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Development and Defense of a Desire-Satisfaction Conception of Well-Being

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DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE OF A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELL-BEING By ANTON TUPA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2006

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Copyright 2006 by Anton Tupa

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This document is dedicated to my parents, George and Lonnie Tupa.

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iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Sharon DiFino, David Sobel, Crystal Thorpe, and Jon Tresan for providing helpful comments to this work in its developmental stages. I would also like to thank the audiences of the Ohio Philosophical Association and Florida Philosophical Association for giving helpfu l comments on parts of two chapters. To Peter Barry, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude for reading over many drafts of my chapters and providing a great deal of helpful advice over the years. Lastly, I would like to thank my advisor, David Copp, for helping me throughout the entire dissertation project and providing guidance at many very difficu lt times. I am sure that I have left out a number of people who have helped me along the way, and for that, I beg their forgiveness.

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v TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................vi ii CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF WELL-BEING............................................................................1 1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................1 1.2 Well-Being and Moral Value..................................................................................7 1.3 Well-Being: Narrow and Broad Concepts............................................................14 1.4 Well-Being and Self-Regarding Interests.............................................................17 1.5 Well-Being and Aesthetic Value..........................................................................20 1.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................34 2 CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING.........................................................................36 2.1 Four Conceptions..................................................................................................37 2.1.1. Mental State Conceptions..........................................................................37 2.1.2 Desire Satisfaction Views...........................................................................41 2.1.3 Explanatory Objective Theories.................................................................44 2.1.4 Pluralistic Theories of Well-Being.............................................................48 2.1.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................50 2.2 Critical Discussion of Conceptions......................................................................51 2.1.1 The Story....................................................................................................51 2.2.2 The Application of Explanatory Objectivism to the Story.........................53 2.2.3 Application of Happiness to the Story........................................................64 2.2.4 Pluralistic Conceptions of Well-Being.......................................................70 2.2.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................80 3 DEVELOPING A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELLBEING........................................................................................................................82 3.1 Actual Desire Accounts Critically Discussed.......................................................82 3.1.1 Some Introductory Remarks.......................................................................82 3.1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Desires....................................................................83 3.1.3 Problems for Total Desire Satisfaction Accounts......................................85 3.1.4 Intrinsic Desires..........................................................................................87

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vi 3.1.5 A Critical Discussion of Actual Intr insic Desire Views of Well-Being.....89 3.2 Counterfactual Desire Accounts Developed.........................................................98 3.2.1 Information and the Re levant Desire Set....................................................98 3.2.2 Ideal Advisor Views.................................................................................104 3.2.3 What the Ideal Advisor Advises (o r what advice we should listen to)....106 4 IDEAL ADVISOR VIEWS......................................................................................111 4.1 The Internalism Requirement.............................................................................111 4.2 Rosati’s Specific Internalism Requirement........................................................117 4.3 Full Information and the Conditional Fallacy....................................................133 4.4 Knowledge That and Knowledge What Something is Like...............................139 4.5 Propositional and Non-Proposi tional Knowledge Revisited..............................150 4.6 Railton’s Account of Personality........................................................................154 4.7 Conclusion..........................................................................................................156 5 TURNING THE DESIRE-SATISFACT ION ACCOUNT DEVELOPED ABOVE INTO A THEORY OF PR UDENTIAL WELL-BEING..........................................158 5.1 Self-Regarding Interests.....................................................................................159 5.1.1 Conceptions of Prudential Well-Be ing and Self-Regarding Interests......159 5.1.2 Self-Regarding Desires: The Problem of Self-Sacrifice..........................160 5.1.3 The Problem Restated...............................................................................162 5.1.4 Overvold’s Proposals................................................................................163 5.1.5 A Problem with the Derived-Desi re Interpretation of Overvold’s Second Proposal.............................................................................................171 5.1.6 Self-Regarding Desires.............................................................................172 5.1.7 Self-Regarding Interests Concluded.........................................................180 5.2 Non-Moral and Non-Aesthetic Interests.............................................................182 5.2.1 The Problem.............................................................................................182 5.2.2 Moral Desires and the Relevant Desire Set.............................................185 5.2.3 Another Approach...................................................................................186 5.2.4 Aesthetic Values and Prudential Well-Being...........................................191 5.3 Perverse Advice..................................................................................................193 5.3.1 Caring and Well-Being.............................................................................193 5.3.2 Darwall on Caring and Welfare................................................................195 5.3.3 Natural Kinds and Definitions..................................................................198 5.3.4 Sympathetic Concern and Well-Wishing.................................................199 5.3.5 The Object of Care and Well-Wishing and “One Thought Too Many”..200 5.3.5 Perverse Advice and Caring.....................................................................204 5.4 Conclusion..........................................................................................................206 6 MIXED THEORIES AND DESIRE-S ATISFACTION CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING..........................................................................................................208 6.1 Mixed Theories: What They Are and What Motivates Them............................209 6.2 Mixed Theories that Involve Desire-Satisfaction Accounts...............................210

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vii 6.2.1 Desire/Objective Mixed Theories.............................................................212 6.2.2 Desire/Mental State Mixed Theories........................................................220 6.3 Mixed Theories that Include Mental States........................................................225 6.3.1 Sumner’s Mixed Happiness Theory.........................................................225 6.3.2 Mental State Accounts Mixed with Objective Elements..........................240 6.4 Conclusion..........................................................................................................247 7 DO POSTHUMOUS EVENTS ALTER THE LEVEL OF WELL-BEING ONE HAD WHEN ALIVE?..............................................................................................248 7.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................248 7.2 Overvold’s and Hooker’s Proposals...................................................................249 7.3 A New Beginning...............................................................................................253 7.4 Concluding Remarks..........................................................................................263 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................271 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................275

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viii Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE OF A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELL-BEING By Anton Tupa May 2006 Chair: David Copp Major Department: Philosophy In my dissertation, I develop what I take to be the best version of desire-satisfaction theories of well-being and I defend my favor ed version against competing theories of well-being. Desire-satisfaction theories, roughly, are t hose according to which one’s well-being varies with the extent to which some or all of one’s desires are satisfied. A desire is satisfied if the desired state of affairs obtains My favored version of desire-satisfaction theories is quite complex, but the basic idea is that the desires that are true to one’s personality are the desires that ar e relevant to one’s well-being. The first chapter is dedicated to a clarifica tion of the concept of well-being. I settle on the following explication of this concept: a person’s well-being is or consists in the non-moral, non-aesthetic, self-reg arding interests of the person.

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ix The second chapter of my dissertation is a defense of desire-satisfaction conceptions of well-being against its traditio nal competitors: mental state conceptions, perfectionist conceptions, and objective list conceptions. The third and fourth chapters involve de veloping and defending my favored desiresatisfaction view. The fifth chapter consists of curtailing the desi re-satisfaction view, thus far developed, to the conditi ons of well-being detailed in th e first chapter. Thus far, nothing has restricted the desire -satisfaction view to the desi res which are not influenced by moral concerns, aesthetic concerns, or desires which are not sufficiently selfregarding. The sixth chapter is dedicated to defendi ng my preferred desire-satisfaction view against more sophisticated conceptions of well-being. The final chapter is dedicated to an app lication of desire-sa tisfaction accounts of well-being to the issue of whether events that happen after one dies can alter the overall amount of well-being the person had in his or her life as a whole. I argue that events that happen after one dies cannot al ter the overall amount of well-being one had in one’s life as a whole, not, at least, on desire-satisfaction co nceptions of well-being.

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1 CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF WELL-BEING 1.1 Introduction My ultimate conclusion is that a desire-satisfaction conception is the best conception of well-being. However, before we get into arguments a bout whether this is so, first we must have at l east a general idea of what the concept of well-being is. I believe that there is a significant amount of misunderstanding about the concept of wellbeing. This first chapter is an attempt to make clear, at least in a general sense, what this concept is. Some authors who write on philosophical accounts of well-be ing give putative synonyms for “well-being” such as “welfare,” “prudence,” “self-in terest,” “a good life,” “individual good” and so on. None of these sy nonyms provide any clearer idea of what the concept of well-being is than any other. Although thes e synonyms are cue words for people who are already familiar with the topic (and so serve an important purpose in virtue of that), none of them provide a clarification of the concept of well-being. What I am looking for in this first chapter is a clarif ication of the concept of well-being. Above, I use the terms “concept” and “concep tion” loosely; I will now give a more precise, semi-technical, explanation of those terms. This will help in two ways: (A) it will help to make clear how fine-grained an account of well-being we should expect at each point in this dissertation, and (B) it wi ll help me in providing a framework for debates over the various accounts of well-being.

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2 Rawls’ distinction in A Theory of Justice should help here. Early in that book, Rawls distinguishes between a concept of justice and a conc eption of justice (Rawls, 56).1 Here is what Rawls says about concepts and conceptions of justice: “Thus it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role whic h these different sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in common” (Ib id, pg. 5). Rawls has an account of the common role of conceptions of justice. Here is one statement of that role: “Those who hold different conceptions of jus tice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between pers ons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life” (Ib id, pg. 5). If one were to generate a conception of how to organize an institution that (1) forbids arbitrary distin ctions between people and (2) provides a solution to the claims of different people regarding the social goods, then that conception would be a conception of justice, according to Rawls. More carefully, it would be a conception of the c oncept of justice that Rawls is trying to explicate. There could be other concepts of jus tice than justice in the arrange ment of social institutions, which is the concept of justice Rawls is after, such as justi ce in punishment or justice in family life; however, Rawls’ project is not to elucidate those concepts of justice. I think that the distinctio n between concepts and conceptions can helpfully be applied in my project. Earlier I mentioned that the account of well-being I favor is a kind of desire-satisfaction theory. This theory is, very roughly, th at one’s life goes well to the extent to which one’s desires are satisfied. There are other conceptions. Another is that 1 Rawls claims to have been influenced by H.L.A. Hart in his The Concept of Law

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3 one’s life goes well to the extent to wh ich one is happy and not sad. Yet another conception is that one’s life goes well to th e extent to which one develops and exercises human nature. These conceptions have in common that they can serve as accounts of a single concept—the concept of prudential well-being. This idea leads naturally to the question, what is the concept of prudential we ll-being? On the concept of well-being I am after in this dissertation, well-being consists in the satisfaction of the non-moral, non-aest hetic, and self-regardi ng interests of the individual. As we will see, there are other conc epts of well-being—other concepts that could be described as concepts of “wellbeing.” For this reason, to sharpen my discussion, I will often use the term “prude ntial well-being” in place of unmodified “well-being.” I shall not be trying to say wh at “prudential well-being” means in ordinary English. It is rather that I am trying to an alyze a concept and have to call it something: I think “prudential well-being” fits the bill at least as well as any other term, but I acknowledge it is not a perfect fit.2 It is important to get clear on the concept we are after because without a clear idea of the concept, we cannot be sure that the various conceptions are competing conceptions of the same concept. The goal of the first chapter is to get clear on what the conceptions are of before going on to argue for my favored conception. With a clearer understanding of the concept we are after, we can be sure that the debate between the competing 2“Prudential” is used in many different ways, so I should say more about my fairly technical usage. Oftentimes “prudential” is used to describe a course of action or, alternatively, a r eason: when it is used in this way, it means a course of action or a reason is suitable given one’s goals. With this use of “prudential,” going to the desert would be prudent for someone who wants to live in isolation, all other things being equal. I am using “prudential” in a sligh tly different sense; I am using “prudential” as a term that captures a kind of value or possible goal—not whether some course of action will obtain the goal or one’s reason is a good reason given a goal, but the goal or value itself. With this use of “prudential,” supposing that friendship enhances one’s well-being intrinsically, going to the desert is not prudent for the hermit, all other things being equal. It is the second use of “prudential” that I am trying to capture.

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4 conceptions involves genuine disagreements, and not pseudo-disagreements based on confusions about the grounds of the debate. In an effort to avoid misunderstanding, I would like to say a bit more about prudential well-being in the next few paragraphs First I will say some more about what it is; then I will say more about why we shoul d study it (what role is plays); lastly I will say more about it to distinguish it from anothe r, somewhat closely related concept. This must all be very brief because I will say a lot more about the first topic throughout the dissertation, and very detailed discussions of the second and third topics are beyond the scope of the dissertation. In Plato’s myth of the Ring of Gyges, we are to imagine that Gyges finds a ring that can make him invisible. Once he puts it on, he finds out very quickly that he can get away with just about anything he wants. Hi s plans are grand: using the ring, he seduces the queen and overthrows the king. These actions are morally wrong, but they seem clearly to serve Gyges’ self-i nterest. Gyges enhances hi s prudential well-being, I would say. The concept of prudential well-being that concerns me in this dissertation is the concept of the kind of value with respect to which Gyges’ life improves in the myth. My proposal is, then, that Gyges’ li fe improves in that he is ab le, by using the ring, to satisfy more of his non-moral, non-aesthetic and self-regarding interests. Now I need to say something about why the concept of prud ential well-being is worth studying and what role it plays in vari ous contexts. One can agree with me in thinking that there is a concept of pruden tial well-being and even have an informal understanding in what such well-being c onsists—and yet wonder why the concept is worth studying.

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5 First, I think that the concep t plays a role in our ordina ry, pre-theoretic, evaluations of lives. The discussion of th e life of Gyges (and the life of the Count of Monte Cristo, which will be my principal example) is meant to illustrate this ordinary, pre-theoretic, notion and how it can be used to evaluate how a life is going. A rigorously philosophical account of prudential well-being could make judgments about people’s lives more articulated. Second, prudential well-being plays a role in many moral and political theories. This may sound paradoxical given that prudential value is restri cted to the satisfaction of non-moral interests, but it is not as paradoxical as it may s eem. A standard Utilitarian view is that an act is right if and only if it maximizes utility impartially in the long run. Some Utilitarians take “utility” to refer to pr udential well-being. So the Utilitarian theory, on this account, is that the right act is that which maximizes prudential well-being impartially in the long run. In political theory, eg alitarians sometimes advocate equality of well-being, and I believe at least some egalitarians have in mind prudential well-being. An egalitarian might add that a proper role of the state is to promote the equality of the prudential well-being of its members. Ther e are numerous other moral and political theories that make refere nce to prudential well-being. One can agree with me that the concept of prudential well-being plays a role in various ordinary, everyday judgments of lives and also that the con cept plays a role in various moral and political theories—and yet think “so much the worse for those judgments and theories.” However, such a view may be based in a confusion between prudential well-being and selfishness.

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6 The term “selfishness” does not appropriate ly capture the concept I am after. Someone behaves selfishly, roughly, when she disregards the welfare of others when concern for the welfare of others is appropriate.3 The basic idea is that selfish behavior involves neglect of the welfare of others. Self-interested behavi or, in contrast, or behavior motivated by concern for the agent’ s well-being does not necessarily include such neglect. Self-interested behavior can include regard for the well-being of others.4 If one conflates the concepts of self-interest and selfishness, then any moral or political theory that is based on the concept of self-i nterest may look extremely implausible. But such conflation is a mistake—the two concepts are different. Thus, it would be a mistake to dismiss our concern with exploring the c oncept of prudential well -being on the basis of a conflation of actions done out of a concern for prudential we ll-being with selfishness. In this brief interlude on prudential well-b eing, I have tried to give some motivation for thinking that there is such a concept and th at the concept plays a role in our ordinary value judgments. Additionally, I have tried to give a few examples of moral and political theories in which the concept of prudential we ll-being plays a role. I also stressed the importance of distinguishing between self ish behavior and behavior motivated by prudential well-being. Might there not be some concept of well-being, besides pr udential well-being, worthy of study? I think that there is. The situation I face with the concept of well-being is similar to the situation Ra wls faces with concepts of justice. Rawls chooses to study 3 Strictly speaking, this is only a necessary condition of selfish behavior. That condition should be enough to make the difference between the concept of prudential well-being and selfishness clear. 4 Suppose that a person is faced with only two possible courses of action; both would enhance her wellbeing to the same degree. Suppose furthermore that the first possible course of action increases the wellbeing of other people while the second does not. The courses of action are equally self-interested. Yet the second is selfish and the first is not.

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7 the concept of justice in the arrangement of social institutions and I choose to study prudential well-being: these are valid choices, despite the fact that there are other, closely related, concepts worthy of study. Th e common role of the various conceptions of prudential well-being in a diverse array of contexts is what makes me think the concept ripe for critical examination. In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will explain my proposed account of the concept of prudential well-being. Later, in Chapters 3-5, I will go on to explicate and develop a desire-satisfaction conception of well-being. Recall that I claim that the concept of prudential well-being is that well-being consists in the satisfaction of the non-moral, non-aesthetic, and self-r egarding interests of the individual. That makes for three key condi tions on what constitute s an interest of the proper sort: It must be (1) non-moral, (2) non-aesthetic, and (3) self-regarding. Heretofore, I have not presented any reas on for believing those three conditions are correct; indeed, I have not expl ained what those condi tions are in detail. In the remainder of this chapter, I take up each of these three conditions in turn, moving from the nonmoral condition to the requireme nt that the interests be self-regarding and then to the requirement that the interests be non-aesthe tic. I will introduce each of these conditions using well-known fictional stories, and then I will go on to discuss the conditions in a more rigorous philosophical manner. 1.2 Well-Being and Moral Value It is helpful to begin with a fairly in-dep th case study that will illustrate the concept of well-being. My case study will be the life of the protagonist in Alexandre Dumas’ novel The Count of Monte Cristo Let me give those readers unfamiliar with the story a very brief outline of the plot. As the nove l begins, the protagonist, Edmond Dantes, is

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8 living quite well. Unbeknownst to him, there is a plot against him and he is thrown in jail without any semblance of a fair trial and wit hout chance of seeing or speaking to anyone. Eventually he escapes and discovers a great tr easure. At this point he becomes known as The Count of Monte Cristo. He uses this treasure for retribu tion against those who plotted against him and to benef it those who truly loved him. In this phase, Monte Cristo sees himself as a “divine angel of retributi on.” In the end, but after he has accomplished his goals, he realizes the emptiness of a life of vengeance and moves on to a different path in life. The plot is fantastically complex and serp entine. I do not have the space to give more detail about it s general structure.5 Nevertheless, the cha nging fortunes of Dantes’ life should provide stories that are helpful. As we begin the novel, Edmond enjoys a hi gh degree of well-being. He is illiterate and does not have a formal education. But he is a good son, is about to be promoted to the rank of captain on a ship, a nd is engaged to be married. His life, intuitively, has a high level of well-being. The pl ot develops and several peopl e, each with motives of his own, conspire against Edmond. They succeed and Edmond is thrown in an island prison called the Chateau d’If. Edmond never receives much of an explanation as to why he is in prison. The worst kinds of conditions imagin able are standard fare in this prison. He is isolated in a small dungeon with very litt le light, he cannot communicate with anybody and he has nothing to do. He is more that just bored; his poor condi tions and inexplicable imprisonment almost drive him insane. Edmond’s change of fate is an easy case for the 5 Just to give the reader a hint, the planning and bringing about (in detail) of Napoleon’s return to The Continent from exile on the Isle of Elba is but a mere sub-plot in this novel.

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9 concept of well-being: his life is clearly going poorly. His most basic needs (where these are understood as food, clothing and shelter) are met, but surely, this is not enough. A while after Edmond enters the Chateau d ’If, another prisoner named Abbe Faria tunnels into Edmond’s prison cell. The Abbe is trying to tunnel his way out of the prison but ends up in Edmond’s cell—now the two ce lls are connected by the tunnel, but the tunnel does not go outside the walls of the pris on. The Abbe is a learned person who has several books (perhaps they ar e better called “manuscripts”) in his cell and quite a few contraptions that help make life go better. He begins to teach Edmond to read and then goes on to teach him various languages and se veral subjects. Lastly, the Abbe, on his deathbed, tells Edmond of a great treasure on the small uninhabited island of Monte Cristo. The Abbe dies and Edmond escapes. Edmond’s life has been improving; first he has someone to talk to; then he develops his ta lents and he starts to live the kind of life he wants to live again. Eventu ally, he gets his freedom. But now let us look at some more di fficult cases. As the novel goes along, Edmond’s conditions improve in various ways. Let us look to see if these improvements are improvements in well-being. Edmond goes to Monte Cristo and finds th e great, almost unfathomably large, treasure. Because he does not want people to know that he has escaped from prison, he changes his name to The Count of Monte Cris to—hereafter referred to as “The Count” or “Monte Cristo.” Has the mere fact that he ha s found this enormous treasure increased his

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10 well-being? No, the wealth will often provide means to well-being; it does not provide well-being itself.6 So the concept of well-bei ng cannot be reduced to wealth. Economists will often look at wealth when trying to measure well-being, and if not exactly well-being, perhaps util ity, which is a concept that is a nearly-related cousin.7 Although wealth may be thought of as the possession of money and goods, perhaps our idea of wealth should also incl ude the ability to spend mone y and to use and have access to possessions. So, wealth (as we should think of it) may be a sligh tly richer notion than just having money and possessions. Still, this richer notion of wealth is not the same as well-being. It would be a mistake to identify wealth with well-being, for one can be wealthy and have a low level of well-being, and one can be poor and yet have a high level of well-being. Perhaps, however, economis ts intend merely to treat wealth as a sign of well-being. If so, I do not have a philosophical disagreement with them, but I have two brief comments. The first is that I am not concerned with finding the signs of wellbeing; I am concerned with finding in what well-being consists. Second, many economists are moving away from wealth as a sign of well-being.8 To bring this discussion back to The Count of Monte Cris to, there is a correlation between the Count finding the great treasure and hi s life going better, but the trea sure is only a means to his 6 I am in concert with Aristotle on this subject. He is looking for an analysis of a similar concept when he says: “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely us eful and for the sake of something else” ( EN 1096a6-8). 7 “Utility” as economists use the term, may be after something slightly different than “well-being” as I understand it. 8 Both the World Bank and the UN publish, at regular intervals, world-wide data that are far better signs of well-being (such as literacy rates and broader educatio n data, employment data such as the kinds of jobs people can have, and so on).

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11 increasing his well-being. The important point is that opulence cannot be identified with well-being. As I mentioned above, after securing the tr easure, Monte Cristo has two goals: to get revenge on those who plotte d against him, and to benefit those who truly cared for him. I will discuss each of these projects in turn, for they raise interesting issues for our discussion of well-being. Firs t I will discuss the Count’s re venge and the possibility of placing a moral condition on wellbeing. The Count is willing to go to great extremes to get his revenge. He does not seem willing to “do whatever it takes,” but some of his actions are, at best, morally inappropriate. At one point, when The Count is trying to bankrupt one of his wealthy adve rsaries, he manipulates a kind of commodities exchange (much like the modern day stock market). Many people lose fortunes due to the Count’s actions (the Count had to have foreseen this ), but the Count achieve s his goal of ruining the one person he was after.9 In another instance, the Count gives the wife of one of his adversaries information about poisons and ways of poisoning people without being detected. The Count then goes on to give her the poison itself. Monte Cr isto does not give her the end or goal (as if by manipulation or command), sh e provides that herself. Sh e then proceeds to poison no fewer than six people—killing five of them, including herself and her son. Monte Cristo knew of her poisonings, which took place over a number of weeks, and did not stop 9 As is always the case in Dumas’ novel, the story is no t quite so simple. The man Monte Cristo is trying to ruin, Danglar, loses great deal of his fortune in the stock market. Danglar then steals a fortune from a hospital and runs away. Danglar is then captured and imprisoned. When in his cell, he must pay exorbitant sums of money in order to get any food, thereby bankrupting him, even of his stolen riches. The lesson that Danglar is to learn is that life is more precious th an money (Danglar originally conspired against Monte Cristo for financial gain).

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12 them.10 Perhaps, in some extremely technical se nse, the Count’s hands were clean. But, we must keep in mind that he knowingly c ontributed to the deaths of many innocent people. Additionally, the Count conspired to have Villefort’s daughter marry her halfbrother (the blood relation of these two individuals unbeknown st to everyone save Monte Cristo, and perhaps his servants).11 There is surely something wrong in that. There are other instances of like actions that I will not go into. Monte Cristo does not seem to be willing merely to ruin the lives of those w ho conspired to ruin his. For each of the four who conspire against him, M onte Cristo has a particular lesson to teach them before they are murdered, commit suic ide, or are ruined. Furthermore, Monte Cristo reveals his true identity to each of th em at the time of ruining their lives, perhaps so that they will learn their le sson better. Despite this moral education that Monte Cristo is doling out, and despite the fact that he does not seem to be willing to go quite so far as to do “whatever it takes,” some of hi s actions are wrong, to say the least. The question we must deal with now is whether the achievement of his plans and projects, expending and developi ng of his natural talents to wards these immoral ends, and his pleasure in these projects and results co uld count as contributing to Monte Cristo’s well-being. The Count is aimed at, or at least involved in, dubious moral enterprises. Should the above-mentioned actions be excluded from increasing the Count’s well-being 10 Villefort’s wife (his second), Madame de Villefort, tries to poison all of those people who stand in the way of making her son inherit several fortunes. Her son with Villefort does not stand to inherit any money because Villefort has a daughter by his first marriage. The people Mada me de Villefort poisons are: (1) a husband and (2) wife who have a fortune who are relatives on her husband’s side, (3) she tries to poison her father in law, who also has a fortune, but instead kills his servant, (4) she poisons, but does not kill, her daughter in law. At this point she is found out and she poisons and kills (5) herself and (6) her son. Villefort originally conspired against Monte Cristo to sa ve his own reputation. This string of poisonings, in addition to several other events, ruins Villefort’s reputation. 11 The details of this plot are too complex to go into.

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13 in virtue of their immorality? My answer is “no.” Now, I do not wish to deny that there is a moral dimension to a life’s going well (wit hout restriction), but I am interested in the specific notion of pr udential well-being. As I have said, I am willing to take it for granted that a life can go better or worse as evaluated by moral criteria. However, eval uating lives in light of moral criteria is not the topic of this dissertation. As I will show later in this chapter, some authors who use terms such as “well-being,” “welfare,” “indi vidual good,” etc. are wr iting about a concept that is essentially moral. It is important to be clear, at this early st age, that I am after a different concept. Here is, I think, a helpful way of putting the issue: we can interp ret “well-being” in a narrow and a broad sense. In the broad sens e, the “well” of “well-being” is a general and overarching term of evaluati on that applies to one’s being or life. If a life goes well in this broad sense, then the life is more choiceworthy without restriction. In the narrower sense, “well-being” re fers to just a single dimens ion of choiceworthiness—the prudential dimension, as I call it. Returning to the Count ’s life, my contention is that he can have a higher level of prudential well-being when he succeeds in his pr ojects, develops and us es his talents, and is pleased in his pursuits and successes, even when his projects are immoral. So, when the Count manipulates the commodities exch ange and thereby ba nkrupts his adversary (also bankrupting people comp letely uninvolved in the conspi racy against the Count), or when he gives poison to the wife of anot her adversary knowing full well that she will poison innocent people, the C ount’s life goes prudentially be tter. He enhances his prudential well-being.

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14 It is also possible for a project to be morally right and increase the agent’s prudential well-being. It is a confusion to think that morally wrong actions always increase well-being. It is e qually a confusion to think that morally right actions always decrease well-being (or do not cont ribute to well-being). It is just that to enhance a life morally is not necessarily to enhance it with respect to prudentia l well-being, nor vice versa. So although I illustra te the distinction between moral and prudential well-being with a discussion of the Count ’s immoral actions, please do not read too much into this. 1.3 Well-Being: Narrow and Broad Concepts I would like to examine two fairly recent works where I thi nk philosophers might seem to be after the same concept as I am (the narrow concept of prudential well-being), but are in reality, after the broader concept of unrestricte d goodness of a life. David Brink, in the final chapter of his book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics examines various proposals for theories of va lue. He uses terms such as “well-being” and “welfare” in addition to “value.” Brink mentions a case of a Nazi who has plans to persecute Jews and claims that the Nazi’s accomplishment of his goals in this example could not count to increase the value of that life (B rink, pg. 227). The particular conception of well-being Brink settles on leav es room for satisfaction of “reasonable” and “admissible” projects as enhanc ing one’s well-being (Ibid, pg. 233).12 Given what Brink says, and the example of the Nazi that he uses, it seems that Brink places a moral requirement on what can count as one’s good. 12 Brink’s final and full-bodied version of well-being is decidedly Aristotelian. But I am not at this moment concerned with which conception of well-being is best. I am here trying to get a fix on the concept of wellbeing and be clear about which concept I am after. It is how Brink argues agai nst certain conceptions of well-being that tells us what he takes the concept to be.

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15 We have had to get to Br ink’s concept of well-being indirectly : that is, we have had to figure out what concept he was after by looking at how he argues for his favored conception. The next author I will discuss speaks more directly about well-being at the level of concepts—at the leve l of generality of concepts as opposed to conceptions. Stephen Darwall, in his recent book Welfare and Rational Care offers an analysis of welfare. He says: “What is for someone ’s good or welfare is what one ought to desire and promote insofar as one cares for him” (Darwall, pg. 7, italics omitted). Darwall uses all of the regular synonyms for welfare such as “a person’s good, in terest, well-being, or welfare” (Ibid, pg. 1) and even “prudential value” (Ibid, pg. 12). Given this, one might think that he is after the same concept I am, however, I intend to show that he is after a different concept—which turns out to be much like the concept that Brink is after. The “ought” that appears in Darwall’s analys is of welfare is no t obviously moral. If it were, I would well be on my way to show ing that Darwall has in mind a concept just like Brink’s. Unfortunately, things are not that easy. Elsewhere, Darwall replaces “ought” with “should” (Ibid, pg. 8) and “would rationally” (I bid, pg. 9). I do not think that Darwall is using “rational” in a moral se nse. Darwall gives a ge neral idea of what he means by “rational” by allowing “makes sense, is warranted or justif ied” to replace it (Ibid, pg. 9). Another important issue is that Darwall’s an alysis is counterfactual in nature. The “insofar as one cares for him” phrase is im portant here. Darwall means that a person’s welfare consists in what one would rationally desire for the person were one to care for him We could even go so far as to give a “pos sible worlds” analysis of this: What is in

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16 someone’s welfare is what one rationally want s for him in the nearest possible world in which one were to care for him.13 Now that I have explained Darwall’s analys is, I can examine whether or not he is after the same concept I am. Da rwall’s claim is that something, x contributes to someone’s, A ’s, welfare if and only if x is what someone, B would rationally want for A were B to care for A other things being equal. Nothing excludes A and B from being the same person (Ibid, pg. 20). Now, as I unders tand this, Darwall is searching for an account of something akin to, or even id entical to, the good life. I do not see any elements of his formulation that limit the ra nge of choices to prudential value in the narrower sense described above. The mora lly good life, prudentia lly good life, and perhaps even the aesthetically good life, all could be elements of the kind of life one would rationally want for someone, were one to care for that someone. Darwall, like Brink, ultimately chooses an Aristotelian conception of well-being. Brink, Darwall, and myself use many of the sa me terms for what we are after: “welfare,” “well-being,” “self-interest,” “p rudential value,” and so on. However, if I am right, we are after very different concepts. There are broad and narrow concepts of well-being: the broad concept is similar to the concept of the good life, the narrower concept excludes at least moral value and focuses only on prudential value. Further explanation of what this narrower value consists in must wait. They are after a broader concept and I am after the narrower concept. I do not claim that Brink and Darwall are wrong in any serious way. I do take myself to have made the difference between us clear: we are after different concepts 13 I am uncertain on whether “insofar as” in Darwall’s usage has any implications about the degree of care. The degree of caring could be relevant to Darwall’s account, but the text is no t clear on that issue.

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17 despite the fact that we use the same terms. I take “prudential we ll-being” to denote the concept of well-being I am after in this di ssertation—this is contra ry to the usage of Darwall and Brink, but I think that “prudentia l” is slightly more apt to the narrower concept that I am trying to exp licate than it is to the wider co ncept that is of interest to Darwall and Brink. Let us return briefly to th e story of the Count. The Count’s revenge then, even though extreme and immoral, would still count as increasing his well-being. At least, it would not be excluded in virtue of its being immoral. Something similar should be said about projects which are morally good. Someth ing should not be incl uded in th e list of what makes someone’s life go well (in the sense I am after), merely in virtue of its moral goodness. There is a great deal more that must be explained about the concept I am after, and for this, we must continue with The Count of Monte Cristo 1.4 Well-Being and Self-Regarding Interests As I mentioned above, the Count directs hi s immense wealth and talents towards a pair of purposes—heaping benefits on his tr ue friends and seeki ng revenge on those who plotted against him. I have already discusse d the relevance of the motive of revenge, but what of the motive of heaping benefits on t hose who really did care for him? Although the bulk of the novel is dedicated to the C ount’s revenge, the firs t thing the Count does with his newly found wealth and secret identity is to benef it those who truly loved him. His mother died before he went to prison, his father died while he was in prison, his fiance married a man who (unbeknownst to her) was one of those who originally plotted against him, but his former employer, Mons ieur Morrel, the owne r of the ship Monte Cristo was to captain, is still alive and much in need of hel p. Morrel is in debt and cannot afford to pay the debt back. Furthermore, Morrel’s reputation is at stake. The Count

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18 risks the loss of his secret identity to help Morrel out. Monte Cris to then gives Morrel money to pay off his debts. 14 While we may not view the Count’s gift of the money as a sacrifice (given that he has so much of it), the danger of people finding out who he is and where his fortune came from are real a nd significant threats to his well-being. Is the success of Monte Cristo’s plan to save Morrel an increase in his (Monte Cristo’s) well-being? In some broad sense, clear ly the Count gets what is in his interests, but this may be a case where the interests ar e not sufficiently self-re garding to count as prudential. As I interpret th e story, the Count’s actions are self-sacrificial. They do not enhance the Count’s well-being, even though th ey serve the count’s goals. To understand self-sacrificial acts, we need to distinguish between self -regarding and other-regarding interests. I will discuss this distinction in detail in a later chapter. For now, however, notice that, intuitively, self-sacrificial beha vior may lead to the satisfaction of otherregarding interests but normally not the satisf action of self-regarding interests. Indeed, with acts of self-sacrifice, there is setback (at least as foreseen by the self-sacrificing agent) to self-regarding interests. There are those who might deny that there are genuine acts of self-sacrifice. Let us call the theory that everyone always acts in her self-interest “Psychological Egoism.” Psychological Egoists must deny that there are an y real acts of self-sacrifice. As I stated above, the interests, the satisfaction of wh ich enhance prudential well-being, must be self-regarding. If Psychological Egoism were true, then the re quirement that the interests 14 In what should now be a familiar dramatic fashion, the details of the story are more complex. Morrel, who takes his honor very seriously, determines that he will kill himself at the moment just before the debt is due—thereby saving the honor of his family. The Count, in a secret identity (I suppose this would be a “second-level” secret identity), as a representative of a banking house, purchases all of Morrel’s outstanding debts to other banking houses and then forgives the entire sum. Of course, all of this happens just a moment before Morrel attempts to commits suicide.

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19 be self-regarding would be vacuous or empty in a strong sense. This is so because, according to Psychological Egoism, all actions are motivated by self-regard, and thus no interests are excluded from being rele vant to one’s prudential well-being.15 Now, I think that Psychological Egoism is false and I will argue against it in a later chapter of this dissertation.16 But for now, let us assume Psychological Egoism is false. Many philosophers have recently dealt with the distinction between “selfregarding” and “other-regarding” interests, though they all us e different terms in drawing the distinction.17 The basic idea is that there must be some restriction placed on which interests are such that thei r satisfaction counts as enhanc ing the agent’s prudential wellbeing. As I said I will discu ss the distinction between selfand other-regarding interests in more detail in a later chapter of this dissertation. At this moment, the important point is that a person’s prudential well-being is not necessarily enhanced by the satisfaction of other-regarding interests. Returning to The Count of Monte Cristo when the Count saves Morrel from his debts, the Count’s well-being is not enhanced, so I say. The Count’s act is self-sacrificial and results in the satisfaction of his interest s, but the interests which are satisfied are other regarding—they concern the welfare of Mo rrel and not the Count. A detailed 15 The Psychological Egoist, for all I have said, could allow that there are other-regarding interests but nevertheless claim that they never motivate. This is a conceptual possibility, but it does not seem to have much initial plausibility. I will discuss it in a later chapter. 16 In a way, my project would be simpler if Psychological Egoism were true because the requirement that interests be self-regarding would not require any ex planation. However, becau se I think Psychological Egoism false, I take on the burden of explaining the distinction between selfand other-regarding interests. 17 Two notable examples are Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Scanlon. Dworkin, in his Sovereign Virtue distinguishes between personal and impersonal preferences for a theory of welfare (pg. 25-28). Scanlon discusses a similar distinction, though using different language, in his What We Owe to Each Other (pg. 114-115, 120-124). Both authors claim to be influenced by Parfit’s discussion of this topic in his Reasons and Persons (pg. 493-502).

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20 explanation of how this is possible, on my pr eferred conception of well-being, is in a later chapter. 1.5 Well-Being and Aesthetic Value So far, I have explained why we need to understand prudential well-being as involving the satisfactio n of non-moral, and self-regarding interests of the individual. Might there be more restricti ons on which interests, when sa tisfied, increase well-being? I would like to look at another proposal. I have briefly mentioned above the possi bility of regardi ng certain aesthetic characteristics of a life as enhancing the ove rall prudential well-being of the person. This idea has not been much discussed. I think it is interesting, however, so I will look at a few accounts of aesthetic value and then address some significant possibilities. G.E. Moore famously claims that the appreciation of beautiful objects is intrinsically valuable. He also makes the stronger and more controversial claim that beautiful objects are intrinsically valuab le apart from any appreciation of them.18 Now, beauty as such, cannot enhance anyone’s prudential well-being. That is because the beauty of beautiful objects might not be in a person’s life or appr opriately related to a person’s life. Well-being is necessarily someth ing of value in a person’s life. It is not merely an impersonal value 18 For Moore’s arguments by the method of absolute isolation, see §50 and §119-§121 of Principia Ethica It should also be noted that Moore, in a later work Ethics does not mention beauty as intrinsically valuable and even is inclined to adopt a view that rejects the possibility of beauty being intrinsically valuable. In Ethics Moore claims: “it does seem as if nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some feeling and also some other form of consciousness; and, as we have said before, it seems possible than amongst the feelings contained must always be some amount of pleasure” (Moore, Ethics pg. 107). This requirement of pleasure, of course, e liminates the possibility of objects being intrinsically valuable in virtue of their beauty alone.

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21 What follows from this discussion is that if aesthetic value enhances someone’s well-being, it must somehow involve the agent whose well-being is at stake. There seem to me to be three obvious ways to go here: (1) we can look at the beauty of a person, or (2) we can look at the subjectiv e or first-person aesthetic appr eciation of beautiful things by an agent and claim that that has somethi ng to do with his wellbeing, or (3) we can look at the aesthetic beauty of the life story of an agent. One thing to keep in mind as I proceed through these three options is that I am not attempting to determine whether or not these ways of involving beauty in one’s life are really valuable. I am concerned with whether they could enhance one’s well-being in the narrow sense, solely in virtue of their aesthetic character. I begin with the first idea, the idea that a person’s well-being can be enhanced by her beauty. This idea does not have much plausibility as serving as a component of prudential well-being, but an examination shoul d prove helpful. A discussion of Oscar Wilde’s work, A Picture of Dorian Gray should illustrate the proposal that is on the table. I will briefly summa rize the story. As the novel begins, Dorian Gray is young and extremely handsome. He is, at least to a la rge extent, innocent and ignorant of his good looks (or at least the extent of them). Basil Halliward, a developing painter, is completing a portrait of Dorian Gray. Halliw ard is so influenced and inspired by the beauty of Gray that he is convinced that he can develop a new style of painting for the modern age with his portrait. Upon completion, Dorian looks at it and realizes the power of his own striking beauty. Struck by his own beauty, Dorian exclaims: “How sad it is!” murmured Dorian Gra y, with his eyes still fixed upon his own portrait. “How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will remain always young. It will neve r be older than this particular day of June . If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young,

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22 and the picture that was to grow old! Fo r that—for that—I would give everything! Yes, there is nothing in the whole world I would not give! I w ould give my soul for that!” (Wilde, pg. 168) Something quite magical happens at this exclam ation. As Gray eventually finds out, he is to remain forever young while the image of him in the portrait will age over time. Gray keeps his remarkable good looks while th e portrait shows th e signs of age. This first proposal does not even seem to be a plausible account of how aesthetic value could enhance a person’s well-being. I have never heard of anyone endorsing it in philosophical writing. The aesth etic value that makes a life go better must go deeper than the mere physical beauty of a person. The stor y of Dorian Gray’s life is in fact supposed to illustrate that something starts to go very bad for him at the time of the magical transformation; that his life goes worse, not be tter, as he continues to live as a beautiful person physically. Could prudential well-being be associated with this kind of beauty? On this account, Gray’s well-being would fore ver be enhanced by his beauty. This is surely implausible. I am certainly willing to grant that, throughout history, beauty has been instrumental to prudential well-being, but it simply cannot be an element in a plausible account of the of prudential well-being.19 As we will see below with the third proposal, there is another way of thinking about the beauty of a life that serves as a far more plausible candidate for being a component of prudential value. What of the second proposal, the idea that a person’s prudential well-being can be enhanced by aesthetic experience and appr eciation? The third major character of The Picture of Dorian Gray is Lord Henry Wotton. He is a friend of Basil’s and turns out to 19 Merely being beautiful is not even plausibly thought of as constituting some broader concept of wellbeing, if there is such a value. The case of Dorian Gray illustrates this in that Dorian is a morally wicked person and yet remains beautiful.

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23 have a profound influence upon Dorian Gray. Ha rry, as he is called, expounds his theory of how to live in several speeches throughout th e novel. Dorian comes to accept and live by Harry’s theories; which prom ote a kind of aestheticism. Perhaps the most basic and fundamental element of Lord Henry’s theory is captured in the following quotation: “The ai m of life is self-devel opment. To realize one’s nature perfectly—that is what each of us is here fo r” (Ibid, pg. 158). Lord Henry believes that there is an end of life and that is to develop one’s nature. The theory is described twice as a “new Hedonism” (Ibi d, pg. 164, 286), though I think Wilde uses the term very loosely. On this note, Lord He nry advises: “Be always searching for new sensations. Be afraid of nothing . a ne w Hedonism—that is what our century wants” (Ibid, pg. 164). We need to be careful in our understanding of what kinds of sensations Lord Henry is talking about. I do not believ e that he means just any sensation, for he already limits it to pleasures ( understood broadly). But if we look at his disciple, Dorian and his actions, Dorian clearly seeks artistic sensations, specificall y, the sensations of beautiful things.20 So although the theory of Lord Henry begins in abstract terms such as “developing one’s self,” something more like a kind of aestheticism or pursuit of aesthetic experience is what he has in mind.21 An additional idea that seems implied by what Lord Henry says is that it is not just aesthetic experien ces that are to be pursued, but aesthetic appreciation. There seems to be an “appreciative” element in Lord Henry’s 20 Indeed, art is described as “simply a method of procuring extraordinary sensations” (Ibid, pg. 379). 21 There was a movement that began in 1880’s England and ran through the turn of the century sometimes called ‘Aestheticism.’ For an excellent, but brief, disc ussion of this movement and Wilde’s role in it, see Stephen Calloway’s “Wilde and the Dandyism of the Senses.” As Calloway describes the movement, it is based in developing one’s aesthetic response to beauty in the world. This, of course, is slightly different from merely having a lot of aesthetic experiences. One explanation for tying together Lord Henry’s claims about (1) developing one’s self and (2) having a myriad of aesthetic experience, primarily of beauty and involving pleasure, is that in these experience s, Dorian can refine his aesthetic sensibilities.

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24 advice in that he seems to suggest a more cognitive, active, and critical element is necessary for the right kind of aesthetic value, rather than just pa ssively “experiencing” something. Aesthetic appreciation makes for a far more plausible account of something that enhances well-being. The entirety of chapter XI of the novel is dedicated to the pursuits and experiences of Dorian Gray. Wonderful music and jewelry are at the forefront of what he seeks to experience. However, he also fancies c onverting to the Catholic Church for the experiences that accompany Catholic worshi p. Gray also resorts to opium use, though that could be interpreted as consistent with his pursuit of fantastic aesthetic experience. This aestheticism so dominates Dorian Gray that the suicide of someone he once loved doesn’t make him feel sad, but instead, he a ppreciates the beauty of the tragedy of her life. It would be a grave misunderstanding to think that tragedy is ugly; tragedy is not ugly. Tragedy is among the most beautiful of art forms. The way the story is set up, Dorian, in his pursuit of aesthetic experien ce, becomes full of vi ce and lacks all moral virtue.22 This change in moral character is reflected (paradoxically), as increased ugliness and decay in the painting. This second proposal for a way in whic h something of aesthetic value could contribute to well-being seems in danger of confusing aesthetic value in a life with aesthetic valuing in a life. Even if a person had a gr eat deal of aesthe tic appreciation, she still could live an ugly life. Indeed, Dorian Gray seems to be such an example of this. 22 The aesthetic movement often eschewed morality. Th e term “decadent” is often attached to “aesthetic” in describing the movement. There are numerous instances in The Picture of Dorian Gray where Lord Henry claims that ethics has no role in aesthetic s. On my schema, I would categorize the aesthetic movement as the pursuit of aesthetic value to the deliberate exclusion of mo ral value—with perhaps a somewhat surprising silence on prudential va lue (though I am but an amateur historian).

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25 One of the things that makes The Picture of Dorian Gray such a thought provoking novel is that Dorian seems to have beauty in his person (the first proposal) and in his experiences (the second proposal) and yet still he fails to be a beautiful person in a clear and strong sense.23 The second proposal seems either wrong or incomplete as an account of how aesthetic value can enhance well-bei ng, even when “well-being” is understood in the broad sense. I am willing to grant for the sake of argument that the aesthetic value of a life has something to do with the aesthetic experien ces and appreciation of the person who is living the life, though I suspect th at many will disagree with that. Still, I do not think that the aesthetic value of a life, so conceived, can plausibly be thought to enhance prudential well-being, in virtue of its aesthetic aspect. Th e initial plausibility of this proposal has to do with the fact that aesthetic appreciation seems like a speci fic kind of pleasure. Lord Henry suggests aesthetic appreciati on is a kind of pleasure. If indeed he is right, then this second proposal could be accommodated by ce rtain conceptions of prudential well-being, though only very loosely, as I wi ll explain below. It is im portant to note that, on this reading of aesthetic appreciation, I am not saying that aesthetic appreciation does contribute to prudential well-bei ng, but merely that the idea that it does it is not ruled out conceptually.24 Is aesthetic appreciation a kind of pleasure? It may be. J.S. Mill, in the second chapter of his Utilitarianism is famous for distinguishing between higher and lower 23 Interestingly, if I am right, one of the lessons of the novel is a rejection of the very aestheticism that Oscar Wilde was supposed to endorse; or at least a much more sophisti cated account of what is to be pursued according to aestheticism must be provided. 24 Here, I am using “concept” and “conception” in th eir technical usages from earlier in the chapter.

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26 pleasures. The higher pleasures are supposed to be the intellectual ones while the lower pleasures are supposed to be the bodily ones. If intellectual pleasures such as the pleasures of philosophical contemplation or friendship could count as “higher quality” pleasures, it is not clear why aesthetic appreciation should no t also count as intellectual pleasures. Mill thinks that a cultivated mind allows for the happiest sort of person because of the increased potential for higher pleasures. Mill says: A cultivated mind—I do not mean that of philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opene d, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties—finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the futu re. (Mill, Ch. 2, paragraph 13) In this quotation, Mill lists several things that increase well-being, including taking an interest in the achievements of art. However, it is important to understand that for Mill, all of the items on his list increase well-being in virtue of their being sorts of pleasure. It is not in virtue of the aesthet ic aspect that a mental state, such as aesthetic appreciation, could enhance pruden tial well-being. As we have seen above, aesthetic ap preciation makes for a better account of something of value within a life that coul d enhance well-being. But it appears that aesthetic appreciation is a ki nd of pleasure. After all, one can have an aesthetic experience of something disgusting or ugly; there is no requirement that the thing experienced is of positive aes thetic value. Aesthetic appreciation, on the other hand, seems to require that the thing appreciated, at least by the lights of the “appreciator,” be beautiful in some way. We could even set up a new category; call it “aesthetic disapproval.” Aesthetic disapproval, let us say, involves aesthetic experience and

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27 employs the intellectual faculties but its obj ect is taken by the “appreciator” to have negative aesthetic value. What makes one attitude aes thetic appreciation and anot her aesthetic disapproval? One very intuitive answer is that aesthetic appreciation is a preferred state of mind while aesthetic disapproval is not prefer red. This fits neatly with Mill’s account of what makes a pleasure higher and lower—choice by compet ent and informed judges (Mill, Ch. 2). Might there be other answers to the question about what makes a state of mind that of aesthetic appreciation as opposed to aesthetic disapproval? Ther e could be, but it is hard to see what they would look like. Pursui ng other lines of thought would be highly speculative. I think that the important point is that the more we look at what aesthetic appreciation could consist in, th e more it fits with a very popular and infl uential account of pleasure. Pleasures are not ruled out conceptually as candidates for constituents of well-being: the arguments and debates over th e various conceptions of prudential wellbeing is something I will get into later in this dissertation I do not think that the second proposal is a plausible account of how well-being of a life can be enhanced (as I thi nk the case of Dorian Gray il lustrates). Moreover, it has trouble distinguishing itself from a kind of sophisticated pleasu re or desire theory. If aesthetic appreciation is a ki nd of pleasure then since one possible view of prudential well-being is that it consists in a pleasurable life, we certa inly cannot rule out the second proposal conceptually. However, this is no t a problem for my proposal about prudential value. I say that only nonaesthetic interests are such that their satisfaction enhances well-being. But this does not exclude pleasure taken in aesthetic ob jects, so it does not

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28 rule out the second proposal. However, I th ink that there is a far better proposal for a way in which aesthetic value in a life can enhance well-being, and I turn to it now. The third, and in my mind, most plausible account as to a way in which something of aesthetic value might enhance well-being is that a kind of narrativ e structure of a life might do it. Lives have narrative st ructures. More properly speaking, life stories have narrative structures. Let us set aside the difference for now. Some lives have more beautiful narrative structures than others. The proposal to be examined is that the narrative structure of a life enhances or de tracts from the prudential well-being of the person living that life. Let me return to the Count’s life because, although it is farfetched and fantastic, it is not mystical and s upernatural as Dorian Gray’s life is. Even though the Count’s life is fiction, it is more naturalistic than is Dorian Gray’s. The Count’s life has a certain literary quality to it. Le t us say that a life has a “literary quality” if it has a pleasing narrative structure. Is the prudential value of a life always enhanced by events that give it a more please narrative structure? Some philosophers have thought so; possibly Mich ael Slote and more likely David Velleman. Slote, in chapter One of his Goods and Virtues at least hints at making literary quality a component of the goodness of a life.25 Slote claims: “Human life seems, as I have said, to possess a natural, though socially influenced, de velopment of different times or stages of life . I believe that such a division [youth, adulthood, and old age] into ‘times of life’ tends to be accompanied, in most of us, by a sense of the greater 25 Technically, the “goodness of a life” is not necessarily th e same concept as “well-being.” If Slote is after a different concept than the concept of well-being, then what he claims of “the goodness of a life” can be extended to “well-being” as a thought experiment. If Slote is after the same concept that I am, then of course what he says applied directly Whether direct or indirect in a pplication, Slote’s arguments and ideas are worthy of critical examination, if for no other reason that to clarify my own position.

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29 importance or significance of cer tain times of life in comparison with others” (Slote pg. 13-14). Slote calls his view, the view that the timing of a success (achievement, or good) matters to how good a life is, a “time pref erence” view. Slote does not necessarily commit himself to the claim that the good of a person must have a literary quality, but as I understand the time preference view, he come s close. Slote claims that successes in “the prime of life” are compar atively more important to t hose of childhood and old age (Ibid, pg. 18, 26). He also suggests that there ar e certain activities that are appropriate to each period of a life (Ibid, pg. 19-21). David Velleman, in his “Well-Being and Ti me,” builds on Slote’s views discussed above. Velleman goes further than Slote explic itly to claim that th e amount of well-being one has depends on the “narrative or dramatic relations” of events in one’s life (Velleman 1991, pg. 49). However, to describe Velleman’ s view of well-being by only looking at the aspect that includes narrative or drama tic relations (or life stories) would be incomplete. For Velleman sees well-being as radically split into two distinct components: momentary well-being and wellbeing over time. On this distinction, Velleman says: “I therefore favor the principl e that a person’s self-interest is radically divided, in the sense that he has an interest in features of his life that aren’t at all reducible to, and hence cannot be exchange d with, patterns of momentary well-being” (Ibid, pg. 61-62). Velleman calls momentar y well-being a first-order good while wellbeing over time is a second order good. A second order good is a “valuable state of affairs consisting in some f act about other goods” (Ibid, pg. 58). Second order goods are irreducible to first order goods if they “at least possess value over and above that of [their] component first-order goods” (Ibid, pg. 58 ). The basic idea that Velleman is after

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30 is that we can imagine two lives that have the same amount of overall momentary wellbeing, but different amounts of value (tempor ally extended well-being). A more detailed discussion of Velleman’s views will come later. For example, here are graphs of two lives with the same amount of overall momentary well-being: Life 1. Life 2. Although the momentary well-being of lives 1 and 2 differ at almost every single moment, the overall momentary well-being, when summed up at the end of both lives is the same. The basic intuition that Velleman is tr ying to get at is that the first life is more valuable than the second, even though they have the same amount of momentary wellbeing. Velleman goes further than Slote because while Slote’s explan ation of the time preference view allows for a formula that adds (or multiplies) goodness at each stage of life thus resulting in increases at particular periods and not others (as I explained above), Velleman’s does not admit of taking momentar y well-being and applying a formula to generate well-being over time. As he says: Well-being Years Well-being Years

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31 Some of the value judgments considered above are incompatible with any reduction of diachronic well-being [well-being over time] to synchronic well-being [momentary well-being], no matter how sophi sticated an algorithm of discounting and weighting is applied. Because an even t’s contribution to the value of one’s life depends on its narrative relation to othe r events, a life’s value can never be computed by an algorithm applied to ba re amounts of momentary well-being . (Ibid, pg. 60)26 The narrative relations between events (whi ch are required to get diachronic wellbeing) suggest a much more complicated mode l than suggested by the charts above. The charts above only deal with amounts of well-being at any given time in hypothetical agents’ lives. Velleman requires a more substantial account of the content of the life in order to assess its diachronic well-being. He does not provide a formula that would enable us to determine the amount of diachronic well-being in a life, given a deta iled sequence of synchronic well-being. Such a general formula would have to involve a complex weighing of narrative and dramatic relations. I certainly do not think that just any literary quality of a life would enhance a person’s prudential well-being. Imagine that the Count’s life ended in the prison; we would certainly call his life a tragedy. Traged ies have a literary qua lity of their own, but it would be absurd to say that a life full of tragedy is thereby enhanced with respect to prudential well-being. As was mentioned above tragedies are beautiful, not ugly, so the aesthetic value of a tragic life would be posit ive. But what makes a tragedy a tragedy is that something goes horribly wrong in a life. In many tragedies, the tragic element is an extreme decrease in prudential well-being. 26 Velleman calls his account of well-being over time “strongly irreducible” (Ibid, pg. 60). Slote’s time preference view would allow for some level of redu cibility: Velleman says that Slote’s time preference view has “weak irreducibility” (Ibid, pg. 60).

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32 What if we restrict the kind of literary quali ty that we take to enhance well-being in a way that excludes tragedy? Now imagine th at the story ends with the Count finding the great treasure. This life woul d have a literary quality to it —but it would not be a tragedy. Let me say his life story in this case would be an “uplifting drama.” Is the life story in an uplifting drama a story of a life that thereby ha s an enhanced level of well-being? No, I do not think so. A preliminary worry is that throughout the third proposal, no fuss has been made of the distinction between a life a nd a life story; only the sec ond can properly be said to have a narrative structure. How could a life go well in virtue of ha ving a life story of a certain sort? This seems a puzzle to which I have not heard an adequate account and do not have even a clear idea of how an account would go. Secondly, the restriction to “uplifting dramas” appears ad hoc If we were trying to distinguish between beautiful and ugly life stories, tr ying to find a distinguishing characteristic would not be ad hoc for we would then be trying to find the distinction between positive and negative aesthetic valu es. However, the distinction between uplifting dramas and tragedies is of a different sort. Here, we are trying to distinguish between two sorts of beautiful life story. I can see no real motive for building this distinction into the account of aesthetic value apart from trying to fit it into prudential well-being. Both uplifting dramas and traged ies are aesthetically valuable on initial construal for the third account of aesthetic value. It is only after it is clear the account of aesthetic value could not plausibly serve as an account of what enha nces one’s prudential well-being that the distinction between uplifti ng dramas and tragedies is made. There must be some sort of external, nonad hoc and principled reason for the distinction. The

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33 proponent of the third account cannot claim that it is having a beautiful life story, as such, that increases prudential wellbeing. After all, both trag edies and uplifting dramas can make for beautiful life stories. Thirdly, it is not clear that we could properly classify the literary types tragedy and uplifting drama without recourse to the concept of prudential well-being. So if we refer to the narrative relations of an uplifting drama in our account of well-being, our account may be circular. For example, the literary quality of an uplifting drama could require lows before highs, while a tragedy could requ ire highs before lows. If these dramatic relations require that there be some variation in prudential well-being, some dip below a high level of well-being and an overcoming of some obstacle, then we must have some independent way of getting at the co ncept of prudential well-being. Although it may seem as though I disagree wi th much of what Velleman says, I actually only disagree with th e thought that prudential well -being could be constituted, wholly or in part, by the narra tive and dramatic relations be tween events in one’s life, where these narrative and dramatic relations ar e a matter of its aesthetic value. That leaves a lot of room for agreement. Vellema n thinks that well-bei ng is radically divided between diachronic and synchronic well-be ing and that diachronic well-being is constituted by the events that compose synchr onic well-being plus the relations between these events. I can agree with this. So when Velleman says that well-being is radically divided, I can agree with him—in a way, but wi th a different distinct ion and for different reasons. I can agree with the idea that there is diachronic well-being, and even diachronic prudential well-being. I think, how ever, that the diachronic prudential wellbeing must be determined by something other than narrative and dramatic relations.

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34 So none of the proposals for aesthetic value I have critically di scussed turn out to be plausible candidates for something that would enhance prudential well-being by partly constituting it. There may be some further proposal about aesthetic value and its relation to prudential value. I feel however, that th e burden of proof is on those who wish to claim that aesthetic value is a c onstituent of prude ntial well-being. 1.6 Conclusion I would like to return to a distinction I made above between two different concepts of well-being and compare the theories of Velleman, Brink and Darwall. On the one hand we have a broader concept where some thing like the “good life” is meant by “wellbeing.” On the other hand, we have th e narrower concept where something like “prudential value” is meant. If I understand Velleman corr ectly (and this is somewhat tentative, because he only has room to give a sketch of his overall th eory), he is after a broader concept of well-being. Brink and Darwall use “well-be ing” in the broad sense to include at least prudential and moral goodness. Velleman may use “well-being” in a different way to include pr udential and aesthetic goodness.27 If Velleman, Brink, Darwall are after a different concept than I am then in some ways, we might not really disagree about “well-being.” I can agree with what they say about the broader concept of well-being and they could agr ee with the narrower concept.28 At this point, we should have a general idea of what non-moral, non-aesthetic, selfregarding interests are. I claim that satisfaction of such interests is constitutive of 27 Darwall’s phrase “what we would rationally want for someone were we to care for them,” as I understand it, is a characterization of overarching value in a life. So if aesthetic value is indeed a separate and basic value, then it too would be a feature included in Darwall’s concept of well-being. 28 Interestingly, even though they are after different concepts than I am, I will discuss the plausibility of their conceptions of well-being as candidates for the narr ower concept I am after. So we will see the work of Darwall, Brink and Velleman again.

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35 prudential well-being. In what follows in the next chapter, I will argue for a particular conception of the concept of prudential well-bei ng. In the subsequent chapters, I will continue to develop and defend what I take to be the best conception of prudential wellbeing.

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36 CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING Having just distinguished between a few different concepts of well-being, and made clear that I am after the concept of prudential well-being, I now turn to the conceptions. First I will give relatively brief accounts of the various conceptions. Next, I will explore the various conceptions by applyi ng them to the two primary protagonists in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein among other hypothetical cases. Lastly, I w ill critically analyze the conceptions in light of what they imply about these cases. I will adopt a four-part taxonom y of the basic conceptions of well-being. There are alternative taxonomies, but this on e is the best for my purposes.1 The four groups of conceptions of well-being are as follows: (1) mental state theories, (2) desire-satisfaction theories, (3) explanatory objective theories, a nd (4) pluralistic theo ries. Mental state theories treat some mental state, such as pleasure or happiness, as constitutive of wellbeing.2 Desire-satisfaction theories treat the satis faction of desires, or the satisfaction of 1 Two alternative taxonomies are: (1) a two-way taxonomy as found in Griffin (1986) and Sumner (1996), and (2) a three-way taxonomy as found in Parfit (1986), Scanlon (1998) and others. The two-way taxonomy traditionally divides the conceptions into subj ective and objective groups. But what features one uses to make the distinction is not an easy and obvious issue. The three-way taxonomy as found in Parfit and others leaves an important group of theories out. There is an alternative four-way taxonomy in Shelly Kagan (1992). Kagan’s four-way taxonomy is composed of two distinctions which cut across each other (subjective/objective and internal/external) making for four basic theories. This four-part taxonomy may make things a bit clearer, but the importance of the categorization is unclear. Additionally, Kagan’s taxonomy still leaves out an important group of theories (what I call “pluralistic” theories). Now, I do not think that the other two other types of taxonomy are wrong, strictly speaking, but I do think them lacking in the virtues of my four-way taxonomy. 2 I do not in this dissertation use “constitute” as some philosophers do. Some philosophers think of “ x constitutes y ” as asserting a specific metaphysical relation between x and y —a reductive metaphysical relation. In this dissertation I use “constitute” in a way that is compatible with reductionism, yet does not commit me to reductionism. I attempt to capture what some philosophers call the “making” relation by my use of “constitutes.”

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37 some relevantly construed desire set, as constitutive of well-being. Explanatory objectivists treat a single feature, such as a person’s de veloping or exercising her human nature, as constituting well-being.3 The first three families of conceptions of well-being are monistic in that they treat some single featur e as constituting wellbeing. The fourth type of conception of well-being is pluralistic in that it treats multiple factors as constituting one’s well-being. Pl uralists, on this characterizati on, treat each of the factors as independently constitutive of well-being. In a later chapter, I w ill discuss what I call “mixed theories” of well-being that combine features from theories in more than one group. For mixed theories, well-being only increases when two or more features combine. Mixed theories qualify as moni stic because although the feature that constitutes well-being acco rding to them is not elemental they are still be st thought of as picking out only a single f eature that constitutes wellbeing, though that feature is complex .4 Pluralists treat each factor as se lf-sufficient for constituting well-being. 2.1 Four Conceptions 2.1.1. Mental State Conceptions Let us first examine mental state concep tions of well-being. A person’s well-being, on mental state accounts, is composed exclusiv ely of some set of mental states of the person. Accordingly, a person’s well-being at a time is set by his or her occurent mental 3 I draw the terms “explanatory objectivism” from K itcher’s “Essence and Perfection.” Please see 2.1.3 for a more detailed account of this sort of theories. 4 For what it is worth, I confess that the distinction between “complex” and “elemental” features is fuzzy. I have set up the arguments for and against the conceptions so that little, if anything, depends on the distinction. The only thing of this dissertation that depends on the distinction is the organization of the chapters: I deal with elemental monistic theories in this chapter and complex monistic theories in a later chapter. So the distinction really ju st ends up affecting when I deal with the theories rather than how I deal with them. Also, as a bit of an aside, one should recognize that it is possible to develop a pluralistic conception of well-being composed of mixed features.

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38 states at that time. Thus, the presence of the correct kind of mental st ate in the past is not constitutive of well-being in the present. Na turally, there are restric tions as to which kind of mental state matters for well-being. Tw o very popular candidates are pleasure and happiness. Of course, “pleasur e” and “happiness” are themselves, at least to some extent, up for definition as well. Philosophers have taken the terms to mean many different things. I do not have time to pursue the hist ory of the conceptions of these two mental states, if indeed they are even different. But some further exposition is necessary. The strategy that virtually all mental stat e proponents adopt is to assert that wellbeing is pleasure or happiness and then goes on to characterize pleasure or happiness.5 Sometimes pleasure is thought to be a sensat ion one has (hereafter, the sensationalist view). The idea that happiness is a sensati on is a bit less plausible than the idea that pleasure is a sensation, but if one thinks that pleasure and happiness are the same and that pleasure is a sensation, then one is committed to thinking that happiness is a sensation. Upon tasting a cold beer on a hot day, one ma y experience a pleasurable feeling. Another example is the pleasure one feels when listeni ng to a great piece of music. Apart from the sensationalist view, there is another view : pleasure and happine ss are attitudes (the attitudinal view). More specifically, the view is that pleasu re and happiness are propositional attitudes in that th ey take propositions as their objects. So, for example, 5 Another strategy is available. One could “cut out the middle-man” and just claim that well-being is composed of certain kinds of mental state and then just go on to characterize this mental state—all of this ignoring whether or not such a state is pleasure or happiness. I have not come across anyone who adopts this strategy for a monistic theory—everyone who adopts a monistic theory seems to like to keep pleasure or happiness in the middle. There are some pluralists, as we will later see, who pick out other mental states as relevant to well-being, such as aesthetic apprecia tion; but these other mental states are on the list of things that make a life go well in addition to pleasure or happiness.

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39 one can be pleased that one’s daughter is doi ng well at college or one can be happy that the Royals baseball team are in the pennant race.6 Happiness, when conceived to be a proposit ional attitude, might be taken to be a factive mental state. What I mean if I were to say “happiness is f active” can be illustrated with an example: in order for a person to be happy that his daught er is doing well in college, his daughter must really be doing well in college. S o, if happiness is factive in this way, one can be happy that such and such is the case only if it really is the case. If his daughter is not doing we ll in college, the father might be construed as happy in the thought that his daughter is doing well at college. Being happy “in the thought that” such and such is the case allows for that thought to be mistaken or wrong. If happiness is factive, however, being happy “tha t” such and such is the cas e makes no such allowance. If happiness is factive in this way, then the important thing to keep in mind is that the mental state is what really matters here. And the mental stat e is relevantly the same between (1) happiness that x is the case and (2) happi ness in the thought that x is the case.7 The only thing that is different between (1) and (2) here is th e way the world is. One could deny that happiness is factive in this way. But I do not want to get into the debate here. All that I am claiming is th at whether we treat ha ppiness or pleasure as 6 So, what is it that makes both the sensation from the beer and the sensation from the music both fall into the same category of pleasure? Presum ably it is not because they are the same feeling. They are the same type of feeling; that is to say, that they fall into a type called pleasure. But then what makes the category of pleasure? The same can be asked of the attitudina l view as well—what makes all of those attitudes pleasure or happiness? 7 Actually, if happiness is factive, those who are happy that x is the case (on this factive interpretation, x must really be the case), strictly speakin g, are also happy in the thought that x is the case. I qualify this by “strictly speaking” because when one says that someone is happy in the thought that x is the case, it might be conversationally implied that x is not the case; but, of course, implication and literal meaning are two different things. So on the factive view, it could be argued that what is important is happiness in the thought that x is the case whether x it actual or not. In any case, the result is the same, that the state of mind is what is important.

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40 factive mental states or not, the important thi ng is the mental state as such. So, even if happiness is factive, happiness that x is the case and happiness in the thought that x is the case are both treated as increasing well-being.8 Something to keep in mind regarding me ntal state accounts is that they do not necessarily have to play down to the lowest and basest human inclinations. Often, critics of mental state accounts, esp ecially when attacking views th at associate well-being with pleasure, chastise the views for pandering to the lowest common element in people; for example, sheer sensory pleasures one gets from food, sex, and even drugs.9 But the relevant class of mental states can be construed as far more inclusive than this objection implies. Of course, as the class of releva nt mental states expa nds, getting right the account of what makes all of the disparat e feelings and attitudes pleasures becomes increasingly important.10 The key attractions of the mental state acc ounts are, I think, two-fold. The first is that the presence of the right kind of mental state plays a crucial role in how, prephilosophically, we evaluate our own lives. Ve ry often it is the case that, in an ordinary conversational context, when a person is as ked how well so-and-so is doing, his reply involves some comment on how so-and-so is fe eling. The second attraction of the mental state accounts is that, according to them, each person has a very good idea of how well 8 Later in this dissertation, though not in this chapter, I will study a theory that treats only factive happiness as increasing well-being. However, such a theory is no longer a pure mental-state theory, as it includes a reference to something outside the mental realm. I must put the “mixed” theory aside for now. 9 This objection to the hedonistic accounts of well-being could be characterized as the “fit for swine” objection. 10 Of course, one could say that nothing holds them together as pleasure or happiness. This would be to take the strategy as found in the fourth footnote of this chapter.

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41 off he or she is.11 This tight connection between a person’s belief s and his or her wellbeing is intuitively attractive be cause well-being, seems, in a st rong sense, to be in and of the person’s lived experiences—well-being and a person’s experi ences seem closely linked. 2.1.2 Desire Satisfaction Views The desire satisfaction account of we ll-being is—to a firs t approximation—that one’s level of well-being is set by the extent to which one’s desires ar e satisfied. A desire is satisfied if the desired stat e of affairs obtains. For exampl e, if my desire is that the Royals win the pennant, then my desire is sati sfied if the Royals wi n the pennant. It is worthwhile to note the possibility that a de sire can be satisfied and yet the agent not know, or even believe it. For example, I can desire that the Royals win today’s baseball game and it can be true that the Royals have won today’s game. In this case, the desire might be satisfied without my knowing or believing it.12 Just as the mental state theories take great pains to characterize which kind of happiness is important for well-being, so t oo does the desire-satis faction proponent take great pains to characterize which desires matte r. Desires are often characterized quite broadly here to include anything from whim s one might have to life-long plans and projects. Sometimes all of these states are refe rred to as pro-attitudes. So a desire, on 11 Now, sometimes one hears of people saying “I thought I was happy, but I wasn’t” or “I didn’t know how happy I was.” If indeed these are real cases of the person being wrong about how happy he or she was, then the connection between the person’s mental awaren ess and her happiness is less than perfect. I tend to think that they rarely should be taken literally, though there do seem to be at least some instances when they hold true. However, the connection between a person’s judgments about her well-being and her actual well-being still seems strong in most cases and that is something that, at least intuitively, favors the mental state accounts. 12 Additionally, one can come to desire something that is already the case. For example, someone, call her “ A ,” can come to desire that her friend have a romantic interest in her when A ’s friend already has such an interest. In this case, A ’s desire is satisfied immediately.

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42 this view, is not just a felt tug or pull at a given moment—though of course, tugs and pulls are still desires. It is important to be charitable to those w ho endorse mental state accounts by not construing the relevant mental states as just base sensory pleasures. Similarly, it is important to understand desires to be far broader than just the urgings that someone feels at any given moment. So, on this broader view of desi res, one could have a desire for x without, at that very moment, having some urge to go out and get x The desire-satisfaction theory is different from the mental state theory in one very important way. Whereas the mental state theo ry takes a person’s well-being at a time to be composed entirely of occurrent mental stat es, the desire theory only treats desires as necessary conditions. Desire-sa tisfaction theories then look to the world to see whether the desired states of affairs obt ain or not. If the desired states of af fairs do obtain, then the agent’s well-being is enhanced.13 As we will see in the next chapter, so me desire-satisfaction accounts give a counterfactual analysis of we ll-being in terms of what an agent would desire under certain conditions, so they do not even treat ac tual mental states as necessary conditions of well-being. This means that there is a fa mily of desire-satisf action accounts rather than merely one. Yet I will simplify my disc ussion for now by talking as if there is only the one simple view. The more complicated views are better left for a later time. The attractions of the desire-theory are, I think, two-fold. First, like mental state accounts, desire and desire satisfactions play a key role, pre-philosophically, in how we see and judge our own lives. For example, c ountless stories in the l iterary and religious traditions count desire-satisfaction as one of the central aspects of a life’s going well— 13 I will discuss a slightly different acc ount of desire-satisfaction in Chapte r 7 of this dissertation. For now, I merely want give the reader an idea of in what desire-satisfaction consists.

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43 (e.g., Job, who looses his wealth and children and is struck with boils, is someone who looses what he desires most and is often thought to have his life go prudentially worse thereby). There is also the tale of the Jinii who grants wishes in such a way that it leads to the thwarting of other wishes and there by make “the wisher’s” life go worse. Both mental state theories and desire-satisfaction theories seem to match up very nicely with our pre-philosophical intuitions about how well lives go. Now I will move on to what I take to be the second key advantage of the desiresatisfaction theory. Please recall that desire satisfaction theories require no belief, on the part of the agent, that the desire is satisfied or that object proposition is true. That is, for the satisfaction of a desire that p to enhance well-being it is not required that the agent believe that p Moreover, according to the desire-s atisfaction theory, one’s well-being could diverge from one’s thoughts about one’s well-being, just because one could be wrong about whether one’s desires are sa tisfied. For example, someone could desire that her friend be a sincere and genuine friend and believe that her friend is sincere and genuine and yet be mistaken in that belief. On the “simple” desire-satisfaction account, her well-being is lower in virt ue of that thwarted desire.14 With the desire-satisfaction account, there is a tight connection between a person’s well-being and aspects of her psychology. But the desire theory does not go so far as to make well-being constituted wholly by a set of mental states; there must be some connection to the world. Given the above example, there seems to be a great a dvantage in that conn ection to the world. 14 Quite probably, there are other closely-related desires that are thwarted as well; such as the desire not to be lied to, etc. So, the agent’s well-being could be lower still in virtue of some other desires not being satisfied.

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44 2.1.3 Explanatory Objective Theories Explanatory objective theories have a l ong history of supporters in philosophy, and have had a relatively recent renaissance in th e literature. They typically base well-being in human nature. Given its recent revita lization, there are not many recent full-blown expositions of this view.15 In light of this, my strategy in 2.1.3 will differ from those in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. Whereas in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 I rarely mentioned any partic ular author, in the present part, I will do so liberally. Before getting into the details of objectiv e accounts and human nature, I would like to remind the reader of my preferred termi nology and the theories associated with each term. Philip Kitcher in his paper “Essence and Perfection” distinguishes between bare objectivism and explanatory objectivism. E xplanatory objectivism unifies the various things that make one’s life go well by citing a fundamental element that figures centrally in the account of what constitutes well-being. Human nature plays this role for most objectivists of this sort. Bare objectivism, in contrast has no single unifying element; each element contributes to well-being. So bare objectivism is non-explanatory objectivism. Bare objective theories are sometimes called “objective list theories.”16 What Kitcher calls “bare object ivist” theories and what others call “objective list” theories, I prefer to call “plu ralistic” theories. I prefer to stick with the descriptor “pluralistic,” because is captures somethi ng more about the set of theories under discussion than does “objective list” and “bare objective.” When the word “objective” is used to identify a class of conceptions of well-being, one might confuse it with 15 Hurka’s book Perfectionism is one recent not able exception. 16 “Objective List” as a name for the theories under discussion was popularized by Parfit in his “What Makes a Life Go Best” in his Reasons and Persons Several philosophers have followed Parfit in his choice of terminology. I find the name “pluralism” to be preferable.

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45 explanatory objectivist acc ounts. The motivation for explanatory objectivism and pluralism differ so much that grouping th em together would no doubt rely on some arbitrarily chosen similarity between the groups, instead of identifying and distinguishing the groups based on core or cen tral characterizations. Most explanatory objective theories claim that increases in well-being come from developing and acting in accordance with human nature. There could be other sorts of explanatory theories, but alternatives to human nature theories are rarely defended.17 Theories of human nature are, of course numerous. Some have thought that human nature is that which is distinctively human, but it seems that distinctiveness is not all that important. For if distinctiv eness is understood as biologic al, then it seems relatively unimportant (especially for a theory of wellbeing). Take for example, the distinctive aspect of humans as featherless bi-peds. It is hard to see how this could play a role in an account of well-being. Alternativ ely, if distinctiveness is ta ken to be some higher level human functioning that is intu itively much more relevant to well-being, then it is not clear why other possible creature s could not have that level of functioning as well. For example, take rationality. Being rational s eems much more relevant to well-being than does being a featherless biped, but it could be that there are other creatures who are rational. Rather than focus on distinctiveness, a bett er focus is on the human essence if there is such a thing. The human essence, on one proposal, consists of a bodily essence and 17 Thomas Carson in his Value and the Good Life provides a contemporary defense of a divine preference theory, according to which one’s life goes well to the extent to which one lives in accordance with what God wants for one (pg. 239-254). I treat Carson’s theory as a sort of desire-satisfaction account, though of an unusual pedigree, instead of an altern ative sort of explan atory objective account.

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46 rational activity, both practical a nd theoretical rational activity.18 Bodily essence could be described as that which humans share with other animals. To develop it, one needs food and exercise. The two kinds of rationa lity are perhaps not completely unique to humans. But certainly the level of rationality of humans is almost incomparably greater than that of the other known creatures. Pract ical rationality is r easoning about what to do. Theoretical rationality is reasoning about what to believe The view of this kind of objectivism is that one’s life goes well to the extent to which one exercises and develops these elements. According to the theory under discussion, de velopment and exercise of one’s bodily and rational capacities only counts as increasing well-being because they are the components of human nature. If human na ture were to be different, then one’s wellbeing would not be enhanced by the developmen t and exercise of these capacities. Thus, although the theory may appear pluralistic in th at it picks out two feat ures as relevant for well-being, it really is monistic because those features are re levant to well-being only because they fit into an account of human nature. This is all, of course, controversial. The temptation to give an evolutionary or socio-biological account of human nature is very strong he re. There is a great deal of prima facia intuitive plausibility to an evolut ionary account of human nature because after all, an evolutionary account would involve a story of how humans came to be as they now are. There are serious problems with any theory that treats well-being as consisting in the development and exercise of one’s nature when one understand human nature as given by an evolutionary or socio-bi ological account. I will discuss this issue in 2.2.2. 18 This is drawn from Hurka’s Perfectionism : to my mind, the most plausible and detailed of the objective accounts.

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47 Interestingly, some recent proponents of huma n nature theories have suggested that there is room for substantial individual difference in what makes a life go well.19 There are very deep questions about whether human na ture is set as one nature for all members of the group of humans or whether there is room, with the corre ct account of human nature, for there to be substantial individua l difference. There might be a single human nature, on some accounts, but a theory of wellbeing might still allow for variation. The risk, of course, is that in th e accounts that allow for substant ial differences in what makes people’s lives go well, the accounts might not be of human nature any more, but of some other feature. I must leave critical discussion of this topic for 2.2.2. The intuitive plausibility of explanat ory objective accounts is two-fold. Wellbeing, on most explanatory objective accounts, c onsists in living life in accordance with, and developing, one’s nature. The first advantage is that the accounts make reference to the essence of the person. What could be a better account of one’s well-being, so the thought goes, than whether one is living his or her life developing and exercising what is at the very center of the person? This c onnection to the essence of the person does not have the pre-theoretical and pre-philosophical intu itive pull of the mental-state and desire-satisfaction theories, because so much groundwork must be laid to get the idea of a human essence even on the table. However, with a plausible acc ount of human nature, the connection to one’s nature is attrac tive. The second intu itive advantage of explanatory objective theories is that they have a characteristic that is very similar to 19 Rasmussen, in his “Human Flourishing and the App eal to Human Nature” is an excellent example of someone who is what I call a explanatory objectivist and yet thinks that there is a great deal of room for individual differences in human nature. As the title of his article indicates, Rasmussen is after the concept of human flourishing—which seems a different and broader concept than the concept of prudential wellbeing. I will treat Rasmussen’s work as if it were a bout the narrower concept howev er, as I do with several of the so-called explanatory objectivists.

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48 desire-satisfaction theories; they both tie well-being to the world in which the person lives. One’s well-being, according to human nature and desire-satisfaction theories, depends on the state of the person and the stat e of the real world. Both theories make well-being not depend entirely on mental states as do the mental state theories. The mental state theories have at tractions of their own, but a c onnection to the outside world is surely something that helps make huma n nature theories initially plausible. 2.1.4 Pluralistic Theories of Well-Being Pluralistic theories are quite different fr om the monistic accounts discussed above. Pluralistic theories have a ve ry different structure and mo tivation. I will discuss two notable recent accounts of plural istic conceptions of well-being. James Griffin in his Value Judgement offers a list of five items that make a life go well. Griffin sets up his list with th e following comment: “To see anything as prudentially valuable, then, we must see it as an instance of something generally intelligible as valuable and, furthermore, as valuable for any (normal) human. Prudential deliberation ends up, I think, with a list of values” (G riffin 1996, pg. 29). Griffin’s account of prudential value makes it necessary fo r the valued thing to be intelligible as valuable—“intelligible to whom?” is of course a big question.20 Also, what role “normal” and “human” play is also quite ope n ended. But what shoul d be clear is that Griffin is generating a list with normal humans in mind. 20 Griffin’s comment makes me think of a character from Jane Austen’s Emma Mr. Woodhouse (Emma’s father). Mr. Woodhouse complains that his son-in-law is too rough with his children—always tossing them up in the air. Emma replies “But they like it, papa; there is nothing they like so much. It is such enjoyment to them, that if their uncle did not lay down the rule of their taking turns, whichever began would never give way to the other.” Mr. Woodhouse says “Well, I cannot understand it” to which Emma replies “That is the case with us all, papa. One half of the world cannot understand the pleasures of the other “ (Austen, Emma ch 9, pg. 624).

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49 Griffin’s list has five items: (a) accom plishment, (b) the components of human existence (autonomy, capability, and liberty), (c) understanding, (d ) enjoyment and, (e) deep personal relationships. Griffin thinks of his list as being a something like a rough draft of the list; with possible amendments to come later (Ibid, pg. 30). John Finnis, in his Natural Law and Natural Rights offers a list of things as an account of “’good,’ ‘basic good,’ ‘value,’ ‘wellbeing’” (Finnis, pg. 86). Finnis’ list is: (1) life, (2) knowledge, (3) play, (4) aesthetic experience, (5) sociab ility (friendship), (6) practical reasonableness, (7) religion. Finnis characterizes the items on the list very broadly. For example, Finnis describes knowledg e as: “the activity of trying to find out, to understand, and to judge matters correctly ” (Ibid, pg. 60). Finnis is far more certain about his list than is Griffin, Finnis thinks of his list as so mething like a final draft. Finnis claim that each element is non-reducible to any other and that the list is exhaustive of well-being. Finnis takes himself to be providing a list of items for human well-being (Ibid, pg. 92-95). Notice that Griffin’s and Finni s’ theories appear to be pluralistic theories. One thing that Griffin and Finnis are not clear on, frustrati ngly, is whether they are full-bodied pluralists. Recall that what is meant by “p luralism” here is that each element on the list is, by itself, sufficient for at leas t some well-being. If they are pluralists in this sense then a person could have some amount or degree of just one of the items on the list and thereby have some amount or degree of we ll-being. Perhaps, though, Finnis and Griffin are not pluralists in this full-bodied sense. Perhaps one needs to have at least a little of each item on the list to have any amount of well-being. On this construal, some degree of

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50 each item is a necessary, rather than a su fficient, condition for having some degree of well-being. I cannot resolve these problems here I will treat the authors as pluralists.21 The motivation for accepting pluralistic theori es of well-being is that they are so very inclusive. A pluralist of the sort I have in mind has the strategy of “having one’s cake and eating it too.” If the mental state, desire-satisfaction, a nd explanatory objective theories each leave something out (in different ways), then a plura list can include aspects from each theory and with luck, do away with any shortcomings. 2.1.5 Conclusion Each of the types of conceptions has what we might think of as an attractive starting point. There is at least an air of in itial plausibility with each. That is not to say that one is just as good as the next, but ther e is something to each of them. What I will do in 2.2 is to take a deeper look at the a dvantages and disadvantages of each of the conceptions. Once the skin is peeled away, desi re-satisfaction theories will turn out to be best. 21 Might Griffin and Finnis really be explanatory objectivists disguised as pluralists? This is an intriguing question. There is some chance that they are. Presuppositions about human nature and the world in which humans live play a role in each philosopher’s thinking. Griffin, in a very helpful footnote on this issue, writes: My own list is very much out of a particular tradition: modern, Western, and atheist. But take someone with a radically different list: instead of enjoyment, the mortification of the flesh; instead of deep personal relationships, cloistered solitude; instead of autonomy, submission to the will of God. But of course one’s list will change with one’s metaphysical views. If I believed in a certain kind of God, I too might have a different list. But this makes lists relative not to culture, but (unsurprisingly) to one’s judgements about the world one thinks one is living in. (Griffin, pg. 15) Griffin’s footnote is quite frank in expressing the difficulties in coming up with a list of items. Perhaps Griffin does presuppose an account of human nature wh en coming up with his list. Finnis explicitly states that his list is only for humans (Finnis, pg. 92-95). Griffin, in a quotation above, makes a similar claim. So there is some reason to believe that they are really expl anatory objectivists at some deep level. However, at this point, I will treat Griffin and Finnis as full-bodied pluralists.

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51 2.2 Critical Discussion of Conceptions 2.1.1 The Story Monte Cristo’s life is not a great case study for crit ically assessing different conceptions of well-being. This is because the four different conceptions diverge only slightly in what they would say about Mont e Cristo’s well-being. Given the purpose of Chapter 1 (to isolate the narrow concept of prudential well-being), the example was suitable. Now, however, I need cases wher e the different conceptions come apart. Things will seem more controversial, and one’s intuitions should not be so definite here. To fit my needs, I have chosen one of the grea test stories of internal and external conflict in literature. The case study I have in mind is of the tw o primary protagonists in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein The first thing I would like to do is to dispel the common thoughts about the book and characters. If the reader is not familiar with the book, forget all that you think you know about Frankenstei n. Victor Frankenstein, the sc ientist, is the creator of his “monster,” who is never given a name Frankenstein, a genius chemist and physiologist, discovers a method of bringing dead human matter back to life. He gathers parts from different corpses and then compos es something of a super-human. He brings his “creation” to life, though without the ai d of lightning. The monster is extremely strong and agile and is very intelligent. He is superior to normal hu mans in all of these respects. However, the monster is also re pulsively ugly. Frankens tein, upon bringing life to his monster, panics and abandons the creature. Frankenstein’s monster is left to fend for himself. He manages not only to survive, but also to become a master of language and learn a great deal of history and some of the other liberal arts. All of this learning is accomplished w ithout direct assistance from

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52 humans, although he “eavesdrops” on a family th at lives in a cottage. When he tries to confront people, they are repulsed by his uglin ess and he is driven away. The monster, created with a very strong longing for compan ionship and a great sensitivity to rejection, eventually tries to find his creator, Frankenstein. The purpose of the monster’s search is to convince Frankenstein to create another being—another monster, but this time a fema le monster who is also ugly and superhuman in many ways. The monster finds Fr ankenstein and convinces him to make another being.22 Frankenstein, out of fear of hor rible consequences, and at the last minute, tears up the still lif e-less body of the monster’s would-be companion. The monster then becomes enraged (again), and kills several members of Frankenstein’s family including Frankenstein’s bride on thei r wedding night. Frankenstein dedicates the rest of his life to destroying his monster but di es in the effort. The monster, whose sole aim towards the end of his life was to tormen t Frankenstein, then goes off to die alone. The idea I have here is that if we take the first three conc eptions of well-being (mental state, desire-satisfaction, and explan atory objectivists) and apply them to the two life-stories, we will have different account s of how well the lives are going. We can compare the accounts and try to decide which is the more pl ausible. I will criticize pluralistic accounts as well, though I think that pluralis ms suffer from a general theoretical defect and so I will not argue ag ainst them using our intuitions based on the stories from Frankenstein 22 This is slightly oversimplified, after the monster is rejected by everyone, he kills one of Frankenstein’s family members and frames another family member for the murder. Then the monster finds Frankenstein and convinces him to try to cr eate a companion for him.

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53 2.2.2 The Application of Explanatory Objectivism to the Story There is a significant section of Frankenstein dedicated to the monster’s acquisition of language and the learning of th e liberal arts (chapt ers 12-15). It is in those chapters that the monster tells his tale of how he learned most of what he will ever know. He is able to find a hovel beside a cottage where a fa mily of farmers lives. The family consists of a father (de Lacey) who is blind, and two children, a son (Felix) and daughter (Agatha). The monster is able to learn language by secretly obser ving the behavior of the family. He teaches himself to read and then goes on to read Plutarch’s Lives Paradise Lost Sorrows of Werther among a few other things. After this period of learning, he is extremely intelligent and is able to give lucid explan ations of his history and very persuasive arguments to get what he wants.23 Let us look first at the explanatory obje ctive accounts that ground well-being in human nature. Such theories typically mainta in that one’s life goes well with the extent to which one exercises or develops one’s human nature. In order to apply such theories of well-being, we have got to look at the na ture of the Frankenstein monster. The monster is unusual, but any adequate acc ount of well-being must be able to say something about him. For surely, his life can go better or worse. I think that the case of Frankenstein’s monster will be a good test cas e precisely because it is such an unusual case. One might object that a dog’s life can go better or worse as well and yet examining a dog’s well-being will do little to assist our understanding of huma n well-being. I think that is true, but Frankenstein’s monster and re levantly similar beings have lives that go 23 He is so persuasive that after he has killed one of Frankenstein’s relatives and framed another relative for the murder, he is still able to persuade Frankenstein to do a favor for him by making him a bride. The monster gives something of an explicit threat that if Fr ankenstein does not create a bride for the monster, he will harm him and his family. But this threat is acco mpanied by the argument that Frankenstein has an obligation to his creation to make him happy and that having a wife will pacify his great anger.

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54 well or poorly in that they, t oo, have lives that can go bette r or worse with respect to prudential well-being. After all, they are rational and have many of the same mental states that human being have. A good place to begin is with an examina tion of the monster’s nature. Let me return to an issue that was raised in the discus sion of human nature ear lier in this chapter. One’s nature is given by one’s essence, it s eems. What is one’s essence? There is a strong temptation to appeal to an evolu tionary biological account, because such an account would involve a story about how we came to be the particular way we are.24 There is a very serious problem, however, for any account of well-being that makes essential reference to human nature when human nature is unde rstood in terms of evolutionary biology. There very well could be an evolutionary disposition to sacrifice oneself for one’s genetic offspring. At fi rst glance the thought may seem perplexing. However, especially in cases where there ar e sufficient numbers of offspring who could reproduce, or at least a few offspring who have a high ch ance of reproduction, and in a case where the parent could no longer re produce, the greater chance of traits, characteristics, or genes continuing into the ne xt generation is for the parent to sacrifice herself for her offspring. There are, of c ourse, some species which reproduce so easily that dispositions of the parent to sacrifice for her offspring would not be selected in a competitive environment. However, humans do not reproduce at a high rate and must put a great deal of resources into each child. So humans could be the sorts of creatures that have a disposition for parental sacrifice. On the evolutionary account of human nature 24 Indeed, the story is even more interesting for Frankenstein’s monster because his story is a combination of evolution and scientific manipulation. But I leave that aside for the moment, in order to get to the nerve of a particular criticism.

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55 and on the human nature account of well-being, such a sacrifice would not really be a sacrifice of well-being, but w ould merely seem so. The self-sacrifice would be merely illusory, according to the account under discussi on, because the person would be living in accordance with his nature and would increase his well-being thereby. But, this is implausible. If one kills oneself for one’s offspring, there normally would be a net decrease in one’s well-being from the previous level of well-being. So, if one appeals to an evolutionary account of hu man nature, then human nature could not plausibly be viewed as playing a central role in what makes for well-being.25 It is possible for one to act in accordance with his nature, on this a ccount of human nature, and decrease his or her well-being, so acting in accordance with one’s nature cannot always lead to increases in well-being. So the evolutionary biological account of human nature must be rejected by the most common sort of explanatory objectivists; though many people find such an account of human nature compelling. Let us set aside these worries and, for the sake of argument, explore Thomas Hurka’s account of human nature. Hurka thinks that one’s life goes well to the extent that one exercises and deve lops one’s human nature.26 The best account of human nature treats human essence as central, according to Hurka. Human essence, on Hurka’s view, has two components: physical e ssence and rational e ssence. Let us st art by trying to find out the monster’s physical essence. There ar e many difficulties here. The monster is a one-of-a-kind being, not a member of a type; more accurately, he is a single member of 25 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Kitcher’s “Essence and Perfection.” 26 Strictly speaking, Hurka cl aims that he is not offering an accoun t of welfare or well-being: according to him, he is offering an account of the human good. For what it is worth, I think that Hurka relies on too narrow a construal of welfare or well-being—he thin k that it is essentially subjective in some way. Regardless of whether Hurka relies on too narrow a construal of well-being, I adopt what he says to my discussion of well-being in this dissertation.

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56 his own type. At least in many aspects, he is sui generis .27 The fact that the monster is one of a kind does not mean he lacks a we ll-being. Indeed, the monster biologically human—though a composite of sorts. An account of human nature, such as Hurka’s, must be able to explain the monster’s physical essence. But what is it? Hurka’s account of physical essence would seem to apply to the monster. Hurka thinks that minimally, the physical essence is good functioning of the organs and systems (Hurka, pg. 37). Hurka remarks: Each system in our body has a characteri stic activity. The respiratory system extracts oxygen from air, circulatory system distributes nutrients, and so on. For a human to remain alive, each system must perform its activity to some minimal degree; for her to achieve reasonable phys ical perfection, it must do so to a reasonable degree. But a system does this when it is free from outside interference and operating healthily. So the basic level of physi cal perfection is good bodily health, when all our bodily systems function in an efficient, unrestricted way. (Ibid, pg. 38). I do have some minor concerns about Hurka’ s account of physical perfection thus far. Presumably, medications that help the systems perform their characteristic activity or even improve the characteristic activity, such as medications that reduce blood pressure, increase physical perfection. And yet such medications surely constitute outside interference and these medications do restrict the systems in a significant way. So I not entirely satisfied with the way in which Hurka explains the basic level of physical perfection. But let me set as ide concerns of this kind. The account of physical perfection I have given so far is incomplete. There remains yet a higher form of physical perfection. Hurka thinks that great athletic feats count for more intrinsic valu e in a life. He says: 27 Although he is extremely ugly, co ncerns of beauty are irrelevant here—they may play a role in the broader concept of well-being that I do not discuss in detail in this dissertation, but that is another issue. Aesthetics aside, he is far superior physically to anyone in existence.

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57 Higher physical perfection comes in vigor ous bodily activity. Here our major physical systems perform to higher degrees processing more air, carrying more nutrients, and moving greater weights longer distances. This activity occurs most notably in athletics, and the Aristotelian perfectionism finds the highest physical good in great athletic feats. (Ibid, pg. 39) Hurka admits that great physical feats also often embody practical rationality, but leave that aside for now. Hurka’s examples of great athletic feats are the record-setting instances of the 100 meter dash and the long-ju mp. I am not entirely satisfied with how Hurka explains the highest kind of physical pe rfection. Some of his examples seem too broad; for example, it is not clear that in the case where one can pr ocess more air that one’s well-being is thereby enhanced. Some of his examples seem too socially influenced; it is not clear why Hurka di d not pick, say, the record-setting for hotdog eating instead of the record-s etting long jump. I do not see any clear way to pick which of one’s physical abilities it is in one’s sel f-interest to develop apart from appealing to social norms, but this would mean appeali ng to something other than human nature. To pick an example from Frankenstein to illustrate my problem with Hurka’s theory, the monster speaks of having an excellent digestive tr act. Perhaps that physical attribute should be developed and exercised on the perfectionist th eory. I can see why developing and exercising his digestive tract is instrumentally good for the monster; then he could each just about anything. But how could developing it be intrinsically good? The worry is that Hurka’s account must pick out the features of one’s nature to be developed, and this “picking” will either be arbitrary or we will be loading the questions about one’s nature by relying on social norms. This is not meant to be a conclusive refutation of Hurka’s account, but it is a worry that I think re quires an answer. Now let us move on to the non-physical aspe cts of the monster’s nature. Does the monster have theoretical and practical rationality? Yes, and what is more, he is more

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58 intelligent than normal humans. This is not th e Frankenstein monster we grew up with in movies and television. He is more sensitive and quicker to learn than the vast majority of people. An objective account, such as Hurka’s, would measure his well-being to be extremely high throughout much of the novel. This is because the monster learns at an incredibly fast rate and he reasons extraordinarily well. Hurka’s account implies that a person’s well-being will increase with well exer cised theoretical and practical rationality. In Hurka’s own words: For theoretical perfection I will take this category [in which perfections occur] to be that of beliefs A person’s theoretical good at a time will depend on the number and quality of (some of) the propositions she believes at that time, so the issue is whether all her beliefs count or only those th at are, say justified or true. On the practical side, the general category will be intentions The relevant facts will concern the ends a person intends at each time or has resolved actively to pursue. (Hurka, pg. 101) Hurka finds the number and quality of one’s be liefs to be relevant to one’s theoretical perfection. He finds the number and quality of one’s intentions to be relevant to one’s practical perfection. Hurka is disinclined to treat all beliefs as enhancing one’s perfec tion. He identifies four categories of belief an agent can have: (1 ) belief, (2) justified belief, (3) true belief, and (4) justified true belief (Ibid, pg. 103). These are, of course, not meant to be mutually exclusive categories; a mental stat e that meets (1) could also meet (4), for example. Hurka has an analogous categorization for in tentions. He says that there are (1) intentions in the belief that one will achieve the end, (2) intentions in the justified belief that one will achieve the end, (3 ) intentions in the true belief that one will achieve the end and (4) intentions in the justified true belief one will achieve the end (Ibid, pg. 103).

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59 Hurka, for both beliefs and intentions, calls members of set (1) “attempts,” members of set (2) “deserving attempts,” members of set (3) “successful attempts,” and members of set (4) “deserving succ essful attempts.” As mentioned above, Hurka does not hold th at all beliefs and intentions count towards one’s perfection equally. He me ntions two possible accounts of how much perfection one could attain in ha ving a belief or intention in se t (1) through (4). The first account treats members of (1) as counting fo r some enhancement of well-being and each higher kind of belief and intention as counti ng for more. The second account treats only some subset of the members of sets (1)-(4 ) as counting for any enhancement of wellbeing. He prefers the second option and suggest s, but does not argue for, an account that treats only members of (4) as counting towards one’s perfection (Ibid, pg. 112-113). There is yet a further aspect of Hurka’s th eory. He thinks that even within the members of (4), there can be variations in th e amount of perfection atta ined. He says that there is a quality to each member of (4) that must be take n into account (Ibid, pg. 114). Those beliefs and intentions with the greater quality, according to Hu rka, are those that are general. The generality of a belief or intention, on Hurka’s account, is set by the breadth of the state of affa irs it describes and, by its role within a hierarchical and explanatory system (Ibid, pg. 115). I will turn now to a critical discussion of Hurka’s account. I am ambivalent as to whether Hurka’s account of theoretical perfec tion is plausible. However, I am certain that even if he has the correct account of perfection, human perfecti on could not serve in an account of well-being in the way he suppos es. There are some problems that seem particular to Hurka’s favored version of hu man nature which do not necessarily apply to

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60 all human nature accounts of well-being. Th ere are more central problems, as well, which seem to be significant obstacles to Hurka’s main arguments for the human nature account of well-being. I will explore these sorts of problems in turn. Hurka’s account seems too narrow in that it excludes too many beliefs from increasing one’s well-being. The countless ge nerations who believed, falsely, in some unifying scientific principle had a low level of theoretical perfection thereby, on Hurka’s theory. It is not clear what prin cipled reason there is for excluding justified though false, beliefs in some contexts. A somewhat related problem is th at people who generated what we now know to be false scientific theories, such as Newton, count as less theoretically rational than many who come af ter him, many of whom were much less good at science, even though Newton sure seems like a pa radigm of the rational individual.28 Theoretical rationality seems to involve more than just having beliefs of the right sort. Now, Hurka could just expand his account to include merely ju stified beliefs as enhancing well-being. And he could even expa nd the account to include all true beliefs as enhancing well-being. Hurka does not give an explanation of why he prefers to restrict the set of beliefs and intenti ons to deserving successes, so it is hard to formulate a specific criticism on this issue. If Hurka we re to expand the circle of which beliefs and intentions are relevant for well-being, it is not clear that there would not be new problems. Also, Hurka could change his posi tion to include more than the mere holding of beliefs of the right sort in his account of theoretical perfection. It is because there seems to be some room to maneuver, th at I do not think that these problems are necessarily damaging. 28 If Newton is a poor example for some reason or another, then there are many others who could serve as examples.

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61 Here is a criticism that hits Hurka’s a ccount more centrally. Hurka’s account of well-being, given the role of hu man nature as described by Hurka, seems to fail to meet the necessary conditions of prudential well-being. Recall that interest s that are relevant to one’s prudential well-being are those th at are non-moral, non-aesthetic, and selfinvolving. It is hard to see a principled wa y of ruling out counterintuitive examples of beliefs that, on Hurka’s account, end up countin g as relevant to one’s well-being. For example, knowing the number of blades of gr ass in Central Park, it turns out, increases one’s theoretical perfection on Hurka’s account. Now, the belief may have very little quality, to use Hurka’s terminology, and t hus might not increase one’s amount of perfection by very much. But, it is an utte r mystery how a true ju stified belief about the blades of grass in Central Pa rk, in itself, could increase one ’s well-being at all. The belief fails to be sufficiently se lf-involving or self-regarding to count as relevant to one’s well-being. It is not that having the beliefs under discussi on decrease one’s well-being, but these beliefs simply do not contribute to one’s well-being. Much of my criticism of Hurka has focused on hi s account of theoretical rationality, so let me turn to a problem with Hurka’s account of practic al rationality. As I say in the first chapter of this dissertation, any account of well-being must be able to explain acts and intentions of self-sacrifice. Hurka, given what he says about practical rationality, cannot explain self-sacrifice. The intention to spend one’s entire life feeding the starving only increases one’s well-being, wh en, in Hurka’s language, it is a successful and justified attempt. That is, on Hurka’s account, so long as one’s plan to feed the starving works and one is justified in believi ng that the plan will work, one’s perfection,

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62 and so one’s well-being, is in creased. But this is false.29 This would be an instance of self-sacrifice, not a way of e nhancing one’s own well-being. It is hard to see how accounts of theore tical and practical ra tionality, given the assigned role of rationality in Hurka’s theory of well-being, are sufficiently self-involving to serve as accounts of prudent ial well-being. With theoreti cal rationality, it is hard to see why merely having beliefs of the right sort intrinsically enhances someone’s prudential well-being. Having true and justifie d beliefs will often l ead to increases in prudential well-being—that is, instrumentally. After all, if one has good means/ends reasoning, one is more likely to get what one is after. However, on Hurka’s view, merely to have such a belief itself brings ab out an increase in well-being, which seems implausible. With practical rationality, Hurka’ s inability to explain self-sacrifice is very problematic; he is committed to saying that a ll of one’s successful and justified projects are in one’s self-interest. This goes directly against the intuition that there are acts of self-sacrifice. I think that the story of Frankenstein ’s monster is a good illustration of my criticism of Hurka’s account of well-being. With this exam ple, I hope to do two things: (a) show at least some reason fo r thinking that beliefs, as su ch, are not relevant to wellbeing and (b) show that ther e are other states of mind, l oosely speaking, that are much more relevant to well-being. As I mentioned in the brief account of the novel above, after the monster’s creation, he learns a great deal very quickly. To use Hurka’s language, the monster increases the size of his set of deserving successful belief and intention attempts 29 This problem comes from Hurka’s c hoice to treat only “formal” considerations as relevant to the restriction of the set of beliefs and intentions that in crease one’s perfection. “Formal” criteria, according to Hurka, cannot make reference to the content of the belief and intention (Ibid, pg. 114).

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63 very quickly. According to Hurka’s account, his well-being should in crease dramatically during this period. And yet in tuitively, this is not the case. Throughout the time of learning, the monster is simply wretched. Here are some reflections by the monster on the matter: I was not even of the same nature as ma n. I was more agile than they and could subsist upon coarser diet. . My statur e far exceeded theirs. When I looked around, I saw and heard of none like me. Wa s I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all men fled and whom all men disowned? I cannot describe to you the agony that these reflections inflicte d upon me. I tried to dispel them, but sorrow only increased with knowledge. . (Ibid, pg. 139) There are many other instances in which th e monster expresses hatred of his own existence. He likens himself to Satan in one passage, because he has been “cast down” by his creator, and then claims that he is wo rse off than Satan in another, because he has been left alone whereas Satan has some co mpany. The kind of anguish he experiences evokes a great deal of sympathy. He states: “Of what a strange nature is knowledge! It clings to the mind, when it has once seized on it, like a lichen on the rock. I wished sometimes to shake off all thought and feeling, but I learned that there was but one means to overcome the sensation of pain, that was death” (Ibid, pg. 140). The monster is clearly suicidal. During this period, the monster is physica lly healthy and devel ops his theoretical and practical rationality significantly. But, in tuitively, his life is simply not going well for him. Now, to be fair to Hurka, the low level of the monste r’s well-being is not intrinsic to the new beliefs, but instead, is cau sed by those beliefs. The low level of wellbeing is caused by the beliefs under discus sion because his holding and reflecting on these beliefs causes him great deal of unhappiness So I think it would be incorrect to say that the monster’s life is going poorly simply in virtue of having the “successful” and

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64 “deserving” beliefs. But Hurka’s account is committed to claiming that the monster’s life is going quite well, and this just does not s eem to be the case. This example is not conclusive, I understand, but it does seem compelling. The above discussion raises the question as to what makes the monster’s life go poorly, at least intuitively. Either his unhappiness or his frustrated desires seem to be two good candidates that could figure into an expl anation of why, intui tively, his life is going poorly. He is living his life in accordance w ith Hurka’s account of nature and yet has a poor life. Some other theory must expl ain the monster’s low level of well-being. Hurka’s account of human nature is not th e only explanatory objective account out there. Perhaps another account could do better. One of the reasons I work with Hurka’s account is that it is the best account of huma n nature I have found; both in terms of how well-developed it is and in terms of how good the arguments are for it.30 So I do not think that any other account of human nature could serve better for the perfectionist model. 2.2.3 Application of Happiness to the Story We turn now to a darker part of the st ory of Frankenstein. Though the above may evoke sympathy for the monster, perhaps what fo llows will not. The monster, after being rejected by everyone he comes across, and after having his hopes of having a spouse dashed, turns on his creator and makes the ruin of Frankenstein the goal of his life. Unbeknownst to Frankenstein, the monster is pr esent when he tears apart the still lifeless body of his monster’s spouse-to -be. As the two part ways, the monster says to Frankenstein “I shall be with you on your wedding night” (Ibid, pg. 202). Frankenstein 30 Note as well that I exclude evolutionary accounts of human nature from consideration at this stage because they could not plausibly serve in a theory of prudential well-being.

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65 takes this to be a threat against him; that is to say, Frankenstein thought the monster was threatening to kill him on his wedding night. However, the monster’s intention was to kill Frankenstein’s new bride, Elizabeth.31 Not wanting his wife to see a fatal ba ttle between himself and his monster, Frankenstein sends his wife to their bedroom. Frankenstein wants he r to be safe, but she is not. He is very nervous and agitated, but is not unhappy. He does not fear for the life of his new bride. The monster sneaks into their bedroom and kills her. Frankenstein finds out very soon thereafter that she has been killed. Frankenstein, in recollecting this sad tale, remarks: “Great God! If one instant I had thought what might be the hellish intention of my fiendish advers ary, I would rather have banished myself forever from my na tive country, and wandered a friendless outcast over the earth, than have consen ted to this miserable marriage. But, as if possessed of magic powers, the monster had blinded me to hi s real intentions and when I thought that I had prepared only my own death, I hastened th at of a far dearer victim” (Ibid, pg. 231). Frankenstein’s life goes worse when his new bride’s life is threatened and even worse when she is killed. But the mental state account does not account for this.32 It has it that Frankenstein’s life goes worse when he “finds out” about E lizabeth’s death. The gap between her death and Fra nkenstein’s finding out about her death is extremely short (the time it takes for Frankenstein to run to thei r room). But there are larger gaps of time in the other murders. Days, perhaps weeks, in the case of one of Fr ankenstein’s relatives 31 No doubt, the monster sees this as a more fitting punishment for Frankenstein’s decision to abort the creation of another being to be the monster’s wife. 32 A newer kind of mental state account, such as th at of Sumner (1996), re quires that happiness and unhappiness be informed to count toward or against one’s well-being. Sumner’s account is what I would call a “mixed theory,” and discussion of it must be put off till later.

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66 who is killed by the monster. Of course it is conceivable that Fr ankenstein would never find out about some of the murders. Yet the mental state accounts sa y that Frankenstein’s life would go well so long as he never found out about them. The objective account and the desire account have something going for them here that the mental state account lacks: namely, that there are cases where pe oples’ lives go poorly for them despite the fact that they are not aware of this. I do not take this point to be conclusive against the mental state conception, but it does show a weakness. For a more telling objection, I must modify the story slightly. In Shelley’s story, Frankenstein’s creation gets angry when he is rejected and gets depressed when he feels utterly alone and isolated. He lashes out at Frankenstein and all of society in his rage. Frankenstein wants to pacify his monster and so let us say, to modify Shelley’s story, he creates an experience machine. The experi ence machine generates experiences for the monster such that he will have whatever me ntal state a mental state theory takes to constitute well-being. This idea, of course is drawn from Robert Nozick’s famous thought experiment found in his Anarchy, State and Utopia Nozick frames the issue as one about whether people would choose to go into the machine. This element of choice needlessly complicates the matter. I will ma ke the story such that Frankenstein just places the monster in the machine without the monster’s knowledge. We must think about whether the monster’s life is going better when he is in the machine. Once in the machine, Frankenstein’s monste r has whatever mental state is relevant to well-being according to any given mental state conception, whether it is pleasure, happiness or some third alternative. The mons ter can be made to believe that all of his wishes are granted and he c ould turn out quite content and happy. Has the monster’s

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67 well-being been increased thereby? It is implausible to think that merely putting the monster in the machine in creases his well-being. Nozick offers three reasons for thinking th at the mental states which result from living in an experience machine could not be all there is to well-being; life in the experience machine leaves something important out of the life. The first reason is that people want to do things rather than just expe rience them (Nozick, pg. 43). The experience machine does not distinguish betw een doing something a nd experiencing it. The second is that people want to be a certain way rather than just to experience things (Ibid, pg. 43). It is a bit di fficult to tell what Nozick has in mind with this second idea, but the way he expresses the concern is that, once inside the machine, we will not be any particular sort of person (Ibi d, pg. 43). The third reason is that living in the machine limits one’s “reality” to a man-made “reality” and people want to be connected to the deeper reality (Ibid, pg. 43-44). Nozick sugge sts that once in the machine, there is no “actual contact” with any deeper reality (Ibid, pg. 43). Perhaps Nozick has misstated the problem just a bit; there could still be some connection to a deeper reality when in the machine. But even if there is some connecti on to a deeper reality, it is less substantial than we would prefer. So I think Nozick’s thir d point needs to be modi fied a bit, but still maintains much of its original force. Nozick’s three points about the inadequaci es of life in the machine are generally quite convincing. A person’s lif e in the machine, even Frankenstein’s monster’s life, would be so separated from his “mental life” that his life cannot plausibly be said to be going better. There must be, as it were, so me change in the world external to his

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68 psychology in order for his life to go better at least some times.33 There might be some cases where we might think that something that happens in the experience machine does make one’s life go better or worse, but that certainly will not be the case across a full range of examples. With the mental stat e theories, no such external changes are necessary; thereby making the theory counter-intuitive. Now the experience machine poses less of a challenge to the theories that base well-being in human nature or desire-satisf action than to mental state accounts. The monster’s beliefs will be false and his intentions will rarely succeed and so, according to Hurka’s account of which beliefs matter for perfection, the monster’s well-being would be low. As I mentioned earlier in this ch apter, Hurka mentions other accounts of which beliefs matter for perfection (such as justif ied beliefs) and so there might be some flexibility in the matter. My th inking on this is that so long as there is flexibility in the issue, human nature accounts will be able to account for experience machine cases with at least a minimum of adequacy. Desire-satisfaction accounts do not imply counter-intuitive resu lts in experience machine examples. Now, some desires can be satisfied within the experience machine, such as desires to have certain experiences So according to at least many desiresatisfaction theories, one’s well-being c ould increase when the experience machine produces the desired pleasure. However, I do not think that these sorts of examples are counterintuitive for the desi re-satisfaction theories. Here is just a simple example meant to il lustrate a point abou t desire-satisfaction theories and experience machines. Imagine that an agent wants to experience the taste of 33 In a later chapter, I will examine a theory that combines mental states with facts outside of the mental life of the agent. Such a theory is a mixed theo ry rather than a pure mental state theory.

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69 mint chocolate chip ice cream and, lacking any ice cream of that sort, opts for the experience machine. The agent’s well-being could thereby increase according to desiresatisfaction accounts. Those who think such ex amples problematic for desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being need to pay careful attention to what the agent’s desires are and which desires are satisfied. Compare the cont ent of three closely related, but different, desires: (1) to experience th e taste of mint chocolate chip ice cream, (2) to taste mint chocolate chip ice cream, or (3) to eat mint chocolate chip ice cream. Of these three desires, only the first could be satisfied with in the experience machine, as the machine is usually understood. Strictly sp eaking, the second and the th ird could not be satisfied when in the machine. The second and third desires cannot be satisf ied because the person does not actually taste any ice cream, nor doe s he actually eat ice cream, when in the experience machine as it is normally unders tood. Although the example is simple, it illustrates something about the content of our desires. Though people often speak loosely about the content of thei r desires, careful attention to th e content of desires is necessary when dealing with such cases. Very close atte ntion to the content of the desires in these cases makes the experience machine cases unproblematic for the desire-satisfaction account of well-being. The three problems that I mention Nozick thought the experience machine posed for certain theories do not show that all accounts of wellbeing that treat well-being as increasing in the machine are problematic. The three problems only show that any theory which treats well-being as consisting entirely in states produced by experience machine is inadequate. So the experience machine shows th at mental state theories are inadequate. But desire-satisfaction and human nature theo ries have no special problems dealing with

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70 experience machine cases. We can allow for some increases in well-being, according to a theory of well-being, within the experience machine without impla usible consequences for that theory. We just have to be able to say what else makes a life go well besides mental states.34 So, there are serious problems with pure mental state accounts. Later in this dissertation, in Chapter 6, I w ill examine more sophisticated theories of well-being that get around the experience machine cases. Bu t for now, note that desire-satisfaction accounts seem to avoid the objections to wh ich mental state and explanatory objective theories fall prey. In the next chapter I will develop what I take to be the most plausible desire-satisfaction account. In 2.2.4, however, I will examine a different kind of account of well-being; an account which does not pick ou t just one thing that makes a life go well, but instead, picks out ma ny different things. 2.2.4 Pluralistic Conceptions of Well-Being An account is pluralistic if it treats two or more factors as each being partly constitutive of well-being. With pluralisms, each factor is a well-being “maker;” i.e. each factor is at least partly constitutive of well-being—the presence of each enhances wellbeing. Pluralisms are not to be confused with mixed theories. A mixed conception takes several different factors a nd adds them together as necessary conditions. Sumner’s view, discussed briefly above as proposing a combina tion of mental states and states outside one’s mental life to constitute well-being, is a mixed theory. Pluralisms differ from 34 Nozick himself states the three pr oblems for mental state theories st emming from the experience machine cases in a way that is very friendly to desire-satisfacti on theories. I paraphrase him above, but I stay true to his language of putting the objections in terms of what we want for ourselves. For example, Nozick states, roughly, that we want to do certain things and be certain sorts of people (Ibid, pg.43). Desire-satisfaction accounts have no trouble including these desires in the account of we ll-being. Indeed, they actually account for the missing elements quite well.

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71 mixed theories in that each factor is sufficient for at least some amount or degree of wellbeing. Assessing mixed theories can be quite complicated because the mixed theories start with one of the above discussed c onceptions but then ch ange it in a quite fundamental manner, thereby losing either one or both of the characteristics that make it plausible in the first place. I must put off discussing mixed theories until a later chapter in this dissertation because they are so sophi sticated. When one draws up a list and does not unify the items on the list, one way of unde rstanding the list is in the pluralistic way. John Finnis, in his Natural Law and Natural Rights offers a list of things as an account of “’good,’ ‘basic good,’ ‘value,’ ‘wel l-being’” (Finnis, pg. 86). As I said before, Finnis lists the following factors as re levant to well-being: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonable ness and religion. Griffin has a similar list. Finnis claims that the fact that these el ement belong on his list is “indemonstrable” and “self-evident” (Finnis pg. 59, 65, and 85). Sometimes views like Finnis’ are dismissed quite quickly. For example, K itcher in his essay “Essence and Perfection” states: Distinguish two varie ties of objectivism. Bare objectivism simply offers a list of the things that make human lives go well. When asked what qualifies the items for inclusion, bare objectivists ha ve no explanatory theory to offer; it’s simply a brute fact that these things are good for us . Clashes between bare objectivists seem doomed to immediate stalemate. (Kitcher, pg. 59-60).35 I think that a lot of the criticism of so-calle d “objective list” theories is due to the claim their advocates often make that such lists are self-evident Other authors disagree with them and do not like to be told that thei r “faculty of perceptio n” of well-being is 35 See also Sumner’s Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (pg. 24, 46).

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72 malfunctioning. However, there is no need to accept Finnis’ claim th at his list is selfevident. The items on the list, then, should be t hought of as having an epistemic status relevantly like the status of th e set of mental states, or satisf actions of the desire set, or the aspects of human nature, in other kinds of theory. So I propose to read Finnis as a pluralis t and ignore his claim to self-evidence. Griffin’s latest book, Value Judgement contains a somewhat simila r list that can also be interpreted as pluralistic. These theories are to be evaluated just as the other theories are, by engaging in critical reflec tion—looking at the implications of the theory and then reexamining the theoretical unde rpinnings of the conception. These pluralistic accounts look very attractive at first beca use they seem to solve at least some of the problems that the other th eories face. In fact, though I do not know of anyone who does this, one could generate a plur alistic theory that combines the factors referred to as enhancing well-being in each of the three types of monistic conception— some mental states, desire satisfaction, and whatever accords with human nature.36 Generally, pluralists offer six or seven items on a list with the claim that no item on the list is reducible to any other and that none is more important than any other. Let us just look at one example where it seems that a pluralist can fix the problems that beset an explanatory objectivist such as Hurka. Think back to the example of Frankenstein’s original monster in the una ltered story. Franke nstein’s monster is 36 Amartya Sen in his “Plural Utility” discusses the po ssibility of a consequentialism that treats utility as composed of both mental states and desire satisfaction in a pluralistic fashion. Scanlon comes close to accepting a theory that treats mental states, desire-satisfaction and othe r features as each constituting at least some well-being (Scanlon, pg 124-125). However Scanlon claims that his account of well-being is still incomplete in that it does not give a final way of deciding between conflicts of the various factors that make a life go well; it is not a theory of well-being in the full sense (Ibid, pg. 125).

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73 developing his natural talents but is nevertheless extremely mi serable. A pluralist could include some subjective elements to account fo r our intuition that the monster’s life is going poorly. The fifth element on Finnis’ list, sociability (friendship), is missing from the monster’s life. In this way, it seems th at a pluralist could account for some of the counterintuitive result s of an explanatory objective theory. There is one complication he re: it appears that the pluralist w ho endorses Finnis’ list must claim that the monster’s life is going quite well because he has nearly every element on the list (and in high amou nts), but that his life would go better if he had social relations. This is counterintuitive, because it looks like the monster’s life is going very poorly. What this might mean is that Finnis’ list is suspect. However, it is open to the pluralist to change the list to make it more pl ausible. So this is not an objection to pluralists per se One could just draw up a list containing mental states, desiresatisfaction, and perhaps friendship. So pluralistic theories, it seems, have some plausibility in virtue of their inclusiveness. If, intuitively, there is so mething missing in someone’s life that thereby makes the person less well-off, one could add wh atever is missing to the list. However, this permissive inclusivity, which at first seem s like a great virtue of this kind of theory, turns out to be a significant liability. Let me explain. Any monistic conception of well-being picks out ju st one factor and says that wellbeing varies with that factor, no matter how co mplexly that factor is characterized. As I have already mentioned, mental state, desi re-satisfaction and e xplanatory objective theories are all monistic. Pluralistic theories, on the other hand, pick out two or more things. For the pluralist, some actions w ill enhance one factor but diminish another

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74 factor. For example, going to church on a re gular basis may increase the “religiosity factor,” but decrease the amount of play in one’s life. Both pl ay and religion are on Finnis’ list. What the pluralist needs is an account of the weighing and measuring of the various different factors that make a life go we ll in order for the theory to give definite assessments of well-being—a principle of adjudication that makes commensurable the factors that constitute at least some well-being.37 The principle of adjudication would say when one’s life is going better than, worse th an, or equally well as the life of another person (or perhaps another time-slice of the same person). There are two sorts of problems for the pl uralist resulting from the lack of a principle of adjudication; me taphysical problems and epis temological problems. The metaphysical problem for pluralis tic theories is that without such a principle, there is no fact of the matter about how much well-being someone has when she has two or more of the factors constitutive of well-being. The epistemological problem for pluralistic theories that arises from the absence of a pr inciple of adjudication is that we have no way of knowing how much well-bei ng one has when she possesses two or more of the features that could contri bute to one’s well-being. Now, I think that the metaphysical problem is much worse than the epistemological problem, but both seem to be significant prob lems. In everyday judgments, people assess levels of well-being and make choices in cases of tradeoffs. What the pluralist needs to do is to vindicate the idea th at there are really are amounts of well-being and so solve the metaphysical problem. But we also would very much like a philosophical account of what epistemological tools one could use to make such judgments. However, it is 37 One interesting issue is whether the principle of adju dication will then turn what looked like a pluralistic conception into a monistic conception. This is an interesting issue, but too far off my course.

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75 because the epistemological problem is not uniqu e to pluralistic theories that I think it is less significant problem.38 Thus far, no principle of adjudication ha s been given and none seems forthcoming. Suppose that the pluralist admits that a pr inciple of adjudication cannot be given and claims instead that intuition can solve the problems. Intuition, on this account, could then determine the amount of well-being someone has (t o solve the metaphysical problem) or intuition could at least serve as a guide in discovering or detecting the level of well-being one has (to solve the epistemological problem). The appeal to intuition will certainly not work to solve the metaphysical problem a nd it probably will not work to solve the epistemological problem. People differ so wide ly in their intuitions on the same cases. There is not a clear reason for thinking anyone ’s intuitions are superior and even if one were to grant that there could be authorities in such an issu e, there is not a clear reason for picking out the authority. The pluralist might grant that there is no principle of ad judication, and that relying on individual intuition will not work. He could simply admit that there is a radical incommensurability involved. This incomme nsuration is especially troubling when viewed as metaphysical incommensuration. Th ere simply would be no fact as to how much well-being someone has when she possesse s two or more features on the list of thinks that make a life go well. This opti on amounts to the claim that people in some cases do not have any definite total amount of well-being at a ny given time. The pluralist 38 All of the monistic theories discussed in this chap ter have at least some epistemological problems. For example, a proponent of Hurka’s perfectionist theory would no doubt have problems identifying a person’s entire belief set: the epistemological problems for Hurk a’s perfectionism are much worse if trying to determine which beliefs are true or false. As I say, I believe other monistic conceptions have epistemological problems too.

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76 of this sort admits that there are many cases where there is no answer to questions about whether one’s life is going better, worse, or remains the same But this is problematic, for then our conception of well-being fails to live up to our ordi nary judgments about well-being.39 This kind of incommensurability is of a different order that is, say, inter personal incommensurability. This kind of incommensurability is what could be called intra personal incommensurability. At least in many cases, it would make it impossible for there to be any fact of the matter as to whether someone’s life is improving or getting worse overall. All that the pluralist could say about some cases is that “insofar as A has feature x A ’s life is better; but insofar as A has y A ’s life is worse.” Intuitively, we make ordinary judgment about overall well-being and think that there is a fact of the matter regarding overall well-being. Pluralism that accepts incommensurability must reject such ordinary, everyday judgments. Pluralisms are inclusive in that they bri ng in to the theory many components that can make a life go well. The cost, however, is th at pluralisms result, in a way, in a sort of fragmentation of well-being. If all one can say is that one’s life goes well in virtue of x but poorly in virtue of y then the overall assessment of a life that should be intuitively fairly clear, at least in many cases, is missing. We have looked at two methods of maki ng the items on the list commensurable; using a principle of commensuration and using intuition to commensurate. No principle of commensuration is forthcoming and ther e is no account of whose intuitions are 39 We have been looking at the difficult cases lately. But I ask the reader to go back to the “easy” cases; those discussed with the Count of Monte Cristo or common sense everyday judgments. It is difficult to test one’s intuitions in cases where the various conceptions of well-being differ. The examples from the first chapter are better (in that one’s intu itions in such cases should be clea rer) because all of the plausible conceptions of well-being “agree” about what to say regarding well-being in those cases.

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77 authoritative. If the pluralist accepts incomm ensurability of the factors on the list, then the pluralist cannot vindicate or dinary judgments of well-bein g in simple cases, either metaphysically or epistemologically. Perhaps there may be a way to save pl uralism, however. There has been an intriguing proposal by Ruth Cha ng in her “Introduction” to Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Chang claims that there is a fourth positive value relation in addition to “worse than,” “equal to,” and “better than.” This fourth relation can be described as “on par with” (Chang, pg. 27-28). The “on par with” relation is “positive” in the sense that it is a kind of co mparability as opposed to incomparability. If two things, and are on a par, and a third thing, +, is better than there is still room for + and to be on a par as well (Ibid, pg. 24). The “on par with” may seem paradoxical in some ways. Chang does not thi nk that the “on par with” relation is a kind of vagueness and so cannot mean “roughly equal to” or anything similar. Furthermore, judgments involving the “on par with” relation are not merely those involving ignorance about the “true” value of the things in que stion. Chang’s “on par with” relation is supposed to be a relation in the metaphysics of value and so looks like it might go some way to solving the metaphysical problems that pluralisms face.40 Whether a fourth positive value relation of the sort Chang has in mind exists is controversial. Chang’s proposal can be argued against on several fron ts. Rather than go into the arguments about whether there indeed is a fourth pos itive value relation howev er, I would like to 40 If a pluralist adopted Chang’s “on par with” relation, perhaps some of the force of the epistemological problems could be lessened as well. For, if there is no concrete fact of the matter that one has more or less well-being than another in some situation, we should not demand that any theory have an account of how one is to, or at least could, decide such cases.

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78 explore the prospects of us ing the “on par with” relati on to solve the problems of commensurability for the plura list about well-being. Chang’s “on par with” relation seems, at fi rst glance, like it might be able to solve the incommensurability problem pluralisms face. 41 What a pluralist could say is that the amounts of well-being enhanced by having some of either of two ite ms on a list are on par with each other. For example, the plura list could say that, othe r things being equal, the level of well-being of someone with a mi nimum amount of religiosity is on par with the level of well-being of someone with a minimum amount of friendship.42 The pluralist could claim that many lives ar e on par with each other. Adopting Chang’s on par relation does not re ally help, however, in that it does not solve the fundamental problem for the pluralist about we ll-being. For, even if we treat lives that have minimal amounts of each of th e items on the list as being on par with each other (other things being equal), the deep metaphysical and epistemological problems remain. There is still nothing about a pluralistic theory that could, even in principle solve the remaining metaphysical and episte mological problems. Let me explain. Presumably for an account of well-being to be adequate, there must be a fair range of cases where one life is worse than, better than, or equal to another life in regards to wellbeing. Even with Chang’s proposal in place, the pluralist has nothing in his theory that 41 I should note that Chang does not offer the “on par with” relation as a solution to the problems that the pluralisms about well-being face. Instead, I have take n what she says about two things being on a par and will examine whether it can help the pluralist out of his problem with incommensurability. 42 Interestingly, perhaps the applicability of the “on par with” relation could be extended. Perhaps a pluralist could say that an agent’s well-being at a time is on par with his past level of well-being, when the person has at least some of the two different factors that make a life go well and one changes over time. For example, at time t1, A has a great deal of friendship and a little bit of religiosity; later at t2, A has the same amount of friendship but a bit more religiosity. A ’s level of well-being at t1 and t2 could be on par with each other. I will not explore this possible extension.

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79 could settle the matter except for in a few ra re instances. The pl uralist who accepts Chang’s “on par with” relation would still need a sort of principle of adjudication or a sort of intuition to determine when two lives ar e on par. The pluralists even if he accepts Chang’s “on par with” relation, must still pr ovide an account of weighing and measuring for many of the ordinary lives. This is a tall order, perhaps not as daunting a task as the fully precise principle of adjudication or in tuition, but neverthele ss an extraordinarily daunting task. Let me illustrate how the central proble m still remains for a pluralist who adopts Chang’s “on par with” relation. Suppose some one has one and only one item on the list, say, friendship. According to a simple vers ion of pluralism with the “on par with” relation, his life will be on par with many othe r possible lives, such as the possible life in which he has a great amount of pleasure. Bo th possible lives will be on par, according to the simplistic theory under discussion, because the person in the examples has a bit of each of the items on the list. Too many lives will be on par accordi ng to a pluralist who adopts the on par relation. Perhaps, by adop ting the “on par with” relation, a pluralist could explain how one life with a little bit of an item on a list is worse than a life with more of the same item, but the problem rema ins about how to distinguish between lives that have differing, perhaps many, items on the lis t. A principle of adjudication is still necessary. Perhaps with the “on par with” relation, only a rough principle of adjudication is necessary. But even a rough prin ciple is a very tall order. At first glance, pluralisms l ook attractive. It seems like they may be able to solve the problems the various monisms face. Their inclusiveness is very appealing initially. However, upon further examination, they come with a set of insurm ountable problems of

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80 their own. In the absence of a method that makes the items on the list commensurable, whether by principle of adjudi cation (which does not seem forthcoming) or intuition (which does not seem up to the task), they have striking difficulties dealing, in a philosophical way, with seemingly easy judgm ents of well-being. The pluralist who adopts Chang’s “on par with” relation does not solve the central problem. 2.2.5 Conclusion Desire-satisfaction accounts of well-be ing seem to come out ahead of its competitors at this point of the critical discussion of conceptions of well-being. Explanatory objective theories have a hard time excluding the evol utionary account of human nature, which could not plausibly se rve in an account of prudential well-being. Non-evolutionary accounts of human nature, such as Hurka’s, also face serious problems. His account of physical nature has at least minor problems, but the bigger problems are with his account of rationality. Developing and exercising one’s theo retical and practical rationality fails to be self-involving enough to meet the conditions of the concept of wellbeing. Mental state theories have problems too. Their initially attrac tive feature, the dependence on the psychology of the agent, turn s out to be an enormous liability when we think of actual and hypothetical cases where one’s psychology can be easily manipulated. Thought experiments involving the experience machine illustrate these problems quite clearly and convincingly. Although I think that pluralisms have not been sufficiently explored and appreciated, they come with huge problems of their own. Given that no principle of commensuration has been forthcoming, there is not any obvious way to vindicate many ordinary judgments of well-being. Adopting Chang’s idea that two possible lives can be

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81 on par when two or more items on the list are had by the agent—or the idea that two possible lives can be on par wh en an agent has some amount of two different items on the list—is initially intriguing, but leaves us no better off in asse ssing ordinary lives; for most lives have multiple items on the list to vary ing degrees and, at least in many cases, we have straightforward intuitions on such matters. To be fair, I have only shown how the desi re-satisfaction account is not susceptible to the problems of the other conceptions. I ha ve not addressed problem s that are specific to desire-satisfaction accounts. I will do that in chapte rs 3-6, where I develop and defend what I take to be the best versi on of the desire-sat isfaction account.

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82 CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPING A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELL-BEING 3.1 Actual Desire Accounts Critically Discussed 3.1.1 Some Introductory Remarks There is a lot to be said in favor of desi re-satisfaction accounts of well-being. We have seen some of their plausi ble features in play in the previous chapter. Before we move on to discuss the more sophisticated mi xed views of well-being, it is necessary to develop the most plausible version of the de sire-satisfaction con ception of well-being. Let us use the term “relevant desire set” to refer to the set of desires the satisfaction of which increase well-being. Some may say, somewhat implausibly, that the relevant desire set for an agent includes all actual desire s of that agent. Most desire-satisfaction theorists have thought that the relevant desire set is someth ing different from the set of total actual desires. The project of this chapte r is to identify the relevant desire set. The project of the next chapter (Cha pter 4) is to defend that acco unt against recent criticisms. The project of Chapter 5 is to make sure that the desire-satisfaction account developed and defended in the third and fourth chapte rs meets the conditions of prudential wellbeing as set out in th e first chapter. So this chapter is dedicated to identifyi ng the most plausible set of desires the satisfaction of which increase well-being. It is because the desire-satisfaction account will be modified slightly in the third and four th chapters that the reader should think of the theory developed in this chapter as a “rough draf t.” The final version of the central theory should be made clear by the end of Ch apter 5, but we must start somewhere. In

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83 this chapter I will first examin e whether the relevant desire set ought to be restricted to intrinsic desires or whether the satisfaction of instrumental desires ought to count in favor of one’s well-being as well. I conclude that restricting the desire set to intrinsic desires makes for a more plausible account of well-be ing. Then I will go on to discuss whether we should think of the relevant desire set as being composed of actua l intrinsic desires or intrinsic desires one would have in counterfact ual situations. I conc lude that intrinsic desires one would have under counterfactual conditions (whi ch I will specify) are best. 3.1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Desires As mentioned above, I will ar gue that only intrinsic desi res are relevant to wellbeing. Before I get into the arguments, it make s sense to provide an account of intrinsic and extrinsic desires. It is commonly said th at intrinsic desires are desires for things in themselves. This common way of understand ing intrinsic desires will do for now, though it will be made clearer after th e discussion of extrinsic desire s below. No desire can be intrinsic and extrinsic; things can be intrin sically desired and extr insically desired, but no desire can be both intr insic and extrinsic. I will discuss three types of extrinsic desi res: (1) instrumental desires, (2) wholeconstitutive desires, and (3) part-constitutive de sires. A desire is instrumental if and only if one has it because one believe s that the satisfaction of it will be a means to some end. For example, Frankenstein may have a desire for money. This would be an instrumental desire if he has it because he believes that th e satisfaction of it will help in satisfying his desire to create his monster. Secondly, a desire is wholeconstitutive if and only if one has it because one believes that the satisfaction of it constitutes the satisfaction of another desire entirely. For example, Frankenstein may have a desire to bring a corpse to life because he believes

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84 that in doing so he will do something God-like. The satisfaction of Frankenstein’s desire, he believes, simply constitutes doing somethi ng God-like. Let me return briefly to intrinsic desires. It may seem, at least at first glance, that wholeconstitution desires are intrinsic. This is a mistake. If Frankens tein really desires to bring a corpse alive because he believes that in doing so he will do some thing God-like, then Frankenstein’s desire to bring a corpse to life makes reference to some other desire. If Frankenstein desires something because of some other desi re, then the desire is extrinsic. Thirdly, a desire is part-constitutive if and only if the agent has it because he believes that satisfaction of it partly constitute s the state of affairs that is the object of another desire. For example, Frankenstein ma y have a desire to ha ve a brain (not the brain in his head, mind you, but an other brain). He has the de sire for a brain because he believes that having it will achieve part of ha ving a whole corpse. St rictly speaking, it is not that the brain is a means to having a corpse: rather, it is that having a brain is part of having a corpse. Frankenstein’s desire for a brain would be part-constitutive in this case. I wrote above that an intrin sic desire, roughly, is a desire for something in itself. An agent has an intrinsic desire for someth ing, on my account, if the agent desires that thing without some other desire playing a role as a reason for the desire. Now, an agent may have an intrinsic desire that her desires are satisfied; so her intrinsic desires might make reference to desires. But she cannot have an intrinsic desire because of some further desire. There is one last thing to note about intrinsic and extr insic desires. It seems entirely possible that a desire could begin as an extrinsic de sire and then change to an intrinsic desire. Frankenstein’s desire for m oney, which begins as an instrumental desire

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85 could change to a desire he has intrinsicall y. The “because” in the above formulations is not supposed to capture something about th e generation of a desire. Rather, the “because” should be thought of as invoking a reason or justification from the agent’s point of view. So, even if someone desires something in itself and she has the desire “because” (in an historical way) she had an extr insic desire of a particular sort, her desire should still be thought of as intrinsic. Should the satisfaction of extrinsic desire s count towards one’s well-being? As I have put it, should extrinsic desires be in the re levant set? I do not think that they should be in the relevant set and in 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, I argue for that conclusion. 3.1.3 Problems for Total Desi re Satisfaction Accounts Total desire accounts take the sa tisfaction of all one’s desires as increasing one’s well-being, whether extrinsic or intrinsic. As I suggest a bove, I believe that actual desires, at least in some cases should not be in the relevant de sire set, but let me set aside the issue for now. On total desire accounts, both extrinsic and intrin sic desires matter. They do not have to matter equally. Desire sets can have a hierarchy. An outcome can be desired because it is instrumental to anot her outcome, which itself might instrumental to some further desired state of affairs. Hi erarchy matters on these accounts, insofar as there are differing “weights” that can be placed on the desires. 1 Some will be more important than others. Even taking hierar chy into account, I think that total desiresatisfaction accounts have significant pr oblems as a theory of well-being. Imagine Frankenstein is working in his laboratory (t his does not happen in the book). He is tired and exhausted, but thirsty. Water will quench his thir st, he thinks. He 1 There could be other forms of hierarchy as well—even between different intrinsic desires. At this point, I only want to focus on one sort of hierarchy as a resource for the total desire view.

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86 reaches out to what he believes is a glass of water in front of him. He pulls it to his mouth and takes a drink. On this imagined ex ample, he has an intrinsic desire to quench his thirst and an extrinsic desi re to drink from the glass in front of him. Frankenstein’s desire to drink from the glass in front of him is satisfied. Has Frankenstein’s well-being increased as a result of his desire-satisfactio n? Well, that depends, I take it, on whether the glass in front of him contained water or not. Let us suppose that it did—that seems a case where it is plausible and intuitive to say that his well-being has been thereby increased. However, let us suppose that it did not contain water. Not to expose the reader to an example that is too disgusting, let us say the glass contained alcohol. So Frankenstein really drank alcohol when he sati sfied his desire to drink from the glass in front of him. It seems clear here that th is cannot be a case of improved well-being, but read on. We cannot put the total desire theory in the coffin just yet. Frankenstein’s desire to drink from the glass in front of him is just one of his desires am ong many. He has other desires as well in the case where the glass co ntains alcohol. Maybe the satisfaction of this one desire has caused the others to be thwarted (such as the desire to be clearheaded). The person who favors a total desire-satisfaction theo ry could argue that, in the story so described, Frankenstein’s well-bei ng suffers a net decrease as a result of the action—so the example does not have counter-intuitive results. Call this response the “swamped desire” response. The desire to drink from the glass can be swamped by other desires both in number and in importance. Bu t I think that the swam ped desire response will not work, for it grants the person who favors total desire-satisfaction far too much. The result (after the net is calculated) comes out all right, but the wa y of getting to that

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87 result is still unacceptable. The following thes is still holds for a to tal desire satisfaction theory: Insofar as Frankenste in drank from the glass in fr ont of him, his well-being was improved. Given that it contains alcohol a nd not water, this is counter-intuitive. Additionally, the “swamped desire” response only works if one ha s enough desires (or enough strong desires) thwarted. There wi ll be cases where there are no such countervailing desires and in those cases, an agent’s desire satisfac tion will increase his well-being. Frankenstein’s desire to quench his thirst seems to be relevant to his well-being. Furthermore, let us suppose that his desire to drink from the glass in front of him is derived from beliefs that are highly justifie d: Frankenstein has not been a careless reasoner. The problem then would lie in count ing the desire to dri nk from the glass in front of him as relevant to his well-being. There are two ways to block this undesired consequence: (1) remain with actual desires, but restrict the relevant set to only intrinsic desires, and exclude extrinsic de sires: this is to abandon total desire views or (2) to move away from an actual desires account to a counterfactual account of the desires, the satisfaction of which, improve one’s well-being: this is compatible with remaining true to total desire views. I will discuss these two strategies, or ways of responding to the objections, in turn.2 3.1.4 Intrinsic Desires Restricting the relevant class of desires to intrinsic desires would solve the abovementioned problem. On the story given, Franke nstein intrinsically desires to quench his 2 Sometimes writers on this topic will look at problems structurally similar to the “thirsty Frankenstein” example and immediately conclude that the way to solve the problem it to go with (2), but this is to miss an important possible solution to this problem. For an example of someone who immediately goes with (2), see Griffin, 1986. I think it very probable that Grif fin understands the deeper issues, but his example is misleading.

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88 thirst. His desire to drink from the glass in front of him is merely instrumental to the end of quenching his own thirst. He has no intrinsic desire to dri nk from the glass in front of him. Even though he drinks from the glass in front of him, his well-being is not increased thereby. In fact, with plausible background values put into place, presumably his well-being is decreased by drinking alcohol because he has intrinsic desires to stay healthy, clear-minded, and so on. It might seem one could solve the probl em—alcohol—by restricting the desire set to exclude desires based on false beliefs—i .e. by going to hypothetical fully informed desires. Let us take a look at the hypothe tical Frankenstein example again, but modify it slightly. Let us go with a case where there ar e true beliefs that link up the intrinsic with the extrinsic desire (the idea being here that we should look at instrumental desires when they are at their best and see whether satisfac tion of them increases one’s well-being). So in this newly described, but similar case, Franke nstein is thirsty, desires to drink from the glass in front of him, but this time, there is water in the glass in front of him. Frankenstein drinks and both desires are satisfied. I am far from sure that even on this ne wly described case, we should think that there is something to be said for the idea that the satisfaction of one’s instrumental desires increases one’s well-being. Frankenste in, so described, has two desires both of which are satisfied: the one to quench his thirst and the other one to drink from the glass in front of him. Does this mean that th e successful completion of his action counts twice in favor of his well-being? That does not s eem quite right. Suppose now that he has to move a sheet of paper that is on top of the glass and he desire s to move the sheet of paper to drink from the glass. Does the satisfacti on of all three desires count toward his well-

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89 being? It seems the improvement in his well -being is the same in the case where he does move the paper and in the case wh ere there is no paper to move.3 The driving intuition in all of these cases is that what matters is the quenching of the thirst, not grasping the glass, or moving the glass closer to his face or what ever. So, even if we look at instrumental desires in their best light (w hen they are correctly related to our intrinsic desires), satisfaction of them does not seem to improve our well-being. We are looking for an account of the set of desires the satisfaction of which lead to an increase in well-being (the so-called “rel evant set”), and total desire views do not seem plausible. This is so when we go with actual desires and even extrinsic desires that are correctly connected to the intrinsic desi res. Now that the relevant set has been restricted to intrinsic desires, let us look to see whether one’s actual intrinsic desires can be in error and whether there is a way of correcting for this e rror in the relevant desire set by moving to a hypothetical desire set. 3.1.5 A Critical Discussion of Actual In trinsic Desire Views of Well-Being My immediate project is to critically asse ss actual intrinsic desire views of wellbeing. I will argue that actual intrinsic desi re views are inadequate in two ways: they do not explain cases that involve ignorance in an intuitively attractive way and they do not explain our intuitions about cases where one would cease to have an intrinsic desire upon confrontation with facts. If actual intrinsic desires constitu ted the best relevant desire set, the resulting desire-theory of well-being w ould be relatively simple. However, and 3 There is an interesting slightly modified case where the glass of water is trapped in a box and Frankenstein would have to spend two hours getting it out of the box (there is no other way to quench his thirst). One might think that getting it out of the box constituted an achievement of sorts and ought to count in favor of his well-being. But I think that this is mistaken. I think that what is going on in the background is our presupposition that Frankenstein, like the rest of us desires to achieve his goals with as little effort as is required or that he desires and enjoys exercising of ingenuity, etc.

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90 unfortunately, actual intrinsic desires prove in adequate as constituting the relevant desire set. A desire-satisfaction theory can deal w ith the two lines of criticism that the actual intrinsic desire theory faces if it treats the relevant desire set as made up of the desires one would have under certain counterfactual c onditions. I will leave the specification of the counterfactual conditions for later. He re, I will show that such a counterfactual specification is desirable by showing that actu al intrinsic desire views are inadequate. I think that actual intrinsi c desire views fail to account for an agent’s well-being when the agent is ignorant, at least in some situations. Let me explore a few hypothetical cases. Imagine a case in which an agent is faced with a choice between eating some pineapple and eating some watermelon. In this example, let us suppose that the agent has never heard of pineapple, much less tasted it. She has tasted watermelon and likes it, though not strongly. In this case, she desires to eat the watermelon and she does not desire to eat the pineapple. Now, let us suppose further, that if she had tasted pineapple, she would prefer it to watermelon. It seems that a theory of wellbeing should say that her well-being would improve more if she were to eat the pineapple than if she were to eat the watermelon. Actual intrinsic desire views have tr ouble explaining the hypothetical case under discussion, because the agent has no desire fo r the pineapple. Hence, her well-being, it seems, can only increase if she eats the wate rmelon. Perhaps a proponent of an actual intrinsic desire view would respond that what accounts for our intuitions in cases such as the one just discussed is that there is some other intrinsic desire that we are presupposing the agent has. For example, we might be presupposing that the agent has a desire for pleasurable experiences and that, were she to taste the pineapple, she would have a

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91 pleasurable experience. So, the reply by the pr oponent of an actual intrinsic desire view goes, our intuitions about well-b eing do not conflict with an ac tual intrinsic desire view in this case because we can presuppose intr insic desires that everyone shares in our thinking about the “pineapple” case.4 The reply under discussion is clever, but unfortunately it will not work in every example. To show that it will not work, cons ider a case of a desire for a life-long project where there is not another desire that one can point to in orde r to explain our intuitions in the case. Take for example, a librarian who does not prefer to be a lawyer even though he would if he knew more about how his life w ould go if he were a lawyer. In this case, there is no plausible alternative desire that one can point to, in a ll of the various more fully-detailed explanations of th e example, in order to explain the intuition that the man’s life would go better if he were to be a la wyer. So even though the librarian does not desire to be a lawyer, the intu ition goes, his life would go better if he were to be a lawyer. Later, I will discuss what I take to be driving our intuitions in the cases discussed in this part. But for now, it is enough to be clear that there is something wrong with actual intrinsic desire views. I think there is another problem with actual intrinsic desire views. I will draw from Richard Brandt’s book, A Theory of the Good and the Right where he argues one’s intrinsic desires can be lost if one were to be informed with propositional knowledge.5 Brandt thinks that if someone were to undergo cognitive psychotherapy then it would be 4 I do not mean to commit myself to the claim that absolutely everyone shares the desire for pleasurable experiences. Certainly people might not share such a desire. An ascetic, roughly, is someone who renounces material comforts. An ascetic, it seems, might not desire pleasurable experiences. For simplicity, I have granted the universal holding of the desire. 5 Although many parts of the book touch on this subject, Chapter VI “The Criticism of Pleasures and Intrinsic Desires” is most apt.

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92 possible for some of his intrinsic desire s to change. The process of cognitive psychotherapy is described by Br andt in the following quotation. [The] aim is to show that some intrinsic desires and aversions would be present in some persons if relevant available inform ation registered fully, that is, if the persons repeatedly represented to themselv es, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time, the available information which is relevant in the sense that it would make a difference to desires and aversi ons if they thought of it. By ‘ideally vivid way’ I mean that the person gets th e information at the focus of attention, with maximal vividness and detail, and with no hesitation or doubt about its truth. I mean by ‘available information’ the beliefs associated with this term in Chapter 1: relevant beliefs which are a part of the ‘scientific knowledge’ of the day, or which are justified on the basis of publicly av ailable evidence in accordance with the canons of inductive or deductive logic, or justified on the basis of evidence which could now be obtained by procedures know n to science. (Brandt, pg 111-112) Elsewhere, Brandt describes th e process of cognitive psycho therapy in more detail, but this quotation should provide us with what we need for now. Brandt is suggesting that intrinsic desires can be lost, in principle, by undergoing a process of being informed with all relevant available information. This c ould give us a counterfactual account of the relevant desire set. For our purposes, it does not really matter whether Brandt is concerned with a theory of well-being. Fo r what it is worth, in the passage quoted immediately above, Brandt is onl y concerned with an account of rational desires and he is not directly concerned with a theory of well-being. The counterfactual account of wellbeing would be, roughly, that any and all desires that would survive cognitive psychotherapy are in the relevant set. Note that information used in cognitive psychotherapy is heavily restricted on Brandt’s description. I will return to the issue of the nature of the information someone is to be subjected to in the process of cognitive psychotherapy in 3.2. For now, I wish to focus on the sorts of cases Brandt has in mind in the quotation above. The process of c ognitive psychotherapy should be a bit clearer after a detailed discussion of some hypothetical cases.

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93 Brandt gives four cases where he thinks that desires can be criticized as irrational, in that they might not survive cognitive ps ychotherapy or at least might not remain the same after cognitive psychotherapy. I will l ook at two of those four cases. Although Brandt’s chapter is geared towards criticism of intrinsic desires and pleasures, some of his examples look like examples of instrumental desires (and pleasures). I will have to do some explaining in these cases. It should be not ed that Brandt takes his four examples to be neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive of all of the wa ys of criticizing intrinsic desires. The first of the two cases I will examin e involves a dependence on false beliefs (Brandt, pg. 115). Consider a hypothetical exam ple of someone who pursues a Ph.D. in an academic field because he thinks (falsely) that his parents want him to do it; now, as I will explain, he wants an academic life intrin sically (Ibid, pg. 115). Br andt thinks that if this person were to be subjected to inform ation that his parents would not have been disappointed had he pursued something else, th en he could cease to desire to get his Ph.D.6 Brandt’s example might look like a simple case where he is merely talking about instrumental desires. But let us suppose that it is not. The agent’s be lief that his parents want him to pursue a Ph.D., and his desire to pl ease his parents, are perhaps crucial in his formation of a desire to pursue a Ph.D. We can treat that belief and desire as explaining how he came to have the desire to pursue a PhD without interpre ting that desire as instrumental. Similarly, someone might have an intrinsic desire that is caused by a 6 Other similar examples from Brandt include a case of a person who develops a dislike of a particular food because eating it once made him ill, and a case where one has a hard time enjoying himself because he believes God wants him to live an ascetic life.

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94 chemical imbalance. This chemical imbalan ce might explain, from the standpoint of an observer, how an agent would come to have this desire without the chemical imbalance being the ultimate end of the desire. In Bra ndt’s example, the desire to please his parents might be the cause of his current desire to get a Ph.D. But if the agent, on Brandt’s account, would desire to get his Ph.D. in the ap propriate circumstances even if he did not believe that satisfying his desire to get his Ph.D. would lead to th e satisfaction of some other desire, it is intrinsic. Brandt does not claim, in the above de scribed case, that such a person, upon confrontation with full availabl e information, must ab solutely give up hi s intrinsic desire to pursue a Ph.D. Brandt is merely claiming th at it is possible that he would. The extent to which people abandon intrinsic desires such as these is a separate issue from whether abandoning these kinds of desires is possible. So Brandt’s fi rst case seems to be a very clear-cut case of how someone could cease to desire somethi ng intrinsically. Let us look at one more case. The second case I will look at is Brandt’s fourth case. So I have skipped over his second and third cases. This fourth case is based on exaggerated valences produced by early deprivation (Ibid, pg. 122). According to Brandt, one may acquire intrinsic desires that are stronger than they ot herwise would be, when sufficient deprivation of the desired object occurs early in one’s life. For ex ample, someone who grows up poor may value wealth disproportionately to the way she w ould have if she had not grown up so poor. Further information, perhaps even knowledge of the fact that she would value money differently if she had not grown up poor, coul d make her cease to value money as much as she does. In this particular example, th e person who what a poor child does not reject

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95 of an intrinsic desire, but the example is sufficient to show that the hierarchy of a person’s desires could change with full rele vant available information. Brandt does, however, discuss a case in which, over time, he suspects one could come to reject an intrinsic desire that was formed from depr ivation (Ibid, pg. 124). However, the example at hand involves a mere change in intensity. At this point there are two general classe s of desire-satisfact ion theories under consideration: a class in which one’s actual in trinsic desires constitute the relevant desire set and a class in which desires one would have under full information constitute the relevant desire set. I will argue that the second, counterfact ually construed, class is more plausible. In light of the example above involving the librarian, actual intrinsic desire views seem incomplete. I think that an appeal to the concept of personality should help make things clearer. A personality, roughly, is a se t of dispositions. I think that someone’s personality, together with her set of experiences and beliefs, generates her desire set. This is close to an idea Railton advances toward the end of his “Facts and Values.” Railton says: “[A personality] is a collecti on of properties that ground dispositions to react in various ways to exposure to certain facts” (Railton, “Facts and Values,” pg. 60). Railton sees a personality as that which grounds dispositions to re act in certain ways under certain conditions. I see a personality the set of dispositions itse lf. I will return to Railton’s account of personality in 4.6. He and I differ on some substantive issues about the role of the concept of personality in de sire-satisfaction, specifi cally ideal advisor, theories of well-being. However, I suspect that Railton would find my development of

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96 the concept of personality and my account of its role in desire-satisfaction theories friendly. I agree with Brandt that one’s intrinsic desire set can change given a change in one’s information. Something must be behi nd the change from having a desire to not having a desire, given a change in information. We do not want to say that, a change in a person’s information can, by itself, change his or her desire set. There must be something else. I say what else is n eeded for an explanation of ch ange in one’s desire set upon receiving more information is the concept of a personality. One’s personality is what forms desires given beliefs and experiences. I think that actual intrinsic desiresatisfaction views can fail to re flect one’s true personality. Let me explain. In a way, actual intrinsic desire views do not capture the full range of one’s personality in the way that a counterfactual th eory captures the full range more easily. It goes without saying that peopl e have a limited range of experiences and information. People’s personalities are often co mpatible with a much larger range of life plans or projects than one act ually explores and adopts. I think one underlying idea for desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being is th at one’s personality is an important factor in how well one’s life is going. An actual intrinsic desire set is incomplete in a way: it does not reflect the full range of the personality. I think that the example of the librarian who would prefer life as a lawyer, were he to know more his potential life as a lawyer, nicely illustrates the incompleteness of actual intrinsic desire view s. The person’s life would go better if she were a lawyer, I say. Being a lawyer “fits” with her personality. The counterfactual account of the relevant desi re set can capture the full range of one’s personality and bring it to bear on one’s well-being.

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97 I think that Brandt’s examples of the academic and person with an impoverished childhood illustrates a different, but related, problem with actua l intrinsic desire views. As I say above, one’s personality together wi th his or her experiences and beliefs will generate a desire set. Now, different desire sets could result when one’s personality is combined with different belief and experience sets Not all desire sets will reflect the true personality, I claim. Many belief or experi ence sets that include false beliefs or inadequately varied experiences will distort one’s personality. It is only the desires that are true to one’s personality that should be relevant to one’s well-being: only the satisfaction of desires that ar e true to one’s personality s hould count as increasing one’s well-being. My goal of 3.1 is to criticize actual intrinsi c desire views. Theo ries that treat the desires one would have under certain counter factual conditions do much better in two ways. The desire set one has in certain count erfactual conditions be tter captures the full range of an agent’s personality than do actual desire views. Additionally, the desires one would have under some, but not all, count erfactual conditions reflect one’s true personality better than do actual intrinsic de sire views: there is less distortion on some counterfactual theories. Now, I understand that I have not said much about what constitutes a true or genuine personality. At this point, I have only relied on a rough notion of personality— personality as consisting in a complex set of characteristics or dispositions that make up a person. Of course, I owe a more rigorous accoun t of what a personality consists in. A more rigorous account will be de veloped in the next chapter. 7 7 I take myself in Chapter 2 of this dissertation to have shown that desire-satisfaction accounts of wellbeing are superior to mental stat e accounts, explanatory objective accounts in the form of human nature

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98 In this part, I hope to have made clear th at the satisfaction of extrinsic desire, as such, do not increase well-being. Only the sa tisfaction of intrinsic desires increases wellbeing. Also, I hope to have shown why counter factual accounts of the relevant desire set are superior to accounts that identify the set as composed of actual de sires. I think that lives can go well in ways that agents do not actual desire a nd I hope to have made clear that the satisfaction of at least some actual desires does not increase well-being. Brandt’s theory that the desires one would have under certain counterfactual conditions is much better at capturing our intuitions in many cases. The explanation of our intuitions in such cases is that one’s personality is cent ral to one’s well-bei ng. There are other counterfactual accounts besides Brandt’s. I cr itically compare and contrast several sorts of counterfactual accounts in 3.2. 3.2 Counterfactual Desire Accounts Developed 3.2.1 Information and the Relevant Desire Set With 3.2.1, I begin to examine counterfactual accounts of the relevant desire set. There have been a number of counterfactual accounts proposed in recent years. I will begin with a critical discussion of aspects of Brandt’s version as a st arting point and then move into more recently developed theories I remind the reader that Brandt, in A Theory of the Good and the Right does not endorse a desire-satis faction account of well-being. However, what he says in his account of ratio nal desires can be adapted to an account of accounts, and pluralist accounts. The reader who finds my arguments in Chapter 2 inadequate might worry about what is driving the ar guments to my preferred desire-satisfac tion theory. The skeptical reader might worry that some other conception of well-being is really the driving force behind the arguments. As my favored version of desire-satisfaction accounts gets more sophisticated, it is important to bear in mind that I think that the personality is one central driving force. The path from thinking of the relevant desire set as actual intrinsic desires to thinking of the relevant se t as somehow counterfactual is indeed complicated, but I think that the idea that personality is relevant to well-being helps make it clear. I will return to this general topic again.

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99 well-being. So the counterfactual theory of well-being under discussion is merely inspired by what Brandt says. I will now take up one aspect of Brandt’s idea of “all available information”—his idea that one undergoing the proc ess of cognitive psychotherapy be subjected only to “the propositions accepted by the science of the agen t’s day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence (including testim ony of others about themselves) and the principles of logic” (Brandt, pg. 13). A plausible alternative to Brandt’s account of “all available information” would be to include all true propositions and perhaps even knowledge of what things are like. We can divide knowledge into two camps: propositional knowledge (knowledge that . .) and non-propositional knowledge (knowledge how . or knowledge what . .). Examples of this distinction seem intuitively plausible. For example, we can know that X is a piece of pineapple, and this is distinct from knowing what pineapple tastes like. Gi ven the quotation above, I am very much inclined to read Brandt as sayi ng that all of the information to which one is to be subject is propositional. Perhaps I am mist aken in my interpretation of Brandt and if so there is not a major problem here. I will discuss the prospects of including nonpropositional information in the next chapte r. Presently I will deal only with propositional beliefs. The task at hand then is to explore the prospects of Brandt’s restriction of the information set to that whic h is supported by the best science of the day, publicly accessible evidence, and principles of logic.8 Brandt’s reasoning on this issue is a bit unc lear. Here is what he says about it: 8 I will follow Brandt is using the term “information” very loosely in that it allows false propositions to be information. Strictly speaking, this usage is probably incorrect, but it is a simple way of speaking.

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100 It [all available information] is also contra sted with the beliefs an omniscient being might have, beliefs in all true propositi ons, since we do not know the identity of such beliefs and can hardly use them as a tool of criticism. (Almost everything a person does would be different if he had the knowledge of an omniscient being made available to him—for instance, if he were informed of the cure for cancer.) We might however, identify a ll available information with the factual beliefs an agent would have had at the time of action, if his beliefs had been fixed by his total observational evidence and the pr inciples of logic, both induc tive and deductive. It seems more useful, however, to define th e concept to include beliefs the agent would have if he obtained evidence which he could obtain at the time. So I prefer to define ‘all available information’ as the propositions accepted by the science of the agent’s day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence (including testimony of others about themselv es) and the principles of logic. (Ibid, pg. 12-13) Brandt admits that this final definition of “all available information” does not exclude false propositions as being in the mix (Ibid, pg. 13). The science of the day may very well be seriously mistaken on many issues, so false propositions are bound to creep in to the information with which one is to confr ont her desires. That fact should be disconcerting, but there are other problems as well. Brandt argues that we ought not to adopt the view that in cludes all true propositions in the information set. His reasoning s eems to be that we cannot know what these propositions are and cannot use them as a tool fo r criticism. I think Brandt is mistaken in thinking that we need to give an account that we can use as a tool for criticism. Let me explain. Brandt’s language in the above quotation suggests that he is after something we might call a “decision procedure” for finding out content of the relevant desire set. A description of a decision pro cedure, on my construal, would involve a description of an actual process one could go thr ough in figuring out the relevant desire set. A decision procedure for identifying the re levant desire set is distin ct from what I will call a “criterion” of the relevant desi re set. A criterion for the relevant desire set is a criterion

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101 that a desire has to meet in order for it to be a member of the relevant desire set. One helpful way of understanding the distinction between a decision procedure and a criterion is that a decision procedure is used to “track” something whereas a criterion simply “makes” something the case.9 When Brandt writes of the need to iden tify the information that the patient is subjected to in the process of cognitive psychotherapy, and the need for a tool of criticism, it seems that Brandt is suggesting th at we need a decision procedure, or perhaps both a decision procedure and a criterion. It is hard to tell what Bra ndt is after based on what he says.10 Perhaps Brandt and I are after differe nt things with our analyses, but I am not after a tool of pr actical criticism. It would be nice to have a tool of practical criticism, but developing such a tool is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Neither Brandt’s model nor a full true propositional model could serve as a decision procedure for the relevant desire se t. Both Brandt’s model and a full true propositional model include far too much informa tion for one to actually be subjected to. This should not prove troubling. At this phase of the dissertation, I am after the best account of the relevant desire set. In order to provide the best account of the relevant desire set, I must provide a crite rion any desire must meet to be in the relevant set. As I said, I am not entirely certain as to what Brandt is after, bu t it is clear that he cannot be providing a plausible decision procedure someone could go through in figuring out what 9 My distinction between a decision procedure for the relevant desire set and a criterion of the relevant desire set is modeled on a similar distinction in th e debates about Utilitarianism. Some have felt that Utilitarianism is implausible because no one could know all of the releva nt consequences of an act, thus could never figure out what to do. Many Utilitarians ha ve replied that the Utilitarian principle is a criterion of right acts and not a decision procedure. The decisi on procedure, so the reply goes, is something to be worked out at a later time. 10 Brandt does admit that some of the information would be “intolerably expensive to get” (Ibid, pg. 13).

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102 one would desire after unde rgoing the process of psychot herapy. Cleary, the set of information Brandt has in mind is far too large for anyone to actually pro cess in real life. Let us just assume that Brandt is proposi ng a criterion for the relevant desire set, and not a decision procedure. There still rema ins the issue of whethe r Brandt’s construal of the information set is better than a full propositional information view. I think that a full propositional information view is far superior. Brandt allows a person’s desire set to be influenced by false information, provided that the false information is countenanced by the best science of the day. While the read er might feel that much of the information of the best science of today is quite good, I ask the read er to consider someone undergoing Brandt’s process of cognitive psychotherapy based on the information countenanced by the best science of one thousand years ago.11 The patient would be subjected to all sorts of false propositions a nd form desires for things (or cease to desire things) in light of these false propositions Additionally, Brandt’s construal of the information set still might not be enough information. Let me explain. As I say in 3.1, one’s personality is cent ral to her well-being. Actual intrinsic desire views are problematic because the desire set they generate might not capture the full range of one’s personality and the desire set might distort one’s personality. Similar problems arise for Brandt’s account.12 The set of propositions countenanced by the best science of the day, propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence and principles of logic, at least in many cas es, will not capture the full range of agents’ personalities and 11 Indeed, if we think about the substantial span of human history when there was no science—at least no rigorous scientific method, Brandt’s theory seems problematic simply because it is not clear what his theory would say about someone’s well-being who lived in that time. 12 Please bear in mind that the theory under criticism is inspired by Brandt and is not one that Brandt finally endorses.

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103 might even distort their personalities. Formi ng desires (or ceasing to desire things) based on false propositions could lead a patient to desires that are not true to her personality. As I have suggested, it might help to think of a personality as a se t of dispositions or characteristics. If one of the core ideas behind desire-satisfacti on accounts of well-being is that one’s life goes better to the extent to which the world and the desires stemming from one’s personality fit, then Brandt’s theo ry is problematic in a similar way in which actual intrinsic desire views are problematic: the desire sets of bot h theories are often either not representative of th e full range of the personality or desires in the set distort the personality. So, the relevant information set should be full information as opposed to the best information available given the science of the day (plus propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence and principles of logic). The account of well-being that treats one’s well-being to vary to the extent to which the desires one would have after having full information are satisfied is sometimes called an “ideal observer” ac count of well-being. Put roughly, ideal observer accounts of wellbeing hold that one’s life goes well to the extent to which the desires one would have if fully informed are satisfied. There are several aspects of Brandt’s account that remain to be critically discussed. First, as of yet, there has been no serious critical discussion of the nature of the process by which one is to be fully informed. Brandt has in mind a process of cognitive psychotherapy that involved repeated exposure to ideally vi vid information (Ibid, pg. 111-112). Brandt’s claim is that the relevant desire set is constituted by desires one would have after undergoing such a process. This claim is ex tremely controversial. I will critically discuss Brandt’s explanation of the process and several recent criticisms in the next

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104 chapter. Second, there has been no signifi cant discussion of whether to include nonpropositional knowledge in the in formation set. Thus far, the discussion has only been about what sort of propositional information to include. I will deal with the matter of non-propositional knowledge in the next chapter. What I will turn to next is the distinction between “ideal observer” views and “ideal advisor” views. I will argue that ideal advisor views are superior to ideal observer views. 3.2.2 Ideal Advisor Views Ideal observer views hold that one’s life goes well to the ex tent to which the desires one would have if fully informed are satis fied. Ideal observer views are far more plausible than actual desire vi ews, but that does not mean th at ideal observer views do not have problems of their own. I prefer a diffe rent sort of account—ide al advisor views of the kind proposed by Peter Railton. Railton ch aracterizes ideal advisor views, roughly, as those according to which the relevant desire set is constituted by the desires one would want herself to have, as she is in her actual circumstances, were she to have full information. Ideal advisor views get quite complicated. I would like to motivate the need for such view by pointing out pr oblems with ideal observer views. The desire set of the ideal observer and the set “recommended” by the ideal advisor would likely differ, and for any individual, th ey might differ sharply. The following is an example to illustrate this. The following exam ple is adapted from Alan Gibbard in his Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Imagine that a person desires to eat. Some of the information her fully informed counterpart will have is knowledge, in maximally vivid detail, of the inner workings of the digestiv e system. Her fully informed counterpart may

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105 find this disgusting and cease to desire to eat.13 However, presumably her fully informed counterpart will want her less informed, actua l self to want to eat. Thus, taking the advice of the ideal advisor as constituting th e relevant desire set for well-being can get around certain problems with the ideal observe r account. I do not intend the example I have adapted from Gibbard to conclusively refute ideal observer theories, but it does seem to cause a problem for the theory. Another problem for ideal observer theories comes from Peter Railton in his “Facts and Values” (Railton, “Moral Realism,” pg. 36). Railton notes that an ideal observer, being fully informed, will have no desire for more information. Here is what Railton says: “For example, [an ideal observer] pr esumably does not want any more information for himself—there is no more to be had and he knows this. Yet it might still be true that [an ideal observer] would want to want more knowledge were he to be put in the place of his less well-informed self, [his actual sel f]” (Railton, “Moral Rea lism,” pg. 36). Let me clarify. It is important to distinguish a desire for information from a desire for more information. Only the latter, I say, causes pr oblems for ideal observe r theories. An ideal observer can desire information, even as he is —that is to say, fully informed. A person can desire at t1 a state of affairs that he knows obtains at t1. We might think of a person’s desire for something he already has, and knows he has, as an instan ce of “cherishing,” or some other similar state of mind. Neverthe less, given that I construe desires quite broadly, “cherishing” something is a way of de siring that thing. A de sire that one have more information is quite different, however. An ideal observer’s desiring more 13 Gibbard’s example, from page 19 of his book, has more detail and complexity than I have presented. I have simplified the example for convenience. Also, Gibbard construes his example as going against Brandt’s characterization of “rational desires” and is not specifically formul ated to go against ideal observer theories. However, I have adapted it for my purposes.

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106 information is a desire of that which is impossible and that which he or she knows is impossible. I do not know whether it is possi ble to desire that which one knows to be impossible—or, worse, logically impossible. If it is indeed impossi ble to desire that which one knows to be impossible, then ideal observer theories ex clude some desires, simply in virtue of the process of being fully informed. Even if it is possible to desire that which one knows to be impossible—so, so me ideal observers could desire to have more information, a problem remains for ideal observer theories. An ideal observer may lose his or her desire for new information upon being fully informed: that is still a problem. It seems an implausible feature of id eal observer theories that they allow for an ideal advisor to lose his desire for more in formation. An actual agent’s desire for more information, on ideal observer accounts, whethe r would not or might not be relevant to his or her well-being. That is an unattractive feat ure of ideal observer accounts. 3.2.3 What the Ideal Advisor Advises (o r what advice we should listen to) Ideal advisor views can be fleshed out in different ways. Peter Railton, in his “Moral Realism” and part of “Facts and Va lues” talks about desires an ideal advisor wants his actual counterpart to have (i.e. which desires the ideal advisor desires for you). Let us call this specification of the relevant advice the “desire to desire” account. If we treat the desire to desire account as holding that well-being is increased when the ideal advisor’s desire is satisfied, there are signi ficant difficulties. What happens when an ideal advisor’s desire is satisfied is that his or her advisee merely forms the desire that the advisor wants the advisee to have. For exam ple, imagine that my ideal advisor would desire that I desire that I ta ke a swim. When the ideal advisor’s desire is satisfied, I desire to take a swim. Presumably though, and this is the intuition here, my life goes

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107 better in this case where I take a swim. Well-being could never depend entirely on forming and losing desires. An additional bit of clarification is in or der. My ideal advisor might desire for instrumental reasons that I desire to sw im—his reason might be that when I desire something, at least some times, I bring it about. The satisfaction of such an instrumental desire cannot enhance one’s well-being because there is the problem of double counting mentioned earlier in this chapter. Desires that are in the relevant set must be intrinsic in some way. Here is one more clarificati on about the “desire to desire ” understanding of an ideal advisor view. Let us say that A is an actual person and A + is his fully informed idealized self. There could be cases where A + desires something for A but A + does not desire A to desire it. For example, Frankenstein’s mons ter desires friends and has none. This makes him miserable. The monster’s ideal advisor might very well want him to have friends, but not want him to want to have friends. A lthough these sorts of case s must be stated in a fairly complex way, the intuition seems fair ly clear and straightforward. There are states of affairs such that desiring them makes one worse o ff, but having them makes one better off. The issues revolve around how unlik ely the state of affairs is to obtain and how miserable the knowledge that one cannot sa tisfy the desire would make the agent. There is a great deal of difficu lty in trying to capture the advi ce of the ideal advisor in the type of case found in the Frankenstein’s m onster example when using the “desire to desire” language. Given all of this, it seems that on the “desire to desir e” interpretation, ideal advisor views are implausible. I think that the philosophers who write on ideal advisor views

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108 must be up to something else. Perhaps a bett er way of talking about ideal advisor views is to drop the desire to de sire language altogether. Here is a more charitable way of understan ding what ideal adviso r views are about. Instead of taking the state of affairs in whic h the ideal advisor’s desire is satisfied as determining the well-being of the advisee, take the object of the advisee’s desire. Look at the example again: A + desires that A desire to take a swim. Instead of taking A +’s desire here, take the desire A would have if A +’s desire were satisfie d (call this the “second desire”). The second desire is satisfied when A takes a swim. The intuitive idea is that one’s well-being is increased when the state of affairs expressed by the object proposition of the second desire obtains. Let me clarify. In our examples, A + has a desire but the satisfaction of her desire is irre levant, at least in many cases, to A ’s well-being. The more intuitive way of understanding ideal advisor vi ews is to treat the object of the second desire as important. Railton and others who write on ideal advisor views must have in mind this second interpretation of ideal advisor accounts. There is a way to simplify all of this id eal advisor talk. We can take out the problematic and confusing element. Instead of talking about what A + desires that A desires, we could instead talk about what kinds of things A + wants for A .14 The clearest way of talking about ideal advi sor accounts is to say that A ’s well-being varies with the extent to which A lives in accordance with what A + desires intrinsically for A Call this the “streamlined” take on ideal advisor views. The result would still be a type of desiresatisfaction account and it takes (at least some of) the desires of A + as determining what constitutes A ’s well-being. 14 Sobel mentions this in footnote 19 of his “Full In formation Accounts of Well-Being,” as does Rosati in her “Internalism and the Good for a Person.”

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109 Let me return to a few examples discussed above and show how the “streamlined” interpretation of ideal advi sor views deals with them. First, consider the examples involving reading the newspaper and eati ng one’s food. The streamlined account explains them very well. A + will not need to read the newspaper and he might lose his appetite, but if A + would still want A to read the newspaper and eat then it is plausible to think that those two states of affairs are relevant to A ’s well-being. Second, if we look at the Frankenstein example, Frankenstein’s id eal advisor wants him to have friends but does not want him to want to have friends. In such a case, Frankenstein’s having friends will increase his well-being, but wanting them, as such, without getting them, will not. Third, if A + wants A to take a swim, then A ’s taking a swim would increase A 's wellbeing, but merely wanting to take a swim, as such, would not. One further benefit of a streamlined ideal advisor view is that it coheres well with our general intuitions about personality. A + is A with additional information. Someone’s idealized counterpart has far gr eater knowledge than her partia lly informed self. Despite this great difference, a person and her idealized counterpart have a lot in common as well. They share a personality, I say. If someone and her fully informed counterpart share a personality, then the fully informed person is ideally situated to speak on matters of her partially informed counterpart’s well-being. Now, what I say about personality and well-be ing is contentious and will have to be defended in the next chapter. Ideal advisor views have been criticized recently in the literature. Some objections turn on the possibi lity of any sort of process by which one could become fully informed. Some objections turn on the very intelligibility of ideal advisor views. There have been so me objections that turn on whether A +’s position is

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110 authoritative for A ’s well-being. Finally, there have b een some objections to the effect that ideal advisor views do not remain true to one core motiv ation for desire-satisfaction views more generally. I will address all four of these objections in the next chapter.

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111 CHAPTER 4 IDEAL ADVISOR VIEWS In Chapter 3, I looked at several different kinds of desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being and concluded that an ideal advi sor account is superior to rival desiresatisfaction views. In this chapter, I will examine several recent criticisms of ideal advisor views. I will argue that the account developed in Chapter 3 either is not susceptible to the criticisms offered or th at a proponent of the account developed in Chapter 3 has responses to the criticisms available to him. 4.1 The Internalism Requirement Connie Rosati, in her paper “Internalism and the Good for a Person” and Don Loeb in his paper “Full-Information Theories of the Individual Good” disc uss an “internalism requirement” that they feel a ny adequate account of what is good for a person must meet. Most, if not all, non-desire-sa tisfaction conceptions of well-being would be eliminated in virtue of the fact that they do not meet the internalism requirement. Only specific kinds of desire-satisfacti on accounts meet the inte rnalism requirement, according to Rosati and Loeb. Specifically, they claim that no fu ll information ideal a dvisor view meets the internalism requirement. If they are right, th en much of my work in Chapter 3 of this dissertation has been a waste of time.1 1 Interestingly, if there were to be an internalism re quirement of the sort that Rosati and Loeb endorse, then much of my work in Chapter 2 could be correct in its conclusion but needlessly complex in its arguments. My work in Chapter 2 would have been correct in its conclusion because I would be right in thinking that some desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being are su perior to non-desire-satis faction accounts of wellbeing. Following the line of thought, my work in Chapter 2 would have been needlessly complex because so many theories of well-being would be excluded simply in virtue of the fact that they fail to meet the internalism requirement.

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112 Very roughly, an internalism requirement would make a strong or essential connection between the good for a person and the person’s motivati on. Both Rosati and Loeb provide brief introductory definitions of the internalism requirement they have in mind. Rosati goes on to provide a more precis e definition and Loeb does not. Before I go into Rosati’s and Loeb’s arguments, I would like to explore some comments by Peter Railton. Railton’s work has influenced Rosa ti’s and Loeb’s work on the internalism requirement. Both Rosati and Loeb are heavily influen ced by Peter Railton’s arguments in his papers “Facts and Values” and “Moral Realis m.” Here is the q uotation from Railton’s “Facts and Values” that Rosati gives and Loeb refers to: It does seem to me [Railton] to capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in so me degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him. (Railton, “Facts and Values”, pg. 47) Railton does not intend to give a precise account of an internalism requirement. He does hint that there must be a c onnection between motivation and what is good for a person. The terms “compelling,” “attr active,” and “engag e” are a bit vague and perhaps he intends to leave th e account open ended.2 Loeb thinks that the internalism requirement is that an adequate theory must show there to be a strong connection between what is good for a person and his motivation. 2 The objective list theorist could argue that if people are rational and aware, in some sense, of their goods (such as wisdom and friendship), then they would be engaged, at least in some sense, by them. The proponent of an objective list theory probably cannot show a necessary connection between a good and a motivation for that good, but, Railton’s language is weak here and strictly speaking would allow room for such a view. So, Railton should be understood in a bit narrower sense than the broadest sense possible. Please see Rosati’s take on a more precise account of the connection between a person’s good and his motivation below.

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113 Loeb characterizes a requirement as follows : “The first [attractive feature of full information desire-satisfaction theories] is mo tivational. The theories typically embrace a version of internalism. They characteri ze a person’s good (or reasons for action, etc.) in terms of her motivation. The motivation in quest ion need not be actual. Dispositions to be motivated would suffice” (Loeb, pg. 1). Lo eb clearly has in mind a strong internalism requirement. It is not clear exactly what he has in mind when he says “They characterize a person’s good . in terms of her motivation.” Perhaps all that Loeb has in mind is that if something is good for someone ( A ), then A has some motivation to pursue it. But Loeb might have something stronger in mind. Rosa ti construes the internalism requirement in a way similar to Loeb’s, but in clearer way. The internalism requirement, on Rosati’s accoun t, is “the general thesis that there is a necessary connection between motivation and nor mative status. The thesis tells us that X can have a certain normative status N only if someone A would be motivated by it in sense M” (Rosati, pg. 298).3 Let us follow Rosati in cal ling this kind of internalism “existence internalism.” This terminology co mes from Stephen Darwall in his “Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality.” He defines “existence internalism” roughly as the position that there is a necessary c onnection between the truth of a normative proposition and motivation (Darwall, pg. 308). Darwall divides existence internalism into two groups: perceptual internalism according to which “it is impossible for a person to know directly or perceive the truth of a normative pr oposition without being moved” and metaphysical internalism according to which “an agent’s being moved (under appropriate conditions) is either part of what it is for a norma tive proposition to be true of 3 When I use direct quotation, I will leave “A” as it appear s in the original, rather than add italics as I do for ease of reading.

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114 him, or a necessary condition for the holding of that normative f act” (Ibid, both page 308). I suspect that Rosati has in mind a sort of metaphysical internalism, but it is not absolutely clear. The existence internalism requirement, on one rough formulation, is that something can be good for A only if A can be motivated to pursue it. It seems that the internalism requirement, even in its rough formulation, w ould cause problems fo r ideal advisor views such as mine and Railton’s.4 As I suggest in the preceding chapter of this dissertation, I think that intrinsic desires can be lost and gained through a process of being fully informed. As a result of this changing of one ’s intrinsic desire set, an ideal advisor can have desires that her advisee does not have Reverting back to the language of the preceding chapter, I say that A +’s advice might not overlap with A ’s desires. Moreover, A + can want something for A without wanting it for herself ( A +). So it might seem that, if an internalism requirement of the sort that Rosati and Lo eb thinks exists does indeed exist, then ideal advisor theori es have some explaining to do. The internalism requirement, very roughly, links one’s good with one’s motivations. The formulation t hus far explained, is still too vague for our purposes here. Let me identify two different versions of th e internalism requirement: the “weak” version and the “strong” version. The weak versi on of the requirement is that in order for something to be good for someone, it must be possi ble, in some way, for her to care for it. The weak version, I say, is that it must be logically possible for one to care about something for it to be relevant to his wellbeing. Rosati offers a strong version of the internalism requirement. I call Rosati’s position “stronger” because it treats the 4 For what it is worth, the internalism requirement seems to cause similar problems for ideal observer views as well.

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115 connection between one’s good and one’s motiva tions in a more specific, narrower, way than mere logical possibility. She thinks th at there are two inte rnalist conditions an account of the personal good must meet. Rosati has in mind that X is good for a person A only if, 1. were A under conditions C and contempla ting the circumstances of her actual self as someone about to assume her actual self’s position, A would care about X for her actual self; and 2. conditions C are such that the facts about what A woul d care about for her actual self while under C are something A woul d care about when under ordinary optimal conditions. (Rosati, pg. 307) Rosati calls her version of th e existence internalism requirement “two-tiered” because it has two clauses. Rosati explains “ordinary optimal conditions” as conditions in which an agent is thinking rationally, calmly and not ignoring or overlooking relevant information (Ibid, pg. 303). Ordinary optimal conditions seem to be, roughly, conditions of clear, careful thinking. To clarify Rosati’s position, let us say that Ao is A in optimal conditions.5 Recall that optimal conditions are not the informati onal conditions. Let us say that on Rosati’s account the advisor is Aic, who is A in informational conditions and other counterfactual conditions, such as contemplating the circumst ances of her actual self, as someone about to assume her actual self’s positi on, etc. Now, Rosati requires that Aic’s advice for A be something Ao cares about. On Rosati’s account, if Ao does not care about what Aic advises for A then what Aic advises cannot be good, as such, for A 5 I prefer to have ‘ A +’ refer just to A ’s fully informed counterpart. A + and Ao might differ significantly in several ways: perhaps most notably, A0 does not have to be as informed as is A +. Ao is merely thinking clearly and rationally, and not necessarily with full information.

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116 Let me explain how Rosati’s strong intern alism seems to be incompatible with ideal advisor views such as Railton’s and the one I develop in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Traditional ideal advi sor theories characterize a person, A in two circumstances: A as he actually is and A +, that is, A as he would be with full information, deliberating without rational error, etc. Now, Aic could be identical to A +, but nothing in ideal advisor theories, as they are traditionally understood, requires that A care about A +’s advice. So it looks like id eal advisor theories, as they are traditionally understood, do not necessarily meet Rosati’s internalism requirement. My ideal advisor account can accommodate the weak internalis m requirement. If A ’s having full information is possible, then, le t us just say, there is a possible world in which A ’s fully informed counterpart A + exists. Suppose that A + wants x for A Then, according to the theory, A ’s life goes better when she gets x There is a strong sense in which A + cares about x ; after all, she recommends it a bove other alternatives. Since A + is just A with full information, then in a very straightforward sense it is possible for A to care about x and she cares for it under certain non-actual conditions. Now, in this way, on my ideal advisor account, it will always be the case that A could care about A +’s advice: and so it follows on the full information theory that one could care about what is good for her. If all that the internalism requirement were to amount to is that one could care, in some such way, about what is good fo r him, then my ideal advisor view would meet the internalism requirement. Moreover, my ideal advisor account seems to meet the conditions of the internalism account of the exact wording of the quotations from Railton above. To repeat Railton’s exact words on th is: “It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage

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117 him” (Railton, “Facts and Values,” pg. 9). Railton’s exact words commit him to nothing stronger than the weak internalism requireme nt and his and my ideal advisor accounts meet the requirement without problem. At this point, I will turn to Rosati’s arguments in favor of an internalism requirement. 4.2 Rosati’s Specific Inte rnalism Requirement Rosati offers five arguments for an inte rnalism requirement. Sometimes it is not clear whether she if offering an argument for the weak or strong version, so I will try to take extra care in being clear on that issue. Most of her arguments are aimed at showing that there is an internalism requirement of the weak sort mentioned above—a version of existence internalism—rather than her own strong version of the requirement. The first argument Rosati gives is an argument from “judgment internalism.” Rosati claims: “According to judgment intern alism, it is a necessary condition on sincere judgment about a person’s good that the speak er normally have some inclination, not necessarily overriding, to promote or to care ab out that thing” (Rosati, pg. 310). Here is Rosati’s argument: An account of the good for a person can succe ed in explaining and preserving the inherent normative force of judgments about a person’s good only if it suitably constrains the possible objects of a person’ s concern relevant to a determination of her good. To do so, it must link a person’ s good to what she would care about, but not just under any conditions whatsoever. Rather, the conditions must be such that information about a person’s wants or reactions under them would matter to the actual person, at leas t if she were under ordinary op timal conditions (Ibid, pg. 311). Rosati’s argument goes something like this: judgment internalism is a fact and that fact is best explained by existence internalism. Her argument is an inference to the best explanation. Rosati is thinking about judgment internal ism in an unconventional way. Judgment internalism is usually thought to be a thesis about judgments by S about S ’s own good.

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118 Rosati seems to make a much stronger claim: that a judgment by S about P ’s good must motivate S at least to some extent. Rosati’s ve rsion of judgment internalism is very controversial. I suspect that it is false, but I do not think that I need to provide a rigorous argument against it. She tries to offer an argument in favor of existence internalism and uses an unusual version of j udgment internalism that is even more controversial to support it. Can Rosati use a more plausible version of judgment internalism to support an internalism requirement? I suspect not. Let us look at two other ve rsions of judgment internalism: (1) judgment internalism as it is traditionally under stood and (2) a hybrid view between what Rosati says above and j udgment internalism as it is traditionally understood. Let us start with (1). Judgment internalism, as it is traditio nally understood, is a thesis about a link between one’s judgments of a certain sort a nd one’s motivation. Darwall characterizes it as follows: “Judgment internalism holds that if S judges (or believes, or sincerely asserts) that she ought to do A (or that she has reason to do A), then, necessarily, she has some motivation to do A” (Darwall, pg. 308) Darwall does not mention judgments by S about what is good for S in this passage, and, of course, judgments by S about S ’s own good are really the central sort of case for the present discussion. Judgment internalism, as it is traditio nally understood, does not support either the weak or Rosati’s strong existe nce internalism requirement. People are often mistaken in their judgments about what is good for them. If judgment internalism were true, people would have to be motivated to pursue that which they mistakenly think is good for them. This suggests that judgment internalis m is really about the nature of judgments about

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119 what is good for someone, rather than what really is good for them. Recall that Rosati seems to think that the internalism requirement on what is good for someone is a kind of existence internalism, and she argues that exis tence internalism is the best explanation of judgment internalism. But this is a mist ake. The best expl anation of judgment internalism, as it is traditionally characteri zed, is not existence internalism—which is about what really is good. In stead, the best explanation of judgment internalism as it is traditionally understood must have its roots in th e nature of judgments. So even if the traditional version of judgment internalism were to be true, it would not help Rosati prove that there is anything lik e an existence inte rnalism requirement on what is good for someone. Might there not be a version of judgment internalism that is more plausible than the version Rosati originally offers and yet at the same time could support an existence internalism requirement? It is hard to see how such a version could be formulated in a plausible way and still serve the required role in Rosati’s argument. Rosati’s version of judgment internalism could be made slightly cl oser to ordinary versions. She could say the following: All judgments by A in any possible condition (e.g. by A A +, or A in some other possible circumstance) about the actual A ’s good must motivate the judger (e.g. A A +, etc.) to some extent. This hybrid version is closer to the tradit ional understanding of judgment internalism in that it limits the range of the “judgers” who must be motivated in different possible scenarios. The problem w ith this version is that it does not ensure A ’s motivation in A ’s actual circumstance. Alternatively, Rosati could say the following: All judgments by A in any possible condition ( A A +, or A in some other possible circumstance) about the actual A ’s good must motivate the actual A to some extent. This

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120 hybrid version will not help either because it is simply too controversial. A would not even be able to comprehend the full range of advice offered to him from those just like him in any possible condition. Re call that Rosati’s argument is by an inference to best explanation and that she needs a theory that is at least fairly plausible to get her argument off the ground. So Rosati’s first argument to prove an existence internalism requirement does not work and cannot be fixed up in an easy wa y. Her original formulation of judgment internalism is very implausible. The traditional version of judgment internalism might not be right, and even if it is, it is not the case that the best explanation of it is existence internalism. Judgment inte rnalism as it is traditiona lly understood and existence internalism on either the strong or weak versi on have quite different contents. There does not seem to be any obvious hybrid account of judgment internalism that helps Rosati’s first argument. Rosati’s next argument is an argument from the metaphysics of value. The argument begins with the thought that value is subj ective; that value is brought into the world with agents who value. Citing R.B. Perry’s General Theory of Value Rosati claims: Introduce into the world crea tures who are affected by and react to their world, Perry tells us, and you introduce value as we ll. Indeed, he suggests, introducing such creatures is sufficient for the introducti on of value. It is a natural step from this thought to the thought that valu e itself must be a complex motivational property. (Rosati, pg. 313) The only other possibility for the metaphysics of value that Rosati sees is Moore’s nonnatural properties. The problem with Moore’ s account of value is its queer metaphysical commitments. Rosati admits that the meta physical argument is inconclusive because a proponent of dispositional accounts of va lue, such as McDowell and Wiggins, can

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121 endorse the metaphysical view of value under discussion and ye t still reject an internalism requirement of the good.6 A proponent of the dispositional account of value could agree with the metaphysical condition th at agents bring value into the world by claiming that goodness consists in reactions or dispositions (such as one might claim that the color red is brought into the world by appropriately perceiving agents), without thinking that that kind of reaction or disposition is motivational. I will not spend too much time on the metaphysical argument because Rosati admits it is inconclusive. She does offer some thoughts on how one might strengthen the argument, but her thoughts are not definite (Ibid, pg. 314-315). I think that we can agree with the metaphysical picture of value (nam ely, that introduction of creatures who are affected by and react to the wo rld leads to the in troduction of value), but disagree with existence internalism. Here is one thought that should make one th ink that this is a coherent position: we can distinguish between moral patients and moral agents. Moral patients, let us say, are those things that are deserving of moral treatment. Moral agents, let us say, are moral patients, but in addition to deserving moral treatment, they also can act morally and be held accountable for th eir actions. Only moral agents can be motivated (in the relevant sense). But mora l patients react to a nd are affected by the world and presumably have a good. Thus valu e could be brought into the world by the existence of moral patients without there being the kind of motivation necessary for existence internalism. For if there were no agents, there would not be motivation in the right sense. It seems as though Rosati’s view of the metaphysics of value implies that, if there were no agents, and at least some patie nts, there might not be any value. This 6 McDowell’s and Wiggins’s accounts are dispositional but not motivational

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122 would be puzzling. I do not take myself to be proving that Perry’s metaphysical picture of value is false. Merely that it does not support either weak or strong existence internalism. Rosati’s third argument is from the episte mology of value. We can justify the thought that something is good for someone, so the argument goes, only if the alleged good satisfies existence internalism (Ibid, pg. 316). Rosati’s first of two lines of epistemological argument is inspired by Mill’s supposed proof of the principle of utility, the argument that turns on the analogy be tween visible/seen, audible/heard, and desirable/desire. In Rosati’s words: Unless a person could care about the thing in questi on it cannot be justified as a part of her good, because the possibility of her caring about the thing is necessary evidence of its being good for her. But w hy think that it is necessary evidence? Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that a person A could not be brought to care about a thing X under any condi tions and so concluded that it is not good for her. What counterevidence could be produced to subvert A’s conclusion? We have no picture, the argument might go, of what such evidence could be. (Ibid, pg. 316) Rosati does not claim that the person must act ually desire the thing in question; merely that it must be the case that it could be desired. The argument in the quotation seems fairly clearly to be an argument for weak inte rnalism. However, I th ink it is, at best, far from conclusive. This is because epistemological arguments can only prove so much in this field. Humans might simply have a limited capacity for knowledge that does not extend to the full field of what exists. If someone cannot be convinced of the existence of something, then that does not mean that it does not exist. However, suppose that the limits of human capacity for knowledge extend far enough to include all that is good for them. I still do not think that Rosati’s arguments support a strong internalism requirement, and probably do not even support a weak

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123 internalism requirement. I would like to dist inguish between two ordinary uses of the term “care.” Sometimes when trying to convince people of something by showing evidence for it, people might respond “why should I care about that?” and what they mean is something like “why should I believe in that?” Imagine that the members of a jury are debating certain pieces of evidence th at point to the guilt and innocence of the defendant. Someone may say “He stood to in herit a lot of money upon the death of his uncle” and another may respond “But why should we care about that.” It is in this epistemic sense that caring is more about belief than about motivation. Other times people speak of caring in a context where a co nnative attitude is meant, such as caring about whether cats are set on fire. If people could not be brought to see the importance of some evidence—if they could not be brought to “care”—in the epis temic sense, I would wonder whether it really is valid evidence. However if someone could not be brought to care and be motivated about something, that does not seem to be evidence that it is not a good—at the very least, additi onal argument is necessary. Rosati’s second epistemological argument is inspired by Richard Brandt’s work on intrinsic desires and cognitive psychotherapy. Rosati states: But Brandt’s strategy suggests that in order to justify to a person the claim that something is good for her one must be able to show how that thing connects with her own actual or possible concerns. We mu st show her that she has reason to care about it, and we can show her that she has reason to care about it only by appropriately connecting it with something that she already does or can care about. (Ibid, pg. 318) We might view Rosati’s second epistemo logical argument as one that relies on reasons as opposed to what we can convince the person of Now the concept of a reason, when left unexplained, will not help clarify the issue. For people say that there are many sorts of reasons.

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124 Again, epistemological arguments can only show so much in this area and Rosati admits that epistemological arguments will be inconclusive (Rosati, pg. 318). However, I will try to deal with her argument directly. The plausibility of Rosati’s argument depends on how we interpret “possible concerns” and on what it is to care about something. She does say this: The reasons version of the epistemological argument yields a similar result. This argument relies upon the idea that we can show a person that she has a reason to care about X only by showing her that it c onnects with something she already does or at least could care about. Two-tier inte rnalism exploits this very idea. If a person is to have a reason to care about X, and thus a reason to think that it is, at least prima facie, a part of her good, it is not enough that X be among the possible objects of her concern. Rather, it must be the case that alth ough she does not now care about X, she would care about it unde r certain conditions, and what’s more, the fact that she would ca re about it under those condi tions is something that concerns her even now, at least if sh e reflects on the matte r carefully” (Ibid, pg. 319). In this passage, Rosati clearly makes a m ove to argue for the strong internalism requirement. However, there is very little of her argumen t that relies on an epistemological argument of any sort. Perhap s what Rosati is up to is proving a plausible way, at least by her lights, of fleshing out the details of internalism requirement. However this is quite different from providi ng an argument. So we must rely on her other arguments for a critical discussion. Rosati’s fourth argument is based on the “‘ ought’ implies ‘can’” doctrine. Drawing from David Velleman, Rosati writes: We think of our good, he [Velleman] sugge sts, as being that which we ought, at least prima facie, to care about. Yet it cannot be that we ought to care about something if we are incapable of caring a bout it. We can be prima facie obligated to care about something only if it is at least prima facie an option . And something can only be prima facie an option for a person, if she is capable of caring about it. (Ibid, pg. 320)7 7 The Velleman article that Rosati references is “Is Motivation Internal to Value?”

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125 Velleman, as characterized by Rosati, seems to say that a necessary condition of something, X, being in A ’s good is that A ought to care about X. Moreover, so this line of thought seems to go, a necessary condition of A ’s being obligated to care about X is that A is capable of caring about X. I will assu me for the sake of argument that Rosati has characterized Velleman’s position correctly. Rosati think that Velleman’s position supports her internalism requirement. Let me explain. Velleman, at least as Rosati characterizes him, is committed to claiming two theses: (1) If X is good for A then prima facie A ought to care about X, and (2) If prima facie A ought to care about X, then A is capable of caring about X. (1) and (2), when taken together, entail (3): If X is good for A then A is capable of caring about X (given suitable prima facie conditions). Now, my id eal advisor theory can accommodate (3) because (3) is merely a weak internalism requirement. Rosati offers an argument for her strong internalism requirement. I will turn to that now. Rosati’s argument for her strong intern alism requirement is an argument by analogy to the “’ought’ implies ‘can’” principle. Rosati says: When, in the moral case, we ask the ques tion, “Can a person choose to die rather than to hand over her money to a thief?” we do not mean to ask, “Can she if we hypnotize her to make that choice?” or “Can she if we alter her brain?” We mean something more like this: “Can she make that choice on her own, as she is, and with all that she can muster from that st andpoint?” Now, to return to the nonmoral case, there may well be things that a person would care about if only she were under conditions other than her current ones . The bare fact that A would care about X under C [such as A on serious hallu cinogenic drugs] surely does not show that A can care about X in the relevant sense. The ought of “’ought’ implies ‘can’” is not addressed to the person she is unde r C. Insofar as judgments about our good present us with prima facie oughts, they are addressed to us in our actual positions. More precisely speaking, they are addr essed to us as occupants of normally accessible improved conditions. (Ibid, pg. 321) Rosati is here offering a fa irly clear argument in favor of her strong internalism requirement. Roughly she sees there as bei ng an “’ought’ implies ‘ can’” principle and

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126 she also sees there as being a similar “’good’ implies ‘can’” pr inciple. Just as the “can” in the “’ought’ implies ‘can’” principle is understood, roughly, to be “can make that choice on her own, as she is, and with all that she can muster from that standpoint,” so too, Rosati’s argument goes, the “can” in the “’good’ implies ‘can’” principle implies, roughly, “can care about it on her own, as she is and with all that she can muster from that standpoint.” I think that Rosati’s ar gument from analogy has serious problems. I will explore a few of the problems I see for her argument by analogy. Firstly, the “’ought’ implies ‘can’” principle, as Rosati characterizes it, is false. Let me illustrate with an example. I, and pr esumably the reader, take it as given that molesting children is wrong. Yet some peopl e cannot refrain from molesting children, on their own, as they are, with all they can mu ster. In such cases, child molesters are not justified in their behavior.8 Rosati’s construal of the “’ ought’ implies ‘can’” principle is controversial at best. Secondly, even if Rosati is correct in he r construal of the “’ought’ implies ‘can’” principle, there are neverthe less serious difficulties with the analogy. To repeat a controversial line from the bl ock quotation above, Rosati sa ys: “Insofar as judgments about our good present us with prima facie oughts, they are addressed to us in our actual positions” (Ibid, pg. 321). Now, Rosati here make s reference to the motivational force of our judgments about our own good rather than the motivational force of what really is our own good. Exactly what Rosati has in mind here is not clear. Perhaps she is alluding to 8 Note that child molesters are not ev en excused in such cases. One is justified in acting a certain way if one is right in one’s action. One is excused in acting a certain way if one acts in a morally wrong way, yet one is, for whatever reason, not resp onsible for acting as he did. Rosa ti needs the “’ought’ implies ‘can’” principle to provide justification in moral cases, in order for her analogy to work. Yet I think she does not even get excuses in moral cases.

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127 her previous argument for exis tence internalism from judgment internalism. As I say above, such an argument does not work. Judgm ent internalism, for all I know, could be true, yet is does not support existence intern alism. So, to be charitable, let us suppose that Rosati, in the quotation, is writing of our actual good. There is still a problem—why suppose that there our indivi dual good presents us with prima facie obligations in the first place. This is something that requires argum ent. Rosati seems to accept what I mention above as Velleman’s (1)—if X is good for A then prima facie A ought to care about X. Yet this is something that requires argument. Simply to assume it will not do in this context. When we look at the details of Rosati’s argument by analogy, it seems that there are serious problems. Rosati’s fifth and final argument is based on autonomy. Here is what Rosati has to say about autonomy and well-being: Internalism is thus suppo rted not merely by the negative concern to prevent alienation, but by a positive concern about autonomy. The negative side of insuring that a person’s good is made for or suits her is insuring that it is not something alien to her. The positive si de of insuring that her good suits her is insuring that it is a reflection of her aut onomous nature. We might, then, attempt to defend internalism about the good directly by appeal to autonomy. (Ibid, pg. 322) Rosati’s fifth argument is positive in the sens e that it does not argue about what does not “suit” the agent, but is instead about wh at does—namely, actions that reflect her autonomous action. Rosati’s argument from autonomy goes like this: Something cannot be a part of a person’ s good if it cannot ente r into her rational self-governance. And it can en ter into her self-governance only if she is capable of caring about it. If she is not capable of caring about it, she cannot of her own accord rationally pursue it, promote it, or simply cherish it. (Ibid, pg. 323-324) I take it that she means that A ’s being capable of caring fo r something is a necessary condition of that th ing’s entering into A ’s self-governance which, in turn, is a necessary

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128 condition of that thing’s being good for A Again, a lot depends on what Rosati means by saying someone is capable of caring for something. If Ro sati just means that there is a possible world in which A cares about the thing, then the full information view can meet the internalism requirement quite easily. But presumably she does not have such a weak internalism requirement in mind. Rosati thinks that there is a general c onnection between autonomy and well-being. Specifically, she mentions that one’s good cannot be alien to her and what is good for her must suit her autonomous nature (Ibid, pg. 322) I agree that there might be such a connection and I think that my ideal advisor account can explain th e connection. Let me explain. There is a recent and significant body of literature in which it is argued that desires can be either autonomous or not autonomous. Whether a desire is autonomous depends on how it is formed. Inspired by Amartya Se n’s writings about desire formation, many people have come to reject the thought that actual desires ar e invariably truly autonomous.9 To borrow and modify an example, we can imagine that someone is “brainwashed,” through cultura l inculcation, into desiring a brand new and expensive bicycle. Is this what the agent autonomous ly wants? It seems not. Many writers on autonomous desires are willing to grant that non-autonomous desires at least sometimes will not “extinguish” with more information, su ch as, for example, information about its origin. Some non-autonomous desires pers ist even when people find out about their origins and disapprove of them. 9 For a good example, see Feinberg’s “Autonomy.” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy

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129 Perhaps we can incorporate the idea of autonomous desire s into my ideal advisor account of well-being. Admittedly, this is speculative, but we might be able to unite the “informed advisor” literature, which has its roots back in the writings of the early utilitarians, if not before, and continue s on through Railton, with the literature on “autonomous desires,” which follows from Se n and the work of others. A central motivation for each of these strands of literature, I say, is that one’s personality is central to her well-being. If an agent were to have information about how a desire was formed, perhaps he would not desire his less informed self to satisfy the desire or even to have it. Perhaps an agent’s desires of this kind are his non-autonomous desires. In the previous chapter, I explored how false beliefs can di stort one’s personality and result in desires that are not true to one’s pe rsonality. Such desires, I ar gued should not be counted as relevant to one’s well-being. Perhaps, in a somewhat similar way, cultural inculcation might distort one’s personality and result in desi res that are not true to one’s personality. Strictly speaking, in th e example of the bicycle above, ther e is not a false belief in play; rather, the distorting element is a culturally in culcated value. If Sen and others are right in thinking that desires can be non-autonomous, I think that appealing to personality is a way of explaining what they are up to. Now, a lot of what I have just said has been speculative, but I do think I have presented an intriguing possi bility for an ideal advisor view. Additionally, I think the idea of the pe rsonality can unify and explain a great deal about the relationship between autonomy and well-being. I think I have sketched out a general way in which one might think that autonomy and my conception of well-being are related. In this way, I hope to have alle viated any concerns that my ideal advisor

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130 account ends up identifying what is good for someone as alien or not true to her autonomous nature. Let me explain why I do not pursue the deta ils of my proposal further. I have a slight suspicion that the exampl es of socially incu lcated values, as found in the works of Sen and others, are not as problematic for an ideal advisor theory such as mine as the examples may initially seem. Examples such as a desire for a new bicycle or the desires of a contented slave always, or at least near ly always, are morally colored in a way that might bias our intuitions on the matter. A bette r test case might be of a desire that is for something that is morally good, which is intrin sic and self-regarding in the way I describe in the previous chapter, such as the intrinsic desire by A that A feed the starving. Imagine that this desire by A is socially inculcated. Is the intuition, nevertheless, that A ’s desire is irrelevant to A ’s well-being? At least my intuitio ns become less clear in the case just discussed. I am not sure that Sen and others ha ve identified a true class of desires that are irrelevant to one’s well-being. Given that I think it is unclea r whether socially inculcated desires ought to be excluded from being rele vant to one’s well-being, I leave the proposal for their exclusion only sketched out. My thesis that one’s personality is a central determiner of her well-being can be modified to fit either side of this issue. Let me sum up what I hope to have shown thus far in this chapter. Rosati and Loeb think that there is an internalism requirement. Unde rstood in a very rough way, the internalism requirement links one’s good with one’s motivation. A weak version of the requirement is that in order for something to be good for someone, it must be possible, in a broad sense, for the person to care for it. My and Railton’s ideal advisor views meet the weak internalism requirement. A strong version of an internalism requirement is Rosati’s

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131 two-tiered view, according to which, roughly, X is good for A only if (1) Aic cares about X for A and (2) Ao cares about Aic’s caring about X for A None of Rosati’s five arguments supports her strong in ternalism requirement. What I will do now is offer some arguments against Rosati’s strong internalism requirement. Rosati’s specification of the requirement does not itself remain true to existence internalism. Recall that exis tence internalism, in the words of Darwall, is the theory, roughly, that there is a necessary connecti on between the truth of a normative proposition and motivation (Darwall, pg. 308). I will now adjust Darwall’s characterization of existence internalism to fit into a di scussion of well-being. Roughly, existence internalism about well-being is the theory that there is a necessary connection between what is prudentially good for someone and hi s motivation. I certainly do not wish to commit myself to existence internalism. It is a very controversial thesis. I will argue, however, that even if existence interna lism were right, it would not be entailed by Rosati’s strong intern alism requirement. Rosati’s characterization of the intern alism requirement—the strong version—does not make what is good for someone depend on th at person’s motivation to pursue it in cases where she does not have it.10 According to Rosati’s c onstrual of the requirement, while Ao has to care about what Aic advises, A does not. So something can be good for A without A having any motivation to pursue it. That aspect of Ro sati’s position might seem surprising. But let us set aside this worry. 10 In this passage I will write of desires as though they are always for things that one does not have. This is false, of course. People may desire things that they have; perhaps such cases might better be called cases of cherishing rather than desiring, but that this beside the point. I will opt for simplicity of expression.

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132 There is yet another “gap” between what is good for someone and his motivation to pursue it. Rosati does not require that Ao care about what Aic advises: instead, she requires that Ao care about Aic’s advice. Those are two very different things. If we think of the advisor’s advice as being a kind of desire about A then Aic’s advice will consist in a set of desires. Now, Ao does not have to have the same desires as Aic. Instead, Ao merely has to care about Aic’s advice. Let me put this more carefully. Let us say that Aic’s advice for A consists in a set of desires for A to have a variety of things, x Ao does not have to desire x he can merely care about the advice of Aic, which means Ao might have no motivation to pursue x whatsoever. Here is an illustration by example. Aic might advise A to improve his health. Ao might approve of the fact that Aic has this advice for A Nevertheless, Ao might not desire to improve his h ealth himself. I could provide many similar examples. Rosati’s internalism require ment, if I am right, does not always require that an agent have some motive for his ow n good: it merely requires that one have a positive attitude toward an ideal counterpart’s advice. So I do not think that one of the core ideas Rosati says motivates her strong internalism requirement, existence internalis m, supports her two-tiered version of the requirement. It is hard to see what else supports her strong internalism requirement. Railton’s and Velleman’s sparse comments on th is issue are far too inchoate to support Rosati’s strong internalism requirement. Atte mpting to establish the strong internalism requirement is a very ambitious project. If st rong internalism were tr ue, then virtually all popular accounts of well-being would be wrong. Thus, it is not surprising that the strong internalism requirement incredibly hard to es tablish. It is not clear whether the weaker

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133 internalism requirement is true. However, ev en if it is true, my ideal advisor theory meets the requirement. Perhaps the reader will be surprised to find me in agreement with Rosati on one “big picture” issue regarding desire-satisfa ction accounts of well-bei ng. Let us say that an “actual” desire-satisfaction view is that one’s well-being varies with the extent to which one’s actual, intrinsi c, self-regarding, non-moral a nd non-aesthetic, desires are satisfied. Rosati is right to be concerned a bout the central motivations for the move from the actual desire-satis faction view to ideal advisor account s. Rosati seeks to locate the central motivation. So do I. She finds the central motivation in he r strong internalism requirement. I, following Railton in a way, find a central motivation in the requirement that relevant desires to one’s well-being fit one’s personality. So, Rosati and I agree that a central motivation must be found. We just disagree about the nature of the central motivation. Ideal Advisor views have been criticized because they do not meet an internalism requirement and I take myself to have discha rged that criticism. There are, however, other criticisms of Ideal Advisor views. I will turn to them now. 4.3 Full Information and the Conditional Fallacy As I explained in the previous chapter, th e ideal advisor view I endorse requires the advisor to have full as opposed to partial in formation. The position is counterfactual in that it does not require a fully informed actual person to want a kind of life for A All that is required is that A ’s being fully informed is in principle possible. Counterfactual analyses have a danger attached to them. A ny analysis fails when some unintended cases are captured by the analysis or some of the in tended cases fail to be captured. Robert

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134 Shope, in his paper “The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy,” explains a special way in which counterfactual analyses can fail. The language of possible worlds helps make counterfactuals cl ear. Shope did not use the language of possible worlds when he discussed the conditional fallacy, but the fallacy, when stated in the language of possibl e worlds, is much easier to grasp than it would otherwise be. So, I will characterize the conditional fallacy in the language of possible worlds. Imagine that person A is in the actual world. Imagine that A + is A in the nearest possible world in which A is fully informed. By the “nearest” world I mean the world in which the fewest possible facts change and yet A is fully informed. There is no guarantee that the two possible worlds differ in just the one fact about the information that A has. Once we look to the nearest possible world in which A is fully informed, there is no guarantee that other things are not different as well. Let us call these other differences “consequent changes” because they are not in tended differences from the actual world. Rather the nearest possible world in which the specifie d, intended, conditions are met also contains these consequent changes. Some consequent changes will not cause pr oblems for an analysis and some will. People speak of Cambridge changes.11 A Cambridge change occurs for some object when there is a change in the statem ents that are true of that object.12 For example, assume that George Bush cut his cheek wh ile shaving today. There is a substantial change in Bush in that he now has a cut on his cheek. There is also a Cambridge Change 11 The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Parfit in his “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best” in Reasons and Persons 12 This is the definition of a Cambridge Change as found in Parfit, pg. 494.

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135 in Aristotle. Aristotle lived in a world in which, later, Bush cut his cheek. If we adopt the Cambridge change example to the ideal advisor examples, there will be lots of Cambridge changes from the real to the nearest possible world in which A is fully informed. For starters, everyone will bear a relation to A + instead of A Cambridge changes will not cause problems for counterf actual analyses but at least some other changes might. One example of a consequent change th at could cause prob lems for the full information account of well-being is that A +, now with full information, may dislike A A + could find A to be a despicable sort of fellow. A+ could then advise A to jump off a cliff. Peter Railton has offered a way in which the above-described problem can perhaps be met. Using Railton’s language in cons truing ideal advisor theories, we place the further constraint on what A + can want for A to want.13 Railton says the following: “The wants in question, then, are wants regarding what he [ A +] would seek were he to assume the place of his actual, incompletely in formed and imperfectly rational self [ A ], taking into account the changes that self is capabl e of, the costs of thos e changes, and so on” (Railton, “Facts and Values”, pg. 16).14 Railton thinks that we can make it a requirement that A + choose as if he were to take the place of A in the immediate future. 13 In this passage, I will stick with the desire to desire language as a way of phrasing the advice of an ideal advisor that is relevant to well-being. However, please bear in mind that I think we should drop the desire to desire language altogether. Please look back to Chapter 3 for the complications concerning this issue. For the present, I will use the desire to desire language for simplicity. 14 Railton, in this quotation uses the “desire to desire” terminology referred to above. As I note above, I think that the “streamlined” a ccount of ideal advisor theories is supe rior in capturing the central ideal of ideal advisor theories. In this context however, I will stick with the “desire to desire” terminology for simplicity.

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136 Although Railton’s proposal resolves some of the counterintuitive results, it does not seem to solve a central worry. The origin al problem was that it seems possible for the fully informed self to cease to care about th e ignorant self. The original problem exposed the unjustified assumption that we care abou t ourselves under differe nt possible scenarios (what we take to be different possible worlds ). Railton’s proposal is that we treat the fully informed self as thinking as if he were to adopt the life of the relatively ignorant self in the immediate future, but the ba sic problem still remains in that A + might still think something such as “if I were to be as A is, I would want myself to jump off a cliff.” A thought of Darwall’s will help here. As is discussed in my Chapter 1, Darwall thinks that a person’s well-being is best unde rstood as what we would rationally want for her for herself, were we to care for her. As I have said, I think that Darwall is writing here at the level of concepts, not conceptions Nevertheless, his id ea can be brought to the level of conceptions. We can solve the problem under discu ssion by including the requirement that the fully informed self care for the actual, less informed, self. That solves the original problem because it forb ids the cases where we do not care for our future life paths (which Railton’ s proposal does not rule out). Darwall, of course, thinks that anyone, if she were to care, could give advice to someone and that the content of that advice would be const itutive of her advisee’s wellbeing. My position is different in that I ta ke the standpoint of the agent himself to be privileged over those others who might happen to care for him. The reason is that others might care for someone deeply, but not really know the person a ll that well on a deep level or even have a large commonality of dispositions and past experiences. In this case, it seems clear, their advice would not fix the person’s well-being. As the reader might

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137 expect, my reason for preferring my account ove r Darwall’s has to do with considerations stemming from the relation between one’s pers onality and what is good for one. Advice from one with the same personality as his ad visee, I say, is authoritative in determining what makes the advisee’s life go best. David Sobel, in his “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being,” offers another example of a consequent change that seems to threaten the full information view. Sobel worries that the fully informed self might be driven mad after undergoing a process through which he gains full information.15 Ignoring for the moment details about the process (I will have more to say about that later), Sobel’s concern looks a lot like the worry about whether the fully informed count erpart would care for his less informed counterpart. Sobel does not pur port to show that someone wh o went through the process of being fully informed would go mad. In stead he only has a concern that someone might become mad after undergoing the proc ess. This would be an undesirable consequent change. This worry can be c ountered by adding the requirement that the person must be sane after the pr ocess of gaining full information.16 I think that so long as the conditional fallacy has the fo rm of “for all we know, x could be a consequent change, given your anal ysans, and if so, your analysis will yield counterintuitive results, ” then a solution can be provided. I am optimistic here because although sometimes critics of id eal advisor accounts write as if there would be only one possible world in which one would have fu ll information, and they then prognosticate 15 Think back to Brandt’s description of what goes on during cognitive psychotherapy: “persons repeatedly represented to themselves, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time, the available information . the person gets the information at the focus of attention, with maximal vividness and detail, and with no hesitation or doubt about its truth” (Brandt, pg. 111-112). It does seem possible that some people would go mad after undergoing such a process. 16 Again, how the process of being fully informed w ould go will be discussed later in this chapter.

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138 doomsday-like scenarios, in reality (in so me sense perhaps), there are many possible worlds in which one is fully informed, i.e. there are many A + candidates. Of these many possible worlds in which one has full inform ation, some will involve changes in one that will be problematic, but some will involve few significant changes in one or changes that are quite unproblematic. The project, as il lustrated above, would be to single out the possible world in which one is fully informed th at works best in the theory. The criterion by which one evaluates which of these possible worlds is best for our purposes has to do with the basic motivation for desire-satisfacti on views. If I am ri ght in thinking that one’s personality is central to her well-being, then the concept of a personality should be a key factor—the desire-set of the A + who reflects the full range of A ’s personality and does not distort A ’s personality is the de sire-set relevant to A ’s well-being. As I explained in the previous chapter of this dissertation, if an advisor has incomplete information, then his advice might not reflect the full range of one’s personality and if an advisor has false beliefs, then his advice might distort one’s personality. My present point is that additional restrict ions may need to be placed on A +’s advice. Problems that can be solved by appeal to the concept of a personality include worries about the increased mental capacity a nd mental processing sp eed that would have to be the case in order for someone to have fu ll information. To be su re, it is a little odd even thinking about people with what can on ly be described as s uper-minds. However, anyone’s personality, I say, is compatible with increased cognitive capacity and the like. Unless someone can show that some counterintuitive consequent change must occur in a world in which one is fully informed, the method of singling out the best possible world in which one is fully informed seems to have a great deal of promise.

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139 My ideal advisor accoun t of well-being treats advice as relevant if it is from one’s counterpart in the nearest possi ble world in which the counter part is fully informed and shares the same personality. Thus far no one has come close to offering an argument that counterintuitive consequent ch anges must result in the ne arest possible world in which one is fully informed. There could be ma ny possible worlds, perhaps infinitely many possible worlds, and my account of wellbeing involves pick ing out just one. I will now turn to several criticisms of ideal advisor views based on the very idea of one’s being fully informed. 4.4 Knowledge That and Knowle dge What Something is Like Take knowledge that something is the case to be “propositional knowledge.” It is factual and everyone who is fully informed w ould have the same knowledge of this kind. Examples of propositional knowledge would be th at the Earth is round and that the sky is blue. Knowledge of “what something is like” is different. I have in mind here knowledge that is not propositional; the object of the knowledge is one’s experience of the thing in the world, or perhaps the thing in the world. Exampl es of non-propositional knowledge would include knowledge of what pineapple tastes lik e and knowledge of what teaching a philosophy class is like. There at least seems to be prima facie reason for thinking that the two kinds of knowledge are dist inct and that one kind is not reducible to another. This is a heavily debated issue, of course.17 If there were only propositional knowledge, then full information accounts of well-being would have a relatively straightforward explanation for how someone co uld be fully informed. The issue is far 17 One recent excellent coll ection on the issue is There is Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument

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140 more complicated if there is non-propositiona l knowledge. For the sake of argument, I will grant that there is a s ubstantive, non-reductive, kind of non-propositional knowledge. Rosati in a different paper than the one discussed above called “Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts of the Good” and David Sobel in his “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being” offer diffe rent arguments that draw in question the plausibility of including knowledge of what things are like in the set of full information. Indeed, they claim to challenge the very intelligibility of an agent’s being fully informed.18 First I will explore the plausibility of including knowledge of what things are like in the information set. Ultimately, I think that at l east some knowledge of what things are like must be left out. Later, I will examine whether full propositional information is adequate as an information set for the ideal advisor. While Rosati and Sobel are skeptical, I argue that full proposit ional information is far richer and more textured than they envision and may very well be sufficient to play the requisite role in the deliberation of the ideal advisor. Rosati has two primary lines of argument ag ainst ideal advisor theories in her paper “Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts of the Good.” The first is the argument that the fully informed self will not necessarily be someone whose judgment 18 God is said to be all-knowing. One really fascin ating thought is whether Sobel’s and Rosati’s arguments purport to show that God could not be fully informed in the required way. The agent with full-information will be God-like in a way on the full-information ideal advisor accounts. So it seems like the two cases of being fully informed might have to stand or fall together. Sobel’s and Rosati’s arguments would prove something quite extraordinary, incredibly significan t, if they showed that one of the three supposed properties of the traditional, Western God is not intelligible. Another interesting issue is whether God could play the role of the ideal advisor. Carson, in his book Value and the Good Life proposes just this. Carson seems to think that God exists and runs his theory from there (though in fairness to Carson, he also runs a parallel argument in case God does not exist). However, no one has to presume that God exists. For, there is a God of the relevant sort in some possible world, even if not in this world. Why is his advice not authoritative for each of our welfares (the advice he would give if he were to exist, for those who are not possible worlds realists)? There are many interestin g issues that arise in theology. But there are also serious issues that are central to my dissertation.

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141 you recognize as authoritative. This line draws heavily from her earlier paper on internalism and in fact presuppos es the internalism requirement. Because I take myself to have rejected her version of the internalism requirement as a requirement on well-being or the individual good, I will not deal with her first line of argument. The second primary line of argument has th e conclusion that no person can be fully informed. Rosati summarizes her thinking on this in the following quotation: Part of being a particular person with pa rticular traits is occupying a point of view—one that involves a certain way of seeing, feeling, and evaluating and which gives access to certain information while ma king other information inaccessible. If a person is to be fully informed, however, she must be able to enter into all her possible points of view. She must be cap able of now apprecia ting all her lives as the persons she would be if living them—side by side, so to speak. The problem concerns how she can occupy a point of view that gives her equal access to viewpoints that may be in direct conf lict, each excluding information accessible from the other. (Rosati, 1995, pg. 317) Roughly put, Rosati’s argument seems include two thoughts: (1) that people have to occupy a single perspective in order to make judgments at all, and (2) that being fully informed, in the relevant way, requires experi encing things from different perspectives, which is impossible. Rosati gives an example of experiencing thi ngs from the distinct viewpoints of an obtuse person and a sympathetic person. “B ut when it comes time to compare these lives, a person must have features that enable her to appreciate both what it is like to be her obtuse self and what it is like to be her sympathetic se lf” (Ibid, pg. 318). No such feature can be found, Rosati argues. The fu lly informed self cannot herself be both obtuse and sympathetic, for they are mutually exclusive (Ibid, pg. 319) The agent who is fully informed will be either obtuse, sympathetic or some other way, but for each way she turns out, there are countless ot her ways that are excluded.

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142 Rosati is not quite right in thinking that there is no po ssibility that the informed person could compare the two ways of living. The fully informed self would not have to be both obtuse and sympathetic. Perhaps full propositional knowledge of how the two different ways of living comp are would be sufficient for co mparison. Or perhaps one can have knowledge of what it is like to be obt use and knowledge of what it is like to be sympathetic without actually being obtuse and sympathetic. There is a further objection to the way Rosati construes the problem for the full information account. I think that the problem Ro sati puts forth is not one that strikes at the core idea behind the full information th eories of well-being. Let me explain. I think that Rosati’s example is poorly cons tructed. I will go back to the way in which she describes the example and problem fo r the ideal advisor theory. I do not think that knowing what it is like to be a certain kind of person is a central test case. It looks like Rosati is demanding that the ideal adviso r account provide an explanation of the “birds-eye” point of view that can incor porate knowledge of all of the different personalities a person could have. I do not th ink that the ideal advisor account owes such an explanation, for the ideal advisor account doe s not even allow that the personality of A + be different from the personality of A Remember that I argued that the best versions of ideal advisor views tr eat the personalities of A and A + as constant. Now, some possible desire sets regarding A ’s life will be “truer” to A ’s personality than others. But a proponent of the ideal advisor theory I favor does not think that th ere is a perspective outside one’s personali ty from which to judge which so rt of person to be (e.g. obtuse versus sympathetic). So I think that Rosati is demanding an explana tion that a proponent of ideal advisor views both does not owe and should not try to give. Rosati would have

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143 done better to put the issue in terms of know ing what different e xperiences are like from a specific perspective. Now, I think Rosati is clearly on to some thing with her arguments. However, I think that the real issue though is knowledge of what two mutually incompatible experiences are like, from a given perspectiv e. Sobel captures th e problem nicely and I will soon move to his discussion soon, but I mu st first finish the discussion of Rosati’s argument and its implications. I agree with Rosati that, given the natu re of what it is to occupy a single perspective, there is some conceivable in formation that cannot be included in the information set with which the ideal adviso r deliberates—namely, information that is only accessible to those with a different perspec tive. However, I disagree with her about the implication of that fact. She thinks that this undermines full information ideal advisor views of the individual good. I think it does not. Part of what has restricted full information accounts all along has been a restric tion on what information it is possible to have. I agree with Rosati that a singular pe rspective is required of an ideal advisor and that it is impossible for the advisor to occupy another perspective. I accept that there is an intelligible kind of information that cannot be included in the set to which the ideal advisor has access; for any perspective, there is some information that a person with that perspective cannot have. If that means that my account is not genuinely a full information account, then I am willing to accept that. So my position could be called an “as much information as a personality (and a perspective) will allow” view. I believe, however, that it is only fair to think that full informati on has been constrained all the while by what is possible given the nature of perspectives.

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144 Sobel, as I stated above, captures the chal lenge to ideal adviso r views in a clearer fashion than does Rosati. Sobe l’s challenge is similar to Ro sati’s in that it involves knowledge of what things are like. Sobel e xplores two different ways of thinking about the full information view: the report model a nd the experiential model. On the report model, full information is obtained when one learns of and comprehends reports about the various possible future scenarios. On the report model, the agent lacks firsthand experience with what the wo rld is like (Sobel, pg. 796). In my terminology, fully informed agents on the report model have only propositional knowledge that things are the case. Sobel argues that the report model is inadequate, and I will come back to visit this question in a little while. The experiential model of full information is the model that gives the agent firsthand experiences of what things are li ke. This model breaks down further into two distinct types: the se rial model and the amnesia version. On the serial version of full information, an agent experiences a specific set of events and th en later goes on to another set, and so on. A simplistic example is the process of sampling various favors of ice cream in order to decide which one to buy. Not all kinds of experience will fit the simplistic example, so the argument goes. Some experiences will make it so that the agent cannot experience another set of circumst ances. Sobel’s example is of the various ways in which one’s first kiss might go. If one experiences his first kiss one way and then moves on to an experience of the next, th e second case cannot be of a first kiss. In this way, it is impossible for one informed serial ly to be fully informed of all of the ways of life open to one (Sobel, pg. 803-805).

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145 The amnesia version solves the problems that the serial version faces, supposedly, by making it so that the agent experiences so mething and then forgets it, experiences the next thing, and then forgets it, and so on. La ter, the agent comes to remember all of the various experiences that he or she had as if these experiences were for the first time. Sobel argues that this version is still inadequate because it fails to give a single unifying perspective from which to judge the various kind s of lives. On this topic Sobel writes: For the purposes of the full information account we need a perspective whose preferences between the lives in question accurately determine their value to the agent. But now a problem arises. Our actual evaluative perspective changes over time. We can therefore e xpect that we would respond differently to factual and experiential knowledge at di fferent times in the future. Thus we do not have a single informed perspective to deal w ith, but several. And each will offer occasionally conflicting assessments of wh ere the agent’s well-being lies. (Ibid, pg. 805) There seem to be three different worries in this passage: the first is about the plausibility of the amnesia version of full information, th e second is about whethe r there is a single evaluative perspective for any agent at a specif ic time and the third is whether there is a single evaluative perspective over time.19 I think that the third problem Sobel mentions is off target if thought of as a problem unique to full information accounts of well-bei ng. Indeed it applies at least to all plausible desire satisfaction theories, and to a very broad range of accounts of well19 A fourth worry that might be in the background of Sobel’s remarks is that the order in which one experiences things might affect how they strike one. I am not sure whether Sobel does indeed have such a concern for the amnesia model because I am not sure whether Sobel thinks that the order of experiences could even be a problem for the amnesia model. The way Sobel thinks of the amnesia model, for the patient undergoing the experiences, it is as though each experience is without the others—for the first time. Of course, there could be a real order, but the patient, even after remembering all of the experiences, might not be able to tell the order on the amnesia model. I will not pursue this issue because I think that it leads us off the central thread of what Sobel is trying to argue. In any case, since I think that the amnesia model is ultimately doomed, I will not tr y to defend it too vigorously.

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146 being.20 So long as we fix the desire set to th e current desire set (or the set we would currently want ourselves to want were we cu rrently fully informed), then at any given moment, well-being can be determ ined in principle. Indeed, in the first chapter of this dissertation, I note that the account of well-being that I am after is an account of one’s well-being at a time. I will not re-open the issue at this point, but I refer the reader my discussion of Velleman’s thoughts on well-being.21 The problem of temporal perspectives is not unique to full-inform ation accounts, nor even unique to desiresatisfaction accounts, but applies to all theories th at allow something to raise well-being at one time which would lower it at another. Let us now look at the second problem S obel seems to have in mind, where we keep the time constant and examine whether th ere is a single perspective from which to judge different possible life paths. Let us treat the amnesia vers ion of how one might acquire full information as unproblematic, at leas t for now (later I will have more to say about it). I think that whether there is a singl e perspective from which to judge the various life paths depends on whether a singl e personality survives the process of being fully informed As I stated above when I discusse d Rosati, I am willing to admit that, given the nature of a personality, for any pe rsonality, there is some information that a person with that personality cannot have. We ought not to think of the information set as including knowledge from radical ly different evaluative pers pectives. Some information is excluded: only information available given the nature of the personality is admitted into the information set with which the ideal advisor deliberates. 20 Brandt has argued this and although Sobel does mention Brandt, Sobel does not mention that Brandt thinks that this is a problem for all desire-satisfaction theories. 21 I will discuss this issue again in the final chapter.

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147 Now, I will turn to the first problem. The first problem is about the plausibility of the amnesia version of being fully informed. Admittedly, the amnesia version has some unattractive features. Sobel sees two things wrong with it: First, it would surely require much very complicated research to have anything to say about the question of the similarity of experience between the original having of an experience and a later sudden r ecollection of it in cases in which the evaluative perspectives held at the tim e of the original experience differs significantly form that held by the pers on who is suddenly remembering. Second, even if we can convince ourselves that some system of controlled amnesia would enable us to avoid the problems I have mentioned above, there is no way of estimating the psychological shock of experiencing such a large number of instances of amnesia and loss of amnesi a to our idealized selves. The full information theorist cannot simply stipul ate that the idealized agent remain sane through this process, and I would have c oncerns about this issue. (Ibid, pg. 807) Sobel has two substantial worries about th e amnesia version of full information. But I wonder if the amnesia and the serial versions are the only options available. Moreover, Sobel, I take it, thinks that a proponent of an ideal advisor view needs to provide an account of the pro cess by which one comes to have full information. I do not think that is so. The “possible worlds” analysis we have been working with has depended at least on what is logically possible. Everyone agrees that it is not physically possible given scientific laws, for a person to become fully informed. This much has always been taken for granted by the proponents and opponents of ideal advisor views. The sense in which it is possible for one to be fully informed, is thus logical, but not physical. Miracles are logically, but not physically pos sible. There will be some possible worlds in which A + becomes fully informed by miracle and some where he becomes informed by a process such as the amnesia version as desc ribed by Sobel above. The world where A + is informed by miracle would likely be one in which th ere are fewer problematic

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148 consequent changes than the world in which he undergoes the amnesia process. So we should think of A + as being informed by miracle. The reader may find my resort to the idea of A +’s being informed by miracle to be ad hoc I, on the contrary, find it hard to see how one could be fully informed in any other way than by miracle, on my account. My account of well-being involves identifying the nearest possible world in whic h one’s counterpart is fully informed. Any agent who undergoes any of the processes Sobel mentions will not be in the nearest possible world in which the agent is fully in formed to the original world. One’s fully informed counterpart can differ from her act ual self only in being fully informed, and one’s counterpart cannot have gone through any of the proces ses Sobel proposes, for if one’s counterpart were to go th rough such processes, she would not be in the nearest possible world in which she is fully informed. Provided there is a world in which one is fully informed by miracle, it is the nearest world in which one is fully informed. Also, I have a deep concern about how Sobel characterizes unique experiences, such as first kisses. Pres umably, the phenomenological experience of what something is like does not have a “firstness” or “secondness” built into it. Instead, the phenomenology of a first kiss and a second kiss, where th ey are different only in order and other prerequisite changes, is the same. So bel must have in mind that it is a cognitive component such as the belief that one kiss is fi rst and one second, that differs. I think that there is good evidence that Sobel must think this. For example, in the example Sobel uses to motivate or explain the serial versi on, one is not in fact kissing different people for the first time—or the same person in diffe rent circumstances; in stead, one is kissing different people with the belief that it is one’s first time. Sobel, and I think Rosati too,

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149 must think that the background cognitive componen ts are crucial to experience or at least to the reaction to such expe riences. I am not convinced that the background cognitive components are crucial. To be sure, th ere has been no argument on either side. However, I feel that the bur den of proof lies on Sobel a nd Rosati to explain how the cognitive components work in affecting our experience. How it is that the background cognitive component works, at this point, is mysterious. Moreover, perhaps the differing backgrounds for any experience are something that mere propositional knowledge could account for. I do not intend to decisively refute Sobel or Rosati on th is point. Rather, I merely feel that there is a debt of explan ation on their part as to what the background cognitive component is and how it functions in experiences, speci fically, experiences about what things are like. Let me briefly sum up my defense of full in formation theories ag ainst the concerns of Rosati and Sobel. Rosati th inks that it is impossible to be fully informed given the nature of a perspective. I agree that one’s personality might not allow for some knowledge, but I do not think that this is at all problematic because, all along, my and Railton’s ideal advisor theory have been motiv ated by the idea that one’s personality is central to her well-being. Sobel’s argument s cause more serious problems for an ideal advisor view than Rosati’s, I think. Sobel ha s three concerns, the last of which is the most serious. I have responded along two lines First, a proponent of a full information view does not owe an account of the pro cess by which one becomes fully informed. Given that full information views have always been about what is logically possible, rather than psychologically possible, a proponent of a full information view can stipulate that one is fully informed by miracle. Sec ond, I think that Sobel owes an explanation of

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150 how beliefs shape experiences in the wa y he seems to think they do. Sobel’s presuppositions about the role of belief are controversial. Knowledge of what things ar e like is part of the information a fully informed individual would have, for my ideal adviso r account. Now, if some information is beyond what any one individual could have, give n his or her perspective, then her ideal advisor will not be fully informed in an ex tremely broad sense. However, I should note that this informational limitation is not as problematic as Rosati and Sobel make it out to be. Since the ideal advisor account of wellbeing I have develope d requires that one’s ideal advisor have the same perspective as he r advisee, and her advice be for her advisee given her advisee’s personalit y, then the missing information seems irrelevant to the content of the advisor’s advice. It simply does not matter what something is like from someone else’s perspective, I say, given that the advisor’s advice is offered from her own perspective. It seems to me, given the ar guments I have offered, that Rosati’s and Sobel’s arguments about the very idea of being fully informed do not present serious difficulties for my ideal advisor account. Suppose I am wrong about my arguments involving knowledge of what something is like. I nevertheless thi nk that my full information acc ount of well-being does quite well with merely propositional knowledge. In the part that follows, I explore the prospects of an ideal adviso r account of well-being on the as sumption that ideal advisors can only be informed with propositional knowledge. 4.5 Propositional and Non-Proposi tional Knowledge Revisited Recall that Sobel discusses the report m odel in which only “knowledge that,” or propositional knowledge, is permitted into the fu ll information. He argues that the report

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151 model has serious deficiencies, but I do not think he is right. View the work in 4.5 as a way covering my bases if my arguments in 4.4 do not work. Sobel first looks at what he takes the report model to lack. Here is what he has to say: We often need firsthand information if we are to be ideally situated, and if we are to be assured that we are ideally situated, to measure the value of a life to ourselves. . Some experiences are revelatory in the se nse that they alter our responses to facts and descriptions. Revelatory experiences enliven our appreciation of facts and descriptions such that although we were vi vidly aware of the facts and descriptions of the case, we had previously been dead to the import that we now find in them. (Sobel, pg. 797) Later, Sobel makes a key move in his argumen ts against the report model when he begins to speak of the experiential model as incorporating the evaluative perspective and the report model as failing to do so. On this Sobel writes: Perhaps there are lives such that almost no matter which of our possible evaluative perspectives we have, we st ill see that those lives are wonderful or horrible for us to live [the example Sobel gives is of life in a concentration camp]. But there are surely many lives that we could lead in wh ich our evaluative perspective in that life plays a large role in how we would experien ce that life from the inside. In many of these cases the way the life feels from th e inside will be an important factor in determining the relative value of that lif e. I therefore see little reason to be optimistic about the attempt to capture the worth of these lives when we are provided only with the facts and experience s accessible to a perspective outside the evaluative perspectives which would be our s in the life in question” (Sobel, pg. 799). Sobel does not describe the evaluative perspec tive in more detail. I will look at a few different interpretations and I will argue that the report mode l does not fail to capture the evaluative perspective in an impor tant sense of “evaluative.” At least in any important sense of “evalu ative,” the report model will capture what is important. To go back to the earlier example about the first kisses22; the report model 22 Recall as well that I have worries about what is goin g on in such cases. I take the experience of what something is like to be just the phenomenological qualities one has and I think that there is not a uniqueness

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152 will be able to capture whether someone regrets or is overjoyed at having had one’s first kiss with such and such a person at a part icular place and time. Regret, resentment, disappointment, indifference, delight and j oy can be propositional attitudes that are expressed in the contents of propositions. “I am delighted that Sophie made it to rugby practice on time” expresses a proposition about on e’s delight. Knowing what it is like for Sophie to be on time or what it is like to be delighted that Sophie is on time is secondary to the fact that one is delighted that S ophie is on time. The report model captures the important evaluative information. In fact, I have a hard time seeing how knowledge of what something is like is evaluative in any important sense—or at least what the content of that evaluation is that ca nnot be captured in a propositi on. Evaluative attitudes are expressible publicly. So at least in one way, an agent with a single personality and full propositional knowledge has an evaluative pers pective. Perhaps S obel has a different sort of evaluative perspective in mind. Sobel has strong concerns about the co mmensurability of very different experiences.23 For example, the ideal advisor, A +, may well know that A is happy with a first kiss and happy with a diffe rent case of a first kiss. How, Sobel wonders, can these cases be commensurable (Ibid, pg. 784-786)? The report model seems to take it for granted that the reports (whi ch are sets of propositions ) about the various possible A ’s who undergo the experiences will make their possible lives commensurable. Two replies are in order. First, it is not clear that the experience model, even if it could be made to such as “firstness” built into them. Instead, the uni queness is reflected in th e content of the person’s background beliefs at the tim e of the experience. 23 Distinguish between interpersonal commensurab ility, which is between different persons, and intrapersonal commensurability, which is within one person. Much has been written on interpersonal commensurability. Sobel’s project in his paper is to raise concerns about intrapersonal commensurability on full information ideal advisor views of well-being.

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153 work would help with intrapersonal commensu rability. We would have these different possible sets of experiences each of which is in commensurable. It is worth noting that at least some of the other conceptions of we ll-being also have this problem. Happiness should probably be thought of as consisting in many different mental states. How these are commensurable is anyone’s guess. Object ive list theories have a similar, if not deeper, failing. Perfectionist theories have a similar problem as well because it is not clear how the differing essential compone nts of a life are commensurable (e.g. developing one’s rational nature and developi ng one’s physical nature). Secondly, Sobel demands a very extreme kind of commensurability, one that our ordinary everyday decisions do not meet. The vividness of detail Sobel seems to require for making decisions is very difficult to have; this, even for decisions based on knowledge of what things are like from one’s past experience. Ev en simple decisions will lack this kind of vividness of information necessary for commensurability on Sobel’s view that we encounter in everyday life. This makes me th ink that the kind of commensurability that Sobel is after might not be all that important. It is a kind of deep commensurability that humans rarely have in normal lives and does not affect choiceworthiness in a life. I think that the report model is less fl awed than Sobel suggests. Just by way of summary, I do not think that an ideal observer theory must rely on the report model, but I do think that the re port model is less flawed that Sobel seems to think. I think that my arguments in 4.4 wo rk to show that a lot of non-propositional knowledge—all of the non-proposit onal knowledge that is rele vant to one’s advice—will be in A+’s information set. My attempts to show that the report model is less flawed than Sobel suggests is to “cover my bases” in case my arguments from 4.4 fail.

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154 4.6 Railton’s Account of Personality I noted in Chapter 3 that Railton has his ow n account of the role of the concept of personality in desire-satisf action accounts of well-being. I should note that while I am influenced by his account of personality, I di ffer with him significantly about its role in desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being. Let me explain. Just before Railton introduces his concept of personality, he discusses the process by which one becomes fully informed (Railton, “Facts and Values,” pg. 57-60). He is concerned with how such a process could go. As I argue above, however, I think that we do not need to provide an account of such a process —indeed, it would be incorrect to think that the fully informed counterpart of oneself would have become fully informed by going through a process of any significant kind, ot her than a miraculous process, since if he were to undergo such a process, then he would not be in the “nearest” possible world to oneself. Yet Railton is led to propose an acco unt of personality that is similar to mine in response to what he believes to be pr oblems in explaining the procedure by which one’s fully informed counterpart becomes fully informed. Here is the relevant passage: [A personality] is a collection of proper ties that ground dispositions to react in various ways to exposure to certain facts. Just as there is a reduction basis for an individual’s current desi res—those features of hi s psychology, physiology, and circumstances in virtue of which he now has these desires— there is a reduction basis for his idealized hypothetical desire s. When we ask how his desires would change upon the impact of further informa tion, we appeal to this basis. We, in effect, hold this basis as nearly constant as possible when asking what someone like him would come to desire—or more precisely, would come to want that he pursue were he to assume the place of his original self. (Railton, “Facts and Values,” pg. 60) Let me assume, for the sake of simplicity in this discussion, a dispositional account of desires and personality. That is, let me assume for the sake of argument that desires are dispositions of a certain sort and that one ’s personality is a set of dispositions of a

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155 certain sort. Given this assumption, then, the notion of personality that I have in mind in my account is, roughly, a set of dispositions to have desire-dispositions. On my account, A and A + share a personality, and this is one of the things that makes A +’s advice authoritative for A ’s well-being. But Railton seems to have something different in mind. A person’s personality, on Railton’s account, seems to be the reduction basis for his dispositions to have dispositions. Railton, then, has a very different understanding of what a personality consists in, it seems, th an I do. Railton seems to have in mind that when A gets further information, an important pa rt of an ideal advisor account of wellbeing is that it keeps A ’s personality the same, which is to say that it keeps the reduction basis for crucial dispositional elements of A ’s psychology the same. That much I can agree with, but Railton’s use of the concept of personality is importantly different than mind. For on my view, what is crucial is just that the relevant dis positional elements of A ’s psychology remain the same. If I am right in my interpretation of Ra ilton, his notion of the reduction basis of relevant dispositions plays a somewhat similar role in his account to the role that the idea of personality plays in my account. In my account what is important is to keep the personality as constant as possible between A in the relevant two possible worlds. Railton and I differ in our accounts of persona lity and its role in an ideal advisor account of well-being. In Railt on’s usage, a “personality” se ems to be the reduction basis for what I refer to as a “personality.” I do not here have an argument that he misuses the term “personality.” Nor do I have an ar gument that there is only one concept of personality and that mine is right. The importa nt point, I think, is that he and I are talking about different things. I think that the term “personality” captures ni cely what I have in

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156 mind and I will continue to use it. I can agree, of course, that there may be a reduction basis for what I refer to as a person’s personali ty, but it is the personality that plays a role in my account, not its reduction basis. 4.7 Conclusion If I am right about what I say in 4.4 of this chapter, A + will have full propositional knowledge and as much knowledge of what thin gs are like as is possible, given her personality. Although Sobel and Rosati worr y that the lack of absolutely total information is problematic for ideal advisor theo ries, I find that it is consistent with what I take to support ideal advisor theories all along. I think that one’s personality is central to one’s well-being. It is not surprising th at the very having of a personality limits the information one can have, given that each personality occupies a single perspective. At this point in the dissertation, we ha ve a more complicated possible worlds analysis of my preferred ideal advisor theory. Let me take a step back and go over the full theory with all of the modifications introdu ced since the previous chapter. There will be lots of possible worlds in which A is fully informed and is a candidate to be considered A +. We must now pick out a subclass of the set of all such candidates to be A +. The ideal advisor must care about the relatively less informed A he must be sane, he must have an intact personality, he must have as much information as that intact personality will admit, and he must have been fully informed by miracle. Let us call this person ‘ A +*.’ A +* is just the sort of pe rson whose advice should be relevant to A ’s well-being, I say. A +*’s advice would span the whole range of A ’s personality and will not include desires that stem from a distorted personality. In this way, A +*’s advice will not run afoul of the c oncerns raised in Chapter 3 about the

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157 amount and quality of information. In later chapters I will call A +* simply A + to keep the language simple.

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158 CHAPTER 5 TURNING THE DESIRE-SATISFACTION ACCOUNT DEVELOPED ABOVE INTO A THEORY OF PRUDENTIAL WELL-BEING Thus far, in developing my preferred view I have not taken into account to any great degree conditions of the narrow concept of well-being discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. For all th at I have said so far, the de sire-satisfaction account I have been discussing could be viewed as a theory of value, broadly speaking, rather than as a theory of well-being. Please recall that in the first chapter I say that one’s prudential well-being is constituted by one’s non-moral, non-aesthetic, and self -regarding interests. As I will make clear in the subsequent parts of this chapter, the requirement that one’s interest be self-regarding if satisfying it is to enhance one’s well-being is especially troubling for desire-satisfaction theories of well-being. Desire-satisfaction accounts, including the version I have developed in th is dissertation, seem to treat all of one’s interests as relevant to one’s well-being. To some extent, I am less concerned with the requirements that an interest be non-moral and non-aesth etic if it is to count as relevant to one’s well-being. As I hope to make clear la ter in this chapter, once desire-satisfaction accounts can make the distinct ion between selfand non-self -regarding interests, the matter of non-moral and non-aesthetic interests is less pressing. Even so, I will argue that desire-satisfaction accounts have a nearly unique resource in excluding one’s non-moral and non-aesthetic interests from being relevant to one’s well-being. I will sketch a few ways in which a desire-satisfaction proponent would eliminate non-moral and nonaesthetic interests.

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159 5.1 Self-Regarding Interests 5.1.1 Conceptions of Prudential Well-Be ing and Self-Regarding Interests I hold that virtually all conceptions of prudential well-being, whether desiresatisfaction conceptions or not, must restrict the set of possible interests relevant to wellbeing to those which are self-regarding. Th is is contrary to what many people who endorse theories other than desire-satisfaction accounts main tain. For example, most proponents of happiness theories do not take themselves to owe an account of how happiness fits the conditions of a theory of well-being.1 Perhaps they think that because it is the agent who has the ha ppiness, nothing more must be said to make happiness selfregarding. However, several ki nds or sources of happiness mi ght not be sufficiently selfregarding. For example, there is happiness that arises vicariously (manifested in the saying “I’m happy for you that. . ”) and happi ness that depends solely on the happiness of other people (manifested in the saying “I’m happy if you’re happy”) and so on. These examples do not prove anything definite; all I hope to accomplish with these examples is to convince the reader that ther e might even be a need to rest rict mental state theories to make them theories of prudential well-being. The thought that “Well, if it is the agent’s happiness in question, then that is sufficient ly self-regarding” works only as well as it would work if the proponent of the desire-sa tisfaction theory said “Well, if it is the agent’s desire in question, then that is suffici ently self-regarding.” I do not think either of 1 Sumner is a notable exception. He says: “We co me now to the notion of happiness with which we will be principally concerned, that in which you are (have been) happy or your life is (has been) a happy one. Being happy in this sense means having a certain kind of positive attitude toward your life. . ” (Sumner, pg. 145). Sumner calls this kind of happiness “life satisfaction” and he takes it to be the most important kind for a theory of welfare. Sumner’s construal of the most important kind of happiness looks as though it is primarily self-regarding.

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160 these responses works well.2 So the problem really seems to be a problem that all conceptions of well-being must address. Fu rthermore, my specific version of desiresatisfaction account does not have any special resources to deal w ith the problem of nonself-regarding interests. One can have desire s and give advice of many different sorts. To use the language of the ideal advisor theo ry, one’s advisor could give advice that is not advisee-regarding.3 In what follows in this section of the chapter, I will provide a way of differentiating self -regarding interests and non-se lf-regarding interests for virtually any desire-satisfacti on account of well-being. Then I will explore the distinction as it is relevant for my specific ideal adviso r account. Interestingly, if I am right, my proposal works almost only for desire-s atisfaction conceptions of well-being. 5.1.2 Self-Regarding Desires: Th e Problem of Self-Sacrifice One illustration of why desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being are troubled by the distinction between selfand non-self-regarding desire s is the problem of selfsacrifice. Lots of hypothetical cases have b een described in the li terature on well-being that have proved troublesome for the desire satisfaction account of the narrow concept of well-being. Mark Overvold has explored the issue of self-interest and self-sacrifice in several papers. His papers figure prominently in the debates over the desire-satisfaction conception of well-being. An example of self-sacrifice would be a case in which someone donates money to a medical group so that it can find a cure to a disease. There are lots of background 2 The perfectionist and objective list theories have similar, if not far worse, sorts of problems. 3 I am also assuming that I could not solve the problem simply by requiring of all ideal advisors, that they restrict their advice to that which is advisee-regarding, for we would no doubt still want to know in what that restriction consists.

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161 assumptions that must be in place to ensure that the case involves se lf-sacrifice, such as the fact that the person is not donating the money because he has the disease himself and wants a cure, that his act is voluntary, etc. On at least one intuitive understanding of the example, when the man gives the money to th e group, he is making a sacrifice of his own well-being because the money he gives could be spent otherwise in a way that benefits him. The reason that examples of self-sacrifi ce at least seem to cause problems for desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being is th at in cases of self-s acrifice, a desire is satisfied and so, according to these accounts of well-being, the agent’s well-being should increase in such cases. Yet, self-sacrifi ce seems to require a d ecrease in well-being.4 So desire-satisfaction accounts cannot explai n it (at least in an easy way). A number of philosophers have recognized the problem of self-s acrifice for desiresatisfaction theories of well-being. Here are a few: Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (pg. 328-331), Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (pg. 493-502), T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (pg. 115), Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (pg. 25-28), and Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (pg. 25-31). Each of these philosophers has argued that de sire-satisfaction ac counts of well-being need to explain self-sacrifice. In what follows, I would like to set up the problem of self-sacrifice in a more detailed way. I will then go on to e xplain how desire-satis faction theories can explain self-sacrifice in an intuitive way. 4 Perhaps one thinks that an agent acts self-sacrificially when she merely intends to act in such a way that her well-being decreases. If unsuccessful, her desire will be left unsatisfied. Thus, in these cases of failed action, so the example is supposed to go, she has no increase in her well-being even though she acts selfsacrificially. The central worry of self-sacrifice remain s for desire-satisfaction account because in the cases where the agent succeeds, it seems her well-being increases I will assume for this paper that self-sacrifice requires a decrease in well-being, for simplicity. If I am wrong in this assumption, the problem is a bit more complex in formulation, but essentially the same.

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162 5.1.3 The Problem Restated The problem of self-sacrifice for desire-sa tisfaction accounts of well-being can be expressed as a supposedly incons istent triad. It seems that any two of the following three propositions can be accepted without inc onsistency, but not all three together: 1. Genuine self-sacrifice is possible. 2. People are motivated by their desires. 3. Well-being is increased wh en desires are satisfied. (1) should be read partly as a thesis of psychology—about what can serve as a motive. (1) is the thesis that people can be motivated to act in a way that is really selfsacrificial, rather than just apparently self-sacrificial. (2) is what I will call “Humeanism.” Humeanism, understood very ro ughly, is a thesis about motivation. The Humean claims that a desire is necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for motivation. (3) is just a general and rough expression of a simple desire -satisfaction account of wellbeing. I will not challenge the first two propos itions in this dissertation. I am disinclined to reject them for reasons outside of the scope of this dissertation. Moreover, many people find (1) and (2) attractive so if I could explain self-sacr ifice in a way that does not require the rejection of (1) and (2), that woul d be an enormous benefit to my theory. I therefore take it that (3) must be altered in some way. However, since I endorse a desiresatisfaction account of well-being, (3 ) must be altered in a subtle way so as to remain true to the original motivations of desire-satis faction accounts generall y. Before I explore ways of altering (3), I would like to discuss a way in which one might think that the triad is not inconsistent. Someone might think that the triad is consistent. He might say that the desire involved in motivation does not need to be the “strongest” or “wei ghtiest” desire. Any desire-satisfaction theorist, presumably, is goi ng to claim that the satisfaction of some

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163 desires increase well-being more than others The triad might seem consistent if one allows for cases of motivation by a less “wei ghty” desire when the satisfaction thwarts the satisfaction of a “weightier” desire, or thwarts the satisfaction of a set of desires which, when added together, are “weightier.” In such cases, there would be a decrease in well-being and all three pr opositions could be true. 5 Unfortunately, this account does not succeed in explaining genuine self-sacrifice. Firstly, the decrease in well-b eing in such cases is only a net decrease. The satisfaction of the motivating desire, in such cases, sti ll increases well-being. That does not seem right. Secondly, the account does not vindica te the possibility of robust self-sacrifice because it limits self-sacrifice to cases in which the agent does not act as she most wants. People who dedicate their lives to feedi ng the starving either would not act selfsacrificially or would fail to live much of th eir lives as they most want. Neither seems right. What I am looking for is an explanati on of a robust sort of self-sacrifice. We should build that robust characte r into what counts as a genu ine case of self-sacrifice in (1). So, this easy way to make the triad c onsistent does not work. In what follows, I explore ways of amending (3) in a way that vindi cates a robust sort of self-sacrifice while remaining true to the spirit of desire-satisfaction accounts. 5.1.4 Overvold’s Proposals Several of the authors mentioned above sugge st that desire-satis faction accounts of well-being must be restricted to include only desires that are in some sense “related to the agent’s own life.”6 The phrase “related to the agent’s own life” is very vague (as the 5 I would like to thank John Deigh for pointing out this possibility to me in conversation. 6 The phrase "related to the agent’s own life” or very similar phrases show up repeatedly in some of the above mentioned philosophers’ writings.

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164 authors under discussion readily admit). So, we need a precise acc ount of the distinction between the desires that are relevantly relate d to the agent’s own life and those that are not. For simplicity of expressi on, let us return to treating the expression “the relevant desire set” to mean “the set of desires the satisfaction of which increase well-being.” If desire-satisfaction accounts restrict the releva nt desire set to include only those desires that are related to the agent’s own life, then the resulting triad (with (3) changed accordingly) can be made consistent. For the scope of the relevant desire set is reduced in such a way that makes room for genuine and robust cases of self-sacrifice—namely, cases in which an agent is motivated by desi res that are not relevantly related to the agent’s own life. Mark Overvold has offered a way to restrict the relevant desire set. Overvold does not explain the problem of self-sacrifice in terms of the inconsistent triad, but his proposed restriction to the releva nt desire set, if it were plau sible, would in effect revise (3) to make it consistent with propositions (1) and (2). In fact, he offers two accounts; he offers one account, finds it inadequate, and then offers an amendment to the first account. He chooses the term “self-regarding” to iden tify the class of desires that are relevantly related to the agent’s own life. Later I will return to his choice of terminology, but for now, let us just take it as it is. Overvold offers his first account in “Sel f-Interest and the Concept of SelfSacrifice.” In that paper, Overvold says that the agent must be an “essential constituent” in the desired outcome in order for the de sire to be self-reg arding (Overvold 1980, pg. 118). More precisely, he says that the way to restrict the relevant de sire set is by adding the following necessary condition: a desire belongs in the desire set only if “the

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165 proposition that the agent exists at [time] t is a logically necessa ry condition of the proposition asserting that the [desir ed] feature or outcome obtains at t ” (Overvold 1980, pg. 118). Very roughly, what Overvold seems to say is that if the agent’s existence is (logically) necessary for the truth of the time indexed proposition which expresses the object of the desire, then the desire is self-regarding. I unde rstand that I have only given a rough construal of what Overvold means, but I think further cl arification will be achieved by turning to the problems Overvold and others see for his initial account. Overvold has been criticized from two side s; one side says th at his requirement excludes too much and the other side says th at his requirement does not exclude enough. That the necessary condition excludes too much has been argued by Richard Brandt. He claims that desires for posthumous fame count as self-interested and yet fail to meet Overvold’s condition of agent-ex istence at the time of desire -satisfaction. (Brandt, pg. 330). People probably do not have clear in tuitions about Brandt’s example because it seems to conflate two issues in desire-sat isfaction theories: (a) whether events that happen after one dies can alter one’s wellbeing when one was living and (b) whether desires for fame when aliv e count as self-regarding. Whether events that happen after one dies can alter one’s well-being when one was alive is not the issue of this chapter, though it is an interesting t opic of discussion I will pursue in the final chapter of this disserta tion. I will briefly disc uss the issue because Overvold’s proposed restriction to the releva nt desire set, as it stands, excludes posthumous events from altering well-being. Moreover, Overvold seems to recognize this feature of his proposed necessary condition and thinks it an advantage of his account.

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166 Overvold says that “it is hard to see ho w anything which happens after one no longer exists can contribute to one’s se lf-interest” (Overvold, 1980, pg. 108). Some people have intuitions that conflic t with Overvold on th e matter of whether posthumous events could alter the well-being one had when one was a live. Rather than enter into the debate about this in the pres ent chapter, instead, I will explore a way of modifying Overvold’s proposed necessary conditi on to make it compatible with the view that events that happen after one has died might alter the well-being one had when one was living. Brad Hooker, in his “A Breakthrough in the Desire Theory of Welfare,” has proposed a way of modifying Overvold’s pr oposed necessary condition to allow for posthumous events to alter the well-bei ng one had when one was alive. Hooker proposes: “We might modify this [Overvold’s proposed necessary condition] so that the relevant desires are the ones in whose propos itional content the ag ent is an essential constituent in the sense th at the state of affairs is desired under a de scription that makes essential reference to the agent ” (Hooker, pg. 212, emphasis his). What Hooker seems to have in mind is that if an agent desires a pa rticular state of affairs to obtain and the proposition describing the desired state of a ffairs includes essential reference to the desiring agent, even if her existence at t is not a logically nece ssary condition to the desired outcome at t then the desire is relevant to her well-being. Hooker’s proposal might be too broad—it might allow desires that are, intuitively, not relevant to one’s well-being to count as relevant to one’s well -being. I will not critically explore Hooker’s proposal. However, I do think that either Hooker’s suggestion or something along those lines could modify Overvold’s proposed n ecessary condition so that it allows some

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167 posthumous events to alter one’s well-being. Overvold’s formulation of the necessary condition, strictly speaking, does not allow r oom for posthumous events to alter one’s well-being, but it could be modified to allow for such cases. I think that the spirit of Overvold’s proposal is compatible with the vi ew that posthumous ev ents can alter one’s well-being. I will not explore the issue of posthumous events now because it is not the central issue of this chapter. Let us turn now to issue, (b) above—the second issue that is brought to light by Brandt’s example of the desire for posthumous fame. The issue is whether desires for fame count as self-regarding. People have conf licting intuitions about this. Suppose than an agent A desires that he be famous when alive. Overvold would say that in this case, A ’s desire is self-regarding. There is esse ntial reference to the desiring agent because A ’s desire is that he be famous. Perhaps the case is c ontroversial in that our intuitions conflict on whether to classify A ’s desire as self-regardi ng or non-self-regarding. But note that in this case, there is no issue about Overvold’s conditi on excluding too much, because Overvold’s account classifies A ’s desire as self-regarding. I will briefly sum up this discussion. I think that neither Brandt’s case of desire for posthumous fame nor the revised case of a desire for fame when alive is a clear counterexample to Overvold’s proposed necessary condition. The issue of whether posthumous events might alter the well-being one had when one was alive is a separate issue and I think Overvold’s proposed necessary condition can be modified to account for it. The issue of whether the desire for fa me when alive is self-regarding might be controversial. Overvold’s proposed necessary condition classifies the desire as selfregarding. If there is some controversy about the classification, the worry would be that

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168 Overvold’s account includes too many desires, rather than that it excludes too many desires. Thomas Carson, Overvold himself, and othe rs, have argued that Overvold’s initial proposal does not exclude enough Carson argues that certain desires, such as desires to accomplish things, will satisfy Overvold’s proposed necessary condition and yet should be classified as non-self-regarding (Carson, pg. 236). For example, someone can desire that she secure the money to fix up a run-dow n park. She is an essential constituent in the desired outcome, so the desire clearl y meets the proposed condition about the person being an essential constituent and yet it might seem that it is not self-regarding. A rough way of stating this first sort of problem is that it turns on desires that have the general form: A desires that A does X Overvold recognizes a different sort of case where his ow n initial theory does not exclude certain desires that should be excl uded from being self-regarding. In a 1982 paper titled “Self-Interest and Getting Wh at You Want,” Overvold says that a case involving A ’s desire that his presen t wife is happy, and similar cases, cause problems for his initial proposal (Overvold 1982, pg. 189). For, at least in some contexts, it seems that someone’s desire that his wi fe be happy is non-self-regardi ng even though he must exist in order to have a wife who is happy. A r ough way of stating the second sort of problem is that it turns on desires with the general form: A desires that his Y is Z There is a third very similar sort of problematic case. Imagine a case where A desires that the man sitting next to him is cured. A ’s existence is necessary for the desired outcome, it seems, because A must exist in order for a man next to him to be cured. People will have conflicting intuiti ons, but it seems that in at least in some

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169 contexts, such a desire would be non-self-r egarding and yet Overvold’s initial proposal would apparently count all such desires as self-regarding. One way of understanding the desires under discussion is by noti ng they have the general form: A desires that Y which bears relation R to A is Z This general formulation is to be understood as only very roughly capturing the third sort of problem cases. Overvold, in his 1982 paper “Self-Interest and Getting What You Want”, proposes an amended necessary condition, which is mean t to be a restriction on his first proposed necessary condition. Here is what he says. To handle this objection, let us introduce the notion of the reason that a person desires that a particular state of affairs obtain . For th e desire to be relevant to one’s welfare, the reason that one wants the state of affairs to obt ain must be due to one’s essential involvement in that state of affairs. Consider, for example, S’s desire that he bring it about that his wife is happy. If th e only reason for this desire is an independent desire that the person who happens to be his wife be happy, then the desire does not seem to be logically rele vant to the determination of his welfare. If he lacked an independent desire for his wife’s happi ness, his essential involvement in the more complex state of affairs would not give him any motivation to perform an act that would have this outcome. For this reason, the desire should be excluded from the determin ation of his self-interest. (Overvold 1982 pg. 189-190) Overvold’s explanation is a bit confusing becau se he uses an example that combines two types of problematic cases: it involves a case of a desire that can be characterized as having the general form of a desire by A that A do X (problem case of the first type discussed above) and it involves a case of a desi re that can be stated as having the general form of a desire by A that his Y is Z (the second type problematic case discussed above). Let us restrict our consideration to a desire by A that his, A ’s, wife is happy. A bit later in this chapter, I will argue that cases of the first sort are not problematic once we get clear on an independent restriction to desire-satisfaction theories.

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170 The new requirement seems to be that the reason for the desire be self-regarding. Unfortunately, what it is to be a reason for a desire is not clear. Indeed, just what it is to be a reason is not clear. One thing that is clear is that Overvold thinks that his new proposal is an amendment to his first proposal. The final result seems to be that a desire is self-regarding only when the proposition e xpressing the object of the desire makes essential reference to the desiring agent and wh en the reason for the desire is due to one’s essential involvement in the state of affairs. At one point in the quotation immediat ely above, it looks as though Overvold is considering cases in which A desires that that woman is ha ppy and also believes that that woman is his wife, and so has a deri ved desire that his wife is happy.7 In such cases, on this interpretation, where no othe r desires are considered, the de sire that his wife is happy should not count as self-regardi ng because the desire is deri ved from a non-self-regarding desire. Let us call the interpretation the “der ived desire” view. The derived desire view is that a self-regarding desire is a desire fo r a state of affairs where the state of affairs involves the desiring agent in an essential way and wh ere the desire is not derived from a further desire for a state of affairs that does not involve the desi ring agent. Overvold writes of there being an “inde pendent desire,” which seems to support the derived desire interpretation. Also in support of the derived desire view is th e fact that it clarifies, at least to some extent, what a person’s reason for a desire could be. One simple way of understanding a person’s reason for a desire, D, is as a desire/belief combination or merely a desire that the person uses to derive the desire D. So there seems to be some 7 Overvold might also be considering cases in which one desires that that woman is happy and sees no other way for her to be happy than to help, and so derives th e desire that he make her happy. This alternative reconstruction is along the lines of problem cases of the first sort. I will deal with problem cases of the first sort later in this essay.

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171 evidence that Overvold has in mind the derived desire view of a reason for a desire. In the part of my chapter that follows, I will argue that Overvold cannot have in mind the “derived desire” view. There is something right about Overvold’s second proposal, but it is important to see why the derive d desire interpretation cannot work. 5.1.5 A Problem with the Derived-Desire In terpretation of Overvold’s Second Proposal The interpretation of Overvold’s second propos al as involving derived desires fails because it includes too many desires as self -regarding, but for an unexpected reason. Desire-satisfaction accounts should include onl y intrinsic desires as relevant to wellbeing. An intrinsic desire, roughly, is a desire for some state of affairs in itself. A necessary condition of a desire for x being intrinsic is, roughl y, that one not desire x because one believes that it will lead to some further desired state of affairs.8 An extrinsic desire, roughly, is a desire for something, x that the agent has because the agent believes x will lead some further good (the satisfaction of some other desire). If extrinsic desires were relevant to we ll-being, then, when both intrinsic desires and the extrinsic desires derived from them were satisfied, there would be a problem of double-counting for well-being. If A intrinsically desires to drink water and for this reason desires to drink from the faucet, then if the latter desire is satisfied, then his intrinsic desire will be satisfied as well.9 There are other sorts of extrinsic desires, but the 8 Of course, one may have an intrinsic desire and believe that satisfying it will lead to some further state of affairs, but one may not have an intrinsic desire because one believes that satisfying it will lead to some further state of affairs. 9 I understand that my example of an extrinsic desire is of an instrumental desire, which is not exactly the same as Overvold’s example, which appears to be wh at we might call a “constitutive” desire. A desire is constitutive if the desired thing is desired because the agent believes that having it will constitute satisfying another desire. The belief that that woman is my wife does not link up the two desires instrumentally, as though the satisfaction of the desire that that woman is happy is a means to the satisfaction of the desire that his wife is happy. Instrumental desires are easier to understand and so I will stick with them.

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172 main point is that if extrinsic desires were included in the relevant desire set along with intrinsic desires, then the result would be double-counting when they all are satisfied. Double-counting, I argue in Chapter 3, is pr oblematic for several reasons. Let me rehearse those arguments here for the r eader. For one, double-counting makes one’s well-being depend to a large extent on the num ber of extrinsic desires one has, and this seems implausible. For another, endors ing double-counting would seem to recommend giving priority to satisfying in trinsic desires that are difficu lt to satisfy or satisfying desires in complex ways, because, in part, if an intrinsic desire is difficult to satisfy, an agent will have to derive and satisfy more ex trinsic desires to bring about the intrinsically desired state of affairs. Let me illustrate. For example, imagine that one has an intrin sic desire to drink wa ter and there is one glass of water front of him and another glass of water beside it locked in a box. On the derived-desire view, in this example (and excluding other intrinsic desires one might have), the agent would benefit more from unl ocking the box to get to the water because she will satisfy many extrinsic desires by unlocking the box. The view that allows double-counting is implausible. We still have yet to get clear on what a reason for a desire is. I certainly do not mean to say that it does not make sense to think of a reason for a desire as being a desire/belief combination or merely a desire in certain contexts. But we need a way of understanding a reason for a desire that can be incorporated into Overvold’s proposal without giving rise to th e double-counting problem. 5.1.6 Self-Regarding Desires In light of the above discussion, think that there are five test-cases that a precise account of the distinction between desires that are relevantly relate d to the agent’s own

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173 life and those that are not relevantly related to the agent’s own life must be able to handle appropriately. Agent A desires that: (a) this stranger is cured of his illness (b) the man sitting next to me [ A ] is cured (c) my [ A ’s] wife is cured (d) I [ A ] cure this stranger (e) I [ A ] am cured Now, the desire for (a) is clea rly not relevantly related to A ’s life and the desire for (e) clearly is relevantly related to A ’s life. The cases of desire s for (b), (c), and (d) are perhaps controversial. A clear account of the distinction must be able to explain desires for (a) – (e) in an intuitive way. Carson thinks that a desire for (d) is a problem case for Overvold’s account and Overvold himself seems to think so as well. I think that, once we re strict the relevant desire set to intrinsic desires, desires that p where p is of the form “I do X ” turn out to be intuitively self-regarding. If a woman has a de sire that a park be repaired and, because no one else is willing to do the work, she derives the desire that she raise the money, then it is plausible to think that the satisfaction of her derived desire would not enhance her well-being. However, if a woman has an intrinsic desire that she raise money for a rundown park, then excluding other desires, she would be disappointed if she found out that someone else raised the money. This intrinsic desire is self -regarding in the relevant way and so its satisfaction should c ount as enhancing her well-being.10 So desires that (d) and relevantly similar cases are not problematic. If it is an intrinsic desi re, then it belongs in the relevant desire set. 10 I will return to Overvold’s choice of “self-regard ing” to capture the notion that a desire must be relevantly related to the agent’s own life in order for it to be relevant to her well-being later in this chapter.

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174 The cases of (b) and (c) are a different matter. To deal with these cases, I think it helps to look at two ways of construing a desire: de dicto and de re .11 A desire is de dicto it is said somewhat vaguely, if it is “about the words” and de re if it is “about the thing.” Additionally, it is said that that de re attitudes relate a pe rson to an object while de dicto attitudes relate a pers on to a proposition. Perhaps it is best to il lustrate this difference by an example. One can have a de dicto desire that the man with the bowler hat is cured. Alternatively, one can have a de re desire, of the man with the bowler hat, that he is cured. The de dicto desire under discussion is for a certain state of affairs to obtain. One can have this desire even if there is no man in a bowler hat. The de re desire under discussion is more particularly a de sire, with respect to an object, that it have some characteristic. One cannot have such a desire unless the relevant object exists. If there is no man in a bowler hat, one cannot desire, of the man in the bowler hat, that he be cured. Let us see whether the distinction between a de re and de dicto desires, so understood, gets us any clarity with the remain ing problem cases. Take my desire that the man sitting next to me is cured (des ire type (b) above). It could be a de re desire in which case it would be a desire, of the man sitting next to me, that he is cured. In such a case the reference to me is clearly just to enable me to pick out the man.12 The desire is not about me. This case is very similar to my desire, of the man with the bowler hat, that 11 Philosophers have provided different ways of understanding de re and de dicto desires. My characterization of the types of desire is quite differe nt from some of them. I will not explore the various ways in which philosophers have charact erized the distinction, but I hope to make clear at least one way of characterizing the distinction in this essay. 12 I understand that desires are not sentences and senten ces are not desires. It is sentences that express desires and it is sentences that “make” reference to the agent. I will adopt a more careful way of speaking when I arrive at a more complete account of the dis tinction between self-regarding and non-self-regarding desires. For simplicity of expression at the present, I will write as though desires, in some cases, make reference to agents.

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175 he is cured. Indeed, if the man next to me is the man in the bowler hat, then the desires are one and the same. Such desire s, intuitively, are non-self-regarding. Alternatively, my desire could be de dicto My desire could be the desire that the man sitting next to me is cured. In such a case, where the desire is intrinsic and de dicto and is not better characterized as de re “of the man,” it is self-re garding. Let me explain this. I could very well have a phobia against being near sick people. Such a phobia could lead to an intrinsic desire th at the man sitting next to me is cured. My phobia would not be my reason for the desire, but would be part of an explanation of the desire. In this case, my de dicto desire that the man sitting next to me is cured would be relevant to my well-being. My desire is rele vantly related to my life. The distinction between de dicto and de re desires can also ex plain how desires of type (c) should be treated. If A ’s desire is de re then A desires, of the woman who is his wife, that she is cured. In such a case, the reference to A is only there to pick out the object of his desire and the de sire is non-self-regarding. The de re reading would treat A ’s desire as very similar to a desire, of the woman in the blue dress, that she is cured. Indeed there might only be the one desire if A ’s wife is the woman in the blue dress. In both cases, the desire is not self-regarding and so its satisfacti on does not enhance the agent’s well-being. I ad mit it is hard to imagine a context in which A ’s desire that his wife be cured—his desire in (c)—is de re Perhaps we can imagine a case in which A ’s desire, of his wife, that she be cured, stems from A ’s caring for his wife for her sake. Perhaps A ’s love of his wife influe nces him to, or consists pa rtly in wanting to, care for her for her sake. If A ’s desire stemmed from or involve s his concern for her for her sake, then his desire could pl ausibly be thought to be de re In any case, I think we can see that

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176 A ’s desire for his wife to be cured would, in some context, be de re, and, in other contexts, be de dicto There is a line in the ab ove quotation from Overvold that suggests he has in mind something along the lines of the de re / de dicto distinction. Overvold says “If the only reason for this desire is an independent desire that the person who happens to be his wife be happy, then the desire does not seem to be logically relevant to the determination of his welfare” (Overvold, 1982, pg. 189-190). Overvold writes of A desiring that the person who happens to be his wife be cured. It seems obvious that Overvold does not have in mind that the man is married to so meone by some strange coincidence. Instead, Overvold might have in mind that the man pi cks out the person who is his wife with a possessive pronoun, but wants her to be happy in dependently of her being his wife. If that is what Overvold has in mind, then the desire is de re Perhaps, then, the de dicto / de re distinction is a clear way to capture his thought. Let me explain the de dicto / de re distinction in a techni cally correct, though more abstract way. Some desires, though they may at first glance seem like de dicto desires, are more accurately construed as de re Let me introduce a bit of terminology. Let us say that the “subject clause” of a de sire attribution is the part of the sentence that ascribes the desire that does not express the object of the desire, but that instead contains the reference to the desiring agent, possi bly the object picked out, and “that” or something synonymous. For example, the “subject clause” of the sentence “ A desires that the person sitting next to him get well” is “ A desires that.” In this ex ample, note the reference to A In the subject clause of desire attributions, there will be some reference to the desiring agent, because the desire must be attributed to someone. Now, in some subject clauses,

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177 there will be a second reference to the desiring agent. For example, in the “subject clause” of “ A desires, of the person sitting next to him, that he be well” there are two references to A The first reference to A just attributes the desire to A while the second reference to A helps pick out the de re object of desire. The first reference to A will not make the desire the sentence is ascribing be self-regarding. A second reference to A will not make the desire self-regarding either. Let us return to the sentence “ A desires that the person sitting next to him get well.” The part of the sentence that reads “the pers on sitting next to him get well” we can call the “object sentence.” A sentence that expresses a de re desire will also have an “object sentence.” In the sentence “ A desires, of the man sitting next to him, that he be cured,” the “object” sentence is “he be cured.” Some de re desire attributions will make reference to the desiring agent in referring to the object of desire in the “subject clause,” and they may ascribe a non-self re garding desire. For example, if A desires, of the man sitting next to him, that he is well, then A ’s desire is non-self-regarding. The second reference to the agent in the subject cl ause is merely there to pick out the de re object i.e., maybe, the man in the bowler hat. Many desires will be de dicto Desire attributions that make reference to the desiri ng agent in the object senten ce will ascribe self-regarding desires. There is one further complication. There may be cases of de re desires where the agent, herself, is the de re object of the desire. As a hypothetical example, it seems entirely possible that I could desi re, of myself, that I be cured of my disease. There is the usual reference to me in the “subject clause ” (merely attributing the desire to me), a de re reference to me in the “subject clause” (helping to pick out the de re object of desire), and

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178 a reference to me in the “objec t sentence.” In such a case, th e desire is self-regarding. Nothing in my treatment of the case under di scussion is incompatible with what I say above. Let me explain. One might think that the de re reference to me in the “subject clause” makes the desire non-se lf-regarding, but this would be a mistake. The reference to me in the “object sentence” ensures that th e desire is self-regarding. The lesson we can learn from the example of my desire, of me, th at I be cured, is that one cannot look just to the “subject clause” of the sentence which expresses the desire in trying to decide whether a desire is self-reg arding or not. One must look for reference to the desiring agent in the “object sentence” as well. If one has a desire such that any sentence that aptly expresses the desire makes reference to the agent in the “objec t sentence,” then the desire is self-regarding. Here is the general principle that makes the distinction between the desires that are self-regarding and those that ar e not: A desire is self-regard ing if and only if (a) it is de dicto and any sentence that aptly expresses th e desire makes reference to the desiring agent in the “object se ntence,” or (b) it is de re and any sentence that aptly expresses the desire has reference to the desiring agen t in the “object sent ence.” In both de dicto and de re desires, there has to be reference to th e desiring agent in the “object sentence.” Reference to the agent in the “subject clause” of a sentence expressi ng the desire does not make a desire self-regarding. This seems a clear way of drawing th e distinction and is intuitive. Let me briefly revisit the problem cases above. Take A ’s desire that the man sitting next to him [ A ] is cured (case (b) above). Desires of this sort will be self-regarding in some contexts and non-self-re garding in others. If A ’s desire in this case is de re then

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179 the desire is non-self-reg arding, but the desire is self-regarding if it is de dicto Take the case of A ’s desire that my [ A ’s] wife is cured (case (c) above). If the desire is de re then it is non-self-regarding, but it is self-regarding if de dicto I am not certain that Overvold had in mi nd exactly what I have proposed. It may even be that Overvold was right in his first proposal if it is prope rly interpreted. For, perhaps one way of understanding just what it is to be an essential constituent in a desire is on the de re / de dicto model. One further thing to b ear in mind is that not all selfregarding desires will be releva nt to one’s well-being. Only desires that are both intrinsic and self-regarding are releva nt to one’s well-being. There may be a bit of dissatisfaction with my account. One may still find it implausible that some desires that my account treats as self-regarding are genuinely selfregarding. Take for example A ’s desire that she help the poor. Even if it is intrinsic, one might say that intuitively it is non-self-regardi ng. I think that any such intuitions to this effect might be caused by Overvold’s choice of terminology. He chooses to use “selfregarding” to identify the key class of desire s to which we must restrict desires that are included in the set of desires the satisfacti on of which increase well-being (the so-called relevant set). I mentioned above that some au thors say that in orde r to solve the problem of self-sacrifice for desire-sat isfaction accounts of well-being, desire-satisfaction theorists must restrict the relevant set of desires to t hose that are “related to the agent’s own life.” Instead of “self-regarding,” pe rhaps it would be better to use “self-involving.” “Selfinvolving” seems to have a broader scope and self-sacrifice may be better explained in terms of self-involving desires than self -regarding desires. Let me explain.

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180 When one speaks of “self-regarding” desi res, the reader may get the impression that such desires have to be selfish in some way. But it would be a mistake to understand well-being or self-interest to be a matter of pursuing selfish wants. Selfish desires are those desires that one has that if satisfied, enhance one’s we ll-being to the exclusion of the well-being of others. In my opinion, no rest riction to selfish desires should be placed on the relevant desire set for an account of well-being or self-interest. One can have desires that are related to the agent’s own lif e that also end up be nefiting other people. So A ’s desire that help the poor may very we ll end up benefiting othe r people in such a way that it is not selfish, but it is related to the agent’s own life a nd is self-involving. I do not know whether speaking of “self-regarding de sires” suggests that the desires must be selfish. But perhaps it does. If Overvol d had used “self-involving,” any potential confusion on this point could have been eliminat ed at an earlier stage. In any event, I will continue to speak of “self-regarding” desires, but it is important to understand that such desires need not be selfish. 5.1.7 Self-Regarding Interests Concluded I take myself to have given an adequa tely precise account of the distinction between self-regarding and non-self-regarding de sires. I feel that I have provided an adequate explanation as to how the desires in (a)-(e) shou ld be treated. (a) clearly involves a non-self-regarding de sire. (e) clearly involves a self-regarding desire. (d) intuitively involves a self-rega rding desire once we understand that any desire must be intrinsic to be relevant to we ll-being. The desires in (b) a nd (c) are non-sel f-regarding, if we assume that they are de re and that there is no reference to the desiring agent in the “object sentence” of the sentence expressi ng the desire, and they are self-regarding otherwise.

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181 Once the distinction between selfand non-self-regarding de sires is in place, selfsacrifice can be explained in a manner that is consistent with the spirit of desiresatisfaction theories of well-b eing. If the desires, the satis faction of which contribute to enhancing one’s well-being, are re stricted to desires that are self-regarding, then an act of self-sacrifice will occur when an agent is moved by a non-self-regarding desire the satisfaction of which thwarts the satisf action of a self-regarding desire. Let me return to the triad mentioned a bove. The first proposition, (1), is that genuine self-sacrifice is possi ble. The second proposition, (2), is that people are motivated by their desires. The third propos ition, (3), is that well-being is increased when desires are satisfied. The triad of propositions is incons istent. Desire-satisfaction theories must be modified and restricted slight ly. If (3) is amended to reduce the scope of the relevant desire set, then the resulting trio of propositions is consistent. There can be genuine acts of self-sacrifice. A desire is necessary to motiv ate action (even if desires are understood so broadly as to include any ment al state that motivat es). Finally, the satisfaction of self-regarding desires increase s well-being. I hope to have dealt with a problem for desire-satisfaction theories in a clear and intuitively attractive way. I need to explain how my ideal adviso r account will deal with the distinction between selfand non-self -regarding desires. My ideal a dvisor account, very roughly, is that one’s well-being varies w ith the extent with which the desires one’s fully informed counterpart would have for one are satisfied. The way I envision my ideal advisor account, one’s ideal advisor, when contemplati ng his relatively less informed counterpart and thinking about what advice to give, would have a list of desires the satisfaction of which would make one’s life go better. If A + is A ’s ideal advisor, A + would want many

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182 things for A A +’s desire is for A in the relevant way, I say, if and only if A +’s desire is A-regarding in the technical way discussed the present section. That is to say, A +’s desire is for A in the relevant way, if it makes reference to A in any “object sentence” aptly expressing A +’s desire, and not merely in a de re “subject clause.” Let me illustrate with an example. Imagine that A + has five intrinsic desires. In particular, A + desires: (1) that A + win the Boston Marathon, (2) that A read The Metamorphoses (3) that A do his moral duty to help the poor, and (4) that A + eat a bowl of ice cream and (5) that A eat a bowl of ice cream. No w, on my account, only desires (2), (3) and (5) will be A -regarding and so only (2), (3) and (5) will be relevant to A ’s well-being. Desires that have as thei r “object sentences” (1) and (4) are nonA -regarding and so are not relevant to A ’s well-being. At this point, I would like to move onto the next area where my account of wellbeing developed in chapters 3 and 4 can be amended to fit the conditions of prudential well-being discussed in Chapter 1. 5.2 Non-Moral and Non-Aesthetic Interests 5.2.1 The Problem In the first chapter of this dissertation, I argued that one’s prudential well-being is a matter of satisfying one’s non-moral, non-aesthetic and self-regarding in terests. Thus far in this chapter, I have discussed how one can make desire-satis faction accounts of wellbeing fit the “self-regard ing condition” of prudential well-bei ng. It is possible, even with the relevant desire set restricted to self-regardi ng desires, to have a de sire that is moral in the relevant way. We have already seen an example for my ideal advisor theory, but let me provide an example that applies to all desire-satisfaction account. A person could have a desire that she do her duty. Her desire is that she do her duty, in my example.

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183 Her desire, let us say in this case, is self-re garding, because any sentence aptly attributing the desire to her makes reference to her in the “object sentence.” In such a case, the desire seems self-regarding and yet the desire seems to have moral content in that any sentence aptly expressing it makes reference to the moral concept of duty in the relevant way.13 My goal of excluding one’s moral interests from being relevant to one’s prudential well-being might strike the re ader as surprising. To the reader who finds my goal surprising, I have two comments. First, I think that my examples from the first chapter show, at least in an intuitive way, that mo ral, aesthetic and prudential values can be separated. My examples from The Count of Monte Cristo were meant to show that an immoral course of action can be in one’s prude ntial interests nevertheless. Think back to the example of Monte Cristo trying deceptively to marry his adversary’s daughter and her half-brother. Surely there is something immoral about the project and yet it seems intuitive that success in immoral projects can make one’s life go better, at least in a prudential way. Second, a number of philosophe rs make reference to the individual good or the non-moral good of a person. One notable example is Peter Railton who claims to be giving an account of the non-moral good of a person in his essays “Moral Realism” and “Facts and Values.” Railton, who favors an ideal advisor account of sorts, and others who write about the non-moral good of a pe rson, leave open the way with which they would deal with desires th at have moral content. 13 If the concept of duty, surprisingly, turns out not to be a (coherent) moral concept, then I feel that another example of the relevant sort could be given. The problem-case that I have in mind need only make use of one moral concept, whichever that concept is among the usual candidates.

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184 If I am right, then all conceptions of the concept of prudential well-being must deal with variations of the problem I discuss above. For example, one could be happy or pleased that one has done one’s duty. Any me ntal state account of prudential well-being that treats one’s happiness or pleasure as constitutive of one ’s well-being must deal with the case in some way. Proponents of such accoun ts have not dealt with problem cases of the sort under discussion. Ob jective accounts of well-being, such as accounts that treat one’s well-being as varying w ith the extent to which one exercises and develops one’s nature, must also deal with problem cases of the sort under discussion. There is not anything in the objective human nature accounts, as they are proposed, to deal with such cases. It is not clear how proponent s of the various conceptions of well-being would deal with the problem cases and ensure that thei r accounts distinguish a person’s prudential good from her moral good. There is not much ex plicit discussion of th is problem in the literature. It seems to me that proponents of happiness conceptions would be willing to “bite the bullet.”14 They accept that one can be happy, say, that one has done one’s duty, and are even willing to accept that happiness that one has done one’s duty increases one’s well-being, at least to some extent. Likewise, proponents of human nature conceptions of well-being might accept that it is or might be in one’s nature to act in a moral way. The proponent of human nature conceptions might also accept that exercising and developing one’s nature in a moral direc tion increases one’s well-being. Desire-satisfaction theorists 14 Given that happiness proponents are willing to grant that happiness that is in a relevant way non-selfregarding nevertheless constitutes some well-being, I suspect that they are also willing to grant that happiness that is self-regarding but moral constitutes some well-being. Their answer, I predict, is very similar to the one they give to examples of non-self-regarding happiness: to wit, that if it is an agent’s happiness, then it constitutes the agent’s well-being.

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185 can “bite the bullet” as well on this issue. A desire-satisfactio n proponent could claim that the desire that one does one’s duty is in the relevant desire set. However, I think that desire-satisfaction theorists can do better, as I will explain in the following parts of 5.2. 5.2.2 Moral Desires and the Relevant Desire Set Earlier in this chapter I wrote of the so-called relevant desi re set, which is the set of desires the satisfaction of which increase we ll-being. A proponent of desire-satisfaction accounts can restrict the relevant desire set to those desires that are non-moral. Let me return to an earlier exam ple. Suppose an agent, A has an intrinsic desire that she, A do her duty. Her desire, in my example, is sel f-regarding. Yet her desi re, so described, also has moral content. A ’s desire, in this case, is one that a desire-satisfaction theorist might wish to exclude from the relevant desire se t given that the desire has moral content and given that the desire-satisfacti on theories under consid eration, let us stipul ate, are theories of prudential well-being. That is, a desire-satisfaction theorist, in her attempt to exclude moral interests from being relevant to well-being, could adopt a st rategy very much like the one she can adopt in her attempt to exclude non-self-regarding in terests from being relevant to well-being— simply restrict the re levant desire set. I think of my ideal advisor account as bei ng able to be restricted in the ways indicated in this chapter thus far. Ther e could be a problem however. As I mention above, on the way I envision my ideal advi sor account, one’s ideal advisor, when contemplating his relatively less informed count erpart and thinking about what advice to give, would have a list of desires the satis faction of which woul d make one’s life go better. If we again speak of A + as A ’s ideal advisor, A + would want many things for A In the example above, three of A +’s desires are sufficiently A -regarding. They are A +’s

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186 desires (1) that A read The Metamorphoses (2) that A do his moral duty to help the poor, and (3) that A eat a bowl of ice cream. Now, in th is simplistic and idealized example, I think that if we restrict the relevant set to desires that do not have moral content, the result would be that the only desires that are relevant to A ’s well-being are (1) and (3). Let us assume that A + desires (1) strongly and (3) much less strongly. However, and now we get to the potential problem, if A + were to not think about A ’s duty, perhaps A + would put desires (1) and (3) in a different order or perhaps A + would desire different things altogether for A If A + were to contemplate only what he wants for A apart from A +’s beliefs or feelings about A ’s duties, A + might rank desire (3) ahead of (1). As I suggested above, I do not think that such a re-ordering could happen, but I do not have an argument to shows that it could not happen. Unless I revert to the “bite the bullet” strategy of simply accepting one’s moral interests as relevant to one’s well-being, which most other proponents of conceptions of well-being seem willing to do, I need another account—a contingency account—in case a re-ordering of the sort I describe above is possible. If such a re-ordering is possible, I think “biting the bullet” on it would be equally as counterintuitive as “biting th e bullet” on the initial problem of moral interests. 5.2.3 Another Approach There is another way that desire-satisf action theorists can exclude one’s moral interests from being relevant to one’s well-being. Moreover, I think that my ideal advisor theory has special resources in dealing with moral and aesthetic interests that other versions of desire-satisfaction accounts do not have. One way that the reader can think of the rest of the present section of this chapter is that in it, I try to show a way in which many desire-satisfaction theories and, more specifically, my ideal advisor theory, can do

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187 better than most other conceptions of well-bei ng in dealing with th e problems that arise from moral and aesthetic values for conceptions of prudential well-being. To see how desire-satisfaction proponents might deal with problem cases of the sort discussed above, I would like to turn, perh aps surprisingly, to John Stuart Mill. As I interpret Mill in his Utilitarianism he does not endorse a desi re-satisfaction conception of well-being, rather, he endor ses a sophisticated kind of pl easure-based mental state account. 15 However, he is concerned that moral va lues may affect his account of utility. Mill describes a test for determining which of one’s pleasures count as increasing one’s utility, given a set amount of intensity and duration. The test is popularly known as the “Test of the Competent Judges”. Of this test Mill states: “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have e xperience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any fee ling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure” (Mill, Ch. 2, Par. 5). Mill, as I in terpret him, proposes that if all or most “competent judges” decidedly prefer one pleas ure to another, give n identical intensity and duration between the two pleasures, then the preferred pleasure counts for more utility, so long as the preferen ces of the competent judges ar e not influenced by feelings of moral obligation. Mill fairly clearly atte mpts to exclude moral influence from altering the judges’ decided preferences. As I note above, Mill is not a desire-satis faction theorist. Perhaps what he calls preferences are what I think of as desires; thus his and my theory might have significant similarities. At most, though, Mill could e ndorse a mixed concepti on of well-being. He 15 For the purposes of this example, it does not matter whether utility and prudential good are the same thing. Though for what it is worth, I think that Mill’s co ncept of utility is very close, if not identical, to the concept of prudential well-being I explicate in the first chapter of this dissertation.

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188 could hold a view that treats bo th one’s mental states and on e’s desires as relevant to one’s well-being. What is important for this section of this chapter, however, is not getting clear on the precise nature of Mill’s theory, but rather, a solution to a problem he sees for his account of utility that can be adopted by many desi re-satisfaction accounts of well-being. It is clear that Mill has in mind a counter factual condition, somewhat similar to the counterfactual condition I set out for my ideal advisor theory. Using “possible worlds” language, Mill’s “Test of the Competent J udges” might be revised and explained as follows: The decided preference for one of two pleasures by our counterparts in the nearest possible world who have experien ced both pleasures and are capable of appreciated both pleasures is the sole criterion for which is the higher pleasure. Though Mill was writing about higher and lower pleasures, what he says about preferences and moral values can be adapted for use by many desire-satisfaction theorists. The key similarity between Mill’s account as I have r econstructed it and ma ny desire-satisfaction theories is that both treat the central criterion for th eir respective accounts as a counterfactual preferences or desires. Mill does not describe how the “competent judges” are to think in any detailed way. Two intuitively attractive ways of unde rstanding what Mill has in mind are: (1) the competent judges are our counterparts in the nearest possible world where we (or they) simply have no moral feelings whatsoev er, and (2) the competent judges are our counterparts in the nearest possible world in wh ich we (or they) disregard, to the best of their abilities, their moral feelings. Similarl y, desire-satisfaction th eorists could say that either (1) A ’s well-being is constituted by the satisfaction of A +’s desires for A in the

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189 nearest possible world in which A + lacks any moral feeling whatsoever, and suitable other conditions, such as a condition of being fully informed, are met, and (2) A ’s wellbeing is constituted by the satisfaction of A +’s desires for A in the nearest possible world in which A + disregards A +’s moral feelings, to the best of A +’s abilities, and suitable other conditions are met.16 Rather than pursue what Mill might have had in mind with his “Test of the Competent Judges,” I would lik e to very briefly explore the options for counterfactual desire-s atisfaction theories. Option (1) is an intriguing way of ex cluding one’s moral interests from being relevant to one’s well-being. But, the near est possible world in which one has no moral feelings whatsoever is perhaps quite a ways away. One’s counterpart in such a world would be incapable of desiring that one’s ac tual self do his duty. Notice that on the proposal under discussion, there is no restriction of the relevant desire set to exclude moral interests, for one’s counterpart could no t have a desire with moral content. There is no room for the potentia l problem of re-ordering. To some extent, I worry that on option (1), the removal of moral feelings at least for some people would result in a different pers onality. This worries me since one of the central motives for adopting my ideal advisor account is that it is the best account that isolates the desires that are true to one’s personality and reflect the full range of one’s personality. I am concerned about changes th at might alter one’s personality. This is somewhat speculative, of course, but I think that the second option is a more promising 16 I see no harm, on either options (1) or (2), in allowing A + having knowledge of A ’s moral feelings and no harm in using information about A ’s moral feelings when forming advice for A A ’s moral feelings are not, in themselves, A +’s moral feelings. Rather, A ’s moral feelings are merely part of the information base that A + uses in formulating advice. It seems that information about A ’s moral beliefs, for our purposes here, is similar to any other sort of information A + could use to formulate advice.

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190 way to deal with the problem of moral interest if there is indeed the potential for a reordering of one’s advisor’s desires in cases of the sort mentioned above. Option (2), I think, is a very good way of dealing with the so rt of problem case under discussion. Disregarding one’s moral feelings might seem to the reader to be impossible, but I think that it is both po ssible and done on a regular basis in cases or everyday judgments of well-bei ng. Think back to some of the Monte Cristo cases found in the first chapter of this dissertation. We have moral feelings, I take it, and yet we managed to disregard them when we made judgments about what is good for Monte Cristo. To use a vivid example, think of assa ssins. Though we feel that their behavior is morally reprehensible, we can easily think of something as good for the assassin without feeling it is morally good for him. Such everyday examples make me think that disregarding our moral feelings in as sessing someone’s prudential good is not an uncommon thing. Bear in mind as well that a theorist who takes option (2) in dealing with moral feelings is trying to identify the nearest possible world in which one is able to disregard his moral feelings to the greatest ex tent possible, while holding constant one’s personality. Since my ideal advisor account is su pported by considerations involving the personality of a person when assessing what contributes to her we ll-being, it makes sense to require that the nearest possible world in which she disregards he r moral feeling to the greatest extent possible be one in which her pe rsonality is the same. This allows for the possibility that one’s personality is so c onstituted that she cannot disregard her moral feelings in giving advice to her counterpart. Bu t I think that this is just as it should be.

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191 If, indeed, a person is so constituted that sh e cannot disregard her moral feelings, then those feelings are relevant to her prudential well-being, I say. Before I finish my discussion of mora l values and prudential well-being, I will briefly discuss one additional pot entially problematic case. We can imagine that a fully informed idealized counterpart is successf ul in disregarding her moral feelings, but nevertheless, has a virtuous character in the sense that her ad vice tracks the non-moral features of the world upon which morally good character or morally good actions are based. For example, a person with a virtuous character might often choose to alleviate the suffering of another, even absent influence from moral beliefs. The virtuous person, on this slender account, tracks the good-maki ng features of the wo rld, but not the good itself. Nothing that has been said so far ex cludes such advice from counting. In fact, I think such advice should count as relevant to a person’s well-being, provided that it is sufficiently advisee-regarding. For example, suppose A +’s advice to A is that A alleviate the suffering of another, and suppose that this advice flows from her virtuous character. If so, then I think it plausible to allow it to count as relevant to A ’s well-being. 5.2.4 Aesthetic Values and Prudential Well-Being A brief discussion about aesthetic value a nd prudential well-bei ng is in order. Much of what I have said regarding moral va lue can be adapted to explain how to deal with aesthetic value. I will briefly explore a problem case. Suppos e that one has aesthetic feelings about life stories. For example, suppose that so meone is taken by the aesthetic beauty of tragedies and thinks that the best kind of lif e (in a sense) is the tragic one. A fully

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192 informed person might advise her less informed self to live a tragic life.17 Surely this advice must be excluded somehow.18 I think that aesthetic advice of the sort I have in mind can be excluded from being relevant to well-being in the same ways th at moral advice can be excluded. Given the way that I discussed moral value, there are f our ways one could go, in my mind: (a) one can “bite the bullet” and claim, somewhat impl ausibly, that desires with aesthetic content are relevant to well-being, (b) one can claim that the relevant desi re set should not have any desires with aesthetic cont ent, (c) one can claim, at least on counterfactual desire accounts, that the relevant c ounterpart must have no aesthetic values, or (d) one can claim, at least on counterfactual desire accoun ts, that the counterpart should disregard one’s aesthetic values.19 17 Once in conversation with me, Elijah Millgram hypot hesized that Oscar Wilde lived his life so that it would be a tragedy. Wilde’s life story can most certain ly be viewed as a tragedy, but the claim that Wilde lived his life so that it would be a tragedy is a more significant claim. The claim that he lived his life so that it would be a tragedy is not entirely unfounded: Wilde deliberately opened up the possibility of his being prosecuted for breaking the sodomy laws in England and then, upon being found guilty and sentenced to prison, refused to flee the country though given ample opportunity to do so. There really does not seem to be any evidence that Wilde was civilly disobedient—broke the law but accepted the punishment as a way of showing respect for the law (i n the way that Martin Luther King Jr. was when he willingly broke the segregation laws an d took the punishment with the goal of showing the injustice of the laws). So there does not seem to be any principled reason why he decided to remain in England and go to prison. Wilde knew of the probable outcome of his provocation of the trial and many people close to him, foreseeing the outcome, advised him against his course of action. So perhaps his ideal adviser, even with full information of the consequences would have advised him to act as he did. The issue is very complicated however, and any furt her debate as to Wilde’s motive s must take place elsewhere. 18 A more controversial case might be one where the fully informed self advises her less informed self to live a life in accordance with a life story that has a supremely happy ending. The happy ending could either consist in the person having a high level of well-being or (more likely) merely involve a high level of wellbeing. Comedies, at least many sorts of comedies, ar e easily eliminable from the list of advice (could one’s ideal advisor recommend to live as Larry, Moe and Curl y do?). The ideal advisor could advise one to live one’s life in accordance with a life st ory that has a supremely happy ending, I suppose, but if the advice is given for aesthetic reasons, it could not count as rele vant to one’s well-being—in the narrow sense of wellbeing. This would be a case where the ideal advisor gives the right advice, but for the wrong reason. 19 Recall Darwall’s claim that what enhances someone’s well-being is he or she getting what it is rational for us to want for them were we to care for them. If there are ways in which a life can go morally or aesthetically better, I do not see anything in Darwall’ s view to exclude this kind of advice from being offered. I do not have children, but if I did, I would want them to have a high moral character, live

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193 As in the cases of desires with moral conten t, I think that option (b) is attractive. However, since I do not have an argument that shows that re-ordering is not possible, my “fallback” preference is for (d). 5.3 Perverse Advice 5.3.1 Caring and Well-Being Thus far I have discussed advice that is in fluenced by substantive values and advice that is non-self-regarding. There seems to be a third kind of advice that could prove troubling for my version of desi re-satisfaction theory. The wo rry is that there are some instances where the advisor could provide advice that is, by our intuitions, perverse and the satisfaction of which should not count towa rds the advisee’s well-being. Such advice could be self-regarding, in a technical sort of way, but seems to run afoul of the spirit behind the requirement of an interest’s being self-regarding as set out in the first chapter of this dissertation. There ar e two sorts of cases of perver se advice I will explore, one that is not genuinely problematic for my theo ry and one that is. The way to get around the genuinely problematic cases, I will argue, is to add the requirement that the ideal advisor care for his advisee. I will begin with the first, merely apparently problematic sort of case. I will revert back to my terminology of saying that A is some agent as he actually is and that A + is his fully informed counterpart who also meets th e conditions set out in chapters 3 and 4, and beautiful lives, and also have a high level of prudential value. I imagine that is what just about everyone wants for his or her children. Darwall, of course, has the restriction that the “wants” must be rational and they must be “for the person,” so perhaps in a fully explicated account of his view, he could exclude moral and aesthetic advice. My suspicion though, is that Darwall’s requirement that the desires be rational does not exclude invading substantive values and his requirement that the desires be “for the person” only excluded instrumental desires; such as th e desire that my brother win the lottery only because I think that he will give me some of the winnings. Please see my Chapter 1 and section 5.3.2 of the present chapter for further discussion of Darwall.

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194 sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the pres ent chapter. Imagine that A +, after having been informed by miracle, now, hates his actual self, say, because A + finds A ignorant. If this were the case, so the objection goes, then A + could recommend to A that he jump off a cliff. Now, I do not think that this sort of case is problematic. Th e reader might recognize it as a counter-intuitive consequent change similar to the ones discussed in the previous chapter. Obviously, it is not logically necessary for someone who becomes fully informed to hate his less informed counterpart. Recall that we are looking for the nearest possible world to the actual world in which A is fully informed. So long as A does not hate himself, so my thought goes, A + will not hate A So the first sort of cas e is not really problematic. However, my opponent might reply, what of cases in which A hates himself? In the nearest possible world in which A is fully informed, A + will hate A so the counterargument goes. Here we have arrived at the s econd sort of case all uded to above which is a genuinely problematic sort of case for my account of well-being. A +’s advice must be A -regarding in a robust way. A +’s advice can be A -regarding in the technical way discussed in the previous section of this chapter, but it might not be A -regarding in a more robust sense. My solution, as I mention above, is to require that A + care for A whether A cares for himself or not. If A + were to care for A then A +’s advice for A would be A -regarding in a robust way. I will explain how the requirement that A + cares for A helps to eliminate perverse advice later, but I wish to deal with concerns that the very idea of the requirement of caring, in this context, is somehow conceptually misguided. What if caring for someone is identical to wishing that he or she have a high level of well-being? If that we re the case, then the account of well-b eing I am proposing

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195 would be circular. If we tr y to add the requirement that A + care for A to solve the problem of perverse advice, but if caring is simply wishing that someone fare well, then the account could not get off the ground. So the ch allenge then, at this stage, is to explain what caring is and how it functions in an id eal advisor account, w ithout explaining caring as involving well-wishing. In explaining what caring is, and how it is to function in the mind of the ideal advisor, great pains must be taken to ensure th at caring is not the same as wishing that the advisee would have a high level of well-be ing (from now on, I will call this “wellwishing”). Strictly speaking, there are obvious cases of well-wi shing that are not cases of caring. Here is one example; say I wish th at my brother has a high level of well-being merely in the belief that he would help me out It would be very misleading to say that I then cared for him because I wished him well. Another case where the two clearly come apart is a case in which one desires to bene fit others out of a Kantian motive of moral duty. So well-wishing and caring are not iden tical, but they still may be close enough to make the proposed solution circular. 5.3.2 Darwall on Caring and Welfare Darwall develops what he calls a meta-e thical account of we lfare according to which something contributes to someone’s welfare if and only if it is something it is rational to want for that person, insofar as one cares for that person (Darwall, pg. 4).20 The penultimate chapter of Darwall’s book include s an account of caring. Of the relation between caring and welfar e Darwall states: 20 The more specific, normative, version of what it is in fact rational to want for someone—the so-called “Aristotelian Thesis”—is spelled out in the final chapter of his book. What concerns me here though, is the so-called meta-ethical account of welf are and how caring f its into it.

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196 In this chapter, we turn to the ques tion of how to understa nd and identify the attitude that is featured in a rational care theory of welfar e. This confronts us with the worry that it is impossible to define care or concern without already making use of the idea of a person’s good or welfare, and therefore that we cannot define welfare in terms of ratio nal care. (Ibid, pg. 50) So Darwall takes himself to owe an account of caring that does not define it in terms of “well-wishing.” Perhaps surprisingly, Darwall’s account of caring sidesteps the issue of circularity by claiming that he does not have to provide a definition of cari ng at all. On this Darwall says: However, we need not define care (or, as I will call it in this chapter, sympathetic concern), if it is something like a psychologi cal natural kind. Just as we can use a term like ‘water’ without a prior definition to refer to the natural stuff in the rivers and lakes for purposes of empirical theory, so likewise might we refer to care for purposes of a metaethical theory of welfar e if it is a natural kind. (Ibid, pg. 50) Darwall does not take himself to have to define care if it is a natural kind. Unfortunately, Darwall does not give criteria for natural kinds and does not really explain very well how the move to classifying caring as a psychol ogical natural kind gets around the problem of circularity. I will try to explain Darwall’s account. Darwall contrasts sympathy with empathy (Ibid, pg 51-53). He says that whereas empathy consists in one person’s feeling (or as least feeling something that resembles) what another person is feeling, sympathy is felt by a person from the perspective of another person. With empathy, one tries to “get into the shoes” of another, with sympathy, this is not the case. Care, for Darw all, is sympathetic concern. Darwall says of sympathy: “Sympathy, again, is a feeling or emotion that responds to some apparent obstacle to an individual’s good and involves concern for him, and thus for his welfare, for his sake” (Ibid, pg. 67). Darwall offers re peated formulations just like this one. In Darwall’s developed account of sympathy, there is still a reference to an individual’s

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197 good and her welfare. This might make the read er think that Darwall’ s construal of care makes his account of welfare circular. But to be charitable, Darwall must not intend the repeated formulation to be definitions; instead, they must explanations of the psychological natural kind. Just what this amou nts to, of course, remains to be discussed. Before discussing it, I will mention one re maining aspect of Darwall’s accounts of caring and welfare. Darwall takes caring (sym pathetic concern) and well-wishing to have different objects. The object of caring is the individual. The obj ect of well-wishing is states of affairs (Ibid, pg. 68-69). In Darwall’s words: According to philosophical orthodoxy, the standard object of desire, action and feeling is some proposition or possible state of affairs. If I want an ice cream, the real object of my desire is that I eat an i ce cream. Or if I fear a tiger, then perhaps I fear that I might be eaten by a tiger. Moreover, it sometimes seems implicit in ethical writing that what it is to care about another person is simply or primarily to have a desire with a specific propositiona l content, namely, that the person fare well. Even if desires and feelings have propositional objects, however, some also have “indirect objects” that are non-propositional. In particular, the form of desire involved in sympathetic concern does. S eeing the child on the verge of falling into the well, we don’t simply desire that the disaster be averted. We desire this for the child’s sake that is, out of a sy mpathetic concern for him (Ibid, pg. 67-68) Darwall’s proposal that care has, perhaps inter alia a non-propositional object is intriguing. I think Darwall is right, but he has not sufficiently expl ained how his account does not face circularity. In what follows in this chapter, I will tr y to explain caring and well-wishing in a way that is friendly to both Darwall’s and my accounts of welfare. Let us return to Darwall’s claims about natural kinds. A lot hangs on whether he needs to give a definition of “care.” Whethe r Darwall can side-step the definition of care is the issue at hand.

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198 5.3.3 Natural Kinds and Definitions The natural kind term “water” picks out the natural kind water. Analogously, thinks Darwall, the psychologica l natural kind term “care” pick s out the natural kind care. Presumably, so the argument must go, once care is established as a na tural kind, it can be used in theorizing without providing a definiti on—for the denotation of the term “care” is set independently of definition. Here is my a ttempt at an illustration. We can imagine an elementary Earth Sciences class is learning th e water cycle. This is oversimplified, but one could set up a chart with cl ouds, precipitation, soil, streams, rivers, and finally oceans linked in a cycle that is repeated until the end of the world. We can understand the functional relations between each of the co mponents. We can understand that water is whatever has this functional role—indepe ndently of knowing whether water is H2O. On Darwall’s account by analogy, and this is somewhat speculative here, “care” is psychological natural kind term. We can understand the functional roles it plays in everyday lives even without a definition of “care.” We can understand its evolutionary history, its psychological and so ciological import, and even its role in the account of well-being without providing an analysis of it. At least so mething like that seems to be going on in Darwall’s account of care and welfare. However, ev en if I am right up to this point, the issue is far from resolved. Certai nly, Darwall ought to have said more about this. Here is the quotation where it looks like Darwall might be giving a definition of “care,” but where I urged before that we not read him as doing such: “Sympathy, again, is a feeling or emotion that responds to so me apparent obstacle to an individual’s good and involves concern for him, and thus for his welfare, for his sake” (Ibid, pg. 67). Instead of regarding this as a definition, let us call it a description of a functional state.

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199 The description still involv es the concept of welfare.21 It is not clear how we are to understand this description of the functi onal state and whether our understanding of caring is any better off than if the description were a definition. Let me therefore take a step back and examine for myself the rela tion between caring and well-wishing before explaining what I take to be Darwal l’s strategy of invoki ng natural kinds. 5.3.4 Sympathetic Concern and Well-Wishing Why is the description of the functional state not problematic for us even though it makes reference to a person’s good? Earlier we saw a couple of cases that show pretty convincingly that well-wishing is not the same thing as caring. Th e two cases were: (1) as case where I wish my brother well so that he will benefit me in turn, and (2) a case where the person is a Kantian and believes she has a moral obligation to at least sometimes benefit those in need and so desire s to benefit someone in need solely from the motive of moral duty. In the first case we have instrumental well-wishing, while the second can be interpreted as either instrumental or in trinsic—depending on how we understand the motivation by a sense of duty. In neither of these cases can we say that the attitude is one of caring for the person. Caring and well-wishing are not identical. Moreover, even intrinsic well-wish ing is not sufficient for caring. There still remains the issue of whether caring is sufficient for well-wishing. If it is, then there still could be a circularity problem. It real ly depends on the nature of what I will call the “caring conditio nal:” if one cares for A then one well-wishes for A Darwall, in describing sympathetic concern, repeated ly makes reference to an individual’s good 21 Actually, Darwall does not quite say what he must mean in this quotation. It is not the apparent obstacles to an individual’s good that provokes the feeling of sympathy. It must be the apparent obstacles to what is judged to be the individual’s good that provokes the feeling of sympathy.

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200 and welfare (Ibid, pg. 52, 67, 69, 70, 71, etc.). No w, the important thing to notice is that even if the “caring conditional” is true, it still could be th at caring and well-wishing are not conceptually linked. If so, we could understand what care is w ithout the concept of well-wishing even though every instance of cari ng is correlated with an instance of wellwishing. If this were the cas e, then there would not be a problem of circularity, even though the “caring conditional” is true. Though Darwall does not say it, maybe this is something like what he has in mind. It is a way of accepting the conditional and yet avoiding the circularity probl em. The circularity problem is avoided, because even though each instance of caring is sufficient fo r a case of well-wishing, the concept of caring could be independently understood. 5.3.5 The Object of Care and Well-Wishing and “One Thought Too Many” In this section I will try to explain ho w every instance of caring could have a corresponding well-wishing, while keeping ca ring conceptually distinct from wellwishing. If I understand Darwall’s position corr ectly, this is something that can help both his and my accounts of well-being. Two things, in particular, make me think that caring should not be analyzed as invol ving well-wishing: (1 ) the object of caring differs from the object of well-wishing, and (2) with well -wishing, there is one thought too many for it to be caring. Darwall, as I mention above, thinks that the object of caring and the object of wellwishing differ. In his book he says: When we care for someone we desire things for her for her sake The object of care is the person herself not some state or property involving her. In caring for her, we of course, want certa in states and properties invol ving her to be realized. But when they derive from care, such de sires also have an “indirect object” in addition to these direct objects. In caring for her, we want these things for her (Darwall, pg. 47, emphasis his).

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201 What Darwall is getting at is that the object of caring and we ll-wishing differ in kind. In caring, the object is the person hi m or herself. In well-wishin g, the object is some state of affairs. The state of affairs, presumably, must involve the agent, but the object is still a state of affairs. Darwall seems to rely on the suppressed premise that when the object of the mental state differs in kind, the mental state must differ in kind too. This seems like a fairly uncontroversial idea. There is another, somewhat related, argumen t that should make us think that caring and well-wishing are not essentially relate d. Bernard Williams has offered a thought experiment that is helpful here. I thi nk Williams’ idea can be extended to caring and well-wishing. Williams, in his paper “Persons, Character and Morality,” discusses the relation between personal connec tions and the demands of mora l theories. In that paper he mentions the hypothetical case of a man w ho faces a dilemma. Both his wife and a stranger are drowning and he can only save one of them. He has a moral duty to save at least one. Some moral theories might recomm end flipping a coin to determine which he should save. Yet other moral theories might recommend that he base his judgment on whatever facts he might know about the drowning victims. Perhaps, for example, one of them, if saved, will produce an enormous amount of happiness for others. But it is counterintuitive that one might be obligated to save someone other than one’s wife. As a response to this, some defenders of some moral theories would try to show how the theories can make it at least permissi ble for the man to save his wife. Williams sees it as a mistake to try to make the saving of the wife compatible with a theory. On this Williams says: “But this construction [revi sing an account to make sa ving the wife compatible with it] provides the agen t with one thought too many: it might have been hoped

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202 by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife” (Williams, pg. 646). The conflict is between love (or friendship) and moral duty. The person who thinks “It is my wife” and then jumps in to save her ac ts out regard for his wife. The person who thinks “It is my wife and in situations of this kind it is pe rmissible to save one’s wife” acts, at least in part, out of regard for moral considerations. So even if the defender of the moral theory can show that the theory is co mpatible with its being permissible to save one’s wife, the defender still requires one thought too many. Requiri ng the extra thought, “In situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife,” is counter-intuitive. Williams writes about the feelings of love and friendship and how motivation from them is different from motivation from mo ral duty. I think that his argument can be modified for my purposes. I am not concerne d with the feeling of love or friendship. Instead, I am concerned with care and what I call well-wishing. Well-wishing is analogous to motivation from duty, I say. Wh en one gives advice based in well-wishing, one’s state of mind is that A should have X and this is so because X contributes to A ’s well-being.22 Care, on the other hand, is analogous to love on Williams’ account. The advice from someone who cares is that A should have X for A ’s sake. This might very well be what Darwall has in mind. In an ex ample above, Darwall says that the state of mind of the well-wisher upon seeing that a child is on the edge of a well would be that 22 This is well-wishing for a particular person at a particular time. I suppose there is a more general kind of well-wishing—when one wishes that th ere is an increase in overall well-being in the world, but this general kind of well-wishing is not the kind of well-wishing that concerns me here. That general kind of wellwishing could not plausibly be thought to be connected in a strong way to caring.

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203 disaster be averted.23 But if I am right, then the state of mind of the well-wisher would be that the disaster be averted because this di saster would be agains t the well-being of the child. Just as in Williams’ case, the course of action recommended by the moral theory and the course of action from the motive of l ove is the same, so too can the advice from a well-wisher and the advice from a caring person be the same. However, just because the advice is the same, it does not follow that that the two attitude s are conceptually connected. The “caring conditional” may very we ll be true, but this is a mere correlation. There is a further complication on my vi ew that Darwall doe s not face. As I discussed at length in Chapter 1, there is a na rrow and a broad concept of well-being. On the narrow concept, well-being turns on the non-moral, non-aesthetic, self-regarding interests of the person. On the broad concep t, well-being includes instead all categories of choiceworthiness in a life; so it could incl ude moral values and whatever other values there might be. Now, to care for someone might involve desiring her broad well-being. An example might be of a parent who cares fo r her children and recommends, in virtue of this, that they be charitable. Now, this recommendation might very well result in a decrease in the narrow, prudential, well-being of the children. Restricting the advice to that which is agent-regarding and non-moral would work to e liminate this advice, but it is important to note that the advice from a cari ng person, without the “filter” provided in the earlier parts of this chapter, might not alwa ys be in the advisee’ s interests, narrowly construed, or rather, it might not furt her the advisee’s na rrow well-being. 23 Of course, someone might have this general well-wishing state of mind. I suppose everyone might have it to some extent. However, this general well-wishing state of mind is not the salient one for my discussion, for it could not plausibly be confused with caring.

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204 This point shows that my account of caring and well-wishing more closely analogous to Williams’ account of love and duty than might have been thought. For in some cases, the course of action motivated by love will not be the same as that motivated by duty. And in my theory, in some cases, the advice motivated by care will not be the same as the advice motivated by well-wishing. Given that I adopt the requirement that A + care for A it is important that I be clear on how my theory of well-being and Darwall’ s differs. First, Darwall’s theory is a rational care view and not a fully-informed care vi ew. It is not the case that one has to be fully informed to make rational, caring, j udgments on Darwall’s view; at least, he mentions no requirement for his theory of full information in his book and essays. Second, I require that the advi sor be the fully informed counterpart of the advisee. Darwall’s theory has no such requirement. Any person, on Darw all’s theory, suitably in a position to rationally care, can make judgmen t about someone’s welfare. On my view, the fully informed counterpart has a privileg ed position for advising, because the advisor and advisee share a personality. Thirdly and lastly, Darwall heavily restricts what can count as “rational” in his rati onal care theory of welfare. He supports what he calls an “Aristotelian Thesis,” according to which, one’s life goes well when one appreciates and engages in activities worthy of merit (Darwall, pg 73-104). I support no such thesis. 5.3.5 Perverse Advice and Caring Let me return to the worries with which I began this section. The worry is that if A hates himself, then A +, being in the nearest possible worl d in which he is fully informed, etc, will hate A and could advise him, say, to jump off a cliff. Desire-satisfaction theories, as a general class of theories, are going to be more permissive as to what they allow as making a person’s life to go better or worse. But we shoul d try to exclude so-

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205 called perverse advice if possible. I think th at the requirement of caring does the trick. Let me discuss a few examples. If the advice to jump off a cliff springs from whim or fancy, then this advice can be eliminated. Care for someone precludes this sort of unconsidered advice. Care for someone requires that one take her plight seriously as opposed to treating it as an unimportant issue. So at least that kind of perverse advice is eliminated. What, if after taking the matter seriously, the advisor who, we are stipulating, still cares for his advisee, nevertheless still advises him to jump off a cliff? Could this happen? In certain circumstan ces it might make sense to advise someone to jump off a cliff—such as if a much more horrible thi ng would happen as the only alternative. But the case I am envisioning (or trying to envision) is one in which there are perfectly fine courses of action as alternatives and yet the advi sor’s advice is to jump off the cliff. It is hard to make sense of this advice in such condi tions and I am not sure it is intelligible if the advisor cares for the advisee. Here is one possible line of response. The caring advisor, we can say, should take into account the desires of the advisee, especially those that are formed from good information. Now suppose, my opponent stipulates, that the advisee, himself, wants to jump off a cliff, even when he, the advisee, ca res for himself. Such a case is quite absurd and it really is hard to understand the motives of such an imaginary person. The more the case is revised to get around the requirement of caring, the less intell igible the state of mind of the advisor and advisee gets. My id eal advisor account, fully developed, seems to handle objections from perver se desires reas onably well.

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206 Indeed, my ideal advisor account handles perv erse cases at least as well as other conceptions of well-being. It is easy to s ee how jumping off a cli ff could contribute to one’s well-being on mental state views. Say that the person can have pleasure only in jumping off a cliff and is simply miserable otherwise. Such a person may not care for himself and may take pleasure only in perverse things. In such a case, jumping off a cliff may be counted as contributing to the pers on’s well-being on some popular mental state views. Mental state theories could perhaps be refined to exclude such cases. But I doubt it would be as easy as it is for th e desire theory. So mental st ate theories likely fare worse than informed advice views on this issue. Perfectionist theories do not fare worse, regarding perverse cases, than informed advice views, but they do not fare any better either. Perfectionist views treat a life that accords with and develops one’s human nature as the best life. Now, like lemmings, it is possible for humans to have an impulse to jump off a cliff.24 So too, in the right conditions, the perfectionist theo ry would have it that jumpi ng off a cliff contributes to one’s well-being. So, I do not see how perfectio nist theories fare any better on this score. 5.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed thre e areas where a generic ideal-advisor account, such as the one developed in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, must be altered to fit the conditions of prudential we ll-being proposed in Chapter 1: Problems are posed by (1) desires that are non-sel f-regarding in that they do not seem to be relevant to an agent’s life, (2) desires that seem to have moral a nd aesthetic content, a nd (3) desires that are self-regarding in the technical way discussed in 5.1 and 5.2, but that, intuitively, stem 24 If the reader finds the example of lemmings implausible, as some have found it, I think other examples could be given.

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207 from hatred or dislike of the ag ent whose well-being is at stake. I have dealt with each of the three sorts of problems in th e sections above. I have argued that only a subclass of an ideal advisor’s desires for her advisee ar e relevant to her advisee’s well-being.

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208 CHAPTER 6 MIXED THEORIES AND DESIRE-SATI SFACTION CONCEPTIONS OF WELLBEING In this chapter, I will argue that my de sire-satisfaction theory developed in this dissertation is superior to ot her accounts of prudential well -being. Let me explain why I return to critically evaluating conceptions of prudential well-bei ng. In Chapter 2, I critically assess the prospect s of desire-satisfaction account s of well-being. In that chapter, I discuss three moni stic conceptions of prudentia l well-being: mental state conceptions, desire-satisfaction conceptions and objective human nature conceptions. The three conceptions just mentioned are monistic in that they each treat just one thing as constituting well-being. Add itionally, in Chapter 2, I discuss so-called pluralistic conceptions which treat well-being as constitu ted by two or more things. I argue that desire-satisfaction accounts are superior to mental state, objective human nature, and pluralistic accounts of well-being. There ar e, however, other, more sophisticated, conceptions of well-being. In Chapter 2, I put off addressing some of the more sophisticated accounts of well-being. My idea in doing so was that an adequate comparison of theses more sophisticated accounts of well-being with my preferred desire-satisfaction account requires that the reader know the details of the latter—the ideal advisor account—in a highly developed form. My goal in this chapter is to critically examine those more sophi sticated accounts of well-being.

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209 6.1 Mixed Theories: What They Are and What Motivates Them A mixed theory is one that takes several things and treats each as a necessary condition for well-being. The important point at this stage is to understand that mixed theories conjoin conditions for well-being. An example of a relatively unsophisticated mixed theory would be one which takes ha ppiness as a necessary condition for a person enjoying a degree of well-being while also taki ng the truth of the beliefs upon which the person’s happiness is based to be necessary as well. An account that combines these two conditions would be a mixed account that combined a mental state component and, loosely speaking, a component having to do with states of the world. Generalizing, we can see that any mixed theory would have the following form: A person enjoys wellbeing (to degree X) if and only if, and because, the person has both characteristics ( ) and ( ) (to degree X). Mixed theories are different from pluralis tic theories, such as those of Finnis and Scanlon.1 Pluralistic theories, like mixed theori es, combine different conditions in an account of well-being. However, pluralistic theories and mixed theories differ in that pluralisms treat each condition as independently contributing to enhanced well-being, whereas mixed theories treat each condition as necessary for well-being. A pluralistic theory would take the following form: A pers on enjoys well-being (to degree X) if and only if and because either the person has characteristic ( ) (to degree X) or the person has characteristic ( ) (to degree X). An example of a si mplistic pluralistic theory is one that treats friendship in a pe rson’s life as contributing to at least some well-being in his life and treats pleasure as contributing to at least some well-being. On this simplistic 1 Please see Chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion of these pluralistic theories.

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210 pluralistic theory, an agent’s having some friendship or some pleasure would result in his having some well-being. I will take up mixed theories in this chapter. What is appealing about a mixed theory is that one might hope that it would capture all of the attractive elements of each necessary condition while avoiding the defects of the conditions. Let me very briefly discuss the unsophisticated mixed theory just mentioned—the happiness-plus-truth theory. One of the problems with the happiness theory—as is seen from Chapter 2 of this dissertation—is that the happiness can be based on false belief. Experience Machine-type exam ples should have convi nced the reader of that. One can try to overcome the counterin tuitive aspect of the happiness theory by alloying it the requirement of true belief. Indeed, if this were the case, lots of counterintuitive aspects of the happine ss theory would fall by the way-side. 6.2 Mixed Theories that Involve Desire-Satisfaction Accounts Desire-satisfaction accounts, so we are lead to believe by their critics, have some serious problems. In what I have done t hus far in this dissertation, I hope to have convinced the reader that many of the issues thought to afflict desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being do not really do s o, at least they do not afflict the best desire-satisfaction theory. There are, however, a few potential problems I have not discussed. One might think that desire-satisfact ion accounts can be improved by adding requirements. The resulting theory would be a mixed theory on my taxonomy. Here is one potentially problematic case that might make one think that desiresatisfaction accounts of well-be ing could be improved by additional conditions. There seem to be certain kinds of desires that could be in a person’s so-calle d relevant desire set but yet their satisfaction should not, intuit ively, enhance her well-being. An example

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211 found in the literature is the desi re to turn radios on and off.2 This desire may meet the condition of being self-regard ing as explained in Chapte r 4, because what the person desires, may be that she turn radios on and off con tinually. There is no reason for thinking that ideal advisor acc ounts get around this problem, at least at first glance. Perhaps, however, one could deal with th is problem by developing a mixed theory of well-being: for example, a theory that treat s well-being as constituted by the satisfaction only of desires that have, as their objects, things which conform in some relevant way with our human nature. Let me briefly explore another potentially pr oblematic case. Ther e is thought to be something counter-intuitive a bout allowing mere desire sati sfactions to constitute wellbeing, without requiring any awar eness of the desire satisfacti on on the part of the agent. Recall that a desire in someone’s so-called relevant desire se t can be satisfied and she not know it. This supposed weakness of desire-satisfaction theories as they are traditionally understood, can perhaps be countered by a dding a necessary condition found in some other conception of well-being, such as a me ntal state conception or a perfectionist conception —thus producing a mixed theory. I will argue in what follows that neither of these supposed weaknesses in desiresatisfaction accounts is as signi ficant as critics have thought and that adding an extra necessary condition cer tainly would not improve upon my ideal advisor theory. For simplicity of expression, let us say that a mi xed theory that involves desire-satisfaction 2 This example is from Warren Quinn’s “Putting Rationa lity in its Place” as found in his book of collected essays, Morality and Action (pg. 236). In that essay, Quinn seems to be concerned with arguing that “subjectivism about moral value” is false (pg. 228-229). He might not have formulated his example specifically to argue against desire-satisfaction accounts of prudential well-being, but I will nevertheless use his example as though it were so formulated.

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212 has the general form: A person enjoys well-be ing (to a certain degree ) if and only if and because both (i) a desire in the person’s releva nt desire set is satisfied and (ii) some other non-desire-satisfaction-related condition is met. I will discuss in some detail several specifications of (ii). 6.2.1 Desire/Objective Mixed Theories Let me first deal with examples that have to do with desires that are in the relevant desire set on at least some de sire-satisfaction accounts and yet, intuitively, the satisfaction of them does not seem to enhance one’s well-being. There is the example of a person who desires that she turn radi os on and off. Another exampl e that appears in a number of works is of a person who wishes that he count blades of grass. One way of trying to fix up this problem is to set restrictions on what desires can count as relevant to one’s well-being. One could combine a desire-satisfaction conception of well-being with a perfectionist conception of well-b eing—resulting in a mixed theory. The resulting theory would be a mixed theory, according to which one’s well-being is constituted by the satisfaction of desires one has, the satisfaction of which, say, would develop or exercise one’s human nature. The theory under discussion could be stated as follows: A person enjoys well-be ing (to degree X) if a nd only if (i) a desire in the person’s relevant desire set is satisfi ed and (ii) the satisfaction of this desire involves the exercising or deve lopment (to degree X) of the person’s human nature. Call this the “Mixed Desire-Satisfaction/Human Nature” theory or “MDH” for short. According to this mixed view, one might ar gue, the desire of a person that he count blades of grass would not be relevant to hi s well-being. Now, it is not clear whether the proponent of the mixed view would be right ab out this. Part of the problem is that scholars have not provided much detail as to what sorts of activiti es (putatively) would

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213 develop or exercise human na ture. Nevertheless, as I di scuss in Chapter 2 of this dissertation Hurka claims that an activity that develops or exercises one’s physical nature or one’s practical or theoretical reasoning enhances one’s good—for my purposes, I will take what he says about the human good as though it were offered as an account of prudential well-being. It is not clear whether Hurka’s acc ount of human nature could help with the problematic case mentioned a bove. Perhaps counting does exercise one’s reasoning. In any case, let us assume that an appeal to human na ture does solve the problem for pure desire-satis faction accounts of well-being. I do not know of any philosopher who ha s whole-heartedly endorsed the abovementioned mixed view; however, several have flirted with it. For example, T.M. Scanlon, in his What We Owe to Each Other, entertains a view that has some similarities to the mixed view I have been discussing. Scanlon finds the informed desire view attractive but subject to serious criticism. He then proposes a “rational desire” view of well-being (even this, ultimately, he does not endorse). Scanlon explains the sense of “rational desire” that he has in mind as follo ws: “by a person’s ra tional aims we might mean aims that he or she actually has, insofa r as these are rational (that is to say, insofar as the nature of these aims does not provide good reason to revise or abandon them)” (Scanlon, pg. 119). The idea that Scanlon has is to bring into the pi cture some ideal of worthwhile aims, apart from their being mere ly the object of desire. On this Scanlon says: The requirement that an aim be rational incorporates this critical element by allowing for the possibility of substantive cr iticism of aims. This requirement also accommodates the fact that from an indivi dual’s own point of view what makes an aim worth adopting and pursuing is, first a nd foremost, not merely its being chosen or desired but the considerations that (i n his or her view) make it worthwhile or valuable” (Ibid, 119).

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214 The proposal that I understand Scanlon to be considering is that we accept the desire view in one of its forms—it seems to be the actual desire view—but that we place constraints on which desires can count as rele vant to one’s well-bei ng. These constraints are based in a conception of independent value. Perhaps surprisingly, Scanlon does not say much about what these substantive independent values are supposed to be. Late r, Scanlon discusses how the rational desire view can deal with some criticisms of so-called objective accounts (Ibid, pg. 120).3 Scanlon distinguishes between subjective a nd objective accounts of well-being, following James Griffin in his Well-Being Griffin includes basic ne eds accounts and objective list accounts as types of objective accoun ts. I assume that he woul d also include perfectionist accounts in that category.4 We cannot be sure what Scanlon has in mind, but my thinking is that since he makes clear reference to objec tive theories, on Griffin’s construal of what objective theories are, Scanlon must have in mind a mixed theory that is part desire theory and part objective theory. I will spend the next two paragraphs sket ching more of the details of Scanlon’s account of well-being so that th e reader has a better idea of how the mixed conception fits into his overall picture. Then I will return to the mixed aspect that I think has some initial attraction. Scanlon’s ultimate account of well-being is plur alistic, one part of which is mixed. He takes rational aim satisf action to be one potential constituent of well3 Although I approach the mixed theories from the side of the desire-satisfaction views, there are other relevant perspectives—such as from the standpoint of the other theory. Objective accounts are often thought to be too inflexible and to specify that one way of life is best for everyone. The mixed theory under discussion would answer this criticism of objective theories by adding flexibility and choice as aspects of the account of well-being. 4 Griffin, like Sumner, adopts a two-part taxonomy: the subjective and the objective. This is different from my preferred three-part taxonomy. Had Griffin considered perfectionist accounts of well-being, he most certainly would have counted them as objective accounts.

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215 being. Also, he takes certain experiential stat es, for example, enjoyment, to be a second potential constituent of well-being. “Thirdly ” he says, “many goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on the person’s ai ms but go beyond the good of success in achieving those aims. They include such th ings as friendship, ot her valuable personal relations, and the achievement of various forms of excellences, such as in art or science” (Ibid, pg. 125). Scanlon’s third condition is a co nfusing and he does not try to explain it. I am not sure if he means that there are al so instrumental goods that come about from achieving one’s rational aims or something entirely different. Scanlon’s account falls victim to the same problem that plagues other pluralisms— that of commensurability between the various parts of the account.5 Scanlon’s pluralism is a lot like the other pluralisms I discuss in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Each item on the list has some initial plausibility but also adds further complicati ons. Furthermore, we are not given a way, even in principle, of making well-being assessments for any given individual. There is no prin ciple of commensuration that would allow for there to be, even in principle, a total overall amount of well-being one has that results from taking the sum of the amounts of well-being one enjoys in each of the categories of th e pluralistic theory. So Scanlon’s overall view can be re jected for the reasons I provided in arguing against pluralistic accounts in Chapter 2. But let us return to what I think is an intriguing idea—leav ing aside Scanlon’s pluralism. Let us take the rational desire vi ew as a mixed view, which combines a desiresatisfaction aspect with either a perfectionist as pect or a pluralistic as pect. To revert to 5 In Scanlon’s defense, he admits he is not offering a unified “theory” of well-being (Ibid, pg. 125). He thinks that we are “unlikely” to find a unified theory of the sort I am after in this dissertation. I do not see any reason to be so pessimistic.

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216 the language found above, the theory could be st ated as follows: A person enjoys wellbeing (to a certain degree) if and only if and because both (i) a desire in the person’s relevant desire set is satisfied and (ii) the object of this desire is a rational aim for him. Call this the “Mixed Desire-Satisfaction Rationa l Aim” theory or “MDR” for short. As I say above, Scanlon does not say much about th e criteria that he thinks a rational aim would have to meet, but given the context, it appears that he has in mind that the an aim would be rational if it corresponded in the right way to an item on an objective list of some sort. Let us treat MDR as holding that th e object of a desire is a rational aim just in case it is on the list. This mixed view might solve some of the problems of typical pure desire-satisfaction views. Now, it seems that MDH and MDR deal w ith problematic cases for pure desire theories in an intuitively attractive way—at l east in a limited range of cases. Moreover, the addition of the desire component to a pure perfectionist account could make the resulting theory more flexible than the pure account, and its addition to a pure objective list account could solve the commensurability pr oblem that afflicts pure objective list views. Perhaps, for example, strength of desire could be used to make commensurable the items on the list. While there is some initial plausibility to such mixed views, they ultimately must be rejected. One of the mixed theories, M DH, combines a desire-satisfaction element with a perfectionist restriction on the relevant desire-set. Such a theory faces problems. For starters, the addition of the desire-based aspect still does not help us get a fix on what our human nature is. That enormous problem still remains. The most plausible account of human nature seems to be the evolutiona ry account, but, as I argued before, it does not

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217 yield an adequate perfectionist account of well-being, even if we grant that it is an adequate account of human nature. Please see chapters 1 and 2 for details on this point. Even where the relevant desire set is restricted to desires that are appropriately related to the exercise and development of human nature, insurmountable problems remain. The mixed theory that combines desire-sat isfaction and an objective list, MDR, is a little bit better than the desi re/perfectionist account, but st ill, I suspect, ultimately untenable. The primary problem with the pl uralisms we have seen so far is the commensurability issue. Perhap s strength of desire can solv e that problem, but I think that there is a dilemma about commensurabili ty that the proponent of MDR must face. Either (1) we do not solve the problem of in commensurability or (2) we do. If we do not, then the problems we may solve by adding the objective list aspect to the desire aspect are not important enough to increase th e overall plausibility of the pure desiresatisfaction theory. This is because the core problem for pluralistic theories is that they have the problem of incommensurability—as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2 of my dissertation. If we do solve the incommensurability problem, then new problems arise. The problems, if the theory falls on the firs t horn of the dilemma are straightforward and so I will not go into a discussion of them. I will explore the second horn of the dilemma. My suspicion is that we could use stre ngth of desire to solve the problem of commensurability. The rough idea is that each individual is faced with a list of goods, and it is the strength of hi s desires that determines th e amount by which his well-being increases when he obtains different goods. Th is seems to solve the problem at least “in principle” which seems sufficient for my pur poses. I suspect though, that if we use

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218 strength of desire to solve the problem of incommensurability, then a new problem will show up. Let me explain. Thus far in my dissertation, I have allo wed those who would support an objective list theory to put anything on the list that he or she likes. This is important because I have not required an account of where the list comes from or how it is generated. My suspicion, however, is that if we use stre ngth of desire to solve the problem of incommensurability, and do not provide an accoun t of how the list is made or where it comes from, then the desire component will “take over” the theory. I will explain what I have in mind by an example. Let us say that there are two items on the list: aesthetic appreciation and frie ndship. Furthermore, let us say that there is some agent with three desires: a desire for aesthetic appreciation, another desire for friendship and a third desire for pleasure. The strongest desire is for aesthetic appreciation, next is the desi re for pleasure, and the weakes t of all is the desire for friendship, let us suppose. According to th e kind of theory we are considering, the satisfaction of the desire for aesthetic apprec iation would lead to a great increase in wellbeing; the satisfaction of th e desire for friendship would lead to a relatively small increase. When asked why there is this diffe rence, the proponent of MDR would say that strength of desire makes commensurable the various items on the list and determines the degree to which they contribute to well-being. But if the desire-component of MDR is as significant as this, we must wonder why the desire for pleasure does not make pleasure relevant to the agent’s well-being. A proponent of MDR will no doubt ta ke it that this is explained by the fact that pleasure is not on the list, while friendship and aesthetic appreciation are. This explanation is unsatisfactory, however, unless some account can

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219 be given of why pleasure is not on the list in the first place.6 If the proponent of MDR had a story to tell about the ge neration of the list, matters would be different, but so far, such a story has not been provided by thos e who have proposed list theories. If no satisfactory explanation can be given, then it is not clear why a desire, by itself, does not make its object relevant to well-being. The existence and strength of desire, after all, already plays a primary role in theory. Absent an explana tion of what determines the content of the list, it is far from clear whet her the list makes an important contribution to the plausibility of the theory. Recall at this point that we have been di scussing the example of a person who has a desire to count blades of grass, and the exam ple of a person who desires to turn radios on and off, on the assumption that the examples result in counter-intuitive implications for at least some pure desire-satis faction accounts. Given this assumption we have been exploring ways to amend such accounts. The important question to ask at this point is whether the examples are as problematic as they originally seemed. I think they are not. To some extent, I think that my ideal advisor th eory deals with this sort of example in an intuitive way. Firstly, we must be sure that, when cons idering such examples, we keep in mind that the desires in question mu st be someone’s desire that he or she does something. If the desire is of the general form, A desires that A do x then we can think of the example as being concerned with a personal project of sorts. Admittedly, it is hard to see how someone could have a personal project that he count blades of grass, but then there are 6 Whether or not this demand for explanation should be pushed upon the pluralist is another matter. I did not demand an explanation for the list in the second chapter of this dissertation. At that point, I ignored the question as to what makes the list. It still strikes me that the demand for explanation is especially forceful in the context of the mixed theory under consideration.

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220 many people who cannot “make sense” of many ot her people’s projects. For example, many people cannot understand why ot hers collect things, such as stamps or coins. If we were to require that A ’s personal projects make sense to others in order for them to be relevant to A ’s well-being, then perhaps many things that the reader holds dear would be excluded from counting as releva nt to his or her well-being. That seems, I hope, counterintuitive. Secondly, I think that examples such as the desire of a person that she turn radios on and off might not meet the conditions my th eory places on the relevant set because turning radios on and off is not the sort of th ing that an ideal adviso r would advise herself to do, were she to care for her less informed self. I will not explor e this reply, but think that it is possible that the requirement that th e ideal advisor care for her actual self could rule out an advisor’s advising he r advisee to turn radios on a nd off or to count blades of grass. In sum, I do not think that either MDH or MDH solve the original problem for pure desire theories. Furthermore, I do not think that the original problem is as serious as it may initially have seemed—for I do not thi nk that the examples provided lead to counterintuitive result s. On careful reflection, it s eems that my preferred desiresatisfaction account may be ab le to handle the problem. 6.2.2 Desire/Mental State Mixed Theories As was mentioned above, a feature of th e desire-satisfaction account of well-being is that a desire can be satisfied and yet the agent never knows about it. This is thought to result in counter-intuitive results for desire -satisfaction accounts. The general concern is that one’s well-being, according to such a th eory, might be too di sconnected with the person’s lived experiences.

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221 One way of trying to solve this problem is to add a belief compone nt to the original theory. I do not know of any philosopher who has proposed this approach, but there have been a few who have considered it, such as Griffin in his Well-Being and others. I will briefly discuss two diffi culties with this new mixed view and then I will turn to a more serious objection to the idea that we need to add a belief component to pure desire-satisfaction theories. One of the diffi culties is that it is not clear which belief component should be added. Recall that the gene ral form of a mixed theory with a desire component is as follows: A person enjoys we ll-being (to a certain degree) if and only if and because both (i) a desire in the person’s relevant desire se t is satisfied and (ii) some other non-desire-satisfaction-re lated condition is met. The issue at hand is to identify which belief component should fill in for clause (ii). There seem to be at least two candidates; (a) require th e person to believe that the desire in the relevant desire set that is mentioned in (i) is satisfied or (b ) require the person to believe that p where the desire that p is the desire in the relevant desire set that is mentioned in clause (i). Call the mixed theory that replaces clause (i i) with (a) the “Mixed Desire-Satisfaction/Belief Satisfied” theory or “MDBS” for short. Call the theory that replaces clause (ii) with (b) the “Mixed Desire-Satisfaction/Belief Proposition” theory or “MDBP” for short. I think that there are serious problems with both MDBS and MD BP. These problems are significant, even in theories that provide counterfactual accounts of the relevant desire set. Let me explain. The best accounts of the desi res that are relevant to we ll-being are counterfactual— as I have argued extensively in chapters 3 through 5 of this dissertation. The move from actual to counterfactual desires has a st riking result for the mixed theory. On counterfactual accounts of the relevant desi re set, the agent whose well-being is under

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222 consideration will not always actually have a desire that belongs in the relevant desire set. When the agent does not actually have such a desire, it is hard to see how a belief requirement could possibly make the theory gi ve more plausible results. With MDBS, it is clear that there could be cases where many agents do not know what their desires would be under the counterfactual conditions sp ecified by the theory. Also, with MDBP, there will be cases where the agent would believe that p and yet never know that the proposition p is the object of a desire which is in the relevant desi re set. What I have said here is too speculative to undermine all possibl e desire/mental state accounts. However, the considerations mentioned should definitely make us think that any desire/mental state theory will face complex difficulties. There is a more devastating objection to de sire/mental state theories. Desire/mental state theories do not actually solve any pr oblem with the desire theory. The first challenge to any proponent of a mixed theory is to show how it solv es a problem with a pure theory. Critics of desire -satisfaction theories say that such theories are faulty because of the possible gap between actual satisf actions and the mental life of the agent. For example, Sumner suggests that “[a] theory of welfare can be descriptively adequate only if it incorporates some form of experience requireme nt; this was the important insight in classical hedonism ” (Sumner, pg. 128). Sumner seems here to say that a necessary condition of an ad equate account of welfare or well-being is that one “experiences” the grounds of one’s well-be ing. I suggest that a better way of characterizing the new requirement is as a “b elief” requirement. Nevertheless, Sumner clearly seems to think that there is a serious problem w ith pure desire-satisfaction theories. I disagree with Sumner and other critics wholeheartedly. There is no need to

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223 add a belief requirement to pure desire-satisf action theories, I say, because there is not a problem of the sort critics like Sumner e nvision to begin with. Desire-satisfaction theories are far more resourceful than their critics have supposed. Consider a slightly modified version of an example that comes from Parfit, the example of a person who wants his children to do well. We can imagine that they do well and yet the parent never comes to know this In fact, we can imagine that the parent is far removed from the lives of his child ren and does not know a nything about them. Now, presumably, the desire that his childre n do well is relevant to his well-being. At least, the position I argue for in chapters 4 and 5 would make the de sire relevant. The objection we are considering is that the parent’s lived experi ence is far separated from his well-being on pure desire -satisfaction accounts. In thinking about this case, we bring to the table certain presuppositions that might make the case look problematical for desire theories. Once these presuppositions are fully laid before us for consideration, however, the case does not turn out to be problematic. We can imagine ourselves, or othe rs we care for, in a very similar situation to the parent. In such cases, we might th ink that our life would go better if we knew about the desire-satisfaction. This much I th ink is right. However, when we think of such cases, we also have in the back ground the thought that the parent wants to know what happens to his children. It is sensible to assume this in the case, i.e., to fill in the details in this particular way. Now, however we have put into the case another desire— the parent’s desire to know whether his children do well. Of course, this is an ordinary desire and it can be satisfied or not. In the hypothetical case this additional desire is not satisfied. But now we have something to point to when we claim that the parent’s life

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224 does not go as well if he never knows that his children do well as it would if he did know this. The additional desire is nothing special and requires no addition to simple desiresatisfaction theories. Our intu itions about the hypothetical cas e are right, I say, for we are assuming that the parent desires both that hi s children do well and that he knows that his children to well. Once we make this a ssumption explicit, we can explain the case perfectly.7 There is no objection here to my theory. Countless cases can be handled in this way. This is because most of us think that knowledge is highly desirable. However, ther e will be hypothetical cases that favor the pure desire-satisfaction account and make the mixed theories, such as MDBP and MDBS, look mistaken. Although knowledge of the conditions of one’s life and the surrounding environment is often seen as extremely desira ble, there are cases wh ere it might not be. For example, some people wish not to know the sex of their fetus. I am not sure why this is, but let us consider cases in which parent s have an intrinsic de sire not to know. Among those who want not to know the sex of their fe tus (at least until it is born), some will have a desire that the fetus be, say, a female. On the desire/belief views I have been examining, the “expecting” adult’s well-being w ill be increased if the fetus is indeed female and the adult has the relevant belief. This seems very count erintuitive indeed. For it is far more plausible to think that the a dult is better off if the fetus is female and even better off not knowing the se x at all, given that he or she has a desire not to know. 7 An interesting thought experiment is to think of the hypothetical case with two different modifications: (1) the case is the same but the parent does not want to know what happens to his children or (2) the case is the same as the original, but the parent wants not to know what happens to his children. Colloquially, when people say “don’t want . ,” they often just mean “want not . ..” Here I am using the terms a bit more rigorously. There is an absence of a desire in (1), an d a desire is present in (2). These are hard cases and we will not have as strong an intuition as we do with the original, unaltered, case. With the first change, desire satisfaction theories treat the knowledge as irre levant to one’s well-being. With the second change, desire satisfaction theories treat knowledge as decreasing one’s well-being, ignorance as increasing it. These are hard cases and bo th results seem acceptable.

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225 The hypothetical case where the parent has a desire to know a bout his children’s well-being should make us think that th e desire/belief view is an unnecessary complication—that the pure desire view does a good job accounting for our intuitions in the case. The case of the “expecting parent” s hould make us think that the mixed theory is simply mistaken where a desire theory does a fine job accounting for our intuitions. So, although philosophers have thought that there is a serious problem with desiresatisfaction theories of well -being because they allow ther e to be a gap on the theory between one’s well-being and one’s conscious lif e, this turns out not to be the case. 6.3 Mixed Theories that Include Mental States While there are few proponents of mixed theori es that include desire satisfaction as an essential component, there are more pr oponents of mixed theories that include happiness as an essential c ondition. Several philosophers entertain the idea of mixing the desire-satisfaction account with so me other theory, but few actually endorse such theories. Mixed theories th at include happiness are more commonly endorsed. Perhaps the best-developed account of a mixed theo ry that includes happi ness as a necessary condition, indeed, the best mixed theory offered of any sort, is that of Wayne Sumner in his book Welfare, Happiness and Ethics It is to his account of well-being that I will now turn. 6.3.1 Sumner’s Mixed Happiness Theory After a survey of hedonism, desire-satisfac tion theories and a few objective theories Sumner finds significant faults with each. He then explores various mixed theories including a desire satisfaction theory with an added experience requirement, which is somewhat like MDBP and MDBS. Finding fa ult with mixed theories that include a

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226 desire-satisfaction component, Sumner then goes on to develop and endorse a mixed theory that includes happiness as a necessary condition.8 Sumner gives an admirably straightfo rward summary of hi s position in the following quotation: The theory I shall defend does not simp ly identify well-being with happiness; additionally, it requires that a subject’s endor sement of the conditions of her life, or her experience of them as satisfying or fulfilling, be authentic, the conditions for authenticity, in turn, are twofold: info rmation and autonomy. Welfare therefore consists in authentic happiness. This theory is subjective, since it makes a subject’s welfare depend on her attitudes, and si nce the function of the authenticity requirement is to ensure that these attit udes are genuinely hers It satisfies the experience requirement, since a subject’s happ iness is a matter of her experience of the conditions of her life. However, it is no t a mental state theory since authenticity is a relation between the subj ect and the world. The happiness theory thus mediates between hedonism and the desire theor y, exploiting the strength of each while avoiding their weaknesses. (Sumner, pg. 139) In the first sentence of the quotation, Sumner is alluding to his thesis that a particular kind of happiness is important for well-b eing—he describes this kind of happiness variously as life satisfaction or ha ppiness about how one’s life is going.9 Note that “Satisfaction” refers to a mental state on Su mner’s account, but on the desire-satisfaction account, “satisfaction” refers to whether the object of the desire comes about. But even the restriction to “life happiness” is not suffi cient in Sumner’s view. Additionally, this “life satisfaction” must be authentic. I will spend much more time below talking about what Sumner takes to be two elements of authenticity: inform ation and autonomy. 8 I am confident that I have already addressed Sumner ’s criticisms of the desire-satisfaction conception of well-being and I have already discounted mixed theories that combine desire-satisfaction with an experience requirement—or at least mixed theories whic h are very similar. In fact, I have a hard time seeing how Sumner would flesh out, in a plausible way, the mixed theory that has a desire component and an experience component, except by fleshing out the details in a way that is identical to either MDBP or MDBS 9 There are other types of happiness that are either irrele vant or at least less relevant to one’s welfare, such as happiness about others and so on. By focusing on life happiness, Sumner is trying to avoid the problem of kinds of happiness that are irrelevant to one’s welf are. There is an analogou s problem with afflicts the desire-satisfaction theory which is discussed in ch apters three through five in this dissertation.

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227 Before leaving my discussion of the quotat ion above, however, it is worth mentioning that perhaps Sumner would have done be tter to say that his theory is not purely a mental state theory instead of simply saying that “ it is not a mental state theory.” His final account of well-being does ha ve a mental state as a n ecessary condition, though the mental state must relate to the non-mental world in the right kind of way. Thus, his account is best viewed as a mixed theory. Although there are interesti ng issues about the happine ss component of Sumner’s theory, such as the issue whether life satisfac tion is best thought of as a kind of happiness as opposed to some other mental state, I will focus instead on what is to supplement the relevant mental state.10 In order for happiness to be au thentic, we are told, it must be informed and autonomous. I will now turn to the two conditions of authenticity on Sumner’s theory. One of the central problems with pure mental state th eories, such as happiness theories, is that they do not have any connection to the real world.11 Because someone can be completely mistaken in her beliefs about her circumstances she can have the rele vant mental state, and yet, intuitively, still have a very low level of well-being. If a re striction is placed on the mental state which, in effect, ties it to th e world, then one of the central worries can be addressed. Sumner calls such a re striction an “information requirement.” 10 I do have some doubts as to whethe r the mental state picked out by Sumn er is indeed a kind of happiness, but I certainly agree that life satisfaction is a mental state. The central issue which concerns me is not whether the mental state under discussion is happiness, but whether it fits well into a theory of well-being. So my focus is on what is mixed in with the mental st ate, regardless of whether th e mental state is indeed a kind of happiness. 11 Of course, one can maintain that happiness is not pure ly a mental state (some say Aristotle thought this). But this is not at issue here because a person who develops a theory of well-being that uses such a conception of happiness will be endorsing a mental state theory alloyed with something else.

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228 Sumner first looks at thr ee candidate requirements, rejecting the first two and accepting the third. Of the first he says: “The strongest candidate would be a truth or reality requirement which would stipulate that happi ness counts as well-being only when it is based on a view of the conditions of our lives which is free from factual error” (Sumner, pg. 158, italics his). Another way of putting this condition is that for happiness to count towards one’s well-being, it must be based on true belief. Sumner considers the reality requirement to be unreasonably puritanical (Ibid, pg. 158). He says: When we reassess our lives in retrospect and from a superior epistemic vantage point, there is no right answer to the ques tion of what our reaction should be —that is surely up to us. Because a reality requirement stipulates a right answer—any happiness based on illusion can make no in trinsic contribution to our well-being— it must be rejected as presumptuously dogmatic. (Ibid, pg. 158 -159, italics his) Sumner thinks that the realit y requirement is too strong in that happiness that is not based on “reality” is automatica lly discounted as not relevant to well-being. The reality requirement undermines individual sovereignt y, he says, because some people would still think that their lives were goi ng well even under the belief th at what they thought in the past was incorrect. For example, one could look back at time spen t in a Nozick-style experience machine as increas ing one’s well-being (Ibid, pg. 161, especially footnote 25). The second information requirement Su mner considers is a justification requirement. The justification requirement is weaker than th e reality requirement in that it requires only that one be justified in the beliefs upon which one’s happiness is based, which falls short of requiring truth, because one can be justified in believing something without it’s being the case. Sumner finds the justificati on requirement slightly more plausible than the reality requi rement, but he still finds the justification requirement too “arrogant” (Ibid, pg. 159). On this Sumner sa ys: “Once again it presumes to dictate to individuals how much their de viation from an ideal episte mic standpoint should matter to

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229 them. But that is for them to decide” (Ibid, pg. 159). So, Sumner re jects the justification requirement for the same reason that he reject s the reality requirement, that it does not leave well-being up to the agen ts’ decision in the right way. Having rejected the reality requirement a nd the justification requirement, Sumner proposes his favored version of the information requirement. He suggest s that the line of argument go in a “somewhat different direction” (Ibid, pg. 159). He says: After all, what we are seeking is an ade quate subjective theory of welfare, one on which the subjects’ point of view on her li fe is authoritative for determining when that life is going well for her By connecting welfare with happiness we have interpreted that point of view as an endor sement or affirmation of the conditions of her life. When that endorsement is base d on a clear view of those conditions, we have no grounds for questioning or challengi ng its authority: in this respect, the individual is sovereign over her well-being. But when it is based, wholly or partly, on a misreading of those conditions then its authority is open to question, since it is unclear whether or not she is endorsing her life as it really is (Ibid, pg. 160, italics his) The details of Sumner’s proposal are a little unclear in this quotat ion. He seems to add the requirement that one would “endorse th e conditions of her lif e” were she to be informed of the matter. Briefly, Sumner seems to favor the following theory: A person enjoys well-being (to a certain degree) if a nd only if and because both (i) the person is enjoying a mental state of life satisfaction and (ii) the person would approve of the conditions giving rise to, her en joyment of life satisfaction were she to be informed of the matter. I have already spoken of Sumner’s vi ew on what “life satisfaction” consists in. Let us leave aside for the moment the que stion of what endorsement could be on Sumner’s proposal. I will brie fly explore the information re quirement Sumner seems to favor. He thinks that information is relevant to A ’s well-being “whenever it would make a difference to a subject’s aff ective response to her life, gi ven her priorities” (Ibid, pg.

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230 160). We can imagine someone who is quite satisfied with his life and who has the relevant mental state—life satisfaction—in a bundance. But let us suppose that the person is deeply misinformed as to the real circum stances of his life. On Sumner’s preferred version of the information requirement, the pe rson’s life happiness counts as well-being only when correcting the misinformation would not make the person somehow disqualify the happiness from being relevant to his or her well-being. Of course “somehow disqualify” is quite vague a nd I will explore a few ways of clarifying the terms. Sumner’s information requirement can be expr essed more clearly with a counterfactual. If an agent were to endorse the conditions of his life were he to be informed in the right way, then his relevantly related life satisfac tion constitutes at least some degree of wellbeing. Even though Sumner does not say he e ndorses a full information account of his information condition, I do not see how Sumner could avoid adopting a full information view. He suggests that “The relevance of information for a person’s well-being is a personal matter to be decided by personal priori ties; there is here no authoritative public standard” (Ibid, pg. 161). Sumner seems to be saying that each i ndividual gets to choose whether information is relevant to her choice or not. If that is wh at Sumner has in mind, this remark by Sumner should be disregarded. For an agent may have different answers regarding which bits of information are releva nt given different info rmational conditions. There is no reason for choosing one over the ot her, if we leave the matter up to personal preference. We know he needs to have all of the information relevant to the life satisfaction in question. Absent an account of which epistemi c viewpoint is superior in regards to an individual’s endorsement of her circumstances, the agent in the

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231 counterfactual condition might ha ve to be fully informed.12 After all, we could imagine a situation in which the agent has some bit of misinformation corrected, but some other bit might just make the difference. This is a perplexing issue for the interpretation of Sumner’s position, but as I argue above in chap ters 3 – 5, the concept of an agent’s being fully informed is not seriously troubling a nd Sumner could simply make use of the account I develop in those chapters. We seems to have a fairly clear idea of what, on Sumner’s view, life satisfaction and the information condition amount to, but we still have not explored the details of the requirement that one endorse the conditions of her life I can think of three different accounts of what Sumner may ha ve in mind: an agent, A would endorse the conditions of her life when given the releva nt information if either (a) A would believe that her life satisfaction is relevant to her well-being if she were re levantly informed or, (b) A would remain happy if she were relevantly informed or, (c) A would desire when relevantly informed that the things that actually ground he r life satisfaction give rise to her sense of life satisfaction. In a number of passages, Su mner seems to support (a), but I will argue that this is not the best inte rpretation of his position because (a) leads to a vicious kind of circularity. Sumner seems not to think th at (b) is the proper way to understand what endorsing the conditions of one’s life amounts to, but I think that (b) is, nevertheless, worthy of being explored as an option. I think that (c) is the most charitable way of fleshing out what Sumner has in mind. I shoul d make it clear to the reader, however, that 12 The ultimate solution to what information is relevant and what is irrelevant cannot invoke yet another counterfactual, e.g., information is relevant if it would make a difference in judgments about what information should make a difference, for then the solution just passes the problem onto another counterfactual situation. Perhaps a better way to put this is to say that the way of distinguishing whether information is relevant or not cannot ultimately be solv ed by invoking yet another counterfactual. At least, it seems that this line of argument would eventu ally result in a full information account.

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232 I think that Sumner’s position, ev en when fleshed out in the mo st charitable way possible, is still seriously and fatally flawed. Let us explore (a). On this option, an agent considers, with relevant information, whether some instance of life satisfaction is par tly constitutive of his or her welfare. In many passages, Sumner seems to have such a construal in mind. For example, Sumner says that there are two options one can ta ke once undeceived about the faithfulness of one’s partner. Here they are: One is that she re-evaluates how well her life was going (not how happy she was) during the period of deception: ‘I thought everything was going so well but now I can see that it was all a farce.’ In that case, the discounting rate she now imposes on her earlier assessment of her well-being determines how relevant the information was. The other possibility is th at she does not care: ‘C’est la vie; at least he was charming and we had a lot of fun.’ Here the information turns out to have zero relevance, since that is the status she c onfers on it.” (Ibid, pg. 160-161, italics added) It seems in this passage, that Sumner has in mi nd that the object of endorsement is one’s life and endorsement, on this construal, involv es a judgment by one of his or her level of well-being. The above is not th e only passage that suggests (a). Sumner says of each individual that: “Their self assessments are therefore determinative of their well-being unless they can be shown to be inauthentic, i.e. not truly theirs. The requirements that these assessments be informed and autonomous spell out the conditi ons of authenticity” (Ibid, pg. 171). There are numerous other passag es that provide at least some support for reading (a).13 I will argue, however, that (a) cannot be what Sumner has in mind, even if several passages seem to support such an interpretation. 13 Perhaps most notable is the passage where Sumner says: “After all, what we are seeking is an adequate subjective theory of welfare, one on which the subject’s point of view on her life is authoritative for determining when that life is going well for her ” (Ibid, 160, italics his). In this passage, one straightforward reading is that an agent’s judgment is about, at least to some extent, her well-being.

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233 There is a danger of vicious circularity with option (a). For with construal (a), the agent in the counterfactual situation is to judge whether some bit of happiness is or is not a constituent of his well-being. For example, Sumner says: “The extent to which the illusoriness of the experiences matters for an individual’s well-being therefore depends on the extent to which she decides (or would decide) to make it matter” (Ibid, pg. 161). If we fill out the expression ‘make it matter’ with ‘make it matter for well-being,’ the danger of circularity become clearer. The deci sion of the agent is supposed to provide us with a criterion for well-being, and yet the agent’s decision is about whether something matters for his well-being or not. I do not thi nk that (b) or (c) lead to vicious circularity, and therefore I think them more charitable in terpretations of what Sumner can have in mind. Let us explore (b). With option (b), an agent’s endorsement merely consists in his remaining satisfied in a certain way after be ing relevantly informed. No passages in Sumner’s book support reading (b). Sumner simply does not say anything similar to (b). Nevertheless, (b) seems plausible to me and it is worth exploring in its own right. Yet I think that there is a general problem with Sumn er’s mixed theory, even if (b) is the best way to go in explaining the counterfactual requirement. I think that (c) is the best interpretation of Sumner’s position. Although there are a few ways of fleshing out the details of (c), all interpretations along the lines of (c) share the idea that endorsement of the sort Sumner has in mind is a desire of a certain sort—a desire for the conditions of one ’s life. Endorsement can eas ily be understood as a desire, on my broad understanding of desires. I th ink of desires as pr o-attitudes generally speaking. One can desire the conditions of one ’s life. Nothing about desiring a state of

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234 affairs, I think, requires that th e state of affairs not already be the case. One might think of a desire for an existing state of affairs as a sort of valui ng. Valuing of this sort could very well be an endorsement of the conditions of one’s life. There are some passages that seem to s upport interpretation (c). For example, Sumner says: “In order for a subject’s endor sement of her life to accurately reflect her own priorities, her own point of view—in order for it to be truly hers —it must be authentic, which in turn requires that it be informed” (Ibid, pg. 160, italics his). Sumner’s use of “priorities” here might be the key to understanding what he has in mind. Perhaps what Sumner has in mind is that one endorse s the conditions of her life if she endorses her life satisfaction, even when the grounds of her life satisfaction turn out to be faulty. Let me at this point take the opportunity to explain one key difference between Sumner’s account and counterfactual desire -satisfaction accounts as I see them. Sumner’s overall account is not entirely counterfactual. That is his view is not that something contributes to your well-being, if it would make you happy under the right information conditions. Instead, Sumner’s theo ry requires that one’s life satisfaction to be actual and then requires that it pass the counterfactual condition, of which I think that (b) and (c) are two possible interpretations.14 Later, I will explore a weakness in Sumner’s account that, I think, pushes Su mner to accepting a fully counterfactual account. I think that one can offer a powerful argum ent in favor of pure desire-satisfaction accounts given what Sumner says about the endorsement condition—especially if we take (c) to be the most plausible interpretati on of his view. Let me explain. Sumner says, 14 A desire satisfaction theory could be set up in a similar fashion. First, the actual agent must presently desire something. Secondly, the thing must still be desired were one to have full information about it.

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235 variously, that one’s well-being depends on her “priorities,” “p ersonal priorities,” “point of view,” “self-assessments,” etc. However, one’s priorities, self -assessments, etc., on option (c), are only relevant to one’s well-bei ng when there is actual life satisfaction in the picture. When there is no actual life satisfaction in the picture, one’s priorities, point of view, self-assessments, etc. are irrelevant to her well-being. Sumner accuses theories other than his own of being unr easonably puritanical because they fail to give significant weight to a person’s own priorities, yet Sumner’s final account of well-being seems guilty of the same fault, given his line of reasoning. Sumner says “On a subjective theory, individuals are the ul timate authorities concerning their own welfare” (Ibid, pg. 171). Yet this is not so on Sumner’s final mixed account. Even on option (c), Sumner’s account requires actual life satisfaction to be in place in order for one to enjoy any degree of well-being. Here is the relevant question: Why restrict the authority of the informed judge exclusively to matters of happiness? On my account of well-being, the informed judge’s opinion in matters of happiness is on par with his judgments about other elements that make up the person’s life as to whether they matter for his well-being. On Sumner’s theory, on this construal, only judgments on ma tters of life satisfaction are important. Of course, if we presuppose that the happiness theo ry is the best account of well-being, then the restriction is natural. But, such a presupposition is unwarranted and we are left wanting an argument. Although interpreting the counterfactual conditio n in Sumner’s theory as (c) results in a plausible theory and seems to have a good deal of support give n what Sumner says, the arguments he at least seems to give in favor of his counterfactual condition really end up supporting a pure desire-satisfaction account, such as mine. Perhaps, given that

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236 interpretation (a) results in a vicious circ ularity and that (c) does not fit well with Sumner’s mixed theory, we should interpret him as having (b) in mind. However, he says very little, if anythin g, that supports interpretation (b). I have an independent argument against all mixed theories of the sort Sumner has in mind that I will offer later in this chapter. So even if we attribut e (b) to Sumner, he does not escape serious criticism. At this point, however, I would like to finish exploring the conditions of Sumner’s theory of well-being. I will now discuss Sumner’s account of the autonomy condition. The worry Sumner is trying to deal with comes from work by Amartya Sen. Sen thinks that happiness and desire-satisfaction theories are all subject to a criticism. Things like personal preferences and happiness are influe nced by society, religion, family, friends and a host of other things. We can imagin e cases where social conditioning might lead one to be happy or have a desire for a state of affairs, and ye t one might feel that there is something “alien” about the happiness or preferences. A person could be happy and could have this happiness based on very good information and yet his happiness might not be “autonomous.” A classic example of this in the philos ophical literature is someone who is a slave and yet is content with his position, the f eeling of contentment having been formed from social or other forms of conditioning.15 Sumner’s way to get around counter-intuitive examples such as the contented slave is to require that the happiness be autonomous. 15 Another good example is from the Harry Potter series by J.K. Rowling. In those books, there is a race of what are called “house elves.” House elves are, in effect, slaves to the humans who can use magic. Through the most recent book in the series (the sixth of what looks to be eight books), only one of the house elves, Dobby, has “thrown off the chains of oppre ssion.” The others are content to live as slaves. No doubt, what makes the house elves such good fictitious examples (and makes us think that they are “brainwashed” and not autonomous) is that most fi ction that involves elves places them outdoors and communing with nature as opposed to indoors ironing clothes and washing dishes.

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237 Sumner discusses two main accounts of autonomy: the identi fication/hierarchy view and the process/formation view. A desire or preference is autonomous on the identification/hierarchy view when the person has a higher-order desire in favor of it. This kind of autonomy requires critical reflect ion on one’s own desires and preferences. Though much of Sumner’s language on this topic is drawn from the preference and desire literature, his target of course is higher or der desires about happine ss. Sumner points out that the main problem with the identificatio n/hierarchy conception of autonomy is that those higher-order values could themselves be socially influen ced, and so would not solve the problem that faces his happiness theory (Sumner, pg. 167-171). The process/formation view of autonomy is concerned with how a desire or preference is formed, not with whether it is id entified with. The basic idea is that there are autonomy-subverting processes, such as indoctrination, progr amming, brainwashing, role scripting, etc (Ibid, pg. 171). Sumner points out the main problem with the process/formation view is that it fails to de al adequately with cases in which a goal is formed by an autonomy-subverting process and ye t the agent later come s to identify with it. Sumner concludes that both of the main conceptions of autonomy have problems and he does not adopt either in his autonomy co ndition. Still, he thinks that however the details of the autonomy condition are worked out, an autonomy condition needs to be included in his account of well-being. Becau se Sumner does not accept a particular conception of autonomy, it is hard to give precis e criticisms of this id ea. It is possible, I suppose, that no satisfactory account of au tonomy will be developed. Also, it seems possible that, even if a satisf actory account of autonomy ca n be worked out, it might not

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238 solve Sen’s particular criticism. So there ar e some worries here, even though Sumner is confident that they can be addressed. To summarize, Sumner’s information re quirement has many significant problems and his autonomy requirement is not spelled out in enough detail to enable us to know much about how it is supposed to work. I do have some other criticisms of Sumner’s theory. Sumner’s theory has counter-intuitive imp lications that are ea sily explained by my desire-satisfaction theory. For exam ple, we could imagine two people, A and B who have the same amount of autonomous and in formed life satisfaction and who are also equally misinformed about the grounds of thei r happiness. Let us suppose that they are equally deluded as to the actual state of affairs. If they were to have their mistaken beliefs corrected, then th ey would not endorse th e conditions of their li ves. Note that in discussing my example, I speak of Sumner’s counterfactual conditi on in the vague or ambiguous way that Sumner does—I speak of “endorsing the conditions of one’s life.” Both A and B in my example, do not endorse the conditions of their lives. So far, everything I have said about A and B is the same. However, A and B differ: Were A to have his beliefs corrected, he would have life dis-satisfaction, but were B to have his beliefs correct, he would have neither life satisfaction nor dissatisfaction. On Sumner’s theory, both A and B enjoy the same amount of well-being—namely zero—because both A and B would not endorse the conditi ons of their lives. But that is an odd consequence even when supposing that happiness, unhappiness, and information all matter for the theory Surely the correct outcome is that A ’s life is going worse than B ’s, though neither’s life is going well.

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239 The pure (mental state) happiness theory doe s horribly with the above example because it gives A and B both a high level of well-being. Sumner’s mixed theory fairs nearly as poorly because it gives both A and B an equally low level of well-being. These results seem implausible, even granting th e supposition that happiness, unhappiness and information matter in a conception of welfare. This example reveals a central problem with Sumner’s mixed theory, independently of which of the three construals of the counterfactual account I discuss above. Of course, one could adopt a fully counterfactual view, according to which one’s well-being is constituted by what would give one life satisfaction if one were informed in the proper way. Such a view might deal with the example I discuss above in an adequate way. One might be able adopt a full counterfactual view a nd remain true to Sumner’s insistence that information and endorsement ma tter. However, if one were to adopt a fully counterfactual life satisfaction account, such as the one just described, I believe that one would loose the original motivation for accepting at least a pa rtially mental-state account in the first place. Surely, one of th e central motivations for accepting a mental state account of well-being is that a mental state account countenances an essential relation between one’s mental life and the level of one’s well-being. On a fully counterfactual life satisfaction account, th e connection between one ’s mental life and one’s well-being would be lost. The funda mental nature of the account would be changed. Surely, desire-satisfaction accounts, such as my ideal advisor account, fare better than fully counterfactual mental state a ccounts. This is because desire-satisfaction accounts never depend on an essential link be tween one’s mental life and one’s wellbeing.

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240 My example of A and B seems to force Sumner to face a dilemma. Either (1) he reverts to a pure mental stat e theory or (2) he adopts a fully counterfactual lifesatisfaction account of the sort suggested above. W ith (1), Sumner would have to explain Nozick-style experience machine examples in a plausible way. This, it seems, he cannot do. At least, he does not seem optimistic that such an explanation can be given. Sumner was led to his mixed theory because of counterintuitive implications for pure mental state theories in experience machine pr oblems. With (2), I say, Sumn er would fare little better. Mental state accounts and count erfactual conditions do not mix well together because they have clashing motivations. A central motiv ation of mental state accounts is that they forge an essential connection between one’s me ntal life and one’s level of well-being. A central motivation of counterfact ual information accounts seems to rest in the belief that one’s mental states can be grounded in mistak en belief. In Sumner’s mixed account there is a central tension between the rationale for the mental state component and the rationale for the full information component, and this ma kes it very unattractive. It seems that on either horn of the dilemma, Sumner faces serious difficulties. 6.3.2 Mental State Accounts Mixed with Objective Elements Just as the desire theory can be mixe d with objective components, so too can mental state conceptions. There is a large literature that tr eats Aristotle’s supposed thesis that happiness is an activity in accordance with human excellence ( Nicomachean Ethics III and X.7-8). Some of it seems to suggest that Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia is, in the terminology of this dissertation, a mixed account, according to which one has eudaimonia to the extent to which one has a ce rtain kind of mental state such as happiness, provided that the ha ppiness arises from the prope r sorts of activities. The interpretation is controversial. More to th e point here, my concern here is neither with

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241 what happiness is nor with interpretive questi ons about Aristotle, such as whether he was indeed writing of happiness as at least partly a mental state. Of course there are many such interpretive questions, such as: “Is ‘ eudaimonia ’ best translated as ‘happiness’?” and “Is eudaimonia the same as the narrow conception of well-being I am after?” But these questions are off my topic. The parts of Aris totle’s theory that we can use to construct a mixed theory have already been developed in the earlier chapters. So I can side-step historical questions and questions about the nature of happiness. A mixed theory that combines happin ess with objective components might be motivated by the thought that happiness should no t count toward a person’s well-being if it is grounded in morally unacceptable activity. People may be happy when torturing others or take pleasure in others’ suffering. But we cannot place moral restrictions on which bits of happiness contri bute to well-being, for we are after a non-moral conception of well-being. So, moral considerations should not be taken into account. But a mixed happiness theory might also be motivated by the worry that happiness can be grounded in activities or thoughts that seem irrelevant to a person’s life. Instead of imagining a person having a plan or desire to count blades of grass or turn radios on and off, we can imagine a person who gets happiness out of such activities. Sumner’s focus on the type of happiness that is satisfaction with one’s life helps because it does exclude happiness that stems from judgments about how the lives of others are going; we might think of this as happiness got through vicarious living. Howe ver, I do not think that the focus on life satisfaction deals away with such examples completely. Nothing excludes a person from getting life satisfaction from turn ing on and off radios or counti ng blades of grass. So it may be that adding an objective requiremen t can help with these sorts of cases.

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242 Let us look first at a combination of a perf ectionist theory with a happiness theory. On this approach, an amount of happiness w ould contribute to a pe rson’s well-being only if the happiness were based in some relevant way in the development of human nature. Roughly, an account of this kind would be of the following form: A person enjoys wellbeing (to a certain degree) if and only if and because (i) the person en joys happiness of a certain sort (and to that degree) and (ii) th is happiness is based in the development of human nature (perhaps, to that degree). Ca ll this theory “Mixed Perfection/Happiness” or “MPH” for short. Counting blades of grass or turning radios on would not accord with one’s human nature, at least so a proponent of MPH could argue.16 If not, then happiness grounded in such activities would not cont ribute toward a person’s well-being. The familiar problems arise. An evol utionary account of human nature is attractive. Yet on an evolutionary account of human nature, the perfectionist requirement cannot significantly help mental state theories. There will be dispos itions that are the result of natural selection, th e pursuit of which do not increas e one’s well-being at all—in fact in some instances, there will be a se lective (genetic) advant age to self-sacrifice.17 Perhaps the evolutionary account of huma n nature is wrong. Hurka thinks that human nature involves, roughly, having a phys ical body combined with two forms of 16 Sumner does consider a mixed theory just like this, though he calls it a hybrid theory. He thinks that the additional objective element would have to be a value requirement, somewhat analogous to the reality requirement. According to Sumner: “A value requirement, howev er, is even more questionable than a reality requirement, since it presupposes that there is an evaluative analogue to empirical truth or reality: a right answer to every question about value” (Ibid, pg. 164). In Sumner’s mind, the value requirement would be objectionable for reasons similar to why the reality requirement was rejected: that it is unreasonably puritanical. I do not share Sumner’s view here because I do not see the additional objective requirement as being evaluative: perhaps some ma y try to bring evaluation into the picture with a perfectionist requirement, but it is not the case that all would do so. This is especially the case when the objective requirement is brought in to solve issues of irrelevance, and not brought in for reasons stemming from moral or aesthetic values. 17 Please see Chapter 2 and the discussion of the mixe d desire/perfectionist accoun ts found earlier in this chapter.

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243 rationality, theoretical and practical. Deve lopment and exercise of one’s physical body and of one’s rationality ar e in one’s self-interest.18 I presented criticisms of Hurka’s theory in Chapter 2 of this dissertation and they are serious and still in effect. We need to hear more, for example, about what is included in the three types of excellences that we can exercise and develop and how th ey are to be made commensurate. Turning radios on and off and counting blades of grass seem to involve exercising one’s rationality, though it is less plausi ble that engaging in such activities develops one’s rationality, except perhaps in those learning to count.19 Also, there are ways of exercising and developing the physical body th at are mundane at best—for example Frankenstein the monster exercises his ex cellent digestive trac t by eating grass and weeds. So unless I hear more about what these three conditions amount to, I do not think that they would necessarily solve the original problem of irrelevant happiness; in an intuitively plausible way. Also, at least one new problem seems to crop up with the combination of the happiness theory and perfectionism in MHP. That is, MHP might exclude too much. It depends on what exactly we take happiness to be – on what the releva nt mental state is. For now, following Sumner, let us say that the relevant mental state is life satisfaction. For a huge percentage of the population, it is ha rd to think of examples in which a person has life satisfaction that is based in activitie s that develop theoreti cal rationality. Most 18 Strictly speaking, Hurka does not take himself to provide an account of well-being, because he thinks that well-being is an essentially subjective concept. I disagree with that claim—my construal of the concept of well-being is neutral with regard to the so-called subjective and objec tive conceptions. So I can interpret Hurka’s theory as concerned with well-being. 19 Perhaps it is the difficulties in spelling out these conditions that make Sumner think that the perfectionist requirement is a requirement of value: that there is no t a value-neutral way of fleshing out three elements. That is just a guess as to what is lying behind Sumner’s arguments, but it might nevertheless be accurate. I am not sure what to make of it.

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244 people do not derive life satisfaction from doing complex mathematics or physics or similar things, not even if they do them well. Paradigmatic ways of exercising and of developing theoretical rationality will not e nhance well-being when there is no properly corresponding life satisfaction—w hich I suspect would be the case for most people. Someone who endorses the mixed theory under consideration might say “so much the worse for the general populace,” but that re sponse should make us pause. One of the reasons for adding a happiness condition to the perfectionist picture is that the perfectionist theory seemed too austere, stipulating that there is one best way to live for everyone, or at least for each person, without any of it being up to the agent in a way of speaking. It seems that the charge of austerity now arises again if the answer is “so much the worse for the general populace.” Let us now look at mixed theories that combine a happiness theory with an objective list theory. I do not know of a ny one who has held such a view, so my discussion of it will be brief. We can comb ine the objective list theory and the happiness theory by requiring that in order for there to be an increase in a person’s well-being, there must be an increase in the person’s level of happiness and the increase in the person’s level of happiness must be based on some ite m on the list. For example, if aesthetic appreciation is on the list and if some agent is made happy by aesthetic appreciation, then there is an increase in the agent’s well-being. The mixed theory under discussion would be of the following form: A person enjoys we ll-being (to a certain degree) if and only if and because both (i) the person enjoys happiness of the required sort (to that degree) and (ii) this happiness is based in an activity of a kind that is on the list. Call this theory “Mixed Happiness/Objective List” or “MHO” for short. Because we can make up the list

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245 anyway we want, MHO should solve any pr oblems of irrelevant happiness—we can make up the list in such a way that simply ex cludes whatever seems irrelevant. Whereas it looks like MHP might not solv e the problem of irrelevant happiness that afflicted pure happiness theories, MHO seems to solve it in an attractive way. The devastating problem which completely unde rmines the objective list theories is incommensurability. Either the addition of the happiness requiremen t solves the problem of incommensurability or it does not.20 If the new requirement does not solve the problem of incommensurability, then the account is still deeply troubled. Nevertheless, I suppose there is something to the idea that MHO is more plausible than a pure objective list theory, at least because of the element of “personal choice” does come into play through the subjective element in happiness. But we still do not know, for example, whether the slightest bit of happiness due to aesthetic a ppreciation increases well-being more than a huge amount of happiness due to fr iendship. So there is still a big problem for MHO if we cannot solve the incommensurability problem. If adding the element of happiness does so lve the incommensurability problem in objective list theories, then there is the possibility that the new mixed theory is plausible—at least it gets off the ground. The happiness condition can perhaps solve the problem on the basis of variations in the “strength” of happiness.21 Strength of happiness could solve the problem of incommensurab ility. If a person’s ground for a bit of 20 The dilemma that faces the happi ness/objective list conception is anal ogous to the one that faces the desire-satisfaction/objective list conception. 21 Following Mill’s thoughts on pleasure; there could be both quantity and quality of pleasures. Quantity consists in intensity and duration of a pleasure, wh ile quality of pleasure comes by choosing one pleasure over the other—perhaps by choosing one pleasure over another when given the same intensity and duration, or some other scheme of choice. At first gl ance at least, this sort of quantity and quality scheme could be applied in a happiness theory. Call the overall scheme a “strength of happiness” scheme.

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246 happiness is on the objective list, then the “str ength” of that bit of happiness determines how much well-being is increased.22 Despite the fact that MHO has some attract ive features, it nevertheless is subject to a fatal flaw.23 Once we adopt strength of happiness as determining the amount by which well-being increased, the account is destabilized. We allo w strength of happiness to determine the amount by which well-being is increased provided th at the basis of the experienced happiness is on the list. There is no increase when the basis of the happiness is not on the list—the strength of an experien ce of happiness does not matter if its basis is not on the list. The natural que stion that arises is: “If st rength of happiness matters in cases where a person has an experience of happiness and the grounds of the experience are on the list, why does it make no difference at all when the grounds of an experience of happiness are not on the list?” Heretofore, I have not required th at the objective list have any justification, but when strength of desire is included to solve the problem of incommensurability, it brings the incompleteness of the objective list theory into clearer light. For unless there is some explanati on for the list, then we cannot answer the question “Why does the strength of an experience of happiness matter in cases where the grounds of the experience are on the list, but not matter at all in cases where the grounds of the experience are off the list?” 22 I do not know if “strength” is the best word in this context. I speak loosely he re. The idea is that each state of happiness has a certain degree of “strength.” Perhaps is would be better to speak of happiness as having intensities, or durations, or some other manner of degree. Nothing in my criticism of MHO hinges on a specific construal of what the “degree” of happin ess consist in. I will use “strength” to capture the idea I have in mind. 23 The problem with MHO is structurally similar to the core problem with MDR (Mixed DesireSatisfaction/Rational Aim) I discuss in 6.2.1 of this chapter.

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247 There is the general problem that we have no explanation for th e objective list, but when a list view is supplemented by either stre ngth of desire or st rength of happiness to solve the problem of incommensurability, the problem becomes more pressing. The addition of the “strength of-” clause destab ilizes an objective list theory. When the strength of a mental state su ch as happiness or desire determines the contribution to wellbeing of items on the list, we need an explan ation of why the streng th of such a mental state does not determine a thing’s contribution to well-being even if the thing is not on the list. So far no mixed theory that combines an objec
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DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE OF A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION
OF WELL-BEING
















By

ANTON TUPA


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2006

































Copyright 2006

by

Anton Tupa



























This document is dedicated to my parents, George and Lonnie Tupa.















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Sharon DiFino, David Sobel, Crystal Thorpe, and Jon Tresan

for providing helpful comments to this work in its developmental stages. I would also

like to thank the audiences of the Ohio Philosophical Association and Florida

Philosophical Association for giving helpful comments on parts of two chapters. To

Peter Barry, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude for reading over many drafts of my

chapters and providing a great deal of helpful advice over the years. Lastly, I would like

to thank my advisor, David Copp, for helping me throughout the entire dissertation

project and providing guidance at many very difficult times. I am sure that I have left out

a number of people who have helped me along the way, and for that, I beg their

forgiveness.
















TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ................................................................................................. iv

A B STR A C T ............................................................................... ..................... viii

CHAPTER

1 THE CONCEPT OF WELL-BEING....................................................................

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. ....... 1
1.2 W ell-B eing and M oral V alue............................................ ........... ............... 7
1.3 Well-Being: Narrow and Broad Concepts.........................................................14
1.4 Well-Being and Self-Regarding Interests..........................................................17
1.5 W ell-Being and A esthetic V alue ........................................ ...................... 20
1.6 Conclusion ..................................... ................................ .......... 34

2 CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING.....................................................................36

2.1 Four Conceptions............................................................... .... 37
2.1.1. M mental State Conceptions ............................................................... 37
2.1.2 D esire Satisfaction V iew s...................................... ......................... 41
2.1.3 Explanatory Objective Theories ............ ...........................................44
2.1.4 Pluralistic Theories of Well-Being..........................................................48
2 .1.5 C on clu sion ................................................................................ 50
2.2 Critical D discussion of Conceptions ........................................... ............... 51
2 .1.1 T h e Story ...................................... .... ... ..................... ............... 5 1
2.2.2 The Application of Explanatory Objectivism to the Story .........................53
2.2.3 Application of Happiness to the Story..................................................64
2.2.4 Pluralistic Conceptions of Well-Being.....................................................70
2.2.5 C conclusion ....................................................... .................... 80

3 DEVELOPING A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELL-
B E IN G ...................................... .................................... ................ 8 2

3.1 Actual Desire Accounts Critically Discussed...........................................82
3.1.1 Som e Introductory Rem arks........................................................ ......... 82
3.1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic D esires................ ............................................83
3.1.3 Problems for Total Desire Satisfaction Accounts .....................................85
3.1.4 Intrinsic D esires .......................................................... ......... ...... 87


v









3.1.5 A Critical Discussion of Actual Intrinsic Desire Views of Well-Being.....89
3.2 Counterfactual Desire Accounts Developed.............................. ............... 98
3.2.1 Information and the Relevant Desire Set.................. ................... ...........98
3.2.2 Ideal Advisor Views .......... ........... ....... ........ ............. ............ 104
3.2.3 What the Ideal Advisor Advises (or what advice we should listen to) ....106

4 IDEAL ADVISOR VIEWS .................. ........... ......................... 11

4.1 The Internalism R equirem ent ..................................... .................. ....... ........ .111
4.2 Rosati's Specific Internalism Requirement................................... ............... 117
4.3 Full Information and the Conditional Fallacy ........................ ........... 133
4.4 Knowledge That and Knowledge What Something is Like .............................139
4.5 Propositional and Non-Propositional Knowledge Revisited ............................150
4.6 Railton's Account of Personality........ .......................................... 154
4.7 Conclusion .................. ......... ................... 156

5 TURNING THE DESIRE-SATISFACTION ACCOUNT DEVELOPED ABOVE
INTO A THEORY OF PRUDENTIAL WELL-BEING ..........................................158

5.1 Self-Regarding Interests ................................... ... ...................159
5.1.1 Conceptions of Prudential Well-Being and Self-Regarding Interests......159
5.1.2 Self-Regarding Desires: The Problem of Self-Sacrifice ..........................160
5.1.3 The Problem R estated......................................... .......................... 162
5.1.4 O vervold's P roposals......................................................... .................... 163
5.1.5 A Problem with the Derived-Desire Interpretation of Overvold's
Second Proposal .............................................. ... .... .. ............ 171
5.1.6 Self-Regarding Desires........................... ... .......................... 172
5.1.7 Self-Regarding Interests Concluded .............................. ................... 180
5.2 Non-M oral and Non-Aesthetic Interests............... ................... ....................182
5.2.1 The Problem .................. ..... ................ ....... ......... .......... .. 182
5.2.2 M oral Desires and the Relevant Desire Set.......................................... 185
5.2.3 A another A approach ........................................................... ............. 186
5.2.4 Aesthetic Values and Prudential Well-Being ................ .................. 191
5.3 Perverse A advice .................. ...................................... .. ........ .... 193
5.3.1 C aring and W ell-B eing...................................... .................. .... ........... 193
5.3.2 Darwall on Caring and W elfare..... .......... ..................................... 195
5.3.3 Natural Kinds and Definitions..... .......... ...................................... 198
5.3.4 Sympathetic Concern and W ell-W fishing ............................................1. 99
5.3.5 The Object of Care and Well-Wishing and "One Thought Too Many"..200
5.3.5 Perverse Advice and Caring ..... ..................... ...............204
5.4 Conclusion ................. ......... ...................... .............. ......... 206

6 MIXED THEORIES AND DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTIONS OF
W ELL-BEING ............... .......................................... ............ 208

6.1 Mixed Theories: What They Are and What Motivates Them ..........................209
6.2 Mixed Theories that Involve Desire-Satisfaction Accounts..............................210









6.2.1 Desire/Objective M ixed Theories............................................... 212
6.2.2 Desire/M ental State M ixed Theories............................................ 220
6.3 Mixed Theories that Include Mental States ............................ ..................225
6.3.1 Sumner's M ixed Happiness Theory .....................................................225
6.3.2 Mental State Accounts Mixed with Objective Elements..........................240
6.4 Conclusion ........................................... .......... 247

7 DO POSTHUMOUS EVENTS ALTER THE LEVEL OF WELL-BEING ONE
H A D W H EN A LIV E? ........................................... .................. ............... 248

7.1 Introduction ............... ... ................................... .. ...... .... .. .............. 248
7.2 Overvold's and Hooker's Proposals ......... ...............................................249
7.3 A N ew B beginning .............................. ........................ .. ...... .... ...... ...... 253
7.4 C including R em arks ................................................ .............................. 263

L IST O F R E FE R E N C E S ..................................................................... ..... .................271

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H ........................................ ............................................275















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE OF A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION
OF WELL-BEING

By

Anton Tupa

May 2006

Chair: David Copp
Major Department: Philosophy

In my dissertation, I develop what I take to be the best version of desire-satisfaction

theories of well-being and I defend my favored version against competing theories of

well-being.

Desire-satisfaction theories, roughly, are those according to which one's well-being

varies with the extent to which some or all of one's desires are satisfied. A desire is

satisfied if the desired state of affairs obtains. My favored version of desire-satisfaction

theories is quite complex, but the basic idea is that the desires that are true to one's

personality are the desires that are relevant to one's well-being.

The first chapter is dedicated to a clarification of the concept of well-being. I settle

on the following explication of this concept: a person's well-being is or consists in the

non-moral, non-aesthetic, self-regarding interests of the person.









The second chapter of my dissertation is a defense of desire-satisfaction

conceptions of well-being against its traditional competitors: mental state conceptions,

perfectionist conceptions, and objective list conceptions.

The third and fourth chapters involve developing and defending my favored desire-

satisfaction view. The fifth chapter consists of curtailing the desire-satisfaction view,

thus far developed, to the conditions of well-being detailed in the first chapter. Thus far,

nothing has restricted the desire-satisfaction view to the desires which are not influenced

by moral concerns, aesthetic concerns, or desires which are not sufficiently self-

regarding.

The sixth chapter is dedicated to defending my preferred desire-satisfaction view

against more sophisticated conceptions of well-being.

The final chapter is dedicated to an application of desire-satisfaction accounts of

well-being to the issue of whether events that happen after one dies can alter the overall

amount of well-being the person had in his or her life as a whole. I argue that events that

happen after one dies cannot alter the overall amount of well-being one had in one's life

as a whole, not, at least, on desire-satisfaction conceptions of well-being.














CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPT OF WELL-BEING

1.1 Introduction

My ultimate conclusion is that a desire-satisfaction conception is the best

conception of well-being. However, before we get into arguments about whether this is

so, first we must have at least a general idea of what the concept of well-being is. I

believe that there is a significant amount of misunderstanding about the concept of well-

being. This first chapter is an attempt to make clear, at least in a general sense, what this

concept is.

Some authors who write on philosophical accounts of well-being give putative

synonyms for "well-being" such as "welfare," "prudence," "self-interest," "a good life,"

"individual good" and so on. None of these synonyms provide any clearer idea of what

the concept of well-being is than any other. Although these synonyms are cue words for

people who are already familiar with the topic (and so serve an important purpose in

virtue of that), none of them provide a clarification of the concept of well-being. What I

am looking for in this first chapter is a clarification of the concept of well-being.

Above, I use the terms "concept" and "conception" loosely; I will now give a more

precise, semi-technical, explanation of those terms. This will help in two ways: (A) it

will help to make clear how fine-grained an account of well-being we should expect at

each point in this dissertation, and (B) it will help me in providing a framework for

debates over the various accounts of well-being.









Rawls' distinction in A Theory of Justice should help here. Early in that book,

Rawls distinguishes between a concept of justice and a conception of justice (Rawls, 5-

6).1 Here is what Rawls says about concepts and conceptions of justice: "Thus it seems

natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of

justice and as being specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these

different conceptions, have in common" (Ibid, pg. 5). Rawls has an account of the

common role of conceptions of justice. Here is one statement of that role: "Those who

hold different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no

arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties

and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the

advantages of social life" (Ibid, pg. 5). If one were to generate a conception of how to

organize an institution that (1) forbids arbitrary distinctions between people and (2)

provides a solution to the claims of different people regarding the social goods, then that

conception would be a conception of justice, according to Rawls. More carefully, it

would be a conception of the concept of justice that Rawls is trying to explicate. There

could be other concepts of justice than justice in the arrangement of social institutions,

which is the concept of justice Rawls is after, such as justice in punishment or justice in

family life; however, Rawls' project is not to elucidate those concepts of justice.

I think that the distinction between concepts and conceptions can helpfully be

applied in my project. Earlier I mentioned that the account of well-being I favor is a kind

of desire-satisfaction theory. This theory is, very roughly, that one's life goes well to the

extent to which one's desires are satisfied. There are other conceptions. Another is that


1 Rawls claims to have been influenced by H.L.A. Hart in his The Concept of Law.










one's life goes well to the extent to which one is happy and not sad. Yet another

conception is that one's life goes well to the extent to which one develops and exercises

human nature. These conceptions have in common that they can serve as accounts of a

single concept-the concept of prudential well-being. This idea leads naturally to the

question, what is the concept of prudential well-being?

On the concept of well-being I am after in this dissertation, well-being consists in

the satisfaction of the non-moral, non-aesthetic, and self-regarding interests of the

individual. As we will see, there are other concepts of well-being-other concepts that

could be described as concepts of "well-being." For this reason, to sharpen my

discussion, I will often use the term "prudential well-being" in place of unmodified

"well-being." I shall not be trying to say what "prudential well-being" means in ordinary

English. It is rather that I am trying to analyze a concept and have to call it something: I

think "prudential well-being" fits the bill at least as well as any other term, but I

acknowledge it is not a perfect fit.2

It is important to get clear on the concept we are after because without a clear idea

of the concept, we cannot be sure that the various conceptions are competing conceptions

of the same concept. The goal of the first chapter is to get clear on what the conceptions

are of before going on to argue for my favored conception. With a clearer understanding

of the concept we are after, we can be sure that the debate between the competing


2"Prudential" is used in many different ways, so I should say more about my fairly technical usage.
Oftentimes "prudential" is used to describe a course of action or, alternatively, a reason: when it is used in
this way, it means a course of action or a reason is suitable given one's goals. With this use of
"prudential," going to the desert would be prudent for someone who wants to live in isolation, all other
things being equal. I am using "prudential" in a slightly different sense; I am using "prudential" as a term
that captures a kind of value or possible goal-not whether some course of action will obtain the goal or
one's reason is a good reason given a goal, but the goal or value itself. With this use of "prudential,"
supposing that friendship enhances one's well-being intrinsically, going to the desert is not prudent for the
hermit, all other things being equal. It is the second use of "prudential" that I am trying to capture.









conceptions involves genuine disagreements, and not pseudo-disagreements based on

confusions about the grounds of the debate.

In an effort to avoid misunderstanding, I would like to say a bit more about

prudential well-being in the next few paragraphs. First I will say some more about what

it is; then I will say more about why we should study it (what role is plays); lastly I will

say more about it to distinguish it from another, somewhat closely related concept. This

must all be very brief because I will say a lot more about the first topic throughout the

dissertation, and very detailed discussions of the second and third topics are beyond the

scope of the dissertation.

In Plato's myth of the Ring of Gyges, we are to imagine that Gyges finds a ring that

can make him invisible. Once he puts it on, he finds out very quickly that he can get

away with just about anything he wants. His plans are grand: using the ring, he seduces

the queen and overthrows the king. These actions are morally wrong, but they seem

clearly to serve Gyges' self-interest. Gyges enhances his prudential well-being, I would

say. The concept of prudential well-being that concerns me in this dissertation is the

concept of the kind of value with respect to which Gyges' life improves in the myth. My

proposal is, then, that Gyges' life improves in that he is able, by using the ring, to satisfy

more of his non-moral, non-aesthetic and self-regarding interests.

Now I need to say something about why the concept of prudential well-being is

worth studying and what role it plays in various contexts. One can agree with me in

thinking that there is a concept of prudential well-being and even have an informal

understanding in what such well-being consists-and yet wonder why the concept is

worth studying.









First, I think that the concept plays a role in our ordinary, pre-theoretic, evaluations

of lives. The discussion of the life of Gyges (and the life of the Count of Monte Cristo,

which will be my principal example) is meant to illustrate this ordinary, pre-theoretic,

notion and how it can be used to evaluate how a life is going. A rigorously philosophical

account of prudential well-being could make judgments about people's lives more

articulated.

Second, prudential well-being plays a role in many moral and political theories.

This may sound paradoxical given that prudential value is restricted to the satisfaction of

non-moral interests, but it is not as paradoxical as it may seem. A standard Utilitarian

view is that an act is right if and only if it maximizes utility impartially in the long run.

Some Utilitarians take "utility" to refer to prudential well-being. So the Utilitarian

theory, on this account, is that the right act is that which maximizes prudential well-being

impartially in the long run. In political theory, egalitarians sometimes advocate equality

of well-being, and I believe at least some egalitarians have in mind prudential well-being.

An egalitarian might add that a proper role of the state is to promote the equality of the

prudential well-being of its members. There are numerous other moral and political

theories that make reference to prudential well-being.

One can agree with me that the concept of prudential well-being plays a role in

various ordinary, everyday judgments of lives and also that the concept plays a role in

various moral and political theories-and yet think "so much the worse for those

judgments and theories." However, such a view may be based in a confusion between

prudential well-being and selfishness.









The term "selfishness" does not appropriately capture the concept I am after.

Someone behaves selfishly, roughly, when she disregards the welfare of others when

concern for the welfare of others is appropriate.3 The basic idea is that selfish behavior

involves neglect of the welfare of others. Self-interested behavior, in contrast, or

behavior motivated by concern for the agent's well-being does not necessarily include

such neglect. Self-interested behavior can include regard for the well-being of others.4 If

one conflates the concepts of self-interest and selfishness, then any moral or political

theory that is based on the concept of self-interest may look extremely implausible. But

such conflation is a mistake-the two concepts are different. Thus, it would be a mistake

to dismiss our concern with exploring the concept of prudential well-being on the basis of

a conflation of actions done out of a concern for prudential well-being with selfishness.

In this brief interlude on prudential well-being, I have tried to give some motivation

for thinking that there is such a concept and that the concept plays a role in our ordinary

value judgments. Additionally, I have tried to give a few examples of moral and political

theories in which the concept of prudential well-being plays a role. I also stressed the

importance of distinguishing between selfish behavior and behavior motivated by

prudential well-being.

Might there not be some concept of well-being, besides prudential well-being,

worthy of study? I think that there is. The situation I face with the concept of well-being

is similar to the situation Rawls faces with concepts of justice. Rawls chooses to study

3 Strictly speaking, this is only a necessary condition of selfish behavior. That condition should be enough
to make the difference between the concept of prudential well-being and selfishness clear.

4 Suppose that a person is faced with only two possible courses of action; both would enhance her well-
being to the same degree. Suppose furthermore that the first possible course of action increases the well-
being of other people while the second does not. The courses of action are equally self-interested. Yet the
second is selfish and the first is not.









the concept of justice in the arrangement of social institutions and I choose to study

prudential well-being: these are valid choices, despite the fact that there are other,

closely related, concepts worthy of study. The common role of the various conceptions

of prudential well-being in a diverse array of contexts is what makes me think the

concept ripe for critical examination.

In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will explain my proposed account of the concept of

prudential well-being. Later, in Chapters 3-5, I will go on to explicate and develop a

desire-satisfaction conception of well-being.

Recall that I claim that the concept of prudential well-being is that well-being

consists in the satisfaction of the non-moral, non-aesthetic, and self-regarding interests of

the individual. That makes for three key conditions on what constitutes an interest of the

proper sort: It must be (1) non-moral, (2) non-aesthetic, and (3) self-regarding.

Heretofore, I have not presented any reason for believing those three conditions are

correct; indeed, I have not explained what those conditions are in detail. In the remainder

of this chapter, I take up each of these three conditions in turn, moving from the non-

moral condition to the requirement that the interests be self-regarding and then to the

requirement that the interests be non-aesthetic. I will introduce each of these conditions

using well-known fictional stories, and then I will go on to discuss the conditions in a

more rigorous philosophical manner.

1.2 Well-Being and Moral Value

It is helpful to begin with a fairly in-depth case study that will illustrate the concept

of well-being. My case study will be the life of the protagonist in Alexandre Dumas'

novel The Count of Monte Cristo. Let me give those readers unfamiliar with the story a

very brief outline of the plot. As the novel begins, the protagonist, Edmond Dantes, is









living quite well. Unbeknownst to him, there is a plot against him and he is thrown in jail

without any semblance of a fair trial and without chance of seeing or speaking to anyone.

Eventually he escapes and discovers a great treasure. At this point he becomes known as

The Count of Monte Cristo. He uses this treasure for retribution against those who

plotted against him and to benefit those who truly loved him. In this phase, Monte Cristo

sees himself as a "divine angel of retribution." In the end, but after he has accomplished

his goals, he realizes the emptiness of a life of vengeance and moves on to a different

path in life.

The plot is fantastically complex and serpentine. I do not have the space to give

more detail about its general structure.5 Nevertheless, the changing fortunes of Dantes'

life should provide stories that are helpful.

As we begin the novel, Edmond enjoys a high degree of well-being. He is illiterate

and does not have a formal education. But he is a good son, is about to be promoted to

the rank of captain on a ship, and is engaged to be married. His life, intuitively, has a

high level of well-being. The plot develops and several people, each with motives of his

own, conspire against Edmond. They succeed and Edmond is thrown in an island prison

called the Chateau d'If. Edmond never receives much of an explanation as to why he is

in prison. The worst kinds of conditions imaginable are standard fare in this prison. He

is isolated in a small dungeon with very little light, he cannot communicate with anybody

and he has nothing to do. He is more that just bored; his poor conditions and inexplicable

imprisonment almost drive him insane. Edmond's change of fate is an easy case for the



5 Just to give the reader a hint, the planning and bringing about (in detail) of Napoleon's return to The
Continent from exile on the Isle of Elba is but a mere sub-plot in this novel.









concept of well-being: his life is clearly going poorly. His most basic needs (where these

are understood as food, clothing and shelter) are met, but surely, this is not enough.

A while after Edmond enters the Chateau d'If, another prisoner named Abbe Faria

tunnels into Edmond's prison cell. The Abbe is trying to tunnel his way out of the prison

but ends up in Edmond's cell-now the two cells are connected by the tunnel, but the

tunnel does not go outside the walls of the prison. The Abbe is a learned person who has

several books (perhaps they are better called "manuscripts") in his cell and quite a few

contraptions that help make life go better. He begins to teach Edmond to read and then

goes on to teach him various languages and several subjects. Lastly, the Abbe, on his

deathbed, tells Edmond of a great treasure on the small uninhabited island of Monte

Cristo. The Abbe dies and Edmond escapes. Edmond's life has been improving; first he

has someone to talk to; then he develops his talents and he starts to live the kind of life he

wants to live again. Eventually, he gets his freedom.

But now let us look at some more difficult cases. As the novel goes along,

Edmond's conditions improve in various ways. Let us look to see if these improvements

are improvements in well-being.

Edmond goes to Monte Cristo and finds the great, almost unfathomably large,

treasure. Because he does not want people to know that he has escaped from prison, he

changes his name to The Count of Monte Cristo-hereafter referred to as "The Count" or

"Monte Cristo." Has the mere fact that he has found this enormous treasure increased his









well-being? No, the wealth will often provide means to well-being; it does not provide

well-being itself.6 So the concept of well-being cannot be reduced to wealth.

Economists will often look at wealth when trying to measure well-being, and if not

exactly well-being, perhaps utility, which is a concept that is a nearly-related cousin.

Although wealth may be thought of as the possession of money and goods, perhaps our

idea of wealth should also include the ability to spend money and to use and have access

to possessions. So, wealth (as we should think of it) may be a slightly richer notion than

just having money and possessions. Still, this richer notion of wealth is not the same as

well-being. It would be a mistake to identify wealth with well-being, for one can be

wealthy and have a low level of well-being, and one can be poor and yet have a high

level of well-being. Perhaps, however, economists intend merely to treat wealth as a sign

of well-being. If so, I do not have philosophical disagreement with them, but I have

two brief comments. The first is that I am not concerned with finding the signs of well-

being; I am concerned with finding in what well-being consists. Second, many

economists are moving away from wealth as a sign of well-being.8 To bring this

discussion back to The Count of Monte Cristo, there is a correlation between the Count

finding the great treasure and his life going better, but the treasure is only a means to his





6 1 am in concert with Aristotle on this subject. He is looking for an analysis of a similar concept when he
says: "wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something
else" (EN, 1096a6-8).

7 "Utility" as economists use the term, may be after something slightly different than "well-being" as I
understand it.

8 Both the World Bank and the UN publish, at regular intervals, world-wide data that are far better signs of
well-being (such as literacy rates and broader education data, employment data such as the kinds of jobs
people can have, and so on).









increasing his well-being. The important point is that opulence cannot be identified with

well-being.

As I mentioned above, after securing the treasure, Monte Cristo has two goals: to

get revenge on those who plotted against him, and to benefit those who truly cared for

him. I will discuss each of these projects in turn, for they raise interesting issues for our

discussion of well-being. First I will discuss the Count's revenge and the possibility of

placing a moral condition on well-being. The Count is willing to go to great extremes to

get his revenge. He does not seem willing to "do whatever it takes," but some of his

actions are, at best, morally inappropriate. At one point, when The Count is trying to

bankrupt one of his wealthy adversaries, he manipulates a kind of commodities exchange

(much like the modern day stock market). Many people lose fortunes due to the Count's

actions (the Count had to have foreseen this), but the Count achieves his goal of ruining

the one person he was after.9

In another instance, the Count gives the wife of one of his adversaries information

about poisons and ways of poisoning people without being detected. The Count then

goes on to give her the poison itself. Monte Cristo does not give her the end or goal (as if

by manipulation or command), she provides that herself. She then proceeds to poison no

fewer than six people-killing five of them, including herself and her son. Monte Cristo

knew of her poisonings, which took place over a number of weeks, and did not stop




9 As is always the case in Dumas' novel, the story is not quite so simple. The man Monte Cristo is trying to
ruin, Danglar, loses great deal of his fortune in the stock market. Danglar then steals a fortune from a
hospital and runs away. Danglar is then captured and imprisoned. When in his cell, he must pay exorbitant
sums of money in order to get any food, thereby bankrupting him, even of his stolen riches. The lesson that
Danglar is to learn is that life is more precious than money (Danglar originally conspired against Monte
Cristo for financial gain).









them.10 Perhaps, in some extremely technical sense, the Count's hands were clean. But,

we must keep in mind that he knowingly contributed to the deaths of many innocent

people. Additionally, the Count conspired to have Villefort's daughter marry her half-

brother (the blood relation of these two individuals unbeknownst to everyone save Monte

Cristo, and perhaps his servants).11 There is surely something wrong in that.

There are other instances of like actions that I will not go into. Monte Cristo does

not seem to be willing merely to ruin the lives of those who conspired to ruin his. For

each of the four who conspire against him, Monte Cristo has a particular lesson to teach

them before they are murdered, commit suicide, or are ruined. Furthermore, Monte

Cristo reveals his true identity to each of them at the time of ruining their lives, perhaps

so that they will learn their lesson better. Despite this moral education that Monte Cristo

is doling out, and despite the fact that he does not seem to be willing to go quite so far as

to do "whatever it takes," some of his actions are wrong, to say the least.

The question we must deal with now is whether the achievement of his plans and

projects, expending and developing of his natural talents towards these immoral ends, and

his pleasure in these projects and results could count as contributing to Monte Cristo's

well-being. The Count is aimed at, or at least involved in, dubious moral enterprises.

Should the above-mentioned actions be excluded from increasing the Count's well-being



10 Villefort's wife (his second), Madame de Villefort, tries to poison all of those people who stand in the
way of making her son inherit several fortunes. Her son with Villefort does not stand to inherit any money
because Villefort has a daughter by his first marriage. The people Madame de Villefort poisons are: (1) a
husband and (2) wife who have a fortune who are relatives on her husband's side, (3) she tries to poison her
father in law, who also has a fortune, but instead kills his servant, (4) she poisons, but does not kill, her
daughter in law. At this point she is found out and she poisons and kills (5) herself and (6) her son.
Villefort originally conspired against Monte Cristo to save his own reputation. This string of poisonings, in
addition to several other events, ruins Villefort's reputation.

1 The details of this plot are too complex to go into.









in virtue of their immorality? My answer is "no." Now, I do not wish to deny that there

is a moral dimension to a life's going well (without restriction), but I am interested in the

specific notion of prudential well-being.

As I have said, I am willing to take it for granted that a life can go better or worse

as evaluated by moral criteria. However, evaluating lives in light of moral criteria is not

the topic of this dissertation. As I will show later in this chapter, some authors who use

terms such as "well-being," "welfare," "individual good," etc. are writing about a concept

that is essentially moral. It is important to be clear, at this early stage, that I am after a

different concept.

Here is, I think, a helpful way of putting the issue: we can interpret "well-being" in

a narrow and a broad sense. In the broad sense, the "well" of "well-being" is a general

and overarching term of evaluation that applies to one's being or life. If a life goes well

in this broad sense, then the life is more choiceworthy without restriction. In the

narrower sense, "well-being" refers to just a single dimension of choiceworthiness-the

prudential dimension, as I call it.

Returning to the Count's life, my contention is that he can have a higher level of

prudential well-being when he succeeds in his projects, develops and uses his talents, and

is pleased in his pursuits and successes, even when his projects are immoral. So, when

the Count manipulates the commodities exchange and thereby bankrupts his adversary

(also bankrupting people completely uninvolved in the conspiracy against the Count), or

when he gives poison to the wife of another adversary knowing full well that she will

poison innocent people, the Count's life goes prudentially better. He enhances his

prudential well-being.









It is also possible for a project to be morally right and increase the agent's

prudential well-being. It is a confusion to think that morally wrong actions always

increase well-being. It is equally a confusion to think that morally right actions always

decrease well-being (or do not contribute to well-being). It is just that to enhance a life

morally is not necessarily to enhance it with respect to prudential well-being, nor vice

versa. So although I illustrate the distinction between moral and prudential well-being

with a discussion of the Count's immoral actions, please do not read too much into this.

1.3 Well-Being: Narrow and Broad Concepts

I would like to examine two fairly recent works where I think philosophers might

seem to be after the same concept as I am (the narrow concept of prudential well-being),

but are in reality, after the broader concept of unrestricted goodness of a life. David

Brink, in the final chapter of his book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics

examines various proposals for theories of value. He uses terms such as "well-being"

and "welfare" in addition to "value." Brink mentions a case of a Nazi who has plans to

persecute Jews and claims that the Nazi's accomplishment of his goals in this example

could not count to increase the value of that life (Brink, pg. 227). The particular

conception of well-being Brink settles on leaves room for satisfaction of "reasonable"

and "admissible" projects as enhancing one's well-being (Ibid, pg. 233).12 Given what

Brink says, and the example of the Nazi that he uses, it seems that Brink places a moral

requirement on what can count as one's good.




12 Brink's final and full-bodied version of well-being is decidedly Aristotelian. But I am not at this moment
concerned with which conception of well-being is best. I am here trying to get a fix on the concept of well-
being and be clear about which concept I am after. It is how Brink argues against certain conceptions of
well-being that tells us what he takes the concept to be.









We have had to get to Brink's concept of well-being indirectly: that is, we have had

to figure out what concept he was after by looking at how he argues for his favored

conception. The next author I will discuss speaks more directly about well-being at the

level of concepts-at the level of generality of concepts as opposed to conceptions.

Stephen Darwall, in his recent book Welfare and Rational Care offers an analysis

of welfare. He says: "What is for someone's good or welfare is what one ought to desire

and promote insofar as one cares for him" (Darwall, pg. 7, italics omitted). Darwall uses

all of the regular synonyms for welfare such as "a person's good, interest, well-being, or

welfare" (Ibid, pg. 1) and even "prudential value" (Ibid, pg. 12). Given this, one might

think that he is after the same concept I am, however, I intend to show that he is after a

different concept-which turns out to be much like the concept that Brink is after.

The "ought" that appears in Darwall's analysis of welfare is not obviously moral.

If it were, I would well be on my way to showing that Darwall has in mind a concept just

like Brink's. Unfortunately, things are not that easy. Elsewhere, Darwall replaces

"ought" with "should" (Ibid, pg. 8) and "would rationally" (Ibid, pg. 9). I do not think

that Darwall is using "rational" in a moral sense. Darwall gives a general idea of what he

means by "rational" by allowing "makes sense, is warranted or justified" to replace it

(Ibid, pg. 9).

Another important issue is that Darwall's analysis is counterfactual in nature. The

"insofar as one cares for him" phrase is important here. Darwall means that a person's

welfare consists in what one would rationally desire for the person were one to care for

him. We could even go so far as to give a "possible worlds" analysis of this: What is in









someone's welfare is what one rationally wants for him in the nearest possible world in

which one were to care for him.13

Now that I have explained Darwall's analysis, I can examine whether or not he is

after the same concept I am. Darwall's claim is that something, x, contributes to

someone's, A's, welfare if and only if x is what someone, B, would rationally want for A,

were B to care for A, other things being equal. Nothing excludes A and B from being the

same person (Ibid, pg. 20). Now, as I understand this, Darwall is searching for an

account of something akin to, or even identical to, the good life. I do not see any

elements of his formulation that limit the range of choices to prudential value in the

narrower sense described above. The morally good life, prudentially good life, and

perhaps even the aesthetically good life, all could be elements of the kind of life one

would rationally want for someone, were one to care for that someone.

Darwall, like Brink, ultimately chooses an Aristotelian conception of well-being.

Brink, Darwall, and myself use many of the same terms for what we are after: "welfare,"

"well-being," "self-interest," "prudential value," and so on. However, if I am right, we

are after very different concepts. There are broad and narrow concepts of well-being: the

broad concept is similar to the concept of the good life, the narrower concept excludes at

least moral value and focuses only on prudential value. Further explanation of what this

narrower value consists in must wait. They are after a broader concept and I am after the

narrower concept.

I do not claim that Brink and Darwall are wrong in any serious way. I do take

myself to have made the difference between us clear: we are after different concepts

13 I am uncertain on whether "insofar as" in Darwall's usage has any implications about the degree of care.
The degree of caring could be relevant to Darwall's account, but the text is not clear on that issue.









despite the fact that we use the same terms. I take "prudential well-being" to denote the

concept of well-being I am after in this dissertation-this is contrary to the usage of

Darwall and Brink, but I think that "prudential" is slightly more apt to the narrower

concept that I am trying to explicate than it is to the wider concept that is of interest to

Darwall and Brink.

Let us return briefly to the story of the Count. The Count's revenge then, even

though extreme and immoral, would still count as increasing his well-being. At least, it

would not be excluded in virtue of its being immoral. Something similar should be said

about projects which are morally good. Something should not be included in the list of

what makes someone's life go well (in the sense I am after), merely in virtue of its moral

goodness. There is a great deal more that must be explained about the concept I am after,

and for this, we must continue with The Count of Monte Cristo.

1.4 Well-Being and Self-Regarding Interests

As I mentioned above, the Count directs his immense wealth and talents towards a

pair of purposes-heaping benefits on his true friends and seeking revenge on those who

plotted against him. I have already discussed the relevance of the motive of revenge, but

what of the motive of heaping benefits on those who really did care for him? Although

the bulk of the novel is dedicated to the Count's revenge, the first thing the Count does

with his newly found wealth and secret identity is to benefit those who truly loved him.

His mother died before he went to prison, his father died while he was in prison, his

fiancee married a man who (unbeknownst to her) was one of those who originally plotted

against him, but his former employer, Monsieur Morrel, the owner of the ship Monte

Cristo was to captain, is still alive and much in need of help. Morrel is in debt and cannot

afford to pay the debt back. Furthermore, Morrel's reputation is at stake. The Count









risks the loss of his secret identity to help Morrel out. Monte Cristo then gives Morrel

money to pay off his debts. 14 While we may not view the Count's gift of the money as a

sacrifice (given that he has so much of it), the danger of people finding out who he is and

where his fortune came from are real and significant threats to his well-being.

Is the success of Monte Cristo's plan to save Morrel an increase in his (Monte

Cristo's) well-being? In some broad sense, clearly the Count gets what is in his interests,

but this may be a case where the interests are not sufficiently self-regarding to count as

prudential. As I interpret the story, the Count's actions are self-sacrificial. They do not

enhance the Count's well-being, even though they serve the count's goals. To understand

self-sacrificial acts, we need to distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding

interests. I will discuss this distinction in detail in a later chapter. For now, however,

notice that, intuitively, self-sacrificial behavior may lead to the satisfaction of other-

regarding interests but normally not the satisfaction of self-regarding interests. Indeed,

with acts of self-sacrifice, there is setback (at least as foreseen by the self-sacrificing

agent) to self-regarding interests.

There are those who might deny that there are genuine acts of self-sacrifice. Let us

call the theory that everyone always acts in her self-interest "Psychological Egoism."

Psychological Egoists must deny that there are any real acts of self-sacrifice. As I stated

above, the interests, the satisfaction of which enhance prudential well-being, must be

self-regarding. If Psychological Egoism were true, then the requirement that the interests


14 In what should now be a familiar dramatic fashion, the details of the story are more complex. Morrel,
who takes his honor very seriously, determines that he will kill himself at the moment just before the debt
is due-thereby saving the honor of his family. The Count, in a secret identity (I suppose this would be a
"second-level" secret identity), as a representative of a banking house, purchases all of Morrel's
outstanding debts to other banking houses and then forgives the entire sum. Of course, all of this happens
just a moment before Morrel attempts to commits suicide.










be self-regarding would be vacuous or empty in a strong sense. This is so because,

according to Psychological Egoism, all actions are motivated by self-regard, and thus no

interests are excluded from being relevant to one's prudential well-being.15 Now, I think

that Psychological Egoism is false and I will argue against it in a later chapter of this

dissertation.16 But for now, let us assume Psychological Egoism is false.

Many philosophers have recently dealt with the distinction between "self-

regarding" and "other-regarding" interests, though they all use different terms in drawing

the distinction.17 The basic idea is that there must be some restriction placed on which

interests are such that their satisfaction counts as enhancing the agent's prudential well-

being. As I said I will discuss the distinction between self- and other-regarding interests

in more detail in a later chapter of this dissertation. At this moment, the important point

is that a person's prudential well-being is not necessarily enhanced by the satisfaction of

other-regarding interests.

Returning to The Count of Monte Cristo, when the Count saves Morrel from his

debts, the Count's well-being is not enhanced, so I say. The Count's act is self-sacrificial

and results in the satisfaction of his interests, but the interests which are satisfied are

other regarding-they concern the welfare of Morrel and not the Count. A detailed


15 The Psychological Egoist, for all I have said, could allow that there are other-regarding interests but
nevertheless claim that they never motivate. This is a conceptual possibility, but it does not seem to have
much initial plausibility. I will discuss it in a later chapter.
16 In a way, my project would be simpler if Psychological Egoism were true because the requirement that
interests be self-regarding would not require any explanation. However, because I think Psychological
Egoism false, I take on the burden of explaining the distinction between self- and other-regarding interests.

17 Two notable examples are Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Scanlon. Dworkin, in his Sovereign Virtue,
distinguishes between personal and impersonal preferences for a theory of welfare (pg. 25-28). Scanlon
discusses a similar distinction, though using different language, in his What We Owe to Each Other (pg.
114-115, 120-124). Both authors claim to be influenced by Parfit's discussion of this topic in his Reasons
andPersons (pg. 493-502).









explanation of how this is possible, on my preferred conception of well-being, is in a later

chapter.

1.5 Well-Being and Aesthetic Value

So far, I have explained why we need to understand prudential well-being as

involving the satisfaction of non-moral, and self-regarding interests of the individual.

Might there be more restrictions on which interests, when satisfied, increase well-being?

I would like to look at another proposal.

I have briefly mentioned above the possibility of regarding certain aesthetic

characteristics of a life as enhancing the overall prudential well-being of the person. This

idea has not been much discussed. I think it is interesting, however, so I will look at a

few accounts of aesthetic value and then address some significant possibilities.

G.E. Moore famously claims that the appreciation of beautiful objects is

intrinsically valuable. He also makes the stronger and more controversial claim that

beautiful objects are intrinsically valuable apart from any appreciation of them.18 Now,

beauty as such, cannot enhance anyone's prudential well-being. That is because the

beauty of beautiful objects might not be in a person's life or appropriately related to a

person's life. Well-being is necessarily something of value in a person's life. It is not

merely an impersonal value





18 For Moore's arguments by the method of absolute isolation, see 50 and 119-121 of Principia Ethica.
It should also be noted that Moore, in a later work Ethics, does not mention beauty as intrinsically valuable
and even is inclined to adopt a view that rejects the possibility of beauty being intrinsically valuable. In
Ethics, Moore claims: "it does seem as if nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some
feeling and also some other form of consciousness; and, as we have said before, it seems possible than
amongst the feelings contained must always be some amount of pleasure" (Moore, Ethics, pg. 107). This
requirement of pleasure, of course, eliminates the possibility of objects being intrinsically valuable in virtue
of their beauty alone.









What follows from this discussion is that if aesthetic value enhances someone's

well-being, it must somehow involve the agent whose well-being is at stake. There seem

to me to be three obvious ways to go here: (1) we can look at the beauty of a person, or

(2) we can look at the subjective or first-person aesthetic appreciation of beautiful things

by an agent and claim that that has something to do with his well-being, or (3) we can

look at the aesthetic beauty of the life story of an agent. One thing to keep in mind as I

proceed through these three options is that I am not attempting to determine whether or

not these ways of involving beauty in one's life are really valuable. I am concerned with

whether they could enhance one's well-being in the narrow sense, solely in virtue of their

aesthetic character.

I begin with the first idea, the idea that a person's well-being can be enhanced by

her beauty. This idea does not have much plausibility as serving as a component of

prudential well-being, but an examination should prove helpful. A discussion of Oscar

Wilde's work, A Picture ofDorian Gray, should illustrate the proposal that is on the

table. I will briefly summarize the story. As the novel begins, Dorian Gray is young and

extremely handsome. He is, at least to a large extent, innocent and ignorant of his good

looks (or at least the extent of them). Basil Halliward, a developing painter, is

completing a portrait of Dorian Gray. Halliward is so influenced and inspired by the

beauty of Gray that he is convinced that he can develop a new style of painting for the

modern age with his portrait. Upon completion, Dorian looks at it and realizes the power

of his own striking beauty. Struck by his own beauty, Dorian exclaims:

"How sad it is!" murmured Dorian Gray, with his eyes still fixed upon his own
portrait. "How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this
picture will remain always young. It will never be older than this particular day of
June ... If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young,









and the picture that was to grow old! For that-for that-I would give everything!
Yes, there is nothing in the whole world I would not give! I would give my soul
for that!" (Wilde, pg. 168)

Something quite magical happens at this exclamation. As Gray eventually finds out, he is

to remain forever young while the image of him in the portrait will age over time. Gray

keeps his remarkable good looks while the portrait shows the signs of age.

This first proposal does not even seem to be a plausible account of how aesthetic

value could enhance a person's well-being. I have never heard of anyone endorsing it in

philosophical writing. The aesthetic value that makes a life go better must go deeper than

the mere physical beauty of a person. The story of Dorian Gray's life is in fact supposed

to illustrate that something starts to go very bad for him at the time of the magical

transformation; that his life goes worse, not better, as he continues to live as a beautiful

person physically. Could prudential well-being be associated with this kind of beauty?

On this account, Gray's well-being would forever be enhanced by his beauty. This is

surely implausible. I am certainly willing to grant that, throughout history, beauty has

been instrumental to prudential well-being, but it simply cannot be an element in a

plausible account of the of prudential well-being.19 As we will see below with the third

proposal, there is another way of thinking about the beauty of a life that serves as a far

more plausible candidate for being a component of prudential value.

What of the second proposal, the idea that a person's prudential well-being can be

enhanced by aesthetic experience and appreciation? The third major character of The

Picture ofDorian Gray is Lord Henry Wotton. He is a friend of Basil's and turns out to



19 Merely being beautiful is not even plausibly thought of as constituting some broader concept of well-
being, if there is such a value. The case of Dorian Gray illustrates this in that Dorian is a morally wicked
person and yet remains beautiful.









have a profound influence upon Dorian Gray. Harry, as he is called, expounds his theory

of how to live in several speeches throughout the novel. Dorian comes to accept and live

by Harry's theories; which promote a kind of aestheticism.

Perhaps the most basic and fundamental element of Lord Henry's theory is

captured in the following quotation: "The aim of life is self-development. To realize

one's nature perfectly-that is what each of us is here for" (Ibid, pg. 158). Lord Henry

believes that there is an end of life and that is to develop one's nature. The theory is

described twice as a "new Hedonism" (Ibid, pg. 164, 286), though I think Wilde uses the

term very loosely. On this note, Lord Henry advises: "Be always searching for new

sensations. Be afraid of nothing ... a new Hedonism-that is what our century wants"

(Ibid, pg. 164). We need to be careful in our understanding of what kinds of sensations

Lord Henry is talking about. I do not believe that he means just any sensation, for he

already limits it to pleasures (understood broadly). But if we look at his disciple, Dorian

and his actions, Dorian clearly seeks artistic sensations, specifically, the sensations of

beautiful things.20 So although the theory of Lord Henry begins in abstract terms such as

"developing one's self," something more like a kind of aestheticism or pursuit of

aesthetic experience is what he has in mind.21 An additional idea that seems implied by

what Lord Henry says is that it is not just aesthetic experiences that are to be pursued, but

aesthetic appreciation. There seems to be an "appreciative" element in Lord Henry's

20 Indeed, art is described as s'iliplk a method of procuring extraordinary sensations" (Ibid, pg. 379).

21 There was a movement that began in 1880's England and ran through the turn of the century sometimes
called 'Aestheticism.' For an excellent, but brief, discussion of this movement and Wilde's role in it, see
Stephen Calloway's "Wilde and the Dandyism of the Senses." As Calloway describes the movement, it is
based in developing one's aesthetic response to beauty in the world. This, of course, is slightly different
from merely having a lot of aesthetic experiences. One explanation for tying together Lord Henry's claims
about (1) developing one's self and (2) having a myriad of aesthetic experience, primarily of beauty and
involving pleasure, is that in these experiences, Dorian can refine his aesthetic sensibilities.









advice in that he seems to suggest a more cognitive, active, and critical element is

necessary for the right kind of aesthetic value, rather than just passively "experiencing"

something. Aesthetic appreciation makes for a far more plausible account of something

that enhances well-being.

The entirety of chapter XI of the novel is dedicated to the pursuits and experiences

of Dorian Gray. Wonderful music and jewelry are at the forefront of what he seeks to

experience. However, he also fancies converting to the Catholic Church for the

experiences that accompany Catholic worship. Gray also resorts to opium use, though

that could be interpreted as consistent with his pursuit of fantastic aesthetic experience.

This aestheticism so dominates Dorian Gray that the suicide of someone he once loved

doesn't make him feel sad, but instead, he appreciates the beauty of the tragedy of her

life. It would be a grave misunderstanding to think that tragedy is ugly; tragedy is not

ugly. Tragedy is among the most beautiful of art forms. The way the story is set up,

Dorian, in his pursuit of aesthetic experience, becomes full of vice and lacks all moral

virtue.22 This change in moral character is reflected (paradoxically), as increased

ugliness and decay in the painting.

This second proposal for a way in which something of aesthetic value could

contribute to well-being seems in danger of confusing aesthetic value in a life with

aesthetic valuing in a life. Even if a person had a great deal of aesthetic appreciation, she

still could live an ugly life. Indeed, Dorian Gray seems to be such an example of this.



22 The aesthetic movement often eschewed morality. The term "decadent" is often attached to "aesthetic"
in describing the movement. There are numerous instances in The Picture ofDorian Gray where Lord
Henry claims that ethics has no role in aesthetics. On my schema, I would categorize the aesthetic
movement as the pursuit of aesthetic value to the deliberate exclusion of moral value-with perhaps a
somewhat surprising silence on prudential value (though I am but an amateur historian).









One of the things that makes The Picture ofDorian Gray such a thought provoking novel

is that Dorian seems to have beauty in his person (the first proposal) and in his

experiences (the second proposal) and yet still he fails to be a beautiful person in a clear

and strong sense.23 The second proposal seems either wrong or incomplete as an account

of how aesthetic value can enhance well-being, even when "well-being" is understood in

the broad sense.

I am willing to grant for the sake of argument that the aesthetic value of a life has

something to do with the aesthetic experiences and appreciation of the person who is

living the life, though I suspect that many will disagree with that. Still, I do not think that

the aesthetic value of a life, so conceived, can plausibly be thought to enhance prudential

well-being, in virtue of its aesthetic aspect. The initial plausibility of this proposal has to

do with the fact that aesthetic appreciation seems like a specific kind of pleasure. Lord

Henry suggests aesthetic appreciation is a kind of pleasure. If indeed he is right, then this

second proposal could be accommodated by certain conceptions of prudential well-being,

though only very loosely, as I will explain below. It is important to note that, on this

reading of aesthetic appreciation, I am not saying that aesthetic appreciation does

contribute to prudential well-being, but merely that the idea that it does it is not ruled out

conceptually.24

Is aesthetic appreciation a kind of pleasure? It may be. J.S. Mill, in the second

chapter of his Utilitarianism, is famous for distinguishing between higher and lower



23 Interestingly, if I am right, one of the lessons of the novel is a rejection of the very aestheticism that
Oscar Wilde was supposed to endorse; or at least a much more sophisticated account of what is to be
pursued according to aestheticism must be provided.

24 Here, I am using "concept" and "conception" in their technical usages from earlier in the chapter.









pleasures. The higher pleasures are supposed to be the intellectual ones while the lower

pleasures are supposed to be the bodily ones. If intellectual pleasures such as the

pleasures of philosophical contemplation or friendship could count as "higher quality"

pleasures, it is not clear why aesthetic appreciation should not also count as intellectual

pleasures. Mill thinks that a cultivated mind allows for the happiest sort of person

because of the increased potential for higher pleasures. Mill says:

A cultivated mind-I do not mean that of philosopher, but any mind to which the
fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any
tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties-finds sources of inexhaustible interest in
all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the
imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and
present, and their prospects in the future. (Mill, Ch. 2, paragraph 13)

In this quotation, Mill lists several things that increase well-being, including taking an

interest in the achievements of art. However, it is important to understand that for Mill,

all of the items on his list increase well-being in virtue of their being sorts of pleasure. It

is not in virtue of the aesthetic aspect that a mental state, such as aesthetic appreciation,

could enhance prudential well-being.

As we have seen above, aesthetic appreciation makes for a better account of

something of value within a life that could enhance well-being. But it appears that

aesthetic appreciation is a kind of pleasure. After all, one can have an aesthetic

experience of something disgusting or ugly; there is no requirement that the thing

experienced is of positive aesthetic value. Aesthetic appreciation, on the other hand,

seems to require that the thing appreciated, at least by the lights of the appreciatorr," be

beautiful in some way. We could even set up a new category; call it "aesthetic

disapproval." Aesthetic disapproval, let us say, involves aesthetic experience and









employs the intellectual faculties but its object is taken by the appreciatorr" to have

negative aesthetic value.

What makes one attitude aesthetic appreciation and another aesthetic disapproval?

One very intuitive answer is that aesthetic appreciation is a preferred state of mind while

aesthetic disapproval is not preferred. This fits neatly with Mill's account of what makes

a pleasure higher and lower-choice by competent and informed judges (Mill, Ch. 2).

Might there be other answers to the question about what makes a state of mind that of

aesthetic appreciation as opposed to aesthetic disapproval? There could be, but it is hard

to see what they would look like. Pursuing other lines of thought would be highly

speculative. I think that the important point is that the more we look at what aesthetic

appreciation could consist in, the more it fits with a very popular and influential account

of pleasure. Pleasures are not ruled out conceptually as candidates for constituents of

well-being: the arguments and debates over the various conceptions of prudential well-

being is something I will get into later in this dissertation

I do not think that the second proposal is a plausible account of how well-being of a

life can be enhanced (as I think the case of Dorian Gray illustrates). Moreover, it has

trouble distinguishing itself from a kind of sophisticated pleasure or desire theory. If

aesthetic appreciation is a kind of pleasure then since one possible view of prudential

well-being is that it consists in a pleasurable life, we certainly cannot rule out the second

proposal conceptually. However, this is not a problem for my proposal about prudential

value. I say that only non-aesthetic interests are such that their satisfaction enhances

well-being. But this does not exclude pleasure taken in aesthetic objects, so it does not









rule out the second proposal. However, I think that there is a far better proposal for a

way in which aesthetic value in a life can enhance well-being, and I turn to it now.

The third, and in my mind, most plausible account as to a way in which something

of aesthetic value might enhance well-being is that a kind of narrative structure of a life

might do it. Lives have narrative structures. More properly speaking, life stories have

narrative structures. Let us set aside the difference for now. Some lives have more

beautiful narrative structures than others. The proposal to be examined is that the

narrative structure of a life enhances or detracts from the prudential well-being of the

person living that life. Let me return to the Count's life because, although it is far-

fetched and fantastic, it is not mystical and supernatural as Dorian Gray's life is. Even

though the Count's life is fiction, it is more naturalistic than is Dorian Gray's.

The Count's life has a certain literary quality to it. Let us say that a life has a

"literary quality" if it has a pleasing narrative structure. Is the prudential value of a life

always enhanced by events that give it a more please narrative structure? Some

philosophers have thought so; possibly Michael Slote and more likely David Velleman.

Slote, in chapter One of his Goods and Virtues, at least hints at making literary

quality a component of the goodness of a life.25 Slote claims: "Human life seems, as I

have said, to possess a natural, though socially influenced, development of different times

or stages of life ... I believe that such a division [youth, adulthood, and old age] into

'times of life' tends to be accompanied, in most of us, by a sense of the greater



25 Technically, the "goodness of a life" is not necessarily the same concept as "well-being." If Slote is after
a different concept than the concept of well-being, then what he claims of "the goodness of a life" can be
extended to "well-being" as a thought experiment. If Slote is after the same concept that I am, then of
course what he says applied directly. Whether direct or indirect in application, Slote's arguments and ideas
are worthy of critical examination, if for no other reason that to clarify my own position.









importance or significance of certain times of life in comparison with others" (Slote pg.

13-14). Slote calls his view, the view that the timing of a success (achievement, or good)

matters to how good a life is, a "time preference" view. Slote does not necessarily

commit himself to the claim that the good of a person must have a literary quality, but as

I understand the time preference view, he comes close. Slote claims that successes in

"the prime of life" are comparatively more important to those of childhood and old age

(Ibid, pg. 18, 26). He also suggests that there are certain activities that are appropriate to

each period of a life (Ibid, pg. 19-21).

David Velleman, in his "Well-Being and Time," builds on Slote's views discussed

above. Velleman goes further than Slote explicitly to claim that the amount of well-being

one has depends on the "narrative or dramatic relations" of events in one's life (Velleman

1991, pg. 49). However, to describe Velleman's view of well-being by only looking at

the aspect that includes narrative or dramatic relations (or life stories) would be

incomplete. For Velleman sees well-being as radically split into two distinct

components: momentary well-being and well-being over time. On this distinction,

Velleman says: "I therefore favor the principle that a person's self-interest is radically

divided, in the sense that he has an interest in features of his life that aren't at all

reducible to, and hence cannot be exchanged with, patterns of momentary well-being"

(Ibid, pg. 61-62). Velleman calls momentary well-being a first-order good while well-

being over time is a second order good. A second order good is a "valuable state of

affairs consisting in some fact about other goods" (Ibid, pg. 58). Second order goods are

irreducible to first order goods if they "at least possess value over and above that of

[their] component first-order goods" (Ibid, pg. 58). The basic idea that Velleman is after









is that we can imagine two lives that have the same amount of overall momentary well-

being, but different amounts of value temporallyy extended well-being). A more detailed

discussion of Velleman's views will come later. For example, here are graphs of two

lives with the same amount of overall momentary well-being:

Life 1.





Years


Life 2.





Years


Although the momentary well-being of lives 1 and 2 differ at almost every single

moment, the overall momentary well-being, when summed up at the end of both lives is

the same. The basic intuition that Velleman is trying to get at is that the first life is more

valuable than the second, even though they have the same amount of momentary well-

being.

Velleman goes further than Slote because while Slote's explanation of the time

preference view allows for a formula that adds (or multiplies) goodness at each stage of

life thus resulting in increases at particular periods and not others (as I explained above),

Velleman's does not admit of taking momentary well-being and applying a formula to

generate well-being over time. As he says:









Some of the value judgments considered above are incompatible with any reduction
of diachronic well-being [well-being over time] to synchronic well-being
[momentary well-being], no matter how sophisticated an algorithm of discounting
and weighting is applied. Because an event's contribution to the value of one's life
depends on its narrative relation to other events, a life's value can never be
computed by an algorithm applied to bare amounts of momentary well-being ...
(Ibid, pg. 60)26

The narrative relations between events (which are required to get diachronic well-

being) suggest a much more complicated model than suggested by the charts above. The

charts above only deal with amounts of well-being at any given time in hypothetical

agents' lives. Velleman requires a more substantial account of the content of the life in

order to assess its diachronic well-being.

He does not provide a formula that would enable us to determine the amount of

diachronic well-being in a life, given a detailed sequence of synchronic well-being. Such

a general formula would have to involve a complex weighing of narrative and dramatic

relations.

I certainly do not think that just any literary quality of a life would enhance a

person's prudential well-being. Imagine that the Count's life ended in the prison; we

would certainly call his life a tragedy. Tragedies have a literary quality of their own, but

it would be absurd to say that a life full of tragedy is thereby enhanced with respect to

prudential well-being. As was mentioned above, tragedies are beautiful, not ugly, so the

aesthetic value of a tragic life would be positive. But what makes a tragedy a tragedy is

that something goes horribly wrong in a life. In many tragedies, the tragic element is an

extreme decrease in prudential well-being.


2Velleman calls his account of well-being over time sionglwg irreducible" (Ibid, pg. 60). Slote's time
preference view would allow for some level of reducibility: Velleman says that Slote's time preference
view has "weak irreducibility" (Ibid, pg. 60).









What if we restrict the kind of literary quality that we take to enhance well-being in

a way that excludes tragedy? Now imagine that the story ends with the Count finding the

great treasure. This life would have a literary quality to it-but it would not be a tragedy.

Let me say his life story in this case would be an "uplifting drama." Is the life story in an

uplifting drama a story of a life that thereby has an enhanced level of well-being? No, I

do not think so.

A preliminary worry is that throughout the third proposal, no fuss has been made of

the distinction between a life and a life story; only the second can properly be said to

have a narrative structure. How could a life go well in virtue of having a life story of a

certain sort? This seems a puzzle to which I have not heard an adequate account and do

not have even a clear idea of how an account would go.

Secondly, the restriction to "uplifting dramas" appears adhoc. If we were trying to

distinguish between beautiful and ugly life stories, trying to find a distinguishing

characteristic would not be adhoc, for we would then be trying to find the distinction

between positive and negative aesthetic values. However, the distinction between

uplifting dramas and tragedies is of a different sort. Here, we are trying to distinguish

between two sorts of beautiful life story. I can see no real motive for building this

distinction into the account of aesthetic value apart from trying to fit it into prudential

well-being. Both uplifting dramas and tragedies are aesthetically valuable on initial

construal for the third account of aesthetic value. It is only after it is clear the account of

aesthetic value could not plausibly serve as an account of what enhances one's prudential

well-being that the distinction between uplifting dramas and tragedies is made. There

must be some sort of external, non-adhoc, and principled reason for the distinction. The









proponent of the third account cannot claim that it is having a beautiful life story, as such,

that increases prudential well-being. After all, both tragedies and uplifting dramas can

make for beautiful life stories.

Thirdly, it is not clear that we could properly classify the literary types tragedy and

uplifting drama without recourse to the concept of prudential well-being. So if we refer

to the narrative relations of an uplifting drama in our account of well-being, our account

may be circular. For example, the literary quality of an uplifting drama could require

lows before highs, while a tragedy could require highs before lows. If these dramatic

relations require that there be some variation in prudential well-being, some dip below a

high level of well-being and an overcoming of some obstacle, then we must have some

independent way of getting at the concept of prudential well-being.

Although it may seem as though I disagree with much of what Velleman says, I

actually only disagree with the thought that prudential well-being could be constituted,

wholly or in part, by the narrative and dramatic relations between events in one's life,

where these narrative and dramatic relations are a matter of its aesthetic value. That

leaves a lot of room for agreement. Velleman thinks that well-being is radically divided

between diachronic and synchronic well-being and that diachronic well-being is

constituted by the events that compose synchronic well-being plus the relations between

these events. I can agree with this. So when Velleman says that well-being is radically

divided, I can agree with him-in a way, but with a different distinction and for different

reasons. I can agree with the idea that there is diachronic well-being, and even

diachronic prudential well-being. I think, however, that the diachronic prudential well-

being must be determined by something other than narrative and dramatic relations.









So none of the proposals for aesthetic value I have critically discussed turn out to

be plausible candidates for something that would enhance prudential well-being by partly

constituting it. There may be some further proposal about aesthetic value and its relation

to prudential value. I feel however, that the burden of proof is on those who wish to

claim that aesthetic value is a constituent of prudential well-being.

1.6 Conclusion

I would like to return to a distinction I made above between two different concepts

of well-being and compare the theories of Velleman, Brink and Darwall. On the one

hand we have a broader concept where something like the "good life" is meant by "well-

being." On the other hand, we have the narrower concept where something like

"prudential value" is meant. If I understand Velleman correctly (and this is somewhat

tentative, because he only has room to give a sketch of his overall theory), he is after a

broader concept of well-being. Brink and Darwall use "well-being" in the broad sense to

include at least prudential and moral goodness. Velleman may use "well-being" in a

different way to include prudential and aesthetic goodness.27 If Velleman, Brink,

Darwall are after a different concept than I am, then in some ways, we might not really

disagree about "well-being." I can agree with what they say about the broader concept of

well-being and they could agree with the narrower concept.28

At this point, we should have a general idea of what non-moral, non-aesthetic, self-

regarding interests are. I claim that satisfaction of such interests is constitutive of

27 Darwall's phrase "what we would rationally want for someone were we to care for them," as I
understand it, is a characterization of overarching value in a life. So if aesthetic value is indeed a separate
and basic value, then it too would be a feature included in Darwall's concept of well-being.

28 Interestingly, even though they are after different concepts than I am, I will discuss the plausibility of
their conceptions of well-being as candidates for the narrower concept I am after. So we will see the work
of Darwall, Brink and Velleman again.






35


prudential well-being. In what follows in the next chapter, I will argue for a particular

conception of the concept of prudential well-being. In the subsequent chapters, I will

continue to develop and defend what I take to be the best conception of prudential well-

being.















CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING

Having just distinguished between a few different concepts of well-being, and

made clear that I am after the concept of prudential well-being, I now turn to the

conceptions. First I will give relatively brief accounts of the various conceptions. Next, I

will explore the various conceptions by applying them to the two primary protagonists in

Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, among other hypothetical cases. Lastly, I will critically

analyze the conceptions in light of what they imply about these cases.

I will adopt a four-part taxonomy of the basic conceptions of well-being. There are

alternative taxonomies, but this one is the best for my purposes.1 The four groups of

conceptions of well-being are as follows: (1) mental state theories, (2) desire-satisfaction

theories, (3) explanatory objective theories, and (4) pluralistic theories. Mental state

theories treat some mental state, such as pleasure or happiness, as constitutive of well-

being.2 Desire-satisfaction theories treat the satisfaction of desires, or the satisfaction of


' Two alternative taxonomies are: (1) a two-way taxonomy as found in Griffin (1986) and Sumner (1996),
and (2) a three-way taxonomy as found in Parfit (1986), Scanlon (1998) and others. The two-way
taxonomy traditionally divides the conceptions into subjective and objective groups. But what features one
uses to make the distinction is not an easy and obvious issue. The three-way taxonomy as found in Parfit
and others leaves an important group of theories out. There is an alternative four-way taxonomy in Shelly
Kagan (1992). Kagan's four-way taxonomy is composed of two distinctions which cut across each other
(subjective/objective and internal/external) making for four basic theories. This four-part taxonomy may
make things a bit clearer, but the importance of the categorization is unclear. Additionally, Kagan's
taxonomy still leaves out an important group of theories (what I call "pluralistic" theories). Now, I do not
think that the other two other types of taxonomy are wrong, strictly speaking, but I do think them lacking in
the virtues of my four-way taxonomy.

2 1 do not in this dissertation use "constitute" as some philosophers do. Some philosophers think of "x
constitutes y" as asserting a specific metaphysical relation between x and y-a reductive metaphysical
relation. In this dissertation I use "constitute" in a way that is compatible with reductionism, yet does not
commit me to reductionism. I attempt to capture what some philosophers call the "making" relation by my
use of "constitutes."










some relevantly construed desire set, as constitutive of well-being. Explanatory

objectivists treat a single feature, such as a person's developing or exercising her human

nature, as constituting well-being.3 The first three families of conceptions of well-being

are monistic in that they treat some single feature as constituting well-being. The fourth

type of conception of well-being is pluralistic in that it treats multiple factors as

constituting one's well-being. Pluralists, on this characterization, treat each of the factors

as independently constitutive of well-being. In a later chapter, I will discuss what I call

"mixed theories" of well-being that combine features from theories in more than one

group. For mixed theories, well-being only increases when two or more features

combine. Mixed theories qualify as monistic because although the feature that

constitutes well-being according to them is not elemental, they are still best thought of as

picking out only a single feature that constitutes well-being, though that feature is

complex.4 Pluralists treat each factor as self-sufficient for constituting well-being.

2.1 Four Conceptions

2.1.1. Mental State Conceptions

Let us first examine mental state conceptions of well-being. A person's well-being,

on mental state accounts, is composed exclusively of some set of mental states of the

person. Accordingly, a person's well-being at a time is set by his or her occurent mental



3 I draw the terms "explanatory objectivism" from Kitcher's "Essence and Perfection." Please see 2.1.3 for
a more detailed account of this sort of theories.

4 For what it is worth, I confess that the distinction between "complex" and "elemental" features is fuzzy. I
have set up the arguments for and against the conceptions so that little, if anything, depends on the
distinction. The only thing of this dissertation that depends on the distinction is the i,,i,:., 'I,, of the
chapters: I deal with elemental monistic theories in this chapter and complex monistic theories in a later
chapter. So the distinction really just ends up affecting when I deal with the theories rather than how I deal
with them. Also, as a bit of an aside, one should recognize that it is possible to develop a pluralistic
conception of well-being composed of mixed features.









states at that time. Thus, the presence of the correct kind of mental state in the past is not

constitutive of well-being in the present. Naturally, there are restrictions as to which kind

of mental state matters for well-being. Two very popular candidates are pleasure and

happiness. Of course, "pleasure" and "happiness" are themselves, at least to some extent,

up for definition as well. Philosophers have taken the terms to mean many different

things. I do not have time to pursue the history of the conceptions of these two mental

states, if indeed they are even different. But some further exposition is necessary.

The strategy that virtually all mental state proponents adopt is to assert that well-

being is pleasure or happiness and then goes on to characterize pleasure or happiness.5

Sometimes pleasure is thought to be a sensation one has (hereafter, the sensationalist

view). The idea that happiness is a sensation is a bit less plausible than the idea that

pleasure is a sensation, but if one thinks that pleasure and happiness are the same and that

pleasure is a sensation, then one is committed to thinking that happiness is a sensation.

Upon tasting a cold beer on a hot day, one may experience a pleasurable feeling. Another

example is the pleasure one feels when listening to a great piece of music. Apart from

the sensationalist view, there is another view: pleasure and happiness are attitudes (the

attitudinal view). More specifically, the view is that pleasure and happiness are

propositional attitudes in that they take propositions as their objects. So, for example,







5 Another strategy is available. One could "cut out the middle-man" and just claim that well-being is
composed of certain kinds of mental state and then just go on to characterize this mental state-all of this
ignoring whether or not such a state is pleasure or happiness. I have not come across anyone who adopts
this strategy for a monistic theory-everyone who adopts a monistic theory seems to like to keep pleasure
or happiness in the middle. There are some pluralists, as we will later see, who pick out other mental states
as relevant to well-being, such as aesthetic appreciation; but these other mental states are on the list of
things that make a life go well in addition to pleasure or happiness.










one can be pleased that one's daughter is doing well at college or one can be happy that

the Royals baseball team are in the pennant race.6

Happiness, when conceived to be a propositional attitude, might be taken to be a

active mental state. What I mean if I were to say "happiness is active" can be illustrated

with an example: in order for a person to be happy that his daughter is doing well in

college, his daughter must really be doing well in college. So, if happiness is active in

this way, one can be happy that such and such is the case only if it really is the case. If

his daughter is not doing well in college, the father might be construed as happy in the

thought that his daughter is doing well at college. Being happy "in the thought that" such

and such is the case allows for that thought to be mistaken or wrong. If happiness is

active, however, being happy "that" such and such is the case makes no such allowance.

If happiness is active in this way, then the important thing to keep in mind is that the

mental state is what really matters here. And the mental state is relevantly the same

between (1) happiness that x is the case and (2) happiness in the thought that x is the

case.7 The only thing that is different between (1) and (2) here is the way the world is.

One could deny that happiness is active in this way. But I do not want to get into the

debate here. All that I am claiming is that whether we treat happiness or pleasure as


6 So, what is it that makes both the sensation from the beer and the sensation from the music both fall into
the same category of pleasure? Presumably it is not because they are the same feeling. They are the same
type of feeling; that is to say, that they fall into a type called pleasure. But then what makes the category of
pleasure? The same can be asked of the attitudinal view as well-what makes all of those attitudes
pleasure or happiness?

7 Actually, if happiness is active, those who are happy that x is the case (on this active interpretation, x
must really be the case), strictly speaking, are also happy in the thought that x is the case. I qualify this by
smincil speaking" because when one says that someone is happy in the thought that x is the case, it might
be conversationally implied that x is not the case; but, of course, implication and literal meaning are two
different things. So on the active view, it could be argued that what is important is happiness in the
;i,. ,irit that x is the case, whether x it actual or not. In any case, the result is the same, that the state of
mind is what is important.









active mental states or not, the important thing is the mental state as such. So, even if

happiness is active, happiness that x is the case and happiness in the thought that x is the

case are both treated as increasing well-being.8

Something to keep in mind regarding mental state accounts is that they do not

necessarily have to play down to the lowest and basest human inclinations. Often, critics

of mental state accounts, especially when attacking views that associate well-being with

pleasure, chastise the views for pandering to the lowest common element in people; for

example, sheer sensory pleasures one gets from food, sex, and even drugs.9 But the

relevant class of mental states can be construed as far more inclusive than this objection

implies. Of course, as the class of relevant mental states expands, getting right the

account of what makes all of the disparate feelings and attitudes pleasures becomes

increasingly important.10

The key attractions of the mental state accounts are, I think, two-fold. The first is

that the presence of the right kind of mental state plays a crucial role in how, pre-

philosophically, we evaluate our own lives. Very often it is the case that, in an ordinary

conversational context, when a person is asked how well so-and-so is doing, his reply

involves some comment on how so-and-so is feeling. The second attraction of the mental

state accounts is that, according to them, each person has a very good idea of how well




8 Later in this dissertation, though not in this chapter, I will study a theory that treats only active happiness
as increasing well-being. However, such a theory is no longer a pure mental-state theory, as it includes a
reference to something outside the mental realm. I must put the "mixed" theory aside for now.

9 This objection to the hedonistic accounts of well-being could be characterized as the "fit for swine"
objection.

10 Of course, one could say that nothing holds them together as pleasure or happiness. This would be to
take the strategy as found in the fourth footnote of this chapter.










off he or she is.1 This tight connection between a person's beliefs and his or her well-

being is intuitively attractive because well-being, seems, in a strong sense, to be in and of

the person's lived experiences-well-being and a person's experiences seem closely

linked.

2.1.2 Desire Satisfaction Views

The desire satisfaction account of well-being is-to a first approximation-that

one's level of well-being is set by the extent to which one's desires are satisfied. A desire

is satisfied if the desired state of affairs obtains. For example, if my desire is that the

Royals win the pennant, then my desire is satisfied if the Royals win the pennant. It is

worthwhile to note the possibility that a desire can be satisfied and yet the agent not

know, or even believe it. For example, I can desire that the Royals win today's baseball

game and it can be true that the Royals have won today's game. In this case, the desire

might be satisfied without my knowing or believing it.12

Just as the mental state theories take great pains to characterize which kind of

happiness is important for well-being, so too does the desire-satisfaction proponent take

great pains to characterize which desires matter. Desires are often characterized quite

broadly here to include anything from whims one might have to life-long plans and

projects. Sometimes all of these states are referred to as pro-attitudes. So a desire, on


11 Now, sometimes one hears of people saying "I thought I was happy, but I wasn't" or "I didn't know how
happy I was." If indeed these are real cases of the person being wrong about how happy he or she was,
then the connection between the person's mental awareness and her happiness is less than perfect. I tend to
think that they rarely should be taken literally, though there do seem to be at least some instances when
they hold true. However, the connection between a person's judgments about her well-being and her actual
well-being still seems strong in most cases and that is something that, at least intuitively, favors the mental
state accounts.

12 Additionally, one can come to desire something that is already the case. For example, someone, call her
"A," can come to desire that her friend have a romantic interest in her when A's friend already has such an
interest. In this case, A's desire is satisfied immediately.









this view, is not just a felt tug or pull at a given moment-though of course, tugs and

pulls are still desires. It is important to be charitable to those who endorse mental state

accounts by not construing the relevant mental states as just base sensory pleasures.

Similarly, it is important to understand desires to be far broader than just the urgings that

someone feels at any given moment. So, on this broader view of desires, one could have

a desire for x without, at that very moment, having some urge to go out and get x.

The desire-satisfaction theory is different from the mental state theory in one very

important way. Whereas the mental state theory takes a person's well-being at a time to

be composed entirely of occurrent mental states, the desire theory only treats desires as

necessary conditions. Desire-satisfaction theories then look to the world to see whether

the desired states of affairs obtain or not. If the desired states of affairs do obtain, then

the agent's well-being is enhanced.13

As we will see in the next chapter, some desire-satisfaction accounts give a

counterfactual analysis of well-being in terms of what an agent would desire under

certain conditions, so they do not even treat actual mental states as necessary conditions

of well-being. This means that there is a family of desire-satisfaction accounts rather

than merely one. Yet I will simplify my discussion for now by talking as if there is only

the one simple view. The more complicated views are better left for a later time.

The attractions of the desire-theory are, I think, two-fold. First, like mental state

accounts, desire and desire satisfactions play a key role, pre-philosophically, in how we

see and judge our own lives. For example, countless stories in the literary and religious

traditions count desire-satisfaction as one of the central aspects of a life's going well-

13 1 will discuss a slightly different account of desire-satisfaction in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. For now,
I merely want give the reader an idea of in what desire-satisfaction consists.









(e.g., Job, who looses his wealth and children and is struck with boils, is someone who

looses what he desires most and is often thought to have his life go prudentially worse

thereby). There is also the tale of the Jinii who grants wishes in such a way that it leads

to the thwarting of other wishes and thereby make "the wisher's" life go worse. Both

mental state theories and desire-satisfaction theories seem to match up very nicely with

our pre-philosophical intuitions about how well lives go.

Now I will move on to what I take to be the second key advantage of the desire-

satisfaction theory. Please recall that desire satisfaction theories require no belief, on the

part of the agent, that the desire is satisfied or that object proposition is true. That is, for

the satisfaction of a desire thatp to enhance well-being it is not required that the agent

believe thatp. Moreover, according to the desire-satisfaction theory, one's well-being

could diverge from one's thoughts about one's well-being, just because one could be

wrong about whether one's desires are satisfied. For example, someone could desire that

her friend be a sincere and genuine friend and believe that her friend is sincere and

genuine and yet be mistaken in that belief. On the "simple" desire-satisfaction account,

her well-being is lower in virtue of that thwarted desire.14 With the desire-satisfaction

account, there is a tight connection between a person's well-being and aspects of her

psychology. But the desire theory does not go so far as to make well-being constituted

wholly by a set of mental states; there must be some connection to the world. Given the

above example, there seems to be a great advantage in that connection to the world.





14 Quite probably, there are other closely-related desires that are thwarted as well; such as the desire not to
be lied to, etc. So, the agent's well-being could be lower still in virtue of some other desires not being
satisfied.









2.1.3 Explanatory Objective Theories

Explanatory objective theories have a long history of supporters in philosophy, and

have had a relatively recent renaissance in the literature. They typically base well-being

in human nature. Given its recent revitalization, there are not many recent full-blown

expositions of this view.15 In light of this, my strategy in 2.1.3 will differ from those in

2.1.1 and 2.1.2. Whereas in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 I rarely mentioned any particular author, in

the present part, I will do so liberally.

Before getting into the details of objective accounts and human nature, I would like

to remind the reader of my preferred terminology and the theories associated with each

term. Philip Kitcher in his paper "Essence and Perfection" distinguishes between bare

objectivism and explanatory objectivism. Explanatory objectivism unifies the various

things that make one's life go well by citing a fundamental element that figures centrally

in the account of what constitutes well-being. Human nature plays this role for most

objectivists of this sort. Bare objectivism, in contrast, has no single unifying element;

each element contributes to well-being. So bare objectivism is non-explanatory

objectivism. Bare objective theories are sometimes called "objective list theories."16

What Kitcher calls "bare objectivist" theories and what others call "objective list"

theories, I prefer to call "pluralistic" theories. I prefer to stick with the descriptor

"pluralistic," because is captures something more about the set of theories under

discussion than does "objective list" and "bare objective." When the word "objective" is

used to identify a class of conceptions of well-being, one might confuse it with

15 Hurka's book Perfectionism is one recent notable exception.
16 "Objective List" as a name for the theories under discussion was popularized by Parfit in his "What
Makes a Life Go Best" in his Reasons and Persons. Several philosophers have followed Parfit in his
choice of terminology. I find the name "pluralism" to be preferable.









explanatory objectivist accounts. The motivation for explanatory objectivism and

pluralism differ so much that grouping them together would no doubt rely on some

arbitrarily chosen similarity between the groups, instead of identifying and distinguishing

the groups based on core or central characterizations.

Most explanatory objective theories claim that increases in well-being come from

developing and acting in accordance with human nature. There could be other sorts of

explanatory theories, but alternatives to human nature theories are rarely defended.17

Theories of human nature are, of course, numerous. Some have thought that human

nature is that which is distinctively human, but it seems that distinctiveness is not all that

important. For if distinctiveness is understood as biological, then it seems relatively

unimportant (especially for a theory of well-being). Take for example, the distinctive

aspect of humans as featherless bi-peds. It is hard to see how this could play a role in an

account of well-being. Alternatively, if distinctiveness is taken to be some higher level

human functioning that is intuitively much more relevant to well-being, then it is not

clear why other possible creatures could not have that level of functioning as well. For

example, take rationality. Being rational seems much more relevant to well-being than

does being a featherless biped, but it could be that there are other creatures who are

rational.

Rather than focus on distinctiveness, a better focus is on the human essence if there

is such a thing. The human essence, on one proposal, consists of a bodily essence and




1 Thomas Carson in his Value and the Good Life provides a contemporary defense of a divine preference
theory, according to which one's life goes well to the extent to which one lives in accordance with what
God wants for one (pg. 239-254). I treat Carson's theory as a sort of desire-satisfaction account, though of
an unusual pedigree, instead of an alternative sort of explanatory objective account.









rational activity, both practical and theoretical rational activity.18 Bodily essence could

be described as that which humans share with other animals. To develop it, one needs

food and exercise. The two kinds of rationality are perhaps not completely unique to

humans. But certainly the level of rationality of humans is almost incomparably greater

than that of the other known creatures. Practical rationality is reasoning about what to

do. Theoretical rationality is reasoning about what to believe. The view of this kind of

objectivism is that one's life goes well to the extent to which one exercises and develops

these elements. According to the theory under discussion, development and exercise of

one's bodily and rational capacities only counts as increasing well-being because they are

the components of human nature. If human nature were to be different, then one's well-

being would not be enhanced by the development and exercise of these capacities. Thus,

although the theory may appear pluralistic in that it picks out two features as relevant for

well-being, it really is monistic because those features are relevant to well-being only

because they fit into an account of human nature.

This is all, of course, controversial. The temptation to give an evolutionary or

socio-biological account of human nature is very strong here. There is a great deal of

primafacia intuitive plausibility to an evolutionary account of human nature because

after all, an evolutionary account would involve a story of how humans came to be as

they now are. There are serious problems with any theory that treats well-being as

consisting in the development and exercise of one's nature when one understand human

nature as given by an evolutionary or socio-biological account. I will discuss this issue in

2.2.2.

18 This is drawn from Hurka's Perfectionism: to my mind, the most plausible and detailed of the objective
accounts.









Interestingly, some recent proponents of human nature theories have suggested that

there is room for substantial individual difference in what makes a life go well.19 There

are very deep questions about whether human nature is set as one nature for all members

of the group of humans or whether there is room, with the correct account of human

nature, for there to be substantial individual difference. There might be a single human

nature, on some accounts, but a theory of well-being might still allow for variation. The

risk, of course, is that in the accounts that allow for substantial differences in what makes

people's lives go well, the accounts might not be of human nature any more, but of some

other feature. I must leave critical discussion of this topic for 2.2.2.

The intuitive plausibility of explanatory objective accounts is two-fold. Well-

being, on most explanatory objective accounts, consists in living life in accordance with,

and developing, one's nature. The first advantage is that the accounts make reference to

the essence of the person. What could be a better account of one's well-being, so the

thought goes, than whether one is living his or her life developing and exercising what is

at the very center of the person? This connection to the essence of the person does not

have the pre-theoretical and pre-philosophical intuitive pull of the mental-state and

desire-satisfaction theories, because so much groundwork must be laid to get the idea of a

human essence even on the table. However, with a plausible account of human nature,

the connection to one's nature is attractive. The second intuitive advantage of

explanatory objective theories is that they have a characteristic that is very similar to


19 Rasmussen, in his "Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Nature" is an excellent example of
someone who is what I call a explanatory objectivist and yet thinks that there is a great deal of room for
individual differences in human nature. As the title of his article indicates, Rasmussen is after the concept
of human flourishing-which seems a different and broader concept than the concept of prudential well-
being. I will treat Rasmussen's work as if it were about the narrower concept however, as I do with several
of the so-called explanatory objectivists.









desire-satisfaction theories; they both tie well-being to the world in which the person

lives. One's well-being, according to human nature and desire-satisfaction theories,

depends on the state of the person and the state of the real world. Both theories make

well-being not depend entirely on mental states, as do the mental state theories. The

mental state theories have attractions of their own, but a connection to the outside world

is surely something that helps make human nature theories initially plausible.

2.1.4 Pluralistic Theories of Well-Being

Pluralistic theories are quite different from the monistic accounts discussed above.

Pluralistic theories have a very different structure and motivation. I will discuss two

notable recent accounts of pluralistic conceptions of well-being.

James Griffin in his Value Judgement, offers a list of five items that make a life go

well. Griffin sets up his list with the following comment: "To see anything as

prudentially valuable, then, we must see it as an instance of something generally

intelligible as valuable and, furthermore, as valuable for any (normal) human. Prudential

deliberation ends up, I think, with a list of values" (Griffin 1996, pg. 29). Griffin's

account of prudential value makes it necessary for the valued thing to be intelligible as

valuable-"intelligible to whom?" is of course a big question.20 Also, what role

"normal" and "human" play is also quite open ended. But what should be clear is that

Griffin is generating a list with normal humans in mind.



20 Griffin's comment makes me think of a character from Jane Austen's Emma, Mr. Woodhouse (Emma's
father). Mr. Woodhouse complains that his son-in-law is too rough with his children-always tossing them
up in the air. Emma replies "But they like it, papa; there is nothing they like so much. It is such enjoyment
to them, that if their uncle did not lay down the rule of their taking turns, whichever began would never
give way to the other." Mr. Woodhouse says "Well, I cannot understand it" to which Emma replies "That
is the case with us all, papa. One half of the world cannot understand the pleasures of the other (Austen,
Emma, ch 9, pg. 624).









Griffin's list has five items: (a) accomplishment, (b) the components of human

existence (autonomy, capability, and liberty), (c) understanding, (d) enjoyment and, (e)

deep personal relationships. Griffin thinks of his list as being a something like a rough

draft of the list; with possible amendments to come later (Ibid, pg. 30).

John Finnis, in his Natural Law and Natural Rights, offers a list of things as an

account of "'good,' 'basic good,' 'value,' 'well-being'" (Finnis, pg. 86). Finnis' list is:

(1) life, (2) knowledge, (3) play, (4) aesthetic experience, (5) sociability (friendship), (6)

practical reasonableness, (7) religion. Finnis characterizes the items on the list very

broadly. For example, Finnis describes knowledge as: "the activity of trying to find out,

to understand, and to judge matters correctly" (Ibid, pg. 60). Finnis is far more certain

about his list than is Griffin, Finnis thinks of his list as something like a final draft.

Finnis claim that each element is non-reducible to any other and that the list is exhaustive

of well-being. Finnis takes himself to be providing a list of items for human well-being

(Ibid, pg. 92-95).

Notice that Griffin's and Finnis' theories appear to be pluralistic theories. One

thing that Griffin and Finnis are not clear on, frustratingly, is whether they are full-bodied

pluralists. Recall that what is meant by "pluralism" here is that each element on the list

is, by itself, sufficient for at least some well-being. If they are pluralists in this sense then

a person could have some amount or degree of just one of the items on the list and

thereby have some amount or degree of well-being. Perhaps, though, Finnis and Griffin

are not pluralists in this full-bodied sense. Perhaps one needs to have at least a little of

each item on the list to have any amount of well-being. On this construal, some degree of







50


each item is a necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for having some degree of

well-being. I cannot resolve these problems here. I will treat the authors as pluralists.21

The motivation for accepting pluralistic theories of well-being is that they are so

very inclusive. A pluralist of the sort I have in mind has the strategy of "having one's

cake and eating it too." If the mental state, desire-satisfaction, and explanatory objective

theories each leave something out (in different ways), then a pluralist can include aspects

from each theory and with luck, do away with any shortcomings.

2.1.5 Conclusion

Each of the types of conceptions has what we might think of as an attractive

starting point. There is at least an air of initial plausibility with each. That is not to say

that one is just as good as the next, but there is something to each of them. What I will

do in 2.2 is to take a deeper look at the advantages and disadvantages of each of the

conceptions. Once the skin is peeled away, desire-satisfaction theories will turn out to be

best.




2 Might Griffin and Finnis really be explanatory objectivists disguised as pluralists? This is an
intriguing question. There is some chance that they are. Presuppositions about human nature and the world
in which humans live play a role in each philosopher's thinking. Griffin, in a very helpful footnote on this
issue, writes:

My own list is very much out of a particular tradition: modern, Western, and atheist. But
take someone with a radically different list: instead of enjoyment, the mortification of
the flesh; instead of deep personal relationships, cloistered solitude; instead of autonomy,
submission to the will of God. But of course one's list will change with one's
metaphysical views. If I believed in a certain kind of God, I too might have a different
list. But this makes lists relative not to culture, but (unsurprisingly) to one's judgements
about the world one thinks one is living in. (Griffin, pg. 15)

Griffin's footnote is quite frank in expressing the difficulties in coming up with a list of items. Perhaps
Griffin does presuppose an account of human nature when coming up with his list. Finnis explicitly states
that his list is only for humans (Finnis, pg. 92-95). Griffin, in a quotation above, makes a similar claim. So
there is some reason to believe that they are really explanatory objectivists at some deep level. However, at
this point, I will treat Griffin and Finnis as full-bodied pluralists.









2.2 Critical Discussion of Conceptions

2.1.1 The Story

Monte Cristo's life is not a great case study for critically assessing different

conceptions of well-being. This is because the four different conceptions diverge only

slightly in what they would say about Monte Cristo's well-being. Given the purpose of

Chapter 1 (to isolate the narrow concept of prudential well-being), the example was

suitable. Now, however, I need cases where the different conceptions come apart.

Things will seem more controversial, and one's intuitions should not be so definite here.

To fit my needs, I have chosen one of the greatest stories of internal and external conflict

in literature.

The case study I have in mind is of the two primary protagonists in Mary Shelley's

Frankenstein. The first thing I would like to do is to dispel the common thoughts about

the book and characters. If the reader is not familiar with the book, forget all that you

think you know about Frankenstein. Victor Frankenstein, the scientist, is the creator of

his "monster," who is never given a name. Frankenstein, a genius chemist and

physiologist, discovers a method of bringing dead human matter back to life. He gathers

parts from different corpses and then composes something of a super-human. He brings

his "creation" to life, though without the aid of lightning. The monster is extremely

strong and agile and is very intelligent. He is superior to normal humans in all of these

respects. However, the monster is also repulsively ugly. Frankenstein, upon bringing life

to his monster, panics and abandons the creature.

Frankenstein's monster is left to fend for himself. He manages not only to survive,

but also to become a master of language and learn a great deal of history and some of the

other liberal arts. All of this learning is accomplished without direct assistance from









humans, although he "eavesdrops" on a family that lives in a cottage. When he tries to

confront people, they are repulsed by his ugliness and he is driven away. The monster,

created with a very strong longing for companionship and a great sensitivity to rejection,

eventually tries to find his creator, Frankenstein.

The purpose of the monster's search is to convince Frankenstein to create another

being-another monster, but this time a female monster who is also ugly and super-

human in many ways. The monster finds Frankenstein and convinces him to make

another being.22 Frankenstein, out of fear of horrible consequences, and at the last

minute, tears up the still life-less body of the monster's would-be companion. The

monster then becomes enraged (again), and kills several members of Frankenstein's

family including Frankenstein's bride on their wedding night. Frankenstein dedicates the

rest of his life to destroying his monster but dies in the effort. The monster, whose sole

aim towards the end of his life was to torment Frankenstein, then goes off to die alone.

The idea I have here is that if we take the first three conceptions of well-being

(mental state, desire-satisfaction, and explanatory objectivists) and apply them to the two

life-stories, we will have different accounts of how well the lives are going. We can

compare the accounts and try to decide which is the more plausible. I will criticize

pluralistic accounts as well, though I think that pluralisms suffer from a general

theoretical defect and so I will not argue against them using our intuitions based on the

stories from Frankenstein.





22 This is slightly oversimplified, after the monster is rejected by everyone, he kills one of Frankenstein's
family members and frames another family member for the murder. Then the monster finds Frankenstein
and convinces him to try to create a companion for him.









2.2.2 The Application of Explanatory Objectivism to the Story

There is a significant section of Frankenstein dedicated to the monster's acquisition

of language and the learning of the liberal arts (chapters 12-15). It is in those chapters

that the monster tells his tale of how he learned most of what he will ever know. He is

able to find a hovel beside a cottage where a family of farmers lives. The family consists

of a father (de Lacey) who is blind, and two children, a son (Felix) and daughter

(Agatha). The monster is able to learn language by secretly observing the behavior of

the family. He teaches himself to read and then goes on to read Plutarch's Lives,

Paradise Lost, Sorrows of Werther, among a few other things. After this period of

learning, he is extremely intelligent and is able to give lucid explanations of his history

and very persuasive arguments to get what he wants.23

Let us look first at the explanatory objective accounts that ground well-being in

human nature. Such theories typically maintain that one's life goes well with the extent

to which one exercises or develops one's human nature. In order to apply such theories

of well-being, we have got to look at the nature of the Frankenstein monster. The

monster is unusual, but any adequate account of well-being must be able to say

something about him. For surely, his life can go better or worse. I think that the case of

Frankenstein's monster will be a good test case precisely because it is such an unusual

case. One might object that a dog's life can go better or worse as well and yet examining

a dog's well-being will do little to assist our understanding of human well-being. I think

that is true, but Frankenstein's monster and relevantly similar beings have lives that go

23 He is so persuasive that after he has killed one of Frankenstein's relatives and framed another relative for
the murder, he is still able to persuade Frankenstein to do a favor for him by making him a bride. The
monster gives something of an explicit threat that if Frankenstein does not create a bride for the monster, he
will harm him and his family. But this threat is accompanied by the argument that Frankenstein has an
obligation to his creation to make him happy and that having a wife will pacify his great anger.









well or poorly in that they, too, have lives that can go better or worse with respect to

prudential well-being. After all, they are rational and have many of the same mental

states that human being have.

A good place to begin is with an examination of the monster's nature. Let me

return to an issue that was raised in the discussion of human nature earlier in this chapter.

One's nature is given by one's essence, it seems. What is one's essence? There is a

strong temptation to appeal to an evolutionary biological account, because such an

account would involve a story about how we came to be the particular way we are.24

There is a very serious problem, however, for any account of well-being that makes

essential reference to human nature when human nature is understood in terms of

evolutionary biology. There very well could be an evolutionary disposition to sacrifice

oneself for one's genetic offspring. At first glance the thought may seem perplexing.

However, especially in cases where there are sufficient numbers of offspring who could

reproduce, or at least a few offspring who have a high chance of reproduction, and in a

case where the parent could no longer reproduce, the greater chance of traits,

characteristics, or genes continuing into the next generation is for the parent to sacrifice

herself for her offspring. There are, of course, some species which reproduce so easily

that dispositions of the parent to sacrifice for her offspring would not be selected in a

competitive environment. However, humans do not reproduce at a high rate and must put

a great deal of resources into each child. So humans could be the sorts of creatures that

have a disposition for parental sacrifice. On the evolutionary account of human nature


24 Indeed, the story is even more interesting for Frankenstein's monster because his story is a combination
of evolution and scientific manipulation. But I leave that aside for the moment, in order to get to the nerve
of a particular criticism.









and on the human nature account of well-being, such a sacrifice would not really be a

sacrifice of well-being, but would merely seem so. The self-sacrifice would be merely

illusory, according to the account under discussion, because the person would be living in

accordance with his nature and would increase his well-being thereby. But, this is

implausible. If one kills oneself for one's offspring, there normally would be a net

decrease in one's well-being from the previous level of well-being. So, if one appeals to

an evolutionary account of human nature, then human nature could not plausibly be

viewed as playing a central role in what makes for well-being.25 It is possible for one to

act in accordance with his nature, on this account of human nature, and decrease his or

her well-being, so acting in accordance with one's nature cannot always lead to increases

in well-being. So the evolutionary biological account of human nature must be rejected

by the most common sort of explanatory objectivists; though many people find such an

account of human nature compelling.

Let us set aside these worries and, for the sake of argument, explore Thomas

Hurka's account of human nature. Hurka thinks that one's life goes well to the extent

that one exercises and develops one's human nature.26 The best account of human nature

treats human essence as central, according to Hurka. Human essence, on Hurka's view,

has two components: physical essence and rational essence. Let us start by trying to find

out the monster's physical essence. There are many difficulties here. The monster is a

one-of-a-kind being, not a member of a type; more accurately, he is a single member of

25 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Kitcher's "Essence and Perfection."

26 Strictly speaking, Hurka claims that he is not offering an account of welfare or well-being: according to
him, he is offering an account of the human good. For what it is worth, I think that Hurka relies on too
narrow a construal of welfare or well-being-he think that it is essentially subjective in some way.
Regardless of whether Hurka relies on too narrow a construal of well-being, I adopt what he says to my
discussion of well-being in this dissertation.









his own type. At least in many aspects, he is sui generis.27 The fact that the monster is

one of a kind does not mean he lacks a well-being. Indeed, the monster biologically

human-though a composite of sorts. An account of human nature, such as Hurka's,

must be able to explain the monster's physical essence. But what is it? Hurka's account

of physical essence would seem to apply to the monster. Hurka thinks that minimally,

the physical essence is good functioning of the organs and systems (Hurka, pg. 37).

Hurka remarks:

Each system in our body has a characteristic activity. The respiratory system
extracts oxygen from air, circulatory system distributes nutrients, and so on. For a
human to remain alive, each system must perform its activity to some minimal
degree; for her to achieve reasonable physical perfection, it must do so to a
reasonable degree. But a system does this when it is free from outside interference
and operating healthily. So the basic level of physical perfection is good bodily
health, when all our bodily systems function in an efficient, unrestricted way.
(Ibid, pg. 38).

I do have some minor concerns about Hurka's account of physical perfection thus far.

Presumably, medications that help the systems perform their characteristic activity or

even improve the characteristic activity, such as medications that reduce blood pressure,

increase physical perfection. And yet such medications surely constitute outside

interference and these medications do restrict the systems in a significant way. So I not

entirely satisfied with the way in which Hurka explains the basic level of physical

perfection. But let me set aside concerns of this kind.

The account of physical perfection I have given so far is incomplete. There

remains yet a higher form of physical perfection. Hurka thinks that great athletic feats

count for more intrinsic value in a life. He says:

27 Although he is extremely ugly, concerns of beauty are irrelevant here-they may play a role in the
broader concept of well-being that I do not discuss in detail in this dissertation, but that is another issue.
Aesthetics aside, he is far superior physically to anyone in existence.









Higher physical perfection comes in vigorous bodily activity. Here our major
physical systems perform to higher degrees, processing more air, carrying more
nutrients, and moving greater weights longer distances. This activity occurs most
notably in athletics, and the Aristotelian perfectionism finds the highest physical
good in great athletic feats. (Ibid, pg. 39)

Hurka admits that great physical feats also often embody practical rationality, but leave

that aside for now. Hurka's examples of great athletic feats are the record-setting

instances of the 100 meter dash and the long-jump. I am not entirely satisfied with how

Hurka explains the highest kind of physical perfection. Some of his examples seem too

broad; for example, it is not clear that in the case where one can process more air that

one's well-being is thereby enhanced. Some of his examples seem too socially

influenced; it is not clear why Hurka did not pick, say, the record-setting for hotdog

eating instead of the record-setting long jump. I do not see any clear way to pick which

of one's physical abilities it is in one's self-interest to develop apart from appealing to

social norms, but this would mean appealing to something other than human nature.

To pick an example from Frankenstein to illustrate my problem with Hurka's

theory, the monster speaks of having an excellent digestive tract. Perhaps that physical

attribute should be developed and exercised on the perfectionist theory. I can see why

developing and exercising his digestive tract is instrumentally good for the monster; then

he could each just about anything. But how could developing it be intrinsically good?

The worry is that Hurka's account must pick out the features of one's nature to be

developed, and this "picking" will either be arbitrary or we will be loading the questions

about one's nature by relying on social norms. This is not meant to be a conclusive

refutation of Hurka's account, but it is a worry that I think requires an answer.

Now let us move on to the non-physical aspects of the monster's nature. Does the

monster have theoretical and practical rationality? Yes, and what is more, he is more









intelligent than normal humans. This is not the Frankenstein monster we grew up with in

movies and television. He is more sensitive and quicker to learn than the vast majority of

people.

An objective account, such as Hurka's, would measure his well-being to be

extremely high throughout much of the novel. This is because the monster learns at an

incredibly fast rate and he reasons extraordinarily well. Hurka's account implies that a

person's well-being will increase with well exercised theoretical and practical rationality.

In Hurka's own words:

For theoretical perfection I will take this category [in which perfections occur] to
be that of beliefs. A person's theoretical good at a time will depend on the number
and quality of (some of) the propositions she believes at that time, so the issue is
whether all her beliefs count or only those that are, say justified or true. On the
practical side, the general category will be intentions. The relevant facts will
concern the ends a person intends at each time or has resolved actively to pursue.
(Hurka, pg. 101)

Hurka finds the number and quality of one's beliefs to be relevant to one's theoretical

perfection. He finds the number and quality of one's intentions to be relevant to one's

practical perfection.

Hurka is disinclined to treat all beliefs as enhancing one's perfection. He identifies

four categories of belief an agent can have: (1) belief, (2) justified belief, (3) true belief,

and (4) justified true belief (Ibid, pg. 103). These are, of course, not meant to be

mutually exclusive categories; a mental state that meets (1) could also meet (4), for

example.

Hurka has an analogous categorization for intentions. He says that there are (1)

intentions in the belief that one will achieve the end, (2) intentions in the justified belief

that one will achieve the end, (3) intentions in the true belief that one will achieve the end

and (4) intentions in the justified true belief one will achieve the end (Ibid, pg. 103).









Hurka, for both beliefs and intentions, calls members of set (1) "attempts," members of

set (2) "deserving attempts," members of set (3) "successful attempts," and members of

set (4) "deserving successful attempts."

As mentioned above, Hurka does not hold that all beliefs and intentions count

towards one's perfection equally. He mentions two possible accounts of how much

perfection one could attain in having a belief or intention in set (1) through (4). The first

account treats members of (1) as counting for some enhancement of well-being and each

higher kind of belief and intention as counting for more. The second account treats only

some subset of the members of sets (1)-(4) as counting for any enhancement of well-

being. He prefers the second option and suggests, but does not argue for, an account that

treats only members of (4) as counting towards one's perfection (Ibid, pg. 112-113).

There is yet a further aspect of Hurka's theory. He thinks that even within the

members of (4), there can be variations in the amount of perfection attained. He says that

there is a quality to each member of (4) that must be taken into account (Ibid, pg. 114).

Those beliefs and intentions with the greater quality, according to Hurka, are those that

are general. The generality of a belief or intention, on Hurka's account, is set by the

breadth of the state of affairs it describes and, by its role within a hierarchical and

explanatory system (Ibid, pg. 115).

I will turn now to a critical discussion of Hurka's account. I am ambivalent as to

whether Hurka's account of theoretical perfection is plausible. However, I am certain

that even if he has the correct account of perfection, human perfection could not serve in

an account of well-being in the way he supposes. There are some problems that seem

particular to Hurka's favored version of human nature which do not necessarily apply to









all human nature accounts of well-being. There are more central problems, as well,

which seem to be significant obstacles to Hurka's main arguments for the human nature

account of well-being. I will explore these sorts of problems in turn.

Hurka's account seems too narrow in that it excludes too many beliefs from

increasing one's well-being. The countless generations who believed, falsely, in some

unifying scientific principle had a low level of theoretical perfection thereby, on Hurka's

theory. It is not clear what principled reason there is for excluding justified, though false,

beliefs in some contexts. A somewhat related problem is that people who generated what

we now know to be false scientific theories, such as Newton, count as less theoretically

rational than many who come after him, many of whom were much less good at science,

even though Newton sure seems like a paradigm of the rational individual.28 Theoretical

rationality seems to involve more than just having beliefs of the right sort.

Now, Hurka could just expand his account to include merely justified beliefs as

enhancing well-being. And he could even expand the account to include all true beliefs

as enhancing well-being. Hurka does not give an explanation of why he prefers to restrict

the set of beliefs and intentions to deserving successes, so it is hard to formulate a

specific criticism on this issue. If Hurka were to expand the circle of which beliefs and

intentions are relevant for well-being, it is not clear that there would not be new

problems. Also, Hurka could change his position to include more than the mere holding

of beliefs of the right sort in his account of theoretical perfection. It is because there

seems to be some room to maneuver, that I do not think that these problems are

necessarily damaging.

28 If Newton is a poor example for some reason or another, then there are many others who could serve as
examples.









Here is a criticism that hits Hurka's account more centrally. Hurka's account of

well-being, given the role of human nature as described by Hurka, seems to fail to meet

the necessary conditions of prudential well-being. Recall that interests that are relevant

to one's prudential well-being are those that are non-moral, non-aesthetic, and self-

involving. It is hard to see a principled way of ruling out counter-intuitive examples of

beliefs that, on Hurka's account, end up counting as relevant to one's well-being. For

example, knowing the number of blades of grass in Central Park, it turns out, increases

one's theoretical perfection on Hurka's account. Now, the belief may have very little

quality, to use Hurka's terminology, and thus might not increase one's amount of

perfection by very much. But, it is an utter mystery how a true justified belief about the

blades of grass in Central Park, in itself, could increase one's well-being at all. The

belief fails to be sufficiently self-involving or self-regarding to count as relevant to one's

well-being. It is not that having the beliefs under discussion decrease one's well-being,

but these beliefs simply do not contribute to one's well-being.

Much of my criticism of Hurka has focused on his account of theoretical

rationality, so let me turn to a problem with Hurka's account of practical rationality. As I

say in the first chapter of this dissertation, any account of well-being must be able to

explain acts and intentions of self-sacrifice. Hurka, given what he says about practical

rationality, cannot explain self-sacrifice. The intention to spend one's entire life feeding

the starving only increases one's well-being, when, in Hurka's language, it is a successful

and justified attempt. That is, on Hurka's account, so long as one's plan to feed the

starving works and one is justified in believing that the plan will work, one's perfection,









and so one's well-being, is increased. But this is false.29 This would be an instance of

self-sacrifice, not a way of enhancing one's own well-being.

It is hard to see how accounts of theoretical and practical rationality, given the

assigned role of rationality in Hurka's theory of well-being, are sufficiently self-involving

to serve as accounts of prudential well-being. With theoretical rationality, it is hard to

see why merely having beliefs of the right sort intrinsically enhances someone's

prudential well-being. Having true and justified beliefs will often lead to increases in

prudential well-being-that is, instrumentally. After all, if one has good means/ends

reasoning, one is more likely to get what one is after. However, on Hurka's view, merely

to have such a belief itself brings about an increase in well-being, which seems

implausible. With practical rationality, Hurka's inability to explain self-sacrifice is very

problematic; he is committed to saying that all of one's successful and justified projects

are in one's self-interest. This goes directly against the intuition that there are acts of

self-sacrifice.

I think that the story of Frankenstein's monster is a good illustration of my

criticism of Hurka's account of well-being. With this example, I hope to do two things:

(a) show at least some reason for thinking that beliefs, as such, are not relevant to well-

being and (b) show that there are other states of mind, loosely speaking, that are much

more relevant to well-being. As I mentioned in the brief account of the novel above, after

the monster's creation, he learns a great deal very quickly. To use Hurka's language, the

monster increases the size of his set of deserving successful belief and intention attempts


29 This problem comes from Hurka's choice to treat only "formal" considerations as relevant to the
restriction of the set of beliefs and intentions that increase one's perfection. "Formal" criteria, according to
Hurka, cannot make reference to the content of the belief and intention (Ibid, pg. 114).









very quickly. According to Hurka's account, his well-being should increase dramatically

during this period. And yet intuitively, this is not the case. Throughout the time of

learning, the monster is simply wretched. Here are some reflections by the monster on

the matter:

I was not even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they and could
subsist upon coarser diet. My stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked
around, I saw and heard of none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the
earth, from which all men fled and whom all men disowned? I cannot describe to
you the agony that these reflections inflicted upon me. I tried to dispel them, but
sorrow only increased with knowledge. .. (Ibid, pg. 139)

There are many other instances in which the monster expresses hatred of his own

existence. He likens himself to Satan in one passage, because he has been "cast down"

by his creator, and then claims that he is worse off than Satan in another, because he has

been left alone whereas Satan has some company. The kind of anguish he experiences

evokes a great deal of sympathy. He states: "Of what a strange nature is knowledge! It

clings to the mind, when it has once seized on it, like a lichen on the rock. I wished

sometimes to shake off all thought and feeling, but I learned that there was but one means

to overcome the sensation of pain, that was death" (Ibid, pg. 140). The monster is clearly

suicidal.

During this period, the monster is physically healthy and develops his theoretical

and practical rationality significantly. But, intuitively, his life is simply not going well

for him. Now, to be fair to Hurka, the low level of the monster's well-being is not

intrinsic to the new beliefs, but instead, is caused by those beliefs. The low level of well-

being is caused by the beliefs under discussion because his holding and reflecting on

these beliefs causes him great deal of unhappiness. So I think it would be incorrect to say

that the monster's life is going poorly simply in virtue of having the "successful" and









"deserving" beliefs. But Hurka's account is committed to claiming that the monster's life

is going quite well, and this just does not seem to be the case. This example is not

conclusive, I understand, but it does seem compelling.

The above discussion raises the question as to what makes the monster's life go

poorly, at least intuitively. Either his unhappiness or his frustrated desires seem to be two

good candidates that could figure into an explanation of why, intuitively, his life is going

poorly. He is living his life in accordance with Hurka's account of nature and yet has a

poor life. Some other theory must explain the monster's low level of well-being.

Hurka's account of human nature is not the only explanatory objective account out

there. Perhaps another account could do better. One of the reasons I work with Hurka's

account is that it is the best account of human nature I have found; both in terms of how

well-developed it is and in terms of how good the arguments are for it.30 So I do not

think that any other account of human nature could serve better for the perfectionist

model.

2.2.3 Application of Happiness to the Story

We turn now to a darker part of the story of Frankenstein. Though the above may

evoke sympathy for the monster, perhaps what follows will not. The monster, after being

rejected by everyone he comes across, and after having his hopes of having a spouse

dashed, turns on his creator and makes the ruin of Frankenstein the goal of his life.

Unbeknownst to Frankenstein, the monster is present when he tears apart the still lifeless

body of his monster's spouse-to-be. As the two part ways, the monster says to

Frankenstein "I shall be with you on your wedding night" (Ibid, pg. 202). Frankenstein

30 Note as well that I exclude evolutionary accounts of human nature from consideration at this stage
because they could not plausibly serve in a theory of prudential well-being.









takes this to be a threat against him; that is to say, Frankenstein thought the monster was

threatening to kill him on his wedding night. However, the monster's intention was to

kill Frankenstein's new bride, Elizabeth.31

Not wanting his wife to see a fatal battle between himself and his monster,

Frankenstein sends his wife to their bedroom. Frankenstein wants her to be safe, but she

is not. He is very nervous and agitated, but is not unhappy. He does not fear for the life

of his new bride. The monster sneaks into their bedroom and kills her. Frankenstein

finds out very soon thereafter that she has been killed.

Frankenstein, in recollecting this sad tale, remarks: "Great God! If one instant I

had thought what might be the hellish intention of my fiendish adversary, I would rather

have banished myself forever from my native country, and wandered a friendless outcast

over the earth, than have consented to this miserable marriage. But, as if possessed of

magic powers, the monster had blinded me to his real intentions and when I thought that I

had prepared only my own death, I hastened that of a far dearer victim" (Ibid, pg. 231).

Frankenstein's life goes worse when his new bride's life is threatened and even

worse when she is killed. But the mental state account does not account for this.32 It has

it that Frankenstein's life goes worse when he "finds out" about Elizabeth's death. The

gap between her death and Frankenstein's finding out about her death is extremely short

(the time it takes for Frankenstein to run to their room). But there are larger gaps of time

in the other murders. Days, perhaps weeks, in the case of one of Frankenstein's relatives


31 No doubt, the monster sees this as a more fitting punishment for Frankenstein's decision to abort the
creation of another being to be the monster's wife.
32 A newer kind of mental state account, such as that of Sumner (1996), requires that happiness and
unhappiness be informed to count toward or against one's well-being. Sumner's account is what I would
call a "mixed theory," and discussion of it must be put off till later.









who is killed by the monster. Of course it is conceivable that Frankenstein would never

find out about some of the murders. Yet the mental state accounts say that Frankenstein's

life would go well so long as he never found out about them. The objective account and

the desire account have something going for them here that the mental state account

lacks: namely, that there are cases where peoples' lives go poorly for them despite the

fact that they are not aware of this. I do not take this point to be conclusive against the

mental state conception, but it does show a weakness.

For a more telling objection, I must modify the story slightly. In Shelley's story,

Frankenstein's creation gets angry when he is rejected and gets depressed when he feels

utterly alone and isolated. He lashes out at Frankenstein and all of society in his rage.

Frankenstein wants to pacify his monster and so, let us say, to modify Shelley's story, he

creates an experience machine. The experience machine generates experiences for the

monster such that he will have whatever mental state a mental state theory takes to

constitute well-being. This idea, of course, is drawn from Robert Nozick's famous

thought experiment found in his Anarchy, State and Utopia. Nozick frames the issue as

one about whether people would choose to go into the machine. This element of choice

needlessly complicates the matter. I will make the story such that Frankenstein just

places the monster in the machine without the monster's knowledge. We must think

about whether the monster's life is going better when he is in the machine.

Once in the machine, Frankenstein's monster has whatever mental state is relevant

to well-being according to any given mental state conception, whether it is pleasure,

happiness or some third alternative. The monster can be made to believe that all of his

wishes are granted and he could turn out quite content and happy. Has the monster's









well-being been increased thereby? It is implausible to think that merely putting the

monster in the machine increases his well-being.

Nozick offers three reasons for thinking that the mental states which result from

living in an experience machine could not be all there is to well-being; life in the

experience machine leaves something important out of the life. The first reason is that

people want to do things rather than just experience them (Nozick, pg. 43). The

experience machine does not distinguish between doing something and experiencing it.

The second is that people want to be a certain way rather than just to experience things

(Ibid, pg. 43). It is a bit difficult to tell what Nozick has in mind with this second idea,

but the way he expresses the concern is that, once inside the machine, we will not be any

particular sort of person (Ibid, pg. 43). The third reason is that living in the machine

limits one's "reality" to a man-made "reality" and people want to be connected to the

deeper reality (Ibid, pg. 43-44). Nozick suggests that once in the machine, there is no

"actual contact" with any deeper reality (Ibid, pg. 43). Perhaps Nozick has misstated the

problem just a bit; there could still be some connection to a deeper reality when in the

machine. But even if there is some connection to a deeper reality, it is less substantial

than we would prefer. So I think Nozick's third point needs to be modified a bit, but still

maintains much of its original force.

Nozick's three points about the inadequacies of life in the machine are generally

quite convincing. A person's life in the machine, even Frankenstein's monster's life,

would be so separated from his "mental life" that his life cannot plausibly be said to be

going better. There must be, as it were, some change in the world external to his









psychology in order for his life to go better at least some times.33 There might be some

cases where we might think that something that happens in the experience machine does

make one's life go better or worse, but that certainly will not be the case across a full

range of examples. With the mental state theories, no such external changes are

necessary; thereby making the theory counter-intuitive.

Now the experience machine poses less of a challenge to the theories that base

well-being in human nature or desire-satisfaction than to mental state accounts. The

monster's beliefs will be false and his intentions will rarely succeed and so, according to

Hurka's account of which beliefs matter for perfection, the monster's well-being would

be low. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Hurka mentions other accounts of which

beliefs matter for perfection (such as justified beliefs) and so there might be some

flexibility in the matter. My thinking on this is that so long as there is flexibility in the

issue, human nature accounts will be able to account for experience machine cases with

at least a minimum of adequacy.

Desire-satisfaction accounts do not imply counter-intuitive results in experience

machine examples. Now, some desires can be satisfied within the experience machine,

such as desires to have certain experiences. So according to at least many desire-

satisfaction theories, one's well-being could increase when the experience machine

produces the desired pleasure. However, I do not think that these sorts of examples are

counterintuitive for the desire-satisfaction theories.

Here is just a simple example meant to illustrate a point about desire-satisfaction

theories and experience machines. Imagine that an agent wants to experience the taste of

33 In a later chapter, I will examine a theory that combines mental states with facts outside of the mental life
of the agent. Such a theory is a mixed theory rather than a pure mental state theory.









mint chocolate chip ice cream and, lacking any ice cream of that sort, opts for the

experience machine. The agent's well-being could thereby increase according to desire-

satisfaction accounts. Those who think such examples problematic for desire-satisfaction

accounts of well-being need to pay careful attention to what the agent's desires are and

which desires are satisfied. Compare the content of three closely related, but different,

desires: (1) to experience the taste of mint chocolate chip ice cream, (2) to taste mint

chocolate chip ice cream, or (3) to eat mint chocolate chip ice cream. Of these three

desires, only the first could be satisfied within the experience machine, as the machine is

usually understood. Strictly speaking, the second and the third could not be satisfied

when in the machine. The second and third desires cannot be satisfied because the person

does not actually taste any ice cream, nor does he actually eat ice cream, when in the

experience machine as it is normally understood. Although the example is simple, it

illustrates something about the content of our desires. Though people often speak loosely

about the content of their desires, careful attention to the content of desires is necessary

when dealing with such cases. Very close attention to the content of the desires in these

cases makes the experience machine cases unproblematic for the desire-satisfaction

account of well-being.

The three problems that I mention Nozick thought the experience machine posed

for certain theories do not show that all accounts of well-being that treat well-being as

increasing in the machine are problematic. The three problems only show that any theory

which treats well-being as consisting entirely in states produced by experience machine is

inadequate. So the experience machine shows that mental state theories are inadequate.

But desire-satisfaction and human nature theories have no special problems dealing with









experience machine cases. We can allow for some increases in well-being, according to a

theory of well-being, within the experience machine without implausible consequences

for that theory. We just have to be able to say what else makes a life go well besides

mental states.34

So, there are serious problems with pure mental state accounts. Later in this

dissertation, in Chapter 6, I will examine more sophisticated theories of well-being that

get around the experience machine cases. But for now, note that desire-satisfaction

accounts seem to avoid the objections to which mental state and explanatory objective

theories fall prey. In the next chapter I will develop what I take to be the most plausible

desire-satisfaction account. In 2.2.4, however, I will examine a different kind of account

of well-being; an account which does not pick out just one thing that makes a life go well,

but instead, picks out many different things.

2.2.4 Pluralistic Conceptions of Well-Being

An account is pluralistic if it treats two or more factors as each being partly

constitutive of well-being. With pluralisms, each factor is a well-being "maker;" i.e. each

factor is at least partly constitutive of well-being-the presence of each enhances well-

being. Pluralisms are not to be confused with mixed theories. A mixed conception takes

several different factors and adds them together as necessary conditions. Sumner's view,

discussed briefly above as proposing a combination of mental states and states outside

one's mental life to constitute well-being, is a mixed theory. Pluralisms differ from


34 Nozick himself states the three problems for mental state theories stemming from the experience machine
cases in a way that is very friendly to desire-satisfaction theories. I paraphrase him above, but I stay true to
his language of putting the objections in terms of what we want for ourselves. For example, Nozick states,
roughly, that we want to do certain things and be certain sorts of people (Ibid, pg.43). Desire-satisfaction
accounts have no trouble including these desires in the account of well-being. Indeed, they actually
account for the missing elements quite well.









mixed theories in that each factor is sufficient for at least some amount or degree of well-

being. Assessing mixed theories can be quite complicated because the mixed theories

start with one of the above discussed conceptions but then change it in a quite

fundamental manner, thereby losing either one or both of the characteristics that make it

plausible in the first place. I must put off discussing mixed theories until a later chapter

in this dissertation because they are so sophisticated. When one draws up a list and does

not unify the items on the list, one way of understanding the list is in the pluralistic way.

John Finnis, in his Natural Law and Natural Rights, offers a list of things as an

account of "'good,' 'basic good,' 'value,' 'well-being'" (Finnis, pg. 86). As I said

before, Finnis lists the following factors as relevant to well-being: life, knowledge, play,

aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness and religion. Griffin has a

similar list.

Finnis claims that the fact that these element belong on his list is "indemonstrable"

and "self-evident" (Finnis pg. 59, 65, and 85). Sometimes views like Finnis' are

dismissed quite quickly. For example, Kitcher in his essay "Essence and Perfection"

states:

Distinguish two varieties of objectivism. Bare objectivism simply offers a list of
the things that make human lives go well. When asked what qualifies the items for
inclusion, bare objectivists have no explanatory theory to offer; it's simply a brute
fact that these things are good for us ... Clashes between bare objectivists seem
doomed to immediate stalemate. (Kitcher, pg. 59-60).35

I think that a lot of the criticism of so-called "objective list" theories is due to the claim

their advocates often make that such lists are self-evident. Other authors disagree with

them and do not like to be told that their "faculty of perception" of well-being is


35 See also Sumner's Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (pg. 24, 46).









malfunctioning. However, there is no need to accept Finnis' claim that his list is self-

evident.

The items on the list, then, should be thought of as having an epistemic status

relevantly like the status of the set of mental states, or satisfactions of the desire set, or

the aspects of human nature, in other kinds of theory.

So I propose to read Finnis as a pluralist and ignore his claim to self-evidence.

Griffin's latest book, Value Judgement, contains a somewhat similar list that can also be

interpreted as pluralistic. These theories are to be evaluated just as the other theories are,

by engaging in critical reflection-looking at the implications of the theory and then

reexamining the theoretical underpinnings of the conception.

These pluralistic accounts look very attractive at first because they seem to solve at

least some of the problems that the other theories face. In fact, though I do not know of

anyone who does this, one could generate a pluralistic theory that combines the factors

referred to as enhancing well-being in each of the three types of monistic conception-

some mental states, desire satisfaction, and whatever accords with human nature.36

Generally, pluralists offer six or seven items on a list with the claim that no item on the

list is reducible to any other and that none is more important than any other.

Let us just look at one example where it seems that a pluralist can fix the problems

that beset an explanatory objectivist such as Hurka. Think back to the example of

Frankenstein's original monster in the unaltered story. Frankenstein's monster is


36 Amartya Sen in his "Plural Utility" discusses the possibility of a consequentialism that treats utility as
composed of both mental states and desire satisfaction in a pluralistic fashion. Scanlon comes close to
accepting a theory that treats mental states, desire-satisfaction and other features as each constituting at
least some well-being (Scanlon, pg 124-125). However Scanlon claims that his account of well-being is
still incomplete in that it does not give a final way of deciding between conflicts of the various factors that
make a life go well; it is not a theory of well-being in the full sense (Ibid, pg. 125).









developing his natural talents but is nevertheless extremely miserable. A pluralist could

include some subjective elements to account for our intuition that the monster's life is

going poorly. The fifth element on Finnis' list, sociability (friendship), is missing from

the monster's life. In this way, it seems that a pluralist could account for some of the

counterintuitive results of an explanatory objective theory.

There is one complication here: it appears that the pluralist who endorses Finnis'

list must claim that the monster's life is going quite well because he has nearly every

element on the list (and in high amounts), but that his life would go better if he had social

relations. This is counterintuitive, because it looks like the monster's life is going very

poorly. What this might mean is that Finnis' list is suspect. However, it is open to the

pluralist to change the list to make it more plausible. So this is not an objection to

pluralists per se. One could just draw up a list containing mental states, desire-

satisfaction, and perhaps friendship.

So pluralistic theories, it seems, have some plausibility in virtue of their

inclusiveness. If, intuitively, there is something missing in someone's life that thereby

makes the person less well-off, one could add whatever is missing to the list. However,

this permissive inclusivity, which at first seems like a great virtue of this kind of theory,

turns out to be a significant liability. Let me explain.

Any monistic conception of well-being picks out just one factor and says that well-

being varies with that factor, no matter how complexly that factor is characterized. As I

have already mentioned, mental state, desire-satisfaction and explanatory objective

theories are all monistic. Pluralistic theories, on the other hand, pick out two or more

things. For the pluralist, some actions will enhance one factor but diminish another









factor. For example, going to church on a regular basis may increase the "religiosity

factor," but decrease the amount of play in one's life. Both play and religion are on

Finnis' list. What the pluralist needs is an account of the weighing and measuring of the

various different factors that make a life go well in order for the theory to give definite

assessments of well-being-a principle of adjudication that makes commensurable the

factors that constitute at least some well-being.37 The principle of adjudication would say

when one's life is going better than, worse than, or equally well as the life of another

person (or perhaps another time-slice of the same person).

There are two sorts of problems for the pluralist resulting from the lack of a

principle of adjudication; metaphysical problems and epistemological problems. The

metaphysical problem for pluralistic theories is that without such a principle, there is no

fact of the matter about how much well-being someone has when she has two or more of

the factors constitutive of well-being. The epistemological problem for pluralistic

theories that arises from the absence of a principle of adjudication is that we have no way

of knowing how much well-being one has when she possesses two or more of the

features that could contribute to one's well-being.

Now, I think that the metaphysical problem is much worse than the epistemological

problem, but both seem to be significant problems. In everyday judgments, people assess

levels of well-being and make choices in cases of tradeoffs. What the pluralist needs to

do is to vindicate the idea that there are really are amounts of well-being and so solve the

metaphysical problem. But we also would very much like a philosophical account of

what epistemological tools one could use to make such judgments. However, it is

37 One interesting issue is whether the principle of adjudication will then turn what looked like a pluralistic
conception into a monistic conception. This is an interesting issue, but too far off my course.









because the epistemological problem is not unique to pluralistic theories that I think it is

less significant problem.38

Thus far, no principle of adjudication has been given and none seems forthcoming.

Suppose that the pluralist admits that a principle of adjudication cannot be given and

claims instead that intuition can solve the problems. Intuition, on this account, could then

determine the amount of well-being someone has (to solve the metaphysical problem) or

intuition could at least serve as a guide in discovering or detecting the level of well-being

one has (to solve the epistemological problem). The appeal to intuition will certainly not

work to solve the metaphysical problem and it probably will not work to solve the

epistemological problem. People differ so widely in their intuitions on the same cases.

There is not a clear reason for thinking anyone's intuitions are superior and even if one

were to grant that there could be authorities in such an issue, there is not a clear reason

for picking out the authority.

The pluralist might grant that there is no principle of adjudication, and that relying

on individual intuition will not work. He could simply admit that there is a radical

incommensurability involved. This incommensuration is especially troubling when

viewed as metaphysical incommensuration. There simply would be no fact as to how

much well-being someone has when she possesses two or more features on the list of

thinks that make a life go well. This option amounts to the claim that people in some

cases do not have any definite total amount of well-being at any given time. The pluralist



38 All of the monistic theories discussed in this chapter have at least some epistemological problems. For
example, a proponent of Hurka's perfectionist theory would no doubt have problems identifying a person's
entire belief set: the epistemological problems for Hurka's perfectionism are much worse if trying to
determine which beliefs are true or false. As I say, I believe other monistic conceptions have
epistemological problems too.









of this sort admits that there are many cases where there is no answer to questions about

whether one's life is going better, worse, or remains the same. But this is problematic,

for then our conception of well-being fails to live up to our ordinary judgments about

well-being.39 This kind of incommensurability is of a different order that is, say,

interpersonal incommensurability. This kind of incommensurability is what could be

called intrapersonal incommensurability. At least in many cases, it would make it

impossible for there to be any fact of the matter as to whether someone's life is

improving or getting worse overall. All that the pluralist could say about some cases is

that "insofar as A has feature x, A's life is better; but insofar as A hasy, A's life is worse."

Intuitively, we make ordinary judgment about overall well-being and think that there is a

fact of the matter regarding overall well-being. Pluralism that accepts

incommensurability must reject such ordinary, everyday judgments.

Pluralisms are inclusive in that they bring in to the theory many components that

can make a life go well. The cost, however, is that pluralisms result, in a way, in a sort of

fragmentation of well-being. If all one can say is that one's life goes well in virtue of x,

but poorly in virtue of y, then the overall assessment of a life that should be intuitively

fairly clear, at least in many cases, is missing.

We have looked at two methods of making the items on the list commensurable;

using a principle of commensuration and using intuition to commensurate. No principle

of commensuration is forthcoming and there is no account of whose intuitions are



39 We have been looking at the difficult cases lately. But I ask the reader to go back to the "easy" cases;
those discussed with the Count of Monte Cristo or commonsense everyday judgments. It is difficult to test
one's intuitions in cases where the various conceptions of well-being differ. The examples from the first
chapter are better (in that one's intuitions in such cases should be clearer) because all of the plausible
conceptions of well-being "agree" about what to say regarding well-being in those cases.









authoritative. If the pluralist accepts incommensurability of the factors on the list, then

the pluralist cannot vindicate ordinary judgments of well-being in simple cases, either

metaphysically or epistemologically.

Perhaps there may be a way to save pluralism, however. There has been an

intriguing proposal by Ruth Chang in her "Introduction" to Incommensurability,

Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Chang claims that there is a fourth positive value

relation in addition to "worse than," "equal to," and "better than." This fourth relation

can be described as "on par with" (Chang, pg. 27-28). The "on par with" relation is

"positive" in the sense that it is a kind of comparability as opposed to incomparability. If

two things, ) and x are on a par, and a third thing, )+, is better than ), there is still room

for )+ and x to be on a par as well (Ibid, pg. 24). The "on par with" may seem

paradoxical in some ways. Chang does not think that the "on par with" relation is a kind

of vagueness and so cannot mean "roughly equal to" or anything similar. Furthermore,

judgments involving the "on par with" relation are not merely those involving ignorance

about the "true" value of the things in question. Chang's "on par with" relation is

supposed to be a relation in the metaphysics of value and so looks like it might go some

way to solving the metaphysical problems that pluralisms face.40 Whether a fourth

positive value relation of the sort Chang has in mind exists is controversial. Chang's

proposal can be argued against on several fronts. Rather than go into the arguments

about whether there indeed is a fourth positive value relation however, I would like to



40 If a pluralist adopted Chang's "on par with" relation, perhaps some of the force of the epistemological
problems could be lessened as well. For, if there is no concrete fact of the matter that one has more or less
well-being than another in some situation, we should not demand that any theory have an account of how
one is to, or at least could, decide such cases.









explore the prospects of using the "on par with" relation to solve the problems of

commensurability for the pluralist about well-being.

Chang's "on par with" relation seems, at first glance, like it might be able to solve

the incommensurability problem pluralisms face. 41 What a pluralist could say is that the

amounts of well-being enhanced by having some of either of two items on a list are on

par with each other. For example, the pluralist could say that, other things being equal,

the level of well-being of someone with a minimum amount of religiosity is on par with

the level of well-being of someone with a minimum amount of friendship.42 The pluralist

could claim that many lives are on par with each other.

Adopting Chang's on par relation does not really help, however, in that it does not

solve the fundamental problem for the pluralist about well-being. For, even if we treat

lives that have minimal amounts of each of the items on the list as being on par with each

other (other things being equal), the deep metaphysical and epistemological problems

remain. There is still nothing about a pluralistic theory that could, even in principle,

solve the remaining metaphysical and epistemological problems. Let me explain.

Presumably for an account of well-being to be adequate, there must be a fair range of

cases where one life is worse than, better than, or equal to another life in regards to well-

being. Even with Chang's proposal in place, the pluralist has nothing in his theory that



41 1 should note that Chang does not offer the "on par with" relation as a solution to the problems that the
pluralisms about well-being face. Instead, I have taken what she says about two things being on a par and
will examine whether it can help the pluralist out of his problem with incommensurability.

42 Interestingly, perhaps the applicability of the "on par with" relation could be extended. Perhaps a
pluralist could say that an agent's well-being at a time is on par with his past level of well-being, when the
person has at least some of the two different factors that make a life go well and one changes over time.
For example, at time tl, A has a great deal of friendship and a little bit of religiosity; later at t2, A has the
same amount of friendship but a bit more religiosity. A's level of well-being at tl and t2 could be on par
with each other. I will not explore this possible extension.









could settle the matter except for in a few rare instances. The pluralist who accepts

Chang's "on par with" relation would still need a sort of principle of adjudication or a

sort of intuition to determine when two lives are on par. The pluralists, even if he accepts

Chang's "on par with" relation, must still provide an account of weighing and measuring

for many of the ordinary lives. This is a tall order, perhaps not as daunting a task as the

fully precise principle of adjudication or intuition, but nevertheless an extraordinarily

daunting task.

Let me illustrate how the central problem still remains for a pluralist who adopts

Chang's "on par with" relation. Suppose someone has one and only one item on the list,

say, friendship. According to a simple version of pluralism with the "on par with"

relation, his life will be on par with many other possible lives, such as the possible life in

which he has a great amount of pleasure. Both possible lives will be on par, according to

the simplistic theory under discussion, because the person in the examples has a bit of

each of the items on the list. Too many lives will be on par according to a pluralist who

adopts the on par relation. Perhaps, by adopting the "on par with" relation, a pluralist

could explain how one life with a little bit of an item on a list is worse than a life with

more of the same item, but the problem remains about how to distinguish between lives

that have differing, perhaps many, items on the list. A principle of adjudication is still

necessary. Perhaps with the "on par with" relation, only a rough principle of adjudication

is necessary. But even a rough principle is a very tall order.

At first glance, pluralisms look attractive. It seems like they may be able to solve

the problems the various monisms face. Their inclusiveness is very appealing initially.

However, upon further examination, they come with a set of insurmountable problems of









their own. In the absence of a method that makes the items on the list commensurable,

whether by principle of adjudication (which does not seem forthcoming) or intuition

(which does not seem up to the task), they have striking difficulties dealing, in a

philosophical way, with seemingly easy judgments of well-being. The pluralist who

adopts Chang's "on par with" relation does not solve the central problem.

2.2.5 Conclusion

Desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being seem to come out ahead of its

competitors at this point of the critical discussion of conceptions of well-being.

Explanatory objective theories have a hard time excluding the evolutionary account of

human nature, which could not plausibly serve in an account of prudential well-being.

Non-evolutionary accounts of human nature, such as Hurka's, also face serious problems.

His account of physical nature has at least minor problems, but the bigger problems are

with his account of rationality. Developing and exercising one's theoretical and practical

rationality fails to be self-involving enough to meet the conditions of the concept of well-

being.

Mental state theories have problems too. Their initially attractive feature, the

dependence on the psychology of the agent, turns out to be an enormous liability when

we think of actual and hypothetical cases where one's psychology can be easily

manipulated. Thought experiments involving the experience machine illustrate these

problems quite clearly and convincingly.

Although I think that pluralisms have not been sufficiently explored and

appreciated, they come with huge problems of their own. Given that no principle of

commensuration has been forthcoming, there is not any obvious way to vindicate many

ordinary judgments of well-being. Adopting Chang's idea that two possible lives can be









on par when two or more items on the list are had by the agent-or the idea that two

possible lives can be on par when an agent has some amount of two different items on the

list-is initially intriguing, but leaves us no better off in assessing ordinary lives; for most

lives have multiple items on the list to varying degrees and, at least in many cases, we

have straightforward intuitions on such matters.

To be fair, I have only shown how the desire-satisfaction account is not susceptible

to the problems of the other conceptions. I have not addressed problems that are specific

to desire-satisfaction accounts. I will do that in chapters 3-6, where I develop and defend

what I take to be the best version of the desire-satisfaction account.














CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPING A DESIRE-SATISFACTION CONCEPTION OF WELL-BEING

3.1 Actual Desire Accounts Critically Discussed

3.1.1 Some Introductory Remarks

There is a lot to be said in favor of desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being. We

have seen some of their plausible features in play in the previous chapter. Before we

move on to discuss the more sophisticated mixed views of well-being, it is necessary to

develop the most plausible version of the desire-satisfaction conception of well-being.

Let us use the term "relevant desire set" to refer to the set of desires the satisfaction of

which increase well-being. Some may say, somewhat implausibly, that the relevant

desire set for an agent includes all actual desires of that agent. Most desire-satisfaction

theorists have thought that the relevant desire set is something different from the set of

total actual desires. The project of this chapter is to identify the relevant desire set. The

project of the next chapter (Chapter 4) is to defend that account against recent criticisms.

The project of Chapter 5 is to make sure that the desire-satisfaction account developed

and defended in the third and fourth chapters meets the conditions of prudential well-

being as set out in the first chapter.

So this chapter is dedicated to identifying the most plausible set of desires the

satisfaction of which increase well-being. It is because the desire-satisfaction account

will be modified slightly in the third and fourth chapters that the reader should think of

the theory developed in this chapter as a "rough draft." The final version of the central

theory should be made clear by the end of Chapter 5, but we must start somewhere. In









this chapter I will first examine whether the relevant desire set ought to be restricted to

intrinsic desires or whether the satisfaction of instrumental desires ought to count in favor

of one's well-being as well. I conclude that restricting the desire set to intrinsic desires

makes for a more plausible account of well-being. Then I will go on to discuss whether

we should think of the relevant desire set as being composed of actual intrinsic desires or

intrinsic desires one would have in counterfactual situations. I conclude that intrinsic

desires one would have under counterfactual conditions (which I will specify) are best.

3.1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Desires

As mentioned above, I will argue that only intrinsic desires are relevant to well-

being. Before I get into the arguments, it makes sense to provide an account of intrinsic

and extrinsic desires. It is commonly said that intrinsic desires are desires for things in

themselves. This common way of understanding intrinsic desires will do for now, though

it will be made clearer after the discussion of extrinsic desires below. No desire can be

intrinsic and extrinsic; things can be intrinsically desired and extrinsically desired, but no

desire can be both intrinsic and extrinsic.

I will discuss three types of extrinsic desires: (1) instrumental desires, (2) whole-

constitutive desires, and (3) part-constitutive desires. A desire is instrumental if and only

if one has it because one believes that the satisfaction of it will be a means to some end.

For example, Frankenstein may have a desire for money. This would be an instrumental

desire if he has it because he believes that the satisfaction of it will help in satisfying his

desire to create his monster.

Secondly, a desire is whole-constitutive if and only if one has it because one

believes that the satisfaction of it constitutes the satisfaction of another desire entirely.

For example, Frankenstein may have a desire to bring a corpse to life because he believes









that in doing so he will do something God-like. The satisfaction of Frankenstein's desire,

he believes, simply constitutes doing something God-like. Let me return briefly to

intrinsic desires. It may seem, at least at first glance, that whole-constitution desires are

intrinsic. This is a mistake. If Frankenstein really desires to bring a corpse alive because

he believes that in doing so he will do something God-like, then Frankenstein's desire to

bring a corpse to life makes reference to some other desire. If Frankenstein desires

something because of some other desire, then the desire is extrinsic.

Thirdly, a desire is part-constitutive if and only if the agent has it because he

believes that satisfaction of it partly constitutes the state of affairs that is the object of

another desire. For example, Frankenstein may have a desire to have a brain (not the

brain in his head, mind you, but another brain). He has the desire for a brain because he

believes that having it will achieve part of having a whole corpse. Strictly speaking, it is

not that the brain is a means to having a corpse: rather, it is that having a brain is part of

having a corpse. Frankenstein's desire for a brain would be part-constitutive in this case.

I wrote above that an intrinsic desire, roughly, is a desire for something in itself.

An agent has an intrinsic desire for something, on my account, if the agent desires that

thing without some other desire playing a role as a reason for the desire. Now, an agent

may have an intrinsic desire that her desires are satisfied; so her intrinsic desires might

make reference to desires. But she cannot have an intrinsic desire because of some

further desire.

There is one last thing to note about intrinsic and extrinsic desires. It seems

entirely possible that a desire could begin as an extrinsic desire and then change to an

intrinsic desire. Frankenstein's desire for money, which begins as an instrumental desire









could change to a desire he has intrinsically. The "because" in the above formulations is

not supposed to capture something about the generation of a desire. Rather, the

"because" should be thought of as invoking a reason or justification from the agent's

point of view. So, even if someone desires something in itself and she has the desire

"because" (in an historical way) she had an extrinsic desire of a particular sort, her desire

should still be thought of as intrinsic.

Should the satisfaction of extrinsic desires count towards one's well-being? As I

have put it, should extrinsic desires be in the relevant set? I do not think that they should

be in the relevant set and in 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, I argue for that conclusion.

3.1.3 Problems for Total Desire Satisfaction Accounts

Total desire accounts take the satisfaction of all one's desires as increasing one's

well-being, whether extrinsic or intrinsic. As I suggest above, I believe that actual

desires, at least in some cases should not be in the relevant desire set, but let me set aside

the issue for now. On total desire accounts, both extrinsic and intrinsic desires matter.

They do not have to matter equally. Desire sets can have a hierarchy. An outcome can

be desired because it is instrumental to another outcome, which itself might instrumental

to some further desired state of affairs. Hierarchy matters on these accounts, insofar as

there are differing "weights" that can be placed on the desires. 1 Some will be more

important than others. Even taking hierarchy into account, I think that total desire-

satisfaction accounts have significant problems as a theory of well-being.

Imagine Frankenstein is working in his laboratory (this does not happen in the

book). He is tired and exhausted, but thirsty. Water will quench his thirst, he thinks. He

1 There could be other forms of hierarchy as well-even between different intrinsic desires. At this point, I
only want to focus on one sort of hierarchy as a resource for the total desire view.









reaches out to what he believes is a glass of water in front of him. He pulls it to his

mouth and takes a drink. On this imagined example, he has an intrinsic desire to quench

his thirst and an extrinsic desire to drink from the glass in front of him. Frankenstein's

desire to drink from the glass in front of him is satisfied. Has Frankenstein's well-being

increased as a result of his desire-satisfaction? Well, that depends, I take it, on whether

the glass in front of him contained water or not. Let us suppose that it did-that seems a

case where it is plausible and intuitive to say that his well-being has been thereby

increased. However, let us suppose that it did not contain water. Not to expose the

reader to an example that is too disgusting, let us say the glass contained alcohol. So

Frankenstein really drank alcohol when he satisfied his desire to drink from the glass in

front of him. It seems clear here that this cannot be a case of improved well-being, but

read on.

We cannot put the total desire theory in the coffin just yet. Frankenstein's desire to

drink from the glass in front of him is just one of his desires among many. He has other

desires as well in the case where the glass contains alcohol. Maybe the satisfaction of

this one desire has caused the others to be thwarted (such as the desire to be clear-

headed). The person who favors a total desire-satisfaction theory could argue that, in the

story so described, Frankenstein's well-being suffers a net decrease as a result of the

action-so the example does not have counter-intuitive results. Call this response the

"swamped desire" response. The desire to drink from the glass can be swamped by other

desires both in number and in importance. But I think that the swamped desire response

will not work, for it grants the person who favors total desire-satisfaction far too much.

The result (after the net is calculated) comes out all right, but the way of getting to that









result is still unacceptable. The following thesis still holds for a total desire satisfaction

theory: Insofar as Frankenstein drank from the glass in front of him, his well-being was

improved. Given that it contains alcohol and not water, this is counter-intuitive.

Additionally, the "swamped desire" response only works if one has enough desires (or

enough strong desires) thwarted. There will be cases where there are no such

countervailing desires and in those cases, an agent's desire satisfaction will increase his

well-being.

Frankenstein's desire to quench his thirst seems to be relevant to his well-being.

Furthermore, let us suppose that his desire to drink from the glass in front of him is

derived from beliefs that are highly justified: Frankenstein has not been a careless

reasoner. The problem then would lie in counting the desire to drink from the glass in

front of him as relevant to his well-being. There are two ways to block this undesired

consequence: (1) remain with actual desires, but restrict the relevant set to only intrinsic

desires, and exclude extrinsic desires: this is to abandon total desire views or (2) to move

away from an actual desires account to a counterfactual account of the desires, the

satisfaction of which, improve one's well-being: this is compatible with remaining true to

total desire views. I will discuss these two strategies, or ways of responding to the

objections, in turn.2

3.1.4 Intrinsic Desires

Restricting the relevant class of desires to intrinsic desires would solve the above-

mentioned problem. On the story given, Frankenstein intrinsically desires to quench his

2 Sometimes writers on this topic will look at problems structurally similar to the "thirsty Frankenstein"
example and immediately conclude that the way to solve the problem it to go with (2), but this is to miss an
important possible solution to this problem. For an example of someone who immediately goes with (2),
see Griffin, 1986. I think it very probable that Griffin understands the deeper issues, but his example is
misleading.









thirst. His desire to drink from the glass in front of him is merely instrumental to the end

of quenching his own thirst. He has no intrinsic desire to drink from the glass in front of

him. Even though he drinks from the glass in front of him, his well-being is not

increased thereby. In fact, with plausible background values put into place, presumably

his well-being is decreased by drinking alcohol because he has intrinsic desires to stay

healthy, clear-minded, and so on.

It might seem one could solve the problem-alcohol-by restricting the desire set

to exclude desires based on false beliefs-i.e. by going to hypothetical fully informed

desires. Let us take a look at the hypothetical Frankenstein example again, but modify it

slightly. Let us go with a case where there are true beliefs that link up the intrinsic with

the extrinsic desire (the idea being here that we should look at instrumental desires when

they are at their best and see whether satisfaction of them increases one's well-being). So

in this newly described, but similar case, Frankenstein is thirsty, desires to drink from the

glass in front of him, but this time, there is water in the glass in front of him.

Frankenstein drinks and both desires are satisfied.

I am far from sure that even on this newly described case, we should think that

there is something to be said for the idea that the satisfaction of one's instrumental

desires increases one's well-being. Frankenstein, so described, has two desires both of

which are satisfied: the one to quench his thirst and the other one to drink from the glass

in front of him. Does this mean that the successful completion of his action counts twice

in favor of his well-being? That does not seem quite right. Suppose now that he has to

move a sheet of paper that is on top of the glass and he desires to move the sheet of paper

to drink from the glass. Does the satisfaction of all three desires count toward his well-









being? It seems the improvement in his well-being is the same in the case where he does

move the paper and in the case where there is no paper to move.3 The driving intuition in

all of these cases is that what matters is the quenching of the thirst, not grasping the glass,

or moving the glass closer to his face or whatever. So, even if we look at instrumental

desires in their best light (when they are correctly related to our intrinsic desires),

satisfaction of them does not seem to improve our well-being.

We are looking for an account of the set of desires the satisfaction of which lead to

an increase in well-being (the so-called "relevant set"), and total desire views do not

seem plausible. This is so when we go with actual desires and even extrinsic desires that

are correctly connected to the intrinsic desires. Now that the relevant set has been

restricted to intrinsic desires, let us look to see whether one's actual intrinsic desires can

be in error and whether there is a way of correcting for this error in the relevant desire set

by moving to a hypothetical desire set.

3.1.5 A Critical Discussion of Actual Intrinsic Desire Views of Well-Being

My immediate project is to critically assess actual intrinsic desire views of well-

being. I will argue that actual intrinsic desire views are inadequate in two ways: they do

not explain cases that involve ignorance in an intuitively attractive way and they do not

explain our intuitions about cases where one would cease to have an intrinsic desire upon

confrontation with facts. If actual intrinsic desires constituted the best relevant desire set,

the resulting desire-theory of well-being would be relatively simple. However, and


3 There is an interesting slightly modified case where the glass of water is trapped in a box and
Frankenstein would have to spend two hours getting it out of the box (there is no other way to quench his
thirst). One might think that getting it out of the box constituted an achievement of sorts and ought to count
in favor of his well-being. But I think that this is mistaken. I think that what is going on in the background
is our presupposition that Frankenstein, like the rest of us, desires to achieve his goals with as little effort as
is required or that he desires and enjoys exercising of ingenuity, etc.









unfortunately, actual intrinsic desires prove inadequate as constituting the relevant desire

set. A desire-satisfaction theory can deal with the two lines of criticism that the actual

intrinsic desire theory faces if it treats the relevant desire set as made up of the desires

one would have under certain counterfactual conditions. I will leave the specification of

the counterfactual conditions for later. Here, I will show that such a counterfactual

specification is desirable by showing that actual intrinsic desire views are inadequate.

I think that actual intrinsic desire views fail to account for an agent's well-being

when the agent is ignorant, at least in some situations. Let me explore a few hypothetical

cases. Imagine a case in which an agent is faced with a choice between eating some

pineapple and eating some watermelon. In this example, let us suppose that the agent has

never heard of pineapple, much less tasted it. She has tasted watermelon and likes it,

though not strongly. In this case, she desires to eat the watermelon and she does not

desire to eat the pineapple. Now, let us suppose further, that if she had tasted pineapple,

she would prefer it to watermelon. It seems that a theory of well-being should say that

her well-being would improve more if she were to eat the pineapple than if she were to

eat the watermelon.

Actual intrinsic desire views have trouble explaining the hypothetical case under

discussion, because the agent has no desire for the pineapple. Hence, her well-being, it

seems, can only increase if she eats the watermelon. Perhaps a proponent of an actual

intrinsic desire view would respond that what accounts for our intuitions in cases such as

the one just discussed is that there is some other intrinsic desire that we are presupposing

the agent has. For example, we might be presupposing that the agent has a desire for

pleasurable experiences and that, were she to taste the pineapple, she would have a









pleasurable experience. So, the reply by the proponent of an actual intrinsic desire view

goes, our intuitions about well-being do not conflict with an actual intrinsic desire view

in this case because we can presuppose intrinsic desires that everyone shares in our

thinking about the "pineapple" case.4

The reply under discussion is clever, but unfortunately it will not work in every

example. To show that it will not work, consider a case of a desire for a life-long project

where there is not another desire that one can point to in order to explain our intuitions in

the case. Take for example, a librarian who does not prefer to be a lawyer even though

he would if he knew more about how his life would go if he were a lawyer. In this case,

there is no plausible alternative desire that one can point to, in all of the various more

fully-detailed explanations of the example, in order to explain the intuition that the man's

life would go better if he were to be a lawyer. So even though the librarian does not

desire to be a lawyer, the intuition goes, his life would go better if he were to be a lawyer.

Later, I will discuss what I take to be driving our intuitions in the cases discussed in this

part. But for now, it is enough to be clear that there is something wrong with actual

intrinsic desire views.

I think there is another problem with actual intrinsic desire views. I will draw from

Richard Brandt's book, A Theory of the Good and the Right, where he argues one's

intrinsic desires can be lost if one were to be informed with propositional knowledge.5

Brandt thinks that if someone were to undergo cognitive psychotherapy then it would be

41 do not mean to commit myself to the claim that absolutely everyone shares the desire for pleasurable
experiences. Certainly people might not share such a desire. An ascetic, roughly, is someone who
renounces material comforts. An ascetic, it seems, might not desire pleasurable experiences. For
simplicity, I have granted the universal holding of the desire.

5 Although many parts of the book touch on this subject, Chapter VI "The Criticism of Pleasures and
Intrinsic Desires" is most apt.