<%BANNER%>

Effects of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act on Federal Congressional Candidates: A Case Study


PAGE 1

EFFECTS OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMP AIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT ON FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: A CASE STUDY By LAURA CHRISTINE DUNN A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2005

PAGE 2

Copyright 2005 by Laura Christine Dunn

PAGE 3

This document is dedicated to Matthew Elias Keil.

PAGE 4

iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank all of my friends and family who supported me while writing this thesis. I would like to es pecially thank Patrick Alexande r because without him, none of this could have been possible.

PAGE 5

v TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................vii ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Research Questions.......................................................................................................4 Methodology.................................................................................................................4 Chapter Outline.............................................................................................................6 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATU RE ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE...............................7 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002............................................................7 The Birth of the Federa l Election Campaign Act.......................................................10 Academic Perspectives on Campaign Finance...........................................................12 Growth and Impact of Political Action Committees..................................................15 Academic Perspectives on Political Action Committees............................................17 The U.S. Public Institute Research Group Study.......................................................22 3 THE DAVE BRUDERLY CAMP AIGN: A CASE STUDY.....................................25 What is a Case Study?................................................................................................25 Methodology...............................................................................................................28 4 FINDINGS..................................................................................................................35 Background Information on Floridas 6th Congressional District..............................35 Findings......................................................................................................................37 Contribution Limits.............................................................................................39 Enforcement........................................................................................................44 Legal and Constitutional Issues...........................................................................45 Soft Money..........................................................................................................46 Issue Ads and Electione ering Communications..................................................49 Disclosure............................................................................................................51 Coordination........................................................................................................53 Unions, Corporations, and Non-Profits...............................................................55

PAGE 6

vi Summary of Findings.................................................................................................57 5 DISCUSSION.............................................................................................................60 Implications of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act..................................60 Limitations of Study...................................................................................................63 Suggestions for Further Research...............................................................................63 LIST OF REFERENCES...................................................................................................66 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.............................................................................................69

PAGE 7

vii LIST OF TABLES Table page 2-1 A table that summarizes the decisions of the McConnell case..................................8 3-2 A table that outlines the strengths and weaknesses of various sources of evidence....................................................................................................................30 4-3 A table that provides a county by county breakdown of the number of votes in the 2002 and 2004 elections.....................................................................................36 4-4 A table that provides information on the budgets of both campaigns in 2002 and 2004..........................................................................................................................36 4-5 A table that details th e rise of hard money in Bruderlys two campaigns................42 4-6 A table that documents the flow of money into both Bruderly and Stearns campaigns in 2002 and 2004....................................................................................42 5-7 A table that summarizes the imp act of the BCRA on the 2004 campaign...............61

PAGE 8

viii Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Mast er of Arts in Mass Communication EFFECTS OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMP AIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT ON FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: A CASE STUDY By Laura Christine Dunn August 2005 Chair: Leonard Tipton Major Department: Mass Communication This thesis is an analysis of Dave Bruderlys 2004 campaign for Floridas 6th District U.S. House seat. This thesis uses qualitative and quantitativ e research methods in order to gauge the effects of the BCRA on federal congressional candidates. Bruderly unsuccessfully ran for U.S. Congress in 2002, prior to the implementation of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Ac t (BCRA), and again in 2004, after the implementation of the BCRA. The Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee (2003), implemented drastic changes within Amer icas campaign finance system. This case challenged key elements of theBCRA, whic h was signed into law in 2002 by President George W. Bush. Before the McConnell decision, the legal precedents surrounding campaign finance were rooted in the Fede ral Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its amendments, which were the firs t federal campaign finance regulations. The final terms of the BCRA prevent national political parties and federal candidates from raising or spending soft money. Additionally, corporations and labor unions are prevented from using soft m oney to fund electioneering communications,

PAGE 9

ix otherwise known as issue ads. The BCRA also raised the individual contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 per federal candidate per election cycle. Prio r to the BCRA, there were no regulations pertaining to soft money ra ised or spent by individuals, corporations or labor unions. National parties were allowe d to use a mix of hard and soft money to fund issue ads. However, there was no limit on the amount of soft money that they could use. This thesis relies primarily on the ca se study methodology. Bruderly and select members of his campaign staff were interviewe d, as well as indivi dual contributors who donated the maximum amount allowed under the terms of the BCRA. Also interviewed was a representative from the United Auto Workers Political Action Committee, which donated $5,000 to Bruderlys 2004 candidacy. Add itionally, this researcher served as Bruderlys campaign manager for seven m onths during the 2004 election. This researchers participant observations and e xperiences are included as noted. Quantitative data were gathered from Bruderlys camp aign by comparing the 2002 election statistics to the 2004 election data. Overall, this thesis finds that the BCRA ha s made it easier for political challengers to run against wealthy incumbents by elimin ating the corrupting effects of soft money within federal campaigns. Bruderly was aff ected both positively and negatively by the BCRA; however, the end result of this le gislation provided Bruderlys 2004 campaign with more chances for success as compared to his 2002 campaign.

PAGE 10

1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee (2003) implemented drastic changes within Amer icas campaign finance system. This case challenged key elements of the Bipartis an Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA), which was signed into law in 2002 by Pres ident George W. Bush. Reporters for The New York Times described the BCRA as, t he broadest campaign fina nce legislation since the Watergate era, (Clymer & Mitche ll, 2002, para. 1). Before the McConnell decision, the legal precedents surrounding campaign finance were rooted in the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its amen dments, which were the first federal campaign finance regulations. Congress passed the FECA in order to circ umvent political corruption by placing limits on the dollar amounts of financial contri butions given to federal candidates. This legislation required all campai gn contributions and expenditu res to be reported, and it also limited the amount of money a campai gn could spend on media advertising. The FECA also laid the foundation for a se parate segregated fund, which allowed corporations and unions to use treasury funds to establish, operate and solicit political contributions for their organization. The monies raised by these political action committees (PACs) could then be donated to candidates running for federal office (Bauer & Kafka, 1982). The 1971 legislation did not establish an independent body to oversee the implementation of the FECA, and following the 1972 elections, more than 7,000 cases of

PAGE 11

2 campaign finance abuse were reported to the Ju stice Department. Only a small number of these cases were litigated, which led to Congress significantly amending the FECA in 1974 (Comptroller General of the United States, 1975). The 1974 amendments to the FECA esta blished the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as the sole agency res ponsible for overseeing the admi nistrative functions of the campaign finance system. The 1974 amendments also created a public campaign finance system used to fund presidential elections. Congress also enacted strict limits on both contributions and expenditures. These limits ap plied to all federal candidates and political committees that could influence a fede ral election. Another provision in the 1974 amendments allowed for corporations and unions with federal contracts to establish and run political action committees (Bauer & Kafka, 1982). Provisions of the 1974 amendments were im mediately challenged in a lawsuit filed by Senator James L. Buckley (former Republi can Senator from New York) and Senator Eugene McCarthy (former Democratic Senator from Minnesota). The plaintiffs asserted that the FECA violated their right to free speech by enacting limits on campaign contributions and expenditures. The Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Buckley on January 30, 1976. The Supreme Court upheld the limits on contribu tions, citing the importance of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption w ithin federal elections, and overturned the limits on political expenditures, stating that limits on campaign spending restricted the freedoms of political expression and association (Hasen, 2002). After Buckley the FECA was amended again in 1979 to allow corporations and individuals to give contributi ons to state and local partie s. These amendments to the

PAGE 12

3 FECA governed federal campaign finan ce until 2002 when the BCRA was passed by Congress. The BCRA is the product of its sponsor s in the U.S. House of Representatives, Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin Meehan (D-MA), and in the U.S. Senate, John McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WIS). The sponsors said the BCRA was written to close the loophole of unregulated soft money donations in federal elections made permissible by the 1979 amendments to th e FECA. This soft money loophole had allowed contributors to bypass the FECAs c ontribution and expenditure limits for years (Corrado, 1997). The final terms of the BCRA, interpre ted by the Supreme Court in the 2003 McConnell decision, prevent national political part ies and federal candidates from raising or spending soft money. Additionally, corpora tions and labor unions are prevented from using soft money to fund electioneering co mmunications, otherwise known as issue ads. The BCRA also raised the individual cont ribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 per federal candidate per election cycle. Prior to the BCRA, there were no regulati ons pertaining to soft money raised or spent by individuals, corporations or labor un ions. National parties we re allowed to use a mix of hard and soft money to fund issue ads. However, there was no limit on the amount of soft money that they could use. The 2004 general election was the first na tional election require d to abide by the BCRA guidelines (Campaign Finance Institute, 2004). To date, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (US PIRG) is one of the few institutions to publish findings on the effects of the BCRA during the 2004 electi on cycle. The US PIRG study examined competitive congressional primary races in 2004. In an attempt to gauge the impact of the

PAGE 13

4 BCRA on federal candidates, th e US PIRG study concluded th at raising the individual contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 had the la rgest impact on the function of federal campaigns. The findings of this study as well as its impact are discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter. In order to better understand the effects of the BCRA on federal candidates during the general election, this thesis uses Democr at Dave Bruderlys candi dacies for Floridas 6th Congressional District as a case study. Br uderly unsuccessfully ran twice for U.S. Congress, first in 2002, prior to the imple mentation of the BCRA, and again in 2004, after the implementation of the BCRA. Research Questions It is important to understand the implicat ions of the BCRA in terms of political communication. Thus, this thesis poses the following broad research questions: How does the BCRA change the way in which federal campaigns operate? How do these new laws impact the ability of a federal candidate to communicate his or her message to the public? Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsors inte nded the legislation to do? What is the likely future of campaign finance reform after the implementation of the BCRA? How has the BCRA altered the communication processes within federal campaigns? Specifically, how has the BCRA impacted th e scope of political communication for federal candidates? The goal of this thesis is to gain a variety of perspectives on the relationship between campaign finance re gulation and the scope of political communication. Methodology This thesis relies primarily on the ca se study methodology reco mmended by Robert Yin (1994) in his book, Case Study Research: Design and Methods Case studies are

PAGE 14

5 designed to capture details from the viewpoint of participants by using multiple data sources. A researcher conducting a case study co nsiders not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them (Yin, 1994). The case study used in this thesis is exploratory in nature, which limits the generalizablity of the findings. Additionall y, this thesis relies on a single case study, which further limits its generalizablity. However, studying Dave Bruderlys campaign can identify factors and issues for future campaign finance research. This thesis also relies on a description of the Federal Election Campaign Act and its major amendments in 1974, 1976 and 1979 as well as U.S. Supreme Court decisions arising from the FECA, including the BCRA. Relevant political sc ience studies that articulate varying perspectives regardi ng campaign finance regulation are noted. When analyzing Bruderlys campaign, qua litative and quantitative research methods are used. Bruderly and select member s of his campaign staff were interviewed, as well as individual contri butors who donated the maximum amount allowed under the terms of the 2004 BCRA. Also interviewed wa s a representative from the United Auto Workers Political Action Committee, which donated $5,000 to Bruderlys 2004 candidacy. Additionally, this researcher se rved as Bruderlys campaign manager for seven months during the 2004 election. This re searchers participant observations and experiences are included as noted. Quantita tive data was gathered from Bruderlys campaign by comparing the 2002 election sta tistics to the 2004 election data. The quantitative data pertaining to Bruderlys cam paign is archived in an online database.

PAGE 15

6 Chapter Outline This chapter introduced the topic of campaign finance, provided the research questions that this study will answer, and described the research methods and other materials used in this study. Chapter 2 is a review of the literature on the issue of campaign finance and a look at the history of campaign finance, focusi ng on the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments of 1974, 1976, and 1979. Chapter 3 describes the case study met hodology, including how the data analysis was performed. Chapter 4 is a discussion of the findings from the analysis of the case study. The conclusion and summary of the findings are discussed in Chapter 5, focusing on what the findings mean for communi cation professionals in the political communication field.

PAGE 16

7 CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal elections. Campaign finance has been a dominant issue in Congress since the 1880s. The first-ever campaign finance laws were enacted in 1883. The most recent campaign finance laws were passed in 2002 with the Bipartisan Ca mpaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA). The final terms of the BCRA are described in the following section. In order to understand the culmination of the BCRA, a historical desc ription of campaign fi nance legislation is presented as well as academic perspectives on the subject. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 The BCRA is the product of its sponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives, Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin Meehan (D-MA), and in the U.S. Senate, John McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-W IS). The Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee issued in December 2003, interpreted the terms and provisions of the BCRA challeng ed by Republican Senator Mitch McConnell from Kentucky. Litigants in the McConnell case questioned five key elements of the BCRA that President George W. Bu sh signed into law in 2002.

PAGE 17

8 Table 2-1. A table that summa rizes the decisions of the McConnell case. BCRA Requirement Supreme Court Decision Impact of Decision National party soft money Prohibits national parties from raising or spending soft money Upheld National parties cannot raise or spend soft money State and local Federal Election Activities Requires state and local parties to pay for federal election activities with hard money and/or Levin funds Upheld State and local parties must use hard money and/or Levin funds for federal election activities Soft money fundraising by federal candidates and officeholders Prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from raising or spending soft money Upheld (with some exceptions) Federal candidates and officeholders cannot raise or spend soft money Prohibition of Issue Ads Prohibits corporations and labor unions from using soft money to fund broadcasts that mention a federal candidate or officeholder within 30 days of a primary and 60 days of a general election Upheld Corporations and labor unions cannot use soft money to fund issue ads. Contribution limits Increases the dollar limit on contributions from individuals to candidate and political parties Upheld Individuals may make larger donations to candidates and political parties Disclosure of Issue Ads Requires disclosure of electioneering communications that exceed $10,000 a year Upheld Electioneering communications must be disclosed to the FEC The Supreme Court issued three se parate majority opinions in the McConnell ruling. The case challenged five titles of the BCRA. Justices Stevens and OConnor along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer de livered the opinion of the Court on Titles I

PAGE 18

9 and II which dealt with soft money and issu e ads. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by all the members of the Court, issued the ruli ng on Titles III and IV which concentrated on hard money limits and the millionaire exemp tion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, OConnor, Souter and Ginsburg ruled on Title V which dealt with broadcasters records ( McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee [FEC], 2003). Titles I and II of the BCRA were upheld by th e Court. The provisions under titles I and II sought to increase regul ation of soft money, electi oneering communications and coordination restrictions. The Court held that soft money contributions could be restricted to protect the integrity of the political process without unconstitutionally burdening party speech and associational activ ities financed with soft money (Whittaker, 2004). The Court also held that issue ads that refer to a candidate 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election we re not precluded by a holding in Buckley which limited regulation of political speech. The Court ruled that the BCRA did not restrict permissible speech and was therefore not unconstitutionally broad in scope. Additionally, the Court ruled that political activity coordinated with political candidates and parties could be regulated in the absence of an agreement to coordinate. Spending at the request or suggestion of a candidate, the Court ruled, could establish coordination (Whittaker, 2004). The only provision in titles I and II that was struck down by the Court was the requirement that national parties choose to either coordinate with candidates or make independent expenditures. Regarding titles III and IV, the Court de termined that the parties to the case lacked standing to challenge the BCRAs denial of the lowest unit charge for a candidate

PAGE 19

10 advertisement that does not include a disclaim er stating that the candidate approved the advertisement. The Court also ruled that th e parties lacked standing to challenge the increase of the hard money contribution lim its as well as the millionaire provision which allows candidates facing self -financed opponents to receiv e contributions above the normal limits. The only provision upheld under titles III and IV was the so-called minor provision. This provision made it cons titutional for underage citizens to make contributions to candidates and political parties (Whittaker, 2004). Title V of the BCRA was also upheld by th e Court, requiring that broadcasters maintain certain publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests. Included records are candidate requests, el ection message requests and issue requests (Whittaker, 2004). The McConnell ruling comprises more than 300 pa ges of provisions that alter the regulations governing federal campaign finan ce. In order to understand how the BCRA came to fruition, the following sections provide a historical analysis of campaign finance legislation and relevant politic al communication commentary. The Birth of the Federal Election Campaign Act The first campaign finance law was passe d in 1883. The Pendleton Act prohibited federal employees from soliciting funds from other federal employees for any type of campaign. With the birth of the Industrial Revolu tion, corporate culture grew to dominate politics and political campaigns (Mutch, 1998). The Tillman Act was passed in 1907, prohibiting corporations and banks from contributing to federal candidates. The Publicity Act of 1910 amended the Tillman Act to require disclosure of campaign donations exceeding $100. In 1911, Congress again amended the Publicity Act to limit spending to $5,000 for House candidates and $12,000 for Senate candidates.

PAGE 20

11 In 1925, the Publicity Act was revised once more to increase disclosure requirements and spending limits for congressional campaigns. These amendments became known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. There were no successful prosecutions during the Federal Corrupt Prac tices Acts 46 years as law (Mutch, 1998). The Hatch Act was passed in 1939, which pr evented government employees from giving political contributions to fe deral candidates. In 1947, Congr ess passed the Taft-Hartley Act, barring unions as well as corporations from making contributions to or expenditures on behalf of a federal candidate. In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to replace the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The FECA was intended, to promote fair practices in the conduct of election campaigns for Fede ral political offices (Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA], 1971). The FECA regulated contributions and spending in federal campaigns and implemented disclosure requir ements for federal candidates, political parties and PACs. The purpose of the FECA was to gi ve candidates for public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform th e voters and, to halt th e spiraling cost of campaigning for public office (S. Rep. No. 92-96, 1971, para. 23). The FECA also attempted to limit the fl ow of excessive su ms of money into political campaigns by limiting contribu tions (S. Rep. No. 92-96, 1971, para. 54). The contribution limits apply to all individual c ontributions given dire ctly to a specific candidate or given indirectly through a third party for the benefit of a specific candidate. The FECA also limited the amount candidates could contribute to their own campaigns

PAGE 21

12 and on expenditures for media advertising in presidential, Senate and House elections (FECA, 1971). Academic Perspectives on Campaign Finance Prior to the enactment of the FECA in 1971, a scholarly consensus on campaign finance prevailed within the political scienc e field (Levine, 1997). That consensus was founded on the work of Louise Overacker (1932). Overacker was the first American political scientist to cond uct systematic campaign finance research. Her 1932 book, Money in Elections is based on campaign finance practices from the 1920s. She noted that electoral corruption dates back to ancient Greece and pointed out that, when adjusted for the size of the economy and population, cam paign costs remained fairly consistent over time. Overacker argued that a flawed de sign and inadequate enforcement measures prevented the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 from banning corporate contributions, limiting expenditures, and pr oviding disclosure. She wrote about the dominance of political partie s during the 1920s and their increasing dependence on high dollar contributors. Overackers normative position regarding money in elections dominated the political science field for decades. Overack er argued that restrictions on campaign finance were illogical. Overacker felt the goa l of campaigns should be to ensure that each candidate at least has a chance to br ing his case before the voters (p. 128). Overacker wanted more money in campaigns, in the form of public subsidies, to provide citizens with informative information about candidates prior to el ection day. She noted that she did not believe contri bution limits would solve the problem of corruption within American elections. Overacker also pointed out that, throughout hi story, there were no examples of governments successfully limiting campaign contributions and expenditures.

PAGE 22

13 She believed Americas system of campaign fi nance should encourage public disclosure, a nonpolitical campaign enforcement agency, and substantial compensation for election day poll workers. Nearly 30 years after Over ackers work, Alexander Heard (1960) published a study of campaign contributions and expenditures in The Costs of Democracy Based largely on financial records from the 1950s, Heard descri bed a pattern of campaigning and political finance that contradicted Overacker's pe rspective of campaign finance in the 1920s. Heards broad conclusions and normative posi tion regarding money, however, were quite similar to Overackers. Heard viewed money as a necessity within political campaigns. He did not believe that the cost of campai gning was overly expensiv e or that the cost would rise significantly in the future. Hear d (1960) advocated increasing the amount of money within campaigns because he felt th e amount of money a candidate possessed had little effect on the outco me of an election. In Heard's (1960) view, reforms that fail to recognize the inhere nt financial needs of political campaigns are flawed. He argue d that negative regulation by the FEC should be replaced by positive measures designed to ease the burden of po litical fundraising and lower the overall cost of campaigns. In addi tion to rejecting limits on contributions and expenditures, Heard advocated public financ ing, tax credits, neut ral and bipartisan solicitation of funds, public disclosure, and a nonpolitic al enforcement agency. Herbert Alexander, another political science scholar, devoted his entire career to the study of campaign finance. Alexander worked closely with Heard as a research fellow on The Costs of Democracy and as executive director of the Commission on Campaign

PAGE 23

14 Costs. In 1958 Alexander became director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, where he compiled and published campaign finance studies. In his book, Money in Politics Alexander (1972) conteste d the theory that money plays an inherently corrupting role in electi ons. He argued that more money is needed for competitive campaigns to inform voters and provide a basis for governmental responsiveness. Alexander felt spending lim its reinforce the status quo and deprive candidates of their rights to free speech. He also believed that contribution limits depress political competition by denying citizens thei r rights to free speech. Alexander said, Because of its universality, money is a tracer element in the political process, marking the tracks both of the individual or groups s eeking influence and of the candidate and the party seeking election to office (p. 11) Alexander extended his argument beyond Overackers (1932) and Heard s (1960) positions, by opposing the bans on corporate and labor-union electioneering, which were enacte d in 1907 with the Tillman Act and in 1947 with the Taft-Hartley Act. Alexander supported a strong system of pub lic disclosure and public subsidies, such as tax credits for private donations, fra nking privileges for all candidates, and voter registration costs paid for by the governmen t. He was concerned that direct public financing of candidates and pa rties could weaken ties betw een national and state parties and disrupt relations between candidate s and their parties (Alexander, 1972). While Overacker, Heard, and Alexande r did not agree on every point, they developed a broad view of m oney within elections that was shared by their peers. However, this view was largely ignored by policymakers, particul arly during the early 1970s with the 1974 amendments to the FECA.

PAGE 24

15 Growth and Impact of Political Action Committees In 1974, the Watergate scandal prompted Congress to amend the FECA, which constituted the most serious effort in U.S. hist ory to regulate the flow of money in federal elections (Clymer & Mitche ll, 2002). The 1974 amendment established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and delegated to th e FEC the power to enforce disclosure laws, enforce public funding programs for pr esidential elections, and enforce campaign finance laws (FECA Amend., 1974). The structur e of the FEC was the antithesis of the nonpolitical, independent entity advocated for by Overacker (1932) and Heard (1960). Congress established control over the a ppointment of the six FEC commissioners, prohibited the agency from investigating a nonymous complaints or conducting random audits and denied the commission the mu ltiyear budgeting authority enjoyed by other independent agencies. The amendment also set limits on contributi ons by individuals, pol itical parties and PACs, and continued the ban against contribu tions and expenditures by corporations and unions. Contributions to candidates from individuals were capped at $1,000, PAC contributions at $5,000, and i ndividual aggregate cont ributions at $25,000. This amendment also placed limits on personal and family finances used in a candidates campaign (FECA Amend., 1974). The 1974 FECA amendment defined multi-candidate PACs as committees that receive contributions from 50 or more individuals and make contributions to more than five political candidates for more than a six-month time period. In addition to the $5,000 limit on contributions per candidate, multi candidate PACs cannot contribute more than $5,000 each per year to other PACs and $15,000 per year to national parties. The

PAGE 25

16 amendment also prohibits PACs and candida tes from knowingly giving or taking money above the contribution ceilings (FECA Amend., 1974). Provisions of the 1974 amendments were challenged by Senator James L. Buckley (former Republican Senator from New York ) and Eugene McCarthy (former Democratic Senator from Minnesota) against the Secret ary of the Senate, Francis R. Valeo ( Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The plaintiffs asserted, among othe r things, that the FECA violated the First Amendment guarantee of free speech because, limiting the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restricti on on communication, because, virtually all meaningful political communica tions in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money (Hasen, 2002, p. 15). The Suprem e Court handed down its ruling in Buckley on January 30, 1976. The Supreme Court upheld th e constitutionality of th e FECA contribution limits, the disclosure requirements, and the presid ential public-financing system. The Supreme Court struck down the caps on expenditures, except for voluntary limits tied to public financing in presidential el ections, and narrowed the class of political communications by independent groups. The Court al so ruled that congressional appointment of members of the FEC was a violation of the separation of powers, a problem re medied in Congress by giving the president the formal authority to appoint all six members to the FEC. The Supreme Court also struck down limits placed on personal and family finances used to fund a candidates campaign (Hasen, 2002). Congress again amended the FECA in 1979, this time to increase, the role of state and local parties in federal elections (H.R. Rep. No. 96-422, 1979, para. 11). The 1979 amendment permitted contributions to be given directly from corporate treasuries and

PAGE 26

17 individuals to local and stat e parties for minor campaign activities, something Alexander (1972) advocated in his work. However, th is amendment created a soft money loophole that permitted more corporate money to find its way into federal election campaigns, because soft money freed the parties to use election activities funds for candidates (Corrado, 1997). This loophole allowed corporations to bypass contribution limits as long as the money they donated went to a politic al party instead of a federal candidate. Initially; the national parties used soft m oney for nonfederal purposes, such as voter mobilization drives. That all changed, according to Corrado, with the birth of entrepreneurial political cons ultants and politicians, who fo und creative ways to finance parts of their federal campaigns with unregulated soft money. The FECA after Buckley marked the beginning of the end of a scholarly consensus on the role of money in elections. Differences emerged as new scholars were drawn to the study of campaign finance by th e controversy surrounding the Buckley decision, rapid changes in campaigns and political organi zations, and the accessi bility of campaign finance data (Levine, 1997). Academic Perspectives on Political Action Committees In 1980, Gary Jacobson published a study on th e impact of money in congressional elections, based on data from the 1972, 1974 and 1976 elections. Jacobsons work provided theoretical and empirical justificati on for arguments made by political scientists since the 1930s. He showed that inadequa te funding by challengers, not excessive spending by incumbents, depresses electoral competition. Jacobson found that limits on contributions and expenditures harm challengers more than they do incumbents. He also argued that a majority of the campaign finance regulations enacted by incumbent politicians, including those in the 1974 la w, benefit those in power (Jacobson, 1980).

PAGE 27

18 Other scholars, Donald Green and Jonath an Krasno (1988), cautioned that political parties had been weakened by changes in th e FECA and were likely to become obsolete in the financing of federal campaigns. Public financing of presidential candidates, they argued, reinforced the growing candidate-cen tered nature of American elections and further weakened the party structure. Rest rictions on party fundraising and how much parties could assist their candidates thr ough direct contributions and coordinated spending put them at a distinct disadvanta ge in comparison to interest groups, whose collective contributions to candidates had no limit. Green and Krasno strongly embraced the view that parties were essential instruments of account ability and responsibility in democratic governments. They argued that re gulations constraining th e ability of parties to raise and spend funds weaken the democr atic spirit of America (Green & Krasno, 1988). In the postBuckley era, the rapid growth of PACs was a popular topic within the political science field. Throughout the 1980s, Richard Hall and Frank Wayman (1990) analyzed the diversity among PACs in structure, size, objec tives, strategies, constraints and degree of engagement in congressional elections. They examined the opportunities that PACs provide to citizens to engage in organized political acti on, and the extent to which politicians dominated the financial d ecisions made by PACs. They also argued against the theory that campaign contributi ons buy votes in Congress. Hall and Wayman said: First, we suggest that in looking for the effects of money in Congress, one must look more to the politics of committee deci sion making than those of the floor. . Second, and more importantly, our account of the member-donor exchange leads us to

PAGE 28

19 focus on the participation of particular members, not on the votes. . If money does not necessarily buy votes or change minds, in other words, it can buy members' time. The intended effect is to mobilize bias in c ongressional committee decision making. (p. 811) The writings of Frank Sorauf provide an in-depth look into the discussion surrounding PACs in the 1980s. A scholar of poli tical parties, Sorauf began his research on campaign finance in 1981 by assembling a task force that investigated the implications of PAC growth on federal campaign finance. Over the next decade, he published Money in American Elections (1988) and Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (1992). Much of Soraufs work fit comfortably within the context of previ ous political science scholars. He disagreed with those who we re concerned with the potential negative consequences stemming from PACs and chal lenged the decision by Congress to regulate them (Sorauf, 1992). Sorauf noted, little if any relationship between the money and the votes exist (p. 88). Sorauf fe lt that work by other political sc ientists demonstrates that the influence of PACs on legislative outcome s is greatly exaggerated. He researched the constraints on the flow of money in electi ons and cautioned of unintended consequences as a result of the FECA and its amendments. So rauf advocated for the values of electoral competition, strong parties, and robust campa ign communications, as well as freedom of political speech, activity, and association. Sorauf argued that the Supreme Court was wrong in Buckley to strike down limits on campaign spending and independent expend itures. To Sorauf, an arms-race dynamic had developed in campaign fundraising, and the money chase was eroding political competition. Sorauf felt spending limits set at high levels would help, not hurt, challengers, especially if combined with publ ic subsidies. He did believe that national

PAGE 29

20 parties, taking advantage of more gener ous limits on their contributors and on coordinated spending on behalf of their can didates, were strengthened by the FECA. Soraufs (1992) greatest worry regarding the Buckley ruling was that national parties might become instruments of incumbent politi cians and manage to evade the contribution limits mandated by Buckley Sorauf 's judgment on the Buckley ruling and his approach to campaign finance reform had a significant impact on the politic al science consensus of his time He demonstrated that a sophisti cated, empirically based understa nding of money in elections did not lead to a normative rej ection of government regulation. The campaign finance legislation that re mained intact after the 1979 amendments triggered both intended and unintended politic al consequences, as Sorauf (1992) warned. Public financing slowed the money chase in presidential elections and somewhat equalized the disparity between the major pa rties in campaign spending and competitive opportunities for challengers. Small donors came to play a significant role in campaign finance as large contributions from individua ls and organizations ce ased. Disclosure of contributions and expenditures also improved dramatically (Synder, 1990). Starting in the 1996 cycle, however, large amounts of soft money were used to finance candidate-specific issue advocacy in presidential and congressional elections. This campaign tactic was deemed permissible by a loophole in the 1976 Buckley ruling. In that decision, the Supreme Court establis hed an express advocacy test to determine which communications by individuals and groups independent of any candidate or party would be subject to government regulation. The standard was defined by the Court as communications that in express terms advo cate the election or defeat of a clearly

PAGE 30

21 identified candidate for federal office ( Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The Court gave examples of express advocacy language which included the phrases: vote for, vote against, support or oppose. This standard became known as the magic words test (Hasen, 2002). The Court acknowledged that the magic words standard would leave some elections-related communications outside the regulatory scop e of the federal government. However, the Court concluded that their st andard would avoid the risk of chilling political speech. The Court did not require an express advocacy standard for candidate and political party advertisements because their financing was subject to federal campaign finance laws. In Buckley the Supreme Court stated that spending by candidates and political committees, including parties, is campaign-related mate rial, subject to the regulation of the FEC (Hasen, 2002). This express advocacy standard had little effect on the conduct and financing of federal campaigns for nearly 20 years. Be ginning in the fall of 1995 and continuing through 1996, Democratic Party committees spent an estimated $34 million on television advertisements designed to promote Clint on's re-election (Corrado, 1997). None of these costs were reported to the FE C as coordinated expenditure s on behalf of Clinton's campaign. Instead, the Democratic Party argued that party communicat ions that did not use explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate could be treated like generic party adve rtising and financed with a mix of soft and hard money. The Republican National Committee responded with a $20 million advertising campaign of its own, on behalf of Bob Dole, the Repub lican presidential ca ndidate. Quickly the parties began to use the sa me financing strategy to cam paign on behalf of their

PAGE 31

22 congressional candidates. The congressiona l party campaign committees shifted their focus from hard to soft money fundraising, al tering the structure of federal campaigns (Corrado, 1997). Other groups soon followed the example set by the national parties. The benefit for groups to advertise under the terms of issu e advocacy, rather than the terms of independent expenditures, was that i ssue advocacy could be conducted without disclosure and financed with so ft rather than hard money. Th is meant that national parties and groups could now solicit contributions from corporations and unions as well as from wealthy donors to finance candidate-specific electioneering communica tions. In spite of the governing federal election laws, by 1996, pa rties and groups were able to campaign for and against specific federal candidates with unlimited amounts of soft money. Soft money receipts grew from roughly $20 milli on in the 1980 and 1984 election cycles to $86 million in 1988 and to $495 million in 2000 (Co rrado, 1997). It was in this political context that the Bipartisan Campaign Re form Act (BCRA) was drafted and passed by Congress in 2002. The U.S. Public Institute Research Group Study The most recent research published sin ce the enactment of the BCRA is a study conducted by the United States Public In terest Research Group (Mason & Cassady, 2004). The study, The Wealth Primary: The Role of Big Money in the 2004 Congressional Primaries analyzed campaign finance data complied by the FEC during the 2004 congressional primaries. One of the major conclusions of the US PIRG study was that the amount of money a candidate possessed was the most important factor in determini ng whether or not the candidate would win the election. The study f ound that candidates who raised the most

PAGE 32

23 money from individuals and PACs won 91% of their primary races in 2004. Winning candidates also raised more money than lo sing candidates by a 4-to-1 margin. Winning candidates in 2004 raised an average of $700,000 from individuals and PACs, while losing candidates raised an average of $162,000 from individuals and PACs (Mason & Cassady, 2004). The US PIRG study also found the vast ma jority of campaign contributions came from a small number of high dollar donors. While only 0.08% of voting age Americans made a contribution of $1,000 or more to a c ongressional candidate, th ese large donations accounted for 63% of all individual contribu tions received by 2004 primary candidates. Similarly, only 0.02% of voting-age Amer icans made a $2,000 contribution, the new maximum amount allowed under the BCRA, to a congressional primary candidate. Yet more than a fifth (21%) of all individua l contributions to congressional primary candidates came at the $2,000 level in 2004. Moreover, the US PIRG study found that a majority of the 2004 congressional primary races (65%) were unc ontested, meaning that only one candidate decided to run for his or her partys seat (2004). More than half of the incumbent senators who ran (58%) were unopposed in their 2004 primary race s. The US PIRG study also noted that individual contributions in amounts larger than $200 came in much larger increments during the 2004 primaries as compared to the 2002 primaries. In 2002, 73% of candidates itemized contri butions came in $1,000 increm ents, but in 2004, 89% of candidates itemized contributions came in increments of $1,000 or more. Additionally in 2004, 27% of the candidates itemized contri butions came in the $2,000 level. More than

PAGE 33

24 one quarter (26%) of individual contributi ons to 2004 congressional primary candidates came from out of state donors (Mason & Cassady, 2004). The authors of the US PIRG study state that their 2004 results differ very little from their findings in the 2002 vers ion of the same study, which le ads them to conclude that the BCRA has failed to eradicate the influence of big money within federal elections, at least at the primary level. The authors focuse d specifically on primary races as a result of the gerrymandering tactics used in Congress to hand design congressional districts. The authors felt that due to redistricting, fewer and fewer races for the House of Representatives are competitive, so the challe nge for incumbents is to beat their primary opponent. The authors believe the role of mone y in primary races is often highlighted because voters cannot separate candidates base d solely on their party affiliation (Mason & Cassady, 2004). While the authors of the US PIRG st udy believe that the BCRA has failed to weaken the impact of big money in congressi onal primary races, a case study analyzing Dave Bruderlys campaign for Floridas 6th U.S. House district, will provide further insight regarding the effectiveness of the BCRA at the general election level.

PAGE 34

25 CHAPTER 3 THE DAVE BRUDERLY CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY In the previous chapters, th e goals and objectives of this thesis were presented and explained. In this chapter, the case study methodology used to accomplish these goals and objectives will be examined. This thesis employs the case study methodology as described by Robert Yin (1993, 1994), a respect ed authority on qualitative research. What is a Case Study? A case study is the preferred methodology to use when circumstances warrant an in-depth investigation (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991). Case studies have been used in several types of investigations, particularly investigations within the field of sociology. Robert Stake (1995), among others, has de veloped strong protocols for case study researchers. Case studies are designed to capture details from the viewpoint of participants by collecting multiple sources of data. A researcher conducting a case study considers not only the voice a nd perspective of the actors, but also distinguishes the relevant groups of actors and the in teraction between them (Yin, 1993). Yin identified three specific types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. Exploratory case studies are used primarily by researchers in the field of sociology when considerable uncertainty exis ts about operations, goa ls, and results of a program. Exploratory case studies help identif y questions, select measurement constructs, and develop measures; they al so serve to safeguard investment in larger studies. Explanatory case studies are used to inves tigate causal connecti ons. Descriptive cases studies require that an illustrative theory be developed before star ting the case study (Yin,

PAGE 35

26 1993). Stake (1995) added three other types of cas es studies to Yins list: intrinsic case studies, where the researcher has an interest in the case; instrument al case studies, where the researcher attempts to understand more than what is obvious; and collective case studies, which focus on a group of cases, rather than a single case. This thesis focuses on a single case in order to fully unde rstand the political implications of the BCRA. Yin (1994) stated single cases may be used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case. The cas e this thesis relies on is the latter because the candida te studied self-identifies as a radical, grassroots candidate, which is an extreme party affiliation. Additi onally, the candidate studied ran prior to the implementation of the BCRA and after the implementation of the BCRA, providing a set of comparisons not generally avai lable in many case studies. Yin points out that case study research should not be confused with sampling research, which decides case selection base d on a population. Yin states this type of sample selection is improper in a case st udy. He believes each individual case study consists of a whole study, in which fact s are gathered from various sources and conclusions are drawn from those facts (Yin, 1994). A case study employs a triangulated resear ch system. The need for triangulation arises from the need to confirm the validity of the research. Stake (1995) explained that the case study protocols used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations are forms of triangulation. Yin (1993) recommends that cas e study researchers use multiple sources of data to authenticate their findings. This thesis relies on multiple interviews with campaign participants, multiple personal observations, and a multitude of campaign finance data to ensure th e validity of the findings.

PAGE 36

27 Denzin (1984) identified four types of triangulation: data source triangulation, where the researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different contexts; investigator triangulation, where several investigators examine the same phenomenon; theory triangulation, where investigators with different viewpoints interpret the same results; and methodological tria ngulation, where one approach is followed by another, to increase confidence in the final interpretation. This th esis employs methodological triangulation in order to further validate the findings presented in the following chapter. The issue of generalization is a frequent criticism of case stud y research. Critics claim that the results of case studies, esp ecially single case studies, are incapable of providing a generalizing conclu sion and are therefore micros copic. Yin refuted this critique by arguing that the sample size of a study had no bearing on the applicability of the conclusions. Also, Yin pointed out that ge neralizing results, from either single or multiple designs, is made to theory and not to populations. He presented four applications for a case study: to explain complex causal links in real life interventions, to describe the real-life context in which the interventions oc curred, to describe the intervention itself, and to explore those situations in which th e intervention being eval uated has no clear set of outcomes (Yin,1994). Stake argued for more of an intuitive ge neralization, which he named naturalistic generalization. Stakes argument focused on the relationship between the readers experiences and the case study itself. He be lieved that the data generated by case study researchers would be applicable to a broad cross section of the public, thereby facilitating a greater understandi ng of the phenomenon studied (Stake, 1995). This thesis follows Stakes principle of natu ralistic generalization.

PAGE 37

28 Methodology Yins (1993) case study methodology has four distinct stages: design the case study protocol, conduct the case study, analyze the case study evidence, and develop the conclusions, recommendations, and implications of the study. The fo llowing sections of this chapter will expand on th ese four stages. Each sect ion will begin by acknowledging the recommendations found in the literature a nd end with a discussion of the application of the method. The first stage in case study methodology is the development of the case study protocol. Yin (1994) suggested the researcher must possess or acquire the following skills in order to design the appropr iate protocol: the ability to ask good questions and to interpret the responses, be a good listener, be adaptive and fl exible so as to react to various situations, have a firm grasp of issues being studied, and be unbiased by preconceived notions. This res earcher received a bachelors degree in political science from Clemson University in 2003 and ha s had years of experience interviewing individuals as a student repor ter for the Clemson newspaper. This researcher understands the subject matter being studied in this case as this researcher wa s previously employed by a U.S. Congressman, a South Carolina State Senator as well as ot her various political candidates. Yin wrote there is more to a protocol than just the instrument. He argued the development of the rules and procedures in th e case study protocol enhance the reliability of the research. Yin (1994) felt that case study protocol should include the following sections: an overview of the cas e study project, field proced ures, case study questions and a guide for the case study report. For the purposes of this thesis, a complete case study protocol is presented in this section.

PAGE 38

29 Yin (1994) presented three conditions for case study design: the type of research question posed, the extent of control an inve stigator has over actua l behavioral events, and the degree of focus on contemporary even ts. To address the fi rst of Yins design conditions, this thesis poses the following research questions: How does the BCRA change the way in which federal campaigns operate? How do these new laws impact the ability of a federal candidate to communicate his or her message to the public? Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsor s intended the legi slation to do? What is the likely future of campaign fi nance reform after the implementation of the BCRA? How has the BCRA altered the communication processes within federal campaigns? Specifically, how has the BCRA impacted th e scope of political communication for federal candidates? In regards to the second de sign condition, this research er had no control over the behavioral events contained within this case study. This is ty pical within case study research. To address Yins thir d design condition, the events ex amined in this case study are contemporary, although historic informa tion was used to provide relevant background information. The second step of case study methodology is the actual execution of the case study. Yin (1994) pointed out that data coll ection should be treated as a design issue because it can enhance the construct and inte rnal validity of the study, as well as the external validity and reliability. Yin (1994) listed six primary sources of evidence for data collection in a case study: documentation, archival records, inte rviews, direct obse rvation, participant

PAGE 39

30 observation, and physical artifacts. Yin pointed out that researchers do not have to use all six sources in every case study. Table 3-2. A table that outlines the strengt hs and weaknesses of various sources of evidence. Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses Documentation stable repeated review unobtrusive exist prior to case study exact names etc. broad coverage -extended time span irretrievability biased selectivity reporting bias reflec ts author bias access may be blocked Archival Records Same as above p recise and quantitative Same as above p rivacy might inhibit access Interviews targeted focuses on case study topic insightful provides perceived causal inferences bias due to poor questions response bias incomplete recollection reflexivity interviewee expresses what interviewer wants to hear Direct Observation reality covers events in real time contextual covers event context time-consuming selectivity might miss facts reflexivity observer's presence might cause change cost observers need time Participant Observation Same as above insightful into interpersonal behavior Same as above bias due to investigator's actions Physical Artifacts insightfu l into cultural features insightful into technical operations selectivity availability Source: (Yin, 1994, p. 80) This thesis analyzed every type of evid ence that Yin suggested case studies should focus on. The types of documents relied on by this thesis include: U.S. Public Institute Research Group (US PIRG) study conducted in 2002 and 2004 Letters written by Dave Bruderly to the FEC The archival records used in this study include: All FEC reports for the 2002 and 2004 elections A list of all contributors to the Bruderly campaign

PAGE 40

31 A personal diary kept by this researcher to document all personal observations during the Bruderly campaign The following individuals were interviewed at their home on the dates listed by this researcher: Dave Bruderly (candidate) (12/18/04) Greg Gorman (Fundraising Coordinator) (1/18/05) Josh Goldstein (Canvassing Director) (1/10/05) Dan Kahn (Event Coordinator) (1/4/05) Jeff Allstadt (a $2,000 contributor) (1/21/05) Bill Schultz (A $2,000 contributo r and volunteer) (12/12/04) Emmit Bowling (Representative from th e United Auto Workers PAC) (1/10/05) Jeremy Sanders (Office Coordinator) (12/8/04) Harold Saive (Technology Director) (12/14/04) Participant observations by this researcher are included as note d. This researcher was employed as the campaign manager fo r the Bruderly campaign for seven months. This researcher began as a Bruderly volunt eer in January of 2004 and by April 2004, was hired to manage the Bruderly campaign. The goa l of a participant observer is to attempt to become part of the community being studi ed and to adopt various participant roles. Participant observers bring their own notions of culture and community to each study. They attempt to participate fully, but must be careful to behave in a consistent manner as part of the setting so as not to cause si gnificant changes in the community itself (Yin, 1994). Also included in this thesis are dir ect observations, which aid the participant observations reported in this study and provide additional perspectives regarding the effectiveness of the BCRA. The physical artif acts included in this study are: campaign signs, campaign literature, campaign palm cards, and an array of quantitative campaign

PAGE 41

32 data exported from Microsoft Access and an online database purchased by Dave Bruderly. The primary means of gathering data for this case study was conducting open ended interviews with campaign employees as well as campaign contributors. Yin suggests using open ended interviews to e xpand the depth of data gathering and to increase the number of information sources. The interviews were conducted individually according to the interviewee's schedule and av ailability, as suggested by Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991). Included in every interview, was a series of core questions designed to capture each individual perspective regarding the impact of the BCRA. Those questions were: What effects, if any, did you notice on Da ve Bruderlys campaign as a result of the implementation of the BCRA? Did the BCRA impact your activity within the Bruderly campaign in any way? How do you feel campaign finance regul ations impact federal campaigns? Can you name a specific reform implemented by the BCRA, and if so, what does this mean to you? What is your opinion of soft money versus hard money within federal campaigns? What is your opinion of the regulatory function performe d by the Federal Elections Committee? What is your opinion on the current state of campaign finance reform? What is your opinion on the future of campaign finance reform? Finally, is there anything you would like to tell me about your experience with the Bruderly campaign that is cam paign finance related? Within one week of completing each interv iew, this researcher sent a copy of the transcribed interview to each participant to ve rify that each transcription was correct. The data analysis used in this study relies on explanation building to derive the categories necessary to logically present the findings of this case. After analyzing each interview

PAGE 42

33 transcription and comparing answ ers to specific questions as ked by the interviewer, eight thematic categories regarding campaign finance regulation emerged. These eight categories are; contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue advertisements and elec tioneering communications, disclosure, coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits. The main source of the quantitative data us ed in this case study came from various FEC records, all of which are available to the public. In addi tion to the figures reported by the FEC, a web-based database was pur chased by Dave Bruderly to archive all campaign related material. This database perfor ms functions similar to that of Microsoft Access. This database allowed Bruderlys cam paign to record volumes of information on campaign donors, campaign staff and campaign volunteers. The third step in case study methodology is analyzing the case study evidence. Data analysis consists of examining, categ orizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial pr opositions of a study (Yin, 1994, p. 204). Yin suggested that every investiga tion should have a general anal ytic strategy, to guide the decision of what will be analyzed and fo r what reason. He presented three possible analytic techniques: pattern matching, expl anation building, and tim e series analysis (Yin, 1994). A pattern matching analysis comp ares an empirically based pattern to a predicted pattern. If the patterns match, the internal re liability of the case study is strengthened. An explanation building analysis is consid ered a form of a pattern matching, in which the analysis of the case st udy is carried by buildi ng an explanation of the case. A time series analysis is a well-known technique used predominantly in experimental analysis. This thesis reli es on an explanation building analysis.

PAGE 43

34 Yin encouraged researchers to make every effort to produce a quality analysis. In order to accomplish this, Yin pr esented four principles that case study researchers should follow: ensure that the analysis relied on a ll relevant evidence, include all major rival interpretations in the analysis, address the most significant aspect of the case study, and use the researcher's prior knowledge to further the analysis. The analys is of this thesis incorporated each of Yins principles into the following chapter. The following categories are used to analyze the data gathered from this case study: contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue advertisements and electioneering communica tions, disclosure, coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits. A majority of the data gather ed for these categories was taken from campaign receipts and FEC reports These categories were derived after an extensive review of campai gn finance legislation and th e interview transcriptions produced as a result of this study. These categories are articu lated in the next chapter. Statistical data was analyzed by compar ing 2002 election data to the 2004 data. The fourth and final step in case stud y methodology is deve loping conclusions, recommendations, and implications based on th e data collected in the study (Yin, 1994). Yin cautions researchers not to use technical vocabulary in th is section and instead rely on clear explanations so that the audience can understand the fu ll implications of the case study. The results of this case study are presente d in the following chapter. Also included are detailed descriptions of the proc edures used throughout this case study.

PAGE 44

35 CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS In this chapter, the findings of th e case study performed on Dave Bruderlys campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives will be presented. The data from this case study is groupe d according to the following categories; contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue advertisements and electioneering communica tions, disclosure, coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits. These thema tic categories emerged after reviewing interview transcriptions with key campaign individuals and analyz ing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). In the following sections of this ch apter, each category is introduced and the campaign finance regu lations that governed each category, during Bruderlys 2002 and 2004 campaigns are discusse d. Direct quotations from interviewees and excerpts from this researchers field not es are used as supporting materials. The quantitative data presented in this chapter relies on a compar ative analysis of statistics from Dave Bruderlys 2002 and 2004 campaigns. Background Information on Floridas 6th Congressional District Prior to his 2002 campaign for Floridas 6th District U.S. House seat, Dave Bruderly had never run for a political offi ce. His 2002 campaign began in July of 2002 and ended unsuccessfully four months later. Bruderly ran against Congressman Clifford Stearns (R) from Ocala, Florida, then a fourteen-year incumbent. After losing in 2002, with only 35% of the vote, Br uderly decided to run against Congressman Stearns again in

PAGE 45

36 the 2004 election. In 2004, Bruderly again lost to Congressman Stearns, receiving 36% of the vote. Table 4-3. A table that pr ovides a county by county breakdown of the number of votes in the 2002 and 2004 elections. Stearns 2002 Bruderly 2002 Stearns 2004 Bruderly 2004 Alachua 28,542 (51%) 26,988 (49%) 41,949 (50%) 42,214 (50%) Bradford 4,861 (64%) 2,713 (36%) 7,072 (68%) 3,329 (32%) Clay 35,823 (80%) 8,972 (20%) 54,709 (78%) 15,694 (22%) Duval 17,701 (71%) 7,086 (29%) 27,755 (68%) 12,815 (32%) Gilchrist 3,070 (62%) 1,852 (38%) 4,422 (66%) 2,228 (34%) Lake 11,244 (68%) 5,336 (32%) 14,849 (65%) 7,874 (35%) Levy 1,205 (53%) 1,081 (47%) 1,997 (59%) 1,390 (41%) Marion 39,124 (65%) 21,018 (35%) 57,837 (65%) 30,853 (35%) Total 141,570 75,046 210,590 116,397 Table 4-4. A table that pr ovides information on the budgets of both campaigns in 2002 and 2004. Stearns 2002 Bruderly 2002 Stearns 2004 Bruderly 2004 Money Raised $618,193 $59, 198 $716, 968 $121,762 Money Spent $332, 419 $58, 524 $283, 334 $118, 904 Money from PACS $395,411 $1,200 $474, 121 $9,600 Money from individuals $149,779 $39,998 $193, 255 $100,012 Money from candidate $0 $18,000 $250 $12,000 Floridas 6th congressional district was redraw n in the summer of 2002. Currently, the 6th district includes all or parts of Alac hua, Bradford, Clay, Duval, Gilchrist, Lake, Levy and Marion counties. Nearly half of the districts 650,000 residents live in Gainesville, Ocala, and Leesburg. Another th ird of the districts residents live in Jacksonville and Clay County. Floridas 6th congressional district is home to many retirees. Its industries include agriculture, education, forestry, tourism, healthcare, service, retail, and defense. There are roughl y 376,000 registered voters in District 6, with 42.1% of the voters identifying as Democrat 41.4% identifying as Republican and 16.5% identifying as Independent.

PAGE 46

37 Findings For this thesis nine indivi duals were interviewed. The age range of the individuals interviewed varies from 21 to 67 years old. Only one of the indi viduals interviewed, Technology Director Harold Saive, worked on both of the 2002 and 2004 campaigns. The following individuals were paid members of the campaign staff; Greg Gorman, Josh Goldstein, Dan Kahn and Jeremy Sanders. The following indivi duals were campaign volunteers; Jeff Allstadt, Bill Schultz, Emmit Bowling and Harold Saive. Dave Bruderly, a 58-year-old environmenta l engineer, has lived in Alachua County for more than thirty years. He has two ch ildren and three grandchildren. He received a bachelor of science in marine engineering and transportati on from the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy in 1969. He also received a master of science in engineering from Columbia University in 1971. Bruderly ha s been working as an environmental engineering consultant for th irty-two years. Bruderly focused primarily on attending public events and making face-to-face requests for contributions during the 2004 campaign. Greg Gorman, a 22-year-old student at the University of Florida, worked for the Bruderly campaign while pursing his undergraduat e degree in political science and was a part-time campaign employee. Originally from Miami, Florida, Gorman has been living in Gainesville for the past four years. Gorman was in charge of coordinating all fundraising phone calls to be made by the candidate. This involved finding contact information for possible donors, preparing a call sheet, and ensuring that Bruderly made each phone call. Gorman also supervised a ll fundraising-related data entry into the campaigns database.

PAGE 47

38 Josh Goldstein, a 21-year-old student at th e University of Florida, worked on the Bruderly campaign as an intern from the polit ical science department. Also, originally from Miami, Goldstein has lived in Gainesville for three years. Goldstein was in charge of developing and implementing a canvassing plan for the field operations of the Bruderly campaign. Goldstein was also respon sible for the development and maintenance of a schedule for the auto-dialer, which play ed a pre-recorded messa ge urging citizens to vote for Bruderly. Dan Kahn, a 38-year-old self-described poli tical activist, was hired to schedule all campaign-related events. Kahn was also in ch arge of formulating Bruderlys platform positions on various government policies. Orig inally from New York, Kahn has lived in Florida for two years. Kahn lives in a tent, by choice, and describes himself as eccentric, but in a good way (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 4, 2005). Jeff Allstadt, a 44-year-old computer engi neer from Clay County, Florida, is married and has two children. Originally from Texas, Allstadt has lived in Florida for twenty-two years. Allstadt was a major financial supporter of the Bruderly campaign, donating the maximum amount allowed by an individual under the terms of the BCRA and opening his home to host house parties to raise money for Bruderlys candidacy. Allstadt acted as the Clay and Duval C ounty coordinator for the Bruderly campaign. Bill Schultz, a 46-year-old business owner, lives in Alachua County. Originally from Kansas, Schultz has lived in Gainesville for three years. He is married and has two children. Schultz was also a major donor to the Bruderly campa ign, donating not only hard money, but also giving in-kind contribu tions such as office space, telephone use, and Internet use, until he met the individual contribution limit defined by the BCRA.

PAGE 48

39 Additionally, Schultz helped to obtain statistical data used by Goldstein in developing the canvassing plan for the campaign. Emmit Bowling, a 62-year-old retired auto wo rker from Ocala, Fl orida, has lived in Florida his entire life. Bowling is a member of the United Auto Workers PAC (UAWPAC), which donated $5,000 to Bruderlys 2004 campaign. Jeremy Sanders, a 24-year-old political consultant from Ohio, graduated with a degree in political science from the Univers ity of Miami in Ohio in 2003. Sanders moved to Florida in 2004 to manage the home offi ce of the Bruderly campaign. Sanders was in charge of coordinating the sc hedule of office volunteers as we ll as the schedule of office staff. Harold Saive, a 67-year-old retired teacher has lived in Gainesville, Florida, for twelve years. Saive was responsible for the development and maintenance of the Bruderly web-site as well as the production of multi-media campaign literature. Saive was also in charge of finding strategic loca tions to display camp aign signs and gaining permission, if needed, to display the signs. Contribution Limits During the 2002 campaign, the FECA placed limits on contributions by individuals and groups to candidates, party committees and PACs. Individuals were permitted to donate an aggregate amount of $25,000 to ca ndidates, parties and PACs per year. Individuals were permitted to donate a maximum of $1,000 per candidate per election cycle. There were no regulations on so ft money donations made by individuals. Individuals could donate $20,000 per year to a national party and $5,000 per year to state parties and federal PACs. PACs could donate $5,000 to candidates, other PACs, or state parties, and $15,000 to national parties (Cam paign Finance Institute [CFI], 2004).

PAGE 49

40 The Campaign Finance Institute is a non-pa rtisan, non-profit institute, affiliated with The George Washington University, that conducts objective rese arch and education, empanels task forces and makes recommenda tions for policy change in the field of campaign finance. During the 2004 campaign, the contributi on limits mandated by the FECA were raised to adjust for inflation. Individuals we re permitted to donate an annual aggregate amount of $95,000 to candidates, parties and PACs. Of that aggregate amount, no more than $37,500 could be donated to candidate s and no more than $57,500 could be donated to national parties and PACs. The maximu m amount an individual could donate to a federal candidate was raised from $1,000 to $2,000. Individuals were permitted to donate up to $25,000 per year per national party, as l ong as the individual aggregate limit for national parties ($57,500) was not exceeded. Indi viduals were also permitted to donate $10,000 to each state, district, and local party committee annually, provided the individual does not donate more than $95,000 per each election cycle. While the BCRA did adjust individual contribu tion limits and aggregate indivi dual contribution limits for inflation, the BCRA did not adju st the contribution limits of PACs for inflation (CFI, 2004). While the FECA did not address the possibili ty of candidates using personal wealth to finance their campaigns, the BCRA di d and a millionaire-opponent provision was included in the legislation. This provision increases the contribution limits for congressional candidates facing wealthy self -financed candidates. Senate candidates facing an opponent who has spent $150,000 of his or her own money plus four cents times the number of eligible voters in th eir state, and House candidates facing an

PAGE 50

41 opponent who has spent $350,000 of his or her ow n money, presumably benefit from this provision which raises the normal BCRA cont ribution limits significantly. If a selffinanced Senate candidate has 2-4 times mo re money than a challenger, and the $150,000 threshold has been met, the challengers co ntribution limits are in creased by 300%. If the Senate candidate has 5-10 times more money than a challenger, the challengers contribution limits are increased by 600%. If a Senate candidate has more than 11 times more money than the challenge r, the challengers contributio n limits are increased 600% and all limits on party coordina ted expenditures are removed. If a self-financed House candidate spends $350,000, the opposing candidates contribution limits are tripled and the opposing candidate can accept coordinate d party expenditures. The amount of contributions and expenditures gained by the less wealthy candidate cannot exceed the total amount of personal wealth spent by the opponent (CFI, 2004). All of the respondents interviewed for this thesis agr eed that the provisions to the individual contribution limits had an overw helmingly positive effect on Bruderlys 2004 campaign. Sanders said: The fact that we were able to raise ov er $18,000 in one night with the house parties indicates to me that the BCRA is accomplis hing what it set out to do, which is to level the political playing field for cha llengers. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 8, 2004) Bruderly benefited in 2004 due to the in crease in contributio n limits as mandated by the BCRA. Doubling the individual contributi on limit drastically incr eased the flow of hard money into Bruderlys 2004 campaign. While the aggregate contribution limits for individuals and contribution limits pert aining to PACs had a negative impact on Bruderlys 2004 campaign, the swell in hard money receipts, due to the increase in individual contribution lim its, had the biggest impact on Bruderlys 2004 campaign.

PAGE 51

42 Table 4-5. A table that deta ils the rise of hard money in Bruderlys two campaigns. Total Amount of Money Raised Total Number of Contributors Average Individual Donation 2002 $59,198 545 $92.09 2004 $121,762 663 $183.65 Table 4-6. A table that docum ents the flow of money in to both Bruderly and Stearns campaigns in 2002 and 2004. Stearns 2002 Bruderly 2002 Stearns 2004 Bruderly 2004 Money Raised $618,193 $59, 198 $716, 968 $121,762 Money Spent $332, 419 $58, 524 $283, 334 $118, 904 Money from PACS $395,411 $1,200 $474, 121 $9,600 Money from individuals $149,779 $39,998 $193, 255 $100,012 Money from candidate $0 $18,000 $250 $12,000 When Bruderly was asked what differen ces came to mind when comparing his 2002 and 2004 campaign, Bruderly replied, W e get twice as mu ch money from individual contributors (L. Dunn, pers onal communication, December 18, 2004). In Bruderlys opinion, the increase in the indi vidual contribution limit meant formulating a fundraising strategy focused on soliciting indi vidual contributions in $2,000 increments. In order to do this, this researcher, along w ith Jeff Allstadt, developed a plan to have eight separate house parties, one in each count y, all on the same night in order to raise money for Bruderlys campaign. The Bruderly Bash house parties were held on September 25, 2004. All campaign contributors were invited to atte nd. The centerpiece of the house parties was a conference call with Senate candidate Betty Castor, Representative Corrine Brown and Jacksonville attorney, Wayne Hogan, all of whom endorsed Bruderly while on the conference call. The house parties raised a total of $18,771.32 for Bruderlys campaign (L. Dunn, personal communication, September 26, 2004). Of that amount, $10,000 was

PAGE 52

43 donated in $2,000 increments, meaning only five people were responsible for more than half of the money raised that night. In th is instance, Bruderlys campaign was enhanced by the increase in the individual contribution limit. Commenting on the house parties, c ontributor Jeff Allstadt said: While our initial goal was to raise $5 0,000 for Bruderlys campaign, we knew that was ambitious, but we still thought it was possi ble. What hurt us was that fact that hurricane Jeanne hit North Central Florid a on the night of our house parties. Over 45 guests, who had promised to show up, were unable to attend due to the inclement weather. Additi onally, the date th at I chose for the house parties happened to fall on one of the biggest Jewi sh holidays of the year. That led to another ten or eleven guests not showing up, but overall I am very happy with what we did accomplish. After all, we did set th e highest one day fundraising record ever in the history of the Bruderly ca mpaign. (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 21, 2005) While increasing the individual aggreg ate contribution level from $25,000 to $95,000 allowed national political parties to receive more money, Bruderlys campaign did not receive any money or assistance from the DNC. Gladys Coffrin, a well-known political activist from Gainesville, Florid a, donated $50,000 to the DNC in September of 2004. When members of the Bruderly campaign c ontacted Coffrin in October to solicit a campaign contribution, she said that this y ear she donated all of her money to the DNC and to contact them for a contribution to Bruderlys campaign (L. Dunn, participant observation, October 11, 2004). In 2002, Bruderly received $1,200 from PACs. In September of 2004 the United Auto Workers PAC (UAW-PAC) donated $5,000 to Bruderlys campaign. While $5,000 is the maximum amount a PAC can donate to a federal candidate under the BCRA, this amount was not adjusted for inflation as the individual contribution limits were. If the contribution limits pertaining to PACs had b een raised according to the increase in individual contribution lim its, Bruderly would have rais ed more PAC money. Emmit

PAGE 53

44 Bowling, a representative from the UAW-PAC in Ocala, Florida, said, If we could have given Bruderly more money, we would ha ve, without a doubt. Bruderly stands for everything that our PAC repres ents and those are the kind of candidates we consistently support (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 10, 2005). The amount of PAC money a candidate receives directly imp acts the amount of support that candidates receive from their resp ective party. If a candida te is able to raise a large amount of PAC money and gain party support, their chances of winning are dramatically increased. Enforcement Prior to the BCRA, the statute of limitations for a FECA violation was three years. The FEC had to be notified of each violati on and enforce the appropriate consequences within a three-year time frame. Since the BCRA, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued new criteria for campaign finance vi olations. This new criteria increases the penalties for contribution and conduit violations and extends the statute of limitations for a BCRA violation from three to five years. All federal campaign finance complaints can be accessed through the FECs web-site (CFI, 2004). During the 2002 campaign there were no campa ign finance violati ons reported to the FEC. In 2004, a Republican from Ocala, Fl orida, filed a report with the FEC claiming that the Bruderly campaign failed to report expenditures on their pre-primary FEC report. Ten days after the complaint was filed, the Bruderly campaign received a document from the FEC outlining the possible violations of federal campaign finance law and provided Bruderly fifteen days to provide a written re sponse to the FEC. However, the gentlemen who filed the initial FEC complaint had misint erpreted the figures reported on Bruderlys pre-primary FEC report and within a month, th e entire situation ha d been cleared by the

PAGE 54

45 FEC and Bruderly was found not to be in viol ation of any federal campaign finance laws (L. Dunn, participant obser vation, October 21, 2004). All of the respondents inte rviewed for this thesis believed that the FEC enforcement measures, mandated by the BCRA benefited all political candidates, including Bruderly. Contributor Schultz sai d, While the FEC could probably do more, federal campaign finance legislation has become so complex, that it is impossible to leave all federal campaign finance regulation to one federal agency (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 12, 2004). Intern Go ldstein said, I think the new and improved enforcement measures developed by the FEC should be applauded (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 6, 2005). Legal and Constitutional Issues Prior to the BCRA, the Supreme Court he ld that campaign finance laws were constitutional if they were narrowly ta ilored enough to advance a compelling public interest. The Supreme Court consistently uphe ld contribution limits on campaign finance, corporate and union contribution bans, and di sclosure statutes, with the goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of co rruption within American elections (CFI, 2004). In the BCRA ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that a ban on soft money and restrictions on certain forms of electioneering communications did not violate the rights of free speech and in fact, helped reduce th e appearance of corruption within federal campaigns (CFI, 2004). All of the individuals interviewed for th is thesis agreed that the BCRA did not violate any rights to free speech. Intern Josh Goldstein said:

PAGE 55

46 If anything, the BCRA attempts to level the playing field for all candidates and just because that involves placing limits on the amount of money allowed into a campaign, I do not believe that the BCRA violates the First Amendment in any way. (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 6, 2005) Fundraising coordinator Gorman also sa id, In America, anything government regulated is automatically assumed by most people to be corrupt. However, I honestly believe that the BCRA is a true attempt to rid federal campaigns of corruption (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 18, 2005). The legal and constitutional issues surrounding the BCRA provided Bruderlys cam paign with a significant advantage in 2004 when compared to his 2002 campaign, because these issues led to a total ban on soft money in federal elections in 2004. Soft Money During Bruderlys 2002 campaign, prior to the BCRA, soft money was given without any limits by individuals, corporations and unions. Soft money is not regulated by the Federal Election Committee (FEC). Political parties were required to use a mix of soft and hard money to fund certain fe deral election activities; including issue advertising, voter registration drives, and party-building exer cises. The term federal election activity was not spec ifically defined anywhere in the FECA legislation. There were no provisions regarding soft money spent by members of Congress, federal officeholders or federal candi dates. There were also no li mits on the amount of soft money a national party could transf er to a state or local party. State and local parties, like national parties, were required to fund federa l election activities with a mix of hard and soft money, but with a much lower percentage of hard money than the national parties (CFI, 2004).

PAGE 56

47 During Bruderlys 2004 campaign, after the implementation of the BCRA, national parties and congressional committees were prohibited from raising and spending soft money, regardless of the purpose. The BCRA prevented members of Congress, federal officials, and federal candidates from raisi ng soft money in connection with a federal election, although exceptions were made for fu ndraising in connection with organizations not involved in any federal election activity. The term federal election activity was defined as any activity beyond express advoc acy. Express advocacy was defined as communications which use words such as vot e for and support or defeat. The BCRA also prevented state and local partie s from using soft money to fund federal election activiti es (CFI, 2004). Bruderlys 2004 campaign was not considered competitive by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) or the Florida Democr atic Party (FDP). Bruderly also lacked support on the local level, finding it difficult to rely on organizations such as the Alachua County Democratic Executive Committee (ACD EC) for assistance (L. Dunn, participant observation, October 2, 2004). Because Bruderl ys candidacy was not taken seriously by any of the major players within the Democra tic Party, eradicating the use of soft money in federal campaigns provided Bruderly s campaign more opportunities to succeed in 2004 versus 2002 because federal candidates as well as parties on the national, state and local levels were prevented from raising or spending soft money in connection with federal elections. The soft money prohibi tion mandated by the BCRA did not have a direct impact on Bruderlys 2004 campaign, but he may have benefited indirectly. In 2002, if Bruderly had been considered a thre at to Congressmen Stearns, organizations

PAGE 57

48 such as the RNC could have targeted Brude rlys campaign with an unlimited amount of soft money, but in 2004 the use of soft mone y was prohibited within federal campaigns. While the impact of the soft money ban cannot be measured directly for this thesis, the following question was posed to each indivi dual interviewed: What is your opinion of soft money versus hard money within fede ral campaigns? Almost all of the respondents (Bruderly, Gorman, Goldstein, Allstadt, Bow ling, Sanders, Saive and Schultz) felt that the presence of soft money w ithin federal campaigns was a deterrent to challengers. They also felt that the advantages of soft m oney favored incumbent politicians, thereby decreasing the spirit of political compet ition. Contributor Bill Schultz said: Soft money benefits the incumbent only a nd it has been abused by politicians for years. Because of the BCRA, I whole-hear tedly believe that Bruderly was given a more even playing field in which to ch allenge [Congressman] Stearns in 2004. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 12, 2004) Technology director Harold Saive ag reed with Schultz and added: The issue of soft money has plagued federa l campaigns for decades. Im glad to see that our government has finally decided to do something about it. Candidates like Bruderly, who are progressive in their ideals and dependent upon grassroots campaign techniques, needed the governmen t to undercut the power of soft money. The underdog definitely wins. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 14, 2004) The only interviewee with a different opi nion on soft money was event coordinator Dan Kahn. Kahn felt that soft money was needed within federal elections to ensure that certain federal election activities, such as vot er mobilization efforts, did not cease with the ban on soft money. Kahn pointed out that th ese types of activities were essential to the health of Americas democracy and w ithout the funds to produce these kinds of events, a larger percentage of American citizens might become disinterested in the democratic process, leading to lower le vels of voter turnout (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 4, 2005).

PAGE 58

49 Issue Ads and Electioneering Communications The effects of the electioneering co mmunication regulations on Bruderlys 2004 campaign were unclear. This is due to th e nature of Bruderly s liberal, grassroots campaign. Bruderly was not considered to be a serious challenger because of his stance on various policy issues. The centerpiece of Bruderlys platform was legislation to enhance the development of hydrogen-powered vehicles in America. Due to the approximate 50/50 split in party prefer ence among the residents of Floridas 6th congressional district and Bruderlys progressive politic s; Congressman Stearns, the RNC, and other Republican organizations, chos e not to target Brude rly in any type of electioneering communications in the 2004 elec tion. This was also the case in Bruderlys 2002 election. During the 2002 campaign, campaign advertis ing and communications fell into two categories, express advocacy and issue a dvocacy. Express advocacy was defined as communications which use words such as vot e for and support or defeat. Issue advocacy was divided into two sub-categories, candidate-specific issue advertising and pure-issue advertising. Candidate -specific advertising clearly identified a candidate but did not use explicit wo rds of express advocacy. Pure-issue advertising discussed an issue without mentioning the name or showing an image of a candidate. National and state parties were permitted to produce issue advertis ing, if a mix of hard and soft money was used, but all party finances had to be fully disclosed to the FEC. Corporations and unions had no limits on advertising, except for the s ponsor identification rules mandated by the Federal Communications Committee (FCC). N on-profits were allowed to produce an unlimited amount of express advocacy advertisi ng as long as the advertising furthered the principal purpose of the spons oring organization (CFI, 2004).

PAGE 59

50 During the 2004 campaign, under the terms of the BCRA campaign advertising and communications were called election eering communications. Electioneering communications are defined as targeted broadcas t, cable, or satellite advertisements that refer to a candidate within 60 days of a gene ral election or within 30 days of a primary election. An advertisement is considered targeted if it can be received by 50,000 people in the congressional district where the elec tion is being held. Na tional parties were limited to using hard money to fund elec tioneering communications. State and local parties were also limited to using hard money to fund any federal-candidate-specific advertising, regardless of whethe r or not the advertising could be considered a form of electioneering communication. Fe deral and state candidates we re also limited to using hard money to fund federal-candidate-speci fic advertising. Corporations, unions, and 501(c)(4) organizations were pr ohibited from directly produc ing targeted electioneering communications, although they are able to produce express advocacy advertisements through a political action committee (PAC). Additionally, all organizations, including non-profits that accept corporat e or labor contributions, were prohibited from directly producing any type of electioneering communi cation. However, these organizations are also able to form PACs to raise hard m oney to fund electioneering communications (CFI, 2004). None of the interviewees questioned could comment on the impact of the electioneering communication regulations, as neither the Democrats nor Republicans used any electioneering communications. Fundraising coordinator Greg Gorman said, There were no ads produced by Congressman Stearns or any other Republican group that portrayed Bruderly in any type

PAGE 60

51 of light (L. Dunn, personal communicati on, January 18, 2005). While the Bruderly campaign did fund several political advertisements, none of the ads were considered to be electioneering communications. In 2004 Br uderly spent 50% of his budget on political advertising. In 2002, Bruderly only spent 33% of his budget on advertising because he was unable to raise a large amount of m oney to fund targeted advertisements. Disclosure During the 2002 campaign, all candidate committees, party committees and PACs were required to submit unscheduled reports disclosing the total amount of money that they raised and spent. Candidates had to identify all PACs and party committees that contributed to their campaign and they had to identify individuals who contributed more than $200 to their campaign. Candidates also ha d to disclose all campaign expenditures in excess of $200 per year. The FECA also requ ired national political committees and any political committee with a soft money account to disclose soft money donations and disbursements. The FECA did not require any form of disclosu re regarding issue advocacy advertising, except to the extent wh ich parties had to disclose soft money disbursements (CFI, 2004). During the 2004 campaign, after the BCRA was implemented, political parties were required to disclose their finances monthly and fe deral congressional candidates were required to disclose th eir finances quarterly. The BCR A mandated that state parties disclose spending related to federal election activities. Th e BCRA also required that all political advertisements must include a disclosure disclaimer (CFI, 2004). The BCRA required the FEC to develop software and software standards that allow reportable campaign receipts and disbursements to be transmitted immediately and posted on the FECs web site upon receipt. The BCRA also expanded the class of persons

PAGE 61

52 required to file electronically, mandating th at each candidate for federal office use software that meets the new standards once such software is made available to the candidate. Data from electronically filed repor ts is received, processed and disseminated more easily and efficiently by the FEC, resulti ng in a better use of resources. Reports that are filed electronically are normally available within five minutes and detailed data is available in the FECs databases within 24 to 48 hours. In contrast, during the 2002 campaign, the time between the receipt of a re port filed through the paper filing system, and its appearance on the FECs web site was 48 hours. In some cases, it took as long as 30 days before detailed data filed on paper was available in the FECs databases (CFI, 2004). The effects of the disclosure regula tions on the Bruderly campaign were both positive and negative. The BCRAs disclosure requirements allowed Bruderly to stay informed of Congressman Stearnss fundraisi ng efforts, and because state parties were required to disclose all federal election activ ities, the Bruderly campa ign could also stay abreast of what was happening within th e Florida Republican Party. Because Bruderly was not deemed a threat to Congressman St earnss re-election, th e Florida Republican Party chose not to concentrate a ny of their efforts on Floridas 6th Congressional District race. The disclaimer required on all political advertising by the BCRA had several negative consequences on the Bruderly campaign. Because Bruderly ran in 2002, he wanted to use old campaign signs and campai gn literature, in order to save money and paper, but without the proper disclaimer, th e campaign could face a multitude of fines and levies from the FEC. Jeremy Sanders informed Bruderly about the disclaimer

PAGE 62

53 requirements, but Bruderly igno red Sanders and instructed Ha rold Saive to distribute the old signs and literature. Within two days, five people had called campaign headquarters to explain the new disclaimer regulations to Bruderly and his staff. Bruderly rescinded his position, after hours of arguing, and Saive a nd Sanders took down all the old campaign signs. Commenting on the disclaimer requireme nts, Sanders said, I had to waste two entire work days taking down signs that I told Bruderly were not permitted to be displayed (L. Dunn, personal communicati on, December 8, 2004). Sanders and Saive were able to remove the outdated campai gn signs before anyone reported that the Bruderly campaign was in violation of the FEC disclaimer regulations. When asked about the disclaimer incident, Saive said: We were lucky not to be reported the FEC. The disclaimer law adds clarity within the realm of political advertising, which I think is a good thing. However, it was just bad timing in regards to the impact of the disclaimer requirements on the Bruderly campaign. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 14, 2004) Bruderly had a different opinion: I think that stupid disclaim er requirement is a perfect example of what is wrong with campaign finance in this country. If our lawmakers have enough time to sit in Washington, D.C. and come up with mundane regulations such as this one, our democracy is in a whole lot of tr ouble. (L. Dunn, pers onal communication, December 18, 2004) Coordination During the 2002 campaign, coordination wa s defined as polit ical activities performed by unions, corporations and inte rest groups made in cooperation with a candidate or agent of a candidate. Prior to th e BCRA, the status of this law was somewhat unclear, as the FEC refrained from public ly regulating coordination between national committees and unions, corporations, and PACs. Due to this, the effects of the federal coordination laws on Bruderlys 2002 campaign are immeasurable. Political parties were

PAGE 63

54 able to make unlimited independent pa rty expenditures and coordinated party expenditures under the regulations se t out in the FECA (CFI, 2004). During the 2004 campaign, coordination was defined as a payment made in cooperation with a candidate or agent of a candidate. Th e BCRA defined coordinated issue advertisements as contributions (subject to hard money limits) if the sponsors of the advertisement coordinated with a candidate or party. The BCRA al so mandated that on a district-by-district ba sis, parties had to decide to ma ke independent expenditures, which cannot be limited, or to make coordinated expenditures, which are limited, on behalf of their respective congressiona l candidates (CFI, 2004). Coordination describes the interaction be tween candidates and political parties, PACs, and/or interest groups that causes activities undertak en by these groups to be regulated as financial co ntributions to federal campaigns. All groups making contributions to a federal candidate are subj ect to limits on the amount of funds they can contribute. When a group's expenditures to support a candidate's election are not coordinated with a candidate's campaign, however, those expenditures are deemed independent (CFI, 2004). In June of 2004, the Bruderly campaign learned first-hand the impact of the BCRAs coordination rules on federal ca mpaigns. Quoted from Bruderly: In June, I received an email from Move On.org announcing they were going to be driving three little pigs, with anti-Bush sayings on the side, from the top of the state of Florida to the bottom. I wrote to the chairman of th e Duval County DEC (Democratic Executive Committee), where the trip was going to begin, asking if I could drive the pigs through part of our district and maybe get some free press. Within, I think, two hours, an attorney re presenting Move On had called me and said the Duval County event had to be cancelled. He said they couldnt do it because they had violated federal law ju st by considering coordinating with me. There is no direct coordination allowed be tween federal campaigns and 527s. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 18, 2004)

PAGE 64

55 Reflecting on the three little pigs incident fundraising coordinator Gorman said I understand why the federal government felt the need to restrict coordination between parties and candidates, but in Bruderlys situat ion, this law designed to help challengers, hurt us more in the long run (L. Dunn, pe rsonal communication, Ja nuary 18, 2005). All of the respondents interviewed for th is thesis agreed with Gorman. In this instance, the BCRA regulations that prohibit coordination between 527 groups and federal candidates negatively im pacted Bruderlys campaign. Bruderly lost the opportunity for earned media in an area of the district targeted by his campaign staff as needing heavy media satu ration in order to win the election. Additionally, Bruderly upset some of the political le aders in Duval County because th e three little pig event had to be cancelled and moved to another count y (L. Dunn, participant observation, July 21, 2004). Unions, Corporations, and Non-Profits Since 1907, corporations have been pr ohibited from making expenditures or contributions in connection with a federa l election (Tillman Act). Since 1943, unions have also been prohibited from making expe nditures or contributions in relation to a federal campaign (Taft-Hartley Act). Howeve r, under the FECA, unions and corporations were allowed to sponsor issue advertisi ng, establish and support PACs, and conduct internal communications with their share holders, executive and union members urging them to support specific candidates, register to vote, and vote. Four types of non-profit organizations were defined by the FECA: 527 groups, 501(c)(3) groups, 501(c)(4) groups and 501(c) groups. Sectio n 527 groups, are political organizations that are tax exem pt, but contributions given to them are not tax deductible. PACs, candidate campaigns and political pa rty committees are cla ssified as 527 groups.

PAGE 65

56 501(c)(3) groups include public ch arities, churches, private un iversities and think tanks. These groups are tax exempt and contributi ons to them are tax deductible. 501(c)(3) groups are completely prohibited from inte rvening in an election. 501(c)(4) groups are social welfare or civic organizations. These groups are tax exempt but contributions to them are not tax deductible. 501(c)(4) groups were allowed to produce issue advertising under the FECA. 501(c) groups include labor unions, business associations and professional associations (CFI, 2004). The 2002 campaigns were required to abide by the regulations outlined in the FECA. During the 2004 campaign, unions and corpor ations were prohibited form giving soft money to parties and from running i ssue advertisements except as hard money expenditures through a PAC. Issue advert ising was prohibited by non-profit groups, including any non-profit social welfare organization that accepts corporate or labor contributions. Non-profit groups are allowe d to form PACs to fund electioneering advertisements with hard money. The BCRA ba nned national parties from contributing to or soliciting contributions for non-profits in connection with a fede ral election or any 527 organization (CFI, 2004). The changes in campaign finance law regarding unions, corporations and nonprofits did not have a clear impact on the Bruderly campaign. This is due to the small scale of Bruderlys campaign. While Bruderly did not experience the first-hand effects of these changes, the growth of 527 groups during the 2004 election was noted by other candidates. When asked about the impact of 527 groups on democracy, Bruderly said: I think we should get money out of fede ral campaigns completely. I think we should put a serious limit on the amount of money a candidate can raise from a private source. Ban corporate money comp letely, ban PAC money completely, ban big donations from any organizations that intends to influence the outcome of the

PAGE 66

57 campaign and have all these campaigns f unded with public money and some cap on private money and require the radio, te levision people who use the airways and lease cable to provide equal access and fr ee access to all qualified candidates and I think that needs to happen immediately b ecause we have lost our democracy. We do not have a democracy anymore in this country. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 18, 2004) When asked about the impact of organi zations on federal candidates, event coordinator Kahn said: I believe that organizations have a hu ge impact on federal elections; however, because Bruderly is considered to be a ra dical, our campaign was not a threat to our opponent. If Bruderly had a million dollars in the bank, then I think we would immediately see the impact that organi zations have on federal campaigns. (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 4, 2005) All of the other respondents interviewed for this th esis agreed with Kahn. Summary of Findings This thesis posed the following research questions when analyzing this case study: How has the BCRA changed the way in whic h federal campaigns operate? How do these new laws impact the ability of a federal candi date to communicate his or her message to the public? Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsors intended the legislation to do? What is the likely future of campaign fina nce reform after the implementation of the BCRA? How has the BCRA altered the comm unication processes within federal campaigns? Specifically, how has the BCR A impacted the scope of political communication for federal candidates? This research finds that the impact of the BCRA on congressional challengers has produced mixed results. Doubling the individual contribution limits dr astically increased the flow of hard money into the 2004 campaign. While the aggr egate contribution limits for individuals and contribution limits pert aining to PACs had a negativ e impact on the 2004 campaign,

PAGE 67

58 the swell in hard money receip ts, due to the increase in i ndividual contribution limits, had the biggest impact on the 2004 campaign, whic h positively impacted all aspects of the campaign. The BCRAs enforcement provisions helped to open channels of political communication in the 2004 campaign among a ll parties in federal campaigns, which solidified the importance of legitimacy in campaign finance disclosure in 2004. The legal and constitutional issues su rrounding the BCRA also positively impacted the 2004 campaign because it was due to the le gal and constitutional issues that soft money was prohibited in all federal campa igns. The BCRAs soft money provisions indirectly benefited the 2004 campaign. A lthough Bruderlys candidacy was not taken seriously by any of the major pl ayers within the Democratic Party, eradicating the use of soft money in federal campaigns provided Bruderlys campaign more opportunities to succeed in 2004 versus 2002 because federal candidates as well as parties on the national, state and local levels were prevented from ra ising or spending soft money in connection with federal elections. The provisions to issue advertisements and electioneering communications did not have a clear im pact on the 2004 campaign because neither Congressman Stearns nor Bruderly produced an y advertisements deemed electioneering communications. The effects of the disclosure regulations on the 2004 campaign were both positive and negative. The BCRAs disclosure requireme nts allowed Bruderly to stay informed of Congressman Stearnss fundraising efforts a nd because state parties were required to disclose all federal election activities, the Bruderly campaign could also stay abreast of what was happening within the Florida Repub lican Party. The disclaimer required on all political advertising by the disclosure requirements negatively impacted the 2004

PAGE 68

59 campaign. This was largely due to situat ional circumstances within the campaign. Because Bruderly ran in 2002, he wanted to use old campaign signs and campaign literature, in order to save money and paper, but without the proper di sclaimer as required by the BCRA, the campaign risked being fine d by the FEC and rece iving negative media attention. The coordination laws mandated by th e BCRA negatively impacted the 2004 campaign, due in large part to the grassroot s nature of the campaign. Because the BCRA prohibited coordination between 527 groups and federal candi dates, Bruderly lost the opportunity for earned media in an area of the congressional district targeted by his staff as needing heavy media saturation. While th e 2004 campaign was able to raise more money than in 2002, in 2004 the campaign was unable to pay for large-scale political advertisements, something that could have b een offset by allowing federal candidates to coordinate with 527 groups. The changes in campaign finance law regarding unions, corporations and non-profits did not have a clear impact on the 2004 campaign because of the small scale of the campaign. In the following chapter, a discussion of these findings will be presented.

PAGE 69

60 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION In the previous chapter, the findings of Bruderlys case study were discussed. In this chapter, a discussion of the implicatio ns of these findings in relation to campaign finance regulation is presented. The findings of the Bruderly case study are compared to the findings of the US PIRG study as well as to normative views on money held by various political scientists. Limitations of this study and areas for future research involving campaign finance are also discussed. Implications of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act Because Bruderly was able to raise more hard money during the 2004 election, which was a direct result of the individua l contribution limit being raised to $2,000, it would seem the BCRA has begun to level the playing field for federal candidates. The authors of the US PIRG study concluded that the amount of money a candidate raises directly impacts their chances for success. Therefore because Br uderlys campaign bank account grew in 2004, in theory, he had a better chance to win the election. While Bruderlys opponent was able to raise $1.7 million in campaign donations, the fact remains that Bruderly was able to nearly double his fundraising abilities in the 2004 election as compared to the 2002 election. The US PIRG authors argue that beca use incumbent politicians have big bank accounts, challengers are hesi tant to run against them and therefore democracy is hindered. Applying the knowledge learned from Bruderlys case study, the size of an incumbent politicians bank account is not always a deterrent for challengers.

PAGE 70

61 The BCRA legislation would have been a pplauded by political scientists Heard (1960) and Alexander (1972) becau se it increases the flow of hard money into federal campaigns while containing the flow of soft mo ney. Political scientists have consistently advocated increasing the limits placed on political contribut ions. Sorauf (1992) would have applauded the BCRA because it did not further regulate the structure of PACs within federal elections. However, Bruderl ys case study is a prime example of why Soraufs argument to set contribution lim its at high levels are designed to help challengers. If the contribution limits pertaini ng to PACs had been adjusted for inflation as the individual contribution limits and the individual aggregate contribution limits were, Bruderly would have received more PAC money during his 2004 campaign. Table 5-7. A table that summarizes the impact of the BCRA on the 2004 campaign. Category BCRA Requirement Overall Impact on 2004 Campaign Contribution Limits Increased the dollar limit on contributions from individuals to candidates and political parties Positive the campaign was able to raise more money from individual donors Enforcement Lengthened the time frame to investigate federal campaign finance complaints and regimented FEC reporting requirements Positive this provision strengthened the FEC and mandated that FEC communications be legitimate Legal and Constitutional Issues Eliminated soft money within federal campaigns Positive the campaign did not have to worry about being targeted by a unlimited amount of soft money Soft Money Prohibited federal candidates and officeholders from raising or spending soft money Positive although this measure had an indirect effect on Bruderlys campaign, it eliminates possible corruption within federal elections Issue Advertisements and Electioneering Communications Prohibited corporations and labor unions from using soft money Unclear this is due to the nature of Bruderlys liberal, grassroots campaign

PAGE 71

62 Table 5-7 Continued Category BCRA Requiremen t Overall Impact on 2004 Campaign Disclosure Required a disclaimer on all political advertising and introduced stricter FEC reporting requirements Mixed while the campaign was able to keep up to date with Congressman Stearnss finances, the disclaimer requirement caused dissension among campaign staff Coordination Prohi bited coordination between federal candidates and political parties, PACs or interest groups Negative Bruderly lost an opportunity for earned media and upset local political leaders Unions, Corporations and Non-Profits Prohibited unions, corporations and non-profits from sponsoring issue advertisements Unclear This is due to the small scale of the campaign The BCRA has changed the way in which federal campaigns operate. While all federal campaigns focus primarily on f undraising, the BCRA has changed the overall approach to political fundraisi ng. This new approach to fundr aising impacts the ability of federal candidates to communicate their message to the masses. In order to be successful in the realm of political advertising after the BCRA, a candidate must possess a fundraising strategy capable of rais ing enough money to produce political communications. The BCRA has altered various communication processes within federal campaigns. The relationship between federal candidates an d the FEC has been strengthened due to the new FEC reporting requirements. Also, communications between federal candidates and interest groups have been comple tely prohibited. Additionally, the BCRA strengthened communications between political parties on the local, state and federal levels.

PAGE 72

63 Overall, this thesis finds that the BCRA ha s made it easier for political challengers to run against wealthy incumbents by elimin ating the corrupting effects of soft money within federal campaigns. Bruderly was aff ected both positively and negatively by the BCRA. However, the end result of this legislation provided Br uderlys 2004 campaign with more chances for success as compared to his 2002 campaign. The scope of political communication within federal elections was drastically altered by the BCRA, offering Bruderly and other challengers a greater likelihood for success. Limitations of Study While it is unlikely that the results of th is single case study ar e applicable to all federal candidates, it is clear that Bruderly did benefit in 2004 because of the BCRA. Furthermore, the case study used in this thes is is exploratory in nature, which limits the generalizablity of the findings. The sma ll scale of Bruderlys campaign and its noncompetitive nature also limits the findings of this study. Additiona lly, the participant observations used in this study were not pl anned prior to the beginning of the campaign. The individuals interviewed for this thesis were interviewed after the completion of the 2004 campaign rather than during the campa ign, which also limits the findings of this study. Also, the individuals interv iewed for this study are not tr ue experts in the field of political communication. Only one of the nine individuals interviewed for this thesis, Technology Director Harold Saive, work ed on both of the 2002 and 2004 campaigns. However, by analyzing the 2004 campaign, area s for future campaign finance research were identified. Suggestions for Further Research As time passes and additional campaign fina nce legislation is adopted by Congress, the eight thematic categories discussed in chapter four (contribution limits, enforcement,

PAGE 73

64 legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue advertisements and electioneering communications, disclosure, coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits) will need to be explored further. Specific atte ntion should be paid to contribution limits, enforcement and soft money issues. A multiple case study concentrating on the effects of the BCRA across the nation would be benefi cial to the field of campaign finance regulation. Another suggestion for further research involves the issue of campaign finance coordination. In 2002 the status of the coordi nation law was completely unclear, and in 2004, while the term coordination was clea rly defined by the Supreme Court, the various levels of coordinati on were not mentioned. In 2006, it would be interesting to study the growth of the coordination laws in comparison to the coordination laws that governed the 2004 election. Also, when performing further campaign fina nce research, the previous experience of the candidate should be noted and taken into consideration when choosing candidates for a case study. Because Bruderly ran in 2002, in 2004, he experienced negative consequences as a result of his 2002 campaign, which decreased the effectiveness of the changes to campaign finance law as mandated in the BCRA. While campaign finance will never go long w ithout the need for further incremental adjustments, this researcher suggests that a ll contribution limits be raised in order to increase the flow of money within federal campaigns and further level the political playing field for all candidates. Also, the coordination laws defi ned in the BCRA should be further developed to decrease the c onfusion surrounding these rules. Enforcement measures should also be strengthened to va lidate the importance of legitimate campaign

PAGE 74

65 finance practices. Because campaign finance regulations directly impact political advertising and the scope of political communication, it is important to understand the effects of these regulations. However, the na ture of campaign finan ce legislation is ever changing. As Justice OConnor said in the McConnell decision: We are under no illusion that this law w ill be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise and how Congress will respond are concer ns for another day. (McConnell v. FEC 2003).

PAGE 75

66 LIST OF REFERENCES Alexander, H. (1972). Money in Politics. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. Bauer, R. F. & Kafka, D. M. (1982). United States Federal Election Law London: Oceana Publications. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Campaign Finance Institute. (2004). Campaign Finance E-Guides. Retrieved December 21, 2004, from http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/index.html. Clymer, A. & Mitchell, A. (2002, February 6). House Speaker Schedules Vote Next Week on Campaign Finance Overhaul, The New York Times p. 19. Comptroller General of the United States. (1975). Report of the Office of Federal Elections of the General Accounting Offi ce in Administering the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Washington, DC: US Gove rnment Printing Office. Corrado, A. (1997). Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Denzin, N. (1984). The Research Act Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. (Eds.). (1991). A Case for Case Study Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 stat. 1053, 1070 (1925) (codified at 18 U.S.C. -17, repealed 1971). Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 stat. 3 (1971) (codified at 2 U. S.C. -56). Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] amendent of 1974, Pub. L. no. 93-433, 88 stat. 1263 (1974) (codified in 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] ame ndent of 2002, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 101, 116 stat 81 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. ).

PAGE 76

67 Green, D. P. & Krasno, J. S. (1988). Salvation for the spendthrift incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campai gn Spending in House Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 32 (4), 884-907. Hatch Act of August 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 stat. 1147 (1939) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 08 (1974). Hall, R. & Wayman, F. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees. The American Political Science Review, 84 (3), 797-820. Hasen, R. L. (2002). The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo. Loyola-LA Public Law Research Working Paper 2002-15. Retrieved December 21, 2004, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=320828 Heard, A. (1960). The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. H.Rep. No. 96-422 (1979). Jacobson, G. C. (1980). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Levine, B.J. (1997). Crime, Law and Social Change New York, NY: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Mason, D. & Cassady, A. (2004). The Wealth Primary: The Ro le of Big Money in the 2004 Congressional Primaries. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. McConnell v. Federal Election Committee, 124 S.Ct. 02-1674 (2003). Mutch, R. (1998). Campaigns, Congresses and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law New York: Praeger. Overacker, L. (1932). Money in Elections New York: Macmillan. Publicity Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 stat. 822, 823 (1910). Publicity Act Amendment of August 19, 1911, ch. 33, sec. 2, 37 stat. 25 (1911). Sorauf, F. J. (1992). Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities New Haven: Yale University Press. Sorauf, F. J. (1988). Money in American Elections Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company Publishing. Snyder, J. M. (1990). Campaign contribut ions as investments: The House of Representatives, 1980. Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), 195-227.

PAGE 77

68 S. Rep. No. 92-96, at 1774 (1971). Stake, R. (1995). The Art of Case Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Taft-Hartley Act, 18 U.S.C. (1970 ed.). Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 stat. at 864. Whittaker, B. (2004). A Legislative Stra tegy Conditioned on Corruption: Regulating Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC. Indiana Law Journal, 81 (3), 1-25. Yin, R. (1993). Applications of Case Study Research Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishing. Yin, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.

PAGE 78

69 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Laura Dunn received her bachelors in po litical science from Clemson University in South Carolina in 2003. Dunn was born in Alabama and has lived in Gainesville, Florida, for two years.


xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID E20101130_AAAACG INGEST_TIME 2010-11-30T15:18:43Z PACKAGE UFE0010700_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES
FILE SIZE 19870 DFID F20101130_AABPGV ORIGIN DEPOSITOR PATH dunn_l_Page_09.QC.jpg GLOBAL false PRESERVATION BIT MESSAGE_DIGEST ALGORITHM MD5
f5330d5ef5ef7a84f731271260de385f
SHA-1
8b432b8a530634220b857843c9b321bc60cf57d5
45347 F20101130_AABPBX dunn_l_Page_43.pro
3751a4c79eb988847f9218c8ac1011d0
fcdc92b6c25655277e75cef31d839c8b52409388
1983 F20101130_AABOSC dunn_l_Page_42.txt
d6ce306224fd99faae5db21ad3575160
ceb4c6781bde21175813680852a4c398a459f9e8
1053954 F20101130_AABOZX dunn_l_Page_65.tif
09f21c5a3a005ec1fb4f04c3e4e18575
d53d273f79a2e34187ca5cd33db799d771611e59
21610 F20101130_AABPGW dunn_l_Page_46.QC.jpg
69013f37a23f1b38cff1ae0ee314ba86
dd5cd8f736ec1025ae5d9c89ae3f9e2dbbc57607
41336 F20101130_AABPBY dunn_l_Page_44.pro
2c2c2cc18262cf53e3b0b31b6dea21fd
5bf9f39df9d5138bed897e058a99fbdb130bec0c
23200 F20101130_AABOSD dunn_l_Page_36.QC.jpg
05753e0edca4152c8a179c15c997e934
c8cc3dc25f684f79db705ef69a8e235a6c8eeb05
118744 F20101130_AABOXA dunn_l_Page_45.jp2
ce5acd0956ca00fa557caeeb9a86134d
1fd5f531bc15c7ad32e8bfc84e98408ca9d84c95
F20101130_AABOZY dunn_l_Page_66.tif
24730179de2b4fa9734c134fdf23190d
f809ba3130bee0e27fc334d9f4189a845dc6cc04
6121 F20101130_AABPGX dunn_l_Page_54thm.jpg
4c45e2c37668a580ed0a6f13b6348624
b4502488dfc0f87b139bbb6c8650029e041212f7
54879 F20101130_AABPBZ dunn_l_Page_45.pro
b4db5333a4b880b5587557177db42f4f
ed0a94946acf7c70b9638046129e7f852be62535
5881 F20101130_AABOSE dunn_l_Page_69thm.jpg
31644bfb7ef3a0f0e8434c95205f56a4
ac9660d8e184cc03a1176ad182baaa337bf9911f
100139 F20101130_AABOXB dunn_l_Page_46.jp2
5dfe0d7902d89cac07a6fe9a825890c7
41aa3f5a042a29b384ef56343aa987de77ec4c1d
F20101130_AABOZZ dunn_l_Page_68.tif
ed424769ea86b68b773796f2f1f42658
3257dec7012cf6bb9a9c7163474e58d450da7c84
23936 F20101130_AABPGY dunn_l_Page_60.QC.jpg
53eb9ae39230bcc195472b341a8226b6
57eb21a2dcc31b399c32619ec94e78504241c8c2
67022 F20101130_AABOSF dunn_l_Page_46.jpg
4e237d8129dfbe62085c31c95905643e
5032a27412193e90542c7c8679197258ba1b7399
107538 F20101130_AABOXC dunn_l_Page_47.jp2
757b3a3cba595d967110b9429eed74db
4a559937d7665f681b30719b8958a28797235395
1910 F20101130_AABPEA dunn_l_Page_39.txt
70de755e4c70e2da87bd384dfc866dbb
5fb993a09bf7743117d173794c96cc0297404c87
105727 F20101130_AABOXD dunn_l_Page_49.jp2
f622178faf8086ab4370419f9d4e7f17
407e444bd246ebd5f7e29938e3ee90957ad47056
21877 F20101130_AABPGZ dunn_l_Page_32.QC.jpg
36c43e29cdd644c4a59708c17239507a
95703060556a974e971d216f3a555681aa04fdfc
F20101130_AABOSG dunn_l_Page_49.tif
6c773b0988d0e09bbb4a9ef5b44b8f1c
981bbbdfda32d8d7fe1b431002cfec4f1ae879db
1847 F20101130_AABPEB dunn_l_Page_40.txt
73ba65a1b080189113511f8d343aec75
20aefe9082e8ce5352e0e467d7599479ed1a3070
114215 F20101130_AABOXE dunn_l_Page_50.jp2
f2852da7584136e339e25e69e17a7758
2bcaa21fcb96167d22286334638f2c58cf1f28a7
20796 F20101130_AABOSH dunn_l_Page_43.QC.jpg
fca9dc2d2ad3aaa896d83918ecab3a40
9cf9c5ab81a48dff508241385d3c02e198dab28b
2000 F20101130_AABPEC dunn_l_Page_41.txt
2d7339e1879427448dac425953b537d7
0b928c8c1a8415f07cfc1f2cc51bff96b7e5d026
121153 F20101130_AABOXF dunn_l_Page_52.jp2
ef32caf4c55c9ec1a7a7ea0259d1be03
5aa08625ea5960c9a9e2b631c67f1bf4c5cb098a
6521 F20101130_AABPJA dunn_l_Page_48thm.jpg
1612ca1dfb28b5da7d0a9e5f08b0861b
8003dbf0199d5071d3b1432d01514d40fb05e6f6
6514 F20101130_AABOSI dunn_l_Page_53thm.jpg
3f7c02a2c99dac5f8a626714d029ff0f
6b374053cad413d12cbe569de0f6992347eacdd7
1811 F20101130_AABPED dunn_l_Page_43.txt
8af618ce5d93ddf4305f58ea0e055ac6
890f69bbbf95c403f475abe0f4dadc3e6d52add8
108358 F20101130_AABOXG dunn_l_Page_53.jp2
cdab90aaaebf3a7d0497352f78d81b09
b3f45b6a5aeb45e96998503e7ba6b91b1c4b2aed
25063 F20101130_AABPJB dunn_l_Page_52.QC.jpg
cf3e8de81b36ba213dc5a0663134c12d
2fb728d973509b25dbbb384441b926f093cd2d16
68586 F20101130_AABOSJ dunn_l_Page_71.jpg
236ac40a0b3d328a0949466460c49b81
a60aca8f11c91adf9dd0744e6cb0f0c4c9945cd7
1730 F20101130_AABPEE dunn_l_Page_44.txt
34344a1c09830f8df73126fae2bd4812
66a3ef2e71c2ed6a28cf7d1a34b4fa35fc88364e
95414 F20101130_AABOXH dunn_l_Page_54.jp2
08def18b5bb1704bc532ae83ffecb191
214a0670fe9064c386312147fa4d2f7500bf734c
6746 F20101130_AABPJC dunn_l_Page_52thm.jpg
4eae62441805bfe1fdeeb732fe112a39
5bdc15b641b8dcaa2f8130eb704658f8579ce451
2424 F20101130_AABPEF dunn_l_Page_45.txt
a86e7a51adde75fbc129d48cfe7617fd
88e9847fa056ad22391e0469699ed49f0ed91162
103472 F20101130_AABOXI dunn_l_Page_55.jp2
4fe5662ae1f8e3f5700af5a77261e59a
7d428c02a1426d36a0a62dd7749b3ae9b1cedfdf
6620 F20101130_AABOSK dunn_l_Page_50thm.jpg
546cc5e20e48d7aca643596324c02610
c956b1260c990fe2d36847cc800f61bf47df7c7f
24079 F20101130_AABPJD dunn_l_Page_53.QC.jpg
e3f83bba58c4f0f2e6d85df77f8425fa
e15a16739f7be225e28d83e0ac4d3cc4c1113d99
1827 F20101130_AABPEG dunn_l_Page_46.txt
e3ffd2e90b8616c8bf5b66c4eeec90f8
7a0d738746230f08a0effc3229a457b0484542f7
107398 F20101130_AABOXJ dunn_l_Page_56.jp2
38733cef303e0180882d50433f2a3630
faf233c00c23b48571c7df524a847db8a30cbd20
1874 F20101130_AABOSL dunn_l_Page_48.txt
e558b0b118513b87da30f8e3bd4317f6
f4cc94e09447d245df9f4aa5ab5753ad3e5eb8a0
21115 F20101130_AABPJE dunn_l_Page_54.QC.jpg
6f06405074f611e5c3084e7642f3e49d
f60dcbe91528fe10ee1d32b36f9b898dff30442e
1982 F20101130_AABPEH dunn_l_Page_47.txt
5331017ff5b647d13c35e6bafb90efb7
fe3526f57753d767ca22f3327a9f0dcbd6314048
122544 F20101130_AABOXK dunn_l_Page_57.jp2
02953c7ab2c8261967b1a3aeef44fc82
6c0eb1ad29f8cb10db12dce01c0f4baece7f9524
18902 F20101130_AABOSM dunn_l_Page_05.QC.jpg
5b29cfeb9e17a6766f8e6a017bd77ad8
b3a7b352134c946eafcf9fc60a6791391ff20ca3
6048 F20101130_AABPJF dunn_l_Page_55thm.jpg
ae79f23ed2651ad56b5f398e04105543
c57df080b254135f4c37dd62de413ec4d4e18e05
1899 F20101130_AABPEI dunn_l_Page_49.txt
cae0d1384d8a59c701183fa600902f89
ca0a1f65181bd311949eb58cea8200a37d62012f
6530 F20101130_AABOSN dunn_l_Page_56thm.jpg
6169016e5b6d8c3f5af5d3a68fe7a374
da4036800c84b089b327e4c6c610446929cf1913
22738 F20101130_AABPJG dunn_l_Page_56.QC.jpg
be29797656f84f8a1711f7e3d1f92521
cc5403bb17fb14ce8e191556da520feaaae5972f
2102 F20101130_AABPEJ dunn_l_Page_50.txt
530508dc2e7b6f544ac571d0627d5a75
f6d0aac6ad54e6d1b4fe3231905996f5cf4615f8
112236 F20101130_AABOXL dunn_l_Page_58.jp2
a2ff94ec2632cce48f26017909100089
9cd56877c025bfd43c62402e9d0c451bf7f87e0f
22978 F20101130_AABOSO dunn_l_Page_59.QC.jpg
cde56305bc75678dbb94d9ce509ee3d8
d17d6aafc05c87c28b23e92db0508ff5aaec1ae9
6694 F20101130_AABPJH dunn_l_Page_57thm.jpg
da4ddea547e45eca7f53c4990c45ddcc
ea91c46e6db7fcc5a8cc671791ae4a6158baa281
2187 F20101130_AABPEK dunn_l_Page_51.txt
d60b770bd04f2edd7b0083102346774d
4d65cfa4c585967fa83e1db68cc2b9d7ecb3da99
111133 F20101130_AABOXM dunn_l_Page_60.jp2
6645f0670c696c11166f9fede9ce9d48
81318ed5d489ebd8d32e4f7050b025b097dca876
69403 F20101130_AABOSP dunn_l_Page_55.jpg
3b1ee796d66e1b1c819afd0b2b330dff
f3f6e0b1f0b24ae5eafd001aaf7e09e2a51ab36c
24001 F20101130_AABPJI dunn_l_Page_58.QC.jpg
f1845d4efa2c9282557e20e479f4bb0d
c28097eb4cc1429813e59276f50c9feb0d0ce294
2309 F20101130_AABPEL dunn_l_Page_52.txt
f400a8e24d9387c8c432a9fe3049b130
951326482004906f8ef85332da4df68a36e78047
105986 F20101130_AABOXN dunn_l_Page_61.jp2
a166c605028ef1f2789c7850adab8757
fd8852b9f4fed0ca39a7928c5d69d1ff4627c4cf
8423998 F20101130_AABOSQ dunn_l_Page_39.tif
7dcbb4f0068ec8f6252ddda9be365efa
a96dcf0b2b30d7e3f94d72b46574a823b6dc1f8b
6583 F20101130_AABPJJ dunn_l_Page_58thm.jpg
7f2a0b9565204c464ae99d2c6f21c419
5f099f7bdda1b0164b553bafee0be48f7f59b42f
1960 F20101130_AABPEM dunn_l_Page_53.txt
ed5cf45b0e5fbafc5737db19108cd991
f797fcffd9bf614b97887693c1ff6b9ce8beba8e
109043 F20101130_AABOXO dunn_l_Page_64.jp2
090236455f4b48aa650da72a1cafb2cc
43ad084a98cfdcebf45a6a6af1d091568b8a8762
69423 F20101130_AABOSR dunn_l_Page_75.jpg
84684bfa55212d3a7032dc38a6e62dbc
b64b4d1275f7a9f6826ea358c4fc3b5581951231
6639 F20101130_AABPJK dunn_l_Page_60thm.jpg
da8c2647c6d8ef971250fcb07a0a7fcb
7fd25c199abbf35fd8e46144ab5fd3e0d3504c74
1729 F20101130_AABPEN dunn_l_Page_54.txt
19ebf97d1d572ab42c4806503f1e942b
a0f5fedc6f71aea9c3f31b41322ba6629658b9f6
115295 F20101130_AABOXP dunn_l_Page_65.jp2
38e9573498cd052395c7e02806d95aaf
a88f0b77fe984e5a880c7c85eff330d0506ce9f0
22359 F20101130_AABOSS dunn_l_Page_22.QC.jpg
7f4e68bd8026435f25f392ed9eb80d3f
26b2d4c05a10c0f126f3c92cb9606f622051829e
22389 F20101130_AABPJL dunn_l_Page_61.QC.jpg
07d02fe625cce9d44703a854ef1d8290
2be834afa667a3f45d778055debe5d108c5905d7
1911 F20101130_AABPEO dunn_l_Page_55.txt
c1be914996136650ae293ffa068ae3fc
00921ca802e7745f11030f4c55022ea0ed640b97
113015 F20101130_AABOXQ dunn_l_Page_66.jp2
86a885dde1a0e453068454d177ad58dd
34af2530b09c64faf3a6e6f822d8f495af15b03e
49828 F20101130_AABOST dunn_l_Page_53.pro
5fa3e9d2c775d40688f8b0500f11d0dd
05daa6faf2f3628431803b6bb6e9abc1bd11e48c
23546 F20101130_AABPJM dunn_l_Page_62.QC.jpg
f86c2e198c153111d7f21f3c835dee7f
d4c8cde8cfdcb5040a514c7c53eb30ade3cc0e2a
F20101130_AABPEP dunn_l_Page_58.txt
c5f972025367c16a78152b634388c02d
1f8ea22862f15b4becc91e0a90aec108f7ca2375
111534 F20101130_AABOXR dunn_l_Page_67.jp2
18b53d90aec030a3bb5cbe81ec4b3329
0cce186c9718d6a957479bb164cdfaad4c9677c5
69834 F20101130_AABOSU dunn_l_Page_24.jpg
8d7fb5f2728677ef88a722b1899411cb
195c4d851cd87d129a6d633cbb3f0a8a518b3f07
24325 F20101130_AABPJN dunn_l_Page_65.QC.jpg
dffcf53476aa0041d493dc6b3d0a2116
12f110c63ddd9a91fd84c05c82ae0f652f5f955b
1915 F20101130_AABPEQ dunn_l_Page_59.txt
b8d2c8a806b2039335d637bfd8bd06d7
44952a8f8be1841866b0857b82572a6a57332060
74562 F20101130_AABOXS dunn_l_Page_68.jp2
dcad0fbce82748104f4ae957c1f6e212
5795e7ab8ae60e9b7976f1db210e8a54ec867a3f
F20101130_AABOSV dunn_l_Page_44.tif
13f0472a4867a4e27e8805c125eee1e2
d332b439dab527dd644e7d4a4fbf76dc303a8de7
23741 F20101130_AABPJO dunn_l_Page_67.QC.jpg
6e2cbe36b1fda9802f8e4b53a00d4b9f
30ec75ea9c388b3525560e7de91d0ce891eae718
F20101130_AABPER dunn_l_Page_60.txt
d2e12477e148c4f341090bca32fe9d8b
a582e7589bed4c869f35894506b6ba58a9947301
100090 F20101130_AABOXT dunn_l_Page_71.jp2
2d519fb6845666955054086f48147fa2
f8d586f31980b62214acbbd8978145109c0b4a6d
106175 F20101130_AABOSW dunn_l_Page_51.jp2
2c2590626bbe24b0b609644252891fc3
83b2484bce2d14e1d58480fa045bb515932ddf5b
6651 F20101130_AABPJP dunn_l_Page_67thm.jpg
9b3f68da2875ac0145e9c60250305dee
79897cb4effb5ce09687ec34c4d95e17b81892ef
1901 F20101130_AABPES dunn_l_Page_61.txt
890649142dc5b850ef2593c11f486a08
3329445f1b569560bc94e9c7c980ef0ff92c09af
105623 F20101130_AABOXU dunn_l_Page_73.jp2
c61399fb44d76187e7899c750b3e67e4
e40f342b51182a94890a30dd50029a3b75ae986f
F20101130_AABOSX dunn_l_Page_47.tif
2d90be86031dee78f938c7e6e9da3327
1e760b7d2b114ac3cb8af669c572aaa032bfef1f
24237 F20101130_AABPJQ dunn_l_Page_70.QC.jpg
67df902b8971b04bb223f97a02bfa15f
9165f243ff18fa3567297fab381d5c69b73ef023
2302 F20101130_AABPET dunn_l_Page_63.txt
9f27454beeccdc2506ca16f58ba1e126
8d59277b01965c7211750c5c8c2538afc1260cda
35336 F20101130_AABOXV dunn_l_Page_74.jp2
f6735def31e96ac676d6de4c9cd179d9
417cb1ee54380f30277fa501e0e13c5b56218b6f
F20101130_AABOQA dunn_l_Page_22.tif
e92aacfa3261518f2387245672f13c8d
bd4c6142e6260e62aa72d7fc51d13b170b222c37
43264 F20101130_AABOSY dunn_l_Page_54.pro
3284bba22ee1234a8cc3b573257d8b0c
3cfe3150104d0462746bca65ef3cfd6e1dfd60c0
21541 F20101130_AABPJR dunn_l_Page_71.QC.jpg
4459791e2e917caa968300ba8d60f43e
838aa0c1f6e4109089070c1e47ff67059cda2945
1998 F20101130_AABPEU dunn_l_Page_64.txt
911f8faf5c559a4606a4ae180207370a
861685224205f233f35ba90f7220ba85ba903174
100323 F20101130_AABOXW dunn_l_Page_75.jp2
e77f16cba361c7fe71792a839816e2b4
80bcddaeff47b151d3fa7398a28cf9851b109683
81549 F20101130_AABOQB dunn_l_Page_52.jpg
3c18c258a475185225edae01e483105c
5fb2fe45a2ac043bdd3360efd8b73beead6a296d
93883 F20101130_AABOSZ dunn_l_Page_10.jp2
9eba249b1c870fc9829632e8a9f3e388
53273a00e13af62e765698da1c223169bfc9b700
6202 F20101130_AABPJS dunn_l_Page_71thm.jpg
36a743e397574618551aec75d9ffbbfc
6bb95b999eac42ce674445ad8c7d0b29baee4e02
2104 F20101130_AABPEV dunn_l_Page_65.txt
d0cc7081ca22845de045f469821e0062
8956fb8d5ad590a9e4367ccd91db5ca69ec1e905
1051984 F20101130_AABOXX dunn_l_Page_76.jp2
12caf188e61b7b09f9b7451b2b7bc89e
47b4988cae599e8adec8a719960bd7efcc759033
70235 F20101130_AABOQC dunn_l_Page_11.jpg
1829b921b9137f5211be1bde158b134f
3ca25784d64a70768a18a3de79cdf2a6a8ba7327
23873 F20101130_AABPJT dunn_l_Page_72.QC.jpg
993435aa1df92df6ba9207fa5b1a666c
1d8912c92ce64b4da4fa89a7c40470484a2334fa
2151 F20101130_AABPEW dunn_l_Page_66.txt
a4392ef7ec8d96f772812f9b88efb81e
b924b5f5ea7b37e35d71bd67b693908c40701d4d
80965 F20101130_AABOVA dunn_l_Page_57.jpg
e7465dde321737fde99afb9075a9dd44
434f76e7cfcbda2efabe4885bd905cda20335834
37501 F20101130_AABOXY dunn_l_Page_77.jp2
6c5a2bc0788431eeac9723e84aae8751
2285b3808eb39b622967cdddc8b5935eac0eecdc
F20101130_AABOQD dunn_l_Page_31.tif
3959d6378356732bf84dd8dc9f45e3f5
2ac9a423f912662cadd99851533640a5c114eed4
8602 F20101130_AABPJU dunn_l_Page_74.QC.jpg
c4853b3769e50d8940700e38d743e70a
0a042db4ab5591ae5f347a0a1e3fe5a2c18054a2
74148 F20101130_AABOVB dunn_l_Page_58.jpg
77c9582a4cca2a87a52515bd4e1554e7
3faff4170bee34a94f821e528ed99edd873eb644
15855 F20101130_AABOXZ dunn_l_Page_78.jp2
ced901d272a009d3c0ba294a3931fcc0
c0847f669baba4a3c7f8fa14043383df9d1ded77
2696 F20101130_AABPJV dunn_l_Page_74thm.jpg
1800aa84c8b5af972365b696fd9476f6
47fd03dd721cc288a59ce75badb092ecb57b302d
1974 F20101130_AABPEX dunn_l_Page_67.txt
dc99a064d8f288b608d23ba834905920
c6d1fccd81553464b1aa0df28f1044af9141b82a
72607 F20101130_AABOVC dunn_l_Page_60.jpg
b17e6281468f747a4683c8fdba30e08a
885b0e69e0e12343718e2aa9d216e15131559760
16887 F20101130_AABOQE dunn_l_Page_33.QC.jpg
7beddaa1b1f142defc68b4904435a71c
49ca97cbf5a58017b70d3e77c9e48102a122f151
20293 F20101130_AABPJW dunn_l_Page_75.QC.jpg
6525c39006f332c48c9e799c747641f6
2291e2aa5f7d85b4bb3f4b9a82f542e29571f743
1776 F20101130_AABPEY dunn_l_Page_69.txt
25a0c17a4fcd19548d2b90ac8dbcad03
c0e60634a5f29f37e8bed42b593dafecc8acb142
69255 F20101130_AABOVD dunn_l_Page_61.jpg
9b882ed0c1fcc793a4fb4bf1e41c015c
a542f6d559b4f59ddae5bcca255bf43d5cc629a2
108234 F20101130_AABOQF dunn_l_Page_72.jp2
292ee3881df95b78608e51bc913b1f27
a16c3ca36bc3567df4804af8629ce8aae7f12225
45106 F20101130_AABPCA dunn_l_Page_46.pro
325246b63296dcaabfb5563ad6c1327b
a68f7e85e2c2cc969e53b2bf645e7ad54a015cb6
5518 F20101130_AABPJX dunn_l_Page_75thm.jpg
9c28aa2cd0ae65d1271c2b3288abe6c2
f7225f74ac0f5a4d1c526b036c9990c6a07c72ee
2834 F20101130_AABPEZ dunn_l_Page_70.txt
fb8b86603b2fd44a79dc94bb7c23df59
9d0a894d4b468009d747f09e730c1b4194e6341f
75148 F20101130_AABOVE dunn_l_Page_62.jpg
acf9e89e194f83ddb87177a91858fb56
2b1058eb9d7791bcf28b9ea6e58ecde9a1b472ca
F20101130_AABOQG dunn_l_Page_60.tif
9159af28d9a1806c0689f9c52d4aff2b
40ecba7c2256a60c102da1c095afbe83e454fe66
50034 F20101130_AABPCB dunn_l_Page_47.pro
bdd39a9577268f7d121b47a7e31d8cb6
2718ceb722a6e11db62d8330783a53f19001be9e
24092 F20101130_AABPJY dunn_l_Page_76.QC.jpg
74e45f09b12d7a2d0c1b2c2d1d4f7726
55dc6e51eaba4688bff28eecf31991d1c4c3f651
80357 F20101130_AABOVF dunn_l_Page_63.jpg
dcc50ef27fd40787f52d64fecc61da73
fffa9ad27dd550616ae0a43b3aea89b1f8a43ce1
53195 F20101130_AABOQH dunn_l_Page_65.pro
6b3a9c747fea93c07f5c80b7ad411f9b
198904a35f00e97d2b15a48cce595169fd54ea2e
47389 F20101130_AABPCC dunn_l_Page_48.pro
2568d6f83bda269349ad56e4e094cd12
31c8859a933b4a5a61f42a564b3ceee59890ed97
6730 F20101130_AABPJZ dunn_l_Page_76thm.jpg
2855f4cd825747171fc695e98e0e7c06
2fc990df98c41554e2e2b1cf0b17de4053a61966
6673 F20101130_AABPHA dunn_l_Page_70thm.jpg
3cd9c7352e3130e8e1b9f8fd1e8be1b3
591dc260be51fa6114bb4f194355d7558c470b2c
73475 F20101130_AABOVG dunn_l_Page_64.jpg
1e08f932946953be81dac07a054db994
3cb2a7c635a6b53254bb5911b7e58824a372a24b
1051966 F20101130_AABOQI dunn_l_Page_05.jp2
675b40abec86f942e34ecb6577d4f15e
1e6649fe6816734cf2b7f3562142cad68cdc96db
48001 F20101130_AABPCD dunn_l_Page_49.pro
4cd8a1d5a39da0ccb7386c61e31a741b
417d29c149d46ec70b2f023c770ec779d66b271b
23027 F20101130_AABPHB dunn_l_Page_42.QC.jpg
9b2dd4526b6768d38a558da2d530d8e7
e72e4f7f170a689a130c8ad3e7b5ff622a4f6e60
60870 F20101130_AABOQJ dunn_l_Page_09.jpg
4c3e2756f5a7375279abf1c93565f3e0
bb288cdbe3fe0aa4b4736f90e6c518ab2fcec247
57291 F20101130_AABPCE dunn_l_Page_52.pro
bfccc6709857f721117802a0424d5b8e
3d75740e1df99f5cec5360c56f3ca7a1b0b52c69
75396 F20101130_AABOVH dunn_l_Page_65.jpg
2850828aba8d357f695b53f79434566d
c8fbf9f67236327cfbb2f3d417b6c8c1ae39a6d4
6634 F20101130_AABPHC dunn_l_Page_19thm.jpg
3cc0d2a21a7eb3828a2fdf0b40bed2f1
a889e8d272f5bfa18d484ab74b08cd4507707a5f
48686 F20101130_AABOQK dunn_l_Page_18.pro
0ccc4d5304a6fb3e0283f4631ae0c768
e5cf0d88c2aa61c311c7fb9e7600d250a25d4924
47679 F20101130_AABPCF dunn_l_Page_55.pro
1028be399b0d157855a3629adb30f6aa
47ede85a8ea07fbba82a742d1b2121604b9f8449
74217 F20101130_AABOVI dunn_l_Page_66.jpg
844278aa0fe63a0590666022762bff95
2073f20e3d9b6f360f910335e1b56d6f9de391bf
5945 F20101130_AABPHD dunn_l_Page_38thm.jpg
f0ba209b900e67d7ec71b6af4cb006cd
21badf50da1ecfd9e3106bf2578fe81b5b32e3b1
2641 F20101130_AABOQL dunn_l_Page_01thm.jpg
54e4e29b89345ef4e94a5394973db162
9ddd76c9812e795b4e92b212f54766a2fb83f16b
50869 F20101130_AABPCG dunn_l_Page_58.pro
25010aed76929be17b116fb765a1822a
531011f9611e536e8317d54c92811d8a682b9773
5631 F20101130_AABPHE dunn_l_Page_78.QC.jpg
f46776e951a5b2fda46f1f15f1136a73
f359eae6bbb3578774fe9a6539a08936fc7e55d6
70481 F20101130_AABOQM dunn_l_Page_59.jpg
7826fc077eb4d495a156cc4f5466ea89
7f528919ab5284274fc1f60c344a28b75381c6e0
48329 F20101130_AABPCH dunn_l_Page_59.pro
984bca77041996ba5d9ec2c7bba3489b
612597f72228977ef59391b4c419c3c08d7e1034
72442 F20101130_AABOVJ dunn_l_Page_67.jpg
84e08778343022671a999e03bcbdfc13
de00d59920173f70ea6e5585d2698bca7f16b5a5
17127 F20101130_AABPHF dunn_l_Page_16.QC.jpg
1bcd57f55d6d716ff476b05e1d551ae6
28d56efe557d0ebcdbd2b6f96af1309bbb304972
71032 F20101130_AABOQN dunn_l_Page_56.jpg
66a75d951262cfbaf9b6cf0be67e0d40
d61ada5cfc2ef4f831976b9e1ca365cf4d7ab654
53530 F20101130_AABPCI dunn_l_Page_62.pro
3716e8d8419f00d5c2fe53b709b08bc5
db4542a7c38e1d1272875865dc169539b20badd0
49563 F20101130_AABOVK dunn_l_Page_68.jpg
2efb3e91e865b39357a0733176fafdc7
ebc18d2749521af5c9cac18e9932f7a60822341f
117142 F20101130_AABPHG UFE0010700_00001.xml FULL
1615fce6830fd77245adfca83f1ff5c6
9a820de12f09d6cacf15fc2e997ad5b53cf4a8ca
F20101130_AABOQO dunn_l_Page_46.tif
21bf194d98d6c312119f6ca0f0d4a678
03380b7265f027a67f0da1d8fd6b40be9a1411bc
57642 F20101130_AABPCJ dunn_l_Page_63.pro
7295821cf8ad5076fc39e37fcf46182b
ce619587d34480d344381a7b7762a70b6ac96937
62794 F20101130_AABOVL dunn_l_Page_69.jpg
e71f97b36b499fe21520c46888462b03
f8d6eca1590d3cd8c96b6704899ddb3ef013a10c
3250 F20101130_AABPHH dunn_l_Page_03.QC.jpg
0379296555de6a9297598194c58a7944
1fc67fdc395a0eb631a2cd23ad16900da154270f
23075 F20101130_AABOQP dunn_l_Page_66.QC.jpg
f16573bf0747e6ea86a8789ecc8cda6d
14875dc6749901db7e96adae2b6196f1f2e0cee6
50513 F20101130_AABPCK dunn_l_Page_64.pro
669e136da20d9d51edef873f98cc5727
ba78626bfe783a25aefa9256e72859d732aeb9b8
81078 F20101130_AABOVM dunn_l_Page_70.jpg
1d7365b35a01a9cb003233169d13c5eb
0f59b5d8ee5b34f9f9480d91858136ae812a19e8
1381 F20101130_AABPHI dunn_l_Page_03thm.jpg
593d7b66eaf7caae47ba4ee649749c00
bc2cca1d09df3aeaa64d60a1c9056e6c8b50257b
6662 F20101130_AABOQQ dunn_l_Page_65thm.jpg
27db6d3ce1585a290c674ef9925c1f35
ac894cf9d2b5a58b36411dc6cc8e06ec2a653a67
52055 F20101130_AABPCL dunn_l_Page_66.pro
e9eb9e860adbe016be7b1a75fbf569d1
34d3332a529c67c0360e9ed61195acc32408120c
71201 F20101130_AABOVN dunn_l_Page_72.jpg
28e58f00b7fa5d10d274e3f7226f098b
d323573a128cfabde1288b4ee6d1865f93865b65
5455 F20101130_AABPHJ dunn_l_Page_04.QC.jpg
752bb7f082c869335cc9b591ba733bb6
607de6a2718cd8c64c00f75de0dd7ba7f3755e55
64102 F20101130_AABOQR dunn_l_Page_54.jpg
7b2c52166c34724053621200715145e2
137bcf254c8075d7c49b4bf974053ba05c33e0c7
50142 F20101130_AABPCM dunn_l_Page_67.pro
d5802abd79cdf1af4cb0bf39b12739f7
b74d9d07d2f890972fd12832c6b868710fd562e2
68996 F20101130_AABOVO dunn_l_Page_73.jpg
b5f2d1b6585bd7bbcd0f128264bb244e
cdb8e5d3576a5939e774975ce4e304490d427181
1980 F20101130_AABPHK dunn_l_Page_04thm.jpg
0f71add9b2d046db1c8157dcdd0b088a
3de91ba7d39a9c129fa1b12bac9425539d81cef7
3321 F20101130_AABOQS dunn_l_Page_02.QC.jpg
232e004887f93aadb595c8cbc8d4f712
0993e8a43b0d26746540cba5d934fbdc909dc507
42556 F20101130_AABPCN dunn_l_Page_69.pro
d11a5a8e7f1c2361e39196e411ed5279
6cd2cad289792e4e355298cf34b2c463de11773b
27289 F20101130_AABOVP dunn_l_Page_74.jpg
ec5a782fe7c1a172a11469d0e313988d
5360587d8e1cbae5065464e66103db9598c77627
4809 F20101130_AABPHL dunn_l_Page_05thm.jpg
41ac80e37e32494f99145ce25e46697f
79875fbf61fe7e015fdabf438a4b9a59feed37ea
104128 F20101130_AABOQT dunn_l_Page_32.jp2
cd91aabc18999ba6106d5586d22be72d
fcf69574f81021fac395c243a8b0ad8f9d026ce1
56681 F20101130_AABPCO dunn_l_Page_70.pro
3e849afea7ea6ba342d1a2eb8785cedf
7213adaf688271cfa2cdf738d327314f0e7ac008
84411 F20101130_AABOVQ dunn_l_Page_76.jpg
c2722a5027226541d56dd0daf35e8fbb
8ac648d7126aabe4042b00d669b37773b5ddbd9e
2172 F20101130_AABPHM dunn_l_Page_06thm.jpg
ad81156ef747cfce871eff476010ebf7
1c1ba40e3b2872d15cbc9672d5f62aa067c64d61
25271604 F20101130_AABOQU dunn_l_Page_07.tif
02954e48dd840eb4c2aecd2d36b2b97d
77931fcc4232a2a21e74b874396f4ee9bb7ffb67
45279 F20101130_AABPCP dunn_l_Page_71.pro
50115be755e0b998a08e154c808f0c81
214364ebd468a2fad59cfb1714d22d7bd368b7ec
27519 F20101130_AABOVR dunn_l_Page_77.jpg
c14487a87efd3896ba2c9a90ac9472bc
e216646cf554bc719495d0cee02fe36c027e8f3b
3539 F20101130_AABPHN dunn_l_Page_07thm.jpg
1a2b378a340402d387462fcd562f0dd3
0222c39d4a298b995b62667ae055f980bdc7cdeb
2158 F20101130_AABOQV dunn_l_Page_62.txt
31d1b2008b9fd5d5b9eb95c15bd41b83
220030c4ebb59a1ee9c435f438302b0e054310e2
49874 F20101130_AABPCQ dunn_l_Page_72.pro
ac8a6c2eee72a797f9d446750d548e47
be3add7ff25e19e2dfcddc747454798d39790338
16796 F20101130_AABOVS dunn_l_Page_78.jpg
a7b9e8527c689c8a5782532c17210dda
035eeb7ce3d8b8aa9a2b1836a0e4e12ec12e8817
21828 F20101130_AABPHO dunn_l_Page_08.QC.jpg
da357b152d65655782d151de871ba8eb
fbd0f6d7f6d57ccf52b983956c54b51592394afb
6463 F20101130_AABOQW dunn_l_Page_35thm.jpg
910480e0aaf0b932df5a5eaedb489dc6
e5f3247216bdea1175e42ab588d8c84aab8cb526
48104 F20101130_AABPCR dunn_l_Page_73.pro
11baeeb620ee81c79fdfe009fae0b3a6
92cc2f775af06b9fbbabaacb4a4f23eb7c35e10b
26420 F20101130_AABOVT dunn_l_Page_01.jp2
311905c01db68e91fbec884f523e58c8
0ea4cff2078a06fcd2b48bc780e7573ccef80c6e
6119 F20101130_AABPHP dunn_l_Page_08thm.jpg
db4df43100cbef59fd0b03296a2f335a
f7a24c27db2f86c526ab00a41c0e0c4a2ddf4916
F20101130_AABOQX dunn_l_Page_61.tif
648e34cbcc4a87d5eb6a613e91f6bc2c
fe2660dfcf658262f5a26b0e753162ac00b95efd
50467 F20101130_AABPCS dunn_l_Page_76.pro
261b91c8d8909e07577f5412e107b32f
5aefe8ecba276416c0c0d1916609199bb634ee3a
6025 F20101130_AABOVU dunn_l_Page_02.jp2
7aa05e027c9f2722fa5e83a12538b79a
a12a17b3d6ec71bb733b733dd5da454a8c0ba1c7
6424 F20101130_AABPHQ dunn_l_Page_11thm.jpg
6f442e8091a4e74bd2b94b3792ae8807
1599e6270a0485ef2dd06fd0c5aaa1ceb82e0334
121482 F20101130_AABOQY dunn_l_Page_63.jp2
a909453c965efe7b046db28f142a91c6
d30aabc26a2a1db59d31be21a6c676fa9b244609
15008 F20101130_AABPCT dunn_l_Page_77.pro
b0e0df53481f3d2e55c50aa7e47f9047
41ac03acbfb4443d712bb00e9a49be80ba43f0f0
16644 F20101130_AABOVV dunn_l_Page_04.jp2
74cd10ddae9f63b94581ff503729adf3
3421a8154f9e8536ac0a0df85364c0a386183291
22735 F20101130_AABPHR dunn_l_Page_12.QC.jpg
cb17fa124f07dc2efffb8b065a78030c
554c007800d27e346155dcd1154eb3a816a82378
24242 F20101130_AABOQZ dunn_l_Page_50.QC.jpg
92cc7959243e0911573f77a7b25d313a
ebab2c8928c2342bcff03e03bcdfcd9a6595288e
5659 F20101130_AABPCU dunn_l_Page_78.pro
bb49c5bd9b245f75b776a29629472c88
a6199b819915278cd5c0520839f367cebc1b5748
1017343 F20101130_AABOVW dunn_l_Page_07.jp2
aa140072d97fb30e7084f5d03177e347
920bf0e5951b84a553051f3497ef3a4f491b0164
6193 F20101130_AABPHS dunn_l_Page_12thm.jpg
ba81c2b4c0bcf07350fe1c04c2f56d4d
36d83c96de8776506d4a8572c9c1cbd554bbb70f
977386 F20101130_AABOVX dunn_l_Page_08.jp2
b306161c1f42d418a73df554fc3f86dc
0f34cd6cffc874fc1576ab7556fdebc699cb4485
22285 F20101130_AABPHT dunn_l_Page_13.QC.jpg
f9acc4192d0ba643309cd787fadc13da
d2fe665467751625e5cd7dd3a301b382f65611cd
479 F20101130_AABPCV dunn_l_Page_01.txt
0711d20ce7eb904ce883dc7032d1330c
57b4bde63f68e613ba321cc78d94cfe24ca4358b
F20101130_AABOTA dunn_l_Page_37.tif
7b38a95112e7e035bcc8261df9c64771
e5f67b0755a0af229a31b1dfc48d95e5f060be5d
91826 F20101130_AABOVY dunn_l_Page_09.jp2
261c8922cfb8e71dfd0908a11498cbb7
20d8c4d7dae266b398dfd989cd9ec35dc4e1a503
6473 F20101130_AABPHU dunn_l_Page_13thm.jpg
4f893909a69bd0a003d6f5abbbc50061
a7fcfe14ff8bba2eb78a8bd743b143ee89597c77
98 F20101130_AABPCW dunn_l_Page_02.txt
3af4154df7c710d8a866dd38ad672c4b
302a63d3efa5b3967541cb966547411ea85e1ebd
F20101130_AABOTB dunn_l_Page_67.tif
c3b6d17218cc7c8f638161ffda7a2977
1b30d9c937f754b65b6a3c2d2e24e2b79c3783d9
106067 F20101130_AABOVZ dunn_l_Page_11.jp2
c0df7a6477dafbc50a74f975bdccd3ce
3ad56579f0b92914b42ce1dbc9d453469d3acecd
21949 F20101130_AABPHV dunn_l_Page_14.QC.jpg
dd881bfa7e19ff358c50767f7fe21f65
8557b99f9564c887fd490ce80ccde239f83e20ea
114 F20101130_AABPCX dunn_l_Page_03.txt
38d3e588d2d0ee0174a3fea0a795f801
cc82a2081e1d44b857d5d49b1d271e592d6b99d2
69927 F20101130_AABOTC dunn_l_Page_25.jpg
ab3a9a7d53dae147b09f6ca9b4f81bb4
8f98076f0f2cdea66e61df6c5c76e029e8970142
6169 F20101130_AABPHW dunn_l_Page_14thm.jpg
9ed845711408269ca6ee3732aba5ef73
17a8867cdb6e6e260e1039316c474c6542e3dfbe
F20101130_AABOYA dunn_l_Page_01.tif
34986540cc498d442974d7d8c2f4a834
2685d29380f78bc1ee1fa0b98e68cb5756a65400
F20101130_AABPAA dunn_l_Page_69.tif
f486c028773402f92579860a5c2324f7
e2c9b1a36c3a59c08cfe83bf39749db0519b5177
292 F20101130_AABPCY dunn_l_Page_04.txt
ce205d208df35f5d922a7b11c54add70
1d058406d78361b04723ec32e7e5d35156605342
6407 F20101130_AABOTD dunn_l_Page_64thm.jpg
0b99d5107c0a9c41939921390aa46c9c
b28cb4918d186254b25c5e00d506eeed3fc08012
4813 F20101130_AABPHX dunn_l_Page_16thm.jpg
10553dedc391a060b0296b51b6e5b9b9
e385863492f4c5b350709f887c3fe049075cf62b
F20101130_AABOYB dunn_l_Page_02.tif
e1ce625359b16a7c279bd076e1b27e95
7e0265df16c22eff8dbb914897e9a3f8ee6f3edb
F20101130_AABPAB dunn_l_Page_70.tif
6e3a90adc9413fa0a086eec919b4e452
6d08699809cd8fbc5ee78bbc469d887318bde627
3134 F20101130_AABPCZ dunn_l_Page_05.txt
65bca2ac965d23346763803b61c96fdb
077f36d4c4d9c57ec0695edd55b711970a3563be
15399 F20101130_AABOTE dunn_l_Page_74.pro
76806ce9c791e06a27bf5bfdcf9e4703
c67c40a254714c98bbdbb4cd07ca25e6d419dafe
22383 F20101130_AABPHY dunn_l_Page_17.QC.jpg
e27e949beaf050d73aebb2307c7a3979
ae15238c100f172343d0dc579982435501cc9187
F20101130_AABOYC dunn_l_Page_03.tif
3eb0c5bbe3b3dc4b0b93ff95328a9c32
f36f1cf8fef01951aea853c1c38145a78ee16871
F20101130_AABPAC dunn_l_Page_71.tif
938c6ab2bdc4ae7511cc856ef753b786
27873644c7fe34fe00badadc46a4f28e4a6c0f9f
90632 F20101130_AABOTF UFE0010700_00001.mets
73cbbaf9e77cc8a94d7fca745787675b
6b14c692f1bee00ea4619a59614ad102f0bb2eaa
6165 F20101130_AABPHZ dunn_l_Page_17thm.jpg
b2a9f06229356100708dce785e1d6be2
1bbe597412e19a44c03725d97961a3f9bae7c3d3
2236 F20101130_AABPFA dunn_l_Page_71.txt
531848b24f9993afcc3d658d2d010725
114c4881af1d80dc11ac61de6ce76453d8bf3b70
F20101130_AABPAD dunn_l_Page_72.tif
5772bbfe68ee7e214496c33b0aaca798
920b14ee13a9ad5935301e43ddde5b4b4d31d0cd
F20101130_AABOYD dunn_l_Page_04.tif
7e711e86f7ab0e7566abd81c037b1fca
525fdcce7e178b0fc99da978fb224407408e5c6a
2044 F20101130_AABPFB dunn_l_Page_72.txt
7093554e471123aa86703ee84364aaf6
31417efcf3b0425a0359dcab028914e69716d534
F20101130_AABPAE dunn_l_Page_73.tif
4762ec9dbe9ae314676f382c087e5a6d
0286d99e8f909048c70c88cc97b452b09b327a0d
F20101130_AABOYE dunn_l_Page_05.tif
fcff48cb1e9dd96c259e56f86414988e
0f363263dd6a0b03223e37622b046f6aec1b11bb
1902 F20101130_AABPFC dunn_l_Page_73.txt
93762c2f308e30f365fb595979c044d6
fe4233b1e2b2f1cbc705e0dbebd6c67db5ae9479
F20101130_AABPAF dunn_l_Page_74.tif
509e50860cc6eda3957eebf7c90f5ffb
c5e561e786c6afd9f0b9c4480ff4f2b402ecd6eb
F20101130_AABOYF dunn_l_Page_06.tif
2f2c01b92ad35050914f0b4d2a0676b2
ee886a45cff5861d27c104a17992afa89cb4145e
2866 F20101130_AABPKA dunn_l_Page_77thm.jpg
675db59367f896c29279c25955035221
8562ed891c0ffadafcd5355217e825707c4b99bb
668 F20101130_AABPFD dunn_l_Page_74.txt
0a3f13513cf5a1ee8d26233ca3a7bc2a
183d3b7d3f97d277f6be5e340e83541c5df33e57
F20101130_AABPAG dunn_l_Page_75.tif
e26d7cf17e669905df9ce03bc81e456b
d441e827395c323f602366ed3e52af2bf7268f69
24853 F20101130_AABOTI dunn_l_Page_01.jpg
2e91afaa3420740501fa6890abca6321
8b8f90081250839d1f281a4b356abf75f2ca6dc0
F20101130_AABOYG dunn_l_Page_08.tif
79affe8b82c4e48c8b925790b55ae9db
01805b1ec8291440e760b970b8c512f545aefc22
1863 F20101130_AABPFE dunn_l_Page_75.txt
22bac5abe85eda3629b32fff7282f3b7
642c27c16e432b9677be91c776a7f6475e170f9f
F20101130_AABPAH dunn_l_Page_76.tif
8435cd3ad214ecbf453aa570d0aff837
c8e5c10128d204dc34a30bc8d59c8751cec662c9
10302 F20101130_AABOTJ dunn_l_Page_02.jpg
c277cd6f8cb476f1e03175e203fa5523
fbb0b9aff0da3e421e403b1cb3ad51fd5eab3ccc
F20101130_AABOYH dunn_l_Page_09.tif
486bef646af803ad714d0cc6a6123970
279544bfdc7c1b9631a5a7c0c6fff139bc7c95d1
2087 F20101130_AABPFF dunn_l_Page_76.txt
d47810cb9a11c17c8b2f7f2504a6a911
c583684a1be150de885c9247532535d2e38c049d
F20101130_AABPAI dunn_l_Page_77.tif
9693966058cf2e633e6265207275cee2
35c922071ae14097e5ebea8b6bf37cc6534fd1b8
10787 F20101130_AABOTK dunn_l_Page_03.jpg
fc02dcc27af8f17468da60a4b3303ec1
e5c4f065518ef122c1a7b2ac14ecc9cedc7931c3
F20101130_AABOYI dunn_l_Page_10.tif
63992fdf3cf70afa2f5c49297204abe2
cee46012cd9e224e207425b1eb5d0431f0c624ad
273 F20101130_AABPFG dunn_l_Page_78.txt
4cbc027227eeab85c25506f9e95f6147
2784e1330d92d41947e6e76f6cb6e7f8173b65ce
F20101130_AABPAJ dunn_l_Page_78.tif
0990b32def3d1001901a97ffcda10ebf
5af89871060fc496e293b7bbe6946d0afd034d1c
16923 F20101130_AABOTL dunn_l_Page_04.jpg
5eecb8cbd6a7c533909604370e643f2f
bfe53e2aa135ba6e3ef41e7ae1d1f9e886113646
F20101130_AABOYJ dunn_l_Page_11.tif
0ff5814fa599ab06d6ae049a41a88d51
33efdb7ecd65cc78a354878dbb0f2a5df72a1cc9
214768 F20101130_AABPFH dunn_l.pdf
ab5b56a4ae92afac63745691010edd30
510ce88129f34c65b06412909a13a759aabcad49
70242 F20101130_AABOTM dunn_l_Page_05.jpg
675de8a4e57947028d4490af9a6e0861
eaefe911e909cc15ed7c8269d80c423122d9aabf
F20101130_AABOYK dunn_l_Page_12.tif
599ef75b7e924c842302c13928d89c5e
2873f145eea6feaa2bef9f86d85c7788bc661db2
9046 F20101130_AABPAK dunn_l_Page_01.pro
30711cbc78e2b076d0fde396d905ed6a
1444a8196e24045186e85b1e8816751112ce3d49
22901 F20101130_AABPFI dunn_l_Page_11.QC.jpg
2c028c539544dc958fcc6ee82e7032d8
52f9bbe58004696c131ccfc77a84a275cd28e009
24208 F20101130_AABOTN dunn_l_Page_06.jpg
ce5eaa1ded9f3b1362a1d587de29a129
6cca0dc7ce3daf71b7209ad8bcf3eabdaf1ae2bb
F20101130_AABOYL dunn_l_Page_13.tif
ff2c674286b3165cc4b3540b4bcdb2f6
f1bb9f336b21a2aa886d390a5a95f23713ea62ac
1302 F20101130_AABPAL dunn_l_Page_02.pro
495a847d8bc229dc8332a428cecb4b0d
46dbc9057f1ede13167d9b0b117f0f1e52c25c9d
12069 F20101130_AABPFJ dunn_l_Page_07.QC.jpg
9fd50551ccd10165daba0ab6a5a2aed5
4602dd444a264e2156d6939c0530d247c07cf31c
40666 F20101130_AABOTO dunn_l_Page_07.jpg
baa58b94e0775fa9b39bdded1d3125a5
665ccfc339a2162652f001e8f42de1b24efaadf7
1558 F20101130_AABPAM dunn_l_Page_03.pro
09db47947fbae1dc1db0f1fb2cc666f4
f7eb0b15f0bf7ded6fb0886e67a77437b3ff414b
22408 F20101130_AABPFK dunn_l_Page_73.QC.jpg
f3077dd04e4802937dc40004104cc257
321e90eaabde65fedd64f871062bbd14890d0eb4
70227 F20101130_AABOTP dunn_l_Page_08.jpg
cd7baeffcbf4b86870aa33e01e5313f0
0bba0abd4eea07f7dafc1984ea71931c935a34f6
F20101130_AABOYM dunn_l_Page_14.tif
d95318e526126302b8b3866dc54a625e
a8bdcd5d1930fe974f0fefb4c993e63b2bb78a65
6075 F20101130_AABPAN dunn_l_Page_04.pro
2b4328e7e32ae1767c48f292f497d53d
db1c0171e9239183fa55de9e330a377635fc00ac
24721 F20101130_AABPFL dunn_l_Page_63.QC.jpg
77492aa4566d6d3c28a935ce42b0b219
d89c9ac11608b2fb8ea0642d5294122e7e18f267
62090 F20101130_AABOTQ dunn_l_Page_10.jpg
fed9769ccd9fc3bc72dfd8c4a03cc47f
68c280ff1fbde426297bf4cc4a3145ac8c6c7264
F20101130_AABOYN dunn_l_Page_15.tif
04fbcd35d2b30bae0d2e4fe9789a2d2b
532ca01fb8d1845a1af63584bb602626703d10b6
76492 F20101130_AABPAO dunn_l_Page_05.pro
b3f40ec223b8cd61da8a7040d3ce8c0e
5a3b69d532d9b97aed119d9894b537dcb3b2dd6b
6130 F20101130_AABPFM dunn_l_Page_46thm.jpg
e71ee8c3d8c9db19d03711971bb13493
fbf3e72c6423b81bf1298c4ac893ad461aa36254
69473 F20101130_AABOTR dunn_l_Page_12.jpg
4fda42b4c782980b431ba6bd74bf6fb9
e1b6f06d181b356554d64e8b41dd3827071ae9c3
F20101130_AABOYO dunn_l_Page_16.tif
5c40c34605914193fff1e4e20448f6e9
511925d2ab88dfef9674e2ca1974bf46488e45ed
18782 F20101130_AABPAP dunn_l_Page_06.pro
b5d620761c539ab46983e3defa203356
a071b2cf61a0e34acb67577b7ca5760b0637210a
16392 F20101130_AABPFN dunn_l_Page_68.QC.jpg
8a3beef5506af7900cf9126fe55bdc55
6b5d9c4decc238dd1e80991956afd3369d0b761b
68124 F20101130_AABOTS dunn_l_Page_14.jpg
c78e67c1d4541734137d397761286acc
64cdf30d89078ca3bff52eba5571b6ff756607ee
F20101130_AABOYP dunn_l_Page_17.tif
4f7bc7b117ddc3925ad1460e11a970f4
cd4bf6908bbe517e5ec9529d9e2f0a9ec3b32d0d
27944 F20101130_AABPAQ dunn_l_Page_07.pro
2cb2487accf4e8efea447cfbfb81742e
f43da88c068932fb73fc36123d343be5e9988cd8
6395 F20101130_AABPFO dunn_l_Page_42thm.jpg
8f6c07b8362f6bf920bbb9d869f46630
34e1926a92e1f9d32a0c863375bf6767eb71c5ab
35744 F20101130_AABOTT dunn_l_Page_15.jpg
65b25ada516645796ac5d526cb7370fb
91ddfe813931f34dde9211a6f4ef21e6dcd1e00d
50478 F20101130_AABOOW dunn_l_Page_51.pro
4400d985fccd312a8e7c473cae1554dd
92ba3450a28affe8461efc9b633bf500609e20a6
F20101130_AABOYQ dunn_l_Page_18.tif
167ece3853f835783535e7c70b1fddbd
5dddbd46903ef48afc0668f13a7c91eebfa425c2
41378 F20101130_AABPAR dunn_l_Page_08.pro
14f462aef97efaf40ce1bf0d45445462
d92281d0a088a64c3fe807749489426a72bb8157
6674 F20101130_AABPFP dunn_l_Page_31thm.jpg
4d9f559506c49b13e2a77b65a9e1f60b
36ea3cd2fcd1a6d7539d17e6ac790baa8ab14264
51797 F20101130_AABOTU dunn_l_Page_16.jpg
ead13186f503befed801a749b37a37b2
29cfac8a996be0bef0fa647bd0f748d89a38e3b2
2002 F20101130_AABOOX dunn_l_Page_19.txt
404f52014e22bfdc099e7479c75189be
e92fc493f4a619d8c3c0628277448a6b6cb82a91
F20101130_AABOYR dunn_l_Page_19.tif
f91ab02f4061fdbdfa860ea4f5ddde47
5347d8e377b01ba825552dc7c29d59c7e9903d0f
40827 F20101130_AABPAS dunn_l_Page_09.pro
848328ebab6abf9b863f81716b11587f
4b1553d6d21d9788461d428dd2e1effa343d8213
6323 F20101130_AABPFQ dunn_l_Page_66thm.jpg
47c37b4e9f10c98f233b82fc675bce9e
23ac7835f8d8648bd96aa72745c3f44d2195a74e
74546 F20101130_AABOTV dunn_l_Page_17.jpg
e51aefb56d4f226bedb68df79c9300ec
28058c7c7c358aa98a3c8c202884bd7b40a3dd00
114565 F20101130_AABOOY dunn_l_Page_62.jp2
69c3902939c48fbdd37a1b9d48caad1b
b021c766777cc747835f5e4af05f03770e5d7ee3
F20101130_AABOYS dunn_l_Page_20.tif
2b7382f52b3c81a98856ceef33427762
01fe1be5bd325fcb1116e593707d45bb95ca544f
6509 F20101130_AABPFR dunn_l_Page_49thm.jpg
786d7eed8405bfe7fe8f2b42079ad9d0
c9d3a61cf2098b3d38ccdcaecad418381d4007b6
70021 F20101130_AABOTW dunn_l_Page_18.jpg
69f87b4c0a8e312c5edd5c7628bf1abe
9f09915fa3f7d6dbcd2454d02ee3f551f2111cc9
66159 F20101130_AABOOZ dunn_l_Page_34.jpg
6978541dc4661b4d723ab3c1353efdb8
700e5f674c37468836409d554e42fb1b76cbd814
F20101130_AABOYT dunn_l_Page_21.tif
c5de405f4f9a27c19f4f6da3335e849b
9204f86c3a00b4f47eaf6fcf84f4b587bf58101f
41776 F20101130_AABPAT dunn_l_Page_10.pro
acc1be24012d152f1422ca5fb8803b7a
6d8005db8c4fff6c6076052a145e54bf1a3abb5d
7842 F20101130_AABPFS dunn_l_Page_01.QC.jpg
613497ca807bc2f9e0888f4c7a255966
bfb76a15b5129071e7da942baa614abf4137b0eb
71468 F20101130_AABOTX dunn_l_Page_19.jpg
1020833c1b4365fa98b1da115328b7f7
a87711bd9f9b9b6467114bcccba65a2eff91171f
F20101130_AABOYU dunn_l_Page_24.tif
44ca6bc6b1b36d75a7f7e08b6c50db0a
14e16b19351a7df67e264752bdb3ff0799ad5c51
48182 F20101130_AABPAU dunn_l_Page_11.pro
56e833da5f0242513702983543673dfb
843e87107ab2c7895e55c1cd92c1ea04bf9b6d4c
5617 F20101130_AABPFT dunn_l_Page_09thm.jpg
29fffc7d106cfc29f8b350f21942ea78
0c46c819b93ddebf846e57b82734820d853f47bf
69603 F20101130_AABOTY dunn_l_Page_20.jpg
1ce1b9209eb84eb6f8bbfecc1478690c
2974f3685412bad5c4245f15851737990e016751
F20101130_AABOYV dunn_l_Page_25.tif
085eed4ea6db4af11c66bf160a1c1004
b575abda54a07a23dece6536713be9dd6490e7d1
47177 F20101130_AABPAV dunn_l_Page_12.pro
c8eac933d927856bc83696bbd55bed58
10a20212f8d1b7577b77a895ab1769ff87efe99c
49498 F20101130_AABORA dunn_l_Page_41.pro
bb74df8f23aad3ee4d0a04cb8ea097cd
f4c47cbcc0c7965a1e27d22bea0c25529562b258
21418 F20101130_AABPFU dunn_l_Page_55.QC.jpg
e7849c4d1c135e78f5cb914b798f70b9
b729568f12d8654f7159828f4c31aa9770e21a7d
70897 F20101130_AABOTZ dunn_l_Page_21.jpg
bf81bcf00c1e464725389cdbcfc3a2e7
f10d3f259cd68b8ad1a96a9e3b173338c76ceed3
F20101130_AABOYW dunn_l_Page_26.tif
4ead9f23c1bd2f0f02e55851f874c2d4
afcde3152c2d589f74ffd3af13c57059b0b342f6
45703 F20101130_AABPAW dunn_l_Page_13.pro
1d08d33475e6481b2aef2a33daa2ec90
27189850b03f5287068c46591b4a03a4910bf3bf
44760 F20101130_AABORB dunn_l_Page_75.pro
4b3c039f44eff26bbb98f2b18cf67ccd
416cf8fcdb97bd8c8943b5d3c1d16d0822f57066
20779 F20101130_AABPFV dunn_l_Page_38.QC.jpg
cd8716f9f90dc2cda26f1fe9e5c92272
68ba07e6b7b4292e360ebaa0a339775b2c818bbf
F20101130_AABOYX dunn_l_Page_27.tif
9ba96d5d067f115d44f58bb6132aa39a
ff03a96993b9640b10c585e29736f26c6297b384
46452 F20101130_AABPAX dunn_l_Page_14.pro
5953e37821451bed262063432471d3be
f12cf846d410ebadf6788005994cb7e1caa99a16
6340 F20101130_AABORC dunn_l_Page_25thm.jpg
42c0e2b9e1e3ccfdf8cb635504508d1e
c94e1c65fdf8f90c33d6a044a2bb9f2d0bff2043
22694 F20101130_AABPFW dunn_l_Page_24.QC.jpg
fe737836f66c6693d66bb1988c82bd82
8c61c95db7d3a39b7a67fabd3fe87cfc3e12d3df
104661 F20101130_AABOWA dunn_l_Page_12.jp2
efea82957c99a11ecc693b5bd2a13c9f
05d4fb23c6b3abe3c6d26da67bc9048ec32372fc
F20101130_AABOYY dunn_l_Page_28.tif
ea514f959bf1e3af3abc4ef92730972e
5a39277fb12d50786eff57e30289f414e3e5f42d
20615 F20101130_AABPAY dunn_l_Page_15.pro
2020b52174f85a2adc6a38b7fea3f312
ab2d2b226dacd61d3a03ee0f2be6e33d0e54e8a6
32178 F20101130_AABORD dunn_l_Page_68.pro
8c86f865f699e4093feab2b159908c13
c75bd9e016406fbf1aa5cc7607f5d25a2bbb0d41
6757 F20101130_AABPFX dunn_l_Page_06.QC.jpg
c4fcfc84a0aefb8c4c3583703c574f27
53abb40f552a355f52a31ac1a092b6a00ed45420
102075 F20101130_AABOWB dunn_l_Page_13.jp2
d0cffccff879fed59e7284620e3824cf
841194512c929dff667c5d8b518360e1c23bef94
F20101130_AABOYZ dunn_l_Page_29.tif
4177e663e03fbb28e753587167027587
bfedc42bc70b2e7213b009e623d5455f8e6cfdc4
31699 F20101130_AABPAZ dunn_l_Page_16.pro
baf85fb33ad0baf337b7011045657d41
79e53309fd63783f12a6fa88c3123d18a1bb66fd
93382 F20101130_AABORE dunn_l_Page_69.jp2
d542f892f80f4a466635448bb2455825
9cd3d2db2480651ad30351763920039d61ce5ffb
48485 F20101130_AABOWC dunn_l_Page_15.jp2
76dcaf762290926a57410917037001ff
b5985c9e2167e9be663939c9bffc4a042b2c331c
23073 F20101130_AABPFY dunn_l_Page_51.QC.jpg
a7cf3520e655c7ea7b021361bf44c934
cefe3849e79be49984e99a3103d3387b16233cb9
752 F20101130_AABPDA dunn_l_Page_06.txt
81be959b16e64215f051ef0006b35e11
c271c33d03ee9835a4306700bfa74f87ec2f7227
73970 F20101130_AABOWD dunn_l_Page_16.jp2
a49384daeef193ff923ef5a39231120d
7132fdc3e92429abfed04b0f41604bc109ab4aeb
67417 F20101130_AABORF dunn_l_Page_13.jpg
01b6d548589f841426dfb8aa68e48c07
bde72c52cf544981d452809b1929a2957328f674
6291 F20101130_AABPFZ dunn_l_Page_61thm.jpg
0b0b323c479ad4f253dcec203842dbb4
c510eb6815a445da57f49ffca631174bff5ad503
1170 F20101130_AABPDB dunn_l_Page_07.txt
54d675d630bb9157955602118b49910f
f081153d564bd0202a36962c1621818d1c73c604
101806 F20101130_AABOWE dunn_l_Page_17.jp2
f2ca4ca7641eca13c500962103c1df49
e3fd6c958e77f86a022cdfb32d37d5a68d74a1a2
24039 F20101130_AABORG dunn_l_Page_64.QC.jpg
e9bee295424ae44555e3428515e6fb89
81514abfc464e4ca78f1983380600103c97b2848
1630 F20101130_AABPDC dunn_l_Page_09.txt
11d1b71d49fddf49e2303170f70713cc
c4db2f4c5bfe328fc6bc539186234bb303d6eaf0
104808 F20101130_AABOWF dunn_l_Page_18.jp2
b13dc2b75fb246216bcd6d3af0013fba
fdd3a08aa085a9ddde3e70d00969f22deab72a18
6255 F20101130_AABORH dunn_l_Page_73thm.jpg
8e990cd5c0881bb1ad27b88b1663bd95
88277163700e75e3755b712311d55eef7d61352c
23007 F20101130_AABPIA dunn_l_Page_18.QC.jpg
1daafc407e25aa69d577992036a0e8f7
8034a472d400ac0a648aa25a277489d646220c6b
1733 F20101130_AABPDD dunn_l_Page_10.txt
35ee2c814a41c7328e5555450ce65c2a
90a5a375e957afa598e43cd64d3520a51aa73ce9
109255 F20101130_AABOWG dunn_l_Page_19.jp2
761bcf9ee7aad4c18914bfebee09cdf5
4e71257df634627009f3a02e4669758c94c41d17
2312 F20101130_AABORI dunn_l_Page_57.txt
412562768cf257932c58b1ec24afb6f4
be5972be747c37fd3220312be261120fd85f201f
6351 F20101130_AABPIB dunn_l_Page_18thm.jpg
5d9f3f84a3edb0860ffb71337cd965df
fc60bd9be22f1a578d39b02fe77056ba3c7439f4
1867 F20101130_AABPDE dunn_l_Page_12.txt
4ed1b2c23732e70c629e72d4dc962cd5
ad1945506a3b86fb53001b227ad70a734893d9dc
109099 F20101130_AABOWH dunn_l_Page_21.jp2
8f10a6ca9f21b6eb6ca34b768126ce7e
1d610fa866c4c5f185a5f9e5059418ee9abe387d
104767 F20101130_AABORJ dunn_l_Page_48.jp2
893c66dbb3db020f0403d3420e48410a
dfd3d1668e9b52de3c65963678447a3cf3f30c5f
23405 F20101130_AABPIC dunn_l_Page_19.QC.jpg
ca78ca9bd4566dc3157a7559bcd21e67
6f15c30b58d63ea575db1aef1c37811dc69005af
1884 F20101130_AABPDF dunn_l_Page_13.txt
9660c2334129749d093fb81af6dc49f9
88ad187fd2fa4488af545b460c41ea667d4fbe46
105216 F20101130_AABOWI dunn_l_Page_22.jp2
02ea2d85f9da4c70f8ec9c2a50574665
4ee1914323a4ef6460084af2f4b2936fe19598b5
1347 F20101130_AABORK dunn_l_Page_33.txt
d6691eedf806e871ed2dc6e47fb96e54
2f6195b39abbd18c73eb41787c680b1bb4412c5f
22425 F20101130_AABPID dunn_l_Page_20.QC.jpg
befe4e247566f0848c3735f7d00f3826
7316b4a63ad7e97d1007d4beba78c2adc15fbc70
104911 F20101130_AABOWJ dunn_l_Page_24.jp2
a8d98984be181f897533e5830820f817
b764c600c0ef0cdda4396d6174a5eb7a2e3da737
52870 F20101130_AABORL dunn_l_Page_50.pro
6e5836c154db48846de60dfce7f51eaa
0782f0b0b64a165b542b17482190072da54dc159
1841 F20101130_AABPDG dunn_l_Page_14.txt
6ce1cdb8ffaf968e1adde6aef53a5ee9
3e0d737a0bd7b76e225f25c378461c949dd9fb9b
6339 F20101130_AABPIE dunn_l_Page_20thm.jpg
0ae8e3ed7dbd840504e9d8d4c586189d
eca5e9384950e977577877b0ec91aac3318f9fca
6074 F20101130_AABORM dunn_l_Page_34thm.jpg
485deef821eeb08fa45e3519578c17de
9f59c1801741e05e544c0d777032ed6e2d033746
1345 F20101130_AABPDH dunn_l_Page_16.txt
639c283b74691cb610842f5000ce83a8
eb4b7dd08cc9b7232fb5b3d909dd0051a59a73ed
23351 F20101130_AABPIF dunn_l_Page_21.QC.jpg
b16762c99d577970058c5e248e4fa4c6
2ec15ee4e0e84ed10e04fa14335c6b158049c853
105890 F20101130_AABOWK dunn_l_Page_27.jp2
da6f6759fad0624014b7f3af068d7341
c783d52d241c48009b40cf957dd4fa49a8fe08d2
5765 F20101130_AABORN dunn_l_Page_10thm.jpg
6c5abb693f83d6de03522f47855998f5
269b9cfb776285e140ebf0ead8e2b3ff6e34dca4
3879 F20101130_AABPDI dunn_l_Page_17.txt
fd29b77cfcc552803a674701eae214fb
12f8e4bd9ccf3da69de29f3f899a191d2d1b6285
23892 F20101130_AABPIG dunn_l_Page_26.QC.jpg
ea143613ac5469174a06ae7d8a867ec6
9660979b5c5bbddc9ba831b3be97478bdf15d5a6
113448 F20101130_AABOWL dunn_l_Page_28.jp2
8045fe7ee8d41867e65aec685814869f
d959c1f412b0257bd99c23ce97b9f53f787225e6
24575 F20101130_AABORO dunn_l_Page_57.QC.jpg
366dd9ccbccc9fe213719351d0bdc43d
1e46cbdaf6bbfd1010e843bd515b7dcd8fb74138
1930 F20101130_AABPDJ dunn_l_Page_18.txt
6ab8747e3b1ad5cef26bcc7c73747bce
2df958cddf02869d3999465faed548c26560f14f
23174 F20101130_AABPIH dunn_l_Page_27.QC.jpg
fd67897157c2eff72bfd7859ee86cb23
04459e459746b4d97393292439d5767ce3c271ba
107470 F20101130_AABOWM dunn_l_Page_30.jp2
93e00e238cc31e32bd0834333a97ee65
f439eec3af41b5a5068b3238def0e4886da480af
3710 F20101130_AABORP dunn_l_Page_15thm.jpg
ac6dc60a69f80637fe4104a47e5030f9
7acc20018edee8c697d63b0b3c8fb25a5d066587
1889 F20101130_AABPDK dunn_l_Page_20.txt
0fa91909b8b60f7ef310483db733a9b4
d6bfbfe054da81314c2db9d8cbec34becdf943bd
24134 F20101130_AABPII dunn_l_Page_28.QC.jpg
fe1ef7a87bb2581109763abe5a83d0ef
bdd3df8e421d1be5e2f1ddc475de88f3b071e94c
107405 F20101130_AABOWN dunn_l_Page_31.jp2
35e1e77223ec28c3790d3c0123cf0b0e
670ecb92c96c8765fb69ac0392ddfaac624481a6
104598 F20101130_AABORQ dunn_l_Page_20.jp2
8bbc1002d8ef2e4e9b4360f49bfcf05a
2fd3b8c125355644715dcf75dcf8d61342526afa
1971 F20101130_AABPDL dunn_l_Page_21.txt
f05762247fb8ea0b3d54234b8e6c30c2
8e5ffe8dcf67c49340b94d594d0406557ac0039d
6600 F20101130_AABPIJ dunn_l_Page_28thm.jpg
ae95bfd059e88e72e8ef3db24ebdabb9
e522d18c6c50571c2c047017fb34b6488f58b1b4
75966 F20101130_AABOWO dunn_l_Page_33.jp2
5617a8954f30d412f46c9a895f82c909
2da40cb5ec2d569efd4a08f34ae6738d563580b7
48029 F20101130_AABORR dunn_l_Page_56.pro
55500791029a8383248bc796dcda42be
350a6585d7e63f792acf7479a26cf53b4c4978fe
1871 F20101130_AABPDM dunn_l_Page_22.txt
54e2f6efc8a6d4c98dec320c4045fc68
0bbbfc3ae3d2266400dcf1fc3b2a712cc941a4e0
23164 F20101130_AABPIK dunn_l_Page_29.QC.jpg
bb220d752467e743360f790f88f5db77
549770b1424be4d4939f4b5cc49f8eb2eb5c6958
100202 F20101130_AABOWP dunn_l_Page_34.jp2
0dba11fa1a27c2cd1b7fd93275e7fa8c
f569d0b005236e4efeac1d15f250854d564fde7d
6443 F20101130_AABORS dunn_l_Page_03.jp2
5baccc6255032c38bd96cac6c2682a18
14eb2ff4fba470006421a1aa47986319827e72f7
1881 F20101130_AABPDN dunn_l_Page_24.txt
b047fcadeb86ae739c70c1ae9298e64b
502e58c9931a25fb08f446b133ce2a3c6b2d72c1
6505 F20101130_AABPIL dunn_l_Page_29thm.jpg
56640bd6c6b1a6d8091c37f686f12017
defd602fa7d15ff885c1549f8189fbe47bd9a39f
107276 F20101130_AABOWQ dunn_l_Page_35.jp2
2d784b9a74eeff04390509d6e37bf01f
1f79c490758967731cb8e96defdd2eebccae1575
1898 F20101130_AABORT dunn_l_Page_56.txt
fd9bcac480c76afc420db883177f25dc
21d27cfe2c224c1c633e7060b4bd3bd952c5f260
1913 F20101130_AABPDO dunn_l_Page_25.txt
4682d881a2867ab0dbf0b19a90bea8fc
8952cf6f9f7f999a0e1c5360040464caad8c7051
23110 F20101130_AABPIM dunn_l_Page_30.QC.jpg
bc20601bb625c6eed9ed1b2beb96f9db
ffbe47e6fe3ea64ca431ff27df20ce6f0bb4d0e6
108797 F20101130_AABOWR dunn_l_Page_36.jp2
4a384963d6a82327e5678da354b29d2e
6f86402a3bd4151f3690ca35048ee61e8aae0d05
1292 F20101130_AABORU dunn_l_Page_68.txt
09498daede170ae06684493c5c41223b
d78640d288f2e9cc3a3ea87ef2de67e6647eab1b
2043 F20101130_AABPDP dunn_l_Page_26.txt
36071509c513f8d00225ce633d10d470
c1291d602af29900343c2d929064fe3d3a8e53b4
23095 F20101130_AABPIN dunn_l_Page_31.QC.jpg
4a4d600c98a45cc4996c99b6afbb276b
34d635d9f6ac5919179ec9365c33fd27637dcc7f
105238 F20101130_AABOWS dunn_l_Page_37.jp2
e5534506b8ca2626365c6a07f91790c2
67d392dab7060483539ed2224d3178dc770c9b6d
50270 F20101130_AABORV dunn_l_Page_60.pro
957bdf1f861dd9e836fe35d565b6c62b
2f4bb3bdae75886dd6958a0b748ec76bdf901ba9
F20101130_AABPDQ dunn_l_Page_27.txt
dcb91ebce8d55e3a000bf16c6b1040f7
5e97ef12751062d896e5d035185c6de835f115ef
6338 F20101130_AABPIO dunn_l_Page_32thm.jpg
6d709dde73abb6504c2b0571aaa06416
1e0e251bd3ee9f2f555c2b3937ba67aeefdc7346
98242 F20101130_AABOWT dunn_l_Page_38.jp2
d2897e42c7c9bbab7a33634d863b0826
3f75090d2b5824cf9d22edf6eac540350bcbc064
102729 F20101130_AABORW dunn_l_Page_14.jp2
6eefc1c81136e6612fcdb4dd755c9da9
911797309470c9cc000e1c6b41eeb1154be3648b
2026 F20101130_AABPDR dunn_l_Page_28.txt
38cfd67095acee0ee8ede4a793e4f0b9
a1d0503bbae17d6ef55153abdaf0e596a56f7ae8
21315 F20101130_AABPIP dunn_l_Page_34.QC.jpg
f4e7575a26337be8ae7b9f0cf3c404c2
8f68ee15a391ba96b8e0cce66fc771bdf171548e
1051944 F20101130_AABOWU dunn_l_Page_39.jp2
65cca72207a6dd1a45da9023b73e9483
a2eea27a2180a063ebdd8b64e8fc158836fd4dc0
F20101130_AABORX dunn_l_Page_11.txt
de0dd7086a2ee1c59080d671af009da2
2082d8f13cf141b5b5b85d9b2bb4be6ef2a7fa54
1950 F20101130_AABPDS dunn_l_Page_29.txt
a588345571716e06b5886be09a8932a8
cc1dca3407fc4a94de703d23c7c1f5710fda2bb0
6149 F20101130_AABPIQ dunn_l_Page_37thm.jpg
5dc194162e4eca3a046792faf0f0211f
c2511516d0c1d6fef96766650086ad580653ab5a
100222 F20101130_AABOWV dunn_l_Page_40.jp2
6a8c925b193b68bc4303994d9d775e37
75e0a9ffafd1d187de2bf7fc2592f3d3d2db2af5
891 F20101130_AABOPA dunn_l_Page_15.txt
877caf4f376a36a917c0675b7514a798
983eaa8cf9f4b683adba4f68c054f23657f56c17
8881 F20101130_AABORY dunn_l_Page_77.QC.jpg
662a2fa4f1a58be0708140c46a4f8feb
1b31c071639cb14001436880bc6c69af5a3ea681
F20101130_AABPDT dunn_l_Page_30.txt
ec1c29f70df786fca460b7d36d24864c
02cb5190f3c30a4ea4a4a12833ee08e17ce57436
22457 F20101130_AABPIR dunn_l_Page_39.QC.jpg
3127ec6a02559659f93820a14ce768a5
610141b4603a847824bda7ee24bc5b8ef1a455d5
107859 F20101130_AABOWW dunn_l_Page_41.jp2
3487cb158a2487a4cc5de932f1b4200f
cff33be18ac0faeb70529d80124311766f65524d
F20101130_AABOPB dunn_l_Page_47thm.jpg
1ff4be08928d777aee3af49b7b4a81fe
3a6f4fad408060b416fd96af8c79037b783248fc
6494 F20101130_AABORZ dunn_l_Page_51thm.jpg
4ef87d1ff12f0cd81a941eff32179d9f
6a13cc26b67c6b67fa78388a66940b286091aed9
1916 F20101130_AABPDU dunn_l_Page_31.txt
45e3346cb6b2611d0a318329b57060e5
6dfeda9d8bba519c9d1ab8060099ebb8e34c753e
6005 F20101130_AABPIS dunn_l_Page_39thm.jpg
12a1eab9669648c8f935deff3e0ca4f3
e4f20516e2081fd2d69fd016adbba1b65b7ca048
109680 F20101130_AABOWX dunn_l_Page_42.jp2
023b4b353264baca30fd56b23bbaee12
3a7f882b3d3d7b6c6259b8bad5b77cba0aba2a98
1798 F20101130_AABOPC dunn_l_Page_08.txt
1740a72537512927fff1ca07d6a1cd65
99abb38eb0b276f160f05bbfe0da2425e8cfa864
1814 F20101130_AABPDV dunn_l_Page_32.txt
e0d09a3e0555bb6f487ae42685f7748d
0c4d5cea8e634b7abcd80b7475fe52517187fdbc
F20101130_AABPIT dunn_l_Page_40.QC.jpg
9e8a90bfc9a733dcdcefd2eabd60840e
a19004eaf3f86803e79f31760afb7a5cc27d0cfd
98578 F20101130_AABOWY dunn_l_Page_43.jp2
6e7e87349d1e18524519655605f85993
596a787bb2fcbd19ce55e40344b4db9f8aded157
69215 F20101130_AABOUA dunn_l_Page_22.jpg
0d943bbf916eea5fb208a58687c22ec3
5b1d1fe2ac00538d6bfb3facf5bd2585637689c4
5830 F20101130_AABPIU dunn_l_Page_40thm.jpg
60f2c3c3e3196d2f3703633939dbfe08
77df8797c314f34809244913f3cc286d67449d12
92350 F20101130_AABOWZ dunn_l_Page_44.jp2
e36fc739f91b1930a553af8124143d3b
5af135d144b45587f5d76908e3945a62edc04b5c
6512 F20101130_AABOPD dunn_l_Page_21thm.jpg
3ac74e4b2b081e08e7816506a476c4fd
1f2652a0c0a9b9b6c413cd3d7d49282231141ef3
1878 F20101130_AABPDW dunn_l_Page_34.txt
7fccb778e06e7bc4b70c20c2e716d6c4
ac0f121a0bbef03e50d8782505bb39d51e594cd5
70314 F20101130_AABOUB dunn_l_Page_23.jpg
b5407e8e82e96e455f1ec8bf2a2a5377
466161d5f025f0c7e303a60f2b10f5a4a0842c6f
22366 F20101130_AABPIV dunn_l_Page_41.QC.jpg
2df6d71c42c709c8c9d0ba7a074a7961
4945af8d02a35f1bcd693ca219bc8eaefa16f750
6446 F20101130_AABOPE dunn_l_Page_45thm.jpg
a919583831c785a2804d1b919c128e39
8b066a51b50623bbc6d617bb68b4d6dc2aac28a9
1977 F20101130_AABPDX dunn_l_Page_35.txt
4e14f07442c9fff4edccf0dc5bf4ba66
d684be3ea7366b890bf840528e77508d5397c48f
72703 F20101130_AABOUC dunn_l_Page_26.jpg
74c4ec9175345ab95d685cdcf83ecfc7
7f3e41582ec34b13c113e776fb2978276e7df509
20208 F20101130_AABPIW dunn_l_Page_44.QC.jpg
efdafa891fa87baae86967e7eb853b07
07bccb18408fd2c3103253c2ccdf3070ff6b99bd
73999 F20101130_AABOPF dunn_l_Page_28.jpg
c1efdd1215a5b6125b284632ef5e0f02
cbd16b656b6cf3dcd2165b80435a604058a55785
F20101130_AABOZA dunn_l_Page_30.tif
02d164480b6dcdcbca752897d0a5b6ac
0cf751a3e6a423459d7c7e176df60d186b2fd3d3
63571 F20101130_AABPBA dunn_l_Page_17.pro
9f7d1488fbc5d126fc24e2f94894aff1
acd68e612db0db31b19f412cfc9c45f84014362d
2012 F20101130_AABPDY dunn_l_Page_36.txt
ba4db1b3d25d2921608c4bf08af7a0bb
74a4c1414ee428954edff8059531d04b3f2c9f86
69938 F20101130_AABOUD dunn_l_Page_27.jpg
ffcd2d671827c5ea3327923a4a2d800d
602b10d72488c15a7fe91074ded2b996a23a3740
5672 F20101130_AABPIX dunn_l_Page_44thm.jpg
6e23ba4c8ab2e3f80382fcc17a4c4ecb
35194c3e2f4e6fb873abe1f9cc6a39b8e755c277
6320 F20101130_AABOPG dunn_l_Page_59thm.jpg
12870de06a92fb114cf9c3cedb23844b
a68ec8a674d7eb795df081dbf9006529dc142479
F20101130_AABOZB dunn_l_Page_32.tif
0bbfa8801856d2e00aa5ac11862148e1
0e2871496291e34f8ac12f12f5a91b515d425604
50281 F20101130_AABPBB dunn_l_Page_19.pro
caafec43538614320cab54e45d180de4
a533e32def50bfb641be0352e64af871bfba9478
1944 F20101130_AABPDZ dunn_l_Page_37.txt
c81ec840e19d099e1e2ba495b02037e3
4c5ec02ea57ef614eccc19e2320c476220edf8ef
71975 F20101130_AABOUE dunn_l_Page_29.jpg
b12a759c6962ec889bb2dca6c7d6ba0e
204290d1cdb39e8f6155e316809e936a0a950abd
23623 F20101130_AABPIY dunn_l_Page_47.QC.jpg
ed7930ffc732840f4453772f176953cd
4a04cfacc2a2418da5a8fd0818237b2003753571
6533 F20101130_AABOPH dunn_l_Page_41thm.jpg
246d67a451098890fd840b6a15063a89
99ee075a987c345b9b74120106e681083af23bdd
F20101130_AABOZC dunn_l_Page_33.tif
82412df169e5fd36770f884a7e22523f
ecd1966afb2e143145564e9af08ca81bc7da89ba
47668 F20101130_AABPBC dunn_l_Page_20.pro
eac4806641194c7b52dd58b52e39b52e
d33a90566012f6b12f712d482d508a10ddb60064
70670 F20101130_AABOUF dunn_l_Page_30.jpg
99c8798810a13abac59028d1177fa3be
4f3eecd7811db0bda87a6b0f96126787badbd927
22274 F20101130_AABPIZ dunn_l_Page_48.QC.jpg
e1ccc9b6a3f12acb152c0973bf482878
46f138fc3d9667d4fa0f011246d93a9aa96a0d0e
6490 F20101130_AABPGA dunn_l_Page_72thm.jpg
7b2b5e06f3cb9f696f89d3cb81ec0a7a
d8662985254361bbe782296deb3834151a7554f8
F20101130_AABOPI dunn_l_Page_23.tif
8eaaa24ef69fc7c7ec1a987265604143
037ce7edc6a65a8b9a9491b0a0ed03b6f5eede73
F20101130_AABOZD dunn_l_Page_34.tif
c29d2e3946b2a9c6204dc591eea89748
e4c0323a38c9260b6ecde58eecb6485c0e9c7d29
49688 F20101130_AABPBD dunn_l_Page_21.pro
a4564fa887ddff6770fbe394c106f8c0
0e637791dd622bf52bbc44c39039b0bd9154cec5
69836 F20101130_AABOUG dunn_l_Page_31.jpg
11f325aabb1b3a8dbbf0b0c7fb755de5
77ae06e122cfb9e806954672f547573b35035667
6738 F20101130_AABPGB dunn_l_Page_26thm.jpg
af2452b3af07469aef7d2ff3eead8d32
0c1f5103a5d809920c5e7c1df240260be493285b
112418 F20101130_AABOPJ dunn_l_Page_26.jp2
139e24b388566345dbe65c4500e37ff5
87625d56414d7591375b5e49c80801b4a5550d7f
F20101130_AABOZE dunn_l_Page_35.tif
a2e8dc4462eff0ac394cc61e75fe3aae
3d197e8b56c67653b409ade723010c2fbbe67b94
47209 F20101130_AABPBE dunn_l_Page_22.pro
5bf426ff8e0301f8839159f4803ae6c2
751a12f7859c30aa335be5ac96cca21127a3321c
68884 F20101130_AABOUH dunn_l_Page_32.jpg
52422591f5a42a9b32cb1c2f2b84a2b1
4b3a3536a94dade3b7b96862fa170a9a910a15d9
20461 F20101130_AABPGC dunn_l_Page_69.QC.jpg
55c5d3353ee2c86d8074655c1db38f08
f74aeb8fa21005a0f0574f54fea42f7d51e5a3eb
108093 F20101130_AABOPK dunn_l_Page_59.jp2
d1e977153f0ee26157fba645a4e0b6d2
b9d3216d8436a4bc61c97dc07887204b69aceaaf
F20101130_AABOZF dunn_l_Page_36.tif
c34f729ddb9e9f4f53c795bdd72cbbb2
d47372d54067ec8510daf6f43a3add135cd4a780
48433 F20101130_AABPBF dunn_l_Page_23.pro
270d6a31b8ec215883a6c0bcc0f2c879
34ef5a744da5bb20de0ade6162f3dc718d1e791e
6267 F20101130_AABPGD dunn_l_Page_23thm.jpg
2064aff8e96e0da8673b394979dba673
ffc5a0494a2db4112725b1e2a9f2b904a4340223
509034 F20101130_AABOPL dunn_l_Page_06.jp2
7d02f44aa847fd020dfe57bda5943653
27e6531f18556697b8dbcd3dd74be16f2fb99b66
F20101130_AABOZG dunn_l_Page_38.tif
ec2ada46b4bc4aa0174f36d565943442
8b4b069f81816d054e46a471e2a446a19cefca0c
47221 F20101130_AABPBG dunn_l_Page_24.pro
8dea0656851b91b33e602f3797d6bfbe
e759a1dab303ad20663f0a690d66f9ccd75f7060
51291 F20101130_AABOUI dunn_l_Page_33.jpg
9b7ad34d865dc57da7d1e2c2f2c2324f
8ccd8ea30fb63a00d9b3fd9a505210ac14b342df
6640 F20101130_AABPGE dunn_l_Page_62thm.jpg
ebaff57b47f8cd3214bdb842485ff7bf
a70edde06308e52b941de700a921dd7f0a5bafe4
48217 F20101130_AABOPM dunn_l_Page_61.pro
628b248c9219a4ec4bdb5a5082b41402
7a31e03026ea623cd858cee9080d4632a149cb64
F20101130_AABOZH dunn_l_Page_40.tif
3bf19cc34cf160930b0a5528a3754b4a
23155d2ed0637c65d5ce09035d23a24bffdb013b
48339 F20101130_AABPBH dunn_l_Page_25.pro
7c6b66dd3e6fa5ca3b4e533c7008920c
8196fa34d91a12336ea2ee301d6457140fa8182f
70634 F20101130_AABOUJ dunn_l_Page_35.jpg
2ac225adca255eb79b7d7c7e42f6bf8a
97796b9db5cd72709979a05976dd7ac4ad05c45b
5005 F20101130_AABPGF dunn_l_Page_68thm.jpg
23c8109ccd324b797c7f236695f8ddfa
19f398561ab44f109ed884192922483c1077e0fc
1919 F20101130_AABOPN dunn_l_Page_23.txt
5cbe1d428f5072451bb0c8d14b8f36d0
0ca778753ba19f0241b49d53fb4e433bdb476d23
F20101130_AABOZI dunn_l_Page_41.tif
6ba8b118f5d1366583b65d626e2e12d5
1e3d79e47b32866747006472dce1ced5ae886aec
47844 F20101130_AABPBI dunn_l_Page_27.pro
c4e413b8ba42caa964f66c9920901ec0
60b7c95ffc9536ff2e771ee6639e917ccde6dc18
71121 F20101130_AABOUK dunn_l_Page_36.jpg
34f13436ef2902dbe5464b76ba644664
adc219ff6bd5e0c90cb2fc99c6449e7a9d268226
6392 F20101130_AABPGG dunn_l_Page_22thm.jpg
6ebbd7c518b6cdb063a2bf837152b7aa
7e1c962eb7199e453be160fdf5b88e7d926e15ce
F20101130_AABOZJ dunn_l_Page_42.tif
86d8d54cf13e810726e9d561b4c6895c
7cb995d8178ec31bce5fe9d99e9cf5671b9f7820
51475 F20101130_AABPBJ dunn_l_Page_28.pro
b63d4201d00f0245569fac005aef2450
28561480022a87f6ede1c177ebc5da7899499b7d
69562 F20101130_AABOUL dunn_l_Page_37.jpg
039a3f9a96fef65f9b092684738e7284
6c2760c5da5f753549d3b4b0b5d306e84833508b
1373 F20101130_AABOPO dunn_l_Page_02thm.jpg
e2092a9c3ec7d040a8f9ed9d79337b5c
bb1dfde5e13544216142805e5532127906970b35
4865 F20101130_AABPGH dunn_l_Page_33thm.jpg
68146dc05d16acc4c727ff3a9a5a1301
c78efcc1bbca98a8770ed6104311c390780cb100
F20101130_AABOZK dunn_l_Page_43.tif
3cf5b48e3e76ca8e5ba525797616f648
d77c21f7371db67446cfae9c2fa18257cc8b2108
49349 F20101130_AABPBK dunn_l_Page_29.pro
b427d9fa83855d7258ac1bd9d1950a61
19600933568cfffa04e03cd733c79019d71fe38c
66755 F20101130_AABOUM dunn_l_Page_38.jpg
0f63431a834bdd6852b71f44f8ae3050
9b366f272b2db41d68897e7cb985f4b5a8210f57
616 F20101130_AABOPP dunn_l_Page_77.txt
4be0a884fdee73f9edb9b2fd1d8d30d2
141e407ed739f53f8e10a9dc19779843af9ce674
22427 F20101130_AABPGI dunn_l_Page_23.QC.jpg
88d4ff45c8f1ebf41805bd7f64906d73
3016e90efe0ca28d56385c235b9b16073bf220ce
F20101130_AABOZL dunn_l_Page_45.tif
f48949a0a0f92906eedaa303cc8a0d3d
eaba99f877e7497c6797a8b96728dfbb58037c24
48452 F20101130_AABPBL dunn_l_Page_30.pro
57e088228cfd86b7cb14573499436960
03ec3b3aa28a5f9fb6032051799aa2cd6790c2e2
75196 F20101130_AABOUN dunn_l_Page_39.jpg
c454bf0e24206c84dd8809d95fd8e78d
c73929f8f93b6bc3f08b4a72a4e6ce5e2129da05
1824 F20101130_AABOPQ dunn_l_Page_38.txt
a7baadc4eaf3179dafaeac795ebeb364
6d6d98c4f28f06c71633eb543fcfa12d0313d0b4
6506 F20101130_AABPGJ dunn_l_Page_36thm.jpg
ab4ec4083bd9dad3fdbbcf241992abc7
c719070f0f93ce968c6cc868eefbc5a5924bc8d6
F20101130_AABOZM dunn_l_Page_48.tif
c20d7968689d4b6c3ef82707e14cde47
9d798e31f3c9021997686fb5f00b543f303e8210
47958 F20101130_AABPBM dunn_l_Page_31.pro
6d68588d80891b9d3f6ee53ee657ffd6
57e551c26b73b6d147d32a3526f6dac842319c5f
66070 F20101130_AABOUO dunn_l_Page_40.jpg
ab2f32ae738093584d22ea66f132bc6f
8ed0a1e176cf142600bcbb8e7a7e7fe578be3144
F20101130_AABOPR dunn_l_Page_53.tif
0e0c2f7e95071db6808994379fdd5ed2
ac0236bd8f5b94979b330dc531fb1311615aaa82
5911 F20101130_AABPGK dunn_l_Page_43thm.jpg
2a34504e00e74b829fe03f4599f85a47
1d0d30472ee11beaa1d92cfb9716e661d633e564
45887 F20101130_AABPBN dunn_l_Page_32.pro
c48e373dabf747b0b7c384004a80b965
567ee6c41fd90737b9b2d8e4121dd391f29ec03d
69618 F20101130_AABOUP dunn_l_Page_41.jpg
a15d2ffbcad989f23917f3553da3e19b
ff65d6b383be9b872af8a4d43b89cca22d1f1a1e
117302 F20101130_AABOPS dunn_l_Page_70.jp2
348b2bbf9e707245bea9cbcb45e0ed01
0d1b9bdba39b24404d5e1c79fc6a13ecce0fd700
22749 F20101130_AABPGL dunn_l_Page_25.QC.jpg
d4370e4189e22c06ab3b7503cadfdf74
7e2cf107a36225ca9df023b0985937af24f10eab
F20101130_AABOZN dunn_l_Page_50.tif
bc8efbd3f7e819fae96569155ddf9e91
5ce717c453a9eec88b16d925b2bd4b1d372d8d47
33606 F20101130_AABPBO dunn_l_Page_33.pro
aea05f0c126ddef4bdfb169e55256f86
81b3db594fe22382f8ff47083501ccc8c61b9d5d
71404 F20101130_AABOUQ dunn_l_Page_42.jpg
06bf81db1a62d4a71436d45416b45761
8fc7431cbe49812eb8d0fedd0427019a87c32bb8
F20101130_AABOPT dunn_l_Page_54.tif
e760da382bd858ba0c892fc51e5f1ba1
8f54e4bdf13379b326057420925a09aaceedf72e
6614 F20101130_AABPGM dunn_l_Page_63thm.jpg
1c9143699c24b35b74518dcb7a314353
959aadc09628e3c12f2ebf78b69733bc9a6337f2
F20101130_AABOZO dunn_l_Page_51.tif
3cc4a483d61a3e4dfbb5d8b8845adc76
c593f181059fa1b1d9925c38517b9abed6870a4d
45282 F20101130_AABPBP dunn_l_Page_34.pro
a1e0987515ea019e9fafce9801f67167
eecbc2bab57ae46c962133e9d7fca77ef83bc6b9
64813 F20101130_AABOUR dunn_l_Page_43.jpg
af2a41022ea218af4f2363a383af1a11
36275d5a6a1e9e7c175a614a2098be4da8447e9d
F20101130_AABOPU dunn_l_Page_24thm.jpg
2966c142f027a2c181cc5c838a77f60b
079aa1ac31894221db7434393938bec87eaea001
19847 F20101130_AABPGN dunn_l_Page_10.QC.jpg
8afa66ef704321efbcd2613667e3dcd5
9cce350da924c17bcb213f81e9565d56642f0492
F20101130_AABOZP dunn_l_Page_52.tif
8657fd1f45014dfa1d6ab9532c170287
a0ca0992903e367129db196e3b9e3a1b2560472b
49990 F20101130_AABPBQ dunn_l_Page_35.pro
133730dcb32bd37aaa346c8bf4c94e8c
7743fd98d90554a671383634368b00325facce48
62273 F20101130_AABOUS dunn_l_Page_44.jpg
24eaac95621c76caced3d09e0dfd67a9
6e4093a090b6f9aeeac0e4960fb88fccfcc703f1
57317 F20101130_AABOPV dunn_l_Page_57.pro
ba51b979b292479952073ac5d10e3d34
6f3852a366101bcabf681ed3746782e2f2ca3966
22307 F20101130_AABPGO dunn_l_Page_37.QC.jpg
2dd86b5da155445a1ef4284641efcb9c
2e2df28da671a245f7bbc8c5c2568d6cb1df0062
F20101130_AABOZQ dunn_l_Page_55.tif
ff9d8676a0ff61599a07c89a7b9dc357
39aafafa93dcfbe013a12e002d307bf9bc7e2432
50915 F20101130_AABPBR dunn_l_Page_36.pro
b40d3fb8feb5eec32b018087ff55d455
13f1497761b5b1d8c9145ba882415c8c685dd906
73735 F20101130_AABOUT dunn_l_Page_45.jpg
1d5e96d58fc38718a3a550bce7140fb7
368566142fede8056cd919a96debb4ed01a75a5a
51625 F20101130_AABOPW dunn_l_Page_26.pro
ca7100e214580fb80cbd1bd745e60108
29520ea9acc845f3f96cd0225f414625fac2fef4
6498 F20101130_AABPGP dunn_l_Page_30thm.jpg
c931962292cc1c6e30d06eecd50825c4
74159b47dc107461ea5b32d64f524c8972d4d580
F20101130_AABOZR dunn_l_Page_56.tif
5ba563a637d20baf1c77e42ad4a1304a
111e89f8e328dbdd1ad9ce00312435eb17bdb63e
48303 F20101130_AABPBS dunn_l_Page_37.pro
0165a52413c4b7fd943dc8865ce256a1
6f1a755411f05af5ee5880009c7468520c605d0c
72554 F20101130_AABOUU dunn_l_Page_47.jpg
efff859d5e61164fee7f3cbbe7a6dba4
6c716d562e2e5f6730110b2cb98a13938bbbf744
F20101130_AABOPX dunn_l_Page_57.tif
480b2c1ad29a96eb172326d132ffb30e
ecc1b92b5f4108a699b1a017acd8e9e10105338c
F20101130_AABPGQ dunn_l_Page_45.QC.jpg
33f666acbd011de48680f269775248d6
c7dbd54da841ec9d8ea6663ee63e2083a280e7c1
F20101130_AABOZS dunn_l_Page_58.tif
dcb2b1a2112d81052e5ed84905e2a20f
336116c78794884f7cbce3503a793b2b2d3d81ab
44833 F20101130_AABPBT dunn_l_Page_38.pro
460cbc929c70742a706402ef9837a25f
4f886a10e0368aa0a4fe4430c815cf79675ec2bc
68517 F20101130_AABOUV dunn_l_Page_48.jpg
0c02272dd18440bbe2904c463f454cd7
318da26141c03d79118c522152f3d0ef9b2565ac
109291 F20101130_AABOPY dunn_l_Page_29.jp2
ccc0665015817efeedeabe1aef2fe525
af1a92c5363e9425ef498f19a312ec1b0c0ffb64
11477 F20101130_AABPGR dunn_l_Page_15.QC.jpg
74984b645351655a6c43e6e197f75c5e
02efb2a5bc959a71813e1a2f45215b167715c264
F20101130_AABOZT dunn_l_Page_59.tif
8a896cac392f57a8664dbf308efbc04c
e17378c362d32b7a86c4d16f156788ed3d9b8a7f
69049 F20101130_AABOUW dunn_l_Page_49.jpg
27b1a49c99e5ecfcd36dfb904a80b563
bd3dab7817703d9c19a7517b7da5e43095d9adb9
106286 F20101130_AABOPZ dunn_l_Page_25.jp2
572c40596232de76ca65d0c08a7d2117
9d42c366682752264aaa54a453ba792e6ef239a6
22808 F20101130_AABPGS dunn_l_Page_35.QC.jpg
10d19c1113c26d5f1982c2d67e765eac
d99aafde8723c02a92ab34dd031cf46b180c461a
F20101130_AABOZU dunn_l_Page_62.tif
e0e63dee313723c8f649d777d0f5c044
a648ed1e7ac4d136eaf64f82b5178575238df64b
47598 F20101130_AABPBU dunn_l_Page_39.pro
36f419874a5988f49b896e9b7a3c99d2
409e1d88a2b7a340e2fed01094ba082fa90bba9e
75610 F20101130_AABOUX dunn_l_Page_50.jpg
cd32b03b0c5f15150fcc3690296fe5a7
a3f462def67cf0a8a030a59a92701f559ab65be6
23051 F20101130_AABPGT dunn_l_Page_49.QC.jpg
3ae863d9652826b1e85a8d0735bddf1a
2e16dec91b62c094d5757ee77ddc971e298cb314
F20101130_AABOZV dunn_l_Page_63.tif
16b185bab2e142b220e161c89d733c3b
b3a0ffc6853a6b8e96fbb1759ef631c2d4f1edfd
46109 F20101130_AABPBV dunn_l_Page_40.pro
c8f03b5e0b00484357acb190b881ef6d
8a8d22ba16ec81b1e613395a0dbd4b2418e2cb72
1917 F20101130_AABOSA dunn_l_Page_78thm.jpg
bc1606052a1f6e3ba6dd543a083dfce2
1904633cfa83be7b23ded912f378951b1f7de534
70964 F20101130_AABOUY dunn_l_Page_51.jpg
4545b8a64fac1d5223938f2c5249df01
fae81d4ffea6dfd0fd5636d7f548f5920fb3161c
6118 F20101130_AABPGU dunn_l_Page_27thm.jpg
e66c321212848b6e77f2619ed7182e37
cd48fd641a084385d16538b0cfb345069356df2d
F20101130_AABOZW dunn_l_Page_64.tif
4da7759aea661b7e32175ecb8597f996
b969f5a820ec3cb82d06fe1536f5d9a5174c951b
50348 F20101130_AABPBW dunn_l_Page_42.pro
e1ac8949a726b076f462dd2165a7b2b0
35000375cb8825ffd469dd76d2ae4e138ec86060
106209 F20101130_AABOSB dunn_l_Page_23.jp2
bf7d020fd05ca9b0dfaa72ef09b4a5b7
a774b62f6c3037097b7d92699e14a8e824400902
71719 F20101130_AABOUZ dunn_l_Page_53.jpg
c720353a051b8d986621e9518de0f8c7
0306f666c2856e9fa764de1317b188dcd96c8ed0


Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0010700/00001

Material Information

Title: Effects of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act on Federal Congressional Candidates: A Case Study
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0010700:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0010700/00001

Material Information

Title: Effects of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act on Federal Congressional Candidates: A Case Study
Physical Description: Mixed Material
Copyright Date: 2008

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0010700:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text












EFFECTS OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT ON
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: A CASE STUDY















By

LAURA CHRISTINE DUNN


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2005






















Copyright 2005

by

Laura Christine Dunn

































This document is dedicated to Matthew Elias Keil.















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all of my friends and family who supported me while writing

this thesis. I would like to especially thank Patrick Alexander because without him, none

of this could have been possible.














TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ................................................................................................. iv

LIST OF TABLES .................................................... ............ ................ vii

A B S T R A C T .......................................... .................................................. v iii

CHAPTER

1 IN TR OD U CTION ............................................... .. ......................... ..

R research Q uestions............ ................................................................ ........ .. ... .4
M methodology ............................................................... ... ..... ......... 4
C chapter O outline .................................................... ............... .. 6

2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE..............................7

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ...................................... ...............7
The Birth of the Federal Election Campaign Act .....................................................10
Academic Perspectives on Campaign Finance.........................................................12
Growth and Impact of Political Action Committees ................................................15
Academic Perspectives on Political Action Committees..............................17
The U.S. Public Institute Research Group Study ................................................. 22

3 THE DAVE BRUDERLY CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY.............................. 25

W h at is a C ase Stu dy ? ..................................................................... ....................2 5
Methodology ............. .......... ..................... 28

4 FIN D IN G S ..................................................................................................... 35

Background Information on Florida's 6th Congressional District ............. ..............35
F in d in g s .............................................................3 7
C contribution L im its .............................. ........................ .. ........ .... ............39
E n force ent ................................................................4 4
Legal and Constitutional Issues........................................... .......................... 45
Soft M money .......................... ........................ 46
Issue Ads and Electioneering Communications..........................................49
D isc lo su re ......... ........... .. ....... ...... ....................................... 5 1
Coordination ...................................................................... ... ............. ..................53
Unions, Corporations, and Non-Profits .......... ........... ...................55









Summary of Findings ....................................... .... .... ................57

5 DISCUSSION ................ ........ .................. 60

Implications of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act..............................60
Lim stations of Study .......................... .... ............ .............................63
Suggestions for Further Research............................ ............... ................. 63

L IST O F R EFE R EN C E S ......... .......................... .......... ........................... ............... 66

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E TCH ..................................................................... ..................69
















LIST OF TABLES


Table p

2-1 A table that summarizes the decisions of the McConnell case. ............................. 8

3-2 A table that outlines the strengths and weaknesses of various sources of
evidence .............. ........ .... .............................. ............. 30

4-3 A table that provides a county by county breakdown of the number of votes in
the 2002 and 2004 elections. ...... ....................................................................... 36

4-4 A table that provides information on the budgets of both campaigns in 2002 and
2 0 04 .................................................................................3 6

4-5 A table that details the rise of hard money in Bruderly's two campaigns ...............42

4-6 A table that documents the flow of money into both Bruderly and Stearns
cam paigns in 2002 and 2004 .................................. ............... ............... 42

5-7 A table that summarizes the impact of the BCRA on the 2004 campaign ..............61











Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communication

EFFECTS OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT ON
FEDERAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: A CASE STUDY

By

Laura Christine Dunn

August 2005

Chair: Leonard Tipton
Major Department: Mass Communication

This thesis is an analysis of Dave Bruderly's 2004 campaign for Florida's 6th

District U.S. House seat. This thesis uses qualitative and quantitative research methods in

order to gauge the effects of the BCRA on federal congressional candidates. Bruderly

unsuccessfully ran for U.S. Congress in 2002, prior to the implementation of the

Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA), and again in 2004, after the

implementation of the BCRA.

The Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee (2003),

implemented drastic changes within America's campaign finance system. This case

challenged key elements of theBCRA, which was signed into law in 2002 by President

George W. Bush. Before the McConnell decision, the legal precedents surrounding

campaign finance were rooted in the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971

and its amendments, which were the first federal campaign finance regulations.

The final terms of the BCRA prevent national political parties and federal

candidates from raising or spending soft money. Additionally, corporations and labor

unions are prevented from using soft money to fund electioneering communications,









otherwise known as issue ads. The BCRA also raised the individual contribution limit

from $1,000 to $2,000 per federal candidate per election cycle. Prior to the BCRA, there

were no regulations pertaining to soft money raised or spent by individuals, corporations

or labor unions. National parties were allowed to use a mix of hard and soft money to

fund issue ads. However, there was no limit on the amount of soft money that they could

use.

This thesis relies primarily on the case study methodology. Bruderly and select

members of his campaign staff were interviewed, as well as individual contributors who

donated the maximum amount allowed under the terms of the BCRA. Also interviewed

was a representative from the United Auto Workers Political Action Committee, which

donated $5,000 to Bruderly's 2004 candidacy. Additionally, this researcher served as

Bruderly's campaign manager for seven months during the 2004 election. This

researcher's participant observations and experiences are included as noted. Quantitative

data were gathered from Bruderly's campaign by comparing the 2002 election statistics

to the 2004 election data.

Overall, this thesis finds that the BCRA has made it easier for political challengers

to run against wealthy incumbents by eliminating the corrupting effects of soft money

within federal campaigns. Bruderly was affected both positively and negatively by the

BCRA; however, the end result of this legislation provided Bruderly's 2004 campaign

with more chances for success as compared to his 2002 campaign.














CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee (2003)

implemented drastic changes within America's campaign finance system. This case

challenged key elements of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA),

which was signed into law in 2002 by President George W. Bush. Reporters for The New

York Times described the BCRA as, "the broadest campaign finance legislation since the

Watergate era," (Clymer & Mitchell, 2002, para. 1). Before the McConnell decision, the

legal precedents surrounding campaign finance were rooted in the Federal Elections

Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its amendments, which were the first federal

campaign finance regulations.

Congress passed the FECA in order to circumvent political corruption by placing

limits on the dollar amounts of financial contributions given to federal candidates. This

legislation required all campaign contributions and expenditures to be reported, and it

also limited the amount of money a campaign could spend on media advertising. The

FECA also laid the foundation for a separate segregated fund, which allowed

corporations and unions to use treasury funds to establish, operate and solicit political

contributions for their organization. The monies raised by these political action

committees (PACs) could then be donated to candidates running for federal office (Bauer

& Kafka, 1982).

The 1971 legislation did not establish an independent body to oversee the

implementation of the FECA, and following the 1972 elections, more than 7,000 cases of









campaign finance abuse were reported to the Justice Department. Only a small number of

these cases were litigated, which led to Congress significantly amending the FECA in

1974 (Comptroller General of the United States, 1975).

The 1974 amendments to the FECA established the Federal Election Commission

(FEC) as the sole agency responsible for overseeing the administrative functions of the

campaign finance system. The 1974 amendments also created a public campaign finance

system used to fund presidential elections. Congress also enacted strict limits on both

contributions and expenditures. These limits applied to all federal candidates and political

committees that could influence a federal election. Another provision in the 1974

amendments allowed for corporations and unions with federal contracts to establish and

run political action committees (Bauer & Kafka, 1982).

Provisions of the 1974 amendments were immediately challenged in a lawsuit filed

by Senator James L. Buckley (former Republican Senator from New York) and Senator

Eugene McCarthy (former Democratic Senator from Minnesota). The plaintiffs asserted

that the FECA violated their right to free speech by enacting limits on campaign

contributions and expenditures.

The Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Buckley on January 30, 1976. The

Supreme Court upheld the limits on contributions, citing the importance of preventing

corruption or the appearance of corruption within federal elections, and overturned the

limits on political expenditures, stating that limits on campaign spending restricted the

freedoms of political expression and association (Hasen, 2002).

After Buckley, the FECA was amended again in 1979 to allow corporations and

individuals to give contributions to state and local parties. These amendments to the









FECA governed federal campaign finance until 2002 when the BCRA was passed by

Congress. The BCRA is the product of its sponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives,

Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin Meehan (D-MA), and in the U.S. Senate, John

McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WIS). The sponsors said the BCRA was written

to close the loophole of unregulated soft money donations in federal elections made

permissible by the 1979 amendments to the FECA. This soft money loophole had

allowed contributors to bypass the FECA's contribution and expenditure limits for years

(Corrado, 1997).

The final terms of the BCRA, interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2003

McConnell decision, prevent national political parties and federal candidates from raising

or spending soft money. Additionally, corporations and labor unions are prevented from

using soft money to fund electioneering communications, otherwise known as issue ads.

The BCRA also raised the individual contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 per federal

candidate per election cycle.

Prior to the BCRA, there were no regulations pertaining to soft money raised or

spent by individuals, corporations or labor unions. National parties were allowed to use a

mix of hard and soft money to fund issue ads. However, there was no limit on the amount

of soft money that they could use.

The 2004 general election was the first national election required to abide by the

BCRA guidelines (Campaign Finance Institute, 2004). To date, the U.S. Public Interest

Research Group (US PIRG) is one of the few institutions to publish findings on the

effects of the BCRA during the 2004 election cycle. The US PIRG study examined

competitive congressional primary races in 2004. In an attempt to gauge the impact of the









BCRA on federal candidates, the US PIRG study concluded that raising the individual

contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 had the largest impact on the function of federal

campaigns. The findings of this study as well as its impact are discussed more thoroughly

in the following chapter.

In order to better understand the effects of the BCRA on federal candidates during

the general election, this thesis uses Democrat Dave Bruderly's candidacies for Florida's

6th Congressional District as a case study. Bruderly unsuccessfully ran twice for U.S.

Congress, first in 2002, prior to the implementation of the BCRA, and again in 2004,

after the implementation of the BCRA.

Research Questions

It is important to understand the implications of the BCRA in terms of political

communication. Thus, this thesis poses the following broad research questions: How does

the BCRA change the way in which federal campaigns operate? How do these new laws

impact the ability of a federal candidate to communicate his or her message to the public?

Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsors intended the legislation to do? What is the

likely future of campaign finance reform after the implementation of the BCRA? How

has the BCRA altered the communication processes within federal campaigns?

Specifically, how has the BCRA impacted the scope of political communication for

federal candidates? The goal of this thesis is to gain a variety of perspectives on the

relationship between campaign finance regulation and the scope of political

communication.

Methodology

This thesis relies primarily on the case study methodology recommended by Robert

Yin (1994) in his book, Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Case studies are









designed to capture details from the viewpoint of participants by using multiple data

sources. A researcher conducting a case study considers not just the voice and perspective

of the actors, but also the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them

(Yin, 1994). The case study used in this thesis is exploratory in nature, which limits the

generalizablity of the findings. Additionally, this thesis relies on a single case study,

which further limits its generalizablity. However, studying Dave Bruderly's campaign

can identify factors and issues for future campaign finance research.

This thesis also relies on a description of the Federal Election Campaign Act and its

major amendments in 1974, 1976 and 1979 as well as U.S. Supreme Court decisions

arising from the FECA, including the BCRA. Relevant political science studies that

articulate varying perspectives regarding campaign finance regulation are noted.

When analyzing Bruderly's campaign, qualitative and quantitative research

methods are used. Bruderly and select members of his campaign staff were interviewed,

as well as individual contributors who donated the maximum amount allowed under the

terms of the 2004 BCRA. Also interviewed was a representative from the United Auto

Workers Political Action Committee, which donated $5,000 to Bruderly's 2004

candidacy. Additionally, this researcher served as Bruderly's campaign manager for

seven months during the 2004 election. This researcher's participant observations and

experiences are included as noted. Quantitative data was gathered from Bruderly's

campaign by comparing the 2002 election statistics to the 2004 election data. The

quantitative data pertaining to Bruderly's campaign is archived in an online database.









Chapter Outline

This chapter introduced the topic of campaign finance, provided the research

questions that this study will answer, and described the research methods and other

materials used in this study.

Chapter 2 is a review of the literature on the issue of campaign finance and a look

at the history of campaign finance, focusing on the Federal Elections Campaign Act of

1971 and its amendments of 1974, 1976, and 1979.

Chapter 3 describes the case study methodology, including how the data analysis

was performed.

Chapter 4 is a discussion of the findings from the analysis of the case study.

The conclusion and summary of the findings are discussed in Chapter 5, focusing

on what the findings mean for communication professionals in the political

communication field.














CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal elections.

Campaign finance has been a dominant issue in Congress since the 1880s. The first-ever

campaign finance laws were enacted in 1883. The most recent campaign finance laws

were passed in 2002 with the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA). The

final terms of the BCRA are described in the following section. In order to understand the

culmination of the BCRA, a historical description of campaign finance legislation is

presented as well as academic perspectives on the subject.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

The BCRA is the product of its sponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives,

Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin Meehan (D-MA), and in the U.S. Senate, John

McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WIS). The Supreme Court decision in

McConnellv. Federal Elections Committee, issued in December 2003, interpreted the

terms and provisions of the BCRA challenged by Republican Senator Mitch McConnell

from Kentucky. Litigants in the McConnell case questioned five key elements of the

BCRA that President George W. Bush signed into law in 2002.









Table 2-1. A table that summarizes the decisions of the McConnell case.
BCRA Requirement Supreme Court Impact of Decision
Decision
Prohibits national National parties
National parties
National party soft parties from raising Upheld
SUpheld cannot raise or
money or spending soft
money spend soft money
money
Requires state and State and local
State and local local parties to pay parties must use
State and local
"Fed l E n for federal election hard money and/or
Federal Election Upheld *. r
A activities with hard Levin funds for
Activities"
money and/or Levin federal election
funds activities
Prohibits federal
Soft money Prohibits federal Federal candidates
Soft m candidates and
fundraising by oficehldes frm Upheld (with some and officeholders
officeholders from ect
federal candidates raising or spending exceptions) cannot raise or
and officeholders so one spend soft money
soft money
Prohibits
corporations and
labor unions from
using soft money to C
fund broadcasts that Corporations and
Prohibition of Issue labor unions cannot
mention a federal Upheld
Ads Upuse soft money to
candidate or .
candidate or fund issue ads.
officeholder within
30 days of a primary
and 60 days of a
general election
Increases the dollar Individuals may
,.i ., Individuals may
limit on make larger
contributions from
Contribution limits Upheld donations to
individuals to candidates and
candidates and
candidate and
candidate ad political parties
political parties
Requires disclosure Electioneering
of electioneering
Disclosure of Issue ofelectioneering communications
Ads communications Upheld must be disclosed to
Ads $00 must be disclosed to
that exceed $10,000 the FEC
the FEC
a year

The Supreme Court issued three separate majority opinions in the McConnell

ruling. The case challenged five titles of the BCRA. Justices Stevens and O'Connor along

with Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court on Titles I









and II which dealt with soft money and issue ads. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by all

the members of the Court, issued the ruling on Titles III and IV which concentrated on

hard money limits and the millionaire exemption. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices

Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg ruled on Title V which dealt with broadcasters'

records (McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee [FEC], 2003).

Titles I and II of the BCRA were upheld by the Court. The provisions under titles I

and II sought to increase regulation of soft money, electioneering communications and

coordination restrictions. The Court held that soft money contributions could be restricted

to protect the integrity of the political process without unconstitutionally burdening party

speech and associational activities financed with soft money (Whittaker, 2004). The

Court also held that issue ads that refer to a candidate 30 days before a primary or 60

days before a general election were not precluded by a holding in Buckley which limited

regulation of political speech. The Court ruled that the BCRA did not restrict permissible

speech and was therefore not unconstitutionally broad in scope. Additionally, the Court

ruled that political activity coordinated with political candidates and parties could be

regulated in the absence of an agreement to coordinate. Spending at the request or

suggestion of a candidate, the Court ruled, could establish coordination (Whittaker,

2004).

The only provision in titles I and II that was struck down by the Court was the

requirement that national parties choose to either coordinate with candidates or make

independent expenditures.

Regarding titles III and IV, the Court determined that the parties to the case

lacked standing to challenge the BCRA's denial of the lowest unit charge for a candidate









advertisement that does not include a disclaimer stating that the candidate approved the

advertisement. The Court also ruled that the parties lacked standing to challenge the

increase of the hard money contribution limits as well as the millionaire provision which

allows candidates facing self-financed opponents to receive contributions above the

normal limits. The only provision upheld under titles III and IV was the so-called minor

provision. This provision made it constitutional for underage citizens to make

contributions to candidates and political parties (Whittaker, 2004).

Title V of the BCRA was also upheld by the Court, requiring that broadcasters

maintain certain publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests.

Included records are candidate requests, election message requests and issue requests

(Whittaker, 2004).

The McConnell ruling comprises more than 300 pages of provisions that alter the

regulations governing federal campaign finance. In order to understand how the BCRA

came to fruition, the following sections provide a historical analysis of campaign finance

legislation and relevant political communication commentary.

The Birth of the Federal Election Campaign Act

The first campaign finance law was passed in 1883. The Pendleton Act prohibited

federal employees from soliciting funds from other federal employees for any type of

campaign. With the birth of the Industrial Revolution, corporate culture grew to dominate

politics and political campaigns (Mutch, 1998). The Tillman Act was passed in 1907,

prohibiting corporations and banks from contributing to federal candidates. The Publicity

Act of 1910 amended the Tillman Act to require disclosure of campaign donations

exceeding $100. In 1911, Congress again amended the Publicity Act to limit spending to

$5,000 for House candidates and $12,000 for Senate candidates.









In 1925, the Publicity Act was revised once more to increase disclosure

requirements and spending limits for congressional campaigns. These amendments

became known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. There were no successful

prosecutions during the Federal Corrupt Practices Act's 46 years as law (Mutch, 1998).

The Hatch Act was passed in 1939, which prevented government employees from giving

political contributions to federal candidates. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley

Act, barring unions as well as corporations from making contributions to or expenditures

on behalf of a federal candidate.

In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)to replace

the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The FECA was intended, "to promote fair practices in

the conduct of election campaigns for Federal political offices" (Federal Election

Campaign Act [FECA], 1971). The FECA regulated contributions and spending in federal

campaigns and implemented disclosure requirements for federal candidates, political

parties and PACs. The purpose of the FECA was "to give candidates for public office

greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and

thereby more fully and completely inform the voters" and, "to halt the spiraling cost of

campaigning for public office" (S. Rep. No. 92-96, 1971, para. 23).

The FECA also attempted to limit "the flow of excessive sums of money into

political campaigns" by limiting contributions (S. Rep. No. 92-96, 1971, para. 54). The

contribution limits apply to all individual contributions given directly to a specific

candidate or given indirectly through a third party for the benefit of a specific candidate.

The FECA also limited the amount candidates could contribute to their own campaigns









and on expenditures for media advertising in presidential, Senate and House elections

(FECA, 1971).

Academic Perspectives on Campaign Finance

Prior to the enactment of the FECA in 1971, a scholarly consensus on campaign

finance prevailed within the political science field (Levine, 1997). That consensus was

founded on the work of Louise Overacker (1932). Overacker was the first American

political scientist to conduct systematic campaign finance research. Her 1932 book,

Money in Elections, is based on campaign finance practices from the 1920s. She noted

that electoral corruption dates back to ancient Greece and pointed out that, when adjusted

for the size of the economy and population, campaign costs remained fairly consistent

over time. Overacker argued that a flawed design and inadequate enforcement measures

prevented the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 from banning corporate

contributions, limiting expenditures, and providing disclosure. She wrote about the

dominance of political parties during the 1920s and their increasing dependence on high

dollar contributors.

Overacker's normative position regarding money in elections dominated the

political science field for decades. Overacker argued that restrictions on campaign

finance were illogical. Overacker felt the goal of campaigns should be to ensure that

"each candidate at least has a chance to bring his case before the voters" (p. 128).

Overacker wanted more money in campaigns, in the form of public subsidies, to provide

citizens with informative information about candidates prior to election day. She noted

that she did not believe contribution limits would solve the problem of corruption within

American elections. Overacker also pointed out that, throughout history, there were no

examples of governments successfully limiting campaign contributions and expenditures.









She believed America's system of campaign finance should encourage public disclosure,

a nonpolitical campaign enforcement agency, and substantial compensation for election

day poll workers.

Nearly 30 years after Overacker's work, Alexander Heard (1960) published a study

of campaign contributions and expenditures in The Costs ofDemocracy. Based largely on

financial records from the 1950s, Heard described a pattern of campaigning and political

finance that contradicted Overacker's perspective of campaign finance in the 1920s.

Heard's broad conclusions and normative position regarding money, however, were quite

similar to Overacker's. Heard viewed money as a necessity within political campaigns.

He did not believe that the cost of campaigning was overly expensive or that the cost

would rise significantly in the future. Heard (1960) advocated increasing the amount of

money within campaigns because he felt the amount of money a candidate possessed had

little effect on the outcome of an election.

In Heard's (1960) view, reforms that fail to recognize the inherent financial needs

of political campaigns are flawed. He argued that negative regulation by the FEC should

be replaced by positive measures designed to ease the burden of political fundraising and

lower the overall cost of campaigns. In addition to rejecting limits on contributions and

expenditures, Heard advocated public financing, tax credits, neutral and bipartisan

solicitation of funds, public disclosure, and a nonpolitical enforcement agency.

Herbert Alexander, another political science scholar, devoted his entire career to

the study of campaign finance. Alexander worked closely with Heard as a research fellow

on The Costs ofDemocracy and as executive director of the Commission on Campaign









Costs. In 1958 Alexander became director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, where

he compiled and published campaign finance studies.

In his book, Money in Politics, Alexander (1972) contested the theory that money

plays an inherently corrupting role in elections. He argued that more money is needed for

competitive campaigns to inform voters and provide a basis for governmental

responsiveness. Alexander felt spending limits reinforce the status quo and deprive

candidates of their rights to free speech. He also believed that contribution limits depress

political competition by denying citizens their rights to free speech. Alexander said,

"Because of its universality, money is a tracer element in the political process, marking

the tracks both of the individual or groups seeking influence and of the candidate and the

party seeking election to office" (p. 11). Alexander extended his argument beyond

Overacker's (1932) and Heard's (1960) positions, by opposing the bans on corporate and

labor-union electioneering, which were enacted in 1907 with the Tillman Act and in 1947

with the Taft-Hartley Act.

Alexander supported a strong system of public disclosure and public subsidies,

such as tax credits for private donations, franking privileges for all candidates, and voter

registration costs paid for by the government. He was concerned that direct public

financing of candidates and parties could weaken ties between national and state parties

and disrupt relations between candidates and their parties (Alexander, 1972).

While Overacker, Heard, and Alexander did not agree on every point, they

developed a broad view of money within elections that was shared by their peers.

However, this view was largely ignored by policymakers, particularly during the early

1970s with the 1974 amendments to the FECA.









Growth and Impact of Political Action Committees

In 1974, the Watergate scandal prompted Congress to amend the FECA, which

constituted the most serious effort in U.S. history to regulate the flow of money in federal

elections (Clymer & Mitchell, 2002). The 1974 amendment established the Federal

Election Commission (FEC) and delegated to the FEC the power to enforce disclosure

laws, enforce public funding programs for presidential elections, and enforce campaign

finance laws (FECA Amend., 1974). The structure of the FEC was the antithesis of the

nonpolitical, independent entity advocated for by Overacker (1932) and Heard (1960).

Congress established control over the appointment of the six FEC commissioners,

prohibited the agency from investigating anonymous complaints or conducting random

audits and denied the commission the multiyear budgeting authority enjoyed by other

independent agencies.

The amendment also set limits on contributions by individuals, political parties and

PACs, and continued the ban against contributions and expenditures by corporations and

unions. Contributions to candidates from individuals were capped at $1,000, PAC

contributions at $5,000, and individual aggregate contributions at $25,000. This

amendment also placed limits on personal and family finances used in a candidate's

campaign (FECA Amend., 1974).

The 1974 FECA amendment defined multi-candidate PACs as committees that

receive contributions from 50 or more individuals and make contributions to more than

five political candidates for more than a six-month time period. In addition to the $5,000

limit on contributions per candidate, multi candidate PACs cannot contribute more than

$5,000 each per year to other PACs and $15,000 per year to national parties. The









amendment also prohibits PACs and candidates from knowingly giving or taking money

above the contribution ceilings (FECA Amend., 1974).

Provisions of the 1974 amendments were challenged by Senator James L. Buckley

(former Republican Senator from New York) and Eugene McCarthy (former Democratic

Senator from Minnesota) against the Secretary of the Senate, Francis R. Valeo (Buckley

v. Valeo, 1976). The plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that the FECA violated the

First Amendment guarantee of free speech because, "limiting the use of money for

political purposes constitutes a restriction on communication," because, "virtually all

meaningful political communications in the modem setting involve the expenditure of

money" (Hasen, 2002, p. 15). The Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Buckley on

January 30, 1976.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FECA contribution limits,

the disclosure requirements, and the presidential public-financing system. The Supreme

Court struck down the caps on expenditures, except for voluntary limits tied to public

financing in presidential elections, and narrowed the class of political communications by

independent groups. The Court also ruled that congressional appointment of members of

the FEC was a violation of the separation of powers, a problem remedied in Congress by

giving the president the formal authority to appoint all six members to the FEC. The

Supreme Court also struck down limits placed on personal and family finances used to

fund a candidate's campaign (Hasen, 2002).

Congress again amended the FECA in 1979, this time to increase, "the role of state

and local parties" in federal elections (H.R. Rep. No. 96-422, 1979, para. 11). The 1979

amendment permitted contributions to be given directly from corporate treasuries and









individuals to local and state parties for minor campaign activities, something Alexander

(1972) advocated in his work. However, this amendment created a soft money loophole

that permitted more corporate money to find its way into federal election campaigns,

because soft money freed the parties to use election activities funds for candidates

(Corrado, 1997). This loophole allowed corporations to bypass contribution limits as long

as the money they donated went to a political party instead of a federal candidate.

Initially; the national parties used soft money for nonfederal purposes, such as voter

mobilization drives. That all changed, according to Corrado, with the birth of

entrepreneurial political consultants and politicians, who found creative ways to finance

parts of their federal campaigns with unregulated soft money.

The FECA after Buckley marked the beginning of the end of a scholarly consensus

on the role of money in elections. Differences emerged as new scholars were drawn to the

study of campaign finance by the controversy surrounding the Buckley decision, rapid

changes in campaigns and political organizations, and the accessibility of campaign

finance data (Levine, 1997).

Academic Perspectives on Political Action Committees

In 1980, Gary Jacobson published a study on the impact of money in congressional

elections, based on data from the 1972, 1974 and 1976 elections. Jacobson's work

provided theoretical and empirical justification for arguments made by political scientists

since the 1930s. He showed that inadequate funding by challengers, not excessive

spending by incumbents, depresses electoral competition. Jacobson found that limits on

contributions and expenditures harm challengers more than they do incumbents. He also

argued that a majority of the campaign finance regulations enacted by incumbent

politicians, including those in the 1974 law, benefit those in power (Jacobson, 1980).









Other scholars, Donald Green and Jonathan Krasno (1988), cautioned that political

parties had been weakened by changes in the FECA and were likely to become obsolete

in the financing of federal campaigns. Public financing of presidential candidates, they

argued, reinforced the growing candidate-centered nature of American elections and

further weakened the party structure. Restrictions on party fundraising and how much

parties could assist their candidates through direct contributions and coordinated

spending put them at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to interest groups, whose

collective contributions to candidates had no limit. Green and Krasno strongly embraced

the view that parties were essential instruments of accountability and responsibility in

democratic governments. They argued that regulations constraining the ability of parties

to raise and spend funds weaken the democratic spirit of America (Green & Krasno,

1988).

In the post-Buckley era, the rapid growth of PACs was a popular topic within the

political science field. Throughout the 1980s, Richard Hall and Frank Wayman (1990)

analyzed the diversity among PACs in structure, size, objectives, strategies, constraints

and degree of engagement in congressional elections. They examined the opportunities

that PACs provide to citizens to engage in organized political action, and the extent to

which politicians dominated the financial decisions made by PACs. They also argued

against the theory that campaign contributions buy votes in Congress. Hall and Wayman

said:

First, we suggest that in looking for the effects of money in Congress, one must

look more to the politics of committee decision making than those of the floor. ...

Second, and more importantly, our account of the member-donor exchange leads us to









focus on the participation of particular members, not on the votes. If money does not

necessarily buy votes or change minds, in other words, it can buy members' time. The

intended effect is to mobilize bias in congressional committee decision making. (p. 811)

The writings of Frank Sorauf provide an in-depth look into the discussion

surrounding PACs in the 1980s. A scholar of political parties, Sorauf began his research

on campaign finance in 1981 by assembling a task force that investigated the implications

of PAC growth on federal campaign finance. Over the next decade, he published Money

in American Elections (1988) and Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (1992).

Much of Sorauf s work fit comfortably within the context of previous political science

scholars. He disagreed with those who were concerned with the potential negative

consequences stemming from PACs and challenged the decision by Congress to regulate

them (Sorauf, 1992). Sorauf noted, "little if any relationship between the money and the

votes exist" (p. 88). Sorauf felt that work by other political scientists demonstrates that

the influence of PACs on legislative outcomes is greatly exaggerated. He researched the

constraints on the flow of money in elections and cautioned of unintended consequences

as a result of the FECA and its amendments. Sorauf advocated for the values of electoral

competition, strong parties, and robust campaign communications, as well as freedom of

political speech, activity, and association.

Sorauf argued that the Supreme Court was wrong in Buckley to strike down limits

on campaign spending and independent expenditures. To Sorauf, an arms-race dynamic

had developed in campaign fundraising, and the money chase was eroding political

competition. Sorauf felt spending limits set at high levels would help, not hurt,

challengers, especially if combined with public subsidies. He did believe that national









parties, taking advantage of more generous limits on their contributors and on

coordinated spending on behalf of their candidates, were strengthened by the FECA.

Sorauf s (1992) greatest worry regarding the Buckley ruling was that national parties

might become instruments of incumbent politicians and manage to evade the contribution

limits mandated by Buckley.

Sorauf's judgment on the Buckley ruling and his approach to campaign finance

reform had a significant impact on the political science consensus of his time He

demonstrated that a sophisticated, empirically based understanding of money in elections

did not lead to a normative rejection of government regulation.

The campaign finance legislation that remained intact after the 1979 amendments

triggered both intended and unintended political consequences, as Sorauf (1992) warned.

Public financing slowed the money chase in presidential elections and somewhat

equalized the disparity between the major parties in campaign spending and competitive

opportunities for challengers. Small donors came to play a significant role in campaign

finance as large contributions from individuals and organizations ceased. Disclosure of

contributions and expenditures also improved dramatically (Synder, 1990).

Starting in the 1996 cycle, however, large amounts of soft money were used to

finance candidate-specific issue advocacy in presidential and congressional elections.

This campaign tactic was deemed permissible by a loophole in the 1976 Buckley ruling.

In that decision, the Supreme Court established an express advocacy test to determine

which communications by individuals and groups independent of any candidate or party

would be subject to government regulation. The standard was defined by the Court as

communications that "in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly









identified candidate for federal office" (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976). The Court gave

examples of express advocacy language which included the phrases: vote for, vote

against, support, or oppose. This standard became known as the "magic words" test

(Hasen, 2002).

The Court acknowledged that the "magic words" standard would leave some

elections-related communications outside the regulatory scope of the federal government.

However, the Court concluded that their standard would avoid the risk of chilling

political speech. The Court did not require an express advocacy standard for candidate

and political party advertisements because their financing was subject to federal

campaign finance laws. In Buckley the Supreme Court stated that spending by candidates

and political committees, including parties, is campaign-related material, subject to the

regulation of the FEC (Hasen, 2002).

This express advocacy standard had little effect on the conduct and financing of

federal campaigns for nearly 20 years. Beginning in the fall of 1995 and continuing

through 1996, Democratic Party committees spent an estimated $34 million on television

advertisements designed to promote Clinton's re-election (Corrado, 1997). None of these

costs were reported to the FEC as coordinated expenditures on behalf of Clinton's

campaign. Instead, the Democratic Party argued that party communications that did not

use explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate could be

treated like generic party advertising and financed with a mix of soft and hard money.

The Republican National Committee responded with a $20 million advertising campaign

of its own, on behalf of Bob Dole, the Republican presidential candidate. Quickly the

parties began to use the same financing strategy to campaign on behalf of their









congressional candidates. The congressional party campaign committees shifted their

focus from hard to soft money fundraising, altering the structure of federal campaigns

(Corrado, 1997).

Other groups soon followed the example set by the national parties. The benefit for

groups to advertise under the terms of "issue advocacy," rather than the terms of

"independent expenditures," was that "issue advocacy" could be conducted without

disclosure and financed with soft rather than hard money. This meant that national parties

and groups could now solicit contributions from corporations and unions as well as from

wealthy donors to finance candidate-specific electioneering communications. In spite of

the governing federal election laws, by 1996, parties and groups were able to campaign

for and against specific federal candidates with unlimited amounts of soft money. Soft

money receipts grew from roughly $20 million in the 1980 and 1984 election cycles to

$86 million in 1988 and to $495 million in 2000 (Corrado, 1997). It was in this political

context that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) was drafted and passed by

Congress in 2002.

The U.S. Public Institute Research Group Study

The most recent research published since the enactment of the BCRA is a study

conducted by the United States Public Interest Research Group (Mason & Cassady,

2004). The study, The Wealth Primary: The Role ofBig Money in the 2004

Congressional Primaries, analyzed campaign finance data complied by the FEC during

the 2004 congressional primaries.

One of the major conclusions of the US PIRG study was that the amount of money

a candidate possessed was the most important factor in determining whether or not the

candidate would win the election. The study found that candidates who raised the most









money from individuals and PACs won 91% of their primary races in 2004. Winning

candidates also raised more money than losing candidates by a 4-to-1 margin. Winning

candidates in 2004 raised an average of $700,000 from individuals and PACs, while

losing candidates raised an average of $162,000 from individuals and PACs (Mason &

Cassady, 2004).

The US PIRG study also found the vast majority of campaign contributions came

from a small number of high dollar donors. While only 0.08% of voting age Americans

made a contribution of $1,000 or more to a congressional candidate, these large donations

accounted for 63% of all individual contributions received by 2004 primary candidates.

Similarly, only 0.02% of voting-age Americans made a $2,000 contribution, the new

maximum amount allowed under the BCRA, to a congressional primary candidate. Yet

more than a fifth (21%) of all individual contributions to congressional primary

candidates came at the $2,000 level in 2004.

Moreover, the US PIRG study found that a majority of the 2004 congressional

primary races (65%) were uncontested, meaning that only one candidate decided to run

for his or her party's seat (2004). More than half of the incumbent senators who ran

(58%) were unopposed in their 2004 primary races. The US PIRG study also noted that

individual contributions in amounts larger than $200 came in much larger increments

during the 2004 primaries as compared to the 2002 primaries. In 2002, 73% of

candidates' itemized contributions came in $1,000 increments, but in 2004, 89% of

candidates' itemized contributions came in increments of $1,000 or more. Additionally in

2004, 27% of the candidates' itemized contributions came in the $2,000 level. More than









one quarter (26%) of individual contributions to 2004 congressional primary candidates

came from out of state donors (Mason & Cassady, 2004).

The authors of the US PIRG study state that their 2004 results differ very little from

their findings in the 2002 version of the same study, which leads them to conclude that

the BCRA has failed to eradicate the influence of big money within federal elections, at

least at the primary level. The authors focused specifically on primary races as a result of

the gerrymandering tactics used in Congress to hand design congressional districts. The

authors felt that due to redistricting, fewer and fewer races for the House of

Representatives are competitive, so the challenge for incumbents is to beat their primary

opponent. The authors believe the role of money in primary races is often highlighted

because voters cannot separate candidates based solely on their party affiliation (Mason

& Cassady, 2004).

While the authors of the US PIRG study believe that the BCRA has failed to

weaken the impact of big money in congressional primary races, a case study analyzing

Dave Bruderly's campaign for Florida's 6th U.S. House district, will provide further

insight regarding the effectiveness of the BCRA at the general election level.














CHAPTER 3
THE DAVE BRUDERLY CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY

In the previous chapters, the goals and objectives of this thesis were presented and

explained. In this chapter, the case study methodology used to accomplish these goals

and objectives will be examined. This thesis employs the case study methodology as

described by Robert Yin (1993, 1994), a respected authority on qualitative research.

What is a Case Study?

A case study is the preferred methodology to use when circumstances warrant an

in-depth investigation (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991). Case studies have been used in

several types of investigations, particularly investigations within the field of sociology.

Robert Stake (1995), among others, has developed strong protocols for case study

researchers. Case studies are designed to capture details from the viewpoint of

participants by collecting multiple sources of data. A researcher conducting a case study

considers not only the voice and perspective of the actors, but also distinguishes the

relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them (Yin, 1993).

Yin identified three specific types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and

descriptive. Exploratory case studies are used primarily by researchers in the field of

sociology when considerable uncertainty exists about operations, goals, and results of a

program. Exploratory case studies help identify questions, select measurement constructs,

and develop measures; they also serve to safeguard investment in larger studies.

Explanatory case studies are used to investigate causal connections. Descriptive cases

studies require that an illustrative theory be developed before starting the case study (Yin,









1993). Stake (1995) added three other types of cases studies to Yin's list: intrinsic case

studies, where the researcher has an interest in the case; instrumental case studies, where

the researcher attempts to understand more than what is obvious; and collective case

studies, which focus on a group of cases, rather than a single case.

This thesis focuses on a single case in order to fully understand the political

implications of the BCRA. Yin (1994) stated single cases may be used to confirm or

challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case. The case this thesis relies on

is the latter because the candidate studied self-identifies as a radical, grassroots candidate,

which is an extreme party affiliation. Additionally, the candidate studied ran prior to the

implementation of the BCRA and after the implementation of the BCRA, providing a set

of comparisons not generally available in many case studies.

Yin points out that case study research should not be confused with sampling

research, which decides case selection based on a population. Yin states this type of

sample selection is improper in a case study. He believes each individual case study

consists of a whole study, in which facts are gathered from various sources and

conclusions are drawn from those facts (Yin, 1994).

A case study employs a triangulated research system. The need for triangulation

arises from the need to confirm the validity of the research. Stake (1995) explained that

the case study protocols used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations are forms of

triangulation. Yin (1993) recommends that case study researchers use multiple sources of

data to authenticate their findings. This thesis relies on multiple interviews with

campaign participants, multiple personal observations, and a multitude of campaign

finance data to ensure the validity of the findings.









Denzin (1984) identified four types of triangulation: data source triangulation,

where the researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different contexts;

investigator triangulation, where several investigators examine the same phenomenon;

theory triangulation, where investigators with different viewpoints interpret the same

results; and methodological triangulation, where one approach is followed by another, to

increase confidence in the final interpretation. This thesis employs methodological

triangulation in order to further validate the findings presented in the following chapter.

The issue of generalization is a frequent criticism of case study research. Critics

claim that the results of case studies, especially single case studies, are incapable of

providing a generalizing conclusion and are therefore microscopic. Yin refuted this

critique by arguing that the sample size of a study had no bearing on the applicability of

the conclusions. Also, Yin pointed out that generalizing results, from either single or

multiple designs, is made to theory and not to populations. He presented four applications

for a case study: to explain complex causal links in real life interventions, to describe the

real-life context in which the interventions occurred, to describe the intervention itself,

and to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear set

of outcomes (Yin, 1994).

Stake argued for more of an intuitive generalization, which he named "naturalistic

generalization." Stake's argument focused on the relationship between the reader's

experiences and the case study itself. He believed that the data generated by case study

researchers would be applicable to a broad cross section of the public, thereby facilitating

a greater understanding of the phenomenon studied (Stake, 1995). This thesis follows

Stake's principle of naturalistic generalization.









Methodology

Yin's (1993) case study methodology has four distinct stages: design the case study

protocol, conduct the case study, analyze the case study evidence, and develop the

conclusions, recommendations, and implications of the study. The following sections of

this chapter will expand on these four stages. Each section will begin by acknowledging

the recommendations found in the literature and end with a discussion of the application

of the method.

The first stage in case study methodology is the development of the case study

protocol. Yin (1994) suggested the researcher must possess or acquire the following skills

in order to design the appropriate protocol: the ability to ask good questions and to

interpret the responses, be a good listener, be adaptive and flexible so as to react to

various situations, have a firm grasp of issues being studied, and be unbiased by

preconceived notions. This researcher received a bachelor's degree in political science

from Clemson University in 2003 and has had years of experience interviewing

individuals as a student reporter for the Clemson newspaper. This researcher understands

the subject matter being studied in this case as this researcher was previously employed

by a U.S. Congressman, a South Carolina State Senator as well as other various political

candidates.

Yin wrote there is more to a protocol than just the instrument. He argued the

development of the rules and procedures in the case study protocol enhance the reliability

of the research. Yin (1994) felt that case study protocol should include the following

sections: an overview of the case study project, field procedures, case study questions and

a guide for the case study report. For the purposes of this thesis, a complete case study

protocol is presented in this section.









Yin (1994) presented three conditions for case study design: the type of research

question posed, the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events,

and the degree of focus on contemporary events. To address the first of Yin's design

conditions, this thesis poses the following research questions:

* How does the BCRA change the way in which federal campaigns operate?

* How do these new laws impact the ability of a federal candidate to communicate
his or her message to the public?

* Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsors intended the legislation to do?

* What is the likely future of campaign finance reform after the implementation of
the BCRA?

* How has the BCRA altered the communication processes within federal
campaigns?

* Specifically, how has the BCRA impacted the scope of political communication for
federal candidates?

In regards to the second design condition, this researcher had no control over the

behavioral events contained within this case study. This is typical within case study

research. To address Yin's third design condition, the events examined in this case study

are contemporary, although historic information was used to provide relevant background

information.

The second step of case study methodology is the actual execution of the case

study. Yin (1994) pointed out that data collection should be treated as a design issue

because it can enhance the construct and internal validity of the study, as well as the

external validity and reliability.

Yin (1994) listed six primary sources of evidence for data collection in a case

study: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant









observation, and physical artifacts. Yin pointed out that researchers do not have to use all

six sources in every case study.

Table 3-2. A table that outlines the strengths and weaknesses of various sources of
evidence.


Source of
Evidence
Documentation


Archival Records

Interviews


Direct
Observation




Participant
Observation

Physical Artifacts


Strengths

stable repeated review
unobtrusive exist prior to
case study
exact names etc.
broad coverage extended time
span


Same as above
precise and quantitative
targeted focuses on case
study topic
insightful provides perceived
causal inferences

reality covers events in real
time
contextual covers event
context

Same as above
insightful into interpersonal
behavior
insightful into cultural features
insightful into technical
operations


Weaknesses

irretrievability
biased selectivity
reporting bias reflects author bias
access may be blocked


Same as above
privacy might inhibit access
bias due to poor questions
response bias
incomplete recollection
reflexivity interviewee expresses
what interviewer wants to hear
time-consuming
selectivity might miss facts
reflexivity observer's presence might
cause change
cost observers need time
Same as above
bias due to investigator's actions

selectivity
availability


Source: (Yin, 1994, p. 80)

This thesis analyzed every type of evidence that Yin suggested case studies should

focus on. The types of documents relied on by this thesis include:

* U.S. Public Institute Research Group (US PIRG) study conducted in 2002 and 2004
* Letters written by Dave Bruderly to the FEC


The archival records used in this study include:

All FEC reports for the 2002 and 2004 elections
A list of all contributors to the Bruderly campaign









* A personal diary kept by this researcher to document all personal observations
during the Bruderly campaign

The following individuals were interviewed at their home on the dates listed by this

researcher:


* Dave Bruderly (candidate) (12/18/04)
* Greg Gorman (Fundraising Coordinator) (1/18/05)
* Josh Goldstein (Canvassing Director) (1/10/05)
* Dan Kahn (Event Coordinator) (1/4/05)
* Jeff Allstadt (a $2,000 contributor) (1/21/05)
* Bill Schultz (A $2,000 contributor and volunteer) (12/12/04)
* Emmit Bowling (Representative from the United Auto Workers PAC) (1/10/05)
* Jeremy Sanders (Office Coordinator) (12/8/04)
* Harold Saive (Technology Director) (12/14/04)

Participant observations by this researcher are included as noted. This researcher

was employed as the campaign manager for the Bruderly campaign for seven months.

This researcher began as a Bruderly volunteer in January of 2004 and by April 2004, was

hired to manage the Bruderly campaign. The goal of a participant observer is to attempt

to become part of the community being studied and to adopt various participant roles.

Participant observers bring their own notions of culture and community to each study.

They attempt to participate fully, but must be careful to behave in a consistent manner as

part of the setting so as not to cause significant changes in the community itself (Yin,

1994).

Also included in this thesis are direct observations, which aid the participant

observations reported in this study and provide additional perspectives regarding the

effectiveness of the BCRA. The physical artifacts included in this study are: campaign

signs, campaign literature, campaign palm cards, and an array of quantitative campaign









data exported from Microsoft Access and an online database purchased by Dave

Bruderly.

The primary means of gathering data for this case study was conducting open

ended interviews with campaign employees as well as campaign contributors. Yin

suggests using open ended interviews to expand the depth of data gathering and to

increase the number of information sources. The interviews were conducted individually

according to the interviewee's schedule and availability, as suggested by Feagin, Orum,

and Sjoberg (1991). Included in every interview, was a series of core questions designed

to capture each individual perspective regarding the impact of the BCRA. Those

questions were:

* What effects, if any, did you notice on Dave Bruderly's campaign as a result of the
implementation of the BCRA?

* Did the BCRA impact your activity within the Bruderly campaign in any way?
How do you feel campaign finance regulations impact federal campaigns?

* Can you name a specific reform implemented by the BCRA, and if so, what does
this mean to you?

* What is your opinion of soft money versus hard money within federal campaigns?
What is your opinion of the regulatory function performed by the Federal Elections
Committee?

* What is your opinion on the current state of campaign finance reform? What is your
opinion on the future of campaign finance reform?

* Finally, is there anything you would like to tell me about your experience with the
Bruderly campaign that is campaign finance related?

Within one week of completing each interview, this researcher sent a copy of the

transcribed interview to each participant to verify that each transcription was correct. The

data analysis used in this study relies on explanation building to derive the categories

necessary to logically present the findings of this case. After analyzing each interview









transcription and comparing answers to specific questions asked by the interviewer, eight

thematic categories regarding campaign finance regulation emerged. These eight

categories are; contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft

money, issue advertisements and electioneering communications, disclosure,

coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits.

The main source of the quantitative data used in this case study came from various

FEC records, all of which are available to the public. In addition to the figures reported

by the FEC, a web-based database was purchased by Dave Bruderly to archive all

campaign related material. This database performs functions similar to that of Microsoft

Access. This database allowed Bruderly's campaign to record volumes of information on

campaign donors, campaign staff and campaign volunteers.

The third step in case study methodology is analyzing the case study evidence.

"Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining

the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study" (Yin, 1994, p. 204). Yin

suggested that every investigation should have a general analytic strategy, to guide the

decision of what will be analyzed and for what reason. He presented three possible

analytic techniques: pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis

(Yin, 1994). A pattern matching analysis compares an empirically based pattern to a

predicted pattern. If the patterns match, the internal reliability of the case study is

strengthened. An explanation building analysis is considered a form of a pattern

matching, in which the analysis of the case study is carried by building an explanation of

the case. A time series analysis is a well-known technique used predominantly in

experimental analysis. This thesis relies on an explanation building analysis.









Yin encouraged researchers to make every effort to produce a quality analysis. In

order to accomplish this, Yin presented four principles that case study researchers should

follow: ensure that the analysis relied on all relevant evidence, include all major rival

interpretations in the analysis, address the most significant aspect of the case study, and

use the researcher's prior knowledge to further the analysis. The analysis of this thesis

incorporated each of Yin's principles into the following chapter.

The following categories are used to analyze the data gathered from this case study:

contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue

advertisements and electioneering communications, disclosure, coordination, and unions,

corporations and non-profits. A majority of the data gathered for these categories was

taken from campaign receipts and FEC reports. These categories were derived after an

extensive review of campaign finance legislation and the interview transcriptions

produced as a result of this study. These categories are articulated in the next chapter.

Statistical data was analyzed by comparing 2002 election data to the 2004 data.

The fourth and final step in case study methodology is developing conclusions,

recommendations, and implications based on the data collected in the study (Yin, 1994).

Yin cautions researchers not to use technical vocabulary in this section and instead rely

on clear explanations so that the audience can understand the full implications of the case

study.

The results of this case study are presented in the following chapter. Also included

are detailed descriptions of the procedures used throughout this case study.














CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS

In this chapter, the findings of the case study performed on Dave Bruderly's

campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives will be presented.

The data from this case study is grouped according to the following categories;

contribution limits, enforcement, legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue

advertisements and electioneering communications, disclosure, coordination, and unions,

corporations and non-profits. These thematic categories emerged after reviewing

interview transcriptions with key campaign individuals and analyzing the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). In the following sections of this chapter, each category

is introduced and the campaign finance regulations that governed each category, during

Bruderly's 2002 and 2004 campaigns are discussed. Direct quotations from interviewee's

and excerpts from this researcher's field notes are used as supporting materials. The

quantitative data presented in this chapter relies on a comparative analysis of statistics

from Dave Bruderly's 2002 and 2004 campaigns.

Background Information on Florida's 6th Congressional District

Prior to his 2002 campaign for Florida's 6th District U.S. House seat, Dave

Bruderly had never run for a political office. His 2002 campaign began in July of 2002

and ended unsuccessfully four months later. Bruderly ran against Congressman Clifford

Stearns (R) from Ocala, Florida, then a fourteen-year incumbent. After losing in 2002,

with only 35% of the vote, Bruderly decided to run against Congressman Stearns again in









the 2004 election. In 2004, Bruderly again lost to Congressman Stearns, receiving 36% of

the vote.

Table 4-3. A table that provides a county by county breakdown of the number of votes
in the 2002 and 2004 elections.
Steams 2002 Bruderly 2002 Steams 2004 Bruderly 2004
Alachua 28,542 (51%) 26,988 (49%) 41,949 (50%) 42,214 (50%)
Bradford 4,861 (64%) 2,713 (36%) 7,072 (68%) 3,329 (32%)
Clay 35,823 (80%) 8,972 (20%) 54,709 (78%) 15,694 (22%)
Duval 17,701 (71%) 7,086 (29%) 27,755 (68%) 12,815 (32%)
Gilchrist 3,070 (62%) 1,852 (38%) 4,422 (66%) 2,228 (34%)
Lake 11,244 (68%) 5,336 (32%) 14,849 (65%) 7,874 (35%)
Levy 1,205 (53%) 1,081(47%) 1,997 (59%) 1,390 (41%)
Marion 39,124 (65%) 21,018 (35%) 57,837 (65%) 30,853 (35%)
Total 141,570 75,046 210,590 116,397

Table 4-4. A table that provides information on the budgets of both campaigns in 2002
and 2004.
Stearns 2002 Bruderly 2002 Stearns 2004 Bruderly 2004
Money Raised $618,193 $59, 198 $716,968 $121,762
Money Spent $332,419 $58, 524 $283,334 $118,904
Money from
Money from $395,411 $1,200 $474, 121 $9,600
PACS
Moneyfrom $149,779 $39,998 $193,255 $100,012
individuals
Money from
Money from $0 $18,000 $250 $12,000
candidate

Florida's 6th congressional district was redrawn in the summer of 2002. Currently,

the 6th district includes all or parts of Alachua, Bradford, Clay, Duval, Gilchrist, Lake,

Levy and Marion counties. Nearly half of the district's 650,000 residents live in

Gainesville, Ocala, and Leesburg. Another third of the district's residents live in

Jacksonville and Clay County. Florida's 6th congressional district is home to many

retirees. Its industries include agriculture, education, forestry, tourism, healthcare,

service, retail, and defense. There are roughly 376,000 registered voters in District 6, with

42.1% of the voters identifying as Democrat, 41.4% identifying as Republican and 16.5%

identifying as Independent.









Findings

For this thesis nine individuals were interviewed. The age range of the individuals

interviewed varies from 21 to 67 years old. Only one of the individuals interviewed,

Technology Director Harold Saive, worked on both of the 2002 and 2004 campaigns. The

following individuals were paid members of the campaign staff; Greg Gorman, Josh

Goldstein, Dan Kahn and Jeremy Sanders. The following individuals were campaign

volunteers; Jeff Allstadt, Bill Schultz, Emmit Bowling and Harold Saive.

Dave Bruderly, a 58-year-old environmental engineer, has lived in Alachua County

for more than thirty years. He has two children and three grandchildren. He received a

bachelor of science in marine engineering and transportation from the U. S. Merchant

Marine Academy in 1969. He also received a master of science in engineering from

Columbia University in 1971. Bruderly has been working as an environmental

engineering consultant for thirty-two years. Bruderly focused primarily on attending

public events and making face-to-face requests for contributions during the 2004

campaign.

Greg Gorman, a 22-year-old student at the University of Florida, worked for the

Bruderly campaign while pursing his undergraduate degree in political science and was a

part-time campaign employee. Originally from Miami, Florida, Gorman has been living

in Gainesville for the past four years. Gorman was in charge of coordinating all

fundraising phone calls to be made by the candidate. This involved finding contact

information for possible donors, preparing a call sheet, and ensuring that Bruderly made

each phone call. Gorman also supervised all fundraising-related data entry into the

campaign's database.









Josh Goldstein, a 21-year-old student at the University of Florida, worked on the

Bruderly campaign as an intern from the political science department. Also, originally

from Miami, Goldstein has lived in Gainesville for three years. Goldstein was in charge

of developing and implementing a canvassing plan for the field operations of the

Bruderly campaign. Goldstein was also responsible for the development and maintenance

of a schedule for the auto-dialer, which played a pre-recorded message urging citizens to

vote for Bruderly.

Dan Kahn, a 38-year-old self-described political activist, was hired to schedule all

campaign-related events. Kahn was also in charge of formulating Bruderly's platform

positions on various government policies. Originally from New York, Kahn has lived in

Florida for two years. Kahn lives in a tent, by choice, and describes himself as "eccentric,

but in a good way (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 4, 2005)."

Jeff Allstadt, a 44-year-old computer engineer from Clay County, Florida, is

married and has two children. Originally from Texas, Allstadt has lived in Florida for

twenty-two years. Allstadt was a major financial supporter of the Bruderly campaign,

donating the maximum amount allowed by an individual under the terms of the BCRA

and opening his home to host house parties to raise money for Bruderly's candidacy.

Allstadt acted as the Clay and Duval County coordinator for the Bruderly campaign.

Bill Schultz, a 46-year-old business owner, lives in Alachua County. Originally

from Kansas, Schultz has lived in Gainesville for three years. He is married and has two

children. Schultz was also a major donor to the Bruderly campaign, donating not only

hard money, but also giving in-kind contributions such as office space, telephone use, and

Internet use, until he met the individual contribution limit defined by the BCRA.









Additionally, Schultz helped to obtain statistical data used by Goldstein in developing the

canvassing plan for the campaign.

Emmit Bowling, a 62-year-old retired auto worker from Ocala, Florida, has lived in

Florida his entire life. Bowling is a member of the United Auto Worker's PAC (UAW-

PAC), which donated $5,000 to Bruderly's 2004 campaign.

Jeremy Sanders, a 24-year-old political consultant from Ohio, graduated with a

degree in political science from the University of Miami in Ohio in 2003. Sanders moved

to Florida in 2004 to manage the home office of the Bruderly campaign. Sanders was in

charge of coordinating the schedule of office volunteers as well as the schedule of office

staff.

Harold Saive, a 67-year-old retired teacher, has lived in Gainesville, Florida, for

twelve years. Saive was responsible for the development and maintenance of the

Bruderly web-site as well as the production of multi-media campaign literature. Saive

was also in charge of finding strategic locations to display campaign signs and gaining

permission, if needed, to display the signs.

Contribution Limits

During the 2002 campaign, the FECA placed limits on contributions by individuals

and groups to candidates, party committees and PACs. Individuals were permitted to

donate an aggregate amount of $25,000 to candidates, parties and PACs per year.

Individuals were permitted to donate a maximum of $1,000 per candidate per election

cycle. There were no regulations on soft money donations made by individuals.

Individuals could donate $20,000 per year to a national party and $5,000 per year to state

parties and federal PACs. PACs could donate $5,000 to candidates, other PACs, or state

parties, and $15,000 to national parties (Campaign Finance Institute [CFI], 2004).









The Campaign Finance Institute is a non-partisan, non-profit institute, affiliated

with The George Washington University, that conducts objective research and education,

empanels task forces and makes recommendations for policy change in the field of

campaign finance.

During the 2004 campaign, the contribution limits mandated by the FECA were

raised to adjust for inflation. Individuals were permitted to donate an annual aggregate

amount of $95,000 to candidates, parties and PACs. Of that aggregate amount, no more

than $37,500 could be donated to candidates and no more than $57,500 could be donated

to national parties and PACs. The maximum amount an individual could donate to a

federal candidate was raised from $1,000 to $2,000. Individuals were permitted to donate

up to $25,000 per year per national party, as long as the individual aggregate limit for

national parties ($57,500) was not exceeded. Individuals were also permitted to donate

$10,000 to each state, district, and local party committee annually, provided the

individual does not donate more than $95,000 per each election cycle. While the BCRA

did adjust individual contribution limits and aggregate individual contribution limits for

inflation, the BCRA did not adjust the contribution limits of PACs for inflation (CFI,

2004).

While the FECA did not address the possibility of candidates using personal wealth

to finance their campaigns, the BCRA did and a millionaire-opponent provision was

included in the legislation. This provision increases the contribution limits for

congressional candidates facing wealthy self-financed candidates. Senate candidates

facing an opponent who has spent $150,000 of his or her own money plus four cents

times the number of eligible voters in their state, and House candidates facing an









opponent who has spent $350,000 of his or her own money, presumably benefit from this

provision which raises the normal BCRA contribution limits significantly. If a self-

financed Senate candidate has 2-4 times more money than a challenger, and the $150,000

threshold has been met, the challenger's contribution limits are increased by 300%. If the

Senate candidate has 5-10 times more money than a challenger, the challenger's

contribution limits are increased by 600%. If a Senate candidate has more than 11 times

more money than the challenger, the challenger's contribution limits are increased 600%

and all limits on party coordinated expenditures are removed. If a self-financed House

candidate spends $350,000, the opposing candidate's contribution limits are tripled and

the opposing candidate can accept coordinated party expenditures. The amount of

contributions and expenditures gained by the less wealthy candidate cannot exceed the

total amount of personal wealth spent by the opponent (CFI, 2004).

All of the respondents interviewed for this thesis agreed that the provisions to the

individual contribution limits had an overwhelmingly positive effect on Bruderly's 2004

campaign. Sanders said:

The fact that we were able to raise over $18,000 in one night with the house parties
indicates to me that the BCRA is accomplishing what it set out to do, which is to
level the political playing field for challengers. (L. Dunn, personal communication,
December 8, 2004)

Bruderly benefited in 2004 due to the increase in contribution limits as mandated

by the BCRA. Doubling the individual contribution limit drastically increased the flow of

hard money into Bruderly's 2004 campaign. While the aggregate contribution limits for

individuals and contribution limits pertaining to PACs had a negative impact on

Bruderly's 2004 campaign, the swell in hard money receipts, due to the increase in

individual contribution limits, had the biggest impact on Bruderly's 2004 campaign.









Table 4-5. A table that details the rise of hard money in Bruderly's two campaigns.
Total Amount of Total Number of Average Individual
Money Raised Contributors Donation
2002 $59,198 545 $92.09
2004 $121,762 663 $183.65

Table 4-6. A table that documents the flow of money into both Bruderly and Stearns
campaigns in 2002 and 2004.
Stearns 2002 Bruderly 2002 Stearns 2004 Bruderly 2004
Money Raised $618,193 $59, 198 $716,968 $121,762
Money Spent $332,419 $58, 524 $283,334 $118,904
Money from
Moneyfrom $395,411 $1,200 $474, 121 $9,600
PACS
Moneyfrom $149,779 $39,998 $193,255 $100,012
individuals
Money from
Moneyfrom $0 $18,000 $250 $12,000
candidate

When Bruderly was asked what differences came to mind when comparing his

2002 and 2004 campaign, Bruderly replied, "We get twice as much money from

individual contributors (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 18, 2004)." In

Bruderly's opinion, the increase in the individual contribution limit meant formulating a

fundraising strategy focused on soliciting individual contributions in $2,000 increments.

In order to do this, this researcher, along with Jeff Allstadt, developed a plan to have

eight separate house parties, one in each county, all on the same night, in order to raise

money for Bruderly's campaign.

The "Bruderly Bash" house parties were held on September 25, 2004. All

campaign contributors were invited to attend. The centerpiece of the house parties was a

conference call with Senate candidate Betty Castor, Representative Corrine Brown and

Jacksonville attorney, Wayne Hogan, all of whom endorsed Bruderly while on the

conference call. The house parties raised a total of $18,771.32 for Bruderly's campaign

(L. Dunn, personal communication, September 26, 2004). Of that amount, $10,000 was









donated in $2,000 increments, meaning only five people were responsible for more than

half of the money raised that night. In this instance, Bruderly's campaign was enhanced

by the increase in the individual contribution limit.

Commenting on the house parties, contributor Jeff Allstadt said:

While our initial goal was to raise $50,000 for Bruderly's campaign, we knew that
was ambitious, but we still thought it was possible. What hurt us was that fact that
hurricane Jeanne hit North Central Florida on the night of our house parties. Over
45 guests, who had promised to show up, were unable to attend due to the
inclement weather. Additionally, the date that I chose for the house parties
happened to fall on one of the biggest Jewish holidays of the year. That led to
another ten or eleven guests not showing up, but overall I am very happy with what
we did accomplish. After all, we did set the highest one day fundraising record ever
in the history of the Bruderly campaign. (L. Dunn, personal communication,
January 21, 2005)

While increasing the individual aggregate contribution level from $25,000 to

$95,000 allowed national political parties to receive more money, Bruderly's campaign

did not receive any money or assistance from the DNC. Gladys Coffrin, a well-known

political activist from Gainesville, Florida, donated $50,000 to the DNC in September of

2004. When members of the Bruderly campaign contacted Coffrin in October to solicit a

campaign contribution, she said that this year she donated all of her money to the DNC

and to contact them for a contribution to Bruderly's campaign (L. Dunn, participant

observation, October 11, 2004).

In 2002, Bruderly received $1,200 from PACs. In September of 2004 the United

Auto Worker's PAC (UAW-PAC) donated $5,000 to Bruderly's campaign. While $5,000

is the maximum amount a PAC can donate to a federal candidate under the BCRA, this

amount was not adjusted for inflation as the individual contribution limits were. If the

contribution limits pertaining to PACs had been raised according to the increase in

individual contribution limits, Bruderly would have raised more PAC money. Emmit









Bowling, a representative from the UAW-PAC in Ocala, Florida, said, "If we could have

given Bruderly more money, we would have, without a doubt. Bruderly stands for

everything that our PAC represents and those are the kind of candidates we consistently

support" (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 10, 2005). The amount of PAC

money a candidate receives directly impacts the amount of support that candidates

receive from their respective party. If a candidate is able to raise a large amount of PAC

money and gain party support, their chances of winning are dramatically increased.

Enforcement

Prior to the BCRA, the statute of limitations for a FECA violation was three years.

The FEC had to be notified of each violation and enforce the appropriate consequences

within a three-year time frame. Since the BCRA, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has

issued new criteria for campaign finance violations. This new criteria increases the

penalties for contribution and conduit violations and extends the statute of limitations for

a BCRA violation from three to five years. All federal campaign finance complaints can

be accessed through the FEC's web-site (CFI, 2004).

During the 2002 campaign there were no campaign finance violations reported to

the FEC. In 2004, a Republican from Ocala, Florida, filed a report with the FEC claiming

that the Bruderly campaign failed to report expenditures on their pre-primary FEC report.

Ten days after the complaint was filed, the Bruderly campaign received a document from

the FEC outlining the possible violations of federal campaign finance law and provided

Bruderly fifteen days to provide a written response to the FEC. However, the gentlemen

who filed the initial FEC complaint had misinterpreted the figures reported on Bruderly's

pre-primary FEC report and within a month, the entire situation had been cleared by the









FEC and Bruderly was found not to be in violation of any federal campaign finance laws

(L. Dunn, participant observation, October 21, 2004).

All of the respondents interviewed for this thesis believed that the FEC

enforcement measures, mandated by the BCRA, benefited all political candidates,

including Bruderly. Contributor Schultz said, "While the FEC could probably do more,

federal campaign finance legislation has become so complex, that it is impossible to leave

all federal campaign finance regulation to one federal agency (L. Dunn, personal

communication, December 12, 2004)." Intern Goldstein said, "I think the new and

improved enforcement measures developed by the FEC should be applauded (L. Dunn,

personal communication, January 6, 2005)."

Legal and Constitutional Issues

Prior to the BCRA, the Supreme Court held that campaign finance laws were

constitutional if they were narrowly tailored enough to advance a compelling public

interest. The Supreme Court consistently upheld contribution limits on campaign finance,

corporate and union contribution bans, and disclosure statutes, with the goal of

preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption within American elections (CFI,

2004).

In the BCRA ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that a ban on soft money and

restrictions on certain forms of electioneering communications did not violate the rights

of free speech and in fact, helped reduce the appearance of corruption within federal

campaigns (CFI, 2004).

All of the individuals interviewed for this thesis agreed that the BCRA did not

violate any rights to free speech. Intern Josh Goldstein said:









If anything, the BCRA attempts to level the playing field for all candidates and just
because that involves placing limits on the amount of money allowed into a
campaign, I do not believe that the BCRA violates the First Amendment in any
way. (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 6, 2005)

Fundraising coordinator Gorman also said, "In America, anything government

regulated is automatically assumed by most people to be corrupt. However, I honestly

believe that the BCRA is a true attempt to rid federal campaigns of corruption (L. Dunn,

personal communication, January 18, 2005)." The legal and constitutional issues

surrounding the BCRA provided Bruderly's campaign with a significant advantage in

2004 when compared to his 2002 campaign, because these issues led to a total ban on soft

money in federal elections in 2004.

Soft Money

During Bruderly's 2002 campaign, prior to the BCRA, soft money was given

without any limits by individuals, corporations, and unions. Soft money is not regulated

by the Federal Election Committee (FEC). Political parties were required to use a mix of

soft and hard money to fund certain federal election activities; including issue

advertising, voter registration drives, and party-building exercises. The term "federal

election activity" was not specifically defined anywhere in the FECA legislation. There

were no provisions regarding soft money spent by members of Congress, federal

officeholders or federal candidates. There were also no limits on the amount of soft

money a national party could transfer to a state or local party. State and local parties, like

national parties, were required to fund federal election activities with a mix of hard and

soft money, but with a much lower percentage of hard money than the national parties

(CFI, 2004).









During Bruderly's 2004 campaign, after the implementation of the BCRA, national

parties and congressional committees were prohibited from raising and spending soft

money, regardless of the purpose. The BCRA prevented members of Congress, federal

officials, and federal candidates from raising soft money in connection with a federal

election, although exceptions were made for fundraising in connection with organizations

not involved in any federal election activity. The term "federal election activity" was

defined as any activity beyond "express advocacy." Express advocacy was defined as

communications which use words such as "vote for" and "support" or "defeat." The

BCRA also prevented state and local parties from using soft money to fund federal

election activities (CFI, 2004).

Bruderly's 2004 campaign was not considered competitive by the Democratic

National Committee (DNC) or the Florida Democratic Party (FDP). Bruderly also lacked

support on the local level, finding it difficult to rely on organizations such as the Alachua

County Democratic Executive Committee (ACDEC) for assistance (L. Dunn, participant

observation, October 2, 2004). Because Bruderly's candidacy was not taken seriously by

any of the major players within the Democratic Party, eradicating the use of soft money

in federal campaigns provided Bruderly's campaign more opportunities to succeed in

2004 versus 2002 because federal candidates as well as parties on the national, state and

local levels were prevented from raising or spending soft money in connection with

federal elections. The soft money prohibition mandated by the BCRA did not have a

direct impact on Bruderly's 2004 campaign, but he may have benefited indirectly. In

2002, if Bruderly had been considered a threat to Congressmen Stearns, organizations









such as the RNC could have targeted Bruderly's campaign with an unlimited amount of

soft money, but in 2004 the use of soft money was prohibited within federal campaigns.

While the impact of the soft money ban cannot be measured directly for this thesis,

the following question was posed to each individual interviewed: What is your opinion of

soft money versus hard money within federal campaigns? Almost all of the respondents

(Bruderly, Gorman, Goldstein, Allstadt, Bowling, Sanders, Saive and Schultz) felt that

the presence of soft money within federal campaigns was a deterrent to challengers. They

also felt that the advantages of soft money favored incumbent politicians, thereby

decreasing the spirit of political competition. Contributor Bill Schultz said:

Soft money benefits the incumbent only and it has been abused by politicians for
years. Because of the BCRA, I whole-heartedly believe that Bruderly was given a
more even playing field in which to challenge [Congressman] Stearns in 2004. (L.
Dunn, personal communication, December 12, 2004)

Technology director Harold Saive agreed with Schultz and added:

The issue of soft money has plagued federal campaigns for decades. I'm glad to see
that our government has finally decided to do something about it. Candidates like
Bruderly, who are progressive in their ideals and dependent upon grassroots
campaign techniques, needed the government to undercut the power of soft money.
The underdog definitely wins. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 14,
2004)

The only interviewee with a different opinion on soft money was event coordinator

Dan Kahn. Kahn felt that soft money was needed within federal elections to ensure that

certain federal election activities, such as voter mobilization efforts, did not cease with

the ban on soft money. Kahn pointed out that these types of activities were essential to

the health of America's democracy and without the funds to produce these kinds of

events, a larger percentage of American citizens might become disinterested in the

democratic process, leading to lower levels of voter turnout (L. Dunn, personal

communication, January 4, 2005).









Issue Ads and Electioneering Communications

The effects of the electioneering communication regulations on Bruderly's 2004

campaign were unclear. This is due to the nature of Bruderly's liberal, grassroots

campaign. Bruderly was not considered to be a serious challenger because of his stance

on various policy issues. The centerpiece of Bruderly's platform was legislation to

enhance the development of hydrogen-powered vehicles in America. Due to the

approximate 50/50 split in party preference among the residents of Florida's 6th

congressional district and Bruderly's progressive politics; Congressman Stearns, the

RNC, and other Republican organizations, chose not to target Bruderly in any type of

electioneering communications in the 2004 election. This was also the case in Bruderly's

2002 election.

During the 2002 campaign, campaign advertising and communications fell into two

categories, express advocacy and issue advocacy. Express advocacy was defined as

communications which use words such as "vote for" and "support" or "defeat." Issue

advocacy was divided into two sub-categories, candidate-specific issue advertising and

pure-issue advertising. Candidate-specific advertising clearly identified a candidate but

did not use explicit words of express advocacy. Pure-issue advertising discussed an issue

without mentioning the name or showing an image of a candidate. National and state

parties were permitted to produce issue advertising, if a mix of hard and soft money was

used, but all party finances had to be fully disclosed to the FEC. Corporations and unions

had no limits on advertising, except for the sponsor identification rules mandated by the

Federal Communications Committee (FCC). Non-profits were allowed to produce an

unlimited amount of express advocacy advertising as long as the advertising furthered the

principal purpose of the sponsoring organization (CFI, 2004).









During the 2004 campaign, under the terms of the BCRA campaign advertising and

communications were called "electioneering communications." Electioneering

communications are defined as targeted broadcast, cable, or satellite advertisements that

refer to a candidate within 60 days of a general election or within 30 days of a primary

election. An advertisement is considered "targeted" if it can be received by 50,000 people

in the congressional district where the election is being held. National parties were

limited to using hard money to fund electioneering communications. State and local

parties were also limited to using hard money to fund any federal-candidate-specific

advertising, regardless of whether or not the advertising could be considered a form of

electioneering communication. Federal and state candidates were also limited to using

hard money to fund federal-candidate-specific advertising. Corporations, unions, and

501(c)(4) organizations were prohibited from directly producing targeted electioneering

communications, although they are able to produce express advocacy advertisements

through a political action committee (PAC). Additionally, all organizations, including

non-profits that accept corporate or labor contributions, were prohibited from directly

producing any type of electioneering communication. However, these organizations are

also able to form PACs to raise hard money to fund electioneering communications (CFI,

2004).

None of the interviewee's questioned could comment on the impact of the

electioneering communication regulations, as neither the Democrats nor Republicans

used any electioneering communications.

Fundraising coordinator Greg Gorman said, "There were no ads produced by

Congressman Stearns or any other Republican group that portrayed Bruderly in any type









of light (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 18, 2005)." While the Bruderly

campaign did fund several political advertisements, none of the ads were considered to be

electioneering communications. In 2004 Bruderly spent 50% of his budget on political

advertising. In 2002, Bruderly only spent 33% of his budget on advertising because he

was unable to raise a large amount of money to fund targeted advertisements.

Disclosure

During the 2002 campaign, all candidate committees, party committees and PACs

were required to submit unscheduled reports disclosing the total amount of money that

they raised and spent. Candidates had to identify all PACs and party committees that

contributed to their campaign and they had to identify individuals who contributed more

than $200 to their campaign. Candidates also had to disclose all campaign expenditures in

excess of $200 per year. The FECA also required national political committees and any

political committee with a soft money account to disclose soft money donations and

disbursements. The FECA did not require any form of disclosure regarding issue

advocacy advertising, except to the extent which parties had to disclose soft money

disbursements (CFI, 2004).

During the 2004 campaign, after the BCRA was implemented, political parties

were required to disclose their finances monthly and federal congressional candidates

were required to disclose their finances quarterly. The BCRA mandated that state parties

disclose spending related to federal election activities. The BCRA also required that all

political advertisements must include a disclosure disclaimer (CFI, 2004).

The BCRA required the FEC to develop software and software standards that allow

reportable campaign receipts and disbursements to be transmitted immediately and posted

on the FECs web site upon receipt. The BCRA also expanded the class of persons









required to file electronically, mandating that each candidate for federal office use

software that meets the new standards once such software is made available to the

candidate. Data from electronically filed reports is received, processed and disseminated

more easily and efficiently by the FEC, resulting in a better use of resources. Reports

that are filed electronically are normally available within five minutes and detailed data is

available in the FECs databases within 24 to 48 hours. In contrast, during the 2002

campaign, the time between the receipt of a report filed through the paper filing system,

and its appearance on the FECs web site was 48 hours. In some cases, it took as long as

30 days before detailed data filed on paper was available in the FECs databases (CFI,

2004).

The effects of the disclosure regulations on the Bruderly campaign were both

positive and negative. The BCRA's disclosure requirements allowed Bruderly to stay

informed of Congressman Steams's fundraising efforts, and because state parties were

required to disclose all federal election activities, the Bruderly campaign could also stay

abreast of what was happening within the Florida Republican Party. Because Bruderly

was not deemed a threat to Congressman Steams's re-election, the Florida Republican

Party chose not to concentrate any of their efforts on Florida's 6th Congressional District

race.

The disclaimer required on all political advertising by the BCRA had several

negative consequences on the Bruderly campaign. Because Bruderly ran in 2002, he

wanted to use old campaign signs and campaign literature, in order to save money and

paper, but without the proper disclaimer, the campaign could face a multitude of fines

and levies from the FEC. Jeremy Sanders informed Bruderly about the disclaimer









requirements, but Bruderly ignored Sanders and instructed Harold Saive to distribute the

old signs and literature. Within two days, five people had called campaign headquarters

to explain the new disclaimer regulations to Bruderly and his staff. Bruderly rescinded his

position, after hours of arguing, and Saive and Sanders took down all the old campaign

signs. Commenting on the disclaimer requirements, Sanders said, "I had to waste two

entire work days taking down signs that I told Bruderly were not permitted to be

displayed (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 8, 2004)." Sanders and Saive

were able to remove the outdated campaign signs before anyone reported that the

Bruderly campaign was in violation of the FEC disclaimer regulations.

When asked about the disclaimer incident, Saive said:

We were lucky not to be reported the FEC. The disclaimer law adds clarity within
the realm of political advertising, which I think is a good thing. However, it was
just bad timing in regards to the impact of the disclaimer requirements on the
Bruderly campaign. (L. Dunn, personal communication, December 14, 2004)

Bruderly had a different opinion:

I think that stupid disclaimer requirement is a perfect example of what is wrong
with campaign finance in this country. If our lawmakers have enough time to sit in
Washington, D.C. and come up with mundane regulations such as this one, our
democracy is in a whole lot of trouble. (L. Dunn, personal communication,
December 18, 2004)

Coordination

During the 2002 campaign, coordination was defined as political activities

performed by unions, corporations and interest groups made in cooperation with a

candidate or agent of a candidate. Prior to the BCRA, the status of this law was somewhat

unclear, as the FEC refrained from publicly regulating coordination between national

committees and unions, corporations, and PACs. Due to this, the effects of the federal

coordination laws on Bruderly's 2002 campaign are immeasurable. Political parties were









able to make unlimited independent party expenditures and coordinated party

expenditures under the regulations set out in the FECA (CFI, 2004).

During the 2004 campaign, coordination was defined as a payment made in

cooperation with a candidate or agent of a candidate. The BCRA defined coordinated

issue advertisements as contributions (subject to hard money limits) if the sponsors of the

advertisement coordinated with a candidate or party. The BCRA also mandated that on a

district-by-district basis, parties had to decide to make independent expenditures, which

cannot be limited, or to make coordinated expenditures, which are limited, on behalf of

their respective congressional candidates (CFI, 2004).

Coordination describes the interaction between candidates and political parties,

PACs, and/or interest groups that causes activities undertaken by these groups to be

regulated as financial contributions to federal campaigns. All groups making

contributions to a federal candidate are subject to limits on the amount of funds they can

contribute. When a group's expenditures to support a candidate's election are not

coordinated with a candidate's campaign, however, those expenditures are deemed

independent (CFI, 2004).

In June of 2004, the Bruderly campaign learned first-hand the impact of the

BCRA's coordination rules on federal campaigns. Quoted from Bruderly:

In June, I received an email from MoveOn.org announcing they were going to be
driving three little pigs, with anti-Bush sayings on the side, from the top of the state
of Florida to the bottom. I wrote to the chairman of the Duval County DEC
(Democratic Executive Committee), where the trip was going to begin, asking if I
could drive the pigs through part of our district and maybe get some free press.
Within, I think, two hours, an attorney representing Move On had called me and
said the Duval County event had to be cancelled. He said they couldn't do it
because they had violated federal law just by considering coordinating with me.
There is no direct coordination allowed between federal campaigns and 527's. (L.
Dunn, personal communication, December 18, 2004)









Reflecting on the three little pigs incident, fundraising coordinator Gorman said "I

understand why the federal government felt the need to restrict coordination between

parties and candidates, but in Bruderly's situation, this law designed to help challengers,

hurt us more in the long run (L. Dunn, personal communication, January 18, 2005)." All

of the respondents interviewed for this thesis agreed with Gorman.

In this instance, the BCRA regulations that prohibit coordination between 527

groups and federal candidates negatively impacted Bruderly's campaign. Bruderly lost

the opportunity for earned media in an area of the district targeted by his campaign staff

as needing heavy media saturation in order to win the election. Additionally, Bruderly

upset some of the political leaders in Duval County because the three little pig event had

to be cancelled and moved to another county (L. Dunn, participant observation, July 21,

2004).

Unions, Corporations, and Non-Profits

Since 1907, corporations have been prohibited from making expenditures or

contributions in connection with a federal election (Tillman Act). Since 1943, unions

have also been prohibited from making expenditures or contributions in relation to a

federal campaign (Taft-Hartley Act). However, under the FECA, unions and corporations

were allowed to sponsor issue advertising, establish and support PACs, and conduct

internal communications with their shareholders, executive and union members urging

them to support specific candidates, register to vote, and vote.

Four types of non-profit organizations were defined by the FECA: 527 groups,

501(c)(3) groups, 501(c)(4) groups, and 501(c) groups. Section 527 groups, are political

organizations that are tax exempt, but contributions given to them are not tax deductible.

PAC's, candidate campaigns and political party committees are classified as 527 groups.









501(c)(3) groups include public charities, churches, private universities and think tanks.

These groups are tax exempt and contributions to them are tax deductible. 501(c)(3)

groups are completely prohibited from intervening in an election. 501(c)(4) groups are

social welfare or civic organizations. These groups are tax exempt but contributions to

them are not tax deductible. 501(c)(4) groups were allowed to produce issue advertising

under the FECA. 501(c) groups include labor unions, business associations and

professional associations (CFI, 2004). The 2002 campaigns were required to abide by the

regulations outlined in the FECA.

During the 2004 campaign, unions and corporations were prohibited form giving

soft money to parties and from running issue advertisements except as hard money

expenditures through a PAC. Issue advertising was prohibited by non-profit groups,

including any non-profit social welfare organization that accepts corporate or labor

contributions. Non-profit groups are allowed to form PACs to fund electioneering

advertisements with hard money. The BCRA banned national parties from contributing to

or soliciting contributions for non-profits in connection with a federal election or any 527

organization (CFI, 2004).

The changes in campaign finance law regarding unions, corporations and non-

profits did not have a clear impact on the Bruderly campaign. This is due to the small

scale of Bruderly's campaign. While Bruderly did not experience the first-hand effects of

these changes, the growth of 527 groups during the 2004 election was noted by other

candidates. When asked about the impact of 527 groups on democracy, Bruderly said:

I think we should get money out of federal campaigns completely. I think we
should put a serious limit on the amount of money a candidate can raise from a
private source. Ban corporate money completely, ban PAC money completely, ban
big donations from any organizations that intends to influence the outcome of the









campaign and have all these campaigns funded with public money and some cap on
private money and require the radio, television people who use the airways and
lease cable to provide equal access and free access to all qualified candidates and I
think that needs to happen immediately because we have lost our democracy. We
do not have a democracy anymore in this country. (L. Dunn, personal
communication, December 18, 2004)

When asked about the impact of organizations on federal candidates, event

coordinator Kahn said:

I believe that organizations have a huge impact on federal elections; however,
because Bruderly is considered to be a radical, our campaign was not a threat to our
opponent. If Bruderly had a million dollars in the bank, then I think we would
immediately see the impact that organizations have on federal campaigns. (L.
Dunn, personal communication, January 4, 2005)

All of the other respondents interviewed for this thesis agreed with Kahn.

Summary of Findings

This thesis posed the following research questions when analyzing this case study:

How has the BCRA changed the way in which federal campaigns operate? How do these

new laws impact the ability of a federal candidate to communicate his or her message to

the public? Does the BCRA accomplish what its sponsors intended the legislation to do?

What is the likely future of campaign finance reform after the implementation of the

BCRA? How has the BCRA altered the communication processes within federal

campaigns? Specifically, how has the BCRA impacted the scope of political

communication for federal candidates?

This research finds that the impact of the BCRA on congressional challengers has

produced mixed results.

Doubling the individual contribution limits drastically increased the flow of hard

money into the 2004 campaign. While the aggregate contribution limits for individuals

and contribution limits pertaining to PACs had a negative impact on the 2004 campaign,









the swell in hard money receipts, due to the increase in individual contribution limits, had

the biggest impact on the 2004 campaign, which positively impacted all aspects of the

campaign. The BCRA's enforcement provisions helped to open channels of political

communication in the 2004 campaign among all parties in federal campaigns, which

solidified the importance of legitimacy in campaign finance disclosure in 2004.

The legal and constitutional issues surrounding the BCRA also positively impacted

the 2004 campaign because it was due to the legal and constitutional issues that soft

money was prohibited in all federal campaigns. The BCRA's soft money provisions

indirectly benefited the 2004 campaign. Although Bruderly's candidacy was not taken

seriously by any of the major players within the Democratic Party, eradicating the use of

soft money in federal campaigns provided Bruderly's campaign more opportunities to

succeed in 2004 versus 2002 because federal candidates as well as parties on the national,

state and local levels were prevented from raising or spending soft money in connection

with federal elections. The provisions to issue advertisements and electioneering

communications did not have a clear impact on the 2004 campaign because neither

Congressman Stearns nor Bruderly produced any advertisements deemed "electioneering

communications."

The effects of the disclosure regulations on the 2004 campaign were both positive

and negative. The BCRA's disclosure requirements allowed Bruderly to stay informed of

Congressman Steams's fundraising efforts and because state parties were required to

disclose all federal election activities, the Bruderly campaign could also stay abreast of

what was happening within the Florida Republican Party. The disclaimer required on all

political advertising by the disclosure requirements negatively impacted the 2004









campaign. This was largely due to situational circumstances within the campaign.

Because Bruderly ran in 2002, he wanted to use old campaign signs and campaign

literature, in order to save money and paper, but without the proper disclaimer as required

by the BCRA, the campaign risked being fined by the FEC and receiving negative media

attention.

The coordination laws mandated by the BCRA negatively impacted the 2004

campaign, due in large part to the grassroots nature of the campaign. Because the BCRA

prohibited coordination between 527 groups and federal candidates, Bruderly lost the

opportunity for earned media in an area of the congressional district targeted by his staff

as needing heavy media saturation. While the 2004 campaign was able to raise more

money than in 2002, in 2004 the campaign was unable to pay for large-scale political

advertisements, something that could have been offset by allowing federal candidates to

coordinate with 527 groups. The changes in campaign finance law regarding unions,

corporations and non-profits did not have a clear impact on the 2004 campaign because

of the small scale of the campaign.

In the following chapter, a discussion of these findings will be presented.














CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

In the previous chapter, the findings ofBruderly's case study were discussed. In

this chapter, a discussion of the implications of these findings in relation to campaign

finance regulation is presented. The findings of the Bruderly case study are compared to

the findings of the US PIRG study as well as to normative views on money held by

various political scientists. Limitations of this study and areas for future research

involving campaign finance are also discussed.

Implications of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act

Because Bruderly was able to raise more hard money during the 2004 election,

which was a direct result of the individual contribution limit being raised to $2,000, it

would seem the BCRA has begun to level the playing field for federal candidates. The

authors of the US PIRG study concluded that the amount of money a candidate raises

directly impacts their chances for success. Therefore because Bruderly's campaign bank

account grew in 2004, in theory, he had a better chance to win the election. While

Bruderly's opponent was able to raise $1.7 million in campaign donations, the fact

remains that Bruderly was able to nearly double his fundraising abilities in the 2004

election as compared to the 2002 election.

The US PIRG authors argue that because incumbent politicians have big bank

accounts, challengers are hesitant to run against them and therefore democracy is

hindered. Applying the knowledge learned from Bruderly's case study, the size of an

incumbent politician's bank account is not always a deterrent for challengers.









The BCRA legislation would have been applauded by political scientists Heard

(1960) and Alexander (1972) because it increases the flow of hard money into federal

campaigns while containing the flow of soft money. Political scientists have consistently

advocated increasing the limits placed on political contributions. Sorauf (1992) would

have applauded the BCRA because it did not further regulate the structure of PACs

within federal elections. However, Bruderly's case study is a prime example of why

Sorauf s argument to set contribution limits at high levels are designed to help

challengers. If the contribution limits pertaining to PACs had been adjusted for inflation

as the individual contribution limits and the individual aggregate contribution limits were,

Bruderly would have received more PAC money during his 2004 campaign.

Table 5-7. A table that summarizes the impact of the BCRA on the 2004 campaign.
Category BCRA Requirement Overall Impact on 2004
Category '
Campaign
Contribution Limits Increased the dollar limit on Positive the campaign was
contributions from able to raise more money from
individuals to candidates individual donors
and political parties
Enforcement Lengthened the time frame Positive this provision
to investigate federal strengthened the FEC and
campaign finance mandated that FEC
complaints and regimented communications be legitimate
FEC reporting requirements
Legal and Constitutional Eliminated soft money Positive the campaign did not
Issues within federal campaigns have to worry about being
targeted by a unlimited amount
of soft money
Soft Money Prohibited federal Positive although this measure
candidates and had an indirect effect on
officeholders from raising Bruderly's campaign, it
or spending soft money eliminates possible corruption
within federal elections


Issue Advertisements and
Electioneering
Communications


Prohibited corporations and
labor unions from using soft
money


Unclear this is due to the
nature of Bruderly's liberal,
grassroots campaign









Table 5-7 Continued
Category BCRA Requirement Overall Impact on 2004
Campaign
Disclosure Required a disclaimer on all Mixed while the campaign
political advertising and was able to keep up to date with
introduced stricter FEC Congressman Stearns's
reporting requirements finances, the disclaimer
requirement caused dissension
among campaign staff
Coordination Prohibited coordination Negative Bruderly lost an
between federal candidates opportunity for earned media
and political parties, PACs and upset local political leaders
or interest groups
Prohibited unions, Unclear This is due to the
Unions, Corporations and corporations and non-profits small scale of the campaign
Non-Profits from sponsoring issue
advertisements

The BCRA has changed the way in which federal campaigns operate. While all

federal campaigns focus primarily on fundraising, the BCRA has changed the overall

approach to political fundraising. This new approach to fundraising impacts the ability of

federal candidates to communicate their message to the masses. In order to be successful

in the realm of political advertising after the BCRA, a candidate must possess a

fundraising strategy capable of raising enough money to produce political

communications.

The BCRA has altered various communication processes within federal campaigns.

The relationship between federal candidates and the FEC has been strengthened due to

the new FEC reporting requirements. Also, communications between federal candidates

and interest groups have been completely prohibited. Additionally, the BCRA

strengthened communications between political parties on the local, state and federal

levels.









Overall, this thesis finds that the BCRA has made it easier for political challengers

to run against wealthy incumbents by eliminating the corrupting effects of soft money

within federal campaigns. Bruderly was affected both positively and negatively by the

BCRA. However, the end result of this legislation provided Bruderly's 2004 campaign

with more chances for success as compared to his 2002 campaign. The scope of political

communication within federal elections was drastically altered by the BCRA, offering

Bruderly and other challenger's a greater likelihood for success.

Limitations of Study

While it is unlikely that the results of this single case study are applicable to all

federal candidates, it is clear that Bruderly did benefit in 2004 because of the BCRA.

Furthermore, the case study used in this thesis is exploratory in nature, which limits

the generalizablity of the findings. The small scale of Bruderly's campaign and its non-

competitive nature also limits the findings of this study. Additionally, the participant

observations used in this study were not planned prior to the beginning of the campaign.

The individuals interviewed for this thesis were interviewed after the completion of

the 2004 campaign rather than during the campaign, which also limits the findings of this

study. Also, the individuals interviewed for this study are not true experts in the field of

political communication. Only one of the nine individuals interviewed for this thesis,

Technology Director Harold Saive, worked on both of the 2002 and 2004 campaigns.

However, by analyzing the 2004 campaign, areas for future campaign finance research

were identified.

Suggestions for Further Research

As time passes and additional campaign finance legislation is adopted by Congress,

the eight thematic categories discussed in chapter four (contribution limits, enforcement,









legal and constitutional issues, soft money, issue advertisements and electioneering

communications, disclosure, coordination, and unions, corporations and non-profits) will

need to be explored further. Specific attention should be paid to contribution limits,

enforcement and soft money issues. A multiple case study concentrating on the effects of

the BCRA across the nation would be beneficial to the field of campaign finance

regulation.

Another suggestion for further research involves the issue of campaign finance

coordination. In 2002 the status of the coordination law was completely unclear, and in

2004, while the term "coordination" was clearly defined by the Supreme Court, the

various levels of coordination were not mentioned. In 2006, it would be interesting to

study the growth of the coordination laws in comparison to the coordination laws that

governed the 2004 election.

Also, when performing further campaign finance research, the previous experience

of the candidate should be noted and taken into consideration when choosing candidates

for a case study. Because Bruderly ran in 2002, in 2004, he experienced negative

consequences as a result of his 2002 campaign, which decreased the effectiveness of the

changes to campaign finance law as mandated in the BCRA.

While campaign finance will never go long without the need for further incremental

adjustments, this researcher suggests that all contribution limits be raised in order to

increase the flow of money within federal campaigns and further level the political

playing field for all candidates. Also, the coordination laws defined in the BCRA should

be further developed to decrease the confusion surrounding these rules. Enforcement

measures should also be strengthened to validate the importance of legitimate campaign






65


finance practices. Because campaign finance regulations directly impact political

advertising and the scope of political communication, it is important to understand the

effects of these regulations. However, the nature of campaign finance legislation is ever

changing. As Justice O'Connor said in the McConnell decision:

We are under no illusion that this law will be the last congressional statement on
the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise
and how Congress will respond are concerns for another day. (McConnell v. FEC,
2003).














LIST OF REFERENCES

Alexander, H. (1972). Money in Politics. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.

Bauer, R. F. & Kafka, D. M. (1982). United States Federal Election Law. London:
Oceana Publications.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

The Campaign Finance Institute. (2004). Campaign Finance E-Guides. Retrieved
December 21, 2004, from http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/index.html.

Clymer, A. & Mitchell, A. (2002, February 6). House Speaker Schedules Vote Next
Week on Campaign Finance Overhaul, The New York Times, p. 19.

Comptroller General of the United States. (1975). Report of the Office of Federal
Elections of the General Accounting Office in Administering the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Corrado, A. (1997). Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law
Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.

Denzin, N. (1984). The Research Act. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. (Eds.). (1991). A Case for Case Study. Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 301, 43 stat. 1053, 1070 (1925) (codified at 18
U.S.C. 610-17, repealed 1971).

Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 stat. 3 (1971)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. 431-56).

Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] amendment of 1974, Pub. L. no. 93-433, 88 stat.
1263 (1974) (codified in 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).

Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] amendment of 2002, Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 101, 116 stat. 81 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
431).






67


Green, D. P. & Krasno, J. S. (1988). Salvation for the spendthrift incumbent: Re-
estimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections. American
Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 884-907.

Hatch Act of August 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 stat. 1147 (1939) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 1501-
08(1974).

Hall, R. & Wayman, F. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of
Bias in Congressional Committees. The American Political Science Review, 84 (3),
797-820.

Hasen, R. L. (2002). The Untold Drafting History ofBuckley v. Valeo. Loyola-LA
Public Law Research Working Paper 2002-15. Retrieved December 21, 2004, from
http://ssm.com/abstract=320828.

Heard, A. (1960). The Costs ofDemocracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press.

H.Rep. No. 96-422 (1979).

Jacobson, G. C. (1980). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University
Press.

Levine, B.J. (1997). Crime, Law and Social Change. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.

Mason, D. & Cassady, A. (2004). The Wealth Primary: The Role ofBig Money in the
2004 Congressional Primaries. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.

McConnell v. Federal Election Committee, 124 S.Ct. 02-1674 (2003).

Mutch, R. (1998). Campaigns, Congresses and Courts: The Making ofFederal
Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger.

Overacker, L. (1932). Money in Elections. New York: Macmillan.

Publicity Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 stat. 822, 823 (1910).

Publicity Act Amendment of August 19, 1911, ch. 33, sec. 2, 8, 37 stat. 25 (1911).

Sorauf, F. J. (1992). Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Sorauf, F. J. (1988). Money in American Elections. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Company Publishing.

Snyder, J. M. (1990). Campaign contributions as investments: The House of
Representatives, 1980-86. Journal ofPolitical Economy, 98 (6), 195-227.









S. Rep. No. 92-96, at 1774 (1971).

Stake, R. (1995). The Art of Case Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Taft-Hartley Act, 18 U.S.C. 610 (1970 ed.).

Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 stat. at 864.

Whittaker, B. (2004). "A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption: Regulating
Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC." Indiana Law Journal, 81 (3), 1-25.

Yin, R. (1993). Applications of Case Study Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publishing.

Yin, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publishing.














BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Laura Dunn received her bachelor's in political science from Clemson University

in South Carolina in 2003. Dunn was born in Alabama and has lived in Gainesville,

Florida, for two years.