer to the groups.

PAGE 190

182 Court handed down its implementation order. Most of the various WCC chapters eventually formed a loose confederation calle d the Citizens Councils of America, which was based in Mississippi. The CCA distri buted Council propaganda, produced a radio program that was disseminated to stations throughout the South, and it arranged for prosegregation speakers to attend rallie s at various locales in the region.62 The Councils provided an important poten tial outlet and framework for white protests in South Carolina. The wave of Council organization first reached South Carolina in August 1955 in Orangeburg C ounty. Shortly after the filing of a desegregation petition in Ora ngeburg District #5, the Orange burg and Elloree Citizens Councils were born. The groups claimed they sought to oppose the use of force by radicals and reactionaries to compel in tegration. Within a month nearly every community in Orangeburg County had formed its own Council. There were WCC units in Cope, Eutawville, Holly Hill, North, Norway, and Cordova. For months, whites had held community meetings and demanded th at civic leaders find a way to protect segregated education but had not formed an organized system for promoting white resistance. The Councils provided such a sy stem and the CCAs standing as the premier organization for combating civil rights activ ism made it an attractive model for South Carolina segregationists. 63 The Orangeburg group obtained a state inco rporation charter that declared the organizations purpose: 62 For examples, see: Klarman, How Brown Chan ged Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis and McMillen, The Citizens Council 63 News and Courier (September 13, 1955) 3A. McMillen, The Citizens' Council 73-79. Quint, Profile in Black and White 40-53. The Orangeburg Citizens Council (February 13, 1956) 1.

PAGE 191

183 "To maintain good relations among the members of all races residing in School District No. 5 (City of Or angeburg), Orangeburg County." "To oppose the use of force by radicals and reactionaries who attempt to disrupt the peace and good relations among the races of this area." "To make every legal and moral effort to save the segregated public schools." "To study ways and means for providing an adequate education for children in School District No. 5 if radical agitat ors force the abandonment of the public schools." "To acquaint well-meaning but misled public officials from outside South Carolina with the local conditions and attitudes whic h make integration impossible in said school district, both white and colored, fa vor continuing segregation in the public schools."64 The Orangeburg Councils received strong endorsements from local whites, with much of the support coming from local busin esses and community leaders. Atlanta journalist William Gordon claimed that Orange burg Council members were elite, church going, club and business-minded folk who also claim to be God-fearing. Several business owners demonstrated their suppor t by purchasing advertisements in the Orangeburg Times and Democrat The issue of desegregation quickly dominated the daily life of Orangeburg Countys roughly 70,000 inhabitants. Since more than 60 percent of the county was black, it was a pa rticularly pressing matter for the white minority. On at least one occasion, the Orangeburg Citizens Council placed a recruitment advertisement on the front page of the local newspaper. An August 29, 1955 Council meeting attracted over 3,000 local whit es. At that meeting, South Carolina State Senator Marshall Williams encouraged every white man in the area to join a WCC chapter. The Elloree chapter received the endorsement of the towns mayor, W.J. Deer. He proclaimed, We will fight the l eaders of the NAACP from ditches to fence 64 News and Courier (September, 13 1955) 3A.

PAGE 192

184 posts to keep Negroes out of white schools. Less than a day after the NAACP petition was filed in Elloree, the WCC claimed 225 mo stly middle class members. Just over a week later, the group had grown to over 800 members. 65 From Orangeburg, the group quickly spread throughout South Carolina. The first meeting of the Kingstree WCC drew 225 attendee s. The second, held a week later, drew over 300, by which time the group claimed a me mbership of nearly 500. In Bowman, over 100 people met to establish a Council chap ter. The organizational meeting of the Winnsboro Citizens Council attracted 300 me mbers. In Manning, near where the Briggs case had originated, nearly 300 whites joined the Councils. On September 1, 1955, the Charleston States Rights L eague renamed itself the Char leston Citizens Council. League President James Hayes claimed the move was motivated by the WCCs superior ability to resist civil rights agitation. He argued, The NAACP is more fearful of the Citizens Councils than any ot her organization opposing their integration campaign. By July 1, 1956, 55 separate Councils had formed. Most of the groups were based in the Low Country. Charleston County alone boa sted over six WCC chapters. Orangeburg County remained the most organi zed with eight active Councils.66 The legitimacy of the WCC and its intimida tion tactics were bol stered by a strong endorsement from South Carolinas politic al elite. In November 1955
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0013899/00001

Material Information

Title: Managed compliance : white resistance and desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1970
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Language: English
Creator: White, John W. ( Dissertant )
Ward, Brian ( Thesis advisor )
Davis, Jack ( Reviewer )
Esenwein, George ( Reviewer )
Montgomery, Charles ( Reviewer )
Conley, Richard ( Reviewer )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008
Copyright Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF
Genre: non-fiction   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: United States -- South Carolina

Notes

Abstract: This dissertation aims to reveal the complex history of white resistance to desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the first federal school desegregation lawsuit, Briggs v. Elliott, and the final failure of overtly racist politics to ensure electoral victory during the gubernatorial election of 1970. Generally, this work contends that historians have underestimated the degree to which physical, legal, and economic pressure were successful in slowing the pace and extent of significant racial change in South Carolina. It also argues that the well-planned bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in the 1950s were instrumental in delaying and minimizing desegregation in the mid-to-late 1960s. From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a multifaceted and flexible massive resistance campaign that was dominated by a policy of managed non-compliance with court ordered desegregation. Rather than face federal intervention and civic unrest, whites adapted South Carolina’s system of racial control in the mid-to-late 1960s to one that is best described as managed compliance. The dissertation argues that white moderation and acceptance of token desegregation in South Carolina were predicated on maintaining the white economic advantage and preserving a racial balance that heavily favored whites in the state’s public school system. It also demonstrates that the generation that controlled the state in the three decades after World War II did not endorse the concept of racial integration and utilized every available device to protect white privilege and advantages. The dissertation reveals that, as late as 1970, after federal intervention and black political agency rendered the politics and practice of massive resistance impotent, whites retained many of the educational and economic advantages that had allowed white supremacy to flourish in the first place.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (411-433).
General Note: Vita.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 434 p.
General Note: Title from title page of document.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0013899:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0013899/00001

Material Information

Title: Managed compliance : white resistance and desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1970
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Language: English
Creator: White, John W. ( Dissertant )
Ward, Brian ( Thesis advisor )
Davis, Jack ( Reviewer )
Esenwein, George ( Reviewer )
Montgomery, Charles ( Reviewer )
Conley, Richard ( Reviewer )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2008
Copyright Date: 2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF
Genre: non-fiction   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: United States -- South Carolina

Notes

Abstract: This dissertation aims to reveal the complex history of white resistance to desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the first federal school desegregation lawsuit, Briggs v. Elliott, and the final failure of overtly racist politics to ensure electoral victory during the gubernatorial election of 1970. Generally, this work contends that historians have underestimated the degree to which physical, legal, and economic pressure were successful in slowing the pace and extent of significant racial change in South Carolina. It also argues that the well-planned bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in the 1950s were instrumental in delaying and minimizing desegregation in the mid-to-late 1960s. From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a multifaceted and flexible massive resistance campaign that was dominated by a policy of managed non-compliance with court ordered desegregation. Rather than face federal intervention and civic unrest, whites adapted South Carolina’s system of racial control in the mid-to-late 1960s to one that is best described as managed compliance. The dissertation argues that white moderation and acceptance of token desegregation in South Carolina were predicated on maintaining the white economic advantage and preserving a racial balance that heavily favored whites in the state’s public school system. It also demonstrates that the generation that controlled the state in the three decades after World War II did not endorse the concept of racial integration and utilized every available device to protect white privilege and advantages. The dissertation reveals that, as late as 1970, after federal intervention and black political agency rendered the politics and practice of massive resistance impotent, whites retained many of the educational and economic advantages that had allowed white supremacy to flourish in the first place.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2008.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (411-433).
General Note: Vita.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 434 p.
General Note: Title from title page of document.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0013899:00001


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MANAGED COMPLIANCE: WHITE RESISTANCE AND DESEGREGATION IN
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1950-1970















By

JOHN W. WHITE


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2006

































Copyright 2006

by

John W. White



































For Anne















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation could not have been completed without the assistance of

numerous individuals and organizations who have offered me professional and personal

support over the last few years. The Addlestone Library at the College of Charleston has

been my employer and base of operations during most of the research for this

dissertation. During that time David Cohen has provided me a workspace,

encouragement, and time for research. Also, Dale Rosengarten, Claire Fund, Bob

Neville, and Gene Waddell have given me helpful advice and Michael Phillips and the

staff of the library's interlibrary loan office have been invaluable in assisting me by

acquiring microfilm and other resources that were not available at my home institution. I

would especially like to thank Marie Ferrara. No one outside of my immediate family

has been more supportive, or more patient than Marie. This dissertation could not have

been completed without her assistance.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to the archivists and librarians at the various

institutions cited in this dissertation. Throughout my research I was routinely and

pleasantly surprised by the level of helpfulness and professionalism I encountered at

Clemson University, the University of South Carolina, and the many other repositories I

visited during my investigations. Also, some of the research for this work was partially

funded by the Ellison Durant Smith Research Award at the University of South Carolina.

This dissertation owes a great debt to my committee chair and graduate advisor,

Brian Ward. For the past several years Brian has been a mentor, an editor, and a friend. I









am deeply grateful to him for making me a better historian. His influence is present on

each and every page of this work. I would also like to thank the other members of my

dissertation committee: Jack Davis, George Esenwein, Charles Montgomery, and

Richard Conley. They have each contributed to my education and to the completion of

this work in some way. Also, I would like to acknowledge Kari Frederickson and W.

Scott Poole, who both read parts of this work during its early phases and provided

constructive criticisms and encouragement.

I would also be remiss if I did not acknowledge several individuals to whom I owe

personal debts. My parents, Arthur and Charlene White, made certain that I was the first

member of my family to earn a bachelor's degree. It is mostly due to their

encouragement that I have been able to continue with my education. Kevin Knott has

been my friend and academic sounding board since our days together at Bridgewater

College. I owe him a great deal for his endless patience and advice. I would also like to

acknowledge Joseph and Nicole Meyers, Jonathan Atkins, Scott White, Steven Edwards,

and Heidi Knott for their friendship and Indiana and Keiko for reminding me that, no

matter how rapidly a deadline is approaching, there is always time for a walk in the park.

Finally, I would like to thank Anne Bennett, to whom this dissertation is dedicated.

Anne is my best and closest friend and confidant. I am indebted to her most of all.









TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ................................................................................................. iv

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION .............. ................. ............ ...................... ..1.. 1

2 MANAGING THE SEGREGATION CRISIS: THE EARLY WHITE BACKLASH
IN SOU TH CAROLIN A .......................................................................... 12

3 CAMPAIGNING ON RACE: THE ELECTIONS OF 1950.......................................62

4 STRADDLING THE FENCE: POLITICS AND AMBIGUITY ON THE EVE OF
BRO W N ............................................................... ...... ..... ......... 99

5 AFTER BROWN: FROM MODERATION TO EXTREMISM............................ 141

6 BOMBINGS, BULLETS, AND BEATINGS: THE ZENITH OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA..............................................................201

7 FISSURES IN THE FACADE OF WHITE UNITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA..........250

8 FROM HARDCORE RESISTANCE TO MANAGED (NON)COMPLIANCE:
EARLY DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA .......................................290

9 WHITE FLIGHT, MANAGED COMPLIANCE, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF
RACE IN SOUTH CAROLINA ........................................ ......................... 341

10 CON CLU SION ................................................... .............. .... ..... 403

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................ .......... .. ............ 411

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H ........................................ ............................................434















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

MANAGED COMPLIANCE: WHITE RESISTANCE AND DESEGREGATION IN
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1950-1970

By

John W. White

May 2006

Chair: Brian Ward
Major Department: History

This dissertation aims to reveal the complex history of white resistance to

desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the

first federal school desegregation lawsuit, Briggs v. Elliott, and the final failure of overtly

racist politics to ensure electoral victory during the gubernatorial election of 1970.

Generally, this work contends that historians have underestimated the degree to which

physical, legal, and economic pressure were successful in slowing the pace and extent of

significant racial change in South Carolina. It also argues that the well-planned

bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in the 1950s were instrumental in delaying and

minimizing desegregation in the mid-to-late 1960s.

From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a multifaceted and flexible massive

resistance campaign that was dominated by a policy of managed non-compliance with

court ordered desegregation. Rather than face federal intervention and civic unrest,

whites adapted South Carolina's system of racial control in the mid-to-late 1960s to one









that is best described as managed compliance. The dissertation argues that white

moderation and acceptance of token desegregation in South Carolina were predicated on

maintaining the white economic advantage and preserving a racial balance that heavily

favored whites in the state's public school system. It also demonstrates that the

generation that controlled the state in the three decades after World War II did not

endorse the concept of racial integration and utilized every available device to protect

white privilege and advantages. The dissertation reveals that, as late as 1970, after

federal intervention and black political agency rendered the politics and practice of

massive resistance impotent, whites retained many of the educational and economic

advantages that had allowed white supremacy to flourish in the first place.















CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In 1950, South Carolina was home to the first federal school desegregation lawsuit,

Briggs v. Elliot, and yet, it holds the dubious distinction of being the last southern state to

end the practice of rigid racial segregation in public education, holding out until 1963. In

spite of this lengthy delay, South Carolina is generally recognized for rejecting the kind

of hardcore, often violent, resistance that typified white defiance in other Deep South

states. According to the limited historical literature on the state's desegregation crisis, it

appears that South Carolina underwent a rapid conversion from being a rigid and

inflexible paragon of white supremacy to become a moderate state that orchestrated the

most orderly and uneventful desegregation in the region. However, it is also clear from

the growing number of dissertations on the African American freedom struggle in South

Carolina that racism and intense white resistance to meaningful change persisted for

some time after the supposedly peaceful accommodation of civil rights demands in 1963.

This dissertation focuses primarily on examining the discrepancy between the notion that

South Carolina peacefully shed its Jim Crow past and the evidence suggesting that the

basic structures of white privilege remained intact for some time after that conversion.



1 For the best examples of these dissertations, see Stephen Lowe, "The Magnificent Fight: Civil Rights
Litigation in South Carolina Federal Courts, 1940-1970" (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University,
1999). Stephen O'Neill, "From the Shadow of Slavery: The Civil Rights Years in Charleston (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1994). R. Scott Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies: The NAACP Legal
Campaign Against Segregation in South Carolina," (Ph.D. Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993).
Millicent Brown, "Civil Rights Activism in Charleston, South Carolina, 1940-1970," (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Florida State University, 1997). Peter F. Lau, "Freedom Road Territory: The Politics of Civil Rights
Struggle in South Carolina during the Jim Crow Era," (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 2002).









The chronicle of how South Carolina was able to mount the longest and most

successful battle against desegregation is complex and multifaceted. Between 1950 and

the late 1960s white South Carolinians were united by the fervor to protect white

privilege and slow the ever quickening pace of racial change. That is not, however, to

say that whites in the state were a monolithic group. Granted, white South Carolinians

engaged in "massive resistance" against desegregation, but massive resistance was itself a

diverse and intricate phenomenon. The term was first used by Virginia Senator Harry F.

Byrd in 1956 and later adopted by historians and contemporary observers to describe

white defiance of anti-Jim Crow pressures. It encapsulates a range of tactics, policies,

and sentiments shared by southern whites that were at best amorphous expressions of

common white anxieties.

Like segregation itself the white resistance movement was an ever changing

arrangement between various factions and interests: a process as much as a program. As

J. Douglas Smith has recently argued, white southerners needed to manage Jim Crow

carefully over time. It was not a fixed entity, but a dynamic system of racial/social

control that was adapted to meet the needs of the white population that benefited from it

and to counteract various challenges to it from African Americans and their allies. This

dissertation demonstrates that, once those challenges became irresistible in the 1950s and

1960s, whites were equally determined to manage the dismantling and replacement of the

state's Jim Crow system in a manner that would also serve white interests.

To date, scholarly attempts to chronicle this process have been few and far

between. With this in mind historian Charles Eagles, in a 2000 historiographical essay in

the Journal of N',,iwhei I History, issued a call for scholars to produce new investigations









of southern white resistance to desegregation. As Eagles noted, several of the key works

on the topic, such as Numan V. Bartley's The Rise of Massive Resistance. Race and

Politics in the .S,,lh During the 1950s and Neil R. McMillen's The Citizens' Council:

Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, are now more than 20 years old and

lack the nuance and focus of more contemporary studies of the freedom struggle.

Bartley's study, much like Francis Wilhoit's 1973 book The Politics of Massive

Resistance, is too focused on elite whites and fails to recognize the extent of grass roots

white participation. McMillen's work, on the other hand, is narrowly focused on grass

roots activism, but he dramatically underestimates the effectiveness of the White

Citizens' Councils in the Palmetto State by measuring them against their Mississippi

counterparts without fully explaining the differences between South Carolina's "sly"

resistance and Mississippi's more confrontational approach.2

Since the publication of Eagles's essay several works have begun to examine the

nature of white supremacy and have launched investigations of the legal and extra-legal

measures adopted throughout the South to defend the racial caste system. Both George

Lewis and Jeff Woods, for example, have studied the connection between anti-

communism and the defense of segregation. Like Eagles, both authors recognize that the

complexity of white resistance warrants the same kind of focused inspection that has

characterized scholarly examinations of African American community actions. Lewis's

The White .Snith and Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and Massive

2 J. Douglas Smilh i L,,1,,,, White Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenship in Jim Crow Virginia
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Charles W. Eagles, "Toward New Histories of
the Civil Rights Era," Journal of Southern History (November 2000) 815-848. Numan V. Bartley, The
Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1969). Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second
Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971). Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of
Massive Resistance (New York: G. Braziller, 1973).










Resistance, 1945-1965 and Woods's Black Struggle Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-

Communism in the Sin,,lh, 1948-1968 are welcome additions to the study of white

resistance. Nevertheless, the narrow topical focus of each work limits its ability to

provide an in-depth analysis of white resistance in South Carolina beyond the tactical use

of anti-communism.3

Regarding the post-World War II freedom struggle, South Carolina has been the

most understudied of all the Deep South states. There has not been a single monographic

analysis of the civil rights era in South Carolina published since Howard Quint's Profile

in Black and White in 1958. This is despite the fact that South Carolina was the origin of

some of the earliest and most dynamic challenges to the South's Jim Crow system during

the 1940s and home to a vigorous and complex massive resistance movement well into

the 1960s. This dissertation offers a long overdue re-interpretation of white legal,

political, and extra-legal resistance in the state, placing it in the context of a resourceful

and resilient civil rights campaign by South Carolina's black communities.4


3 George Lewis, The White South and Red Menace: ,. g-. oii. ~, i'. Anticommunism, and Massive
Resistance, 1945-1965 (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 2004). Jeff Woods, Black Struggle Red
Scare: g,,. ga,,. i andAnti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2004). For other examples of works that attempt to answer Eagles call for community
based studies of white resistance, see: Joseph Hardin Crespino, "Strategic Accommodation: Civil Rights
Opponents in Mississippi and Their Impact on American Racial Politics, 1953-1972" (Ph.D. Dissertation:
Stanford University, 2003). J. Todd Moye, Let the People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance
Movements in 1i,, i?. .1,. r County, Mississippi, 1945-1986 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2004). Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash: White Working Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). Yasuhiro Katagiri, The Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States Rights (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001).

4 Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1958). For discussions of the civil rights pressures in South Carolina during the
1940s, see: Patricia Sullivan, Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996) especially pp. 170-220. Kari Frederickson, 'Dual Actions, One
for Each Race': The Campaign Against the Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950," International Social
Science Review (1997) 14-25; 'The Slowest State' and 'Most Backward Community' : Racial Violence
in South Carolina and Federal Civil-Rights Legislation, 1946-1948, South Carolina Historical Magazine
(April 1997) 177-202; and The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001) especially pp. 118-216.









To date, the three most noteworthy examinations of massive resistance to

desegregation in South Carolina are Quint's Profile in Black and White, John Sproat's

essay "Firm Flexibility: Perspectives on Desegregation in South Carolina," and Marcia

Synnott's article "Desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1963: Sometime Between

'Now' and 'Never'." Quint's work, which was published five years before any public

school desegregation occurred in South Carolina, is pessimistic about the possibility for a

peaceful resolution to the desegregation crisis. The book, which is largely a summary of

contemporary journalistic observations, chronicles the state's reactions to black

encroachments on white privilege during the 1950s and concludes that no desegregation

would occur in South Carolina without a "catastrophic struggle." Sproat's work, on the

other hand, praises the state for adopting a policy of "peaceful accommodation" in the

1960s. He argues that moderate white leaders worked with a generally conservative and

patient black population to foster slow but peaceful racial progress in the state. Synnott's

work is more nuanced. She acknowledges the influence of Quint and Sproat, but

criticizes them for their narrow temporal focus. According to Synnott, Quint's work

provides valuable insight into a period when traditional patterns of race relations were

breaking down in South Carolina, but, because it was written during the zenith of militant

white resistance, the author did "not anticipate that the state's political and business

leadership would by 1963 peacefully and without federal intervention choose to integrate

Clemson College." Likewise, she concludes that Sproat's work is also flawed in that it

fails to define "how fast and how far white South Carolinians" would permit racial

progress to go. Instead, Synnott contends that racial change in South Carolina resulted

from a "conservative, controlled 'evolution'."5

5 Quint, Profile in Black and White, V. John Sproat, "'Firm Flexibility': Perspectives on Desegregation in










Synnott's work is valuable in that she recognizes that changes in white resistance

tactics happened gradually and that it is impossible to understand the shift away from

militant white resistance without examining the nature and fate of the segregationist

political and legal campaigns of the 1950s. However, like Sproat she overemphasizes the

significance of the peaceful desegregation of Clemson College and overstresses the

importance of both white and black elites in South Carolina's major cities. Moreover,

both Synnott and Sproat adopt the notion, first mentioned in I.A. Newby's 1973 book

Black Carolinians, that the black population was generally conservative, citing as

evidence what they see as a significant lull in black activism in the late 1950s and the

African American acceptance of only gradual, incremental changes in racial

arrangements in the mid-late 1960s. 6

As Synnott admitted in her 1989 essay, more investigations of the civil rights

movement in South Carolina are necessary before scholars can begin to understand the

complex process of desegregation in the Palmetto State. The lack of proper study of

white resistance still places limits on the ability of historians to understand the political

and social landscape of this period of supposed white moderation and consistent black

conservatism. Consequently, they have failed to appreciate fully the complex social,

South Carolina," in eds. Robert H. Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, New Perspectives on Race and Slavery
in America: Essays in Honor of Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986)
164-184. Marcia Synnott, "Desegregation in South Carolina, 1950-1963: Sometime "Between 'Now' and
'Never'," in eds. Winfred B. Moore, Jr. and Joseph F. Tripp, Looking South: (C /,iq. in the Story of an
American Region (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) 51-64. Paul Lofton generally agrees with Sproat's
assessment in his study on the integration of Columbia, the state capital. Likewise, Maxie Myron Cox
emphasizes the state's peaceful accommodation in his dissertation, see: Paul S. Lofton, "Calm and
Exemplary: Desegregation in Columbia, South Carolina," in eds. David Colburn and Elizabeth Jacoway,
Southern Businessmen and L. ',.. i.,. ,, (Louisiana State University Press, 1982) 70-81. Maxie Myron
Cox, Jr. "1963 The Year of Decision: Desegregation in South Carolina" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University
of South Carolina, 1996).

6 I.A. Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 1968 (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1973). Synnott, "Desegregation in South Carolina," 51-64.









economic, and political context within which black activists had to work for meaningful

racial progress. Close research into the White Citizens' Councils, for instance, reveals

that the "lull" in civil rights activism detected by Newby was deceptive, as black leaders

simply shifted their priorities away from legal challenges to segregation in the late 1950s

in response to the specific nature of local defiance by white supremacists. For example,

local blacks in Clarendon and Orangeburg Counties may have relaxed the pressure on

whites to desegregate during this period, but black organizations were heavily involved in

aiding African Americans who faced economic reprisals from white business leaders,

employers, and landlords. This kind of aid, especially to blacks whose "activism" made

them subject to white economic pressure, was instrumental in creating the supportive

environment in which further black mobilization took place. In other words, without

understanding the nature and impact of white resistance, it is difficult to explain the

agenda of South Carolina's black activists and civil rights organizations.7

Thematically, this dissertation focuses on the variety of forms of resistance to

desegregation and full black enfranchisement utilized by white South Carolinians, and on

the manner in which whites adopted strategies to deal with the demands of both the

federal courts and their own insurgent black citizens for greater civil rights. It is one of

the core findings of this dissertation that at no point did the majority of white South

Carolinians admit that segregation was either wrong or undesirable. The dissertation also

contends that, although the state has routinely been praised for its "moderation" during

the civil rights crises of the 1950s and 1960s (most notably by its own political and

economic leadership), the generation of white South Carolinians that controlled the state


Synnott, "Desegregation in South Carolina," 61.









in the 30 years after World War II never lost faith in white supremacy and made every

effort to preserve white privilege and curtail black advancements. Indeed, this study

argues that, while the deployment of alternatives to violent resistance helped keep

bloodshed in the state to a minimum, it was mostly through luck, poor marksmanship,

and inept bomb-making that the Palmetto State enjoys its reputation for peaceful

desegregation.

In marshalling the evidence for this contention, this work utilizes a variety of

primary and secondary sources. It relies heavily on manuscript collections of state

politicians and activists, black and white; and on contemporary newspaper accounts and

periodicals. Although hardly offering a balanced guide to the events of the period, the

Charleston News and Courier was especially helpful in tracing the evolution of white

resistance as its editor, Thomas R. Waring, was a devout racial conservative who openly

endorsed many of the tenets of massive resistance and advocated for the state to adopt an

uncompromising defense of Jim Crow on the pages of the Low Country's largest and

oldest newspaper. The dissertation also makes use of oral history interviews and the

contemporary publications of regional organizations, such as the Southern Regional

Council and the Southern Education Reporting Service. White electoral behavior,

participation in segregationist civic groups, and economic concerns are also analyzed to

provide a general sense of white public opinion and to explain the changing nature of

white resistance in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970. Although this dissertation is not

primarily an examination of the inner workings of the South Carolina civil rights

movement, it will demonstrate that the tactics employed by African American activists

and their allies shaped and were shaped by the ever changing nature of white resistance to









black demands and progress. The ebb and flow of cause and effect between black

activism and white responses was complex and untidy, changing over time and according

to locale. Nevertheless, at all times and in all places, there was a reciprocal relationship

between black protests and various forms of white power in South Carolina which this

dissertation seeks to illuminate.

The most significant problem in researching this topic was that some relevant

manuscript collections, such as the Ernest F. Hollings Papers and the Floyd Spence

Papers, were not yet available for research. Others, such as the L. Marion Gressette

Papers, appear to have been purged of "controversial" materials prior to their donation to

archival repositories. And, still others, such as the Burnet R. Maybank Papers and parts

of the L. Mendel Rivers Papers are still unorganized and only available with special

permission. Although some of these restricted or "lost" materials may have been helpful,

there is nonetheless a significant archival record for the period in question. Moreover,

much of the important correspondence from the Gressette Commission that seems to be

missing from the Gressette collection at Modern Political Collections at the South

Caroliniana Library can be found in other manuscript collections.

These sources shed light on the complex history of white resistance to

desegregation in South Carolina from 1950 to 1970, a period between the filing of the

Briggs case and the final failure of overtly racist politics to ensure electoral victory

during the gubernatorial election of 1970. Chapters 1 through 3 discuss the initial white

reaction to the increased pace of black activism in South Carolina in the years before

1954. These chapters also take into account the emerging political and economic

concerns confronting white South Carolinians and the developing patterns of resistance to









racial change apparent in the white communities. Chapters 4 through 6 are focused on

the state's reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education and

the evolution of organized mass resistance in South Carolina between 1954 and 1961.

Chapters 5 and 6 explain the reasons for the eventual dissolution of the hardcore

segregationist coalition that dominated official policy and the public debate on race

during the late 1950s in South Carolina and its transformation into a new segregationist

plurality that was no less committed, but that pursued a more moderate brand of managed

non-compliance with desegregation. The final two chapters discuss the evolution of

white resistance from managed non-compliance to yet more subtle and bureaucratic

forms of opposition to black advance designed to preserve the maximum feasible amount

of white power and privilege compatible with the law and a new era of black voting and

biracial politics. These final chapters also shed light on the political, cultural, and

economic changes that resulted from these adjustments.

In sum, this dissertation contends that historians have underestimated the degree to

which physical, legal, and economic pressures were successful in slowing the pace and

extent of significant racial change in South Carolina. It is the contention of this work that

the well-planned bureaucratic roadblocks put in place in the 1950s were instrumental in

delaying and minimizing desegregation in the mid-to-late 1960s. South Carolina whites

had anticipated federally enforced desegregation and prepared strategies to counter it as

early as 1950. Only after the preservation of total segregation was no longer compatible

with the maintenance of public order and economic growth did white South Carolinians

accept even token desegregation. From 1950 to 1963, South Carolina engaged in a

variety of massive resistance campaigns that were dominated by a policy of managed






11


non-compliance with court ordered desegregation. Rather than face federal intervention

and civic unrest, whites adapted South Carolina's system of racial control in the mid-to-

late 1960s to one that is best described as managed compliance. Even then, the

dissertation argues that white moderation and acceptance of token desegregation in South

Carolina were predicated on maintaining white economic advantage and preserving a

racial balance that heavily favored whites in the state's public school system.














CHAPTER 2
MANAGING THE SEGREGATION CRISIS: THE EARLY WHITE BACKLASH IN
SOUTH CAROLINA

This dissertation is primarily devoted to exploring the origins, nature and

effectiveness of white responses to the African American freedom struggle from 1950 to

1970. However, by the mid-1940s, there were already clear signs that white South

Carolina was mobilizing considerable resources to combat gathering challenges to the

operation of Jim Crow in the Palmetto State. Those tactics would form important

precedents for resistance in the 1950s and beyond, and, therefore, warrant attention in this

chapter. Comprehending these initial skirmishes over Jim Crow is crucial for

understanding the mounting desegregation crisis that would peak in the period between

1956 and 1963.

In July 1943 an African American veteran named John Wrighten and 33 other

black students applied for admission to the College of Charleston. The school, which

was a publicly supported municipal college, rejected the applicants on the basis of their

race. A year later, Wrighten and 32 graduates from the Avery Normal Institute, a private

African American secondary school near the College of Charleston, sought admission to

the small city college. Again, the students' applications were rejected. Though the

students were denied admission without serious consideration, the affront to Charleston's

long history of segregation in education worried conservative white Charlestonians. In

the wake of the Gaines v. Canada verdict in 1938, which required states to integrate their

graduate schools or build "equal" facilities for African American students, whites were









concerned that a new legal challenge from black students might result in the

desegregation of the school.1

The Charleston News and Courier predicted that "the white people cannot and will

not take on an elaborate burden of free schools and colleges for the 814,000 negroes (sic)

in the state." In response to Wrighten's attempt to enter the College of Charleston, the

conservative Charleston newspaper went so far as to claim that the court ordered

admission of African American students into white schools would lead to the replacement

of the public school system in South Carolina with a network of private schools, insisting

that although the "negro invasion of [the state's schools] shall by law cause its

destruction, white school training will greatly improve and cost less."2

The Charleston Evening Post similarly warned that the attempted desegregation of

the College of Charleston was an "organized" effort "to challenge the city's educational

system" and "to break down the social, educational and political institutions of the

South." Charleston's evening newspaper also promoted privatization as a potential

remedy to court ordered desegregation. Like its sister paper, the News and Courier, the

Evening Post blamed black activists and New Deal politics for the challenge to

Charleston's racial caste system. "The New Deal," claimed an editorial, "has scrupled at

nothing to gain the votes of Northern negroes (sic) and white "liberals" to whom the

South's way is anathema."3


1 William Peters, The Southern Temper (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959) 184-
185. News and Courier (June 11, 1944), (June 12, 1944) clippings from the College of Charleston
Archives, Special Collections, College of Charleston, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as College of
Charleston Archives, Special Collections].

2 News and Courier (June 12, 1944) clipping from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections.

3 News and Courier (June 12, 1944), Evening Post (June 12, 1944) clippings from the College of
Charleston Archives, Special Collections.









The same year that Wrighten mounted his challenge to segregated education in

South Carolina, the state's predominately black Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) also

attempted to challenge the seating of the all-white South Carolina delegation to the

Democratic National Convention. PDP spokesman and black newspaperman John H.

McCray argued that, since South Carolina's Democratic Primary excluded African

Americans while the PDP primary was open to all South Carolinians, the PDP delegation

was the only legitimate delegation to the national convention. The request was denied by

the convention, but the challenge, like the attempt to desegregate the College of

Charleston, was evidence of growing African American demands for equality in South

Carolina.4

This increase in black civil rights agitation deeply concerned white South

Carolinians. By the mid-1940s it was apparent that black South Carolinians had

marshaled considerable resources to combat the state's separate and unequal racial

hierarchy. Between 1944 and 1950 African Americans regularly and openly challenged

unequal treatment in public schools and mounted a well-organized attack on Jim Crow

politics. In addition to attempts to desegregate the College of Charleston and the

formation of the PDP, black activists also assailed unequal pay in the state's school

system. As elsewhere in the South at the time, a number of educators, including a civil

rights pioneer from the Charleston County public school system named Septima Clark,

sued the state demanding that African American teachers receive the same pay as their

white counterparts. In 1945 Federal Judge J. Waties Waring ruled, in Thompson v.



4 Patricia Sullivan, Days ofHope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996) 170-220. Miles S. Richards, "The Progressive Democrats in Chicago, July
1944," South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 2001) 219-237.









Gibbes, that the practice of paying black teachers in South Carolina less than whites

violated the "separate but equal" doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court

in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.5

The cumulative effect of these new challenges to Jim Crow in South Carolina was

to harden white resistance. Whites, especially those in majority black counties like

Orangeburg and Clarendon, were fearful at the prospect of African American political

power and determined to prevent educational equality. In South Carolina white anxiety

was palpable, and resistance to any black progress was immediate at both the popular and

official levels. For example, after the federal courts ruled against the white primary in

Smith v. Allwright, South Carolina's Governor, Olin D. Johnston, called a special session

of the state legislature. During that session, the state eliminated any and all mention of

political parties in the South Carolina constitution and the Democratic Party was re-

defined as a "private club." Johnston and leaders in the General Assembly declared that

since the political parties were "private" organizations, the Texas case did not apply.6

In addition to these kinds of legislative responses, whites used a variety of formal

and informal tactics to resist calls for black civil and political rights. At times, that

resistance was violent. White South Carolinians did not take kindly to even the most

minor infraction of racial custom. For example, a black World War II veteran named

Isaac Woodward was nearly beaten to death during the summer of 1946 while traveling

through South Carolina on his way to meet his wife in North Carolina. During his trip,



5 David W. Southern, "Judge Waring's Fight Against Segregation," Journal oJ ., History (Autumn,
1981) 212-214. Also see: Tinsley E. Yarbrough, A Passionfor Justice: J. Waties Waring and Civil Rights
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
6 Southern, "Judge Waring's Fight Against Segregation," 214-216.









Woodward quarreled with a white bus driver over what historian John Egerton describes

as "a minor point of racial etiquette." Woodward had asked the driver to stop the bus so

he could use the restroom. When he returned the bus driver berated Woodward for taking

too long. After arguing with the driver, Woodward returned to his seat. The driver,

however, was furious with what he saw as Woodward's insolence and lack of deference

and called ahead to authorities in Batesburg, a small town northwest of Columbia, to ask

for assistance in dealing with the "unruly" African American. When he exited the bus in

Batesburg, Woodward was apprehended by local Police Chief Linwood Shull and a white

deputy. The two men took Woodward behind the bus station and beat him severely.

Woodward awoke the next day blinded for life by the assault.7

Notwithstanding such brutal episodes, violent repression was not, however, as

prevalent in South Carolina as it was in some other Deep South states. More often,

whites utilized a more subtle, but no less effective approach to preserving Jim Crow and

white power. For example, soon after his request for admission to the College of

Charleston was denied, John Wrighten was summoned to Columbia for a physical

examination. He had been discharged from the army with a peptic ulcer. As a result of

his ailment, Wrighten drew a 10 percent disability pension from the military. After the

examination, Wrighten was informed that the ulcer was completely healed. Therefore,

local military administrators ordered an end to his pension payments. Despite his clean

bill of health, Wrighten continued to experience painful symptoms. After checking


7 John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement (New
York: Knopf, 1994) 362-363. Herbert Shapiro, White Violence and Black Response: From
Reconstruction to Montgomery (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988) 373. Richard Kluger,
Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality
(New York: Knopf, 1975) 295-304. Andrew Myers, "The Blinding of Isaac Woodward," Proceedings of
the South Carolina Historical Association ( 2" 1!4) 63-74.









himself into the Charleston Naval Hospital, Wrighten was transferred to the Veterans

Administration Hospital in Columbia. Again, he was told that X-rays showed no sign of

an ulcer. Only after a persistent letter writing campaign to President Harry S. Truman

and South Carolina Senator Olin D. Johnston was Wrighten correctly diagnosed and his

pension restored. The incident epitomized the ways in which whites combined their

control of government bureaucracies with flagrant falsifications to exert economic

pressure over blacks, especially "activist" ones who dared to challenge the racial status

8
quo.

As the Wrighten incident illustrated, even before the zenith of white resistance in

the 1950s and 1960s, white South Carolinians used every tactic at their disposal to quell

black challenges to Jim Crow. For instance, in 1949, when James Hinton, the President

of the South Carolina National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP), warned that his organization was planning on testing the College of

Charleston's policy of racial segregation in federal court, the white reaction was swift and

decisive. Before the NAACP could even prepare a case, the city of Charleston sold the

college and all of its property to the Board of Trustees for one dollar. If the college

became a private institution, college President George Grice reasoned, the NAACP had

no case against its admission policy.9

Despite these kinds of legal and extra-legal reprisals, African Americans persisted

with their demands for civil and voting rights. Wrighten, for example, following his

rejection from the College of Charleston had attended the segregated South Carolina



8 Peters, The Southern Temper, 186-187.

9 Undated and Untitled news clippings from the College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections.









State College in Orangeburg from where he applied for admission to the state's only

public law school at the University of South Carolina. Two weeks before his graduation

from South Carolina State in July 1946, Wrighten's application was rejected on the basis

of his race. Though he was disappointed, Wrighten was determined to continue his fight

for admission to law school. With support from Hinton and the South Carolina NAACP,

he filed a federal lawsuit, and, in 1947, federal Judge Waring declared that the state had

three options: it could admit Wrighten to the law school at the University of South

Carolina, close any publicly funded law school in South Carolina, or build a comparable

school for black students at South Carolina State. Rather than close or desegregate the

state's only law school, the General Assembly allocated funds to construct a law college

at South Carolina State.10

Wrighten's limited success, as well as a series of legal victories against segregation

throughout the South, emboldened South Carolina's small community of civil rights

activists. The South Carolina branch of the NAACP continued to chip away at dujure

segregation and challenged South Carolina's white primary in federal court in 1947. In

Rice v. Elmore and Brown v. Baskin, Judge Waring ruled that the Smitl v. Allwright

decision effectively outlawed South Carolina's white primary, and that the privatization

of political parties was an unconstitutional attempt to avoid compliance with the federal

verdict. 11

Waring, however, understood that his rulings were meaningless unless the national

government demanded that local white officials enforced the verdicts. Moreover, he



10 Peters, The Southern Temper, 184-186.

1 Southern, "Judge Waring's Fight Against Segregation," 214-216.









recognized that white South Carolinians were, for the most part, united in their

commitment to segregation, if not necessarily in their preferred methods of preserving the

status quo. Therefore, Waring later told a New York audience that racial change in the

South would require "outside assistance." "The problem," he declared, "is to change the

feeling, the sentiment, the creed of the great body of white people of the South that a

Negro is not an American citizen." Waring understood that southern whites had a deep

cultural commitment to white supremacy. "My people have one outstanding fault," he

concluded, "the terrible fault of prejudice." According to the judge, southerners had

"been born and educated to feel that a Negro is some kind of animal that ought to be

well-treated and given kindness, but as a matter of favor, not right."12

Waring and South Carolina's other civil rights advocates understood that whites

were particularly concerned at the creeping threat of federal intervention to enforce black

rights. Of course, the judge and other like minded activists also recognized that the best

opportunities for rapid change would demand an active federal role. In the fall of 1947

President Harry S. Truman's civil rights commission simultaneously gave hope to

African Americans and increased white anxieties when it issued a report entitled To

Secure These Rights. The report called for "a sweeping denunciation of all government

and some private sanctions of race discrimination or segregation." It was immediately

condemned by southern leaders. For example, L. Mendel Rivers, who represented South

Carolina's First District in the United States House of Representatives, called the report a

"brazen and monumental insult to the Democratic South and the southern way of life for

both white and colored." He demanded that the South "be left alone and freed from


12 News and Courier (October 14, 1948) 13.









agitation by the northern political hitch-hikers who" wanted to use the region "as a guinea

pig for their screwball, crackpot plans and ideologies." Rivers insisted, "for me and the

people I represent, no negro (sic) born is on my social level."13

Southerners like Rivers, however, no longer held the balance of power in the

national Democratic Party. Before 1936 two-thirds of the delegates at the Democratic

National Convention had to agree on a candidate before that candidate was eligible to

represent the party as its nominee for the presidency. There was no real controversy

when Franklin D. Roosevelt was nominated in 1940 or in 1944, but the election of 1948

was the first since the death of the popular New Dealer. Much to the chagrin of southern

whites, northern activists within the party were determined to make civil rights an

important issue at the national convention. Without the "veto" power of the two-thirds

rule, southerners were unable to stop them. Consequently, at the Democratic Convention

of 1948, the party adopted a pro-civil rights platform. Its platform called on the party to

fight "racial, religious and economic discrimination" and stated that the Democrats

believed "that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work,

the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on the basis of equality with all

citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution." The convention also commended President

Truman for his interests in enforcing civil rights and urged Congress to support the

president in the call for an end to racial discrimination.14



13 To Secure These Rights quoted in: Alexander Lamis, The Two Party South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988) 9. News and Courier (December 9, 1947) 1. L. Mendel Rivers to Thomas R.
Miller (January 12, 1948), L. Mendel Rivers Papers, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South
Carolina [Hereafter cited as Rivers Papers, SCHS].
14 "Democratic Party Platform," reprinted in ed. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. History ofAmerican Presidential
Elections, 1940-1948 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 3154.









The call for civil rights enforcement infuriated conservative southern whites, who

made no effort to mask their displeasure with Democratic Party leaders. Handy Ellis, the

leader of the Alabama delegation, led his fellow Alabamians off the convention floor.

One southern delegate paid the band to play "Dixie" as the Mississippi delegation exited

the building with other southern whites who bolted the convention twirling confederate

flags and kicking over "Truman for President" signs. Three days after the convention

ended 6000 whites gathered in Birmingham, Alabama to declare their defiance of

President Truman and the national Democratic Party.15

The rebellious southern "delegates" introduced a "Declaration of Principles"

condemning Truman's "infamous and iniquitous program [of] equal access to all places

of public accommodation for persons of all races, colors, creeds, and national origins."

The declaration was followed by an announcement that the group had nominated South

Carolina Governor J. Strom Thurmond and Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright as

presidential and vice presidential candidates, respectively, on the States' Rights (or

Dixiecrat as it was popularly known) Party ticket. 16

The Dixiecrat revolt divided state Democratic parties across the South and southern

politicians were undecided as to which faction to support in the general election. In

South Carolina, the loyalist wing of the party was dominated by United States Senator

Olin D. Johnston, State Senator Edgar Brown, and Speaker of the State House of

Representatives Sol Blatt. Most of the South Carolina's other leading politicians, such as

United States Senator Burnet R. Maybank, chose to endorse the state Democratic Party


15 Time (July 26, 1948) 13.

16 bid.









but avoided either a public endorsement or open criticism of the national party. Others,

such as Rivers, joined the growing chorus of Thurmond supporters. Eventually, the

States' Rights Party received the official endorsement of the Democratic Party in South

Carolina, just as it did in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.17

Thurmond and his Dixiecrat supporters hoped to capture all 127 of the South's

electoral votes and deny both Truman and Republican candidate Thomas Dewey victory.

In that case, the election would have been decided by the United States House of

Representatives. However, this strategy failed and Thurmond was only able to win 39

electoral votes. The Dixiecrat won in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama

overwhelmingly. He also won in Louisiana with 52 percent of the popular vote. In each

of the states where the Thurmond-Wright ticket was victorious, Thurmond had replaced

Truman on the ballot and was listed as the official nominee of the Democratic Party.18

For many, Thurmond's inability to build a consensus across the South was an

indication that white frustration with civil rights victories had not yet reached a boiling

point. However, in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama Thurmond had scored a

decisive victory and won the loyalty of the party regulars at the state conventions.

Moreover, his success in those states was a warning that the preservation of segregation

and the defense of the South's Jim Crow system was a potent campaign issue. It was also

an indication that, in the Deep South states, committed segregationists would go to

extraordinary lengths to prevent the formation of a moderate biracial coalition. In sum,

the election results encapsulated the intensification of white anxiety that was to become


17 For a detailed analysis and history of the States' Rights Party, see: Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat
Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

18 News and Courier (November 3, 1948) 3. Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 118-216.









the hallmark of white southern politics during the next decade. Moreover, it was an early

indication that, as South Carolina's white and black populations entered the 1950s, the

debate over whether or not to preserve the legal and cultural mechanisms for enforcing

racial segregation would become the dominate social issue.

For many black South Carolinians, the coming decade promised an end to the

indignities of southern segregation. Nearly a century after the end of slavery and over 50

years after the Plessy decision codified dejure segregation, civil rights leaders had finally

won a series of legal battles against white supremacy that both inspired and energized

black activism throughout the South. However, whites had already reacted to this

progress with the kind of opposition that would come to characterize the region's massive

resistance to forced desegregation. Therefore, in spite of this newfound determination

and guarded confidence that change would come, the challenges confronting South

Carolina's civil rights advocates in 1950 remained daunting. Years before 1956, when

Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia issued his call for "massive resistance" to federally

mandated desegregation, South Carolina whites began to implement a complex

legislative and extra-legal agenda to maintain and manage white supremacy and limit

African American political and economic power. Whites were resolute in their desire to










protect the racial status quo, mounting a determined effort to forestall court ordered

desegregation at the voting booths, in public spaces, and in the public school systems.19

During the late 1940s and early 1950s the most serious challenges to racial

segregation in South Carolina originated in sparsely populated Clarendon County, a rural

enclave northwest of Charleston that was in the heart of the state's black belt. In 1948, a

group of African Americans led by Reverend Joseph DeLaine and a farmer named Levi

Pearson brought a suit against the county demanding that it provide bus transportation to

black public school children. Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund

argued that, since the local school board already provided bus transportation for white

students, the county was in violation of the United States Supreme Court's "separate but

equal" decision in the Plessy v. Ferguson case. The case, which was brought against

Clarendon County District 26 on behalf of Pearson's son James, met with immediate

resistance from whites. Clarendon County Superintendent of Schools L.B. McCord, the

superintendent of District 26, and the county auditor informed Pearson that his taxes had

been paid to Clarendon School District Five, and therefore, the case was invalid. Even

though Pearson and several members of his family living on the same property had tax

receipts from District 26, Marshall decided that his legal team could not win the case. He

claimed that he could not overcome the fact that Pearson, who was the lone plaintiff, had


19 For the best analysis of the NAACP's legal strategy and black aspirations during the civil rights era, see:
Stephen Lowe, "The Magnificent Fight: Civil Rights Litigation in South Carolina Federal Courts, 1940-
1970" (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University, 1999). R. Scott Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies: The
NAACP's Legal Campaign Against Segregation in Charleston, South Carolina, 1935-1975" (Ph.D.
Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993). Kluger, Simple Justice. David Armor, Forced Justice: School
D,. ,..g -.g~,ir. i and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Lau, "Freedom Road
Territory: The Politics of Civil Rights Struggle in South Carolina During the Jim Crow Era" (Ph.D.
Dissertation: Rutgers University, 2002). For examples of how segregation was locally controlled, see,
John Dittmer, Local People: The Strugglefor Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1994). J. Douglas Smith i 1,,, ,,, i White Supremacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2002).









been gerrymandered out of the district. On June 8, 1948, only a day before the case was

scheduled to be heard in federal court, Marshall asked for a dismissal. The presiding

judge in the case, J. Waties Waring, ruled that Pearson had no standing to sue district 26

in federal court. It was not the last time that gerrymandering would serve to undermine

black aspirations in South Carolina.20

Throughout the next year DeLaine, Pearson, and other black parents in Clarendon

County continued to demand better treatment of their children within South Carolina's

system of segregated education. For his efforts, DeLaine was fired from his post as

principal of the all-black Scott's Branch School. After an unsuccessful attempt to return

to his job, DeLaine and a small group of black activists filed a petition in 1949

demanding that Clarendon County provide equal facilities to black and white students.

With the support of the state NAACP and South Carolina civil rights pioneer Modjeska

Simkins, DeLaine and the petitioners promised that, if the county did not rectify the

disparity between the black and white schools in Clarendon County District 22

(Summerton), they would file a federal lawsuit demanding that the district comply with

the precedent established in the Plessy case. When the district refused to address the

issue, Marshall and a black Columbia attorney named Harold Boulware filed a federal

lawsuit in May 1950. The case, Briggs v. Elliott, took its name from the first two petition

signers, Harry and Eliza Briggs. At first it called for Clarendon County to equalize its

segregated schools, but in the fall of 1950 it was amended to challenge dejure






20 Julie Magruder Lochbaum, "The Word Made Flesh: The Desegregation Leadership of the Reverend J.A.
DeLaine" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1993) 86-93.









segregation directly. At the behest of Waring, Marshall filed a brief alleging that

segregation per se was inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional.21

In 1958, political scientist Howard Quint wrote that whites had been slow to react

to the intensification of black activism in Clarendon County. He noted that it was not

until January 1951 that the state legislature began to take measures to counteract the

threat posed by DeLaine and his supporters in the county. Although the official state

response in 1951 did represent an escalation of white resistance at the statewide level, it

is important to stress that at the local level resistance had been growing for several years.

Even before Pearson and DeLaine petitioned school officials to provide bus

transportation for black students, whites in Clarendon County had little tolerance for any

kind of African American activism. By the time the South Carolina General Assembly

initiated a series of laws designed to undermine the Briggs case in 1951 and 1952 local

whites had already unleashed a wave of intimidation in Clarendon County.22

White supremacy was firmly entrenched in Clarendon County in the late 1940s and

early 1950s. Local whites controlled government agencies, the banking and crop lien

system, and black education. In fact, Clarendon County was one of the most dramatic

examples of the inequity between whites and blacks in the nation. Many observers noted

that it seemed untouched by the surge of mechanized farming that swept through the

21 Lochbaum, "The Word Made Flesh," 96-115. Benjamin F. Hornsby, Jr. Stepping Stone to the Supreme
Court: Clarendon County (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1992) 2-7.
Barbara A. Woods, "Modjeska Simkins and the South Carolina Conference on the NAACP, 1939-1957," in
ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Women in the Civil Rights Movement: Trailblazers and Torchbearers, 1941-1965
(Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1990) 108-110. Joseph A. DeLaine, "A Summary of
Incidents in the Summerton School Affair" (January 1950), Joseph A. DeLaine Papers, South Caroliniana
Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as DeLaine Papers, SCL]. Howard Quint,
Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1958) 13. Kluger, Simple Justice, 3-26, 327-366. Lau, "Freedom Road Territory," 309-312. New York
Times (June 3, 1951) 7IV. Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies," 141-145.

22 Quint, Profile in Black and White," 21-37.









South in the post-World War II period. Instead, most of Clarendon County resembled the

agricultural lands of the nineteenth century. The landscape was dotted with small plots

farmed by sharecroppers and its few small towns were populated by a large number of

black day laborers and domestics. Much like black belt regions throughout the Deep

South, it was closely controlled by white rural elites who did not tolerate violations of

racial custom, let alone direct assaults on segregation.23

African Americans represented 70 percent of the total population in Clarendon

County in 1950, and yet whites owned 85 percent of the land. Over two-thirds of the

black population earned less than $1000 a year and no African American earned more

than $2000 per year. According to contemporary author Richard Kluger, blacks lived

under a system of "economic slavery, an unbreakable cycle of poverty" which was

perpetuated by white educational and economic advantages. Even though there were

over 6,000 black students in the county compared to just over 2,000 whites, the state

allocated $100,000 more to pay for the education of whites. Due in part to that unequal

distribution of resources, white schools had indoor plumbing; black schools did not.

According to Judge Waring, African American schools were "just tumbledown, dirty

shacks with horrible outdoor toilet facilities." 24

It was within this context of educational and economic advantage that whites

exerted pressure on "troublesome" blacks. Even before Briggs v. Elliott was filed, two

agriculture teachers were fired for simply signing the equalization petition and Harry


23 Quint, Profile in Black and White, 12-13. Kluger, Simple Justice, 3-27. The Reminiscences ofJ. Waties
Waring (New York: Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1957) 341.
24 Kluger, Simple Justice, 6-10. Lau, "Freedom Road Territory," 309-312. New York Times (June 3, 1951)
7IV. News and Courier (June 9, 1950) clipping from the Rivers Papers, SCHS. Reminiscences ofJ.
Waties Waring, 341-342.









Briggs and fellow veteran William Stukes were denied admission to night classes held at

Scott's Branch School for former GIs. Historian Julie Lochbaum argues that crop lien

debts were called in at Christmas, credit was denied to farmers, and cotton gins refused to

purchase cotton from the petitioners at fair market price.25

In response to his leadership role in organizing the petitions and encouraging

lawsuits against the school system, Joseph DeLaine was threatened by the Ku Klux Klan

and forced to post armed guards at his home. He was also sued for slander for his

renunciations of a local school official, which resulted in a $2,700 judgment against him.

In addition to firing DeLaine, the county sacked his wife, his niece, and his two sisters

from their public school teaching jobs. In the fall of 1951, the threats and political

pressure also led church authorities to transfer DeLaine to an A.M.E church almost 50

miles away in Lake City. Shortly after the DeLaine family moved, their home in

Summerton, which still contained most of their possessions, was burned to the ground.

Local fire officials argued that the home was 20 feet outside of city limits and refused to

try to contain the blaze. In addition to the loss of most of the family's belongings, the

DeLaine's insurance company refused to pay a claim on the property. Instead, the money

was used to settle the $2,700 judgment against the minister.26

Angry whites also singled out the other petitioners for economic reprisals. Harry

Briggs, a World War II veteran, was fired from a job at a local gas station after 14 years

of employment. His wife, Eliza, was released from her custodial job at a Summerton

motel. When the family attempted to make ends meet by becoming sharecroppers, they


25 Lochbaum, "The Word Made Flesh," 116-125.

26 Lochbaum, "The Word Made Flesh," 125-130.









were denied credit and local gin operators refused to purchase the cotton they did manage

to grow. According to Kluger, the local sheriff even arrested Harry Briggs's cow after it

wandered off the family's land. Briggs, who remained steadfast in his support of the

NAACP, eventually had to go to Sumter, South Carolina and then to Florida for work.

He and his family eventually ended up New York, unemployed and penniless as a result

of the economic reprisals. "So many of the people," remembered Eliza Briggs, "were

living on a white man's place. So they had to move or else take their name off the

petition."27

Numerous other individuals also saw their employment terminated. Maids,

mechanics, service station attendants, and even teachers were fired for their support of

the Clarendon petition. Massie Solomon, a local maid, was fired and her sharecropping

family was evicted from the land it farmed. Annie Gibson, a Clarendon domestic worker,

was also fired. Like Solomon, she was forced to leave her rented home. John Edwards,

who was a veteran of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, was denied credit for farm equipment and

Willie Stukes was fired from his job as a mechanic. Stukes attempted to continue

working from his home, but did not have the proper equipment to work safely on

automobiles and was crushed to death under a car. Beyond those who signed the petition,







27 Joseph A. DeLaine, "A Summary of Incidents in the Summerton School Affair" (January 1950), DeLaine
Papers, SCL. Affidavit of Harry Briggs (November 13, 1984), Historical Marker Files, South Carolina
Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina. Kluger, Simple Justice, 22-25. Peter Lau,
"Freedom Road Territory," 323-325. Interviews with Eliza Briggs and Billie Fleming from Will the Circle
be Unbroken?: A Personal History of the Civil Rights Movement in Five Southern Communities. Episode
3: Under Color of Law, Columbia, South Carolina (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1997), Audio
distributed by Public Radio International, Transcript available at www.unbrokencircle.org (January 2005).
Lochbaum, "The Word Made Flesh," 118.









at the time simple membership in the NAACP meant the loss of home and occupation for

many Clarendon blacks.28

Like his fellow activists, Levi Pearson faced the full brunt of white economic

intimidation. Joseph DeLaine's nephew, Billie Fleming, later recalled that Pearson's

credit was "completely stopped." According to Fleming, "Cotton gins refused to gin his

cotton. He was not able to borrow money ... Fertilizer dealers refused to sell him, even

for cash money, fertilizer. Oil distributors refused to deliver oil." When Pearson sought

to supplement his income by selling the timber growing on his land, a group of angry

whites intervened. They approached the potential buyer of Pearson's lumber and

threatened to ostracize him and "completely cut [him] off from the white community" if

he followed through with the purchase. The buyer backed off and Pearson's fresh cut

timber was left on the ground where it fell.29

Despite the effects of this wave of intimidation, the federal lawsuit against

Clarendon County helped spark a second petition in Dorchester County, where the

NAACP also asked for an end to discrimination against African American school

children. The Dorchester suit was brought on behalf of over 200 students and their

parents in District 18 of the county. Lawyers for the children claimed they were

"deprived of their Constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws and to freedom

from discrimination because of race or color." They were seeking "educational

advantages and facilities equal in all respects to that which is being provided for whites."




28 Ibid.

29 Will the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Personal History of the Civil Rights Movement in Five Southern
Communities. Episode 3: Under Color ofLaw, Columbia, South Carolina.









Along with the suits in Dorchester and Clarendon Counties, James M. Hinton noted that

similar lawsuits were being prepared for Lee, Fairfield, and Orangeburg Counties.30

Many white South Carolinians were educated about the threat that these lawsuits

posed to white supremacy on the pages of the state's most conservative daily newspaper.

In a series of front-page editorials commencing on January 2, 1950 in the Charleston

News and Courier, William Workman warned white readers that the Supreme Court's

pending decision in Sweatt v. Painter could provide a precedent for desegregating the

public school system in South Carolina. Although the Sweatt case involved the

constitutionality of the segregated law school at the University of Texas, Workman wrote

that "it could have originated anywhere in the South." Like South Carolina, Texas had

constructed a "separate but equal" law school to avoid integrating the all-white

institution, but an African American mailman named Herman Sweatt had challenged this

maneuver in court. Workman pointed out that the plaintiff's attorneys contended that

"separation itself' was discriminatory. Furthermore, he quoted the attorney general of

Texas, who cautioned all southerners that the "petitioner is asking for a court decision

which would apply to high schools and elementary schools as well."31

In the second editorial of the series, Workman reminded his readers that John

Wrighten's legal challenge had led to the creation of a segregated law school at the

"South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical college for negroes." Workman pointed

out that Wrighten's case had not only resulted in the formation of a school of law at

South Carolina State, but was enormously expensive for South Carolina taxpayers.


30 News and Courier (May 16, 1950) 1A. I ,hulr. *, ..- and Informer, (May 20, 1950) 1, from the Rivers
Papers, SCHS.

31 News and Courier (January 2, 1950) 1.









Under a court order from Judge Waring, the state appropriated $200,000 for the creation

of the new school. Workman cautioned that several other challenges to the state's

segregated university system were in the planning phase, and noted that a school

equalization case had emerged in Clarendon County.32

Workman's editorials were a wake up call to white voters who were still coming to

grips with the loss of the white primary and the liberal turn of the national Democratic

Party on racial issues. The combination of black demands for voting rights and African

American challenges to segregated education led to a marked increase in white racial

anxieties. Rank and file whites may not have understood the particulars of the Clarendon

County school desegregation case, but they did have a general understanding that the

basic framework of the state's system of Jim Crow laws was under attack. By 1951, most

white South Carolinians wanted more concerted action to protect dejure segregation

from these assaults. For decades, racial separation had been managed locally but was

legitimized by state law. Over the course of the next two years, whites intensified their

efforts to preserve the racial caste system through a variety of local efforts while at the

same time insisting that their actions receive legislative endorsements from the state

capitol. The lesson of Clarendon County was that extra-legal actions, economic

intimidation, and physical violence could impede black protests, but could not completely

eliminate local civil rights activism. Most South Carolina whites agreed that the defense

of white supremacy would require a full battery of official action to compliment the

informal measures enacted by local whites.


32 News and Courier (January 3, 1950) 1.










In an era of Cold War anxieties, anti-communism was a predictable weapon in the

arsenal of white resistors. In May 1950, State Representative Joseph R. Wise asked

United States Congressman L. Mendel Rivers to investigate whether or not state NAACP

leaders were also members of communist organizations. "I was told four days ago in

Columbia," Wise informed Rivers, "that [James] Hinton held a 'red card' in 1935."

Rivers took full advantage of the rising tide of anti-communism and investigated Wise's

claim. The congressman telephoned Louis J. Russell, a senior investigator with the

House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), to request information on

Hinton. Russell forwarded a copy of the committee's file on the civil rights leader. The

report cited Hinton as a sponsor of the Congress on Civil Rights, an organization founded

in 1946 when the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties and the International

Labor Defense merged. According to the HUAC, the Congress was "dedicated not to the

broader issues of civil liberties, but specifically to the defense of individuals who are

either members of the Communist Party or openly loyal to it." Furthermore, the

association was cited as "subversive and Communist" by Attorney General Tom Clark.33

Rivers forwarded a copy of the Un-American Activities Committee report to

Representative Wise and South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond. The congressman


33 For a discussion of the use of anticommunism against civil rights activists, see: Jeff Woods, Black
Struggle Red Scare: .~,, ',, ,i andAnti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968. (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2004). George Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace:
N~\,. .',.i, *, 'I. Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965 (Gainesville, University Press of
Florida, 2004). Telephone message from Joseph Wise, Jr. to L. Mendel Rivers, May 5, 1950 (1:15 PM),
I. ihiii 1 ,,.- andInformer, (July 24, 1950), Louis J. Russell to L. Mendel Rivers (May 6, 1950), L. Mendel
Rivers to Louis J. Russell (May 11, 1950) all in the Rivers Papers, SCHS. For a specific discussion of
communism and the Civil Rights Congress, see: Gerald Home, Communist Front: The Civil Rights
Congress, 1946-1956 (Rutherford: Fairleign Dickinson University Press, 1985). See also: Michael J.
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 375. Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights:
Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993) 257-268. Woods, Black
Struggle Red Scare, 31-38.










suggested Thurmond might wish to "expose this negro [sic] when he starts attacking you,

as he has been doing." Rivers also collected HUAC reports on civil rights advocates

Clifford J. Durr, Lillian Smith, and Myles Horton as well as on the Southern Conference

for Human Welfare. Rivers's actions were indicative of his ability to gather "secret"

information about civil rights activists and were reflective of the intricate network of

segregation advocates that existed in the South. Moreover, it demonstrated the ability of

committed segregationists to share information and exchange advice about tactics with

one another.34

Shortly after Rivers sent Hinton's HUAC file to Wise, the state legislator publicly

charged that Hinton was affiliated with the Communist Party. On the floor of the South

Carolina House of Representatives, Wise read the report and asked that it be printed in

the Journal of the House ofRepresentatives of Si,,ih Carolina. Hinton vigorously denied

the charges. He claimed the Civil Rights Congress was an organization whose aims

"were to secure civil rights for all Americans," and argued those goals remained a worthy

cause even if the organization itself had taken a turn to the political left. Hinton decried

the trend of labeling all civil rights leaders as communist. "It has become fashionable to

label all Negroes as Reds, or radicals if they speak out for first class citizenship," he

said.35




34 L. Mendel Rivers to Joseph Wise (May 11, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to J. Strom Thurmond (May 11,
1950), "Information From the Files of the Committee on Un-American Activities: U.S. House of
Representatives," Report on Clifford J. Dunn, Lillian Smith, and Myles Horton (February 14, 1950),
"Report on the Southern Conference for Human Welfare: Investigation of Un-American Activities in the
United States," (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, DC: 1947), all from the Rivers
Papers, SCHS.

35 News and Courier (June 9, 1950) 1A. Journal of the House ofRepresentatives of the State of South
Carolina (1950) 2428-2429. News and Courier (June 10, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.









Most whites refused to take Hinton's cries of innocence seriously. The HUAC

report obtained by Rivers gave the charges of communism an air of respectability and

seemed to validate state action against the NAACP and other black organizations. The

widespread acceptance of Wise's claims meant that South Carolina segregationists were

free to use charges of communism as justification for further intimidation of the state's

African American population and against the handful of "treasonous" whites who

supported black aspirations. Labeling an African American leader a communist meant

that any progressive white leader who allied himself/herself with the black freedom

struggle risked his/her standing in the community. The Second Red Scare suffocated free

speech throughout the nation, but the atmosphere of repression was especially disruptive

to civil rights advocates in the South.36

As the character assassination of Hinton demonstrated, powerful white South

Carolinians, such as Rivers and Wise, were adept at using their control of state

bureaucracies to intimidate and threaten black leaders. Though such attacks were

numerous in South Carolina, none was more significant than the campaign of

intimidation directed at Progressive Democratic Party founder John McCray. Amidst the

furor over the Clarendon school desegregation case and the charges of a communist

conspiracy within the South Carolina NAACP, McCray was charged with libel in

Greenwood County for a story that ran in the state's largest African American newspaper,

The Lighthouse and Informer. McCray, who was the paper's editor and publisher, was

indicted in January 1950 for publishing a story about an African American convicted of

raping a white woman. Although McCray never published the young woman's name, he


36 For examples, see: Lewis, The White South and Red Menace and Woods, Black Struggle Red Scare.









did print the claims of the accused rapist, Willie Tolbert, that the sex was consensual. In

the racially charged atmosphere of South Carolina in the 1950s the story was considered

an assault on white womanhood and a violation of one of segregation's most sacred

tenets: in cases of interracial sex, black men were routinely depicted as oversexed

predators victimizing chaste white women. As far as whites were concerned, consensual

interracial sex involving a black man and a white women simply did not happen.

Moreover, whites supposed that African Americans, such as McCray, were prohibited

from commenting on any sex acts involving black men and white women and McCray

paid the price for breaking that taboo even though a similar story appeared in the white

owned Anderson Independent. The woman's father, a Greenwood County solicitor,

charged that McCray had published false and libelous statements that defamed the

character of the victim.37

McCray was advised in the case by Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg of the

NAACP Legal Defense Fund and by local black lawyer Harold Boulware. Since McCray

was unlikely to receive the benefit of any doubt from a white jury, his legal counsel

advised him to enlist the aid of a white lawyer for his defense though even this would

be unlikely to sway an all-white jury. He approached several white attorneys, but was

turned away. One unnamed white attorney did assist with McCray's defense, but he









3 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 209-213. "Memorandum from Harold R. Boulware," n.d., John H.
McCray Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as
McCray Papers, SCL].









insisted that his participation in the case be kept secret and would only meet with

McCray, Greenberg, or Boulware at night.38

Despite having solid grounds for a defense, Marshall and McCray's lawyers urged

him to accept a plea agreement. The attorneys agreed that an African American

defendant who was a known "agitator" was unlikely to receive a fair trial in South

Carolina. Pleading guilty, they argued, would keep McCray out of jail and allow him to

continue publishing the Lighthouse andInformer. McCray heeded their advice and

entered a guilty plea in exchange for a sentencing agreement with the Greenwood County

prosecutor. As part of that agreement, McCray was fined $3,000, given three years

probation, and forced to admit his "guilt" on the front page of the Lighthouse and

Informer. 3

McCray's brush with the legal system was an important indication of the degree to

which whites controlled the state's bureaucracy and utilized official state agencies to

subdue "troublesome" blacks. The conviction was an obvious attempt to discourage

McCray from engaging in political activism and a reminder to middle class African

Americans that their relative prosperity was dependent on staying in the good graces of

the white power structure. McCray, however, continued to engage in the kind of political

activism that had drawn the ire of whites in the first place. He campaigned for more

progressive candidates in the elections of 1950 and was a vocal supporter of the plaintiffs


38 John H. McCray to T. Carl McFall (May 8, 1950). John H. McCray to Guery E. Nelson (May 6, 1950).
Richard E. Fields to John H. McCray (February 16, 1950), McCray Papers, SCL. Wim Roefs, "Leading
the Civil Rights Vanguard in South Carolina: John McCray and the I iith ,.." and nformer,1939-1954,"
in eds. Charles M. Payne and Adam Green, Time Longer than a Rope: A Century of African American
Activism, 1850-1950 (New York: New York University Press, 2003) 462-491.

39 Ibid. The State of South Carolina v. John H. McCray (June 20, 1950), General Sessions Court,
Greenwood County, South Carolina.









in Briggs v. Elliott. As a consequence of his continued activism McCray's parole was

revoked in 1951 for giving a political speech in Illinois. McCray claimed that he had

been given permission to travel outside of South Carolina for the event, but the state

argued that his trip was an unauthorized violation of his parole agreement and sentenced

him to serve on a chain gang from November 1951 to December 18, 1952. McCray later

claimed that his arrest resulted from a direct order from South Carolina Governor James

F. Byrnes who was outraged by the African American's civil rights activities. 40

Although they were rarely confronted with the kind of intimidation directed at

politically active blacks, racially progressive whites also faced harsh treatment for

advocating better treatment of African Americans. For example, after Judge Waring

ordered an end the white primary and became openly critical of segregation he endured a

near constant stream of criticism, intimidation, and social ostracism from his

segregationist neighbors. White anxiety became even more palpable after Waring's

involvement in the Clarendon County school desegregation case became clear.41

Nonetheless, the hostility directed toward Waring paled in comparison to the

attacks levied at his wife, Elizabeth. After all, it was Elizabeth who many white elites

blamed for the judge's late conversion to the cause of civil rights. Shortly before

Waring's judicial decisions began to dismantle dejure segregation in South Carolina, he



40 New York Times (May 30, 1951) 12. Lau, "Freedom Road Territory," 309-312. Quint, Profile in Black
and White, 14-15. Roefs, "Leading the Civil Rights Vanguard in South Carolina," 462-491.

41 See: Yarbrough, A Passion for Justice, 42-67. Robert Lewis Terry, "J. Waties Waring: Spokesman for
Racial Justice in the New South" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utah, 1970) 21-161. Klarman, From
Jim Crow to Civil Rights, 201-245. Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, 408-409. Kari Frederickson,
"As a Man, I am Interested in States' Rights": Gender, Race, and the Family in the Dixiecrat Party, 1948-
1950," in eds. Jane Daily, Glenda Gilmore, and Bryant Simon, Jumpin 'Jim Crow: Southern Politicsfrom
Civil War to Civil Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 260-274. Pete Daniel, Lost
Revolutins: The South in the 1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) 232.









had divorced his Charlestonian first wife to marry Elizabeth, a native northerner. Soon

after, the Warings became social outcasts in Charleston's close knit high society.42

In January 1950 Elizabeth Waring spoke at the Annual Meeting of the traditionally

all-black Coming Street Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) to a mixed-race

audience of over 150. Aside from breaking the social mores regarding race mixing, Mrs.

Waring openly attacked the South's racial caste system and defended her husband's

attempts to break down Jim Crow in South Carolina. In doing so she challenged the

notion that Jim Crow was necessary, first and foremost, to protect of white women.

Waring's participation in desegregated meetings and her commitment to racial equality

was contrary to white notions about how race and gender rules operated in South

Carolina and the South as a whole.43

For white South Carolinians, especially "Old Charleston" elites, Elizabeth

Waring's willingness to speak out against segregation was not only wrong-headed, but an

unladylike transgression into the world of politics. In the YWCA speech, Mrs. Waring

declared that segregationists were "stupid" and claimed that white leaders were afraid

that her civil rights activism would "destroy their selfish and savage white supremacy

way of life." The outspoken advocate of integration equated southern use of the filibuster

to defeat civil rights legislation to treason. "The White Supremacists are so self-

centered," said Waring, "that they are drawing walls around themselves so close and high

that they have become completely isolated from the rest of the world and have not

considered themselves part of the country since the Civil War." She went on to call


42 Ibid.

43 News and Courier (January 17, 1950) 8.









segregationists "decadent", prideful, "morally weak," and "confused." Waring even

called on civil rights activists to stand up to the "Dixiecrat Gestapo."44

State Representative Joseph Wise summarized the view of most white South

Carolinians regarding Elizabeth Waring when he declared that the state did not need a

lecture from a "Damn Yankee." The Warings received telephoned death threats and were

denounced by state leaders. In February 1950, the state House of Representatives passed

a resolution promising that "the necessary funds be allocated to purchase a one-way

ticket to any point in the United States of America or preferably a foreign country for

Federal Judge J. Waties Waring and his socialite wife. .. with the sole provision they

leave the State of South Carolina and never again set foot on her soil." The resolution

also committed $800,000 to build an animal science building on the campus of Clemson

College, and suggested the school dedicate a stall in the mule barn for the Warings.

Although the resolution was quashed in the state Senate, it represented a sentiment shared

by many angry whites in South Carolina who tended to view all civil rights activism as

orchestrated by outsiders who threatened the virtue of white democracy in the Palmetto

State.45

Even when faced with threats and ostracism, the Warings refused to curtail their

activism. Mrs. Waring went on NBC's "Meet the Press" to defend her position. She also

reiterated her denunciation of segregation in an interview with Colliers magazine. In

44 Ibid. For a discussion of the intersections of Race and Gender in the South, see: Glenda Elizabeth
Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-
1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). For a discussion of the various networks of
women in Charleston, see: Stephanie E. Yuhl, A Golden Haze of Memory: The Making ofHistoric
Charleston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

45 News and Courier (January 18, 1950) 8. A Joint Resolution, Records of the General Assembly, House
Bills, Part 2, Calendar 2177, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South
Carolina.









response to her call for immediate integration, Senator Burnet Maybank invoked charges

of communism against the Warings and asked Peyton Ford, an Assistant to the Attorney

General of the United States to investigate Waring's wife for advocating a "revolution" to

bring about an end to segregation. Maybank told Ford that the civil rights activities of

the Warings "amounts to persecution of respectable people, whether they be black or

white, and I think the Justice Department should look into the matter." A month later,

Maybank wrote to Attorney General J. Howard McGrath requesting an investigation of

the couple.46

Maybank's demand went unanswered, but many of his constituents refused to give

up on the crusade against the unpopular judge and his wife. J.C. Phillips, a retired

merchant marine, launched a petition drive demanding the impeachment of Judge

Waring. At a closed-door meeting in March 1950 in the office of First District

Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Phillips claimed to have almost 21,000 signatures

demanding action from Congress. The meeting was attended by each of the state's

representatives in the House except for James P. Richards and John L. McMillan, and all

of the participants agreed not to share information about the proceedings with the media.

However, one observer admitted that the group did not have the necessary evidence to

proceed. "We certainly can't impeach him for making pro-negro speeches," claimed the

unidentified source.47




46 Burnet Maybank to Peyton Ford (February 13, 1950), Maybank to J. Howard McGrath (March 20, 1950),
Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections, College of Charleston, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as
Maybank Senatorial Papers, Special Collections]. Samuel Grafton, "The Lonesomest Man in Town,"
Colliers (April 29, 1950) 20-21, 49-50.

47 News and Courier (March 9, 1950) lB.









Phillips was joined in the meeting by Dr. Charles D. Leverett, a Charleston Dentist;

L. Eddie Heinson, a Dorchester County magistrate; A.A. Jordan, an Aiken lumberman;

W. Lee Cooper, a Pelion farmer and merchant; and V.M. Wingard, a farmer from

Lexington. Together, this economically and geographically diverse group promised to

form a "sort of Southern association for the advancement of white people." According to

Phillips, the new organization would be dedicated to countering pressure from minority

groups and protecting traditional southern society. Before his organization could form,

however, Phillips's worst fears were realized: in December 1950 African Americans in

Clarendon County amended Briggs v. Elliott to challenge the very legality of segregation

in education.48

The white reaction to the case placed incredible pressure on South Carolina's

political elites to defend the basic framework of the racial hierarchy. With arguments in

Briggs v. Elliott set for May 1951, South Carolina's state government initiated an urgent

attempt to head off a court decision that threatened to erode white power and

fundamentally undermine dejure segregation. Under the leadership of newly elected

governor James F. Byrnes, the state launched a concerted effort to defend the legality of

its Jim Crow schools. Byrnes was South Carolina's most well known political leader.

He had served as a United States Senator, a United States Supreme Court Justice, and as

Secretary of State under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. Despite

his position as a leader in Roosevelt's New Deal government, however, he did not share

the socially progressive outlook of other leading New Dealers, such as Henry Wallace.

Instead, Byrnes was a committed racial conservative who had no intention of

48 News and Courier (March 9, 1950) 1B, (November 18, 1950) 1, (December 23, 1950) 1. Quint, Profile
in Black and White, 13.









volunteering to dismantle South Carolina's system of racial separation. Moreover, he had

widespread support from the state's white population and a reputation as an able leader.

Most whites assumed that Byrnes would find a solution to the "segregation problem" that

would not result in an end to Jim Crow in South Carolina.49

Governor Byrnes surmised that South Carolina's best hope for preventing or, at

least, delaying a federal desegregation order was to give the impression that the state was

in compliance with Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine. Therefore, he launched a

school equalization initiative that preceded similar programs in other southern states by

almost two years. School equalization, according to Byrnes, would halt federal

interference in South Carolina's system of dejure segregation and limit civil rights

activism in the state. He outlined his plan in an address to the South Carolina House of

Representatives in January 1951. In his speech Byrnes pledged to "find a lawful way of

educating South Carolina's children" while "providing separate schools for the races."

He called on the state legislature to pass a three-cent sales tax to finance equalization and

new school construction and promised that, even though a large portion of the funds

would be spent on educating African Americans, the new tax would actually strengthen

institutional segregation.50

With the equalization plan, Byrnes established a blueprint for white resistance to

black advancement in South Carolina that would last for more than a decade. He pledged

his commitment to segregation, but demanded respect for the rule of law. Byrnes failed


49 For a discussion of Byrnes's political career, see: David Robertson, Sly andAble: A Political Biography
ofJames F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994).
50 Quint, Profile in Black and White, 16. Thomas S. Morgan, "James F. Byrnes and the Politics of
Segregation," The Historian (Summer 1994) 645-654. Journal of the House ofRepresentatives of the State
of South Carolina (January 24, 1951) 160-166.









to appreciate that, at some point, the two might become incompatible. The governor

promised a legal remedy, but assured South Carolina voters that "what a carpetbag

government could not do in the reconstruction period, cannot be done in this period." If

the federal courts ordered desegregation, Byrnes promised to close the schools rather than

integrate them. He claimed that "the majority of colored people in the state do not want

to force their children into white schools." Instead, Byrnes concluded that black

Carolinians only wanted whites to "see to it that innocent colored children will not be

denied an education because of selfish politicians and misguided agitators."5

Byrnes's plan was to provide better treatment for South Carolina's black population

within the Jim Crow system, but his proposal did have an important corollary. If black

activists continued to press for desegregation or if the federal government attempted to

force an end to the racial caste system, South Carolina was prepared to take radical action

and abandon public schooling altogether. Byrnes and other state leaders warned that any

attempt to break down the barriers of racial separation was sure to incite a violence and

disorder. He also advised black leaders that continued pressure to desegregate would

diminish, rather than expand, African American opportunity. "The White people of

South Carolina," declared Byrnes, "could pay for the education of their children" in a

private system. Conversely, few African Americans had the financial resources to pay

for private schooling. In such a situation, "Negro citizens would suffer," alleged the

governor, "because of the irresponsible action of representatives of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People." 52


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid, "Address of James F. Byrnes, Governor of South Carolina, to the South Carolina Education
Association," (March 16, 1951) 577-583.









Byrnes was aware that in order for his plan to work, he had to maintain the illusion

of uncompromising white unity on how to handle the segregation issue. In fact, while

most whites were firmly committed to Jim Crow, the exact degree of that commitment

varied. In his quest to map out a plan for preserving the racial caste system, the governor

had to gain the support of these distinct, if overlapping, white constituencies: hardcore

segregationists, mainstream whites, and white business interests. The hardcore group

was determined to use any and all means to fend off all civil rights progress, including

the open intimidation of black activists and efforts to ostracize and pressure sympathetic

whites. Mainstream whites sought to preserve segregation, but were unwilling to tolerate

lawlessness, civil unrest, or the disruption of the state's economy simply to prevent what

they hoped would be a modicum of token desegregation. Most of the white business

elites were in the mainstream group, but even conservative business owners and

professionals who were ardent segregationists were unwilling to accept steep financial

costs in their quest to preserve white privilege. With rare exceptions, such as the

Warings, integrationist sentiment among white South Carolinians was almost non-

existent.

In many ways, Byrnes's most difficult task was gaining the support of the most

uncompromising hardcore segregationists. Even the term "equalization" was problematic

for committed white supremacists, but whites trusted the governor when he promised that

the program was the only way to avoid a federal order to desegregate the schools.

Fiscally conservative segregationists were also reluctant to allocate funds to black

schools, but Bymes assured the state's white voters that, if the new schools were closed

as a result of court ordered desegregation, the new buildings would not be "wasted." The









governor promised that, should the courts order South Carolina to desegregate its public

education system, the state would simply hand over its public school buildings to

segregated private schools. According to Bymes, however, such drastic action would not

be necessary anyway. He assured the state's segregationists that if the taxpayers

"properly discharge our duty, we make more difficult the task of those who would have

the Federal Government control our schools." He was also careful to note that the

proposed three cent tax would also afford whites the opportunities to improve their own

schools.53

In order to ensure support from educators and more moderate whites, Byrnes

declared his desire to provide a "full public education" to "every child in the state, white

or colored." At a meeting of the South Carolina Educational Association in March 1951,

the governor promised that the main purpose of the equalization plan was to improve, not

to close, South Carolina's schools. He pointed out that South Carolina had the highest

rate of rejection for intellectual ineptitude for military service in the Korean conflict.

More than 60 percent of the South Carolinians called up for the draft were rejected as

opposed to a rejection rate of 35 percent for the rest of the South. Bymes blamed this

failure on South Carolina's poor education system and pointed out that on average over

80,000 of the state's 494,000 students were absent from school on any given day. Byrnes

also noted that at least 16,000 white children and more than 17,500 black children were

not enrolled in school at all. His plan, Bymes argued, would not only equalize, but also

modernize the state's failing school system.54



53 Ibid.

54Ibid.









School improvement was also the best way for the governor to reach out to

business owners and the state's chambers of commerce. Byrnes argued that the

equalization plan would foster a positive business climate in South Carolina and pointed

out that, in order to bring new jobs to the state, it would have to improve its dismal public

school system. New Deal farm programs had decreased the emphasis on labor-intensive

agriculture and modern jobs required skilled workers. When poor whites and African

Americans poured into cities looking for work, they were often unqualified for the new

jobs. For white economic boosters, the equalization plan promised to promote the post-

World War II industrial economy without disrupting racial customs.

At first, the South Carolina General Assembly balked at raising taxes to fund the

construction of black schools. However, by the end of his first legislative session, Byrnes

was able to convince a handful of powerful lawmakers, including state Senator L. Marion

Gressette and future Governor and United States Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, that

equalization was a worthy goal for the state. Education professionals and the state's

business interests overwhelmingly supported the measure while hardcore segregationists

did so more reluctantly. Before formal arguments in the Briggs case could even begin,

the Education Finance Commission initiated the process of "equalizing" South Carolina's

segregated schools.5

After winning an important political victory in the sales tax debate, Byrnes

pressured the state assembly to follow through with other important aspects of his


55 John G. Sproat, "'Firm Flexibility': Perspectives on Desegregation in South Carolina," in eds. Robert H.
Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, New Perspectives on Race and Slavery in America: Essays in Honor of
Kenneth M. Stampp (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986) 167. New York Times (December
11, 1952) 44. Quint, Profile in Black and White, 16-17. South Carolina Educational Finance Commission,
South Carolina's Educational Revolution; A Report ofProgress in South Carolina. (Columbia: 1955).
Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina, 1951. Kluger, Simple Justice, 419-420.









equalization strategy. Since the governor had promised that the new school buildings

could be privatized if necessary, Byrnes encouraged the legislature to pass a bill which

would allow local school boards to sell or lease school property to private groups. If the

federal government forced desegregation and the state followed through with its plan to

abandon the pubic school system, the governor wanted to ensure that local boards could

create a "private" school system using existing facilities. The legislature passed the

measure and took it a step further when it passed a law to withhold state funds from any

district that was ordered to desegregate by a federal court. The new laws would have

made it all but impossible for local school officials to operate a desegregated public

education system in South Carolina. The lack of funding would force desegregated

districts to either privatize or close altogether. So that county governments would have

time to set up a new private system, the South Carolina General Assembly also passed a

measure that forbade the transfer of a student from one school to another without

permission from the county superintendent. This law created one last bureaucratic

roadblock to prevent or delay student transfers from an African American school to a

white one.56

Not content with creating this elaborate bureaucratic and legal bulwark against

school integration, the General Assembly also created a special committee to monitor

legal challenges to segregated education and plan a response. The South Carolina School

Committee, which was chaired by Calhoun County Senator L. Marion Gressette, included

five members from the state Senate, five from the state House of Representatives, and


56 Ibid.









five members at large. It was the first legislative committee created to deal with the

"desegregation issue" in any southern public school system.57

Despite Byrnes's self-serving efforts to "equalize" the state's dual school system,

African Americans in Clarendon County were determined to press on with their challenge

to segregated schools. Although intimidation had eroded membership in the NAACP and

forced several individuals to remove their names from the desegregation petition, the

NAACP's legal team was able to secure the signatures of 20 adults and 46 children

demanding an end to the county's segregated school system. The case, Briggs v. Elliott,

both frightened and infuriated whites when it finally went before a three-judge panel in

May 1951. South Carolina whites were particularly upset at the presence of Waring on

the panel. Though they knew that fellow jurist Judge George Bell Timmerman would

rule in favor of the defense, many whites feared that Waring would convince Judge John

J. Parker, who was a political moderate, to order an end to segregated schools in South

Carolina.5

The plaintiffs' attorney, Thurgood Marshall, contended that students in the county

were denied their constitutional rights in the segregated school system. Since the

county's attorneys Robert McCormick Figg and S. Emory Rogers acknowledged that the

physical facilities of the black schools were inadequate, the NAACP legal team

concentrated on the inequity of segregation itself. Marshall introduced the testimony of a

number of social scientists, who each argued that segregation established a psychological

impediment to success and was therefore a violation of the rights of African American


57 Ibid.

58 News and Courier (November 18, 1950) 1, (December 23, 1950) 1. Quint, Profile in Black and White,
13.









students. Rogers and Figg insisted that Plessy v. Ferguson allowed for segregated

schools as long as they were equal. The attorneys contended that black leaders had every

right to demand equal facilities and requested that the court give the state time to improve

black schools. Figg warned that a court order demanding the desegregation of southern

schools would lead to extensive conflict and violence in the region. He asked the judges

to grant the state "reasonable time" to implement school equalization. 59

Briggs v. Elliott brought widespread attention to South Carolina's segregated

schools and may have served to embolden black activists, but it was initially a victory for

white segregationists. When the decision of the three judge panel was handed down in

the summer of 1951, Judge Parker declared that the state must afford African American

students the same educational opportunities as those afforded to whites, but he and Judge

George Bell Timmerman refused to outlaw state supported segregated education. The

two judges ruled that Byrnes's equalization plan would bring the state in compliance with

the "separate but equal" doctrine established in the Plessy case. South Carolina's white

leadership gave its overwhelming endorsement to the decision. Senator Maybank

declared it an "honest, clear, straight Constitutional ruling on behalf of public education

in South Carolina." In an interview on CBS television, Maybank insisted that "the good

colored people," of his state were not interested in integration, although he refused to








59 Byrnes "Inaugural Address" was reprinted in: South Carolina Educational Finance Commission, South
Carolina's Educational Revolution; A Report of Progress in South Carolina. (Columbia: 1955). New York
Times (May 29, 1951) 27, (May 30, 1951) 12. Kluger, Simple Justice, 710-750. Lau, "Freedom Road
Territory," 309-312. Quint, Profile in Black and White, 14-15. Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies," 142-143.









lend support to abandoning the public school system if the courts did order

desegregation.60

Judge Waring, however, provided solid grounds for an appeal when he issued a

strong dissenting opinion. He insisted that segregation itself was inherently unequal. He

wrote, "I am of the opinion that all the legal guideposts, expert testimony, common sense

and reason point unerringly to the conclusion that the system of segregation in education

adopted and practiced in the state of South Carolina must go and must go now.

Segregation is per se inequality." Therefore, African Americans left the courthouse with

a mandate to improve black schools and, thanks largely to Waring's opinion, hopes for a

more promising outcome if the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Less than a month after the three-judge panel issued its decision, Marshall appealed the

verdict to the nation's highest court. White leaders had hoped that the panel's decision

had created a viable alternative to desegregation and would silence "bothersome" black

activists, but they fully expected an appeal.61

The delay between the case and its appeal gave white leaders an opportunity to

consolidate and refine Byrnes's equalization plan. Under the direction of the governor

and state legislature, local school boards began to redraw district boundaries in an effort

to create another defense against desegregation. The new plan reduced the number of

school districts in the state from 1,002 to 102. Small rural schools were closed and

consolidated into larger, newer buildings. Moreover, the newly gerrymandered districts


60 Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies," 145-147. Briggs et al. v. Elliot et alt., United States District Court for
the Eastern District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951). Maybank to George
Bell Timmerman (June 25, 1951), Transcript of "Capital Cloak Room" (May 29, 1951), Maybank
Senatorial Papers, Special Collections.
61 Waring quoted in Briggs v. Elliott. Baker, "Ambiguous Legacies," 145-147.









were designed to allow whites to use residential segregation as a means to maintain racial

separation in education. Although consolidation did have an important modernizing

effect on the South Carolina school system, its implementation further solidified racial

separation as the official policy of the state.62

African American leaders, however, were not willing simply to allow whites to use

the time consumed with the appellate process to construct additional barriers to black

access without opposition. Even in defeat the Briggs case had an immediate impact on

black community efforts to improve African American schools. Civil rights leaders from

all over the state demanded that the general assembly utilize the new "equalization" funds

to close the educational gap between black and white children. However, for South

Carolina whites school equalization was a mechanism for limiting, not encouraging,

black community activism, and local whites were determined to manage carefully the

impact of the program. In many districts local school boards used the new sales tax

revenues to funnel money into existing, or new white schools. 63

Perhaps the most dramatic example of a local school board using a disproportionate

amount of the new funds to improve white schools while black schools remained under-

funded occurred in Charleston. Charleston's School Board hoped to utilize its black

population to convince the Finance Commission to allocate significant funds to the city's

schools. In 1952, the city implemented a plan to divide its $2.4 million dollar allocation

equally between the white and black school system even though there were more black



62 South Carolina's Educational Revolution. For the best example of this see: Baker, "Ambiguous
Legacies," 146-150. Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1998) 522-523.
63 Ibid.









students and the African American schools were in a worse state of disrepair. Statewide,

less than half (40%) of the student population was black, and the state did spend almost

two-thirds of the new money on African American schools, but, as the situation in

Charleston demonstrated, even the disbursement of a large portion of the funds to the

black schools could do little to erase the disparities in black and white education.64

Initially, black leaders in Charleston were pleased to see any improvements in the

city's African American schools. Black parents, however, soon became frustrated with

the school board's use of the new funds. Arthur Clement, the President of the Charleston

NAACP and Secretary of the PDP, and Peter Poinsette, an African American member of

the PTA, claimed that the city's growing black population and the poor condition of its

existing educational facilities dictated that the school board should allocate even more

funds to the black community and truly "equalize" the dual system. Clement pointed out

that the new budget called for building a new gym for an all-white school that already

had one, and yet failed to pay for a gym for the city's black high school, which had no

gym at all. He argued that if the school board spent the entire $2.4 million allocation on

its black schools "the per capital valuation of school property for the two races would be

$392 for white pupils and $345" for African American students. In other words, even a

complete overhaul of the city's black schools using 100 percent of the new state funds

would have failed, in Clement's estimation, to "equalize" the "separate but equal"

system. Clement promised to bring the issue to the federal courts if the school board did

not carry out a legitimate equalization program. He warned Low Country whites, "You


64 Ibid.









established the separate but equal theory it has protected you these many years now,

you are faced with the problem of paying for it."65

Clement's succinct warning was a reminder to the all-white school board that the

fight over segregated schools was far from over. Although they won a technical victory

in the Briggs case, white segregationists were hardly confident that the ruling would

stand on appeal. Byrnes and his supporters realized that they might have to follow

through with their threats to close the public school system if they wanted to maintain

segregated education. However, the governor's administration faced one major barrier to

the abandonment of the public schools. If Byrnes wanted to privatize the schools, he first

had to convince South Carolinians to change the state's constitution. Article XI, Section

5 of the South Carolina State Constitution stipulated that "The General Assembly shall

provide for a liberal system of free public schools for all children between the ages of six

and twenty-one years." 66

A proposed amendment to alter this provision quickly passed through the South

Carolina House of Representatives during the 1951 session, but the measure stalled in the

state Senate. Whites supported Jim Crow, but were many apprehensive about the notion

of abandoning the publicly funded education of their own children. On January 8, 1952,

Byrnes addressed the General Assembly and called on state senators to "submit to the

electors of the General Election in 1952 a resolution to repeal Article XI, Section 5."

According to Byrnes, the proposed amendment was the state's only means of ensuring its

ability to maintain a segregated school system. "If this provision of our Constitution is

65 Arthur J. Clement to the Charleston School Board (January 23, 1952), Henry Hutchinson Collection,
Avery Research Center, College of Charleston, Charleston, South Carolina.
66 Journal of the House ofRepresentatives of South Carolina (1952) 17-18.









not repealed, and if the Supreme Court's decision is against us," the governor declared,

"no legal avenue will be left open to us in South Carolina to have separate schools for

children of the white and colored races." Rather than oppose the popular governor, the

state Senate heeded Byrnes's warning and voted to include the amendment on the state's

ballot in the 1952 general election.67

Once the measure passed, Byrnes and his supporters initiated a sophisticated

publicity campaign to increase support for the constitutional amendment. Their efforts

were a prime example of how political leaders worked to ensure a consensus among

South Carolina whites over how best to deal with the impending crisis over segregation.

The vast majority of white South Carolinians were unapologetic segregationists who

were determined to protect Jim Crow. For them, the amendment became a political

statement of their commitment to South Carolina's racial caste system. Byrnes

understood that as long as he kept the question simple he could mask any divisions within

the state's white communities over how far to go to protect segregation in South

Carolina's public school systems. Byrnes and his supporters portrayed the amendment

vote as a "referendum" on Jim Crow schooling.68

In a statewide radio broadcast, Lieutenant Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr.

called on voters to cast their ballots for the change. Chairman of the Senate Committee

on Education, Marion Gressette, claimed that the measure would "protect" the state's

education system. Congressman Rivers promised voters that the amendment was the

only way to prevent "the mixing of the races in our elementary and high schools" while


67 Howard G. McClain, "South Carolina's School Amendment," New South (February 1953) 1-5, 8.

68 Blick, "Beyond 'The Politics of Color," 20-30.









simultaneously improving African American institutions. Governor Byrnes went so far

as to proclaim, "If you vote against the amendment," and the Supreme Court overturns

the district court's decision, "you will force the mixing of the races in the schools." The

proposed amendment served as both a means of white resistance and as a threat to black

activists who persisted in challenging South Carolina's segregated school system.69

Of course, the NAACP and most African Americans objected to the proposal, but

civil rights activists were not the only ones who opposed it. Though they refused to

condemn segregation per se, both the League of Women Voters and the mostly white

South Carolina Educational Association publicly denounced the Byrnes plan. The

League of Women Voters even purchased radio time in Columbia to discuss the issue,

but no state leader would debate the merits of the amendment on the air. 7o

With few exceptions, South Carolina's elected officers generally preferred not to

discuss the specifics of the Byrnes amendment, and certainly only the most hardcore

segregationists declared that school closure was a good idea. South Carolina's white

leadership simply called for the continuation of segregation and left the impression that

voting against the amendment would hasten the erosion of white privilege. When state

leaders were ask if they favored closing the schools, most of them simply responded that

they hoped it would not become necessary. The failure of white voters to question this

tactic was indicative of white confidence that the state could manage the desegregation

threat if given the power to do by its white constituents. Most whites considered the




69 McClain, "South Carolina's School Amendment," 1-5, 8. News and Courier (January 8, 1952) from the
Rivers Papers, SCHS.

70 Ibid.









amendment a potent resistance tactic whether or not they truly supported the idea that

closing the public schools was a good idea.7

The proposal's strongest support came from South Carolina's black belt, especially

along the state's coastal plains in the southern Low Country region and the northeast Pee

Dee area. There was, however, mild opposition in the piedmont and upstate regions of

South Carolina. For example, Pickens County Representative Earle Morris, Jr. declared,

"The purported abolition of the public schools is a calculated risk that I could not

conscientiously support unless I was assured that a satisfactory method of educating our

children would replace the system of free public schools." Morris worried that "the so-

called 'private schools' would reduce education to a prerogative of a privileged few."

Likewise, Dr. E.C. McCants, the retired Superintendent of Schools in Anderson County,

claimed that the amendment could destroy what he had worked his life to build.72

Even one Low Country paper surmised that both options of either closing the

school system or desegregating it would be a "great sacrifice with little return to the

voters." Opposition also came from some church leaders who worried that they would

face the financial burden of operating an education system if the state abandoned its

schools. The Public Affairs Committee of the Young Women's Christian Association

(YWCA) issued a statement protesting the amendment, and the Christian Action

Committee (CAC), which represented ten denominations, publicly asserted its opposition

in September. The CAC declared that public education was important to democracy and

chastised state leaders for using the measure to "intimidate" the Supreme Court. The


71 Ibid.
72 Journal of the House ofRepresentatives of South Carolina (1952) 513. McClain, "South Carolina's
School Amendment," 1-5, 8. Blick, "Beyond 'The Politics of Color'," 20-30.









council also accused South Carolina politicians of using education as a "political

football."73

Such pockets of dissent aside, widespread popular support for the amendment was

unmistakable. The constitutional change passed in November 1952 with 72 percent of

the voters supporting the measure. Although the vote probably indicated some

willingness to abandon public education, it is best interpreted as a referendum on

segregation. Byrnes had warned voters that a ballot against the amendment was not a

vote for preserving the public school system, but a vote for the desegregation of South

Carolina's schools and the political agenda of the NAACP. His ability to shape the

public debate and limit the range of options was an important reminder of the confidence

that whites placed in Byrnes and his ability to properly manage the segregation issue.74

Beyond the utility of the amendment in the battle to preserve segregated schooling,

the governor's broader economic argument for school modernization resonated with

white South Carolinians. Although the impetus for passing the three cent sales tax, the

equalization plan, school consolidation, and Governor Byrnes's other legislative

initiatives came from the legal challenges to Jim Crow segregation, there is significant

evidence to suggest that white South Carolinians also supported these proposals because

they really did promise to improve and modernize the state's schools systems.

Legislative reformers, such as future Governors Hollings and John West, were

determined to promote educational reform. At the same time that the state assembly was

debating the school amendment, it proposed a "free school lunch" program, a program to



73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.









help pay for the use of school buses for sanctioned athletic events, minimum standards

for public high schools, and a bill to modernize education funding. In fact, throughout

1952 the legislature instituted significant changes to the state's public school system that

brought much needed improvements to the antiquated and under-funded system.

Although the discrepancy between black and white schools remained, even African

American institutions were promised significant improvements under the equalization

plan.7

Nonetheless, Byrnes strategy for defending South Carolina's particular brand of

Jim Crow was an important step toward organized white resistance. The drastic measures

adopted by the South Carolina General Assembly and endorsed by Governor Byrnes in

the early 1950s were the state's first significant efforts to take over the day-to-day

management of white supremacy in education since the state had enacted its Jim Crow

laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, Byrnes ensured that

white South Carolinians understood that any crack in the wall of separation between

whites and blacks could spell disaster for the entire institution of segregation. The

governor's unequivocal language and his endorsement of a zero tolerance policy toward

desegregation hardened white resolve and strengthened white unity. Still, the widespread

support for educational improvements and the recognition that economic development

depended on employing an educated and well-trained work force was evidence that some

white South Carolinians were as interested in progress as they were in the fight to

preserve segregation.



75 South Carolina House Journal (1952) 522-530. *In February of 1952 the Supreme Court was set to
decide Brown v. Board of Education in the summer of 1953.









In passing the school tax and the school amendment, South Carolinians

simultaneously prepared for two possible paths. The first promised moderate leadership

and a commitment to improving the state's poor public education system. The other laid

the groundwork for more militant resistance. By the fall of 1952, the minds of South

Carolina whites were as divided and contradictory as the system of segregation they were

fighting to protect. Plans to modernize and improve the state's public schools coincided

with threats to close them, and promises to abandon, rather than desegregate, public

education overlapped with assurances that such action would never become necessary.

Meanwhile, contemporary brick buildings with electricity and indoor plumbing replaced

one-room schoolhouses with potbelly stoves and outhouses, and, by 1956, the state had

spent more than $120 million on school improvements two-thirds of which was spent

on African American schools.76

In 1952, few could predict which tactics South Carolina would adopt to combat the

still rising tide of civil rights activism and the unmistakable signals of increasing federal

opposition to the South's Jim Crow laws. State leaders promised moderation and respect

for the law, but adopted measures for circumventing federal orders and implicitly

encouraged reprisals against civil rights activists. The most troubling, and yet predictable

aspect of the white response to the Briggs case for African Americans was the fact that

white Carolinians who were the most affected by the Clarendon case and other civil

rights activism displayed the greatest propensity to adopt extreme measures to protect

segregation. Blacks and whites who voiced opposition to such actions were publicly

shunned, economically isolated, and, at times, physically threatened and attacked. White


76 South Carolina Educational Finance Commission, South Carolina's Educational Revolution.






61


South Carolinians debated a wide range of appropriate and possible tactics for protecting

white supremacy across the state, but to the victims of white reprisals in the black belt

counties it was already apparent that, at mid-century, South Carolina had already teetered

over the edge of massive resistance.














CHAPTER 3
CAMPAIGNING ON RACE: THE ELECTIONS OF 1950

Between 1950 and 1952 South Carolina whites were nearly uniform in their

opposition to black civil rights. However, reactions to the increasing encroachments on

white privilege were diverse and the degree to which the segregation issue would

radicalize state politics was unclear. Although the race issue was seldom far from the

surface of public consciousness and debate, many whites were equally concerned with

improving the state's schools, its economy, and its infrastructure. To address those

concerns political leaders at the local and state level often relied on funding from the

national government. In the early 1950s South Carolina was home to several large

federally funded public works projects. These projects, which included the construction

of the Santee-Cooper hydroelectric plant, the Charleston Air Force Base, and the

Savannah River nuclear weapons plant, funneled a considerable amount of money into

the impoverished state. Furthermore, they created high paying jobs and paid for much

needed internal improvements. For white voters and their elected leaders, securing

funding for federal projects was both a political and economic necessity. Even elected

officials who vilified federal intervention in civil rights issues vigorously lobbied for

national funding for improving the state's infrastructure and its economy.

In the wake of nascent signs of federal interests in civil rights enforcement and the

intensification of internal black pressure, there were some concerns about the state's

increasing dependence on federal funding, but they were minor in comparison to calls for

more, not less, federal aid to South Carolina. For example, George Grice, the president









of the College of Charleston, wrote to Senator Burnet Maybank in June 1950 to ensure

that the school's plan to borrow federal funds to improve its faculty housing would not

"involve the College in any way in the racial problem." Grice, who was a committed

segregationist, worried that accepting the much needed funds would place the school

under federal regulatory control. Such control, he surmised, could result in a

desegregation order. Despite these apprehensions, Grice and the college continued to

seek federal monies whenever possible. 1

For many whites, even Grice's mild worries were unwarranted. In spite of the

post-World War II recession, the state's economic outlook and the standard of living

enjoyed by its citizens had vastly improved since the depths of the Great Depression.

Most South Carolinians felt that these improvements were a direct result of federal

investments during the New Deal and World War II. The Second World War had saved

the Charleston Navy Base and Naval Shipyard, the Korean conflict had rescued Fort

Jackson from threatened closure, and the Cold War had helped pump money into the

state's various other defense facilities. The Charleston Naval Shipyard alone employed

between 10,000-15,000 workers during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and navy yard

employees earned on average nearly twice as much as other area workers.2





1 George Grice to Burnet R. Maybank (June 17, 1950), Bumet Maybank to George Grice (July 17, 1950),
College of Charleston Archives, Special Collections.

2 Fritz Hamer, "A Southern City Enters the Twentieth Century: Charleston, its Navy Yard, and World War
II, 1940-1948" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of South Carolina, 1998). Andrew Herbert Myers, "Black,
White, and Olive Drab: Military-Social Relations During the Civil Rights Movement at Fort Jackson and
in Columbia, South Carolina" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Virginia, 1998). Ivan D. Carson to
Burnet R. Maybank (March 3, 1952), Earl J. McGrath to Burnet R. Maybank (February 28, May 27 and
March 10, 1952), and Howard J. Sears to Burnet R. Maybank (October 6, 1952), Maybank Senatorial
Papers, Special Collections.









In addition to military spending, New Deal agriculture reforms contributed farm

subsidies, low interest loans to buy agricultural equipment, and increased funding to

agricultural colleges like Clemson University in the South Carolina upstate.

Furthermore, Federal Housing Authority funds helped to alleviate South Carolina's

housing shortage and the rural electrification project funded the expansion of electric

lines across the bucolic state. Indeed, even though the state had roundly rejected

Roosevelt's successor in 1948, New Deal programs remained popular as South Carolina

entered the 1950s.3

African Americans in South Carolina, who had also been stalwart supporters of the

New Deal, were also generally optimistic that the 1950s would usher in an age of

prosperity. However, unlike their white neighbors, they hoped that new economic and

educational opportunities would go hand in hand with the expansion of their civil and

political rights. African Americans throughout the South yearned for rapid social change

and an official endorsement of black rights from regional and national leaders. For the

state's African American population, progress meant more than a bigger paycheck and

rural electrification.

Black South Carolinians had reason to believe that substantial change was on its

way. By the dawn of the new decade the South Carolina branch of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had challenged

educational inequality in the state, President Harry S. Truman had ordered the

desegregation of the military and promised to support civil rights in the waning years of


3 Jack Irby Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
2001). George Calvin Waldrep, Southern Workers and the Search for Community: Spartanburg County,
South Carolina (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 123-126. Dewey W. Grantham, The Life and
Death of the Solid South: A Political History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988) 102-124.









his administration, and northern Democrats were advocating anti-poll tax legislation,

anti-lynching bills, and support for African American voting rights. These national

trends provided a crucial backdrop for local initiatives in South Carolina where, in 1950

alone, Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) leader and Charleston NAACP President

Arthur Clement challenged white supremacist Congressman L. Mendel Rivers in South

Carolina's First Congressional District's Democratic primary, blacks in Clarendon

County allied with NAACP Legal Defense Fund to initiate Briggs v. Elliott, and civil

rights leaders attempted to use black ballots to influence state elections in a meaningful

way for the first time since Reconstruction.

It was within this context of cautious, if differently configured hopes for the future

of the state that white and black South Carolinians confronted the civil rights issue. Civil

rights had dominated state politics in 1948 and the expansion of black activism since

President Truman's re-election heightened anxiety among white segregationists. Support

for segregation remained a litmus test for white office seekers in South Carolina, but it

was not the only issue that concerned white voters. Politicians also had to preach

economic progress and support for education while simultaneously cautioning against

rapid social change. Elected officials faced enormous, often contradicting, pressures to

preserve white supremacy without jeopardizing white economic prosperity or

surrendering local autonomy in exchange for federal funding. This chapter explains the

nature of those pressures and the numerous responses to them by black and white South

Carolinians during the various elections of 1950.

The economic concerns of Charleston exemplified the controversy over federal

funds in South Carolina. Charleston was the largest city in South Carolina's Low









Country region and home to the state's most conservative daily newspaper, the News and

Courier. In the post-World War II era the city was also a hotbed of white resistance to

NAACP and PDP activism. However, Charleston was also an important bastion of the

Cold War military industries and its civic leaders demanded that its congressional

representatives direct federal funds to the region even if, as conservatives like George

Grice feared, such money brought with it the specter of possible federal intervention in

racial arrangements.

After suffering through numerous post-World War II cutbacks, the military

initiated a building boom in the region beginning in the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s,

more defense dollars were spent in the Charleston area than anywhere else in the nation

except Norfolk, San Antonio, and San Diego, and no region saw more internal

improvements funded by the United States military than the South Carolina Low

Country. Moreover, federal contributions to dredging and maintaining the harbor

contributed to improvements in commercial shipping. These improvements created

scores of high paying jobs and provided a substantial amount of political capital for

elected officials. Most of these projects were navigated through congress by

Representative Rivers, who was a powerful member of the Armed Services Committee.

Throughout his nearly 30 years in Congress, Rivers was notorious for steering federal

defense money to his home district and lauded for his ability to increase defense spending

throughout his home state.4





4 George Hopkins, "From Naval Pauper to Naval Power: The Development of Charleston's Metropolitan-
Industrial Complex," in ed. Roger W. Lotchin, The MartialMetropolis: U.S. Cities in War and Peace
(New York: Praeger, 1984) 1-34.









Rivers's influence on the growth of military industries in South Carolina was

ubiquitous, but other city leaders were also important in recruiting federal projects to the

previously impoverished area. Although Charleston area boosters promoted the city with

the zeal of many "New South" advocates, city leaders were also happy to sell the historic

district's genteel charm. In 1949, the Carolina Art Association published a book praising

Charleston for its ability to be both a prime tourist destination and a modern industrial

city. The book, entitled Charleston Grows, pointed out that the historic peninsula was a

"city with a heritage," but it was not "an anachronistic" place "sleeping through the

present." According to the various contributors to the book it was not "a reconstruction

of the eighteenth century, preserved as a museum piece."5

Charleston Grows portrayed the city as divided into two distinct districts.

Peninsular Charleston was the epitome of southern charm and gentility and the area

northwest of US 17 and southeast of Berkeley County was a booming industrial marvel.

In the book, prominent Charleston author Herbert Ravenel Sass claimed, "The old

historic Charleston and the new industrial Charleston are geographically separate and

distinct, so that industrial development here can be wholly helpful with none of the

disastrous cultural sacrifices which progress often involves." Sass and other

Charleston area boosters recognized that economic advancement might blur the lines of

racial and ethnic separation, but hoped that the city could find a way to foster

development without risking the loss of white supremacy. Sass concluded that the "new



5 Carolina Art Association, Charleston Grows (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co., 1949). For a
discussion of role of historical memory in Charleston, see: Stephanie Yuhl, A Golden Haze of Memory:
The Making of Historic Charleston (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).









Charleston" could find "inspiration and courage" in the "strong and masculine old

Charleston."6

The convoluted mixture of historic memory and economic boosterism in

Charleston Grows represented the desire of many white South Carolinians to promote

economic modernization without upsetting the racial status quo. This bifurcated mindset

was evident throughout South Carolina, but it was especially influential in the Low

Country region in the southeast corner of the state where Charleston was located. Nearly

the entire region was part of the First Congressional District and every county in it was

part of the black belt. In the early spring of 1950, Low Country whites began pressuring

the South Carolina Democratic Party to take immediate action to thwart various

expressions of civil rights reform and activism. The Charleston County Democratic

Convention passed a resolution commending the Palmetto State's opposition to "the

FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Commission] law, the anti-lynching law, the anti-poll

tax law, the anti-segregation laws, commonly known as the so-called Civil Rights

program." The group also instructed its delegates to the State Democratic Convention of

1950 to "oppose any effort to have the Democratic Party of South Carolina sacrifice or

compromise its traditional principles or reverse and repudiate the State Party's opposition

to the so-called Civil Rights program and those who advocate such programs." 7

Nonetheless, black activists pressed on with their calls for an end to South

Carolina's restrictive election process. And, when Arthur Clement challenged Rivers in

the Democratic Primary of 1950, he became both a symbol of the increasing intensity of


6 Ibid.

7 "Resolution for the County Convention" (c. 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.









black political activism and a reminder of the deeply entrenched discrimination in the

state's election system. His challenge is especially noteworthy because, other than Strom

Thurmond, no politician in South Carolina embodied the Dixiecrat movement more than

Rivers. Indeed, Rivers and Representative John L. McMillan of Florence were the only

members of the South Carolina congressional delegation to campaign openly for the

Thurmond-Wright ticket in 1948.8

Rivers had built his reputation as an ardent segregationist with vicious political

attacks on the Truman Administration. He called the president a "dead chicken" who did

not have "sense enough" to lead the nation. In October 1948, Rivers went so far as to

issue a public statement requesting that the state Democratic Party remove his name from

the Truman ticket. The move was unnecessary because in South Carolina, the

"Democratic" ticket was headlined by Thurmond and not Truman, but the congressman's

rhetoric helped solidify support from angry whites. "I wouldn't be true to my

convictions," he explained, "if I ran also on the Truman ticket. I want it known that I'm

supporting the States' Rights Democrats and not the Truman Democrats." Rivers

followed the Dixiecrat Party line arguing that the States' Rights primary was the "regular

Democratic primary of South Carolina." He declared, "I don't want to sail under false

colors or to mislead you or anyone else, and certainly it is not my desire to give Truman

any intentional or inadvertent help or assistance." Rivers called on every Southerner to

"stand up and be counted," and warned, "You're on one side or the other, not both."9





SIbid.

9 Ibid.









Like Rivers, Clement was a political veteran. He was the Executive Secretary of

the PDP and had campaigned for Henry Wallace during the presidential election of 1948.

In a letter to the Charleston News and Courier that year, Clement wrote:

The Progressive Democrats do not want 'to get into the Party of the White folks.'
We want to fully participate like any other citizen in 'the only material and realistic
election machinery' in this State The Democratic Party and its Primaries. The
present government of South Carolina is not good enough for the Progressive
Democrats. We desire no part of it. It is putrid. Its odor stenches the clear clean
air of South Carolina. 10

In addition to their obvious differences regarding racial politics, a host of other

issues separated Rivers and Clement. The .Si,,ih Carolina Democratic Digest, which was

an official publication of the national Democratic Party in South Carolina, gave brief

biographies of all of the candidates. It described Clement as a "statewide leader of Negro

groups" and as a "liberal" who was "pro-labor" and "pro-National Democrat." The paper

claimed that Rivers was an "arch-foe of Truman and Civil Rights" who was "strongly

conservative."11

During the election Rivers promised voters that he would "continue our fight in

Washington to uphold our traditions, our customs, and our rights to run our own business

in South Carolina against outside interference." In a half-page political advertisement in

the News and Courier, he pledged not to sell the southern "birthright for a mess of

political patronage." The congressman also claimed to be "one of the foremost defenders

of states' rights and local self-government." Rivers, however, refused to discuss Clement

directly. Instead, he attempted to remain aloof. The congressman was contemptuous of


10 Arthur J. Clement to "To the Editor of the Charleston News & Courier," (June 1, 1948), Arthur J.
Clement Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter cited as
Clement Papers, SCL).

1 "South Carolina Democratic Digest" (Columbia: May 1950), Clement Papers, SCL.









black forays into politics and, rather than campaign directly against Clement, Rivers

utilized the publicity surrounding the race issue to enhance his reputation as defender of

white privilege. He declared, "I am not taking any notice of the candidacy of one A.J.

Clement, Jr. for Congress from the First Congressional District," as he did not wish to

"lend dignity to [Clement's] candidacy." The congressman dismissed Clement as an

unsuitable opponent who was "an officer in the organization created by Henry Wallace,

known as the 'Americans for Democratic Action,' that opposed "every concept and

political philosophy of which the South Carolina Democratic Party is made and of which

it is composed."12

In addition to provoking declarations of contempt from Rivers, Clement's

candidacy helped to exacerbate white fears and reinforced the notion that the state's Jim

Crow voting restrictions were under siege. That anxiety was a potent tool for mobilizing

white political power. State Representative Joseph Wise of Charleston published a

campaign leaflet that warned against the "menace" of "bloc voting." The advertisement

quoted former North Carolina Governor Charles B. Aycock who had said in 1898:

"When we came to power, we desired merely the security of life, liberty and prosperity.

We had seen all these menaced by 120,000 Negro votes cast as the vote of one man."

Wise's campaign literature pointed out that several North Carolina cities had been

affected by "bloc voting" by blacks in the state's primary. Furthermore, he contended,

"These same tactics are BEING ATTEMPTED in Charleston County, South Carolina."




12 Telegram from L. Mendel Rivers to Calvit N. Clarke, Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee,
Monck's Corer, South Carolina (July 9, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS. News and Courier (July 9, 1950)
7A. Rough Draft of Letter from L. Mendel Rivers to "Dear Mr. Chairman" (June 21, 1950) Rivers Papers,
SCHS.









He also cautioned that white "must UNITE TOGETHER in order to preserve our TRUE

SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY."13

Like Wise, Rivers understood that white political unity was very important to his

re-election, but Rivers seemed more concerned about setting the stage for future

elections. Like other white leaders in the South, Rivers was tasked with rallying whites

to his cause without encouraging politically ambitious moderates to recognize the

prospective power of a biracial coalition. While he feigned a lack of interest in the

election and assured voters of his certain victory, Rivers also reminded voters that the

primary was "very important," and he urged "every eligible white person" to register to

vote by June 10, 1950 so that "all qualified white persons" could show up at the polls.

According to the congressman, "It is essential that we register and vote to maintain and

preserve good government and protect our interest against the forces that are working day

and night to change our way of life and deprive us of the freedom we cherish."14

Rivers's actions in the campaign revealed a tension that permeated white political

ranks across South Carolina in the 1950s. Jim Crow restrictions were created to limit the

potential power of black ballots and to prevent the formation of a biracial political

alliance that could threatened the elite white power structure. The erosion of those

controls on African American voting rights threatened to create new political coalitions

and weaken white unity on the issue of segregation. During the election Rivers worried

privately that a high black turnout might encourage moderate whites to seek office in

future elections. He understood, as did most white leaders, that such a combination of

13 "Bloc Voting By Any Group is a Menace to Democracy" (n.d.), Clement Papers, SCL.

14 L. Mendel Rivers to Y.C. Weathersbee et al. (May 25, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to James Henry Clark et
al. (May 25, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.









white and black votes could pose a serious challenge to more conservative candidates.

Rivers proclaimed:

I believe that the white people in Charleston are alert to the potentialities of the
negro (sic). The election this year will demonstrate one thing that we have in our
midst people of the Waring ilk who are promoting the negro (sic) and in the future
we will have white men running with their blessings. Then they can really wield
the balance of power.15

Clement recognized the same potential and spent most his campaign attempting to

energize black voters and, as Rivers feared, reach out to more moderate whites. He

realized that in 1950 it was impossible for a black candidate to win an election in South

Carolina, even in the First District where blacks comprised a majority of the population.

According to the 1940 census there were approximately 170,000 blacks in the district

compared to just over 120,000 whites. However, despite the legal advances for black

political rights in the previous decade, the majority of the district's African Americans

were still not registered for the elections of 1950 reflecting a recurring void between

increasingly progressive laws and judicial rulings regarding race and consistently

conservative practices at the local level.16

Journalist and publisher John McCray also understood the potential effect of a large

black voter turnout. He urged African Americans to register before the June 10 deadline

and called for "the chairman and executive committee of each precinct, club and

organization working under the Progressive Democrats banner to begin at once a daily


15 L. Mendel Rivers to Ashley Halsey (June 3, 1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

16 1 giit. ii 1,.' and Informer, (May 13, 1950) 4. Howard Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank
Portrait of South Carolina. (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958) 1-25. For a discussion of the
political situation of Low Country African Americans see: Millicent E. Brown, "Civil Rights Activism in
Charleston, South Carolina, 1940-1970" (Ph.D. Dissertation: Florida State University, 1997). L. Mendel
Rivers to Y.C. Weathersbee et al.(May 25, 1950), L. Mendel Rivers to James Henry Clark et al. (May 25,
1950), Rivers Papers, SCHS.









campaign of registration which must not be slowed up until the last minute is used."

McCray instructed the Executive Committee of the Progressive Democratic Party to

arrange transportation for citizens who wished to register. "Mendel Rivers must not go

back to Congress" he proclaimed, "We can keep him out, but we must do it by registering

now and following through with the voting until July 11th."17

Since many whites and blacks were apprehensive of being associated with radical

leftist politics, Clement attempted to counter the accusation that "civil rights" was

euphemism for communism. Instead, he claimed that black progress was an important

issue for all South Carolinians. "When we hear the term 'civil rights' we immediately

see 'color," observed Clement, but he contended, "Civil Rights is the essence of our

American Way. It is our chief weapon against all foreign 'isms.' In South Carolina, civil

rights have been a 'dead truth,' an untouchable. We wish to bring it onto the open for its

avoidance has affected all our people not just a segment." "We have frittered away our

glorious heritage," said Clement, "and the possibilities wrapped up in the American

Dream by allowing our attitudes and ambitions to become wrapped by racism."18

Despite these efforts, Rivers easily defeated Clement in the primary election. The

incumbent garnered over 42,000 votes compared to Clement's 7,000. Most of Clement's

support came from the African American communities in Charleston and Beaufort

Counties. The Charleston Evening Post smugly declared, "We believe he [Rivers] would

have won the election even if there had been any serious opposition to him."19


17 John H. McCray to Fcllow Citizen" (May 26, 1950), Clement Papers, SCL.

18 News and Courier (May 17, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.

19 Evening Post (July 12, 1950), I ,ini. *, .. and Informer (July 15, 1950) from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.
Evening Post (July 17, 1950) 4.









The African American communities in South Carolina and across the South were

divided over how to react to Clement's showing. In an editorial, the Atlanta Daily World

claimed to have "nothing but the highest esteem and commendation for South Carolina's

young A.J. Clement, Jr." The paper noted that Clement had received enough financial

support to pay for campaign expenses and that he had made a remarkably good showing

despite the overwhelming challenge of confronting the white political hierarchy. The

editorial stated:

Although he received only 7,299 votes against his opponent's 43,489, we do not
think that was a poor showing for a candidate entering a campaign with so many
grave and insuperable obstacles. Not only was the total atmosphere of the
campaign rabidly anti-Negro but the atmosphere and tempo of the state was hostile.
Dixiecrats and the Dixiecrat spirit was the central note, the like of which only
Georgia could equal or surpass. Accordingly, his race, while badly beaten, served
to educate white voters and to give Negroes a keener interest and appreciation for
the right of the franchise.20

Closer to home, however, some members of the black community were outraged by

the limited support that Clement had received from African American voters. An

editorial in the Lighthouse andInformer complained that blacks in Charleston could have

done more to promote Clement's candidacy and hinted at alleged improprieties in the

election process. "In the initial probing of the matter," the paper claimed, "it seems that

several [blacks] were urged to vote against" Clement and "for his Dixiecrat opponent."

McCray and Clement each condemned conservative blacks who supported Rivers in

order to gain political patronage. The Lighthouse andInformer editorial argued that the

loss was a serious blow to the political rights of African Americans. The article stated,


20 "It Was Worth the Try," Atlanta Daily World (July 16, 1950), from the Clement Papers, SCL.









"Never again soon will we have the golden opportunity we had in the first district." In a

letter to Clement, McCray declared the black participation in the election "disgraceful."21

Although McCray, Clement, and other black leaders had not expected a victory for

the African American candidate, the miniscule voter turnout in the black communities of

the First District was a serious blow. Not only was it evidence that white state leaders

had minimized the effectiveness of court orders to end the lily white primary, but the low

turnout also meant that it would be even harder to convince white candidates that a

moderate biracial coalition could unseat conservative Democrats, such as Rivers. White

solidarity coupled with the absence of federal enforcement of anti-discrimination laws

and rulings meant that black voters could be safely ignored in black belt elections for the

foreseeable future.

The election also demonstrated the degree to which white segregationists still

controlled the political process. White leaders had made Clement's candidacy as difficult

as possible. Clement's campaign received no assistance from the Democratic Party of

South Carolina, and party officials actively sought to limit his involvement in official

events. For example, The County Chairman of the Democratic Party of Hampton County

refused to allow Clement to speak at a party rally. When the challenger complained to

state party officials, William P. Baskin, the State Chairman of the South Carolina

Democratic Party, responded that local officials were not required to invite any candidate

to speak. Baskin claimed that he had no authority to "invite" a candidate to a county

meeting.22


21 "A Lesson to Learn Early," I ,lih. ,.. and Informer (n.d.), John H. McCray to Arthur Clement (July 21,
1950), Clement Papers, SCL.
22 William P. Baskin to Arthur J. Clement (June 1, 1950), Clement Papers, SCL.









White newspapers encouraged the notion that Clement was a fringe candidate with

little or no support from whites or blacks. For example, Clement was vilified by the

Charleston News and Courier. On two occasions, the conservative newspaper attacked

Clement for not properly answering the "race question." The Charleston paper editorially

condemned him for failing to oppose the "compelled mixture of the white and colored

races in industries (the FEPC)" and for his support of "mixed race schools and colleges."

It also noted that Clement was not "in favor of separation of the races in railroad cars,

public buses, hotels and restaurants, or in favor of residential separation of races as is

now customary in cotton mill villages and other localities." In summation, the editorial

declared that Clement was undesirable because he did "not commit himself to opposing

any kind of racial mingling or as favoring any kind of racial separation." The News and

Courier insisted that its opposition to Clement was not based on the candidate's race, but

on his political beliefs. In fact, an editorial declared that African Americans should enjoy

the same political rights as whites, as long as any prospective black candidate favored

segregation. Of course, the newspaper's editorial staff was well aware that such a caveat

would eliminate any serious black candidate.23

After the election, segregationists were convinced that their efforts had paid off.

Whites were jubilant at the lack of black political participation in the primary, and

Rivers's easy victory seemed to alleviate paranoid fears of an African American takeover

of the Democratic Party. The Hampton Democrat declared: "Apparently the fear that

many South Carolinians had that the Negroes would flock to the polls and vote into office

candidates unpalatable to the majority of white voters was without justification." The


23 News and Courier (July 8, 1950) 4A.









newspaper argued that voter turnout among African Americans was so low in the state

that "there is no real reason to believe Negroes would vote in a bloc." For many whites,

Rivers' triumph was an indication that they had stemmed the rising tide of black activism

that had characterized the previous year. It was also additional fodder for whites to

utilize to argue that most South Carolina blacks were content with white political

leadership.24

Nonetheless, any display of black political activism, no matter how circumscribed,

elicited a palpable degree of fear from South Carolina's white communities. For some

politicians, the time seemed ripe to take advantage of these apprehensions in a statewide

election. Governor J. Strom Thurmond, who had won over 70 percent of the state's

popular vote in the presidential election of 1948, hoped that white distrust of President

Harry Truman and the national Democratic Party would lead him to victory over the

state's most prominent Truman supporter, United States Senator Olin D. Johnston.

Against the backdrop of the Rivers-Clement race, NAACP legal challenges to white

supremacy, and the desegregation of the military, Thurmond initiated his first attempt to

reach the United States Senate.

By the time the former Dixiecrat announced his candidacy, many of the state's

leading political observers had already envisaged a victory for Thurmond. The

Charleston News and Courier forecast an "overwhelming" triumph for the governor.

Conservative newspaperman William D. Workman predicted Thurmond would garner

almost 60 percent of the popular vote, and the Sumter Daily Item declared that Johnston's

support for the president would translate into a sure victory for Thurmond. In fact, few


24 Hampton Democrat (July 16, 1950), from the Rivers Papers, SCHS.









political observers felt that Johnston could defeat the popular governor. Several political

prognosticators reasoned that the recent election losses of other southern Truman

supporters and racial moderates like Claude Pepper of Florida and Frank Porter Graham

of North Carolina were evidence of Johnston's vulnerability on the race issue.25

In each of these cases, political pundits calculated that a conservative backlash

against the national Democratic Party would provide an election-day win for Thurmond.

However, these same analysts underestimated Johnston's own reputation as an ardent

white supremacist at a time when the race issue was especially vexing for many voters.

For example, when the incumbent senator received the endorsement of his hometown

newspaper, the Anderson Independent, it defended his record on matters of race and

attempted to draw a contrast between Johnston and several other southern senators who

faced difficult elections in 1950. The Anderson newspaper editorialized that Johnston

had little in common with the defeated "liberal" senators from North Carolina and

Florida. Instead, the paper asserted that Johnston was a member of a powerful block of

southern senators who helped defeat civil rights initiatives, such as the permanent FEPC.

The newspaper concluded, "Both Pepper and Graham gave support and sympathy to

FEPC legislation. Johnston never has and never will." Furthermore, the Anderson daily

claimed that the Senator had more in common with arch-segregationists Lister Hill of

Alabama, Walter George of Georgia, and Clyde Hoey of North Carolina.26


25 News and Courier (June 23, 1950) 4. William D. Workman, Jr. to Judson Chapman (n.d.), William D.
Workman, Jr. Papers, Modem Political Collections, University of South Carolina, Columbia [Hereafter
cited as Workman Papers, MPC]. Sumter Daily Item (July 10, 1950) 4.

26Anderson Independent (July 9, 1950) 4. The State (July 1, 1950) 3. Several Thurmond campaign
advertisements and clippings that deal with this strategy are located in the 1950 Democratic Primary
campaign files of the Olin D. Johnston Papers, Modem Political Collections, University of South Carolina,
Columbia, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as Johnston Papers, MPC].









Johnston adopted much the same tactic as his hometown newspaper. He tried to

reach out to popular southern conservatives and distanced himself from the moderate

wing of the national Democratic Party. The senator even attempted to gain an

endorsement from Georgia Senator Richard Russell, who was well respected amongst

segregationists for his efforts to preserve Jim Crow. Russell praised Johnston and fellow

South Carolina Senator Burnet R. Maybank, but did not wish to "interject" himself "into

the South Carolina primary." Despite Russell's desire for neutrality, Johnston's

campaign staff reprinted Russell's praise of the incumbent in newspaper

advertisements.27

Fortunately for Johnston, conservative newspaper editors and black belt

segregationists did not constitute the majority of white voters. Convincing white

Johnston supporters to abandon the senator was a difficult sell. He was a former mill

worker who had a strong following in the upstate region and appealed to white voters on

both racial and economic grounds. Johnston considered himself the political champion of

the state's white textile workers, and, like many of his constituents, he was a vocal

supporter of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and white workers' rights. He was the only

southern senator to vote for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, which limited the rights of

workers to form unions and to strike. He had also led the South's efforts to limit the

effects of the SNmithi v. Allwright decision. As governor (1943-1945) Johnston was the

architect of the "South Carolina Plan," whereby the state legislature removed any


27 Richard Russell to Olin Johnston (June 27, 1950), Johnston Papers, MPC. Several of these
advertisements are located injournalist William D. Workman's files on the campaign, Workman Papers,
MPC. For a discussion of Russell, see: Gilbert Courtland Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr., Senator from
Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Robert Mann, The Walls ofJericho:
Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell and the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1996).









reference to political parties from state law, and declared the Democratic Party a "private

club" that was not subject to the court decision. Almost overnight, the state legislature

repealed 150 state statutes governing primary elections. Although this process was later

declared unconstitutional in Elmore v. Rice, it nonetheless boosted Johnston a reputation

as an uncompromising segregationist.28

Thurmond's strategy was more one-dimensional. He hoped to recreate the

Dixiecrat alliance that had helped him win the state in 1948. Thurmond felt that white

voters would flock to his campaign and cast their ballots based on his stalwart defense of

segregation two years earlier. The governor realized that, due to his stint as a Dixiecrat in

1948, he had no hope of winning the black vote. Even though he and every other white

politician in South Carolina were aware of the increase in black voting rights, Thurmond

felt that he could attract enough alienated white voters to offset the modest increase in

black participation. He anticipated that alienating blacks would make him a more

attractive candidate to the segregationist electorate, but also understood that his victory

depended on his ability to persuade South Carolina whites that the re-election of Johnston

actually threatened the institution of segregation.

Many political observers knew that the governor's strategy was a risky one.

Former South Carolina State Senator Paul Quattlebaum cautioned the governor not to

miscalculate the effects of the African American vote in the primary, and United States

Congressman L. Mendel Rivers contended that state NAACP leader James Hinton was

openly campaigning against Thurmond. Quattlebaum expressed a common concern and


28 Tinsley Yarbrough, A Passion for Justice: J. Waties Waring and Civil Rights (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987) 68-106. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: the History of Brown v. Board of
Education and BlackAmerica's Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 1975) 299.









alleged that blacks were registering to vote at a rate of "twenty to one" when compared to

new white voters. Moreover, he repeated the common speculation that African American

voters would cast their ballots as a "herd."29

When the official campaign tour commenced in Lexington County on May 23,

1950, neither Thurmond nor Johnston wasted any time with polite debate. Each

candidate accused the other of jeopardizing the foundation of segregation with his

political actions in 1948. Johnston repeatedly claimed that the only way to preserve the

separation of the races was for southern politicians to maintain seniority within the

national Democratic Party. Thurmond accused Johnston of collaborating with the very

forces that sought to dismantle Jim Crow. Thurmond reminded voters that "I stuck my

neck out for you two years ago." Referring to the Dixiecrat revolt, he declared, "Don't

forget that I fought the fight for states rights while my opponent ran out on the Democrats

of South Carolina." Since the South Carolina Democratic Party had endorsed Thurmond

in the presidential election of 1948, the governor even claimed that Johnston had violated

his loyalty oath to the state party by supporting Truman.30

Thurmond's campaign rested largely on his assertion that Johnston was trying to

pose as a loyal segregationist at home, but was really a committed "Trumanite." "My

opponent," declared Thurmond, "may think he can play around in Washington with the

Truman-C.I.O. crowd and then come back down here and pose as a great States' Rights

Democrat, but he is not going to get by with it." He grouped Johnston with "those who


29 Paul Quattlebaum to J. Strom Thurmond (April 22, 1950), Paul Quattlebaum Papers, Special
Collections, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina [Hereafter cited as
Quattlebaum Papers, Thurmond Institute]. Rivers to Thurmond (n.d.), Rivers Papers, SCHS.

30 News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 9B. The State (June 3, 1950) 3, (June 8, 1950), 8. News and Courier
(June 10, 1950) 3.









stabbed the Democratic Party of South Carolina in the back and repudiated its principles.

S." He warned that Johnston "should not now try to get back in the party and seek favors

from party membership," and suggested that the incumbent Senator "sail under [his] true

colors and offer [himself] openly on the Truman Party ticket." Moreover, Thurmond

claimed that United States Attorney General J. Howard McGrath was the driving force

behind Truman's civil rights initiatives and that Johnston's support for him was a direct

threat to the legal structure of segregation. In one campaign advertisement, Thurmond

labeled a photograph of Johnston and McGrath together with the caption: "Olin Johnston

Drinks Toast to the man Harry Truman Appointed to End Segregation in the South."

Thurmond alleged that no southerner could work within Truman's Democratic Party to

protect segregation. Instead, he insisted that southern leaders should refuse to

compromise with party members who advocated civil rights for African Americans.31

By contrast, Johnston urged South Carolina voters to look toward the Democratic

Party to defend segregation. He claimed that southerners could only counteract the

burgeoning support for black voting and civil rights within the national party. The

senator told voters that he had "been fighting for states rights for thirty years." He

cautioned South Carolinians not to isolate themselves from the rest of the nation, and

declared that the fight to save segregation should remain "within the party." Johnston

preached a unified front in the battle to preserve segregated society. "As long as we are

split," he said, "we can't hope to accomplish much."32



31 News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 1. "Olin Johnston Drinks Toast to the Man Harry Truman Appointed
to End Segregation in the South," Thurmond Campaign Advertisement, Workman Papers, MPC. The State
(June 21, 1950) lB. News and Courier (June 8, 1950) 11.

32 News and Courier (May 27, 1950) 1. The State (June 2, 1950) 5, (June 2, 1950) 5.









Unfortunately for Johnston, South Carolina's black belt newspaper editors tended

to agree with Thurmond. The Sumter Daily Item went so far as to announce that a

Thurmond victory would be a defeat for Truman and his supporters. The editorial

labeled Johnston "Truman's man," and decided that he was "tainted with Trumanism."

The Charleston News and Courier joked that, if Johnston were to defeat Thurmond in the

primary, the state should hold a run-off election between the "Trumanite" Johnston and

the anti-Truman Johnston. When Johnston labeled President Truman a "political mishap"

and a "blabbermouth," the Charleston paper asked whether the Senator referred to

Truman as "Mr. President" or "Mr. Blabbermouth" while in Washington D.C.33

The governor tapped further into white anxiety by accusing Johnston of secretly

working with black leaders and pandering to black crowds. At one debate, Thurmond

declared, "I appreciate the fact that the applause for me came from the white people of

Berkeley county," and noted that Johnston only received cheers from the African

American attendees. Thurmond was clearly attempting to influence the media's

perception of the event. Journalist William Workman, whose articles appeared in the

News and Courier and The State newspapers, frequently reported on the racial makeup of

the campaign audiences. He also took detailed notes regarding which candidate curried

the most favor from white audiences and which participant received the most applause

from African Americans. Workman, who had a clear political agenda, privately warned








3 Sumter Daily Item (July 6, 1950) 4, (July 10, 1950) 4. News and Courier (July 11, 1950) 4. The State
(June 10, 1950) 3. News and Courier (May 24, 1950) 1, (May 25, 1950) 4.









Thurmond that the National Democratic Party and the NAACP planned to spend

$250,000 to organize black voters and rally support for Johnston.34

Despite the near constant attacks from Thurmond's campaign, Johnston did not shy

away from his allegiance to the national Democratic Party in 1948 or from his record on

the race issue. The incumbent senator argued that it was he, and not Thurmond, who had

struggled to defend white privilege. For instance, Johnston attacked the former Dixiecrat

for naming Dr. T.C. McFall, an African American, to a South Carolina medical advisory

board in 1949. The board, which was appointed by the governor, was charged with

working with the state board of health to evaluate hospital construction. State law

stipulated that the members of the council were chosen on the recommendation of the

South Carolina Medical Association. The Association had recommended McFall so that

state policy makers could better understand the health needs of South Carolina's black

population. Johnston characterized Thurmond's actions as an attempt "to break down

segregation," and accused Thurmond of pandering for black votes with the McFall

appointment. According to Johnston, Thurmond's appointment of the African American

doctor was directly related to the "end" of the white primary with the Smithi v. Allwright

decision.35

In the face of Johnston's audacious attack on his segregationist credentials,

Thurmond claimed that state law had required him to appoint McFall and that he took no

pleasure in the selection. He vigorously denied Johnston's accusation of pandering to


34 The State (July 7, 1950) 1. Notes on the 1950 Democratic Primary and Untitled manuscript dated
February 6, 1950 from the Workman Papers, MPC.

35 The State (June 30, 1950) 5B, (July 1, 1950) 1. News and Courier (June 30, 1950) 4. "Thurmond's
Appointment of a NEGRO," (n.d.) Johnston Papers, MPC. The State (June 27, 1950) 7. Nadine Cohodas,
Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern C I,,I;,..- (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) 201-214.









black voters. Thurmond was supported by the state medical association, and a number of

South Carolina newspapers. The Charleston News and Courier proclaimed that the

McFall nomination contributed to the "health of all the people, white and colored."36

Thurmond sought to distract attention from the McFall nomination issue by

implicating Johnston in a race scandal of his own. While serving as governor, Johnston

had approved the parole of Dave Dunham. Upon his release, Dunham, who was an

African American, murdered a white 22-year-old Chester County veteran. Thurmond

blamed Johnston for the crime and declared that Johnston's "pardon racket" was to blame

for the murder. Thurmond charged that during Johnston's gubernatorial term, "an

unbridled and unbelievable pardon and parole spree" occurred. He claimed that Johnston

was responsible for the release of over 3,000 convicts from South Carolina prisons.

According to Thurmond, during Johnston's administration "it was easier to get out of the

penitentiary than it was to get in."37

In spite of Thurmond's defense that he was simply following state law and his

condemnation of the Senator's gubernatorial record, Johnston refused to let the former

Dixiecrat off the hook. Johnston presented evidence that, as governor, he had only

pardoned or paroled 671 people. Furthermore, he pointed out that he had only released

half as many prisoners as his predecessor, Ibra C. Blackwood. He also noted that voters

should hold Thurmond responsible for the McFall nomination. He reminded his

constituents that Thurmond had signed the law in the first place. "I would have suffered

my right arm to be severed," claimed Johnston, "before I would have signed any


36 Ibid. Sumter Daily Item (July 7, 1950) 4. News and Courier (June 28, 1950) 4.

37 News and Courier (June 9, 1950) 1. The State (June 9, 1950) 1.









commission" for McFall. The Senator went so far as to place a full-page advertisement

in The State proclaiming:

Thurmond Appoints Negro! Wade Hampton's Era of Segregation Ends in South
Carolina as Thurmond replaces white Doctor with Charleston Negro in Bold bid to
Capture Negro Vote of State! First Negro Appointed to State Position Since Days
of Carpetbaggers and Scalawags!

On another occasion, Johnston declared, "I would never have appointed the nigger

physician ... to displace your beloved white physician ." When a group of African

Americans in the audience took offense at Johnston's remarks, Johnston declared, "make

those niggers keep quiet." When the Thurmond campaign declared Johnston a closet

integrationist, he proclaimed that his opponents were "low down contemptible liar[s]." 38

In addition to instigating the uproar over the McFall affair, Johnston also chastised

Thurmond for "inviting" the black governor of the Virgin Islands, William H. Hastie, to

visit South Carolina as the governor's guest. Following the national governor's

conference in 1947, Thurmond's office sent invitations to visit South Carolina as the

official guests of the governor to each state executive who could not attend the

conference. Since Hastie did not attend, he received the invitation. Apparently,

Thurmond's secretary was unaware that Hastie was black. Unfortunately for Thurmond,

Hastie was also a Truman appointee who had participated in the Smith v. Allwright

39
case.

Beyond his attacks on Thurmond's commitment to racial integrity, Johnston also

re-enforced his own reputation as a committed segregationist with a well-timed attack on

38 The State (June 27, 1950) 7, (June 12, 1950) 12C. News and Courier (July 7, 1950) 1. "Pardons," (n.d.)
Johnston Papers, MPC. The State (June 23, 1950) 1.

39 Ibid. Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, 206-220. For a discussion of Hastie's involvement with Smith v.
Allwright, see: Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the
Road to Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 153-154.









the FEPC. In the months leading up to the campaign, Johnston was a leading spokesman

against the establishment of a permanent FEPC. He and 21 other southern senators used

the filibuster to prevent a vote on the bill. Johnston also utilized his position as the

chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service to slow down congressional

committee work until the bill was ultimately defeated. Each of the 12 attempts to end the

impasse and create a permanent FEPC failed. For Johnston, the defeat of the FEPC

legislation was one of his most important achievements. Both the Anderson Independent

and The State newspaper in Columbia congratulated the senator for his stand against the

FEPC, and he did not hesitate to remind voters of his "victory" over the legislation. "I

have fought for you in the United States Senate," Johnston declared, "and I mean to

continue." Predictably, Thurmond was less impressed with his opponent's efforts to

block permanent FEPC legislation, proclaiming, "I fail to see how he can claim any

support from the people of South Carolina for helping to kill the pet measure of the man

he helped elect on a platform calling for civil rights programs." 40

By the time the votes were tabulated in the primary, Johnston had defeated

Thurmond by over 27,000 votes. The upcountry Democrat carried 186,180 votes to

Thurmond's 158,904. Thurmond's showing paled in comparison to his performance in

the 1948 presidential campaign when he carried every South Carolina county except

Anderson and Spartanburg, which were dominated by the textile industry and populated

by staunch New Dealers.41


40 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise ofMassive Resistance (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1969) 35-40. News and Courier (May 25, 1950) 1. Anderson Independent (May 13, 1950) 4. The State
(June 3, 1950) 3. News and Courier (June 21, 1950) 4B.
41 The State (July 19, 1950) 1. For a discussion of the nature of the Dixiecrat movement, see: Kari
Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill, University of
North Carolina Press, 2001).









Thurmond's 1950 campaign failed on three levels. First, the governor

underestimated Johnston's reputation as a defender of Jim Crow and overestimated the

potency of his own credentials as a white supremacist. Second, he gambled that the

recent challenges to the racial status quo would alienate a large number of white

Democratic loyalists, but failed to attract enough white voters to offset the effects of a

growing African American electorate, which voted largely for Johnston. Third,

Thurmond criticized federal funding of state sponsored projects in a state that was

economically dependent on such funds. Each of these tactical errors merits closer

attention and each reveals important information about the tone and substance of racial

politics in South Carolina in the years before the Brown decision.

Although Thurmond is routinely rendered in the historiography of massive

resistance as a peerless segregationist, in fact, his reputation for supporting white

supremacy was no stronger than Johnston's in 1950. Indeed, prior to his stint as a

Dixiecrat, Thurmond was widely regarded a progressive governor. It was no surprise,

then, that Johnston supporters refused to accept the governor's claim that a vote for the

incumbent senator would undermine the racial status quo.42

Ironically, Thurmond's demagoguery was more successful in driving away African

American voters than in uniting whites. Black leaders had few real choices. In a state

where civil rights minded public officials were extremely scarce, African Americans

were forced to choose between the lesser of two evils. The senator secretly met with

black leaders to help drum up support for his campaign in African American


42 Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson, 01' Strom: An Unauthorized Biography ofStrom Thurmond
(Atlanta: Longstreet, 1998) 79-88 (Bass and Thompson actually titled their chapter on Thurmond's
gubernatorial administration "The Liberal Governor"). Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, 93-125.









neighborhoods and the nearly 73,000 registered black voters in South Carolina

overwhelmingly supported Johnston. Though he remained steadfast in his support for

segregation, he did promote economic reforms that were beneficial to black voters. Civil

rights activist Modjeska Simkins, for example, charged that Johnston's support of New

Deal and Fair Deal programs that aided blacks made him a more acceptable option than

Thurmond. He also received the support of the state's most influential African American

newspaper when the Lighthouse andInformer urged its readers to vote for Johnston. In

an editorial, the weekly newspaper declared that Johnston's brand of segregation was

preferable to the "Dixiecrat" vision of Thurmond.43

The impact of black ballots on the election was unmistakable. For example,

Columbia's Ward 9, a majority black voting precinct, supported Johnston with 1,249

votes compared to a paltry 72 for Thurmond. John McCray wrote that "60,000" black

votes carried Johnston to victory in South Carolina, and the Charleston News and Courier

reported, "there is little doubt that the colored vote. .. went to Mr. Johnston." 44

For the most part, Thurmond's campaign strategy only worked with white voters in

the traditional black belt areas. White workers in South Carolina's textile regions

remained loyal to the New Deal coalition and supported Johnston. Thurmond only won

five of the 23 counties where textile workers made up at least 10 percent of the

population, and each of those five was located near Edgefield, which was Thurmond's

43 Bass and Thompson, Ole Strom, 119-134. Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, 200-216 ii. .,i ,.. and
Informer (July 8, 1950) 4, from the Johnston Papers, MPC. Modjeska Simkins' "Campaign Letter" (March
30, 1950), Johnston Papers, MPC.

44 Ibid. News and Courier (July 13, 1950) 4. For Election data see: Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D.
Graham, Southern Elections: County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1978) 201-216, 383-402. "Report on the United States Census, 1950, Maybank
Senatorial Papers, Special Collections. Also see statistical analysis in: Luther Faggart, "Defending the
Faith: The 1950 U.S. Senate Race in South Carolina" (M.A. Thesis: University of South Carolina, 1992).









home county. Aside from having a "home field" advantage, Thurmond also benefited

from white anxieties over the large black population in that region. For example, in

Edgefield African Americans made up almost 60 percent of the population, and in nearby

McCormick blacks accounted for nearly 63 percent of the total population. Like

Edgefield and McCormick, Thurmond did best in counties where blacks were a majority

of the population, but a minority on the voting rolls. Twenty of the 28 counties where

African Americans accounted for at least 40 percent of the population voted for

Thurmond.45

Johnston collected over half of his votes in counties where at least 25 percent of the

population was employed in the textile industry where New Deal allegiance were

traditionally strong. Furthermore, Johnston defeated Thurmond in towns, cities, and

suburbs. The only notable exception was Charleston. Johnston carried Columbia,

Beaufort, and Greenville-Spartanburg. Unlike state government representation and

Electoral College voting, the malaportionment of votes that gave a greater voice to South

Carolina whites in rural counties did not tip the balance of the election to Thurmond.

Senators were popularly elected; therefore, the disproportionate voice given to rural white

voters in South Carolina did not help the more conservative candidate.46

Race was clearly important in this contest, but white voters did not simply jump on

the bandwagon of the candidate who declared himself the most racially conservative

45 Ibid. For a discussion of Johnston's relationship with Textile workers see: JoAnn Deakin Carpenter,
"Olin D. Johnston, the New Deal and the Politics of Class in South Carolina, 1934-1938" (Ph.D.
Dissertation: Emory University, 1987). Anthony Barry Miller, "Palmetto Politician: The Early Political
Career of Olin D. Johnston, 1896-1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of North Carolina, 1976). John
Ervin Huss, Senatorfor the South: A Biography of Olin D. Johnston (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1961).

46 Ibid. Bryant Simon, "The Devaluation of the Vote: Legislative Apportionment and Inequality in South
Carolina, 1890-1962," South Carolina Historical Magazine (July 1996) 227-245.









choice, and did not abandon trusted political figures because they were told to do so. In

1950, voter concern for a variety of economic and social issues other than race had not

yet been wholly eclipsed by a monolithic public debate on desegregation. Urban whites

and white workers in the South Carolina's textile mills trusted Johnston to defend

segregation just as much as they did Thurmond, but deemed the incumbent senator more

likely to promote progressive economic reforms while doing so.

For many voters, Thurmond's alarmism was unwarranted and his portrayal of

Johnston as liberal integrationist was preposterous. Many South Carolina whites were

reluctant to follow Thurmond's brand of Dixiecratic separatism because doing so could

isolate the state's business interests and deter federal agencies from steering much needed

capital to South Carolina. Nowhere was Thurmond's post-Dixiecrat militant racism more

apparent than in discussions about the issue of education. In fact, during his run for

governor, and even in his Dixiecrat campaign, Thurmond had championed federal

expenditures on education. In an attempt to ingratiate himself with South Carolina's

segregationist electorate, he changed his views on federally supported public education in

the senatorial campaign of 1950.

During his inaugural address in 1947, Thurmond had cautioned voters that "fear of

federal aid to education is without foundation." He insisted, "the effect of federal court

decisions requiring equalization between the races will cost the state much more money,"

and would "lower the quality of the total school program unless aid [was] received from

federal sources." Three years later, in an address to state legislators, Thurmond

concluded that federal aid would eventually mean federal control, and, thus, an end to

segregated schools. Thurmond's comments came as congress was debating on a massive